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Full text of "Interlocking subversion in Government Departments. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, second session,first session]"

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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 



HEARINGS ^ 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS 



PART 19 



MARCH 25 AND APRIL 6, 1954 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




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UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
32918"' WASHINGTON : 1954 



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PGBLIU 




Boston Public Liorary 
Superintendent of Documents 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chairman 



ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

WILLIAM E. JBNNER, Indiana 

ARTHUR V. WATKIXS. Utah 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 

EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 



PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 
HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 
ESTES KEPAUVEI^, Tennessee 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON. South Carolina 
THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jk., Missouri 
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Secukity 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 



ARTHUR V. WATKIN?, Utah 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 



PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Charles P. Grimes, Chief Counsel 

J. G. SOurwine, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 



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CONTENTS 





Date 


Page 


Testimony of — 

Braden, Spruille__ 


Mar. 25, 1954 
Apr. 6, 1954 


1349-1419 


Mitchell, Jonathan P 


1421-1460 







lU 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

DEPARTMENTS 



THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act 

and Other Internal Security Laws, 

of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 324, 
Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman) 
presiding. 

Present : Senators Jenner, Watkins, Welker, and Butler. 

Also present : Charles P. Grimes, chief counsel ; J. G. Sourwine, 
associate counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; Dr. Edna 
R. Fluegel and Robert C. McManus, professional staff members. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Let the record show this is a continuation of a hearing with Am- 
bassador Braden that was started December 22, 1953, in New York, and 
I will ask Mr. Grimes to connect the two and to clarify the record. 

Mr. Grimes. Thank you. I think that would make a more orderly 
record. 

There will be some repetition, but simply by way of amplification. 

The Chairman. Mr. Witness, do you swear the testimony you will 
give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God ? 

Mr. Braden. So help me God, I do. 

TESTIMONY OF SPRUILLE BRADEN, NEW YORK, N. Y. 

The Chairman. State your full name. 

Mr. Braden. Spruille Braden, and I live in New York, 320 East 
72d Street. 

The Chairman. Wliat is your business or profession? 

Mr. Braden. Presently as a consultant to various firms mostly on 
foreign investments and particularly in Latin America. 

The Chairman. Wlien were you with the Government of the United 
States? 

Mr. Braden. I was with the Government of the United States more 
or less continuously — there were in the first couple of years a few 
intermissions — from the end of 1933 until June 28, 1947. 

The Chairman. In what capacities did you serve? 

Mr. Braden. I began first as a delegate in charge of all the economic 
and financial discussions at the Seventh International Conference of 

1349 



1350 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

American States held in Montevideo, Uruguay. Cordell Hull, as 
Secretary of State, was the chairman of our delegation, and was the 
one who placed me in charge of all that work at that time. 

I then returned to the Taiited States where I had what resulted in 
]nerely an honorary position on an advisory committee on Latin- 
America to the State Department because we never actually had a 
meeting of the committee. 

I consulted Secretary Hull and others on various things individu- 
ally during that period. 

I returned to Latin America in early 1935 as the head of our dele- 
gation at the Pan-American Commercial Conference which was con- 
sidered to be particularly important because the Argentine Foreign 
Minister was anxious to have a followup conference on the famous 
London Economic Conference which had caused such a tremendous 
stir in the early summer of 1933. 

There were many difficult problems coming up and they felt they 
had to have somebody down there who knew Latin America thor- 
oughly and knew how to get along Avith them. 

I returned from that conference at which point I was asked whether 
I would go to Peru as Ambassador. I replied I would, but before 
lliat occurred we were in the midst, beginning on June 12, 193,5, of 
the Chaco Peace Conference to settle the war between Bolivia and 
Paraguay. 

A 90-day truce was declared, during which time they were sup- 
])osed to get the final peace treaty and also to get all of the prisoners 
exchanged. 

The 90 days had run out and nothing had been done. It was a very 
serious situation which might involve the two countries going back 
to war, and if they had, probably the adjoining nations would have 
become involved and we would have had a major conflict in this hemi- 
sphere with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile involved, along with Bolivia 
and Paraguay. 

My authority for that is such people as President Ortiz, of Argen- 
tina. President Roosevelt was so concerned about developments in 
Europe and the menace of a coming world war that he wished to iso- 
late this hemisphere from such a conflict and he, therefore, wished to 
have what was known later as the Maintenance of the Peace Confer- 
ence of the 21 American Eepublics. 

Needless to say it would be impossible to have sucli a conference so 
long as the conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay was going on, or 
so long as they had not reached a point where at least we had the 
security of their not returning to war. 

Ambassador Gibson, who was our American Ambassador in Chaco 
Peace Conference, Avas also Ambassador in Brazil. He had to return 
to his post and Cordell Hull called me in and said, "Here is a terribly 
urgent job. Will you please take this on? Go down as chairman of 
our delegation," which was somewhat of an anomaly because there 
was only one delegate, myself; although I had some assistants. 

I agreed to do it. I was engaged for a little over 3 years in regard 
to that war and getting the final peace treaty between Bolivia and 
Paraguay. 

It IS the one time in my life I have ever walked the floor at night 
because if we didn't get that peace treaty, I think they would have 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1351 

cone back to fichtino; and witli what we saw comino: in Europe we 
would liave a major conflict in this hemisphere. That was how seri- 
ous it was. 

I mi<rht interpolate there, if you will fortjive me, to say one of the 
influences which enabled me to do that job was that when I was 7 
years old I first went to Mexico with my father who was a minin<i: 
engineer. At that time he was the general manager of Velardenna 
I\ lining and Smelting Co. 

I subsequently went to Chile for 21/2 years with my father. There 
I went to school when I was 10 years old. 

I returned to the United States to go through school and college, 
graduated from Yale Sheffield Scientific School in mining engineering, 

When I was 20 years old, after graduating, and after a trip to Eu- 
rope, I went to South America to work with my father. I was en- 
gaged in mining work of various kinds there. 

I might say, before going to work in South America, I had gone out 
to the West and worked as a mining engineer and a mucker and timber- 
man, so I knew the game from the ground up. 

I worked as an engineer and chemist in Chile. I then became the 
representative, after several years there, of the Anaconda interests and 
my father's interests in Santiago, Chile. 

My work in Chile involved the development of such important prop- 
erties as the Andes Copper Mining Co., which belongs to the Anaconda 
Co., the Santiago Mining Co., the Cerro Verde property in Peru. 

I was never connected with the Braden Copper Co., which now is 
part of Kennecott and Avhich was founded by my father. 

In 1919, the middle of that year, I had gotten as high up as I could 
down there and I realized that promotion from there on might be very 
slow, so I resigned from that position with my father and the Ana- 
conda and organized a Chilean company and came to the United 
States and obtained the representation of the Westinghouse Electric 
Co. 

Under my supervision this Chilean company, my associates and I, 
got the contract for electrifying the Chilean state railways between 
Valparaiso and Santiago. 

At that time it was the largest electrification in the world. 

Mr. Gkimes. What was your role in that ? 

Mr. Bbaden. My role was a principal in that, supervising, employ- 
ing the engineers we needed for it, supervising all of the contracts, ob- 
taining the financing for both the Chilean Government and for the 
Chilean state railway, which I did. 

Mr. Grimes. To summarize your career, you have had, then, a very 
extensive experience as a mining engineer, as a businessman, as a finan- 
cier, as a diplomat, and later you became Assistant Secretary of State. 
Is that correct ? 

Mr. BiL\DEN. Yes. 

Going back, if I may, to the diplomatic career 

Mr. Grimes. We will go back to that at the appropriate time. 

The ChxVirman. Let the record show that Senator Welker is now in 
attendance at this hearing. 

Mr. Grimes. I wish you would state briefly your career as Ambassa- 
dor to Colombia in 1939-42 and the conditions that you found there as 
regards German n Aviation which might become military, but was osten- 
sibly civilian at that time. 



1352 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

First, you were our Ambassador to Colombia from 1939 to April of 
1942; is that correct? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. I arrived in Colombia in January of 1939 as the 
first Ambassador. Before that it had been a legation. 

Before going to Colombia I was sufficiently familiar with the situa- 
tion there, and I was sufficiently concerned by reason of my experience 
in the Chaco war — and what was happening in Europe — concerned 
about the Nazi-controlled airlines known as the Scadta Airlines oper- 
ating in Colombia, the head of which was a German, or, really, an 
Austrian, by the name of Peter Paul von Bauer. 

Mr. Grimes. How far were those airplanes flying to the Panama 
Canal, or rather, how far were their flights from the Panama Canal ? 

Mr. Braden. They got to the Gulf of Aruba which is 200 miles 
from the Panama Canal. 

Mr. Grimes. What kinds of planes were they using? 

Mr. Braden. At that time they were using Boeing twin-motor 
planes. 

Mr. Grimes. Was there anything unusual about them as regards 
their civilian status or military? 

Mr. Braden. They all had military aviators as pilots and copilots. 
They had 131 Nazis employed in Scadta Airlines. They had in- 
gratiated themselves and played an important role in developing 
aviation in Colombia. 

Mr. Grimes. What was the nature of the planes? They were 
ostensibly civilian planes? 

Mr. Braden. Subsequently, after the taking over of the lines from 
them, my naval air attache informed me that he had inspected the 
planes and he had found borings for both bomb racks and machine 
guns on those planes. 

Mr. Grimes. Were you able to stop the operation of those planes 
under German operation? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. How? 

Mr. Braden. If I may go back just a second, I was so concerned 
that when I arrived in Washington from the Chaco Peace Con- 
ference to take over as Ambassador to Colombia, I endeavored to 
find out fully about the ownership of this company. 

I was able to get practically nothing in Washington. I finally 
did from Pan-American Airways. I got the information in New 
York. I then went to Colombia. 

Mr. Grimes. What was the information? That they were Ger- 
man owned? 

Mr. Braden. That Pan-American Airways had control in actual- 
ity, but the Germans had the entire operation in their hands. 

Mr. Grimes. And could control the operations ? 

Mr. Braden. Completely. I was so concerned about it that I 
went to Panama on my way into Colombia in order that I could talk 
with the military command there — General Stone. I found that he 
was grievously concerned about it. 

Subsequently, Colonel Dever, since General Dever, a 4-star gen- 
eral, spent 1 entire day showing me around the bases in Panama 
that we had and the antiaircraft installations, and explained to me 
that while these Boeings were relatively small planes we had listen- 
ing devices that only carried about 15 miles and 1 group of planes 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1353 

could come in at a high level from one side and another group at a 
low level from another side and we could not possibly defend the 
Canal against both groups of those planes. 

Senator Welkek. At tliat time, Mr. Ambassador, they were not 
considered so small, were they? They were a twin-engine craft. 
They were considered a fair sized plane? 

Mr. Braden. The DC-3's were just coming in, the bigger planes. 

Senator "Welker. I think it is the Boeing 2hd that was used on our 
domestic airways at about that time. Apparently it was considered 
a rather large aircraft at that time? 

Mr. Braden. Yes, at that time. 

I was so concerned about it that I decided we simply had to get 
the Scadta Nazi military pilots and copilots out of Colombia. 

Mr. (trimes. AVIiat did General Dever say about his concern, then 
Colonel Dever? 

Mr. Braden. He was very mucli worried about it. He told me he 
considered it a very serious situation. 

]Mr. Grimes. In other words, it would be very easy for them to make 
a surprise attack, or any type of attack, and blow up the Panama 
Canal locks? 

Mr. Braden. Absolutely. 

So we were in desperate straits if any tj-ouble came. 

Mr. Grimes, Our military was worried about that? 

Mr. Braden. Absolutely. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you get them out of there in some manner? 

Mr. Braden. I was able, with the perfectly splendid assistance of 
President Santos, of Colombia, and the Minister of War, Mr. Mar- 
tinez, and others, on June 10, 1940, one year and a half before Pearl 
Harbor, to get Scadta completely out of Colombia and all of these 
pilots replaced by American and Colombian pilots and copilots. 

Mr. Grimes. So that the threat to the safety of the United States 
was eliminated as of that time ? 

Mr. Braden. As of that date. 

I may say for 6 months after that we had continuous sabotage, the 
actual placing of bombs in a passenger plane at one time. 

Mr. Grimes. Jumping down to October 1945, you became Assistant 
Secretary of State; is that correct? 

Mr. Braden. Correct. 

Mr. Grimes. You were appointed by the President of the United 
States. 

Mr. Braden. Yes, and confirmed by the Senate. 

Mr. Grimes. That was Mr. Truman? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr, Grimes. Did the United States at that time have bases in 
Panama ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. What were they? 

Mr. Braden. We had 134 bases in the Republic of Panama because 
self-evidently the canal could not be defended merely from the nar- 
row strip of the Canal Zone. 

These 184 bases varied all the way from some simple observation 
outposts and antiaircraft posts to the huge Rio Hato Airbase, which 
at that time was the largest airbase in the world, I was told. 



1354 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

We also had a whole island where we were carrying on various 
experiments, which was one of our bases. We had acquired those 
bases as I subsequently learned — I didn't know it at that time when 
I took over as Assistant Secretary and there was no need of my digging 
into the situation. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you learn this in the course of your official duties 
as Assistant Secretary of State ? 

Mr. Braden. Absolutely, from official documents and memoranda 
right straight down the line. 

Mr. Grimes. Go ahead, please. 

Mr. Braden. Wlien I took over in 1945, there was no need for me 
to delve into it. One year after V-J Day, all of a sudden, agitation 
started in Panama. There was agitation by Communists. There 
was agitation by the students, the nationalists, the whole group, 
demanding that these 134 bases should be returned 1 year after V-J 
Day. 

Mr. Grimes. What was the actual situation with reference to any 
agreement between the United States and Panama with reference to 
these bases ? 

Mr. Braden. On this, I have no documents whatsoever. This is 
all based on my memory, but it is substantially correct. 

Mr. Grimes. Where are those documents, if they are still in 
existence ? 

Mr. Braden. If they are still in existence, or could be found, if they 
have not been destroyed or hidden away, they are in the State Depart- 
ment and, I assume also, the War Department and, probably, the 
Navy Department. 

Certainly they would be in the files of the Government of the Canal 
Zone in Panama and of the commanding general there. 

Mr. Grimes. You don't have the documents? 

Mr. Braden. I have no documents. 

Mr. Grimes. But you do have a clear recollection of the contents 
of those documents ? 

Mr. Braden. I have a very clear recollection because when this 
agitation started 

The Chairman. Let the record show that Senator Butler of Mary- 
land is now in attendance at this hearing. 

Mr. Braden. Eight after this agitation started, caused by these 
Communists and students, et cetera, it got into the Panamanian Con- 
gress and they started to raise "ned." 

Mr. Grimes. I want to ask you about the documents and provisions, 
since you mentioned something about a 1-year provision. 

Would you tell us about that ? 

Mr. Braden. In view of all this agitation I called for the docu- 
ments. I found that the history of the case — this is approximately 
right — was that Mr. Sumner Welles, as Under Secretary of State 
of the United States, and his assistants, had carried on negotiations 
here in Washington with, presumably, the Panamanian Ambassador, 
but also with a gentleman by the name of Fabregat, who was Foreign 
Minister of Panama. 

The Chairman. Spell that, please. 

Mr. Braden. F-a-b-r-e-g-a-t. He came up to Washington and also 
was in on these conversations. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1355 

As to the bases that we would take over in the Republic of 
Panama 

Mr. Grimes. I wish you would tell us in more detail the importance 
of those bases. 

First, some of them were actually in the Canal Zone itself, were 
they not ? 

]Mr, Bkaden. These 134 bases were not in the Canal Zone. We 
required no agreement for the Canal Zone, but to put bases out into 
the Republic of Panama we had to have a special agreement. That 
was the agreement to which I referred. 

Mr. Grimes. We did have bases in the Canal Zone, but we had no 
special agreement? 

Mr. Braden. That is right. 

Mr. Grimes. These 134 were throughout the Republic of Panama? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. They were necessarily outside of the Canal Zone 
because in the opinion of the military they needed all of these bases 
and tliey could not all be located in the Canal Zone ? 

Mr. Braden. You couldn't defend the canal without them. They 
were vitally important for the defense of the canal. 

INIr. Grimes. Are they still, as far as you know ? 

Mr. Braden. I assume they still are important, although with the 
development, as Senator Welker has said, of the larger planes, the 
area for the defense now spreads much farther out, so we have the 
situation in Guatemala, concerning the bases we built there, being in 
the hands of the Government that is Communist-controlled. 

That is what we are facing today. 

Mr. Grimes. But they would be useful if we are to defend the Canal 
Zone? 

Mr. Braden. Of course. I am not a military man, but I think it is 
obvious. 

Mr. Grimes. About the agreement under which we had those 
bases 

Mr. Braden. We actually took over the bases, I found from these 
documents which I saw in the State Department, before we had con- 
cluded the agreement. There were delays on the agreement. 

One of the delays in reaching an agreement that I recall from a 
perusal of the documents at the time was a disagreement as to the 
period that we would occupy those bases after the cessation of 
hostilities. 

Mr. Grimes. Delay or not, what were the provisions with reference 
to our occupation ? 

Mr. Braden. The provision that was finally included in that agree- 
ment was that we w^ould occupy those 134 bases until 1 year after the 
signature of the definitive treaty of peace. Those words stuck very 
much in my mind because that was the essence of the situation. 

And not only did the agreement stipulate clearly that it was the 
definitive treaty of peace — and, of course, we haven't got a definitive 
treaty of peace yet — that was the controlling factor, but there were 
attached to that agreement 

The Chairman. Let the record show that Senator Watkins is in 
attendance. 

Senator, this is former ximbassador Spruille Braden testifying. 

Senator Watkins. Thank you. 



1356 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Braden. There were attached to that agreement memoranda. 
My recollection may be a little bit otf on the exact- 



Mr. Grimes. The only thing we are interested in is the exact 
provision. 

Mr. Braden. I think yon are interested in one other thing, if you will 
permit me. That is : There was attached to this memorandum agree- 
ment a memorandum either of a conversation of Sumner Welles with 
Fabregat, or with other authorities of Panama, or a simple memo- 
randum drafted by Mr. Welles — I do not recall exactly which — stip- 
ulating that the agreement, when it said definitive treaty of peace, 
meant just that, and that it did not mean a truce or cease tire or an 
armistice, or anything other than a definite treaty of peace. That was 
the important part. 

Mr. Grimes. In other words, it was not one of these cessation-of- 
hostility agreements ? 

Mr. Braden. Nothing of the kind. 

One year after the signing of the definitive treaty of peace — that was 
the terminology. 

Mr. Grimes. They said it twice to make sure ? 

Mr. Braden. When the Pentagon told me they wanted and needed 
those bases urgently, that was the basis on which I made the fight. 

Mr. Grimes. You said there was Communist agitation, students and 
others. Had you learned something about Communist agitation before 
in the course of your experience with the State Department? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. Going back to 1941, when I was in Colombia, I 
began sounding warnings to the State Department about the menace 
of communism in this hemisphere and during the war — 1943 and 
1944 — there were repeated dispatches in which I said that this is the 
gravest peril we face and that after the war it is going to be most 
serious. 

The Chairman. That was in your written reports ? 

Mr. Braden. Written reports and telegrams, all kinds of things. 

Mr. Grimes. What was the Russian Communist Party line at that 
time? 

Mr. Braden. More or less simultaneously with that, we had the 
opening that fall of the first United Nations Assembly meeting in 
New York. They had a San Francisco meeting and a London meeting, 
but here the Assembly met in New York for the first time. 

]Mr. Grimes. They were about to meet at the time this took place? 

Mr. Braden. This all took place after V-J Day, August or 
August 7. 

Mr. Grimes. The agitation began? 

Mr. Braden. It began promptly and it grew rapidly in volume. 

Mr. Grimes. You knew this through reports that reached you? 

Mr. Braden. I had all kinds of reports and telegrams, everything 
coming in from Panama. The Army had the same thing. The news- 
papers carried it. 

Mr. Grimes. But your knowledge is based on the official reports 
made to you as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin Ameri- 
can affairs ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Braden. Exactly. 

Mr. Grimes. That is the position you occupied, then? 

Mr. Braden. That is the position. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1357 

Mr. Grimes. Will you state, please, what the Kussian Communist 
Party line was? I think I interrupted you. 

Mr. BiLVDEN. I was going to say that for the first time the Russians 
at that time at that Assembly in New York, made the attack on us 
that we had aggressive intentions — that we were aggressive and the 
proof of the aggressive intentions we had was our establishing bases 
all over the world. 

Mr. Grimes. Did they at that time mention Panama bases? 

Mr. Braden. Subsequently during the discussions in the Assembly 
they did, not at the beginning, as I recall. 

Mr. Grimes. So they used the Panama bases as proof of our aggres- 
sive intentions? 

Mr. Braden. AVell, you say they used it. We gave them the am- 
munition. 

Mr. Grimes. Let's get to that later, but that was the party line? 

Mr. Braden. Sure. 

Mr. Grimes. We were the aggressors. The proof is we have the 
bases, the military bases, all over the world, including Panama; is 
that right? 

Mr. Braden. As I recall, the Russians made the point specifying 
Panama later. 

The Chairman. They were not referring to the Canal Zone, they 
were referring to the Republic of Panama, 134 bases? 

Mr. Braden. Yes, the 134 bases I am talking about. But the Canal 
Zone was brought in implicitly. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you have an experience in connection with the 
agitation in Panama and the Communist Party line with Alger Hiss? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. What was it? 

Mr. Braden. There were two instances. 

Mr. Grimes. What was Hiss doing at that time? 

Mr. Braden. Hiss was in charge of the Office of Special Political 
Affairs. 

Mr. Grimes. In the State Department ? 

Mr. Braden. In the State Department. That office today is headed 
by an Assistant Secretary of State. It is the office for United Nations 
affairs. He was the head of that office, although he did not have the 
rank of Assistant Secretary of State. 

The first thing that happened was that, in the routine performance 
of his duties, the Governor of the Canal Zone submitted his annual 
report. 

Mr. Grimes. To whom? 

Mr. Braden. On the operations of the Canal Zone. I think that is 
submitted to the War Department. I am not sure of that, but in any 
case, it was published, as it usually is. 

Mr. Grimes. You say routine operations. Would you describe it, 
briefly, please? 

Mr. Braden. I can't do a good job of describing it. I don't think 
I read it. 

Mr. Grimes. What sort of report was it? 

Mr. Braden. How many boats are going through the canal in dif- 
ferent directions, the tonnage, et cetera ; what were the operations of 
the stores in the canal, what was the labor operation, everything. 

Mr. Grimes. Population, matters of that sort? 



1358 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Braden. I think population was probably in it. I don't recall 

Mr. Grimes. This is a report by our Governor down there on opera- 
tions in the Canal Zone and a report which he submits annually ; is 
that correct ? 

Mr. Bkaden. Exactly. 

Mr. Grimes. He had been submitting it to the American Govern- 
ment; is that right? 

Mr. Braden. Since 1903, 1 assume. 

Mr. Grimes. Go ahead, please. What happened in connection with 
that report ? 

Mr. Braden. My office, represented by Mr. Cochran, Mr. William 
Cochran, who was in charge of that whole area in the Caribbean, and 
Mr. Wise, who was on the Panama desk, became involved in an argu- 
ment with the Office of Political Affairs, because the latter wished to 
submit this report by the Governor of the Canal Zone to the United 
Nations. 

My officers immediately got in touch with the legal adviser's office 
where Miss Ann O'Neill, a very competent lawyer, and a very sturdy 
soul, I may say — I have a great admiration for her — supported the 
thesis of my officers that under no circumstances should this report of 
the Governor of the Canal Zone be submitted to the United Nations. 

Finally, Mr. Hiss himself 

Mr. Grimes. Wliat was your reason for that? 

Mr. Braden. I was going to say what Hiss' reason was first, because 
I think that makes it clearer. 

Alger Hiss and his office claimed under article 73 (e) of the United 
Nations Charter, it was our obligation to submit that report. I don't 
know whether you would like to have article 73 reviewed now, or not. 

The Chairman. Let it go into the record and become a part of the 
record, without reading. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 357" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 357 

Charter of the United Nations — Chapter XI, Declaration Regarding Non- 
Self-Governing Territories 

article 73 

Members of the United Nations wliich have or assume responsibilities for the 
administration of territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of 
self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of 
these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to 
promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security 
established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these 
territories, and, to this end : 

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their 
political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, 
and their protection against abuses ; 

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations 
of the i>eoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free 
political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory 
and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement ; 

c. to further international peace and security ; 

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, 
and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with special- 
ized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, 
economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this article ; and 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1359 

e. to transmit repnilarly to the Secretary General for information purposes, 
subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may re- 
quire, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, 
social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respec- 
tively responsible other than those territories to which chapters XII and XIII 
apply. 

Mr. Braden. My officers maintained that was perfectly ridiculous; 
that article 73 (e) anticipated self-government. That was the phrase- 
ology used in it. 

The Canal Zone, so far as the Eepublic of Panama is concerned, 
is self-governing. 

We had a special agreement as to the operation of the Canal Zone. 
There was no rhyme or reason, in my opinion, nor in the opinion of my 
officers, why that should be presented to the United Nations. 

Moreover, we knew that if it were presented that it was just going to 
enrage the Panamanians. It was going to play into the hands of the 
Kussians with their allegations about our bases scattered all over the 
world, and particularly in Panama. 

It was going to alienate a lot of the other Latin Americans, who 
would say, "See what the United States is doing in the Canal Zone?" 

It was a thoroughly bad move to make and particularly with the 
Assembly starting up in New York. 

I knew that Mr. Alfaro, the former President of Panama, and 
Minister of Foreign Relations, a leading politician, already faced this 
terrific problem about the bases outside of the zone, and would be 
terrifically annoyed by this report being presented. 

Mr. Grimes. In addition, would it complicate our relations insofar 
as operation is concerned by giving the United Nations a voice ? 

Mr. Braden. It would complicate us with the Eepublic of Panama. 
It brought the United Nations into something where they had no right 
to be. 

Mr. Grimes. It might give them a claim to some stake in the opera- 
tion of the Panama Canal ? 

Mr. Braden. Exactly. 

Mr. Grimes. Was that part of the argument ? 

Mr. Braden. Absolutely. 

The Chairman. Senator Watkins. 

Senator Watkins. Is it not true we also made reports on Alaska ? 

Mr. Braden. That was not in my sphere, so I haven't any idea about 
that. 1 think we did. I don't know whether we did on Hawaii, or 
not, but I think we did, now that you mention it. But I wasn't con- 
cerned about that. I had enough troubles of my own with Panama. 

Senator Watkins. The reason I call your attention to it was the 
fact I entered a protest about reporting from Alaska. 

Mr. Braden. I vaguely remember that was true. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Chairman, may I have a question ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Ambassador, you were fortified by your 
counsel's opinion and the opinion of yourself and others, that you were 
permitted not to submit this information as requested by Mr. Hiss 
under the limitation of security; is that correct? That is subsection 
(e) of article 73. 

Mr. Braden. That I can't give you an opinion on as a lawyer. I 
know that the procedure was totally out of order. There was no 



1360 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

justification for that; aside from all of the issues that counsel has 
brought up in regard to our relations. 

Senator Welker. Notwithstanding the fact that you did have the 
security defense in mind, it was still insisted by Mr. Hiss ? 

Mr. Braden. It was still insisted by Mr. Hiss that it had to be sub- 
mitted to the United Nations. 

Finally, Mr. Cochran and Mr. Murray Wise, my assistants on this 
matter, came to me and said, "You have got to enter this fight. We 
can't get any further on it." 

At that point we got Mr. Hackworth, the legal adviser to the State 
Department, in on it. 

My boys reported to me they were quite concerned. They feared 
Mr. Hackworth was veering over to the side of Alger Hiss, but I 
stormed around quite a bit on this problem and finally Mr. Hackworth 
would not give a decision. 

At that point it was appealed to the Under Secretary of State. 

The Chairman. Who was that? 

Mr. Braden. Mr. Acheson. 

I remember very vividly that I went in to see Mr. Acheson. I 
think Mr. Hiss had already been there for some time. 

This was all 7 years ago, so my memory may be a bit off, but I 
think it is substantially accurate. 

When I tried to state my case, Mr. Acheson, as a lawyer, agreed 
with Mr. Hiss, and I didn't even have a chance to state my case. I 
remember that I came out of that meeting boiling with rage at what 
happened. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Hiss was present there ? 

Mr. Braden. Oh, yes. The only thing w^e got out of Mr. Hiss' office 
was an expression which today I don't understand very clearly, and 
he said this — he put in a phrase that this was submitted to the United 
Nations, this report of the Governor, on a pragmatic basis for this 
year, for the year 1946. What that means, I don't know, but that 
was supposed to take care of our objections, which needless to say, 
it did not. 

As we predicted, the Panamanian Foreign Minister made a speech 
in the United Nations. I have a copy of this if you wish to have it in 
the record. 

The ChxUrman. I think it should go into the record and become a 
part of the record. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 358" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 358 

"Panama Canal Zone Is Not Leased Territory * * *" 

dr. ricardo j. alfako explains payment of .$430.00(» annuity by the united 

states government 

Speech by the president of the Panamanian delegation, Dr. Ricardo .J. Alfaro, 
during the session of the Political Commission of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on November 14, 1946, in respect to the international status of the 
Panama Canal Zone. 

The Panamanian Delegation has been informed that by virtue of a resolution 
adopted on February 9, 1946, by the United Nations Assembly, the United States 
has presented a report concerning the territories under its administration and 
has included the Panama Canal Zone among those about which it had to report 
to the General Secretariat, in accordance with article 73 (e) of the United 
Nation Charter. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1361 

The Panamanian Delegation maintains that the Canal Zone should not have 
been included among such territories, for the following reasons : 

I. rUOVISIOiNS OF rilK CIIAUTEK I.N KI'XiARl) TO NONAUTONOMOUS TERRITORIES 

Article 73 of the charter reads: 

The niomher of the United Nations that have or that assume the responsiMlity 
of administering territories whose people have not yet acliieved full self-govern- 
ment, recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of those terri- 
tories are paramount, accept as a sacred charge the obligation to i)i-omote to the 
greatest degree possible, within the system of peace and international security 
established by this charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of those territories, 
and they likewise obligate themselves : 

(a) * * *. 

(h) to develop self-government, to take into due account the political 

aspirations of the inhabitants and to assist them in the progressive development 

of their free political institutions, in accordance with the special circumstances 

of each territory, of its people, and of its particular degree of advancement ; 
if,) * * *_ 

(d) * * *. 

(c) to transmit with regularity to the Secretary General, for informational 
purposes and within the limits which security and considerations of constitu- 
tional nature require, both statistical information and any of a technical nature 
that deal with the economic, social and educational conditions of the territories 
for which they are respectively responsible, except those territories to which 
chapters XI and XII of this charter refer. 



It is evident, from a reading of the article of the charter transcribed above, 
that the Panama Canal Zone cannot be included among the territories referred to 
therein and about which information nuist be sent to the United Nations in ac- 
cordance with paragi'aph (e) . Moreover, it is easy to show that it is a mistake to 
include the Canal Zone among those territories which may be generally classified 
as possessions of the United States ; that is to say, territories acquired by pur- 
chase, conquest, cession, annexation or by any other manner of acquisition or 
transfer of territory, as in the case of Alaska (purchased from Russia), Hawaii, 
(annexed), Puerto Rico (ceded by Spain after the war of 189S), the Virgin Islands 
(purchased from Denmark), Guam (acquired as a result of the war between the 
United States and Spain), and American Samoa (first occupied and later acquired 
by an agreement with Great Britain and Germany). 

The strip of land known as the Panama Canal Zone has been neither purchased, 
conquered, annexed, ceded, nor leased, nor has its sovereignty been transferred 
by Panama to the United States. The United States administers this strip of 
land by virtue of a very specific stipulation in article II of the treaty concluded 
between the Republic of Panama and the United States on the ISth of November 
1003, which reads as follows : 

"The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the use. occupation and 
supervision of a zone of land and of land covered with water for the construction, 
maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of the said canal" * * * 

Article III of the same treaty concedes ample "rights, power and authority" 
to the Ignited States within the zone mentioned in article II, btit establishes in 
unequivocal terms that Panama retains its sovereignty over the canal strip. 
In fact, the aforementioned articles establish that the United States is granted 
"the rights, power, and authority" that the United States would exercise if it 
were the sovereign of the territory. The sentence "if it were" means clearly and 
unmistakably that it is not the sovereign, and consequently, that the United 
States acquired the power of administration and .iurisdiction only, while the 
supreme attribute of sovereignty inheres in the original sovereign, the Repub- 
lic of Panama. This interpretation of the treaty, as far as it regards the inter- 
nation status of the Canal Zone, is supported by the judicial authority of none 
less than William H. Taft, President of the United States from 1900 to 1015, 
and afterward Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The summary information 
transmitted by the United States and printed by the Secretary General (docu- 
ment A (73)) in the part which bears the title "Panama Canal," says on page 
20: "The following is a resume in telegraphic form of the information about the 
social and educational conditions contained in the report on this leased territory.'' 

32918° — 54 — pt. 19 2 



1362 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

And the general report of the Secretary General (docnnient A (74)), dated 
the 21st of October 1946, referring to the information transmitted by the United 
States on the 19th of August, says on page 5 : "One may note a great variety in 
the status of these territories. In particular, the Panama Canal Zone is held in 
lease." 

The idea that the Canal Zone is a leased territory is a rather generalized 
error which doubtlessly stems from the fact that by the treaty of 1903 the 
United States agreed to pay to the Republic of Panama an annuity of 250,000 
balboas in gold coin (today equivalent to approximately 430,000 balboas in de- 
valued dollars). But it was never maintained that this annunity would be, 
nor has it ever been, nor it is now, the fee for a lease, and moreover, the word 
"lease" is not even found in the treaty with relation to the Canal Zone. 

By the treaty of 1903 the Republic of Panama made many concessions to the 
United States, and for all these concessions the United States agreed to pay as 
compensation the sum of $10 million immediately and an annuity of $250,000 
beginning with the year 1912, in accordance with the following stipulation, from 
article XIV of the treaty in question : 

"As comi)ensation for the rights, privileges and powers granted in this con- 
vention by the Republic of Panama to the United States, the Government of the 
United States agrees to pay to the Republic of Panama the sum of $10 million 
in gold coin of the United States on the date of the ratification of this treaty, 
and also an annual payment during its life of $250,000 in the same gold coin, 
beginning 9 years after the date mentioned above." 

In reality, then, the annuity was not nor is it in any way a compensation. The 
reason for the annuity was that among the concessions made by Panama to the 
United States was that of the right which Panama possessed, in conformity with 
the contract with the Panama Railroad Company, of receiving from that private 
company, which the Government of the United States had absorbed, the afore- 
mentioned sum of $250,000 as a tax debt. Thus the Government of the United 
States, as a grantee of the right to collect this sum, would receive $250,000 from 
the company and would deliver exactly the same amount to the Republic of 
Panama. It is clear, consequently, that there is no such lease in the sense of 
existing international leases, for example, as in China for some time, and that 
the international status of the Panama Canal Zone is determined by the fact that 
its use, occupation, and supervision were granted for the specific purpose of con- 
structing, maintaining, managing, sanitizing and protecting a canal between the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. 

III. DEMOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE 

It is evidence that non-self-governing territories which the charter has in mind, 
are territories inhabited by a native population, permanently attached to the 
land, and which for some reason has not reached full autonomy and which, if 
it places it.self under international trusteeship administration, must be educated 
and prepared for self-government, in accordance with article 76 of the charter, 
which establishes the following as one of the basic objectives of the trustee 
system : 

"(b) To promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement 
of the inhabitants of territories held in trust, and their progressive development 
toward self-government, or independence, keeping in mind the particular cir- 
cumstances of each territory and of its people and the freely expressed wishes 
of the populations whose interests are at stake, and in conformity with the pro- 
visions of each agreement for trust administration." 

Well and good, the Panama Canal Zone is a strip of land without such kind of 
inhabitants. There is no native population. There is no permanent population. 
There is homogeneous population that aspires to self-government or independence 
or that is capable of reaching one or the other. In accordance with the purposes 
for which were granted the "use, occupation and supervision" of the Canal Zone, 
that strip of land is inhabited solely by officials, employees and workers of the 
Panama Canal, by the Army and Navy forces stationed in the zone and adjacent 
waters for the protection of the canal, and by the families of all these persons. 

Of the 44,688 inhabitants who were living in the zone in 1945, 31,0.52 were 
employees and workers of the canal and of the Panama Railroad : 6,685 of the 
so-called "gold badge" employees and 24,347 of the so-called "silver badge" em- 
ployees, names that have no relation with money, but which serve to draw a line 
of separation based on color among those who work on the canal. 

The.se employees and their families do not constitute a permanent population. 
They live in the zone while they are working for the canal. And it has to be 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1363 

lluis. since the treaty between Panama and the United States signed the 'J<1 of 
March liKiiJ establishes in article III, paragraph 2, tliat only those persons who 
directly or indirectly are occnpied in the operation, maintenance, the sanitation, 
or the protection of the canal or those connected with these duties have the rijiht 
to reside in the Canal Zone. When a person who lives in the zone lias stojtped 
working for the canal or in connection with it, he must depart from the said zone. 
In consequence, the iM)pnlation of that territory chan.^es constantly, and as is 
natural, it has no interests there nor political aspirations for independence or 
self-government. Moreover, almost all the employees who belong to the so-called 
"gold badi-'e" groui> are North American citizens, while the .ureat majority of the 
"silver badge" employees are Antilleans of IJritish nationality or citizens of other 
countries, and the Panamanians constitute a very small minority. 

There was a native population in the Canal Zone when the administration of 
that strip of land was transferred to the United States. But in 1913 the Presi- 
dent of the United States issued tlie so-called Depopulation Order, by virtue of 
which all the land within the zone was declared necessary for the construction, 
maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of the canal, and in conse- 
quence, the Panamanian citizens who had their lands, their farms and their 
homes in the zone were obliged to leave it. All the lands were expropriated and 
there is no private property in real estate in this strip of territory. The Canal 
Zone, consequently, turned into wliat is today strictly an administrative reserva- 
tion placed under the direct authority of the War Department and devoted ex- 
clusively to the purpose of maintaining, administering and protecting the seaway 
that connects the Atlantic with the Pacific. The Panama Canal Zone can be only 
what it is today, or otherwise return to the jurisdiction and full and complete 
control of the Republic of Panama. 

From the facts set forth above we may reach the following conclusions : 

1. That the Republic of I'anama is and never has ceased being, the sovereign 
of the strip of land known by the name of the Canal Zone ; 

2. That the United States has accjuired through treaty only "the use, occupa- 
tion and supervision" of the Canal Zone ; 

3. That such "use, occupation, and supervision" have been granted for the 
specific purposes of the construction, maintenance, and the operation, the sani- 
tization, and the protection of the canal ; 

4. That the Canal Zone is not a possession nor a part of the political dominion 
of the United States ; 

5. That the Panama Canal Zone is a territory without a population which is 
native, permanent and homogeneous ; 

6. That the inhabitants of the Canal Zone have no interests bound up with the 
land and do not have nor can they have political aspirations for independence or 
self-government ; 

8. That the Canal Zone can be administered only as a strip of land destined 
exclusively for the purpose of maintaining, administering, and protecting the 
canal. 

It follows from this that there exists no basis for including the Panama Canal 
Zone among the nonautonomous territories to which article 73 (e) of the 
charter refers. Its inclusion among the territories and possessions of the United 
States and among those territories concerning which there have been rendered 
reports as the charter stipulates, it is a manifest error which the Republic of 
Panama hopes will be rectified by the appropriate means to which access may 
be had. 

Note : After the delivery of this speech by the Delegate from Panama, the 
North American delegation declared that the United States did not claim 
sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Later the Department of State informed the 
Panamanian Chancellery that it has abstained and would abstain in the future 
from including the Panama Canal Zone in the reports stipulated by article 73 of 
the charter of the United Nations. 

Mr. Grimes. Would you state what his points were ? 

Mr. Bp.adex. The substance was tliat here we were talkinfj about 
the canal as if we had it under lease, and we did not ; that it was a 
special agreement beo^inning in 1903 between Panama and the United 
States; that Panama had given the United States certain facilities and 
we had in return made certain payments in regard to — I tliink it was 
$10 million to Panama, plus an annual rental of $250,000 a year. 

Subsequently we went off gold, raised it to $-t30,000 a year. 



1364 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

There were the various quid pro quos back and forth that the sub- 
mission of this to the United Nations was an outrage both to Panama 
and to the agreement. 

Mr. Grimes. In other words, it was none of the business of the 
United Nations that he came out very much on the side of the United 
States on this ? 

Mr. Braden. He came out very much on tlie side of my office, not 
of the United States, because we had submitted it. 

Mr. Grimes. That depends on what the United States interest is. 

Mr. Braden. Of the true interest of the United States, yes. 

Mr. Grimes. The report was then submitted to the United Na- 
tions? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. Did another incident take place in regard to Panama? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. What was that ? 

Mr. Braden. At that time, and you have to get the picture of the 
United Nations, the Russians making their speeches about our being 
aggi'essors, and the proof being the bases, the Panama bases, 134 out- 
side of Panama Canal Zone being brought in as proof positive of our 
aggressive intentions, and I desperately trying and praying that I 
would be able to keep the lid on everything until the Assembly was 
over in New York. 

And that we could get Mr. Alfaro down to Washington and quietly 
and calmly in luncheons and in our offices work out an agreement with 
him about these 134 bases which the military informed me were vitally 
necessary for the security of the Panama Canal — therefore, of the 
United States. 

You can, therefore, imagine my utter astonishment when one morn- 
ing I picked up the Washington Post at my apartment and here on 
the front page was an announcement that we had reported to the 
United Nations on the Canal Zone as an occupied territory. When I 
read that, I realized that was really putting the fat in the fire in our 
relations with Panama in the substantiation of the Russian allega- 
tions and in our relations with all of the American Republics ; it was 
such a nasty situation. 

Mr. Grimes. In other words, our State Department had officially 
reported it to the U. N., that Panama was one of our occupied terri- 
tories ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. The only thing, my memory is a little hazy on 
whether that came along at about the same time as the submission of 
the report by the Governor, or whether it came subsequently, but my 
best recollection is it came subsequently. 

Mr. Grimes. This was a matter under your jurisdiction as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs ? 

Mr. Braden. Exactly. 

Mr. Grimes. You learned about it for the first time in the news- 
papers ? 

Mr. Braden. I learned about it for the first time in the newspapers. 

Mr. Grimes. What did you do ? 

Mr. Braden. I dropped the newspaper, and I tore down to the 
State Department. I called in the Director of the Office of American 
Republics Affairs, Mr. Briggs, who presently is our American Am- 
bassador in Korea; and my first special assistant, Mr. Wright; and 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1365 

JNIr. Murray Wise was then called in as the officer on the Panamanian 
desk. 

I may say I was iisinf^ some pretty stron<2; lanj^nage around the 
place at this outra<2;e. None of them knew any more about it than I. 

They also had read it in the newspapers. 

We then tried to run it down, and we found that this report had 
been submitted and the employment of the words "occupied territory" 
by the Office of Special Political Alfairs, that is to sav, JNIr. Al<2;er Hiss. 

1 immediately went from my office on the third floor down to the 
second floor to the Office of the Acting Secretary of State with fire in 
uiy eye. 

The Chairman. Who was that? 

Mr. Braden. Mr. Dean Acheson. 

I went down to demand this report be withdrawn from the United 
Nations. Mr. Acheson said that "We can't do anything about it. 
AVhereisMr. Hiss?" 

Mr. Hiss was not to be found that day in Washington. He had left 
his home. He had not come to his office. He was presumed to be in 
some meetings, but his office said that he had not come in, that they 
had telephoned to the places where he was presumed to be but they 
couldn't find him anywhere. 

That whole day went by without the appearance of Mr. Alger Hiss. 

In the meantime this whole thing was stymied. The delay, I may 
say, of course, was doing great harm because of inaction during this 
whole day. 

We ought to have hit it and we didn't. 

Finally, that afternoon at 5 o'clock, I was engaged in an important 
conference in my office from which I could not leave when I received 
word from Mr. Acheson's office that Mr. Hiss finally had been located. 
He had shown up and he was in Mr. Acheson's office. 

Mr. Briggs, therefore, as my deputy 

Mr. Grimes. Did you send somebody ? 

Mr. Bradex. I instructed Mr. Briggs to go down and make the 
demand that this report be withdrawn. 

Mr. (trimes. Did he do so ? 

Mr. Braden. He did so. 

Mr. (trimes. Did he make a report to you ? 

Mr. Braden. He came back from Mr. Acheson's office and reported 
that Mr. Acheson had sustained Mr. Hiss and INIr. Hiss had been very 
apologetic. He had been very charming about it. He said that he 
was oh, so sorry ; that, of course, this should have been submitted to 
the Office of American Republics Affaire. We should have been con- 
sulted before this was submitted to the United Nations, but it was 
just one of those things that happened that slipped by, a mistake 
somewhere, and he was very regretful about it. 

But it was there and that it would do great harm for it to be with- 
drawn after it was already submitted. 

Mr. Acheson sustained ]\Ir. Hiss on that. That is where the thing 
rested. We did subsequently get Mr. Alfaro down to Washington. 
We did have negotiations that were carried on for some time. 

We kept the bases so long as I was Assistant Secretary of State, 
up until June 28, 1947, but I think it was the fall of 1947 that I read 
that we had to give up those basis which our military said were highly 
essential for the defense of the canal and of the United States. 



1366 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker, May I have a question ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Braden, you say Alger Hiss was apologetic. 
He was apologetic notwithstanding the fact that he had your objec- 
tions made to him and to the Under Secretary of State, Dean Ache- 
son, weeks prior to this decision ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions by any member of 
the committee ? 

If not, proceed, Mr. Grimes. 

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Ambassador, going back just a bit, you have testi- 
fied that you were Ambassador to Colombia. Following your being 
Ambassador to Colombia, you became Ambassador to Cuba, did you 
not? 

Mr, Braden. Exactly. 

Mr. Grimes. That was under commission and appointment by Pres- 
ident Roosevelt ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. When did you become Ambassador to Cuba ? 

Mr. Braden. I took my oath, I think, sometime in early May. 
About the middle, the 20th, somewhere around that time, I went to 
Cuba as Ambassador. 

Mr. Grimes. Was there an interval between your being Ambassador 
to Colombia and your being Ambassador to Cuba? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. I left Colombia, I think, toward the end of 
March. It might have gone into early April. I came up to Wash- 
ington and to New York in order to acquaint myself with all of the 
various problems of my new post, a practice I have always made. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you find, during the course of your acquainting 
yourself with your new duties, some problem relating to the banking 
structure of Cuba ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. When I got up here to the United States, I 
know I heard of it in Washington, and going through such files as I 
was able to get hold of, with reference to what was known as the 
White mission 

Mr. Grimes. The White mission ? 

Mr. Braden. The White mission to Cuba. 

Mr. Grimes. Who was White ? 

Mr. Braden. Mr. White who gave the name- 



Mr. Grimes. Was that Harry Dexter White ? 

Mr. Braden. Harry Dexter White ; yes. 

Mr. Grimes. Whose name was attached to the White mission; is 
that correct? 

Mr. Braden. He was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury by that 
time, I believe. He had been very high up in the Treasury, and he 
headed this mission that went to Cuba. I don't remember the names 
of the other members of the mission, but they were people from the 
Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and financial banking experts, pre- 
sumably.^ 



1 The Second Report of the American Technical Mission to Cuba on the Central Bank 
and Stabilization Fund, dated April 22, 1942, lists the mission personnel as follows : 
G. A. Eddy, Treasury Department : A. T. Estate, Farm Credit Administration ; W. R. 
Gardner, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ; F. A. Southard, Jr., Treasury 
Department ; H. R. Spiegel, Treasury Department ; G. B. Vest, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System ; and H. D. White, Treasury Department, chief of mission. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1367 

I heard about this White mission report. I also observed from dis- 
patches that word that was comin<i^ from Cuba that it had ah^eady gone 
into the Congress in Cuba for legishition to be approved. 

Naturally I considered this important, and it was a document 
which I wished to peruse. I therefore asked for copies, and it is sig- 
nificant that while I was in and about Washington and New York, 
during this period that I have mentioned of i)ractically a month and 
a half or maybe a little more, I was unable to get a copy of the Wliite 
mission report during that entire period until the afternoon of the 
day I left for Cuba. I left by train for 

The Chairman. Whom did you ask for the report? 

Mr. Braden. I tried to get it in the State Department from the 
Division of American Republics, from the people on the Cuba desk, 
and others, and kept on insisting that I, as American Ambassador, 
should have this report. But I was unable to get it until that after- 
]ioon. 

1 read the report. 

Mr. Grimes. What afternoon ? 

Mr. Braden. The afternoon of the day I left for Cuba. I thought 
I just said that. I read the report on the train going to Miami. After 
I reached Cuba and got squared away on the very most urgent prob- 
lems, I began to check on the preliminary opinion that I had formed 
of this report, which was a very low one. 

I thought that it was a very dangerous proposition because it in- 
volved two things: One, it involved the establishment of a central 
bank in Cuba ; 2, it established a Cuban currency, entirely separate 
from the dollar. 

Now I am going back 12 years, so I can't remember everything. 

I wrote a long dispatch which should be in the departmental files, 
with all of the several reasons why I opposed this White mission's 
report. I do remember one thing, that under the terms of this central 
bank the central bank could finance and use up to 15 percent of its 
capital to establish other banks — agricultural banks, mineral banks, 
all kinds of subsidiary banks, using in each case up to 15 percent. 

That might be all right, excepting that there was no limitation on 
the number of these "15 percents" that could be used. 

This central bank could use 150 or 200 percent of its capital, ap- 
parently, in this setup. 

Along with that were a number of other reasons, very strong reasons, 
against it. 

Also, under the establishment of the Cuban currency and the exclu- 
sion of the dollar, there is a Cuban currency today and there has been 
for years, but it has been interchangeable with the dollar. 

As I wrote to Secretary Hull in a personal letter at the time, and 
I also said it in 

Mr. Grimes. How would that change this? 

Mr. Braden. In that they would have a Cuban currency and the 
dollar would no longer be acceptable in Cuba. Up to recently it has 
been legal tender there. You use dollars the same as the Cuban 
peso. 

Mr. Grimes. That greatly facilitated foreign trade? 

Mr. Braden. We had no problem on foreign trade on this score. 
All over the rest of the hemisphere, for that matter, the world, we 



1368 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

have one of the gi'eatest impediments to foreign trade — the exchange 
controls. 

Tariffs are a minor incident in this whole thing. We whoop it up 
a lot about tariffs, but you can have an agreement on tariffs and if 
the country puts in exchange controls, why, your tariffs go out the 
window. 

Mr. Grimes. In other words, there was no foreign-exchange problem 
with Cuba then ? 

Mr. Bradejst. We had no foreign-exchange problem with Cuba 
whatsoever. And by the enactment of these recommendations of 
the Wliite report, there would be. 

The Chairman. You started to say you wrote Cordell Hull. 

Mr. Braden. I wrote him a letter in which I particularly called his 
attention to this. I said : 

Here you have been making this fight for years in freeing trade all over the 
world and here is the one place where we have no such problem. Under this 
White report they are going to put in conditions which will, in my opinion, 
inevitably bring exchange controls, so you will have it here in Cuba, too. 

That was one of my great objections. 

After I studied this report I went to the Prime Minister, and I said, 
"I am very much concerned about this report." 

They have three debates in each Chamber — the Chamber of Deputies 
and the Senate. The first debate is the ^presentation of a project. 

The second debate is the real debate, and the third debate is just 
to tie up the loose ends. 

I understood this Wliite report and the recommendations therein 
had already gone through the second debate in one of the Chambers 
and was likely to go through on the other side. 

I said that I thought it could do a great economic and financial 
harm to Cuba. 

Dr. Saladrigas expressed his utter astonishment because he said 
that the Ambassador in Washington, Ambassador Concheso, who 
is Ambassador today, was being called in practically every day by 
either the State Department or the Treasury Department and told 
that really this was "must" legislation. This was practically a war 
measure it was so important for Cuba to have her own currency and 
to have this central banking system as set up by Harry Dexter White. 

I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, let's go through it." 

We went through the report paragraph by paragraph. Wlien we 
got through and my explanations of why I thought it was so bad for 
Cuba and potentially very bad for the United States, not merely from 
the trade point of view, but more because of the economic chaos and 
financial distress which would result in Cuba. As a result of this 
report, of course, the United States would have been blamed because 
here was a report based on the recommendations of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury of the United States and the White mission 
was made up entirely of American experts, or so-called experts. 

Mr. Grimes. Incidentally, a situation of great economic distress is 
one of the Marxian conditions for revolution? 

Mr. Braden. Yes, of course. 

Mr. Grimes. You knew that then ? 

Mr. Braden. I knew it, but I must admit I did not realize the sig- 
nificance of the thing at the time. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1369 

Tlie Chairman. After yon finished this report puragrupli by piira- 
orapli and explained it, what was his interj^retation? 

Mr. I>KADEN. He said, "I will o-o ri^ht over and see the President and 
we will stop this lei^islation. 1 agree with you 100 percent." 

Dr. Saladrigas went to the president. President Batista, and con- 
vinced the President purely from the Cuban aspect that they should 
not proceed with these measures. 

I might say also my predecessor, JMr. Messersmith, on instructions 
from the Department — it wasn't his doing, but the Department in- 
structed him to press for the Cuban Government to legislate as per 
the White reconnnendations. When this legislation was stopped, 
and the dates on that run along into the summer — I don't remember 
just the terminal dates. 

Subsequently JMr. Duggan, who was the political adviser on Latin 
American Affairs to the Secretary 

The Chairman. Lawrence Duggan? 

JVIr. Braden. Yes, and he was the equivalent of Assistant Secretary 
as he had a job equivalent to what I held later. 

The Chairman. That was the summer af what year ? 

Mr. Braden. 1942. 

Long afterwards, I saw some notes in the Department wherein Mr. 
Duggan made the remark within the Department and to the vice 
president of the Chase National Bank, that I was out of step with the 
Government and the Government completely disagreed with the posi- 
tion that 1 had taken on this matter. 

I am very proud to have been out of step with Messrs. White and 
Hiss, and those people. That is all right with me. 

But getting back to this story of what happened in Cuba and in 
Washington. As soon as this legislation was stopped by the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister of Cuba and entirely on that accomplish- 
ment, I reported at great length and in full detail to the State Depart- 
ment what I had done and why in a dispatch. 

Mr. Grimes. May I ask you this question : Did you seek the advice 
of practical bankers as to the feasibility and efficacy of the 'NYliite 
plan ? 

Mr. Barden. Not until after I had taken the action wdiich I did. 
And I am very glad I did not because in the reply that I got from the 
State Department, and it was a pretty nasty reply which came back 
to me and replied to this dispatch of mine 

Mr. Grimes. '\Miat was the nature of the reply that came back from 
the State Department? 

Mr. Braden. The nature was that I had far exceeded my authority 
in taking the stand. I had because this was something that the United 
States Government wanted very much; that I was intervening in the 
internal affairs of Cuba, which, of course, I wasn't, in presenting it to 
the Prime INIinister and leaving it up to him to make the decision with 
the President. 

But they accused me of intervention. They implied that I must be 
in the pay of the New York bank — I say New York, one was a Boston 
bank — in the pay of three American banks in Cuba for me to have 
taken this stand. 

And that I should forthwith go to the Prime Minister, completely 
reverse my position, and tell him that we want this legislation to go 



1370 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

tlirough, and that I had no authority to speak to him in the terms 
I had. 

It was a thorough dressing down. 

The Chairman. Who signed this reply ? 

Mr. Braden. I assume that it was the usual type of signature — 
Hull, but signed by somebody else. That is, the Secretary signs 
everything, but it was a document he had never laid his eyes on, 
probably. 

When I received this reply, fortunately after I had raised these 
objections and given every reason why this should not go through, 
only at that time did I call in the managers of the three American 
banks in Cuba, and fortunately also this Mr. Rosenthal, the vice presi- 
dent of the Chase Bank who was on a visit to Cuba. He has since 
died. There was Mr. Carter of the National City and Mr. Carriker 
of the First National of Boston. I have forgotten the name of the 
Chase Bank manager, but I think they all are alive and available. I 
called them in and said, "This is what I have done : I have a layman's 
experience and perhaps a bit more in finance and trade matters. I 
want to find out what you think about this dispatch." 

They w^ere enthusiastic. They practically got up and cheered be- 
cause they had been so worried as to what would happen to Cuba, and, 
therefore, to their banking business in Cuba if this thing had gone 
through. 

The Chairman. I think our records show" in relation to this testi- 
mony that this Lawrence Duggan whom you have testified about com- 
mitted suicide on December 20, 1948. 

Mr. Braden. I don't know" the date. 

In any case, after receiving this communication I sent back an 
equally snappy message to the State Department saying that my duties 
as Ambassador in Cuba, my prime duty, was to promote the friendly 
relations between the two Republics ancl that if this legislation were 
to go through, self-evidently if trouble resulted, financial and economic 
trouble and chaos in Cuba, our relations w^ould be very seriously 
prejudiced. 

Therefore, so long as I w^as American Ambassador in Cuba, I said, 
I was going to stand my ground and protect our relations and, in fact, 
I refused to go back to the Prime Minister. 

Fortunately my communication to Secretary Hull was wdiat saved 
the day for me, I think, because the showdown finally came, but I 
got a short note from Mr. Duggan in which he said that he thought 
it best that I cease to discuss the matter any longer and they would 
no longer discuss it. 

In other words, I had won the day. 

Mr. Grimes. Prior to this incident had your relations with Mr. 
Lawrence Duggan been friendly ? 

Mr. Braden. Oh, extremely so. 

Mr. Grimes. What happened after this incident ? 

Mr. Braden. As I testified in the hearing in New York on De- 
cember 22, they were cut as if by a knife. From that day on some 
of his communications to me had a certain amount of the old cordial- 
ity, but whenever I saw him or had anything to do with him, he was 
very much off and antagonistic to me. 



INTEKLOCKIXG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1371 

He had been so friendly that he had actually asked me when I re- 
turned from Colombia to <.>'o to Cuba to stay at his house rather than 
at the ]Motro])()litan Club. That was how friendly he had been. 

Mr. (iRiMKs. That ceased? 

Mr. BuADEN. That ceased as if cut by a knife. 

Mr. Gkimp:s. There is no doubt that the White mission was an 
official mission? 

Mr. Braden. Absolutely, absolutely an official mission of the 
United States Government. That is what made it so dangerous. 

Mv. Grimes. Mr. Chairman, we have a letter which I think might 
well be read into the record at this point as pertinent so that this 
story may have a continuity, a letter from Mr. Sumner Welles to 
Mr. Harry Dexter White, establishing this mission. It is short. I 
believe for the sake of continuity it should go into the record now. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is that already in our record? 

Mr. Grimes. That is already in our record. It is being repro- 
duced here now for the reason given, because there has been a con- 
siderable amplification of the testimony on this general subject. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Does the record show the source of it? 

Mr. Grimes. It does. This is a letter dated December 30, 1941, 
from the De])artment of State signed by Sumner Welles addressed 
to Harry Dexter White. 

(The material referred to is as follows:) 

I\Iy Dear Mr. White: It is a pleasure to inform you that the Government of 
Cuba has indicated to the Department its satisfaction with the namins" of your- 
self and IMessrs. Eddy and Spiegel, of the Treasury, and Messrs. Walter K. 
Gardner and George B. Vest, of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, as a technical mission in compliance with its request for assistance 
in connection with monetary and banking questions. Your assignment to this 
mission is consequently effected in accordance with the letter of the Secretary of 
the Treasury of September 25, 1941. 

You will act as chief of the mission and direct the work of its other members. 

The Cuban Government has been informed that the mission will arrive in 
Habana during the first week in October. Ui>on your arrival there you should 
report to the Honorable George S. Messersmith, Ambassador of the United 
States to Cuba, who will introduce you to the appropriate Cuban officials. The 
mission will be responsible to Ambassador Messersmith, and you should obtain 
his approval of any informal recommendations involving (juestions of policy 
which the mission may propose to make to the Cuban officials. Formal recom- 
mendations should lie prepared for transmittal to the Cuban Government through 
the Department of State. 

I wish you a pleasant journey and every success in the mission. 
Sincerly yours, 

Sum NEE Welles. 

Mr. Grimes. Insofar as you know, w\as that the letter on which 
the White mission went to Cuba prior to your arrival there and made 
the recommendations which you have described ? 

Mr. Braden. That, I can't say ; however, they went there. I know 
they went and made an official report. 

I would like to add one thing. 

In my previous testimony I mentioned the fact that a Mr. South- 
ard, who later formed a part of this mission, came to Cuba to try 
and dissuade me. 

I argued out the question with him. He was a supposed banking 
expert, but he admitted on one of the counts I had in the letter that 
I was right in my objections to this White mission report. 



1372 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

So not only a member of the mission, but the top bankers having 
to do with Cuba fully confirmed my views. 

Mr. Grimes. And did they agree with you that the plan would be 
disastrous ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes ; that it would be catastrophic for Cuba. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you find when you became Assistant Secretary 
of State, as you have testified, that there was a plan on foot to re- 
organize the State Department ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes ; I did. As a matter of fact, they are too lengthy, 
but I think it would be worthwhile to read into the record some memo- 
randa or the substance of memoranda that I have, because I do not 
have the originals in most of these cases, but I have my own notes. 

For instance, one to Mr. Donald Eussell, who was Assistant Secre- 
tary of State in Charge of Administration. 

As I testified on December 22, an attempt was made to take all of 
these various alphabetical agencies — OWI and BEW-FEA, and the 
Coordinator's office — and superimpose them on the State Department. 

I was new in Washington. I had just taken over a few weeks before 
as Assistant Secretary of State. So I wanted to get my bearings 
first. So I took rather a defensive stand on that, but I took the stand 
that the career Foreign Service and the departmental service of the 
ILJnited States, by and large, were a fine organization, good or better 
than any organization I had seen. 

Sure, they had some bad people and incompetents, but the overall 
was good. I said what we have got to do is to build on this firm 
foundation and not have this swarm of people coming in from these 
outside agencies who only had had to do with foreign affairs in the 
OWI or the OSS during the war. 

They were utterly inexperienced and incompetent, from what I saw 
of them, and I saw several of them that came in from other offices 
and divisions. 

We resisted having them in my office, but to build on that fine 
foundation of the career Foreign Service was right. 

I would like to put that memorandum in the record, because I think 
it is important. I go into detail. It was more or less of a holding 
action that I proposed in that memorandum, but subsequently I have 
another memorandum I made in connection with the OSS. 

They apparently claimed they had been of the utmost use to the 
Office of American Republics Affairs. Actually they hadn't been 
anything of the kind. 

They claimed they did all kinds of work. They did very little, 
and the little they did was badly done for the most part. 

A lot of the stuff they had sent over was material that came from 
us in the first place, anyway. We didn't want any part of most of 
their records. 

We, therefore, resisted this invasion of all these swarms of people. 

They were mostly collectivists and "do-gooders" and what-nots, 
that were trying to come into the State Department. I am glad to say 
that my office was able to hold out on that. 

We had one actual case of an FBI report that came across my desk. 
I imagine it is the same one that the Attorney General, Mr. Brownell, 
referred to with reference to White, in which there was a reference to 
Alger Hiss and his brother. There was one man in that report that 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1373 

was mentioned as being slated to come into the Oflice of American 
Kopublics Att'airs. 

1 gave my testimony on December 22 in respect to that particular 
case. 

JNIr. Grimes. You stopped that ? 

Mv. Braden. We stopped that riglit in its tracks. 

The most serious case we had, and I found myself engaged in a 
knockdown, dragout fight, was in the case of the creation of what 
was known as the Office of Research and Intelligence. The first time 
I heard of that project was one day — this is in the hatter part of 
1945. I don't know the exact date. But I came back from luncheon 
and I was informed there was to be a very top echelon meeting in 
the office of the Under Secretary at 5 p. m. that afternoon, that I 
Avas to cancel any other engagements that I might have in order to 
attend this meeting. 

Mr. Grimes. The Under Secretary was Dean Acheson? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

I therefore canceled an engagement that I had at 5 o'clock. I went 
to that meeting. Mr. Dunn, who was the other Assistant Secretary 
in charge of geographic sections in the State Department, was abroad 
at the time, so he was not at the meeting. 

As I remember, another Assistant Secretarj'^, Mr. Will Clayton, 
who was in charge of economic work, was not there, but he was repre- 
sented by Mr. Willard Thorpe. Mr. Dunn was represented by the 
three chiefs of the geographical divisions — Doc Matthews for Euro- 
pean Affairs, John Carter Vincent for the Far East, and Loy Hender- 
son for the Near East. 

The Assistant Secretary in Charge of Administration, Donald 
Russell, also was there. 

The meeting began by Mr. Acheson telling us that they were going 
to establish this Office of Research and Intelligence. 

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Byrnes was Secretary? 

Mr. Bradex. Yes. He did not attend this meeting, but was in his 
office at the time it was held. 

Mr. Grimes. What relation, if any, did Mr. Don Russell have to 
]Mr. Byrnes? 

Mr. Braden. Mr. Don Russell had been a law partner of Mr. Byrnes 
and lie was brought into the Department, as I understand, as Assist- 
ant Secretary when Mr. Byrnes took over as Secretary of State. 

Mr. Grimes. "\Yliat w^ere his duties, in general ? 

Mr. Braden. In charge of all of the administration of the Depart- 
ment, which included security, personnel, operations, both of the 
Foreign Service and of the Department. 

At this meeting Mr. Acheson at some length detailed why this new 
office was necessary; that we had no office in the State Department 
that had the intelligence function, that had the necessary information. 

I remember his citing the case that during the war the importance 
of intelligence was in the office work, in which I agreed, and that the 
way we had been able to pinpoint the points to be bombed in Japan 
was through a magnificent setup in the Army Intelligence where 
they got it out of information actually in this country, out of news- 
papers and out of gathering all this information together first through 
research and intelligence. 



1374 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

He expatiated on that, that this was a "must", an absolute "must". 
He had a volume there. I would say it was 6 to 8 inches thick, black 
covered, probably 10 to 12 inches long, and 6 or 7 inches in width. I 
don't know how many pages. It probably ran well over a thousand 
pages. 

Mr. Grimes. What was the volume supposed to be? 

Mr. Braden. It was supposed to be the full directive for the estab- 
lishment of this Office of Research and Intelligence in the State De- 
partment. 

This was resting on the corner of Mr. Acheson's desk and I was 
sitting at the right of it. 

Mr. Grimes. Tliat was the new plan for the State Department? 

Mr. Bradex. Yes. They were to bring in 1,080 people as I recall. 
I may be off a bit, but it was over a thousand. That 1,080 people were 
to be brought into the State Department to man this new office. 

Mr. Grimes. In short, did the plan involve a complete reorganiza- 
tion of the State Department ? 

Mr. Braden. It meant a complete change in the whole State De- 
partment. 

Mr. Acheson, I remember very vividly, said, "This is going to the 
Hill this afternoon." 

Later on in the discussion it turned out that it wasn't to the Hill, but 
to the Budget Bureau. But his first remark was that it was going 
to the Hill and that this was a must, that if any of us had any objec- 
tions to this, we could say our piece right then and there by going into 
the Secretary of State's office, Mr. Byrnes. We could make our pro- 
test to him. 

Mr. Byrnes might or might not listen to us, but in any case, we 
would be thrown out. 

The Chairman. In other words, you were to pass judgment upon 
this large document without examining it or seeing it or knowing its 
contents ? 

Mr. Braden. This was going through whether we liked it or not. 
If we didn't like it, we could say our piece; but we wouldn't be lis- 
tened to. It was an ultimatum. That was the only word for it. 

As we sat there I reached over and took this volume and naturally 
I turned to the Latin-American Republics. After very hurriedly 
looking at it, time being of the essence in this meeting, since this was 
going to the Hill at 6 o'clock, and by this time it was probably a quar- 
ter to 6, 1 thumbed through these pages. 

Then I expressed my strong opposition. I said, "I protest on this 
proposition because I have glanced through here and there is not one 
single item or function I can find in these pages which is not being 
fully and competently performed by the Office of American Republics 
Affairs." 

Granted, I had looked at the new directions hurriedly, but I can see 
the general trend. There is not one single item that the Office of 
American Republics Affairs is not doing today and doing competently. 
Therefore, I said, "this is a complete duplication. There is no need 
for it. It is an extravagance, an inefficiency, and I protest." 

Curiously enough I was not asked to go in to the Secretary of State. 
Later on the meeting broke up without any conclusion at that time. 

At that meeting, however, the only person who forcefully took sides 
with me after I made my statement, having laid the book down, was 



INTERLOCKIXG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1375 

Mr. Loy Henderson, who took it up and thumbed through it and sup- 
ported me and said, "I agree with Spruille on this. This same thing 
applies to the Office of Near Eastern Affairs. This is a duplication. 
We are doing the work that is supposed to be done here. There is no 
rhyme or reason for it." 

Also, I remember Mr. Donald Russell coming into the conversation 
at that time. The matter was then referred to the Secretary's staff 
committee where there was a group — Colonel McCormack, who had 
been brought into the State Department, being on this. 

I may say all of this was based on a directive that came from the 
President about the establishment of research and intelligence. We 
had some knockdown, drag-out fights there. 

You have in your records Mr. Panuch's testimony. Mr. Panuch 
was very useful in this fight. I have forgotten the number of the 
document or exhibit he presented to this committee, but it is included 
in his testimony. I remember that paper, but I also have a vivid recol- 
lection of returning from New York one afternoon before a meeting 
of the Secretary's staff committee scheduled for the next morning. 

There was a paper on the subject of this Office of Research and In- 
telligence which was actually insulting in language that it used about 
those of us who were opposing. 

Mr. Dunn returned from Europe, and at that time, mind you, it was 
only Loy Henderson, Donald Russell, supported by Joe Panuch as 
his deputy, and I, who were opposing it. 

All of the others accepted and went along. 

I had an hour or so with Jimmie Dunn, and we convinced Jimmie 
Dunn so that he came along on our side. 

After a very disagreeable fight and, as I described it, a knockdown, 
drag-out fight, finally that project was abandoned. 

An Office of Research and Intelligence was established, but on a 
very minor and relatively insignificant scale in the Department, 

But I am appalled by what I saw happen at that time, and since 
then I have been told by such reliable informants as Mr. Panuch, who 
was right on the job at the time, that that project also emanated 
originally from the Office of Special Political Affairs; that is to say, 
Mr. Alger Hiss' office. 

The Chairmax. Our records show the testimony in that respect. 

Mr. Grimes. After this fight what happened to the persons who 
opposed this plan ? 

Mr. Bradex. Immediately thereafter, I think, thanks in large part 
to Donald Russell and his persuasiveness with Secretary Byrnes, we 
were supported by the Secretary. That is the reason we won the 
fight. 

Immediately Secretary Byrnes left the Department at the beginning 
of 1947, Mr. Donald Russell left with him. 

Mr. Grimes. Who succeeded Mr. Byrnes? 

Mr. Braden. General Marshall. The day that General Marshall 
was sworn in, and I don't remember the exact timing, but I know that 
it was astonishing, the speed with which Mr. Panuch was thrown out 
of his office. 

We had barely gotten General Marshall sworn in as Secretary of 
State when Mr. Acheson called a meeting and informed us that Joe 
Panuch was already out. It was sort of "the day before yesterday" 
he did it. 



1376 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Dunn went to Italy as Ambassador. Mr. Henderson went to 
India later and now is in Iran. 

I withdrew from the Department at the middle of 1947, approxi- 
mately a year and a half later. 

Mr. Grimes. While we are on that subject, will you state briefly the 
circumstances under which you left the Department? How did you 
first find out that you might be leaving the Department? 

Mr. Braden. The first time wdien I came to Washington to become 
Assistant Secretary of State and I was accused, completely falsely, 
of having indulged in intervention in Argentina, I suggested to 
Secretary Byrnes I resign at that time. 

He said, "No,'" not to resign, and I felt that I would appear to be 
more or less of a tempermental soprano if I did, so I stayed on. 

But I was having some terrific fights. I was completely in dis- 
accord with the lack of support for sound policies where I found 
the most opposition was in meeting of representatives of many dif- 
ferent officers and divisions, and from agencies outside the Depart- 
ment. 

We practically had young Soviets. I had the responsibility for the 
conduct of our affairs with Latin America, but I found that in these 
meetings there would be anywhere from 2 or 3 up to 20 or more people, 
all with the same color of authority that I had; and, wherever I 
tried to defend American legitimate interests, these people were all 
opposed to private enterprise and to our system and way of life. 

I wanted to get out. 

I may say I think there was a mutuality about the situation. I 
wanted to get out, and I guess they probably wanted to get me out. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you learn that you might be leaving? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. I wanted to do it as quickly as I could. 

Mr. Grimes. From some other source, did you learn ? 

Mr. Braden. I have a clipping here Mr. Reston published in the 
New York Times that I no longer had the support of the President. 
I have my memorandum of conversation with Mr. Reston, of the 
Times, in respect of his article at that time. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you read in other newspapers that you might be 
leaving? 

Mr. Braden. Mr. Bert Andrews called me, he having been a friend 
of mine, and told me I was on the way out and nothing could be done 
about it. 

My special assistant and very close friend, Mr. Jim Wright, told 
me the same thing.- I had to get a bit tough about it and say I was 
going to get out with dignity and in the right way, and I did. 

But I was anxious to get out, as anxious as anybody would be to 
have me get out of the Department. 

Mr. Grimes. The time came when you actually submitted your 
resignation and it was accepted by President Truman ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. That ended your diplomatic career of some 13 years ; 
is that right ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 



- Extract from letter of Mrs. James Wright to Maria and Spruille Braden dated Novem- 
ber 1, 1953 : "Jim said, 'Tlie tops are after Spruille's hide. It worries me because he's 
doing a grand job, but tliey are trying to get him. I'm afraid it will be an out-and-out 
firing if he isn't careful.' When I pressed him for more information he, as was his habit, 
said, 'I can't go into details. You wouldn't understand.' " 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1377 

Mr. Grimes, I presume, hnvinp: served your country for 13 years, 
you paid a call on President Truman to say goodby? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Ctkimes. And you talked with him, did you? 

Mr. Bradex. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. For about how lon^r? 

Mr. Bradex. 1 would say 10 or 15 minutes. 

Mr. Grimes. Durine; the course of that conversation, did he criti- 
cize any of your actions over the period of 13 years ? 

Mr. Braden. No. He couldn't, because he had written a letter 
highly praisino- me for all of my service during the 13 years I had 
been in the Department. 

Mr. Grimes. During tlie course of that conversation, did he thank 
you for your services of some 13 years ? 

Mr. Braden. I don't think so. I don't recall his doing so. He 
might have. 

Mr. Grimes. What happened during this conversation ? 

Mr. Bradex. Frankly, it was a conversation that I don't think 
worthy of putting in the record. It was largely the discussion of a 
gabardine suit I had on. 

Mr. Grimes. That ended your service? 

Mr. Bradex^. That ended my service. 

Mr. Grimes. Had you, from time to time while you were American 
Ambassador in Cuba, sent warnings to the Department of State that 
there might be trouble with the Communists ? 

Mr. Bradex. Yes; I began in 1941. 

1 would like, if the committee is agreeable, to just give you a little 
bit of what I sent in. 

In 19-11 from Colombia I warned the State Department that the 
Communists were working hand in glove with the Nazis distributing 
propaganda of the Nazis throughout Colombia. 

Then in 1942 when I arrived in Cuba, my first conversation with 
Dr. Saladrigas, the Prime Minister, discloses that I told him I was 
A'ery much concerned about the situation of communism. This is 
early 1942 in Cuba — very much concerned about communism in Cuba 
and throughout the hemisphere. 

Then from that time on there are a long series of dispatches. I 
have a list of some of them that I can give to you for the record, but 
I will read this one, dated July 22, 1944 : 

Attention is respectfully invited to my several dispatches commenting on the 
strong, intelligent, and efficient Communist organization in Cuba ; their drive for 
Negro membership ; their tie-in with the Russian Legation ; the unnecessarily 
large staff in that mission : the Communists' employment of secret inks and 
ciphers; * * * No one could be more convinced than I of the imperativeness 
of friendly relations being built up in every way between the Russians and our- 
selves — 

we were allies and naturally I couldn't say they were just no good, so 
I had to put in some reservation — 

but we must be realists and the aforelisted items at least engender a suspicion 
that the Russians have some ulterior motive in respect of this hemisphere. 

I would like to put that document in the record. 



32918°— 54— pt. 19- 



1378 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

(The material referred to was marked ''Exhibit No. 359" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 359 

Habana, Julij 22, Wli-'h 

Foreign Influences and Activities in Cuba 
Russian 

Attention is respectfully invited to my several dispatehes commenting on the 
strong, intelligent, and efficient Communist organization in Cuba : their drive 
for Negro membership ; their tie-in with the Russian Legation ; the unneces- 
sarily large staff in that mission ; the Communists' employment of secret inks 
and ciphers; * * * No one could be more convinced than I of the imperativeness 
of friendly relations being built up in every way between the Russians and our- 
selves, but we must be realists and the aforelisted items at least engender a 
suspicion that the Russians have some ulterior motive in respect to this hemi- 
sphere. Whether it be a species of imperialistic policy or some other reason is, 
of course, pure speculation, but the fact remains that if in the postwar era 
differences of opinion should arise between the Russians and ourselves, the 
former in a matter of hours only could throw Cuba into a general strike, with 
such chaos resulting as to cause us serious concern. 

^ ^ t- * * * * 

Spruille Braden, 
Atnhassador of the United States. 

Mr. Braden. I have another memorandum prepared at the latter 
part of that year, more or less going along the same lines, that I woidd 
like to put in the record. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 360" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 360 

I particularly wish to refer to a memorandum entitled "Examples of Failure 
by the Division of American Republics to Support the Embassy." This was 
attached to a memorandum for the DepartJuent dated July 22. 1044, and con- 
sisted of dVo pages citing 23 distinct items It did not include the incident of 
the White mission. 

Items 1, 2, 5, the last half of 7, and parts of several other items treat of such 
delicate matters that they could only be discussed in executive session and with 
complete assurance of secrecy. 

The other items may be summarized as follows : 

Item 3 : An American-owned sugar mill in Cuba which had operated on mostly 
a losing basis, i. e., making a profit in only 2 years out of the previous 22, burned 
down immediately before the cutting season began. The Prime Minister hap- 
pened to tell me one evening when he was in my office at the chancellery that he 
proposed to "intervene," i. e., take over this sugar mill, as he had found Mr. 
David Reiser, head of the American company, unreasonable. I pleaded with 
him to defer all action until I personally had talked with Mr. Reiser. This I 
did the next morning, thereafter bringing the Piime Minister and Mr. Reiser 
together and arranging a mutually satisfactory accommodation of the matter, 
for which both thanked me. 

The problem, in essence, was to find employment or, at least, wages for 
the sugar-mill workers during the ensuing season. When this accommodation 
had been reached, I earnestly requested both the Prime Minister and Mr. 
Reiser, in anticipation of the sugar crop a year later, to take adequate steps to 
find other employment for these employees. The fieldworkers did not enter 
into the problem and Mr. Reiser's company owned other sugar mills which could 
more profitably grind this sugar. In fact, this particular sugar had been trans- 
ported past 7 other mills in order to get to the 1 which had burned down. 

Mr. Reiser did get a number of the employees located in other places, I believe, 
some even in Florida. But a year later, the Prime ^linister intervened the mill 
anyway. 

Shortly after the seizure of this American-owned mill in September 1943, 
Cuban Government officials as well as the company's lawyer received the im- 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1379 

prossion from a hi.irh official of our Govorniiicnt that tho Department was not 
particularly concerned in the matter and considered tiiat it would have heen 
wiser had the company aurt^ed to rebuild this unprofitable mill. This same hi^h 
official expressed exactly the same sentiments to me personally. 'i'hes(» asser- 
tions to tho Cuban representatives uncpiestionably contributed to the subsequent 
difficuKies which arose, convincing the Cuban Government that it was in the 
riuht and that the United States Government would not defend these property 
rights of its citizens. A series of recommendations in the premises by me were 
rejected by tlie Department. Warnings by me as to wiiat action mi;,'ht be taken 
by the company similarly were not acted upon. 

The result of all this was that the Embassy and I personally were placed in 
an extremely embarrassing situation. The situation was rendered mucii more 
difficult than it otherwise would have been and, of course, a definite precedent 
was set, that the Department of State would not protect the pi-operty rights of 
is citizens. 

Fortunately, the subsequent sale of the mill to some Cuban interests solved 
the immediate problem, but the attitude of the Department, and its failure to 
support the Embassy, left the fundamental principles not only unsupported, but 
greatly weakened, and established the theory that a foreign goveiTiment could 
force a United States company to operate on an unprofitable basis and to in- 
vest money in said unprofitable operation. 

Item 4 : This was an equally reprehensible stand by the Department which, 
however, did not involve loss for any American concern or individual, but rather 
for the United States taxpayers. 

Item 6 : In April 1952 the municipality appointed an intervener and took 
over the operation of the branch office in that town for the purpose of paying 
itself out of receipts approximately 371,000 pesos which the municipality claimed 
was due for taxes for the years 1928 to 1942. The right of the municipality to 
take this step rested on filmsy legal grounds and it was clearly apparent that 
what was really involved was an attempted shakedown on the part of the 
notoriously corrupt city council. 

After efforts to compose the situation through informal discussions had failed, 
the Embassy recommended that an official protest be made. The Department re- 
quested the Embassy to submit to it the text of this proposed note, which text was 
weakened and the word "protest" was deleted, the Department substituting 
therefor an expression of "hope" that the Government would so something about 
it. This contributed to the further delay experienced by the Embassy in having 
the seizure of funds suspended, action to that effect not being taken by the Gov- 
ernment until January 27, 1944, by which time over 153,000 pesos of company 
funds had been seized by the municipality. No Cuban official has expressed the 
opinion that as a practical matter there is any possibility of the company's recov- 
ering these funds in the event it wins its various pending suits contesting the 
right of the municipality to collect the taxes in question. It may be mentioned in 
this connection that the case does not involve an attempt to avoid payment of 
taxes, but an attempt on the part of the municipality to collect taxes hitherto 
payable to the central Government. 

Item 7 : When it became apparent that heavy demand for priorities to proceed 
to the Dominican Republic in February 1944 was to be expected, the Embassy 
recommended that priorities be issued only to delegates themselves and not to 
their wives or to athletes. This recommendation was accepted notwithstanding 
which on February 14 the Embassy learned Indirectly that a priority had been 
issued to the wife of one of the American delegates. A telegram was immedi- 
ately sent to the Department pointing out the difficulties and embarrassments 
which this might be expected to cause. No reply was received to this message, 
but instead an urgent unnumbered circular was transmitted to the field author- 
izing the issue of priorities for the wives of all delegates. Since the circular was 
not sent until the day on which most of the delegates were proceeding to the 
Dominican Republic, the news produced irritation and ill will, whereas the denial 
of priorities to wives had originally been accepted in good part, as reasonable 
in view of wartime congestion of communications. 

Item 8 : "The Embassy has had numerous occasions during the past few 
months to recommend the withholding of passport facilities from American citi- 
zens whose business activities had tended either to interfere with the war effort 
or to cast discredit upon our country. In reply to the Embassy's request concern- 
ing the factors taken into consideration by the Department, a nu^morandum 
was received which indicates that there is considerable reluctance in the Depart- 
ment to deny passport facilities to persons in the foregoing category notwith- 



1380 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

standing the harm which in the Embassy's estimation may result from their being 
permitted to travel." 

Item 9 : This involves an attack on tlie integrity of the President of the United 
States. 

Item 10: This involves a situation on which the Embassy had repeatedly re- 
ported to the Department but was never able to elicit any interest whatsoever. 
Finally, the condition liecame so bad that another agency of the United States 
Government protested to the Department, whereupon the latter expressed to the 
Embassy its great alarm over the shocking allegations made by the other 
agency of the Government and demanded a report thereon from the Embassy, de- 
spite the fact that the Department files were filled wih protests from me. 

Item 11 : This involved a similar case of reported protests by the Embassy to 
the Department, to which no response was ever made. Biat again, when a report 
from another branch of the Government was received by the Department, al- 
though it differed in no essential particular from the several protests I had sent 
in, the Department then came along. 

Item 12 : This involved a situation where the Embassy, after careful investiga- 
tion, recommended in the strongest possible terms certain action by the Depart- 
ment in respect of vitally scarce materials needed for the war effort. Despite 
this fact, the Department took a stand directly contrary to that of the Embassy. 

Item 13 : This involved the matter of just compensation to a great many 
United States individuals and corporations, mounting into the millions of dollars. 
The Department failed to respond to Embassy dispatches and otherwise took a 
completely wishy-washy stand. 

Item 14 : This involved a strong recommendation made to the Department 
on which the Department simply failed to comment or acknowledge. 

Item 1.5 : This concerned my proiwsal in a speech to be delivered on September 
22, 1943, to declare that while my Government had the greatest desire to see 
Cuba prosper and that her people would make wise selections in the elections, 
these elections were none of our business nor that of our nationals and that, 
accordingly, every United States citizen, individual or corporate, should refrain 
from exercising any influence by contributions or otherwise in the Cuban elec- 
tions. The Department refused its support. 

Item 16 : This involved a visa case in which the Department first endeavored 
to overrule the Embassy and subsequently, when I supported my consul in his 
decision, the Department informed interested parties that it washed its hands 
of the matter. 

Item 17 : No comment. 

Item 18: This involved the leakage, from the Department, of information trans- 
mitted in confidential despatches to the Department. This information was made 
available, at least in substance, to the United States company involved. 

Item 19 : This involved a case where the Department quotes information 
"from a confidential source within the Government" and instructed the Embassy 
to take this information into account. These reports were utterly unsubstan- 
tiated and ran counter to the accurate reports sent to the Department from the 
Embassy under more recent date. 

Item 20: Tliis involved a matter wherein the Department promised to take 
a forthright stand when, in point of fact, it took a weak position. 

Item 21 : This involved the item of import tax of 2 cents per package which 
had been under discussion for 5 years as a violation of our trade agreement. 
The Cuban Government never denied our claims that it conflicted with the 
trade agreement. Despite these prolonged and multiple discussions, the De- 
partment would never go further than to say it "would appreciate an indication 
of the Cuban Government's position. 

Item 22 : This represents another visa case, wherein a thoroughly disreputable 
United States attorney received the support of the Department despite the Em- 
bassy's protests. 

Item 23 : "The Embassy's attention was first drawn to the plans of an Ameri- 
can group headed by Frank Cohen to construct a vegetable dehydrating plant in 
Cuba early in 1943. The Embassy reported adversely on the program of the 
American Dehydrating Co. and in its A-2147 of October 22, 1943, questioned 
tlie company's aliility successfully to complete its program. As a result of 
continued careful study of this program, the Embassy sent increasingly strong 
suggestions to the Department with a view to having the United States Govern- 
ment cease granting export assistance to the American Dehydrating Co. Nothing 
was done to prevent the situation from growing worse in spite of the Embassy's 
recommendations, supported by evidence of serious mismanagement, disruption 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1381 

of Cuban agricultural economy, injury to United States-Cuban relations, etc. 
From several sources the Embassy lias now been informed that its appraisal of 
the situation was correct, as the affairs of the company in Cuba are now in an 
insoluble muddle. 

"Not only did the Department fail adequately to support the Embassy's force- 
ful recommendations, but in some way or other the contents of the Embassy's 
strictly cniilideiUlal A-ll()l> of .Alay 24, 12: 'M) p. m. (1944) came to the attention 
of a memi)er (if the company. This is only one case of a leakage in confidential 
information in this case among several w hicli have come to the Embassy's atten- 
tion. Needless to say, these leaks seriously compromised the Embassy's position 
and weakened its ability to in-otect the best interests of the Government. 

"On the other hand, there are many cases which could be cited wherein a firm 
policy by the Embassy resulted in the successful adjustment of many analogous 
problems." 

Mr. Braden. I broiiirlit that document up to Washington. I spoke 
about that first memorandum in the Secretary's staff committee that 
was presided over by Under Secretary of State Ed Stettinius in a top 
echelon meetino;. They had war maps up and we had a briefing on 
what was happening on the battlefronts and what our plans were. 

At that time I sounded the alarm. Then I came up 6 months later 
and left this memorandum entitled "Agenda for Washington". 

(The memorandum was marked "Exhibit No. 361" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 361 
Agenda for Washington 

^ $ ^ ^t jp ^ 3|S 

(&) Leftist movements 

1. While fully appreciating the imperativeness of maintaining friendly rela- 
tions with the U. S. S. R., nevertheless the activities of Soviet representatives and 
of Commimists in general and the connection between the two and the common 
pattern which Is shown by them in the different republics warrants our most 
careful and intelligent observation. 

2. What may he the objectives pursued by the Soviet and the Communists is 
not yet clear, but the fact remains that for instance in Cuba, should the United 
States Government appear to Stalin to be too intrusive in European affairs, it 
would be possible through agitation, such as a general strike, to give us a head- 
ache practically on our own doorstep which might induce us to abandon our 
activities abroad. (My comments in various dispatches on the CTAL, CTO, 
and the radical Autentico groups merit consideration.) 

■f ^ * ^ * ^ ^ 

That is the memorandum that disappeared from the files of the State 
Department until a Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee 
forced the State Department to get it out. 

This is the way I got a copy. They sent a copy to me. 

Then on April 5, 1945, in a dispatch I wrote, entitled "Policy Re- 
specting Dictatorships and Disreputable Governments," I made cer- 
tain statements in this latter connection. 

I suggest that that go into the record, also. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 362" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 362 

Habana, April 6, 191/5. 
Subject : Policy respecting dictatorships and disreputable governments. 

"In this latter connection, we must not ignore what, as I have frequently 
reported, may prove in the po.stwar era to be the most dangerous and insidious 
threat of all to the American mode of life and to democracy — communism. 
And it is well to bear in mind that the laws of action and reaction cause the 
dictators to prepare the most fertile soil for that disruptive ideology." 



1382 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNIVIENT 

"* * * since it may well I)e that in tlie postwar era, after we have laid down 
our military arms used in defense of democracy, we will be confronted with an 
even more dangerous attack, which our enemies may well camouflage in the 
spurious roI)es of a false democracy." 

"Therefore, even implicitly to evidence an apparent approval of the dictators 
may not only entrench them, but may serve to spread the system elsewhere and 
so discourage the people as to induce the acceptance of "anything for a change, 
be it nazism, falangism, or communism." 

Mr. Braden. When I was in Argentina as Ambassador, I sent two 
telegrams, dated July 5 and July 8. 

Mr. Grimes. Wliat year? 

Mr. Bradex. 1945, July 5 and July 8. Both of them were directed 
for the President and the Secretary of State. They were that im- 
portant. 

Mr. Grimes. Why did you send them at that time? 

Mr. Barden. I sent them in anticipation of the Potsdam Conference. 
You can get why I sent them from these notes that I made of the 
July 8 telegram, and what it contained. 

My notes say that — 

I cabled the Department today, top secret for the President and Secretary, that 
Ambassador newly arrived from Chile discussed with his staff pos- 
sible secret alliance— 

I will have to put in some blanks here because it would be improper 
to bring out some of the names — 

between and and Peron to get together with Russia against 

the United States. I observed that there was no concrete proof except that 
the last two mentioned were in touch and were willing to use the Soviet to 
offset our influence in Latin America. 

Example : mission to . Peron declaration to Cue — 

He was the owner and editor of a large Cuban paper — 

and to me, that Argentina would get together with Stalin if we didn't dance 
to his tune. 

That is, to Peron's tune. 

Also bear in mind get-together with ; old story of dictators 

joining anyone to retain power. Other sources report Bolivia might join such 

a union, plus militarists. All this ties in with Nazis open boasts in 

Argentina they may have lost the war, but would win the postwar. Recall 
previous Nazi-Commie alliance — 

Hitler and Stalin. 

In light of all this I repeated my strongest urgings of July 5 cable that Truman 
and Churchill discuss with Premier Stalin all aspects of Soviet activities through- 
out Latin America, even though the latter might not wish to jeopardize present 
good relations with us for the chimera of less valuable gains in Latin America, 
but get-together with those dictators would give Stalin fine trading card. 

I recalled my repeated reports from Habana that Russia was using Com- 
munist organizations and activities in Latin America as an instrument of 
Soviet power politics rather than these activities being the spontaneous will of 
popular masses. 

I went on: 

Soviet power politics to be utilized if, as, and when the occasion arises. 

I concluded: 

We must omit no precaution. 

I never got an answer from that. Secretary Byrnes told me he 
never saw that telegram. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1383 

I, therefore, assume that the President never saw it. What hap- 
pened to it, I don't know. 

When I came to Washington on December 6, 1945, I gave a memo- 
randum to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the counselor of the 
State Department, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Matthews of the European Divi- 
sion, that : 

The Communist Party organizations are now, as prior to our entry into the 
war, attacking us and our policies at every opiwrtunity. For example, Ambas- 
sador P>owers, in Santiago, reports Cuban Communist Bias Koca, one of the top 
ranking- hemisphere Communists, 

et cetera. 

I would like to put that memorandum into the record. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 363" and is as 
follows:) 



Exhibit No. 363 



December 6, 1945. 



S — The Secretary. 
U — The Under Secretary. 
C — The Counselor. 
EUR— Mr. Matthews. 

The Communist Party organizations are now, as prior to our entry into the 
war, attacking us and our policies at every opportunity. For example. Bowers 
in Santiago reports Cuban Communist Bias Roca (one of topranking hemisphere 
Communists), while on visit to Chile, made vitriolic denunciations of us as 
"monopolistic, imperialistic," and as beng against "truly democratic forces and 
working classes." Similar attitude is evidenced by Communists all over Latin 
America and by related groups within the United States. 

Communist anti-United States action throughout the hemisphere is so coordi- 
nated and synchronized tliat there is no doubt that it is being directed from one 

central point. In my • • of July 8 from Buenos Aires, I recommended that 

this subject be discussed by the President with Stalin at Potsdam. I still feel 
this general subject should be explored fully and energetically at the highest 
levels. 

Spruiixe Beaden. 
A-Br : JHWright : JW/SV. 

Mr. Braden. That same day I presented a memorandum to the 
Secretary's staff committee in which I said more or less the same thing. 

On June 12, 1946, we received a cablegi'am, and I will introduce this 
into the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record at this point. 

(A memorandum from Mr. Braden to the Under Secretary, refer- 
ring to and quoting from the cablegram referred to was marked "Ex- 
hibit No. 364" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 364 

June 12, 1946. 
U — Tlie Under Secretary. 
Subject: ^Moscow's [communication], June 6. 

The following comments appear pertinent : 

The USSR is not so much "doing everything possible to ingratiate itself with 
Argentina" as it is attempting to exploit every move we make, good or bad, in 
order to embarrass us. 

It must be borne in mind that economically, politically, and otherwise there 
is no sound enduring basis for any substantial trade or relations between Argen- 
tina and Russia. 

On the contrary, mitigating against the USSR permanently "achieving danger- 
ously influential position" are such powerful forces as the Catholic Church, the 
majority of the Argentine people, the Navy, important Army sectors, and finally 



1384 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

the adverse reaction of the other American Republics. About the only way that 
communism and therefore the USSR could get a real foothold in Argentina would 
be as a reaction from a protracted period of a demagogic-military dictatorship. 

The above-mentioned cable wai-ns that "our actions during the next few 
months may well determine whether USSR or USA is to win out in Argentina." 

This warning seems to parallel the type of thinking which has led persons in 
and out of the Government to urge that we immediately come to an understand- 
ing with Peron. It suggests that the intricate, difficult, long-pull problems of 
relations among nations can be resolved like military engagements if forces in 
strength are brought into play at the right hour of the right day. 

If the USA were to be "panicked" by fear of Russia into appeasement of Peron, 
the consequences will be disastrous — disastrous because Peron will never sur- 
render the advantage he enjoys through playing us off against the Soviets ; and 
the only encouragement he requires to play the game again and again and again 
is further evidence now of weakness or vacillation by us. 

Rather than yield to such fears, we should make it clear that if Peron prefers 
to follow the Soviet Union, we are so strong and confident of our i>rinciples and 
our position as to remain unconcerned. Reports from Buenos Aires already 
indicate that the old line and especially the Catholic press is worried about the 
precipitous reestablishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with the 
Soviet Union. If Peron is satisfied that we are not going to be bluffed into 
appeasement by his maneuvers with the Soviet Union, he will soon be deterred 
from actual collaboration with the Soviets by the influence mentioned in para- 
graph three above. In other words, there is a substantial measure of bluff in 
the Peron play toward the Kremlin. He unsuccessfully tried this same bluff on 
me a year ago in Buenos Aires. 

Argentina has been one of those problems which too many people have classified 
as a passing headache to be cured by the powder mentioned in your recent 
address. 

It is in fact a very deep-seated illness which began more than 50 years ago 
and which is more acute now than at any other time. By despatch in September 
1937 I warned the Department in these particulars. 

If we try the headache-powder approach, it will be due to faulty diagnosis 
and might create the illusion — for a In-ief but dangerous period — that we have 
cured the ailment, whereas in fact we will not even cure its minor manifestations. 

Speuille Beaden. 
A-Br/S : CBSpaeth : SBraden : akh 

Mr. Braden. a telegram had come in from our Embassy in Mos- 
cow about the rehitions between the Soviet and Argentina, the Peron 
regime there. 

I gave a full sounding alarm again. 

On May 12, 1947, I pnt out an instruction to my principal assist- 
ants — Briggs, Wright, Mann, Woodward and Barber. I would like 
to supply that for the record and I will read a little of it. 

It says: 

On the basis of first things first, we should begin by putting our own bouse in 
order. This will set an example for others to follow and so preserving and in- 
creasing our economic and financial potential that private enterprise can func- 
tion effectively — 

ct cetera. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 365" and is as 
follows. ) 

Exhibit No. 365 
ARA — Mr. Briggs 
A-Br — Mr. Wright, Mr. Mann 
ARA— Mr. Woodward 
CRB— Mr. Barber 
Subject : Combating communism. 

WFB's initiative gives a good chopping block. I thoroughly agree our ap- 
proach must be constructive, positive, honest and dynamic. If it is such it 
should be convincing and effective. 

Re WFB's memo, the following immediate comments occur to me: 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1385 

1. We are already "considering steps to disconrage growth of Coramunisin" 
in Latin Aniericai! Keyublic-s. As I outlined at meeting in aiy offiie we have in 
mind : 

(a ) Raising of living standards. This will be a long arduous undertaking, 
with a great many obstacles in the way. With manifest exceptions this can 
only be carried out by private enterprise. Unfortunately, many of the re- 
publics will have "to learn the hard way." 

(b) We are proceeding with such palliatives as the IIAA. 

(c) L)epartment's QIC program perhaps is doing some good. But a de- 
tailed analysis of it should be made — as we did with IIAA. We must have 
the facts. 

In this connection I like my suggestions to Benton (see memos) re employment 
of ridi(ul(> and exposition of facts about living conditions in Communist domi- 
nated countries. 

(rf) A most important consideration is problem posed by Pedro Cue — how 
to offset the emotional appeal of Communism to the emotional Latins (in- 
cluding those with Negro and Indian strains?). 

(c) Also we have given encouragement to the A. F. of L. in its efforts to 
establish an anti-Communist grouping of trade unions throughout the hemis- 
phere. We have likewise encouraged such anti-Communist popular leaders 
as Ibanez of Chile and Haya de la Torre of Peru. 
(/) Our approach must be firm, fair, constructive and dynamic. 
{[/) On the basis of "tirst things first," we should begin by putting our own 
house in order. This will set an example for others to follow and so preserve 
and increase our economic and financial potential that private enterprise can 
function effectively. Thus by investment and purchases abroad we will be able 
to assist the economies of other countries. 

In this connection, it is pertinent to observe that the much discussed "test 
between democracy and communism" cannot presently be made in any nation of 
this hemisphere — including the United States of America — because the large 
measure of Government controls (statism) manacles democracy and its com- 
ponent, free, competitive private enterprise. 

( h ) Most important of all : We cannot live in the same world with this 
completely divergent ideology — as for "one world" talk, it is stupid. We can- 
not do business as individuals or as a Nation with crooks and murderers. 
That is what the Commies are. Let's recognize this fact and act acordingly. 
To the foregoing there might be added my urgent recommendation (prior to 
Potsdam Conference) that we have a showdown with Moscow on what they are 
up to in this hemisphere. 

Similarly, the line I have followed in conversations with Latin American 
representatives is, I believe, helpful, viz : emphatically damning every facet 
of communism and denouncing the Commies as dishonest and dangerous, ex- 
pressing confidence that given a fair break, we can beat them bands down, 
but insisting on the folly of permitting a Communist to hold any public office 
in an American Republic, since they, themselves, confess that their first loyalty 
is to Russia. 

2. Manifestations of communism in this hemisphere self-evidently are part 
of world phenomenon and should be coordinated accordingly. 

I do have definite reservations (as per 1 (o) and (g) above) as to employ- 
ment for this purpose of "funds and credits" with other American Republics. 

3. I agree re need to analyze other leftist movements. However, I am op- 
posed to utilizing Trotskyites, anarchists and such. Probably Socialists can be 
used, but always bearing in mind that they form, at best, a transition from 
democratic-capitalism towards communism. 

4. I have always maintained that to join with Fascists and ultra-reaction- 
aries in "common cause" against communism is against principle, foolhardy 
and will greatly weaken us in the struggle to defeat totalitarianism of every 
variety. 

5. I fear the gathering at the Vatican — and the sending of Spanish instead of 
American priests to Latin America — will lead to more reaction or fascism, 
which in time will strengthen the Communists. 

Spruuxe Braden. 
A-Br : SB : sv 

Mr. Braden. I then have without date another memorandum, but 
I recall that it was shortly after Secretary Marshall took over as 



1386 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Secretary of State. I have notes on it entitled, "Immediate policy 
matters." 

I began that by saying that there are listed below three problems 
requiring the immediate attention of Secretary Marshall in connec- 
nection with our relations with the other American Republics. 

In each case a brief statement of the problem itself is accompanied 
by an amplifying memorandum. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 366" and is 
as follows: 

ExHiiiiT No. 366 
For the Secretary : Immediate Policy Matters 

There are listed below three problems requiring the immediate attention of 
Secretary Marshall in connection with our relations with the other American 
Republics. In each case, the brief statement of the problem itself is accompanied 
by an amplifying memorandum : 

*!■ ¥ ^ ^ Sp «|S ^fi 

COMMUNISM AND FASCISM IN LATIN AMERICA : NECESSITY FOR DEVISING COUNTER 

MEASURES 

Although Communists still represent only a fraction of the population in most 
Latin American countries, Communist strength has undeniably increased greatly 
since the end of the war and is a source of serious and growing concern to this 
Government. While each of the Latin American countries has the primary 
responsibility for handling this matter, this Government should give immediate 
thoiight to the formulation of measures in the political, economic, and cultural 
fields to stem Communist expansion. 

An important related problem is the affinity between totalitarianism of the 
left and of the right, and the facility with which Communist totalitarianism can 
merge with Nazi-Fascist ideology. 

The long-range solution of this problem lies in increased per capita produc- 
tion and increased prosperity in Latin America which will permit overall better- 
ment of living conditions and the elimination of certain social maladjustments, 
the existence of which now makes Latin America so fertile a field for totalitarian 
penetration. 



COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA 

Communist influence in Latin America in recent years has increased con- 
siderably. Official Communist Parties now operate openly in 13 countries in 
Latin America and are strongest in Chile, where the Communists participate in 
the Government, and in Cuba, where the Communists hold the balance of power. 
Communist influence in strategically important Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela 
is making itself felt increasingly and the majority of Latin American labor 
organizations are dominated by Communist sympathizers. 

Fundamental economic ills, temporary maladjustments caused by the war, 
and the rising tide of nationalism have been important factors in facilitating the 
increase of comnumism in the other American Republics. 

One of the most disturbing features of the Communist movement in Latin 
America at present is its consistent anti-United States propaganda line. Be- 
cause of such propaganda, the Communists constitute a highly vocal gx'oup 
directly opposing hemispheric solidarity. Other aspects of the Communist inter- 
national line in Latin America are (1) support of Soviet foreign policy, (2) 
advocacy of "nonintervention," (3) support of big power unity, with the under- 
standing that the U. S. S. R. will be upheld in case of disagreement, and (4) the 
superiority of the Soviet economic and social system. Internally, Communist 
groups (1) seek to increase their power by capitalizing on economic difficulties, 
(2) identify Communist interests with those of the working classes, and (3) 
support nationalistic aims, including sponsorship of vicious attacks on all United 
States enterprises. 

Communist propaganda in Latin America follows, with minor variations, the 
lead of the U. S. S. R., although it appears that there are few direct ties between 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1387 

local Communist Parties and JIoscow. Policy snidance is fnrnishod by the 
Soviet press and radio. Credible evidem-e of (lirf«'t contact hetwcen Soviet 
diplomatic missions and local Communist I'arties is lacking and Soviet officials 
in Latin America have, in general, confined their activities to the molding of 
public opinion favorable to the U. S. S. R. and the promotion of Soviet political 
and economic aims through foreign trade. 

Mr. Braden. The third one of those problems is communism in this 
hemisphere, which, I said, requires his immediate attention. 

The Chairman. To whom was that sent? 

Mr. Braden. To Secretary Marshall, prepared by my staff at my 
direction. 

The Chairman. Do you know w^hether or not he ever received it? 

Mr. Braden. Of course he received it. I never received any ac- 
knowledgement. 

To the best of my knowledge and belief all of these warnings I sent 
in through the years beginning in 1941, 1 never received any acknowl- 
edgment on that I recall. If there was any, it was purely pro forma. 

When I got to the State Department and I wanted to discuss these 
matters, I was never able to do it. I had the sensation of walking up 
the stairs in the dark and thinking there is another step, come down, 
with a jolt or punching a pillow is probably a better analogy. 

The Chairman. Would it be a fair statement to say that, in your 
relations with the State Department during your tour of service, from 
the memorandums you have received, that the United States Depart- 
ment of State was pro-Communist '^ 

Mr. Braden. I don't know that I would say that. I can speak from 
my own knowledge, but I got no results. My warnings were un- 
listened to. 

When an important Ambassador, and, after all, as Ambassador to 
Cuba and Argentina, I might be in that category, when he sounds 
warnings and as Assistant Secretary of State he cannot get dis- 
cussions of these matters and get any action taken, that in itself 
shows a very dangerous and serious pattern. 

The Chairman. If it was not pro-Communist, there was something 
radically wrong? 

Mr. Braden. My feeling was there were relatively f ew^ Communists, 
but there were an awful lot of State interventionists, collectivists, 
"do gooders," misinformed idealists and what-not that were easily lecl 
and were in effect the puppets of an unidentified "they." 

I say "unknown"; we do have Hiss and White and some of those 
names coming out now, but the great majority were the puppets of 
those unidentified people. That very definitely is my feeling and it is 
the reason wdiy I am so alarmed today about the future of this country. 

Senator Watkins. Do you not think there has been a reform since 
that time ? 

Mr. Braden. I haven't been able to see it. I don't think so. I am 
not inside Government. Therefore, perhaps it is unfair for me to 
express an opinion on something that I am not intimately connected 
with. But when I see what is going on, when I see the fact that we, 
for some years, despite my going to Washington and begging that 
something be done about the situation in Guatemala, and that nothing 
was done about it uiuil recently — then what is done is ineffective. 

Senator Watkins. Have you heretofore testified about the Guate- 
mala situation ? 



1388 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Braden. Yes. In fact, in my December 22 testimony before this 
committee in New York I gave a copy of a speech that I gave at Dart- 
mouth College on March 12 last year. 

As a matter of fact, a year before that I had given a speech sound- 
ing the same alarm. 

To go back to the summer of 1950 after I had been in Guatemala, 
I told the Department what the situation was and what the danger 
was to us, not only about the Panama Canal, but all of the gulf 
ports with all the chemical and oil industries and everything there. 

They were just within easy bombing range. 

Senator Watkins. To whom did you talk ? 

Mr. Braden. To Eddie INIiller and I talked to his assistants in the 
State Department. I have sounded off at every opportunity publicly 
and privately on this subject. 

Senator Butler. By and large, do you still have the same people 
there ? 

Mr. Braden. I think so. That is my impression. 

Senator Butler. Some of the principal characters have been 
changed though ? 

Mr. Braden, Some of the principal characters have been changed, 
but it is like when Mr. Byrnes was Secretary of State and I talked 
to him about these matters. He was overburdened with the neces- 
sity for immediate decisions, decisions that he had to make, and then 
he was continually being called off to meetings of the foreign ministers, 
to United Nations meetings. 

As I see it, I think they are doing the same thing with Secretary 
Dulles. He does not have a chance to light. 

Senator Butler. The Secretary is not in a position to really run 
the Department? 

Mr. Braden. Exactly. 

Senator Butler. As a matter of fact, does he run it ? 

Mr. Braden. Secretary Byrnes was not able to, because he was 
away too often. When he was, it was just one decision on top of 
another that had to be taken immediately. 

Senator Watkins. In the case of Secretary Dulles. Who runs it 
when he is away? 

Mr. Braden. That I don't know. I assume the Under Secretary. - 

The Chairman. Have you any further questions, Mr. Grimes? 

Mr. Grimes. No. 

The Chairman. Mr. Sourwine, will you proced with your questions ? 

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Braden, I have a few loose ends here and I will 
necessarily have to go back and come forward over the testimony you 
have given. 

Do you remember near the outset of your testimony speaking of 
certain documents concerning which you said if they had not been 
destroyed or hidden away somewhere they are in the State Depart- 
ment or in some other department ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. You have in mind the particular documents to which 
you referred at that time? 

Mr. Braden. Well, I had this experience of asking for the copy 
of this memorandum that I have mentioned, Agenda for Cuba, and 
a search was made of departmental files. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1389 

After 2 or 8 months I was told it could not be fonnd. I said it 
has to be found in the Embassy files in Habana. 

I am astonished we do not have it vip here, I brought up several 
copies. They were not able to find them until I gave this lecture at 
Dartmouth and a Senator immediately told the Department to find 
that. 1 was told this by a friend of mine who added that the Senator 
was on the Foreign Relations Committee. 

When he read what I said and the fact that I had not been able to 
get a copy of that memorandum, he raised such Ned about it that 
they finally found it, not in the Department central files, but in the 
Bureau of Inter-American files, stowed awav. 

Mr, SouRWiNE. I wondered if you had in mind any particular docu- 
ments you had seen and were able to tell us where they were in the 
Department at the time you were there. You were talking about 
documents there while you were in the Department as Assistant 
Secretary. 

Mr. Braden. We already had great difficulty in finding documents 
when I was Assistant Secretary of State and even before that, when I 
would come back from my missions. Whether that was sheer ineffi- 
ciency or not, I don't know. 

I asked for a dispatch that I w^rote September 27, 1937, from Buenos 
Aires when I was Ambassador in the Chaco Peace Conference. 

I am told that is now regarded as classified and that I can't have 
the copy. 

I also asked the Department, because I thought it might be inter- 
esting in relating what has happened on this research and intelligence 
matter. 

And I go back to the days wdien Cordell Hull was complaining, in 
fact, did complain to me in a letter that the budget had gone above 
$15 million for the State Department and the Foreign Service. That, 
he said, was just getting too high. 

When I compare that $15 million w^ith whatever the figure is today, 
and when I realize that the 800 good Foreign Service career officers 
that we have, and now I think it has been increased perhaps to a 
thousand or 1,300, or something of that kind — I don't know exactly. 

Because I wrote to the Department and in order to make my testi- 
mony complete and bring out the fact that after those of us who 
opposed this research and intelligence project left the Dei)artment, 
beginning, I would say, in about 1948 or late 1947, or 1949 — I don't 
know the period there — there has been a huge growth and this swarm 
of people come into our foreign operations either in the Department 
or in the other services of mutual aid or point 4, or whatever else you 
choose. 

Those newcomers are the ones, as I said in my first testimony, that 
are giving the career officers the bad reputation. Sure, there are some 
bad ones even in the career service, but those are the ones that are 
doing the harm. 

I wrote to the Department a few weeks ago and said : "Will you 
please give me the number of Foreign Service officers in 1947, 1941, 
and 1937?'' I also asked for the present-day figure. And the same 
for the clerks. 

Mr. Grimes. That is for 4 years ? 



1390 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Braden. Also the budgets on those. I get a reply from the 
Department which seems to me utterly ludicrous when addressed to 
me as a former Assistant Secretary of State, or even as just a private 
citizen. 

It seems to me that the data could be given out. The answer on that 
is: 

With respect to personnel and budgetary figures which you request, I am 
informed by the administrative staff of the Department tliat because of their 
complexity — 

I don't know wdiere the complexity is. 

Mr. Grimes. You asked for 4 sets of employees for 4 years? 
Mr. Braden (reading) : 

Because of their complexity they cannot be released to you. Many requests 
for similar statistics are being made by various committees of Congress and by 
several groups studying the personnel problems of the Department. 

In answering these requests the administrative staff believes it important to 
have members of the Department on hand to answer questions and to follow 
up with respect to any further clarifying details desired. 

Mr. Sourwine, May I respectfully suggest that Mr. Braden be 
asked to put his letter and the reply into the record? 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of it. 

(The letters referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 367 and 368" 
and are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 367 

February 26, 1954. 
Hon. Robert F. Woodward, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, 
Department of State, Washington, D. C. 
Dear Bob : Recently going through my files, I failed to find copy of my dispatch 
from Buenos Aires, dated September 27, 19.37, entitled "The ABC Powers and 
the Chaco Peace Conference." ProI)ably it has been misplaced and will show up 
in due course, but in the interim, if it is not too much trouble, I wonder if you 
could arrange to have a copy struck off and sent to me. This, of course, was 
written during my tour as Ambassador and chairman of our delegation in the 
Chaco Peace Conference. It had evidenced some prophetic ability on my part of 
which I am rather proud. 

Under date of .January 16, 19.54, I sent Lou Halle a copy of my statement before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security, in which I defended the career 
service. My next appearance before the committee is scheduled for 2 or 3 weeks 
Iience. In order to be prepared for their questioning, I would deeply appreciate 
it if you could give me the following figures : 

Numl)er of Foreign Service career officers as of 1935, 1941, 1947, and 1953. 
Number of foreign clerical staffs for 1935, 1941, 1947, and 1953. 
Number of Department employees in 1935, 1941, 1947, and 1953. 
Department and Foreign Service budgets for these same years. 
Lastly, for the strictly confidential information of yourself and your associates, 
I am disposed to believe that the Brazilian delegation at Caracas, which has in- 
structions to cooperate, as always, with our delegation, will do so with even 
greater enthusiasm, by reason of their being in possession of a copy of Peron's 
speech last December to the high-ranking military officers (major and up) in 
Buenos Aires. 

Maria joins me in sending you both our affectionate greetings. 
As ever. 
Yours, 



INTERLOCKmG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1391 

Exhibit No. 368 

Department of State, 
Wnshimitnn, hfarch 19, 195ji. 
Hon. Spruille Braden, 

320 East 72d Street, Netc York, N. Y. 
Dear Spruiixe: In reply to your letter of February 20, I rej^ret that it will 
not be possible to send you a copy of the dispatch to which you refer. The 
document is classified, and in reviewinj; it, we in the I'.uroau l)elieve that it 
should not be declassified. Under the Department's security regulations you 
will appreciate that it would be a viohilion for me to send you a copy. 

With respect to the personnel and ))U(lgetaiy figures which you request, I am 
informed by the administrative staff of the Departm(>nt that, because of their 
complexity, they cannot be released to you. Many requests for similar statistics 
are being made by various committees of Congress and by the several groups 
studying the personnel problems of the Department. In answering these re- 
quests, the administrative staff believe it important to have members of the 
Department on hand to answer questions and to follow-up with respect to any 
further clarifying details desired. 

Your hunch with respect to the cooperation of tlie Brazilian delegation at 
Caracas proved correct although I doubt that we would attribute it to the inci- 
dent which you mention. 

I am sorry that I cannot be more helpful to you in this reply. 
With best wishes to you and Maria, 

Sincerely, ^ , 

[s] Bob. 

Senator Watkins. To whom was that ? 

Mr. Braden. To a friend of mine. 

Senator Watkins. I thought it was one of the officials. 

Mr. Braden. Yes. This is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. 

The Chairman. That memorandum has been made a part of the 
record. 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

I would suggest that this afternoon or tomorrow morning that I 
sit down with whomever you designate and give them all of these 
various things. 

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Mandel will handle that. 

Senator Butler. Is it a fair statement to make that while the top 
echelon has changed, the people who really make the policy are the 
same people that have been there for years ? 

Mr. Braden. That is my conviction. 

Senator Watkins. How do they make the policy ? 

Mr. Braden. It is a complicated process, but it goes 'way down the 
line. It extends up to the United Nations in my opinion. 

First of all it may be merely somebody on the desk that is in a very 
low position. But some of these people I have described may repre- 
sent a large office. In the instances of these young Soviets, or these 
meetings in my office, these people would come in, would have the 
same color of authority that I had, and insist that they had to be con- 
sulted before any decision was made. They could overrule even an 
Assistant Secretary of State. I learned that several times. 

Then these collectivists, even though underlings, would draw up 
these papers proposing policies and action and with the tremendous 
volume of work coming on the top echelon, the Secretary of State, or 
even the Assistant Secretaries, frequently they cannot go over every 
single one of these papers. The decisions are made by these people 
working at the lower levels writing these papers, writing the agree- 
ments, doing all the rest of it. 



1392 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Tliey are pretty cagey about it. They can make some pretty good 
arguments as to why such and such a thing should be done. They 
take advantage of their superiors' ignorance of a given area or subject. 

Because of my long experience both in business and diplomacy in 
Latin America, I happen to know the ground so thoroughly that I 
could not have that pulled on me. 

But I am sure that it is pulled very frequently there by these sub- 
ordinates all down the line. 

Until you get rid of these collectivists and their ilk, I don't think 
you are going to cure the situation. 

Senator Watkins. Do you know how to get rid of them? 

Mr. Braden. I have prepared a brief statement on what I think 
is the way. 

No. 1. I think this committee, as I say in the statement, should 
continue its work in order to explore not only the Communists but 
all of these other 2:)eople that are around. 

Then I emphasize my experience as cliaiiman of the New York 
City anticrime committee where we have found that it is frequently 
difficult to name names and pinpoint facts, but if we expose the pat- 
tern on the New York waterfront or the garment industry or the build- 
ing trades or the railways, whatever it may be, then we catch up 
with a lot of gangsters who otherwise we wouldn't catch. Or if we 
do, we only get them on perjury charges, or w^e get them on evasion 
of income taxes, or something of that kind. 

Therefore, I am very keen about this proposition of these various 
patterns. That is the reason I refer to the pattern tliat I have here of 
my continued warnings being ignored. 

I have several other patterns. The pattern in these meetings in 
the State Department with these people coming in there was a very 
definite pattern in which a collectivist ideology w^as expressed. They 
were against private investment. They were against the protection 
of the legitimate interests of the United States. 

Senator Watkiks. Have you any definite information that sort 
of thing is occurring now in the Department ? 

Mr. Braden. I think that it is pretty apparent that it is occurring 
in the Department because our legitimate interests and our private 
enterprises are not being supported the way they should. 

Senator Watkins. Can you give us the information as to the names 
of those who are influencing that ? 

Mr. Braden. I can't give the names, but I repeatedly see wdiere the 
United States, in our business operations abroad, does not get the 
full support that we should have. 

Mr. Grimes. Perhaps you can give Senator Watkins some examples 
of that type of thing that went on while you were there. 

Senator Watkins. I understand that, but what I am interested in 
now is the question of whether we are getting any kind of service 
in the Department. If it is the same thing, then I think we ought to 
know who is responsible for it, the names of those who are working 
as they did in the days that you were there. 

Mr. Braden. I can't tell who is responsible. 

The Chairman. He cannot name names, but it is our job to look 
into the pattern of operation. 

Senator Watkins. I certainly have the right to inquire if he knows 
the names. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1393 

Mr. Braden. I doivt know the names today. 

Senator Watkins. He said tliere were a lot of the same people that 
were there who were around today. 

Mr. Bradex. I see them around. 

Senator Watkins. Yon can name them ? 

Mr. Bradex. In this meeting I described there were over 20. One 
I have particularly in mind came up in connection with the Havana 
Tramways Co. 

Mv. Grimes. Why don't you tell that and who was there. Then a 
check can be made as to who is still there. 

Senator Watkins. He said he sees them around. 

Mr. Braden. If I can go back, I have to tell wdiat happened in con- 
nection with the Tinguaro Sugar Mill, because that sets the pattern 
for what happened on the tramw^ays. 

While I w\as American Ambassador in Cuba, this sugar mill burned 
down. It so happened Saladrigas' successor as Prime Minister was 
in my ofRce at the Chancery one afternoon. He said, "We are going 
to intervene." This is the way Mr. Truman proposed to take over the 
steel industry. 

They were going to take over the Tinguaro Sugar Mill because the 
owners of that company had not made provisions for the mill workers. 
This mill had burned down just before the crop was to start being cut. 

It concerned the mill workers. I did not want intervention or the 
taking over of any United States enterprise. I said, "Wait a moment 
before you do that. Wliat is wrong?" 

The premier replied : "Mr. Keiser, the president of the company, is 
unreasonable." 

I said, "Let me talk to him." 

I got Mr. Keiser and had a talk with him ; as a result I acted more or 
less as a mediator, but reached a settlement of that disagreement for 
which I was thanked by both the Prime Minister and Mr. Keiser. 

At the time I said, "Look, this problem is going to arise again next 
year because self-evidently that mill is worse than marginal. It has 
operated for the last 20 years and only made a profit in 2 of the years. 
It would be foolish for this company to rebuild the mill. Both of 
you should get busy and see these millworkers are located at other 
jobs." 

They both assured me they would do so. Mr. Keiser did. He got 
a number of these millworkers other jobs. 

At the end of the year, however, there were these millworkers 
hanging around, at which point the Prime Minister proceeded to inter- 
vene and take over that mill. 

When that happened, as Ambassador, I naturally felt that I had to 
protect the legitimate interests of the United States stockholders. I 
did so in a memorandum to the Cuban Government in which I said 
that if this seizure were tantamount in whole or in part to an expro- 
in'iation, my Government expected adequate, effective, and prompt 
com])ensation to be paid for this company. 

Much to my consternation, the State Department, the Office of 
American Republics Affairs did not agree with me. They thought the 
Cubans were right on this; that it was all right to take over this 
American property. 

Not only did they tell me that, but they actually told Cuban officials 
that. They told the lawyer for Mr. Keiser that. 

32918°— 54— lit. 10 4 



1394 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Fortunately, by being vigorous about it on the ground, I was able 
to make this note of mine about an expropriation without compensa- 
tion stick. 

The thing was finally accommodated by a group of Cubans buying 
the mill at a handsome price, which more than satisfied Mr. Keiser, 
and the whole thing was adjusted. 

Senator Watkins. Are those same fellows that argued that way 
men that were in the State Department and are still there ? 

Mr. Braden. Mr. Duggan has, of course, since died. His assist- 
ant, Mr. Bonsai, is in the State Department. He is not in American 
Republic Affairs. I don't know the division. 

Senator Watkins. Was he one of those arguing? 

Mr. Braden. He stated to me over the telephone that he agreed with 
the Cuban intervention; he remonstrated at my taking a vigorous 
stand and thought I was pretty much out of order. But I took it, 
anyway. 

Senator Watkins. Can you name any more of them that were 
there ? 

Mr. Braden. If I can continue, we will get to the others. 

Then the years went by, and I got back to the State Department. 
Meantime, the Cuban administration had changed. The American- 
owned tramway company in Habana had a strike. They had great 
difficulty in adjusting the strike. In fact, it wasn't adjusted. The 
Cuban Government proceeded to intervene and take over the Ameri- 
can-owned tramway company. 

I immediately called my successor in Cuba, Mr. Norweb, who was 
Ambassador, on the telephone. I said, "Harry, get out my notes on 
the Tinguaro sugar mill where I used the expression 'This is tanta- 
mount to an expropriation, in whole or in part, and we expect ade- 
quate, effective, and prompt compensation,' and put in a note to the 
Cuban Government along those lines saying the same thing. That 
may solve the situation." 

Harry said, "All right, I will do that, but will you please confirm 
your instruction to me by cable?" 

I was new in the Department. I didn't know the regulations. So 
I immediately called in my stenographer and I dictated a cable con- 
firming my instructions to our American Ambassador. I sent it on 
the way. 

That afternoon at about 6 : 30 or a quarter to 7, I was called by one 
of the old career departmental service people and a very fine person 
for whom I have great admiration, Mrs. Blanche Halla, who is Chief 
of the Division of Liaison and Review, which had to check everything 
going out. She said, "Mr. Secretary, you have sent out this telegram ?" 

I sent it out. She said, "There are all of these offices and divisions 
in the Department ; also there are the Department of Labor and some 
other outside agencies that all have a sayso on this. You have got to 
get their initials on this telegram before it can be sent." 

I knew the job of getting any number of initials on a telegram. 
Unless you took an officer and sent him around individually to each 
person to argue it out, it would take days before you could get it out. 
Any delay in this tramway matter very likely would have lost the 
opportunity to get this matter settled. 

So I pleaded with her. "For heaven's sake, I have given this in- 
struction orally. The Ambassador won't act until he gets the confir- 
mation. Please can't you get it out?" 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1395 

She very fjracioiisly agreed to send it out without these other ini- 
tials. I suppose she was breaching the reguhitions, but as Assistant 
Secretary I took the responsibility. 

Senator Watkins. Did you get reprimanded for that? 

Mr. Bhaokx, I am coming to that. 

Within '24: hours, 1 think, or certainly 3G hours, or thereabouts, the 
strike was settled. The intervention ceased. The company got the 
tramways back. Everything was fixed. 

About a week later, JNIr. Briggs and Mr. AVright came in to me and 
said, "Good God, Spruille, you have gotten yourself into the darndest 
jam there is. You have completely violated regulations here." 

I said, "What have I done?" 

They said: "You had to have these initials. You had no right to 
send that telegram without all these initials. These people are up in 
arms and they insist on an audience with you to protest what you have 
done." 

The harm had been done, but I said, "All right, bring them in. Make 
an appointment and I will explain it has been successful ; that we have 
satisfactorily settled the intervention. I will try and put their minds 
at rest and express my regrets that my ignorance of regulations was 
the reason I did not get their initials." 

So they came in. There were at least 20 of them. They had 1 princi- 
pal spokesman and 2 or 3 others there to back him. You can get their 
names out of the record if there was one of that conference. I don't 
remember the names of any of them. 

Senator Watkins. They were not responsible for the setting up of 
regulations ? 

Mr. Braden. They were not responsible. But they had authority 
because they were supposed to have initialed the telegram to Ambassa- 
dor Norweb. 

What saved my neck on the thing was that I began by saying: "All 
right, gentlemen, what is it you have on your mind?" They cut loose 
and they really were pretty violent about it. They said that I had 
interfered with the rights of labor. They made that the issue. 

They alleged that this was a strike and I, by taking this action, arbi- 
trarily, without consulting them, was intervening with the rights of 
Cuban labor. 

In short, according to them, I was a terrible person and this inter- 
ference with labor's right to strike was awful. Everything was wrong 
They went ahead. 

This one man who acted as spokesman gave his little oration there 
and 2 or 8 others spoke. When they go through and came to a breath- 
ing spell, I asked "Is that all?" Yes, that was it. I was greatly re- 
lieved because they had me cold on the regulations, but on the defense 
of United States property rights. I was right. 

I said, "Wait a moment. As Assistant Secretary of State it is my 
duty to protect American property rights and I propose to do it as long 
as I am Assistant Secretary of State. I haven't mentioned labor. I 
haven't mentioned the strike, either, in my telephone conversation to 
Mr. Norweb, or in my telegram of confirmation, the subject never hav- 
ing come up. You are totally out of order and good day, gentlemen. 
The conference is over." 

That is a typical instance of the kind of thing we had. I can read 
later 10 pages of instances of various kinds where as Ambassador I 



1396 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

completely failed to get the support to which I was entitled. I found 
in these meetings that there was this attitude that American property 
interests were not deserving of protection. These invaders of the De- 
partment play along and give reason to any foreign government 
which takes over either a sugar mill or tramways or other properties. 

Senator Watkins. You feel now that same sort of situation exists 
in the Department at the present time ? 

Mr. Braden. I don't tnink offhand of any recent instance on it, 
but I am sure I could find it. I know that is the type of attitude that 
prevails. 

We talk about point 4 and getting private investment abroad. If 
w^e w^ould get back to protecting American investments and the in- 
terests of American citizens generally, there would be a better chance 
of getting some investment abroad. 

Senator Watkins. I agree with you on that little inspection I made 
in Europe this last summer. 

The Chairman. Mr. Sourwine. 

Mr. Sourwine. I had asked you if you recalled the documents you 
had in mind when you talked about documents which might have 
been destroyed or hidden away. Apparently you did not recall be- 
cause your answer went into something else. 

Were you not talking about agreements respecting the Panama 
bases ? 

Mr. Braden. Those documents, when I called for them I was able to 
get them. 

Mr. Sourwine. Where did you get them ? Where did you call for 
them ? 

Mr. Braden. I was Assistant Secretary of State and I told my boys 
to get them. I suppose out of the central files. 

Mr. Sourwine. In other words, they were filed in the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. That would be a starting point for the committee ? 

Mr. Braden, Yes. Those documents were there and they should 
be there today. 

Mr. Sourwine. You don't have those agreements, particularly the 
agreement that used the words "definitive treaty of peace"? 

Mr. Braden. I don't have a single document on that. As I said, I 
am testifying from memory and it has been several years ago. But, 
nevertheless, what I have said is substantially correct. 

Mr. Sourwine. It is a loose end. The document is the best evi- 
dence and the committee, I am sure, will want to try to get it.^ 



1 The agreement for the lease of defense sites In the Republic of Panama, approved 
by the Panamanian Government and the National Assembly of Panama, May 11, 1943, 
and published by the Department of State in its Executive Agreement Series 359, includes 
as article I, the following : 

"The Republic of Panama grants to the United States the temporary use for defense 
purposes of the lands referred to in the Memorandum attached to this Agreement and 
forming an integral part thereof. These lands shall be evacuated and the use thereof 
by the United States of America shall terminate one year after the date on which the 
definitive treaty of peace which brings about the end of the present war shall have 
entered into effect. If within that period the two Governments believe that, in spite of 
the cessation of hostilities, a state of international insecurity continues to exist which 
makes vitally necessary the continuatiion of the use of any of tlie said defense bases or 
areas, the two Governments shall again enter into mutual consultation and shall conclude 
the new agreement wliich the circumstances require." 

The national authorities of the Republic of Panama shall have adequate facilities for 
access to the defense sites mentioned herein. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1397 

I know time is ^ettiiio: on. T Imve a nnmbor of qnostions that I 
would like to <;o over. JSIay 1 respectfully ask you to keep your 
answers brief? 

You offered for the record the speech of the Panamanian Minister. 

That was a published account of that speech? 

Mr. Braden. It is a newspaper clipping of what he said in the as- 
sembly. 

Mr. SouRwixE. You don't know who transLated it? 

Mr. Braden. No. 

Mv. SouRwixE. You spoke of an incident which occurred when you 
met with Mr. Acheson and INIr. Hiss on the subject of the Panama 
report. 

Do you recall that ? 

Mr. Bradex. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwixE. Where did that meeting take place ? 

Mr. Bradex. In Mr. Acheson's office. 

Mr. Sourwixe. Who else was there, if anyone, besides yourself? 

Mr. Bradex. I don't think anyone else was there. 

Mr. Sourwixe. Just the three of you ? 

Mr. Bradex. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwixe. When you left was Hiss still there ? 

Mr. Braden. I believe I left him there. 

Mr. Souravixe. You found him there, as best you recall ? 

Mr. Bradex. That is the best of my recollection. 

Mr. Sourwixe. You remember you were discussing the matter of 
the dollar and its position in Cuba wath relation to the White report. 
You used the phrase "The dollar was legal tender in Cuba." 

Did you mean just that ? 

Mr. Bradex. Yes, it was entirely legal tender at that time. It was 
the same whether you had dollars or pesos. 

Since then the Cuban peso is the only legal tender. 

Mr. Souravixe. You mean the Government of Cuba had provided 
that the dollar was legal tender in Cuba ? 

JNIr. Bradex. When you get to a strict legal interpretation of tender, 
I am not sure that I can answer, because I am not a law^^er, but you 
could pay for anything w4th dollars just the same as you used pesos. 

You saw more dollars than pesos. 

Mr. Sourwixe. Were they worth more? 

ISIr. Bradex. Just the same. 

Mr. SouRwix^E. Were there any exchange controls? 

Mr. Bradex. Xo. 

Mr. Sourwixe. A dollar was worth a peso and a peso was worth a 
dollar? 

Mr, Bradex. Exactly. 

]\Ir. Sourwixe. That has been true for a number of years in Canada. 

Mr. Bradex. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwix^E. At the present time ? 

Mr. Bradex^. Excepting there has been a change. 

Mr. Sourwixe. The dollar is not quite worth the peso. 

Does the White report provide for exchange controls ? 

Mr. Bradex. It didn't provide for exchange controls. All you have 
to do is look at the record of every other Republic in this hemisphere 
and the world to know what would have happened. 



1398 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. SoURWiNE. Can you state in your opinion if the White report 
had been adopted exchange controls would have been inevitable in 
Cuba? 

Mr. Braden. That was my opinion. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do they have them there? 

Mr. Braden, No. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is the dollar still circulating freely in Cuba ? 

Mr. Braden. Pretty freely, although they have a little restriction 
on it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Is the dollar still worth a peso and vice versa ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. I think strictly speaking on a large transaction 
that the peso is a little bit off from the dollar, but I am not even sure 
of that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you have a copy of the White report ? 

Mr. Braden. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where the committee can get a copy ? 

Mr. Braden. I assume that the State Department and the Treasury 
.Department must have copies of that. Of course they have. 

Mr. SoTTRWiNE. Did you turn in the copy you had as Ambassador? 

Mr. Braden. That was left in the files in Habana. 

Mr. Sourwine. How long is the White report as a physical docu- 
ment ? 

Mr. Braden. As a physical document I remember its being about 
three-quarters of an inch to an inch thick ; the particular copy I had. 
I don't remember whether it was 

Mr. Sourwine. Is it legal size ? 

Mr. Braden. That copy I had I don't think was legal size. 

Mr. Sourwine. You know whether it was bound on the end or the 
side? 

Mr. Braden. It was bound, and I think it was bound in a paper 
cover. I am not sure of that. 

Mr. Sourwine. Mimeographed or typed? 

Mr. Braden. I think it was typed. 

Mr. Sourwine. That copy that you went over joaragraph by para- 
graph with Dr. Saladrigas, how long did it take you to go over it? 

Mr. Braden. I don't remember exactly because my method of work- 
ing with Dr. Saladrigas was we would meet at his office or mine. We 
would usually have lunch together at the Embassy or a restaurant in 
a private room. I would bring along an agenda of questions and we 
would spend 2 or 3 hours together going over these things. It was in 
one of those meetings. 

I would say in going over that report, and this is just recollection, 
we probably must have spent three-quarters of an hour to an hour. 
That didn't mean reading each paragraph. It meant reading the 
paragraphs or the phrases to which I objected, so we didn't have to 
read the whole report. 

Mr. Sourwine. You actually did go through it page by page ? 

Mr. Braden. Every objection I had I went through, and stated the 
paragraphs and the parts to which I objected. 

Mr. Sourwine. You wrote a letter to Secretary Hull about the 
White report. Do you have a copy of that ? 

Mr. Braden. No. I should clarify. I have gone through such 
personal files as I can get at, but I have only gotten back into 1945 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1399 

and a few odd files that Avere not in the hooks tliat my secretaries liave 
set apart for me of i)ersonal liles. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you have a cop3' of your dispatch to the State 
Department Avith re<iard to your action in the case of the White 
report ? 

Mr. Braden. I have not located a copy of that yet, and 1 may not 
liave it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have a copy of the State T^epartment's reply 
Avhieh you say im])lied that you must he in the ])ay of these hanks ? 

Mr. Braden. Xo. I don't lind anything. The nearest I have are 
some notes jotted down which are very summary on the subject. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You were asked who signed that rejdy, and you 
said you assumed it was signed by Hull. Do you have any better 
recollection on who signed it ? This was a document which insulted 
you by the implication that you must be in the pay of certain banks. 
I imagine you felt rather strongly. 

Can't you remember who signed it? 

Mr. Braden. I don't remember who signed it or whether it was 
signed. Sometimes these go out without signature. At the bottom 
"Cordell Hull'' is typed in, and nothing else. To really know the 
story you have got to get to the departmental files and get the initials 
on those liles in order to see who wrote it and who had to do with 
it. 

Mr. Grimes. Hull's name may have been on it? 

Mr. Braden. Yes, but I don't recall. 

Mv. Grimes. You don't recall^ 

Mr. Braden. No. I did not take any affront at Cordell Hull be- 
cause I knew well that he was not sendino; any such message as 
that. 

jNIr. SouRWiNE. After you got that reply you then did call in these 
bank managers ? 

JNIr. Braden. No. The reply had not reached me when I had the 
meeting. I waited until I sent my dispatch because I wanted to do 
it all on my own. I didn't think it proper for me to call in the bank 
managers until I had done it, and then to check and find out whether 
1 was right or wrong. 

Mr. Sourwine. So by the time you got the reply accusing you of 
having talked with these bank managers 



Mr. Braden. By then I had talked with them, but T didn't talk 
with them before I sent the message to the Department because I 
made a point of it. 

Mr. SoURWiNE. You have stated you got explicit orders to get back 
and change your attack on this and you refused to do that. Were 
you disciplined ever for that ? 

Mr. Braden. No, because I put it on the basis T was sent to Cuba 
to protect the interests of the United States and to maintain friend- 
ly relations with the Cubans. Self-evidently if this thing went 
throu<2;h and caused chaos, it would destrov frientllv relations. 

Therefore, I could not, as Ambassador, do it. 

Mr. Sourwine. If you had been completely in the wrong in the 
violation of that order, it is probable you would have been dis- 
ciplined, isn't it ? 

Mv. Braden. I think I would have been fired. I should have 
'kbeen if I had been wrong on that. 



1400 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You stated you got a copy of this White report be- 
fore you left to go to Cuba ? 

Mr. Braden. The afternoon before I left. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Presumably you read it on the way ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. After you got down there you checked on your 
original impressions which you say were bad ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. With whom did you check ? 

Mr. Braden. I just made my own check of what were the con- 
ditions in Cuba, what were the various situations that I felt might 
be bad. 

Mr. Sourwine. You didn't talk to anybody about it ? 

Mr. Braden. I talked to members of my staff, Mr. Briggs, who 
was counselor of the Embassy, I undoubtedly talked with Mr. Nufer. 
who was the economic counselor of the Embassy. 

Mr. Sourwine. You didn't go outside the Embassy? 

Mr. Braden. No. 

Mr. Sourwine. Until after your action? 

Mr. Braden. I didn't go outside of the Embassy until I went to the 
Prime Minister and said, "Look, I am very much worried about this. 
Here is the story." 

Mr. Sourwine. Jumping forward again, were you thoroughly 
familiar with all of the operations of the OSS? 

Mr. Braden. No. I was not at all familiar with them, because the 
OSS did not operate in Latin America. 

Mr. Sourwine. You made some statements about the OSS — I won't 
attempt to quote you, but they were generally derogatory. Were you 
talking about all the work of the OSS, or were you talking only about 
portions of it that you knew about ? In what area were you criticizing 
the OSS? 

Mr. Braden. I was criticizing them in a memorandum that I think 
I sent to Mr. Kussell on November 30, 1945. I said that I was informed 
that AEA — Office of American Republics Affairs — had made only 3 
or 4 requests of OSS for information or reports. Having its own 
analysis section, ARA requested the help of the OSS only in response 
to repeated proffers of assistance made by that organization which ex- 
plained that it had personnel available for such work. 

Because it was short handed, ARA availed itself of these offers on 
certain special emergency projects in order to expedite its work. 

Those requests were before I became Assistant Secretary. In the 
memorandum to Mr. Russell, I said : 

Pursuant to an early decision, OSS lias never had field representatives in Latin 
America. Therefore, it has had to rely principally on published material or such 
material as the State Department or other Government agencies made available 
to it. No action by ARA has been induced or influenced by the aforementioned 
facilities supplied by OSS. It is my conviction that the establishment of a 
large organization such as appears to be contemplated would be tantamount 
to duplicating the work which ARA was established to perform. 

Mr. Sourwine. Perhaps I misunderstood you. As I got the context 
of what you said, the OSS was inefficient and incompetent. 

I wanted to know in what area you were making that comment. If 
I misunderstood you, I am sorry. 

Mr. Grimes. Or what was the source of your opinion. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1401 

INIr. Braden. The source was my subordinates in that office, whom I 
called in and with whom I checked. 

For instance, 1 say that I can find no record of any request by ARA 
for political studies of current developments and trends in Latin 
America listed as point A under assignments now in procuress in the 
Latin American Section of OSS. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have particular complaint about some work 
that OSS had done? That it was inefficient? 

Mr. Braden. I am looking for that. It is in here. 

ARA did request a series of basic studies referred to in point C. Tliis request 
having been made more tlian 2 years ago when tlie OSS volunteered its services 
in any research whicli the Department would find helpful. 

So far a basic study of only one ccnmtry has been received in response to our 
request. 

Also, about 2 years ago the Department suggested to OSS that it might make 
a report on transportation and communication projects affecting the area of 
Bolivia and Paraguay. 

So far as I can determine this report was never completed. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. This is what you had reference to when you pre- 
viously referred to OSS ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

Mr. Sourwine. May I respectfully suggest that Mr. Braden be 
asked to offer that memorandum for the record in full ? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 369" and is as 

follows : ) 

Exhibit No. 369 

NOVEMBEB 3, 1945. 
A-R— Mr. Russell 

Operations of the OSS in Regabd to Latin America 

I am informed that ARA has made only 3 or 4 requests of OSS for informa- 
tion or reports. Having its own analysis section, ARA requested the help of 
the OSS only in response to repeated proffers of assistance made by that organ- 
ization, which explained that it had personnel available for such work. Because 
it was short handed ARA availed itself of these offers on certain si>ecial emer- 
gency projects in order to expedite its work.^ 

Pursuant to an early decision, OSS has never had field representatives in 
Latin America ; therefore, it has had to rely principally upon published material 
or such material as the State Department or other Government agencies made 
available to it. 



1 With reference to that part of the Intelligence and Research Report on the functions 
of Latin America Division, tlie followini; is pertinent : 

( 1 ) I can find no record of an.v request Ijy ARA for "political studies of current develop- 
ments and trends In Latin America" listed as point (a) under assignments now in progress 
in the Latin American Section of OSS. Political studies are in any case already a function 
of ARA. 

(2) ARA did request the series of basic country studies referred to in point (c), this 
request having been made more than 2 years ago when the OSS volunteered its services 
in any research which the Department would find helpful. So far a basic study on only 
one country has been received in response to our request. 

(3) Also, about 2 years ago, the Department suggested to OSS that it might make a 
report on transportation and communication projects affecting the area of Bolivia and 
Paraguay. So far as I can determine, this report was never completed. 

(4) In connection with special work in assembling and reviewing information on the 
Argentine question, last January the Department asked the OSS to assist in regard to 
certain problems, notably the pro-Nazi press in Argentina, of which that agency had com- 
plete files. At the present time the Department is also using the services of some of tlie 
I>ersonnel from the Latin American Section for an emergency jiroject of similar cliaractoi'. 
Here again it should be noted that ARA lacks personnel to perfdrin these special rush jol)s. 

(5) Other reports which the OSS has given to the State Dejiartineiit have been entirely 
voluntary. Although they have been read l)y desk officers with the same interest tliat 
would be attached to any report on conditions in Latin America, they are not considered to 
have contributed information which was not already available to the Department or to 
have affected the formulation of departmental policy. 



1402 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

No action by ARA has been induced or influenced by the aforementioned facili- 
ties supplies by OSS. 

It is my conviction that the establishment of a large organization such as 
appears to be contemplated would be tantamount to duplicating the work 
which ARA was established to perform (see p. X-1 of Department Order 1301) 
and for which it is far better equipped since most of our oflBcers have had actual 
field experience and all of them are acquainted with the reporting sources and, 
therefore, can far better evaluate the information received than can the pro- 
posed OflBce of Intelligence and Research. 

To have such duplication of effort can only result in confusion for all con- 
cerned. 

So long as the much needed and competent personnel is made available to ARA 
(conceivably a few of the OSS experts could be absorbed by ARA Research and 
Analysis Section) and a system is established whereby information respecting 
Latin America but emanating elsewhere in the world is promptly made avail- 
able to this oflSce, the need for the proposed new division is not evident. 

What we do need is a competent counterespionage organization, such as has 
been supplied during the war by the FBI operating at all times under the direc- 
tion of the Department and our resi^ective diplomatic missions. This is a press- 
ing problem since FBI plans a radical reduction or elimination of its activities 
by December 31. 

SPEuille Braden. 
A-Br: SBraden : JW 

The Chairman. The staff will sit down with Mr. Braden and go 
over these matters which are pertinent. 

Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Yon referred to the meetings and discussions in re- 
gard to the proposed Office of Eesearch and Intelligence. 

Do you recall whetlier any one was there besides Acheson, Thorpe, 
Matthews, Henderson, Russell, and yourself ? 

Mr. Braden. There were some others present. I have forgotten 
who. It was a big meeting. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Were they officials or clerical personnel ? 

Mr. Braden. They were high officials in the Department, either As- 
sistant Secretaries or directors of divisions or offices. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Were minutes of that meeting kept ? 

Mr. Braden. I haven't the remotest idea. I didn't see anybody tak- 
ing minutes. There surely must be a memorandum by someone, Mr. 
Acheson or someone. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You spoke of meetings with 3 to 20 people with the 
same authority as yourself, or the same color of authority as yourself. 
You were at that time Assistant Secretary of State ? 

Mr, Braden. Yes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Can't you tell us any of the people, these 3 to 20 
people, who had the same authority as you ? 

Mr. Braden. This tramways case I just related : I don't remember 
who was in on that. I remember one case. I don't know whether it 
was that meeting. I think it it was the meeting on the tramways, al- 
though I can't for the life of me understand why they shoulcl be 
present. 

It might have been another meeting, I remember one of these big 
meetings in which my office was filled with people and that Ralph 
Bunche came in. I don't even remember what his office was. 

I think he was with Dependent Areas in 1945. It might have been 
some other meeting. I remember his being there because he has be- 
come famous since then. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. As Assistant Secretary there were not many people 
who had the same authority as you ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1403 

My. Braden. They exercised it the minute I tried to send out a tele- 
orani or an instruction without having their initials on it. They im- 
niediately acquired the same authority. 

]SIr. (Ikimes. You mean the same authority in a ])articuhir matter? 

ISIr. Hkaden. Yes ; they didn't have the same overall authority. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You have spoken of reports which you sent in from 
Colombia, from Cuba, and from Argentina. Are those also going to 
be available? 

Mr. l^RADEN. I haven't the reports. I have this one of agenda for 
Washington that I got from the State Department. I have 1 or 2 
other rejwrts that I happen to have in my files, but it is mostly my 
notes and minutes. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. You have a fairly thick file that you referred to 
when talking about Colombia. Would that be made available ? 

Mv. Bbaden. Whatever I have. Everything I have said and any- 
thing I have is available. 

]Mr. Sourwixe. You have referred several times to young Soviets 
coming into meetings. You used the pronoun "they," "they," "they." 

I wish you would try to name any of the names who were young 
Soviets or who were the "they's" you referred to, 

Mr. Grimes. Didn't you refer to the meeting as a Soviet? 

Mr. Braden. Yes. My use of that — perhaps I misled you. I used 
the expression that it was a "young Soviet" because I was so irritated 
that, instead of having a chain of authority corresponding to the 
responsibility and being a Presidential appointee and working as 
the Assistant Secretary of State where I could carry through, I had 
to have these meetings with everybody in them having a chance to 
talk. 

Mr. Sourewine. Then did I understand you did not mean to say 
any person was a young Soviet ? 

Mr. Braden. No. 

Mr. Sourwixe. If you spoke of young Soviets coming into a meet- 
ing, you misspoke yourself ? 

Sir. Braden. I didn't mean Communists. I don't know who were 
Communists. 

Mr. Grimes. A soviet is a meeting? 

Mr. Braden. Yes ; that is the reason I used the expression. 

Mr. Sourwixe. The word has a somewhat different meaning. Do 
you usually use the word to mean meeting? 

Mr. Bradex. No; I used that in a sense that these people were 
against private enterprise, against our system and way of life gen-^ 
erally. 

Mr. Sourwixe. These people? Who? 

Mr. Bradex. The ones who came. 

Mr. Sourwixe. Who were they? 

Mr. Bradex. I can't give you the names. In my statement that I 
have asked to put in here I refer to an unidentifiable "they." That 
unidentifiable "they" covers all of those people. 

The Chairmax. AVe want to thank you for your cooperation and we 
feel sure your evidence has been very beneficial. 

I want to instruct the staff to make a request of the State Depart- 
ment for the record that has been testified about here his morning. 



1404 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Further, I want the staff to sit down with Mr. Braden and go 
through this material and select that which is pertinent to this hearing 
and have it made a part of our record. 

(The material follows at the end of Mr. Braden's testimony.) 

Do you have anything else ? 

I have been informed by counsel that you have another statement 
that you would like to make before we recess. 

You may do so. 

Mr. Braden. I would be happy to make it if I may. 

As set forth in my December 22, 1953, testimony before the Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee, the very life of these United States 
may be destroyed by two interrelated threats : 

I. The Moscow-inspired conspiracy to destroy onr country by spreading com- 
munism throughout tlie rest of this hemisphere : 

II. The fact that this undi^rmining of our national security has been counte- 
nanced and even, at times, abetted by our own Government. This has been due 
largely to the invasion of Washington by shrewd and skillful individuals and 
groups, who hold and propagate ideas antagonistic to representative constitu- 
tional government and private property and enterprise. 

The first danger is immediate and grave, increasing and spreading. 

The second danger is less spectacular and the threat to our security 
is neither so quickly nor easily accessible. Yet, in the end it is a 
greater clanger than No. 1. 

The second — i. e,, the internal danger — involves what has been called 
the "inevitability of gradualness*'^ — ^i. e., the almost imperceptible de- 
struction, bit by bit, of the principles on which the United States 
of America was founded. By slow degrees those individuals and 
groups, whom I have described as invading the Federal Government — 
and in particular, our foreign operations — are corroding the Constitu- 
tion and bill of rights. They would have us renounce the very corner- 
stone of our system of Government : That God made man in his own 
image and endowed him, as an individual person, with certain un- 
alienable rights; that government is the servant and not the master 
of the people. 

Instead, they propagate State interventionism with its corollaries 
of corruption and the creation of class prejudice. They spread col- 
lectivist ideologies, both in our internal and foreign affairs. 

The majority of these invaders are neither Communists nor fellow 
travelers. But they have an affinity for extremist nostrums and are 
unwittingly the dupes or instruments of Soviet-directed communism, 
which they thus aid and abet. 

Formerly, when we lived somewhat apart from the rest of the world, 
it was easier both to adhere to and repulse attacks on our pristine 
principles. Science, and especially the acceleration of transportation 
and communications, have erased much of the protective insulation we 
formerly had. As a result, we are assailed presently not only by Soviet 
expansionism and Moscow-directed communism, but by all manner of 
global collectivist theories. 

The generation of these ideas, so utterly counter to our system, and 
so adverse to our enlightened rational self-interest, was augmented by 
World War II and is now facilitated by multilateral diplomacy oper- 
ating through and in the numerous, uncontrollable and often obscure 
councils and committees of such organizations as the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States. The latter has become sort 
of a combined affiliate and subsidiary of the world body. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1405 

The 72 niTiltilateral internatioiinl orijniiiziitions. in wliich tho ITnited 
States i)aiticipates, as they proliferate both their structures and activi- 
ties — hirgely at the expense of United States taxpayers — are imposing 
superstatisms, over and above our National Government. 

Superstatisms are worse tlian the purely national variety, which, at 
least, may retain some measure of patriotism and popular control. To 
the extent peoples come to accept superstatism and the collectivistic 
ideas which flow therefrom, they will be easier prey for Moscow's 
ambitions to impose world hegemony. 

The greatest danger to the security and permanence of this Republic 
is that these statist and snperstatist ideas, originating abroad, have 
been absorbed — often nnconsciously — by so many United States offi- 
cials, who in the aggregate exercise extraordinary infkience, by reason 
of their employment in sensitive areas of Government, including the 
De]3artment of State. 

It is my impression that amongst these people, there are relatively 
few out-and-out Communists. But this is no reason to relax our 
precautions, because these few^ are so fanatically dedicated, and so 
trained in all the arts of clecejition, as to make them far more dangerous 
than mere numbers would indicate. 

Moreover, they are rigidly disciplined and directed. Worst of all, 
they are able adroitly to inspire, guide, and impel the state-interven- 
tionists and "do-gooders," the misguided idealists and ignorant, to 
pursue collectivist and State-interventionist ideologies, which slowly 
but inevitably evolve into some form of totalitarianism. 

These ideologies, given time, will destroy our representative con- 
stitutional Government, its religious and spiritual content and the gen- 
eral welfare built by our system of private property and individual 
initiative. 

In my capacity as chairman of the New York City Anticrime Com- 
mittee, I have observed that, in organized crime, the gangsters, even the 
top ones, could not themselves alone keep the "system" going. It is 
the politicians and authorities, labor and business leaders, and many 
others in different walks of life, who through cupidity or for favors, 
tlirough ignorance, apathy or for other reasons, either aid and abet the 
hoodlums or tolerate continuance of the rackets. It is these elements 
of the general public, who knowingly or unknowingly sustain the 
"system,"' which otherwise would collapse. 

Our local. State, and Federal Governments often have found it im- 
possible to uncover and obtain proof, indict and convict notorious 
gangsters for the outrages they are known to have committed. 

Sometimes, the real potentates of organized crime are not even men- 
tioned or recognized to l)e what they are. Law enforcement au- 
thorities, even with full competency and integrity, are unable to name 
names and pinpoint facts. 

Instead, they are reduced to the pathetically inadequate measures 
of imprisoning, for tax evasion or perjury, a few hoodlums, who, more 
often than not, are of minor category. 

The New York City Anticrime Committee has found the most — 
perhaps the only — effective way to combat organized crime is to place 
and keep before the public the patterns of what has been or is now 
going on in the rackets. It is only by this procedure of exposing the 
patterns of the waterfront, labor pension funds, perishable foods. 



1406 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

building trades, harness racing, et cetera, that we are getting results in 
New York City. 

Legislation alone will not do the job, 

I believe a close analogy can be drawn in this particular between 
organized crime and the assault on our security through the infiltra- 
tion and collectivization, bit by bit, of our Government. In either 
case, the patterns must be exposed before any substantial or lasting 
cure can be effected. So soon as the patterns are exposed and elimi- 
nated, the malefactors, be they gangsters or subversives, will be para- 
lyzed and impotent. This will be true even if they remain unnamed 
and free from prosecution. 

As I said on December 22, swarms of state-interventionists have 
been injected or absorbed into the agencies having to do with our for- 
eign operations. Behind them, in the wings, developing and pushing 
plans, infiltrating not only our political structures, but education, the 
press, and elsewhere, exists an unidentifiable, but nonetheless effective, 
"they." 

Here is where we may expect to find the dangerous Communists and 
traitors. "They" are diabolically ingenious and effective in both plans 
and methods. Get rid of one purportedly top echelon group — as was 
done in the trials before Judge Medina — and substitutes take over. 

The state-interventionists and "do-gooders" often turn out to be 
puppets who can be juggled by "they." If the United States, and 
therefore civilization, are to survive, this anonymous "they" must 
be rendered impotent. 

But how may this be done, if only on rare occasions we are able to 
expose and convict those who form this "they" ? 

To seek out and prosecute those who, knowingly or unknowingly, 
are merely the followers or dupes of "they," at most means getting 
relatively insignificant sinners and may entail our punishing some 
witless but innocent individuals. 

If only now and again we are able to name names and pinpoint facts, 
how are we to block the "they" programs? Plow are we to defend 
ourselves against the insidious Communist and collectivist infiltra- 
tions and perversions? 

We cannot and will not resort to totalitarian or any other prac- 
tices which would deny the very principles and freedoms to which we 
are devoted. 

The valuable and patriotic work of this subcommittee, of course, 
should be continued. That is imperative. But I respectfully sug- 
gest that, irrespective of how many Communists and traitors you 
expose and how important they may be, by reason of our aforede- 
scribed inabilities, the "system" which threatens our security will not 
be destroyed or even materially weakened. We must develop and 
employ other measures and weapons for our defense. 

I urge that instead of attempting in the first instance to name names 
and pinpoint facts, we endeavor to expose those broad patterns within 
the area of foreign operations which demonstrate the existence of ex- 
otic influences and the degree to which these United States have 
departed from the principles laid down by the Founding Fathers. 

In this latter connection, I wish parenthetically to emphasize that 
George Washington's Farewell Address enunciates a simple and brave 
foreign policy. It is as wise and valid today as when it was written. 
So long as we are guided by that address, no Communist, even if he 
penetrates our Government, will be able to harm us very much. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1407 

I Avisli to interpolate tliat in prepnrinjj; for tliis hearin*;- 1 liavc been 
able to review only a few of my personal liles and none of my official 
ones, which are in the Department or the several embassies where I 
ser\e(l. 

Therefore, I mnst often depend more on memory than documents. 
Nevertheless, I hope my testimony may assist this distinguished sub- 
committee to search for and expose some of the broad patterns to 
which I have referred. 

You will tind. I am sure, that these patterns are measurably inter- 
related, soPiieti^mes overlapping, and converge to favor the ends sought 
by the Soviet. 

When you gentlemen have uncovered and com]:)leted a thorough 
study of a number of these patterns, I believe the Congress, under 
your guidance, may competently prescribe such measures as will 
bring about a complete cure. 

In my opinion, that cure will come when the American people and 
their Government, with a dedication equal to or surpassing that of 
the Communists, return to and abide by the basic principles of these 
United States, as set forth in the Declaration of Independence, the 
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and, in foreign affairs, the Farewell 
Address. 

The Chairman. Thank you, INIr. Ambassador. 

At this time the committee will stand recessed. We will reconvene 
again in executive session this afternoon. 

(Thereupon, at 12:30 a. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 
subject to call of the Chair.) 

(The following material was supplied by Mr. Braden after consul- 
tation with the subcommittee staff as instructed by Chairman Jenner :) 

Exhibit No. 370 

List of Dispatches Feom Embassy at Habana 

Date Subject 

April 28. 1944 Communism in Cuba. 

March 6, 1944 Transmitting copy of Nueva Historia de los Paises 

Coloniales y Dependientes 

February 28, 1944 Cultural interchange betw,een the U. S. S. R. and Cuba. 

January 25, 1944 Change of name and change of tactics of Cuban Com- 
munist Party. 

August 9, 1943 Congress of the CTAL held in Habana from July 26 

to August 1, 1943. 

November 20, 1943 Reaction of Juan Arevalo, Maritime Workers' Union 

leader, to increasing Communist influence in labor 
unions. 

April 1, 1944 Dr. Domingo R. Tamargo, ex-secretary of justice, joins 

the Partido Socialists Popular (Communist I'arty). 

March 16, 1944 IManifesto issued by the Partido Socialists Popular 

(Communist Party) advocating national union. 

June 9, 1944 Relations of Grau with the Communist Party. 

October 14, 1943 Past efforts of President Batista to get rid of the Com- 
munist Party. 

August 24, 1943 Couriei- service between Mexico City and Cuba main- 
tained by Spanish Communist Party. 

August 9, 1944 Conversation with Juan Arevalo, secretary of the Na- 
tional Jlaritime Workers Federation (FO^NIN). 

September 4, 1943 Resignation of Ramon Leon Renteria and ,Juau Arevalo 

from Conferacion de Trabajadores de Cuba. 

September 30, 1943 Proposed contribution of Cuban sugar workers to the 

war effort of the United Nations; transmitting copy 
of address to Ambassador Braden at closing session 
of fourth Congress of Sugar Workers of Cuba. 



1408 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 371 

HAliANA, FK!!KUARY 23, 1944. 

Subject : Recent contact established between the Soviet Legation and the 

Cuban Army. 
The honorable the Secretary of State, 

Washingtoiu D. C. 
Sir : I have the honor to report to the Department that the legal attache has 
just informed me that last February 14 an individual connected with the official 
Cuban Army magazine El Cuatro de Septiembre requested Nora Chegodaeva, 
the Soviet Legation press attache, to furnish him with 15 photographs and 4 or 
5 articles for the Army publication. They made arrangements for a person of 
editorial talents to visit the Soviet Legation and choose the most suitable material. 
It is the opinion of the legal attache, in which I concur, that this arrange- 
ment offers an excellent opportunity for the U. S. S. R., through its Legation 
in Habana, to offer propaganda to the Cuban Army in a concealed but effective 
form. 

Respectfully yours, 

Spruille Braden. 



Exhibit No. 372 

[Draft] 
A-R: Mr. Russell. 

Urgent Need of Strengthening Both Department and Foreign Service 

The Department has before it at present two important projects which are 
receiving priority consideration — the establishment of a peacetime informational 
and cultural service, and the establishment of a coordinated intelligence service. 
Without minimizing the importance of these projects, it is submitted that there 
is an even more urgent need for strengthening both the Department and the For- 
eign Service. 

The informational-cultural program and the intelligence program envisage the 
employment of hundreds of additional personnel and the appropriation of millions 
of dollars. Yet these projects can only operate successfully in the measure in 
which they are guided and implemented by the four geographical political offices 
of the State Department, and by our diplomatic missions in the field. It is hance 
more important and more urgent that we strengthen and develop the existing 
machinery than it is to establish this proposed new machinery. 

During the brief period that I have been in the Department it has become appar- 
ent that our operations are very seriously hampered by personnel and space limi- 
tations at home, and by an acute shortage of personnel in the field. The present 
programs would superimpose the weight of added tasks and responsibilities on the 
present sound but underdeveloped foundation. It is my belief that this cannot 
and should not be done until we have repaired the foundation itself. 

There is nothing the matter with our present organization that cannot be 
remedied if we obtain funds and personnel. I am not suggesting another reorgan- 
ization of the Department. Far from it. In my opinion the present departmental 
organization is administratively sound, and that with respect to policy the ar- 
rangement regarding geographical offices is correct. The backbone of these policy- 
making offices is the "country desk officer." These officers are generally well 
equipped and possess sufficient detailed knowledge of the areas they handle. 
Give them adequate tools, including advisory and research facilities, and ade- 
quate immediate supervision as is provided for in the divisional setups by regions, 
and the Department has machinery fully capable of handling day-to-day problems 
that arise and of furnishing policy recommendations to the respective geo- 
graphic area directors, the Assistant Secretaries and other ranking officers of 
the Department. 

The State Department and the Foreign Service have recently been subjected 
to renewed attack by the press, and the current Senate investigation has brought 
about a further impairment of public confidence in our organization. Practically 
everyone seems to agree that something must be done — and done promptly — 
but there is apparently much confusion regarding where the weaknesses lie and 
where to attack them. Some assert that the Department and Foreign Service 
must be better understood at home and our policies must be made clear abroad, 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1409 

so that the most important iinmedi.-ito need is to eslablish a stroiifj; information 
service, snpiileniented l).v a cultural service, with counselors for public informa- 
tion and staffs sometimes eipial in size to the present regular Forei^'u Service 
staffs to assist them. Others demand more counselors for econonnc affairs 
assisted by technicians in agriculture, l.-ihor, geology, forestry, etc. Still otliers 
recommend embarking on a worldwide intelligence service — and then undermine 
the prospects of success of any intelligence service by describing the kind of 
organization tlu'y tliink we should have. Still others reconnnend better allow- 
ances, a Foreign Service building plan, etc. INIany of these suggestions are sound, 
but few of them have devoted suthcient attention to surveying our present ecpiip- 
ment or estimating what that equipment means in order to function effectively. 

It is time to take stock of what we already have and to determine the needs 
of the existing organization. It is time to strengthen that organization, to 
vitalize it, to centralize responsibility, and then to consider what in the way 
of new organization should be added to it. It is not, in my opinion, the time to 
set up new, or parallel, or superimposed organizations. Specifically, before we 
go about the employment for service at home and abroad of hundreds of addi- 
tional persons to undertake additional or specialized functions, important though 
those may be, we shtmld overhaul and strengthen the sound present foundation 
and give to its component parts authority and bac-king conunensurate with their 
responsibility. This will require (1) that the fine of responsibility in policy- 
making tlow from the Secretary and Assistant Secretaries to the four political 
geographic oflices. It should include reatlirmation of the proposition that these 
ofiices must have the final decision (subject of course to the respective Assistant 
Secretaries) in matters involving decisions on foreign policy. The technical 
divisions and offices should perform functions primarily advisory in character, 
(2) personnel — adequately paid — to staff l)oth the Department and the field. 

In a recent top-secret memorandum prepared for the Secretary's Staff Com- 
mittee I expressed the opinion (with respect to problems facing us in our Latin 
American relations) that we cannot expect to cope successfully with them 
unles.s — 

"1. Policy decisions in all fields affecting relations with the other American 
Kepublics are centered in AKA, equipped with the necessary personnel and inte- 
grated space. 

"2. We have an enlarged and improved Foreign Service, 

"a. We must have able and experienced chiefs of mission, adequately com- 
pensated. 

"b. These competent ambassadors must be given policy directives and responsi- 
bility, with corresponding authority. They must exercise unquestioned control 
over all agents and agencies of our Government in each country. Tliey nu;st be 
fully .supported l)y the Department. 

'c. We have many able Foreign Service Officers who are discouraged by low 
pay, inadequate allowances, slow promotions and unwi.se policies during the war. 
The career must be made attractive, deadwood eliminated, and a drive made 
to get in new men of the right type. 

"d. Officers of the Department serving in ARA should be interchangeable 
with Foreign Service ofiicers, and should be required to perform service abroad 
at mininuun intervals. (Interchangeability would likewise be desirable between 
departmental and Foreign Service clerks). Technical and specialist personnel 
serving in nonpolitical divisions of the Department, and in other departments and 
agencies, should be available through flexible administrative procedure for 
temporary assignment to Latin America. 

"e. The Foreign Service is not adequately luiderstood either by the American 
people or by the Congress. Definite efforts should be made by the Department, 
through the press and other mediums of public opinion, to describe the work 
of the Foreign Service. Consideration might also be given to the assignment 
of a Foreign Service liaison officer to handle congressional relations." 

To illustrate the type of obstacles to efficient operation encountered during 
my 10 weeks in the Department I may cite the following: 

(1) Inadequate si)ace for ARA. This was the subject of a recent memoran- 
dum giving .specific information regarding our space needs. 

(2) Return to ARA and the Latin American field of officers with broad 
previous experience and demonstrated capacit.v for service in that ai'ea. Two 

months ago a list of ai)proximately such officers was submitted to FP. It 

has not been possible thus far to obtain the relea.se from service in Europe, the 
Near and Middle East, Asia, et cetera, of a single one of these officers. We are 
of course, prepared to surrender to other areas officers with similar specialized 

32»18°— 54— pt. 19 5 



1410 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

backgronnd In those areas in Latin America ; for example, an officer now iii 
Cuba who had a fluent knowledge of Chinese. 

(3) Notwithstanding abundant personnel seeking entry into the proposed 
informational-cultural and intelligence service, it has proved virtually impossible 
to bring the staff of ARA to the level already authorized or to fill new positions 
urgently required. I am by no means unaware of the splendid collaboration 
received in providing a special staff to handle the preparation of our case 
respecting Argentina, although it is pointed out that this required special di- 
rectives and was handled on an extraordinary basis. In the case of the special 
work undertaken in respect to the problem of alien enemy internees brought 
from the other American Republics, we have not thus far been able to obtain 
the service of a handful of research assistants, notwithstanding the fact that in- 
numerable persons in that category are understood to be available from (.)SS 
ranks. Moreover, our operations in ARA are somewhat harassed by the efforts 
of the interim ex-OSS organization to duplicate certain research and analysis 
functions already being carried out satisfactorily by ARA. 

(4) Notwithstauding the theoretical interchageability of ARA and field per- 
sonnel, efforts over a period of weeks to send two ARA officers to the field have 
been altogether unsuccessful, and we are now informed that "it is regretted that 
it is not possible to consider such an assignment in view of the present lack of 
funds for that purpose." This is an intolerable situation completely defeating 
the purpose of legislation which has long been on the books. 



Exhibit No. 373 
quotations feom the daily woeker 

July 22, 1945 : " 'Imperialism' — how often have you read that word in these 
pages? And how often have you stopped to think of what it really means? * * * 
It was at Sewell, in a mine owned by the Braden Copper Co., an Ameincan cor- 
poration which I will tell you more about in a moment. * * * And what is the 
Braden Copper Co.? It was formed in the First World War by William Braden, 
an American mining engineer. His son, who is connected with the company 
today, is none other than Spruille Braden, the former American Ambassador 
to Cuba and the pi'esent American Ambassador to Argentina." 

July 2u, 1945: "Mr. Braden went as the 'appeasement of (sic) Ambassador,' as 
the figure who symbolized the new American policy of trying to win the Argen- 
tina Fascists over by recognizing them, coddling them at Mexico City, and putting 
down, red carpets for them at San Francisco." 

August IS, 1945 : "But there is no word that the United States Government 
or its Ambassador (Braden) is in touch with Patria Libre, the committee rep- 
resenting all democratic Argentine parties including the Commvmists * * *, And 
Patria Libre is less enthusiastic than some groups in this country over the great 
'achievements' of Spruille Braden. It would prefer to see us get tough with 
Peron." 

August 28, 1945 : "While Braden is identified with opposition to the Farrell- 
Peron dictatorship, he is also, like Rockefeller, identified with powerful monop- 
olist interests in Latin America. We should therefore not be surprised if our 
neighbors view with suspicion the type of men we appoint to supervise Latin 
American affairs." 

The newspaper A Classe Operaria, published in Rio de Janiero as the official 
news organ of the Communist Party of Brazil, in its first issue published on 
March 9, 1946, printed the text of the statement of the Communist Party of 
Brazil on the blue book. The statement reads : 

"The executive committee of the Communist Party of Brazil, in a meeting held 
on February 16, 1946, made a detailed study of the statements contained in the 
so-called blue book made public by the Department of State of the United States. 
After a complete discussion of the subject, the executive committee concluded 
that the cited document is a definite indication of attempts being made by the 
most reactionary forces of investment capital to create an atmosphere of disorder 
in the continent assuming ostensibly a position of support or criticism of Latin 
American governments and political currents, and preaching foi'eign interven- 
tion against governments which they do not favor, for the purpose of protecting 
their interests and to stop the march of our people along the road of progress 
and democracy. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1411 

"2. The coniniitttH' f«»uiul, in addition to tlio altovf, jiistitioatioii for the con- 
stant warniniis made l).v the Coninninist Tarty of Iirazil airainst the preiiaration 
for war in Latin America by imperialist forces, as contained in tlie i)oliti<al 
manifesto read to the last plenary session of the national connnittec and other 
declarations ma<ie suhseipiently by members of this execntive commiltee. 

"3. The execntive committee is tlrndy convinced that the document imhlislied 
iiy the I)ei)artment of State of tlie United States is a syni]»tom of tiie seiiousness 
of the iiitt>rimiierialist liiilit in the continent, wliicli is focused principally in 
the River Plate area, and that of the prt'text of defendini:; democracy i)repara- 
tions are beiu.u made for tlu> breakin,:;' of diplomatic relations by American 
nations witli the Arjientine Republic as the first step for foreiun iidervention and 
war a.i-'ainst that country. A war of that type, undertaken directly by ai,'ents 
of investment capital, sndi as Uraden and otliers, would undonbledly be an 
tnijust war, intei-imperialist, directed mainly auainst democracy and the inde- 
pendeiue of the Latin American people, iiaviiii;- as its particular olgective the 
annilnlation of tlie lai)or and popular movements in our countries. 

"In addition, the problem of Argentina, raised by the Department of State 
outside of the United Nations Organization, constitutes an attempt to form a bloc 
of Anieri< an nations, wliich is contrary to the interests of our pe(»ples and a 
threat to tlie cause of world peace. 

"4. As it applies to Brazil, the so-called blue book only confirms the well-known 
role of inte.uralismo as the vantiuard of the fifth column directly connected with 
the agents of the Axis in otir land, and it is only straiifie that better known names, 
such as that of Felinto. Mnller, and others, were not mentioned. The refei-ence 
to the Falanjtist Aunos also confirmed what we have consistently stated concern- 
inix the role of spies and traitors undertaken by the Ambassadors of Spain and 
I'ortugal in Brazil. 

","). The Communist I'arfy of Brazil has alwa.vs supi)orted ami will continue 
to support the tiuhf of all peoples for democracy, for civil riirhts a.ii^ainst reac- 
tionaries and Fascists, a.uainst the cruelties of the police and concentration 
camps. At the same time, however, it reaflBrms its position of unalterable de- 
fender of the principle of self-determination by the peoples, a democratic victor.v 
included in the Atlaidic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations, and 
sfrenufhened by the victory over fascism, and that it is therefore read.v to con- 
tinue its tight to gnarantee the Latin American people the right to decide for 
themselves all (luestions of domestic politics, using the weapons of democracy, 
such as the Argentine people already have, free from any foreign influences, 
since we know that the victory of democracy in a country is a result of the 
struggle of its own people and cannot come from the outside. 

'•Therefore, the Communist Party of Brazil warns all our people, as well as 
our brothers in other countries, that it is terribly disastrctus to stimulate by any 
means an intervenfioiusf policy, which can be of interest only to the strongest 
nation in the continent, the only one capable of undertaking, econonucally and 
militarily, i)ractical and efficient intervention." 

Rio de Janeiro. Febiniary 16, 194(5. 

The Executive Commii ike of rHE Commumst Party of Buazil. 



ExiriniT Xo. .S74 

Rio DE Janeiro, Jftvunrti 2^, lU'/d. 
Unrestricted. 
No. 4nso. 
Subject : Tribuna Popular on Braden's Speech. 

The Charge d'Affaires a. i. has the honor to transmit a clipping of an edito- 
rial in Tribuna Popular, Communist daily, on Secretary Braden's most recent 
speech. There follows an abstract of this editorial, in its turn quoting liberally 
from Luiz Carlos Prestes' speech at the closing session of the Cimimunist Party 
"pleno" (See Despatch No. 4017 of January l(i). 

"Nothing better than INIr. Itraden's latest speech shows how rigid Prestes is 
in warning us against the danger of a war with the Argentine people, in which 
Brazil would be involved by colonizing capital. The language of the diplomat of 
the Braden Bank family is ever more threateinng. in his efforts to lead local 
opposition (mce more into armed struggle, which would be an excuse for even 
worse. Argentina is divided into two inimical and univconcilable factions, 
driven by hate, and on the side of one of them is openly placed the former and 



1412 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

famous Ambassador of Cuba, encouraging it, pushing it on, as if to say, 'Go 
ahead, friends, for liere we are, the colossus, to help you. Buenos Aires is the 
new citadel of Nazism, since Berlin fell, and you are the new army of democ- 
racy organized to conquer it. Free the world from Nazism. Count on us and 
on the rest of the American countries.' * * * 

"But does this Nazi-Fascist Argentina really exist in 1946, enslaving and 
oppressing its people, and threatening Brazil, for example, with its armies on a 
war footing? Prestes made this point very clear in his closing speech at the 
pleno of the Communist Party. 'We see,' he said, 'that there is a strong pressure 
of monopolistic colonizing capital in Argentina, where there is a Government of 
the type called "South American," a military dictatorship. In that country, 
linancial capital is today the most intransigent fighter against that Government — 
a reactionary Government, there is no doubt, but which is generally presented 
by Mr. Braden as a Nazi Government. Well, companions and fellow citizens, 
we all know that the Nazi residues in Argentina are no more widespread or 
dangerous than in Brazil. We know that the economic roots of Nazism survive 
in Argentina as in our country, perhaps deeper and more widespread here. 
This does not prevent our country from pacifically moving toward democracy, 
without benefit of any aid from Messrs. Braden and Berle, so intent upon pro- 
tecting us with their belated democratic zeal. * * * 

" 'Mr. Braden, that most recent disciple of Ruy Barbosa, attempts to create 
'Conditions for civil war in Argentina, in short, and, by means of intrigue, a 
possible war between our people and the Argentine people. This war will be an 
imperialistic war, of struggle for raw materials, for wheat and meat markets, 
a war between English and American financial capital. * * * 

" 'Yes, there is a reactionary government in Argentina. * * * But Chiang 
Kai-chek's government is many times more reactionary than the Farrell govern- 
ment. * * *' 

"There is a factor that should not be lost sight of in the Argentine case * * * 
the old connections between Argentina and England. * * * The Americans were 
always in a minority (there), thus the traditional opposition between the 
(Argentine) Chancellery and the State Department in Washington, * * * In 
1938, at the Lima Conference, Chancellor Jose Maria Cantilo, today an admirer of 
Mi\ Braden's, scandalized all America, declaring that Argentina was a European 
nation on the continent." 

Copy to Embassy at Buenos Aires. 



Exhibit No. 375 

Newspaper Accounts of Speeches by Prestes 

Diretrizes, Federal District. Rio, January 18, 1946 : "A war is being manipu- 
lated between Argentina and Brazil." 

Tribuna Popular, Federal District, Rio, January 19, 1946: "The imperialists 
prepare a war between Brazil and Argentina." 

Tribuna Popular, Federal District, Rio, February 3, 1946 : "Prestes submits 
his speech before a woman's conference." 

Tribuna Popular, Federal District, Rio, May 8, 1946: "Communist Party on 
alert to Nacuo." 

Tribuna Popular, Federal District, Rio, March 3, 1946: "Reactionaries and 
Fascists conspire against order." 

Brazil-Portugal, Federal District, Rio, April 28, 1946 : "Universities stirred up 
against communism." 

(Above clippings attached to file in BA.) 



Exhibit No. 376 

January 23, 1946. 
A-Br/S— Mr. Spaeth, 
BA— Mr. Mein. 

Statement of Luiz Carlos Prestes on this Government's Argentine Policy 

On January 13 Luiz Carlos Prestes, Secretary General and head of the Com- 
munist Party of Brazil, in addressing a plenary session of the Communist Party 
referred to the coups in Venezuela, Brazil and Haiti, and the threat of one in 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1413 

Ecxiador, as liaviiii: heoii hacked by "cdlonizint: capital" attoinptiuji to provoiit 
tlie (lemofratizatinii and 'Vcoiiomic einaiuipatioii" of thoso countries. He then 
went on to state: "Now they are plauniny; one more sinister maneuver. On the 
pretext tliat it is necessary to free Argentina from tiie claws of fascism, they are 
attemptinii to force the Brazilian people into a bloody conflict with the Argen- 
tine people. It is not purely accidental that Mr. Braden takes such an interest 
in the 'fascist dictatorship' in Aruentina, while he says nothinir alxtut the situa- 
tion in Portugal or about the friendly relations between his Government and 
that of falani,'ist Spain. If the Government in Argentina is reactionary and is 
n()t supported by the peolde, it is up to the Ar.ii;entine people to fisht a.2;ainst the 
dictatorship and establish democracy in their country in the same way as we 
Brazilians are fiiihting for democracy in Brazil. We should not allow our people 
to become involved in a war as reactionary as this one into which these men 
plan to force us. Let us fight with all our might to avoid it, because it can be 
avoided. * * * Therefore, let us be on the alert so as not to l>e taken in by the 
maneuvers of the imperialists who wish to shed the blood of the Brazilian and 
Ax-gentine people." 

In this counectiou telegram No. 52, January 22, from Managua may be of 
special interest. 



A-Br, ARA— Mr. Briggs. 
BA— Mr. Mein. 



Exhibit No. 377 

January 29, 1946. 



Statemext of Luiz Carlos Prestes Regarding Our Argentine Policy 

In addressing the general meeting of the Communist Party in Brazil in Rio 
(le Janeiro on January 4, 1946, Luiz Carlos Prestes, leader of the Communists 
in Brazil, stated that the recent military coup in Venezuela and Brazil, the at- 
tempted coups in Panama, and the actions of the Apristas against democratic 
currents in Peru, were manifestations of the "aggressive spirit of the colonizing 
capital". As to the Argentine problem he said : "There is nothing more .seri- 
ous * * * than Mr. Braden's love for democracy, as well as his act of interest In 
the welfare of the Argentine people, while he says nothing about the Morinigo 
dictatorship or the friendly relations the American Government maintains with 
the falangist tyranny of Franco." He added that the Communist Party was 
against breaking relatiims with Argentina, which would be "the first step toward 
a conflict which could easily result in war, an imperialist war which would be 
contrary to the interests of our peoples.'' 

The Tril)una Popular, the Communist newspaiKT in Brazil, on January 1*> 
published a telegram which Prestes is reported to have addressed to General 
Morinigo, President of Paraguay, on behalf of the National Executive Committee 
of the Communist Party of Brazil, retiuesting the abolition of the concentration 
camps, the granting of complete amnesty to political prisoners, and the permission 
for operation of political parties, including the Comnmnist Party, as a guarantee 
of democracy and as the first step for the holding of free and honest elections 
which will "c(msoli(late democratic liberties and the unity of the Paraguayan 
family, necessary to the defense of peace, and to the unity of the continent against 
the remnants of the Fascist and reactionary enemies of independence and of the 
liberty of natiou.s." 



Exhibit No. 378 

January 30, 1946. 
A-Br. 
P. A— Mr. Mein. 

Statements Made by Luiz Carlos Prestes on Ouu Latin American Policy 

In an interview to Diretrizes, Rio de Janeiro, on January 18, reprinted in 
the Tribuna Popular, the Commiuiist paper, of January 10, Luiz Carlos Prestes 
is reported to have stated : "The breaking of diplom;iti<' relations with Argentina, 
which would seem to me as apparently nmch desired by certain financial groups 
in Washinv^on, would be a step toward war. From the breaking of diplomatic 
relations to an armed conflict — that would be the inevitable. We, however, will 



1414 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

not pull chestnuts out of the fire for anybody, nor will the Argentine people lend 
themselves to the drama now being played by the zealous and unexftected friend- 
ship of the type of Mr. Braden. We want to live in peace with Argentina as weJl 
as with the other nations. This is the determination of the Brazilian people, and 
we have nothing but good reasons to believe that this is the present policy of the 
Itamarati on this subject. We repudiate the idea of breaking diplomatic rela- 
tions as unpopular and contrary to the interests of the two peoples." 

Pre.stes did not discuss the internal situation in Argentina, which he considers 
to be a matter exclusively for the Argentines but he did add, "It is only necessary 
to observe what is now going on to reach the conclusion that the country is on the 
verge of having a revolution which will be provoked from the outside. The 
foreign enemies of Peron more than anybody else are afraid that he will win the 
election. Therefore, the only remedy is a coup. It is, therefore, not hard to 
come to the conclusion that conditions are now being created to foment a revolu- 
tion before the elections which might easily result in a civil war. That is what 
the diplomats who are now placing pressure on the present Government want, 
now that the country has regained political liberty, amnesty, free press, and 
elections already set for the choice of representatives. Only now — it should be 
emphasized also in view of the Argentine situation — is it desired to intervene in 
the affairs of that nation." 



Exhibit No. 379 

Excerpts From Speech of Litiz Carlos Prestes Delivered at Sao Paulo, 

February 7, 1946 

"Before concluding, allow me to call your attention to the provocations of 
foreign colonizing capital, to the most reactionary capitalism, to the imperial- 
ism — principally English and North American imperialism — in our country* * *. 

"If we are to fight, principally the laborers, we must fight conscientiously, 
with conviction, for democracy, against high cost of living, for better salaries ; 
you must be on guard against the provocators, against those who desire disorder 
in our country. * * * 

"Constant vigilance is necessary against these men. Today they are trying 
to form an ideology in our land, a condition so extreme as a war against the 
Argentine people. 

"It is one, Mr. Braden, of the Department of State. This same Department 
of State which maintains the best of relations with Franco's Falangist Spain, 
with Salazar in Portugal, with Morinigo who tortures and assassinates the Para- 
guayan people in concentration camps, shows itself to be an intransigent partisan 
of a democracy in Argentina, and in the name of an Argentine democracy is 
endeavoring to make our Government break relations with that country. 

"We must, therefore, be alert. It is an imperialistic struggle which actually 
exists. Argentina is one of the only Latin American countries in which Yankee 
capital does not yet predominate. In Argentina, English capital predominates. 
Yankee capitalism intends to take advantage of the present moment to win a 
position in Argentina, the same as the position won in our country after the 
coup of 1930. Because if we were under English economic dominion until 1930, 
from 1930 on Yankee capitalism has predominated. It is a question, therefore, 
of a struggle for markets ; it is a question of a dispute between imperialists. 
Consequently we ai'e not the ones who should do the dirty work of these im- 
perialistic lords. 

"Tlie Argentine Government is a dictatorship just as all the other well-known 
dictatorships of Latin America, * * * the same type as the one from which we 
have just emerged only a few days ago. It is a South American dictatorship, 
but that dictatorship has already yielded a great deal on the road to democracy. 
In Argentina, where Mr. Braden declared that there was no democracy, there 
is a free press, there is freedom of reunion, of political association ; and also 
the Communist Party exists, which publishes its newspapers freely and for the 
first time was registered electorally as a party which could participate in the 
coming elections. That Government, which is reactionary, is calling elections 
for the people, who should be the intervening force in their own country. 

"Democracy in Argentina is a problem which concerns the Argentine people, 
and it is the Argentine people who will solve their problems. 

"We have seen, here in our own country, that if we advanced on the road to 
democracy it was because we fought without ceding and we shouted loudly that 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1415 

in» j\Ii". Bradt'ii — unr .Mr. I'.erlc liiid tlit' liiilit to talk of (lu> iiilcinal nlTiiirs of 
our c-omitry. That is why wo are also against the pniiiosals of Minister Larreta, 
wiio seeks intiMveutioii in any country in the name of democracy. * * * 

"Wiiich of tlie Soutii American countries can really carry out an intervention 
in tliese terms? * * * Only the stronuest — the United States of North America. 
Tliey are the only ones capable of transforming tins into reality. Tliat is where 
they will he.iiin ; and from there ohV 

"For that reason tlie proposal of Minister Larreta is really nothiiiir more than 
North American intervention in the internal alfairs of our people. 

"We are, therefore, ap.ainst intervention of any kind. The prohleni of democ- 
racy in Arj^entina is a problem of the Argentine people. They will resolve 
it for themselves. In rciiard to the rupture of relations with Argentina, it is 
just the same as taking the first step toward war; and what w'ill that war heV 
Will it 1)6 a just war? Will it bring about progress? Will it have some interest 
for our people? 

"This would be an imperialistic war in which the blood of the Brazilian ann 
Argentine people would be shed in the exclusive benefit of large foreign banker.^, 
monopolists and colonizing capital. 

"That is why we must be alert, vigilant; because the ideological preparation 
of that war has already been begun in our country and tlie bourgeois press will 
make use of all demagogic arguments in order to exploit the patriotic sentiments 
of our people to set them on the road toward this war. * * * 

"You can all rest assured that we will fulfill the oath that we take here: that 
we, Communists, will be against a war of that nature." 



Exhibit No. 380 

Kio DE Janeiro, Fc'brunry 28, 19^6. 
Subject: Coiinnunist Party of Brazil; speech of Luiz Carlos Prestes, in Sao 
Paulo. February 7, 1946 ; attacks United States policy in the Argen- 
tine. 

The honorable the Secketary of State, 

W(ishin<jto)i, D. C. 

Sir: With reference to the Embassy's current reports on the Brazilian Com- 
munist Party attacks on United States policy toward the Argentine, I have the 
honor to enclose a copy of a si»eech which Luiz Carlos I'restes delivered at a 
Communist meeting in Sao Paulo on the evening of February 7, 1946. 

As reported by the consul in Sao Paulo, Prestes devoted 25 minutes to a 
"violently anti-American tirade." The principal points which he stressed were 
made in the natur^ of allegations (1) that the United States was promoting an 
Argentine-Brazilian war, and (2) that it was forbidding the sale of rubber 
products to the Argentine to the prejudice of Brazilian wheat imports. Passages 
dealing with the first of these allegations have been translated and are enclosed 
as an attachment to this dispatch. 

In other sections of his speech, Prestes devoted considerable attention to the 
evils of the Vargas regime and named the Trabalhista Party of Sao Paulo as a 
traitor to its class cai»able of selling out to foreign capitalists. 
KespectfuUy yours, 

For the Charge d'Affaires : 

Vinton Chapix, 
First Secretary of Embufusif. 

Enclosures : (1) Copy of Prestes' speech ; (2) extracts of speech in translation. 
VChapin/eco 
File No. 800 

To Department in hectograph and original. 



1416 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 381 

March 28, 1946. 
A-Br/S— Mr. Spaeth. 
BA— Mr. Braddock. 

The Communist Party of Brazil and the "Blue Book" 

The newspaper A Classe Operaria, published in Rio de Janeiro as the official 
news or;;an of the Communist Party of Brazil, in its first issue published on 
March 9, 1046, printed the text of the statement of the Communist Party of 
Brazil on the Blue Book. The statement reads : 

"The executive committee of the Communist Party of Brazil, in the meeting 
held on February 16, 1946, made a detailed study of the statements contained in 
the so-called Blue Book, made public by the Department of State of the United 
States. After a complete discussion of the subject, the executive committee con- 
cluded that the cited document is a definite indication of attempts being made by 
the most reactionary forces of investment capital to create an atmosphere of 
disorder in the continent assuming ostensibly a position of support or criticism 
of Latin American governments and political currents, and preaching foreign 
intervention against governments which they do not favor, for the purpose of 
protecting their interests and to stop the marcli of our people along the road 
of progress and democracy. 

"2. The committee found, in addition to the above, justification for the con- 
stant warnings made by the Communist Party of Brazil against the preparation 
for war in Latin America by imperialist forces, as contained in the political 
manifesto read to the last plenary session of the national committee and other 
declarations made subsequently by members of this executive committee. 

"3. The executive committee is firmly convinced that the document published 
by the Department of State of the United States is a symptom of the seriousness 
of the interimperialist fight in the continent, which is focused principally in 
River Plate area, and that on the pretext of defending democracy preparations 
are being made for the breaking of diplomatic relations by American nations with 
the Argentine Republic as the first step for foreign intervention and war against 
that country. A war of that type, undertaken directly by agents of investment 
capital, such as Bradeu and others, would undoubtedly be an unjust war, inter- 
imperialist, directed mainly against democracy and the independence of the Latin 
American people, having as its particular objective the annihilation of the labor 
and popular movements in our countries, 

"In addition, the problem of Argentina, raised by the Department of State 
outside of the United Nations Organization, constitutes an attempt to form 
a bloc of American nations, which is contrary to the interests of our peoples 
and a threat to the cause of world peace. 

"4. As it applies to Brazil, the so-called Blue Book only confirms the well- 
known role of integralismo as the vanguard of the fifth column directly con- 
nected with the agents of the Axis in our land, and it is only strange that 
better known names, such as that of Felinto, MuUer, and others, were not 
mentioned. The reference to the Falangist Aunos also confirmed what we 
have consistently stated concerning the role of spies and traitors undertaken 
by tlie Ambassadors of Spain and Portugal in Brazil. 

"5. The Communist Party of Brazil has always supported and will continue 
to support the fight of all peoples for democracy, for civil rights against re- 
actionaries and Fascists, against the cruelties of the police and concentration 
camps. At the same time, however, it reaffirms its position of mialterable 
defender of the principle of self-determination by the peoples, a democratic 
victory included in the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the L^nited Na- 
tions, and strengthened by the victory over fascism, and that it is therefore 
ready to continue its fight to guarantee the Latin American people the right 
to decide for themselves all questions of domestic politics, using the weapons of 
democracy, such as the Argentine people already have, free from any foreign 
influences, since we know that the victory of democracy in a country is a re- 
sult of the struggle of its own people and cannot come from the outside. 

"Therefore, the Communist Party of Brazil warns all our people, as well 
as our brothers in other countries, that it is terribly disastrous to stimulate 
by any means an interventionist policy, which can be of interest only to the 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1417 

strongest nation in thf continent, the only one oaiial)le of undertaking', eco- 
nomically and militarily, practical and eflicient intervention." 

Eio de Janeiro, February IH. 1940. 

The Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil. 
I!A:JGMein:ifd 
3-2S-46 



Exhibit No. 382 

August 7, 194G. 
Office memorandum 

To : ARA — Messrs. Butler, Brings ; 

A-Br — Mr. P>raden ; 

NWC— IMr. Wells. 
From : BA — Air. INIein. 

Subject : Communist Party in Brazil accuses United States of interference 
in Bolivia. 

The following statement, accusing the United States of directing the recent 
overthrow of the Bolivian Govei-nment, was issued by the Communist Party of 
Brazil on July 30, 1946: 

"Actually, the telegraphic dispatches of the last days make it clear tliat 
the recent events in Bolivia were directed by North American imperialist 
forces. It was even disclosed, according to Renter, that among the dead in a 
tank there was a North American soldier, that rifles of North American manu- 
facture were used to overthrow the Government, and that a Bolivian citizen 
residing in the United States has stated that the position of the North Amer- 
ican ex-Ambassador in Argentina, the famous Braden, is potentially compro- 
mised in the outcome of the Bolivian case. 

"Other dispatches of North American agencies say that the steel barons 
planned the armed coup against Villarroel. 

"It is no less revealing that there is open rejoicing in the Department iu 
Washington over the destruction of the Villarroel government, while the Wash- 
ington Post suggests the establishment of rapid transportation from the United 
States to Bolivia so that that country will not have to depend so much on 
Argentine products, l)ut, naturally, on North American products, and speaks 
against the Argentine expansionist who would wish to incorporate Bolivia, etc., 
as though it involved a dispute between two imperialist powers for the domina- 
tion of Bolivia, whereas there is actually only one imperialist power in- 
volved — the United States. 

"There is also the impression that the Bolivian people not only participated, 
but took the initiative and control of the events in Bolivia, with the students as 
leaders. Some telegrams refer to the demands made by the students that the 
Army withdraw to its barracks and that it eliminate from its numbers the ele- 
ments who opposed the movement, as if the armed forces were l)acking the stu- 
dents and not the army. We see, therefore, the effort being made to present 
the coup as having been initiated and controlled by the people. 

"We are not discussing whether the government which succeeds that of Villar- 
roel — who was a dictator and a reactionary — will be better for the Bolivian peo- 
ple. We are discussing and condemning the fact tiiat the North American Gov- 
ernment continues to intervene as though they were mere colonies, and that their 
governments should be substituted each time they do not satisfy the interests 
of one or another financial group of the colonizing capital, principally, as it now 
appears, evident, for the purpose of obtaining in Bolivia the position lo.'^t in Ar- 
gentina, openly favoring the most reactionary groups of each country in which 
it intervenes, because these are the groups which favor the policy of submitting 
their country to the imperialists, as is the case among us. It is not purely acci- 
dental that at this moment there is rejoicing over the coup in Bolivia also on the 
part of a Fa.scist party such as the Partido Aprista of Peru, whose provocations 
against democracy are almost uninterrupted." 
BA : JGMein : ifd 
8/7/4G 



1418 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 383 

September 12, 1946. 
Subject : Attempt of Communist writers to disassociate United States and Frank- 
lin D. Roosevelt in minds of Mexican people. 

This is a technique used not only by the Communists but also by certain of the 
conservative Hispanidad journali.sts, the race conscious, and the otherwise 
discontented. 

In illustration of this Laborde cites the public intervention of Ambassador 
Berle in the presidential succession in Brazil (where General Dutra is now the 
first to accept publicly for his country the hemisphere defense plan), the sig- 
nificant letter written recently by 50 American businessmen to the Department 
of State requesting intervention in Venezuela, and, most eloquent of all, the 
case of Bolivia, where the "demogogic, pseudo-democrat, Spruille Braden insti- 
gated directly the revolt against the Government of Villarroel." To prove this 
last point Laborde cites the letter addres.sed to Assistant Secretary Braden by 
Ernesto Galarza, recently resigned Bolivian delegate to the Pan-American Union. 
Laborde quotes Galarza as saying that the State Department consistently opposed 
the revolutionary regime of Villarroal, and tells, as characteristic of dollar 
diplomacy, how the American Ambassador in La Paz managed in 1945 to get 
the Bolivian Foreign Minister to iiropose the ousting of the General of Labor 
because of alleged responsibility in the bad treatment of American mining per- 
sonnel, a thing which Galarza himself later determined had not existed. 



Exhibit No. 384 

October 21, 1946 : The following is taken from the Communist news service 
Prensa Continental, with main ottices at Habana, and ought to come in handy to 
counter certain silly charges about your being in cahoots with certain people : 

"El aprismo ha devenido en un movimiento sometido totalmente a los dictados 
de los imperialistas yanquis, de los cuales su lider es el mils fiel lacayo. Esta 
posicion es muy diflcil de acoplar al furibundo 'anti-imperialismo' que antes 
sirvio de caballo de batalla a los lideres apristas, que hoy comen en la mano de 
Mister Braden." 



Exhibit No. 385 
Office Memorandum, United States Government 

January 2, 1947. 
To : BA, Mr. Braddock ; ABA, Mr. Briggs ; A-Br, Mr. Braden. 
From : BA, Mr. Mein. 
Subject : Brazilian elections. 

Under the title "Braden's Threats to Democracy" the Communist newspaper, 
Tribuna Popular, published in Rio de Janeiro, in a recent issue editorially attacks 
Assistant Secretary of State Braden who, the paper claims, "once again has 
threatened armed intervention in Latin American countries." The pai>er adds 
that the diplomacy of the "atomic bomb in one hand and the dollar in the other 
is doomed to complete failure" and urges the people to vote in the forthcoming 
elections (January 19) "for the Brazilian Communist Party candidates and 
against Braden and the imperialists." 

John Gordon Mein. 



IXTERLOCKING SUB^'E1^S10N IN GOVERNMENT 
Exhibit No. 38(5 



1419 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



Assistant Secretary 



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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

DEPARTMENTS 



TUESDAY, APRIL 6, 1954 

United States Senate, 
subcoilmittee to investigate the administration 
or THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 318, 
Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner, chairman of the 
subcommittee, presiding. 

Present : Senators Jenner, Welker, and Butler. 

Present also : Charles P. Grimes, chief counsel to the subcommittee ; 
Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Robert C. ISIcManus, pro- 
fessional staff member. 

The Chairman. The committee \\'\\\ come to order. 

Call your witness. 

Mr. Grimes. Mr. INIitchell. 

The Chairman. Mr. Mitchell, will you take the witness stand, 
please ? Will you be sworn to testify ? 

Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God t 

Mr. Mitchell. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN P. MITCHELL, CROTON-ON-HUDSON, N. Y. 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Jonathan Mitchell. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside, INIr. Mitchell ? 

INIr. Mitchell. Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y. 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession ? 

IMr. ^Mitchell. I am a writer. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Grimes, with the questioning of the 
witness. 

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Mitchell, will you state your career briefly, from 
the time when you graduated from Amherst, first stating the year of 
your graduation and then what your occupation has been since that 
time ? 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. I was a reporter and European correspondent for 
the New York World. 

INIr. Grimes. During what years ? 

Mr. Mitchell. From 1922 to 1930, 1 believe. I was then Washing- 
ton correspondent of the New Republic until 1940. I then went to the 
Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton until 1944, 1 believe. 

1421 



1422 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

I then did free-lance writing until 1950, when I was associate edi- 
tor of Newsweek for something over a year, and since then I have been 
writing again. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you have occasion in the year 1939 to undertake 
to Avrite some speeches for Secretary Morgenthau ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. Will you state, please, how you came to undertake to 
write these speeches ? 

Mr. Mitchell. There had been a depression or recession in 1937. 
Many of the officials of the administration were concerned to provide 
venture capital after that, and there was a great deal of talk about the 
need for setting up banks which would provide venture capital in the 
same way that money was being provided for homeowners and for 
farm owners and for banks which were in difficulty. 

Mr. Grimes. By banks under that proposal, do you mean banks to 
be established and owned by the Federal Government? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. What officials, as you recall it, were making that pro- 
posal ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am sorry : I don't remember the exact title at the 
time ; but Mr. Jerome Frank was one of the leaders in the effort to set 
up these banks. 

Mr. Grimes. That is now Judge Jerome Frank ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Judge Jerome Frank, of the New York circuit. 

]\Ir. Grimes. What other persons that you recall were making such 
proposals ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Former Assistant Attorney General Thurman 
Arnold was another official concerned with that. 

Mr. Grimes. Do you recall any others at the moment? 

Mr. Mitchell. I believe that Mr. Leon Henderson was in this 
group. 

Mr. Grimes. What position did you take with respect to that pro- 
posal ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I took a position only once, and that was in a con- 
versation with Secretary Morgenthau. 

Mr. Grimes. Will you state what that was, please ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In conversation I said that the private enterprise 
had always provided venture capital — to a degree unknown anywhere 
else in the world — and if the difficulties which entrepreneurs had 
been faced with Avere removed, they would go ahead and provide ven- 
ture capital without anything needing to be done by the Government. 

Mr. Grimes. In other words, your view was that it could be pro- 
vided from private sources rather than governmental ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. sir. 

Mr. Grimes. How did you happen to meet Secretary Morgenthau on 
that occasion? 

Mr. Mitchell. I was at that time correspondent for the New Re- 
public, and, with other newspaper and magazine writers, I made it my 
business to see him. 

Mr. Grimes. You had known him before, had you ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I had known him before, yes. 

Mr. Grimes. You met him on this occasion? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1423 

Mr, Grimes. Will you state the date or the time as nearly as you 
can, i>lease, Mr. Mitchell? 

Mr. MiTciiKi.i,. It was sometime in the si)rin«i- of 19'>9. 

Senator Wki.kkr. INIay I ask a question, Mr. Chairman? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Wklkkr. Mr. Mitchell, will you define the New Republic 
for the committee, please? Was that a conservative ma<i;azine or a 
liberal maijazine? What <;enerally was its political philosophy? 

Mr. AriTCHKi.L. It supported the New Deal, but I think it was 
critical of the New Deal for beini^ conservative rather than otherwise. 

Senator Wki.kkr. It was critical of the New Deal as being con- 
servative ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. It wished to go further. 

Senator AA'elker. In other words, it might be construed as being a 
liberal publication, quite liberal? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have a difficulty about using the characterization 
"liberal." 

Senator Welker. Yes. I do, too. So if you will define what you 
think the New Republic was, I would appreciate it. 

]\Ir. ]\IiTCiiELL. I must say it was the focus of several different in- 
fluences. Not all the editors had exactly the same opinion. There 
were among the editors some who greatly admired British and Ger- 
man socialism, I should say. 

Senator Welker. I think that covers it. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Grimes. Mr. IMitchell, will you give, please, the conversation 
that voii had with Secretarv Morgenthau on this occasion? 

Mr. Mitchell. As I have just testified, I told him that I thought 
Americans could find their own money if the Government did not 
prevent them from doing it or make it difficult for them to do it ; and 
this, I am sure, was by no means the first time Secretary ISIorgenthau 
had heard this idea. He agreed, and soon afterward asked me if I 
would hel}) him prepare some speeches for delivery the following 
winter. 

]\Ir. Grimes. Did you agree to do so? 

Mv. oNIiTCHELL. Yes, sir. 

INIr. Grimes. Did you prepare a speech? 

]Mr. ]VIiTCHELL. Yes, sir. 

Mv. Grimes. What title did the speech bear? 

Mr. ]MiTCHELL. The series of speeches were to have the general 
heading of "The Seedlings of Capitalism," and if I remember cor- 
rectly — and I am not entirely sure I do — I believe this was Secretary 
Morgenthaii's own proposal, his own choice of phrase. 

Mr. Grimes. Would you say that he was enthusiastic about the idea 
of delivering a series of speeches under that heading? 

Mr. Mitchell. Moderately so, I think. 

Mr. Grimes. Were you commissioned to write the speeches or as- 
sist him in writing them? 

]\Ir. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

INIr. Grimes. Did you undertake to do that? 

Mv. ISIiTCHELL. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Gri:mes. Did you submit a draft of the speech to him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Grimes. Do you recall whether j'ou submitted more than one 
draft to him? 



1424 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Mitchell. As I recall it, I submitted an outline of 6 or 8 
speeches, the draft of 1 speech and a rather full outline of a second 
speech. 

Mr. Grimes. Did he read those drafts ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. Did he express himself on the subject of the drafts? 

Mr. Mitchell. He did on the draft of the first speech, yes. 

Mr. Grimes. What did he say about it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I am not very sure I remember the exact date, but 
my memory is that sometime in August he called me up at my home 
over the weekend from his home, which was further up the Hudson 
River, and wanted the speeches clone up at once, in a hurry, so he could 
deliver one of them. At that time he seemed to be committed to 
m.aking these speeches. 

Mr. Grimes. Did he express himself as pleased with the speech that 
you had written ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That I don't recall. He was pleased with the idea. 

Mr. Grimes. He did say that he was prepared to make that speech 
and wanted you to finish it in a hurry, is that correct, or to submit it in 
a hurry ? 

Mr, Mitchell. He said he wanted me to finish it in a hurry, and I 
gathered from that that he meant that. 

Mr. Grimes. What happened after that? I should ask you this: 
I gather it is true, but will you state for the record, please, whether 
or not the speech which you submitted and which he was in a hurry 
to give, incorporated the ideas which you described a minute or two 
ago, namely, that private capital should form the basis of capital 
in this country ? Would you outline briefly the ideas that you incor- 
porated in the speech for Secretary Morgenthau, please? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. This was a special sort of risk capital, the 
capital which a young man needs to have to start a business, a man who 
is not in a business but who has some idea of merchandising or manu- 
facturing and gets together a few dollars from his family, and then 
he is a success and needs money to expand and has to go to sources 
other than his family or friends to fi;et the money. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you express the view that certain of our laws 
hampered this type of enterprise? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, that is right. 

Mr. Grimes. Would you elaborate that idea, please; that is to say, 
as contained in the speech which you had submitted to him ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Sir, the criticisms of administration policy were in 
the vaguest possible terms. Secretary Morgenthau was a member of 
the administration, and when one helps a Cabinet officer with speeches 
he does not ordinarily ask him or suggest to him that he criticize his 
colleagues. So the problem was stated, and the question was asked 
whether some of these laws had not been of a nature to make it difficult 
to raise capital. 

Mr. Grimes. Would you state the principal laws that you had in 
mind, those that prohibited 

Mr. Mitchell. Primarily the tax laws which had been enacted just 
prior to the 1937 recession, and which many people believed had 
something to do with the recession. There was also the question of 
the excessively low interest rate, because of which many people who 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1425 

otherwise would have advanced money for business were reluctant 
to do so. 

JSfr. Gkimes. Was that speech given ? 

Mr. ^IiTCHELL. No, sir. 

Mr. (iRiMES. What were the circumstances that took place in con- 
nection with the failure to give that speech? 

Mr. Mitchell. After the conversation that I have reported in 
August, there were numy, many postponements of going ahead, and 
finally, I think sometime late in the year, around November or De- 
cember, I was told that the Secretary wouldn't give the speeches and 
I was in a sense reprimanded for trying to suggest that the Secre- 
tary should ever have given them. 

JVIr. Grimes. When and where did you receive this information and 
this reprimand ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In the Treasury, by a number of Secretary Mor- 
genthau's advisers, I think the chief of whom would have been Assist- 
ant Secretary Gaston, who was my former colleague on the New York 
World and in a sense made it a part of his duty to oversee the Secre- 
tary's public relations. 

Mr. Grimes. What did Mr. Gaston, Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury, say to you about the speech ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He expressed no opinion on his own behalf of any 
sort, but told me, as I remember it — and I want to be quite explicit 
that my memory is not by any means clear on this — that a man named 
White in the Department w^ouldn't stand for it. 

Mr. Grimes. A man named White wouldn't stand for it ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. Do you know what White that was? 

Mr. Mitchell. At the time, I did not. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you find out later ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. Mr. Harry D. Wliite. 

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Harry Dexter Wliite ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. That Mr. White would not stand for it, and the speech 
therefore was not delivered by Secretary Morgenthau ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. That was told you by Assistant Secretary of the Treas- 
ury Gaston, is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. Had you met Harry Dexter White up to that time ? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, sir ; I had not. 

Mr. Grimes. Did you meet him on a later occasion? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. Would you explain, please, what that occasion was, 
•when it was, and where it took place, and how you happened to meet 
him? 

Mr. Mitchell. As I have said, after 1940 I went to the Institute for 
Advanced Study at Princeton. A number of my colleagues 

Mr. Grimes. What subject did you take at the Institute for Ad- 
vanced Studies at Princeton? You were pursuing, of course, some 
field. What was that field? 

Mr. Mitchell. It was a study of the Senate and how the Senate 
operates and what its value is, and so on. 

32918°— 54 — pt. 19 6 



1426 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Grimes. I gather you concluded it had some vahie? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I think it is a very wonderful institution. 

The Chairman. We thank you for that. 

Senator Welkek. Would you ask him if that is an 8-year course? 

Mr. Grimes. Senator Welker wants to know if that is an 8-year 
course. 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't pretend that I have found out all there is to 
know about it, although I spent a long time at it. 

Mr. Grimes. While, you were pursuing your studies at Princeton 
at the Institute of Advanced Study, you did meet Harry Dexter 
White? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. Will you tell us under what circumstances, how you 
came to meet him, first? 

Mr. Mitchell. A number of my colleagues were advisers of the 
Treasury. They began to ask me if I knew a person named White, 
and this finally came to a sort of climax in 194:3, in which they said 
that they had become convinced that AYhite had influence in the 
Senate far beyond public knowledge 

Mr. Grimes. In the what? 

Mr. Mitchell. In the Treasury — excuse me — far beyond public 
knowledge and far beyond his nominal title. 

The specific grounds on which the suspicion rested were that these 
colleagues of mine attended quite regularly the staff conferences of 
the Secretary. There was a general meeting with perhaps 50 or 60 
persons present, once a week, and the people from the institute woidd 
very often have worked out plans for technical — they were interested 
in the technique of carrying the very large war debt at that time. 
They had worked out procedures, plans, and so on, with Secretary 
Morgenthau ; that is, they had given him their advice, and the Secre- 
tary accepted it. At these meetings, these plans would be chewed to 
pieces. 

After a great deal of careful observation and comparing of notes, 
they were convinced that each time the opposition came from the 
same quarter ; namely, Mr. White, and they took to watching him at 
the meetings, and they caught him passing notes to people who then 
got up and raised extraneous subjects or presented opposite views. 
They found that whenever these devices didn't work, Mr. White him- 
self would wait until he was certain the Secretary was about to leave, 
and then rise and say, "I would like to summarize what has been said 
here today," and he would summarize it without any relation to what 
actually had been said. 

Mr. Grimes. Then influenced action in some manner? 

Mr. Mitchell. These meetings were sort of the way in which the 
Secretary 

Mr. Grimes. Yes ; but he would summarize wdiat had been said quite 
incorrectly and inaccurately; is that correct? 

Mr. MiT( HELL. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. Then what would happen ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Either the action would be taken in the sense that 
]\rr. White desired, or no action would be taken at all. 

Mr. Grimes. Did your colleagues suggest that you try to look into 
this matter somewhat? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1427 

]\Ir. Mitchell. That is ri<ilit. They wanted to know who White 
was and what I could lind out about liim. 

Mr. Gkimes. Did they express themselves as disturbed over the 
situation in the Treasvu'y ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. In other words, they presented to you, did they not, a 
picture of White dominating the Secretary of the Treasury and 
makina" the decisions? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes ; I think that is correct. 

Mr. Grimes. What did you do in line with tlieir request that you 
look into the matter and see if you could lind out who White was 
and what he was up to ? 

Mr. Mitchell. 1 arranged to have lunch with him. 

Mr. Grimes. Through whom did you make the arrangement? 

Mr. ]\Iitciiell. Through Assistant Secretary Gaston. 

Mr. Cirimes. Did you have lunch with White? 

jVIr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. Where did that take place ? 

Mr. Mitchell. In the dining rooms in the basement of the 
Treasury. 

Mr. Grimes. Have you any way of fixing the approximate date 
of that lunch ? 

Mr. iSIiTCHELL. Yes, sir. It was August 5 or G, and I remember 
it because it was just before V-J Day. 

Mr. Grimes. The year, of course, would be 1945 ? 

Mr. Mitchell. 1945, yes. 

Mr. Grimes. Just before the Japanese surrender ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. Will you tell what happened, please, at that luncheon, 
starting at the beginning? 

Mr. Mitchell. Possibly I might say that the luncheon divided 
itself, as it turned out, into two parts. The first few minutes, the 
first 20 minutes or so, were taken up in a discussion of the work 
which Mr. White had been doing 

The Chairman. Who was present at the luncheon ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. White, Assistant Secretary Gaston, and my- 
self. It was in one of these small dining rooms in the bottom of 
the Treasury. Although there were a great many tables and chairs, 
we were the only persons in the room. 

]\Ir. Grimes. Go ahead, please. You said the first 20 minutes 
were taken up by a discussion of what Mr. White was doing and 
planned to do ? 

Mr. jVIitchell. Yes. As I remember it, the first thing I brought 
up was what the sterling rate was likely to be. My mission was to 
try to get Mr. White to tell something about himself, and I merely 
brought that up because I knew or at least I thought this was a mat- 
ter of interest. 

He pointed out that there was a — I am not absolutely sure whether 
the British Labor Party had taken power at that moment or not, 
but he at any rate believed it would, if it hadn't. I think, as a mat- 
ter of fact, that it had — and that Mr. Attlee would need a great 
many months to make up his mind Avhat he wanted to do. He went 
into some of the considerations that would probably weigh on Mr. 
Attlee's mind. 



1428 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

From that he went over to the International Monetary Fund, which 
a few weeks — I think about 3 weeks — before, had been finally ap- 
proved by the Congress and was the subject of a great deal of talk 
at that time. 

Mr. Grimes. Was it generally understood, then, that Mr. White 
would endeavor to head the International Monetary Fund, or do you 
not know? 

Mr. Mitchell. I don't know. 

Mro Grimes. You knew that he had worked a great deal on the 
fund, did you not? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Grimes. Go ahead, please, and tell the Senators what he said 
about the future operations of the International Monetary Fund and 
the future methods of doing business, both in Europe and in the 
United States, as he saw it. 

Mr. Mitchell. As I remember it, Mr. White said that England's 
position was very difficult because of the huge sterling balances owned 
by foreigners, by non-Britishers, by the Indians and Egyptians in 
London and by the Argentines, and until some of this was dealt with, 
which he foresaw would be extremely difficult, he doubted whether 
London would be eligible for the monetary fund or willing to use it. 

This was a subject in which I myself was interested, and I pressed 
him at some length on this. I found, to my great surprise, that he 
had, or at least this is the conclusion that I possibly ought not to 
state — that he really had very little interest in the monetary fund. 

Mr. Grimes. Did he express himself upon the future methods of 
trade in the world to you during the course of this first 20 minutes, 
as you have described it, of your conversation; that is to say, how in- 
evitably Europe would do business and how the United States would 
do business as he saw it? 

Mr. INIiTCHELL. Not in this first part of the conversation. 

Mr. Grimes. That came later? 

Mr. Mitchell. That came later; yes. 

Mr. Grimes, Will you go ahead in your own way in describing the 
conversation that took place during this luncheon ? 

Mr. Mitchell. After our conversation about the monetary fund 
had dropped of its own weight, he then started to question me. He 
knew that Mr. Harold Laski 

Mr. Grimes. Laski? Harold Laski? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. Was a contributing editor of the New Re- 
public, and that I knew him. He asked me if I didn't think he was a 
great man, and in particular what I thought of his then latest book 
which had come out about a year before, as I recall it. 

Mr. Grimes. Is that the book. Faith, Reason, and Civilization ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. Go ahead, please. 

Mr. Mitchell. I didn't wish to be controversial about anything, 
and I said what I thought was the universal opinion about Mr. Laski ; 
that he was a charming teller of cockney stories, but intellectually a 
lightweight. 

This infuriated Mr. White. He then read me a very long lecture. 

Mr. Grimes. When you said "read," you mean "gave" ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He gave me a very long lecture on my lack of under- 
standing of the world I was living in, and my denseness in foreseeing 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1429 

the future, and tried to spell that out by ex])lainiii<2; to nie that at that 
time, ^vhich was true, all business across international frontiers was 
bein<r done by governments. Because of the failure of the monetary 
fund to operate, which Mr. White foresaw, this, in the case of every 
nation except the United States, would have to be the procedure in 
the future. 

Mr. Grimes. That is, all trade would be governmental in the future 
in the case of all nations excei)t the United States? 

Mr. Mitchell. All international trade. 

Mr. Grimes. All international trade. 

Mv. Mitchell. Do you want me to spell that out ? 

Mr. Grimes. Yes, please. 

Mr. Mitchell. At that time, raw materials were bought by all 
governments, and then were parceled out by the governments to their 
national firms after they had crossed the boundaries. Nearly all 
manufactured goods were being bought by governments for war pur- 
poses, and then each government would distribute the machinery, or 
whatever it was, to its nationals to be used in war production. So 
anything which passed a boundary, frontier, was under the control of 
the government of the country. 

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Mitchell, that of course was true during the war, 
which was still then on ; but when Mr. White wns speaking, was he 
speaking of war conditions or was he speaking of the postwar 
conditions ? 

Mr. Mitchell. He was speaking of postwar conditions. In order 
for this situation to be changed, private businessmen had to be able 
to get money to spend outside their countries, and it was the purpose 
of the monetary fund — at least it was the purpose, I think, of Lord 
Keynes for the monetary fund — to make possible the convertibility 
of currency. 

Senator AVelker. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator W^elker. Mr. Mitchell, when you appeared a bit critical of 
Mr. Laski, is it j^our testimony that Mr. White became quite angry, 
vitriolic at you, and made quite a lengthy, bitter speech against your 
ideas of business and the operation of future Government trade ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. That little speech that he delivered to you was 
quite lengthy ; is that true ? 

Mr. Mitchell. I should think so. It was. As I remember it, 
we were there at lunch a little over an hour, and I think 40 minutes of 
that time were spent in Mr. White's explaining to me my denseness 
about this. 

Senator AVelker. That was brought about because of the fact that 
you termed Mr. Laski a lightweight, but quite a storyteller ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Senator AA^elker. That brought about the lecture that you received 
from Harry Dexter AVhite? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

Senator AA-'elker. Thank you. 

JNIr. Grimes. You are familiar with Mr. Laski's book, Faith, 
Reason, and Civilization, are you not? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 



1430 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

INTr. Grimes. And you were at the time of the conversation ? You 
had read the book? 

]\Ir. jVIitchell. Yes. I haven't read it since. 

Mr. Grimes. Would you state, please, what the thesis of Laski's 
book was? 

INIr. Mitchell. I think the thesis could be put as sayinir that the 
Second "World War was the end of a great historic period, and that 
private business or capitalism had proved itself inadequate, and that 
the faith which underlay it, the Christian faith, no lon<zer had any 
validity for the people who were livine; then ; and that, happily, the 
Russians had worked out a new system of economics and a new faith 
which could replace capitalism and Christianity. 

Mr. Grimes. Laski expressed himself as wholeheartedly in favor of 
the Russian vSystem as replacino; both capitalism and Christianity, 
did he not? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. I think that was his jjreat pro-Russian 
phase. 

Mr. Grimes. This was the book that White expressed himself — in 
what terms did White express himself about this book ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Mr. White said that this was by all odds the most 
profound book which had been written in our lifetime, and that no one 
had foreseen with such uncanny accuracy and depth the way in 
which the world was going. 

Mr. Grimes. In other words, his approval of Laski's views was 
100 percent, would you say? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

]\Ir. Grimes. And anyone who could not see that was stupid ? 

Mr, Mitchell. Yes, sir. 

INIr. Grimes. Including yourself? Was that his thesis? 

Mr. Mitchell. Particuhirly myself. 

Mr, Grimes, Particularly yourself. Did he during the coiu'se of 
this conversation predict the future economic system of the United 
States? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. He said that already at that time private 
business in England and on the continent of Europe was wholly 
under the control of the government of each country, which was true, 
and that this situation could not be broken because there would be 
no way, because none of these countries had capital enough to relax 
the restrictions which they put on business. 

Mr. Grimes, In other words, that would be, in his opinion, the 
])ermanent economic condition of Europe ? 

Mr. Mitchell. That is right. 

Mr. Groies. Including England? 

Mr. M'tchell. Well, I am doing Mr. White an injustice to say 
that it would be. His point was that it already had happened. 

Mr. Grimes, And there would be no change in the postwar world ? 

Mr, Mitchell, That is right; but that most people didn't realize 
what had happened, Mr. Laski and he did know what had happened, 

Mr. Grimes. What did he say with reference to the future economic 
condition and situation in the United States? 

Mr, Mitchell, He said that we, the United States, because of its 
tremendous domestic market, could carry on for some time. That is, I 
should go back and say that his point was that so much of the business 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1431 

of European companies is across internntional Ixjiiiulai-ies they could 
not continue as private business. The amount of their business wliich 
would be under trovernment control was very lar^e. 

In America it was ])ossible for a businessman to carry on a business 
wholly within American boundaries and without bein<r under the 
Government. But, to his mind, it was entirely clear that with a 
world in which private business had disappeared, the United States 
system could not very lone; survive. 

Mr. Grimes. Did he express a prediction as to time? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. In the context of his speech he was talking 
about between 5 and 10 years. 

Mr. Grimes. In other words, our system of capitalism could not 
last more than 5 or 10 years, in his opinion, as he expressed himself 
then and there ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Mitchell, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. Will you go ahead, please? 

]\Ir. IVIiTCHELL. That is about the substance of what he had to say. 
A little incident happened at the end— — 

Mr. Grimes. Before we get to that, is it fair to say that Mr. AVhite 
expressed himself as 100 percent in favor of communism in his 
approval of Mr. Laski's book? 

Mr. Mitchell. So far as I remember, he at no occasion used the 
word "communism." He expressed extravagant approval of Mr. 
Laski's book, which was a eulogy of communism. 

Mr. Grimes. A eulogy of communism ? 

Mr. Mitchell. Yes. 

Mr. Grimes. Will you tell about the close of the luncheon, please? 

Mr. Mitchell. I expressed mild dissent at Mr. White's argument, 
and at each dissent he became more and more upset and toward the 
end of the lunch, at the end of the lunch, he arose and advanced upon 
me with his arms swinging, and Mr. Gaston 

Mr. Grimes. Fists clinched? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. I think, as a matter of fact, his hands were 
clutching. It wasn't exactly the way I think most people would behave 
in the circumstances. At any rate, Mr. Gaston arose and put his arms 
around White, and they waltzed back and forth for 3 or 4 minutes until 
Mr. White became calmer and agreed to sit down. That more or less 
destroyed the spirit of the lunch. We broke up soon thereafter on the 
worst possible terms, I think. 

Mr. Grimes. Was it clear to you that he did try to make some kind 
of physical attack upon you? 

Mr. Mitchell. I have since found out that he suffered from high 
blood pressure, and I think a great deal of the excessive emotion he 
showed was partly due to that. 

The Chairman. He did advance toward you? 

Mr. Mitchell. Oh, yes, he was extremely angry. 

Senator Welker. Is there any question in your mind that had Mr. 
Gaston not interceded, you would have had physical contact with Mr. 
White? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, there is no question. 

Senator Welker. There is no question about that? 

Mr. Mitchell. No. He was in a towering rage. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Mitchell, in the discussion that you have just 
related with White, I will ask you if it is not a fact that Mr. White was 



1432 INTEIfLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

discussing matters of government wliicli primarily should have been 
in the State Department of the United States rather than in the 
Treasury Department? 

Mr. Mitchell. In his analysis of the situation, I think he was talk- 
ing primarily about economic matters, sir. 

Senator Welker. At any time in future discussions with Mr. AVhite, 
or from any information you have learned from his discussions, did 
he get into the field of diplomacy, which should be exercised by the 
State Department? 

Mr. Mitchell. Sir, I think it was a well-known matter that Treas- 
ury did have its representatives in every capital of the world and did 
have an independent foreign policy, and there was constant friction 
with the State Department. But that, so far as I remember, did not 
come up directly in this conversation. 

The Chairman. Mr. Mitchell, did you know at the time of this 
luncheon which you have just described in detail, that Harry Dexter 
White had been designated by the Treasury Department as the official 
representative to the State Department concerning all matters of 
foreign relations? 

Mr. Mitchell. No, I did not, sir. 

Mr. Grimes. Mr. Chairman, at this time I am going to ask our 
Research Director, Mr. Mandel, to read into the record certain por- 
tions or conclusions from our own files, and certain other official 
documents and some communications, for the purpose of showing the 
importance of Mr. Harry Dexter White, not only in the Treasury 
Department, but to the Government of the United States in general, 
and also bearing further upon his beliefs. 

The Chairman. Let the record show that Senator Butler is in 
attendance at this session. 

Proceed, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here the Department of State bulletin entitled 
"Developing Plans for an International Monetary Fund and a World 
Bank," by John Parke Young, adviser, Office of Financial and 
Development Policy, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State. 

JNIr. Grimes. In other words, that is an official Department of State 
document, Mr. Mandel? 

Mr. Mandel. Yes, sir. Released December 1950. Participating in 
the formulation of this document are certain individuals whom I wish 
to describe later very briefly. They have come up before in our hear- 
ings. 

At the outset, this document says : 

"During that period, the Treasury Department's Division of Mone- 
tary Research, under the leadership of Harry D. White, was giving 
independent study to these same questions. * * *" 

Mr. White's name occurs all through the list of the committees 
participating in this study. Also enumerated here are V. Frank 
Coe 

The Chairman. Right there, Mr. Mandel, what does our record 
show concerning V. Frank Coe? 

Mr, Mandel. ISIr. Chairman, may I take up the summary of the 
individuals involved later, because a number of them occur together. 

Also Lauchlin Currie. 

I wish to offer this for the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of it. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1433 

(The State Department Bulletin referred to was marked "Exhibit 
No. 388'' and is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 388 
[Reprint from the Department of State Bulletin] 

Department of State pul)li(ati()ns 4046, luternationnl Orjiiinization and Confer- 
ence Series IV, International Kank ami Monetary Fund 1, released December 
1950; reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin of November 13, 1*J.50. 
Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs 

Developing Plans For an Inti':rnational Monetary Fund and a World Bank 

(By John Parke Young, adviser. Office of Financial and Development Policy) 

formulation of united states proposai^s 

The studies which the United States Government undertook regarding the kind 
of international financial machinery that would be needed in the postwar period 
were commenced shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Secretary 
of State Cordell Hull, in December 19.39, appointed from among the higher officers 
of the Department of State a committee known as tlie Advisory Committee on 
Problems of Foreign Relations. This committe had three subcommittees, one to 
deal with each of the following subjects : 

Political problems; 

Limitation and Reduction of Armaments ; and 

Economic problems 

The subcommittee on economic problems concerned itself, among other things, 
with postwar financial and monetary matters. Among the early papers it con- 
sidered was one entitled "Interlocking of Commercial, Financial, Monetary, and 
Other Economic Problems." This committee was expanded in May 1940 to include 
representatives from other Departments and accordingly became the Interdepart- 
mental Group To Consider International Economic Problems and Policies. ' This 
group appointed a subgroup on monetary and financial policy which held a series 
of meetings beginning in the fall of 1940. 

During that period, the Treasury Department's Division of Monetary Re- 
search, under the leadership of Harry D. White was giving independent study 
to these same questions, and, in the latter part of Deceml)er 1941, produced a 
memorandum entitled, "Proposal for a Stabilization Fund of the United and 
Associated Nations." This draft proposal was submitted to the State Depart- 
ment early in January 1942 with the suggestion that the proposal be presented 
to the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics 
which was to convene later that month in Rio de Janeiro. The Treasury Depart- 
ment suggested also that the proposal be submitted simultaneously to all of the 
other members of the United Nations. Although the proposal was not submitted 
to the Conference, nor to any other nation at that time, the following resolution, 
presented by the United States, was adopted by the Rio de Janeiro Conference as 
Resolution XV : 

"1. A more effective mobilization and utilization of foi'eign exchange resources 
would be of assistance in the struggle against aggression and would contribute 
to the realization of the economic objectives set forth at the First and Second 
Meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of tlie American Republics at 
Panama and Habana ; and 

"2. The American Republics which are combined in a common effort to main- 
tain their political and economic independence can cooperate in the creation of 
an organization to promote stability of foreign exchange rates, encourage the 
international movement of productive capital, facilitate the reduction of arti- 
ficial and discriminatory barriers to the movement of goods, assist in the cor- 
rection of the maldistribution of gold, strengthen monetary systems, and facili- 
tate the maintenance of monetary policies that avoid serious inflation or 
deflation. 



1 Tlie membersliip of this group consistod initially of the following : State Department ; 
Leo Pasvolsliy (Chairman), Adolf A. Kerle. .Jr., Henry F. Grady. Lynn R. Edminster, 
Herlif'rt P>is, Harry C. Hawkins : Treasury Department : H. Merle Cochran. Harry D. 
Wliite : Commerce Department : Grosvenor M. .Jones, Louis Donieratzky. Richard V. 
Gilbert ; Department of Agriculture : Mordecai Ezekiel, James L. McCamy, Howard R. 
Tolley, and Leslie A. Wheeler. 



1434 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

"The Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American 
Republics 

^'Recommends: 

"1. That the Governments of the American Keimblics particiiiate in a special 
conference of Ministers of Finance or their representatives to be called for the 
purpose of considering the establishment of an international stabilization fund. 

"2. That the conference in considering the establishment of such a fund shall 
formulate the plan of organization, powers, and resources necessary to the proper 
functioning of the fund, shall determine the conditions requisite to participation 
in the fund, and shall propose principles to guide the fund in its operation." 

The Treasury Department continued to nialte studies and, in March 1942, a 
memorandum was prepared entitled, "Preliminary Draft I'roposal for United 
Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of 
the United and Associated Nations." This proposal dealt also with various 
economic problems in the field of commercial policy and commodity agreemputs, 
although it was subsequently narrowed to more strictly financial problems. 
Secretary Morgenthau presented the matter to President Roosevelt in ISIay 1942 
and proposed that the United States call a conference of Ministers of Finance 
to consider it. The President, in turn, suggested that the proposal be discussed 
with the Department of State and otlier Government agencies and tliat the 
question of such a possible conference be discussed with Secretary Hull. 

Following the discussion with the President, an interdepartmental group, 
known as the Cabinet Committee, met. May 25, 1942, in Secretary Morgeuthau's 
oflSce to consider the proposals.^ Those present at this meeting believed It de- 
sirable that the United States proceed with its plans and endeavor to establisli 
the necessary international financial institutions prior to the postwar period. 
The group agreed to establish an interdepartmental subcommittee to whicli the 
interested agencies would send representatives ; this subcommittee would report 
to the so-called Cabinet Committee. 

The interdepartmental subconnnittee, known as the American Technical Com- 
mittee, held its first meeting May 28, 1942. The agencies represented were 
Department of State. Treasury Department, Department of Commerce, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Securities and Exchange Cora- 
mission, and the Foreign Economic Administration. This Committee, under the 
chairmanship of Harry D. White of the Treasury Department, gave detailed 
consideration to the plans for a Monetary Fund and Bank, held numerous meet- 
ings over the next few years, and was to a large extent responsible for the final 
form of these institutions.^ 

The Committee in 1942 discussed the calling of a United Nations conference of 
technical experts to consider the Treasury proposal and so recommended to the 
Cabinet Committee. At a meeting of the Cabinet Committee in July 1942,^ Mr. 
Acheson said the State Department believed that no general conference should be 
held before preliminary discussions had taken place with the United Kingdom and 
other large countries. After considerable deliberation it was agreed, in January 
1943, that such exploratory discussions should take place with experts from six 
countries. 

Considerable work in the field of international financial problems was being 
carried on in the meantime in the State Department by the Division of Special 
Research under the direction of Leo Pasvolsky and, after the end of 1942, l)y the 
new Division of Economic Studies of which Leroy D. Stinebower was chief. This 
new Division, in addition to studying monetary matters, prepared a plan for an 



^ This meeting was attended by : Department of State : Leo Pasvolsk.v and Herbert Feis ; 
Treasury Department : Henry Morgenthau, David W. Bell. Edward A. Foley, Harry D. 
White, Bernard Bernstein, and Frank A. Southard, Jr. : Commerce Department : Jesse H. 
Jones ; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System : Marriner S. Eccles and 
Emanuel A. Goldenweiser ; Board of Economic Warfare : Louis Bean and V. Frank Coe. 

2 The individuals serving on this Committee varied from time to time, but the principal 
attendants were as follows : White House : Benjamin Cohen ; State Department : William 
Adams Brown, Jr., E. G. Collado, Frederick Livesey, Leo Pasvolsky, John Parke Young ; 
Treasury Department : Eltin^;- Arnold, Edward M. Bernstein, Henry J. Bittermann, Ansel F. 
Luxford, Raymond F. Mikesell, Harry D. White : Commerce : William L. Clayton, Hal B. 
Lary, August MafFry ; Federal Reserve Board : Alice Bourneuf, Walter Gardner, E. A. 
Goldenweiser ; Securities and Exchange Commission : Walter C. Louchheim : Export- 
Import Bank : Hawthorne Arey, Warren Lee Pierson : Foreign Economic Administration : 
James W. Angell, V. Frank Coe ; National Resources Planning Board : Alvin H. Hansen. 

-• The meeting was held in Mr. Morgeuthau's office at the Treasury and was attended by : 
White House: Lauchlin Currie ; State Department: Dean Acheson and Leo Pasvolsky; 
Commerce Department : Jesse H. Jones ; Federal Reserve Board : Marriner S. Eccles and 
Emanuel A. Goldenweiser : Board of Economic Warfare : Louis Beau and V. Frank Coe. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1435 

International Invostnient Agency to make loans and facilitate the flow of capital. 
Assistant Secretary I'.erle transniilled this proposal to the American Technical 
Conunittee in 104;}. The Division of Economic SIndies also j^ave consideralde 
attention to means of reviving private investment and to the question of a 
possihle international organization to develop and enforce standards of invest- 
ment practice and principles of equitable treatment by foreign governments. 
Under the chairmanship of Mr. l?erle and later Mr. Pasvolsky, a series of meet- 
ings in the State Department considered fundamental problems of international 
finance and investment. Most of the attendants at these meetings were also 
members of the American Technical Committee. 

COMPARISON WITH BRITISH PUOPOSALS 

During this period when the United States was considering international 
monetary and financial problems and was making plans for bilateral discussions 
of its proposals, the United Kingdom was considering the same problems. In 
August 1942, the British Embassy in Wa.shington transmitted to the State and 
Treasury Departments copies of a plan entitled "Proposals for an International 
Clearing Union." A letter to Assistant Secretary Berle said that the statement 
was for the informal consideration of United States experts. 

The proposal had been prepared by John Maynard Keynes and came to be 
known as the Keynes I'lan ; the United States proposal was popularly known 
as the White Plan. The United States plan was made available to the British, 
and a series of informal discussions took place between British and American 
technical experts. Under the leadership of the United Kingdom, a series of 
meetings also took place in London attended by representatives of the various 
governments in exile. The two plans remained strictly secret as far as the 
general public was concerned. 

The British and United States proposals had many similarities but differed in 
several important respects. Both plans provided for the stabilization of exchange 
rates as a main objective and specified that changes in rates could take place, 
apart from changes within certain narrow limits, only with the approval of 
the proposed international organization. Both plans provided for an inter- 
national currency unit defined in terms of gold — called bancor in the British 
plan and, unitas in the United States plan, and a quota to be assigned each 
member based upon its economic importance, the quota to determine the mem- 
ber's drawing privileges on the organization as well as the member's voting 
rights. The plans differed in the organization's resources and their availability 
to members. 

The United States plan provided for a contributory fund, each member pro- 
viding its share of the resources based on its assigned quota. Members might 
have access to these resources under prescribed conditions in order to meet 
temporary deficits in their balances of payments. 

The British plan, on the other hand, was based on the overdraft principle and 
provided that creditor countries on current international account would accept 
from their debtors a credit balance on the books of the Clearing Union, the 
balance being in terms of the new currency unit, the bancor. The bancor was 
to be tran.«ferable and acceptable by all member countries in payment of inter- 
national obligations. A debtor country could, in this manner, pay for imports 
by a debit balance against it on the books of the organization up to the amount 
of its quota. In the original form, the British proposal had provided almost 
no limit on the amount of credit to be supplied by the creditor country. The 
United States, a potential creditor, opposed this idea which the British eliminated 
in their revised proposal. 

The Keynes plan also provided that a credit balance which remained unused 
for a certain period of time was automatically canceled. Thus, if a country 
continued, on total current account, to export more heavily than she imported, 
she would accumulate credits which she would lose unless she were to spend them 
prior to a certain date. The reasoning was that the burden of adjustment to 
bring international accounts into balance should be placed more heavily on the 
creditor than it had in the past. This reasoning visualized the postwar problem 
as one of inadequate imports by certain countries. Unless such countries im- 
ported more goods, the credits earned by their exports would be canceled 
according to the Keynes plan. A debtor country could, therefore, continue to 
import without embarrassment. The United States did not accept this provision. 



1436 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chancellor of the Exchequer referred in Parliament on Fel)ruary 2, 1043, 
tt> the need for "an international monetary mechanism which will serve the 
requirements of international trade and avoid any need for unilateral action 
in competitive exchange depreciation * * * j^ system in which blocked balances 
and unilateral clearances would be unnecessary * * * an orderly and a^rreed 
method of determining the value of national currency units * * * we want to 
free the international monetary system from those arbitrary, unpredictable, and 
undesirable influences which have operated in the past as a result of large scale 
speculative movements of short-term capital." 

On March 9, 1943, newspapers carried a description of the British and United 
States plans. Accordingly, the two Governments decided to release the plans 
to the public. Before releasing the United States plan on April 7, 1943, Secre- 
tary of the Treasury Morgenthau appeared on April 5 l)efore a joint secret 
session of the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Banking and Cur- 
rency and the Special Committee on Post War Economic Policy and Planning to 
discuss a revised draft of the United States proposal. The British Government 
released its proposal to the public under date of April 8, 1943, pointing out that 
it had been discussed with the United States, the Dominions, and India but that 
the British Government was not committed to its principles or details. The 
United States had also made clear that her proposal was the work of technical 
experts and did not involve any official commitment. 

DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES 

The revised draft of the United States proposal, already available to the Gov- 
ernments of the United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., French Committee of National 
Liberation, and China, was sent under date of March 4, 1943, to the Governments 
of Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecmador, El Salvador, Greece, Guate- 
mala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, LuxemI)ourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, I'oland, Union of South 
Africa, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Secretary Morgenthau's covering 
letter said : 

"The document is sent to you not as an expression of the official views of this 
Government but rather as an indication of the views widely held by the tech- 
nical experts of this Government." 

He also invited these Governments to send technical experts to Washington to 
make suggesti(»ns and to discuss the proposal. In April 1943, the plan was also 
sent to the Goveriunents of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iceland, Iran, and Liberia. 

In addition to the discussions with British representatives, bilateral discus- 
sions with representatives of various other countries liegan in the spring of 1943. 
An informal conference was held at Washington on .Tune ir>, 1(\, and 17, 1943, 
attended by such technical representatives as were available from the above- 
named countries. Representatives of the following countries were present at 
these meetings : Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, 
P^cuador, Egypt, French Committee of National Liberation, Ijuxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, the Philippines, Poland, United Kingdom, 
U. S. S. R., Venezuela, and the United States. 

At this informal conference of 19 countries a number of proposals and memo- 
randa were sulnnitted. The Canadian i-epresentative presented a carefully pre- 
pared plan for an International Exchange Union. This plan provided for an 
organization with S billion dollars of resources embodying many of the features 
of the British and United States proposals and was intended to be a compromise 
plan. The Canadian plan was favorably received by many of the representatives 
and was the basis for considerable discussion. Other proposals and suggestions 
submitted by China, Ecuador, and France received extended attention, either at 
the conference or subsequently. The similarities of the various views embodied 
in all these proposals were nuich more marked than were the differences. The 
conference considered especially the problems of adjustments of exchange rates, 
the size of quotas, gold contributions, and voting power in the proposed organi- 
zation. 

Bilateral discussions Iietween the United States and various other countries 
were held during the latter part of 1943 and the first of 1944. These included dis- 
cussions with Soviet experts who came to Washington early in 1944 and engaged 
in a sex'ies of lengthy discussions. Doubts had been expressed on how the Soviet 
economy could be related to the proposed organization. After asking numerous 
questions regarding the proposals, the Russian experts stated that they Iselieved 
it would be possible for the U. S. S. R. to participate in the organization. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1437 

RECONCILIATION OF UNITED STATB:S AND ItKlTISn MONETARY PROPOSALS 

At meetiiifis between British and American representatives on June 22 and 23, 
11)43,' the United States informed the British that the minimum conditions for 
United States acceptance of membership in a stabilization fund were essentially 
as follows : 

1. The United Kingdom should not alter its exchange rate prior to the beginning 
of fund operations ; 

2. the resources of the fund must be on the contributory rather than the over- 
draft principle ; 

3. the United States financial commitment must be a limited one, perhaps 
2 or 3 l)illion dollars ; and 

4. the United States must have a veto over any change in the gold value of the 
dollar and over any change in the gold value of the proposed new currency unit. 

These minimum conditions were set forth in a letter of July 24, 1943, from 
Mr. White to Lord Keynes. In reply. Lord Keynes, under date of August 10, 1943, 
accepted in substance the conditions, stating however, that for British acceptance 
of the fund proposal provision must be made for greater flexibility in exchange 
rates and that gold sul^scriptions should be reduced. 

In order that an international conference be successful, it was recognized 
that the United States and the United Kingdom must first reach agreement on all 
major points. Accordingly, British and American representatives held a series 
of informal conferences with this objective in view. Lord Keynes arrived in 
Washington in September 1943 at the head of a British delegation to conduct 
negotiations on various commercial policy and financial subjects and promptly 
outlined British views regarding the proposed stabilization fund. These views 
may he summarised as follows : 

1. The United Kingdom would accept the contributory principle with a modifi- 
cation which Lord Keynes would introduce later. 

2. The United Kingdom was agreeable to a maximum subscription by the 
United States of approximately 3 billion dollars but believed that aggregate 
quotas should be 10 to 12 billion dollars. 

3. The United Kingdom was prepared to commit itself to maintenance of the 
present exchange rate for the pound sterling provided agreement was reached on 
other aspects of the fund proposal. 

4. The gold contributions stipulated in the proposal would need to be reduced. 

5. Greater flexibility of exchange rates should be provided for ; the United 
Kingdom could not accept the requirement of approval by a % majority vote for 
a change in exchange rates. 

6. The provision for approval by an 8.5-percent majority vote for a change in 
the gold value of the new currency unit was unacceptable to the United Kingdom. 

7. The provisions in the United States proposal for the gradual liquidation of 
the so-called abnormal sterling balances should be omitted since the British 
preferred to negotiate tliis matter themselves. 

Lord Keynes presented a memorandum entitled "Exchange Rates" which em- 
l)odied the following points : 

1. Members would agree not to propose a change in exchange rates unless 
the change was essential to correct a fundamental disequilibrium. 

2. The Fund should not withhold its approval of a proposed change if the 
change, inclusive of previous changes did not exceed 10 percent within any 10-year 
period. 

3. Special consideration should be given to members which had exceeded their 
quota rights. 

4. In the event that it was not possible to obtain the Fund's prior approval to 
a change in rate, a member could make the cliange and, if the Fund disapproved, 
the member could then either reverse its action or withdraw from the Fund. 

5. The Fund should not disapprove a change in rate necessitated by social or 
political policies of the meml)er. 

In these discussions, Lord Keynes took the position that a member should 
have access to the resources of the Fund without limitation until it liad with- 
drawn resources equivalent to its quota. The United States representatives, on 
the other hand, argued that the Fund should exercise control over all drawings 
on the Fund's resources and that no member should have an automatic right to 
utilize these resources. The British replied that, if a member were to be able to 



5 The British representatives included Sir Frederick Phillips, Messrs. D. H. Robertson, 
Lionel Robbins, and Redvcrs Opie. 



1438 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

I'uriiiiilate its own i>olities and proiirams, it would need the assurance of un- 
hampered access to the resources of tlie I'und. Tlie United States experts 
believed that discretion on the part of the Fund was essential if the Fund's 
resources were to he conserved for the purposes for which the Fund was estah- 
lished and if the Fund were to Ise influential in promoting what it considered to 
he appropriate financial policies. 

These discussions revealed a fundamental difference in viewpoint between the 
United Kingdom and United States regarding the nature of the proposed Fund 
and its operations — a difference of view which has at times reappeared. The 
F>ritish believed that the Fund .should operate as an automatic institution witii a 
minimum of discivtion ou the part of its management, whereas the United States 
believed that the Fund could he most effective in achieving its purposes if its 
operations were conducted on a discretionary basis. According to the United 
States viewpoint, it followed that the Fund should be managed by well-paid 
officers who give their full time to Fund responsibilities. 

In tbe discussions witli the British representatives in 1!)48, the United States 
insisted that before ad.iustnients in exchange rates could take place a member 
should first consult with the Fund and obtain its approval. The F.ritish preferred 
latitude for independent member actions. Other matters which were considered 
at length had to do with the foUowing: problems which would arise in the event 
that the Fund's holdings of the currency of a member were to become scarce, the 
amount of each member's subscription payable in gold, voting with respect to 
adjustments in exchange rates, and the amount of the aggregate quotas. It was 
agreed that a joint statement should be prepared showing the points of agree- 
ment and those that were as yet unresolved. 

During the discussions, Loi'd Keynes presented a memorandum entitled "Sug- 
gestions for the Monetization of Unitas" dated September 21, 1!)4S. The objec- 
tive of the proposal was to make the nnitas a tridy international currency rather 
than merely an accounting unit. Lord Keynes' proposal provided that each mem- 
ber would pay at least I2V2 percent of its quota in gold and the remainder in 
securities carrying an interest rate of IM; percent payable in unitas. Each 
member would be given a balance at the Fund in unitas, such balances to be 
freely acceptable ))y all members in the settlement of international obligatii>ns. 
Members would agree to accept unitas in exchange for their own currency np to 
the point that a member's holdings of unitas reached 120 percent of its quota. 
Members able to do so should redeem each year in gold or gold convertible cur- 
rencies their securities in the amount of 2 percent (»f their quotas. Lord Keynes 
urged that his proposal wonld provide a basis for multilateral clearing which did 
not exist in the United States proposal. 

The principal differences between the British and United States representatives 
at the end of these discussions were on the following points : 

1. The amount of gold subscription of each menilter; the United States i>ro- 
posed 25 percent of the quota or 10 percent of gold and foreign exchange hold- 
ings, whichever was the smaller ; the British proposed 12K- percent of the quota. 
(Later the British accepted the United States proposal Imt specified that the 
foreign-exchange holdings were to be net official holdings.) 

2. I'owers of the Fund to limit a member's access to the Fund's resources ; 
the United States believed that the Fund should be able to limit such access at 
any time, wliereas the British urged that no restrictions should be imposed prior 
to the point where the Fund's holdings of a member's currency exceeded 1^6 
percent of the member's quota. 

3. Provision for an internati(tnal currenc.v unit other than a unit of an account- 
ing nature ; the United States preferred the latter. 

4. Rights of a member to adjust its exchange rate; the British desired that 
latitude be provided for unilateral changes. 

5. Requirements regarding the repurchase by a member of its currency held 
by the Fund. 

Lord Keynes returned to London in tbe early part of r)ctol)er 104:!. but an 
exchange of views continued between British and American repre.sentatives by 
correspondence, cable, and direct negotiations with British representativ<'S in 
Washington. The British transmittvd in December 104r) a new draft of the 
joint statement introducing a section entitled "Transitional Arrangements" the 
substance of which was biter embodied in the final agreement. This section 
provided for a period of ?, or more years f>)Uowing the war during which mem- 
bers would not l>e required to accept the obligations of the Fund regarding ex- 
change restrictions. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1439 

JOINT STATEMENT 

Airreement betwoen tlio United States, the United Kin.udoin, and other coun- 
tries was finally reached, and, on April 21, 1944, a "Joint Statement by Experts 
on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund" was released to the 
public, wliich contained the outlines of the plan finally worked out at Brettou 
Woods. 

The statement was published simultaneously in Washington, London, ^Moscow, 
Chun.iikin.t:, Ottawa, Ilio de Janiero, Mexico City, and Habana, and in full or 
abbreviated form in many other countries. The Governments of the Soviet Union 
and China agreed to participate in a financial conference on the basis of that 
statement. The British decision to participate in a conference was reached, INhiy 
10, 1944, on the understanding that the United Kin.^dom was not committed to 
become a member of the proposed institution. This position was the same as 
that of other governments including the United States, where congressional 
action would be necessary for the United States to become a member. During 
the negotiations, the Secretary of the Treasury had kept the Congress informed 
of developments. 

INTERNATIONAL BANK PROPOSAL 

The original proposal of the Treasury Department in January 1942, noted 
above, concerned the establishment of an international stabilization fund. The 
proposal as revised in March 1942 included also the outlines of a bank and 
was entitled "Preliminary Draft Proposal for United Nations Stabilization Fvxnd 
and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated 
Nations." The proposed bank was to have a capital of 10 billion dollars sub- 
scribed by the member governments and was designed to make loans for recon- 
struction' and development purposes. At least 25 percent of the capital was 
to be paid in gold. The loans were to be partly in local currencies and partly 
in international currency units, according to estimates of the portion of the loan 
to be spent at home and abroad. 

In the interdepartmental discussions of the Treasury proposal for a monetary 
fund and bank, the possibility was considered of combining the two institutions 
into a single institution. Tliis suggestion was rejected, however, in the belief 
that the functions of the two institutions were distinct and that they would 
require different types of personnel. 

The interdepartmental discussions during 1942 and most of 1943 were given 
over practically entirely to the proposal for a stabilization fund and there was 
little or no discussion of the bank. This .situation was due partly to the greater 
technical difficulties Inherent in the fund proposal and also to the fact that 
currency and exchange difficulties during the 1930's had been so severely dis- 
ruptive to world trade and to the internal economies of all countries. 

Although little or no interdepartmental discussion of the bank proposal took 
place during this period, active study of the question was underway both in 
the State and Treasury Departments. 

At the 3-day informal conference held at Washington in the middle of June 
1943 with representatives from 19 countries. Secretary Morgenthau informed 
the conference that, following the consideration of the stabilization fund pro- 
posal, the next step would be consideration of the proposal for an International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This was the first announcement 
to other countries that the United States was considering plans for an inter- 
national bank. 

Under date of September 4, 1943, Assistant Secretary Berle sent to Mr. White 
of the Treasury Department a proposal for an International Investment Agency 
which had been prepared in the State Department. This proposal had been 
prepared in the Division of Economic Studies in consultation with other divi- 
sions and officers of the Department. It proposed in some detail an international 
institution which would make loans to its members for approved purposes. 

The Treasury and State Department proposals were fundamentally not very 
different. Each provided for an institution with a substantial amount of capital 
payable pai-tly in gold and partly (the larger part) in national currencies. The 
proposed institution would cooi>erate with private capital and would not com- 
pete with it in financing reconstruction and development needs of subscribing 
countries. Loans could be made out of its own resources or it could guarantee 
private loans. Repayment prospects of all borrowers were to be carefully exam- 
ined since the institution was intended to operate on sound financial principles. 



1440 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

It could issue its own obligations for sale in the private capital market in order 
to obtain funds for lending. The Treasury proposal provided that each loan 
by the bank must be guaranteed by a member government. This guaranty was 
not required in the State Department proposal. 

The two proposals differed also in that the Treasury draft provided that the 
proceeds of loans could be spent only in the country of the currency loaned. 
The State Department proposal, on the other hand, provided that the proceeds 
of loans could be spent in any country the borrower chose; i. e., the proceeds 
were freely transferable. This matter of "tied loans" was one of considerable 
debate in the American Technical Committee, representatives of the Export- 
Import Bank urging the Treasury view. The final arrangement in the Bretton 
Woods document was a compromise ; the proceeds of certain loans are not 
freely transferable into other currencies (principally loans made out of the 
Bank's subscribed capital), whereas the proceeds of other loans (made out of 
money borrowed by the Bank) are freely transferable. Tlie Bank, however, 
provides borrowers with such currencies as are needed for expenditures in the 
territories of other members. 

The British proposal for a Clearing Union referred to the need for other insti- 
tutions, including a Board for International Investment, and mentioned the 
services which the Clearing Union might perform for such a Board. At the 
close of the discussions between British and American representatives in the 
fall of 1943, the United States representatives referred to this country's interest 
in a bank and gave the British representatives a draft of the bank proposal. 
At a meeting tlie following morning, this proposal was discussed, which was 
the only discussion of a bank during this series of British and American meetings. 
The Treasury Department published on November 24, 11)43, "A Preliminary 
Draft Outline of a Proposal for a Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
of the United and Associated Nations." 

The bilateral conversations with representatives of various countries, includ- 
ing the United Kingdom, which took place late in 1943 and during the first part 
of 1944 dealt primarily with the fund proposal, although before these discussions 
were over the bank had received considerable detailed consideration. The for- 
eign representatives showed a strong interest in the establishment of an inter- 
national bank. The war-devastated countries desired a source of funds to assist 
in reconstruction, whereas the relatively iinderdeveloped countries were inter- 
ested in an institution which would aid them in their plans for economic devel- 
opment. 

The discussions between the British and United States representatives had 
centered around the development of the so-called Joint Statement by Experts 
on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund, as tbe basis for an 
international conference. Agreement on this statement required prolonged and 
difficult negotiation, and, since it was desired to hold a conference promptly, time 
did not permit the preparation of a similar statement with respect to the bank 
proposal. The discussions with the British and other representatives had, how- 
ever, indicated a large measure of agreement on the provisions regarding the 
proposed Bank. Thus it was that when plans were made for the calling of an 
international conference for July 1944 the projiosal for an international liank 
was not so far advanced as that for the Monetary Fund. Some of the United 
States experts believed that if the conference could agree upon a Monetary 
Fund that would be a significant accomplishment and was perhaps all that 
could lie hoped for. Although the bank proposal was greatly desired, a feeling 
existed in some cpiarters that the conference might not be able to develop and 
agree upon plans for both a monetary fund and a bank and that a subsequent 
conference to consider the question of a bank and other investment problems 
might be necessary. 

BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE 

In May 1944, the President issued invitations to the 44 united and associated 
nations to send representatives to a United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference to be held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in July 1944. The 
Conference was to discuss the proposal f(;r an international Monetar.v Fund 
within the terms of the Joint Statement and was also to consider the proposal 
for a Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 

In order to develop further some of the details of the proposals and thereby 
facilitate the work of the Conference, a preliminary meeting was held at Atlantic 
City during the latter part of June. On June 15, a group of American financial 
experts assembled there and were joined a few days later by experts frona 16 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1441 

other countries, uaniely Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ciiik', China, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, the 
United Kingdom, and the U. S. S. R. This group w<irki'd intensively endeavor- 
ing to deal with some of the still unsettled questions and to produce a more 
finished document. Informal discussions were held and on June 26 a full meeting 
of this preliminary conference took place. 

At the Atlantic City meetings, the British experts, headed by Lord Keynes, 
presented proposals regarding the Bank which involved rather extensive changes 
from the earlier plan, but which met with almost immediate approval by the 
experts of the other nations including the United States. According to these 
suggestions, embodied in the final document, only a small portion of the Banks" 
capital, namely 20 percent, would be paid in and be available for loans. The 
remaining 80 percent would constitute a guaranty fund to be used, if necessary, 
in connection with the Bank's guaranties of private loans or to meet other ol)li- 
gations of the Bank. This proposal meant that the Bank's cash resources would 
be considerably smaller than originally contemplated. It became clear that 
the proposal for a Bank was to receive major consideration at the Conference. 
These proposals, together with suggested changes in the Fund plan, had been 
prepared by the British delegates in collaboration with the delegates of several 
European governments in exile. 

The group at Atlantic City completed its work there on June 30 and went 
directly to the Conference at Bretton Woods which convened on July 1, 1944." 
Forty-four governments were represented at the Conference. In addition, Den- 
mark, which had no government in exile, was represented unofficially by her 
Minister in Washington who attended in his personal capacity upon the invita- 
tion of the Conference. 

The Conference divided itself into three technical commissions as follows : 
Commission I, International Monetary Fund ; Commission II, Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development; and Commission III, Other Cleans of International 
Financial Cooperation. These Commissions were broken down into committees 
and subcommittees which considered the various specific sections of the proposed 
articles of agreement for the Monetary Fund and for the Bank. 

A great deal of interest centered around the determination of the quotas 
to be assigned the countries by the Monetary Fund agreement. A member's 
quota determined not only its subscription, payable partly in gold and partly in 
its own currency, but also was related to its drawing privileges on the Fund and 
established its voting rights. Countries, therefore, desired to have their quotas 
as large as possible, the size of the quota, as a matter of prestige, indicating 
the importance of the country, so that preparation of a schedule of quotas satis- 
factory to all countries proved to be a difficult task. The quotas were based upon 
economic considerations such as the size of a country's foreign trade, fluctua- 
tions in its balance of payments, and other factors indicating needs for foreign- 
exchange reserves. Lengthy negotiations were necessary and several of the 
countries were not satisfied with the final results. 

A different attitude prevailed regarding the quotas, or subscriptions as they 
were called, for the Bank. Although the size of the subscription determined 
a member's voting rights, it had no relation to the amount which the member 
might borrow. The countries therefore desired that their Bank subscriptions 
be as small as possible. The United States and others urged that Bank and 
Fund quotas be identical for each member, but due to the opposition of certain 
countries, several departures from this were made, the United States and a few 
others accepting larger Bank subscriptions. 

The United States and the United Kingdom continued their differences over 
the extent to which the Fund should be an automatic institution, the British be- 
lieving that a member's rights of access to the Fund's resources should be prede- 
termined and according to established rules. Th?e United States on the other 
hand, believed that the Fund's operations should be on a discretionary basis. 
The articles of agreement as finally adopted represented somewhat of a com- 
promise of the.se views. 

The United States desire for a strong discretionary Fund led to the provision 
that the Board of Executive Directors should sit in continuous session. The 
United States interpreted this to mean that the Directors should devote their full 
time to their Fund duties. At the inaugural meeting in Savannah in March 1046, 
however, it developed that the British did not so interpret this provision. It was 



• For proceedings and documents of the D. N. monetary and financial conference at 
Bretton Woods, see Department of State publication 2866. 

82918"— 54— pt. 19 7 



1442 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

finally arranged that either the Director or his alternate should be in continuous 
attendance at Fund headquarters. 

The question of charges to be imposed by the Fund on amounts drawn by 
members from Fund resources was the subject of considerable discussion. Some 
of the representatives urged that there be no charges on such drawings. The 
provisions agreec. to provide that the charges increase progressively with the 
amounts drawn, and the length of time such drawings remain unpaid. 

The U. S. S. R. proposed that the gold contributions of countries devastated by 
the war be substantially less than for other members. The Conference did not 
accept this provision The U. S. S. R. also desired that the Bank grant more 
favorable terms on its loans to countries whose territories had been devastated. 
The articles of agreement of the Bank contain a concession on this score in that 
they provide that the Bank "shall pay special regard to lightening the financial 
burden" for members suffering "great devastation from enemy occupation or 
hostilities." The U. S. S. R. also objected to the Fund provision regarding the 
obligation af a member to supply information to the Fund. As a result of 
U. S. S. R. opposition, this provision was somewhat weakened. 

The Latin American representatives feared that the Bank would be more 
interested in making reconstruction loans to European countries than in extend- 
ing development loans to the underdeveloped areas. Provision, therefore, was in- 
serted to the effect that the Bank's resources should be used "with equitable con- 
sideration to projects for development and projects for reconstruction alike." 

Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and a few other countries feared 
that the Fund provisions regarding the elimination of exchange restrictions and 
the maintenance of stable exchange rates might be inconsistent with a domestic 
policy of full employment and other social objectives. Australia desired that 
the articles of agreement set forth that members had an obligation to maintain 
full employment. Such a provision was not included. The articles, however, 
contain a provision that the Fund "shall not object to a proposed change [in rate] 
because ot the domestic, social or political policies of the member . . .".' 

Considerable discussion, led particularly by the United Kingdom, centered 
around the language to be used in describing the postwar transitional period and 
the flexible arrangements and special privileges to be enjoyed by members during 
this period with respect to the elimination of exchange restrictions, discrimi- 
natory currency arrangements, and multiple currency practices. Most of the 
countries maintained exchange restrictions, and several Latin American coun- 
tries had multiple currency arrangements which were inconsistent with the pro- 
posed articles of agreement. The provision adopted regarding the transitional 
period permitted the temporary retention of these restrictions and arrangements 
and their gradual elimination. 

Other matters which were the source of extensive discussion had to do with a 
definition of monetary reserves and of convertible currencies ; with voting rights 
weighted in favor of creditor countries as proposed by the United States and in- 
cluded in the final draft; with the withdrawal of a member, either forced or 
voluntary, and the payment to such memlier of its share of the assets, some of the 
Latin American representatives urging that a forced withdrawal would be a re- 
flection on the honor of a country ; distribution of assets, in the event of liquida- 
tion of the Fund or Bank, and the relative rights of delitors and creditors in 
such case; and various technical problems such as provisions regarding a possi- 
ble scarcity in the Funds' holdings of a particular currency (these sections pro- 
vide that if the Fund declares its holdings of a certain currency scarce, members 
may impose restrictions on the purchase and sale of such currency ; they also 
provide for measures to i-ei)lenish Fund holdings of such currency), and provi- 
sions regarding the repurchase l)y a member of its own currency held by the 
Fund particularly when such currency has been acquired by the Fund as a re- 
sult of large drawings by the member on Fund resources. 

Consideration was given to commercial policy and other economic problems, 
sucli as restrictions on the movement of goods, closely related to the objectives of 



' The Board of Executive Directors in September 1 946 interpreted the articles of agree- 
ment as follows : 

The Executive Directors interpret the Articles of Agreement to mean that steps which 
are necessnry to protect a member from unemployment of a chronic or persistent character, 
arising from pressure on its balance of pnyments, are among the measures necessary to 
correct a fundamental disequilibrium ; and that in each instance in which a member pro- 
poses a cliange in tlie par value of its currency to correct a fundamental disequilibrium the 
Fund will be required to determine, in the light of all relevant circumstances, whether in 
its opinion the proposed change is necessary to correct the fundamental disequilibrium. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1443 

the Fund. It was realized that Fund objectives could not be attained through the 
instrumentality of the Fund alone. Accordinj^ly, Resolution VII recommended 
that the ^Governments promptly reach ai-'reement on the reduction of obstacles to 
international trade and on other important matters. These i)rol)lems were sub- 
sequently dealt with in the charter for an International Trade Orjianization. 

Other resolutions included a recommendation that the Uank for International 
Settlements be liciuidated (this recommendation was not carried out) and that 
further study be made of fluctuations in the value of silver, adopted at the sug- 
gestion of ^lexico. 

The ('(inference worked strenuously to reconcile the differences of viewpoint, 
large and small, of the 44 countries and to complete its diliicult task in the short 
time assijined to it. On July '22, 1944. 3 weeks after the Conference bejian, the 
articles of aijreement for the two institutions were complete, and the tinal act 
was si.uned by representatives of the 44 jiovernments present. Provision was 
made for the subseiiueut participation of other countries in the Fund and Bank. 
The articles of agreement required the formal approval of the various govern- 
ments in accordance with their various legal processes. 

SUMMARY OF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 

The articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund as finally drafted 
at Bretton Woods set forth what the nations represented there considered the 
principles and procedures which nations should follow in the field of currency 
and exchange and i)rovided international machinery to help attain these objec- 
tives. The following purposes of the Fund as stated in article I are to guide the 
Fund in all its decisions : 

"(i) To promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent in- 
stitution whicli provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on in- 
ternational monetary problems. 

"(ii) To facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, 
and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of em- 
ployment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of 
all members as primary objectives of economic policy. 

"(iii) To promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrange- 
ments among members, and to avoid competitive exchange depreciation. 

"(iv) To a.ssist in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in 
respect of current transactions between membei's and in the elimination of for- 
eign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade. 

"(v) To give confidence to members by making the Fund's I'esources available 
to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with opportunity to cor- 
rect maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to measures 
destructive of national or international prosperity. 

"(vi) In accordance with the above, to shorten the duration and lessen the 
degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of members." 

The principal provisions through which the above purposes are to be achieved 
are, in summary form, as follows : 

"i. Member countries undertake to keep their exchange rates as stable as pos- 
sible, confining fluctuations to narrowly prescribed limits, and to make no change 
in rates unless essential to correct a fundamental disequilibrium. 

"ii. Any adjustment of an exchange rate must In all cases be made by consulta- 
tion with the Fund. Beyond certain small changes, rates can be adjusted only 
with the concurrence of the Fund. 

"iii. Par values are to be stated in terms of gold (or U. S. dollars of the weight 
and fineness as of July 1, 1944), and gold is to be accepted by members in settle- 
ment of accounts. 

"iv. A common pool of resources contributed by the members on the basis of 
quotas is established and available under safeguarding conditions to meet tem- 
porary shortages of exchange. It is designed to help a member maintain the for- 
eign exchange value of its currency until such member has had time to correct 
maladjustments. The total of the quotas of the countries * represented at Bret- 
ton Woods is 8,800 million dollars of which the United States quota is 2,750 mil- 
lion dollars. The resources of the Fund are not intended to be used to provide 
capital for reconstruction, investment, or for other long-term purposes but are 



' Excluding Denmark ; see p. 786. 



1444 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

available only for making payments for current transactions, which are defined 
in the articles of agreement. 

"v. Member countries agree not to engage in discriminatory or multiple cur- 
rency practices or similar devices or, except with the approval of the Fund, 
to impose restrictions upon payments for current international transactions. 
Existing restrictions and practices are to be abandoned as soon as the postwar 
transitional period permits. Special provisions provide flexibility in eliminating 
restrictions and practices during this transitional period. 

"vi. Member countries agree to maintain the gold value of their currency held 
by the Fund so that the assets of the Fund will not depreciate in terms of gold. 

"vii. The Fund may deal only with governments or their agencies and may 
have no direct contact with the foreign exchange market. 

"viii. The Fund is governed by a Board of 12 or more Executive Directors 
which functions in continuous session at the Fimd's headquarters. Five of these 
are appointed by the countries with the five largest quotas and the remainder 
are elected by the other members. The Board of Governors which has final 
authority consists of one governor appointed by each member and meets annually. 
Voting of members is weighted according to the size of a member's quota." 

SUMMABY OF ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BANK 

The following purposes of the International Bank as stated in article I of 
the Bank articles of agreement are to guide the Bank in all its decisions : 

"(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of mem- 
bers by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including 
the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of 
productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the develop- 
ment of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries. 

"(ii) To promote private foreign investment by means of guarantees or 
participations in loans and other investments made by private investors ; and 
when private capital is not available on reasonable terms, to supplement pri- 
vate investment by providing, on suitable conditions, finance for productive 
purposes out of its own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources. 

"(iii) To promote the long-range balanced growth of international trade and 
the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging inter- 
national investment for the development of the productive resources of mem- 
bers, thereby assisting in raising productivity, the standard of living and 
conditions of labor in their territories. 

"(iv) To arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to inter- 
national loans through other channels so that the more useful and urgent 
projects, large and small alike, will be dealt with first. 

"(v) To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of international 
investment on business conditions in the territories of members and, in the 
immediate postwar years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transition from 
a wartime to a peacetime economy." 

The International Bank was given an authorized capital of 10 billion dollars 
of which 8.8 billion dollars was assigned to the countries represented at the 
Bretton Woods Conference. The United States subscription was 3,175 million 
dollars. Only 20 x>ercent of the subscribed capital, however, is paid-in and avail- 
able for loans by the Bank, the remainder being a guaranty fund which can be 
called for payment only if needed in connection with the Bank's guaranties or 
other obligations. Two percent of a member's subscription is payable in gold 
or United States dollars and the balance in its own currency. 

In order to obtain funds for lending, the Bank may sell its own obligations in 
the private capital market. Such sale is intended to be the principal source of 
funds for the Bank. Loans by the Bank must be exclusively for the benefit of 
members and are ordinarily for specific projects of reconstruction or development. 
The Bank may not only make loans itself but may also guarantee private loans. 
Each loan whether guaranteed or made directly by the Bank must be guaranteed 
by the national government of a member. The Bank is not to compete with 
private capital and may not make a loan if private capital is available on reason- 
able terms. 

The Bank, like the Fund, is governed by a Board of at least 12 Executive 
Directors which is in continuous sessions at the Bank's headquarters. The 
Board of Governors is the final authority. This Board which consists of one 
governor appointed by each member meets annually. Voting is weighted accord- 
ing to the size of a member's subscription. In order to become a member of the 
Bank, a country must first become a member of the Fund. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1445 

ESTABLISHMENT OF FUND AND liANK 

United States pai-ticipation in the Fund and Bank was autliorized by Consress 
in the Hretton Woods AgrtHMiicnt Act of July ir)4r). Tliis act also created tlie 
National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial problems 
consisting of the" Secretary of the Treasury (Chairman), Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Commerce, Chairnuni of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, and (added later) the 
Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration. This Council con- 
sults with the United States representatives on the Fund, and the Bank and 
advises them on policies to be pursued. 

The articles of agreement of the Fund and of the Bank were signed at the 
Department of State on December 27, lJ»4o, by representatives of 30 countries 
who also deposited their appropriate instruments, thereby bringing the two 
institutions into formal existence. Five additional countries signed the articles 
of agreement prior to December 31, 1945, and several others followed soon there- 
after. The inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors of each institution was 
held at Savannah, Georgia, in March 1946, at which time the Executive Directors 
were chosen. The two Boards of Executive Directors held their first meetings 
in !\Iay 1946 at Washington which was selected as Fund and Bank headquarters. 
The two institutions were thus officially underway. 

Mr. Mandel. Next I have excerpts from the memoirs of former 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, published in 1948, volume I : 

The Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., who ranked next to 
me in the Cabinet, often acted as if he were clothed with authority to project 
himself into the field of foreign affairs and inaugurate efforts to shape the course 
of foreign policy in given instances. He had an excellent organization in the 
Treasury Depai'tment, ably headed by Harry White, but he did not stop with 
his work at the Treasury. Despite the fact that he was not at all fully or accu- 
rately informed on a number of questions of foreign policy with which he under- 
took to interfere, we found from his earliest days in the Government that he 
seldom lost an opportunity to take long steps across the line of State Department 
jurisdiction. Emotionally upset by Hitler's rise and his persecution of the Jews, 
he often sought to induce the President to anticipate the State Department or 
act contrary to our better judgment. We sometimes found him conducting nego- 
tiations with foreign governments which were the function of the State Depart- 
ment. His work in drawing up a catastrophic plan for the postwar treatment of 
Germany, and inducing the President to accept it without consultation with the 
State Department, was an outstanding instance of this interference (pp. 207-8). 

This is from volume II of the same work : 

At the same time we worked on an outline of a 10-point peace settlement to 
accompany the modus vivendi. In general, my associates and I had reached a 
stage of clutching at straws to save the situation. 

Mr. Orimes. This was just before Pearl Harbor when they were 
working on the modus vivendi, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

We groped for anything that might offer any possibility for keeping serious con- 
versations going. The Department's Far Eastern experts had drafted a pro- 
posed outline of settlement on November 11 — 

that would be 1941— 

which I went over word for word. This was drawn up with a view to keeping 
the conversations going — and thus gaining time — and also, if accepted, to serving 
as the basis for an eventual comprehensive settlement. Secretary Morgenthau 
sent me a further draft written in his Department. Although this was a further 
example of what seemed to me to be the Secretary of the Treasury's persistent 
inclination to try to function as a second Secretary of State, some of its points 
were good and were incorporated in our final draft (p. 1073). 

******* 
At that moment the situation was almost upset entirely by a sudden move of 
Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau and his advisers. Morgenthau often 
interfered in foreign affairs, and sometimes took steps directly at variance with 

32918°— 54— pt. 19 8 



1446 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

those of the State Department. Since there was frequently a connection between 
foreign and financial affairs, he hart in his hands monetary weapons which he 
brandished in the foreign field from time to time, often without consulting the 
State Department. In this practice he ran a close race with Vice President 
Henry V^allace, formerly head of the Board of Economic Warfare. 

Morgenthau was particularly avid on the subject of freezing the credits of 
foreign countries in the United States. Now I suddenly became aware that he 
was proposing to freeze Argentina's funds in the United States, reported to 
amount to .$.500 million. Early in May the Treasury Department sent the Board 
of Economic Warfare a memorandum making this proposal. When a copy of It 
came to my hand, I sent it to the President on May 14 with an accompanying 
note in which I said : 

"You will readily see that this proposes a complete reversal of the good 
neighbor policy and a substitution of our old discredited policy of coercion and 
domination of South American countries by Jiig-stick methods. Naturally, I am 
greatly surprised that this view would be seriously presented by any other 
governmental agency, for two reasons. One is that this raises purely a question 
[of foreign policy, and the other Is that it would wipe out our good neighbor 
policy, as stated, and substitute the big stick." 

I urged the President to intervene at the earliest practicable time, especially 
in view of the fact that if this proposal became public It would have terrific 
repercussions all over South America. And I added that, from the type of some 
of the persons who were dealing with it, it was liable to become public at any 
time. 

The President did effectively intervene and prevent this drastic move. Mor- 
genthau, however, did not give up the idea (pp. 1379-1380) . 

******* 

Harry Plopkins came to me on September 1, 11)44, and informed me of the 
President's desire to establish a "Cabinet committee on Germany." He said 
the President had asked him to give his undivided attention to this matter in the 
next few weeks. Hopkins at this time also explained Morgenthau's interest in 
the question, arising from his disagreement with certain sections of the plans 
for Germany which already had been prepared. 

My associates at the State Department, particularly H. Freeman Matthews 
and James W. Riddleberger, went over with Hopkins in detail the studies con- 
cerning postwar Germany made at the State Department and by the Eurojiean 
Advisory Commission in London. They prepared a memorandum, which I 
approved, explaining the work that already had been done and setting forth 
the State Department's views on the treatment of Germany. This Matthews 
and Riddleberger presented at a meeting of representatives of the State, Treas- 
ury, and War Departments called by Hopkins in his office at the White House on 
September 2. 

Morgenthau's. or the Treasury's, plan was presented at this session by Dr. 
Harry White. This plan proposed, among other things, that parts of Germany 
should be given to neighboring countries and the remainder split into three units. 

Poland should get southern Silesia and that part of East Prussia which did 
not go to Russia. France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories 
bounded by the Rhine and Moselle Rivers. Denmark should get territories north 
of the Kiel Canal, between her present borders and an International Zone. 

This International Zone would be one of the three units into which Germany 
would be partitioned. 

Let me skip a portion there and go on : ^ 

Dr. White explained that no trade would be permitted between the Inter- 
national Zone and the remainder of Germany. He emphasized that the pro- 
ductivity of this zone would in no way be permitted to contribute to German 
economy. 



1 Following is the matter omitted : 

"It would contain the Kiihr and the snrroiinding industrial areas and the Kiel Canal, 
and would be run by the proposed United Nations organization. The remaining portion 
of Germany would be divided into two autonomous, independent states — a South German 
state, compriifiing a large part of the old state of I'russia, Saxony, Thuringia, and several 
smaller states. There would be a customs union between the new South German state and 
Austria, the latter to be restored to her pre-lO.SS borders. 

"Industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the 
North and South (Jerman states would be removed and distributed among devastated 
countries. Forced German labor would be used in such countries." 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1447 

Later the Treasury inserted in its plan this paragraph with regard to the lUihr 
and surrounding industi'ial areas: 

"This area sliould not only he stripped of all presently existing industries hut 
so weakened and controlled that it cannot in the foreseeahle future heconie an 
industrial area — all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military 
action shall either be completely dismantled or removed from the area or com- 
pletely destroyed, all equipment should be removed from the mines and the 
mines shall he thorougldy wrecked." 

The Treasury plan stated that the United States would have military and 
civilian representation on whatever international commission might be es- 
tablished to carry out the German program, but tliat the primary responsibility 
for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany would be 
assumed l)y the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors, specifically 
Russia, France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway, the Nether- 
lands, and Belgium. United States troops could be withdrawn within "a rela- 
tively short time." (Pp. 1604-05.) 

The Chairman. The entire document will go into the record and 
become a part of the record. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 389" and are 
in the committee's record by reference.) 

Mr. Mandel, The next is a translation made by John Dorosh, Cura- 
tor of the Slovak Room of the Library of Congress, from an article 
appearing in The War and the Working Class, No. 20, October 15, 
1944, entitled "Meetings in America," by I. Zlobin. This magazine 
is published in Moscow, and it gives in part an estimate of Harry 
Dexter White. 

* * * At Bretton Woods we became acquainted and have established business 
contacts with many influential financiers of America and some other coun- 
tries. Among them, first of all, we should mention the chairman of the Con- 
ference and Secretary of Finance of the United States of America, Henry Mor- 
genthau, and his assistant, Harry White, author of the American project of the 
International Currency Fund and tlie Bank of Reconstruction. Also the head 
of the British delegation and author of the British project of the International 
Clearing Union, Lord Keynes * * * 

* * * Mr. Morgenthau and his immediate assistant White have displayed live 
interest to our country and first of all, naturally, to her economical and financial 
problems. We have felt that this interest of practical Americans is far from 
being idle; that it was dictated by a realization of the fact that in the postwar 
period the problems of economic collaboration with the Soviet Union would 
play an important role for America. Particularly Morgenthau was very much 
interested in the question of subscription of loans in the Soviet Union and was 
interested in the forms of loans, the amount of prices and also what form of 
a loan and whether the population preferred interest-bearing loans or lottery 
loans. * * * 

* * * Harry White, a man of about 50 years old, of medium height, and wearing 
ghisses, is very businesslike and sociable. When we were in Washington he has 
invited me and another member of our delegation. Comrade N. F. Chechulin, to 
his country cottage, and he and his wife came to take us over. They have also 
driven us back. The cottage of White is not large. It is a two-story dwelling 
encircled by plants. It is about 15 kilometers from Washington * * *. 

* * * White is a passionate sportsman. He has a special passion to volleyball 
and tennis. In Bretton Woods, between meetings, we have for the first time met 
our skill in a game with him in volleyball. He was the head of the American 
team, and Comrade Chechulin was the captain of the Soviet Command. At 
first we won, and with a substantial score. White was very much disappointed 
and has threatened that for the next game he will get together such a team 
that will literally crush us; and, sure enough, he has gathered such a command 
and the most important thing is that he has invited a v^^ell-known sportsman 
from South America and has finally succeeded in beating us. Later on, when- 
ever there was an occasion that we liad to put through some decisions of interest 
to us, White would always jokingly say, "All I can place at your disposal are 
our own votes and the votes of the 22 Latin American Republics. * * *" 



1448 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

I have here, Mr. Chairman, a photostat of the Russian version of 
the article from which I read. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 390" and is 
filed with the subcommittee.) 

Mr. Mandel. The next is an excerpt from the Daily Worker, the 
official Communist organ in this country, dated November 20, 1953, 
page 2. I won't bother to read the entire article; just a few para- 
graph references to Mr. White. I read : 

For the "crimes" that White committed were all calculated to advance the 
interests of the American majority, the true interests of the Nation, as opposed 
to the interests of the handful of parasitic monopolists and bankers who trietl and 
[are] still trying to plunder and beti-ay the Nation. 

White's No. 1 crime, it now turns out, was the fact that he reflected In his 
proposals and fight for them the crying needs of the American people, which the 
people were themselves saying in many ways. And high on the list of these 
needs was the demand for a program to consolidate Soviet-American economic 
and political cooi^eration. 

******* 

Repeatedly before World War II White accused the State Department of failing 
to stem Axis aggression. 

******* 

White fought for massive economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union — 
to the tune of a $10 billion postwar credit — so as to enable us to obtain the raw 
materials we need. A brilliant proposal for advancing our national interests 
through the expansion of trade — as even such businessmen as Republic Steel's 
Ernest Weir and the Chrysler executives are now realizing as the economic con- 
sequences of our cold war policies begin to pile up here at home. 

White urged Roosevelt to press Chamberlain to join the Soviet Union in an 
effort to check Hitler. * * * 

White called for "real aid" to Latin America and to China — instead of tlie 
"aid" with political strings attached which the Wall Street bankers re- 
quired. * * * 

(The newspaper article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 391" 
and is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 391 
[From the Daily Worker, New York, November 20, 1953] 

Harry D. White's Record or Service to PIis Country 
(By John Pittman) 

The "crimes" that the late Harry Dexter White committed as a Government 
servant under President Roosevelt and President Truman help to throw light 
on the ferocity with which White has been singled out for McCarthyite attack. 

Of course, it is easier to heap calumny on a dead man than on a man able 
to speak back and say his piece. And to date none of the New Deal oflBcials who 
were White's superiors have had the courage to play the part of Marc Antony 
and tell the country the good that is now interred with Harry White's bones. 

Wallace is silent. Morgenthau remains silent. Even Truman, while indi- 
cating his disbelief of the FBI's hodge-podge of slander and stool-pigeon testi- 
mony about White, has not seen fit to fight the issue across the boards — which 
is the only way it can be fought to victory over McCarthyism. 

For the issue is McCarthyism versus Rooseveltism. Or to put the matter 
bluntly, fascism versus another Labor-Farmer-Negro people's coalition in support 
of a truly American program for the benefit of the majority of the people of 
our country. And this issue stands out conspicuously in the White case. 

For the "crimes" that White committed were all calculated to advance the 
interests of the American majority, the true interests of the Nation, as opposed 
to the interests of the handful of parasitic monopolists and bankers who tried and 
are still trying to plunder and betray the Nation. 

White's No. 1 crime, it now turns out, was the fact that he reflected in his 
proposals and fight for them the crying needs of the American people, which 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1449 

tlio pooplo woro thoinsolvos saying in many ways. And hijih on the list of those 
noods was tlie tieniand for a program to coiisolidatt' Suviet -American economic 
and political cooperation. 

In the atmosphere of McCarthyism, in which even a statement favoring nero- 
tiations with Moscow, may he held up as "proof" of "Communist espionage," this 
"crime" of White's is a greater offense than murder, I'ape, arson, dope-peddling, 
and grand larceny, not to speak of grafting at the taxpayers' expense which 
seems to receive a clean bill of health from J. Edgar Hoover, especially if the 
accused is McCarthy. And one need only read Hoover's fanatical statement 
about ";'.-■) years of infiltration of an alien way of life," "the godless forces of 
coiiimuiiism," and "Red Fascists," to understand that McCarthyism has reigned 
in th(> FBI headquarters since Hoover became FBI boss. 

White's advocacy of measures to strengthen Soviet-American cooperation, 
according to a New York Times survey of his papers at Princeton (11-14), 
included these specific activities: 

Repeatedly before World War II White accused the State Department of fail- 
ing to stem Axis aggression. 

Who will deny this now, in view of our policy toward Japan's seizure of Man- 
churia (1931), Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia (1034), the Hitler-Mussolini 
intervention in Spain (1936), the Munich conspiracy (1939)? And who will 
denv that had we intervened against the Axis, the world might have been spared 
World War II? 

White predicted the Axis would attack Britain and France, rather than the 
Soviet Union. Wouldn't it have been better for everyone if all our Government 
servants had seen this consequence of the building up of German militarism? 
Wouldn't it be better today if they saw it in reference to our current policies 
toward West Germany? 

White fought for economic and moral support of the Chinese Government 
against the Japanese invasion in 1938. Wouldn't that, too, have been better 
than continuing to ship iron and oil to Japan militarism, which later killed 
American boys in the Far East, and wouldn't a similar policy loday be better 
than the p<ilicy of again building up Japan militarism? 

White fought for massive economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union — 
to the tune of a $10 billion postwar credit — so as to enable us to obtain the raw 
materials we need. A brilliant proposal for advancing our national interests 
through the expansion of trade — as even such businessmen as Republic Steel's 
Ernest Weir and the Chrysler executives are now realizing as the economic 
consequences of our cold-war policies begin to pile up here at home. 

White urged Roosevelt to press Chamberlain to .join the Soviet Union in an 
effort to check Hitler. Had that been successfully done, there would have been 
no Munich. 

White called for "real aid" to Latin America and to China — instead of the 
**aid" with political strings attached which the Wall Street bankers required. 
Is this not what a majority of Americans wanted? 

Such is the record of Harry Dexter White — a record of devotion to the 
Rooseveltian ideals. 

White's major ideas were the concepts of Rooseveltian foreign policy, con- 
cepts based on the people's progressive alliance which kept Roosevelt in the 
Presidency despite the conspiracy of the America Fii'sters, the Du Ponts, the 
Rockefellers to replace him with Dewey. 

Today, the Fascist hirelings of the Du Ponts, Rockefellers, and backers of 
the "Liberty League" are having their revenge. And J. Edgar Hoover and 
his McCarthyite pals, exploiting the well-known fact that all States have intelli- 
gence services, are doing their utmost to link American Communists and former 
New Deal stalwarts M'ith the intelligence services of foreign powers. If they 
ai"e successful in this, no candidate voicing ideas even remotely New Dealish 
could hope lor election in 19r)4 and 196;' [sic]. Indeed, their success in this plot 
might even rule elections in 1954 and 1965 [sic]. 

Clearly the issue is Roosevelt's foreign and domestic program versus the 
program of the worst plunderers and l)etrayers of the American people. Fought 
along these lines, the P.rownell-Hoover-McCarthy maneuver can be smashed, 
and the Nation's attention returned to the real issues of jobs and liberty. 

Mr. Mandel. Then I liave a series of documents with a letter from 
tlie Treasury Department accreditinor them. I ask that tlie letter 
be placed in the record without my reading it. 



1450 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chairman. It may go in the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 392." and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 392 

Treasury Department, 
Washinyton, D. C, March 31, 195 Jt. 
Hon. William E. Jenner, 

Chairman, Internal Security Suhconimittce, 
United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 
My Dear Mr. Chairman : In accordance with your letter of March 26, we 
are sending you herewith photostatic copies of the following documents : 

1. Memorandum by White to Morgenthau, March 31, 1939. 

2. Memorandum of September 7, 1944, "Is European Prosperity Dependent on 
German Industry?" 

3. Memorandum from White to Morgenthau, March 7, 1944, "Proposed United 
States Loan to the U. S. S. R." 

It is my understanding that the other three documents which you request 
are now the subject of discussion between Mr. Grimes of your staff and Mr. 
H. Chapman Rose. 

Sincerely yours, 

Catherine B. Cleary, 
Assistant to the Secretary. 

Mr, Mandel. I will read excerpts from the documents, all of which 
come from the Treasury Department. 

The first is a document dated March 7, 1944. At the foot of the 
document are the following initials: "HDW," presumably Harry 
Dexter White; "WHT," presumably William Henry Taylor; "ISF," 
presumably Irving S. Friedman ; "SG," presumably Sonia Gold. 

We have checked these initials with the Treasury Department, and 
those are the names they give us. Portions of this document read 
as follows : 

Subject : Proposed United States loan to the U. S. S. R. 

The following memorandum is in reference to your request that the feasibility 
of the extension of a large credit to the U. S. S. R. in exchange for needed 
strategic raw, materials be explored. Your opinion that such an arrangement 
might well be feasible appears to us to be supported by our study of the 
possibilities. 

This is addressed to Secretary Morgenthau, and from Mr. White. 
In regard to his proposed loan to Russia, I read at the end this 
section : 

The proposed financial agreement appears desirable — 

he says — 

because : 

1. The United States will obtain access to an important source of strategic 
raw materials which are expected to be in short supply in the United States 
after the war. 

2. The United States will also be assured an important market for its indus- 
trial products since the LT. S. S. R. represents one of the largest single sources 
of demand in Europe and is ideally suited to supply us with a large and varied 
backlog of orders for both producers' and consumers' goods. Such a sustained 
demand could make an important contribution to the maintenance of full employ- 
ment during our transition to a peace economy. 

3. Moreover, the United States will not only be assured a desirable market 
because of the anticipated volume of demand the U. S. S. R. will exercise, but 
because of its superior repayment potential compared with other foreign buyers 
of American products. 

4. An arrangement of this character would provide a sound basis for con- 
tinued collaboration between the two governments in the postwar period. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



1451 



The Chairman. The entire document will go into the record and 
become a ]^art of the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 393" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 393 

March 7, 1944. 
From : Secretary Morgeiithau. 
To : Mr. White. 
Subject : Proposed United States loan to the U. S. S. R. 

Tlie following memorandum is in response to your request tlnit the feasibility 
of the extension of a large credit to the U. S. S. R. in exchange for needed 
strategic raw materials be explored. Your opinion that such an arrangement 
might well be feasible appears to us to be supported by our study of the possi- 
bilities. 

1. Recent confidential reports on our raw material resources prepared for 
the Under Secretary of Interior disclose an increasing dependence of the United 
States on foreign sources of supply for strategic raw materials because domestic 
reserves have been seriously diminished or virtually depleted. 

2. Tlie following table indicates the extent of United States current reserve 
supplies for some important strategic materials, which can be produced in 
quantity in the U. S. S. R., in terms of prewar and current war domestic require- 
ments : 





Reserve domestic supplies 








On basis of our 
1938 domestic 
consumption 


On basis of our 

current con- 
sumption, 1943 


Petroleum 


Years' supply 
16 

9 
23 
17 

7 

<" 3 


Years' supply 
13 


Manganese - 


3 


Tungsten . - _ - - - 


3 


Zinc - - . - . 


8 


Lead -. 


6 


Chrome 


(2) 


Mercury -- --- - - - -._.. 


2 







1 No record. 

> Less than 1 year's supply. 

3. It is evident from the above table that, although our domestic reserves of 
petroleum, tungsten, and zinc may suffice to meet consumption requirements for 
the next decade, they will be almost entirely dissipated by the end of that period ; 
in the case of manganese, chrome, mercury, and lead, our reserves are too limited 
to satisfy even probable domestic requirements of tlie next 10 years. The 
number of strategic materials for which our reserves are very low and wliich 
can be produced in the U. S. S. R. is greater than indicated above, and includes 
platinum, vanadium, graphite, and mica. 

4. Although our reserves of strategic materials could be somewhat expanded, 
given an increase in price to make possible further development of marginal 
res<(urces, the necessity of growing United States dependence on foreign sources 
of supply in order to satisfy anticipated postwar industrial requirements and 
to maintain adequate security reserves is inescapable. 



U. S. S. R. UNTAPPED RAW IVrATERIALS RESERVOIR 

1. The U. S. S. R. is richly provided with a wide range of strategic raw 
materials, including metals, minerals, timl)er, and petroleum, but the unequal 
degrees to which these have l)een developed will limit the number and volume 
that may be available for exiJort in the immediate postwar years. 

2. Rapid economic reconstruction and expand(Hl resource development could 
greatly enhance the export surplus of the U. S. S. R. If provided with develop- 
mental facilities the U. S. S. R. could sustain large-scale exports of metal and 
metallic ores, petroleum, and timber at an average annual value of at least !?.")00 
million, not including exports of other materials such as furs and semimanu- 
factures. 



1452 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

3. It therefore appears that a financial agreement whereby the United States 
would extend a credit of $0 billion to the U. S. S. R. for the purchase of indus- 
trial and a.uricultural products over a 5-year period, to be repaid in full over a 
30-year period, chiefly in the form of raw material exports, would not only be 
advantageous to the United States, as well as helpful to the U. S. S. R., but would 
be within the limits of feasible trade between the two countries, since the amount 
we would wish to purchase woiild be in excess of the repayment which the 
U. S. S. R. would be required to make under the proposed loan terms. 

IS THE PROPOSED FINANCIAL AGREEMENT PRACTICAL AND DESIRABLE? 

The proposed financial agreement appears practical because : 

1. The prewar restricted pattern of trade should not be used to define the poten- 
tials of postwar trade between the United States and U. S. S. R. since both 
economies have been fundamentally restructured by the war. In both the 
United States and the U. S. S. R. the accelerated expansion of productive capacity 
and national output which has been achieved during the last 3 years indicates 
the new and larger dimensions which foreign trade can assume in both economies 
in the postwar period. 

2. The low level of prewar international trade relations were both a symptom 
and a cause of deteriorated economic and political international relations. It is 
realistic to assume that as compared with prewar years a decreasing proportion 
of expanding Soviet resources will be devoted to war industries, thereby creating 
an enlarged export potential through the release of resources. 

3. Since the U. S. S. R. has a completely state-controlled economy, the extent 
and character of its surpluses and deficits (i. e. imports and exports) are largely 
determined by planning decisions covering the allocation of manpower, materials 
and equipment, it will be possible for the United States to influence the Soviet pat- 
tern of anticipated national surpluses and deficits. 

4. If United States trade plans are premised on an expanded volume of trade 
and a correlative in<Tease in United States import requirements, the expansion of 
trade between the United States and U. S. S. R. need not necessarily involve a 
reduction in total United States imports from other areas. 

The pi'oposed financial agreement appears desirable because : 

1. The United States will obtain access to an important source of strategic raw 
materials which are expected to be in short supply in the United States after the 
war. 

2. The United States will also be assured an important market for its industrial 
products, since the U. S. S. R. represents one of the largest single sources of de- 
mand in Europe and is ideally suited to supply us with a large and varied backlog 
of orders for both producers' and consumers' goods. Such a sustained demand 
could make an important contribution to the maintenance of full employment 
during our transition to a peace economy. 

3. Moreover, the United States will not only be assured a desirable market 
because of the anticipated volume of demand the U. S. S. R. will exercise, but 
because of its superior repayment potential compared with other foreign buyers 
of American products. 

4. An arrangement of this character would provide a sound basis for continued 
collaboration between the two Governments in the postwar period. 

HDW: V^HT:ISF: SG:gp 3/7/44. 
copy: gaa 

Mr. Mandel. Next I have a document dated September 7, 1944, 
"Memorandum, Subject: Is European Prosperity Dependent upon 
German Industry?" I will read selected portions of it : 

In the postwar period the expanded industrial capacity of the United Nations, 
particularly the United States, can easily provide the reconstruction and indus- 
trial needs of Europe without German assistance. 

He speaks of the need for German industry bein<j eliminated. 

This document has attached to it the names of White and Glasser, 
presumably Harold Glasser. The initials at the end are HDW, pre- 
sumably Harry Dexter White; HG, Harold Glasser; ON, Oscar 
Nathan ; HB, Henry Bittermann ; and the stenographer's initials. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1453 

I ask that tlils be placed in the record. 

Tlie Chaikman. The entire document will go into the record and 
become a part of the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 394" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 394 

[Handwritten] White (original document consisted of 4 pages with handwrit- 
ten numbers 1^ — 4'). 

September 7, 1944. 

memorandum 

Subject: Is European prosperity dependent upon German industry? 

1. The assumption sometimes made that Germany is an indispensable source of 
industrial supplies for the rest of Europe is not valid. 

United States, United Kingdom and the French-Luxembourg-Belgian industrial 
group could easily have supplied out of unused industrial capacity practically 
all that Germany supplied to Europe during the prewar period. In the postwar 
period the expanded industrial capacity of the United Nations, particularly the 
United States, can easily provide the reconstruction and industrial needs of 
Europe without German assistance. 

Total German exports to the entire world in 19.38 were only about $2 billion, 
of which machinery steel and steel products amounted to about .$7.50 million, 
coal $16.5 million and chemicals $2.30 million. 

These amounts are trivial in comparison with the increased industrial iKitential 
of the Ignited States alone, or of the United Kingdom. One-fifth of our lend- 
lease exports of 1943 would be sufficient to replace the full exports of Germany 
to the whole world. 

2. A claim has been made that Europe is dependent upon Ruhr coal. The 
French-Belgian steel industry and some of the new industrial units which will 
arise in Europe after the war will need imported coal supplies. However, the 
British coal industry which suffered from German comi)etition before the war 
will be able to supply a major part if not all of these needs. Further supplies 
if necessary could be obtained from the United States though at a nuich higher 
price. The different quality of British coal may require some technological 
changes but the adjustment can be made. 

Germany had a net export of coal of .32 million tons in 19.37. The difference 
between the Briti.sh coal production in a good year and a depressed year was more 
than the total German exports of coal. Moreover, at no time in the last 25 
years has the British coal industry worked at full capacity. 

3. Germany has been important to the rest of Europe as a market principally 
for surplus agricultural products. In 1937 Germany's food imports from the 
world were $800 million, of which Europe supplied $450 million. Total German 
I)Tirchases of raw materials from Europe in 1937 were about .$350 million. The 
loss of the German market will be largely compensated for by the following 
developments : 

(a) If German industry is eliminated, no doubt the bulk of the industrial 
raw materials which Germany used to purchase will now be bought by other 
European nations which will henceforth produce the industrial commodities 
which Germany exported before to Eiirope. 

(&) The industrialization and the heightened standard of living of the rest 
of Europe will absorb a part of the food surpluses which formerly went to 
Germany. 

(c) Those parts of Germany which will be added to other countries (the 
Rhineland, Silesia, East Prussia) may have as high a volume of food imports 
as before, perhaps higher. 

{(l) The remaining parts of Germany will continue to import some food, 
perhaps 25 to 50 percent of former food imports. 

4. Germany was important to the rest of Europe as a market to the following 
extent : 



1454 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION m GOVERNMENT 

Percentage of each country's exports to Germany — 

Percent 

United Kingdom 4 

France 6 

U. S. S. R 7 

Belgium 12 

Norway 13 

Italy 15 

Czechoslovakia 15 

Netherlands 15 

Denmark 20 

Poland 24 

Yugoslavia 38 

Greece 3S 

The United Kingdom exported principally coal and textile materials to Ger- 
many and the principal Fi-ench exports were iron ore and wool. The elimina- 
tion of German industrial exports will provide adequate markets for these 
exports and more. 

The loss of the German market may be important to the Balkan countries. 
Agricultural exports of these countries to Germany were abnormally large in 
1938 because of Germany's unscrupulous exploitation through clearing agree- 
ments and other devices. These countries will find markets for part of their 
food surplus thi-ough industrialization and a higher standard of living within 
their own country. German areas will continue to imix)rt some food from them 
However, there may be a net loss of markets to Denmark, Holland, Yugoslavia, 
and Greece, and these countries will need to make an adjustment in their econo- 
mies which should not be difficult in the period of greater adjustments which 
will come with lii^eration. 

5. Under a program of imposing recurrent reparations payments on Germany, 
which would be the alternative to partition and reduction of her industry, the 
markets in which European nations can sell their surplus agricultural and indus- 
trial raw materials will be no greater than under the other program. 

The reparations program would, moreover, considerably reduce export market 
possibilities both in Europe and the rest of the world for the industries of the 
United Nations. 

6. In short, the statement tliat a healthy European economy is dependent xipon 
German industry was never true, nor will it be true in the future. Therefore 
the treatment to be accorded to Germany should be decided upon without refer- 
ence to the economic consequences upon the rest of Europe. At the worst, these 
economic consequences will involve relatively minor economic disadvantages in 
certain sections of P]urope. At best, they will speed up the industrial develop- 
ment of Europe outside of Germany. But any disadvantages will be more than 
offset by real gains to tlie political objectives and the economic interests of the 
United Nations as a whole. 

HDW :HG :0N :HB :gp 9/7/44 
9/8/44 — Or. and copies to Mr. White. 

1 copy to Mr. Pehle. 

OC to Mr. DuBois. 
cc filed : White ; Germany — Postwar Treatment, 
cr. ref. : Glasser ; Bittermann ; Nathan. 

Mr. Mandel. The next is a document dated March 31, 1939, ad- 
dressed to Secretary Morgenthau from Mr. White, which carries the 
initials H. D. W., presumably Harry Dexter White, and H. G., pre- 
sumably Harold Glasser. I will read excerpts from this document: 

In our opinion events of the past few months give clear indication that the 
aggressor nations plan to get their future gains, not out of Russia, but out of 
the British and French Empires. * * * 

We must force the issue of real aid to Latin America. 

H: $ N: 4: ^ 4: 4= 

The time is now opportune for an arrangement with Russia which would 
accomplish four things : 

(a) Be an important factor in helping I'ecovery in the United States. 

(b) Make substantial contributions to the solution of our surplus-cotton 
problem. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1455 

(c) Settle the outstaiKlina: delits I)et\ve(>n Russin aiul tlie Ignited States and 
clear the decks for luture ecoiioinie collaboralidu between (he two most powerful 
countries in the world, which, irrespective of their political differences, consti- 
tute, for the present, at least, the core of resistance a.i,'ainst the aggressor 
nations. 

(d) Bring pressure to bear against the Chamberlain government to seek closer 
military collaboration with Russia in stopping German aggiession. 

The Chairman. The entire document will go into the record and 
become a part of the record. 

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 895," and 

is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 395 

March 31, 1939. 
To: Secretary Morgenthaii. 
From : Mr. White. 

1. In our opinion events of the past few months give clear indication that the 
aggressor nations plan to get their future gains, not out of Russia, but out of 
the British and French Empires. We will not have long to wait before the 
aggressor nations will actually proceed along this path. 

2. Your letter to the President of October 17, 19:^8, is proved by recent events 
to have been 100-perceut accurate in its prophecies and analyses. (I am attach- 
ing a copy for your convenience.) That was 6 months ago. Since then the 
aggressor "nations have greatly improved their position and strengthened their 
chances for dominating the world. 

3. The need for an aggressive, bold policy on our part is greater than ever. 
There is nobody on the horizon who can or will successfully push that program 
unless you and the President do so. 

Our international policy should move along three fronts at this time : 

1. We must force the issue of real aid to Latin America. 

Our progress in bringing Latin America into the United States orbit has 
yielded negligible results in the past 6 months. On the other hand, with 
Franco's victory in Spain, the strength of the aggressor nations in Latin America 
has greatly increased. 

Looking at the picture as a whole it seems to us that the State Department is 
following its traditional policy and apparently is not interested in energetically 
pushing a program of assistance to Latin American countries on a scale appro- 
priate to the problem with which we are faced. Unless this policy changes, 
Latin America will gradually succumb to the organized economic and ideological 
campaign now being waged by aggressor nations. 

I am convinced that if the Latin American program is left in the control of 
the State Department nothing substantial will come of it, despite a great deal 
of fireworks. I believe that you should make one more attempt to convince 
the President of this fact. If results commensurate with the problem are to 
be attained, that portion of the program dealing with the rendering of any 
economic aid should be unqualifiedly under your leadership. 

2. We must render further substantial aid to China. 

The time is ripe to propose to Congress the extension of a $100 million 10- 
year credit to be used by China for the purchase of whatever American prod- 
ucts she wishes. China is the only country that is now- resisting the aggressor 
nations and China's fight is being carried out on such a large scale that there 
is a very good chance that China can seriously weaken, if not neutralize, one 
important nation in the aggressor bloc. 

With England and France very much on the defensive, it becomes more im- 
portant than ever that we supp<jrt China. 

A loan at this time would mean much to China's stiffened resistance and 
would offset the effects of the administration's neutrality legislation, which 
by its terms would in fact prevent China from buying any materials from the 
United States. 

3. The time is now opportune for an arrangement with Russia which would 
accomplish four things : 

(o) Be an important factor in helping recovery in the United States. 

(h) Make substantial contributions to the solution of our surplus-cotton 
problem. 

(c) Settle the outstanding debts betw^een Russia and the United States and 
clear the decks for future economic collaboration between the two niost pow'er- 



1456 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

ful countries in the world, which, irrespective of their political differences, 
constitute, for the present at least, the core of resistance against the aggressor 
nations. 

(d) Bring pressure to l)ear against the Chamberlain government to seek 
closer military collaboration with Russia in stopping German aggression. 

The proposal in its bare outlines is as follows : 

(a) Negotiate for a settlement of the intergovernmental and private debts. 
It is our opinion that a settlement can be reached agreeal)le to Russia at this 
time which would involve payments amounting to $15 or $20 million a year 
by Russia. 

(&) The extension of a $250 million credit to Russia to be used exclusively for 
the following purposes and under the following conditions : 

(1) $150 million to be expended within the next 2 years on products made 
chiefly of cotton, which are processed in the United States. This should ab- 
sorb from 1 to 2 million bales of our surplus stocks. 

(2) $.50 million to be expended in the United States on machinery. 

(3) $25 million to be expended on goods consisting chiefly of leather. 

(4) $25 million to be expended on miscellaneous manufactured items. 

(5) All imports to be shipped only on United States or Russian l)oats. 

(6) Russia to agree not to reexport any of the material she purchases In 
the United States and not to export any raw cotton or textiles in excess of 
the value of exports of the 3 preceding years. 

Terms of the loan : 10-year loan, amortized monthly at the rate of 10 per- 
cent a year and interest payments quarterly at 8 percent a year, and the dif- 
ference between the cost to the Government of borrowing and the 8 percent to 
be applied toward the settlement of their public and private debt to the United 
States. 

(It may be worth considering that both the Russian loan and the Chinese loan, 
as well as the Latin American loans, may be all financed by special Govern- 
ment guaranteed serial notes and hence not appear in the budget, or out of 
silver seigniorage at no cost. The latter might add support of the silver bloc 
and maybe even Borah.) 

[The above paragraph is preceded by the handwritten characters -a] 

The eifects of such a loan on (o) the current business situation and (6) the 
international political situation, would be startling. 

(a) The cotton textile industry in the United States would have the biggest 
boom that it has experienced in many years. (The New England and South- 
eastei'n States would benefit very substantially and their Representatives in 
Congress would be keenly aware of such benefits. ) 

(&) We would sell 1 to 2 million bales of cotton, which, I believe, is more 
cotton than the export subsidy scheme will dispose of. Moreover, the sale to 
Russia will not depress the price of the other cotton we sell, nor will it supply 
cotton at low prices to the aggressor nations, nor will it injure Brazil as will 
other plans for increasing cotton exports. Russia is probably the only market 
in the world where we can sell cotton goods without interfering with world 
markets. Russia has an adequate supply of raw cotton but has inadequate 
means for processing that cotton. 

Likewise, machine goods and leather industries would benefit which would 
give some added legislative support from the cattle States and industrial States. 

Such action will be notice to Germany that we intend to provide substantial 
economic supiwrt to the enemies of aggression 

Japan will be more hesitant to join Germany and Italy in their plans of ag- 
gression. 

The people of Great Britain will be profoundly influenced by such action and 
it will be much more difficult for Chamberlain to avoid taking similar steps 
just as it was difficult for England to avoid coming to Chinese economic aid after 
we took the first step. In this connection, England already has a trade com- 
mission in Russia and such action on our part will make a success of their 
negotiations easier. 

3/31/30 — Original sent to Secretary in 4 o'clock pouch. 

HDW : HG : Irs 3/31/39 

Mr. Mandel. Finally, I have a letter from the Secretary of the 
Treasury which is undated. I understand that this ^Yas written on or 
about January 1. There was another draft, and it is addressed to the 
President. 



rNTTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1457 

My Dear ^Ik. TKEsinKNT : During the last year T have (liscusse<l s-everal timps 
with Mr. Haniiiian a plan which we in the Treasury liave heen fornmlating for 
('oniprehensive ai<l to Kussia (hiring her reconstruction period. We are not 
thinking of more lend l(>ase or any 1'orni of relief iait rather of an arrangeuuent 
that will have definite and long-range henetits to the United States. 

Ambassador Harrinian has expressed great interest and would like to see the 
plan advanced. I nndei-stand from him that the Russians are reluctant to 
take the initiative, hut woidd welc<nne our presenting a constructive program. 

You will recall that at Quebec ^Ir. Churchill showed every evidence that his 
greatest worry was the period immediately following V-E Day. We have now 
worked out the phase 2 lend-lease program with the British after 2 months' very 
hard work. 

I am convinced that if we came forward now and presented to the Russians 
a concrete plan to aid them in the reconstruction period, it would contribute a 
great deal toward ir«ming out many of the dilficulties we have been having with 
re.spect to their problems and policies. 

I hope that you will give me an opportunity to present to you the work which 
we have been doing here in the Treasury over a ii^riod of a year on this subject. 

I am furidshing Mr. Stettinius witli a copy of this letter for his consideration. 

The Chairman. That is signed by whom ? 

Mr. Mandel. From the Secretary of the Treasury's office. It is 
not signed. It is a copy. It is undated. There was another draft 
later whicli was forwarded. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record. 

Mr. Mandel. The date is about January 1, 1945. 

(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 396" and was read 
in full by Mr. Mandel.) 

Mr. Mandel. Finally, I want to read what the committee has said 
on different occasions in its reports in reference to the individuals I 
have mentioned thus far : 

In our report on Interlocking Subversion in Government, we quote 
the testimony of Miss Bentley, Elizabeth Bentley. The testimony 
reads as follows : 

Senator Ferguson. What were your avenues for placing people in strategic 
positions ? 

Miss Bentley. I would say that two of our best ones were Harry Dexter White 
and Lauchlin Currie. They had an immense amount (»f influence and knew peo- 
ple, and their word was accepted when they recommended someone. 

Quoting Miss Bentley again : 

In 1944, I took a group of people I called the Perlo group. One of the mem- 
bers of this group was a Mr. Harold Glasser in the Treasury. In the process 
of checking everyone's past, I found that Mr. Glasser had at one time been 
pulled out of that particular group and had been turned over to a person whom 
both Mr. Perlo and Charles Kramer refused to tell me who it was, except that 
he was working foi- the Russians ( IPR hearings, pp. 441-442). 

Then on Frank Coe our report said : 

The Berle memorandum of V.)P,'.) ccjutains the names of Frank Coe and his 
brother, Charles Coe. In 1948, Miss Bentley publicly brought forth in testimony 
that Frank Coe was a member of her espionage ring (U. N., pp. 227-256). 

The Chairman. Is that the Virginius Frank Coe referred to in the 
documents you have read ? 
Mr. Mandel. Yes. The report continued : 

Miss Bentley testified that Lauchlin Currie was a full-fledged member of the 
Silvermaster group who was used not only to bail out other members when they 
were in trouble, but also to steal White House secrets for the Soviets. Most of 
these secrets, she said, were related to America's Far Eastern affairs. Currie 
was President Roosevelt's adviser on these matters, having served as the Presi- 
dent's personal emissary to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On one occasion, 



1458 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

according to Miss Bentley, Cvirrie sent word ttirough George Silverman and 
Harry Dexter White that the United States was about to break a Soviet code.^ 

May I ask that the rest of these excerpts be put into the record, deal- 
ing with the individuals mentioned in those documents. 

The Chairman. They will go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The material follows:) 

Whittaker Cliambers involved both Kaplan and Weintraub as Communists. He 
said that Kaplan gave him, Chambers, a job with the National Reseai'ch Project 
of WPA in the 1930's as a service to the Communist conspiracy (IPR, p. 4756). 

Elizabeth Bentley testified that Kaplan was one of the espionage ring who gave 
her stolen Government seci'ets in the 1940's. 

Kaplan used the names of Currie and Silverman again, 2 years later, when he 
sought a job with Foreign Economic Administration. He got the job.' He used 
the same names, with the same success, in an application to the Treasury in 1945. 

When Kaplan went to the Treasury in June 1945, it was Frank Coe who ai> 
pointed him.^ Coe's name was on the Berle notes and he was identified by Bentley 
as a Communist. He invoked the fifth amendment before us last December 1, 
1952 (p. 227£E— U. N. hearings). 

3|» •(» ?I* •!* »i* ^» ^* 

Harry Dexter White, Frank Coe, Harold Glasser, Victor Perlo, Irving Kaplan, 
Sol Adler, Abraham George Silverman and William Ludwig Ullmann were em- 
ployees of the Treasury Department during part or all of the period studied by 
the subcommittee. 

All these persons were named by both Miss Bentley and Chambers as partici- 
pants in the Communist conspiracy. Perlo was identified also by Nathaniel 
Weyl. The names of Perlo, Adler, Silverman, and Ullmann turn up in the Nixon 
Memorandum of 1945. Several of those named were listed in the telephone finder 
of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, identified by Miss Bentley in 1948 as the most 
important person she dealt with in the Government underground.^ . 

Mr. Mandel. On the point you mentioned about foreign affairs, I 
would like to read that letter to which you referred. It is dated 
December 15, 1941, from the Secretary of the Treasury : 

On and after this date, Mr. Harry D. White, Assistant to the Treasury, will 
assume full responsibility for all matters with which the Treasury Department 
has to deal having a bearing on foreign relations. Mr. White will act as liaison 
between the Treasury Department and the State Department, will serve in the 
capacity of adviser to the Secretary on all Treasury foreign affairs matters, and 
will assume responsibility for the management and operation of the stabilization 
fund without change in existing procedures. Mr. White will report directly to 
the Secretary. 

The Chairman. Who is that signed by ? 

Mr. Mandel. Signed by Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau. 
I ask that the remaining excerpts be placed in the record. 
The Chairman. They will go in the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The excerpts referred to follow:) 

The pertinent paragraph from a Treasury document memorandum dated 
February 25, 1943, and sent to White by Secretary Morgenthau : 

"Effective this date, I would like you to take supervision over and assume full 
responsibility for Treasury's participation in all economic and financial matters 
(except matters pertaining to depository facilities, transfers of funds, and war 
expenditures) in connection with the operations of the Army and Navy and the 
civilian affairs in the foreign areas in which our Armed Forces are operating or 



2 IPR hearinj?s, p. 243. 

3 Hearings on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, pt. 14, p. 968. 
* Ibid., p. 976. 

6 Report on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, p. 29. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1459 

are likely to opt^rate. This will, of course, iiichule general liaison with the State 
Depjirtniont, Army and Navy, and other departments or agencies and representa- 
tives of foreign governments on these matters." " 

* ****** 

A compilation of the interdepartmental and international bodies on which 
Assistant Secretary White was the official Treasury representative: 

The Interdepartmental Lend-Lease Committee 
The Canadian-American Joint Economic Committee 
The Executive Committee on Commercial Policy 

The Executive Committee and Board of Trustees of the Export-Import Bank 
The Interdepartmental Committee on Inter-American Affairs 
The National Resources Committee 
The Price Administration Committee 
The Committee on Foreign Commerce Regulations 
The Interdepartmental Committee on Post-War Economic Problems 
The Committee on Trade Agreements 
The National Munitions Control Board 
The Acheson Committee on International Relief 
The Board of P^conomic Warfare 

The Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy 
The Liberated Areas Committee 
The O. S. S. Advisory Committee 
The U. S. Commercial Corporation 

The Interdepartmental Committee on Planning for Coordinating the Economic 
Activities of United States Civilian Agencies in Liberated Areas ' 

White was also chief architect of the International Monetary Fund* as well 
as its first United States executive director. 

The Chairman. I want to thank you, Mr. Mitchell, for appearing 
here and ^jiving ns your assistance in this most important subject. 
At this time the committee will stand in recess. 
(Whereupon, at 11:20 a. m., the hearing was recessed.) 

Exhibit No. 397 

Apeil 6, 1954. 
Hon. William E. Jenner, 

United States Senate, Washington 25, D. C. 

Dear Mr. Chairman : For the record, in connection with my testimony before 
the Subcommittee on Internal Security, I enclose a document which shows that 
I was appointed a special consultant to the Secretary of the Treasury on .Jan- 
uary 20, 22, and 23, 1940, in connection with the work I described, preparing 
speeches for the Secretary. 

In answer to questions, I see no objection to confirming that when I was 
Washington corresjmndent for the New Republic, between 19.35 and 1941, I 
wrote under the initials "TRB." 
Sincerely, 

Jonathan Mitchell. 

Enclosure. 



Exhibit No. 398 

Treasury Department, 
Washington, February 3, lO-'fO. 
Mr. Jonathan Mitchell, 

Croton-on-Hndson, N. Y. 

Dear Mr. Mitchell: There is enclo.sed check in the amount of $G6.G0 to reim- 
burse you for services rendered the Treasury Department on January 20, 22, 
and 23, 1940, together with letter of appointment covering this period of 
employment. 

Very truly yours, 

W. N. Thompson, 
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary. 

« Pt. 14, hoarings on Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments, p. 953. 

' Ibid., p. 955. 

* Post War Foreign Policy Preparation, a State Department publication, p. 142. 



1460 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 400 

Treasury Department, 
Washington, January 18, IBl/Q. 
Mr. Jonathan Mitchell, 

Croton-on-Hudson, N. Y. 

Sir: You are hereby appointed a consulting expert in the Office of the Secre- 
tary, with compensation at the rate of $22.22 per diem, payable from the ap- 
propriation, "Exchange Stabilization Fund," for 3 days, January 20, 22, and 23, 
1940. 

Very truly yours, 

D. W. Bell, 
Acting Secretary of the Treasury. 

X 



,«**«JC/ 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 

"Army Information and Education'* 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTEENAL SECURITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTEENAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
ON 

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS 



JULY 6, 7, AUGUST 5 AND 6, 1954 



PART 20 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
32918° WASHINGTON : 1954 



Boston Public Library 
superintendent of Documents 

NOV 2 4 1954 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chairman 

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utali JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey ESTES KEFAUVER. Tennessee 

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho THOMAS C. PIENNINGS, Jr., Missouri 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah PAT McCARRAN, Nevada 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

Alva C. CaRpentek, Chief Counsel 
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 

II 



J 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of — 

C'riley, Richard L 

De Toledano, Ralph 

Fenichel, Carl 

Fischer, Stephen r^I 

Gandall, William P 

Gerson, Simon W 

James, Daniel 

Kerr, John Kenneth 

McINIanus, Robert C 

Schreiber, Jidius 

Wilson, Luke Woodward. 



Date 



Julv 6, 1954 
.._;_do 



Julv 
Julv 



7, 1954 
6, 1954 



Aug. 6, 1954 

Aug. 5, 1954 

.___".do 



July 6, 1954 

do 

Julv 7, 1954 
July 6, 1954 



Psges 



1462 
1477 
1586 
1498 
1627 
1593 
1622 
1469 
1506 
1527 
1485 



III 



^ 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN (lOVERNMENT 

DEPARTMENTS 



TUESDAY, JULY 6, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 

OF THE Internal Security x\ct and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., piisuant to call, in room 457, 
Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman of the 
subcommittee) presiding. 

Present : Senator Jenner. 

Present also : Alva C. Carpenter, counsel to the subcommittee; Ben- 
jamin Mandel, research director; and K-obert C. McManus, profes- 
sional staff member. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

On March 10, 1953, Bella V. Dodd appeared before the Senate 
Internal Security Subcommittee. She was formerly the legislative 
representative of the Xew York district of the Communist Party, 
and a former member of the national committee of the Communist 
Political Association, later known as the Communist Party. 

She was asked about the conduct of Communists in the Armed 
Forces during the last war. I read from her testimony : 

Question : 

Dr. Dodd, did Communist teachers therefore accept the general directives of 
the Communist Party, and did they themselves go into the armed services of the 
United States during this pt^riod? 

Answer : 

Yes; they immediately began volunteering for service and cooperating with 
the war effort to their fullest extent. 

Question : 

Do you know, based on your experience with these schoolteachers, wiiat as- 
signments they ultimately obtained in the armed services of the United States? 

Answer : 

I guess it was varied, because it depends upon the branch of service. IMany 
of our teachers did seeli to go into the educational division of the Army, tiie 
indoctrination course. 

Question : 

How do you know that, Dr. Dodd? 

Answer : 

From time to time the members would come back and we would discuss the 
question of what their work was, and they would discuss particularly the in- 
doctrination courses where they were very eager to make the turn for the 

14G1 



1462 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

American soldier in a pro-Soviet fashion. Many of our soldiers were anti- 
Soviet, despite the fact that the Soviet Union was in the war with us. It was 
the question of making the turn and establishing the idea that the Soviet Union 
was a democracy and was, as a matter of fact, the most perfect democracy in the 
world. 

The purpose of the indoctrination courses was to get as much of that in as 
possible. Of course, in some places they got a lot in ; in some places they had to 
take little. They were very anxious to get it in. 

Question : 

You know this, Dr. Dodd, because of the fact that you knew these par- 
ticular Communist teachers who did come back and as a matter of fact re- 
ported to you at Communist Party headquarters how they were carrying on 
their own indoctrination courses in their service? 

Answer : 

As a matter of fact, no Communist went to the Armed Forces or came out 
of the Armed Forces without reporting to the party his experience, his work. 
No man came in on leave without reporting to the party and finding out just 
what the pitch was. 

It is the purpose of this series of hearings to demonstrate how 
Communists in the Armed Forces, more particularly in the Infor- 
mation and Education Division, sought to indoctrinate 8 million of 
our GI's, who today are in civilian life. It is our purpose here to 
-sketch the pattern of their activity in seeking to mold the minds of 
our fighting men through -Communist propaganda so that we may 
have an ineradicable lesson for the future. 

We will call the first witness in this series of hearings. Who is the 
first witness? 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Criley. 

The Chairman. Richard Criley, come forward, please. 

Mr. Forer. May we have the cameras turned off, Senator ? 

The Chairman. You may. 

Do not put the cameras on the witness. You can keep them on the 
committee and in the room, but we will grant the witness' request. 

Will you be sw^orn and testify, Mr. Criley ? Do you swear the tes- 
timony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Criley. I so swear, 

TESTIMONY OF EICHARD L. CRILEY, CHICAGO, ILL, ACCOMPANIED 
BY JOSEPH rORER, ATTORNEY AT LAW, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name to the committee? 

Mr. Criley. Richard L. Criley, C-r-i-1-e-y. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside, Mr. Criley ? 

Mr. Criley. At 4107 Arlington Street, Chicago, 111. 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession? 

Mr. Criley. I am a hod carrier. 

The Chairman. Hod carrier. 

You may proceed, Mr. Carpenter, with the examination of the wit- 
ness. 

Let the record show that Mr. Criley is before the committee as a 
witness and sworn, with his attorney, Mr. Forer. 

Mr. Forer, I believe your address has been given in our record. 

Mr. Forer. At the closed hearing, yes, sir, Senator. Do you want 
me to give it again ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 14G3 

The Chairman. You mij>-ht ^ive it a<>ain. 

Mr. FoRER. 711 14tli Street NAV., Washinoton, D. C. 

INIr. Carpenter. Where and by wlioin are you now em])h)ye(l? 

Mr. Criley. I am employed in Wheaton, 111., by McHugh Con- 
struction Co. 

Mv. Carpenter. "Were you in the service during the last war? 

]\Ir. Crieey. I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Briefly tell us the branch of service and the various 
commissions you held, if any. 

Mv. Criley. I was first assigned, after I was drafted, to the military 
police as a private. I became a private, first class, at Fort Ord, Calif. 
I went to oflicer candidate school. That was the military police school 
in Fort Custer, Mich., in January of 1943. I received a commission 
tliere, after the 3-month course, as a second lieutenant in the military 
police. 

I attended a 1-month further schooling in what was called occupa- 
tional military police. 

I Avent overseas almost immediately. That was about the middle of 
May of 1943, landing in North Africa and entering the invasion of 
Sicily as an officer assigned to the First Division of the Infantry. I 
landed in Gela, and worked for a period of time as a civil affairs officer 
in the towns of Niscemi, Montechiaro, Mousormelli, and in Caltanis- 
setta. 

I was then transferred to Palermo in Sicily. I remained there until 
about November, I think it was, of 1943, and was transferred to 
Naples. I did service there as an ofTicer in the labor division of the 
Allied Military Government until about January of 1944. I was 
shipped to England, assigned to the civil affairs center in Chippenham 
in England, where I remained for several months. 

Then I was assigned to the mission to France, and sometime about 
4 weeks after D-day I landed in France at Omaha Beach. After some 
delays, I was finally stationed in Paris as a staff officer of SHAEF, 
that is, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, mission 
to France. I served there in the welfare and displaced persons divi- 
sions of that staff headquarters until after the end of the war. 

I came home in December of 194.5. I left the Army about that time. 

Mr. Carpenter. Your basic training was military police; is that 
correct ? 

JSIr. Criley. That is correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. "When did you go into civil affairs work ? 

Mr. Criley. The special school that I went to in Fort Custer, which 
was called occupational military police, was a branch of civil affairs 
work or of military government work having to do with public safety 
behind the lines. However, when we landed in Sicily, the number of 
civil affairs officers was so few and the advance of our forces were so 
rapid that virtually none of us actually carried out the original assign- 
ments for which we had had training in advance. So I functioned 
as a general civil affairs officer starting from the time that I arrived 
in Sicily. I would say that is probably the beginning of my assign- 
ment in civil affairs as such. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you request assignment in the military police ? 

Mr. Criley. No. I was assigned as most people are assigned in the 
Army. I was simply told, "You are a military ])oliceman.'' That is 
the way things work in the Ariny usually. 



1464 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. You made application to attend officer candidate 
school ; did you not ? 

Mr. Criley. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. In that application you made your selection of the 
type of service desired ; did you not ? 

Mr. Crilet. I applied for the military police school, because that 
was the branch of the service that I was already in and that I had ex- 
perience in, and I though I had probably the best opportunity of being 
accepted in that school since I was already assigned to that branch 
of service. 

Mr. Carpenter. Specifically, what were your duties in civil affairs? 

Mr. CRn.EY. That varied a great deal according to time and place. 
In the early days of the invasion in Sicily, it included virtually every- 
thing. Wlien I arrived in Mousormelli, for example 

Mr. FoRER. Could we have the cameras off ? 

The Chairman. The cameras are not on the witness. The cameras 
are directed this way. 

Mr. Criley. When I was sent to Mousormelli, the town had just 
been taken. I was the only American officer or soldier in an area of 
some 7 villages with a population of about 50,000 people. The Fascist 
militia still had their arms. There was virtually a situation of chaos, 
as far as any governmental functioning was concerned, as far as food 
and water supplies were concerned. It was my job, the same as that 
of any other civil affairs officer, to attempt to establish some degree 
of government, of security primarily, to guarantee that the rear of our 
Armed Forces was safe. 

In these towns it involved primarily, I would say, the solution to 
the economic problems of food and water in a period when railroad 
lines were destroyed, when pipelines were broken, when there was 
almost no fuel for the flour mills, and so forth. 

So as a general civil affairs officer, it involved virtually everything 
that a person can think of in terms of trying to fill in the gaps to 
reestablish some sort of orderly existence in these villages. 

When I was transferred to Caltanissetta, my assignment was to 
assist in the collection of grain. It so happens that there was a very 
serious food shortage in Sicily, and the Province of Caltanissetta was 
one of the better grain-growing provinces. We tried to follow through 
with somewhat the same apparatus that had existed under the former 
Italian Government, of collecting the grain in Government warehouses 
and then this grain was either issued on ration cards or, more often, 
ground into flour, given to bakers, and the bread was rationed at a 
low price to attempt to keep the standard of living from rising too 
precipitously. 

Mr. Carpenter. What did you do when you were assigned to civil 
affairs in Paris, France ? 

Mr. Criley. When I was in France, I was in the welfare and dis- 
placed persons division. Our major problem, as far as I was con- 
cerned, was in the first instance the care of, and in a later period the 
repatriation of, the hundreds of thousands of people that had been 
rooted up from their homes by the Nazi armies as they spread all over 
Europe, and to try to get them back ultimately, after the war, to their 
homes. This included virtually every nationality in Europe, I would 
say. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1465 

My specific assignment was that of liaison officer, since I speak some 
French, and my work was with the French Government ])rimarily, 
and to a somewhat lesser decree bnt to a considerable degree with the 
Allied missions of repatriation which Avere stationed in Paris, repre- 
senting all of the Allied countries in the war. 

Mv. Carpenter. What were the nationalities of these various peo- 
ple? You said practically every one in Europe. Were there any ])re- 
dominating ones? 

Mr. Crieet. To list the nationalities, there were quite a consider- 
able number of Italians; there were Greeks, Belgians, Czechs, Poles, 
Eussians. The largest numbers were Polish, Russians, Bohemians, 
and Italians, I would say. 

Mr. Carpextkr. Were any of these repatriations forced ? 

]\fr. Crieey. No; none of the repatriations were forced, and may I 
say that the question strikes me as a lij:tle bit strange. When a per- 
son has been uprooted from his home by force, driven into forced labor 
under Nazi whips, and finally has an opportunity of going home, it is 
an occasion for rejoicing for virtually any person, whatever his 
nationality. 

Mr. Carpexter. When did you separate from the service? 

Mr. Crieey. I separated from the service in the early part of De- 
cember 1945. 

JSIr. Carpexter. What was your rank? 

Mr. Criley. My rank was captain. 

Mr. Carpexter^ Do you now hold a Reserve commission ? 

]Mr. Criley. I do not. 

]Mr. Carpexter. Were you tendered a Reserve commission when you 
were se]-)arated from the service? 

Mr. Criley. I was oifered the opportunity of signing up in the Re- 
serve, and I did not take it. 

]\Ir. Carpexter. You could not take it? 

Mr. Criley. I did not. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you receive your university training, 
if any? 

;Mr. Criley. I received my university training at the University of 
California in Berkeley and, by the way, 2 years at Stanford Univer- 
sity, my freshman and sophomore years. 

Mr. Carpexter. What degrees do you hold ? 

Mr. Criley. Bachelor of arts. 

INIr. Carpexter. When did you receive your degree? 

]\fr. Criley. In 1934. 

Mr. Carpexter. Where did you go to grade and high school ? 

Mr. Criley. I attended grade school in Carmel Grammar School, 
Carmel-by-the-Sea, Calif., and I went to high school in Monterey 
Union High School, Monterey, Calif. 

]Mr. Carpexter. AYhere were you first employed when you left the 
university ? 

The Chairmax^. Let the record show that the witness, before re- 
sponding to the question, conferred with his counsel. 

Mr. Criley. I was a supervisor of a WPA project. 

Mr. Carpexter. Where was this ? 

Mr. Criley. In northern California, Santa Clara and San Mateo 
Counties. 

Mr. Carpexter. How long did you work there? 



1466 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Criley. I think it was about a year. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you next employed ? 

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer this question on the basis of my 
privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against 
myself. 

The Chairjvian. That is a proper refusal. 

Mr. Carpenter. Can you give this committee the various places you 
worked after your WPA work until you joined the armed services? 

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer this question on the same basis as 
the previous question. 

The Chairman. And that basis is that under the fifth amendment 
you refuse to be a witness against yourself because it might tend to 
incriminate you ? 

Mr. Criley. On the basis of my privilege under the fifth amend- 
ment not to be a witness against myself. 

The Chairman. All right. I think you should state it. 

Mr. Carpenter. While you were at Berkeley, were you in fact presi- 
dent of the League for Industrial Democracy ? 

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question as a violation of my 
rights under the first amendment and on the basis of my privilege 
under the fifth amendment not to be a witness against myself. 

The Chairman. This committee does not recognize your right to 
refuse to answer under the first amendment. However, your refusal 
under the fifth amendment is acceptable to this committee. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you in 1936 lead the so-called peace strike 
sponsored by the American League Against War and Fascism at 
Berkeley, Calif. ? 

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons just 
cited. 

The Chairman. The same ruling, Mr. Reporter. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you State executive secretary of the Young 
Communist League of California in 1936 ? 

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons just 
given. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a registered member of the Communist 
Party in 1938, residing at 1140 Clay Street, San Francisco, Calif. ? 

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons pre- 
viously given. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party prior 
to entering the Armed Forces ? 

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons pre- 
viously given. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party while 
you were in the Armed Forces ? 

Mr. Criley. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you been a member of the Communist Party 
since j^ou left the Armed Forces ? 

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons pre- 
viously given. 

The Chairman. Are you a member of the Communist Party now ? 

Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question as a violation of my 
rights under the first amendment and on the basis of my privilege 
under the fifth amendment. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 14G7 

The Chairman. The committee does not recoo;nize your riolit to 
refuse to answer under the first amendment, but we do recognize your 
ri<iht to refuse to answer under the fifth amendment to the Con- 
stitution. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you expelled from Local 28 of the United 
Packinfrhouse AVorkers Union of Chicago because of your Communist 
record ? 

The Chairman. Let fhe record show that the witness, before re- 
sponding to the question, conferred with his counsel. 

]\rr. Criley. I refuse to ansA\er that question for the reasons pre- 
viously given. 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever used any of the following aliases : 
Ei chard Foster, David Athis ? 

]Mr. Criley. I refuse to answer that question for the reasons pre- 
viously given. 

Mr. Carpenter. Going back to your war service, during the war 
were you a speaker on the Army Hour radio program, and did you 
s})eak on that program regarding the handling of lalDor affairs in 
Sicily^ 

JNlr. Criley. I had about three sentences. I am not even sure of 
what the subject matter was. The total broadcast, I believe, for our 
group was a 5-minute broadcast, and I think there were some 3 or 4 
officers on the panel, of which I was one. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has some documents he would like to 
place in the record. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a clipping, a photostat of a clipping from 
the New York Times of October 10, 1946, page 15, which shows that 
"Richard h. Criley, former head of the Young Communist League of 
California, and district educational director of the Congress of In- 
dustrial Organizations, was expelled from Local 28 of the United 
Packinghouse Workers Union, CIO, today by a 59-to-16 vote of the 
membership." 

I ask that that be placed in the record. 

The Chairman. It will go in the record and become a part of 
the record. 

jNIr. Mandel. I have here a photostatic copy of a page of the Young 
Communist Review of June 1939, page 9, which shows that Richard 
Criley was then a member of the Young Communist League. 

This gives an account of the convention of the Young Communist 
League. 

The Chairman. That may go in the record and become a part of 
the record. 

Mr. Mandel. The same is true of another exhibit, the Young Com- 
munist Review for July 1939, which shows Richard Criley as heading 
the California delegation of the Young Communist League at the con- 
vention in 1939. 

The Chairman. It may go in the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The documents referred to were marked "exhibits Nos. 401, 402, and 
403'' and are as follows :) 



1468 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 401 

[From the New York Times, October 10, 1946, p. 15] 

Expelled as Communist 

west coast man ousted by cio packinghouse union in chicago 
[Special to the New York Times] 

Chicago, October 9. — Richard L. Criley, former head of the Young Communist 
League of California and district educational director of the Congress of In- 
dustrial Organizations, was expelled from Local 28 of the United Packinghouse 
Workers Union, CIO, today by a 59-to-16 vote of the membership. 

Earlier, by a vote of 63 to 12, he had been found to be a Communist and guilty 
of violating constitutional provisions of the union and of the Congress of In- 
dustrial Organizations. 

The principal charge against him was that "contrary to CIO policy he visited 
local 28 and advised its members not to become affiliated with nor send dele- 
gates to the Chicago Industrial Union Council, city central body of the CIO." 

Mr. Criley had been a member of the local and of the union only a few months, 
the members said. 



Exhibit No. 402 

[From the Young Communist Review, June 1939, p. 9] 
******* 

Speeches from the various district organizations : Jim West of Seattle, Nick 
Sanders of Detroit, Claude Lightfoot, Chicago, Dick Criley, San Francisco, Joe 
Moore, of Ohio, Elwood Dean, of New Jersey, all of them biting into the hard 
bread of politics, placing their problems on the broad palm of the convention. 
Listen, they say, this is what's been happening in our nook of the country. This 
is what people say and think out our way. Think it over, comrades, consider 
both sides of the question, turn it over in your minds ; it adds up the problem of 
young America. 

Up in the stenographers room I met a fellow I had not seen in years. Back in 
the beginning of the student movement, he had come in from evening high school; 
tall, gangling, a wizard with machinery ; a demon with nuts, bolts, gears, wires, 
switches, pulleys. Ernie Amat was his name, and it was he that made the 
mimeograph machines go, the Jimmy Higgins of the student movement. That 
was 7 years ago. Then Ernie went to Spain, was wounded bringing in the tele- 
phone wires out of no man's land. I met him again at the YCL convention, and 
what do you think he was doing? His grin smeared with ink, his long skilled 
fingers coaxing the mimeograph machine along, right there in the steno room : 
making the wheels turn, keeping the convention going. The same old Ernie 
Amat : mechanic, veteran of the Lincoln Brigade, delegate to the YCL convention, 
the same Jimmy Higgins. 

Then a high note. A delegation of mothers, 30 of them. New York mothers 
of every nationality, Negro and white, coming up front with their arms full of 
flowers. Listen to Mrs. Jiggetts, mother of two children : "I bring you greetings, 
you builders of the world of tomorrow * * * warm greetings, from our proud 
hearts. You begin life with what it took us difficult years to achieve. To you, 
young people who take your places side by side with us in the struggle for 
socialism, I say : Carry on, your YCL mothers are proud of you * * * young 
Communists." 

Not a single hour without something to do, seemed to be the convention 
slogan * * * for when there weren't panel meetings, and committee meetings, 
and powows of various delegations, there was a dance on Saturday night. They 
tell me, a whale of a dance, crowded to the eaves, swinging far into the early 
hours of morning. 

• Things were naturally a bit slow in starting on Sunday a. m. Delegates were 
observed to be snoozing here and there. Occasionally that day, comrades were 
seen the armchairs in the lobby, loafing a bit in the hallways, and now that 
the city streets were enjoying the relative quiet of the Sabbath, delegates idled 
In front of the hotel — and scurried across the street, and took pictures in groups 
in front of the delicatessen stores, and the theatrical scenery shops, their laughter 
rending the stillness, and even the cop at the doorway laughing with them, 
kidding with them. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1469 

Bill Foster brought tliein to their feet, however, in the late morning. A guest 
from the Communist Party, with a speecli in the classical style, in the best 
Foster style * * * a sturdy oak of a man, a man in whose very l»earing one sees 
two generations of American labor history; in whom one sees the living con- 
nection between the great tradition of D::'bs and Haywo(»d * * * in whose 
majestic brow, uplifted hands, and earnest voice, four decades of the 20th cen- 
tury give serene inspiration to the younger generation. * *  

Skip the panels on Sunday afternoon (you will get theui all in tlie convention 
proceedings) and relax at the cultural festival on Sunday night. A musical 
revue, the great ballroom overcrowded with friends and visitors. The songs 
again and again, the i)Ui)pet shows, and the skits prepared by delegations from 
five State organizations with Cliicago carrying off the honors. 

Business in the air on Monday * * * the convention is clearly coming to a 
close just wiien everybody is pretty much getting to know one anotlier, liki> 
the last hours of an exciting weekend in the country. Reports from the panels 
* * * 6 minutes each, 5 minutes each * * * comrades: just 1 more word * * * 
now, comrades, order in the rear of the will, will the comrades be seated * * * 
will all ushers please report to the front. * * * 

Just before adjour-nment for lunch. Enrico Ramirez, organizational secretary 
from the Mexican Confederation of Youth, in a beautiful speech, a honey, well- 
phrased, direct, snappy, hitting straight to the point: the good-neighbor policy, 
the danger of a Fascist uprising in IMexico this summer, the unity that must 
exist among the youth .organizations in the Western Hemisphere. Dave Kashtan, 
leader of the Canadian Y'CTj, the living evidence of the spirit of international 
fraternitv which distinguishes our organization. * « * 



Exhibit No. 40o 

[From tlie Young Coninnmist Review, July 1939] 
 ****♦* 

Both our districts will unquestionably learn much from the observations of 
the mass, popular work of the Kings County YCL and the splendid example of 
collective work and leadership of Comrade Saunders. The Northwest delega- 
tion particularly wishes to take this opportunity to thank the Kings County 
YCL for the excellent cooperation extended to our district in sending it $00 
toward covering part of the expenses in bringing its delegation from the Pacific 
Northv.est. 

Both west coast districts pledge our utmost of energy and enthusiasm toward 
building on the coast, too, a large and popular YCL for "character building and 
education in the spirit of socialism." Let's go to town. 

James West, 
For the "Northwest delegation. 

Richard Criley, 
For the California delegation. 

The Chairman. Further questions ? [No response.] 

You may stand hy, 

Mr. FoRER. Is the witness excused ? 

The Chairiman. You may be excused for this morning. 

"\Vi]l Mr. John Kerr come forward, please? 

Will you be sworn to testify ? Do you swear the testimony you will 
oive in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

]\Ir. Kerr. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN KENNETH KERR, BALTIMORE, MD. 

The Chairman. Mr. Kerr, you have no objection to photographers 
taking your picture or the cameras being on while you testify? You 
have no objection to that, do you ? 

Mr. Kerr. If it is necessary, all right, but otherwise I don't care 
for it. 



1470 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chairman. You are not objecting to it ? 

Mr. Kerr. No. 

The Chairman. We will try it. 

Will you state your full name for the record ? 

Mr. Kerr. John Kenneth Kerr. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside, Mr. Kerr ? 

Mr. Kerr. In Baltimore, Md. 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Kerr. I am in the insurance business. 

The Chairmlan. You may proceed, Mr. Carpenter, to question the 
witness. 

Mr. Carpenter. Specifically what is the nature of your duties with 
the insurance company? 

Mr. Kerr. I am a claim manager for Casualty Insurance Co. in 
Baltimore. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Armed Forces during 
World War II? 

Mr. Kerr. I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please state what posts you occupied dur- 
ing World War II? 

Mr. Kerr. At the termination of my service, I was a captain in the 
Counterintelligence Corps. I was Chief of the Investigations Branch 
for the Third Service Command. 

Mr. Carpenter. When did you first enter the service? 

Mr. Kerr. About December 23, 1942. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you go in with a commission or as an enlisted 
man? 

Mr. Kerr. My previous commission was reactivated. 

Mr. Carpenter. You had been a Reserve officer ? 

Mr. Kerr. I had, years before. 

Mr. Carpenter. Reactivated, and you went into the service in 1942. 
In what branch of the service ? 

Mr. Kerr. My commission was reactivated in the Coast Artillery. 

Mr. Carpenter. Then where were you assigned? 

Mr. Kerr. I was assigned to Fort Monroe. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of the work? 

Mr. Kerr. I would say it was training status there for a period of 
time, about 6 months. 

Mr, Carpenter. What was the nature of the training? 

Mr. Kerr. In the Navy they call it boot training. In the Army it 
is just 

Mr. Carpenter. Just basic? 

Mr. Kerr. Basic training. 

Mr. Carpenter. When did you first go into CIC work ? 

Mr. Kerr. About April of 1943. 

Mr. Carpenter. What is CIC ? 

Mr. Kerr. Counterintelligence Corps. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you take any special training for your CIC 
Work ? 

Mr. Kerr. No. My insurance work for about 18 years prior to that 
was that type of training, investigative work. 

Mr. Carpenter. Investigative. CIC work requires investigation, is 
that correct? 

Mr. Kerr. Some phases. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1471 

Mr. Carpenter. Were yon in the pliase that had for its purpose in- 
vesti<;atiiig? 

Mr. Kerr. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Cari'enter. Where were you assigned when you started to 
work, that is, after you had concluded basic training? 

]\rr. Kkkr. In Baltimore, I\Id. 

Mv. Carpenter. In the city of Hal(ini(;re? 

Mr. Kerr. No. Tliat was the headquarters of the Third Service 
Command, and I was attached to the headquarters stati' of the Counter- 
intelligence Corps. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was your rank at that time ? 

]Mr. Kerr. Second lieutenant. 

INIr. Carpenter. Did 3'ou have occasion at some period to investigate 
conditions at Cam]> Pickett, Va. ? 

]\Ir. Kerr. I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. When was that ? 

]Mr. Kerr. That was about Augiist of 1945— of 1944. 

Mr. Carpenter. August of 1944? 

Mr. Kerr. No, ])ardon me. August of 1945. 

Mr. Carpenter. August of 1945. What was the nature of that 
investigation ? 

Mr. Kerr. There was some activity there. It Avas not authorized. 
As the investigation will show, it should not have been occurring. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was this thing that you were investigating? 
Something was going on there, you say, that should not have been 
going on. What was that ? 

Mr. Kerr. It was activities of a group of people, I would say in- 
doctrinating the forces at the cam]) in a manner that was not approved 
and was unauthorized. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was this in any special division at Camp Pickett? 

Mr. Kerr. Yes. It was in the Information and Education Division. 

Mr. Carpenter. The Information and Education Division. 

Mr. Kerr, I hand you here a document entitled "Prospectus — Troop 
Training Orientation Program." I will ask if you will state what 
that is and if you have seen it before. 

(Mr. Kerr examining document.) 

Mr. Kerr. I have never seen this before. 

Mr. Carpenter. You have never seen that document before ? 

I\Ir. Kerr. No. 

INIr. Carpenter. Have you ever seen any document like that before ? 

Mr. Kerr. Not like this. This even includes a prospectus of in- 
doctrination for the Korean war, which was after my time. 

Mr. Carpenter. I hand you another document and ask if you can 
identify that. 

(Mr. Kerr examining book.) 

Mr. Kerr. I cannot identify this, but I knew of its existence. 

Mr. Carpenter. You knew of its existence. Did you ever see it 
before ? 

Mr. Kerr. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you do any investigation in connection with 
that? 

Mr. Kerr. Not as such, no. I may have done some piecemeal in- 
vestigation from time to time, not knowing that it was involved in 
this. We don't always in an investigation get the basic facts. In a 



1472 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

book we may investigate a paragraph, and that is the symbol at a 
higher echelon. 

Mr. Carpenter. These are entitled "Army Talk." Did you have 
any investigation whatsoever to do with Army Talk ? 

Mr. IvERR. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. Just a moment, please. 

How were these particular documents used ? 

Mr. Kjerr. It is my understanding that they were used in courses of 
the I. and E. instruction. They had quite a few package kits of 
different series that were used. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know who was responsible for preparing 
those Army Talks ? 

Mr. Kerr. No, but I would assume they came out of the I. and E. 
headquarters, which at that time I believe was at Washington and Lee 
University. 

Mr. Carpenter. In the course of your investigation at Camp Pickett 
when you investigated the I. and E., did you have any occasion to 
inquire as to those Army Talks ? 

Mr. Kerr. Not that particular fact sheet, no, or series of fact sheets. 
I did collect a series of pamphlets there in the course of the investiga- 
tion which were attached to the investigation as exhibits. 

Mr. Carpenter. But they were not these Army Tal ks ? 

Mr. Kerr. No, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. I will hand you another series of documents and 
ask if you can recognize those ? 

Mr. Kerr (examining documents). I don't recognize these specific 
ones, but I did collect, in the library at Camp Pickett and in the class- 
room of instruction, similar such bulletins put out by the same people. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please read what those docimients are? 

Mr. Kerr. It is captioned : "Embassy of the Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics, Information Bulletin, Washington, D. C., May 15, 
1945, Volume 5, No. 52, Issued Three Times Weekly." The subject 
matter of this particular one before me is "Citizens of Liberated 
Prague Joyously Greet Red Army Forces." 

Mr. Carpenter. You say you found similar documents when you 
made your investigation at Camp Pickett? 

Mr. Kerr. Yes, similar publications, like a weekly magazine. This 
happens to be May 15, 1945. The one I may have picked up might 
have been March of 1944. 

Mr. Carpenter. But they had the same caption ? 

]\Ir. Kerr. Yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you find those documents ? 

Mr. Kerr. I attached the documents that I found to the exhibits 
of my investigation. I found one in the library and several in the 
classrooms. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know how they happened to get in the 
library or the classroom ? 

Mr. Kerr. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was that a part of your investigation ? 

Mr. Kerr. Yes, but at that time troops were moving in and out of 
Camp Pickett quite frequently, and it was the dead end of that par- 
ticular branch of the investigation. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you make any examination of whether or not 
they were purchased or in any way requested by the War Department ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1473 

Mr. Kerr. No. My investigation was a fact finding investigation 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you make any investigation whether they were 
brought there by private individuals or how they were arriving at 
Camp Pickett? 

Mr. Kerr. No. My investigation was a fact-finding investigation 
in which I collected the information that was available at the time and 
turned it in to headquarters. 

Mr. Carpenter. I hand you another document. Tliis is a mimeo- 
graphed publication headed "The GI Plan for Postwar America," 
and ask you if you have seen that document before? 

Mr. Kerr (examining document). I have. 

Mr, Carpenter. Did you find that document in connection with your 
investigation activities at Calnp Pickett ? 

Mr. Kerr. I did, and it w\as this document which started my in- 
vestigation. 

Mr. Carpenter. "What is peculiar about that document that started 
your investigation? 

JNIr. Kerr. There are some phases in there that we considered sub- 
versive. 

Mr. Carpenter. You considered them subversive. 

Calling your attention to page 16, the following statement: 

The Oflice of Scientific Research and Development should become a permanent 
office and it shall patent all developments that were made by it in the past and 
will be made by it in the future. These patents should be licensed to anyone 
who wants to use them, and in return the Government should be paid a small 
percentage of the profits made from their use. 

Is that passage there? 
Mr. Kerr. That is right. 
Mr. Carpenter. On page 21 : 

There should be an international control commission set up as a part of the 
United Nations World Orj^'anization to supervise and control the use of atomic 
enerjry. This commission should make sure that no nation is using atinnic 
energy to prepare for war. It will also make atomic energy available to all na- 
tions on an equal basis. This is because it is impossible to keep the secret of 
atomic energj". Other nations will develop it themselves. A secret atomic 
bomb race could result in the destruction of the world. 

Is that passage there ? 

Mr. Kerr. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. In connection with that pamphlet, please tell the 
committee what it is and how it fitted into the program. 

Mr. Kkrr. I am not quite sure that I understand your question, 
how this passage 

^Ir. Carpenter. Who drew up that pamphlet ? 

Mr. Kerr. Who drew it up, I don't know. It is supposed to have 
been drawn up by this group of young soldiers listed on the frontis- 
piece, or cover. 

JNIr. Carpenter. Did your investigation reveal that, or did you take 
it as a fact? 

IMr. Kerr. They gave me affidavits that they drew it up. 

Mr. Carpenter. They drew it up ? 

^fr. Kerr. But who "brain-childed" it, I don't know, because in my 
opinion it was beyond their ability. 

Mr. Carpenter. It allegedly was drawn up by a group of soldiers? 

Mr. Kerr. That is correct. 

32;nS°— 31— lit. 20 2 



1474 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. That was part of your investi<:?ation? 

Mr. Kerr. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. What did the soldiers do with this particular 
document ? 

Mr. Kerr. They tried to have the entire camp sponsor this pamphlet 
or brochure. They had a meeting 

Mr. Carpenter. Was that some kind of convention ? Would you 
call it a convention? 

Mr. Kerr. They were permitted to have a general meeting in the 
auditorium from time to time on the post. They held one of these 
meetings, against orders to hold it. I was not present at that meet- 
ing, but I understand that there were about a thousand troops there, 
in which -they were to vote on whether or not this would be sponsored 
by the entire post or not, or just the I. and E. group, the distinction 
being the entire post at Camp Pickett was a large post. I think you 
could get two complete divisions in Camp Pickett. 

Mr. Carpenter. How did that program Avork into the I. and E. 
section? You mentioned about working in the I. and E. How did it 
happen to be a part of the I. and E. which you were investigating? 

Mr. Kerr. These soldiers who are listed as members of the GI Post- 
war Planning Board were also very active as members of the I. and E. 
section. They had a building set aside divided in two sections. The 
front part of the buildirg was a recreation room, the rear part of the 
building was classroom, and a small space between the two, all under 
the same roof, which was a library. From that library and from the 
desks of the students attending classes is where I obtained the exhibits 
attached to my original investigation, this being, of course, the dom- 
inating feature of why I was there with some of my men investigating 
what was going on. 

They had a meeting to vote on whether this would represent the 
entire camp or not, at a general session of the troops. The meeting 
was not quite honest. They padded the ballots, and the soldiers found 
out the ballots were being stuffed, and walked out. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you investigate how they padded the ballots? 

Mr. Kerr. Yes, by statements taken from persons that are listed 
here. As I recall, David Sloane was one, as a leader in the group. I 
believe also he was fr()m New York City. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you investigate who Avere the chief sponsors 
and who kept this idea going there at Camp Pickett ? 

Mr. Kerr. Yes. As 1 just said, David Sloane was one. I think 
Murray Carp was another. The officer in charge was a woman named, 
I believe, Alice Murray. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you talk to any of those individuals when you 
were investigating? 

Mr. Kerr. I did, and took signed statements from them. 

Mr. Carpenter. What did you elicit from them ? 

]\Ir. Kerr. All the information that I could as to the entire history 
of the whole episode. 

Mr. Carpenter. I would like to call your attention to page 21 and 
the passage there which says : 

Through the United Nations World Organization, the same freedom of airlanes 
and airports as exists for sealanes and seaports, should he guaranteed to all 
nations. This will prevent any one country from having a monopoly on air 
transportation. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1475 

Does that appear in that document? 

Mr. Kekr. It does. 

Mr. Carpenter. On page 22: 

Therefore, Congress should gradually reduce tariff rates to encourage free 
trade and lead to better understanding and world prosperity. The United 
Nations Council should adopt this policy for all nations. 

Does that appear in that document? 

Mr. Kerr. It does. 

Mr. Carpenter. What eventually happened as a result of this meet-* 
ing where you stated the ballot box was stuffed ? 

Mr. Kerr. The average soldier was disgusted with the manner in 
which the meeting was being conducted. He didn't approve of this, 
and he left. 

Mr. Carpenter. You state you feel that document was not written 
by the enlisted men. Did your investigation reveal any outside source 
from where it might come ? 

Mr. Kerr. Yes, it gave an indication that there was outside in- 
fluence. The wife of one of these men listed in the frontispiece was 
there, and another young soldier's mother had come down from New 
York to help them. The privilege of the families living near the post 
was exercised at Pickett, and I believe in a small town there called 
Blackstone, Va., they had apartments. 

My investigation took me to — I don't remember the address now, 
but we found extra copies of these in the attic and in the basement of a 
building out in the civilian part of town a couple of miles from camp. 
But these were mimeographed or printed on the post by the post press. 
They were assembled off the post, apparently. 

Mr. Carpenter. They were printed on the post press, but were 
assembled off the post? 

Mr. Kerr. Apparently. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was any authority given to this organization to 
use the post press? 

Mr. Kerr. I can't answer that. 

Mr. Carpenter. But it was primarily operated and managed by the 
I. and E. section, by certain individuals in the I. and E. section? 

Mr. Kerr. That is correct. 

Mr, Carpenter. Were there any officers involved in the preparation 
of this document? 

Mr. Kj:rr. There were five of them listed here. 

The Chairman. What were their ranks ? 

Mr. Kerr. Col. Henry S. Blesse, Maj. Carl F. Billiston, Maj. 
William Darrough, Lt. Alice Murray, Lt. Arnold Wasserman. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have occasion to talk to these individuals 
you have just mentioned? 

Mr. Kerr. I don't recall talking to a colonel. I did talk to two 
majors and Lt. Alice Murray. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did they tell you what part they played in it? 

Mr. Kerr. They seemed to think it was all right. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did they tell you whether or not they had permis- 
sion from higher headquarters to prepare this document and this 
program ? 

Mr. Kerr. They told me that they had asked for a ruling from the 
War Department, and I assume that meant Washington headquarters 



1476 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

of the I. and E. or the War Department, and they were told they 
couldn't put this document out, but they proceeded to do it anyhow. 

Mr. Carpenter. They violated instructions, then. 

Did you have occasion to make any invesigation at the I. and E. 
school at Washinoton and Lee University ? 

Mr. Kerr. I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. What did you find there? 

Mr. Kerr. At the time I arrived there, they were preparing to close 
the establishment and go to Pennsylvania. 1 did find — I can't say 
that. As a matter of fact, my investigation at Washington and Lee at 
that time didn't develop too much with regard to this pamphlet. It 
did develop, however, that some of the people in the I. and E. Avere 
receiving decorations. 

The Chairman. For what? 

Mr. Kerr. I can't answer that. I don't know. 

The Chairman. I didn't understand you. Were receiving what ? 

Mr. Kerr. The Legion of Merit decoration. I can't answer for 
what, why they got it, although I did attend the function of receiving 
the medal. 

Mr. Carpenter. Who received that medal ? 

Mr. Kerr. Lt. Col. Fred Herschberg, and there was a master 
sergeant. 

Mr. Carpenter. Who was Lieutenant Colonel Herschberg? 

Mr. Kerr. I believe he was in charge of the I. aTid E. school there. 
He was an official in the I. and E. school. Whether he was in command 
or not, I am not sure, because there was a full colonel in command. 

Mr. Carpenter. The master sergeant — who was he? 

Mr. Kerr. He seemed to be Colonel Herschberg's chief assistant. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you remember his name? 

INIr. Kerr. No, but it is in my investigation. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long were you on this investigation at Camp 
Pickett? 

Mr. Kerr, Two or three weeks. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have a staff with you? 

Mr. Kerr. I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. How many were on your staff? 

Mr. Kerr. I had the post special agent, and I took 2 or 3 men out of 
the Richmond office, the Richmond headquarters, to go down. 

Mr. Carpenter. All right, you had a staff, you were at Pickett for 
about 2 weeks. What was the result of your investigation? What 
was the entire result ? We would like to know. 

Mr. Kerr. I am not quite sure that I understand that, because I 
made quite an extensive investigation. As I recall, the file is about 
that thick [indicating about 3 inches]. 

Mr. Carpenter. Don't you recall some of the highlights of your 
investigation ? 

Mr. Kerr. You mean you want my opinion of the result of that 
investigation ? 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Mr. Kerr. Now I am clear. 

I thought that the investigation, in my opinion, established that 
these persons were left of center, or subversives; that they were at- 
tempting to indoctrinate the troops with unauthorized information 



I 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1477 

and material not beneficial to the Army or the United States or the 
Government. 

Mr. Carpenter. How many people did your investigation show 
were actively engaged in this work of providing or building up this 
brochure ? 

Mr. Kerr. Some of this is what I would call, in terms of my 
language, a dress rehearsal. They had one colored boy here who was 
practically pushed onto this piece of paper, and as soon as he found 
out what was going on, he resigned. I believe he graduated from 
Columbia. He was higlily educated. He objected to being a pawn 
in any racial issue. It was obvious to me that they only had him 
around there to dress it up to appeal to whatever colored troops 
happened to be at Pickett at the time. 

The Chairman. After your investigation was completed, I pre- 
sume that you forwarded the information that you obtained, through 
channels, on to higher echelons ; is that correct? 

Mr. Kerr. That is correct. 

The Chairman. You of course do not know what happened to that 
information ? 

Mr. Kerr. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. About how many people that you feel were subver- 
sive were in this organization? 

Mr. Kerr. That is a little difficult to answer, under the conditions. 
That is about 8 years ago, and I haven't been connected with it since. 
It would be an injustice to name names without seeing the faces of 
the persons. 

The Chairman. We would not want names. Just an estimate, if 
you can recall. 

Mr. Kerr. 1 would say possibly 6 to 10. 

The Chairman. That is all, Mr. Kerr. You may stand aside. We 
thank you for appearing. 

Will Ralph de Toledano come forward, please? 

Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will 
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

Mr. DE Toledano. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF RALPH DE TOLEDANO, NEW YORK, N. Y. 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name? 

Mr. DE Toledano. Ralph de Toledano. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside? 

Mr. DE Toledano. New York City. 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. DE Toledano. I am a newspaperman. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where are you presently employed ? 

Mr. DE Toledano. I am associate editor of Newsweek magazine. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you with the armed services during World 
War II? 

Mr. DE Toledano. I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you stationed ? 

Mr. DE Toledano. I took my basic training at Fort Eustis, Va., in 
antiaircraft artillery. I was transferred to the area and language 
program of the Army specialized training program. 



1478 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

After that 1 was stationed at Pine Camp, N. Y., in the intelligence 
office, handling Italian prisoners. 

From there I was transferred to Camp Lee, Va., for retraining. I 
was transferred to New York to put out an Army weekly newspaper. 
I was subsequently assigned to OSS. 

I was brought from OSS, as I learned later, for being too anti- 
Communist, and sent back to Camp Lee, Va., and then I served for 
close to a year at Fort Brook, P. E., in the information and education 
l^i^^rani. -v 

Mr. C^'itP^TER. You had considerable experience in the informa- 
tion and education program? 

Mr. DE ToLEDANO. I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. At some time were you stationed at Cornell 
University? 

Mr. DE ToLEDANO. I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Can you tell this committee your experiences in 
Cornell University, and especially with subversive activities? 

Mr. DE ToLEDANO. I was sent up to Cornell University under the 
area and language program to study Italian. There were four lan- 
guage study groups at Cornell — Italian, German, Chinese, and Rus- 
sian. It was the practice to have the entire unit, all four language 
groups, hear one lecture by the head of each language group on the 
geography and customs of that pai'ticular area. We were called in to 
hear a speech on Russian geography and customs, -and so on, by the 
head of the Russian program, whose name was Vladimir Kazake.vich. 

Kazakevich was known to me then as a Soviet propagandist. I be- 
lieve, although I am not certain, that he had registered with the State 
Department as a Soviet propagandist. He had been on the staff of 
Signs and Society, a Communist theoretical organ. I knew his record. 

So when he began to speak, I took notes. Instead of talking about 
Russian geography and Russian customs, he delivered a political 
speech. It was a riprcaring speech, in part attacking the United 
States Army, praising the Soviet Union, criticizing the military record 
of the United States Army. 

This was a sector in the second front agitation period. He said that 
the Red Army would determine the fate of Europe; that we would 
have to deal with Russia or else — a s])eech of that sort. 

It is some years now since I heard it, but it stayed within my mind. 

There was also at Cornell — and this has nothing to do with the 
Army program — a large Russian section which had been and, as I 
remember, still was quite heavily infiltrated. It included, among 
other people, Corliss Lamont. 

As a result of this speech and of the notes I took, certain stories ap- 
peared in the newspapers. I guess I was resj^onsible for those stories, 
since I wrote to Fred AVoltman, of the Scripps-HoAvarcl newspapers, 
and the "World Telegram, and gave him a copy of my notes. I wrote 
to another friend, and I wrote to Mr. Mandel of your staff. 

The stories in the newspapers led to an investigation by the House 
Military Affairs Committee. In the course of that investigation the 
investigator for the committee very indiscreetly mentioned that I was 
the source of the information. I was called in by the civilian head 
of the entire program and was threatened with reprisals for having 
passed on this information. He also made it very clear and fairly 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT ' 1479 

explicit that nothing would happen to me if I put all the responsibil- 
it}^, all the blame for having written these letters, on one instructor 
in the Russian section of ASTP, who was an anti-Connnunist and was 
the target of attack by the pro-Communist group at Cornell. 

I of course refused, and since I was strictly within my rights in writ- 
ing those letters, nothing happened to me. 

Mr, CARrENTER. You have had some other experiences in tliis 
I. and E. program, I believe, in Puerto Rico ? 

Mr. DE ToLEDANO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please tell the committee about those 
experiences ? 

Mr. DE ToLEDANO. I think I should describe how the information 
and education program operated down there. At the end of my serv- 
ice in Puerto Rico, I was the enlisted chief of section of the I. and E. 
section at Fort Brook, in Puerto Rico. I had a variety of jobs. I put 
out the post daily and the post weekly. From the information and 
education point of view, my most important job was to brief the orien- 
tation noncoms and officers once a week on what was called the orien- 
tation line. The material for this briefing was prepared in part by 
I. and E. in Washington, and was the Army Talks which were men- 
tioned earlier in the testimony, and then it was sort of fattened up 
by the information and education branch of the Antilles Depart- 
ment, which was right above Fort Brook. 

I read the material very thoroughly each week and prepared my 
briefing on the basis of it. The incident that comes to mind con- 
cerns a briefing on the Chinese Communists. Material had come from 
Washington on the Chinese Communists and, as I said, it had been 
fattened by the Antilles Department, I. and E. I received the ma- 
terial, read it very carefully, and it w^as very clear that this material 
followed the Communist Party line completely. It described the 
Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers. It said they were not 
really Communists. It said that we should get along with them ; that 
they were friends of the United States. 

The material also supplied a bibliography which I usually used in 
preparing my briefings, and on that bibliography were the standard 
Army texts on China, namely Owen and Eleanor Lattimore's The 
Making of Modern China, and a pamphlet by Maxwell Stewart on 
China, and Maxwell Stewart was known to me then as at least a fellow 
traveler, and he has since been identified before this committee as a 
party member by several witnesses. 

I read the material and realized exactly what it was, and I called 
up the colonel in charge, whose njime I don't remember. He was a 
perfectly loyal American. He had been a Vermont schoolteacher, 
and he just wasn't "hep" when it came to propaganda. I explained 
to him precisely what I was supposed to pass on to orientation non- 
coms and officers. We had quite a hassle over it, and I refused cate- 
gorically to pass it on. He made it very clear that I had four stripes, 
and that I could be court-martialed for this, but I still refused to 
pass it on. 

After considerable discussion, he agreed to let me read the material 
as it was prepared, and then answer it. That is precisely what was 
done. 



1480 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. I hand 3'ou here a pamphlet and ask you if that is 
one of the pamphlets that you received in Puerto Rico to disseminate 
to the troops ? 

Mr. DE ToLEDANO. Yes, sir. This is called Our Chinese Ally, War 
Department Education Manual EM-42, G. I. Round Table series. 
That is one of them ; yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel would like to read into the record 
something concerning the existing military situation in the Far East. 

The Chairman. Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr. Mandel. I read from a report on the military situation in the 
Far East, the report of certain members of the Joint Armed Services 
and Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate with 
reference to the pamphlet which is here exhibited. It says as follows : 

Further evidence that the administration did not support the Government of 
the Republic of China is shown in the orientation fact sheet Army Talli. This 
was an official War Department publication used in World War II to indoctrinate 
our soldiers. The issue, dated April 7, 1945, was entitled Our Ally China and the 
role of the Communists was discussed. 

Throughout the article "Communist" was in quotation marks and it was 
pointed out that when we speak of the Chinese "Communist," we should re- 
member that many competent observers say that they stand for something very 
different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word "Communist." 
In the first place, unlike Communists of the orthodox type, they believe in the 
rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present 
is to improve the economic position of Chinese farmers, many of whom own but 
little land themselves but rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy land- 
lords. In the second place, the Chinese Communists are not like those in 
America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception of Kuomintang 
itself, they are easily China's most important single political group. They 
exercise almost independent control over many parts of North China, where 
they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla activity against 
the Japanese. 

I read that in part, and ask that it be placed in the record. 

The Chairman. The whole article may go into the record and be- 
come a part of the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 404" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No 404 

[From Army Talk, Orientation Fact Sheet, 66, War Department, Washington 25, D. C, 

April 7, 1945] 

Our Ally China 

There is no need to tell you that great numbers of American soldiers are fight- 
ing the Japanese in the Pacific. Many of them are fighting alongside our Chinese 
ally — on the soil of China. And many more — perhaps some of you — will even- 
tually get there. 

This is certainly not the first time you have talked about China — you have 
undoubtedly read articles about the Chinese people and their heroic struggle with 
the Japanese since as far back as September IS, 1931. 

Today we will spend our hour in an attempt to get at several important points 
that we ought to know about China — there is a lot moi-e to talk about but this will 
not be our only opportunity. 

Newspaper stories, magazine articles, and books have been written about what 
Is supposed to be going on within China. Sometimes authors tell conflicting 
stories. Often enough it is hard to tell whether the conflicting reports are the 
result of individual bias or inadequate information. 

One hears a lot of phrases that seem to have special meaning : The Nationalist 
Government, the Chinese "Communists," guerrilla fighters, lack of unity, war 
lords, Japanese puppets, and so on. Later, we will try to get a clearer picture. 
Right now let us remember that China is big — China is poor — China has about 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1481 

450 million people — people like yourself and myself — all of whom very likely want 
the same things that you and I do : peace, a chance to make a decent living, and 
a chance to have some fun out of life. There isn't a GI in our Army who doesn't 
want these things — and that is about the same for the Chinese GI. 

China, like the United States — like any nation — has her problems. Some are 
Internal, others are related to the war. We can't begin to consider all of them. 
But it is important for us to know how some of her major problems affect the 
United Nations war effort and how they will affect the peace to come. 

We are vitally concerned in the affairs of our Chinese ally. We each need each 
other in the battle against Japan. And when the war has been won — we will 
still need each other. America and the world need a strong, forward-looking, 
democratic China ready to give leadership to the people of the Far East and 
prepared to function as a leading member of the United Nations. 

(The foregoing may be useful as a brief introduction to the topic for dis- 
cussion.) 

WHY IS CHINA BACKWARD? 

(Question: Why does China, by American standards, seem poverty-stricken 
and backward?) 

Many reasons might be given for China's poverty and economic backwardness. 
Here are a few of the most important. 

1. China has an enormous population. Even with all her dependencies, she is 
not a great deal larger than the United States, yet she has between 3 and 4 times 
as many people — about 450 million, as compared with the 130 million of the 
United States. Much of her land is either mountainous or so dry that it cannot 
support agriculture without artificial irrigation. As a result, most of her people 
are crowded upon a comparatively small part of the land. Forty-six Chinese farm 
families have to get a living out of the land that one American farm family of 
the same size would have. 

As things now stand, the overcrowding of land means poverty for most people. 
About SO percent of China's population are farmers. And it also means that 
in the past, the existence of an almost limitless supply of cheap manpower has 
acted as a definite check upon such a development of labor-saving machinery as 
we have had in the West. 

2. China is an old country. Considerable parts of China have been under 
continuous and intensive cultivation for more than 3,(K)0 years, yet they still 
produce large crops today. This is only possible because of the infinite and pains- 
taking toil that has been put into the soil by generation after generation of 
Chinese farmers. In the United States we have had quite a different situation. 
But that would happen if we were as crowded as the Chinese, or if we had been 
forced to stay settled on the same land for two or three thousand years. Taking 
these factors into account, perhaps it will be easier for us to realize what the 
Chinese are up against. 

3. China is poor in natural resources. Coal is the only basic resource that 
is plentiful, except for large deposits of a few of the rarer metals, such as tung- 
sten. But in iron her known reserves would last only 9 years at the annual 
United States rate of consumption. Her situation as to oil is even worse. This 
helps to explain why the Chinese are so far behind us in industrialization. They 
do not have our almost limitless and easily accessible natural resources. The 
annual output of iron in China is only 3 pounds per capita (as compared with 
550 pounds in the United States, and even in coal she annually produces only 
100 pounds per capita (as compared with 10,000 pounds in the United States) . 

Much of China has never been properly surveyed for minerals, and future 
explorations, especially in China's little-known western regions, will undoubt- 
edly reveal many hitherto unknown resources. As things stand today, these 
figures point clearly to why China is a poor country. 

4. China has been fighting a war, on her own soil, for 7 years. Actually China's 
war with .Japan began in 1031 when the Japanese struck in Manchuria. However, 
after rapidly overrunning this province, the Japanese turned to the problem of 
exploiting its resources, and did not strike again until 1937. But between 1937 
and 19.39 the Chinese had lost to the enemy precisely those parts of their country 
which were richest and economically most developed. They were forced back 
into the deep interior regions that were the least modernized parts of the country. 
Before 1937 that part of China which is not now occupied by the Japanese pos- 
sessed only about 10 percent of the industrial plants, and 20 percent of the rail- 
roads; it mined only 22 percent of China's coal and milled less than 3 percent 
of her flour. 



1482 IXTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Millions of Chinese preferre<l to flee from Japanese rule into the interior of 
free China, thus complicating the problem of food and support. The entry of 
America and Britain into the Far Eastern war and the resulting blockade 
against our shipping made China's economic position worse rather than better, 
because its immediate result was to cut off China almost entirely from the out- 
side world. Is it any wonder, then, that there is a terrible scarcity of almost 
all kinds of goods in free China today ; a resulting inflation that has i-aised price 
levels to several hundred times what they were in 1937; and that black markets 
and profiteering activities have .sprung up on all sides? This blockade has re- 
duced China's normal poverty to misery and srffering. Thousands of highly 
cultivated Chinese people who were accustomed to some of the normal comforts 
of living are gradually dropping below the minimum standard of health require- 
ments. In spite of the profiteers who are fattening on the war, and in spite 
of certain other inequities in the di.stribution of wartime burdens, the harrowing 
fact remains that the average Chinese is living under conditions but one step 
removed from starvation. Rut in spite of all this, the Chine-se are still fighting 
with us today, though the battle has not been going to well. 

MILITARY SITUATION CRITICAL 

(Question: What is the present military situation?) 

At the start of 194.5, the military situation in China looked worse than it has 
in all her 7 years of war. The United Nations .suffered a major defeat when the 
Japanese succeeded in joining together their forces in northern and southern 
China. Three major gains accrued to Japan from this "move — she virtually 
established a continuous land corridor between her base in Manchuria and her 
conquests in Indochina and the East Indies; she drove us from our principal 
air bases in south China ; she placed herself in a position to prevent the Chinese 
from coming to our aid should we attempt a landing on the China coast. 

At present Japan is garrisoning the coast of China, in greater strength, to 
prepare for the threat of American landings. 

These gains by the Japanese have been blamed on many things — insufficient 
supplies from us, corruption, and bad management in the Chinese Govei-ument, 
and poor leadership in the Chinese Army. We shall take a closer look at these 
complaints a little later. 

IS GOVERNMENT DEMOCRATIC? 

(Question: Why do some people find it difficult to call China a "democracy"?) 
Since 1912 China has been a republic. We Americans have been told many 
things about China's heroic struggle for human freedom. But there are certain 
things that may seem startling or even appalling — things that don't seem to fit 
into the usual pattern of what we think of as a republic. A one-party form 
of government, for example, controlled by the Kuomintang (Gwoh-min-dahng) 
or National I'eople's Party; a president, but no popular elections; and govern- 
mental control over th« yjress and other institutions tliat are run as private 
enterprises in our own country. In other words we find in China that the terms 
"republic" and "democracy" do not always necessarily mean the same thing. 
Though China, by abolishing the monarchy, has become a republic, she hasn't yet 
fully worked out the democratic processes that we think should go with a 
republican form of government. 

ONE-PARTY RULE 

The control of the government by a single party, the Kuomintang, is the result 
of historical circumstances, for it was the Kuomintang that, under Sun Yat-sen's 
leadership, overthrew the monarcliy in 1912. In China the men who created 
the revolution were a comparatively small group of ardent revolutionaries. 
They had to struggle against reactionary forces of all kinds. Thus the 
Kuomintang tends to look upon itself as a very special and select group, better 
qualified than others to lead China in her new path. 

Sun Yat-sen and his followers believed that the introduction of representative 
government in China could only be done very slowly. Therefore they regarded 
the revolution as a gradual and continuing process that would include three 
different stages: 'i'he firsr. that of military operations, came to an end in 1929, 
after the Kuomintang armies, led by Chiang Kai-shek, bad reunified China 
after the disorders that had followed the overthrow of the empire. The second 
stage that I'oUowed, that of political tutelnge, was a period when China was being 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1483 

prepared, under the leadership of the Kuoniintang, for full democratic govern- 
ment. In 1937 it was to have been followed by the third phase, tbat of full 
constitutional government, when the Kuomintang would give up its one-party 
rule and hand the government over to the entire Chinese people. But, unfor- 
tunately, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in the same year made this last 
step Impossible. Thus China still remains in the stage of political tutelage, and 
is still under the government of the Kuomintang. 

During the last 100 years China has been politically weak — so weak that it has 
sometimes been referred to as "a loose sheet of sand." During the last 20 years 
the Kuomintang has done very much to change this situation, but in the process 
it has inevitably been led to the use of forceful and sometimes even repressive 
measures. Since 1937, too, its centralized control has been considerably in- 
creased. Whether China can make a smooth transition to constitutionalism at 
the end of the war, or whether reactionary forces win out is a question of vital 
importance. 

ROLE OF THE "COMMUNISTS" 

(Question: What is the difficulty between the Kuomintang and the Chinese 
"Communists"?) 

One of the most serious bars against the realization of full representative 
government in China is the continuing tension between the Kuomintang and the 
Chinese "Communists." When we speak of the Chinese "Communists," we 
should remember that many competent observers say that they stand for some- 
thing very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word 
"Communist." In the first place, unlike Communists of the orthodox type, 
they believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their 
chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of China's farmers, 
many of whom own but little land themselves, and rent their land in part or in 
whole from wealthy landlords. In the second place, the Chinese "Communists" 
are not, like those in America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception 
of the Kuomintang itself, they are easily China's most important single political 
group. They exercise almost independent control over many parts of north 
China, where they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla 
activity against the Japanese. 

The present situation between the Kuomintang and the Chinese "Communists" 
has a long and complex history behind it. The Chinese Communist Party got 
its real start when certain Soviet advisers were sent by the U. S. S. R. to China in 
the early 1920's to help the Kuomintang in its work of uniting the country. 

In 1927, shortly before this unification was completed, a split developed between 
the Kuomintang and "Communist" groups, and in the years following this split 
led to serious civil war, in the course of which the Kuomintang armies finally 
drove the "Communists" into the northwest pai-t of China. Their capital is 
at Tenan (Yen-ahn) in Shensi (Shen-see) province. 

But late in 1936, when the threat from Japan was growing, the feeling became 
general that this costly internal conflict must end. This resulted in the creation 
of an armed truce. 

During the first years of the war this truce operated very well. But as the 
years passed by, and China became almost completely isolated from the outside 
world with resulting inflation and economic suffering of incredible proportions, 
the old tensions and mutual suspicions reappeared. The "Communists" accused 
the Kuomintang of failing to send them necessary military supplies and with- 
holding the cooperation needed for the common struggle against Japan. The 
Kuomintang, on the other hand, accused the "Communists" of failing to obey the 
orders of the Central (Kuomintang) Government, and of wanting to set up an 
independent state for themselves in the northwest. 

The situation is so complex and has such an involved history, that it is very 
diflicult for any outsider to say definitely who is right and who is wrong. 
Probably some degree of right and wrong attaches to both sides. The "Commu- 
nists" say that they are trying to carry out certain economic and political reforms 
that the Kuomintang has up till now been unable or unwilling to make. Some 
American and other observers who have visited the "Communists" agree that 
their program is a moderate one, and that the things they have been doing in 
their areas are quite in accord with what we think of as a liberal democracy. 

In the early autumn of 1944, Chinese press censorship was temporarily relaxed 
and American correspondents in China were able to give us a clearer picture of 
the Chinese situation in general, a situation wliich came as somewhat of a shock 
to the American public 



1484 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

NEED UNDERSTANDING AND HELP 

We Americans are accustomed to newspapers which freely express their views. 
We have a long heritage of political freedom. We have fought for the rights 
of trial by jury, habeas corpus, and freedom of speech. With us the idea of a 
secret police run by a government is so obnoxious that no government would dare 
try it. But we sometimes forget that part of the reason that we have and keep 
these liberties is that we also have enough to eat, and a certain security in our 
lives which is unknown in the Orient. The years of war against Japan, the 
terrible malnutrition of the people and the internal conflicts have produced, in 
Cliina, conditions which require both economic and political improvement. We, 
on our part, must try to understand China's problems and help her in solving 
them. All who know this pjitient people, cheerful under unbelievable hardships, 
believe they have a chance of coming through. 

Recently there have been indications that internal affairs in China have been 
improving. iSegotiations and talks l)etween Chungking and Tenan have been 
continuing over the past 9 montlis, with Gen. Chou En-lai as the chief repre- 
sentative of the "Communists." Dr. T. V. Soong, whose attitude toward the 
"Communists" is considered moderate, has been made premier of the Central 
Government. Early in December 1944, the Generalissimo withdrew large num- 
bers of troops from the armies that Iiad been blockading the "Communists" for 6 
years and rushed them south to Kweichow (Gway-joh) province where they 
have helped to repulse the Japanese. In March, Chiang announced a national 
assembly to convene on November 12, 1945, to draw up a constitution. All parties 
including the "Communists," are to be invited and all are to have equal status. 

OUR BASIC CONCERN 

(Question: How would you summarize the essential problem of China?) 
In brief, our basic conc-ern with China's problems is related to the winning 
of the war and the peace that will follow. China needs supplies — China needs 
well-trained and well-equipped troops — but perhaps most of all China needs 
internal unity. 

The issue in China is not so much the tension that exists between the Nation- 
alist Government and the Chinese "Communists" as it is between those elements 
within each camp who place their personal prestige, ideas, and ambitions ahead 
of winning of the war. A strong, democratic, and united China will hasten the 
end of the war in the Pacific and make it possible for China to assume her 
important role in the Far East and among the United Nations. 

Mr. Carpexter. Did you have occasion to refer to Army Talk in 
your program there in Puerto Rico? 

Mr. i)E ToLKD.\xo. Yes. It was standard operating procedure to use 
Army Talks in preparino; the briefing sessions, and kits were made 
up by my office every week consisting of the Army Talks and other 
material prepared by Antilles Department, Information and Educa- 
tion, and such supplementary material as we had on hand on the week's 
topic. 

Mr. Carpenter. There is a volume of Army Talks, 1 through 100. 
Did you have any use of that particular group of Army Talks? 

Mr. de Toledano. These all look familiar. I was stationed in 
Puerto Rico between April of 1915 and December of 1945, and the 
Army Talks of that period are here, so I assume that those are the 
ones. 

May I add one other small incident which occurred in the course of 
my duties as Information and Education chief of section. One of 
my jobs, as I said before, was to put out the newsj^apers that we dis- 
tributed to the troops. One of these papers was a weekly called the 
Sentry Box. I wrote the editorials. During the summer of 1915, I 
wrote an editorial on the Soviet Union, highly critical of the Soviet 
Union, and in the editorial there was one line that the world cannot 
exist half slave and lialf free. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1485 

As a result of that editorial and that line in particular, censorship 
of a sort Avas placed on the newspaper where no censorship had existed 
before. That is, I had to submit my editorials each Aveek, from that 
point on, to Antilles Department, Information and Education, for 
O. K. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know who was responsible for that cen- 
sorship ? 

Mr. DE ToLEDANO. I liave a guess, and that is all. It is hearsay. 
I was told in a roundabout way. 

Mr. Carpenter. Thank you. 

The Chairman. You may stand aside. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilsf)n, will you come forward ? 

IVIr. WiESON. May we have the cameras off, please ? 

The Chairman. We will ask the cameraman not to photograph 
the witness. 

Mr. Wilson, will you be sworn. Do you swear the testimony you 
will give in this matter will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Wilson. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF LUKE WOODWARD WILSON, WELLESLEY, MASS., 
ACCOMPANIED BY EUGENE GRESSMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 

The Chairman. Be seated. 

Will you state your full name, Mr. Wilson, for our record? 

Mr. Wilson. Luke Woodward Wilson. 

The Chairman. Will you sit up to the mike so we can hear you. 

Where do you reside, Mr. Wilson ? 

Mr. Wilson. Wellesley, Mass. 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. W^iLSON. Kesearch work and writing. 

The Chairman. Are you here this morning with counsel ? Is this 
gentleman here your counsel ? 

Mr. Wilson. Yes. 

The Chairman. Would you give us your name for the record. 

Mr. Gressman. Eugene Grossman, 1830 Jefferson Place NW., Wash- 
ington. 

The CiLviRMAN. Attorney at law? 

Mr. Gressman. Yes. 

The Chairman. Proceed with the questioning of Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Wilson, what has been the nature of your em- 
ployment for the past 15 years ? 

Mr. AViLSON. Shall I start with the first ? 

The Chairman. Surely. 

IMr. Wilson. After I got out of college my first employment was 
in Washington in an organization called the National Institution of 
Public Affairs. I worked for tliat for a matter of several months. It 
was an organization tliat brouijht college students who were interested 
m Government service to Washington to learn something about the 
workings of the Government. They worked as voluntary ; they were 
not paid. They worked as interns in various Government agencies. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you an officer in this company, or this or- 
ganization ? 



1486 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Wilson. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. What were your duties tliere ? 

Mr. Wilson. I gave a few talks to these students as I recall, based 
on describing the different Goverinnent agencies, basically out of the 
document — I don't know whether they still publish it — the United 
States Government Manual. That describes the different agencies. 
As I recall, I went around and made some of the arrangements for 
these interns to work in different offices. 

JNIr. Carpenter. In about what year was this ? 

Mr. Wilson. This was from the fall of 1034 until the spring of 1935. 

JNIr. Carpenter. AVho was the sponsor of this organization 'I 

Mr. Wilson. Sponsor ? 

ISIr. Carpenter. Who was the head of the organization ? 

Mr. Wilson. There was a former Congressman from Pennsylvania, 
I believe, Frederick Davenport, who was the chairman. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was it an eleemosynary institution, or was it an 
institution for profit? 

Mr. Wilson. It was not for profit. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you charge a fee to these students to come here 
and interne, as you call it ? 

JNIr. Wilson. I didn't. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did the organization charge ? 

Mr. Wilson. I don't believe they did, no. I think the students, as 
I recall — it is a long time back — I think they paid their own expenses. 

Mr. Carpenter. The organization maintained an office here, did it 
not? 

Mr. Wilson. They had an office. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where was that office ? 

INIr. y\''iLS0N. As I recall, it was in a downtown office building at 
17 — not 17, at 15th and K, I believe it was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you on the payroll ? 

Mr. Wilson. I was not paid. 

Mr. Carpenter. This organization worked here and had no funds, 
made no charge to the students ? 

Mr. Wilson. I didn't get the beginning of your question, excuse me. 

Mr. Carpenter. I said, you were not on the payroll ? 

Mr. Wilson. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. You received no money ? 

Mr. Wilson. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. The students paid no fees to this institution ? 

Mr. Wilson. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Carpenter. It Avas headed by an ex-Congressman. You don't 
know Avhether there were any fees of any kind, or how this organiza- 
tion operated ? Where did it get its money ? 

]Mr. Wilson. I think they got funds from some foundation, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know the name of the organization ? 

Mr. Wilson. I don't recall now. 

The Chairman. You do not recall it? 
_ Mr. Wilson. I don't actually recall. I think there was talk at that 
time about getting funds from one or the other of the big foundations. 
I don't know which. 

The Chairman. What do you mean one or the other ? 

Mr. Wilson. The Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations. 

The CiiAirir.rAN, One or the otlier? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1487 

Mr. Wilson. Whether they got them from them or not, I don't 
recall. 

Mr. Carpenter. After leaving that organization, where did you go? 

Mr. Wilson. I worked for a while in the office of the Chairman of 
the Attorney General's Advisory Committee on Crime. That was 
Dean Justin Miller. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you on the payroll? 

Mr. Wilson. I was not. 

Mr. Carpenter. Again you were giving your services ? 

Mr. Wilson. I was, 

Mr. Carpenter. Following that employment, where did you go ? 

Mr. Wilson. I worked for the United States Senate, for the Senate 
investigating committee headed by Senator La Follette. It was a sub- 
committee of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you on the payroll there ? 

Mr. Wilson. I was not on the committee payroll. For part of the 
time that I worked for the committee I was on the payroll of, I think, 
two different executive departments, and on loan to the committee. 

Mr. Carpenter. What executive department ? 

Mr. Wilson. As I recall, I was on the Public Works Administra- 
tion payroll for a while, and then one of the housing agencies. Which 
of the housing agencies I don't recall at the time. They changed 
names at diU'erent times, and I don't recall which one it was. 

Mr. Carpenter. At all times you were on the La Follette committee 
you were receiving pay ? 

Mr. Wilson. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. Which period of the time were you not receiv- 
ing pay ? 

Mr, Wilson. The first part. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long was that? 

Mr. Wilson. I don't recall exactly now. I would guess it was a 
year, perhaps longer. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long did you work for the committee ? 

Mr. Wilson. Nearly 4 years. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you remember the year that you left the com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. Wilson. I left the committee in 1940. 

Mr. Carpenter. Then where did you work ? 

Mr. Wilson. I wasn't regularly employed until I went in the Army. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you living after you left the commit- 
tee ? Where did you go to live ? 

Mr. Wilson. After I left the committee I was living in California. 

Mr. Carpenter. What year did you go to California ? 

Mr. Wilson. You mean the first time ? 

Mr. Carpenter. No, after you left the committee. 

Mr. Wilson. I was working for the committee in California. When 
I left the committee I stayed in California. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you recall where you lived in California ? 

IMr. AViLSON. In San Francisco. 

]\Ii\ Carpenter. Where in San Francisco? 

Mr. AViLsoN. 3820 Washington Street. 

Mr. Carpenter. What work did you engage in there ? 

Mr. Wilson. I said a moment ago that I wasn't regularly employed 
until I went into the Army. 



1488 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have any employment there at all ? ' 

IMr. Wilson. I had for a short time, I don't recall just how long it 
was, I tliink it was a matter of 2, maybe 3 weeks, I was employed by a 
law firm in San Francisco. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the name of that law firm ? 

Mr. Wilson. I recall two names in the firm. There might have 
been a third. As I recall it, the firm name was Athern & Farmer. 

Mr. Carpenter. Athern & Farmer. 

Mr. Wilson. I think to the best of my recollection that was the 
firm name. 

^Ir. Carpenter. Is that L-e-i-g-h Athern? 

Mr. Wilson. The Athern in the firm name — I believe his name was 
Fred Athern. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was Leigh Athern in the firm, too? 

Mr. Wilson. He was. 

Mr. C\\rpenter. When did you go in the Army? 

Mr. Wilson. In February 1942. 

]Sfr. Carpenter. Were you drafted or did you enlist ? 

Mr. Wilson. I was drafted. 

Mr. Carpenter. From California ? 

Mr. Wilson. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you sent to camp ? 

Mr. Wilson. From San Francisco I went to the Presidio of Monte- 
rey for a few days, possibly a week, and then I went to Sheppard 
Field, Tex. 

Mr, Carpenter. Was all your service in the Army enlisted? 

Mr. Wilson. You mean not as a commissioned officer ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. 

Mr. Wilson. It was all enlisted grades. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you relate briefly your experiences or your 
assignments in the Army? 

Mr. Wilson. My first assignment at the Presidio of Monterey was 
just getting uniform and that sort of thing. Then I was transferred 
to the Air Corps for basic training at Sheppard Field, Tex. That 
consisted of approximately 2 months, I believe, of basic training. At 
the end of that I was assigned to Chanute Field, 111., where I took a 
course of training again for approximately 2 months, as I recall it, in 
the School for Link Trainer Instructors. The Link trainer is a 
mechanical device that simulates blind flying, and it is used to train 
pilots in night and blind instrument flying. I took this course there, 
learning to be an instructor to instruct pilot trainees in this instrument 
flying. 

At the conclusion of that school I was transferred to Minter Field, 
Calif. Minter Field, Calif., was a basic flying school where cadets 
who were training to be pilots took the second of their three phases of 
flight training- At first I was a Link-trainer instructor there, in- 
structing the pilot trainees in instrument flying in the Link trainer. 
After some time, a matter of several months — I don't recall just how 
long — I was transferred from the job on the Link trainer to the ground 
school and taught navigation, principles of cross-country flying and 
map reading and the use of radio aids to navigation and the use of 
the basic flight instruments in a simple plane to these pilot trainees. 

On that particular job I was approximately a year and a half, I 
think. During that year and a half I was transferred temporarily to 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1489 

the Central Instructors School at Kandolj)!! Field, Tex. That school 
Avas one which was desiijned to sort of standardize the instruction in 
the Air Force ^iround schools. 

Having been teaching navigation, I took the navigation instructors 
course there. That was about 30 days' duration, I think. I went 
back to Minter Field and continued in the ground school as a naviga- 
tion instructor. I continued there until approximately the first of 
1944, at which time I was transferred to Washington to the Morale 
Services Division of tlie Armed Forces. My headquarters in Wash- 
ington was for I don't recall exactly how long, a period of a few 
months. During that time I was sent for approximately a month or 
5 weeks or something like that — whatever the course was — to the 
Morale Services School at Lexington, Va. I was there in the infor- 
mation and orientation school for, as I say, approximately a month. 

Then after that I was assigned to New York on a temporary basis 
pending an overseas assignment which came through in approximately 
another month. Then I went to Europe in July 1944. 

I was in the Information and Education Division Headquarters, 
first in London and then in Paris. I remained overseas, my head- 
quarters being in Paris, until sometime in December 1945. I was 
sent back to this country and discharged in January 1946. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long were you stationed in Washington ? 

Mr. Wilson I first came here approximately the early part of 
January 1944, I think it was, and Washington I tliink was my assign- 
ment, my headquarters until I was transferred to New York prior to 
the overseas shipment in June. 

INIr. Carpenter. You were stationed here in Washington ? 

Mr. Wilson. I was. I think at that time it was called the Morale 
Services. 

Mr. Carpenter. Which later became I. and E. while you were still 
there, is that right ? 

Mr. Wilson. I am not positive. As I recall it, the change in the 
name was after I left. It may have been while I was there. I don't 
recall. 

Mr. Carpenter Then you were stationed in New York at an address 
there where Information and Education had an office ? 

Mr. Wilson. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. Who was your commanding officer while you were 
in the I. and E.? 

Mr. Wilson. In the I. and E. where ? 

Mr. Carpenter. In Washington. 

Mr. Wilson. In Washington. The head of the Orientation Sec- 
tion where I was I believe was a Colonel Farlow. 

Mr- Carpenter. Who ? 

Mr. Wilson. I think a Colonel Farlow. I can't recall his first 
name. I believe he was the head of the Orientation Section. There 
were an awful lot of officers. 

Mr. Carpenter. That was broken down into two branches, wasn't 
it ? The section was broken into two branches ? 

Mr. Wilson. Which section ? 

Mr. Carpenter. The Orientation Section, which Colonel Farlow 
"was in charge of. 

S2918°— 54— pt. 20 3 



1490 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr, Wilson. Frankly, I don't remember how the different sections 
were. In the Pentagon where these officers were, it was a huge big 
space with people at desks all over. I knew some of them were in this 
section. I didn't know what others were. I don't recall what the T. O. 
was in terms of breaking down. There may have been 2 or there may 
have been more than 2 sections. Of course Colonel Farlow wasn't 
the head of this whole business. There was the whole Morale Services 
Section. 

As I recall, there were a number of other sections than the Orienta- 
tion Branch. 

Mr. Carpenter. When you went into the Information and Morale 
Section did you request assignment to the Morale Service? 

Mr. Wilson. As I recall it, I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know to whom you made your request ? 

Mr. Wilson. It is my recollection that I requested it of Major 
Schreiber. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was he in the Morale Section at that time? 

Mr. Wilson. He was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know him? 

Mr. Wilson. Yes, I knew him. 

Mr. Carpenter. What college did you graduate from? 

Mr. Wilson. Dartmouth College. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party and 
the Young Communist League at the time of your graduation from 
Dartmouth College ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on two grounds : The 
first ground is that the first amendment to the Constitution fences 
off certain areas of as!>ociation and belief from congressional legisla- 
tion, and therefore inquiry, and on that ground I am not required to 
answer the question. 

My second ground for refusing to answer the question is that I 
assert my privilege under the fifth amendment not to be a witness 
against myself. 

The Chairman. This committee will recognize your grounds not to 
answer that question under the fifth amendment, but this committee 
does not recognize your refusing to answer under the first amendment. 

Mr. Carpenter, Were you a member of the Communist Party when 
you were on the staff of the La Follette committee? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question. I will abbreviate my 
answer. If the Senator desires, I will state the ground that I have 
previously stated. Is that sufficient, Senator? Do you want it 
restated ? 

The Chairman. That will be sufficient. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party with 
Al Rosenberg while you were with the La Follette committee ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds I 
have previously stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party with 
Charles Kramer when you were with the La Follette committee ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds 
previously stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party with 
Margaret Bennett when you were with the La Follette committee? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1491 

INIr. Wii.sux. I decline to answer that question on the grounds 
previously stated. 

jNIr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party with 
John Abt when you were with the La Follette committee? 

]\Ir. Wir.soN. I decline to answer that question on the grounds 
1 liave ])reviously stated. 

Mr. CARrEXTER. Were you a member of the Connnunist Party with 
Julius Schreiber? 

Mr, Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I have 
previously stated. 

The Chairman. Is that the Major Schreiber you just testified 
about ? 

Mr. Wilson. Senator, I declined to answer the previous question. 

The Chairman. I am trying to determine if Julius Schreiber was 
the same Schreiber as the Major Sclireiber under whose command you 
were and to whom you made a request in the I. and E. when you were 
in the Army. 

Mr. Wilson. Senator, I don't want to quibble with you. I decline 
to answer his question and I believe your question is referring to the 
question that I have declined to answer. I believe that is getting be- 
hind my declination. 

The Chairman. When did you first know^ Julius Schreiber? Let's 
get it that way. When did you first know Julius Schreiber? 

Mr. Wilson. I don't recall exactly when it was. It was prior to 
my Army service. 

The Chairman. Where did you meet him first ? 

Mv. Wilson. As I recall it, it was in Stockton, Calif. 

The Chairman. You later served under his command in the Army ? 

IMr. Wilson. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party be- 
fore you entered the Armed Forces? 

]\Ir. Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I 
previously stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party while 
you were in the Armed Forces? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I have 
previously stated. 

The Chairman. Are you a member of the Communist Party now, 
Mr. Wilson? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that one, Senator, on the grounds 
I have previously stated. 

The Chairman. What is your employment now? 

IMr. Wilson. I am not employed now, Senator. 

The Chairman. You are not employed? 

Mr. Wilson. No. 

The Chairman. Where are you residing now? 

^Ir. Wh.son. I beg your pardon. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside now ? 

Mr. Wilson. Wellesley, Mass. 

The Chairman. How long has it been since you had employment? 

Mr. AViLSON. Several years. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work in the Informa- 
tion and Education Division ? 



1492 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Wilson. I did several different kinds of things. Most of it 
was research work gathering material for use in one or another of 
the different publications. There were different kinds of publications 
and I worked on material for several different ones. 

Mr. Carpenter. What were the names of those publications ? 

Mr. Wilson. I think the first that I ever worked on was — at that 
time I think they were simply called Fact Sheets. I prepared some 
material that I believe was used in one of the Fact Sheets. I think the 
Fact Sheets were later — the designation of them was changed from 
Fact Sheet to Army Talk. ' 

Mr. Carpenter. I hand you here a volume entitled "Army Talk," 
and I will ask you if you recognize those documents. 

(Witness examining document.) 

Mr. Wilson. They look familiar. I am not positive I saw every 
one of them, but I am familiar with them. 

Mr. Carpenter. You participated in the drawing up of those Army 
Talks? 

Mr. Wilson. Of these, I think only one. 

Mr. Carpenter. Which one was that? 

Mr. Wilson. It had to do with labor-management relations during 
the war. 

]Mr. Carpenter. Do you know the number of that particular one ? 

Mr. Wilson. Perhaps I could find it. Would you like me to ? 

Mr. Carpenter. That is not necessary. You did your original 
work on one? 

Mr. Wilson. I compiled some material. I guess you could say it 
was the original work. I got material on — as I recall it, a good bit of 
it was about the labor-management committees that were set up in 
war plants, where the company and the union in the plant set up a 
joint committee to speed up war production and expedite grievances 
and to avoid strikes and that sort of thing. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever work on any others in a consultive 
way? 

Mr. Wilson. I don't recall that I ever did. 

Mr. Carpenter. Is that the only work that you did all the time 
you were in the Army in the Information and Education? 

Mr. Wilson. Oh, no. These were put out from Washington and I 
was over in Europe in Information and Education. 

Mr. Carpenter. I am talking about while you were in Wash- 
ington. 

Mr. Wilson. I spent some of the time on that. That was not the 
only thing I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. What else did you do? 

Mr. Wilson. Part of the program involves — the publication of these 
Fact Sheets wasn't the only thing. Part of the program was to pro- 
mote visual displays of material, news about the war. The Army 
and Navy published a lot of weekly war maps and that sort of thing. 

Mr. Carpenter. What did you do in that work? 

Mr. Wilson. I didn't work in the preparation of that, but while I 
was assigned to headquarters in Washington I went with some other 
Army personnel to several military installations, and on those par- 
ticular trips most of what I did was putting up the so-called war-room 
displays of visual material, using maps, any kind of maps we could 
get hold of, these weekly news maps, maps to show the battlelines, 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1493 

war pliotop;raplis, photoo;raphs chosen with respect to the particuhir 
type of troops at the instaHation. 

Mr. Carpenter. Then you went with Information and Education 
teams around the country giving lectures and visual aids to the troops 
in the field, is that right? 

JNIr. Wilson. I didn't give any lectures to troops. I was mainly 
concerned with putting up these visual displays. 

Mr. Carpenter. When you were in Washington, how many ])eople 
were on the statf, the immediate staff of Colonel Schreiber? 

Mr. Wilson. As I recall it, there were around 4 or 5, something 
like that. 

Mr. Carpenter. Major Schreiber, later Lieutenant Colonel Schrei- 
ber, was responsible for the preparation of the Army Talks, is that 
right ? 

Mr. Wilson. I am not sure how many of them. I think he had a 
considerable amount to do with some of them. I am actually not sure 
how many of them or exactly what the chain of authority was. I was 
a sergeant at the time, at a place where there was more brass than 
you could shake a stick at. I wasn't quite sure about who above me 
was responsible, exactly, for everything else. Major Schreiber wasn't 
the head of the whole orientation thing. If he was responsible for 
these things, I don't know it of my own personal knowledge. 

Mr. Carpenter. You were in the New York office for a while? 

Mr. Wilson. I believe I was assigned there for only about 30 days. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work there? 

Mr. W^iLSON. I was doing practically nothing at that time. Half 
the time I was there, I was on furlough. The time I wasn't on fur- 
lough, I think, was only about 2' weeks, and I didn't have any regular 
duty there. I was expecting shipping orders to be shipped to Europe 
momentarily. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever consult with any Communist Party 
official regarding your work in the Information and Education Divi- 
sion? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I have 
previously stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you meet with and work jointly with members 
of the Communist Party within the Information and Education Divi- 
sion ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously 
stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a Communist Party member together 
with Carl Fenichel? 

Mr. Wii-soN. I decline to answer. 

Mr. Carpenter. Steve Fischer ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously 
stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know Steve Fischer? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously 
stated. 

The Chairman. Let me read you a War Department memorandum 
to Colonel Farlow from Major Schreiber : 

I have been advised by Sergeant Wilson tbat 1st Lt. S. M. Fischer, Army 
Air Force'^ Flexible Gunnery School, Tyudell Field, Fla., is an outstanding young 
oflScer. 



1494 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Lieutenant Fischer spent a long time in the South or Southwest Pacific and 
after completing his 25 (?) bombing missions came back to the mainland- 
According to Wilson "this guy's terrific — he already knows as much if not more 
than the instructors at the school." 

In civilian life he was a newspaperman on the San Francisco Chronicle. 
Prior to that, Wilson believes, he completed a course in journalism at Columbia 
(?) University. 

Recommend that steps be taken to have this officer brought in for 2 week's tem- 
porary duty with a view to determining his usefulness either in Materials or 
Field Operations Section. 

You were a Sergeant Wilson, weren't you ? 

Mr. Wilson. I was a sergeant, that is right. 

The Chairman. Do you know S. M. Fischer or Steve Fischer re- 
ferred to in this memorandum signed by Major Schreiber, who you 
told us was your superior officer ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously 
stated. 

The Chairman. You do know Colonel Farlow ? 

Mr. Wilson. I have met Colonel Farlow. 

The Chairman. I would like this memorandum to go in the record 
and be made a part of the record. 

(The memorandum referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 405" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 405 

War Department — Armt Service Forces 

(W. D. A. G. O. Form No. 0115) 

memo routing slip 

April 7, 1943. 
To the following in order indicated : 
1. Colonel Farlow 
Stephen [handwritten] : 

I have been advised by Sgt. Wilson that 1st Lt. S. M. Fischer, Army Air Forces 
Flexible Gunnery School, Tyndell Field, Fla., is an outstanding young officer. 
Lt. Fischer spent a long time in the South or Southwest Pacific and after 
completing his 25 (?) bombing missions came back to the mainland. According 
to Wilson "this guy's terrific — he already knows as much if not more than the 
instructors at the school." 

In civilian life he was a newspaperman on the San Francisco Chronicle. Prior 
to that, Wilson believes, he completed a course in journalism at Columbia (?) 
University. 

Recommend that steps be taken to have this officer brought in for two weeks 
temporary duty with a view to determining his usefulness either in Materials 
or Field Operations Section. 
From : 

(Name) Major Schreiber. 
(Building and room) BCB. 
(Date) 6-16-44. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party when 
you were working for the National Institute of Public Afl'airs? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds that I have pre- 
viously stated. 

The Chairman. What is your wife's name, Mr. Wilson ? 

Mr. Wilson. Kuth, 

The Chairman. Is she a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question, Senator. 

The Chairman. Mr. Wilson, I want to read you an excerpt from 
the FBI report and one of the Nixon memorandums : 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1405 

Luke Wdodward Wilson >vas last known to be serving overseas as a morale 
(ifHcor in the United States Army. Coiifuleiitial reliable sources have indicated 
that Wilson is a close friend of Louise lUansteu — 

Do you know Louise Bransten ? 

Mr. AViLSON. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously 
stated. 

The Chairman (reading) : 

and that his wife, Ruth Wilson, is a Communist Party functionary in the Stock- 
ton, Calif., area. Wilson for a number of years was employed by the La Follette 
Civil Liberties Committee of the United States Senate investigating labor mat- 
ters. A highly confidential source has advised that in INIay 1941 Wilson was 
attempting to determine how information contained in the files of the FBI might 
best be obtained in order to assist in the defense of Harry Bridges. 

Is that a fact, Mr. AVilson ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously 
stated. 

The Chairman (reading) : 

It is further reliably reported that Wilson desired Charles S. Flato — 

Do you know Charles S. Flato ? 

Mr. Wilson. I do. I know a Charles Flato. 

The Chairman. Do you know Charles S. Flato? 

Mr. Wilson. I know a Charles S, Flato. 

The Chairman (reading) : 

It is further reliably reported that Wilson desired Charles S. Flato, then of 
the Farm Security Administration, to approach John Abt, formerly connected 
with the Department of Justice, and at that time counsel for Sidney Ilillman, 
on how best to obtain such data. 

Is that true, Mr. Wilson ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds I have previously 
stated. 

The Chairman. When you were with the La Follette Senate com- 
mittee, did you do some work in Chicago for that committee? 

Mr. Wilson. I don't believe so, Senator. I have worked in many, 
many cities of the country for the committee. I don't recall working 
on an investigation in Chicago. 

The Chairman. Were you in contact with the Communist Party 
of Michigan when you were investigating the Michigan sitdown 
strikes for the La Follette committee? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer the question on the grounds I have 
previously stated. 

The Chairman. You were in Michigan with the La Follette com- 
mittee doing investigating work ? 

Mr. AViLsoN. I was in Michigan on an investigation of the Black 
Legion and the sluggings of UAAV organizers by the service depart- 
ment men of the Ford Motor Co. 

The Chairman. Did you engage in any subversive activity or espio- 
nage while you were in the Armed Forces? 

Mr. AVilson. Senator, would you break that question down ? 

The Chairman. AA'^hen you were in the Armed Forces, did you en- 
gage in any espionage activities? 

Mr. AA^iLSON. No. 

The Chairman. AA^hen you were in the Armed Forces, did you en- 
gage in any subversive activities ? 

Mr. AViLSON. I decline to answer that question on the grounds I 
have previously stated. 



1496 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. When you were in the Armed Forces in France, 
were you in contact with the Communist Party of that country ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer on the grounds that I have previ- 
ously stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was it your practice to train and place students, 
at the Institute of Public Affairs, who were Communists, into positions 
with the United States Government ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds I 
have previously stated. 

The Chairman. Mr. Wilson, have you engaged in any subversive 
activities ? 

Mr. Wilson. I decline to answer that question on the grounds I 
have previously stated. 

The Chairman. You say you are unemployed. Where do you get 
your compensation? Where do you get your money to live on? 

Mr. Wilson. I have a private income, sir. 

The Chairman. You have a private income. You are not paid 
by the Communist Party, a salary or funds ? 

Mr. Wilson. I have a private income, and that is my entire income, 
Senator. 

The Chairman. You have no other income except your private in- 
come ? You receive no money from any outside source ? 

Mr. Wilson. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. We have three documents we would like to place in 
the record, Senator. 

The Chairman. Identify them, Mr, Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. A letter dated April 14, 1944, from Henry J. Mueller, 
major, assistant executive oflicer, Morale Services Division, in which 
he states that Luke W. Wilson is to be assigned temporary duty for 
approximately 30 days for the purpose of attending the orientation 
course school for special service. I ask that that be placed in the 
record. 

Here is the enlisted record and report of separation and honorable 
discharge of Luke W. Wilson, which I ask be placed in the record. 
It notes here that he is a pistol marksman and an orientation writer. 

The Chairman. Both of those will go in the record and become a 
part of the official record of this committee. 

Mr. Mandel. A memorandum from the Army Air Forces Head- 
quarters, Air Transport Command, dated April 10, 1944, noting a 
request for transfer for Luke Wilson. It says he is on T. D. with 
the Orientation Branch, Morale Services Division, signed by Talbot 
Rantoul, first lieutenant, Air Corps, assistant executive, Personnel. 

The Chairman. It may go in the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 406, 407, 
and 408" and are as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 406 

V^AR Department, 
Headquarters, Army Services Forces, 

Washington, D. C, April U, WU- 
In reply refer to SPMSA 201, Wilson, Luke W. (14 Apr 44). 
Memoiandum for the Adjutant General, Enlisted Branch, Orders Section, Room 

4215, Munitions Building. 
Subject : Orders. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



1497 



It is requested thnt ordors be issufd directing.' Scrseiuil Lnkc W. Wilson, 
39090797, Hq & Hq S(i, IMYIm] Basic Flying Tnjj; Gy, Miiitor Field, Bakersfield, 
California, now ou temporary duty this oflice, to proceed on or about 17 April 1944, 
from Washington, D. C, to Lexington, Va., on further temporary duty for approxi- 
mately thirty (30) days for the purpose of attending the Orientation Course, 
School for Special Service, reporting upon arrival to the Commandant, School for 
Special Service. Upon completion of this temporary duty, enlisted man to 
return to temporary duty station, Washington, D. C. 

For the Director : 

Henry J. Mueller, 

Major, A. O. I)., 
Assistant Executive Officer, 

Morale Services Division. 
Exhibit No. 407 



ENLISTED RECORD AND REPORT OF SEPARATION 
HONORABLE DISCHARGE 



1. LAiT HAM! • Pinrr namk • miodli initiai. 

•ILfON LjSF 


a. ARMT aUIIAL NO. 

j9 090.797 


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4. ARM OR aCRVICB 

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T. DATS OP aiPARATION 


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Ij j:j>, 12 


II. PLACE OP BIRTH 

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la. ADDMCaa prom which CUPLOTMaNT VTILl.  aOUOHT 

?l' 9 


11. cotot nil 


14. COLOt NAia 

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1 


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MILITARY HISTORY 



U. OATI OP INDUCTION 

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PISTOL »:•! 70.6 2 i?r c 



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DATE OP ARRIVAL 

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40 RIAaON AND AUTHORITY POR aKPARATtON 

C^N-VDIIDICt lF THF. Gt-VFIOJV.ENT Alt 61i-3t5 15 DfC iM & FH 1-1 (ih.OblLI ; TIi^K) 



4t. acRvici acHOOLa attcndeo 

AS.F OKIf:.-)T;.TIO.N VFITIR lOF^LE ^'FRVICl. SCHOOL LtM..'CTON K/> 1 ML 



4a^ EDUCATION (Yfcr?) 



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PAY 


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47. TOTAL AWOUNT, NAME OP OiSBURaiNS OFFICER 

% 60^.21 J ^.H {.' (-01, -1 


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INSURANCE NOTICE 



IMPnRTAMT " "*"'»*'l"* <• "OT "^'O **"t" D"« O" >*'TM1N TM.RTV-O 
"^'^""*"' pAYAaLE TO THE THEAaURCR OF TMC U. 6, AND FORWARD 


NE D*>9 TMEntAFTEO. IN9UBANCE WH.L LAPaE MA«E CMECK* OR MONET OROCR4 
TO COLLECTfONS SUBDIVISION. .VETEPANS ADMINISTRATION. WASHINGTON 2B. D C 




48. NINO OP IHaURANCt 4a. HOW PAID 
lltt,J«n. 1 U-t. Gart. 1 Ita* AlMaaal 1 BIntt l« 


BO Etlur<*t DuU vf AlKt- 
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tOna month allar 50) each month CinlloM 1 CMllai* Oaly 1 OlMeatinii 

31 Jiuj i6 . y 1. 1 








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m>n. bjt"On iff'ji-D 

A.'F S;\;F.E (2 fhP /.5) 62 



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WD, AGJO Forma JT and 5i lor •nUalad p«r«ona 
anim»d to an Honorable Dlacharge. whtch 
Will not ba uaad aiiai tacaipi ol ihia ravuion. 



K rSTfJU. l^t LT LC. 



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3. FTNAL TNDORSCMEINT COPY (Alllxad lo final 
d Sarvlca Racord) 



■23 



final IntfoMioti 



Z 



1498 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 408 

Army Air Forces, 
Headquarters, Air Transport Command, 

Washington, 10 April 19^. 
Subject: Request for Transfer. 

To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington 25, D. C. Attn: 
AC/AS, Personnel— AFPMP-2-KRS. 

1. Provided there are no military objections and Sgt Luke W. Wilson, ASN 
39090797, Hq & Hq Sq. 302d Basic Flying Training Group, AAF Pilot School, 
M inter Field, California, and presently on TD with Orientation Branch, Morale 
Services Division, The Pentagon, is available for reassignment, it is requested 
that he be transferred to 559th AAF Base Unit, Ferrying Division, ATC, Munici- 
pal Airport, Nashville, Tennessee. 

2. Sgt Wilson attended the Link Trainer instructor school at Chanute Field 
and the Central Instructors' school at Randolph Field. He has been Link 
Trainer instructor at Minter Field for seven (7) months, and Navigation instruc- 
tor at the same Field for eight (8) months. As a civilian he was on a Senate 
Subcommittee on Education & Labor, as an Investigator and Economist, for four 
years. He spent one year on research work on crime prevention for the Attorney 
General's Advisory Committee on Crime. He planned and supervised the initial 
program of internship training in government service for the National Institute 
of Public Affairs. EM is a graduate of Dartmouth College with an A. B. degree. 
It is contemplated assigning the soldier to orientation training duties. 

3. It is further requested that this Headquarters be notified of the action taken. 
For the Commanding General : 

Talbot Rantoul, 
1st Lieut., Air Corps, 
Asst. Executive, Personnel. 

The Chairman. The hour of 12 o'clock having arrived, this com- 
mittee will stand in recess, and we will meet again at 2 o'clock in this 
room this afternoon. 

Thank you, Mr. Wilson. You are excused. 

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the hearing was recessed until 2 p. m. of 
the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The hearing was resumed at 2 p. m.) 
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 
The first witness will be Mr. Stephen Fischer. 
Will you come forward, please? Will you be sworn to testify? 
Do you swear that the testimony you give in this hearing will be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
Mr. Fischer. I do. 
Mr. Carpenter. Will you state your full name ? 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN M. FISCHER, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOM- 
PANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, HOWARD S. WHITESIDE, BOSTON, 

MASS. 

Mr. Fischer. My name is Stephen Fischer. 
The Chairman. What is your initial? Do you have one? 
Mr. Fischer. M. 
The Chairman. F-i-s-c-h-e-r? 
Mr. Fischer. Correct. 
The Chairman. And your address? 
Mr. Fischer. 425 Riverside Drive, New York City. 
The Chairman. What is your business or profession? 
Mr. Fischer. I work for Scientific American Magazine and do ad- 
vertising promotion. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1499 

The Chairman. Scientific American 'wliat? 

Mr. Fischer. Ma<?azine. 

The Chairman. And you are present here today with your counsel? 

Mr. Fischer. I am. 

The Chairman. Counsel, would you give your name? 

Mr. Whiteside. Howard S. Whiteside, 30 State Street, Boston. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Carpenter. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you in the armed services during World War 
II? 

Mr. Fischer. I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you in the Information and Education Serv- 
ice of the Armed Forces? 

Mr. Fischer. I was at one point, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. What pohit was that? 

]\Ir. Fischer. Well, following my return from combat duty as an 
aerial navigator in the Solomon Islands, I was reassigned, after some 
months, to Tyndall Field, Fla. 

Mr. Carpenter. AVhat year was this? 

Mr. Fischer. My combat duty took the course of all of 1943. 

Mr. Carpenter.* When you were assigned in Florida, what year 
was that? 

Mr. Fischer. That was in 1944. j 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know the month ? 

Mr. Fischer. Somewhere about March or April, I believe. 

Mr. Carpenter. And were you in the I. and E. in Florida ? 

INIr. Fischer. In Florida I was grounded because of combat fatigue 
and did some public relations and I think some I. and E., but that was 
a secondary duty. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you later transferred from that field in 
Florida? 

Mr. Fischer. I was, some time about July of 1944. 

Mr. Carpenter. And where were you transferred ? _ _ 

Mr. Fischer. I was transferred to the I. and E. Division here in 
Washington, and then tc New York City. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was your grade or rank when you were 
transferred? 

Mr. Fischer. First lieutenant. 

Mr. Carpenter. And what division were you assigned to here in 
Washington ? 

Mr. Fischer. To the Orientation Branch. 

Mr. Carpenter. Of what? 

Mr. Fischer. Of the I. and E. Division. 

ISIr. Carpenter. Of the Information and Education Division ? 

Mr. Fischer. That js correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. The Orientation Branch? 

Mr. Fischer. Right. 

Mr. Carpenter. Who was your immediate superior officer? 

Mr. Fischer. Well, I would say I had 2 immediate superior officers 
who worked closely together, Colonel Bowker and Colonel Schreiber. 

Mr. Carpenter. Bowker? 

ISIr. Fischer. B-o-w k-e-r, as I recall. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work while you were 
assigned in Washington under Colonel Schreiber and Colonel Bowker? 

Mr. Fischer. I was engaged 



1500 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Whiteside. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that there be no pictures 
during the hearing? 

The Chairman. All right. Your request will be respected. 

You may proceed. 

Mr. Fischer. I was engaged in helping to prepare a series of weekly 
bulletins called Army Talks. 

Mr. Carpenter. You were helping in the preparation of Army 
Talks? 
. Mr. Fischer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of that work? 

Mr. Fischer. Weil, there was discussion with other members of the 
Orientation Branch, and then gathering of information and writing 
and rewriting and editing, not only by myself, but it was a collabora- 
tive effort with the colonels and eventually with superior ofticers with 
whom I did not come into contact, but who would approve the material 
and pass it back. 

Mr. Carpenter. In other words, you did original work in the prepa- 
ration of these Army Talks. Is that right? 

Mr. Fischer. Some original, and some editing and discussion. 

Mr. Carpenter. How many people were on the staff at the time you 
were there ? 

Mr. Fischer. I would say — this is an estimate, sir, after a period 
of some 10 years — it seems to me there were, oh, 8 or 10. We are 
talking now during the month of July 1944? 

Mr. Carpenter. When you were here in Washington. 

Mr. Fischer. When J was here in Washington. I would say about 
6, 8, or 10. 

Mr. Carpenter. Six, eight, or ten. How did you happen to come 
into the Information and Education Section here in Washington? 
Was it through a reconnnendation, or was it through something on 
your part, wherein you asked to come in? 

Mr. Fischer. No, I did not ask to come in, 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know whether you were recommended to 
come into the I. and E. Section? 

Mr. Fischer. I do not know whether I was recommended. I do not 
recall that I was recommended. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know a Luke Wilson ? 

Mr. Fischer. I do. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know whether or not he was instrumental 
in your coming to Washington in the Information and Education 
Section ? 

Mr. Fischer. I don't know. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know whether Major Schreiber at that 
time, later Lieutenant Colonel Schreiber, brought you in, or did he 
recommend you coming into the Information and Education Section? 

Mr. Fischer. I know that Major Schreiber spoke to me about com- 
ing in, and that when I reported he told me what I was ^oing to do. 

The Chairman. Where did he speak to you about coming into the 
I. andE.? 

Mr. Fischer. He spoke to me by telephone when I was in Florida. 

The Chairman. He called you up ? 

Mr. Fischer. Yes. 

The Chairman. All right. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1501 

Mr. Carpenter. I have here a niemorandum from Major Schreiber 
to Colonel Farlow, wherein he states : 

I have boon advised bv Sovfjoant Wilson that 1st I.t. Stephen M. Fischer * *  
is an outstaudins younsi ofiic.er. In civilian life he was a newsi)aperinan on the 
San Francisco Clironiclo, and prior to that Wilson believes he coniplotod a 
course in journalism at Columbia University. It is recommended that steps be 
taken to have this officer brought in for 2 weeks' temporary duty with a view 
to detorminins his usefulness. * * * 

Do you recall that? 

]\Ir. Fischer. No, sir, I never heard that recommendation before. 

Mr. Carpenter. It also states: 

According to Wilson, this guy is terrific. He already knows as much if not 
more than the instructors at the school. 

Do you recall any such memorandum ? 

Mr. Fischer. No, sir, I do not. 

Mr. Carpenter. You say you knew Luke Wilson ? 

Mr. Fischer. I met him. 

Mr. Carpenter. You knew him prior to coming into the service? 

Mr. Fischer. I met him a couple of times prior to coming into the 
service. I do not recall ever meeting him in the service. 

Mr. Carpenter, Where did you first meet him before coming into 
the service ? 

Mr. Fischer. In San Francisco. 

Mr. Carpenter. On what occasion,? 

Mr. Fischer. I don't remember. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know him in a friendly way ? 

Mr. Fischer, Yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you attend meetings with him ? 

Mr. Fischer. I don't remember ever attending a meeting with Luke 
W^ilson. 

Mr. Carpenter. You were employed in California for some time 
prior to the war ? 

Mr. Fischer. I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. And what was the nature of your employment? 

Mr. Fischer. I was a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Fischer. Yes, I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. When were you a member of the Communist 
Party ? 

Mr. Fischer, I believe I joined the Communist Party in the spring 
of 1940, when I was at the graduate school of journalism at Columbia, 
I went, to the best of my recollection, to 1 or 2 meetings when I was at 
Columbia. I then went to San Francisco, where I was employed, 
and for approximately 1 year up until some time in the early fall, as 
I recall, of 1941, I considered myself and was a member of the Com- 
munist Party, with a group of newspapermen, in San Francisco. And 
1 just left in the fall of 1941. 

Mr. Carpenter. You left the party in the fall of 1941? Can you 
state approximately what month? 

Mr. Fischer. I didn't take any formal action, and I don't recall 
exactly the month, but I would state approximately October. 

Mr. Carpenter. October of 1941 2 

Mr. Fischer. I believe so. 



1502 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party while 
you were a member of the Armed Forces of the United States ? 

Mr. Fischer. I was not, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you later join the Communist Party after 
retiring from service? 

Mr. Fischer. When I returned from service, 4 years after leaving 
San Francisco, I was asked to come to some meetings, which I am not 
as positive about as I am about these other dates I gave. I am not 
positive whether they were left-wing caucus meetings of the News- 
paper Guild or whether they were open Communist Party meetings, 
but I did go in — may I figure my dates here ? I guess it was in late 
1945 or so that I did go to 2 or 3 meetings, such as I just described. 
And I was no longer interested in remaining as a member of the 
Communist Party, and I once again just left, and I have not been a 
member since. 

Mr. Carpenter. You paid dues in the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Fischer. I did at one time, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever attend any Communist meeting 
with Luke Wilson ? 

Mr. Fischer. Not that I recall ; no, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know Major Schreiber, later Lieutenant 
Colonel Schreiber, prior to your induction into the service? 

Mr. Fischer. I don't recall knowing him prior to induction into 
the service. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you not know him in California prior to your 
entry into the service? 

Mr. Fischer. No, I do not recall ever having met him. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever have occasion to talk with your sister 
in New York about Julius Schreiber? 

Mr. Fischer. Oh, I may have talked to my sister. 

Mr. Carpenter. Didn't she give you an introduction to Julius 
Schreiber in California before the war? 

Mr. Fischer. This is belief, sir, but to the best of my knowledge 
1 do not know that my sister knows Julius Schreiber. 

Mr. Carpenter. You do not know that you ever met Julius Schrei- 
ber in California prior to the war ? 

Mr. Fischer. I do not remember ever having met him before the 
war. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you positive you did not ? 

Mr. Fischer. I do not recall ever having met him before the war. 

Mr. Carpenit:r. Have you ever offered to cooperate with the FBI 
to inform the American people as to what you know about the Com- 
munist conspiracy? 

Mr. Fischer. Have I ever offered to do that ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. 

Mr. Fischer. No, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever had any associations with William 
L. Patterson? 

Mr. Fischer. I have. 

Mr. Carpenter. What were those associations? 

Mr. Fischer. I met William L. Patterson, to the best of my memory, 
as a newspaperman. I spoke with him about stories, or a story, as 
a matter of fact, and that is about all that I remember about him. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1503 

]Mr. Carpenter. What year did you first know him? 

]Mr. Fischer. To tlie best of my recollection, 1949, 1 would say. 

JMr. Carpenter. 11)4-9? 

Mr. Fischer. That is to the best of my recollection, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. You did not know him in 1933? 

]\rr. Fischer. In 1933, sir, 1 was 13 years old. 

jNIr. Carpenter. You didn't know him in 1940? 

]Mr. Fischer. I don't remember meeting him in 1940. 

]Mr. Carpenter. Did you know him as a member of the national 
committee of the Communist Party? 

]\Ir. Fischer. Xo, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have any citations to show 
Patterson's position in the Communist Party? 

JMr. IMandel,. The records show that in 1933 he was a Communist 
candidate for alderman in the 19th district of New York. He was 
a Conmuinist candidate for the State assembly in the 21st assembly 
district in New York in 1931 and 1940; Communist candidate for 
Congress in Chicago in 1940; and he has later been listed as a member 
of the national committee of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you attend a dinner in behalf of William L. 
Patterson on May 15, 1951. at Plaza Hall, New York City ? 

]Mr. Fischer. I don't believe I was in New York City in 1951. 

INIr. Carpenter. Well, would you recall that? 

INIr. Fischer. No ; I do not recall having been to such a dinner. 

INIr. Carpenter. Did you know him as head of the Civil Rights 
Congress, which has been cited as subversive by the Attorney General ? 

Mr. Fischer. It was in that position of his that I met him. When 
I met him he was the head of the Civil Rights Congress. 

Mr. Carpenter. And in what connection did you meet him? 

Mr. Fischer. I was covering a story for the Daily Compass con- 
cerned with a man — what was the name of that organization, Patter- 
son's organization ? 

Mr. Carpenter. The Civil Rights Congress. 

Mr. Fischer. The Civil Rights Congress was working on his be- 
half. And I went to Patterson and talked to him about the story, as 
I was assigned to do, 

Mr. Carpenter. ^Yhnt paper was that ? 

Mr. Fischer. The Daily Compass, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know Mr. John T. McTernan? 

Mr. Fischer. I do- 
Mr. Carpenter. What were your associations with him? 

Mr. Fischer. That of a friend. 

Mr. Carpenter. A what? 

Mr. Fischer. A friend. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever have any business associations with 
him? 

Mr. Fischer. As a reporter, I once at some time or other covered 
activities in which he was engaged as an attorney. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did Mr- McTernan ever recommend you to the 
Armed Forces? 

Mr. Fischer. I don't remember. 

Mr. Carpenter. I have a letter here, copy of a letter, signed "John 
T. McTernan," to the commanding general of the Ninth Corps Area, 
Presidio, San Francisco, Calif.: 



1504 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mt Dear Sir : I am happy to recommend Mr. Stephen Fischer for an appoint- 
ment as flying cadet in the United States Army. I linow Mr. Fischer well both 
personally and socially. He is a highly intelligent and competent young man 
who has consistently demonstrated ability to give leadership to his associates 
and to perform difficult assignments with confidence and tact. As a devoted 
believer in the principles of our Constitution, he will, I am sure, give loyal service 
to his country at this hour. 

Do you recall that recommendation ? 

Mr. Fischer. I did not recall it until you read it, and I assume he 
wrote it if you say so. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that Mr. McTernan, when asked 
about his Communist affiliations by the California Legislative Com- 
mittee Investigating Communists, invoked the fifth amendment ? 

Mr. Fischer. I do not know that, sir. 

Mr- Carpenter. What were your last dealings with Mr. McTernan ? 

Mr. Fischer. My last dealings? 

Mr. Carpenter. Your last dealings, yes. 

Mr. Fischer. I am trying to think. May I consult with my counsel 
for a minute ? 

Mr. Carpenter. You may. 

(Mr. Fischer consults with counsel.) 

Mr. Fischer. I last saw Mr. McTernan, I would say, about a year 
ago. 

Mr. Carpenter. And in what connection ? 

Mr. Fischer. He was in New York. He called me up, and I saw 
him socially. 

Mr. Carpenter. It was a social engagement? 

Mr. Fischer. Yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel would like to put in a citation. 

Mr. Mandel. New York Times, February 18, 1948, page 20, shows 
that when Mr. McTernan was questioned by the California Committee 
on Un-American Activities he invoked the fifth amendment; that he 
was one of the attorneys defending Communist cases, according to the 
New York Times of March 4, 1950, page 18, and June 4, 1950, page 13. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know William Schneiderman, former sec- 
retary of the Communist Party of California? 

Mr. Fischer. I once met him, sir, on a transcontinental train. I 
spoke to him for a couple of hours, and that is as much as I know. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was that the last time you saw him ? 

Mr. Fischer. To the best of my recollection. 

Mr, Carpenter. Do you know John Pittman? 

Mr. Fischer. I did know him, yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. A feature writer of the Daily Worker, official Com- 
munist organ ? 

Mr. Fischer. I did know him, yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. And in what relation did you know him? 

Mr. Fischer. I think he was a neighbor of ours. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where? 

Mr. Fischer. In San Francisco. And also I sometimes bumped into 
him on assignments as a newspaperman. 

Mr. Carpenter. When was the last time you saw him ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1505 

Mr. Fischer. I would say I think before the war. I am not cer- 
tain. It has been many years.^ 

JMr. Carpenter. I have a copy of the recommendation for the pro- 
motion of an officer, and I would like to read to you the following : 

Stephen M. Fischer, Army serial No. 0-72S3G8. 

You are the same Stephen Fischer? 
INIr. Fischer. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Carpenter (reading) : 

Description of duties is as follows : 

This officer's primary duties are editorial research and writing. He recom- 
mends and initiates subject matter, directs and conducts research work, and does 
actual writing of weekly Army Talk fact sheets and orientation discussion 
guides for distribution to all Army units in continental United States and to all 
overseas theaters. In addition, this officer is in charge of conducting pre-tests 
of discussion material by directing discussions in field units. The assignment 
calls for a high order of judgment, wide knowledge of world affairs and Army 
policy, and sympathetic understanding of troops in the field. This officer's duties 
carry great responsibility because of the global use to which the materials are 
put. 

Would you say that is a fair description of the job that you filled 
while in the Information and Education Section ? 

Mr. Fischer. I would say that is a very flattering description of 
the job I attempted to do. 

Mr. Carpenter. But you did do this ? 

Mr. Fischer. Well, yes ; but as you see, sir, no one man could do all 
that in 1 day, I don't think. 

Mr. Carpenter. Well, you were in the Army more than 1 day, 
weren't you ? 

Mr. Fischer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was Carl Fenichel a member of your group when 
you were in the I. and E. Section ? 

Mr. Fischer. He was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Marian Thompson ? 

Mr. Fischer. I don't remember that name. 

Mr. Carpenter. Hyman Forstenzer? 

Mr. Fischer. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know whether any of those people were 
members of the Communist Party ? 

]\fr. Fischer. I do not. 

The Chairman. Mr. Fischer, would you be willing to appear before 
the FBI and give them the benefit of the information that you learned 
when you were a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Fischer. Senator, as I have told you in our other session 

The Chairman. I know 3.0U told us in executive session that you 
would not tell this committee your former associates. I just won- 
dered what you thought about the FBI. 

Mr. Fischer. I feel that at any time, sir, that I know of anyone 
who, to my knowledge, has performed any treasonous, subversive ac- 
tion against the United States, I would not wait to be asked to go to 
the FBI. I would personally and immediately get in touch with 
the FBI. I know of no one, sir, who, to my knowledge, has done any- 

' In a letter dated June 30. 1954, to Senator Jenner. Howard S. Whiteside, attorney for 
Fischer wrote : "On further thouj^ht, Fischer believes it was after the war, in 1945 or 
early 1946, that he last saw Pittman." 

32SJ18°— 54— ut. 20 4 



1506 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

thing wrong. I know of people with whom I have disagreed. I 
know of people who may have thoughts which I do not share. But I 
would not wish to bring trouble upon anybody unless I personally 
knew him to be the cause of trouble. 

The Chairman. In other words, you do not know, of course, what 
other members of the Communist Party did when you were not in 
their presence, and so forth and so on. 

Mr. Fischer. That is right. 

The Chairman. But you could tell this committee and you could 
tell the FBI the members of the Writers (xuild and the members that 
you associated with when you were in the Communist Party ? Would 
you be willing to do that? Just tell us who attended the meetings. 
We do not care whether they did anything treasonable or not, but we 
would like to know who they are. 

Mr, Fischer. No, sir; I would not do that unless I thought that 
they had committed wrong. 

The Chairman. All right. Then you are to be the judge. 

Thank you very much. You are excused. 

Mr. Fischer. May I make one statement, sir ? 

The Chairman. No. 

Mr. McManus, will you take the witness stand, please ? 

Do you swear that the testimony you give in this hearing will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. McManus. I do. 

The Chairman. You may proceed. 

Mr. Carpenter. W^ill you give the reporter your name, please ? 

TESTIMONY OF HOBERT C. McMANUS, STAFF MEMBER, SENATE 
INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE 

Mr McManus. Robert C. McManus. 

INIr. Carpenter. And are you a member of the staff of this com- 
mittee? 

^Ir. McManus. lam. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you cleared for security ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir ; I am. 

]\[r. Carpenter. Wliat is the nature of your work on this committee ? 

IVIr. McManus. Well, I have general tasks. I help prepare ma- 
terial for hearings, and 1 help write reports. My title is a staff mem- 
ber, sort of a jack-of-all-trades. 

^Jr. Carpenter. In connection with preparing reports for this com- 
mittee, did you come across and documents in connection with your 
investigation which would help this committee in its progress? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir; in connection with this particular in- 
vestigation, as a result of interviews and conversations with Captain 
Kerr, who was a witness this morning, I was advised by him of the 
existence of a file which had been put together by him and his squad of 
investigators after they made a survey in Camp Pickett and the I. and 
E. School at Lexington, Ky. 

Mr. Carpenter. That was Lexington, Va. ; was it not ? 

Mr. McManus. Lexington, Va. Yes, excuse me. 

I was advised that one section of this file had exhibits in it, and I 
transniitttd that information to Mr. Lewis Berry, Jr., Deputy Depart- 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1507 

ment Counsel of tlie Department of the Army, and Mr. Berry under- 
took to n;et hold of that file for the committee and supplied us with 
some of the exhibits that were there. 
Mr. Carpenter. And do you have some of those exhibits with you 

today? 

Mr. McManus. I do, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Would you please state from those exhibits, taking 
them one by one, what you found ? 

Mr. I^IcManus. Would you like me to identify them first and then 
describe them later ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes, if you will. 

Mr. McManus. The first one is a War Department circular, Wash- 
ington, D. C., September 5, 1944, entitled "Orientation Information 
Education," and that is a circular describing the authority and func- 
tions of the Information and Education Division. 

The next is a prospectus entitled, "Prospectus ASF Troop Training 
Orientation Program," and it contains these introductory sentences : 

In this kit you will find the orientation training program for the Army Service 
Forces. The program consists of 34 hours ; subdivided into 6 weeks' basic 
orientation (6 hours) and 14 weeks' advanced orientation (28 hours). Of the 
total of 34 hours, 13 are devoted to films. 

Next is War Department pamphlet No. 20-3, dated September 1944, 
Guide to the Use of Information Material. 

The next is a series of mimeographed sheets. The originals were 
supplied to the subcommittee, and we have made those photostats. 
"Daily News Bulletin, Post Information and Education Office, Camp 
Swift, Tex." And they are in chronological order, and mostly in 1944. 

The Chairman. That may be incorporated into the record by refer- 
ence. We will not need to make them a part of the record. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now I wish you would tell us what the results of 
your investigation of those documents were. 

Mr. McManus. In connection with this orientation information 
education document, here is what you might call a job description of 
the outfit, which says as follows : 

Information : To formulate policies and provide a service for the dissemination 
of information to military personnel, using the media of motion pictures, printed 
materials, and radio, including the publication and production of Yank, News 
Map, Army News Service, Camp Newspaper Service, Armed Forces Radio Serv- 
ice, Pocket Guides to Foreign Countries, and informational posters and pam- 
phlets ; to formulate iwlicies for, plan and initiate the production and be 
responsible for the content of, integration of, and final approval of information- 
orientation films for military personnel, including GI Movie Weekly and the 
Army-Navy Screen Magazine, issued periodically. * * * 

And so on. It states the authority. 

The Chairman. I would like for that entire document to go into the 
record and be a part of the record as just now identified. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 409" and is 
as follows :) 




'7l VV"'*|, WA^ tWP4XTMl!M9V 



1508 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 409 

Ha 4» } \ WjJbmmtm aa, |X O, 6 Scftaaber 1»M. 

pOUENTATION, mrORiUTIOM, CmJCATtDN 

Sc<rt>o« 

INTRODt'CTION — Puri>oac of circular: deflnltlon of terms I 

INKORMATION AND BDUCATtON DIVISION— B«t«Wljhinent ind fua«tloo« II 

TRAINING — Orientation training required for all mlUl«ry perMounel , lit 

OPERATION — Hemounel autborUed. mlMloo. dutl«i>. quallflcatioiia ; fuDda . IV 

SI,'rEBS'lS10N — By conimanUlnK generaU of gervlce comruandH... V 

MATERIALS— Imus, dlattibutlon, u«e of orleulatton, lufomiaiinn, and educitnon 

materlHla VI 

KESCI8SION— Prcvloua liutructloiia „ _ VII 

1 . .INTRODUCTION.— I. Purpo»«.— The purpose of this circular Is to define 
the mlialDn, org:'iilzTitii>n, aud functions of the information aiiil Education Di- 
vision, Army Service Korces, and of orientation, Information, and education In 
the field. 

2. Definition of terms. — o. The tenn "Information and educHtion" erahi'nc<»8 
orientation, Inforin.itlon, e<lucatlon, research on factors affectiiiR morale, and 
related morale iictlvltles provided by the Iiiforniallon and Kduiatlon Division. 
The term "Information and e<iucatlou" dlvlHlou, branch, or section will be used 
to designate staff divisions or sections In the major echelons of coiniuand. 

6. Q'he term "Information-education officer" will be used to designate com- 
missioned poi-sonnel In the field engnped In orientation. Informfitlim, and educa- 
tion and related morale activities. This terra will replace the title "orientation 
dtflcer" previously used lu Tables of Organization and other War Department 
•lirectives relating to personnel engaged in these a<ilvlties. 

c. The term "education officer" will be used to designate those officers charged 
••xcluslvely with aui)ervlslon or operation of the educational program available 
'o military i)ersoiiiiel through the services of the Information and Education 
Pivlslon and Its branches. Including the United States Armed Forces Institute 
and Its branches. Such offict')-s are now on duty in theater, department, Bervtoe 
• ommand, and similar headquarters. 

II. .INFORMATION AND EDUCATION DIVISION.— 3. EsUblishment.— 
The Information and Education Division was established on 10 November 1948 
•s the Morale Services Division and a8.'»lgned to the Director of Personnel, Army 
-terviee Forces, so far as matters pertaining to general administrative procedure 
«nd supply are concernitl. Ffffctlve 9 August 1M4, the title of this division whs 
hanged to Information and Education DlvlaJon. For the mission and functloim 
•f the Information and Edue-ition Division, see paragraphs 4 and r>. 

i. Mission.— The dire( tor of the Information and Education Division la 

barged with the plaiuiini:, production, dlss*"nii nation, ami supervision of urn- 

••rials and programs fi>r the inforitiation, orientation, and nonmilitary education 

f troops and wiHi research on tnxip attitudes, In order to a.ssist comnianilvrK in 

ii4«intalning a l.igh state of morale. 

5. Functions and activities. — a. Ocnvral. 

(1) To advise the Chief of Staff and the Commanding Generals, Army 
Ground Korc'es, Army Air Forces, Array Service Forces, theaters, 
depurtnients, and defense couimand.s. regarding plans, policies, and 
programs covering iiK)rale activitiefi. 

(2) To oiHTate branch ottices of the Information and Education DivUioa, 
and 10 uix*rate the United Statea Armed Forces Institute. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1509 

(Oni.880) 



(t> To Tt^miatn4 i>rnc«dure« and arrang* for tlw Mlactio*. 

aihl BMlfnmeut of pt>r«>nn«l, commiaatoned and <«liaaaiL lor •rtab* 
UtloQ, loformatloo, and (Klucatloa duties (hruogboat tW Amy , In- 
civllag file operattoo of uei-egaary tratoluf eatabUatUMBCa, and 
Uii«u(b oiv-Job tralolDg. 
(4) To ouotrol aaaigojoaoit of oflicers to and relief of olBcera fhom Um In- 
formatloD-edocadoa nplacetneot pool. 
k. Retearch. — T<y «m&aer v m nu Trb gtodlea In cofltlnental United Btatee and 
h) oversea theaters defeuae comiuanda, and departments on factors nfTectlng 
tBora'e; and to collect and analyse data for War Department agencies n^juestlog 
rcMarcb eervlcea. Operations loclude definition of proUema to be stadlod, con> 
($wn of fleid operations, and tabulatiiiu and auab'Sis of rfHulta. Reporis on Army 
problema abont which remedial action can be taken only by tiie War Department 
cr by theater of department commanders are forwarded to appropriate staff 
o<Bcers In the War Department or to the theater or department commaitdcr im- 
mediately coocviued. Siudlea oo problems of interest to officers iii all echelons 
of command are reported in appropriate publications, including "What the Sol- 
dier Thiuks," a monthly digest, distributed thruugh The Adjutunt Ueneral to all 
company and b'gher ecbelou tommauders. 

0. Intormatiini. — To formulate policies and provide a service for the dlfw»>mln- 
atlon of Informstion to military persioanel, using the media of motion picttir>>8, 
printed materials, and radio, lucludlni; the p\iblicatioD and prodiKtlon of Tank, 
Newsmap, Army News 8«rvlce, Camp Newspaper Service, Armed Forces Radio 
^errice, Pocket Uuldea to Porelfn Countriea, and informational posters and pam- 
phlets; to formulate policies for, plan, and initiate the production and be re- 
Kponaible for the content of. Integration of, and final approval of Information- 
«rlentatioo films for military personnel, Including O. I. Movie Weekly and the 
Army-Navy Bcrfea Magazine, Issued periodically; to exercise staff supervisioo 
and policy control over all post, camp, station, and unit periodicals of the Krmf 
for the dlaaemlnatlon of news and other items of Interest to the military person- 
Del of such installation or unit. 

t. £d«»M(io».— To formulate poiiclea and operate a service for appropriate 
•ducattooal opportunltWa for troops through correspondence coursea, self- 
teaching course*, accreditation and testing service, and the prorlatoa of 
materials (edocaUea nanoals, educational films, educatloaal radio profraaia. 
extaiblta) for use in eiaaa Instnjction, off-duty dtacnsslon (roupa. and lectiuva; 
to supervise tlte coodoct of the United State* Armed Forces Institute and oyene* 
branches thereof; to arrtmge for the use by military personnel of selected coU««ip 
•nd university eitensloa cooraee; to select or prepare forelgu language lustn*)-- 
tlonal guides, phrasebooks. and dictionaries; and to famish necessary ^<>iis 
tnd materials for a tralainf program, Ipcludlng general and rocatlonal eduratiuu, 
to prepare roillury persounel upon cesaatloo of hostlUtUii for return to rUil \y$f. 
€. Orientation. — To forsiakte pi»lirl«^ plsn aiMl Nup^rvlse proos^cw* f»»r 
orientation of nilllrary pcrssonei In tlM borfccroond, cauat^ and cxttrmt fttmrn 
of the war and current events relatinc thereto, and for eventssi returu to 
civilian life; to prepare and select War Department materials for lhai«p inryeaea. 
Including motkw picture film, recordings, pamphlets, f«ct s UsttSk books, BMjta, 
and other vlsoal aids, and weekly reports of military an4 wu«td events, £mI 
,wl>eo pMctlesbX to provitf* aticb other materials as asy ks i«qaeflted for tM 



40l>i 



1510 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



(Qa.SaO) 



•peck! i&ots9« porpoees or progranu of Uw Anoy OropHil Vorcee, jkmif AJr 
JWcM, »nd Anay Serrioe forces. 

/. Fisl4 $e7-vice — To adylse and assist commanda la tUe field la a^tling up 
mrleotatloa. tcfonQniloo, fuMl education programs, aod to adviw^ is tbc operatioa 
of sofb prt>gr«3ats, locimJlng advice on materials avallab!« tmna tita Informatloa 
asd Eiut-atlirn pivlfilon. 

HI ..TRAl\l!^G.-\A, Gen«ra5. — AH military per«oai>€l, conmilsrloDod and «j- 
Sigt^^ on active datyYTill be glveo training In orleotfttlcu f^^rlugh a coura* lo 
be knoTTB as the ArmAorii^n'aiioa Course. In rettmeatts, g»-oui)s and .sepac 
battalions, squadrons, c\n;paiile.s and dPtfichments, or eqalvalftot orgaolsa^QS, 
not l€«s than 1 uMividea^our per:weck will b<> devoted to tbis training ^dirlog 
duty hours, acd such tr\ulng will be conductted or dlr«^tly supendsed by 



the lowest eob«>loa« of conuuand. 

are — 
(tb factual infonsation as to th« cai 
ttomlng a cuinbatant In a global 



The, 



tlT«fl 



and events 
In December 



reguiajly as^^lgaed ofBcfTs 
oj^*^ Anny Orientation Co 
^1^0, To acquaint all recruits 
leading to the Unltt'd States 
1041. 

b. To infoio: all military per3<Anel on the courae of mill*^^ actions, particu- 
larly those in which Unlt«d StatM forc<« hay« particlM^M ainoe 7 December 
IMl, ^Bd on other phases of the wa^flort of the United J^tes. 

o. To ixiform ail military porsonue\of the principle^^r wlilcb we are fighting 
and of the dangprs to American prlu^plea arl«iag^K>ai Axia policies and Axia 
•ggreBsloo& 

d. To Inform all military personnel on 
to tlielr regular training. 

«. To fix In tLe mind of the American 
personal- role and rctiponBlbilitlea in tbe 

7. On transports and hospital ships. 
importance during that time spent on t 



'■ natriR of the eaemy, as a supplement 



a sense of tbe importiutce of bis 
nt ("truggle. 
Slice the morale of troop* Is of major. 
iportk and hospital abipa, nod since tbe 



iiece-ssarlly enforced Inactivity, reatcfltlon, anovother factors present on board 
transports and hospital ships are^Rtrimental t\ morale. It is e.=;!»entlal that a 
well organized and integrated Aj^ Orientation iV^gram be Instituted on board 
every transport and hospital alm> at the earliest piVtieal muuient after leavUig 
the port of embarkation; Tba program will be tbe\esiponsibility of the trans- 
port commandei. Tbe tranmort commander wl}l dea%uaie an <ifflccr for orien- 
tation, iDformation, and^ucation activities from sbip^ complement persoonel 
cr from tranaient peTso»el for each trip. 

b. On Toyages of 4&Aur8 or more, the time devoted to tlalnlng In Army orien- 
tation while on boaE#tran8porta and hospital shiin, weatha^and other physic; 
conditions permit^K. wUi not be less than 1 hour per day 

a At the earUpn time consistent with necessary secuxityVseasures tro 
destined for orrJtaeaa will receive additional orientation instrnc^on or Infor 
tioD whicb wM^fauUliarize tbem with the area to which they are dl^tlned. Such 
tfistmctUm^ Information wUl include tbe following sa'ojeets: 

(Ij^Jeopraphy. 

People — their habits, (Tastoms, language. 
Cun^ncy — deDominatldna, exchange rata, «tc. 
Communicable diseases — their Importance, maaoer In which \tini 
mltted, and control. 
(5) Other subjects peculiar to tbe area. 



C^ 



J(OOMB 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1511 

(On. 880) 



in or boipltml i*lp«i i*t\\mlntitoJ^/t0l0Km fhiteB 

require special orlentafW^»MiMU^^' ^"'_£23te WiW^MP-ll^*r«t<o« f»r- 
Km^ or leare, and return to aj^JlUM^iiS ^?"* - r<>a8Hlgnmertt to aoa* of 

Interior, or fTtto^^a00tlltfmuAAeqaAte r^ — gJH *• '^ throttgh 

tbe rrfulaj^Mirti^^l^rleBtatlon programs and the fulIetrt'tateS^M^^callMble, 
to *^ii^Su?hper«onnel to anttclpate 'and prepare for cootlnnanoe ^n 'iBHl^ry 
Flee or ft<JJu«tmeot to civilian life upon neparation 

■tV..OFBRATION.—t, Peraoanel.— Pending pybllcatlon of changea to Tahles 
i<t Organisation and Equipment, units and InntallatioiiH will reorganise In ac- 
«>rdance with Ihla circular. 

a. Army, owpa, and divition headtniarteri o*>d compurahle Ant<y Air Forcei 

tHHtt. 

(1) One staff officer Id army, corpa. division, and comparable unit bend- 

qiiarters (except Army Air Forces units) will be designated "assist- 
ant G-3. Information-education officer" In the gniile and with en- 
listed aiwlKtants as Rhown In tuble I. 

(2) For Army Air Forces units this ollli-er will be dipsignated as "a^efstant 

A-1, Information-education officer." 

(3) Onnuilseloned and enlisted autliorlratluns In appropriate Tables of 

Orir:uilsatlon and Equipment for Special Service sections will be 
reduced a<-c<>rding!y and Special Services sections will be estubllshed 
to conform with authorizations shown In table II. 

(4) Commissioned and enlisted grades in excess of Table of Organliatlon 

and Blqulpnient authorizations created by this change will be carried 
Is surplus In gnide until Hli.orbeiJ b.v normal attrition. No officer 
or »-ull9ted man assigned to either orientation, Information, and erf- 
ocniloii duties or to spet'lal scitIcmj duties will be relieved, rea* 
signed, or reduoed aol-^ly because his grade, Is In excess of current 
Muihorizatlnn, when such excess in grade was brought about by thia 
change. 
^f^, Armored divi^on. 

(0) In armored divisions which do not orfranicully Include regi- 
ments or equivalent units in their orpi nidations, three offloirs 
in the grade of captain and three eBlIste<l men, technicians, 
cmde .'), will be Irx-liided in the divl.sion headquarters to be 
detailed as Infornintlon-education offlct-rs and enlisted assist- 
aiiw to the combat commands or otherwise at the discretion 
of the dlvlalon connnander ( is4>e table I). 
(b) Tables of Organization and ?:quipraent for Headquarters and 
Headquarters Hattery, Division Artillery, Armored Division 
(T/0 & E 6-160-1), will be changed to delete the "assistant 
S-3. orientation officer" now provided, and this officer will b« 
reassigned to division headquarters as one of the officers pro- 
Tided for armored division In table I. The additional officer 
and enlisted man necessary to comply with the requlrementt 
aet forth In table I will be provided through an Increase is 
total streugtb of the dlvlflDo by oot officer and one eullsted 
BtaiL 



AGO MB 



1512 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 







X%^\ 







*A0lstvit K-1 (a Armr Air Foroea anlu kbor* p«yp hftt tod loofaulid la the pereanne! wetlca JB 

Innj Atr Form jroup (MOS 50M). 
°*Hee(Jqu»rt«n, division vtlUery (except annoird dlvlslsn krt(Uei7} win to eoaatdered M •mlvtleat 



to r«(lmenu 
•*<'AHtotaDt 8-3 in oalu (other than A A F aniu) of the refimental level. 



Tabl 
SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION 








• 


1 


4 




• 


7 


• 


1 


rnH 


Tfch- 
nician 
grade 


Army 
Hq 


Air 

Force 


Corp* 
H<1 


Cato- 

maxkd 
and 

DlTl- 

liaa 


Arm and 

Plvtsloa 

Hq 


Regl. 

laant 

sad 

Oroop 


, 






1 


1 










1 


M«)or 




1 


I 


1 
3 




4' 


C^UiB..., 










IS 


Fin*' Ueuten»nt 












1 




















c 




I 


1 


I 


1 


I 


1 




Tecbnioian, (rad» SI 

Technician, tr«<Se i/lacludinc ...«•... 






7 

t 




3 


§! 


1 


1 


i 


1 


t 
10 


Tatfintaton, frmi* tj 

Total rnlhted 


I 
4 
t 




11 
u 


s 


(J) 
0) 


(2) 
(J) 


(i) 


u 




i 


t 


* 


3 


} 


t 










M 




t 


4 


4 


«l • 


> 















A<k>0eB 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1513 

6 

h. Reffim«nti, f fompt, — < Mmpt^t^U *mn$. 

(1) One BUff HBrvr t« the vradc of cttpUin will to lBei»«>4 la the TkMm 

of Organltttloo and E4iulpDieiit Af esrti rc«f»n>t or •VilT«S««t anlt 
(ncept Aitaf ' Air Forcae 9rt»u^> W anliit««t 8-S witk Mitatftn 
under **lt«itnirka" cnlunin "Asstetant 8-8, liifonB*tion-«dttcmtlnQ 
oflV-er," In Hev of "Aaslstant 8-3, ortentation oflVtr." 

(2) For Amy klr Forces group, this ofBcer will be a captain and Inclitied 

in tba "PersoQiMi aecttoa." 
(8) Aa provided tn tables I and II above, Tabtea of Organlutlon aud 
Equlpmeot of each regiment or equivalent unit tUI be chancad b> 
Include one enlisted man, tectmirian, grade {^ aa aaalataDt to ilie 
regimental Inforruation-e^iucntion officer, and Sp#^lal Servlr» •po- 
tion of eatrb Table of Org:nni«ition and Equlproem will he red«ired 
by one ealtBt»d.mtta accordloglf. 
(4) Groups and headquarters division artillery (exrefit headquarter* 
armored division artillery), will be considored aa «^ulvaient to 
refiments for the purpone of interpretation of this pararrapb. 
e. Separate battaliom, iquadront, end comparable orimntzatitm* In separate 
battalions, M)nadroq||k companies, detachments, and oth«r coipparaMe organUa- 
tiona whose Tables o£.Organlsation and Equipment do not authoriaa laAarmatioa- 
education ntOcera, a qnaltSttd officer, other than chaptHln, vill ba AMl(»at«td to 
perform the duties «f iBfonaation-education offloer in addition to ethar duties. 
4, B«rvio* «04n«»«ul«. 

(1) Tb«i« Witt ks m inJomatlon and education divigion la tiM ttead- 

qoartegv o( each service command stafted with suffloieat offlcerR 
adequatJriy tn supervise orientHtion, information, and education 
actlrltlaa within the service coniumnd. 

(2) Po$tn, oam^, and jiffltton^. 

(s) Allotments for posts, camps, and stations having a tr«w«(i pii()ula- 
tion of 2,000 or more, not including troops for which iniornia- 
tton-educatloo personnel are otherwise organically iwt.vided 
(reflmentSi'groups, divisions, trHluiiig centers, and l»«Mp)tal 
bed capacities), will incl«4e not !»■• than one oftt<<er hi the 
grade of captain or stove wko wfll w designated an iu^iraui> 
MiiA-aducation otBeor: anA not kiw than one enlle{v<d sm*. 
ttrluUcian, grade 5, SMlsniat to the Infortfiatiou-edtft^lion 
uWosi. In determining troup p«>pnlatlon of a port, euavk or 
Btatteo for the puri)otie of interpreting this circular. I'titted 
States iDllltary prisoners and troopH phyKlcally distant «k<> 
are under the station commnnd will be lix'luded. In oinp rbe 
nuiober of troops Is too larj^e for the «Arle«t fan<'tliNi,lus m( 
this ofllcer, the number will be IncreaaM with eomramaui 
distribution of grades, <tu tits ha sin uf otte uddltioDal 
and one Additional enliat«4 Man fvr each Z<)il<> additloMil 
truopa. 

(t) In poflts, camps, and stations having a tnwp pofMilatloa ot 
less than 2,000, not including troops for whlck IjufurosatJaa- 
ettncation personnel areotherwlae organically provided (regi- 
ments, groups, divisloDS, training centers, and hospital bed 
capecitles), a qiiaHfled oflkrr other than chaplain will b* 
designated by the po8t conjinander as lnforuiHti*»n-eUucatioa 
oflrer, In addition to other duties. 



1514 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



c «•*•©/ imUr<o0- hntffitaU. psrttpi Armp Air ror*tm »o#f«<rH.— The snper- 
TMon of oflentatlon. Information, and education fxinctiou* reiaiia* to hot-pital 
patteaU by aervlce ooraeaand haaaqnarters will be performad by reconditioning 
4lTl«lon« aad reconditloaln* persooneL Orientation, informatlaa, and educa- 
tion functions for general and station hoepltala, eicei»t Krxaj Al» Forces hos- 
piUiLa, wUl be condncted or dJnpctly wiperrlsed a8 follows: 

(1) In hospitals with Hurhorleed bed CRpaclttes of le« ttain aJQ, tl»e« 

tanctlonn for hospital patients wUl bep«*foruied by p«r8«n*el within 
current allotments, assigm-d to rectinditlonlng duties; and (or opep- 
atlUK pwwmiiel by i)t'r8<)niiel provided in d(2) (o) and (ft) «b«v}i_ 

(2) HoapltHls with aiuiiorlued bed capocltlea of 2r!0 to 600 are authorUfli 

one oftioer, liifoniiatlon-edmatlon, In addition to current alWUJenta, 
who will conilm I or dlrwtly supervi*.' orientation, Information, and 
wlucatlon ftuu tionK for both lioBpltal patients and hospital operating 
personnel, «ii<l who will also serve as educational recondltioniof 
iiltlcei-. 

^3) In hospitals with autliori/ed bed capacities In exces* of 500, these 
functions for both hospital patients and operating personnel will 
be performeil by the educational recondllloutng otticer. Where the 
rotal «tith(uized hospital be<l capacity plus the authorized strength 
of hospital operatlug persijnnel la in excess of 2,(XK), current allot- 
nieiit>( will lie increased by one orticer, infonuation-eduoatlon, who 
will conduct or directly supervise the functions of orientation, la- 
foriualion, and education for hospitals operating personnel and who 
wiU assist the educational reconditioning olticer In the conduct 
ond/or supetvision.of thcfie functions for hogpital patients. 

(4) Convalescent oftker and enlisted personnel may be utilized lu the 
conduct of the functions of orientution, Information, and education. 

(1) mutj section* —Theater. depaHment, base, defense (lacluding d«*e»9e 

commundK in the o>n!in<m«l llnilu of the United States), aad com- 
parable overnea commanders will establish staff divisions or sections 
within their headquarters and assign Information-education and 
«Hlucatiou personnel to such staft sections within their current 
alloti»e«t8. They will be entitled "information and education" 
division, branch, or section, as appropriate. The organization of 
lnformatlon-edu<-«tlou in the continental United States, especially 
as it provide* orientation, information, and education channels from 
major echelons to the regimental level, will be followed so far as 
practicable for organization overseas. It is deemed of utmost Im- 
portance that the chief staff officer assigned to orientation, Informu- 
tiou, and e«lui-atioii duties have access in reporting on matters of 
policy and c«introl to the commander and the chief of staff, corre- 
sponding to the relationship of the Director, Information and Educa- 
tion Division, to The Chief of Staff. ( See par. 5a ( 1) .) 

(2) Ttuk forcen and comparable oommandii. — In task force, defense, Island, 

base, and similar oversea commands where uiMcellaueous troops of 
Army Ground, Air, and/or Service Forces are gathered together 
under one command to accomplish special missions or objective*, the 
OMBmaading officer thereof Is authorUed to designate one Utforma- 
ttOQ-education ofScer in the grade of not less than captain aad one 



AflCI 



INTERLOCKING SUBVEKSION IN GOVEUNMENT 1515 

IKMLMOD 




flrgsat««4 lau mcUbmiIb. «qaival«nt or 

«U1 nawmw tk« ■iMfcw. ^trtatm tht Aot&H, 

«U»1«, teT« Um qsaltfteatioiM o< tatonn«C 

wt toTth la paraffrafik 0. 
r Pfit of ^m^Hyr frt wi.— Port coaiaawton an autlMrtMA t* aatiiDUah u» 
lafwrBiatfon «Ad edocktlea br&aieh Mad«r tb* director of permmmtt •( ib» port 
wMb • braacb chief, la the gn&t of —Jnc and with aaalataM tBfnrmatlim- 
edUieatiOQ officers la tlte xrade of captain, oe the tMsla of ocw for tm^ 2.*J<I0 
prnnaaeDtly loslfrDed troops under tlte port rommander, sad wUh eurh mllitted 
aa4/or rinilan personnel a8 are required to cvrry out Um miaakMi »n4 fatxtlntM 
of ttM hTMDCh. This braach will be charged with the mtMle* aixi '<iRrtlun« nf 
brleQtatloa, InformatloD, aud educatloD aa atated In parairniptt M •• far a* It 
pertalaa to operating military personnel of the port and to treo^ pwwinc thrt>««b 
the port, Incladlng tfa<«e In ata^tng areas, casual detacbmeata, askd <>th»>r laatalla- 
tlons and organisatloos assigned to the port. This p(>r8onnel vtti not iw <iMrg^ 
wltjl OT«nee Bnpplj functions of the port. In addition to the dutif* e»«aMrat>-l 
In paracrapb 9, the port Infurmatlou-edncation hrsnch will be rha rtr"<1 with 

(1) DerlsiBB orientation, informatloo, and education pmirraRMi aad de- 

■nkofiiag material therefor specially adaptnd for preM^iuition to 
tranalent troops whlfe under the command of the port comiaander. 

(2) Brieflng informetioD-education officers of nnits passing through the 

port and other mich offlcprs who will conduct or exercise* sup»'rTlBloD 
orer ofiicera conducting orientation, information, and <><iucu»t<»n pro- 
graoia: Instructing thsni in use nf matfrlals and adrlsing (htm of 
probieoM prcullar to ports of eoitxirkatton. staging arnttH. and trans- 
port* with which they wUl be confronted; and inntnictlng and 
assisting them In the solution of such problems. (Se<> par 7 > 
k. Traininff centert. including replacement training ctnteri tn4 irmy »mrvir4 
FvrOM trairUnff centeri. 

il) Allotments for training centers. Including replacement trai«iiic 
centers. Army Service Forees training centers, and oAWt^ ''«Mb4*t# 
Bchoola win Include not leas than one officer who will tM* <>nai«>««t<»t 
as Informatlon-educatlOB officer and who will normally '^ tiw is4«tl 
In the (^-8 or ft-S wctlon of the training center taeadqiiartnrs B» 
listed aaslstanta will be allotted in the number Indicate tn 'aMv I 
under the columa for "AAF Goaunand and Division HfOnvmrtmr*. 
In addition, oue ofilcer and one enlisted man will be autiMtrisatf im 
each lO.OUO troops, or major fraction thereof, In excess "t i*» 9mm 
15.000. 
(2) Training reglroents. Including provisional training rcgiiatx--* •>!« m 
elude information-education ofncera and enlisted perMMx-i « •!«»- 
bers as provided in b above, 
i Bdueation o/7Uer«.— Bdncatloo oBicers are on duty preaentty • baatan. 
departments, service commands, asd in similar hendquarterfl. 

9. Miasioa, duties, aad qaalificationa af InforBation-aAKatla* tMmn. — 
a. Mi$*ion, — To assist the commanding ofBear In creatlttc aaxl «aiii*«iolng In 
etrary ofiicer and enlisted man a feeling of Individual raa^riaitUit); for particl- 
patlm la the war and to strengthen bis efficiency aa a aiililMi by lacraaaing hla 
aoderstandlog as to why we fight,, keeping hira lafiifiad aa la Iba cotiraa of tba 
Wwt attlof to U that he baa ready acceaa to Dews «r «ha waiM, aad glTlng hloa 



AOOi 



1516 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

(Co. MO]' 

9 

aii opportunity to add to his nillltftry effect I veocw uai IndJTldual competence 
through instruction and opportunity foretudy. 
(. Duliet. 

(1) Omeial. — To study and report to the <y)mmandliig officer on condi- 
tions alTe<ring ludiule within the command; to exercise staff suptr- 
vlsion over all orientiillon, iiifnrniHtion, and Pilinatioii activities 
and functions, Including training and briefing of ofiBcers assigned to 
conduct pr(>graniK required during duty time in lower echelons; to 
coordinate all orientation, information, and education ilrnginms 
within thecomrannd; and to arrange that facilities for orlentiitlon, 
lnf<>rniatio;i, and ediuuiion are made known and avallahle to all 
pers/mnel of the rnnimand. 
(2) Oriftitatiun. 

(u) To or^'HOize nnd pnpervlse the conduct of the Array Orientation 
Course, and to obtain from available military sources such 
deiiriiiinns of the millt:uy mission as are related to orienta- 
tion and the Army Orientation ('ourse. 
(6) Ti> prejiiuc and i Irculate nuilerials for use In the Army Orienta- 
tion (;iinrne and related orientation activities. 

(c) To maintain a current orientation center, or centers, containing 

flics and library materials relating to the subject matter and 
principU* of orientation. 

(d) To provide camp and unit newspapers with materials relating 

to orientation, 

(e) To nrrauKe for and jirescnt lectures and motion picfiire.«i show- 

ings iclaiive tti ririentation and to Initiate. sujK-i'vlse, and 
guide voluntary orientation activities relating to morale. 

(f) To obiaiiMfiatcrials for and to disseminate news snniruarics. 
(y) To orj;aiii7.c and pn'vuli' for comUicting orientation meeiin;:si 

fur I'liicery. 
(8) Jiifiirmaiioii 

(0) To air.uikre ilial the Information services and facilities made 
avaraMe by the War Depurtinent are used to the fullest 
exictir 

{I) To aiiMiee U-\- .showing of inforni.iilimal fllixis in couipII:ince 
with \S ;ir I »i'ii:irnMfn1 dirni'tives. 

(«) To arrange clrculinion and display of orieniation, information, 
and. cdiu'ution p^'^^'ei's. and distriltution of orientation, In- 
f(>rniaUori, and ediiiation pamphlets. 

(d) To arrange projK'r dl.^tribuUou of pwket guides to foreign 
coaiiirie.s to jiers('nnel of units after leaving a port of 
embarkaiion. 

(c) To sui>prMse iind/or cooperate In the publication of unit news- 
paptTs and the utilization of Omp Newspaper Service, and 
outside the continental limits of the United i?tates, where 
applicable, the Army News Service. 

(/) To supervise the oix'rutlon «f radio, pnhllc addrcM, and carrier 
installations, wheie furnished, utilizing, outside the conti- 
nental limits of the L'nitt'<l .States, radio transcriptions of the 
Armetl Fones Radio Service. Army News Service, ami special 
ItrAgrtiius. 

AO0 9B8 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1517 

10 

(#) To Mlantau laterMt In Tuak. th» Am9 weekly, tad «MiK 
Id lu promotiuti aad distrlbutloo. 

(h) To itlmuUtc Int4^re«t In Newamap, and tMlat ia Its M^lklthm 
aad dlstrlb«tloB. 

(<) To eacoanc^ military "pprMniDel in tbe field to nboilt to tlM 
tnformatioD-educatloD officer Ideas and asatcHal««4table f«r 
DBf in information and education divlirioa pcUkatlonr, wh 
tlon pictures, and radio acrlpta, and to torward these tdMts 
and materials, where approred, tbroni^ chaanrta. to tb« 
Director, Information and Education Dlvlstoo, JLrmj Service 
Vorces. 

f /) To arrange for tbe regular abowing of "O. I. Movie We^ly." 
O) Bducation. 

(tt) To learn tbe educational interest and needs of aiUttary per> 
sonnel of tbe command and plan snltable programs of class 
tosiructlon; to arrange for nn^essary claHiruom space ami 
equipment, and obtain the services of QuallflMl Inatruotorx. 

(() To facilitate enroilatent of military personnel In the pro(;raiii 
offered by tbe United States Armed Forces lastltutr. and to 
arrange that this program is made known to all lullltary 
personnel of tbe command. 

(o) To supervise the planning and conduct of off-duty gnmp dis- 
CQMlon.on subjects of general interest. 

{4) To make suitable arrangements for obtaining adaqaate sup- 
plies at dlsenseion paaiphleta, teitbooka, and other instruc- 
tlouRl inHt«>rlHlH. 

{e) To arrnng»> f<<r the recording and accrediting of educational 
acblevemeuta of military personnel tbrougb tbe I'atted Ktates 



c. 0MOH/r<>»ii6nf— Snforifetion-educatton offlcei^ will be selected on tb** basis / 
nf tlK'ir understanding of and belief In the mission of orientation, infonnattna. 
and eflucation as described ia this cironlar ; tbeir understanding of tbe Itnpnrtaae* 
of ail components of t/ie Army Including those stationed in tbe zone of tatt^iwr; 
anil their ability to present tbeIr views clearly and convincingly. It Is part«--«- 
larly desirable that lnff>nnation-edi>cnt1on ofllcers, at the regimental ie*H have 
exi)erlence with troops as company, platoon, or similar organiz«r|<K>M' -^nia- 
manders. Officers selected for this duty should have a background of i«»(nli« 
or experience as instructors or i^terpretlve-^rltera, and should be aht* ^■ eriat* 
the curi-ent dlacusBion topic to tbe t>efsonal Interest of the Indivldoal A r«ro> 
fnlly selected Information-edticntion offloer can be of Invaluable assl8isr>i» to tho 
commander; a weak officer may do irreparable harm. Where prafit'sWe, In- 
ftiruiation-education olllcers will be selected from among the oflW"*»» already 
a-sKlgtied to the unit or organisation In which they will serve, and wli; i« iraiii«l 
in orientatlen, Infonnatton, and education at training establlsbmeaio approved 
by the War Department within the continental United States or by theater or. 
department commanders outside the continental United States. 

10. Foads — •. As the Army Orientation Course (see sra. Ill) ts a twining 
coarse authorised during duty time, applicable training funds may be aspended 
for the coBstroctlon of visual aids, displays, and exhibits. 

*. Nnoapproprlated funds governed by AR 210-50, may properly be used for 
floancing such orientation, InCoruiation, and education fuaictloas, and aetlvitiea 

AiQOOW 



1518 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



11 



[Cn-saol 



, wftl eOntrlbufe to the comfort, pleasure, confentment mental Improvement, 
-»^ tndgeneral welfare of military personnel. 

<y ^^^'^''''^yi'Si^ii/t^'^^-- " Resjsonsibility.— Pending revision of 
C( Service Comma ndsaftW*<igMrtn]*nts ) andM^4rf*««fW8?l1?T^*coiHman<l!ng 
^ j«nerali of service ^ rnrrio n jyi^]^^|[jf^.««i^y^|Ki » ^ supervision of orlentaOoa, 
^*Hnfornntlrin^j)flj^^»itTirTfHiin' ni ri rlflrn at ci a iiftP«^W^^w^—A.Aa-U),||ai i«tir.na 
supply of materials, except as provided In section VI. 
%J VI. .MATERIALS.~\Z. Generml.— Materials fnmlshed by the Information and 
Sg^ EdiKWtloii Division for use by operating personnel In the field are for the moat 
VV part of such a nature as to require si>e(lal Issue and distribution. 

11 Educational materials. — a. Individual inttructkm materials. — Individual 
lastnictlon materteU (correspondence courses and self-teaching courses) are 
available to eligible military personnel upon appllmtton for enrollment by In- 
dividuals to the United States Armed Forces Institute, Madison 3, Wisconsin, or 
to the neart^t branch ( see d below ) . 

b. Class inntrvclion materials. — Text books and other Instructional materials, 
except as noted In c below, are normally obtainable on requisition submitted 
through military channels to the United States Armed Forces Institute, Madison 
S, Wisconsin, except that outside the continental United States reqiilsitions will 
be submitted to the department or theater branch of the United States Armed 
Forces lo.stitute in acctjrdnsK-e with department or theater directives. In de- 
partments and theaters which do not Include USAFI branches, requisitions Will 
be forwarded through military channels to the appropriate port of embarkation, 
whence they will be forwarded (unfilled) to USAFI. 

c. Exceptioius to 6 above are Foreign Language Guides (TM 30-300 series) 
and Foreign Lnnguage Rpcordings which are distributed through The Adjutant 
General's Office, and "O. I. Movie Weekly" (see d below). 

d. References.— S'ecUon VI, Circular No. 68, War Department, 1944; AB 3.V>- 
8100; the United States Armed Forces Institute Catalog, Second EMItion; Mem- 
orandum No. W210-2.V43, 31 August 1943, subject. "G. I. Movies'— 16-mm Circuit 
System; and Circular No. '^32, War D<>partment, 1642. 

i. Orientation materials.— a. Periodic Issues of collections of orien^tlon 
mat^igls and weekly Army Talk fact sheets are prepared or selec^^^ th« 
Informa^*^fl and Education Division, for use by Informatlonedncjlwin offlcers 
tn carrying tft>>i^jig p rovisions of paragraphs 7, 8, and 9. Thejg^^of ci>llection« 
of materials will ^^Monnced by War Department cirgj^^rbeee materials 
will be conslderetl as operaitMand tratuing equipm^?ror Informal ion -educa* 
^pJi^sn offlcers. (.<ee sec. U, Clr%*«K^ec. I, Cirjil^and sec. I, Clr. 302, WD, 

<^&43 ; arid sec. II, Cir. 33 ; sec. I, Cir. iT^i^^e^I. Clr. 334. WD, 1944.) 
.,— . 6. Distribution of Issues of orletitatiott^Har^^s will be made by the Informa- 
-■^tion and Bducallon Division drrf^J^mthe follow^«agencles by whom farther 
^^latributlon will be made «« im^tnted : 

-rf»^ (1) To Headquarttp^Trniy Ground Forces; to heSHi^artera of armies, 

^S^"^ corpa, a^^nner comnuiiuls of the Army Ground FS^hHk.for dlstrl- 

» a,l. butUj^y headquarters and headquarters company. 

,# » <2) Tp^Tvlsiou, separate brigades, harbor defense commands, tra? 

centers, and headquarters of army and corps troops of the Army" 
Ground Forces, for distribution to all units and organliationa within 
the command. 



I 



AOOMB 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



1519 



(CdlSOO] 



12 




U M4organ- 

i>u. ^v 



it) Tp Iwadqaarteri Anay Air roroee ; to he«dqiiaiiars of air tanm «•< 
imaiHla of the Army Air FurcM, tor iiairVhmti^xo hm^mmrUwn 
idqnartcra ■%— rlron. 
(4) To bM(fl)«^rt«ra urttaem. theater* and <l«M|KMmta TM 
^.^ dlatrlbatio^Nfi •'•cli ttaaater or (tepcrtp^It to he deunalMd mfr- 
•^y ataly ty.- tbet^Mtar or iiepanrng^ conrauMdrr and tJia W«r 

^. Depanment >v ^^ ,^ 

^K) To United SUt«a Mimt^r^inemy, for dlatrlkotlon t« all oHts, 
^^ orgHolntloDR, and lostadi^ca wltbla the comma nB. 

\»J^) To UcadqunrterB A rma^eervlc^yW^ ; to p«Mita, cunpa, and sUttoas 
I A In tbe contiuenta^cnlted StHtes — 

\7 (o) Claei*^^; II. and IV iustuUHtk^l^ftk^Mr dlatrtbatlon to ail 

^^ %f \0KB and organitatlonH uf the Army SNctoe Forree larated 

C-*^ 55^ ^^ncreon. 

Class III Inntnllntions, for dlBtrlbntiOD to all unltal 
Isutluns of the Army Air Forces located ttereou. 
(y^o War Df>pMrtiDeDt General StafT. 
IL Information Batcrials. — Infonuatimi materials are dlatrlhnted hy the In- 
forsjatlon and Education DlTlslon. us i)r»^rlbed from tln>e to time iu War De- 
partment directlvea; by The Adjutant tieiieral. a>« stated in KM 21-«. Lint of 
PabllcatioDS For Training; and throuKh film libraries n» described In rM 21-7. 
LUt ot Training rilma, Film Strips, and Film Bulletins. (See aec. IV, nr. 3i'>8. 
WD. 1942; aec. II. Cir. 55, aec. 1, fir. 247. WD, lft43; sec. IV, Cir. 20. Bee. 111. 
Clr. 86. WD. 1(H4: WD Pamphlet 20-3. Guide to the Use of Informatloa Mate- 
rials, IMS: Mi-«a. W 310-10-4S, DlstHhutlon and TrouoUon of Yank, the Army 
WetOdy, within coaUoAiul United Sta«fi. Vt U»t VMA. and C 1, ttereto; Itono. 
•W 850-236-43, Army OrtcoUtloa OoBrM',.80 Aii«. l'.*iS > 

U. Ua«.-^rnlt commaadera are ut>t reetricte<l to the uae of orlentatlan, In- 
formational, or educational material provided by the War Department, itiese 
may be au^nn^nted by such additional materials as seem necessary or dMnmble. 
The responsibility for keeping, the aelectlon and use of supplementary tuat«<rlal 
Wtthia tlte provision of War Department policies and directives, ho«'ev« lies 
ipielj' with comtaandingofncers. .' 

//..«fi«C/SS/O.V.— 17. Praviotu iaatmctions.— <i. J3rcu]ar K.». Ml (ad 
lop I, Circu la r No. SCO. War Depart {yj ^l 943 : BPr tton VII, ClrculyrTtgy , «ft. 
War DepartmgST; Vh4 ;^ and^Meowrand up v^ warj^,yt-Aa. 9 Fettni aq tytf . 
MthJect. Army 6rienqih»n fconrarT 

b. Piwlaloos of an 1-16. Va 100-10. FM 101-5, TM 20-205, TM il »* aad 
Memorandum No. W)ll<^-44. 26 January 1944 (iliuite<] dlstrlDiitlnni. ii> -^uafltct 
vltb loatructlona contained la this circular are modified accordin«it j^n^mg 
publication of chaofwa. 

(A. U. 020 (2ia^i4).] 

Bt oaaaa or tbb flaraar Ast «r Wai : 

OrrtotAt: 

BOBERT p. DUNLOr, 
Brigadier General, 

Acting TKe Sijutant (hnerat. 







1520 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. McManus. I made an analysis of the recommended materials 
for reading for the indoctrination of the troops, and I fonnd that of 
39 books recommended for reading, 22 were published by the Institute 
of Public Relations. 

On page 10, the recommendations include a pamphlet, Know Your 
Enemy, by Anthony Jenkinson. On page 12, Wartime China, another 
pamphlet, by Maxwell Stewart. 

The Making of Modern China, by Owen and Eleanor Lattimore. 

('hina's Wartime Policies, by Lawrence Rosinger. 

Asia's Captive Colonies, by Philip E. Lilienthal, and John H. Oakie. 

Solution in Asia, by Owen Lattimore. 

Know Your Enemy : Japan, is again mentioned in the 15- week 
course. 
. Page 16, Pacific Islands iji War and Peace, IPR, by Marie Keesing. 

Again, Asia's Captive Colonies, by Lilienthal and Oakie. 

Korea Looks Ahead, IPR, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev, G-r-a-j- 
d-u-n-z e-v, the way I remember. 

Peoples of the China Sea, by Elizabeth A. Clark. 

Page 17, Speaking of India, IPR, by Miriam S. Farley. 

Again, Peoples of the China Sea. 

Twentieth Century India, IPR, by Kate Mitchell and Kumar 
Goshar. 

Our Far Eastern Record, IPR, Rock wood and Brody. 

Our Job in the Pacific, by Henry A. Wallace. 

Page 18, Filipinos and their Country, IPR, by Catherine Porter. 

(hiide to the Use of Information 

Mr. Carpenter. Just a moment. Now, were these documents the 
reading material you just read, all IPR-recommended publications? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, they were in these kits, as I described before: 

In this kit you will find tlie orientation training program for the Army Serv- 
ice Forces. The program consists of — 

such and such a number of hours. 

Mr. Carpenter, Mr. Mandel, will you state for the record the 
conclusions drawn by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee 
after 11 months of hearings with reference to the Institute of Pacific 
Relations? 

Mr. Mandel. The conclupions drawn by the Senate Internal Secu- 
rity Subcommittee after its investigations are as follows: 

The II'R has been considered by the American Communist Party and by Soviet 
officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda, and military intelli- 
gence. 

The IPR disseminated and sought to popularize false information including 
information originating from Soviet and Communist sources. 

The IPR was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far 
eastern policies toward Communist objectives. 

Many of the persons active in and around the IPR, and in particular though 
not exclusi\ely Owen Lattimore, Edward C. Carter, Frederick V. Field, T. A. 
Bisson. 1 awrence K. Rosinger, and Maxwell Stewart, knowingly and deliberately 
used tiie language of books and articles which they wrote or edited in an attempt 
to influence the American public by means of pro-Communist or pro-Soviet 
content of such writings. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have a purchase contract which you would 
like to put in the record at this time I 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



1521 



Mr. Mandel. I have a letter addressed to Senator Pat McCarran, 
dated November 26, 1951, from Frank H. Weitzel, Acting Comptrol- 
ler General of the United States, showing the contracts for IPR publi- 
cations published by the Armed Forces. And I ask that that be placed 
in the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become part of the 
record in full. 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 410," and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 410 
exhibit no. 1346-l 

General Accounting Office, 
Comptroller General of the United States, 

WasJimgton, Novemler 26, 1951. 
Hon. Pat McCarran, 

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate. 
My Dear Mr. Chairman : Further reference is made to your letters dated 
September 27 and 28, 1951, acknowledged October 2, 1951, furnishing a list of 
Government contracts entered into with the American Council, Institute of 
Pacific Relations and requesting the titles of the publications and the number 
thereof ordered under said contracts. 

In accordance with your request there is submitted herewith a report compiled 
from the records of this OflBce showing the number of copies ordered under said 
contracts, with the exception of contract No. W-28-021-QM-14783, and the titles 
of the publications, which are identified with the specific contract involved. 
With respect to contract No. W-28-021-QM-14783, I have to advise that said 
contract covered not only the publications ordered by the Department of the 
Army, but. also, provided that the contract "may be utilized by any Government 
bureau, instrumentality or agency desiring to participate in same," and this 
Office has no centralized record of the titles of the publications and the number 
thereof ordered under the contract. 

I trust that the otherwise available information contained in the enclosure will 
serve the purpose of your inquiry. 
Sincerely yours, 

Frank H. Weitzel, 
Acting Comptroller General of the United States. 
Enclosure. 



Contract number 



N140S-99790 

W-1445-QM-2230, 

N140S-15198A 

NOm-41776 

N140S-28522A 

NI40S-460OOA 

Nl40s-€9197A 

N140S-72028A...., 



Number 
of copies 



100, 000 

118 

118 

118 

118 

118 

1,000 

500 

500 

500 

600 

1 

10,000 

10,000 

40,000 

40,000 

40,000 

28, 000 

20,000 

19, 955 

30,000 



Title of publication 



Know Your Enemy; Japan. 

Far Eastern Record. 

Know Your Enemy. 

China America's Ally. 

Meet The Anzacs. 

Asia's Captive Colonies. 

Alaska Comes of Age. 

Changing China. 

Land of the Soviets. 

Peoples of the China Seas. 

Modern Japan. 

Bibliography of Pacific Area Maps. 

Speaking of India. 

Wartime China. 

Know Your Enemy: Japan. 

Wartime China. 

Our Job in the Pacific. 

Speaking of India. 

Asia's Captive Colonies. 

Pacific Islands in War and Peace. 

War on Japan. 



81918*— M-^t 



1522 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



General Accounting Office, 
Comptroller General of the United States, 

Washington, November SO, 1951. 
Hon. Pat McCarran, 

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, 

United States S>enate. 
My Dear Mr. Chairman : Supplementing office letter of November 26, 1951, 
furnishing, in response to your letters of September 27 and 28, 1951, tbe titles of 
publications and the numiier thereof ordered under certain Government contracts 
made with the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, there is sub- 
mitted herewith another list showing the titles of the publications and the num- 
ber of copies ordered and paid for by the Department of the Army only, under 
contract No. W-28-021-QM-14783 ; for the period July 1, 1944, through August 31, 
1945. 

Sincerely yours, 

Lindsay C. Warken, 
Comptroller General of the United States. 
Enclosure. 



Contract number 


Number of 
copies 


Title of publication 


W-28-021-QM-14783 


1 


America's Far Eastern Policy. 
Security in the Pacific. 




1 




1 


Gateway to Asia. 




63 


Land of the Soviets. 




65 


Modern Japan. 




62 


Peoples of the China Seas. 




62 


Lands Down Under. 




64 


Our Far Eastern Record. 




1 


Alaska Comes of Age. 




1 


Speaking; of India. 




1 


Pacific Islands in War and Peace. 




1 


China in Peace and Freedom. 




1 


Korea for the Koreans. 




2 


Asia's Captive Colonies. 




1 


Knowing the Soviet Union. 




1 


Filipinos and Their Country. 




2 


Wartime China. 




3 


Changing China. 




2 


Our Job in the Pacific. 




1 


Japan Since 1931. 




1 


Japan Emerges as a Modern State. 




1 


Basis for Peace in the Far East. 




2 


Korea Looks Ahead. 




1 


An Atlas of Far Eastern Politics. 




1 


The Far East: A Syllabus. 




1 


Meet the Anzacs. 




1 


Know Your Enemy: Japan. 




1 


Twentieth Century India. 




1 


Small Industries of Japan. 



Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, what does the record of the IPR hear- 
ings have to say with reference to the pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific, 
by Henry A. Wallace ? 

Mr. Mandel. It shows that the draft for the pamphlet, according 
to the testimony of Mr. Wallace, was drawn by Eleanor Lattimore, and 
the original plan for this project was proposed by Frederick V. Field. 
This is in the testimony of Mr. Dennett, a former secretary of the IPR. 

Mr. Carpenter. What does the record show in the IPR hearings 
regarding Lawrence Rosinger ? 

Mr, Mandel. Lawrence Rosinger invoked the fifth amendment 
when he was asked about his Communist associations. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now we will proceed to the next document. 

Mr. McManus. This is Guide to the Use of Information Materials. 
The foreword, under II : 

This pamphlet is an outline of principle to govern the use of ideas so that 
they may become moi*e effective weapons in the war. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1523 

At the top of page 7, under the caption "The Home Front," this 
passage appears: 

Only a naive minority finds it necessary to believe that present democracy Is 
the best of all possible worlds, and those who believe otherwise do not draw 
assurance from being kept in the darli. 

Page 19 : This is under the caption "Our Allies, the U. S. S. R." 

Whether their present government is the kind of political system that is most 
satisfactory to the Russian people has been sufficiently answered by a war in 
which the political faith of the people as well as of the Armed Forces has stood 
the trial by fire. 

The Russians are under attack; they are fighting to maintain their right to 
determine how they shall be governed. Though we do not agree with their po- 
litical ideas (and they uo not believe in ours), we believe utterly in the defense 
of the principle for which they are fighting. 

The ultimate military consequences are the best evidence of whether the 
U. S. S. R.'s 19o9 attack on Finland and subsequent overrunning of the Baltic 
provinces were barehanded aggressions motivated by greed for territory or were 
done to strengthen the U. S. S. R.'s western frontiers against attack by Ger- 
many. The possession of this buffer territory did greatly facilitate the U. S. S. R. 
defense when the attack actually fell. Without attempting any moral judg- 
ments on the matter, it is enough to state the military fact that had the U. S. S. R. 
not acted so, the allied cause would be weaker today. 

Another paragraph : 

The Moscow Pact, one of the strongest allied acts of the war, recognizes as 
a first condition of peace the protracted cooperation of all the allies. In view 
of this agreement, anything written or said that tends to alienate the U. S. S. R. 
from the United States may he counted as a self-inflicted wound. 

Page 22, under the heading "Terminology." 

Speak of the Red Army and the Red Navy, not the Russian Army. Speak 
of Communists, when use of the word is necessary, but of Bolsheviks only when 
using its historical connotation. Say the U. S. S. R. or the Soviet Union when 
referring to that country as it has existed since 1917. Say Russia only when 
taking a long view of the national history, as, for example: "Both Napoleon and 
Hitler have invaded Russia." It is preferable to speak of the Battle of the 
U. S. S. R. rather than of the Battle of Russia, though it is proper to speak 
of the Russian language. To use the words "Red soldier" is correct. "Russian 
soldier" is incorrect. 

The Chairman. How do you interpret that, Mr. McManus ? 

Mr. McManus. Well, I think it is indoctrination, and according to 
my recollection — and I think Mr. Mandel has a clearer recollection 
of this — the Communist line at about the time this pamphlet was 
written was to make people think that the Russians were doing well 
in the war because of the Communist system. 

The Chairman. It was the Red soldier, and not the Russian soldier. 
They wanted to leave the impression that it was communism that made 
them successful in the war. Is that a fair interpretation ? 

Mr. McManus. I think so ; yes, sir. 

Now I have some of this material from Camp Swift, that is pretty 
long. I will not read all of it. This is the Daily News Bulletin, Post 
Information and Education Office, Camp Swift, Tex., November 21, 
1944. 

Mr- Carpenter. That is a group of papers, is it not? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. It is the Daily News mimeographed job 
that we all used to get. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have one dated November 25, 1944 ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 



1524 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you find a statement there as follows : 

U. S. S. R. land and naval forces have completed the liberation of Estonia, 
and Red armies are now concentrating on the liberation of Latvia. 

Mr. McManus. That is what date ? 

Mr. Carpenter. That is November 25, 1944. 

Mr. McMands. Yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, turning to April 28, 1945, do you have that? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you find the advertisement of a "Win the 
Peace Rally"? 

Mr. McManus. I do, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, will you state whether or not the "Win 
the Peace Conference," has been cited as subversive by the Attorney 
General ? 

Mr. Mandel. The "Win the Peace Conference" or the "Win the 
Peace Rally" — as it was known by various names — has been cited by 
the Attorney General, and the date of such citation is June 1, 1918. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, do you have an edition of May 19, 1945 ? 

Mr. McManus. I do. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have a reference to "Premier Stalin Clari- 
fies Certain Issues''? 

Mr. Mc]\Ianus. The one I have refers to Chinese partisans. 

Oh, yes. I have it. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have one of May 1, 1945 ? 

Mr. McManus. I do. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you find a statement there devoted to "Tito 
Eases Tension Over Austria"? 

Mr. McManus. I do. 

Mr. Carpenter. And at that time Tito was in the Communist camp ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. On Jun6 2, 1945 — do you have that? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you find a section devoted to "Soviets Add 
Peace Demands as French Reject British-U. S. Negotiations"? 

Mr, McManus. I do. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have June 18, 1945 ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you find this statement: 

Two days after the opening of the second Moscow conference, where Poland's 
provisional government is being broadened * * * 15 of the 16 Polish defendants 
have admitted charges that some of them turned state's evidence. 

Mr. McManus. I do, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you find there a section devoted to "Fourteen 
Poles Admit Government Plots Against the Soviets"? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, do you find in an undated publication from 
the same source, that is, from Camp Swift, the heading, "Fascism 
Against Communism" ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you find this quote : 

* * * almost as great as the size of the Soviet Union is our ignorance about it 
Mr. McManus. Do you have the page? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1525 

Mr. Carpenter. That is an undated memorandum. 
Mr. McManus. I have it ; yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, from your observation of those, Mr. Mc- 
Manus, what is your opinion relative to that newspaper that was 
published at Camp Swift? 

Mr. McManus. Well, it would demonstrate an effort to indoctrinate 
along the Communist line as described by the witness this morning, 
Captain Kerr, it seems to me. I think these documents substantiate 
what he said about etlorts to indoctrinate. There are other parts of 
this "fascism versus communism." For instance, there are extensive 
quotations from the Soviet constitution, and a great effort to disasso- 
ciate Communist tyranny from Fascist tyranny and make one white 
and the other black. 

Mr. Carpenter. I have here several pamphlets and ask where you 
received those, if you did. 

Mr. McManus. These are the pamphlets supplied to the committee 
by Mr. Berry and Mr. Simonds and the Department of the Army. 

They are the pamphlets whose names I just read. They are part of 
the instruction kit in the information and education course. 

The Chairman. Those pamphlets may be incorporated in the record 
by reference. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you identify them, please? 

Mr. McManus. "War-time China" by Maxwell S. Stewart. 

"-facitic Islands in War and Peace," 

Mr. Carpenter. Excuse me, but are these all IPR pamphlets? 

]\Ir. JNIcManus. I will look them over, and if there are any others 
I will take them out. 

All of these are. 

The Chairman. Will you identify them, so that we may have them 
identified and so that they may be incorporated in the record by 
reference ? 

Mr. McManus. Speaking of India, by Miriam S. Farley. 

Twentieth Century India, by Kate Mitchell and Kumar Goshar, 
edited by Maxwell S. Stewart. 

Filipinos and Their Country, by Catherine Porter. 

Cooperation for What?, by F. R. Scott. 

Peoples of the China Seas, by Elizabeth Allerton Clark, edited by 
Maxwell S. Stewart. 

Asia's Captive Colonies, by Philip E. Lilienthal and John H. Oakie. 

Know Your Enemy : Japan, by Anthony Jenkinson. 

China's Wartime Politics, by Lawrence K. Rosinger. 

Korea Looks Ahead, by Andrew J. Grajdanzev. 

Our Far Eastern Record, A Reference Digest on American Policy. 
That is a bibliography, I guess. 

Pacific Islands in AVar and Peace, by Marie M. Keesing. 

Wartime China, by Maxwell S. Stewart. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say for the record that I have been 
given access to the library of the I. and E., the Department of the 
Army, when I asked for these documents. They gave me access, and 
I have the freedom of going through the library, and they have been 
very cooperative with me. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. McManus. 



1526 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

At this time we will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow, at 
which time we will continue this series of hearings. We will have 
witnesses tomorrow, including tlie men who actually prepared the 
fact sheets for this orientation work, later developed into Army 
Talks, as I believe they called it, and also the program director. They 
will be witnesses tomorrow. 

We will stand in recess now until 10 o'clock tomorrow. 

(Whereupon, at 3 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m., 
Wednesday, July 7, 1954.) 



INTEELOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

DEPARTMENTS 



WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D^ G, 

The subcommittee met at 10 : 10 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 
457, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman 
of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senator Jenner. 

Present also: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel to the subcommittee; 
Benjamin Mnndel, research director; and Robert C. McManus, pro- 
fessional staff member. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Will Dr. Schreiber come forward, please ? 

Mr. Fanelli. I am his counsel. He does not desire his picture 
taken. 

The Chairman. I did not hear you. 

Mr. Fanelli. He does not desire his picture to be taken. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Will you be sworn to testify. Doctor ? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you swear that the testimony you give in this 
hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God? 

Dr. Schreiber. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. JULIUS SCHEEIBEK, WASHINGTON, D. C, 
ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH A. PANELLI, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 

The Chairman. You may be seated here, Doctor. 

Will you state your full name? 

Dr. Schreiber. My name is Dr. Julius Schreiber. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside? 

Dr. Schreiber. I live at 4418 Ellicott Street NW., Washington, 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession ? 
Dr. Schreiber. I am a psychiatrist. 

The Chairman. You are here this morning with counsel ? 
Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman? Counsel, will you give your name and address to 
the reporter, please? 

1527 



1528 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Fanelli. It is Joseph A. Fanelli. I am a member of the Dis- 
trict of Cohnnbia bar, with law oflices at 1701 K Street NW., Wash- 
ington, D. C. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

You may proceed with the questioning of Dr. Schreiber. 

Mr. Carpbnter. Doctor, were you a member of the Armed Forces 
during World War II? 

Dr. ScriREir.ER. Yes, sir; I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please give the committee the dates of 
your service ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I served from April 27, 1942, until I began my 
terminal leave on July 4, 1945, completing my terminal leave on 
October 30, 1945. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was your rank during service? 

Dr. Schreiber. I came in as a captain and I left as a lieutenant 
colonel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a Reserve officer when you came on 
duty ? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir; I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. When did you first receive a Reserve commission? 

Dr. Schreiber. I think it was in the summer of 1933, in the Medical 
Corps. 

Mr. Carpenter. Had you had any prior service, prior to coming in 
in World War II? 

Dr. Schreiber. Just some Reserve officer duty, yes, sir. You mean 
Regular Army? 

Mr. Carpenter. Any Army duty. 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes. I had Reserve officer Army duty. I was with 
the Civilian Conservation Corps. 

Mr. Carpenter. For how long? 

Dr. Schreiber. From the summer of 1933 until January of 1936, 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you in the Information and Education 
Division during your service? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir; I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. What period was that? 

Dr. Schreiber. You are speaking of the Information and Education 
Division of the War Department? 

Mr. Carpenter. That is right. 

Dr. Schreiber. I was there from October 25, 1943, until June 28, 
I believe is the date, 1945, at which time I began processing for my 
terminal leave which, as I said before, began on the 4th of July. 

Mr. Carpenter. I hand you here a chart of the Information and 
Education Division, and ask you if this describes your position in the 
Information and Education Division? 

Dr. Schreiber. This chart that you have handed me is a chart of 
the Orientation Branch of the Information and Education Division, 
and I think it represents — let me just finish it, please. [Dr. Schreiber 
examining document.] 

I don't understand the two blocks at the base of the chart, the 
Report and Analysis Unit. I don't know what that means, nor the 
New York unit. We had a Pilot Programs Unit which was stationed 
in New York. The Division liaison with the Surgeon General's Office 
is not quite accurate, because the Surgeon General's Office had their 
own liaison officer to our Division. I assume it might have been 
implied, since I was a doctor. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



1529 



(The chart referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 411," and is as 
follows :) 




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1530 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Redistribution stations may have been one of my functions. The 
basic fact was that I was Chief of the Programs Section. 

Mr. Carpenter. You were Chief of the Programs Section? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Yes; that is right. 

Do you want this back ? 

Mr. Carpenter. What was your rank and duties as Chief of the 
Programs Section? 

Dr. Schreiber. I came in as a major, and, as I told you, I left as a 
lieutenant colonel. The basic mission of the Programs Section was — 
it was a long time back — was basically to sell the idea of morale or 
Army orientation to commanders in the field, to help them to under- 
stand why it was essential that men who were risking their lives had 
some understanding of why they were fighting. 

The Division itself, as you know, produced a great deal of mate- 
rial — films, publications, Yank Magazine, Stars and Stripes, and in 
our Branch, the Branch produced a publication called Army Talks. 

There was a school, as I told you in executive session, at Lexington, 
where orientation or I. and E. officers were trained in the techniques 
of carrying out the T. and E. program. 

My mission, at least at the beginning when I got there, was just 
getting acquainted. I got there the latter part of October, and I had 
November and December to get oriented. But in January and Febru- 
ary of 1944, our mission was to take a pilot team to the various service 
commands and there demonstrate how orientation is to be conducted. 
My main task was to talk with the commanding officer of the post 
and his staff, to give them psychological reasons why conscious moti- 
vation was important in war. It was recognized that unless there is 
high morale, there is a danger of psychiatric casualties. 

It was repeatedly shown that men who didn't know why they were 
risking their lives cracked up. It was clear unless a man could feel 
that he had a purpose, a sense of mission. 

The program itself had six categories. One was called Know 
Why We Fight. Second, Know Your Allies. Third, Know Your 
Enemies. Fourth, Know the News and Its Significance. Fifth, Have 
Pride in Your Outfit and Your Personal Mission. Sixth, Have Faith 
in the United States and Its Future. 

All of our activity was directed toward the fulfillment of these six 
major categories. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has an exhibit here he wants to read, 
and I will ask you questions about it when he finishes. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here "Recommendation for Promotion of Of- 
ficer," dated January 5, 1945, from the Chief of the Army Orientation 
Branch to the Director of Information and Education Division. It 
concerns Julius Schreiber. It describes his position. 

A. Position vacancy now occupied and to be occupied : Lieutenant colonel, 
Army Orientation Branch, Information and Education Division. 

B. Mission of Army Orientation Branch: The mission of the Army Orientation 
Branch as stated in Cir 360 WD 1944, is "To formulate policies, plan and super- 
vise procedures for orientation of military personnel in the background, causes, 
and current phase of the war and current events relating thereto, and for 
eventual return to civilian life ; to prepare and select War Department materials 
for these purposes, including motion-picture film, recordings, pamphlets. Fact 
Sheets, books, maps, and other visual aids, and weekly reports of military and 
world events; and when practical to provide such other materials as may be 
requested for the special morale purposes or programs of the Army Ground 
Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Services Forces." 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1531 

The orientation program is compiilsory throughout the Army, both in the 
United States and in all oversea theaters. Not less than 1 undivided hour per 
week of normal training time is devoted to Army orientation. 

Mr. Carpenter. Does that reflect your duties while you were Chief 
of the Programs Branch ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. That reflects, I think quite accurately, the mission 
of the Orientation Branch, in which Branch I was Chief of the Pro- 
grams Section. That was not the description of my duties. 

Mr. Mandel. May I go on with the job description. 

O. Job description: The officer has the following duties and responsibilities: 

As Chief of the Programs Section, Major Schreiber plans orientation programs 
for such important specialized needs as those of recovered prisoners of war, 
AGF and ASF redistribution stations, staging areas and ports of embarkation, 
transports going overseas and returning, rehabilitation centers, replacement 
training centers, and overseas replacement depots. This involves close coordi- 
nation with high-ranking officers of the WDGS, AAF, AGF, and ASF. This 
officer has demonstrated ability of an unusual order in establishing and main- 
taining sound policies of orientation in these specialized and difficult fields. 

After planning the contents of these special programs, this officer directs the 
actual production of required materials, by a staff including 6 officers, 8 enlisted 
men, and 4 civilians. He has demonstrated judgment of a high order in his 
control and coordination of a vast amount of such production. 

As liaison officer for the Information and Education Division with the Office 
of the Surgeon General, this officer is charged with a special set of extremely 
important and responsible duties in connection with the educational recondition- 
ing and reorientation of sick and wounded ijersonnel. This involves overall 
direction of a training program to instruct hospital personnel in conducting 
orientation for patients, directing the preparation of approximately 60 hours of 
material especially designed to meet hospital requirements, and the continuing 
coordination through service commands of the application of these programs. 

As supervisor for the assignment and conduct of orientation pilot teams, this 
officer has the responsibility for maintaining close contact with the I. & E. 
Directors of AAF, AGF, and ASF, and filling the needs of various units and 
posts by sending out orientation instruction teams to conduct schools as required. 
Included in the personnel of these teams are 4 officers and 8 enlisted men. 

During the frequent absence of the Chief of the Orientation Branch, this officer 
acts as Chief, attends conferences and handles the large number of official 
visitors to the Branch, handling a large variety of complex problems. 

Among this officer's special duties is that of conducting 2 hours each week of 
orientation discussions for the 93 officers of the I. and E. Division. He also repre- 
sents the I. and E. Division on a number of required speeches before large public 
bodies, especially those concerned with medical and psychiatric problems. In all 
his varied responsibilities and duties this officer makes an especially valuable 
contribution to the I. and E. Division by drawing upon his experience in civilian 
life as a professional psychiatrist. 

The Chairman. That is the job description, is it not. Doctor ? 

Dr. Schreiber. It is certainly very complimentary. Now that I 
have heard this, I certainly had pretty much of this, practically every- 
thing that he has read. I was about to continue with my own job 
description when I was interrupted here, that the first 2 months, I 
told you, we did pilot teamwork. From there on out, I was in Wash- 
ington for, I think, about a month, and then went over to the Pacific 
to assist Colonel Looker to set up his program in General Richardson's 
headquarters. That was April and May. We came back in June. 

From there, sir, pretty much what is described here was my activity 
for the remaining year or more that I was in the Division. 

The Chairman. That may go in the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 412" and is 
as follows :) 



1532 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1535 

Sheet A 

C. Job description : The officer has the following duties and responsibilities : 

As Chief of the Programs Section, Major Schreiber plans orientation programs 
for such important specialized needs as those of recovered prisoners of war, 
AGF and ASF redistribution stations, staging areas and ports of embarkation, 
transports going overseas and returning, rehabilitation centers, replacement 
training centers, and overseas replacement depots. This involves close coordi- 
nation with high-ranking officers of the WDGS, AAF, AGF, and ASF. This 
officer has demonstrated ability of an unusual order in establishing and main- 
taining sound policies of orientation in these specialized and difficult fields. 

After planning the contents of these special programs, this officer directs the 
actual production of required materials, by a staff including G officers, 8 enlisted 
men, and 4 civilians. He has demonstrated judgment of a high order in bis 
control and coordination of a vast amount of such production. 

As liaison officer for the Information and Education Division with the Office 
of the Surgeon General, this officer is charged with a special set of extremely 
important and responsible duties in connection with the educational recondi- 
tioning and reorientation of sick and wounded personnel. This involves overall 
direction of a training program to instruct hospital personnel in conducting orien- 
tation for patients, directing the preparation of approximaely 60 hours of mate- 
rial especially designed to meet hospital requirements, and the continuing coordi- 
nation through service commands of the application of these programs. 

As supervisor for the assignment and conduct of orientation pilot teams, this 
officer has the responsibility for maintaining close contact with the I. and E. 
Dii-ectors of AAF, AGF, and ASF, and filling the needs of various units and posts 
by sending out orientation instruction teams to conduct schools as required. 
Included in the personnel of these teams are 4 officers and 8 enlisted men. 

During the frequent absence of the Chief of the Orientation Branch, this officer 
acts as Chief, attends conferences, and handles the large number of official vis- 
itors to the branch, handling a large variety of complex problems. 

Among this officer's special duties is that of conducting 2 hours each week 
of orientation discussions for the 93 officers of the I. and E. Division. He also 
represents the I. and E. Division on a number of required speeches before large 
public bodies, especially those concerned with medical and psychiatric problems. 
In all his varied responsibilities and duties this officer makes an especially valu- 
able contribution to the I. and E. Division by drawing upon his experience in 
civilian life as a professional psychiatrist. 

Mr. Carpenter. Doctor, are you now or have you ever been a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party of the United States? 

Dr. Schreiber. I am not now a member of the Communist Party, 
and I have not been a member of the Communist Party since January 
1, 1941. However, for the period prior to that date, I must respect- 
fully decline, on the advice of counsel, to answer the question on the 
basis of the first and fifth amendments and all other constitutional 
rights available to me. 

The Chairman. The committee, of course, does not recognize your 
refusal to answer under the first amendment of the Constitution. I 
believe you used that. But we do recognize your right to refuse to 
answer under the fifth amendment of the Constitution. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you go to school. Doctor? 

Dr. Schreiber. I went to the University of Cincinnati, both pre- 
medical and medical school. 

Mr. Carpenter. You received degrees from the University of 
Cincinnati ? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir ; bachelor of science, bachelor of medicine, 
and doctor of medicine. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party of the 
United States of America when you Avere a student in the University 
of Cincinnati ? 



1536 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Sir, I must decline to answer, respectfully, on the 
basis I have already cited. 

The Chairman. The same ruling. 

Mr. Carpenter. When did you graduate from the University of 
Cincinnati ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. In 1932. 

Mr. Carpenter. Then from 1932 to 1940, were you a member of the 
Communist Party of the United States ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Sir, I must respectfully decline to answer. The 
declining to answer goes back to the date of my birth, sir. 

The Chairman. Doctor, I believe you testified earlier that in 1933 
you went to work for the Government. 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir. Yes; that is right. 

The Chairman. In the CCC Division. 

Dr. Schreiber. That is right. I was camp surgeon, as it was called. 
That was the terminology they employed. 

The Chairman. Where were you assigned? Where was your 
assignment at that time? 

Dr. Schreiber. It was in California. I think Camp Buck Meadow, 
I think it was called. 

The Chairman, How long were you with the National Government 
in the CCC Division, the Civilian Conservation Corps ? 

Dr. Schreiber. From somewhere in the summer of 1933, I think 
July or August, something like that, to January of 1936. 

The Chairman. January 1936. Wliat did you do then ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I joined the staff of the Stockton State Hospital in 
Stockton, Calif., where I served as psychiatrist. 

The Chairman. You no longer were connected with the Govern- 
ment in any way ? 

Dr. Schreiber. No. 

The Chairman. Until the war ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I was no longer employed by the Government. I 
had my reserve commission. 

The Chairman. I see. You no longer were active with the Gov- 
ernment until you went into the armed services ? 

Dr. Schreiberj That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. I believe you said you went into the armed 
services 

Dr. Schreiber. April 27, 1942. 

The Chairman. April 27, 1942^ When did you cease to be a member 
of the Communist Party? 

Dr. Schreiber. Sir, I have stated from January 1, 1941, and there 
on after, I have not been a member of the Communist Party. 

The Chairman.' Did you resign? 

Dr. Schreiber. May I ask my counsel, sir ? 

The Chairman. You may consult your counsel at any time. Doctor. 
(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Dr. Schreiber. May I respectfully decline to answer on the same 
grounds stated. 

The Chairman. Did you make any kind of a formal severance? 

Dr. Schreiber? I am sorry, I must respectfully decline. 

The Chairman. You want this committee to undei-stand you were 
a Communist up to a certain time, and then you were no longer a 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1537 

Communist, and yet you will not tell us liow in the world you severed 
your connection with the Communist Party? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Sir, I would like this committee to understand that 
since January 1, 1941, 1 have not been a Communist ; I am not no\y a 
Communist. During my entire Army career I was not a Communist. 
I participated in no Communist activities, I saw no Communist activi- 
ties. I am thoroughly opposed to communism. 

The Chairman. Doctor, don't you know it is a tactic of the Com- 
munist Party for their membei-s to make a tactical withdrawal from 
the Communist Party when they go into the armed services? Don't 
you know that is the pattern of the Communist Party ? 

Dr.: ScHREiBER. I don't know anything about the Communist Party 
tactics or activities, sir, at the present time. 

The Chairman. You must know something about it. You decline 
to answer questions from the period 1933 on up to 1941. 

Dr.: ScHREiBER, I decline to answer from the moment of my birth 
until 1941, sir. 

Will you give me the question? I am sorry. I would like to have 
it again. 

The Chairman. Eepeat the question, Mr. Reporter. 

(The question was read by the reporter as follows : 

Doctor, don't you know it is a tactic of the Communist Party for their members 
to make a tactical witiidrawal from the Communist Party when they go into 
the armed services? Don't you know that is the pattern of the Communist 
Party? 

The Chairman. You say you decline to answer any questions from 
the moment of your birth up to 1941 ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER.: On this question, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. Proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you now or have you ever been connected with 
any organizations cited as subversive by the Attorney General or by 
any congressional committee? 

Dr. ScHREEBER. The answer is "no" since January 1, 1941; and 
before that date, I must respectfully decline on the grounds already 
stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you responsible for any speech before the 
Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace held at the Wal- 
dorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, on March 25, 26, and 27, 1949? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. As I told you in executive session, I was invited to 
give a talk on psychiatry or mental health and the social environment, 
and I brought the copy of the speech that you requested, and I would 
like to introduce it into the record. That was the only session that I 
attended. I spoke on the medical panel just once, Sunday morning, 
with I think three other physicians. One spoke on pediatrics, one 
spoke on general medicine, and I spoke on psychiatry. 

The Chairman. It may go in the record by reference. 

Mr. Fanelli. Mr. Chairman, this was requested. 

The Chairman. It may go in the record by reference. 

(The document referred to was filed with the subcommittee.) 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, would you characterize the Scientific 
and Cultural Conference for World Peace? 



8201«»— W-*pt 80-^—6 



1538 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Mandel. The Committee on Un-American Activities, in a re- 
port dated April 1949, on the Scientific and Cultural Conference for 
World Peace, said the following: 

Parading under the imposing title of the Scientific and Cultural Conference 
for World Peace, the gathering at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City 
on March 25, 26, and 27, 1949, was actually a supermobilization of the inveterate 
wheelhorses and supporters of the Communist Party and its auxiliary organi- 
zations. 

The report says further: 

The purpose of the Scientific and Cultural Conference can be briefly summa- 
rized as follows ; 

1. To provide a propagandist forum against the Marshall plan, the North 
Atlantic Defense Pact, and American foreign policy in general. 

2. To promote support for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. 

3. To mobilize American intellectuals in the field of arts, science, and letters 
behind this program even to the point of civil disobedience against the American 
Government. 

4. To prepare the way for the coming World Peace Congress to be held in 
Paris on April 20 to 23, 1949, with similar aims in view on a world scale and 
under similar Communist auspices. 

5. To discredit American culture and to extol the virtues of Soviet culture. 

Dr. ScHREiBER. May I say, Mr. Mandel 

The Chairman. What was the date of that speech which just went 
into the record? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. It was in April 1949, as Mr. Mandell read the date 
there. 

The Chairman. You were appearing before that organization as a 
speaker in 1949? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Yet you tell this committee that since January 
1941, you had not been a member of the Communist Party? 

Dr. Schreiber. I certainly do, sir, and I would like also to say that 
everything that he just read is certainly foreign to what I would 
have endorsed then, now, or from January 1, 1941. I spoke on psy- 
chiatry and social environment or mental health and social environ- 
ment. I have done a great deal of research interesting to me and 
my colleagues in the field of the relationship between social phenome- 
non and the emotional health of children and adults. I spoke entirely 
en scientific terms. 

There was nothing in the thing that I spoke — I hope you take time 
to read it — that even under any conditions would be considered as 
pro-Communist, because it was a very thoroughly honest scientific 
paper. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were there not Communists on this speakers' panel 
with you? 

Dr. Schreiber. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have a reference ? 

Mr. Mandel. I have here the Daily Worker of March 30^ 1949, 
page 9, which carries the speech of Richard Boyer at the scientific 
and cultural conference. In this speech Mr. Boyer openly says that 
he is an American Communist, that he speaks as a Communist, and he 
defends the Communist Party. 

Dr. Scpireiber. Mr. Mandel, in our executive session I pointed out 
to you, after you told me Mr. Boyer was a Communist, I asked you 
whether he was a physician. He was not a doctor. He did not par- 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1539 

ticipate in our panel. I never heard of the guy before or since until 
I heard from Mr. Mandel. I never saw him. _ I went that Sunday 
morning to the health conference, whatever it was called, health 
panel. I went in and made my talk. 

The Chairman. Who invited you to be there ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. I don't remember. The officials of the organization, 

I suppose. 

The Chairman. You do not recall who invited you ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. No, sir, I don't. 

The Chairman. In other ^yords, Doctor, you just go to an organi- 
zation on any kind of an invitation? 

Dr. SciiREiBER. No, sir. I told Mr. Mandel and Counsel Carpenter 
at the time they asked me about it in the earlier session that I had 
been invited, aiid I assumed that I was invited on the basis of my 
interest and my work in mental health. I said at that t:ime that I 
didn't want to sound immodest, but I know I had achieved some 
status in my profession as somewhat an authority on the relation- 
ship between the social environment and mental health, and I wel- 
comed the chance to talk. 

I also pointed out that the then Under Secretary of State urged 
people to go who were not Communists, who were anti-Communists, 
and also to participate. This was in a telegram to Mr. Norman 
Cousins of the Saturday Review of Literature, who certainly spoke 
quite anti-Communist at that meeting. 

I did not participate in any panel except the health panel Sun- 
day morning. 

The Chairman. Who was the Under Secretary of State that you 
have referred to ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I think his — it was in that official record. I think 
his name was — I don't remember. I am sorry. Certainly it was 
in 1949. 

The Chairman. The record will show that. 

Mr. Carpenter. The Assistant Secretary of State didn't ask you to 
attend this meeting, did he? 

Dr. Schreiber. No. I didn't even know the man. But I cite this 
as an example that the implication that everybody who went there 
was a Communist is utter nonsense and unfair. 

Mr. Carpenter. But you are not able to tell this committee who in- 
vited you to speak at this meeting ? 

Dr. Schreiber. No. Whoever the officials were who were organ- 
izing the panel on mental health, I assume. 

aS". Carpenter. Did you attack the Communist Party at that 
meeting ? 

Dr. Schreiber. No, I had no occasion to. I gave a talk on mental 
health and the social environment. I was very ardently pointing 
out that to make our democracy work you have to insure mental 
health, and to insure mental health you have to make our democracy 
Avork, since the two are interdependent. 

It is my view, frankly, that if our democracy works, the Commu- 
nists lose any propaganda value they have through the suckers they 
pull in. I think we have to make our democracy work. 

As a psychiatrist, I know that little kids growing up have to feel 
secure, have to find their w^ay of believing in their way of life. I 



1540 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

think if the kids get a chance to believe, they are not susceptible to 
all sorts of nonsense propaganda that is pushed at them. 

I believe very much that a functioning democracy and mental health 
are definitely interdependent. 

The Chairman. We will put in the record the statement just re- 
ferred to, and it will become a part of the record. 

(The excerpt from the Daily Worker referred to was marked "Ex- 
hibit No. 413" and is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 413 

[From the Daily Worker, New York, March 30, 1949] 

Denounce War Plots 

excerpts from addresses at the cultural and scientific conference 

(By Richard Boyer, magazine writer) 

The great American writers have always held that the final court of last 
appeal is a man's own conscience. This is the essence of Emerson and Thoreau. 
Both declared that every policy, every principle, every program must be judged 
at least before the bar of private understanding. No man, they said, particu- 
larly the writer, can be absolved from individual responsibility. He can obtain 
no change of venue that takes the issues of the day — in our time, world peace or 
world destruction — from the court of his own conscience to some other tribunal 
which excuses him from the hard and painful duty of thinking for himself. 

This is peculiarly true, it seems to me, of the American writer today, sur- 
rounded as he is by monopoly's press and radio, intent on convincing him that 
the highest patriotism rests in the destruction of Soviet socialism, apparently 
ready and willing to sacrifice 10 million American lives if only 20 million Rus- 
sians can also be killed. No, if he would spare his counti*y fascism and frightful 
war, the writer cannot safely surrender his conscience to the existentialists or 
T. S. Eliot, to Spellman or to Truman, to Hearst or the New York Times. 
Rather he must follow Emerson's dictum, "The root and seed of democracy is the 
doctrine, judge for yourself." 

COMMUNIST VIEW 

I emphasize this Emersonian theme of individual responsibility as an Ameri- 
can Communist. To the uniformed it may seem strange emphasis coming as it 
does from a Communist. While Communists fight for peace and brave Wall 
Street and jail for conscience's sake — and the world's sake — they are frequently 
described as regimented automatons bereft of free will. At the same time the 
obedient clerk, all aglow at Wall Street's virtues, is praised as an example of 
rugged individualism. 

This nonsense is part of a Avorld upside down in which plans for war become 
designs for peace. The fact is that Communist loyalty and Communist discipline 
is based on individual conscience and individual understanding. We want no 
other kind. 

If a member of the Communist Party does not approve of our goal of peace and 
socialism and complete racial equality, we demand that he leave. If a member 
of the Communist Party does not agree, and deeply agree, that the most im- 
portant issue in the world today is world peace, if he is not ready and eager to 
submerge all differences and cooperate with any and all forces sincerely seeking 
peace, we say his conscience does not place him in our ranks. 

NO BLIND ALLEGIANCE 

We ask no blind allegiance. Rather we ask that the intelligence be at its most 
tender and sensitive, that it transcend private interest and selfish advantage and 
take the peace of the world as its concern. 

This is sound American ground if the words of Emerson and Thoreau still have 
meaning to the American ear. Both expressed the utmost scorn for that legality 
which included injustice. Both said, and explicitly said, that the very heart of 
American thought was that no act or policy of the government is binding on the 
individual unless it meets the requirements of his conscience. Both sought to be 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1541 

citizens of the world and Thoreau declared, "I would remind my countrymen that 
they are to be men first and Americans only at a late and convenient hour." Both 
asserted it the duty of Americans to defy an American Government intent on 
imperialist war. 

This theme of conscience, of individual responsibility apart from the enj^ines 
of public opinion, was once an American truism among progressives. Thoreau 
phrased it trenchantly enough, after he had gone to jail for opposing an unjust 
war, when he said : "We should be men first and subject afterward. It is not 
desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so mucli as for the right." He 
wondered then that the state was so fearful of ideas that it jailed the men who 
had them. * * ♦" 

A FAMILIAR CHARGE 

This charge of treason was a familiar one to both Emerson and Thoreau. 
Scarce a colleague of theirs, from Whittier to Parker, from Alcott to Lowell, who 
had not been a target of that charge. 

But there is a more basic likeness between their age and ours. Both times, 
theirs and ours, were stultified by the all-pervading lie that emasculates writers 
and paralyzes thought. Until writers of Emerson's time, not without pain and 
travail, broke through the all-embracing falsehood of their era, there was little 
creative activity. Writers then no more than now, could flourish in the climate 
of the widely believed and widely accepted social life. The withering falsehood 
that dried up the creative spring between the end of the Revolution and the rise 
of the Abolitionists, was the lie that chattel slavery was sacrosanct and benevo- 
lent and could only be attacked by traitors to the country. 

"From 1790 to 1820," Emerson wrote in his journal, "there was not a book, 
a speech, a conversation, or a thought in the state." The great lie of our own 
age, the lie that also paralyzes and withers, the lie from which all other lies 
spring, the lie that turns black into white, virtue into evil and patriotism into 
treason, is the all pervading, all-embracing falsehood that Communists are the 
possessors of some political original sin, some inherent, inbred, basic wickedness 
that puts them' beyond the pale of honorable men. 

The writers of Emerson's time not without suffering, broke through the stulti- 
fying falsehood of their day and when they did there was a golden age of Ameri- 
can literature. American writers of our own day can do no less. * * * 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you an incorporator of tlie National In- 
stitute of Social Relations ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Yes, sir ; I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you edit its magazine, Talk It Over, in 1946 
and 1947? 

Dr. Schretber. I was a director of the organization. I saw every 
piece that the organization put out. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long were you with the National Institute of 
Social Relations ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. From the moment it was born until it died, so to 
speak. It was organized in — I think we incorporated, I am not sure 
of the date, late in 1945. Anyhow, we began in 1946, and then our 
funds ran out toward the end of 1948, 1 think December 1948. 

Mr. Carpenter. This is a copy of the incorporation of the National 
Institute. 

The Chairman. It may go in the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 414" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 414 

Recobder of Deeds, Washington, D. C. 

This is to certify that the pages attached hereto constitute a full, true, and 
complete copy of a certificate of incorporation of "National Institute of Social 
Relations, Inc.," dated the 1st day of February 1946, and recorded on the 5th 
day of February 1946 at 3 : 06 p. m., in Incoriioration Liber No. 63, folio 288, as the 
same appears of record in this office. 



1542 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of 
this office to be affixed, this the 5th day of May A. D. 1954. 

[seal] John B. Duncan, 

Recorder of Deeds, D. 0. 
By Eleanor Daque Williams, 
Deputy Recorder of Deeds, D. 0. 

No. 29497 
Certificate of Incorporation of National Institute of Social Relations, Inc. 

Know all men by these presents that we, the undersigned, all ciMzens of the 
United States, and a majority of whom are citizens and residents of the District 
of Columbia, do hereby associate ourselves as a body politic and corporation, 
pursuant to the provisions of Subchapter 6, Title 29 of the Code of Laws for the 
District of Columbia (1940), for the purpose hereinafter mentioned; and to 
that end we do hereby make, sign, acl^nowledge, and file this certificate as follows : 

first 
The name of the corporation is "National Institute of Social Relations, Inc." 

SECOND 

The duration of this corporation shall be perpetual. 

third 

The particular business and objects of the corporation shall be: 

(1) To promote a better understanding of human behavior and a fuller under- 
standing of man's relationship to his fellow men, by the preparation of educa- 
tional materials dealing with all aspects of social' relations and by making 
available the personal services of experts in the field of adult and youth edu- 
cation. The materials and personal services will be made available to Churches, 
Schools, Civic, Business, Labor, Women, Youth, Veteran, Professional, Social, 
Fraternal, and similar groups, on a free and/or nonprofit basis. 

(2) To do all such acts as are necessary or convenient to attain the objects 
and purposes herein set forth, to the same extent and as fully as any natural 
person could or might do, and as are not forbidden by law or by this certificate of 
incorporation, or by the bylaws of this corporation. 

(3) As a nonprofit corporation, none of the income of which shall accrue to 
any member as such, lo purchase, lease, sell, mortgage, hold, receive by gift, 
devise or bequest, or otherwise acquire or dispose of such real or personal prop- 
erty as may be necessary to the purposes of this corporation. 

(4) To have offices and promote and carry on its objects and purposes, within 
or without the District of Columbia, and in the states or territories of the United 
States and in foreign countries. 

(5) To have all powers that may be conferred upon corporations formed under 
subchapter 6, Title 29, of the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia (1940). 

fourth 

The concerns and affairs of said corporation for the first year of its existence 
shall be managed by a board of not more than six trustees. 

FIFTH 

The corporation reserves the right to amend, alter, or change any provision 
contained in this certificate in any manner prescribed by law. 

In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this 1st day of 
February 1946. 

Julius Schreiber. 
Malcolm R. Hobbs. 
John Beecher. 
Milton W. King. 
Frank L. Weil. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION EST GOVERNMENT 1543 

District of Columbia, ss: 

I, Hazel Bauer, a Notary Public in and for tlie District of Columbia, do hereby 
certify that Julius Schreiber, Malcolm R. Ilobbs, John Beecher, Milton W. King, 
and Frank L. Weil, parties to a certain Certificate of Incorporation bearing date 
ou the 1st day of February 1946, and hereto annexed, personally appeared before 
me in said District, the said persons being personally well known to me to be 
the persons who executed the said Certificate of Incorporation and acknowledged 
the same to be their act and deed. 

Given under my baud and seal this 5th day of February 194G. 

[seal] Hazel Bauer, 

Notary Public, D. 0. 
County of New York, 

State of Ncjv York, ss: 

I, Lillian B. Fox, a Notary Public in and for the County of New York, State 
of New York, do hereby certify that Frank L. Weil, a party to a certain Certifi- 
cate of Incorporation bearing date on the 1st day of February 1940 and hereto 
annexed, personally appeared before me in said County of New York, State of 
New York, the said person being well known to me to be the person who executed 
the said Certificate of Incorporation and acknowledged the same to be his act 
and deed. 

Civen under my hand and seal this 1st day of February 1946. 

[seal] liiLLiAN B. Fox, Notory Public. 

Mr. Carpenter. When you worked for the National Institute of 
Social Relations, did they have a subcontract with the United States 
Government or the United States Army in the work of this insti- 
tution ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I don't understand the question. Subcontract — I 
don't know what you mean. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you receive any money from the Government 
by way of subcontract? 

Dr. Schreiber. No. The only money we ever received was the initial 
grant that we got from the organization, the American Jewish Com- 
mittee, which was interested in combating problems of intergroup 
tension. Our effort here was to apply the principles of psychiatry 
in community education on the basis that if the people got together 
and understood their common problems, they would be able to resolve 
their problems without a lot of anti-Semitism or anti anybody else, 
but would in a democratic way function as good citizens in the 
community. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you personally under contract with the 
United States Government after you left the Army ? Did you receive 
funds for your work ? 

Dr. Schreiber. As I told you, the only time I ever received any 
funds after I left the Army was for a few hours on Saturday for a 
period of months when I assisted as a psychiatrist in the VA clinic. 
The Veterans' Administration was short of psychiatrists. I worked 
for a few hours every Saturday for several months. That was 1946, 
1 believe it was. 

The Chairman. After you left the Army ? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes. 

The Chairman. Doctor, you still hold a Reserve commission; do 
you not ? 

Dr. Schreiber. He asked me that before. The only thing I had — 
I have a certificate that I got in 1947, indicating the highest rank 1 
had ever attained, and I think you have it here. I think the certificate 
merely states that this is not a new commission but merely an indica- 
tion of the highest rank achieved. 



1544 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

I became a lieutenant colonel in January 1945. I am unaware of 
being a Reserve officer now. I have never received any communication 
from the Army to that effect. 

Mr. Fanelli. Wliile I am looking for that, if there is any question 
about the nature of the National Institute of Social Relations, we have 
a number of documents on the subject that we would be glad to intro- 
duce for the enlightenment of the committee. 

Dr. ScHREiBER. May I also, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, 
introduce documents which show that my work in the Army was not 
only of a superior quality in terms of actual work, but that I was 
regarded by my superiors and colleagues as a very able, patriotic 
American citizen, and I insist that I am that and was that all through- 
out the war. May I introduce those documents, sir? 

The Chairman. At a later time. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you tendered a Reserve commission when 
you left the service ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. No. Will you explain to me how you get one? 

Mr. Fanelli. Just a second. You answer his questions and don't 
ask any? Either you know or you don't. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ask for one ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I was being processed. As I told you, I left the 
division on June 28, I think the date was. On July 4 I completed 
my processing, and I never got anything, never heard anything from 
the young lady who was processing me. This came on June — at least 
is dated June 30, 1947. If you would like, may I read this to you, this 
two-paragraph thing ? 

The Chairman. In other words, that is almost 2 years after you 
were out of the Army ? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir ; and it reads as follows 

The Chairman. Read it. 

Dr. Schreiber. This comes from the War Department, the Adju- 
tant General's Office, Washington, D. C., and there is a rubber stamp 
3 June 47, 1947. It says : 

Subject : Commission in the Army of the United States. 
To : Officers who served in World War XL 

Paragraph 1 : 

The Secretary of War has directed me to issue a commission, in the highest 
rank attained, to each officer relieved from active duty after serving honorably 
In the Army of the United States during the recent war, who has not been 
Issued a commission subsequent to being processed for release from active 
duty. 

2. The commission herewith does not constitute a new appointment but is 
formal evidence of the highest military rank you attained. It is forwarded to 
you with the grateful thanks and deep appreciation of the War Department for 
your services. 

It is signed Edward F. Witsell, major general, for the Adjutant 
General; and this is the document. This is all I ever got from the 
Army. 

Mr. Carpenter. That is a commission, isn't it? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, but as I understand it— do you want to look 
at it? 

As I understand it, this was not a Reserve appointment or anything 
of the sort. I don't know. Is that it? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1545 

The Chairman. It is a Reserve commission signed by the Adjutant 
General of the United States. So you are a Reserve ofticer as of today ; 
are you not? 

Dr. SciiREiBER. If you say I am a Reserve officer and if your state- 
ment is accurate, then I am. 

The Chairman. That is a commission issued. 

Dr. ScHREiBER. All right. I don't know. 

Mr. Fanelli. Mr. Chairman, as I read these documents, I can't 
find a Reserve commission in there. I am not an expert in this, but 
you ought to read this top memorandum that came with it. It appears 
to be proof of an earlier commission. As I say, I am not an expert 
in it. 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Will you read it? 

[Documents handed to the subcommittee.] 

The Chairman (reading) : 

The Secretary of War has directed me to issue a commission, in the highest 
rank attained, to each officer relieved from active duty after serving honorably 
in the Army of the United States during the recent war, vpho has not been 
issued a commission subsequent to being processed for release from active duty. 

The commission herewith does not constitute a new appointment but is formal 
evidence of the highest military rank you attained. It is forwarded to you with 
the grateful thanks and deep appreciation of the War Department for your 
services. 

Signed by the Adjutant General. 

Dr. SciiREiBER. That is what I interpret it to mean, that it was 
evidence of the fact that I achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel on 
January 5, 1945, and this was the only document I have that I was 
ever lieutenant colonel. 

May I have it back, or do you want it? 

The Chairman. You may have them back. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were any of your Information and Education as- 
sociates associated with you in the National Institute of Social Re- 
lations ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Yes, sir. Sergeant or Mr. Forstenzer; Mr. Feni- 
chel; a Julian Stein; David Humphrey for a brief period. These 
were all people who worked with me in the Information and Educa- 
tion, and we brought them over into the national institute because we 
felt they were very skilled and good people. 

For a brief time there was, I think, Hannon McClay, who was an 
editorial research worker. 

That is all I remember. 

JSIr. Carpenter. John Beecher ? 
i Dr. Schreiber. He was never in the Army with us. He worked for 
us in the institute. 

Mr. Carpenter. You say you edited the magazine, Talk It Over. 
In this magazine did you recommend certain pro-Communist authors 
and the publications of pro-Communist organizations ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I don't know what you are talking about, ]Mr. Car- 
penter. All tliat I know is that we prepared material pro and con 
on any issue that Ave wrote on, and in the biographical sketch, or the 
bibliographical sketch, you were just reading, there were a lot of 
references on either side of any issue. I don't know what specific 
thing you have in mind. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you use the following articles written by Max- 
well Stewart, Carey McWilliams, Susan B. Anthony II, Joseph Gaer, 



1546 INTEBLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Leo Huberman, Evans F. Carlson, Frederic L. Schuman, Lawrence 
K. Rosinger, Barrows Dunham, and recommended the Physician's 
Forum ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. I don't remember whether we recommended any of 
their writings or not with respect to any particular issue. We might 
well have. The fact is, we gave pro and con on any issue, and we 
recommended the National Association of Manufacturers as well as 
the CIO or any other point of view. Whenever there was an issue 
by definition itself, Mr. Carpenter, there are many or usually many 
points of view. Our effort was to be fair and present arguments 
pro and con so that in discussions people could make up their own 
minds. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, will you read for the record your 
analysis of these various writers? 

Mr. Mandel. I would like to present for the record without read- 
ing, if I may, Mr. Carpenter, an analysis of the magazine, Talk It 
Over, for the period 1946 and 1917, showing that these authors and 
other pro- Communist authors were recommended for reading by the 
magazine, Talk It Over. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 415" and is 
as follows:) 

Talk It Oveb 

Published by National Institute of Social Relations, Inc., 1029 17th Street NW., 

Washington, D. 0. 

(Note. — No editor or board of editors named.) 

SERIES YlOl, 1946 

Recommended reading: Maxwell Stewart's Schools for Tomorrow's Citizens, 

SERIES GlOl, 1946 

Notes for discussion leaders on Can the Atomic Bomb Be Kept a Secret? 

Recommended reading : Atoms and You, by Tom O'Connor, a writer for PM 
and other leftwlng publications. The Independent, January 1946 proceedings 
of a Madison Garden rally on atomic energy under the auspices of the Inde- 
pendent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. 

SERIES G102, 1046 

Page 5 quoting Col. Evans F. Carlson (deceased) former head of the Commit- 
tee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy which has been cited as subversive by 
the Attorney General. 

SERIES G105, 1946 

Page 6, discussing Persecution of Minorities in America. 

Page 9, praising the War Department publication, Prejudice — Roadblock^ to 
Progress. Also page 10. 

Page 11, praising War Department publication Army Service Forces Manual 
M5 and quoting therefrom. 

SERIES G107, 1946 

Recommended reading: Out of the Kitchen Into the War, by Susan B. An- 
thony II and F. Daye. (See record of Susan B. Anthony in House Committee 
on Un-American Activities Report on Congress of American Women.) 

SERIES G109, 1946 

Recommended reading: For the People's Health, published by the People's 
Forum which has been designated as "established primarily by the Communist 
Party" (Bella Dodd, September 8, 1952, Subversive Influence in the Educational 
Process, p. 37). 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1547 

SERIES 0112, 1940 

Recommended reading : The First Round, the story of the CIO Political Action 
Committee, by Joseph Gaer. 

SEBIES Q115, 1946 

Lists Julius Schreiber, M. D., as director of the National Institute of Social 
Relations. 

Recommended reading (p. 12) : The Southern Patriot, monthly pul)licatioa 
of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, which has been cited as sub- 
versive by the House Uu-Americau Activities Committee. 

SERIES Gil 6, 1940 

Page 16, etc., discussion of Can We Get Along With Russia? quoting Molo- 
tov, Henry Wallace, Frederic L, Schuman, Henry Steele Commager, Stalin, all 
pro-Soviet statements with a few anti-Soviet statements. 

Recommended reading: The following pro-Communist books: The Great Con- 
spiracy Against Russia, by Micliael Sayers and Albert E. Kahu ; Soviet Politics, 
by Frederic L. Schuman; Russia — Menace or Promise, by Vera M. Dean; and 
Russia, by Sir Bernard Pares. Of 6 books recommended, 4 are pro-Communist 
and 2 are anti. 

Page 24, statement of purpose of the National Institute of Social Relations. 

SERIES Gil 7, 1946 

Page 16. Raises question, "Do we have freedom of the press?" Quotes state- 
ments for and against. 

SERIES G118, 1497 

Page 2. Showing officers, board of consultants, H. M. Forstenzer, coordinator. 

Page 14. Recommended reading : Southern Exposure, by Stetson B. Kennedy, 
writer for PM. Race and Democratic Society, by Franz Boas (deceased) and 
formerly of the American Committee for Democracy and Intellectual Freedom, 
cited as subversive by the House Un-American Activities Committee. 

SERIES G119, 1947 

Recommended reading : the following left-wing writers : Small Farm and Big 
Farm, by Carey McWilliams; Some Problems of Postwar Agriculture, by James 
G. Patton, head of the National Farmers Union ; Factories in the Feld, by Carey 
McWilliams ; page 23; The Truth About Unions, by Leo Huberman. 

SERIES G121, 1947 

Page 18. Discussion of "Should we have universal military training?" Topics : 
Is it necessary for national defense? * * * How does it fit in with U. N.? * * * 
How will it atfect education for citizenship? 

SERIES G123, 1947 

What Hope for China, page 6. "In the areas they control, the Communists 
are said to have cut rents and taxes considerably and given non-Communists the 
major voice in local self-government. Their present program calls for the 
maintenance and encouragement of private enterprise and a respect for prop- 
erty rights." 

Page 7, quoting John K. Fairbank. 

Page 12, To What Extent Should We Work With Russia? 

Page 14, recommended reading, the following left-wing writers : Thunder Out 
of China, by Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby; China's Crisis by Law- 
rence K. Rosinger (fifth amendment case) ; The Challenge of Red China, by Gun- 
ther Stein (identified as a meml)er of the Communist underground) ; Solu- 
tion in Asia, by Owen Lattimore ; The Making of Modern China, by Owen and 
Eleanor Lattimore ; Far Eastern Survey, published by the American Institute of 
Pacific Relations ; China's Madame Sun, by Nym Wales. 

Page 20. Books recommended and reviewed : Thunder Out of China, by Theo- 
dore H. White and Annalee Jacoby; Solution in Asia by Owen Lattimore; Don't 
be a Jerk !' published by the League of Fair Play, headed by liobert Norton (fifth 
amendment case). 



1548 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

SERIES G125, 1947 

Quoting pages 7 and 9, Barrows Dunham (fifth amendment case) (February 
27, 1953, House Un-American Activities Committee). Page 10, Edgar Snow on 
Why We Don't Understand Russia. 

13. Recommended reading: Man Against Myth by Barrows Dunham; and 
Why We Don't Understand Russia, by Edgar Snow. 

SERIES G126, 1947 

Discussing "How Free is Freedom of Religion?" 

Page 14, recommended reading : Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, by R. H. 
Tawney. 

SERIES G127, NOVEMBER 1947 

Page 13, recommended reading : What Foreign Trade Means To Us, by Max- 
well Stewart ; Sixty Million Jobs, by Henry Wallace. 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Will you also, Mr. Mandel, include those anti- 
Communist authors who were also recommended? I think it only 
fair. 

Mr. Fanelli. We have some documents on this whenever it is con- 
venient, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Carpenter. Doctor, have you ever been responsible for the 
appointment of individuals with Communist records to the informa- 
tion and education program? 

Dr. SciiREiBER. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Carpenter. What part did you play in the securing of the 
appointment of the following persons in your division : Carl Fenichel? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. As I told you before, I never heard of Carl Fenichel 
until he was appointed to our division and went to the Information 
and Education School. I remember that he was supposed to have 
done an excellent job as a training student there. I don't recall how 
he was appointed. But I would have been very happy to appoint 
him on the basis of what I heard about him at that time. 

Mr. Carpenter.- Stephen Fischer? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Stephen Fischer — as I told you before, I first heard 
about Stephen Fischer at a dinner party in New York, I think in 
1939 or 1940. 1 met his sister, who waxed eloquently about her younger 
brother, who was a journalism major or graduate at Columbia. He 
was on the San Francisco Chronicle. I was doing neuropathology 
and neuropsychiatry in Mount Sinai Hospital in New York. I met 
him once socially briefly. He made on me a very good impression. 

As I told you, I don't remember how, but I think I recommended 
him after I came back from the Pacific when they were looking for 
writers for the Army talks. I knew that he had been in combat, had 
flown some thirty-odd missions. I felt he was a man who was a com- 
petent craftsman and a man who had some experience in combat. 

The Chairman. Doctor, you knew that Stephen Fischer had been 
a member of the Communist Party when you appointed him ; did you 
not? 

Dr. Schreiber. I certainly did not know that. 

The Chairman. Did you make inquiry of him whether or not he 
had been a member of the Communist Party ? 

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir ; I did not. I pointed out to Mr. Carpenter 
when he asked me before, I went on the general assumption any man 
who was appointed by the War Department is examined by the G-2 
of the War Department, and if they clear him he is 0. K. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1549 

The Chairman. When did you first meet Stephen Fischer? 

Dr. ScHREiBER.- I think it was in 19-10 or 1941. 

The Chairman. Before the war? 

Dr. ScHREiBKR. Yes, sir. 1 am positive. 

The Chairman. Where did you meet him ? 

Dr.' ScHREiBER. Somewhere socially, in San Francisco. I can't 
remember exactly where, but I know I met him one time. 

The Chairman. Did you ever attend any meetings with Stephen 
Fischer in California? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Then why did you take the recommendation of 
his sister when you had already met him in 1940 or 1911? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Why did I take the recommendation? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Dr. Schreiber. I met his sister before I met him. 

The Chairman. Oh, you met his sister before you met hii«. 

Dr. Schreiber. She was telling me about her kid brother in Cali- 
fornia, who was quite a cracker jack writer. 

The Chairman. How many times did you meet him in California 

in 1940? 

Dr. Schreiber. I think one time is all I met him, and I don't remem- 
ber how much time I talked with him, 5 or 10 minutes, perhaps, some- 
thing like that. 

The Chairman. ^Vliy is it that June 16, 1944, 3 or 4 years later, 
a man you have met only 1 time, you recommended that he come in 
the Information and Education Division of the United States Army ? 

Dr. Schreiber. He certainly made a very excellent impression on 
me. I don^t remember how I was reminded about him a^ain, but I 
thought he was a fine man, and I recommended him. I wouldn't recom- 
mend someone I hadn't any ideas about or didn't think was a good 
person. 

Mr. Carpenter. I would like to read this memorandum: 

I have been advised by Sergeant Wilson that 1st Lt. S. M. Fischer, Army Air 
Forces Flexible Gunnery School, Tyndell Field, Fla., is an outstanding young 
officer. 

Lieutenant Fischer spent a long time in the South or Southwest Pacific and 
after completing his 25 bombing missions came back to the mainland. According 
to Wilson "tills guy's terrific — he already knows as much if not more than the 
instructors at the school." 

In civilian life he was a newspaper man on the San Francisco Chronicle. 
Prior to that, Wilson believes, he completed a course in journalism at Columbia 
University. 

Recommend that steps be taken to have this officer brought in for 2 weeks 
temporary duty with a view to determining his usefulness either in Materials 
or Field Operations Section. 

That is from Major Schreiber. 

Are you the author of that memorandum? 

Dr. Schreiber. I imagine that must be. April 7 this is dated, is 
that right? 

The Chairman. 1944. 

Dr. Schreiber. This is dated April 7, 1943, up here. I wasn't in 
the War Department then. 

Mr. Carpenter. This is dated the 16th of June, 1944. 

Dr. Schreiber. We have 2 dates on here. 



1550 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Yes. That must have been after I came back from the Pacific, and 
apparently Wilson was still there. I thought he had already gone 
overseas. He must have been the one who reminded me about it. 

The Chairman. Then you knew Sergeant Wilson ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Oh, sure. 

The Chairman. How long had you known him ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I met him in California in, I think it was, 1938 or 
1939. 

The Chairman. Did you ever attend any meetings with him? 

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you know him to be a member of the Com- 
munist Party? 

Dr. Schreiber. No. sir. 

The Chairman. Did j^ou make any inquiry whether or not he was a 
member of the Communist Party? 

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. You say you knew Luke Wilson in California? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you meet him, and how? 

Dr. Schreiber. As I told you before, I think he was brought over 
to the hospital by Jack Burke, and I met him that way. Jack Burke 
was a member of the La Follette committee at that time, and I think 
Mr. Wilson was a colleague of his on the La Follette committee. 

The Chairman. In 1938 ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I think it was '38 or '39, something like that. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the reason for Jack Burke bringing him 
to you ? 

Dr. Schreiber. You meet a lot of people socially, and he just intro- 
duced me to him. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was this a social occasion? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know Marian Thompson? 

Dr. Schreiber. This is the young lady you asked me about several 
times. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you do anything about bringing her into your 
office? 

Dr. Schreiber. As I told you several times before, this is the 
strangest sort of a question. I don't understand what it is all about. 
This young lady either worked in the division before I ever got there, 
or came into the division afterwards. I knew her nowhere from out- 
side the organization. Whether she worked in the pool and was 
brought into my office from somewhere, I don't know, but she worked 
for me as my secretary. 

Mr. Carpenter. What connection did you have with the Special 
Service School at Lexington, Va. ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I had no official connection with it. I visited it 
once or twice to see how it goes. I was not on the staff of the school. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has a memorandum. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat of a War Department mem- 
orandum dated September 30, 1943, addressed to the Chief of Military 
Personnel, and it reads as follows : 

The inauguration of a special course of instruction at the Special Service 
School, Lexington, Va., for the regimental orientation officers requires the 
services of especially qualified field personnel who have been assigned to related 
duties. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1551 

Throufch observations made l)y officers of this l)rancli tlie following officer is 
liiKhly qualified by training, luiowledRC of the subject matter, and method of 
conduct of orientation and is requested for inunediate assignment to this branch 
for planning and for assistance to the school faculty — 

and then the name of Julius Schreiber, major, M. C, is listed. 

I read the letter in part, and ask that it be made a part of the record. 

Dr. Schreiber. What was the date of that, Mr. Mandel ? 

The Chairman. That will be made a part of the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 41G" and is as 
follows :) 

Exhibit No. 416 

Wab Department, 
Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 
Washington, D. C, September 30, 19ffS. 

Memorandum for Chief, Military Personnel Section, S. S. D. 
Subject: Assignment of Personnel. 

1. The inauguration of a special course of instruction at the Special Service 
School, Lexington, Virginia, for the regimental orientation officers requires the 
services of especially qualified field personnel vpho have been assigned to related 
duties. 

2. Through observation made by officers of this Branch the foUovping officer 
is highly qualified by training, knowledge of the subject matter and method of 
conduct of orientation and is requested for immediate assignment to this Branch 
for planning and for assistance to the school faculty : 

Julius Schreiber, Major, M. C, O-31100, Hq. 11th AA Tng. Grp. AARTC, Camp 
Callan, Calif. 

3. Major Schreiber is now on duty in the capacity of a field medical officer and 
an informal concurrence for his release has been obtained from his commanding 
general. It is understood through other informal contacts that Army Ground 
Forces will interpose no objections provided the Surgeon General's Office can 
supply a replacement. Informal contacts with the S. G. O. (Colonel Halloran, 
Ext. 78645) indicate that they will take immediate steps to assign a replacement 
officer. 

4. As Major Schreiber's services in the future will be greatly increased in 
value if he be available at an early date to assist in the preparation of curriculum, 
it is requested that he be made available on temporary duty until a permanent 
transfer is effected. The period of this T/D will not exceed two weeks beginning 
on or about 8 October 1943. 

5. A vacancy in the grade of Major exists in the allotment of officers to this 
Branch and the job assignment is with the Training Plans and Materials Section. 

6. It is desired that a formal request for this transfer and assignment be 
initiated and concurrences of Army Ground Forces and Surgeon General's Office 
be obtained. 

Arthur C. Fablow, 

Lt. Colonel, AU8, 
Chief, Orientation Branch, 

Special Service Division. 

Dr. Schreiber. Could I hear the date of that, please? 

Mr. Mandel. September 30, 1943. 

Dr. Schreiber. That was almost a month before I was in the War 
Department, and I was not assigned to the school. It may have 
been somebody's plan to assign me to the school, but I was not. 

I would like to say there was nothing wrong with the school. 

Mr. Carpenter. You don't challenge the accuracy of this record ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I don't know the letter. That is the first time I 
have heard it. 

The Chairman. Hand him the letter. 

Examine it. 

(Dr. Schreiber and his counsel examining document.) 



1552 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Mr. Mandel, I think it would have been more useful 
had you read the whole letter, because it points out I was then at 
Camp Callan. This was a request to be transferred to the War 
Department for temporary duty. It was the belief of Colonel Farlow, 
who made this request, that my value to the Army would be enhanced 
if I served in the I. and E. program rather than as a psychiatrist at 
Camp Callan, where, among my duties 

The Chairman. The whole letter is in the record. 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Since he didn't read the whole thing, I had no idea 
what he was talking about. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever assign or recommend students or 
instructors or courses of study at Lexington, Va. ? 

Dr. Schreiber. Did I ever sign 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever assign or recommend 

Dr. Schreiber. Assign or recommend. 



"te* 



Mr. Carpenter. Students or instructors or did you recommend 
courses of study at the I. & E. school ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I may well have. I don't remember. I know I 
certainly recommended Lt. Russell Babcock to go there, because he 
was with me at Camp Callan. He was a very excellent teacher. I 
don't know anyone else I recommended as an instructor. I may have 
suggested that Sergeant Wilson go to the school. I don't know. I 
don't remember. 

It would have been perfectly possible for me to recommend him. 
Anyone who participated in the program ought to have been trained. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have anything to do with the preparation 
of "Prospectus, ASF, Troop Training Program"? 

Dr. Schreiber. What is the date of that prospectus? 

The Chairman. Pass it to the witness and let him examine it. 

(Dr. Schreiber examining document.) 

The Chairman. Did you have anything to do with the preparation 
of that. Doctor? 

Dr. Schreiber. I don't see a date on it, and I don't know. 

If it was while I was in the service, I might well have — I mean the 
War Department. If it was before that, then I couldn't have. 

The Chairman. Does that refresh your memory by examining it ? 

Dr. Schreiber. The subject matter is the kind of material we dealt 
with the entire time I was in the Division, sir. As I say, it could well 
have been something that I had something to do with if it was after 
October 30 or October 25, 1943. I am just looking at it casually. 

Wait a minute. Here is Army Talk No. 53. That certainly was 
after I was in the War Department Division. So if this was written 
after Army Talk 53, then I was certainly there and would have had a 
hand, perhaps, in this. 

Mr- Carpenter. All right. Doctor. 

Were you in any way responsible for the publication by the armed 
service forces of the pamphlet Races of Mankind, by Ruth Benedict 
andG.Weltfish? 

Dr. Schreiber. No; I was not. I had nothing to do with that 
pamphlet. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was it published by the Armed Forces? 

Dr. Schreiber. Not to my knowledge. Isn't that a Public Affairs 
pamphlet ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1553 

Mr. Carpenter. Was it published by the Information and Education 
Division ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. Not to my knowledge, no. 

Mr. Carpenter. Not to your knowledge. 

Do you have any information about tliis document, Mr. Mandel ? 

Mr- Mandel. The New York Times of March 6, 1944, has an article 
dealing with this pamphlet. The headline of the article is "Army 
Drops Race Equality Book," and it mentions the fact that the Army 
obtained copies, as it says in this statement, 

After the USO banned the pamphlet, Mr. May, the chairman of the House 
Military Affairs Committee, asserted the CIO war relief committee promoted 
its distribution and the Army obtained 55,000 copies. Army spol^esmen, he said, 
told the committee that distribution had been held up because some of the 
material was subject to misinterpretation. 

Mr. Carpenter. You don't know anything about this pamphlet ? 

Dr. Schreiher. Now that he has read that, I remember there was 
something to do about it. I had nothing to do with picking the pam- 
phlet. I think I told you, Mr. Carpenter, in our earlier session, to the 
best of my recollection there was a committee of three — General Mc- 
Cloy, Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, and some other man, I think 
Dr. Brown, of the American Historical Society — who were appointed 
to select the basic orientation reference library. They were the ones, 
as I remember, who made the official final selection of what background 
material would be distributed to the orientation officers in the field. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did they ever call on you for recommendation ? 

Dr. Schreiber. To the best of my recollection, I never met any one 
of them. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have something to say about 
this document? 

Mr. Mandel. This pamphlet, which was published by the Armed 
Forces , on page 26 of one edition has a paragraph of which I w411 just 
read the first sentence : 

The Russian nation has for generations shown what can be done to outlaw 
race prejudice in a country with many kinds of people. It did not wait for 
people's minds to change. 

In subsequent editions this passage was left out. I have asked the 
Library of Congress to make an analysis of the question of whether 
the Russians showed prejudice toward minorities or not, and they 
have given us a memorandum which I would like to put into the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The docimient referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 417" and is 
as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 417 

The Libkakt of Congress, 
Legislative Reference Service, 

Washington, D. C. 
To : Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Attention : Mr, Benjamin Mandel. 
From : Joseph G. Whelan, Foreign Affairs Division. 
Subject: Statements on Soviet nationality policies and practices. 

On page 26 of the pamphlet, The Races of Mankind (1946 edition), the authors, 
Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish, make the following statement concerning the 
policy of the Soviet Government toward the nationality groups within the Soviet 
Union : 

32918°— 54— pt. 20 7 



1554 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

"The Russian nation has for a generation shown what can he clone to outlaw 
race prejudice in a country with many kinds of people. They did not wait for 
people's minds to change. They made racial discrimination and persecution 
illegal. They welcomed and honored the different dress, different customs, 
different arts of the many tribes and countries that live as part of their nation. 
The more backward groups were given special aid to help them catch up with 
the more advanced. Each i^eople was helped to develop its own cultural forms, 
its own written language, theater, music, dance, and so on. At the same time 
that each people was encouraged in its national self-development, the greatest 
possible interchange of customs was fostered, so that each group became more 
distinctively itself and at the same time more a part of the whole. 

"The Russians have welcomed cultural differences and they have refused to 
treat them as inferiorities. No part of the Russian program has had greater 
success than their racial program." 

In contrast to the argument set forth in this statement, there is quoted below 
a selection of quotations from various sources on the same subject: 

"The world has seen cold-blooded massacres and mass starvation before but in 
almost every case these have been the result of war or plague or catastrophes of 
nature and the governments involved have done their best to alleviate the human 
suffering. In the ca.se of the Ukrainian famine, the situation was different. 
The government deliberately profited by the shortage of crops to starve an 
unwanted portion of the population. This had not been its policy in 1921, just 
10 years before, when it was trying to cement its position. Now, it was sure of 
itself and felt safe in resorting to any action necessary to curb a discontented 
population instead of meeting its demands even in part. There is no question 
that the Ukrainian famine was deliberately engineered to break opposition and 
disintegrate the population. 

"Starvation was supplemented by deportation in order to clear the land for 
the introduction of alien elements who would be more loyal to the central regime, 
while the Ukrainians were uprooted from their homes and scattered in hetero- 
geneous groups throughout the country. Perhaps no act of the Soviet Govern- 
ment has l)een more revealing of its e.s.sentially callous attitude toward human 
life than the satisfaction which it received from this famine and its accom- 
panying arrests and executions. [The al)ove took place during the early 1930's.]" 
( Source : Manning, Clarence A. Twentieth-century Ukraine. New York, Book- 
man associates, 1951. pp. 93-04.) 

"Russia knows well how effective a purge of this sort can be. On June 10, 
1941, shortly after the Soviet annexation of the three Baltic States, a single 
purge, overshadowing anything Hitler ever dreamed of, took place. All the 
cities and villages in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were surrounded by special 
units of the MVD. At 2 o'clock in the morning, hundreds of thousands of intel- 
lectuals, doctors, lawyers, engineers, government officials, businessmen, and of 
course 'reactionaries' in general — even the stamp collectors, because of possible 
'international affiliations' — were awakened, ordered to dress, and led out of their 
homes to the nearest railway sidings where they were loaded into boxcars and 
shipped off to an 'unknown destination.' So well did the MVD operate that the 
job was finished in less than 2 hours ; by 4 o'clock that morning, Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia had been stripped of 1Y> million men — the natural leaders — 
and the 3 nations standing in the way of Russia's domination of the Baltic 
were virtually wiped out. While I was in Moscow I discovered that this stag- 
gering depopulation raid had been executed by none other than my jovial, pa- 
tient, witty Russian 'friend,' General Merkulov ! 

"As Molotov once said 'Minorities are no problem at all, the problem is sim- 
ply finding enough boxcars.' " (Source: Nyardi, Nicholas. My Ringside Seat in 
Moscow. New York, Crowell, 19.j2. pp. 160-161.) 

Lev E. Dobriansky submits the following cases of what he terms "genocide" 
on the part of the Soviet Union : 

"The Ingrian nation, which consisted of 400,000 civilized people of Scandi- 
navian culture and who inhabited Ingermanland, was wiped out in 1921-23, 
accommodating thereby the Russification of this hinterland of Leningrad ; 

"The Don and Kuban Cossack nations, who considered themselves separate 
national groups, were annihilated between 1928 and 1930 ; 

"The Greek population of the Kerch Peninsula, an ethnic group of some 8,000 
people, was deported to a forced labor camp in the Arctic in order to allow the 
Russification of this strategically important region ; * * *." 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1555 

The following list of Soviet "autonomous" republics recently liquidated is also 
of interest : 

"As a 'precautionary measure' the Volga German Republic was abolished by 
the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in September 
1941 and its inhabitants deported. In 1943 the Chechen-Ingush and Kalmyk 
autonomous republics were abolished and their population exiled. In 1945 the 
Crimean autonomous republic inhabited by Tatars was also wiped out of ex- 
istence and its population scattered throughout Siberia. The Soviet Government 
alleged that these peoples had failed to resist the Germans sufficiently * * *." 
(Source: U. S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Tensions 
within the Soviet Union. 83d Cong., 1st sess. Washington, U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1953. p. 42.) 

"Indeed, the Soviet nationality policy has proven to be a failure. Julian 
Towster, a specialist on Soviet Government and politics at the University of 
California, insists most emphatically 'that much in the Soviet nationality 
solution is subterfuge, fiction, and fraud, that the Communist road to unity 
is paved with slavish subordination in controlled uniformity spelling the ultimate 
obliteration of nations.' The Soviets failed to eliminate growing antagonisms 
between the various national groups residing in the Soviet Union, and they 
succeeded neither in establishing them on an equal footing nor in wfnning the 
support and sympathy of these nationalities and their elite for the Communist 
cause. A former Soviet army officer and member of the Communist Party, who 
succeeded in escaping from Soviet Russia, recently testified that although local 
differences among the Slavic elements of the Soviet population were gradually 
disappearing owing to the mobility of the population and to the standardizing 
influence of mass communications media, the same observation did not, on the 
whole, apply to the non-Slavic nationalities. 'The Great Russians,' he said, 
'looked upon all the other nationalities, particularly those of Asiatic origin, 
with a mild feeling of superiority. On their side, the non-Russians, especially 
the Central Asians, were hostile to the Russians.' " ( Source : Ibid. p. 45. ) 

"An example of actual resistance to the imperialism of Moscow is to be found 
in the case of the Ukraine. This nation formed an independent republic in 1920 
but was soon swallowed up by the Soviet Union. In spite of the fact that all 
Ukrainian anti-Communist parties were thoroughly liquidated in the period of 
1920-23, resistance continues. Lev E. Dobriansky states that '* * * there have 
been, as now in the form of the efficient Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which the 
Kremlin classifies as a bandit force, outbursts of spirited resurgence against the 
planned attacks on the Ukrainian national entity as such * * * the patent fact 
is that the Ukrainian nation itself is intrinsically anti-Communist because it 
has never surrendered spiritually to the prime objective of the Kremlin to create 
the Soviet Nation (Sovietsky Narod) and its Soviet man, speaking only the 
Russian language, thinking only in terms of nonbourgeois Soviet concepts, and 
taught to forget his non-Russian cultural tradition, his language, his history, 
his church, his art and customs — all the sensitive fibers that sustain the life of a 
national group." (Source: Ibid. p. 46.) 

"Moslem groups, however, have not resiwnded with alacrity to the Com- 
munist appeal. Although the Kremlin has attempted to drop an extra thick 
Iron Curtain around the Moslem regions in the U. S. S. R. in order that the 
claims of fair treatment for Moslems cannot be easily checked, Moslem groups 
are becoming more and more aware of the fate of their coreligionists within 
the U. S. S. R. Despite the difficulty of getting information, the world is 
beginning to realize that the terms 'oppression' and 'exploitation,' associated 
by Soviet propaganda with 'Western imperialism,' are more applicable to the 
Moslem regions of the U. S. S. R. 

"The picture of conditions of Moslems in the U. g. S. R., pieced together 
largely from Soviet sources, is highly unfavorable — Communist assertions to the 
contrary. Despite the solemn promises given by the Communists when they 
came to power in the U. S. S. R., the Kremlin has conducted an all-out war 
against the Moslem religion and against the Shariat — the Moslem code of civil 
law. The freedom which the Communists said would be accorded to Moslem 
people to develop their culture and language without interference has not been 
realized : the Kremlin exercises a strict supervision over form and content 
and allows no deviations. The Moslem minority has not shared equally with the 
advantages of the introduction of modern machinery, canals, and irrigation 
systems into Moslem regions. When these developments came, the great Rus- 
sians poured in, monopolizing the better-paying, higher-skilled occupations. 
Furthermore, thousands of Moslems have been uprooted and forced to migrate 
for political reasons to other regions as unskilled or semiskilled laborers. 



1556 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

"The granting of autonomy to Moslem peoples by establishing autonomous 
states under the constitution has been a meaningless gesture. The Communists 
through a clever system of gerrymandering have drawn the boundary lines of 
the various national units so that they cut across ethnic, geographic units and 
across irrigation systems. A centralized, monolithic Communist Party with 
absolute control over all phases of national life further tears down particularism 
and local unity. The result has been to weaken the autonomy of each national 
unit and reduce the influence of the Moslems in each state. In turn, this allowed 
the Communists to take over the political direction more easily and stand guard 
to stamp out any expressions of national aspirations among the Moslems. In 
these and many other ways Soviet Moslems are kept in subjection and ready 
targets for exploitation by their Kremlin masters." (Source: The Fate of 
Moslems Under Soviet Rule. Soviet Affairs Notes, No. 144, Apr. 20, 1953, p. 1.) 

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Carpenter. 

Mr. Carpenter. Doctor, I show you here a document entitled "Army 
Talk — 1 Through 100." Will you tell us what part you played in the 
initiation, drafting, approval, and distribution of these talks? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. In general, my job insofar as the preparation of 
the finished publications is concerned, is primarily editing, along 
with 2 or 3 other people in the branch — my chief, whoever he was 
at that time, whether Colonel Farlow or Colonel Barker or Major 
Beech, and one other officer — the material that was written by the 
writers in New York. When we finished editing it, we sent the mate- 
rial, the chief sent it on to Colonel Watrous, who also edited it. 
Finally he would send it to General Osborn, who did the final editing 
and approval before we could publish it. 

To the best of my recollection, some 9 or 10 years ago, they had 
policy meetings. The chiefs of each branch — and I was not the Chief 
of the Orientation Branch, although I would have been quite pleased 
to participate in it, because there was never anything wrong with 
this program — would sit and, based upon the research from the field 
that the research branch would produce, decide we ought to have an 
Army Talk on China or on India or Germany or France, or whatever 
the news of the week was. The writers would then be told to prepare 
material on this talk, stressing certain themes. 

My participation in this primarily was the editing of it, along with, 
as I say, the other people. 

In the special programs, the chart you first handed me, my par- 
ticipation would be to select finished materials already published and 
to organize them for use in special programs, hospitals and such. 

Mr. Carpenter. Wliat part did the following individuals play: 
Stephen Fischer? 

Mr. Schreiber. He was a writer. 

Mr. Carpenter. In your section? 

Dr. Schreiber. He was a writer of Army Talks, and I was not in 
charge of Army Talks. He was a writer in New York under the direc- 
tion of the then chief, whoever he was at that time, either Colonel 
Farlow or Colonel Boswell. 

Mr. Carpenter. Doesn't this chart show the New York office as 
under your jurisdiction? 

Dr. Schreiber. That chart will show you that the chief of the branch 
had the materials section on the right-hand side. The New York 
office was under him as far as material. I had the pilot teams, the 
people who went out and demonstrated how to conduct discussion 
programs, how to conduct orientation meetings. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1557 

The production of the materials — I am not a writer. I am a psy- 
chiatrist. My job deals with motivation. The professional writers 
were under the chief of the branch, who usually was a writer. Colonel 
Farlow was an advertising man. Colonel Barker was a newspaper- 
man. The writers, also the New York unit, were under the chief of 
the branch. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did Hyman Forstenzer work on that document? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. No. Hyman Forstenzer, to the best of my memory, 
worked on the pilot teams. He w\as an excellent group discussion 
leader. He was an excellent man in that. 

The Chairman. Did Stephen Fischer work on it? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. No. Stephen Fischer was a writer, sir. I don't 
remember that he went on the pilot teams. 

Mr. Carpenti':r. How about Luke Wilson? 

Dr. Schreiber. He was on the pilot teams for the 2 months he was 
with me in January and February, and then I thought he went over 
to Paris, but apparently, from this memo you handed me, he was 
even there Avhen I got back. So I don't know how he was used, ex- 
cept on a pilot team somewhere. 

Mr. Carpenter. How about Carl Fenichel? 

Dr. Schreiber. Carl Fenichel was a man who worked both as a 
writer and in the pilot teams. 

Mr. Carpenter. What part did you play in drawing up Fact Sheet 
No. 70, dated May 5, 1945 ? 

Dr. Schreiber. The same as any other Fact Sheet, Mr. Carpen- 
ter. I would edit and review whatever came down from the New 
York office, along with the then chief of the branch and one of the 
other officers. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that this talk was reprinted and dis- 
tributed and sold by the International Labor Defense ? 

Dr. Schreiber. I never heard it until you told me about it, or Mr. 
Mandel did, at the last session. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know what the International Labor De- 
fense is? 

Dr. Schreiber. My counsel — since you told me it is on the Attorney 
General's list, I would like to point out that many good American 
organizations, or at least one, reprinted that same talk, because it 
was interestecl in combatting prejudice. It was a Jewish organization, 
a national organization, a highly respected organization, which felt 
it was important to combat prejudice. 

Mr. Fanelli. We have documents on this and other documents 
which are interesting, whenever it is convenient. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here, and offer for the record, a copy of Army 
Talk No. 70, as reprinted by the International Labor Defense, by per- 
mission of the War Department. The International Labor Defense 
was cited by Attorney General Biddle as the legal arm of the Com- 
munist Party. 

The Chairman. That may become a part of the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 418" and is 
as follows:) 



1558 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 418 

[Army Talk, Orientation Fact Sheet, No. 70, War Department, Washington 25, D. C 

May 5, 1945] 

(Reprinted by permission of tlie War Department by International Labor Defense, 
112 East 19th Street, New York 3, N. Y.) 

Prejudice — Roadblock to Progress 

Practically everyone of us has prejudices. Some of us may shudder at the 
Idea of eating frogs and other foods we've never tasted but which other people 
enjoy. Or we may be prejudiced against bow ties or purple shirts. But these 
are meaningless prejudices which don't hurt us. There are other prejudices, 
however, which affect our lives very much. A prejudice against a necktie because 
of its color is harmless — but a prejudice against a person because of his color, 
race, nationality, or religion can do plenty of damage. 

A prejudice is an opinion or emotional feeling which isn't based on fact or 
on reason. It is an attitude in a closed mind. Prejudice has been used by the 
Germans and the Japanese to split nations wide open with hate and confusion. 
Recognizing how powerful is this weapon in the Axis arsenal, ASF Manual M 5, 
issued October 1944, declares : 

"Enemy attempts to cause confusion in the United States through the spread 
of racial doctrines have made it particularly necessary that there be frank and 
objective discussion of this subject during the present war. The doctrine of 
'Aryan' superiority has become one of the dominant factors in the present world 
struggle. Hitler has made this doctrine the reason for untold aggression and 
devastation. 

"Likewise, on the other side of the world," the Manual continues, "the Japa- 
nese have been trying to demonstrate their inherent superiority. * * *" 

The mjigic of race prejudice, the Japanese discovered, had performed miracles 
in Europe. It had enabled the Nazis to get away with murder. If Hitler could 
seize Germany and disrupt Europe with the help of race hate, the Japanese saw 
no reason why they couldn't do the same thing in Asia. 

About a week after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were broadcasting: "How can 
America be fighting for racial equality when it does not exist in America?" 
During the 1943 race riots in Detroit, the Japanese propagandists had a field 
day broadcasting the news ti hundreds of millions of nonwhites in Asia and 
throughout the world. 

Japan's championing of the Negroes in the United States has only one pur- 
pose — to divide us. Negroes, forming as they do about one-tenth of the Amer- 
ican population, are an important minority, and Hitler has shown how minority 
problems can be exploited to the advantage of fascism. 

"The man who spreads rumors," ASF Manual M 5 declares, "particularly race 
rumors, about any group — racial, religious, or national — is doing Hitler's or 
Tojo's woi'k. The Nazis assumed that in this country they would find antago- 
nistic groups who would spend their time fighting each other instead of the 
German armies. Goebbels said to one of his confidants : 'Nothing will be easier 
than to produce a bloody revolution in America. No other country has so many 
social and racial tensions. We shall be able to play on many strings there.' " 

Any American who "plays on these strings" by spreading prejudices against 
minorities — Catholics, Jews, Negroes, foreign-born, and others — is, whether he 
knows it or not, playing the Axis game. 

(The foregoing will help you to plan a brief introductory talk in your own 
words.) 

THE MAINSPRING OF AMERICAN LIFE 

"The Founding Fathers of the United States drew up a Declaration of Inde- 
pendence proclaiming that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable rights. Among these rights are life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness. Once independence had been won, the framers of the 
Constitution secured these rights in law by incorporating them into a Bill of 
Rights guaranteeing freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, 
and equality before the law. 

"This, the mainspring of American life, is what our enemies would have us 
destroy even while our armies are winning victories overseas. They would 
have us forget our belief in the equality of man and adopt their own false 
standards of race supremacy. They would see us divided against ourselves, 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1559 

our national strength consumed in racial and religious hatreds. The America 
our troops sought to preserve would then have been destroyed by our own hands. 
"This attempt to bring about civil strife has met with more success than many 
of us care to admit. Propaganda aimed at setting one group against another 
has found its mark in many instances, and we have seen the sorry spectacle of 
religious bigotry and racial hatred rise where none had existed before. Or, 
where misunderstandings already existed, we have seen these misunderstandings 
somehow turned into animosities bitter enough to involve an entire city. And 
largely because a few hate-spreaders have accomplished their assignments." — 
Hon. Frank Murphy, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court: Race 
Hate — The Enemy Bullets Can't Stop (Liberty magazine, Jan. G, 1945). 

SCAPEGOAT CONCEPT VIOLATES CHRISTIAN CODE 

"In truly civilized societies, where the rights and dignity of the individual 
are respected and economic opportunity is open to all according to their ability — 
in short, in a working democracy — these fears and hatreds have little to feed 
upon. They are dissolved by the forces of political freedom, universal education, 
and social welfare. Nothing is more undemocratic than hatred of other groups 
merely because they are somewhat different from our own. To condemn a whole 
class for the faults of 1 or 2 individuals is a sign of stupidity — or of knavery. 

"Likewise, when the religion of the people Is spiritually vital, prejudices against 
minorities do not easily take root. The concept of a scapegoat selected from 
weak and defenseless groups for cruel and unjust treatment violates the whole 
ethical code of Christianity : 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.' A religion 
whose foundation stones are the universal fatherhood of God and the brother- 
hood of man must inevitably contradict any scheme of things that divides man- 
kind into permanently 'superior' groups, mutually hostile. The greatest religious 
leaders of all faiths have, in fact, opposed these tendencies to set one race or 
class against another. Pope Pius XII, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the heads 
of the Protestant communions in America, and the chief rabbis of Judaism have 
all condemned racial and religious prejudices in outspoken and strikingly similar 
language. 

"The scapegoats of history have suffered tragic injustice, but persecution has 
never destroyed them. But the bad effects of intolerance upon the intolerant 
themselves have been evident from Nero to Hitler. Mental specialists who have 
studied these subjects have found that extreme intolerance has a destructive 
effect on the mind, and often results in a condition similar to some forms of 
insanity. It undermines the personality and even physical health ; it weakens 
the ability to enjoy normal life. In the long run, the hater is more to be pitied 
than the hated." — Kenneth M. Gould : They Got the Blame. 

TEST OF DEMOCRATIC FAITH 

"The peace, to which we now look, will further test our democratic faith. It 
will not be enough to stamp out antidemocratic practices in the lands of our 
enemies. The conditions which created fascism there must not pass unnoticed 
here. Their first, and most dangerous symptom, is always the same every- 
where — an abandonment of equal justice to all — the placing of some groups in 
a preferred class of citizenship at the expense of other groups. True democracy 
must continue the war on all such beliefs. 

"Like most of the great values of life, the ideals of democracy and peace can 
be won or maintained only by constant struggle. For democracy is a fighting 
faith. No man with a conscience can be so far removed from that struggle as 
not to feel the compulsion of joining in it. Each of us in our own way has a job 
to do. The principles of fascism, and all that fascism stands for with its barbaric 
denial of human values, must be obliterated and destroyed. To accomplish this 
there must be an emphatic reassertion of democratic values and a resurgence 
of democratic faith at home and throughout the world. And there will be." — 
Hon. Hugo L. Black, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court. 

HOW PREJUDICES DEVELOP 

1. How do we get our prejudices f 

All of us inherit certain characteristics such as the color of our skin and the 
shape of our head. But we do not inherit our prejudices. When we are born 
we have only the capacity to develop love and hate and the other human emotions. 



1560 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Whom we learn to like or dislike, love or hate, deiiends on our experiences — in 
our home, in our school, in our neighborhood — and the effect these experiences 
have upon us. The language we learn, our religion, ideas, feelings, and atti- 
tudes, our manners and prejudices — all these come from our environment. 

As children, we imitate not only activities of those around us, especially our 
parents, but also feelings, attitudes, and opinions. Prejudices, too, are absorbed 
unconsciously from our parents and other people in our environment. 

By the time we have grown up we already have pictures in our mind of many 
people with whom we've had little or no contact. We may have a stereotyped 
picture of Negroes as lazy, stupid, happy-go-lucky; of Jews or Scots as stingy 
and money-mad ; of Irishmen as hot-tempered, brawling, whisky-loving. These 
stereotypes are being constantly reinforced through newspapers, movies, con- 
versations and jokes, books and radio. A single story, comic strip, or movie 
may not make too deep an impression. However, when time after time the Negro 
is presented as a crap-shooting, shiftless character ; the Latin as a gangster or 
racketeer ; the oriental as a slinking, mysterious, and crafty person — then deep 
and lasting impressions are made which go to form attitudes and prejudices. 

ERRORS OF GENERALIZING 

There is another way that we get false ideas about whole groups of people. 
As youngsters we may have played games with boys in the neighborhood, and 
one of them, perhaps a Pole or an Italian, may have cheated. We then conclude 
that all Poles or all Italians cheat, and we carry this idea with us all through 
life. We conclude that because one member of a group acted in a certain way, 
all members of that racial, i-eligious, or national group will act the same way. 
We usually make these false generalizations about any group but our own. If 
we're Protestant and a member of our group lies, we don't condemn all Protes- 
t".nts. If we're Catholic and one of our members steals, we don't say all Cath- 
olics are thieves. If we're Jewish and one of our group commits a crime, we 
don't say all Jews are criminals. 

It is only natural and human to be curious about things or people about whom 
we know very little. Curiosity is wholesome, and when it leads a man to 
investigate honestly the thing that arouses his curiosity, he often finds something 
new and interesting. However, when he does not make the effort to look honestly 
into the thing that first called forth curiosity — when, instead, he lets the matter 
dwell and go unanswered — he closes his mind to healthy thinking, and trouble 
begins: Curiosity gives way to su.spicion — suspicion quickly converts itself to 
fear — and fear grows into hate. One fears the thing he suspects, and hates that 
which makes him afraid. This fear of the strange and unfamiliar is called by a 
high-sounding name — xenophobia. Primitive tribes usually feared and there- 
fore hated a neighboring tribe because they didn't know them. Unenlightened 
people today have that same fear and suspicion of the unknown. Only when 
we've lived and worked with people of different races, cultures, and backgrounds, 
and learned to know them, can we really overcome these primitive fears. 

INSECURITY BREEDS PREJUDICE 

Prejudices develop too, from a feeling of insecurity or frustration. We may 
feel uncertain about our ability or prestige. We may feel insecure in our job 
or our social position. To strengthen our own confidence and feeling of self- 
importance, we often search for someone to look down upon as "inferior" or some 
group to blame for our failure and misfortune. That is why there is more 
prejudice in times of social stress and economic depre-ssion. Depression brings 
insecurity — and insecure people begin looking around for someone or some group 
on whom they can pin the blame. 

Prejudices are often deliberately exploited by some people to further their 
own purposes. The Germans used the hate technique to divide opposition, to 
confuse the real issues, to blame national or international ills on innocent scape- 
goats, and to gain a following by a common hate. "Hate the Jews !" they yelled. 
"Hate the Poles !" "Hate the Russians !" "Hate the Negroes !" "Hate the Cath- 
olics !" Hate them for their color — their religion — their politics — their national- 
ity. Hate them for any reason — or for no reason — but hate theni. For hate 
meant power — to the Nazis. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1561 

WHAT IS A MINORITY? 

2. What do we mean hy a minority? 

The dictionary defines a minority as less than half. But tliat doesn't quite 
explain the kind of minorities to which you and I and everyone in America 
belongs. If you're a Catholic, you're part of a minority, because Catholics don't 
number more than half of the people in this country. If you're a Negro, a foreign- 
born, a Jew, you're a member of a minority. 

Now, if you're a I'rotestant, you're a member of a majority group in America — 
but Protestants include Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and 
scores of other minorities. And while a Protestant may be part of a majority 
group in one locality in the United States, he may be in a numerical minority in 
another locality. 

America, like the rest of the world, is made up of minorities — religious, racial, 
and national. Let us remember that a minority group, like the Poles or the 
Negroes in America, may be a majority group elsewhere (say in Poland or 
Africa), and that a majority group today may become a minority group tomor- 
row — or vice versa. 

ALL HAVE BEEN "SCAPEGOATS" 

In ancient days many people believed that their guilt and sins could be trans- 
ferred to some other person, animal, or object. During rituals performed by a 
leader of the tribe, a goat was often chosen by lot and the sins of the tribe passed 
on to the animal. The goat was then driven into the wilderness or destroyed. 

Today, when people blame their troubles or woes on innocent people, we call 
this unjust persecution "scapegoating." 

S. Have all minority groups been "scapegoats"? 

At one time or another, every minority group has been used as a scapegoat and 
has suffered fi-om prejudice and pei'secutiou. If we go back deep into history, 
we find powerful leaders who covered up their selfish motives by inciting people's 
emotions against "troublemaking'' minorities. In the days of the Romans, 
Christians were blamed tor all the troubles of the Roman Empire — including 
the burning of Rome — and for years they were persecuted. 

Christians, in turn, have persecuted Jews. During the "Black Deatk" in the 
Middle Ages, when bubonic plague killed off one-fourth of Europe's population, 
responsibility was laid to the Jews who were tortured and oppressed, even though 
Jews were dying off as rapidly as Christians. In Spain, monarchists rode to 
power against the Jews. The autocratic empire of the Czars blamed the Jews 
for the abuses of the Russian feudal regime and massacred thousands of them. 

In the ISth century, a large colony of French Huguenots lived in England. 
They were accused of being dirty, of x-educing the standard nf living, of depriving 
Englishmen of the jobs, and of reducing their wages. A flood of pamphlets 
issued against these Huguenots was reprinted a hundred years later with the 
word "Jew" substituted for "Huguenot." 

In Hitler's Germany the Nazis began by persecuting the Jews, but eventually 
they turned upon Catholics, Protestants, Czechs, Poles — and the entire world. 

PERSECUTION IN AMERICA 

4. How about America? Has our oxen history Iteen free of scapegoating? 

America, too, has its shameful pages of persecution of minorities. Many of 
our early settlers who came here to escape religious pi-ejudices and persecution 
denied religious freedom to others. Massachusetts expelled dissenters like Roger 
Williams, while in Salem hysterical witch hunts were pursued. In one colony 
or another. Catholics, Quakers, Jews, Lutherans, Moravians, Presbyterians, 
Baptists, deists, atheists, were deprived of political and religious rights. 

In the 19th century, earlier immigrant groups began to discriminate against 
the newer immigrants. Feeling ran high against the invasion of the Irish who 
arrived in large numbers after Ireland's potato famine of 1846. Riots broke out 
against them in Philadelphia, Boston, and New York. They were accused of 
introducing slums, crime, and of depriving Americans of jobs. 

In IS50 the Know Nothing Party was formed to fight the Irish and Catholic 
immigrants, and the party remained a political force until the Civil Wax*. They 
and their prejudiced successors yelled about "the flood of ixumigration sweeping 
its millions of foreign Roman Catholics over the laixd." 



1562 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION EST GOVERNMENT 

Eventually, most of this discrimination was turned against later immigrant 
groups — tlie Poles, Italians, Slavs, Jeves, and Russians. When immigration was 
restricted to annual quotas for each nationality after World War I, preference 
was given to earlier immigrant groups. (Quotas were based on the census of 
1910, then of 1890, then on the national origin of the white population of 1920.) 

What many seem to forget is that we are all immigrants or the children of 
Immigrants. No one has a right to complain about foreigners unless it be the 
American Indian. "Americanism," said our late President Roosevelt, "is not 
and never was a matter of race and ancestry. Americanism is a matter of the 
mind and heart." 

TRUE DEMOCRACY GAINING 

5. Are there any signs that prejudices and discrimination are decreasing in 

Americat 

While the democratic ideals expressed by the Founding Fathers, the Declara- 
tion of Independence, and the Constitution have not always been practiced, never- 
theless, the liberties and freedoms which we share and which bind this Nation 
together, are one of the glorious. chapters in human history. We have gone 
further in the direction of equality of opportunities than have the people of most 
other countries, and we are continuing our progress in that direction. Through 
the years there has been a sustained effort to abolish discriminations and preju- 
dices which deny a person his fundamental rights as a citizen in a democracy. 
Discrimination and prejudices are not products of — but rather challenges to — the 
American way of life. And each of us has a personal responsibility to see to it 
that the American way of life prevails. 

From the time of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation to the present time, 
laws have been passed to carry forward the democratic principle that all men 
are created equal. 

When the Negroes were freed, 90 percent of them could neither read or write. 
In 1940, according to the Federal census, 18 of every 20 Negroes could read and 
write. Many States have already moved far toward equalization of educational 
opportunity for Negroes and whites. In a 25-year period, the registration of 
Negro college students showed an increase of 2,400 percent. 

A great advance was made in June 1941 when President Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 8802 and declared: "It is the policy of the United States to 
encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens of 
the United States regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin." The 
order requires that in all war contracts there is no discrimination because of 
race, creed, or national origin and sets up the Fair Employment Practice Com- 
mittee to enforce this provision. 

At the same time, many Americans are beginning to realize that racial and 
religious prejudices menace our war effort and our hopes for world peace. More 
and more Americans are becoming convinced that every person, regardless of 
his race, religion, or national origin, should be judged on the basis of his own 
merit. They are beginning to see that much straight thinking is needed on the 
problems of minorities and that the solution of these problems has a great deal 
to do with the welfare of our Nation as well as our own and our children's welfare. 
Many are learning that democracy cannot work for some unless it works for all. 

SIX DANGERS OF PREJUDICE 

6. Why is religious and racial prejudice a threat to all of us? 

( Suggestion : Write on the board or read to your group the topic heads in 
italic below. Then get as man.v of the answers as possible from the group.) 

A. Prejudice is contagious. — History has taught us that when we discriminate 
against one segment of the people we set a pattern that may be used against 
other groups. Hitler's persecution of the Jews, trade unionists. Communists, 
and Socialists was later directed against Catholics, Protestants, liberals, and 
eventually the people of the world. 

In 1855 Abi'aham Lincoln understood this when he said : "As a Nation we 
began by declaring all men are created equal. We now read it 'AH men are 
created equal except Negroes.' When the Know Nothings get control it will 
read 'All men are created equal except Negroes, and foreigners, and Catholics'." 

Consideration for the Negro, the Jew, the Catholic, the foreign born, or for 
any other minority group, rests not merely on the grounds of humanity and 
Justice ; it rests on the solid base of self-interest. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1563 

B. Prejudice makes all of us poorer. — We can't have an enliKhtenecl democracy 
with minority groups living in ignorance. We can't have a prosperous democracy 
with minority groups so poor that they can't afford to buy the goods America 
produces. 

If a minority is kept at a low wage scale in the same field or area in which 
we work, eventually our own wages will be reduced because of a smaller demand 
for consumer goods and the competition of cheap labor. CoiiverseVy, a higher 
standard of living for any group increases the demands for consumer goods and 
makes for a more prosperous country. Aside from the fact that it is Christian 
and democratic, it is also to our own selfish interest to help secure better housing, 
clothing, and nutrition for all our people. 

As Eric A. Johnston, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce, 
recently declared: "Whenever we erect barriers on the grounds of race or 
religion, or of occupational or professional status, we hamper the fullest ex- 
pansion of our economic security. Prejudice doesn't pay. Discrimination is 
destructive." 

C. Prejudice rois us of minority talents. — Prejudice often prevents minority 
groups from developing their abilities and skills. It limits their achievements 
and deprives the Nation of their genius. We are all poorer in America today 
because discrimination prevents members of some minorities from rising to their 
greatest possible achievements, thus lessening their potential contributions to the 
general wealth and welfare of America. 

D. Prejudice Hinds us to real situation. — Prejudice makes impossible any real 
solution of economic, social, or personal difficulties. When we blame war or 
social and economic troubles on some innocent minority group, we are diverting 
our attention from the real causes. By blaming and hating some scapegoat for 
our misfortunes, we intensify rather than remove the difficulties. Social ills 
can only be remedied by all members of society accepting their share of responsi- 
bility and cooperating through democratic means t© solve their common problems. 

E. Prejudice endangers victory. — Prejudice means disunity, and disunity plays 
into the hands of the enemies of democracy. National unity is just as essential 
to victory as battleships and flying forti'esses. America can't give its maximum 
to the w-ar effort unless we conquer the disrupting effects of prejudice on the 
fighting front and the producion front. 

The War Department (in ASF Manual M 5) recognizes that "discrimination 
on the basis of race or color * * *" is "fatal to military efficiency." And War 
Department pamphlet 20-3 states : "To contribute by act or word toward the 
increase of misunderstanding, suspicion, and tension between peoples of different 
racial or national origin in this country or among our allies is to help the 
enemy." 

The Detroit race riot of June 1943 and the Philadelphia transport strike of 
August 1944 offer two isolated but dramatic instances of the disruptive effects of 
discrimination on the production front. 

The walkout of 6,000 employees of the Philadelphia Transportation Co., precipi- 
tated by the assignment of 8 Negroes to jobs as streetcar operators, paralyzed 
the city's vast transportation system. The 6-day traflic tieup kept thousands of 
war workers from their jobs, and 4 million man-hours of vital war production 
were lost. 

The 2-day Detroit race riot cut war production 15 to 50 percent in some plants, 
and absenteeism ranged from 20 to 90 percent. A million hours of labor were 
lost. 

F. Prejudice endangers world peace. — Even more disastrous is the effect which 
news of race riots and discrimination against minorities has upon the morale of 
our fighting men abroad, and on the millions of people throughout the world, 
white and colored, whose loyalty and help are so vital to the Allied cause. It 
has been powerful ammunition for the propagandists of the Axis in Europe, 
Africa, the Near East, and particularly the Far East. 

Three-fourths of the people of the world are what we call colored. These 
people naturally look to the treatment of our American Negroes to see what we 
really mean when we speak of democracy. Racial and religious prejudice alien- 
ates the confidence of the vast nonwhite populations as well as other peoples, 
thwarts their hopes and our hopes of peace and freedom, and ultimately creates 
the conditions from which future global wars can develop. 

How we treat minorities is, therefore, more than a matter of mere domestic 
concern. Almost 13 million people in the United States were born in Europe, and 
27 million have parents born in Europe. The mistreatment of some Mexicans in 
the United States echoes throughout North and South America ; a race riot 



1564 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

provokes discussions and resentments in Africa, the Philippines, and among the 
800 million nonwhite people in China and India. 

Throughout the world there are millions of people convinced that this is a 
total war against fascism and fascist ideas. Their concept of peace includes 
the hope — even the determination — that when this war is won, there will be no 
such thing as superior and inferior peoples anywhere in the world. 

STORY OF AMERICA PROVES IT 

The story of America is proof that there are no superior or inferior people. 
Our country has been made great by people who came from every land under the 
sun — people with names like Carnegie, Sikorsky, Toscanini, Einstein, Osier — 
and thousands more. But it isn't only the big names, the hall-of-fame names, 
who have made America— any more than it is only the big names who are winning 
the war. We know that the biggest part of this war is being fought and won by 
the little names, by the millions of Joe Doakes who may never make tomorrow's 
headlines. 

The men who built and ai'e building America — who clear her forests, span her 
rivers, dig her coal, plow her fields, work her machines — the men who made 
America strong and free — and are fighting and dying to preserve that freedom on 
battlefields all over the world — are men of every race, color, religion, and 
nationality. Listen to their names at rollcall. Read their names in casualty 
lists — like these from the New York Times of March 29, 1945 : Agostinello, Cohen, 
Curran, Grunwald, Hrubec, Ivanoski, Kuzian, Marshall, Thomas, Warblanski. 

Were any of these inferior? 

FOUR ARMY CHAPLAINS 

Four Army chaplains — a Catholic priest, a Jewish rabbi, and two Protestant 
ministers — stood hand In hand on the deck of the sinking transport steamship 
Dorchester in the North Atlantic one bitter winter morning. Struck by a U-boat 
torpedo, the ship was doomed. 

Most of the men were resoued — but not the four khaki-clad chaplains. With 
utter disregard for their own lives, these four had stripped off their own life- 
jackets and given them to soldiers who had none of their own. Then praying to 
(rod for the safety of the men abandoning the sinking ship, they remained stead- 
fast on its deck until it plunged to the bottom. 

Survivors later told of having seen the four chaplains. Lieutenant Washington, 
priest; Lieutenant Goode, rabbi; Lieutenant Poling and Lieutenant Fox, minis- 
ters — praying together as the ship carried them to their death. 



Aids for Discussion Leaders 

The following points of information are offered with the thought that they 
may be helpful to you during the discussion. They have no immediate place 
in the discussion proper, but they may prove useful should additional questions 
be raised by any members of your group. 

Modern science has revealed that all human blood is the same whether it be 
the blood of an Eskimo, Frenchman, German, Englishman, or an African pygmy — 
except for one basic difference. If you look at the dog tags of the men in your 
unit you'll notice that their are four types of blood — O, A, B, AB — and it all has 
to do with the matter of blood transfusions. While blood type O can be mixed 
successfully with the other 3, none of the other 3 can be mixed with one another 
without clotting. 

Whites, Negroes, Mongolians — all races, religions, nationalities have every one 
of these blood types. 

The blood and race theories of the Nazis have never been accepted by scientists 
and have more than been disproved by the war. It is true that years ago 
Germ.'ins were in the forefront in many fields of science. But today, the United 
States — a melting pot of all nationalities — leads the world in science. In the 
mid-19th century it was the British, while in the 17th century it was the Dutch 
who were the most scientifically inclined. 

Under future historical or cultural influences, the Chinese may again be among 
the most advanced technological people as they were at an earlier period in world 
history. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1565 

In the ninth century, Scandinavians were the feared, warlilic Viliings; today 
they are a ijeaceful, nonaggressive people and chief advocates of cooperatives. 
For centuries the Japanese had a record of uninterrupted peace and nonaggres- 
sion while today Japan is one of the most warlike nations. 

Immigrant groups coming to America have carried with them the special 
traditions, skills, and attitudes of the economic group into which they were 
forced. In feudal agricultural societies the Jews, excluded from agriculture, 
were compelled to become the merchants and craftsmen. Thus Jews in America 
most commonly entered commerce and certain of the skilled crafts and pro- 
fessions. Italians are vine growers in California for obvious geographical 
and liistorical reasons. Poles entered the coal fields because many of the first 
and most enterprising immigrants from Poland were miners from Silesia who 
established centers of Polish population in America's mining regions. 

The special skills which members of a group possess and the occupations in 
which they engage are the result of historical conditioning and not the result 
of any inherent traits. 

The following excerpts are from ASF Manual IVI 5 : 

"Competent scholars in the field of racial differences are almost unanimous 
In the opinion that race 'superiority' and 'inferiority' have not been demonstrated 
despite the existence of clearly defined and tested differences between individuals 
within every race. 

"Scientific knowledge does not support the idea of the inherent superiority 
of any one race over another. Students of history, psychology, biology, and 
anthropology are in general agreement that the progress of civilization has 
had little or no relation to alleged inborn, biological characteristics of particular 
races or nationalities. 

"It Is agreed also that most of the differences revealed by intelligence tests 
and other devices can be accounted for in terms of differences in opportunity 
and background. The important consideration at this time, then, is how to 
offer increased opportunities — both physical and cultural — to all handicapped 
groups, regardless of race, since the.se variables account in large part for poor 
performance and achievement in every group. 

"Character and personality traits unsuitable in the soldier which may exist 
among your men are principally the result of environment, not of race. 

"The Army cannot function efficiently on the basis of theories that Individual 
capacities are definitely fixed by a man's race. 

"The Army accepts no theories of racial inferiority or superiority for American 
troops, but considers that its task is to utilize its men on their individual merits 
In the achievement of final victory. A realistic and impartial examination of 
the evidence on racial difference in ability supports this position." 

The following are unofficial figures, compiled under the supervision of Louis I. 
Dublin, vice president and chief statistician of the Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co.: 

"Jews comprise approximately 3.5 percent of the population of the United 
States. As of March 1, 1945, more than 500,000 Jews were in the Armed Forces. 
They constitute a little over 4 percent of the men and women in the service. 
It is estimated that on March 1, 1945, there were 35,000 Jewish causualties, 
approximately 7 percent of the Jews in service. Up to March 1, 1945, total 
casualties in the Armed Forces were 840.000, or approximately 7 percent." 

For the past 100 years organizations like the "Know Nothing" Party have been 
asserting that a good Roman Catholic can't be, at the same time, a loyal American 
citizen. The Vatican, they maintain, claims absolute and unquestioning obedi- 
ence in all things, and as an American citizen, a Catholic must support the 
church against the state. 

This slander assumes the existence of a Catholic political party in the United 
States. Of course, there is no such thing. Catholics, like every other group, 
are found in all political parties. 

Eeligious bigotry reached shameful heights in the election campaign of 1923 
when the late Alfred E. Smith, a devout Catholic, was nominated for President. 
Anti-Catholics maintained that in the event of Smith's election, the Pope would 
dictate to the President, and that the interests of the United States would be 
subordinated to those of the church. 

Alfred E. Smith stated his position clearly and unequivocally. He declared 
that no power in the Catholic Church could interfere with the operations of the 
United States Constitution or the enforcement of the laws of the land. He 
believed in absolute freedom of conscience for all men, and in equality of all 
churches, sects, and beliefs. He believed in the absolute separation of church 



1566 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

and state, and in the enforcement of the Constitution's provisions prohibiting 
Congress from enacting any law concerning an establishment of religion or pre- 
venting religion's free exercise. He believed in the common brotherhood of man 
and he fervently hoped that "never again in this land will any public servant 
be challenged because of the faith in which he has tried to walk humbly with 
his God." 

According to an intensive study made by Fortune magazine, "there is no 
basis whatever for the suggestion that Jews monopolize United States business 
and industry. * * * The great mass of the 4,500,000 American Jews, liive the 
great mass of American non-Jews, is made up of workers, employed and non- 
employed." 

"First of all and very definitely," continues the Fortune survey, "they do not 
run banking. They play little or no part in great commercial houses like J. P. 
Morgan, National City Bank, Chase National Bank, Guaranty Trust Co., etc. 

"Among the 93,000 bankers in the United States, the Jews constitute six-tenths 
of 1 percent whereas the Jewish population comprises about 3.5 percent of the 
total number of inhabitants. * * * 

"They have an even more inconspicuous place in basic industry * * * steel, 
rubber, automobiles, chemicals, coal, shipping, transportation, aviation, light and 
power, telephone and telegraph, engineering, lumber, mining, etc. 

"In brief, Jews are so far from controlling the most characteristic of present 
day American activities that they are hardly represented in them at all. 

"There is much Jewish participation in the textile industry as agents and 
joI)bers, silk and cotton converters and in the manufacture of clothing, * * * " 

The Fortune study concludes : "Jews do not dominate the American scene. 
They do not even dominate major sections of the American scene." 



Supplementary Material 
america the hope of the oppressed 

"Evil doctrines of discrimination frequently imported from gangster nations 
plague certain areas in America. Racial and religious intolerance is being 
preached and practiced here by agents of our enemies, as well as by innocent 
victims of their propaganda. With relentless determination, our deadly oppo- 
nents still seek to apply the ancient doctrine of 'divide and rule' in their drive for 
world domination. 

"Unfortunately, propaganda poison is exceedingly difficult to remove from our 
national bloodstream. The aftereffects of this poison may be felt for years to 
come, especially if we do not recognize its danger and actively combat its spread. 
No nation on earth is more vulnerable to intolerance and bigotry than America, 
for no nation is compo-sed of more diverse races and differing creeds than this 
land of the free. America became great by being a secure haven for freedom of 
thought and action. 

"We prove conclusively that people of every race and of every creed can dwell 
together in harmony. In fact, America has become the hope and inspiration of all 
oppressed people throughout the civilized world." — President Harry S. Truman. 
March 17, 1945. 

Dr. ScHREiBER. May I ask when that was reprinted, please? 

(Document handed to Dr. Schreiber.) 

Dr. Schreiber. I don't know anything about this, but I was curious 
when they reprinted it, if you know. I don't see the date on it. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that it was advertised in the Commu- 
nist Daily Worker of October 21, 1945 ? 

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know this reprint was advertised in the 
Communist New Masses of September 11, 1945 ? 

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir ; I did not. 

Mr. Carpenter. While you were in the service, was any action taken 
to prevent the sale or reprint of Army Talk by Communist organi- 
zations ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1567 

Dr. SciiREiBER. Look, I was so low down on the scale — first of all, 
I didn't know anything about anybody doing such nonsense. Sec- 
ondly, not knowing this, I wouldn't have any authority to do anything 
about this sort of thing. I can't imagine how this was clone. It says 
"By permission of the War Department." I don't know who gave it 
to them. I never heard of it until you people told me. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that the magazine In Fact for 
August 27, 1945, stated: 

The War Dejiartment lia.s sent a complete set of orientation and etUication 
documents, 74 pamphlets in all, to this weekly with written permission to reprint 
all its restricted material. 

Dr. ScHREiBER. I didn't know about it until you told me in our 
executive session, and I pointed out to you I was not in the Army then. 
I was already out since June 28. Whoever gave permission I don't 
know. I assume it became public property. 

Mr. Carpenter. You knew nothing about this transaction at all ? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. No, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that this publication. In Fact, has 
been cited as subversive by congressional committees and other 
committees ? 

Dr. Schreiber. You people told me about it. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, will you give the citations, please ? 

Mr. ]\Iandel. The publication In Fact has been cited as subversive 
by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. 

Mr. Carpenter. In Fact states in 1945 there are several thousand 
documented instances where a soldier in charge of orientation was 
called up before high officers and accused of printing subversive ideas, 
citing as an instance Dowry Field, Calif. Do you know anything 
about this statement? 

Dr. Schreiber. No, sir. 

Mr, Carpenter. Do you know of any other instance ? 

Dr. Schreiber. Incidents of what, sir ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Where soldiers were brought up before their 
commanding officers for printing subversive ideas. 

Dr. Schreiber. I don't know specifically. There is a vague recol- 
lection that people in the field, the Information and Education people 
in the field, were frequently accused of being subversive because they 
were carrying out the Information and Education program. I think 
there was a rumor around the division that a piece might come out, 
let us say, on Negro soldiers, and if some particular officer was pretty 
troubled about Negro soldiers, he might consider that subversive edu- 
cation, and things of that sort. I don't remember anything specific. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have anything to do with the preparation 
of Army Talk No. 53? 

Dr. Schreiber. I don't know. May I look at it ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Our Soviet Ally. 

Dr. Schreiber. No more than any other talk. I would have edited 
part of any Army Talk, I think. Many of them I didn't even see. 
I would like to see the date on this first. 

Here it is. I undoubtedly participated in the editing of this. I 
assume I did. It was January 6, 1945. I was in the division. 

Mr. Carpenter. I would like to have that whole Talk printed in 
the record. 



1568 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chairman. That may go in the record and become a part of J 
the record. ' 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 419," and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 419 

[Army Talk, Orientation Fact Sheet 53, War Department, Washington 25, D. C, Jnimniy 

6. 1945] 

CHECKING THE SCORE ON OUB SOVIET ALLY 

The subject of our relations with the Soviet Union is one of the most contro- 
versial, as well as most important, that can be raised. Many deep-seated 
prejudices are likely to be encountered, along with confusion of ideas and lack 
of facts. Keep the discussion as much as possible to a realistic approach toward 
the central problem of whether we can get along with the U. S. S. R. after the 
war, and don't let it wander into lengthy side debates. 

WHAT IS A SOVIET? 

Consider half a dozen of the words that we casually toss around in conversa- 
tion about the Russians. 

Soviet : We commonly use this word to designate what was formerly called 
Russia. It actually means "council" in Russian. The Supreme Soviet is a 
legislative council, representing the group of republics officially known as the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Each of the republics (there are 13, 
not counting Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) has its own Soviet, too. Strictly, 
the word "Russia" now appears only in the names of the "Russian Socialist 
Federated Soviet Republic," which is by far the largest republic in the union. 

Socialist : They are "Socialist" Republics because they are organized along 
the lines of a system in which the means for the production (such as factories, 
mines, and utilities) and the distribution of wealth are the collective property 
of the workers. The goods which are to be consumed bt'come the personal prop- 
erty (if individual workers. 

Comuiunist : The Communists are the political organizers, it being their aim to 
spread and strengthen belief in their principles among the great majority of 
citizens who are not party members. They have two basic ideas. One is state 
ownership of factories, farms, and all other productive agencies, with distribu- 
tion of the proceeds among all the workers according to their productivity. The 
other idea is political. 

Thus, although they now have a secret police and a government-controlled 
press, their ultimate political ideals are directly opposite to the stated ideals of 
Fascist dictatorship, and their hope is to drop the appurtenances of dictatorship 
in the process of democratic evolution. 

Red : This was the color of the Russian Revolution's flag, and thus has become 
identified with the whole nation in the way that "Stars and Stripes" has become 
a national phrase for us. In some cases, too, the word that means "red" in 
Russian has the further meaning of "beautiful." 

END OF THE COMINTERN 

Bolshevik : In the early days of the Russian Revolution, both expressions 
brought us a comic-strip picture of a wild-eyed individual with an unkempt 
beard, carrying a lighted bomb. The word in Russian has no relation to this 
cartoon figure ; it simply means "majority," and referred to the group among 
the early revolutionists which believed in stronger action. 

Comintern : As early as 1928, the Soviet had ousted Leon Trotsky, one of the 
"diehard" exponents of world revolution, who was assassinated in Mexico in 
1940. 

IN MANY WAYS LIKE AMERICANS 

But poverty is comparative and the Russian was not suffering at the begin- 
ning of the war from such poverty as he had suffered under the czar. He was 
proud and reassured because the Russian state owned all the productive wealth 
and he no longer felt exploited by a ruling class. He is confident now that his 
upward march will be rapidly resumed with the end of the war, the resumption 
of production for civilian use, and the expansion of his great resources. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 15G9 

CORDIAL HELATIONS IN PAST 

After the Russian Revolution, we did not recognize the new state until 19.33, 
partly because we disapproved of the early Soviet empliasis upon world revolu- 
tion, and partly because the new regime refused to recogiii'/.e df'i)ts incurred by 
the czar. 

AVOWED STAND FOR PEACE 

On its record, the Soviet policy has had a clear and realistic aim. Its avowed 
policy has been peace through international collective security, if possible, or 
strong defenses by its own efforts if collective security failed. 

After Munich in September 1938, pursuing its realistic policies, the Soviet 
looked to its own protection. Among its actions was moving into Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and into Poland after the Nazi blitzkrieg hit the Poles 
in September 1939. The Soviet made a nonaggression pact with Germany in 
1939 which the Nazis broke, and a 5-year nonaggression pact with Japan in 
1941. 

Through our conferences at Moscow and Teheran, and through daily repeti- 
tions to its people through state-controlled press and radio, the Soviet liiis re- 
affirmed its aim as lasting peace through international cooperation. 

HAS EARNED A BREAK 

On the other hand, there are voices which automatically condemn anything 
the Soviet does. Their basic fear is that demonstrated success of communism 
might threaten their proi^erty and way of life developed under our system of free 
enterprise and private ownership. 

Dr. ScHREiBER. May I point out to you, please, Mr. Carpenter, that 
durinjr the war we were fighting the Axis, and the Soviets, the Chinese, 
the British and French were our allies. Only an Axis agent would try 
to cause hostility between the allies. Our task was to keep people 
together and to preserve national unity and allied unity, as I have out- 
lined before. 

Today, God forbid we have a war, we will not revive hostility 
against Japan and Germany, because we need them on our side now, 
and we would certainly point propaganda against the Russians. 

This was done 9 or 10 years ago when every American was fighting 
against the common enemy. So the purposes of the division in pro- 
moting knowledge of the enemy were to preserve unity among allies, 
to preserve national unity; to combat prejudice, to hold people to- 
gether so we could win a war, was basic psychological motivation. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you responsibile for Orientation Fact Sheet 
No. 27, entitled "Progress and Poverty in China," reprinted later by 
your division under the title "Our Chinese Ally?" 

Mr. Fanelli. What number was that, counsel ? 

Mr. Carpenter. No. 27. 

Dr. Schreiber. These were Fact Sheets before the Army Talks. I 
did very little of these. In fact, I think I wrote only 1 or 2. This 
was before Army Talks was born. I don't remember this piece at 
all. 

The Chairman. You do not remember it? 

Dr. Schreiber. No. 

The Chairman. You do not even remember editing it? 

Dr. Schreiber. No. At that time I wasn't even in the glorified 
position of an editor. It must have been very early in my • 

The Chairman. That is an answer. Proceed. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you approve, in Fact Sheet No. 70, tlie follow- 
ing statements 

32918°— 54— pt. 20 8 



1570 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chairman. Fact Sheet No. 70, You may turn to it. 
Dr. ScHREiBER. Yes, sir. What page are you talking about? I 
have 70. The statement he was going to read ? 
Mr. Carpenter (reading) : 

America, too, has its shameful pages of persecution of minorities. 

Dr. Schreiber. What page is that, please ? 

Mr. Carpenter. I don t have the page number. 

Dr. Schreiber. O. K., I have the paragraph. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you approve of that statement ? 

Dr. Schreiber. That was an accurate statement. We have had 
Know Nothings; we have had persecution of Catholics, Protestants, 
and Jews. 

Mr. Carpenter (reading) : 

While the democratic ideals expressed by the Founding Fathers, the Declara- 
tion of Independence, and the Constitution have not always been practiced * * *. 

Dr. Schreiber. I don't see the statement, but would you read it 
again? You don't have the original copy there? Will you read me 
that again? I can't find it. 

Mr. Carpenter (reading) : 

While the democratic ideals expressed by the Founding Fathers, the Declara- 
tion of Independence, and the Constitution have not always been practiced * *  

Do you approve of that? 

Mr. Fanelli. It doesn't seem to be a sentence, Counsel. There must 
be more to it. It is just a phrase. 

Dr. Schreiber. You give me a clause out of some total of 4 or 5 or 6 
pages, and I cannot find it. Counsel. 

The Chairman. Did you edit that Army Talk ? 

Dr. Schreiber. Yes; I edited it. 

The Chairman. All right ; that is sufficient. 

Dr. Schreiber. This was a talk devoted to combating prejudice. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have a study that you want 
to enter into the record? 

Mr, Mandel. The Library of Congress has made a study of excerpts 
from Fact Sheet No. 53, comparing them with authoritative studies 
from other sources. I would like to have that go into the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 420." and is 

as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 420 

The Library of Congress, 
Legislative Reference Service, 
Washington, D. C, May 20, 195//. 
To : Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Attention : Mr. Benjamin Mandel. 
From : Joseph G. Whelan, Foreign Affairs Division. 
Subject : Statements on the Soviet Union. 

In response to your inquiry of May 6 there are listed below selections from 
authoritative sources which might be contrasted with the quotations given in 
your inquiry : 

I. SOVIET nationality POLICY 

A. With regard to the second and third paragraphs of your letter, selected 
quotations have already been given in a memorandum sent from this office on 
May 7, 1954. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1571 

II. SOVIET "peace" por.icy 

A. "On its record, the Soviet policy has had a clear and realistic aim. Its 
avowed policy has been peace through international collective .security, if pos- 
sible, or strong defenses by its own efforts if collective security fails *  * 

"After Munich in September 1938, pursuing its realistic policies, the Soviet 
lool<ed to its own protection. Among its actions was moving into Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and into Poland after the Nazi blitzkrieg hit tlie 
Poles in September 1930. The Soviet made a nouaggression pact with Germany 
in 1039 which the Nazis broke and a S-year-nonaggression pact with Japan in 
1941. 

"Through oar conferences at Moscow and Teheran, and through daily repeti- 
tions to its people thiough state-controlled press and radio, the Soviet has 
reaffirmed its aim as lasting peace through international cooperation. As 
soldiers accustomed to faoinp facts, we can recognize the Soviet Union as a big 
accomplished fact * * * In addition, we feel that the magnificent fighting job of 
tlie Red Army against our German enemy has earned the Soviet 'a break' in our 
judgment, a new right to the benefit of the doubt * * * " (Orientation Fact Sheet 
53.) 

B. In contrast to this statement are the following selections: 

1. "Moscow's acceptance of a treaty with Nazi Germany, which called itself 
a nonaggression pact and was in fact an aggression pact directed against Poland 
and the Baltic States, was an act of foreign policy by the government of a great 
power. The Soviet Government had its reasons. One was that it had no con- 
fidence in Mr. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain. Since Munich, it had been con- 
vinced — though wrongly — that these two were u.sing all the arts of diplomacy to 
persuade Hitler to attack the Soviet Union. When the evidence of hostility 
between them and Hitler liecame undeniable, the Soviet leaders believed — per- 
haps somewhat less wrongly — that if they alined themselves diplomatically with 
the Western Powers, and war broke out, tlie Soviet Union would bear the brunt 
of the German onslaught, while the French and Briti.sh sat behind the Maginot 
line and watched. The second reason was that the Yezhovshchina had reduced 
the armed forces and civil administration of the Soviet Union to such a 
pitiful condition that it could not face war. The third reason was that the Soviet 
leaders believed that the Anglo-French and German forces would be sufficiently 
well balanced to ensure a long and mutually exhausting war. While 'the im- 
perialists' exhausted each other, 'the land of socialism' would grow stronger in 
peace. Later on, a chance would come to intervene in favor of world revolution, 
in favor, that is, of the extension of the Stalinist system to a large part of the 
world. Meanwhile eastern Poland, the Baltic States and Bessarabia would be 
substantial gains." (Source: Seton-Watson, Hugh. From Lenin to Malenkov. 
New York, Frederick A. Praeger. Inc., 1953. p. 200.) 

2. "Only 3 weeks later, on October 22, [1939] a typical Communist election 
was held in the Polish provinces seized by Ru.ssia. The purpose was to elect 
representatives to 'People's Assemblies.' As usual, better than 90 percent of the 
eligible voters cast their ballots, and the figures showed that better than 90 
percent of the votes had gone to the candidates of various Communist-approved 
organizations. Within a matter of days, the newly elected People's Assembly of 
the Western Ukraine in turn passed a resolution requesting tha-t its territory be 
annexed to the Soviet Union, and that all large industries, banks, and land be 
confiscated by the state. The same process occurred in White Russia. The 
Supreme Soviet of the U. S S. R. wasted no time in recommending that the 
requests be granted and that the former eastern provinces of I'olaud be formally 
affixed to the Soviet Union. 

"Thus the U. S. S. R. gained 76,500 [square] miles of territory and a popula- 
tion of 12,800,000 of whom approximately 7 million were 'kindred' Ukrainians, 
and some 3 million were 'brother' White Russians. The balance consisted of 
about a million Poles and a million Jews. In Soviet eyes the legality of the 
transaction was beyond question. The Socialist motherland had extended the 
Communist principle to more non-Soviet people in a montli than it had in all of 
its previous 20 years history. For the records at least, 90 percent of them had 
expressed their gratitude at the polls. From then on, the future of Eastern 
Poland was to be solely a matter of internal Soviet politics. 

"Strategically, the new land was not vitally important. The area provided 
depth, but no natural frontier barriers. Moreover, the German-controlled, 
wedge-shaped Suwalki District menaced Soviet defense plans in the West. 
Offensively, however, the new borders with Lithuania were of immediate value. 



1572 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

and those with the Czechoslovak Carpathian Ukraine were to prove most helpful 
at the end of World War II. 

"In a little more than a month, the alliance with Nazi Germany had con- 
clusively demonstrated its worth. But the dividends had just begun. There was 
much more to come." (Source: Carman, Ernest Day. Soviet imperialism. 
Russia's drive toward world domination. Washington, D. C, Public Affairs 
Press, 1950, pp. 2G-27.) 

3. "Thus, the final moves of the Soviet Union in the Baltic area were quick 
and deadl;'. The Politburo waited patiently until Germany was occupied in 
the west with France and Britain and then carried out the Baltic coup de grace. 
Once again the ostensible basis for Soviet action was security. In addition, 
however, the Kremlin was anxious to legalize territorial seizures within its 
sphere of influence. The Baltic region, which a quarter of a century earlier had 
been Tsarist Russia's, was triumphantly restored to Soviet Russia. A 'window' 
on the Baltic had been opened. The U. S. S. R. achieved, as Molotov said, 'ice-free 
ports of which we have such great need.' Furthermore, Communist doctrine ex- 
panded with territorial acquioition. The 66.800 square miles of territory and 
5,998,000 people that were affixed to the U. S. S. R. were simultaneously liberated 
from 'capitalist enslavement' and returned to the control of the 'toiling masses.' 

"The methods employed were perhaps crude, but Soviet historians were pro- 
vided with the necessary basis of legitimacy all the way through, and including 
a 'spontaneous' desire of the aggrandized states to become Soviet republics. 
Soviet history would not record, however, that the presence of the Red army 
made it impossible for the Baltic States to resist, or negotiate on an equal 
basis, that the Soviet notes had been in the form of ultimatums, that the pres- 
ence of Zhadanov, Dekanozov, and Vinshlnsky constituted direct interference in 
the internal affairs of the Baltic Republics. 

"All in all, the Red army was doubtless the indispensable instrument of 
aggrandizement : its presence facilitated subsequent actions which otherwise 
could not have proceeded with such ease. Subsequently, Soviet constitutional 
provisions for the admittance of new states made possible the quick absorption 
of new Soviet regimes and added that measure of legitimacy always sought for 
in Kremlin actions of this type. 

"The time in which these startling acts of aggrandizement were accomplished 
was less than 2 weeks. When the world looked briefly away from the tragedy 
of June 1940, the Soviet Union presented it with a fait accompli in the Baltic. 
But it was not the only swift Soviet seizure of this period. With equal quick- 
ness the Politburo soon struck in the Balkans." (Source: Ibid., p. 50-51.) 

III. ALLEGED DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION 

A. "The Supreme Soviet is a legislative council, representing the group of 
republics officially known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics * * * they 
are 'socialist' republics because they are organized along the lines of a system 
in which the means for the production (such as factories, mines and utilities) 
and distribution of wealth are the collective property of the workers. The goods 
which are to be consumed becomes the personal property of individual work- 
ers. * * * The Communists today form a political party, the only legal one in 
the Soviet Union. * * * the Communists are the political organizei's, it being 
their aim to spread and strengthen belief in their principles among the great 
majority of citizens who are not party members. * * * Thus, although they now 
have a secret police and a government-controlled press, their ultimate political 
ideals are directly opposite to the stated ideals of Fascist dictatorship, and 
their hope is to drop the appurtenances of dictatorship in the process of demo- 
cratic evolution." (()rientation Fact Sheet 53.) 

B. In contrast to this statement are the following selections : 

1. "Today the Kremlin, when discussing the state, talks about the 'collective 
leadership' of the central committee of the Communist Party, a group of 125 
persons who are characterized as representing the best elements of the country. 
Not a single member of the central committee is a member of the Soviet prole- 
tariat. 

"That the Soviet Union is a dictatorship over the proletariat, rather than of 
it, is proved by a recital of the conditions under which Soviet proletarians work. 
Lateness for work, playing truant from the job and similar 'economic crimes' 
are punishable by law. In practice, strikes are forbidden and the Soviet trade 
unions have as their most important function not the protection of their mem- 
bers but the raising of labor prodnrtivity. 

****** 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1573 

•'Engles wrote in Anti-Duehring : 'The proletariat seizes the state power and 
transforms tlie means of production in the first instance into the state power. But 
in doing this, it puts an end to itself as tlie proletariat, it puts an end to all class 
differences and class antagonisms, it puts an end also to the state as the 
state.  * * The government of persons is replaced by the administration of 
things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not 
abolished, it withers awa.v.' 

"On this score, Soviet doctrine has explicitly repudiated the founders of so- 
cialism. Stalin, in 11)39, defended the continued existence of the Soviet state 
as such, and called for its strengthening on the ground that it was required to 
defend 'socialism from foreign attack.' He heaped scorn on those who expected 
Marx and Engels to have foreseen all future contingencies .so that 'we might 
calmly doze at the fireside and nninch readymade solutions.' 

"In fact, Russia today has the most all-embracing state and the most gigantic 
bureaucratic apparatus the world has ever known. Where Engels had thought 
that with capitalism overthrown 'there is nothing more to be repressed which 
would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary,' the Soviet state is 
the most efficient repressive force known to history. 

^ ***** * 

"In the political field, the Communist Party is, and for more than three decades 
has been, the only political group permitted to exist. Communist ideology has 
the sanctity of holy writ in a theocracy. There is no sign that Stalin's suc- 
cessors intend to permit any real clash of political opinion to emerge in public. 
The recent Soviet 'elections' were the same mockei'y of Western forms as before. 
Only one candidate, approved beforehand by Moscow, was on the ballot for each 
seat in the Soviet Parliament." (Source: Schwartz, Harry. Communism: The 
Promise and the Reality. The New York Times Magazine (New York), May 2, 
1954: 9, 76, 77.) 

IV. ALLEGED NATIONAL UNITY IN THE SOVTET UNION 

A. "Red : This was the color of the Russian revolution's flag and thus has 
become identified with the whole nation in the way that 'stars and stripes' has 
become a national phrase for us. * * * In some cases, too, the word that means 
'red' in Russian has the further meaning of 'beautiful.'" (Orientation Fact 
Sheet 53.) 

B. The "New Complete Russian-English Dictionary" gives the following mean- 
ing of the word "Kapachbin" "red; ruddy; fig. [figurative] serene, fine, nice, 
fair, beautiful, pretty, handsome ; a republican, revolutionary, extremist * * *" 
[Source: Segal, Louis Dr. New complete Russian-English dictionary. New York, 
G. E. Stechert & Co., 1946. 3d ed., p. 316]. But, the suggestion of national unity 
in the Soviet Union might possibly be contrasted with the quotations given in 
the memorandum from this office of May 7. In addition, the following quota- 
tions might serve as a contrast : 

1. "The Soviet Ukrainians, Russians, Byelorussians, and other nationals de- 
serted and surrendered to and welcomed the Germans — not as such, but as the 
enemy of the regime. The conditions created in the initial rout of the Soviet 
Armies were seized upon as a promise of liberation from oppression rather than 
as an opportunity to establish independent national minority states. The fact 
that the Ukrainians predominated among the defectors was principally a geo- 
graphical accident of war. The same pattern of behavior on the part of the 
Soviet population was repeated — if more hesitantly — in other than predominantly 
Ukrainian areas." (Source: Rostow, Walt Whitman. The Dynamics of Soviet 
Society. New York, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1953, p. 214-215.) 

2. "According to top-secret German sources 2,053,0(X) Soviet prisoners wei'e 
taken in major battles before November 1, 1941, and a total of 3,600,000 prior 
to March 1, 1942. 'It is quite probable,' observes a student of anti-Soviet move- 
ments during World War II, 'that in 1941 many Soviet citizens felt only luke- 
warm toward their Government, and that there did exist considerable potential 
disaffection. But having gone this far, we can go no further with this "revolt" 
interpretation. It is our contention that the vastness of the early Soviet defeats 
cannot be satisfactorily explained without the inclusion of an entirely different 
concept, that of intertness.' [Sic, 'inertness?'] 

"In particular, soldiers belonging to minority groups have deserted Moscow. 
The Central Asians, reported a wartime Soviet major, a veterinarian in private 
life 'had been very poor soldiers during the war * * *. They were so hostile 
to the Russians and to the Soviet regime that they often deserted to the Ger- 



1574 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

mans * * * The Soviet Government itself was to blame for this situation be- 
cause it had treated these peoples badly. Central Asians who were formed into 
military units by the Germans fared far better than while they were in the Soviet 
Army. The appearance and discipline of Uzbeks and Turkmens improved so 
much in German service that they were almost unrecognizable.' " Source : U. S. 
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Tensions Within the Soviet 
Union (revised). Wa.shingtou, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953, p. 16. 
(Document No. 69. 83d Cong., 1st sess., Senate.) 

V. MEANING OF THE WORD "bOLSHEVIK" 

A. "Bolshevik : In the early days of the Russian revolution, both expressions 
(Bolshevik, Red) brought us a comic strip picture of a wild-eyed individual with 
an unkempt beard, carrying a lighted bomb. The word in Russian has no rela- 
tion to this cartoon figure ; it simply means 'majority' * * *." (Orientation Fact 
Sheet 53.) 

B. Freund has given the following meaning of the word "Bolshevik" : 

1. "At the second congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party 
(R. S. D. L. P.; see Social Democrats) held in 1903 in London, a wing of that 
party, led by Lenin, opposed another wing, led by Martov. Being in a majority 
toward the end of the congress, Lenin's party were called Bolsheviks (from 
the Russian word 'bolshinstvo' meaning 'majority') whereas the others were 
known as Mensheviks (from the Russian 'menshinstvo' meaning 'minority'). 
After that, Lenin formed the Bolsheviks into a separate party which, at first, 
continued to use the name of the R. S. D. L. P., adding, to distinguish them 
from the Mensheviks, a 'b' in brackets behind the abbreviation of the party 
name: R. S. D. L. P. (b)." (Source: Freund, Henry Alexander. Russia From 
A to Z, London, Angus and Robertson, Ltd., 1945, p. 45. ) 

With a view to demonstrating the nature of Bolshevik terrorism during the 
early years of the revolution which inspired the image in the above quotation A, 
the following is quoted : 

2. "When Lady Astor, in company with Bernard Shaw and Lord Lothian, met 
Stalin in the summer of 1931, she blurted out the unconventional question : 'How 
long are you going to continue killing people?' And Stalin, possibly taken a 
little off his guard, shot back the retort : 'As long as it is necessary.' 

"Here one has in a nutshell the philosophy of the terrorism which has always 
been an integral part of the Communist dictatorship. The right of the rulers 
to decide how long it may be necessary to go on killing people is absolute and 
unquestioned. The right of the individual to live does not weigh in the balance. 
And the absence of habeas corpus in Soviet jurisprudence has often led to the 
application of a sterner substitute : habeas cadaver. 

"The degree of Soviet terrorism has always varied with time and circum- 
stances. One of its fiercest outbursts was in the late summer and early autumn 
of 1918, when the military situation was critical and an attempt had been made 
on the life of Lenin. According to official reports, which certainly did not err 
in overexaggeration, the numbers of people who were rounded up and shot at 
this time ran into thousands. Another major example of Red terror occurred in 
the Crimea in the winter of 1920-21, after the defeat of the last White leader. 
Baron Wrangel. The former President of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Bela 
Kun, and a fanatical veteran woman Communist, Zemlyachka, were sent to the 
Crimea with sweeping powers to root out counter-revolution ; and under their 
orders there was a wholesale slaughter of former White officers and individuals 
of all classes who were suspected of having been in any way connected with 
Wrangel's regime." (Source: Chamberlin, William Henry. Russia's Iron Age. 
Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1934, pp. 152-153.) 

VI. THE COMINTERN 

A. "Comintern: As the U. S. S. R. devoted itself more and more to building 
up its internal economic structure and to trade with other nations, emphasis 
upon the Comintern lessened. On May 22, 1943, the organization was officially 
dissolved." (Orientation Fact Sheet-53.) 

B. In describing the seven strategies of the Communist movement, Martin 
Ebon wrote : 

1. "The fourth strategy (1935 to 1938) : United Front.— It took the Comintern 
more than a year to realize that Adolf Hitler, Germany's ambitious dictator, 
had to be taken seriously. His regime came to power on January 30, 1933. In 
January 1934 the Comintern finally abandoned its third strategy of extremist 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1575 

revolutionary technique. It immediately pressed for a workinp; coalition among 
the Communists, Socialists, and all other anti-Nazi forces. This was an abrupt 
change, dictated by the very real fear of Soviet leaders that Hitler's aggressive 
nationalist regime might translate its rantings against communism into actual 
military attacks on the U. S. S. K. Russia's leaders wanted the rest of the world 
on their side. This was no time to alienate possible allies. The Socialists, whom 
the Communists had only a few weeks before denounced as 'social Fascists,' 
as 'imposters,' as 'knaves of the bourgeoisie,' hardly had time to adjust themselves 
to this sudden change. 

"The Popular Front Government of France was a striking illustration of Com- 
munist ability to cooperate wlien told to do so. There was also a shift in Com- 
intern top leadersiiip. The experienced and colorful Georgi Dimitrov took over 
as president in 193.5. Dimitrov had won worldwide admiration for his courage- 
ous defense at the Reichstag trials, staged by the Nazis in 10;}3. 

"Then, in the fall of l!>oG and throughout 1037, other trials took place in 
Moscow. An)oug the defendants were Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and 
Radek, as well as a host of other Russian officials accused of treason. For 
months, these Moscow trials absorbed world attention. The prosecution charged 
the defendants with conspiracy, linking them with Nazi Germany and Trotsky. 
The defendants startled the world with exceedingly frank confessions and were 
executed or imprisoned. 

"Stalin's control and policy remained triumphant. Communist strategy was 
coordinated with Soviet foreign affairs, then in the hands of the moderate, 
westernized Maxim Litvinov. Russia joined the League of Nations and con- 
cluded alliances with France and Czechoslovakia. Everywhere, Communists 
cooperated actively with other leftist groups. Civil war in Spain further em- 
phasized the split between fascism and the rest of the world. The Communists 
were anxious to show that they were on the side of the angels, respectable and 
democratic. 

"The fifth strategy (1939 to 191,0): Imperialist war. — The change from ex- 
tremist-revolutionary protection of Russia to a popular front policy had been 
i-apid. But it could not compare with the propagandistic somersault that fol- 
lowed the Soviet-German pact of August 19.39. World War II began immediately 
afterward with the attack on Poland. The blind loyalty of Communist sup- 
porters was put to its severest test. Those who had been violently anti-Nazi 
were suddenly forced to help the Germans by sabotaging the war effort of the 
Western nations. France, where the Communist Party had enjoyed its highest 
prestige during the Popular Front period, was pai'ticularly affected. 

"For a year and a half, the Communist press was filled with violent denuncia- 
tions of British and American leaders. This worldwide spectacle of party 
discipline and hypocrisy ended, as abruptly as it had begun, with Germany's 
attack on the Soviet Union, on June 22, 1941. 

"The sixth strategy (19^1 to 19Ii5) : United v-ar effort. — In many respects, the 
war period marked a return to the 'united front' policy. There were, however, 
important variations. The Comintern has suspended the class struggle. The 
charge of imperialism, leveled against the Western Powers during all previous 
strategic phases, was dropped. Strikes were no longer regarded as legitimate 
tools in the hands of the working class. The Communists and Soviet Russia 
shared with the Allied Nations the desire to defeat the Axis quickly and 
completely. 

"Communist propaganda stressed United Nations unity: Military effective- 
ness in the struggle against the Axis powers became paramount. Communist 
units played a prominent, and often leading, role in underground movements. 
This was especially true in France, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia. 

"At the same time, the Communist parties did not fail to press special aims 
of the Soviet Union. When, in 1943, the Western Powers believed that establish- 
ment of a second front against the German-occupied European Continent would 
be militarily premature, this policy did not coincide with the wishes of the 
Soviet leaders. Through its diplomatic and military representatives, the 
U. S. S. R. pressed for a second front, while Communist groups attempted to 
create public pressure in the same direction. 

"As victory approached, the Teheran conference among President Roosevelt, 
Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin was used by the Communists as a 
symbol of Allied cooperation. Communist emphasis on this pact underlined that 
It assigned most of eastern Europe and the Balkans, as well as certain far eastern 
areas, to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. 



1576 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

"Throughout the War, Communist strategy played up the role of Soviet-backed 
military movements throughout the world. The Chinese Communist armies, the 
Yugoslav Liberation Movement, and the Greek National Liberation Front (EAM) 
vpere among the forces held up by the Communist press and defended against 
all criticism. The most celebrated case was the clash between Marshal Josip 
Broz-Tito of Yugoslavia and the war minister and guerrilla leader Draja 
Mikhailovitch, who was later executed by the Tito regime. 

"Thus, the postwar policy of communism was already perceptible in outline 
during the war. But it i-emained for the seventh strategy to reveal clearly the 
aims of communism in a world where the Soviet Union occupies a commanding 
position." (Source: Ebim, ]\Iartin. World Communism Today. New York, 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1048, pp. 22-24.) 

2. "Has the Communist International really been dissolved? 

"The official Communist view, expressed by so high an authority as Joseph 
Stalin himself, is that it ceased to exist in 1943. But the striking similarities in 
policy, activities, and organizational methods that Communist parties display 
in every part of the world point to the existence of an international synchroniza- 
tion machinery. 

^ t ^ * * * ^i 

"The precision with which the seventh strategy of world communism is being 
carried out permits the conclusion that the Comintern has ceased official existence 
while going underground." ( Source : Ibid., p. 456. ) 

VII. NAZI PROPAGANDA 

A. "Some of the people who talk so glibly about 'our future war with the 
Soviet' are echoing Nazi propaganda without realizing it." 

B. The search for contrasting statements to this quotation was not successful. 

VIII. SOVIETS VIEW POSTWAR ERA WITH OPTIMISM 

A. "In many ways like Americans *  * The Russian was not suffering at the 
beginning of the war from .such poverty as he had suffered under the Czar, He 
was proud and reassured because the Russian state owned all the productive 
wealth and he no longer felt exploited by a ruling class. He is confident now 
that his upward march will be rapidly resumed with the end of the war, the 
resumption of production for civilian use, and the expansion of his great resources. 
Personally, and as a nation, the Russians look to the future with confidence. 
In this confidence they are like Americans." (Orientation Fact Sheet 53.) 

B. Contrasting views to this statement might be suggested in the selections 
from the memorandum of May 7 from this office. The following quotation reflects 
the attitude of the Soviet youth : 

1. "Frederick C. Barghoorn, who for years was attached to the American 
Embassy and traveled widely in the Soviet Union, states : 

" 'Writers and poets had been given a little more freedom of expression during 
the war than was customary, and some of them, not realizing the temporary 
character of this relaxation of control, cautiously gave expression to moods which 
the party was not slow in denouncing as irresponsible, frivolous, and downright 
harmful. 

" 'Soviet youth, particularly students, seem to have been especially hit by these 
moods. The Soviet press has had a good deal to say about the attitude of youth. 
The head of the Communist Youth League in an article written in the spring of 
1946 denounced a mood of "demobilization" among a part of the young people. 
In some cases, their disillusionment took the form of deep discontent or even a 
nihilistic attitude toward Soviet life. One Soviet acquaintance told me that the 
regime had lost confidence in the youth, and reposed its faith in the children, 
who are now being subjected to intense chauvinistic indoctrination. The book 
"I Want To Be Like Stalin," edited by Prof. George Counts and recently pub- 
lished here — a translation of parts of the Soviet handbook for teachers — indicates 
the flavor of this indoctrination. The skepticism of Soviet youth tends to be 
bitter and sardonic, though tinged with deep fatalism. It is very different from 
the superficial hard-boiled mood of many American young people. In part, it is 
the psychology of a generation which has infinitely more reason to consider 
itself 'host" than had its American counterpart in the 1920's. I often was told 
by young Soviet acquaintances that the war had taken a part of their youth and 
that the liard postwar period would consume the rest — if a new war didn't. 
Among a few of the intelligent youth, there is a feeling that the revolutionary 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1577 

ideas of comnninisni have been betrayed. I remember a conversation with a 
woman student whom I met once or twice in a park in Moscow and who de- 
nounced successful Soviet people as careerists and speculators. She said that the 
NKVD men and party bosses were getting all the good things of life.' " (Source : 
Tensions in the Soviet Union. Op. cit., pp. 10-11.) 

IX. UNITED STATES ROCOGNITION OF THE SOVIET UNION 

A. "After the Russian revolution, we did not recognize the new state until 
1933, partly because we disapproved of the early Soviet emphasis upon world 
revolution, and partly because the new regime refused to recognize debts 
incurred by the Czar." ( Orientation Fact Sheet 53. ) 

B. There were other reasons for the [delay in] United States recognition of the 
Soviet Union than the two given in the above quote A. On the subject of United 
States recognition of the Soviet Union, Samuel F, Bemis, an authority on Ameri- 
can diplomatic history, has written : 

1. "We have already observed in a former chapter how normal relations were 
restored by the United States after the First World War, with all but one great 
nation, Russia, with its 168 million people in Europe and Asia. Following the 
failure of the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919 to devise any solution of the 
problem of Soviet Russia, the United States during 16 years refused to extend 
recognition to that republic. The fundamental reason for this was the irrecon- 
cilability of the revolutionary communistic theory and practice of government 
with the theory and practice of American democracy and capitalism. The Soviet 
Government strengthened this determination of the United States Government 
by its refusal to sanction the loans and contracts made by previous Ru.ssian gov- 
ernments with the United States and its nationals, and by its refusal to extend 
to American citizens in Russia the type of protection customarily extended to 
aliens in the other countries of Europe. Further, the ardor of revolutionary 
propaganda, not technically from the Soviet Government, in Moscow, but from 
its international image, the Third Internationale, or international communistic 
revolutionary society, militated against American recognition. So long as a 
foreign community permitted its nationals to propagate seditious activities 
within the United States and to seek to overthrow by revolution the existing 
Government and Constitution of the United States, it was not difficult to under- 
stand why that government should shrink so inveterately from extending its own 
recognition to the source of the subversive activities. The passage of time, how- 
ever tended to smooth down the hitherto insuperable asperities and difficulties 
and incompatibilities between the two peoples. One by one the great powers of 
Europe had recognized Russia ; and in 1934 Russia took its place in the League 
of Nations. Even without recognition a very considerable volume of trade, more 
indeed than existed after recognition, sprang up between the two republics. 
Their citizens visited each other even without directly visaed passports. The 
more radical features of Russian Government gave way to a slightly less rigorous 
state communism. To keep in friendly relations with the states of the capital- 
istic world, the Russians abated their missionary ambitions and made agree- 
ments not to excite revolutionary propaganda in foreign states. Above all, the 
increasing tension of Far Eastern politics, where the interests of Russia and the 
United States supported each other more than they did Japanese policy, impelled 
the two nations, so different in their constitutional structure and social organ- 
ization to close up the gap of diplomatic irreconcilability." (Source: Bemis, 
Samuel Flagg. A Diplomatic History of the United States. New York, Henry 
Holt & Co., 1942, pp. 734-735.) 

Mr. Carpenter. Doctor, are you now an official in any organization 
known as the Washington Mental Health Association? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. I am not an official. I am chairman of the Wash- 
ington Mental Health Association of the district association. 

Mr. Carpenter. What is that ? 

Dr. Schreiber. It is locally an organization of people interested 
in promoting mental health education by getting more clinics for the 
schools, by getting more psychiatric treatment for the people. We are 
short of money. We hope it will affiliate with the National Association 
of Mental Health. It is one of hundreds throughout the country and 
basic to the mental health needs of our country. 



1578 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you born? 

Dr. ScHREiBER. G-o-r-d-o-k, Ukraine, Russia, on September 10, 
1908, and I came to the United States when I was 4 years and 9 months 
old, June 19, 1913. 

Mr. Carpenter. We have some documents to be placed into the 
record. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here the Daily Worker of October 21, 1945, 
placing and promoting the ILD, International Labor Defense, a 
reprint, which I offer for the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 421" and is as 

follows:) 

Exhibit No. 421 

[From the Daily Worker, October 21, 1954] » 

Prejudice! Roadblock to Pkogkess 

THE army's orientation COURSE 

Here is part of the United States Army's orientation course on 
racial, religious, and political prejudice. To give this excellent 
expos^ of the senselessness of prejudice the widest possible distribu- 
tion the International Labor Defense has reprinted the entire course. 
It may be obtained in sinale copy at 5 cents or in quantity at cheaper 
prices from the ILD, 112 East 19th Street, New York 3, N. Y. 

HOW PREJUDICES DEVELOP 

All of US inherit certain characteristics such as the color of our skin and 
the shape of our head. But we do not inherit our prejudices. When we are 
born we have only the capacity to develop love and hate and the other human 
emotions. 

Whom we learn to like or dislike, love or hate, depends on our experiences — 
in our home, in our school, in our neighborhood — and the effect these experiences 
have upon us. The language we learn, our religion, ideas, feelings, and attitudes, 
our manners and prejudices — all these come from our environment. 

As children, we imitate not only activities of those around us, especially our 
parents, but also feelings, attitudes, and opinions. Prejudices, too, are absorbed 
unconsciously from our parents and other people in our environment. 

By the time we have grown up we already have pictures in our mind of many 
people with whom we've had little or no contact. We may have a stereotyped 
picture of Negroes as lazy, stupid, happy-go-lucky ; of Jews or Scots as stingy 
and money mad ; of Irishmen as hot tempered, brawling, whisky loving. These 
stereotypes are being constantly reinforced through newspapers, movies, con- 
versation, and jokes, books, and radio. A single story, comic strip, or movie 
may not make too deep an impression. However, when time after time the 
Negro is presented as a crap-shooting, shiftless character ; the Latin as a gangster 
or racketeer ; the oriental as a slinking, mysterious, and crafty person — then 
deep and lasting impressions are made which go to form attitudes and prejudices. 

ERRORS OF GENERALIZING 

There is another way that we get false ideas about whole groups of people. 
As youngsters we may have played games with boys in the neighborhood, and 
one of them, perhaps a Pole or an Italian, may have cheated. We then con- 
clude that all Poles or all Italians cheat, and we carry this idea with us all 
through life. We conclude that because one member of a group acted in a 
certain way, all members of that racial, religious, or national group will act 
the same way. We usually make these false generalizations about any group 
but our own. 



»Text, as printed by the International Labor Defense, appears at p. 1558. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1579 

INSKCURTTY BREEDS PREJUDICE 

Prejudices develop, too, from a feeling of iusecurity or frustration. We may 
feel uncertain about our ability or prestige. We may feel in.secure in our job 
or our social position. To strengthen our own confidence and feeling of self- 
imiKirtance we often search for someone to loolj down upon as inferior or 
some group to blame for our failure and misfortune. 

Prejudices are often deliberately exploited by some people to further their 
own purposes. The Germans used the hate technique to divide opposition, to 
confuse the real issues, to blame national or international ills on innocent 
scapegoats, and to gain a following l)y a common hate. "Hate the Jews," tliey 
yelled. "Hate the Poles." "Hate the Russians." "Hate the Negroes." "Hate 
the Catholics." Hate them for their color, their religion, their politics, their 
nationality. Hate them for any reason — or for no reason — but hate them. For 
hate meant power to the Nazis. 

WHAT is A MINORITT? 

2. What do we mean by a minority? 

If you're a Catholic, you're part of a minority, because Catholics don't number 
more than half of the people in this country. If you are a Negro, a foreign 
born, a Jew, you're a member of a minority. 

Now, if you're a Protestant, you're a member of a majority group in America — 
but Protestants include Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and 
scores of other minorities. And while a Protestant may be part of a majority 
group in one locality in the United States, he may be in numerical minority 
in another locality. 

America, like the rest of the world, is made up of minorities — religious, racial, 
and national. Let us remember that a minority group, lilie the Poles or the 
Negroes in America, may be a majority group elsewhere (say in Poland or 
Africa), and that a majority group today may become a minority group tomor- 
row — or vice versa. 

ALL HAVE BEEN SCAPEGOATS 

3. Have all minority groups been scapegoated? 

At one time or another, every minority group has been used as a scapegoat and 
has suffered from prejudice and persecution. If we go back into history, we find 
powerful leaders who covered up their own selfish motives by inciting people's 
emotions against troubleniaking minorities. 

PERSECUTION IN AMERICA 

4. How about America? Has our own history been free of scapegoating? 
America, too, has its shameful pages of persecution of minorities. Many of 

our early settlers who came here to escape religious prejudices and persecution 
denied religious freedom to others. Massachusetts expelled dissenters like 
Roger Williams, while in Salem hysterical witch hunts were pursued. In one 
colony or another, Catholics, Quakers, Jews, Lutheran, Moravians, Presbyterians, 
Baptists deists, atheists, were deprived of political and religious rights. 

In the 19th century, earlier immigrant groups began to discriminate against 
the newer immigrants. Feeling ran high against the invasion of the Irish who 
arrived in large numbers after Ireland's potato famine in 184G. Riots broke out 
against them in Philadelphia, Boston, and New York. They were accused of 
introducing slums, crimes, and of depriving Americans of jobs. 

In 1850, the Know Nothing Party was formetl to fight the Irish and Catholic 
immigrants, and the party remained a political force until the Civil War. They 
and their prejudiced successors yelled about "the flood of immigration sweeping 
its millions of foreign Roman Catholics over the land." 

What many seem to forget is that we are all immigrants or the children of 
Immigrants. No one has a right to complain about foreigners unless it be the 
American Indian. "Americanism," said our late President Roosevelt, "is not and 
never was a matter of race and ancestry. Americanism is a matter of the mind 
and heart." 



1580 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



Danger Signals 




Hate Groups 




Rumors 




Job Discrimination 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1581 




Bad Housing 




Police Bias 




Juvenile Crimes 



1582 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

TRUE DEMOCRACY GAINING 

5. Are there any signs that prejudicies and discrimination are decreasing in 
America? 

While the democratic ideals expressed by the Founding Fathers, the Declara- 
tion of Independence, and the Constitution have not always been practiced, never- 
theless, the liberties and freedoms which we share and which bind this Nation 
together, are one of the glorious chapters in human history. 

From' the time of Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation to the present time, 
laws have been passed to carry forward the democratic principle "that all men 
are created equal." 

A great advance was made in June 1941, when President Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 8802 and declared : "It is the policy of the United States to 
encourage full participation in the national defense program by all citizens of 
the United States regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin." The order 
required that in all war contracts there was to be no discrimination "because of 
race, creed, or national origin" and sets up the Fair Employment Practice Com- 
mittee to enforce this provision. 

SIX DANGERS OF PREJUDICE 

6. Why is religious and racial prejudice a threat to all of us? 

A. Prejudice is contagious : History has taught us that when we discriminate 
against one segment of the people, we set a pattern that may be used against 
other groups. Hitler's persecution of the Jews, trade unionists, Communists, and 
Socialists was later directed against Catholics, Protestants, liberals, and even- 
tually the people of the world. 

Consideration for the Negro, the Jew, the Catholic, the foreign born, or for any 
other minority group, rests not merely on the grounds of humanity and justice ; 
it rests on the solid base of self-interest. 

B. Prejudice makes all of us poorer : We can't have an enlightened democracy 
with minority groups living in ignorance. We can't have a prosperous democracy 
with minority groups so poor that they can't afford to buy the goods America 
produces. 

If a minority is kept at a low wage scale in the same field or area in which 
we work, eventually our own wages will be reduced because of a smaller demand 
for consumer goods and the competition of cheap labor. Conversely, a higher 
standard of living for any group increases the demand for consumer goods and 
makes for a more prosperous country. Aside from the fact that it is Christian 
and democratic, it is also to our own selfish interest to help secure better housing, 
clothing, and nutrition for all our people. 

C. Prejudice robs us of minority talents : Prejudice often prevents minority 
groups from developing their abilities and skills. It limits their achievements 
and deprives the Nation of their genius. We are all poorer in America today 
because discrimination prevents members of some minorities from rising to their 
greatest possible achievements, thus lessening their potential contributions to the 
general wealth and welfare of America. 

D. Prejudice blinds us to real situation : Prejudice makes impossible any real 
solution of economic, social, or personal difficulties. When we blame war or so- 
cial and economic troubles on some innocent minority group, we are diverting our 
attention from the real causes. By blaming and hating some scapegoat for our 
misfortunes, we intensify rather than remove the difficulties. Social ills can 
only be remedied by all members of society accepting their share of responsibility 
and cooperating through democratic means to solve their common problems. 

E. Prejudice endangers victory : Prejudice means disunity, and disunity plays 
into the hands of the enemies of democracy. National unity was just as essen- 
tial to victory as battleships and flying fortresses. 

The War Department (in ASF Manual M 5) recognizes that "discrimination 
on the basis of race or color * * *" is "fatal to military efficiency." And War 
Department pamphlet 20-3 states : "To contribute by act or word toward the 
increase of misunderstanding, suspicion and tension between peoples of dif- 
ferent racial or national origin in this country or among our Allies is to help 
the enemy." 

F. Prejudice endangers world peace : Even more disastrous is the effect which 
news of race riots and discrimination against minorities had upon the morale 
of millions of people throughout the world, white and coloi-ed, whose loyalty 
and help wore so vital to the allied cause. It was powerful ammunition for 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1583 

the propagandists of the Axis in Europe, Africa, the Near East, and particularly 
the Far East. 

Tliree-fourtlis of the people of the world are what we call "colored." These 
people naturally look to the treatment of our American Negroes to see what we 
really mean when we speak of democracy. Racial and religious prejudice alien- 
ates the confidence of the vast non-white population as well as other peoples, 
thwarts their hopes and our hopes of peace and freedom, and ultimately creates 
the conditions upon which future global wars can develop. 

How we treat minorities is, therefore, more than a matter of mere domestic 
concern. Almost 13 million iwople in the United States were horn in Europe, and 
27 million have parents l)orn in Europe. The mistreatment of some Mexicans 
in the United States echoes throughout North and South America ; a race riot 
provokes discussions and resentments in Africa ; the Philippines, and among 
the 800 million non-white people in China and India. 

Throughout the world there are millions of people convinced that the war was a 
total war against fascism and Fascist ideas. Their concept of peace includes the 
hoiie — even the determination — that in peace, there will be no such things as 
"superior" and "inferior" peoples anywhere in the world. 

STORY OF AMERICA PROVES IT 

The men who built and are building America— who clear her forests, span 
her rivers, dig her coal, plough her fields, work her machines — the men who made 
America strong and free — and fought and died to preserve that freedom on 
battlefields all over the world — are men of every race, color, religion, and na- 
tionality. Listen to their names at roll call. Read their names in ca.sualty 
lists— like these from the New York Times of March 29, 1945 : 

Agostinello, Cohen, Curran, Grunwald, Htubec, Ivanoski, Kuzian, Marshall, 
Thomas, Warblanski. Were any of these "inferior." 

Mr. Mandel. And an advertisement in the New Masses, a Com- 
munist magazine, advertising the sale of Fact Sheet No. 70. 

The Chairman. It will go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The docnment referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 422" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 422 

[From New Masses, September 11, 1945] 

NOW AVAILABLE FOR CIVILIAN USE 

Army Talk, Orientation Fact Sheet No. 70 : 

Prejudice — Roadblock to Progress 

The complete text of this important Army education pamphlet. The answer to 
Bilbo and Rankin. 

Reprinted by permission of the War Department by International Labor 
Defense, 112 East 19th Street, New York 3, N. Y.— 100 for $4 ; 500 for $16 ; 1,000 
for $30. 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

There are no further questions. You may .stand aside. 

Mr. Fanelli. We have some documents to be submitted. 

The Chairman. You can submit them to the committee and we will 
determine whether or not they may go into the record. 

Mr. Fanelli. Do you want them now? 

The Chairman. You may stand aside, Doctor. We will not excuse 
you at this time. 

Any documents you wish to, you may submit them to the committee. 

Mr. Fanelli. When do you want me to do that? 

The Chairman. You may submit them to the committee now. 

]VIr. Fanelli. May we have just a moment? 



1584 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chairman. Surely. 

In the meantime, we will complete the record here. Go ahead, Mr. 
Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. I would like to }Dlace into the record previous testi- 
mony that the committee has received from other witnesses who were 
in the Orientation and Information Section. I quote first the testi- 
mony of Jerome A. Oberwager, who testified before the subcommittee 
on February 19, 1953. He said, in answer to questions : 

Mr. MoKRis. What was your assignment while you were in the Army? 

Mr. Oberwager. Production of audio-visual material, charts, and film scripts. 

Mr. Morris. To what base were you assigned? 

Mr. Oberwager. Aberdeen Training Center. 

Mr. Morris. In other words, all your actual Army work was from the Aber- 
deen Training Center? 

Mr. Oberwager. That is correct. 

I produced film scripts, not films, and other audiovisual devices for training. 

Mr. Morris. Training with the United States Army personnel? 

Mr. Oberwager. That is correct. 

Mr. Morris. Were you, during that period, a member of the Communist Party? 

Mr. Oberwager. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the ground 
that it may tend to incriminate me. * 

Then we had testimony by Alexander Svenchansky. The testimony 
of Mr. Svenchansky is as follows : 

Mr. Morris. Now, you have held employment with an organization called the 
All Russian Textile Syndicate; have you not? 

Mr. Svenchansky. I did, sir. 

Mr. Morris. That was in September 1928? 

Mr. Svenchansky. Yes, I believe so. 

Mr. Morris. Were you a member of the Communist Party in September 1928 
when you commenced that employment? 

Mr. Svenchansky. I plead the same privilege. 

The Chairman. The same record, Mr. Reporter, fifth amendment against self- 
incrimination. 

Mr. Morris. Now, you worked for the Amtorg Trading Corp., New York City, 
from March 1932 to April 1932 ; did you not? 

Mr. Svenchansky, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Morris. Were you a Communist Party member at that time? 

Mr. Svenchansky. I refuse to answer, sir, on the same ground. 

it It * * * * 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us briefly about your Army experiences? 

Mr. Svenchansky. I got my basic training, I believe it was in Georgia, then I 
transferred to Fairbanks, Alaska, and then to Tanacross, Alaska. 

Mr. Morris. Spell that Tanacross. 

Mr. Svenchansky. T-a-n-a-c-r-o-s-s. 

Then I was transferred to White Horse, to Great Falls and released, having 
received an honorable discharge. 

Mr. Morris. Were you an education and information ofiicer in the Army? 

Mr. Svenchansky. Yes, sir, I was.' 

Then we have the testimony of George A. Faxon, who testified in 
1953.^ His testimony is as follows : 

Mr. Morris. When did you serve in the Army, Mr. Faxon? 

Mr. Faxon. From January of 1943, I believe, to January of 1946. 

Mr. Morris. Now, what kind of service did you render while you were in the 
United States Army? 

Mr. Faxon. I was an oflBcer in the Information and Education Branch. 

Mr. Morris. Officer in the Information and Education Branch of the United 
States Army? Where were you stationed? 

Mr. Faxon. I was stationed at a lot of places. 

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us some of the places you were? 



» P. 454, hearings on United States citizens employed by the United Nations. 

» Ibid., p. 070. 

' Subversive Influences in the Educational Process, p. 682. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1585 

Mr. Faxon. Fort Bliss in Texas, Pentagon in Washinpton, Lake Placid Club, 
Paris University in Paris--, France, and the University of Biarritz, at Biarritz, 
France. 

]\Ir, Faxon in the course of his testimony pleaded the fifth amend- 
ment when he was asked about his Communist affiliations. 

The last one that I would like to put into the record is Diana Wol- 
man, who testified before the Senate Committee on Government Opera- 
tions.* She also pleaded the fifth amendment and stated she was 
employed as follows: 

Mr. CoHN. Have you ever been employed by the Army Sipial Corps? 

Mrs. WoLMAN. Yes; I have. But contrary to the lie which was told after the 
other hearing, I was never in Fort Monmouth and I never worked in the radar 
lalioratory. 

Mr. CoiiN. Have you ever been employed by the Army Signal Corps? 

Mrs. WoLMAN. Yes, I have. 

Mr. CoHN. When? 

Then she ^roes on further and states that, as advertised by the Jeffer- 
son School for Social Science, a Communist organization, she taught 
at Brooklyn College and the Central Army Induction Station in New 
York City. 

I would like to have those in the record. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Do you gentlemen have your material that you want to submit ? 

Mr. Fanelli. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. Will you pass it up ? 

Mr. Fanelli. This bears on various aspects. 

The Chairman. You may stand by for the time being. 



At an open hearing September 28, 1954, the following record was 
made : 

Mr. Carpenter. And for the I. and E. record, we have the testi- 
mony of Benjamin Holmes Haddock on February 1, 1954, before the 
House Committee on Un-American Activities.^ We would like to 
have an excerpt of about 2 pages from that testimony entered into the 
record at the proper place. 

The Chairman. At the proper place in the I. and E. record it will 
be inserted and made a part of the record. 

(The testimony referred to was marked "Exhibit 442-B" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit 442-B 

Mr. Tavenner. You Joined the party after you were discharged from the 
United States Army? 

Mr. Haddock. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you tell the committee, please, the circumstances under 
which you became a member? 

Mr. Haddock. May we be off the record a minute? 

Mr. Tavenner. Off the record. 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Mr. Tavenner. On the record. 

Mr. Haddock. In answer to your question, I walked into the party oflBce in 
San Diego and asked for an application form, and signed it. The person who 
accepted it was Mrs. Lolita Bunyard. Her name now is Gibson. She married 
after the time of my joining. 



*Arniv Signal Corps — Subversion and Espionage, p. 213. 
econimunlet Activities In the State of California, pt. 2, pp. 4507, 4598. 

32018°— 54— It. 20 



1586 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Well, I became interested in the Communist Party througb men who were in 
the information and education section of the Army. I had more education 
than most of the men in tny outfit, even though it was only a B. A., and then 
we went to the Gilbert Islands ; I was on that invasion and was stationed there 
for 8 months following the Invasion, so while there they needed someone to do 
the information and education, which I volunteered to do. There wasn't much 
else to do, and I also found it quite interesting. There weren't any libraries 
there. 

Well, I might interject here the comment that the person who really gave 
me the introduction to this was a little fellow named Solomon Kantor, from 
New York City, who was a subscriber to this little labor paper called In Fact, 
and he gave me copies of that, and he gave me a booli by Seldes, I think. Facts on 
Fascism, so this was interesting. I don't know how leftist this boy was, but 
this was certainly the kind of thing that appealed to him, and although most of 
my activity on Makin was fairly intellectual in terms of presenting factual 
material and had no leftist tinge, as far as I was able to discern, I had no 
introduction to anyone who might be described as a real leftist : however, when 
I got back to Hawaii it was purely by accident tliat I met a man, whose name 
I have been trying to think of for the last week, who was in the information and 
education section of the Antiaircraft Command, and he came in and talked to 
me one day. I was just about to take a 5-day pass to Hawaii, that is, the 
Island of Hawaii, and he told me he was organizing a school for officers and 
enlisted men as a part of the information and education program so that the 
two groups could be brought closer together so they could function more 
effectively. 

I don't know whether I met him again or not — I may have — but if I did It was 
In passing, because he was returned to the mainland ; but he said, "You come 
up to the information and education shack ; there are several other fellows who 
meet here whom you will get to know." And sure enough, I was interested ; and 
I met three fellows, one or whose name was Martin Mitchnick ; another one was 
Robert Gould — and both of these, incidentally, are from Detroit — and then a 
third one who I think was like me, sort of excited by this new area, a fellow 
named Murray Crummlns. 

Mr. Tavenneb. Do you know where he was from? 

Mr. Haddock. No; I don't. The last time I heard, he was Uvms. with his 
mother in a hotel in New York City, which was used by one of the social organi- 
zations that handle refugees when they come in  * * 

TESTIMONY OF CARL FENICHEL, NEW YORK, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED 
BY COUNSEL, JOSEPH FORER, WASHINGTON, D. C. 

Mr. FoRER. Mr. Counsel, may we ask for the usual instructions to 
photographers? 

The Chairman. The witness does not care to be photographed. 
We will comply with his request. 

Will you be sworn and testify. Do you swear the testimony given 
in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I do. 

The Chairman. Be seated. 

Let the record show that Mr. Fenichel is here with his counsel, 
Mr. Forer. 

State your name. 

Mr. Fenichel. Carl Fenichel. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside ? 

Mr. Fenichel. New York City, 166 Second Avenue. 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Fenichel. Right now I am a director of a school for disturbed 
children. 
^ The Chairman. Director of a school for disturbed children. All 
right, proceed with the question. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1587 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Fenichel, you were in the armed services dur- 
ino- the last war? 

Mr. Fenichel. Yes, sir ; I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. World War II? 

Mr. Fenichel. Yes. 

Mr, Carpenter. When did you first enter the service ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I was inducted in January 1943, at Fort Dix. Do 
you want me to give a history of my Army career since then ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Just in summary. 

Mr. Fenichel. Brief, yes. From there I was sent for basic train- 
ing to Kearns, Utah. After I completed my basic training I was sent, 
to Jonesboro, Ark., to an Army Administration School. Then I was 
assigned to Syracuse, to some company, as a company clerk. Tho 
company was then moved to Ardmore, Okla. 

From Ardmore, Okla., we went to Charleston. At Charleston the 
company was broken up and I was assigned to Charleston head- 
quarters. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt at this time and go back to the 
record on Dr. Schreiber. We have just received a communication 
from the Office of the Department of the Army, office of the counselor, 
stating that Julius Schreiber's appointment and reserve commission 
expired on April 1, 1953, by operation of law. So that clears up that 
point, ' 

Mi". Fenichel. In Charleston I was assigned to the headquarters. 
1 think it was because of overage, I was about 38 at the time, and 
typed special orders and did clerical work. 

At that time, I also helped w^rite a musical play for the base. I used 
to write jingles that we put in the Daily Bulletin selling war bonds. 
A lieutenant there, I don't recall his name, I think it is Lieutenant 
Arthur, but I am not sure, who ran the Army film office, came to the 
office and asked me if I would, when some Army films came, introduce 
the Army films. He wanted some one who could present a little intro- 
duction, which I did. 

At that time there was an order, I think, for some one to go to Wash- 
ington and Lee, to the I. and E. School. He sent me to the school. 

I remember at that time the first time I went, I was told to go back 
because it was only for commissioned officers, that type group. I 
remember coming about 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning and being told 
I had to go back. A few months later I went to the school again, 
where enlisted men were now taken. 

Following that, I went back to Charleston and about 2 weeks later 
I received orders to go to 205 42d Street, and then I was 

Mr. Carpenter. New York? 

Mr. Fenichel. New York City. 

And then I went to Washington and I was told I was assigned to 
this Division involving the writing of Army talks and training dis- 
cussion leaders. That is the work I did from about August, I think, 
1944, around that time, I am not too clear, up until the time I was 
discharged in 1945. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was Colonel Schreiber your immediate superior 
officer ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I wouldn't say he was my immediate. I didn't have 
a very clear picture, honestly, of who was my immediate superior. It 
was a rather flexible setup. We had in New^ York City a group of 



1588 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

people who were assigned to writing talks, and we also had the pilot 
team which operated from there. 

In New York City there were a number of commissioned oflScers, 
I know, who were immediate superiors, but then Dr. or Colonel Schrei- 
ber came from Washington sometimes, or sometimes we were told to 
go to the Pentagon to do some writing. He was certainly superior to 
me, as was a lot of other people in the I. & E. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever confer with Colonel Schreiber in your 
work ? 

Mr. Fenichel. Yes. 

JVIr. Carpenter. How about Col. Fred Herzberg ? 

Mr, Fenichel. I never met the man. I think he had been at the 
school before I did, maybe, or the I. & E. Division. I heard the name 
but never met the man. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Fenichel, were you a member of the Commu- 
nist Party when you were in the Armed Forces? 

Mr. Fenichel. No, sir ; I wasn't. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party prior 
to your entry into the Armed Forces ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer on the basis of my privilege under 
the fifth amendment not to be a witness against myself. However, I 
would like to say that during the last 10 years I have been completely 
inactive and disinterested politically. 

]Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party a 
week before you entered the armed services ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer for the same reason. 

The Chairman. The day before ? 

^Iv. Fenichel. The same. 

The Chairman. Two minutes before^ 

Mv. Fenichel. The same. 

The Chairman. Before you held up your hand to take your oath, 
were you a member of the Communist Party ? 

JMr! Fenichel. I refuse to answer for the same reason. 

The Chairman. All right. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. Did you have anything to do with the preparation 
of the Army Talks? 

Mr. Fenichel. I did, sir. 

JMr. Carpenter. I show you a copy of the Army Talk 1 through 100, 
and ask you to look through and list for us the Army Talks which 
you worked on and describe the nature of the work. 

IMr. Fenichel. May I look just at the table to make it easier? 

The Chairman. You may. 

Mv. Fenichel. I do recall the title "From D-Dav to D-Plus 337." 
Army Talk No. 77. I worked on Army Talk 64. I worked on Army 
Talk 70, the one on prejudice. I know I worked on an Armv Talk on 
lend-lease, and I wrote or helped write an Army Talk on manpower. 
Those are the only ones I can recall doing any kind of work on. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Carpenter. That was all you did any kind of work on. 

Do you know anything about securing these documents for reprint- 
ing by an organization known as the International Labor Defense, 
with offices at 112 East 19th Street, New York ? 

Mr. Fenichel. Any of these documents from there? 

The Chairman. For example. Army Talk 70, 1 think you referred 
to, you said you had something to do with the preparation of that? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1589 

Mr. Fenichel. That is right. 

The Chairman. Did you know this organization reprinted that 
Army Talk? 

Mr. Fenichel. This took place during the war? I wasn't aware of 
it. The only thing I was aware of, and I know we resented it, was 
the fact that In Fact reprinted one of our Army Talks. We weren't 
told about it. I heard about it later, and many of us talked about 
it and did not like it. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has a reference he Avants to put into 
the record. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a copy of In Fact for August 27, 1945, 
which is headed "The War Department Has Sent Its Complete Set 
of Orientation and Education Documents, T-l Pumplilets in All, to This 
Weekly, With Written Termission To Reprint All Its Restricted 
Material." 

This sheet reprinted parts of Fact Sheet No. 8, Fact Sheet No. 29, 
Fact Sheet No. 34, Fact Sheet No. 53, on our Soviet Ally. I offer this 
for the record. ,„,',,.., 

Mr. Fenichel. Gentlemen, I had nothing to do with those. 

The Chairman. I would like for the stall' to make some research on 
who gave permission to this magazine. In Fact, to reprint these re- 
stricted documents of the United States Army. 

JSlr. Mandel. Mr. Chairman, we have asked the Defense Depart- 
ment who gave permission to these organizations, and thus far they 
have not been able to find any written permission or who was respon- 
sible. 

The Chairman. I would like that to be pursued until we determine 
who was responsible. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Fenichel, were you a teacher in the New York 
City school system ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I was. 

Mr. Carpenter, When and for how long were you employed? 

Mr. Fenichel. From about 1929 or 19— no, maybe 1930 or 1931, 
until the time I went into the Army. And then after the war I went 
into the national institute for a few months. I left, I think it was 
about a year or so later, after I went back to the school system. 

Mr. Carpenter. What were the circumstances surrounding your 
leaving the New York City school system ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I will tell you. After I got out of the Army I had 
2 heart attacks, 1 shortly after and 1 a few years ago. I Avas beginning 
to feel the same kind of pain again, chest pains, pains here [indicat- 
ing], and my doctor recommended tJiat I get out of the school system. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you resign ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I retired on disability. 
^ Mr. Carpenter. Were you under a loyalty investigation at the 
time ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I wouldn't call it that. What happened was this : 
After I had seen my doctor, about a month and a half after, I dicl 
get a letter asking me to appear, as did hundreds of other teachers, 
many of whom are still in the school system. Because my retirement 
went through, I didn't appear before the board. 

Mr.^ Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party at 
that time? 

Mr. Fenichel. No, I was not. 



1590 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you in fact a member of the Flatbusli- 
Browns Height section of the Communist Party in New York? 

Mr. Fenichel. I was not. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was your wife a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Fenichel. Are you referring to what time now? After 1943? 

Mr. Carpenter. At any time ? 

Mr. Fenichel. Well, I can answer questions beyond 1943, which 
is the time I said I have been completely disinterested in politics. 

Mr. Carpenter. Prior to 1943 ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I use the fifth amendment, sir, before that. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the New York Teachers' 
Union ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know that it has been expelled because of 
its Communist control from both the American Federation of Labor 
and the Congress of Industrial Organizations ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I know that. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the executive board of the 
teachers' union in 1939? 

Mr. Fenichel. I was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the executive board, to- 
gether with the following individuals who invoked the fifth amend- 
ment before this committee with regard to the Communist Party 
membership. 

Meyer Case? 

The Chairman. What was your answer? 

Mr. Fenichel. Was I a member of the executive board with Meyer 
Case? That is right. 

The Chairman. You were? 

Mr. Fenichel. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. Abraham Lederman ? 

Mr. Fenichel. That is right. 

Mr, Carpenter. And the following officials: Charles J. Hendley? 
Hendley was president? 

Mr. Fenichel. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. Eugene Jackson, vice president? 

Mr. Fenichel. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. Also Bella Dodd, legislative representative, who 
admitted her former Communist Party membership ? 

Mr. Fenichel. Was I a member with her, do you mean? That is 
right. She was on the executive board. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you attend Communist Party meetings with 
them ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer for the same reason. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was Hyman Forstenzer associated with you in 
the Education and Information Division in the Army ? 

Mr. Fenichel. He was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was he also a member of the executive board of 
the union? 

Mr. Fenichel. He was, as far as I can remember he was ; yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you in 1942 the editor in chief of the New 
York Teacher's News, official organ of the New York Teachers' Union 
in New York ? 

Mr. Fenichel. That is right. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you write for the New York Teacher ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1591 

Mr. Fenichel. The Teacher News I wrote for. 

Mr. Carpenter. You didn't write the New York Teacher? 

The Chairman. At that time were you a member of the Communist 

Party? 

Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer any question up to 1943. 

Tlie Chairman. Under your rights of the fifth amendment, that 
your answer might tend to incriminate you. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you employed by the Executive Office of the 
President's National Eesources Planning Board? 

Mr. Fenichel. The President of the 

Mr. Carpenter. The National Resources Planning Board. 

Mr. Fenichel. I never heard of the organization as far as I can 
remember. 

Mr. Carpenter. The National Roster of Scientific and Specialized 
Personnel? 

Mr. Fenichel. I was never employed by either one. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. ^landel, do you have something for the record ? 

Mr, Mandel. I have here a memorandum dated July 3, 1942, from 
the Executive Office of the President, National Resources Planning 
Board, National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, ad- 
dressed to the Personnel Procedure Section, Office of the Adjutant 
General, re Registrant, Carl Fenichel. It says: 

The above man probably will be inducted into the Army on the date indicated. 
Our records indicate that Mr. Fenichel received a B. S. degree in English and 
economics from the City College of New York in June of 1928. Mr. Fenichel is 
now employed by the Board of Education. 

Mr. Fenichel. But I was never employed — that was the question 
you asked. Was I ever employed by them. I may have applied. I 
may have applied to them. I clon't know what the procedure is. But 
I was never employed by them as such. That was the question you 
asked me. 

Mr. Carpenter. You said you never heard of this organization ; is 
that right? 

Mr. Fenichel. That is true. Now that you recall it, I think there 
was an organization like that many years ago, but I don't know how it 
happened, whether I was asked to apply or not. 

The Chairman. That may go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 423" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 423 

Executive Office of the President, 
National Resources Planning Board, 
National Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel, 

Washington, D. C, July 3, 1942. 
Personnel Procedures Section, 
Office of the Adjutant General, 

War Department, Washington, D. C. 
(For the attention of : Lt. Col. Frederick S. Foltz.) 

Re : Registrant : Fenichel, Carl. 

Address : 166 Second Avenue, New York, N. Y. 

Order No. 2205. 

Registered with Local Board No. 11 of New York, New York County, N. Y. 

Probable date of induction : July 7, 1942. 

The above man probably will be inducted into the Army on the date indicated. 
Our records Indicate that Mr. Fenichel received his B. S. S. degree in English and 
economics from the College of the City of New York in June 192S. 



1592 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Fenichel is now employed by the Board of Education, Public School 246, 
Veronica and Snyder Avenues, Brooklyn, N. Y., where he is a teacher of English 
and health education. He supervises the central library and conducts the boys' 
athletic and health program. He is also editor of Teachers News. Public speak- 
ing and photography are his hobbies. 
Tours sincerely, 

Steuart Henderson Britt, 

Consultant. 

Office for Emergency Management, 

War Manpower Commissign, 
Washington, D. C, January 7, 1943. 
Classification and Enlisted Replacement Branch, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 

War Department, Pentagon Building, 

Washington, D. C. 

Re : Registrant : Fenichel, Carl. 

Address : 166 Second Avenue, New York, N. Y. 

Order No. 220r.. 

Registered with Local Board No. 11 of New York, New York County, N, T. 

Probable date of induction, January 11, 1943. 

The above-named man probably will be inducted into the Army on the date 
indicated. Our records indicate that Mr. Fenichel received his B. S. S. degree 
in English and economics from the College of the City of New York in June 1928. 

Mr. Fenichel is now employed by the board of education, Public School 246, 
Veronica and Snyder Avenues, Brooklyn, N. Y., where he is a teacher of English 
and health education. He supervises the central library and conducts the boys' 
athletic and health program. He is also editor of Teacher News. Mr. Fenichel 
is experienced as a teacher of geography and indicates that public speaking 
and photography are his hobbies. 
Your.s sincerely, 

Steuart Henderson Britt, 

Consultant. 

Mr. Carpenter. After you left the Armed Forces, were you asso- 
ciated with any one from the information and education division in an 
orjranization known as the National Institute of Social Relations? 

JNIr. Fenichel. That is right, I was for a short period of time, for 
about 5 months. 

]Mr. Carpenter. "Were you associated with Julius Schreiber and 
Hyman Forstenzer in that organization ? 

JNIr. Fenichel. That is right. 

IVIr. Carpenter. Did you at any time make your Communist record 
known to the Army authorities ? 

Mr. Fenichel. I refuse to answer for the same reason. 

The Chairman. The same answer, the fifth amendment, that it 
might tend to incriminate him. 

If there are no further questions, you may stand aside. 

The committee will stand adjourned. All witnesses will be excused 
at this time. One witness will be called at a later time. 

You may consider your.self, Mr, Gandell, under subpena. You will 
be called at a later time and we will give you ample notice through 
your attorney, IMr. Forer. 

(Whereupon, at 11 : 45 a. m., the committee was recessed subject to 
call.) 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

DEPARTMENTS 



THURSDAY, AUGUST 5, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigati: the Administration 
OF the Internal Secukity Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washingto7i, D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 4 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 457, 
Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner presiding. 

Present : Senators Jenner and Welker. 

Present also: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel; Benjamin Mandel, 
director of research; Eobert C. McManus and Dr. Edna Fluegel, 
professional staff members. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Gerson, will you come forward, please? Will you be sworn 
to testify? 

Do you swear that the testimony given before this committee will 
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

Mr. Gerson. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF SIMON W. GERSON, BROOKLYN, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED 
BY COUNSEL, ROYALE W. ERANCE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 

The Chairman. Give us your full name. 

Mr. Gerson. Simon W. Gerson. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside, Mr. Gerson ? 

Mr. Gerson. 8860 18th Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y. 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on two 
grounds, both constitutional grounds. 

The first is on the first amendment grounds — that this or any other 
congressional committee has not the power to inquire into the opinions, 
beliefs, or associations of any American under our Constitution. 

Secondly, I respectfully decline to answer the question and invoke 
my right under the fifth amendment not to testify against myself. I 
might state to the committee that I regard the fifth amendment, along 
with millions of other Americans, as a shield of innocent as well as of 
the guilty. 

The Chairman. The committee made inquiry of what you did, what 
your business is. We would not recognize your refusal to answer or 
recognize your refusal to answer under the first amendment. We 
would recognize your refusal to answer under the fifth amendment, 

1593 



1594 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

providing you think that whatever you do might tend to incrimi- 
nate you. 

Mr. Gerson. I renew my answer, sir. 

The Chairman. That is your testimony ? 

Mr. Gerson. I renew my answer, sir, on both grounds. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Proceed, Mr. Carpenter. 

Mr, Carpenter. Mr. Mandel at this time has a clipping he would 
like to read. 

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. The Daily Worker of August 4, 1954, page 4, in an 
article headed "Questions and Answers on the New York Election 
Campaign," by Simon Gerson, has this footnote : 

Because of the interest of our readers in the 1954 New York election cam- 
paign, we are reprinting In two installments a series of questions and answers 
on the campaign by Simon W. Gerson, legislative director of the Communist 
Party in New York City. 

In the same paper, on page 3, I find that there is a little publicity 
on this hearing, saying as follows : 

Simon W. Gerson, who will chair the National Communist Party election 
campaign rally of A4igust 6, has been subpenaed by the Jenner Internal Security 
Subcommittee. 

I ask that those two items be placed into the record, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. They will go into the record and become part of 
the record. 

(The articles referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 435a and 
435b" and are as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 435-A 

IProm the Dally Worker, Aug. 4, 19541 

Questions and Answers on the New York Election Campaign , 

Because of the interest of our readers in the 1954 New York election campaign, 
we are reprinting, in two installments, a series of questions and answers on 
the campaign by Simon W. Gerson, legislative director of the Communist 
Party in New York State. They are published in the July issue of Party Voice, 
publication of the New York Communist Party 

(By Simon Gerson) 

Question. What about the American Labor Party in New York State? 

Answer. Its role was well defined by one of its leaders, Paul L. Ross, at its 
opening campaign rally at Manhattan Center, May 6, Ross said : 

"The ALP enters the 1954 election campaign determined to fight every mani- 
festation of the program of McCarthyism, without regard to the political label 
it bears. 

"On the other hand, we still join forces, or fight independently, along the same 
lines, with all those people and organizations who will fight McCarthyism, what- 
ever the segment of the program they may attack." 

Question, Will the ALP have a candidate for governor in this election? 

Answer. Paul Ross, in the major policy speech quoted above, made it plain 
that the best way to defeat Dewey in New York would be a common front of the 
Democratic, Liberal, and Labor Parties, backed by the trade-union movement. 
At the same time, however, he pointed out that it is virtually impossible at this 
moment to obtain such formal agreement. He therefore suggested — and the 
ALP is following this suggestion — that while the ALP direct its main fire at 
Dewey and McCarthyism, it run its own candidate for Governor. 

Failure to run a candidate — and obtain at least 50,000 votes for that candi- 
date — would mean the loss of oflJicial status as a ballot party. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1595 

It Is the position of the ALP that it is possible to attain a powerful anti- 
Dewey movement which will accomplish both objectives: (1) Defeat Dewey; and 
(2) obtain more than the requisite 50,000 votes for the ALP candidate. 

Question. Isn't that a risky policy? 

Answer. Of course it is. But no policy in this period can be devised that is 
free of the element of risk. To fail to run a candidate would mean: (1) Tlie 
death of the ALP; (2) the loss of a powerful voice raising the most vital issues 
of the day. 

For example, many Democrats will attack McCarthy but most will concentrate 
on his methods. The ALP alone has been battling not only the methods but the 
aims of McCarthyism. 

While many Democrats may attack, as Senator Lehman has done, the Know- 
land proposal to leave the U. N. if People's China is given its rightful seat, few, 
if any. Democrats will advance a rounded-out peace program. The ALP does 
just that. By so doing, it forces the pace of the whole campaign, drives the 
Democrats forward and compels reluctant candidates to accept portions of its 
anti-McCarthy, propeace program. To that extent it strengthens the entire 
anti-Dewey camp, including the Democrats. The Truman-Dewey-Wallace cam- 
paign of 1948 was a classic example of this. By forcing the issues in 1948, the 
Progressive Party compelled the adoption of a portion of its program by the 
Democrats. This clearly helped the defeat of Dewey. 

Question. Some trade imionists say such a policy will isolate the ALP and the 
left. What about that? 

Answer. DiflScult and complex as the problem is, the implied "solution" is really 
no solution. It would mean that there will be no statewide force to the left 
of the Democrats. This leaves the New Dealers under the Farleyite pressure 
from the right wing of their organization without any mass pressure exercised 
by a statewide party under conditions where labor has not yet sufficiently or- 
ganized itself as an independent force. 

Specifically, on the issue of peace, the tendency on the part of the FDR-Wagner- 
Harriman group will be to subordinate the issue in the State campaign. 

Looking beyond the 1954 campaign, the failure of the ALP to run a candidate 
and maintain its own legal status will create a political vacuum into which Trot- 
skyites, Titoites, and similar grouplets will attempt to mislead a substantial 
number of New York progressives who today accept the leadership of the ALP. 

Question. How does the situation vary from 1953 when we differed with the 
ALP tactic of running a candidate at the top of its city ticket? 

Answer. The stakes are considerably different, although the main direction 
of the struggle is essentially the same. In 1953 it would have been possible for 
the ALP to unite with the bulk of the organized labor movement against Dewey's 
mayoralty candidates. It could have at the same time rolled up a substantial 
vote for its other citywide candidates. Without taking any responsibility for 
Wagner, it could have shown its kinship with CIO, AFL, and New Deal forces 
who were seeking the defeat of Dewey's mayoralty candidate, Harold Riegelman, 
and Dewey's stooge, Vincent Impellitteri. Instead, it adopted a go-it-alone 
policy, ignoring the attitude of the organized labor movement, and lumped to- 
gether all candidates and the forces behind them. 

This was not the attitude of the ALP in the regular mayoralty election in 
1949. In 1949, when the ALP was running Vito Marcantonio for mayor, it cor- 
rectly left the senatorial line blank, since it did not wish to come into collision 
with the masses of labor and New Deal voters who supported Herbert Lehman 
against his Republican opponent, John Foster Dulles. 

The same flexible tactic of 1949, which unfortunately was rejected by the 
ALP in 1953, is now being followed in California by the Independent Progres- 
sive Party. The IPP is not running a candidate for Governor or Lieutenant 
Governor and is, instead, leaving a blank line so as not to oppose the candidates 
backed by the labor movement, Richard Graves and Edward Roybal, both Demo- 
crats. 

But this same flexible tactic is not available to the ALP due to New York's rigid 
election laws. In California any statewide candidate polling the required mini- 
mum keeps a party officially on the ballot. In New York the law requires 50,000 
votes for the gubernatorial candidate only. The ALP plans, therefore, to run a 
gubernatorial candidate on a platform essentially anti-McCarthy, anti-Dewey, 
while sharply critical of the Democrats in a number of respects. It also plans 
to advance its coalition policy on a congressional and legislative level. 

This is not an ideal or a simple policy (real politics rarely provide ideal and 
simple solutions) but it accords with the present stage in the complex process of 



1596 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

creating a powerful political realinement. It indicates that the ALP is breaking 
with the paralyzing go-it-alone concept — which is a healthy step forward and will 
bring the ALP closer to developments in the labor and Negro people's move- 
ments. 

Question. What is the possibility of Vito Marcantonio's reelection to Congress? 

Answer. The situation has altered considerably in the last 4 years. 

It may be useful to recall that in 1944, in a period of national unity, Marc- 
antonio won all three party designations (Kepublican, Democratic, and ALP). 

In 1946, when the cold war had already begun, Marcantonio lost the Republican 
primary, won a close Democratic primary and went on to win the general elec- 
tion on the Democratic and Democratic-Labor lines. 

In 1947 the legislature passed the Wilson-Pakula law, which was openly labeled 
an anti-Marcantonio law, to prevent Marcantonio and others from cross-flling in 
major party primaries. 

In 1948, however, Marcantonio running on the ALP line against a Republican 
and a Democratic opponent, was able to win. 

In 1950, after the Korean War had begun, the major parties and the Liberal 
Party ganged up on Marcantonio, nominating the reactionary James Donovan. 
The latter, at that time, got support from both the Liberal Party and some of the 
leaders of organized labor. 

In 1952 the gang-up continued and Marcantonio chose not to run. 

In 1954, however, the following happened : The Liberal Party withdrew from 
the gang-up; the CIO announced its opposition to Donovan, and a group of liberal 
Democrats broke with the Tammany leadership to announce they were support- 
ing Caspar Citron in the Democratic primary against Donovan. 

These changes indicate clearly that political relationships are beginning to 
unfreeze in the 18th Congressional District — as they are, in truth, virtually every- 
where. The cold war spell is being broken. Many who were deluded by war 
hysteria 4 years ago now recognize the validity of Marcantonio's position against 
the Korean war in 1950. 

The trend in the district is anti-McCarthy and anti-Donovan. It is up to 
progressives, particularly in the trade unions, to give the required support that 
will not only defeat Donovan but will elect Marcantonio. That new opportunity 
now exists. 

******* 

Question. What are the possibilities for Increased political representation 
for the Negro and Puerto Rican peoples? 

Answer. The fight for Negro and Puerto Rican representation is definitely on 
the upgrade. In 1952 a 165-year-old tradition of a lily-white State senate was 
smashed with the election of Senator Julius Archibald. Bronx Assemblyman 
Felipe N. Torres gave the Puerto Rican people their first representation in years 
in 1953. In 1953 the first Brooklyn Negro elected to the bench was Municipal 
Court Justice Lewis S. Plagg. In 1953, finally, for the first time in the city's 
history, a Negro was elected to the board of estimate — Hulan Jack — as borough 
president of Manhattan. 

But these, while advances, are still pitifully inadequate. The Negro people 
and their white supporters are raising a series of broadened demands (as evi- 
denced by a recent Amsterdam News series). These include nominations for 
supreme court and for other courts as well as increased representation in the 
congress and the legislature. Finally, there has been advanced by the American 
Labor Party the demand for nomination of a Negro among the four top can- 
didates on the statewide ticket. 

In Brooklyn, the Bedford-Stuyvesant Political League, an independent body, 
is waging an aggressive fight for increased Negro representation. 

Among the Puerto Rican people, the fight may not be so advanced, but here, 
too, some gains have been registered. Tammany has been forced to concede a 
Puerto Rican leader in the 14th assembly district of Manhattan and increasing 
attention is being paid to the demands of the Puerto Rican people by both city 
hall and Tammany Hall. 

Question. What about other candidates for Congress from New York? What 
about the legislature? 

Answer, We propose to discuss those In some detail next month. But the 
basic framework is contained in our policy — to defeat the McCarthyites and 
outstanding reactionaries and elect a bloc of Congressmen and legislators com- 
mitted to the struggle agaisnt McCarthyism and for a policy of coexistence. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1597 

Exhibit No. 435-B 

[From the Daily Worker, Aug. 4, 1954] 

Summon Gerson on Rally Eve 

Simon W. Gerson, wlio will chair the national Communist Paity election 
campaign rally August G, lias been subpenaed by the .Tenner Internal Security 
Committee 1 (lay before the rally, it was learned yesterday. 

Gerson is to appear Thursday in Washington. 

A broad hint that the subpona was in the ofling was given by Walter Winehell 
in a coast-to-coast Sunday night telecast .iust before the Hearst commentator 
went otf the air for the suninier. Winehell indicated that Gerson would be 
probed about his Army activity in World War II. 

The committee has lieen recently investigating the Army's Information and 
Education Division activities during the war, particularly its strict adherence 
to President Roosevelt's line of American-Soviet-British unity against the Axis. 

A number of officers have been hauled before the committee and been given 
hostile treatment. Committee Chairman Jenner has attacked wartime com- 
mander, Gen. George C. Marshall, as "a front man for traitors." 

The Chairman. Mr. Gerson, are you the Mr. Gerson referred to in 
the Communist Daily Worker? 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

The Chairman. Let the record show that the committee will not 
recognize the witness' refusal to answ^er the question under the lirst 
amendment, but we do recognize his right not to answer under the 
fifth amendment, that his answer might tend to incriminate him. 

Senator AVelker. Do you know any other Simon W. Gerson, living 
in New York or any place else in the United States? 

Mr. Gerson. Would you indulge me a moment? 

The Chairman. You may consult your counsel if you desire. 

Let the record show that he does wish to consult his counsel and 
does consult him. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. I have heard that there is one or more i)ersoiis of the 
same name, but I don't know that to be a fact of my own knowledge. 

Senator Welker. Have you heard where they lived ? 

Mr. Gerson. In one instance I was told that one lives in the same 
borough in which I live. 

Senator Welker. Have you ever heard that he was the legislative 
chairman of the New York Communist Party ? 

Mr. Gerson. I have heard nothing beyond the existence or the pos- 
sible existence of such a person or persons. 

Senator Welker. The possibility? 

Mr. Gerson. Yes. 

Senator Welker. Have you ever read any articles by anyone under 
the byline of Simon ^V. Gerson, other than yourself? 

Why do you hesitate? You can answer that question without 
hesitating. 

Mr. Gerson. I don't have any recollection, sir, of having read any 
such articles. 

Senator Welker. Have you ever written any articles for the Daily 
Worker or Time magazine, or Police Gazette, or any other periodical 
or newspaper ? 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

Senator Welker. Sir ? 



1598 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Gerson. On the grounds hitherto stated by myself. 

The Chairman". Just a minute. What are those grounds? We 
have told you that this committee does not recognize your refusal to 
answer under the first amendment. Is it under the fifth amendment 
because your answer may tend to incriminate you? 

Mr. Gekson. I stated both of ray grounds. 

The Chairman. State them again. 

Mr. Gf.rson. If the committee sees fit to reject them, I am awfully 
sorry. But I wish to restate for the record 

The Chairman. State it. 

Mr. Gerson. That I am declining to answer the question because, 
No. 1, that I believe that neither this nor any other congressional 
committee has the right to investigate or to legislate in respect to my 
beliefs, opinions, and associations. 

The Chairman. Even if your beliefs might be such that they would 
tend to destroy and overthrow this country, you think we as a con- 
gressional committee have no right to inquire into something which 
might devastate and destroy our country ? 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully suggest to the committee that beliefs 
never destroyed any nation, but that 

The Chairman. How about the Communist Party and its beliefs? 

Mr. Gerson. * * * but that acts do. 

The Chairman. How about the Communist Party and its beliefs? 

Mr. Gerson. Are vou asking for my opinion, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Gerson. This is strictly an opinion question? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

The Chairman. Let the record show that the witness, before re- 
sponding to the question, conferred with his counsel. 

Mr. Gerson. May the recf rd show, Mr. Chairman, that my confer- 
ence with counsel is perfectly permissible and according to the rules 
of this committee. 

The Chairman. You may confer with your counsel when you 
want to. 

Mr. Gerson. Very good, sir. There is nothing prejudicial about 
my conference. 

The Chairman. We want your testimony and not your counsel's 
testimony. 

Mr. Gerson. I assure you you are getting my testimony and solely 
my testimony. My counsel here is solely present for the purpose of 
advising me about my legal rights. 

I am a layman, myself, and I require legal assistance as would any 
other person in this position. 

The Chairman. It is perfectly proper. 

Mr. Gerson. Very good, sir. 

Would the reporter reread the original question propounded by 
the chairman, please ? 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

The Chairman. All right. Proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you affirm or deny that you are the same Simon 
Gerson who was mentioned in those two articles just submitted to you? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1599 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfulJy decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Armed Forces during 
World War II? 

Mr. Gerson. I was, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. When did you first join the Armed Forces? 

Mr. Gerson. I was inducted in January 1944. 

Mr. Carpenter. During part of your service were you stationed at 
Camp Upton, N.Y.? 

Mr. Gerson. Yes, sir; and let me be precise. Camp Upton, N. Y., 
•was my reception center for the first 7 days of my entrance into the 
service. Thereupon, I went to basic training camp, and thereupon 
I went ovei-seas where I served with the 24th Division. I was hos- 
pitalized back to the United States, and Camp Upton was my con- 
valescence center, to which I was assigned. I returned there some- 
where in the late spring or early summer of 1945, to the best of my 
recollection. 

Mr. Carpenter. What division or type of work were you assigned 
to at Camp Upton ? . _ 

Mr. Gerson. After my recuperation and convalescence, I was as- 
signed to the Orientation Branch, as I recall it, of the Information 
und Education Division. 

Mr. Carpenter. Normally called the I. and E. Division? 

Mr. Gerson. Yes^ir ; I believe it was generally called I. and E. 

Mr. Carpenter. Wliat actual work did you do in the I. and E. ? 

Mr. Gerson. I was an administrative noncom. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you give lectures? 

Mr. Gerson. On some rare occasions I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you do any writing ? 

Mr. Gerson. At Camp Upton? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. 

Mr. Gerson. I don't recall any, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you consult with the troops in connection with 
your I. and E. work ? 

Mr. Gerson. Did I consult with them ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. Confer with them. 

Mr. Gerson. I saw them; yes, sir. 
. ' Mr. Carpenter. Well, what was the actual work that you did with 
them ? You had some job to do ? 

Mr. Gerson. Part of it was straight office work in the Orientation 
Office. Some of it was, as you said, consultation with the troops. As 
I explained earlier in the private hearing, or rather the executive 
hearing, this was a convalescent center. We had two main battalions 
of troops. One battalion was composed of men who had leg wounds. 
Another was composed of men who were neuropsychiatric patients, 
men suffering from various degrees of battle fatigue. All of the 
troops received therapy. Some was medical, some of it was 
occupational, and some of it took on the aspect of orientation work. 

In the latter branch I would include things like holding current 
event discussions, quiz contests, concerts, amusements of various sorts. 
I was involved in the latter. 

Mr. Carpenter. In other words, you were to assist in the orientation 
of these sick troops, and prepare them mentally to take up their regu- 
lar duties in the Army or elsewhere ? 



1600 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Gerson. I didn't quite get that. To dig up, did you say? To 
take up? 

Well, I did whatever work was assigned to me, based on directives 
handed down from higher echelons. 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Mandel has a document he would 
like to have placed into the record. 

The Chairman. We will hear it, Mr. Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here an affidavit dated July 2, 1954, from a 
Mr. Walker L. Kirschebaum, who is ready to appear, if necessary, 
and who is on tour. I will read the affidavit : 

This will confirm your telephone call to me of this date informing me that I 
should appear in Washington, D. C, at a hearing of your committee on Wednes- 
day, July 7, in order to give certain testimony with regard to my service in the 
Armed Forces between late October 1945 and the date of my honorable discharge 
therefrom late in December of the same year. The facts I am about to furnish 
you have already appeared in one form oranother in the press. However, in 
order that the record might be accurate and in view of the fact that I would 
bave to appear under orders from your committee I am making these facts 
known : 

(1) I am not and have never been a member of the Communist Party and 
have been consistently and historically opposed to its tenets and policies. 

(2) I have also consistently and historically opposed all forms of totali- 
tarianism actively and overtly. I have also engaged in covert activities against 
both fascism and communism. 

(3) Upon return from overseas duties I served in the Armed Forces of our 
Nation from May 15, 1943, until December 22, 1945, I was sent to Camp Upton, 
N. Y., late in October 1945. A very close friend of mine who knew that I was 
awaiting honorable discharge and would have to "sweat out" two points for as 
many months, spoke to the captain in charge of Information and Education at 
Camp Upton, N. Y. Since I had been a regular contributor to the.prolabor and 
antitotalitarian periodical, the New Leader, had l)een abroad during the war 
where I took an active journalistic interest when military duties permitted of 
conditions in the countries I visited, he suggested that I might be a valuable asset 
to I. and E. The captain's name, to my best recollection was Posner. He is sup- 
posed to be a Yonkers teacher. My friend, now deceased, had shared the billets 
with Captain Posner. My friend was as violently antitotalitarian as I am. He 
warned me, however, that I would find that the sergeant in charge of the whole 
operation was one Simon W. Gerson, known to both of us as an open member 
of the Communist Party. When I inquired of my friend why Gerson was there, he 
told me that he, my friejid, had nothing to do with I. and E., but that post G-2 
had apparently cleared him. I do not remember the names of the others assigned 
to the jobs there, but I do recall that at least one other had pro-Communist 
affinities. 

(4) At the time, during the course of a telephone conversation with Fred Wolt- 
man of the Scripps-Howai-d alliance, I mentioned the fact that Gerson was in 
charge of this important position. Woltman told me later that he had phoned 
Upton Intelligence, had been told that Gerson had a fine war record and that 
Russia was our ally. That, pretty much, was the sentiment at Upton when I 
raised the issue. 

(5) I recall only twice — although there might have been other times — when 
the Communist line was injected into our work. One time when we were in- 
structed by Gerson, who apparently was guided by Army Talks, that we tell the 
GI's who came to our classes to be recreated into enlightened civilians that the 
Chinese in the north who were stirring at that moment were "Agrarian reformers, 
like Jefferson." I had known Mao-tse Tung's record from reading Comintern 
material and I recall raising the issue privately with Gerson. * * * 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt? I notice the witness is smiling. 
What do you see about that statement that you think is funny ? 

Mr. Gerson. The statement about agrarian reformers, sir; I don't 
have the slightest recollection of it. I recall it subsequently, sir, as 
having appeared in the press. If I may so so, and I shall have some- 
thing to say on this, with the committee's permission, later 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1601 

Senator Welkkr. We will be p;l;ul to got 3'oiir observations. 
Mr. Gerson. I believe it is ludicrous. 
Mr. Mandel (continuing) : 

*   It was then that he asked ''W^hat is your background, anyway?" I do not 
recall my precise answer, but it stirred suspicion in Gerson's mind. On another 
occasion, during an Information Please-type program, GI's were asked this ques- 
tion : "Who is the labor leader who is urging that all GI's be brought home fmni 
the Pacific?" There was a pause of silence. "Come, come," Gerson exhorted, 
"let's not burn our Bridges until we come to (hem. Let's not burn our Bridges!" 
Obviously the winner had the name of Harry Bridges on his lips. 

The aI)ove is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I hereby swear to 
that effect. 

Walter L. Kirsciienbaum. 

The Chairman. Is that a sworn statement? 

Mr. Mandel. A sworn statement.^ 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The affidavit was marked "Exhibit No. 463-A" and was read in full 
above.) 

The Chairman. Mr. Gerson, you have heard the affidavit read. 
What have you to say about it? 

Mr. Gerson. Just one or two brief observations, if I may, sir. 

The Chairman. You may. 

Mr. Gerson. The affidavit is inaccurate in a number of respects. I 
was never a sergeant. I appreciate the promotion. My rank, how- 
ever, was that of corporal. 

Secondly, I haven't the faintest recollection of having made any 
such statement as attributed to me in respect to so-called agrarian 
reformers. 

Thirdly, whatever lecturing I did was strictly on the basis of Army 
bulletins or outlines, handed down to us, and strictly adhered to by 
us from higher echelons. It was the policy of the Army under those 
circumstances, to support President Roosevelt's policy of a firm alli- 
ance between Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, 
and we, as GI's, followed that policy. 

Finally, sir, in respect to Mr. Ku'schenbaum, perhaps I did not get 
it, but I got the implication he was rejected for this work. Is that 
correct? Does he so affirm in his affidavit? 

The Chairman. I do not recall that. 

Mr. Gerson. All right. Then let me state for the record that to 
the best of my recollection, Mr. Kirschenbaum was a neuropsychiatric 
patient, and the orientation branch there apparently had a solid policy 
of not permitting neuropsychiatric patients to serve as instructors. 

The Chairman. All right. Proceed. 

Senator Welker. May I have a question ? 

The Chairman. Senator Welker. 

Senator Welker. I am concerned with the affidavit of Mr. Kirschen- 
baum. 

Were you at that time a member of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer the question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

Senator Welkkr. You decline? 



*TLe affidavit was sworn to before Betty Kaye, commissioner of deeds of the city of 
New York. 

32918*— 64— pt. 20 10 



1602 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chairman. That is under the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you in November 1929, endorse the line of 
the Communist International ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated in respect to all other questions concerning 
political affiliations and views. 

The Chairman. Senator Welker ? 

Senator Welker. Did your counsel tell you to decline to answer 
that question ? 

Mr. Gerson. Senator, my counsel is here solely to give me specific 
advice. 

Senator Welker. I asked you a question. Did he tell you to decline 
to answer that question ? 

Mr. Gerson. I made the suggestion to him, after some thought, and 
he concurred in the suggestion. 

Senator Welker. And he stated to you, in an audible voice to you, 
at least, and I saw it from here, "Decline to answer"' ? Is that correct? 

Mr. Gerson. He concurred in my suggestion; The initiative in 
declining to answer, sir, was my own. 

Senator Welker. I want to tell you and your counsel, as I am sure 
your able counsel knows, the privilege afforded to you under the fifth 
amendment is a personal one, and is not one granted to your counsel 
to suggest to you. So hereafter, if you decline to answer upon your 
constitutional rights, you please do the answering and not your coun- 
sel. He cannot suggest to you, sir, to take advantage of any provisions 
provided by the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Gerson. It was my impression, sir, that counsel under these 
circumstances, as under all circumstances, may indicate what the 
alternatives are. 

Senator Welker. I have told you the law on this matter. We have 
had this before us many times. We do not want to argue about it, 
because I am certain that counsel will agree with me on that. It is 
just so we keep the record straight. 

Mr. France. I agree with you. Senator. My purpose was to advise 
him that he had a right to decline to answer. If I said anything 

Senator Welker. I understand. I did not want it to happen again, 
I am sure able counsel will not permit it to happen. 

Mr. Mandel. I should like to present for the record a photostat 
of the Daily Worker of November 21, 1929, page 4, a long time before 
Mr. Gerson was in the Armed Forces, and I read from this photostat 
under the column Party Life : 

Workers of the North and South alike, help your party cleanse itself and 
march with Atlanta. 

The correctness of the new line of our party, as laid down by the Sixth World 
Congress of the CI, the 10th plenum, and the address to our party, was never 
brought out more clearly than in the Atlanta unit of the party and its work. 

This article, which I will not read in full, has below it the name of 
Si Gerson. I offer that for the record. 

Senator Welker (presiding). It will be admitted. Show it to the 
witness and his counsel. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 436-B," and is 
as follows:) 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1603 

Exhibit No. 436- B 

[From the Dally Worker, Nov. 21. 1929] 

Party Life — Workers of the North and South Alike Help Your Party 
Cleanse Itself ano March With Atlanta 

Th3 correctness of the new line of our party, as laid clown by the sixth world 
congress of the CI, the 10th plenum, and the address to our party, was never 
brought out more clearly than in tlie Atlanta unit of tlie party and its work. 

Years ago the unit was composed of a few businessmeu, and was a tail to a 
local Workmen's Circle. With the change in party line necessitated by the sliarp- 
eniug class battles ahead and tlie ridding of the party of the oi)portunist Love- 
stone group, many of tlie little-business men withdrew. The unit was reorganized 
with proletarian elements taking an active part in it. The unit orientated itself 
on mass work — "Toward tlie oppressed Negro masses and the workers in the 
basic industries" was the sloj;an. 

Today the unit is overwhelmli:gly proletarian. Half the members are Negro 
workers, right from factories, railroad shops, etc. Only a few days ago tlie 
Atlanta unit carried through a successful I'ith anniversary meeting where both 
black and white workers came together and celebrated the 12th anniversary of 
the founding of the Soviet Union. 

Anyone who knows the South knows that this was nothing short of a little 
revolution — to hold a Communist meeting south of the Mason-l>ix(m line where 
both Negro and white workers would sit in the same hall. But the fact that the 
party is leading both white and Negro workers in the struggle in the South is 
directly a result of the new line of the party and the throwing overboard of the 
old, petty-bourgeois elements who waxed fat and lazy in the party under the 
benevolent gaze of Jay Lovestone, whom they instinctively recognized as their 
ideological leader. 

Today some of the elements who were expelled from the party unit in Atlanta — 
the very same ones who used to scoff at the notion that it was possible to unite 
white and Negro workers or to lead the "backward American workers" — have 
crystallized themselves into parlor radical groups bitterly fighting the Atlanta 
unit of the party, boycotting meetings, etc. This is typical of the times and 
period — the sliding back of these elements into "disguised" reaction. In Atlanta, 
however, these elements masquerade under the protection of bona fide leftwirig 
organizations, the leftwing Workmen's Circle and the Icor. 

The Atlanta unit of the party, while not neglecting to expose these elements, 
as forging ahead with its work among the bitterly exploited Negro and white 
workers. Special attention is being given the textile workers and the work of 
the NTWU is supported to the utmost. Marked success has already been achieved 
among the Negro workers, 6 Negro workers having joined the party in Atlanta 
as a result of the work of the party in the last 2 weeks. 

The conclusions are very clear : 

Under Lovestone and his rightwing line — stagnation, petty-bourgeois sectarian- 
ism, actual decay. 

With the new line of the party — growth and development. 

Si Gerson. 

Senator Welker. Without objection, it is so admitted. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you affirm or deny that you are the same Si 
Gerson whose name a^Dpears on this news item ? 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question, sir, on 
the grounds hitherto stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you now or have you ever been a member of 
the Communist Party ? 

Mr. Gerson. 1 respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Communist Party when 
you were in the armed services of the United States? 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a candidate for the city council in New 
York on the Communist ticket in 1948 ? 



1604 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the New York State com- 
mittee of the Communist Party, or are you ? 

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the 
national committee of the Communist Party? 

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you arrested in 1928 in connection with dem- 
onstrations conducted by the Young Workers League, a Communist 
organization, at the Brooklyn Navy Yard? 

Mr. Gerson. Would you indulge me a moment, Mr. Chairman ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member 

Senator Welker. Do you mean if you were not arrested at that 
demonstration that that might tend to incriminate you? 

Mr. Gerson. No, sir. But with my layman's understanding of the 
tricky law of waiver, I have decided that that is the only answer which 
can protect my constitutional rights. 

Senator Welker. Would you deny it if we gave you at a later date 
a certified copy of the arrest report? 

Mr. Gerson. I would prefer not to answer hypothetical questions. 
I will meet that when I come to it, sir. 

Senator Welker. Thank you. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you a member of the Young Workers League 
at that time? 

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has sometliing. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a photostat from the Daily Worker of 
February 1, 1928, page 5, and I wish to read part of it and put the 
entire article into the record : 

CCNY behind student jailing. That pressure was exerted on the part of the 
nnthorities of the College of the City of New York to obtain a conviction in the 
case of a student of the college, S. W. Gerson, arrested in a demonstration of 
young workers and students in front of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, January 14, 
was indicated yesterday in the evidence of William Lindsay, the policeman who 
arrested the student. 

I offer that for the record. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you affirm or deny the statements in that news 
article ? 

Mr. Gerson. The same answer as to all other questions in respect 
to political beliefs and associations. 

Senator Welker. Don't get yourself in trouble. We do not recog- 
nize that. You should go ahead on the fact that we do recognize the 
fifth amendment. You can make that one, but we do not recognize it, 
and we do not want you to get into difficulty, if you want to preserve 
your right under the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Gerson. I am invoking my rights under the first and fifth 
throughout, sir, and I want that distinctly understood, when I say 
the same answer, I mean my original answer which included both 
the first and fifth. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1G05 

Senator Welker. Don't go into the first amendment because we do 
not recognize that, and to save time you will say "I decline to answer 
on the grounds heretofore given," and we will get along more speedily. 

Without objection the article will be made a part of the record. 

(The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 437" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 437 

[From the Daily Worker, Feb. 1, 1928 J 

CCNY Behind Student Jailing 

The pressure was exerted on the part of the authorities of the College of the 
City of New York to obtain a conviction In the case of a student of the college, 
S. W. Gerson, arrested in a demonstration of young workers and students in 
front of the Brooklyn Navy Yard, January 14, was indicated yesterday in the 
evidence of William Lindsay, the policeman who arrested the student. 

As Judge Farrar, of the Gates Avenue Court, Brooklyn, was about to dismiss 
the case or discharge Gerson with a suspended sentence when Lindsay came 
rushing up to the bench after having had something whispered into his ear. 
"Your Honor," he said, "this man has been convicted In his college of distribut- 
ing inflammatory literature." 

SENTENCED THURSDAY 

Although challenged to produce the actual evidence, Lindsay could not do so. 
Nevertheless Farrar declared Gerson guilty of disorderly conduct Sentence 
will be pronounced February 2, pending investigation by a probation oflBcer of 
Gerson's past record. 

The pressure is being exerted on Gerson by the college authorities because 
of his activity in connection with the student struggle against military training 
in the college. He has already been threatened with suspension on this account. 
A prominent reactionary professor at the college was present in court the first 
time the case was brought up. 

AUTHORITIES RESPONSIBLE 

Gerson, when reached last night by a Daily Worker reporter, told him that the 
dean of the college had already quizzed him on the matter. He stated that a 
conviction would be no surprise to him. "It is evident that a conviction of 10 
days or 30 days would please a lot of people at the college who want nobody to 
challenge imperialism there," he declared. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you arrested in Winston-Salem, N. C, on a 
charge of carrying a concealed weapon in 1930? 

JNIr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you at that time the district organizer of the 
Young Communist League ? 

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir. 

Mr. Carppenter. Mr. Mandel has something. 

Senator Welker. Just a moment. Have you ever been to Winston- 
Salem, N. C? _ 

Mr. Gerson. Would you indulge me, sir. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. I have been in Winston-Salem on occasion, sir. 

Senator Welker. What year? 

Mr. Gerson. I should say about a quarter of a century ago, sir. 

Senator Welker. About 25 years ago? 

Mr. Gerson. Perhaps 24. 

Senator Welker. That would be pretty close to the time in the 
question just propounded to you by counsel. 



1606 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Gerson". Arithmetically it would appear so, sir. _ 

Senator Welker. Would you mind telling the committee what you 
were doing there? 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
ground hitherto stated. 

Senator Welker. You were down there just for a visit or playing 
golf, visiting friends? 

Mr. Gerson. Well, the committee wouldn't regard playing golf as 
subversive; would it? 

Senator Welker. It depends a little bit on who you played with. 
Let's go into that. Did you play golf while you were there? 
' Mr. Gerson. I honestly don't recall, sir. 

Senator Welker. Do you recall anything you did at Winston-Salem, 

N. C? 

Mr. Gerson. Would you excuse me ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated, sir. 

Senator Welker. You do not recall whether or not you played golf, 
you do not recall whether or not you made the clink or were arrested 
in other words ? 

Mr. GtRsoN. I respectfully declined to answer the question, sir, on 
the grounds hitherto stated. 

Mr. Mandel. I have hiere a photostat of a clipping from the Daily 
Worker of May 2, 1930, page 1, headlined "ANLC Organizer Missing 
in South." I want to read part of the article : 

Si Gerson, district organizer of the Young Communist League in Nortli Caro- 
line, was airested Wednesday afternoon after the car in which he and two local 
workers were riding was stopped. 

Later on in the account it says, and it is dated from Winston-Salem, 

N. C, May 2— 

While Gerson was in jail, his room was raided by a number of detectives 

Senator Welker. While who was in jail? 
Mr. Mandel. Gerson. [Eeading:] 

While Gerson was in jail, his room was raided by a number of detectives who 
claimed to be searching for arms. 

I offer the whole article for the record. 
Senator Welker. Without objection, it is accepted. 
' (The article referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 438" and is as 
follows:) 

ExHiRiT No. 438 

[From the Daily Worker, May 2, 19301 

ANLC Organizer Missing in South— Pouce Try To Prevent May 1 

Demonstration 

Winston- Salem, N. C, May 2.— Paul Beverhardt, Negro organizer of the 
American Negro Labor Congress is still missing. Local police admit having 
arrested him, but claim to have freed him and that now they do not know his 
whereabouts. Beverhardt was held incommunicado with no charges brought 
against him. 

Si Gerson, district organizer of the Young Communist League in North 
Carolina, was arrested Wednesday afternoon, after the car in which he and 
two local workers were riding was stopped. Gerson was held Incommunicado 
until the night of May Day, the police not even bothering to book him on the 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1 G07 

police blotter. E. R. Whitman, local International liabor Defense attorney, 
was refused permission to soe Gerson. The obvious intent was to prevent 
Winston-Salem workers from holding a May Day demonstration. 

While Gerson was in jail, his room was raided by a number of detectives who 
claimed to be searching for arms. They tried to intimidate the landlady by 
telling her that "she was harboring dangerous people," but the working class 
landlady couldn't see it that way and refused to be bluffed. 

Senator Welker. Do you know a man by the name of Paul Croucli? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

Senator Welker. I take it you would not want to say whether or 
not you ever met him down in the South, either Winston-Salem or 
Chapel Hill? 

Mr. Gekson. Same answer, sir. 

Senator Welker. The same? 

Mr. Gerson. The same answer, sir. 

Senator Welker. Thank you. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you the same Gerson who appears in this 
news item that was just handed to you, the one that Mr. Mandel just 
read ? 

Mr. Gerson. Same answer, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. In 1927 were you a reporter for the Daily Worker? 

Mr. Gerson. Would you indulge me, sir? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has something. 

Mr. Mandel. I have a photostat of a clipping from the Daily 
Worker dated December 22, 1937, page 1, the headline is "Daily 
Worker reporter named to city position." Attached to the article 
is a photograph of S. W. Gerson. I offer that for the record. 

Senator Welker. Show it to counsel and the witness. 

Without objection it will be so entered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 439" and is 
as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 439 

[From the Dally Worker. Dec. 22, 1937] 

Daily Worker Reporter Named to Citt Position 

Stanley M. Isaacs, president-elect of the Borough of Manhattan, yesterday 
announced the appointment to his staff of S. W. Gerson, Dally Worker city hall 
correspondent, in the capacity of confidential inspector, 

Gerson will also take charge of the press relations work of the borough presi- 
dent's oflSce. 

Isaacs also announced that he had completed all the appointments for the 
various other positions to be filled in his office. 

Gerson will assume his new office January 1. He has been a member of the 
Daily Worker staff since December 1933, and covered city hall and city politics 
for 3 years. He is 28 years old and a member of the New York State Executive 
Committee of the Communist Party* 

NAMES OTHERS 

Isaacs announced the appointment 10 days ago of Walter D. Dinger as commis- 
sioner of borough works. 

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir. 

Mr. France. May I say. Senator, when you say "without objection," 
I don't understand that I have a right to keej) anything out of the 



1608 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

record that the committee wishes to put in. So if I fail to object, it is 
not because I admit the relevancy of anything. 

Senator Welker. We do that for the benefit of the staff, if there is 
an objection from one of the staff. And 1 might say to you, counselor, 
that we try to get along with able counselors like yourself. If you 
have an objection, we will certainly listen. 

Mr. France. Thank you. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Gerson, I have listened attentively to your 
testimony here and I am unable to determine whether or not you are 
the man who has been arrested in Winston-Salem, or has taken any 
part in any Communist activities. For the conclusion of this inter- 
rogation, I must step down and show you a little matter I want to 
interrogate you about. 

Did you or did you not in 1954 write for the New York State Com- 
munist Party, 268 Seventh Avenue, New York 1, N. Y., an article 
named "The Rights You Save May Be Your Own," by Simon W. 
Gerson. I am asking you that question. When I get through inter- 
rogating you, then you can see it. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. The same reply as given hitherto to questions in re- 
spect to matter of this sort. 

Senator Welker. Are you now or have you ever been legislative 
chairman of the New York Communist Party ? 

Mr. Gerson. The same reply, sir. 

Senator Welker. Have you ever been a city hall reporter in the 
city of New York, or Brooklyn, or anyplace else? 

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir. 

Senator Welker. Have you ever been legislative correspondent 
and city editor of the Daily Worker ? 

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Gerson, I ask you whether or not you have 
ever been assistant to the borough president of Manhattan in the years 
1938-48, during the LaGuardia administration ? 

Mr. Gerson. Would you repeat that, please? 

Senator Welker. Mr. Gerson, have you ever been, or were you ever 
assistant to the borough president of Manhattan during the years 
1938-40, during the LaGuardia administration? 

Mr. Gerson. The same reply, sir. 

Senator Welker. Do you mean if you told us the truth on that, you 
might tend to incriminate yourself? 

Mr. Gerson. In the present McCarthyite atmosphere, I believe I 
would. 

Senator Welker. How about in the present American atmosphere? 
Forget about McCarthy. 

Mr. Gerson. Unfortunately, Senator, Senator McCarthy has tended 
to poison the American atmosphere, making it necessary for American 
citizens to invoke their constitutional rights. 

Senator Welker. How would he cause anything to incriminate you 
if it were the truth ? 

Mr. Gerson. In view of present inquisitions into political beliefs, I 
regard it as the best protection of American rights of citizens to invoke 
the constitutional rights handed down to us by the Founding Fathers. 

Senator AVelker. Even though if you told us the truth, you think it 
is still best for you to invoke the fifth amendment? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1609 

Mr. Gerson. I did not create this McCarthyite atniospliore in the 
country, sir. 

Senator Welker. Do you know who did? 

Mr. Gerson. I have a sneakino; hunch that political inquisitions of 
this sort tend to poison the atmosphere, sir. 

Senator Welker. I have a little intimate idea that people who will 
not answer questions truthfully may have had something to do with it, 
too. 

Mr. Gerson. Very well, sir, that is a matter of opinion. 

Senator Welker. Yes, it is. You are, of course, a New Yorker 
and an ex-GI? 

Mr. Gerson. I have testified to that. 

Senator Welker. Have you ever engaged in politics? I mean seek- 
ing public office. 

Mr. Gerson. Now, sir, my offhand reaction would be that that 
should not be an incriminating question in a meeting of Senators. 
But I will discuss the matter with counsel, with your permission. 

Senator Welker. Fine. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. I regret to say that I have to give the same reply as 
I did to the other questions. 

Senator Welker. We will agi*ee that had you sought public office 
of any office, that would be a matter of public record and we could 
find that out very easily ? 

Mr. Gerson. But insofar as I am concerned, my understanding of 
our laws and our basic law, I am not required to testify against 
myself. 

Senator Welker. I will ask you if it isn't a fact that in 1948 you 
received over 150,000 votes as a candidate for city council for Brooklyn 
on the Communist, American Labor Party ticket. 

]Mr. Gerson. I respectfully decline to answer that question on the 
grounds hitherto stated. 

Senator Welker. And that you have appeared frequently before 
various Government bodies on legislative matters? 

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir. 

Senator Welker. Now, Mr. Gerson, I am not having much success 
with you as to what you have done and where you have been. Or, 
really, who you are. So I now direct your attention to a picture 
appearing on page 2 of the document I read to you a moment ago, and 
ask you whether or not that is a picture of you, the witness before 
this committee. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

]\Ir. Gerson. Same reply, sir. 

Senator Welker. You will deny that that is a picture of you ? 

Mr. Gerson. I have neither affirmed or denied. I have given you a 
particular reply, sir. 

Senator Welker. You are using your fifth amendment on it? Is 
that right? 

Mr. Gerson. I am using my constitutional right. 

Senator Welker. Under the fifth amendment? 

Mr. Gerson. Your right and mine, sir. 

Senator Welker. Very well, sir. You wouldn't say it was a picture 
of Joe McCarthy ? 



1610 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Gerson. No, that would be stretching constitutional immunity 
a little too far. 

Senator Welker. Well, I believe you are stretching it a little too 
far, if I may be argumentative like you, because if I can see correctly, 
and I have fairly good eyesight, that is a perfect resemblance of you, 
the witness, before this committee. 

Now, would you care to comment on the introduction to this article, 
The Rights You Save May Be Your Own, with the initials S. W. G. 
appearing at the bottom? 

Mr. Gerson. The question was would I care to? 

Senator Welker. Yes. 

Mr. Gerson. The answer is "No." 

Senator Welker. Upon what grounds ? 

Mr. Gerson. The same grounds as hitherto stated concerning all 
questions with respect to my political views and affiliations, and the 
fifth amendment. 

Senator Welker. And I take it you would not care to discuss any- 
thing else in this document which is alleged to have been written by 
one Simon W. Gerson, whose picture allegedly appears on page 2 
and in the opinion of the acting chairman is very, very similar to the 
witness we liave before our committee. 
' Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir. 

Senator Welker. Thank you very much. 

Without objection we will introduce this entire document. The 
Rights You Save May Be Your Own, by Simon W. Gerson, and make 
it a part of the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 440" and is 
as follows : ) 

Exhibit No. 440 

The Rights You Save May Be Your Own 

(By Simon W. Gerson) 



SIMON W. GERSON is legisla- 
tive chairman of the New York 
Communist Party. A former 
City Hall reporter, legislative 
correspondent and city editor of 
the Daily Worker, Gerson was 
assistant to the Borough Presi- 
dent of Manhattan, 1938-40, dur« 
ing the LaGuardia Administra- 
tion. A New Yorker and an ex- 
GI, Gerson has run for pub- 
lic office. In 1948 he received 
150,000 votes as a candidate for 
City Council from Brooklyn on 
the Communist and American 
Labor Party tickets. He has appeared frequently before 
various government bodies on legislative matters. 

INTRODUCTION 

This Statement of the Communist Party's opposition to 10 bills designed to 
outlaw the party was delivered to a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Com- 
mittee on April 7, 1954. 




INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1611 

Since its deliv<'ry, Attorney General Herbert Browiiell Iwis also testified be- 
fore the same coinniittee. Mr. Brownell differed with (lie coinmittee. but not 
in principle. He proposed a series of bills to accomplish the same objective 
In a ditTereut way. 

Wliether it is the crude way of Representative Martin Dies or the sliclf way 
of the Attorney General, this type of le.ulslatiou adds up to the same thing — 
the strangling of the rights of all Americans. No American who seelis to express 
himself against the Dul'es-McCarthy type of policy on foreign or domestic 
affairs will be ."secure. 

To dt^feat McCarthyism, the American form of Hitlerism, is the is.sue of the 
day. To unite against McCartbyism, of which these outlawry bills and the 
Brownell program are but parts, is to unite in defense of the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights. 

And to defend the Constitution today is to defend our right to have a voice 
in shaping the answer to the crucial issues of today; Will our sons fight in the 
jungles of Indochina? Will there be an H-bomb war? Will there be jobs 
tomorrow? 

Our civil liberties, our living standards, yes, our very lives, are bound together. 
To defend the one, we must defend all. 

S. W. G. 

My name is Simon W. Gerson. I am legislative chairman of the New York 
Communist Party, and api>ear here today on behalf of the national committee 
of the party in opposition to the 11 bills designed to outlaw the Communist Party 
and now before your connnittee. 

While these measures may seem to touch only one small section of our popula- 
tion, their implications are of far-reaching national importance. One of your 
colleagues, Representative Harley O. Staggers, warned the committee against 
blitzing through such bills. He put the question correctly when he told this 
subcommittee on March 18 that "it is the most important thing that comes 
before us. It will affect our w<iy of life." 

The issue, gentlemen, is not simply the legal existence of a single political 
party. That in itself would merit deep consideration. The issue, as Mr. Staggers 
indicated, is the infinitely deeper one of the continued existence of a constitu- 
tional way of life in the United States. 

For what we have here is a legislative hellbomb that woidd pulverize our 
constitutional liberties. The radioactive dust of such measures would not settle 
for a long time. Significantly, these bills are advanced precisely at a time when 
America and the world are in a great debate over the issues of the H-bomb and 
Indochina. People are asking whether the awful power of the H-bomb — from 
which no hide-or-run schemes can protect us or anybody else — will be controlled. 
People are debating the issue of whether the administration will drag our sons 
into a new war in Indochina. 

The question, therefore, arises : Are these bills designed to strangle public 
discussion and opposition to such a war? 

It is precisely at this time that the constitutional guaranties of free discus- 
sion, as set forth in our Bill of Rights, are so essential to our national life. That 
is why we emphasize today, at the very threshold of our argument, that we call 
not only for the defen.se of the rights of the Communist Party but the defense of 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. We ask you constantly to remember 
the point made by Supreme Court Justice Jackson, In another connection, that 
the rights of all Americans are tied up in one bundle with the rights of the 
Communists. 

BILLS CLEARLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL 

We regard these bills as fundamentally unconstitutional. They are bills of 
attainder in direct violation of article I, section 9, of the Constitution. They 
are, for the most part, vague and indefinite and obviously destructive of the rights 
of freedom of speech, press, and assembly. No legislative tinkering can make 
them even plausibly constitutional, since they are squarely directed at Ideas and 
associations of Americans — a realm forbidden to Congress by the Constitution. 

But it is not primarily the unconstitutionality of these bills that I wish to 
emphasize today. It is the broad question of public policy that I want to stress. 

These bills, we submit, are far worse than the ill-famed sedition law of 1798. 
They move in a dangerous direction — the direction of fascism. A detailed exami- 
nation of these bills Indicates that the pattern is essentially that of fascism — 
first, the outlawing of the Communists, and then, swiftly in turn, every other 
group which opposes fascism or its American variant, McCartbyism. 



1612 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

These bills, if enacted into law, would represent a sinister and qualitative 
change in American legal processes. They would open jail doors for literally 
tens of thousands of Americans. In fact, their enforcement would probably 
require a concentration camp system as an auxiliary to the present Federal 
prison system. 

Mere membership in organizations whose nonconformist activities are frowned 
upon by the powers that be would lay the basis for heavy prison terms. As any 
detailed examination of the measures will show, these are dragnet bills going far 
beyond the Communist Party and affecting millions of Americans of all points of 
view. 

In terms of world esteem, enactment of this type of legislation would be the 
sign absolute that McCarthyism, which the peoples of the globe equate with 
fascism, has made seven-league strides in the United States of America. For, as 
the world knows, fascism has always begun by outlawing the Communist Party, 
as in Mussolini Italy and Hitler Germany, and then proceeded to destroy every 
other movement — the trade unions, the cooperatives, the liberals, the church 
groups — in opposition to its policies of aggression abroad and fascism at home. 

Significantly, in those nations where the contrary is true, where fascism or 
military dictatorships have not come to power — as in England, France, Italy, 
Belgium, Sweden, Holland, Mexico, etc. — there, legal Communist parties exist, 
with their rights in the market place of ideas. There too, exist trade unions. 
There, too, one finds a relatively high degree of piiblic discussion about all prob- 
lems, domestic and foreign. In those countries where McCarthyism is anathema 
today, it is not considered treasonable to discuss publicly the possibility of nego- 
tiations, East-West trade and coexistence of differing social systems. 

THE TWO BIG LIES 

Fascism, which always began by demanding "only" the outlawry of communism, 
based its action on two big lies — the first, on the allegetl danger of external aggres- 
sion, generally from the Soviet Union ; and second, on the alleged danger of violent 
overthrow of the government by the Communists. 

On such bases all antidemocratic actions were justified. It was on such a basis 
that the aggressive Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis was formed. History has demon- 
strated with crystal clarity that Hitler's aim was world conquest ; his method 
was anticommunism. The Red scare was the means he used to crush democratic 
opposition at home in order to serve a handful of German bankers and the great 
Ruhr industrialists. The Red scare was the means he used to organize aggression 
abroad — against both West and East. 

Substantially the same assumptions are the basis of our native repressionists' 
pi'oposals. Let us examine them briefly. 

Is there a danger of aggression against our shores? There is not a single 
responsible authority who thinks so. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, testifying July 
18, 1953, before the Senate Appropriations Committee, said flatly : "I do not think 
a war is ever going to come," 

Steel magnate, Ernest Weir, writing in Harpers magazine, December 1953, asso- 
ciating himself with the widespread Euroi)ean conviction that the Soviet Union 
wants peace, said ; "* * * Europeans are convinced that Russia is not marking 
time while she awaits the opportune moment and place to start war. On the 
contrary, they are convinced that Russia actually is eager for peace and will make 
concessions to get it," 

Every sign points to a certain relaxation of tensions, whatever frustrations 
those relaxations may induce in some of our big business or big brass circles. 
Only last Friday, April 2, 1954, the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times, 
Harrison Salisbury, wrote that the Soviet Union was seeking sincerely to end the 
cold war and resolve problems by negotiation. Repeated warnings from Soviet 
leaders that war under H-bomb conditions would mean the end of civilization 
correspond to the deepest feelings of many Americans, including some Congress- 
men. Clearly, any policy premised on the theory of Soviet aggression against us 
is a policy based on a colossal historical lie. 

THE "CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER" FABLE 

What of the other "big lie" — the assumption that the Communist Party repre- 
sents a clear and present danger of the overthrow of our Republic? 

As far as the Communist Party is concerned, we reject the notion that we are 
a clear and present or an obscure and remote danger to the Nation. We say 
this not because we are a small party. Large or small, a political party which 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1G13 

bases itself on advocating Its views and winning tlie majority of the people to 
its side can never be a clear and present danger to democratic processes. 

If size were the sole criterion, then the Italian and French Communist Parties 
would be reckoned as clear and present dangers. But in their respective coun- 
tries tliese parties are part of the normal political life of the Nation. They 
I»ublish newspapers, lead trade unions, sit in parliamentary bodies, etc. The 
sole danger, according to some correspondents in Italy, for example, is that 
the Communist Party and its allies will legally win control of the Government 
tnrough constitutional processes. 

But if a large Communist Party does not constitute a clear and present danger, 
it is hard to see how a small party can. Sane people cannot accept for a moment 
the weird notion that the smaller the party, the greater the danger. 

Both basic assumptions, both "big lies," must therefore be rejected and the 
entire structure of exceptional laws built upon them must necessarily collap.se. 

The bills before you are predicated on the assumption— which we vigorously 
reject — that the party teaches and advocates the overthrow of our government 
by force and violence. This is sheer slander and is in sharp conflict with the 
real truth. This slander is most assiduously circulated by those elements in our 
Nation and life who do not oppose antilabor violence against strikers or the 
persistent, shameful violence of the lynch system against the Negro people. 

WHAT DO COMMUNISTS REALLY ADVOCATE? 

The Communist Party has just published its new draft program, entitled "The 
American Way," in a quarter of a million copies. It represents the considered 
viewpoint of the Communists and their proposals for meeting the critical prob- 
lems now facing the American people — the issues of peace, democracy, and jobs. 
The Communist Party does not hold that the issue of today is the question of 
socialism. 

"The choice before the people today," says the program, "is peace, security, 
democracy versus the grip which the monopolists have on the country and their 
plans of fascism and war." 

What does this draft program say about the advocacy of the Communist 
Party in respect to a transition to socialism? I quote the pertinent section — 
and submit the entire draft program as part of my testimony — at this point: 

"The Communist Party advocates a peaceful path to .socialism in the United 
States. It brands as a lie the charge that it advocates the use of force and 
violence in the pursuit of any of its immediate or long-range goals. It declares 
that socialism will come into existence in the United States only when the major- 
ity of the American people decide to establish it. The Communist Party affirm.s 
its deep and abiding faith in the American people and their ultimate decision 
to establish socialism. The needs of our Nation cannot b? served by any sect 
or conspiracy. For no progress, wliether of a minimum or of a more far-reaching 
nature, can come other than through the will and action of a majority of the 
American people. 

"The Conimuni.st Party has no blueprint for the path to socialism in the 
United States. The American i)eople will move along the path to socialism as 
inevitably as other peoples and nations have done becau.se ultimately there is 
no other solution to their prolilems. But they will do so in a form and manner 
which will be determined by the history, the traditions, and the specific needs 
of the American people. No social system can be imported from abroad. Nor 
do we propose to do so." 

THE MATURING OF A CONCEPT 

Communists have taught this for years. Thus William Z. Foster, national 
chairman of the Communist Party, wrote in 1949 in his book. Twilight of World 
Capitalism (p. 125) : 

"* * * In all good time the American people, on the basis of their existing 
conditions, will decide how and in what form they will introduce socialism. The 
way our party foresees the po.ssible development of the future is along the 
f oUowing general lines : 

"First, we propose the regular election of a democratic coalition government, 
based on a broad united front combination of workers, small farmers, Negroes, 
professionals, small business groups, and other democratic elements who are ready 
to fight against monopoly, economic breakdown, fascism, and war.  *  

"Second, our party contends that such an anti-Fascist, antiwar, democratic 
coalition government, once in power, would be compelled to move to the left," 



1614 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Substantially the same position was developed by Mr. Foster in his authorita- 
tive work, History of the Communist Party in the United States, published 
in 1952. 

Election through democratic processes of a people's front government and the 
concept of the American road to socialism are not gimmick theories to avoid 
prosecution. The concept of the American road to socialism — i. e., the orienta- 
tion upon a peaceful and democratic accession to governmental power of the 
working class and its allies, and the use of its lawful governmental power to 
advance toward socialism — has been maturing in Communist teaching and 
advocacy for at least 19 years. 

THE "treason" lie 

Branding as false the charge that the Communist Party teaches the overthrow 
of the United States Government by force and violence, I now want to turn to 
the loosely hurled charges of "treason," etc. Here there is a very short answer. 

The charge of treason is one with which the Founding Fathers were completely 
familiar. That was why they defined treason very carefully not by statute but 
in the basic charter of our Government, the Con.stitution. The writers of the 
Constitution made it clear that treason was not dissent but a clearly demon- 
strable crime that required a certain minimum of objective proof. 

In the 35-year history of the Commimist Party there has not been a single 
Communist ever convicted or even indicted on that charge. In the more than 
100 Smith Act indictments drawn by various Federal United States attorneys 
there is not a single allegation of anything remotely resembling treason, sabotage, 
violence, or espionage. 

Will any rational man argue that a succession of United States Attorneys 
General under Republican and Democratic administrations have pei'mitted 
treason to flourish for the last 35 years, or that the FBI has been unable to 
discover it? 

Of course, not. The simple truth is that the Communist Party has not advo- 
cated or practiced treason, sabotage, violence, espionage, or any other crimes. 

Quite the contrary. In the hours of our Nation's gravest peril, in World 
War II, 15,000 American Communists served in the Armed Forces of our Nation. 
A number of them were decorated for heroic service above and beyond the call 
of duty. The late Captain Herman Bottcher. killed in action in Leyte, was a 
well-known Communist. So, of course, is Robert Thompson, now a Smith Act 
victim in Atlanta penitentiary, and winner of the Distinguished Service Cross 
for extraordinary heroism in New Guinea. 

MARTIN DIES ON SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM 

At this point I would like to examine some of the bills in detail as well as the 
legislative intent as expressed by their sponsors. I said earlier that the bills 
were a dragnet menace to the freedom of many Americans to speak and asso- 
ciate and that these bills go far beyond the Communist Party. 

Representative Martin Dies, speaking before your committee on March 18 in 
behalf of his bill, H. R. 7984, made it clear that he regards Socialists as substan- 
tially in the same category as Communists. In an.swer to a question from a 
committee member, Mr. Dies said : 

"The Socialist Party is the Communist Party. Socialism touches communism. 
Up until the Third Communist Internationale they were in the same Communist 
movement." 

At another point, Mr. Dies said, "All of them recognize Marxism." From the 
context it is clear that by "all" Mr. Dies was referring to both Socialists and 
Communists. 

Now, who is a Socialist these days? According to some pundits, the last two 
decades have been years of "creeping socialism." According to some, the TVA 
is an example of "creeping socialism." On April 26, 1950, Edwin S. Friendly, 
president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, attacked the so- 
called welfare state of the administration and "communism disguised as demo- 
cratic socialism." It is a matter of record that public housing is persistently 
denounced as "socialistic" by the real-estate lobby and their political agents. 

Under Mr. Dies' definition of socialism and communism are advocates of TVA, 
public housing, and such allegedly "socialistic" projects to suffer 10-year jail 
sentences? What would happen to trade unionists. New Dealers, liberal Re- 
publicans, and independents who advance such "socialistic" proposals? What 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1G15 

would happen to supporters of the Nntional Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People who, along with millions of supporters, Negro and white, advance 
such a "socialistic" proposal as full economic, political, and social etiuality for 
the Negro people, one-tenth of the population of the United States? If all this 
alleged socialism "touches communism," will all these groups not he guilty under 
Mr. Dies' curious definition? 

Is not this type of argumentation Just another way of advancing Senator 
McCarthy's incredible thesis thac the four administrations between 1933 to 1953 
were "20 years of treason"? 

Lest it be said that Mr. Dies* definitions are somewhat unique, let us examine 
both the hill, 11. 1{. 79S0, and the views of a member of this committee. Repre- 
sentatives Francis Walter. Representative Walter seeks to avoid a crude and 
unconstitutional bill of attainder. His bill does not mention the word "Com- 
munist" and he told the committee quite frankly on March 18 that "it is utterly 
impossible to outlaw the Communist Party as such." He also stated candidly 
that his statute would cover persons about whom it would be difficult to find 
"any evidence of teaching the overthrow of the Government by force and violence." 

Mr. Walter states that he wants to outlaw the "activities" of "these people" 
since he admits that "you cannot outlaw a party any more than you can outlaw 
a chair." 

Now, what are these "activities" that H. R. 7980 would make punishable by a 
10-year sentence? 

Testifying before a House appropriations subcommittee January 9, 1953, FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover defined — and I quote his language — the "principal 
Communist activities and objectives In the United States" as the following : 

"1. Its peace objective geared primarily to raising nationwide appeal for a 
settlement of the Korean war ; 

"2. The recall of American troops from abroad ; 

"3. A five-power peace pact, including Communist China ; 

"4. The resumption of trade with the Iron Curtain countries." 

Referring to the national scene, Mr. Hoover said : 

"On the domestic front, the Communists have also directed their attention to 
urging repeal of the Smith Act, the Taft-Hartley law, and the Internal Security 
Act of 1950." 

These are the "principal activities" of the Communists — and, incidentally, of 
many, many more people beyond the Communist Party — as defined by J. Ei'gar 
Hoover. Presumably, these must be the "activities" which Mr. Walter's bill 
would outlaw and make punishable by 10-year sentences. 

Examine each of these "principal activities." Aren't there millions of Ameri- 
cans, including Congressmen, who want "a settlement of the Korean war"? 
Doesn't the entire Nation look with revulsion at what the late Senator Taft 
called "a bloody, useless war"? Doesn't the Nation shudder at the thought of 
involvement in another Korea, this time in the jungles of Indochina? 

CONTROVERSIAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL 

And wliat is subversive about seeking a five-power peace pact, including the 
government of People's China, the effective government of the mainland of 
China? Controversial, yes; criminal, no. 

And if the resumption of East-West trade to help American workers, farmers, 
and business is a criminal activity, then some administration officials and Con- 
gressmen may as well get themselves measured for prison denims now. At least 
one of your members. Representative Thurmond Chatham of North Carolina, 
a member of the House Forei'j:n Affairs Committee, told a big dinner in New York 
on January 25 last that he favored trade with Russia in nonstrategic items. 
In fact, he made his speech available for readers nationally by insertion in the 
Congressional Record. Are Americans who want to sell butter and other Ameri- 
can products to Russia now to be guilty of "activities" which would bring them 
under Mr. Walter's ban? 

As far as the domestic activities of the Communists, as defined by Mr. Hoover, 
Is there anything criminal in seeking the repeal of the Smith Act, whose advocacy 
section was denounced by at least two Supreme Court judges, a CIO national 
convention, the NAACP, and many newspapers throughout the country? Is 
there anything criminal in seeking the repeal of the Taft-Hartley law, the 
announced objective of all sections of the organized labor movement as well as 



1616 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

considerable portions of the Democratic Party? Or is there anything criminal 
in seelving repeal of the McCarran Act which, like the Taft-Hartley law, was 
vetoed by then President Truman? 

Simply to examine these bills is to see how far America has gone in the 
direction of surrender to McCarthyism. If these "principal activities" of the 
Communists become illegal, then no American who has any independent views 
on foreign or domestic policy is safe. Opposition to involvement in the Indo- 
chinese war on the side of French colonialism and efforts to stimulate our 
economy by East-West trade will both be virtually equated with treason or 
subversion. 

M'CARTHYISM — THE REAL DANGER 

Gentlemen, there is a clear and present danger in our Nation. It is the danger 
of the McCarthyian destruction of basic American constitutional rights. It is, 
of course, designed first of all to prevent the election of a Congress in 1954 
devoted to the return to the policies of the New Deal. McCarthyism throws out 
a smokescreen behind which the most powerful elements in American political 
life, the huge banks and trusts, America's financial oligarchy, advance against 
the interests of tie American people. The effect of these McCarthyite bills and 
the whole hysterical and artificial clamor about the menace of communism is to 
divert attention from the real problems that concern the American people : 

Will our sons be fighting in the Indochinese jungles tomorrow? 

Will we have our jobs tomorrow? 

Will we have our liberties tomorrow? 

This McCarthyite danger does not come primarily from one or another head- 
line-hunting Congressman. It represents the extreme right in American poli- 
tics — and is not limited only to a few millionaire Texas oilmen, either. William 
A. White was quite correct when he wrote of McCarthy's supporters in the New 
York Times magazine March 21, 1954: 

"Some rich and cogent men support him in full awareness of what they are 
about — which is an attempt to raise up what they believe to be a puissant symbol 
of right-wing thought and action in Government." 

Nor is this extreme right wing in American politics the creation of a moment. 
This is the same section of American big business which 18 years ago fought 
President Roosevelt tooth and nail through the American Liberty League. They 
bitterly opposed New Deal social legislation and any concessions to organized 
labor. 

Later, many opposed any real effort to halt nazism and many actively sup- 
ported the America First crowd. This extreme right feels that in World War II 
we fought the wrong war with the wrong allies against the wrong side. 

It is this basically pro-Fascist antilabor extreme right wing big business crowd 
which inspires the present series of violently antidemocratic bills. 

A STEP TO FASCISM 

If enacted into law, these bills will mark the furthest step down the road to 
fascism that the United States has yet taken. The United States will then 
have the dubious distinction of being the first non-Fascist country in the world to 
outlaw the Communist Party. The world will see it for what it is — an effort to 
terrorize the country so that we may not debate freely the issues of the day : 
the prohibition of the H- and A-bombs ; intervention in Indochina ; a five-power 
peace pact ; East- West trade ; a genuine antidepression program to meet mount- 
ing unemployment ; and quick passage of an FEPC law and a full civil-rights 
program. 

Whether this bill passes or not, the Communist Party will continue to fight 
for its legal existence. In so doing, it is mindful that it represents the fight 
of all Americans, irrespective of party, for the right to speak, organize, write, and 
assemble. 

We know, of course, the present temper of this committee. We are aware that 
to a man this committee is anti-Communist. But the issue here is not commu- 
nism ; it is the defense of the Constitution. Rejection of this fantastic legislation 
is not approval of the Communist Party ; it is reaffirmation of the basic validity 
of the Bill of Rights. Rejection of these bills will be a signal to the world that 
McCarthyism has not conquered our Halls of Congress. 

To defeat these bills is to defend the rights of all Americans to speak their 
minds on the issues of the day. To defeat these bills is to defend your own rights, 
gentlemen. Remember — the rights you save may be your own. 

Published by the New York State Communist Party, New York, N. Y. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1017 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Gersoii, liave you ever had occasion during 
your lifetime to attend Conimimist meetings in Russia? 

Mr. Gerson. Might I consult with counsel on that question? 

Mr. Carpenter. What was that? 

Mr. Gerson. Might I considt, sir? 

Senator Welker. At any time, Mr. Witness. 

(The witness consulted with his coiuisel.) 

Mr. Gerson. I will respectfully decline to answer that question on 
the grounds hitherto stated. 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever been in Russia ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you use a passport if and when you went to 
Russia ? 

Mr. Gerson. What was that? 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you use a passport, if and when you went to 
Russia ? 

Mr. Gerson. Isn't that a hypothetical question? To be frank with 
3'ou, I don't understand it. 

Senator Welker. I think we better strike the last part, "if and 
when you went to Russia." That is a double-barreled question. You 
can ask that in some other way : Has he ever used a passport. 

^Ir. Carpenter. Have you ever used a United States passport in 
traveling? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. The same reply, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. If you ever used a passport, did you tell the truth 
to all the questions that were asked you concerning the procuring of 
that passport? 

Mr. Gerson. I make it a habit generally to tell the truth, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Well, did you on the occasions of asking for a 
passport ? 

Mr. Gerson. Same reply, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever use a passport under an alias? 
That is, a name other than your own name ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. Categorically, no. 

Senator Welker. How was that? 

Mr. Gerson. Categorically no, to the best of my recollection. 

Senator Welker. Counselor, we have opened up the subject of 
passports, and I think now I will direct the witness to answer the 
counsel's question with respect to whether or not he ever asked for 
or received a passport to go to Russia. I am sure able counsel realizes, 
once you open up the subject matter 

Mr. France. Senator, I would agree with you if he had said no, 
which did not concede that he had ever used any passport for any 
purpose. 

Senator Welker. I will ask the witness a question : 

Did you ever apply for or receive a passport to go to Russia? 
(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. The question pertained: Did I make an application 
under my own name for 

32918"— 54— pt. 20 11 



1618 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION EST GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. Read the question to him, will you, Mr. Re- 
porter ? 

(The reporter read from his notes as requested.) 

]\Ir. Gekson. I applied for an American passport. 

Senator AVelkek. What year? 

Mr. Gekson. In 1927, sir. 

Senator Welker. And was the passport granted you ? 

Mr. Gersox. It was, sir. 

Senator Welker. And did you answer all the questions truthfully 
propounded to you before you received the passport? 

]\Ir. Gerson. To the best of my present recollection, I did. 

Senator Welker. Did you go to Russia in 1927? 

Mr. Gerson. I visited Europe in 1927; yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. I asked you, did you go to Russia in 1927. 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. The answer is, sir, that I visited the Soviet Union 
among the countries of Europe ; yes. 

Senator Welker. Did you go to school there? 

Mr. Gersox. I did not. 

Senator Welker. yV\\y did you raise your voice on that? I merely 
wanted to find out what you were doing there. 

Mr. Gerson. I beg your pardon, sir. I think this whole thing  

Senator Welker. Would you mind telling the committee what you 
did in Russia there, who you saw? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. Repeat the last question, please. 

(The rey)orter read from his notes as requested.) 

Mr. Gerson. Yes, sir. I traveled thousands of miles in the Soviet 
Union, visiting various sections of the Soviet Union, particularly its 
national minorities. 

Senator Welker. National what ? 

Mr, Gerson. Minorities. 

Senator Welker. Did you pay your own expenses? 

Mr. Gerson. The bulk of them. 

Senator Welker. Who paid the balance ? 

Mr. Gerson. The college. 

Senator Welker. What college? 

Mr. Gerson. The college club to which I belonged. 

Senator Welker. What ? 

Mr. Gerson. A college club to which I belonged. 

Senator Welker. Let's have the name of the college club and its 
address. 

Mr. Gerson. The Social Problems Club, the College of the City of 
New York. 

Senator Welker. That was in the year 1927 ? 

Mr. Gerson. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Welker. Did you visit with, or talk to, any officials of the 
Communist Party in Russia ? 

Mr. Gerson. I don't recall visiting Communist Party officials. I 
recall a group of students and professors visiting whatever officialdom 
was on hand in any town we went to. 

Senator Welker. You went with a group of students, am I correct, 
Mr. Witness? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT IGIO 

Mr. Gerson. That is correct, sir. 

Seiiiitor AVeuveu. And you met with ofTlcijils who were present? 

Mr. Gerson. The local mayor mio^ht turn out and |)eoj)le like that. 

Senator Welkeh. They treated you quite splendidly at that time; 
did they? 

JNIr. Gerson. They treated all Americans who were there, includ- 
ini; one <rentleinan who is now a Member of the United State Senate, 
quite splendidly. 

Senator Welker. Who was that? 

]\Ir. Gerson. He wasn't a Senator then, so the reference may bo un- 
fair. It was Paul Douglas, of Illinois. Just to be strictly accurate, 
he was not a member of the particular delegation that I was on. 

Senator Welker. He happened to be visitinoj there at the same time ? 

IMr. Ge3{son. That is correct, sir, with some others. 

Senator Welker. Is this this only time you ever visited Russia ? 

IMr. Gerson. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Welker. Did you ever hear of the Lenin School in Hussia? 

IMr. Gerson. I have heard, sir, that there was such a school, but 
I have no personal knowledge of it. 

Senator Welker. You did not visit that school while you were 
there ? 

Mr. (terson. Absolutely not. 

Senator Welker. From your information received abmt the Lenin 
School, you knew, did you not, that that was a school that trained 
Americans and other people in espionaj2;e and sabotage 

Mr. Gerson. No, sir; I knew no such thing. 

Senator Welker. You never heard anything about that? 

Mr, Gerson. No, sir. 

Senator Welker. Did they ever tell you what they taught in the 
Lenin School? 

Mr. Gerson. No, sir. 

Senator Welker. You did not inquire about it ? 

Mr. Gerson. No, sir. 

Senator Welker. But you were there to seek to learn? 

Mr. Gerson. I traveled all over the Soviet Union, sir, and I had a 
special interest. I indicated what that interest was. 

Senator Welker. That was the minority ? 

Mr. Gerson. That is correct. 

Senator Welker. Did Mr. Harold Ware go with you on that trip? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Senator Welker. I will call attention to the code of fair ethics. 
I think we are fair Avhen we let you sit there and discuss matters of 
law which you want to. 1 am not going to object to it. You may now 
proceed, Mr. Witness. 

Mr. Gerson. I recall no such person. 

Senator Welker. Did you know that at that time Hal Ware was 
then an agricultural expert for the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Gerson. I don't think I had the faintest knowledge at that 



time- 



Senator Welker. Did you ever have any other knowledge of Mr. 
Harold Ware, eitlier in Kussia or any other place? 
Mr. Gerson. I have no recollection of such an individual, sir. 
Senator Welker. You have seen his name in print, of course. 
Mr. Gerson. Yes, sir. 



1620 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Wei.ker. Have you ever in your lifetime ever known a 
member of the Communist Party outside of Russia? 

Mr. Gerson. I think I am going to have to decline to answer that 
question on the grounds hitherto stated. 

Senator Welker. Mr. Carj>enter? 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever been in contact with agents of the 
Soviet Military Intelligence? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. GERSoisr. To the best of my knowledge, sir, I have never been 
in contact with such people. 

Senator Welker. Have you ever visited at any time the Soviet 
Embassy in the United States or 

Mr. Gerson. No, sir. 

Senator Welker. Any of its representatives? 

Mr. Gerson. Any of its representatives? 

Senator Welker. Yes. Any of its counselors or attaches. 

Mr. Gerson. I don't recall, sir, having made any visits to the type 
of organization you refer to. 

Senator Welker. Have you ever met or visited with any of the 
membership, the attaches, the workers, even the janitor or anybody 
else connected with the Soviet Embassy ? 

Mr. Gerson". I liave no independent recollection of any such visits. 

Senator Welker. Have you ever at any time either distributed 
yourself or had distributed by your order Soviet Communist propa- 
ganda coming into the United States? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. I am frankly a bit at a loss, sir, on what you mean by 
Soviet Communist propaganda. Would you define that a little for 
me? 

Senator Welker. Had you been at one of our hearings over at New 
York, you would have seen 2 million pieces of Communist propaganda 
that had come into one customs office 

Mr. Gerson. I wasn't there, sir. 

Senator Welker (continuing). In less than 2 days, and it included 
magazines, articles, such as the one we described in my interrogation 
of you, only some were printed in Peking, some were printed in 
Poland, and other captive states which are behind the Iron Curtain. 

I have asked you, have you, or have you under your orders ever 
distributed any of that sort of propaganda ? 

(The witness conferred with his counsel.) 

Mr. Gerson. I have no recollection of ever having clone so. 

Senator Welker. In case there is some doubt in your mind as to 
what I mean by propaganda, I would say it is just about similar to 
that little pamphlet I interrogated you about, and where I directed 
your attention to a certain picture on it. 

Mr. Gerson. I have no memory of such. 

Senator Welker. Any further questions? 

You are excused. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Gerson. May I make one request of the committee, sir? 

Since the question of my war service was entered into by Colonel 
Carpenter, with whom I served, I believe, in the same division in the 
Philippines, might I request that I reserve the right to enter into your 
record a photostatic certified copy of my honorable discharge, a simi- 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1G21 

Jar copy of ray war record, and such other relevant documents from 
my superior officers that I may have in my possession? 

Senator Welker. Would you care to save time, to certify any rec- 
ords you may have "with respect to any connection you have with the 
Communist i*arty in the State of New York or the Communist Inter- 
national? I will certainly happily make a baro;ain with you on that. 

Mr. Gerson. I will be very happy, sir, to confine my request to my 
war records, since that matter was originally raised by counsel. 

Senator Welker. I certainly want you to have that right, and I will 
order tJiat you submit that and it will be made a part of the record. 
But at the same time, the Chair would like to make the observation 
that you are just not playing fair with me when you put into the 
record the good part and hold out the part that I have interrogated 
you about. If you were innocent of it, there certainly would not be 
anything entered into the record. But if you were connected with the 
Communist -Party, I hope and pray that you will be fair and put that 
in with vour war record. 

Since you insist upon your war record, we will happily order that 
to be done. 

(The following information on Gerson's service record was fur- 
nished by the Department of the Army at the subcommittee's request. 
No documents were received from Gerson.) 

Department of the Army, 

Washington, May 11, 1954' 
Hon. William E. Jenner, 

Chairman, Internal Security Suicotnmittee, 

United States Senate. 
(Attention: Mr. Robert McManiis.) 

Dear Mr. Chairman : In response to a letter from Mr. Benjamin Mandel, re- 
search director of your subcommittee, to Assistant Secretary of Defense Seaton, 
dated April 29, 1954, there follows a r^sum^ of information available at this time 
concerning the service history of Simon W. Gerson. More complete details con- 
cerning Gerson's service at Camp Upton, N. Y., are not set forth in Gerson's 
pei'sonnel file, but this office will attempt to search any other records in the 
Department of the Army to secure this information. If located, this information 
will be furnished to your subcommittee without delay. 

The records show that Simon W. Gerson, service No. 420G7462, was inducted 
January 19, 1944, at New York, N. Y. ; transferred to the Enlisted Reserve Corps 
the same date; entered on active duty February 9, 1944, at Camp Upton, N. Y. ; 
transferred to Company E, 218th ITB, 67th ITR, Camp Blanding, Fla., February 
18, 1944 ; transferred to Company G, 2d Battalion, AGF, Replacement Depot No. 
2. Fort Ord, Calif., August 10, 1944 ; departed for overseas service in the Southwest 
Pacific area September 21, 1944 ; arrived in New Guinea October 16, 1944 ; trans- 
ferred to the 43d Tng. Gp., APO 711, October 16, 1944 ; transferred to the 4th 
Replacement Depot, APO 703, November 25, 1944 ; assigned to Company G, 19th 
Infantry, APO 24, November 28, 1944. 

While overseas Gerson participated in Luzon and Southern Philippines cam- 
paigns. He received the Combat Infantryman Badge, American Service Medal, 
Asiatic-Pacific Service Medal, Good Conduct Medal, Philippines Liberation Medal 
with Bronze Star, and World War II Victory Medal. His military occupation 
speciality number was 745 (rifleman). 

On May 2, 1945, Gerson was evacuated to the United States as a result of 
contracting epidermophytosis of the feet. He arrived at Letterman General 
Hospital on May 22, 1945, and was transferred to the Detachment of Patients, 
ASF Convalescent Hospital, Camp Upton. N. Y., on May 30, 1945. 

On July 1, 1945, Gerson was assigned to Hq Detachment, 1234th SCU, Camp 
Upton. His service record does not Indicate the nature of his duties during 
the period of this assignment. On January 25, 1046, he was transferred to 
Separation Center, Fort Dix, N. J., and he was honorably discharged on Janu- 
ary 29, 1946, at Fort Dix. 

82918*— 54— pt. 20 12 



1G22 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Gerson was promoted from private to private first class, October 22, 1945, and 
from private first class to corporal on November 6, 1945. He was discharged 
as a corporal. 

Sincerely yours, 

Lewis E. Berry, Jr., 
Deputy Department Counselor. 

Mr. Gerson. Thank you. 

Senator VVelker. Thank you. 

Thank you, Counsel, for appearing. 

Is there another witness? 

(Discussion off the record.) 

Senator VVelker. Daniel James. Please call him. 

Mr. James, you have heretofore been sworn. For the purpose of 
the public record, I will ask you to state your full name, your residence, 
and occupation. 

TESTIMONY OF DANIEL JAMES, NEW YORK, N. Y. 

Mr. James. My full name is Daniel James. My residence is 334 
Kiverside Drive, New York City. My occupation is writer. 

Senator Welker. The record will show you are appearing without 
counsel. 

Mr. Jaimes. Correct. , . 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. James, when and where were you born? 

Mr. James. I was born in Liverpool, England, October 26, 1914. 

Mr. Carpenter. When did you come to the United States? 

Mr. James. 1937. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you a naturalized citizen of the United States? 

Mr. James. I am. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you go to school? 

Mr. James. In Toronto ; the University of Toronto. 

J\lr. Carpenter. Did you receive any degrees from that university ? 

Mr. James, No; I did not. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you enter the Armed Forces of the United 
States? 

Mr. James. I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. What time? 

Mr. James. July 1943. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long were you in the Armed Forces of the 
United States? 

Mr. James. I was in from that point until January 1946. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work in the Armed 
Forces of the United States? 

Mr. James. During most of the time 1 was connected with the 
Information and Education program. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you stationed ? 

Mr. James. Originally I was stationed at Camp Reynolds, Penn- 
sylvania, as an enlisted man, and entered the I. and E. program at 
that time, when it was known as the Morale Services Division. 

From there I was sent to the Orientation School, Morale Services 
School, I believe, was the official name for it at the time, at Wash- 
ington and Lee University, Lexington, Va. 

I was graduated from that school and thereafter recommended 
for OCS. I took a course at OCS, entered the I; and E. officers re- 
placement pool at AVashington and Lee University for 2 or 3 days, 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1623 

and thereafter was assigned to tein))orary duty with the Informa- 
tion and Education Division in the War Department.; 

Mr. Carpenter. What was your rank at that time ? 

Mr. James. Second lieutenant. 

Mr. CARrEN'i"ER. Who was your commanding officer? 

JNIr. James. In the Pentagon, do you mean? 

Mr. Carpenter. That is right. 

Mr. James. Maj. J alius Schreiber. 

Mr, Carpenter. How long were you there with Major Schreiber? 

Mr. James. I was there for approximately 30 days and afterward 
transferred to the New York Branch of the Information and Educa- 
tion Division where I remained for about 6 months. 

Mr. Carpenter. You were with Major Schreiber for about 6 weeks 
in Washington ? 

Mr. James. About 30 days. 

Mr, Carpenter. About 30 days? 

Mr. James. Yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work while here in 
Washington with Major Schreiber? 

Mr. James. I was in the Orientation Branch, presumably to par- 
ticipate in the writing and publication of materials that were used 
for discussions and lectures among the troops. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you do any of the writing? 

Mr. James. I did some in the Pentagon. I don't recall what was 
ever printed. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was it accepted? 

Mr. James. As I say, I don't recall whether it was ever used. 

Mr. Carpenter. While you were here in Washington, in the I. and 
E. Section, did you have occasion to wonder about some of the ma- 
terial that was being done and published or speeches that were being 
made ? 

Mr. James. Well, there were two incidents in particular that 
aroused my interest at the time. One was a discussion which I hap- 
pened to get into with Major Schreiber at the time that the so-called 
Lublin Committee was formed in Poland, which I believed then had 
been formed by the Soviet Government and was a puppet committee, 
in opposition to the Polish government-in-exile then quartered in 
London. I made known that view to Major Schreiber. He happened 
to disagree directly with it, maintaining that it was a democratically 
constituted government, that is, this so-called Lublin Committee was. 

During the course of our discussion, in order to indicate his dis- 
approval of the position I took, he pointed to a book in the library 
up there in the Orientation Branch written by an anti-Communist 
author named David J. Dallin, and told me that I sounded like 
Mr. Dallin. 

The second incident concerned a lecture that Major Schreiber deliv- 
ered to officers at the Pentagon as part of his duty, during the course 
of which he used a chart setting forth the structure of the Soviet 
Government. The intent and purport of that lecture, in my opinion 
at that time, was to attempt to portray the Soviet Government, the 
Soviet State, as democratic. The chart consisted of a breakdown of 
the various organs of the Soviet State. 

Mr. Carpenter. This was to a group of officers, did you say ? 



1624 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. James. This was to a group of officers in the War Department. 

Mr. Carpenter. What were their ranks? 

Mr. James. I am afraid I did not make a tally of their ranks, and 
I cannot recall, certainly at this time, what their ranks were. I would 
say there was a good sprinkling of colonels, majors, captains, and 
lieutenants. I don't recall having seen any generals there, but there 
may have been. 

Mr. Carpenter. About how many people were in this group? 

]\Ir. James. That, too, is a very difficult thing to recall, since this 
happened 10 years ago. I would say there were probably a few dozen 
officers present. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have occasion to inspect the literature 
that was being used in order to build up these programs? 

Mr. James. Well, in the course of my writing activities up at the 
Branch I had recourse to the library facilities, and there I observed 
that there were a number of publications written by such people as 
Owen and Eleanor Lattimore, Lawrence Rosinger. I believe that 
these publications were put out by the Institute of Pacific Relations. 

I also saw copies of Amerasia, which I encountered there for the first 
time, and of the Far Eastern Survey. 

Mr. Carpenter. From your experience there, do you feel that the 
program they were outlining was definitely slanted toward the Com- 
munist thinking? 

Mr. jAaiES. I don't believe that you can quite say that. 

I think that insofar as they possibly could, certain individuals who 
might have had an interest in portraying the Soviet Union in the 
best possible light attempted to do so. I don't think that you can say 
that the orientation program, as a program, was slanted in the direc- 
tion 

Mr. Carpenter. I meant the particular individuals that you were 
associated Avith in that particular branch. 

Mr. James. I would say this, that had I had the power of selecting 
individuals, I would not have selected some of these individuals to 
conduct the program. 

Senator Welker. Why? 

Mr. James. I think they had ulterior political interests. 

Senator Welker. What were those ulterior political interests? 

Mr. James. I think that certainly you could say that some of those 
people may have been classified as extremely friendly toward com- 
munism and Communist ideas, the Soviet Union, and all that sort of 
thing. 

Senator Welker. And by their friendliness, they imparted it to 
their fellow officers and made their positions clear? 

Mr. James. I would say, sir, wherever they could they probably 
attempted to do so. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you spend some time in New York at the New 
York office? 

Mr. Ja:\ies. I spent approximately 6 months, from early January 
to June of 1945. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was tbe nature of your work in the New 
York office? 

Mr. James. The nature of my work in the New York office was to 
participate in the writing and publication of the Army weekly discus- 
sion guide called Army Talk. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1G25 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you find the same atmosphere in the New York 
office that you found in the Washington office ? 

Mr. James. Yes, I did. And to some extent it was even more pro- 
nounced. 

Mr. Carpenter. How were you accepted among those who were 
working both in the Washington office and the New York office? 

Mr. James. I would say that when I got to New York I very early 
discovered that I was not a member of the group that seemed to be 
running the show. That is to say it became clear to me that there were 
a number of individuals in the branch who operated as a sort of 
clique working together. 

Mr. Carpenter. In other words, in that clique they had enlisted 
men, did they not? 

Mr. James. Yes, they did. 

Mr. Carpenter. And those enlisted men rated more favor than 
you as an officer, and their counsel was accepted more readily than 
your recommendations ? -t ■••.;'•' i 

Mr. James. Well, there were any number of what you might call 
closed discussions that Avent on between members of this gi^oup, among 
the members of this group, from which just about everyone of us in 
the office outside the group was excluded. There were other officers 
there, too. and other enlisted personnel. They also were excluded. 

I want it clearly understood, Mr. Counsel, that this was distinctly an 
impression I got. It is a very intangible thing, something that is 
difficult to put your fingers on. 

Mr. Carpenter. Can you give the names of those people who seemed 
to be in the clique ? 

Mr. James. I know that frequently Major Schreiber would come 
up to New York and go into a huddle with Forstenzer, Hyman Forsten- 
zer, and Carl Fenichel, particularly. I think possibly on one or more 
occasions Stephen Fischer was usually consulted. I better strike out 
usually, since perhaps it was just a few occasions. 

That would be about it. They would have these discussions. They 
would go into one of the smaller offices in our establishment. Of 
course, I had no idea what the}' were talking about, but it was quite 
obvious that the rest of the office was excluded from these discussions. 

Mr. Carpenter. Out of this office field trips were arranged to vari- 
ous installations, various Army installations, in the United States, 
and certain individuals went, is that right ? 

Mr. James. I did not hear that. 

Mr. Carpenter. From this installation in New York there were 
certain individuals selected from the New York office to travel through- 
out the United States to the various camps and stations in order to 
carry out the work of the I. and E. ? 

Mr. James. That is correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you ever included on any of those trips ? 

Mr. James. I was included on only one inspection trip to Atlantic 
City and Fort Monmouth, wJiich covered a period of perhaps 2 or 3 
days. I was once scheduled to go on a trip to Texas, but for some 
unaccountable reason that was canceled. However, Forstenzer and 
Fenichel and other individuals in the office were frequently en route 
to some post or camp to give indoctrination courses and run orienta- 
tion schools and so on. 



1628 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. CARrENTER. They were the ones who belonged to this particular 
clique? 

Mr. James. That is right. 

I might add, Mr. Counsel, if I may, that I was not the only one 
so excluded to the best of my knowledge. 

Mr. Carpeni'er. There were others excluded ? 

Mr. James. I think there were others in the office. At least, I did 
not notice one other officer, at least, who ever went on such a trip. 
Again, I say to my knowledge. And perhaps there were even more 
individuals whom I can't recall at this moment. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. Did you have occasion to discuss with this clique 
their political ideas or the idea they were trying to inculcate into 
the minds of the American soldiers? 

Mr. James. The very nature of our work — we were frequently 
engaged in discussions of one political issue or another. On more 
than one occasion I found myself discussing such things as the Soviet 
Union and Soviet policy, and communism, the Communist Party, 
with members of this group. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever have a discussion with Forstenzer? 

Mr. James. Well, on one particular occasion I was about to relate, 
we went to lunch together and had a rather lengthy discussion of the 
nature of conmnunism and the structure of the international Com- 
munist movement. I exhibited a good deal of curiosity as to why the 
Communist Parties of the various countries of the world always 
seemed to act together, in concert, and I put the question to Forstenzer 
of whether or not there wasn't some central direction that would ex- 
plain why all of these parties usually thought and acted alike. It was 
his opinion that they did so because they came to the same conclusions 
independently. That, I may add, is a favorite phrase that is used 
in Conununist circles. 

Mr. Carpenter. We have had several of those individuals before 
this committee from time to time. Many of them have taken advan- 
tage of the fifth amendment. I am wondering if you observed dur- 
ing your time in I. and E. how was it that those individuals gravitated 
into the I. and E, Division ? 

Mr. James. Well, it has been a question that I have thought about 
a great deal. I don't know that there is any one explanation for itj 
There are probably a number of explanations, one being apparently 
that personnel sympathetic to such ideas got in on the ground floor 
of the program, and naturally tended to obtain the assistance, aid, of 
others in the Armed Forces who may have thought like them. I 
think that would be a perfectly natural thing for them to do. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever hear any discussions wherein some 
member of the organization would suggest that some other member 
from the outside join the organization? 

Mr. James. I never heard any such discussion, no< 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. James, are you or have you ever been a mem- 
ber of the Communist Party ? 

Mr. James. I not only never have been, but I have always opposed 
communism and any other form of totalitarianism. 

JSIr. Carpenter. That is all. 

Senator Welker. Any further questions ? 

If not, the witness is excused, and the meeting is adjourned. 

(Whereupon, at 5:25 p. m. the committee was recessed, to re- 
convene at 2 : 30 p, m. Friday, August 6, 1954.) 



INTEELOCKING SUKVEESION IN GOVERNMENT 

DEPARTMENTS 



FRIDAY, AUGUST 6, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 2 : 30 p. m., pursuant to call, in room 457, 
Senate Oftice Building, Hon. William E. Jenner (chairman) presiding. 

Present : Senator Jenner. 

Also present: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel; Benjamin Mandel, 
director of research; and Robert C. McManus, professional staff 
member. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Call the first witness. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Gandall. 

The Chairman. Do you swear the testimony you will give in this 
hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Mr. Gandall. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM P. GANDALL, NEW YORK, N. Y., 
ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH FOREE, ATTORNEY 

The Chairman. Will you give the committee your full name? 

Mr. Gandall. William Gandall. 

The Chairman. You may be seated. 

Mr. Gandall. May I stand ? I have an intestinal disorder. 

The Chairman. Yes; you may. 

Where do you reside ? 

Mr. Gandall. 225 West 12th Street, New York. 

The Chairman. What is your business or profession ? 

Mr. Gandall. I am a publicist. 

The Chairman. You are here today with counsel, Mr. Forer? 

Mr. Gandall. Yes. 

The Chairman. You may proceed with the questioning, Mr. Car- 
penter. 

Mr. Carpenter. When and where were you born ? 

Mr. Gandall. October 4, 1908, New York City. 

Mr. Carpenter. Wliere did you attend school ? 

Mr. Gandall. I attended school at William Penn Grammar School 
in Chicago, 111.; and Wilson Junior High School in Cleveland, Ohio; 
New Utrecht High in Brooklyn, N. Y. ; Palm Beach High in Palm 

1627 



1628 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Beach, Fla. ; a number of Army schools ; the University of Cambridgej 
Cambridge, England; and Trinity College. Roughly, that is it. I 
may have attended school a month or two at some other place, small 
location. 

JSfr. Carpenter. By whom are you now employed? 

Mr. Gandall. I am employed by Universal Pictures. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long have you been employed by Universal 
Pictures ? 

Mr. Gandall. Is that temporary or permanent? I was employed 
in two capacities. 

Mr. Carpenter. Both. 

Mr. Gandall. About 2i/2 years this time. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where have you been employed since 1935, up until 
the time you joined Universal Pictures? 

Mr. Gandall. 1945? 

Mr. Carpenter. 1935. 

Mr. Gandall. I did a lot of odd jobs in my time, and you are 
asking me something offliand that you did not ask before. I will have 
to recollect now, if you do not mind, just where I was employed. I 
think I drove a taxi in 1935, among other things. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

In 1939 I was employed by the Transport Workers Union as an 
international and legislative representative. 

In 19 — well, I think it was either 1939 or 1940, somewhere right 
around there — I was deleaated by the CIO and then the leader of the 
CIO at that time, John L. Lewis, to the farmers' union as a repre- 
sentative of the Trade Union Movement to the Dairy Farmers' Union 
of the New York milkshed. 

Mr. Carpenter. Is that the National Farmers' Union ? 

JNIr. Gandall. It is now, but it was not then. 

ISIr. Carpenter. From 1936 until 1939, where were you employed? 
"You said you drove a taxi for 1 year. 

Mr. Gandall. Yes; and I was not employed for 2 years there. 

Mr. Carpenter. Which 2 vears? 

ISIr. Gandall. 1937 and 1938. 

Mr. Carpenter. In 1936 where were you employed ? 

Mr. Gandall. I was employed as a taxi driver, and I did a lot of 
other odd jobs that I would have to recall if you want them. If you 
want them, I will gladly think it over and try to find them. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will it take you long to think it over ? 

Mr. Gandall. Let me think. It is a long time ago; 1936 — let me 
see. This is 1954. It is darn near 20 years. You may have been an 
attorney all your life, but I am just — in those days I was a working 
stitf. i naturally did a lot of odd jobs wherever I could find them. 
It was a pretty tough time, if you remember. I have been in many, 
many jobs. So, among others, I drove a taxi. I am trying to recall 
the year. I did some organizing work, too, in that year. 

Mr. Carpenter. For whom? 

IMr. Gandall. Workers' Alliance. That was an organization of 
WPA employees, I believe. I am not quite certain now. I think that 
is what it was at that time. The alphabets escape me at this stage. 

I did some other union work around there. I was very active in 
union activities. I was also active in the Fusion campaign around 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1629 

tliat period or after that period, during that period; active with a lot 
of Republicans, by the way, as well. 

The Chairman. What do yon mean "as well" ? 

Mr. Gandall. I was active with other people there, and among the 
other people I met were a lot of good Republicans, including Joseph 
Clark Baldwin III. I was very interested in legislative matters that 
affected the taxi drivers. I consulted with them and tried to get legis- 
lation that would be on our side, favorable to us, just as everybody 
has a right to do. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you a member of the Communist Party? 

The Chairman. Let the record show that the witness confers with 
his counsel before responding to the question. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. No. 

The Chair3ian. Have you ever been a member of the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Gandall. I think I answered that question this morning, and 
1 want to repeat that thing. First, I would like to say that I do not 
believe that the committee has a right — I do not think anybody has a 
right — to inquire into your political or religious beliefs. I think we 
were taught that in grammar school, and we were taught right through 
our whole educational process that political and religious beliefs are 
supposed to be your own. However, we are living in different times 
and I want to claim, I want to refuse to answer on the basis of my 
privilege under the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States not to be a witness against myself. 

The Chairman. The committee recognizes your right to refuse to 
answer under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, but it does not 
extend the privilege of refusing to answer to your political and 
religious belief because it happens to be the belief of this committee 
that commuuism is not a political belief because it has been known 
and declared to be a conspiracy designed to overthrow and destroy 
this Government by force. That goes beyond the ground of political 
belief. 

Mr. Gandall. I believe that is a matter of opinion, but I am not 
prepared to discuss or argue the case with you. 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever been employed by the Commu- 
nist Party ? 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

The Chairman. The same, Mr. Reporter. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you in service during World War II? 

Mr. Gandall. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you stationed ? 

Mr. Gandall. Do you want every station ? 

Mr. Carpenter. For any reasonable length of time; say 3 months? 

Mr. Gandall. I was stationed in a heck of a lot of places then in 3 
years and 6 months. I want to point out I may miss a spot or two 
because I was getting the treatment and naturally got bounced around 
from post to post. 

I was drafted in the Army. I tried to reenlist in the Marines but I 
was drafted into the Army in January 1943. I was stationed at 
Fresno, CaMl, Basic Training Center No. 8, United States Army Air 



1630 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Force. It is a training command. I drilled troops there for around 
9 or 10 months. I was made a sergeant almost immediately due to the 
fact I had a lot of military background. 

I requested overseas service after I saw they were not going to 
ship me. I got over to England, and one of the first places I hit in 
England was Marbury Hall where I met Captain Jenner, Capt. Bill 
Jenner, or William Jenner. I guess Captain Jenner started the 
treatment. I was acting special service officer for the camp, ap- 
pointed by the colonel, and almost immediately Captain Jenner 
started to ride me. From that time on it was every day that we had 
a staff meeting. Jenner was on my neck, and I guess he is still keep- 
ing it up. 

The Chairman. You were a member of the Communist Party then ; 
were you ? 

Mr. Gandall. I said I was not. 

The Chairman. It was the policy of the Communist Party that 
when a man went into uniform to say he was not a member of the 
Communist Party; is that correct? 

Ml'. Gandall. I do not know about that. All I am talking about is 
the camp. 

The Chairman. Is that not correct? 

Mr. Gaxdall. I do not know anything about that policy. 

The Chairman. Were you a member of the Communist Party before 
you took the oath to go into the uniform of the United States Gov- 
ernment? 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

The Chairman. The same record^ Mr. Reporter. 
 Mr. Gandall. At Marbury Hall the captain finally had me shang- 
haied but not before I had accused him of being a subversive. He was 
the subversive element in the Army and a couple of others like him. 
They tried to divide the Army and tried to get us not to fight with a 
hundred percent cooperation behind Roosevelt because essentially he 
is an anti-Roosevelt man. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work? Were you 
in the I. and E. ? 

Mr. Gandall. Not when Captain Jenner started the treatment. 
When he started to give me the business and got me kicked around 
from pillar to post, I was not in the I. and E. It was only General 
Eisenhower that put me into the I. and E. after guys like him, Charles- 
worth, and Colonel Hudson started to give me the treatment because I 
had some independence of ideas and did not knuckle under all the 
time like a lot of stool pigeons and misfits. 

I got kicked around. I got kicked around all over England and 
Ireland, all starting with Jenner. I was transferred to Langford 
Lodge. I was given posts out in a remote area with 2 or 3 people 
who said, "Stay away." I had commanding officers show me the docu- 
ments and say, "Will you please go on leave ? Don't come around the 
post. We want you in a nonsensitive position. We don't want you 
around." 

The Chairman. Nonsensitive? 

Mr. Gandall. Yes, sir. "We haven't got any positions, so won't 
you take a leave?" 

Mr. Carpenter. You did some lecturing there ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1631 

Mr. Gandall. I sure did. I ^ave an Army talks program for the 
benefit of the men. That is another thing we liad to fight on. Before 
the Army talks program came in, I tried to get an orientation course 
started there at Marbury Hall while the men were stewing around, 
going on drunks — includinrj Jenner, by the way. I had to pull him 
out of a pub tight as hell and also 

The CiTAiRjrAN. You know you are lying now. 

Mr. Gandall. I am not lying, sir. We were over there and you 
remember it. 

The Chairman. You are under oath. 

Mr. Gandall. I remember it, and there is many a sergeant that saw 
you drunk and disorderly. We saw you with your hair down. We 
did not call you the captain of the night for nothing. 

The Chairman. You are trying to provoke a scene. 

Mr. Gandall. I am not. 1 am irritated by your riding me, not only 
in the Army but in civil life. 

The Chairman. Please, you are trying to provoke a scene. We 
must have order here. We have come here to ask for certain infor- 
mation. My record is clear as far as the Army is concerned. 

Mr. Gandall. My record will stand up to yours. 

The Chairman. We know about you. 

Mr. Gandall. I know about you. 

The Chairman. All we ask you to do is answer the question, and 
"we do not care for any scene. 

Mr. Gandall. You don't care if you crucify somebody. 

The Chairman, Mr. Forer, your counsel, will tell you how this 
committee has conducted its proceedings. 

Mr. Gandall. You have not been fair. You gave me 48 hours to 
get down here. I had an hour with him. 

Th6 Chairman. You were down here the other day. 
 Mr. Gandall. Yes, and I was under the impression you dismissed 
me. 

The Chairman. You tried to get me— you asked me before this 
hearing if you could not possibly postpone. 

Mr. Gandall. Darn right, so I could talk to my attorney. I had 
asked for a postponement, but I 

The Chairman. You cannot use any influence with this committee. 
We are here to do a job for the United States, and we are looking 
into the internal security of this country. We have asked you certain 
questions. Are you a Communist now ? 

Mr. Gandall. I said I was not. 

The Chairman. When did you resign from the Communist Party? 

Mr. Gandall. W^hat has this to do with the question just asked 
about the Army ? Which question do you want to have answered ? 

The Chairman. When did you resign from the Communist Party? 

Let the record show the witness is conferring with counsel before 
responding to the question. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. Sir, that is an unfair question because I never said 
I was a member. I ask you to withdraw it. 

The Chairman. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party ? 

Let the record show the witness is conferring with counsel. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 



1632 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chairman. Under the fifth amendment? 

Mr. Gandall. Among other things. 

The Chairman. The same record, 

Mr. Gandall. Do you want the rest of my Army career? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. Were you a member of the Abraham Lincoln 
Brigade? 

Mr. Gandall. I said the United States Army. I had a long career 
there. 

The Chairman. Please do not try to provoke a scene. 

Mr. Gandall. He does not want the answers. He asked me about 
15 other MOS's I was in, different places. I was over in Europe in 
the ETO in the Chanor Base. 

The Chairman (to Mr. Forer). You are his counsel. You have been 
before this committee many times. We would like some cooperation. 

You were asked a question. Will you repeat the question, Mr. Re- 
porter ? 

Were you a member of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade? 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

The Chairman. Under the fifth amendment of the Constitution? 

Mr. Gandall. Yes. 

The Chairman. That your answer might tend to incriminate you ? 

Mr. Gandall. I did not say that. 

The Chairman. What did you say ? 

Mr. Gandall. I will repeat it. On the basis of my privilege under 
the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States not to be a 
witness against myself. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever apply for a passport to travel to 
Spain or any European country ? 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you ever issued a passport to travel to 
Europe? 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

The Chairman. Same record. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was passport No. 358978 issued to you to travel to 
Spain? 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

The Chairman. Same record. 

What did you do in Spain ? 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

The Chairman. Let the record show the witness smirked and 
laughed and then conferred with counsel. 

Mr. Gandall. I refused to answer for the reason I gave before. 
That struck me funny. You ask me a question and I refused to an- 
swer. Then you go ahead and ask me another question that if I did 
answer I would be — you asked me about a passport. Then you asked 
me about something else that relates to the passport. Obviously, one 
question is related to the other. I refused on those grounds. 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever had any contact with Soviet mili- 
tary oflicials? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1633 

The Chairman. Let tlie record show the witness confers with hiu 
counsel before responding to the question of counsel. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. I again refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

The Chairman. Same record, Mr. Reporter. 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you ever been given any training in guer- 
rilla warfare by the Soviet officers? 

;Mr. Gandall. United States Marine Corps officers ? 

The Chairman. Let the record show the witness confers with 
counsel before responding. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason given before. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever get any instructions in dynamiting, 
espionage, by representatives of the Soviet military forces? 

The Chairman. Let the record again show the witness confers with 
counsel before responding to the question. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

The Chairman. Same record, Mr. Reporter. 

Mr. Carpenter. When were you discharged from the Army ? 

Mr. Gandall. I think it was May 28 — I am not a 100 percent certain 
of that— 1946. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you join the Communist Party in 1946 after 
you were discharged from the Army ? 

The Chairman. Let the record show the witness conferred with 
.■s-oounsel before responding. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

Mr. Carpenter. I have a news item from the CIO News that I 
would like Mr. Mandel to read and introduce it into the record. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a clipping from the CIO News of May 
15, 1944, page 8 with a photograph — and I read the caption of the 
photograph: 

Army Leader : A former CIO organizer and editor, Sgt. William Gandell, "some- 
where in England" gives American GI's the lowdown on how the Nazis tight. 
Gandell, who received his experience during service with the International Bri- 
gade, is in charge of all Arrny talks given at an air service command where he 
is stationed. He is a former associate editor of the Transport Bulletin. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 



1634 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



(The clipping referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 441" and is 
as follows:) 




A pkyJY I PAnpP* ^ 'ormer CIO organizer and 
/MXIVI I LC^L/C|\. ^^.^^^ gg^ William Gandell, 

"somewhere in England" gives American GIs the lowdown 
on how the Nazis fight. Gandell, who received his experience 
during service with the Intl. Brigade, Is In charge of all army 
talks given at an Air Service Command where he is stationed. 
He is a former associate editor of the "Transport Bulletin." 

The Chairman. Does that article refer to you? 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

ISIr. Gandall. I refuse to answer for the reason I gave before. 

The Chairman. The same record, Mr. Keporter. 

Mr. Mandel. The Transport Workers Union in a report dated 
March 29, 1944, by the House Connnittee on Un-American Activities 
was cited at that time as a union in which Communist leadership is 
strongly intrenched. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel has a letter from the Department of 
the Army, and I would like for him to read the last paragraph. 

Mr. Mandell. This is a letter to Mr. Jenner dated June 30, 1954, 
from C. A. Haskins, assistant department counselor. The letter re- 
cites the service of Mr. Gandall, and the last paragraph refers to the 
topic we are investigating, so I would like to read it. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1635 

While Gandall's service record does not specify the precise nature of his 
duties while assijrned to the various stations listed above, it does indicate that 
as of March 22, 1948, Gandall vpas assigned military occupation specialty (MOS) 
56C (duty noncommissioned officer), which involved the supervision of details 
performing general military and fatigue duties. His service record further 
shows that, as of February 1, 1944, Gandall was assigned MOS 274 (information 
specialist). The words "public relations" which apitear in the same entry on 
his service record indicate that, as of that date, Gandall was probably par- 
ticipating in the preparation of public information material. He attended a 
course for education ollicers and discussion leaders on May 24, 25, and 26, 1944, 
while assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, BADA, ASF, 
USSTAF. Gandall's discharge certificate indicates that the most highly skilled 
duty performed during his Army career was MOS 274 (information specialist), 
with the duty position of information and education noncommissioned officer, 
a position which may have included either troop or public information respon- 
sibilities, or both. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of tlie 
record. 

(Tlie letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 442" and is as 
follows:) 

Exhibit No. 442 

Department of the Army, 
Office of the Department Counselor, 

Washington, June 30, I95ff. 
Hon. William E. Jenner, 

Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee, 

Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. 

(Attention Mr. Robert C. McManus.) 

Dear Mb. Chairman : In response to letters from Mr. Robert C. McManus of 
your sxibcommittee staff to this office, dated June 4, 1954, and June 7, 1954, the 
following r^sum^ of the service record of former S. Sgt. William P. Gandall, 
39554255, is provided for the use of the subcommittee. 

Gandall was born on October 4, 1908, at Brooklyn, N. Y. Several years prior 
to his Army service, he served a 4-year enlistment in the United States Marine 
Corps, from November 9, 1926, to November 8, 1930. He also served a 4-year 
enlistment in the United States Marine Corps Reserve (inactive status) from 
August 19, 1932, to August IS, 1936. 

He was inducted into the Army at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1943, 
and was attached to Service Command Unit 1950, Arlington, Calif., on Janu- 
ary 22, 1943. On January 25, 1943, he was attached to the 779th Technical 
School Squadron, Fresno, Calif. ; he was later assigned to this same unit, where 
he served until approximately March 1, 1943. He was then assigned to the 
Army Air Forces Basic Training Center at Fresno until October 27, 1943, at 
which time he was sent overseas to the European Theater of Operations (ETO). 

Upon his arrival in the ETO, Gandall was attached on November 2, 1943, to 
Squadron B, 17th Replacement Control Depot (Aviation). On November 27, 
1943, he was assigned to Headquarters, 8th Air Force Service Command. On 
January 23, 1944, he was attached to Detachment A, 8th Air Force Base Air Depot 
Area. 

On March 1, 1944, Gandall was assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters 
Squadron, Base Air Depot Area, Air Service Command, United States Strategic 
Air Force (BADA, ASF, USSTAF). Subsequent European assignments were: 
97th Airdrome Squadron, from June 22, 1944; Headquarters and Headquarters 
Squadron, 401st Air Depot, from July 26, 1944 ; Headquarters and Headquarters 
Squadron. 401st Base Air Depot, from August 5, 1944; Base Air Depot No. 3, 
from September 16, 1944 ; Detachment B, Headquarters and Headquarters Squad- 
ron, BADA, ASC, USSTAF, from December 18, 1944; Detachment G, same 
squadron, from April 9, 1945. He was attached to the 1917 Ordnance Ammu- 
nition Company (Aviation) on April 20, 1945, and assigned to Headquarters 
Detachment, Chanor Base Section, on September 14, 1945. On September 17, 
1945, he was attached to the 16th Major Port. 

From October 8, 1945, to April 1, 1946, Gandall was assigned to Headquarters 
Company, 16th Major Port, APO 562, for purposes of attending a liberal arts 
program at Cambridge University (Training Within Civilian Agencies Program, 



1036 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

UK Region). From April IG, 1940, to May 28, 1046, he was assigned to the 
14th Major Port, and on May 28, 1940, he was honorably discharged at Head- 
quarters 14th Major Port, Processing Center, Southampton, England. 

Gandall was promoted to corporal on March 22, 1943, to sergeant on May 1, 
1943, and to staff sergeant on May 21, 1944. 

While Gandall's service record does not specify the precise nature of his 
duties while assigned to the various stations listed above, it does indicate that 
as of March 22, 1943, Gandall was assigned military occupation speciality (MOS) 
566 (duty noncommissioned officer), which involved the supervision of details 
performing general military and fatigue duties. His service record further 
shows that, as of February 1, 1944, Gandall was assigned MOS 274 (information 
specialist). The words "public relations" which appear in the same entry on 
his service record indicate that, as of that date, Gandall was probably participat- 
ing in the preparation of public-information material. He attended a course 
for education officers and discussion leaders on May 24, 25, and 26, 1944, while 
assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, BADA, ASF, USSTAF. 
Gandall's discharge certificate indicates that the most highly sliilled duty per- 
formed during his Army career was MOS 274 (information specialist), with 
the duty po.sition of Information and Education noncommissioned officer, a posi- 
tion which may have included either troop or public-information responsibilities, 
or both. 

Sincerely yours, 

C. A. Haskins, Assistant Department Counselor. 

Mr. Carpenter. Is that a fair statement of your service? 

The Chairman. Let the record show the witness confers with 
counsel 'before responding. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mr. Gandall. It is not correct, of course. It gives me a lot more- 
credit, I imagine, than I had in the service. Notice I stopped at staff 
sergeant almost immediately, despite my. requests for a commission, 
et cetera. I never got an^ further than that, and I do not think I 
was that important. But it sounds good. 

Mr. Carpenter. While you were in the Farmers' Union, did you 
know an Archie Wright ? 

Mr. Gandall. Yes ; I knew Archie Wright. 

Mt. Carpenter. Were you associated with him ? 

Mr. Gandall. Well, as far as associated with him, I was up there 
and knew him. That is my association. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your work with him? 

Mr. Gandall. Do you want the complete picture of this? I will 
give it to you. I do not mind. I was trying to form — I first con- 
tacted the Dairy Farmers' Union, trying to form a farmer-labor party 
because I believed that the farmers-and labor had a lot in common. 
I tried to get some backing in that idea. Later on, because of my 
familiarity with the farm problem, and the dairy problem especially — 
we have a real problem there in the surplus production of milk that 
occurred in those years, and I made a rather thorough study of the 
farm problem at that time when I was a legislative representative of 
the Transport Union — because of that background, I believe I was 
appointed as the CIO representative to the Farmers Union, and, 
naturally, I tried to do a number of things that would help us and 
help them. I tlien knew Archie Wright in that connection. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you ever a member of the NKVD? 

Mr. Gandall. The what? 

The Chairman. The NKVD. 

Mr. Gandall. What the heck is that? I heard a lot of alphabets. 
Explain that. 

The Chairman. That is a Kussian military organization. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1G37 

Mr. Gandaix. Tliat is silly. 

The Chairman. Your answer is, "That is silly"? 

Mr. Gandall. No; I was not. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Mandel, do you have anything on the Workers* 
Alliance? 

Mr. Mandel. ]\Ir. Gandall mentioned he was working for the 
Workers' Alliance, and I would like to place in the record the fact 
that the Workers' Alliance w\as cited as suoversive and Communist by 
Attorney General Clark in the Loyalty Review Board releases of 
December 4, 1947, and September 21, 1948, and also, by Attorney 
General Biddle, cited as a Communist-penetrated organization. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

That will be all, Mr. Gandall. You are excused- 

Mr. Gandall. Thank you, Senator. 

Mr. Mandel. I have here a part of an editorial from the Saturday 
Evening Post which is germane to the subject we are on, and I wanted 
to read a paragraph from the Saturday Evening Post of February 
3, 1945, which says as follows: 

ARMY USES SNOW BOOK 

Associate Editor Edgar Snow's new book, People on Our Side, is being used 
by Army lecturers in scliools for Information-Education Personnel in the 13tli 
Armored Division and in the 7th Headquarters, Fourth Army, Capt. Mitchell 
Lindemann, Division IE officer, writes. The boolf, composed largely of material 
Mr. Snow wrote as Post articles, is of "inestimable value," Captain Lindemann 
says. A special edition of 200,000 copies of the book is also being printed for 
distribution to the armed services. 

I might add Mr. Edgar Snow was mentioned in our IPR hearings 
as one of the writers for the Institute of Pacific Relations, and we 
have testimony to show his pro-Communist opinions and slant. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The material referred to was read in full above by ISIr. Mandel, and 
was filed for the record.) 

Mr. Mandel. We have a mimeographed copy of what is labeled 
"Orientation Course — Headquarters, Central Signal Corps School, 
Camp Crowder, Mo.— For Week Ending August 26, 1944," and part 
2, "P or Week Ending September 2, 1944." The topic of this cours6 
is "Kusso- American Relations in War and Peace." 

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read just a few excerpts 
and then place the entire document in the records 

The Chairman. Proceed^ 

Mr. Mandel (reading) : 

The weight of evidence discloses most definitely that there is a fundamentally 
sound basis for collaboration with Russia, and little or no reason for fearing 
enmity. 

In consideration of these questions, this paper has been prepared in 2 parts 
by 2 CSCS students, Cpl. Stanley Schoenbrod and Pvt. Edward Dassin, of 
Company D, 804th Signal Training Regiment. 

The Bolshevist bogey: We have been well taught In the past to have our 
hate aroused by the words, Bolshevist, Communist, Red, Soviet, and Russia. 
Just how concrete has been the basis for this hate? 

V^e are in no position to judge how much of the program of the American 
Communist Party was inspired by Moscow, whether entirely or not at all. 

32018°— 54— pt. 20 13 



1638 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The fact that the Communist Party was dissolved as a political organization 
and that the Comintern was disbanded removes one of the most Important 
barriers toward a friendly relationship with Russia. 

I give these few to give the flavor of the document, and I ask that 
the entire document be placed in the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The document, which is an excerpt prepared by the subcommittee 
staff from the Camp Crowder document printed in full below, was 
marked "Exhibit No. 443-B" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 443-B 

The weight of evidence discloses most definitely that there is a fundamentally 
sound basis for collaboration with Russia, and little or no reason for fearing 
enmity. 

In consideration of these questions, this paper has been prepared in 2 parts 
by 2 CSCS students, Cpl. Stanley Schoenbrod and Pvt. Edward Dassiu, of Com- 
pany D, 804th Signal Training Regiment. 



PART I — A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

The Bolshevist 'bogey. — We have been well taught in the past to have our 
hate aroused by the words, Bolshevist, Communist, Red, Soviet, and Russia. Just 
how concrete has been the basis for this hate? 

We are in no position to judge how much of the program of the American Com- 
munist Party was inspired by Moscow, whether entirely or not at all * * * The 
fact that the Communist Party was dissolved as a political organization and 
that the Comintern was disbanded removes one of the most important barriers 
toward a friendly relationship with Russia. 

* 4> * * * * * 

. Is it not a fact that every Fascist and would-be Fascist used this anti-Bolshevisi, 
bogey technique in his climb to power? V 

* * * * * * . ,  

Why then does such a thought persist? Perhaps it has been because an excel-' 
lent job of miseducation has been perpetrated upon us. Perhaps we have been ill- 
informed and misinformed. Peihaps we have been too quick and too ready to 
see something black in anything red. 

*. « *  * * ♦■_j 

When the Soviet Union first came into being, there were some who said, "It Is 
doomed to failure: Marxist principles won't work." Then when apparently, 
socialism ha J been made to work, we were told that it is not socialism, or that- 
the fine principles of Marx and Lenin had been ignored and Stalin is not following 
the Marxian line. 

* * • • * * * 

But when the Loyalists, the Spanish Government, asked for our aid only to the 
extent of selling them materials they needed, only to permit them to import' 
vital supplies, in adopting an attitude of strict neutrality, we were, in effect, 
blind to their struggle and deaf to their entreaties. Why? Because someone 
sold too many of us a bill of goods that the Loyalists were Reds. The American 
men who volunteered to fight against Franco and survived to return found a 
great number of Americans and virtually the entire press very unsympathetic to 
the role they had played in attempting to prevent the spread of fascism. 

And whose voice could be heard above all others imploring the League time 
and time again to take a firm stand and to employ sanctions against aggressor 
nations? It was the voice of Maxim Litvinov, Russia's representative, preaching 
the philosophy of the indivisibility of peace and the doctrine of collective security. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1G30 

On repeated occasions the Soviet Union beseeclied tlie great powers to embark 
on a program of international disarmament, a program with which it seemed 
only the United States sympatliized. 

How different might have been tlie course of history had there not existed such 
distrust of Russia and unwillingness to cooperate with her. 

How confused our thinking was, when so many of us were saying that Hitler 
and Stalin would get together — that Nazi Germany and Communist Russia were 
of the same ilk. And how sure we were that we were right when the Nazi-Soviet 
pact was signed in 1939    We see those things in retrospect, but at that time 
we said, "Well, the two thieves finally got together." However, the fact re- 
mains tliat Russia got what she was bargaining for, a little longer breathing 
spell to build her defenses. 

lUit are we not beginning to understand how natural it was for Russia not to 
have trusted the Western Powers after such things as the failure of the League, 
the betrayal at Munich, and their obvious distrust of her? 

m ***** * 

And when the Russian strategy began to give evidence of its wisdom and 
the tide began to turn against the Nazis, those same people began to fear that 
Russia was too strong. 



Exhibit No. 443-0 

Orientation Course 

Headquarters, Central Signal Corps School, Camp Crowder, Mo. 

(For week ending August 26, 1944) 

Russo-American Relations in Wae and Peace 

introduction 

There is no doubt that upon the successful conclusion of World War II, the 
United States and Russia will emerge as two of the greatest powers on earth. 
Of paramount concern to all of us, therefore, is the question: Can these two 
great nations live together harmoniously in the postwar world and thus provide 
the foundation for a permanent and equitable peace? If not, the only conclusion 
which we can draw is that we hfjd better start preparing now for world war III. 

"Well, after this war is over, vse'U have to fight Russia." You have heard that 
said often — too often. Perhaps you have even said it or thought it yourself. 
It is reported in the June issue of Fortune magazine in an article on Russo- 
British relations that the British are very worried by the anti-Soviet sentiment 
and statements of many American soldiers. One Cabinet minister is quoted as 
saying that if the America people continue to say that war with Russia is inevi- 
table it will be inevitable. 

But what facts can prcmipt one to feel that we have to fight Russia — over 
what land, over what grievance shall we take up arms against the U. S. S. R.V 
On the other hand, is there a good basis for believing that we can cooperate with 
Russia in building a lasting peace? The weight of evidence discloses most defi- 
nitely that there is a fundamentally sound basis for collaboration with Russia, 
and little or no reason for fearing enmity. 

In consideration of these questions, this paper has been prepared in 2 parts 
by 2 CSCS students, Cpl. Stanley Schoenbrod and Pvt. Edward Dassin, of Com- 
pany D, 804th Signal Training Regiment. In part I is discussed some of the 
distorted appraisals of Russia that have been made in the past and the mistakes 
in the policies resulting from them. Part II contains a discussion of the prac- 
ticability and need of collaboration between Russia and the United States in 
building and maintaining the structure of world peace. 

part I. A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS 

The Bolshevist hogey.—We have been well taught in the past to have our hate 
aroused by the words, "Bolshevist," "Communist," "Red," "Soviet," and "Russia." 
Just how concrete has been the basis for this hate? 



1640 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Let ns analyze briefly whence grew this hate and fear. In the United States 
proper, the activities of the American Communist Party created resentment, 
chiefly because it was felt that it was acting under the direction of the Commu- 
nist International. We are in no position to judge how much of the program 
of the American Communist Party was inspired by Moscow, whether entirely 
or not at all. It is certainly true that there is no place in the American scene 
for a political party which acts under the orders of a foreign government. The 
fact that the Communist Party was dissolved as a political organization and 
that the Comintern was disbanded removes one of the most important barriers 
toward a friendly relationship with Russia. However, the fact remains that 
the past resentment did create distaste and prejudice and those words became 
labels of stigma. While there may have been some substance to those labels, 
the unfortunate result was that they were so exploited, misused, and grotesquely 
overemphasized that the net confusion became inestimable. For example, by 
taking advantage of the prejudices aroused by the application of such labels, 
too ofteii movements, organizations, and individuals, liberal and progressive in 
character, were condemned unfairly and without hearing by merely the device 
of such name calling. This was true not only in the United States, but inter- 
nationally as well. 

Does not the fact that Hitler fanned the hate inspired by such'wordg to divide 
and conquer make us wonder whether or not the world has been victimized by 
this propaganda device? Is it not a fact that every Fascist and would-be Fascist 
used this anti-Bolshevist bogey technique in his climb to power? Hitler, Mus- 
solini, Franco, and Baron Von Mannerheim are only some of the most prominent 
of them. The Nazis insist that their mission is to save the world from com- 
munism, and made some desperate and almost successful attempts to wipe out 
the Russians. If the Nazi mission is to our advantage, are we not playing a 
peculiar role in fighting Germany and preventing the accomplishment of that 
mission? 

But on the contrary, at this moment we are engaged in a titanic struggle^ to 
wipe out the menaces of nazism and fascism, and by our side doing a magnificent 
job is the Red Army of the Soviet Union. What a queer tribute we pay to the 
heroism and sacrifice of that country and its people, who are fighting our fight as 
we fight theirs, by saying that after this war is over we will fight them. Surely 
this must be some sort of insanity, and yet we still hear people saying it, and 
in the newspapers and magazines we still read more or less subtle references 
to it. However, it must be admitted that some of those publications have been 
suppressed and some of the writers of such sentirnents have been jailed or are 
being tried as pro-Nazi saboteurs. 

Why then does such a thought persist? Perhaps it has been because an 
excellent job of miseducation has been perpetrated upon us. Perhaps we have 
been ill-informed and misinformed. Perhaps we have been too quick and too 
ready to see something black in anything red. 

Consistent inconsistency. — Let us look at some examples of the type of thinking 
which led us on the road to the conclusion that we will fight Russia next, and 
determine some of the mistakes which resulted from it. Let us review some 
of the actions of the Soviet Union in recent years and appraise her position in 
the family of nations — as a nation of peace or of war. 

When the Soviet Union first came into being, there were some who said, "It 
is doomed to failure; Marxist principles won't work" Then when apparently 
socialism had been made to work, we were told that it is not socialism, or that 
the fine principles of Marx and Lenin had been ignored and Stalin is not follow- 
ing the Marxian line. We rallied against the doctrine of world revolution. 
But when he was expelled from the Soviet Union, we sympathized with Trotzky, 
who was. we said, the tine Marxist. Trotzky, it appears, preached world revolu- 
tion and was willing to sabotage the national interests of Russia for the sake 
of his fine principles. For some strange reason a number of our publications 
took Trotzky to their bosoms. Was it because we admired his principles or 
because he sniped at the U. S. S. R. Evidently it was because it made good 
reading material, for so many of us were pleased to read unfavorable reports 
of the Soviet Union and thus have our opinions vindicated. 

Aid to Fascists as anti-Bolshevists. — Hitler rose to power in Germany, and 
there were many who aided him from without that country as well as from 
within, particularly certain elements in France and Britain. Was it because 
they were misled as to the meaning of nazism, or were they blinded to it by the 
great desire to build a power that would turn to the East and crush communism? 
Whatever it was. Hitler was aided and abetted ; but he turned into a Franken- 
stein monster, striking his very makers with great zeal and little gratitude. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1G41 

We ri-alize now that the war in Europo liad hpon hrowing sinco the sif^nin? 
of the Versailles Treaty aud that the tirst shots were fired in Spain. The so- 
called civil war in that country was the proving ground for Nazi and Fascist 
military strategy and tactics when Hitler and Mussolini came to Franco's aid 
against the legally elected Republican government. But when the Loyalists, the 
Spanish Government, asked for our aid only to the extent of selling them 
materials they needed, only to permit them to import vital supplies, in adopting 
an attitude of strict neutrality, we were, in effect, blind to their struggle and 
deaf to their entreaties. Why? Because someone sold too many of us a bill 
of goods that the Loyalists were Reds. The American men who volunteered to 
fight against Franco and sunivcd to return found a great number of Americans 
and virtually the entire press very unsympathetic to the role they had played 
in attempting to prevent the spread of fascism. Now Fascist Spain is an 
extremely sore thorn in our side, a source of more than mere embarrassment. 

Russia urges world to stop aggression. — Woodrow Wilson had the tremendous 
foresight to realize the need of a I^eague of Nations and It was he who almost 
single-handedly made its creation a part of the Versailles Treaty — practically the 
only constructive statesmanship incorporated in that doctrine. And then what 
happened when the opportunity came for the League to prove Its ability to stop 
aggression and wars? The country of its creator, the United States, was not 
even a member. And whose voice could be heard above all others imploring the 
League time and time again to take a firm stand and to employ sanctions against 
aggressor nations? It was th€ voice of Maxim Litvlnov, Russia's representative, 
preaching the philosophy of the indivisibility of peace and the doctrine of col- 
lective security. It should be noted that some of the leaders In the United States 
also recognized the validity of those principles, as evidenced by the now famous 
"Quarantine the Aggressor" speech made by President Roosevelt in Chicago in 
193P and the subsequent statements of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who 
believed that "war anywhere In the world threatens peace everywhere In the 
world." But too many could not see the need of such principles at that time. 

On repeated occasions the Soviet Union beseeched the great powers to embark 
on a program of international disarmament, a program with which It seemed 
only the United States sympathized. Had there been such a program, this war 
might well have been averted. When the great powers of the world refused to 
adopt such a policy Russia besought them individually to accept the idea of col- 
lective security, that Is, joint military action against any or all aggressors. This 
goal has finally been achieved under the stress of war at terrific cost, and Is our 
surest guaranty of victory. But had this policy been adopted before Hitler and 
his legions became powerful, this war might well, even then, have been averted. 

Russia never wearied of criticizing England and France for their tolerance 
toward Hitler, their lenient attitude to his acts of aggression. After every act 
of Fascist or Nazi aggression the Soviet Government proposed far-reaching meas- 
ures of resistance, measures which at the time were considered too radlcaL 
When Italy Invaded Ethiopia the Soviet Government advocated the application of 
^sanctions or economic blockade. When German troops occupied the Rhineland 
the Soviet Government proclaimed that action must be taken Immediately or It 
would be too late. When Germany and Italy intervened In Spain the Soviet 
Government insisted on active opposition instead of a policy of nonintervention. 

Mutual assistance program fails. — Then there was Munich — where Chamber- 
lain and Daladier purchased a hollow mockery when they thought they were buy- 
ing "peace In our time." At that time the Soviet Government demanded armed 
resistance on the part of France and Czechoslovakia and promised its aid accord- 
ing to the mutual assistance pact she had with those countries. But France pre- 
ferred to appease Germany rather than protect Czechoslovakia. 

When Hitler was poised on Poland's borders, England, France, and Poland 
could not come to an agreement with the Soviet Government for their mutual 
protection. We were told that one of the reasons was that Poland did not want 
Russian soldiers on its soil — an event now heartily welcomed ; and reports were 
widely circulated and believed that Russia was too weak to be of much value aa 
an ally — her air force negligible, her mechanical equipment defective, and her 
military leadership unsound. Could It have been pos-sible that even then there 
was hope that Hitler's ambitions would turn to the East? As a matter of fact, 
United States Ambassador to Russia Joseph Davies reported at the time that the 
actions of Chamberlain and Daladier were causing a growing suspicion in Russia 
that "Britain and France were playing a diplomatic game to place the Soviets in 
the position where Rus.sia would have to fight Germany alone." 



1642 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

In view of all this, it is hardly conceivable that Russia would have been con- 
templating aggression as its own program. On the contrary, the truth is that 
Russia needed peace and consistently fought for peace. Ambassador Davies 
stated in his book. Mission to Moscow, "Litvinov's able and persistent ideas at the 
League of Nations and the vigorous attitude of the Soviet Government in being 
prepared to fight for Czechoslovakia were indications of real sincerity of pur- 
pose and a marked degree of high-mindedness. The dominant motive of the 
Soviets is and always has been 'self-interest.' For a time they were ardent 
advocates of active militant hostility against aggressors in order to preserve 
peace. This was not only because of love of peace per se, but also because it 
was to their interest." How different might have been the course of history 
had there not existed such distrust of Russia and unwillingness to cooperate 
with her. 

How confused our thinking was, when so many of us were saying that Hitler 
and Stalin would get together — that Nazi Germany and Communist Russia were 
of the same ilk. And how sure we were that we were right when the Nazi-Soviet 
pact was signed in 1939, Of course the Western powers resented it, but do we 
realize now that Russia was virtually forced ipto it by the unwillingness of 
those powers to cooperate with her? We see those things in retrospect, but at 
that time we said, "Well, the two thieves finally got together." However, the 
fact remains that Russia got what she was bargaining for, a little longer breath- 
ing spell to build her defenses. 

Russia upsets the miUiary dopesters. — When Hitler turned on his so-called 
pal and the Nazis marched into Russia, we said, "The thieves have fallen out; 
it serves Stalin right for having trusted Hitler instead of us." But are we not 
beginning to understand how natural it was for Russia not to have trusted the 
Western Powers after such things as the failure of the League, the betrayal at 
Munich, and their obvious distrust of her? 

The Wehrmacht strode through Russia with seven-league boots and the con- 
sensus of so many of our armchair authorities on military strategy gave Russia 
a fighting chance to last a few weeks or months. And there were many who 
advised against granting lend-lease to Russia because they had no faith iu 
her power to resist. They claimed it would amount to handing over such sup- 
plies to Germany. Fortunately such advice was not heeded, for we were be- 
ginning to reverse our opinion of the U. S. S. R. How many were there who 
hoped Germany and Russia would cut each other to pieces, but with the reserva- 
tion that Germany might have just a little the better of it? Even then there were 
those who preferred a strong Germany to a strong Russia, or at least nursed 
the hope that they would neutralize each other. 

And when the Russian strategy began to give evidence of its wisdom and the 
tide began to turn against the Nazis, those same people began to fear that Rusr 
sia was too strong. Yes, that is true — many of our writers feared in their 
columns that Russian troops would Overrun Europe when some big Russian 
victory was announced. Many of these same writers also voiced the opinion 
when there was a lull in the fighting that Russia was not in this war for ultimate 
victory, but intended to stop after the Nazis were thrown across Russia's borders. 
We know now that the Red army does not recognize any borders as a stop; 
signal. There was even the thought that once we committed ourselves to a 
second front, the Russians would sit back and let us carry the burden. This, of 
course, has been completely refuted by the tremendous summer drive of the 
Red army. 

Summary of the contradictions. — How peculiarly inconsistent thinking. How 
peculiarly inconsistent has been too much of our thinking as evidenced by such 
examples as those mentioned. How peculiarly consistent then it is that some 
of us should now be toying with such thoughts as that after this is over we 
will have to fight Russia. 

In summation, we see that at one time writers told us that Russia cannot 
survive under socialism, and then they told us that Russia does not have social- 
ism ; on the one hand they told us that Russia was too weak to count on as an 
ally, and then on the other hand they told us that Russia was too strong not 
to be feared as an enemy ; first they told us that there was no difference between 
nazism and communism, and then they told us that they knew all along that 
the two were mortal enemies and eventually would come to blows; they in- 
formed us that it is to Russia's interest to sue for a separate peace with Germany 
at any price — no, to stop fighting at her borders— no, to stop fighting when we 
committed ourselves to an invasion — no, to have her armies overrun all of 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1G43 

Euroiu'. One l)ogins to wondor wiietlior our writers or the Russians are more 
couftisiug. We now realize that the ch)th of these inconsistencies were woven 
out of the warp of a dislike of Russia and the woof of a distrust of her. 

Why the contradictions? — Why have there been so many contradictions In re- 
ports concerning the U. S. S. U.? Perhaps one explanation is the statement 
that is often made: Only angels can discuss the Soviet Union impersonally and 
without heat. Many books and articles have been written about the U. S. S. R., 
but perhaps the chief reason for our distorted appraisal of that country is that 
its sympathizers have been too enthusiastic in sintring praises and its critics 
too persistent in assigning faults. As a result we received conflicting reports 
and believed the ones which vindicated our prejudices in favor of or against 
Russia. 

It is true that Russia, herself, contributed to some of the mystery in which 
she was cloaked. For example, under a strict censorship only vague and gen- 
eral Information was issued to the rest of the world as to the extent of her 
industrial accomplishments. We knew of her several 5-year plans and of per- 
centages of increase, but we did not have a definite and complete picture of th» 
potential output. We knew that the Russian Army was large, but we were given 
hazy information of the extent and efficiency of its training and equipment. 
Russia apparently made a decidetl effort to conceal any information which could 
be of value to an enemy as to her industrial and military strength. 

Misunderstandings in the past have not been altogether one sided. There have 
been instances when Russia lias misunderstood actions or policies of the Western 
Powers. There was, for example, the instance when the English and the Ameri- 
can public were incensed over the report that appeared in the Russian press 
that Nazi agents were negotiating with the British for a separate peace. This 
misunderstanding was not completely dissipated until July 21 of this year, when 
the Week of London reported : "It was in November that the first serious offer 
by the (Nazi) generals to remove Hitler and withdraw from occupied territories 
in the West was made to the British and Americans through Ankara and Lisbon. 
The offer was countersigned by Von Runstedt, and it was for this reason that 
It was received with almost laughable credulity in London. The nroposal did 
not in essence differ from those originally brought to Britain by Hess. It en- 
visaged a state of affairs in which, following a complete withdrawal in the West, 
the Germans would — unofficially — be given a free hand to conduct their war 
in the East without serious interference by the Western Allies.   * 

"The German proposals were reported in March and April *  * at Lisbon 
and Estoril, continued until the very eve of D-day. There is .some ground for 
believing that whereas in the first phase the British were to some extent foxed 
by the Germans, in the second phase it was the Germans who were led up to 
the garden path. It may in fact turn out that * * * it was at Estoril (near 
Lisbon) that Von Runstedt really lost the battle of Normandy." The Week ex- 
plains that the British representatives led Runstedt to believe that there was a 
chance for a negotiated peace, that even the Normandy landings would be only 
a "limited maneuver." 

There was the instance when the American public was disturbed by the report 
from Admiral Standley in Russia that America's contribution by way of lend- 
lease to the Russian war effort was either being concealed from the Russian 
people or at least not being publicized by the Russian press. However, Russia 
was quick to rectify the situation and immediately after the admiral's protest, 
publications in the Soviet Union carried full reports of lend-lease aid. 

Until Russia entered the war, the most widely accepted version of the Soviet 
Union was the one stressing the darker side of that country and its policies. 
With the magnificent fight the Red army is making has come a new appreciation 
of Russia, of what she must have accomplished, and of her unequivocal stand 
against nazism and fascism. Perhaps now, with a better understanding of the 
U. S. S. R., we will be less likely to commit such tragic mistakes as those that 
have been made in the past in our relationship with her. 

Armed with greater objectivity, and stripped of the prejudices which led to 
so many of those tragic mistakes in the past, we are then better equipped to 
analyze the next phase of this discussion — that is, whether the Soviet Union is 
our potential enemy or ally after the war. 



1644 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

(For week ending September 2, 1944) 

PART II. FRIEND OR FOE? 

With a spirit of greater understanding and the realization of the tremendous 
need to avoid the mistakes of the past, let us turn to the question of the possi- 
bility of collaboration with Russia in the future. 

No territorial dispute. — Is there a clash of interests that would prevent the 
two countries from working together to construct and preserve the future peace? 

Walter Lippmann, in his book, U. S. Foreign Policy, states : "Is there a con- 
flict of vital interest [between the United States and Russia] which could cause 
enmity? One thing can be said at once ; There is no boundary dispute, no Ameri- 
can territory which Russia covets, no Russian territory to which the United 
States has laid any claim whatever." 

Looking back to the time when the Colonies were first established in America, 
one sees a period of unbroken peace between the United States and Russia. 
There are very few other instances in the history of the world of two great 
powers enjoying such a lasting peace between them. Why has it been so? A 
principal and necessary cause of war has always been an irreconcilable conflict 
between the vital interests of the societies involved. 

The one bit of territory over which we might have quarreled with Russia is 
Alaska, and it was ceded to us at a nominal sum of $7 million. Certainly it 
was not done under threat of military pressure. Alaska fitted better into our 
scheme of things jwlitically, economically, and geographically, and Russia did 
not need Alaska. Thus, the only possible conflict area was settled amicably. 
In short, the only territory which could be the basis of hostility between the 
United States and Russia is Alaska, and that hostility could only exist as a 
potential threat against us if Alaska were Russian. 

No clash in icorld markets. — What of the possibility of economic controversy? 
Again we cannot find a basis for conflict, for actually our interests have been 
complementary rather than competitive. We have never engaged in any exten- 
sive competition with Russia for foreign markets, since both countries possess 
vast territory and clearly defined areas of primary economic influence which 
do not overlap. As a matter of fact, Russia is a market for our industrial 
products, and American industry can count heavily on the Soviet Union, as it 
has in the recent past, as a potential customer, according to Eric Johnston, presi- 
dent of the United States Chamber of Commerce, recently returned from a tour 
of Russia. Certainly it would be rather bad business tactics to attempt to 
throttle a good customer. Vice President Wallace, on his return from visits to 
Soviet Siberia and China, spoke most enthusiastically of the possibilities of 
cooperation with Russia and China in building up the Pacific area. He stated 
that there was a great desire on the part of both peoples to collaborate with us 
and each other. 

Pressure of common enemies. — We are also allied to Russia by the pressure 
of common enemies, including Japan. The fact that the U. S. S. R. is not at war 
with Japan can be explained only on the basis of better military judgment on the 
part of both countries, since each has her hands full fighting present opponents. 
There were some who believed that Russia was our inevitable enemy and Japan 
our ultimate ally, as evidenced by the amount of pro- Japanese sentiment in the 
United States in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, and throughout the series 
of Japanese aggressions. Perhaps that sentiment is one of the explanations of 
our failure to fortify some of our outposts in the Pacific. 

On the other hand, some of the leaders in Russia apparently foresaw our battle 
with Japan, for as far back as 1918 Lenin in an address before the central execu- 
tive committee in Moscow stated, "An inevitable conflict will arise between Japan 
and America for the supremacy of the Pacific and its coasts." As for the con- 
flict between Japan and Russia, many reports have come to us in recent years 
of border incidents between Russian and Japanese troops, and in 1938 the clashes 
took the form of a small war, in which the Russians decisively defeated the 
Japs. Again in 1939 a large battle occurred between the Japanese-Manchuquoan 
forces and the Red army in which two Japanese divisions were annihilated. 

No fundamental conflict. — There is an increasing growth of opinion in the 
United States amongst scholars of international affairs that war with Russia is 
far from inevitable. Professor Sorokin, of Harvard University, states in his 
book Russia and the United States : "The United States is less likely to become 
involved in war with Russia than with any great power." Walter Duranty in 
his book The U. S. S. R. writes, "There are no causes of fundamental conflict 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1645 

between the two countries * * * It will be to their (Russia's) interest to co- 
operate with the United States, because — if for no other reason — they and the 
United States want peace for development of their own resources." All)ert Rhys 
Williams in his work the Russians avers, "Between the two countries (Russia 
and the United States) exists no fundamental conflict of Interest; on the 
contrary, there are countless reasons for collaboration." Even writers who are 
extremists in their distrust of Russia state that it would be to the best interests 
of all concerned if Russia and the Anglo-American countries collaborated in the 
forthcoming peace. 

Doca Riisxin plan aggression? — Is there some menace which prevents collabo- 
ration with Russia? Such a menace could only be based on the fear that she plan.s 
some form of aggression. 

Of course, no one can predict with certainty future events — what Russia, the 
United States, England, or any country will do after the war. However, there 
is a valid basis for predicting general policies, that is, consideration of what the 
best interests of the particular country dictate. 

Is Rtissia imperiaUsticf — Having that criterion in mind, let us determine 
whetlier the Soviet Union would be interested in embarking on a program of 
imperialism. Perhaps the answer lies in asking ourselves .several questions: 
Does Russia need more territory, particularly at the price or risk of war? The 
Soviet Union comprises half of Europe and half of Asia — one-sixth of the land 
mass of the world. Certainly we must conclutle that she has more than sufficient 
"Lebensraum" for many generations to come. Does she need more resources? 
Geologists inform us that Russia contains vast reserves of practically every raw 
material required by industry. Will she look for places to invest her money? 

While the Soviets have granted small loans to Turkey and Mongolia, the.se 
are not important because Russia has no firms or monopolies with surplus 
moneys. All of her capital is required and u.sed for internal developm.ent. 
Does Rus.sia have a crying need for foreign markets where she can dispose of 
surplus production? By the very nature of her economic structure there cannot 
he overproduction in the U. S. S. R. economists tell us. for the money gets back 
into the hand of the people to buy all the goods produced, giving her an insatiable 
domestic market. Williams states, "It is apparent that none of the usual 
motives for imperialism exist in Russia." 

Will Russia promote world revolution?. — However, what about the doctrine 
of world revolution? Can that be a basis for future aggression on the part 
of Russia? Will she interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in order 
to spread socialism? 

Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated. "Revolutions cannot be carried to other 
countries in a suitcase." History discloses that revolution has never been an 
exportable item but rather one of domestic production. 

It has been feared that Russia intends to promote Pan-Slavism under the 
Socialist banner, and will therefore seek to subjugate her immediate western 
neighbors. Ralph Parker. Moscow correspondent for the New York Times for 
a great many years, wrote in a recent article in Liberty Magazine, "Russia 
believes it to her interest that the Slav nations should be strong. A weak 
Poland, events of the past 25 years have shown, is a danger to Russia. A 
Czechoslovakia on which a Munich can be forced, a Yugoslavia which, through 
Internal disunity, can be toppled, a Bulgaria so internally corrupted that its 
rulers are forced to lead it Into adventurous policies are dangerous to Russia. 
If they are strong internally, these lands. Russia believes, can never be turned 
against her or go down one by one before the Germans. Thus measures to 
strengthen her western neighbors take precedence, in Russian postwar policy, 
because this concerns her own security." 

The Baltic problem. — The question arises : If this is the policy of the Soviet 
Union, how can Russia's attitude toward the Baltic nations of Latvia. Lithuania, 
and Esthonia be reconciled with it? Russia has definitely made it clear that 
the Baltic States are to be incorporated within the Soviet Union as autonomous 
republics. We are inclined to forget that these countries and their people were 
forcefully taken from Russia at the end of the last war, after having been 
Russian for a period several times as long as the United States has been in 
existence. 

Gregory Meiksins in his book, The Baltic Riddle, states, "The existence of the 
Baltic Republics as 'independent' and isolated .states has proven to be a pathetic 
fiction, false and harmful in effect.    Everyone seemingly must know that 
this liberating army (freeing the Baltics from Nazi occupation) will and can 
be only the Red Army with its Latvian, Lithuanian, and Esthonian troops in 



1646 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

the vanguard marching home again. * * * It is certain that the Inhabitants 
who had been oppressed under the German yoke will meet them as their own 
longed-for deliverers. * * * It is time for sound thinking people to realize that 
history has passed her verdict on the Baltic problem, and the Baltic people 
will not appeal for a retrial." 

In his book, They Shall Not Sleep, Leland Stowe writes : "The Baltic 
States * * * were improvised as separate national states for the first time after 
the last war, and have been an integral part of Russia for more than 700 
years. * * * If we are at all realistic, and if we have any proper appreciation 
of our need of Russia's good will, we shall not stir up acrimony and dissension 
by entering into any such futile debate (whether Russia is entitled to the Baltics) . 
As a matter of cold fact and whether we like it or not, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania are already federated republics of the Soviet Union and they are 
certain to remain so. If we were to insist that they be restored to a status 
which before 1918 they had never had for hundreds of years, the Russians might 
as logically reply : 'First, we suggest that you Americans I'eturn Texas and parts 
of Oklahoma and New Mexico to Mexico.' To the Russians that would make 
quite as much sense." 

The Polish dispute. — The same question that arises over the Baltic States may 
be posed concerning the area in dispute between the Russian Government and the 
Polish Government in exile. Authorities seem to agree that both sides have their 
arguments but that the great power of Russia makes the question practically 
academic. The dispute over these territories is not of recent origin ; it does not 
arise from a new policy conceived by the Soviet regime. It is important to note 
that the Russians demand a boundary which is practically the same as the 
Curzon line established as the equitable boundary by the committee which Lord 
Curzon headed after World War I. Certainly Lord Curzon was not pro-Russian. 
The evidence discloses that a great majority of the people in the disputed area 
(which was wrested from Russia after the last war) is Russian. This appar- 
ently was the basis for Lord Curzon's decision. 

Prof. Oscar Lange, of the University of Chicago, who returned recently from 
Russia, where he discussed with Premier Stalin the subject of Soviet-Polish 
relations, has stated : "Stalin intends Poland to be an independent nation. He' 
has not the slightest intention of interfering with the internal affairs of the 
Polish nation, nor will he dictate the political, economic, or social forms of the 
new Polish State. He wants her to be strong externally and internally and td 
play an important part in the concert of nations." Lange does not believe that 
the boundary problem is the main one. "The real problem," he states, "is 
whether Poland will have a government friendly to the Soviet Union or not. 
Provided friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Poland are established, 
the boundary problem can be solved in a way which will satisfy the Polish people 
as well as the Ukrainian, W^hite Russian, and Lithuanian nations." (Recent 
reports disclose that the Soviet Union has recognized a Polish government of 
liberation as representative of Poland and has afiirmed the stand that she is 
desirous of seeing a strong Poland built and will not interfere with her internal 
affairs.) 

The Finnish question. — As far as Russo-Finnish relations are concerned, there 
no longer seems to be a serious doubt that the U. S. S. R. is not intent on 
destroying the independence of Finland. The terms of the armistice recently 
proposed by the Soviet Union to Finland, and previously approved by the United 
States and Great Britain, demonstrate this. It must be remembered that the 
Soviet Union has never claimed Finland as part of Russia, bilt actually was the 
first countiy to recognize Finland's independence. 

Russia's interests in the icar. — The actions of the U. S. S. R. since the expulsion 
of Trotzky indicate a definite trend away from the doctrine of world revolution. 
Recent Soviet pronouncements contain no ambiguity in stating that Russia Is not 
interested in the local affairs of other countries, and her actions thus far bear 
out this statement. Stalin is quoted as saying, "Our aims are clear and noble. 
Our first task is to liberate our own people from the Fascist scoundrels. We 
have no idea of imposing our own regime on other peoples, Slav, or otherwise. 
Our aim is to help liberate them from Nazi tyranny and then to leave them free 
to live in their own land as they wish." 

Heniy Cassidy, Associated Press correspondent with the Red army in Rumania, 
has given us very tangible evidence that the policy announced by Stalin is being 
practiced. Cassidy reported in July of this year, "It can now be said with 
complete conviction that the Russians in the initial venture of this war beyond 
their borders have adopted a strict attitude of nonintervention in local affairs. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 1647 

• • * It was the unanimous consensus of American, British, and Cliiiiose 
observers (in Rumania) that the Russians are not interfering with the political, 
economic, or social life of Rumania." 

Russia's stake in the peace. — Duranty writes, "The Russians, I think, liave 
abandoned Ibeir first fanatical Impulse to impose their ideas and methods upon 
the Western Powers. They have before them a tremendous and mo.st difficult 
task of national reconstruction." 

Williams states, "The exile of Trosky virtually brought to an end the notion 
(hat the Russians must force their institutions and ideas on other peoples." 
Tliis does not imply that the Soviets have reuomiced tlieir principles. To be 
sure they liope and expect socialism to spread. They hoi^e it will spread because 
they hold it provides a linal .solution of unemployment, strife between races, 
nations, and classes. They expect it to spread because they believe one country 
alter another will be forced by failure of capitalism to try .socialism. As 
America rejoices to see any country become a republic, .so Soviet Russia would 
rejoice to see any country socialized. But W^illiams does not believe Russia 
will "engage in any revolutionary knight errantry" to spread socialism, that 
rather her policies will be dictated by her own national interests and needs in 
reconstruction and development. 

Ralph Parker also stated in his article in Liberty magazine that "Russia 
doesn't want future relations with her allies to be spoiled by the suspicion that 
she is using her influence on the leftwing to spread revolutionary doctrine. 
Recent developments in Soviet foreign policy will make it difficult for any radical 
leftwing group to convince London and Washington that it has Moscow's 
support." 

Leland Stowe writes : "Soviet Russia must preoccupy herself chiefly with peace, 
security, and rehabilitation because her war los.ses and sacrifices have been so 
staggeringly enormous. It seems almost impossible for Americans, in our remote 
security, to comprehend what these losses are. But we cannot measure Russia 
accurately, we cannot deal with her intelligently, and we cannot treat her 
fairly unless we make an effort to comprehend them." 

The tremendous task of rceonstruction. — "A territory almost as large and as 
Industrially important as a strip of the United States of America from Maine 
to South Carolina and as far west as Tennessee and Indiana has been occupied 
and fought over in Russia by more than 200 Nazi-Axis divisions for consider- 
ably more than 2 years. If we could transpose these long months of savage war- 
fare into the above-mentioned section of the United States and substitute Buffalo, 
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Detroit for Dnieprostroy, Kharkov, Leningrad, and 
Stalingrad, with these great American industrial centers lying in ruins, we 
should still scarcely have begun to appreciate what war has done to Russia. 
We should still have to picture thousands of towns and small villages laid waste 
in New England, New York, Penn.sylvania, West Virginia, Ohio, and several other 
States. We should have to imagine that approximately one-third of the popula- 
tion of the United States (equivalent to some 60 million people in Russia) had 
been swallowed by the Nazi invaders, that millions had been sent to Germany in 
slavery and that the fate of some 2.j million Americans was still unknown. 
We should have to imagine another 15 million American civilians, with noth- 
ing left of their possessions save a few bundles and the clothes on their backs, 
swept from the Eastern States by the tide of war and pu.shed back across the 
Middle West aud across the Mississippi — a helpless horde of refugees, existing 
under any kind of roof for more than 2 years. The equal of all this, and more, 
has happened in Russia since June 1941. 

"* * * Supposing that America, in less than 3 years of war, should lose 1 out 
of every 12 persons in our population of 130 million people. If all these tragedies 
and disasters had been suffered by us, can you imagine with what stupendous 
relief we should greet the end of the war? Can you conceive what would be our 
consuming desires and necessities? They could not fail to be anything else but — 
peace, security, and rehabilitation. 

"* * * This is why the Soviet Union's need for many years of peace is cruelly 
imperative. No government, of whatever ideology, could ignore its obligations 
to a huge population emaciated and weakened to such a degree. The Soviet 
regime won the confidence of Soviet Russia's masses by its leadership in the war. 
It can only retain their confidence by an equally energetic leadership in the 
nation's reconstruction. But only a long-term and heroic program can ever 
rebuild Russia's ravaged cities and towns or reclothe and revitalize her scores ol 
millions of civilians." 



1618 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Is there mutual trust? — In the program to build the postwar world which 
I9 being developed the Soviet Union has indicated her intentions to cooperate in 
many ways. For example she has participated in and has shown her willing- 
ness to continue this participation in various conferences on postwar problems. 
Her representatives have attended the World Food Conference, the Monetary 
Conference, the Dunbarton Oaks Conference, and are active in the UNRRA 
and she has entered into various treaties and agreements with the United Na- 
tions. But will Russia live up to her agreements, can she be trusted? Am- 
bassador Davies has said, "Of all the nations of the earth, none has a finer 
record of living up to its treaty promises than the Soviet Union." To refer 
again to Williams, he writes, "Live up to our obligations as partners and allies, 
and they will do likewise." 

Fortune magazine reports in its June issue that Chui'chill and England have 
decided that they can trust Russia and relates a story of an industrialist who was 
asked to turn over a process to Russia which would be worth millions commer- 
cially after the war. In a conference with Russian representatives the industri- 
alist hesitantly suggested that there be a postwar settlement of the process. Al- 
most immediately he received the answer, "Of course." Later he met Churchill 
who asked him how he was coming along with his negotiations. "Do you know%" 
he said to Churchill, "I have decided that the Russians can be trusted," Churchill 
bit into his cigar and answered, "So have I." 

Does Russia trust us? Drew Pearson reports Stalin as saying recently in 
answer to the question whether he was worried about the danger of harmony 
breaking up between Russia and the Anglo-American countries : "This alliance is 
not built merely on an agreement between three men. It is the result of a deep 
and compelling fundamental community of historical interests. It is assured 
by the fact that we all need each other. As one of your American statesmen 
once said, 'If we do not hang together, we will hang separately.' So I am con- 
fident that, despite minor disturbances and occasional irritations, our friendship 
will continue and assure peace to the postwar world." 

Hands off domestic issues. — Will the fact that Russia's social and economic 
institutions differ from ours prevent our collaboration with her? Certainly we 
would be narrowminded were we to think that we have the answer to all the 
social and economic problems of the world here in the United States. We would 
resent any interference by Russia in our internal affairs and by the same token 
Russia would resent interference on our part. Obviously the only effective 
agreement between the two countries must be based on a handsoff attitude 
toward each other's domestic affairs. What will work for the United States may 
not work in Russia and vice versa, and since the domestic policies of either 
country are not predicated upon aggression, as is the case with any Fascist 
nation, there is no purpose to be served in concerning ourselves with Russia's 
internal structure or tl ey with ours. 

Distrust has arisen in the past because of such interference. We have bitterly 
resented the activities of the American Communist Party when he felt that its 
program was dictated by Moscow. On the other hand, we too have been guilty 
of interference in Russia's affairs, for shortly after World War I we permitted 
our military forces to intervene on the side of the White Russian army in its 
attempt to destroy the young Soviet Government. Past distrusts can and must 
be forgotten, so that the two countries may be able to work side by side. 

However, an attempt shoul