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vrrs, PH.D., LL.D. T. E. PAGE, LITT.D. w. H. D. ROUSE, LITT.D. 






H. E. BUTLER, M.A., 










Preface. Ch. 1 : The prooemium or exordium. 
Ch. 2 : The narratio or statement of facts. Ch. 3 : 
Digressions. Ch. 4 : Propositions preparatory to 
proof. Ch. 5 : Partition. 

BOOK v 153 

Preface. Ch. 1 : Proofs, artificial and unartificial. 
Ch. 2 : Previous decisions. Ch. 3 : Public report 
or opinion. Ch. 4 : Evidence extracted by torture. 
Ch. 5 : Refutation of documentary evidence. 
Ch. 6 : Reasons for and against offering to take 
an oath. Ch. 7 : Documentary evidence ; oral 
evidence ; production of witnesses ; attitude to be 
adopted toward witnesses ; examination ; conflict 
between documentary and oral evidence; super- 
natural evidence. Ch. 8 : Artificial proofs. Ch. 9 : 
Signs, indications, circumstantial evidence, their 
difference from proofs ; appearances ; prognostics. 
Ch. 10: Arguments. Ch. 11: Examples and 
instances. Ch. 12 : Arguments again. Ch. 13 : 
Refutation and proof. Ch. 14 : The enthymeme, 
epicheireme, and syllogism. 

BOOK vi 371 

Preface; the death of Quintilian's son. Ch. 1: 
Peroration. Ch. 2: Necessity of studying the 
temper of the judges; pathos, ethos, and emotional 
appeal. Ch. 3 : Laughter, wit, and humour. 
Ch. 4 : Altcrcatio or debate. Ch. 5 : Judgment 
and sagacity. 

NOTES 523 

INDEX . 527 


A = Codex Ambrosianus, llth century. 

B Agreement of Codices Bernensis, Bambergensis and 
Nostradamensis, 10th century. 

G = Codex Bambergensis where gaps in B have been 
supplied by an 11th-century hand. 







PERFECTO, Marcelle Victor!, operis tibi dedicati 
tertio libro et iam quarta fere laboris parte transacta, 
nova insuper mihi diligentiae causa et altior sollici- 
tudo, quale iudicium hominum emererer, accessit. 
Adhuc enim velut studia inter nos conferebamus, et 
si parum nostra institutio probaretur a ceteris, 
contenti fore domestico usu videbamur, ut tui meique 

2 filii formare disciplinam satis putaremus. Cum vero 
mihi Domitianus Augustus sororis suae nepotum 
delegaverit curam, non satis honorem iudiciorum 
caelestium intelligam, nisi ex hoc oneris quoque 

3 magnitudinem metiar. Quis enim mihi aut mores 
excolendi sit modus, ut eos non immerito probaverit 
sanctissimus censor? aut studia, ne fefellisse in iis 




I HAVE now, my dear Marcellus Victorius, com- 
pleted the third book of the work which I have 
dedicated to you, and have nearly finished a quarter 
of my task, and am confronted with a motive for 
renewed diligence and increased anxiety as to the 
judgment it may be found to deserve. For up to 
this point we were merely discussing rhetoric 
between ourselves and, in the event of our system 
being regarded as inadequate by the world at large, 
were prepared to content ourselves with putting it 
into practice at home and to confine ourselves to the 
education of your son and mine. But now Domiti- 2 
anus Augustus has entrusted me with the education 
of his sister's grandsons, and I should be unde- 
serving of the honour conferred upon me by such 
divine appreciation, if I were not to regard this 
distinction as the standard by which the greatness 
of my undertaking must be judged. For it is 3 
clearly my duty to spare no pains in moulding 
the character of my august pupils, that they may 
earn the deserved approval of the most righteous 
of censors. The same applies to their intellectual 


videar principem ut in omnibus, ita in eloquentia 
4 quoque eminentissimum ? Quod si nemo miratur 
poetas maximos saepe fecisse, ut non solum initiis 
operum suorum Musas invocarent, sed provecti 
quoque longius, cum ad aliquem graviorem venissent 
locum, repeterent vota et velut nova precatione 
6 uterentur, mini quoque profecto poterit ignosci, si, 
quod initio, quo primum hanc materiam inchoavi, 
non feceram, nunc omnes in auxilium deos ipsumque 
in primis, quo neque praesentius aliud nee studiis 
magis propitium numen est, invocem, ut, quantum 
nobis exspectationis adiecit, tantum ingenii adspiret 
dexterque ac volens adsit et me qualem esse credidit 

6 faciat. Cuius mihi religionis non haec sola ratio, 
quae maxima est, sed alioqui sic procedit ipsum 
opus, ut maiora praeteritis ac magis ardua sint, 
quae ingredior. Sequitur enim, ut iudicialium 
causarum, quae sunt maxime variae ac multiplices, 
ordo explicetur : quod prooemii sit officium, quae 
ratio narrandi, quae probationum fides, seu pro- 
posita confirmamus sive contra dicta dissolvimus, 
quanta vis in perorando, seu reficienda brevi repe- 
titione rerum memoria est iudicis sive adfectus 

7 (quod est longe potentissimum) commovendi. De 
quibus partibus singulis quidam separatim scribere 
maluerunt velut onus totius corporis veriti, et sic 

BOOK IV. PR. 3-7 

training, for I would not be found to have dis- 
appointed the expectations of a prince pre-eminent 
in eloquence as in all other virtues. But no one 4 
is surprised at the frequency with which the 
greatest poets invoke the Muses not merely at the 
commencement of their works, but even further 
on when they have reached some important passage 
and repeat their vows and utter fresh prayers for 
assistance. Assuredly therefore I may ask indulgence 5 
for doing what I omitted to do when I first entered 
on this task and calling to my aid all the gods and 
Himself before them all (for his power is unsur- 
passed and there is no deity that looks with such 
favour upon learning), beseeching him to inspire me 
with genius in proportion to the hopes that he has 
raised in me, to lend me propitious and ready aid and 
make me even such as he has believed me to be. 
And this, though the greatest, is not the only 6 
motive for this act of religious devotion, but my work is 
of such a nature that, as it proceeds, I am confronted 
with greater and more arduous obstacles than have 
yet faced me. For my next task is to explain the 
order to be followed in forensic causes, which 
present the utmost complication and variety. I must 
set forth the function of the exordium, the method 
of the statement of facts, the cogency of proofs, whether 
we are confirming our own assertions or refuting 
those of our opponents, and the force of the peroration, 
whether we have to refresh the memory of the 
judge by a brief recapitulation of the facts, or to do 
what is far more effective, stir his emotions. Some 7 
have preferred to give each of these points separate 
treatment, fearing that if they undertook them as 
a whole the burden would be greater than they 



quoque complures de unaquaque earum libros 
ediderunt ; quas ego omnes ausus contexere prope 
infinitum laborem prospicio et ipsa cogitatione 
suscepti muneris fatigor. Sed durandum est, quia 
coepimus, et si viribus deficiemur, animo tamen 

I. Quod principium Latine vel exordium dicitur, 
maiore quadam ratione Graeci videntur Trpoot/xtov 
nominasse, quia a nostris initium modo significatur, 
illi satis clare partem hanc esse ante ingressum rei 

2 de qua dicendum sit, ostendunt. Nam sive prop- 
terea quod OI/AT; cantus est et citharoedi pauca ilia, 
quae, antequam legitimum certamen inchoent, eme- 
rendi favoris gratia canunt, prooemium cognomina- 
verunt, oratores quoque ea quae, priusquam causam 
exordiantur, ad conciliandos sibi iudicum animos 

3 praeloquuntur eadem appellatione signarunt ; sive, 
quod ol//.ov iidem Graeci viam appellant, id quod 
ante ingressum rei ponitur sic vocare est institutum : 
certe prooemium est, quod apud iudicem dici, prius- 
quam causam cognoverit, possit ; vitioseque in scholis 
facimus, quod exordio semper sic utimur, quasi 

4 causam iudex iam noverit. Cuius rei licentia ex 
hoc est, quod ante declamationem ilia velut imago 
litis exponitur. Sed in foro quoque contingere istud 

BOOK IV. PR. 7-1. 4 

could bear, and consequently have published several 
books on each individual point. I have ventured 
to treat them altogether and foresee such infinite 
labour that I feel weary at the very thought of the 
task I have undertaken. But I have set my hand to 
the plough and must not look back. My strength 
may fail me, but my courage must not fail. 

1. The commencement or exordium as we call it in 
Latin is styled a proem by the Greeks. This seems 
to me a more appropriate name, because whereas we 
merely indicate that we are beginning our task, they 
clearly show that this portion is designed as an intro- 
duction to the subject on which the orator has to 
speak. It may be because OI/AT? means a tune, and 2 
players on the lyre have given the name of proem to 
the prelude which they perform to win the favour of 
the audience before entering upon the regular contest 
for the prize, that orators before beginning to plead 
make a few introductory remarks to win the in- 
dulgence of the judges. Or it may be because oT/xos 3 
in Greek means a way, that the practice has arisen of 
calling an introduction a proem. But in any case 
there can be no doubt that by proem we mean the 
portion of a speech addressed to the judge before he 
has begun to consider the actual case. And it is a 
mistaken practice which we adopt in the schools of 
always assuming in our exordia that the judge is 
already acquainted with the case. This form of 4 
licence arises from the fact that a sketch of the case 
is always given before actual declamation. 1 Such 
kinds of exordia may, however, be employed in the 

1 i.e. the statement of the "hard case'' with which the 
declaimer has to deal. cp. iv. ii. 98. 



principiorum genus secundis actionibus potest ; 
primis quidem raro unquam, nisi forte apud eum, 
cui res iam aliunde nota sit, dicimus. 

5 Causa principii nulla alia est, quam ut auditorem, 
quo sit nobis in ceteris partibus accommodation prae- 
paremus. Id fieri tribus maxime rebus inter 
auctores plurimos constat, si benevolum, attentum, 
docilem fecerimus,, non quia ista non per totam 
actionem sint custodienda, sed quia initiis praecipue 
necessaria, per quae in animum iudicis, ut procedere 
ultra possimus, admittimur. 

6 Benevolentiam aut a personis ducimus aut a causis 
accipimus. Sed personarum non est, ut plerique 
crediderunt, triplex ratio, ex litigatore et adversario 

7 et iudice. Nam exordium duci nonnunquam etiam 
ab actore causae solet. Quanquam enim pauciora 
de se ipso dicit et parcius, plurimum tamen ad omnia 
momenti est in hoc positum, si vir bonus creditur. 
Sic enim continget, ut non studium advocati videa- 
tur adferre sed paene testis fidem. Quare in primis 
existimetur venisse ad agendum ductus officio vel 
cognationis vel amicitiae maximeque, si fieri poterit,, 
reipublicae aut alicuius certe non mediocris exempli. 
Quod sine dubio multo magis ipsis litigatoribus 


BOOK IV. i. 4-7 

courts, when a case comes on for the second time, but 
never or rarely on the first occasion, unless we are J ^ 
speaking before a judge who has knowledge of (^ <)L 
the case from some other source. 

The sole purpose of the exordium is to prepare our 5 * ^ 
audience in such a way that they will be disposed to J * /> 
lend a ready ear to the rest of our speech. The 
majority of authors agree that this is best effected in 
three ways, by making the audience well-disposed, 
attentive and ready to receive instruction. I need 
hardly say that these aims have to be kept in 
view throughout the whole speech, but they are espe- 
cially necessary at the commencement, when we 
gain admission to the mind of the judge in order 
to penetrate still further. 

As regards good-will, we secure that either from 6 
persons connected with the case or from the case 
itself. Most writers have divided these persons into 
three classes, the plaintiff, the defendant and the 
judge. This classification is wrong, for the exordium 7 
may sometimes derive its conciliatory force from the 
person of the pleader. For although he may be 
modest and say little about himself, yet if he is 
believed to be a good man, this consideration will 
exercise the strongest influence at every point of 
the case. For thus he will have the good fortune to 
give the impression not so much that he is a 
zealous advocate as that he is an absolutely reliable 
witness. It is therefore pre-eminently desirable 
that he should be believed to have undertaken 
the case out of a sense of duty to a friend or 
relative, or even better, if the point can be made, 
by a sense of patriotism or at any rate some serious \/ 
moral consideration. No doubt it is even more 


faciendum est, ut ad agendum magna atque honesta 
ratione aut etiam necessitate accessisse videantur. 

8 Sed ut praecipua in hoc dicentis auctoritas, si omnis 
in subeundo negotio suspicio sordium aut odiorum 
aut ambitionis afuerit, ita quaedam in his quoque 
commendatio tacita, si nos infirmos, imparatos, im- 
pares agentium contra ingeniis dixerimus, qualia 

9 sunt pleraque Messalae prooemia. Est enim naturalis 
favor pro laborantibus, et iudex religiosus libentis- 
sime patronum audit, quern iustitiae suae minime 
timet. Inde ilia veterum circa occultandam 
eloquentiam simulatio multum ab hac nostrorum 

10 temporum iactatione diversa. Vitandum etiam, ne 
contumeliosi, maligni, superbi, maledici in quem- 
quam hominem ordinemve videamur praecipueque 
eorum, qui laedi nisi adversa iudicum voluntate non 

11 possunt. Nam in iudicem ne quid dicatur non 
modo palam sed quod omnino intelligi possit, stul- 
tum erat monere, nisi fieret. Etiam partis adversae 
patronus dabit exordio materiam, interim cum 
honore, si eloquentiam eius et gratiam nos timere 
fingendo, ut ea suspecta sint iudici, fecerimus, 
interim per contumeliam, sed hoc perquam raro, ut 
Asinius pro Urbiniae 1 heredibus Labienum adversarii 
patronum inter argumenta causae malae posuit. 

1 cp. vu. ii. 4 and 26. 

BOOK IV. i. 7-1 1 

necessary for the parties themselves to create the 
impression that they have been forced to take legal 
action by some weighty and honourable reason or even 
by necessity. But just as the authority of the speaker 8 
carries greatest weight, if his undertaking of the case 
is free from all suspicion of meanness, personal spite 
or ambition, so also we shall derive some silent support 
from representing that we are weak, unprepared, and 
no match for the powerful talents arrayed against us, 
a frequent trick in the exordia of Messala. For 9 
men have a natural prejudice in favour of those 
who are struggling against difficulties, and a scrupu- 
lous judge is always specially ready to listen to an 
advocate whom he does not suspect to have designs 
on his integrity. Hence arose the tendency of 
ancient orators to pretend to conceal their eloquence, 
a practice exceedingly unlike the ostentation of our 
own times. It is also important to avoid giving the 10 
impression that we -are abusive, malignant, proud 
or slanderous toward any individual or body of 
men, especially such as cannot be hurt without 
exciting the disapproval of the judges. As to the 11 
judge, it would be folly for me to warn speakers 
not to say or even hint anything against him, but 
for the fact that such things do occur. Our oppo- 
nent's advocate will sometimes provide us with 
material for our exordium : we may speak of him 
in honorific terms, pretending to fear his eloquence 
and influence with a view to rendering them suspect 
to the judge, or occasionally, though very seldom, we 
may abuse him, as Asinius did in his speech on behalf 
of the heirs of Urbinia, where he includes among the 
proofs of the weakness of the plaintiffs case the fact 
that he has secured Labienus as his advocate. 

1 1 


12 Negat haec esse prooemia Cornelius Celsus, quia 
sint extra litem. Sed ego cum auctoritate sum- 
morum oratorum magis ducor, turn pertinere ad 
causam puto quidquid ad dicentem pertinet, cum sit 
naturale, ut iudices iis, quos libentius audiunt, etiam 

13 facilius credant. Ipsius autem litigatoris persona 
tractanda varie est. Nam turn dignitas eius ad- 
legatur, turn commendatur infirmitas. Nonnunquam 
contingit relatio meritorum, de quibus verecundius 
dicendum erit sua quam aliena laudanti. Multum 
agit sexus, aetas, condicio, ut in feminis, senibus, 
pupillis, liberos, parentes, coniuges adlegantibus. 

14 Nam sola rectum quoque iudicem inclinat miseratio. 
Degustanda tamen haec prooemio, non consumenda. 
Adversarii vero persona prope iisdem omnibus, sed e 
contrario ductis impugnari solet. Nam et potentes 
sequitur invidia et humiles abiectosque contemptus 
et turpes ac nocentes odium, quae tria sunt ad 

15 alienandos iudicum animos potentissima. Neque 
haec dicere sat est, quod datur etiam imperitis ; 
pleraque augenda aut minuenda, ut expediet. Hoc 
enim oratoris est, ilia causae. 

16 Iudicem conciliabimus nobis non tantum laudando 
cum, quod et fieri cum modo debet et est tamen 


BOOK IV. i. 12-16 

Cornelius Celsus denies that such remarks can be 12 
considered as belonging to the exordium on the 
ground that they are irrelevant to the actual case. 
Personally I prefer to follow the authority of the 
greatest orators, and hold that whatever concerns the 
pleader is relevant to the case, since it is natural that 
the judges should give readier credence to those to 
whom they find it a pleasure to listen. The character 13 
of our cliejit himself may, too, be treated in various 
ways : we may emphasise his worth or we may 
commend his weakness to the protection of the 
court. Sometimes it is desirable to set forth his 
merits, when the speaker will be less hampered by 
modesty than if he were praising his own. Sex, age 
and situation are also important considerations, as for 
instance when women, old men or wards are pleading 
in the character of wives, parents or children. 
For pity alone may move even a strict judge. 14 
These points, however, should only be lightly touched 
upon in the exordium, not run to death. As regards 
our opponent he is generally attacked on similar 
lines, but with the method reversed. For power is 
generally attended by envy, abject meanness by 
contempt, guilt and baseness by hatred, three 
emotions which are powerful factors to alienate the 
good-will of the judges. But a simple statement will 15 
not suffice, for even the uneducated are capable of 
that : most of the points will require exaggeration 
or extenuation as expediency may demand : the 
method of treatment belongs to the orator, the 
points themselves belong to the case. 

We shall win the good-will of the judge not 16 
merely by praising him, which must be done with 
tact and is an artifice common to both parties, but 



parti utrique commune, sed si laudem eius ad 
utilitatem causae nostrae coniunxerimus, ut adle- 
gemus pro honestis dignitatem illi suam, pro humi- 
libus iustitiam, pro infelicibus misericordiam, pro 

17 laesis severitatem et similiter cetera. Mores quo- 
que, si fieri potest, iudicis velim nosse. Nam prout 
asperi, lenes, iucundi, graves, duri, remissi erunt, 
aut adsumere in causam naturas eorum, qua com- 
petent, aut mitigare, qua repugnabunt, oportebit. 

18 Accidit autem interim hoc quoque, ut aut nobis 
inimicus aut adversariis sit amicus qui iudicat ; quae 
res utrique parti tractanda est ac nescio an etiam ei 
magis, in quam videatur propensior. Est enim 
nonnunquam pravis hie ambitus adversus amicos 
aut pro iis, quibuscum simultates gerant, pronun- 
tiandi faciendique iniuste, ne fecisse videantur. 

19 Fuerunt etiam quidam rerum suariim iudices. 
Nam et in libris Observationum a Septimio editis 
adfuisse Ciceronem tali causae invenio, et ego pro 
regina Berenice apud ipsam earn causam dixi. 
Similis hie quoque superioribus ratio est. Adver- 
sarius enim fiduciam partis suae iactat, patronus 

BOOK IV. i. 16-19 

by linking his praise to the furtherance of our own 
case. For instance, in pleading for a man of good 
birth we shall appeal to his own high rank, in speaking 
for the lowly we shall lay stress on his sense of jus- 
tice, on his pity in pleading the cause of misfortune, 
and on his severity when we champion the victims 
of wrong, and so on. I should also wish, if possible, 17 
to be acquainted with the character of the judge. 
For it will be desirable to enlist their temperaments 
in the service of our cause, where they are such as 
are like to be useful, or to mollify them, if they are 
like to prove adverse, just according as they are 
harsh, gentle, cheerful, grave, stern, or easy-going. 
It will, however, sometimes happen that the judge 18 
is hostile to us and friendly to our adversaries. Such 
cases demand the attention of both parties and 1 am 
not sure that the party favoured by the judge does 
not require to handle the situation with even more 
care than his opponent. For perverse judges have 
sometimes a preposterous tendency to give judg- 
ment against their friends or in favour of those with 
whom they have a quarrel, and of committing in- 
justice merely to avoid the appearance of partiality. 
Again some have been judges in cases where their 19 
own interests were involved. I note, for instance, 
in the books of observations published by Septimius 
that Cicero appeared in such a case, while I myself, 
when I appeared on behalf of Queen Berenice, 
actually pleaded before her. In such cases we must 
be guided by the same principles that I have laid 
down above. The opponent of the judge will 
emphasise his confidence in the justice of his client's 
cause, while the advocate of his interests will 
express the fear that the judge may be influenced 


20 timet cognoscentis verecundiam. Praeterea detra- 
henda vel confirmanda opiiiio, praecipue si quam 
domo videbitur iudex attulisse. Metus etiam 11011- 
nunquam est amovendus, ut Cicero pro Milone, ne 
arma Pompeii disposita contra se putarent, laboravit : 
nonnunquam adhibendus., ut idem in Verrem facit. 

21 Sed adhibendi modus alter ille frequens et favora- 
bilis : ne male sentiat populus Romanus, ne iudicia 
transferantur ; alter autem asper et ranis, quo 
minatur corruptis accusationem, et id quidem in 
consilio ampliore utcunque tutius ; nam et mali 
inhibentur et boni gaudent; apud singulos vero 

22 nunquam suaserim, nisi defecerint omnia. Quod 
si necessitas exigit, non erit iam ex arte oratoria, 
noil magis quam appellare, etiamsi id quoque saepe 
utile est, aut, antequam pronuntiet, reum facere ; 
nam et minari et deferre etiam non orator potest. 

23 Si causa conciliandi nobis iudicis materiam dabit, 
ex hac potissimum aliqua in usum principii, quae 
maxime favorabilia videbuntur, decerpi oportebit. 

1 i. 15. 

2 e.g. in the Verrines Cicero points out to the jury, then 
drawn entirely from senators, that they are on their trial. 
If they fail in their duty, the constitution of the panels will 
be altered and the equites be admitted as well. 


BOOK IV. i. 19-23 

by a quixotic delicacy. Further, if the judge is L'O 
thought to have come into court with a prejudice s 
in favour of one side, we must try to remove or 
strengthen that prejudice as circumstances may 
demand. Again occasionally we shall have to calm 
the judges' fears, as Cicero does in the pro Milone, . 
where he strives to persuade them not to think that 
Pompey's soldiers have been stationed in the court 
as a threat to themselves. Or it mav be necessary 
to frighten them, as Cicero does in the Verrines.^- 
There are two ways of bringing fear to bear upon 21 
the judges. The commonest and most popular is to 
threaten them with the displeasure of the Roman 
people or the transference of the juries to another 
class 2 ; the second is somewhat brutal and is rarely 
employed, and consists in threatening them with a 
prosecution for bribery : this is a method which is 
fairly safe with a large body of judges, since it 
checks the bad and pleases the good members of 
the jury, but I should never recommend its employ- 
ment with a single judge 3 except in the very last 
resort. But if necessity should drive us to such a 22 
course, we must remember that such threats do not 
come under the art of oratory, any more than appeals 
from the judgment of the court (though that is often 
useful), or the indictment of the judge before he 
gives his decision. For even one who is no orator 
can threaten or lay an information. 

If the case affords us the means of winning the 23 
favour of the judge, it is important that the points 
which seem most likely to serve to our purpose 
should be selected for introduction into the exordium. 

3 It must be borne in mind that index may be a juryman 
forming one of a large panel, or a single judge trying a civil 



Quo in loco Verginius fallitur, qui Theodoro placere 
tradit, ut ex singulis quaestionibus singuli sensus 

24 in prooemium conferantur. Nam ille non hoc dicit^ 
sed ad potentissimas quaestiones iudicem prae- 
parandum ; in quo vitii nihil erat, nisi in universum 
id praeciperet, quod nee omnis quaestio patitur nee 
omnis causa desiderat. Nam protinus a petitore 
primo loco, dum ignota iudici lis est, quomodo ex 
quaestionibus ducemus sententias ? nimirum res 
erunt indicandae prius. Demus aliquas (nam id 
exiget ratio nonnunquam) ; etiamne potentissimas 
omnes, id est totam causam ? sic erit in prooemio 

25 peracta narratio. Quid vero ? si, ut frequenter 
accidit, paulo est durior causa, non benevolentia 
iudicis petenda ex aliis partibus erit, sed non ante 
conciliate eius animo nuda quaestionum committetur 
asperitas ? Quae si recte semper initio dicendi 

26 tractarentur, nihil prooemio opus esset. Aliqua ergo 
nonnunquam, quae erunt ad conciliandum nobis 
iudicem potentissima, non inutiliter interim ex 
quaestionibus in exordio locabuntur. Quae sint 


BOOK IV. i. 23-26 

On this subject Verginius falls into error, for he 
asserts that Theodorus lays down that some one 
reflexion on each individual question that is involved 
by the case should be introduced into the exordium. 
As a matter of fact Theodorus does not say this, 24 
but merely that the judge should be prepared for 
the most important of the questions that are to be 
raised. There is nothing to object to in this rule, 
save that he would make it of universal application, 
whereas it is not possible with every question nor 
desirable in every case. For instance, seeing that 
the plaintiff's advocate speaks first, and that 
till he has spoken the judge is ignorant of the 
nature of the dispute, how is it possible for us to 
introduce reflexions relating to all the questions 
involved ? The facts of the case must be stated 
before that can be done,. We may grant that some 
questions may be mentioned, for that will sometimes 
be absolutely necessary ; but can we introduce all 
the most important questions, or in other words the 
whole case ? If we do we shall have completed our 
statement of facts within the limits of the exordium. 
Again if, as often happens, the case is somewhat 25 
difficult, surely we should seek to win the good-will 
of the judge by other portions of our speech sooner 
than thrust the main questions upon him in all their 
naked harshness before we have done anything to 
secure his favour. If the main questions ought 
always to be treated at the beginning of a speech, 
we might dispense with the exordium. We shall 26 
then occasionally introduce certain points from the 
main questions into the exordium, which will exercise 
a valuable influence in winning the judge to regard 
us with favour. It is not necessary to enumerate 

c 2 


porro in causis favorabilia, enumerare non est iie- 
cesse, quia et manifesta erunt cognita cuiusque 
controversiae condicione et omnia colligi in tanta 

27 litium varietate non possunt. Ut autem haec in- 
venire et augere, ita quod laedit aut omnino re- 
pellere aut certe niinuere ex causa est. Miseratio 
quoque aliquando ex eadem venit, sive quid passi 

28 sumus grave sive passuri. Neque enim sum in hac 
opinione, qua quidam, ut eo distare prooemium ab 
epilogo credam, quod in hoc praeterita, in illo futura 
dicantur, sed quod in ingressu parcius et modestius 
praetemptanda sit iudicis misericordia, in epilogo 
vero liceat totos effundere adfectus et fictam ora- 
tionem induere personis et defunctos excitare et 
pignora reorum producere ; quae minus in exordiis 

29 sunt usitata. Sed haec, quae supra dixi, non movere 
tantum, verum ex diverse amoliri quoque prooemio 
opus est. Ut autem nostrum miserabilem, si vin- 
camur, exitum, ita adversariorum superbum, si 
vicerint, utile est credi. 

30 Sed ex iis quoque, quae non sunt personarum nee 
causarum, verum adiuncta personis et causis, duci 

BOOK IV. i. 26-30 

the points which are likely to gain us such favour, 
because they will be obvious as soon as we have 
acquainted ourselves with the circumstances of each 
dispute, while in view of the infinite variety pre- 
sented by cases it is out of the question to specify 
them here. Just, however, as it is in the interest 27 
of our case to note and amplify these points, so it is 
also to rebut or at any rate lessen the force of 
anything that is damaging to our case. Again 
our case may justify an appeal to compassion with 
regard to what we have suffered in the past or are 
likely to suffer. For I do not share the opinion 28 
held by some, that the exordium and the peroration 
are to be distinguished by the fact that the latter 
deals with the past, the former with the future. 
Rather I hold that the difference between them is 
this : in our opening any preliminary appeal to the 
compassion of the judge must be made sparingly 
and with restraint, while in the peroration we may 
give full rein to our emotions, place fictitious 
speeches in the mouths of our characters, call the 
dead to life, and produce the wife or children of the 
accused in court, practices which are less usual in 
exordia. But it is the function of the exordium not 29 
merely to excite the feelings to which I have alluded, 
but to do all that is possible to show that our 
opponent's case is not deserving of them. It is 
advantageous to create the impression not merely 
that our fate will be deserving of pity, if we lose, but 
that our adversary will be swollen with outrageous 
insolence if he prove successful. 

But exordia are often drawn from matters which 30 
do not, strictly speaking, concern either cases or the 
persons involved, though not unrelated to either. 



prooemia soleiit. Personis applicantur non pignora 
modo, de quibus supra dixi, sed propinquitates, 
amicitiae, interim regiones etiam civitatesque, et si 
quid aliud eius quern defendimus casu laedi potest. 

31 Ad causam extra pertinent tempus, unde principium 
pro Caelio ; locus, unde pro Deiotaro ; habitus, unde 
pro Milone ; opinio, unde in Verrem ; deinceps, ne 
omnia enumerem, infamia iudiciorum, exspectatio 
vulgi ; nihil enim horum in causa est, ad causam 

32 tamen pertinent. Adiicit Theophrastus ab oratione 
principium, quale videtur esse Demosthenis pro 
Ctesiphonte, ut sibi dicere suo potius arbitrio liceat 
rogantis quam eo modo, quern actione accusator 

33 Fiducia ipsa solet opinione arrogantiae laborare. 
Faciunt favorem et ilia paene communia non tamen 
omittenda, vel ideo ne occupentur, optare, abominari, 
rogare, sollicitum agere ; quia plerumque attentum 
iudicem facit, si res agi videtur nova, magna, atrox, 
pertinens ad exemplum, praecipue tamen, si iudex 
aut sua vice aut reipublicae commovetur, cuius animus 

1 In the pro Caelio (c. 1) Cicero calls attention to the fact 
that the trial is taking place during a festival, all other legal 
business being suspended. In the pro Deiotaro (c. 2) he 
calls attention to the unusual surroundings, the speech being 
delivered in a private house. For the pro Milone see 20 
of this chapter. In the first Verrine (c. 1) he remarks that 

BOOK IV. i. 30-33 

In such relation to persons stand not only wives 
and children of whom I have just spoken, but also 
relations, friends, and at times districts and states 
together with anything else that is like to suffer 
injury from the fall of the client whom we defend. 
As regards external circumstances l which have a 31 
bearing on the case, I may mention time, which 
is introduced in the exordium of the pro Caelio, 
place (in the pro Deiotaro), the appearance of the 
court (in the pro Milone), public opinion (in the 
Verr'mes], and finally, as 1 cannot mention all, 
the ill-repute of the law courts and the popular 
expectation excited by the case. None of these 
actually belong to the case, but all have some 
bearing on it. Theophrastus adds that the exordium 32 
may be drawn from the speech of one's opponent, 
as that of the pro Clesiphonte of Demosthenes appears 
to be, where he asks that he may be allowed to 
speak as he pleases and not to be restricted to the 
form laid down by the accuser in his speech. 

Confidence often labours under the disadvantage 33 
of being regarded as arrogance. But there are 
certain tricks for acquiring good-will, which though 
almost universal, are by no means to be neglected, if 
only to prevent their being first employed against 
ourselves. I refer to rhetorical expressions of wish- 
ing, detestation, entreaty, or anxiety. For it keeps 
the judge's attention on the alert, if he is led to 
think the case novel, important, scandalous, or 
likely to set a precedent, still more if he is excited 
by concern for himself or the common weal, when 

it is generally believed that the corruption of the courts is 
auch that it is practically impossible to secure the condemn- 
ation of a wealthy man. 



spe, metu, admonitione, precibus, vanitate denique, 

34 si id profuturura credimus, agitandus est. Sunt et 
ilia excitanclis ad audiendum non inutilia, si nos neque 
diu moraturos neque extra causam dicturos existiment. 
Docilem sine dubio et haec ipsa praestat attentio ; sed 
et illud,si breviter et dilucide summam rei,de qua cog- 
noscere debeat, indicaverimus, quod Homerus atque 

35 Vergilius operum suoruni principiis faciunt. Nam is 
eius rei modus est, ut propositioni similior sit quam ex- 
positioni, nee quomodo quidque sit actum, sed de qui- 
bus dicturus sit orator ostendat. Nee video, quod huius 
rei possit apud oratores reperiri melius exemplum 

36 quam Ciceronis pro A. Cluentio : Animadverti, indices, 
ownem accusatoris orationem in duas divixam esae paries ; 
quarum alter a mihi inniti et magnopere con/idere videbatur 
invidia iam inveterata iudicii luniani, alter a tantummodo 
consuetudinis causa timide et diffldenter attingere rationem 
veneficii criminum, qua de re lege est haec quaestio 
constituta. Id tamen totum respondent! facilius est 
quam proponenti, quia hie admonendus iudex, illic 

37 docendus est. Nee me quanquam magni auctores in 
hoc duxerint, ut non semper facere attentum ac 

BOOK IV. i. 33-37 

his mind must be stirred by hope, fear, admonition, ..-" 
entreaty and even by falsehood, if it seems to us 
that it is likely to advance our case. We shall also 34 
find it a useful device for wakening the attention of 
our audience to. create the impression that we shall 
not keep them long and intend to stick closely to 
the point. The mere fact of such attention un- 
doubtedly makes the judge ready to receive instruc- 
tion from us, but we shall contribute still more to 
this effect if we give a brief and lucid summary of 
the case which he has to try ; in so doing we shall 
be following the method adopted by Homer and 
Virgil at the beginning of their poems. For as regards 35 
the length of the exordium, it should propound rather 
than expound, and should not describe how each 
thing occurred, but simply indicate the points on 
which the orator proposes to speak. I do not think 
a better example of this can be found than the 
exordium to the pro Cluentio of Cicero. " I have 36 
noted, judges, that the speech for the prosecution 
was divided into two parts : of these, the first seemed 
to rest and in the main to rely on the odium, now 
inveterate, arising from the trial before Junius, 
while the other appeared to touch, merely as a 
matter of form, and with a certain timidity and 
diffidence, on the question of the charge of poison- 
ing, though it is to try this point that the present 
court has been constituted in accordance with the 
law." All this, however, is easier for the defender 
than the prosecutor, since the latter has merely to re- 
mind the judge, while the former has to instruct him. 
Nor shall any authority, however great, induce me 37 
to abandon my opinion that it is always desirable to 
render the judge attentive and ready to receive 



docilem iudicem velim ; non quia nesciam, id quod ab 
illis dicitur, esse pro mala causa, qualis ea sit non in- 
telligi, verum quia istud non negligentia iudicis con- 

38 tingit, sed errore. Dixit enim adversarius et fortasse 
persuasit ; nobis opus est eius diversa opinione, quae 
mutari non potest, nisi ilium fecerimus ad ea quae 
dicemus docilem et intentum. Quid ergo est ? 
Imminuenda quaedam et levanda et quasi contem- 
nenda esse consentio ad remittendam intentionem 
iudicis, quam adversario praestat, ut fecit pro Ligario 

39 Cicero. Quid enim agebat aliud ironia ilia, quam ut 
Caesar minus se in rem tanquam non novam in- 
tenderet ? Quid pro Caelio, quam ut res exspecta- 
tione minor videretur ? 

Verum ex iis, quae proposuimus, aliud in alio 

40 genere causae desiderari palam est. Genera porro 
causarum plurimi quinque fecerunt, honestum, 
humile, dubium vel anceps, admirabile, obscurum : 
id est ei/SooVj a$oov, dya^)i8o^ov, TrapaSo^oi 7 , Svcnrapa- 
KoXovOrjrov. Sunt quibus recte videtur adiici turpe, 

41 .quod alii humili, alii admirabili subiiciunt. Admi- 

rabile autem vocant, quod est praeter opinionem 
hominum constitutum. In ancipiti maxime bene- 
volum iudicem, in obscuro docilem, in humili 

1 pro Cad, 31. 

BOOK IV. i. 37-41 

instruction. I am well aware that those who dis- 
agree with me urge that it is to the advantage of a 
bad case that its nature should not be understood; 
but such lack of "understanding arises not from 
inattention on the part of the judge, but from his 
being deceived. Our opponent has spoken and 38 
perhaps convinced him ; we must alter his opinion, 
and this we cannot do unless we render him attentive 
to what we have to say and ready to be instructed. 
What are we to do then ? I agree to the view that 
we should cut down, depreciate and deride some of L- x ' 
our opponent's arguments with a view to lessening 
the attention shown him by the judge, as Cicero did 
in the pro Ligario. For what was the purpose of 39 
Cicero's irony save that Caesar should be induced to 
regard the case as presenting only old familiar 
features and consequently to give it less attention ? 
What was his purpose in the pro Caelio ! save to 
make the case seem far more trivial than had been 
anticipated ? 

It is, however, obvious that of the rules which I 
have laid down, some will be applicable to one case 
and some to another. The majority of writers 40 
consider that there are five kinds of causes, the 
honourable, the mean, the doubtful or ambiguous, the 
extraordinary and the obscure, or as they are called in 
Greek, eiSoov, a8oov, a^iSo^or, 7rapu8oov and 
Svo-irapaKoXovOrjTov. To these some would add a sixth, 
the scandalous, which some again include under the 
heading of the mean, others under the extraordinary. 
The latter name is given to cases which are contrary 41 
to ordinary expectation. In ambiguous cases it is 
specially important to secure the good-will of the 
judge, in the obscure to render him ready to receive 



attentum parare debemus. Nam honestum quidem 
ad conciliationem satis per se valet,, admirabili et 
turpi remediis opus est. 

42 Eo quidam exordium in duas dividunt partes, 
principium et insinuationem, ut sit in principiis recta 
benevolentiae et attentionis postulatio ; quae quia 
esse in turpi causae genere non possit, insinuatio 
surrepat animis, maxime ubi frons causae non satis 
honesta est, vel quia res sit improba vel quia 
hominibus parum probetur, aut si facie quoque ipsa 
premitur vel invidiosa consistentis ex diverso patroni 

43 aut patris vel miserabili senis, caeci, infantis. Et 
quidem quibus adversus haec modis sit medendum, 
verbosius tradunt materiasque sibi ipsi fingunt et ad 
morem actionum persequuntur ; sed hae cum oriaiitur 
ex causis, quarum species consequi omnes non possu- 
mus, nisi generaliter comprehenduntur, in infinitum 

44 sunt extrahendae. Quare singulis consilium ex 
propria ratione nascetur. Illud in universum prae- 
ceperim, ut ab his quae laedunt ad ea quae prosunt 
refugiamus. Si causa laborabimus, persona subveniat ; 


BOOK IV. i. 41-44 

instruction, m the mean to excite his attention. As 
regards the honourable the very nature of the case is 
sufficient to win the approval of the""judge ; in the 
scandalous and extraordinary some kind of palliation 
is required. 

Some theretore divide the exordium into two parts, 42 
the introduction and the insinuation, making the former 
contain a direct appeal to the good- will and attention 
of the judge. But as this is impossible in scandalous 
cases, they would have the orator on such occasions in- 
sinuate himself little by little into the minds of his 
judges, especially when the features of the case which 
meet the eye are discreditable, or because the subject 
is disgraceful or such as to meet with popular disap- 
proval, or again if the outward circumstances of the 
case are such as to handicap it or excite odium (as for 
instance when a patron appears against a client or a 
father against a son), or pity (as when our opponent 
is an old or blind man or a child). To save the situa- 43 
tion the rhetoricians lay down a number of rules at 
quite inordinate length : they invent fictitious cases 
and treat them realistically on the lines which would 
be followed in actual pleading. But these peculiar 
circumstances arise from such a variety of causes as 
to render classification by species impossible, and 
their enumeration save under the most general heads 
would be interminable. The line to be adopted will 44 
therefore depend on the individual nature of each 
case. As a general principIeT^FiaweveFTT should 
advise the avoidance of points which tell against us 
and concentrate on those which are likely to be of 
service. If the case itself is weak, we may derive 
help from the character of our client ; if his character 
is doubtful, we may find salvation in the nature of 



si persona, causa ; si nihil quod nos adiuvet erit, 
quaeramus quid adversarium laedat ; nam ut optabile 

45 est plus favoris mereri, sic proximum odii minus. In 
iis, quae negari non potuerint, elaborandum, ut aut 
minora quam dictum est aut alia mente facta aut 
nihil ad praesentem quaestionem pertinere aut 
emendari posse paenitentia aut satis iam punita 
videantur. Ideoque agere advocato quam litigatori 
facilius, quia et laudat sine arrogantiae crimine et 

46 aliquando utiliter etiam reprehendere potest. Nam 
se quoque moveri interim finget, ut pro Rabirio 
Postumo Cicero, dum aditum sibi ad aures faciat et 
auctoritatem induat vera sentientis, quo magis 
credatur vel defendenti eadem vel neganti. Ideoque 
hoc primumintuebimur^litigatoris an ad vocati persona 
sit utendum, quotiens utrumque fieri potest ; nam id in 
schola liberum est,, in fbro rarum, ut sit idoneus 

47 suae rei quisque defensor. Declamaturus autem 
maxime positas in adfectibus causas propriis personis 
debet induere. Hi sunt enim, qui mandari non 

1 pro Rob. i. 1. 

BOOK IV. i. 44-47 

the case. If both are hopeless, we must look out for 
something that will damage our opponent. For 
though it is desirable to secure as much positive 
good-will as possible, the next best thing is to incur 
the minimum of actual dislike. Where we cannot 45 
deny the truth of facts that are urged against us, we 
must try to show that their significance has been 
exaggerated or that the purpose of the act was not 
what is alleged or that the facts are irrelevant or 
that what was done may be atoned for by penitence 
or has already been sufficiently punished. It is 
consequently easier for an advocate to put forward 
such pleas than for his client, since the former can 
praise without laying himself open to the charge of 
arrogance and may sometimes even reprove him with 
advantage to the case. At times, like Cicero in his 46 
defence of Rabirius Postumus, 1 he will pretend that 
he himself is strongly moved, in order to win the 
ear of the judge and to give the impression of 
one who is absolutely convinced of the truth of his 
cause, that so his statements may find all the readier 
credence whether he defends or denies the actions 
attributed to his client. Consequently it is of the first 
importance, wherever the alternative is open to us, 
to consider whether we are o adopt the character of 
a party to the suit or of an advocate. In the schools, 
of course, we have a free choice in the matter, but it 
is only on rare occasions that a man is capable of 
pleading his own case in the actual courts. When 47 
we are going to deliver a declamation on a theme 
that turns largely on its emotional features, we 
must give it a dramatic character suited to the 
persons concerned. For emotions are not transfer- 
able at will, nor can we give the same forcible ex- 


possimt, nee eadem vi profertur alieni animi qua sui 

48 motus. His etiam de causis insinuatione videtur opus 
esse, si adversarii actio iudicum animos occupavit, si 
dicendura apud fatigatos est ; quorum alterum pro- 
mittendo nostras probationes et adversas eludendo 
vitabimus, alterum et spe brevitatis et iis, quibus 

49 attentum fieri iudicem docuimus. Et urbanitas 
opportuna reficit animos et undecunque petita 
iudicis voluptas levat taedium. Non inutilis etiam 
est ratio occupandi quae videntur obstare, ut Cicero 
dicit, scire se mirari quosdam, quod is, qui per 
tot annos defenderit multos, laeserit iieminem,, 
ad accusandum Verrem descenderit ; deinde ostendit, 
hanc ipsam esse sociorum defensionem ; quod schema 

50 Trp6\rj\{/i<s dicitur. Id cum sit utile aliquando, nunc a 
declamatoribus quibusdam paene semper adsumitur, 
qui fas non putant nisi a contrario incipere. 

Negant Apollodorum secuti tris esse, de quibus 
supra diximus, praeparandi iudicis partes ; sed multas 
species enumerant, ut ex moribus iudicis, ex opinioni- 

1 Div. in Caec. i. 1. 
3 2 

BOOK IV. i. 47-50 

pression to another man's emotions that we should 
give to our own. The circumstances which call for 48 
insinuation arise also in cases where the pleading of 
our opponent has made a powerful impression on the 
minds of the judges, or where the audience whom 
we have to address are tired. The first difficulty we 
shall evade by promising to produce our own proofs 
and by eluding the arguments of our opponents, the 
second by holding out hopes that we shall be brief 
and by the methods already mentioned for capturing 
the attention of the judges. Again an opportune 49 
display, of wit will often restore their flagging spirits 
and we may alleviate their boredom by the introduc- 
tion of entertaining matter derived from any source 
that may be available. It will also be found advan- 
tageous to anticipate the objections that may be 
raised by our opponent, as Cicero l does when he 
says " I know that some persons are surprised that 
one, who for such a number of years has defended so 
many and attacked none, should have come forward 
as the accuser of Verres," he then goes on to show 
that the accusation which he has undertaken is 
really a defence of the allies, an artifice known as 
7rpdA.r?i/as or anticipation. Although this is at times 60 
a useful device, some of our declaimers employ it 
on practically every occasion, on the assumption 
that one should always start with the order thus 

The adherents of Apollodorus reject the view 
stated above to the effect that there are only three 
respects in which the mind of the judge requires to 
be prepared, and enumerate many others, relating to 
the character of the judge, to opinions regarding 
matters which though outside the case have still 




bus ad causam extra pertinentibus, ex opinione de 
ipsa causa, quae sunt prope infinitae, turn its, ex 
quibus omnes controversiae constant, personis, factis, 
dictis, causis, temporibus, locis, occasionibus, ceteris. 

51 Quas veras esse fateor, sed in haec genera recidere. 
Nam si iudicem benevolum, attentum, docilem habeo, 
quid amplius debeam optare, non reperio ; cum metus 
ipse, qui maxime videtur esse extra haec, et attentum 
iudicem faciat et ab adverse favore deterreat. 

52 Verum quoniam non est satis demonstrare discen- 
tibus, quae sint in ratione prooemii, ' sed dicendum 
etiam, quomodo perfici facillime possint, hoc adiicio, 
ut dicturus intueatur, quid, apud quern, pro quo, 
contra quern, quo tempore, quo loco, quo rerum statu, 
qua vulgi fama dicendum sit, quid iudicem sentire 
credibile sit, antequam incipimus, turn quid aut de- 
sideremus aut deprecemur. Ipsa ilium natura eo ducet, 

53 ut sciat, quid primum dicendum sit. At nunc omne, 
quo coeperuiit, prooemium putant et, ut quidque 
succurrit, utique si aliqua sententia blandiatur, exor- 
dium. Multa autem sine dubio sunt et aliis partibus 
causae communia, nihil tamen in quaque melius di- 
citur, quam quod aeque bene dici alibi non possit. 

BOOK IV. i. 50-53 

some bearing on it, to the opinion current as to the 
case itself, and so on ad infinitum : to these they add 
others relating to the elements of which every 
dispute is composed, such as persons, deeds, words, 
motives, time and place, occasions and the like. 
Such views are, I admit, perfectly correct, but are 51 
covered by one or other of the three classes which I 
have mentioned. For if I can secure good-will, 
attention and readiness to learn on the part of my 
judge, I cannot see what else I ought to require ; 
even fear, which perhaps may be thought more than 
anything else to lie outside the considerations I have 
mentioned, secures the attention of the judge and 
deters him from favouring our opponent. 

It is not, however, sufficient to explain the nature 52 
of the exordium to our pupils. We must also indicate 
the easiest method of composing an exordium. I 
would therefore add that he who has a speech to 
make should consider what he has to say ; before 
whom, in whose defence, against whom, at what 
time and place, under what circumstances he has to 
speak ; what is the popular opinion on the subject, 
and what the prepossessions of the judge are likely 
to be ; and finally of what we should express our 
deprecation or desire. Nature herself will give him 
the knowledge of what he ought to say first. Now- 63 
adays, however, speakers think that anything with 
which they choose to start is a proem and that 
whatever occurs to them, especially if it be a reflexion 
that catches their fancy, is an exordium. There are, 
no doubt, many points that can be introduced into an 
exordium which are common to other parts of a speech, 
but the best test of the appropriateness of a point to 
any part of a speech is to consi3"er~wKether it would 

D 2 


54 Multum gratiae exordio est, quod ab actione diversae 
partis materiam trahit, hoc ipso, quod non composi- 
tum domi, sed ibi atque ex re natum, et facilitate 
famam ingenii auget et facie simplicis sumptique ex 
proximo sermonis fidem quoque adquirit ; adeo ut, 
etiamsi reliqua scripta atque elaborata sint, tamen 
plerumque videatur tota extemporalis oratio, cuius 
initium nihil praeparati habuisse manifestum est. 

55 Frequentissime vero prooemium decebit et senten- 
tiarum et compositionis et vocis et vultus modestia, 
adeo ut in genere causae etiam indubitabili fiducia 
se ipsa nimium exserere non debeat. Odit enim index 
fere litigantis securitatem, cumqtie ius suum intelli- 

56 gat, tacitus reverentiam postulat. Nee minus dili- 
genter ne suspecti simus ilia parte vitandum est, 
propter quod minime ostentari debet in principiis 
cura, quia videtur ars omnis dicentis contra iudicem 

57 adhiberi. Sed ipsum istud evitare summae artis est. 
Nam id sine dubio ab omnibus et quidem optime 
praeceptum est, verum aliquatenus temporum con- 
dicione mutatur, quia iam quibusdam in iudiciis 
maximeque capitalibus aut apud centumviros ipsi 
iudices exigunt sollicitas et accuratas actiones, con- 

1 The court of the centumviri was specially concerned with 
cases of inheritance. 


BOOK IV. i. 54-57 

lose effect by being placed elsewhere. A most attrac- 54 
tive form of exordium is that which draws its material 
from the speech of our opponent, if only for the 
reason that the fact of its not having been composed 
at home, but having been improvised on the spot to 
meet the needs of the case increases the orator's 
reputation for natural talent by the readiness with 
which it is produced and carries conviction owing to 
the simple and ordinary, language in which it is 
clothed. As a result, even although the rest of the 
speech;.has been committed to writing and carefully 
elaborated, the whole of the speech will often be 
regarded as extempore, simply because its com- 
mencement is clearly not the result of previous 
study. Indeed a certain simplicity in the thoughts, 55 
style, voice and look of the speaker will often 
produce so pleasing an effect in the exordium that 
even in a case where there is no room for doubt the 
confidence of the speaker should not reveal itself too 
openly. For as a rule the judge dislikes self- 
confidence in a pleader, and conscious of his rights 
tacitly demands the respectful deference of the 
orator. No less care must be taken to avoid exciting 56 
any suspicion in this portion of our speech, and we 
should therefore give no hint of elaboration in the 
exordium, since any art that the orator may employ 
at this point seems to be directed solely at the 
judge. But to avoid all display of art in itself 
requires consummate art : this admirable canon has 
been insisted on by all writers, though its force has 
been somewhat impaired by present conditions, since 
in certain trials, more especially those brought on 
capital charges or in the centum viral l court, the 
judges themselves demand the most finished and 



temnique se, nisi in dicendo etiam diligentia appareat, 
credunt, nee doceri tantum sed etiam delectari volunt. 

58 Et est difficilis huius rei moderatio, quae tamen tem- 
perari ita potest, ut videamur accurate non callide 
dicere. lllud ex praeceptis veteribus manet, ne quod 
insolens verbum, ne audacius translatum, ne aut ab 
obsoleta vetustate aut poetica licentia sumptum in 

59 principio deprehendatur. Nonduin enini recepti 
sumus, et custodit nos recens audientium interitio ; 
magis conciliatis animis et iam calentibus haec libertas 
feretur, maximeque cum in locos fuerimus ingressi, 
quorum naturalis ubertas licentiam verbi notari cir- 

60 cumfuso nitore non patitur. Nee argumentis autem 
nee locis nee narration! similis esse in prooemio debet 
oratio, neque tamen deducta semper atque circumlita, 
sed saepe simplici atque illaboratae similis, nee verbis 
vultuque nimia promittens. Dissimulata enim et, 
ut Graeci dicunt, dvcTri'^aros actio melius saepe sur- 
repit. Sed haec, prout formari animum iudicum 

61 Turbari memoria vel continuandi verba facultate 
destitui nusquam turpius, cum vitiosum prooemium 

1 i.e. unobtrusive. 

BOOK IV. i. 57-61 

elaborate speeches, think themselves insulted, unless 
the orator shows signs of having exercised the 
utmost diligence in the preparation of his speech, 
and desire not merely to be instructed, but to be 
charmed. It is difficult to preserve the happy mean 58 
in carrying this precept into effect : but by a skilful 
compromise it will be possible to give the impression k 
of speaking with care but without elaborate design. 
The old rule still holds good that no unusual word, 
no overbold metaphor, no phrase derived from the 
lumber-rooms of antiquity or from poetic licence 
should be detected in the exordium. For our position 59 
is not yet established, the attention of the audience 
is still fresh and imposes restraint upon us : as soon 
as we have won their good-will and kindled their 
interest, they will tolerate such freedom, more 
especially when we have reached topics whose 
natural richness prevents any licence of expression 
being noticed in the midst of the prevailing 
splendour of the passage. The style of the exordium 60 
should not resemble that of our purple patches nor 
that of the argumentative and narrative portions of 
the speech, nor yet should it be prolix or continu- 
ously ornate : it should rather seem simple and 
unpremeditated, while neither our words nor our 
looks should promise too much. For a method of 
pleading which conceals its art and makes no vain 
display, being as the Greeks say dyeTri'^aros, 1 will 
often be best adapted to insinuate its way into the 
minds of our hearers. But in all this we must be 
guided by the extent to which it is expedient to 
impress the minds of the judges. 

There is no point in the whole speech where con- 61 
fusion of memory or loss of fluency has a worse effect, 



possit videri cicatricosa fades, et pessimus certe 
gubernator qui navem, dum portu egreditur, im- 

62 pegit. Modus autem principii pro causa. Nam 
breve simplices, longius perplexae suspectaeque et 
infames desiderant. Ridendi vero, qui velut legem 
prooemiis omnibus dederunt, ut intra quattuor sensus 
terminarentur. Nee minus evitanda est immodica 
eius longitudo, ne in caput excrevisse videatur et 

63 quo praeparare debet fatiget. Sermonem a persona 
iudicis aversum, quae drrocrTpo^rJ dicitur, quidam in 
totum a prooemio summovent, nonnulla quiclem in 
hanc persuasionem ratione ducti. Nam prorsus esse 
hoc magis secundum naturam confitendum est, ut 
eos alloquamur potissimum, quos conciliare nobis 

64 studemus. Interim tamen et est prooemio neces- 
sarius sensus aliquis, et hie acrior fit atque vehemen- 
tior ad personam derectus alterius. Quod si accidat, 
quo iure aut qua tanta superstitione prohibeamur 

65 dare per hanc figuram sententiae vires? Neque 
enim istud scriptores artium, quia non liceat, sed 
quia non putent utile, vetant. Ita si vincet utilitas, 
propter eandem causam facere debebimus propter 

66 quam vetamur. Et Demosthenes autem ad Aeschi- 

BOOK IV. i. 61-66 

for a faulty exordium is like a face seamed with scars ; 
and he who runs his ship ashore while leaving port 
is certainly the least efficient of pilots. The length 62 
of the exordium will be determined by the case ; 
simple cases require a short introduction only, 
longer exordia being best suited to cases which are 
complicated, suspect or unpopular. As for those 
who have laid it down as a law applying to all 
exordia that they should not be more than four 
sentences long, they are merely absurd. On the 
other hand undue length is equally to be avoided, 
lest the head should seem to have grown out of all 
proportion to the body and the judge should be 
wearied by that which ought to prepare him for 
what is to follow. The figure which the Greeks 63 
call apostrophe, by which is meant the diversion of 
our words to address some person other than the 
judge, is entirely banned by some rhetoricians as 
far as the exordium is concerned, and for this they 
have some reason, since it would certainly seem to 
be more ( natural that we should specially address 
ourselves to those whose favour we desire to win. 
Occasionally however some striking expression of 64 
thought is necessary in the exordium which can be 
given greater point and vehemence if addressed to 
some persqn other than the judge. In such a case 
what law or what preposterous superstition is to 
prevent us from adding force to such expression 
of our thought by the use of this figure ? For the 65 
writers of text-books do not forbid it because they 
regard it as illicit, but because they think it useless. 
Consequently if its utility be proved, we shall have 
to employ it for the very reason for which we are 
now forbidden to do so. Moreover Demosthenes 66 


nen orationem in prooemio convertit, et M. Tullius, 
cum pro aliis quibusdam, ad quos ei visum est, turn 

67 pro Ligario ad Tuberonem ; nam erat multo futura 
languidior, si esset aliter figurata. Quod facilius 
cognoscet, si quis totam illam partem vehementis- 
simam, cuius haec forma est, Habes igitur, Tubero, 
quod est accusatori maxime optandum, et cetera con- 
vertat ad iudicem ; turn enim vere aversa videatur 
oratio et languescat vis omnis, dicentibus nobis Habet 
igitur Tubero, quod est accusatori maxime optandum. 

68 Illo enim niodo pressit atque institit, hoc tantum 
indicasset. Quod idem in Demosthene, si flexum 
ilium mutaveris, accidit. Quid ? non Sallustius de- 
recto ad Ciceronem, in quern ipsum dicebat, usus est 
principio, et quidem protinus ? Graviter et iniquo 
animo maledicta tua paterer, Marce Tulli, sicut Cicero 

69 fecerat in Catilinam : Quousque tandem abutere ? Ac, 
ne quis apostrophen miretur, idem Cicero pro Scauro 
ambitus reo, quae causa est in commentariis (nam 
bis eundem defendit), prosopopoeia loquentis pro reo 
utitur, pro Rabirio vero Postumo eodemque Scauro 

1 de Cor. 11. 2 i. 2. 

3 This speech is lost : the existing speech in his defence is 
on the charge of extortion. 


BOOK IV. i. 66-69 

turns to address Aeschines in his exordium, 1 while 
Cicero adopts the same device in several of his 
speeches, but more especially in the pro Ligario, 2 
where he turns to address Tubero. His speech 67 
would have been much less effective, if any other 
figure had been used, as will be all the more clearly 
realised, if the whole of that most vigorous passage 
" You are, then, in possession, Tubero, of the most 
valuable advantage that can fall to an accuser etc." 
be altered so as to be addressed to the judge. For 
it is a real and most unnatural diversion of the 
passage, which destroys its whole force, if we say 
" Tubero is then in possession of the most valuable 
advantage that can fall to an accuser." In the 68 
original form Cicero attacks his opponent and 
presses him hard, in the passage as altered he 
would merely have pointed out a fact. The same 
thing results if you alter the turn of the passage in 
Demosthenes. Again did not Sallust when 
speaking against Cicero himself address his exordium 
to him and not to the judge ? In fact he actually 
opens with the words " I should feel deeply injured 
by your reflexions on my character, Marcus Tullius," 
wherein he followed the precedent set by Cicero 
in his speech against Catiline where he opens with 
the words " How long will you continue to abuse 
our patience ? " Finally to remove all reason for 69 
feeling surprise at the employment of apostrophe, 
Cicero in his defence of Scaurus, 3 on a charge of 
bribery (the speech is to be found in his Notebooks ; 
for he defended him twice) actually introduces an 
imaginary person speaking on behalf of the accused, 
while in his pro Rabirio and his speech in defence 
of this same Scaurus on a charge of extortion he 



reo repetundarum etiam exemplis, pro Cluentio (ut 

70 modo ostendi) partitione. Non tamen haec, quia 
possunt bene aliquando fieri, passim facienda sunt, 
sed quotiens praeceptum vicerit ratio ; quomodo et 
similitudine, dum brevi, et translatione atque aliis 
tropis (quae omnia cauti illi ac diligentes prohibent) 
utemur interim, nisi cui divina ilia pro Ligario ironia, 

71 de qua paulo ante dixeram, displicet. Alia exordio- 
rum vitia verius tradiderunt. Quod in plures causas 
accommodari potest, vulgare dicitur ; id minus favo- 
rabile aliquando tamen non inutiliter adsumimus, 
magnis saepe oratoribus non evitatum. Quo et 
adversarius uti potest, commune appellatur ; quod 
adversarius in suam utilitatem deflectere potest, com- 
mutabile ; quod causae non cohaeret, separatum ; 
quod aliunde trahitur, tralatum ; praeterea quod 
longum, quod contra praecepta est ; quorum pleraque 
non principii modo sunt vitia sed totius orationis. 

72 Haec de prooemio, quotiens erit eius usus, non 
semper autem est ; nam et supervacuum aliquando 
est, si sit praeparatus satis etiam sine hoc index, aut 


BOOK IV. i. 69-72 

employs illustrations, and in the pro Cluentio, as I 
have already pointed out, introduces division into 
heads. Still such artifices, although they may be 70 
employed at times to good effect, are not to be 
indulged in indiscriminately, but only when there is' 
strong reason for breaking the rule. The same remark 
applies to simile (which must however be brief), 
metaphor and other tropes, all of which are forbidden 
by our cautious and pedantic teachers of rhetoric, but 
which we shall none the less occasionally employ, 
unless indeed we are to disapprove of the magnificent 
example of irony in the pro Ligario to which I have 
already referred a few pages back. The rhetoricians 71 
have however been nearer the truth in their censure 
of certain other faults that may occur in the exordium. 
The stock exordium which can be suited to a number 
of different cases they style vulgar; it is an unpopular 
form but can sometimes be effectively employed and 
has often been adopted by some of the greatest orators. 
The exordium which might equally well be used by 
our opponent, they style common. That which our 
opponent can turn to his own advantage, they call 
interchangeable, that which is irrelevant to the case, 
detached, and that which is drawn from some other 
speech, transferred. In addition to these they 
censure others as long and others as contrary to rule. 
Most of these faults are however not peculiar to the 
exordium, but may be found in any or every portion 
of a speech. 

Such are the rules for the exordium, wherever it 72 
is employed. It may however sometimes be dis- 
pensed with. For occasionally it is superfluous, if 
the judge has been sufficiently prepared for our 
speech without it or if the case is such as to render 



si res praeparatione non egeat. Aristoteles quidem 
in totum id necessarium apud bonos iudices negat. 
Aliquando tamen uti nee si velimus eo licet, cum 
iudex occupatus, cum angusta sunt tempora, cum 

73 maior potestas ab ipsa re cogit incipere. Contraque 
est interim prooemii vis etiam non exordio. Nam 
iudices et in narratione nonnunquam et in argu- 
mentis ut attendant et ut faveant rogamus, quo 
Prodicus velut dormitantes eos excitari putabat, quale 

74 est : Turn C. Varenus,is qui afamilia Anchariana occisus 
est hoc, quaeso, indices, diligenter attendite. Utique 
si multiplex causa est, sua quibusque partibiis danda 
praefatio est, ut Audite mine reliqua, et Transeo nunc 

75 illuc. Sed in ipsis etiam probationibus multa funguntur 
prooemii vice, ut facit Cicero pro Cluentio dicturus 
contra censores, pro Murena, cum se Servio excusat. 
Verum id frequentius est, quam ut exemplis con- 
firmandum sit. 

76 Quotiens autem prooemio fuerimus usi, turn sive 
ad expositionem transibimus sive protinus ad pro- 
bationem, id debebit in principio postremum esse, 
cui commodissime iungi initium sequentium poterit. 

77 Ilia vero frigida et puerilis est in scholis adfectatio, 

1 Rhet. iii. 14. 2 Cic. pro Far. fr. 8. 

3 xlii. 117. 4 iii. 7. 


BOOK IV. i. 72-77 

such preparation unnecessary. Aristotle l indeed 
says that with good judges the exordium is entirely 
unnecessary. Sometimes however it is impossible 
to employ it, even if we desire to do so, when, 
for instance, the judge is much occupied, when time 
is short or superior authority forces us to embark 
upon the subject right away. On the other hand 73 
it is at times possible to give the force of an exordium 
to other portions of the speech. For instance we 
may ask the judges in the course of our statement of 
the facts or of our arguments to give us their best 
attention and good- will, a proceeding which Prodicus 
recommended as a means of wakening them when 
they begin to nod. A good example is the 
following : 2 " Gaius Varenus, he who was killed 74 
by the slaves of Ancharius I beg you, gentlemen, 
to give me your best attention at this point." 
Further if the case involves a number of different 
matters, each section must be prefaced with a short 
introduction, such as "Listen now to what follows," 
or " I now pass to the next point." Even in the 75 
proof there are many passages which perform the 
same function as an exordium, such as the passage in 
the pro Cluentio 3 where Cicero introduces an attack 
on the censors and in the pro Murena* when he 
apologises to Servius. But the practice is too 
common to need illustration. 

However on all occasions when we have employed 76 
the exordium, whether we intend to pass to the statement 
of facts or direct to the proof, our intention should 
be mentioned at the conclusion of the introduction, 
with the result that the transition to what follows 
will be smooth and easy. There is indeed a pedantic 77 
and childish affectation in vogue in the schools of 



ut ipse transitus efficiat aliquam utique sententiam 
et huius velut praestigiae plausum petat, ut Ovidius 
lascivire in Metamorphosesin solet, quern tamen ex- 
cusare necessitas potest res diversissimas in speciem 

78 unius corporis colligentem. Oratori vero quid est 
necesse surripere hanc transgressionem et iudicem 
fallere, qui, ut ordini rerum animum intendat, etiam 
commonendus est ? Peribit enim prima pars exposi- 

79 tionis, si iudex narrari nondum sciet. Quapropter, 
ut non abrupte cadere in narration em,, ita non obscure 
transcendere est optimum. Si vero longior sequetur 
ac perplexa magis expositio, ad earn ipsam praepa- 
randus erit iudex, ut Cicero saepius, sed et hoc loco 
fecit : Paulo longius exordium rei demonstrandae repel am, 
quod, quaeso, indices, ne moleste patiamini ; principiis 
enim cognitis multo facilius extrema intelligetis. Haec 
fere sunt mihi de exordio comperta. 

II. Maxime naturale est et fieri frequentissime 
debet, ut praeparato per haec, quae supra dicta sulit, 
iudice res, de qua pronuntiaturus est, indicetur. 
2 Haec est narratio. In qua sciens transcurram sub- 
tiles nimium divisiones quorundam plura eius genera 

1 pro Cluent. iv. 11. 

BOOK IV. i. 77-n. 2 

marking the transition by some epigram and seeking 
to win applause by this feat of legerdemain. Ovid 
is given to this form of affectation in his Metamor- 
phoses, but there is some excuse for him owing to the 
fact that he is compelled to weld together subjects 
of the most diverse nature so as to form a continuous 
whole. But what necessity is there for an orator to 78 
gloss over his transitions or to attempt to deceive the 
judge, who requires on the contrary to be warned to 
give his attention to the sequence of the various 
portions of the speech ? For instance the first part 
of our statement of the facts will be wasted, if the 
judge does not realise that we have reached that 
stage. Therefore, although we should not be too 79| 
abrupt in passing to our statement of facts, it is best 
to do nothing to conceal our transition. Indeed, if 
the statement of fact on which we are about to embark 
is somewhat long and complicated, we shall do well 
to prepare the judge for it, as Cicero often does, 
most notably in the following passage : l " The in- 
troduction to my exposition of this point will be 
rather longer than usual, but I beg you, gentlemen, 
not to take it ill. For if you get a firm grasp of the 
beginning, you will find it much easier to follow what 
comes last." This is practically all that I can find 
to say on the subject of the exordium. 

II. It is a most natural and frequently necessary 
proceeding, that after preparing the mind of the 
judge in the manner described above we should in- 
dicate the nature of the subject on which he will have 
to give judgment : that is the statement of facts, In 2 
dealing with this question I shall deliberately pass 
over the divisions made by certain writers, who make 
too many classes and err on the side of subtlety. For 




facientium. Non enim solam volunt esse illam 
negotii, de quo apud iudices quaeritur, expositionem, 
sed personae, ut M. Lollius Palicanus, humili loco 
Picens, loquax magis quam facundus ; loci, ut Oppidum 
est in Hellesponto Lampsacum, iudices ; temporis ut 

Vere novo, gelidus canis cum montibus humor 
Liquitur ; 

causarum, quibus historic! frequentissirne utuntur, 
cum exponunt, unde bellum, seditio, pestilentia. 

3 Praeter haec alias perfectas, alias imperfectas vocant ; 
quod quis ignorat ? Adiiciunt expositionem et prae- 
teritorum esse temporum, quae est frequentissima, 
et praesentium, qualis est Ciceronis de discursu 
amicorum Chrysogoni, postquam est nominatus, et 
futurorum, quae solis dari vaticinantibus potest ; 

4 nam vTroruVoKm non est habenda narratio. Sed nos 
potioribus vacemus. 

Plerique semper narrandum putaverunt, quod 
falsum esse pluribus coarguitur. Sunt enim ante 
omnia quaedam tarn breves causae, ut propositionem 

5 potius habeant quam narrationem. Id accidit ali- 
quando utrique parti, cum vel nulla expositio est, 

1 Sail. Hist. iv. 25. 2 Cic. Verr. i. xxiv. 63. 
3 Verg. O. i. 43. 4 pro Rose. Am. xxii. 60. 

BOOK IV. ii. 2-5 

they demand an explanation dealing not only with the 
facts of the case which is before the court, but with the 
person involved (as in the sentence/ "Marcus Lollius 
Palicanus, a Picentine of humble birth, a man gifted 
with loquacity rather than eloquence " ) or of the 
place where an incident occurred (as in the sen- 
tence 2 " Lampsacus, gentlemen, is a town situated 
on the Hellespont"), or of the time at which some- 
thing occurred (as in the verse 3 

" In early spring, when on the mountains hoar 
The snows dissolve "), 

or of the causes of an occurrence, such as the 
historians are so fond of setting forth, when they 
explain the origin of a war, a rebellion or a pestilence. 
Further they style some statements of fact "complete" 3 
and others " incomplete" a distinction which is self- 
evident. To this they add that our explanation may 
refer to the past (which is of course the commonest 
form), the present (for which compare Cicero's 4 
remarks about the excitement caused among the 
friends of Chrysogonus when his name was men- 
tioned), or of the future (a form permissible only to 
prophets) : for hypoiyposis or picturesque description 
cannot be regarded as a statement ofj'acts. However 4 
let us pass to matters of more importance. 

The majority regard the statement ofj'acts as being 
indispensable : but there are many considerations 
which show that this view is erroneous. In the first 
place there are some cases which are so brief, that 
they require only a brief summary rather than a full 
statement of the facts. This may apply to both 5 
parties to a suit, as for instance in cases where there 
is no necessity for explanation or where the facts are 

c 2 


vel de re constat, de iure quaeritur, ut apud centum- 
viros, filius an frater debeat esse intestatae heres, 
pubertas annis an corporis habitu aestimetur: aut 
cum est quidem in re narration! locus, sed aut ante 
iudici nota sunt omnia aut priore loco recte exposita. 

6 Accidit aliquando alteri et saepius ab actore, vel 
quia satis est proponere vel quia sic magis expedit. 
Satis est dixisse, Certain creditam pecuniam peto ex 
stipulatione ; Legatum peto ex testamento. Diversae 

7 partis expositio est, cur ea non debeanttir. Et satis 
est actori et magis expedit sic indicare : Dico ab 
Horatio sororem mam interfectam. Namque et pro- 
positione iudex crimen omne cognoscit, et ordo et 

8 causa facti pro adversario magis est. Reus contra 
tune narrationem subtrahet, cum id, quod obiicitur, 
neque negari neque excusari poterit, sed in sola iuris 
quaestione consistet ; ut in eo, qui, cum pecuniam 
privatam ex aede sacra surripuerit, sacrilegii reus est, 
confessio verecundior quam expositio : Non negamus 

BOOK IV. n. 5-8 

admitted and the whole question turns on a point of 
law, as it so often does in the centumviral court, as 
for example when we discuss, whether the heir of a 
woman who has died intestate should be her son or 
brother, or whether puberty is to be reckoned by age 
or by physical development. The same situation 
arises also in cases where the facts admit of full 
statement, but are well known to the judge or have 
been correctly set forth by a previous speaker. 
Sometimes again the statement of facts can be 6 
dispensed with only by one party, who is generally 
the plaintiff, either because it is sufficient for him to 
make a simple summary of his case or because it is 
more expedient for him to do so. It may, for in- 
stance, suffice to say, " I claim repayment of a 
certain sum of money which was lent on certain 
conditions " or " I claim a legacy in accordance with 
the terms of the will." It is for the other party to 
explain why these sums are not due to the plaintiff. 
Again it is sometimes sufficient and expedient to 7 
summarise a case in one sentence such as " I say 
that Horatius killed his sister." For the judge will 
understand the whole charge from this simple 
affirmation : the sequence of events and the motive 
for the deed will be matters for the defence to ex- 
pound. On the other hand in some cases the 8 
accused may dispense with the statement of facts, 
when for instance the charge can neither be denied 
nor palliated, but turns solely on some point of law : 
the following case will illustrate my meaning. A 
man who has stolen from a temple money belonging 
to a private individual is accused of sacrilege : in 
such a case a confession will be more seemly than 
a full statement of facts : "We do not deny that the 



de templo pecuniam esse sublatam, calnmniatur tamen 
accusator actione sacrilegii, cum privata fuerit non 
sacra; vos autem de hoc cognoscetis, an sacrilegium 
sit admissum. 

9 Sed ut has aliquando non narrandi causas puto, sic 
ab illis dissentio,, qui non existimant esse narrationem, 
cum reus quod obiicitur tantum negat ; in qua est 
opinione Cornelius Celsus, qui condicionis huius esse 
arbitratur plerasque caedis causas et omiies ambitus 

10 ac repetundarum. Non enim putat esse narrationem, 
nisi quae summam criminis de quo iudicium est 
contineat, deinde fatetur ipse pro Rabirio Postumo 
narrasse Ciceronem ; atque ille et negavit pervenisse 
ad Rabirium pecuniam, qua de re erat quaestio 
constituta, et in hac narratione nihil de crimine ex- 

11 posuit. Ego autem magnos alioqui secutus auctores, 
duas esse in iudiciis narrationum species existimo, 
alteram ipsius causae, alteram rerum ad causam 

12 pertinentium expositionem. Non occidi hominem, 
nulla narratio est ; convenit ; sed erit aliqua et interim 
etiam longa contra argumenta eius criminis de ante- 
acta vita, de causis, propter quas innocens in peri- 
culum deducatur, aliis, quibus incredibile id quod 

13 obiicitur fiat. Neque enim accusator tantum hoc 


BOOK IV. ii. 8-13 

money was taken from the temple ; but the accuser 
is bringing a false accusation in charging my client 
with sacrilege, since the money was not consecrated, 
but private property : it is for you to decide whether 
under these circumstances sacrilege has been 

While however I think that there are occasional 9 
cases where the statement of facts may be dispensed 
with, I disagree with those who say that there is no 
statement of facts when the accused simply denies the 
charge. This opinion is shared by Cornelius Celsus 
who holds that most cases of murder and all of 
bribery and extortion fall into this class. For he 10 
thinks that the only statement of facts is that which 
gives a general account of the charge before the 
court. Yet he himself acknowledges that Cicero 
employed the statement of facts in his defence of 
Rabirius Postumus, in spite of the fact that Cicero 
denies that any money came into the hands of 
Rabirius (and this was the question at issue) and 
gives no explanations relating to the actual charge in 
his statement of facts. For my part I follow the very 11 
highest authorities in holding that there are two 
forms of statement of facts in forensic speeches, the 
one expounding the facts of the case itself, the other 
setting forth facts which have a bearing on the case. 
1 agree that a sentence such as " I did not kill 12 
the man" does not amount to a statement of facts : 
but there will be a statement of facts, occasionally, too, 
a long one, in answer to the arguments put forward 
by the accuser : it will deal with the past life of the 
accused, with the causes which have brought an 
innocent man into peril, and other circumstances 
such as show the charge to be incredible. For the 13 



dicit, occidisti ; sed, quibus id probet narrat. Ut in 
tragoediis, cum Teucer Ulixen reum facit Aiacis 
occisi dicens inventum eum in solitudine iuxta 
exanime corpus inimici cum gladio cruento, non id 
, modo Ulixes respondet non esse a se id facinus 
admissum, sed sibi nullas cum Aiace inimicitias 
fuisse, de laude inter ipsos certatum ; deinde sub- 
iungit, quomodo in earn solitudinem venerit, iacentem 
exanimem sit conspicatus, gladium e vulnere ex- 

14 traxerit. His subtexitur argumentatio. Sed ne 
illud quidem sine narratione est, dicente accusatore, 
Fuisti in eo loco, in quo tuus inimicus occisus est : Non 
fui; dicendum enim, ubi fuerit. Quare ambitus 
quoque causae et repetundarum hoc etiam plures 
huiusmodi narrationes habere poterunt, quo plura 
crimina; in quibus ipsa quidem neganda sunt, sed 
argumentis expositione contraria resistendum est 

15 interdum singulis interdum universis. An reus 
ambitus male narrabit, quos parentes habuerit, que- 
madmodum ipse vixerit, quibus meritis fretus ad peti- 
tionem desceriderit ? Aut qui repetundarum crimine 
insimulabitur, non et anteactam vitam, et quibus de 
causis provinciam universam vel accusatorem aut 

16 testem offenderit, non inutiliter exponet? Quae si 
narrationon est, ne ilia quidem Ciceronis pro Cluentio 
prima, cuius est initium : A. Cluentius Habitus. Nihil 

1 v. 11. 

BOOK IV. ii. 13-16 

accuser does not merely say " You killed him/' but 
sets forth the facts proving his assertion : tragedy will 
provide an example, where Teucer accuses Ulysses 
of murdering Ajax, and states that he was found in a 
lonely place near the lifeless body of his enemy with 
a blood-stained sword in his hands. To this Ulysses 
does not merely reply that he did not do the deed, 
but adds that he had no quarrel with Ajax, the 
contest between them having been concerned solely 
with the winning of renown : he then goes on to 
say how he came to be in the lonely place, how he 
found Ajax lying lifeless and drew the sword from 
the wound. Then follow arguments based on these 
facts. But even when the accuser says " You were 14 
found on the spot where your enemy was killed " 
and the accused says " I was not," a statement of facts 
is involved ; for he must say where he was. Conse- 
quently cases of bribery and extortion will require 
as many statements of this kind as there are 
charges : the charges themselves will be denied, but 
it will be necessary to counter the arguments of the 
accuser either singly or all together by setting forth 
the facts in quite a different light. Is it, I ask you, 15 
irrelevant for one accused of bribery to set forth 
his parentage, his past life and the services on which 
he relied for success in his candidature ? And if a 
man is indicted for extortion, will it not be to his 
advantage to set forth not merely his past record, 
but also the reasons which have made the whole 
province or the accuser or a witness hostile to 
himself? If these are not statements of facts, neither 16 
is the first portion of Cicero's l defence of Cluentius, 
beginning with the words "Aulus Cluentius Hab- 
itus." For there he says nothing about the charge 



enim hie de veneficio, sed de causis, quibus ei mater 

17 inimica sit, dicit. Illae quoque sunt pertinentes ad 
causam sed non ipsius causae narrationes : vel exempli 
gratia ut in Verrem de L. Domitio, qui pastorem, 
quod is aprum, quern ipsi muiieri obtulerat, exceptum 
esse a se venabulo confessus esset, in crucem sustulit ; 

18 vel discutieiidi alicuius extrinsecus criminis, ut pro 
Rabirio Postumo : Nam ut ventum Alexandria. est, 
indices, haec una ratio a rege proposita Postumo est 
servandae pecuniae, si curationem et quasi dispensationem 
regiam suscepisset ; vel augendi, ut describitur iter 

19 Ficta interim narratio introduci solet, vel ad 
concitandos iudices ut pro Roscio circa Chrysogonum, 
cuius paulo ante babui mentionem ; vel ad resolven- 
dos aliqua urbanitate, ut pro Cluentio circa fratres 
Caepasios ; interdum per digressionem decoris gratia, 
qualis rursus in Verrem de Proserpina, In his quondam 
locis mater filiam quaesisse dicitur. Quae omnia eo 
pertinent, ut appareat non utique non narrare eum 
qui negat, sed illud ipsum narrare quod negat. 

1 v. 3. The shepherd was crucified because the carrying 
of arms was forbidden. 

2 x. -28. The charge in question was that Rabirius had 
worn the Greek pallium instead of the Roman toga. But as 
an official of the king he was forced to wear Greek dress. 

3 Verr. v. 10. 4 xxii. 60. 5 xx. 57 sqq. 

6 iv. 48. The words quoted do not occur in our MSS. of 


BOOK IV. ii. 16-19 

of poisoning, but confines himself entirely to setting 
forth the reasons for the hostility of Cluentius' 
mother to her son. There are also statements 17 
which do not set forth the facts of the case itself, 
but facts which are none the less relevant to the 
case : the speaker's purpose may be to illustrate the 
case by some parallel, as in the passage in the 
Ferrines l about Lucius Domitius who crucified a 
shepherd because he admitted that he had used a 
hunting spear to kill the boar which he had brought 
him as a present ; or he may desire to dispel some 18 
charge that is irrelevant to the case as in the passage 
of the speech for Rabirius Postumus, 2 which runs as 
follows : " For when he came to Alexandria, gentle- 
men, the only means of saving his money which the 
king suggested to Postumus was that he should 
take charge of the royal household and act as a kind 
of steward." Or the orator may desire to heighten 
the effect of his charges, as Cicero 3 does in his 
description of the journey of Verres. 

Sometimes a fictitious statement is employed 19 
either to stir the emotions of the judges, as in that 
passage of the pro Koscio Amerino* dealing with 
Chrysogonus to which I referred just recently, or to 
entertain them with a show of wit, as in the 
passage of the pro Cluentio 5 describing the brothers 
Caepasius : sometimes again a digression may be 
introduced to add beauty to the speech, as in the 
passage about Proserpine in the Verrines* begin- 
ning " It was here that a mother is once said to have 
sought her daughter." All these examples serve to 
show that he who denies a charge may not necessarily 
refrain from stating, but may actually state that very 
fact which he denies. 



20 Ne hoc quidem simpliciter accipiendum, quod est 
a me positum, esse supervacuam narrationem rei, 
quam iudex noverit ; quod sic intelligi volo, si non 
modo quid factum sit sciet, sed ita factum etiam, ut 

21 nobis expedit, opinabitur. Neque enim narratio in 
hoc reperta est, ut tantum cognoscat iudex, sed ali- 
quanto magis, ut consentiat. Quare, etiamsi non 
erit docendus, sed aliquo modo adficiendus, nar- 
rabimus cum praeparatione quadam: scire quidem 
eum in summam, quid acti sit, tamen rationem 
quoque facti cuiusque cognoscere ne gravetur. 

22 Interim propter aliquem in consilium adhibitum nos 
repetere ilia simulemus, interim, ut rei, quae ex 
adverso proponatur, iniquitatem omnes etiam circum- 
stantes intelligant. In quo genere plurimis figuris 
erit varianda expositio ad effugiendum taedium nota 
audientis, sicut Meministi, et Fortasse supervacwim 
fuerit hie commorari. Sed quid ego diutius, cum tu optime 

23 noris ? Illud quale sit, tu scias, et his similia. Alioqui 
si apud iudicem, cui nota causa est, narratio semper 
videtur supervacua, potest videri non semper esse 
etiam ipsa actio necessaria. 

24 Alterum est, de quo frequentius quaeritur, an sit 
utique narratio prooemio subiicienda ; quod qui 

1 i.e. introduced to till the place of a juror who had had 
to leave the jury. 


BOOK IV. ii. 20-24 

Even the assertion which I made above to the 20 
effect that a statement of facts familiar to the judge 
is superfluous, is not to be taken too literally. My 
meaning is that it may be dispensed with, if the 
judge knows not merely what has been done, but 
takes a view of the facts which is favourable to our 
case. For the purpose of the statement of facts is 21 
not merely to instruct, but rather to persuade the 
judge. Therefore, when we desire to influence him 
in some way or other, although he may require no 
instruction, we shall preface our statement with 
some such remarks as these : " I know that you are 
aware of the general nature of the case, but I trust 
you will not take it ill if I ask you to consider each 
point in detail." At times again we may pretend 22 
that we are repeating the facts for the benefit of 
some new member of the jury, 1 at times that we do 
so with a view to letting every bystander as well realise 
the gross unfairness of our opponents' assertions. 
Under these circumstances our statement must be 
diversified by a free use of figures to avoid wearying 
those to whom the facts are familiar : we shall for 
instance use phrases such as " You remember," " It 
may perhaps be superfluous to dwell on this point," 
" But why should I say more, as you are well acquainted 
with the fact?", "You are not ignorant how this 
matter stands " and so on. Besides, if we are always to 23 
regard as superfluous a statement of facts made before 
a judge who is familiar with the case, we may even 
go so far as to regard it as superfluous at times to 
plead the case at all. 

There is a further question which is still more 24 
frequently raised, as to whether the statement of 
facts should always follow immediately on the 



opinantur, non possunt videri nulla ratione ducti. 
Nam cum prooemium idcirco comparatum sit, ut 
iudex ad rem accipiendam fiat conciliation docilior, 
intentior, et probatio nisi causa prius cognita non 
possit adhiberi, protinus iudex notitia rerum instruen- 

25 dus videtur. Sed hoc quoque interim mutat condicio 
causarum ; nisi forte M. Tullius in oratione pulcher- 
rima, quam pro Milone scriptam reliquit, male distu- 
lisse narrationem videtur tribus praepositis quaestion- 
ibus ; aut profuisset exponere, quomodo insidias 
Miloni fecisset Clodius, si reum, qui a se hominem 
occisum fateretur, defendi omnino fas non fuisset, 
aut si iam praeiudicio senatus damnatus esset Milo, 
aut si Cn. Pompeius, qui praeter aliam gratiam 
iudicium etiam militibus armatis clauserat, tanquam 

26 adversus ei timeretur. Ergo hae quoque quaestiones 
vim prooemii obtinebant, cum omnes iudicem prae- 
pararent. Sed pro Vareno quoque postea narravit 
quam obiecta diluit. Quod fiet utiliter, quotiens 
non repellendum tantum erit crimen, sed etiam 
transferendum, ut his prius defensis velut initium 
sit alium culpandi narratio, ut in armorum ratione 

BOOK IV. ii. 24-26 

exordium. Those who hold that it should always do so 
must be admitted to have some reason on their side. 
For since the purpose of the exordium is to make 
the judge more favourably disposed and more 
attentive to our case and more amenable to 
instruction, and since the proof cannot be brought 
forward until the facts of the case are known, it 
seems right that the judge should be instructed in 
the facts without delay. But the practice may be 
altered by circumstances, unless it is contended that 
Cicero in his magnificent published defence of Milo 
delayed his statement too long by placing three 
questions before it ; or unless it is argued that, if it 
had been held to be impermissible to defend a man 
at all who acknowledged that he had killed another, 
or if Milo's case had already been prejudged and 
condemnation passed by the senate, or if Gnaeus 
Pompeius, who in addition to exerting his influence 
in other ways had surrounded the court with an 
armed guard, had been regarded with apprehension 
as hostile to the accused, it would have served his 
case to set forth how Clodius had set an ambush for 
Milo. These three questions, then, served the 26 
purpose of an exordium, since they all of them were 
designed to prepare the minds of the judges. 
Again in the pro Vareno Cicero delayed his 
statement of facts until he had first rebutted 
certain allegations put forward by the prosecution. 
This may be done with advantage whenever we 
have not merely to rebut the charge, but to turn 
the tables on our opponents : thus after first 
rebutting the charge, we make our statement of 
facts the opening of an incrimination of the other 
party, just as in actual fighting we are most 



antiquior cavendi quam ictum inferendi cura est. 

27 Erunt quaedam causae (neque id raro) crimine 
quidem, de quo cognitio est, faciles ad diluendum 
sed multis anteactae vitae flagitiis et gravibus 
oneratae ; quae prius amovenda sunt, ut propitius 
iudex defensionem ipsius negotii, cuius propria 
quaestio est,, audiat: ut, si defendendus sit M. 
Caelius, nonne optime patronus occurrat prius con- 
viciis luxuriae, petulantiae, impudicitiae quam vene- 
ficii, in quibus solis omnis Ciceronis versatur oratio ; 
turn deinde narret de bonis Pallae totamque de vi 
explicet causam, quae est ipsius actione defensa? 

28 Sed nos ducit scholarum consuetude, in quibus certa 
quaedam ponuntur, quae themata dicimus, praeter 
quae nihil est diluendum, ideoque prooemio narratio 
semper subiungitur. Inde libertas declamatoribus, 
ut etiam secundo partis suae loco narrare videantur. 

29 Nam cum pro petitore dicunt et expositione, tanquam 
priores agant, uti solent et contradictione, tanquam 
respondeant, idque fit recte. Nam cum sit declam- 
atio forensium actionum meditatio, cur non in 


BOOK IV. ii. 26-29 

concerned to parry our adversary's blows before 
we strike him ourselves. There will also not 27 
infrequently be certain cases, in which it is easy to 
rebut the charge that is under trial, but the conduct 
of which is hampered by the past life of our client 
and the many and serious crimes which he has 
committed. We must dispose of these first, in order 
that the judge may give a favourable hearing to our 
defence of the actual facts which form the question 
at issue. For example, if we have to defend 
Marcus Caelius, the best course for his advocate to 
adopt will be to meet the imputations of luxury, 
wantonness and immorality which are made against 
him before we proceed to the actual charge, of poison- 
ing. It is with these points that the speech of Cicero 
in his defence is entirely concerned. Is he then to 
go on to make a statement about the property of 
Palla and explain the whole question of rioting, a 
charge against which Caelius has already defended 
himself in the speech which he delivered on his own 
behalf? We however are the victims of the practice 28 
of the schools in accordance with which certain points V 
or themes as we call them are put forward for dis- 
cussion, outside which our refutation must not go, 
and consequently a statement of facts always follows 
the exordium. It is this too that leads declaimers to 
take the liberty of inserting a statement of j acts even 
when they speak second for their side. For when 29 
they speak for the prosecution they introduce both a 
statement of facts, as if they were speaking first, and a 
refutation of the arguments for the defence, as if 
they were replying : and they are right in so doing. 
For since declamation is merely an exercise in forensic 
pleading, why should they not qualify themselves to 




utrumque protinus locum se exerceat? Cuius ratioiiis 
ignari ex more, cui adsueverunt, nihil in foro putant 

30 esse mutandum. Sed in scholasticis quoque nonnun- 
quam evenit, ut pro narratione sit propositio. Nam 
quid exponet, quae zelotypum malae tractationis 
accusat, aut qui Cyiiicum apud censores reum de 
jnoribus facit ? cum totum crimen uno verbo in qua- 
libet actionis parte posito satis indicetur. Sed haec 

31 Nunc, quae sit narrandi ratio, subiungam. Narratio 
est rei factae aut lyt factae) utilis ad persuadendum 
expositio, vel (ut Apollodorus finit) oratio docens 
auditorem, quid in controversia sit. Earn plerique 
scriptores, maxime qui sunt ab Isocrate, volunt esse 
lucidanij brevem, verisimilem. Neque enim refert, 
an pro lucida perspicuam, pro verisimili probabilem 

32 credibilemve dicamus. Eadem nobis placet divisio ; 
quanquam et Aristoteles ab Isocrate parte in 
una dissenserit praeceptum brevitatis irridens, tan- 
quam necesse sit longam esse aut brevem expositio- 
nem nee liceat ire per medium, Theodorei quoque 
solam relinquant ultimam partem, quia nee breviter 

33 utique nee dilucide semper sit utile exponere. Quo 

1 See note prefixed to Index. 
2 See Index, .v. Cynicus. 3 Rhet. iii. 16. 


BOOK IV. ii. 29-33 

speak either first or second l ? Those however who 
do not understand the reason for such a practice, 
think that when they appear in the courts they 
should stick to the custom of the schools with which 
they have become familiar. But even scholastic 30 
rhetoricians occasionally substitute a brief summary 
for the full statement of the facts. For what state- 
ment of the case can be made when a wife is accusing 
a jealous husband of maltreating her, or a father is 
indicting his son turned Cynic before the censors 
for indecent behaviour 2 ? In both cases the charge 
can be sufficiently indicated by one word placed 
in any part of the speech. But enough of these 

I will now proceed to the method to be adopted 31 
in making our statement of j acts. The statement oj 
facts consists in the persuasive exposition of that 
which either has been done, or is supposed to 
have been done, or, to quote the definition given by 
Apollodorus, is a speech instructing the audience as to 
the nature of the case in dispute. Most writers, more 
especially those of the Isocratean school, hold that 
it should be lucid, brief and plausible (for it is of 
no importance if we substitute clear for lucid, or 
credible or probable for plausible). I agree with 32 
this classification of its qualities, although Aristotle 3 
disagrees with Isocrates 011 one point, and pours 
scorn on his injunction to be brief, as though it 
were necessary that a statement should be either 
long or short and it were impossible to hit the happy 
mean. The followers of Theodorus on the other 
hand recognise only plausibility on the ground 
that it is not always expedient that our exposition 
should be either short or clear. It will be necessary 33 

F 2 


diligentius distinguenda sunt singula, ut quid quo- 
que loco prosit ostendam. 

Narratio est aut tota pro nobis aut tota pro ad- 
versariis aut mixta ex utrisque. Si erit tota pro 
nobis, content! sumus his tribus partibus per quas 
efficitur, quo facilius iudex intelligat, meminerit, 

34 credat. Nee quisquam reprehensione dignum putet, 
quod proposuerim earn, quae sit tota pro iiobis, debere 
esse verisimilem, cum vera sit. Sunt enim plurima 
vera quidem, sed parum credibilia, sicut falsa quoque 
frequenter verisimilia. Quare non minus laborandum 
est, ut index, quae vere dicimus quam quae fingimus, 

35 credat. Sunt quidem hae, quas supra retuli, virtutes 
aliarum quoque partium. Nam et per totam actio- 
nem vitanda est obscuritas et modus ubique custodien- 
dus, et credibilia esse omnia oportet quae dicuntur. 
Maxime tamen haec in ea parte custodienda sunt, 
quae prima iudicem docet ; in qua si accident, ut 
aut non intelligat aut non meminerit aut non credat, 
frustra in reliquis laborabimus. 

36 Erit autem narratio aperta atque dilucida, si fuerit 
primum exposita verbis propriis et significantibus et 

non sordidis quidem, non tamen exquisitis et ab usu 

BOOK IV. ii. 33-36 

therefore for me to devote some care to the differ- 
entiation of the various features of this portion of a 
speech, in order that I may show under what 
circumstances eacli is specially useful. 

The statement will be either wholly in our favour 
or wholly in that of our opponent or a mixture of 
both. If it is entirely in our own favour, we may 
rest content with the three qualities just mentioned, 
the result of which is to make it easier for the judge 
to understand, remember and believe what we say. 
Now I should regret that anyone should censure my 34 
conduct in suggesting that a statement which is 
wholly in our favour should be plausible, when as 
a matter of fact it is true. There are many things 
which are true, but scarcely credible, just as there 
are many things which are plausible though false. 
It will therefore require just as much exertion on 
our part to make the judge believe what we say 
when it is true as it will when it is fictitious. These 35 
good qualities, which I have mentioned above, do 
not indeed cease to be virtues in other portions of the 
speech ; for it is our duty to avoid obscurity in every 
part of our pleading, to preserve due proportion 
throughout and to say nothing save what is likely 
to win belief. But they require special observance 
in that portion of the speech which -is the first 
from which the judge can learn the nature of the 
case : if at this stage of the proceedings he fails to 
understand, remember or believe what we say, our 
labour is but lost in the remainder of the speech. 

We shall achieve lucidity and clearness in our 36 
statement of facts, first by setting forth our story ir 
words which are appropriate, significant and free 
from any taint of meanness, but not on the other 



remotis, turn distincta rebus, personis, temporibus, 
locis, causis, ipsa etiam pronuntiatione in hoc ac- 
commodata, ut iudex quae dicentur quam facillime 

37 accipiat. Quae quidem virtus negligitur a plurimis, 
qui ad clamorem dispositae vel etiam forte circum- 
fusae multitudinis compositi non ferunt illud in- 

<.J^ ufu-oojj- 

tentionis silentium nee sibi diserti videntur, nisi 
omnia tumultu et vociferatione concusserint ; rem 
indicare sermonis cotidiani et in quemcunque etiam 
indoctorum cadentis existimant, cum interim, quod 
tanquam facile contemnunt, nescias, praestare minus 

38 velint an possintJ Neque enim aliud in eloquentia, 
cuncta experti, difficilius reperient quam id, quod se 
fuisse dicturos omnes putant, postquam audierunt, 
quia non bona iudicant esse ilia, sed vera.\ Turn 
autem optime dicit orator, cum videtur vera dicere. 

39 At nunc, velut campum nacti expositionis, hie potissi- 
mum et vocem flectunt et cervicem reponunt et 
brachium in latus iactant totoque et rernm et ver- 
borum et compositionis genere lasciviunt ; deinde, 
quod sit monstro simile, placet actio, causa non 
intelligitur. Verum haec omittamus, ne minus 

BOOK IV. ii. 36-39 

hand farfetched or unusual, and secondly by giving 
a distinct account of facts, persons, times, places and 
causes, while our delivery must be adapted to our 
matter, so that the judge will take in what we say 
with the utmost readiness. This latter virtue is 37 
disregarded by the majority of speakers who are 
used to the noisy applause of a large audience, 
whether it be a chance gathering or an assembly of 
claqueurs, and consequently are unnerved by the 
attentive silence of the courts. They feel that they 
have fallen short of eloquence, if they do not make 
everything echo with noise and clamour ; they think 
that to state a matter simply is suited only to every- 
day speech such as falls within the capacity of any 
uneducated man, while all the time it is hard to say 
whether they are less willing or less capable of 
performing a task which they despise 011 account of 
its supposed easiness. For even when they have 38 
tried everything, they will never find anything more 
difficult in the whole range of oratory than that 
which, once heard, all think they would have said, 
a delusion due to the fact that they regard what has 
been said as having no merit save that of truth. But 
it is just when an orator gives the impression of 
absolute truth that he is speaking best. As ik is, 39 
when such persons as these get a fair field for stat- 
ing their case, they select this as the precise occasion 
for affected modulations of the voice, throwing back 
their heads, thumping their sides and indulging in 
every kind of extravagance of statement, language 
and style. As a result, while the speech, from its 
very monstrosity, meets with applause, the case 
remains unintelligible. However, let us pass to 
another subject ; my aim is to win favour for 


gratiae praecipieiido recta quam offensae reprehend- 
endo prava mereamur. 

40 Brevis erit narratio ante omnia,, si iride coeperimus 
rem exponere, unde ad iudicem pertinet ; deinde, si 
nihil extra causam dixerimus ; turn etiam, si recideri- 
mus omnia, quibus sublatis neque cognitioni quid- 

41 quam neque utilitati detrahatur. Solet enim quae- 
dam esse partium brevitas, quae longam tamen efficit 
summam. In portum veni, navem prospexi, quanti vehe- 
ret interrogavi, de pretio convenit, conscendi, sublatae 
sunt a,7icorae } soluimus oram, profecti sumus. Nihil ho- 
rum dici celerius potest, sed sufficit dicere e portu 
navigavi. Et quotiens exitus rei satis ostendit priora, 
debemus hoc esse coiitenti, quo reliqua intelliguntur. 

42 Quare^ cum dicere liceat, Ext mihi films iuvenis, omnia 
ilia supervacua : Cupidus ego liberorum uxorem duxi, 
natuin filium sustuli, educavi, in adolescentiam perduxi. 
Ideoque Graecorum aliqui aliud circumcisam ex- 
positionem, id est o-uVro/xov, aliud brevem putaverunt, 
quod ilia supervacuis careret, haec posset aliquid ex 

43 necessariis desiderare. Nos autem brevitatem in 
hoc ponimus, non ut minus, sed ne plus dicatur quam 
oporteat. Nam iterationes quid em et ravroAoyia? et 
Trepto-croXoyia?, quas in narratione vitandas quidam 
scriptores artium tradiderunt, transeo ; sunt enim 


BOOK IV. ii. 39-43 

pointing out the right road rather than to give 
offence by rebuking such perversity. 

The statement of facts will be brief, if in the first 40 
place we start at that point of the case at which it 
begins to concern the judge, secondly avoid irrele- 
vance, and finally cut out everything the removal 
of which neither hampers the activities of the judge 
nor harms our own case. For frequently conciseness 41 
of detail is not inconsistent with length in the 
whole. Take for instance such a statement as the 
following : " I came to the harbour, I saw a ship, I 
asked the cost of a passage, the price was agreed, I 
went on board, the anchor was weighed, we loosed 
our cable and set out." Nothing could be terser 
than these assertions, but it would have been quite 
sufficient to say " I sailed from the harbour." And 
whenever the conclusion gives a sufficiently clear 
idea of the premisses, we must be content with 
having given a hint which will enable our audience 
to understand what we have left unsaid. Con- 42 
sequently when it is possible to say " I have a young 
son," it is quite superfluous to say, " Being desirous of 
children I took a wife, a son was born whom I 
acknowledged and reared and brought up to man- 
hood." For this reason some of the Greeks draw a 
distinction between a concise statement (the word 
they use is crwrofto?) and a brief statement, the 
former being free from all superfluous matter, while 
the latter may conceivably omit something that 
requires to l>e stated. Personally, when I use the 43 
word brevity, I mean not saying less, but not saying, 
more than occasion demands. As for repetitions 
and tautologies and diffuseness, which some writers 
of textbooks tell us we must avoid, I pass them by ; 



haec vitia non tantum brevitatis gratia refugienda. 

44 Non minus autem cavenda erit, quae nimium 
corripientes omnia sequitur, obscuritas, satiusque est 
aliquid narrationi superesse quam deesse. Nam 
supervacua cum taedio dicuntur, necessaria cum 

45 periculo subtrahuntur. Quare vitanda est etiam ilia 
Sallustiana, quanquam in ipso virtutis obtinet locum, 
brevitas et abruptum sermonis genus, quod otiosum 
fortasse lectorem minus fallat, audientem transvolat 
nee dum repetatur exspectat, cum praesertim lector 
non fere sit nisi eruditus, iudicem rura plerumque in 
decurias mittant de eo pronuntiaturum quod intellex- 
erit ; ut fortasse ubicunque, in narratione tamen 
praecipue, media haec tenenda sit via dicendi quan- 

46 turn opus est et quantum satis est. Quantum opus est 
autem non ita solum accipi volo, quantum ad indican- 
dum sufficit, quia non inornata debet esse brevitas, 
alioqui sit indocta ; nam et fallit voluptas et minus 
longa quae delectant videiitur, ut amoenum ac molle 
iter, etiamsi est spatii amplioris, minus fatigat quam 

47 durum aridumque compendium. Neque mihi unquam 
tanta fuerit cura brevitatis, ut non ea, quae credibilem 
faciunt expositionem, inseri velim. Simplex enim 
et undique praecisa non tarn narratio vocari potest 
quam confessio. Sunt porro multae condicione ipsa 



BOOK IV. ii. 43-47 

they are faults which we should shun for other reasons 
beside our desire for brevity. But we must be 44 
equally on our guard against the obscurity which . 
results from excessive abridgment, and it is better to 
say a little more than is necessary than a little less. 
For though a diffuse irrelevance is tedious, the 
omission of what is necessary is positively dangerous. 
We must therefore avoid even the famous terseness 45 
of Sallust (though in his case of course it is a merit), 
and shun all abruptness of speech, since a style 
which presents no difficulty to a leisurely reader, 
flies past a hearer and will not stay to be 
looked at again ; and whereas the reader is 
almost always a man of learning, the judge* often 
comes to his panel from the country side and is 
expected to give a decision 011 what he can under- 
stand. Consequently we must aim, perhaps every- 
where, but above all in our statement of facts, at 
striking the happy mean in our language, and the ' 
happy mean may be defined as saying just what 
is necessary and just what is sufficient. By " just 46 
what is necessary " I mean not the bare minimum 
necessary to convey our meaning ; for our brevity 
must not be devoid of elegance, without which it 
would be merely uncouth : pleasure beguiles the 
attention, and that which delights us ever seems less 
long, just as a picturesque and easy journey tires us 
less for all its length than a difficult short cut through 
an arid waste. And I would never carry my desire 47 
for brevity so far as to refuse admission to details 
which may contribute to the plausibility of our 
narrative. Simplify and curtail your statement of 
facts in every direction and you will turn it into 
something more like a confession. Moreover, the 



rei longae narration es, quibus extrema (ut praecepi) 
prooemii parte ad intentionem praeparandus est 
index ; deinde curandum, ut omni arte vel ex spatio 

48 eius detrahamus aliquid vel ex taedio. Ut minus 
longa sit, efficiemus quae poterimus differendo, non 
tamen sine mentione eorum, quae differemus : Quas 
causas occidendi habuerit, quos adsumpserit conscios, 
quemadmodum disposuerit insidias, probationis loco 

49 dicam. Quaedam vero ex ordine praetermittenda, 
quale est apud Ciceronem : Moritur Fulcinius ; multa 
enim, quae sunt in re, quia remota sunt a causa, prae- 
termittam. Et parti tio taedium levat : Dicam quae 
acta sint ante ipsum rei contractum, dicam quae in re 

50 ipsa, dicam quae postea. Ita tres potius modicae 
narrationes videbimtur quam una longa. Interim 
expediet expositiones brevi interfatione distinguere : 
Audistis quae ante acta sunt, accipite nunc quae inse- 
quuntur. Reficietur enim iudex priorum fine et se 

51 velut ad novum rursus initium praeparabit. Si tamen 
adhibitis quoque his artibus in loiigum exierit ordo 
rerum_, erit non inutilis in extrema parte commonitio ; 

1 pro Caec. iv. 11. 

BOOK IV. ii. 47-51 

circumstances of the case will often necessitate a 
long statement of facts, in which case, as I have 
already enjoined, the judge should be prepared for 
it at the conclusion of the exordium. Next we must 
put forth all our art either to shorten it or to render 
it less tedious. We must do what we can to make 48 
it less long by postponing some points, taking care 
however to mention what it is that we propose to 
postpone. Take the following as an example. " As 
regards his motives for killing him, his accomplices 
and the manner in which he disposed his ambush, 
I will speak when I come to the proof." Some 49 
things indeed may be omitted altogether from our 
marshalling of the facts, witness the following 
example from Cicero, 1 " Fulcinius died ; there are 
many circumstances which attended that event, but 
as they have little bearing on this case, I shall pass 
them by." Division of our statement into its various 
heads is another method of avoiding tedium : for 
example, " I will tell you first what preceded this 
affair, then what occurred in its actual development, 
and finally you shall hear its sequel." Such a 50 
division will give the impression rather of three short 
than of one long statement. At times it will be well 
to interrupt our narrative by interjecting some brief 
remark like the following : " You have heard what 
happened before : now learn what follows." The 
judge will be refreshed by the fact that we have 
brought our previous remarks to a close and will 
prepare himself for what may be regarded as a fresh 
start. If however after employing all these artifices 61 
our array of facts is still long, it will not be without 
advantage to append a summary at the end of it as 
a reminder : Cicero does this even at the close of a 



quod Cicero etiam in brevi narratione fecit : Adhuc, 
Caesar, Q. Ligarius omni culpa caret ; domo est egressus 
non modo nullum ad bellum sed ne ad minimam quidem 
belli suspicionem et cetera. 

52 Credibilis autem erit narratio ante omnia., si prius 
consuluerimus nostrum animum, ne quid naturae 
dicamus adversum, deinde si causas ac ration es factis 
praeposuerimus, non omnibus sed de quibus quae- 
ritur, si personas convenientes iis, quae facta credi 
volemus, constituerimus, ut furti reum cupidum, 
adulterii libidinosum, homicidii temerarium, vel his 
contraria, si defendemus ; praeterea loca, tempora 

53 et similia. Est autem quidam et ductus rei credibilis, 
qualis in comoediis etiam et in mimis. Aliqua enim 
natural] ter sequuntur et cohaerent ut, si priora bene 
narraveris, iudex ipse quod postea sis narraturus 

54 exspectet. Ne illtid quidem fuerit inutile, semina 
quaedam probationum spargere, verum sic ut narra- 
tionem esse meminerimus non j)robationem. Non- 
nunquam tamen etiam argumeiito aliquo confirmabi- 
mus, quod proposuerimus, sed simplici et brevi, ut 
in veneficiis : Sanus bibit, statim concidit, livor ac tu- 

55 mor confestim eat invecutus. Hoc faciunt et illae prae- 

1 pro Lig. ii. 4. 

BOOK IV. ii. 51-55 

brief statement of facts in the pro Ligaiio l : "To 
this day, Caesar, Quiiitus Ligarius is free from all 
blame : he left his home not merely without the 
least intention of joining in any war, but when there 
was not the least suspicion of any war etc." 

The statement of fact will be credible, if in the first 52 
place we take care to say nothing contrary to nature, 
secondly if we assign reasons and motives for the 
facts on which the inquiry turns (it is unnecessary to 
do so with the subsidiary facts as well), and if we 
make the characters of the actors in keeping with 
the facts we desire to be believed : we shall for 
instance represent a person accused of theft as 
covetous, accused of adultery as lustful, accused of 
homicide as rash, or attribute the opposite qualities 
to these persons if we are defending them : further 
we must do the same with place, time and the like. 
It is also possible to treat the subject in such a way 53 
as to give it an air of credibility, as is done in 
comedy and farce. For sometKings have such natural 
sequence and coherence that, if only the first 
portion of your statement is satisfactory, the .judge 
will himself . anticipate what you havE^gSr to 
say in the later part. It will also be useful to 54 
scatter some hints of our proofs here and there, but 
in such a way that it is never forgotten that we are 
making a statement of facts and not a proof. Some- 
times, however, we must also support our assertions 
by a certain amount of argument, though this must 
be short and simple : for instance in a case of 
poisoning we shall say, " He was perfectly well 
when he drank, he fell suddenly to the ground, and 
blackness and swelling of the body immediately 
supervened." The same result is produced by pre- 55 



parationes,, cum reus dicitur robustus, armatus contra 
iufirmoS; inermes, secures. Omnia denique, quae 
probatione tractaturi sumus, personam, causam, 
locum, tempus, instrumentum, occasionem , narratione 

56 delibabimus. Aliquando, si destituti fuerimus his, 
etiam fatebimur vix esse credibile, sed verum et hoc 
maius habendum scelus ; nescire nos quomodo factum 

57 sit aut quare, mirari sed probaturos. Optimae vero 
praeparationes erunt quae latuerint, ut a Cicerone 
sunt quidem utilissime praedicta omnia, per quae 
Miloni Clodius non Clodio Milo insidiatus esse videa- 
tur ; plurimum tamen facit ilia callidissima simplici- 
tatis imitatio : Milo autem, cum in senatu juisset eo die, 
quoad senatus est dimissus, domum venit, calceos et 
vestimenta mutavit, paulisper, dmn se uxor, uljii, comparat, 

58 commoratus est. Quam nihil festinato^ nihil prae- 
parato fecisse videtur Milo ! Quod non solum rebus 
ipsis vir eloqueiitissimus, quibus moras et lentum 
profectionis ordinem ducit, sed verbis etiam vulgari- 
bus et cotidianis et arte occulta consecutus est ; quae 
si aliter dicta essent, strepitu ipso iudicem ad custo- 

59 diendum patronum excitassent. Frigere videntur ista 
plerisque, sed hoc ipso manifestum est, quomodo iudi- 

1 pro Mil. x. 28. 

BOOK IV. ii. 55-59 

paratory remarks such as the following : " The 
accused is a strong man and was fully armed, while 
his opponents were weak, unarmed and suspecting no 
evil." We may in fact touch on everything that we 
propose to produce in our proof, while making our 
statement of facts, as for instance points connected 
with persons, cause, place, time, the instrument and 
occasion employed. Sometimes, when this/resource 56 
is unavailable, we may even confess that the charge, 
though true, is scarcely credible, and that therefore 
it must be regarded as all the more atrocious; that 
we do not know how the deed was done or why, that 
we are filled with amazement, but will prove our 
case. The best kind of preparatory remarks are 57 
those which cannot be recognised as such : Cicero, 1 
for instance, is extraordinarily happy in the way he 
mentions in advance everything that shows that 
Clodius lay in wait for Milo and not Milo for Clodius. 
The most effective stroke of all is his cunning feint 
of simplicity : " Milo, on the other hand, having 
been in the senate all day till the house rose, went 
home, changed his shoes and clothes, and waited for 
a short time, while his wife was getting ready, as is 
the way with women." What an absence of haste 58 
and premeditation this gives to Milo's proceedings. 
And the great orator secures this effect not merely 
by producing facts which indicate the slow and 
tardy nature of Milo's departure, but by the use of 
the ordinary language of everyday speech and a 
careful concealment of his art. Had he spoken 
otherwise, his words would by their very sound have 
warned the judge to keep an eye on the advocate. 
The majority of readers regard this passage as lack- 59 
ing in distinction, but this very fact merely serves 



cem fefellerit, quod vix a lectore deprehenditur. Haec 

60 sunt quae credibilem faciant expositionem. Nam 
id quidem, ne qua contraria aut sibi repugnantia in 
narratione dicamus, si cui praecipiendum est, is 
reliqua frustra docetur, etiamsi quidam scriptores 
artium hoc quoque tanquam occultum et a se 
prudenter erutum tradunt. 

61 His tribus narrandi virtutibus adiiciunt quidam 
magnificentiam, quam ^icyaA-oTrpeVeiav vacant, quae 
iieque in omnes causas cadit (nam quid in plerisque 
iudiciis privatis, de certa credita, locate et conducto, 
interdictis habere loci potest supra modum se tollens 
oratio ?) neque semper est utilis, velut proximo 

62 exemplo Miloniano patet. Et meminerimus multas 
esse causas, in quibus confitendum, excusandum, 
summittendum sit quod exponimus ; quibus omni- 
bus aliena est ilia magnificentiae virtus. Quare non 
magis proprium iiarrationis est magnifice dicere 
quam miserabiliter, invidiose, graviter, dulciter, 
urbane ; quae, cum suo quoque loco sint laudabilia, 
non sunt huic parti proprie adsignata et velut dedita. 

63 Ilia quoque ut narration! apta, ita ceteris quoque 
partibus communis est virtus, quam Theodectes huic 
uni proprie dedit ; non enim magnificam modo vult 
esse, verum etiam iucundam expositionem. Sunt 

BOOK IV. ii. 59-63 

to show how the art which is scarce detected by H 
reader succeeded in hoodwinking the judge. It is 
qualities of this kind that make the statement of facts 
credible. If a student requires to be told that we 60 
must avoid contradiction and inconsistency in our 
statement of facts, it will be vain to attempt to instruct 
him on the remaining points, although some writers 
of text books produce this precept as if it were a 
mystery only discovered by their own personal 

To these three qualities some add magnificence of 61 
diction or /xeyaAoTrpcTrcio. as they call it : this quality 
is not, however, suitable to all cases. For what place 
has language that rises above the ordinary level in 
the majority of private suits dealing with loans, 
letting and hiring and interdicts ? Nor yet is it 
always expedient, as may be inferred from the 
passage just cited from the pro Milone/ We must 62 
remember, too, that there are many cases in which 
confession, excuse or modification are necessary with 
regard to our statements : and magnificence is a 
quality wholly out of keeping with such procedure. 
Magnificence of diction is therefore no more specially 
appropriate to the statement of facts than language 
calculated to excite pity or hatred, or characterised 
by dignity, charm or wit. Each of these qualities 
is admirable in its proper place, but none can be 
regarded as the peculiar and inalienable property of 
this portion of the speech. 

Theodectes asserts that the statement of facts 63 
should not merely be magnificent, but attractive 
in style. But this quality again though suitable 
enough to the statement of facts, is equally so in 
other portions of the speech. There are others 

G 2 


qui adiiciant his evidentiam. quae empycia Graece 

64 vocatur. Neque ego quemquam deceperim, ut 
dissimulem Ciceroni quoque plures partes placere. 
Nam praeterquam planam et brevem et credibilem 
vult esse evidentem, moratam cum dignitate. Sed 
in oratione morata debent esse omnia cum dignitate, 
quae poterunt. Evidentia in narratione, quantum 
ego intelligo, est quidem magna virtus, cum quid 
veri non dicendum, sed quodammodo etiam osten- 
dendum est ; sed subiici perspicuitati potest, quam 
quidam etiam contrariam interim putaverunt, quia 
in quibusdam causis obscuranda veritas esset ; quod 

65 est ridiculum. Nam qui obscurare vult, narrat falsa 
pro veris, et in iis quae narrat debet laborare, ut 
videantur quam evidentissima. 

66 Et quatenus etiam forte quadam pervenimus ad 
difficilius narrationum genus, iam de iis loquamur, 
in quibus res contra nos erit, quo loco nonnulli prae- 
tereundam narrationem putaverunt. Et sane nihil 
est facilius, nisi prorsus totam causam omnirio non 
agere. Sed si aliqua iusta ratione huiusmodi susce- 
peris litem, cuius artis est malam esse causam 
silentio confiteri ? nisi forte tarn hebes futurus est 
iudex, ut secundum id pronuntiet, quod sciet narrare 

67 te noluisse. Neque infitias eo in narratione, ut 
aliqua neganda, aliqua adiicienda, aliqua mutanda, 

1 Top. xxvi. 97. 

BOOK IV. ii. 63-67 

who add palpability, which the Greeks call 
And I will not conceal the fact that Cicero l himself 64 
holds that more qualities are required. For in 
addition to demanding that it should be plain, brief 
and credible, he would have it clear, characteristic j 
and worthy of the occasion. But everything in 
a speech should be characteristic and worthy of the 
occasion as far as possible. Palpability, as far 
as I understand the term, is no doubt a great virtue, 
when a truth requires not merely to be told, but to 
some extent obtruded, still it may be included under 
lucidity. Some, however, regard this quality as 
actually being injurious at times, on the ground that 
in certain cases it is desirable to obscure the truth. 
This contention is, however, absurd. For he who 65 
desires to obscure the situation, will state what is 
false in lieu of the truth, but must still strive to 
secure an appearance of palpability for the facts 
which he narrates. 

A chance turn of the discussion has led us to a 66 
difficult type of statement of facts. I will therefore 
proceed to speak of those in which the facts are 
against us. Under such circumstances some have 
held that we should omit the statement of facts 
altogether. Nothing can be more easy, except 
perhaps to throw up the case altogether. But 
suppose you undertake a case of this kind with 
some good reason. It is surely the worst art to 
admit the badness of the case by keeping silence. 
We can hardly hope that the judge will be so 
dense as to give a decision in favour of a case which 
he knows we were unwilling to place before him. 
I do not of course deny that just as there may be 67 
some points which you should deny in your statement 



sic aliqua etiam tacenda ; sed tacenda, quae tacere 
oportebit et liberum erit. Quod fit nonnunquam 
brevitatis quoque gratia, quale illud est, Respondit 

68 quae ei visum est. Distinguamus igitur genera 
causarum. Namque in iis, in quibus non de culpa 
quaeretur sed de actione, etiamsi erunt contra nos 
themata, confiteri nobis licebit : Pecuniam de temph 
sustulit sed privatam, ideoque sacrilegus non est. 

69 Virginem rapuit, non tamen oplio patri dabitur. In- 
genuum stupravit et stupratus se suspendit, non tamen 
ideo stuprator capite ut causa mortis punietur, sed decent 
milia, quae poena stupratori constHuta est, dabit. Verum 
in his quoque confessionibus est aliquid, quod de 
invidia, quam expositio adversarii fecit, detrahi 
possit, cum etiam servi nostri de peccatis suis mol- 

70 lius loquantur. Quaedam enim quasi non narrantes 
mitigabimus : Non quidem, ut adversarius dicit, con- 
silium furti in templum attulit nee diu captavit eius rei 
tempus ; sed occasione et absentia custodum corruptus et 
pecunia, quae nimium in animis hominum potest, victus 
est. Sed quid refert ? peccavit et fur est ; nihil attinet 

J The victim can claim either that the ravisher should 
marry her or be put to death. Her father cannot however 
make either of these demands on her behalf. 


BOOK IV. ii. 67-70 

of facts, others which you should add, and yet again 
others that you should alter, so there may be some 
which you should pass over in silence. But still 
only those points should be passed over which we 
ought and are at liberty to treat in this way. This 
is sometimes done for the sake of brevity, as in the 
phrase "He replied as he thought fit." We 68 
must therefore distinguish between case and case. 
In those where there is no question of guilt but 
only of law, we may, even though the facts be 
against us, admit the truth. " He took money 
from the temple, but it was private property, and 
therefore he is not guilty of sacrilege. He abducted 
a maiden, but the father l can have no option as to 
his fate. He assaulted a freeborn boy, and the 69 
latter hanged himself, but that is no reason for the 
author of the assault to be awarded capital punish- 
ment as having caused his death ; he will instead 
pay 10,000 sesterces, the fine imposed by law for 
such a crime." But even in making these ad- 
missions we may to some extent lessen the odium 
caused by the statement of our opponent. For even 
our slaves extenuate their own faults. In some 70 
cases, too, we may mitigate a bad impression by 
words which avoid the appearance of a statement of 
facts. We may say, for instance, "He did not, as 
our opponent asserts, enter the temple with the 
deliberate intention of theft nor seek a favourable 
occasion for the purpose, but was led astray by 
the opportunity, the absence of custodians, and 
the sight of the money (and money has always an 
undue influence on the mind of man), and so 
yielded to temptation. What does that matter ? 
He committed the offence and is a thief. It is 



71 id dejendere, cuius poenam non recusamus. Interim 
quasi damnemus ipsi : Vis te dicam vino impulsum ? 
errore lapsum ? node deceptum ? vera sunt ista forlasse ; 
tu tamen ingenuum stuprasti, solve decem milia. Non- 
nunquam praepositione praemuniri potest causa, 

72 deinde exponi. Contraria sunt omnia tribus filiis, 
qui in mortem patris coniurarant : sortiti nocte 
singuli per ordinem cum ferro cubiculum intrarunt 
patre dormiente ; cum occidere eum nemo potuisset, 

73 excitato omnia indicarunt. Si tamen pater, qui 
divisit patrimonium et reos parricidii defendit, sic 
agat : Quod contra legem sufficit, parricidiurn obiicilur 
iuvenibus, quorum pater vivit atque etiam liberis suis 
adest. Ordinem rei narrare quid necesse est, cum ad 
legem nihil pertineat ? sed si confessionem culpae meae 
exigitis, fid pater durus et patrimonii, quod iam melius 

74 ab his administrari poterat, ienax custos ; deinde 
subiiciat stimulates ab iis, quorum indulgentiores 
parentes erant, semper tamen habuisse eum animum, 
qui sit eventu deprehensus,, ut occidere patrem non 

BOOK IV. ii. 70-74 

useless to defend an act to the punishment of 
which we can raise no objection." Again we may 71 
sometimes go near condemning our client our- 
selves. " Do you wish me to say that you were 
under the influence of wine ? that you made a mis- 
take ? that the darkness deceived you ? That may 
be true. But still you committed an assault on a 
freeborn boy ; pay your 10,000 sesterces." Some- 
times we may fortify our case in advance by a 
preliminary summary, from which we proceed to the 
full statement of facts. All the evidence points to 72 
the guilt of three sons who had conspired against 
their father. After drawing lots they entered 
their father's bedroom while he slept, one following 
the other in the order predetermined and each 
armed with a sword. None of them had the heart 
to kill him, he woke and they confessed all. If, 73 
however, the father, who has divided his estate 
among them and is defending them when accused 
of parricide, pleads as follows : " As regards my 
defence against the law, it suffices to point out, 
that these young men are charged with parricide 
in spite of the fact that their father still lives and is 
actually appearing on behalf of his children. What 
need is there for me to set forth the facts as they 
occurred since the law does not apply to them ? But if 
you desire me to confess my own guilt in the matter, 
I was a hard father to them and watched aver my 
estate, which would have been better managed by 
them,, with miserly tenacity." And if he then should 74 
add, "they were spurred to attempt the crime by 
others who had more indulgent fathers ; but their 
real feelings towards their father have been proved 
by the result ; they could not bring themselves to 



possent ; neque eiiim iureiurando opus fuisse, si 
alioqui hoc mentis hafcuissent,, nee sorte, nisi quod 
se quisque eximi voluerit, omnia haec qualiacunque 
placidioribus animis accipientur, ilia brevi primae 

75 propositions defensione mollita. At cum quaeritur 
an factum sit vel quale factum sit, licet omnia 
contra nos sint, quomodo tamen evitare expositionem 
salva causae ratione possumus ? Narravit accusator 
neque ita ut^ quae essent acta, tantum indicaret, sed 
adiecit invidiam, rem verbis exasperavit, accesserunt 
probationes, peroratio incendit et plenos irae reli- 

76 quit. Exspectat naturaliter iudex, quid narretur a 
nobis. Si nihil expoiiimus, ilia esse quae adversa- 
rius dixit et talia qualia dixit credat necesse est. 
Quid ergo ? eadem exponemus ? Si de qualitate 
agitur, cuius turn demum quaestio est, cum de re 
constat, eadem sed non eodem modo ; alias causas, 

77 aliam mentem, aliam rationem dabo. Verbis elevare 

quaedam licebit ; luxuria liberalitatis, avaritia parsi- 

BOOK JV. ii. 74-77 

kill him. It would have been quite unnecessary 
for them to take an oath to kill him, if they had 
really had the heart to do the deed, while the only 
explanation of their drawing lots is that each of 
them wished to avoid the commission of the crime." 
If such were his pleading, all these pleas would, 
such as they are, find the judges all the more 
disposed to mercy, since the brief defence offered 
in the first summary statement would have paved 
the way for them. But if the question is wjiether 75 
an act has been committed or what its nature may 
be, even though everything be against us, how can 
we avoid a statement of facts without gross neglect 
of our case ? The accuser has made a statement of 
facts, and has done so not merely in such a way as 
to indicate what was done, but has added such 
comments as might excite strong prejudice against 
us and made the facts seem worse than they are 
by the language which he has used. On the top 
of this have come the proofs, while the peroration 
has kindled the indignation of the judges and left 
them full of anger against us. The judge naturally 76 
waits to hear what we can state in our behalf. If 
we make no statement, he cannot help believing 
that our opponent's assertions are correct and that 
their tone represents the truth. What are we to 
do then ? Are we to restate the same facts ? Yes, 
if the question turns on the nature of the act, as 
it will if there is no doubt about the commission, 
but we must restate them in a different way, 
alleging other motives and another purpose and 
putting a different complexion on the case. Some 77 
imputations we may mitigate by the use of other 
words ; luxury will be softened down into generosity, 


moniae, negligentia simplicitatis nomine lenietur ; 
vultu denique, voce, habitu vel favoris aliquid vel 
miserationis merebor. Solet nonnunquam inovere 
lacrimas ipsa confessio. Atque ego libenter interro- 
gem, sint ilia defensuri, quae non narraverint, 

78 necne? Nam si neque defenderint neque narra- 
verint, tota causa prodetur ; at si defensuri sunt, 
proponere certe plerumque id, quod confirmaturi 
sumus, oportet. Cur ergo non exponamus, quod et 
dilui potest et, ut hoc contingat, utique indicandum 

79 est? Aut quid inter probationem et narrationem 
interest, nisi quod narratio est probationis continua 
propositio, rursus probatio narrationi congruens con- 
firmatio ? Videamus ergo, num haec expositio 
longior demum debeat esse et paulo verbosior prae- 
paratione et quibusdam argumentis (argumentis dico, 
non argumentatione), cui tamen plurimum confert 
frequens adfirmatio effecturos nos quod dicimus ; 
non posse vim rerum ostendi prima expositione ; 
exspectent et opiniones suas differant et bene 

80 sperent. Denique utique narrandum est, quidquid 
aliter quam adversarius exposuit narrari potest, aut 
etiam prooemia sunt in his causis supervacua ; quae 
quid magis agunt, quam ut cognitioni rerum accom- 


BOOK IV. ii. 77-80 

avarice into economy, carelessness into simplicity, 
and I shall seek to win a certain amount of favour 
or pity by look, voice and attitude. Sometimes a 
frank confession is of itself sufficient to move the 
jury to tears. And I should like to ask those who 
differ from me whether they are prepared to defend 
what they have refused to state, or no. For if 78 
they refuse either to defend or to state the facts, 
they will be giving away their whole case. If, on 
the other hand, they do propose to put in a defence, 
they must at least, as a rule, set forth what they 
intend to justify. Why then not state fully facts 
which can be got rid of and" must in fact be pointed 
out to make that possible ? Or again what 79 
difference is there between a proof and a statement 
of facts save that the latter is a proof put forward 
in continuous form, while a proof is a verification 
of the facts as put forward in the statement ? Let 
us consider therefore whether under such circum- 
stances the statement should not be somewhat 
longer and fuller than usual, since we shall require 
to make some preliminary remarks and to introduce 
certain special arguments (note that I say arguments, 
and not argumentation), while it will add greatly 
to the force of our defence if we assert not once 
nor twice that we shall prove what we say is true 
and that the significance of the facts cannot be 
brought out by one opening statement, bidding them 
wait, delay forming their opinions and hope for the 
best. Finally it is important to include in our 80 
statement anything that can be given a different 
complexion from that put upon it by our opponent. 
Otherwise even an exordium will be superfluous 
in a case of this kind. For what is its purpose if 



modatiorem iudicem faciant ? Atque constabit, nus- 
quam esse eorum maiorem usum, quam ubi animus 
iudicis ab aliqua contra nos insita opinione flectendus 

81 est. Coniecturales autem causae, in quibus de facto 
quaeritur, non tarn saepe rei, de qua indicium est,, 
quam eorum, per quae res colligenda est, exposi- 
tionem habent. Quae cum accusator suspiciose 
narret, reus levare suspicionem debeat, aliter ab hoc 

82 atque ab illo ad iudicem perferri oportet. At enim 
quaedam argumenta turba valent, diducta leviora 
sunt. Id quidem non eo pertinet, ut quaeratur an 
narrandum, sed quomodo narrandum sit. Nam et 
congerere plura in expositione quid prohibet, si id 
utile est causae, et promittere, sed et dividere 
narrationem et probationes subiungere partibus 

83 atque ita transire ad sequentia ? Nam ne iis qui- 
dem accedo, qui semper eo putant ordine, quo quid 
actum sit., esse narrandum, sed eo malo narrare, quo 
expedit. Quod fieri plurimis figuris licet. Nam et 
aliquando nobis excidisse simulamus, cum quid 

1 For this technical term = cases turning on questions of 
fact, see HI. vi. 30 xqq. 


BOOK IV. ii. 80-83 

not to make the judge better disposed for the 
investigation of the case ? And yet it will be 
agreed that the exordium is never more useful than 
when it is necessary to divert the judge from some 
prejudice that he has formed against us. Con- 81 
jectural 1 cases, on the other hand that is to say 
questions of fact require a statement, which will 
more often deal with the circumstances from which 
a knowledge of the point at issue may be derived 
than with the actual point which is under trial. 
When the accuser states these circumstances in 
such a manner as to throw suspicion on the case for 
the defence, and the accused has consequently to 
dispel that suspicion, the facts must be presented to 
the judge in quite a different light by the latter. But, 82 
it may be urged, some arguments are strong when put 
forward in bulk, but far less effective when employed 
separately. My answer is that this remark does not 
affect the question whether we ought to make a 
statement of fact, but concerns the question how it 
should be made. For what is there to prevent us 
from amassing and producing a number of arguments 
in the statement, if that is likely to help our cause ? 
Or from subdividing our statement of facts and 
appending the proofs to their respective sections 
and so passing on to what remains to be said ? 
Neither do I agree with those who assert that 83 
the order of our statement of facts should always 
follow the actual order of events, but have a pre- 
ference for adopting the order which I consider 
most suitable. For this purpose we can employ a 
variety of figures. Sometimes, when we bring up 
a point in a place better suited to our purpose, 
we may pretend that it had escaped our notice ; 



utiliore loco reducimus, et interim nos reddituros 
reliquum ordinem testamur, quia sic futura sit causa 
lucidior ; interim re exposita subiungimus causas 

84 quae antecesserunt. Neque enim est una lex defen- 
sionis certumque praescriptum ; pro re, pro tempore 
intuenda quae prosint, atque ut erit- vulnus, ita vel 
curandum protinus vel, si curatio difFerri potest, 

85 interim deligandum. Nee saepius narrare duxerim 
nefas, quod Cicero pro Cluentio fecit ; estque iion 
concessum modo, sed aliquando etiam necessarium, 
ut in causis repetundarum omnibusque quae sim- 
plices non sunt. Amentis est enim superstitione 

86 praeceptorum contra rationem causae trahi. Narra- 
tionem ideo ante probationes ponere est institutum, 
ne iudex, qua de re quaeratur, ignoret. Cur igitur, si 
singula probanda aut refellenda erunt, non singula 
etiam narrentur ? Me certe, quantacunque iiostris 
experimentis habenda est fides, fecisse hoc in foro, 
quotiens ita desiderabat utilitas, probantibus et eru- 
ditis et iis, qui iudicabant, scio ; et (quod non arro- 
ganter dixerim, quia sunt plurimi, quibuscum egi, 
qui me refellere possiiit, si mentiar) fere ponendae 

87 a me causae officium exigebatur. Neque ideo tamen 
non id saepius facere oportebit, ut rerum ordinem 
sequamur. Quaedam vero etiam turpiter conver- 


BOOK IV. ii. 83-87 

occasionally, loo, we may inform the judge that we 
shall adhere to the natural order for the remainder 
of our statement, since by so doing we shall make 
our case clearer, while at times after stating a fact, 
we may append the causes which preceded it. For 84 
there is no single law or fixed rule governing the 
method of defence. We must consider what is 
most advantageous in the circumstances arid nature 
of the case, and treat the wound as its nature 
dictates, dressing at once or, if the dressing can be 
delayed, applving a temporary bandage. Again I 85 
do not regard it as a crime to repeat a statement of 
a fact more than once, as Cicero does in the pro 
Cluentio. It is not merely permissible, but some- 
times necessary, as in trials for extortion and all 
complicated cases ; and only a lunatic will allow a 
superstitious observance of rules to lead him counter 
to the interests of his case. The reason for placing 86 
the statement of facts before the proof is to prevent 
the judge from being ignorant of the question at 
issue. Why then, if each individual point has to be 
proved or refuted, should not each individual point be 
stated as well ? If my own experience may be 
trusted, I know that I haye followed this practice in 
the courts, whenever occasion demanded it, and my 
procedure has been approved both by learned authori- 
ties and the judges themselves, while the duty of 
setting forth the case was generally entrusted to. me. 
I am not boasting, for there are many with whom I 
have been associated as counsel, who can bring me to 
book if I lie. On the other hand this is no reason 87 
for not following the order of events as a general rule. 
Indeed inversion of the order has at times a most 
unhappy effect, as for example if you should mention 




tuntur, ut si peperisse narres, deinde concepisse ; 
apertum testamentum, deinde signatum ; in quibus 
si id, quod posterius est, dixeris, de priore tacere 
optimum ; palam est enim praecessisse. 

88 Sunt quaedam et falsae expositiones, quarum in 
foro duplex genus est : alterum, quod instrumentis 
adiuvatur, ut P. Clodius fiducia testium, qua nocte 
incestum Romae commiserat, Interanmae se fuisse 
dicebat ; alterum, quod est tuendum dicentis in- 
genio. Id interim ad solam verecundiam pertinet, 
unde etiam mihi videtur dici color, interim ad quae- 

89 stionem. Sed utrumcunque erit, prima sit curarum, 
ut id quod fingemus fieri possit ; deinde, ut et per- 
sonae et loco et tempori congruat et credibilem 
rationem et ordinem habeat ; si continget, etiam 
verae alicui rei cohaereat aut argumeiito, quod sit in 
causa, confirmetur. Nam quae tota extra rem petita 

90 sunt, mentiendi licentiam produnt. Curandum prae- 
cipue, (quod fingentibus frequenter excidit) ne qua 
inter- se pugnent ; quaedam enim partibus blandi- 
untur, sed in summam non consentiunt ; praeterea, 

. 1 color is a technical term for ' ' the particular aspect given 
to a case by the skilful manipulation of the facts the 'gloss' 
or ' varnish ' put on them by the accused or accuser. "- 
Peterson on Quint, x. i. 116. 


BOOK IV. 11. 87-90 

first that a woman has brought forth and then that 
she has conceived, or that a will has been read and 
then that it has been signed. In such cases, if you 
should happen to have mentioned the later incident, 
it is better to say nothing about the former, which 
must quite obviously have come first. 

Sometimes, too, we get false statements of facts ; 88 
these, as far as actual pleading in the courts is con- 
cerned, fall into two classes. In the first case the state- 
ment depends on external support ; Publius Clodius, 
for instance, relied on his witnesses when he stated 
that he was at Interamna on the night when he com- 
mitted abominable sacrilege at Rome. The other has 
to be supported by the speaker's native talent, and 
sometimes consists simply in an assumption of modesty, 
which is, I imagine, the reason why it is called a 
gloss, 1 while at other times it will be concerned with 
the question at issue. Whichever of these two forms 89 
we employ, we must take care, first that our fiction 
is within the bounds of possibility, secondly that it 
is consistent with the persons, dates and places in- 
volved and thirdly that it presents a character and 
sequence that are not beyond belief: if possible, 
it should be connected with something that is 
admittedly true and should be supported by some 
argument that forms part of the actual case. For if 
we draw our fictions entirely from circumstances 
lying outside the case, the liberty which we have 
taken in resorting to falsehood will stand revealed. 
Above all we must see that we do not contradict 90 
ourselves, a slip which is far from rare on the part of 
spinners of fiction : for some things may put a most 
favourable complexion on portions of our case, and 
yet fail to agree as a whole. Further, what we say 

H 2 


ne iis, quae vera esse constabit, ad versa sint ; in 
schola etiam, ne color extra themata quaeratur. 

91 Utrobique autem orator meminisse debebit actione 
tota, quid finxerit, quoniam solent excidere quae 
falsa simtj verumque est illud, quod vulgo dicitur, 

92 mendacem meraorem esse oportere. Sciamus autem, 
si de nostro facto quaeratur, unum nobis aliquid esse 
dicendum ; si de alieno, mittere in plura suspiciones 
licere. Est tamen quibusdam scholasticis contro- 
versiis, in quibus ponitur aliquem non respondere 
quod interrogator, libertas omnia enumerandi, quae 

93 responded potuissent. Fingenda vero meminerimus 
ea, quae non cadant in testem. Sunt autem haec, 
quae a nostro dicuntur animo, cuius ipsi tantum 
conscii sumus ; item quod a defunctis, nee hoc enim 
est qui neget ; itemqiie ab eo cui idem expediet, is 
enim non negabit ; ab adversario quoque, quia non 

94 est habiturus in negando fidem. Somniorum et 
superstitionum colores ipsa iam facilitate auctori- 
tatem perdiderunt. Non est autem satis in narra- 
tione uti coloribus, nisi per totam actionem con- 
sentiant, cum praesertim quorundam probatio sola 

95 sit in adseveratione et perseverantia ; ut ille para- 
situs, qui ter abdicatum a divite iuvenem et abso- 


BOOK IV. ii. 90-95 

must not be at variance with the admitted truth. Even 
in the schools, if we desire a gloss, we must not look 
for it outside the facts laid down by our theme. In 91 
either case the orator should bear clearly in mind 
throughout his whole speech what the fiction is to 
which he has committed himself, since we are apt to 
forget our falsehoods, and there is no doubt about the 
truth of the proverb that a liar should have a good 
memory. But whereas, if the 'question turns on some 92 
act of our own, we must make one statement and 
stick to it, if it turns on an act committed by others, 
we may cast suspicion on a number of different 
points. In certain controversial themes of the schools, 
however, in which it is assumed that we have put a 
question and received no reply, we are at* liberty to 
enumerate all the possible answers that might have 
been given. But we must remember only to invent 93 
such things as cannot be checked by evidence : I 
refer to occasions when we make our own minds 
speak (and we are the only persons who are in their 
secret) or put words in the mouth of the dead (for 
what they say is not liable to contradiction) or 
again in the mouth of someone whose interests are 
identical with ours (for he will not contradict), or 
finally in the mouth of our opponent (for he will not 
be believed if he does deny). Glosses drawn from 94 
dreams and superstitions have long since lost their 
value, owing to the very ease with which they can 
be invented. But it will avail us little to use glosses 
in a statement of fact, unless they are consistent 
throughout the whole of our speech, more especially 
as certain things can only be proved by persistent 
assertion. Take for instance the case of the parasite 95 
who claims as his son a young man who has been 



lutum tanquam suum filium asserit, habebit quidem 
colorem, quo dicat et paupertatem sibi causam 
exponendi fuisse et ideo a se parasiti personam esse 
susceptam, quia in ilia domo filium haberet ; et ideo 
ilium ter innocentem abdicatum, quia filius abdi- 

96 cantis non esset. Nisi tamen in omnibus verbis et 
amorem patrium atque hunc quidem ardentissimum 
ostenderit et odium divitis et metutn pro iuvene, 
quern periculose mansurum in ilia domo, in qua tarn 
invisus sit, sciat, suspicione subiecti petitoris non 

97 Evenit aliquando in scholasticis controversiis, quod 
in foro an possit accidere dubito, ut eodem colore 
utraque pars utatur, deinde eum pro se quaeque 

98 defendat, ut in ilia controversia : Uxor marito dixit, 
appellatam se de stupro a privigno et sibi constitution 
tempus et locum ; eadem contra filius detulit de 
noverca, edito tantum alio tempore ac loco ; pater in 
eo, quern uxor praedixerat, filium invenit, in eo, 
quem filius, uxorem ; illam repudiavit, qua tacente 
filium abdicat. Nihil dici potest pro iuvene, quod 

99 non idem sit pro noverca. Ponentur tamen etiam 
communia ; deinde ex personarum comparatione et 

BOOK IV. ii. 95-99 

thrice disinherited by a wealthy father and thrice 
restored to his own. He will be able to put forward 
as a gloss or plea that poverty was the reason why he 
exposed the child, that he assumed the role of a 
parasite because his son was in the house in question 
and, lastly, that the reason why the young man was 
thrice disinherited was simply that he was not the 
son of the man who disinherited him. But unless 96 
every word that he utters reveals an ardent paternal 
affection, hatred for his wealthy opponent and 
anxiety on behalf of the youth, who will, he knows, 
be exposed to serious danger if he remains in the 
house where he is the victim of such dislike, he will 
be unable to avoid creating the suspicion that he 
has been suborned to bring the action. 

It sometimes happens in the controversial themes 97 
of the schools, though I doubt whether it could ever 
occur in the courts, that both sides employ the same 
gloss and support it on their own behalf. An 98 
example of this may be found in the theme which 
runs as follows. " A wife has stated to her husband 
that her stepson has attempted to seduce her and 
that a time and place have been assigned for their 
meeting : the son has brought the same charge 
against his stepmother, with the exception that a 
different time and place are mentioned. The father 
finds the son in the place mentioned by the wife, 
and the wife in the place mentioned by the son. 
He divorces her, and then, as she says nothing in 
her own defence, disinherits the son." No defence 
can be put forward for the son which is not also a 
defence of the stepmother. However, what is com- 99 
mon to both sides of the case will be stated, and 
then arguments will be drawn from a comparison of 



indicii ordine et silentio repudiatae argumenta 

100 ducentur. Ne illud qtiidem ignorare oportet, quae- 
dam esse quae colorem non recipiant, sed tantum 
defendenda sint, quails est ille dives, qui statuam 
pauperis inimici flagellis cecidit et reus est iniuriarum ; 
nam factum eius modestum esse nemo dixerit, fortasse 
ut sit tutum obtinebit. 

101 Quodsi pars expositionis pro nobis, pars contra nos 
erit, miscenda sit an separanda narratio, cum ipsa 
condicione causae deliberandum est. Nani si plura 
sunt quae iiocent, quae prosunt obruuiitur. Itaque 
tune dividere optimum erit, et iis, quae partem 
nostram adiuvabunt, expositis et confirmatis, adversus 
reliqua uti remediis, de quibus supra dictum est. 

102 Si plura proderunt, etiam coniungere licebit, ut quae 
obstant in mediis velut auxiliis nostris posita minus 
habeant viriuni. Quae tamen non erunt nuda po- 
nenda, sed ut et nostra aliqua argumentatioiie 
firmemus et diversa cur credibilia non sint adiicia- 
mus ; quia^ nisi distinxerimus, verendum est, ne l>ona 
nostra permixtis malis inquinentur. 

103 Ilia quoque de narratione praecipi solent, ne qua 

BOOK IV. ii. 99-103 

the characters of the two parties, from the order in 
which they laid information against each other and 
from the silence of the divorced wife. Still we ICO 
must not ignore the fact that there are some cases 
which do not admit of any form of gloss, but must 
be defended forthright. An example is provided by 
the case of the rich man who scourged the statue 
of a poor man who was his enemy, and was subse- 
quently indicted for assault. Here no one can deny 
that the act was outrageous, but it may be possible 
to maintain that it is not punishable by law. 

If, however, part of the statement of facts tells in 101 
our favour and part against us, we must consider 
whether in view of the circumstances of the case 
the parts in question should be blent or kept 
apart. If the points which are damaging to. our 
case be in the majority, the points which are in 
its favour will be swamped. Under those circum- 
stances it will be best to keep them apart and, after 
setting forth and proving the points which help our 
case, to meet the rest by emploving the remedies 
mentioned above. If, on the other hand, it be the 102 
points in our favour which predominate, we may 
even blend them with the others, since thus the 
traitors in our camp will have less force. None the 
less these points, both good and bad, must not be set 
forth naked and helpless : those in our favour must 
be supported by some argument, and then reasons 
must be added why the points which tell against 
us should not be believed ; since if we do not dis- 
tinguish clearly between the two, it is to be feared 
that those which are favourable may suffer from 
their bad company. 

Further rules are laid down with regard to the 103 


ex ea fiat excursio, ne avertatur a iudice sermo, ne 
alienae personae vocem demus, ne argumentemur ; 
adiiciunt quidam etiam, ne utamur adfectibus ; 
quorum pleraque sunt frequeiitissime custodienda, 

104 immo nunquam, nisi ratio coegerit, mutanda. Ut 
sit expositio perspicua et brevis, nihil quidem tarn 
raro poterit habere rationem quam excursio ; nee 
unquam debebit esse nisi brevis et talis, ut vi quadam 
videamur adfectus velut recto itinere depulsi, qualis 

105 est Ciceronis circa nuptias Sasiae : muiieris acelus 
incredibile et praeter hanc unam in omni vita inauditum ! 
O Libidinem effrenatam et indomitam ! audaciam 
singularem ! nonne timuisse, si minus vim deorum homi- 
numque famam, at illam ipsam noctem facesque illas 
miptiales ! non limen cubicidi ! non cubile /iliac ! non 
parietes denique ipsos, superiorum testes nuptiarum ! 

106 Sermo vero aversus a iudice et brevius indicat in- 
terim et coarguit magis. de qua re idem, quod in 
prooemio dixeram, sentio, sicut de prosopopoeia 
quoque ; qua tamen non Servius modo Sulpicius 
utitur pro Aufidia : Somnone te languidum an gravi, 

1 pro Cln. vi. lo. 
1 06 

BOOK IV. 11. 103-106 

statement of fact, forbidding us to indulge in 
digression, apostrophe or argumentation or to put 
our words into the mouths of others. Some even 
add that we should make no appeal to the passions. 
These rules should for the most part be observed, 
indeed they should never be infringed unless the 
circumstances absolutely demand it. If our state- 104 
ment is to be clear and brief, almost anything can 
be justified sooner than digression. And if we do 
introduce a digression, it must always be short and 
of such a nature that we give the impression of 
having been forced from our proper course by 
some uncontrollable emotion. The passage in 
Cicero l about the marriage of Sasia is a good ex- 
ample of this. "What incredible wickedness in a 105 
woman ! Unheard of in the history of mankind till 
she dared the sin ! What unbridled and un- 
restrained lust, what amazing daring ! One might 
have thought that, even if she had no regard for the 
vengeance of heaven and the opinion of man, she 
would at least have dreaded that night of all nights 
and those torches that lighted her to the bridal bed : 
that she would have shrunk in horror from the 
threshold of her chamber, from her daughter's room 
and the very walls that had witnessed her former 
marriage." As to addressing another in place of 106 
the judge, it may be a means of making a point with 
greater brevity and give it greater force. On this 
subject I hold the same view that I expressed in 
dealing with the exordium, as 1 do on the subject of 
impersonation. This artifice however is employed not 
only by Servius Sulpicius in his speech on behalf of 
Aufidia, when he cries " Am I to suppose that you 
were drowsed with sleep or weighed down by some 



lethargo putem pressum ? sed M. quoque Tullius 
circa nauarchos, (nam ea quoque rei expositio est) 

107 Ut adeas, tantum dabis, et reliqua. Quid ? pro 
Cluentio, Staieni Bulbique colloquium nonne ad 
celeritatem plurirnum et ad fidem confert ? Quae 
ne fecisse inobservantia quadam videatur, quanquam 
hoc in illo credibile non est, in Partitionibus prae- 
cepit, ut habeat narratio suavitatem, admirationes, 
exspectationes, exitus inopinatos, colloquia persona- 

108 rum, omnes adfectus. Argumentabimur, ut dixi, 
nuiiqtiam ; argumentum ponemus aliquando ; quod 
facit pro Ligario Cicero, cum dicit sic eum provinciae 
praefuisse, ut illi pacem esse expediret. Inseremus 
exposition! et brevem, cum res poscet, defensionem 

109 et rationem factorum. Neque enim narrandum est 
tanquam testi sed tanquam patrono. Rei ordo per se 
talis est : Q. Ligarius legatus cum C. Considio pro feet us. 
Quid ergo M. Tullius? Q. enim., inquit, Ligaritix, 
cum esset nulla belli suspicio, legatus in Africam cum 

1 10 C. Considio profectus est. Et alibi : Non modo ad 
bcllum ,scd nc ad minimam quidcm mispicfonem belli. 

1 Vcrr. v. xlv. 118. - pro Clu. xxvi. :< ix. 31. 

4 ii, 4. Ligarius was accused of having fought for the Poni- 
peians in Africa. Cicero points out that he went out to Africa 
before the outbreak of war was dreamed of and that his 
whole attitude was discreet. 

1 08 

HOOK IV. ii. 106-110 

heavy lethargy?" but by Cicero 1 as well, when in a 
passage which, like the above, belongs to the state- 
ment of facts, in speaking of the ships' captains he 
says. "You will give so much to enter, etc." Again lo7 
in the pro Cluenlio 2 does not the conversation 
between Staienus and Bulbus conduce to speed and 
enhance the credibility of the statements ? In 
case it should be thought that Cicero did this 
without design (quite an incredible supposition in 
his case), I would point out that in the Partitiones 8 
he lays it down that the statement of facts should 
be characterised by passages which will charm and 
excite admiration or expectation, and marked by 
unexpected turns, conversations between persons and 
appeals to every kind of emotion. We shall, as I 108 
have already said, never argue points in the state- 
ment of facts, but we may sometimes introduce 
arguments, as for example Cicero does in the pro 
Ligario,* when he says that he ruled his province in 
such a way that it was to his interest that peace 
should continue. We shall sometimes also, if 
occasion demand, insert a brief defence of the facts 
in the statement and trace the reasons that led up 
to them. For we must state our facts like advocates, 109 
not witnesses. A statement in its simplest form 
will run as follows, " Quintus Ligarius went out 
as legate to C. Considius." But how will Cicero 5 put 
it ? " Quintus Ligarius,'' he says, " set out for Africa 
as legate to Gaius Considius at a time when there 
was no thought of war." And again elsewhere 6 110 
he says, " Not only not to war, but to a country 
where there was no thought of war." And when the 
sense would have been sufficiently clear had he 

5 pro Liy. i. 2. * il>. ii. 4. 



Et cum esset indicaturo satis, Q. Ligarius tiu/lo .w 
implicari negotio passus est, adiecit, domum specta?if>, ad 
x-uos redire cupiens. Ita quod exponebat, et ratione 
fecit credibile et adfectu quoque implevit. 

111 Quo niagis miror eos, qui non putant utendum in 
narratione adfectibus. Qui si hoc dicunt, non din 
neque ut in epilogo, mecum sentiunt ; effugiendae sunt 
enim morae. Ceterum cur ego iudicem nolim, dum 

112 eum doceo, etiam movere? Cur, quod in summa 
parte sum actionis petiturus, non in primo statim 
rerum ingressu, si fieri potest, consequar ? cum 
praesertim etiam in probationibus faciliorem sini 
animum eius habiturus occupatum vel ira vel misera- 

113 tione. An non M. Tullius circa verbera civis Romani 
omnes brevissime movet adfectus, non solum con- 
dicione ipsius, loco iniuriae, genere verberum, sed 
animi quoque commendatione ? Summum enim 
virum ostendit qui, cum virgis caederetur, non in- 
gemuerit, non rogaverit, sed tantum civem Romanum 
esse se cum invidia caedentis et fiducia iuris clama- 

114 verit. Quid? Philodami casum nonne cum per 
totam expositionem incendit invidia, turn in sup- 

1 pro Lig. i. 3. 

- Verr. v. 62. A Roman citizen might not be scourged. 
<'j>. St. Paul. 3 ib. i. 30. 

I 10 

BOOK IV. M. i 10-1 14 

said no more than "Quintus Ligarius would not 
sutt'er himself to be entangled in any transaction/' l 
he adds " for he had his eyes fixed on home and 
wished to return to his own people." Thus he made 
what he stated credible by giving a reason for it 
and at the same time coloured it with emotion. 

I am therefore all the more surprised at those 111 
who hold that there should be no appeal to the 
emotions in the statement of facts. If they were to 
say " Such appeals should be brief and not on the 
scale on which they are employed in the peroration," 
I should agree with them ; for it is important that 
the statement should be expeditious. But why, 
while I am instructing the judge, should I refuse to 
move him as well? Why should I not, if it is 112 
possible, obtain that effect at the very opening of 
the case which I am anxious to secure at its con- 
clusion, more especially in view of the fact that I 
shall find the judge far more amenable to the 
cogency of my proof, if I have previously filled his 
mind with anger or pity? Does not Cicero, 2 in his 113 
description of the scourging of a Roman citizen, in a 
few brief words stir all the emotions, not merely by 
describing the victim's position, the place where the 
outrage was committed and the nature of the 
punishment, but also by praising the courage with 
which he bore it ? For he shows us a man of the 
highest character who, when beaten with rods, 
uttered not a moan nor an entreaty, but only cried 
that he was a Roman citizen, thereby bringing 
shame on his oppressor and showing his confidence 
in the law. Again does he not throughout the 114 
whole of his statement excite the warmest indigna- 
tion at the misfortunes of Philodamus 3 and move 

1 1 1 


plicio ipso lacrimis implevit, cum flentcs non tain 
narraret quam ostenderet patrem de morte filii, filium 

115 de patris ? Quid ulli epilogi possunt magis habere 
miserabile ? Serum est enim advocare iis rebus 
adfectum in peroratione, quas securus narraveris ; 
adsuevit illis iudex iamque eas sine motu mentis 
accipit, quibus commotus novis non est, et difficile 
est mutare animi habitum semel constitutum. 

116 Ego vero (neque enim dissimulabo iudicium meum, 
quanquam id, quod sum dicturus, exemplis magis 
quam praeceptis ullis continetur) narrationem, ut si 
ullam partem orationis, omni qua potest gratia et 
venere exornandam puto. Sed plurimum refert, 

117 quae sit natura eius rei quam exponemus. In parvis 
ergo, quales sunt fere privatae, sit ille pressus et 
velut applicitus rei cultus, in verbis summa diligentia ; 
quae in locis impetu feruntur et circumiectae oratio- 
nis copia latent, hie expressa et, ut vult Zeno, sensu 
tincla esse debebunt ; compositio dissimulata quidem 

USsed tamen quam iucundissima ; figurae non illae 
poeticae et contra rationem loquendi auctoritate 
veterum receptae (nam debet esse quam purissimus 

sermo), sed quae varietate taedium effugiant et 

BOOK IV. ii. , 14-1 iS 

us even to tears when he speaks of his punishment 
and describes, or rather shows us as in a picture, 
the father weeping for the death of his son and the 
son for the death of his father? What can any 115 
peroration present that is more calculated to stir 
our pity ? If you wait for the peroration to stir your 
hearer's emotions over circumstances which you 
have recorded unmoved in your statement of facts, 
your appeal will come too late. The judge is 
already familiar with them and hears their mention 
without turning a hair, since he was unstirred when 
they were first recounted to him. Once the habit 
of mind is formed, it is hard to change it. 

For my own part (for I will not conceal my 116 
opinion, though it rests rather on actual examples 
than on rules), I hold that the statement of fact more 
than any portion of the speech should be adorned 
with the utmost grace and charm. But much will 
depend on the nature of the subject which we have 
to set forth. In slighter cases, such as are the 117 
majority of private suits, the decoration must be 
restrained and fit close to the subject, while the 
utmost care must be exercised in choice of words. 
The words which in our purple passages are swept 
along by the force of our eloquence and lost in the 
profusion of our language, must in cases such as 
these be clear and, as Zeno says, "steeped with mean- 
ing." The rhythm should be unobtrusive, but as 
attractive as possible, while the figures must neither 118 
be derived from poetry nor such as are contrary to 
current usage, though warranted by the authority of 
antiquity (for it is important that our language should 
be entirely normal), but should be designed to relieve 
tedium by their variety and should be frequently 

VOL. n. 


mutatioiiibus animum, ne in eundem casum, 
similem compositionem, pares elocutionum tractus 
incidamus. Caret eriim ceteris lenociniis expositio 
et, nisi commendetur hac venustate, iaceat necesse 

119 est. Nee in ulla parte intentior est iudex, eoque 
nihil recte dictum perit. Praeterea nescio quomodo 
etiam credit facilius, quae audienti iucunda sunt, et 

120 voluptate ad fidem ducitur. Ubi vero maior res 
erit, et atrocia invidiose et tristia miserabiliter dicere 
licebit, non ut consumantur adfectus, sed ut tainen 
velut primis lineis designentur, ut plane, qualis futura 

121 sit imago rei, statim appareat. Ne sententia quidem 
velut fatigatum intentione stomachum iudicis reficere 
dissuaserim, maxime quidem brevi iriteriectione, 
qualis est ilia, Fecentnl servi Milonix. quod snot; 
servux in tali re facere volnuaet, interim paulo liberiore, 
qualis est ilia, Nubit genero socrua, nuUia 

122 nullifi auctoribus, funestis ominibus omnium. Quod cum 
sit factum iis quoque temporibus, quibus omnis ad 
utilitatem potius quam ad ostentationem compoiie- 
batur oratio, et erant adhuc severiora indicia, quant* > 

(i HI syne 

1 pro Mil. x. 29. - pro Clu. v. 14. 


HOOK IV. 11. i 18-122 

di.mged lo relax the strain of attention. Thus we 
shall avoid repeating the same terminations and 
escape monotony of rhythm and a stereotyped turn 
of phrase. For the statement of facts lacks all the 
other allurements of style and, unless it is charac- 
terised by this kind of charm, will necessarily fall flat. 
Moreover there is no portion of a speech at which 119 
the judge is more attentive, and consequently nothing 
that is well said is lost. And the judge is, for some 
reason or other, all the more ready to accept what 
charms his ear and is lured by pleasure to belief. 
When on the other hand the subject is on a larger 120 
scale, we have a chance to excite horror by our 
narration of abominable wrongs or pity by a tale 
of woe : but we must do so in such a way as not to 
exhaust our stock of emotions 011 the spot, but 
merely to indicate our harrowing story in outline so 
that it may at once be clear what the completed 
picture is like to be. Again 1 am far from dis- 121 
approving of the introduction of some striking 
sentence designed to stimulate the judge's jaded 
palate. The best way of so doing is the inter- 
position of a short sentence like the following : 
" Milo's slaves did what everyone would have 
wished his own slaves to do under similar circum- 
stances " l : at times we may even be a little more 
daring and produce something like the following : 
" The mother-in-law wedded her son-in-law : there 
were no witnesses, none to sanction the union, and 
the omens were dark and sinister." 2 If this was 122 
done in days when every speech was designed for 
practical purposes rather than display and the courts 
were far stricter than to-day, how much more should 
\ve do it now, when the passion for producing; a 

i 2 


mine fkciendttni magis. ctun in ipsa capilis ;iut f'or- 
tunarum pericula inrupit voluptas? eui hominum 
desiderio quantum dari debeat alio loco dicam. In- 

123 terim aliquid indulgendum esse confiteor. Multum 
confert adiecta veris credibilis rerum imago, quae 
velut in rem praesentem perducere audientes videtur, 
qualis est ilia M. Caelii in Antonium descriptio : 
\mnque ipsum offend unt temulento sopore prqjligatuw. 
totis praecordiis stertentem, ruct-uosox spiritus geminare, 
praeclarasque contubernafes ab omnibus s-pondis trans- 

124 versas incubare et reliquas circumiacere passim. Quae 
tamen exanimatae terrore, hostium udveniu percepto, e.r- 
citare Antonium conahantitr, nomen inclamabant, fnatra 
a cervicibus tollebant, blandius alia ad aurem invocafyaj, 
vehementitis eliam nonnulla fenebat ; quarum cum omnium 
vocem tactumque nosciiaret, proximae cuiusque collum 
amplexn petebat, neque dormire excitalus neque rigilare 
ebrius poterat, sed semisomno sopore inter manus centuri- 
onum concubinarnmcine iactabatur. Nihil liis neque 
credibilius fingi neque vehementius exprobrari 
neque manifestius ostendi potest. 

125 Neque illud quidem praeteribo, quantam adferat 
(idem exposition} narrantis auotoritas ; quam mereri 
debemusj ante onmia quidem vita, sed et ipso 


BOOK IV. ii. 122-125 

thrill of pleasure has forced its way even into cases 
where a man's life or fortunes are in peril ? 1 shall 
say later to what extent I think we should indulge 
popular taste in this respect : in the meantime I 
shall admit that some such indulgence is necessary. 
A powerful effect may be created if to the actual 123 
facts of the case we add a plausible picture of what 
occurred, such as will make our audience feel as if 
they were actual eyewitnesses of the scene. Such 
is the description introduced by Marcus Caelius in 
his speech against Antonius. " For they found him 
lying prone in a drunken slumber, snoring with all 
the force of his lungs, and belching continually, 
while the most distinguished of his female com- 
panions sprawled over every couch, and the rest of 
the seraglio lay round in all directions. They 124 
however perceived the approach of the enemy and, 
half-dead with terror, attempted to arouse Antonius, 
called him by name, heaved up his head, but all in 
vain, while one whispered endearing words into his 
ear, and another slapped him with some violence. 
At last he recognised the voice and touch of each 
and tried to embrace her who happened to be 
nearest. Once wakened he could not sleep, but 
was too drunk to keep awake, and so was bandied 
to and fro between sleeping and waking in the 
hands of his centurions and his paramours." Could 
you find anything more plausible in imagination, more 
vehement in censure or more vivid in description ? 

There is another point to which I must call atten- 123 
tion, namely the credit which accrues to the statement 
of facts from the authority of the speaker. Now 
such authority should first and foremost be the re- 
ward of our manner of life, but may also be conferred 

i '7 


genere orationis, quod quo fuerit gravius ac sanc- 
tius, hoc plus habeat necesse est in adfirmando 

126 ponderis. Effugienda igitur in hac praecipue parte 
oranis calliditatis suspicio, neque enim se usquani 
custodit magis index ; nihil videatur fictum, nihil 
sollicitum ; omnia potius a causa quam ab oratore 

127 profecta credantur. At hoc pati noil possnmns et 
perire artem putamus, nisi appareat, cum desinat ars 
esse, .si apparet. Pendemus ex laude atque hanc 
laboris nostri ducirnus suinmam. Ita, quae circuin- 
stantibus ostentare volumus, iudicibus prodimus. 

128 Est quaedam etiam repetita iiarratio, quae 7rt8t7/y7/- 
crts dicitur^ sane res declamatoria magis quam forensis, 
ideo autem reperta, nt, (niia narratio brevis esse 
debet, fusius et ornatius res possit exponi ; quod fit 
vel invidiae gratia vel miserationis. Id et raro 
faciendum iudico neque sic unquam., ut totus ordo 
repetatur ; licet enim per partes idem consequi. 
Ceterum, qui uti 7rt8t^yrjo-et volet, narrationis loco 
rein stringat et contentus indicare, quod factum sit, 
quo sit niodo factum plenius se loco suo expositurum 
esse promittat. 

129 Initium narrationis quidam utique faciendum a 

BOOK IV. IT. 125-129 

by our style of eloquence. For the more dignified 
and serious our style, the greater will be the weight 
that it will lend to our assertions. It is therefore 126 
specially important in this part of our speech to avoid 
anything suggestive of artful design, for the judge is 
never more on his guard than at this stage. Nothing 
must seem fictitious, nought betray anxiety ; every- 
thing must seem to spring from the case itself rather 
than the art of the orator. But our modern orators 127 
cannot endure this and imagine that their art is 
wasted unless it obtrudes itself, whereas as a matter 
of fact the moment it is detected it ceases to be art. 
We are the slaves of applause and think it the goal 
of all our effort. And so we betray to the judges 
what we wish to display to the bystanders. 

There is also a kind of repetition of the statement 128 
which the Greeks call cViSnp/r/cris. It belongs* to 
declamation rather than forensic oratory, and was in- 
vented to enable the speaker (in view of the fact that 
the statement should be brief) to set forth his facts 
at greater length and with more profusion of orna- 
ment, as a means of exciting indignation or pity. I 
think that this should be done but rarely and that 
we should never go to the extent of repeating the 
statement in its entirety. For we can attain the same 
result by a repetition only of parts. Anyone, how- 
ever, who desires to employ this form of repetition, 
should touch but lightly on the facts when making 
his statement and should content himself with merely 
indicating what was done, while promising to set 
forth how it was done more fully when the time 
comes for it. 

Some hold that the statement of 'facts should always 129 
begin by referring to some person, whom we must 



persona putant, eamque, si nostra sit, ornandam, si 
aliena, infamandam statim. Hoc sane frequentis- 

130 simuni est, quia personae sunt inter quas litigatur. Sed 
hae quoque interim cum suis accidentibus ponendae, 
cum id prbfuturuTO est : ut A. Clueniius Habitus J'uil 
pater huiusce, indices, homo non solum municipii Larinatis, 
r.r (fttn crat, sed rcgionis illius el vicinitatis rirttite, cxisti- 
malione, nobililate princeps ; interim sine his ut Q. enim 

131 Ligarius cum esset ; frequenter vero et a re, sicut pro 
Tullio Cicero Fundiim habet in agro Thurino M. Tullius 
paternum ; Demosthenes pro Ctesiphonte Tov yap 
&WKIKOV (rucrravTos xroXcftov. 

132 De fine narrationis cum iis contentio est, qui per- 
duci expositionem volunt eo, unde quaestio oritur : 
His rebus ita gcsiis, P. Dolabella praetor interdivit, itf 
est consuetude, de vi, hominibus armatis, sine ulla excep- 
tione, tantum ut unde deiecisset restitueret ; deinde resti- 
tuisse se dixit. Sponsio facia est; hac de sponsione 
vobis iudicandum est. Id a petitore semper fieri 
potest, a defensore non semper. 

III. Ordine ipso narrationem sequitur confirmatio. 

1 pro Clnent. v. 1 1 . 2 pro Liy. i. 2. 

:{ pro Tull vi. 14. 4 18. 5 Cic. pro Caec. viii. 23. 


BOOK IV. ii. 129-111. i 

praise if he is on our side, and abuse if he is on the 
side of our opponents. It is true that this is very 
often done for the good reason that a law-suit must 
take place between persons. Persons may however 130 
also be introduced with all their attendant circum- 
stances, if such a procedure is likely to prove useful. 
For instance, " The father of my client, gentlemen, 
was Aulus Cluentius Habitus, a man whose character, 
reputation and birth made him the leading man not 
only in his native town of Larinum, but in all the 
surrounding district." 1 Or again they may be in- 131 
troduced without such circumstances, as in the 
passage beginning " For Quintus Ligarius etc." 2 
Often, too, we may commence with a fact as Cicero 
does in the pro Tu/lio y : " Marcus Tullius has a farm 
which he inherited from his father in the territory 
of Thurium," or Demosthenes in the speech in de- 
fence of Ctesiphon, 4 "On the outbreak of the 
Phocian war." 

As regards the conclusion of the statement of facts, 132 
there is a controversy with those who would have 
the statement end where the issue to be determined 
begins. Here is an example. " After these events 
the praetor Publius Dolabella issued an interdict in 
the usual form dealing with rioting and employment 
of armed men, ordering, without any exception, that 
Aebutius should restore the property from which he 
had ejected Caecina. He stated that he had done so. 
A sum of money was deposited. It is for you to 
decide to whom this money is to go." 5 This rule 
can always be observed by the prosecutor, but not 
always by the defendant. 

III. In the natural order of things the xlale- 
nioil of fact is followed l>v the rcri/icnfiati. For it 

12 I 


Probanda sunt enim quae propter hoc exposuimus. 
Sed priusquam ingrediar hanc partem, pauca mi hi 
de quorundam opinione dicenda sunt. Plerisque 
moris est prolate reruni ordine protinus utique in 
aliquem laetum ac plausibilem locum quam maxinie 

2 possint favorabiliter excurrere. Quod quidem natuin 
ab ostentatione declamatoria iam in forum venit, 
postquam age re causas iion ad utilitatem litigatorum, 
sed ad patronorum iactationem repertum est, ne. si 
pressae illi, qualis saepius desideratur, narrationis 
gracilitati coniuncta argumentorum pugnacitas fuerit, 
dilatis diutius dicendi voluptatibus oratio refrigescat. 

3 In quo vitium illud est, quod sine discrimine causarum 
atque utilitatis hoc, tanquam semper expediat aut 
etiam necesse sit, faciunt, eoque sumptas ex iis 
partibus, quarum alius erat locus, sententias in hanc 
congerunt, ut plurima aut item in dicenda sint aut, 
quia alieno loco dicta sunt, dici suo non possint. 

4 Ego autein confiteor, hoc exspatiandi genus non modo 
narration! sed etiam quaestionibus vel universis vel 

BOOK IV. in. i-4 

is necessary to prove the points which we stated 
with the proof in view. But before I enter on this 
portion, I have a few words to say on the opinions 
held by certain rhetoricians. Most of them are in 
the habit, as soon as they have completed the state- 
ment of facts, of digressing to some pleasant and 
attractive topic with a view to securing the utmost 
amount of favour from their audience. This practice 2 
originated in the display of the schools of declama- 
tion and thence extended to the courts .as soon as 
causes came to be pleaded, not for the benefit of the 
parties concerned, but to enable the advocates to 
Haunt their talents. I imagine that they feared that 
if the slender stream of concise statement, such as is 
generally required, were followed by the pugnacious 
tone inevitable in the arguing of the case, the speech 
would fall flat owing to the postponement of the 
pleasures of a more expansive eloquence. The ob- 3 
jection to this practice lies in the fact that they do 
this without the slightest consideration of the 
difference between case and case or reflecting 
whether what they are doing will in any way assist 
them, on the assumption that it is always expedient 
and always necessary. Consequently they transfer 
striking thoughts from the places which they should 
have occupied elsewhere and concentrate them in 
this portion of the speech, a practice which involves 
either the repetition of a number of things that they 
have already said or their omission from the place 
which was really theirs owing to the fact that they 
have already been said. I admit however that this 4 
form of digression can be advantageously appended, 
not merely to the statement of facts, but to each of 
the different questions or to the questions as a whole, 


interim singulis opportune posse subiurigi, cuni res 
postulat aut certe permittit, atque eo vel maxime 
illnstrari ornarique orationem, sed si cohaeret et 
sequitur, non si per vim cuneatur et quae natura 

o iuncta erant distraint. Nihil enim tarn est con- 
sequens quam narration! probatio, nisi excursus ille 
vel quasi finis narratioiiis vel quasi initium j)robationis 
est. Erit ergo illi nonnunquam locus, ut, si expositio 
circa finem atrox fuerit, prosequainur earn velut 

erumpente protinus indignatione. Quod tainen ita 
fieri oportebit, si res dubitationem non . habebit. 
Alioqui prius est quod obiicias verum efticere quam 
magnum, quia criminum invidia pro reo est, prius- 
quam probabitur; difficillima est enim gravissimi 

7 cuiusque sceleris fides. Item fieri non inutiliter 
potest ut, si merita in adversarium aliqua exposueris., 
in ingratum inveharis, aut, si varietatem criminum 
narratione demonstraveris, quantum ob ea periculum 

8 intentetur, ostendas. Verum haec breviter omnia- 
ludex enim ordine audito festinat ad probationem 
et quam prim um certus esse sententiae cnpit. 
Pivieterea cavendum est, ne ipsa expositio 

HOOK IV. in. 4 -S 

so long as the case demand, or at any rate permit il. 
Indeed such a practice confers great distinction and 
adornment on a speech, but only if the digression 
fits in well with the rest of the speech and follows 
naturally on what has preceded, not if it is thrust in 
like a wedge parting what should naturally come 
together. For there is no part of a speech so closely 5 
connected with any other as the statement with the 
proof, though of course such a digression may be 
intended as the conclusion of the statement and the 
beginning of the proof. There will therefore some- 
times be room for digression ; for example if the end 
of the statement has been concerned with some speci- 
ally horrible theme, we may embroider the theme 
as though our indignation must find immediate 
vent. This, however, should only be done if 6 
there is no question about the facts. Other- 
wise it is more important to verify your charge than 
to heighten it, since the horrible nature of a charge 
is in favour of the accused, until the charge is 
proved. For it is just the most flagrant crimes that 
are the most difficult to prove. Again a digression 7 
may be advantageous if after setting forth the services 
rendered by your client to his opponent you denounce 
the latter for his ingratitude, or after producing a 
variety of charges in your statement, you point out 
the serious danger in which the advancement of such 
charges is likely to involve you. But all these di- 8 
gressions should be brief. For as soon as he has 
heard the facts set forth in order, the judge is in a 
hurry to get to the proof and desires to satisfy him- 
self of the correctness of his impressions at the 
earliest possible moment. Further, care must be 
taken not to nullifv the effect of the statement by 



vanescatj aversis in aliud aniniis rl inani mora 

Sed ut non semper est necessaria post narratioiiem 
ilia procursio, ita frequenter utilis ante quaestionem 
praeparatio, utique si prima specie minus erit favora- 
bilis, si legem asperam ac poenarias actiones tuebimur. 
Est hie locus velutsequentis exordii 1 ad coiiciliandum 
probationibus nostris iudicem, mitigandum, eonci- 
tandum.' 2 Quod liberius hie et vehementius fieri 

10 potest, quia iudici iiota iam causa est. His igitur 
velut fomentis, si quid erit asperum, praemolliemus, 
quo facilius aures iudicum quae post dicturi eriimis 
admittant, ne ius nostrum oderint. Nihil eriim facile 

11 persuadetur invitis. Quo loco iudicis quoque noscenda 
natura est, iuri magis an aequo sitappositus ; proinde 
enim magis aut minus erit hoc necessarium. 

Ceterum res eadem et post quaestionem perora- 

12 tionis vice fungitur. Hanc partem -rraf^Kfiaau' vocant 
(Jraeci, Latini egressum vel egressioiiem. Sed liar 
suiit plures, ut dixi, quae per totam causam varius 
habent excursus, ut laus hominum locorumque, ut 
descriptio regionum, expositio quarundam reruni 

13 gestarum, vel etiam fabulosarum. Quo ex genere est 
in orationibus contra Verrem compositis Siciliae laus, 

1 exordii, B : exordium, .A and Victor, 
- niitiganduni, conc-itandum omitttd ly B. 


BOOK IV. in. 8-13 

diverting the minds of the court to some other theme 
and wearying them by useless delay. 

But, though such digressions are not always neees- 9 
sary at the end of the statement, they may form a very 
useful preparation for the examination of the main 
question, more especially if at first sight it presents 
an aspect unfavourable to our case, if we have to 
support a harsh law or demand severe punishment. 
For this is the place for inserting what may be 
regarded as a second exordium with a view to 
exciting or mollifying the judge or disposing him 
to lend a favouring ear to our proofs. More- 
over we can do this with all the greater freedom 
and vehemence at this stage of the proceedings 
since the case is already known to the judge. We 10 
shall therefore employ such utterances as emol- 
lients to soften the harder elements of our state- 
ment, in order that the ears of the jury may be 
more ready to take in what we have to say in the 
sequel and to grant us the justice which we ask. 
For it is hard to persuade a man to do anything 
against the grain. It is also important on such 1 1 
occasions to know whether the judge prefers equity 
or a strict interpretation of the law, since the neces- 
sity for such digression will vary accordingly. 

Such passages may also serve as a kind of per- 
oration after the main question. The Greeks call 12 
this 7rapeKy3a<m, the Romans egressm or egressio 
(digression). They may however, as I have said, 
be of various kinds and may deal with different 
themes in any portion of the speech. For instance 
we may extol persons or places, describe regions, 
record historical or even legendary occurrences. As 13 
examples I may cite the praise of Sicily and the rapt 



Proserpinae niptns ; pro ('. Cornelio popularis ilia 
virtutum Cn. Pompei commemoratio, in quam ille 
divinus orator, velut nomine ipso ducis cursus dicendi 
teneretur, abrupto quern inchoaverat sermone devertit 

14 actutum. Hape/c^ao-is est, ut inea quidem fert opinio, 
alieuius rei, sedad utilitatem causae pertinentis extra 
ordinem excurrens tractatio. Quapropter non video 
cur himc ei potissimum locum adsignent, qui rerum 
ordinem sequitur, non magis quam illud, cur hoc 
nomen ita demum proprium putent, si aliquid in di- 
gressu sit exponendum, cum tot modis a recto itinere 

15 declinet oratio. Nam quidquid dicitur praeter illas 
quinque quas fecimus partes, egressio est, indignatio, 
miseratio, invidia, convicium, excusatio, conciliatio, 
maledictorum refutatio. Similia his, quae non sunt 
in quaestione, omnis amplificatio, minutio, omne ad- 
fectus genus, et quae 1 maxime iucundam et ornatam 
faciunt orationem. de luxuria, de avaritia, religione, 
otticiis ; quae cum sint argumentis subiecta similium 

10 rerum, quia cohaerent, egredi non videntur. Sed 

plurima sunt, quae rebus nihil secum cohaerentibus 

inseruntur, quibus index reficitur, adnionetur, pla- 

catur, rogatur, laudatur. Innumerabilia sunt haec, 

1 et quae, Spdldnnj : atque fa, ^^SS. 

1 Verr. ill. vii. % 27. - See note on iv. iv. S. 

BOOK IV. in. 13-16 

of Proserpine 1 in the I'errines, or the famous recital of 
the virtues of Gneius Pompeius in the pro Comelio, 2 
where the great orator, as though the course of his 
eloquence had been broken by the mere mention of 
the general's name, interrupts the topic on which he 
had already embarked and digresses forthwith to sing 
his praises. IlapcK/Jao-is may, I think, be defined as the 14 
handling of some theme, which must however have 
some bearing on the case, in a passage that involves 
digression from the logical order of our speech. I do 
not see therefore why it should be assigned a special 
position immediately following on the statement of 
J'acls any more than I understand why they think 
that the name is applicable only to a digression where 
some statement has to be made, when there are so 
many different ways in which a speech may leave 
the direct route. For whatever we say that falls 15 
outside the five divisions of the speech already laid 
down is a digression, whether it express indignation, 
pity, hatred, rebuke, excuse, conciliation or be de- 
signed to rebut invective. Other similar occasions 
for digression on points not involved by the question 
at issue arise when we amplify or abridge a topic, 
make any kind of emotional appeal or introduce any 
of those topics which add such charm and elegance 
to oratory, topics that is to say such as luxury, 
avarice, religion, duty : but these would hardly 
seem to be digressions as they are so closely attached 
to arguments on similar subjects that they form part 
of the texture of the speech. There are however a 16 
number of topics which are inserted in the midst of 
matter which has no connexion with them, when 
for example we strive to excite, admonish, appease, 
entreat or praise the judge. Such passages are 




quorum alia sic praeparata adferimus, quaeclam ex 
occasione vel necessitate ducimus, si quid nobis agen- 
tibus novi accidit, interpellatio, interventus alicuius,, 
17 tumultus. Unde Ciceroni quoque in prooemio, cum 
diceret pro Milone, digredi fuit necesse, ut ipsa ora- 
tiuncula qua usus est patet. Pqtest autem paulo 
longius exire, qui praeparat aliquid ante quaestionem 
et qui finitae probation! velut commendationem adii- 
cit. At qui ex media erumpit, cito ad id redire debet 
unde devertit. 

IV. Sunt qui narration! propositionem subiungant 
tanquam partem iudicialis materiae, cui opinioni 
respondimus. Mihi autem propositio videtur omnis 
confirmationis initium, quod non modo in ostendenda 
quaestione principali, sed nonnunquam etiain in sin- 
gulis argumentis poni solet maximeque in iis quae 
cTri^eip^ara vocantur. Sed nunc de priore loquimur. 
2 Ea non semper uti necesse est. Aliquando enim sine 
propositione quoque satis rnanifesturn est quid in 
quaestione versetur, utique si narratio ibi finem habet, 
ubi initium quaestio, adeo, ut aliquando subiungatur 
exposition^ quae solet in argumentis esse summa col- 
lectio : Haec, sicut exposui, it a gesta sunt, indices; in- 

1 The speech actually delivered, not the long speech which 
lias come down to us, but was never delivered. 

- in. ix. 5 ; xi. 27. 3 in. ix. 2. 4 See v. xiv. 14. 


BOOK IV. in. i6-iv. 2 

innumerable. Some will have been carefully pre- 
pared beforehand, while others will be produced to 
suit the occasion or the necessity of the moment, if 
anything extraordinary should occur in the course of 
our pleading, such as an interruption, the interven- 
tion of some individual or a disturbance. For example, 11 
this made it necessary for Cicero to digress even in 
the exordium when he was defending Milo, as is 
clear from the short speech l which he made on 
that occasion. But the orator who makes some 
preface to the main question or proposes to 
follow up his proofs with a passage designed to 
commend them to the jury, may digress at some 
length. On the other hand, if he breaks away in 
the middle of his speech, he should not be long in 
returning to the point from which he departed. 

IV. After the statement of facts some place the 
proposition - which they regard as forming a Mivisioii 
of a forensic speech. I have already expressed 
my opinion of this view. 3 But it seems to me 
that the beginning of every proof is a proposition, 
such as often occurs in the demonstration of the 
main question and sometimes even in the enunciation 
of individual arguments, more especially of those 
which are called cTrt^cip^aTa. 4 But for the moment 
I shall speak of the first kind. It is not always ne- 
cessary to employ it. The nature of the main question L* 
is sometimes sufficiently clear without any proposition, 
especially if the statement of facts ends exactly where 
the question begins. Consequently the recapitula- 
tion generally employed in the case of arguments is 
sometimes placed immediately after the statement 
of foots. "The affair took place, as I have described, 
gentlemen : he that laid the ambush was defeated, 

K '2 


xidiator supemlus c.\l, ri victa w rcl politis oppressu vir- 

3 tute audacia est. Nonnunquam vero valde est utilis, 
ubi res defend! non potest et de fine quaeritur, ut 
pro eo, qui pecuniam privatam de templo sustulit, 
Sacrilegii agitur, de sacrilegio cognoscitu, ut iudex in- 
telligat id unum esse officii sui, quaerere an id quod 

4 obiicitur sacrilegium sit. Item in causis obscuris aut 
multiplicibus, nee semper propter hoc solum ut sit 
causa lucidior, sed aliquando etiam ut magis moveat. 
Movet autem, si protinus subtexantur aliqua, quae 
prosint. Lex aperte script a est ut peregrin us qui. 
murum ascendent morte multetiir ; peregrinum te esse 
cerium est ; quin aseenderis murum , non quaerihir ; quid 
superest, nisi ut te puniri oporteat ? Haec enim pro- 
positie confessionem adversarii premit et quodam- 
modo iudicandi moram tollit^ nee indicat quaes- 
tionem sed adiuvat. 

5 Sunt autem propositiones et simplices et duplices 
vel rnultiplices, quod accidit non uno nioclo. Narn 
et plura crimina iunguntur, ut cum Socrates accusatus 
est, quod corrumperet iuventutem et novas supersti- 
tionesintroduceret; et singula ex pluribus colliguntur, 
ut cum legatio male gesta obiicitur Aeschini, quod 
mentitus sit, quod nihil ex mandatis fecerit^ quod 

1 pro Mil. xi. 30. 

BOOK IV. iv. 2-5 

violence was conquered by violence, or rather I 
should say audacity was crushed by valour." l 
Sometimes proposition is highly advantageous, more 3 
especially when the fact cannot be defended and 
the question turns on the definition of the fact ; 
as for example in the case of the man who has taken 
the money of a private individual from a temple : we 
shall say, " My client is charged with sacrilege. It 
is for you to decide whether it was sacrilege," so 
that the judge may understand that his sole duty is 
to decide whether the charge is tantamount to 
sacrilege. The same method may be employed 4 
in obscure or complicated cases, not merely to make 
the case clearer, but sometimes also to make it more 
moving. This effect will be produced, if we at once 
support our pleading with some such words as the 
following : " It is expressly stated in the law that 
for any foreigner who goes up on to the wall the 
penalty is death. You are undoubtedly a foreigner, 
and there is no question but that you went up on to 
the wall. The conclusion is that you must submit 
to the penalty." For this proposition forces a con- 
fession upon our opponent and to a certain extent 
accelerates the decision of the court. It does more 
than indicate the question, it contributes to its 

Proposition* may be single, double or manifold : 5 
this is due to more than one reason. For several 
charges may be combined, as when Socrates was 
accused of corrupting the youth and of introducing 
new superstitions ; while single propositions may br 
made up of a number of arguments, as for instance 
when Aeschines is accused of misconduct as an 
ambassador on the ground that he lied, failed to 



6 moratus sit, quod inunera acceperit. Recusatio 
quoque plures interim propositiones habet, ut contra 
petitionem pecuniae : Male petit, procuratorem enint 
///>? esse non licnit, sed neqite i/li. ruins nomine Ht.igas, 
/if there procuralorem ; sed neque eat heres eins, ft quo 

7 nrcepixse mutuam d'icor nee ipsi dehui. Multiplicari haec 
in quantum libet possunt, sed rem ostendisse satis 
est. Hae si poiiantur singulae subiectis probationibus, 
plures sunt propositiones ; si coniungantur, in parti- 
tionem cadunt. 

8 Est et nuda propositio, qualis fere in coniectura- 
libus, Caedis ago, furtmn obiicio ; est ratione subiecta, 
ut Maiestaiem minuit C. Cornelius; namcodicemtribumi.s 
plelns ipse pro contione legit. Praeter haec utiinur pro- 
positione aut nostra, ut Adulteriwn obiicio ; aut ad- 
\ ersarii, ut Adulterii mecum agitur, aut communi, ut 
Inter me et adversarium quaetttio exf. uter sit intestato 
propior. Nonnunquam diversas quoque iun^imus : 
Ego hoc dico, adversarim hoc. 

1 The speech is lost. In 67 B.C. Cornelius as tribune of 
the plebs proposed a law enacting that no man should bo 
released from the obligations of a law save by decree of 
the people. This struck at a privilege usurped by tlu j 
senate, and Servilius Globulus, another tribune, forbade the 
herald to read out the proposal. Cornelius then read it 
himself. He was accused of maicttas, defended by Cicero 
in 65 B.C. and acquitted. 


BOOK IV. iv. 5-8 

carry out his instructions, wasted time and accepted 
bribes. The defence may also contain several pro- (\ 
positions : for instance against a claim for money we 
may urge, " Your claim is invalid ; for you had no 
right to act as agent nor had the party whom you 
represent any right to employ an agent : further, he 
is not the heir of the man from whom it is asserted 
that I borrowed the money, nor am I his debtor." 
These propositions can be multiplied at pleasure, but 7 
it is sufficient to give an indication of my meaning. 
It propositions are put forward singly with the proofs 
appended, they will form several distinct propositions: 
if they are combined, they fall under the head of 

A proposition may also be put forward unsup- 8 
ported, as is generally done in conjectural cases : 
" The formal accusation is one of murder, but I also 
charge the accused with theft." Or it may be 
accompanied by a reason : " Gains Cornelius is guilty 
of an offence against the state ; for when he was 
tribune of the plebs, he himself read out his bill to 
the public assembty." l In addition to these forms of 
proposition we can also introduce a proposition of our 
own, such as " I accuse him of adultery," or may 
use the proposition of our opponent, such as " The 
charge brought against me is one of adultery," or 
finally we may employ a proposition which is common 
to both sides, such as "The question in dispute 
between myself and my opponent is, which of the 
two is next-of-kin to the deceased who died intes- 
tate." Sometimes we may even couple contradictory 
propositions, as for instance " I say this, my opponent 
says that." 



9 Habet interim vim propositions, etiamsi per se 
non est propositio, cum exposito rerum ordine subii- 
cimus : DC his cognosce!, ut sit haec commonitio 
iudicis, quo se ad quaestionein acrius intendat et 
velut quodam tactu resuscitatus finem esse narrationis 
et initiurn probationis intelligat, et nobis confirma- 
tionem ingredientibus ipse quoque quodamrnodo 
novum audiendi sumat exordium. 

V. Partitio est nostrarum aut adversarii propositio- 
nuni aut utrarumque ordine collocata enumeratio. 
Hac quidam utendum semper putant, quod ea fiat 
causa lucidior et iudex attentior ac docilior, si scierit 
et de quo dicamus et de quo dicturi postea simus. 

2 Rursus quidam periculosum id oratori arbitrantur 
duabus ex causis : quod nonnunquam et excidere 
soleaiit quae promisimus et, si qua in partiendo prae- 
terimus, occurrere ; quod quidem nemini accidet, 
nisi qui plane vel nullo fuerit ingenio vel ad agendum 

3 nihil cogitati praemeditatique detulerit. Alioqui 
quae tain manifesta et lucida est ratio quam rectae 
partitionis ? Sequitur enirn naturam ducem adeo ut 
memoriae id maximum sit auxilium via dicendi non 
decedere. Quapropter ne illos quidem probaverim, 
qui parti tionem vetant ultra tres propositiones ex- 
tendere. Quae sine dubio, si nimium sit multiplex, 


BOOK IV. iv. 9-v. 3 

We may at times produce the effect of a propo- 9 
guion t even though it is not in itself a proposition, by 
adding after the statement of facts some phrase such 
as the following : " These are the points on which 
you will give your decision," thereby reminding the 
judge to give special attention to the question and 
giving him a fillip to emphasise the point that we 
have finished the statement of facts and are beginning 
the proof, so that when we start to verify our state- 
ments he may realise that he has reached a fresh stage 
where he must begin to listen with renewed attention. 

V. Partition may be defined as the enumeration in 
order of our own propositions, those of our adversary 
or both. It is held by some that this is indispen- 
sable on the ground that it makes the case clearer 
and the judge more attentive and more ready to be 
instructed, if he knows what we are speaking about 
and what we are going subsequently to speak about. 
Others, on the contrary, think that such a course is 2 
dangerous to the speaker on two grounds, namely 
that sometimes we may forget to perform what we 
have promised and may, on the other hand, come 
upon something which we have omitted in the par- 
tition. But this will never happen to anyone unless 
he is either a fool or has come into court without 
thinking out his speech in detail beforehand. Be- 3 
sides, what can be simpler or clearer than a straight- 
forward partition? It follows nature as a guide and 
the adhesion to a definite method is actually of the 
greatest assistance to the speaker's memory. There- 
fore I cannot approve the view even of those who 
lay down that partition should not extend beyond 
the length of three propositions. No doubt there is 
a danger, if our partition is too complicated, that it 



fugiet memoriam iudicis et turbabit intentionem ; hoc 
tamen numero velut lege non est alliganda, cum 

4 possit causa plures desiderare. Alia sunt magis, 
propter quae partitione non semper sit utendum : 
primum, quia pleraque gratiora sunt, si inventa subito 
iiec domo adlata, sed inter dicendum ex re ipsa nata 
videantur, unde ilia non iniucunda schemata, Paene 
excidit mihi, et Fugerat me, et Pecte admones. Propo- 
sitis enim probationibus omuls in reliquum gratia no- 

5 vitatis praecerpitur. Interim vero etiam fallendus 
est iudex et variis artibus subeundus, ut aliud agi 
quam quod petimus putet. Nam est nonminquam 
dura propositio, quod iudex si providit, non alitcr 
praeformidat quam qui ferrum medici priusquam 
curetur aspexit ; at si re non ante proposita securum 
ac nulla denuntiatione in seconversum intrarit oratio, 

6 efticiet, quod promittenti non crederetur. Interim 
refugienda non modo distinctio quaestionum est, sed 
omnino tractatio ; adfectibus turbandus et ab inten 
tione auferendus auditor. Non enim solurn oratoris 

BOOK IV. v. 3-6 

may slip the memory of the judge and disturb his 
attention. But that is no reason why it should be 
tied down to a definite number of propositions, since 
the case may quite conceivably require more. There 4 
are further reasons why we should sometimes dis- 
pense with partition. In the first place there are 
many points which can be produced in a more 
attractive manner, if they appear to be discovered on 
the spot and not to have been brought ready made 
from our study,, but rather to have sprung from the 
requirements of the case itself while we were speak- 
ing. Thus we get those not unpleasing figures such 
as " It has almost escaped me/' " I had forgotten," 
or " You do well to remind me." For if we set forth 
all that we propose to prove in advance, we shall 
deprive ourselves of the advantage springing from 
the charm of novelty. Sometimes we shall even 5 
have to hoodwink the judge and w r ork upon him by 
various artifices so that he may think that our aim is 
other than what it really is. For there are cases 
when a proposition may be somewhat startling : if the 
judge foresees this, he will shrink from it in advance, 
like a patient who catches sight of the surgeon's 
knife before the operation. On the other hand, if 
we have given him no preliminary notice and our 
words take him unawares, without his interest in 
them having been previously roused by any warning, 
we shall gain a credence which we should not have 
secured had we stated that we were going to raise 
the point. At times we must not merely avoid 6 
distinguishing between the various questions, but must 
omit them altogether, while our audience must be 
distracted by appeals to the emotion and their atten- 
tion diverted. For the duty of the orator is not 



est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet. 
Cui rei contraria est maxime tenuis ilia et scrupulose 
in partes secta divisionis diligentia eo tempore quo 

7 cognoscenti iudicium conamur auferre. Quid quod 
interim, quae per se levia sunt et infirma, turba 
valent ? Ideoque congerenda sunt potius et velut 
eruptione pugnandum ; quod tamen rarum esse debet 
et ex necessitate demum, cum hoc ipsum quod dissi- 

8 mile rationi est coegerit ratio. Praeter haec in omni 
partitione est utique aliquid potentissimum, quod 
cum audivit iudex cetera tanquam supervacua gravari 
solet. Itaque si plura vel obiicienda sunt vel diluenda, 
et utilis et iucunda partitio est ut, quid quaque de 
re dicturi simus, ordine apparent ; at si unum crimen 

9 varie defendemus, supervacua. Ut si ilia partiamur, 
Dicam mm lalem esse hunc quern tneor reum, ut in eo 
credibile videri possit homicidium ; dicam occidendi can- 
,sam hide non fuisse ; dicam hunc eo tempore quo //onto 
accixHs csl trans marc fuisse, omnia,, quae ante id quod 
ultimum est exsequeris, inania videri iiecesse est. 

10 Festinat enim iudex ad id quod potentissimum est. 

et velut obligatum promisso patronum^ si est pa- 

BOOK IV. v. 6-10 

merely to instruct : the power of eloquence is greatest 
in emotional appeals. Now there is no room for 
passion if we devote our attention to minute and 
microscopic division at a time when we are seeking 
to mislead the judgment of* the person who is trying 
the case. Again, there are certain arguments which 7 
are weak and trivial when they stand alone, but 
which have great force when produced in a body. 
We must, therefore, concentrate such arguments, 
and our tactics should be those of a sudden charge 
in mass. This, however, is a practice which should 
be resorted to but rarely and only under extreme 
necessity when reason compels us to take a course 
which is apparently irrational. In addition it must 8 
be pointed out that in any partition there is always 
some one point of such special importance, that when 
the judge lias heard it he is impatient with the re- 
mainder, which he regards as superfluous. Conse- 
quently if we have to prove or refute a number of 
points partition will be both useful and attractive, 
since it will indicate in order what we propose to say 
on each subject. On the other hand, if we are de- 
fending one point on various grounds, partition will 
be unnecessary. If vou were to make a partition such 9 
as the following, " I will not say that the character 
of my client is such as to render him incapable of 
murder, I will only say that he had no motive for 
murder and that at the time when the deceased was 
killed he was overseas," in that case all the proofs 
which you propose to bring before this, the final 
proof, must needs seem superfluous to the judge. 
For the judge is always in a hurry to reach the most 10 
important point. If he has a patient disposition he 
will merely make a silent appeal to the advocate. 



tientior, lacitus appellat ; si vel occupatus vel in 
aliqua potestate vel etiam si moribus incompositus, 

11 cum convicio efflagitat. Itaque non defuerunt, qui 
Ciceronis illam pro Cluentio partitionem improbarent, 
qua se dicturum esse promisit primum, neminem 
maioribus criminibus, gravioribus testibus, in iudicium 
vocatum quam Oppianicum ; deinde praeiudicia esse 
facta ab ipsis iudicibus, a quibus condemnatus sit ; 
postremo, iudicium pecunia temptatum non a Cluentio, 
sed contra Cluentium ; quia, si probari posset, quod 

12 est tertium, nihil necesse fuerit dicere priora. Rursus 
nemo tarn erit iniustus aut stultus, quin eum fateatur 
optime pro Murena esse partitum : Intelligo, indices, 
tris tot lus accusation** fuisse paries., el. earum imam in 
reprehensions mlae, alteram in contentions dignitatis, 
iertiam in criminibus ambitus esse versatam. Nam sic et 
ostendit lucidissime causam et nihil fecit altero super- 

13 De illo quoque genere defensionis plerique du- 
bitant : Si occidi, rede fed ; sed non occidi ; quo enim 
prius pertinere, si sequens firmum sit ? haec invicem 
obstare, et utroque utentibus in neutro haberi fidem. 
Quod sane in parte verum est, et illo sequenti, si 

1 iv. 9. Oppianicus had been indicted by Cluentius for an 
attempt upon his life and condemned. The "previous judg- 
ments" referred to were condemnations of his accomplices, 
which made Oppianicus' condemnation inevitable. Oppiani- 
cus was condemned, and it was alleged that this was due to 
bribery by Cluentius. Cluentius was now on his trial for 
the alleged murder of various persons. 


BOOK IV. v. 10-13 

whom lie will treat as bound by his promise. On 
the other hand, if he is busy, or holds exalted 
position, or is intolerant by nature, he will insist in 
no very courteous manner on his coming to the point. 
For these reasons there are some who disapprove of 11 
the partition adopted by Cicero in the pro Cluentio, 1 
where he premises that he is going to show, first, 
" that no man was ever arraigned for greater crimes 
or on stronger evidence than Oppianicus," secondly, 
" that previous judgments had been passed by those 
very judges by whom he was condemned," and 
finally, " that Cluentius made no attempt to bribe 
the jury, but that his opponent did." They argue 
that if the third point can be proved, there is no 
need to have urged the two preceding. On the 12 
other hand you will find no one so unreasonable or so 
foolish as to deny that the partition in the pro Mwrena 2 
is admirable. " 1 understand, gentlemen, that the 
accusation falls into three parts, the first aspersing 
my client's character, the second dealing with his 
candidature for the magistracy, and the third with 
charges of bribery." These words make the case as 
clear as possible, and no one division renders any 
other superfluous. 

There are also a number who are in doubt as to 13 
a form of defence which I may exemplify as follows : 
" If 1 murdered him, 1 did right ; but I did not 
murder him." 3 What, they ask, is the value of the 
first part, if the second can be proved, since they are 
mutually inconsistent, and if anyone employs both 
arguments, we should believe neither? This con- 
tention is partially justified ; we should employ the 

- v. 11. J See in. vi. 10. 



14 inodo indubitabile est, sit solo utenduin. At si quid 
in eo, quod est fortius, timebimus, utraque proba- 
tione nitemur. Alius enim alio moveri solet, et qui 
factum putavit, iustum credere potest ; qui tanquam 
iusto non movebitur, factum fortasse non credet. Ut 
certa manus uno telo possit esse contenta, incerta 

15 plura spargenda sunt, ut sit et fortunae locus. Egregie 
vero Cicero pro Milone insidiatorern primum Clodium 
ostendit, turn addidit ex abundanti, etiarasi id non 
luisset, talem tamen civem cum summa virtute inter- 

16 fectoris et gloria necari potuisse. Neque ilium tamen 
ordinem, de quo prius dixi, damnaverim ; quia quae 
dam, etiamsi ipsa sunt dura, in id tamen valent, ut 
ea molliantquaesequuntur. Nee omnino sine ration e 
est quod vulgo dicitur : Iniquum petentlwn, ut aequuw 

17 feras. Quod tamen nemo sic accipiat ut omnia credat 
audenda. Recte enim Graeci praecipiunt, Xon 
tempt anda, quae effici omnino non possint. Sed quotiens 
liac, de qua loquor, duplici defensione utemur, id 
laborandum est, ut in illam partem sequentem fides 
ex priore ducatur. Potest enim videri, qui tuto etiam 
confessurus fuit, mentiendi causam in negando non 

1 <5 13. 

2 The proverb would seem originally to refer to bargaining 
in the market : the salesman, knowing he will be beaten 
down, sets his original price too high. Hut it would equally 
apply to claims for damages in the courts. 


BOOK IV. v. 13-17 

second alone only it the tact can be proved without 
a doubt. But if we have any doubts as to being able 14 
to prove the stronger argument, we shall do well to 
rely on both. Different arguments move different 
people. He who thinks that the act was committed 
may regard it as a just act, while he who is deaf to 
the plea that the act was just may perhaps believe 
that it was never committed : one who is confident 
of his powers as a marksman may be content with one 
shaft, whereas he who has no such confidence will do 
well to launch several and give fortune a chance to 
come to his assistance. Cicero in the pro Milone 15 
reveals the utmost skill in showing first that Clodius 
laid an ambush for Milo and then in adding as a 
supernumerary argument that, even if he had not 
done so, he was nevertheless so bad a citizen that 
his slaying could only have done credit to the 
patriotism of the slayer and redounded to his glory. 
I would not however entirely condemn the order 1C 
mentioned above, 1 since there are certain arguments 
which, though hard in themselves, may serve to 
soften those which come after. The proverb, " If you 
want to get your due, you must ask for something 
more," 2 is not wholly unreasonable. Still no one 17 
should interpret it to mean that you must stop short 
of nothing. For the Greeks are right when they 
lay it down as a rule that we should not attempt 
the impossible. But whenever the double-barrelled 
defence of which I am speaking is employed, we 
must aim at making the first argument support the 
credibility of the second. For he who might with- 
out danger to himself have confessed to the com- 
mission of the act, can have no motive for lying 
when he denies the commission. 




18 Et illud utique faciendum rst, ut, quotiens stis- 
picabimur a iudice aliani probationem desiderari 
quam de qua loquimur, promittamus nos plene et 
statim de eo satis esse factiiros, praecipueque si de 

19 pudore agetur. Frequenter autem aecidit, ut causa 
parum verecunda lure tuta sit ; de quo ne inviti 
indices audiant et aversi, frequentius sunt admonendi, 
secuturam defensionem probitatis et dignitatis : ex- 

20 spectent paulum et agi urdine sinaiit. Quaedam 
interim nos invitis litigatoribus simulanduni est 
dicere, (jiiod Cicero pro Cluentio tacit circa iudieia- 
riam legem ; nonnunquam, quasi interpelleinur ab 
iis, subsistere ; saepe convertenda ad ipsos oratio ; 
hortandi ut sinant nos uti nostro consilio. Ita sur- 
repetur animo iud^cis et, dum sperat probationem 

21 pudoris, asperioribus illis minus repugnabit. (^tiae 
cum receperit, etiam verecundiae defensioni facilior 
erit. Sic utraque res invicem iuvabit, eritque index 
circa ius nostrum spe modestiae attentior, circa 
modestiam iuris probatione proclivior. 

22 Sed ut non semper necessaria aut utilis est par- 
titio, 1 ita opportune adhibita plurimum orationi 

1 utilis est partitio, Victor: ntilis etiam partitio est. A : 
etiarn supervacua partitio est, K. 


BOOK IV. v. 18-22 

Above all it is important, whenever we suspect 18 
that the judge desires a proof other than that on 
which we are fetigaged, to promise that we will satisfy 
him on the point fully and without delay, more 
especially if the question is one of our client's 
honour. But it will often happen that a discredit- 19 
able case has the law on its side, and to prevent 
the judges giving us only a grudging and reluct- 
ant hearing on the point of law, we shall have to 
warn them with some frequency that we shall shortly 
proceed to defend our client's honour and integrity, 
if they will only wait a little and allow us to follow 
the order of our proofs. We may also at times 20 
pretend to say certain things against the wishes of 
our clients, as Cicero } does in the pro Cluenlio when 
he discusses the law dealing with judicial corruption. 
Occasionally we may stop, as though interrupted by 
our clients, while often we shall address them and 
exhort them to let us act as we think best. Thus 
we shall make a gradual impression on the mind of 
the judge, and, buoyed up by the hope that we are 
going to clear our client's honour, he will be less ill- 
disposed toward the harder portions of our proof. 
And when he has accepted these, he will be all the -1 
readier to listen to our defence of our client's 
character. Thus the two points will render mutual 
assistance to each other; the judge will be more 
attentive to our legal proofs owing to his hope that 
wr shall proceed to a vindication of character and 
better disposed to accept that vindication because 
we have proved our point of law. 

But although partition is neither always necessary 22 
nor useful, it will, if judiciously employed, greatly 
1 lii. 


i. '1 


lucis et gratiae oonferl. Neque enini soluni id efficit, 
ut clariora fiant, quae dicuntur, rebus velut ex 
turba extractis et in conspectu iudicum positis ; sed 
reficit quoque audientem certo singularum partium 
fine, non aliter quam facientibus iter multum detra- 
hunt fatigationis notata inscriptis lapidibus spatia. 

23 Nam et exhausti laboris nosse mensuram voluptati 
est, et hortatur ad reliqua fortius exsequenda scire 
quantum supersit. Nihil enim longuin videri necesse 

24 est, in quo,, quid ultimum sit, certum est. Nee im- 
merito multum ex diligentia partiendi tulit laudis 
Q. Hortensius, cuius tamen divisionem in digitos 
diduetam nonnunquam Cicero leviter eludit. Nam 
est suus et in gestu modus, et vitanda, utique 
maxime, concisa nimium et velut articulosa partitio. 

25 Nam et auctoritati pluriminn detrahunt minuta ilia 
nee iam membra sed frusta, et huius gloriae cupidi, 
quo subtilius et copiosius divisisse videantur, et super- 
vacua adsumunt et quae natura singularia sunt secant, 
nee tarn plura faciunt quam minora ; deinde cum 
fecerunt mille particulas, in eandem incidunt obscuri- 
tatem, contra quam partitio inventa est. 


HOOK JV. v. 22-25 

arid to the lucidity and grace of our speech. For 
it not only makes our arguments clearer by isolating 
the points from the crowd in which they would 
otherwise be lost and placing them before the 
eyes of the judge, but relieves his attention by 
assigning a definite limit to certain parts of our 
speech, just as our fatigue upon a journey is relieved 
bv reading the distances on the milestones which we 
pass. For it is a pleasure to be able to measure how 23 
much of our task has been accomplished,, and the 
knowledge of what remains to do stimulates us to 
fresh effort over the labour that still awaits us. For 
nothing need seem long, when it is definitely known 
how far it is to the end. Quintus Hortensius 24 
deserves the high praise which has been awarded 
him for the care which he took over his partitions, 
although Cicero more than once indulges in kindlv 
mockery of his habit of counting his headings on his 
fingers. For there is a limit to gesture, and we must 
be specially careful to avoid excessive minuteness and 
any suggestion of articulated structure in our partition. 
If our divisions are too small, they cease to be limbs 25 
and become fragments, and consequently detract not 
a little from the authoritv of our speech. Moreover, 
those who are ambitious of this sort of reputation, 
in order that they may appear to enhance the nicety 
and the exhaustive nature of their division, introduce 
what is superfluous and subdivide things which 
naturally form a single whole. The result of their 
labours is, however, not so much to increase the 
number of their divisions as to diminish their im- 
portance, and after all is done and they have split 
up their argument into a thousand tiny compartments, 
they fall into that very obscurity which the partition 
was designed to eliminate. 



26 Et divisa autem et simplex propositio, quotien 
utiliter adhiberi potest, primuin debet esse aperta 
atque lucida (nain quid sit turpius, quam id esse 
obscurum ipsum,, quod in eum solum adhibetur usum, 
ne sint cetera obscura?), turn brevis nee ullo super- 
vacuo onerata verbo. Non enim, quid dicamus, sed 

27 de quo dicturi simus ostendimus. Obtinendum etiain, 
ne quid in ea desit, ne quid supersit. Superest auteni 
sie fere, cum aut in species partimur, quod in genera 
partiri sit satis, aut geiiere posito subiicitur species, 
ut dicam de virtulv, instifia, coniinentia. cum iustitia 

28 atque cpntinentia virtutis sint species. Partitio priina 
estj quid sit de quo conveniat, (juid de quo ambiga- 
tur. In eo, quod convenit, quid adversarius fateatur, 
quid nos; in eo, de quo ambigitur, quae nostrae j>ro- 
positiones, quae partis adversae. Pessimum vero, 
non eodem ordine exsequi, quo quidque proposueris. 

J 5 

BOOK IV. v. 26-28 

The proposition, whether single or multiple, must, 26 
on every occasion when it can be employed with 
profit, be clear and lucid ; for what could be more 
discreditable than that a portion of the speech, 
whose sole purpose is to prevent obscurity else- 
where, should itself be obscure ? Secondly it must 
be brief and must not be burdened with a single 
superfluous word ; for we are not explaining what 
we are saying, but what we are going to say. We 27 
must also ensure that it is free alike from omissions 
and from redundance. Redundance as a rule occurs 
through our dividing into species when it would be 
sufficient to divide into genera, or through the addi- 
tion of species after stating the genus. The following 
will serve as an example : " I will speak of virtue, 
justice and abstinence." But justice and abstinence 
are species of the genus virtue. Our first partition 28 
will be between admitted and disputed facts. 
Admitted facts will then be divided into those 
acknowledged by our opponent and those acknow- 
ledged by ourselves. Disputed facts will be divided 
into those which we and those which our opponents 
allege, lint the worst fault of all is to treat your 
points in an order different from that which was 
assigned them in your proposition. 




FUERUNT et clari quidem auctores, quibus solum 
videretur oratoris officium docere ; namque et adfectus 
duplici ratione excludendos putabant, primum quia 
* vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio, deinde quia 
iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia gratia simili- 
busque non oporteret, et voluptatem audientium 
petere, cum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non 
modo agenti supervacuum, sed vix etiam viro dignum 

2 arbitrabantur ; plures vero, qui nee ab illis sine dubio 
partibus rationem orandi summoverent, hoc tamen 
proprium atque praecipuum crederent opus, sua con- 
firmare et quafc ex adverse proponerentur refutare. 

3 Utrumcunque est (neque enim hoc loco meam inter- 
pono sententiam), hie erit liber illorum opinione 
maxime necessarius, quia toto haec sola tractantur ; 
quibus sane et ea., quae de iudicialibus causis iam 

4 dicta suntj serviunt. Nam neque prooemii neque 
narrationis est alius usus, quam ut iudicem huic 
praeparent ; et status nosse atque ea, de quibus 

>. Ar. Rhc.f. i. i. 4 Also Quint. IV. v. 6. 
ee in. vi. 




THKKE have been certain writers of no small 
authority l who have held that the sole duty of the 
orator was to instruct : in their view appeals to the 
emotions were to be excluded for two reasons, first 
on the ground that all disturbance of the mind was 
a fault, and secondly that it was wrong to distract 
the judge from the truth by exciting his pity, bring- 
ing influence to bear., and the like. Further, to seek 
to charm the audience, when the aim of the orator 
was merely to win success, was in their opinion not 
only superfluous for a pleader, but hardly Worthy of 
a self-respecting man. The majority however, while 
admitting that such arts undoubtedly formed part of 
oratory, held that its special and peculiar task is to 
make good the case which it maintains and refute 
that of its opponent. Whichever of these views is 
correct (for at this point I do not propose to express 
my own opinion), they will regard this book as 
serving a very necessary purpose, since it will deal 
entirely with the points on which they lay such 
stress, although all that I have already said on the 
subject of judicial causes is subservient to the same 
end. For the purpose of the exordium and the state- 
ment of fads is merely to prepare the judge for these 
points, while it would be a work of supererogation to 
know the hases 2 of cases or to consider the other 



supra scripshiHis, intueri supervacuuni ibret, nisi ad 
5 hanc perveniremus. Denique ex quinque quas iudi- 
cialis materiae fecimus partibus, quaecunque alia 
potest aliquando necessaria oausae non esse ; lis 
i nil la est, cui probatione opus non sit. Eius prae- 
cepta sic optime divisuri videmur, ut prius, quae in 
commune ad omnes quaestiones pertinent, ostenda- 
inus ; deinde, quae in quoque causae genere propria 
sint, exsequamur. 

I. Ac prima quidein ilia parti tio ab Aristotele 
tradita consensum fere omnium meruit, alias esse 
probationer quas extra dicendi rationem acciperet 
orator, alias, quas ex causa traheret ipse et quodam 
inndo gigneret. Ideoque illas arcxyovs, id est inarti- 
fieiales, has h'Te^vov?, id est artificiales, vocaverunt. 

2 Ex illo priore genere sunt praeiudicia, vumores, tor- 
inejita, tabulae, iusiurandum, testes, in quibus j>ars 
maxima contentionum forensium consistit. Sed ut 
ipsa j)er se carent arte, ita summis eloquentiae viribus 
et adlevaiida sunt plerumque et refelleiida. Quare 
mihi videntur magnopere damiiandi, qui totum hoc- 

3 genus a praeceptis removerunt. Nee tamen in ammo 
est oinnia, quae aut pro his aut contra dici solent. 
complecti. Non enim communes locos tradere de- 
stinamus, quod esset operis infiniti, sed viam quandam 

2 in. ix. J : iv. iii. 15. 
Khtf. i. ii. -2. 


BOOK V. PH. 4-1. 3 

points dealt with above, 1 unless we intend to proceed 
to the consideration of the proof. Finally, of the 5 
five parts 2 into which we divided judicial cases, any 
single one other than the proof may on occasion be 
dispensed with. But there can be no suit in which 
the proof is not absolutely necessary. With regard 
to the rules to be observed in this connexion, we 
shall, I think, be wisest to follow our previous method 
of classification and show first what is common to all 
cases and then proceed to point out those which are 
peculiar to the several kinds of cases. 

I. To begin with it may be noted that the divi- 
sion laid down by Aristotle 3 has met with almost 
universal approval. It is to the effect that there are 
some proofs adopted by the orator which lie outside 
the art of speaking, and others which he himself 
deduces or, if 1 may use the term, begets out of his 
case. The former therefore have been styled artyy 01 
or inartificial proofs, the latter IVTC^^OI or artificial. 
To the first class belong decisions of previous courts, 2 
rumours, evidence extracted by torture, documents, 
oaths, and witnesses, for it is with these that the 
majority of forensic arguments are concerned. But 
though in themselves they involve no art, all the 
powers of eloquence are as a rule required to disparage 
or refute them. Consequently in my opinion those 
who would eliminate the whole of this class of proof 
from their rules of oratory, deserve the strongest 
condemnation. It is not, however, my intention to 3 
embrace all that can be said for or against these views. 
I do not for instance propose to lay down rules for 
commonplaces, a task requiring infinite detail, but 
merely to sketch out the general lines and method 



atque rationein. QuibuS demonslratis. non modo in 
exsequendo suas quisque vires debet adhibere, sed 
etiam inveniendo similia, ut quaeque condicio litiuin 
poscet. Neque enim de omnibus causis dicere 
quisquam potest saltern praeteritis, ut taceain de 

II. lam praeiudic'iorum vis omnis tribus in gene- 
ribus versatur: rebus, quae aliquandd ex paribus 
causis sunt iudicatae, quae exempla reetius dicuntur, 
ut de rescissis patrum testameiitis vel contra filios 
confirmatis ; iudiciis ad ipsam causam pertinentil>us, 
unde etiam nomen ductum est, qualia in ()pj)ianicunj 
faeta dicuntur et a senatu adversus Milonem ; ant 
cum de eadem causa pronuntiatum est, ut in reis 
deportatis et assertione secunda et partibus cen- 
_ i umviralium, quae in duas hastas divisae sunt. Con- 
firmantur praecipue duobus : auctoritate eorum^ qui 
pronuntiaverunt, et similitudine rerum, de quibus 
quaeritur; refelluntur autem raro j)er contumeliam 

1 pro Clutnt. xvii. sqq. - pro Mil. \. 

z Banished persons wlio have been accused afresh after 
their restoration. 

4 When a slave claimed his liberty by awertio through a 
representative known as assert or, his case was not disposed 
of once and for all by a first failure, but the claim might be 
presented anew. 


BOOK V. i. 3-11. 2 

U> bi- followed by the orator. The method once 
indicated, it is for the individual orator not merely to 
employ his powers on its application, but on the 
invention of similar methods as the circumstances of 
the case may demand. For it is impossible to deal 
with every kind of case, even if we confine ourselves 
to those which have actually occurred in the past 
without considering those which may occur in the 

II. As regards decisions in previous courts, these 
fall under three heads. First, we have matters 
on which judgment has been given at some time or 
other in cases of a similar nature : these are, how- 
ever, ny>re correctly termed precedents, as for 
instance where a father's will has been annulled or 
confirmed in opposition to his sons. Secondly, 
there are judgments concerned with the case itself; 
it is from these that the name praenidicium is 
derived : as examples I may cite those passed 
against Oppianicus 1 or by the senate against Milo. 2 
Thirdly, there are judgments passed on the actual 
ease, as for example in cases where the accused has 
been deported,' 5 or where renewed application is 
made for the recognition of an individual as a free 
man, 4 or in portions of cases tried in the centumviral 
court which come before two different panels of 
judges. 5 Such previous decisions are as a rule 2 
confirmed in two ways : bv the authority of those 
who gave the decision and bv the likeness between the 
two cases. As for their reversal, this can rarely be 

5 The meaning is not clear. The Latin suggests that 
portions of a case might be tried by two panels sitting 
separately, while the case as a whole was tried by the two 
panels .sitting conjointly. The hasta (spear) was the symbol 
of the centumviral court, cp. XI. i. 7S. 



iudicum, nisi forte manifesta in iis culpa erit. Vult 
enim cognoscentiurn quisque firmani esse alterius 
sententiam, et ipse pronuntiaturus, nee libenter 

3 exemplum, qiiod in se fortasse recidat, facit. Con- 
fugieiidum ergo est in duobus superioribus, si res 
feret, ad aliquam dissimilitudinem causae ; vix autem 
ulla est per omnia alteri similis. Si id non continget 
aut eadem causa erit, actionum incusanda negligentia 
aut de infirmitate personarum quereridum, contra 
quas erit iudicatum, aut de gratia, quae testes cor- 
ruperit, aut de invidia aut de ignorantia, aut viden- 

-t dum, quid l causae postea accesserit. Quorum si 
nihil erit, licet tarn en dicere multos iudiciorum casus 
ad inique pronuntiandum valere ideoque damnatum 
Rutilium, absolutes Clodium atque Catilinam. Ro- 
gandi etiam iudices, ut rem potius intueantur ipsam, 

5 quam iuriiurando alieno suum donent. Adversus 
consulta autem senatus et decreta principum vel 
magistratuum remedium nullum est, nisi aut inventa 
quantulacunque causae differentia aut aliqua vel eo- 
rundem vel eiusdem potestatis hominum posterior 
constitutio, quae sit priori contraria ; quae si deerunt, 
Iis non erit. 

1 videndum quid, Victor : inveniendum quod, MSS. 

1 Publius Rutilius Rufus condemned for extortion while 
govei'nor of Asia, owing to a conspiracy of the publicans 
against him. He went into voluntary exile at Mitylene and 
was highly honoured by the people of Asia. 91 B.C. 


BOOK V. ii. 2-5 

obtained by denouncing the judges, unless they have 
been guilty of obvious error. For each of those who 
are trying the case wishes the decision given by 
another to stand, since he too has to give judgment 
and is reluctant to create a precedent that may 
recoil upon himself. Consequently, as regards the :! 
first two classes, we must, if possible, take refuge in 
some dissimilarity between the two cases, and two 
cases are scarcely ever alike in all their details. 
If, however, such a course is impossible and the 
case is the same as that on which the previous 
decision was given, we must complain of the negli- 
gence shown in the conduct of the previous case 
or of the weakness of the parties condemned, 
or of undue influence employed to corrupt the 
witnesses, or again of popular prejudice or ignorance 
which reacted unfavourably against our client ; or 
else we must consider what has occurred since to 
alter the aspect of the case. If none of these courses 4 
can be adopted, it will still be possible to point out 
that the peculiar circumstances of many trials have 
led to unjust decisions ; hence condemnations such 
as that of Rutilius ] and acquittals such as those of 
Clodius and Catiline. We must also ask the judges 
to consider the facts of the case on their merits 
rather than make their verdict the inevitable con- 
sequence of a verdict given by others. When, how- 5 
ever, we are confronted by decrees of the senate, or 
ordinances of emperors or magistrates, there is no 
remedy, unless we can make out that there is some 
difference, however small, between the cases, or 
that the same persons or persons holding the same 
powers have made some subsequent enactment re- 
versing the former decision. Failing this, there will 

be no case for judgment. 


VOL. n. M 


III. Famam atque rurnores pars altera coiiseiisuin 
civitatis et velut publicum testimonium vocat, altera 
sermonem sine ullo certo auctore dispersum, cui 
malignitas initium dederit, incrementum credulitas ; 
quod nulli non etiam innocentissimo possit accidere 
fraude inimicorum falsa vulgantium. Exempla 
utrinque non deerunt. 

IV. Sicut in tormentis quoque, qui est locus fre- 
quentissimus, cum pars altera quaestionem vera 
fatendi necessitatem vocet, altera saepe etiam causam 
falsa dicendi, quod aliis patientia facile mendacium 
faciat, aliis infirmitas necessarium. Quid attinet de 
his plura? Plenae sunt orationes veterum ac novo- 

2 rum. Quaedam tamen in hac parte erunt propria 
cuiusque litis. Nam sive de habenda quaestione 
agetur, plurimum intererit, quis et quern postulet 
aut offerat et in quern et ex qua causa ; sive iam erit 
habita, quis ei praefuerit, quis et quomodo sit tortus, 
incredibilia dixerit an inter se constantia, persevera- 
verit in eo quod coeperat, an aliquid dolore mutarit, 
prima parte quaestionis an procedente cruciatu. 


BOOK V. in.-iv. 2 

III. With regard lo rumour and common report, 
one party will call them the verdict of public opin- 
ion and the testimony of the world at large ; the 
other will describe them as vague talk based on no 
sure authority, to which malignity has given birth 
and credulity increase, an ill to which even the most 
innocent of men may be exposed by the deliberate 
dissemination of falsehood on the part of their 
enemies. It will be easy for both parties to produce 
precedents to support their arguments. 

IV. A like situation arises in the case of evidence 
extracted by torture : one party will style torture an 
infallible method of discovering the truth, while the 
other will allege that it also often results in false 
confessions, since with some their capacity of en- 
durance makes lying an easy thing, while with others 
weakness makes it a necessity. It is hardly worth 
my while to say more on the subject, as the speeches 
both of ancient and modern orators are full of this 
topic. Individual cases may however involve special 2 
considerations in this connexion. For if the point at 
issue is whether torture should be applied, it will 
make all the difference who it is who demands or 
offers it, who it is that is to be subjected to torture, 
against whom the evidence thus sought will tell, and 
what is the motive for the demand. If on the other 
hand torture has already been applied, it will make 
all the difference who was in charge of the proceed- 
ings, who was the victim and what the nature of the 
torture, whether the confession was credible or con- 
sistent, whether the witness stuck to his first state- 
ment or changed it under the influence of pain, and 
whether he made it at the beginning of the torture 
or onl after it had continued some time. The 



Quae utrinque tain iniinita sunt quain ipsa rerum 

V. Contra tabulas quoque saepe dicendum est, cum 
eas non solum refelli sed etiam accusari sciamus esse 
usitatum. Cum sit autem in his aut scelus signato- 
rum aut ignorantia, tutius ac facilius id, quod secundo 

2 loco diximus, tractatur, quod pauciores rei fiunt. Sed 
hoc ipsum argumenta ex causa trahit, si forte aut 
incredibile est id actum esse, quod tabulae continent,, 
aut, ut frequentius evenit, aliis probationibus aeque 
inartificialibus solvitur ; si aut is in quern signatum 
est, aut aliquis signator dicitur afuisse vel prius esse 
defunctus ; si tempora non congruunt ; si vel ante- 
cedentia vel insequentia tabulis repugnant. Inspectio 
etiam ipsa saepe falsum deprehendit. 

VI. lusiurandum litigatores aut offerunt suum aut 
non recipiunt oblatum, aut ab adversario exigunt aut 
recusant, cum ab ipsis exigatur. Offerre suum sine 
ilia condicione, ut vel adversarius iuret, fere impro- 

2 bum est. Qui tamen id faciet, aut vita se tuebitur, 

1 An oath might be taken by one of the parties as an 
alternative to evidence. In court such an oath might be 
taken only on the proposal of the adversary ; the litigant 
might not swear on his own initiative, although an oath 
might be taken voluntarily before the case came into court. 
The matter of the oath rested with the profferer, and the 
taking of such a proffered oath meant victory for the 


BOOK V. iv. 2-vi. 2 

variety of such questions is as infinite as the variety 
of actual cases. 

V. It is also frequently necessary to speak 
against documents, for it is common knowledge that 
they are often not merely rebutted, but even 
attacked as forgeries. But as this implies either 
fraud or ignorance on the part of the signatories, it 
is safer and easier to make the charge one of igno- 
rance, because by so doing we reduce the number 
of the persons accused. But our proceedings as a 2 
whole will draw their arguments from the circum- 
stances of the case at issue. For example, it may be 
incredible tjiat an incident occurred as stated in the 
documents, or, as more often happens, the evidence 
of the documents may be overthrown by other proofs 
which are likewise of an inartificial nature ; if, for 
example, it is alleged that the person, whose in- 
terests are prejudiced by the document, or one of 
the signatories was absent when the document was 
signed, or deceased before its signature, or if the 
dates disagree, or events preceding or following the 
writing of the document are inconsistent with it. 
Even a simple inspection of a document is often 
sufficient for the detection of forgery. 

VI. With regard to oaths, 1 parties either offer to 
take an oath themselves, or refuse to accept the oath 
of their opponent, demand that their opponent 
should take an oath or refuse to comply with a 
similar demand when proffered to themselves. To 
offer to take an oath unconditionally without 
demanding that one's opponent should likewise take 
an oath is as a rule a sign of bad faith. If, however, 2 
anyone should take this course, he will defend his 
action by appealing to the blamelessness of his life 



ut earn non sit credibile peieraturum ; aut ipsa vi 
religionis, in qua plus fidei consequetur, si id egerit, 
ut non cupide ad hoc descendere sed ne hoc quidem 
recusare videatur ; aut, si causa patietur, modo litis, 
propter quam devoturus se ipse non fuerit ; aut 
praeter alia causae instrumenta adiicit ex abundant! 

3 hanc quoque conscientiae suae fiduciam. Qui non 
recipiet, et iniquam condicionera et a multis con- 
temni iurisiuraridi metum dicet, cum etiam philosophi 
quidam sint reperti, qui deos agere rerum humanarum 
curam negarent ; eum vero, qui nullo deferente iurare 
sit paratus, et ipsum velle de causa sua pronuntiare 
et, quam id quod offert leve ac facile credat, osten- 

4 dere. At is, qui defert, agere modeste videtur, cum 
Htis adversarium iudicem faciat, et eum cuius cognitio 
est onere liberat, qui profecto alieno iureiurando stari 

5 quam suo mavult. Quo difficilior recusatio est, nisi 
forte res est ea, quam credibile sit notam ipsi lion 

esse. Quae excusatio si deerit, hoc unum relinque- 


BOOK V. vi. 2-5 

as rendering perjury on his part incredible, or by the 
solemn nature of the oath, with regard to which he 
will win all the greater credence, if without the 
least show of eagerness to take the oath he makes it 
clear that he does not shrink from so solemn a duty. 
Or again, if the case is such as to make this possible, 
he will rely on the trivial nature of the point in 
dispute to win belief, on the ground that he would 
not incur the risk of the divine displeasure when so 
little is at stake. Or, finally, he may in addition to 
the other means which he employs to win his case 
offer to take an oath as a culminating proof of a 
clear conscience. The man who refuses to accept his 3 
opponent's offer to take an oath, will allege that the 
inequality of their respective conditions are not the 
same for both parties and will point out that many 
persons are not in the least afraid of committing 
perjury, even philosophers having been found to deny 
that the gods intervene in human affairs ; and further 
that he who is ready to take an oath without being 
asked to do so, is really proposing to pass sentence 
on his own case and to show what an easy and trivial 
thing he thinks the oath which he offers to take. 
On the other hand the man who proposes to put 4 
his opponent 011 oath appears to act with moderation, 
since he is making his adversary a judge in his own 
case, while he frees the actual judge from the burden 
of coming to a decision, since the latter would 
assuredly prefer to rest on another man's oath than 
on his own. This fact makes the refusal to take an 5 
oath all the more difficult, unless indeed the affair 
in question be of such a nature that it cannot be 
supposed that the facts are known to the person 
asked to take the oath. Failing this excuse, there 



tur, ut invidiam sibi quaeri ab adversario dicat atque 
id agi, ut in causa, in qua vincere non possit, queri 
possit ; itaque hominem quidem malum occupatiK 
rum hanc condicionem fuisse, se autem probare 
malle quae adfirmet, quam dubium cuiquam relin- 

6 quere, an peierarit. Sed nobis adolescentibus seniores 
in agendo facti praecipere solebant, ne temere un- 
quam iusiurandum deferremus, sicut neque optio 
iudicis adversario esset permittenda nee ex advocatis 
partis adversae iudex eligendus ; nam, si dicere 
contraria turpe advocate videretur, certe turpius 
habendum, face re quod noceat. 

VII. Maximus tamen patronis circa testimonia 
sudor est. Ea dicuntur aut per tabulas aut a prae- 
sentibus. Simplicior contra tabulas pugna. Nam et 
minus obstitisse videtur pudor inter paucos signa- 
tores, et pro diffidentia premitur absentia. Si reprc- 
hensionem non capit ipsa persona, infamare signatores 

2 licet. Tacita praeterea quaedam cogitatio refragatur 
his omnibus, quod nemo per tabulas dat testimonium 
nisi sua voluntate ; quo ipso non esse amicum ei se, 

1 The choice of the single iudex in civil cases rested with 
the plaintiff, though the defendant had the right to refuse 
the person proposed. 

2 Not an actual advocate, but a supporter and adviser 
on points of law. 


BOOK V. vi. 5-vn. 2 

is only one course open to him : he must say that 
his opponent rs trying to excite a prejudice against 
him and is endeavouring to give the impression that 
he has real ground for complaint though he is not in 
a position to win his case ; consequently, though a 
dishonest man would eagerly have availed himself of 
the proposal, he prefers to prove the truth of his 
statements rather than leave a doubt in anyone's 
mind as to whether he has committed perjury or no. 
But in my young days advocates grown old in plead- 6 
ing used to lay it down as a rule that we should 
never be in a hurry to propose that our opponent 
should take an oath, just as we should never allow 
him the choice of a judge l nor select our judge 
from among the supporters of the opposite side : for 
if it is regarded as a disgrace to such a supporter 2 
to say anything against his client, it is surely a still 
worse disgrace that he should do anything that will 
harm his client's case. 

VII. It is, however, the evidence that gives the 
greatest trouble to advocates. Evidence may be 
given either in writing or orally by witnesses present 
in court. Documentary evidence is easier to dispose 
of. For it is likely that the deponent was less 
ashamed of himself in the presence of a *small 
number of witnesses, and his absence from court is 
attacked as indicating a lack of confidence. If we 
cannot call the character of the deponent in question, 
we may attack the witnesses to his signature. 
Further there is always a certain tacit prejudice 2 
against documentary evidence, since no one can be 
forced to give such evidence save of his own free will, 
whereby he shows that he harbours unfriendly feel- 
ings towards the person against whom he bears 



contra quern dicit, fatetur. Neque tamen protinus 
cesserit orator, quo minus et amicus pro amico et 
inimicus contra inimicum possit verum, si integra sit 
ei fides, dicere. Sed late locus uterque tractatur. 

3 Cum praesentibus vero ingens dimicatio est, ideo- 
que velut duplici contra *eos proque iis acie confligitur 
actionum et interrogationum. In actionibus primum 
generaliter pro testibus atque in testes dici solet. 

4 Et hie comniunis locus, cum pars altera nullam 
firmiorem probationem esse contendit, quam quae sit 
hominum seientia nixa ; altera ad detrahendam illis 
fidem omnia, per quae fieri soleant falsa testimonia, 

5 enumerat. Sequeiis ratio est cum specialiter quidem, 
sed tamen multos pariter invadere patroni solent. 
Nam et gentium simul universarum elevata testimonia 
ab oratoribus scimus et tota genera testimoniorum : 
ut de auditionibus ; non enim ipsos esse testes sed 
iniuratorum adferre voces ; ut in causis repetundarum, 
qui se reo numerasse pecunias iurant, litigatorum non 

6 testium habendos loco. Interim adversus singulos 
dirigitur actio ; quod insectationis genus et per- 


1 Inlerrogatio includes both the examination in chief and 
cross-examination . 

2 e.g. in cases of extortion, where a whole province might 
give evidence against the accused. 


BOOK V. vn. 2-6 

witness. On the other hand an advocate should be 
chary of denying that a friend may give true 
evidence against a friend or an enemy against an 
enemy, provided they are persons of unimpeachable 
credit. But the subject admits of copious discus- 
sion, from whichever side it be regarded. 

The task of dealing with the evidence of witnesses 3 
present in court is, however, one of great difficulty, 
and consequently whether defending or impugning 
them the orator employs a twofold armoury in the 
shape of a set speech and examination. 1 In set 
speeches it is usual to begin with observations either 
on behalf of or against witnesses in general. In so 4 
doing we introduce a commonplace, since one side 
will contend that there can be no stronger proof than 
that which rests on human knowledge, while the 
other, in order to detract from their credibility, will 
enumerate all the methods by which false evidence 
is usually given. The next procedure is the common 5 
practice of making a special attack, which all the 
same involves impugning the validity of evidence 
given by large numbers of persons. We know, for 
instance, that the evidence of entire nations 2 and 
whole classes of evidence have been disposed of by 
advocates. For example, in the case of hearsay 
evidence, it will be urged that those who produce 
such evidence are not really witnesses, but are 
merely reporting the words of unsworn persons, while 
in cases of extortion, those who swear that they paid 
certain sums to the accused are to be regarded not 
as witnesses, but as parties to the suit. Sometimes 6 
however the advocate will direct his speech against 
single individuals. Such a form of attack may be 
found in many speeches, sometimes embedded in 


mixtum defensioni legimus In orationibus plnrimis et 

7 separatim editum, sicut in Vatinium testem. Totum 
igitur excutiamus locum, quando universam institu- 
tionem aggressi sumus. Sufficiebant alioqui libri duo 
a Domitio Afro in hanc rein compositi, quern adole- 
scentulus senem colui, ut non lecta mihi tantum ea, 
sed pleraque ex ipso sint cognita. Is verissime prae- 
cepit primum esse in hac parte officium oratoris, ut 
totem causam familiariter norit ; quod sine dubio ad 

8 omnia pertinet. Id quomodo contingat, explicabimus, 
cum ad destinatum huic parti locum venerimus. Ea 
res suggeret materiam interrogationi et veluti tela 
ad manum subministrabit ; eadem docebit, ad quae 
iudicis animus actione sit praeparandus. Debet enim 
vel fieri vel detrahi testibus fides oratione perpetua, 
quia sic quisque dictis movetur, ut est ad credendum 
vel non credendum ante formatus. 

9 Et quoniam duo genera sunt testium, aut volun- 
tariorum aut eorum, quibus in iudiciis publicis lege 
denuntiari solet, quorum altero pars utraque utitur, 
alterum accusatoribus tantum concessum est, sepa- 
remus officium dantis testes et refellentis. 

10 Qui voluntarium producit, scire quid is dicturus 

1 Vatinius had appeared as a witness against Sestius, who 
was defended by Cicero. 

2 xn. viii. 

3 In civil cases evidence was as a rule voluntary ; in 
criminal cases the accuser might subpoena witnesses, while 
the defence was restricted to voluntary testimony, 


BOOK V. TII. 6-10 

the speech for the defence and sometimes published 
separately like the speech against the evidence of 
Vatinius. 1 The whole subject, therefore, demands a 7 
thorough investigation, as the task which we have 
in hand is the complete education of an orator. 
Otherwise the two books written on this subject by 
Domitius Afer would suffice. I attended his lectures 
when he was old and I was young, and consequently 
have the advantage not merely of having read his 
book, but of having heard most of his views from 
his own lips. He very justly lays down the rule that 
in this connexion it is the first duty of an orator to 
make himself thoroughly acquainted with the case, 
a remark which of course applies to all portions of 
a speech. How such knowledge may be acquired I 8 
shall explain when I come to the appropriate portion 
of this work. 2 This knowledge will suggest material 
for the examination and will supply weapons ready 
to the speaker's hand: it will also indicate to him 
the points for which the judge's mind must be 
prepared in the set speech. For it is by the set speech 
that the credit of witnesses should be established 
or demolished, since the effect of evidence on the 
individual judge depends on the extent to which he 
has been previously influenced in the direction of 
believing the witness or tfye reverse. 

And since there are two classes of witnesses, 3 I) 
those who testify of their own free will and those 
who are summoned to attend in the public courts, of 
whom the former are available to either party, the 
latter solely to the accusers, we must distinguish 
between the duties of the advocate who produces 
witnesses and the advocate who refutes them. 

He who produces a voluntary witness is in a 10 


sit potest; ideoque faciliurem videtur in rogando 
habere rationem. Sed haec quoque pars acumen ac 
vigilantiam poscit, providendumque, ne timidus, ne 

1 1 inconstans, ne imprudens testis sit ; turbantur enim 
et a patronis diversae partis inducuntur in laqueos et 
plus deprehensi nocent quam firmi et interriti pro- 
fuissent. Multum igitur domi ante versandi, variis 
percontationibus, quales haberi ab adversario possint, 
explorandi sunt. Sic fit, ut aut constant sibi aut, si 
quid titubaverint, opportuna rursus eius a quo pro- 
ducti sunt interrogation e velut in gradum reponantur. 

12 In iis quoque adhuc, qui constiterint sibi, vitandae 
insidiae ; nam frequenter subiici ab adversario so- 
lent et omnia profutura polliciti diversa respondent 
et auctoritatem habent non arguentium ilia, sed con- 

13 fitentium. Explorandum igitur, quas causas laedendi 
adversarium adferant ; nee id sat est iriimicos fuisse, 
sed an desierint, an per hoc ipsum reconciliari velint, 
ne corrupt! sint, ne poenitentia propositum muta- 

BOOK V. vii. 10-13 

position to know what he is likely to say : con- 
sequently the task of examining him would seem to 
be rendered easier. But even here such cases make 
a great demand on the acumen and watchfulness of 
the advocate, who must see that his witness is neither 
timid, inconsistent nor imprudent. For the opposing 11 
counsel have a way of making a witness lose his head 
or of leading him into some trap; and once a witness 
trips, he does more harm to his own side than he 
would have done good, had he retained his composure 
and presence of mind. The advocate must therefore 
put his witnesses through their paces thoroughly 
in private before they appear in court and must 
test them by a variety of questions such as may 
well be put to them by his opponent. The result 
will be that they will not contradict themselves 
or, if they do make some slip, can be set upon 
their feet again by a timely question from the advo- 
cate who produces them. Still, even in the case 12 
of witnesses whose evidence is consistent, we must 
be on our guard against treachery. For such 
witnesses are often put up by one's opponent and, 
after promising to say everything that will help our 
case, give answers of exactly the opposite character 
and carry more weight by the admission of facts 
which tell against us than they would have done had 
they disproved them. We must therefore discover 13 
what motives they have for doing our opponent a hurt, 
and the fact that they were once his enemies will 
not suffice our purpose : we must find out whether 
they have ceased to be ill-disposed to him or whether 
they desire by means of their evidence to effect a 
reconciliation with him, in order to assure our- 
selves that they have not been bribed or repented of 



verint. Quod cum in iis quoque, qui ea,, quae dicturi 
videntur, re vera sciunt, necessarium est praecavere ; 
multo magis in iis, qui se dicturos, quae falsa sunt. 

14 pollicentur. Nam et frequentior eorum poenitentia 
est et promissum suspectius et, si perseverarint, re- 
prehensio facilior. 

15 Eorum vero, quibus denuntiatur, pars testium est 
quae reum laedere velit, pars quae nolit, idque in- 
terim scit accusator interim nescit. Fingamus in 
praesentia scire ; in utroque tamen genere summis . 

16 artibus interrogantis opus est. Nam si habet testem 
eupidum laedendi, cavere debet hoc ipsum, ne cupi- 
ditas eius appareat, nee statim de eo, quod in indi- 
cium venit, rogare, sed aliquo circuitu ad idpervenire, 
ut illi, quod maxime dicere voluit, videatur expressum ; 
nee nimium instare interrogationi, ne ad omnia respon- 
dendo testis fidem suam minuat, sed in tan turn evo- 

17 care eum, quantum sumere ex uno satis sit. At in eo, 
qui verum invitus dicturus est, prima felicitas interro- 
gantis extorquere quod is noluerit. Hoc non alio 
modo fieri potest quam longius interrogatione repetita. 
Respondebit enim, quae nocere causae non arbitra- 

HOOK V. vii. 13-17 

their previous attitude and changed their purpose. 
Such precautions are necessary even with witnesses 
who know that what they propose to say is true; 
but it is still more necessary with those who promise 
to give false evidence. For experience shows that 14 
they are more likely to repent of their purpose, their 
promises are less to be relied on, and, if they do keep 
their promise, their evidence is easier to refute. 

Witnesses appearing in answer to a subpoena may 15 
be divided into two classes : those who desire to 
harm the accused, and those who do not. The 
accuser sometimes is aware of their disposition, 
sometimes unaware. For the moment let us assume 
that he is aware of their disposition, although I must 
point out that in either case the utmost skill is re- 
quired in their examination. For if an advocate is 16 
producing a witness who is desirous of harming the 
accused, he must avoid letting this desire become 
apparent, and must not at once proceed to question 
him on the point at issue. On the contrary this 
point must be approached by a circuitous route in 
such a manner as to make it seem that the state- 
ment which the witness is really desirous of making 
l>as been forced from him. Again he should not 
press the witness too much, for fear he should impair 
his credit by the glibness with which he answers 
every question, but should draw from him just so 
much as may seem reasonable to elicit from a single 
witness. On the other hand in the case of a witness 17 
who is reluctant to tell the truth, the essential for 
successful examination is to extort the truth against 
his will. This can only be done by putting questions 
which have all the appearance of irrelevance. 
If this be done, he will give replies which he 



bitur ; ex pluribus deinde, quae confessus erit. eo 
perducetur tit quod dicere non vultnegarenon possit. 

18 Nam, ut in oratione sparsa plerumque colligimus ar- 
gumenta, quae per se nihil reum aggravare videantur, 
congregatione deinde eorum factum convincimus, ita 
huiusmodi testis multa de anteactis, multa de inse- 
cutis, loco, tempore, persona, ceteris est interro- 
gandus, ut in aliquod responsum incidat, post quod 
illi vel fateri quae volumus necesse sit vel iis quae 

19 iam dixerit repugnare. Id si non contingit, reliquuni 
erit, ut eum nolle dicere manifestum sit, protrnhen- 
dusque, ut in aliquo, quod vel extra causam sit, de- 
prehendatur ; teneiidus etiam diutius, ut omnia ac 
plura quara res desiderat pro reo dicendo suspectus 
iudici fiat ; quo non minus nocebit, quam si vera in 

20 reum dixisset. At si (quod secundo loco diximus) 
nesciet actor, quid propositi testis attulerit, paulatim 
et, ut dicitur, pedetentim interrogando experietur 
animum eius et ad id responsum quod eliciendum 

21 erit per gradus ducet Sed, quia nonnunquam sunt 
hae quoque testium artes, ut primo ad voluntatem 
respondeant, quo maiore fide diversa postea dicant, 

BOOK V. vii. 17-21 

thinks can do no harm to the party which he 
favours, and subsequently will be led on from the 
admissions which he has made to a position which 
renders it impossible for him to deny the truth of 
the facts which he is reluctant to state. For just as IS 
in a set speech we usually collect detached argu- 
ments which in themselves seem innocuous to the 
accused, but taken together prove the case against 
him, so we must ask the reluctant witness a number 
of questions relative to acts antecedent or subsequent 
to the case, places, dates, persons, etcetera, with a 
view to luring him into some reply which will force 
him to make the admissions which we desire or to 
contradict his previous evidence. If this fails, we 19 
must content ourselves with making it clear that he 
is reluctant to tell what he knows, and lead him 
with a view to tripping him up on some point or 
other, even though it be irrelevant to the case ; we 
must also keep him in the witness-box for an unusual 
length of time, so that by saying everything that can 
be said and more than is necessary on behalf of the 
accused, he may be rendered suspect to the judge. 
Thus he will do the accused no less harm than if he 
had told the truth against him. But if (to proceed to 20 
our second supposition) the advocate does not know 
what the intentions of the witness may be, he must 
advance gradually inch by inch and sound him by 
examination and lead him step by step to the par- 
ticular reply which it is desired to elicit. But since 21 
these witnesses are sometimes so artful that their 
first replies are designed to meet the wishes of the 
questioner, in order to win all the greater credit 
when subsequently they answer in a very different 
way, it will be the duty of the advocate to dismiss 

N 2 


est actoris 1 suspectum lestein, dum prodest, 

22 Patronorum in parte expedition in parte ditficilior 
interrogatio est. Difficilior hoc, quod raro unquani 
possunt ante indicium scire, quid testis dicturus sit ; 
expeditior, quod, cum interrogandus est, sciunt quid 

23 dixerit. Itaque, quod in eo incertum est, cura et 
inquisitione opus est, qnis reum premat, quas et 
quibus ex causis inimicitias habeat : eaque in oratione 
j)raedicenda atque amolienda sunt, sive odio con- 
flatos testes sive invidia sive gratia sive pecunia 
videri volumus. Et si deficietur numero pars diversa, 
paucitatem ; si abundabit, coiispirationem ; si humiles 
producet, vilitatem ; si potentes, gratiani oportebit 

24 incessere. Plus tamen proderit causas, propter quas 
reum laedant, exponere ; quae sunt variae et pro 
condicione cuiusque litis aut litigatoris. Nam contra 
ilia, quae supra diximus, simili ratione responderi 
locis cornmunibus solet, quia ut in paucis atque 
humilibus accusator simplicitate gloriari potest, quod 
neminem praeter eos, qui possint scire, quaesierit, 

1 actoris, Regius ; oratoris, MSS. 
I 80 

BOOK V. vn. 21-24 

a suspect witness while he can still do so with 

In the case of advocates for the defence exam- 2'2 
i nation is in some respects easier, in some more 
difficult. It is more difficult because it is rarely 
possible for them to have any previous knowledge of 
what the witness is likely to say, and easier because, 
when they come to cross-examine, they know what 
he has already said. Consequently in view of the ^3 
uncertainty involved, there is need for careful in- 
quiry with a view to discovering the character of the 
witness against the accused and what are his motives 
for hostility and what its extent: and all such points 
about the witness should be set forth in advance 
and disposed of, whether we desire to represent the 
evidence against the accused as instigated by hatred, 
envy, bribery or influence. Further, if our opponents 
bring forward only a small number of witnesses, we 
must attack them on that head ; if on the other 
hand they produce an excessive number, we must 
accuse them of conspiracy : if the witnesses are 
persons of inconspicuous rank, we must minimise 
their importance, while if they are powerful, we shall 
accuse our adversaries of bringing undue influence to 
bear. It will, however, be still more helpful if we 24 
expose the motives which they have for desiring to 
injure the accused, and these will vary according to 
the nature of the case and the parties concerned. 
For the other lines of argument mentioned above 
arc often answered by the employment of common- 
places on similar lines, since the prosecutor, if he 
produce but few witnesses of inconspicuous rank, can 
parade the simple honesty of his methods on the 
ground that he has produced none save those who 



et multos atque honestos cornmendare aliquanto est 

25 faeilius. Verum interim et singulos ut exornare, ita 

destruere contingit, aut recitatis in actione testi- 

moniis 1 aut testibus nominatis. Quod iis tempori- 

bus, quibus testis 11011 post finitas actiones rogabatur, 

et faeilius et frequentius fuit. Quid autem in quern- 

que testium dicendum sit, sumi nisi ex ipsorum 

personis non potest. 

-6 Reliquae interrogandi sunt partes. Qua in re 
primum est nosse testem. Nam timidus terreri, 
stul tus decipi, iracundus concitari, ainbitiosus inflari 
potest; prudens vero et constans vel tanquani inimi- 
cus et pervicax dimittendus statim vel non iiiterro- 
gatione, sed brevi interlocutione patron! refutaridus 
est aut aliqiio, si continget, urbane dicto refrigerandus 
aut, si quid in eius vitam dici poterit, infainia crimi- 
27 num destruendus. Probos quosdam et verecundos 
non aspere incessere profuit ; nam saepe, qui adver- 
sus insectantem pugnassent, modestia mitigantur. 
Omnis autem interrogatio aut in causa est aut extra 
causam. In causa, sicut accusatori praecepimus,, 

1 testimoiiiis added by Halm, some such word having been 
omitted by the MSS. 

1 It is not dear to what Quintilian refers. There are. it is 
true, passages in Cicero where the orator speaks of evidence 
as already given, but the speeches where these references are 
found are all second pleadings. 


BOOK V. vn. 24-27 

are in a position to know the real facts, while if he 
produce a number of distinguished witnesses, it is 
even easier to commend them to the court. But at 25 
times, just as we have to praise individual witnesses, 
so we may have to demolish them, whether their 
evidence has been given in documentary form or they 
have been summoned to appear in person. This was 
easier and of more frequent occurrence in the days 
when the examination of the witnesses was not 
deferred till after the conclusion of the pleading. 1 
With regard to what we should say against individual 
witnesses, no general rules can be laid down : it will 
depend on the personality of the witness. 

It remains to consider the technique to be followed 26 
in the examination of witnesses. The first essential 
is to know your witness. For a timid witness may 
be terrorised, a fool outwitted, an irascible man 
provoked, and vanity flattered. The shrewd and 
self-possessed witness, on the other hand, must be 
dismissed at once as being malicious and obstinate ; 
or refuted, not by cross-examination, but by a brief 
speech from the counsel for the defence ; or may be 
put out of countenance by some jest, if a favourable 
opportunity presents itself; or, if his past life admits 
of criticism, his credit may be overthrown by the 
scandalous charges which can be brought against him. 
It has been found advantageous at times when con- 27 
fronted with an honest and respectable witness to 
refrain from pressing him hard, since it is often the 
case that those who would have defended themselves 
manfully against attack are mollified by courtesy. 
But every question is either concerned with the 
case -itself or with something outside the case. As 
regards the first type of question counsel for the 



patronus quoque altius et unde nihil suspect! sit 
repetita percontatione, priora sequentibus applicando 
saepe eo perducit homines, ut invitis quod prosit 

28 extorqueat. Eius rei sine dubio neque disciplina 
ulla in schblis neque exercitatio traditur, et naturali 
magis acuinine aut usu contingit haec virtus. Si 
quod tain en exemplum ad iinitationem demonstran- 
dum sit, solum est, quod ex dialogis Socratieorum 
maximeque Platonis duci potest ; in quibus adeo 
scitae sunt interrogationes, ut, cum plerisque bene 
respondeatur, res tamen ad id quod volunt efficere 

29 perveniat. Illud fortuna interim praestat, ut aliquid, 
quod inter se parum consentiat, a teste dicatur ; 
interim,, quod saepius evenit, ut testis testi diversn 
dicat. Acuta autem interrogatio ad hoc, quod casu 

30 fieri solet. etiam ratione perducet. Kxtra causam 
quoque multa, quae prosint, rogari solent, de vita 
testium aliorum, de sua quisque, si turpitudo, si 
humilitas, si amicitia accusatoris, si inimicitiae cum 
reo, in quibus aut dicant aliquid quod prosit, aut in 

1 Above, 17, 18. 



BOOK V. vir. 27-30 

defence may, by adopting a method which I have 
already recommended for the prosecutor, 1 namely by 
commencing his examination with questions of an 
apparently irrelevant and innocent character and 
then by comparing previous with subsequent replies, 
frequently lead witnesses into such a position that 
it becomes possible to extort useful admissions from 
them against their will. The schools, it is true, give 28 
no instruction either as to theory or practice in this 
subject, and skill in examination comes rather 
from natural talent or practice. If, however, I am 
asked to point out a model for imitation, I can 
recommend but one, namely that which may be 
found in the dialogues of the Socratics and more 
especially of Plato, in which the questions put are 
so shrewd that although individually as a rule the 
answers are perfectly satisfactory to the other side, 
yet the questioner reaches the conclusion at which 
he is aiming. Fortune sometimes is so kind that a 29 
witness gives an answer involving some inconsistency, 
Avhile at times (and this is a more frequent occurrence) 
one witness contradicts another. But acute exam- 
ination methodically conducted will generally reacli 
the same result which is so often reached by chance. 
There are also a number of points strictly irrelevant 30 
to the case on which questions may be put with 
advantage. We may for example ask questions about 
the past life of other witnesses or about the witness' 
own character, with a view to discovering whether 
they can be charged with ome disgraceful conduct, 
or degrading occupation, with friendship with the 
prosecutor or hostility toward the accused, since 
in replying to such questions they may say some- 
thing which will help our cause or may be convicted 



mendacio vel cupiditate laedendi deprehendantur. 

31 Sed in primis interrogatio cum debet esse circum- 
specta, quia multa contra patronos venuste testis saepe 
responded eique praecipue vulgo favetur ; turn verbis 
quam maxime ex medio sumptis, ut qui rogatur (is 
autem est saepius imperitus) intelligat aut ne in- 
telligere se neget, quod interrogantis non leve frigus 

32 est. Illae vero pessimae artes, testeni subornatum 
in subsellia adversarii mittere, ut inde excitatus plus 
noceat vel dicendo contra reum cum quo sederit, 
vel, cum adiuvisse testimonio videbitur, faciendo ex 
industria multa immodeste atque intemperanter, per 
quae 11011 a se tantum dictis detrahat fidem, sed 
ceteris quoque, qui profuerant, auferat auctoritatem ; 
quorum mentionem habui, non ut fiercnt, sed ut 

Saepe intei: se collidi solent inde testatio hinc 
testes ; locus utrinque ; haec enim se pars iureiu- 

33 rando, ilia consensu signantium tuetur. Saepe inter 
testes et argumenta quaesitum est. Inde scientiam 

1 An over-statement, since in many cases the signatories 
could only testify that the statement was that actually 
made by the deponent ; with its truth they were not 
necessarily concerned. 

1 86 

BOOK V. MI. 30-33 

of falsehood or of a desire to injure the accused. 
But above all our examination must be circumspect,, 31 
since a witness will often launch some smart repartee 
in answering counsel for the defence and thereby 
win marked favour from the audience in general. 
Secondly, we must put our questions as far as possible 
in the language of everyday speech that the witness, 
who is often an uneducated man, may understand our 
meaning, or at any rate may have no opportunity of 
saying that he does not know what we mean, a 
statement which is apt to prove highly disconcerting 
to the examiner. I must however express the 32 
strongest disapproval of the practice of sending a 
suborned witness to sit on the benches of the oppo- 
sing party, in order that on being called into the 
witness-box from that quarter he may thereby do all 
the more damage to the case for the accused by 
speaking against the party with whose adherents he 
was sitting or, while appearing to help him by his 
testimony, deliberately giving his evidence in such 
an extravagant and exaggerated manner, as not only 
to detract from the credibility of his own state- 
ments, but to annul the advantage derived from 
the evidence of those who were really helpful. I 
mention this practice not with a view to encourage 
it, but to secure its avoidance. 

Documentary evidence is not frequently in conflict 
with oral. Such a circumstance may be turned to 
advantage by either side. For one party will rest 
its case on the fact that the witness is speaking on 
oath, the other on the unanimity of the signatories. 1 
Again there is often a conflict between the evidence 33 
and the arguments. One party will argue that the 
witnesses know the facts and are bound by the 



in testibus et religionem, ingenia esse in arguraentis 
dicitur ; hinc testeni gratia, metu. pecunia, ira, odio. 
amicitia, ambitu fieri ; argumenta ex natura duci, in 

34 his iudicem sibi, in illis alii credere. Communia 
haec pluribus causis, multumque iactata sunt et 
semper tamen iactabuntur. Aliquando utrinque sunt 
testes, et quaestio sequitur ex ipsis, utri meliores 
viri ; ex causis, utri magis credibilia dixerint ; ex 

35 litigatoribus,, utri gratia magis valuerint. His adii- 
cere si qui volet ea, quae divina testimonia vocant. 
ex responsis, oraculis, ominibus, duplicem sciat esse 
eorum tractatum ; generalem alterum, in quo inter 
Stoicos et Epicuri sectam secutos pugna perpetua est, 
regaturne provideiitia mundus ; specialem alterum 
circa partes divinationis, ut quaeque in quaestionem 

36 cadit. Aliter enim oraculorum aliter aruspicum^ 
augurum, coniectorum^ mathematicorum fides con- 
firmari aut refelli potest, cum sit rerum ipsarum 
ratio diversa. Circa eiusmodi quoque instrumenta 
firmanda vel destruenda multum habet operis oratio, 
si quae sint voces per viuuin, somnum, dementiain 

1 88 

BOOK V. vii. 33-36 

sanctity of their oath, while the arguments are 
nought but ingenious juggling with the facts. The 
other party will argue that witnesses are procured by 
influence, fear, money, anger, hatred, friendship, or 
bribery, whereas arguments are drawn from nature ; 
in giving his assent to the latter the judge is believ- 
ing the voice of his own reason, in accepting the 
former he is giving credence to another. Such 34 
problems are common to a number of cases, and are 
and will always be the subject of vehement debate. 
Sometimes there are witnesses on both sides and the 
question arises with regard to themselves as to which 
are the more respectable in character, or with regard 
to the case, which have given the more credible evi- 
dence, with regard to the parties to the case, which 
has brought the greater influence to bear on the 
witnesses. If to this kind of evidence anyone should 35 
wish to add evidence of the sort known as super- 
natural, based on oracles, prophecies and omens, I 
would remind him that there are two ways in which 
these may be treated. There is the general method, 
with regard to which there is an endless dispute 
between the adherents of the Stoics and the Epicu- 
reans, as to whether the world is governed by provi- 
dence. The other is special and is concerned with 
particular departments of the art of divination,accord r 
ingas they may happen to affect the question at issue. 
For the credibility of oracles may be established 36 
or destroyed in one way, and that of soothsayers, 
augurs, diviners and astrologers in another, since 
the two classes differ entirely in nature. Again the 
task of establishing, or demolishing such evidence as 
the following will give the orator plenty to do ; as 
for example if certain words have been uttered under 



emissae. vel excepta parvulorum indicia, quos pars 
altera nihil tingere, altera iiihil iudicare dictura est. 
37 Nee tantum praestari hoc genus potenter, sed etiam, 
ubi non est, desiderari solet : Pecuniam dedisti ; quix 
niimeravit ? ubi? unde? Venenum arguis ; ubi emi? 
a quo ? quanii '? per quern dedi ? quo conscio ? Quae 
fere omnia pro Cluentio Cicero in crimine veneficii 
excutit. Haec de inartificialibus quam brevissime 

VIII. Pars altera probation um, quae est tota in 
arte constatque rebus ad faciendam fidem appositis, 
plerumque aut omnino negligitur aut levissime attin- 
gitur ab iis, qui argumenta velut horrida et confra- 
gosa vitantes amoenioribus locis desident, neque 
aliter quam ii, qui traduntur a poetis gustu cuiusdam 
apud Lotophagos graminis et Sirenum cantu deleniti 
voluptatem saluti praetulisse, dum laudis falsarn 
imaginem persequuntur, ipsa, propter quam dicitur, 
2 victoria cedunt. Atqui cetera, quae continue magis 
orationis tractu decurrunt, in auxilium atque orna- 
mentum argumentorum comparantur, nervisque illis, 
quibus causa continetur, adiiciunt inducti super cor- 

1 cp. Ix. 167. 

BOOK V. vii. 36-vm. 2 

the influence of wine, in sleep or in a fit of madness, 
or if information has been picked up from the mouths 
of children, whom the one party will assert to be in- 
capable of invention, while the other will assert that 
they do not know what they are saying. The follow- 37 
ing method may not merely be used with great effect, 
but may even be badly missed when it is not em- 
ployed. You gave me the money. Who counted it out ? 
Where did this occur and from what source did the money 
come ? You accuse me of poisoning. Where did I buy 
the poison and from whom ? What did I pay for it and 
whom did I employ to administer it ? Who was my 
accomplice ? Practically all these points are discussed 
by Cicero in dealing with the charge of poisoning in 
the pro Clueniio. 1 This concludes my observations 
upon inartificial proofs. I have stated them as briefly 
as I could. 

VIII. The second class of proofs are wholly the 
work of art and consist of matters specially adapted 
to produce belief. They are, however, as a rule almost 
entirely neglected or only very lightly touched on 
by those who, avoiding arguments as rugged and 
repulsive things, confine themselves to pleasanter 
regions and, like those who, as poets tell, were be- 
witched by tasting a magic herb in the land of the 
Lotus-eaters or by the song of the Sirens into pre- 
ferring pleasure to safety, follow the empty semblance 
of renown and are robbed of that victory which is the 
aim of eloquence. And yet those other forms of 2 
eloquence, which have a more continuous sweep and 
flow, are employed with a view to assisting and 
embellishing the arguments and produce the appear- 
ance of superinducing a body upon the sinews, on 
which the whole case rests ; thus if it is asserted 



poris specicm : lit, .si forte quid f'actum ira vel inctu 
vel cupiditate dioatur, latius, quae cuiusque adfectus 
natura sit, prosequainur. lisdem laudamus, incusa- 
mus,, augemus, minuimus, describimus, deterremus, 

3 querimur, consolamur, hortamur. Sed horum esse 
opera in rebus aut certis aut de quibus tanquam 
certis loquimur potest. Nee abnuerim esse aliquid 
in delectatione, multum veroin commovendis adfecti- 
bus ; sed haec ipsa plus valent, cum se didicisse 
index putat, quod consequi nisi argumentatione alia- 
que omni fide rerum non possumus. 

4 Quorum priusquam partiamur species, indicandum 
est esse quaedam in oumi probationum genere com- 
munia. Nam neque ulla quaestio est, quae non sit 
aut in re aut in persona ; neque esse argumentorum 
loci possunt nisi in iis, quae rebus aut personis 

5 accidunt, eaque aut per se inspici solent aut ad 
aliud referri ; nee ulla confirmatio nisi aut ex con- 
sequentibus aut ex repugnantibus, et haec necesse 
est aut ex praeterito tempore aut ex coniuncto aut 
ex insequenti petere ; nee ulla res probari nisi ex alia 
potest, eaque sit oportet aut maior aut par aut minor. 

G Argumenta vero reperiuntur aut in quaestionibus, 
quae etiam separatae a complex u rerum persona - 
rumque spectari per se possint, aut in ipsa causa, 


BOOK V. vin. 2-6 

that some act lias been committed under the in- 
fluence of anger, fear or desire, we may expatiate 
at some length on the nature of each of these 
passions. It is by these same methods that we 
praise, accuse, exaggerate, attenuate, describe, deter, 
complain, console or exhort. But such rhetorical 3 
devices may be employed in connexion with matters 
about which there is no doubt or at least which we 
speak of as admitted facts. Nor would I deny that 
there is some advantage to be gained by pleasing 
our audience and a great deal by stirring their 
emotions. Still, all these devices are more effective, 
when the judge thinks he has gained a full knowledge 
of the facts of the case, which we can only give him 
by argument and by the employment of every other 
known means of proof. 

Before, however, I proceed to classify the various 4 
species of artificial proof, I must point out that there 
are certain features common to all kinds of proof. 
For there is no question which is not concerned 
either with things or persons, nor can there be any 
ground for argument save in connexion with matters 
concerning things or persons, which may be considered 
either by themselves or with reference to something 
else ; while there can be no proof except such as is 5 
derived from things consequent or things opposite, 
which must be sought for either in the time preced- 
ing, contemporaneous with or subsequent to the 
alleged fact, nor can any single thing be proved save 
by reference to something else which must be 
greater, less than or equal to it. As regards argu- 6 
ments, they may be found either in the questions 
raised by the case, which may be considered by them- 
selves quite apart from any connexion with individual 




cum invenitur aliquid in ea non ex communi ratione 
ductum, sed eius iudicii, de quo cognoscitur, pro- 
prium. Probationum praeterea omnium aliae sunt 
necessariae, aliae credibiles, aliae non repugnantes. 
7 Et adhuc omnium probationum quadruplex ratio est, 
ut vel quia est aliquid, aliud non sit ; ut Dies est, nox 
non est ; vel quia est aliquid, et aliud sit : Sol est 
supra terrain, dies est ; vel quia aliquid non est, aliud 
sit : Nox non est, dies est ; vel quia aliquid non est, 
iiec aliud sit : Non est rationalis, nee homo est. His in 
universum praedictis partes subiiciam. 

IX. Omnis igitur probatio artificialis constat aut 
signis aut argumentis aut exemplis. Nee ignoro 
plerisque videri signa partem argumentorum. Quae 
mihi separandi ratio haec fuit prima, quod sunt 
paene ex illis inartificialibus ; cruenta enim vestis 
et clamor et livor et talia sunt instrumenta, qualia 
tabulae, rumores, testes ; nee inveniuntur ab oratore. 

2 sed ad eum cum ipsa causa defer untur ; altera, quod 
signa, sive indubitata sunt, non sunt argumenta, quia, 
ubi ilia sunt, quaestio non est, argumento autem nisi 
in re controversa locus esse non potest ; sive dubia, 
non sunt argumenta sed ipsa argumentis egent. 

3 Divid untur autem in has duas primas species, 


HOOK V. viii. r, ix. 3 

things or persons, or in the itself, when any- 
thing is discovered in it which cannot be arrived at 
by the light of common reason, but is peculiar to the 
subject on which judgment has to be given. Further, 
all proofs fall into three classes, necessary, credible, 
and not impossible. Again there are four forms of 7 
proof. First, we may argue that, because one tiling 
is, another thing is not ; as // i* day and therefore not 
night. Secondly, we may argue that, because one 
thing is, another thing is ; as The .sun is risen, therefore 
it is day. Thirdly, it may be argued that because one 
thing is not, another thing is ; as // is not night, there- 
fore it is day. Finally, it may be argued that, because 
one thing is not, another thing is not ; as He is not a 
reasoning being, therefore he is not a man. These 
general remarks will suffice by way of introduction 
and I will now proceed to details. 

IX. Every artificial proof consists either of indica- 
tions, arguments or examples. 1 am well aware that 
many consider indications to form part of the argu- 
ments. My reasons for distinguishing them are two- 
fold. In the first place indications as a rule come 
under the head of inartificial proofs : for a blood- 
stained garment, a shriek, a dark blotch and the like 
are all evidence analogous to documentary or oral 
evidence and rumours ; they are not discovered by 
the orator, but are given him with the case itself. 
My second reason was that indications, if indubitable, 2 
are not arguments, since they leave no room for 
question, while arguments are only possible in 
controversial matters. If on the other hand they 
are doubtful, they are not arguments, but require 
arguments to support them. 

The two first species into which artificial proofs 3 

o 2 


quod eorlmi alia sunt, ut dixi, quae necessaria sunt, 
alia quae non necessaria. 1 Priora ilia sunt quae 
aliter habere se non possunt, quae Graeci vocant 
rcKfji-^pLa, quia sunt aXvra crry/xeta, quae mihi vix 
pertinere ad praecepta artis videntur; nam ubi est 

4 signum insolubile, ibi ne lis quidem est. Id autem 
accidit, cum quid aut necesse est fieri factumve esse 
aut omnino non potest fieri vel esse factum ; quo in 
causis posito non est lis facti. Hoc genus per omnia 

5 tempora perpendi solet. Nam et coisse earn cum 
viro, quae peperit, quod est praeteriti, et fluctus 
esse, cum magna vis venti in mare incubuit, quod 
coniuncti, et eum mori, cuius cor est vulneratum, 
quod futuri, necesse est. Nee fieri potest, ut ibi 
messis sit, ubi satum non est, ut quis Romae sit, 
cum est Athenis, ut sit ferro vulneratus, qui sine 

6 cicatrice est. Sed quaedam et retrorsum idem valent, 
ut vivere homlnem qui spirat, et spirare qui vivit. 
Quaedam in contrarium non recurrent; nee enim, 
quia movetur qui ingreditur, etiam ingreditur qui 

7 movetur. Quare potest et coisse cum viro, quae 
non peperit, et non esse ventus in mari, cum est 
fluctus, neque utique cor eius vulneratum esse, qui 
perit. Ac similiter satum fuisse potest, ubi non 

1 sunt . . . non necessaria added by Reyius. 

BOOK V. ix. 3-7 

may be divided are, as I have already said, those 
which -involve a conclusion and those which do not. 
The former are those which cannot be otherwise and 
are called TfK^pia. by the Greeks, because they are 
indications from which there is no getting away. 
These however seem to me scarcely to come under 
the rules of art. For where an indication is irrefut- 
able, there can be no dispute as to facts. This 4 
happens whenever there can be no doubt that some- 
thing is being or has been done, or when it is impos- 
sible for it to be or have been done. In such cases 
there can be no dispute as to the fact. This kind of 
proof may be considered in connexion with past, 
present or future time. For example, a woman who is 5 
delivered of a child must have had intercourse with 
a man, and the reference is to the past. When there 
is a high wind at sea, there must be waves, and the 
reference is to the present. When a man has re- 
ceived a wound in the heart, he is bound to die, and 
the reference is to the future. Nor again can there 
be a harvest where no seed has been sown, nor can 
a man be at Rome when he is at Athens, nor have 
been wounded by a sword when he has no scar. 
Some have the same force when reversed : a man 6 
who breathes is alive, and a man who is alive breathes. 
Some again cannot be reversed : because he who 
walks moves it does not follow that he who moves 
walks. So too a woman, who has not been delivered 7 
of a child, may have had intercourse with a man, 
there may be waves without a high wind, and a man 
may die without having received a wound in the 
heart. Similarly seed may be sown without a harvest 
resulting, a man, who was never at Athens, may 



fait messis, nee fuisse Romae_, qui non fuit Athenis, 
nee fuisse ferro vulneratus, qui habet cicatric'em. 

8 Alia sunt signa non necessaria, quae dKora Graeci 
vocant ; quae etiamsi ad tollendam dubitationem sola 
non sufficiunt,tamen adiuncta ceteris plurimum valent. 

9 Signum vocatur, ut dixi, (nqpeiov, quanquam id qui- 
dam indicium quidam vestigium nominaverunt, per 
quod alia res intelligitur, ut per sanguinem caedes. 
At sanguis vel ex hostia respersisse vestem potest 
vel e naribus profluxisse : non utique, qui vestem 

10 cruentam habuerit, homicidium fecerit. Sed ut 
per se non sufficit, ita ceteris adiunctum testimonii 
loco ducitur, si inimicus, si minatus ante,, si eodem 
in loco fuit ; quibus signum cum accessit, efficit 

11 ut, quae suspecta erant, certa videantur. Alioqui 
sunt quaedam signa utrique parti communia, ut 
livores, tumores (nam videri possunt et veneficii et 
cruditatis) et vulnus in pectore sua manu et aliena 
perisse dicentibus, in (juo est. Haec proinde firma 
habentur atque extrinsecus adiuvantur. 

12 Eorum autem, quae signa sunt quidem, sed 
non necessaria., genus Hermagoras }>utat^ non esse 

BOOK V. ix. 7-12 

never have been at Rome, and a man who has a scar 
may not have received a sword-wound. 

There are other indications or CIKO'TO, that is 8 
probabilities, as the Greeks call them, which do not 
involve a necessary conclusion. These may not 
be sufficient in themselves to remove doubt, but 
may yet be of the greatest value when taken in 
conjunction with other indications. The Latin 9 
equivalent of the Greek o-q/zaov is signum, a sign, 
though some have called it indicium, an indication, 
or vestigium, a trace. Such signs or indications 
enable us to infer that something else has happened ; 
blood for instance may lead us to infer that a 
murder has taken place. But bloodstains on a 
garment may be the result of the slaying of a victim 
at a sacrifice or of bleeding at the nose. Everyone 
who has a bloodstain on his clothes is not neces- 
sarily a murderer. But although such an indication 10 
may not amount to proof in itself, yet it may be 
produced as evidence in conjunction with other 
indications, such for instance as the fact that the 
man with the bloodstain was the enemy of the 
murdered man, had threatened him previously or 
was in the same place with him. Add the indication 
in question to these, and what was previously only a 
suspicion may become a certainty. On the other 11 
hand there are indications which may be made to 
serve either party, such as livid spots, swellings 
which may be regarded as symptoms either of 
poisoning or of bad health, or a wound in the breast 
which may be treated as a proof of murder or of 
suicide. The force of such indications depends on the 
amount of extraneous support which they receive. 

Hermagoras would include among such indica- \'l 
tions as do not involve a necessary conclusion, an 



virginem Atalantam, quia cum iuvenibus per silvas 
vagetur. Quod si receperimus, vereor, ne omnia 
quae ex facto ducuntur signa faciamus. Eadem 

13 tamen ratione qua signa tractantur. Nee mihi vi- 
dentur Areopagitae, cum damnaverint puerum cotur- 
nicum oculos eruentem, aliud iudicasse quam id 
sighum esse perniciosissimae mentis multisque malo 
futurae, si adolevisset. Unde Spurii Maelii M arcique 
Manlii popularitas signum adfectati regni est existi- 

14 matum. Sed vereor, ne longe nimium nos ducat 
haec via. Nam si est signum adulterae lavari cum 
viris, erit et convivere cum adolescentibus, deinde 
etiam familiariter alicuius amicitia uti ; fortasse 
corpus vulsum, fractum incessum, vestem muliebrem 
dixerit mollis et parum viri signa, si cui (cum signum 
id proprie sit, quod ex eo, de quo quaeritur, natum 
sub oculos venit) ut sanguis e caede, ita ilia ex im- 

15 pudicitia fluere videantur. Ea quoque quae, quia 
plerumque observata sunt, vulgo signa creduntur, ut 
prognostica. Vcnto rubet aurea Phoebe et Comix 
plena pliimam vocal improba voce, si causas ex qualitate 

1 Verg. G. i. 431. 2 ib. i. 388. 


BOOK V. ix 12-15 

argument such as the following, " Atalanta cannot 
be a virgin, as she has been roaming the woods in 
the company of young men." If we accept this 
view, I fear that we shall come to treat all inferences 
from a fact as indications. None the less such argu- 
ments are in practice treated exactly as if they were 
indications. Nor do the Areopagites, when they 13 
condemned a boy for plucking out the eyes of 
quails, seem to have had anything else in their 
mind than the consideration that such conduct 
was an indication of a perverted character which 
might prove hurtful to many, if he had been 
allowed to grow up. So, too, the popularity of 
Spurius Maelius and Marcus Manlius was regarded 
as an indication that they were aiming at supreme 
power. However, I fear that this line of reasoning J4 
will carry us too far. For if it is an indication 
of adultery that a woman bathes with men, the 
fact that she revels with young men or even an 
intimate friendship will also be indications of the 
same offence. Again depilation, a voluptuous gait, 
or womanish attire may be regarded as indications of 
effeminacy and unmanliness by anyone who thinks 
that such symptoms are the result of an immoral 
character, just as blood is the result of a wound : for 
anything, that springs from the matter under in- 
vestigation and comes to our notice, may properly 
be called an indication. Similarly it is also usual lo 
to give the names of signs to frequently observed 
phenomena, such as prognostics of the weather which 
we may illustrate by the Vergilian 

" For wind turns Phoebe's face to ruddy gold " 1 

" 1 he crow 
With full voice, good-for-naught, invites the rain."-' 



16 caeli trahunt, sane ita appellentur. Nam si vento 
rubet luna, signum venti est rubor. Et si, ut idem 
poeta colligit, densatus et laxatus aer facit, ut sit 
inde ille avium concentus, idem sentiemus. Sunt 
autem signa etiam parva magnorum, ut vel haec ipsa 
comix ; nam maiora minorum esse, nemo miratur. 

X. Nunc de argumentis. Hoc enim nomine com- 
plectimur omnia, quae Graeci fvOvfji^ara, eVi^ciprJ- 
/xara, aTroSci'^eis vacant, quanquam apud illos est aliqua 
horum nominum differentia, etiamsi vis eodem fere 
tendit. Nam enthymema (quod nos commentum 
sane aut commentationem interpretemur, quia aliter 
*non possumus, Graeco melius usuri) unum intellec- 
tual habet, quo omnia mente concepta significat (sed 
nunc non de eo loquimur) ; alterum, quo sententiam 

2 cum ratione; tertium, quo certain quandam argu- 
menti conclusionem vel ex consequentibus vel ex 
repugnantibus, quanquam de hoc parum convenit. 
Sunt enim, qui illud prius epichirema dicant, plu- 
resque invenias in ea opinione, ut id demum, quod 
pugna constat, enthymema accipi velint, et ideo illud 

3 Cornificius contrarium appellat. Hunc alii rhetori- 
cum syllogismum, alii imperfecturn syllogismum vo- 
caverunt, quia nee distinctis nee totidem partibus 

1 Verg. G. i. 422. 2 v. viii. ."> ; xiv. 2. n. 

3 See v. xiv. 2, vin. v. 9. 


BOOK V. ix. i5-x. 3 

If these phenomena are caused by the state of the 
atmosphere, such an appellation is correct enough. 
For if the moon turns red owing to the wind, her 16 
hue is certainly a sign of wind. And if, as the same 
poet infers, 1 the condensation and rarification of 
the atmosphere causes that " concert of bird-voices " 
of which he speaks, we may agree in regarding it as 
a sign. We may further note that great things are 
sometimes indicated by trivial signs, witness the 
Vergilian crow ; that trivial events should be 
indicated by signs of greater importance is of course 
no matter for wonder. 

X. I now turn to arguments, the name under 
which we comprise the iyBv^^ara, eTri^ctp^/xara, and 
aTToSci^ets of the Greeks, terms which, in spite of 
their difference, have much the same meaning. For 
the cnthymemc (which we translate by commentum or 
commentatio, there being no alternative, though we 
should be wiser to use the Greek name) has three 
meanings : firstly it means anything conceived in 
the mind (this is not however the sense of which 
I am now speaking) ; secondly it signifies a proposi- 2 
tion with a reason, and thirdly a conclusion of an 
argument drawn either from denial of consequents or 
from incompatibles ~ ; although there is some contro- 
versy on this point. For there are some who style a 
conclusion from consequents an epicheireme, while it 
will be found that the majority hold the view that an 
ciit/n/tncnte is a conclusion from incompatibles 3 : 
wherefore Cornificius styles it a contrarium or argu- 
ment from contraries. Some again call it a rhetorical 3 
syllogism, others an incomplete syllogism, because 
its parts are not so clearly defined or of the same 
number as those of the regular syllogism, since such 



concluderetur ; quod sane non utique ab oratore de- 

4 sideratur. Epichirema Valgius aggressionem vocat ; 
verius autem iudico, non nostram administrationem 
sed ipsam rem quam aggredimur, id est argumen- 
tum, quo aliquid probaturi sumus, etiamsi nondum 
verbis explanatum, iam tamen mente conceptum, 

5 epichirema dici. Aliis videtur non destinata vel in- 
choata, sed perfecta probatio hoc nomen accipere, 
ultima specie ; ideoque propria eius appellatio et 
maxime in usu est posita, qua significatur certa 
quaedam sententiae comprehensio, quae ex tribus 

6 minimum partibus constat. Quidam epichirema 
rationem appellarunt, Cicero melius ratiocinatio- 
nem, quanquam et ille nomen hoc duxisse magis a 
syllogismo videtur. Nam et statum syllogisticum 
ratiocinativum appellat, exemplisque utitur philoso- 
phorum. Et quoniam est quaedam inter syllogis- 
mum et epichirema vicinitas, potest videri hoc nomine 

7 recte abusus. 'ATroSei^is est evidens probatio, ideo- 
que apud Geometras ypa//ukat aTroSet^t? dicuntur. 
Hanc et ab epichiremate Caecilius putat differre 
solo genere conclusionis et esse apodixin imperfectum 
epichirema eadem causa, qua diximus enthymema 
syllogismo distare. Nam et epichirema syllogismi pars 
est. Quidam inesse epichiremati apodixin putant 

1 See in. i. 18. A rhetorician of the reign of Augustus. 

2 The last or lowest species, cp. 56 and vn. i. 23. 

3 i.e. the. major and minor premisses and the conclusion. 
See v. xiv. 6 sqq. 


BOOK V. x. 3-7 

precision is not specially required by the orator. 
Valgius * translates cTri^'/o^a by aggressio, that is 4 
an attempt. It would however, in my opinion, be 
truer to say that it is not our handling of the 
subject, but the thing itself which we attempt which 
should be called an eVi^e^/Aa, that is to say the 
argument by which we try to prove something and 
which, even if it has not yet been stated in so many 
words, has been clearly conceived by the mind. 
Others regard it not as an attempted or imperfect 5 
proof, but a complete proof, falling under the most 
special 2 species of proof; consequently, according to 
its proper and most generally received appellation it 
must be understood in the sense of a definite con- 
ception of some thought consisting of at least three 
parts. 3 Some call an eTrixfiprj/Aa a reason, but Cicero 4 6 
is more correct in calling it a reasoning, although he 
too seems to derive this name from the syllogism 
rather than anything else ; for he calls the 
syllogistic basis b a ratiocmative basis and quotes phil- 
osophers to support him. And since there is a cer- 
tain kinship between a syllogism and an epicheireme, 
it may be thought that he was justified in his use of 
the latter term. An a7rdSetis is a clear proof; hence 7 
the use of the term ypa/u/uxat airoSci'&t?, "linear 
demonstrations " 6 by the geometricians. Caecilius 
holds that it differs from the epicheireme solely in the 
kind of conclusion arrived at and that an apodeixis is 
simply an incomplete epicheireme for the same reason 
that we said an enthymeme differed from a syllogism. 
For an epicheireme is also part of a syllogism. Some 
think that an apodeixis is portion of an epicheireme, 

4 de Inv. i. xxxi. 34. 6 See in. vi. 43, 46, 51. 

8 See i. x. 38. 



8 et esse parteru eius confirmantem. Utrumque 
autem quanquam diversi auctores eodem modo 
finiunt, ut sit ratio per ea, quae certa sunt, fidem 
dubiis adferens ; quae natura est omnium argu- 
mentorum, neque enim certa incertis declarantur. 
Haec omnia generaliter TriVrtis appellant, quod eti- 
amsi propria interpretatione dicere fidem possumus, 
apertius tamen probationem interpretabimur. Sed 

9 argumentum quoque plura significat. Nam et fabulae 
ad actum scenarum compositae argumenta dicuntur, 
et orationum Ciceronis velut thema ipse exponens 
Pedianus, Argumentum, inquit, tale est ; et ipse Cicero 
ad Brutum ita scribit : Verilus Jorfasse, ne nos in 
Catonem nostrum transferremus il/inc aliquid, elsi argu- 
mentum simile non erat. Quo apparet omnem ad 

10 scribendum destinatam materiam ita appellari. Xec 
mirunij cum id inter opifices quoque vulgatuin sit, 
unde Vergilius, Argumentum inyens ; vulgoque paulo 
numerosius opus dicitur argumentosum. Sed mine 
de eo dicendum argumento est, quod probationem 
praestat. Celsus quidem probationem,, 1 indicium, 
fidem, aggressionem eiusdem rei nomina facit, paruin 

11 distincte, ut arbitror. Nam probatio et fides efficitur 
non tantum j)er liaec quae sunt rationis, sed etiam 
per inartificialia. Signum autem, quod ille indicium 
vocat, ab argumentis iam separavi. Ergo^ cum sit 

1 praestat . . . probationem, added by Meister. 

1 In some letter now lost. 

2 Aen. vii. 791, with reference to the design on th shield of 
Turnus. 3 v. ix. 2. 


BOOK V. x. 7-11 

namely the part containing the proof. But all 8 
authorities, however much they may differ on other 
points, define both in the same way, in so far as they 
call both a method of proving what is not certain by 
means of what is certain. Indeed this is the nature 
of all arguments, for what is certain cannot be 
proved by what is uncertain. To all these forms of 
argument the Greeks give the name of /no-rets, a 
term which, though the literal translation is Jides "a 
warrant of credibility," is best translated by probatio 
" proof." Rut argument has several other meanings. 9 
For the plots of plays composed for acting in the 
theatre are called arguments, while Pedianus, when 
explaining the themes of the speeches of Cicero, 
says The argument is as follows. Cicero 1 himself in 
writing to Brutus says, Fearing that I might transfer 
something from that source to my Colo, although the 
argument is quite different. It is thus clear that all 
subjects for writing are so called. Nor is this to be 10 
wondered at, since the term is also in common use 
among artists ; hence the Vergilian phrase A mighty 
argument.* Again a work which deals with a number 
of different themes is called "rich in argument." 
But the sense with which we are now concerned is 
that which provides proof. Celsus indeed treats 
the terms, proof, indication, credibility, attempt, 
simply as different names for the same things, in 
which, to my thinking, he betrays a certain con- 
fusion of thought. For proof and credibility are not 11 
merely the result of logical processes, but may 
equally be secured by inartificial arguments. Now 
I have already 3 distinguished signs or, as he prefers 
to call them, indications from arguments. Con- 
sequently, since an argument is a process of reasoning 



argumentum ratio probationem praestans, qua colli- 
gitur aliud per aliud, et quae quod est dubium per 
id quod dubium non est confirmat, necesse est esse 

12 aliquid in causa, quod probatione non egeat. Alioqui 
nihil erit quo probemus, nisi fuerit quod aut sit verum 
aut videatur, ex quo dubiis fides fiat. Pro certis 
autem habemus primum, quae serisibus percipiuntur, 
ut quae videmus, audimus, qualia sunt signa ; delude 
ea, in quae communi opinione consensum est, deos 

13 esse, praestandam pietatem parentibus ; praeterea, 
quae legibus cauta sunt, quae persuasione etiamsi 
non omnium hominum, eius tamen civitatis aut gentis, 
in qua res agitur, in mores recepta sunt, ut pleraque 
in iure non legibus sed moribus constant ; si quid 
inter utramque partem convenit, si quid probatum 
est, denique cuicunque adversarius non contradicit. 

14 Sic enim fiet argumentum, Cum providentia mundus 
regatur, administranda respublica est l / sequitur ut ad- 
ministranda respublica sit, si liquebit mundum providentia 

1 5 regi. Debet etiam nota esse recte argumenta tractaturo 
vis et natura omnium rerum, et quid quaeque earum 
plerumque efficiat ; hinc enim sunt, quae et/cora di- 

16 cuntur. Credibilium autem genera sunt tria : unum 
firmissimum, quia fere accidit, ut liberos a parentibus 

1 est . . . respublica, addedby Halm after Regius. 

BOOK V. x. 1 1- .6- 

which provides proof and enables one thing to be 
inferred from another and confirms facts which are 
uncertain by reference to facts which are certain, 
there must needs be something in every case which 
requires no proof. Otherwise there will be nothing 12 
by which we can prove anything ; there must be 
something which either is or is believed to be true,* 
by means of which doubtful things may be rendered 
credible. We may regard as certainties, first, those 
things which we perceive by the senses, things for 
instance that we hear or see, such as signs or indica- 
tions; secondly, those things about which there is 
general agreement, such as the existence of the gods 
or the duty of loving one's parents ; thirdly, those 13 
things which are established by law or have passed 
into current usage, if not throughout the whole 
world, at any rate in the nation or state where the 
case is being pleaded there are for instance many 
rights which rest not on law, but on custom ; finally, 
there are the things which are admitted by either 
party, and whatever has already been proved or is 
not disputed by our adversary. Thus for instance it 14 
may be argued that since the world is governed by 
providence, the state should similarly be governed 
by some controlling power : it follows that the state 
must be so governed, once it is clear that the world 
is governed by providence. Further, the man who is 15 
to handle arguments correctly must know the nature 
and meaning of everything and their usual effects. 
For it is thus that we arrive at probable arguments 
or eiKora as the Greeks call them. With regard to 1U 
credibility there are three degrees. First, the 
highest, based on what usually happens, as for in- 
stance the assumption that children are loved by 




amari ; alterum velut propensity eum qui rectc valeat 
in crastinum perventurum ; tertium tan turn non re- 
pugnans, in domo furtum factum ab eo qui domi fuit. 

17 Ideoque Aristoteles in secundo de Arte Rhetorica 
libro diligentissime est exsecutus, quid cuique rei et 
quid cuique homini soleret accidere, et quas res 
quosque homines quibus rebus aut hominibus vel 
conciliasset vel alienasset ipsa natura : ut divitias 
quid sequatur aut ambitum aut superstitionem, quid 
boni probent, quid mail petant, quid milites, quid 
rustici, quo quaeque modo res vitari vel appeti soleat. 

18 Verum hoc exsequi mitto ; non enim longum tantum, 
sed etiarn impossibile aut potius infinitum est, prae- 
terea positum in communi omnium intellectu. Si 
quis tamen desideraverit, a quo peteret, ostendi. 

19 Omnia autem credibilia, in quibus pars maxima coii- 
sistit argumentations, ex huiusmodi fontibus fluunt : 
an credibile sit a filio patrem occisum, incestum cum 
filia commissum ; et contra, veneficium in noverca, 
adulterium in luxurioso ; ilia quoque, an scelus palam 
factum, an falsum propter exiguam summam, quia 
suos quidque horum velut mores habet, plerumque 


BOOK V. x. 16-19 

Lheir parents. Secondly, there is the highly 
probable, as for instance the assumption that a man 
in the enjoyment of good health will probably live 
till to-morrow. The third degree is found where 
there is nothing absolutely against an assumption, 
such as that a theft committed in a house was the 
work of one of the household. Consequently 17 
Aristotle in the second book of his Rhetoric^ has 
made a careful examination of all that commonly 
happens to things and persons, and what things and 
persons are naturally adverse or friendly to other 
things or persons, as for instance, what is the 
natural result of wealth or ambition or sunjei'stitipn,, , 
what meets with the approval of good men .what is 
the object of a soldier's or a farmer's desires, and by 
what means everything is sought or shunned. For 18 
my part I do not propose to pursue this subject. It 
is not merely a long, but an impossible or rather an 
infinite task ; moreover it is within the compass of 
the common understanding of mankind. If, how- 
ever, anyone wishes to pursue the subject, I have 
indicated where he may apply. But all credibility, ID 
and it is with credibility that the great majority of 
arguments are concerned, turns on questions such 
as the following : whether it is credible that a father 
has been killed by his son, or that a father has com- 
mitted incest with his daughter, or to take questions 
of an opposite character, whether it is credible that 
a stepmother has poisoned her stepchild, or that a 
man of luxurious life has committed adultery ; or 
again whether a crime has been openly committed, 
or false evidence given for a small bribe, since each 
of these crimes is the result of a special cast of 
character as a rule, though not always; if it were 

2 I I 


tamen, non semper; alioqui indubitata essent, non 

20 Excutiamus nunc argumentorum locos ; quanquam 
quibusdam hi quoque, de quibus supra dixi, videntur. 
Locos appello non, ut vulgo nunc intelliguntur, in 
luxuriam et adulterium et similia ; sed sedes argu- 
mentorum, in quibus latent, ex quibus sunt petenda. 

21 Nam, ut in terra non omni generantur omnia, nee 
avem aut feram reperias, ubi quaeque nasci aut 
morari soleat ignarus, et piscium quoque genera alia 
planis gaudent alia saxosis, regionibus etiam litori- 
busque discreta sunt, nee helopem nostro mari aut 
scarum ducas, ita non omne argumentum undique 

22 venit ideoque non passim quaerendum est. Multus 
alioqui error est ; exhausto labore, quod non ratione 
scrutabimur, non poterimus in venire nisi casu. At 
si scierimus, ubi quodque nascatur, cum ad locum 
ventum erit, facile quod in eo est pervidebimus. 

23 In primis igitur argumenta a persona ducenda 
sunt ; cum sit, ut dixi, divisio, ut omnia in haec duo 
partiamur, res atque personas, ut causa, tempus, 
locus, occasio, instrumentum, modus et cetera, rerum 

1 In previous chapter. 

- See ii. iv. 22, v. xii. 6 and xiii. 57. 

a v. viii. 4. 


BOOK V. x. 19-23 

always so, there would be no room for doubt, and 
no argument. 

Let us now turn to consider the " places " of argu- 20 
ments, although some hold that they are identical 
with the topics which I have already discussed 
above. 1 But I do not use this term in its usual 
acceptance, namely, commonplaces 2 directed against 
luxury, adultery, and the like, but in the sense of 
the secret places where arguments reside, and from 
which they must be drawn forth. For just as all 21 
kinds of produce are not provided by every country, 
and as you will not succeed in finding a particular bird 
or beast, if you are ignorant of the localities where 
it has its usual haunts or birthplace, as even the 
various kinds of fish flourish in different surround- 
ings, some preferring a smooth and others a rocky 
bottom, and are found on different shores and in 
divers regions (you will for instance never catch 
a sturgeon or wrasse in Italian waters), so not 
every kind of argument can be derived from every 
circumstance, and consequently our search requires 
discrimination. Otherwise we shall fall into serious 22 
error, and after wasting our labour through lack of 
method we shall fail to discover the argument which 
we desire, unless assisted by some happy chance. 
But if we know the circumstances which give rise to 
each kind of argument, we shall easily see, when 
we come to a particular "place," what arguments 
it contains. 

Firstly, then, arguments may be drawn from 23 
persons ; for, as I have already said, 3 all arguments 
fall into two classes, those concerned with things and 
those concerned with persons, since causes, time, 
place, occasion, instruments, means and the like are 



sint accidentia. Personis autem non quidquid accidit 
exsequendum mihi est. ut plerique fecerunt, sed uride 

24 argumenta sumi possunt. Ea porro sunt, genus, 
nam similes parentibus ac maioribus suis plerumque 
creduntur, et nonnunquam ad honeste turpiterque 
vivendum inde causae fluunt ; natio, nam et gentibus 
proprii mores sunt, iiec idem in barbaro, Romano, 

25 Graeco probabile est ; patria, quia similiter etiam 
civitatum leges, instituta, opiniones habent diffe- 
rentiam ; sexus, ut latrocinium facilius in viro, vene- 
ficium in femina credas ; aetas, quia aliud aliis annis 
magis convenit ; educatio et disciplina,, quoiiiam 
refert, a quibus et quo quisque modo sit institutus ; 

26 habitus corporis, ducitur eniin frequenter in argu- 
mentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae., his 
contraria in diversum ; fortunaj iieque enim idem 
credibile est in divite ac paupere^ propinquis amicis 
clientibus abundante et his omnibus destitute : con- 
dicionis etiam distantia, nam clarus an obscurus, 
magistrates an privatus, pater an filius^ civis an 
peregrinus, liber an servus, maritus an caelebs, 
parens liberorum an orbus sit, plurimum distat ; 

27^animi natura,, etenim avari.tia, iracundia, misericordia, 
crudelitas, severitas aliaque his similia adferunt fre- 
quenter fidem aut detrahunt, sicut victus luxuriosus 


BOOK V. x. 23-27 

all accidents of things. 1 have no intention of 
tracing all the accidents of persons, as many have 
done, but shall confine myself to those from which 
arguments may be drawn. Such are birth, for 24 
persons are generally regarded as having some 
resemblance to their parents and ancestors, a re- 
semblance which sometimes leads to their living 
disgracefully or honourably, as the case may be ; 
then there is nationality, for races have their own 
character, and the same action is not probable in the 
case of a barbarian, a Roman and a Greek ; country 25 
is another, for there is a like diversity in the laws, 
institutions and opinions of different states ; sex, 
since for example a man is more likely to commit a 
robbery, a woman to poison ; age, since different 
actions suit different ages ; education and training, 
since it makes a great difference who were the in- 
structors and what the method of instruction in each 
individual case ; bodily constitution, for beauty is 26 
often introduced as an argument for lust, strength as 
an argument for insolence, and their opposites for 
opposite conduct ; fortune, since the same acts are 
not to be expected from rich and poor, or from one 
who is surrounded by troops of relations, friends or 
clients and one who lacks all these advantages ; 
condition, too, is important, for it makes a great 
difference whether a man be famous or obscure, a 
magistrate or a private individual, a father or a son, 
a citizen or a foreigner, a free man or a slave, 
married or unmarried, a father or childless. Nor 27 
must we pass by natural^ disposition, for avarice, 
anger, pity, cruelty, severity and the like may often 
be adduced to prove the credibility or the reverse of 
a given act ; it is for instance often asked whether a 


an frugi an sordidus, quaeritur ; studia quoque, nam 
rusticus, foreiisis, negotiator, miles, navigator, medicus 

28 aliud atque aliud efficiunt. Intuendum etiam, quid 
adfectet quisque, locuples videri an disertus, Justus 
an potens. Spectantur ante acta dictaque, ex prae- 
teritis enim aestimari solent praesentia. His adii- 
ciunt quidam commotionem ; hanc accipi volunt 
temporarium animi motum, sicut iram, pavorem ; 

29 consilia autem et praesentis et praeteriti et futuri 
temporis ; quae mihi, etiamsi personis accidunt, per 
se referenda tamen ad illam partem argumentorum 
videntur, quam ex causis ducimus ; sicut habitus 
quidam animi, quo tractatur, amicus an inimicus. 

30 Ponunt in persona et nomen ; quod quidem ei acci- 
dere necesse est, sed in argumentum raro cadit, nisi 
cum aut ex causa datum est, ut Sapiens, Magnus, 
Pius ; aut et ipsum alicuius cogitationis attulit 
causam, ut Lentulo coniurationis, quod libris Sibyl- 
linis aruspicumque responsis dominatio dari tribus 
Corneliis dicebatur, seque eum tertium esse credebat 
post Sullam Cinnamque, quia et ipse Cornelius erat. 

31 Nam et illud apud Euripidem frigidum sane, quod 
nomen Polynicis, ut argumentum morum, frater in- 
cessit. locorum tamen ex eo frequens materia, qua 

1 Publius Cornelius Lentulus Sura, Catilinarian con- 
spirator, cp. Sail. Cat. c. 46. 

2 Phoeniss. 636. a.\fi0>s 8' uvo^a no\vvflirn irar^p e^ero crot 
Qfia Trpovoia vtiKeuv eirwyvfj.oi', "with truth did our father call 
thee Polyniccs with divine foreknowledge naming thee after 
'strife.'" 3 See vi. iii. 53. 


BOOK V. x. 27-31 

man's way of living be luxurious, frugal or parsi- 
monious. Then there is occupation, since a rustic, a 
lawyer, a man of business, a soldier, a sailor, a doctor 
all perform very different actions. We must also 28 
consider the personal ambitions of individuals, for 
instance whether they wish to be thought rich or 
eloquent, just or powerful. Past life and previous 
utterances are also a subject for investigation, since 
we are in the habit of inferring the present from the 
past. To these some add passion, by which they 
mean some temporary emotion such as anger or fear ; 
they also add design, which may refer to the past, 29 
present or future. These latter, however, although 
accidents of persons, should be referred to that class 
of arguments which we draw from causes, as also 
should certain dispositions of mind, for example \^ 
when we inquire whether one man is the friend or 
enemy of another. Names also are treated as 30 
accidents of persons ; this is perfectly true, but names 
are rarely food for argument, unless indeed they 
have been given for some special reasons, such as the 
titles of Wise, Great, Pious, or unless the name has 
suggested some special thought to the bearer. 
Lentulus 1 for instance had the idea of conspiracy 
suggested to him by the fact that according to the 
Sibylline books and the Responses of the sooth- 
sayers the tyranny was promised to three members 
of the Cornelian family, and he considered himself to 
be the third in succession to Sulla and China, since 
he too bore the name Cornelius. On the other hand 31 
the conceit employed by Euripides 2 where he makes 
Eteocles taunt his brother Polynices on the ground 
that his name is evidence of character, is feeble in 
the extreme. Still a name will often provide the 
subject for a jest, 3 witness the frequent jests of 



Cicero in Verrein rion semel usus est. Haec fere 
circa personas sunt aut his similia. Neque enini 
complecti omnia vel hac in parte vel in ceteris 
possumus, contenti rationein plura quaesituris osten- 

32 Nunc ad res transeo, in quibus maxime sunt per- 
sonis iuncta. quae agimus,, ideoque prima tractanda. 
In omnibus porro., quae fiunt, quaeritur aut Quart- ? 
aut Ubi ? aut Quando ? aut Quomodo? aut Per quae 

33 facta sunt? Ducuntur igitur argumenta ex causis 
factorum vel futurorum ; quarum materiam, quani 
quidam vA./i>, alii SL'IM/AU/ nominaverunt, in duo genera, 
sed quaternas utriusque dividunt species. Nam fere 
versatur ratio faciendi circa boiiorum adeptionem, 
incrementum, conservationeru, usum, aut malorum 
evitationem, liberationem, imminutionem^ toleran- 

31 tiam ; quae et in deliberaiido plurimum valent. Sed 
honestas 1 causas habent recta^ prava contra ex falsis 
opinionibus veniunt. Nam est his initium ex iis. 
quae credunt bona aut mala; inde errores existunt 
et pessimi adfectuS; in quibus sunt ira^ odium, invidia, 
cupiditaSj spes, ambitus, audacia, metus, cetera generis 
eiusdeni. Accedunt aliquando fortuita, ebrietas, 
ignorantia, quae interim ad ve'niam valent, interim 
ad probationem criminis, ut si quis, dum alii insidia- 

35 tur, alium dicitur interemisse. Causae porro non ad 
convincendum modo, quod obiicitur, sed ad defen- 
dendum quoque excuti solent, cum quis se recte 

1 honestas \V. Meyer: has B : haec A. 


BOOK V. x. 31-35 

Cicero on the name of Verres. Such, then, and the 
like are the accidents of persons. It is impossible 
to deal with them all either here or in other portions 
of this work., and I must content myself with point- 
ing out the lines on which further enquiry should 

TTiow pass to things : of these actions are the most 32 
nearly connected with persons and must therefore be 
treated first. In regard to every action the question 
arises either Why or Where or When or How or By 
what means the action is performed. Consequently 33 
arguments are drawn from the causes of past or future 
actions. The matter of these causes,, by some called 
r\rj, by others SuVa/xts, falls into two genera, which 
are each divided into four species. For the motive 
for any action is as a rule concerned with the acquisi- 
tion, increase, preservation and use of things that are 
good or with the avoidance, diminution, endurance 
of things that are evil or with escape therefrom. 
All these considerations carry great weight in de- 
liberative oratory as well. But right actions have r>4 
right motives, while evil actions are the result of 
false opinions, which originate in the things which 
men believe to be good or evil. Hence spring errors 
and evil passions such as anger, hatred, envy, desire, 
hope, ambition, audacity, fear and others of a similar 
kind. To these accidental circumstances may often 
be added, such ajs drunkenness or ignorance, which 
serve sometimes to excuse and sometimes to prove 
a charge, as for instance when a man is said to have 
killed one person while lying in wait for another. 
Further, motives are often discussed not merely to 35 
convict the accused of the offence with which he is 
charged, but also to defend him when he contends 



fecisse, id est honesta causa, contendit; qua de re 

36 latius in tertio libro dictum est. Finitionis quoque 
quaestiones ex causis interim pendent. An tyran- 
nicida, qui tyrannum, a quo deprehensus in adulterio 
fuerat, occidit? An sacrilegus, qui, ut hostes urbe 

37 expelleret, arma templo adfixa detraxit ? Ducuntur 
argumenta et ex loco. Spectatur enim ad fidem 
probationis, montanus an planus, maritimus an medi- 
terraneus, consitus an incultus, frequens an desertus, 
propinquus an remotus, opportunus consiliis an ad- 
versus ; quam partem videmus vehementissime pro 

38 Milone tractasse Ciceronem. Et haec quidem ac 
similia ad coniecturam frequentius pertinent, sed 
interim ad ius quoque : privatus an publicus, sacer 
an profanus, noster an alienus ; ut in persona, magi- 
stratus, pater, peregrinus. Hinc enim quaestiones 

39 oriuntur : Privaiam pecnniam sustulisti ; verum quia de 
tetnplo, non j'urtum sed sacrilegium est. Occidisti adul- 
terum, quod lex permittit ; sed quia in lupanari, caedes 
est. Iniuriam Jecisti ; sed quia magistratui, maiestatis 

40 actio est. Vel contra : Licuit, quia pater cram, quia 
magistratus. Sed circa facti controversiam argumenta 
praestant, circa iuris lites materiam quaestionum. 
Ad qualitatem quoque frequenter pertinet locus, 

1 in. xi. 4-9. 2 pro Mil. xx. 


BOOK V. x . 35-40 

that his action was right, that is to say proceeded 
from an honourable motive, a theme of which I have 
spoken more fully in the third book. 1 Questions 36 
of definition are also at times intimately connected 
with motives. Is a man a tyrannicide if he kills a 
tyrant by whom he has been detected in the act of 
of adultery ? Or is he guilty of sacrilege who tore 
down arms dedicated in a temple to enable him to 
drive the enemy from the city ? Arguments are also 37 
drawn from place. With a view to proving our facts 
we consider such questions as whether a place is hilly 
or level, near the coast or inland, planted or unculti- 
vated, crowded or deserted, near or far, suitable for 
carrying out a given design or the reverse. This is a 
topic which is treated most carefully by Cicero in his 
prb Milone. z These points and the like generally 38 
refer to questions of fact, but occasionally to 
questions of law as well. For we may ask whether 
a place is public or private, sacred or profane, our 
own or another's, just as where persons are concerned 
we ask whether a man is a magistrate, a father, a 
foreigner. Hence arise such questions as the follow- 39 
ing. " You have stolen private money, but since you 
stole it from a temple, it is not theft but sacrilege." 
" You have killed adulterers, an act permitted by law, 
but since the act was done in a brothel, it is murder." 
" You have committed an assault, but since the 
object of your assault was a magistrate, the crime is 
lese-majeste. Similarly it may be urged in defence, 40 
"The act was lawful, because I was a father, a 
magistrate." But such points afford matter for 
argument when there is a controversy as to the 
facts, and matter for enquiry when the dispute 
turns on a point of law. Place also frequently 



iieque enim idem ubique ant licet aut decorum est : 
quin etiam in qua quidque civitate quaeratur interest, 

41 moribus enim et legibus distant. Ad eommendatio- 
nem quoque et invidiam valet. Nam et Aiax apud 
Ovidium : Ante rates, inquit, agimus causam. el mecum 
confertur Ulixes ? Et Miloni inter cetera obiectum 
est, quod Clodius in monumentis ab eo maiorum 

42 suoruni esset occisus. Ad suadendi momenta idem 
valet, sicut tempus, cuius tractatum subiungam. 
Eius autem, ut alio loco iam dixi, duplex significatio 
est ; generaliter enini et specialiter accipitur. Prius 
illud est : nunc, ol im, sub Alexandro, cum apud Ilium 
pugnatum est, denique praeteritum, instans, futurum. 
Hoc sequens habet et constituta discrimina: aestatt-. 
hieme, noctu, interdiu ; et fortuita : in pestilentia, 

43 in bello, in convivio. Latinorum quidam satis signi- 
ficari putaverunt, si illud generate tempus, hoc 
speciale tempora vocarent. Quorum utrorumque 
ratio et in consiliis quidem et in illo demonstrative) 
geiiere versatur, sed in iudiciis frequeiitissima est. 

44 Nam et iuris quaestiones facit et qualitatem distinguit 
et ad coniecturam plurimum confert : ut cum interim 

1 Mf-f. xiii. ,1. Ajax had saved the ships from being burned 
by the Trojans. The dispute as to whether the arms of 
Achilles should be awarded to him or to Ulysses is beinu 
tried there. Ajax's argument is, " Can you refuse me 1113- due 
reward on the very spot where I saved you from disaster ? " 


BOOK V. x. 40-44 

affects the quality of an action, for the si me action 
is not always lawful or seemly under all circum- 
stances, while it makes considerable difference in 
what state the enquiry is taking place, for they differ 
both in custom and law. Further arguments drawn 41 
from place may serve to secure approval or the 
reverse. Ajax for instance in Ovid l says : 

" What ! do we plead our cause before the ships ? 
And is Ulysses there preferred to me ? " 

Again one of the many charges brought against 
Milo was that he killed Clodius on the monument of 
his ancestors. 2 Such arguments may also carry 42 
weight in deliberative oratory, as may those drawn 
from time, which 1 shall now r proceed to discuss. 
Time may, as I have said elsewhere, 3 be understood 
in two different senses, general and special. The first 
sense is seen in words and phrases such as " now," 
"formerly," "in the reign of Alexander," "in the 
days of the siege of Troy," and whenever we speak 
of past, present or future. The second sense occurs 
when we speak either of definite periods of time 
such as "in summer," "in winter," "by night," "by 
day," or of fortuitous periods such as " in time of 
pestilence," "in time of war," "during a banquet." 
Certain Latin writers have thought it a sufficient 43 
distinction to call the general sense "time," and the 
special "times." In both senses time is of importance 
in advisory speeches and demonstrative oratory, but 
not so frequently as in forensic. For questions of law 1 1 
turn on time, while it also determines the quality of 
actions and is of great importance in questions of 
fact ; for instance, occasionally it provides irrefragable 

- jtro Mi/.\i'\. 17. i.e. on the Appian Way constructed by 
one of Clodius' ancestors. 3 in. vi. '25. * 



probationes inexpugiiabiles adferat, quales sunt, si 
dicatur (ut supra posui) signator, qui ante diem 
tabularum decessit, aut commisisse aliquid, vel cum 

45 infans esset vel cum omnino riatus non esset ; praeter 
id, quod omnia facile argumenta aut ex iis, quae ante 
rem facta sunt, aut ex coniunctis rei aut insequenti- 
bus ducuntur. Ex antecedentibus : Mortem minatus 
es, noctu existi, pro/iclscentem anlecesaisti ; causae quo- 

46 que factorum praeteriti sunt temporis. Secundum 
tempus subtilius quidam, quam necesse erat, divise- 
runt, ut esset iuncti Sonus auditus est ; adhaerentis 
Clamor sublatus est. Insequentis sunt ilia Latuisti, 
profugisti, livores et tumores apparuerunt. lisdem tem- 
porum gradibus defeiisor utetur ad detrahendam ei 

47 quod obiicitur fidem. In his onmis factorum dicto- 
rumque ratio versatur, sed dupliciter. Nam fiunt 
quaedam quia aliud postea futurum est, quaedam 
quia aliud ante factum est : ut, cum obiicitur reo leno- 
cinii, speciosae marito, quod adulterii damnatam quon- 
dam emerit ; aut parricidii reo luxurioso, quod dixerit 
patri, Non amplius me obiurgabis. Nam et ille non 

1 v. v. 2. 

2 Both cases are clearly themes from the schools of 


BOOK V. x. 44-47 

proofs, which may be illustrated by a case which I 
have already cited, 1 when one of the signatories to a 
document has died before the day on which it was 
signed, or when a person is accused of the com- 
mission of some crime, although he was only an infant 
at the time or not yet born. Further, all kinds of 45 
arguments may easily be drawn either from facts 
previous to a certain act, or contemporary or sub- 
sequent. As regards antecedent facts the following 
example will illustrate my meaning ; " You threat- 
ened to kill him, you went out by night, you started 
before him." Motives of actions may also belong to 
past time. Some writers have shown themselves 46 
over-subtle in their classification of the second class 
of circumstances, making <f a sound was heard" an 
example of circumstances combined with an act and 
" a shout was raised " an instance of circumstances 
attached to an act. As regards subsequent circum- 
stances I may cite accusations such as " You hid 
yourself, you fled, livid spots and swellings appeared 
on the corpse." The counsel for the defence will 
employ the same divisions of time to discredit the 
charge which is brought against him. In these 47 
considerations are included everything in connexion 
with words and deeds, but in two distinct ways. 
For some things are done because something else is 
like to follow, and others because something else 
has previously been done, as for instance, when the 
husband of a beautiful woman is accused of having 
acted as a procurer on the ground that he bought 
her after she was found guilty of adultery, or 
when a debauched character is accused of parri- 
cide on the ground that he said to his father 
"You have rebuked me for the last time." 2 For 




quia emit leno est, sed quia leno erat emit ; nee hie, 
quia sic erat locutus, occidit, sed, quia erat occisurus, 

48 sic locutus est. Casus autem, qui et ipse praestat 
argumentis locum, sine dubio est ex insequentibus, 
sed quadam proprietate distinguitur, ut si dicam : 
Melior dux Scipio quam Hannibal ; vicit Hannibalem. 
Bonus gubernator ; nunquam fecit naufragium. Bonus 
agricola ; magtios sustulil fructus. Et contra : Sump- 
tuosus fuit ; patrimonium exhausit. Turpiier vixit ; 

49 omnibus invisus est. Intuendae sunt praecipueque 
in coniecturis et facilitates ; credibilius est enim 
occisos a pluribus pauciores, a firmioribus imbecil- 
liores, a vigilantibus dormientes, a praeparatis inopi- 

50 nantes ; quorum contraria in diversum valent. Haec 
et in deliberando intuemur, et in iudiciis ad duas 
res solemus referre, an voluerit quis, an potuerit ; 
nam et voluiitatem spes facit. Hinc ilia apud Cice- 
ronem coniectura, Insidiatus est Clodius Miloni, non 
Milo Clodio ; tile cum servis robustis, hie cum mulierum 
comitatu, ille equis, hie in raeda, ille expeditus, hie pae- 

51 nula irretitus. Facultati autem licet instrumentum 

1 pro Mil. x. 29. 

BOOK V. x. 47-51 

in the former case the accused is not a procurer 
because he bought the woman, but bought her 
because he was a procurer, while in the latter the 
accused is not a parricide because he used these 
words, but used them because he intended to kill his 
father. With regard to accidental circumstances, 48 
which also provide matter for arguments, these 
clearly belong to subsequent time, but are distin- 
guished by a certain special quality, as for instance if 
I should say, " Scipio was a better general than 
Hannibal, for he conquered Hannibal" ; " He was a 
good pilot, for he was never shipwrecked"; "He was 
a good farmer, for he gathered in huge harvests" ; 
or referring to bad qualities, " He was a prodigal, for \ 
he squandered his patrimony"; "His life was dis- 1 
graceful, for he was hated by all." We must also 49 
consider the resources possessed by the parties 
concerned, more especially when dealing with ques- 
tions of fact ; for it is more credible that a smaller 
number of persons were killed by a larger, a weaker 
party by a stronger, sleepers by men that were wide 
awake, the unsuspecting by the well-prepared, while 
the converse arguments may be used to prove the 
opposite. Such considerations arise both in deliber- 50 
ative and forensic oratory : in the latter they occur 
in relation to two questions, namely, whether some 
given person had the will, and whether he had the 
power to do the deed; for hope will often create 
the will to act. Hence the well-known inference in 
Cicero: 1 "Clodius lay in wait for Milo, not Milo for 
Clodius, for Clodius had a retinue of sturdy slaves, 
while Milo was with a party of women ; Clodius was 
mounted, Milo in a carriage, Clodius lightly clad, 
Milo hampered by a cloak." With resources we may 51 

Q 2 


coniungere ; sunt enim in parte facultatis et copiae. 
Sed ex instrumento aliquando etiam signa nascuntur, 

52 ut spiculum in corpore inventum. His adiicitur 
modus, quern rpdVov dicunt, quo quaeritur, quemad- 
modum quid sit factum. Idque turn ad qualitatem 
scriptumque pertinet, ut si negemus adulterum 
veneno licuisse occidere, turn ad coniecturas quoque, 
ut si dicam bona mente factum, ideo palam ; mala, 
ideo ex insidiis, nocte, in solitudine. 

53 In rebus autem omnibus, de quarum vi ac natura 
quaeritur, quasque etiam citra complexum personarum 
ceterorumque ex quibus fit causa, per se intueri pos- 
sumus, tria sine dubio rursus spectanda sunt, An sit, 
Quid sit, Quale sit. Sed, quia sunt quidam loci 
argumentorum omnibus communes, dividi haec tria 
genera non possunt, ideoque locis potius, ut in quos- 

54 que incurrent, subiicienda sunt. Ducuntur ergo 
argumenta ex finitione seu fine ; nam utroque modo 
traditur. Eius duplex ratio est ; aut enim simpliciter 
quaeritur, sitne hoc virtus ; aut praecedente finitione, 
quid sit virtus. Id aut universum verbis complec- 
timur, ut Rhetorice est bene dicendi scientia ; aut per 
partes, ut Rhetorice est invemendi rede et disponendi et 
eloquendi cum firma memoria et cum dignitate actionis 

1 See 40. Also in. v. 4, in. vi. 55 and 66. 
* See above 20. 


BOOK V. x. 51-54 

couple instruments, which form part of resources and 
means. But sometimes instruments will provide us 
with indications as well, as for instance if we find 
a javelin sticking in a dead body. To these we may 52 
add manner, the Greek rpoTros, in regard to which 
we ask how a thing was done. Manner is concerned 
sometimes with quality and the letter of the law l 
(we may for instance argue that it was unlawful to 
kill an adulterer by poison), sometimes with ques- 
tions of fact, as for example if I argue that an act 
was committed with a good intent and therefore 
openly, or with a bad intent and therefore treacher- 
ously, by night, in a lonely place. 

In all cases, however, in which we enquire into the 53 
nature and meaning of an act, and which can be 
considered by themselves apart from all consider- 
ations of persons and all else that gives rise to the 
actual cause, there are clearly three points to which 
we must give attention, namely Whether it is, What 
it is and Of what kind it is. But as there are cer- 
tain "places" 2 of argument which are common to 
all three questions, this triple division is imprac- 
ticable and. we must therefore consider these ques- 
tions rather in connexion with those " places " in 
which they most naturally arise. Arguments, then, 54 
may be drawn from definition, sometimes called 
finuio and sometimes finis. Definition is of two 
kinds. We may ask whether a particular quality is a 
virtue or make a definition precede and ask what is 
the nature of a virtue. Such a definition is either 
stated in general terms, such as Rhetoric is the science 
of speaking well, or in detail, such as Rhetoric is the 
science of correct conception, arrangement and utterance, 
coupled with a retentive memory and a digni/icd delivery. 



55 scienlia. Praeterea finimus aut vi, sicut superiora, 
aut ervyuoAoyi'a, ut si assiduum ab asse 1 dando, et locu- 
pletem a locorum, pecuniosum a pecorum copia. 
Finitioni subiecta maxime videntur genus, species, 

56 differens, proprium ; ex iis omnibus argumenta du- 
cuntur. Genus ad probandam speciem minimum 
valet, plurimum ad refellendam. Itaque non, quia est 
arbor, platanus est, at quod non est arbor, utique 
platanus non est ; nee quod virtus est, utique 
iustitia est, at quod non est virtus, utique non 
potest esse iustitia. 2 Itaque a genere pervenien- 
dum ad ultimam speciem : ut Homo est animal non 
est satis, id enim genus est; mortale, etiamsi est 
species, cum aliis tamen communis finitio ; rationale,, 
nihil supererit ad demonstrandum id quod veils. 

57 Contra species firmam probationem habet generis, 
infirmam refutationem. Nam, quod iustitia est, 
utique virtus est ; quod non est iustitia, potest esse 
virtus, si est fortitude, constantia, continentia. Nuri- 
quam itaque tolletur a specie genus, nisi ut omnes 
species, quae sunt generi subiectae, removeantur, hoc 
modo, Quod nee rationale nee mortale est neque animal, 

1 asse, Regius : aere, MSS. 

2 quod virtus ... at, omitted by B : iustitia est . . . est 
virtus, omitted by A : the missing words are supplied by 

1 Paulus (exc. Fest. ) gives the following explanation of this 
absurd derivation, for which Cicero tells that Aelius Stilo 
was responsible : ."Some think that asziduus was originally 


BOOK V. x. 54-57 

Further, we may define a word by giving its content 55 
as in the preceding instances, or by etymology : we 
may for instance explain assiduus 1 by deriving it from 
as and do, locuples 2 by deriving it from copia locorum, 
pecuniosus 3 from copia pecorum. Genus, species, difference 
and property seem more especially to afford scope for 
definition, for we derive arguments from all of these. 
Genus is of little use when we desire to prove a 56 
species, but of great value for its elimination. A tree 
is not necessarily a plane tree, but that which is not 
a tree is certainly not a plane tree ; again, a virtue is 
not necessarily the virtue of justice, but that which 
is not a virtue is certainly not justice. We must 
proceed from the genus to the ultimate species ; 4 for 
example, to say that man is an animal will not 
suffice ; for animal merely gives us the genus : nor 
vet will the addition of the words " subject to 
death " be adequate ; for although this epithet gives 
us a species, it is common to other animals as well. 
If, however, we define man as a rational animal, we 
need nothing further to make our meaning clear. 
On the other hand species will give us clear proof of 57 
genus, but is of little service for its elimination. 
For example, justice is always a virtue, but that 
which is not justice may still be a virtue, such as 
fortitude, constancy or self-control. Genus therefore 
cannot be eliminated by species unless all the species 
included in the genus be eliminated, as for instance 
in the following sentence : That which is neither rational 

the epithet applied to one who served in the army at bis own 
expense, contributing an a-s" (i.e. instead of receiving it) ! 

2 locuples (" wealthy") is derived from locus = the posses- 
sors of many places. 

3 pecuniosus ("moneyed") is derived from pecus = "rich 
in herds." * cp. 5. 



68 homo non est. 1 His adiiciunt propria et differentia. 
Propriis confirmatur finitio, differentibus solvitur. 
Proprium autem est aut quod soli accidit, ut homini 
sermo, risus ; aut quidquid utique accidit sed non 
soli, ut igni calfacere. Et sunt eiusdem rei plura 
propria, ut ipsius ignis lucere, calere. Itaque, quod- 
cunque proprium deerit, solvit finitionem ; non uti- 

69 que, quodcunque erit, confirmat. Saepissime autem, 
quid sit proprium cuiusque, quaeritur : ut, si per 
eru/xoAoyiav dicatur, Tyrannicidae proprium est tyran- 
num occidere, negemus ; non enim, si traditum sibi 
eum carnifex occiderit, tyrannicida dicatur, nee si 

60 imprudens vel invitus. Quod autem proprium non 
erit, differens erit, ut aliud est servum esse aliud 
servire ; qualis esse in addictis quaestio solet : Qui 
servus est, si manumittatnr, fit libertinus, non item 

61 addictus ; et plura, de quibus alio loco. Illud quoque 
differens vocarit, cum, genere in species diducto, 
species ipsa discernitur. Animal genus, mortale 
species, terrenum vel bipes differens ; nondum enim 

1 quod neque im mortale nee mortale est animal non est 
(and the like) MSS. : the text gives the conjecture of Halm. 

1 vn. iii. 26. Also in. vi. 25. 

BOOK V. x 57-61 

nor mortal nor an animal is not a man. To these they 58 
add property and difference. Properties serve to 
establish definitions, differences to overthrow them. 
A property is that which happens to one particular 
object and that alone ; speech and laughter for 
instance are properties of man. Or it may be some- 
thing specially belonging to an object, but not to it 
alone ; heating for instance is a property of fire. The 
same thing may also have a number of properties : 
light and heat are both properties of fire. Con- 
sequently, the omission of any property in a definition 
will impair it, but the introduction of a property, 
whatever it may be, will not necessarily establish a 
definition. We have, however, often to consider 59 
what is a property of some given object ; for example, 
if it should be asserted, on the ground of etymology, 
that the peculiar property of a tyrannicide is to kill 
tyrants, we should deny it : for an executioner is not 
ipso facto a tyrannicide, if he executes a tyrant who 
has been delivered to him for the purpose, nor again 
is he a tyrannicide who kills a tyrant unwittingly or 
against his will. What is not a property will be a 60 
difference : it is, for instance, one thing to be a slave, 
and another to be in a state of servitude ; hence the 
distinction raised in connexion with persons assigned 
to their creditors for debt : A slave, if he is manu- 
mitted becomes a freedman, bid this is not the case with 
one who is assigned. There are also other points of 
difference which are dealt with elsewhere. 1 Again, 61 
the term difference is applied in cases when the 
genus is divided into species and one species is sub- 
divided. Animal, for instance, is a genus, mortal a 
species, while terrestrial or biped is a difference : for 
they are not actually properties, but serve to show 



proprium est sed iam differt a marine vel quadripede ; 
quod non tarn ad argumentum pertinet quam ad 

62 diligentem finitionis comprehensionem. Cicero genus 
et speciem, quam eandem formam vocat, a finitione 
deducit et iis, quae ad aliquid sunt, subiicit : ut, si 
is, cui argentum omne legatum est, petat signatum 
quoque, utatur genere ; at si quis, cum legatum sit 
ei, quae viro materfamilias esset, neget deberi ei, 
quae in manum non convenerit, specie ; quoniam 

63 duae formae sint matrimoniorum. Divisione autem 
adiuvari finitionem docet, eamque differre a partitione, 
quod haec sit totius in partes, ilia generis in formas ; 
partes incertas esse, ut Quibus constet respublica ; 
formas certas, ut Quot sint species rerumpubli- 
carum, quas tris accepimus, quae populi, quae pauco- 

64 rum, quae unius potestate regerentur. Et ille quidem 
non iis exemplis utitur, quia scribens ad Trebatium 
ex iure ducere ea maluit ; ego apertiora posui. Pro- 
pria vero ad coniecturae quoque pertinent partem : 
ut, quia proprium est boni recte facere, iracundi 
verbis aut manu male facere, facta haec ab ipsis l 

1 male facere, facta haec ab ipsis, supplied by Halm and 

1 Cic. Top. iii. 13. 

8 There was the formal marriage per coemptionem, bringing 
the woman under the power (in manum) of her husband and 
giving her the title of materfamilias, and the informal marriage 
based on cohabitation without involving the wife's coming in 
manum mariti. 


BOOK V. x. 61-64 

the difference between such animals and quadrupeds 
or creatures of the sea. This distinction, however, 
comes under the province not so much of argument 
as of exact definition. Cicero l separates genus and 62 
species, which latter he calls form, from definition 
and includes them under relation. For example, 
if a person to whom another man has left all his 
silver should claim all his silver money as well, he 
would base his claim upon genus \ on the other hand 
if when a legacy has been left to a married woman 
holding the position of materfamilias, it should be 
maintained that the legacy is not due to a woman 
who never came into the power of her husband, the 
argument is based on species, since there are two 
kinds of marriage. 2 Cicero 3 further shows that 63 
definition is assisted by division, which he dis- 
tinguishes from partition, making the latter the 
dissection of a whole into its parts and the former 
the division of a genus into its forms or species. The 
number of parts he regards as being uncertain, as for 
instance the elements of which a state consists ; the 
forms or species are, however, certain, as for instance 
the number of forms of government, which we are 
told are three, democracy, oligarchy, and monarchy. 
It is true that he does not use these illustrations, 64 
since, as he was writing to Trebatius, 4 he preferred 
to draw his examples from law. I have chosen my 
illustrations as being more obvious. Properties have 
relation to questions of fact as well ; for instance, 
it is the property of a good man to act rightly, of an 
angry man to be violent in speech or action, and 
consequently we believe that such acts are com- 
mitted by persons of the appropriate character, or 

8 Cic. Top. v. 17. * A famous lawyer, cp. in. xi. 18. 



esse credantur aut contra. Nam ut quaedam in qui- 
busdam utique simt, ita quaedam in quibusdam l 
utique non sunt : et ratio, quamvis sit ex diverse, 
eadem est. 

65 Divisio et ad probandum simili via valet et ad 
refellendum. Probationi interim satis est unum 
habere, hoc modo, Ut sit civis, ant natus sit oportet aut 
foetus ; utrumque tollendum est, Nee natus nee factus 

66 est. Fit hoc et multiplex, idque est argumentorum 
genus ex remotione, quo modo efficitur totum falsum, 
modo id, quod relinquitur, verum. Totum falsum 
est hoc modo, Pecuniam credidisse te dicis; aut habuisti 
ipse aut ab aliquo accepisti aut invenisti aut surripuisti. 
Si neque domi kabuixti neque ab aliquo accepisti et cetera, 

67 non credidisti. Reliquum fit verum sic, Hie servus, 
quern tibi vindicas, aut verna tuus est aut emptus aut 
donatus aut testamento relictus aut ex hoste captus aut 
alienus ; deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus. 
Periculosum et cum cura intuendum genus, quia, si 
in proponendo unum quodlibet omiserimus, cum risu 

68 quoque tota res solvitur. Tutius, quod Cicero pro 
Caecina facit, cum interrogat, Si haec actio non sit, 
quae sit ? simul enim removentur omnia. Vel cum 
duo ponentur inter se contraria, quorum tenuisse 

1 utique sunt, ita quaedam in quibusdam, lulius Victor : 
omitted by MSB. 

1 pro Caec. xiii. 37. 

BOOK V. x. 64-68 

not committed by persons of inappropriate character. 
For just as certain persons possess certain qualities, 
so certain others do not possess certain qualities, 
and the argument is of precisely the same nature, 
though from opposite premises. 

In a similar way division is valuable both for proof 65 
and refutation. For proof, it is sometimes enough to 
establish one thing. " To be a citizen, a man must 
either have been born or made such." For refutation, 
both points must be disproved : " he was neither born 
nor made a citizen." This may be done in many ways, 66 
and constitutes a form of argument by elimination, 
whereby we show sometimes that the whole is false, 
sometimes that only that which remains after the 
process of elimination is true. An example of the 
first of these two cases would be : " You say that you 
lent him money. Either you possessed it yourself, re- 
ceived it from another, found it or stole it. If you did 
not possess it, receive it from another, find or steal it, 
you did not lend it to him." The residue after elimin- 67 
ation is shown to be true as follows : " This slave whom 
you claim was either born in your house or bought or 
given you or left you by will or captured from the 
enemy or belongs to another." By the elimination 
of the previous suppositions he is shown to belong to 
another. This form of argument is risky and must 
be employed with care ; for if, in setting forth the 
alternatives, we chance to omit one, our whole case 
will fail, and our audience will be moved to laughter. 
It is safer to do what Cicero 1 does in the pro 68 
Caecina, when he asks, "If this is not the point at issue, 
what is? " For thus all other points are eliminated at 
one swoop. Or again two contrary propositions may be 
advanced, either of which if established would suffice 



utrumlibet sufficiat, quale Ciceronis est, Unum quidem 
certe, nemo erit tarn inimicus Cluentio, qui mihi non con- 
cedat ; si constet corruptum illud esse indicium, aid ab 
Habito aid ab Oppianico esse corruptum ; si doceo non 
ab Habito, vinco ab Oppianico ; si ostendo ab Oppianico, 

69 purgo Habitum. Fit etiara ex duobus, quorum necesse 
est alterum verum, eligendi adversario potestas, 
efficiturque, ut, utrum elegerit, noceat. Facit hoc 
Cicero pro Oppio : Utrum, cum Cottam appetisset, an 
cum ipse sese conaretur occidere, lelum e manibus ereptum 
est ? et pro Vareno : Optio vobis datur, utrum velitis 
casu illo itinere Varenum usum esse an huius persuasu 
et inductu. Deinde utraque facit accusatori contraria. 

70 Interim duo ita proponuntur, ut utrumlibet electum 
idem efficiat, quale est, Philosophandum est, etiamsi 
non est philosophandum. Et illud vulgatum, Quo 
schema, si intelligitur ? quo, si non intelligitur ? Et, 
Mentietur in tormentis, qui dolorem pati potest ; mentie- 
tur, qui non potest. 

7 1 Ut sunt autem tria tempora, ita ordo rerum tribus 
momentis consertus est ; habent enim omnia initium, 
incrementum, summam, ut iurgium deinde pugna, 

1 pro Cluent. xxiii. 64. 

8 Oppius was accused of embezzling public money and 
plotting against the life of M. Aurelius Gotta, governor of 
Bithynia, where Oppius was serving as quaestor. Cicero's 
defence of him is lost. 


BOOK V. x. 68-71 

to prove the case. Take the following example 
from Cicero : l " There can be no one so hostile to 
Cluentius as not to grant me one thing : if it be a 
fact that the verdict then given was the result of 
bribery, the bribes must have proceeded either 
from Habitus or Oppianicus : if I show that they 
did not proceed from Habitus I prove that they 
proceeded from Oppianicus : if I demonstrate that 
they were given by Oppianicus, I clear Habitus." Or 69 
we may give our opponent the choice between two 
alternatives of which one must necessarily be true, 
and as a result, whichever he chooses, he will 
damage his case. Cicero does this in the pro 
Oppio : 2 " Was the weapon snatched from his hands 
when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was trying 
to commit suicide ? " and in the pro Vareno : 3 " You 
have a choice between two alternatives : either you 
must show that the choice of this route by Varenus 
was due to chance or that it was the result of this 
man's persuasion and inducement." He then shows 
that either admission tells against his opponent. 
Sometimes again, two propositions are stated of such 70 
a character that the admission of either involves 
the same conclusion, as in the sentence, " We must 
philosophise, even though we ought not," or as in 
the common dilemma, " W'hat is the use of a figure, 4 
if its meaning is clear ? And what is its use, if it 
is unintelligible ? " or, " He who is capable of endur- 
ing pain will lie if tortured, and so will he who 
cannot endure pain." 

As there are three divisions of time, so the order 71 
of events falls into three stages. For everything has a 
beginning, growth and consummation, as for instance 

* See TV. ii. 26. 4 See vn. iv. 28, ix. i. 14, ix. ii. 65. 



turn 1 caedes. Est ergo hie quoque argumentoruna 
locus invicem probaiitium. Nam et ex initiis summa 
colligitur, quale est, Non possum togam praetextam 
xperare, cum exordium pullum videam ; et contra, non 
dominationis causa Sullam arma sumpsisse, argumen- 

72 turn est dictatura deposita. Similiter ex incremento 
in utramque par tern ducitur rei ratio cum in con- 
iectura turn etiam in tractatu aequitatis, an ad 
initium summa referenda sit, id est, an ei caedes 
imputanda sit, a quo iurgium coepit. 

73 Est argumentorum locus ex siinilibus : Si continen- 
tia virtus, utique et abstinentia ; Si fidem debet tutor, et 
procurator. Hoc est ex eo genere, quod oraywyr/i' 
Graeci vocant, Cicero inductionem. Ex dissimilibus : 
Non, si laetitia bonum, et voluptas ; Non, quod mulieri, 
idem pupillo. Ex contrariis : Frugalitas bonum, luxuria 
enim malum ; Si malorum causa bellum est, erit emenda- 
tio pax ; Si veniam meretur, qui imprudens nocuit, non 

74 meretur praemium, qui imprudens profuit. Ex pugnan- 
tibus : Qui est sapiens, stultus non est. Ex consequenti- 
bus sive adiunctis : Si bonum iustitia, est recte iudi- 

1 pugna, turn, supplied by Halm. 

1 de Inv. i. 31. 

2 It is possible that Quintilian regards adinncta as = con- 
sequentia. The distinction made above is that made by 
Cicero, Top. xii. 


BOOK V. x. 71-74 

a quarrel, blows, murder. Thus arise arguments which 
lend each other mutual support ; for the conclusion 
is inferred from the beginnings, as in the following 
case : " I cannot expect a purple-striped toga, when 
I see that the beginning of the web is black " ; or the 
beginning may be inferred from the conclusion : 
for instance the fact that Sulla resigned the dictator- 
ship is an argument that Sulla did not take up 
arms with the intention of establishing a tyranny. 
Similarly from the growth of a situation we may 72 
infer either its beginning or its end, not only in 
questions of fact but as regards points of equity, 
such as whether the conclusion is referable to the 
beginning, that is, " Should the man that began the 
quarrel be regarded as guilty of the bloodshed with 
which it ended ? " 

Arguments are also drawn from similarities : " If 73 
self-control is a virtue, abstinence is also a virtue." 
" If a guardian should be required to be faithful to 
his trust, so should an agent." To this class belongs 
the type of argument called 7raywy?/ by the Greeks, 
induction by Cicero. 1 Or arguments may be drawn 
from unlikes: " It does not follow that if joy is a 
good thing, pleasure also is a good thing " : " It 
does not follow that what applies to the case of a 
woman applies also to the case of a ward." Or 
from contraries : " Frugality is a good thing, since 
luxury is an evil thing " : "If war is the cause of 
ill, peace will prove a remedy" : " If he who does 
harm unwittingly deserves pardon, he who does 
good unwittingly does not deserve a reward." Or 74 
from contradictions : " He who is wise is not a 
fool." Or from consequences necessary or prob- 
able 2 : " If justice is a good thing, we must give 




candum ; Si malum per/idia, non est fallendum. Idem 
retro. Nee sunt his dissimilia ideoque huic loco 
subiicienda, cum et ipsa naturaliter congruant : Quod 
quis non habuit, non perdidit ; Quern quis amat, sciens 
non la edit ; Quern quis heredem suum esse voluit, carum 
habuit, habet, habebit. Sed cum sint indubitata, vim 

75 habent paene signorum immutabilium. Sed haec con- 
sequentia dico, aKoXovOa ; est enim consequens sapien- 
tiae bonitas ; ilia insequentia, TrapcTrojjitva, quae postea 
facta sunt aut futura. Nee sum de nominibus anxius ; 
vocet enim, ut voluerit quisque, dum vis rerum 
ipsa manifesta sit, appareatque hoc temporis, illud 

76 esse naturae. Itaque non dubito haec quoque vocare l 
consequentia, quamvis ex prioribus dent argumentum 
ad ea quae sequuntur, quorum duas quidam species 
esse voluerunt : actionis, ut pro Oppio, Quos educere 
invitos in provinciam non potuit, eos invitos retinere qui 
potuit ? temporis, in Verrem, Si finem praeioris edicto 
adferunt Kalendae Ian., cur non initium quoque edicti 

77 nascatur a Kalendis Ian.? Quod utrumque exemplum 

1 vocare, added by Spalding. 

1 See ch. ix. 

2 Verr. I. xlii. 109. The praetor on entering office on 
Jan. 1 issued an edict announcing the principles on which his 
rulings would be given. This edict was an interpretation of 


BOOK V. x. 74-77 

right judgment " : " If breach of faith is a bad 
thing, we must not deceive." And such arguments 
may also be reversed. Similar to these are the 
following arguments, which must therefore be 
classed under this same head, since it is to this 
that they naturally belong : " A man has not lost 
what he never had " : "A man does not wittingly 
injure him whom he loves " : " If one man has ap- 
pointed another as his heir, he regarded, still regards 
and will continue to regard him with affection." 
However, such arguments, being incontrovertible, 
are of the nature of absolute indications. 1 These, 75 
however, I call consequent or aKoXovOa. ; goodness, for 
instance, is consequent on wisdom : while in regard 
to things which merely have taken place afterwards or 
will take place I use the term insequent or 7ra/37ro'/xva. 
though I do not regard the question of terminology 
as important. Give them any name you please, as 
long as the meaning is clear and it is shown that 
the one depends on time, the other on the 
nature of things. I have therefore no hesitation in 76 
calling the following forms of argument also con- 
sequential, although they argue from the past to the 
future : some however divide them into two classes, 
those concerned with action, as in the pro Oppio, 
" How could he detain against their will those 
whom he was unable to take to the province against 
their will?" and those concerned with time, as in 
the I'er rines, 2 " If the first of January puts an end 
to the authority of the praetor's edict, why should 
the commencement *of its authority not likewise 
date from the first of January ? " Both these in- 77 

the law of Rome, and held good only during the praetor's 
year of office. 

R '1 


tale est, ut idem in diversum, si retro agas, valeat. 
Consequens enim est, eos, qui inviti duci non 

78 potuerint, invitos non potuisse retineri. Ilia quo- 
que, quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationera prae- 
stantibus ducuntur (quae proprii generis videri 
quidam volunt et vocant e* TU>V Trpos aXXvjXa, Cicero 
ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus) fortiter 
consequentibus iunxerim : Si portorium Rhodiis 
locare honeslum est, et Hermocreonti conducere, et 

79 Quod discere honestum, et docere. Unde ilia non hac 
ratione dicta sed efficiens idem Domitii Afri sen- 
tentia est pulchra: Ego accusavi, vos damnastis. 
Est invicem consequens et quod ex diversis idem 
ostendit ; ut, qui mundum nasci dicit, per hoc ipsum 
et deficere significet, quia deficit omne quod nascitur. 

80 Simillima est his argumentatio, qua colligi solent 
ex iis quae faciunt ea quae efficiuiitur, aut contra,, 
quod genus a causis vocant. Haec interim neces- 
sario fiunt, interim plerumque sed non necessario. 
Nam corpus in lumine utique umbram facit, et umbra,, 

81 ubicunque est, ibi esse corpus ostendit. Alia sunt, 
ut dixi, non necessaria, vel utrinque vel ex altera 
parte : Sol colorat ; non utique, qui est coloratus, a sole 

1 Ar. Rhet. n. xxiii. 3. 

2 de Inv. i. xxx. 46. 8 ib. 47. 


BOOK V. x. 77-81 

stances are of such a nature that the argument is 
reversible. For it is a necessary consequence that 
those who could not be taken to the province" 
against their will could not be retained against their 
will. So too I feel clear that we should rank as 78 
consequential arguments those derived from facts 
which lend each other mutual support and are by 
some regarded as forming a separate kind of argu- 
ment, which they 1 call c TMV Trpos ahXrjXa, arguments 
from things mutually related, while Cicero 2 styles 
them arguments drawn from things to which the 
same line of reasoning applies ; take the following 
example 3 : " If it is honourable for the Rhodians to 
let out their harbour dues, it is honourable likewise 
for Hermocreon to take the contract," or " What it 
is honourable to learn, it is also honourable to teach." 
Such also is the fine sentence of Domitius Afer, 79 
which has the same effect, though it is not identical 
in form : " I accused, you condemned." Argu- 
ments which prove the same thing from opposites 
are also mutually consequential ; for instance, we may 
argue that he who says that the world was created 
thereby implies that it is suffering decay, since this 
is the property of all created things. 

There is another very similar form of argument, 80 
which consists in the inference of facts from their 
efficient causes or the reverse, a process known as 
argument from causes. The conclusion is sometimes 
necessary, sometimes generally without being neces- 
sarily true. For instance, a body casts a shadow in 
the light, and the shadow wherever it falls indicates 
the presence of a body. There are other conclusions 81 
which, as I have said, are not necessary, whether as 
regards both cause and effect or only one of the two. 
For instance, " the sun colours the skin, but not 



esL Iter pulverulentum facit ; sad neque oinne iter pul- 
verem movet nee, quisquis est pulverulentus , ex itmere 

82 est. Quae utique fiunt, talia sunt : Si sapientia 
bonum virum facit, bonus vir est utique sapiens; itemque 
Boni est honeste facere, mail turpiter ; et Qui honesle 
faciunt, boni, qui turpiter, mail iudicantur ; recte. At, 
Exercitatio plerumque robustum corpus facit ; sed non 
quisquis est robustus exercitalus, nee quisquis exercitatus 
robustus ; nee, quia forlitudo praestat ne mortem time- 
amus, quisquis mortem non timuerit, vir fortis erit existi- 
mandus ; nee, si capitis dolorem facit, inutilis hominibus 

83 sol est. Haec ad hortativum maxime genus perti- 
nent : Virtus facit laudem, sequenda igitur ; at voluptas 
infamiam, fugienda igitur. Recte autem monemur, 
causas non utique ab ultimo esse repetendas, ut 

84 Medea, Vtinam ne in nemore Pelio ; quasi vero id earn 
fecerit miseram aut nocentem, quod illic ceciderint 
abiegnae ad terrain trabes ; et Philocteta Paridi, Si 
impar esses tiki, ego nunc non essem miser ; quo modo 

1 The opening of Ennius' translation of the Medea of 

2 From the Philoctetes of Accius, Ribbeck fr. 178. 


BOOK V. x. 81-84 

everyone that is coloured receives that colour from 
the sun ; a journey makes the traveller dusty, but 
every journey does not produce dust, nor is everyone 
that is dusty just come from a journey." As examples 82 
of necessary conclusions on the other hand I may 
cite the following : " If wisdom makes a man good, 
a good man must needs be wise " ; and again, " It is 
the part of a good man to act honourably, of a bad 
man to act dishonourably," or "Those who act 
honourably are considered good, those who act dis- 
honourably are considered bad men." In these 
cases the conclusion is correct. On the other hand, 
" though exercise generally makes the body robust, 
not everyone who is robust is given to exercise, nor 
is everyone that is addicted to exercise robust. Nor 
again, because courage prevents our fearing death, is 
every man who has no fear of death to be regarded 
as a brave man ; nor is the sun useless to man 
because it sometimes gives him^a headache." Argu- 83 
ments such as the following belong in the main to 
the hortative department of oratory: " Virtue 
brings renown, therefore it should be pursued ; but 
the pursuit of pleasure brings ill-repute, therefore 
it should be shunned." But the warning that we 
should not necessarily search for the originating 
cause is just : an example of such error is provided 
by the speech of Medea l beginning 

" Ah ! would that never there in Pelion's grove," 
as though her misery or guilt were due to the fact 84 
that there 

" The beams of fir had fallen to the ground " ; 
or I might cite the words addressed by Philoctetes 
to Paris, 2 

" Hadst thou been other than thou art, then I 
Had ne'er been plunged in woe." 



pervenire quolibet retro causas legentibus licet. 

85 Illud his adiicere ridiculum putarem, nisi eo Cicero 
uteretur, quod coniugatum vocant, lit eos, qui rem 
iustam faciunt, iuste facere (quod certe non eget 
probatione), quod compascuum est, compascere licere. 

86 Quidam haec, quae vel ex causis vel ex efficientibus 
diximus, alieno nomine vocant eK/?acras id est exitus. 
Nam nee hie aliud tractatur quam quid ex quoque 

Adposita vel comparativa dicuntur, quae minora 
ex maioribus, maiora ex minoribus, paria ex paribus 

87 probant. Confirmatur coniectura ex maiore, Si quis 
sacrilegium facit, f octet et furtum ; ex minore, Qui 
facile ac palam mentitur, peierabit ; ex pari, Qui ob 
rem iudicandam pecuniam accepit, et ob dicendum fahum 

88 testimonium accipiet. luris confirmatio huiusmodi est : 
ex maiore, Si adulterum occidcre licet, et loris caedere ; 
ex minore, Si furem nocturnum occidere licet, quid la- 
tronem ? ex pari, Quae poena adversus interfectorem 
patris iusta est, eadcm adversas matrix ; quorum 

89 omnium tractatus versatur in syllogismis. Ilia magis 

1 Top. iii. 12. 2 See m. vi. 15, 43, 88. 

BOOK V. x. 84-89 

By tracing hack causes on lines such as these we 
may arrive anywhere. But for the fact that Cicero 1 5 
has done so, I should regard it as absurd to add to 
these what is styled the conjugate argument, such as 
" Those who perform a just act, act justly/' a self- 
evident fact requiring no proof; or again, " Every 
man has a common right to send his cattle to graze 
in a common pasture." Some call these arguments 86 
derived from causes or efficients by the Greek name 
fK/3do-(is, that is, results ; for in such cases the only 
point considered is how one thing results from 

Those arguments which prove the lesser from the 
greater or the greater from the less or equals from 
equals are styled apposite or comparative, A con- 87 
jecture as to a fact is confirmed by argument from 
something greater in the following sentence : " If 
a man commit sacrilege, he will also commit theft " ; 
from something less, in a sentence such as " He who 
lies easily and openly will commit perjury " ; from 
something equal in a. sentence such as " He who 
has taken a bribe to give a false verdict will take a 
bribe to give false witness." Points of law may be 88 
proved in a similar manner ; from something greater, 
as in the sentence " If it is lawful to kill an 
adulterer, it is lawful to scourge him " ; from some- 
thing less, " If it is lawful to kill a man attempting 
theft by night, how much more lawful is it to kill 
one who attempts robbery with violence " ; from 
something equal, " The penalty which is just in the 
case of parricide is also just in the case of matri- 
cide." In all these cases we follow the syllogistic 
method. 2 The following type of argument on the 89 
other hand is more serviceable in questions turning 



fmitionibus aut qualitatibus prosunt, Si robur corpori- 
bus bonum est, non minus sanitas ; Si furtum scelus, ma gift 
sacrilegium ; Si abstinentia virtus, et continentia ; Si 
mundus providentia regilur, administranda respublica ; 
Si domus aedificari sine ratione non potest, quid nrhs 
universa ? Si agenda est 1 navalium cura, el armorum. 

90 Ac mihi quidem sufficeret hoc genus, sed in species 
secatur. Nam ex pluribus ad unum et ex uno ad 
plura (unde est Quod semel, et saepius], et ex parte 
ad totum et ex genere ad speciem, et ex eo quod 
continet ad id quod continetur, aut ex difficilioribus 
ad faciliora et ex longe positis ad propiora et ad 
omnia, quae contra haec sunt, eadem ratione argu- 

91 menta ducuntur. Sunt enim et haec maiora et 
minora aut certe vim similem obtinent, quae si 
persequamur, nullus erit ea concidendi modus. 
Infinita est enim rerura comparatio, iucundiora, 
graviora, magis necessaria-,, honestiora, utiliora. 
Sed mittamus plura, ne in earn ipsam, quam vito, 

92 loquacitatem incidam. Exemplorum quoque ad haec 
infinitus est numerus, sed paucissima attingam. Ex 
maiore pro Caecina, Quod exercitus armatos movel, id 
advocationem togatorum non videbitur ?novisse ? Ex fa- 

1 urbs universa ? si agenda est, Radermacher : agenda si, 
B : agendas, A. 

1 See iii. 6 jxissim. * xv. 43, 


BOOK V. x. 89-92 

on definition or quality. 1 " If strength is good for 
the body, health is no less good." " If theft is a 
crime, sacrilege is a greater crime." " If abstinence 
is a virtue, so is self-control." " If the world is 
governed by providence, the state also requires a 
government." " If a house cannot be built without 
a plan, what of a whole city ? " " If naval stores 
require careful supervision, so also do arms." I am 90 
content to treat this type of argument as a genus 
without going further ; others however divide it into 
species. For we may argue from several things to 
one or from one thing to several ; hence arguments 
such as "What has happened once may happen 
often." We may also argue from a part to a whole, 
from genus to species, from that which contains to 
that which is contained, from the difficult to the 
easy, from the remote to the near, and similarly 
from the opposite^ of all these to their opposites. 
Now all these arguments deal with the greater or 91 
the less or else with things that are equal, and if we 
follow up such fine distinctions, there will be no 
limit to our division into species. For the com- 
parison of things is infinite ; things may be more 
pleasant, more serious, more necessary, more honour- 
able, more useful. I say no more for fear of falling 
into that very garrulity which I deprecate. The 92 
number of examples of these arguments which I 
might quote is likewise infinite, but I will only deal 
with a very few. As an example of argument from 
something greater take the following example from 
the pro Caecina * : " Shall we suppose that that 
which alarms whole armies caused no alarm to a 
peaceful company of lawyers ? " As an instance of 
argument from something easier, take this passage 



ciliorein Clodium et Curionem, Ac vide, an facile Jieri 

93 in potiieris, cum is factus non sit, cui lit concessisti. Ex 
difficiliore, Fide quaeso, Tubero, iit t qui de meo facto 
non dubitem, de Ligarii audeam dicere. Et ibi, An 
sperandi Ligario causa non sit, cum mihi apud te locus 
sit etiam pro altero deprecandi ? Ex minore pro Caecina, 
Itane scire esse armatos sat est } ut vim factam probes ; 

94 in manus eorum incidere non est satis ? Ergo, ut breviter 
contraham summam, ducuntur argumenta a persoms, 
causis, locis, tempore (cuius tres partes diximus, 
praecedens, coniunctum, insequens), facultatibus 
(quibus instrumentum subiecimus), modo (id est, ut 
quidque sit factum), finitione, g^pere,, specie, diffe- 
rentibus, propriis, remotione, divisione, initio, incre- 
mentis, summa, similibus, dissimilibus, pugnantibus, 
consequentibus, efficientibus, effectis, eventis, com- 
paratione, quae in plures diducitur species. 

95 Illud adiiciendum videtur, duci argumenta non a 
confessis tantum sed etiam a fictione, quod Graeci 
KaO' vTro^eortv vocant ; et quidem ex omnibus iisdem 

1 A lost speech of Cicero, to which reference is made in 
in. vii. 2. 

2 pro Lig. iii. 8 and x. 31. Cicero's point is that he has 
been a much more bitter opponent of Caesar than Ligarius, 
and yet he has been pardoned while Ligarius has not. 

3 xvi. 45. Caecina had attempted to take possession of 
lands left him by will, but was driven off by armed force. 
Cicero has just pointed out that there were precedents for 

BOOK V. x. 92-95 

from the speech against Clodius and Curio 1 : " Con- 
sider whether it would have been easy for you to 
secure the praetorship, when he in whose favour you 
withdrew failed to secure election ? " The fol- 93 
lowing 2 provides an example of argument from 
something more difficult : " I beg you, Tubero, to 
remark that I, who do not hesitate to speak of my 
own deed, venture to speak of that performed by 
Ligarius " ; and again, "Has not Ligarius reason 
for hope, when I am permitted to intercede with 
you for another ? " For an argument drawn from 
something less take this passage from the pro 
Caecina 3 : " Really ! Is the knowledge that the 
men were armed sufficient to prove that violence 
was offered, and the fact that he fell into their 
hands insufficient ? " Well, then, to give a brief 94 
summary of the whole question, arguments are 
drawn from persons, causes, place and time (which 
latter we have divided into preceding, contemporary 
and subsequent), from resources (under which we 
include instruments), from manner (that is, how a 
thing has been done), from definition, genus, species, 
difference, property, elimination, division, begin- 
nings, increas^, consummation, likes, unlikes, con- 
tradictions, consequents, efficients, effects, results, 
and comparison, which is subdivided into several 

I think I should also add that arguments are 95 
drawn riot merely from admitted facts, but from 
fictitious suppositions, which the Greeks style KaO' 
vTroOe&iv, and that this latter type of argument falls 
into all the same divisions as those which I have 

regarding the mere sight of armed men in occupation of the 
property claimed as sufficient proof of violence. 



locis, quibus superiora, quia totidem species esse pos- 

96 sunt fictae quot verae. Nam fingere hoc loco hoc est 
proponere aliquid, quod, si verum sit, aut solvat 
quaestionem aut adiuvet ; deinde id, de quo quae- 
rjtur, facere illi simile. Id quo facilius accipiant 
iuvenes nondum scholam egressi, primo familiaribus 

97 magis ei aetati exemplis ostendam. Lex : Qui paren- 
tes non aluerit, vinciatur. Non alit aliquis, et vincula 
nihilominus recusat. Utitur fictione, si miles, si in- 
fans sit, si reipublicae causa absit. Et ilia contra 
optionem fortium, si tyrannidem petas, si templorum 

98 eversionem. Plurimum ea res virium habet contra 
scriptum. Utitur his Cicero pro Caecina, unde iu 
aut familia aut procurator tuus. Si me villicus tuus 
solus deiecisset Si vero ne habeas quidem servum prae- 
ter eum, qui me deiecerit, et alia in eodem libro plurima. 

99 Verum eadem fictio valet et ad qualitates : Si Catilina 

1 cp. vn. v. 4. 

2 xix. 55. Quintiliari merely quotes fragments of Cicero's 
arguments. The sense of the passages omitted is supplied in 
brackets. The interdict of the praetor had ordered Caecina's 
restoration. His adversary is represented by Cicero as 
attempting to evade compliance by verbal quibbles. 

8 pro Mur. xxxix. 83. Cicero argues that Murena's 
election as consul is necessary to save the state from Catiline. 
If the jury now condemn him, they will be doing exactly 
what Catiline and his accomplices, now in arms in Etruria, 
would do if they could try him. 


BOOK V. x. 95-99 

mentioned above, since there may be as many 
species of fictitious arguments as there are of true 
arguments. When I speak of fictitious arguments 90 
I mean the proposition of something which, if true, 
would either solve a problem or contribute to its 
solution, and secondly the demonstration of the 
similarity of our hypothesis to the case under con- 
sideration. To make this the more readily intelli- 
gible to youths who have not yet left school, I will 
first of all illustrate it by examples of a kind familiar 
to the young. There is a law to the effect that (i the 97 
man who refuses to support his parents is liable to 
imprisonment." A certain man fails to support his 
parents and none the less objects to going to prison. 
He advances the hypothesis that he would be exempt 
from such a penalty if he were a soldier, an infant, 
or if he were absent from home on the service of 
the state. Again in the case where a hero is allowed 
to choose his reward 1 we might introduce the 
hypotheses of his desiring to make himself a tyrant 
or to overthrow the temples of the gods. Such 98 
arguments are specially useful when we are arguing 
against the letter of the law, and are thus employed 
by Cicero in the pro Caecina 2 : " [The interdict con- 
tains the words,] ( whence you or your household or 
your agent had driven him.' If your steward alone 
had driven me out, [it would not, I suppose, be your 
household but a member of your household that had 
driven me out]. ... If indeed you owned no slave 
except the one who drove me out, [you would cry, 
' If I possess a household at all, I admit that my 
household drove you out ']." Many other examples 
might be quoted from the same work. But fictitious 99 
suppositions are also exceedingly useful when we 
are concerned with the quality of an act 3 : " If 



cum suo consilio nefariorum hommum, quos secum edu.iit , 
hac de re posset iudicare, condemnaret L. - Murenam ; et 
ad amplificationem : Si hoc tibi inter cenam in illis im- 
manibus poculis tuis acddisset. Sic et, Si respublica 
vocem haberet. 

100 Has fere sedes accepimus })robationum in univer- 
sum, quas iieque generatim tradere sat est, cum ex 
qualibet earum innumerabilis argumentorum copia 
oriatur, neque per singulas species exsequi patitur 
natura rerum, quod qui sunt facere conati, duo pari- 
ter subierunt incommoda, ut et nimium dicerent nee 

101 tamen totum. Inde plurimi, cum in hos inexpli- 
cabiles laqueos inciderunt, omnem, etiam quern ex 
ingenio suo poterant habere, conatum velut adstricti 
certis legum vinculis perdiderunt, et magistrum 

102 respicientes naturam ducem sequi desierunt. Nam 
ut per se noil sufficiet scire, omnes probatioaes aut a 
personis aut a rebus peti, quia utrumque in plura 
dividitur^ ita ex antecedentibus et iunctis et insequen- 
tibus trahenda esse argumenta qui acceperit, num 
protinus in hoc sit instructus ut, quid in quaque 

103 causa ducendum sit ex his, sciat? praesertim, cum 
plurimae probationes in ipso causarum complexu 

1 Phil. ii. xxv. 63. " This " = vomiting. Cicero con- 
tinues " who would not have thought it disgraceful." 

2 Probably an allusion to Cat. i. 7, where Cicero makes 
the state reproach Catiline for his conduct. 

2 5 6 

BOOK V. x. 99-103 

Catiline could try this case assisted by a jury com- 
posed of those scoundrels whom he led out with him 
he would condemn Lucius Murena." It is useful 
also for amplification l : " If this had happened to you 
during dinner in the midst of your deep potations " ; 
or again, 2 " If the state could speak." 

Such in the main are the usual topics of proof 100 
as specified by teachers of rhetoric, but it is not 
sufficient to classify them generically in our instruc- 
tions, since from each of them there arises an infinite 
number of arguments, while it is in the very nature 
of things impossible to deal with all their individual 
species. Those who have attempted to perform 
this latter task have exposed themselves in equal 
degree to two disadvantages, saying too much and 
yet failing to cover the whole ground. Consequently 101 
the majority of students, finding themselves lost in 
an inextricable maze, have abandoned all individual 
effort, including even that which their own wits 
might have placed within their power, as though 
they were fettered by certain rigid laws, and keep- 
ing their eyes fixed upon their master have ceased 
to follow the guidance of nature. But as it is not 102 
in itself sufficient to know that all proofs are draw r n 
either from persons or things, because each of these 
groups is subdivided into a number of different heads 
so he who has learned that arguments must be 
drawn from antecedent, contemporary or subse- 
quent facts will not be sufficiently instructed in 
the knowledge of the method of handling arguments 
to understand what arguments are to be drawn from 
the circumstances of each particular case ; especially 103 
as the majority of proofs are to be found in the 
special circumstances of individual cases and have 




reperiantur, ita ut sint cum alia lite nulla communes, 
eaeque sint et. potentissimae et mininie obviae, quia 
communia ex praeceptis accepimus, propria inveni- 

104 eiida sunt. Hoc genus argumentorum sane dicamus 
ex circumstantia, quia Trepitrrao-iv dicere aliter non 
possumus, vel ex iis quae cuiusque causae propria 
sunt : ut in illo adultero sacerdote, qui lege, qua 
unius servandi potestatem habebat, se ipse servare 
voluit, proprium controversiae est dicere, Non unum 
nocentem servabas, qnia te dimisso adulteram occidere 
non licebat. Hoc enim argumentum lex facit, quae 

105 prohibet adulteram sine adultero occidere. Et ilia, 
in qua lata lex est, ut argentarii dimidium ex eo 
quod debebant solverent, creditum suum totum exi- 
gerent. Argentarius ab argentario solidum petit. 
Proprium ex materia est argumentum creditoris, 
idcirco adiectum esse in lege, ut argentarius totum 
exigeret ; adversus alios enim non opus fuisse lege, 
cum omnes praeterquam ab argeiitariis totum exi- 

106 gendi ius haberent. Cum multa autem novaiitur in 
omni genere materiae turn praecipue in iis quaestio- 

1 This law and those which follow are imaginary laws 
invented for the purposes of the schools of rhetoric. 

2 The argument is far from clear. The case assumes that 
by a species of moratorium a banker may be released from 
payment of his debts in full to ordinary creditors. This 
moratorium does not however apparently apply to debts 
contracted between banker and banker. 


BOOK V. x. 103-106 

no connexion with any other dispute, and therefore 
while they are the strongest, are also the least 
obvious, since, whereas we derive what is common 
to all cases from general rules, we have to discover 
for ourselves whatever is peculiar to the case which 
we have in hand. This type of argument may 104 
reasonably be described as drawn from circum- 
stances, there being no other word to express the 
Greek Trepurrao-is, or from those things which are 
peculiar to any given case. For instance, in the 
case of the priest who having committed adultery 
desired to save his onm life by means of the law 1 
which gave him the power of saving one life, the 
appropriate argument to employ against him would 
run as follows : " You would save more than one 
guilty person, since, if you were discharged, it would 
not be lawful to put the adulteress to death." For 
such an argument follows from the law forbidding 
the execution of the adulteress apart from the 
adulterer. Again, take the case falling under the 105 
law which lays down that bankers may pay only 
half of what they owe, while permitted to recover 
the whole of what they are owed. One banker 
requires payment of the whole sum owed him by 
another banker. The appropriate argument supplied 
by the subject to the creditor is that there was 
special reason for the insertion of the clause 2 
sanctioning the recovery of the whole of a debt 
by a banker, since there was no need of such a law 
as against others, inasmuch as all have the right to 

I recover the whole of a debt from any save a banker. 
But while some fresh considerations are bound to 106 
present themselves in every kind of subject, this is 
more especially the case in questions turning on 


s 2 


nibus, quae scripto constant, quia vocuin est in sin- 
gulis ambiguitas frequens et adhuc in coniunctis 

107 magis. Et haec ipsa plurium legum aliorumve scrip- 
torum vel congruentium vel repugnantium complexu 
varientur necesse est, cum res rei aut ius iuris quasi 
signum est. Non debut tibi pecuniam ; nunquam me 
appellastiy usuram non accepisti, ultro a me mutuatus es. 
Lex est, Qui patri proditionis reo non adfuerit, exheres 
sit. Negat filius, 1 nisi si pater absolutus sit. Quid 
signi ? Lex altera, Proditionis damnatus cum advocate 

108 exulet. Cicero pro Cluentio Publium Popilium et 
Tiberium Guttam dicit non iudicii corrupt! sed am- 
bitus esse damnatos. Quid signi ? quod accusatores 
eorum, qui erant ipsi ambitus damnati, e lege sint 

109 post hanc victoriam restituti. Nee minus in hoc 
curae debet adhiberi, quid proponendum quam quo- 
modo sit quod proposuerimus probandum. Hie 
immo vis inventionis, si non maior, certe prior. 
Nam ut tela supervacua sunt nescienti, quid petat, 
sic argumenta, nisi provideris ctii rei adhibenda sint. 

110 Hoc est, quod comprehendi arte non possit. Ideo- 

1 filius, Speeding : fit, MSS. 

1 xxxvi. 98. The lex luliade ambitu contained a provision 
that the penalty (loss of civil rights) incurred by convic- 
tion for ambitus should be annulled if the condemned man 
could secure the conviction of another person for the same 


BOOK V. x. 106-110 

the letter of the law, since not merely individual 
words, but still more whole phrases are frequently 
ambiguous. And these considerations must vary 107 
according to the complexity of laws and other 
documents, whether they are in agreement or con- 
tradictory, since fact throws light on fact and law on 
law as in the following argument : " I owed you no 
money : you never summoned me for debt, you took 
no interest from me, nay, you actually borrowed 
money from me." It is laid down by law that he 
who refuses to defend his father when accused* of 
treason thereby loses his right to inherit. A son 
denies that he is liable to this penalty unless his 
father is acquitted. How does he support this con- 
tention ? There is another law to the effect that a 
man found guilty of treason shall be banished and 
his advocate with him. Cicero in the pro Cluentio l 108 
says that Publius Popilius and Tiberius Gutta were 
not condemned for receiving bribes to give a false 
verdict, but for attempting to bribe the jury. What 
is his argument in support of this view ? That 
their accusers, who were themselves found guilty of 
bribing the jury, were restored in accordance with 
law after winning their case. But the consideration 109 
as to what argument should be put forward requires 
no less care than the consideration of the manner in 
which we are to prove that which we have put 
forward. Indeed in this connexion invention, if 
not the most important, is certainly the first con- 
sideration. For, just as weapons are superfluous 
for one who does not know what his target is, so 
too arguments are useless, unless you see in advance 
to what they are to be applied. This is a task for 
which no formal rules can be laid down Conse- 110 



que, cum plures eadem didicerint, generibus argu- 
mentorum similibus utentur ; alius alio plura, quibus 
utatur, inveniet. Sit exempli gratia proposita con- 
troversia, quae communes minime cum aliis quaes- 

111 tiones habet: Cum Tkebas evertisset Alexander, invenit 
tabulas, quibus centum talenta mutua Thessalis dedisse 
Thebanos continebatur. Has, quid erat usus commilitio 
Thessalorum, donavit his ultra; postea restituti a Cas- 
sandro Thebani reposcunt Thessalos. Apud Amphi- 
ctyonas agitur. Centum talenta et credidisse eos 

112 constat et lion recepisse. Lis omnis ex eo, quod 
Alexander ea Thessalis donasse dicitur, pendet. 
Constat illud quoque, iiori esse iis ab Alexandro 
pecuniam datam ; quaeritur ergo, an proinde sit, 

113 quod datum est, ac si pecuniam dederit ? Quid pro- 
derunt argumentorum loci, nisi haec prius videro, 
nihil eum egisse donando, non potuisse donare, non 
donasse ? Et prima quidem actio facilis ac favora- 
bilis repetentium iure quod vi sit ablatum ; sed hinc 
aspera et vehemens quaestio exoritur de iure belli, 
dicentibus Thessalis, hoc regna, populos, fines gen- 

114 tium atque urbium contineri. Inveniendum contra 

BOOK V. x. 110-114 

quently, though a number of orators, who have 
studied the same rules, will use similar kinds of 
arguments, one will discover a greater number of 
arguments to suit his case than another. Let us 
take as an example a controversial theme involving 
problems that have little in common with other 
cases. "When Alexander destroyed Thebes, he 111 
found documents showing that the Thebans had 
lent'a hundred talents to the Thessalians. These 
documents he presented to the Thessalians as a 
reward for tile assistance they had given him in the 
campaign. Subsequently the Thebans, after the 
restoration of their city by Cassander, demanded 
that the Thessalians should repay the money." The 
case is tried before the Amphictyonic council. It is 
admitted that the Thebans lent the money and 
were not repaid. The whole dispute turns on the 112 
allegation that Alexander had excused the Thessa- 
lians from payment of the debt. It is also admitted 
that the Thessalians had received no money from 
Alexander. The question is therefore whether his 
gift is equivalent to his having given them money. 
What use will formal topics of argument be in such 113 
a case, unless I first convince myself that the gift of 
Alexander made no difference, that he had not the 
power to make it, and that he did not make it ? 
The opening of the Thebans' plea presents no 
difficulty and is likely to win the approval of the 
judges, since they are seeking to recover by right 
what was taken from them by force. But out of this 
point arises a violent controversy as to the right of 
war, since the Thessalians urge that kingdoms and 
peoples and the frontiers of nations and cities 
depend upon these rights. To meet this argument 114 



est, quo distet haec causa a ceteris, quae in potesta- 
tem victoris venirent; nee circa probationem res 
haeret, sed circa propositionem. Dicamus inprimis : 
in eo, quod in iudicium deduci potest, nihil valere 
ius belli nee armis erepta nisi armis posse retineri ; 
itaque, ubi ilia valeant, non esse iudicem ; ubi iudex 

115 sit, ilia nihil valere. Hoc inveniendum est, ut adhi- 
beri possit argumentum : ideo captivos, si in patriam 
suam redierint, liberos esse, quia bello parta nonnisi 
eadem vi possideantur. Proprium est et illud causae, 
quod Amphictyones iudicant (ut alia apud centum- 
viros, alia apud privatum iudicem in iisdem quaes- 

110 tionibus ratio); turn secundo gradu, non potuisse 
donari a victore ius, quia id deraum sit eius, quod 
teneat ; ius, quod sit incorporate, adprehendi manu 
non posse. Hoc reperire est difficilius quam, cum 
inveneris, argumeutis adiuvare, ut alia sit condicio 
heredis, alia victoris, quia ad ilium ius, ad hunc res 

117 transeat. Proprium deinde materiae, ius public! 

1 cp. 118. The Amphictyonic Council of Delphi in the 
fourth century B.C. had come to be an international council, 
in which the great majority of the states of Greece were 

2 i.e.. a, right can only be transferred by the possessor, not 
by force or seizure. 


BOOK V. x. 114-117 

it is necessary to discover in what respect this case 
differs from others which are concerned with pro- 
perty that has fallen into the hands of the victor : 
the difficulty moreover lies not so much in the 
proof as in the way it should be put forward. We 
may begin by stating that the rights of war do not 
hold good in any matter which can be brought 
before a court of justice, and that what is taken 
by force of arms can only be retained by force of 
arms, and consequently, wherever the rights of war 
hold good, there is no room for the functions of 
a judge, while on the contrary where the functions 
of the judge come into play, the rights of war cease 
to have any force. The reason why it is necessary 115 
to discover this principle is to enable us to bring 
the following argument into play : that prisoners of 
war are free on returning to their native land just 
because the gains of war cannot be retained except 
by the exercise of the same violence by which they 
were acquired. Another peculiar feature of the case 
is that it is tried before the Amphictyonic council, 1 
and you will remember that we have to employ 
different methods in pleading a case before the 
centumviral court and before an arbitrator, though 
the problems of the cases may be identical. Secondly 116 
we may urge that the right to refuse payment could 
not have been conferred by the victor because he 
possesses only what he holds, but a right, being 
incorporeal, cannot be grasped by the hand. 2 It is 
more difficult to discover this principle than, once 
discovered, to defend it with arguments such as 
that the position of an heir'and a conqueror are 
fundamentally different, since right passes to the 
one and property to the other. It is further an 117 



credit! transire ad victorem non potuisse, quia, quod 
populus crediderit, omnibus debeatur, et, quamdiu 
quilibet unus superfuerit, esse eum totius summae 
creditorem, Thebanos autem non omnes in Alex- 

118 andri manu fuisse. Hoc non extrinsecus probatur, 
quae- vis est argument!, sed ipsum per se valet. 
Tertii loci pars prior magis vulgaris, non in tabulis 
esse ius ; itaque multis argumentis defendi potest. 
Mens quoque Alexandri duci debet in dubium, hono- 
rarit eos an deceperit. Illud iam rursus proprium 
materiae et velut novae controversiae, quia restitu- 
tione recepisse ius, etiamsi quod amiserint, Thebani 
videntur. Hie et, quid Cassander velit, quaeritur ; 
sed vel potentissima apud Amphictyonas aequi trac- 
tatio est. 

119 Haec 11011 idcirco dico, quod inutilem horum loco- 
rum, ex quibus argumenta ducuntur, cognitionem 
putem, alioqui nee tradidissem ; sed ne se, qui cog- 
no verint ista, si cetera negligant, perfectos protinus 
atque consummates putent et, nisi in ceteris, quae 

1 See v. x. 20. 

BOOK V. x. 117-119 

argument peculiar to the subject matter of the case 
that the right over a public debt could not have 
passed to the victor, because the repayment of a 
sum of money lent by a whole people is due to them 
all, and as long as any single one of them survives, 
he is creditor for the whole amount : but the 
Thebans were never all of them to a man in Alex- 
ander's power. The force of this argument resides 118 
in the fact that it is not based on any external 
support, but holds good in itself. Proceeding to 
the third line of argument we may note that the 
first portion of it is of a more ordinary type, namely 
that the right to repayment is not based on the 
actual document, a plea which can be supported 
by many arguments. Doubt may also be thrown on 
Alexander's purpose : did he intend to honour them 
or to trick them? Another argument peculiar to 
the subject (indeed it practically introduces a new 
discussion) is that the Thebans may be regarded as 
having in virtue of their restoration recovered the 
right even though it be admitted that they had lost 
it. Again Cassander's purpose may be discussed, 
but, as the case is being pleaded before the Amphi- 
ctyonic council, we shall find that the most powerful 
plea that can be urged is that of equity. 

I make these remarks, not because I think that a 119 
knowledge of the " places " l from which arguments 
may be derived is useless (had I thought so, I 
should have passed them by) but to prevent those 
who have learnt these rules from neglecting 
other considerations and regarding themselves as 
having a perfect and absolute knowledge of the 
whole subject, and to make them realise that, 
unless they acquire a thorough knowledge of the 



mox praecipienda sunt, elaboraverint, mutam quan- 

120 dam scientiam consecutos intelligant. Neque enim 
artibus editis factum est, ut argumenta inveniremus, 
sed dicta sunt omnia, antequam praeciperentur, mox 
ea scriptores observata et collecta ediderunt. Cuius 
rei probatio est, quod exemplis eomm veteribus 
utuntur et ab oratoribus ilia repetunt, ipsi nullum 

121 novum et quod dictum non sit inveniunt. Artifices 
ergo illi qui dixerunt ; sed habenda his quoque 
gratia est, per quos labor nobis est detractus. Nam, 
quae priores beneficio ingenii singula invenerunt, 
nobis et non sunt requirenda et notata l sunt omnia. 
Sed non magis hoc sat est quam palaestram didi- 
cisse, nisi corpus exercitatione, continentia, cibis, 
ante omnia natura iuvatur, sicut contra ne ilia qui- 

122 dem satis sine arte profuerint. Illud quoque studiosi 
eloquentiae cogitent, neque omnibus in causis, quae 
demonstravimus, cuncta posse reperiri ; neque, cum 
proposita fuerit materia dicendi, scrutanda singula 
et velut ostiatim pulsandum, 2 ut sciant, an ad proban- 
dum id, quod intendimus, forte respondeant, nisi 

123 cum discunt et adhuc usu carent. Infinitam enim 
faciat ista res dicendi tarditatem, si semper necesse 

1 notata, Guelferbytanus : notat, B : notant, A. 

2 pulsandum, Francius : pulsanda, MSS. 


x. 119-123 

remaining points which I am about to discuss, they 
will be the possessors of what I can only call a dumb 
science. For the discovery of arguments was not 120 
the result of the publication of text-books, but every 
kind of argument was put forward before any rules 
were laid down, and it was only later that writers 
of rhetoric noted them and collected them for pub- 
lication. A proof of this is the fact that the ex- 
amples which they use are old and quoted from the 
orators, while they themselves discover nothing new 
or that has not been said before. The creators of 121 
the art were therefore the orators, though we owe 
a debt of gratitude also to those who have given us 
a short cut to knowledge. For thanks to them the 
arguments discovered by the genius of earlier orators 
have not got to be hunted out and noted down in 
detail. But this does not suffice to make an orator 
any more than it suffices to learn the art of gymnastic 
in school : the body must be assisted by continual 
practice, self control, diet and above all by nature ; 
on the other hand none of these are sufficient in 
themselves without the aid of art. I would also 122 
have students of oratory consider that all the forms 
of argument which I have just set forth cannot be 
found in every case, and that when the subject on 
which we have to speak has been propounded, it is 
no use considering each separate type of argument 
and knocking at the door of each with a view to 
discovering whether they may chance to serve to 
prove our point, except while we are in the position 
of mere learners without any knowledge of actual 
practice. Such a proceeding merely retards the 123 
process of speaking to an incalculable extent, if 
it is always necessary for us to try each single 



sit, ut temptantes unumquodque eorum, quod sit 
aptum atque conveniens, experiendo noscamus ; ne- 
scio an etiam impedimento futura sint, nisi et animi 
quaedam ingenita natura et studio exercitata velo- 
citas recta nos ad ea, quae conveniunt causae, ferant. 

124 Nam, ut cantus vocis plurimum iuvat sociata nervo- 
rum concordia, si tamen tardior manus nisi inspectis 
demensisque singulis, quibus quaeque vox fidibus 
iungenda sit, dubitet, potius fuerit esse contentum 
eo, quod simplex canendi natura tulerit, ita huius- 
modi praeceptis debet quidem aptata esse et citharae 

125 modo intenta ratio doctrinae ; sed hoc exercitatione 
multa consequendum, ut, quemadmodum illorum 
artificum, etiamsi alio spectant, manus tamen ipsa con- 
suetudine ad graves, acutos, medios nervorum l sonos 
fertur, sic oratoris cognitionem nihil moretur haec 
varietas argumentorum et copia, sed quasi offerat se 
et occurrat, et, ut litterae syllabaeque scribentium 
cogitationem non exigunt, sic rationem sponte qua- 
darn sequantur. 

XL Tertium genus ex iis, quae extrinsecus addu- 
cuntur in causam, Graeci vocant TrapaSety/xa, quo 
nomine et generaliter usi sunt in omni similium 
adpositione et specialiter in iis, quae rerum gestarum 
auctoritate nituntur. Nostri fere similitudinem vo- 
cari maluerunt, quod ab illis TrapafioXr) dicitur, alterum 
exemplum, quanquam et hoc simile est et illud 

1 nervorum, Oertz : horum, MSS. 

BOOK V. x. i23-xi. i 

argument and thus learn by experiment what is apt 
and suitable to our case. In fact I am not sure that 
it will not be an actual obstacle to progress unless 
a certain innate penetration and a power of rapid 
divination seconded by study lead us straight to the 
arguments which suit our case. For just as the 124 
melody of the voice is most pleasing when accom- 
panied by the lyre, yet if the musician's hand be 
slow and, unless he first look at the strings and 
take their measure, hesitate as to which strings 
match the several notes of the voice, it would 
be better that he should content himself with the 
natural music of the voice unaccompanied by any 
instrument ; even so our theory of speaking must be 
adapted and, like the lyre, attuned to such rules as 
these. But it is only by constant practice that we 125 
can secure that, just as the hands of the musician, 
even though his eyes be turned elsewhere, produce 
bass, treble or intermediate notes by force of habit, 
so the thought of the orator should suffer no delay 
owing to the variety and number of possible argu- 
ments, but that the latter should present themselves 
uncalled and, just as letters and syllables require no 
thought on the part of a writer, so arguments should 
spontaneously follow the thought of the orator. _ 

XI. The third kind of proof, which is drawn into 
the service of the case from without, is styled a 
TrapaScty/xa by the Greeks, who apply the term to all 
comparisons of like with like, but more especially 
to historical parallels. Roman writers have for the 
most part preferred to give the name of comparison 
to that which the Greeks style Trapa/JoAr/, while they 
translate Trapaoeiy/xa by example, although this 
latter involves comparison, while the former is of 



2 exemplum. Nos, quo facilius propositum explicemus, 
utrumque TrapaSety/xa esse credamus, et ipsi appelle- 
mus exemplum. Nee vereor, ne videar repugnare 
Ciceroni, quanquam collationem separat ab exemplo. 
Nam idem omnem argumentationem dividit in duas 
partes, inductionem et ratiocinationem, ut plerique 
Graecorum in TrapaoVyjuara et en-ixci/Di/fiara, dixerunt- 

3 que TrapaSciy/xa prjropiKrjv eTraywyryf. Nam ilia, qua 
plurimum est Socrates usus, hanc habuit viam, ut cum 
plura interrogasset, quae fateri adversario necesse 
esset, novissime id, de quo quaerebatur, inferret, 
ut simile concessis. 1 Id est inductio. Hoc in ora- 
tione fieri lion potest ; sed, quod illic interrogatur, hie 

4 fere sumitur. Sit igitur ilia interrogatio talis : Quod 
est pomum generosissimum ? nonne quod optimum ? con- 
cedetur. Quid equus ? qui generosissimus ? Nonne qui 
optimus ? et plura in eundem modum. Deinde, cuius 
rei gratia vogatum est, Quid homo ? Nonne is genero- 

5 sissimus, qui optimus ? fatendum erit. Hoc in testium 
interrogatione valet plurimum, in oratione perpetua 
dissimile est ; aut enim sibi ipse respondet orator 
aut quod illic interrogatur, hie fere sumitur. 2 Quod 

1 concessis, Tornebladh : concessisse, MSS. 

2 aut quod . . . sumitur, supplied by Mf.ister. Some, such 
phrase must have been lost, hut there can be no certainty either 
as regards the exact words or their precise place. 


BOOK V. xi. 1-5 

the nature of an example. For my own part, I 2 
prefer with a view to making my purpose easier of 
apprehension to regard both as TrapaScty/xara and to 
call them examples. Nor am I afraid of being 
thought to disagree with Cicero, although he does 
separate comparison from example. 1 For he divides 
all arguments into two classes, induction and 
ratiocination, just as most Greeks 2 divide it into 
TrapaSei'y/nara and cTri^c/p^ara, explaining TrapaSciy/xa 
as a rhetorical induction. The method of argument 3 
chiefly used by Socrates was of this nature : when 
he had asked a number of questions to which his 
adversary could only agree, he finally inferred the 
conclusion of the problem under discussion from its 
resemblance to the points already conceded. This 
method is known as induction, and though it 
cannot be used in a set speech, it is usual in a 
speech to assume that which takes the form of a 
question in dialogue. For instance take the follow- 4 
ing question : ' ' What is the finest form of fruit ? Is 
it not that which is best? " This will be admitted. 
" What of the horse ? What is the finest ? Is it not 
that which is the best?" Several more questions 
of the same kind follow. Last comes the question 
for the sake of which all the others were put : 
" What of man ? Is not he the finest type who is 
best ? " The answer can only be in the affirmative. 
Such a procedure is most valuable in the examina- 5 
tion of witnesses, but is differently employed in a set 
speech. For there the orator either answers his 
own questions or makes an assumption of that which 
in dialogue takes the form of a question. " What is 

1 de Inv. i. xxx. 49. 

2 cp. Ar. Rh. i. ii. 18. 




pomum generosissimum ? puto, quod optimum ; et equus ? 
qui velocissimus : ita hominum, non qui claritate nascendi 
sed qui virtute maxime excellet. 

Omnia igitur ex hoc genere sumpta necesse est 
aut similia esse aut dissimilia aut contraria. Simili- 
tude adsumitur interim et ad orationis ornatum ; sed 
ilia, cum res exiget, nunc ea, quae ad probationem 

6 pertinent, exsequar. Potentissimum autem est inter 
ea quae sunt huius generis, quod proprie vocamus 
exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad 
persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio. 
Intuendum igitur est, totum simile sit an ex parte, 
ut aut omnia ex eo sumamus aut quae utilia sunt. 
Simile est, lure occisus est Saturnmus sicut Gracchi. 

7 Dissimile, Brutus occidit liberos proditionem molientes ; 
Manlius virtutem filii morte multavit. Contrarium, 
Marcellus ornamenta Syracusanis hostibus restituit ; 
Verres eadeni sociis abstulit. Et probandorum et cul- 
pandorum ex iis confirmatio eosdem gradus habet. 

8 Etiam in iis, quae futura dicemus, utilis similium 
admonitio est, ut si quis dicens, Dionysium idcirco 
petere custodes salutis suae, ut eorum adiutus armis 

1 VITI. iii. 72 sqq. 

- Manlius had forbidden all encounters with the enemy. 
His son engaged in single combat and slew his man. See 
Liv. VIIT. vii. 1. 3 cp. Verr, iv. Iv. 123. 


BOOK V. xi. 5-8 

the finest fruit ? The best, 1 should imagine. What 
is the finest horse ? The swiftest. So too the 
finest type of man is not he that is noblest of birth, 
but he that is most excellent in virtue." 

All arguments of this kind, therefore, must be 
from things like or unlike or contrary. Similes are, 
it is true, sometimes employed for the embellish- 
ment of the speech as well, but I will deal with 
them in their proper place l ; at present I am con- 
cerned with the use of similitude in proof. The most 6 
important of proofs of this class is that which is mo'st 
properly styled example, that is to say the adducing 
of some past action real or assumed which may 
serve to persuade the audience of the truth of the 
point which we are trying to make. We must 
therefore consider whether the parallel is complete 
or only partial, that we may know whether to use it 
in its entirety or merely to select those portions 
which are serviceable. We argue from the like 
when we say, " Saturninus was justly killed, as were 
the Gracchi " ; from the unlike when we say, 7 
"Brutus killed his sons for plotting against the 
state, while Manlius condemned his son to death for 
his valour " ; 2 from the contrary when we say, 
" Marcellus restored the works of art which had 
been taken from the Syracusans who were our 
enemies, while Verres 3 took the same works of art 
from our allies." The same divisions apply also to 
such forms of proof in panegyric or denunciation. 
It will also be found useful when we are speaking of 8 
what is likely to happen to refer to historical parallels : 
for instance if the orator asserts that Dionysius is 
asking for a bodyguard that with their armed assist- 
ance he may establish himself as tyrant, he may 

T 2 


tyraimidem occupet, hoc referat exemplum, eadem 
ratione Pisistratum ad dominationem pervenisse. 
9 Sed ut sunt exempla interim tola similia ut hoc 
proximum, sic interim ex maioribus ad minora, ex 
minoribus ad maiora ducuntur. Urbes violata propter 
matrimonia eversae sunt ; quid Jieri adultero par est ? 
Tibicines, cum ab urbe discessissent, pub lice revocati sunt ; 
quanta magis principes civitatis viri et benc de republica 

10 meriti, cum invidiae cesserint, ab exilio reducendi ? Ad 
exhortationem vero praecipue valent imparia. Ad- 
mirabilior in femina quam in viro virtus. Quare, si ad 
fortiter faciendum accendatur aliquis, non tantum 
adferent momenti Horatius et Torquatus quantum 
ilia mulier cuius manu Pyrrhus est interfectus, et 
ad moriendum non tarn Cato et Scipio quam Lucretia ; 

11 quod ipsum est ex nutioHbus ad minora. Singula 
igitur horum generum ex Cicerone (nam unde potius ?) 
exempla ponamus. Simile est hoc pro Murena, 
Etenim mihi ipsi accidit, ut cum duobus patriciis, altero 
impj'obissimo et audacissimo altero modestissimo atque 
optima viro, peterem ; superavi iamen dignitate Catilinam, 

1 cp. Liv. ix. 30. The flute-players employed in public 
worship migrated to Tibur because deprived of an old- 
established privilege, but were brought back by stratagem, 
after their hosts had made them drunk. 

2 viii. 17. Sulpicius, one of Murena's accusers and an 
unsuccessful candidate for the consulship, had sought to 
depreciate Murena's birth. Gicero urges that even if Sul- 
picius' statements were true they would be irrelevant and 
cites his own case to support his argument. 


BOOK V. xi. 8-1 1 

adduce the parallel case of Pisistratus who secured 
the supreme power by similar means. 

But while examples may at times, as in the last 9 
instance, apply in their entirety, at times we shall 
argue from the greater to the less or from the less 
to the greater. " Cities have been overthrown by 
the violation of the marriage bond. What punish- 
ment then will meet the case of adultery?" "Flute- 
players have been recalled by the state to the city 
which they had left. How much more then is it 
just that leading citizens who have rendered good 
service to their country should be recalled from 
that exile to which they have been driven by envy." 1 
Arguments from unlikes are most useful in exhor- 10 
tation. Courage is more remarkable in a woman 
than in a man. Therefore, if we wish to kindle 
someone's ambition to the performance of heroic 
deeds, we shall find that parallels drawn from 
the cases of Horatius and Torquatus will carry 
less weight than that of the woman by whose 
hand Pyrrhus was slain, and if we wish to urge 
a man to meet death, the cases of Cato and 
Scipio will carry less weight than that of 
Lucretia. These are however arguments from the 
greater to the less. Let me then give you separate 11 
examples of these classes of argument from the 
pages of Cicero ; for where should I find better ? 
The following passage from the pro Murena 2 is an 
instance of argument from the like : " For it 
happened that I myself when a candidate had two 
patricians as competitors, the one a man of the most 
unscrupulous and reckless character, the other a 
most excellent and respectable citizen. Yet I de- 
feated Catiline by force of merit and Galba by my 



12 gratia Galbam. Maius minoris, pro Milone, Negant 
intueri lucem esse fas ei qui a se hominem occisum essc 
fateatur. In qua tandem urbe hoc homines stultissimi 
disputant ? nempe in ea quae primum indicium de capite 
vidit M. Horatii, fortissimi viri, qui nondum libera civi- 
tate tamen populi Romani comitiis liberatus esl, cum sua 
tnanu sororem esse inter fectamfateretur. Minus maioris : 
Occidi } occidi) non Spurium Maelium, qui annona lecanda 
iacturisque rei familiaris, quia nimis amplecti plebem vi- 
debatur, in suspicionem incidit regni adfectandi, et cetera, 
deinde,, Sed eum (auderet enim dicere, cum patriam peri- 
culo liberasset) cuius nefandum aduUerium in pulmnaribus, 
et totus in Clodium locus. 

13 Dissimile plures causas habet, fit enim genere, 
modo, tempore, loco, ceteris, per quae fere omnia 
Cicero praeiudicia^ quae de Cluentio videbantur facta, 
subvertit ; contrario vero exemplo censoriam notam 
laudando censorem Africanum, qui eum, quern peie- 
rasse conceptis verbis palam dixisset, testimonium 
etiam pollicitus, si quis contra diceret, nullo accu- 

1 iii. 7. 2 pro Mil. xxvii. 72. 

3 pro Cluent. xxxii. sqq. 

4 ib. xlviii. 134. The accused was a knight : the retention 
of his horse implied that he retained his status. 

2 7 8 

BOOK V. xi. 11-13 

popularity." The pro Milone 1 will give us an 12 
example of argument from the greater to the less : 
" They say that he who confesses to having killed a 
man is not fit to look upon the light of day. Where 
is the city in which men are such fools as to argue 
thus ? It is Rome itself, the city whose first trial 
on a capital charge was that of Marcus Horatius, 
the bravest of men, who, though the city had not 
yet attained its freedom, was none the less acquitted 
by the assembly of the Roman people, in spite of 
the fact that he confessed that he had slain his 
sister with his own hand." The following 2 is an 
example of argument from the less to the greater : 
" I killed, not Spurius Maelius, who by lowering the 
price of corn and sacrificing his private fortune fell 
under the suspicion of desiring to make himself 
king, because it seemed that he was courting popu- 
larity with the common people overmuch," and so 
on till we come to, " No, the man I killed (for my 
client would not shrink from the avowal, since his 
deed had saved his country) was he who committed 
abominable adultery even in the shrines of the gods " ; 
then follows the whole invective against Clodius. 

Arguments from unlikes present great variety, for 13 
they may turn on kind, manner, time, place, etcetera, 
almost every one of which Cicero employs to over- 
throw the previous decisions that seemed to apply 
to the case of Cluentius, 3 while he makes use of 
argument from contraries when he minimises 4 the 
importance of the censorial stigma by praising Scipio 
Africanus, who in his capacity of censor allowed one 
whom he openly asserted to have committed de- 
liberate perjury to retain his horse, because no one 
had appeared as evidence against him, though he 



saute, traducere equum passus esset ; quae, quia erant 

14 longiora, non suis verbis exposui. Breve autern apud 
Vergilium contrarii exemplum est : 

At non ille, satum quo te mentiris, Achilles 
Talis in hoste fnit Priamo. 

15 Quaedam autem ex iis, quae gesta sunt, tota narra- 
bimus, ut Cicero pro Milone : Pudicitiam cum eriperet 
militi tribunus militaris in exercitu C. Ma?ii, propinquus 
eius impemtoris, interfectus ab eo est, cui vim adferebat. 
Facere enim probus adolescens periculose quam perpeti 
turpiter maluit ; atque hunc ille summits vir scelere solutum 

16 periculo liberavit. Quaedam significare satis erit, ut 
idem ac pro eodem : Neque enim posset Ahala ille 
Servilius ant P. Nasica aut L. Opimius aut me consule 
senatus non nefarius haberi, si sceleratos interjici nefas 
esset. Haec ita dicentur, prout nota erunt vel utilitas 
causae aut decor postulabit. 

17 Eadem ratio est eorum, quae ex poeticis fabulis 
ducuntur, nisi quod iis minus adfirmationis adhibetur ; 
cuius usus qualis esse deberet, idem optimus auctor 

18 ac magister eloquentiae ostendit. Nam huius quo- 
que generis in eadem oratione reperietur exemplum : 
Itaque hoc, indices, non sine causa etiam t fictis fabulis 

1 Aen. ii. 540. 

2 pro Mil iv. 9. 3 ib. iii. 8. 

4 ib. iii. 8. The allusion is to Orestes, acquitted when 
tried before the Areopagus at Athens by the casting vote of 
Pallas Athene. 


BOOK V. xi. 13-18 

promised to come forward himself to bear witness to 
his guilt, if any should be found to accuse him. I 
have paraphrased this passage because it is too long 
to quote. A brief example of a similar argument is 14 
to be found in Virgil, 1 

" But he, whom falsely thou dost call thy father, 

Even Achilles, in far other wise 

Dealt with old Priam, and Priam was his foe." 
Historical parallels may however sometimes be re- 15 
lated in full, as in the pro Milone 2 : " When a 
military tribune serving in the army of Gaius Marius, 
to whom he was related, made an assault upon the 
honour of a common soldier, the latter killed him ; 
for the virtuous youth preferred to risk his life by 
slaying him to suffering such dishonour. And yet 
the great Marius acquitted him of all crime and let 
him go scot free." On the other hand in certain 16 
cases it will be sufficient merely to allude to the 
parallel, as Cicero does in the same speech 8 : " For 
neither the famous Servilius Ahala nor Publius Nasica 
nor Lucius Opimius nor the Senate during my con- 
sulship could be cleared of serious guilt, if it were a 
crime to put wicked men to death." Such parallels 
will be adduced at greater or less length according 
as they are familiar or as the interests or adornment 
of our case may demand. 

A similar method is to be pursued in quoting from 17 
the fictions of the poets, though we must remember 
that they will be of less force as proofs. The same 
supreme authority, the great master of eloquence, 
shows us how we should employ such quotations. For 18 
an example of this type will be found in the same 
speech 4 : " And it is therefore, gentlemen of the 
jury, that men of the greatest learning have re- 



doctissimi homines memoriae prodiderunt, eum, qui patris 
ulciscendi causa matrem necavisset, variatis kominum sen- 
tentiis, non solum divina sed sapientissimae deae sententia 

19 liberatum. Illae quoque fabellae, quae, etiamsi ori- 
ginem non ab Aesopo acceperunt (nam videtur 
earum primus auctor Hesiodus), nomine tamen Aesopi 
maxime celebrantur, ducere animos solent praecipue 
rusticorum et imperitorum, qui et simplicius, quae 
ficta sunt, audiunt; et capti voluptate facile iis quibus 
delectantui' consentiuiit : siquidem et Menenius 
Agrippa plebem cum patribus in gratiam traditur 
reduxisse nota ilia de membris humanis adversus 

20 ventrem discordantibus fabula. Et Horatius ne in 
poemate quidem humilem generis huius usum putavit 
in illis versibus. Quod dixit vulpes aegroto cauta leoni. 
Alvov Graeci vocant et ai<ru>7retous, ut dixi, Aoyovs et 
\iftvKovs; nostrorum quidam, non sane recepto in 

21 usum nomine, apologationem. Cui confine est 
Trapoi/Atas genus illud, quod est velut fabella brevior 
et per allegorian accipitur : Non nostrum inquit onus ; 
bos clilellas. 

22 Proximas exempli vires habet similitudo, praecipue 
ilia, quae ducitur citra ullam translationum mixturam 
ex rebus paene paribus : Ut } qui accipere in Campo 
consuerunt, iis candidatis, quorum nummos suppressos esse 
putanty inimicissimi solent esse, sic eiusmodi indices infesti 

1 See Liv. ii. 32. 2 Epist. i. i. 73. 

3 In the preceding section, cp. Arist. Rhet. u. xx. 3 for 
" Libyan stories." 


BOOK V. xi. 18-22 

corded in their fictitious narratives that one who had 
killed his mother to avenge his father was acquitted, 
when the opinion of men was divided as to his guilt, 
not merely by the decision of a deity, but by the 
vote of the wisest of goddesses." Again those fables 19 
which, although they did not originate with Aesop 
(for Hesiod seems to have been the first to write 
them), are best known by Aesop's name, are specially 
attractive to rude and uneducated minds, which are 
less suspicious than others in their reception of 
fictions and, when pleased, readily agree with the 
arguments from which their pleasure is derived. 
Thus Menenius Agrippa l is said to have reconciled 
the plebs to the patricians by his fable of the limbs' 
quarrel with the belly. Horace 2 also did not regard 20 
the employment of fables as beneath the dignity 
even of poetry ; witness his lines that narrate 

" What the shrewd fox to the sick lion told." 
The Greeks call such fables alvot (tales) and, as I 
have already 3 remarked, Aesopean or Libyan stories, 
while some Roman writers term them " apologues," 
though the name has not found general acceptance. 
Similar to these is that class of proverb which may 21 
be regarded as an abridged fable and is understood 
allegorically : "The burden is not mine to carry," 
he said, "the ox is carrying panniers." 

Simile has a force not unlike that of example, more 22 
especially when drawn from things nearly equal 
without any admixture of metaphor, as in the follow- 
ing case : " Just as those who have been accustomed 
to receive bribes in the Campus Martius are specially 
hostile to those whom they suspect of having withheld 
the money, so in the present case the judges came 
into court with a strong prejudice against the 



23 turn reo venerunt. Nam Trapa/SoX?;, quam Cicero col- 
lationem vocat, longius res quae comparentur repe- 
tere solet. Neque hominum raodo inter se opera 
similia spectantur, ut Cicero pro Murena facit : 
Quodsi e portu solventibus, qui iam in portum ex alto in- 
vehuntur, praecipere summo studio solent el tempestatum 
rationem et praedonum et locorum (quod natura adfert, 
ut us faveamus, qui eadem pericula, quibus nos perfuncti 
sumus, ingrediantur), quo me tandem animo esse oportet, 
prope iam ex magna iactatione terram videntem, in hunt; 
cui video maximas tempestates esse subeundas ? sed et a 
mutis atque etiam inanimis interim simile l huius- 

24 modi ducitur. Et quoniam similium alia facies in alia 
ratione, admonendum est rarius esse in oratione il- 
lud genus, quod eiKova Graeci vocant (quo exprimitur 
rerum aut personarum imago, ut Cassius : Quis istam 

faciem lanipedis senis torquens ?) quam id, quo proba- 
bilius fit quod intendimus : ut, si animum dicas ex- 
colendum, similitudine utaris terrae, quae neglecta 
spinas ac dumos, culta fructus creat ; aut si ad curam 
1 simile, added by Halm. 

1 pro Cluent. xxvii. 75. 2 de Inv. i. 30. 3 ii. 4. 

4 Probably the epigrammatist Cassius of Parma, lanipedis 
= bandaged for the gout. Regius emended to planipedis, a 
dancer who performed barefoot, 


BOOK V. xi. 22-24 

accused." 1 For 7rapa/?oA?7, which Cicero 2 translates 23 
by "comparison," is often apt to compare things whose 
resemblance is far less obvious. Nor does it merely 
compare the actions of men as Cicero does in the 
pro Murena 3 : "But if those who have just come 
into harbour from the high seas are in the habit of 
showing the greatest solicitude in warning those who 
are on the point of leaving port of the state of the 
weather, the likelihood of falling in with pirates, and 
the nature of the coasts which they are like to visit 
(for it is a natural instinct that we should take a 
kindly interest in those who are about to face the 
dangers from which we have just escaped), what 
think you should be my attitude who am now in 
sight of land after a mighty tossing on the sea, 
towards this man who, as I clearly see, has to face 
the wildest weather?" On the contrary, similes of 
this kind are sometimes drawn from dumb animals 
and inanimate objects. Further, since similar objects 24 
often take on a different appearance when viewed 
from a different angle, I feel that I ought to point 
out that the kind of comparison which the Greeks 
call tiKuv, and which expresses the appearance of 
things and persons (as for instance in the line of 
Cassius 4 

" Who is he yonder that doth writhe his face 
Like some old man whose feet are wrapped in 


should be more sparingly used in oratory than those 
comparisons which help to prove our point. For 
instance, if you wish to argue that the mind requires 
cultivation, you would use a comparison drawn from 
the soil, which if neglected produces thorns and 
thickets, but if cultivated will bear fruit ; or if you 


rei publicae horteris, ostendas apes etiam formicasque, 
non modo muta, sed etiam parva animalia, in commune 

25 tameii laborare. Ex hoc genere dictum illud est 
Ciceronis : Ut corpora nostra sine mente, ita civitas sine 
lege suis partibus, ut nervis ac sanguine et membris, uti 
non potest. Sed ut hac corporis humani pro Cluentio, 
ita pro Cornelio equorunr, pro Archia saxorum quoque 

26 usus est similitudine. Ilia (ut dixi) propiora : ut re- 
miges sine gubernatore, sic milites sine imperatore nihil 
valere. Solent tamen fa41ere similitudinum species, 
ideoque adhibeiidum est iis iudicium. Neque enim, 
ut iiavis utilior nova quam vetus, sic amicitia ; vel, ut 
laudanda, quae pecuniam suam pluribus largitur, ita, 
quae formam. Verba sunt in his similia vetustatis et 
largitionisj vis quidem longe di versa navis et amicitiae, 1 

27 pecuniae et pudicitiae. Itaque in hoc genere maxime 
quaeritur, an simile sit, quod infertur. Etiam in illis 
interrogationibus Socratis, quarum paulo ante feci 
mentionem, cavendum, ne incaute respondeas ; ut 
apud Aeschinen Socraticum male respondit Aspasiae 
Xenophontis uxor, quod Cicero his verbis transfert : 

28 Die mihi, quaeso, Xenophontis uxor, si mcina tua melius 

1 navis et amicitiae, added by Spalding. 

1 pro Clutnt. liii. 146. 2 See iv. iv. 

3 pro Arch. viii. 19. * 3. 

5 de Inv. i. xxxi. 51. 


BOOK V. xi. 24-28 

are exhorting someone to enter the service of the 
state, you will point out that bees and ants, though 
not merely dumb animals, but tiny insects, still toil 
for the common weal. Of this kind is the saying 25 
of Cicero l : "As our bodies can make no use of 
their members without a mind to direct them, so the 
state canmake no use of its component parts, which 
may be compared to the sinews, blood and limbs, 
unless it is directed by law." And just as he draws 
this simile in the pro Cluentio from the analogy of 
the human body, so in the pro Cornelio * he draws 
a simile from horses, and in the pro Arckia 3 from 
stones. As I have already said, the following type 26 
of simile comes more readily to hand : " As oarsmen 
are useless without a steersman, so soldiers are use- 
less without a general." Still it is always possible 
to be misled by appearances in the use of simile, 
and we must therefore use our judgment in their 
employment. For though a new ship is more useful 
than one which is old, this simile will not apply to 
friendship : and again, though we praise one who is 
liberal with her money, we do not praise one who 
is liberal with her embraces. In these cases there is 
similitude in the epithets old and liberal) but their 
force is different, when applied to ships and friend- 
ship, money and embraces. Consequently, it is all- 27 
important in this connexion to consider whether the 
simile is really applicable. So in answering those 
Socratic questions which I mentioned above, 4 the 
greatest care must be taken to avoid giving an in- 
cautious answer, such as those given by the wife of 
Xenophon to Aspasia in the dialogue of Aeschines 
the Socratic : the passage is translated by Cicero 5 as 
follows : " Tell me, pray r wife of Xenophon, if your 28 



haheat durum, quam iu habes : utrumne illud an tuum 
malis ? Illud, inquit. Quid si vestem et ceterum 
ornatum mnliebrem pretii maioris habeat, quam tu, 
tuumne an illius malis ? Respondit, Illius vero. Age sis, 
inquit, si virum ilia meliorem habeat, quam tu habes, 

29 utrumne tuum virum malis an illius ? Hie mulier 
erubuit, merito ; male enim responderat se malle 
alienum aurum quam suum ; nam est hoc improbum. 
At, si respondisset malle se aurum suum tale esse, 
quale illud esset, potuisset pudice respondere malle 
se virum suum talem esse, qualis melior esset. 

30 Scio quosdam inani diligentia per minutissimas ista 
partes secuisse, et esse aliquid minus simile, ut simia 
homini et marmora deformata prima manu, aliquid 
plus, ut illud, Non ovum tarn simile ovo ; et dissimili- 
bus inesse simile, ut formicae et elephanto genus, 
quia sunt animalia ; et similibus dissimile, ut canibus 
catulos et matiibus haedos, differunt enim aetate ; 

31 contrariorum quoque aliter accipi opposita, ut noctem 
luci, aliter noxia, ut a quam frigidam febri, aliter 
repugnantia, ut verum falso, aliter disparata, ut dura 
lion duris ; sed, quid haec ad praesens propositum 
magnopere pertineant, non reperio. 

1 Verg. Ed. i. 23. 

BOOK V. xi. 28-31 

neighbour has finer gold ornaments than you, would 
you prefer hers or yours ? " " Hers/' she replied. 
" Well, then, if her dress and the rest of her orna- 
ments are more valuable than yours, which would you 
prefer, hers or yours ? " " Hers," she replied. " Come, 
then," said she, " if her husband is better than yours,, 
would you prefer yours or hers ? " At this the wife of 29 
Xenophon not unnaturally blushed ; for she had 
answered ill in replying that she would prefer her 
neighbour's gold ornaments to her own, since it 
would be wrong to do so. If on the other hand she 
had replied that she would prefer her ornaments to 
be of the same quality as those of her neighbour, she 
might have answered without putting herself to the 
blush that she would prefer her husband to be like 
him who was his superior in virtue. 

I am aware that some writers have shown pedantic 30 
zeal in making a minute classification of similes, and 
have pointed out that there is lesser similitude (such 
as that of a monkey to a man or a statue when first 
blocked out to its original), a greater similitude (for 
which compare the proverb " As like as egg to 
egg"), a similitude in things dissimilar (an elephant, 
for instance, and an ant both belong to the genus 
animal), and dissimilitude in things similar (puppies 
and kids, for example, are unlike the parents, 1 for 
they differ from them in point of age). So too they 31 
distinguish between contraries : some are opposites, 
as night to day, some hurtful, as cold water to a 
fever, some contradictory, as truth to falsehood, and 
some negative, as things which are not hard when 
contrasted with things which are hard. But I 
cannot see that such distinctions have any real 
bearing on the subject under discussion. 




32 lllud est adnotandum magis, argumenta duel ex 
iure simili : ut Cicero in Topicis, Eum, cut domus usus 
fructus relictus sit, non restituturum heredem, si corruerit, 
quia non restituat servum, si is decesserit ; ex contrario : 
Nihil obstat quo minus iustum matrimonium sit mente 
coeuntium, etiamsi tabulae signatae non fuerint. Nihil 
cnim proderit signasse tabulas, si mentem matrimonii non 
fuisse constabit ; ex dissimili, quale est Ciceronis pro 

33 Caecina : Ut, si qui me exire domo coegisset armis, ha- 
berem actionem, si qui introire prohibuisset, non haberem ? 
Dissimilia sic deprehendunttir, Non si, qui argentum 
omne legavit, videri potest signatam quoque pecuniam 
reliquisse, ideo etiam, quod est in nominibus, dari voluisse 

34 'AvaXoymv quidam a simili separaverunt, nos earn 
subiectam huic generi putamus. Nam_, ut unum ad 
decem, ita l decem ad centum simile certe est ; et ut 
hostis, sic malus civis. Quanquam haec ulterius quo- 
que procedere solent : si turpis dominae consuetudo 

1 ita, Spalding : et, MJSS. 

1 iii. 15. - xii. 34. 

3 c,p. Oic. Top. iii. 13 and 16. 


BOOK V. xi. 32-34 

It is more important for our purpose to note that 32 
arguments may be drawn from similar, opposite, and 
dissimilar points of law. As an example of the first, 
take the following passage from the Topica of 
Cicero, 1 where he argues that a man to whom the 
usufruct of a house has been left will not restore it 
in the interests of the heir if it collapses ; just as 
he would not replace a slave if he should die. The 
following will provide an example of an argument 
drawn from opposite points of law : " The absence 
of a formal contract is no bar to the legality of 
a marriage, provided the parties cohabit by mutual 
consent, since the signing of a formal document will 
count for nothing in the absence of such mutual 
consent." An instance of an argument drawn from 
dissimilar points of law occurs in the pro Caecina of 
Cicero 2 : "If anyone had driven me from my house 33 
by armed violence, I should have ground for action 
against him. Have I then no ground, if he has 
prevented me from entering my house ? " Dis- 
similar points may be illustrated by the following 
example 3 : " Because a man has bequeathed all his 
silver to a given person and this bequest is regarded 
as including silver coin as well as plate, it does not 
follow that he intended all outstanding debts to be 
paid to the legatee." 

Some draw a distinction between analogy and 34 
similarity, but personally I regard the former as 
included under the latter. For the statement that 
the relation of 1 to 10 is the same as that of 10 to 
100 certainly involves similarity, just as does the 
statement that a bad citizen may be compared to an 
actual enemy. But arguments of this kind are 
carried still further : " If connexion with a male 

u 2 


cum servo, turpis domino cum ancilla ; si mutis animali- 

35 bus jinis voluptas, idem homini. Cui rei facillime occur- 
rit ex dissimilibus argumentatio : Non idem esl domi- 
num cum ancilla coisse, quod dominam cum servo ; nee, 
si mutis Jinis voluptas, rationalibus quoque ; immo ex 
contrario : Quia mutis, ideo non rationalibus. 

36 Adhibebitur extrinsecus in causam et auctoritas. 
Haec secuti Graecos, a quibus /c/nVei? dicuntur, 
indicia aut iudicationes vocant, non de quibus ex causa 
dicta sententia est (nam ea quidem in exemplorum 
locum cedunt), sed si quid ita visum gentibus, populis, 
sapientibus viris, claris civibus, illustribus poetis 

37 referri potest. Ne haec quidem vulgo dicta et recepta 
persuasione populari sine usu fuerint. Testimonia 
sunt enim quodammodo vel potentiora etiam, quod 
non causis accommodata, sed liberis odio et gratia 
mentibus ideo tantum dicta factaque, quia aut hon- 

38 estissima aut verissima videbantur. An vero me de 
incommodis vitae disserentem non adiuvabit earum 
persuasio nationum, quae fletibus natos, laetitia de- 

BOOK V. xi. 34-38 

slave is disgraceful to the mistress of the house, so 
is the connexion of the master with a female slave. 
If pleasure is an end sought by dumb animals, so 
also must it be with men." But these arguments 35 
may readily be met by arguments from dissimilars : 
" It is not the same thing for the master of the 
house to have intercourse with a female slave as for 
the mistress to have intercourse with a male slave ; 
nor does it follow that because dumb animals pursue 
pleasure, reasoning beings should do likewise." Or 
they may even be met by arguments from opposites ; 
as for instance, " Because pleasure is an end sought 
by dumb animals, it should not be sought by 
reasoning beings." 

Authority also may be drawn from external sources 36 
to support a case. Those who follow the Greeks, 
who call such arguments Kpums, style them judg- 
ments or adjudications, thereby referring not to 
matters on which judicial sentence has been pro- 
nounced (for such decisions form examples or pre- 
cedents), but to whatever may be regarded as 
expressing the opinion of nations, peoples, philo- 
sophers, distinguished citizens, or illustrious poets. 
Nay, even common sayings and popular beliefs may 37 
be found to be useful. For they form a sort of 
testimony, which is rendered all the more impressive 
by the fact that it was not given to suit special cases, 
but was the utterance or action of minds swayed 
neither by prejudice or influence, simply because it 
seemed the most honourable or honest thing to say 
or do. For instance, if I am speaking of the mis- 38 
fortunes of this mortal life, surely it will help me to 
adduce the opinion of those nations who hold that 
we should we,ep over the new-lxmi child and rejoice 



functos prosequuntur ? Aut si misericordiam com- 
mendabo iudici, nihil proderit, quod prudentissima 
civitas Atheniensium non earn pro adfectu sed pro nu- 

39 mine accepit ? lam ilia septem praecepta sapientium 
nonne quasdam vitae leges existimamus ? Si causarn 
veneficii dicat adultera, non M. Catonis iudicio dam- 
nata videatur, qui nullam adulteram non eandem esse 
veneficam dixit? Nam sententiis quidem poetarum 
non orationes modo sunt refertae sed libri etiam 
philosophorum, qui quanquam inferiora omnia prae- 
ceptis suis ac litteris credunt, repetere tameii auctor- 

40 itatem a plurimis versibus non fastidierunt. Neque 
est ignobile exemplum, Megarios ab Atheniensibus, 
cum de Salamine contenderent, victos Homeri versu, 
qui tamen ipse non in omni editione reperitur, 
significans Aiacem naves suas Atheniensibus iunxisse. 

41 Ea quoque, quae vulgo recepta sunt, hoc ipso, quod 
incertum auctorem habent, velut omnium fiunt : quale 
est, Ubi amid, ibi opes 3 et, Conscienlia mille testes, et 
apud Ciceronem, Pares autem (ut est in vetere proverbio) 
cum paribus maxime congregantur ; neque enim duras- 
sent haec in aeternum, nisi vera omnibus viderentur. 

42 Ponitur a quibusdam et quidem in parte prima deo- 
rum auctoritas, quae est ex responsis, ut, Socraten 

1 11. ii. 558. " Twelve ships great Ajax brought from 
Salamis, And ranged them where the Athenian army stood.'' 
9 Cato maj. iii. 7. 


BOOK V. xi. 38-42 

over the dead. Or if 1 am urging the judge to shew 
pity, surely my argument may be assisted by the 
fact that Athens, the wisest of all states, regarded 
pity not merely as an emotion, but even as a god. 
Again, do we not regard the precepts of the Seven 39 
Wise Men as so many rules of life? If an adul- 
teress is on her trial for poisoning, is she not already 
to be regarded as condemned by the judgment of 
Marcus Cato, who asserted that every adulteress 
was as good as a poisoner ? As for reflexions drawn 
from the poets, not only speeches, but even the 
works of the philosophers, are full of them ; for 
although the philosophers think everything in- 
ferior to their own precepts and writings, they 
have not thought it beneath their dignity to 
quote numbers of lines from the poets to lend 
authority to their statements. Again, a remark- 40 
able example of the weight carried by authority 
is provided by the fact that when the Megarians 
disputed the possession of Salamis with the Athen- 
ians, the latter prevailed by citing a line from 
Homer, 1 which is not however found in all editions, 
to the effect that Ajax united his ships with those of 
the Athenians. Generally received sayings also be- 41 
come common property owing to the very fact that 
they are anonymous, as, for instance, " Friends are a 
treasure," or " Conscience is as good as a thousand 
witnesses," or, to quote Cicero, 2 " In the words of 
the old proverb, birds of a feather flock together." 
Sayings such as these would not have acquired im- 
mortality had they not carried conviction of their 
truth to all mankind. Some include under this head 42 
the supernatural authority that is derived from 
oracles, as for instance the response asserting that 
Socrates was the wisest of mankind : indeed, they 



esse sapientissimum. Id^rarum est, non sine usu tamen. 
Utitur eo Cicero in libro de aruspicum responsis et in 
contione contra Catilinani,cum signum lovis columnae 
impositum populoostendit,et pro Ligario,cum causam 
C. Caesaris meliorem, quia hoc dii iudicaverint, 
confitetur. Quae cum propria causae sunt, divina testi- 
monia vocantur ; cum aliunde arcessuntur, argumenta. 

43 Xonnunquam contingit iudicis quoque aut adversarii 
aut eius, qui ex diverse agit, dictum aliquid aut fac- 
tum adsumere ad eorum, quae intendimus, fidem. 
Propter quod fuerunt, qui exempla et has auctori- 
tates inartificialium probationum esse arbitrarentur, 

44 quod ea non inveniret orator, sed acciperet. Pluri- 
mum autem refert. Nam testis et quaestio et his 
similia de ipsa re, quae in iudicio est, pronuntiant ; 
extra petita, nisi ad aliquam praesentis discepta- 
tionis utilitatem ingenio applicantur, nihil per se 

XII. Haec fere de probatione vel ab aliis tradita 
vel usu percepta in hoc tempus sciebam. Neque 
mihi fiducia est, ut ea sola esse contendam, quin 
immo hortor ad quaerendum et inveniri posse fateor ; 
quae tamen adiecta fuerint, non multum ab his 

1 de har. resp. passim. The soothsayers consulted as to 
the significance of certain prodigies had replied that they 
were due to the profanation of sacred rites. Clodius inter- 
preted this as referring to the rebuilding of Cicero's house. 
Cicero argued against this in a speech to the senate (58 B.C.). 

3 in Cut. TTT. ix. 21. 3 vi. |1. 

BOOK V. xi. 42~xii. i 

rank it above all other authorities. Such authority 
is rare, but may prove useful. It is employed by 
Cicero in his speech on the Replies of the Sooth- 
sayers l and in the oration in which he denounced 
Catiline to the people,- when he points to the statue 
of Jupiter crowning a column, and again in the 
pro Ligario? where he admits the cause of Caesar to 
be the better because the gods have decided in his 
favour. When such arguments are inherent in the 
case itself they are called supernatural evidence ; 
when they are adduced from without they are styled 
supernatural arguments. Sometimes,, again, it may 43 
be possible to produce some saying or action of the 
judge, of our adversary or his advocate in order to 
prove our point. There have therefore been some 
writers who have regarded examples and the use of 
authorities of which I am speaking as belonging to 
inartificial proofs, on the ground that the orator 
does not discover them, but receives them ready- 
made. But the point is of great importance. For 44 
witnesses and investigation and the like all make 
some pronouncement on the actual matter under 
trial, whereas arguments drawn from without are in 
themselves useless, unless the pleader has the wit to 
apply them in such a manner as to support the 
points which he is trying to make. 

XII. Such in the main are the views about proof 
which I have either heard from others or learned by 
experience. I would not venture to assert that this 
is all there is to be said ; indeed I would exhort 
students to make further researches on the subject, 
for I admit the possibilities of making further 
discoveries. Still anything that may be discovered 
will not differ greatly from what I have said here. 



abhorrebunt. Nunc breviter, quemadmodum sit 
utendum iis, subiungam. 

2 Traditum fere est argumentum oportere esse 
coiifessum ; dubiis enim probari dubia qui possunt ? 
Quaedam tamen, quae in alterius rei probationem 
ducimus, ipsa probanda sunt. Occidixti virum, eras 
enim adultera. Prius de adulterio convincendum 
est ut, cum id coeperit esse pro certo, fiat incerti 
argumentum. Spiculum tuum in corpore occisi 
invention est ; iiegat suum : ut probation! prosit, 

3 probandum est. Illud hoc loco monere inter neces- 
saria est, nulla esse firmiora quam quae ex dubiis 
facta sunt-certa. Caedes a te commissa est, cruentam 
enim vestem habuisti ; non est tarn grave argumentum, 
si fatetur quam si convincitur. Nam si fatetur, multis 
ex causis potuit cruenta esse vestis ; si negat, hie 
causae cardinem ponit, in quo si victus fuerit, etiani 
in sequentibus ruit. Non enim videtur in negando 
mentiturus fuisse, nisi desperasset id posse defendi, 
si coiifiteretur. 

4 Firmissimis argumentorum singulis instandum, 
infirmiora congreganda sunt, quia ilia per se fortia 
iion oportet circumstantibus obscurare, ut qualia sunt 

1 cp. v. xi. 30. 

BOOK V. xn. 1-4 

I will now proceed to make a few remarks as to how 
proofs should be employed. 

It has generally been laid down that an argument 2 
to be effective must be based on certainty ; for it is 
obviously impossible to prove what is doubtful by 
what is no less doubtful. Still some things which are 
adduced as proof require proof themselves. "You 
killed your husband, for you were an adulteress." l 
Adultery must first be proved : once that is certain it 
can be used as an argument to prove what is uncer- 
tain. " Your javelin was found in the body of the 
murdered man." He denies that it was his. If this 
point is to serve as a proof, it must itself be proved. 
It is, however, necessary in this connection to point 3 
out that there are no stronger proofs than those in 
which uncertainty has been converted into certainty. 
" You committed the murder, for your clothes were 
stained with blood." This argument is not so 
strong if the accused admits that his clothes were 
bloodstained as if the fact is proved against his 
denial. For if he admits it, there are still a number 
of ways in which the blood could have got on to his 
clothes : if on the other hand he denies it, he makes 
his whole case turn on this point, and if his con- 
tention is disproved, he will be unable to make a 
stand on any subsequent ground. For it will be 
thought that he would never have told a lie in 
denying the allegation, unless he had felt it a hope- 
less task to justify himself if he admitted it. 

In insisting on our strongest arguments we must 4 
take them singly, whereas our weaker arguments 
should be massed together : for it is undesirable 
that those arguments which are strong in them- 
selves should have their force obscured by the 



appareant, haec imbecilla natura mutuo auxilio 

5 sustinentur. Ita quae non possunt valere, quia 
magna sint, valebunt, quia multa sunt ; utique vero 
ad eiusdem rei probationem omnia spectant. Ut, si 
quis hereditatis gratia hominem occidisse dicatur : 
Hereditatem sperabas ct magnam hereditatem, et pauper 
eras et turn maxime a creditoribus appellabaris ; et 
offenderas eum, emus eras heres, et mutaturum tabular 
sciebas. Singula levia sunt et cpmrnunia, universa vero 

nocent etiarasi non ut fulmine, tamen ut grandine. 

6 Quaedam arguraenta ponere satis non est, adiu- 
vanda sunt : cupiditas causa sceleris Juit, quae sit vis 
eius : ira, quantum efficiat in animis hominum talis 
adfectio ; ita et firmiora erunt ipsa et plus habebunt 
decoris, si non nudos et velut carne spoliatos artus 

7 ostenderint. Multum etiam refert^ si argumento 
nitemur odii, utrum hoc ex invidia sit an ex iniuria 

an ex ambitu, vetus an novum, adversus inferiorem, 


BOOK V. xii. 4-7 

surrounding matter, since it is important to show 
their true nature : on the other hand arguments 
which are naturally weak will receive mutual support 
if grouped together. Consequently arguments 5 
which have no individual force on the ground 
of strength will acquire force in virtue of their 
number, since all tend to prove the same thing. 
For instance, if one man is accused of having mur- 
dered another for the sake of his property, it may 
be argued as follows : " You had expectations of 
succeeding to the inheritance, which was moreover 
very large : you were a poor man, and at the time 
in question were specially hard pressed by your 
creditors : you had also offended him whose heir 
you were, and knew that he intended to alter his 
will." These arguments are trivial and common- 
place in detail, but their cumulative force is 
damaging. They may not have the overwhelming 
force of a thunderbolt, but they will have all the 
destructive force of hail. 

There are certain arguments, which must not 
merely be stated, but supported as well. If we say, 
"The motive for the crime was greed," w r e must 
show the force of greed as a motive : if we say that 
anger was the motive, we must show the sway that 
this passion has over the minds of men. Thus our 
arguments will not only be strengthened, but will 
be more ornamental as well, since we shall have 
produced something more than a mere fleshless 
skeleton. It also makes an enormous difference, 7 
supposing that we allege hatred as the motive for a 
crime, whether such hatred was due to envy, injury 

Kor unlawful influence, whether it was recent or of 
ong standing, whether it was directed against an 



parem, superiorem, alienum, propinquum. Suos 
habent omnia ista tractatus et ad utilitatem partis 

8 eius quam tuemur referenda sunt. Nee tamen 
omnibus semper, quae invenerimus, argumentis one- 
randus est iudex, quia et taedium adferunt et fidem 
detrahunt. Neque enim potest iudex credere satis 
esse ea potentia, quae non putamus ipsi sufficere qui 
diximus. In rebus vero apertis argumentari tarn sit 
stultum quam in clarissimum solem mortale lumen 

9 His quidam probationes adiiciunt, quas TraB-qriKa.^ 
vocant, ductas ex adfectibus. Atque Aristo teles 
quidem potentissimum putat ex eo, qui dicit, si sit 
vir bonus ; quod ut optimum est, ita longe quidem, 

10 sed sequitur tamen, videri. Inde enim ilia nobilis 
Scauri defensio: Q. Varius Sucrone7isis ait Aemilium 
Scaurum rein publicam populi Romani prodidisse ; 
Aemilius Scaurvs negat. Cui simile quiddam fecisse 
Iphicrates dicitur, qui cum Aristophontem, quo 
accusante similis criminis reus erat, interrogasset, an 
is accepta pecunia rem publicam proditurus esset ; 
isque id negasset : Quod igilur, inquit, tu nonfecisses, 

11 ego fed? Intuendum autem et qui sit apud quern 
dicimus, et id quod illi maxime probabile videatur 
requirendum ; qua de re locuti sumus in prooemii et 

1 Rhef. i. ii. 4. 2 Ar. Rhet. IT. xxiii. 7. 


BOOK V. xii. 7-1 1 

inferior, an equal or a superior, against a stranger 
or a relative. There are special methods for the 
treatment of all these arguments, and the treatment 
to be selected will depend on the interests of the 
case which we are defending. On the other hand 8 
we must not always burden the judge with all the 
arguments we have discovered, since by so doing we 
shall at once bore him and render him less inclined 
to believe us. For he will hardly suppose those 
proofs to be valid which we ourselves who produce 
them regard as insufficient. On the other hand, 
where the facts are fairly obvious, it would be 
as foolish to argue about them as to bring some 
artificial light into broad sunlight. 

To these proofs some authorities would add those 9 
which they call pathetic or emotional. Aristotle 1 
indeed holds that the strongest argument in support 
of a speaker is that he is a good man. This no 
doubt is the best support, but to seem good is also 
of value, though the semblance is but a bad second 
to the reality. Of this nature is the noble defence 10 
of Scaurus. " Quintus Varius of Sucro asserts that 
Aemilius Scaurus has betrayed the interests of the 
Roman people : Aemilius Scaurus denies it." A 
similar defence is said to have been employed by 
Iphicrates 2 : he asked Aristophon who was accusing 
him on a similar charge of treason whether he 
would consent to betray his country for a bribe : 
when Aristophon replied in the negative, he con- 
tinued, " Have I then done what you would have 
refused to do?" We must however take the 11 
character of the judge into consideration arid seek 
out such arguments as will appeal to him. I have 
already spoken of this in the rules which I laid 



12 suasoriae praeceptis. Altera ex adfirmatione pro 
batio est : Ego hoc fed ; Tu miki hoc dixuti ; et 
fuciwus indignum ! et similia ; quae non debent quidem 
deesse oration! et, si desunt, multum nocent ; non 
tamen habenda sunt inter magna praesidia, cum hoc 
in eadem causa fieri ex utraque partesimiliter possit. 

13 lllae firmiores ex sua cuique persona probationes, 
quae credibilem ratioiiem subiectam habeant : ut 
vulneratus aut filio orbatus non fuerit alium accu- 
saturus quam nocentem, quando, si iiegotium in- 
nocenti facit, liberet eum noxa qui admiserit. Hinc 
et patres adversus liberos et adversus suos quisque 

. necessaries auctoritatem petunt. 

1 4 Quaesitura etiam, potentissima argumenta primone 
ponenda sint loco, ut occupent animos, an summo, 
ut inde dimittant, an partita primo summoque, quod 
Homerica disposition^ in medio sint infirma, ut ab 
aliis 1 crescant? Quae prout ratio causae cuiusque 
postulabit, ordinabuntur, uno, ut ego censeo, excepto, 
ne a potentissimis ad levissima decrescat oratio. 

15 Ego haec breviter demonstrasse contentus ita 
posui, ut locos ipsos et genera quam possem apertis- 

1 ab aliis, Butler : aut animis, MSS. 

1 iv. i. 17 sq., in. viii. 36 *q. a II. iv. 299. 

BOOK V. xii. i r -15 

down for the exordium and for deliberative oratory. 1 
Another form of proof is provided by asseveration 12 
as in "I did this," "You told me this," or "O 
outrageous crime ! " and the like. Every pleading- 
should contain some such asseverations ; if it does 
not, the loss will be considerable. Still asseve- 
rations must not be regarded as supports of the first 
importance, since they can be produced by -either 
party in the same case with the same emphasis. 
A more forcible kind of proof is that drawn 13 
from character and supported by some plausible 
reason, as for instance, " It is not likely that a 
wounded man or one who has lost his son would 
accuse anyone who is not guilty, since if he accused 
an innocent man, he would free the real offender 
from all risk of punishment." It is from such 
arguments that fathers seek support when pleading 
against their sons or one relative against another. 

The further question has been raised as to whether 14 
the strongest arguments should be placed first, to 
take possession of the judge's mind, or last, to leave 
an impression on it ; or whether they should be 
divided between the commencement and close ot the 
proof, adopting the Homeric disposition of placing 
the weakest in the centre of the column, 2 so that 
they may derive strength from their neighbours. 
But in the disposition of our arguments we must be 
guided by the interests of the individual case : there 
is only one exception to this general rule in my 
opinion, namely, that we should avoid descending 
from the strongest proofs to the weakest. 

1 have been content to give a brief outline of my *5 
views concerning these points, and have put them 
forward in such a way as to show as clearly as was in 


\OL. II. \ 


sime ostenderem. Quidam exsecuti sunt verbosius, 
quibus placuit, proposita locorumcommuniummateria, 
quo quaeque res modo dici posset, ostendere ; sed 

16 mihi supervacuum videbatur. Xam et fere apparet, 
quid in iniuriam, quid in avaritiam, quid in testem 
inimicum, quid in potentes amicos dicendum sit ; et de 
omnibus his omnia dicere infinitum est, tarn hercule 
quam si controversiarum, quae sint quaeque futurae 
sint, quaestiones, argumenta, sententias tradere 

17 velim. Ipsas autem argumentorum velut sedes non 
me quidem omnes ostendisse confido, plurimas tamen. 

Quod eo diligentius faciendum fuit, quia declama- 
tiones, quibus ad pugnam forenseni velut praepilatis 
exerceri solebamus, olim iam ab ilia vera imagine 
orandi recesserunt atque ad solam compositae volup- 
tatem nervis carent, non alio medius fidius vitio 
dicentium, quam quo mancipiorum negotiatores for- 

18 mae puerorum virilitate excisa lenocinantur. Nam 
ut illi robur ac lacertos barbamque ante omnia et 
alia, quae natura proprie maribus dedit, parum existi- 
mant decora, quaeque fortia, si liceret, forent ut dura 
molliunt, ita nos habitum ipsum orationis virilem et 
illam vim stricte robusteque dicendi tenera quadam 
elocutionis cute operimus et, dum levia sint nc 


BOOK V. xii 15-18 

my power the various topics and kinds of arguments. 
Others have dealt with the subject at greater length, 
preferring to deal with the whole subject of common- 
places and to show how each topic may be treated. 
This seems to me unnecessary, since it is as a rule 16 
obvious what should be said against the injurious 
conduct or avarice of our opponents, or against a 
hostile witness or powerful friends ; to say every- 
thing on all these subjects is an endless task, as 
endless in fact as if I were to attempt to lay down 
rules for dealing with every dispute that can ever 
occur and all the questions, arguments and opinions 
thereby involved. I do not venture to suppose that 17 
I have pointed out all the circumstances that may 
give rise to arguments, but I think that I have 
done so in the majority of cases. 

This was a task which required all the more careful 
handling because the declamations, which we used 
to employ as foils wherewith to practise for the duels 
of the forum, have long since departed from the 
true form of pleading and, owing to the fact that 
they are composed solely with the design of giving 
pleasure, have become flaccid and nerveless : indeed, 
declaimers are guilty of exactly the same offence as 
slave-dealers who castrate boys in order to increase 
the attractions of their beauty. For just as the 18 
slave-dealer regards strength and muscle, and above 
all, the beard and other natural characteristics of 
manhood as blemishes, and softens down all that 
would be sturdy if allowed to grow, on the ground 
that it is harsh and hard, even so we conceal the 
manly form of eloquence and power of speaking 
closely and forcibly by giving it a delicate complexion 
of style and, so long as what we say is smooth and 



nitida, quantum valeant, nihil interesse arbitramur. 

19 Sed mihi naturam intuenti nemo non vir spadone 
formosior erit, nee tarn aversa unquam videbitur ab 
opere suo providentia, ut debilitas inter optima in- 
venta sit, nee id ferro speciosum fieri putabo, quod, 
si nasceretur, monstrum erat. Libidinem iuvet ip- 
sum effeminati sexus mendacium, numquam tameii 
hoc continget malis moribus regnum ut, si qua 

20 pretiosa fecit, fecerit et bona. Quapropter eloquen- 
tiam, licet hanc (ut sentio enim, dicam) libidinosam 
resupina voluptate auditoria probent, nullam esse 
existimabo, quae ne minimum quidem in se indicium 
masculi et incorrupti, ne dicam gravis et sancti viri, 

21 ostentet. An vero statuarum artifices pictoresque 
clarissimi, cum corpora quam speciosissima fingendo 
pingendove efficere cuperent, numquam in hunc inei- 
derunt errorem, ut Bagoam aut Megabyzum aliquem 
in exemplum operis sumerent sibi, sed Doryphoron 
ilium aptum vel militiae vel palaestrae, aliorum quo- 
que iuvenum bellicosorum et athletarum corpora 
decora vere existimaverunt : nos, qui oratorem stu- 
demus effingere, noh arma sed tympana eloquentiae 

22 demus ? Igitur et ille, quern instituimus, adolescens, 
quam maxime potest, componat se ad imitationem 
veritatis, initurusque frequenter forensium certami- 
num pugnam iam in schola victoriam spectet et ferire 

1 Eunuchs. 

2 The famous statue of Polycletus, regarded as the standard 
of manly beauty and proportion. Many copies have survived. 
Doryphorus = the Spearbearer. 


BOOK V. xn. 18-22 

polished, are absolutely indifferent as to whether our 
words have any power or no. But I take Nature for 19 
my guide and regard any man whatsoever as fairer 
to view than a eunuch, nor can 1 believe that 
Providence is ever so indifferent to what itself has 
created as to allow weakness to be an excellence, nor 
again can 1 think that the knife can render beautiful 
that which, if produced in the natural course of 
birth, would be regarded as a monster. A false 
resemblance to the female sex may in itself delight 
lust, if it will, but depravity of morals will never 
acquire such ascendancy as to succeed in giving real 
value to that to which it has succeeded in giving a 
high price. Consequently, although this debauched 20 
eloquence (for I intend to speak with the utmost 
frankness) may please modern audiences by its 
effeminate and voluptuous charms, I absolutely refuse 
to regard it as eloquence at all : for it retains not 
the slightest trace of purity and virility in itself, not 
to say of these qualities in the speaker. When the 21 
masters of sculpture and painting desired to carve 
or paint forms of ideal beauty, they never fell into 
the error of taking some Bagoas or Megabyzus l as 
models, but rightly selected the well-known Dory- 
phorus, 2 equally adapted either for the fields of war 
or for the wrestling school, and other warlike and 
athletic youths as types of physical beauty. Shall 
we then, who are endeavouring to mould the ideal 
orator, equip eloquence not with weapons but with 
timbrels ? Consequently, let the youth whom we 22 
are training devote himself, as far as in him lies, to 
the imitation of truth and, in view of the fact that 
the battles of the forum that await him are not few, 
let him strive for victory in the schools and learn 



vitalia ac tueri sciat; et praeceptor id inaxime exi- 
gat, inventum praecipue probet. Nam, ut ad peiora 
iuvenes laude ducuntur, ita laudari in bonis malent. 
23 Nunc illud male est, quod necessaria plerumque 
silentio transeunt, nee in dicendo videtur inter bona 
utilitas. Sed haec et in alio nobis tractata sunt 
opere et in hoc saepe repetenda. Nunc ad ordinem 

XIII. Refutatio dupliciter accipi potest. Nam et 
pars defensoris tota est posita in refutatione, et quae 
dicta sunt ex diverso debent utrinque dissolvi. Et 
hoc est proprie, cui in causis quartus adsignatur locus. 
Sed utriusque similis condicio est. Neque vero ex 
aliis locis ratio argumeritorum in hac parte peti 
potest quam in confirmatione, nee locorum aut sen- 
tentiarum aut verborum et figurarum alia condicio 
2 est. Adfectus plerumque haec pars mitiores habet. 
Non sine causa tamen difficilius semper est credi- 
tum, quod Cicero saepe testatur, defendere quam 
accusare. Primum, quod est res ilia simplicior, pro- 
ponitur enim uno modo, dissolvitur varie, cum accu- 
satori satis sit plerumque, verum esse id, quod obie- 
cerit, patronus neget, defendat, transferat, excuset, 

1 Perhaps the lost de causis corruplae. eloquentiat. 
3 (i) exordium, (ii) statement of facts, (iii) confirmation, 
(iv) refutation, (v) peroration. 

BOOK V. Ml. 22-XIII. 2 

how to strike the vitals of his foe and protect his 
own ; and let his instructor insist on his doing this 
above all else and reserve his special approval for the 
mastery of this art. For though young men may be 
lured to evil practices by praise, they still prefer to 
be praised for what is right. At the present time 23 
the misfortune is that teachers more often than not 
pass over what is necessary in. silence, and utility is 
not accounted one of the good qualities of eloquence. 
But 1 have dealt with these points in another work, 1 
and shall often have to recur to them in this. I will 
now return to my prescribed course. 

XIII. Refutation may be understood in two senses. 
For the duty of the defence consists wholly in 
refutation, while whatever is said by our opponents 
must be rebutted, whether we are speaking for the 
defence or the prosecution. It is in this sense that 
refutation is assigned the fourth place 2 in pleadings, 
but the methods required in either case are identical. 
For the principles of argument in refutation can 
only be drawn from the same sources as those used 
in proof, while topics and thoughts, words and figures 
will all be 011 the same lines. As a rule no strong 2 
appeal to the emotions is made in refutation. 

It is not, however, without reason that, as Cicero 
so often testifies, 3 the task of defence has always been 
considered harder than that of prosecution. In the 
first place accusation is a simpler task : for the charge 
is put forward in one definite form, but its refutation 
may take a number of different forms, since as a rule 
it is sufficient for the accuser that his charge should 
be true, whereas counsel for the defence may deny 

3 It is not clear what passages Q.uintilian has in his 



deprecetur, molliat, minuat, avertat, despiciat, deri- 
deat. Quare inde recta fere atque, ut sic dixerim, 
clamosa est actio ; hinc mille flexus et artes deside- 

3 rantur. Turn accusator praemeditata pleraque domo 
adfert, patronus etiam inopinatis frequenter occurrit. 
Accusator dat testem, patronus ex re ipsa refellit. 
Accusator e criminum invidia, etsi falsa sit, mate- 
riam dicendi trahit, de parricidio, sacrilegio, maie- 
state ; quae patrono tantum neganda sunt. Ideoque 
accusationibus etiam mediocres in dicendo suffe- 
cerunt ; bonus defensor nemo nisi qui eloquentissi- 
mus fuit. Quanquam ut, quod sentio, semel finiam, 
tanto est accusare quam defendere. quanto facere 
quam sanare vulnera, facilius. 

4 Plurimum autem refert, et quid proposuerit l adver- 
sarius et quomodo. Primum igitur intuendum est, 
id, cui responsuri sumus, proprium sit eius iudicii an 
ad causam extra arcessitum. Nam si est proprium, 
aut negandum aut defendendum aut transferendum : 

5 extra haec in iudiciis fere nihil est. Deprecatio 
quidem^ quae est sine ulla specie defensionis, rara 

1 proposnerit, M lister : profuerit, AB. 

1 See ITI. vi. 23. No exact rendering of tranxlatio is 
possible. Literally it means "transference of the charge" : 
it would seem to cover cases where the charge was brought 
in the wrong court or by the wrong person. It is used gen 
erally to indicate a plea made by defendant in bar of 
plaintiffs action. 2 See vn. iv. 17. 

BOOK V. xin. 2-5 

or justify the facts, raise the question of competence, 1 
make excuses, plead for mercy, soften, extenuate, 
or divert the charge, express contempt or derision. 
The task of the accuser is consequently straight- 
forward and, if I may use the phrase, vociferous ; but 
the defence requires a thousand arts and stratagems. 
Moreover the prosecutor generally produces a speech 3 
which he has prepared at home, while the counsel 
for the defence has frequently to deal with quite 
unexpected points. The prosecutor brings forward 
his witnesses, while counsel for the defence has to 
refute the charge by arguments drawn from the case 
itself. The prosecutor draws his material from the 
odium excited by the charges, even though it have 
no justification, denouncing parricide, sacrilege, or 
treason, whereas counsel for the defence can only 
deny them. Consequently quite moderate speakers 
have proved adequate in prosecution, while no one 
can be a good counsel for the defence unless he 
possesses real eloquence. In a word, it is just so 
much easier to accuse than to defend as it is easier 
to inflict than to heal a wound. 

The nature of the arguments put forward by our 4 
opponent and the manner in which he produces them 
will, however, make an enormous difference to our 
task. We must therefore first consider what it is to 
which we have to reply, whether it is part and parcel 
of the actual case or has been introduced from circum- 
stances lying outside the case. For in the former 
case we must deny or justify the facts or raise the 
question of competence : for these are practically 
the sole methods of defence available in the courts. 
Pleas for mercy, 2 which are not in any sense a 5 
method of actual defence, can rarely be used, and 



admodum et apud eos solos iudices, qui imlla certa 
pronuntiandi forma tenentur. Quanquam illae quo- 
que apud C. Caesarem et triumviros pro diversarum 
partium hominibus actiones, etiamsi precibus utun- 
tur, adhibent tamen patrocinia ; nisi hoc non fortis- 
sime defendentis est dicere, Quid aliud egimus, Tubero. 

6 nisi ut, quod hie potest, nos possemus ? Quodsi quando 
apud principem aliumve, cui utrum velit liceat. 
dicendum erit, dignuni quidem morte eum, pro quo 
loquemur, dementi tamen servandum esse vel talem, 
primum omnium non erit res nobis cum adversario 
sed cum iudice, deinde forma deliberativae inagis 
materiae quam iudicialis utemur. Suadebimus enim 
ut laudem humanitatis potius quam voluptatem ulti- 

7 onis concupiscat. Apud iudices quidem secundum 
legem dicturos sententiam de confessis praecipere 
ridiculum est. Ergo, quae neque negari neque 
traiisfem possunt, utique defendenda sunt, qualia- 
cunque sunt, aut causa cedendum. Negandi dupli- 
cem ostendimus formam, aut non esse factum aut 
non hoc esse, quod factum sit. Quae neque defendi 

1 e.g. in the emperor's court as opposed to the quaestioM* 
perpetuae or civil actions. 

2 As in the pro Ligario and pro Deiotaro pleaded in 
Caesar's house. It is not known what cases were tried 
before the (2nd) triumvirate. * Cic, pro Liy. iv. 10. 

BOOK V. xm. 5-7 

only before judges who are not limited to some 
precise form of verdict. 1 Even those speeches de- 
livered before Gaius Caesar 2 and the triumvirs on 
behalf of members of the opposite party, although 
they do employ such pleas for mercy, also make use 
of the ordinary methods of defence. For I think 
you will agree with me that the following passage 
contains arguments of a strongly defensive char- 
acter 3 : "What was our object, Tubero, save that 
we might have the power that Caesar has now ? " 
But if, when pleading before the emperor or any 6 
other person who has power either to acquit or con- 
demn, it is incumbent on us to urge that, while our 
client has committed an offence that deserves the 
death penalty, it is still the duty of a merciful judge 
to spare him despite his sins, it must be noted in 
the first place that we have to deal, not with our 
adversary, but with the judge, and secondly that we 
shall have to employ the deliberative rather than the 
forensic style. For we shall urge the judge to fix 
his desire rather on the glory that is won by 
clemency than on the pleasure that is given by 
vengeance. On the other hand, when we are 7 
pleading before judges who have to give their 
verdict in accordance with the prescriptions of law, 
it would be absurd to give them advice as to how 
they should deal with a criminal who admits his 
guilt. Consequently, when it is impossible either to 
deny the facts or to raise the question of com- 
petence, we must attempt to justify the facts as 
best we can, or else throw up the case. I have 
pointed out that there are two ways in which a fact 
can be denied : it can be denied absolutely, or it 
may be denied that a fact is of the nature alleged. 



neque transferri possunt, utique neganda, nee solum 
si finitio potest esse pro nobis, sed etiam si nuda 

8 infitiatio superest. Testes erunt, multa in eos dicere 
licet ; chirographum, de similitudine litterarum dis- 
seremus. Utique nihil erit peius quam confessio. 
Ultima est actionis controversia, cum defendendi 

9 negandive 11011 est locus, id est translatio. 1 Atqui 
quaedam sunt, quae neque negari neque defendi 
neque transferri possunt. Adulterii rea est quae, cum 
anno vidua fuisset, enixa est; lis non erit. Quare 
illud stultissime praecipitur, quod defendi non possit, 
silentio dissimulandum : siquidem est id, de quo 

10 iudex pronuntiaturus est. At si extra causam sit 
adductum et tantum coniunctum, malim quidem 
dicere, nihil id ad quaestionem nee esse in iis mo- 
randum et minus esse quam adversarius dicat ; 
tamen velut huic simulationi oblivionis ignoscam. 
Debet enim bonus advocatus pro rei salute brevem 
negligentiae reprehensionem non pertimescere. 

11 Videndum etiam, simul nobis plura aggredienda 

1 translatio, Regius : relatio, MSS. 

' l i.e. if we cannot say ".The act was right" or "This 
court is not competent to try it " or " The prosecutor has no 
locus standi." See n. on 2. 

2 i.e. suggest that it is a forgery. 


BOOK V , xiii. 7-1 1 

When it is impossible to plead justification or to 
raise the question of competence, 1 we must deny the 
facts, and that not merely when a definition of the 
facts will serve our case, but even when nothing 
except an absolute denial is left for us. If wit- 8 
nesses are produced, there is much that may be said 
to discredit them ^ if a document is put forward, 
we may hold forth on the similarity of the hand- 
writings. 2 In any case there can be no worse course 
than confession of guilt. When denial and justifi- 
cation are both impossible, we must as a last resort 
base our defence on the legal point of competence. 
Still, there are some cases in which none of these 9 
three courses is possible. " She is accused of adul- 
tery on the ground that after a widowhood of twelve 
months she was delivered of a child." In this case 
there is no ground for dispute. Consequently I re- 
gard as the height of folly the advice that is given 
in such cases, that what cannot be defended should 
be ignored and passed over in silence, at any rate if 
the point in question is that on which the judge has 
to give his decision. On the other hand, if the 10 
allegation is irrelevant to the actual case and no 
more than accessory, I should prefer simply to state 
that it has nothing to do with the question at issue, 
that it is not worth our attention, and that it has not 
the importance given to it by our opponent, though 
in such a case I should be prepared to pardon a 
policy of ignoring the charge such as 1 have just 
mentioned. For a good advocate ought not to be 
afraid of incurring a trivial censure for negligence, 
if such apparent negligence is likely to save his 

We must further consider whether we should 11 



sint an amolienda singula. Plura simul invadimus, 
si aut tarn infirma sunt, ut pariter impelli possint, 
aut tarn molesta, ut pedem conferre cum singulis 
non expediat ; turn enim toto corpora obnitendum 
et, ut sic dixerim, directa fronte pugnandum est. 

12 Interim, si resolvere ex parte diversa dicta difficilius 
erit, nostra argumenta cum adversariorum argumentis 
conferemus, si modo haec ut valentiora videantur 
eflici poterit. Quae vero turba valebunt, diducenda 
erunt,'ut, quod paulo ante dixi : Heres eras et pauper 
et magna pecunia appellabaris a creditoribits et offen- 

13 deras et mittatuntm tabular testomenti sciebas. Urgent 
uni versa; at si singula quaeque dissolveris, iam ilia 
flamma, quae magna congerie convaluerat, diductis 
quibus alebatui% concidet, ut, si vel maxima flumina 
in rivos diducantur, qualibet transitum praebent. 
Itaque propositio quoque secundum hanc utilitatem 
accommodabitur,ut ea nunc singula osteiidamus, nunc 

14 complectamur universa. Nam interim quod pluribus 
collegit adversariiiSj sat est semel proponere ; ut, si 
multas causas faciendi, quod arguit, reo dicet accu- 
sator fuisse, nos, non enumeratis singulis, semel hoc 
in totum l negemus, quia non, quisquis causam faci- 

1 hoc in totum, Becker : hoc intuendum, MSB. 

BOOK V. xiii. 11-14 

attack our opponent's arguments en masse or dispose 
of them singly. We shall adopt the former course 
if the arguments are so weak that they can be over- 
thrown simultaneously,, or so embarrassing that it 
would be inexpedient to grapple with them indi- 
vidually. For in such a case we must fight with all 
the force at our disposal and make a frontal attack. 
Sometimes, if it is difficult to refute the statements 12 
made by our opponents, we may compare our argu- 
ments with theirs,, at least if by such a procedure it 
is possible to prove the superiority of our own. On 
the other hand, those arguments which rely on their 
cumulative force must be analysed individually, as 
for example in the case which I cited above : " You 
were the heir, you were poor and were summoned 
by your creditors for a large sum : you had offended 
him and knew that he intended to change his will." 
The cumulative force of these arguments is dam- 13 
aging. But if you refute them singly, the flame 
which derived its strength from the mass of fuel will 
die dowri as soon as the material which fed it is 
separated, just as if we divert a great stream into a 
number of channels we may cross it where we will. 
We shall therefore adapt our method of refutation 
to the exigencies of our case, now dealing with in- 
dividual arguments and now treating them in bulk. 
For at times we may include in a single proposition 14 
the refutation of an argument which our opponent 
has constructed of a number of different points. 
For instance, if the accuser allege that the accused 
had a number of motives for committing a crime, 
we may make a general denial of the fact without 
dealing singly with each alleged motive, because the 
fact that a man has had a motive for committing a 



15 endi sceleris habuit, et fecerit. Saepius tamen 
accusatori congerere argumenta. reo dissolvere 

Id autem, quod erit ab adversario dictum, quo- 
rnodo refutari debeat, intuendum est. Nam si erit 
palam falsum, negare satis est, ut pro Cluentio Cicero 
eum, quern dixerat accusator epoto poculo concidisse, 

16 negat eodem die inortuum. Palam etiam contraria 
et supervacua et stulta reprehendere nullius est artis. 
ideoque nee rationes eorum nee exempla tradere 
necesse est. Id quoque (quod obscurum vocant), 
quod secreto et sine teste aut argumento dicitur 
factual, satis natura sua infirmum est; sufficit enim, 
quod adversarius non probat ; item si ad causam non 

17 pertinet. Est tamen interim oratoris efficere, ut 
quid aut contrarium esse aut a causa diversum aut 
incredibile aut supervacuum aut nostrae potius causae 
videatur esse coniunctum. Obiicitur Oppio, quod de 
militum cibariis detraxerit ; asperum crimen, sed id 
contrarium ostendit Cicero, quia iidem accusatores 
obiecerint Oppio, quod is voluerit exercitum largi- 

18 endo corrumpere. Testes in Cornelium accusator 
lecti a tribuno codicis pollicetur ; facit hoc Cicero 

1 lx. 168. 2 cp. 21 and v. x. 69. 3 cp. iv. iii. 13. 

BOOK V. xin. 14-18 

crime does not prove that lie has actually committed 
it. It will however as a rule be expedient for the 15 
prosecution to employ massed arguments, and for 
the accused to refute them in detail. 

We must, however, also consider the manner in 
which we should refute the arguments of our 
opponent. If his statements be obviously false, it 
will be sufficient to deny them. This is done by 
Cicero in the pro Cluentio, 1 where he denies that 
the man alleged by the accuser to have fallen dead 
on the spot after drinking the contents of the cup, 
died on the same day. Again, it requires no skill 16 
to rebut arguments which are obviously contra- 
dictory, superfluous or foolish, and consequently I 
need give no examples nor instructions as to the 
method to be employed. There is also the type 
of charge which is known as obscure, where it is 
alleged that an act was committed in secret without 
witnesses or any evidence to prove it : this suffers 
from an inherent weakness, since the fact that our 
opponent can produce no proof is sufficient for our 
purpose : the same applies to arguments which are 
irrelevant to the case. It is, however, sometimes an 17 
orator's duty to make it appear that some argument 
of his opponent is contradictory or irrelevant or 
incredible or superfluous or really favourable to his 
own client. Oppius 2 is charged with having em- 
bezzled the supplies intended to feed the troops. 
It is a serious charge, but Cicero shows that it 
contradicts other charges, since the same accusers 
also charged Oppius with desiring to corrupt the 
army by bribes. The accuser of Cornelius offers to 18 
produce witnesses to show that he read out the law 
when tribune 3 : Cicero makes this argument super- 




supervacuum, quia ipse fateatur. Petit accusationem 
in Verrem Q. Caecilius, quod fuerat quaestor eius ; 

19 ipsum Cicero ut pro se videretur effecit. Cetera, 
quae proponuntur, communis locus habet. Aut enim 
coniectura excutiuntur, an vera sint ; aut finitione, 
an propria ; aut qualitate, an inhonesta, iniqua, im- 
proba, inhumana, crudelia et cetera, quae ei generi 

20 accidunt. Eaque non modo in propositionibus et 
rationibus sed in toto genere actionis intuenda : an 
sit crudelis, ut Labieni in Rabirium lege perduellio- 
nis ; inhumana, ut Tuberonis Ligarium exulem accu- 
santis atque id agentis ne ei Caesar ignoscat; superba, 

21 ut in Oppium ex epistola Cottae reum factum. Per- 
inde praecipites, insidiosae, impotentes deprehen- 
duntur. Ex quibus taraen fortissime invaseris, quod 
est aut omnibus periculosum, ut dicit Cicero pro 
Tullio : Quis hoc statuit unquam, aut cui concedi sine, 
summo omnium periculo polest, ut cum iure potuerit occi- 
dere, a quo metuisse se dicat, ne ipse posterius occide- 

1 Cicero argues that since the relation between praetor 
and quaestor is almost that which should exist between 
father and son, a quaestor should not be allowed to prosecute 
his praetor. 

2 Rabirius was accused of causing the death of Saturninus 
forty years after the event. 

3 P. Oppius, quaestor to M. Aurelius Cotta in Bithynia, 
was charged by Cotta in a letter to the senate with mis- 
appropriation of supplies for the troops and with an attempt 
on his life. Cicero defended him in 69 B.C. The speech 
is lost. 


BOOK V. xiii. 1 8-2 1 

Huous by admitting it. Quintus Caecilius demands 
to be entrusted with the task of accusing Verres on 
the ground that he had been the latter's quaestor : 
Cicero actually makes this argument tell in his own 
favour. 1 As regards other charges, they may all be 19 
dealt with by very similar methods. For they may 
be demolished either by conjecture, when we shall 
consider whether they are true, by definition, when 
we shall examine whether they are relevant to the 
case, by quality, when we shall consider whether 
they are dishonourable, unfair, scandalous, inhuman, 
cruel, or deserve any other epithet coming under 
the head of quality. Such questions have to be 20 
considered, not merely in connection with the state- 
ment of the charges or the reasons alleged, but with 
reference to the nature of the case in its entirety. 
For instance, the question of cruelty is considered 
with regard to the charge of high treason brought 
against Rabirius 2 by Labienus ; of inhumanity in the 
case of Tubero who accused Ligarius when he was 
an exile and attempted to prevent Caesar from 
pardoning him ; of arrogance as in the case of the 
charge brought against Oppius 3 on the strength of 
a letter of Cotta. Similarly, it may be shown that 21 
charges are hasty, insidious or vindictive. The 
strongest argument, however, which can be brought 
against a charge is that it involves peril to the 
community or to the judges themselves ; we find an 
example of the former in the pro Tullio* where 
Cicero says " Who ever laid down such a principle as 
this, or who could be allowed, without grave peril 
to the community, to kill a man, just because he 
asserts that he feared that he himself might be 

4 cp. iv. ii. 131. The speech is lost. 

Y 2 


relur ? aut ipsis iudicibus, ut pro Oppio monet 
pluribus, ne illud actionis genus in equestrem ordi- 

22 nem admittant. Nonnunquam tamen quaedam bene 
et contemnuntur vel tanquam levia vel tanquam 
nihil ad causam pertinentia. Multis hoc locis fecit 
Cicero ; et haec simulatio interim hucusque procedit, 
ut, quae dicendo refutare non )x>ssumus, quasi fasti- 
diendo calcemus. 

23 Quoniam vero maxima pars eorum similibus 
constat, rimandum erit diligentissime, quid sit in 
quoque, quod adsumitur, dissimile. In iure facile 
deprehenditur. Est enim scriptum de rebus utique 
diversis, tantoque magis ipsarum rerum differentia 
potest esse manifesta. Illas vero similitudines, quae 
ducuntur ex mutis animalibus aut inanimis, facile est 

24 eludere. Exempla rerum varie tractanda sunt, si 
nocebunt ; quae si vetera erunt, fabulosa dicere lice- 
bit ; si indubia, maxime quidem dissimilia. Neque 
enim fieri potest, ut paria sint per omnia, ut si Nasica 
post occisum Gracchum defendatur exemplo Ahalae, 
a quo Maelius est interfectus, Maeliurn regni adfecta- 
torem fuisse, a Graccho leges modo latas esse popu- 
laresj Ahalam magistrum equitum fuisse, Nasicam 
privatum esse dicatur. Si defecerint omnia, viden- 

A third of the jury were composed of equites. 
cp. in. vii, 20, v. ix. 13. 


BOOK V. xin. 21-24 

killed by him?" An instance of the latter occurs 
in the pro Oppio, where Cicero warns the judges at 
some length not to permit such an action to be 
brought against the equestrian order. 1 On the other 22 
hand there are certain arguments which at times 
may best be treated with contempt, as being trivial 
or irrelevant. This course is frequently pursued by 
Cicero, indeed this affectation of indifference is some- 
times carried so far that we trample disdainfully 
under foot arguments which we should never suc- 
ceed in refuting by counter-argument. 

Since, however, the majority of such arguments 23 
are based on similarity, we must make diligent 
search to discover if any discrepancy is to be found 
in what is put forward. It is easy to do this where 
points of law are concerned. For the law was drafted 
to cover cases quite other than the present, and 
consequently it is all the easier to show the difference 
between case and case. As to parallels drawn from 
dumb animals or inanimate objects, they are easy to 
make light of. Examples drawn from facts, if damag- 24 
ing to our case, must be treated in various ways : if 
they are ancient history, we may call them legendary, 
while if they are undoubted, we may lay stress on 
their extreme dissimilarity. For it is impossible for 
two cases to be alike in every detail. For instance, 
if the case of Ahala, 2 by whom Maelius was killed, 
is quoted to justify Nasica for the slaying of Tiberius 
Gracchus, we may argue that Maelius was endeavour- 
ing to make himself king, while all that Gracchus 
had done was to bring forward laws in the interest 
of the people, and that while Ahala was Master of 
the Horse, Nasica was a private citizen. In the last 
resort, if all else prove unavailing, we must see if 



dum erit, an obtineri possit, ne illud quidem recte 
factum. Quod de exemplis, idem etiam de iudicatis 

25 Quod autem posui, referre, quo quidque accusator 
modo dixerit, hue pertinet, ut, si est minus efficaciter 
elocutus, ipsa eius verba ponantur ; si acri et vehe- 
ment! fuerit usus oratione, eandem rem nostris verbis 
mitioribus proferamus, ut Cicero de Cornelio, Codicem 

26 attigit ; et protinus cum quadam defensione, ut, si pro 
luxurioso dicendum sit, Obiecta est paulo libcralior vita. 
Sic et pro sordido parcum, pro maledico liberum 

27 dicere licebit. Utique committeiidum nunquam est, 
ut adversariorum dicta cum sua confirmatione refera- 
mus, aut etiam loci alicuius exsecutione adiuvemus, 
nisi cum eludenda erunt : Apud exercitum mihi fueris, 
inquit ; tot annis forum non attigeris, ab fueris taimliu et, 
cum tarn longo intervallo veneris, cum his, qui in foro 

28 habitarunt, de dignitate contendas ? Praeterea in con- 
tradictione interim totum crimen exponitur, ut Cicero 
pro Scauro circa Bostarem facit veluti orationem 
diversae partis imitatus, aut pluribus propositionibus 
iunctis, ut pro Vareno, cum Her per agros et loca sola 

1 cp. iv. iv. 8. 2 cp. iv. ii. 77. 3 pro Mur. ix. 21. 

4 cp. iv. i. 69. Scaurus was accused of extortion in 
Sardinia, and of having murdered a certain Bostar at a 
banquet. 5 cp. v. x. 69. 

BOOK V. xin. 24-28 

we can show that the action adduced as a parallel 
was itself unjustifiable. These remarks as to ex- 
amples apply also to previous decisions in the courts. 

With regard to my statement that the manner in 25 
which the accuser stated his charges was of import- 
ance,, I would point out in this connexion that if 
he has spoken but feebly, we may repeat his actual 
words ; while, if he has used bitter and violent 
language, we may restate the facts in milder terms, 
as Cicero does in the pro Cornelio, where he says, 
" He put his hand to the tablet containing the 
law" 1 : and we may do this in such a way as to 26 
defend our client ; for instance, if our client is 
addicted to luxury, we may say, " He has been 
charged with living in a somewhat too liberal style." 
So, too, we may call a mean man thrifty and a 
slanderous tongue free. 2 But we must never under 27 
any circumstances repeat our opponent's charges 
together with their proofs, nor emphasise any of his 
points by amplifying them, unless we do so with a 
view to making light of them, as for instance in the 
following passage 3 : " You have been with the army, 
he says, and have not set foot in the forum for so 
many years, and do you now on returning after so 
long an interval seek to compete for a post of high 
dignity with those who have made the forum their 
home ? " Again, when we are replying to the 28 
accuser we may sometimes set forth the whole 
charge, as Cicero does in the pro Scauro with refer- 
ence to the death of Bostar, 4 where he virtually 
parodies the speech of his opponent, or we may take 
a number of points raised in the course of the 
accusation and put them together as in the pro 
Vareno 5 : " They have asserted that, when he was 



faceret cum Pompuleno, in familiam Ancharianam inci- 
disse dixerunt, delude Pompulenum occisum esse, i//ico 
Varenum mnctum asservatum, dum hie ostenderel, quid dr 
eo fieri vellet. Quod est utile, 1 si erit incredibilis rei 
ordo et ipsa expositione fidem perditurus. Interim 
per partes dissolvitur, quod contextu nocet ; et 
pleriimque id est tutius. Quaedam contradictiones 
natura sunt singulae ; id exemplis non eget. 

29 Communia bene apprehenduntur non tantum, quia 
utri usque sunt partis, sed quia plus prosunt respon- 
denti. Neque enim pigebit, quod saepe monui, 
referre ; commune qui prior dicit, contrarium facit. 

30 Est enim contrarium, quo adversarius bene uti potest : 
At enim non verisimile est, lantum scelus M. Cottam esse 
commentum. Quid ? hoc verisimile est, tantum scelus 
Oppium esse conatum ? Artificis autem est invenire 
in actione adversarii quae contra semetipsa pugnent 
aut pugnare videantur, quae aliquando ex rebus ipsis 
manifesta sunt, ut in causa Caeliana Clodia aurum se 
Caelio commodasse dicit, quod signum magnae fami- 
liaritatis est ; venenum sibi paratum, quod summi 

1 utile, BadiiLS : utique, MSS. 

1 i.e. are easy to make use of. z pro Cad. xiii. 


BOOK V. XIH. 28-30 

journeying with Pompulenus through a lonely stretch 
of country, he fell in with the slaves of Ancharius, that 
Pompulenus was then killed and Varenus imprisoned 
on the spot until such time as this man should indi- 
cate what he wished to be done with hhh." Such a 
procedure is useful, if the sequence of facts alleged 
by the prosecution is incredible, and likely to lose 
its force by restatement. Sometimes, on the other 
hand, we may destroy the cumulative force of a 
number of statements by refuting them singly ; in 
fact this is generally the safest course. Sometimes, 
again, the different portions of our reply will be 
independent of one another, a case which requires 
no illustration. 

Common arguments ] are readily appropriated, not 29 
merely because they can be used by either party, 
but because they are of greater service to the 
speaker who is replying ; for I shall not scruple to 
repeat the warning which I have often given already ; 
the speaker who is first to employ such an argu- 
ment makes it tell against himself. For an argument 30 
must needs tell against a speaker if it be one which 
his opponent can use with effect. " But, you say, it 
is not probable that a crime of this magnitude was 
designed by Marcus Cotta. Is it probable then that 
a crime of this magnitude was attempted by 
Oppius ? " On the other hand it is a task for a real 
artist to discover inconsistencies, real or apparent, 
in the speech of his opponent, though such incon- 
sistencies are sometimes evident from the bare facts, 
as for instance in the case of Caelius, 2 where Clodia 
asserts on the one hand that she lent Caelius money, 
which is an indication of great intimacy, and on the 
other hand that he got poison to murder her, which 



31 odii argumentum est. Tubero Ligarium accusat, 
quod is in Africa fuerit, et queritur, quod ab eo ipse 
in Africam non sit admissus. Aliquando vero praebet 
eius rei occasionem minus considerata ex ad verso 
dicentis oratio ; quod accidit praecipue cupidis sen- 
tentiarum, ut ducti occasione dicendi non respiciant 
quid dixerint, dum locum praesentem non totam 

32 causam intuentur. Quid tarn videri potest contra 
Cluentium quam censoria nota? Quid tarn contra 
eundem, quam filium ab Egnatio corrupti iudicii, 
quo Cluentius Oppianicum circumvenisset, crimine 

33 exheredatum ? At haec Cicero pugnare in- 
vicem ostendit : Sect tit, Atti, consideres, censeo, dili- 
genter, ulrum censorium indicium grave velis esse an 
Egnatii. Si Egnatii, leve est, quod censores de ceteris 
subscripserunt. Ipsum enim Egnatium, quern lu gravem 
esse vis, ex scnatu eiecerunt. Sin autem censorium, tunic 
Egnatium, quern pater censoria subscriptione exheredavil, 
censores in senatu, cum patrem eiecissent, retinuerunt. 

34 Ilia magis vitiose dicuntur quam acute reprehen- 

. 1 pro Liy. iii. 2 pro Cluent. xlviii. 135. 


BOOK V. xm. 30-34 

is a sign of violent hatred. Tubero similarly l 31 
accuses Ligarius of having been in Africa, and com- 
plains that Ligarius refused to allow him to land 
in Africa. At times, however, some ill-advised 
statement by our opponent will give us an oppor- 
tunity of demolishing his arguments. This is 
specially likely to occur with speakers who have a 
passion for producing impressive thoughts : for the 
temptation to air their eloquence is such that they 
take no heed of what they have said already, being 
absorbed by the topic immediately before them to 
the detriment of the interests of the case as a 
whole. What is there likely to tell so heavily 32 
against Cluentius as the stigma inflicted by the 
censors ? What can be more damaging than the fact 
that Egnatius disinherited his son on the ground 
that he had been bribed to give a false verdict in 
the trial in which Cluentius secured the condemna- 
tion of Oppianicus? But Cicero 2 shows that the 33 
two facts tell against one another. " But, Attius, I 
would urge you to give the closest consideration to 
the following problem. Which do you desire to earn 
the greater weight the judgment of the censors, or 
of Egnatius? If the latter, you regard the judg- 
ment of the censors in other cases as counting for 
little, since they expelled this same Gnaeus Eg- 
natius, on whose authority you lay such stress, from 
his place in the senate. On the other hand, if you 
attach most weight to the judgment of the censors, 
I must point out that the censors retained the 
younger Egnatius, whom his father disinherited by 
an act resembling a censorial decision, in his position 
as senator, although they had expelled his father." 
As regards errors such as the following, the folly 34 


duntur, argumentum dubium pro neeessario, coa- 
troversum pro confesso, commune pluribus pro 
proprio, vulgare, supervacuum, constitutum contra 
fidem. Nam et ilia accidimt parum cautis, ut criinen 
augeant, quod probandum est ; de facto disputent, 
cum de auctore quaeratur ; impossibilia aggrediantur, 
pro eflfectis relinquant vixdum inchoata, de homine 

35 dicere quam de causa malint ; hominum vitia rebus 
adsignent, ut, si quis decemviratum accuset non 
Appium ; manifestis repugnent ; dicant, quod aliter 
accipi possit ; summam quaestionis non intueantur, 
non ad proposita respondeant ; quod unum aliquando 
recipi potest, cum mala causa adhibitis extrinsecus 
remediis tuenda est, ut cum peculatus reus Verres 
fortiter et Industrie tuitus contra piratas Siciliam 

36 Eadem adversus contradictiones nol)is oppositas 
j>raecepta sunt, hoc tamen amplius, quod circa eas 
multi duobus vitiis diversis laborant. Nam quidam 
etiam in foro tanquam rem molestam et odiosam 
praetereunt, et iis plerumque, quae composita domo 


BOOK V. xm. 34-36 

shown in their commission is out of all proportion to 
the skill required to deal with them : I refer to 
mistakes such as advancing a disputable argument 
as indisputable, a controversial point as admitted, a 
point common to a number of cases as peculiar to 
the case in hand, or the employment of trite, 
superfluous, or incredible arguments. For careless 
speakers are liable to commit a host of errors : they 
will exaggerate a charge which has still got to be 
proved, will argue about an act when the question is 
who committed it, will attempt impossibilities, drop 
an argument as if it were complete, whereas it is 
scarcely begun, speak of the individual in preference 
to the case, and attribute personal faults to circum- 35 
stances, as for instance if a speaker should attack the 
decemvirate instead of Appius. They will also con- 
tradict what is obvious, speak ambiguously, lose 
sight of the main issue of the case, or give replies 
which have no relation to the charges made. This 
latter procedure may, it is true, be occasionally em- 
ployed when we have a bad case which requires to 
be supported by arguments drawn from matters 
foreign to the case. The trial of Verres provides an 
example ; when accused of peculation it was alleged 
that he had shown courage and energy in his defence 
of Sicily against the pirates. 

The same rules apply to objections which we may 36 
have to meet. But there is one point which requires 
special attention, since in such cases many speakers 
fall into two very different faults. For some even 
in the courts will pass by such objections when 
raised by their opponents as troublesome and vexa- 
tious details, and, contenting themselves with the 
arguments which they have brought ready-made 



attulerunt, contenti sine adversario dicunt ; et scilicet 
multo magis in scholis, in quibus non solum contra- 
dictiones omittuiitur, verum etiam materiae ipsae sic 
plerumque finguntur, ut nihil dici pro parte altera 

37 possit. Alii diligentia lapsi verbis etiam vel senten- 
tiolis omnibus respondendum putant, quod est et 
infinitum et super vacuum ; non enim causa repre- 
henditur sed actor ; quern ego semper videri malim 
disertum, ut, si dixerit quod rei prosit, ingenii 
credatur laus esse non causae ; si forte laedat, 1 

38 causae non ingenii culpa. Itaque illae reprehen- 
siones aut obscuritatis, qualis in Rullum est, aut 
infantiae in dicendo, qualis in Pisonem, aut inscitiae 
rerum verborumque et insulsitatis etiam, qualis in 
Antonium est, animo dantur et iustis odiis, suntque 
utiles ad conciliaiidum iis, quos invisos facere volueris, 

39 odium. Alia respondendi patronis ratio ; et aliquando 
tamen eorum non oratio modo, sed vita etiam, vultus 
denique, incessus, habitus recte incusari solet ; ut 
adversus Quintium Cicero non haec solum, sed ipsam 
etiam praetextam demissam ad talos insectatus est. 
Presserat enim turbulentis contionibus Cluentium 

1 non laedat, MSS., corrected by Becker. 

1 de Leg. Ayr. n. v. 13. 2 in Pis. i. 30, etc. 

8 Phil. ii. 4, iii. 4, xiii. 19, etc. 4 pro Clutnt. xl. 111. 


BOOK V. xiii. 36-39 

from their study, will speak as if their opponent did 
not exist. This error is of course far more common 
in the schools, for there objections are not merely 
disregarded, but the subjects for declamation are 
generally framed in such a way that there is nothing 
to be said on the opposite side. On the other hand 37 
there are some who suffer from excess of zeal, 
and think it their duty to reply to every word 
and even every trifling reflexion, a task which- is 
at once endless and superfluous. For it is not the 
case, but the pleader, whom they are refuting. Per- 
sonally I should always prefer that a speaker should 
reveal his eloquence in such a way that, if what he 
says advances his case, the credit will be given to his 
talent and not to the nature of his case, while if 
what he says damages his case the blame will attach 
to the case and not to his powers. Consequently 38 
when we come across denunciations such as that 
directed against Rullus for the obscurity of his 
language, 1 or against Piso for his utter incapacity as 
a speaker, 2 or against Antony 3 for his lack of taste 
and his complete ignorance both of words and 
things, we shall give them our sanction as reasonable 
concessions to passion and just resentment, and as 
useful in stirring up hatred against those whom it is 
desired to render unpopular. The method of reply 39 
to our opponent's counsel should be on different 
lines. Sometimes however we are justified in at- 
tacking, not merely their manner of speaking, but 
also their character, their appearance, their gait or 
bearing. Indeed, in his attack on Quintius, Cicero 4 
does not confine himself to these topics, but even 
attacks his purple-bordered toga that goes trailing 
to his heels : for Quintius had caused Cluentius grave 



40 Quintius. Nonnunquam elevandae invidiae gratia, 
quae asperius dicta sunt, eluduntur, ut a Cicerone 
Triarius. Nam cum Scauri columnas per urbem 
plaustris vectas esse dixit, Ego porro, inquit, r/wi 
Albanas liabeo columnas, clitellis eas apportavi. Et 
magis hoc in accusatores concessum est, quibus con- 

41 viciari aliquando patrocinii fides cogit. Ilia vero 
adversus omnes et recepta et non inhumana con- 
questio, si callide quid tacuisse, breviasse, obscurasse 

42 distulisse dicuntur. Defensionis quoque permutatio 
reprehenditur saepe, ut Attius adversus Cluentium, 
Aeschines adversus Ctesiphontem facit, cum ille 
Ciceronem lege usurum modo, hie minime de lege 
dicturum Demosthenen queritur. 

Declamatores vero inprimis sunt admonendi, ne 

contradictiones eas ponant, quibus facillime respon- 

deri possit, neu sibi stultum adversarium fingant. 

JVicimus autem (quod maxime uberes loci popula- 

\ resque sententiae nascuntur materiam dicendi nobis, 

1 pro Scauro xxii. 46. 2 pro Cluent. lii. 

3 Aesch. in Ctes. 206. cp. also in. vi. 3. 


HOOK V. xni. 39^42 

embarrassment by his turbulent harangues. Some- 40 
times, in order to dispel the unpopularity excited by 
bitter criticism, the latter may be disposed of by a 
jest, as for example Cicero disposes of Triarius. 
For to the allegation that the pillars destined for the 
house of Scaurus were carried on waggons through 
the city streets he replied, 1 " I got my pillars 
from the quarries of Alba, and had them brought in 
panniers ! " Such tactics are more readily allowed 
against an accuser, for the duties of counsel for the 
defence sometimes force him to make such personal 
attacks. On the other hand there is no objection to 41 
complaining of the conduct of the advocates on 
either side, so long as our complaint follows accepted 
practice and does not overstep the limits imposed by 
good manners ; I refer to complaints such as that 
our opponents have abridged, obscured or postponed 
the discussion of some point, or with deliberate 
cunning have avoided discussing it at all. A change 42 
in the tactics of defence is also often selected for 
censure. For example, Attius 2 in his speech against 
Cl.uentius complains that Cicero insists on the letter 
of the law, and Aeschines 3 in his speech against 
Ctesiphon complains that Demosthenes refuses to 
consider the legal aspect of the case. 

It is however necessary to issue a special warning 
to declaimers that they should not put forward 
objections that can easily be met or assume that 
their opponent is a fool. As it is, owing to our 
tendency to think that the subject-matter of our 
speech may be drawn from our own fancy, florid 
commonplaces and epigrams designed to bring down 
the house occur to our minds with the utmost 


VOL. II. / 


quod volumus, ducentibus) ut non sit ille inutilis 
versus : 

\on male respondit, male enim prior ille rogarat. 

43 Pallet haec nos in foro consuetude, ubi adversario, 
non ipsi nobis respondebimus. Aiunt Atcium inter- 
rogatum, cur causas non ageret, cum apud eum in 
tragoediis tanta vis esset optime respondendi, bane 
reddidisse rationem, quod illic ea dicerentur quae ipse 
vellet, in foro dicturi adversarii essent quae minime 

44 vellet. Ridiculum est ergo in exercitationibus, quae 
foro praepararit, prius cogitare quid responded 
quam quid ex diverse did possit. Et bonus prae- 
ceptor non minus laudare discipulum debet, si quid 
pro diversa quam si quid pro sua parte acriter ex- 

45 cogitavit. Rursus aliud in scholis permittendum 
semper, in foro rarum. Nam loco a petitore primo 
contradictione uti qui possumus, ubi vera res agitur, 

46 cum adversarius adhuc nihil dixerit ? Incidunttamen 
plerique in hoc vitium vel consuetudine declamatoria 
vel etiam cupiditate dicendi, dantque de se respon- 
dentibus venustissimos lusus, cum modo, se vero nihil 
dixisse neque tarn stulte dicturos ; modo, bene ad- 
monitos ab adversario et agere gratias, quod adiuti 

1 Origin unknown. 


BOOK V. xin. 42-46 

readiness, with the result that we should do well to 
bear in mind the lines : 

" A shrewd retort ! Could it be otherwise ? 
A foolish question makes for smart replies." l 

But such a practice will be fatal in the courts, 43 
where we have to answer our opponent and not 
ourselves. It is said that Accius, when asked why 
he did not turn advocate in view of the extraordinary 
skill in making apt replies which his tragedies 
revealed, replied that in his plays the characters said 
what he himself wanted them to say, whereas in the 
courts his adversaries would probably say just what 
he least wanted them to say. It is therefore 44 
ridiculous in exercises which prepare the student 
for the actual courts to consider what answer can be 
made before ever giving a thought to what the 
opposing counsel is likely to say. And a good teacher 
should commend a pupil no less for his skill in 
thinking out arguments that may be put forward 
for the opposite side than in discovering arguments 
to prove his own case. Again, there is another 45 
practice which is always permissible in the schools, 
but rarely in the courts. For when we speak first 
as claimants in a real case, how can we raise objec- 
tions, seeing that our opponent has so far said 
nothing ? Still, many fall into this error either 4G 
because they have acquired the habit in declamation 
or simply owing to a passion for hearing their own 
voice, thereby affording fine sport to those who 
reply : for sometimes the latter will remark sarcasti- 
cally that they never said anything of the kind and 
have no intention of saying anything so idiotic, and 
sometimes that they are grateful for the admirable 

z 2 


tj iocautur ; frequentissime vero, ill quod tinnis- 
simum est, riuiiquam iis responsuruni adversariuin 
fuisse, quae proposita non essent, nisi ilia sciret vera 
esse et ad fatendum conscientia esset impulsus ; ut 

47 pro Cluentio Cicero : Xam hoc persaepe dixisti, tibi sic 
renuntiari, me habere in ammo causam hanc praesidio legis 
defendere. Itane est ? ab amicis imprudentes videlicet 
prodimur? et est nescio quis de Us, quos amicos nobis 
arbitramur, qui nostra consilia ad advcrsarium deferat ? 
Quisnam hoc tibi renuntiavit ? quis tarn improbus fuit ; 
cui ego autem narravi ? Nemo, ut opinor, in culpa est ; 

48 nimirum tibi istud lex ipsa renuntiavit. At quidam con- 
tradictione non content! totos etiam locos ex pi i cant : 
scire se hoc dicturos adversaries et ita persecuturos. 
Quod factum venuste nostris temporibus elusit Vibius 
Crispus, vir ingenii iucundi et elegantis : Ego vero, 
inquit, ista non dico ; quid enim attinet ilia bis did ? 

49 Nonnunquam tamen aliquid simile contradiction! 
poni potest, si quid ab adversario testationibus com- 
prehensum in advocationibus iactatum sit ; respon- 
debimus enim rei ab illis dictae, non a nobis excogi- 
tatae ; aut, si id genus erit causae, ut proponere 

1 lii. 143. 

2 The exact purport is not clear. The reference would 
seem to be to information as to the line of defence likely to 
be adopted, which has leaked out during a discussion of the 
written evidence by the advocati or legal advisers of the 


BOOK V. xin. 46-49 

warnings so kindly given by their opponent : but 
most often they will say, and this is the strongest 
line that they can take, that their opponent would 
never have replied to objections which had never 
been raised had he not realised that these objections 
were justified and been driven to admit it by his 
consciousness of the fact. We may find an example 47 
of this in the pro Cluentio } of Cicero : " You have 
frequently asserted that you are informed that I 
intend to base my defence on the letter of the law. 
Really ! I suppose that my friends have secretly be- 
trayed me, and that there is one among those whom 
I believe to be my friends who reports my designs to 
my opponent. Who gave you this ' information ? 
Who was the traitor? And to whom did I ever 
reveal my design ? No one, I think, is to blame. 
It must have been the law itself that told you." 
Hut there are some who, not content with raising 48 
imaginary objections, develop whole passages on such 
themes, saying that they know their opponents will 
say this and will proceed to argue thus and thus. I 
remember that Vibius Crispus in our own day dis- 
posed of this practice very neatly,, for he was a 
humorous fellow with a very pretty wit : " 1 do not 
make those objections which you attribute tome," he 
said, " for what use would it be to make them twice ?" 
Sometimes however it may be possible to put for- 49 
ward something not unlike such objections, if some 
point included by our opponent in the depositions 
which he produces has been discussed among his advo- 
cates 2 : for 'then we shall be replying to something 
which they have said and not to an objection which 
has been invented by ourselves ; or again, this will 
be possible if the case is of such a nature that \vr 


possimus certa, extra quae diet nihil possit : ut, cum 
res furtiva in domo deprehensa sit, dicat necesse est 
reus aut se ignorante illatam aut depositam apud se 
aut donatam sibi ; quibus omnibus, etiamsi proposita 

50 non sunt, responded potest. At in scholis recte et 
propositionibus l et contradictionibus occurremus, ut 
in utrumque locum, id est primum et secundum, 
simul plurimum exerceamur. Quod nisi fecerimus, 
nunquam utemur contradictione ; non enim erit, cui 

51 Est et illud vitium nimium sollicite et circa omnia 
momenta luctantis ; suspectam enim facit iudici 
causam, et frequenter, quae statim dicta omnem du- 
bitatiouem sustulissent, dilata ipsis praeparationibus 
fidem perdunt, quia patronus et aliis crediderit opus 
fuisse. Fiduciam igitur orator prae se ferat semper- 
que ita dicat, tanquam de causa optime sentiat ; quod 

52 sicut omnia in Cicerone praecipuum est. Nam ilia 
summa cura securitatis est similis, tantaque in oratione 
auctoritas,ut probationis locum obtineatdubitare nobis 
non audentibus. Porro, qui scierit, quid pars adversa, 
quid nostra habeat valentissimum, facile iudicabit, 

1 propositionibus. added by Badius. See note prefixed to 


BOOK V. xin. 49-52 

are in a position to state certain definite objections 
which are absolutely essential to our opponent's case : 
for instance, if stolen goods have been discovered 
in a house, the accused must of necessity allege 
either that they were brought there without his 
knowledge or deposited with him or given to him ; 
and we may therefore answer all these points even 
although they have not been put forward. On the 50 
other hand, in the schools we are quite justified in 
answering both statements and imaginary objec- 
tions ; for by these means we shall train ourselves 
at one and the same time for speaking either first or 
second. Unless we do this, we shall have no chance 
of employing objections, since there is no adversary 
to whom we can reply./ 

There is another senous fault into which pleaders 51 
fall : the anxious over-elaboration of points. Such 
a procedure makes his case suspect to the judges, 
while frequently arguments which, if stated without 
more ado, would have removed all doubt, lose their 
force owing to the delay caused by the elaborate 
preparations made for their introduction, due to the 
fact that the advocate thinks that they require 
additional support. Our orator must therefore adopt 
a confident manner, and should always speak as if he 
thought his case admirable. This quality, like all 
other good qualities, is particularly evident in Cicertf. 
For the extraordinary care which he takes gives the 52 
impression of confidence and carries such weight 
when he speaks that it does not permit us to feel 
the least doubt and has all the force of genuine 
proof. Further, the advocate who knows what are 
the strongest points in his own and his opponent's 
case will easily be able to decide what points it 



quibus maxime rebus vel occurrendum At vel 

53 Ordo quidem in parte nulla minus adfert laboris. 
Nam si agimus, nostra confirmanda sunt primum, 
turn, quae nostris opponuntur refutanda ; si respon- 

54 demus, prius incipiendum est a refutatione. Nas- 
cuntur autem ex his, quae con trad ictioni opposuimus, 
aliae contradictiones, euntque interim longius ; ut 
gladiatorum manus, quae secundae vocantur, fiunt 
et tertiae, si prima ad evocandum adversarii ictum 
prolata erat, et quartae, si geminata captatio est, ut 
bis cavere, bis repetere oportuerit ; quae ratio et 

55 ultra ducit. Sed illam etiam, quam supra ostendi, 
simplicem ex adfectibus atque ex adfirmatione sola 
probationem recipit refutatio, qualis est ilia Scauri, 
de qua supra dixi ; quin nescio an etiam frequentior, 
ubi quid iiegatur. Videiidum praecipue utrique^ 
parti, ubi sit rei summa. Nam fere accidit, ut in 
causis multa dicantur, de paucis iudicetur. 

56 In his probandi refutandique ratio est, sed adiu- 
vanda viribus dicentis et ornanda. Quamlibet enim 
sint ad dicendum, quod volumus^ accommodata, 
ieiuna 1 tamen erunt et infirma, nisi maiore quodam 

57 oratoris spiritu implentur. Quare et illi communes 

1 ieiuna, Bom tell : pecunia, A : omitted by B. 

1 Not enough is known of gladiatorial fighting to render 
this passage fully intelligible. 
* v. xii. 12. 8 v. xii. 10. 



BOOK V. XIH. 52-57 

will be most necessary for him to emphasise or to 

As regards order, there is no part of a case which 53 
involves less trouble. For, if we are prosecuting, 
our first duty will be to prove our own case, our 
second to refute the arguments brought against it. 
If, on the other hand, we are defending, we must 
begin by refutation. But from our answers to 54 
objections fresh objections will arise, a process 
which may be carried to some length. The strokes l 
of gladiators provide a parallel. If the first stroke 
was intended to provoke the adversary to strike, the 
second will lead to the third, while if the challenge 
be repeated it will lead to the fourth stroke, so that 
there will be two parries and two attacks. And the 
process may be prolonged still further. But refuta- 55 
tion also includes that simple form of proof, which 
1 described above, 2 based on an appeal to the 
emotions and mere assertion ; for an example see 
the words of Scaurus which 1 have already quoted/' 
Nay, I am not sure that this form of proof is not 
actually of more frequent occurrence when some- 
thing is denied. It is, however, specially important 
for both parties that they should see where the 
main issue lies. For it often happens that the points 
raised in pleading are many, although those on 
which a decision is given are few. 

Such are the elements of the methods of proof 50 
and refutation, but they require to be embellished 
and supported by the powers of the speaker. For 
although our arguments may be admirably adapted 
to express what we desire, they will none the less 
be slight and weak unless the orator makes a special 
effort to give them life. Consequently the common- 57 



loci de testibus, de tabulis, de argumentis aliisque 
similibus magnam vim animis iudicum adferunt, et hi 
proprii, quibus factum quodque laudamus aut contra,, 
iustum vel iniustum docemus, maius aut minus, aspe- 
rius aut mitius. Ex iis autem alii ad comparationem 
singulorum argumentorum faciunt, alii ad plurium, 

58 alii ad totius causae inclinationem. Ex quibus sunt 
qui praeparent animum iudicis, sunt qui confirment. 
Sed praeparatio quoque aut confirmatio aliquando 
totius causae est, aliquando partium, et proinde, ut 

59 cuique conveniunt, subiicienda. Ideoque miror inter 
duos diversarum sectarum velut duces non mediocri 
contentione quaesitum, singulisne quaestionibus sub- 
iiciendi essent loci, ut Theodoro placet, an prius 
docendus iudex quam movendus, ut praecipit Apol- 
lodorus, tanquam perierit haec ratio media, et 
nihil cum ipsius causae utilitate sit deliberandum. 
Haec praecipiunt, qui ipsi non dicunt in foro, 
ut artes a securis otiosisque compositae ipsa pug- 

60 nae necessitate turbentur. Namque omnes fere, 
qui legem dicendi quasi quaedam mysteria tradide- 
runt, certis non inveniendorum modo argumentortim 

1 cp, v. xiv. 27. 

BOOK V. XHI. 57-60 

places on the subject of witnesses, documentary 
evidence, arguments and the like make a great 
impression on the minds of the judges, as also do 
those topics which are peculiar to the case, those I 
mean in which we praise or blame any action or 
show that it is just or unjust, or make it seem more 
or less important or more or less harsh than it 
really is. Of these topics some are adapted to the 
comparison of individual arguments, others to the 
comparison of a number, while others may serve to 
influence the success or failure of the whole case. 
Some again prepare the mind of the judge, while 53 
others confirm it in opinions already formed. But 
such preparation or confirmation will sometimes 
apply to the whole case, sometimes only to par- 
ticular portions, and must therefore be em- 
ployed with due regard to circumstances. I am 59 
consequently surprised that there should be a 
violent dispute between the leaders of two opposite 
schools as to whether such commonplaces should be 
applied to individual questions (which is the view of 
Theodorus), or whether the judge should be in- 
structed in the facts before any appeal is made to 
his feelings (the latter being the view of Apollo- 
dorus), as though no middle course were possible and 
no regard were to be had to the exigencies of the 
case itself. Those who lay down such rules have no 
experience of speaking in the actual courts, tlu 
result being that text-books composed in the calm 
leisure of the study are sadly upset by the neces- 
sities of forensic strife. For practically all those 60 
who have set forth the law of speaking as though it 
were a profound mystery, 1 have tied us down not 
merely to fixed topics for argument, but to definite 



locis, sed concludendorum quoque nos praeceptis 
alligaverunt ; de quibus brevissime praelocutus, quid 
ipse seiitiam, id est quid clarissimos oratores fecisse 
videam, non tacebo. 

XIV. Igitur enthymema et argumentum ipsum, id 
est rem, quae probationi alterius adhibetur, appellant 
et argument! elocutionem, earn vero, ut dixi, dupli- 
cem : ex consequentibus, quod habet propositionem 
coniunctamque ei protinus probationer^ quale pro 
LigariOj Causa turn dubia, quod erat aliquid in utraquc 
parte, quod probari posset ; mine melior ea iudicanda est, 
quam etiam dii adiuverunt ; habet enim ration em et 

2 propositionem, non habet conclusionem. Ita est ille 
imperfectus syllogismus. Ex pugnantibus vero, quod 
etiam solum enthymema quidam vocant, fortior multo 
probatio est. Tale est Ciceronis pro Milone : Eius 
igitur mortis sedetis uliores, cuius vitam si putetis per vox 

3 restitui posse, nolitis. Quod quidem etiam aliquando 
multiplicari solet, ut est ab eodem et pro eodem reo 
factum : Quern igitur cum omnium gratia noluit, hunc 
roluit cum aliquorum querela ? quern iure, quern loco, 

1 For this chapter see note prefixed to Index. 2 cp. v. x. 2. 

3 vi. 19. The cause helped by heaven is that of Caesar. 
cp. Lucan's viotrix causa dei* pfacnif, $?rl ricfa Catoni. 

4 cp. v. x. 2. 

s xxix. 79. The death is that of Clodius. '' xvi. 41. 


BOOK V. xui. 6o-xiv. 3 

rules as to how we should draw our conclusions. 1 
propose after making a few preliminary remarks on 
the subject to give a frank expression of my own 
views, or in other words to set forth what I perceive 
to have been the practice of the most distinguished 

XIV. The term entkymemc l is applied not merely to 
the actual argument, that is to say, the matter ad- 
duced to prove something else, but also to its expres- 
sion, the nature of which, as I have already pointed 
out, is twofold. 2 It may be drawn from denial of 
consequents, when it will consist of a proposition 
immediately followed by a proof, as in the following 
passage from the pro Ligario 3 ; "At that point the 
justice of the cause was doubtful, since there was 
something to be said on both sides. But now we can 
only regard that cause as superior, which even the 
gods supported." Here we have a proposition and a 
reason, but no formal conclusion : it is therefore the 
incomplete syllogism known as an enthymeme. It may 2 
on the other hand be drawn from incompatible^, in 
which case the proof will be much stronger ; indeed 
some restrict the title of enthymeme* to this form of 
argument. The following passage from the pro 
Milone 5 of Cicero will provide a parallel : " You 
are then sitting there to avenge the death of a man 
whom you would refuse to restore to life, even if 
you thought it within your power to do so." This form 3 
of argument may even at times consist of a number 
of clauses, as in the following passage from the same 
speech : " Was he resolved then to kill to the 
dissatisfaction of some a man whom he refused to 
kill to the satisfaction of all ? Are we to believe 
that he did not hesitate, in defiance of the law and 



<]ucm tcmpore, quern Impnne non esl aiisits, /time iniuria, 
iniquo loco, alieno tempore, aim pericnlo capitis non 

4 dubitftvit occidere ? Optimum autem videtur enthy- 
mematis genus, cum propositio dissimili vel con- 
traria ratio subiungitur, quale est Demosthenis : 
\on enim, si quid unquam contra leges actum est, idque 
in es imitatus, idcirco te convenit poena liberari ; quiti e 
contrano damnari multo magis. \am ut, si quis eorttm 
damnatus esset,tuhaecnon scripsisscs, ita, damnatus fu *i 
fueris, non scribet alius. 

5 Epichirematos et quattuor et quinque et sex etiam 
factae sunt partes a quibusdam. Cicero maxime 
quinque defendit, ut sit propositio, deinde ratio eius, 
turn adsumptio et eius probatio, quinta complexio ; 
quia vero interim et propositio non egeat rationis et 
adsumptio probationis, nonnunquam etiam complexi- 
one opus non sit, et quadripertitam et tripertitam et 

C bipertitam quoque fieri posse ratiocinationem. Mibi 
et pluribus nihilominus auctoribus tres summum vi- 
dentur. Nam ita se habet ipsa natura, ut sit, de quo 
quaeratur et per quod probetur ; tertium adiici potest 
velut ex consensu duorum antecedentium. Ita erit 

1 in Amlrot. 7 ; In Aritocr. 99. 
* de Inv. i. xxxvii. 67. 


BOOK V. xiv. 3-6 

despite the unfavourable circumstances both of time 
and place and the risk involved to his own life, to 
kill one whom he did not venture to kill when he 
might have done so legally, at his own time and 
place and without the least danger to himself? " The 4 
most effective kind of enthi/menie seems however to 
be that in which a reason is subjoined to a dissimilar 
or contrary proposition as in the following passage 
from Demosthenes l : " For if at any time an act 
has been committed contrary to law and you have 
imitated it, it does not therefore follow that you 
should go scot free ; on the contrary it is an 
additional reason why you should be condemned. 
For if any of those who transgressed the law had 
been condemned, you would not have proposed this, 
and further, if you are condemned, no one else will 
propose anything of the kind." 

As regards the cpicheiremc , some authorities hold 5 
that it consists of four, five, and even six parts. 
Cicero 2 urges that there are not more than five at 
most, i.e. the major premise and its reason, the minor 
premise and its proof, and fifthly the conclusion. 
But since at times the major premise does not 
require a reason nor the minor a proof, while 
occasionally even the conclusion is not necessary, 
he holds that the epicheireme may consist of only 
four, three, or even two parts. Personally however 6 
I follow the majority of authorities in holding that 
there are not more than three parts. For it follow s 
from the very nature of reasoning that there must 
be something to form the subject of enquiry and 
something else to provide the proof, while the third 
element which has to be added may be regarded 
as resulting from the agreement of the two previous 


prima intentio, secunda adsumptio, tertia cotinexio. 
Nam confirmatio primae ac secundae partis et exor- 

7 natio eisdem cedere possunt, quibus subiiciuntur. Su- 
mamus enim ex Cicerone quinque partium exemplum : 
Melius gubernantur ea, quae consilio reguntur quam qua? 
sine consilio administrantur. Hanc primam partem 
numerant; earn deinceps rationibus variis et quam 
copiosissimis verbis approbari putant oportere. Hoc 
ego totum cum sua ratione unum puto ; alioqui si 
ratio pars est, est autem varia ratio, plures partes 

8 esse dicantur. Adsumptionem deinde ponit : \ihil 
autem omnium rerum melius quam omnis mundus admini- 
stratur. Huius adsumptionis quarto in loco iam porro 
inducunt approbationem ; de quo idem quod supra 

9 dico. Quinto inducunt loco complexionem, quae aut 
id infert solum quod ex omnibus partibus cogitur, 
hoc modo, Consilio igitur mundus administrator ; aut, 
unum in locum cum conduxit breviter propositionem 
et adsumptionem, adiungit quid ex his conficiatur, ad 
hunc modum : Quodsi melius geruntur, quae consilio 
quam quae sine consilio administrantur, nihil ante in 
omnium rerum melius quam omnis mundux administra- 
////, consilio igitur mundus adnrinistratur. Cui parti 

10 In tribus autem, quas fecimus, partibus non est 

1 de Inv. i. xxxiv. 58. 

BOOK V. xiv. 6-10 

elements. Thus the first part will be the major, the 
second the minor premise and the third the con- 
clusion. For the confirmation and development of 
both premises may reasonably be included in the 
parts to which they belong. Let us then take 7 
an example from Cicero l of the epicheireme consisting 
of five parts. " Those things which are controlled 
by reason are better governed than those which are 
not." This they call the first part and consider that 
it requires to be established by various reasons and 
a copious display of eloquence. Personally I hold 
that the whole of this together with its reason forms 
but one part. Otherwise, if the reason is to be treated 
as a separate part and if there are a variety of 
reasons, this will involve an addition to the number 
of parts. Next he produces the minor premise : 8 
" But there is nothing better administered than the 
universe." The proof of this minor premise is 
treated as the fourth part of the epicheireme. My 
criticism of this statement is identical with my 
criticism of the preceding. The fifth place they 9 
assign to the conclusion which either merely makes 
the necessary inference from the preceding parts 
(i.e. " Therefore the universe is governed by reason ") 
or after briefly bringing major and minor premise 
together adds what is deduced from them with the 
following result : " But if on the one hand things 
that are controlled by reason are better governed 
than things which are not and on the other nothing 
is better administered than the universe, then it 
follows that the universe is governed by reason." 
As regards this part of the epicheireme I agree. 

I have said that the epicheireme consists of three 10 
parts : its form is not however invariable. There is 




forma semper eadem, sed una, in qua idem conclu- 
ditur quod intenditur : Anima immortalis est. Nam 
quidquid ex se ipso movetur, immortale est ; anima auteni 
ex se ipsa movetur, immortalis igitur est anima. Hoc fit 
non solum in singulis argumentis sed in totis causis, 

11 quae sunt simplices, et in quaestionibus. Nam et 
hae primam habent propositionem : Sacrilegium com- 
misisti ; Non, quisquis hominem occidit, caedis tenetur, 
deinde rationem ; (sed haec est in causis et quae- 
stione longior quam in singulis argumentis) et 
plerumque summa complexione, vel per enumera- 
tionem vel per brevem conclusionem, testantur, quid 
effecerint. In hoc genere propositio dubia est, de 

12 hac enim quaeritur. Altera est complexio non par 
intentioni sed vim habens parem : Mors nihil ad nos, 
nam quod est dissolutum, sensu caret ; quod autem sensu 
caret, nihil ad nos. In alio genere non eadem pro- 
positio est quae connexio : Omnia animalia meliora 
sunt quam inanima, nihil autem melius est mundo, mundus 
igitur animal. Hie potest videri deesse intentio. 1 
Potuit enim sic constitui ratiocinatio : Animal est 
mundus. omnia enim animalia meliora sunt quam inanima 

13 et cetera. Haec propositio aut confessa est ut 

1 deesse, Maduiy : de re, MSS. : intentio, Spalding : 
contentio, MSS. 

1 See in. vi. 9, 10. 

BOOK V. xiv. 10-13 

firstly the form in which the conclusion is identical 
with what has already been stated in the major 
premise. "The soul is immortal, since whatever 
derives its motion from itself is immortal. But the 
soul derives its motion from itself. Therefore the 
soul is immortal." This process occurs not merely 
in individual arguments, but in whole cases, provided 
they are of a simple character, and also in questions. 1 
For cases and questions always have first a major 1J 
premise, such as " You have committed sacrilege," 
or " Not everyone who has killed a man is guilty 
of murder." Second comes a reason, which is 
stated at greater length in cases and questions than 
in separate arguments, while finally comes the con- 
clusion in which as a rule they set forth the point 
they have proved either by enumeration of par- 
ticulars or in the form of a hasty conclusion. In this 
type of epicheireme the major premise is doubtful, since 
it is still under investigation. There is another 12 
form of conclusion which is not actually identical 
with the major premise, but has the same force 
" Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved 
into its elements is devoid of feeling, and that 
which is devoid of feeling is nothing to us." There 
is a third form in which the major premise and the 
conclusion are different. " All animate things are 
better than inanimate, but there is nothing better 
than the universe, wherefore the universe is ani- 
mate." It may be thought that in this case there is 
no real major premise, since it would be possible 
to state the reasoning in the following form : " The 
universe is animate, for all things animate are better 
than inanimate," etcetera. This major premise is either 13 
an admitted fact as in the last example or requires 


A A 2 


proxima, aut probanda ut, Qui beatam vitam vivere 
volet, philosophetur oportet, non enim conceditur ; 
cetera sequi nisi confirmata prima parte non possunt. 
Item adsumptio interim confessa est ut, Omnes autem 
volunt beatam vitam vivere ; interim probanda ut ilia, 
Quod est dissolution, sensu caret ; cum, soluta corpore 
anima an sit immortalis vel ad tempus certe maneat, 
sit in dubio. Quam adsumptionem alii, rationem alii 
L4 Epichirema autem nullo differt a sjllogismis, nisi 


quod illi et plures habent species et vera colligunt 
veris, epichirematis frequentior circa credibilia est 
usus. Nam si contingeret semper controversa con- 
fessis probare, vix esset in hoc genere usus oratoris. 

15 Nam quo ingenio est opus, ut dicas : Bona ad me 
pertinent, solus enim sum filius defuncti, vel solus heres, 
cum inre bonorum possessio testati secundum tabulas tes- 

16 tamenti detur, ad me igitur pertinet. Sed cum ipsa 
ratio in quaestionem venit, efficiendum est certum id 
quo probaturi sumus quod incertum est : ut si ipsa 
forte intentione dicatur aut Jilius non es aut non es 
legitimus aut non es solus, itemque aut non es heres, 
aut non iustum testamentwn est, aut capere non potes, aut 
habes coheredes, efficiendum est iustum, propter quod 


BOOK V. xrv. 13-16 

to be proved as in the following: " He who wishes 
to live a happy life, must be a philosopher " : for 
this is not an acknowledged truth, and the premises 
must be established before we can arrive at the 
conclusion. Sometimes again the minor premise is 
an admitted fact, as for instance, " But all men wish 
to live a happy life," while sometimes it requires to 
be proved, as for example the statement quoted 
above, " That which is dissolved into its elements is 
devoid of feeling," since it is doubtful whether the 
soul is immortal after its release from the body or 
only continues to exist for a time. Some call this a 
minor premise, some a reason. 

There is no difference between the epicheireme and 14 
the syllogism, except that the latter has a number 
of forms and infers truth from truth, whereas the 
epicheireme is frequently concerned with statements 
that are no more than credible. For if it were 
always possible to prove controversial points from 
admitted premises, the orator would have little to 
do in this connexion. For what skill does it require 15 
to say, " The property is mine, for I am the only son 
of the deceased," or " I am the sole heir, since pos- 
session of the testator's estate is given by the law of 
property in accordance with the terms of his will : 
the property therefore belongs to me " ? But when 16 
the reason given is itself disputable, we must 
establish the certainty of the premises by which we 
are proposing to prove what is uncertain. For 
example, if our opponent says "You are not his 
son " or " You are illegitimate " or " You are not his 
only son " ; or, again, " You are not his heir " or " The 
will is invalid " or " You are not entitled to inherit " 
or " You have co-heirs," we must prove the validity 



17 nobis bona adiudicari debeant. Sed turn est neces- 
saria ilia summa connexio, cum intervenit ratio 
longior ; alioqui sufficiunt intentio ac ratio : Silent 
enim leges inter arma nee se expectari iubent, cum 
ei, qui exspectare velit, ante iniusta poena Luenda sit quam 
iusta repetenda. Ideoque id enthymema, quod est 
ex consequentibus, rationi simile dixerunt. Sed et 
singula, interimque recte, ponuntur, ut ipsum illud 

18 Silent leges inter arma; et a ratione incipere fas est, 
deinde concludere, ut ibidem : Quodsi duodecim tabulae 
nocturnum furem quoquo modo, diurnum autem, si se telo 
defenderet, inter/id impune voluerunt, quis est qui, 
quoquo modo quis inter fectus sit, puniendum putet ? 
Variavit hie adhuc et rursus rationem tertio loco 
posuit, cum videat aliquando gladiu?n nobis ab ipsis 

19 porrigi legibus. Per constantem l partis duxit ordinem : 
Insidiatori vero et latroni quae potest inferri iniusta nex ? 
hoc intentio ; Quid comitatus nostri, quid gladii volunt ? 
hoc ratio ; Quos habere eerie non liceret, si uti illis nullo 
pacto liceret, hoc ex ratione et intentione connexio. 

1 per constantem, Radermacher : prioris autem, MSS. 

1 pro Mil. iv. 10. 2 ib. iii. 9. 3 ib. iv. 10. 


BOOK V. xiv. 16-19 

of the reason on which we base our claim that the 
property should be adjudicated to us. But when 17 
a reason of unusual length intervenes, it is neces- 
sary to state the final conclusion, otherwise the 
major premise and the reason would suffice. " Laws 
are silent in the midst of arms, and do not require 
us to await their sanction when the circumstances 
are such that he who would await their sanction is 
certain to be the victim of an unjust penalty before 
ever the just penalty can be claimed." 1 Hence it 
has been asserted that the form of enthymeme which is 
based on denial of consequents resembles a reason. But 
sometimes, again, it is sufficient to state a single 
proposition as in the example just quoted," The laws 
are silent in the midst of arms." We may also begin 18 
with the reason and then proceed to the conclusion 
as in another passage from the same speech 2 : " But 
if the Twelve Tables permitted the killing of a thief 
by night under any circumstances, and by day if he 
used a weapon to defend himself, who is there who 
will contend that the slayer must be punished under 
whatever circumstances a man has been killed ? " 
The process is still further varied by Cicero, and the 
reason placed third, as in the phrase, " When he sees 
that the sword is sometimes placed in our hands by 
the laws themselves." On the other hand, he 19 
places the various parts in the regular order in the 
following instance : " How can it be unjust to kill a 
robber who lies in wait for his victim ? " 3 Next comes 
the reason : " What is the object of our escorts and 
our swords?" Last comes the conclusion resulting 
from the major premise and the reason : " Which we 
certainly should not be permitted to have, if we 
were absolutely forbidden to use them." 



20 Huic generi probationis tribus occurritur modis ; 
id est per omnes partes. Aut enim expugnatur 
intentio aut adsumptio aut conclusio, nonnunquam 
omnia. Intentio expugnatur : hire occidi eum, qui 
insidiatus sit. Nam prima statim quaestio pro Milone 
est, an ei fas sit lucem intueri qui a se hominem necatum 

21 esse fateatur. Expugnatur adsumptio omnibus iis 
quae de refutatione diximus. Et ratio quidem non 
nunquam x est vera, cum eius propositio vera non sit ; 
interim verae propositionis falsa ratio est. Virtus 
bonum est, verum est ; si quis rationem subiiciat, quod 
ea locupletes facial, verae intentionis falsa sit ratio. 

22 Conclusio autem aut vera negatur, cum aliud colligit 
quam id quod ex prioribus efficitur, aut nihil ad 
quaestionem dicitur pertinere. Non est vera sic : 
Insidiator iure occiditar ; nam cum vitae vim adferat 
ut kostis, debet etiam repelli ut hostis ; recte igitur Clodius 
ut hostis occisus est ; non utique, nondum enim Clodium 
insidiatorem ostendimus. Sed fit vera connexio, 
Recte igitur insidiator ut hostis occiditur ; nihil ad nos, 

23 nondum enim Clodius insidiator apparet. Sed ut 
potest vera esse intentio et ratio et tamen falsa 

1 nonnunquam, MSS. : nunquam, Victor. 

1 In the preceding chapter. 

BOOK V. xiv. 20-23 

This form of proof may be countered in three 20 
ways, that is to say it may be attacked in all its 
parts. For either the major premise or the minor or 
the conclusion or occasionally all three are refuted. 
The major premise is refuted in the following case : 
" I was justified in killing him, as he lay in wait 
for me." For the very first question in the defence 
of Milo is " whether it is right that he who confesses 
that he has killed a man should look upon the" light 
of day." The minor premise is refuted by all the 21 
methods which we mentioned in dealing with refuta- 
tion. 1 As to the reason it must be pointed out that it 
is sometimes true when the proposition to which it 
is attached is not true, but may on the other hand 
sometimes be false although the proposition is true. 
For example, " Virtue is a good thing " is true, but 
if the reason, "Because it brings us wealth," be 
added, we shall have an instance of a true major 
premise and a false reason. With regard to the 22 
conclusion, we may either deny its truth when it 
infers something which does not logically result 
from the premises, or we may treat it as irrelevant. 
The truth is denied in the following case : " We 
are justified 111 killing one who lies in wait for us ; 
for since, like an enemy, he threatens us with 
violence, we ought to repulse his attack as though 
he were an enemy : therefore Milo was justified in 
killing Clodius as an enemy." The conclusion is not 
valid, since we have not yet proved that Clodius lay 
in wait for him. But the conclusion that we are 
therefore justified in killing one who lies in wait 
for us is perfectly true, though irrelevant to the 
case, for it is not yet clear that Clodius lay in wait 
for Milo. But while the major premise and the reason 23 



connexio, ita, si ilia falsa sunt, nunquam est vera 

24 Enthymema ab aliis oratorius syllogismus, ab aliis 
pars dicitur syllogismi, propterea quod syllogismus 
utique conclusionem et propositionem habet et per 
omnes partes efficit, quod proposuit, enthymema 

25 tantum intelligi contentum sit. Syllogismus talis : 
Solum bonum virtus, nam id demum bonum est, quo nemo 
male uti potest ; virtute nemo male uti potest, bonum est 
ergo virtus. Enthymema ex consequentibus : Bonum 
est virtus, qua nemo male uti potest. Et contra, Non est 
bonum pecunia ; non enim bonum, quo quis male uti 
potest ; pecunia potest quis male uti, non igitur bonum est 
pecunia. Enthymema ex pugnantibus : An bonum est 

26 pecunia, qua quis male uti potest ? Si pecunia, quae 
est in argento signato, argentum est, qui drgentum omne 
legavit, et pecuniam, quae est in argento signato, legavit ; 
argentum autem omne legavit, igitur et pecuniam, quae est 
in argento, legavit, habet formam syllogismi. Oratori 
satis est dicere, Cum argentum legaverit omne, pecuniam 
quoque legavit, quae est in argento. 

27 Peregisse mihi videor sacra tradentium artes, sed 
consilio locus superest. Namque ego, ut in oratione 

BOOK V. xiv. 23-27 

may both be true and the conclusion false, yet if 
both are false, the conclusion can never be true. 

Some call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, while 24 
others regard it as a part of the syllogism, because 
whereas the latter always has its premises and 
conclusion and effects its proof by the employment 
of all its parts, the enthymeme is content to let its 
proof be understood without explicit statement. The 25 
following is an example of a syllogism : " Virtue is 
the only thing that is good, for that alone is good 
which no one can put to a bad use : but no one can 
make a bad use of virtue; virtue therefore is good." 
The enthymeme draws its conclusion from denial of 
consequents. " Virtue is a good thing because no 
one can put it to a bad use." On the other hand 
take the following syllogism. " Money is not a 
good thing ; for that is not good which can be put 
to a bad use : money may be put to a bad use ; 
therefore money is not a good thing." The enthy- 
meme draws its conclusion from incompatibles. " Can 
money be a good thing when it is possible to put it 
to a bad use ? " The following argument is couched 26 
in syllogistic form : " If money in the form of silver 
coin is silver, the man who bequeathes all his silver to 
a legatee, includes all money in the form of coined 
silver : but he bequeathed all his silver : therefore 
he included in the bequest all money in the form of 
coined silver." But for the orator it will be sufficient 
to say, " Since he bequeathed all his silver, he in- 
cluded in his bequest all his silver money." 

I think I have now dealt with all the precepts of 27 
those who treat oratory as a mystery. But these rules 

I ill leave scope for free exercise of the judgment, 
or although I consider that there are occasions 



\i y, constare totam aut certe confertam esse aggressionum ' ^ 

et enthymematum stipatione minime velim. Dialogis 


syllogismo quidem aliquando uti nefas non duco, ita 


"VC^- enim et dialecticis disputationibus erit similior quam 

^ A nos ^ r ^ peris actionibus, quae quidem inter se pluri- 

28 mum difFerunt. Namque in illis homines docti et inter 
doctos verum quaerentes minutius et scrupulosius 
scrutantur omnia, et ad liquidum confessumque 
perducunt, ut qui sibi et inveniendi et iudicandi 
vindicent partes, quarum alteram TOTTLK-^V alteram 

29 KpiTLKrjv vocant. Nobis ad aliorum iudicia compon- 
enda est oratio^ et saepius apud omiiino imperitos 
atque illarum certe ignaros litteraram loquendum 
est, quos nisi et delectatione allicimus et viribus 
trahimus et nonnunquam turbamus adfectibus, 
ipsa, quae iusta ac vera sunt, tenere non possumus. 

30 Locuples et speciosa et imperiosa vult esse 
eloquentia ; quorum nihil consequetur, si conclu- 
sionibus certis et in unam prope formam cadentibus 
concisa et contemptum ex humilitate et odium ex 
quadam severitate et ex copia satietatem et ex simili- 

31 tudine fastidium attulerit. Feratur ergo non semitis 
sed campis, non uti fontes angustis fistulis colliguntur 

BOOK V. xiv. 27-31 

when the orator may lawfully employ the syllogism, I 
am far from desiring him to make his whole speech 
consist of or even be crowded with a mass of 
epicheiremes and enthymemes. For a speech of that 
character would resemble dialogues and dialectical 
controversies rather than pleadings of the kind with 
which we are concerned, and there is an enormous 
difference between the two. For in the former we 28 
are confronted with learned men seeking for truth 
among men of learning ; consequently they subject 
everything to a minute and scrupulous inquiry with 
a view to arriving at clear and convincing truths, 
and they claim for themselves the tasks of invention 
and judgment, calling the former TOTTIK^ or the 
art of selecting the appropriate material for treat- 
ment, and the latter K^ITIK^ or the art of criticism. 
We on the other hand have to compose our 29 
speeches for others to judge, and have frequently 
to speak before an audience of men who, if not 
thoroughly ill-educated, are certainly ignorant of 
such arts as dialectic : and unless we attract them 
by the charm of our discourse or drag them by its 
force, and occasionally throw them off their balance 
by an appeal to their emotions, we shall be unable 
to vindicate the claims of truth and justice. Elo- 30 
quence aims at being rich, beautiful and commanding, 
and will attain to none of these qualities if it be broken 
up into conclusive inferences which are generally 
expressed in the same monotonous form : on the 
contrary its meanness will excite contempt, its se- 
verity dislike, its elaboration satiety, and its sameness 
boredom. Eloquence therefore must not restrict 31 
itself to narrow tracks, but range at large over the 
open fields. Its streams must not be conveyed 



sed ut beatissimi amnes totis vallibus fluunt, ac sibi 
viam, si quando non acceperit, faciat. Nam quid ilia 
miserius lege velut praeformatas infantibus litteras 
persequentium et, ut Graeci dicere solent, quern 
mater amictum dedit, sollicite custodientium : pro- 
positio ac conclusio ex consequentibus et repugnan- 

32 tibus ? Non inspiret ? non augeat ? non mille figuris 
variet ac verset ? ut ea nasci et ipsa provenire natura, 
non manu facta et arte suspecta magistrum fateri 
ubique videantur? Quis unquam sic dixit orator? 
Nonne apud ipsum Demosthenen paucissima huius 
generis l reperiuntur ? Quae apprehensa Graeci magis 
(nam hoc solum peius faciunt) in catenas ligant et 
inexplicabili serie connectunt, et indubitata colliguiit 
et probant confessa et se antiquis per hoc similes 
vocant, deinde interrogati nunquam respondebunt, 
quern imitentur. Sed de figuris alio loco. 

33 Nunc illud adiiciendum, ne iis quidem consentire 
me, qui semper argumenta sermone puro et dilucido 
et distincto ceterum minime elato ornatoque putant 
esse dicenda. Namque ea distincta quidem ac per- 

1 generis, Zumpt : veris, A : veris vel artis, 6r. 

1 The proverb which is also found in Plutarch (de Alex. 
Fort. i. 330 B) seems to refer to a child's passionate fondness 
for some particular garment. 2 ix. i. ii. iii. 


BOOK V. xiv. 31-33 

through narrow pipes like the water of fountains, 
but flow as mighty rivers flow, filling whole valleys ; 
and if it cannot find a channel it must make one 
for itself. For what can be more distressing than 
to be fettered by petty rules, like children who 
trace the letters of the alphabet which others have 
first written for them, or, as the Greeks say, insist 
on keeping the coat their mother gave them. 1 
Are we to have nothing but premises and conclu- 
sions from consequents and in compatibles ? Must 
not the orator breathe life into the argument and 
develop it ? Must he not vary and diversify it by a 32 
thousand figures, and do all this in such a way that 
it seems to come into being as the very child of 
nature, not to reveal an artificial manufacture and a 
suspect art nor at every moment to show traces of 
an instructor's hand ? What orator ever spoke thus ? 
Even in Demosthenes we find but few traces of such 
a mechanism. And yet the Greeks of to-day are even 
more prone than we are (though this is the only 
point in which their practice is worse than ours) to 
bind their thoughts in fetters and to connect them 
by an inexorable chain of argument, making infer- 
ences where there was never any doubt, proving ad- 
mitted facts and asserting that in so doing they are 
following the orators of old, although they always 
refuse to answer the question who it is that they are 
imitating. However of figures I shall speak else- 
where. 2 

For the present I must add that I do not even 33 
agree with those who hold that arguments should al- 
ways be expressed in language which is not only pure, 
lucid and distinct, but also as free as possible from 
all elevation and ornateness. I readily admit that 



spicua debere esse confiteor, in rebus vero minoribus 
etiam sermone ac verbis quam maxima propriis et ex 

34 usu ; at si maior erit materia, nullum iis ornatum, 
qui modo non obscuret, subtrahendum puto. Nam 
et saepe plurimum lucis adfert ipsa translatio, cum 
etiam iurisconsulti, quorum summus circa verborum 
proprietatem labor est, litus esse audeant dicere, qua 

35 fluctus eludit. 1 Quoque quid est natura magis aspe- 
rum, hoc pluribus condiendum est voluptatibus ; et 
minus suspecta argumentatio dissimulatione, et mul- 
tum ad fidem adiuvat audientis voluptas. Nisi forte 
existimamus Ciceronem haec ipsa mala in argumen- 
tatione dixisse, silere leges inter arma, et gladium nobis 
interim ab ipsis porrigi legibus. Hie tamen habendus 
istis modus,, ut sint ornamento non impedimento. 

1 elidit, Valla. . 


BOOK V. xiv. 33-35 

arguments should be distinct and clear, and further 
that in arguments of a minor character the language 
and words should be as appropriate and as familiar 
as possible. But if the subject be one of real im- 34 
portance every kind of ornament should be employed, 
so long as it does nothing to obscure our meaning. 
For metaphor will frequently throw a flood of light 
upon a subject : even lawyers, who spend so much 
trouble over the appropriateness of words, venture 
to assert that the word litus is derived from eludere, 
because the shore is a place where the waves break 
in play. Further, the more unattractive the natural 35 
appearance of anything, the more does it require 
to be seasoned by charm of style : moreover, an argu- 
ment is often less suspect when thus disguised, and 
the charm with which it is expressed makes it all the 
more convincing to our audience. Unless indeed we 
think that Cicero was in error when he introduced 
phrases such as the following into an argumentative 
passage : " The laws are silent in the midst of arms," 
and " A sword is sometimes placed in our hands by 
the laws themselves." However, we must be careful 
to observe a happy mean in the employment of such 
embellishments, so that they may prove a real orna- 
ment and not a hindrance. 




R B 



HAEC, Marcelle Victor!, ex tua voluntate maxima 
ingressus, turn si qua ex nobis ad iuvenes bonos per- 
venire posset utilitas, novissime paene etiam necessi- 
tate quadam officii delegati mihi sedulo laborabam ; 
respiciens tamen illam curam meae voluptatis, quod 
filio, cuius eminens ingenium sollicitam quoque 
parentis diligentiam merebatur, hanc optimam par- 
tem relicturus hereditatis videbar ut, si me, quod 
aequum et optabile fuit, fata intercepissent, prae- 

2 ceptore tamen patre uteretur. At me" fortuna id 
agentem diebus ac noctibus festinantemque metu 
meae mortalitatis ita subito prostravit, ut laboris mei 
fructus ad neminem minus quam ad me pertineret. 
Ilium enim, de quo summa coiiceperam et in quo 
spem unicam senectutis reponebam, repetito vulnere 

3 orbitatis amisi. Quid nunc agam ? aut quern ultra 

cp. Proem, Bk. I. a cp. Proem, Bk. IV. 




I UNDERTOOK my present task, Marcellus Victorius, 
mainly to gratify your request, 1 but also with a view 
to assist the more earnest of our young men as far 
as lay in my power, while latterly the energy with 
which I have devoted myself to my labours has 
been inspired by the almost imperative necessity 
imposed by the office conferred 011 me, 2 though 
all the while I have had an eye to my own 
personal pleasure. For I thought that this work 
would be the most precious part of the . inheritance 
that would fall to my son, whose ability was so 
remarkable that it called for the most anxious 
cultivation on the part of his father. Thus if, as 
would have been but just and devoutly to be 
wished, the fates had torn me from his side, he 
would still have been able to enjoy the benefit of 
his father's instruction. Night and day I pursued 2 
this design, and strove to hasten its completion in 
the fear that death might cut me off with my task 
unfinished, when misfortune overwhelmed me with 
such suddenness, that the success of my labours now 
interests no one less than myself.' A second bereave- 
ment has fallen upon me, and I have lost him of 
whom I had formed the highest expectations, and 
in whom 1 reposed all the hopes that should solace 
my old age. What is there left for me to do ? Or 3 



esse usum mei, diis repugnantibus, credam? Nam 
ita forte accidit, ut eum quoque librum, quern de 
causis corruptae eloquentiae emisi, iam scribere 
aggressus ictu simili ferirer. Nonne igitur optimum 
fuit, infaustum opus et quidquid hoc est in me infe- 
licium litterarum super immaturum funus consump- 
turis viscera mea flammis iniicere neque hanc impiam 

4 vivacitatem novis insuper curis fatigare ? Quis enim 
mihi bonus parens ignoscat, si studere amplius pos- 
sum, ac non oderit hanc animi mei firmitatem, si 
quis in me alius usus vocis, quam ut incusem deos 
superstes omnium meorum, nullam in terras despi- 
cere providentiam tester, si non meo casu, cui tamen 
nihil obiici, nisi quod vivam, potest, at illorum certe, 
quos utique immeritos mors acerba damnavit, erepta 
prius mihi matre eorundern, quae nondum expleto 
aetatis undevicesimo anno duos enixa filios, quamvis 

5 acerbissimis rapta fatis, non infelix decessit? Ego 
vel hoc uno malo sic eram adflictus, ut me iam nulla 
fortuna posset efficere felicem. Nam cum omni 
virtute, quae in feminas cadit, fuucta insanabilem 
attulit marito dolorem, turn aetate tarn puellari, 
praesertim meae comparata, potest et ipsa numerari 

6 inter vulnera orbitatis. Liberis tamen superstitibus 
et, quod nefas erat, sed optabat ipsa, me salvo maxi- 


BOOK VI. PR. 3-6 

what further use can I hope to be on earth, when 
heaven thus frowns upon me ? For it so chances 
that just at the moment when I began my book on 
the causes of the decline of eloquence, I was stricken 
by a like affliction. Better had I thrown that ill- 
omened work and all my ill-starred learning upon 
the flames of that untimely pyre that was to consume 
the darling of my heart, and had not sought to 
burden my unnatural persistence in this wicked 
world with the fatigue of fresh labours ! For what 4 
father with a spark of proper feeling would pardon 
me for having the heart to pursue my researches 
further, and would not hate me for my insensibility, 
had I other use for my voice than to rail against 
high heaven for having suffered me to outlive all 
my nearest and dearest, and to testify that provi- 
dence deigns not at all to watch over this earth of 
ours ? If this is not proved by my own misfortune 
(and yet my only fault is that I still live), it is most 
surely manifest in theirs, who were cut off thus 
untimely ; their mother was taken from me earlier 
still, she had borne me two sons ere the completion of 
her nineteenth year ; but for her, though she too died 
most untimely, death was a blessing. Yet for me her 5 
death alone was such a blow that thereafter no good 
fortune could bring me true happiness. For she had 
every virtue that is given to woman to possess, and 
left her husband a prey to irremediable grief; nay, 
so young was she when death took her, that if her 
age be compared with mine, her decease was like 
the loss not merely of a wife, but of a daughter. 
Still her children survived her, and I, too, lived on 6 
by some unnatural ordinance of fate, which for all 
its perversity was what she herself desired ; and 



mos cruciatus praecipiti via effugit. Mihi filius minor 
quintum egressus annum prior alterum ex duobus 

7 emit lumen. Non sum ambitiosus in malis nee 
augere lacrimarum causas volo, utinamque esset ratio 
minuendi. -Sed dissimulare qui possum, quid ille 
gratiae in vultti, quid iucunditatis in sermone, quos 
ingenii igniculos, quam substantiam placidae et (quod 
scio vix posse credi) iam turn altae mentis ostenderit; 
qualis amorem quicunque alienus infans mereretur. 

8 Illud vero insidiantis, quo me validius cruciaret, 
fortunae fuit, ut ille mihi blandissimus me suis nutri- 
cibus, me aviae educanti, me omnibus, qui sollicitare 

9 illas aetates solent, anteferret. Quapropter illi do- 
lori, quern ex matre optima atque omnem laudem 
supergressa paucos ante menses ceperam, gratulor. 
Minus enim est, quod flendum meo nomine quam 
quod illius gaudendum est. 

Una post haec Quintiliani mei spe ac voluptate 
10 nitebar, et poterat sufficere solacio. Non enim flos- 
culos, sicut prior, sed iam decimum aetatis ingressus 
annum, certos ac deformatos fructus ostenderat. 
luro per mala mea, per infelicem conscientiam, per 
illos manes, numina mei doloris, eas me in illo 
vidisse virtutes ingenii, non modo ad percipiendas 
disciplinas, quo nihil praestaiitius cognovi plurima 
expertus, studiique iam turn non coacti (sciunt prae- 


BOOK VI. PR. 6-ro 

thus by her swift departure from this life she escaped 
the worst of tortures. v My youngest boy was barely 
five, when he was the first to leave me,, robbing me 
as it were of one of my two eyes. I have no desire 7 
to flaunt my woes in the public gaze, nor to exagge- 
rate the cause I have for tears ; would that I had 
some means to make it less ! But how can I forget 
the charm of his face, the sweetness of his speech, 
his first flashes of promise, and his actual possession 
of a calm and, incredible though it may seem, a 
powerful mind. Such a child would have captivated 
my affections, even had he been another's. *^Nor was 8 
this all ; to enhance my agony the malignity of 
designing fortune had willed that he should devote 
all his love to me, preferring me to his nurses, to 
his grandmother who brought him up, and all those 
who, as a rule, win the special affection of infancy. 
I am, therefore, grateful to the grief that came to 9 
me some few months before his loss in the death 
of his mother, the best of women, whose virtues 
were beyond all praise. For I have less reason to 
weep my own fate than to rejoice at hers. 

After these calamities all my hopes, all my delight 
were centred on my little Quintilian, and he might 
have sufficed to console me. For his gifts were not 10 
merely in the bud like those of his brother : as 
early as his ninth birthday he had put forth sure 
and well-formed fruit. By my own sorrows, by the 
testimony of my own sad heart, by his departed 
spirit, the deity at whose shrine my grief does 
worship, I swear that I discerned in him such talent, 
not merely in receiving instruction, although in all 
my wide experience I have never seen his like, nor 
in his power of spontaneous application, to which his 



ceptores), sed probitatis, pietatis, humanitatis, libe- 
ralitatis, ut prorsus posset hinc esse tanti fulminis 
metus, quod observatum fere est celerius occidere 
festinatam maturitatem et esse nescio quam, quae 
spes tantas decerpat, invidiam, ne videlicet ultra 

11 quam homini datum est nostra provehantur. Etiam 
ilia fortuita aderant omnia, vocis iucunditas clari- 
tasque, oris suavitas et in utracunque lingua, tan- 
quam ad earn demum natus esset, expressa proprietas 
omnium litterarum. Sed hae spes adhuc ; ilia ma- 
iora, constantia, gravitas, contra dolores etiam ac 
metus robur. Nam quo ille animo, qua medicorum 
admiratione mensium octo valetudinem tulit ! ut me 
in supremis consolatus est ' quam etiam deficiens 
iamque lion noster ipsum ilium alienatae mentis 

12 errorem circa scholas ac litteras habuit ! Tuosne ego, 
o meae spes inanes, labentes oculos, tuum fugientem 
spiritum vidi? Tuum corpus frigidum exsangue 
complexus animam recipere auramque commuiiem 
haurire amplius potui, dignus his cruciatibus, quos 

13 fero, dignus his cogitationibus ? Tene consulari nuper 
adoptione ad omnium spes honorum prius admotum, 
te avunculo praetori generum destinatum, te [om- 
nium spes] avitae eloquentiae candidatum, super- 

1 It was customary for the next-of-kin to receive in the 
mouth the last breath of the dying to continue the existence 
of the spirit. 


BOOK VI. PR. I0 -i3 

teachers can bear witness, but such upright, pious, 
humane and generous feelings, as alone might have 
sufficed to fill me with the dread of the fearful 
thunder-stroke that has smitten me down : for it 
is a matter of common observation that those who 
ripen early die young, and that there is some malign 
influence that delights in cutting short the greatest 
promise and refusing to permit our joys to pass 
beyond the bound allotted to mortal man. He 11 
possessed every incidental advantage as well, a 
pleasing and resonant voice, a sweetness of speech, 
and a perfect correctness in pronouncing every letter 
both in Greek and Latin, as though either were his 
native tongue. But all these were but the promise 
of greater things. He had finer qualities, courage 
and dignity, and the strength to resist both fear 
and pain. What fortitude he showed during an ill- 
ness of eight months, till all his physicians marvelled 
at him ! How he consoled me during his last 
moments. How even in the wanderings of delirium 
did his thoughts recur to his lessons and his literary 
studies, even when his strength was sinking and he 
was no longer ours to claim ! Child of my vain 12 
hopes, did I see your eyes fading in death and your 
breath take its last flight? Had I the heart to 
receive your fleeting spirit, 1 as I embraced your cold 
pale body, and to live on breathing the common air. 
Justly do I endure the agony that now is mine, and 
the thoughts that torment me. Have I lost you at 13 
the moment when adoption by a consular had given 
hope that you would rise to all the high offices of 
state, when you were destined to be the son-in-law 
of your uncle the praetor, and gave promise of 
rivalling the eloquence of your grandsire ? and do 1 



stes parens tantum ad poenas, amisi l ? Et si non 
cupido lucis, certe patientia vindicet te reliqua mea 
aetate. Nam frustra mala omnia ad crimen fortunae 

14 relegamus. Nemo nisi sua culpa diu dolet. Sed 
vivimus, et aliqua vivendi ratio quaerenda est, cre- 
dendumque doctissimis hominibus, qui unicum ad- 
versorum solacium litteras putaverunt. Si quando 
tamen ita resederit praesens impetus, ut aliqua tot 
luctibus alia cogitatio inseri possit, noii iniuste peti- 
erim morae veniam. Quis enim dilata studia mire- 
tur, quae potius non abrupta esse mirandum est? 

15 Turn, si qua fuerint minus effecta iis, quae levius 
adhuc adflicti coepefamus, imperitanti fortunae re- 
mittantur, quae, si quid mediocrium alioqui in nostro 
ingenio virium fuit, ut non exstinxerit, debilitavil 
tamen. Sed vel propter hoc nos contumacius ei 
gamus, quod illam ut perferre nobis difficile est, i1 
facile contemnere. Nihil enim sibi adversus m< 
reliquit et infelicem quidem, sed certissimam tamen 

16 attulit mihi ex his malis securitatem. Boni autem 
consulere nostrum laborem vel propter hoc aequum 
est, quod in nullum iam proprium usum perse vera- 
mus, sed omnis haec cura alienas utilitates (si modo 

1 omnium spes, br&ekfted by Spalding. avitae, Erasmus : 
acutis or acutae, MSS. : ad poenas amisi, Regius : poenas, 







BOOK VI. PR. 13-16 

your father survive only to weep ? May my endur- 
ance (not my will to live, for that is gone from me) 
prove me worthy of you through all my remaining 
years. For it is in vain that we impute all our ills 
to fortune. No man grieves long save through his 
own fault. But I still live, and must find something 14 
to make life tolerable, and must needs put faith in 
the verdict of the wise, who held that literature 
alone can provide true solace in adversity. Yet, if 
ever the violence of my present grief subside and 
admit the intrusion of some other thought on so 
many sorrowful reflexions, I may with good cause 
ask pardon for the delay in bringing my work to 
completion. Who can wonder that my studies have 
been interrupted, when the real marvel is that they 
have not been broken off altogether? Should 15 
certain portions therefore betray a lack of finish 
compared with what was begun in the days when 
my affliction was less profound, I would ask that the 
imperfections should be regarded with indulgence, 
as being due to the cruel tyranny of fortune, which, 
if it has not utterly extinguished, has at any rate 
weakened such poor powers of intellect as I once 
possessed. But for this very reason I must rouse 
myself to face my task with greater spirit, since it 
is easy to despise fortune, though it may be hard 
to bear her blows. For there is nothing left that 
she can do to me, since out of my calamities she 
has wrought for me a security which, full of sorrow 
though it be, is such that nothing can shake it. 
And the very fact that I have no personal interest 16 
in persevering with my present work, but am moved 
solely by the desire to serve others, if indeed any- 
thing that I write can be of such service, is a reason 


quid utile scribimus) spectat. Nos miseri sicut facili- 
tates patrimonii nostri, ita hoc opus aliis praepara- 
bamus, aliis relinquemus. 

I. Peroratio sequebatur, quam cumulum quidam, 
conclusionem alii vocant. Eius duplex ratio est 
posita aut in rebus aut in adfectibus. Rerum repe- 
titio et congregatio, quae Graece dicitur di'a/c<a- 
AauacrtSj a quibusdam Latinorum enumeratio, et 
memoriam iudicis reficit et totam simul causam ponit 
ante oculos et, etiamsi per singula minus moverat, 

2 turba valet. In hac, quae repetemus, quam brevis- - 
sime dicenda sunt et, quod Graeco verbo patet, 
decurrendum per capita. Nam, si morabimur, non 
iam enumeratio sed quasi altera net oratio. Qua 
auteni enumeraiida videntur, cum pondere aliqu 
dicenda sunt et aptis excitanda sententiis et figuris 
utique varianda ; alioqui nihil est odiosius recta ilia 

3 repetitione velut memoriae iudicum diffidentis. Sunt 
autem innumerabiles species, 1 optimeque in Verrem 
Cicero : Si pater ipse iudicaret, quid diceret, cum haec pro- 
barentur? et deinde subiecit enumerationem; aut cum 

1 species, added by Halm. 

1 v. lii. 136. 



BOOK VI. PR. 16-1. 3 

for regarding my labours with an indulgent eye. 
Alas ! I shall bequeath it, like my patrimony, for 
others than those to whom it was my design to 
leave it. * 

I. The next subject which I was going to discuss 
was the peroration which some call the completion 
and others the conclusion. There are two kinds of 
peroration, for it may deal either with facts or with 
the emotional aspect of the case. The repetition 
and grouping of the facts, which the Greeks call 
dvaK^>aXaiWis and some of our own writers call the 
enumeration, serves both to refresh the memory of 
the judge and to place the whole of the case before 
his eyes, and, even although the facts may have 
made little impression on him in detail, their cumu- 
lative effect is considerable. This final recapitu- 2 
lation must be as brief as possible and, as the 
Greek term indicates, we must summarise the facts 
under the appropriate heads. For if we devote 
too much time thereto, the peroration will cease 
to be an enumeration and will constitute some- 
thing very like a second speech. On the other 
hand the points selected for enumeration must 
be treated with weight and dignity, enlivened 
by apt reflexions and diversified by suitable figures; 
for there is nothing more tiresome than a dry re- 
petition of facts, which merely suggests a lack of 
confidence in the judges' memory. There are how- 3 
ever innumerable ways in which this may be done. 
The finest example is provided by Cicero's prosecu- 
tion of Verres. 1 " If your own father were among 
your judges, what would he say when these facts 
were proved against you ? " Then follows the enumer- 



idem in eundem per invocationem deorum spoliata a 
praetore templa dinumerat. Licet et dubitare, num 
quid nos fugerit, et quid responsurus sit adversarius 
his et his, aut quam spem accusator habeat omnibus 

4 ita defensis. Ilia vero iucundissima, si contingat 
aliquod ex adversario ducere argumentum, ut si 
dicas : Reliquit hanc partem causae, aut invidia premere 
maluit, aut ad preces confugit merito, cum sciret haec et 

5 haec. Sed non sunt singulae species persequendae, 
ne sola videantur, quae forte nunc dixero, cum occa- 
siones et ex causis et ex dictis adversariorum et ex 
quibusdam fortuitis quoque oriantur. Nee referenda 
modo nostra, sed postulandum etiam ab adversariis, 

6 ut ad quaedam respondeant. Id autem, si et actioni 
supererit locus et ea proposuerimus, quae refelli non 
possint. Nam provocare quae inde sint fortia, non 

7 arguentis est, sed monentis. Id unum epilogi genus 
visum est plerisque Atticorum et philosophis fere 
omnibus, qui de arte oratoria scriptum aliquid reli- 

1 ib. Ixxii. 

BOOK VI. i. 3-7 

ation. Another admirable example l may be found 
in the same speech where the enumeration of the 
temples which the praetor had despoiled takes the 
form of invoking the various deities concerned. We 
may also at times pretend to be in doubt whether 
we have not omitted something and to wonder what 
the accused will say in reply to certain points or 
what hope the accuser can have after the manner in 
which we have refuted all the charges brought against 
us. But the most attractive form of peroration is 4 
that which we may use when we have an opportun- 
ity of drawing some argument from our opponent's 
speech, as for instance when we say " He omitted to 
deal with this portion of the case," or "He preferred 
to crush us by exciting odium against us," or " He 
had good reason for resorting to entreaty, since he 
knew certain facts." But I must refrain from deal- 5 
ing with the various methods individually, for fear 
that the instances that I produce should be regarded 
as exhaustive, whereas our opportunities spring from 
the nature of the particular case, from the statements 
of our opponents and also from fortuitous circum- 
stances. Nor must we restrict ourselves to recapitu- 
lating the points of our own speech, but must call 
upon our opponent to reply to certain questions. 
This however is only possible if there is time for him 6 
to do so and if the arguments which we have put 
forward are such as not to admit of refutation. For 
to challenge points which tell in our opponent's 
favour is not to argue against him, but to play the 
part of prompter to him. The majority of Athenians 7 
and almost all philosophers who have left anything 
in writing on the art of oratory have held that the 
recapitulation is the sole form of peroration. I 




querunt. Id sensisse Atticos credo, quia Athenis 
adfectus movere etiam per praeconem prohibebatur 
orator. Philosophos minus miror, apud quos vitii 
loco est adfici ; nee boni mores videntur, sic a vero 
iudicem averti, nee convenire bono viro vitiis uti. 
Necessaries tamen adfectus fatebuntur, si aliter ob- 
tineri vera et iusta et in commune profutura non 

8 possint. Ceterum illud constitit inter omnes, etiam 
in aliis partibus actionis, si multiplex causa sit et 
pluribus argumentis defensa, utiliter dvaK<aA.cuWu' 
fieri solere, sicut nemo dubitaverit multas esse cau- 
sas, in quibus nullo loco sit necessaria, si breves et 
simplices fuerint. Haec pars perorationis accusatori 
patronoque ex aequo communis est. 

9 Adfectibus quoque iisdem fere utuntur, sed aliis 
hie, aliis 1 ille saepius ac magis, nam huic concitare 
iudices, illi flectere convenit. Verum et accusator 
habet interim lacrimas ex miseratione eius rei quam 
ulciscitur ; et reus de indignitate calumniae aut con- 

1 aliis, Spalding : aut, A G. 

1 Athenaeus (xiii. 6, 590 E) states that a law against 
appeals to the emotions was passed at Athens after Hype- 
rides' defence of Phryne (see IT. xv. 9.). But there is no real 
evidence for the existence of such a law save in cases tried 
before the Areopagus (see Arist. Rhet. I. i. 5). Appeals for 
pity were as freely employed in the ordinary courts of 
Athens during the fourth century as at Rome. When Xeno- 
phon (Mem. IV. iv. 4) says that Socrates refused to beg 
mercy of his judges contrary to the law, he seems to refer 
to the spirit, not the letter. 


BOOK VI. i. 7-9 

imagine that the reason why the Athenians did so 
was that appeals to the emotions were forbidden to 
Athenian orators, a proclamation to this effect being 
actually made by the court-usher. 1 I am less sur- 
prised at the philosophers taking this view, for they 
regard susceptibility to emotion as a vice, and think 
it immoral that the judge should be distracted from 
the truth by an appeal to his emotions and that 
it is unbecoming for a good man to make use of 
vicious procedure to serve his ends. None the less 
they must admit that appeals to emotion are neces- 
sary if there are no other means for securing the 
victory of truth, justice and the public interest. It 8 
is however admitted by all that recapitulation may 
be profitably employed in other portions of the 
speech as well, if the case is complicated and a 
number of different arguments have been employed 
in the defence ; though no one will doubt but that 
there are many cases, in which no recapitulation at 
all is necessary at any point, assuming, that is, that 
the cases are both brief and simple. This part of 
the peroration is common both to the prosecution 
and the defence. 

Both parties as a general rule may likewise em- 9 
ploy the appeal to the emotions, but they will 
appeal to different emotions and the defender will 
employ such appeals with greater frequency and 
fulness. For the accuser has to rouse the judge, 
while the defender has to soften him. Still even 
the accuser will sometimes make his audience weep 
by the pity excited for the man whose wrongs he 
seeks to avenge, while the defendant will at times 
develop no small vehemence when he complains of 
the injustice of the calumny or conspiracy of which 

c c 2 


spirationis vehementius interim queritur. Dividere 
igitur haec officia commodissimum, quae plerumque 
sunt, ut dixi, in prooemio similia, sed hie liberiora ple- 

10 nioraque. Inclinatio enim iudicum ad nos petitur mitio 
parcius, cum admitti satis est et oratio tota superest ; 
in epilogo vero est, qualem animum iudex in con- 
silium ferat, et iam nihil amplius dicturi sumus nee 

11 restat quo reservemus. Est igitur utrisque com- 
mune, conciliare sibi, avertere ab adversario iudicem, 
concitare adfectus et componere. Et brevissimum 
quidem hoc praeceptum dari utrique parti potest, ut 
totas causae suae vires orator ponat ante oculos ; et 
cum viderit, quid invidiosum, favorabile, invisum, 
miserabile aut sit in rebus" aut videri possit, ea 
dicat, quibus, si iudex esset, ipse maxime moveretur. 

12 Sed certius est ire per singula. 

Et quae concilient quidem accusatorem, in prae- 
ceptis exordii iam diximus. Quaedam tamen, quae 
illic ostendere sat est, in peroratione implenda sunt 
magis, si contra impotentem, invisum, perniciosum 
suscepta causa est, si iudicibus ipsis aut gloriae dam- 

1 iv. i. 27, 28. 2 iv. i. 5 sq. 


BOOK VI. i. 9-12 

he is the victim. It will therefore be best to treat 
these duties separately : as I have already said, 1 they 
are much the same in the peroration as in the 
exordium, but are freer and wider in scope in the 
former. For our attempts to sway the judges are 10 
made more sparingly at the commencement of the 
speech, when it is enough that such an attempt 
should gain admittance and we have the whole 
speech before us. On the other hand in the per- 
oration we have to consider what the feelings of the 
judge will be when he retires to consider his verdict, 
for we shall have no further opportunity to say any- 
thing and cannot any longer reserve arguments to be 
produced later. It is therefore the duty of both parties 11 
to seek to win the judge's goodwill and to divert it 
from their opponent, as also to excite or assuage his 
emotions. And the following brief rule may be laid 
down for the observation of both parties, that the 
orator should display the full strength of his case 
before the eyes of the judge, and, when he has made 
up his mind what points in his case actually deserve 
or may seem to deserve to excite envy, goodwill, 
dislike or pity, should dwell on those points by which 
he himself would be most moved were he trying the 
case. But it will be safer to discuss these consider- 12 
ations in detail^ 

The points likely to commend the accuser to the 
judge have already been stated in my remarks on 
the exordium. 2 There are however certain things 
which require fuller treatment in the peroration 
than in the exordium, where it is sufficient merely to 
outline them. This fuller treatment is specially 
required if the accused be a man of violent, un- 
popular or dangerous character or if the condemna- 



13 natio rei aut deformitati futura absolutio. Nam 
egregie in Vatinium Calvus, Factum, inquit, ambitum 
scitis omnes et hoc vos scire omnes sciunt. Cicero qui- 
dem in Verrem etiam emendari posse infamiam iudi- 
ciorum damnato reo dicit ; quod est unum ex supra 
dictis. Metus etiam, si est adhibendus, ut faciat 
idem, hunc habet locum fortiorem quam in pro- 
oemio. Qua de re quid sentirem, alio iam libro 

14 exposui. Concitare quoque invidiam, odium, iram, 
liberius in peroratione contingit ; quorum invidiam 
gratia, odium turpitudo, iram offensio iudici facit, si 
contumax, arrogans, securus sit, quae non ex facto 
rnodo dictove aliquo sed vultu, habitu, aspectu 
moveri solet. Egregieque nobis adolescentibus dix- 
isse accusator Cossutiani Capitonis videbatur, Graece 
quidem, sed in hunc sensum, Erubescis Caesarem 

15 timere. Summa tamen concitandi adfectus accusa- 
tori in hoc est, ut id, quod obiecit, aut quam atro- 
cissimum aut etiam, si fieri potest, quam maxime 
miserabile esse videatur. Atrocitas crescit ex his, 
quid factum sit, a quo, in quern, quo animo, quo 

1 i. xv. 43. 2 iv. i. 20, 21. 

3 See Tac. Ann. xiii. 33. Cossutianus was condemned for 
extortion in his province. His accuser is not known. 


BOOK VI. i. 12-15 

tion of the accused is likely to cover the judges with 
glory or his acquittal with disgrace. Calvus for 13 
example in his speech against Vatinius makes an 
admirable remark : " You know, gentlemen, that 
bribery has been committed and everybody knows 
that you know it." Cicero again in the Verrines 1 
says that the ill-name acquired by the courts may 
be effaced by the condemnation of Verres, a state- 
ment that comes under the head of the conciliatory 
methods mentioned above. The appeal to fear also, 
if it is necessary to employ it to produce a like effect, 
occupies a more prominent place in the peroration 
than in the exordium, but I have expressed my views 
on this subject in an earlier book. 2 The peroration 14 
also provides freer opportunities for exciting the 
passions of jealousy, hatred or anger. As regards the 
circumstances likely to excite such feelings in the 
judge, jealousy will be produced by the influence of 
the accused, hatred by the disgraceful nature of his 
conduct, and anger by his disrespectful attitude to 
the court, if, for instance, he be contumacious, 
arrogant or studiously indifferent : such anger may be 
aroused not merely by specific acts or words, but by 
his looks, bearing and manner. In this connexion 
the remark made by the accuser of Cossutianus 
Capito 3 in my young days was regarded with great 
approval : the words used were Greek, but may be 
translated thus: "You blush to fear even Caesar." 
The best way however for the accuser to excite the 15 
feelings of the judge is to make the charge which he 
brings against the accused seem as atrocious or, if 
feasible, as deplorable as possible. Its atrocity may 
be enhanced by considerations of the nature of 
the act, the position of its author or the victim, the 


tempore, quo loco, quo modo ; quae omnia infinites 

16 tractatus habent. Pulsatum querimur : de re pri- 
mum ipsa dicendum ; turn si senex, si puer, si magis- 
tratus, si probus, si bene de re publica meritus ; 
etiam si percussus sit a vili aliquo contemptoque vel 
ex contrario a potente nimium vel ab eo, quo minime 
oportuit, et si die forte sollemni aut iis temporibus, 
cum iudicia eius rei maxime exercerentur, aut in 
sollicito ci'vitatis statu ; item in theatre, in templo, 

17 in contione, crescit invidia ; et si non errore nee ira 
vel etiam, si forte ira, sed iniqua, quod patri adfuis- 
set, quod respondisset, quod honores contra peteret, 
et si plus etiam videri potest voluisse quam fecit. 
Plurimum tamen adfert atrocitatis modus, si graviter, 
si contumeliose : ut Demosthenes ex parte percussi 
corporis, ex vultu ferientis, ex habitu invidiam Midiae 

18 quaerit. Occisus utruni ferro an igne an veneno, 
uno vulnere an pluribus, subito an exspectatione 

1 in Mid. 72. 
39 2 

BOOK VI. i. 15-18 

purpose, time, place and manner of the act : all of 
which may be treated with infinite variety. Suppose 16 
that we are complaining that our client has been 
beaten. We must first speak of the act itself; we 
shall then proceed to point out that the victim was 
an old man, a child, a magistrate, an honest man or 
a benefactor to the state ; we shall also point out 
that the assailant was a worthless and contemptible 
fellow, or (to take the opposite case) was in a 
position of excessive power or was the last man who 
should have given the blow, or again that the 
occasion was a solemn festival, or that the act was 
committed at a time when such crimes were 
punished with special severity by the courts or when 
public order was at a dangerously low ebb. Again 
the hatred excited by the act will be enhanced if it 
was committed in the theatre, in a temple, or at 
a public assembly, and if the blow was given not 17 
in mistake or in a moment of passion or, if it 
was the result of passion which was quite un- 
justifiable, being due to the fact that the victim 
had gone to the assistance of his father or had 
made some reply or was a candidate for the same 
office as his assailant ; or finally we may hint that 
he wished to inflict more serious injury than he 
succeeded in inflicting. But it is the manner of the 
act that contributes most to the impression of its 
atrocity, if, for example, the blow was violent or in- 
sulting : thus Demosthenes 1 seeks to excite hatred 
against Midias by emphasising the position of the 
blow, the attitude of the assailant and the expression 
of his face. It is in this connexion that we shall IS 
have to consider whether a man was killed by sword 
or fire or poison, by one wound or several, and 



tortus, ad hanc partem maxime pertinet. Utitur 
frequenter accusator et miseratione, cum aut eius 
casum, quern ulciscitur, aut liberorum ac parentium 

19 solitudinem conqueritur. Etiam futuri temporis 
imagine iudices movet, quae maneant eos, qui de vi 
et iniuria questi sunt, nisi vindicentur; fugiendum 
de civitate, cedendum bonis aut omnia, quaecunque 

20 inimicus fecerit, perferenda. Sed saepius id est 
accusatoris, avertere iudicem a miseratione, qua reus 
sit usurus, atque ad fortiter iudicandum concitare. 
Cuius loci est etiam occupare, quae dicturum factu- 
rumve adversarium putes. Nam et cautiores ad 
custodiam suae religionis iudices facit et gratiam 
responsuris aufert, cum ea quae dicta sunt ab accusa- 
tore iam, si pro reo repetentur, non sint nova : ut 
Servium Sulpicium Messala contra Aufidiam, ne signa- 
torum, ne ipsius discrimen obiiciatur sibi, praemonet. 
Nee non ab Aeschine, quali sit usurus Demosthenes 
actione^ praedictum est. Docendi quoque interim 
iudices, quid rogantibus respondere debeant ; quod 
est unum repetitionis genus. 

21 Periclitantem vero commendat dignitas et studia 

1 cp. iv. ii. 106. See note prefixed to Index. 

2 in Gtes. 207. 


BOOK VI. i. 1 8-2 1 

whether he was slain on the spot or tortured by 
being kept in suspense. The accuser will also 
frequently attempt to excite pity by complaining of 
the fate of the man whom he is seeking to avenge or 
of the desolation which has fallen upon his children 
or parents. The judges may also be moved by draw- 19 
ing a picture of the future, of the fate which awaits 
those who have complained of violence and wrong, 
if they fail to secure justice. They must go into exile, 
give up their property or endure to the end what- 
ever their enemy may choose to inflict upon them. 
But it will more frequently be the duty of the 20 
accuser to divert the judge from all the temptations 
to pity which the accused will place before him, and 
to incite him to give a strong and dispassionate 
verdict. It will also be his duty in this connexion 
to forestall the arguments and actions to which his 
opponent seems likely to have recourse. For it 
makes the judge more cautious in observing the 
sanctity of his oath and destroys the influence of 
those who are going to reply to us when the argu- 
ments used by the defence have already been dealt 
with by the prosecution, since they lose their novelty. 
An instance of this will be found in the speech of 
Messala against Aufidia, 1 where he warns Servius 
Sulpicius not to talk about the peril which 
threatens the signatories to the document and the 
defendant herself. Again Aeschiiies 2 foretells the 
line of defence which Demosthenes will pursue. 
There are also occasions when the judges should be 
told what answer they should make to requests on 
behalf of the accused, a proceeding which is a form 
of recapitulation. 

If we turn to the defendant, we must note that 21 



fortia et susceptae bello cicatrices et nobilitas et 
merita maiorum. Hoc, quod proxime dixi, Cicero 
atque Asinius certatim sunt usi, pro Scauro patre hie 

22 ille pro filio. Commendat et causa periculi, si sus- 
cepisse inimicitias ob aliquod factum honestum 
videtur; praecipue bonitas, humanitas, misericordia. 
lustius enim tune petere ea quisque videtur a iudice, 
quae aliis ipse praestiterit. Referenda pars haec 
quoque ad utilitatem rei publicae,ad iudicum gloriam, 

23 ad exemplum, ad memoriam posteritatis. Plurimum 
tamen valet miseratio, quae iudicem non flecti tantum 
cogit, sed motum quoque animi sui lacrimis confiteri. 
Haec petentur aut ex iis, quae passus est reus, aut iis 
quae cum maxime patitur, aut iis quae damnatum 
manent ; quae et ipsa duplicantur, cum dicimus ex 

24 qua illi fortuna et in quam recidendum sit. Adfert 
in his momentum et aetas et sexus et pignora ; liberi, 
dico, et parentes et propinqui. Quae omnia tractari 

1 See iv. i. 69. 

BOOK VI. i. 21-24 

his worth, his manly pursuits, the scars from wounds 
received in battle, his rank and the services rendered 
by his ancestors, will all commend him to the good- 
will of the judges. Cicero, 1 as I have already pointed 
out, and Asinius both make use of this form of 
appeal : indeed they may almost be regarded as 
rivals in this respect, since Cicero employed it when 
defending the elder Scaurus, Asinius when defend- 
ing the son. Again, the cause which has brought 22 
the accused into peril may serve to produce the 
same effect, if, for example, it appears that he has 
incurred enmity on account of some honourable 
action : above all his goodness, humanity or pity 
may be emphasised with this end in view. For it 
adds to the apparent justice of his claim, if all that 
he asks of the judge is that he should grant to him 
what he himself has granted to others. We may 
also in this connexion lay stress on the interests of 
the state, the glory which will accrue to the judges, 
the importance of the precedent which their verdict 
will set and the place it will hold in the memory of 
after generations. But the appeal which will carry 23 
most weight is the appeal to pity, which not merely 
forces the judge to change his views, but even to 
betray his emotion by tears. Such appeals to pity 
will be based either on the previous or present 
sufferings of the accused, or on those which await 
him if condemned. And the force of our appeal will 
be doubled if we contrast the fortune which he now 
enjoys with that to which he will be reduced, if he 
fail. In this connexion great play may be made by 24 
reference to the age and sex of the accused, or to 
his nearest and dearest, that is, his children, parents 
and kindred, all of which topics are treated in 



varie solent. Nonnunquam etiam ipse patronus has 
partes subit, ut Cicero pro Milone, me miserum ! o 
te infelicem ! Revocare me tu in patriam, Milo, potuisti 
per hos, ego te in patria per eosdern retinere non potero ? 
Maximeque, si, ut tune accidit, non conveniunt ei qui 

25 accusatur preces. Nam quis ferret Milonem pro 
capite suo supplicantem, qui a se virum nobilem 
interfectum, quia id fieri oportuisset, fateretur? 
Ergo et illi captavit ex ipsa praestantia animi favorem 
et in locum lacrimarum eius ipse successit. 

His praecipue locis utiles sunt prosopopoeiae, id 
est fictae alienarum personarum orationes, quales 
litigatorum ore dicit patronus. Nudae tantum res 
movent; at cum ipsos loqui fingimus, ex personis 

26 quoque trahitur adfectus. Non enim audire iudex 
videtur aliena mala deflentis, sed sensum ac vocem 
auribus accipere miserorum, quorum etiam mutus 
aspectus lacrimas movet ; quantoque essent misera- 
biliora, si ea dicerent ipsi, tanto sunt quadam portione 
ad adficiendum potentiora, cum velut ipsorum ore 

1 xxxvii. 102. 

BOOK VI. i. 24-26 

different ways. Sometimes the advocate himself may 
even assume the role of close intimacy with his 
client, as Cicero does in the pro Milone, 1 where he 
cries : " Alas, unhappy that I am ! Alas, my unfor- 
tunate friend ! You succeeded by the agency of 
those who are now your judges in recalling me to 
my native land, and cannot I through the same 
agency retain you in yours?" Such a method is 
especially serviceable when, as was the case with 
Milo, entreaty is not in keeping with the character 
of the accused. Who would have endured to hear 25 
Milo pleading for his life, when he admitted that 
he had killed a man of noble birth because it was 
his duty to do so ? Consequently Cicero sought to 
win the judges' goodwill for Milo by emphasising 
the staunchness of his character, and himself assumed 
the role of suppliant. 

Impersonation may also be employed with profit 
in such passages, and by impersonations I mean 
fictitious speeches supposed to be uttered, such as 
an advocate puts into the mouth of his client. The 
bare facts are no doubt moving in themselves ; but 
when we pretend that the persons concerned them- 
selves are speaking, the personal note adds to the 
emotional effect. For then the judge seems no 26 
longer to be listening to a voice bewailing another's 
ills, but to hear the voice and feelings of the unhappy 
victims, men whose appearance alone would call 
forth his tears even though they uttered never a 
word. And as their plea would awaken yet greater 
pity if they urged it with their own lips, so it is 
rendered to some extent all the more effective when 
it is, as it were, put into their mouth by their 
advocate : we may draw a parallel from the stage, 



dicuntur, ut scenicis actoribus eadem vox eademque 
pronuntiatio plus ad movendos adfectus sub persona 

27 valet. Itaque idem Cicero, quanquam preces non 
dat Miloni, eumque potius animi praestantia com- 
mendat, accommodavit tamen ei verba, convenientes 
etiani forti viro conquestiones : Frustra, inquit, mei 
suscepti labores ! spes fallaces ! cogitatio?ies inanes 
meas ! 

Nunquam tamen debet esse longa miseratio, nee 
sine causa dictum est, nihil facilius quam lacrimas 

28 inarescere. Nam cum etiam veros dolores mitiget 
tempus, citius evanescat necesse est ilia, quam 
dicendo effinximus, imago ; in qua si moramur, lacri- 
mis fatigatur auditor et requiescit et ab illo, quern 

29 ceperat, impetu ad rationem redit. Non patiamur 
igitur frigescere hoc opus, et adfectum, cum ad sum- 
mum perduxerimus, relinquamus nee speremus fore 
ut aliena quisquam diu ploret. Ideoque cum in aliis 
turn maxime in hac parte debet crescere oratio, quia, 
quidquid non adiicit prioribus, etiam detrahere 
videtur, et facile deficit adfectus qui descendit. 

30 Non solum autem dicendo sed etiam faciendo 
quaedam lacrimas movemus, unde et producere ipsos, 

1 pro Mil. xxxiv. 94. 

2 A quotation from the rhetorician Apollonius, cp. Cic. 
de Inv. i. 56. 


BOOK VI. i. 26-30 

where the actor's voice and delivery produce greater 
emotional effect when he is speaking in an assumed 
role than when he speaks in his own character. 
Consequently Cicero, to quote him once again, 27 
although he will not put entreaties into Milo's 
mouth, and prefers to commend him by his staunch- 
ness of character, still lends him words in the form 
of such complaint as may become a brave man. 1 
"Alas!" he says, "my labours have been in vain! 
Alas for my blighted hopes ! Alas for my baffled 
purpose ! " 

Appeals to pity should, however, always be brief, 
and there is good reason for the saying that nothing 
dries so quickly as tears. 2 Time assuages even 28 
genuine grief, and it is therefore inevitable that the 
'semblance of grief portrayed in our speech should 
vanish yet more rapidly. And if we spend too much 
time over such portrayal our hearer grows weary of 
his tears, takes a breathing space, and returns once 
more to the rational attitude from which he has 
been distracted by the impulse of the moment. We 29 
must not, therefore, allow the effect which we have 
produced to fall flat, and must consequently abandon 
our appeal to the emotion just when that emotion 
is at its height, nor must we expect anyone to 
weep for long over another's ills. For this reason 
our eloquence ought to be pitched higher in this 
portion of our speech than in any other, since, 
wherever it fails to add something to what has pre- 
ceded, it seems even to diminish its previous effect, 
while a diminuendo is merely a step towards the 
rapid disappearance of the emotion. 

Actions as well as words may be employed to 30 
move the court to tears. Hence the custom of 

VOL. n. D D 


qui periclitentur, squalidos atque deformes et liberos 
eorum ac parentes institutum, et ab accusatoribus 
cruentum gladium ostendi et lecta e vulneribus ossa 
et vestes sanguine perfusas videmus, et vulnera 

31 resolvi, verberata corpora iiudari. Quarum rerura 
ingens plerumque vis est velut in rem praesentem 
animos hominum ducentium, ut populum Romanum 
egit in furorem praetexta C. Caesaris praelata in 
funere cruenta. Sciebat interfectum eum, corpus 
denique ipsum impositum lecto erat, at vestis tamen 
ilia sanguine madens ita repraesentavit imaginem 
sceleris, ut non occisus esse Caesar sed turn maxime 

32 occidi videretur. Sed non ideo probaverim, quod fac- 
tum et lego et ipse aliquando vidi, depictam in tabula 
sipariove 1 imaginem rei, cuius atrocitate iudex erat 
commovendus. Quae enim est actoris infantia, qui 
mutam illam effigiem magis quam orationem pro se 

33 putet locuturam? At sordes et squalorem et pro- 
pinquorum quoque similem habitum scio profuisse, 
et magnum ad salutem momentum preces attulisse. 
Quare et obsecratio ilia iudicum per carissinia pig- 

1 sipariove, F. C. Conradus : supra lovem, MSS. 

BOOK VI. i. 30-33 

bringing accused persons into court wearing squalid 
and unkempt attire, and of introducing their children 
and parents, and it is with this in view that we see 
blood-stained swords, fragments of bone taken from 
the wound, and garments spotted with blood, dis- 
played by the accusers, wounds stripped of their 
dressings, and scourged bodies bared to view. The 31 
impression produced by such exhibitions is generally 
enormous, since they seem to bring the spectators 
face to face with the cruel facts. For example, the 
sight of the bloodstains on the purple-bordered toga 
of Gaius Caesar, which was carried at the head of 
his funeral procession, aroused the Roman people to 
fury. They knew that he had been killed ; they 
had even seen his body stretched upon the bier : 
but his garment, still wet with his blood, brought 
such a vivid image of the crime before their minds, 
that Caesar seemed not to have been murdered, but 
to be being murdered before their very eyes. Still I 32 
would not for this reason go so far as to approve a 
practice of which I have read, and which indeed I 
have occasionally witnessed, of bringing into court 
a picture of the crime painted on wood or canvas, 
that the judge might be stirred to fury by the 
horror of the sight. For the pleader who prefers 
a voiceless picture to speak for him in place of his 
own eloquence must be singularly incompetent. On 33 
the other hand, I know that the wearing of mourn- 
ing and the presentation of an unkempt appearance, 
and the introduction of relatives similarly arrayed, 
has proved of value, and that entreaties have been 
of great service to save the accused from condemna- 
tion. The practice therefore of appealing to the 
judges by all that is near and dear to them will be 

D D 2 


nora, utique si et reo sint liberi, coniux, parentes, 

34 utilis erit ; et deorum etiam invocatio velut ex bona 
conscientia profecta videri solet; stratum denique 
iacere et genua complecti, nisi si tamen persona nos 
et anteacta vita et rei condicio prohibebit ; quaedam 
enim tarn fortiter tueiida quam facta sunt. Verum 
sic habenda est auctoritatis ratio, ne sit invisa securi- 

35 tas. Filit quondam inter haec omnia potentissimum, 
quo L. Murenam Cicero accusantibus clarissimis viris 
eripuisse praecipue videtur, persuasitque nihil esse 
ad praesentem rerum statum utilius quam pridie 
Kalendas lanuarias ingredi consulatum. Quod genus 
nostris temporibus totum paene sublatum est, cum 
omnia curae tutelaeque unius innixa periclitari nullo 
iudicii exitu possint. 

36 De accusatoribus et reis sum locutus, quia in peri- 
culis maxime versatur adfectus. Sed privatae quoque 
causae utrumque habent perorationis genus, et illud 
quod est ex enumeratione probationum, et hoc quod 
ex lacrimis, si aut statu periclitari aut opinione liti- 
gator videtur. Nam in parvis quidem litibus has 

1 i.e. although such entreaties are effective, they cannot 
always be employed. Thus they would have been out of 
place in the case of Milo, whose character was such that it 
was necessary to defend him with a boldness worthy of the 
boldness required to perform the deed of which he was 
accused. Still we must not carry such methods (e.g. such 
as Cicero employs on behalf of Milo) too far. 


BOOK VI. i. 33-36 

of great service to the accused, especially if he, too, 
has children, a wife and parents. Invocation of the 34 
gods, again, usually gives the impression that the 
speaker is conscious of the justice of his cause, while 
it may produce a good effect if the accused throws 
himself on the ground and embraces the knees of 
the judges, unless his character, his past life and 
station prohibit a resort to this device : for there are 
some acts which require to be defended with no less 
boldness than was required for their commission. But 
we must take care not to carry matters with too 
high a hand, for fear of creating a bad impression 
by an appearance of over-confidence. 1 The most 35 
effective of all such methods was in times past that 
by which more than anything else Cicero is con- 
sidered to have saved Lucius Murena 2 from the 
attacks of his accusers, who were men of the greatest 
distinction. For he persuaded the court that nothing 
was more necessary in view of the critical position 
of affairs than that Murena should assume the consul- 
ship on the thirty-first of December. This form of 
appeal is now, however, almost entirely obsolete, 
since the safety of the state is to-day dependent on 
the watchful care of a single ruler, and cannot con- 
ceivably be imperilled by the result of a trial. 

I have spoken of accusers and accused because it 36 
is in situations involving danger that the emotional 
appeal is most serviceable. But private cases also 
admit of both kinds of peroration, namely, that which 
consists in the recapitulation of the proofs and that 
which takes the form of an appeal for pity, the 
latter being employed when the position or reputa- 
tion of the litigant seems to be in danger. For to 

2 pro Mur. xxxvii. 79. 



tragoedias movere tale est, quasi si personam Herculis 
et cothurnos aptare infantibus velis. 
>1 Ne illud quidem indignum est admonitione, ingens 
in epilogis meo iudicio verti discrimen, quomodo se 
dicenti, qui excitatur, accommodet. Nam et impe- 
ritia et rusticitas et rigor et deformitas adferunt 
interim frigus, diligenterque sunt haec actori provi- 

38 denda. Equidem repugnantes eos patrono et nihil 
vultu commotos et intempestive renidentes l et facto 
aliquo vel ipso vultu risum etiam moventes saepe vidi ; 
praecipue vero cum aliqua velut scenice fiunt, alio 

39 cadunt. 2 Transtulit aliquando patronus puellam, 
quae soror esse adversarii dicebatur (nam de hoc lis 
erat), in adversa subsellia, tanquam in gremio fratris 
relicturus, at is a nobis praemonitus discesserat. 
Turn ille, alioqui vir facundus, inopinatae rei casu 
obmutuit et infantem suam frigidissime reportavit. 

40 Alius imaginem mariti pro rea proferre magni puta- 
vit, et ea saepius risum fecit. Nam et ii, quorum 
officium erat ut traderent earn, ignari, qui esset epilo- 

1 renidentes, Spalding : residentes, A G. 
z alio, Halm : aliam, alia, alias, MSS. 


BOOK VI. i. 36-40 

embark on such tragic methods in trivial cases would 
be like putting the mask and buskins of Hercules 
on a small child. 

It is also worth while pointing out that, in my 37 
opinion, the manner in which the client whose 
sorrows we parade before the court conforms his 
behaviour to the methods of his advocate is of the 
utmost importance. For sometimes our appeal falls 
flat owing to the ignorance, rusticity, indifference or 
uilcouthness of our client, and it is consequently 
most important that the advocate should take all 
necessary precautions in this connexion. I have 38 
often seen clients whose behaviour was wholly out 
of keeping with the line adopted by their counsel, 
since their expression showed not the slightest 
emotion, while they displayed a most unseasonable 
cheerfulness and even aroused laughter by their 
looks or actions ; such incongruity is especially fre- 
quent when the appeal is of a theatrical character. 
On one occasion an advocate produced a girl alleged 39 
to be the sister of the opposing party (for it was on 
this point that the dispute turned) and led her 
across to the benches occupied by his opponents as 
though to leave her in the arms of her brother: I how- 
ever had given the brother timely warning and he had 
left his seat. The advocate, although as a rule an 
eloquent speaker, was struck dumb by the unexpected 
turn of events and took his little girl back again in 
the tamest possible manner. There was another 40 
advocate who was defending a woman who thought 
to secure a great effect by producing the portrait of 
her husband, but sent the court into repeated 
peals of laughter. For the persons entrusted with 
the duty of handing in the portrait had no idea 



gus, quotiens respexisset patronus, offerebant palam, 
et prolata novissime deformitate ipsa (nam senis 
cadaver! cera l erat infusa) praeteritam quoque ora- 

41 tionis gratiam perdidit. Nee ignotum, quid Glyconi, 
cui Spiridion fuit cognomen, acciderit. Huic puer, 
quern is productum quid fleret interrogabat, a pae- 
dagogo se vellicari respondit. Sed nihil ilia circa 
Cepasios Ciceronis fabula efficacius ad pericula epi- 

42 logorum. Omnia tamen haec tolerabilia iis, quibus 
actionem mutare facile est ; at, qui a stilo non rece- 
dunt, aut conticescunt ad hos casus aut frequentissime 
falsa dicunt. Inde est enim, Tendit ad genua vestra 
supplices manus, et Haeret in complexu liberorum miser, 
et Revocat ecce me, etiamsi nihil horum is, de quo 

43 dicitur, faciat. Ex scholis haec vitia, in quibus omnia 
libere fingimus et impune, quia pro facto est quidquid 
voluimus ; non admittit hoc idem veritas, egregieque 
Cassius dicenti adolescentulo : Quid me torvo mdtu 
intuerisj Severe ? Non mehercule, inquit, faciebam, sed 
si sic scripsisti, ecce ! et quam potuit truculentissime 

44 eum aspexit. Illud praecipue monendum, ne quis 

1 cadaver! cera, Halm: caduca veri, AG. 

1 pro Cluent. xx. sqq. cp. Quint, vi. iii. 40. 

BOOK VI. i. 40-44 

of the nature of a peroration and displayed it when- 
ever the advocate looked their way, and when at last 
it was produced at the proper moment it destroyed 
all the good effect of his previous eloquence by its 
hideousness, for it was a wax cast taken from an old 
man's corpse. We are also familiar with the story 41 
of what happened to Glycon, nicknamed Spiridion. 
He asked a boy whom he produced in court why he 
was crying ; to which the boy replied, that his 
paedagogus was pinching him. But the most effective 
warning as to the perils which beset the peroration 
is the story told by Cicero 1 about the Caepasii. 
But all these perils may be boldly faced by those 42 
who have no difficulty in changing their line of 
pleading. Those however who cannot get away 
from what they have written, are reduced to silence 
by such emergencies or else led into making false 
statements, as for instance if an advocate should say, 
"He stretches out suppliant hands to embrace your 
knees," or "The unhappy man is locked in the 
embrace of his children," or " See he recalls me to 
the point," although the person in question is doing 
none of these things. Such faults are due to the 43 
practice of the schools, where we are free to feign 
what we will with impunity, because we are at 
liberty to invent facts. But this is impossible when 
we are confronted with realities, and it was an 
excellent remark that Cassius made to a young 
orator who said, "Why do you look so fiercely at 
me, Severus ? " To which he replied, " I was doing 
nothing of the kind, but if it is in your manuscript, 
here you are ! " And he fixed his eyes on him with 
the most ferocious scowl that he could muster. 
There is one point which it is specially important to 44 



nisi summis ingenii viribus ad movendas lacrimas 
aggredi audeat; nam ut est longe vehementissimus 
hie, cum invaluit, adfectus, ita, si nihil efficit, tepet ; 
quern melius infirmus actor tacitis iudicum cogitatio- 

45 nibus reliquisset. Nam et vultus et vox et ipsa ilia 
excitati rei facies ludibrio etiam plerumque sunt 
hominibus, quos non permoverunt. Quare metiatur 
ac diligenter aestimet vires suas actor et quantum 
onus subiturus sit intelligat; nihil habet ista res 
medium, sed aut lacrimas meretur aut risum. 

46 Non autem commovere tantum miserationem se( 
etiam discutere epilogi est proprium cum oration< 
continua, quae motos lacrimis iudices ad iustitiai 
reducat, turn etiam quibusdam urbane dictis, qual< 
est Date puero panem, ne ploret ; et corpulento liti| 
tori, cuius adversarius, item puer, circa iudices en 
ab advocate latus : Quid faciam ? ego te baiulare m 

47 possum. Sed haec tamen non debent esse mimic? 
Itaque nee ilium probaverim, quanquam inter claris- 
simos sui temporis oratores fuit, qui pueris in epilo- 
gum productis talos iecit in medium, quos illi diripere 
coeperunt; namque haec ipsa discriminis sui igno- 

BOOK VI. i. 44-47 

remember, that we should never attempt to move our 
audience to tears without drawing on all the resources 
of our eloquence. For while this form of emotional 
appeal is the most effective of all, when successful^ 
its failure results in anti-climax, and if the pleader is 
a feeble speaker he would have been wiser to leave 
the pathos of the situation to the imagination of the 
judges. For look and voice and even the expression 45 
on the face of the accused to which the attention of 
the court is drawn will generally awaken laughter 
where they fail to awaken compassion. Therefore 
the pleader must measure and make a careful 
estimate of his powers, and must have a just com- 
prehension of the difficulty of the task which he 
contemplates. For there is no halfway house in such 
matters between tears and laughter. 

The task of the peroration is not however confined 46 
to exciting pity in the judges : it may also be re- 
quired to dispel the pity which they feel, either by 
a set speech designed to recall them from their tears 
to a consideration of the justice of the case, or by a 
few witticisms such as, " Give the boy some bread to 
stop him crying," or the remark made by counsel 
to a corpulent client, whose opponent, a mere child, 
had been carried round the court by his advocate, 
" What am I to do? I can't carry you!" Such 47 
jests should not however descend to buffoonery. 
Consequently I cannot give my approval to the 
orator, although he was one of the most distin- 
guished speakers of his day, who, when his opponent 
brought in some children to enhance the effect of 
his peroration, threw some dice among them, with 
the result that they began to scramble for them. 
For their childish ignorance of the perils with which 



48 rantia potuit esse miserabilis ; neque ilium, qui, cum 
esset cruentus gladius ab accusatore prolatus, quo is 
hominem probabat occisum, subito ex subselliis ut 
territus fugit et, capite ex parte velato cum ad agen- 
dum ex turba prospexisset, interrogavit, an iam ille 
cum gladio recessisset. Fecit enim risum, sed ridi- 

49 culus fuit. Discutiendae tamen oratione eiusmodi 
scenae, egregieque Cicero, qui contra imaginem 
Saturnini pro Rabirio graviter et contra iuvenem, 
cuius subinde vulnus in iudicio resolvebatur, pro 
Vareno multa dixit urbane. 

50 Sunt et illi leniores epilogi, quibus adversario 
satisfacimus, si forte sit eius persona talis, ut illi 
debeatur reverentia, aut cum amice aliquid commo- 
nemus et ad concordiam hortamur. Quod est genus 
egregie tractatum a Passieno, cum Domitiae uxpris 
suae pecuniaria lite adversus fratrem eius Ahenobar- 
bum ageret ; nam, cum de necessitudine multa dix- 
isset, de fortuna quoque, qua uterque abundabat, 
adiecit : Nihil vobis minus deest, quam de quo conten- 

51 Omnes autem hos adfectus, etiamsi quibusdam 

1 cp. pro Rob. ix. 24. 

BOOK VI. i. 47-51 

they were threatened might in itself have awakened 
compassion. For the same reason I cannot commend 48 
the advocate who, when his opponent the accuser 
produced a bloodstained sword in court, fled suddenly 
from the benches as though in an agony of terror, 
and then, when his turn came to plead, peeped out 
of the crowd with his head half covered by his robe 
and asked whether the man with the sword had 
gone away. For though he caused a laugh, he made 
himself ridiculous. Still, theatrical effects of the 49 
kind we are discussing can be dispelled by the 
power of eloquence. Cicero provides most admirable 
examples of the way in which this may be done both 
in the pro Rabirio l where he attacks the production 
in court of the portrait of Saturninus in the most 
dignified language, and in the pro Vareno where he 
launches a number of witticisms against a youth 
whose wound had been unbound at intervals in the 
course of the trial. 

There are also milder kinds of peroration in which, 50 
if our opponent is of such a character that he de- 
serves to be treated with respect, we strive to 
ingratiate ourselves with him or give him some 
friendly warning or urge him to regard us as his 
friends. This method was admirably employed by 
Passienus when he pleaded in a suit brought by his 
wife Domitia against her brother Ahenobarbus for 
the recovery of a sum of money : he began by 
making a number of remarks about the relationship 
of the two parties and then, referring to their 
wealth, which was in both cases enormous, added, 
" There is nothing either of you need less than the 
subject of this dispute." 

All these appeals to emotion, although some hold 51 


videntur in prooemio atque in epilogo sedem habere, 
in quibus sane sint frequentissimi, tamen aliae quo- 
que partes recipiunt, sed breviores, ut cum ex iis 
plurima sint reservanda. 1 At hie, si usquam, totos 

52 eloquentiae aperire fontes licet. Nam et, si bene 
diximus reliqua, possidebimus iam iudicum animos, 
et e confragosis atque asperis evecti tota pandere 
possumus vela, et, cum sit maxima pars epilogi 
amplificatio, verbis atque sententiis uti licet magni- 
ficis et ornatis. Tune est commovendum theatrum, 
cum ventum est ad ipsum illud, quo veteres tragoe- 
diae comoediaeque cluduiitur, Plodite. 

53 In aliis autem partibus tractandus erit adfectus, 
ut quisque nascetur, nam neque exponi sine hoc res 
atroces et miserabiles debent ; cum de qualitate 
alicuius rei quaestio est, probationibus uniuscuiusque 

54 rei recte subiungitur. Ubi vero coniunctam ex pluri- 
bus causam agimus, etiam necesse erit uti pluribus 
quasi epilogis, ut in Verrem Cicero fecit. Nam et 
Philodamo et nauarchis et cruci civis Romani et aliis 

55 plurimis suas lacrimas dedit. Sunt, qui hos /xepiKov? 
eTTiXdyovs vocent, quo partitam perorationem signi- 

1 sint reservanda, Early editors : sit res eruenda, MSS. 

BOOK VI. i. 51-55 

that they should be confined to the exordium and 
the peroration, which are, I admit, the places where 
they are most often used, may be employed in other 
portions of the speech as well, but more briefly, since 
most of them must be reserved for the opening or 
the close. But it is in the peroration, if anywhere, 
that we must let loose the whole torrent of our 
eloquence. For, if we have spoken well in the rest 52 
of our speech, we shall now have the judges on our 
side, and shall be in a position, now that we have 
emerged from the reefs and shoals, to. spread all our 
canvas, while since the chief task of the peroration 
consists of amplification, we may legitimately make 
free use of words and reflexions that are magnificent 
and ornate. It is at the close of our drama that we 
must really stir the theatre, when we have reached 
the place for the phrase with which the old tragedies 
and comedies used to end, "Friends, give us your 

In other portions of the speech we must appeal 53 
to the emotions as occasion may arise. For it would 
clearly be wrong to set forth facts calling for horror 
and pity without any such appeal, while, if the 
question arises as to the quality of any fact, such 
an appeal may justifiably be subjoined to the proofs 
of the fact in question. When we are pleading a 54 
complicated case which is really made up of several 
cases, it will be necessary to introduce a number of 
passages resembling perorations, as Cicero does in 
the Verrines, where he laments over Philodamus, the 
ships' captains, the crucifixion of the Roman citizen, 
and a number of other tragic incidents. Some call 55 
these /jicpiKol eVi/Voyoi, by which they mean a perora- 
tion distributed among different portions of a speech. 



ficant. Mihi non tarn partes eius quam species 
videntur, siquidem et epilogi et perorationis nomina 
ipsa aperte satis ostendunt, hanc esse consumma- 
tionem orationis. 

II. Quamvis autem pars haec iudicialium causarum 
summa praecipueque constet adfectibus, et aliqua de 
iis necessario dixerim, non tamen potui ac ne debui 
quidem istum locum in imam speciem concludere. 
Quare adhuc opus superest, cum ad obtinenda quae 
volumus potentissimum, turn supradictis multo diffi- 
cilius, moveiidi iudicum animos atque in eum quern 
volumus habitum formandi et velut transfigurandi. 

2 Qua de re pauca, quae postulabat materia, sic attigi, 
ut magis quid oporteret fieri quam quo id modo con- 
sequi possemus, ostenderem. Nunc altius omnis rei 
repetenda ratio est. 

Nam et per totam, ut diximus, causam locus est 
adfectibus, et eorum non simplex natura nee in tran- 
situ tractanda, quo nihil adferre maius vis orandi 

3 potest. Nam cetera forsitan tenuis quoque et an- 
gusta ingenii vena,, si modo vel doctrina vel usu sit 
adiuta, generare atque ad frugem aliquam perducere 
queat ; certe sunt semperque fuerunt non parum 

1 vi. i. 51. 

BOOK VI. i. 55-11. 3 

I should regard them rather as species than as parts 
of the peroration, since the terms epilogue and 
peroration both clearly indicate that they form the 
conclusion of a speech. 

II. The peroration is the most important part of 
forensic pleading, and in the main consists of appeals 
to the emotions, concerning which I have conse- 
quently been forced to say something. But I 
have not yet been able to give the topic specific 
consideration as a whole, nor should I have been 
justified in doing so. We have still, therefore, 
to discuss a task which forms the most powerful 
means of obtaining what we desire, and is also 
more difficult than any of those which we have 
previously considered, namely that of stirring the 
emotions of the judges, and of moulding and 
transforming them to the attitude which w r e 
desire. The few remarks which I have already 2 
made on this subject were only such as were 
essential to my theme, while my purpose was rather 
to show what ought to be done than to set forth the 
manner in which we can secure our aim. I must 
now review the whole subject in a more exhaustive 

There is scope for an appeal to the emotions, as 
I have already said, 1 in every portion of a speech. 
Moreover these emotions present great variety, and 
demand more than cursory treatment, since it is in 
their handling that the power of oratory shews itself 
at its highest. Even a slight and limited talent may, 3 
with the assistance of practice or learning, perhaps 
succeed in giving life to other departments of oratory, 
and in developing them to a serviceable extent. At 
any rate there are, and have always been, a con- 



multi, qui satis perite, quae essent probationibus 
utilia, reperirent ; quos equidem non contemno, sed 
hactenus utiles credo, ne quid per eos iudici sit 
ignotum, atque (ut dicam, quod sentio) dignos, a 
quibus causam diserti docerentur. Qui vero iudicem 
rapere et, in quern vellet habitum animi, posset per- 
ducere, quo dicente l flendum irascendumve esset, 

4 rarus fuit. Atqui hoc est quod dominetur in iudi- 
ciis, haec eloquentia regnat. 2 Namque argumenta 
plerumque nascuntur ex causa, et pro meliore parte 
plura sunt semper, ut, qui per haec vicit, tantuni non 

6 defuisse sibi advocatum sciat. Ubi vero animis iudi- 
cum vis adferenda est et ab ipsa veri contemplation 
abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus es 
Hoc non docet litigator, hoc causarum libellis n 
continetur. Probationes enim efficiant sane ut cau- 
sam nostram meliorem esse iudices putent, adfectus 
praestant ut etiam velint ; sed id quod volunt cre- 

6 dunt quoque. Nam cum irasci, favere, odisse, mise- 
reri coeperunt, agi iam rem suam existimant ; et, 
sicut amantes de forma iudicare non possunt, quia 

1 dicente, Spcdding : dicto, MSS. 

2 eloquentia regnat, Halm : eloquentiam regunt, MSS. 





BOOK VI. ii. 3-6 

siderable number of pleaders capable of discovering 
arguments adequate to prove their points. I am far 
from despising such, but I consider that their utility 
is restricted to providing the judge with such facts 
as it is necessary for him to know, and, to be quite 
frank, I regard them merely as suitable persons to 
instruct pleaders of real eloquence in the facts of 
a case. But few indeed are those orators who can 
sweep the judge with them, lead him to adopt 
that attitude of mind which they desire, and compel 
him to weep with them or share their anger. And 4 
yet it is this emotional power that dominates 
the court, it is this form of eloquence that is the 
queen of all. For as a rule arguments arise out of 
the case itself, and the better cause has always the 
larger number to support it, so that the party who 
wins by means of them will have no further satisfac- 
tion than that of knowing that his advocate did not 
fail him. But the peculiar task of the orator arises 5 
when the minds of the judges require force to move 
them, and their thoughts have actually to be led away 
from the contemplation of the truth. No instruction 
from the litigant can secure this, nor can such power 
be acquired merely by the study of a brief. Proofs, it 
is true, may induce the judges to regard our case 
as superior to that of our opponent, but the appeal 
to the emotions will do more, for it will make them 
wish our case to be the better. And what they 
wish, they will also believe. For as soon as they 6 
begin to be angry, to feel favourably disposed, to 
hate or pity, they begin to take a personal interest 
in the case, and just as lovers are incapable of 
forming a reasoned judgment on the beauty of the 
object of their affections, because passion forestalls 


E E 2 


sensum oculorum praecipit animus, ita omnem veri- 
tatis inquirendae rationem iudex omittit occupatus 
adfectibus ; aestu fertur et velut rapido flumini obse- 

7 quitur. Ita argumenta ac testes quid egerint, pro- 
nuntiatio ostendit ; commotus autem ab oratore 
iudex, quid sentiat, sedens adhuc atque audiens 
confitetur. An cum ille, qui plerisque peroratio- 
nibus petitur, fletus erumpit, non palam dicta sen- 
tentia est? Hue igitur incumbat orator, hoc opus, 
hie labor est, sine quo cetera nuda, ieiuna, infirma, 
ingrata sint ; adeo velut spiritus operis huius atque 
animus est in adfectibus. 

8 Horum autem. sicut antiquitus traditum accepi- 

A-V)'^ {,-</ 
mus, duae sunt species : alteram Graeci Traces vocant;V 

quod nos vertentes recte ac proprie adfectum dici- M 
mus, alteram rjOos, cuius nomine, ut ego quidem 
sentio, caret sermo Romanus ; mores appellantur, 
atque inde pars quoque ilia philosophiae yOucr) moralis 

9 est dicta. Sed ipsam rei naturam spectanti mihi 
non tarn mores significari videntur quam morum 
quaedam proprietas ; nam ipsis quidem omnis habitus 
mentis continetur. Cautiores voluntatem complecti 
quam nomina interpretari maluerunt. Adfectus igi- 

1 A en. vi. 128. 

BOOK VI. ii. 6-9 

the sense of sight, so the judge, when overcome by 
his emotions, abandons all attempt to enquire into 
the truth of the arguments, is swept along by the 
tide of passion, and yields himself unquestioning to 
the torrent. Thus the verdict of the court shows 7 
how much weight has been carried by the arguments 
and the evidence ; but when the judge has been 
really moved by the orator he reveals his feelings 
while he is still sitting and listening to the case. 
When those tears, which are the aim of most perora- 
tions, well forth from his eyes, is he not giving his 
verdict for all to see ? It is to this, therefore, that 
the orator must devote all his powers, 

" There lie the task and toil ! " l 

Without this all else is bare and meagre, weak and 
devoid of charm. For it is in its power over the 
emotions that the life and soul of oratory is to be 

Emotions however, as we learn from ancient 8 
authorities, fall into two classes ; the one is called 
pathos by the Greeks and is rightly and correctly ex- 
pressed in Latin by adfectus (emotion) : the other is 
called ethos, a word for which in my opinion Latin has 
no equivalent : it is however rendered by mores (morals) 
and consequently the branch of philosophy known as 
ethics is styled moral philosophy by us. But close 9 
consideration of the nature of the subject leads me 
to think that in this connexion it is not so much 
morals in general that is meant as certain peculiar 
aspects ; for the term morals includes every attitude 
of the mind. The more cautious writers have pre- 
ferred to give the sense of the term rather than to 
translate it into Latin. They therefore explain pathos 



tur TrdOos concitatos, rjOos 1 mites atque composites esse 
dixerunt ; in altero vehementer commotos, in altero 
lenes ; denique hqs imperare, illos persuadere ; hos 
ad perturbationem, illos ad benivolentiam praevalere. 

10 Adiiciunt quidam r)0os perpetmim, 2 Traces temporale 
esse. Quod ut accidere frequentius fateor, ita non- 
nullas credo esse materias, quae continuum desi- 
derent adfectum. Nee tamen minus artis aut usus 
hi leniores habent, virium atque impetus non tan- 
tiindem exigunt. In causis vero etiam pluribus 
versantur, immo secundum quendam intellectum in 

11 omnibus. Nam cum ex illo ethico 3 loco nihil non 
ab oratore tractetur, quidquid de honestis et utilibus, 
denique faciendis et non faciendis dicitur, rjBos vocari 
potest. Quidam commendationem atque excusatio- 
nem propria huius officii putaverunt, nee abnuo esse 
ista in hac parte ; sed non concede ut sola sint. 

12 Quin illud adhuc adiicio, Tratfos atque r)6os esse inte- 
rim ex eadem natura, ita ut illud maius sit, hoc 
minus, ut amor TrdOos, caritas rj^os ; interdum diversa 
inter se, sicut in epilogis, nam quae TrdOos concitavit, 
rjOos solet mitigare. Proprie tamen mihi huius no- 
minis exprimenda natura est, quatenus appellatione 

13 ipsa non satis significari videtur. T H^os, quod in- 
telligimus quodque a dicentibus desideramus, id erit, 
quod ante omnia bonitate commendabitur, non solum 

1 trdBos . . 3dos, excerpts of Cassiodorus with slight alter- 
ation of order : hos . . illos, MSS. 

2 -fiQos perpetuum, excerpt* of Cassiodorus : hoc pertuum, 
A : aut pertuum, O ; peritorum, codd. dett. 

3 ethico, Halm : et hoc, MSS. 


BOOK VI. ii. 9-13 

as describing the more violent emotions and ethos as 
designating those which are calm and gentle : in the 
one case the passions are violent, in the other sub- 
dued, the former command and disturb, the latter 
persuade and induce a feeling of goodwill. Some 10 
add that ethos is continuous, while pathos is momen- 
tary. While admitting that this is usually the case, 
I still hold that there are some subjects which 
demand that the more violent emotion should be 
continuous. But, albhough the gentler emotions 
require less force and impetus, they call for no less 
art and experience than the more vehement, and are 
demanded in a greater number of cases, indeed in a 
certain sense they are required in all. For as every- 11 
thing treated by the orator may be regarded from 
the ethical standpoint, we may apply the word ethos 
whenever he speaks of what is honourable and ex- 
pedient or of what ought or ought not to be done. 
Some regard commendation and excuse as the pecu- 
liar spheres of ethos, but while I admit that they do 
fall within its sphere, I do not regard them as being 
alone in so doing. Indeed I would add that pathos 12 
and ethos are sometimes of the same nature, differing 
only in degree ; love for instance comes under the 
head of pathos, affection of ethos ; sometimes however 
they differ, a distinction which is important for the 
peroration, since ethos is generally employed to calm 
the storm aroused by pathos. I ought however to 
explain what is meant by ethos in greater detail, 
since the term is not in itself sufficiently expressive 
of its meaning. The ethos which I have in my mind 13 
and which I desiderate in an orator is commended 
to our approval by goodness more than aught else 
and is not merely calm and mild, but in most cases 



mite ac placidum, sed plerumque blandum et huma- 
num et audientibus amabile atque iucundum, in quo 
exprimendo summa virtus ea est, ut fluere omnia ex 
natura rerum hominumque videantur utque mores 
dicentis ex oratione perluceant et quodammodo ag- 

14 noscantur. Quod est sine dubio inter coniunctas 
maxime personas, quotiens " ferimus, ignoscimus, 
satisfacimus, monemus, procul ab ira, procul ab odio. 
Sed tamen alia patris adversus filium, tutoris ad- 
versus pupillum, mariti adversus uxorem moderatio 
est (hi enim praeferunt eorum ipsorurn, a quibus 
laeduntur, caritatem, neque alio modo invisos eos 
faciunt quam quod amare ipsi videntur), alia, cum 
senex adolescentis alieni convicium, honestus in- 
ferioris fert ; hie enim tantum concitari, illic etiam 

15 adfici debet. Sunt et ilia ex eadem natura, sed 
motus adhuc minoris, veniam petere adulescentiae, 
defendere amores. Nonnunquam etiam lenis caloris 
alieni derisus ex hac forma venit, sed his non ex 
locis tantum. Verum aliquanto magis propria fuit 
virtus simulationis, satisfaciendi rogandi dpwtLa, quae 

16 diversum ei quod dicit intellectum petit. Hinc etiam 

BOOK VI. ii. 13-16 

ingratiating and courteous and such as to excite 
pleasure and affection in our hearers, while the chief 
merit in its expression lies in making it seem that \ 
all that we say derives directly from the nature of I 
the facts and persons concerned and in the revela- I 
tion fvH-Tjjft nf t^p orator in such a way that ' 
all may recognise it. This kind of ethos should be 14 
especially displayed in cases where the persons con- 
cerned are intimately connected, whenever we 
tolerate or pardon any act or offer satisfaction or 
admonition, in all of which cases there should be no 
trace of anger or hatred. On the other hand the 
moderation shown by a father to his son, a guardian 
to his ward or a husband to his wife will differ from 
that which is shown by an old man to a youthful 
stranger who has insulted him or by a man of high 
rank to his inferior, since in the former cases they 
emphasise their affection for the wrongdoer and 
there is no desire to do anything that will excite 
dislike against them save by the manifestation of 
the fact that they still love them ; while in the one 
case the offended party should be no more than pro-^/^*^ 
voked, in the other he should be really deeply moved./ ' 
Of the same character, though less violent, is the 15 v, 
emotion to be shown when we ask pardon for the 
errors of the young, or apologise for some youthful 
amour. Sometimes again gentle raillery of another's 
passion may derive its tone from ethos, though only 
to a partial extent. More closely dependent on ethos 
are the skilful exercise of feigned emotion or the 
employment of irony in making apologies or asking 
questions, irony being the term which is applied to 
words which mean something other than they seem 
to express. From the same source springs also that 16 



ille maior ad concitandum odium nasci adfectus solet, 
cum hoc ipso, quod nos adversariis summittimus, in- 
telligitur tacita impoteiitiae exprobratio. Namque 
eos graves et intolerabiles id ipsum demonstrat, quod 
cedimus, et ignorant cupidi maledicendi aut adfecta- 
tores libertatis plus invidiam quam convicium posse ; 
nam invidia adversaries, convicium nos invisos facit. 

17 Ille iam paene medius adfectus est ex amoribus et ex 
desideriis amicorum et necessariorum, nam et hoc 
maior est et illo minor. Non parum significanter 
etiam ilia in scholis fjOrj dixerimus, quibus plerumque 
rusticos, superstitiosos, avaros, timidos secundum 
condicionem propositionum effingimus. Nam si rj&rf 
mores sunt cum hos imitamur, ex his ducimus 

18 Denique ^os 1 omne bonum et com em virum 
poscit. Quas virtutes cum etiam in litigatore debeat 
orator, si fieri potest, approbare, utique ipse aut 
habeat aut habere credatur. Sic proderit plurimum 
causis, quibus ex sua bonitate faciet fidem. Nam 
qui, dum dicit, malus videtur, utique male dicit ; non 
enim videtur iusta dicere, alioqui rjOos videretur. 

19 Quare ipsum etiam dicendi genus in hoc placidum 
debet esse ac mite ; nihil superbum, nihil elatum 

1 30os, Meister : hoc JISS. 


BOOK VI. ii. 16-19 

more powerful method of exciting hatred, when by 
a feigned submission to our opponents we pass silent 
censure on their violence. For the very fact of our 
yielding serves to demonstrate their insupportable 
arrogance, while orators who have a passion for abuse 
or are given to affect freedom of speech fail to realise 
that it is a far more effective course to make your 
antagonist unpopular than to abuse him. For the 
former course makes our antagonists disliked, the 
latter ourselves. The emotion of love and longing 17 
for our friends and connexions is perhaps of an inter- 
mediate character, being stronger than ethos and 
weaker than pathos. There is also good reason for 
giving the name of ethos to those scholastic exercises l 
in which we portray rustics, misers, cowards and 
superstitious persons according as our theme may 
require. For if ethos denotes moral character, our 
speech must necessarily be based on ethos when it is 
engaged in portraying such character. 

Finally ethos in all its forms requires the speaker to 18 
be a man of good character and courtesy. For it is 
most important that he should himself possess or be 
thought to possess those virtues for the possession of 
which it is his duty, if possible, to commend his client 
as well, while the excellence of his own character 
will make his pleading all the more convincing and 
will be of the utmost service to the cases which he 
undertakes. For the orator who gives the impres- 
sion of being a bad man while he is speaking, is 
actually speaking badly, since his words seem to be 
insincere owing to the absence of ethos which would 
otherwise have revealed itself. Consequently the 19 
style of oratory employed in such cases should be 
calm and mild with no trace of pride, elevation or 

' 42? 


saltern ac sublime desiderat ; proprie, iucunde, cre- 
dibiliter dicere sat est, ideoque et medius ille orationis 
modus maxime convenit. 

20 Diversum est huic, quod Traces dicitur, quodque nos 
adfectum proprie vocamus ; et, ut proxime utriusque 
differentiam signem, illud comoediae, hoc tragoediae 
magis simile. Haec pars circa iram, odium, metum, iri- 
vidiam, miserationem fere tota versatur. Quae quibus 
ex locis ducenda sint, et manifestum omnibus et a 
nobis in ratione prooemii atque epilogi dictum est. 

21 Et metum tamen duplicem intelligi volo, quern pati- 
mur et quem facimus, et invidiam ; namque altera 
invidum, altera invidiosum facit. Hocautem hominis, 
illud rei est ; in quo et plus habet operis oratio. Nam 
quaedam videntur gravia per se, parricidium, caedes, 

22 veneficium ; quaedam efficienda sunt. Id autem con- 
tingit, cum magnis alioqui malis gravius esse id quod 
passi sumus, ostenditur ; quale est apud Virgilium : 

felix una ante alias Priame'ia virgo, 
Hostilem ad tumulum Troiae sub moenibus altis 
lussa mori 

(quam miser enim casus Andromachae, si comparata 

1 i.e. the style intermediate between the restrained (Attic) 
and the grand (Asiatic) style. 

2 iv. i and vi. i. ' A Aen. iii. 321. 


BOOK VI. ii. 19-22 

sublimity, all of which would be out of place. It is 
enough to speak appropriately, pleasantly and per- 
suasively, and therefore the intermediate 1 style of 
oratory is most suitable. 

The pathos of the Greeks, which we correctly 20 
translate by emotion, is of a different character, and 
I cannot better indicate the nature of the difference 
than by saying that ethos rather resembles comedy 
and pathos tragedy. For pathos is almost entirely 
concerned with anger, dislike, fear, hatred and pity. 
It will be obvious to all what topics are appropriate 
to such appeals and I have already spoken on the 
subject in discussing the exordium and the perora- 
tion. 2 I wish however to point out that fear is of 21 
two kinds, that which we feel and that which we 
cause in others. Similarly there are two kinds of 
invidia (hatred, envy), to which the two adjectives 
invidus (envious) and invidiosus (invidious, hateful) 
correspond. The first supplies an epithet for persons, 
the second for things, and it is in this latter con- 
nexion that the orator's task is even more onerous. 
For though some things are hateful in themselves 
such as parricide, murder, poisoning, other things 
h^ve to be made to seem hateful. This latter con- 22 
tingency arises when we attempt to shew that what 
we have suffered is of a more horrible nature than 
what are usually regarded as great evils. Vergil will 
provide an example in the lines 3 : 

" O blest beyond all maidens Priam's child, 
Beneath Troy's lofty bulwarks doomed to die 
Upon the tomb of him that was thy foe." 

For how wretched was the lot of Andromache, if 
Polyxena be accounted happy in comparison with 



23 ei felix Polyxena) ; aut cum ita exaggeramus iniuriam 
nostram, ut etiam quae multo minora sunt intole- 
randa dicamus : Si pulsasses, dejendi non poteras ; vul- 
nerasti. Sed haec diligentius, cum de amplificatione 
dicemus. 1 Interim notasse contentus sum, non id 
solum agere adfectus, ut, quae sunt, ostendantur 
acerba ac luctuosa, sed etiam ut, quae toleranda 
haberi solent, gravia videantur : ut cum in maledicto 
plus iniuriae quam in manu, in infamia plus poenae 

24 dicimus quam in morte. Namque in hoc eloquentiae 
vis est, ut iudicem non in id tantum compellat, in 
quod ipsa rei natura ducetur, sed aut, qui non est, 
aut maiorem quam est, faciat adfectum. Haec est 
ilia, quae SetvoxHs vocatur, rebus indignis, asperis, 
invidiosis addens vim oratio; qua virtute praeter 
alias plurimum Demosthenes valuit. 

25 Quodsi tradita mihi sequi praecepta sufficeret satis- 
feceram huic parti, nihil eorum quae legi vel didici, 
quod modo probabile fuit, omittendo ; sed eruere in 
animo est quae latent, et penitus ipsa huius loci 
aperire penetralia, quae quidem non aliquo tradente, 
sed experimento meo ac natura ipsa duce accepi. 

26 Summa enim, quantum ego quidem sentio, circa 

. 1 de amplificatione dicemus, Halm : ad earn amplifica- 
tionem dicemus, AO : ad earn amplificationem venerimus, 
dicemus, i<nlyo. 

1 vin. iv. 9. 2 Lit. " making terrible." 


BOOK VI. ii. 22-26 

her! Again the same problem arises when we en- 2 
deavour to magnify our wrongs by saying that other 
far lesser ills are intolerable ; e.g. " If you had merely 
struck him, your conduct would have been inde- 
fensible. But you did more, you wounded him." 
However I will deal with this subject more fully 
when I come to speak of amplification. 1 Meanwhile 
1 will content myself with the observation that the 
aim of appeals to the emotion is not merely to shew 
the bitter and grievous nature of ills that actually 
are so, but also to make ills which are usually re- 
garded as tolerable seem unendurable, as for instance 
when we represent insulting words as inflicting more 
grievous injury than an actual blow or represent 
disgrace as being worse than death. For the force 24 
of eloquence is such that it not merely compels the 
judge to the conclusion toward which the nature of 
the facts lead him, but awakens emotions which 
either do not naturally arise from the case or are 
stronger than the case would suggest. This is known 
as demosLs, 2 that is to say, language giving additional 
force to things unjust, cruel or hateful, an accom- 
plishment in which Demosthenes created immense 
and special effect. 

If I thought it sufficient to follow traditional rules, 25 
I should regard it as adequate treatment for this 
topic to omit nothing that I have read or been 
taught, provided that it be reasonably sound. But 
my design is to bring to light the secret principles 
of this art, and to open up the inmost recesses of 
the subject, giving the result not of teaching re- 
ceived from others, but of my own experience and 
the guidance of nature herself. The prime essential 26 
for stirring the emotions of others is, in my opinion, 


movendos adfectus in hoc posita est, ut moveamur 
ipsi. Nam et luctus et irae et indignationis aliquando 
etiam ridicula fuerit imitatio, si verba vultumque 
tantum, non etiam animum accommodarimus. Quid 
enim aliud est causae, ut lugentes utique in recenti 
dolore disertissime quaedam exclamare videantur et 
ira nonnunquam indoctis quoque eloquentiam faciat, 
quam quod illis inest vis mentis et veritas ipsa morum ? 

27 Quare in iis, quae esse verisimilia volemus, simus ipsi 
similes eorum qui vere patiuntur adfectibus, et a tali 
animo proficiscatur oratio qualem facere iudicem volet. 
An ille dolebit, qui audiet me, qui in hoc dicam, non 
dolentem? irascetur, si nihil ipse, qui in iram con- 
citat se idque exigit, similia patietur ? siccis agentis 

28 oculis lacrimas dabit ? Fieri non potest. Nee in- 
cendit nisi ignis nee madescimus nisi humore nee res 
ulla dat alteri colorem quern non ipsa habet. Primum 
est igitur, ut apud nos valeant ea quae valere apud 
iudicem volumus, adficiamurque antequam adficere 

29 conemur. At quomodo net, ut adficiamur ? neque 
enim sunt motus in nostra potestate. Temptabo 
etiam de hoc dicere. Quas <avTcurias Graeci vocant, 
nos sane visiones appellemus, per quas imagines rerum 
absentiuin ita repraesentantur animo, ut eas cernere 


BOOK VI. ii. 26-29 

first to feel those emotions oneself. It is sometimes 
positively ridiculous to counterfeit grief, anger and 
indignation, if we content ourselves with accommo- 
dating our words and looks and make no attempt 
to adapt our own feelings to the emotions to be 
expressed. What other reason is there for the 
eloquence with which mourners express their grief, 
or for the fluency which anger lends even to the 
uneducated, save the fact that their minds are 
stirred to power by the depth and sincerity of their 
feelings? Consequently, if we wish to give our 27 
words the appearance of sincerity, we must assimilate 
ourselves to the emotions of those who are genuinely 
so affected, and our eloquence must spring from the 
same feeling that we desire to produce in the mind 
of the judge. Will he grieve who can find no trace 
of grief in the words with which I seek to move 
him to grief? Will he be angry, if the orator who 
seeks to kindle his anger shows no sign of labouring 
under the emotion which he demands from his 
audience ? Will he shed tears if the pleader's eyes 
are dry ? It is utterly impossible. Fire alone can 28 
kindle, and moisture alone can wet, nor can one 
thing impart any colour to another save that which 
it possesses itself. Accordingly, the first essential 
is that those feelings should prevail with us that 
we wish to prevail with the judge, and that we 
should be moved ourselves before we attempt to 
move others. But how are we to generate these 29 
emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our 
own power? I will try to explain as best I may. There 
are certain experiences which the Greeks call <j>av- 
Tacricu, and the Romans visions, whereby things absent 
are presented to our imagination with such extreme 




30 oculis ac praesentes habere videamur. Has quisquis 
bene conceperit, is erit in adfectibus potentissimus. 
Hunc quidam dicunt ev^avTacrtWov, qui sibi res, voces, 
actus secimdum verum optime finget ; quod quidem 
nobis volentibus facile continget. Nisi l vero inter 
otia animorum et spes inanes et velut somnia quaedam 
vigilantium ita nos hae de quibus loquor imagines 
prosequuntur, ut peregrinari, navigare, proeliari, 
populos alloqui, divitiarum, quas non habemus, usum 
videamur disponere, nee cogitare sed facere : hoc 

31 animi vitium ad utilitatem non transferemus ? At 
hominem occisum queror ; non omnia, quae in re 
praesenti accidisse credibile est, in oculis habebo? 
non percussor ille subitus crumpet? non expavescet 
circumventus ? exclamabit vel rogabit vel fugiet? 
non ferientem, non concidentem videbo ? non animo 
sanguis et pallor et gemitus extremus, denique 
exspirantis hiatus insidet ? 

32 Insequitur eVapyeio, quae a Cicerone illustratio et 
evidentia nominatur, quae non tarn dicere videtur 
quam ostendere ; et adfectus non aliter, quam si 

1 nisi, Tornebladh: nihil, AG. 

1 Perhaps an allusion to Part. Or. vi. 20. (vdpyeia = clear- 



BOOK VI. ii. 29-32 

vividness that they seem actually to be before 
our very eyes. It is the man who is really sen- 30 
sitive to such impressions who will have the greatest 
power over the emotions. Some writers describe 
the possessor of this power of vivid imagination, 
whereby things, words and actions are presented 
in the most realistic manner, by the Greek word 
ev<avTa(rc'u)Tos ; and it is a power which all may 
readily acquire if they will. When the mind is un- 
occupied or is absorbed by fantastic hopes or day- 
dreams, we are haunted by these visions of which 
I am speaking to such an extent that we imagine 
that we are travelling abroad, crossing the sea, fight- 
ing, addressing the people, or enjoying the use of 
wealth that we do not actually possess, and seem 
to ourselves not to be dreaming but acting. Surely, 
then, it may be possible to turn this form of halluci- 
nation to some profit. I am complaining that a man 31 
has been murdered. Shall I not bring before my 
eyes all the circumstances which it is reasonable to 
imagine must have occurred in such a connexion? 
Shall I not see the assassin burst suddenly from his 
hiding-place, the victim tremble, cry for help, beg 
for mercy, or turn to run ? Shall I not see the fatal 
blow delivered and the stricken body fall ? Will 
not the blood, the deathly pallor, the groan of 
agony, the death-rattle, be indelibly impressed upon 
my mind ? 

From such impressions arises that evapycta which 32 
Cicero 1 calls illumination and actuality, which makes 
us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the 
actual scene, while our emotions will be no less 
actively stirred than if we were present at the actual 

F F 2 


rebus ipsis intersimus, sequentur. An non ex his 
visionibus ilia sunt ; Excussi manibus radii, revolutaque 

33 pensa? Levique patens in pectore vulnus? equus ille 
in funere Pallantis, positis insignibus ? Quid ? non 
idem poeta penitus ultimi fati concepit imaginem, ut 

34 diceret : Et dulces ?noriens reminiscitur Argos ? Ubi 
vero miseratione opus erit, nobis ea, de quibus 
queremur, accidisse credamus atque id animo nostro 
persuadeamus. Nos illi simus, quos gravia, indigna, 
tristia passes queremur,necagamus rem quasi alienam, 
sed adsumamus parumper ilium dolorem. Ita dicemus, 

35 quae in nostro simili casu dicturi fuissemus. 1 Vidi 
ego saepe histriones atque comoedos, cum ex aliquo 
graviore actu personam deposuissent, flentes adhuc 
egredi. Quodsi in alienis scriptis sola pronuntiatio 
ita falsis accendit adfectibus, quid nos faciemus, qui 
ilia cogitare debemus ut moveri periclitantium vice 

36 possimus? Sed in schola quoque rebus ipsis adfici 
convenit casque veras sibi fingere, hoc magis quod 

1 fuissemus, Halm : vidissemus, A G. 

1 A en. ix. 474. 2 ib. xi. 40. 

3 ib. xi. 89 4 ib. x. 782. 


BOOK VI. n. 32-36 

occurrence. Is it not from visions such as these that 
Vergil was inspired to write 

" Sudden her fingers let the shuttle fall 

And all the thread was spilled," l 

" In his smooth breast the gaping wound," 2 33 

or the description of the horse at the funeral of 
Pallas, " his trappings laid aside " ? 3 And how vivid 
was the image of death conceived by the poet when 
he wrote 

" And dying sees his own dear Argive home " ? 4 

Again, when we desire to awaken pity, we must 34 
actually believe that the ills of which we complain 
have befallen our own selves, and must persuade 
our minds that this is really the case. We must 
identify ourselves with the persons of- whom we 
complain that they have suffered grievous, unmerited 
and bitter misfortune, and must plead their case and 
for a brief space feel their suffering as though it 
were our own, while our words must be such as we 
should use if we stood in their shoes. I have often 35 
seen actors, both in tragedy and comedy, leave the 
theatre still drowned in tears after concluding the 
performance of some moving role. But if the mere 
delivery of words written by another has the power 
to set our souls on fire with fictitious emotions, what 
will the orator do whose duty it is to picture to 
himself the facts and who has it in his power to feel 
the same emotion as his client whose interests are 
at stake? Even in the schools it is desirable that 30 
the student should be moved by his theme, and 
should imagine it to be true ; indeed, it is all the 
more desirable then, since, as a rule in scholastic 



illic ut litigatores loquimur frequentius quam ut 
advocati. Orbum agimus et naufragum et pericli- 
tantem, quorum induere personas quid attinet, nisi 
adfectus adsumimus ? Haec dissimulanda mihi non 
fuerunt, quibus ipse, quantuscunque sum aut fui, 
pervenisse me ad aliquod nomen ingenii credo ; fre- 
quenter motus sum, ut me non lacrimae solum 
deprehenderent, sed pallor et veri similis dolor. 

III. Huic diversa virtus, quae risum iudicis mo- 
vendo et illos tristes solvit adfectus et animum ab 
intentione rerum frequenter avertit et aliquando 
etiam reficit et a satietate vel a fatigatione renovat. 
Quanta sit autem in ea difficultas, vel duo maxime 
oratores, alter Graecae alter Latinae eloquentiae 

2 principes, decent. Nam plerique Demostheni facul- 
tatem defuisse huius rei credunt, Ciceroni modum. 
Nee videri potest iioluisse Demosthenes, cuius pauca 
admodum dicta nee sane ceteris eius virtutibus re- 
spondentia palam ostendunt, non displicuisse illi 

3 iocos, sed non contigisse. Noster vero non solum 
extra iudicia, sed in ipsis etiam orationibus habitus 
est nimius risus adfectator. Mihi quidem, sive id 
recte iudico sive amore immodico praecipui in elo- 

BOOK VI. ii. 36-111. 3 

declamations, the speaker more often appears as the 
actual litigant than as his advocate. Suppose we are 
impersonating an orphan, a shipwrecked man, or one 
in grave peril. What profit is there in assuming 
such a role unless we also assume the emotions 
which it involves ? I have thought it necessary not 
to conceal these considerations from my reader, since 
they have contributed to the acquisition of such 
reputation for talent as I possess or once possessed. 
I have frequently been so much moved while speak- 
ing, that I have not merely been wrought upon to 
tears, but have turned pale and shown all the 
symptoms of genuine grief. 

III. I now turn to a very different talent, namely 
that which dispels the graver emotions of the judge 
by exciting his laughter, frequently diverts his atten- 
tion from the facts of the case, and sometimes even 
refreshes him and revives him when he has begun 
to be bored or wearied by the case. How hard it 
is to attain success in this connexion is shown by 
the cases of the two great masters of Greek and 
Roman oratory. For many think that Demosthenes 2 
was deficient in this faculty, and that Cicero used 
it without discrimination. Indeed, it is impossible 
to suppose that Demosthenes deliberately avoided 
all display of humour, since his few jests are so 
unworthy of his other excellences that they clearly 
show that he lacked the power, not merely that he 
disliked to use it. Cicero, on the other hand, was 3 
regarded as being unduly addicted to jests, not 
merely outside the courts, but in his actual speeches 
as well. Personally (though whether I am right in 
this view, or have been led astray by an exaggerated 
admiration for the prince of orators, I cannot say), 



quentia viri labor, mira quaedam in eo videtur fuisse 

4 urbanitas. Nam et in sermone cotidiano multa et in 
altercationibus et interrogandis testibus plura quam 
quisquam dixit facete, et ipsa ilia, quae sunt in 
Verrem dicta frigidius, aliis adsignavit et testimonii 
loco posuit ; ut, quo sunt magis vulgaria, eo sit cre- 
dibilius ilia ab oratore non ficta sed passim esse 

5 iactata. Utinamque libertus eius Tiro aut alius, 
quisquis fuit, qui tris hac de re libros edidit, parcius 
dictorum numero indulsissent et plus iudicii in eli- 
gendis quam in congerendis studii adhibuissent : 
minus obiectus calumniantibus foret, qui tamen nunc 
quoque, ut in omni eius ingenio, facilius, quod reiici 

6 quam quod adiici possit, invenient. Adfert autem 
summam rei difficultatem primum, quod ridiculum 
dictum plerumque falsum est (hoc semper humile), 
saepe ex industria depravatum, praeterea nunquam 
honorificum ; turn varia hominum iudicia in eo, quod 
non ratione aliqua sed motu animi quodam nescio an 

7 enarrabili iudicatur. Neque enim ab ullo satis expli- 
cari puto, licet multi temptaverint, unde risus, qui 
non solumgfacto aliquo dictove,, sed interdum quodam 
etiam corporis tactu lacessitur. Praeterea non una 
ratione moveri solet, neque enim acute tantum ac 
venuste sed stulte, iracunde, timide dicta aut facta 


BOOK VI. in. 3-7 

I regard him as being the possessor of a remarkable 
turn of wit. For his daily speech was full of humour, 4 
while in his disputes in court and in his examination 
of witnesses he produced more good jests than any 
other, while the somewhat insipid jokes which he 
launches against Verres are always attributed by him 
to others and produced as evidence : wherefore, the 
more vulgar they are, the more probable is it that 
they are not the invention of the orator, but were 
current as public property. I wish, however, that 5 
Tiro, or whoever it may have been that published 
the three books of Cicero's jests, had restricted their 
number and had shown more judgment in selecting 
than zeal in collecting them. For he would then 
have been less exposed to the censure of his calum- 
niators, although the latter will, in any case, as in 
regard to all the manifestations of his genius, find 
it easier to detect superfluities than deficiencies. 
The chief difficulty which confronts the orator in 6 
this connexion lies in the fact that sayings designed 
to raise a laugh are generally untrue (and falsehood 
always involves a certain meanness), and are often 
deliberately distorted, and, further, never complimen- 
tary : while the judgments formed by the audience 
on such jests will necessarily vary, since the effect of 
a jest depends not on the reason, but on an emotion 
which it is difficult, if not impossible, to describe. For 7 
I do not think that anybody can give an adequate 
explanation, though many have attempted to do so, of 
the cause of laughter, which is excited not merely 
by words or deeds, but sometimes even by touch. 
Moreover, there is great variety in the things which 
raise a laugh, since we laugh not merely at those 
words or actions which are smart or witty, but also 



ridentur ; ideoque anceps eius rei ratio est, quod a 

8 derisu non procul abest risus. Habet enim, ut Cicero 
dicit, sedem in deformitate aliqua et turpitudine, quae 
cum in aliis demonstrantur, urbanitas, cum in ipsos 
dicentes recidunt, stultitia vocatur. 

Cum videatur autem res levis et quae ab scurris, 
mimis, insipientibus denique saepe moveatur, tamen 
habet vim nescio an imperiosissimam et cui repug- 

9 nari minime potest. Erumpit etiam invitis saepe, 
nee vultus modo ac vocis exprimit confessionem, sed 
totum corpus vi sua concutit. Rerum autem saepe 
(ut dixi) maximarum momenta vertit, ut cum odium 

10 iramque frequentissime frangat. Documento sunt 
tuvenes Tarentini, qui multa de rege Pyrrho sequius 
inter cenam locuti, cum rationem facti reposceren- 
tur et neque negari res neque defendi posset, risu 
sunt et opportune ioco elapsi. Namque unus ex iis, 
ImmOf inquit, nisi lagona defecisset, occidissemus te ; 
eaque urbanitate tota est invidia criminis dissoluta. 

11 Verum hoc, quidquid est, ut non ausim dicere 
carere omnino arte, quia nonnullam observationem 
habet, suntque ad id pertinentia et a Graecis et a 

1 De Or. n. Iviii. 236. 2 Where? 


BOOK VI. in. 7-1 1 

at those which reveal folly, anger or fear. Conse- 
quently, the cause of laughter is uncertain, since 
laughter is never far removed from derision. For, 8 
as Cicero 1 says, " Laughter has its basis in some 
kind or other of deformity orligTihess7 r ^n3 wheTeas, 
when we point to such a blemish in others, the 
result is known as wit, it is called folly when the 
same jest is turned against ourselves. 

Now, though laughter may be regarded as a trivial 
matter, and an emotion frequently awakened by 
buffoons, actors or fools, it has a certain imperious 
force of its own which it is very hard to resist. It 9 
often breaks out against our will and extorts con- 
fession of its power, not merely from our face and 
voice, but convulses the whole body as well. Again, 
it frequently turns the scale in matters of great 
importance, as I have already observed : 2 for instance, 
it often dispels hatred or anger. A proof of this is 10 
given by the story of the young men of Tarentum, 
who had made a number of scurrilous criticisms of 
Pyrrhus over the dinner table : they were called 
upon to answer for their statements, and, since the 
charge was one that admitted neither of denial nor 
of excuse, they succeeded in escaping, thanks to a 
happy jest which made the king laugh ; for one of 
the accused said, "Yes, and if the bottle hadn't 
been empty, we should have killed you ! " a jest 
which succeeded in dissipating the animosity which 
the charge had aroused. 

Still, whatever the essence of humour may be, and 11 
although I would npt venture to assert that it is jal to- 
gether independent of art (for it involves a certain 
power of observation, and rules for its employment 
have been laid down by writers both of Greece and 



Latinis composita praecepta, ita plane adfirmo, prae- 

12 cipue positum esse in natura et in occasione. Porro 
natura non tantum in hoc valet, ut acutior quis atque 
habilior sit ad inveniendum (nam id sane doctrina 
possit augeri), sed inest proprius quibusdam decor in 
habitu ac vultu, ut eadem ilia minus alio dicente 

13 urbana esse videantur. Occasio vero et in rebus est 
cuius est 1 tanta vis, ut saepe adiuti ea non indocti 
modo, sed etiam rustici salse dicant, et in eo cum quis 
aliquid dixerit prior. Sunt enim longe venustiora 

14 omnia in respondendo quam in provocando. Accedit 
difficultati, quod eius rei nulla exercitatio est, nulli 
praeceptores. Itaque in conviviis et sermonibus 
multi dicaces, quia in hoc usu cotidiano proficimus. 
Oratoria urbanitas rara nee ex arte propria sed ad 

15 hanc consuetudinem commodata. Nihil autem 
vetabat et componi materias in hoc idoneas, ut 
controversiae permixtis salibus fingerentur, vel res 
proponi singulas ad iuvenum talem exercitationem. 

16 Quin illae ipsae (dicta sunt ac vocantur), quas certis 
diebus festae licentiae dicere solebamus, si paulum 
adhibita ratione fingerentur, aut aliquid in his serium 

1 cuiiis est, added by Halm foil 

1 The meaning of this passage is not clear, and no satis- 
factory explanation or correction has been suggested. 


BOOK VI. in. 11-16 

Rome), I will insist on this much, that it depends 
mainly on nature and opportunity. The influence 12 
of nature consists not merely in the fact that one 
man is quicker or cleverer than another in the 
invention of jests (for such a power can be increased 
by teaching), but also in the possession of some 
peculiar charm of look or manner, the effect of which 
is such that the same remarks would be less enter- 
taining if uttered by another. Opportunity, on the 13 
other hand, is dependent on circumstances, and is of 
such importance that with its assistance not merely 
the unlearned, but even mere country bumpkins are 
capable of producing effective witticisms : while 
much again may depend on some previous remark 
made by another which will provide opportunity for 
repartee. For wit^always appears itogreater advan- 
| a ^!LJ n _I2EljL..! ; .l lan * n attack! We "~ are : also con- 14 
fronfed by the additional "difficulty that there are 
no specific exercises for the development of humour 
nor professors to teach it. Consequently, while 
convivial gatherings and conversation give rise to 
frequent displays of wit, since daily practice develops 
the faculty, oratorical wit is rare, for it has no fixed 
rules to guide it, but must adapt itself to the ways 
of the world. There has, however, never been any- 15 
thing to prevent the composition of themes such as 
will afford scope for humour, so that our contro- 
versial declamations may have an admixture of jests, 
while special topics may be set which will give the 
young student practice in the play of wit. Nay, 16 
even those pleasantries in which we indulge on 
certain occasions of festive licence (and to which we 
give the name of mots, 1 as, indeed, they are), if only 
a little more good sense were employed in their 



quoque esset admixtum, plurimum poterant utilitatis 
adferre ; quae nunc iuvenum vel sibi ludentium exer- 
citatio est. 

17 Pluribus autem nominibus in eadem re vulgo uti- 
mur ; quae tameii si diducas, suam quandam pro- 
priam vim ostendent. Nam et urbanitas dicitur, qua 
quidem significari video sermonem praeferentem in 
verbis et sono et usu proprium quendam gustum 
urbis et sumptam ex conversatione doctorum taci- 
tam eruditionem, denique cui contraria sit rusticitas. 

18 Venustum esse, quod cum gratia quadam et venere 
dicatur, apparet. Salsum in consuetudine pro ridi- 
culo tantum accipimus ; natura non utique hoc est, 
quanquam et ridicula oporteat esse salsa. Nam et 
Cicero omne, quod salsum sit, ait esse Atticorum, 
non quia sunt maxime ad risum compositi ; et Ca- 
tullus, cum dicit, Nulla est in corpore mica satis, non 

19 hoc dicit, nihil in corpore eius esse ridiculum. Sal- 
sum igitur erit, quod non erit insulsum, velut quod- 
dam simplex orationis condimentum, quod sentitur 
latente iudicio velut palato, excitatque et a taedio 
defendit orationem. Sales enim, 1 ut ille in cibis 
paulo liberalius aspersus, si tamen non sit immo- 
dicus, adfert aliquid propriae voluptatis, ita hi quo- 
que in dicendo habent quiddam, quod nobis faciat 

1 sales enim, Spalding : sane tamen, MSS. 

1 Orat. xxvi. 90. 2 Cat. Ixxxvi. 4. 


BOOK VI. m. 16-19 

invention, and they were seasoned by a slight ad- 
mixture of seriousness, might afford a most useful 
training. As it is, they serve merely to divert the 
young and merrymakers. 

There are various names by which we describe 17 
wit, but we have only to consider them separately 
to perceive their specific meaning. First, there is 
urbanitas, which I observe denotes language with a 
smack of the city in its words, accent and idiom, 
and further suggests a certain tincture of learning 
derived from associating with well-educated men ; 
in a word, it represents the opposite of rusticity. 
The meaning of venustus is obvious ; it means that 18 
which is said with grace and charm. Salsus is, as 
a rule, applied only to what is laughable : but this 
is not its natural application, although whatever is 
laughable should have the salt of wit in it. For 
Cicero, 1 when he says that whatever has the salt of 
wit is Attic, does not say this because persons of 
the Attic school are specially given to laughter ; 
and again when Catullus says 

In all her body not a grain of salt ! 2 
he does not mean that there is nothing in her body to 
give cause for laughter. When, therefore, we speak 19 
of the salt of wit, we refer to wit about which there 
is nothing insipid, wit, that is to say, which serves 
as a simple seasoning of language, a condiment which 
is silently appreciated by our judgment, as food is 
appreciated by the palate, with the result that it 
stimulates our taste and saves a speech from be- 
coming tedious. But just as salt, if sprinkled freely 
over food, gives a special relish of its own, so long 
as it is not used to excess, so in the case of those 
who have the salt of wit there is something about 



audiendi sitim. Facetum quoque non tantum circa 

20 ridicula opinor cohsistere. Neque enirn diceret 
Horatius, facetum carminis genus natura coiicessum 
esse Vergilio. Decoris hanc magis et excultae cuius- 
dam elegantiae appellationem puto. Ideoque in 
epistolis Cicero haec Bruti refert verba : Ne illi sunt 
pedes faceti ac delicatius ingredienti molles. Quod con- 
venit cum illo Horatiano, molle atqve facetum Fergilio. 

21 locum vero accipimus, quod est contrarium serio ; 
sed hoc nimis angustum, 1 nam et fmgere et terrere 
et promittere interim iocus est. Dicacitas sine dubio 
a dicendo, quod est omni generi commune, ducta 
est, proprie tamen significat sermonem cum risu ali- 
quos incessentem. Ideo Demosthenen urbanum 
fuisse dicunt, dicacem negant. 

22 Proprium autem materiae, de qua nunc loquimur, 
est ridiculum, ideoque haec tota disputatio a Graecis 
Trept yeXotov inscribitur. Eius prima divisio traditur 
eadem, quae est omnis orationis, ut sit positum in 

23 rebus aut in verbis. Usus autem maxime triplex ; 
aut enim ex aliis risum pethnus aut ex nobis aut ex 
rebus mediis. Aliena aut reprehendimus aut refu- 
tamus aut elevamus aut repercutimus aut eludimus. 

1 sed hoc nimis angustum, added by Halm. 

1 Sat. r. x. 44. molle atque facetum / Vergilio adnuerunt 
gaudentes rure Camenae. 2 This letter is lost. 


BOOK VI. in. 19-23 

their language which arouses in us a thirst to hear. 
Again, I do not regard the epithet facetus as applic- 
able solely to that which raises a laugh. If that 20 
were so Horace 1 would never have said that nature 
had granted Vergil the gift of being facetus in song. 
I think that the term is rather applied to a certain 
grace and polished elegance. This is the meaning 
which it bears in Cicero's letters, where he quotes 
the words of Brutus, 2 " In truth her feet are graceful 
and soft as she goes delicately on her way." This 
meaning suits the passage in Horace, 1 to which I 
have already made reference, " To Vergil gave a soft 
and graceful wit." locus is usually taken to mean 21 
the opposite of seriousness. This view is, however, 
somewhat too narrow. For to feign, to terrify, or to 
promise, are all at times forms of jesting. Dicacitas 
is no doubt derived from dico, and is therefore 
common to all forms of wit, but is specially applied 
to the language of banter, which is a humorous form 
of attack. Therefore, while the critics allow that 
Demosthenes was urbanus, they deny that he was 

The essence, however, of the subject which we 22 
are now discussing is the excitement of laughter, 
and consequently the whole of this topic is entitled 
Trept yeXotov by the Greeks. It has the same primary 
division as other departments pfjjraiory^ that is to 
say, it is concerned with things and words. The 23 
application of humour to oratory may be divided 
into three heads : for there are three things out of 
which we may seek to raise a laugh, to wit, others, 
ourselves, or things intermediate. In the first case 
we either reprove or refute or makelight of or 
retort or deride the_argumen.ts of others! In the 




Nostra ridicule indicamus et, ut verbo Ciceronis 
utar, dicimus aliqua subabsurda. Namque quaedem, 
quae, si imprudentibus excidant, stulta sunt, si 

24 simulamus, venusta creduntur. Tertium est genus, 
ut idem dicit, in decipiendis exspectationibus, dictis 
aliter accipiendis ceterisque, quae neutram personam 

25 contingunt ideoque a me media dicuntur. Item 
ridicula aut facimus aut dicimus. Facto risus con- 
ciliatur interim admixta gravitate : ut M. Caelius 
praetor, cum sellam eius curulem consul Isauricus 
fregisset, alteram posuit loris intentam ; dicebatur 
autem consul a patre flagris aliquando caesus ; inte- 
rim sine respectu pudoris, ut in ilia pyxide Caeliana, 
quod neque oratori neque ulli viro gravi conveniat. 

26 Idem autem de vultu gestuque ridiculo dictum sit ; 
in quibus est quidem summa gratia, sed maior, cum 
captare risum non videntur ; nihil enim est iis, quae 
sicut salsa 1 dicuntur, insulsius. Quanquam autem 
gratiae plurimum dicentis severitas adfert, fitque 
ridiculum id ipsum, quod qui dicit ilia non ridet, est 
tamen interim et aspectus et habitus oris et gestus 

1 sicut, Gesner: dut, G : dicenti, A. 

1 de Or. ii. Ixxi. 289. 

- rp. pro Cad. xxix. 69. There is no jest in this passage 
which lays itself open to such censure. The jest must have 
consisted in some action on the part of the orator. 


BOOK VI. in. 23-26 

second we speak of things which concern our- 
selves in a humorous manner and, to quote the 
words of Cicero, 1 say things which have a sugges- 
tion of absurdity. For there are certain sayings 
which are regarded as folly if they slip from us 
unawares, but as witty if uttered ironically. The 24 
third kind consists, as Cicero also tells us, in cheating 
expectations, in taking words in a different sense 
from what was intended, and in other things which 
affect neither party to the suit, arid which I have, 
therefore, styled intermediate. Further, things de- 25 
signed to raise a laugh may either be said or done. 
In the latter case laughter is sometimes caused by 
an act possessing a certain element of seriousness 
as well, as in the case of Marcus Caelius the praetor, 
who, when the consul Isauricus broke his curule 
chair, had another put in its place, the seat of which 
was made of leather thongs, by way of allusion to 
the story that the consul had once been scourged 
by his father : sometimes, again, it is aroused by 
an act which passes the grounds of decency, as in 
the case of Caelius' box, 2 a jest which was not fit 
for an orator or any respectable man to make. On 26 
the other hand the joke may lie in some remark 
about a ridiculous look or gesture ; such jests are 
very attractive, more especially when delivered with 
every appearance of seriousness ; for there are no 
jests so insipid as those which parade the fact that 
they are intended to be witty. Still, although the 
gravity with which a jest is uttered increases its 
attraction, and the mere fact that the speaker does 
not laugh himself makes his words laughable, there 
is also such a thing as a humorous look, manner or 

o o '2 


27 non inurbanus, cum iis modus contingit. Id porro, 
quod dicitur, aut est lascivum et hilare, qualia A. 
Galbae pleraque, aut contumeliosum, qualia nuper 
lunii Bassi, aut asperum, qualia Cassii Severi, aut 

28 lene, qualia Domitii Afri. Refert, his ubi quis 
utatur. Nam in convictibus et cotidiano sermone 
lasciva humilibus, hilaria omnibus convenient. Lae- 
dere nunquam velimus, longeque absit propositum 
illud potius amicum quam dictum perdendi. In 
hac quidem pugna forensi malim mi hi lenibus uti 
licere ; quanquam l et contumeliose et aspere dicere 
in adversaries permissum est, cum accusare etiam 
palam et caput alterius iuste petere concessum sit. 
Sed hie quoque tamen inhumana videri solet for- 
tunae insectatio, vel quod culpa caret vel quod reci- 
dere etiam in ipsos, qui obiecerunt, potest. Primum 
itaque considerandum est, et quis et in qua causa et 

29 apud quern et in quern et quid dicat. Oratori minime 
convenit distortus vultus gestusque, quae in mimis 
rideri solent. Dicacitas etiam scurrilis et scenica 
huic personae alienissima est. Obscenitas vero non 
a verbis tan turn abesse debet, sed etiam a signifi- 

1 quanquam, Regius : nonnunquam, MSS. 

BOOK VI. in. 26-29 

gesture, provided always that they observe the happy 
mean. Further, a jest will either be free and lively, 27 
like the majority of those uttered by Aulus Galba, 
or abusive, like those with which Junius Bassus 
recently made us familiar, or bitter, like those of 
Cassius Severus, or gentle, like those of Domitius 
Afer. Much depends on the occasion on which a 28 
jest is uttered. For in social gatherings and the inter- 
course of every day a certain freedom is not unseemly 
in persons of humble rank, while liveliness is be- 
coming to all. Our jests should never be designed 
to wound, and we~~should never make it our ideal 
to lose a friend sooner than lose a jest. Where the 
battles of the courts are concerned 1 am always 
better pleased when it is possible to indulge in 
gentle raillery, although it is, of course, permissible 
to be abusive or bitter in the words we use against 
our opponents, just as it is permissible to~liccuse 
them openly of crime, and to demand the last penalty 
of the law. But in the courts as elsewhere it is 
regarded as inhuman to hit a man when he is down, 
either because he is the innocent victim of mis- 
fortune or because such attacks may recoil on those 
who make them. Consequently, the first points to 
be taken into consideration are who the speaker 
is, what is the nature of the case, who is the judge, 
who is the victim, and what is the character of 
the remarks that are made. It is most unbecoming 29 
for an orator to distort his features or use uncouth 
gestures, tricks that arouse such merriment in farce. 
No less unbecoming are ribald jests, and such as 
are employed upon the stage. As for obscenity, it 
should not merely be banished from his language, 
but should not even be suggested. For even if our 



catione. Nam si quando obiici potest, non in ioco 

30 exprobranda est. Oratorern praeterea ut dicere 
urbane volo, ita videri adfectare id plane nolo. 
Quapropter ne dicet quidem salse, quotiens poterit, 
et dictum potius aliquando perdet quam minuet 

31 auctoritatem. Nee accusatorem autem atroci in 
causa nee patronum in miserabili iocantem feret 
quisquam. Sunt etiam iudices quidam tristiores 

32 quam ut risum libenter patiantur. Solet interim 
accidere, ut id quod in adversarium dicimus aut in 
iudicem conveniat aut in nostrum quoque litiga- 
torem ; quanquam aliqui reperiuntur, qui ne id qui- 
dem, quod in ipsos recidere possit, evitent. Quod 
fecit Longus Sulpicius, qui, cum ipse foedissimus 
esset, ait eum, contra quern iudicio liberali aderat, 
ne faciem quidem habere liberi hominis ; cui respon- 
dens Domitius Afer, Ex tui, inquit, animi sententia, 

33 Longe, qui malam faciem kabet, liber non est ? Vitan- 
dum etiam, ne petulans, ne superbum, ne loco, ne 
tempore alienum, ne praeparatum et domo adlatum 
videatur quod dicimus. Nam adversus miseros, 
sicut , supra dixeram, inhumanus est iocus. Sed qui- 
dam ita sunt receptae auctoritatis ac notae verecun-r 
diae, ut nocitura sit in eos dicendi petulantia. Nam 

34 de amicis iam praeceptum est. Illud non ad oratoris 1 

1 oratoris, Harster : orat fori#, A : ora fori, G. 

BOOK VI. in. 29-34 

opponent has rendered himself liable to such a 
charge, our denunciation should not take the form 
of a jest. Further, although I want my orator to 30 
speak with wit, he must not give the impression of 
striving after it. Consequently he must not display 
his wit on every possible occasion, but must sacrifice 
a jest sooner than sacrifice his dignity. Again, no 31 
one will endure an accuser who employs jests to 
season a really horrible case, nor an advocate for the 
defence who makes merry over one that calls for pity. 
Moreover, there is a type of judge whose tempera- 
ment is too serious to allow him to tolerate laughter. 
It may also happen that a jest directed against an 32 
opponent may apply to the judge or to our own client, 
although there are some orators who do not refrain 
even from jests that may recoil upon themselves. 
This was the case with Sulpicius Longus, who, 
despite the fact that he was himself surpassingly 
hideous, asserted of a man against whom he was 
appearing in a case involving his status as a free 
man, that even his face was the face of a slave. To 
this Domitius Afer replied, " Is it your profound 
conviction, Longus, that an ugly man must be a 
slave ? " Insolence and arrogance are likewise to 33 
be avoided, nor must our jests seem unsuitable to 
the time or place, or give the appearance of studied 
premeditation, or smell of the lamp, while those 
directed against the unfortunate are, as I have 
already said, inhuman. Again, some advocates are 
men of such established authority and such known 
respectability, that any insolence shown them 
would only hurt the assailant. As regards the 
way in which we should deal with friends I have 
already given instructions. It is the duty not merely 34 



consilium sed ad hominis pertinet ; lacessat hoc 
modo quern laedere sit periculosum,. ne aut inimi- 
citiae graves insequantur aut turpis satisfactio. Male 
etiam dicitur, quod in plures convenit, si aut nationes 
totae incessantur aut ordines aut condicio aut studia 

35 multorum. Ea quae dicet vir bonus omnia salva 
dignitate ac verecundia dicet. Nimium enim risus 
pretium est, si probitatis impendio constat. 

Unde autem concilietur risus et quibus ex locis 
peti sol eat, difficillimum dicere. Nam si species 
omnes persequi velimus, nee modum reperiemus et 

36 frustra laborabimus. Neque enim minus numerosi 
sunt loci, ex quibus haec dicta, quain illi, ex quibus 
eae, quas sententias vocamus, ducuntur, neque alii. 
Nam hie quoque est inventio et elocutio, atque ipsius 

37 elocutionis vis alia in verbis, alia in figuris. Risus 
igitur oriuntur aut ex corpore eius, in quern dicimus, 
aut ex animo, qui factis ab eo dictisque colligitur, aut 
ex iis, quae sunt extra posita. Intra haec .enim est 
omnis vituperatio ; quae si gravius posita sit, severa 
est, si levius, ridicula. Haec aut ostenduntur aut 

38 narrantur aut dicto notantur. Rarum est, ut oculis 

BOOK VI. in. 34-38 

of an orator, but of any reasonable human being, 
when attacking one whom it is dangerous to offend 
to take care that his remarks do not end in exciting 
serious enmity, or the necessity for a grovelling 
apology. Sarcasm that applies to a number of 
persons is injudicious : I refer to cases where it is 
directed against whole nations or classes of society, 
or against rank and pursuits which are common to 
many. A good man will see that everything he 35 
says is consistent with his dignity and the respecta- 
bility of his character ; for we pay too dear for the 
laugh we raise if it is at the cost of our own integrity. 
It is, however, a difficult task to indicate the 
sources from which laughter may be legitimately 
derived or the topics where it may be naturally em- 
ployed. To attempt to deal exhaustively with the 
subject would be an interminable task and a waste 
of labour. For the topics suitable to jests are no 36 
less numerous than those from which we may derive 
reflexions, as they are called, and are, moreover, 
identical with the latter. The powers of invention 
and expression come into play no less where jests 
are concerned, while as regards expression its force 
will depend in part on the choice of words, in part 
on the figures employed. Laughter then will be 37 
derived either from the physical appearance of our 
opponent or from his character as revealed in his 
words and actions, or from external sources ; for all 
forms of raillery come under one or other of these 
heads ; if the raillery is serious, we style it as 
severe ; if, on the other hand, it is of a lighter 
character, we regard it as humorous. These themes 
for jest may be pointed out to the eye or described 
in words or indicated by some mot. It is only on 38 



subiicere contingat, ut fecit C. Julius ; qui, cum 
Helvio Manciae saepius obstrepenti sibi diceret, 
Etiam ostendam, qualis sis, isque plane instaret inter- 
rogatione, qualem se ostensurus esset, digito demon- 
stravit imaginem Galli in scuto Cimbrico pictam, cui 
Mancia turn simillimus est visus. Tabernae autem 
erant circa forum, ac scutum illud signi gratia positum. 

39 Narrare, quae salsa sint, inprimis est subtile et ora- 
torium, ut Cicero pro Cluentio narrat de Caepasio 
atque Fabricio aut M. Caelius de ilia D. Laelii col- 
legaeque eius in provinciam festinantium conten- 
tione. Sed in his omnibus cum elegans et venusta 
exigitur tota expositio, turn id festivissimum est 
quod adiicit orator. Nam et a Cicerone sic est 

40 Fabricii fuga ilia condita : Itaque cum callidissime se 
putaret dicere, et cum ilia verba gravissima ex iniimo 
artificio deprornpsisset, Respicite, indices, hominum for- 
1/nws, respicite C. Fabricii senectutem, cum hoc, Respicite, 
07-nandae orationis causa saepe dixisset, respexit ipse ; at 
Fabricius a suhselliis demisso capite discesserat, et cetera, 
quae adiecit (nam est notus locus), cum in re hoc 

1 Cic. de Or. n. Ixvi. 266. 

2 pro Cluent. xxi. 58. 


BOOK VI. in. 38-40 

rare occasions that it is possible to make them 
visible to the eye, as Gaius Julius 1 did when Hel- 
vius Mancia kept clamouring against him. " I will 
show you what you're like ! " he cried, and then, as 
Mancia persisted in asking him to do so, pointed 
with his finger at the picture of a Gaul painted on 
a Cimbric shield, a figure to which Mancia bore a 
striking resemblance. There were shops round the 
forum and the shield had been hung up over one 
of them by way of a sign. The narration of a 39 
humorous story may often be used with clever effect 
and is a device eminently becoming to an orator. 
Good examples are the story told of Caepasius and 
Fabricius, which Cicero tells in the pro Cluentio, or 
the story told by Caelius of the dispute between 
Decimus Laelius and his colleague when they were 
both in a hurry to reach their province first. But 
in all such cases the whole narrative must possess 
elegance and charm, while the orator's own contri- 
bution to the story should be the most humorous 
element. Take for instance the way in which Cicero 
gives a special relish to the flight of Fabricius. 2 
"And so, just at the moment when he thought his 40 
speech was showing him at his best and he had 
uttered the following solemn words, words designed 
to prove a master-stroke of art, ( Look at the for- 
tunes of mankind, gentlemen, look at the aged form 
of Gaius Fabricius,' just at that very moment, I 
say, when he had repeated the word 'look' several 
times by way of making his words all the more 
impressive, he looked himself, and found that Fabri- 
cius had slunk out of court with his head hanging 
down." I will not quote the rest of the passage, 
for it is well known. But he develops the theme 



41 solum esset, Fabricium a iudicio recessisse. Et 
Caelius cum omnia venustissime finxit, turn illud 
ultimum, Hie subsccutus quomodo transient, uirum rate 
an piscatorio navigio, nemo sciebat, Siculi quidem, ut sunt 
lascivi et dicaces, aiehant in delphino sedisse et sic tan- 

42 quam Ariona trqnsvectum. In narrando autem Cicero 

^'^ > oA. V-M tOx TVjcv\vvv<, 

consistere facetias Iputat, dicacitatem in iaciendo. 
Mire fuit in hoc genere venustus Afer Domitius, 
cuius orationibus complures huiusmodi narrationes 
insertae reperiuntur, sed dictorum quoque ab eodem 

43 urbane sunt editi libri. Illud quoque genus est 
positum non in hac veluti iaculatione dictorum et 
inclusa breviter urbanitate sed in quodam longiore 
actu, quod de L. Crasso contra Brutum Cicero in 
secundo de Oratore libro et aliis quibusdam locis 

44 narrat. Nam, cum Brutus in accusatione Cn. Planci 
ex duobus lectoribus ostendisset, contraria L. Crassum 
patronum eius in oratione, quam de Colonia Narbo- 
nensi habuerat, suasisse iis, quae de lege Servilia 
dixerat, tris excitavit et ipse lectores, bisque patris 
eius dialogos dedit legendos ; quorum cum in Priver- 
nati unus, alter in Albano, tertius in Tiburti sermonem 
habitum complecteretur, requirebat, ubi essent eae 
possessiones. Omnes autem illas Brutus vendiderat ; 
et turn paterna emancupare praedia turpius habeba- 

1 i.e. D. Laelius or his colleague : see 39. 

2 Orat. xxvi. 87. 8 lv. 223. 

4 Probably members of his household, employed on this 
occasion to read out passages from Crassus' previous speeches. 


BOOK VI. in. 40-44 

still further although the plain facts amount simply 
to this, that Fabricius had left the court. The 41 
whole of the story told by Caelius is full of wit and 
invention, but the gem of the passage is its con- 
clusion. " He followed him* but how he crossed the 
straits, whether it was in a ship or a fisherman's 
boat, no one knew ; but the Sicilians, being of a 
lively turn of wit, said that he rode on a dolphin and 
effected his crossing like a second Arion." l Cicero 2 42 
thinks that humour belongs to narrative and wit to 
sallies against the speaker's antagonist. Domitius 
Afer showed remarkable finish in this department ; 
for, while narratives of the kind I have described 
are frequent in his speeches, several books have been 
published of his witticisms as well. This latter form 43 
of wit lies not merely in sallies and brief displays of 
wit, but may be developed at greater length, witness 
the story told by Cicero in the second book of his 
de Oratore? in which Lucius Crassus dealt with 
Brutus, against whom he was appearing in court. 
Brutus was prosecuting Cnaeus Plancus and had 44 
produced two readers 4 to show that Lucius Crassus, 
who was counsel for the defence, in the speech 
which he delivered on the subject of the colony of 
Narbo had advocated measures contrary to those 
which he recommended in speaking of the Servilian 
law. Crassus, in reply, called for three readers and 
gave them the dialogues of Brutus' father to read 
out. One of these dialogues was represented as 
taking place on his estate at Privernum, the second 
011 his estate at Alba, and the third on his estate at 
Tibur. Crassus then asked where these estates were. 
Now Brutus had sold them all, and in those days it 
was considered somewhat discreditable to sell one's 



tur. Similis in apologis quoque et quibusdam interim 
etiam historiis exponendi gratia consequi solet. 

45 Sed acutior est ilia atque velocior in urbanitate 
brevitas. Cuius quidem duplex forma est dicendi ac 
respondendi, sed ratio communis in partem ; nihil 
enim quod in lacessendo dici potest, noil etiam in 

46 repercutiendo. At quaedam propria sunt respon- 
dentiuin ; ilia etiam l atque etiam cogitata adferri 
solent, haec plerumque in altercatione aut in rogandis 
testibus reperiuntur. 2 Cum siut autem loci plures, 
ex quibus dicta ridicula ducantur, repetendum est 
mihi non omnes eos oratoribus con venire ; in primis 

47 ex amphibolia neque ilia obscena, 3 quae Atellani 
e more captant, nee qualia vulgo iactantur a vilissimo 
quoque, conversa in maledictum fere ambiguitate ; 
ne ilia quidem, quae Ciceroni aliquando sed non in 
agendo exciderunt, ut dixit, cum is candidatus, qui 
coqui filius habebatur, coram eo suffragium ab alio 

48 peteret : Ego quoque tibi favebo. Non quia excludenda 
sint omnino verba duos sensus significantia, sed quia 
raro belle respondeant, nisi cum prorsus rebus ipsis 

1 etiam atque etiam, Spaldiny : etiam itaque or etiam ira 
MSS. : cogitata, Becker : concitati, MSS. 

2 reperiuntur, Spalding : requiriuntur, A : requirantur, G. 

3 obscena, Ttu/tl : obscura, MSS. 

1 The pun is untranslatable, turning as it does on the 
similarity of sound between coque and qiioqxt, so that the 


HOOK VI. in. 44-48 

paternal acres. Similar attractive effects of narrative 
may be produced by the narration of fables or at 
times even of historical anecdotes. 

On the other hand brevity in wit gi^^_g a t er 46 
point and speed. It may be employee! m two-way s, 
according as we are the aggressors, or are replying 
to our opponents ; the method, however, in both 
cases is to some extent the same. For there is 
nothing that can be said in attack that cannot 
be used in riposte. But there are certain points 46 
which are peculiar to reply. For remarks designed 
for attack are usually brought ready-made into 
court, after long thought at home, whereas those 
made in reply are usually improvised during a dis- 
pute or the cross-examination of witnesses. But 
though there are many topics on which we may 
draw for our jests, I must repeat that not all these 
topics are becoming to orators : above all doubles 47 
entendres and obscenity, such as is dear to the Atellan 
farce, are to be avoided, as also are those coarse 
jibes so common on the lips of the rabble, where 
the ambiguity of words is turned to the service of 
abuse. I cannot even approve of a similar form of 
jest, that sometimes slipped out even from Cicero, 
though not when he was pleading in the courts : 
for example, once when a candidate, alleged to be 
the son of a cook, solicited someone else's vote in 
his presence, he said, Ego quoque tibi favebo. 1 I say 48 
this not because I object absolutely to all play__on 
words capable of two different meanings,TnTt because 
such jests are rarely effective, unless they are helped 
out by actual facts as well as similarity of sound. 

sentence might mean either I will support yon, cook, or / too 

will support you. 



adiuvantur. Quare [non hoc modo] 1 paene et ipsum 
scurrile Ciceronis est in eundem, de quo supra dixi, 
Isauricuni : Miror, quid sit, quod pate)' tuus, homo con- 

49 stantissimus, te nobis varium reliquit. Sed illud ex 
eodem genere praeclarum ; cum obiiceret Miloni 
accusator in argumentum factarum Clodio insidia- 
rum, quod Bovillas ante horam nonam devertisset, 
ut exspectaret, dum Clodius a villa sua exiret, et 
identidem interrogaret, quo tempore Clodius occisus 
esset, respondit, Sero ; quod vel. solum sufficit, ut 

50 hoc genus non totum repudietur. Nee plura modo 
significari solent, sed etiam diversa, ut Nero de servo 
pessimo dixit nulli plus apud se fidei haberi, nihil 

51 ei neque occlusum neque signatum esse. Pervenit 
res usque ad aenigma, quale est Ciceronis in Pletorium 
Fonteii accusatorem, cuius matrem, dixit, dum viocisset, 
ludum, postquam mortua essel, magistros kabuisse. Di- 
cebantur autem, dum vixit^ infames feminae convenire 
ad earn solitae ; post mortem bona eius venierant. 
Quanquam hie Indus per translationem dictus est, 

52 magislri per ambiguitatem. In metalepsin quoque 

1 rion hoc modo, bracketed by Halm. 

1 Here again the pun is virtually untranslatable, varium 
is used in the double sense of unstable or mottled, with 
reference to the story that he had been scourged by his 
father. See above 25. 

2 sero may mean at a late hour or too late. 

3 Cic. de Or. n. Ixi. 248. Probably C. Claudius Nero, 
victor of the Metaurus. 


BOOK VI. in. 48-52 

For example, I regard the jest which Cicero levelled 
against that same Isauricus, whom I mentioned 
above, as being little less than sheer buffoonery. 
" I wonder," he said, "why your father, the steadiest 
of men, left behind him such a stripy gentleman 
as yourself." l On the other hand, the following 49 
instance of the same type of wit is quite admirable : 
when Milo's accuser, by way of proving that he had 
lain in wait for Clodius, alleged that he had put up 
at Bovillae before the ninth hour in order to wait 
until Clodius left his villa, and kept repeating the 
question, "When was Clodius killed?", Cicero re- 
plied, " Late ! " 2 a retort which in itself justifies us 
in refusing to exclude this type of wit altogether. 
Sometimes, too, the same word may be used not 50 
merely in several senses, but in absolutely opposite 
senses. For example, Nero 3 said of a dishonest 
slave, " No one was more trusted in my house : there 
was nothing closed or sealed to him." Such ambi- 51 
guity may even go so far as to present all the 
appearance of a riddle, witness the jest that Cicero 
made at the expense of Pletorius, the accuser of 
Fonteius : "His mother," he said, "kept a school 
while she lived and masters after she was dead." 4 
The explanation is that in her lifetime women 
of infamous character used to frequent her* 
house, while after her death her property was 
sold. (I may note however that Indus, is used 
metaphorically in the sense of school, while 
magistri is used ambiguously.) A similar form of 52 

4 magister may mean a schoolmaster or a receiver (magister 
honor um) placed in charge of the goods to be sold. The 
phrase here has the same suggestion as "having the bailiffs 
in the house." This passage does not occur in the portions 
of the pro Fonttio which survive. 



cadit eadem ratio dictorum, ut Fabius Maximus, 
incusans August! congiariorum, quae amicis dabantur, 
exiguitatem, heminaria esse dixit ; nam congiarium 
commune liberalitatis atque mensurae, a mensura 

53 ducta imminutio rerum. Haec tarn frigida quam 
est nominum fictio adiectis, detractis, mutatis litteris, 
ut Acisculum, quia esset pactus, Padsculum, et Placi- 
dum nomine, quod is acerbus natura esset, Acidum, et 

54 TulHum, cum fur esset, Tollium dictos inveriio. Sed 
haec eadem genera commodius in rebus quam in 
nominibus respondent. Afer enim venuste Manlium 
Suram, multum in agendo discursantem, salientem, 
manus iactantem, togam deiicientem et reponentem, 
non agere, dixit, sed satagere. Est enim dictum 
per se urbanum satagere etiamsi nulla subsit alterius 

55 verbi similitudo. Fiunt et adiecta et detracta aspi- 
ratione et divisis coniunctisque verbis similiter saepius 
frigida, aliquando tamen recipienda. Eademque 
condicio est in iis, quae a nominibus trahuntur. 
Multa ex hoc Cicero in Verrem, sed ut ab aliis dicta, 

1 See V T III. vi. 37. "Substitution" is the nearest translation. 

2 congiarium is derived from congius a measure equal to 
about 6 pints. It was employed to denote the largesse of 
wine or oil distributed to the people. Fabius coined the 
word heminarium from hemina, the twelfth part of the 
congius. Fabius was consul in 10 B.C. and a friend of Ovid. 

3 From toller e to take away. 


BOOK VI. in. 52 55 

jest may he made by use of the figure known as 
mctalepsity as when Fabius Maximus complained of 
the meagreness of the gifts made by Augustus to 
his friends, and said that his congiaria were hetni- 
naria : for congiarium ' 2 implies at once liberality and 
a particular measure, and Fabius put a slight on the 
liberality of Augustus by a reference to the measure. 
This form of jest is as poor as is the invention of 53 
punning names by the addition, subtraction or change 
of letters : I find, for instance, a case where a certain 
Acisculus was called Pacisculus because of some 
" compact " which he had made, while one Placidus 
was nicknamed Acidus because of his "sour " temper, 
and one Tullius was dubbed Tollius 3 because he was 
a thief. Such puns are more successful with things 54 
than names. It was, for example, a neat hit of 
Afer's when he said that Manlius Sura, who kept 
rushing to and fro while he was pleading, waving 
his hands, letting his toga fall and replacing it, was 
not merely pleading, but giving himself a lot of 
needless trouble. 4 For there is a spice of wit about 
the word satagere in itself, even if there were no 
resemblance to any other word.J Similar jests may 55 
be produced by the addition or removal of the 
aspirate, or by splitting up a word or joining it to 
another : the effect is generally poor, but the practice 
is occasionally permissible. Jests drawn from names 
are of the same type. Cicero introduces a number 
of such jests against Verres, but always as quotations 

4 This pun cannot be reproduced. Watson attempts to 
express it by "doing business in pleading" and "overdoing 
it." But " overdoing it '' has none of the neatness of aatagere, 
which is said to have "a spice of wit about it," since it means 
lit. "to do enough," an ironic way of saying "to overdo 

4'' 7 

H H 2 


modo futurwH, ut omnia verreret, cum diceretur Verres, 
modo Herculi, quern expilaverat, molestiorem apro 
Erymanthio fuisse, modo malum sacerdote?n, qui lain 
nequam verrem reliquisset, quia Sacerdoti Verres suc- 

56 cesserat. Praebet tameii aliquando occasionem 
quaedam felicitas hoc quoque bene utendi : ut pro 
Caecina Cicero in testem Sex. Clodium Phormionem, 
Nee minus niger, inquit, nee minus confidens quam est 
ille Terentianus Phormio. 

57 Acriora igitur sunt et elegantiora, quae trahuntur 
ex vi rerum. In his maxime valet similitude, si 
tamen ad aliquid iuferius leviusque referatur; quae 
iam veteres illi iocabantur, qui Lentulum Spintherem 
et Scipionem Serapionem esse dixerunt. Sed ea non 
ab hominibus modo petitur verum etiam ab animali- 
bus, ut nobis pueris lunius Bassus, homo inprimis 

58 dicax, asinus albus vocabatur ; et Sarmentus Mes- 
sium Cicirrum equo fero comparavit. Ducitur et ab 
inanimis 1 sicut P. Blaesius lulium, hominem nigrum 
et macrum et pandum, fibulam ferream dixit. Quod 

59 nunc risus petendi genus frequentissimum est. Adhi- 

1 Messium . . . inanirais, an addition suggested by Rader- 

1 verres is also the second pers. sing, of the future of verro. 

2 verres means a boar and here suggests a pig that should 
have been killed as a victim. For these jests see Verr. n. 
xxi. 62, iv. xliii. 95, I. xlvi. 121 respectively. Compare also 
iv. xxiv. 53 and xxv. 57. 

3 x. 27. The reference must be to the make-up of Phormio 
on the stage : there is nothing in the play to suggest the 
epithet "black." 


BOOK VI. HI. 55-59 

from others. On one occasion he says that he 
would sweep 1 everything away, for his name was 
Verres ; on another, that he had given more trouble 
to Hercules, whose temple he had pillaged, than 
was given by the Erymanthine " boar" ; on another, 
that he was a bad " priest " who had left so worthless 
a pig behind him. 2 For Verres' predecessor was 
named Sacerdos. Sometimes, however, a lucky 56 
chance may give us an opportunity of employing 
such jests with effect, as for instance when Cicero 
in the pro Caecina 3 says of the witness Sextus 
Clodius Phormio, " He was not less black or less 
bold than the Phormio of Terence." 

We may note therefore that jests which turn 011 57 
the meaning of things are at once more pointed and 
more elegant. In such eases resemblances between 
things produce the best effects, more especially 
if we refer to something of an inferior or more trivial 
nature, as in the jests of which our forefathers were 
so fond, when they called Lentulus Spinther and 
Scipio Serapio. 4 But such jests may be drawn not 
merely from the names of men, but from animals as 
well ; for example when I was a boy, Junius Bassus, 
one of the wittiest of men, was nicknamed the white 
ass. And Sarmentus 5 compared Messius Cicirrus 58 
to a wild horse. The comparison may also be 
drawn from inanimate objects : for example Publius 
Blessius called a certain Julius, who was dark, lean 
and bent, the iron buckle. This method of raising 
a laugh is much in vogue to-day. Such resemblances 59 

4 From their resemblances to Spinther, a bad actor, and to 
Serapio, a dealer in sacrificial victims. 

6 Sarmentus, a favourite of Augustus, cp. Hor. Sat. i. v. 
">6, where the story is given. 



betur autem similitudo interim palam, interim inseri 
solet parabolae ; cuius est generis illud Augusti, qui 
militi libellum timide porrigenti, Noli, inquit, tanquam 

60 assem elephanto des. Sunt quaedam vi 1 similia ; unde 
Vatinius dixit hoc dictum, cum reus, agente in eum 
Calvo, frontem candido sudario tergeret, idque ipsum 
accusator in invidiam vocaret, Quamvis reus sum, inquit, 

61 et panem item* candidum edo. Adhuc est subtilior ilia 
ex simili translatio, cum., quod in alia re fieri solet, in 
aliam mutuamur. Ea dicatur sane fictio : ut Chry- 
sippus, cum in triumpho Caesaris eborea oppida essent 
translata, et post dies paucos Fabii Maximi lignea, 
thecas esse oppidorum Caesaris dixit. Et Pedo de 
mirmillone, qui retiarium consequebatur nee feriebat, 

62 Vivum, inquit, capere vult. lungitur amphiboliae 
similitude, ut a Galba, qui pilam negligenter 
petenti, Sic, inquit, petis, tanquam Caesaris candidates. 

1 vi is the reading of AG, but is unsatisfactory as intro- 
ducing nothing new. veri (some later MSS.), vitii (Halm), 
vix (Radermacher), do nothing to help out the meaning. 

2 panem item, Haupt : parentem, MSS. 

1 The accused habitually wore mourning. Calvus suggested 
that Vatinius should not therefore have a white handkerchief. 
Vatinius retorts, You might as well say that 1 ought to have 
dropped eating white bread. 

2 Legatus of Caesar in Spain. The wooden models were 
so worthless compared with those of ivory that Chrysippus 
said they must be no more than the boxes in which Caesar 
kept the latter. 

3 Probably Chrysippus Vettius, a freedman and architect. 

4 Presumably the poet Pedo Albinovanus. 


BOOK VI. in. 59-62 

may be put to the service of wit either openly or 
allusively. Of the latter type is the remark of 
Augustus, made to a soldier who showed signs of 
timidity in presenting a petition, "Don't hold it out 
as if you were giving a penny to an elephant." Some 60 
of these jests turn on similarity of meaning. Of 
this kind was the witticism uttered by Vatinius when 
he was prosecuted by Calvus. Vatinius was wiping 
his forehead with a white handkerchief, and his 
accuser called attention to the unseemliness of the 
act. Whereupon Vatinius replied, "Though I am 
on my trial, I go on eating white bread all the 
same." 1 Still more ingenious is the application of 61 
one thing to another on the ground of some resem- 
blance, that is to say the adaptation to one thing of 
a circumstance which usually applies to something 
else, a type of jest which we may regard as being an 
ingenious form of fiction. For example, when ivory 
models of captured towns were carried in Caesar's 
triumphal procession, and a few days later wooden 
models of the same kind were carried at the triumph 
of Fabius Maximus, 2 Chrysippus 3 remarked that the 
latter were the cases for Caesar's ivory towns. And 
Pedo 4 said of a heavy-armed gladiator who was 
pursuing another armed with a net and failed to 
strike him, " He wants to catch him alive." Resem- 62 
blance and ambiguity may be used in conjunction : 
Galba for example said to a man who stood very 
much at his ease when playing ball, "You stand 
as if you were one of Caesar's candidates." 5 The 

6 A candidate recommended by the emperor was auto- 
matically elected. I have borrowed Watson's translation of 
the pun. Petere is the regular word for " standing for 
office." Petere pilam probably means " to attempt to catch 
the ball." 



Nam illud petis ambiguum est, securitas similis. 

63 Quod hactenus ostendisse satis est. Ceterum fre- 
quentissima aliorum generum cum aliis mixtura est, 
eaque optima, quae ex pluribus constat. Eadem 
dissimilium ratio est. Hinc eques Romanus, ad 
quern in spectaculis bibentem cum misisset Augustus, 
qui ei diceret, Ego si prandere volo, domum to : Tu 

64 enim, inquit, non times, ne locum perdas. Ex contrario 
non una species. Neque enim eodem modo dixit 
Augustus praefecto, quern cum ignominia mittebat, 
subinde interponenti precibus, Quid respondebo patii 
meo ? Die, me tibi displicuisse ; quo Galba penulam 
roganti : J\ on possum commodore, domi maneo, cum 
cenaculum eius perplueret. Tertium adhuc illud : 
(nisi quod, 1 ut ne auctorem ponam, verecundia ipsius 
facit) Libidinosior es quam ullus spado ; quo sine dubio 
et opinio decipitur sed ex contrario. Et hoc ex 
eodem loco est sed nulli priorum simile, quod dixit 
M. Vestinus, cum ei nuntiatum esset. . . necatum esse,- 

55 Aliquando desinet put ere. Onerabo librum exemplis 
similemque iis, qui risus gratia componuntur, efficiam, 
si persequi voluero singula veterum. 

1 nisi quod, Becker : si quod, AG. 

2 necatum esse, supplied by Spalding. 


BOOK VI. in. 62-65 

ambiguity lies in the word stand, while the indifference 
shewn by the player supplies the resemblance. I 63 
need say no more on this form of humour. But the 
practice of combining different types of jest is very 
common, and those are best which are of this com- 
posite character. A like use may be made of dissi- 
milarity. Thus a Roman knight was once drinking 
at the games, and Augustus sent him the following 
message, " If I want to dine, I go home." To which , 
the other replied, " Yes, but you are not afraid of 
losing your seat." Contraries give rise to more than 64 
one kind of jest. For instance the following jests 
made by Augustus and Galba differ in form. Augustus 
was engaged in dismissing an officer with dishonour 
from his service : the officer kept interrupting him 
with entreaties and said, " What shall I say to my 
father?" Augustus replied, "Tell him that I fell 
under your displeasure." Galba, when a friend asked 
him for the loan of a cloak, said, " I cannot lend it 
you, as I am going to stay at home," the point being 
that the rain was pouring through the roof of his 
garret at the time. I will add a third example, 
although out of respect to its author I withhold his 
name : " You are more lustful than a eunuch," where 
we are surprised by the appearance of a word which 
is the very opposite of what we should have expected. 
Under the same heading, although it is quite 
different from any of the preceding, we must place 
the remark made by Marcus Vestinus when it was 
reported to him that a certain man was dead. " Some 
day then he will cease to stink," was his reply. 
But I shall overload this book with illustrations and 65 
turn it into a common jest-book, if I continue to 
quote each jest that was made by our forefathers. 



Ex omnibus argumentorum locis eadem occasio 
est. Nam et finitione usus est Augustus de panto-* 
mimis duobus, qui alternis gestibus contendebant, 
cum eorum alterum saltatorem dixit alterum interpella- 

66 torem ; et parti tione Galba, cum paenulam roganti 
respondit, Non pluit, non opus est tibi ; si pluit, ipse 

. utar. Proinde genere, specie, propriis, differentibus, 
iugatis, adiunctis, consequentibus, antecedentibus, 
repugnantibus, causis, effectis, comparatione parium, 
maiorum, minorum similis materia praebetur ; sicut 

67 in tropos quoque omnes cadit. An non plurima per 
hyperbolen 1 dicuntur? quale refert Cicero de homine 
praelongo, caput eum ad fornicem Fabium offendisse ; 
et quod P. Oppius dixit de genere Lentulorum, cum 
assidue minores parentibus liberi essent, nascendo 

68 interiturum. Quid ironia ? nonne etiam quae severis- 
sime fit, ioci prope genus est ? Qua urbane usus est 
Afer, cum Didio Gallo, qui provinciam ambitiosis- 
sime petierat, deinde, impetrata ea, tanquam coactus 
querebatur, Age, inquit, aliquid et rei publicae causa. 
Metaphora 2 quoque Cicero lusit, cum, Vatinii morte 
nuntiata, cuius parum certus dicebatur auctor, Inte- 

1 per hyperbolen, added by Regius. 

2 metaphora, Halm : et abora, et labora, etc. , MSS. 

1 See v. x. 85. 2 See v. x. 55 sqq. 

3 cp. de Orat. 11. Ixvi. 267, where the jest is attributed to 


BOOK VI. in. 65-68 

All forms of argument afford equal opportunity for 
jests. Augustus for example employed ^dejinition 
when he said of two ballet-dancers who were engaged 
in a contest, turn and turn about, as to who could make 
the most exquisite gestures, that one was a dancer and 
the other merely interrupted the dancing. Galba on 66 
the other hand made use of partition when he replied 
to a friend who asked him~~~for~a cloak, " It is not 
raining and you don't need it ; if it does rain, I shall 
wear it myself." Similar material for jests is sup- 
plied by genus, species, property, difference, conju- 
gates, 1 adjuncts, antecedents, consequents, contraries, 
causes, effects, and comparisons of things greater, 
equal, or less, 2 as it is also by all forms of trope. Are 67 
not a large number of jests made by means of hyper- 
bole? Take for instance Cicero's 3 remark aboutTa 
man who was remarkable for his height, " He bumped 
his head against the Fabian arch," or the remark 
made by Publius Oppius about the family of the 
Lentuli to the effect, that since the children were 
always smaller than their parents, the race would 
"perish by propagation." Again, what of irony? Is not 68 
even the most severe form of irony a kind of jest ? 
Afer made a witty use of it when he replied to Didius 
Callus, who, after making the utmost efforts to secure 
a provincial government, complained on receiving 
the appointment that he had been forced into accept- 
ing, " Well, then, do something for your country's 
sake." 4 Cicero also employed metaphor to serve 
his jest, when on receiving a report of uncertain 
authorship to the effect that Vatinius was dead, 
he remarked, " Well, for the meantime I shall 

4 i.e.. sacrifice your own interests and serve? your country 
for its own sake. 



69 rim, inquit, usura fruar. Idem per allegorian M. 
Caelium, melius obiicientem crimina quam defen- 
dentem, bonam dextram, malam sinistram habere 
dicebat. Emphasi A. Villius dixit, ferrum in Tuc- 

70 cium incidisse. Figuras quoque mentis, quae <r^?J/xaTa 
Suxvoias dicuntur, res eadem recipit omnes, in quas 
nonnulli diviserunt species dictorum. Nam et in- 
terrogamus et dubitamus et adfirmamus et minamur 
et optamus, quaedam ut miserantes, quaedam ut 
irascentes dicimus. Ridiculum est autem omne, 

71 quod aperte fingitur. Stulta reprehendere facilli- 
mum est, nam per se sunt ridicula ; sed rem urbanam 
facit aliqua ex nobis adiectio. Stulte interrogaverat 
exeuntem de theatre Campatium Titius Maximus, an 
spectasset ? fecit Campatius dubitationem eius stulti- 
orem dicendo, Non, sed in orchestra pila lusi. 

12 Refutatio cum sit in negando, redarguendo, defen- 
dendo, elevando, ridicule negavit Manius Curius ; 
nam, cum eius accusator in sipario omnibus locis aut 
nudum eum in nervo aut ab amicis redemptum ex 

73 alea pinxisset : Ergo ego, inquit, nunquam vici ? Re- 

1 The report may be false, but I will enjoy the hope it 
arouses, in me. The capital on which I receive a dividend 
may be non-existent, but I will enjoy the interest. 

2 The right being the sword arm, the left carrying the 

3 Tuccius was clearly a coward who committed suicide. 
Villius suggested that he would never have had the courage 

47 6 

BOOK VI. HI. 68-73 

make use of the interest." l He also employed 69 
(i!!egory_ in the witticism that he was fond of making 
about Marcus Caelius, who was better at bringing 
charges than at defending his client against them, to 
the effect that he had a good right hand, but a weak 
left. 2 As an example of the use of emphasis I may 
quote the jest of Aulus Villius, that Tuccius was 
killed by his sword falling upon him. 3 Figures of 70 
thought, which the Greeks call o-^r/^ara Siavotas, may 
be similarly employed, and some writers have classi- 
fied jests under their various headings. For we ask 
questions, express doubts, make assertions, threaten, 
wish and speak in pity or in anger. And everything 
is laughable that is obviously a pretence. It is easy 71 
to make fun of folly, for folly is laughable in itself; 
but we may improve such jests by adding something 
of our own. Titius Maximus put a foolish question 
to Campatius, who was leaving the theatre, when he 
asked him if he had been watching the play. " No," 
replied Campatius, "I was playing ball in the stalls," 
whereby he made the question seem even more 
foolish than it actually was. 

Refutation consists in denying, rebutting, defend- 72 
ing or making light of a charge, and each of these 
affords scope for humour. Manius Curius, for example, 
showed humour in the way in which he denied a 
charge that had been brought against him. His 
accuser had produced a canvas, in every scene of 
which he was depicted either as naked and in prison 
or as being restored to freedom by his friends paying 
off his gambling debts. His only comment was, 
" Did I never win, then ? " Sometimes we rebut a 73 

to fall upon his sword, and that therefore the sword must 
have fallen on him. 



darguimus interim aperte, ut Cicero Vibium Curium 
multum de annis aetatis suae mentientem, Turn ergo, 
cum und declamabamus, non eras natus ; interim et 
simulata assensione, ut idem Fabia Dolabellae di- 
cente triginta se annos habere, Verum est, inquit ; nam 

74 hoc illam iam vigi?iti annis audio. Belle interim subii- 
citur pro eo, quod neges, aliud mordacius : ut lunius 
Bassus, querente Domitia Passieni, quod incusans 
eius sordes calceos earn veteres diceret vendere 
solere, Non mehercuJea, inquit, hoc unquam dixi ; sed 
dixi emere te solere. Defensionem imitatus est eques 
Romanus, qui obiicienti Augusto, quod patrimonium 

75 comedisset, Meum, inquit, ptitavi. Elevandi ratio est 
duplex, ut aut nimiam quis * iactantiam minuat : 
quemadmodum C. Caesar Pomponio ostendenti vul- 
nus ore exceptum in seditione Sulpiciana, quod is se 
passum pro Caesare pugnantem gloriabatur, Nunquam 
fugiens respexeris, inquit ; aut crimen obiectum, ut 

Cicero obiurgantibus, quod sexagenarius Publiliam 

1Q virginem duxisset, Cras mulier erit, inquit. Hoc 

genus dicti conjequens vocant quidam, atque illi 

1 niniiam qnis, Deffner : veniam quis ant, 

See vi. i. 50. 

A cousin of the father of C. Julius Caesar. 


BOOK VI. in. 73-76 

charge openly, as Cicero did when he refuted the 
extravagant lies of Vibius Curius about his age : 
"Well, then/' he remarked, "in the days when you 
and I used to practise declamation together, you 
were not even born." At other times we may rebut 
it by pretending to agree. Cicero, for example, when 
Fabia the wife of Dolabella asserted that her age was 
thirty, remarked, " That is true, for I have heard it 
for the last twenty years." Sometimes too it is 74 
effective to add something more biting in place of 
the charge which is denied, as was done by Junius 
Bassus when Domitia the wife of Passienus J com- 
plained that by way of accusing her of meanness he 
had alleged that she even sold old shoes. " No," 
he replied, "I never said anything of the sort. I 
said you bought them." A witty travesty of defence 
was once produced by a Roman knight who was 
charged by Augustus with having squandered his 
patrimony. " I thought it was my own," he an- 
swered. As regards making light of a charge, there 75 
are two ways in which this may be done. We may 
throw cold water on the excessive boasts of our 
opponent, as was done by Gaius Caesar, 2 when Pom- 
ponius displayed a wound in his face which he had 
received in the rebellion of Sulpicius and which he 
boasted he had received while fighting for Caesar : 
" You should never look round," he retorted, "when 
you are running away." Or we may do the same 
with some charge that is brought against us, as was 
done by Cicero when he remarked to those who 
reproached him for marrying Publilia, a young un- 
wedded girl, when he was already over sixty, " Well, 
she will be a woman to-morrow." Some style this 76 
type of jest consequent and, on the ground that both 



simile, quod Cicero Curionem, semper ab excusatione 
aetatis incipientem, facilius cotidie prooemium ha- 
bere dixit, quia ista natura sequi et cohaerere 

77 videantur. Sed elevandi genus est etiam causarum 
relatio, qua Cicero est usus in Vatinium. Qui pedi- 
bus aeger, cum vellet videri commodioris valetudinis 
factus et diceret, se iam bina milia passuum ambu- 
lare, Dies enim, inquit, longiores sunt. Et Augustus 
nuntiantibus Tarraconensibus palmam in ara eius 

78 enatam, Apparet, inquit, quam saepe accendatis. Trans- 
tulit crimen Cassius Severus. Nam cum obiurgare- 
tur a praetore, quod advocati eius L. Varo Epicureo, 
Caesaris amico,, convicium fecissent, Nescio, inquit, 
qui conviciati sint, et puto Stoicos fuisse. 

Repercutiendi multa sunt genera, venustissimum, 
quod etiam similitudine aliqua verbi adiuvatur : ut 
Trachalus dicenti Suelio, "Sihocita est, is in exilium" 

79 " Si non est ita, redis," inquit. Elusit Cassius Severus 
obiiciente quodam, quod ei domo sua Proculeius in- 
terdixisset, respondendo, Numquid ergo illuc accedo ? 
Sic eluditur et ridiculum ridicule : ut duiis Augus- 
tus, cum ei Galli torquem aureum centum pondo 
dedissent, et Dolabella per iocum, temptans tamen 

1 The point is obscure ; we have no key to the circum- 
stances of the jest. 


BOOK VI. HI. 76-79 

jests seem to follow so naturally and inevitably, class 
it with the jest which Cicero levelled against Curio, 
who always began his speeches by asking indulgence 
for his youth : " You will find your exordium easier 
every day," he said. Another method of making 77 
light of a statement is to suggest a reason. Cicero 
employed this method against Vatinius. The latter 
was lame and, wishing to make it seem that his health 
was improved, said that he could now walk as much 
as two miles. "Yes," said Cicero, "for the days are 
longer." Again Augustus, when the inhabitants of 
Tarraco reported that a palm had sprung up on the 
altar dedicated to him, replied, "That shows how 
often you kindle fire upon it." Cassius Severus 78 
showed his wit by transferring a charge made against 
himself to a different quarter. For when he was 
reproached by the praetor on the ground that his 
advocates had insulted Lucius Varus, an Epicurean 
and a friend of Caesar, he replied, " I do not know 
who they were who insulted him, I suppose they 
were Stoics." 

Of retorts there are a number of forms, the wittiest 
being" tTTatTwhich is helped out by a certain verbal 
similarity, as in the retort made by Trachalus to 
Suelius. The latter had said, " If that is the case, 
you go into exile": to which Trachalus replied, 
" And if it is not the case, you go back into exile." 1 
Cassius Severus baffled an opponent who reproached 79 
him with the fact that Proculeius had forbidden him 
to enter his house by replying, " Do I ever go there ? " 
But one jest may also be defeated by another : for 
example, Augustus of blessed memory, when the 
Gauls gave him a golden necklet weighing a hundred 
pounds, and Dolabella, speaking in jest but with an 




ioci sui eventum, dixisset, " Imperator, torque me dona" 

80 " Malo, in quit, te civica donare" : mendacium quoque 
mendacio, ut Galba, dicente quodam, victoriato se uno 
in Sicilia quinque pedes longam murenam emisse : 
Nihil t inquit, mirum ; nam ibi tarn longae nascuniur, id 

81 its piscatores pro restibus cingantur. Contraria est ne- 
ganti confessionis simulatio, sed ipsa quoque multum 
habet urbanitatis. Sic Afer, cum ageret contra 
libertum Claudii Caesaris, et ex diverse quidam con- 
dicionis eiusdem, cuius erat litigator, exclamasset, 
" Praeterea tu semper in libertos Caesaris dicis," " Nee 
mehercule, inquit, quicquam projicio." Cui vicinum 
est non negare quod obiicitur, cum et id palam 
falsum est et inde materia bene respondendi datur : 
ut Catulus dicenti Philippo, " Quid latms? " "Furem 

82 video" inquit. In se dicere non fere est nisi scur- 
rarum et in oratore utique minime probabile, quod 
fieri totidem modis quot in alios potest. Ideoque hoc, 

83 quamvis frequens sit, transeo. Illud vero, etiamsi 
ridiculum est, indignum tamen est homine liberali, 1 
quod aut turpiter aut potenter dicitur ; quod fecisse 

1 liberali, early edd. : tolerabili, MSS. 

1 The civic crown of oak leaves was given as a reward for 
saving the life of a fellow-citizen in war. The torquis was 
often given as a reward for valour, and Augustus pretends 
to believe that Dolabella had asked for a military decoration. 
The point lies in the contrast between the intrinsic value and 


BOOK VI. HI. 79-83 

eye to the success of his jest, said, " General, give 
me your necklet," replied, "I had rather give you 
the crown of oak leaves." 1 So, too, one lie may be 80 
defeated by another: Galba, for instance, when 
someone told him that he once bought a lamprey 
five feet long for half a denarius in Sicily, replied, 
" There is nothing extraordinary in that : for they 
grow to such a length in those seas that the fisher- 
men tie them round their waists in lieu of ropes ! " 
Then there is the opposite of denial, namely a feigned 81 
confession, which likewise may show no small wit. 
Thus Afer, when pleading against a freedman of 
Claudius Caesar and when another freedman called 
out from the opposite side of the court, " You are 
always speaking against Caesar's freedmen," replied, 
"Yes, but I make precious little headway." A 
similar trick is not to deny a charge, though it is 
obviously false and affords good opportunity for an 
excellent reply. For example, when Philippus said 
to Catulus, " Why do you bark so ? " the latter replied, 2 
"I see a thief." To make jokes against oneself is 82 
scarcely fit for any save professed buffoons and is 
strongly to be disapproved in an orator. This form 
of jest has precisely the same varieties as those which 
we make against others and therefore I pass it by, 
although it is not infrequently employed. On the 83 
other hand scurrilous or brutal jests, although they 
may raise a laugh, are quite unworthy of a gentle- 
man. I remember a jest of this kind being made by 

weight of the two decorations. Further, Augustus was very 
parsimonious in bestowing military decorations and had him- 
self received the crown of oak leaves from the senate as the 
saviour of Rome, a fact which must have rendered its be- 
stowal on others rare, if not non-existent. 

i i 2 


quendain scio, qui humiliori libere adversus se 
loquenti, Colaphum, inquit, tibi ducam et formulam 
scribam, 1 quod caput durum habeas. Hie enim dubium 
est, utrum ridere audientes an indignari debuerint. 

84 Superest genus decipiendi opinionem aut dicta 
aliter intelligendi, quae sunt in omni hac materia 
vel venustissima. Inopinatum et a lacessente poni 
solet, quale est, quod refert Cicero, Quid huic abest 
nisi res et virtus ? aut illud Afri, Homo in agenda 
causis optime . vestitus ; et in occurrendo, ut Cicero, 
audita falsa Vatinii morte, cum obvium libertum 
eius interrogasset, "Rectene omnia ? " dicenti, "Rede,'' 

86 " Mortuus est?" inquit. Plurimus autem circa simu- 
lationem et dissimulationem 2 risus est, quae sunt 
vicina et prope eadem ; sed simulatio est certam 
opinionem animi sui imitantis, dissimulatio aliena se 
parum intelligere fingentis. Simulavit Afer, cum in 
causa subinde dicentibus Celsinam de re cognovisse, 
quae erat potens femina : Quis est, inquit, iste ? 

86 Celsinam enim videri sibi virum finxit. Dissimu- 
lavit Cicero, cum Sex. Annalis testis reum laesisset, 
et instaret identidem accusator ei, Die, M. Tulli, 

1 scribam, Badius : scribes, A : scribe, G. 

2 et dissimulationem, added by Regius. 

1 See ix. ii. 22. * de Or. n. Ixx. 281. 3 cp. 68. 

BOOK VI. in. 83-86 

a certain man against an inferior who had spoken 
with some freedom against him : " I will smack your 
head, and bring an action against you for having such 
a hard skull ! " In such cases it is difficult to say 
whether the audience should laugh or be angry. 

There remains tlie^prettiest of all formsjDf humour, 84 
namely the jest which depends for success on deceiv- 
ing anticipations l or taking another's words in a 
seffse other than he intended. The unexpected 
element may be employed by the attacking party, 
as in the example cited by Cicero, 2 " What does this 
man lack save wealth and virtue?" or in the 
remark of Afer, " For pleading causes he is most 
admirably dressed." Or it may be employed to 
meet a statement made by another, as it was by 
Cicero 3 on hearing a false report of Vatinius' death : 
he had met one of the latter's freedmen and asked 
him, " Is all well ? " The freedman answered, " All is 
well." To which Cicero replied, " Is he dead, then ? " 
But the loudest laughter of all is produced by Simula- 85 
tion and dissimulation, proceedings which differ but 
rrttle and are almost identical; but whereas simulation 
implies the pretence of having a certain opinion of 
one's own, dissimulation consists in feigning that 
one does not understand someone else's meaning. 
Afer employed simulation, when his opponents. in a 
certain case kept saying that Celsina (who was an 
influential lady) knew all about the facts, and he, 
pretending to believe that she was a man, said, " Who 
is he? " Cicero on the other hand employed dissimu- 86 
lation when Sextus Annalis gave evidence damaging 
to the client whom he was defending, and the accuser 
kept pressing him with the question, "Tell me, Marcus 
Tullius, what have you to say about Sextus Annalis ? " 



numquid 1 potes de Sex. Annali? versus enim dicere 
coepit de libro Ennii annali sexto : 

Quis potis ingentis causas evolvere belli ? 

87 Cui sine dubio frequentissimam dat occasionem am- 
biguitas : ut Cascellio, qui consultatori dicenti, "Na- 
vem dividere volo," " Perdes," inquit. Sed avert! 
intellectus et aliter solet, cum ab asperioribus ad 
leniora deflectitur : ut qui interrogatus, quid sentiret 
de eo, qui in adulterio deprehensus esset, Tardum 

88 fuisse respondit. Ei confine est, quod dicitur per 
suspicionem : quale illud apud Ciceronem querenti, 
quod uxor sua ex fico sese suspendisset, Rogo, des 
mihi surculum ex ilia arbore, ut inseram ; intelligitur 

89 enim quod non dicitur. Et hercule omnis salse 
dicendi ratio in eo est, ut aliter quam est rectum 
verumque dicatur : quod fit totum fingendis aut 
nostris aut alienis persuasionibus aut dicendo quod 

90 fieri non potest. Alienam finxit luba, qui querenti, 
quod ab equo suo esset aspersus, Quid ? Tu, inquit, 
me Hippocentaurum putas ? suam C. Cassius, qui militi 

1 Tulli numquid, cod. Parisinus 7723 : Tullius inquid, A O. 

1 Enn. 174 (with oras for causas). The question (numquid, 
etc.) is treated by Cicero as meaning "Can you quote any- 
thing from the sixth book of the Annals ? " ingentis is ace. 

* A famous lawyer mentioned by Horace, A. P. 371. Cas- 
cellius pretends to take dividere literally (i.e. cut in two) ; 
his client had meant "to sell half his ship," i.e. take a 
partner in the venture. 


BOOK VI. in. 86-90 

To which he replied by beginning to recite the Sixth 
book of the Annals of Ennuis, which commences with 
the line, 

" Who may the causes vast of war unfold ? " l 

This kind of jest finds its most frequent opportunity 87 
in ambiguity, as for example, when Cascellius, 2 on 
being consulted by a client who said, " I wish to 
divide my ship," replied, tl You will lose it then." 
But there are also other ways of distorting the 
meaning ; we may for instance give a serious state- 
ment a comparatively trivial sense, like the man who, 
when asked what he thought of a man who had been 
caught in the act of adultery, replied that he had 
been too slow in his movements. 3 Of a similar nature 88 
are jests whose point lies in insinuation. Such was 
the reply which Cicero 4 quotes as given to the man 
who complained that his wife had hung herself on a 
fig-tree. " ^ wish," said someone, "you would give 
me a slip of that tree to plant." For there the mean- 
ing is obvious, though it is not expressed in so many 
words. Indeed the essence of all wit lies in the 89 
distortion of the true and natural meaning of words : 
a perfect instance of this is when we misrepresent 
our own or another's opinions or assert some im- 
possibility. Juba misrepresented another man's opin- 90 
ion, when he replied to one who complained of 
being bespattered by his horse, "What,jdo you 
think I am a Centaur ? " 6 Gaius Cassius misrepre- 
sented his own, when Tie said to a soldier whom he 

8 de Or. n. Ixviii. 275. 4 ib. Ixix. 278. 

5 The point of the jest, such as it is, is that Juba dis- 
claims forming part of his horse. The reference is to Juba, 
historian and king of Mauretania, captured by Julius Caesar 
and restored by Augustus. 



sine gladio decurrenti, Heus, commilito, pugno bene 
uteris, inquit. Et Galba de piscibus, qui cum pridie 
ex parte adesi et versati postera die appositi essent, 
Festinemus, alii subcenant, inquit. Tertium illud Cicero, 
ut dixi, adversus Curium ; fieri enim certe non pote- 

91 rat ut, cum declamaret, natus non esset. Est et ilia 
ex ironia fictio, qua usus est C. Caesar. Nam cum 
testis diceret a reo femina sua ferro petita,.et esset 
facilis reprehensio, cur illam potissimuni partem cor- 
poris vulnerare voluisset : Quid enim faceret, inquit, 

92 cum tu galeam et loricam haberes ? Vel optima est 
simulatio contra simulantem, qualis ilia Domitii Afri 
fuit : vetus habebat testamentum, et unus ex amicis 
recentioribus, sperans aliquid ex mutatione tabu- 
larum, falsam fabulam intulerat, consulens eum, an 
primipilari seni iam testato rursus 1 suaderet ordinare 
suprema iudicia. Noli, inquit, facere ; offendis ilium. 

93 lucundissima sunt autem ex his omnibus lenia et, 
ut sic dixerim, boni stomachi : ut Afer idem ingrato 
litigatori conspectum eius in foro vitanti per nomen- 
clatorem missum ad eum, Amas me, inquit, quod te 
non vidi ? Et dispensatori, qui, cum reliqua non 

1 primipilari . . . rursus, Spalding : primipilaris enim 
intestator, AG. 

1 73. 

2 Lit. the slave employed to name persons to his master. 


BOOK VI. HI. 90-93 

saw hurrying into battle without his sword, " Shew 
yourself a handy man with your fists, comrade." So 
too did Galba, when served with some fish that had 
been partially eaten the day before and had been 
placed on the table with the uneaten sides turned 
uppermost : " We must lose no time/' he said, " for 
there are people under the table at work on the 
other side." Lastly there is the jibe that Cicero 
made against Curius, which I have already cited ; l 
for it was clearly impossible that he should be still 
unborn at a time when he was already declaiming. 
There is also a form of misrepresentation which has 91 
its basis in irony, of which a saying of Gains Caesar 
will provide an example. A witness asserted that 
the accused attempted to wound him in the thighs, 
and although it would have been easy to ask him 
why he attacked that portion of his body above all 
others, he merely remarked, " What else could he 
have done, when you had a helmet and breast- 
plate? " Best of all is it when pretence is met by 92 
pretence, as was done in the following instance by 
Domitius Afer. He had made his will long ago, 
and one of his more recent friends, in the hopes of 
securing a legacy if he could persuade him to change 
it, produced a fictitious story and asked him whether 
he should advise a senior centurion who, being an old 
man, had already made his will to revise it ; to which 
Afer replied, "Don't do it : you will offend him." 

But the most agreeable of all jests are those which 93 
are good humoured and easily digested. Take 
another example from Afer. Noting that an un- 
grateful client avoided him in the forum, he sent his 
servant 2 to him to say, " I hope you are obliged to 
me for not having seen you." Again when his 



respond erent, dicebat subinde, " Non comedi ; pane el 
aqua vivo," l " Passer, redde quod debes." Quae VTTO TO 
9 4 5#os vocant. Est gratus iocus, qui minus exprobrat 
quam potest, ut idem dicenti candidate, Semper domum 
tuam colui, cum posset palam negare, Credo, inquit, 
et verurn est. Interim de se dicere ridiculum et quod 
in alium si absentem diceretur urbanum non erat, 

95 quoniam ipsi palam exprobratur, movet risum : quale 
Augusti est, cum ab eo miles nescio quid improbe 
peteret et veniret contra Marcianus, quern suspica- 
batur et ipsum aliquid iniuste rogaturum : A on 
magis, inquit, faciam, commilito, quod petis, quam quod 
Marcianus a me petilurus est. 

96 Adiuvant urbanitatem et versus commode positi, 
seu toti ut sunt (quod adeo facile est, ut Ovidius ex 
tetrastichon Macri carmine librum in malos poetas 
composuerit), quod fit gratius, si qua etiam ambi- 
guitate conditur : ut Cicero in Lartium, hominem 
callidum et versutum, cum is in quadam causa sus- 

97 pectus esset, Nisi si qua Ulixes intervasit Lartius ; seu 
verbis ex parte mutatis, ut in eum qui, cum antea 

1 respondereb MSS. corr. Salmasius. pane et aqua, A : 
panem et aquam, remaining MSS. vivo, Haupt : bibo, MSS. 

1 The meaning is dubious and the phrase cannot be paralleled 
and is probably corrupt. 

2 Aemilius Macer, a contemporary of Virgil and Horace. 
The work presumably consisted of epigrams, four lines long. 

3 The author, presumably a tragic poet, is unknown. 
Lartius = Laertius, son of Laertes. 


BOOK VI. in. 93-97 

steward, being unable to account for certain suras 
of money, kept saying, " I have not eaten it : I 
live on bread and water," he replied, " Master 
sparrow, pay what you owe." Such jests the Greeks 
style VTTO TO T/tfos l or adapted to character. It is a 94 
pleasant form of jest to reproach a person with less 
than would be possible, as Afer did when, in answer 
to a candidate who said, " I have always shown my 
respect for your family," he replied, although he might 
easily have denied the statement, " You are right, it 
is quite true." Sometimes it may be a good joke to 
speak of oneself, while one may often raise a laugh 
by reproaching a person to his face with things that 
it would have been merely bad-mannered to bring 
up against him behind his back. Of this kind was the 96 
remark made by Augustus, when a soldier was mak- 
ing some unreasonable request and Marcianus,whom 
he suspected of intending to make some no less 
unfair request, turned up at the same moment : " I 
will no more grant your request, comrade, than I 
will that which Marcianus is just going to make." 

Apt quotation of verse may add to the effect of 96 
wit. The lines may be quoted in their entirety 
without alteration, which is so easy a task that Ovid 
composed an entire book against bad poets out of 
lines taken from the quatrains of Macer. 2 Such a 
procedure is rendered specially attractive if it be 
seasoned by a spice of ambiguity, as in the line 
which Cicero quoted against Lartius, a shrewd and 
cunning fellow who was suspected of unfair dealing 
in a certain case, 

"Had not Ulysses Lartius intervened." 3 
Or the words may be slightly altered, as in the line 97 
quoted against the senator who, although he had 



stultissimus esset habitus, post acceptam hereditatem 
primus sententiam rogabatur, Hereditas est, quam 
vacant sapientiam, pro illo, facilitas est ; seu ficti notis 

98 versibus similes, quae TrapwoYa dicitur. Et proverbia 
opportune aptata : ut homini nequam lapso et, ut 
allevaretur, roganti, Tollat te qm non novit. Ex 
historia etiam ducere urbanitatem eruditum est : 
ut Cicero fecit, cum ei testem in iudicio Verris 
roganti dixisset Hortensius, "Non intelligo haec 
aenigmata" " Atqui debes, inquit, cum Sphingem domi 
habeas " ; acceperat autem ille a Verre Sphingem 
aeneam magnae pecuniae. 

99 Subabsurda ilia constant stulti simulatione ; quae, 1 
nisi fingantur, stulta sunt : ut, qui mirantibus, 
quod humile candelabrum emisset, Pransorium erit, 
inquit. Sed ilia similia absurdis sunt acria, quae 
tanquam sine ratione dicta feruntur : ut servus 
Dolabellae, cum interrogaretur an dominus eius 
auctionem proposuisset, Domum, inquit, vendidit. 

1 stulti simulatione ; quae, Spalding : stultissimi imita- 
tione et quae, MSS. 

1 Probably from a lost comedy. 

* Hor. Ep. i. xvii. 62, where the passers by reply Quaere 
peregrinum to an imposter who, having fallen down and 
broken his leg, implores them to pick him up, crying Credite, 
non ludo : crudeles, tollite claudum. 


BOOK VI. in. 97-99 

always in previous times been regarded as an utter 
fool, was, after inheriting an estate, asked to speak 
first on a motion 

"What men call wisdom is a legacy/' l 

where legacy is substituted for the original faculty. 
Or again we may invent verses resembling well- 
known lines, a trick styled parody by the Greeks. 
A neat application of proverbs may also be effective, 98 
as when one man replied to another, a worthless 
fellow, who had fallen down and asked to be helped 
to his feet, " Let someone pick you up who does not 
know you." 2 Or we may shew our culture by draw- 
ing on legend for a jest, as Cicero did in the trial of 
Verres, when Hortensius said to him as he was 
examining a witness, " I do not understand these 
riddles." "You ought to, then," said Cicero, "as 
you have got the Sphinx at home." Hortensius had 
received a bronze Sphinx of great value as a present 
from Verres. 

Effects of mild absurdity are produced by the 99 
simulation of folly and would, indeed, themselves, 
be foolish were they not fictitious. Take as an 
example the remark of the man who, when people 
wondered why he had bought a stumpy candlestick, 
said, " It will do for lunch." 8 There are also say- 
ings closely resembling absurdities which derive 
great point from their sheer irrelevance, like the 
reply of Dolabella's slave, who, on being asked 
whether his master had advertised a sale of his 
property, answered, "He has sold his house." 4 

3 Lunch requiring a less elaborate service, but being in 
broad daylight. 

* i.e. how can he ? he has nothing left to sell. 



100 Deprehensi interim pudorem suum ridicule aliquo 
explicant : ut, qui testem diceiitem se a reo vulner- 
atum interrogaverat an cicatricem haberet, cum ille 
ingentem in femine ostendisset, Latus, inquit, opor- 
tuit. Contumeliis quoque uti belle datur : ut Hispo 
obiicienti atrociora l crimina accusatori, Me ex te 
metiris, 2 inquit. Et Fulvius Propinquus legato in- 
terroganti an in tabulis, quas proferebat, chirogra- 
phus esset, Et vems, inquit, domine. 

101 Has aut accepi species aut inveni frequentissimas, 
ex quibus ridicula ducerentur ; sed repetam necesse 
est, infinitas esse tarn, salse dicendi quam severe, 
quas praestat persona, locus, tempus, casus denique, 

102 qui est maxime varius. Itaque haec, ne omisisse 
viderer, attigi ; ilia autem, quae de usu ipso et modo 
iocandi complexus sum, audeo confirmare 3 esse 
plane necessaria. 

His adiicit Domitius Marsus, qui de urbanitate 
diligentissime scripsit, quaedam non ridicula, sed 
cuilibet severissimae orationi convenientia eleganter 
dicta et proprio quodam lepore iucunda ; quae sunt 

103 quidem urbana sed risum tamen non habent. Neque 

1 contumeliis Badins : umis A G : atrociora, Halm : arbore, 

2 me ex te metiris, Burmann : mentis, mentiris, MSS. 

3 audeo confirmare, Radermacher : adeo infirmare, infirm- 
arem, infirma sed, MSS. 

1 sc. because then he would have killed, you. 

2 Presumably the legatus had been suspected of forgery. 


BOOK VI. m. 100-103 

Sometimes you may get out of a tight corner by 100 
giving a humorous explanation of your embarrass- 
ment, as the man did who asked a witness, who 
alleged that he had been wounded by the accused, 
whether he had any scar to show for it. The witness 
proceeded to show a huge scar on his thigh, on which 
he remarked, " I wish he had wounded you in the 
side." l A happy use may also be made of insult. 
Hispo, for example, when the accuser charged him 
with scandalous crimes, replied, "You judge my 
character by your own " ; while Fulvius Propinquus, 
when asked by the representative of the emperor 
whether the documents which he produced were 
autographs, replied, " Yes, Sir, and the handwriting 

ume, too ! " 2 

Such I have either learned from others or dis- 101 
\covered from my own experience to be the com- 
monest sources of humour. But I must repeat that 
the number of ways in which one may speak wittily 
are of no less infinite variety than those in which one 
may speak seriously, for they depend on persons, 
place, time and chances, which are numberless. I 102 
have, therefore, touched on the topics of humour 
that I may not be taxed with having omitted them ; 
but with regard to my remarks on the actual prac- 
tice and manner of jesting, I venture to assert that 
they are absolutely indispensable. 

To these Domitius Marsus, who wrote an elaborate 
treatise on Urbanity, adds several types of saying, 
which are not laughable, but rather elegant sayings 
with a certain charm and attraction of their own, 
which are suitable even to speeches of the most 
serious kind : they are characterised by a certain 
urbane wit, but not of a kind to raise a laugh. And 103 



enim ei de risu sed de urbanitate est opus institutum, 
quam propriam esse nostrae civitatis et sero sic 
intelligi coeptam, postquam Urbis appellatione, 
etiamsi nomen proprium non adiiceretur, Romam 

104 tamen accipi sit receptum. Eamque sic finit : Ur- 
banitas est virtus quaedam in breve dictum coacta et apta 
ad delectandos movendosque homines in omnem adfectum 
animi, maxime idonea ad resistendum vel lacessendum, 
prout quaeque res aut persona desiderat. Cui si 
brevitatis exceptionem detraxeris, omnes orationis 
virtutes complexa sit. Nam si constat rebus 
et personis, quod in utrisque oporteat dicere per- 
fectae eloquentiae est. Cur autem brevem esse 

105 earn voluerit, nescio, cum idem atque x in eodem 
libro dicat fuisse in multis narrandi urbanitatem. 
Paulo post ita finit, Catonis (ut ait) opinionem 
secutus, Urbanus homo erit, cuius multa bene dicta 
responsaque eritnt, et qui in sermonibus, circuits, con- 
viviis, item in contionibus, omni denique loco ridicule 
commodeque dicet. Risus erunt, quicunque haec faciet 

106 orator. Quas si recipimus finitiones^ quidquid bene 
dicetur, et urbane dicti nomen accipiet. Ceterum 
illi, qui hoc proposuerat, consentanea fuit ilia divisio, 
ut dictorum urbanorum alia seria., alia iocosa, alia 

1 cum idem atque, Halm : cumidem ad quern, A : cuidem 
ad quern, O ; quidem at quam, codd. Hit. 


BOOK VI. in. 103-106 

as a matter of fact his work was not designed to deal 
with humour, but with urbane wit, a quality which 
he regards as peculiar to this city, though it was not 
till a late period that it was understood in this sense, 
after the word Urbs had come to be accepted as indi- 
cating Rome without the addition of any proper 
noun. He defines it as follows : " Urbanity is a 104 
certain quality of language compressed into the limits 
of a brief saying and adapted to delight and move 
men to every kind of emotion, but specially suitable 
to resistance or attack according as the person or 
circumstances concerned may demand." But this 
definition, if we except the quality of brevity, in- 
cludes all the virtues of oratory. For it is entirely 
concerned with persons and things to deal with 
which in appropriate language is nothing more nor 
less than the task of perfect eloquence. Why he 
insisted on brevity being essential I do not know, 
since in the same book he asserts that many speakers 105 
have revealed their urbanity in narrative. And a little 
later he gives the following definition, which is, as 
he says, based on the views expressed by Cato : 
" Urbanity is the characteristic of a man who has 
produced many good sayings and replies, and who, 
whether in conversation, in social or convivial 
gatherings, in public speeches, or under any other 
circumstances, will speak with humour and appro- 
priateness. If any orator do this, he will undoubtedly 
succeed in making his audience laugh." But if we 106 
accept these definitions, we shall have to allow the 
title of urbane to anything that is well said. It was 
natural therefore that the author of this definition 
should classify such sayings under three heads, 
serious, humorous and intermediate, since all good 


VOL. 11. K K 


media faceret. Nam est eadem omnium bene dic- 
torum. Verum mihi etiam iocosa quaedam videntur 

107 posse in non satis urbana referri. Nam meo quidem 
iudicio ilia est urbanitas, in qua nihil absonum, nihil 
agreste, nihil inconditum, nihil peregrinum neque 
sensu neque verbis neque ore gestuve possit depre- 
hendi ; ut non tarn sit in singulis dictis quam in toto 
colore dicendi, qualis apud Graecos aTTiKur/xos ille 

108 reddens Athenarum proprium saporem. Ne tamen 
iudicium Marsi, hominis eruditissimi, subtrahanr, 
seria partitur in tria genera, honorificum, contume- 
liosum,, medium. Et honorifici ponit exemplum 
Ciceronis pro Ligario apud Caesarem, Qui nihil soles 

109 oblivisci nisi iniurias ; et contumeliosi, quod Attico 
scripsit de Pompeio et Caesare, Habeo, quern fugiam ; 
quern sequar, non habeo ; et medii, quod d7ro<0ey- 
/xartKov vocat et est ita, cum dixerit, Nee gravem 
mortem accidere viro forti posse nee immaturam consulari 
neque miseram sapienti. Quae omnia sunt optime 
dicta ; sed cur proprie nomen urbanitatis accipiant, 

110 non video. Quod si non totius, ut mihi videtur, 
orationis color meretur, sed etiam singulis dictis 
tribuendum est, ilia potius urbana dixerim, quae sunt 
generis eiusdem, quo ridicula dicuntur et tamen 

1 xii. 35. a Ad. Att. vm. vii. 2. 8 iv. ii. 3. 

49 8 

BOOK VI. in. 106-110 

sayings may be thus classified. But, in my opinion, 
there are certain forms of humorous saying that may 
be regarded as not possessing sufficient urbanity. For 107 
to my thinking urbajiity involves the total absence of 
all that is incongruous, coarse, unpolished and exotic 
whether in thought, language, voice or gesture, and 
resides not so much in isolated sayings as in the 
whole complexion of our language, just as for the 
Greeks Atticism means that elegance of taste which 
was peculiar to Athens. However, out of respect to 108 
the judgment of Marsus, who was a man of the 
greatest learning, I will add that he divides serious 
utterances into three classes, the honorific, the 
derogatory and the intermediate. As an example 
of the honorific he quotes the words uttered by 
Cicero in the pro Ligario 1 with reference to Caesar, 
"You who forget nothing save injuries." The 109 
derogatory he illustrates by the words used by 
Cicero of Pompey and Caesar in a letter to Atticus : 2 
" I know whom to avoid, but whom to follow I 
know not." Finally, he illustrates the inter- 
mediate, which he calls apophthegmatic (as it is), by 
the passage from Cicero's speech against Catiline 3 
where he says, " Death can never be grievous to the 
brave nor premature for one who has been consul 
nor a calamity to one that is truly wise." All these 
are admirable sayings, but what special title they 
have to be called urbane I do not see. If it is 110 
not merely, as I think, the whole complexion of 
our oratory that deserves this title, but if it is to 
be claimed for individual sayings as well, I should 
give the name only to those sayings that are of 
the same general character as humorous sayings, 
without actually being humorous. I will give an 

K K 2 


ridicula non sunt, ut de Pollione Asinio seriis iocisque 
pariter accommodate dictum est esse eum omnium 

111 horarum ; et de actore facile dicente ex tempore, 
ingenium eum in numerate habere ; etiam Pompeii, 
quod refert Marsus, in Ciceronem diffidentem parti- 
bus, Transi ad Caesar em t me timebis. Erat enim, 
si de re minore aut alio animo aut denique non ab 

ipso dictum fuisset, quod posset inter ridicula nume- 

112 rari. Etiam illud, quod Cicero Caerelliae scripsit 
reddens rationem, cur ilia C. Caesaris tempora tarn 
patienter toleraret, Haec aut animo Catonis ferenda 
sunt aut Ciceronis stomacho ; stomachus enim ille habet 
aliquid ioco simile. Haec, quae movebaiit, dissimu- 
landa mihi non fuerunt ; in quibus ut erraverim, 
legentes tamen nori decepi, indicata et diversa 
opinione, quam sequi magis probantibus liberum est. 

IV. Altercationis praecepta poterant videri tune 
inchoanda, cum omnia, quae ad continuam orationem 
pertinent, peregissem, nam est usus eius ordine ulti- 
mus ; sed, cum sit posita in sola inventione neque 
habere dispositionem possit nee elocutionis ornamenta 
magnopere desideret aut circa memoriam et pronun- 
tiationem laboret, prius quam secundam quinque 
partium, hanc quae tota ex prima pendet tractaturus 

1 Now lost. Caerellia was a literary lady. 

2 i.e. he must "stomach" it, 

3 The altercatio, which followed the set speeches, took the 
form of a number of brief arguments pro and con. 

4 See v. Pr. 5. 


BOOK VI. HI. no-iv. i 

illustration of what I mean. It was said of Asinius 
Pollio, who had equal gifts for being grave or gay, 
that he was "a man for all hours/' and of a pleader 111 
who was a fluent speaker extempore,, that " his 
ability was all in ready money." Of the same kind, 
too, was the remark recorded by Marsus as having 
been made by Pompey to Cicero when the latter 
expressed distrust of his party : " Go over to Caesar 
and you will be afraid of me." Had this last remark 
been uttered on a less serious subject and with less 
serious purpose, or had it not been uttered by Pompey 
himself, we might have counted it among examples 
of humour. I may also add the words used by 112 
Cicero in a letter 1 to Caerellia to explain why he 
endured the supremacy of Caesar so patiently : 
" These ills must either be endured with the courage 
of Cato or the stomach 2 of Cicero," for here again the 
word " stomach " has a spice of humour in it. I felt 
that I ought not to conceal my feelings on this point. 
If I am wrong in my views, I shall not, at any rate, 
lead my readers astray, since I have stated the oppo- 
site view as well, which they are at liberty to adopt 
if they prefer it. I 

IV. With regard to the principles to be observed 
in forensic debate, 8 it might seem that I should 
delay such instructions until I had finished dealing 
with all the details of continuous speaking, since 
such debates come after the set speeches are done. 
But since the art of debate turns on invention alone, 
does not admit of arrangement, has little need for 
the embellishments of style, and makes no large 
demand on memory or delivery, I think that it will 
not be out of place to deal with it here before I 
roceed to the second of the five parts, 4 since it is 

5 01 


non alieno loco videor ; quam scriptores alii fortasse 
ideo reliquerunt, quia satis ceteris praeceptis in hanc 

2 quoque videbatur esse prospectum. Constat enim 
ex intentione ac depulsione, de quibus satis traditum 
est; quia, quidquid in actione perpetua circa proba- 
tiones utile est, idem in hac brevi atque concisa 
prosit necesse est. Neque alia dicuntur in alterca- 
tione, sed aliter, aut interrogando aut respondendo. 
Cuius rei fere omnis observatio in illo testium loco 

3 excussa nobis est. Tamen quia latius hoc opus 
aggressi sumus neque perfectus orator sine hac vir- 
tu te dici potest, paululum impendamus huic quoque 
peculiaris operae, quae quidem in quibusdam causis 

4 ad victoriam vel plurimum valet. Nam ut in quali- 
tate generali, in qua rectene factum quid an contra 
sit quaeritur, perpetua dominatur oratio, et quaestio- 
nem finitionis actiones plerumque satis explicant et 
omnia paene, in quibus de facto constat aut coniec- 
tura artificiali ratione colligitur, ita in iis causis, quae 
sunt frequentissimae, quae vel solis extra artem pro- 
bationibus vel mixtis continentur, asperrima in hac 
parte dimicatio est, nee alibi dixeris magis mucrone 

5 pugnari. Nam et firmissima quaeque memoriae 
iudicis inculcanda sunt et praestandum quidquid in 

1 See v. vii. a See in. vi. 

3 See v. i. 4 See v. i. 


BOOK VI. iv. 1-5 

entirely dependent 011 the first. Other writers have 
omitted to deal with it on the ground perhaps that 
they thought the subject had been sufficiently covered 
by their precepts on other topics. For debate con- 2 
sists in attack and defence, on which enough has 
already been said, since whatever is useful in a con- 
tinuous speech for the purpose of proof must neces- 
sarily be of service in this brief and discontinuous 
form of oratory. For we say the same things in 
debate, though we say them in a different manner, 
since debate consists of questions and replies, a topic 
with which we have dealt fairly exhaustively in 
connexion with the examination of witnesses. 1 But 3 
since this work is designed on an ample scale and 
since no one can be called a perfect orator unless he 
be an expert debater, we must devote a little special 
attention to this accomplishment as well, which as a 
matter of fact is not seldom the deciding factor in a 
forensic victory. For just as the continuous speech 4 
is the predominant weapon in general questions of 
quality (where the inquiry is as to whether an act 
was right or wrong), and as a rule is adequate to 
clear up questions of definition and almost all those 
in which the facts are ascertained or inferred by 
conjecture 2 from artificial proof, 3 so on the other 
hand those cases, which are the most frequent of all 
and depend on proofs which are either entirely 
inartificial 4 or of a composite character, give rise 
to the most violent debates ; in fact I should say 
that there is no occasion when the advocate has to 
come to closer grips with his adversary. For all the 5 
strongest points of the argument have to be sharply 
impressed on the memory of the judge, while we 
have also to make good all the promises we may 



actione promisimus et refellenda mendacia. Nus- 
quam est denique qui cognoscit intentior. Nee im- 
merito quidam quanquam in dicendo mediocres hac 
tamen altercandi praestantia meruerunt nomen patro- 

6 norum. At quidam litigatoribus suis ilium modo 
ambitiosum declamandi sudorem praestitisse content! 
cum turba laudantium destitiumt subsellia pugnam- 
que illam decretoriam imperitis ac saepe pullatae 

7 turbae relinquunt. Itaque videas alios plerumque 
iudiciis privatis ad actiones advocari alios ad proba- 
tionem. Quae si dividenda sunt officia, hoc certe 
magis necessarium est, pudendumque dictu, si plus 
litigantibus prosunt minores. In publicis certe iudi- 
ciis vox ilia praeconis praeter patronos ipsunx, qui 
egerit, citat. 

8 Opus est igitur inprimis iiigenio veloci ac mobili, 
animo praesenti et acri. Non enim cogitandum, sed 
dicendum statim est et prope sub conatu adversarii 
manus exigenda. Quare cum in omni parte huiusce 
officii plurimum facit, totas non diligenter modo sed 
etiam familiariter nosse causas, turn in altercatione 
maxime necessarium est, omnium personarum, in- 
strumentorum, temporum, locorum habere notitiam ; 

1 The allusion is obscure. But Quintilian's point seems to 
be merely that the pleader is officially regarded as being 
of at least equal importance with the other advocates. 


BOOK VI. iv. 5-8 

have made in the course of our speech and to refute 
the lies of our opponents. There is no point of a 
trial where the judge's attention is keener. And 
even mediocre speakers have not without some reason 
acquired the reputation of being good advocates 
simply by their excellence in debate. Some on the 6 
other hand think they have done their duty to their 
clients by an ostentatious and fatiguing display of 
elaborate declamation and straightway march out of 
court attended by an applauding crowd and leave the 
desperate battle of debate to uneducated performers 
who often are of but humble origin. As a result 7 
in private suits you will generally find that different 
counsel are employed to plead and to prove the case. 
If the duties of advocacy are to be thus divided, the 
latter duty must surely be accounted the more 
important of the two, and it is a disgrace to oratory 
that inferior advocates should be regarded as adequate 
to render the greater service to the litigants. In 
public cases at any rate the actual pleader is cited 
by the usher as well as the other advocates. 1 

For debate the chief requisites are a quick and 8 
nimble understanding and a shrewd and ready judg- 
ment. For there is no time to think ; the advocate 
must speak at once and return the blow almost 
before it has been dealt by his opponent. Conse- 
quently while it is most important for every portion 
of the case that the advocate should not merely have 
given a careful study to the whole case, but that he 
should have it at his fingers' ends, when he comes 
to the debate it is absolutely necessary that he 
should possess a thorough acquaintance with all the 
persons, instruments and circumstances of time and 
place involved ; otherwise he will often be reduced 



alioqui et tacendum erit saepe et aliis subiicientibus 
(plerumque autem studio loquendi fatue modo) acce- 
dendum ; quo nonnunquam accidit, ut nostra creduli- 
9 tate aliena stultitia erubescamus. Neque tantum cum 
his ipsis monitoribus clam res erit l ; quidam faciunt 
aperte ut quoque rixentur. 2 Videas enim plerosque 
ira percitos exclamantes, ut iudex audiat contrarium 
id esse, quod admoneatur, sciatque ille, qui pronun- 

10 tiaturus est in causa, malum quod tacetur. Quare 
bonus altercator vitio iracundiae careat ; nullus enim 
rationi magis obstat adfectus et fert extra causam 
plerumque et deformia convicia facere ac mereri 
cogit et in ipsos nonnunquam iudices incitat. Melior 
moderatio ac nonnunquam etiam patientia. Neque 
enim refutanda tan turn quae ex contrario dicuntur, 
sed contemnenda, elevanda, ridenda sunt ; nee 
usquam plus loci recipit urbanitas. Hoc, dum ordo 
est et pudor ; contra turbantes audendum et impu- 

11 dentiae fortiter resistendum. Sunt enim quidam 
praeduri in hoc oris, ut obstrepant ingenti clamore 

1 tantum . . . clam res erit, Halm : tarn cum . . . clarescit, 

2 ut quoque rixentur, Madvig : quod (or quae} rixemur, 


BOOK VI. iv. 8-1 1 

to silence and forced to give a hurried assent to 
those who prompt him as to what he should say, 
suggestions which are often perfectly fatuous owing 
to excess of zeal on the part of the prompter. As a 
result it sometimes happens that we are put to the 
blush by too ready acceptance of the foolish sugges- 
tions of another. Moreover, we have to deal with 9 
others beside these prompters who speak for our ear 
alone. Some go so far as to turn the debate into an open 
brawl. For you may sometimes see several persons 
shouting angrily at the judge and telling him that the 
arguments thus suggested are contrary to the truthj 
and calling his attention to the fact that some point 
which is prejudicial to the case has been deliberately 
passed over in silence. Consequently the skilled 10 
debater must be able to control his tendency to 
anger ; there is no passion that is a greater enemy 
to reason, while it often leads an advocate right 
away from the point and forces him both to use 
gross and insulting language and to receive it in 
return ; occasionally it will even excite him to such 
an extent as to attack the judges. Moderation, and 
sometimes even longsuffering, is the better policy, 
for the statements of our opponents have not merely 
to be refuted : they are often best treated with con- 
tempt, made light of or held up to ridicule, methods 
which afford unique opportunity for the display of 
wit. This injunction, however, applies only so long 
as the case is conducted with order and decency : if, 
on the other hand, our opponents adopt turbulent 
methods we must put on a bold front and resist 
their impudence with courage. For there are some 1 1 
advocates so brazen-faced that they bluster and 
bellow at us, interrupt us in the middle of a sentence 



et medios sermones intercipiant et omnia tumultn 
confundant, quos ut non imitari sic acriter propulsare 
oportebit, et ipsorum improbitatem retundendo, et 
iudices vel praesidentes magistratus appellando fre- 
quentius, ut loquendi vices serventur. Non est res 
animi iacentis et mollis supra modum frontis, fallit- 
que plerumque, quod probitas vocatur, quae est im- 

12 becillitas. Valet autem in altercatione plurimum 
acumen, quod sine dubio ex arte non venit (natura 

13 enim non docetur), arte tamen adiuvatur. In qua 
praecipuum est, semper id in oculis habere, de quo 
quaeritur et quod volumus efficere ; quod propositum 
tenentes nee in rixam ibimus nee causae debita tem- 
pora conviciando conteremus gaudebimusque, si hoc 
adversarius facit. 

14 Omni tempore fere parata sunt meditatis diligen- 
ter, quae aut ex adverse dici aut responderi a nobis 
possunt.' Nonnunquam tamen solet hoc quoque esse 
artis genus, ut quaedam in actione dissimulata subito 
in altercando proferantur; est inopinatis eruptioni- 
bus aut incursioni ex insidiis factae simillimum. Id 
autem turn faciendum, cum est aliquid, cui respon- 
deri non statim possit, potuerit autem, si tempus ad 
disponendum fuisset. Nam quod fideliter firmum 


BOOK VI. iv. 11-14 

and try to throw everything into confusion. While, 
then, it would be wrong to pay them the compli- 
ment of imitation, we must none the less repel their 
onslaughts with vigour by crushing their insolence 
and making frequent appeals to the judges or pre- 
siding magistrates to insist on the observance of the 
proper order of speaking. The debater's task is 
not one that suits a meek temper or excessive 
modesty, and we are apt to be misled because that 
whicfe is really weakness is dignified by the name of 
honesty. But the quality which is the most service- 12 
able in debate is acumen, which while it is not the 
result of art (for natural gifts cannot be taught), 
may none the less be improved by art. In this 13 
connexion the chief essential is never for a moment 
to lose sight either of the question at issue or the 
end which we have in view. If we bear this in 
mind, we shall never descend to mere brawling 
nor waste the time allotted to the case by indulging 
in abuse, while we shall rejoice if our adversary 
does so. 

Those who have given a careful study to the ar- 14 
guments that are likely to be produced by their 
opponents or the replies which may be made by 
themselves are almost always ready for the fray. 
There is, however, a further device available which 
consists in suddenly introducing into the debate ar- 
guments which were deliberately concealed in our set 
speech : it is a procedure which resembles a surprise 
attack or a sally from an ambush. The occasion for 
its employment arises when there is some point to 
which it is difficult to improvise an answer, though 
it would not be difficult to meet if time were 
allowed for consideration. For solid and irrefutable 



est a primis statim actionibus ampere optimum est, 

15 quo saepius diutiusque dicatur. Illud vix saltern 
praecipiendum videtur, ne turbidus et clamosus tan- 
tum sit altercator, et quales facet! sunt, qui litteras 
nesciunt. Nam improbitas, licet adversario molesta 
sit, iudici invisa est. Nocet etiam diu pugnare in 

16 iis quae obtinere non possis. Nam, ubi vinci necesse 
est, expedit cedere ; quia, sive plura sunt de quibus 
quaeritur, facilior erit in ceteris fides, sive unum, 
mitior solet poena irrogari verecundiae. Nam cul- 
pam praesertim deprehensam pertinaciter tueri 
culpa altera est. 

17 Dum stat acies, multi res consilii atque artis est, 
ut errantem adversarium trahas et ire quam longis- 
sime cogas, ut vana interim spe exultet. Ideo quae- 
dam bene dissimulantur instrumenta. Instant enim 
et saepe discrimen omne committunt, quod deesse 
nobis putant, et faciunt probation ibus nostris aucto- 

18 ritatem postulando. Expedit etiam dare aliquid 
adversario quod pro se putet, quod apprehendens 
maius aliquid cogatur dimittere ; duas interim res 

5 10 

BOOK VI. iv. 14-18 

arguments are best produced at once in the actual 
pleading in order that they may be repeated and 
treated at greater length. I think I need hardly 15 
insist on the necessity for the avoidance in debate of 
mere violence and noise and such forms of pleasantry 
as are dear to the uneducated. For unscrupulous 
violence, although annoying to one's antagonist, 
makes an unpleasant impression on the judge. It is 
also bad policy to fight hard for points which you 
cannot prove. For where defeat is inevitable, it is 16 
wisest to yield, since, if there are a number of other 
points in dispute, we shall find it easier to prove 
what remains, while if there is only one point at 
issue, surrender with a good grace will generally 
secure some mitigation of punishment. For obstinacy 
in the defence of a fault, more especially after de- 
tection, is simply the commission of a fresh fault. 

While the battle still rages, the task of luring on 17 
our adversary when he has once committed himself 
to error, and of forcing him to commit himself as 
deeply as possible, even to the extent at times of 
being puffed up with extravagant hopes of success, 
requires great prudence and skill. It is, therefore, 
wise to conceal some of our weapons : for our 
opponents will often press their attack and stake 
everything on some imagined weakness of our own, 
and will give fresh weight to our proofs by the 
instancy with which they demand us to produce 
them. It may even be expedient to yield ground 18 
which the enemy thinks advantageous to himself: 
for in grasping at the fancied advantage he may 
be forced to surrender some greater advantage : at 
times, too, it may serve our purpose to give him a 
choice between two alternatives, neither of which 



proponere quarum utramlibet male sit elect urus ; 
quod in altercatione fit potentius quam in actione, 
quia in ilia nobis ipsi respondemus, in hac adver- 

19 sarium quasi confessum tenemus. Est inprimis acuti 
videre, quo iudex dicto moveatur, quid respuat ; quod 
et vultu saepissime et aliquando etiam dicto aliquo 
factove eius deprehenditur. Et instare proficienti- 
bus et ab iis, quae non adiuvent, quam mollissime 
pedem oportet referre. Faciunt hoc medici quoque, 
ut remedia proinde perseverent adhibere vel desinant, 

20 ut ilia recipi vel respui vident. Nonnunquam, si rem 
evolvere propositam facile non sit, inferenda est alia 
quaestio, atque in earn iudex, si fieri potest, avocan- 
dus. Quid enim, cum respondere non possis, agen- 
dum est, nisi ut aliud invenias, cui adversarius 

21 respondere non possit? In plerisque idem est, ut 
dixi, qui circa testes locus et personis modo distat, 
quod hie patronorum inter se certamen, illic pugna 
inter testem et patronum. 

Exercitatio vero huius rei longe facilior. Nam est 
utilissimum, frequenter cum aliquo, qui sit studiorum 
eorundem, sumere materiam vel verae vel etiam fictae 
controversiae, et diversas partes altercationis modo 
tueri ; quod idem etiam in simplici genere quaestio- 

22 num fieri potest. Ne illud quidem ignorare advoca- 

1 We propound the dilemma and ourselves point out that 
whichever answer our opponent gives must tell against him. 

2 2. 3 cp. ii. i. 9 and v. x. 53. 


BOOK VI. iv. 18-22 

he can select without damage to his cause. Such 
a course is more effective in debate than in a set 
speech, for the reason that in the latter we reply 
to ourselves, 1 while in the former our opponent 
replies, and thereby delivers himself into our hands. 
It is, above all, the mark of a shrewd debater to 19 
perceive what remarks impress the judge and what 
he rejects : this may often be detected from his 
looks, and sometimes from some action or utterance. 
Arguments which help us must be pressed home, 
while it will be wise to withdraw as gently as 
possible from such as are of no service. We may 
take a lesson from doctors who continue or cease 
to administer remedies according as they note that 
they are received or rejected by the stomach. 
Sometimes, if we find difficulty in developing our 20 
point, it is desirable to raise another question and 
to divert the attention of the judge to it if this be 
feasible. For what can you do, if you are unable 
to answer an argument, save invent another to which 
your opponent can give no answer? In most re- 21 
spects the rules to be observed in debate are, as I 
have said,' 2 identical with those for the cross-exami- 
nation of witnesses, the only difference lying in the 
fact that the debate is a battle between advocates, 
whereas cross-examination is a fight between advocate 
and witness. 

To practise the art of debate is, however, tar 
easier. For it is most profitable to agree with 
a fellow-student on some subject, real or fictitious, 
and to take different sides, debating it as would 
be done in the courts. The same may also be 
done with the simpler class of questions. 3 I 22 
would further have an advocate realise the order in 


VOL. 11. L L 


turn volo, quo quaeque ordine probatio sit apud iu- 
dicem proferenda ; cuius rei eadem quae in argumentis 
ratio est, ut potentissima prima et summa ponaiitur. 
Ilia enim ad credendum praeparant iudicem, haec ad 

V. His pro nostra facultate tractatis non dubitas- 
sem transire protinus ad dispositionem, quae ordine 
ipso sequitur, nisi vererer ne, quoniam fuerunt qui 
iudicium inventioni subiungerent, praeterisse hunc 
locum quibusdam viderer, qui mea quidem opinione 
adeo partibus operis huius omnibus connexus ac 
mixtus est, ut ne a sententiis quidem aut verbis 
saltern singulis possit separari, nee magis arte tra- 

2 ditur quam gustus aut odor. Ideoque nos, quid in 
quaque re sequendum cavendumque sit, docemus ac 
deinceps docebimus, ut ad ea iudicium dirigatur. 
Praecipiam igitur, ne, quod effici non potest, aggre- 
diamur, ut contraria vitemus et communia, ne quid 
in eloquendo corruptum, obscurum sit? Referatur 
oportet ad sensus, qui non docentur. 

3 Nee multum a iudicio credo distare consilium, nisi 
quod illud ostendentibus se rebus adhibetur, hoc 
latentibus et aut omnino nondum repertis aut dubiis. 
Et iudicium frequentissime certum est, consilium 

1 See in. iii. 5 and 6. 

BOOK VI. iv. 22-v. 3 

which his proofs should be presented to the judge : 
the method to be followed is the same as in argu- 
ments : the strongest should be placed first and 
last. For those which are presented first dispose 
the judge to believe us, and those which come last 
to decide in our favour, f 

V. Having dealt with these points to the best of 
my ability, I should have had no hesitation in pro- 
ceeding to discuss arrangement, which is logically 
the next consideration, did I not fear that, since 
there are some who include judgment 1 under the 
head of invention, they might think that I had 
deliberately omitted all discussion of judgment, 
although personally I regard it as so inextricably 
blent with and involved in every portion of this 
work, that its influence extends even to single 
sentences or words, and it is no more possible to 
teach it than it is to instruct the powers of taste 
and smell. Consequently, all I can do is now and "1 
hereafter to show what should be done or avoided 
in each particular case, with a view thereby to guide 
the judgment. What use then is it for me to lay 
down general rules to the effect that- we should not 
attempt impossibilities, that we should avoid what- 
ever contradicts our case or is common to both, and 
shun all incorrectness or obscurity of style ? In all 
these cases it is common sense that must decide, 
and common sense cannot be taught. 

There is no great difference, in my opinion, 3 
between judgment and sagacity, except that the 
former deals with evident facts, while the latter is 
concerned with hidden facts or such as have not 
yet been discovered or still remain in doubt. Again 
judgment is more often than not a matter of 


L L 2 


vero est ratio quaedam alte petita et plerumque 
pi ura perpendens et comparans habensque in se et 

4 inventionem et indication em, Sed ne de hoc quidem 
praecepta in universum exspectanda sunt. Nam ex 
re sumitur cuius locus ante actionem est frequenter ; 
nam Cicero summo consilio videtur in Verrem vel 
contrahere tempora dicendi maluisse quam in eum 
annum, quo erat Q. Hortensius consul futurus, in- 

5 cidere. Et in ipsis actionibus primum ac potentis- 
simum obtinet locum ; nam, quid dicendum, quid 
tacendum, quid differendum sit, exigere consilii est ; 
negare sit satis an defendere, ubi prooemio utendum 
et quali, narrandumne et quomodo, iure prius pug- 
nandurn an aequo, qui sit ordo utilissimus, turn 
omnes colores, aspere an leniter an etiam summisse 

6 loqui expediat. Sed haec quoque, ut quisque passus 
est locus, monuimus, idernque in reliqua parte facie- 
mus ; pauca tamen exempli gratia ponam, quibus 
manifestius appareat quid sit, quod demonstrari 

7 posse praeceptis non arbitror. Laudatur consilium 
Demosthenis, quod, cum suaderet bellum Athenien- 

1 Phil. i. 2. 

BOOK VI. v. 3-7 

certainty, while sagacity is a form of reasoning from 
deep-lying premises, which generally weighs and 
compares a number of arguments and in itself 
involves both invention and judgment. But here 4 
again you must not expect me to lay down any 
general rules. For sagacity depends on circumstances 
and will often find its scope in something preceding 
the pleading of the cause. For instance in the pro- 
secution of Verres Cicero seems to have shown the 
highest sagacity in preferring to cut down the time 
available, for his speech rather than allow the trial to 
be postponed to the following year when Quintus 
Hortensius was to be consul. And again in the 5 
actual pleading sagacity holds the first and most 
important place. For it is the duty of sagacity to 
decide what we should say and what we should pass 
by in silence or postpone ; whether it is better to 
deny an act or to defend it, when we should employ 
an exordium and on what lines it should be designed, 
whether we should make a statement of facts and if 
so, how, whether we should base our plea on law or 
equity and what is the best order to adopt, while it 
must also decide on all the nuances of style, and 
settle whether it is expedient to speak harshly, 
gently or even with humility. But I have already 6 
given advice on all these points as far as each 
occasion permitted, and I shall continue to do the 
same in the subsequent portions of this work. In 
the meantime, however, I will give a few instances 
to make my meaning clearer, since it is not possible, 
in my opinion, to do so by laying down general rules. 
We praise Demosthenes 1 for his sagacity because 7 
when he urged a policy of war upon the Athenians 
after they had met with a series of reverses, he 


sibus parum id prospere expertis, nihil adhuc factum 
esse ratione monstrat. Poterat enim emendari neg- 
ligentia ; at, si nihil esset erratum, melioris in pos- 

8 terum spei non erat ratio. Idem, cum offensam 
vereretur, si obiurgaret populi segnitiam in asse- 
renda libertate rei publicae, maiorum laude uti 
maluit, qui rem publicam fortissime administrassent. 
Nam et faciles habuit aures, et natura sequebatur, ut 

9 meliora probantes peiorum poeniteret. Ciceronis 
quidem vel una pro Cluentio quamlibet multis 
exemplis sufficiet oratio. Nam quod in eo consilium 
maxime mirer? primamne expositionem, qua matri, 
cuius filium premebat auctoritas, abstulit fidem ? an 
quod iudicii corrupti crimen transferre in adversarium 
maluit quam negare propter inveteratam, ut ipse 
dicit, infamiam? an quod in re invidiosa legis auxilio 
iiovissime est usus, quo genere defensionis etiam 
offendisset nondum praemollitas iudicum mentes? 
an quod se ipsum invito Cluentio facere testa tus 

10 est? Quid pro Milone? quod non ante narravit, 
quam praeiudiciis omnibus reum liberaret? quod 

1 Phil. i. 1. 2 vi. 17. 3 i. 4. * Hi. 143 sqq. 
5 Hi. 144, 148, 149. 6 cp. Quint, in. vi. 93. 

BOOK VI. v. 7-10 

pointed out that so far their action had been entirely 
irrational. For they might still make amends for their 
negligence, whereas, if they had made no mistakes, 
they would have had no ground for hopes of better 
success in the future. Again, 1 since he feared to 8 
give offence if he taxed the people with lack of 
energy in defending the liberties of their country, 
he preferred to praise their ancestors for their 
courageous policy. Thus he gained a ready hearing, 
with the natural result that the pride which they 
felt in the heroic past made them repent of their 
own degenerate behaviour. If we turn to Cicero, we 9 
shall find that one speech alone, the pro Cluentio, 
will suffice to provide a number of examples. The 
difficulty is to know what special exhibition of saga- 
city to admire most in this speech. His opening 
statement of the case, by which he discredited the 
mother whose authority pressed so hardly on her 
son ? 2 The fact that he preferred to throw the 
charge of having bribed the jury back upon his 
opponents rather than deny it on account of what he 
calls the notorious infamy of the verdict ? 3 Or his 
recourse, last of all, to the support of the law in spite 
of the odious nature of the affair, a method by which 
he would have set the judges against him but for 
the fact that he had already softened their feelings 
towards him ? 4 Or the skill which he shows in stat- 
ing that he has adopted this course in spite of the 
protests of his client ? 5 What again am I to select as 10 
an outstanding instance of his sagacity in the pro 
Milone? The fact that he refrains from proceeding 
to his statement of facts until he has cleared the 
ground by disposing of the previous verdicts against 
the accused ? 6 The manner in which he turns the 


insidiarum invidiam in Clodium vertit, quanquam 
revera fuerat pugna fortuita ? quod factum et lauda- 
vit et tamen voluntate Milonis removit ? quod illi 
preces non dedit et in earum locum ipse successit ? 
Infinitum est enumerare, ut Cottae detraxerit aucto- 
ritatem, ut pro Ligario se opposuerit, Cornelium 
11 ipsa confessionis fiducia eripuerit. Illud dicere satis 
habeo, nihil esse non modo in orando, sed in omni 
vita prius consilio, frustraque sine eo tradi ceteras 
artes, plusque vel sine doctrina prudentiam quam 
sine prudentia facere doctrinam. Aptare etiam ora- 
tionem locis, temporibus, personis est eiusdem vir- 
tutis. Sed hie quia latius fusus est locus mixtusque 
cum elocutione, tractabitur cum praecipere de apte 
dicendo coeperimus. 

1 See above i. 25 and 27. 

2 cp. above v. xiii. 30. The reference is to the pro Oppio. 
8 See above v. x. 93. 4 See above v. xiii. 18 and 26. 

6 In xi. i. cp. i. v. 1. 


BOOK VI. v. lo-n 

odium of the attempted ambush against Clodius, 
although as a matter of fact the encounter was a 
pure chance ? The way in which he at one and the 
same time praised the actual deed and showed that 
it was forced upon his client? Or the skill with 
which he avoided making Milo plead for consider- 
ation and undertook the role of suppliant himself? 1 
It would be an endless task to quote all the instances 
of his sagacity, how he discredited Cotta, 2 how he 
put forward his own case in defence of Ligarius 3 and 
saved Cornelius 4 by his bold admission of the facts. 
It is enough, I think, to say that there is nothing 11 
not merely in oratory, but in all the tasks of life 
that is more important than sagacity and that with- 
out it all formal instruction is given in vain, while 
prudence unsupported by learning will accomplish 
more than learning unsupported by prudence. It is 
sagacity again that teaches us to adapt our speech to 
circumstances of time and place and to the persons 
with whom we are concerned. But since this topic 
covers a wide field and is intimately connected with 
eloquence itself, I shall reserve my treatment of it 
till I come to give instructions on the subject of 
appropriateness in speaking. 6 



IV. ii. 28, secundo partis suae loco. There seems to have 
been nothing in the schools of rhetoric which corresponded 
with the mock trials employed to-day for the training of law 
students. It would have needed little to adapt the contro- 
versial to this more practical form, but it seems not to have 
been done. The declaimer dealt both with the case for the 
prosecution and that for the defence, as stated in section 29. 
But more than one declamation might be made on the 
same theme. The declamation which is described as being 
delivered secundo loco would appear to be, not a declamation 
for the defence, though this is conceivable, but rather a 
second speech in answer to the defence. The declaimer 
refutes the arguments which he alleges have been made by 
the defence, but that he may not miss the opportunity of 
practice in making a statement of facts, preludes his refuta- 
tion with a statement of facts, inserted in the usual position 
immediately following the exordium. For the whole of this 
obscure passage cp. v. xiii. 50. 

V. xiii. 49. An alternative interpretation is that certain 
depositions have been communicated to the prosecution by 
the defence and are used to supply material for contra- 
dictione* after discussion among the prosecutor's advocali. 

V. xiii. 50. The reading is uncertain. Cod. Bern, reads 
et * et ; Cod. Bamb. et et ; Cod. Ambr. enaribus. It is 
clear that something is lost, proposltionibits is a harmless 
rather than a probable emendation, propositionibus and 
contradictionibus have been translated as datives. It would 
also be possible to treat them as ablatives : " meet our 
imaginary opponent's case both by statements and by 

5 2 3 


V. xiv. 1 sqq. I am indebted for this note to my col- 
league, Dr. A. Wolf, Reader in Logic and Ethics in the 
University of London. 

1 . ex consequentibus. If S is M, it is P ; S is not P ; 
therefore S is not M (a Destructive syllogism). The 
argument is : [If Caesar's cause were not superior the 
gods would not support it;] the gods have supported 
Caesar's cause ; therefore our cause is superior. The Major 
is omitted, thereby converting the syllogism into an 
enthymeme. The conclusion is stated, though it does 
not follow the premise, as it should do formally. 

2. ex pugnantibus. The usual form would be : It would be 
inconsistent for S to be M and not also to be P ; S is M ; 
therefore S is also P. Quintilian's form of Minor and 
Conclusion is : S is not P ; therefore S is not M. The 
argument is : [It would be inconsistent to hold that 
someone's death should be avenged and not also that his 
life should be restored, if possible ;] you hold that his 
life was not worth restoring, even if possible ; therefore 
you cannot hold that his death should be avenged. The 
Major is omitted. 

3. The argument is : [It would be inconsistent to hold 
that a man would commit a murder under unfavourable 
circumstances, and not to hold that he would do so 
under favourable circumstances ;] but you know that he 
did not commit murder under favourable circumstances ; 
therefore, you cannot hold that he did so under un- 
favourable circumstances. 

4. The original argument is : If a man is guilty of an 
illegality which others have committed with impunity, 
he should not be punished ; S is guilty of such an 
illegality ; therefore he should not be punished. The 
counter- argument (in the text) uses the same reason 
(i.e. the fact that the illegality in question has been 
frequently committed with impunity) to establish a 
contrary conclusion (i.e. that special punishment should 
be administered). 

5. The epicheireme is a syllogism in which either premise 
is supported by a reason. The reason is a premise of 
another syllogism, so that the reason taken together 
with the premise which it supports is really an enthy- 
meme ; e.g. M is P, because it is Q [and Q is P] ; 

5 2 4 


S is M, because it is R [and R is M]; therefore 
S is P. 

7-9. The argument is confused. It may be expressed 
thus : Major. [If the universe were not controlled by 
reason, something could be found better governed than 
it is.] Reason. Because things that are governed by 
reason are better governed than those which are not. 
Minor. But nothing is better administered than the 
universe. Conclusion. Therefore the universe is governed 
by reason. (The argument is at once an enthymeme 
(ex consequential f) and an epicheireme.) 

10. The Conclusion here is not identical with the Major, it 
is only expressed in the same sentence : viz. Major. 
Whatever derives its motion from itself is immortal. 
Minor and Conclusion. The soul derives its motion from 
itself ; therefore the soul is immortal. 

11. The proposition is doubtful because it is a hasty 
inference based on mere enumeration of instances. 

12. 1st Ex. The argument is : Major. That which is 
devoid of feeling is nothing to us. Minor (omitted). 
Death is a state devoid of feeling. Reason. Because 
a state of dissolution is a state devoid of feeling. Here 
we have an epicheireme with Reason substituted for 
Minor, and Major is misunderstood as in 10 (q.v.). 

2nd Ex. Major (omitted). If the universe were not 
animate, there would be something better. Reason. 
Because all animate things are better than inanimate. 
Minor. But there is nothing better than the universe. 
Conclusion. Therefore the universe is animate. The 
Major is really omitted as Quintilian suspects. 
13 (last sentence). What he calls the Minor is only its 

17. The argument is : Major. If in the midst of arms laws 
were not silent, then he who would await their sanction 
is certain to be the victim, etc. Minor (omitted). But 
he who awaits their sanction should not be the victim, 
etc. Conclusion. Therefore in the midst of arms laws 
are silent. Here we have an enthymeme ex consequen- 
tibns. There is still no Reason for either premise. The 
Major is the Reason for the Conclusion, which is a 
different matter. 

18. Major (omitted). If the Twelve Tables permit the 
killing of a man under certain circumstances, it cannot 



be maintained that a slayer must be killed whatever 
the circumstances. Minor. The Twelve Tables do 
permit the killing, etc. Conclusion. Therefore it can- 
not be maintained that a slayer, etc. Here also what is 
given is a Reason for the Conclusion (i.e. itself a premise) 
and not for the Premise. 

19. The Real argument is : Major. If it were wrong to kill 
robbers, etc., we should not be allowed escorts and 
swords. Reason. For escorts and swords are intended 
to enable us to fight robbers. Minor. But we are 
allowed escorts and swords. Conclusion. Therefore it 
is not wrong to kill robbers, etc. 

20. Major. If a man confesses, etc., he should be con- 
demned. Objection. If a man confesses that he has 
killed someone who lay in wait for him he should not 
be condemned. 

21. The Reason is one of the premises for the proposition. 
If the other Reason be false, the proposition will be 
false, but the first Reason will still be true. 

23. The doctrine is false. If both premises are true, the 
conclusion, if valid, is true, while if both premises or 
either be false, the conclusion may still be true. Cp. 
Ar. An. Pr. ii. 2. 

25. Enthymema ex const quentibus . . . ex puynantibus. See 
on 10. Both these enthymemes omit the major 

VI. i. 20. Servium Sulpicium Messala is the reading of 
Scholl. The MSS. give Servius Sulpicius. 




(Only those names are included which sewn to require some explanation ; a 
complete index will be contained in Vol. IV.) 

Acciua, v. xiii. 43. Famous tragic 
poet, fl. 140 B.C. 

Aeschines, iv. i. 66; IV. iv. 6. 
Attic orator, contemporary and 
opponent of Demosthenes. 

Ahala, Servilius, v. xi. 16 ; xiii. 24. 
Put to death Sp. Maelius, q.v. 

Antonius, C., IV. ii. 123. Colleague 
of Cicero in the consulship, 63B.C., 
and a man of the lowest character 

Apollodorus of Pergamus, iv. i. 50 ; 
iv. ii. 31 ; v. xiii. 59. A dis- 
tinguished rhetorician of the 
Augustan age. 

Appius Claudius, v. xiii. 34. The 
decemvir, whose conduct in 
relation to Verginia caused the 
overthrow of the decemvirate, 
449 B.C. 

Asinius, see Pollio. 

Aspasia, v. xi. 27. An Athenian 
hetaira, mistress of Pericles. 

Atellani, vi. iii. 47. Actors in the 
Atellan farce, an indigenous form 
of comedy, deriving its name 
from Atella in Campania. 

Berenice, iv. i. 19. Daughter of 
Herod Agrippa, mistress of the 
Emperor Titus. 

Bovillae, VI. iii. 49. A town on the 
Applan Way, not far from Rome. 

Brutus (i), v. xi. 6. The expelier 
of the kings ; executed his sons 
for an attempt against the newly 
established republic. 

Brutus (ii), VI. iii. 44. An orator 
notorious as an accuser and as a 
man of scandalous extravagance, 
accused a certain Cn. Plancius iu 
91 B.o. 

QUINT, ii. 

Brutus (iii), v. x. 9. The murderer 
of Caesar, famous as an orator of 
the Attic school. 

Caecilius, v. x. 7. Sicilian rhetori- 
cian, who taught at Rome in the 
reign of Augustus. 

Caelius Rufus, M., iv. i. 31 and 
39 ; iv. ii. 27 and 123 ; vi. iii. 39 
and 41. A younger contem- 
porary of Cicero famous as an 
orator. Defended by Cicero 
on a charge of attempted murder 
brought by Clodia. The speech 
cited in iv. ii. 123 is against 
C. Antonius. 

Calvus, vi. i. 13; vi. iii. 60. 
Younger contemporary of Cicero, 
poet and orator, with Brutus 
chief representative of the Attic 

Cassander, v. x. Ill and 118. A 
Macedonian, claimant to the 
throne of Macedon, exercised a 
powerful influence in Greek 
politics during the years fol- 
lowing the death of Alexander. 

Cassius Severus, vi. i. 43 ; vi. iii. 27, 
78 and 90. A distinguished orator 
of the reigns of Augustus and 

Cato, M., the Censor, V. xi. 39 ; 
vi. iii. 105. The famous oppo- 
nent of Carthage, one of the most 
distinguished writers and orators 
of his day. 234-149 B.o. 

Cato Uticensis, v. xi. 10 ; VI. iii. 
112. Contemporary of Cicero, a 
Stoic and one of the most 
ardent opponents of Caesar. 

Oatulus, Q. Lutatius, vi. iii. 81. 


M M 


Consul with Marius 102 B.O. 
and with him victor over the 
Cimbri at Vercellae. One of the 
characters in Cicero's de Oratore. 

Celsus, Cornelius, iv. i. 12; ii. 9. 
Writer on rhetoric, medicine and 
many other subjects : flourished 
under Augustus and Tiberius. 

Chrysogonus, IV. ii. 3. A powerful 
freedman of Sulla. 

Clodia, v. xiii. 30. Sister of 
Clodius.V mistress of Catullus, 
Caelius and many others. 

Clodius, iv. ii. 25, 57, 88 ; v. ii. 4 ; 
v. x. 41 ; v. xiv. 22. Demagogue 
and inveterate enemy of Cicero ; 
killed by Milo. 

Corm'ficius, v. x. 2. Rhetorician 
contemporary with Cicero, pro- 
bably author of the rhetorical 
treatise ad Herennium. 

Crassus, L., vi. iii. 43, 44. With 
L. Antonius the chief Roman 
orator prior to Oicero of whom 
he was an elder contemporary. 

Curio, vi. iii. 76. Younger con- 
temporary of Cicero, a turbulent 
politician and supporter of Caesar. 

Cynicus, iv. ii. 30. The reference 
seems to be to a rhetorical theme 
which occurs in the declamations 
of the Pseudo-Quintilian (283) 
where a father disinherits his 
son for turning Cynic and de- 
nounces the indecency of his 

Deiotarus, IV. i. 31. A Galatian 
King defended by Cicero. 

Dionysius, v. xi. 8. Tyrant of 

Dolabella (i), IT. ii. 132. Praetor 
67 B.O. 

Dolabella (ii), vi. iii. 73 and 99. 
A disreputable politician and 
follower of Caesar. Fabia ap- 
pears to have been his first wife. 
He later married Cicero's 

Dolabella (iii), vi. iii. 79. Son of 
(ii) ; friend of Augustus. 

Domitius Afer, v. vii. 7 ; v. x. 79 ; 
vi. iii. 27 and 91. A brilliant 
orator of the reigns of Tiberius, 
Calignla, Claudius and Nero. 

Domitius, L., iv. ii. 17. Governor 
of Sicily circ. 97 B.O. 

Fontieus, vi. iii. 51. Defended by 
Cicero on a charge of extortion 
as governor of Gaul in 69 B.C. 

Galba, A., VI. iii. 27, 62 and 80- 
Unknown humorist. The name 
should perhaps be Gabba. 

Galba, P. Sulpicius, v. xi. 11. 
Unsuccessful candidate for the 
consulship in 64 B.C. 

Glyco, vi. i. 41. A Greek rhetori- 
cian, fl. circ. 40 A.D. 

Hermagoras, V. ix. 12. Famous 
rhetorician of the Rhodian 
school, contemporary with Cicero. 

Hispo, vi. iii. 100. A rhetorician 
prominent from the time of 
Tiberius to that of Nero. No- 
torious as an informer. 

Horatius, M. (i), iv. ii. 7 ; v. xi. 12. 
The survivor of the three 
Horatii who defeated the three 
Curiatii, champions of Alba. 
He slew his sister for bewailing 
the death of one of the Curiatii 
to whom she was betrothed. 

Horatius (ii), v. xi. 10. Perhaps 
Horatius Codes, defender of the 
bridge against the Etruscans ; 
perhaps identical with (i). 

Hortensius, iv. v. 24; VI. iv. 4. 
The leading orator at Rome when 
Cicero first made his appearance 
at the bar, and the latter's most 
serious rival. 

Iphicrates, v. xii. 10. Athenian 
general prosecuted for refusing 
to engage the enemy : according 
to one account the speech in 
question was written by Lysias. 

Isocrates, IV. ii. 31. Famous orator 
and founder of the science and 
technique of Greek rhetoric, 
436-333 B.C. 

lulius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus, C., 
VI. iii. 3S. A distinguished 
orator, one of the characters of 
Cicero's dialogue, the de Oratore ; 
was put to death by Marius. 



Lablenus (i), iv. i. 11. Orator and 
historian under Augustus. 

Labienus (ii), V. xiii. 20. Accuser 
of Rabiriua on a charge of 
treason, afterwards served under 
Caesar in Gaul and Pompey in 
the Civil War. 

Lncretia, v. xi. 11. Wife of 
Brutus (i), whose rape by Sextus 
Tarquinius, and subsequent sui- 
cide, was the immediate cause 
of the fall of the monarchy. 

Macer, Aemilius, vi. iii. 96. Augus- 
tan didactic poet. 

Maelius, Spurius, v. ix. 13 ; v. 
xiii. 24. Bought up corn in 
time of dearth and sold it cheap 
to the people in 440 B.C. Was 
suspected of wishing to seize 
the supreme power and killed 
in the following year. 

.Mauius Curius, vi. iii. 72. Possibly 
the same that betrayed the 
Catilinarian conspiracy. 

Manliua Capitolinus, v. ix. 13 ; 
xi. 7. Saved Rome from the 
Gauls, but was subsequently 
suspected of aiming at supreme 
power and hurled from the 
Tarpeian rock in 384 B.C. 

Marcellus, v. xi. 7. Great general 
of the second Punic war, who 
conquered Sicily for Rome. 

Marsus, Domitius, vi. iii. 102 sqq. 
and 111. Distinguished man of 
letters of the Augustan age. 

Messala, iv. i. 8 ; vi. i. 20. Dis- 
tinguished orator and man of 
letters, 64 B.O.-8 A.D. 

Midias, vi. 1. 17. Prosecuted by 
Demosthenes (348 B.C.) for 
striking him in the face on the 
festival of Dionysus. Demos- 
thenes demanded the extreme 
penalty of the law (death or 
confiscation) on the ground that 
the act was of the nature of 

Nasica, Scipio, v. xi. 16 ; xiii. 24. 
The slayer of Tiberius Gracchus. 

Opimius, v. xi. 16. The slayer of 
G. Gracchus. 

Passienus Crispus, vi. i. 50 ; 
vi. iii. 74. Stepfather of the 
emperor Nero and a famous 

Pedianus, Asconius, V. x. 9. 
Distinguished historian and critic, 
contemporary with Quintilian. 

Philippus, L. Marcius, vi. iii. 81. 
Consul 91 B.C. and a distin- 
guished orator. 

Philodamus, iv. ii. 114 ; VI. i. 54. 
A citizen of Lampsacus, plun- 
dered by Verres when the latter 
was legatus of Dolabella in Asia. 
On his offering resistance he was 
tried, condemned and executed. 

Pisistratus, v. xi. 8. Tyrant of 
Athens, 6th cent. B.C. 

Piso, v. xiii. 38. Consul in 58 
and proconsul of Macedonia in 
57, 56 B.C. On his return he 
was prosecuted by Cicero on the 
charge of extortion in a most 
violent speech. 

Plancius, Cn. Munatius, vi. iii. 44. 
See Brutus (ii). 

Pollio, Asinius, iv. i. 11; VI. i. 21 ; 
iii. 110. Famous orator, poet and 
historian of the Augustan age. 

Polynices, v. x. 31. Son of 
Oedipus, who contended with his 
brother Eteocles for the throne 
of Thebes. 

Polyxena, vi. ii. 22. Daughter of 
Priam, sacrificed on the tomb of 

Proculeiu?, VI. iii. 79. A close 
friend of Augustus. 

Prodicus of Cos, iv. i. 73. Sophist 
of the 1st cent. B.C. 

Pyrrhus, v. xi. 10; VI. iii. 10. 
King of Epirus, who waged war 
on Rome at the beginning of the 
3rd cent. B.C. 

Rabirius, C., v. xiii. 20 ; vi. i. 49. 
Accused by Caesar in 63 for the 
murder of the tribune Satur- 
ninus in 100 B.C. 

Rabirius Postumus, IV. i. 69 ; 
iv. ii. 10. A Roman knight 
defended by Cicero in 54 B.C. 
when accused of extortion in 
Egypt while acting as treasurer 
to King Ptolemy Auletes. 



Ruling, v. xiii. 38. Tribune of the 
plebs in 63 B.C. proposed a law 
for the distribution of public 
lands, which was attacked by 
Cicero in his three speeches de 
Lege Agraria. 

Saturninus, v. xi. 6; vi. i. 49. 
Tribune of the plebs and dema- 
gogue, killed 100 B.C. 

Scaurus, M. Aemilius (i), v. xii. 10 ; 
v. xiii. 55. Consul 115 and 107 
B.C. A pillar of the senatorial 
party, famous for his integrity-. 
In 90 B.C. he was accused of 
inciting the Italian allies to 
revolt by Q. Varius, q.v. 

Scaurus, M. Aemilius (ii), iv. i. 69 ; 
v. xiii. 28 and 40 ; vi. i. 21. Son 
of (i), defended by Cicero on two 
occasions, when accused of (a) ex- 
tortion in Sardinia, (b) bribery as 
candidate for the consulate in 
54 P.O. 

Servius Sulpicius, iv. ii. 106 ; 
vi. i. 20. Distinguished orator 
and lawyer, friend and con- 
temporary of Cicero. 

Suelius Rufus, P., vi. iii. 78. 
Notorious informer in the reign 
of Claudius. 

Teucer, IV. ii. 13. Brother of 

Theodectes, rv. ii. 63. Rhetorician 
of first half of 4th cent. B.C. 

Theodorus of Gadara, iv. i. 23 ; 
IV. ii. 32 ; v. xiii. 59. Famous 
rhetorician of the Augustan age. 

Theophrastus, iv. i. 32. Famous 
Greek philosopher, pupil of 

Tiro, vi. iii. 5. Freedman and 
friend of Cicero, and an accom- 
plished man of letters. He col- 
lected and edited Cicero's works. 

Torquatus, T. Manlius, v. xi. 10. 
Consul 347, 844, 340 B.C. Won 
the title of Torquatus by en- 
gaging a gigantic Gaul in single 
combat in 361 and taking from 
his dead body a necklet (iorquis). 

Trachalus, vi. iii. 78. Famous 
orator, consul 68 A.D. 

Trebatius, y. x. 64. Distinguished 
lawyer, junior contemporary of 

Triarius, v. xiii. 40. Accuser of 
Scaurus (ii) on both charges. 

Tubero, iv. i. 66 ; v. x. 93 ; xiii. 
5. Accused Ligarius before 
Caesar 46 B.C. 

Tullius, IV. ii. 131 ; v. xiii. 21 ; 
A landowner at Thurii, defended 
by Cicero about 71 B.C. Only 
fragments of the speech remain. 

Varenus, iv. i. 74 ; V. x. 69 ; 
xiii. 28; VI. i. 49. Accused of 
murder and defended by Cicero 
circ. 80 B.C. The speech is lost. 

Varius Sucronensis, v. xii. 10. 
Tribune of the plebs 90 B.C., 
native of Sucro in 
Accuser of Scaurus (i). 

Vatinius, V. vii. 6 ; VI. i. 13 ; 
VI. iii. 77 and 84. An unscrupu- 
lous politician, and a bitter 
enemy of Cicero. 

Verginius Flavus, iv. i. 23. Famous 
rhetorician, flourished under 

Vestinua, vi. ill. 64. Perhaps 
Vestinus Atticus, consul under 
Nero, by whom he was put to 

Vibiua Crispus, v. xiii. 48. An 
eminent orator, contemporary 
with Quintilian. 

Zeno of Citium, iv. ii. 117. Famous 
Stoic philosopher of first half of 
third cent. B.C. 

B.C., a 




Latin Authors. 

APULEIUS. The Golden Ass (Metamorphoses.) Trans, by W. Adlington 

(1566). Revised by S. Gaselee. (znd Impression.) 
AUSONIUS. Trans, by H. G. Evelyn White. 2 Vols. Vol. I. 

PHIAE. Trans, by Rev. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand. 
CAESAR : CIVIL WARS. Trans, by A. G. Peskett. 

CAESAR: GALLIC WAR. Trans, by H. J. Edwards. (?nd Impression.) 
CATULLUS. Trans, by F. W. Cornish ; TIBULLUS. Trans, by J. P. 

Postgate; and PERVIGILIUM VENERIS. Trans, by J. W. Mackail. 

(4? A Impression.) 

CICERO : DE FIN I BUS. Trans, by H. Rackham. (?nd Impression.) 
CICERO : DE OFFICIIS. Trans, by Walter Miller. 
CICERO: LETTERS TO ATTICUS. Trans, by E. O. Winstedt. 

3 Vols. (Vol. I ~\rd Impression. Vol. II znd Impression.) 
CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE. Trans, by W. Watts 0631). 

2 Vols. (vnd Impression.) 

FRONTO : CORRESPONDENCE. Trans, by C. R. Haines. 2 Vols. 
HORACE : ODES AND EPODES. Trans, by C. E. Bennett. ( 3 r<t 


JUVENAL AND PERSIUS. Trans, by G. G. Ramsay. (*nd Impression.) 
L1VY. Trafis. by B. O. Foster. 13 Vols. Vol. I. 
MARTIAL. Trans, by W. C. Ker. 2 Vols. 
OVID : HEROIDES AND AMORES. Trans, by Grant Showermun. 

(znd Impression. ) 

OVID: METAMORPHOSES. Trans, by F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. 
PETRONIUS. Trans, by M. Heseltine ; SENECA: APOCOLO- 

CYNTOSIS. Trans, by W. H. D. Rouse. (j,rd Impression.) 
PLAUTUS. Trans, by Paul Nixon. 5 Vols. Vols. I and II. 
PLINY: LETTERS. Melmoth's Translation revised by W. M. L. 

Hutchinson. 2 Vols. 

PROPERTIUS. Trans, by H. E. Butler, (znd Impression.) 
QUINTILIAN. Trans, by H. E. Butler. 4 Vols. Vols. I and II. 
SALLUST. Trans, by J. C. Rolfe. 
SENECA: EPISTULAE MORALES. Trans, by R. M. Gummeie. 

3 Vols. Vols. I and II. 

SENECA : TRAGEDIES. Trans, by F. J. Miller. 2 Vols. 
SUETONIUS. Trans, by J. C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (ind Impression.) 
TACITUS : DIALOGUS. Trans, by Sir Wm. Peterson ; and AGRICOLA 

AND GERMANIA. Trans, by Maurice Hutton. (vnd Impression.) 
TERENCE. Trans, by John Sargeaunt. 2 Vols. (i,rd Impression.) 
VIRGIL. Trans, by H. R. Fairclough. 2 Vols. (Vol. I d Impression.) 

Greek Authors. 

ACHILLES TATIUS. Trans, by S. Gaselee. 

AESCHINES. Trans, by C. D. Adams. 

APOLLONIUS RHODIUS. Trans, by R. C. Seaton. (tnd Impression.) 

THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS. Trans, by Kirsopp Lake. 2 Vols. 

(Vol. I yd Impression. Vol. II znd Impression.) 

APPIAN'S ROMAN HISTORY. Trans, by Horace White. 4 Vols. 
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Trans, by Rev. G. W. Butterworth. 
DAPHNIS AND CHLOE. Thornley's Translation revised by J. M. 

Edmonds ; and PARTHENIUS. -Trans, by S. Gaselee. 
DIG CASSIUS : ROMAN HISTORY. Trans, by E. Cary. g Vols. 

Vols. I to VI. 
EURIPIDES. Trans, by A. S. Way. 4 Vols. (Vols. I and II yd 

Impression. Vols. Ill and IV znd Impression.) 

THE GREEK ANTHOLOGY. Trans, by W. R. Paton. 5 Vols. 

(Vols. I and II -2nd Impression.) 

CHUS). Trans, by J. M. Edmonds, (yd Impression.') 
HERODOTUS. Trans, by A. D. Godley. 4 Vols. Vols. I and II. 

White, (znd Impression.) 

HOMER : ODYSSEY. Trans, by A. T. Murray. 2 Vols. 
JULIAN. Trans, by Wilmer Cave Wright. 3 Vols. Vols. I and II. 
LUCIAN. Trans, by A. M. Harmon. 8 Vols. Vols. I and II. (znd 


MARCUS AURELIUS. Trans, by C. R. Haines. 

Jones. 5 Vols. and Companion Vol. Vol. I. 

Trans, by F. C. Conybeare. 2 Vols. (znd Impression.) 
PINDAR. Trans, by Sir J. E. Sandys, (znd Edition.) 

RUS. Trans, by H. N. Fowler, (yd Impression.) 

PLUTARCH: THE PARALLEL LIVES. Trans, by B. Perrin. nVols. 

Vols. 1 to IX. 

7 Vols. Vols. I to III. 

QUINTUS SMYRNAEUS. Trans, by A. S. Way. 
SOPHOCLES. Trans, by F. Storr. 2 Vols. (Vol. I yd Impression. 

Vol. II md Impression.) 

the Rev. G. R. Woodward and Harold Mattingly. 

STRABO : GEOGRAPHY. Trans, by Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols. Vol. I. 

Hort, Bart. 2 Vols. 

THUCYDIDES. Trans, by C. F. Smith. 4 Vols. Vols. I and II. 
XENOPHON : CYROPAEDIA. Trans, by Walter Miller. 2 Vols. 
POSIUM. Trans, by C. L. Brownson and O. J. Todd. 3 Vols. Vols. 

I and II. 



Greek Authors. 


Illinois Club. 

AESCHYLUS, H. W. Smyth. 
APOLLODORUS, Sir J. G. Frazer. 
ARISTOTLE, ORGANON, St. George Stock. 

Edward Capps. 

ATHENAEUS, C. B. Gulick. 

CALLIMACHUS, A. W. Mair ; ARATUS, G. R. Mair. 

T. H. Vince. 

^,w CHRYSOSTOM, W. E. Waters. 



EPICTETUS, W. A. Oldfather. 

EUSEBIUS, Kirsopp Lake. 




HOMER, ILIAD, A. T. Murray. 

1 SOCRATES, G. Norlin. 

LONGINUS, W. Hamilton Fyfe. 

MANETHO, S. de Ricci. 

MENANDER, F. G. Allinson. 

PAPYRI, A. S. Hunt. 


\VilmerCave Wright. 


PLATO, LAWS, R. G. Bury. 



PLATO, REPUBLIC, Paul Shorey. 




POLYBIUS, W. R. Paton. 

ST. BASIL, LETTERS, Prof. Van Den Ven. 



Latin Authors. 

AMMIANUS, C. U. Clark. 

AULUS GELLIUS, S. B. Plainer. 





W. A. Falconer. 

CLAUDIAN, M. Platnauer. 


LUCAN, S. Reinach. 

LUCRETIUS, W. H. D. Rouse. 






STATIUS. H. G. Evelyn White. 

TACITUS, ANNALS, John Jackson. 


VALERIUS FLACCUS, A. F. Scholfield. 



New York 



PA Quintilianus, Marcus Babius 

6649 The institute oratoria 




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