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Full text of "Interlocking subversion in Government Departments. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-third Congress, second session,first session]"

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INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 



HEARING • 

BEFORE THE -' JU 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
ON 

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS 



TESTIMONY OF GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET 



SEPTEMBER 29, 1954 



PART 24 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
32918» WASHINGTON : 1954 



Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

DEC 2 9 1954 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chairman 

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah JAMES O, EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey ESTES KEFAUVEK, Tennessee 

EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM B. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON. New Jersey JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

Alva C. Cahpenter, Chief Counsel and Executive Director 
J. G. SoDRWiNE, Associate Counsel 
Ben.jaiun Mandel, Director of Reaearch 

n 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

DEPARTMENTS 



WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBEB 29, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
or THE Internal Securi'it Act and Other Internal 

Security Laws of the CoMMirrEE on the Judiciary, 

Washington, D. C. 

The subcommittee met at 2 p. m., pursuant to call, in the caucus 
room, Senate Office Building, Senator William E. Jenner (chairman) 
presiding. 

Present : Senators Jenner and Johnston. 

Also present: Alva C. Carpenter, chief counsel; Dr. Edna Fluegel, 
professional stall' member. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Last night in Hawthorne, Nev., the Honorable Pat McCarran died. 
He was a casualty, a grievous casualty, in this world war in which 
free men and women fight to defend their bodies and their souls 
against the bloody-fanged barbarians of the Communist jungle. 

^Y[\nt he stood for and what he feared is demonstrated in a passage 
from testimony taken a few weeks ago : 

Senator McCarran. General, looking back over our history, do you remember 
the expression "Give me liberty or give me death"? 

The Witness. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarran. Do you remember the expression "54-40 or fight"? 

The Witness. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCarran. Do you find that prevalent today, that spirit that made 
those enunciations? 

The Witness. It certainly has not been prevalent. Senator McCarran, since 
World War II was over. 

When word came to us that Senator McCarran had died, our first 
thought was to postpone this hearing out of respect to the Senator's 
memory. But then we liad a second thought. 

Pat McCarran founded this subcommittee. He wrote the law out 
of which it was created. He fixed the standards by which it operates. 
He molded it into a deadly piece of artillery in the anti-Communist 
war. 

And he did one other thing. He made our enemies for us. Tliey 
are the kind of enemies we are proud to have. They are the kind of 
enemies we vow to keep. If the day ever comes when the enemies of 
Pat McCarran cease to be the enemies of tliis subcommittee, and every 
last member of its staff, then we will know we have failed the man who 
died hist night. 

So it was, as we thought about tliese things, that we put aside all 
notion of postponing this hearing. We knew that Pat ]\IcCarran 

2017 



2018 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

would not v/ant it that way. He was particularly interested in these 
hearinos on Korea. 

Just recently he made a trip for this committee to Florida and inter- 
viewed a very important witness, General Stratemeyer. Let the record 
show this hearing of the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the 
Senate of the United States is held in honor of the subcommittee's 
founder, the honorable Pat McCarran, of Nevada. 

Before proceeding with the witness, I have one other short statement 
that I think the American people should know about. John W. 
Powell, editor of Communist China's propaganda magazine, China 
Eeview, appeared before this subcommittee on Monday of this week 
and invoked the fifth amendment against self-incrimination, again 
and again, when asked questions which touched on his Communist 
affiliations. We also had here American officers and soldiers who 
had spent as much as 2i/2 years in Communist prison camps in Asia 
and were forced to read the issues of this once American magazine 
and repeat the lies it peddled before they could get any food or medical 
care. If they did not cooperate, they were severely punished. "We 
learned of at least one death as a result. One of our witnesses, Carroll 
Wright, Jr., a former lieutenant in the Army, said that Powell was 
a murderer, responsible for the deaths of many American fighting 
men. 

I was shocked beyond words to learn that this renegade American 
was permitted to hold a press conference yesterday in the National 
Press Club of Washington. 

It is reasonable to assume that John W. Powell is in this country 
to soften up the American people, as he tried to soften up our fight- 
ing men, so we will agree to trade with the Soviet bloc, and keep quiet 
if Red China is admitted to the United Nations. 

Mr. Powell probably intends to use the prestige of the National Press 
Club in Washington to get a background for his propaganda when he 
goes to other cities. 

We sentence a Corporal Dickenson, of Crackers Gap, to 10 years 
in prison, and give a dishonorable discharge to Colonel Fleming, al- 
though these men withstood most of the horrors of imprisonment in 
Communist prison camps, while we let a renegade American, who in- 
directly helped to torture them, travel freely about this country, to 
spread the poison of confusion and defeatism. 

It is time to end this folly. Yesterday I asked the Attorney General 
of the United States to press a treason charge against ]Mr, Powell. 
He is an American citizen. He has adhered to our enemies in wartime 
and given them substantial aid and comfort, as the testimony came 
from the lips of the former soldiers and officers who were taken 
prisoners in that war. I am submitting the testimony of these hear- 
ings to the Department of Justice, and I hope for quick action. 

General Van Fleet, will you be sworn to testify. Do you swear that 
the testimony given in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

General Van Fleet. I do. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2019 

TESTIMONY OF GEN. JAMES A. VAN FLEET, UNITED STATES ARMY, 

EETIRED 

The Chairman. General, let me say it is a pleasure and a privilege 
to meet here with you today. I know I speak for all my absent col- 
leagues and, indeed, for all America, in paying tribute to you. Your 
record is brilliant; your courage extraordinary; your forthright ness, 
phenomenal — and most refreshing. 

It is good in these days of whining and of breast-beating, of buck- 
passing and of expediency, to hear from an American leader who 
believes in America and in its future. Yours is not the blind faith 
of the ill-informed, nor the courage of the untried. You have met the 
Communist enemy in Greece and, again, in Korea — and to the extent 
that you were free to act it is the enemy who has good reason to regret 
the encounter. Y^ou, yourself, have never wavered in your will to 
win and in your conviction that "there is no substitute for victory." 

But victory in Korea was denied to you — not by your fighting gen- 
eralship and not by your valiant men — but by an unidentified "they." 
Whatever the motivation of "they" it is now fairly clear that the an- 
nounced reasons were preposterous and the results disastrous. As you 
know, this subcommittee is not concerned with either foreign policy 
or with military policy, per se. 

The internal security of this great country is our concern, however, 
and there are many facets of both foreign and of military policy 
that raise the question, "Why?" — why were the experts, the policy- 
makers, the men who so arrogantly discounted the judgment of our 
field and theater commanders; why were these men so uniformly and 
consistently wrong when ^reat masses of our citizens who make no 
claim to expertness were right? 

Why was there so much conflict in testimony in the MacArthur 
hearings? Why are so many crucial questions still unanswered? 
What secret commitments were made ? Who made them ? America ? 
A caucus of diplomats ? The U. N. ? They told us we must limit our 
action ; we must appease to preserve allied unity and to avoid world 
war III. They told us Korea was the wrong war. They told us 
time was on our side. Was it? What has happened to the unity 
for which we repudiated our great traditions ? Can anyone contem- 
plating the world abroad maintain that "they" were right? 

And now, as you observe: 

 * * We have at home other curious, perhaps well-intentioned, defeatists who 
would have us believe that our time to win has already passed. When I listen 
to their siieeehes and read their articles — exaggerating the enemy's present 
strength, playing down the importance of the Pacific and of Asia, I wonder if 
they are not, consciously or unconsciously, waging psychological warfare against 
us — destroying our will to win, minimizing our strength, softening us up to 
accept unnecessary defeat. 

Can you identify any of these individuals? Do you believe that 
stupidity alone motivates them? 

I note that 5'ou use the expression "consciously or unconsciously." 
What difference does it make whether serving the enemy has been con- 
scious or unconscious if American security is thereby jeopardized? 
And so. General Van Fleet, some of our questions today will cover 
these borderline areas of policy in the ho])e that your answers may 
serve to pinpoint areas of decision where the mystery of "why" may 



2020 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

lead to further identification of the mysterious "they," and to an 
exploration of the extent to which the subversion of our policy may 
have been a factor. 

This we do know. The "neutralization" of Formosa freed the 
Chinese Communists armies to move north to the Yalu. Limitations 
unprecedented in our military history were imposed on our com- 
manders. We have isolated and are studying a whole series of 
peculiar episodes in the conduct of that war. We have noted that 
some of the same American officials who, for one reason or another, 
were architects of earlier disaster, were in policymaking positions 
during the Korean war. As I said to the Senate on August 13, 1954 : 

We have learned what hidden Communists did to our foreign policy agencies. 
That has been documented. We have not spelled out what they did to our 
military agencies. 

No Senator would want to sit down at a chess game with the Soviet chess 
team, if he thought his American partner was a secret Communist, planning 
how to throw the game to the Soviet players without being detected. Mr. 
President, you and I do not want to draft American youth, to engage in any 
military contest with the Soviet forces, if somewhere, high up on our side, 
someone is secretly planning how to throw the contest to the Soviet side, with- 
out doing anything tangible enough to be found out. 

You may proceed, Mr. Carpenter, with the questioning. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please give us your full name, your ad- 
dress, and occupation ? 

General Van Fleet. James A. Van Fleet, general, United States 
Army, retired. Home address, Lake Alfred, Fla. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you give us an outline of your military career, 
please? 

General Van Fleet. I entered West Point in 1911 from Florida, 
graduated in the class of 1915, was assigned to the Infantry. I went 
overseas in World War I in command of a machinegun company; 
promoted, commanded a machinegun battalion in the closing 
months of World War I. 

Between the wars I had various commands from battalion to regi- 
ment, lots of civilian duty with ROTC's and Organized Reserves. 

In the beginning of World War II, I was with the 29th Infantry 
Regiment at the Infantry School, Fort Benning. That was a demon- 
stration regiment, the only war-strength regiment we had in the 
United States Anny. 

There I was promoted to full colonel and took command of tlie 
Eighth Infantry Regiment which I had for 3 years and commanded 
as an assault regiment in the invasion of France. I spent 10 months 
of combat in Europe during World War II as regimental, division, 
and corps commander. My corps was one selected to be moved to the 
Pacific and was on its way there when VJ-Day was declared. So I 
stayed in this country then and subsequently commanded the Second 
Corps area with headquarters at Governors Island and later I was 
Deputy Army Commander of the First Army there. 

Then I was sent to Germany for a few weeks and then selected by 
General Marshall and sent to Greece. Following 29 months in Greece 
I returned to command the Second Army with headquarters at Fort 
Meade and I was there 8 months before being sent to Korea to com- 
mand the Eighth Army. 

I retired from acti\e duty on March 31, 1953. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2021 

Mv. Carpenter. Tims, you have been in the service of your country 
since your very early days, is that riiiht, General? 

General Van Fleet. That is correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was your assignment in Greece? 

General Van Fleet. I was the director of the Joint United States 
Military Advisory Group to Greece. 

Mr. Carpenter. What political briefing did you receive before 
accepting that assignment? 

General Van Fleet. I was in Germany at the time and was asked 
to come to Washington and here report to General Marshall who was 
then Secretary of State. While here I received some briefings, both 
political and military. 

Mr. Carpenter. And for how long a period. General? 

General Van Fleet. Just a few days. It was expected that I would 
be here longer, but that was rather amusing, (xeneral Marshall asked 
the Pentagon representative how long I would be here and he said 
about a month. The general asked again to have it repeated. Then he 
said, "'Well, did you arrange an armistice with the guerrillas?" That 
comment seemed to speed up my departure from W^ashington because 
a day or two after that I was on my way. The briefings were very 
few. 

Mr. Carpenitr. Because of the situation in Greece, it was most 
urgent that you get there as quickly as possible, is that right? 

General Van Fleet. General IMarshall thought so, and that proved 
correct. 

Mr, Carpenter. General Van Fleet, have you ever wondered 
whether the whole Greek episode that you went through and the Berlin 
airlift were diversions to keep us concentrated in Europe while the 
debacle developed in the Far East ? 

General Van Fleet. Wliat is the first part of the question? 

Mr. Carpenter. From your experience in Greece, have you ever 
wondered whether the whole Greek episode and the Berlin airlift were 
diversions to keep us concentrated in Europe while the debacle de- 
veloped in the Far East ? 

General Van Fleet. Gradually, I came to that conclusion. I would 
not say I was of that opinion when I first went to Greece, but that 
evolved and I so believe today. 

Mr. Carpenter. You believe that today ? 

General Van Fleet. I do. 

The Chairman. Why do you believe that today ? Will you briefly 
state it ? 

General Van Fleet. Mr. Chairman, a lot of events point to it. I 
might go back with a few views I have. 

I believe our Government and especially the military was oriented 
to Europe rather than to Asia. For generations we have had very 
close ties with Europe while the reverse holds for Asia. Asia is 
very difficult country. There is no luxury out there to enjoy like 
there is in Paris or London or other capitals. So for a hundred years 
Ave have been a European nation in our views. 

The Pentagon was filled with many high-ranking officers who had 
experience in Europe, and their thinking was Europe — in fact, West- 
ern Europe. While in Greece, when 1 fully understood the whole 
picture of the importance of the Balkans and the eastern Mediter- 
ranean, I advocated greater strength, military strength, in that area. 



2022 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

I was told repeatedly that the high command was not interested in 
that, that Russia would have no interest at all to the south, that the 
whole threat was against Western Europe. Nothing we could do in 
the Balkans or the eastern Mediterranean would prevent Russia from 
driving west. So I ceased sending in such recommendations. 

But in the latter part of my tour there it so happened that General 
Gruenther took up the war plans position in the Department of the 
Army. I got a message from him asking for more information on 
such plans. So then I began to send in volumes of information on 
the importance the Balkans and other areas in the eastern Mediter- 
ranean would play by providing a threat that would point north to the 
underbelly of Russia, should Russia advance west. 

So it was rather late in my tour in Greece before even the eastern 
Mediterranean got much attention from the Western European 
advocates. 

So I have often wondered as we go farther east to take in the Middle 
East and then the Near East and finally the Far East, why those areas 
receive even less consideration in the world picture of a threat from 
Russia. 

The Chairman. In other words, up until that time we had a Euro- 
pean complex and could not see anything but Europe? 

General Van Fleet. I believe that to be correct. 

The Chairman. And only a certain segment of that, of Western 
Europe ? 

Genera] Van Fleet. Yes, sir. 

Senator Johnston. General, in other words, we did not consider 
the Far East very much at that time ; is that true ? 

General Van Fleet. I do not know how we considered the 
Far East at that time. Senator, since I was in Greece. I myself had 
little knowledge of the Far East. I do not know the thinking that 
actually went on, but I do know they did not give the eastern Medi- 
terranean much consideration other than the Truman doctrine assist- 
ance which was to help a nation maintain its freedom. It first applied 
to Greece and Turkey in 1947. 

Mr. Carpenter. What were the Russians seeing at that time when 
we were seeing only Western Europe ? 

General Van Fleet. I think that is clearly outlined in the state- 
ments of the Soviet leaders. All their written statements of world 
conquest, corroborated by their deeds, suggest that they were oriented 
to capture Asia before Europe, 

Mr. Carpenter. In Greece did you observe any American involve- 
ment on the Communist side ? 

General Van Fleet. I was familiar with some difficulties which the 
chief of the mission, who was then former Governor Griswold of 
Nebraska, later Senator, had with one of our American correspondents. 
They seemed to have been at cross-purpose and a lot of charges and 
countercharges were being aired in the press. I thought it played 
into the hands of the enemy. 

Mr. Carpenter. Can you tell us a little more about who were in- 
volved. General, other than Governor Griswold ? 

General Van Fleet. Former Governor Griswold was chief of the 
economic mission. There was no Ambassador there at the time, so 
he was the senior American present and in command of all our Amer- 
ican missions, the Embassy, the economic and military groups. 



I 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2023 

JSIr. Hoiner Bigart was one of the American correspondents in 
Greece at the time, and Mr. Bigart seemed to symj^athize greatly with 
the Communist cause in Greece, the guerrilla cause, perhaps thinking 
they were the underdog or were helping the underdog. Actually they 
were the dirty dog rather than the underdog; but perhaps his views 
were honest. 

The CuAiRMAX. "Were his views in line with our foreign policy at 
that time ? 

General Vax Fleet. I would say "No." It was a very harmful 
criticism which he made of our efforts in Greece. Then he finally 
entered the guerrilla territory through Yugoslavia and spent some 
time with the Communist guerrillas in northern Greece, and eventually 
came through the lines and surrendered to an American advisory 
group with a Greek national unit. I thought the whole episode was 
wrong. 

t^enator Johnston. Was he ever tried ? 

General Van Fleet. No, he was not. He wrote quite a story about 
his ex]>eriences. 

Senator Johnston. Who had the authority to try him at that 
time ? 

General Van Fleet. I do not suppose anybody had unless it would 
be this committee, with new legislation. 

Senator Johnston. No one in Greece in command had a right to 
try him ? 

General Van Fleet. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Of course, this committee has no right of trial. 

General Van Fleet. You mentioned earlier this other gentleman — 
a Mr. Powell — who was playing with the enemy, too. 

Mr. Carpenter. Bigart later covered the Korean war, did he not? 

General Van Fleet. Yes, he did ; or part of it. 

Senator Johnston. Where is he now? 

General Van Fleet. I do not know. He is a very able fellow. I 
would say he is a good American all right, but he goes to extremes to 
get the enemy's point of view. 

Mr. Carpenter. What about the efficiency of the United Nations in 
Greece, General? 

General Van Fleet. The United Nations set up a United Nations 
special committee on the Balkans to observe border troubles. The 
Soviet bloc of nations boycotted that mission, so it was made up of 
only friendly allies. They were there to observe troubles along the 
Bulgarian, Yugoslavian, and Albanian borders. I do not believe there 
is anv other United Nations mission there. 

The CiLAiRMAN. What about UNSCOB? 

General Van Fleet. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. How did it operate? 

General Van Fleet. They were fairly effective as regards our side 
of the border. They never crossed over into the enemy's territory or 
into the guerrilla territory. 

The Chairman. They gave yon good cooperation ? 

General Van Fleet. Yes. In fact, it was my organization which 
gave them support in the form of logistics. 

Mr. Carpenter. What conclusions did you reach in regard to Com- 
munist political strategy and tactics? 

82918°— 54— pt. 24 2 



2024 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

General Van Fleet. That takes us into tlie whole subject of guer- 
rilla warfare, which is an unorthodox, unconventional type of war- 
fare where it is a hit-and-run process. Never fight or give battle and 
work on the civilians as much as on the government forces. 

When you combine communism with guerrilla warfare, it becomes 
doubly bad because you get all kinds of lies. It gets out of the realm 
of the partisan or patriotic movem.ent for the good of their side of a 
civil war. It gets into international communism which prospers by 
lies and murders to make the underprivileged believe they can have 
more under a Communist regime. It is very appealing to people who 
are unemployed or who are suffering for want of food or shelter. 
Those lies appeal very much. That, I would say, is the first step in 
getting a convert to communism. It is only later, as they find it does 
not work that way, that they have eventually lost their souls. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was any attempt made by American officials to 
force a coalition government on Greece? 

General Van Fleet. That was our wdiole policy in the State De- 
partment, to have a government that would represent all elements. It 
was a coalition government always that was set up; all parties being 
represented in tlie government. That was what we advocated as a 
policy for Greece. 

Mr. Carpenter. Does that include Communists? 

General Van Fleet. That would include Communists or leftwingers 
or collaborators — any and all parties. 

The Chairman. General, in order to make that policy successful, 
didn't we as a Government threaten to withhold aid if they did not 
take the Communists into their Government? 

General Van Fleet. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that threat was 
used on many occasions. I remember one particular occasion I might 
relate. 

The Chairman. I wish you would, General. 

General Van Fleet. There was a Greek election in which the left- 
wing got a substantial vote, I would say about 14 percent of the vote, 
which is a good vote, because there are so many parties. But His 
Majesty did not wish to appoint the leader of that party as the 
Prime Minister because it was a leftist party headed by General 
Plastiris. 

Oiir ambassador there, Mr. Henry Grady, insisted that Plastiris 
be named Prime Minister and head up a new government. There 
was quite an impasse for some time. Other solutions were tried to 
form a government. I won't say tried, were proposed, before His 
Majesty saw that he would have to, in conformity with American 
wishes, name General Plastiris as Prime Minister to head up a new 
government. When he did so, the American Ambassador attended a 
big party given by Plastiris and publicly announced that now" Greece 
vrould get the money for the hydroelectric projects. 

Mr. Carpenter. What later developed in that situation that you 
recall ? 

General Van Fleet. General Plastiris' government w^as not very 
successful, was not in power long, had much opposition. The rightists 
and conservative parties would not go along on many issues. About 
that time Gen. Alexander Papagos, who was then the general in 
command of the Greek forces under me, retired. His Majesty had 
previously appointed him lo the rank of field marshal. Field Marshal 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2025 

Papagos entered politics, organized the Greek Rally Party in the 
hopes that he would get a majority of the vote, but he actually got less 
than 50 percent. AVithout a majority he would not take part in the 
government. 

At a second general election he received a majority of the vote of 
the people, which did away with all the coalition governments of the 
many past years. With a majority Papagos could name the ministers 
and be backed by Parliament and thus have a permanent government, 
one which (jreece enjoys today. 

The CiiAiRMAN. When our Government insisted upon the Commu- 
nists being taken into the Government of Greece and finally the Com- 
munists did take over, this Plastiris did take over for a short time 
and had an unsuccessful government, would you tell us what the 
Communists did? Did they make growth in the communities? 

General Van Flket. Yes, Mr. Chairman. During the short while 
that General Plastiris headed up tlie Government, more of the fellow 
travelers got into office by appointment. I would not say General 
Plastiris always had knowledge that they were Communists or fellow 
travelers. General Plastiris was an ignorant person and was easily 
influenced. Pfe was under the control of the leftists. He would ap- 
point a friend of a friend who would be recommended. In that way 
the Communists were gradually getting back into power. There was a 
Communist mayor appointed in a little town which is the capital of 
a province in northwest Greece near the Albanian border Those 
trends were quite widespread and became very alarming to the con- 
servative element of the Govei'nment and to the Greek Army itself. 
They were shocked to see these people gradually getting back into 
power. Based upon such evidence, I sent a message to Washington ad- 
vising them of the conditions. I believe it was about the last message 
I sent from Athens before I came home in July 1950. 

The Chairman. Did it change our policy ? 

General Van Fleet. Well, I think it did because it was shortly after 
that that the Plastiris government fell and Marshal Papagos became 
the prime minister. 

I will not say my message did it, Mr. Chairman. I think the Greek 
Army and conservative elements were aroused to the danger and took 
action. 

Senator Johnston. You were not in Greece any time Peurifoy was 
there ? 

General Van Fleet. Xo, sir. He followed. 

Mr. Carpenter. When you returned from Greece, General, what 
was your assignment ? 

General Van Fleet. I was placed in command of the Second Army 
in the continental United States. Headquarters were at Fort Meade. 

Mr. Carpenter. What were your views on the military situation at 
the Pentagon meeting in early December 1950 ? 

General Van Fleet. I attended an Army commanders' conference 
in the Pentagon about December 1 to 3 of 1950. It Avas a regularly 
scheduled Army commanders' conference such as were held a few 
years back. Of course, the Korean war was discussed very fully at 
that conference. The Chinese Reds had entered the war in November ; 
that is, just a few weeks prior. The American Army was withdrawing 
from North Korea. The situation looked very bad. That was the 
subject of much discussion at that Army commanders' conference. 



2026 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION" IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. What were the views expressed there ? 

General Van" Fleet. The need of more personnel, personnel ques- 
tions, how serious they were, how serious the shortage of equipment 
was, the condition of some of our units in Korea which had been 
overrun. 

It was indeed quite a gloomy picture that was painted of our position 
in Korea. 

Mr. Carpenter. Who painted gloomy pictures, General ? 

General Van Fleeet. It was expressed by many people. I think 
the one I remember most was Greneral Haislip. I remember speaking 
out that I thought the picture was not so bad, that there were great 
opportunities there. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you alone in those views? 

General Van Fleet, No. I think there were several other generals 
present who agreed with me. However, I believe we were in the 
minority. I was reminded that the 2d Infantry Division had lost all 
its equipment in the action at Kunari Pass. Only about half of the 
personnel had managed to get back. Tlie division therefore would 
be out of action for an extended period of time, if ever it could be 
put back into fighting condition. 

I said, I believe they will bounce back rapidly. Their morale will 
remain high if we can get them the equipment. They will be ready to 
fight in short order. 

The Chairman. Wasn't this conference held shortly after the Pres- 
ident of the United States announced that General MacArthur would 
be authorized to use the atomic bomb wherever needed ? 

General Van Fleet. I do not recall, sir. I do not remember that 
incident. 

Mr. Carpenter. When were you first placed on a standby basis for 
Korea ? 

General Van Fleet. Early January 1951. 

Mr. Carpenter. Who placed you on that standby basis ? 

General Van Fleet. The Chief of Staff, Gen. J. Lawton Collins, 
told me in tlie event of replacement for General Ridgway I would 
be next and that I must keep it quiet and only tliree other people 
would know about it. 

Mr. Carpenter. When did he tell you this, on what occasion, Gen- 
eral? 

General Van Fleet. It was at the funeral of Gen. Walton H. 
Walker at Arlington. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you remember the exact date ? 

General Van Fleet. I think it was Januar}' 3. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you briefed during the period you were on 
a standby basis? 

General Van Fleet. No, I did not get any special briefings. I 
followed the war closer than ever, of course, to keep posted. 

Mr. Carpenter. You say you were on a 10-day leave in Florida 
when on April 11, 1951, General Collins phoned and ordered you to 
Korea. T^'Tien did that leave start? 

General Van Fleet. I went on a 10-day leave from Fort Meade on 
April 8 to my place in Florida. It was the night of April 10-11 that 
I received a telephone call from General Collins reminding me of 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2027 

the conversation he had had with me in early January and that I 
would be going at once and to hurry back to "Washington. AVe did 
not mention Korea or the assignment to the Eighth Army. It merely 
referred to the prior conversation in January. 

Mr. Carpenter. Had you any inkling of the impending relief of 
General MacArthur? 

General Van Fleet. That had been discussed in the newspapers 
for the past 2 or 3 days ; that is, prior to April 10. So as I remember, 
that had already occurred. 

The Chairman. All you knew was what you had read in the news- 
papers, the rumors? 

General Van Fleet. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you expect that General MacArthur's relief 
would lead to your sudden departure to Korea ? 

General Van Fleet. No. It did not occur to me because I was to 
be General Ridgway's replacement, and I thought someone else would 
replace General MacArthur rather than General Ridgway. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was your view concerning the MacArthur 
proposals in 1950? 

General Van Fleet. Those proposals I remember were to use the 
atomic weapons and bomb enemy targets in north China and Man- 
churia. 

Mr. Carpenter. I do not believe it was to use the atomic bomb. 
It was hot pursuit, to bomb the enemy sanctuaries in Manchuria and 
to drive through to the Yalu River ? 

General Van Fleet. Of course, I was very much in accord with 
such views. 

Mr. Carpenter. How about his subsequent views ? 

General Van Fleet. I have always subscribed to such aciidii then 
and since. 

The Chairman. And now. General? 

General Van Fleet. And now ; yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did vou ever discuss these proposals with any of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff'? 

General Van Fleet. I am sure I have. We had many visitors from 
Washington to Korea, and the discussions would be rather general 
and complete. I am sure that question came up. I am sure my views 
were still in line. I cannot recall any specific conversation with the 
Army Chief of Staff — Army, Navy, or Air Force — on that subject. 

The Chairman. The high officials you did visit with, what were 
their views? You told them your views; what were their views? 

(leneral Van Fleet. I am unable to say, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. You do not recall ? 

General Van Fleet. No, sir; I do not. I do remember General 
Clark's views were very much for it, but I do not have any recollec- 
tion of specific views on that subject by the members of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff who came to Korea. 

I would believe they would all be for it. 

The Chairman. Did the policy change? Were j^ou allowed the 
right of hot pursuit? Were you allowed to bomb sanctuaries? Did 
our Government's policy change ? 

General Van Fleet. At times we were in hot pursuit and other times 
we were stopped. 



2028 ESfTERLOCKmG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chairman. Were your planes given the right of hot pursuit to 
cross the Yalu sanctuaries ? 

General Van Fleet. No, never. 

The Chairman. Then the basic policy did not change ? 

General Van Fleet. I do not think it did. As far as crossing the 
Yalu, never was it granted. It was never done. 

The Chairman. General, have you ever heard of a war in all of 
history, especially American history, where the fighting was to be 
confined to the territory of our friends ? 

General Van Fleet. No ; it is most unusual. 

]Mr. Carpenter. Prior to your assignment in April 1951, General, 
had you ever been in the Far East ? 

General Van Fleet. No, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was Korea the wrong war in the wrong place and 
at the wrong time ? 

General Van Fleet. Well, certainly not. I have often made a state- 
ment that it was the right w^ar at tlie right place and the right time 
against the right enemy and with the right allies, thinking of the 
Koreans as a very worthy, friendly ally in whose country to fight. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, would you say that General Bradley's 
judgment was based on the theory of the paramount importance of 
Western Europe, particularly the Ruhr ? 

(xeneral Van Fleet. I agree with that statement. 

Mr. Carpenti-:r, Can you comment on that a little ? 

General Van Fleet. I believe General Bradley and General Collins, 
especially those two of the Joint Chiefs, were oriented entirely to 
Western Europe and that they could not see a deployment of American 
strength in the far Pacific. They, I am sure, helped in the estimate 
of the situation that Russia would strike in Europe and not in Asia. 
That estimate of enemy's intentions, in my opinion, was one of the 
greatest errors we have ever made in sizing up our enemy's intentions. 

The Chairman. What would happen to a field commander who 
made that kind of a mistake? 

General Van Fleet. He would be relieved, of course. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, would bombing the supply lines of Man- 
churia have contributed to victory ? 

General Van Fleet. Certainly. 

Mr. Carpenter. Could we have won the war in Korea ? 

General Van Fleet. Certainly. Let me say that everybody in 
the Eighth Army, to include our United Nations allies and the 
Koreans, believed in victory and believed they could achieve victory. 
I still believe that we could have achieved victory in Korea. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, have you ever wondered why w^e adopted 
what you describe as a weak policy, one that gave the enemy the 
initiative and produced the present chaos ? 

General Van Fleet. Why we adopted that policy ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. 

General Van Fleet. I have always blamed that on the United 
Nations. I have no real evidence to point to, but the war in Korea 
■was a United Nations action. By resolution they named the United 
States as the executive agent to prosecute the war. W^e named the 
commander. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2029 

We set up in Washington a little group of nations or representa- 
tives of the nations who had forces in Korea. They were informed 
from time to time of the progress of the war. Tliere had to be some 
machinery for advising our friendly allies what their forces were 
doing in Korea. They were briefed one or two or more times a week 
here in Washington. 

I believe on major issues they would be consulted perhaps in advance. 
Especially would Great Britain be consulted. They may have helped 
us in some of our decisions. They may have guided us, influenced 
us to go easy with a weaker policy, to stop at the 38th, or to work for 
an armistice. I surmise that. I do not have the evidence that would 
make it conclusive. 

JNIr. Carpenter. General, you state that the aim of the Communists 
in Asia clearly is to bring all Asia into the Communist fold as part 
of a grand design for a Communist w^orld. This is their announced 
objective, is it not ? 

General Van Fleet. That is their announced objective, and their 
deeds are in line with it. 

Senator Johnston. Summing up your statement, I believe you 
would say this was a war fought by the military but guided by the 
State Department; is that right? 

General Van Fleet. That is correct. The policy was set by the 
State Department. I would assume they would consult certain allies, 
that the military would be consulted. But I believe our military was 
very much oriented to Europe. They went along very readily with 
a weak policy. 

Senator Johnston, I agree with you thoroughly, and I think I 
expressed my feelings in the matter in October 1950, in Los Angeles 
in a speech that I made there. I came out with it in a vigorous speech. 

The Chairman. General, let me ask at this point : Would you want 
to fight another war with American boys under those conditions ? 

General Van Fleet. Of course, I have seen so much destruction and 
horror of war, Mr. Chairman, that I think to fight in any war is a 
terrible thought. But under justified reasons and to preserve our 
freedom, I believe I would be ready to go to war again and that in 
any future war, with the same conditions, we would have diiierent 
decisions. So my answer would be "Yes" ; we would never do it again 
like we did in Korea. 

The Chairman. Thank you, General. 

General Van Fleet. I might say just a word more, using the map, 
about this being the right war and the right place. 

The Chairman. You may go to the map, and there is a microphone, 
General, that you may speak into. 

General Van Fleet. On the map you have Red China and Korea. 
For the lied Chinese to maintain an effort in Korea they had a single 
rail line along the coast through North China, running up into Man- 
churia, and then south across the border; at which time they came 
under the fire of our Air Force for 200 miles thereafter south to the 
battle lines, across the middle of the peninsula. That is a long supply 
line, a very difficult supply line. And for the Chinese to assemble 
and to move and support in action an army of nearly a million men 
halfway down this peninsula, the last 200 miles under attack, is a 
tremendous undertaking; which places them at a great disadvantage. 



2030 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

In addition, supplies from Russia, -which were considerable, had to 
come a long distance across Siberia, by rail line, into Vladivostok and 
then along a much longer rail line along the Korean coast, which 
was under the constant fire of our Navy and air. They were paying 
a very heavy price to maintain a war at a point of great disadvantage 
to them. 

The reverse of that is true of the American forces. We were sup- 
plied by water, and some air, through Japan, to Korea. We had 
command of the water and the air. We had, and still have, un- 
excelled bases in Japan and Korea for redeployment. And to main- 
tain an expeditionary^ force overseas and sustain it in battle, you 
must have large bases. 

There are only tAvo places in the world where such conditions exist 
outside of the United States. One is England and the other is Japan. 
We had a base here, Japan, fully at our disposal, to do as we pleased 
about it ; unexcelled harbors and repair facilities and fields. 

We had tlie tremendous skill of the Japanese industrial nation, em- 
ployed as civilians, to help us prosecute that war. It could not pos- 
sibly be made or altered any better. We had the flank protected by 
our Navy, and all this base here to destroy a Red Chinese Army far 
from home, well out on the limb, and in great difficulty all the time — 
a beautiful opportunity for victory. 

Look at other places around the world anywhere ; you cannot find 
it any better. 

That is why I say this was the right place and at the right time, with 
the wonderful nation of the Koreans, the right ally. And against 
this new enemy, Red China, far from home. 

The Chairman. General, have you ever wondered why the experts, 
who must have known what you pointed out, were so blind ? 

General Van Fleet. I can't figure that out, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Johnston. Why did we have a divided peace, under those 
circumstances ? 

General Van Fleet. I should conclude this by saying that we left 
an armistice line 1 day's march from the capital city of Seoul, gen- 
erally through there, but an impossible line from a military point of 
view or from a political point of view. Everyone in the city of Seoul 
lives in fear of the enemy 1 day's march away. How can you expect 
any private capital to invest and rehabilitate that city ? 

In addition, economically it is the wrong line. Here is South Korea 
with 21 million people, an agricultural country. North Korea, origi- 
nally with 8 million, is the industrial part of the nation. It has min- 
erals, hydroelectric power, coal. 

Of course, of the original 8 million in North Korea, about 4 mil- 
lion are now refugees in South Korea; among them large numbers 
of Christians, whom our missionaries converted during the past 60 
years, principally in the town of Pinyang. It is these Christians 
from the north more than any other element of the Korean race who 
are the strong advocates of President Syngman Rhee's going north, to 
liberate their homes and such relatives as may be left. 

I have often advised our high command that, if we must confine 
the war to Korea south of the Yalu, to at least stop it at the nar- 
row waist, which would be a shorter line, easier to defend, could be 
defended by the Koreans themselves, and would give them much needed 
territory and many cultural centers, which play a very big part in the 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2031 

history of the culture of that race, such as the ancient capital of 
Kaesonof, not far from Seouh 

It was this narrow line I advocatetl that we seize, by many, many 
diti'orent plans for operations which were submitted throughout the 
time I was in Korea; all of which were, of course, turned down. 

l^lv. Cakpkxti.k. General Van Fleet, you say that native troops are 
cheaper and they make it diilicult for the Conununists to charge im- 
perialism. Were there reasons for limiting the ROK training 
program ? 

General Van Fleet. I do not believe there was any political reason 
for limiting the siz3 of the Korean forces. I think it was mostly 
economic and perhaps some person's military views that they were not 
good soldiers. 

JMr. Gakpexter. A^liat is your opinion as to their ability as soldiers? 

General Van Fleet. They are among our finest soldiers in the 
world. 

The Chairman. Then we made another mistake on that calculation, 
did we not, General ? 

General Van Fleet. I would say we did, for a long while after I 
arrived there. 

I judge that this way: In the early days of the war, the Korean 
Army, as such, was quickly overrun. They had a force of only 96,000 
at the time of the attack. During the days of the Pusan perimeter, 
under General Walker, the Koreans were impressed into the army 
from fields, from cities, ^iven a few hours of instruction on how to load 
and shoot a gun, and found themselves in the front line. So they 
gave all they could in the way of spirit and bravery, but they were not 
a trained and equipped army as we know one. And it was not until 
months later that the time and circumstances permitted training of 
Koreans. 

Shortly after I arrived in April, 1951, I observed that the Korean 
was a very hardy individual, was used to austere existence, could 
endure hardships, suffering; that he was intelligent, he learned fast, 
was very obedient, and that he respected age and orders of his elders, 
would do exactly as told, and go forward on orders and die, if 
necessary. 

So, having those wonderful qualifications, I knew we could make 
good soldiers of them if only we gave them equipment, weapons, and 
training. 

I advocated a large program of training and activation of addi- 
tional divisions from almost the time I arrived. 

Mr. Carpex^ter. Were there limitations on the number of EOK 
troops you could train. General ? 

General Van Fleet. Yes. There was a ceiling on the number. That 
ceiling was controlled partly by money, partly by a belief that it would 
be enough to take care of the situation the high command had in mind. 
But within that ceiling we had great numbers of ineffectives. We 
had 50,000 or more in the hospitals, who were counted against the 
ceiling strength of the army. I took every means possible to get them 
discharged so as to replace them with able-bodied soldiers. 

There is no Veterans' Administration in Korea; there is no one 
to take care of discharged veterans, and it was a very difficult process. 



2032 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

We finally adopted a system, wliich was proposed by President 
Rliee, that the men in the training camps would be called civilians; 
which I accepted. We did not swear them in until they were trained. 
We have a similar category in this country, like CMTC, ROTC, even 
a CCC. So I called them civilians and that gave me quite a few 
more soldiers for the fighting units. 

Officially that was not supported, but Washington let me get by 
with it. In fact, Mrs. Rosenberg,^ when she came over was smiling 
about it and thought it a pretty smart system. 

That limitation was gradually lifted so that the ceiling strength 
of the Korean Army gradually crept up to take care of each specific 
case and I could get another few soldiers added to the army. 

I advocated, of course, more divisions; but additional divisions were 
not authorized until December 1 of 1952. 

Mr. Carpenter. You certainly needed additional manpower, did 
you not, General? 

General Van Fleet. We felt that the Korean could do about as 
much as an American boy and would replace Americans if we had 
enough of them. 

The Chairman. General, did you ever stop to wonder why the most 
powerful, the richest Nation in the world, engaged in a war that 
we were supposed to win, would put a limitation ceiling upon the 
troops of a country that our boys were defending, fighting for? 

General Van Fleet. It seemed absurd since a war that they were 
willing to fight — as a matter of fact. President Rhee, bless him, would 
often inspect with me new arrivals of American units, and with tears 
in his eyes would say, "General, I don't like to see your little American 
boys come over here so far from home and fight in this country for us ; 
we have lots of manpower; we will do the fighting. Just give us the 
weapons and the training." 

Repeatedly he would ask me to present that to my Government as a 
plea to them. 

The Chairman. And you did? 

General Van Fleet.; I did. 

The Chairman. What was your answer ; a limitation ? 

General Van Fleet. Always a limitation^ 

The Chairman. Proceed, JVIr. Carpenter. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, you frequently state that the cease-fire in 
Korea freed Communist power for further marauding. Is it not 
likewise true that the neutralization of Formosa the second day of the 
Korean war freed the Chinese Communists for action in Korea ? 

General Van Fleet. Yes, it would certainly help them; give them 
a feeling of security that they could go north free from a threat in 
the south. 

JMr. Carpenter. Does that make sense, from a military point of 
view ? 

General Van Fleet. No. 

That is the unfortunate part about the whole Far East situation. 
There are so many fronts, to win on any one you need to put pressure 
on all. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you believe that the Chinese Communists would 
have crossed the Yalu without assurance that our military action would 
be limited? 



' jNIrs. Anna M. Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1951-53. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2033 

General Van Fleet. No; he would not have entered Korea if he did 
not feel safe from attack in north China and Manchuria. 

Ml'. Caupexter. He felt pretty secure, did he not? 

General Vax Fleet. I am sure he must have, or he would have been 
foolish to have entered Korea. 

Mr. Cakpenteu. Have you ever speculated as to the source of this 
assurance ? 

General Van Fleet. I have no evidence on where he would be as- 
sured. 

The Ciiairiman. General, we are looking for the "theys." 

General Van Fleet. I merely have a guess that he would get it 
througli some embassy source in Pei])ing. 

Mr. Carpenter. At Wake Island, General MacArthur is reported 
to have said he doubted that Red China Avould enter the war in view 
of our overwhelming sea and airpower and atomic potential. If any 
participant in that conference had already committed this country to 
limit our retaliation, not to employ these normal military measures, 
should our military commander not have been informed? 

General Van Fleet. I think he should have been informed ; yes, if 
there were such a promise to Red China. 

The Chairman. And you think there was such a promise ; or they 
would not have come in ? 

General Van Fleet. My own conviction is that there must have 
been information to the enemy that we would not attack his home 
bases. 

Mr. Carpenter. You may recall that subsequently General Mac- 
Arthur was blamed for miscalcuhiting Chinese intentions, that is, the 
Chinese Reds. Actually, his judgment was based on the normal mili- 
tary assumption that he would be allowed to use all of his weapons, 
was it not ? 

General Van Fleet. I agree. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to intro- 
duce as an exhibit. General MacArthur's letter to Senator Byrd on 
the 19th of April 1953. I would like to enter it into the record and 
have it made a part of the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 492'' and ap- 
pears below :) 

Exhibit No. 492 

General MacArthur's Letter 

Aprh. 19, 1953. 

Dear Senator Byrd: Thank you for your note of the 13th inquiring as to 
my views with reference to certain testimony hefore the Senate subcommittee 
investigating the shortage of ammunition in Korea. For the salve of historical 
accuracy, I am very glad to give you my comments on the points you have 
raised. 

I was never consulted directly or indirectly with reference to the supply 
program under di.scussion. Its scope and volume, its appropriations and pro- 
duction schedules were prepared solely by Washington authorities, the function 
of my command being limited entirely to routine reporting of my needs and 
necessities. Lender such circumstances, the labored effort made by the former 
Secretary of the Army to create without the slightest foundation of i-ealism 
some sort of relationship between me and the ammunition shortage in Korea 
during the last 2 years since I left there, is completely fantastic. 

Nor would it be any more logical to attribute the failure to set up an adequate 
program for United States security to optimistic views, if and wherever hold, 
of an early end to the Korean war during the early mojiths of the conflict. 



2034 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

As a matter of fact, no such optimism existed, either at the front or elsewhere, 
during those early months when our beleaguered and heavily outnumbered 
forces, with their backs to the sea, clung desperately to the Pusan beachhead 
perimeter. The only predictions from Washington at that time warned of im- 
pending military disaster. Then, too, our ammunition was critically short. As 
I recall, General Walker [then commander of the Eighth Army] at one stage 
was down to five rounds per gun. His heroically successful efforts under 
unparalleled shortages of all sorts constituted an amazing military exploit. 

Disaster was avoided by the Inchon operation — an enveloping movement de- 
signed to destroy the enemy's supply network — which was only grudgingly 
approved on my desperate Insistence over the most serious professional doubts 
from higher authority. The North Korean Army, with its supplies cut off, 
disintegrated and was practically destroyed, and by the latter part of October 
the capital of Pyongyang was captured. These events completely transformed 
the situation fi'om pessimism to optimism. 

This was the golden moment to translate military victory to a politically 
advantageous peace. Success in war involves political as well as military 
considerations. For the sacrifice leading to a military victory would be pointless 
if not translated promptly to the political advantage of peace. But what hap- 
pened was just to the contrary. The inertia of our diplomacy failed utterly 
to utilize the victory of Inchon and subsequent destruction of the North Korean 
armies as the basis for swift and d.vnamic political action to restore peace and 
unity to Korea. This was one of the great contributing causes to the subsequent 
new war into which we were later plunged by Red China. At this time a 
new war with this much more formidable foe was not foreseen. Neither the 
State Department through its diplomatic listening posts abroad, nor the Central 
Intelligence Agency to whom a field commander must look for guidance as to 
a nation's intention to move from peace to war, found any evidence of intent 
by the Peiping Government to intervene with major forces until the moment they 
actually struck. 

My own military estimate was that our largely unopposed air forces, with 
their atomic potential, capable of destroying at will bases of attack and lines 
of supply north as well as south of the Yalu River, no Chinese military com- 
mander would dare hazard the commitment of large forces upon the Korean 
Peninsula. The risk of their utter destruction through lack of suppl.v would be 
too great. But by one process or another it was conjectured by, or conveyed to, 
the Red Chinese that even though they entered the fray in large force it would 
be under the sanctuary of being relieved from any destructive action of our 
military forces within their own areas. Such a limitation upon the utilization 
of available military force to repel an enemy attack has no precedent either in 
our own history or, so far as I know, in the history of the world. 

The results were disastrous beyond imagination and are still incalculable. 
When the Chinese Communists actually struck without warning, and my order to 
destroy the bridges at their points of enti\v over the Talu into Korea was imme- 
diately countermanded from Washington, I realized for the first time the extra- 
ordinary decision which had been made to deny me the use of my full military 
power to safeguard the lives of my soldiers and insure the safet.v of the Army. 
To me it clearly foreshadowed the tragic situation which has since developed and 
left me with a sense of shock I had never before experienced in a long life crammed 
with explosive reactions and momentous hazards. 

Hopi!ig this basic decision might still be changed, I made recommendations in- 
cluding, among others, air bombardment of military installations north of the 
Yalu which were being actively employed against us, naval blockade of tlie coast 
of China to cut off enemy supplies, and the utilization of Nationalist China troops 
available on Formosa. These recommendations were actually approved by the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 12, 1951, but somewhere between the ofiices of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the President, those recom- 
mendations were pigeonholed, and we took the course leading to the present stale- 
mate of positional warfare, by all odds the most costly and least productive 
method of waging war. 

The overriding deficiency incident to our conduct of the war in Korea was not 
in the shortage of ammunition or other materiel, but in the lack of the will for 
victory, which has profoundly infinenced both our strategic concepts in the field 
and our supporting action at home. This lack undoubtedly must boar responsi- 
bility for the extraordinary failure to anticipate and provide the means by which 
victory might have been made possible. This led us into the fatal error of be- 
coniiug bogged down in positional warfare on terrain which with the abandonment 
of a war of maneuver necossitated a tremendously increased expenditure of am- 
munition to protect our lines from enemy infiltration or collapse. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION" IN GOVERNMENT 2035 

Uncleriying the whole problem of ammunition and snpply has always been the 
Indoterniinate question as to whether or not the Soviet contemplates world mili- 
tary conquest. If it does, the time and place will be at its initiative and could 
not fail to be influenced by the fact that in the atomic area the lead of the United 
States is being diminisiied with the passage of time. So, likewise, is the great 
industrial potential of the United States as compared with the Communist world. 
In short, it has always been my own belief that any action we might take to resolve 
the Far Eastern problem now would not in itself be a controlling factor in the 
precipitation of a world conflict. 

It is quite probable that the Soviet masses are just as eager for peace as are our 
own people. They probably suffer the delusion that there are aggressive inten- 
tions against them on the part of the capitalistic world and that they would 
■welcome an imaginative approach which would allay this false impression. The 
Soviet is not blind to the dangers which actually confront it in the Far East in the 
present situation. 

We still possess the potential to destroy Red China's flimsy industrial base and 
sever her tenuous supply lines from the Soviet. This would deny her the resource 
to suppcut modern war and sustain large military forces in the field. This in turn 
would greatly weaken the Communist Government of China and threaten the 
Soviet's present hold on Asia. A warning of action of this sort provides the lever- 
age to induce the Soviet to bring the Korean struggle to an end without further 
bloodshed. It would dread risking the eventuality of a Red China debacle, and 
such a hazard might well settle the Korean war and all other pending global issues 
on equitable terms just as soon as it realizes we have the will and the means to 
bring them to a prompt and definite determination. Such an end would justify 
the sacrifice of our countrymen we have asked to die in that far-off land, would 
rejoice the Korean people whose nation we are pledged to redeem, would validate 
the principle of collective security upon which rests our present foreign policy, 
and would, insure us the respect and faith of the peoples of Asia now and for all 
time. 

Again, Senator, let me thank you for the sense of fair play and the courtesy 
which have prompted you to write me as you have. I appreciate such action more 
than I can say. 

With best wishes and warm regai'ds. 
Most faithfully, 

Douglas MacAbthub. 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time I would like to read about two para- 
graphs. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Mr. Carpenter. General Mac Arthur wrote : 

My own militai-y estimate was tliat, with our largely unopposed air forces, 
with their atomic potential, capable of destroying at will bases of attack and 
lines of supply north as well as south of the Yalu River, no Chinese military 
commander would dare hazard the commitment of large forces upon the 
Korean Peninsula. The risk of their utter destruction through lack of supply 
would be too great. 

But by one process or another it was conjectured by, or conveyed to, the Red 
Chinese that even though they entered the fray in large force it would be 
under the sanctuary of being relieved from any destructive action of our 
military forces within their own areas. Such a limitation upon the utiliza- 
tion of available military force to repel an enemy attack has no precedent 
either in our own history or, so far as I know, in the history of the world. 

The results were disastrous beyond imagination and are still incalculable. 
When the Chinese Communists actually struck without warning, and my order 
to destroy the bridges at their points of entry over the Yalu into Korea was 
immediately countermanded from Washington, I realized for the first time 
the extraordinary decision which had been made to deny me the use of my full 
military power to safeguard the lives of my soldiers and insure the safety of the 
Army. 

To me it clearly foreshadowed the tragic situation which has since developed 
and left me with a sense of shock I had never before experienced in a long 
life crammed with explosive reactions and momentous hazards. 

That letter is signed by Douglas MacArthur. 

Mr. C.\nPF.NTF.R. General Van Fleet, in Reader's Digest, February 
1954, you state : 



2036 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

When the Korean war began, Chiang offered us his army. Had we accepted, 
we might not have needed to bring a single American ground division from the 

States. 

Why did we not accept? 

General Van Fleet. I never have understood why we did not use 
Chiang Kai-shek's divisions. Looking on it today, it was a terrible 
mistake, because it would have given them a wonderful training, a 
battle test, to develop Chiang's army and to know which of his generals 
are good in combat and what the Nationalist troops can really do. 
Even today we do not know that answer. 

Mr. Carpenter. You say that later you wanted to use Chiang's 
troops, three divisions at a time, to rotate and get battle experience. 
You say you believed many more Chinese Communist troops would 
have come over to our side since no loss of face would have been in- 
volved if they joined other Chinese. This is logical. 

Why did not the high policy experts comprehend it ? 

General Van Fleet. I am unable to answer the question. 

Mr. Carpenter. You have given that some thouglit, have you, Gen- 
eral ? 

General Van Fleet. Yes, sir. 

I was influenced in my views largely by conferences I had with 
Chinese officials in Korea, especially their Ambassador from Formosa, 
who often stated to me their wish to bring Chinese divisions there and 
face Chinese Communists that speak in the same language ; they would 
get wholesale desertions by the simple expedient of offering them 
better food and still a military home. 

Mr, Carpenter. You state that you still believe that Chiang, if his 
landing were facilitated, would attract many to switch sides, and that 
a change in China is fundamental to peace and security in the Far East. 

Again, why did we not do it? 

General Van Fleet. I am unable to answer the question. 

The Chairman. General, right there at that point, let me ask: 
There appears in our press daily the situation in Quemoy. Is Quemoy 
important to the United States ? 

General Van Fleet. Senator, I would say it is vitally important. 
I visited Quemoy during my recent visit to the Far East, inspected the 
Chinese positions along the beach facing the mainland. I think it is 
important because a defeat there would mean a further retreat of 
American policy and prestige. I do not believe we can afford to have 
any further loss of prestige in the Pacific. 

The Chairman. Are we replacing the ammunition that is being 
expended there by the Nationalists? 

General Van Fleet. I am sure we are. 

The Chairman. Do you think we give the Nationalists as much aid 
as the Communists give the Reds? 

General Van Fleet. No ; I do not. AVe may in dollars, but not in 
kind. 

The Chairman. "Which is the more important? 

General Van Fleet. To actually receive the article that you use and 
the food you eat is more important. 

The Chairman. The newspapers recently said. General, that Ko- 
reans had, a week or two ago, only about a 2-day supply of ammu- 
nition. Do you know whether there is any basis of fact in that 
statement ? 

General Van Fleet. These are the Koreans? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2037 

The CiTATRMAisr. Yes. 

General Van Fleet. I am sure there are ample supplies in the Far 
East and also in Korea. But, of course, they are in American hands, 
and perliai)S the 2 days that you speak of represents the amount in 
Korean possession. 

The Chairman. General, let me ask you, as a military man, a ques- 
tion, because I am not a military man. 

Sujipose that story is true, that as far as the South Koreans are con- 
cerned, they only have 2 days' ammunition, but as far as the Ameri- 
cans are concerned, there is ample amnumition. Now let us assume 
the Communists decide to strike; what would happen to the American 
boys? Could they jret the supplies and ammunition to the South 
Koreans and deploy it in time to be effective to save American boys' 
lives? 

General Van Fleet. The supply services would operate, I am sure, 
effectively so as to replenish the supplies. 

The Chairman. In 2 days' time ? 

General Van Fleet. As lone; as we are in command and have suffi- 
cient troops there, especially service troops, to supply them. 

The Chairman. And you assume we have sufficient troops there to 
do this job? 

General Van Fleet. I mu^t assume we have. I do not believe we 
would create such a critical situation. 

However, that situation you speak of would create quite a fear in 
the minds of the Korean troops and their fear would be quite justified. 
It hurts their morale. 

The Chairman. If that be true. General, what could be the purpose 
of our command withholding the necessai'y supplies from South Ko- 
reans to defend that wliich our boys fought and died for only a few 
months ago ; if that be true ? I do not know that it is. 

General Van Fleet. That raises quite an issue. Senator, in that it 
proves that we are not willing to trust a worthy ally, or that we do 
not trust him. I think that is a mistake. We should have complete 
confidence. "We sliould treat all our allies as partners and equals, and 
when we do not, we do not have the willing cooperation in return. 

The Chairman. General, this committee is not a military com- 
mittee, as I said, or a foreign relations committee, but we are interested 
in that ''they" that caused this war to be limited, caused this war to 
be lost. ''They" would not let the fundamental principles of mili- 
tary policy be adhered to. "They" would not permit the use of the 
Nationalist Chinese troops or Korean troops, who could have fought 
just as well as American boys, as you say. 

It is the same situation today that we are interested in. They are 
still controlling the 2 days' supply of ammunition in the hands of the 
South Koreans. And for what purpose? 

Go ahead, Mr. Carpenter. 

Mr. Carpenter. General Van Fleet, since your return to the United 
States, do you get the impression that the American people want 
peace at any price? 

General Van Fleet. No, they do not. 

]\rr. Carpenter. In your recent article in U. S. News & World Re- 
port, written in tlie fall of 1953 and released for publication Septem- 
ber 17, 1054, you make a series of statements, on which the following 
questions are based. 



2038 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

You point out that the small nations in Asia will be forced to make 
their peace with China, that fifth columns will flourish, and that 
neutralist countries like India will not be able to afford to remain 
neutral, that once the raw materials and manpower of this vast region 
come under the dominance of the Communists our position will be 
frightful indeed. All this is logical and clear. 

Why, then, have we followed and do we continue to follow a policy 
leading to these results? 

General Van Fleet. Do you want me to try to answer that? 

Mr. Carpenter. Just your impression. 

General Van Fleet. Of course, in southeast Asia the policy there 
has been pretty much set by Great Britain and France. We were 
helping France, which, in turn, was handling the Indochina war. 

I think it is traditional with the United States not to interfere with 
decisions which belong to a sovereim nation. 

The Chairman. But we did in Greece, did we not. General? We 
did influence it. 

General Van Fleet. We had endeavored to influence it through 
diplomatic channels, yes; sometimes by tlie dollar. 

My formula for making a country feel safe and resist Communist 
aggression is to strengthen it in all fields, political, economic, military; 
of which the military field very often is the dominant factor. When 
you build a native army tlie people feel a strength ; they can see the 
soldiers and feel strong and become confident that they are safe. 

That, in turn, will make the leaders bold, and they will say "No" 
to all kinds of pressures, Communist pressures, or cold pressures, 
propaganda, the agents. They will become so bold as to arrest these 
agents; they will outlaw the Communist Party. They will stamp 
out the beginning of a Communist takeover. 

When you do that in the early stages in any country, do it in time, 
you have a strong, stout-hearted nation who loves its freedom and is 
willing to die for it. When a people do not feel they can win, then 
they must accommodate themselves to the enemy position, and they 
go over to the enemy side. 

You must remember that they are living with that clanger close 
to them, around them all the time. It is so much easier, under those 
conditions, to accommodate yourself to the winning side. 

We have not done this in southeast Asia in sufficient time or quan- 
tity to make those countries feel that they are going to win. To size 
the situation up today, communism is going to win. 

Senator Johnston. Are we not also holding back our friendly 
nations in Europe? What about Western Germany? What about 
her army? I think you could give her a little more rights and give 
her an army at the present time. 

General Van Fleet. Senator Johnston, the best allies we have in 
the world are those who have outlawed the Communist Party. You 
can name them: Greece, Turkey, Spain, Iran, Pakistan, the Philip- 
pines, Korea, Formosa. Some of our weakest allies are those who 
encourage communism. 

I use the word "encourage" in that they do not stamp it out. 

That is France, Italy, even England, Japan. 

I was disappointed in Japan to find that the Communist Party 
there has gotten control oi the labor unions. They are in the 
newspaper lield; they are in the teaching professions. And when 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2039 

I pointed that out to one of tlieir ministers, liis reply was, "Well, 
General, "we have your country to thank for that." 

That is more of our policy of including all parties in a coalition 
government. 

Now we get by with the Communist Party in this country because 
we are so strong and powerful and very much an enlightened people, 
and with superior connnunioation means, tliat the Conununists cannot 
get far. But those conditions do not exist in other countries, weak 
countries, illiterate countries, where as much as 80 percent of the people 
are illiterate. And connnunism can thrive. So, giving it a legal posi- 
tion, they are there with full rights to take advantage of the freedom 
to destroy those freedoms, and they make great headway. 

I have always said that the reason to ontlaw the Communist Party 
in the United States, as you have done, the greatest reason for that 
was to set the right example to our smaller allies; not so much that 
America needs it, but we need to show the right example to those 
weak nations whom we are trying to help. 

The first thing in helping another nation is to see that they get 
rid of tlie enemy, wliich is our No. 1 enemy in the world today: com- 
munism; not a political party, but a conspiracy. 

Mr. Carpenter. You state that United Xations pnblic opinion seems 
to feel it gains an immense superiority by letting them call the shots. 
It is they, never we, who will decide whether the next "limited" war 
will be fonght, as noAv, on the Korean, Formosa, and Indochinese 
sector, or on some more distant spot. 

You also state the United Nations apparently feels that the standard 
military maneuver of vigorously pursuing a beaten army before it can 
jeform is unworthy of our ideals. You say that you feel this policy 
"politically impossible" and wrong, and that the entire armistice epi- 
sode was a profound mistake. 

Why, then, did we pursue this policy ? 

General Van Fleet. We were misinformed and guessed wrong on 
Eussia — I say the greatest blunder that we have ever made in estimat- 
ing the intentions of an enemy. 

Mr. Carpenter. You say that the United Nations policymakers lost 
their nerve in dealing with Eed China ; that having condemned the 
small aggressor. North Korea, and also having condemned Red China 
as an aggressor, members of the United Nations now deal with China 
as a neutral ; are asked to arbitrate wdiat was once a crusade to defend 
freedom against aggression as though it was only a neighborhood 
brawl. During the course of the MacArthur hearings it became clear 
that from the legal point of view the United Nations had vested in 
the United States full charge of the Korean war. 

Who are the United Nations' policymakers ? Is it the whole United 
Nations ? Is it the United Nations' countries with forces in Korea ? 
Or is it American policymakers using these as a blind and a disguise 
for pursuing so fatal a policy? 

No official body of the United Nations, as far as the record has been 
disclosed, ever forbade bombing in Manchuria, reconnaissance, block- 
ade of the China coast, or any other measure. 

Do you know the existence of such a body ? 

General Van Fleet. I assume the United Nations' policymakers are 
the whole body, of which the Comnmnist bloc are members. 



2040 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to intro- 
duce as an exhibit a summaiy of the information of this subject 
contained in a book, In the Cause of Peace, by Trygve Lie, former 
United Nations Secretary-General, and I would like to introduce it 
into the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 493" and 
appears below.) 

Exhibit No. 493 

Lie, Trygve. In the Cause of Peace. Macmillan, 1954 

The cominaud situation is described in some detail on pages 333-335, 336-340, 
343-346. On pages 333-334, Mr. Lie mentions a draft resolution circulated 
July 3, 1950, to the United States, British, and French delegations and to the 
then president of the Security Council, Arne Sunde, of Norway. While request- 
ing the United States to assume direction of the armed forces, it would have 
estal)lished a committee on coordination of assistance for Korea (Australia, 
France, India, New Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom, and United States), 
possil)ly others members who furni.shed assistance. Mr. Lie says the United 
States mission and the Pentagon opposed this committee on coordination and 
the resolution adopted placed full power in the United States alone. In succeed- 
ing pages Mr. Lie makes it clear that the unified command was the United States — 
and he deplores its solo role. 

On page 343, Mr. Lie states in one paragraph that no military secrets came 
to the U. N. Department of Security Council Affairs. In the next paragraph he 
publishes an intelligence estimate of August 29, 1950, sent in from Korea by the 
U. N. representative. 

Mr. Carpenter. I would like to make a comment on it : 

If Mr. Lie's version is correct, full authority to act in Korea rested 
with United States officials, and any restraints imposed by allied gov- 
ernments were accepted voluntarily. 

I would also like to enter into the record and have made a part of the 
record at this time some items from volume 5 of the MacArthur 
hearings. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 494" and ap- 
pears below.) 

Exhibit No. 494 

Military Situation in the Far East : Hearings before the Committee on Armed 
Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty- 
second Congress, First Session, to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situa- 
tion in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of Greneral of the 
Army Douglas MacArthur from his Assignments in that Area, Part 5 — Appendix 
and Index : * 

Page 33S2: 

"The Aide-memoii-e of the Chinese Nationalist Government offering Chinese 
troops was addressed to the United States Oovernment. The offer was considered 
by the United States Government and the answer was made by the United States 
State Department." 

I'ages 3372-3373 : 

"G. the third united nations security council resolution, JULY T, 1950 

"The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack upon the 
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, 
having recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such assist- 
ance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack 
and to restore international peace and security in the area. 



* Enipliasis supplied by the subcommittee. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2041 

" U ) Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples 
of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June 11)50 to as- 
sist the Repuhlic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to 
restt)re international pence and security in the area; 

"(2) yotes that members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United 
Nations oilers of assistance for the Republic of Korea; 

"(3) Recommends that all members providing military forces and other as- 
sistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces 
and other assistance available to a unified comnidnd under the United SUttcs; 

"(4) Rcfjiiexts the United States to designate the commander of such forces ; 

"(5) Authorises the unified command at its discretion to use tlie United Nations 
flag in the course of o^wratious against North Korean forces concurrently with 
the flags <»f the various nations participating; 

"(()) Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, 
as appropriate, on the course of action taken under the luiified command. 

"iVotinff for the resolution: United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, 
Cuba, Ecuador, and Norway. Abstention: Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia. Ah- 
sent; Soviet Union.'' 

"h. statement by the president of the united states, JULY 8, 1950 

"The Security C<mncil of the United Nations in its resolution of July 7, 19.^)0, 
has recommended that all members providing military forces and other assistance 
pursuant to the Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27, make such forces 
and other assistance availal)le to a unified command under the United States. 

"The Security Council resolution also requests that the United States des- 
ignate the commander of such forces, and authorizes the unified command at 
Its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against 
the North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations 
participating. 

"I am responding to the recommendation of the Security Council and have 
designated Gen. Douglas MacArthur as the commanding general of the military 
forces which the members of the United Nations place under the unified com- 
mand of the United States pursuant to the United Nations' assistance to the 
Republic of Korea in repelling the unprovoked armed attack against it. 

"I am directing General MacArthur, pursuant to the Security Council resolu- 
tion, to use the United Nations flag in the cour.se of operations against the North 
Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating." 

Page 3382 : 

"k. general order no. 1, general headquarters, united nations command, 
tokyo, july 25, 1950 [from united nations release, july 25, 1950] 

"1. In respon.se to the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations 
of July 7, 1950, the President of the United States has designated the under- 
signed Commander in Chief of the Military Forces assisting the Republic of 
Korea. Pursuant thereto, there is established this date the United Nations 
Command, with General Headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. 
"2. The undersigned assumes command. 

"Douglas MacArthur, 
"General of the Army, United States Army, 

"Vommander in Chief." 

]\lr. Carpenter. And I would add this comment on the document: 

Throughout the hearings repeated questioning failed to develop a 
clear picture as to the "chain of command" beyond the President of 
the United State.s. The role of the United Nations in the actual 
direction of the Korean war has never been clarified. 

General Van Fleet, j'ou state that the free world situation is now 
worse than it was in June 1950, that Red China is stronger, both 
militarily and i)^^ychologicall3', and that our allies are more intent on 
aj)peasement. 

i)o you believe, then, that time is not on our side? 

General Van Fleet. Time is not on our side. 

]Mr. Carpenter. You say time is not on our side? 

General Van Fleet. 1 do. 



2042 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. The excuse given by our policymakers in the 
spring of 1951 was that the MacArthur proposals would bring Russia 
into the fight and would jeopardize the free world alliance. Do you 
believe that Russia would have entered the war in any event? 

General Van Fleet. I do not believe so. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you believe the free world alliance is stronger 
because we renounced victory ? 

General Van Fleet. No. We are weaker. 

Mr. Carpenter. In other words, did we sacrifice victory for some- 
thing we actually lost by that appeasement? 

General Van Fleet. We did. 

Mr. Carpenter. You state that — 

yet we have at home other curious, perhaps well-intentioned, defeatists who 
would have us believe that our time to win has already passed. When I listen 
to their speeches and read their articles — exaggerating the enemy's present 
strength, playing down the importance of the Pacific and of Asia — I wonder 
if they are not, consciously or unconsciously, waging psychological warfare 
against us, destroying our will to win, minimizing our strength, softening us up 
to accept unnecessary defeat. 

I note that you use the expression "consciously or unconsciously." 
Do you believe that stupidity alone motivates them ? 

General Van Fleet. Stupidity and ignorance and lack of expe- 
rience. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you believe that, when events have demon- 
strated policymakers to have been fatally wrong, they should be 
dismissed ? 

General Van Fleet. They certainly should be relieved. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know that many policymakers who were 
fatally wrong on China were again in positions making Korean war 
policy ? 

General Van Fleet. Surely. Many may be still in power. I don't 
know who. I am unable to recall many names. Surely the high com- 
mand had continuous service through China and Korea. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, what difference does it make in the life 
and death of a nation whether this serving the enemy has been con- 
scious or unconscious? 

General Van Fleet. I will have to ask you to repeat the question. 
I am sorry. 

Mr. Carpenter. "Wliat difference does it make in the life and death 
of a nation whether serving the enemy has been conscious or 
unconscious ? 

General Van Fleet. It makes no difference; the same result. 

Mr. Carpenter. You state that — 

had not the people, the press, and the Congress spoken up clearly and firmly in 
the past, Formosa would have been surrendered as an appeasement to Red China, 
and even the Korean Republic might have been thrown in to seal the bargain. 
Such protests have blocked the attempt of the Chinese Reds to shoot their way 
into the United Nations. 

Do you believe that this danger has passed? 

General Van Fleet. I do not. I believe that we should speak out 
more than ever. 

Mr. Carpenter. How do you feel about the responsibility of mili- 
tary oflicers to speak up when the best interests of the country are 
jeopardized? 

General Van Fleet. I believe they do speak up through their com- 
manders. In that way their voice can be heard. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2043 

Mr. Carpenter. Is it not a fact, General, that had not General Mac- 
Arthur and others spoken out of turn on the subject of Formosa and 
recoauition of Ked China, both of those disasters would have probably 
been consunuuated ? 

General Van Fleet. That is correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. You say that in our obligations to the United Na- 
tions you see nothing that compelled us to surrender the initiative 
in Avar to the Communists. You referred to distant political com- 
mittees in command in our battlelines which forced the military to 
abandon all the lessons of American military history. 

You say that the United Nations diplomats considered it bad taste 
to be reminded that the United Nations once branded Red China as 
an aggressor and shifted to the concept of the Chinese as volunteers 
and that this constituted a low in political morality, both for the 
woild and for the United States. 

AVliat United Nations diplomats, do you believe? 

General Van Fleet. I believe all of them who agreed to the 
armistice and called lv?d China troops volunteers; who denounced 
them as aggressors, but in recent months, in fact, in recent years, they 
do not talk about them as aggressors. 

Mr. Cari'enter. The United Nations has never repealed its con- 
demnation of China as an aggressor. Do you know from where the 
orders came which limited your efforts? 

General Van Fleet. Yes. It came from the Far East Command, 
my immediate superior. 

Mr. Carpenter. From where did the Far East Command get their 
orders? 

General Van Fleet. From the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Mr. Carpenter. You state that the United Nations should not be 
relied upon as an instrument for collective security. You go on to 
point out that Eussia and her European satellites are members while 
manj^ others proudly proclaim neutrality in the fight for freedom. 
You further state that while some members of the United Nations 
participated in the effort, their participation was very limited, and 
that^ 

tbe price we paid for them was the loss of decisive military command. 

You say that — 

they controlled not only overall strategy, but small-scale tactical moves, and even 
the choice of bombing targets within Korea. 

You also refer to a caucus of diplomats. 

What this committee would like to know is what the joint committee 
invei^tigating General MacArthur's relief continually asked and never 
clearly ascertained. Who were these diplomats? 

General Van Fleet. The caucus referred to in that article included 
the representatives of the 16 countries who had fighting forces in 
Korea. They were kept advised of the progress of the war and I 
assume were consulted from time to time on major operations and 
policy in the conduct of the Avar. 

They subscribed to the wish for an armistice, helped achieve it. 

During that time, our operations were extremely limited, so that 
no operation could take place other than patrol action of sufficient 
nature to keep the Eighth Army from being surprised. That patrol 
action could not be more than one platoon in size. 



2044 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Johnston. That is true with the Allied forces, but it was 
not true with the other side ; is not that true ? They could go ahead 
and fight? 

General Van Fleet. They felt confident that we would not strike 
them. Therefore they could seize the initiative in assembling forces 
and piles of ammunition at critical points and then break out with a 
perfectly furious attack to take a limited objective of considerable 
tactical value to them. 

Having the initiative was a big advantage. We could counter that 
offensive and regain the position ; which we usually did. 

The Chairman. But again you were limited? 

General Van Fleet. Very much so. We could not go beyond that 
objective, even when the enemy was completely defeated. 

The Chairman. That order to you came to the Far East Command ? 

General Van Fleet. Yes; presumably, on directions from Wash- 
ington. 

There were many wonderful opportunities where we could have 
advanced great distances following up one of those Communist attacks, 
in which he threw everything he had on a rather wide front. His 
effort was destroyed usually by our air and artillery, counteroffensive; 
by counteroffensive, by fire rather than by manpower. And having 
destroyed his troops and the supplies he had in that area, we were 
fjuite free then to go considerable distances; but there were no orders 
to do so. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, I note that you state "If we must again 
send our sons abroad to fight for freedom, I hope they go unshackled ; 
that no appeaser's chains bind their arms behind their backs." 

You then proceed to recommend regional pacts as more effective 
because they represent a greater common interest. 

Will you expand on this ? 

General Van Fleet. Of course, in battle, as in any business, you 
must have a single head to make decisions. You must have fixed 
responsibility and unity of command. And where it is American 
effort, we should have American decision and freedom of action and 
not have to account for it to a United Nations. 

That is what I mean, that, in future warfare, we should have a free 
hand to do as the United States decides to do on the battlefield. 

We may have had the legal authority to do that, as Mr. Trygve Lie 
has pointed out; but I do not believe that we had always the moral 
right to do it without consulting them. And I subscribe to the point 
of view that our State Department would consult these other allies, 
and especially Great Britain, which had a full division in Korea. 

The very fact is that we did weaken our command structure to do 
as they would have us do and not as 1 would want and the genius of 
America would have us do. 

Senator Johnston. Do you know whether or not our Chiefs of Staff 
at any time took the matter up with United Nations to free your hands 
and let you fight like you ought to have been able to fight in the field 
of battle? 

General Van Fleet. I do not know that, but I feel confident they 
did not. It was a little bit beyond what they normally do, in my 
opinion. 

I must say. Senator, that when I speak of the governments of our 
allies 1 wish to cast no refiection whatsoever on their troops. Their 



ESTTERLOCKIKG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2045 

troops were magnificent. We had a f!:reat team in tlie P^i^jhth Army; 
and they were very proud of bein*; a part of that Kio:hth Army, and we 
were very hap])y and gh\d and fortunate to liave them part of us. 

The CiiAiRMAisr. And they wanted to win? 

(leneral Van Fleet. It was a great professional gathering of good 
figliters in Korea 



The Chairman. Who wanted to wnn, General ? 

General Van Fleet. Who wanted to win. 

I say that for the British Commonwealth as strongly as I would 
for the American commanders and other U. N. commanders. 

The Chairman. But that does not a]-)ply to the diplomats? 

General Van Fleet. No, sir; not in all cases. Some governments; 
yes. 

Tliis was what T called a caucus of 16. No doubt there were many of 
the 16 who wanted to win that war as badly as we did. 

JMr. CARrENTEK. General, in the light of your exi:)erience in dealing 
with the Communists and your experience in fighting the U. N. war, 
do you favor severance of diplomatic relations with Russia? 

General Van Fleet. I believe our relations with Russia are not get- 
ting us anything at this time, and 1 believe it would be a good move, 
short of war. 1 would favor a break with Russia as a major dramatic 
step in an effort to prevent world war III. 

I believe it would create a situation in Russia that their people 
would want to know why we did sever relations. It might give us an 
opportunity to tell the Russian people that the reason is their own 
leaders, who are misguiding them and leading them into war. 

Mr. Carpenter. How about the satellite countries? 

General Van Fleet. The same thing. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you consider the regional organization of the 
Pacific, excluding South Korea, Nationalist China, and Japan, 
feasible? 

General Van Fleet. I would favor two regional alliances in the 
Pacific : The one which has been created, SEATO, and another one 
for East Asia. 

jVIr. Carpenter. Do you favor continuance of the IT. N.? 

General Van Fleet. Yes; I do. I think the U. N. has served a 
good purpose. It means well. I look on it as a const i-uctive force 
for what good it hopes to accomplish. Some things it has accom- 
plished. 

I think it has served a good purpose in showing up Russia for what 
she is. AVe did not fully understand Russia at the beginning of the 
United Nations. Some of us may have, but our population, as a 
whole, did not. I think they do understand Russia today and know 
their methods and denounce them. 

I think the U. N. has served a good purpose just to acquaint the 
American people with the kind of Communist bloc we are faced with. 

The Chairman. But you would not want to fight another war under 
their system? 

General Van Fleet. I do not see how you can fight a war under 
United Nations, but you can under smaller groupings. 

The Chairman. General, let me ask you this: Suppose Red China 
was admitted to the United Nations; what would you do? 

General Van Fleet. I would advocate that the United States resign 
and that the United Nations be moved out of this country. Let it take 



2046 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

its turn for the next 10 years in Moscow. The U. N. has given them a 
wonderful opportunity to broadcast their propaganda throughout the 
United States. I think it is high time that some of the United States 
propaganda, which is the truth rather than lies, be broadcast inside 
Russia. 

Senator Johnston. Along that same line, do you not believe it 
would be nice to meet in Russia and meet in other nations and find out 
what is going on there? They are allowed to come over here. 

General Van Fleet. I think the Iron Curtain should work both 
ways, not a one-way route. 

Senator Johnston. Do you think they would let us come over there? 

General Van Fleet. No; they would not, sir. 

Senator Johnston. That might be a good way to get around it. 

General Van Fleet. We find ourselves fighting with an honorable 
set of rules, and they are not abiding by the rules. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, what was your recent mission to Korea? 

General Van Fleet. I was asked to conduct a survey of the military 
forces of the Far East and to include the military assistance programs 
which we have for those countries, including in that survey many other 
factors in other fields — economic aiKl political. 

Mr. Carpenter. And you will submit a report on that later, I 
presume ? 

General Van Fleet. I hope to submit it tomorrow. 

Mr. Carpenter. Of course, what this committee is wondering is : 
Will your report be suppressed? Shall Congress and the American 
people hear about it years later and wait until a further catastrophe 
and only after some congressional committee has managed to obtain 
and disclose portions of it will it be made public. General? 

General Van Fleet. My report is confidential and submitted to the 
President. I have no say-so on that, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. Do you have any further questions, Senator 
Johnstoji ? 

Senator Johnston. No further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

The Chairman. General Van Fleet, I want to thank you on behalf 
of every .member of this committee for your forthright statements 
made here today. I think you have contributed a great deal of infor- 
mation both to this committee and to the American people. We are 
still in the search of the "they" that tied your hands, that prevented 
us from winning a war ; that caused us to fight a war limited to the land 
and the territory of our friends. 

Your contribution here has been beneficial and we certainly thank 
you from the bottom of our hearts. 

General Van Fleet. Thank you. 

The Chairman. We stand adjourned. 

(Whereupon, at 4:20 p. m. the hearing was recessed to reconvene 
subject to call of the Chair.) 

X 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 



HEARING 



BEFORE THE 



SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
ON 

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS 



TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. EDWARD M. ALMOND (Retired) 



NOVEMBER 23, 1954 



PART 25 



Printed for the use of tlie Committee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
32918» WASHINGTON : 1954 



Boston Public Library- 
Superintendent of Documents 

FEB2 1955 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM LANGEK, North Dnkota, Chairman 

ALEXANDER WILEY, WisooiiMU HAKLEY M. KILGOKE, West Virginia 

WILLIAM E. JENNEK, Indiana JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois THOMAS C. HENNINGS, Jr., Missouri 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, MarylaBd 

J. G. SouRwiNE, Counsel 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Intebnal Security 
Aci' AND Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

Alva C. Carpe.nteu, Chief Counsel and Executive Director 

J. G. SOURWINE, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 

n 



f 



INTERLOCKING SUBVEPiSlON IN COVEKNMENT 

DEPARTMENTS 



TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1954 



Unitkd States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
or THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws, of the Commiitee on the Judiciary, 

Washington^ D. G. 

The subcommittee met, pui'suant to call, at 3 p. m., in room 318, 
Senate Office Building, Senator Eobert C. Hendrickson, presiding. 

Present: Senators Hendrickson and Welker. 

Also present: Alva Carpenter, chief counsel and executive direc- 
tor of the Internal Security Subconnnittee ; J. Sourwine, counsel of the 
Judiciary Committee and associate counsel, Internal Security Sub- 
committee; and Dr. Edna K. Fluegel, professional statf member. 

Senator Hendrickson. This hearing of the Subcommittee on In- 
ternal Security will now be in order. The witness this afternoon is 
General Almond. 

General, we greet you and Ave are grateful for your presence. Gen- 
eral Almond, in meeting here with you today, we are conscious of the 
fact that you have served your country long and well, Avith courage, 
with devotion, Avitli brilliance, and with honor. 

Your career was a varied one, rich in combat experience, in ad- 
vanced training, in stail^' work, and in accumulated experiences. You 
fought in World War I and served in the occupation thereafter. You 
were in military intelligence Avork in the midthirties. In World War 
II you liberated Genoa and Avorked with and observed the Italian 
partisans. As Chief of Staff of the Far East Command in Tokyo in 
the postAvar years, you Avere in an exceptionally advantageous posi- 
tion to observe the march of events in the Far East and the rising 
poAver of Soviet Russia and of Communist China in that crucial area. 
As chief of stati" in Tokyo, and as commander of the X Corps in 
Korea, you can speak Avith unique authority on some of the events 
of the first year of the Korean war. 

Your published statements and your testimony before Prepared- 
ness Subcommittee No. 2 of the Senate Committee on Armed Services 
indicate grave distress at some of the events of that Avar. 

On February 13, 1953, in an intervieAV in U. S. Ncavs & World 
Eeport, you stated, in part: 

I had no confidence in tlie armistice talks then, and I don't now * * * to 
harangue and dehiy and allow your opponent to become stronj^er so that he 
can fif;ht you harder later on is unpardonable, in my hundde opinion as a sol- 
dier * * *. aiy philosophy is to engage the chosen enemy to defeat him iu 
hattle * * *. My belief is tliat when we engage an enemy, we ought to defeat 
that enemy * * *. I also think that where we haA-e an enemy who is inclined 

2047 



2048 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

to become stronger and stronger, we have to seek a solution, and it has to be 
either a different approach by force or an effective political arrangement on a 
national policy basis. 

General, this subcommittee is not concerned with either foreign or 
with military policy per se. We are concerned, however, as I know 
yon are concerned, with the national security and the tranquility of 
this great country of ours. "VVe believe, as I know you believe, as 
millions of Americans believe, that there have been and still are hostile; 
forces working tirelessly to corrupt, to misdirect and to destroy us' 
from within. 

We believe that the most skillful, and the most menacing, of these 
forces are engaged in trying to subvert our political and military 
policy. This would be a logical deduction even though it were based 
on no tangible evidence, but solely on the nature of the enemy and on 
his annoimced purpose. This subcommittee has tried to approach 
each of its investigations judiciously, seeking out the truth, searching 
for the pattern of subversion. Some of its investigations have been 
initiated by the American people, through letters, through group 
petitions, through information collected and sent to the subcommittee. 
Other investigations have developed as events clarified previously 
assembled facts, and added new urgency to the pursuit of unexplored 
items. Our interest in past events has been and is directed to the 
present danger and the future. 

The series of hearings, of which this meeting today is a part, was 
initiated last August with the appearance before the subcommittee of 
General Mark Clark. The late Senator McCarran met with General 
George Stratemeyer in Florida. More recently, we have questioned 
General James Van Fleet. 

In each instance, information was gleaned that helped clarify the 
still-confused, partly-undisclosed story of the Korean war. In each 
instance, it was discovered that these great generals shared our un- 
easiness and had asked themselves some of the questions the American 
people are asking : "Why ? And who ? And when ? And how will 
it end?" 

Today, General Almond, we are asking you to share with us your 
knowledge, your observations, and your judgment in the interest of 
the internal security of this great Nation you have served so long and 
so valiantly. 

Now, General, you were sworn in executive session this morning, but 
I think it would be good form to have you sworn again in public 
hearing. 

General, do you solemnly swear that the evidence you are about to 
give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

General Almond. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF EDWAED M. ALMOND, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, 

U. S. ARMY, RETIRED 

Senator Hendrickson. Thank you. Now, would you state your full 
name and your address and something of your career for the record, 
General ? 

General Almond. My name is Edward Mallory Almond. I was 
born in Luray, Va., on December 12, 1892. I attended school there 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2049 

and in Ciilpcper, Va., from Avliit'li 1 gradual od, as a hi<^-li-sc'l\()()l senior. 
1 then Avent to Virginia JNIilitary Inslitnlo, from Avhicli 1 gradnaled 
as a bachelor of science in electrical engineerino; in 11)15. In IDIG I 
entered the Army as a second lieutenant in what was known as the 
first provisional class, at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and for J) montlis 
underwent a trainin<r course similar to the oilicer Irainin^L? cour.ses 
that followed in World "War I. 1 then became a second lieutenant 
on the Mexican border with the Itli Infantry and later on connnanded 
a company in that reirinient and the 58th Infant it. AVe were moved 
from the border at Brownsville, Tex., to Gettysburg, Pa., and there 
the United states 4th Division was formed, and I became a part of the 
4tli Division, first as a company commander and later as a battalion 
connnander of the l'2tli Machinegun Battalion. In that capacity I 
went to Europe with the 4th Division in the First World War. I 
participated with that division in all the major engagements from 
May of 1918 until the armistice on November 11, 1918. 

I then participated in the army of occupation on the Tihine for 
about 8 months. Upon my return to the United States I became an 
ofiicer in charge of civilian instruction at a military school in an 
ROTC capacity. Reserve Officer Training Corps. From there I went 
to Fort Benning, Ga., to the Infantry School, and took a course for 
commanders and later stayed at the Infantry School as an instructor 
in the Department of Tactics for 4 years. At the same time, General 
IMarshall was the assistant commandant at the Infantry School. Fol- 
lowing that tour of 4 j'ears, and in 1928, I was detailed to attend the 
General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, which I did for 2 years. 

Following that service, I went to the Philippine Islands and became 
a battalion commander of Philippine Scouts and served at Fort 
William JNIcKinley, very close to ISIanila. Following that tour, I came 
back to the United States as a student at the Army War College, then 
at Fort jMcXair in Washington, D. C. 

Following that tour, I was detailed to the War Department General 
Staff where I served for 4 years in the Department of Intelligence. 
From there I went to the Air Corps Tactical School as a ground officer 
for a year's training in the employment of aviation, combat aviation. 
Following that I went to the Naval War College at Newport, 11. I., 
where I spent a year, trying to learn something about the problems and 
activities of the Navy. 

I went from that assignment back to the War Department and the 
Department of Intelligence, where I spent the next G months. And 
from there, I was assigned as the Operations Officer of the Sixth Army 
Corps in Providence, Iv. 1. As training officer of the Sixth Army 
Corps in 1941 I participated in the maneuvers that we had in the 
C'arolinas in those clays, which was just before our entry into the war, 
World War II. 

I then became chief of staff of the Sixth Army Corps, shortly after 
the Japanese action against Pearl Harbor, and from that assignment 
1 was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, assigned to the 93d 
Division, stationed at Fort Iluachuca, Ariz. I served in that capacity 
for 5 months when 1 was promoted to major general and given com- 
mand and the task of organizing the 92d Division, with headquarters 
at Fort ]\IcClellan, Ala. 

From that assignment in Alabama, I went back to the desert with 
this division, the 92d, and trained there for more than a year. Fol- 



2050 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

lowing that training, in August of 1944, I was sent to the Italian 
theater, where I participated in all of our operations until the end 
of the war in 1945, under the command of the Fifth Army, mostly, 
Gen. Mark Clark and later Gen. Lucian Truscott. 

Following the termination of the war in Europe, I was assigned to 
command the 2nd United States Infantry Division for the purpose of 
redeploying that division in Japan and finishing the military opera- 
tions over there, in conjunction with all the other troops that were 
so designated. Before I could take command of that division, the 
war ended, as we all know. 

We know of the signing of the terms of agreement aboard the Bat- 
tleship Missouri, 

I coimnanded the 2d Division at Camp Swift in Austin, Tex., and 
at Camp Lewis, Wash., for the next 8 months, when in June 1946 I 
was transferred to Tokyo as one of 12 general officers of the Army; 
and there I was given an assignment in General MaciVi-thur's head- 
quarters, iirst as his personnel officer, G-1, where I remained for 5 
months, starting in June 1946, until November or early December 
1946. 1 then became the Deputy Chief of Stall', Far East Command, 
for the Army portion of General MacArthur's responsibilities. 

He was both Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and Com- 
mander of the Army Forces in the Japanese area and the Philippine 
area. 

In 1949, February, I became Chief of Staff under General Mac- 
Arthur, and, as such, remained until the 12th of September 1950, when 
I became commander of the X Corps, and participated in the Inchon 
landing, and other operations in Korea, terminating on July 15, 1951. 
At that time, I returned to the PTnited States and became commandant 
of the Army War College at Carlisle, Pa., where I remained until I 
was retired on the 31st of January 1953. 

I now am retired and live in Anniston, Ala. 

Senator Hendrickson. Mr. Carpenter, you may proceed to develop 
the testimony of the witness. 

Mr. Carpenter, General, I would like to go back to the period of 
1934-38. I believe at that time you were in the Latin-American sec- 
tion of the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department 
General Staff ; is that correct ? 

General Almond. That is correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, while you were in that section, did you 
have cause to wonder about Communist infiltration in our Govern- 
ment or possible Communist subversion of our policy ? 

General Almond. I most certainly did. 

Mr. Carpenter. Would you tell us about that, please? 

General Almond. When I became a part of the G-2 Division of 
the General Staff' in June of 1934. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman ? 

Senator Hendrickson. The Senator from Idaho. 

Senator Welker. Will you define for the record, please, what you 
mean by G-2 ? I know and I want the record to so show.^ 

General Almond. Yes, sir. The intelligence functions of most 
staff's, starting Avith the Department of the Army, or the War Depart- 
ment then, are placed in what they call G-2, the Department of 
Intelligence. It is a General Staff section. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2051 

Senator Welkek. Thank you, General. I am sorry for tlic inter- 
rii]ition. 

General Almond, "\^^len I joined that section in June of 10?A, I 
was told that the Department of the Army was in a com|)lete state of 
confusion because of a recent order, I will say in the last 3 or 4 months 
prior to that time, emanating from some very high authority, that 
investigators representing the Nye committee were authorized to go 
through the files of the Dei)artment of the Army or the "War Depart- 
ment, and to see any tile we had. The thing that concerned those 
responsible for their files was what would be the result of general 
investigations of the most secret files we had, and would the informa- 
tion in those files, secured for the investigation, be held within the 
proper limits. 

That caused a lot of consternation among those officers responsible 
for the files, Avhich were prepared in some cases in all confidence, 
which involved the relationship between the Latin-American coun- 
tries and our own country, with which we were trying, as far as 
possible, to build the highest types of friendship. To throw dis- 
cussions and our interest in their discussions and interests open to 
unknown grabbing or misuse or misappropriation was something that 
we could not see the end of. 

Therefore, at that time we were very much disturbed by what we 
though was at least pinkish intrusion in the most secret files in our 
establishment. 

jNIr. Carpenter. Now, I would like to take you to 1938-44, General. 
I believe you have testified that yon graduated from the Air Force 
Tactical School and also from the Naval War College. Yet you were 
stationed in the United States until 1944 before you were sent to Italy. 
You also had experience in the Far East. Was that not a rather 
peculiar assignment, to wait so long before sending you to a theater 
of action? 

General Almond. Well, it was to me, and I would have had a great 
desire for other assignments. But those were my orders and those 
were the orders that I carried out to the best of my ability. I could 
have thought of many jobs I would have rather participated in as 
an Army officer. If you read my record of that time, you will see why. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, you were stationed in the Mediterranean 
theater of occupation. What unit did you command there, and 
where ? 

General x^lmond. Well, I joined General Clark's Fifth Army in 
August of 1944. I was then in command of the 92d Infantry Divi- 
sion. That division deployed from Arizona to the western coast of 
Italy about the time that, or just after, our forces entered Rome. 
The Fifth Army entered Eome on the Gth of June, and then moved 
from that general area up to the Arno River, which empties into the 
Mediterranean about where Leghorn is, from the direction of Florence. 
That was the line at the time my division began to participate in the 
war in Italy, which ended the following May 5, 1 believe. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did .\ )u liberate one of the areas in Italy? 

General Almond. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. What area was that, please? 

General Almond. That is the area extending along the Ligurian 
coast, the western portion of Italy, from the general location of where 



2052 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

the Tower of Pisa is, to the French border in the Alps, and to Torino 
at the head of the Po Valley, across the Apennines, and facing the 
Alps. 

Mr. Cx\RPENTER. In yonr particular area, did you have any contact 
with the so-called partisans in that area ? 

General Almond. Yes ; very specifically. 

Mr. Carpenter. What were their nationalities ? 

General Almond. They w^ere basically and in the mass Italians. 
They were people who had been under the oppression of the Fascists, 
who had endured the oppression of Mussolini for the past 20 years, 
and who were glad the yoke was removed. 

But there were also other elements. Yugoslavs, some Russians, I 
found out later, or Soviets, Rumanians. It was the general run of 
the miscellaneous type of Balkan and Mediterranean bordering 
countries. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have any experiences that made you ques- 
tion the Russian postwar intentions ? 

General Almond. Made me question what ? 

Mr. Carpenter. The Russians' postwar intentions. 

General Almond. Yes ; I was very much disturbed on several occa- 
sions. Our relations, as I said, with the Partisans for probably 8 
months were very close, and we relied upon them to do things beyond 
the front line of our ow^n forces, which we could not do for ourselves, 
being in uniform. We had the opportunity of sending patrols by 
small boat, including Partisans, wdiich were then on our side, around 
through the ]\Iediterranean, landing behind the enemy, staying there 
for several weeks and coming back and reporting on the area to which 
they were designated to go. That was very helpful to us. 

But, when the war ended, I found that these same Partisans that 
we used so usefully were the rank and file of the Partisan movement, 
but they were, as far as I knew, in my area, in the vicinity of Genoa, 
and Turin, Ventemilia, Savona, and many other of those Mediterran- 
ean ports and towns, that they were readily under the direction of a 
Soviet comrade known as Mira, and Comrade Mira was the fellow 
that I held responsible for the atrocities that happened in my area, 
and with which I had much to do to try to suppress, both as to 
kangaroo courts, and murders as a result of these courts; on some 
occasions we found as many as 20 bodies, 10 to 20 bodies every morn- 
ing l.ying on the beach in the harbor of Genoa. We found out who 
was behind that. We began to deal with these groups that were 
holding these kangaroo courts. All during this period, I will say, 
for a month following the war, my contacts with Comrade Mira were 
frequent, always on a high plane, if I could keep it that way, but 
always trying to hold him responsible for the things that I have just 
recounted. 

Finally, at one of these conferences participated in by some 20 or 
30 partisan chieftains — always Mira was the leader and the most dom- 
inant character present — on one of these occasions he was absent. 
I said "Where is Comrade Mira?" They said "He has gone back to 
Rumania. Things are too peaceful here for him." 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, General, I would like to take you to the period 
of 1946 to July of 1951, and in your various capacities in the Far East. 
To what extent were you able to follow the developments OA^er there 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2053 

in such areas as Cliina, Korea, Formosa, and oHut (orritories con- 
ti<i"iioiis thereto? 

Senator IIknorickson. Counsel, before we fjet to the Far Fast, may 
I pursue one question as a result of a statement that the general made? 

General, you said you tliou<ilit it was peculiar that you were held 
here in the United States until 11)44, with the rich experience and 
back«;Tound you had. What did you think was responsible for hold- 
inp; you here wlien your experience would have been of such great 
value elsewhere? 

General Almond. Well, INIr. Chairman, possil)ly you misunder- 
stood what I said. I did not think tliat 1 was held here because my 
experience would have been more useful elsewhere. I said I might 
have desired to have more pleasant assignments than I had. I felt 
at the time that, if I received the assignments I did receive, that it 
was my duty, not only my duty but I should readily and lia[)pily 
accept such assignments and did. 

Senator Hendkk kson. I see. 

General Almond. I have no quarrel with what my assignments 
were, except I could have thought of some that would have been more 
pleasant. 

Senator IIendrickson. I thank you. General. 

Counsel, you may proceed. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, I would like to go back and clear up one 
more point. Were yon familiar with a man by the name of Tinio? 

(jeneral Almond. Yes, sir. 

Tinio was a nomad from a Turkishtanian area. I could not even 
locate it myself, if I tried. He had a partisan band and to look at them 
you would immediately decide they were cutthroat pirates. This band 
was a band of his own. He was a nomad. He came to Italy and joined 
with one of my regiments. He became a very reliable patrol leader. 
He many times and on more than one occasion occupied a section of 
the front in the Appenines, virtually unoccupied by regular military 
personnel, between my right flank and the left flank of the Brazilian 
Division which was just beyond me or east of me, in the winter of 
1945. He did such good work that he was known throughout my 
division. I think we gave him a certificate of accomplishment or 
something, just to be grateful about it. 

But one day soon after the war ended in Italy, in 1945, 1 was queried 
from General McNarney's headquarters, which he very pro])erly did, 
because he had the request from a Soviet mission that had come to 
Italy. Apparently, they heard about this Tinio. The specific query 
of me Avas: "Was there a Turkishtanian by the name of Tinio with a 
band or group operating in my sector?"' I said "Yes, there was one, 
but where he is now, I don't know." They said, "Is he in your area 
now?" 

On investigation, I found he was still over there with the 370th 
Infantiy, his friends. I got in touch with the colonel of that regiment. 
He said that he would and did talk to Tinio. He innnediately dis- 
covered that he, Tinio, was very much alarmed, that the Soviets had 
queried about him. What he had done in his own country, I didn't 
inquire of him. I have no knowledge. He was a good fighter and on 
our side. But he was disturbed that the liussians wanted to know 
where he and his men were. 

32918'— 54— pt. 25 2 



2054 INTERLOCKmG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

I also attribute it to tlie fact that he was not a convert of the 
Communists or Soviets and they were after him. I was ordered even- 
tually to turn Tinio over to the Russians for transportation back to 
Kussia. I did that with the complete conviction, based on the things I 
had gotten from Tinio and from those with whom he associated, that 
it meant his certain destruction, and that of his band. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator Hendrickson. The Senator from Idaho. 

Senator Welker. Are you at liberty to tell who ordered you to 
return this oeutleman to the Russians? 

General Almond. Well, as I recall, that was a routine understand- 
ing. Russia at that time had been our ally, and was then, presumably. 
As soon as the war was over, I think it was their practice to send 
their delegations into every area. I suppose Britain and France. 
They certainly came to Italy. I suppose to all of Europe. That was 
to find out what nationals they could claim title to within the bounds 
of what they said was Soviet Russia so that these people might be 
returned to their native land. I believe that that was the general 
policy that we followed, and I think that our being ordered to turn 
that particular band over to that group was a matter of routine. 

Senator Welker. Granted that it was a matter of routine, can you 
give the committee the name of the superior officer who ordered you 
to return them to Russia ? 

General Almond. No; I could not. But I might find that out. 
I know who the commander was. General McNarney was the com- 
mander. He was the Deputy Commander of the Allied, AFHQ, 
Allied Forces in Italy. It was a joint command. General McNarney 
was our American commander. He had many people under him and 
many bureaus. So I think a policy that had been decided would be 
something that would be transmitted to his headquarters and his 
staff would carry it out. 

Senator Welker. And he was bound to do that because of the 
policy followed? 

General Almond. I think so. 
' Senator Welker. There is nothing derogatory to General 
McNarney ? 

General Almond. No ; not at all. 

Senator Welker. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, General, during your various assignments 
in Tokyo, to what extent were you able to follow the developments 
in such areas as China, Korea, Formosa, and those various countries 
in that locale of the world? 

General Almond. Of course, our headquarters in Tokyo was very 
intimately connected with what went on in the Philippines, in Oki- 
nawa, in Jajian, in Guam, Saipan, Tinian, and so on, which was 
within General MacArthurs definite jurisdiction. And in Korea, at 
the time, because our General Hodge in the early time had the 24th 
Corps there, in South Korea. We knew wJiat was going on in those 
areas. We had no jurisdiction over China, Formosa, southeastern 
Asia, and, of course, Manchuria and North Korea, because we could not 
get in there. We had as intimate knowledge as might be possible, I 
would say, in the contacts of our people who went to China, went to 
Formosa, went to Honk Kong, Indochina, Korea, as travelers. We 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2055 

had coiitncfs witli those people who lived in those countries, cither by 
assi<iinnent or who were natives who came to Japan. 

For example, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the Hi^^h Commissioner 
of southeast Asia, all the time I was over there, made a visit to Japan 
and many other functionaries did. People came from India. In 
connection with all of those visits and our visits to them, when one 
of our ofiicers would «j:o to that area, and when he came back he was sup- 
posed to make a report on what he found out that was unusual. 
Those were unolHcial contacts in the areas not under General Mac- 
Arthur's connnand from which we jrleanecl much information. 

But there was no oriranizod system or intelli<;ence service that 
we could rely upon except through our missions and embassies in the 
State Department. 

]Mr. Carpenter. I believe one of the visitors that you had there 
was Mr. Philip Jessup from the United States; is that true? 

General Almond. That is right. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. Did you talk with him while he w^as there? 

General Almond. Yes; I talked with Mr. Jessup several times. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did he try to sell you on his theories regarding 
Formosa ? 

General Almond. No. He was very pleasant to me, and I to him, 
I hope. I saw him on his way in to have conferences with General 
MacArthur and on his way out. I met him at a number of parties. 
But I never discussed with Mr. Jessup the policy of the United States. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you know whether he tried to sell his views 
on Formosa to General JMacArthur ? 

General Almond. Well, from the general discussion that General 
MacArthur had with me, after these conferences, I gathered that 
Mr. Jessup was probing General INIacArthur to find out how deter- 
mined General MacArthur was in his views on Formosa, and General 
MacArthur's views on Formosa have been plentifully and completely 
discussed, I think, since that time. 

Senator Welker. And probably at that time, too. General. 

General Almond. I have no doubt of that. But I have no direct 
knowledge of his discussions with General MacArthur except the 
general atmosphere of our discussions afterward. 

Senator Welker. Knowing General IMacArthur, I doubt very 
mucli that you would say that he did not make his position very clear 
to INIr. Jessup. 

General Almond. I tried to convey that. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, were the forces in Japan, United States 
forces in Japan, strengthened in view of the Communist conquest of 
the China mainland, and of the discovery that Kussia had the atomic 
bomb ? 

General Almond. Well, from the time of my knowledge of the 
occupation, in June of 1946, until some time in 1948, the Eighth 
Army was always below strength. It was most difficult, for, first, 
(Tcneral Eichelberger, who was the commander at first, and General 
Walker, who succeeded to that command, to carry out his occupation 
functions, and at the same time to maintain a semblance of a military 
command which might be called upon at any instant to do something 
in a military way, which had nothing to do with occupational func- 
tions, but might be required to suppress disorder, because his strength, 
the strength of the Army in the period I am talking about got as low 



2056 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

as 60 percent, as I recall it; 60 percent, I mean, of the peacetime 
strength of military organizations, not 60 percent of the wartime 
strength. There is a difference and it is a considerable difference. 
But during those lean years, our strength got so low that most of our 
men in some way or other were involved in occupational duties which 
gave us just the merest skeleton of a military command. We brought 
that to the attention of the Pentagon repeatedly. I made a trip my- 
self in October of 1946, sent by General MacArthur, to call attention 
to the very thing that I am talking about. 

We monthly and perhaps in some cases daily, for periods, called 
attention to the reduced strength of our command. I do not think 
that was anybody's fault particularly; I just think our Army was in a 
pretty low state of personnel following the demobilization after the 
war. I believe the Pentagon was trying to build up our strength as 
rapidly as possible and we just had to bear our share. But that did 
not make it any easier on us. 

About the middle of 1948 or the spring of 1948, replacements began 
to arrive, and I would say when the operations in Korea began. Gen- 
eral Walker's army was pretty well up to its peacetime organization. 
But peacetime organization meant a battalion of infantry with only 
3 companies instead of 4. It meant a regiment of infantry with only 
2 battalions instead of 3. It meant a tank battalion with only 1 com- 
pany instead of 3. It meant an artillery battalion with 1 battery 
instead of 3 in it. That was the condition of the Eighth Army when 
we were faced with throwing our troops into Korea. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, did you have any inkling of the change 
in British policy in 1949 and 1950? 

General Almond. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Carpenter, Would you tell us something about that ? 

General Almond. In August of 1949, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, 
the High Commissioner for southeast Asia, with residence in Singa- 
pore, arrived in Tokyo for a friendly visit. Everybody had a friendly 
visit. Several days after that Mr. MacDonald expressed the desire 
to talk to the principal staff officers of our headquarters. We had 
many sections. I think we had 32 sections in that headquarters, 10 
or 15 SCAP and 10 or 15 EEC, covering every activity of occupation 
in the military forces. 

General MacArthur agreed. He said, "Have Mr. MacDonald say 
anything he wants. We will be glad to hear his viewpoints." I was 
Chief of Staff then, and I had at least the heads of every section and 
many other officers and others of our staff who I thought would benefit 
by hearing a foreign viewpoint, although for some of the SCAP peo- 
ple the British Commonwealth was a participant in the occupation 
activities, the SCxA.P activities. Mr. MacDonald came to our briefing 
room. He addressed us for 40 or 50 minutes, and then we had a 
question period of some half hour afterward, trying to adjust our 
views and ask questions and understand his points. 

The theme of Mr. MacDonald's discussion with us — there wasn't 
any secret about it, he talked to everybody about it, all over Tokyo — 
was that the basis of a rehabilitated far eastern area was India; that 
India, being economically depressed, to say the least, overpopulated, 
poorly irrigated, and somewhat irritated, if helped economically, 
would be a stabilizing factor in Asia, and especially so since their 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2057 

rclifiion, the religion of the Indians, was the antitliesis of the Coni- 
jinniists, who I am sure have no religion. 

So it was a question of IMohannnedanism, and so on, against zero- 
ism, and if we thouglit well of it, we might bend our efforts to a re- 
habilitation of India in opposition to the Communist threat. 

That was in August of 1949. In December of 1949, as I recall, 
Ued China was recognized by the British Government. 

Senator "Wklkkh. Mr. Chairman, may I have a question ? 

Senator IIknduickson. The Senator from Idaho, ]\Ir. AVelker. 

Senator Welkkr. General, based upon your experience as Chief 
of Staif with General MacArthur, can you tell the committee whether 
or not General MacArthur was ever asked for his opinion on tlie whole 
Far Eastern situation before the Korean war? 

General Almond. Yes ; he was, yes. 

Senator Welker. Can you tell us more about that ? 

General Almond. AVell, we were always being asked for views on 
various things. We were asked for views on the economic situation 
in Japan, and what the Communist threats to the Japanese were, and 
various other things. So that was just, I suppose, a regularroutine 
question. But it nnist have had more than an ordinary import- 
tance. A short communication came to us wdiich asked for General 
MacArthur's estimate of China, the situation in China, and the coun- 
tries contiguous to China. 

Before I took this conununication in to General MacArthur to dis- 
cuss it with him, I had the operations officer get a map and just count 
what the countries contiguous to China are. As I recall it, there were 
14. India, Manchuria, Indochina, and various others. That looked 
like to me, on the face of it, an impossible task for the reason that 
General MacArthur had already arrived at when I got into his office. 
He read this Pentagon request again with me. The point was having 
no means of collecting the information in those countries, General 
MacArthur was loath to give an estimate without facts upon which 
to base it. 

Senator Welker. As a matter of fact, he planned a trip, did he not, 
to visit Formosa on July 1, shortly before the Korean outlireak 'i 

General Almond. That was a'little bit later. If I may just finish 
this one thing 

Senator Welker. Very well. 

General Almond. Our reply to that telegram, radio, was essentially 
that: When the Far Eastern Commander is given the intelligence 
agencies under his control to visit China and the countries contiguous 
to it, and the facts are collected, "I will be in a position to render 
the estimate that you request." 

We never heard any more from that request. Later on we did go 
to Formosa. We planned a trip to Formosa because, I presume— 
I am not sure, I couldn't be certain about it— after Mr. Jessup's trip, 
Formosa began to be a pretty hot potato. After that, General Mac- 
x\rthur, being asked to give an estimate of Formosa, decided himself 
to go to Formosa. He made this decision and notified the Pentagon 
that he proposed to do this. He didn't ask permission. He was 
given a mission and he decided to do it himself. We had planned 
that trip, as I recall it, for the 1st of July, the 1st to the 4th. This 
was early in June that he made the plans. 



2058 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

On the 25th of June the invasion of Korea began, and that tem- 
porarily suspended that Formosan trip. We did make the trip, Gen- 
eral Mac Arthur, General Stratemeyer, Admiral Joy, the naval com- 
mander. General Willoughby, General Marquat, the economic adviser, 
and myself, and others. We did go to Formosa, as I recall, on the 
25th of July. 

Senator Welker. As I understand, that trip, though, was postponed 
by the outbreak of the Korean Avar ? 

General Almond. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Welkek. And is it a fact, General, that this trip, when 
made, stirred up a hornet's nest, even though it was fully authorized 
and was undertaken to comply with the Pentagon request and inquiry ? 

General Almond. That is my recollection; yes, sir. The people 
back here weren't any too ha])py, but General MacArthur is a man 
who, when he is responsible for a task, doesn't have to ask anybody 
how to perform it. 

Senator Welker. General, may I ask you this very simple ques- 
tion: Why Avere the people back here very upset? Can you give us 
your observations on that ? 

General Almond. No, sir; I wouldn't know. 

Senator Welker. You have a pretty good idea, don't you ? 

General Almond. Many things happened back here that I didn't 
understand, and I would hesitate to try to assign reasons for them. 

Senator Welker. But in the back of your mind you have a pretty 
good idea, don't you ? 

General Almond. Well, I believe I do really recall the statement 
being made that we had a mission down there, a State Department 
mission, which was capable of furnishing General MacArthur the 
information that he would need in order to make that estimate. 

Senator Welker. A State Department mission? 

General Almond. That is right. 

Senator Welker. To take the place of one of the greatest field com- 
manders, one of the greatest generals in the history of the Republic? 
In other words, your impression was that the State Department Avas 
calling the signals at that time? 

General Almond. Yes ; I have that distinct impression on that and 
many other instances. 

Senator Welker. Now, if counsel will alloAv me to interrogate. 

Senator Hendrickson. The Senator may proceed. 

Senator Welker. Shortly thereafter Secretary of Defense Johnson 
and General Bradley came to Tokyo. Is that correct ? 

General Almond. That is right ; about the 20th of June. 

Senator Welker. A few days before the Korean outbreak, but the 
trouble was brcAving. Is that correct ? 

General Almond. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Welker. Did you get any impression or intelligence from 
those officers to the effect that trouble Avas brewing in Korea ? 

General Almond. No, sir. We did not. I don't think they knew it, 
and I don't think we kneAv it. 

Senator Welker. Well, did General MacArthur enlighten them on 
anything along that line? 

General Almond. It Avas along intelligence lines that he did. It was 
the practice of our headquarters, and at General MacArthur's direc- 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2059 

tion, that everybody wlio came to his lieadquaiters had the privilege, 
and we woidd suggest if they di(hrt ask it, oi' being l)riefed on the 
situation in the Far East as we knew it, Mr. Johnson, General Brad- 
ley, and all the others. I am sure General Bradley was present. I 
remember Mr. Johnson being present because we had many discus- 
sions about various things all through the stalL The stall' was all 
present. 

A briefer for military intelligence at our headquarters described 
the intelligence situation in North and South Korea. The operations 
ofiicer, who was then (leneral Wright, as 1 recall it, (U^sci-ibed the 
Strength of the North Korean forces and the South Korean forces, in 
ground forces, in weapons, in naval units, and in police. The osten- 
sible size of the two forces was about 105,000 ground forces for the 
North Koreans, and about 100.000 for the South Koreans. Each side 
had about 50,000, of what they called, organized national police. 
That, roughly, gave 150,000 but not all combat units. And then the 
few planes that each side Avas known to have, and the few ships were 
almost enumerated by name. 

Mr. Johnson got that, and General Bradley got that. We knew the 
potentialities of both sides but not their intentions. 

Senator Welker. General, will you describe to the committee, sir, 
the opening days of the Korean war as viewed from your position 
as the Chief of Statf, including the first inspection trip, and the tele- 
con? 

General Almond. Well, I recall right off the bat that those were 
very hectic days. They were particularly a jolt to me because, on 
Sunday morning, which was the 25th of June, having had a week of 
General Bradley and Mr. Johnson visiting to our area, we were con- 
cerned with almost a 20-hour schedule to see that they got to the right 
places, that they had the right conferences, to do the preparing for 
these conferences where it was our function. 

In general, we had been pretty busy. So on that particular morn- 
ing, I went down to my office with the idea of shuffling a few papers on 
Sunday and going home at least by 2 o'clock in the afternoon. I had 
been in my office only some 20 minutes when the first telegram came 
from Korea, from our little communication detachment we had over 
there with Ambassador Muccio's diplomatic group. That said that a 
border incident happened on the Oncjin Peninsula, which is at the 
mouth of the Ilan River, in western Korea. In about 30 minutes we 
got another such message. In the next 2 hours or two hours and a 
half we had 5 messages that stretched all the way across the 38th 
parallel, roughly. From the first one we were concerned, but we 
thought perhaps it had been a border raid. But when we got them 
scattered all across the front, we knew that something unusual was 
bound to happen and was happening. We transmitted each one of 
those, as I recall it, as rapidly as possible to the Pentagon to show that 
something was brewing. That has all been established, I am sure. 

The next day — after the 25th of June — or the next 2 clays, here in 
America, realization having taken place also of something unusual, we 
were directed to send a group to Korea as General MacArthur's recon- 
naissance party to determine just what was going on. We sent Major 
General Church of our staff and 14 officers from our headquarters by 
plane, destination Seoul. They landed at Suwon, Korea. The condi- 
tion of the Korean Army had deteriorated so in that period of 2 days 



2060 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

that ]\Iajor General Church never got to Seoul. On June 29, General 
MacArthur and a small staff flew to Korea. We found Major General 
Church on the 29th, 2 days later, there at Suwon. 

We had continued to observe the deteriorating situation on June 
25, 26, 27, and 28. General MacArthur got query after query, wanting 
to know just what was happening. So, again, as he went to Formosa 
later on, he decided to go to Korea. He took the key members of his 
staff. I, as chief of staff, v^as a member of it. We flew to Suwon 
airport and landed at almost the instant that two YAK Xorth Korean 
planes dropped a bomb on the end of the runway. We sent our plane 
back to Pusan after we landed. It was to come back and pick up the 
group at 4 o'clock that afternoon, which it did. 

At 20 minutes to 4, as we were coming down the road from the direc- 
tion of Seoul, where we had been the latter part of the day, two 
YAK's came over again and dropped two more bombs on the end of 
the runway, Avhich delayed General ]\IacArthur"s plane coming in to 
pick him up to take him back to Tokyo. His purpose in going to 
Korea was to have first-hand information, not only of what the Korean 
Army was doing, but what the President of the Nation thought about 
it, what our own United States Ambassador thought, what the Chief 
of Staff of the Korean Army was thinking about doing in the face of 
all this debacle that was happening. 

We arrived, I would say, at 10 : 30 in the morning. We went to a lit- 
tle schoolhouse where General MacArthur found General Church and 
his 14 officers from Tokyo, our officers. Tliey had had 2 days to sense 
throughout the soutliern part of Korea what was going on. 

There we met with Mr. Rhee, the President of the Republic; Mr. 
Muccio, our Ambassador in Korea; the Chief of Staff of the South 
Korean Army, and a lot of lesser lights. 

General MacArthur began his query by asking General Church to 
have his officers, or himself, give the situation as he understood it. To 
make a long story as short as possible, General Church gave us the 
current situation on June 29 with the assistance of some of his officers 
who had been out and who had more intimate information than he had 
received in the last few hours. General Church said, "This morning 
we knew of 8,000 men in hand in the Korean Army, 8,000 out of 
100,000." He said, "As far as we can tell, they are straggling all over 
South Korea, coming down all the roads, and even across the moun- 
tains. They all have their rifles and ammunition, but apparently 
nobody is fighting." He said, "I have just received a report that we 
now have in groups standing along the road 8,000 more, and I hope 
to have 8,000 more toniglit, all stragglers." 

That made 24,000, if lie got them, out of 100,000 supposedly combat 
forces. That just gives you an example of how deteriorated that situ- 
ation had gotten. That had a considerable bearing on our deployment 
into Korea within the course of the next week. 

General MacArthur then asked Mr. Rhee what his concept of the 
condition was, and Mr. Rhee gave a very brief statement. To be a 
little facetious, it amounted to about the statement that "We are in a 
hell of a fix." 

Senator Welker. And he was in a hell of a fix. 

General Almond. Undoubtedly. And we recognized it and so did 
he. General MacArthur then asked the chief of staff of the Korean 



I 



INTERLOCKING SUBVEHSiON IN COVEUNMENT 20GI 



Army wliat his plan was in (he fmor<>(Micy. His reply was that he 
was ^oin<r to mobilize 2 million youths in 8outh Korea and repel the 
invasion,''which had already happened. That was a little impractical. 
Mr. Mnecio tlien gave his 'impression and he gave a very sound one. 
1 have the highest respect for Mr. Muccio. 1 never saw him before, 
and I haven't seen him since, except during the Korean war, but he 
liad real courage in the interpretations that he gave us and his attitude 
toward repelling the invasion. General MacArthur then said, "AVell, 
I have heard a good deal theoretically, and now I want to go and see 
these troops thai are straggling down the road/' 

"We got three old, broken down cars and got them there at Suwon, 30 
miles out of Seoul, the capital. We drove to the south bank of the 
Han Eiver, where we could see the enemy firing from Seoul to targets 
on tlie south hank. We were within probably a hundred yards of 
where some of these mortar shells were falling. It wassafe enough, 
so we had no worry. Going up that road from Suwon for a distance 
of 30 miles, we passed many trucks, many stragglers, many men in 
groups, all smiling, all with rifles, all with bandoliers of ammunition 
around them, all saluting, showing that they were discij^lined— they 
recognized that some dignitary was coming along. "We had some 
MP's Avith us, some Korean MP's, and some policemen clearing the 
road. They all smiled. General MacArthur made the remark. He 
said, "It is a strange thing to me that all these men have their rifles 
and amnuinition, they all know how to salute, they all seem to be 
more or less happy, but I haven't seen a wounded man yet." That 
indicated that nobody was fighting, that they had lost their leader- 
ship, and th-at is what happened. The best men in the world can't 
fight without coordination and determination. 

Some fight better than others individually as guerrillas. But any- 
how, that gave him the idea of just how bad the situation was. We 
then returned to Suwon and took off, as I told you, between YAK 
bombings, and went back to Tokyo. I think that night we began a 
series of telecon conferences with our Government here, in the Penta- 
gon, which enabled General MacArthur to personally, from personal 
observation, interpret how bad the situation was. 

It was during that period just before and duriuf^ this trip to Korea 
that it became known to us, much to our surprise, I will say, and 
much to General JNIacArthur's surprise, that this country was going 
to participate in armed action in Korea. None of our plans had in- 
volved this, had included this. Our plan and our mission was to 
evacuate our diplomatic and military training personnel (KMAG) 
from Seoul in case of adversity. We had done that by June 28. But 
in these telecons, it developed that it bad been decided by the United 
Nations to iutsrvene in Kor^a in some way. The first manner was 
by the way of supply. When we learned that we were to supply the 
Korean armed forces, the question went back "Where do we land 
these supplies and how?" 

As I recall it, it was stated that we would put these in at Pusan, the 
soutliern port. The reply that went back from our headquarters was 
to the effect that Pusan might not exist in our hands any too long, and 
perhaps not more than a day or two longer. "Plow Avould we land the 
supplies then?" The directive then came back. It must be re- 
membered that in the meantime we had received the instructions that 



82918°— 54— pt. 25- 



2062 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

the United States Air Force and the United States Navy would assist 
the South Koreans in opposing the NK forces and in restoring order. 

We knew from our trip to Korea on June 29 that the South Koreans 
had lost their capacity to restore order anywhere for tlie reasons 
that I have just recounted. Our rejoinder to that concept of "restoring 
order" was that this could be looked upon with little confidence. 
Whereupon, we were directed to place defense forces to protect the 
port of Pusan in Korea to the extent of one regiment of infantry so 
tliat supplies to the ROK government could be sent by us from Japan. 

The rejoinder that the Pentagon received from that statement was 
that "that is totally inadequate." That reply by General MacArthur 
caused a suspension of conversation over the telecon, to be resumed 
30 minutes later. 

In 30 minutes the telecon was resumed, whereupon General Mac- 
Arthur was authorized to use the forces necessary in his opinion to 
protect the port of Pusan. The question then came, "Do you require 
any further instructions?" The answer was "No." That terminated 
the telecon and General MacArthur immediately ordered three divi- 
sions under General Walker, the bulk of the Eighth Army, to Korea, 
because he knew the situation was so bad that nothing short of a funda- 
mentally sound military movement would salvage it. I don't think 
you have to have me to testify that even that wasn't enough for the 
next 3 months. The immediate action that was taken was barely 
enough to drag along so that General Walker could maintain the 
semblance of a continuous line in the defense of Pusan, called the 
Pusan perimeter. 

Senator Welker. Now, General, I am sure you are farriiliar with a'n 
article appearing in the Saturday Evening Post on August 22, 1953, 
written by General Bradley, which stated, and I quote : 

By some miracle our forces held in Pusan and the "brilliant Inchon operation" 
carried our forces northward faster than the Communists anticipated. 

Just how miraculous was that initial period? 

General Almond. That article that you refer to. Senator, is the one 
entitled "A Soldier's Farewell"? 

Senator Welker. That is it, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to intro- 
duce into the record excerpts from A Soldier's Farewell by General of 
the Army Omar Bradley, which appeared in the Saturday Evening 
Post on August 22, 1953. 

Senator Hendrickson. Without objection, the statement will ap- 
pear in the record at this point in the general's remarks. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 495," and is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 495 

[Source : The Saturday Evening Post, August 22, 1953] 

A Soldier's Farewell 

By General of the Armv Omar N. Bradley, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, as told to Beverly Smith 

* * « « 4: « * 

The quality of the Communist North Korean Army which made tlie original 
attack indicated that Soviet leadership had spent at least 2 years in secretly 
training and equipping it. Thus they had plenty of time to think out their plans, 
which doubtless envisaged a series of possibilities — somewhat as follows : 

First possibility : The powerful North Korean Army routs the lightly armed 
South Koreans and grabs the whole peninsula within 2 or 3 weeks — before the 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 20G3 

U. N. or the United States can docide whctlier to iiilervene. This would wreck 
the prestige of the U. N. and iirt)ve to all wavering' nations tliat America would 
not tight to protect her allies. Southeast Asian countries would then be ripe for 
one-by-oue iilucking. 

Second possibility: The United States and the U. N. intervene, but, not realiz- 
ing the power of the Conuniuiist drive, are promptly and humiliatingly kicked 
ont of South Korea. From the Communist viewpoint, this possibility would have 
been in someways preferable to the tirst in its demonstration of Communist power 
and American-allied weakness. 

Third possii)ility: The United States and the U. N. uitervene and l)y somo 
miracle man.-ige to hold. In that case, they might eventu.ally drive the North 
Koreans back north of the 3Sth parallel. In this event, an enormous army of 
Chinese Comnuinist "volunteers," secretly readied in advance, would strike south 
from Manchuria, overwhelm the battle-tired allied troops and drive them into 
the sea. This came close to fruition in the winter of 1950-51, but our lines held. 

Fourth possibility : The tired allies somehow manage to check the Chinese 
hordes. In this case the Communists had to think of the possibility that the 
Ann'ricans, enraged and impetuous, would make war on Communist China, at- 
tacking her ports and cities by sea and air, and eventually bogging down in an 
all-out Asiatic war. During the process, America's strategic Air Force could be 
heavily depleted l>y operational losses and RUG attacks. Then the Communist 
leaders would really have America over the barrel. They could start their world 
■war or seize all of Europe, without any very effective counteraction available. 

To the materialistic mind it would seem that such a plan could hardly fail. If 
any one of the possibilities came to pass, it would be a great success. And yet, as 
we now can see, each one of the possibilities — if this is the way they figured it 
out — successively l)roke down against the courage and calm spirit of America and 
the free world. 

The United States and the U. N. acted with unprecedented speed in coming to 
the aid of the South Koreans ; the lines at Pusan held firm ; General MacArthur's 
brilliant Inchon operation carried the line northward faster than the Commu- 
nists anticipated ; the Communist Chinese armies, rushed into the conflict sooner 
than they had forecast under the third possibility, struck with less power than 
they could have mustered a few weeks later. The allies lost heavily, were driven 
far southward, but recovered their balance and moved again toward tlie 3Stli 
parallel. 

At this point there arose an honest difference of opinion between the Joint 
Chiefs and their deeply respected brother-in-arms. General IMacArthur. The Mac- 
Arthur controversy was broad and many faceted, and I wish here to touch briefly 
only on its militiiry aspect. General ]\IacArthur wanted to carry the attack 
directly against Communist China or parts thereof, and he believed this attack 
would have decisive results. It was a soldierly desire. Any one of the Joint 
Chiefs, if he had been in local command in the Far East, might have urged a 
similar course. But the duty of the Joint Chiefs as a group was to consider the 
world military picture as a whole, and the fourth possibility (above) was a real 
one in our minds. Our overriding concern must be the safety of the United 
States — no less. The action urged by General MacArthur, we felt, would hazard 
this safety without promising any certain or proportionate gain. We may have 
been wrong. As of today, I still believe that we v.'ere right, because at that par- 
ticular time we did nf)t have the necessary armed might to risk such a course 
of action, as well as the safety of Europe. 

General Alhiond. I have read that. I have a transcript of part of 
it here, and I have written a comment on it which I would like to 
read. 

Senator Welkf.r. Very well, sir. 

General Almond. My remark is that : "Otir lines held in spite of the 
restrictions and limitations imposed by our own Government, and our 
casualty rates were enormous." That is the first comment I have 
on that. 

The second one is General Bradley sets up the same "strawman" as he 
has done on every other opportunity. Tliat is, "Communists might 
attack us after we weaken our strategic Air Force." That is a quote. 
lie never seems to consider what we might gain by a strong reaction to 



2064 INTERLOCKmG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Eed Chinese aggression. Any military commander knows the tre- 
mendous risks the Chinese were taking by operating hundreds of miles 
away from their bases of supply. This comment applies to the situa- 
tion after the Chinese had attacked. And so does General Bradley's 
article written after the Chinese attack? 

Senator Welker. General, may I interrupt you? Would you re- 
peat, please, your first comment on the question that I asked you ? 

General Almond. I would be glad to, yes, sir. You were speaking 
about "cur lines held." Of course they held. American lines always 
will hold unless they are too much restricted in what the command 
aw^ay from the front imposes. 

My comment, though, is that our lines held in spite of the restrictions 
and limitations imposed by our own GoA'ermnent, and our casualty 
rates were enormous. There isn't any doubt about that. 

Just take the record of the 24th Division, starting with General 
Dean's battalion at Osan on July 4, 1950, when he lost the whole 
thing, being overrun by NK forces. But that wasn't "the line" that 
General Bradley was talking about, as I assumed. He talks about 
this line in the winter of 1950-51, "but our lines held.'' 

I was saying in the second comment, General Bradley sets up the 
same strawman as he has done on every other opportunity. The 
Communists might attack us after we weaken our strategic Air Force." 
He never seems to consider what we might gain b}' a strong reaction 
to Chinese Red aggression. My own comment is that "any military 
commander knows the tremendous risks that the Chinese were taking 
by operating hundreds of miles away from their bases of supply. 
"VVliat if we had defeated the Chinese ? AYhy does he not consider this 
eventuality in his analysis? General Bradley was oriented toward 
Europe and nothing could budge him from it."' 

Senator Welker. Would you repeat that, please ? 

General Almond. I say General Bradley's analysis of the world 
situation was oriented toward Europe, he says so himself, and nothing 
could budge him from it. He could not visualize tlie effect on Russia 
or China in the logical supposition that we might win. As a matter 
of fact, the entire Saturday Evening Post article by General Bradley 
in my opinion was "an apology" for being wrong. In his estimate of 
what we should have done in the Far East, General MacArthur's 
wisdom and vision will endure as long as time runs. I doubt that 
many in the next generation will recall this apology entitled "A 
Soldier's Farewell." 

Senator Welker. Now, General, based upon your distinguished 
service to your country, do you feel that few, if any, commanders 
could have handled the Inchon operation as it was handled ? 

General Almond. Do I think that any field commander 

Senator Welker. Few, if any, great field commanders or generals, 
such as General MacArthur, could have handled the Inchon operation 
as it was handled. 

Gejieral Almond. Well, I think General MacArthur is a master at 
that kind of operation. He told me when we were formulating this 
operation that this was the 11th amphibious operation that he had 
engaged in since he left Australia, fighting back up the axis. He 
said, incidentally, if I may continue, "this is the largest force that 
I have ever had, and I have the greatest hopes for it." 



INTEULOCKLNU &UBVKHS10N IN GOVERNMENT 20G5 

Senator Wei.kek, When did the planning of the Inchon operation 
commence? 

General Almond. When? 

Senator Welkeh. Yes. 

General Almond. It was alwaj^s in General MacArthur's mind from 
the time that he realized how hard pressed General AValker was going 
to be. Knowing the capacity of the troops that he would be likely 
to get, he knew some master stroke had to be conceived and executed 
in order to give the relief to those hard-pressed forces that we iirst 
sent straight into the face of the enemy. lie at one time, before the 
Inchon landing was ever conceived in its eventual guise, considered 
sending the 1st Cavalry Division over on the west flank of Korea 
to help General Walker by an amphibious envelopment. He onco 
considered sending the 1st Cavalry Division in at Inchon, but the 
condition with which General Walker was faced grew worse so rapidly 
that before we could load the 1st Cavalry Division, we had to send 
it in to General Walker's area landing it at Pohang-Dong to block the 
enemy which was upon General Walker, and we couldn't trifle with 
any wide envelopments. That is why the 1st Cavalry Division went 
in on the east coast of Korea and joined up and very soon took its 
position in front of Tague. Later on, always having it in the back of 
his mind I would say, General MacArthur racked his brain and the 
brains of all the statl' as well, to find out how we could assemble a force 
sufficiently large to make a strategic effort to relieve the enemy 
pressure uj^on the front that General AYalker was having so much 
difficulty defending north and west of Pusan. He didn't have the 
troops required. He was constantly rushing one unit from one side 
to the other, like a fire brigade putting out a fire. He would grab the 
24th Division and put it in a gap and pull it out 3 days later to give 
it some rest, when another gap would occur in some other place, and 
he was then forced to put this unit back in the line again. He had 
tremendous trials and tribulations. The forces with which he had 
to contend and those of the enemy are shown on this map (see p. 2111, 
exhibit 498-A). 

General MacArthur then began to search for more troops than the 
Department of the Army thought were available to him at the time. 
Almost as if by a miracle, those troops were made available, to a large 
degree, by General Shepherd, now Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
then Fleet Marine Commander on Admiral Radford's staif in the 
Pacific Naval Forces who was making a visit to General MacArthur's 
headquarters. 

In conversation. General Shepherd said, "Why don't you use some 
marines?'' General JVlacArthur's reply was, "Well, I will use the 
Marines if you can get them for me." lie also said, "If you will give 
me the Marines you will solve a lot of my problems." 

From that conversation developed the essence of the Inchon landing. 

We knew that if we could get a division of marines, that we would 
have that much to go on, and we were willing to try to get other troops 
from the Department of the Army. We then also decided to build up 
the 7th Division then in Japan with replacements, a ])art of which 
General Walker needed very badly, but we were trying to make this 
coup at Inchon which we thought would be most beneiicial; and I 
think it proved so. 



2066 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Witli those tanoible assets and tlie promise of a marine division, 
General MacArthur directed me, as Chief of Staff, to have a plan 
prepared for a landing on one flank or the other of Korea with the 
objective as Seonl. 

We studied this problem for a little while and we came up with 
Inchon as the selected point. The details are of no matter here. But 
the Inchon landing was planned and executed in 23 clays from the 
time we got the word "go" until we landed there, only 18 miles west of 
Seoul on the 15th of September, 1950 (see pp. 2112, 2113, exhibits 
498-Band498-C). 

Senator Welker. Now, will you tell me, General, what sort of sup- 
port or cooperation did you receive from Washington. 

General Almond. Well, Washington, of course, was very interested 
in these plans. They had already told ns that troops were extremely 
limited. That is why we asked for the Marines. 

They even brought to our attention how strenuously General Walker 
rieedecl what we were trying to divert to this flank operation. I am 
sure General Walker was conscious of that. We certainly were. We 
never thought for a minute that he did not need them. 

But General MacArthur's solution was that "if we could strike in 
the rear, at the heart of the enemy's communications, it would do more 
good than any other way." Events proved him right. 

As these plans developed, General Collins and others came over 
to Tokyo and discussed them with us. It advanced from one stage to 
another, and finally we sent an officer back to the Pentagon with our 
completed plan, which was presented before the Joint Chiefs of Staff', 
and approved by them. Thus began the movement toward Inchon. 

Senator Welker. General, if the whole operation from July througli 
September was so miraculous was not the calculated risk of these who 
launched us into that action a very great one indeed ? 

General Almond. The calculated risk was recosmized as beine not 
hazardous but problematical. General MacArthur had at manv times 
so assured everyone, and had so assured Admiral Sherman, who was 
concerned with the technical side of this operation. It is one thing 
to order a thing, and another thing to carry it out. You appreciate 
that fully, I know. 

The technicjue of utilizing the Marines with many types of special 
equipment, with amtracks, landing boats, cranes, air support from 
carriers, and submarines and mines and so forth, were all technicalities. 

I would not say we were plagued with them, but we were abundantly 
confronted with them and repeatedly confronted with them as being 
reasons for not attempting the Inchon landing. 

General MacArthur thought the risk was worth the result, and I 
think the result proved that he was correct. 

Senator Welker. Now, General, considering the unrestrained 
criticism, the Veterans of Foreign Wars episode, and the failure of 
normal moral support and protection by the Pentagon from ill-in- 
formed press criticism, and attack by our own allies, have you ever 
wondered whether we were meant to win or whether there were com- 
mitments made at that time ? 

Senator Hendrickson. Commitments not to win ? 

Senator Welker. Yes; in the words of General Van Fleet, who 
appeared before this committee. Commitments made that we were not 
to win at that tima. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 20G7 

General Almond. Senator, I have no way of knowiniif what coni- 
niitnients were made. 1 can only answer to that to say that tlie thin;i;s 
as they happened looked very stran<^e insofar as the assurance with 
wliicli the enemy appeared to operate. I think it would have been 
a very hazardous thino- for the (^hinese to enter North Korea in tlio 
abundant numbers in which they did if they had thou<j;ht that their 
bases of rice or ammunition or any other base would be subject to 
attack. 

Is that what you mean ? 

Senator Welkek. TJiat is It. Thank you very much. 

Now, Counsel, I am sorry I interrupted. 

ISIr. Cakpen'I'ek. I Avould like to retrace this inquiry for a moment. 
General. I do not believe we had finished the period of 194:l)-50 
(British policy changes). 

General Almond. 1 was np to December 1949, of the llritish policy. 

INIr, Carpenti.r. I would like for you to finish that at tliis time, 
please. 

General Almond. I was saying that in December, after IMalcolm 
MacDonald had given us the basis of anti-Communist action in the 
southeast Asia area and in Asia proj^er, in December, the British 
recognized the Ked Chinese Government as being the de jure govern- 
ment of China. 

It was explained to me very carefully once by the British Am- 
bassador in Tokyo that there was a dift'erence between the de jure and 
de facto status of the recognition — an explanation which he volun- 
teered and I did not seek. 

The following spring, in 1950, all British heads of mission through- 
out Asia and southeast Asia were assembled in Singapore to meet 
with Mr. MacDonald, and there they had a 2- or 3-day discussion. I 
am sure, from the rumors I heard in Tokyo when those from our area 
returned, that they must have been receiving a reorientation of policy 
because the British Ambassador in Tokyo in his conversation with me, 
and there was nothing secret about it — he was very frank about it — 
assured me that the United States Consul General Angus Ward 
incident, which had happened in December 1919 in Mukden, was very 
unfortunate in that, had it not happened, our Government as well as 
his own would have recognized Eed China. 

I was astounded as far as our Government was concerned, and I 
told the Ambassador so. I said in reply, "I have no idea what course 
your Government will take. I do not believe that my Government 
intends to recognize Eed China. If it does, tluit fact has not been 
communicated to me either formally or informally." 

Therefore, that seemed to me a very distinct reversal of policy as 
to how we could combat communism in Asia. 

IMr. Carpenter. General, I believe General ]\IacArthur has indi- 
cated that the neutralization of Formosa was a tipoff to the Chinese 
Reds that they would enjoy unprecedented sanctuary and that the 
Chinese Reds must have known our efforts would be limited before they 
crossed the Yalu. Do you agree ? 

General Alimond. AVell, I can only judge by what I saw on the 
Soth of July when General INIacArthur and his staff, of which I was 
one, went to Formosa. I saw the face of the Generalissimo and 
Madame Chiang and his Chief of Staff and other Chinese staff 
officers; the consternation with which they accepted the ruling that 



2068 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Formosa or an invasion of the Chinese coast was forbidden to tliem. 
When we got down there their whole theme was "How much can you 
help us to get back to China?" 

To answer the second part of your question, I am sure that if I were 
a military commander of a squad, or up to the size of a field army, if I 
thought that I could block any particular section of my problem out, 
it would make it easier for me to operate on the balance of my front. 
Therefore, the neutralization of Formosa, in my opinion, was a 
facility which the Chinese took advantage of in order to concentrate 
all of their troops, their worthwhile troops, in the north — having no 
concern about the south. 

It may not have been contemplated that way when the decision was 
made, but contemplations, in my opinion, ought to be temjDered by the 
probable result. 

Mr. Carpenter. To a military commander that was very obvious, 
was it not? 

General Almond. Very, to me. 

Mr. Carpenter. General MacArthur has also stated that his orders 
to bomb the Yalu bridges were countermanded within a matter of 
hours. From your extensive experience, would you say this was ex- 
traordinary promptness on the part of the Pentagon? 

General Almond. Yes, I think that was pretty prompt. 

Mr. Carpenter. Does it suggest a decision based on commitments 
which may have been taken earlier in anticipation of such an eventu- 
ality? 

General Almond. Not necessarily. That prohibition might have 
been issued in following out or carrying out a policy within which it 
would fall. Therefore, if the policy was well established, it might have 
been very easy to answer yes or no. If it was indicated that the policy 
would cover it, that is. On the other hand, a complicated problem, 
even though in conformity with the policy, might require much longer 
to reply to or evaluate. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, I believe you are familiar with General 
MacArthur's remarks that appeared in the New York Times on Sun- 
day, February 1, 1953. 

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce these excerpts 
into the record. 

Senator Welker (presiding). It will be so ordered, and will be 
made a part of the record at this point. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 496" and is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 496 

ISource : The New York Times, February 1, 1953] 

Text of MacAethur Remakks 

Here is the text of the statement by General MacArthur, as released by his 
aides last night : 

"That reported decision of the administration to revolie the order to the 7th 
Fleet requiring it to protect the Red Chinese mainland against combat opera- 
tions by the free Chinese forces on Formosa will correct one of the strangest 
anomalies known to military history. This order, issued in June 1950, proved to 
be a fundamental error which has contaminated the entire far eastern situation. 

"Its restriction upon tlie activity of the free Chinese forces gave public notice 
that the Chinese Reds were to enjoy unprecedented sanctuary in the struggle for 
Asia between the forces of communism and those of the free world. It was 
undoubtedly this decision, with its implications, which emboldened the Chinese 



I 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2069 

Conmmnist forces to intervene in iucreasin?,' stronsth in Indochina, in Korea, 
in Tibi't, and along the entire iieripliery of Ilieir aggressive advance in Asia. 

lAIMUNllY HKU) i'ACTOlt 

"Actually it was this protection wliich iiernutled the transfer of the very 
Communist armies assigned to the constat defense of central China for the 
attack upon our forces in Korea. Indeed, the concept of such sanctuary im- 
munity uncpiestionahly predominantly intiuenced lied China to enter the Korean 
conflict after the North Korean armies liad heen destroyed. For, in tlie absence 
of assurance that his bases of attack and lines of supply to Ids rear would be 
safe, uo military c()mnuinder lacking both uaval force and air cover would have 
comnntted large forces across the i'alu River. 

"As a matter of historical record, wlieu he did so, I immediately ordered the 
destruction by air bombardment of the bridges across the Yalu wliich would 
have imperiled his entire force. Within a matter of hours my order was 
countermanded and these bridges, augmented and increased, have since borne 
millions of marching feet and hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies and 
munitions to sustain the enemy's operations against our hard-pressed forces. 
It has been stated that the purpose of tlie order to the 7th Fleet was to 
prevent the spread of tlie war, but the result has been just the opposite. 

"It laid tlie basis for altering the localized character of the Korean conflict 
and set the stage for furtlier involvements just as appeasement and indecisiveness 
have always done. Tlie moditication of the 7th i'leet's orders should be 
supported by all loyal Americans irresi)ective of party. It certainly is time for 
this change." 

General Almond. I think I have commented on that, liave I not? 
I just said my connnent on that was, after readinrjj this, I accompanied 
General MacArtluir to Formosa on the 25th of July, a month after 
this order of June 1950. I saw the consternation that was on the 
Generalissimo's face, and all of his associates. 

I wholly agree with General MacArthur's statement that this neu- 
tralization of Formosa was a clear signal to the Reds to move north, 
which they did. I have no way of knowing Avhether it was pre- 
meditated or not. 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time I would like to introduce into the 
record excerpts from an article in the U. S. News & World Report 
entitled "Bradley Defends AYorld Policy of the United States," dated 
March 28, 1952. 

Senator Welker. It will be so ordered, and introduced into the 
record and made a part of the record at this point in the proceedings. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 497" and is as follows :) 

ExHiiiiT No. 407 
t. Source : U. S. News & World Report, March 28, 1952] 

(Foregoing are excerpts of address l>y General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Junior Chamber of Commerce 
of Pasadena, Calif., on March 20.) 

Bradley Defends World roLicY of United States 

STRATEGY I.\ KOKEA — USE OF AIUPOWER — TKUCE NEGOTIATIONS 
******* 

The top-priority problem on our military docket— tlie war in Korea — has been 
tough from the very beginning. Despite the military odds against us, uo de- 
cision, at the time it was talieu, had such complete support from the Americaa 
people as our decision to oppose the outright aggression in Korea. But militarily, 
it has been an upliill fight all the way. 

We have a long and successful history of tackling every problem directly. We 
pitch in, appropriate enough money, build enough equipment or weapons, and 
slug it out for enough rounds to win a decision. We usnally start our military 

32018°— 54— lit. 25 4 



2070 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



operations when we have built up our strength and are ready to launch an 
offensive. 

But in Korea we were in the scrap before we were militarily ready. We 
started with less than an Infantry battalion when the South Koreans had their 
backs to the wall. We opened up on the defensive. 

When we have to fight, we Americans like to fight on a big scale, with plenty 
of elbow room. However, because we did not want to enlarge the war unneces- 
sarily by bombing in Manchuria, we have tried to fight the war in a limited area. 

The decision not to extend the bombing to INIanchuria and China was taken 
after long and careful thought. It was felt that the results would not be de- 
cisive ; that such bombing might incite hostile bombing behind our lines, or might 
bring on a general war. 

It has given some a feeling of frustration that we have withheld part of our 
airpower. Americans felt like a fighter who doesn't really have enough room to 
swing. We have withheld what Americans consider our "Sunday punch" — the 
atomic bomb — because strategic bombing to be effective must be aimed at the 
source of supply. And we all know that the main source of Communist supply is 
not in China. 

There is no guaranty that airpower in any of its dimensions would be decisive. 
An air attack by the United Nations on China might possibly trade the small 
deadlock in Korea for larger stalemate in China. 

Even with our war limited to Korea, we proved to the enemy that his aggres- 
sion was not successful. So they offered to sit down and talk truce. 

Truce negotiations have now dragged on for over 8 months. This is not the 
fault of the United Nations or the United States. 

We could have secured an armistice by agreeing to all Communist demands. 
This would have sacrificed all that we had gained, and would have proved that 
the Communists can succeed by aggression. 

The negotiators for the United Nations are working hard to settle the last 
three major points. Of the original problems on the agreed agenda, there 
remains our disagreement with the Communists on the rehabilitation of some of 
their North Korean airfields and the exchange of prisoners of war. In addition, 
there is the recent introduction of the Soviet Union as a possible member of the 
neutral truce inspection team. 

:): sK >l< * IK * * 

No summary of the military outlook would be complete without facing the 
Inevitable question : If the Soviet Union and her satellites really have the in- 
tention of conquering the free world, why haven't they attacked before this? 

They have attacked and are attacking every day — by any means they consider 
advantageous. In the cold war, they have taken advantage of our free press, 
free speech, and free economy. They have used our freedoms, and our support of 
freedoms, as modes of attack. Every medium has been used to spread the Com- 
munist line. 

The Communist directors have used the technique of war by satellite in Korea. 
If it is allowed to become a successful method, they may be encouraged to try 
some more of it. 

They have not started an all-out war. Maybe it is because of our atomic stock- 
pile, and our airpower, and because they have watched the rehabilitation of the 
peoples in Western Europe. 

We don't know what the Soviet imperialists intend to do. But from a military 
viewpoint, I believe that if we continue to work for collective-security arrange- 
ments that help our allies to help themselves, we will continue to deter the 
aggressive designs of the enemy. 

I believe that the actions we have taken so far will continue to have the sup- 
port of the American people. The moves we have made are morally right, 
politically and economically feasible, and spiritually well founded . 

The citizens of the free world have criticized themselves for a lack of positive 
military policy. We have accused ourselves of failing to act, and allowing our- 
selves only to react to the aggressor's moves. 

The situation is different today. We have positive programs for security. We 
have a sound military policy that has taken the initiative for peace as a deterrent 
to war. 

Mr. Carpenter. General Almond, are you familiar with this article, 
and. could you comment on it ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2071 

General Almond. I road that over. "We have to remember that 
this was March 28, 1952, 8 months after 1 left the Korean front. 
Bnt the significant part of those remarks, as they strnck me, was liis 
statement, the first ])ara<;raph of the excerpt, maintaining that the 
American people ^vere solidly behind onr decision to o])pose the out- 
right aggression in Korea. 

JNfy comment on that is if this was so why did onr administration 
insist that it was a police action when it could have stated the serious- 
ness of it and mobilized sufficient forces? For one, I don't appreciate 
the Korean war, having fought in it, being termed a "fracas, as was 
done by General Collins, then Chief of Staff, United States Army, in 
the Senate hearings in May 1951. It was a great deal more than a 
fracas, as it has been termed by witnesses that have appeared before 
congressional committees who have talked about the "fracas occurring 
in Korea" and the great problem in Europe. 

The problem wasn't in Euro])e then, in an actual way. The prob- 
lem was in Korea where we had a quarter of a million men engaged. 
And with the result that we now know of, 142,000 casualties and some 
$20 billion. That didn't start as a fracas; it didn't start as a police 
action, from the 29th of June, 4 days after it started when General 
JNIacArthur saw the condition of that South Korean army. It was 
never a police action to us. That is my comment. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, when you testified before the subcommit- 
tee of the Committee of the Senate on Armed Services in April 1953, 
you stated, on page 33 : 

I became conscious of what we call tlie sitdov/n war about the 1st of May, 
before the Chinese attack on the IGth of May 1951. 

"Were our forces north or south of the 38th parallel at that time? 

General Alimond. "Were they ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. 

General Almond. They were south of the 38th parallel, I believe. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, do you have a map? Could you identify 
on the map and go into detail so that we can see it, these various 
locations ? That was never well reported in this country, General. I 
believe it needs clarification by one who was there. 

General Almond. The Chinese made three distinctly large attacks 
in Korea, in my opinion. The first one was in early December against 
the Eighth Army and against the X Corps at the Chosin Reservoir in 
1950. That attack— on this other map (see p. 2114, exhibit 498-D) 
eventually resulted in the Eighth Army withdrawing as far south as 
Seoul. 

"When this first attack occurred the X Corps was over here [indi- 
cating], from "Wonsan and Hamhung and on up toward the Chosin 
Reservoir. The Eighth Army was in this vicinitv [indicating]. (See 
p. 2115, exhibit 498-E.) 

Mr. Carpenter. "Would you identify that? 

General Almond. This vicinity is south of the crossings of the Yalu 
River at Antimg, Sinanju, Sinuiju, and south of JNIanpojin on the 
Yalu River, where we found so many Commies had crossed unknown 
to our own forces, even unknown to our Air Force reconnaissance. 
But that concentration of some 8 or 10 or more divisions against the X 
Corps initially was done at night very surreptitiously, and the Eighth 
Army was also suddenly confronted with great masses of Chinese 
against the South Koreans on its right flank with a strong attack. 



2072 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

That attack resulted in the Eighth Army's right flank, where the 
South Koreans were, being crushed. It caused a readjustment of 
Eighth Army forces to the extent tliat they withdrew in the face of 
superhuman odds; you might say, in numbers up to 20-to-l odds; 
gradually down into the vicinity of Seoul along and south of the 38th 
parallel. That was the first attack. (See p. 2116, exhibit 498-F.) 

The second atack occurred on the 22d of April 1951, and this attack 
was on the front of the I Corps and in the vicinity of Uijongbu and 
some 20 miles north of Seoul. That attack involved about 38 Chinese 
divisions ; 24 of these were badly handled, and the Chinese withdrew 
from the 22d of April to about tlie 30th. ( See p. 2117, exhibit 498-G.) 

On the 8th of May 1951 General Marshall testified before a com- 
mittee of Congress that the Chinese were so badly handled in that 
attack of the 22d that forces of the CCF probably wouldn't be em- 
ployed again in an important attack for months. 

In exactly 8 days from the time he made that statement the Chinese 
moved, as this map indicates (see p. 2118, exhibit 498-H), five army 
corps across the front, from the front of the I Corps, where I am 
pointing to, to the front of the X Corps, north of Hongchon, where 
I am pointing to now, and which corps I commanded at the time; 
175,000 Chinamen attacked the 2d Infantry Division here north of 
Hangye, with the idea of destroying that division, also about here 
[indicating] (see p. 2119, exhibit 498-1), splitting the EOK Army 
on the right of the 2d Division from here to here [indicating] away 
from the Eighth Army, driving a wedge through there and blocking 
off the Eighth Army from its base at Pusan. 

That attack materialized on the 16th of May. (See p. 2119, exhibit 
498-1.) 

This chart shows the extension from this line [indicating] to this 
position [indicating], that it went to. In that effort the X Corps, 
composed of 3 American divisions and 4 ROK divisons, sustained 
14,000 casualties, 7,000 Americans and about 7,000 EOK's. 

For 6 days while this battle was going on day and night, after 
the second day, we withdrew each night to a new line and bent with 
the wind or the breeze of the enemy attack. 

If you ever read The Three Bamboos, an intriguing Japanese story, 
that is what the Three Bamboos, three powerful Japanese brothers, did. 
They accepted every situation in the best possible shape, readjusted to 
meet the next situation, and that is what we did. But we also captured 
many prisoners during that battle. 

"VViien my intelligence officer indicated to me that this great force 
of 175,000 men which had turned our flank virtually enveloping the 
X Corps and which was coming down like this [indicating] and strung 
out in this direction [indicating] (see p. 2119, exhibit 498-1), when 
they had consumed most of their rations and a great part of their 
ammunition — well, that is when we struck back at them. It has always 
been my concept of battle that "if our force is tired the enemy might be 
tired as well." With that philosophy and the pretty certain knowledge 
that his supplies were running low, if not exhausted, and with General 
Van Fleet's full cooperation and understanding — he being present on 
the battlefield or always nearby — it seemed time to go to a counter- 
offensive. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVEUSION IN GOVERNMENT 2073 

General Van Fleet and myself discussed this at great length. Most 
of the reserves were either in the line or just behind it, including his 
own. 

I asked him to give me the 187th Airborne Kegiment, a fine outfit, 
with close to 5,000 men in that regiment, his last resource, including 
the supporting artillery. 

On the 22d we started the attack. "We drove across the enemy's rear 
on an axis of attack from Ilongchon to this point called Inje, and in 
the next 2 or 3 days this complete enemy force, down here (see p. 2120, 
exhibit 498-J), reversed itself and started hiking for the rear. They 
lost every piece of transportation that they had in this area. "We 
captured groups of pack mules and pack animals which they should 
have been able to get out except that the horses and mules were poor 
and the supplies were exhausted. 

"With this result, by the 1st of June we had regained much of this 
territory that we had lost in December and January 1950-51, and some 
more besides. 

About that time, I will say between the 1st of June and the 1st of 
July, when we were readjusting this line, a thing happened to me 
that I have never experienced before. By private conversaton with 
my commander, the Eighth Army commander. General Van Fleet, I 
was told to halt my troops on that line and advance no further and only 
take action in an aggressive way that would either straighten out and 
stabilize that line or protect the lines of my men. In other words, it 
was decided somewhere above General Van Fleet's head, and where I 
do not know — I complied with the orders — that when we had defeated 
this huge force that General Marshall didn't think could be employed, 
but it showed that the Chinese not only had 36 divisions over here, 12 
of which could be deployed, and were according to my map (see 
p. 2118, exhibit 498-H), but they had more, and did employ them to 
the extent of 137,000 Chinamen and 37,000 or 38,000 North Koreans 
against this one sector [indicating] (see p. 2119, exhibit 498-1) — that 
when they did that they were using the cream of their army, and when 
we defeated that cream I think we were entitled to capitalize on it. 

In defense of this line I had told my men — I not only told them 
but I landed in a helicopter along their line in every battalion, 11 
battalions across this front, Avith the X Corps — I told them that they 
would stay in their established positions until somebody in authority 
ordered them to leave, which they did. 

I have no hesitation in the interest of my country in ordering men 
to battle if I think that it is worth while and that something useful, 
as this line which we had built to defend as here shown, will result 
from it. 

I have a great resentment when I find that 7,000 of my own men 
and 7,000 of my allies, the Koreans, including a French battalion and 
a Dutch battalion — with four nations being involved — in finding that 
I am not permitted or I am prevented from obtaining recompense for 
those losses when the mission of any battlefield commander is to win 
in the field and not be denied a victory for his forces. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to intro- 
duce the maps that General Almond has used in describing the situ- 
ation as he found it. 

Senator Wei.ker. Very well, thoy and other maps as required will 
be so introduced and made a part of the record. 



2074 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

(The maps were marked "Exhibits Nos. 498-A, 498-B, 498-C, 
498-D, 498-E, 498-F, 498-G, 498-H, 498-1, 498-J, 498-K, 498-L, 
498-M," and ai^pear on pp. 2111-2123, inclusive.) 

Senator Welker. When Secretary of State Acheson testified on 
the investigation of the military situation in the Far East, in the 
first week of June 1951, he stated that "area" should be defined as the 
territory of the Eepublic of South Korea, and the settlement of the 
war as the 38th parallel would constitute victory. 

When were you informed that the 38th parallel would constitute 
victory ? 

General Almond. I was never informed of that fact or decision. I 
was only informed that my troops, which I considered victorious and 
which were prepared to destroy the enemy — this means the X Corps — 
acting in conjunction with the rest of the Eighth Army, and with the 
help of the Air Force and Navy in Korean areas, that could have been 
easily done; the only knowledge I had of that statement by Mr. 
Acheson is the fact that we were ordered not to advance farther than 
that line as a matter of procedure on the battlefield. 

Senator Welker. According to the records of the 1951 hearings, 
the 38th parallel was first crossed by advancing U. N. forces about the 
middle of October 1950. American casualties up to October 13, 1950, 
were 26,083, of whom 4,036 were dead, 4,336 were missing and the 
rest were wounded. Were you then advised that the military job in 
Korea was accomplished ? 

General Ai.mond, I was not, and I have the distinct concept from 
no less than General MacArthur, whose subordinate I Avas, and oper- 
ating under his instructions — and I believe General Walker had the 
same concept — that we were there, we had just about defeated the 
North Korean Army, and we were going to finish it up and that we 
were going to clear up northern Korea and do what the United Na- 
tions had intended, so they say, to reunite Korea as a free, democratic 
republic as quickly as possible. We were in the process of doing that. 

Senator Welker. "V^Hien was the mission changed. General ? 

General Almond. Never, as far as I know. 

Senator Welker. And you have already testified that we did not 
defeat the North Koreans ? Is that correct ? 

General Almond. That we did. 

Senator Welker. You did ? 

General Almond. We did defeat the North Koreans. 

Senator Welker. But you were not permitted to go ahead and com- 
pletely obliterate them as army men should ? 

General Almond. My move in northeast Korea, when some of my 
troops reached Hyesanjin on the Yalu, what we did prior to that time 
is well illustrated by a map that I also have. (See p. 2121, exhibit 
498-K.) 

I am speaking of the X Corps now because that is what I com- 
manded. 

The area to the left of the pointer was the Eighth Army area. This 
over here in northeastern Korea [indicating] is the area for which I 
was responsible. In connection with the defeat of the North Korean 
forces, our forces arrived on the Yalu here at Hyesanjin, on 21 No- 
vember, up here at Chongjin, about this distance, 60 miles from 
Vladivostok. 

In this area south of that line and on down to the 38tli parallel, 
as we advanced w^e established civil government in every town and vil- 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2075 

la^e and hainlot. The fact that we established these contacts and <jjave 
assistance to these people was one of the reasons, I believe, that con- 
fidence in our forces over here and nnder General Walker was built 
n|), "Wherever we went we were tryino- to do somethin*;' worth while 
for the people who lived there. 

"We furnished their medical supplies, clothinfj, shelter, jjasoline and 
oil for their fishin*; boats, and ;Li;asoline for their transportation to 
liaul the lumber for the mountain people, the people in the moun- 
tains, to exchanp,e with peo]de on the coast, lumber for rice. 

Where we came out of this northeast area from Hun<iiuun (see 
p. 2116, exhibit -tOS-F) to rejoin the Ei<ihth Army here [indicating] 
the fact that we brought 100,000 refugees hanging on our LST's — as a 
matter of fact, one L8T had 10,000 people on it, believe it or not. We 
even had a baby born, moving the mother from the gangplank up to 
the top of the L8T. That is how distraught they were. They were 
all kinds of people in all kinds of conditions. But 100,000 refugees 
came out of this area where we had befriended them, and they are now 
on Kojedo and other places in South Korea. I know that. I get let- 
ters from them even to this day. 

Senator Welker. General, you have stated to the committee that 
we defeated the North Koreans. Did we defeat the Chinese Com- 
munists ? 

General Almond. Not at all ; no, sir. 

Senator Welker. Do they now occupy more territory than they 
did in November of 1950 ? 

General AL:M0Nn. Decidedly. When they first attacked the front 
of the Eighth Army they were pretty well up above Pyongyang. 
Now they are pretty well below it. 

Senator Welker. I will ask you if it is not a fact that the Com- 
munist Chinese are a greater power today than they were then. 

General Almond. I think decidedly so, sir. I think they have 
learned a lot from us in military operations that they w^ill never forget. 
They have a finer army. I wouldn't hesitate to say that they have a 
fine army. 

Senator Welker. And now, in concluding this part of my questions, 
T will ask if it is not a fact that in your appearance before the Armed 
Services Subcommittee in April of 1953 you testified, at page 53 of 
those hearings, that you never had any confidence in the truce talks 
because they simply gave the Chinese Communists time to build up. 
The same judgment applies to a protracted armistice as well, does it 
not? 

General Almoxd. Yes, sir. In my opinion. If anyone has any con- 
fidence in the commitments of the Communists in any direction I don't 
know who he is, and I will be glad to have anybody explain his funda- 
mental reasons for carrying out any commitment at any time any- 
where. 

Senator Welker. Reverting to late October and November of 1950, 
were you familiar with the special report which General MacArthur 
submitted to the U. N. on November 5, 1950 ? 

General Almond, What did that have reference to? The indication 
of the Chinese entry into the war? Is that what it was? 

]\Ir. Carpenter. November 5, 1950, a special i-eport of (leneral Mac- 
Arthur to the Security Council of the United Nations. I believe you 
have it, General. 



2076 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

At this time I would like to introduce this into the record, Mr. 
Chairman. 

Senator Welker. It may be so introduced and made a part of the 
record. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 499" and is as follows:) 

Exhibit No. 499 

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee 
on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82d 
Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far 
East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas Mac- 
Arthur from his assignments in that area, part 5, August 17, 1951.) 

[From Department of State Bulletin, November 27, 1950] 

Special Report of General MacArthur to the Security Ccuncil, 
United Nations, November 5, 1950 

I herewith submit a special report of the United Nations Command operations 
in Korea which I believe should be brought to the attention of the United Nations. 

The United Nations Forces in Korea are continuing their drive to the north 
and their efforts to destroy further the effectiveness of the enemy as a fighting 
force are proving successful. However, presently in certain areas of Korea, the 
United Nations Forces are meeting a new foe. It is apparent to our fighting 
forces, and our intelligence agencies have confirmed the fact, that the United 
Nations are presently in hostile contact with Chinese Communist military units 
deployed for action against the forces of the United Command. 

Hereafter, in summary form, are confirmed intelligence reports .substantiating 
the fact that forces other than Korean are resisting our efforts to carry out the 
resolutions of the United Nations : 

A. August 22 : Approximately 50 bursts heavy antiaircraft fire from Man- 
churian side of Yalu River against RB-29 flying at 7,000 feet over Korea in the 
vicinity of the Sui-Ho Reservoir ; damage, none ; time 1600K ; weather 10 miles 
visibility, high broken clouds. 

B. August 24: Approximately 40 bursts heavy anti-aircraft fire from Man- 
churian side of Yalu River against RB-29 flying at 10,000 feet over Korea in 
the vicinity of Sinuiju ; damage, none ; time 1500K ; weather, 20 miles visibility. 

C. October 15: Antiaircraft fire from the Manchurian side of Yalu River 
against a flight of 4 F-51's flying near the Sinui.iu airfield on the Korean side of 
the river : damage, 1 aircraft total loss ; time, 14451 ; weather, overcast at 8,000 
feet ; 8 to 10 miles visibility. 

D. October 16: The 370th Regiment of the 124th Division of the Chinese 
Communist 42d Army, consisting of approximately 2,.")00 troops, crossed the Yalu 
River (Korean border) at Wan Po Jin, and proceeded to the area of Chosen 
and Fusen Dams in North Korea where they came in contact with U. N. forces 
approximately 40 miles north of Hamhung. 

E. October 17 : Approximately 15 bursts heavy antiaircraft fire from IMan- 
churian side of Yalu River against RB-29 flying at 10,000 feet over Korea in 
the vicinity of Sinuiju ; damage, none ; time 12001 ; weather, 8 miles visibility, 
low clouds 2,-300 feet. 

F. October 20: A Chinese Communist task force known as the 58th unit, con- 
sisting of approximately 5,000 troops, crossed the Yalu River (ICorean border) at 
Antung and deployed to positions in Korea south of the Sui-Ho Dam. A captured 
Chinese Communist soldier of this task force states that his group was organized 
out of the regular Chinese Communist 40th Army stationed at Antung, Man- 
churia. 

G. November 1: A flight of F-.51's was attacked early in the afternoon by 6 
to 9 jet aircraft which flew across the Yalu River into Manchuria. No damage 
was done to United States aircraft. A red star was observed on the top of the 
right wing on one of the jet aircraft. 

H. November 1 : Antiaircraft fire from the Manchurian side of the Yalu River 
directed against a flight of 13 F-80 aircraft was observed in the vicinity of 
Sinuiju at 1345 hours. This resulted in the total loss of one U. N. aircraft. 

I. October 30 : Interrogation of 19 Chinese prisoners of war identified two 
additional regiments of 124 CCF Division, the 371 and the 372 in the vicinity 
of Changjin. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2077 

J. November 2: Interrofifition of jn-isonevs of war indicafes Hie HI CC¥ unit 
ill Korea. This unit is reported to iiave same organization as ■">."> and 0(5 units, 
but to be drawn from the 112, llo, and 114 divisions of the oS CC Army. 

K. November 3: Further iuterrosation of Chinese prisoners of war indicates 
Tifi CCF unit orsianized from elements of IIS, 111), and 120 CCF Divisions of 
the 40 CCF Army. 

L. November 4 : As of tliis date, a total of 3;j CCF prisoners had been takeu 
in Korea. 

The continued employment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea and the ho.s- 
tile attitude assumed by such forces, either inside or outside Korea, are nmtters 
which it is incumbent upon me to bring at once to the attention of the U. N. 

General Almond. I have tliis comment on it. 

Part of my forces captured some Chinese prisoners, 1 think about the 
2r)th of October. We found out that these Chinese had crossed the 
Yalu River on the IGth and made contact with the 23d ROK Ilegiment, 
a ])art of my force, on the 2Gth. I interviewed those prisoners and 
reported the identification to GHQ in Tolcyo. I flew to the 1st ROK 
Corps operating under my command, the X Corps, and interviewed 
these prisoners, 

Tlie radio that I sent to General MacArthur is a matter of record. 
It is somewhere in the records of the Department of the Army at the 
Pentagon. 

This statement that we refer to, it seems to me, should have alerted 
the United States Government by means of a realistic evaluation that 
a new war was in the making in Korea and that we must defeat this 
new aggressor. 

I think, instead of alerting us to a new evaluation, it struck terror 
to '"the thinking in Washington'' at the time. 

Senator Welker. AVould you describe to the committee, please, the 
meetings that you attended and the thinking of the top command in 
Tokyo and Korea in the interval between this report and full-scale 
entry of the Chinese Communists? 

General Almond. Would you repeat that, please ? 

Senator Welker. What did you think about it ? 

General Almond. Between what periods ? 

Senator Welker. The time General MacArthur made his report to 
the United Nations. How did your men out there, trying to win a 
victory, think about it ? What was the thinking of you who were there 
trying to protect not only your country but those precious American 
boys that you commandecl ? 

General Almond. I think it was that everything possible should 
be done to assist us who were trying to carry out the mission to which 
we had been assigned. I don't believe I was, as a cor2:>s commander, as 
conscious as perhaps General JNlacArthur's headquarters was, that we 
weren't receiving that assistance. But I have learned it later, and 
I think very deeply on it now. 

Mr. Carpenter. Does that complete your answer ? 

General Almond. Yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to intro- 
duce into the record the statement of the President, President Truman, 
on Xovember 16, 1050, which appeared in the New York Times of No- 
vember 17, 1950. ] 

General Almond, I believe you have a copy of that. Could you 
comment on that, please ? 

May this go into the record ? 

32918°— 51— pt. 25 5 



2078 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. It is so ordered. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit 500" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 500 

(Source: Military Situation in tlie Far East, hearings before the Committee 
on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 82d 
Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East 
and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur 
from his assignments in that area, pt. 5, Aug 17, 1951.) 

[From New York Times, November 17, 1950] 

Statement of the President (Truman), November 16, 1950 

The Security Council has before it a resolution concerning the grave situation 
caused by the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. This resolution, intro- 
duced by the representatives of Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, reaffirms that it is the policy of the United 
Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate, to protect fully legiti- 
mate Korean and Chinese interests in the frontier zone, and to withdraw the 
United Nations forces from Korea as soon as stability has been restored and a 
unified, independent and democratic government established throughout Korea. 

This resolution further calls upon all states and authorities to withdraw im- 
mediately from Korea all individuals or unils which are assisting the North 
Korean forces. I am sure that all members of the Security Council genuinely 
interested in restoring peace in the Far East will not only support this resolution 
but also use their influence to obtain comj)liance with it. 

United Nations forces now are being attacked from the safety of a privileged 
sanctuary. Planes operating from bases in China cross over into Korea to attack 
United Nations ground and air forces and then flee back across the border. 
Chinese Communist and North Korean Communist forces are being reinforced, 
supplied and equipped from bases behind the safety of the Sino-Korean border. 

The pretext which the Chinese Communist advance for taking offensive action 
against United Nations forces in Korea from behind the protection afforded by 
the Sino-Korean border is their professed belief that these forces intend to carry 
hostilities across the frontier into Chinese territory. 

The resolutions and every other action taken by the United Nations demon- 
strate beyond any doubt that no such intention has ever been entertained. On 
the contrary, it has been repeatedly stated that it is the intention of the United 
Nations to localize the conflict and to withdraw its forces from Korea as soon as 
the situation permits. 

Speaking for the Unite<l States Government and people, I can give assurance 
that we support and are acting within the limits of United Nations policy in 
Korea, and that we have never at any time entertained any intention to carry 
hostilities into China. 

So far as the United States is concerned. I wish to state unequivocally that 
because of our deep devotion to the cause of world peace and our long-standing 
friendship for the people of China we will take every honorable step to prevent 
any extension of the hostilities in the Far East. 

If the Chinese Communist authorities or people believe otherwise, it can only 
be because they are being deceived by those whose advantage it is to prolong and 
extend hostilities in the Far East against the interests of all Far Eastern people. 

Let it be understood, however, that a desire for peace, in order to be effective, 
must be shared by all concerned. If the Chinese Communists share the desire of 
the United Nations for peace and security in the Far East they will not tnke upon 
themselves the responsibility for obstructing the objectives of the United Nations 
in Korea. 

General Almond, My statement on this is, first, that this statement 
reiterates the mission of General MacArthur in Korea, when the 
President said "It is the policy of the U. N. to hold the Chinese fron- 
tier with Korea inviolate." 

The other quote is "To withdraw our forces from Korea as soon as 
a unified, independent and democratic government is established 
throughout Korea." 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2079 

of fair intentions toward 



This whole statement '/ixqs every assurance c 
the Chinese Keds, without a sinii'le warnin*!; of the consecjuences to the 
Chinese if they continue to ])ursuc their invasion, which tliey did. 

This announcement must iuvve been the stron<? endorsement of some- 
one in the li*2;ht of what occurred on November 24, 7 days later, and 
our denial to (general MacArthur when he desired to protect his front 
from Chinese knilin<^ attacks by usin<^ his Air Force against Ked bases 
in Manchuria. 

The line that held, accordin"; to General Bradley's A Soldier's 
Farewell, was the line on which so many of our men died without 
benefit of our own and immediately available supporting weapons. 
Fear of the mob or of your own armed opponent never saved a conflict 
in battle of my knowledge. 

Mr. Carpexter. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to intro- 
duce into the record, and have made a part of the record, an address 
delivered on November 17, 1950, by Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chair- 
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the convention of the Associ- 
ated Press Managing Editors Association at the Biltmore Hotel, 
Atlanta, Ga. 

Senator Welker. It will be so introduced and made a part of the 
record. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 501" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 501 

Depabtment of Defense, 
Office of Public Information, 
WasJiinffton 25, D. C, November 11, 1050. 

Address by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Before the Convention of the Associated Press Managing 
Editors Association at the Biltmore Hotel, Atlanta, Ga. 

The military problems of the United States have rarely been as difficult as they 
are today. 

We are participating in active military operations in Korea. We face an 
aggressive power in Europe which might be capable of overrunning the land 
mass of that continent. And in the United States, we are forced to contemplate 
that war, if it comes, may mean the atomic boml)ing of our cities and homes. 

With our own military forces already committed at many points around the 
globe to the protection of free peoples, and the threats to freedom constantly in- 
creasing, where is the American citizen to turn for a sound solution — and even- 
tually for lasting peace? 

Conld we turn to appeasement and acquiescence? In Europe and in Korea, 
the American people have rejected a course of appeasement and acquiescence. 
For we seek the liberty, and the advantages of a free system founded upon the 
dignity and the worth of the individual, as it is stated in the measured phrases of 
the Declaration of Independence. Appeasement would either put an end to the 
freedoms we seek, or it would lead to war. 

Could we then contemplate preventive war? No. the American people have 
rejected any idea of preventive war, for we seek peace. The American people 
would like to see order emerge from this chaos, and security arise from this 
present insecurity. We strive for the political and economic rehabilitation of 
those countries already ravaged by attack. Preventive war is not a means to 
these ends— and does not offer a solution. 

What about a return to isolation? This, too, the American people have rejected. 
For we know that we need other free nations, and they need us. We seek a 
complete freedom of ideas in a world that wel(!omes new ideas. We have re- 
jected the course of isolation, for if American citizens withdraw from world 
political decisions, from woi-ld commerce, and from world leadership, we would 
see the collapse of the United Nations, a reduction of economic wealth and well- 
being, and eventually a return to chaos and insecurity in the free world of 
today. 



2080 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The only course left open to us is the best one — and the one that gives the 
greatest promise. It more nearly suits our ideals and fundamental purposes. 

We must continue the fight for freedom and against aggression. We must 
seek every means possible to avoid war, and to prolong peace. The doors of 
negotiation must always remain open. 

We must continue to help rebuild the economic, moral, and military strength 
of our friends. Wherever and whenever possible, we must enlarge and improve 
the capabilities for self-help and mutual aid among free nations. 

In this course of action lies our chance for success — and for peace. Unswerv- 
ingly we can uphold the fundamental purposes of the American people which 
have not changed in 175 years. 

Almost two centuries ago, our forefathers mutually pledged, in support of the 
Declaration of Independence, and with a tirm reliance on Divine Providence, 
their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor. 

What better could we Americans do today? 

Accomplished in the talents of science, we have created the atom bomb. Today, 
We would gladly trade it for a genuine course of righteousness in the world. 

Acknowledged victors in the art of war, we would prefer the benefits of lasting 
international agreement and tranquillity. Today, we would trade all military 
power for a century of peace. 

But no easy trades are on the open market. We must earn the world righteous- 
ness we seek, and the peace we so earnestly desire. 

Evidently our labors have just begun. 

Unfortunately, the means open to Communist aggression are unlimited, for 
they can try any method, and will sacrifice any civilized advancement to their 
slavery and its wicked ends. 

The means open to freemen are limited to the worthy ones — limited to methods 
that the overwhelming majority of civilized men can recognize unmistakably as 
honorable methods to achieve freedom and peace. 

We may ask ourselves honestly: what means are these? 

First, we can build a strong and wholesome nation, to act as a pivotal center 
for freedom. This calls for preservation of our ideals, and our way of life. It 
calls for protection of every freedom we respect. 

We must maintain and enlarge the industry and productivity that we have 
developed. At the same time, wherever it serves freedom's interest, we must 
share the benefits. 

Next, we must exercise all the means of diplomacy, all the skills of negotiation, 
to enlarge the opportunities for freedom throughout the world. 

In short, we can and must win the cold wars, as well as the hot ones. So 
long as we create the political, economic, religious, and moral strength with 
which to face the threats of International communism, we are on the road to 
success. 

At the same time, we must build the enduring military strength which can 
preserve and protect the United States, and freedom, so that we insure the 
security of this pivotal Nation. This means a rapid rebuilding and enlargement 
of our own Armed Forces, as well as continued support to the reconstruction of 
the military strength of friendly nations. 

It is the reconstruction of this essential military strength that concerns Ameri- 
cans today, next month, and for years to come. None of it is easily done, and 
none of it comes without community and individual sacrifice. 

In broadest outline, the principles of our military security, like the prin- 
ciples of our democracy, have not changed in 175 years. Our military objec- 
tives are three : to create the power to prevent disaster in the event we are 
attacked ; to have in hand the immediate capability of quick and strong retalia- 
tion to the attacker ; and finally, to have a base upon which to build an over- 
whelming force with which we can take up the offensive, and overpower the 
aggressor. 

Any provision short of this would invite disaster. 

It is a bruising and shocking fact that when we Americans were committed 
in Korea, we were left without an adequate margin of military strength with 
which to face an enemy at any other specific point. Certainly, we were left 
without the strength to meet a general attack. In the military sense, the free 
world was left without adequate reserves except for the atomic bomb. 

We cannot continue this unnecessary jeopardy to our own security. As a 
first step, we must build the forces — our own, and our allies — in Western Europe, 
as well as in the United States — which can prevent disaster, and afford effec- 
tive retaliation. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 20S1 

For our share, we need a greater desree of readiness. It rails for more people 
in active military service tlian at any time in our peacetime history. 

Some peoi»le seem to believe that when the Korean war is brought to a suc- 
cessful conclusion, our defenses can once more be partially demobilized. Nothing 
would put us in greater danger. 

So we are going to propose Armed Forces which will solve the threefold mili- 
tary problem as well as we possibly can. The number of combat air groups which 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose for the remainder of this fiscal year will be 
larger than the Air Forces that exist today. 

Since the Navy is sharing with the I'nited Kingdom, and to some degree France, 
the naval responsibility for the North Atlantic Ocean, its buildup is interna- 
tionally important. For not only American citizens but citizens of the whole 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization are depending on the United States Navy. 
Fortunately, we will be able to program the necessary ships, including an ade- 
quate naval air arm for this task. 

As part of the Navy, we are scheduling two full-strength divisions of INIarines 
for the Fleet Marine Force and its naval role. It is unnecessary to point out 
that we are also counting on these two Marine divisions to serve as a supplement 
to the ground army whenever such action is necessary. 

Our defense obviously calls for a larger Army than we have ever had before. 
But this week the Joint Chiefs of Staff are face to face with a difficult problem. 
If we establish the number of divisions and separate regimental combat teanis 
that we need as a bare minimum, our manpower total for Army, Navy, and Air 
Force comes face to face with manpower shortages. They are not real short- 
ages in the sense that in case of war we could not meet the demands. After all, 
in 1945 we had S9 divisions and a great Air Force and a great Navy. 

But in peacetime, we will have to maintain, for many years to come, large 
forces which may cut into the manpower available for industry and production. 
Obviously, we must strike a sound balance between these denmnds. If our re- 
quirements for immediately available forces exceed those we can properly main- 
tain on continuous active duty, then maybe we should restudy our entire system 
of reserves so that we can have more trained units immediately available in 
case we are attacked. 

For examplP, instead of maintaining all National Guard divisions at 100 percent 
officer strength and approximately nO percent enlisted strength— with many of 
these soldiers serving recruit enlistments— perhaps we should maintain some 
of them at 100 percent officer strength and So to t)0 percent enlisted strength, 
with every soldier in th(>se divisions having had the benefit of a couple of years 
of active service. If this were the case, then some National Guard divisions 
could be available for combat almost immediately. 

Similarly, some of our Reserve units should be brought up to this standard. 
In addition to their officer personnel, their enlisted men should liave all had 
at least 2 years' training, and the units should liave annual training periods 
to keep them up to date. 

There was a time when commanders of United States forces could look across 
both oceans and could plan on fielding their first divisions in 6 months to a year. 
That is no longer the case, for the manifest intent of Communist aggression 
as shown in Korea has shortened the readiness time for American forces. 

Somehow we must modify our Reserve and National Guard system — ground, 
air and navy — to meet this new recjuirement. However, until such time that 
units of the civilian components are in this improved state of readiness, the 
American mani»ower resources may have to be severely taxed to create the active 
forces we need. 

While we are building up our own forces, our friends in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization are planning with us, and with our help, an increase in 
the military caiiabilities of their countries. We are working toward an im- 
provejuent in command structure and strategic guidance that will enable our 
combined forces to defend the North Atlantic Community, and to retaliate if 
any part of it is attacked. 

Our strategic concept of mutual defense was fashioned a year ago. In the 
spring we settled upon the balanced collective force principle as the most eco- 
ncmiic and effective means to military strength in the heart of Europe. Last 
month in Washington we were able to sit down at the conference table with 
11 other nations and work out the military commitments and the timetable for 
the creation of these forces which will lead us steadily to an adequate defense 
in Western Europe. 



2082 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The key area of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the land mass of 
Western Europe, anfl its sea approaches. Althonj^h the pivotal strength now 
lies in the United States — and it must be protected at all costs — any tide of 
aggression on the European continent must be met and contained. 

In order to improve the military structure for the defense of Europe we have 
been considering an integrated force, a Supreme Headquarters and a Supreme 
Commander to plan and operate the defense of this area in time of peace. 

However, the Defense Ministers in conference were given a most ditficult 
problem by the North Atlantic Council. The Council had directed "The Defense 
Committee in the light of the information available at the time of its meeting, 
to make specific recommendations regarding the method by which, from the 
technical point of view, Germany could make its most useful contribution to 
the successful implementation of the plan  * *" All 12 nations had agreed 
that a contribution from Western Germany was essential to the adequate de- 
fense of the enlarged ai'ea extending "as far east as possible." 

For 5 years we have struggled to unify Germany and to help Germans toward 
democracy, to peace, and to permanent freedom. To further such efforts, we 
must grant these people an opportunity to defend themselves in the event that 
the Western Powers are attacked. 

It is unthinkable that Frenchmen, Englishmen, and Americans should combine 
with other European nations to defend the line of the Elbe, without allowing all 
of those people being defended, including the Germans, to particii)ate in that 
defense. 

On the other hand, the reestablishment of German armed forces is fearsome 
for a Frenchman to anticipate. Three times in the last century France has been 
invaded by the Germans from the north. However, it is just as difficult for a 
Dane, or a Norwegian, or a Belgian, or a family in the Netherlands to contem- 
plate the reestablishment of a German military menace. They, too, have felt the 
bit of the Wehrmacht sword. 

And the world will not quickly forget the British as they staved off the air 
blitz of 1940. 

But these nations now weigh the greater threat advisedly. With the establish- 
ment of adequate safequards — including no German general staff, no German 
war machine — these nations are willing to devise a scheme of defense for Western 
Europe as far east as possible, with the production, resources and manpower of 
Germany being permitted to make an adequate contribution to the mutual 
defense. 

The enlargement of our defensive zone does not bring the Germans into the 
pact completely forgiven and with a free hand. In my mind, it enlarges their 
opportunity to prove the German people are bent upon a continuing course of 
international cooperation with freedom-loving people, in the hope of preventing 
war, in the purpose of deterring aggression, and if necessary, with the capability 
of helping defend their homeland. 

Our international problem is political and military. On the political side we 
must achieve a measure of German participation which is acceptable to the 
German people and their democratic progress. It must be acceptable and 
tolerable to the French people — and the Danes, and the Norwegians, and the 
Belgians, and the Dutch — while the memory of invasion still burns in their minds. 

From a military standpoint, we must establish a defense of Western Europe 
which is militarily sound, and includes the participation of the total resources, 
productivity and manpower of combined free peoples of Western Europe — includ- 
ing the Germans. 

This month the Military Committee is working on a militarily acceptable solu- 
tion. Simultaneously, the Council Deputies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 
zation are working on a politically acceptable solution to the Gei'man participa- 
tion problem. 

Ver.y shortl.v these two committees will meet and combine their efforts in a 
report to the Defense Committee, which we hope will be acceptable to all 12 
nations, and to the German people. 

I hope that we find a speedy solution to this difl3cult problem. There is urgency 
in our desire to get on with the establishment of an integrated force for the 
defense of Europe. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are 
convinced that a resurgent Western Europe is one of the great hopes for the 
defense of freedom, and the improvement of our chances for peace. As soon as 
the problem of German participation is solved, then we can proceed with our 
plan for an integrated defense force for Western Europe. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2083 

If we are nble to in-ovide adecni^ilt' military support for the protection and 
preservation of freedom-lovinj; nations, freemen need not fear eommunism. We 
Lave, in the free world and esi)ecially in America, the undeniable power of a 
better idea. Our societies hold the individual and his freedom as an end in itself. 
This appeal to mankind is the most contajiious and comix'lliu}; idea in all history. 

Any si"'>"l> of men, or any creed which holds to despotic slavery of one man in 
bondage to another must create a curtain of ignorance between the enslaved and 
the free people. We nuist try to pierce that curtain with enlightenment and tiope. 
It is our purpose to provide that ray of hope as frequently and as constantly as 
possible. 

It is our iiurpose— now, and for the succeeding years — to create the .strength 
that will protect the pivotal core of freedom, the United States, and contribute to 
the protection through self-help and mutual aid of all those people who struggle 
with us for the spread of freedom. 

It is within our power— but the time is short. We have set out upon the long, 
hard road. We must steadfastly continue the march toward freedom and peace. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, I believe you are familiar witli the address, 
and you have studied it. Could you give us your comments on the 
statements contained therein ? 

General At.mond. My first comment is that the purposes enunciated 
in this address are high purposes with which we all agree. The gen- 
eralities are intriguing. I think, referring to the specific thing 1 have 
reference to, that was the first part of it wdiere it was said — 

the only course left open to us is the best one, the one that gives the greater 
promise. It more nearly suits our ideas. We must continue to fight for freedom 
and against aggression — 

and so on. I agree with that. "We must continue to fight it. 
The second is : 

Any provision short of this will invite disaster. It is a bruising and shocking 
fact- 
says General Bradley — 

that when we Americans were committed to Korea we were left without an ade- 
quate margin of military strength with which to face an enemy at any other 
specific point. Certainly we were left without the strength to meet a general 
attack. In the military sense, the free world was left without adequate reserves 
except for the atom bomb. 

This is a statement which proves to me, at least, that Washington 
operated from fear of the unknown. 

It is true that our ready-to-move units were few, but our reserve 
potential was enormous. Where were the 8 million men discharged 
from a victorious army only 5 years before? One of the things that 
General MacArthur asked for early in the Korean war was that suffi- 
cient men of our Organized Reserves be called at once to give our units 
in Korea added strength. This was not done because, I believe, we 
were still trying to pan off on the public a serious military operation 
as a '"police action." 

The Xavy began mobilizing its reserve ships. Why did not the 
Army do likewise? 

When General MacArtliur saw that the reserves were not going to 
be called he asked for Marine reinforcements. I have described to 
you how General Shepherd oft'ered these Marines to him, and finally 
we irot them. 

That is the conunent I have on that. 

Senator Welker. General, may I ask you this question : If you had 
been an enemy weighing the risks of intervention would you not have 
found the insurance that the United States was "caught short and un- 



2084 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

prepared and lacking the strength to meet a general attack" definitely 
enticing? Is it customary to make such information available? Was 
such a revelation, preoccupation with Euro])ean defense, and such a 
detailed account of weakness, well calculated to discourage the Chinese 
Communist intervention ? 

General Almond. I certainly do think the enemy would be highly 
gratified, and I think it is a much worse offense to make such "disarm- 
ing" statements to the enemy than the offense for which General Mac- 
Arthur was relieved. 

Senator Welker. Once the Chinese Communists intervened Gen- 
eral MacArthur issued the following special communique on November 
28, 1950, which I would like at this time to have introduced into the 
record, a copy from the New York Times of November 29, 1950. 

General Almond. The 28th, isn't it? 

Mr. Carpenter, It is November 28, but it is in the New York Times 
of the 29th. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 502" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 502 

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee 
CD Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, S2d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in 
the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of The Army 
Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 5, August 17, 1951.) 

fFrom New York Times, November 29, 1950] 

Specfal Communique Issued by General MacArthur 

November 28, 1950 

Enemy reactions developed in the course of our assault operations of the past 
4 days di.sclnse 'iiat a major segment of the Chinese continental armed forces in 
army, corps and divisional organization of an aggregate strength of over 200,000 
men is now arrayed against the United Nations forces in North Korea. 

There exis*^s the obvious intent and preparation for support of these forces 
by heavy reinforcements now concentrated within the privileged sanctuary north 
of the international boundary and constantly moving forward. 

Consequently, we face an entirely new war. This has shattered the high hopes 
we entertained that rhe intervention of the Chinese was only of a token nature 
on a volunteer and individual basis as publicly announced, and that therefore 
thf^ war in Korea could be brought to a rapid close by our movement to tlie inter- 
national boundary and the prompt withdrawal thereafter of United Nations 
forces, leaving Korean problems for settlement by the Koreans themselves. 

It now appears to have been the enemy's intent, in breaking off contact with 
our forces some 2 weeks ago, to secure tlie time necessary surreptitiously to build 
up for a later surprise assault upon our lines in overwhelming foi'ce, taking 
advantage of the freezing of all rivers and roadbeds which would have materially 
reduced the effectiveness of our air interdiction and permitted a greatly acceler- 
ated forward movement of enemy reinforcements and supplies. This plan has 
been disrupted by our own offensive action, which forced upon the enemy a 
premature engagement. 

General IMacArtliur later issued this additional paragraph to the communique: 

This situation, repugnant as it may be, poses issues beyond the authority of 
the linited Nations Military Council — issues which must find their solution within 
the councils of the United Nations and chancelleries of the world. 

General Almond. Basically, in this he said, "Consequently we face 
an entirely new war. This has shattered the high hopes we enter- 
tained, that the intervention of the Chinese was only a token force 
or volanteer force," and so on. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN COVKRNJMENT 2085 

My comment on that is this statement was tlie plain triilli, wliich 
should have sobered the approach to the problem stated in fhe state- 
ment made by the President on the 17th of November, It took only 
10 days to prove that the U. N. attitude must be reexamined and some 
more -ili'ective steps than pleading with the enemy must be forth- 
coming:. 

JNlr. (yARrENTER. General, was a new directive to cover the new war 

received? 

(leneral Almond. "Was the what, sir? 

Mr. Carpenter. Was a new directive issued at that time to cover 
this new war? 

General Almond. Not to my knowledije, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you familiar with the Joint ('hiefs of Staff 
paper of January 12,^ 1951 ? 

General Almond. No, sir; I never heard of it until I read the pro- 
ceedinirs of the MacArthur inquiry. 

Mr. (yARPENTER. In the President's messaj^e to Con<^ress on Decem- 
ber 1, 1950, he stated that General Mac Arthur's report to the U. N. on 
November 5 had proof of Chinese participation. I'he President also 
referred to possible "dreadful consequences" to the Chinese (^onunu- 
nists, and warned they "must bear the responsibility for those acts." 

Were any new orders issued to implement tliis statement? 

General Almond. Not that I am familiar with. I was prelty much 
concerned wuth my own command around the Chosin Reservoir on 
December 1. But in readinfj; that statement since I have become aware 
of it I have this to say: First, the statement "I am today transmitting 
to Congress a request for additional funds." I say that is 5 months 
too late. I believe if the American people w^ere fully aware of what 
we had done in Korea and were behind it, as General i^radley said, 
then was the time to say "This is going to be a costly effort. Ameri- 
cans, do you desire to su|)port it or not ? If you are behind it. sup])ort 
it and don't beat around the bush continually and 5 months later ask 
for funds to sustain it." 

Up to this time, the time that the President asked for these funds, 
Korean support in arms, tanks, and other equipment, as I understand 
it, had been coming from JVIDAP stores, then coming off" the 
assembly lines. They were intended for our allies — maybe very prop- 
erly. We certainly needed them in Korea. Very properly we should 
have diverted them to Korea. That is where the war was. It was not 
m Iran or Turkey or some other place that these stores were intended 
for. Our men needed what we got, and more in many cases, much 
more. 

In itself, a misuse of our strength to support our democratic allies 
elsewhere is this: This action furthered the President's scheme, as I 
said, to label Korea as a police action, up to this 5-month delay that 
I am talking about, and not to ask Congress for funds for use in 
Korea. This wild scheme thus exploded in the face of the Washington 
planners. 

INIany people have testified that even their budgetary planning for 
the next year — it is in all the papers, it is in all the testimony — in 
planning that budget they say When we put in our estimate we will 
say it was not recognized that a war existed in Korea." 



2086 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

I think the President and everybody below him ouglit to measure 
up and shoukler up to the fact that Ave did have a war there and we 
didn't have "a fracas." 

Mr. (Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to put in 
the President's Messajje to Congress, December 1, 1950, from House 
Document 726, 81st Congress, as well as the communique of De- 
cember 8. 

Senator Welker. Without objection, it is so ordered as a part of 
the record. 

(The documents were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 503 and 504" and 
are as follows:) 

ExniiUT No. 503 

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, bearings before tbe Committee 
on Armed Services and tbe Committee on P'oreign Relations, I^nited States 
Senate, 82d Consress, 1st session, to conduct an inquiry into tbe military situation 
in tbe Far East and tbe facts surrounding tbe relief of General of tbe Army 
Douglas MacArtbur from bis assignments in tbat area, part 5, August 17, lOol.) 

[From House Document No. 726, 81st Congress] 
The Pkesident's Message to the Congress, DECEiiuFn 1, 1050 

To flic Co7ig)Css of the United Btatcs: 

I am today transmitting to tbe Congress a request for additional funds to 
strengtben our defenses. Tbe gravity of tbe world situation requires tbat tbese 
funds be made available witb tbe utmost speed. 

ITnited States troops are no.v figbting as part of tbe United Nations command 
in Korea. Tliey are lighting for freedom and against tyranny— for law and order 
and against brutal aggression. Tbe attack of the North Korean Communists on 
their peaceful fellow countrymen in June was in defiance of tbe IJniled Nations 
and was an attack upon the security of peaceful nations everywhere. Their ac- 
tion, ii unchecked, would have blasted all hope of a just and lasting peace— for 
if open asgression bad been unopposed in Korea, it would have been an invita- 
tion to aggression elsewhere. 

In that crisis, tbe ITnited Nations acted, and tbe United States strongly sup- 
ported that action— for the people of this country knew that our own freedom 
was as much at stake as tbe freedom of tbe Korean people. We knew tbat tbe 
issue was nothing less than the survival of freedom everywhere. If freemen did 
not stand together against aggression, there could be no hope for peace. This 
was essentially a moral decision. We did not hesitate, even though we knew 
we would have to operate at tbe end of lengthy .supply lines, and would initially 
be faced witb overwhelming odds. 

There were serious reverses at first, but the courage and skill of our men, 
and those of other free nations, working together under brilliant leadership, 
drove tbe aggressors back. 

It soon became evident that North Koreans alone could not have prepared tbe 
kind of well-organized, well-armed attack which was launched against the 
Republic of Korea. As Ambassador Austin proved in tbe Security Council of 
tbe United Nations, the aggressors were armed with Soviet Russian weapons. 
From tbe early days of the attack, it became clear tbat tbe North Korean forces 
were l)eing suiipleinented and armed from across the frontier. Men and equip- 
ment were coming out of those dark places which Hp behind tbe Iron Curtain. 

As the United Nations forces continued to defeat the aggressors and continued 
to advance in their mission of liberation, Cliinese Communist particiiiation in 
the asgression became more blatant. General INIacArthur, as commander of the 
United Nations forces, reported to the United Nations Security Council on No- 
vember T) tbe ])roof of this participation. 

Despite this outside Communist aid. United Nations troops were well on the 
way to success in tlieir mission of restoring peace and independence in Korea 
when tbe Chinese Communists a few days ago sent their troops into action on 
a large scale on tlie side of the aggressor. 

The present ag.'ircssion is thus revealed as a long calculated move to defy tbe 
United Nations and to destroy tbe Republic of Korea which was giving a demon- 
stration to llie lieoples of Asia of tbe advantages of life in an independent, na- 
tional, n(m Commnuist state. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2087 

The present attack on the ITnited Nations forces by the Chinese Communists 
is a new act of asRi'cssion— oijually as nailed, deliberate, and uni)rovol<t'd as 
the earlier assression of the North Korean Communists. Cuttinj; tiiroui,'li tiie 
fos of Communist propasanda, this fact stands unmistakably clear: Tlie Chi- 
nese Communists, witlmut a shadow of justitication, crossed tlie border of a 
neishl)oring country and attacked United Nations troops who were on a mission 
to restore peace under the direction of the organization representing mankind's 
best hope for freedom and justice. 

The Cliinese Communists liave acted presumably with full knowledge of the 
dreadful consequences their action may bring on them. The Chinese people 
have been engaged in lighting within their own country for years, and in the 
l)r()cess tlicir lands and factories have been laid waste and their young men 
killed. Nothing but further misery can come to the Chinese people from tlie 
reckless course of aggression into which they have been led by the Communists. 

The United Nations resolutions, the statements of responsible officials in every 
free country, the actions of the United Nations command in Korea, all have 
proved beyond any possible misunderstanding that the United Nations action 
in Korea presented no threat to legitimate Chinese interests. The United States 
especially has a long history of friendship for the Chinese peoi)le and support 
for Chinese independence. There is no conceivable justification for the attack of 
the Chinese Communists upon the United Nations forces. 

The only explanation is that these Chinese have been misled or forced into 
their reckless attack — an act which can only bring tragedy to themselves — to 
further the imperialist designs of the Soviet Union. 

Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists have acted, and they must bear the 
responsibility for those acts. 

Exhibit No. 504 

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee 
on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
82d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation In the Far 
East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Ainiy Douglas Mac- 
Arthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 5, August 17, 1951.) 

[From Department of State Bulletin, December 18, J 950 J 

The Pbesident's Communique of Dfxemheb 8, 1950, Regarding His Conkekences 

With Prime Minister Attlee 

Since Prime Minister Attlee arrived in Washington on December 4, six meetings 
between the President and Mr. Attlee have been held. Among those who partici- 
pated as adviseis to the President were the Secretary of Stare Dean Acheson, the 
Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder, the Secretary of Defense Gen. George 
0. Marshall, the Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman, the Secretary of 
Commerce Charles Sawyer, the (.-haii-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
of the Army Omar N. Bradley, W. Aveiell Harriman, the Chairman of the Na- 
tional Security Resources Board, W. Stuart Symington, and Ambassador-desig- 
nate Walter S. Gifford. Mr. Attlee's advisers included the British Ambassador, 
Sir Oliver S. Franks, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder, Sir Roger Makins, 
and R. H. Scott of the Foreign Office, and Sir Edwin Plowden, Chief of the 
Economic Planning Staff. 

At the conclusion of their conferences, the President and the Prime Minister 
issued the following joint statement : 

"We have reviewed together the outstanding problems facing o\ir two countries 
in international affairs. The objectives of our two nations in foreign policy are 
the same : to maintain world peace and respect for the rights and interests of all 
peoples, to promote strength and confidence among the freedom-loving countries 
of the world, to eliminate the causes of fear, want, and discontent, and to advance 
the democratic way of life. 

"We first reviewed the changed aspect of world affairs arising from the mas- 
sive intervention of Chinese Communists in Korea. We have discussed the 
problems of the Far East and the situation as it now presents it.self in Europe. 
We have surveyed the economic problems and the defense progi-ams of our respec- 
tive countries, and particularly the existing and threatened shortages of raw 
materials. We have considered the arrangements for the defense of the Atlantic 
community, and our future course in the United Nations. 



2088 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

"The unity of objectives of onr two roiintries underlay all the discnssions. 
There is no difference between ns as to the nature of the threat which our 
countries face or the l)asic policies which must be pursued to overcome it. We 
recognize that many of the problems which we have discussed can only be tle- 
cided through the procedures of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. 

"The peoples of the United States and the United Kingdom will act together 
with resolution and unity to meet the challenge to peace which recent weeks 
have made clear to all. 

"The situation in Korea is one of great gravity and far-reaching consequences. 
By the end of October, the forces of the United Nations had all but completed 
the mission set for them by the United Nations 'to repel the armed attack and 
to restore international peace and security in the area.' A free and unified 
Korea — the objective which the United Nations has long sought — was well on 
the way to being realized. At that point Chinese Communist forces entered 
Korea in large numbers, and on November 27 launched a large-scale attack on 
the United Nations troops. The United Nations forces have the advantage of 
superior airpower and naval support, but on the ground they are confronted by 
a heavy numerical .superiority. 

"Tlie United Nations forces were sent into Korea on the authority and at the 
recommendation of tlie United Nations. The United Nations has not changed 
the mission which it has entrusted to them and the forces of our two countries 
will continue to discharge their responsibilities. 

"We were in complete agreement that there can be no thought of appeasement 
or of rewarding aggression, whether in the Far East or elsewhere. Lasting peace 
and the future of the United Nations as an instrument f(^r world peace depend 
upon strong support for resistance against aggression. 

"For our part we are ready, as we have always been, to seek an end to the 
hostilities by means of negotiation. The same principles of international conduct 
should be applied to this situation as are applied, in accordance with our obliga- 
tions under the Charter of the United Nations, to any threat to world peace. 
Every effort must be made to achieve the iiuri)oses of the United Nations in 
Korea by peaceful means and to lind a solution of tlie Korean problem on the 
basis of a free and independent Korea. We are contident that the great majority 
of the United Nations takes the same view. If tlie Chinese on their side display 
any evidence of a similar attitude, we are hopeful that the cause of peace can 
be upheld. If they do not, then it will be for the peojiles of the world, acting 
through the United Nations, to decide how the principles of the Charter can best 
be maintained. For our part, we declare in advance our firm resolve to uphold 
them. 

"We considered two questions regarding China which are already before the 
United Naticms. On the question of the Chinese seat in the United Nations, the 
two Governments differ. The United Kingdom has recognized the Central Peo- 
ple's GovernmeTit and considers that its representatives should occupy China's 
seat in the United Nation.s. The I'nited States has opposed and continues to 
oppose the seating of the Chinese Communist representatives in the United 
Nations. We have discussed our difference of view on this point and are deter- 
mined to prevent it from interfering witli our united effort in support of our 
common objectives. 

"On the question of Formosa, we have noted that both Chinese claimants 
have insisted upon the validity of the Cairo Declaration and have expressed 
reluctance to have the matter considered by the United Nations. We agree that 
the issues should be settled by peaceful means and in such a way as to safeguard 
the interests of the people of Formosa and the maintenance of peace and security 
in the Pacific, and that consideration of this question by the United Nations will 
contribute to these ends." 

****** t 

The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never 
call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that 
it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of devel- 
opments which might bring about a change in the situation. 

Senator Welker. General, did you know, for example, that as 
early as October of 1950 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
was writing about the defense of South Korea and telling the world 
that "Korea is not an area of first-class strategic value." 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2089 

If, as an enemy commander, you liaci heard that address with the 
assurances it contains as to what we would re<^ard as local wars, in 
which we would limit our efl'orts, would it not have affected your 
strate<ry ? 

General Almoxd. If 1 were the enemy ? 

Senator Welker, Yes. 

General Almond. Yes, sir, it certainly w'ould have affected it. 

Senator "Welker. As a matter of fact, it would make you quite 
hap]:)y, would it not ? 

General Almoxd. Very, sir. 

Senator Wfxker. You could not have lost, in other words? 

General Almond. Is that the Header's Digest ? 

Senator Y\^elkeu. Yes. At this time I introduce into the record, 
this Reader's Digest article of October 1950. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 505" and is as follows :) 

EvTTTniT No. 505 
[Source: The Jtcider'a Diupst. Ortolier 1950] 

General Omar N. Bradley, 
United States Military Policy : 1950 

Our foreign policy and our iuilit:u-y policy iu 1950 call for the defense of 
Western Europe from the start, not for a liberation of our friends after they 
have been overrun nnv tbcir homes occupied. 

Korea is a deeitly siiinificant step of United States military policy. The 
American people have made a great decision in Asia, and should know, from the 
military viewpoint, h* w this decision was reached. 

For months many had contended that we must somewhere draw the line against 
Communist aggression in Asia. However, it was recognized that American 
military capabilities should not be unduly weakened by involvement in areas of 
secondary importance and of negligible strategic value. 

K'lrea is not an area of first-class strategic value. In an all-out world war it 
would be extremely difficult to hold. But iu Korea we were bound by an inter- 
national commitment made at Cairo in 1948 and by the action of the United 
Nations in supervising the setting up of the Rei)ublic of South Korea. The Com- 
munist aggression could not be condoned. Any action of the United States would 
be in accordance with the U. N. Charter. And if the defense of South Korea was 
risking all-out war, the choice was not ours, for the Communists had thrown 
down the gauntlet. President Truman's decision to defend South Korea was 
made upon the 'jnanimou^; recommendaticm of his advisers, and with the full 
concurrence of Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense ; the Secretaries of the Army, 
Navy, and A.ir Force; and myself and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 

W^hen th^ President made his historic Korean announcement of June 27, he 
also mentione(t the Philippines, Formosa, and Indochina. 

The Philippine.^ arf- strategically essential to us. Together with Japan, while 
we occupy it, and with Okinawa, they constitute our front defense line iu the 
Pacific. Additionally, we are bound to the Philippines by a treaty of mutual 
assistance. We have air and naval bases in the Philippines. We are now 
strengthening our support there. 

Formosa presents itself now in a new aspect. I have always felt that in a 
world war Formosa should not be in unfriendly hands. I have also thought, 
however, that Formosa was not of sufficient strategic value to justify our occupy- 
ing it at the risk of provoking a war. 

Today, because of the Communist temper revealed by the aggression in Korea, 
we think our fleet should patrol the waters between Formosa and Communist 
China, and it does. We feel that F(»rmosa should be neutralized until its status 
is determined by a Japanese peace treaty or by the United Nations. 

In Indochina the French are using a large proportion of their regular troops, 
plus considerable native forces, against the Communists. The French have not 
asked for American troops. We are sending them some military equipment. 



2090 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

There are numerous other areas of i)otential local wars in Asia. Among them 
are Siain, Burma, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. In fa<-t, the whole vast 
semicircle of Asia from the China Sea to the Mediterranean Sea can be regarded 
as a range of volcanoes that can erupt into local wars at any moment if the Com- 
munists St) choose. Two principles should guide us in our attitude toward all 
such locals wars : 

1. We will recommend aid only to those peoples who are willing to fight Com- 
munist aggression. 

2. We will refuse absolutely to allow local wars to divert us unduly from our 
central taslc. They must not be allowed to consume so much of our manpower 
and resources as to destroy our strength and imperil our victory in a world war. 

No enemy is likely to overcome us unless he first possesses Western Europe, 
which is still the strategic pivot of the world. Let us thereupon discuss the 
defense of the Thiited States, which is our primary aim, and then the defense 
of Western Europe, which forwards that aim. 

General Almond. ]\fy comment on that is, where it says that Korea 
is not an area of first-class strategic value — of course, everybody is 
entitled to his own opinion — I say it just so happens that for the brand 
of Communist expansion with which we are confronte^l, Korea is a 
first-class strategic area of value in which to contest such expansion. 
Nowhere in the world could we have found a better area except for the 
individual hard lighting in which to oppose (-hinese hordes of men. 
I am tallving about the isolation of the area. Nowhere could we have 
found a better area in which to oppose these Chinese. Nowhere could 
we have found a battleground where the base facilities for supply, air 
and naval support are better present than Korea with the areas of 
Japan, the Philippines, and Formosa virtually secure from Chinese 
or Soviet attack, except air attack on Japan from Soviet Asia. There 
are many places closer than Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, but 
what I say is the areas in which this is so isolated, where they could 
not get to us except on the Korean Peninsula. 

This statement shows that the Washington concept excluded what 
might happen in Asia. 

There is another comment that I have. Today, because the Com- 
munist temper is revealed by the aggression in Korea, we think our 
fleet should patrol the waters between Formosa and Communist China. 
I say General IMacArthur's statement. New York Times, February 1, 
lOS'"), on the result of the utilization of Korea, is important. Events 
now past have proven that General MacArthur was right and Gen- 
eral l^radley was wrong. I need add nothing to this series of facts. 
Their noise is deafening to those who listen. The opportunity to 
deal a death blow to expanding communism presented itself in Korea. 
But I don't believe General Bradley ever could see it. 

He could never see that victory in our grasp in Korea would be the 
one beacon to anticommunism throughout the world. We are exactly 
where we started in 1050, on the 38th parallel. 

Senator Weiker. I am not a military man, General, but I woul 1 
like to ask vou this : As a matter of fact, had you been permitted to win 
the war in Korea, in that event you would have saved Indochina also; 
is that a correct assumption ? 

General Almond. I think so, sir; decidedly. I think the failure to 
win has given the Chinese Communists great incentive to proceed 
farther than they ever hoped to proceed at this time. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to introduce 
an excerpt from a speech delivered before the National Association of 
lladio and Television Broadcasters, Chicago, 111., on April 17, 1951, 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2091 

by Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army, entitled "Korea, the Key 
to Success or Failure." 

Senator Welker. It will be so admitted. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 50G" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 506 
[Source: Vital Speeches of the D.iy] 

Our Worldwide Strategy — Korea, the Key to Success or Failure 

By Omar N. Bradley, General of the Army 

(Delivered before the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcast- 
ers, Chicago, 111., April 17, 1951) 

It is hard to realize that our relatively small-scale military operations in Korea 
hold the key to the success or failure of our worldwide strategy. 

in the hands of our Lnited Is'atious' soldiers, sailois, jiud airmen, fighting 
the unwarranted attacks of twice as many North Korean and Chinese Com- 
munist aggressors, rests the possibility for peace. Success in Korea may prevent 
a new incident, and may prevent World AVar III. Failure in Korea will only 
invite another aggression. 

When our forces were in the throes of withdrawal last December, many people 
who saw no point to further struggle, were recommending that we give up the 
fight. Nothing could have been more disastrous for the South Koreans, the 
United States, the United Nations, and the ultimate chances for peace in this 
world. 

As much as I hate war, if we had abandoned Korea under any less circum- 
stances than being driven out, we would have dealt a tragic blow to the hopes 
of freemen everywhere for peace. 

Adding up the military pros and cons of the situation, there is no early end in 
sight to the Korean war under present conditions. As far as we can see now 
there is nothing transitory, nothing temporary about the Communists' determi- 
ation to drive us out of Korea, and, if possible, to destroy our forces completely. 
We may strive for peace, and a cessation of hostilities, but while so doing we 
must continue to tight. 

policy objectives 

Foreign policy is the expression of a nation's instinct for survival. Military 
policy comprises the practices of a people in the organization of their military 
resources for defense. 

There is little immediate danger of this country being overrun ; but our way 
of life, our freedom, and our Nation have the best chances for survival by keeping 
peace in the world. 

This is the overriding consideration of our national foreign and military poli- 
cies. Any recommended course of action which would enlarge the present war 
is contrary to our best intrests, and by jeopardizing world peace, ultimately 
would threaten our security. 

In Korea our foreign policy and our military policy are united in three basic 
objectives : 

First, to protect and maintain our form of government and our way of life 
against any challenge. On this point we recognize no limitation of expenditures 
or of exertion. 

Second, to seek peace by every means at our command. We will not provoke 
a war against anyone. And we will not wage a so-called preventive war even 
against an archenemy, for this certainly destroys peace. But there is one price 
we will not pay — appeasement. 

Third, to assure peace, not only for ourselves, but for all others. For this 
reason we support the United Nations, realizing that world peace is an integral 
part of American security. 

I would like to emphasize that our military action in Korea is closely related 
to our North Atlantic Treaty efforts in Europe. 

The same guiding principles govern our actions there. We joined in the North 
Atlantic Treaty as a collective defense effort for mutual security. In collective 
action, we multiply our defensive strength. Bound together in a pact, the indi- 
vidual nations gain strength from their close ties, and individually, are more 
secure. 



^ — 



2092 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Not only are we trying to contain communism, but we hope to deter all forms 
of aggreysiou in order to bring peace to the world. 

Through our efforts in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty, and our 
even more positive action in Korea, we have drawn the line — giving unmistakable 
evidence that appeasement of communism is not part of American policy. 

In Korea, comnuinism went, without warning, one step further than it had 
ever gone before, and for the first time resorted to open and organized armed 
aggression to gain its oppressive end, shedding even its pretense of peaceful in- 
tention. 

THREE PEACE FACTORS 

The United Nations had to take some quick, positive action. The decision to 
support the Republic of Korea, first with air and sea power, and then with 
ground forces, was heralded in this country as a sound decision, and given 
wholehearted support. Like every other international jiolitical decision from 
time immemorial, there had to be some authority behind it to make it stick, 
and the task of establishing that authority was assigned to the Armed Forces. 

As we proceed wih the assigned military task in Korea, your military advisers 
and planners are keeping these three important factors in mind : 

Because we are intent upon preventing world war III, we are not making 
moves that might lead to an enlargement of the present conflict, whenever it is 
militarily practicable ; furthermore, because we seek peace and an end of this 
war in Korea, our Government is cautious in every decision that might prolong 
this conflict. I might add that it has been difficult for the men in the field to 
refrain from attacking the airbases in Manchuria. However, Communist air 
intervention has not been a factor in the ground action to date. Neither has 
it been any serious threat to our Air Force. 

And, third, every decision we have recommended has supported United Nations 
unity in the conduct of war. With these principles in mind, we of the United 
Nations are now doing an outstanding military job. 

Conjecture in military afl'airs is always risky and often unwarranted, but I 
would like to give my personal opinion as to some of the accomplishments of 
the Korean decision that may have escaped public attention. I doubt that even 
those who supported this move at the time realized how much more was being 
gained toward world peace. 

I believe that our positive action in support of the United Nations resolution 
was unexpected by the Kremlin-dominated Communists. I think we scored an 
advantage, and disarranged their plans for Asia. 

I think our positive action in support of the United Nations slowed down the 
plans for world domination, not only in Asia, but in other areas in the world. 

The Communist action in Korea indicated to me that the people in the Kremlin 
are willing to risk world war III. I believe the United Nations action in Korea 
gave them pause for thought. 

I would also estimate that our action in Korea may have prevented, at least 
temporarily, Chinese Communist aggression toward Indochina. It may have 
saved Thailand. It may have preserved Formosa. At least it gained time in 
all of these areas. 

There was no doubt in the minds of free men that we had to draw a line 
somewhere. Appeasement would have forfeited our chance to stop communism, 
and encourage them to continue picking off helpless nations one by one. Even- 
tually the international situation would liave become intolerable as the Red- 
dominated areas covered more and more space on the map. 

Today, we are carrying out the military operations to enforce this political 
decision. 

As we carry out these actions, even though it would possibly result for a time 
in a military stalemate, we have already achieved an international victory. 

As long as we are able to confine the battles to Korea and continue to destroy 
tlie Communist aggressors, we are making progress toward our international 
objective of preventing world war III. As long as we are keeping Communist 
forces occupied and off balance and keeping the war confined to Korea, we are 
minimizing their chances for world domination. 

We are going to be faced with some difficult decisions in Korea in the next 
few months. 

To solve them, we must realize that Korea is not a brief, acute attack of a 
new disease ; it is a symptom of a chronic ailment which must be cured. 

In outlining my thoughts on this matter, I have no intention of entering the 
foreign policy field or even urging a particular policy in the conduct of foreign 
affairs. Conduct of foreign affairs is a civilian responsibility. But a soldier 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2093 

can often see strategic perils that the layman might overlook. However, it is 
fundamental that our foreign policj' must be based upon our military capabilities 
to back it up. 

We cannot take the chance of trying to anticipate innnedlate Communist inten- 
tions. AVe can only determine their capabilities, and prepare to meet them. 
Otherwise we would be in a guessing game without a referee. We would be 
playing Russian roulette with a gun at our heads. 

IMPATIENCE NO SOLUTION 

Fundamentally we Americans are apt to become impatient with a situation 
that has no foreseeable conclusion. We all would like to know when the war 
in Korea will be over. 

I wish that I might tell you ; my job would be less difficult If I knew. 

If we examine the Communist capabilities in Korea, we find indications that 
the Chinese Communists are building up for another drive. We must prepare 
to meet it. There is no assurance that even when this attack is dispelled that 
the war will be over. 

In the case of Korea, those who despair of an early solution are apt to become 
frustrated and discouraged. There have been recurring and louder whispers in 
favor of forcing a showdown and delivering an ultimatum to those who encourage 
such "local wars'' and who continue to obstruct sincere efforts for peaceful 
negotiation. 

Any such direct, unilateral solution to the problem would be militarily in- 
feasible. 

I wonder if these responsible citizens have pondered the conditions of such an 
act. Any ultimatum must state clearly the irreducible minimum of what we 
would regard as satisfactory and it ordinarily, if not always, implies a threat 
to use force if the demands are not met. These dissatisfied and impatient strate- 
gists — and they are not representing the views of responsible Air Force oflicials — 
suggest the threat of bombardment as part of the ultimatum. 

Our policy is to avoid war, and to promote peace. 

Our best chance for the survival of our way of life, and our freedom is to 
continue cooperation in mutual security efforts, and to continue negotiation in 
this worldwide conflict as long as possible. An ultimatum would either commit 
us to a so-called preventive war, or gain for us only a temporary respite from 
war until the enemy feels that conditions for his victory were more favorable. 

Enlarging the battle to a full-scale war is never an economical or morally 
acceptable solution to a limited conflict. If at all possible, Korea should be 
settled on the present battleground. 

EOLE OF DIPLOMACY 

The confinement or extension of the area of combat is in the realm of diplomacy 
and international politics. 

However, the military consideration is an intrinsic part of this problem. Our 
armed force will continue to carry out the tasks assigned to them until condi- 
tions permit a political decision to be reached. 

I have mentioned the complexity of the United Nations problems only to 
encourage us in a steadfast course of patience and preparedness. 

The United Nations forces in Korea have done a magnificent job and have 
exhibited a cooperative spirit that is more effective than anyone could liave 
previously imagined. 

The Air Force and the Navy have performed wonders in supporting the 
ground forces in Korea. They have exercised ingenuity and imagination in 
carrying out missions that could not have been anticipated. The Marines have 
performed heroically side by side with our soldiers. 

I am especially proud of the United States Army. 

The soldiers entered the war in platoon strength, building up to a force of 
six divisions which have fought through fierce summer heat and bitter winter, 
usually against great odds, and with platoons and companies, battalions, and 
regiments which were for a long time under strength. 

The American people can be very proud of their Armed Forces and of the 
spirit which these men have shown. 

If we here at home can only measure up to their standards of sacrifice and 
devotion — to their achievements in patience and courage — there is every reason 
to believe that the war in Korea can ultimately be concluded on honorable 
terms, contributing to a hoped-for permaufiit roace in our times. 



2094 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

]Mr. Carpenter. General, w'lW you comment on this statement? I 
believe you have it. 

General Almond. General Bradley, after having said previously 
that Korea was not a first-class strategic area, said on the I7th of 
April, 6 days after he recommended General MacArthur's relief to 
President Truman : 

It is hard to realize that our relatively small-scale operations in Korea hold 
the Icey to the success or failure of our worldwide strategy. 

If that doesn't constitute strategic importance, I don't know what 
does. He had learned the error oi his thoughts in October, and from 
the great strategist. General MacArthur, whom he had agreed should 
be relieved of his command. 

Another comment goes on : 

Furthermore, because we seek peace and an end of this war in Korea, our 
Government is cautions in every decision * * * 

And, third, every decision we have recommended has supported United Nations 
unit in the conduct of war. With these principles in mind, we of the United 
Nations are now doing an outstanding military job. 

He said these three factors that I cited in talking about worldwide 
strategy show how far the JCS could go, under General Bradley's 
guidance, to avoid conclusive victor}^ in the Korean war by force of 
arms. He said we were not making use of the Air Force to attack 
Manchuria. He failed to mention tlie bridges which, if destroyed, 
would leave a million Chinese Communist forces stranded in Korea. 
He said the U. N. is now doing an outstanding military job when, as 
a matter of fact, on the l7th of April, we were clinging to our lines 
like drowning men to a sinking raft, awaiting a huge Chinese attack 
that came on the 22d of April, 5 days after he made this statement, 
and it came again on the IGth of May, as I have described on my map, 
1 month later only 8 days after General Marshall had testified that 
"the CCF could not attack in strength for months to come." 

Either General Bradley did not know the situation, or he was care- 
less in his interpretation of the real facts in order to suit the trepida- 
tions and fears of our American people, who should have been given 
the true picture. 

One more comment. The role of diplomacy. When you are in battle 
and war, I say these are just words for public consumption and all of 
these actions at the present cost of more than $20 billions to the Treas- 
ury, and 142,000 American casualties, and we are now just where we 
were then, on the o8th parallel. 

Senator Welker. You might add the enemy is stronger now than he 
was at that time. You have taught him to fight. Is that a correct 
assumption ? 

General Almond. In my opinion; yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Could we have won the war in Korea in Novem- 
ber and December of 1950 had reinforcements been sent and had 
authorizations for bombing across the Yalu been granted ? 

General Almond. Well, in my opinion ; yes. I don't know whether 
the reinforcements were available in the degree that we would have 
needed them. I believe, as many of the people that I discussed it with, 
as the situation developed, as more force was brought in by the Chinese, 
we might have had to expend more force, but we had the opportunity 
by the use of all our facilities — air, navy, and ground, with a little 
more ground effort and tha intensification of air and navy, esx^ecially 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2095 

planes — (o destroy the bases which were sustaining this great force, 
and that, in my opinion, constituted the potentiality to Min, but the 
thing that frustrated that was the fear oi something that we in the 
Far East did not think was likely to happen, has not happened yat, 
and I do not think it is going to happen until the Soviet decides in his 
own mind that he is ready to accomplish something by force, which 
he is now accomplishing by threat. 

Senator "Welker. I shall never forget the testimony given by that 
great military leader. Gen. Mark Clark, before this same committee a 
few months ago when he testified that he saw witli his own eyes the 
l)uildup of thousands of ]MIG airplanes across the Yalu River and at 
the same time antiaircraft from the enemy shooting down our boys 
flying, but we were not permitted to do anything. That, to me, as a 
ronmilitary man, seems certainly the answer to the question I pro- 
pounded to you, which comes to a later date, not 1050. Certainly we 
had the military force at that tune to have destroyed those thousands 
of MIG planes sitting there in wide open daylight ready as sitting 
ducks, I think he called them. Could we have won the w^ar in 1951 
with, for example, the casualties we subsequently had during the pro- 
tracted armistice negotiations ? 

General Almond. I think so. I have shown on one of these maps 
that we lost 14,000 ROK's and Americans, Frenchmen, and Dutch- 
men, in defending for 6 days. "VVe had the opportunity with a reason- 
able estimate of casualties to return to the oti'ensive, certainly with a 
few more troops than we had, if the go sign had been given. They 
could have been secured. Our failure to do that at, I would say, a cost 
of 25,000 or 30,000 casualties at the most, has now cost us 52,000 since 
that stabilization took place. We had lost 52,000 casualties from the 
time I left Korea on the 15th of July, after this battle, until the time 
the armistice was negotiated. 

Senator Welker. I think you have already testified to this, but do 
you believe an all-out effort to win in Korea would have led to World 
War III as propagandized all over the country ? 

General Almond. I have no such idea, sir. 

Senator Welker. Do you believe with me, a nonmilitary man, that 
if Russia wanted to move in Western Europe she could move in 2 weeks 
and take it ? 

General Almond. I don't know the facts on that, Senator. I could 
not answer that, sir. She could move, but whether she could take it 
or not, I haven't the slightest idea. I don't believe she could, though. 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, I would like to introduce into the rec- 
ord, an excerpt from a statement of Gen. Claire Chennault, which was 
sent to Senator Russell on June 20, 1951. 

Senator Welker. It will be so entered as part of the record at this 
time. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 507" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 507 

(Source: Military Situation in tlie Far East, hearings before the Committee 
on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 
82d Cong., 1st sess., to conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far 
East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas 
MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 0, August 17, I'J.ol, p. 3348.) 



2096 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Statement of C. L. Chennault, Major General (Retired) United States Armt, 

Sent to Senator Russell on June 20, 1951 

******* 

As a matter of fact, available evidence reveals that Stalin is opposed to open 
warfare as a means for spreading communism. He has indicated on numerous 
occasions that he prefers infiltration and overthrow from wuthin. Stalin is op- 
posed to war because he has learned from experience that it is destructive and 
that tlie outcome of war is not always certain. He was forced into World War 
II by Hitler's treacherous attack, and he kept out of the war with Japan until 
he was certain that Japan could not win. He refused to use Russian soldiers 
in Greece thougli there is no doubt that he wanted a Communist satellite on the 
Mediterranean Sea. All of the evidence indicates that Stalin will refrain from 
open war unless Russian territory is invaded or until the time arrives when he 
is convinced that his retention of power depends upon war. 

Then what are his intentions with regard to the conflict between the United 
Nations and the combined Chinese-Korean Communist forces? Why are there 
repeated reports of an increase in Russian troops, airplanes and submarines in 
eastern Siberia? It is these reports that have frightened us into maintaining 
the present limitations upon our military action against the Chinese Communists 
and which caused the sunnnary removal of General MacArthur. It is curious 
that such precise reports of Russian troop movements and dispositions "leak out" 
from Siberia but the vast buildup of Chinese troops and supplies on the Korean 
border last October was concealed from the American Army in Korea, from 
Tokyo and from Washington. Can it be possible that the Siberian intelligence 
leaks are intentional? Has Washington suddenly opened a pipeline under the 
Siberian Iron Curtain or is it only a blow hole which spouts nothing but that 
which the Russians pump into it? 

]Mr. Carpenter. General, would you comment on this statement? 

General Almond. My comment on that is most military evaluations 
and certainly most of our own responsible commanders think, and I 
concur, that the Soviet will never start a war until he is ready and at 
a place of his own choosing; that he has no intention of open warfare 
involving Soviet forces, ground, air, or naval, so long as he continues 
to win diplomatic victory by conference and armed conflict by satel- 
lites. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I have a copy of a tele- 
gram sent to certain embassies in regard to hot pursuit, dated Novem- 
ber 13, 1950, and I will ask that it be introduced and made a part 
of the record. 

Senator Welker. It will be so introduced and made a part of the 
record. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 508" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 508 

(Source: Military Situation in the Far East, hearings before the Committee 
on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States 
Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, to conduct an inquiry into the military situa- 
tion in tlie Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army 
Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, pt. 3, June 1-13, 1951, 
p. 1928.) 

Telegha?.! Sent to Certain Embassies in Regard to Hot Pursuit, 

November 13, 1950 

Please discuss with Foi'eign Minister at earliest possible moment grave problem 
confronting U. N. forces in Korea in use by enemy of Manchuria as privileged 
sanctuary for forces which are in fact attacking U. N. forces in Korea itself. 
See excerpt from Austin's statement to U. N. Security Council on November 10. 

This problem arises in two respects. First, ground forces can move into Korea 
and supply themselves from bases and lines of communication which are largely 
sheltered by immunity of Manchuria. Secondly, enemy aircraft (nationality not 
always known) operate from Manchurian fields, dash into Korea air space to 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2097 

strike U. N. air and ground forces and then fly to safety behind Manchurian 
border a very few minutes away. 

U. N, commander has strictest orders about violations IManchurian territory in 
addition to orders to use extreme care in operations near the frontier itself to 
insure that hostilities are restricted to Korea. This determination to iilay accord- 
ing to the rules imposes most serious handicap in face of an enemy which is will- 
ing not only to brealc the rules themselves but to exploit proper conduct U. N. 
forces. 

United States Government is determined to do everything possible to localize 
conflict in Korea. This is illustrated by rigorous instructions to commanders as 
well as by efforts made to adjust accidental intrusions into Chinese territory by 
offering compensations for damages, et cetera. It is obvious, however, that the 
abuse of Manchuria by the enemy could easily impose an intolerable burden upon 
U. N. forces operating lawfully and properly on U. N. missions in Korea. 

Therefore United States Government wishes to inform government to which 
you are accredited that it may become necessary at an early date to permit U. N. 
aircraft to defend themselves in the air space over the Yalu River to the extent 
of permitting hot pursuit of attacking enemy aircraft up to 2 or 3 minutes' 
flying time into Manchuria airspace. 

It is contemplated that U. N. aircraft would limit themselves to repelling ene- 
my aircraft engaged in offensive missions into Korea. 

We believe this would be a minimum reaction to extreme provocation, would 
not itself affect adversely the attitude of the enemy toward Korean operations, 
would serve as a warning, and would add greatly to the morale of U. N. pilots 
who are now prevented from taking minimum defense measures and for whom 
in case of bomber pilots it is impossible under existing conditions to provide 
adequate air cover. 

For your information we are not asking the concurrence of Government be- 
cause we believe the highly limited application of hot-pursuit doctrine in this 
situation would turn upon military necessity and elementary principles of self- 
defense, but we think it important that Government be notified of the problem. 
Please telegraph any reactions NIACT. 

ACHESON. 

(Note. — Hot pursuit approved by Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense, State, Presi- 
dent. Telegram taken up with six nations only. "Hot pursuit" not granted.) 

Mr. Carpenter. General Almond, can you comment on this tele- 
gram ? 

General Almond. Because certain interests prevailed upon certain 
entities to disagree "with our idea of hot pursuit, which I think our 
own country was favorable to, I say we confirmed the absurdity of the 
reaction to this statement of our intention, best described in the eyes of 
a commander : 

The absurdity is magnified by our United States acceptance of tlie 
policy ''hot pursuit denied." 

I don't agree with it at all. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, if the enemy received information to the 
effect that this proposal approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, De- 
fense, State, and the President, Avas protested by the six countries to 
which it was addressed and that the proposal was thereupon discarded, 
would it not have constituted pretty definite assurance that the United 
States woukl not take stronger measures? 

General Almond. Would not take stronger measures ? 

Mr. Carpenter. That is right. 

General Almond. I think so. 

Mr. Carpenter. Since this matter of "hot pursuit" was rejected aft- 
er General Mac Arthur had notified the U. N. that the Chinese Com- 
munists had intervened as identifiable military units, it was a strong 
indication, was it not, that normal military measures to counter such 
intervention would be disallowed l 

General Almond. I think so. 



2098 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. General, would you care to figlit another war un- 
der the same inhibitions, with the same back seat drivers, and with 
the same channels of information open to the enemy as you had to 
fif^ht in Korea ? 

General Almond. I will always contribute as much as I am capable 
of as a soldier of this Nation. I would deplore beinf? sent on a mis- 
sion which was foredoomed or developed into foredooming where my 
mission originated to gain a decision and I was in any way hampered. 
We have a philosophy in the Arni}^, and all military services, that 
sums up what I mean : It is bad enough to have to fight the enemy; 
it is terrible to have to fight both the enemy and those that you are 
supposed to have sup])ort from. 

Senator Welker. General, do you believe that the United States 
should recof^nize Communist China? 

General Almond. Decidedly not, sir. 

Senator Welker. Do you care to comment on the U. N. and on 
Soviet membership in the U. N. while aiding Communist China, which 
was declared by the U. N. to be an aggressor ? 

General Almond. I have great hopes for the U. N. 

Senator Welker. So do all of us, but what kind of a U. N. ? Will 
you tell us what you mean ? 

General Almond. I have not seen the materialization of any of 
those hopes. I think the U. N. provides a listening post in the midst 
of our country, which has been utilized to the fullest. I would like to 
see the U. N. hold sessions for the next 2 or 5 years — this is a ])rivate 
opinion, and as an American voter now, and retired also, I think I 
can express it — I would like to see the U. N. take up its headquarters 
in Moscow and give our men an oportunity to put their ears to the 
Itussian ground as the Russians have put their ears to ours. 

Senator Welker. In other words, you agree with General INIark 
Clark that the U. N, is now and has been a nest and a haven for spies, 
saboteurs, and people who can come over here and get vital informa- 
tjon that might seriously affect the future of our Republic? 

General Almond. I have no doubt of it, sir. 

Senator Welker. This is a question I wanted to propound to you : 
In the last session of the Congress, the late and great Senator Pat 
McCarran, of Nevada, and Senator Jenner, the chairman of this com- 
mittee, introduced a resolution asking that we sever diplomatic rela- 
tions with the Soviet Union. I will ask you. General, if you care to 
give us your opinion as to whether or not we should go along and have 
relations with them, or should we sever our relations ? 

General Almond. My opinion isn't worth very much. Senator. 

Senator Welker. Yes, it is. It may not be worth a lot to a lot of 
people, but it is worth a lot to the American people who are listening 
and who will read your ]n'of ound testimony, sir. 

General Almond. I think we have done and said so many things to 
counter the Russians to which they pay no attention. I think they 
have shot down so many planes that we should have resented it as a 
national insult. I think they have subjected us to many indignities 
that no nation should accord another, and I think although there are 
sufficient grounds to separate our diplomatic relations or to rupture 
them, as a guide if they wanted to do business with us they should be 
reasonable, according to our standards of conduct, and honesty, and 
sense of cooperation in all these matters. I think they disregard with 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2099 

impunity the statements we make. I don't believe they care, thinkinf^ 
that it Avill amount to nothing, wliether we accept even tlieir excuses 
if they clioose to give them or not. 

I think it might be a good idea to jolt their complacency and see 
AAliat happens then. I don't think it could get any Morse. 

Senator Welker. General, I am thinking now of the Russian people, 
the slave laborers, the people who are denied their freedom, not only 
in Russia, but those in the satellite states under the control of Russia. 
"Would it not have a tremendous eifect upon those ])eople to know that 
we were stop])ing the coddling and the kissing of Russia and that we 
were cutting olf our relations wdtli them, to give them an inspiration, 
a desire, to seek freedom and help, and in the end that they could 
help us ? 

General Almond. I think so, sir. How deep down into the mass of 
those people the information would go, I do not know. I do not know 
how they allow their peo]:)le to even become informed, but if they 
happened to be informed, I think it would certainly be a salutary 
influence. 

Mr. Carpenter. General, in the light of subsequent developments, 
have you ever wondered why the political decisions that hamstrung 
the prosecution of the Korean war so consistently served the enemy ? 

General Axmond. Yes, I have often wondered wdiy we, do the things 
we do. 

JSIr. Carpenter. At this time I would like to introduce into the 
record excerpts from a statement made by General ]\IacArthur as 
printed in the U. S. News & World Report of March 28, 1952, and ask 
that it be made a part of the record. 

Senator Welker.; Without objection, it is so ordered. 

(The document was marked "Exhibit No. 509" and is as follows :) 

Exhibit No. 509 

[Source : U. S. News & World Report, March 28, 1952] 

(Excerpts from General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's address, joint ses- 
sion of the Mississippi Legislature at Jackson, Miss., on March 22.) 

MacArthur Attacks World Policy of United States 

THREAT to ALL ASIA — YALU AS DEFENSE KEY — "bETRAYAL" OF CHINA 

Possibly In Asia, where the record is more fully developed and events them- 
selves have more plainly written the judgment, has the irresponsibility of our 
national policy been most pronounced. There our betrayal of China will ever 
stand as a black mark upon our escutcheon. But the tragedy of Korea comes 
closer to the hearts of the American people. For there thousands of our beloved 
dead give mute evidence to the tragic failure of American leadership. 

There, in the aftermath of victory in World War II, we first undertook the 
protection of the Korean people and the welding of their segments into a con- 
solidated and free nation. Later, we repudiated that purpose and practically 
Invited the aggression which ensued by withdrawing our forces, enunciating the 
policy that the defen.se and consolidation of Korea was no longer within our 
sphere of political and military interest, and simultaneously withholding the 
arms needed adequately to prepare the South Korean defense force. Yet, still 
later after its southern half had been brought under attack from the north, 
we reassnmed its defense and consolidation. 

We defeated the Northern Korean armies. But in the wake of the commit- 
ment of Communist China against us, we again repudiated our purpose to weld 
all of Korea into a free nation and denied our own beleaguered forces the ortho- 
dox military means which offered promise of early victory. We had them fight 
to a stalemated position on the peninsula and left them there to die in a dead- 
locked struggle of position and attrition, while we entered into so-called cease- 
-fire negotiations universally interpreted as our suing for peace. 



2100 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

These negotiations have been luuler way for 8 months, the only noticeable 
result being that the enemy has gained time to bring up artillery, air and mechan- 
ical transport and to perfect his antiaircraft defenses and communications, all 
to gain strength where once his weakness was most pronounced. And the high 
and nol)le purpose which introduced us into the Korean conflict is now no nearer 
fruition than when our Nation was tirst committed to the task. At that time, 
it was our stated intent to punish the aggressor, but through our strange and 
unprecedented war policies, we have inflicted the punishment, not upon the ag- 
gressor, but upon our own forces and upon the Korean nation. 

We have permitted the enemy with impunity to prepare his blows against us 
from behind arbitrary and unreasonable sanctuary. We have protected him by 
holding inviolate his own soil, his warmaking facilities, and his own nearby 
bases of attack. 

We have protected him by preventing, with our own naval forces, any hostile 
movement against his flank by our faithful ally garrisoned on J^ormosa. And 
this despite the fact that such a movement would liave relieved the pressure 
upon our own Army fighting in Korea and thereby saved countless American 
lives. 

And, while we afforded him this measure of protection and the time and battle 
training to permit him to build and perfect his military strength to challenge 
our mastery of the air, we enforced upon the Korean people the dreadful tragedy 
involved in the exclusive use of tlieir soil as the sole battleground. As a conse- 
quence, death has come to hundreds of thousands of defenseless Korean civilians 
and a nation brought under our sacred protection has been devastated and gutted. 

As long as history is written, the shame of this will be recorded, but its more 
immediate consequences will I)e found in the loss of the faith of Asia in our 
Nation's pledged word and the consequent undermining of the foundations to the 
futur"* peace of the world. For our failure to sustain our solemn commitments 
in Korea will probably mean the ultimate loss of all of continental Asia to inter- 
national communism. It might well mean foreclosure upon the chances the 
Chinese may have had to throw off tlie chains of Red tyranny and oppression. 

It perhaps will even mean the ultimate fulfillment of the Russian dream of 
centuries to secure warm-water outlets to tlie south as a means of gaining a mili- 
tary posture of global omnipotence, with the hope of ultimate domination over 
the seaborne commerce of the world. Beyond Asia, Africa would then be exposed 
to Communist hordes dominating the Indian Ocean area, and Eurc»pe would come 
under a real threat of invasion. 

I repeat here what I said many months ago — the first line of freedom's defense 
is not the Elbe, not the Rhine, but it is in Korea on the Yalu. Prejudiced and 
willful voices scoffed at this warning, but there is where the Communists elected 
to challenge our spiritual and military strength and there is where we have failed 
adequately to meet tliat challenge, even though we had the military resource and 
means at our command. 

Our failure has been of the spirit, not of the arms — a bankruntcy of leadership 
In our American tradition. Yet this failure has furnished the Soviet the passkey 
to world conquest. Small wonder that such weakness and vacillation sliould 
cause us loss of faith and respect abroad. Not since the early days of the 
Republic has our Nation been so reduced in the universal esteem. Never have we 
as a neople been held in such douI)t by others. 

Mr. Carpexter. Could you comment on tliis statement made by Gen- 
eral MacArtlmr? 

General Almond. Yes; I will comment, and I will contribute a two- 
line poem I wrote about it. I say this is a masterful statement of our 
failure to obtain by victory on the battlefield what has been nnobtain- 
a'^'^ by any other means and my poetic contribution is : 

"Of all the freedoms which we hold dear 

The one we should cherish is the freedom from fear." 

Fear of what might happen if we lead from strength is robbing the 
free world of its success in opposing ever-expanding communism. 

Senator Wei.ker. General, I have one concluding question. 

One of my friends of the press informed me a moment ago that a 
number of our American boys have been sentenced to from 4 years to 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2101 

life imprisonment behind the Iron Curtain of tlie Communists in Red 
China. I take it that statement woukl merely add to your testimony 
about the shootinc: clown of the planes. Yet, certain of our diplomatic 
officers, more skilled no doubt than the now actin*;^ chairman, con- 
tinually ask for ])eaceful coexistence with people of that type. Do 
you think that will work ? 

General Almond. I don't know anything about coexistence except 
in my own family life. 

Senator Welker. You know we have not had very much luck in 
peaceful coexistence since this thing started, do you not? 

General Almond. Maybe I am mistaken, and very probably I am, 
but I do not have any faith in the kind of coexistence you speak of. I 
know what Mr. Churchill says about it, and I know what other people 
say about it, but coexistence with the Soviet philosophy is just hard for 
me to digest. I cannot well conceive of it. 

Senator Welker. Do you have any further questions ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. General Almond, much criticism has been 
directed toward the separation of the X Corps from the Eighth Army 
in late November 1950. Could you describe the strategy and the rea- 
sons for that separation? 

General Almond. Yes; I will be glad to do so, 

Mr, Carpenter, "What would be your reply to this criticism ? 

General Almond. My reply to the criticism of separation of the 
X Corps from the Eighth Army is that the people who criticize it do 
not appreciate the very basis of such separation. 

At the time this separation was made — we have to remember that 
for the preceding 3 months, because the capture of Seoul was exactly 
3 months after the North Korean invasion, the 25th of September — the 
railroads had been completely interrupted from Pusan, by our own Air 
Force, the base from which the Eighth Army had to get all of its sup- 
plies. General Walker was confronted with a serious guerrilla prob- 
lem back in this area. He left his IX Corps under General Coulter 
back there to clear that up. He moved his I Corps and other troops 
up into this Seoul area, 

Mr, Carpenter. Will you please explain that ? 

General Almond. This area [indicating] is the area of Seoul (see 
p. 2122, exhibit 498-L). With General Walkers operation coming 
up from the south and the Inchon landing coming in from the west, 
there was a merging of these two forces. The problem was to clear up 
North Korea, and North Korea goes from the 38th parallel close to 
VladiA^ostok here and to the Yalu River over on the other side. Gen- 
eral Walker's main problem was to attack and crush the remaining 
North Korean force, wdiich was greatly decimated, but there Avere 
pockets of appreciable resistance. 

The first thing that was thought necessary was to capture Pj'ong- 
yang, the capital of the North Koreans, but the question of supply 
was a very vital one. General Walker had come all the way from 
Pusan to Seoul, some 300 miles. He had come by "combat parties" and 
"attack groups" and by marching the main forces of his army, and 
truck transportation alone supplied his men. One of the great assets 
of the Inchon-Seoul area was to gain another port at Inchon through 
which our supplies could come. The capacity of a port determines 
what you can do with it. As for the capacity, during the Inchon land- 
ing, of the port of Inchon, we tried to put our Liberty ships in to un- 



2102 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

load them. There is a tremendous tide there, which was one of the 
problems in our landing there. Only 4 hours a day can you unload a 
ship. If you don't get that ship in in 2 hours and get it out in 2 more, 
you will iind it lying on its side when the tide goes down. Thirty-one 
feet is the range of the tide. So, the greatest capacity that we could 
expect from Inchon was 6,000 tons a day using LST and lighter 
service to do it. 

Six thousand tons was not a beginning for General Walker's force 
and for the X Corps. The X Ccrps alone had 80,000 troops. General 
Walker had something close to i:0l),000 besides the ROK troops. The 
ROK's had to be fed like anybody else, although they ate a different 
ration. So the question was : Can you get the supplies to this great 
force ? 

Therefore, one of the motivating factors in General MacArthur's 
mind was to take the X Corps, an amphibiously proven force, and not 
some other corps, because the others had not had that experience of 
landing and getting in and out of boats, and so on, to take that corps, 
reload it again, and bring it around here to Wonsan (see p. 2115, 
exhibit 498-E), and put it in opposite to what was the main objective 
of General Walker, Pyongyang, move it across here, and assist him 
from the east by a movement westward from Wonsan. 
Mr. Carpenter. Would you identify that on the map ? 
General Almond. Wonsan is where the X Corps landed. Pyong- 
yang was the objective of General Walker. The X Corps was to 
come in here at Wonsan and join with General Walker when it was 
my understanding, as the commander of this force, that all the troops 
would merge and come under the command of General Walker. 

In the meantime, as this movement progressed, and in fact before 
it culminated, about the 12th or 14th, the KOK's I Corps, Avhich was 
coming up the coast by marching, did make this much and were in 
control of Wonsan. About that time. General Walker pushed his 
forces north from Seoul and took control of Pyongyang. That made 
the original concept of this movement useless, so General MacArthur 
then, on the 27th of October, I believe, issued a new order in which he 
reoriented the mission of the Eighth Army to drive on to the Yalu and 
the mission of the X Corps, not to come across the Taebek Mountain 
Eange here and further complicate the supply situation, but to turn 
and go up in this direction and clear up this area, as I have shown you 
on another map (see p. 2123, exhibit 498-M). 
Mr. Carpenter. Will you identify that? 

General Almond. That area extends from the SOtli parallel, I believe 
it was, north, east of the Taebek Mountain Range, and all the way up 
to Chongjin, which is 60 miles from Vladivostok. So that was the mis- 
sion of these two forces. Here was the mountain range between us, just 
like the Appalachian chain, except worse, with no roads between them, 
so that was the condition in which we found our troops of the Eighth 
Army and the X Corps w'hen this surreptitious move of the Chinese 
crossing into North Korea occurred. 

It is very well to say what you ought to have done beforehand. It 
is a different matter to readjust yourself when a new element is intro- 
duced in a military situation, especially one, as General MacArthur 
has testified, which was a new element in the war, an element that 
required a new study, a new approach. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IX GOVERNMENT 2103 

It has been discussed many times and one of tlie Senators on tlie 
investigatin<x committee, when General MacArthur, General Alarshall, 
General Bradley, and General Collins testilied tried to make the point: 
of the fallibilit}' of General IMacArthnr's concept by the losses he had 
sutt'ered because he did not join these forces soon enough. He said 
that ''it is 300 miles from here to here [indicating] across North 
Korea and it is only 160 miles here across Korea near the 38th par- 
allel." 

We were not there. '\^'e were here. "We were trying to go clear up 
north of the 38th parallel when a new element was introduced. There- 
fore, he claimed that because there were losses here in North Korea, 
and there were some losses here, of course, those losses should be 
charged to General MacArthur's lack of judgment. Therefore, if he 
had lack of judgment in this case, then in his recommendations to the 
JCS later, in such latter case hisjudgment should be questioned, in any 
other case, namel}', a blockade and bombing of these supply bases along 
the Yalu Kiver and these enemy air bases. 

I contest that very definitely. I have told you why these forces Avere 
separated like this, and I tell you now that the fact that General Mac- 
Arthur thought this corps would be a threat in this direction from the 
flood of the CCF invasion, even after these forces developed, that 
thought was a sound one, for this reason: When we first met the 
Chinese at the Chosin Reservoir, we met one division on about the 2Gth 
of October, in the beginning the elements of one regiment. As days 
went on, for the next 10 or 15 days, those divisions grew into 2. 

As soon as the Chinese found a force on their flank, they not only 
sent 2 divisions, but it ended up by their sending 8 more, so that what 
had been a nominal threat to their advance against the Eighth Army 
was now a serious threat to them, so serious that instead of sending 
1 division over here to Hungnam, which our prisoner interrogations 
said was the purpose, they diverted 10 divisions. The CCF main army 
didn't outflank General Walker. General Walker's right flank was 
composed of the III Korean Corps. They never came through the gap 
west of the X Corps. They came through the collapsed III ROK 
Corps of the Korean Army, the ROK Army. When they struck the 
X Corps, they came frontally and around the X Corps flank. When 
they struck the Eighth xirmy, they came through this collapsed Eighth 
Army flank where the ROK's were. They continued on through here, 
but as that penetration widened, then we had to readjust the situation. 

General MacArthur asked me, on the 11th of December, at an air- 
field at Hungnam whether I though we ought to withdraw this force 
here. It is no secret now. I said, "General MacArthur, to leave this 
force here would be a great threat to any further aggression of this 
big force unless the augmentation of the Eigthtli Army caused by 
the force against them required immediate assistance. If it does, that 
is the primary thing and I think the X Corps should be pulled out and 
pulled around here because there are no troops anywhere else so close 
to assist them." 

I do not think I made the decision — I just contributed to it — with 
respect to this movement which took place in 14 days from the 10th 
of December to the 24th, in which we moved from here by our own 
choice (see p. 2116, exhibit 498-F). 

Mr. CARrENTER. From where ? 



2104 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

General Almond. From Huno-nam, where I am pointiiifr, over 
100,000 of our own troo))s, and RUK's, and over 100,000 refugees in a 
number of ships so finely provided by the Navy, and bringing all of 
our own fighting equipment, 325,000 tons of combat equipment, in such 
a manner that, in a week, from the 24th to the 1st of January, New 
Year's Day 1951, this X Corps force had been moved to Ulsan and 
Pusan and disembarked. It had moved to a place east of Taegue, 
which is Knanju, an ancient capital of Korea. It then moved its com- 
mand group and a 1 division force to the second most important rail 
center of Korea, Wonju. So this force was withdraw^n from its com- 
mitted area in 14 days, when the last elements came out, and it was 
redeployed in the south and became the defensive force on the east 
central front on the Eighth Army front, and was operating there on 
the 2d of January. It was done because the Eighth Army needed 
more troops in the face of this great threat and there were no troops 
to come from anywhere else. 

On 11 December General MacArthur had said, "How long could you 
sta}^ here in the Hungnam area if we decided to leave you here?" 

I had said, "As long as you desire." 

Why? Because we had sufficient troops to guard that port. 

We had the entire Navy in the Far East within gun fire of the 
enemy threat. We had a supply line that was only 8 miles long from 
the water. Therefore, we were safe, but we did and ought to have 
contributed to a withdrawing force of the Eighth Army down here. 
We did do that, but had other troops been available to send in there 
and support General Walker, what could be a happier situation now 
with tlie Communists down here on the 38th parallel and us with a 
good, strong force sitting there at Hungnam. I think it would have 
been ideal, but we could not take that liberty with a force that needed 
the reinforcement of a force the size of the X Corps, and that is why it 
came about. So I want to disabuse anybody's mind of the gap the 
Chinese came through and of the illogic of employing the X Corps 
separately from the Eighth Army. It was basically and initially a 
question of supplies, as I have tried to explain. 

It was then modified by the change in the situation in which we 
were picking up the remnants of the North Korean Army north of 
the 38th parallel. 

A new situation later still was introduced which required a new 
estimate. That new estimate was made in some form, I am sure. In 
what form, I am not aware of, but that explains the situation as it 
applied to us there in Korea. 

I gave a lecture to the Army War College, of which I was president, 
6 months after I came back from Korea, and the true situation is a 
matter of record everywhere in the military service that I know about. 

Senator Welker. Are there any further questions, Counsel ? 

INIr. Carpenter. ]\Ir. Sourwine has a few questions. 

]\Ir. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions, the answers 
to which with the questions may take as much as 15 minutes, if you 
can allow the time, to wind up some loose ends in the testimony that 
has already been given. 

Senator Welker. I should say for the record that Mr, Sourwine 
was the counsel for Senator McCarran who passed away on the 28th 
of September. 

You may proceed, Mr. Sourwine. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2105 

Mr. SouRWiNE. General, do yoii remember testifyiiifr very early in 
j'our ai)pearaiice here respectino- a state of confusion in the AVar De- 
i^artment because of a certain investi<»ation ? 

General Almond. Today? 

JNfr. SorinviNE. Yes. 

General Almond. I am not clear on what you mean. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I ask you if you remember testifying at the outset 
of your testimony here respecting a state of confusion in the Depart- 
ment, meaning the War Department, because of a certain investiga- 
tion ? 

(jreneral Almond. You are talking about General jMacArthur's in- 
vestigation ? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. No, sir. I am just asking you if you remember tes- 
tifying about the "War Department being in a state of confusion be- 
cause of a congressional investigation. 

Mr. Carpenter. That was back in 1934, I believe, and 1938. 

General Almond. Yes. I thouglit j^ou were talking about Korea. 

IVIr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember your testimony ? 

General Almond. Yes, I remember that. I took part in it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes, sir. How did you know that the Depart- 
ment was in a state of confusion, General ? 

General Almond. I was in the Latin American section. I had two 
research clerks. These women were people who had been in the War 
Department 20 years. They were high type, intelligent, research 
people. I would say their morale, as far as their job was concerned, 
was about 10 miles below sea level, if you could go that far. They 
thought that all the integrity of our Intelligence Service was at 
stake where we had sent a military attache, for example. Our repre- 
sentatives gain the conlidence of a military man in, w^e will say, Chile, 
or Brazil, or Argentina, or Uruguay, or Paraguay, or some other j)lace, 
Cuba, Central America, or Panama. Our people in the War Depart- 
ment thought that to throw these files open to just any kind of rilfralf 
utilization either for publication or criticism would seriously disturb 
our effectiveness presently and perhaps forever. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. General, was riff'raff seeking the files at that time? 

General Almond. Well, these research clerks thought so. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You spoke earlier of holding the investigation with- 
in proper limits. ^Yhat did you mean by that ? What limits ? 

General Almond. I think Congi-ess, and I think this committee, has 
certainly a complete right to know what is going on in our country, 
and if I thought that that investigation would be reposed only in this 
committee or the committee that was representative of our people, that 
would be all right with me, but if I thought that by giving a confiden- 
tial document, or allowing it to become known to them, and I would 
see it in a book on the 10-cent counter in the near future in order to 
make this fellow some money, I would be seriously concerned about it. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you believe that the legislative branch has the 
right to subpena documents from the executive branch of the Govern- 
ment ? 

General Almond. You are asking a question that I am not a legal 
authority on. I just say that I believe that our Congress has an equal 
right with other branches of the Government to know what is good 
for our peof)le. 



2106 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

]Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think it makes any difference whether the 
documents sought are Army documents or from some other depart- 
ment ? 

General Almond. No, I wouldn't say so. I don't think the Army 
has any special privilege. 

Mv. SouRWiNE. General, while you were personnel officer for Gen- 
eral IMacArthur, did you have a free hand subject to General Mac- 
Arthur's orders, or were there any influences or pressures from the 
outside on you in the performance of your duties ? 

General Almond. When I was the personnel officer? 

Mr. SouRWiNE. Yes, sir. 

General Almond. No, when I was the personnel officer I had many 
occasions to seek personnel and I tried to, but I had short success on 
most of the cases. 

I have S])oken of how we did receive replacements in the Eighth 
Army in the middle of 1948, I believe, and those are my chief con- 
cerns. I don't have anything in mind that interfered with my work. 
I was in military operations. I was concerned with personnel, and 
promotions, and pay, and things of that kind, and the morale of our 
troo):)S. I tried to carry on those duties and I didn't have anybody 
interfering with them to any degree. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. There was no civilian interference that you recall? 

General Almond. No, We had many civilians working with us. 
We had about 3,000 in Tokyo. _ 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General, skip])ing to another to])ic. you remember 
3'ou discussed the partisans and you spoke of finclin^ out later that 
the partisans, included some Eussians. What did you mean by "find- 
ing out later" ? Later than what ? 

General Almond. My contact with the partisans began in Septem- 
ber and October of 1944. My division intelligence officer, my G-2, 
would come to me directly and say, "Now, if it is all right we will use 
a partisan man to make this reconnaissance instead of our own soldier. 
They are dressed like Italians. They speak Italian. They are Italians. 
They are more successful." At that time, I took a partisan for an 
Italian patriot who was seeking some sort of contentment after his 
experience with Mussolini, and when the war was over and I became 
an area connnander in a military occupied area, then I began to realize 
that the people who were directing a lot of these partisan efforts or 
were gaining control of them were Soviets. 

JSIr. SouRAViNE. Thank you, General. 

General, were you in Tokyo when certain Japanese Communists 
were liberated from prison and ridden through the streets of Tokyo in 
American automobiles? 

General Almond. No. I came to Tokyo 9 months after the occupa- 
tion began. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. You remember your discussion of the visit of Mal- 
colm MacDonald ? 

General Almond. Yes. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. What was the policy of Great Britain in and prior 
to August 1949, when ]\Ir, MacDonald arrived ? 

General Almond. With respect to what? General policy? 

Mr. SouRwiNE. With respect to communism, sir, specifically. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2107 

General Almond. I thouolit tliat they were as much interested in 
frustratino- connnunistic tendencies in Japan and elsewhere as we 
were, and tliey may still be, but they just don't show it. 
• Mr. SouRWiNE. It is a fair statement to say that General INlacArthur 
proposed carrying; the attack directly a<rainst Communist China? 

(ieneral Almond. Is it correct? 

]Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes. 

General Almond. No. It is correct to say that General MacArthur 
said we should do everythiuf^ to eject Communist interference from 
Korea, which we were tr^'ino- to do. So many people have tried to trip 
him u]) and trip up other people that he recommended the introduction 
of ground troops into China. It is absurd to observe the efforts of 
those who are alwaj's trying to catch somebody off base, but I don't 
think they have succeeded. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. He never did, as a matter of fact, recommend carry- 
inp: the attack directly against Communist China, did he ? 

General Almond. No. He only intended to do that against Com- 
munist China which would prevent their interfering in Korea as 
they were doing. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt, Counsel ? 

As a matter of fact, no military commander, whether it be Bonaparte 
or whether it be any other great leader has ever been successful in a 
land war against the Asiatics, and certainly the Russians are. Am I 
correct on that ? 

General Almond. Not even Genghis Khan. 

Senator W :lker. That is right. 

General Almond. He endured for 150 years, but that is all. 

Senator Welker. And that commander out of bounds over in the 
hotel in New York would never be so naive as to even suggest such a 
matter. 

General Almond. He said the man that conceived that ought to have 
his head examined. I remember that expression. He told me that 
many times. 

Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember the use of the phrase, "the cal- 
culated risk was recognized as being not hazardous, but problemati- 
cal"? 

General Almond. What was the risk ? 

Mr. Sourwine. I was going to try to find out wdiat the specific 
calculated risk was that you had in mind. I doubt if the record is 
clear. 

General Almond. I think the calculated risk I must have had in 
mind was the calculated risk of doing more than we were doing in 
Korea to win the war and I think the calculation was that based upon 
the knowledge of these people that we had been fighting by a com- 
mander who knew their characteristics and what to expect of them, 
that his judgment that a little more force in certain directions certainly 
"was more valuable than somebody sitting back eight or ten thousand 
miles, each one of whom have admitted that they had never been to 
the theater of operations prior to their visits to the Eighth Army or 
the X Corps after the operation began. General MacArthur s])ent 
more than 25 years in the Far East. He knows more about Asiatic 
tendencies and philosophies than anybody' I know. 



2108 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. SouKWiNE. General, you will recall that counsel asked you 
whether you saw any evidence of a commitment ^uidin^- the orders 
that came from Washington, and I believe you said you did not, but 
suggested that those orders indicated possibly a firm policy, which 
would account for the speed with which General MacArthur got back 
an answer. Do you recall that colloquy ? 

General Almond. Yes, I remember it. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. I wanted to ask you, if we had a firm policy, 
wouldn't that mean commitment to that policy ? 

General Almond. 1 would say so; yes. 

Mv. SouRwiNE. And would it not be reasonable to assume that our 
allies at least were advised of what our policy was ? 

General Almond. I am certain of that. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. So, actually, that would imply a certain measure of 
commitment, would it not ? 

General Almond. Yes, but, as I recall "hot pursuit," as I recall "hot 
pursuit'' in the testimony that has appeared publicly, the Secretary 
of State was directed to contact our allies and get their reaction, and 
Trygve Lie says in his book that the United States being the executive 
agent of the United Nations was not required to have a referendum 
on all these things, although I can see the logic of keeping friendly 
with all of our allies in discussing these problems with them, but cer- 
tainly when you think of the contribution in force, 90 percent Ameri- 
can and Korean, or 95 percent, and 5 percent others, no corporation 
that I know of settles its issues on any basis except a 51 jjercent stock 
vote. 

Mv. SouRWiNE. General, you remember the discussion of Korea not 
being strategically important. Do you think tliat there is a difference 
in that regard whether you look at it from the standpoint of a solely 
defensive war, or whether you look at it from the standpoint of a war 
in which we might take the offensive ? In other words, is it possible 
that the view that Korea has no strategic importance might be argued 
by a man who is considering only defending against the capture of 
Korea, but might not well be defended by a man who is considering 
Korea as a base for operations in a war which he hopes to win ? 

General Almond, I don't know. I can't answer that question. I 
think Korea is of strategic importance. I think this war has show^n 
it. Somebody else, in his view may think it is not important. You 
always write down a number of reasons why you think things, and I 
think if you want to make a point you can usually write down about 
10 things that will support your thesis. Whether somebody else agrees 
with it or not is another matter. 

Mr. SouRWiNE. General, you said it is terrible to have to fight botli 
the enemy and those you 

General Almond. I said, "being hampered." You are in a bad fix 
if you have to contend with the enemy and those who are supposed to 
sui)poi't you. 

]SIr. SouRWiNE. You said those who you are supposed to have sup- 
port from. I wondered who you had to fight that you were supposed 
to have support from. 

General Almond. Not me. I had in mind General MacArthur. 

Mr. SouRWiNE, The "you" is plural. 

With whom did you and General ISIacArthur have to contend that 
you were supposed to have support from ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2109 

General Almond, I believe General MacArdmr had that to contend 
with when he asked for the authority for ''hot pursuit.*' That is an 
exanipk\ 

]Mr. SouRwixE. Any other instances ? 

General Al:moxd. I don't know. There are a number, I guess. I 
don't know what tliey would be. I just know there was constant cau- 
tion of every thino; we did. 

For example, everybody became alarmed with this diagram we have 
hei-e. after it had happened, became alarmed at what was going to hap- 
pen to the X Corps. Messages were sent to General MacArthur that 
''You better be careful. You might lose some forces." 

Senator "Wrr.KER. Who sent the messages? 

General Al:mond. I think they came from the Pentagon. I think 
that is General Bradley's testimony, and I believe General Marshall's 
testimony, and General Collins' certainly, that they were concerned 
at the time, and some Senator asked General Bradley, "Would you 
have done it dillerently ?" 

General I^radley was very magnanimous when he said, "General 
MacArthur was on the grounds. He might have had his own reasons. 
He [Bradley] might have done it differently, but whether my plan 
would have been better than his, I can't answ^er," so I think he had the 
right solution there. General MacArthur had reasons which I have 
tried to explain, the fact that all these Commies came in, but as far as 
danger to the X Corps or danger to the Eighth Army, when you are 
attacked by a greatly superior force, what do you do ? You get the 
heck out of there as soon as possible and readjust your lines in accord- 
ance wath the new development. You just don't run away. Nobody 
ran away over there. They readjusted themselves to the new situation. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. General, how many opportunities did our side have 
to win the war in Korea ? 

General Almond. I think we had one with additional force. If we 
could have reinforced General Walker and left the X Corps up where 
it was on the flank, that is one. I think we had an opportunity, a very 
definite one, even without General MacArthur's request to use the naval 
blockade, air action, and possibly a few more troops on the ground, 
whatever was demanded which he thought would win it, but even with- 
out that, I say that in the month of June, had we taken advantage of 
the defeat that I am satisfied involved as many as 50 divisions of tlie 
Chinese, we had an opportunity then to win it even without General 
Macx^rthur's stipulation of blockade. 

Senator Welker. June of what 3'ear, General ? 

General Almond. 1951. 

]N[r. SouRwiNE. Your answer is, then, we had two opportunities to 
win the war ? 

General Almond. I think so. 

Mr. SouRwiNE. In your opinion, sir, were the same factors respon- 
sible in both instances for the fact that we did not take advantage of 
the opportunity ? 

General Almond. I don't know. I couldn't answer that. I just 
know that in one case, in November and December, when we were badly 
off, had we had reinforcements it would have helped that situation. 
I am not sure that the Chinese weren't greatly surprised at their suc- 
cess in November and December, and I believe they were so surprised 
they were unable to take advantage of it because when they captured 



2110 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Seoul aronncl the first part of 1951, tliey hud battalions down as far as 
Suwon. When they took S?oul, they had battalions down as far as 
tliere. The Eif^hth Army was still in sort of a rocky condition, al- 
though the X Corps had come down and reinforced this Eighth Army. 
They, the Chinese, made no attempt to go farther south at that time, 
but they did later in April and May. 

If they had had all tliat success, they should have pushed their efforts 
then as much as we should have pushed them later on in June and 
July 1951. 

JNlr, SouRwiNE. I have no more questions, Mr, Chairman. 

Senator Wei.keu. Are there any more questions, Counsel ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Nc more, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Welker. (xeneral Almond, it has been the acting chair- 
man's great honor to have been here and listened to you and to other 
great military men, including General Van Fleet, Gen. Mark Clark, 
General Stratemeyer, General Wedemeyer, and others. We have 
omitted to say that General Walker gave his life in the defense of his 
country and men. 

On behalf of Chairman Jenner, the chairman of the full committee, 
over which I am now acting chairman, I want to thank you profound- 
ly, and I know this: that your profound testimony today will have 
an impact on red-blooded Americans all over this land who either have 
given or are ready to give their only sons that this Republic might live. 

It is a great pleasure and an honor to have such a distinguished 
man before us. We expect to continue on with other great military 
leaders cj our forces. I thank you profoundly. You have clone some- 
thing, and I hope that by virtue of your testimony, the American 
people will once again arise and have that strength, that great ability, 
and that wall to win that you and the other great generals have evi- 
denced before this committee. 

Thank you so profoundly. 

Also, before we close, I would like the record to show that the distin- 
guished general who has favored us today by his testimony lost a son 
and a son-in-law in defense of our country in World War II. 

Thank yon again. 

General Almond. Thank you very much, ISIr. Chairman. 

It is a pleasure to be here. 

(Whereupon, at 6 : 05 p. m., the hearing was recessed, subject to the 
call of the Chair.) 

(For acceptance of exhibits which appear on the following pages, 
see pp. 2073-2074.) 



INTERLOCKII^G SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



2111 



ExiiiniT 40S-A 



ATTACK OF NK 

FORCES 

25 JUN - 15 SEP 1950 



JAPAN 




oIlYONSDOK 



WAEGWONl<id!„ [al5^),ANS.D0N<S 



2112 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



Exhibit 498-B 




SEOUL-INCHON 
AREA 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



2113 



Exhibit 498-C 



z9 <« 




w5 ^ 


W< i 


,^>-c/3 St 


H5CU - 
















JS oil 




2114 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



ExHiElT 498-D 




INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



2115 



ExniniT 49S-E 



V II I ' 

\ U S S R 



X CORPS 

ADVANCES INTO 

NE KOREA 




LADIVOSTOK 



YELLOW 



JAPAN 



2116 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



ExHir.iT 498- F 



X CORPS MANEUVER 

TO SUPPORT 

EIGHTH ARMY 



\ 



^ 



^-^ V >— •* OHYESANJIN, 




CHONGJIN 




YELLOW 
SEA 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



2117 



Exhibit 49S-G 




2118 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



Exhibit 498-H 




INTERLOCKIXG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



2119 



EXHIRIT 40S-I 




2120 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



E:>HIBIT 498- J 




INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



2121 



ExniiUT 49S-K 



ESTABLISHMENT OF 
CIVIL CONTROL 



X CORPS 
EIGHTH ARMY 



^ 
"^^ 




YELLOW 



JAPAN 



2122 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



Exhibit 498-L 



ROUTES OF 
COMMUNICATION 



Roads 

— =— ^-^ Rivers 
 ' ' *. ' ". I * Railroads 



J^ MILES 




INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



2123 



ExTiiiiiT 4!)S-M 



X CORPS REDEPLOYMENT 
TO N E KOREA 




JAPAN 



^-\ 






INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 



HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
ON 

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS 



TESTIMONY OF ADM. CHARLES TURNER JOY 



DECEMBER 29, 1954 



PART 26 



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
32918" WASHINGTON : 1935 



Boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

FEB 2 1955 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chairman 

ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ' 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, IlllnolB THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR., Missouri 

HERMAN WELKER, Idaho JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

J. G. SODBwiNE, Oounsel 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act AND Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 
ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

ALVA C. Cakpentee, Chief Counsel and Executive Director 
J. G. SODRWiNB, Associate Counsel 
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 
a 



INTEELOCKING SUBYEKSION IN GOVERNMENT 

DEPARTMENTS 



WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the 
Administilvtion of the Internal Security Act 

AND Other Internal Security Laws, 

or THE Committee on the Judiciary, 

San Diego, Calif. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a. m., in room 359, 
Civic Center, San Diego, Calif., Senator William E. Jenner (chair- 
man of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present : Senator Jenner. 

Also present : Alva C. Carpenter, chief counsel to the subcommittee; 
and Dr. Edna R. Fluegel, professional staff member. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. 

Admiral Joy, I am afraid this is not at all original, but it is a re- 
lief, after all the cartoons, to find that the floor-length beard you were 
supposed to have acquired during the protracted Korean truce nego- 
tiation is nonexistent. 

It is indeed a privilege and a pleasure. Admiral, to meet here with 
you today. Your career has spanned tumultuous decades of our his- 
tory. The very place names that occur in your biography, covering 
as they do both oceans and three great wars, arouse pride and hope in 
the hearts of all Americans. 

You were with the U. S. S. Pennsylvania in "World War I and 
shared in the exultation of victory as you escorted President Wilson 
to Paris for the Peace Conference. You were in the Pacific at the 
time of the Pearl Harbor disaster, but you were also there, fighting 
back to victory, from Bougainville to the Aleutians, from Saipan to 
Leyte, to Manila, to Iwo Jima and Okinawa. You knew the Pacific 
when American prestige and power were paramount and wheUj under 
the beneficent influence of this power, the Pacific had assumed, indeed, 
the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. 

You returned in 1949 when storm signals were up. Again you met 
disaster and again you fought back. Once again you shared in vic- 
tory at Inchon and once again you met disaster and fought back, until 
3'ou were stopped on orders from Washington. 

Even then, at Kaesong and at Panmunjom — where, as you say, "The 
field of combat was a long, narrow, green-baize-covered table. The 
weapons were words" — you fought within the limits prescribed by 
Washington. 

2125 



2126 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

And, from this varied experience, even from the last bitter ordeal, 
you have gleaned the information and the wisdom which we are here 
today to ask you to share with this subcommittee and, through it, the 
American people. 

In 1952, Collier's, August 23, page 31, you stated : 

It has been said that in war there is no substitute for victory. It can also 
be said that in debating with the Communists there is no substitute for the im- 
perative logic of military pressure  * *. In the end, might is essential to right, 
not because you or I would have it that way, but because, unless we have armed 
might and unless we are willing to use that armed might in dealing with the 
Communists, we cannot win our point and, in fact, we may not survive to argue 
our point. 

That was 1952. 

Again, in 1953, Newsweek, May 4, page 38, you stated : 

Of course, by far the best way to negotiate with the Communists in a military 
situation is to apply sufficient military power to give emphasis and meaning to 
your arguments. 

And what of 1954 ? And the future ? 

Four months ago, Senator McCarran, of Nevada, whose death on 
September 28, deprived this country of a great patriot and wise leader, 
addressed the following words to Gen. George E. Stratemeyer : 

And, General, what of today? What of tomorrow? Where are the mission- 
aries and traders, the soldiers and statesmen who gave to the Pacific "the friendly 
aspect of a peaceful lake," a "vast moat to protect us?" You know the answer. 
Not only in the Pacific but throughout the world events confirmed that "the 
Communist threat is a global one. Its successful advance in one sector threatens 
the destruction of every other sector. You cannot appease or otherwise sur- 
render to communism in Asia without simultaneously undermining our efforts 
to halt its advance in Europe." But we continue to appease, and to lose. 

Is it any wonder, then, that throughout the length and breadth of this land the 
questions are asked "why?" and "how?" and "who?" and "where will it end?" Is 
it any wonder that, in these days of peril, we are turning to men like yoiu'self, men 
who should have been consulted and were not, men whose patriotism is tried and 
tested, men who, denied victory, have considered and analyzed and thought 
deeply over the events and the reasons for that denial?  * * For victory, we 
substituted disaster. It is to explore some of the reasons for that disaster and, 
by exposure, to arouse the American people to their jeopardy, that we meet here 
this morning. 

This hearing is a continuation of that effort. Indeed, Admiral Joy, 
nothing but the urgency of the matter and its import for the future 
would warrant this subcommittee intruding on your well-earned re- 
tirement in this jewel (La Jolla) of the Pacific. Yet, here in San 
Diego, where so much history was made, you know well the dangers 
that beset this country for which you fought all over the world with 
such brilliance and such gallantry. 

I repeat. Admiral Joy, it is a great privilege as well as a pleasure 
to meet here with you today. 

Admiral Joy, you were sworn yesterday in executive session. It is 
our custom to again swear you in open session. Will you stand and be 
sworn to testify. Do you swear that the testimony given in this hear- 
ing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God ? 

Admiral Joy. I do. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2127 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES TURNER JOY, ADMIRAL, UNITED STATES 
NAVY (RETIRED), LA JOLLA, CALIF. 

The CHAiR:\rAic. "Will you state for our record your full name? 

x\dmiral Joy. JNIv name is Charles Turner Joy. 

The Chairman. Where do you reside ? 

Admiral Jor. I reside in La Jolla, Calif. 

The Chairman. Would you give us a brief biop;raphy ? 

Admiral Joy. Yes, sir. I was born on the 17tli of February 1895. 
in St. Louis, Mo., and appointed to the Naval Academy from tiie 22a 
Illinois District in 1912. Following; graduation from the Academy 
in 1916, I served on the battleship Pennsylvania until January 1921 
Avhen I was ordered to a postgraduate course of instruction in 
ordnance engineering at Annapolis. Upon completion of this course 
of instruction, which included a college year at the University of 
Michigan from which I received a master of science degree, I joined 
the stall of the Commander, Yangtze Patrol Force, in 1923, as aide and 
flag lieutenant. 

From then on, my tours of duty included routine assignments ashore 
and afloat, such as duty with the Bureau of Ordnance, assistant gun- 
nery officer, U. S. S. California, ordnance officer at the Navy Mine 
Depot, Yorktown; commander of the destroyer Litchfield,' staff of 
command, destroyers, battle force ; head of Department of Ordnance 
and Gunnery, Naval Academy ; executive officer, U. S. S. iTidianapolis; 
and then, in late 1940, operations officer on the staff of Vice Adm. 
Wilson Brown, who was commander. Scouting Force. I was with 
Admiral Brown when World War II broke out and his force, with 
the carrier Lexington as flagship, participated in the Battle of 
Bougainville, and the raid on Salamau and Lae, in February and 
March 1942. During this period, I was promoted to captain. 

From September 1942, until June of 1943, 1 commanded the heavy 
cruiser Louisville which took part in the operations in the Aleutians 
and off Guadalcanal. 

In August 1943 I became head of the Pacific Plans Division, at the 
headquarters of commander in chief, serving in that capacity until 
May of 1944 when I was promoted to rear admiral and ordered as 
commander, Cruiser Division Six. Operations of Cruiser Division 
Six included all engagements of the Central Pacific from Saipan to 
Okinawa. 

In June 1943 I was ordered to activate and train an amphibious 
group for the invasion of Japan. I was in Coronado, Calif., under- 
taking this task when the war ended. Then, I was ordered back to 
the Far East as commander, Yangtze Patrol Force, with the mission 
of clearing the Yangtze of mines, entering Shanghai, and assisting the 
Chinese in the rehabilitation of that port. 

In January of 1946 I w\as ordered to Hong Kong as commander- 
Task Force 74, remaining there until April 1946, when I returnecl 
to the United States to become commander of the Naval Proving 
Ground, Dahlgren, Va. 

In August i949 I was ordered as commander, Naval Forces, Far 
East, with the rank of vice admiral. As such, I commanded, under 
General MacArthur, the naval forces assisting in the occupation of 
Jaj)an. Later, when the Korean war broke out, I commanded the 
United Nations Naval Forces engaged in the war. 



2128 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Shortly after July 1, 1951, I was designated by General Kidgway 
to be senior United Nations Command delegate at the Korean Armis- 
tice Conference, which assignment was in addition to my regular duty 
as commander, Naval Forces, Far East. 

I returned to the United States in June of 1952 to become Superin- 
tendent of the Naval Academy. I was retired on July 1 of this year 
at my own request, because of physical disability. On retirement, 
I was advanced to the rank of admiral on the basis of combat awards. 

The Chairman. Mr. Carpenter, you may proceed with the ques- 
tioning of Admiral Joy. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, for the purpose of the committee, we will 
begin with your career from about 1940. You were in the Pearl 
Harbor vicinity on December 7, 1941 ; is that correct? 

Admiral Joy. That is correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, the Pearl Harbor attack has recently 
been the subject of much discussion. Have you an opinion on that 
Pearl Harbor attack, how it happened ? 

Admiral Joy. No; I think it is all in the record. I have always 
felt that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were made scapegoats, 
but outside of that I have no comment. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of your assignment, Admiral, 
from 1943 until 1944? 

Admiral Joy. My assignment was as head of the Pacific Plans Divi- 
sion in the headquarters of commander in chief, in Washington. I 
have no real comments on that tour of duty. I was too busily engaged 
in work connected with the tactical problems of the Navy in the Pacific. 
That was my main job. 

Mr. Carpenter. Then from April of 1944 to June of 1945 you were 
again back in the Pacific; is that right? 

Admiral Joy. That is correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. At that time. Admiral, did you believe it necessary 
to make concessions to insure Soviet participation in the Pacific war 
in 1945 ? 

Admiral Joy. No ; I did not. The war was already won when the 
Soviets entered. 

Mr. Carpenter. What contributions did the Soviet Union make? 

Admiral Joy. Negligible, if any. 

Mr. Carpenter. I would now like to take you to the period of June 
1945 to August 1945. What were your duties during that period, 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Joy. I was in California training an amphibious group for 
the landings in Japan. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you believe that such landings would be neces- 
sary ? 

Admiral Joy. At the time I did. 

]VIr. Carpenter. Were you informed of the Japanese attempt to 
surrender ? 

Admiral Joy. Not from official sources. I gleaned such from the 
newspaper. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, I believe you testified that you led the Yangtze 
Patrol Force in September of 1945 to January 1946 ; is that correct? 

Admiral Joy. That is correct. 



I 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2129 

Mr. Carpenter. "What was the position of the United States in the 
Pacilic in September of 104:5? 

Admiral Joy. Well, I would say we were all-powerful. "We could 
have shaped the course of the Pacific. 

Mr. Carpenter. "What was your impression of the China situation 
durinj]: the period September 1945 to April 19-46? 

Admiral Joy. My impression was confused, to say the least, thouf^h 
I believed with timely and eti'ectual help from the United StateSj the 
Comnnmist menace which then had not reached grave proportions, 
could be defeated. I certainly never expected to be back in the Pacific 
4 years later fighting communism. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, were you familiar with the Marshall 
mission to China? 

Admiral Joy. Only in a general way. I knew that his mission was, 
in ell'ect, to attempt to establish a coalition government. I was in 
Shanghai when he arrived. I witnessed his welcome, which was one 
of the most enthusiastic welcomes I have ever seen. All of Shanghai 
turned out. AVhen General IMarshall came from the airport into 
Shanghai, the streets were lined by Chinese with American flags. I 
have never seen such a friendly welcome or anything like it. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you encounter the agrarian line with respect to 
the Chinese Communists ? 

Admiral Joy. Yes, I did; among the Chinese intelligentsia, and 
British and French. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were American 

The Chairman. And Americans ? 

Admiral Joy. There weren't any Americans in Shanghai. You will 
recall the Americans got out of Shanghai before the war started. 
There were practically none. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were the Americans popular in China in 1945 ? 

Admiral Joy. They certainly were. Wlien we entered Shanghai, 
the welcome was really marvelous. I have never seen anything like it. 
The Chinese nearly killed us with kindness. 

Mr. Carpenter. Then, American criticism of Chiang at this time 
carried weight and helped to undermine tlie regime; is that right? 
Would you say that ? 

Admiral Joy. Well, I don't know, really. You say whether it would 
undermine the regime. But I know at the time, the British and the — 
not the British, but the foreigners, I will put it that way — were very 
critical of the Kuomintang government. They thought it was cor- 
rupt. They felt that the agrarian reformers couldn't be any worse. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, what were your hopes and expectations 
for the PaciHc in April 1946? 

Admiral Joy. I would say that my hopes were that the Kuomin- 
tang government would be able to withstand the encroachments of 
the Communists. 

^Ir. Carpenter. At that time, you didn't expect to go back there 
fighting 4 years later ? 

Admiral Joy. Xo, I did not. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, I would like to take you to the period of 1946 
to 1949, when you were in Dahlgren, Va. Did you follow the 
developments affecting the Pacific during this period. Admiral? 

Admiral Joy. Only in a general way, through the newspapers. 



2130 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you concerned about our apparent absorption, 
in Europe? 

Admiral Joy. Not particularly, as I remember, although I did notice 
a gradual deterioration of our position in the Pacific. 

Mr. Carpenter, Admiral, do you believe that the No. 1 objective of 
the Communists during this period was expansion in the Far East? 

Admiral Joy. I certainly do now. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, I would like to go to the period of August 
1949, to June of 1950, when you were commander of United States 
naval forces in the Far East. Admiral, were you briefed on the 
international political aspects before your departure ? 

Admiral Joy. No. I was thoroughly briefed on the conditions in 
Japan, and the missions of the occupation, and so on. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, what was our policy at that time in 
regard to Formosa, Korea, Indochina ? 

Admiral Joy. Well, I would say it was a laissez faire policy, 
because there seemed to be no noticeable firm policy. I did definitely 
gain the impression, however, that Korea was considered outside of 
the United States sphere of interest, and of no particular concern to us. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, was the conquest of China and the 
announcement of Soviet atomic progress reflected in any change in 
policy affecting your assignment ? 

Admiral Joy. No. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you informed of the results of the recon- 
sideration of our policy in the State Department meeting in the fall 
of 1949 ? 

Admiral Joy. No ; I was not. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was Philip Jessup in Tokyo during the period you 
were stationed there ? 

Admiral Joy. Yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you talk with him ? 

Admiral Joy. Yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did he attempt to ascertain your views on 
Formosa ? 

Admiral Joy. He did. It was my distinct impression that Jessup 
attempted to persuade me that Formosa was of no importance strate- 
gically to the defense of the Pacific. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, did you see Special Guidance 

The Chairman. Just a moment, counsel. And what was your 
opinion at that time of Formosa ? 

Admiral Joy. I think all of us out there shared General Mac- 
Arthur's views, that it was a very important bastion in the island 
chain of defense. 

The Chairman. And in your conversation then with Philip Jessup, 
did you insist that it was of strategic importance to the defense of 
the United States? 

Admiral Joy. I tried to, but what impression I made I do not know. 

The Chairman. Anyhow, you brought your views out in this 
conversation ? 

Admiral Joy. That is correct. 

The Chairman. All right ; proceed. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, did you see Special Guidance Paper No. 
28 of December 23, 1949 ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2131 

Admiral Joy. I never saw this special paper until Dr. Fluegel sent 
it to me recently. 

INIr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to intro- 
duce into the record and have made a part of the record Special Guid- 
ance Paper No. 28, dated December 23, 1949, issued by the Department 
of State, entitled "Policy Information Paper — Formosa." 

The Chairman. It may <^o into the record and become a part of the 
oflicial record. 

(The document referred to follows:) 

Exhibit No. 534 

[Source : Military Situation In the Far East, hearings before the Committee on Armed 
Services and tiie Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate. 82d Cons., 1st sess., to 
conduct an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding 
the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area, 
pt. 3, June 1, 2, 4-9, 11-13, 1951, pp. 1667-16G9] 

Department of State 

public affairs area — policy advisory staff 

(Special guidance No. 28, December 23, 1949) 

Policy Information Paper — Formosa 

i. problem 

To formulate information policy which will minimize damage to United States 
prestige and others' morale by the possible fall of Formosa to the Chinese Com- 
munist forces. 

II. BACKGROUND 

A. Comment on Formosa is on the increase as the Communist advances on 
the Chinese mainland leave the island as the last substantial part of China under 
Nationalist control. Attention is focused by three principal elements : 

1. Communists, worldwide, who charge the United States with conspiring to 
build the island into a fortress to be talien over by the United States (if it does 
not already control it), thereby trying to brand the United States with the niarli 
of aggressive imperialism, and also hoping to get us involved in a risliy and un- 
promising venture ; 

2. Pro-Nationalists (principally in the United States) who consider Formosa 
a redoubt in which the government could survive, and who tend to create an 
impression the United States is delinquent if it fails to "save Formosa" ; 

3. Groups in the United States who are inclined to be critical of the United 
States for failure to act to prevent loss of the island to the Communists, largely 
because of mistaken popular conception of its strategic importance to United 
States defense in the Pacific. 

P>. Loss (if the island :s widely anticipated, and the manner in which civil and 
military conditions there have deteriorated under the Nationalists adds weight 
to the expectation. Its fall would threaten : 

1. Loss of United States prestige at home and abroad to the extent we have 
become committed in the public mind to hold it ; 

2. Damage to the morale of other nations, particularly in the Far East, which 
are disturijed by the Communist gains and fear its possible further advances. 

C. Formosa, politicall.v, geographically, and strategically, is part of China in 
no way especially distinguished or important. Although ruled by the Japanese 
(as "Taiwan") for 50 years, historically it has been Chinese. Politically and 
militarily it is a strictly Chinese responsibility. 

It is true that the technical status of the island remains to be determined 
by the Japanese peace settlement, but the Cairo agreement and Potsdam Declara- 
tion and the surrender terms of September 2, 1945, looked to its return to Cliiua, 
and the United States facilitated its takeover by Chinese troops shortly after 
VJ-day. 

S2918°— ."iS— pt. 2G 2 



2132 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Even the small United States military advisory group sent there at Chinese 
Government request was completely withdrawn a year ago. Merely a handful 
of military attach^ personnel with diplomatic status remains. The United States 
never has had military bases there, and never has sought any si>ecial concessions 
there. 

EGA work done on the Island, i)articularly through the Joint Commission on 
Rural Reconstruction, has been of purely economic and technical nature for 
assistance in improvement of conditions, and no quid pro quo has been sought. 

D. United States public opinion has concerned itself primarily with the ques- 
tion of the island's strategic importance ; there has been insistent demand from 
a few sources for military action by the United States, but it has not assumed 
significant proportions. Rather, public opinion obviously is divided and uncer- 
tain, and there is no apparent consensus for a particular course of active 
intervention. 

III. TREATMENT 

A. If rising public interest warrants it, gradually increasing attention may be 
paid Formosa, to establish, publicly, the facts indicated below. Overseas use 
should be made of unofficial materials in public analysis and comment appearing 
both at home and abroad, as well as official statements as they may appear. 
Label conflicting public statements properly as "individual expressions of opin- 
ion," as "unofficial," etc. 

B. All material should be used best to counter the false impressions that — 

1. Formosa's retention would save the Chinese Government ; 

2. The United States has a special interest in or "designs on" the island or any 
military bases on Formosa ; 

3. Its loss would seriously damage the Interests of either the United States or 
of other countries opposing communism ; 

4. The United States is responsible for or committed in any way to act to save 
Formosa. 

C. Without evidencing undue preoccupation with the subject, emphasize as 
appropriate any of the following main points : 

1. Formosa is exclusively the responsibility of the Chinese Government : 
(a) Historically and geographically a part of China; 

( & ) The National Government has run the island's affairs since the takeover 
and is responsible for present conditions there ; 

(c) The United States has assumed no responsibilities or obligations, actual 
or moral. 

2. Formosa has no special military significance : 

(a) It is only approximately 100 miles off the China coast ; 

(6) Other potential objects of Communist aggression are closer to points on 
the Chinese mainland than to Formosa ; 

(c) China has never been a seapower and the island is of no special strategic 
advantage to the Chinese Communist armed forces. 

3. Economic assistance in Formosa has been for economic and social purposes, 
has been consistent with demonstrated United States concern for the welfare 
of the Chinese generally, and has involved no thought of special concessions for 
the United States. 

4. In areas of insistent demand for United States action, particularly in the 
United States itself, we should occasionally make clear that seeking United States 
bases on Formosa, sending In troops, supplying arms, dispatching naval units, 
or taking any similar action would — 

(«) Accomplish no matei'ial good for China or its Nationalist regime; 

(&) Involve the United States in a long-term venture producing at best a new 
area or bristling stalemate, and at worst possible involvement in open warfare ; 

(c) Subject the United States to a violent propaganda barrage and to reaction 
against our "militarism, imperialism, and interference" even from friendly 
peoples, and particularly from Chinese, who would be turned against us anew ; 

{(I) Eminently suit purposes of the U. S. S. R., which would like to see us 
"substantiate" its propaganda, dissipate our energies, and weaken effectiveness 
of our policies generally by such action. 

5. In reflecting United States unofficial demands for action of various kinds 
In Formosa, avoid giving them prominence unwarranted by their limited (usually 
individual) source, and make clear that the total of such demands evidences 
concern and frustration in some quarters but does not add up to a consensus on 
any particular position different from that officially taken. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVEUSION IN GOVERNMENT 2133 

D. Avoid— 

1. Speculation wliich would show undue concern with whether Nationalists 
can hold the island or when Communists may take it ; 

2. Keforences wliich would indicate important Strategic significance, or that 
the island is a political entity ; 

3. In output to Cliina, any emphasis on bad conditions In Formosa under the 
Nationalists, although to other areas reference can be made among reasons why 
Nationalists are vulnerable there as elsewhere ; 

4. Statements that Formosa's final status still is to be determined by the Japa- 
nese I'oace Treaty ; 

5. Name "Taiwan" ; use "Formosa." 

Mr. Carpexter. Admiral, did you take part in any of the discus- 
sions with Secretary Johnson and General Bradley in Tokyo directly 
prior to the Korean war ? 

Admiral Joy. No; I did not. 

Mr. Carpenter, Were you familiar with the memorandum on For- 
mosa which General MacArthur gave to Secretary Johnson at that 
time ? 

Admiral Jot. No; I did not see it. 

jNIr. Carpexter. Did you know General MacArthur's views? 

Admiral Jot. Yes ; I am very familiar with them. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you concur in General MacArthur's view^s on 
Formosa ? 

Admiral Jot. I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did they differ from the views presented in the 
State Department paper of December 1949 ? 

Admiral Jot. Decidedly. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. Do you believe the Chinese Communists may have 
planned to launch an attack on Formosa shortly after the North 
Korean attack ? 

Admiral Jot. Strong concentrations of junks and craft of all types 
opposite Formosa indicated they may have planned an attack, though 
I believe they were waiting to see our reaction to the invasion of 
South Korea. The positive and expeditious action on the part of the 
United Nations and the United States with regard to Korea, as well 
as the decision to defend Formosa, undoubtedly dissuaded them from 
making the attempt, if such was the original intention. This resulted 
in their moving their Third and Fourth Armies, which were opposite 
Formosa, to Manchuria later on. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, I would like to go to the period of June 1950 
to July of 1951. Admiral, if you would, please, I would like to have 
you summarize the developments during the first week of the Korean 
war, that is, from a naval point of view. 

Admiral Joy. From a naval point of view, developments during 
the first week of the Korean war were hectic, to say the least, because 
the war came as a complete surprise to all of us in the Far East. But 
it did not take us long to realize that Korea was being plunged into 
a real war, and not a border fracas in force, as was first suspected. 
Orders from Washington came thick and fast, and in our first telecon 
with the Pentagon the Seventh Fleet, then in the Philippine waters, 
was placed under my operational control through the commander in 
chief of the Far East, General MacArthur. Orders to evacuate Ameri- 
can nationals from Korea followed, and then to blockade the coast of 
Korea, south of the 38th parallel. 

On June 27 the Formosa neutralization order to the Seventh Fleet 
came through. On June 30 restrictions on the 38th parallel were 



2134 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

lifted and authority given to blockade the entire Korean Peninsula 
and to attack military targets above the parallel. 

When the 24th Division was deployed to Korea, our orders also 
included support of the Eighth Army. 

Fortunately, a major portion of the British Pacific Fleet, which was 
in Japanese waters when the war broke out, reported for duty under 
my command during these first few days. Their help was timely and 
effective. 

Besides blockade and escort missions, naval action during the first 
week included the destruction of practically the entire North Korean 
Navy, a squadron of motor torpedo boats, by the United States cruiser 
Jymeau and two Royal Navy ships. Bombardment and interdic- 
tion missions of enemy troops were also undertaken in our efforts 
to slow down the invading North Koreans. I think that is about all. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you recall any comments of General Mac- 
Arthur as to the need for ground troops if we planned to stay in 
Korea ? 

Admiral Joy. Well, at the first telecon. General MacArthur was 
authorized to send a regiment, as I remember, to Korea. General 
MacArthur, who had visited Korea to find out what the situation was, 
knew that the situation was bad, and said that that was not enough. 
The Pentagon, as I remember, took time out for about 30 minutes, 
and then came back and authorized him to use whatever troops he 
thought necessary. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you believe that the neutralization of Formosa 
was essential at that time ? 

Admiral Joy. 1 certainly didn't believe it was essential after the 
Chinese moved all their armies up to Korea. 

The Chairman. But the order remained in effect ? 

Admiral Joy. The order remained in effect all the time. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, was consideration given to changing the 
Seventh Fleet orders when it was reported that Chinese forces opposite 
Formosa were moving to Manchuria? 

Admiral Joy. There was no change in orders from Washington ; no. 

Mr. Carpenter. And no consideration was given at all ? 

Admiral Joy. Well, there was no consideration by Washington that 
I know of. At least, I never heard of it. 

Mr. Carpenter. And your opinion was not asked? 

Admiral Joy. It wasn't asked. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, I believe you are familiar with the Inchon 
operation. 

Admiral Joy. Yes ; quite a bit. 

Mr. Carpenter. Could you comment on that, please? 

Admiral Joy. The Inchon operation was a brilliant tactical maneu- 
ver, conceived by General MacArthur, to bring an early end to the 
Korean war. The general felt that with this bold stroke, followed 
by the capture of Seoul, the entire southern peninsula would be sealed 
off, thereby resulting in the rapid deterioration of the North Korean 
armies, which had the Eightli Army penned up in the Pusan perim- 
eter. He was supremely confident of success. The assault on Inchon 
by the X Corps was a Navy-Marine Corps operation, both in planning 
and execution. Subject to the overall command of commander, naval 
forces. Far East, who, in turn, was responsible to the commander in 
chief of the Far East, the commander, Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2135 

Struble, commanded all naval forces afloat that were engaged in the 
operation. 

Kear Adm, J. IT. Doylo, the amphibious commander, who was respon- 
sible to Adm. E. M. Struble, was in command of the actual attack phase 
of the operation. Command of the X Corps comprising two regi- 
ments of the 1st Marine Division, under INIajor General Smith, with 
the Ttli Infantry Division in reserve, devolved upon the X Corps 
connnander, Major General Almond, after the beachhead was secure. 

The landing caught the enemy flatfooted, no doubt because, as 
General MacArthur had said beforehand, he did not expect anyone 
would attempt such a difficult operation. These difficulties included 
such natural hazards as tides of 30 feet, lack of suitable landing 
beaches, narrow and restricted waters leading to the city, and the 
fortified island of "Walmi-do, which controlled the harbor. As some- 
one had said previously, "one can search the world over and not find a 
worse site for an amphibious operation than Inchon." 

The entire operation was as successful as General MacArthur had 
predicted. With the fall of Inchon and the subsequent capture of 
Seoul by the X Corps, practically all North Korean resistance in the 
southern part of the peninsula collapsed. In ending my comments, 
I should like to quote the message that General MacArthur sent to 
the commander. Seventh Fleet, after the Inchon beachhead had been 
secured. 

Said he, "The star of the Navy and Marine Corps never shone 
brighter." 

JSIr. Carpenter. Admiral, will you comment on the events of No- 
vember of 1950 in Korea ? 

Admiral Joy. The events of November 1950 indicated to all of us 
in the Far East that a new and different war had begun. We knew 
that Chinese forces had crossed the Yalu, but I, for one, had no idea 
they had crossed in such large numbers. In anticipation of an early 
end to the war, and at the request of commander in chief of the Pacific 
Fleet, we had, for example, returned some elements of the Seventh 
Fleet to the United States for overhaul. These were recalled to the 
Far East as soon as the seriousness of the situation was realized. 

When the Eighth Army developed the strength of the Chinese 
by attacking on November 27, and then fell back in the face of vastly 
superior numbers, the Navy's primary task became the evacuation of 
Eighth Army forces from Chinnampo, Inchon, and later the X Corps 
from Hungnam. This last operation was completed on December 24. 

]Mr. Carpenter. Did you favor General JNIacArthur's proposal at 
that time for reinforcements and otherwise? 

Admiral Joy. I certainly did. 

The Chairman. What would have happened, in your opinion. 
Admiral, if General MacArthur had received the reinforcements that 
he begged for ? 

Admiral Joy. He continually begged for reinforcements. Senator, 
in the early days, as well as after the Chinese attack. But he was, 
in general, told that they were not available. I believe that had he 
received ample reinforcements at the beginning of the Korean war, 
the Japanese might not have dared to attack. 

]\Ir. Carpenter, • You said "Japanese." You meant the Chinese? 

Admiral Jot. Chinese. 



2136 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Chairman. Did they notify General MacArthur as to why 
reinforcements were not available, where they were ? 

Admiral Joy. They said at one conference that I attended, where 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were also present, the tenor of the remarks 
by the Army Chief of Staff was to the effect that they did not have 
any trained or available forces, in the United States, and that their 
commitments in Europe were such that they could not withdraw any 
troops from Europe. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, were you satisfied with the economic 
measures taken to restrict supplies to the Chinese Communists after 
the Chinese attack ? 

Admiral Joy. No; I was not. From reports of our Navy recon- 
naissance planes, which flew daily missions over the Yellow Sea, and 
the Formosa Straits, we knew that many ships of foreign registry, 
such as British, Panamanian, Greek, and Norwegian, were visiting 
Chinese ports. For example, during the 6 weeks ending May 9, 1951, 
there were 204 visits, of which 76 were British ships. During the 6 
weeks ending May 16 of the same year there were 219 ships. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, were you acquainted with the JCS paper 
of January 12, 1951 ? 

Admiral Joy. Only when I read it in the minutes of the MacArthur 
hearings. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was it not at this time that General MacArthur 
described the resjjonse to the Korean war in terms of a fire depart- 
ment, and using only part of it? Could you tell us something about 
that story, Admiral ? 

Admiral Joy. Yes. It was a very dramatic and interesting confer- 
ence. This took place, as I remember, on January 14, 1951. The Air 
Chief of Staff, General Vandenberg, and the Army Chief of Staff, 
General Collins, were present. General MacArthur addressed his 
remarks almost entirely to the Army Chief of Staff, and this was 
the tenor of them. I wish I could be as dramatic as he was, but 
anyway, according to General MacArthur, as he told the Army Chief 
of Staff, the Armed Forces of the United States were like an excellent 
fire department in a big city, divided into 3 elements ; 1 in the poorer 
section of the city, 1 in the industrial section, and 1 in the residential 
section. Said General MacArthur, "If a fire starts in the poorer sec- 
tion of the city, would you wait until it became a serious conflagration 
endangering the rest of your city before using the other two elements, 
or would you use those other two elements of your fire department 
and try to put the fire out before it spreads?" Well, of course, the 
implication was, ""V\^iy not use the forces we have, the troops" — he 
was particularly concerned about ground forces — "in the United States 
and in Europe to put the fire out in Korea before it spreads to other 
parts of the world?" It was a very forceful and rather elementary 
plea. 

The CiTAiRjiAN. What reply did he get to that request? 

Admiral Joy. The reply was to the effect, as I think I told you, that 
they did not have the trained troops in the United States and they 
had too many commitments in Europe to bring any to Korea. 

The Chairman. They were still looking upon the Korean war as a 
police action? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2137 

Admiral Jot. "Well, I don't know; I think the Army Chief of Staff 
•was realizing at that time — that was when the Chinese attack was on— 
that it was a pretty serions war. 

The CirAiKMAN. Not serious enough to take their eyes off Europe 
and put them on Korea? Would that be a fair analysis of it? 

Admiral Joy. Of course, we all felt that they should take the troops 
from Europe to put the lire out and then send them back. 

Mr. Cakpenti-jj. Admiral, what was our mission in Korea? 

Admiral Joy. Do you mean the mission of the United Nations 
command? 

Mr. Carpenter. That is right ; yes. 

Admiral Joy. The mission, as I understood it, was to repel aggres- 
sion and to restore international peace and security in Korea. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was that just South Korea or all Korea ? 

Admiral Joy. As I understood it, it was the Korean Peninsula. 

JNIr. Carpenter. Was it ever changed ? 

Admiral Joy. In January of 1951, as I remember, the mission to 
repel aggression was not changed, but the emphasis shifted and the 
primary mission became the preservation of the United Nations forces 
and the security of Japan. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was there a written directive on that, Admiral ? 

Admiral Joy. I never saw it. 

IMr. Carpenter. Was Korea the wrong war at the wrong place at 
the wrong time? 

Admiral Joy. Quite the contrary. It was a war of deep significance 
in a battle area which held many advantages for the United Nations 
forces. Furthermore, it was very timely from the standpoint of re- 
sisting Communist aggression. With the excellent bases in Japan, 
with the capabilities of flying carrier-based planes over the entire pen- 
insula, and with a coastline that lent itself admirably to bombardment 
missions in support of the Army, the Navy could not have fought in a 
more favorable distant area from the United States. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was time on our side ? 

Admiral Joy. Well, I would say from the standpoint of develop- 
ments to date, I believe that time was on the Communist side. 

Mr. Carpenter. And I think you have already testified that it was 
a war and not a skirmish or a police action ? 

Admiral Joy. Decidedly. 

Mr. Carpenter. Now, I would like to take you. Admiral, to the 
period of July 8, 1951, to May of 1952. I believe at that time you 
were senior U. N. delegate to the truce talks in Korea ? 

Admiral Joy. That is right. 

]Mr. Carpenter. In the U. S. News & World Eeport, ]\Iay 22, 
1953, there are excerpts from a speech you delivered at Winston- 
Salem on May 15, 1953. In that address, you stated that when Jacob 
Malik proposed truce talks on June 24, 1951, Communist forces had 
suti'ered 200,000 casualties in the fighting in May and needed a cease 
fire. Do you agree, then, with General Van Fleet and with General 
Almond that our forces had scored a victory and were on the offen- 
sive when the truce was proposed? 

Admiral Joy. Yes; but not a decisive victory, in my opinion. The 
Communists still had considerable potential strength left. There is 
no doubt, however, that the United Nations command was on the of- 
fensive and that the Communists were badly hurt. 



2138 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to intro- 
duce into the record an excerpt from an address delivered by Admiral 
Joy on May 15, 1953, at Winston-Salem, N. C, reprinted in the U. S. 
News & World Keport of May 1953, and I ask that it be made a part 
of the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The excerpt referred to appears below, where it was read into the 
record by Mr. Carpenter.) 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, will you elaborate on that statement, and 
trace the events leading up to this decision ? 

Admiral Joy. I beg your pardon ? 

The Chairman. That is the statement at Winston-Salem, and trac- 
ing the events leading up to this decision. 

Admiral Jot. I think the events you mean are the decisions on the 
demarcation line, aren't they ? 

Mr. Carpenter. That was the 30-day limit. 

Admiral Joy. Well, you haven't brought that out yet. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, were the truce negotiations directed by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by the State Department ? 

Admiral Joy. All directives connected with negotiations emanated 
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When I returned to the States, in 
June of 1952, I heard on good authority that these directives were 
drafted by a high-powered group from State and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, you say presumably the decision was to 
give the Communists an incentive to show good faith. Why should 
anyone have presumed this? 

Admiral Joy. I said presumably because it was the only logical ex- 
planation for a serious mistake. Are you talking about this demarca- 
tion line? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. 

Admiral Joy. Do you want to make that a little clearer ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Can you elaborate a little more on your state- 
ment 

The Chairman. You are referring back to the Winston-Salem 
statement? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. 

Admiral Joy. Do you want to read that ? 

The Chairman. We will read it into the record. 

Read it into the record, Mr. Carpenter. 

Mr. Carpenter (reading) : 

The Communists wanted to fix the then-existing battleline as the final de- 
marcation line between both sides. Their strategy was obvious. If the line 
were fixed once and for all, there would be no reason for the Eighth Army to 
push them farther north because we would have to give them back the territory 
we had gained when and if an armistice was signed. In short, the Commu- 
nists wanted a de facto cease fire then and there as a relief from the Eighth 
Army's pressure. But we insisted that the demarcation line be the battleline 
as of the time of the signing of the armistice. We realized, if the line were fixed 
permanently before completion of the negotiations, the Communists could stall 
to their hearts' content over the remaining items of the agenda. General Ridg- 
way and the delegation felt very strongly that this was the situation calling for 
more steel and less silk. We felt certain the Communists would eventually 
give in on this point, thus assuring us of the retention of the negotiating initiative 
and of continuing pressure by the Eighth Army. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2130 

However, orders came tlirouKli to asreo to the then existing battleline as a 
provisional (hMiiarrat ion line with a ."D-day time limit. This was done in a 
plenary session on Novemlier 27. I'resnmal)ly tlie decision had been made on the 
basis that it would serve as an incentive lor the ("ommunists to show good faith 
by speeding up agreement on honorable and e(putal)ie terms. Instead of showing 
good faitii they dragged their feet at every opportunity and used the 30 days of 
grace to dig in and staltilize tlKMr battleline. 

In r(>trospect, I believe this was the turning point of the armistice conference, 
and a principal rt'ason iirc.grcss slowed to a snail's pace from then on. In demon- 
strating our own good faith we lost the initiative, never to regain it. We were 
no longer negotiating from a position of strength but from a position of military 
stalemate. And slowly before our eyes that which we wanted most to avoid 
began to happen — the balance of military advantages began to shift in favor of 
the enemy. The end of the 30-day time limit was just another date en the cal- 
endar. No one wanted to launch another ground offensive because the psycho- 
logical handicap would be too large to overcome. The impetus was gone. And 
if the U. N. did launch an offensive it would be with the foreknowledge that the 
price would be extremely high because of the time the enemy had been given to 
prepare. 

Kather late, and yet comparatively early, in our efforts to end the war, we had 
to learn that in negotiating with the Communists there is no substitute for the 
imperative logic of military pressure. In other words, we learned that progress 
in negotiating with them is in direct proportion to the degree of militai'y pressure 
applied. 

The CiiAiRMAisr. No^v, Admiral, will yoti elaborate on tliat state- 
ment and trace the events leading up to this decision? 

Admiral Joy. Yes. In early November 1951 the United Nations 
Command delegation informed the Commander in Chief of the United 
Nations Command, General Ridgway, who, in turn, advised Washing- 
ton that the Commttnist delegation had proposed hxing definitely the 
then existing battleline as the final demarcation line for the armistice. 

The proposal was rejected by the United Nations Command delega- 
tion on the ground that the establishment of a demilitarized zone, 
based on the current line of contact, would constitute an immediate 
cease-fire on the basis of agreement on one item only of the agenda. 
Thus, the Communists would be insured against effects of future mili- 
tary operations while other agenda items were being discussed. 

Washington expressed concern over the Communist proposal be- 
cause it would curtail U. N. C. — that is, United Nations Command — 
ground advances beyond the current line of contact. This was con- 
sidered unacceptable unless other agenda items were agreed upon 
shortly thereafter. 

General Ridgway's comments were requested on a time limit for 
agreement on other agenda items, preferably a definite period in which 
major operations, grotmd operations, were not contemplated. 

Washington told General Ridgway that early agreement on prin- 
ciple concerning the line of demarcation was important, and expressed 
concern that the Commtmists having made concessions on the location 
of the line might stiffen their resistance and revert to the o8th parallel. 

A day or so after the Communists submitted their proposal, I, as 
senior delegate, pointed out to General Ridgway that the Connnunist 
insistence on having the current line of contact fixed as the final line 
was based on the belief that once the line Avas determined, the United 
Nations command would not want to engage in grouncl operations 
which would necessitate excessive casualties. 

I also pointed out that they might expect to delay indefinitely on 
other agenda items or lull the United Nations connnand into a tie 

32918°— 55— pt. 26 3 



2140 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

facto cease fire to increase their bargaining power in remaining nego- 
tions because of less United Nations command military pressure. 

Anotlier day or so later, ^yasllington directed the commander in 
chief of the United Nations command to press for early settlement 
of this item of the agenda, on the basis of present line of contact, 
giving Communists to understand that the agreement only held good 
for a definite period during which the other three agenda items must 
be disposed of. A period of 1 month was suggested, after which 
the agreement was no longer to be valid. 

"Washington also did not consider that an agreement on this basis 
would imply a cease fire. 

General Ridgway strongly requested reconsideration of Washing- 
ton's instructions. He pointed out that in every case where the United 
Nations Command delegation had been allowed to stand pat, forcibly, 
on their proposals, the Communists had eventually agreed. He be- 
lieved that continued patience and resistance would gain us this 
extremely important point. He also said that it was the concern of 
everyone in the United Nations command that Communist insistence 
on their proposal was based on the belief that once a demarcation line 
had been agreed to by the United Nations command we would be in 
no position to continue aggressive ground activities, which would 
mean excessive casualties, thereby giving the enemy the benefit of an 
effective ground cease fire without an actual armistice. 

He mentioned what the senior delegate had said earlier with regard 
to stalling on other agenda items, and increasing their bargaining 
power because of less military pressure. In his opinion, premature 
acceptance of the present line of contact under any conditions would 
delay consummation of an acceptable armistice. 

He went on to say Washington's course of action would increase 
Communist intransigence and debilitate our further position and that 
he was convinced that more steel and less silk would give us our 
objectives. 

The directed course of action, according to him, would lead to sacri- 
fice of our basic principles and would repudiate the cause for which 
many gallant lives had been lost. He argued standing firm, pointing 
that we stood at a crucial point. He went on to say that in his opinion. 
Communist military forces in Korea were badly hurt as a result of 
the United Nations command military operations and desired the 
earliest suspension of hostilities. 

Washington replied by saying that the advantages of the early 
armistice outweighed the disadvantages present in giving a time 
limit on the current line of contact. Early action was directed to 
effect a settlement based on the current line of contact, which settle- 
ment would hold good for 30 days. 

On November 17, the United Nations command delegation sub- 
mitted to the enemy this proposal providing a 30-day period of grace. 
It v/as accepted by them with obvious relief. 

The Chairman. That directive, of course, you later found out was 
not necessarily prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff", but by the State 
Department? 

Admiral Jot. I do not know. Senator, who drafted it. I have said 
that, when I returned to the States, I heard on good authority that 
it was a high-poAvered group of JCS and State which drafted messages 
like that. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2141 

The CiiATinrAN. Yon say prosiimably tlio docision was to f>;ive the 
Comniiinists an incentive to show <rood faith. How long had you 
been ne<iotiatingAvith the Commnnists at this time? 

Admiral Joy. From Jnly to November. 

The CiTAiinrAN, AVhy shonld anyone have presnmed that this 
^vouhl make them have a sliow of gootl faith? 

Admiral Joy. Well, as I said 

The Chairman. Had they shown any good faith np to date? 

Admiral Joy. Very little, if any. I said presnmably becanse it 
■was the only logical explanation for a serions mistake. 

The Chairman. And it was a serions mistake, Admiral ? 

Admiral Joy. In my opinion, it was a very serions mistake. 

The Chairman. Proceed, ]\Ir. Carpenter. 

Admiral Joy. I also have an article which appeared in the Xew 
York Times at that time which mentions that, mentions the qnestion 
of good faith. That was the Times' snmmary of why it was given. 

The Chairman. Is that the article — I am asking from memory — 
is that the article which referred to the British position, the British 
attitnde? 

Admiral Joy. No. I think the British attitnde had a great deal to 
do with that decision, because I have a clipping here from the New 
York Times which is entitled "British Perturbed by Korean Im- 
passe'' — dated November 17 — "Disquiet Mounts Over Delay on Cease 
Fire — Sincerity of United States Questioned in Press." It goes on to 
say — well, it ends up here with a very amusing paragraph ; at least, it 
was to me: 

The last thing with which to oppose Comnnuiist combination of rigidity and 
skill in negotiation is a combination of rigidity and clumsiness, and it loolis very 
much as if the tactics of General Kidgway's negotiators have been pedestrian, if 
not flatfooted. 

The Chairman. Tell us the importance of that, Admiral. 

Admiral Joy. I thought I had. 

The ChxVirman. In other words, you threw away your bargaining 
rights ? 

Admiral Joy. The decision on the demarcation line gave the Com- 
munists a chance to dig in and a oO-day period of grace to rehabilitate 
their lines and their forces. 

The Chairman. Proceed. 

Mr. Carpenter. Isn't it elementary in any negotiations with the 
Communists that you need to retain the potential of pressure? 

Admiral Joy. It certainly is elementary that you need to retain 
the potential of pressure. 

The Chairman. Admiral, let me get this point straight in my 
mind and for the record. This decision to give the 30-day period of 
grace in your estimation was a fatal decision? 

Admiral Joy. It was a serious mistake. 

The Chairman. And that was the turning point of the armistice 
negotiations? 

Admiral Joy. In my opinion, it was. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, in Collier's, August 1052, you state : 

A military armistice is a military problem requiring a military solution. It is 
not a general peace treaty. 

Doesn't a prolonged armistice tend to be just that? 



2142 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Admiral Joy. "Well, I would say that a prolonged armistice is es- 
sentially a stagnant armistice, always unstable and subject to renewed 
fighting at a moment's notice. A peace treaty by its very nature is far 
more stable. 

Mr. Carpenter. You state that from the beginning, at Kaesong, the 
time and talents of many people were diverted from solutions by force 
of arms to solutions by negotiation. You also state Kaesong was ac- 
cepted in the interest of avoiding delay though its disadvantages were 
recognized. 

Why were we so anxious when the Communists were on the de- 
fensive, when they needed the armistice? 

Admiral Joy. I can only quote what General Ridgway had said in 
his message to Gen. Kim-Il Sung, the Korean commander, and Gen. 
Peng Teh Huai, the Chinese commander, on July 13, 1951. 

This was a message sent after the negotiations were suspended a few 
days, because the Communists would not allow some of our corres- 
pondents and newspaper people in Kaesong. General Ridgway sus- 
pended the negotiations. 

He said here in a paragraph : 

In the interest of expediting the end of bloodshed and to demonstrate good 
faith under which the United Nations command was proceeding, I accepted 
Kaesong as a site for our discussions, and in so doing I expected that the con- 
ditions referred to above, vital to the success of any discussion, would be afforded 
at Kaesong. 

Of course, you must remember, Kaesong then was in more or less of a 
no man's land, although the Communists really controlled the town. 
We had proposed beforehand that the Jutlandia be used as the site 
of the armistice conference, the Jutlandia being a Danish hospital 
ship. The Communists would have none of it. They came back with a 
proposal of Kaesong. General Ridgway felt that we should go ahead 
and accept Kaesong. 

I am sure he wouldn't agree to meet in Kaesong if we had to do it 
all over again. 

Mr. Cari>exter. Admiral, in Collier's magazine of August 23, 1952, 
you observed that while the 38th parallel represented the approximate 
ground strength, the U. N. dominated the air and sea picture in North 
Korea ; in otlier words, the military advantage was ours in the summer 
of 1951. Is that correct? 

Admiral Joy. That is correct. 

]Mr. Carpenter, Did the ultimate armistice represent this advan- 
tage or did the Communists achieve at the conference table that which 
they failed to achieve on the battlefield? 

Admiral Joy. I would rather answer that as two questions. The 
first question would be: Did the ultimate armistice represent this 
advantage ? 

No, I would say not. Because the Communists had no comparable 
seapower nor did they control the air. They did not have these ad- 
A'antages to give up, although the Communists always contended the 
sum total of these advantages was represented in the position of the 
battleline. 

With regard to the second question : Did the Communists achieve at 
the conference table what they had failed to achieve on the battle- 
field ? I would say that the Communists came to the conference table 
on July 10, 1951, because they were on the verge of decisive defeat. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2143 

The armistice negotiations p;ave tliem an oppordiinty to repair their 
shattered war machine. Consequently, from tliat standpoint, you 
might say tliey accomplislied at tlie conference table what they were 
unable to achieve on the battlelield. On the other hand, they failed 
at the conference table to accomplish what they had sought when they 
attacked South Korea, namely, to take over the entire peninsula. 

The CiiAiiiMAN. You state that Nam 11 — 

had apparently taken for granted onr acci^ptiinoe of the 3Sth parallel, since there 
had heoii ninny piil)lic statements in hiuii places to drive the enemy across the 
oSth parallel wonld represent a victory for the United Nations command. 

Admiral Joy. He evidently had. and Malik had, because you will 
remember in Malik's proposal over the radio, on June 24, 1951, his sug- 
gestion was that we stop fighting, that we get together and stop fight- 
ing, and withdraw from the 88th parallel. Those statements were 
all made before we entered the conference. Our instructions from 
Washing-ton were definitely to disregard those statements and to press 
for the jjattleline. 

The CiiAimrAX. Is it normal to announce the acceptance of less 
than your position justifies? 

Adiniral Joy. No, of course not. But I don't think Washington 
accepted less, judging from our instructions. 

The CiiAiKMAx. Had you been informed at any previous time dur- 
ing the fighting that the 38th parallel would constitute victory ? 

Admiral Joy. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Go ahead, Counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, in the same issue of Collier's, you de- 
scribe a p'm endorsed by General Van Fleet to exert pressure and 
present the Comnnmists with a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. You 
state that General Ridgway was interested, but that — 

In view of the approaching Japanese Peace Treaty Conference at San Francisco, 
he felt that the time had not arrived for drastic action. 

Were these matters connected? 

Admiral Joy. It should be remembered that at the time the Japa- 
nese Peace Treaty came up for signing at San Francisco, many people 
thought the Soviet Union's policy with regard to Korea and Japan 
were closely interrelated. As I remember it at the time. General 
Ridgway thought it best to wait and see what happened at San Fran- 
cisco before doing anything that might upset the applecart. Many 
people even thought the Soviet Union would inject the Korean armi- 
stice into the peace treaty conference, and demand that it should be 
settled elsewhere than in the tent at Panmunjom, 

Mr. Carpenter. This was a military armistice you were negotiating, 
wasn't it, x\dmiral ? 

Admiral Joy. That is correct. A military armistice is a military 
problem, requiring a military solution. It is not a general peace 
treaty as some people tend to believe. 

The Chairman. Did political considerations enter into the direc- 
tives from Washington ? 

Admiral Joy. I would say that they did. An armistice agreement 
is simply an agreement between two opposing commanders to stop the 
fighting. It is not concerned, nor should it be, with political ciuestions. 

Mr. Carpenter. In General Clark's book, From the Danube to the 
Yalu, he mentions his concurrence in your recommendation to suspend 



2144 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

the negotiations nnilaterally, wliicli you made shortly before you left 
Korea. He also said that this recommendation was disapproved by 
Washington. 

What were your reasons for making this recommendation, and can 
3'ou throw any light on why it was disapproved ? 

Admiral Joy. About May 10, 1952, I pointed out to General Clark 
that the Communists evidently intended to use further delegation 
meetings as a propaganda vehicle and for the present had not the 
slightest intention of accepting the United Nations Command final 
package proposal. If you will remember, that package proposal was 
introduced by the senior delegate on April 28, in the form of a final 
armistice agreement, in which we conceded on the question of the 
rehabilitation of airfields, compromised on the composition — or offered 
a compromise solution — on the neutral nations supervisory commission 
and stood pat on the principle of voluntary repatriation. 

I am simply bringing that out because I don't think many people in 
the room realize what was in that proposal. 

To continue, I said to General Clark that the issue must be 
squarely faced and that time for decisive action was at hand. By 
continuing it as at present, we were exhibiting weakness when strength 
was imperative. I pointed out that inasmuch as the President and 
other high U. N. officials had made statements backing up the finality 
of our package proposal, the United Nations Command delegation 
should be given authority to announce the unilateral suspension of the 
conference until the Communists were ready to accept our final solu- 
tion of April 28 without substantive change. I also said that my 
recommendation to suspend the negotiations had the unanimous ap- 
proval of the entire delegation. 

General Clark strongly concurred in our recommendation and rec- 
ommended to Washington that he be authorized to give us the author- 
ity to suspend the negotiations. 

About that time there occurred the Koje-Do prison camp riots, with 
the capture of the United Nations Command camp commander by the 
Communist prisoners, and the incredible statement by the relief camp 
commander who, in order to effect his predecessor's release, assured the 
Communist prisoners that in the future they would not be treated 
inhumanely nor subjected to forcible screening. 

Our recommendation was turned down by Washington for the fol- 
lowing three reasons, as I recollect: (1) Confusion existed in domestic 
circles because of the Koje-Do riots; (2) the disadvantages of uni- 
lateral suspension were overriding in terms of continuing interna- 
tional and domestic support for the United Nations Command, and 
(o) suspension by the United Nations Command would require the 
Communists to initiate subsequent meetings and thereby render it 
more difficult for them to concede to our terms. Washington also told 
us to intensify negotiating pressure at the meetings and put the Com- 
munists on the defensive in order to maintain worldwide support of 
the United Nations Command position. 

In other words, as the delegation looked at it, our primary task 
from the Washington viewpoint became the defense of our position in 
the eyes of the free world. Our negotiatory position apparently was 
a matter of secondary consideration. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2145 

Ml". Carpkxtkr. Admiral, had your rooomniondation boon followed, 
is it your opinion that we would have acliieved an aiinistioe sooner 
than July of 1953 ? 

Admiral Joy. The answer to your question, I believe, is simply a 
question of arithmetic. (»onoral Harrison, my successor, was finally 
given authority to suspend unilaterally the negotiations, which he did 
in early October of 1952, 5 months later. Consequently, I have always 
believed we would have achieved an armistice 5 months earlier had 
the delegation's recommendation of May boon approved at that time. 

Mr. Carpextkr. Mr. Chairman, at this time, 1 would like to intro- 
duce into the record, and ask that it be made a part of the record, an 
article entitled "A Deadly Game of Tit-for-Tat," by Vice Adm. 
Charles Turner Joy, appearing in Collier's August 23, 1952. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The document referred to follows :) 

Exhibit No. 535 

[Suurce: Ft. 2, A Deadly Game of Tit-for-Tat, by Vice Adm. Charles Turuer Joy, United 
States Navy, Collier's, August 23, 1952, p. 31 (excerpt)] 

From a negotiating standpoint we had worked up a good head of steam. We 
were no longer trying to catch up. We were ahead. The feeling around camp 
was positive and optimistic. But the feeling was short-lived. 

The Red negotiators wanted to fix the then current battleline as the demarca- 
tion line once and for all ; achieving, in eft'ect, a de facto cease fire. We insisted 
that the demarcation line be identical with the line of ground contact as of the 
date of the signing of the armistice agreement. Our reason was obvious. With 
a de facto cease fire the Communists could stall to their heart's content over the 
remaining items of the agenda. Vv'ith a de facto cease fire they would have what 
they wanted — respite from our military pressure. We would then have no 
reason for taking more ground and destroying more of their forces — and they, 
consequently, would have no incentive for coming to terms. General Kidgway 
and the delegation felt strongly that this was a situation calling for "more steel 
and less silk." We felt certain that the Comniiniists would eventually give in 
on the point and that we would, as a consequence, retain the negotiating initiative 
and reap the benefits of the Eighth Army's continuing pressure. 

However, the question had another side. Our mere presence at the conference 
table represented a commitment in the eyes of the world to seek a solution 
through negotiation where a final solution had not been arrived at through force 
of arms. Once committed, no amount of late apprehension could negate our early 
obligation to proceed in the good faith we had professed; no anutunt of trepi- 
dation could remove our obligation to assume good faith on the part of the 
enemy until he had proved his own bad faith — and no amount of after thought 
could alter the fact that compromise is the essence of negotiation. 

If there had been indications that the enemy was disposed to stall, there also 
had been indications that he really wanted an armistice. He had agreed to a 
new conference site and he had given up on the 3Sth parallel, both of which were 
very difficult decisions for him to make. Some felt that if the enemy were 
worried about a northward movement of the demarcation line, the .'JO-day time 
limit would actually serve as an incentive. Our choice lay between action based 
on well-founded fear and action based on well-established obligation. The deci- 
sion was made to respect our obligation and give the enemy the benefit of the 
doubt. 

Agreement on a provisional demarcation line with a .''.0-day time limit was 
ratified in a plenary session on November 27. The Communists Jiad their de facto 
cease fire. Would they accept it as an opportunity to demonstrate good faith by 
speeding agreement on an honorable and stable armistice, or would they seize 
on it as an opportunity to stall while they rebuilt their war machine"? We did 
not have to wait long for our answer. 

As I write this the Communists are still stalling. In demonstrating our own 
good faith we lost the initiative, never fully to regain it. AVe gradually found 



2145 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

ourselves no longer negotiatin.j? from strength, but from a position of military 
stalemate. We had lost the full use of our best argument, the magnificent Eighth 
Army. Technically the way was clear for a renewal of full-scale hostilities, but 
practically the way was barred. 

The Communists would not resume an all-out offensive because they already 
had the cease-lire they wanted, and we would not because the psychological 
handicap would be too large to overcome. Who wanted the honor of being the 
last man to die in a war that might end at any time, and who wanted the 
responsibility for ordering that last man to die? Expiration of the 30-day time 
limit was just another date on the calendar. We lost our head of steam and 
were dead in the water, drifting with the tide. The situation we desired most 
to avoid slowly began to develop before our eyes — the balance of military ad- 
vantages began to shift in favor of the enemy. 

If the object of a story is to point a moral, my story could very well end 
here. It has been said that in war there is no substitute for victory. It can 
also be said that in debating with the Communists there is no substitute for the 
imperative logic of military pressure. 

Debating with the Communists is not as simple as starting from a valid 
premise and proceeding by cogent logic to a sound conclusion. The Com- 
munist way is to start from a false or irrelevant premise and proceed by in- 
vective and bombast to a shameless demand described as a "just and reasonable 
proposal." The relation between premise and conclusion is seldom clear and 
the road between the two is traveled with untroubled lack of logic. History is 
rewritten to support the claim of the moment and most claims are uncomplicated 
by moral considerations. The end is mother of the means. Proof is by asser- 
tion, and rebuttal is by vilification. Repetition is the alchemy by which fiction 
becomes fact and fact becomes fiction. The machinery of debate is used to 
destroy the purpose of debate, just as democratic institutions are used by the 
Communists to destroy democracy. While you can expect to accomplish very 
little positive good through debate you can he certain of unlimited opportunity 
to foul your own anchor, to become buried under your own patience or to become 
impaled on your lack of it. Patience and logic are essential, but they can 
never be decisive. In the end, might is essential to right, not because you or I 
would have it that way, but because, unless we have armed might and unless 
we are willing to use that armed might in dealing with tbe Communists, we 
cannot win our point and, in fact, we may not survive to argue our point. 

Mv. Cx\RPENTER. Admiral, in your Collier's article, you dwell on the 
Communists' "malevolently whimsical" nomination of the U. S. S. R. 
as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which 
their delegation proposed on February 16, 1952. 

Why did this become a major issue which was still unresolved when 
you presented your final package solution in the form of an armistice 
document on April 28 ? 

Admiral Joy. Around the middle of February 1951, the Commu- 
nists nominated Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union as mem- 
ber nations of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and then 
formally proposed that both sides agree simultaneously to the neutral 
nations nominated by both sides. You know, the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission was the organization set up to make the 
behind the lines inspections at the ports of entry. 

"We had nominated Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland a month 
earlier. The UNC delegates stated they were authorized to accept 
the nomination of Poland and Czechoslovakia, but the Soviet Union 
was not acceptable. The Communists in reply said they could not 
understand why the United Nations Command should reject any na- 
tion nominated by their side. The United Nations Command answered 
that it should be obvious why the Soviet Union was not acceptable and 
our reasons for nonacceptance would be presented at the next meeting. 

The delegation also called attention to the principle which had 
previously been agreed upon by both delegations and which stated 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2147 

both sides afrieed to invite neutral nations acceptable to both sides 
■\vhicli have not participated in the Korean war. 

General I\ido:\vay concurred in our rejection of the Soviet Union 
as one of the neutral nations for the reason that the country was not 
neutral. When he informed Washington of his action, we were 
astonished at the reply he received. 

This reply concurred in our rejection of the Soviet Union but con- 
sidered it inadvisable to give reasons for rejection because it would 
be difiicult to substantiate proof of Soviet participation in the war. 
We were also directed by Washington that either no reason be given 
or the Communists told it was our view that members of the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission should be selected from nations not 
in close proximity to Korea. 

Washington then w^ent on to say that a rejection of the Soviet Union 
should be treated as a matter of fact without undue emphasis. We 
were further cautioned not to give the Communists the impression that 
the United Nations Command position was unalterable. 

After being ridiculed and challenged by the Communists for our 
failure to give good reasons wdiy we did not consider the Soviet Union 
a neutral in the war, I pointed out to General Ridgway that the restric- 
tions imposed on the United Nations Command delegation had re- 
sulted in arrogant propaganda statements from the enemy, praising 
the Soviet Union's neutral attitude in the Korean war. I went on to 
show how embarrassing this was to us because of our lack of authority 
to refute such assertions. 

I also recommended that we be allowed to make a statement to the 
Communists essentially as follows: During their meetings, the Se- 
curity Council of the U. N. gave many reasons why the Soviet Union 
was not considered as a neutral in the war. These reasons are well 
known to the world. If you doubt this, we suggest you inform your- 
selves by obtaining copies of these meetings. The basic fact is, how- 
ever, both sides have agreed to invite only neutral nations acceptable 
to both sides who have had no part in the Korean war. Since the 
Soviet Union does not qualify under these agreed criteria, your nom- 
ination of the Soviet Union is formally rejected. 

Although General Ridgw\ay strongly recommended to Washington 
that the delegation be permitted to give this statement to the Com- 
munists, this authority was refused. Finally, around the end of Feb- 
ruary, I pointed out to General Ridgway that the question of the 
Soviet Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Com- 
mission was rapidly becoming a major issue, and that we should be 
given authority to say to the Communists that our refusal to accept 
the Soviet Union was final and irrevocable, and no longer subject 
to discussion. Washington gave this authority, but no authority to 
amplify the basis for the United Nations Command rejection of the 
Soviet Union. 

In short, we were never permitted by Washington to give full jus- 
tification as to why the U. S. S. R. was not a neutral nation in the war. 
To me, this was incomprehensible, except when viewed in the light 
of reluctance on the part of Washington and probably elsewhere to 
offend the Soviet Union. 

Later, about the middle of March, General Ridgway recommended 
to Washington that the United States Govermnent publicly announce 



2148 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

without delay and with concurrent announcement by as many of its 
U. N. allies as practical the decision to reject unequivocably the Soviet 
Union as a member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. 

He also pointed out that the removal of the U. S. S. R. as an issue 
in the negotiations was a prerequisite to the remaining two unsolved 
questions, i. e., rehabilitation of our airfields and the voluntary re- 
patriation of the prisoners of war. Nothing ever came of this recom- 
mendation. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, in discussing the POW question in Col- 
lier's of August 30, 1952, you state : 

In short order the opposing delegations were bound and tied in a statistical, 
administrative, legal, moral, and political Gordian knot. The fact of military 
stalemate precluded cutting the knot; it had to be untied through negotiations. 

General MacArthur had constantly warned against a military stale- 
mate, had he not? 

Admiral Joy. That is correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, have you any comment on our present 
plight that we apparently accepted an armistice without the return 
of all American prisoners of war? 

Admiral Jot. By present plight, I presume you mean the predica- 
ment we are in with regard to our men who are being held in Red 
China, allegedly as spies ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. 

Admiral Joy. In answering your question, I should like to read to 
you paragraphs 51-A and 51-B of article III, arrangements relating 
to prisoners of war in the signed armistice agreement. 

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of 
each side at the time this armistice agreement becomes effective shall be effected 
in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to 
the signing of the armistice agreement : A. Within 60 days after this armistice 
agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, 
directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its 
custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time 
of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related 
provisions of this article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such 
personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the armistice agreement, ex- 
change the total number by nationalities of personnel to be directly repatriated. 
Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied 
by rosters prepared by nationality, to include name, rank, if any, and intern- 
ment, or military serial number. Each side shall release all those remaining 
prisoners of war who are not directly repatriated from its military control and 
from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Com- 
mission for disposition in accordance with the annex hereto. 

Obviously, then, the Communists in holding our men have broken 
this agreement which clearly provides for the return of all prisoners 
of war, either directly to the United Nations Command or to the 
Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at Panmunjom. In short, 
the United Nations Command did not accept an armistice which failed 
to provide for the return of all American prisoners of war. 

The Chairman. Admiral, you frequently point out that an armi- 
stice is a technical state of war. 

Admiral Joy. Correct. 

The Chairman. Then advocates of military pressure to insure good 
faith are not in fact advocating preventive war, are they ? 

Admiral Joy. No ; I would say not. 

The Chairman. Blockade is a normal military pressure, is it not? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2149 

Admiral Jot. Yes, in a state of war; yes. 

The Chairman. And since an armistice is a technical state of war, 
a blockade would be perfectly proper and legal; correct? 

Admiral Joy. That is ri^ht. 

The Chairman. In addition to that, Admiral, does not the United 
Nations Charter itself provide for a blockade under similar circum- 
stances? 

Admiral Jot. That is correct. I have the article right here. 

The Chairman. Would you state that for our record ? 

x\dmiral Jot. Article 42 of the United Nations Charter says that 
the Security Council, and I quote : 

may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demon- 
strations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of the 
members of the United Nations. 

I just want to say that the U. N. Charter containing this provision 
was approved by the United States Senate 89 to 2 on July 28, 1945. 

The Chairman. If the prisoners are not returned now, would you 
favor a blockade? 

Admiral Jot. I certainly think it should be seriously considered. 

The Chairman. You frequently refer to the Communists giving us 
lessons in the desirability of decisively defeating the Communists 
before entering negotiations with them. 

Do you believe, then, that in war, there is no substitute for victory? 

Admiral Jot. Yes ; I do. 

The Chairman. Did we defeat the North Koreans ? 

Admiral Jot. Yes ; decisively. 

The Chairman. Could we have defeated the Chinese Communists 
in Korea ? 

Admiral Jot. Well, I believe the United Nations Command could 
have defeated the Communists, or at least caused them to withdraw 
from the Korean peninsula, had not the commander in chief of the 
Far East been restricted in the use of his forces, and had an effective 
U. N. blockade of Red China been established as soon as the Chinese 
entered the war. 

Some Army commanders I have talked to also believed we would 
have required more ground troops in reserve to accomplish this. I 
know General Eidgway was also concerned about the paucity of 
reserve units for a sustained offensive. In view of article 42 of the 
United Nations Charter, I can see no valid reason why a naval blockade 
should not have been established. 

The Chairman. Admiral, this committee has had before it on this 
series of hearings on this phase of our work, General Clark, General 
Van Fleet, General Almond, General Stratemeyer and others. I have 
asked them this question, and I want to ask it of you. 

Would you ever again want to fight a war under the wraps and 
restrictions placed upon you by the United Nations ? 

Admiral Jot. I certainly wouldn't want to fight another war under 
those restrictions ; no. 

The Chairman. In other words, a war that we could have won, but 
were prevented from doing so ? 

Admiral Jot. I believe we could have decisively defeated the 
Communists. 

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Carpenter. 



2150 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to intro- 
duce into the record a statement made to the U. N. correspondents at 
Munsan-ni by Vice Adm. Turner Joy, dated November 11, 1951. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The document referred to follows:) 

[Exhibit No. 536] 
General Headquarters, United Nations Command (ADV) 

PUBLIC INFORMATION office, APO 500 

11 November 1951 
8 : 00 A. M. 

(Following is the text of a statement made to U. N. correspondents at Miinsan-nl 
at 8 a. m. today by Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, U. S. Navy, senior U. N. C. delegate 
at the military armistice conference in Korea.) 

The U. N. C. basic concept of a military armistice is of long standing and is 
crystal clear. 

Our firm objectives of last July when we entered into negotiations at Kaesong, 
continue to be our unswerving objectives today. 

As military men, we are attempting to negotiate a full-fledged military armis- 
tice, based on military realities. We want an armistice agreement tliat will 
stick and we want terms that will discourage if not prevent a resumption of 
hostilities. 

Specifically, the goals the U. N. C. delegation are striving for are: 

1. The establishment of a demilitarized zone that will reflect the military 
situation as it exists on the day the armistice agreement is signed. 

2. Completely adequate security for U. N. C. combat forces and U. N. C. rear 
areas during the suspension of hostilities. This requirement calls for militarily 
sound defensible main positions to discourage attack and minimize the effects of 
any surprise attack. In addition we need adequate room for our outposts ahead 
of our main positions to insure early warning of attack. 

3. We require concrete arrangements that will prevent a buildup of military 
forces beyond the level existing at the time the armistice is placed in effect. 
This includes a proviso against the rehabilitation and refurbishment of existing 
forces whose combat effectiveness has been significantly reduced as the result 
of combat. 

4. We are especially concerned with quick and satisfactory arrangements 
relating to prisoners of war. Prompt and expeditious recovery of the thousands 
of United Nations Command men in enemy hands is a primary aim. 

We intend to press vigorously for a full military armistice. Anything less 
would be totally unacceptable. 

We entered into negotiations last July at Kaesong with the fervent hope tha* 
a realistic military armistice and cease-fire could be achieved quickly. Our 
hopes dimmed as the Communists maintained an adamant stand on the 38th 
as a demarcation line and basis for a demilitarized zone. When the Commu- 
nists summarily suspended the meetings of the delegations on August 22 serious 
doubts were i-aised that they did not share our desire for an early armistice. 

Our hopes were revived when, after 2 months of suspension, the talks were 
resumed on October 25. We immediately proposed a realistic solution to an 
all too realistic problem. We suggested tentative establishment of a demilita- 
rized zone related directly to the existing line of battle contact but adjustable 
to any subsequent military action prior to the actual signing of the armistice 
agreement. 

But as the resumed subdelegation talks continue it becomes increasingly appar- 
ent that what the enemy wants in effect is a finalized demilitarized zone deter- 
mined now. 

He wants all of the advantages of a de facto cease-fire so that he can pro- 
long the armistice negotiations without cost to himself. He wants immediate 
relief from our inexorable military pressure — the pressure which would be an 
"incentive" to arrive quickly at agreement on other items. 

Our proposal of yesterday on item 2 is honest and realistic and in accordance 
with United Nations Command objectives. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2151 

We proposed that a demarcation line and demilitarized zone be located on the 
actual line of ground contact at the time of the siKiiin^ <>f the armistice. We 
suggested that only minor, local, and mutually desired adjustments he made to 
the zone or line. In elfect we said to the Communists, "tiie military situation 
existing at the time of the armistice will be the controlling factor on the loca- 
tion of the boundary." We must retain this flexibility of military action, with- 
out which any immediate solution to other agenda items is problematical. 

We shall continue to use every weap<m at our connnand, be it at the con- 
ference table or on the battletield, to achieve a complete military armistice at 
the earliest possible time. 

But we will not compromise our principles. We will not endanger the secu- 
rity of our forces in the held. We will not jeopardize early recovery of our 
prisoners of war. 

Mr. Carpenter. I would also like to introduce into the record an 
article from Time magazine of April 28, 1952, entitled "Strategy, the 
Ivoason." 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(The document referred to follows:) 

Exhibit No. 537 

Strategy 
2hc reasoti 

Why has no truce agreement been reached in Korea? Beneath the weird and 
interminable welter of words at Panmunjom, the reason is plain even to the 
newest soldier on the front. 

When the truce talks got underway last July, the U. N. knew what brought 
the Reds to the conference table : they were suffering heavy losses on the battle- 
field and they faced the prospect of defeat. U. N. spokesmen said insistently 
that only by continued pressure could the Reds be brought to sign an armistice. 
But U. N. strategists lost sight of that fact. 

Last summer the Communists set out to test U. N. determination by breaking 
off the talks for 2 months. The result was to bring Matt Ridgway's army down 
on them with almost as much weight as before, and the Reds came meekly hack 
to the table and gave up their demand for a truce line on the 38th parallel. 
Washington might have learned a lesson. Instead, it all but stopped the pres- 
sure. U. N. settled down to a wait-and-see campaign. Casualties fell off, but 
over the past 10 weeks the United States has still suffered a weekly average 
loss of sixty-plus killed, one-hundred-and-forty-plus wounded. The cost of the 
war went on at roughly $5 billion a year. 

Since the lull on the battlefield, the Red negotiators have been wholly in- 
tractable. The U. N. has no policy except to try to wear down the Reds at the 
conference table. In the game of waiting, the U. N. is up against the champs. 
Once, the U. N. had the advantage in Korea ; now it has got into a contest in 
which the advantage is with the enemy. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, would the military pressure required — 
that is, in order to defeat the Communists in Korea — would that have 
started world war 111? 

Admiral Joy. I do not believe so. I do not think that the Soviet 
Union was ready for a war. 

JNIr. Carpenter. As long as she was not ready, she would not have 
gotten into the war ? 

Admiral Joy. The Soviet Union will never start a war except at 
the time and place of their own choosing. I don't think they were 
ready for it then. 

Mr. Carpenter. When you secured concessions in negotiations was 
it as a result of proof of our good faith or of pressure ? 

Admiral Joy. As I have said publicly a number of times, the only 
way to negotiate with the Communists is through patience and un- 



2152 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

mistakable firmness, backed up by military power and a willingness 
to use that power. Nothing else makes sense to the Communist mind. 
They are not impressed by logic nor are they remotely concerned with 
morality. Their guiding precept is that the end justifies the means. 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to intro- 
duce into the record an article published in the U. S. News and World 
Report of January 11, 1952, and ask that it be made a part of the 
record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of 
the record. 

(Tlie document referred to follows :) 

Exhibit No. 538 
How To Deal With Communists 

Out of the prolonged negotiations with Communists in Korea are emerging 
lessons which United States negotiators feel are vitally important for the Amer- 
ican people to learn and take to heart. 

These military officers have been trying earnestly for 6 months to do busi- 
ness with the Communists. They have negotiated under the pressure of war 
with men being liilled on both sides day by day as the tallss went on. The same 
frustrations, delays, harassments that confronted diplomats in past negotiations 
with the Communists were met by military men seeking to deal when time meant 
lives. 

To these men, the lessons for the American people are simple and basic — to be 
misunderstood or overlooked only at great peril for the future. 

The basic conclusion is this : Communist leaders, fundamentally, are convinced 
that the United States is afraid to risk major war, and can be bluffed and forced 
to make sacrifices if treated rough. The Communist assumption is that capitalist 
countries are decadent and prefer their comforts to a prolonged shooting war. 
Communists assumed that when they went into Korea. They assume it now. 
They will keep on assuming it, in the opinion of negotiators, in Asia and else- 
where until convinced by something besides words that the West is willing 
to fight and to kick the pants off Communist forces every time that aggression is 
tried. 

This leads to the question of whether further wars can be avoided by a display 
of firmness. 

The answer, as the negotiators see it, is this : If the Communists are convinced 
that the West really will fight, then there wiU be no fight. The Communist tech- 
nique, set down in black and white and followed consistently, is to strike at weak 
points, not to attack when it is known that there will be military opposition. 
If Americans are ready and willing to go to war, in other words, there will be 
no war. But the burden of proof is on the United States and the West — it has 
to demonstrate beyond a shadow of a doubt that it will fight before Communists 
will be convinced. Words and threats will not do. 

How to convince them that America means business, then, becomes the big 
problem. The conclusions of the United States in that regard point to these 
answers : 

What do the Communists respect? 

Not a threat, not an ultimatum as such, not a bribe, not a promise of future 
action, not a compromise, certainly not payment of blackmail in any form. They 
seem to respect only power than can and will be used to back up a United States 
position. It must be power in being and in place, where it can be seen and be- 
lieved unquestionably. 

But can you really deal with Communists, short of warf 

The negotiators believe it can be done, within limits. But you need infinite 
patience, you must be firm at all times, you must be coldly logical, and you have 
to have the military strength actually to enforce every position you take^and 
to make it perfectly clear that you would just as soon use it for that purpose. 

Just how to go about dealing with the Communists is becoming clear, too. 
The way to operate, as the negotiators see it now, is as if you were a calm, 
mature teacher who is dealing with a clever juvenile delinquent. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2153 

Basically, in other words, the men who have been nepotiatlng with Com- 
miiuists in Korea have come to believe the only way to deal with Comuiunists 
anywhere is to "sijeak softly and carry a big stick." There must be no com- 
promise of principles. There can be no give and take, only a demonstration 
of power or the lack of it. 

What the West really is up against is shown, In turn, by these further lessons 
from Korea : 

JVhJj not use YanJcee "Jiorse trading" methods with the Communistsf 

They won't work, say the negotiators. If you give an inch, the Communists 
will take a mile. Any concession, it appears, is taken as a sign of weakness and 
the Communists then will increase their demands instead of lowering them. 

Can you Relieve anything they say? 

Not as a rule. The men who have been dealing with Communists for 6 
months conclude that their word is good only if signed to an agreement that 
the West can enforce. Each agreement was reached only because it could be 
enforced and, as long as we are willing to enforce it, their word will be kept. 

Eoiv ahont using their methods ourselves? 

That wouldn't work, the American officers conclude. Communists operate 
on a set formula that has been used by Russia for years, one based on deceit 
and understood by them better than by us. They are masters at using the 
"big lie" technique to sidetrack the real issues, to confuse and camouflage the 
point at hand, to get their opponents angry and off guard. No westerner could 
compete with them on that basis. 

Then is there any real way to deal with them ty negotiations? 

Yes ; if you can back it up. It's a matter of repetition. It is very important 
to make our position perfectly clear by repeating it over and over again, and 
in different words so that there can be no misunderstanding or suspicion of a 
loophole. The Communists, who are geniuses at twisting words around, are 
highly suspicious of any single statement. Several papers, each saying the 
same thing in different words, should be presented to back up each point. Even 
after an agreement is reached, the Communists will search for loopholes and 
give the agreement different meaning if the idea is not made completely clear 
by other statements saying the same thing. 

Can you get an agreement on anything in a hurry this way? 

No ; it always takes time at best. Time means nothing to the Communists, 
the negotiators say, and they will haggle indefinitely until they are absolutely 
certain that the opposition won't weaken and maybe concede something else. 
In the past, they have come out on top of conference after conference largely 
because of their willingness just to sit and wait. It takes no intelligence, but 
a good deal of patience. Others get impatient, under pressure from home to get 
results in a hurry, and the Communists know this and take advantage of it. 

Just how do you go about getting any agreement then? 

Well, take the case of the agreement reached on the so-called truce line In 
Korea. That took months of negotiating. It was done, in essence, by demon- 
strating to the Communists that if they didn't accept the present battleline. 
United Nations forces then would push further north and take more Communist- 
held ground. Further delay, in other words, would cost the Communist 
something. 

The Communists, in that case, finally offered a compromise when they were 
convinced they could not get the 38th parallel as a truce line. Then they offered 
a better compromise, and finally agreed to the present line. They still bring the 
matter up constantly. But they respect the United Nations Army's ability to 
hold that line, and so the agreement will stand unless they think they can talk 
us out of it later. It was a matter of carefully demonstrated firmness coupled 
Mith active pressure. 

Do all Communist negotiators have to clear every agreement icith Moscow? 

Probably. There is some leeway and not every jwint is cleared. But all 
major positions and agreements appear to be sent to and finally decided by an 
office of the Politburo somewhere — either in Moscow or perhaps a branch office 
In Peiping or elsewhere. Nothing important is left up to the local commander 
in any dealings with the West. 



2154 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

What is the Communist formula for dealing with the West? 

The pattern invariably followed is something like this : Communists will pro- 
pose or agree to settlement talks only when on the defensive ; they were in Korea 
last summer. Then, by negotiating, they will try to relieve the pressure on them- 
selves, or gain a breathing spell, or even get a major concession. They will 
make a proposal and proceed to disagree violently with any change, as a means 
of testing how firm the position of the West is. They often will make wild 
statements that are obviously untrue just to confuse the basic issue and upset 
th3 Western negotiators. If any concessions are made by the West at this stage, 
then there is no chance of compromise. It becomes possible to deal later if the 
West takes steps which will put the Communists further on the defensive, if 
actual pressure is applied so that it is obviously to the Communist advantage 
to settle quickly. Words themselves mean nothing. Time means nothing. Only 
action, and power that can and will be applied, is meaningful. 

In the case of Korea, wasn't United Nations power clearly demonstrated in the 
Communists' high casualty rate? 

Yes, but the pressure exerted by casualties is always less on the Communists 
than it would seem to the western mind. Human life means little to them. 
Purges all over the Communist world show that. It shows up, too, in other 
ways. For example, if Americans knew that there was a spy in a unit of 50 men, 
they would go to a lot of trouble to ferret him out, try him, then either jail him 
or deport him. The Communists would simply shoot all 50 men in the unit, 
thus getting rid of the spy with a minimum of trouble. Loss of life even in their 
own armies apparently becomes a problem only in logistics and replacement. 

Looking back, was there a more effective way of trying to get a settlement in 
Korea? 

The negotiators believe so. To get results, the United Nations just had to 
resume a full-scale land offensive at any time. Tell the Communists you don't 
cai'e when they come to an agreement, but in the meantime you are going to drive 
further north every day and move the truce line with you. Then do it. That's 
the kind of incentive, the officers believe, that gets results in a hurry. The cost 
of such an offensive would be high in United Nations casualties, so land drives 
have been limited since the beginning of talks with the Communists. 

These, in brief, are tlae lessons coming out of the latest attempt to deal with 
Communists around a conference table. The negotiators feel that they must be 
learned and used skillfully in years ahead if a full-scale war with the Communist 
world is to be avoided. 

Mr. Carpenter. I would also like to ask that the last statement 
of Admiral Joy to Commmiist negotiators, Panmunjom, May 22, 1952, 
be made a part of the record. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record and become a part of the 
record. 

(The docmnent referred to follows:) 

Exhibit No. 539 

Last Statement of Admiral Joy to Communist Negotiators, Panmunjom, 

May 22, 1952 

At the very first plenary session of our two delegations, on the 10th of July 
of last year, I said : "The success or failure of the negotiations begun here today 
depends directly upon the good faith of the delegations present." These words 
constituted both a promise and a warning — a promise of good faith by our side 
and a warning that we would expect good faith from your side. Today at the 
Goth plenary session, my opening remarks on the subject of good faith are more 
than ever pertinent. 

It has become increasingly clear through these long drawn out conferences that 
any hope that your side would bring good faith to these meetings was forlorn 
indeed. From the very start, you have cavilled over procedural details ; you have 
manufactured spurious issues and placed them in controversy for bargaining pur- 
poses ; you have denied the existence of agreements made between us when you 
found the fulfillment thereof not to your liking ; you have made false charges 
based on crimes invented for your purposes and you have indulged in abuse and 
invective when all other tactics proved ineffective. Through a constant succes- 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2155 

sion of delays, fraudulent arguments, and artificial attitudes you have obstructed 
the attainment of an armistice which easily hiy witliiu our grasp had there been 
equal honesty on both sides of this coiifevence table. Nowhere in the record is 
there a single action of your side which indicates a real and sincere desire to at- 
tain the objective for wliich these conferences were designed. Instead you have 
increasingly presented evidence before the world that you did not enter these 
negotiations with sincerity and high puri,)ose, but rather that you entered into 
tliem to gain time to repair your shattered forces and to try to accomplish at the 
conf*'rence table what your armies could not accomplish in the field. It is an 
enormous misfortune that you are constitutionally incapal»le of understanding the 
fair and dignified attitude of the UNC. Apparently you en mutt comprehend that 
strong and proud and free nations can make costly siicrifices for principles 
because they are strong; can be diiinified in the face of abuse and deceit because 
they are proud, and can si>eak honestly because they are free and do not fear the 
truth. Instead you impute to the UNC the same suspicion, greed, and deviousness 
which are your stock in trade. You search every word for a hidden meaning 
and every agreement for a hidden trap. It would be ch!irital)le for me to say that 
you do these things by Instinct, but you are people of intelligence and it is prob- 
ably truer to say that you do these things with purix)se and design. 

From the very first the UNC has had but one objective in Korea : To bring 
an end to the Korean war so that a permanent and enduring peace might be 
established as quickly as possible. This has been the precise objective of the 
UXC delegation in these negotiations. This is what we meant by good faith on 
our part. You have but to examine the record to see the many evidences of our 
restraint, our constructive suggestions, our willingness to conciliate and com- 
promise, and our patience. There is very little evidence of similar contributions 
by your side. As an answer to the question : "Which side has brought good 
faith to these meetings?" Nothing could be more impressive than a comparison 
of the actions of the two delegations during our 10 months of these conferences. 
They are as different as day and night. No amount of propaganda however oft 
repeated can hide your ignoble record. That these meetings have continued this 
long and that we have, after a fashion, resolved our differences to the point where 
only one major issue remains is testimony to the patience and dedication of 
the UNC. 

Now our negotiations have come to the point where the POW Issue stands as 
a formidable barrier to the accomplishment of an armistice. Casting aside any 
pretense of humanity, you have made the demand that the UNC must return to 
your side all POW's in its custody, driving them at the point of a bayonet, if 
necessary. You even have the colossal impertinence to document your position 
by referring to the Geneva Convention. What could be more ironic than your 
attempt to found your inhuman proposition upon an International agreement 
whose purpose is to defend and protect the unfortunate victims of war. These 
are strange words for you to employ. You who have denied the International 
Red Cross access to your POW camps, who have refused to furnish lists of 
POW's to the POW Bureau, and who cannot even account for over 50,000 UNC 
soldiers whom you oflScially boasted as having in your custody before the Korean 
war was 9 months old. After months of conciliation, of meeting you more than 
halfway on issue after issue, the UNC has told you with all firmness and finality 
that it will not recede from its position with respect to POW's. On the 28th 
of April we offered you an equitable and specific solution to the issues remaining 
before us. We told you then, and we tell you now, that we firmly adhere to the 
principles of humanity and the preservation of the rights of the individual. 
These are values which we will not barter, for they are one and the same with 
the principles which motivated the UNC to oppose you on the battlefield. No 
amount of argument and invective will move us. If you harbor the slightest 
desire to restore peace and to end the misery and suffering of millions of innocent 
people, you must bring to the solution of this issue the good faith which, as I 
said at our first meeting, would directly determine the success or failure of our 
negotiations. The decision Is In your hands. 

After 10 months and 12 days I feel that there Is nothing more for me to do. 
There is nothing left to negotiate. I now turn over the unenviable job of further 
dealings with you to Maj. Gen. William K. Harrison, who succeeds me as senior 
delegate of the UNC delegation. May God be with him. 

Mr. Carpenter. Shortly before you left Korea in June 1952 you 
presented the Communists with our final and irrevocable offer. How 
did this differ from the armistice achieved later, a year later? 



2156 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Admiral Jot. It was essentially the same, except for a few minor 
changes, and the addition of a few supplementary paragraphs cover- 
ing the details of the screening and disposition of prisoners of war 
not desiring repatriation. 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to intro- 
duce into the record, and ask that it may become a part of the record, 
the extract from Admiral Joy's farewell to the Naval Forces, Far 
East, June 1952. 

The Chairman. It may go into the record, and will become a part 
of the record. 

(The document referred to follows :) 

Exhibit No. 540 

Extract Fkom Admiral Joy's Farewell to the Naval Forces, Far East, 

June 1952 

During the last 10 months of my tour in the Far East I was fortunate or 
unfortunate enough to face our common enemy across the conference table. If 
there are still those in the free world who believe that the enemy can be moved 
by logic, or that he is susceptible to moral api)eal, or that he is willing to act in 
good faith, those remaining few should immediately disabuse themselves of that 
notion. Our one serious mistake during the negotiations was In assuming, or 
even hoping, that the enemy was capable of acting in good faith. Future text- 
books can set down the maxim that the speed with which agreement is reached 
with the Communists varies directly as the military pressure applied ; and that 
the worth of any agreement is in proportion to the military pressure you are able 
and willing to apply to enforce it. 

As for the future, it should be clear that there is nothing inevitable about the 
onward a'nd upward progress of the United States or the United Nations. In 
fact, there is nothing inevitable about our survival. History Is littered with the 
graves of civilizations that assumed all is well. All is not well. We will survive 
and progress to the extent that we are aware of the nature of the enemy who 
threatens us and to the extent that we stay strong enough to meet him in the 
arena of his choosing. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, why, then, do you believe that the ne- 
gotiations were protracted for another year? 

Admiral Jot. I have no — protracted from the time we suspended 
the negotiations ? 

The Chairman. Protracted from your final one. 

Admiral Jot. Yes. Well, of course, it was entirely up to the Com- 
munists. We had made our final offer, and there was no backing 
down on it by the United Nations Command or our Government, or 
the United Nations. This final offer, to me, has always represented 
the difference between the free world and the Communist world. 

It was very, very difficult for them to accept anything like that 
final offer for the simple reason that the principle of voluntary repa- 
triation is a principle of this country that the rights of man come be- 
fore the rights of the state. In the Communist countries, as you know, 
the rights of the state come before the rights of man. Therefore, 
there was a fundamental difference in this final proposal between 
what the Communists believe and what we believe. To accept that 
meant a great deal to them. Of course, I have no way of knowing 
why they held off so long and finally came back to the conference table. 
I can only guess they were using that period, trying to decide whether 
or not it was to their interest to back down on the prisoner issue and 
agi^ee to an armistice on United Nations terms for the exchange of 
prisoners. Probably they realized it was better to forego for the time 



IXTERLOCKIXG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2157 

being their original intention of attempting to take over all of the 
Korean Peninsuhx, and concentrate instead on a more vulnerable area 
snch as Indochina. 

Mr. CARrEXTER. May I ask yon this, Admiral: Did leaks of infor- 
mation handicap your efforts at the armistice negotiations? 

Admiral Joy. Yes, decidedly. 

Mr. Carpenter. Would you comment on that, please ? 

Admiral Joy. We were very embarrassed at the time by the leaks 
that appeared in periodicals and newspapers in the States, because, as 
you know, the Communists can read just as well as we can, and they 
had access to all of that information. 

For example, here is an article which is headlined : The Steps Wash- 
ington Is Planning To Achieve a Truce in Korea. It was incorrect in 
several details but at the same time when the Communists read some- 
thing like that, they just sit back and wait, and since time means noth- 
ing to them, they continue to wait and see whether such information 
is correct or not. 

For example, here is one : 

A decision has been made to abandon opposition to the Soviet Union serving 
as one of the neutral powers siipervising the armistice. 

Possibly, that is the reason they stood pat on the neutral nations. 
I don't know. 

Here is another one : 

The U. N. seen ready to yield on issue of airfield ban. 

And there were others. As I have often said, when you negotiate 
with Communists, it is like playing poker: You can't have a mirror 
behind your back. 

The Chairman. In other words, Admiral, some of these releases 
that you referred to came out with the position that our Government 
was going to take even before you received it officially ? 

Admiral Joy. I wouldn't say before we received it officially. 

The Chairman. Before you were ready to use it in your nego- 
tiations? 

Admiral Joy. Before we were ready to use it ; yes. 

For example, when we made our proposal for a 30-day time limit 
on the demarcation line, 2 days before we made it we had received it 
from Washington. Two days before we made it, one of the cor- 
respondents came up to me at Panmunjom and said that his head office 
had heard we were going to give the Communists a time limit, and 
was that correct? Of course, they had contacts with the Communist 
correspondents and that all gets in to the Communists. Well, I think 
that is about enough. 

The Chairman. Someplace along the line, there were some damag- 
ing leaks. 

Admiral Joy. We always felt they were unnecessary leaks. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, other than the intransigence of the Com- 
munists, what was the greatest handicap under which you conducted 
the negotiations ? 

Admiral Joy. I would say that the greatest handicap under which 
we negotiated was the apparent reluctance or inability, in a number of 
instances, of Washington to give us firm and minimum positions which 
would be supported by national policy. In other words, positions 



2158 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

•which we could carry through to the breaking point of the negotiations 
if necessary. 

As General Ridgway said on one occasion, to introduce and argue 
vigorously for a basic principle only to be later required to give up that 
position is detrimental to the overall success of the negotiation. The 
final position to be supported by national policy should be known to 
the United Nations Command delegation prior to opening discussion 
on any general agenda item. In that connection, I would like to 
read you a telegram I received gratuitously from one of my senior staff 
officers only yesterday. He is a brilliant and able officer now stationed 
in Washington. 

In view of the forthcoming interrogation, as your ex-staffer, I wish to offer the 
following comments. At no time were we able to confront our opponents with a 
forceful alternative to accept our proposals. We knew and they linew there was 
no steel in the UNC's final positions. There was no point at which our side could 
resume the military argument powerfully if the discussions failed to make 
progress. Our lack of determination, revealed to our opponents by acts of 
recession directed from above us, utterly denied our cause. The only effective 
combination in negotiating with such enemies is the combination of reasonable 
proposals, linked with forcible alternatives. Our enemies can be brought to 
accept reasonable propositions only If these are posed in combination with an 
alternative of imposing force. This essential was never allowed to us. End of 
comment. Use this if you like. 

Well, this indicates how other members of my staff felt. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, do you have any comment on SEATO ? 

Admiral Joy. Well, as a layman, pure and simple, I think it is a 
step in the right direction, though I should like to have seen all anti- 
Communist countries in the Far East included in the organization, 
such countries as Japan. 

Mr. Carpenter. What about Indochina ? 

Admiral Joy. Well, again speaking as a layman, I deplore the fact 
that the French apparently found it necessary from the standpoint 
of their national interest to come to an appeasement agreement with 
the Vietminh. In my opinion, their action in so doing presages the 
Communist ultimate conquest of the rest of Indochina, probably 
Thailand and the Malay Peninsula, and Indonesia. 

The Chairman. Should we recognize Communist China ? 

Admiral Joy. Decidedly no. 

The Chairman. Reverting to the armistice negotiations : Do you 
feel the real source of our directives was the Joint Chiefs of Stan or 
the State Department ? 

Admiral Joy. Well, as I say, I have no means of knowing, Senator. 
I told you what I heard on good authority when I got back, that it 
was a combination of a group of State and JCS. That is about all 
I can say about it. 

The Chairman. In other words, political considerations injected 
themselves into the military considerations ? 

Admiral Joy. There were undoubtedly political considerations ; yes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Admiral, do you believe that the American people 
wanted then or w^ant now peace at any price ? 

Admiral Joy. I don't believe the American people have ever wanted 
peace at any price, when they became aware of the principles and the 
issues involved. 

The Chairman. Do you have anything further ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Nothing further, Senator. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2159 

The CHAiiniAN. In conclusion, Admiral, I want to thank you for 
sharing with us some of your hard-earned knowledge. I understand 
that you went to Kaesong in full and radiant health and that you 
linished your tour of negotiating with the Conmiunists with your 
liealtli seriously impaired. I felt at the time, and I feel strongly now, 
that the Nation owes you and our other fighting military ofhcers an 
apology for subjecting you to the sheer indignity of having to nego- 
tiate with those unprincipled barbarians, I understand, also, the reti- 
cence acquired in a lifetime of dedicated military service and appre- 
ciate how difficult this session has been for you. I sincerely believe 
your appearance has been in the public interest and deeply appreciate 
your cooperation. 

Tlie committee will stand adjourned. 

Admiral Joy. Thank you, Senator. It has been an honor to appear 
before your distinguished committee. 

("Whereupon the hearing was concluded at 11 : 40 a. m.) 

X 



J 

INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN 
GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS 

[Activities of United- States Citizens in Red China] 



HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE 

ADMINISTEATION OF THE INTERNAL SECUEITY 

ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

EIGHTY-THIRD CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

IN ERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS 



DECEMBER 13, 1954 



PART 27 



Printed for the use of the Coromittee on the Judiciary 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
32918* WASHINGTON : 1955 



Boston Public i^i^rary 
Superintendent of Documents 

MAR %r 1955 



COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota, Chninnan 
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin HARLEY M. KILGORE, West Virginia 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utali ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 
EVERETT Mckinley DIRKSEN, Illinois THOMAS C. HEXXINGS, Jr., Missouri 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

J. G. SovRwixE, Counsel 



Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security 
Act and Other Internal Security Laws 

WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana, Chairman 

ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi 

ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina 
HERMAN WELKER, Idaho JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas 

JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, Maryland 

Alva C. Carpenter, Chief Counsel and Executive Director 

J. G. SouRwiNE, Associate Counsel 

Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 

II 



CONTENTS 



Testimony of^ Pase 

Anderson, CLirence L., Maj., Medical Corps, United States Army 2236 

Aul^rey, Carl L., Lt. Col., United States Army 2247 

Bach, Lawrence B., Jr., Maj., United States Air Force 2259 

Bell, Frank O 2196 

Burns, Robert J., Maj., United States Air Force 2250 

Daltrv, Raymond, Maj., United States Army 2228 

Gill, Delores Holmes 2200 

Kopischkie, Carl E., United States Army 2262 

McManus, Robert C _ 2215 

O'Dowd, Paul T., Jr., Capt., United States Army 2254 

Powell, Svlvia Campbell 2162 

Wolfe, Claudius 2220 



Statement of Senator Herman Welker, acting chairman. Senate Internal 

Security Subcommittee-- 2240 

III 



INTEELOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

DEPARTxAIENTS 



MONDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1954 

United States Senate, 
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration 
or the Internal Security Act and Other Internal 
Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 

San Francisco^ Calif. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 30 a. m., in the audi- 
torium of the Department of Health Building, 101 Grove Street, 
San Francisco, Calif., Hon. Herman Welker presiding. 

Present: Senator Welker. 

Also present: Alva C. Carpenter, counsel; Benjamin Mandel, re- 
search director; and Robert McManus and Louis R. Colombo, pro- 
fessional statf members. 

Senator Welker. The meeting will come to order. 

The hearing today concerns the activities of American citizens in 
behalf of Communist China. This hearing is a continuation of hear- 
ings held in Washington, D. C, on September 27 and September 28. 
We heard a number of witnesses, some prisoners of war wlio had suf- 
fered incredible tortures in Communist Chinese prison camps. A cen- 
tral figure in the hearings held in Washington, D. C, was John W. 
Powell, former editor of the China Monthly Review, published in 
Communist China. Former prisoners of war described how the China 
]\Ionthly Review was used for indoctrinating Americans in Com- 
munist prison camps. Failure to accept such indoctrination resulted 
in penalties ranging all the way from beating, solitary confinement, 
and starvation to the withholding of medical treatment, food, and 
in many cases, in death. 

John W. Powell, we hope, will be our first witness today. I might 
say that be has been roaming the country of the United States of 
America, free to continue what the committee feels is the vicious 
propaganda that he started in Communist China. 

We shall today hear from additional prisoners of war, not used in 
Washington, D. C, who were subjected to this indoctrination. We 
shall hear from Sylvia Powell, who will be identified at a later time. 
We shall hear from the widow of one American Army officer who 
died in the cruel hands of his Chinese Communist captors in a Korean 
prison camp. This lady will tell you under oath of her dealings with 
John W. Powell, who the committee feels is certainly living high and 
mighty in the city of San Francisco, Calif. 

Mr. Carpenter, the chief counsel of the subcommittee, will call the 
first witness. 

]Mr. Cabpenter. John W. Powell, please. 

2161 



2162 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. Is John W. Powell in the hearing room at this 
time ? 

Does anyone in the hearing room know of the whereabouts of Mr. 
Powell, John W. Powell? 

If not, Mr. Counsel, will you call your next witness? 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Sylvia Powell. 

Senator Welker. Will you stand and be sworn, please. Do you 
solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the subcom- 
mittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God? 

."Mrs. Powell. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF SYLVIA CAMPBELL POWELL, SAN FRANCISCO, 
CALIF. (ACCOMPANIED BY ATTORNEY BORIS BRIN WALKER) 

Senator Welker. Will you state your name, please? 

ISIrs. Powell. Sylvia Campbell Powell. 

Senator W^elker. Where do you reside? 

Mrs. Powell. 1015 Carolina Street, San Francisco. 

Senator Welker. In San Francisco, Calif. ? 

Mrs. Pow^ELL. Yes. 

Senator Welker. Are you a married woman ? 

]\Irs. Powell. I am married. 

Senator Welker. And do you have issue of that marriage, chil- 
dren ? 

Mrs. Powell. I have two children. 

Senator Welker. Their ages, I think, are 5 and 9. 

Mrs. Powell. Five and three. 

Senator Welker. Five and three, I beg your jjardon. 

Where were j^ou born, Mrs. Powell ? 

Mrs. Powell. I was born in Pendleton, Oreg. 

Senator Welker. Now you may proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Wlien were you born, Mrs. Powell ? 

Mrs. Powell. November 15, 1920. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you tell the committee your educational back- 
ground, please ? 

Mrs. Powell. I was educated in the public schools of Portland, 
Oreg., and Milwaukie, Oreg. 

Mr. Carpenter. What year or years? 

Mrs. Powell. During the thirties, I assume. 

Mr. Carpenter. What college did you attend ? 

Mrs. Powell. I attended Reed College in Portland, Oreg. 

Mr. Carpenter. When did you graduate? 

Mrs. Powell. I graduated in 1943. 

Mr. Carpenter. With what degree ? 

Mrs. Powell. With a B. A. degree. 

Mr. Carpenter. After leaving college, did you go to work? 

Mrs. Powell. I worked for 1 year for the International Wood 
Woikers of America, in Portland, Oreg. 

Mr. Carpenter. From there where did you go? 

Mrs. Powell. To W^ashington, D. C. 

Mr. Carpenter. For whom did you work in Washington, D. C. ? 

]\Irs. Powell. For the National Planning Board for a few months ; 
for the Labor Research Bureau of the Midwest for a few months. 



IXTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 21C3 

JVIr. Carpf.ntf.r. Then wliore did you fjo? 
^]\Irs. PowKLL. Then I worked in Washington, D. C, for the United 
Kations Kelief and Rehabilitation Administration. 

Mr. Cakpkntek. What year was that? 

IVIrs. PowEr.L. 1945. 

]\Ir. Cari'knter. How long did you work for the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Washington, D. C? 

ISIrs. PowEfX. For just a few months. 

Senator Welker, Counsel, may I interrupt you? 

"Would counsel for the witness^please identify herself? Give your 
name and address, please. 

Airs. Walker. My name is Doris Brin Walker, attorney at law, 
845 Franklin Street, San Francisco. 

Senator Welker. You are admitted to practice law in the State of' 
California? 

]Mrs, Walker. I am. 

Senator Welker. Any other jurisdiction? 

_Mrs. Walker. I am admitted to practice before the Federal dis- 
trict court. 

Senator Welker. How long have you been so admitted to practice 
law? 

Mrs. W^vi^i^ER. Although I am not a witness, Senator, I will answer 
the question. 

Senator Welker. If you do not care to identify yourself, all right. 
We will strike the question. 

Mrs. Walker. I was admitted on December 

Senator Welker. All right. We will not have you say if you do not 
want to. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long did you work for UNRRA in Wash- 
ington, D. C. ? ^ 

Airs. Pow^ell. For just a few months. 

Mr. Carpenter. Then where did you go ? 

Mrs. Powell. I went to China for UNRRA. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where were you stationed in China ? 

Mrs. Pow^ell. I was stationed in Shanghai. 

Mr. Carpenter. Who was your immediate superior in UNRRA in 
Shanghai ? 

Mrs. Powell. I had several jobs in UNRRA. I was the adminis- 
trative assistant to the administrative officer of UNRRA. I was in 
the public-relations office of UNRRA. I was secretary to the head 
of CNRRA,^ which is the Chinese counterpart of UNRRA. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was that an organ of the Chinese Government, 
CNRRA? 

Mrs. Powell. I would assume that the funds would have come 
from the Chinese Nationalist Government, but I was an employee of 
UNRRA. 

Mr. Carpenter. "\ATio was your immediate superior while you were 
with CNRRA? 

Mrs. Powell. I was secretary to John Ting-Fu, T. F. John." 

Mr. Carpenter. How long did you work for CNRRA ? 



» China Nationnl Rollof anrl Rohabilitatton Arlmlntstratlon. 

"Tinc-fu Tsiuiig, former CNKKA ollicial, is liow iiermanent representative of Nationalist 

TlTln ti\ tha FT V 



China to the U. N 



2164 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mrs. Powell. For just a short while, perhaps several weeks. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where did you go from CNRRA ? 

Mrs. Powell. Gentlemen, I would like very much, in view of the 
fact that I have an honorable Senator here 

Senator Welker. Will you answer the question, please ? 

Mrs. Powell. I would like to answer the question, Senator. 

Senator Welker. Please answer the question and then, if you desire 
to explain, I will be happy to have you explain. 

Mrs. Powell. I would like the opportunity of telling you, Senator, 
and you gentlemen, of the experiences I have had in China because 
I think that they have given me some insight there. I must say, Sen- 
ator, that in view of the way this hearing has been presented, the 
publicity that has preceded the hearing, the threats that have been 
given to other people who have appeared before hearings by this same 
subcommittee, I feel that I cannot answer your questions on the ground 
of the first amendment, which gives me freedom of association. 

I also take my constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment 
for fear that anything I might say might be used in future criminal 
trials against me. 

Senator Welker. In other words, you take as your objection the 
first and fifth amendments of the Constitution of the United States ? 

Mrs. Powell. I am using my constitutional privileges; that is 
correct. 

Senator Welker. The first and fifth amendments ? 

Mrs. Powell. Both the first and the fifth amendments. 

Senator Welker. I will advise you and your counselor that the com- 
mittee recognizes the fifth amendment only. We do not recognize the 
first amendment. Your refusal to answer under the fifth amendment 
will be recognized. 

Proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you on the editorial staff of the China lie- 
view — the China Weekly Review, and later the China Monthly Review, 
published in Shanghai, China? 

]\Irs. Powell. Gentlemen, I think we are in the realm of freedom 
of the press, which I feel I have the right, under the first amendment, 
to refuse to answer this question. Since you have ruled j^ou do not 
recognize that, I will take my constitutional privilege in the fifth 
amendment. 

Senator Welker. Madam witness, now you feel we are invading the 
freedom of the press to ask you a very simple question, whether or not 
you are a writer or assistant editor or any part of the press, not only 
of our great Nation but any other country, whether it be Communist 
or anti-Communist ? Is that your objection, that we are now invading 
the freedom of the press by asking you now whether or not you were 
assistant editor of any publication ? We are not asking you, Madam, 
what you wrote or anything of that sort at this time. 

Mrs. Powell. May I consult ? 

Senator Welker. Yes, you may consult with your counsel. 

(Witness consulting with counsel.) 

Mrs. Po-^T^LL. Senator, I will stand on my previous answer. 

Senator Welker. What is that again ? 

Mrs. Powell. That I take my privilege under the first amendment 
and my constiti.tional privilege under the fifth amendment. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 21 05 

Senator "Wfxker. !N'ow, Counselor, I hope tlir.t 3-011 are advisinn; tlie 
client because we all want to save time. AVe have a number of wit- 
nesses. We are not goin^ to- reco<^-nizo the lirst amendment. I so 
advise you, when she desires, [to take the fifth amendment. Let us 
limit it to that, please. If you want it so, I Mill sti])ulate that she 
includes, in her refusal to answer, the first and fifth amendments of 
the Constitution, with the further stipulation that the committee 
recoi2;nizes only the fifth amendment. 

Mrs. "Walker. The question of the application of the first amend- 
ment to various witnesses is presently before the United States 
Supreme Court, Senator. 

Senator Welker. I did not ask you for any legal opinion. Coun- 
selor; I was merely trying to expedite the hearing. You know our 
rulings. We have never recognized the first amendment. "We do 
recognize the fifth amendment: It will save time if you do not put 
the objection upon the grounds of the first amendment. I could not 
be any fairer than that because I am stipulating that the objection go 
into the record, but we do not recognize it. Do you understand, 
Counselor ? 

]\Irs. "Walker. I wish to cooperate with you in every way. Senator, 
in expediting the hearing. 

Senator "Welker. I am sure you do. 

Mrs. Walker. But I feel in advising my client I must advise her 
completely and not partially. 

Senator Welker. Let me say to you that you are here as a guest of 
the committee. You are not to advise your client until she seeks advice 
from you. We shall be happy to permit her to ask your advice at any 
time. We are glad to have you here, Mrs. Walker. 

We will proceed, Counsel. 

Mr, Carpenter. You were sometimes known as Sylvia Campbell ; is 
that right? 

Mrs, Pomt:ll, That is my maiden name, Sylvia Campbell. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. Have you done any writing under the name of 
Sylvia Campbell ? 

Mrs. Powell. Gentlemen, I again use the first amenclment and my 
constitutional privilege under the fifth amendment. 

Senator Welker. ISIay I interrupt you, Counselor, again? 

In m}' statement made heretofore I probably did not make myself 
as clear as I should have that this committee does not recognize the 
first amendment as a basis for refusing to answer. Naturally, all 
Americans recognize the first amendment and all the amendments to 
our great Constitution. Once again let me say that the committee does 
not recognize the first amendment as a basis for refusing to answer 
any question propounded to you. 

You inay proceed. Counsel. . 

Mr, Carpenter. ]\Ir. Chairman, at this time I would like to intro- 
duce into the record, to be made a part of the record, the flyleaf of a 
magazine I hold in my hand entitled "China Monthly Eeview." 
May it go into the record and be made a part of the record ? 

Senator Welker. It is dated January 19, 1953. It may be made a 
part of the record. 

(The material referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 510"' and 
appears on following page,) 



2166 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION EST GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 510 









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Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Powell, I have here a copy of the China 
Monthly Review of January 1953. I notice under the name of "Con- 
tributing editors" the name Sylvia Campbell. Is that your name and 
were you in tliat position with tlie China Monthly Eeview of January 
1953? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 21G7 

Mrs. Powell. Gentlemen, I use my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Wklker. ^lay we, stipulate, Counsel, that she means by that 
the lii'th amendment. 

Now, with the ordinary stipulation, if she wants the first amendment 
it will be not recognized as a l)asis for not answering the question. 

Mrs. "Walker. Senator, I believe that the witness' assertion of her 
rights under the first amendment will not consume a great deal of time, 
and it will help to keep the record straight on her assertion of her 
right not to answer on both grounds. I believe that the ground of the 
first amendment is a proper ground, particularly in tlie fields into 
which j'ou are now inquiring; that is, a publication, and that the wit- 
ness should preserve her right not t:o answer on the ground of the 
first amendment, freedom of speech, as well as on the ground of the 
fifth amendment, her fear that her answer might be used against her. 

I do not believe that it will consume an unreasonable amount of 
time if she merely states both grounds. 

Senator "Welker. We are happy to cooperate with you in any way 
that we can. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to intro- 
duce into the record the flyleaf of the China Monthly Review for June 
of 1953 and have it made a part of the record. 

Senator Welker. It will be so ordered. 

(The material referred to above was marked "Exhibit No. 511" and 
appears on following page.) 

iMr. Carpexter. Mrs. Powell, I notice here in the magazine entitled 
"China Monthly Review," jDublished in June 1953, associate editor, 
along with Julian Schuman, the name of Sylvia Campbell. I will ask 
you if you are the same person whose name appears on this fly cover 
of the China Monthly Review. 

JNIrs. Powell. Sir, I again use the first amendment, freedom of the 
press, and my constitutional right under the fifth amendment. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt you, counsel ? 

Have you ever heard of the China ISIonthly Review ? 

jNIrs. Powell. IMay I consult with my counsel ? 

Senator Welker. You may. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

INIrs. Powell. Sir, I use the same grounds, freedom of the press, of 
the first amendment, and constitutional privilege of the fifth amend- 
ment. 

Senator Welker. I take it you would take the same objection if I 
asked you if while you lived in China you had ever seen the China 
Monthly Review or the China Weekly Review? 

INIrs. Powell. I stand on my answer. 

Senator Welker. Proceed, counsel. 

IMr. Carpenter. How long were you in Shanghai, Mrs. Powell? 

Mrs. Powell. I was in Shanghai from 1945 to July 1953. 

INIr. Carpenter. Did you travel extensively while you were in 
China? 

]\Irs. Powell. I traveled some while I was in China. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you travel to any foreign countries while you 
were in Shanghai ? 

Mrs. Powell. May I consult ? 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 



2168 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 511 




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Mrs. Powell. I assert my privilege under the fifth amendment that 
I am afraid my answer might be used against me in some future trial. 
Senator Welker. We will recognize that. 
Proceed, counsel. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 21C9 

Mr. CARrKXTER. Did you travel to Soviet Russia while you were in 
Shanii'liai? 

JNIrs. Powell. Gentlemen, I would like to say that if Americans had 
traveled to Soviet Russia ^ < 

Senator Welker. Just a moment. I will ask you, counselor, to bo 
helpful. Please respond to tlie question. 

JNIrs. Powell. May I add that we had corresi:)ondents in the Soviet 
Union, and I am sure there would have been something in the papers 
to the ell'ect. 

Senator AVelker. Just a moment. You said "we'' had corre- 
spondents. I 

Now, counselor, may I admonish you not to be touching the witness, 
please. I want no more of that activity because you know I admon- 
ished you in private hearing that you are here as a guest of the com- 
mittee. Please do not touch the witness or ask her to look your way 
until she asks for your help. 

Now, Mrs. Powell, you stated a moment ago you had correspondents 
in other countries. Vrhat do you mean by that ? 

INIrs. Powell. I mean the United Press, Associated Press, and 
correspondents — Associated Press and correspondents of others. 

I would like to finish my statement. I am sorry. Senator, but it 
makes me very confused when you keep interrupting. 

Senator Welker. I am sorry I am interrupting. I should be more 
humble. I traveled a long way. I know you are tired; so am I. If 
I interrupt you at any time, I am sorry. I merely have a job to do 
for the American people. You are here as a witness. We want to 
protect you in every way possible. 

Now, if you desire to, go ahead and tell me about the correspondents 
you have. I want to interrogate you further on that score. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. I decline to answer the question on my travels on the 
ground of my constitutional privilege. I mean the fifth amendment. 

Senator Welker. The fifth amendment, if you told the committee 
the truth, might tend to incriminate you or cause you to bear witness 
against yourself? 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I feel that anything I may say may be used as 
evidence against me at some future trial. 

Senator Welker. You fear that ? 

Mrs. Powell. I do fear prosecution, although I am innocent. I 
have committed no crime. Senator. Innocent people have been prose- 
cuted before this, and in this hearing I fear prosecution. 

Senator Welker. You do ? 

]Mrs. Powell. Indeed, I do. 

Senator Welker. Have you heard of the Internal Security Com- 
mittee, of which I have the hcjnor to be the acting chairman, prose- 
cuting any innocent people? It is not our duty. Madam, to prosecute 
innocent people. 

Mrs. Powell. Senator, there are innocent people who have been 
prosecuted and who have been committed to jail. I am sorry; I will 
therefore not answer the questions that might tend • 

Senator AVelker. I take it you do not believe very much in the 
American system of jurisprudence and justice? 

Mrs. Powell. I decline to give my opinion, sir. 



2170 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator "Welker. You decline to state your opinion? Why, on 
the fifth amendment? 

Mrs. Powell. This is an opinion question, I believe, sir. 

Senator Welker. All right. You will answer it whether it calls 
for an opinion or not. I hereby direct you to answer it, i\Iadam. 

Mrs. Powell. May I consult? 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. Gentlemen, there have been innocent people con- 
victed, as history books will show, and as our press will show, and 
because of the threats that have been made in prior hearings of this 
committee, and because of the atmosphere in which this committee is 
being conducted, I must take my privilege under the fifth amendment. 

Senator Welker. And I take it, too, that if I may make this observa- 
tion without rancor or bitterness, that answer must strike in their very 
hearts the brave American soldiers who suffered atrocities in Com- 
munist China with a great deal of honor. I am sorry that I had to 
make that statement, but that is your statement. 

You may proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Wliat is your husband's name, Mrs. Powell? 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I would like to say that I love my husband, I am 
proud of my husband ; but in view of the threats that have been made 
in prior hearings of this sort, in view of the manner and the way this 
hearing is being conducted, I regret very much that I cannot give you 
my husband's name. I would be most proud to be able to admit his 
name. I must take my privilege because I fear that this could be 
used against me in some future prosecution. 

Senator Welker. Under the fifth amendment, if you told the name 
of your husband, that you might be prosecuted and bear witness against 
yourself ? 

]\Irs. Powell. I fear that — excuse me. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. I have stated my answer, sir. I will stand on that. 

Senator Welker. When did you last hear from your husband ? 

Mrs. Powell. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Do you live with your husband at this time ? 

]\Irs. Powell. I take my constitutional privilege under the fifth 
amendment. 

Senator Welker. Did you confer with your husband this morning? 

Mrs. Powell. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. That is the fifth amendment now, that if you 
answered truthfully it might tend to incriminate you or you would 
have to bear witness against yourself ? 

Mrs. Powell. I am taking it for fear that anything I should say 
to this could be used against me at some future criminal trial . 

Senator Welker. Did you confer with your husband last night? 

Mrs. Powell. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Did you confer with your husband 2 days ago? 

Mrs. Po'WTELL. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Do you know the United States marshal of this 
moment ? 

Mrs. Powell. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Do you know the United States marshal of this 
district has tried to subpena your husband since last Monday ? Do you 
know that as a fact ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IX GOVERNMENT 2171 

]\Irs. PowEix. Mi\y I consult ? 

(Witness conferred -svitli counsel.) 

INIrs. Powell. The same answer. 

Senator Welker. The fiftli amendment? 

IMrs. Powell. My constitutional privilege under the fifth amend- 
ment. 

Senator Welker. Has your husband ever talked to you about the 
open letter that I wrote the people of this area, the people of Cali- 
fornia, published by, I think, most of the papei-s here and given on 
radio and television asking that he come before the committee? 

]\Irs. Poa\t:ll. Senator, I must take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Are you familiar with the fact that the letter 
that I used in begging his appearance before this committee was also 
sent to your residence by special delivery? 

Mrs. Poa^tsll. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Wflker. Have you ever received a letter from Senator 
Welker, the acting chairman of this subcommittee? 

]\[i-s. Powell, ily constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Powell, when and where were you married? 

Mrs. Po\vi:ll. Gentlemen, this covers an area which I feel I cannot 
discuss. I therefore use my constitutional privilege. 

Mr. Carpenter. You feel you cannot tell this committee wb-en and 
where you were married ? 

Mrs. Powell. May I consult ? 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 

Mrs. PoAVELL. I stand on my previous answer. 

Senator Welker. Madam, may I ask you this : Have you ever read 
the official transcript of the hearings of the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee held in W^ashington, D. C, on September 27, 1954, 
when Mv. John W. Powell was a witness before that committee ? 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. That is the fifth amendment. We will stipulate 
that. 

Mrs. Powell, were you familiar with the fact that Chairman Jenner, 
the Senator from Indiana, advised John W. Powell, as appears on 
page 1904 of the printed record of said hearing, "Mr. Powell, you are 
not excused, but you will stand aside at this time from the witness 
stand. You will be recalled later." Are you familiar with that? 
Are you familiar with that order given by the chairman of this com- 
mittee ? 

Mrs. PoAVELL. My constitutional privilege. 

Mr. Carpenter. When did you return to the United States, Mrs. 
Powell? 

Mrs. Powell. I returned in August 1953. 

Mr. Carpenter. From Shanghai? 

Mrs. Powell. From Shanghai. 

INIr. Carpenter. AVhat type of passport did you use when you left 
Shanghai? 

ISIrs. Poavt:ll. An American passport. 

INIr. Carpenter. From Shanghai? 

]\Irs. Powell. Excuse me. 

(Witness conferred with counsel.) 



2172 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mrs. PoAVELL. Sir, I am afraid you do not understand. All I needed 
to leave Shanghai was a British visa to Hong Kong. 

Mr. Carpenter. So you had a British visa to Hong Kong. From 
Hong Kong did you travel on an American visa ? 

Mrs. Powell. On an American passport. 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes ; a visa or American j^assport. And you ar- 
rived here when ? 

Mrs. Powell. August 1953. 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you been employed since your return to the 
United States? 

Mrs. Powell. Gentlemen, I am very sorry that you ask me this 
question. As I stated in the closed hearing, I feel your committee 
knows that I was employed ; that your committee was aware of where 
I was employed since my subpena was served at my job. My employers 
would appreciate it greatly, as the Senator agreed with me — it is a 
very worthy, worthwhile organization, and it would be a great regret 
to have its name shamed. It would also, as I am sure you realize, 
jeopardize my job. I therefore beg you not to press me to give the 
name of my present employer. 

Senator Welker. I would like to say that I reiterate the fact, the 
questions and answers that we had in private session a few moments 
ago, to the effect that the work on which your employer is engaged is, 
indeed, a meritorious and a great one. By a like token, I feel that 
these boys who gave their lives and their limbs and suffering, many 
thousands of them, were engaged also in quite a meritorious, fine 
function on behalf of their country. 

Now I am directing you, madam, to answer the question of counsel. 

Mrs. Powell. I work for the National Foundation for Infantile 
Paralysis. 

Senator Welker. Here in San Francisco ? 

Mrs. Powell. Yes. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. How long have you worked there ? 

Mrs. Powell. Since February 1954. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Powell, are you now or have you ever been a 
member of the Communist Party of the United States ? 

Mrs. Powell. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you now or have you ever been a member of 
the Communist Party of China ? 

Mrs. Powell. But I am American. 

Mr. Carpenter. I still ask you, were you a member of the Com- 
munist Party of China? 

Mrs. Powell. Gentlemen, I take my constitutional privilege. 

Mr. Carpenter. Are you a member of the Communist Party at the 
present time? 

Mrs. PoAVELL. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Mr. Carpenter, Were you a member of the Communist Party when 
you were a student at Reed College ? 

Mrs. Powell. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker^ How old were you when you attended Reed 
College? 

Mrs. Powell. I was 17 when I first went there. 

Senator Welker. As a resident? 

Mrs. Powell. Yes. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2173 

Senator "Welker. And if you told the committee the truth, you 
feel that your answer mi^ht tend to incriminate you? 

Mrs. Powell. I fear that my answer could be used against me 
at some future trial. I therefore am using my constitutional privilege. 

Senator "Welker. Were you a member of the Communist Party 
when you did the work for the labor organizations about wliich you 
testified heretofore? 

Mrs. PoAVELL. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Were you a member of the Communist Party 
when you were employed at Milwaukie, Oreg. ? 

J^frs. Powell. I take my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Were you a member of the Communist Party 
when you did your work in Washington, D. C? 

Mrs. Powell. Senator, I refuse; the same answer. 

Senator Welker. Mrs. Powell, I would like to say that certainly 
we are Americans, too, and if anything is more meritorious than 
the work you are doing in the National Federation for Infantile 
Paralysis, it would be hard for me to describe one more meritorious 
work than that. I hope that anything that has been said here — I 
hope and pray that the citizenry of this great State, those who con- 
tribute to that great cause, Avill not fail to contribute by virtue of 
3'our answer, and answers to the questions propounded to you. . 

Mrs. Powell, I am again directing your attention to page 1,881 
of the official hearings held by the chairman of this committee, Sen- 
ator Jenner, in Washington, D. C, on September 27, 1954, when 
John W. Powell, editor and publisher of the China Monthly Review, 
was on the stand. I will ask you this: whether or not you were 
informed that Mr. Powell, under oath, informed the committee that : 

My wife is available. If you gentlemen liave questions about my wife, she 
will be more than pleased to come here and give you her views on any variety of 
subjects. 

Are you familiar with that ? 

Mrs. Powell. My constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Would it make any difference if we asked you 
to come to Washington, D. C, and testify ? Would you change your 
answers ? 

]\Irs. Powell. My constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Very well. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you serve as secretary to Madam Sun Yat-Sen 
in the China Welfare Fund in China, in Communist China? 

Mrs. Powell. Gentlemen, as I said, I would be most glad, under 
other circumstances, to tell you of my experience in China. I would 
certainly be proud to say that I knew JNIadam Sun Yat-Sen, whom 
I believe is one of the great women in the world today. In view 
of the atmosphere that is conducted in this hearing, in view of the 
threats that have been made to these other witnesses, I greatly regret 
that I cannot answer this question any more. 

Senator Welker. Counselor, may I take over? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes.i 

Senator Welker. I regret very much to hear statements made 
about this committee. We have always taken pride in trying to 
defend those who are honest and fair with us. I hope that at the 

82918°— 55— pt. 27 2 



2174 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

end of this interrogation 3^011 will give us the benefit of the doubt 
and say that at least we tried to be honest and fair. 

Never in my service upon this committee have we attempted to 
embarrass or to abuse. I hope and pray that if I do that today, or 
if my counselor does that today, you Avill call it to my attention. We 
are, in fact, seeking only to work for the American people that we 
represent. We are the only way of their having a voice in the Halls 
of the Congi'ess of the United States. 

Now you have praised Madam Sun Yat-Sen. I will ask our re- 
search director, Mr. Ben Mandel, for the record and, for the people 
here, to give his findings and observations with respect to this lady 
that you say is such a wonderful person. 

Mr. INIandel. The record on ]\ladam Sun Yat-Sen is quite elaborate, 
but I will confine myself to reading a short dispatch from the New 
York Times of August 20, 1954, page 2, an AP dispatch from London, 
which reads as follows : 

Madam Sun Yat-Sen, sister-in-law of Generalissimo Cliiang Kai-shek, has 
been elected deputy to Red China's National Congress, the Peiping radio said 
today. Madam Sun Yat-Sen, widow of tlie famed Kuomintang, revolutionary 
leader, is a supporter of the Chinese Communists and has served as a senior 
member of the Peiping government since 1949. 

Senator Welker. Now, in view of that statement made by our re- 
search director, I assume you still want your answer to stand, that 
she is a very famous woman and you would like to tell all about her 
if you were not afraid of the committee ? 

Mrs. Walker. Is that a question, Senator ? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. Gentlemen, I have answered that question. 

Senator Welker. IMrs. Powell, have you ever been in the service of 
a foreign Communist government ? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. I use my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. JNIrs. Powell, I am going to approach the witness 
stand now. Would you be so kind as to give me an example of your 
handwriting, please? 

IMrs. Powell. IMay I consult with my counsel ? 

Senator Welker. Certainly. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. I decline to do so, sir, on the grounds of the fifth 
amendment. 

Senator Welker. If you did so, that it might tend to incriminate 
you? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I would like to say I am innocent of any crime, 
but I am afraid if I do this, it might be used against me. 

Senator Welker. I may answer that by saying that if you are in- 
nocent of any crime and your able counselor cannot take care of you, 
I will volunteer my services to he]p you. [Applause.] 

I would please like to ask the audience to refrain from any clapping, 
cheering, whether or not it be for or against any witness who might 
be on the witness stand. I can say to you all that this is not pleasant 
for the witness; it certainly is not pleasant for the chairman or the 
staff. I know that you fine people here will abide by that admonition. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2175 

Now direct I'nj^ Tour attention, ^Irs. Powell, to a document marked 
"Exhibit xV" for iilentilication only, I ask you to look at the signature, 
"Sylvia Campbell Powell," in the lower righthand corner and ask 
you whether or not that is your signature. 

("Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. Senator, I decline to answer. 

Senator Wfxker. On the ground that if you answer the question 
it might tend to incriminate you ? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

INIrs. l*owELL. The ground is that my answer might be used against 
me in some future trial. 

Senator Welker. Do you actually feel that if you told the truth as 
to a signature, wherein you swore to the truth, that it might tend to 
incriminate you ? 

Mrs. Powell. Senator, I repeat, I am innocent ; but in this hearing 
and with the threats that have been made in previous hearings, I must 
stand on my answer. 

Senator Welker. I never knew that I was such a vicious person or 
the committee that I have had the honor to serve on for all these years. 

Did you ever live at 410 Embankment Building, Shanghai, China? 

(Witness confers Avith counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. I decline to answer under my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. AVould you like to tell the committee where you 
resided on the 31st day of October 1949 ? 

Mrs. Powell. Senator, I use my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. I will ask you if it is not a fact that on exhibit A 
you did swear under oath to your God, and I quote : 

I have not been naturalized as a citizen of a foreign state, taken oath or made 
an atiirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state; 
entered or served in the armed forces of a foreign state, accepted or performed 
the duties of any office, post, or employment under the government of a foreign 
state or political subdivision thereof ; voted in a political election in a foreign 
state or participated in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty 
over foreign territory ; made a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplo- 
matic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state; been convicted 
by court-martial of deserting the military or naval service of the United States 
in time of war, or of committing any act of treason against or of attempting by 
force to overthrow, or of bearing arms against the United States. 

If any of the above-mentioned acts or conditions are applicable to the appli- 
cant's case, or to the case of any other person included in this application, a 
supplementary statement under oath should be attached and made a part hereof. 

Did you so swear before one Allan A. Turner, vice consul of the 
United States of America, on the 31st of October 1949? You may 
look at the exhibit. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. I decline to answer. 

Senator Welker. Exhibit A will be introduced in whole in the body 
of the record at this part of the testimony. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 512" and 
appears on follovring p;r"es.) 



2176 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 




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INTERLOCKIKG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2177 

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2184 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 512 H 



^mmmt m mmwrnt 



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INTERLOCKING SUDVBTvSlON IN GOVERNMENT 2185 

Mr. Carpenter. At the same time, Senator, I would lilce the cover- 
iiiir letter from the Department of State referring to that document 
to be inchuled Avitli it. 

Senator Welker. Very well. "We will mark that "Exhibit B" for 
identification. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit 513" and appears 
below.) 

ExHiniT No. 513 

Department of State, 
Washington, August 11, 195^i. 
In reply ivfer to 
FloO-Powell, John William 

Hon. William E. Jenner, 

Chairman, Internal Sccuritij Committee, 

United States Senate. 
Dear Senator Jenner: In reply to your letter dated Ausust 10, 1954, I am 
enclosing photostats of the passport applications of Mr. John William Powell ^ 
and his wife, Mrs. Sylvia Campbell Powell, together with photostats of the 
applications for renewal and amendment of their pa.ssports. 

It will be noted that Jlr. Powell's passport No. 79G, which was issued to him 
on February 28, 1950, by the consulate general at Shanghai, China, was amended 
by the consulate general at Hong Kong on August 6, 1953, to include the names 
of his wife, Sylvia Campbell Powell, and his minor sons, John Sellett Powell 
and Thomas Sargent Powell. His passport was then renewed to expire on Sep- 
tember 6, 1953, and was validated for travel to the United States only. Mr. 
Powell submitted to the consulate general at Hong Kong INIrs. Powell's passport 
No. 5G0, which was issued to her on November 8, 194G, by the consulate general 
at Shanghai, China, and which delinitely expired on November 7, 1950. The 
passportwas issued to her in her maiden name of Sylvia Campbell and had been 
amended to read in her married name ; had been renewed to be valid until 
November 7, 1950 ; and had been amended to include the name of her minor son, 
John Sellett Powell. 

Sincerely yours, 

R. B. Shipley, 
Director, Passport Office. 
Enclosures : Copy of this letter, photostats. 

Senator Welker. I shall hand this to counsel. It is merely hearsay ; 
it is from the Department of State. It is with respect to exhibit A 
for identification, and I want to be fair with you on that [handing 
document to Mrs. Walker] . 

This letter, without reading it for the record, has been introduced 
at this portion of the testimony and marked "Exhibit B" for identifi- 
cation and put into the body of the record. 

Proceed, coimsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Powell, did you know a Gerald Tannebaum? 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I am not going to answer any names about any 
people which I feel could be used in later proceedings against me. 
1 refuse to answer this question on my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Counsel, may I ask a question ? 

In order to be sure that there is no mistaken identity, certainly not 
to embarrass your young sons, I wonder if you woidd be kind enough 
to state to the committee the names of your sons. 

(Witness confers with her counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I do not see what the opinions of my sons or 
why 

Senator Welker. I did not ask about their opinions. 



^Mr. PoweU'e passport Is roprodnced nt pp. 1870 1870 of pt. 2." of the snbcnmmltttee'S 
Inquiry Into Interlocking subversion in Government departments, wbereiu Mr. I'owell 
testified. 



2186 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mvs. Powell. I would not like to see tliem entered into this sort 
of hearing. I do not understand why you are asking tliis question. 

Senator Welker. I am sure I do not want to embarrass you. I 
thought I qualified my statement. If you are the great American you 
say you are, I am certain that your sons will be proud and not 
embarrassed. 

Now, would you care to give us the names of your children, because 
certainly this committee does not want to have the wrong Mrs. Powell 
before it. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Po^vELL. Senator, as I stated at the closed hearing, my sons are 
5 years old and 3 years old. I Avould prefer that publicity relating to 
this hearing would not affect either of them. Therefore, I hope you 
will not press this question. 

Senator Welker. I hope and pray that any publicity given to you 
will not reflect back upon those two fine sons. No one loves his chil- 
dren any better than the acting chairman. 

Your declination to give us the names leads me to read a portion of 
exhibit B from R. B. Shipley, Director, Passport Office, of the Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, D, C, dated August 11, 1954, addressed to 
our chairman, Senator Jenner, of Indiana, second paragraph, and I 
quote : 

It will be noted that Mr. Powell's passport No. 796 which was issued to him on 
February 28, 1950, by the Consulate General at Shanghai, China, was amended by 
the consulate general at Hong Kong on August 6, 1953, to include the names of 
his wife, Sylvia Campbell Powell, and his minor sons, John Sellett Powell and 
Thomas Sargent Powell. His passport was then renewed to expire on September 
6, 1953, and was validated for travel to the United States only. Mr. Powell 
submitted to the consulate general at Hong Kong Mrs. Powell's passport No. 560 
which was issued to her on November 8, 1946, by the consulate general at Shang- 
hai, China, and which definitely expired on November 7, 1950. The passport was 
issued to her in her maiden name of Sylvia Campbell and had been amended to 
read in her married name; had been renewed to be valid until November 7, 1950; 
and had been amended to include the name of her minor son, John Sellett Powell. 
Sincerely yours, 

R. B. Shipley, 
Director, Passport Office. 

Do you have any comment to make on that? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

]\Irs, Powell. I have no comment to make. 

Senator Welker. Will you say to the committee that the names of 
the minors there were not the names of your children and the children 
of John W.Powell? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

ilrs. Powell. I decline to answer. 

JNIr. Carpenter. Mrs. Powell, were you a contributor to the China 
Monthly and/or the China Weekly Review during the period when 
the Communists were in power in Shanghai ? 

IMrs. Powell. Gentlemen, I use my privilege of the first amendment 
in this case as well as my constitutional privilege. 

Mr. Carpenter. Is it a fact that you were contributing editor during 
the Korean war to the China Monthly Review ? 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, the same answer. 

Mr. Carpenter. Is it not a fact that you actively assisted in editing 
that magazine, along with your husband, John W. Powell 8 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, the same answer. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2187 

Mr. CARrKNTF.R. And is it not a fact, ^Mrs. Powell, that that maga- 
zine Avas used for propaganda purposes to propagandize American 
POW's against the United States and in behalf of Connnunist China? 

Senator Welker. You mean -what by 1*0 Ws? 

!Mr. Carpenter. Prisoners of Avar. 

Mrs. Powell. The same answer. 

Senator Welker. ]\[ay I ask a question, Counselor? 

^Ir. Carpenter. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Mrs. Poaa'cH, did you ever write to any of the 
loved ones of prisoners of war on stationery of the China Monthly 
Eeview in which one John W. Powell was named as editor and 
publisher? Did you ever write to any of those great suffering 
Americans? 

("Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. I use the first amendment and I use the fifth amend- 
ment, my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. Now I must advance to the witness chair again so 
that I can show you something. No, I think the record is very clear 
that the first amendment is not accepted by the committee as a basis 
for refusal to answer questions propounded to you. 

Will you mark this as exhibit C for identification, Mr. Reporter. 

Mrs. Powell, I will ask you if it is not a fact that on November 27, 
1952, on the stationery of the China Monthly Review you did airmail 
the following letter "to Mr. and Mrs. William D. Scott, 4 Auburn 
Street, Wakefield, Mass. 

Before reading the letter let me say that up in the left-hand corner 
the name of John W. Powell appears as editor and publisher. The 
address on the right-hand corner is 160 Venan Road East, Shanghai 
(O) ; telephone 14772. Then there is some Chinese language that I do 
not have the ability to interpret. 

Now I will read exhibit C to you. 

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Scott : I am sorry not to have answered yonr letter of 
October 10 sooner. My husband has been traveling around China and I have 
been doing double duty at tlie ofBce. 

Your son's name was broadcast over Radio Peking on June 24, 1951. He, 
along with several hundred other American prisoners of war, had signed a 
statement addressed to the American people, which described an incident on 
April 22, 1951, when their camp was rocketed and strafed by four United States 
Mustang fighter planes, causing the death of 16 prisoners of war and wounding 
16 others. This statement and the list of signatories appeared in the New Cliina 
Daily News Release, and we sent this material on to the National Guardian, 
which also published them. 

We can certainly understand your great concern for yonr son's welfare and 
would like to help you in whatever way we can. It is our fefling tliat when 
there is a cease-fire in Korea all information about prisoners of war and boys 
listed as missing in action can be clarified. 

As you know, the only issue preventing a cease-fire is the question of the 
exchange of prisoners of war. I am certain that if tlie American prisoners of 
war had any say on this issue — and who has more right than they? — it would 
have been settled long before this and all the prisoners from both sides would 
now be back with their families. 

Radio Peking is still broadcasting messages of prisoners of war and we shall 
certainly keep on the lookout for your son's name. If you feel we can be of any 
further help, please feel free to write us again. We would be glad to send a letter 
on to the China Peace Committee for you to be forwarded from there. 
Very sincerely, 

(Signed) "Sylvia Powell," and in typed letters, "Mrs. John W. 
Powell," which appears to me to bo the same namt' as that of John W. 
Powell listed as the editor and publisher of the China Monthly Review. 



2188 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Now will you look at that and say whether or not that is your signa- 
ture and whether or not you sent that letter to Mrs. and Mr. William 
B.Scott? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

IMrs. Powell. Senator, I use the first amendment and my constitu- 
tional privilege under the fifth amendment in declining to answer. 

Senator Welker. My, that Constitution is a wonderful thing, is it 
not? 

Now this letter will be made a part of the record at this point of our 
proceeding. 

(The letter referred to as exhibit C for identification was marked 
"Exhibit No. 514" and appears below.) 

Exhibit No. 514 



-REVICWIMG <>IIAn&|;Ar MK MtlW'99fS gMHI ICO VtMAn bOAD t. !it 

_ ^^^ IISSQH MIAnt.HAI 101 ^ 

JOHM W. rOWEll ~ ^ * TEL l4rT« » 



Etbof ud PubliiKa 



AIR!J!hIL 



Chiim 






o 



llovember eH , 195'^ 



Itr. and Ups* nilllam D, Scott 
4 Auburn street 
Wakefield,, llaaa. 

Dttur Vt, and Urs. stocttt 

I am sorry n»t to have answered your lerier' or October loth 
soonsr* My husbana has been travolllnr; around Jhlna anu I have 
been doing «eubla «uty at the of rice, 

Your son'a nan* was broaitcast over Rmtlio fsklng en June '^t, 
1951. Ho, alone vrlth several hvinai-wa orher American Prlseitera 
01 «ar, had algnea a statement addrenseo ou tne Hmerican p9opl«, 
whleh dascrlbea an Inclaent on April 22, lv/51, whan their cann 
was rocketted anc straiefl by feur Uo Mustang fighter planes, caus- 
ing the death or 16 Prisoners of War and woundinn- 16 othars. 
This statement ana the list oj signatories appeared in the New 
China Dally Newa Release, and we sent this raatorlal on to the 
ITational Ouardian , which also oublis.ied them. 

■,Ve can certainly undoratand your great concern for your son's 
walfaro and would like to help you in whatever way we can. It is 
our feelin^'^ th«i, when there la a cease-rire in Korea, all Informa- 
tien about Prisoners or War ana boys listea as missing in action 
can be clarified, 

AS you know, the only issue preventing a coase-ilre is the 
question of the exchange or prlsonora or war, I am certain that 
ir the Arierican Prisoners or Mar had any say on this issue -- and 
who has more right than theyV -- it would have oeon settle* long 
beroro this and all the prisoners frcw both siaoa would now be back 
with their families. 

Radio Peking is still broadcasting messages or Prisoners or 
War and wo shall certainly keep on the look-out ror yoijr son's 
name, ir you feel wo can bo or any rurtiier help, please feel free 
to wrlto UB again, rto would be r;l'»^ to s»nd a letter on to the 
China Peace Ccnnlttee for you to be forv/arded from there. 



Very sincerely, 
(Krsi John '.r. Powoll) 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2189 

Senator "\Vei.ker. You may proceed, Counsel. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Senator Welker. Once again let me rule on the first amendment, as 
I have ruled hero all morning, that the lirst amendment is not recog- 
nized by this conunittee as a basis for refusal to answer the question. 
Your iifth amendment objection Avill be recognized. 

Mr. CAKrENTER. INIrs. Powell, did you attend the Asian and Pacific 
Peace Conference in October 1952 with your husband John "W. Powell ? 

Mrs. Powell. I use my constitutional ])rivilege. 

Mr. Carpexter. In connection with this conference, did you write 
an article recounting your visit to Communist China ? 

Mrs. PoAVELL. I use, on advice of counsel, the first amendment ; and 
I use my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. INIay I interrupt ? 

As your able counselor well knows, the privilege of the fifth amend- 
ment is a right granted to you and not to your counsel. She has no 
right whatsoever to advise you to take the fifth amendment. You, my 
friend, must take that right yourself. 

Am I correct on that, Counselor ? 

ISIrs. Walker. I understood the witness to say that she continued 
to use the first amendment on my advice that it was available to her. 
She also inserted the fifth amendment in her right. 

Senator Welker. Let me say that the privileges granted by both of 
those amendments — the first and fifth amendments — are personal 
privileges and you have no right to advise. I want to repeat this so 
that the record is straight for your benefit as well. 

Mrs. Walker. I merely advised her that, in my opinion, if she chose 
to use the first amendment, it was a proper ground. 

Senator Welker. Very well. Keasonable minds might differ on 
that. 

A moment ago you were interrogated about the National Guardian. 
I will ask you whether or not you have any information as to whether 
or not the^ China Monthly Eeview, whose editor was one John W. 
Powell — whether or not they have as an advertisement in the news- 
paper, in the China Monthly Review the following : 

National Guardian — an American weekly that covers United States and world 
events from a progressive point of view. Order through the China Monthly 
lleview. Seventy-five thousand yen a year postage included. 

. Did you ever know that the National Guardian was advertised in 
the China Monthly Review in the month of May 1953? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I use the first amendment and my constitutional 
privilege. 

Senator Wi-:lker. Are you familiar with one Cedric Bel f rage, a 
Kew York writer ? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Senator Welker. He was editor of the National Guardian and has 
been ordered deported as a Red, according to a news release of the 
New York Times dated December 11, 1954; on page 6 thereof. 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I use my constitutional privilege. 

Senator Welker. I want this news release, as heretofore related, 
marked "Exhibit D" and made a part of the record at this point of 
the j)roc8eding. 

32918°— 55— pt. 27 3 



2190 mTERLOCKENQ SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

(The material referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 515" and 
appears below.) 

Exhibit No. 515 

Editor Is Okdeked Deported as Red — Belfrage Linked to Communist Activity — 

British Subject to Appeal Ruling 

"Washington, December 10 (AP). — The Justice Department said today that an 
Immigration Service inquiry officer had ordered Cedric H. Belfrage, a New York 
writer, deported "on grounds of Communist Party membership." 

Mr. Belfrage, identified as the editor of the National Guardian, has 10 days to 
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. He was arrested May 15, 1953, and 
has been free on $5,000 bond. 

The inquiry officer, the Department said, decided after a hearing in New York 
that Mr. Belfrage, a British subject, had been a member of the Communist Party 
at the time of and since his latest entry into this country. 

Mr. Belfrage, born in London November 8, 1904, entered the United States at 
San Ysidro, Calif., in 1937. His latest reentry was as a returning resident at 
Rouses Point, N. Y., October 28, 1945. 

The Department said that after World War II Mr. Belfrage had been active as 
a writer in Hollywood and had been listed as a research director of the Peoples 
Institute of Applied Religion. The organization, the Department said, is on the 
Attorney General's list of subversive organizations. 

Order to be appealed 

Mr. Belfrage said yesterday that he would appeal the deportation order and 
would carry on the fight as long as the National Guardian, a news weekly, had 
the resources. 

"The fight to protect the right of any publication to criticize the Government in 
any way it sees fit — for that is the essence of this fight as we see it — is an enor- 
mously costly one, but our many friends and readers are back of us," he declared. 

The editor said he had been confined to Ellis Island for 4 weeks in 1953 on 
request of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, as an "imminent 
danger to the United States." Mr. Belfrage commented that although he had 
"continued in circulation for l^^ years" since his release on bail from Ellis 
Island, "the Government of the United States still stands." 

He charged that he had been ordered deported now because his "politics were 
wrong 17 years ago." The order was issued under the Walter-McCarran law 
which the National Guardian will continue to fight until "it goes to the ashcan 
where it belongs," Mr. Belfrage asserted. 

The McCarran-Walter Act, passed by Congress over President Truman's veto 
in 1950 and amended in 1951 and 1952, provides for the deportation of aliens who 
have belonged to totalitarian organizations. 

Senator Welker, Proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. INIrs. Powell, while you were in Shanghai, did you 
contribute any articles to American newspapers ? 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I use the first amendment and my constitutional 
privilege. 

Senator Welker. The fifth amendment will be recognized as the 
basis for not answering the question, not the first. 

Mr. Carpenter. I have here a photostatic cojoy of the editorial page 
of the Oregon Daily Journal, Portland, Oreg., dated Monday, Febru- 
ary 1.3, 1950. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have our 
investigator, Mr. McManus, read an article from this page and describe 
the article. 

Senator Welker. Very well. 

I think you had better ask her whether or not she wrote it. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Powell, did you write an article entitled 
"Tedav's Guest Editorial — Red Shanghai, by Sylvia Campbell 
Powell"? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2191 

INIrs. Powell. Sir, I foci (his is an al)rid<2:mcnt of my right under the 
first amendment. I also nse my constitutional privilege. 

:Mr. Carpexter. At this point I would like to ask Mr. McManus to 
read the statement. 

Senator "Wklker. The committee will accept your refusal to answer 
questions claiming the fifth amendment, but not the first. 

(AVitness confers with counsel.) 

k!!enator AVelkek. Proceed, Mr. MclNIanus. 

Mr. McManus. This is a photostat of the editorial page of the 
Oregon Daily Journal, Portland, Oreg., Monday, February 13, 1050, 
An editorial note preceding the article referred to reads : 

The following letter is from Mrs. Powell, wife of John Powell, editor of 
the China Weeldy Review; daughter of Mrs. John Campbell of Milwaukee; a 
graduate of Ree*' College. It was written about 2 months ago and gives her 
personal reactions to the Red army regime in Shanghai. It is a surprising 
report. 

The "guest editorial" is as follows : 

I wrote you how much Bill and I were looking forward to witnessing the 
great changes that were bound to take place here in Shanghai. We haven't 
been the least bit disappointed. It has been amazing and if I hadn't seen for 
myself, I never would have believed it. 

We had heard a lot about the wonders of the Red army, and now we have 
seen for ourselves. They are truly Spartans and devoted to the cause of build- 
ing up China. Right now those stationed in this city are out in the countryside 
helping the peasants build dikes and harvest the crops. But what has impressed 
uj most is the new spirit. This whole summer has been filled with parades and 
the parade to end all parades was held the first of October to celebrate the 
founding of the new government and International Peace Day. 

An estimated 1 million people marched for 12 hours past our window, shouting 
slogans, singing songs, dancing the new folk dances — floats, torches, the new 
flags. It was terrific. And the real cross section of Shanghai — bankers, pro- 
fessors, doctors, small shopkeepers, thousands of students, but mainly workers. 
When we remembered that human lives in China have had little value, it was 
especially impressive to see that now all these people were realizing their 
potentialities. I wanted to cry, it was so wonderful. 

Anotlier thing we find most exciting is the constant meetings and the quickened 
interest of everyone to learn the new ideas and to participate in the production 
program. Every banker, student, worker — nearly everyone — attends some kind 
of a study meeting. They are so eager to know. 

Of course, everything hasn't been sugar and honey. All during the summer 
several times a week 2 or 3 — sometimes more — Kuomintaug bombers came over 
the city. Though they caused little damage, still it was far from pleasant. 
Naturally, we weren't too happy to hear the Voice of America say last week 
that America is "selling" another 11 bombers to the KMT. The KMT blockade 
of this port has been another headache. It's not only made it more difficult 
for the new government, but foreign and Chinese businessmen have had to 
take it on the chin since Shanghai depends on trade to keep going. Though 
our State Department has said that it does not recognize this "illegal" blockade, 
still it is American Government supplies of oil and other fuels that make 
it possible. You can see why we're not too happy about the way things are 
going at home. 

Just this week the two Chinese airways have deserted the KMT and come 
over to the new government, which is very good news indeed. Our friend 
Chennault is having a field day for he now has a monopoly flying the bigwigg 
from Chungking to "T^aiwan. It's bound to add more gold bars to his collection. 
Another unpleasantness has been the several incidents between foreigners and 
the new government. We feel that the primary cause has been the attitude on 
the part of some foreigners that Shanghai is their city. They forget that these 
aren't the "good old extra-territoriality days." For the rest of us who are 
willing to respect the laws and the Chinese people, there's nothing to worry 
about. 

On the contrary, there is much to learn. It's a fascinating experience and 
we can't leave just yet. 



2192 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Powell, did you ever participate in any 
parades in Shanghai? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. I use my constitutional privilege. 

Mr. Carpenter. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to intro- 
duce into the record, to be made a part of the record, as exhibit E for 
identification this article entitled "Today's Guest Editorial— Red 
Shanghai, by Sylvia Campbell Powell," which appears on the edi- 
torial page of the Oregon Daily Journal. 

Senator Wflker. It will be so ordered. 

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 516"' and 
appears below.) 

Exhibit No. 516 



TODAY'S GUEST 
EDITORIAL 

Red Shanghai 

By SYLVIA' CAMPBELL POWELL 

(Th» felhwing l»tt»r is from Mn. Powell, wUe «f 
John Powell, eeitor ct the China Weekly Reritw, 
dauihtar ef Mrs. John Campbell ef Milwaukie end 
^rgduai* cf Heed eeilege. ICwos v/ritten about two 
months oge end gives her personal reactions to the 
Red army regime in Shanghai. It is a surprising 
report.) 

I wrote you Iiow much Bill and I were look-, 
ing forward to witnessing the great changes 
that were bound to take place here in Shang- 
hsj. "We haven't been the least bit disap- 
pointed. It has been amazing and if I hadn't 
seen for myself, I never would have believed it. 

We had heard, a lot about the wonders of 
the Ived army, and now we have seen for our-' 
selves. They are truly Spartans and devoted 
tp the cause of building up China. RSght now 
those stationed in this city arc out in the 
countryside helping the peasants build dikes 
and harvest the crops. But what has Impressed 
us mo3t is the new spirit. This whole summer 
has been filled with parades and tho parade 
to end all parades was held the first cf Octo- 
ber to celel)rat» the founding of the new gov- 
ernment and Internationa! Peace day. 

An estimated 1 million people marched for 
12 hours past our window, shouting slogans; 
singing songs, dancing the new folk dances- 
floats, torches, the new flags. It was terrific. 
And the real cross-section of Shanghai — bankw 
ers, professors, doctors, small shopkeepers, 
thousands of students, but mainly workers. 
When we remembered that human lives ia 
China have had little value. It was especially 
Impressive to see .that now all these people 
were realizing their potentialities. I wanted 
to cry. It was so wontjerful. 



Another thing we find most exciting is the 
constant meetings and the quickened interest 
of everyone to learn the new ideas and to par- 
ticipate in the production program. Every 
banker, student, worker — nearly everyone— 
attends some kind of a study meeting. They 
are so eager to know. 

Of course, everything hasn't been sugar and 
honey. AH during the summer several times 
a week tv,o or three — sometimes more — Kuo- 
mintang bombers came over the city. Though 
they caused little damage, still it was far from 
pleasant. Naturally, we weren't too happy to 
hear the Voice of America say last week that 
Arnerlqa is "saHing" another 11 boaibers to 
the KMT. The KMT blockade of this port has 
been another headache. It's not oaly made it 
nore difficult for the new government, but 
foreign and Chinese businessMcn have had to 
take it on the chin si.nce Slianghai depends on 
trade to keep going. Though our state depart- 
ment has said that It' does not recognize this 
'illegal" blockade, still it is American govern- 
ment supplies of oil and other fuels that make 
if Dossible. You can see why we're not too 
happy about the way things are going at home. 

Just" this week the two Chinese airways 
have deserted the KMT and come over to the 
new government, which is very good news 
indeed. Our friend Chennault is having a field 
day for he now has a monopoly flying the big- 
wigs from Chungking to Taiwan. It's bound 
to add many more gold bars to his collection. 
A.nother unpleasantness has been the several 
Incidents between foreigners and the new 
government. We feel thatthepiimary Cause 
has been the attitude on the part c£ some 
, foreigners that Shanghai is their city. They 
forget that these aren't the "good old extra- 
territoriality days." For the rest cf us who 
are willing to respect the laws and the Chi- 
nese people, there's nothing to worry about' 

Oh Ihe contrary, there is much to' learn. 
It's a fascinating experience and we can't 
leave just yet. 



INTERLOCKIXG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2193 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Powell, uhere you were in Shanghai, did you 
ever travel into North Korea? 

("Witness confers -with counsel.) 

INIrs. PowErx. I decline to answer. 

]Mr. Carpentkr. ]\Irs. Powell, durino; the Korean war, while you 
and John W. Powell were publishing and editing the China Weekly 
and later the China INIonthly Review, is it not a fact that you sup- 
ported many editorials in "that paper accusing the United States 
troops of using germ warfare against the Xortli Koreans and the 
Communist forces of China? 

INIrs. Powell. Sir, I use my privilege under the fifth amendment, 
which provides freedom of the press. I decline to answer on my 
constitutional privilege. 

Senator AYelker. I ask you this question: Do you use the fifth 
amendment as to whether or not you have ever been in North Korea ? 

I will ask you whether or not you ever interviewed any American 
prisoners of war who were found in Shanghai ? 

]\Irs. Powell. The first amendment and the fifth amendment. 

Senator Welker. Or China or Korea ; did you ever interview any 
American prisoners of war in either place? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I stand on my answer. 

Senator Welker. Let me say, for the — I do not know how many 
times I have so ruled — that we accept your refusal under the fifth 
amendment to answer, but not under the first amendment. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Powell, I believe at one time you were em- 
ployed by the United States Government; is that right? 

Mrs. Powell. Between my junior and senior years in college I did 
work for a very few months for the United States Government. 

JSIr. Carpenter. Was that as a junior clerk-stenographer in the 
Office for Emergency Management, San Francisco, Calif. 

Mrs. Powell. I imagine that is what it was called. I do not re- 
member the name. 

JNIr. Carpenter. And were you in a CAF-2 classification, paying 
$1,440 per annum ? Is that right ? Later you were promoted to assist- 
ant clerk-stenographer, CAF-3, at $1,620 per annum; is that correct? 

]Mrs. Powell. Sir, I do not remember exactly. 

Mr. Carpenter. And that was in the year 1942, specifically May 1, 
1942, to September 29, 1942? Were those the dates? 

Mrs. Powell. Sir; I am sorry; I do not remember that long ago 
exactly. 

Mr. Carpenter, At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to intro- 
duce into the record a statement from the United States Civil Service 
concerning Sylvia Campbell, dated August 11, 1954, which shows that 
during that period. May 1, 1942, to September 29, 1942, she was 
employed as a junior clerk-stenographer in the Office of Emergency 
Management. 

Senator Welker. It will be so marked as an exhibit and made a part 
of the record. 

(The document referred to was marked as "Exhibit No. 517" and 
appears on the following page.) 



2194 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION EST GOVERNMENT 



Exhibit No. 517 

United States Civil Service CoimissioN, 

Washington 25, D. C, August 25, 195i. 
Mr. Benjamin Mandel, 

Research Director Internal Security Subcommittee, 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 

Washington 25, D. C. 
Dear Me. Mandel : In accordance with the request in your letter of August 2, 
1954, I am forwarding herewith a history of the Federal service of Sylvia 
Campbell (dob 11/15/20), as shown in our service record file. 
No application papers are available for Miss Campbell. 
Sincerely yours, 

John W. Macy, Jr., Executive Director. 



united states civil service commission 

Service Record Division 

Washington 25. 0. C. 

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL SERVICE 



DSCtlPW 
August 11, 1951* 



Notice to individuali • Thi* record ihould be preserved • Additional copies of service 
histories can not be furnished due to limited personnel in the ComDission. This re- 
cord nay be presented to appointing officers for their inspection. 



Sylvia Campbell' 



OATE.CF BIRTH 



11-15-20 



Authority for original appointment (Examination from which appointed or other author ity--Esecutiv* 
Order, Law, or other exenption) 



EFFECTIVE DATE 



NATURE OF ACTION 



5-1-1*2 



S-25-lf2 



War Service Appointment 



POSITICN. 6RAOE. SALARY. ETC. 

Jr. Clerk-Stenographer CAF-2 $1440 per 
annum OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
San Francisco California 



Resignation w/o Prejudice Assistant Clerk-Stenographer CAF-3 

$1620 per annum 



Correspondence Section 



.Chief, 



Ttw Bbev* truticript of lervict hiitory does not ificludt til tslary chanict, intra-*(cficy traotfert vlthin sit 
erssnisatlonal unit not involving changca froo ona official headquartera or duty atation to another, and 
proaetiona or daetotiona, ainca Federal agencies are not required to report all such actions to the CoaBissien. 



USCSC-.SASNINGTON C 



OS 80- Ilk 

JANUARY I0S4 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2195 

]Mr. CARrENTER. Mrs. Powell, did anyone later give you access to 
the State Department files on the so-called Formosa incident? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 
 Mrs. Powell. I decline to answer. 

INIr. Carpenter. Did you take information from that file or any 
other information from United States Government sources, put it in 
an envelope and take it to a luncheon that you attended in Shanghai? 

("Witness confers with counsel.) 

]\Irs. Powell. I decline to answer. 

JNIr. Carpenter. Did you ever know a Joe Neeley ? 

]\Irs. Powell. I decline to answer. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever know a William II. Hint on ? 

Mrs. Powell. I decline to answer. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever have any connection with either 
Soviet or Communist military intelligence? I mean Eed China by 
that. 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. Are we being serious, gentlemen? Are you accusing 
me of something ? 

Mr. Carpenter. We are not accusing you of anything. I am asking 
you a question. 

Mrs. Powell. Well, this is a very, very serious charge, gentlemen. I 
never heard of such a gentleman. 

Senator Welker. Will you please answer the question? 

]\Irs. Powell. It seems to me if you 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Senator Welker. We are merely seeking the truth, Mrs. Powell. 

]\Irs. Powell. Well, the way this atmosphere is, I decline to answer. 

Senator Welker. ]\Irs. Powell, in conclusion of your testimony, I 
might say that we can interrogate you at length on other phases, but 
I do not desire to pursue the testimony further. 

I want to say this to you and to the country : that our committee 
believes in repentance. Certainly people have made mistakes. Many 
times we have had before us people who have made mistakes with re- 
spect to defections from the greatest country on the face of the earth, 
the United States of America. When I knew they were truly repent- 
ant and I knew that they wanted to come back to America and help 
us in the cause of freedom, and wanted to saj', "I am sorry ; I made 
a mistake," it has been my great happiness to send them home with 
our warmest congratulations. 

Would you say now that you have anything that you have been 
sorry for or that you had made a mistake? 

(Witness confers with counsel.) 

Mrs. Powell. Sir, I have never done anything that I have re- 
pented, or I have never done anything that I would apologize or be 
sorry for. 

Senator Welker. I think that ends your testimony. You are 
excused. Thank you very much. 

Thank j'ou, Madam Counselor. You have been very kind. 

The next witness. Is John W. Powell in the room ? 

Mrs. Powell, I will inform you that you are now relieved of the 
subpena. 



2196 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr, Bell, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give 
before the conmiittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Bell. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF FRANK 0. BELL, VALLEJO, CALIF. 

Senator Welker. State your name for the record. 

Mr. Bell. My name is Frank O. Bell. 

Senator Welker. And you reside in San Francisco ? 

Mr. Bell. I reside in Vallejo, Calif. 

Senator Welker. And do you have an official position? 

Mr. Bell. United States marshal, in the northern district of Cali- 
fornia. 

Senator Welker. You may proceed. 

Mr. Carpenter. Have you had occasion in the past week to serve 
a summons, a series of summons that were issued by Senator William 
E. Jenner, of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee ? 

Mr. Bell. I have. 

Mr. Carpenter. And, in particular, did you receive a summons for 
a John W. Powell ? 

Mr. Bell. I did. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please tell the committee the efforts you 
have made to serve the subpena on John W. Powell and whether or 
not the same has been served ? 

Mr. Bell. I received on December 6 a summons from the Jenner 
committee. I immediately proceeded to serve the summons by dep- 
uties, which I have in my office. In fact, there was more than one 
deputy endeavoring to make the service. 

We could not locate Mr. John W. Powell. However, we did serve 
Mrs. Powell on the 8th and asked Mrs. Powell if she knew the where- 
abouts of her husband. She declined to give us a,n answer to his 
whereabouts. 

As we have various information available to us, there were numer- 
ous addresses which we went to to find out if he could be located in 
those places. 

I am sorry to say that we could not locate his whereabouts, or we 
have no trace of them at this time. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt you. Counselor ? 

Where did you serve Mrs. Powell with her subpena, at 1015 Carolina 
Street? 

Mr. Bell. No ; 609 Sutter. 

Senator Welker. Is that a place of business ? 

Mr. Bell. I believe Mrs. Powell gave the name of the National 
Infantile Paralysis Office, 609. 

Senator Welker. Do you know, Mr. Marshal, where Mrs. Powell 
resides in the city of San Francisco ? 

Mr. Bell. I believe she resides at 1015 Carolina Street, which is 
the address which we have as her residence. 

Senator Welker. Did you serve John W. Powell in September or 
August of this year? 

Mr. Bell. I believe we did. 

Senator Welker. Where did you serve him? 

Mr. Bell. I cannot say at this time. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2197 

Senator "Welker. Will you check that up and report back to the 
committee? 

;Mr. Bell. I will be glad to.^ 

Senator Welker. Very Avell, sir. You may step down. 

]\Ir. Carpexter. Senator, at this time I would like to place into the 
record a copy of the release of last Friday, December 10, 1945, which 
you released to the press, and a letter wherein you called on Mr. John 
W. Powell, 1015 Carolina Street, San Francisco, Calif., to appear 
before the committee. I would like to have the letter placed in the 
record at this time. 

Before entering the letter into the record I would like to read it. 

For release after 5 p. m., Friday, December 10, 1954, from the Senate Internal 
Security Subcouimittee. 

r.enator Herman Welker (Republican, Idaho), today asked the cooperation 
of the press and radio in locating John W. Powell, resident of San Francisco, 
and former editor of the China Review, an English-language magazine published 
in China. Senator Welker explained that he made the request in his capacity 
as acting chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. The sub- 
committee will hold a public hearing next Monday in the Health Auditorium of 
the Civic Center. Powell's presence is desired as a witness at that hearing, 
but efforts to subpena him during the past 5 days have been unavailing. 

Senator AVelker has written an open letter to Powell, which the Senator has 
asked the press and radio to publicize as widely as possible. Senator Welker's 
letter dated December 10, 1954, and addressed to Powell at the address he gave 
the subcommittee as his home, follows : 

Mr. John W. Powell, 

1015 Carolina Street, San Francisco, Calif. 

Dear Mr. Powell : This morning's edition of the People's World contains an 
article which appears under your signature. In an editorial attached to that 
article, the People's World, which has frequently been described as the official 
organ of the Communist Party on the west coast, declared : 

"Bill Powell, son of J. B. Powell, famed United States editor and foreign cor- 
respondent, spent 15 years in China, the last 8, from 1945 to 1953, as editor of 
the English-language China Monthly Review. In September he was subjected 
to an inquisition by the Senate Subconnnittee on Internal Security. This is the 
statement he prepared for the committee, but was not permitted to present." 

Let me remind you of the facts in this case set forth in volume 23 of the sub- 
committee's record of hearings on Interlocking Subversion in Government De- 
partments. 

As this record shows, you appeared before us on September 27, 1954. At that 
time you invoked the tifth amendment against self-incrimination in answer to 
40 questions put to you by the subcommittee (pp. 1S4S-1904). You used the 
fifth amendment when asked if you were a menit)er of the Communist Party of 
the United States (p. 1863). You used the fifth ameiuhnent when asked if you 
were a member of the Communist Party of China (p. 1864). You used the fifth 
amendment when asked if you knew Owen Lattimore (p. 1868). You used the 
fifth amendment when you were asked to identify your own signature on a docu- 
ment in which you had i)ledged to support and defend the Constitution of the 
United States (p. 1872). 

During the course of the hearing you asked permission to read a statement 
prepared by you. In reply to your request. Chairman Jenner informed you of 
our rule that statements must be filed by witnesses, one day in advance of their 
appearance before us (p. 1950). At the conclusion of your testimony. Senator 
Jenner said this : 

''The CiiAiRMAX. Mr. Powell, you are not excused, but you will stand aside at 
this time from the witness stand. You will be recalled later." 

For the past 5 days, extraordinary efforts have been made to subpena you to 
appear at a public hearing at 9 a. m., at the Health xVuditorium of the Civic 
Center, Monday, December 13, 1!]54. You have been unavailable to accept the 
subpena. This is to inform you that your presence is required at this hearing. 



^ The snbpena bonrs a record of service npon .John W. rowell, Anptist 11, 1054, at 
Kadiiuah Temple, Los Augeles, Calif., aud is attested by W. S. Sweeuty, deputy United 
States marshal. 



2198 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

When you appear, you may put your previously submitted statement into the 
record in accordance with the rules of the subcommittee. If you have any addi- 
tional statements at that time, they must be delivered to us at least 24 hours 
before the hearing. 

Very sincerely, 

Herman VP^elkeb. 

Senator Welker. That will be made a part of the record. 
(The letter referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 518" and appears 
below.) 

Exhibit No. 518 

For release after 5 p. m., Friday, December 10, 1954, from the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee 

Senator Herman Welker (R. Idaho) today asked the cooperation of the press 
and radio in locating John W. Powell, resident of San Francisco, and former 
editor of the China Review, an English language magazine published in China. 
Senator Welker explained that he made the request in his capacity as Acting 
Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. The Subcom- 
mittee will hold a public hearing next Monday in the Health Auditorium of the 
Civic Center. Powell's presence is desired as witness at that hearing, but 
efforts to subpoena him during the past five days have been unavailing. 

Senator Welker has written an open letter to Powell, which the Senator has 
asked the press and radio to publicize as widely as possible. Senator Welker's 
letter addressed to Powell at the address he gave the Subcommittee as his home, 
follows : 

Mr. John W. Powell, 

1015 Carolina Street, San Franciso, Calif. 

Dear Mr. Powell : This morning's edition of the People's World contains an 
article which appears under your signature. In an editorial attached to that 
article, the People's World which has frequently been described as the official 
organ of the Communist Party on the West Coast, declared : 

" 'Bill' Powell, son of J. B. Powell, famed U. S. editor and foreign correspond- 
ent, spent 15 years in China, the last eight, from 1945 to 1953, as editor of the 
English language China Monthly Review. In September he was subjected to 
an inquisition by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. This is the 
statement he prepared for the committee, but was not permitted to present." 

Let me remind you of the facts in this case set forth in Volume 23 of the Sub- 
committee's record of hearings on Intei'locking Subversion in Government 
Departments. 

As this record shows, you appeared before us on September 27, 1954. At that 
time you invoked the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination in answer to 
forty questions put to you by the Subcommittee (pp. 1848 to 1904). You used 
the Fifth Amendment when asked if you were a member of the Communist Party 
of the United States (p. 1863). You used the Fifth Amendment when asked if 
you were a member of the Communist Party of China (p. 1864). You used the 
Fifth Amendment when asked if you knew Owen Lattimore (p. 1868). You 
used the Fifth Amendment when you were asked to identify your own signature 
of a document in which you had pledged to support and defend the Constitution 
of the United States (p. 1872). During the course of the hearing, you asked per- 
mission to read a statement prepared by you. In reply to your request, Chairman 
Jenner informed you of our rule that statements must be filed by witnesses, 
one day in advance of their appearance before us (p. 1850). At the conclusion 
of your testimony. Senator Jenner said this : 

"The Chairman. Mr. Powell, you are not excused, but you will stand aside at 
this time from the witness stand. You will be recalled later." 

For the past five days, extraordinary efforts have been made to subpoena you 
to appear at a public hearing at 9 : 00 a. m. at the Health Auditorium of the 
Civic Center, Monday, December 13, 1954. You have been unavailable to accept 
the subpoena. This is to inform you that your presence is required at this hearing. 

When you appear, you may put your previously submitted statement into the 
record in accordance with the rules of the Subcommittee. If you have any addi- 
tional statements at that time, they must be delivered to us at least twenty-four 
hours bt'fore the hearing. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2199 

As actino: chairman of the subcommitteo, I should like to say that 
^Ir. rowell has not favored us by appearing here. I should like to 
interrogate him at length with respect to his activities in China and 
with respect to the statement which he prepared and submitted to 
the subcommittee in violation of our rule, on September 27, 1954, in 
"Washington, D. C. 

At this time the subcommittee will suspend until 1 o'clock. I regret 
very much that we do not give much time for the lunch hour. AVe 
have a large number of witnesses, prisoners of war and other wit- 
nesses, and it will take a great deal of the subcommittee's time. 

We will convene again at 1 p. m., sharp. 

(Whereupon, at 12 : 15 p. m., a recess was taken until 1 p. m., of 
the same day.) 

AFTER RECESS 

Senator Welker. The meeting will come to order. 

Counsel, you may proceed. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to place 
into the record certain subpenas that the deputy marshal has testified 
about, tliose that he served and those he did not serve. At this time I 
want to place into the record the subpena issued to Sylvia Powell in 
San Francisco, to be made a part of the record. 

Senator Welker. It is so ordered. 

Mr. Carpenter. Also a subpena issued to John W. Powell, in San 
Francisco. 

Also a subpena issued to Mrs. Isobel Milton Cerney, 2465 Alpine 
Road, Menlo Park, Calif. She has been served. However, she is in 
the hospital, and, under doctor's orders, is not able to attend the 
meeting here this afternoon.^ 

Also a subpena issued to Edwin H, Cerney, 2465 Alpine Road, 
Menlo Park, Calif. The deputy marshal states that he is unable to 
serve this witness. 

Also a subj^ena was issued to Paul F. Schnur, Jr., of 1250 James 
Street, San Francisco, Calif. Mr. Bell remarked that he had ex- 
hausted all efforts to locate Mr. Schnur in San Francisco. 

Senator Welker. They will be made a part of the record at this 
point as exhibit 519. 

(The documents referred to were read in substance by Counsel Car- 
penter and were filed for the record.) 

^ Thp following letter regarding Mrs. Cerney was delivered to Counsel Carpenter upon 
his arrival in San Francisco : 

Sequoia Hospital District, 
Rcilnood City, Calif., December 7, 195i. 
Hon. William E. .Tenner, 

Chuirmnn, Subcommittee on Internal Security, 
Health Aiiditorium, Han Francisco, Calif. 
Dear Sir : Mrs. Isobel Jlilton Cerney, 2-IG5 Alpine Road, Menlo Park, Calif., was served 
with papers commanding her to appear before the Internal Security Committee on Monday, 
December ].3. at !• a. in. 

This letter will certify that Mrs. Cerney is a patient In Sequoia Hospital and her 
condition is such that it is not anticipated Ihat she will be released on the date she is 
reijuesled to appear. 

Very truly yours, 

Max E. Glrfex, F. A. C. H. A., 

Administrator. 



2200 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. Counsel, you may proceed. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Gill. 

Senator Welker. Mrs. Gill, will you be sworn? 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the com- 
mittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Mrs. Gill. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF DOLORES HOLMES GILL, KANSAS CITY, MO. 

Senator Welker. Will you state your name to the committee, 
please ? 

Mrs. Gill. Dolores Holmes Gill. 

Senator Welker. Where do you reside ? 

Mrs. Gill. Kansas City, Mo. 

Senator Wefker. Kansas City, Mo. ? 

Mrs. Gill. That is correct. 

Senator Welker. And your address there, please? 

]Mrs. Gill. 7418 Jefferson. 

Senator Welker. Proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Gill, what is your marital status? 

Mrs. Gill. I am a widow. 

Mr. Carpenter. Who was your husband ? 

Mrs. Gill. 2d Lt. Charles L. Gill. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did he serve in the Armed Forces of the United 
States? 

Mrs. Gill. Yes, sir; he did. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where did he serve? 

Mrs. Gill. He served in the Korean theater. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was he taken prisoner while in the Korean war? 

Mrs. Gill. Yes, sir. 

It was the Saturday after Thanksgiving in 1950, we received word 
that he was reported missing in action as of November 2, 1950. Until 
that time, of course — well, my last letter from him was written Octo- 
ber 30, 1950. So there was a period of almost a month where we heard 
nothing. 

Mr. Carpenter. Your last letter from him was October 30, 1950? 

Mrs. Gill. October 30, 1950. _ 

Mr. Carpenter. That was prior to his becoming a prisoner of war? 

Mrs. Gill. That is correct. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever receive any letters from him while he 
was a prisoner of war ? 

Mrs. Gill. My first letter from him while he was a prisoner was 
received February 27, 1951. At that time a copy of the letter — his copy 
to me was received by me. 

But before that time, on January 9, 1951, a member of the Kansas 
City Star staff — that is our local newspaper — phoned me and told me 
that they had received an Associated Press dispatch which had come 
over Peiping radio, that he was supposed to have read this letter to me, 
in which he said he was alive and had been wounded. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you receive any other information from him 
in regard to that same letter? 

Mrs. Gill. In that letter he stated that he had been wounded in both 
legs and one arm, he was being taken care of, they were receiving food 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNIMENT 2201 

and ci^iaretles. And tlien lie asked me to contact the mother of a Ser- 
geant Harvey, ^Yllo was with my husband at the time they were cap- 
tured. 

]\Ir. CARrENTER. And did you receive later mail from him, or infor- 
mation? 

JNIrs. Gill. No. That was the only letter I received. 

JMr. Carpenter. Yon say you first received the notice over the radio ? 

]\rrs. Gill. That is correct. 

Now, of course, I didn't get the broadcast, but it was picked up on an 
Associated Press dispatch out of London. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did yon ever receive any information from any 
other source relative to your husband? 

]\Irs. Gill. After that Associated Press dispatch was released, then 
1 began to receive letters from various parts of the country, in fact, 
various parts of the world. Now, in that, several of the letters had 
enclosed a clipping reprinting his letter to me, and this reprint I 
found out was from this China Weekly News. 

Mr. Carpenter. The China "Weekly News, or the China 

Mrs. Gill. At the time, if you will notice — well, in some of the 
letters that I had to present, part of those mentioned the China Weekly 
Keview and part of them mentioned the China Monthly Review. But 
all of them mentioned the fact that John W. Powell was the editor. 

Now, when I received — or when the reporter had called me from 
the Star staif, of course I was upset. But I was so thrilled to hear 
something, just anything. Then after these letters w^ere received, 
relayed from Mr. Powell, I told this same man on the Star staff 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you receive mail from Mr. Powell ? 

JNIrs. Gill. He wrote to me, yes. And he sent a copy of this article 
that had appeared in his paper. 

He stated that, as a fellow Missourian, he felt like it was his duty 
to giA^e me this information. 

Mr. Carpenter. When was that letter sent to you by Mr. Powell ? 

Mrs. Gill. That I don't know. I think it was just about a month 
after that radio release. 

Mr. Carpenter. What did that letter state as to the treatment your 
hus])and was receiving? 

JNIrs. Gill. Don't mention that 

Senator Welker. We will suspend for just a moment. 

Mrs. Gill. In that letter he mentioned that I was not to pay any 
attention to these "fabricated atrocity stories," that there was nothing 
to them; that, as far as he knew, the men were being taken care of. 

Of course, at the same time we were still getting our newspaper 
releases from our own press saying that the men were not being taken 
care of. 

Senator Welker. Will you repeat that last answer to me, Mr. Re- 
porter ? 

(The record was read by the reporter.) 

Senator Welker. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Gill, is it not true 
that he did not say that was as far as he knew, but he said, "From 
our own personal observation of the action of the Chinese People's 
Government here in Shanghai, we know it is the policy to treat all 
prisoners — captured Kuomintang soldiers as well as criminals — with 
the greatest leniency and fairness in order to win over their sui:)port"2 
Is that a truthful statement? 



2202 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mrs. Gill. That sounds like a direct quote. 

Senator Welker. That was included in the letter that we will intro- 
duce. 

Mrs. Gill. It sounds like it is a definite part of that first letter I 
received from him. 

Senator Welker. Counsel, if you will let me interrupt further 

Mrs. Gill, you are a resident of the State of Missouri ? 

Mrs. Gill. That is correct. 

Senator Welker. And Mr. Powell at one time was a student at the 
University of Missouri ; is that correct ? 

Mrs. Gill. That is the way I understand it. 

Of course, my understanding was derived from this member of 
the Star staff in Kansas City, and at the time I received this letter 
from Mr. Powell I called him, not knowing what to do with it. I 
was glad to hear the news, and still — well, people in my place in 
life just don't receive foreign mail, they certainly don't receive letters 
like that from anyone. And when I contacted this member of the 
Star staff I asked him about Mr. Powell, what he knew about him. 

Apparently he has known the family over a period of years, both 
as a newspaperman and, from what I gather, that he was an acquaint- 
ance of the family. 

And then he told me that Mr. Powell had been known as a fellow- 
traveler for years before that^ So, of course, that answered all my 
questions. 

Senator Welker. As a matter of fact, in the letter you received 
from Mr. Powell, which contained the only letter you received from 
your loved one, Mr. Powell stated in effect — and we will have the 
letter read in a moment — that, as a fellow Missourian he wanted to 
write to you ; is that not correct ? 

Mrs. Gill. That is correct. 

Senator Welker. Proceed counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you ever receive any information or propa- 
ganda from the National Guardian magazine? 

Mrs. Gill. Yes. 

Now, after that letter was received, my husband's letter was picked 
up and it was carried through the Daily Worker, it was carried 
through the National Guardian. It was reprinted in that. 

And then, at the same time, Cedric Belfrage sent me a note enclosed 
with a copy of the paper and said that they were reprinting this letter 
from my husband and that they hoped that I would be pleased when 
I received the news. And his note was very short. 

Mr. Carpenter. All this information and propaganda was to the 
effect that your husband was being well cared for and in good health ; 
is that correct? 

Mrs. Gill. This letter was reprinted in these papers. 

Now, the letter itself was rei^rinted by — what is it, the Cliinese 
Soldier, or the Chinese News Correspondent, somewhere in Korea. 
I believe that was the byline on the articles. 

I am afraid I forgot the question. About the various papers it 
was carried in ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Carpenter. Yes. 

Mrs. Gill. When this letter was reprinted, of course, there was 
always a paragraph or two of how grateful I should be that I 
received word about my husband, that I should be grateful to know 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2203 

that he was alive when there were so many Korean, so many Chines© 
women who had no news at all. 

INIr. Carpenter. As a matter of fact, Mrs. Gill, at that time, what 
was your husband's condition ? 

]\Irs. Gill. At the time, from the information I have received since 
then, he was dying of malnutrition. 

Mr. Carpenter. And your husband did die from malnutrition ? 

Mrs. Gill. That was the official release ; yes, sir. 

Senator AVelker. May I take over. Counsel ? 

Mr. Carpenter. You may. 

Senator Welker. Mrs. Gill, John W. Powell, editor and publisher 
of the China Monthly Review, sent you a letter headed "China 
]\Iontlily Review," cable address; Reviewing Shanghai; John W. 
Powell, editor and publisher, dated January 10, 1951; address, 160 
Yenan Road, Shanghai ; telephone, 14772 ; addressed to Mrs. Charles 
L. Gill, 7118 Jefi'erson Street, Kansas City 5, Missouri, in which he 
included these words : 

Dear IMks. Gill: Perhnps you have already received the original copy of your 
husband's letter to you, but as a fellow Missourian I wanted to make sure that 
you saw it and in good time. We know from the clippings and magazines we 
receive from home that there has been little, if any, news on the American POW's 
except for fabricated atrocity stories, and we felt the enclosed clippings from the 
local papers here might give you some reassurance. 

From our own personal observation of the action of the Chinese People's Gov- 
ernment here in Shanghai, we know it is the policy to treat all prisoners — cap- 
tured Kuomintang soldiers as well as criminals — with the greatest leniency and 
fairness in order to win over their support, and we are sure this is the same 
policy being carried out by the Chinese volunteers in Korea. This accounts for 
the numerous statements of gratitude and expressions of good will by the Amer- 
ican POW's which appear in our local newspapers almost daily. 

In addition, there have been several demonstration groups of American and 
British POW's demanding the end of the "dirty war," for after they have seen 
the hatred of the Korean people against the Syngman Rhee government and the 
help being given by the Americans for that hated clique, they cannot help but 
feel tins has all been one tragic mistake. We imagine many people in America 
must feel the same way, also. 

We should have sent the enclosed clippings of a letter to Mrs. Foss before, but 

we did not think of it at the time. Perhaps you would be kind enough to send 

it on to her. If you would like us to send any further clippings about the POW's 

or the news on Korea that appears in our local press, please feel free to write us. 

Very sincerely. 

It is signed John W. Powell and typed John W. Powell. 

In that letter is contained the clipping that I referred to. 

Now, Mrs. Gill, this is an hour of sorrow and tragedy to you, of 
course, and our hearts go out to you. But let me ask, have you been 
informed since that time that when this letter was written to you by 
a man Avho posed as a fellow JNIissourian, your husband was, in fact, 
dying — dying of malnutrition and the disgraceful way he was treated 
by the enemy ? 

Mrs. Gill. "Well, of course, until July 13, 1953 — it's funny how you 
remember those dates, but they are all so important — I was just living 
for just any information at all, just to know he was still alive. And 
then we received word from the Government that he had died of mal- 
nutrition and dysentery. 

At the time, they thought that he had died in April of 1953, and 
since that time, after the last group of men were released a year ago, 
in September, I talked to one of the men who buried him. lie said 
that he had died the end of June (1951), he was buried then. 



2204 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. Now, Mrs. Gill, it is a fact, is it not, that in our 
Washington hearing on September 27, 1954, and since you have been 
here in San Francisco, you have talked with great men of the medical 
profession who were prisoners of war, too, who were trying to save 
their comrades, and they have told you under oath that they knew at 
the time this infamous letter was written that your husband was 
dying? 

Mrs. Gill. That is correct. 

Senator Welker. Proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mrs. Gill, you said you received propaganda mate- 
rial from all over the world. Can you name some of the things that 
you received in the various parts of the world which were sent? 

JNIrs. Gill. Really that letter amazed me, a letter like that, when 
he had just talked about our plans for the future, told me he hoped his 
allotment would come through all right. Then he mentioned he was 
alive and he was being taken care of but that he had been wounded. 

That letter was reprinted in German; it was reprinted in the 
Scottish Daily Worker. Now, I have previously submitted those 
letters.^ 

And then it was reprinted in the National Guardian. 

At no time was his name released on the official prisoners' list, al- 
though I think it was in the April issue of the National Guardian 
that there was a list in which his name was released as a prisoner of 
the Chinese people, volunteers. Actually, that is the way it was 
listed. 

Now, since that time, of course, I have received other letters, and 
there were a few letters that I chose to submit now, not to involve 
the people. I don't know a thing about their sympathies, of course, 
but they were people who gave you the impression in their letters that 
tney were just a part of the common people; they could just be any 
American citizen. And still they all had access to this paper printed 
by John Powell. 

Myself, I wouldn't know where to buy a copy of it; I don't know 
whether anyone would. Still these people had access to it. 

Some of the other letters I had previously submitted were from 
people who had access to the Daily Worker, to the National Guardian, 
in which this letter was reprinted. They all enclosed the article to 
me. 

And then, since the hearing, I received one more paper since that 
last hearing, and it was sent from Canada. 

But on that — and it surprised me because I personally was not 
interested in any man's religion, but I would like to read to you what 
it says here. 

Now, this paper, I don't know whether any of you have ever seen 
it before, or not ; I certainly have never seen or heard of it. But at 
the top, typewritten, it says : "The Jew, John W. Powell, is not here." 

I didn't know we were trying any religion. To me, I thought it 
was a man that we were talking about. He was fighting against the 
American people ; he was fighting against his own — I guess you would 
call them brother citizens. 



^ See pp. 1824 ff. of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee's hearing, September 27, 
1954, on interlocking subversion in Government departments. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2205 

"Well, lio wasn't dointr anythino- at all to help these prisoners of war 
bnt in truth Mas writinji about— well, we mentioned those ''fabricated 
atrocity stories.'' These men can prove they Averen't fabricated. Any 
of them you talk to, they will bear scars the rest of their lives for 
what they went throu<ih. 

And when I received this letter, I don't know. I don't know any of 
the i)eople ment ioned in this paper in fact were Jewish. 1 wasn't ptiy- 
inir any attention to them ; they carried hi^h positions. 

And this is my country. I am an American citizen and I won't 
give up my American citizenship or do anything to jeopardize it for 
anything in this world. 

Senator Welker. Of course, you are not interested, Mrs, Gill, in 
the race, color, or creed, other than the fact that they are great Ameri- 
cans. And you realize that we have in every race great Americans, 
j3eople who are lighting the infamous Communist conspiracy. 

But these people took away your loved one in trying to destroy 
this country of ours. You know that to be a fact and that is your 
testimony, and you want to swear before your God to that efl'ect. 

jSIrs. Gill. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Thank you. 

Mrs. Gill. Some of these other letters that I had brought with me, 
they were letters from people who had read this letter reprinted 
in some of the various papers, like he said. They actually — I couldn't 
swear that they w^ere Communists or even fellow travelers, but it was 
the idea that they had access to the publications, or the fact that they 
were interested in having access to the publications. 

I just don't understand it at all. To me, as an American citizen, I 
see that we have too much to lose when our Government is threatened 
by a foreign power. 

Senator Welker. Mrs. Gill, the last letter that you received from 
your husband was sent to you by a so-called fellow Missourian, Mr, 
John W. Powell, and reads as follows : 

III Gal : Well I never thought I would find myself in the fix I'm in now. 
You most likely by now have the telegram that says I'm missing in action. 
I'm a F! )W but I'm all right. I have a bullet in each leg and one in the arm 
but they are taking care of them for me. Please don't worry ; they aren't bad to 
us at all ; they give us foo(^ and cigarettes and they say we shall not be hnnned. 

I don't know if this will get to you or not so I shall just pray that it will 
get through. Tell the family I'm all right and not to worry. I'm not dead 
but could have been very easy. It's a long story about how and where but 
I'll tell you about it when I see you as I'm sure I will. Darling, I miss you 
very much and wish to God that this all ends and we can start our life again. 
Do me a favor. A mnster sergeant, Harvey, cai-ried me out of the ambush 
we were in. Please write to liis folks for me and toll them he's all right and 
not hurt ; we will come home together. His address is Mr. and Mrs. A. A. 
Harvey, Box 34, Franklin, Mo., telephone IF 42. 

This is all the paper I have so I will have to stop. I love you, darling, and 
miss you so much. I believe the Government will send all of my pay and I may 
be a first lieutenant now so you'll be all right. 

Goodby for now. 
Love always, 

Chuck. 

That was the last and only letter sent to you by your loved one, was 
it not? 

Mrs. Gill. That is right. 

8i:918'— 55— pt. 27 1 



2206 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. In Washington, D. C, when you appeared before 
Senator Jenner and this committee, did you hear the testimony of 
Mr, Powell when Senator Jenner and our counsel interrogated him 
with respect to whether or not he wrote the letter? 

Mrs. Gill. Yes, sir. I remember very Avell when he said about the 
signature. He said, "It looks like it." 

Senator Welker. He would not admit it was his signature ? 

Mrs. Gill. No, he wouldn't admit it was his signature, and he 
wouldn't admit it was his stationery. 

Senator Welker. Is it a fair or truthful statement, Mrs, Gill, that 
while you were there on the witness stand, one of the most tremendous 
jobs you have ever had in your life, that Mr. Powell laughed at you 
and sneered at you ? 

Mrs. Gill. Some of the officers that were with me — of course, it 
was the first time any of us had ever seen him, and they turned 
around and watched him. And he sat back there and grinned. It 
may have been a joke to him, but it hasn't been to me. 

Actually, what has happened to me is no different from what has 
happened to so many others, but it still hurts. 

Senator Welker. And yet he lives here in the great State of Cali- 
fornia, as I said this morning, high and mighty, enjoying the wonder- 
ful things that the most wonderful country in the world could give to 
a human being. I am referring to Mr. Powell. 

]\Irs. Gill. Of course, one thing that impressed me most at that 
other hearing was the fact that he said, when he was asked the question 
why did he return to the United States, he said that he returned 
because it was home to him. 

Of course, I am like everyone else; my home I try to protect, I 
certainly don't try to ruin it. 

Senator Welker. It is a fact, and you know it of your own knowl- 
edge, do you not, that Mr. Powell gave a press conference, if you 
please, at the National Press Club in the Nation's Capital, Washing- 
ton, D. C, after he had testified before our committee ? 

Mrs. Gill. Yes ; he did. 

Senator Welker. And after he had taken the fifth amendment 
some 50 times, I think. 

Mrs. Gill. At that time he did the same thing his wife did this 
morning. He refused to acknowledge the fact that he was married 
to her, on the grounds of the fifth amendment. This morning she 
refused to acknowledge him, on the grounds of the fifth amendment. 
She said she loved her husband, she honored him. I love mine, too ; 
but I am not ashamed of him. And I am not ashamed to admit that 
I was married to him. 

Senator Welker. You have never taken the fifth amendment to 
tell the American people that you gave the most precious thing in 
your life to your country ? 

Mrs, Gill. As an American citizen, I don't see I have any con- 
stitutional right to deny answering any question like some of those 
she was asked this morning. 

Senator Welker. INIrs, Gill, do you remember the interrogation by 
the chairman of our committee. Senator Jenner, of Indiana, when 
Mr. Powell stated as follows ? 

This appears at page 1902 of the official hearing record : 

Mr. Powell. I don't think you have a right to inquire into phrases. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2207 

Senator Jenner, the chairman : 

This is your letter, your signature. What did you mean by writing this lady 
this kind of a letter"? 

Mr. PowKLL. I think in 

The Chairman. You are an American citizen. You are under oath here. 
Don't sit there and tell me what I have a right to do. Why did you wrile this 
lady this kind of a letter? 

Mr. Powell. Would you like me to answer? 

The Chaikmax. Yes ; I would. 

Mr. Powell. If you give me a chance, I will be more than glad to answer. 

The Chairman. You have the chance. 

Sir. Powell. I think this invades what I have written. I don't think you have 
a position to question me on this. The letter is there. You can read it. You 
have read it here. I think to be cross-examined in this place by you on various 
points in the letter — I think I am covered by the first amendment. 

The Chairman. You must have a motive for writing this kind of a letter. 
What was your motive? 

Mr. Powell. I decline to answer under the provisions of the first amendment 
regarding my freedom of expression. 

Did yon hear that? 

Mrs. Gill. Yes, sir. I was present dnring all of that. 

Senator Welker. Did you see that printed in the Missouri press? 

Mrs. Gill. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. But did you see the full hearing, or the import 
of it, the whole printed hearing? 

Mrs. Gill. No. No, sir; I didn't. 

Of course, it was amazing to me, the fact that in a courtroom, where, 
if you are telling the truth, there is no question that can be the wrong 
question. And yet he refused to answer every question that was put 
to him on the grounds of the fifth amendment. Still he could go and 
have a news conference, where he felt that he would have the full value 
of all the publicity received, and there he would answer the same 
questions. 

To me, you can always give your name and your family, tell your 
wife's name, tell where you are employed, where a'ou ^vere at a certain 
time, without actually incriminating yourself. 

But then, there again, I don't have anything to hide. My life has 
been the same for years. I never change. People like that, I guess 
he has been involved in so many things that he can't afford to answer 
one question truthfully, because if he does they could find another 
question to ask him where he hesitates to answer it. 

Senator Welker. ISIrs. Gill, as a matter of fact, you know that the 
press conference he gave at the National Press Club, that huge edifif^e 
there, dedicated to those Avho write the news for America, you know 
that he was not under oath, and you know that he took off and he 
made a long and lengthy statement. But he was not under oath at 
that time, and here the acting chairman has begged the news people, 
the radio, every means of communication, to have liim brought before 
me; he is not quite so brave in tJie area in wliich lie lives, where, as I 
say — and I repeat — he enjoys the life of the high and mighty. 

I am embarrassed that I have not had the chance to cross-examine 
the gentleman upon the press release that he gave when he was so 
brave, but yet not so brave when under oath before our committee. I 
hope that in the months and years to follow I will have a chance 
to see Mr. Powell again. I hope that I will have a chance to meet 
him in friendly interrogation, in honest and fair interrogation, so 



2208 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

that we can find the facts and not publicize, while not nnder oath, but 
explain to the American people the thing that brought you and 
thousands and thousands of others scars on your hearts, that you 
will never get over. 

You may proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have any other information for the com- 
mittee, Mrs. Gill ? 

Senator Welker. I want to say to you that I feel sorry for Mrs. 
Powell. I feel sorry for any person that gets involved as they did. 
I cannot help but believe that the spirit of repentance and love may 
come forth from seeing the great American that you are. 

Proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you have any other information, Mrs. Gill, 
that would be helpful to the committee ? 

Mrs. Gill. None other than these letters that I mentioned before, 
those that mentioned reading the article, in which I felt people actu- 
ally said nothing. In the letters that I submitted at previous hear- 
ings, those letters used phrases like, well, like "minions of Wall 
Street" — phrases of that order, that are printed or reprinted by some- 
one who has definitely Communist sympathies. 

That is the amazing thing that I see from so many of these letters 
that I received, that these people, they don't write like educated people, 
they don't talk like educated people, and yet they are able to write a 
full letter in nothing but three-letter words, except when it comes 
to using those expressions like "fabricated atrocity stories" and "min- 
ions of Wall Street." They might not spell the words right, but 
they can use them. People don't pick up those words out of papers. 

Mr. Carpenter, All written along the same line ? 

Mrs. Gill. That is right. That is what amazed me about it. 

Of course, I had a lot of time to sit down and think over all of this 
when it first happened. 

I was upset ; I still am. But when I had a chance to reread the 
letters, then it was amazing to me just how much alike they were. 
And yet from the different sections of the country they come, and 
from different sections of the world. But the same idea was carried 
through in all of them. 

Mr. Carpenter. You believe that it was a concentrated, worldwide 
conspiracy, so to speak? 

Mrs. Gill. I would rather think that than to think it was an original 
idea by each one of these writers. I know that there is no idea that 
is completely original. I think you are taught that in school, that 
whatever you think has been thought before jou. But when people 
from all over the world start writing the same type of letter almost 
word for word, I would hesitate to think that that much of it was 
orif^inal. 

Senator Welker. Did you tell the committee that you had letters 
written in German and other foreign languages, such as Eussian, 
Czechoslovakian? If you did, tell us again, I perhaps missed that. 

Mrs. Gill. You weren't present, of course, at that other hearing, 
I am sorry. 

Senator Welker. I studied the hearings quite closely. 

Mrs. Gill. At that hearing, when I presented those letters, I had 
some propaganda pamphlets that were sent to me, where they, oh, 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2209 

■were supposed to be stories or articles, statements of men who were 
prisoners of war. 

Of course, it was the same old thin<;. They were supposed to })e 
true statements and yet none of those were signed. They were sip;ned : 
"A ser2:eant in the Second Division," or "Second lieutenant in the 
First Cavalry"; somethino; like that; no names on them. 

Senator AVelkek. Mrs. Gill, I hate to bore you with interrogating 
you with respect to your testimony given before the committee in 
Washington, D. C, before Senator Jenner, the chairman, but in the 
city of San Francisco I was admitted to the practice of law before the 
supreme court of this great State. I want the people of this State to 
know the facts. I know some of them have not received the facts. 

I know this is hard upon j'ou, but in order that the people do receive 
the facts I must go ahead with respect to Senator Jenner's interroga- 
tion of Powell in Washington, D. C., on September 27. 

Directing your attention to page 1902 of the hearings, Senator 
Jenner said : 

Toil must have a motive for writing this kind of a letter. What was your 
motive? 

Mr. Powell. I decline to answer under the provisions of the first amendment 
regarding my freedom of expression. 

The Chairman. Of course we do not recognize that, and you know that, Mr. 
Powell. 

Mr. Powell. In that event, I will decline under the constitutional privilege of 
the fifth amendment. 

From the official transcript, in other words, Mr. Powell said that 
if he gave a truthful answer as to the reasons for writing you that 
letter it might tend to incriminate him. 

Now pursuing the transcript further : 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Powell 

Then he starts quoting from the letter of Mr. Powell, including the 
letter from your husband, and his letter, that is, Mr. Powell's, had 
this to say : 

From our own personal observation of the action of the Chinese People's 
Government here in Shanghai, we know it is the policy to treat all prisoners 
captured, Kuomintang soldiers, as well as criminals, with the greatest leniency 
and fairness in order to win over their support. We ai-e sure this is the same 
policy being carried out by the Chinese volunteers in Korea. This accounts for 
the numerous statements of gratitude and good will of American POW's which 
appear in our local papers almost daily. 

Then Senator Jenner continued : 

What was your reason for writing that? 

Mr. Powell. I think the letter as a whole speaks ; it is there, but as I say, with 
all due respect, I don't think you have the right to cross-examine me on phrases in 
this letter. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Powell, you have reporters gathering news. You heard 
the major testify just a while ago. You know how they secured their demon- 
strations, how they got the smiles on the faces of American prisoners. Yon 
know how they were treated. As a news gathering agency, you had every reason 
to know how they were treated. Why did you write this to this woman, who 
is now a widow as the result of the atrocities of the Communists? 

IVIr. Powell. I can't answer that question. 

The CHAIRMAN. You said from personal observation. 

Mr. Powell. I said from personal observation of what I had seen of the 
treatment of Chinese POW's, Senator. 

Before counsel proceeds, I want to ask you a few questions. 
How old are you ? 



2210 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

]Mrs. Gill. Twenty-six years old. 

Senator Welker. "V^^ien did you meet Clinck ? 

Mrs. Gill. Well, I had known him for 2 years before we were mar- 
ried in June of 1950. 

Senator Welker. Did he live in the same hometown with you ? 

Mrs. Gill. Yes, sir. We were both from Kansas City. Previously 
he had lived in Minnesota. 

Senator Welker. Did you go to school together? 

Mrs. Gill. No ; we did not. We were introduced by mutual friends. 

Senator Welker. He was a dedicated soldier ; he loved the military ? 

IMrs. Gill. Yes, sir ; he did. He had entered the service in August 
of 1949. At that time the newspapers were carrying articles to the 
effect that they expected that all men from 18 up would be drafted in 
September of 1919, and he thought rather than go in and take what 
was given to him he would go and enlist. He enlisted and went to 
Signal Corps School. Then later he applied, I guess, for a transfer 
to Fort Knox, and then after that he applied for officers candidate 
training. He was sent to Fort Riley for that. 

After he was graduated from Fort Riley in February of 1950, he was 
sent back to Fort Knox. Then at the time we were married, he had 
overseas orders to serve in Japan. Then the day that he was to leave, 
we took him down to the plane. Of course, when we came back and 
read the papers — that was June 25 — we knew then that the Korean 
war had broken out. 

Senator Welker. "Wliat was Chuck's age ? 

Mrs. Gill. At that time we were both 21. Our birthdays are in 
October. 

Senator Welker. In other words, j^ou were just starting out your 
life together ? 

Mrs. Gill. That is right. 

Senator Welker. I am sorry, Mrs. Gill, that you have had to appear 
here. I know that your heart is heavy and will always be heavy. On 
behalf of Chairman Jenner's entire committee and the entire staff, we 
say, God bless you and may He give to you comfort in the years ahead. 
Thank you very much. 

Mrs. Gill. Thank you very much. Really, I was glad to testify. 
It is just the idea that w^e have got to fight for our country if we ex- 
pect to keep it the way it is. It is not the party in power that counts, 
it is the idea, the freedoms that we have now, tlie freedoms that we 
have to maintain. After all, we want our freedoms. Our families 
have fought for them for years before. It is so important that we 
keep this Government so that it allows a religious freedom. And we 
have the educational freedom. I was educated in public schools. I 
went to the State university, and, of course, when I left school in 1950 
at the completion of my junior year — after we heard about my hus- 
band, I went on and got my degree, bachelor of arts degree in 
sociology. 

It just seems like — on so many of these hearings it seems like they 
are trying to ridicule the law. The law of this country is not anything 
to ridicule. It is so important to all of us, it protects all of us. We 
find that out. It protected Mrs. Powell this morning, it protected her 
counsel. I do not have a counsel; I have to think for myself. I have 
nothing to hide, and as far as I am concerned, any time that I am 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2211 

asked to testify I am going to be there. If I ain not aiskecl, I will 
request the opportunity. 

Senator Welker. That leads me to one of my concluding questions. 
Tliis morning I asked Mrs. Powell a question that she did not desire 
me to ask because it affected a great organization — one that we are 
all dedicated to. As I said before, I hope her employment here in 
San Francisco will not hurt that great organization that has done 
so much for human beings and mankind. 

Would you mind telling the committee whether or not you do any- 
thing for good organizations, just about as good as the organization 
she works for here in San Francisco ? 

Mrs. Gill. Eight now my job — I work 6 days a week. I do not 
have time for volunteer work. Before this job I had — well, it was 
immediately after we had heard about my husband — I volunteered to 
the Red Cross. Then I did office work. I had not been there too long 
before I started doing social work. Then they put me on the staff 
as a paid worker. At the time I w\as receiving no allotment, so I had 
to work for a living. It was either that or hare my parents support me, 
which I did not think was fair to them. 

Senator Welker. But when you could, you dedicated your time, 
your work, your labors, and your efforts to the Red Cross ? 
Mrs. Gill. Yes ; I did. 

Now, that was something that I wanted to tell you about. In one 
of these letters that I have brought with me today, one of the women 
mentions having contact with the Red Cross, and they told her where 
sho could write to obtain a propaganda leaflet giving a letter that 
was supposedly written by her son. Now, the same time she wrote 
to me and gave me this information, I was working at the Red Cross. 
I had contacted the national office, I had contacted my superiors there 
in the Kansas City chapter office, and at that time there was no official 
information released by the Red Cross, by any other organization, 
or even by the United States Government. So where she got the infor- 
mation, I do not know. I would hesitate to think that any organiza- 
tion gave it to her when even the Government did not know about it. 
In fact, my letter from my husband was the first time that any 
information was received at all on how to contact these men. After 
that letter had come through— I showed it to you— I had sent it in 
to the Government and they had seen that stamp on it. I will not say 
that that address, just on the basis of that letter, was the reason why 
the United States Government accepted it; but that letter was the 
rubber stamp telling that you could direct 1 letter a month to — now, 
I do not have that letter w'ith me, but it said you could direct 1 letter 
to the member in 1 month, giving the name and rank, giving the 
Chinese volunteers' address, in care of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers 
for Peace, Peiping, China. 

Senator Welker. At this time I am ordering the letters that you 
have there at your left hand introduced into the record and made a 
part of the record. I Avill not permit the other publication there at 
the right of you to be put in, because we never engage in those things 
that might offend loyal Americans of any race, color, or creed. 

(The documents referred to above were marked "Exhibit No. 520," 
and appear on following pages.) 



2212 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Exhibit No. 520 

Those Reds 

Wherever you go, whatever you see or read, it's "those darned old reds." Who 
are they anyway, those wild-eyed, twist-brained, ungodly, trouble-making reds? 
Are they really the ones responsible for our wars, strikes & national strife/ 
deterioration of home & morality? The Czar could not kill Communism, Hitler 
failed & all the Truman-Marshall Plan money to China failed to stop communism. 
It must be a dread disease people catch when they get hungry. We think our 
government had better not go too far giving money to other countries or the 
American people might go Communist, instead of building homes for vets & every- 
body and stopping poverty or the constant fear of poverty with all its horrors 
here in the richest, most productive & scientific nation on earth. Starve the 
WARS. Feed America. Let's Build homes. 

War 2 Veterans & Seamen's League, 
MoLiNE Local 802.* 



March 5, 1951. 
Mrs. Charles L. Gill, 

llflS Jefferson Street, Kansas City 5, Mo. 
Dear Mrs. Gill: While reading a recent issue of the newspaper Shanghai 
News I came across a letter addressed to you by your husband. It seems he is a 
prisoner of war and had asked the correspondent of the paper to forward his 
lerter to you in some way. 

Because I know how relieved and happy you will be to hear that your husband 
is safe and sound I am taking the privilege copying his letter to you. Here it is : 
'"Hi, gal : Well I never thought I would find myself in the fix I'm in now. 
You most likely by now have the telegram that says I'm missing in action. I'm 
a POW, but I'm all right. I have a bullet in each leg and one in the arm, but 
they are taking care of them for me. Please don't worry, they aren't bad to us 
at all; they give us food and cigarettes, and they say we shall not be harmed. 
"I don't know if this will get to you or not, so I shall pray that it will get 
through. Tell the family I'm all right and not to worry. I'm not dead but could 
have been very easy. It's a long story, but I'll tell you about it when I see you, 
as I'm sure I will. Darling, I miss you very much and wish to God that this 
ends and we can start our life again. Do me a favor, a Master Sgt. Harvest (sic) 
carried me out of ambush we were in, please write his folks and tell them he's all 
riglit and not hurt. His address is : Mr. and Mrs. A. A. Harvey, Box 34, Franklin, 
Missouri. Telephone I. F. 42. 

"This is all the paper I have, so I will have to stop. I love you, darling, and 
miss you very much. I believe the government will send all my pay and I may 
be a First Lieutenant now so you'll be all right. Goodbye for now. 
"Love always, 

"Chuck." 
I hope the above letter will set your mind at ease, Mrs. Gill, and, like your 
husband, I hope a peaceful settlement of the war in Korea will be made so that 
all our boys can come home. 
Very truly yours, 

Nathaniel Low. 
11554 Huston Street, 

2forth Holly wood, Calif. 



Hotel Wyndham, 

52 West 58th Street, 
New York 19, N. Y., January 19, 1951. 
Dear Mrs. Gill : Today I received a letter from a friend of mine in Shanghai 
with a newspaper clipping (North China Daily News, published in Shanghai) 
which I am enclosing. 

Maybe you have already received the good news about your husband. If not, 
you will be glad to learn that he is alive, although a prisoner. 

Would you be so kind as to get in touch with Mrs. A. A. Harvey, in Franklin, 
Missouri, and inform her about the fate of her husband? 

Yours very truly, 
Joseph G. Preuss. 

^ A postal card rostmarkcd St. Paul, Minn., May 24, 1951, 



DsTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2213 

U. S. Prisonkr of War Writes to Family 

(Special correspondent with Chinese people's volunteers) 

Korea, January 8 (Hsinlma). — Today, I came across a wounded war prisoner, 
now nearly recovered, who asked me to try to get a letter to his folks in America. 
He was very worried because he was known to have been wounded and in a tight 
spot and felt sure that he would be reported dead. Here are relevant parts of his 
letter, addressed to Mrs. Charles L. Gill of 7418 Jefferson Street, Kansas City 5, 
Mo. : 

"Hi gal. Well I never thought I would find myself in the fix I'm in now. You 
most likely by now have the telegram that says I'm missing in action. I'm a POW 
but I'm all right. I have a bullet in eacli leg and one in the arm but they are 
taking care of them for me. Please don't worry, they aren't bad to us at all, they 
give us food and cicavettes and they say we shall not be harmed. 

"I don't know if this will get to you or not so I shall just pray that it will get 
through. Tell the family I'm all right and not to worry. I'm not dead but could 
have been very easy. It's a long story about how and wliere but I'll tell you about 
It when I see you as I'm sure I will. Darling, I miss you very much and wish to 
God that this all ends and we can sfart our life again. Do me a favor, a master 
sergeant, Harvey, carried me out of the ambush we were in, please write to his 
folks for me and tell them he's all right and not hurt — we will come home to- 
gethei-. His address is : Mr. and Mrs. A. A. Harvey, Box 34, Franklin, Mo., tele- 
phone IF 42. 

"This is all the paper I have so I will have to stop. I love you, darling, and 
miss you so much. I believe the Government will send all of my pay and I may 
be a first lieutenant now so you'll be all right. Goodbye for now. Love alwavs— 
Chuck." 



115 AxTHONY Street, 
Santa Cruz, Calif., Fchriiaiy 2.}, i9J//. 
Mrs. Charles L. Gill, 

741s Jefferson Street, Kansas City 5, Mo. 
Dear Mrs. Gill : I enclose a clipping from the North China Daily News of 10th 
January which I received today. I sincerely hope that you have had news of your 
husband before this but if not, no doubt the news in the clipping will be more 
than welcome. 

Yours sincerely, 

Paui, Komob. 

Beardstown, III., September 20, 1951. 
Mrs. CHAKLi-s L. Gill, 

Kansas City, Mo.: 

Today I received several leaflets of (Red propaganda) from my 23-yeai-old 
son who is serving with the 3rd Inf. Div. in Korea. These leaflets have been 
dropped to U. N. soldiers trying to induce them to surrender. One of these leaflets 
contained several letters supposedly written by some of our soldiers who v.ere 
POW's to their families in America informing them of the wonderful treatment 
they were receiving in the prisoner of war camp. One of these letters was written 
to you by your husband, Charles L. Gill. I could not resist the temptation of 
trying to find if there was such a person at the address mentioned and if the 
soldier mentioned really was a prisoner and had contacted you. My motive is 
not entirely selfish as I have friends whose son has been missing since June 11 
and thought I may be able to uncover something to give them hope for they liave 
had no word from him. 

Then, too, I thought if you hadn't heard from your husband this might give you 
fresh hope that at least he is among the living. 

If there is a you and you have a loved one missing in this terrible lieart- 
breaking war my sincerest sympathies are yours. 

If you would like to see the leaflet I have mentioned please write me and I 
will send it to you if you will return it to me. I am writing to several others 
regarding the same paper and as I have only the one copy I wouldn't want to 
lose it as we are keeping everything our son sends us for him if God is kind 
enough to send him back to us. 
Sincerely yours, 

Mrs. James B. Wai;dex. 

Route 2, Beardstown, III. 



2214 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Brevard, N. C, March 5, 1952. 

Dear Mrs. Gill : I have a son that is a prisoner in Korea and has been for 
15 mouths now. I was told by the Red Cross to write for a booli that has a lot 
of prisoners' names and pictures and also their home address. I have received 
the book and your husband has written a statement that is in the book. I feel 
like you would be glad to know what he writes. Therefore I am writing you 
a copy. 

"Hi, Gal: Well, I never thought I would find myself in the fix I'm in now. 
You most likely by now have the telegram that says I am missing in action. 
I am a I'OW, but I am all right. I have a bullet in each leg and one in the arm, 
but they are taking care of them for me. Please don't worry, they aren't bad 
to us at all. They give us food and cigarettes and they say we shall not be 
harmed. Tell the family I am all right and not to worry. I'm not dead, but 
could have been very easy. It's a long story about how and where, but I'll tell 
you about it when I see you as I am sure I will. Darling, I miss you very much 
and wish to God that this all ends and we can start our life again. Do me a 
favor. A Master Sergeant Harvest carried me out of ambush we were in. Please 
write to his folks for me and tell them he is all right and not hurt. We will 
come home together. His address is Mr. and Mrs. A. A. Harvey, Box 34, Franklin, 
Mo., telephone L. F. 42. 

"This is all the paper I have so I will have to stop. I love you, darling, and 
miss you so much. I believe the Government will send all of my pay and I may 
be a first lieutenant now, so you'll be all right. Goodby for now. 
"Love always, 

"Chuck." 

Mrs. Gill, I do hope you have received a letter from your husband by now. 
I have received two letters from my son. He writes like they were all getting 
good treatment, and oh how I pray for all of them and pray they will soon be 
home again. If you would like to send a picture of your husband I will check 
it with the pictures in the book I have and see if it is there. I will i-eturn the 
picture if you send one. 

INIay God bless and comfort you. 

Please write me. I would like to hear from you. I am trying to write to all 
the mothers and wives that have an address in the book. 
Yours truly, 

Mrs. Frank M. Garren. 

Box 22, Brevard, N. C. 

Mrs. Gill. Eeally, on this paper, like I said, it mentioned people 
that I had never even questioned their religion. Now here it said 
that Gen. IMark Clark is supposed to be Jewish. I do not know 
whether he is or not. Personally, I am not interested.' As long as 
he is capable of serving as a general in the Army, I do not care what 
church he belongs to. I do not think I am so terribly different from 
any other American. 

Senator Welker. I might say to you and for the records that that 
great senior general officer, Mark Clark, has given me the great 
honor of presiding at his hearing when he unburdened his heart to 
the American people. No finer man ever lived, no greater soldier, 
dedicated to human freedom, like you are. 

I say in closing again, Mrs. Gill, that you have suffered for freedom- 
loving people all over the world. They will gain new luster by your 
life and by your testimony. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. Gill.- Thank you. 

Senator Welker. The committee will now call Mr. McManus. 

Mr. McManus, do you solemnly swear the testimony you shall give 
in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

Mv. IMcManus, I do. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2215 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT McMANUS, PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER, 
INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
THE JUDICIARY 

Senator Welker. Will you state your name for the record? 

Mr. McManus. Robert McManus. 

Senator Welkek. And you are connected with the Internal Security 
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States 
Senate? 

Mr. McINIanus. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. What is your capacity? 

Mr. McManus. My title is staff member. 

Senator Welker. You may proceed, counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Mr. ;McManus, did you attend a press conference 
at the National Press Club in Washinoton, D. C, on September 28, 
1954? ^ 

Mr. McManus. Yes ; I did. 

IVIr. Carpenter. Who conducted that press conference? 

Mr. McManus. Mr. John W. Powell. 

Mr. Carpenter. You did this in connection with your duties as a 
member of the staff'? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. What was the nature of that press conference? 
Will 3'ou please tell us, for the record ? 

Mr. McManus.' This press conference was held subsequent to Mr. 
Powell's appearance on the stand before the subcommittee, the day 
following his appearance, and was apparently intended to get his 
side of the argument circulated without the necessity for making any 
statements under oath. I took some notes at that press conference, 
which I have here, and I can give you an outline of what was said. 

In discussing the testimony of the POW's who told of the mistreat- 
ment that they received in camps, he attempted to explain that by 
stating that while it may have seemed very rough to them, the real 
problem was that life was pretty rough in China anyway because 
apparently their experience was the way everyone in China lived. 
He said that when the Koreans were handling the prisoners it was 
much worse; things got a little better when the Chinese took over. 
I remember that particularly because of what was said by the wit- 
nesses in testimony before that. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did he say at the time where he received this 
information, how he received it ? 

Mr. Mc]Mant^s. No ; he did not say that he had ever made any first- 
hand investigation in the course of his journalistic activity. 

He was asked about the charges printed in the China Monthly 
Review regarding germ warfare allegedly practiced by Americans. 
He spent a good deal of time failing to answer that one. He said it 
was a very serious question, he w^ould like to give it a lot of thought. 
He said the Chinese began to produce evidence and there was testi- 
mony from an enormous number of villages; and if it was a hoax, that 
they certainly had an awful lot of people involved in this hoax. That 
is a direct quotation. 

He was asked if he had seen any of the evidence, and he said, '*I 
didn't see any." 



2216 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

It will be recalled that when he was asked whether or not he was 
a Communist  

Senator Welker. Pardon me, Mr. McManus. You were with our 
committee when we investigated this germ-warfare allegation. Do 
you know it to be a fact that it was a hoax all the way and Red Com- 
munist propaganda of the most vile form ? You were with me when 
we intercepted the first English version of the germ-warfare motion- 
picture film that came to our country. You know, as all people will 
know who have seen that thing, that it was nothing but an infamous 
lie made out of whole cloth. You know that ; do you not ? 

Mr. McManus. I think there is every evidence to support that 
statement ; yes, sir. It has been investigated. 

Senator Welker. We will go into that with some boys who know 
all about it later on. 

]\lr. McManus. He was asked directly whether or not he was a 
Communist, which he had refused to answer on the witness stand. He 
said, "I am not a Communist, not now, and never have been." 

Again he was questioned on germ warfare. He said, "I have a 
feeling of doubt. Something must have happened there. Something 
sure in heck must have happened up there. ' These are direct quotes 
again. "I find it difficult to think it was American policy. Maybe 
somebody in Korea did something." 

Mr. Carpenter. What did he say about Mrs. Gill? "Wliat did he 
say as to the letter to Mrs. Gill ? 

Mr. McManus. He was not asked to explain it. He said that he 
had never been in Moscow. That was another question that he re- 
fused to answer under questioning. He was asked about the testi- 
mony that the China Review was taken into the camp in truckloads. 
He said, "I would take exception to that statement about truckloads." 

Again he came back to the question about the germ warfare. He 
said he had seen pictures and he had no reason to believe the pictures 
were faked. 

Excuse me. In connection with the letter of Mrs. Gill, the only 
thing he said about that was, "We wrote a lot of letters." 

He declared that his paper was not considered pro-Communist by 
the Communists in China. Then he made a good many statements 
about how^ much better off everybody was in Communist China than 
they had been before, but I did not bother to take notes on that. 

Mr. Carpenter. ]VIr. IMcJManus, in connection with your duties on 
the staff of this committee, did you visit Boston, Mass., and vicinity? 

Mv. McManus. I did. 

Mr, Carpenter. In connection wdth prisoners of war ? 

Mr. McManus. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Can you state what you found there in the vicinity 
of Boston ? 

Mr. McManus. I made visits to William D. Scott and John 
Mahoney, in Wakefield, Mass., and also other persons in the Boston 
area. Mr. Scott is the father of a POW who was missing in action 
and may be dead. He has never received final word. Mr. Scott told 
me this story : On about September 7, 1951, Mr. Scott received a post- 
card from a INIrs. Floyd Wells or Wills — it was not clear ; you could 
not decipher the "e" or the "i" — of Steubenville, Ohio, informing him 
that his son's name had been listed in a group of POW s whose names 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2217 

■were printed in the Aiifrust issue of the National Guardian. Scott did 
not know at that time -what the National Guardian was, 

I am reading from the notes I made. He telephoned Mrs. Wells 
for more information and reached her at 2 o'clock in the morning. 
She told him about the Guardian and in the course of conversation 
said, "They told me to get in touch with you." It was not clear to him 
what she meant hj "they." 

As a result, Scott became a subscriber to the Guardian and in a while 
began to receive propaganda from all over the world, including 
Czechoslovakia, just as in the case of Mrs. Gill. He also received 
hundreds of letters from other parents and relatives of POW's from 
all over the United States. 

Among other things, apparently this device of working on the rela- 
tives of prisoners is also a means of trying to drum up subscriptions 
and circulation for Communist publications. I suppose there is a 
slimier waj' to develop circulation, but if there is I have never heard 
of it. 

Here is the card that he received from the "Weekly Guardian Asso- 
ciates; that is, the National Guardian. Apparently they used the 
same mailing machine as something called the Blue Heron Press. 

This is addressed to William D. Scott, 4 Auburn Street, Wakefield, 
Mass. It is on one of those — apparently the result of an adclresso- 
graph job. Above the name are the numbers 9561— 53-S. 

Here is a solicitation from the Blue Heron Press asking ]SIr. Scott 
to buy Hovrard Fast's, The Passion of Sacco and Vanzetti. It has the 
same addressograph plate, 9561:-53-S. 

He also received subscriptions, solicitations, from the New World 
Eeview, of which the editor is Jessica Smith. Our record shows, I 
think, Mr. Chairman, that Jessica Smith is the widow" of Hal Ware. 

Senator Welker. Tell us about Mr. Ware. 

Mr. McMantts. He dug the first tunnel under the United States 
Government. He was an agent. He was a young American farmer. 

Senator Welker. As a matter of fact, he was taught by JSIother 
Bloor, the founder of communism in America. As a matter of fact, 
he was a head man in the Ware cell that Whittaker Chambers and 
Alger Hiss were involved in; is that correct? 

Mr. McManus. Yes. He was an agent of Lenin from the very 
beginning of the revolution. Lenin brought him to the U. S. S. R. 
His mother. Mother Bloor, tells Hal Ware's story in her own biog- 
raphy. 

Senator Welker. Will you tell us about Howard Fast? Do you 
suppose he was an American, a dedicated man to save the comitry, or 
did he write propaganda? 

^Ir. Mc^NIaxus. I can see Mr. Mandel getting ready to answer that 



one, sir. 



Senator Welker. All right, I will direct my question to Mr. !Mandel. 

Mr. Mandel. The record of congressional hearings shows that 
Howard Fast is a member of the Communist Party. 

Mr. McManus. Jessica Smith, to return to her, invoked the fifth 
amendment a good many times, it is my recollection. I mean she is 
an oldtime party wheelhorse. 

Senator Welker. Leaving what you have to say with respect to this 
press conference, do you remember at the hearing held in Washing- 
ton, D. C, before Chairman Jenner, September 27, 1954, page 1896, 



2218 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

I 

when the chairman was interrogating Mr. Powell with respect to the 
advertising contained in the China Weekly and^ Monthly Review ? 
Mr. Carpenter, our counsel, first asked the question : ] 

You carried some advertising in your China Weekly and Monthly Review, 
did you not, Mr. Powell, American advertising? 

Mr. Powell. I think the same answer. 

The Chairman. You claim your privilege under the fifth amendment to that 
question? 

Mr. Powell. That is correct. 

The Chairman. The same record, Mr. Reporter. 

Mr. Carpenter. You had considerable advertising in your newspaper prior to 
the taking over of Shanghai by the Communists, didn't you? 

Mr. Powell. The same answer. 

Meaning the fifth amendment. 

Mr. Carpenter. You only had two advertisers, when you closed, I believe. 
Mr. Powell. The same answer. 

Meaning the fifth amendment. 

On page 1897, Mr. Carpenter, our counsel, asked Mr. Powell : 

"Who paid for the copies of your China Weekly and Monthly Review that were 
sent to the POW camps in Korea? 

The answer from Mr. Powell : 

That is an implication ; isn't it? Is that a straight question? 

The Chairman, It is a question. 

Mr. Powell. In that form, I would decline. I would take my privilege. 

Then, of course — to shorten this matter, because we must hurry 
along — he was asked whether or not he knew Mr. Randall Gould in 
Shanghai. ^Ir. Gould had sent to the committee a letter informing 
the committee that Mr. Powell, if I recall correctly, was strictly on 
the left. I am being very, very charitable on the statement. 

]\Ir. McManus. I have two other things that I would just like to 
bring up. 

Among other things that the Scotts got, and according to what they 
told me, and what other people got, were books like this. Here is one 
book, "We Can Be Friends, written by Carl Marzani. 

Senator Welker. Can you tell us about that gentleman — if I may 
say gentleman — where he is holding forth now ? 

Mr. INIcManus. When he appeared before us he was doing propa- 
ganda work for the United Electrical Workers, to my recollection. 
He had been reposing a little while before that in jail, Senator. 

Senator Welkeb. For what reason ? 

Mr. McManus. I would rather not give the exact reason because 
there was a dispute as to what he had been convicted of. Whether it 
was perjury or — I know there was a legal argument as to why he had 
gone to jail. 

Senator Welker. Did it involve falsifying a public record? He 
certainly was not convicted for being a red-blooded American, was he? 

Mr. McManus. No. He had been a former employee of the OSS 
and the State Department. 

Here is one other thing. There is an organization in Boston known 
as the American Prisoners of War, Inc., and I have a letter from the 
commander of that outfit, Mr. Vincent A. Harrold, in which he says : 

I am enclosing names and addresses of relatives of POW's who have been 
subjected to the Communist propaganda apparatus and have received letters 
from the editors of the China Review and the National Guardian, et cetera. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2219 

In other words, it is very obvious that this was a general practice. 
The kind of thint^ that happened to Mrs. Gill has been happening to 
many other people all around the country. 

Senator "Welker. I will order that that letter be incorporated in 
the record as our next exhibit at this point of the remarks of the 
witness. 

You may step down. 

(The document referred to above was marked as "Exhibit No. 520" 
and appears below:) 

Exhibit No. 520 

American PRieoNEnis of War, Inc., 
Boston 34, Mass., November 19, 195^. 
Committee on the Judiciary, 

United States Senate, Senate Office Building, 

Washington, D. G. 
(Attention of Mr. Robert C. McManiis.) 

Dear Mr. McIVIanus : In reply to your request of November 4th, I am sub- 
mitting the names and addresses of five ex-POW's of the Communists who will 
testify from firsthand knowledge how they were forced under threat of severe 
physical punishment to study the China Review and other English-language 
Communist periodicals while pi'isoners. 

I am also enclosing names and addresses of relatives of POW's who have been 
subjected to the Communist propaganda apparatus and have received letters 
from the editors of the China Review and The National Guardian, etc. I will be 
willing to testify myself regarding this subject, relating the experiences of 
our organization in attempting to be of service to the relatives of captured 
American GI's and attempts by Commvmists to first infiltrate, then intimidate 
this organization of prison camp veterans. 

My ofllce telephone number is LI-2-i310 and I can be reached there between 
9 a. m. and 5 p. m. My home number is AL-^2951 and I can be contacted there 
after 5 p. m. 

I sincerely hope the committee will decide to hold hearings in Boston as we 
feel much valual)le information can be obtained here. 

Please be assured of our complete cooperation in the event we can be of further 
service to you and the committee. 

Many more witnesses can be made available if you so desire. 
Sincerely yours, 

Vincent A. Harrold, Commander. 

(Enclosure referred to in above letter:) 
M. Sgt. John J. O'Keefe RA.31432135, 12 Birch Hill Avenue, Wakefield, Mass. 
M. Sgt. George J. Malta, 6G Market Street, Brockton, Mass. 
George A. Vitale, 38 Pleasant Street, Stoneham, Mass. 
Joseph Dicato, 195 Bradford Street, Everett, Mass. 
Guv T. Vadala, 105 Bradford Street, Everett, Mas.s. 
William D. Scott, 4 Auburn Street, Wakefield, Mass. Father of Army Sgt. Gerald 

F. Scott who died in Communist captivity. 
Mrs. Bessie McDonough, 2.~f) Elm Street, New London, Conn. Mother of Air 

Force ]Major Charles E. McDonough who died in Communist captivity. 
Mrs. Dorothy Kennealy, 325 East 8th Street, South Boston, Mass. Wife of Pfc. 

James R. Kennealy who died in Communist captivity. 
Mrs. Ernest Graveline, 22 Warren Avenue, Pawtucket, R. I. Mother of Capt. 

Ernest Graveline, Army Medical Corp., who died in Communist captivity. 
Mrs. Mae Pratt, 38 Pleasant Avenue, Stoneham, Mass. Mother of George A. 

Vitale, released POW. Mrs. Pratt was the victim of an extortion attempt 

while her son was held by the Communists. 

Mr. Carpexter. Colonel Wolfe, please. 

Senator Welker. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will 
give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and noth- 
ing but the truth, so help you God? 

Colonel Wolfe. I do, sir. 



2220 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION EM" GOVERNMENT 

TESTIMONY OF CLAUDIUS 0. WOLFE, COLONEL, UNITED STATES 

ARMY 

Senator "Welker. State your name. 

Colonel Wolfe. Claudius O. Wolfe, colonel, United States Army. 

Senator Welker. Where is your residence. Colonel ? 

Colonel Wolfe. At the present time I am on active duty, Headquar- 
ters, San Francisco Port of Embarkation, Fort Mason, Calif. 

Senator Welker. "Wliat has been your duty since the so-called arm- 
istice in Panmunjom ? 

Colonel Wolfe. For the period from August 1952 to November 
1953, I was charged with responsibility for investigating and docu- 
menting war crimes perpetrated by Communist forces against United 
Nations forces in Korea. I was personally in Korea during that 
time. The actual investigations were carried on by teams of military 
]:)ersonnel in the field. Documentation was done in the War Crimes 
Division of my office under the supervision of Lt. Col. Jack Todd at 
Pleadquarters, Korean Communication Zone, Taeju, Korea. I believe 
Colonel Todd appeared before your committee in Washington. 

Senator Welker. Yes. 

Proceed, Counsel. 

Mr. Carpenter. You have a prepared statement, have you, Colonel ? 

Colonel Wolfe. Do you desire me to present that? 

Senator Welker. I think that will expedite things because we are 
running short of time. 

Colonel Wolfe. We have here a number of exhibits. However, as 
a preface to those, Iwould like to explain briefly what they are and 
how we arrived at those. 

In order to get the background of these investigations, attention is 
invited to the following facts which I am sure all of us are familiar 
with. The North Korean forces launched an unprovoked attack upon 
the Eepublic of Korea at 0400 on June 25, 1950. On June 29, the 
President of the United States authorized General ISIacArthur to use 
armed forces in Korea. And on July 7 the Security Council author- 
ized a unified command in Korea and requested the United States to 
designate the commander in chief of the United Nations forces in 
Korea. Despite a valiant defense, by August 1950 the United Nations 
forces had been pushed back to the Pusan perimeter. 

It soon became apparent that the aggressors in such barbaric attack 
did not intend to be bound by the rules of humane warfare, and 
reports were received at GHQ, United Nations, describing barbaric 
and unspeakable atrocities being committed by the North Korean 
People's army. September 1950 saw the United Nations counteroffen- 
sive get underway with the landing at Inchon, Korea, and the attack 
of the enemy was turned into a rout. In the wake of this action, there 
was exhibited a sordid and unbelievable picture of bestial war crimes 
committed against South Korean civilian and military prisoners of 
war by the retreating Communists. 

When it became apparent that atrocities were being committed in 
Korea on a large and increasing scale. General IMacArthur set up the 
machinery for the investigation and accumulation of evidence for the 
cases of atrocities and other crimes committed by Communist aggres- 
sors in violation of the laws and customs of war in connection with 
and arising from the Korean conflict. Statements of victims and eye-* 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2221 

witnesses were taken. riioton:raplis of tlic site and bodies of atrocity 
victims were takon. Proof (hat woukl meet the test of judicial courts 
was accumulated. The facts thus feathered \Yithout doubt established 
the commission of unspeakable atrocities. 

The couiiterofl'ensive of the United Nations forces carried them to 
the Yalu Kiver by November of 1050, However, at this point Chinese 
Connnunist forces crossed into Nortli Korea and without justification 
joined in combat witli the United Nations forces and in support of the 
Nortli Korean Communists. The United Nations forces were pushed 
back to the oStli parallel. Durino; all of this period evidence of the 
perpetration of atrocities by the Communists was accumulating. 

Armistice talks bef^an in 1051. In April 1053 these talks resulted in 
an agreement to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war in an 
oi)eration known as Little Switch. Approximately 160 United States 
prisoners were returned by the Communists. Many voluntary state- 
ments were made by these persons indicating brutal and harsh treat- 
ment. As a result of such statements, a total of 201 new cases of atroc- 
ities against U. N. Command were opened. 

Ultimately an armistice agreement was entered into, effective on 
the 27th day of July 1053, which established the present demilitarized 
zone in Korea. Under the terms of this agreement, all remaining 
prisoners of war who desired to be repatriated were to be returned 
within 60 days. This was known as Operation Big Switch. In this 
operation approximately 3,330 American prisoners of war were re- 
turned, a number woefully less than that which we had every reason 
to believe would be returned. 

Evidence gathered from these returned POWs not only corrobo- 
rated previously reported atrocities but added many new atrocity 
cases not theretofore uncovered. In the latter part of 1053 a fully 
documented report of atrocities committed by Communists in Korea 
was published by the Department of the Army. Information pertain- 
ing to atrocities was presented to the United Nations General Assem- 
bly at a later date and the action there taken is a matter of public 
record for the world to see. 

The statements of victims and witnesses show a remarkable unanim- 
ity as to mistreatment by Communist captors of U. N. military per- 
sonnel. There were practically no American prisoners of war except 
those captured toward the end of hostilities who were not victims 
of cruel and inhuman treatment while they were prisoners. 

It must be remembered that prisoners of war, under the accepted 
rules of land warfare and the principles of the Geneva Convention 
occupy an honorable status and are entitled to treatment in accordance 
therewith. They are not felons who are to be held in penal servitude. 
Yet the Communists apparently treated them as such. Of course, 
where it served their immediate purpose they would treat them well — 
for propaganda purposes. 

Likewise, when it became apparent the Communists might not win 
or that the prisoners might be returned as a result of an armistice, 
treatment would improve. However, in the beginning when the 
Communists felt the surge of victory and when the Chinese intervened 
and the United Nations forces suffered temporary reverses, it is my 
opinion that there was a considered command policy to exterminate 
prisoners or to subject them to humiliating and inhuman treatment. 

32918°— 55— pt. 27 5 



2222 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The Panmiinjom peace talks showed the necessity of having living 
prisoners as a bargaining point. This was the turning point in mis- 
treatment. Had this not occurred, I am convinced that there would 
have been no effort to spare or save these men, and that they would 
have been permitted to die of malnutrition and lack of medical care 
and exposure to the elements. 

Now, with that background in mind, we have a series of pictures 
which have been selected to depict certain atrocities committed. 

Senator Welker. Colonel, may I digress ? These are different pic- 
tures than were used in our hearing in Washington ; are they ? 

Colonel Wolfe. That is correct. These were not introduced in the 
previous hearing in Washington. 

Senator Welker. Are you ready now to take a ruler or something 
to go up and explain them ? 

Colonel Wolfe. They are marked 1 (A), 2 (B), 3 (C). If they 
were marked also 4 and 5, 1 could explain each one of them. 

(The photographs were marked "Exhibits 521 A to E" and appear 
on pages facing the text.) 

Senator Welker. Very well. 

Will you tell the committee what picture No. 1 presents? 

Colonel Wolfe. Yes, sir. Pictures Nos. 1, 2, and 3 were taken at 
what is known as the Hill 303 massacre. In order to understand that, 
let me give you just a few words of what that was. 

On tJie morning of August 15, 1950, a mortar platoon of the 5th Cav- 
alry Regiment was overrun by Communists. The prisoners' hands 
were tied with wire or their own shoelaces. For 2 days they were 
held, and then suddenly on the afternoon of August 17, 1950, their 
captors opened fire on them without warning. 

Senator Welker. May I interrupt ? Were their hands tied behind 
their backs ? 

Colonel Wolfe. Yes, sir. You can see in those three photographs 
that we have there, each of those are bound with either wire, shoe- 
laces, or other means behind their backs. They were prisoners of war 
at the time. They were not in combat. 

Senator Welker. And they (the Communists) violated every rule 
of the Geneva Conference ? 

Colonel Wolfe. That is correct. 

Senator Welker. In the treatment of prisoners ? 

Colonel Wolfe. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. In fact, they violated every rule of humanity ? 

Colonel Wolfe. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Welker. Proceed, sir. 

Colonel Wolfe. Thirty-four American soldiers were slaughtered 
and their bodies were left on the scene. There were four survivors. 
These were rescued by a U. N. patrol later in the day. The patrol 
recovered the bodies, took photographs, and captured two of the 
enemy. Statements were voluntarily given by Communist soldiers, 
admitting participation in the crime. 

That documentary evidence is a matter of evidence and is retained 
in the files of the Department of the Army. 

Now, photo No. 1 shows a chaplain saying the last rites over the 
bodies of atrocity victims, certain ones of them, in this Hill 303 mas- 
sacre, shortly after the advancing American forces found these bodies. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 
Exhibit No. 521A 



2223 




Picture No. 1. 

Picture Xo. 2 shows hands tied witli his own slioeLaces at the execu- 
tion site; the body of a murdered American soldier lying on the 
ground with his hands tied behind him. The soldier was separated 
from the others, who were found in the same condition in another 
ravine a short distance away. 

Senator Welker. How was the soldier in picture No. 2 killed? 

Colonel Wolfe. By rifle fire. 

Senator "Welker. In the back or front ? 

Colonel Wolfe. That I cannot tell from the picture. They were 
fired at from whatever position they were in when the Communists 
suddenly opened fire. Some of them were probably facing the Com- 
munists, others were probably marching Avith their backs down the 
road. 

Senator Welker. Very well. Proceed. 

Colonel Wolfe. This picture was made on the 18th of August 1950. 

By the way, all these pictures are authentic United States pictures. 
You can verify them by the photographer who took them. They are 
the official photographs of the Department of the Army. 



2224 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



Exhibit No 521B 



■v; , -11 



' -^ 



^ST' ^"Vnsvi" VBV 





Picture No. 2, 

Exhibit No. 521G 




'■:^'~:^ 



^^^B 


i 
"J 








. A 


Picture No. 3. 





I 



Photo No. 3, showing two American soldiers face down, having 
been excuted in that position, were also victims of the Hill 303 
massacre. The pictnre shows them as they were left by their captors. 
The bodies of American soldiers shot by Communist-led North Ko- 
reans were found in this ditch. This is just simply a small group of 
that whole group. This was also on the ISth of August, 1950. 

Picture No. 4, which is not marked — we will call the next two 4 (D) 
and 5 (E). 

Senator Welker. Very well. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



2225 



Colonel AVoLFE. This (D) is the scene from Avhat is known as the 
Taejon Massacre. Taejon is about the center of South Korea at tlie 
present time. It is midway between Pusan and Seoul on the main 
militarj' railroad that runs north and south through Korea. 



KxHiiiTT Xi\ r;2in 






KT 




Picture No. 4. 

A little background of that: This is one of the most sordid and 
bestial crimes that the North Korean Communists committed during 
the summer of 1950. The Communists captured the city of Taejon. 
Both civilian and military prisoners were put in the city prison and 
within the confines of the Catholic mission, the two of them adjoining 
each other. While being held they were beaten and tortured^ 
Favorite pastimes were the twisting of prisoners' fingers, kicking and 
beating them without i^rovocation. 

When recapture of Taejon by the United Nations forces became 
evident in late September 1950, the Communists decided to liquidate 
all prisoners. Commencing September 23, groups numbering from 
100 to 200 were bound and transported to previously selected sites, 
I>laced in open trenches dug for this purpose, and summarily shot, 
^lany skulls were found crushed. The bodies were covered lightly 
with dirt. When the trenches were filled by the bodies, others were 
slain in the churchyard and basement of the Catholic mission. Many 
bodies were tlirown in a well until it was completely stuffed witn 
people — a civilian, 1 ROK soldier, and 2 Americans. 

Thousands of bodies were recovered by the liberating United Na- 
tions forces who occupied the site shortly thereafter. 



2226 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



Now, this fourth picture shows the mutihited body of a United States 
soldier tortured and killed by the fleeing Communist-led North Ko- 
rean forces, recovered from a crude grave in Taejon on September 30, 
1950. This is only one of the remains' of 42 American military victims 
of this massacre. 

If you will examine the picture carefully, you will note the total 
lack of medical attention given this soldier prior to his murder. You 
can see the stub of his left leg there, to which no medical treatment 
whatsoever had been rendered. You will see that he not only has been 
shot, but he has either been bayoneted or bamboo spears had pierced 
his body, both undoubtedly prior to the time of his death. 

The last picture (E) we have is one of sordid bestiality that is hard 
to believe. It is taken from what is known as the Suchon Tunnel 
Massacre. When the fall of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang 
to United Nations forces seemed imminent in October of 1950, all 
POW's were entrained by the Communists for movement forward. 
The men were herded into open gondolas, packed to overflowing, and 
forced to ride unprotected in the raw October weather. 

Exhibit No, 521B 




Picture No. 5. 

Those of you who have been in Korea at that time of the year know 
actually how severe the winters are. Pneumonia and exposure then 
started taking its daily toll from the weakened survivors. After they 
had suffered such inhuman treatment for a period of 9 days, their 
train arrived at a railroad tunnel approximately 4i/^ miles northwest 
of Suchon and remained inside the mountain all day to avoid U. N. 
air activity. 

During the early afternoon of October 20, the starving men were 
promised their first meal in several days. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2227 

An American major, together with a group of selected prisoners, 
purportedly as a detail, were taken supposedly to a nearby villago 
to prepare food. Instead, they were shot. Hours later the men 
remaining in the tunnel were informed that food had been prepared 
and that they were to be conducted to a Korean house to eat; but 
clue to the limited space, they must go in small units alternately.) 

The first group of 30 men were removed from the tunnel, escorted 
down the tracks, and told to hide in an erosion ditch until food was 
brought to them. As soon as they had relaxed on the ground the 
guards opened point blank lire, in cold blood, with liussian-made 
burp guns and rifles. Those living through the initial massacre and 
those still showing signs of life were dispatched by shooting or 
bludgeoning. Some of the victims survived by feigning death. 

Eemaining groups were treated in a like manner. U. N. forces 
overran this Suclion area the following day, recovering the bodies 
of C)8 murdered Americans, and in addition, discovering 7 more inside 
the tunnel who had apparently died of malnutrition. 

At least 138 American soldiers lost their lives in this crime. Pic- 
tures of the crime, statements of survivors, and statements of even 
enemy soldiers corroborated the occurrence of this atrocity. 

This last photograph, which we will call No. 5 (E), shows the 
remains of 1 of these 68 American prisoners of war who were slain 
in a group while prisoners of war in this Suchon tunnel. As stated 
above, 138 said prisoners lost their lives in the movement and the 
murder. 

Are there any questions? 

Senator Welker. Yes. 

Colonel, there is no question about the validity of the profound 
investigation made by your organization and the Army; is that a 
fact? 

Colonel "Wolfe. As to the existence of these atrocities ? 

Senator Welker. Yes. 

Colonel Wolfe. There is none whatsoever, and I believe the evi- 
dence will stand up in any court of law. 

Senator Welker. I am convinced of that. I heard you testify 
at one time in Washington in Senator Potter's atrocity hearings. 
I remember that so well.- I am sorry that we cannot go on and on 
with the many cases that we have. Those were taken up at other 
hearings. We must hurry on. I want to ask you a couple of questions. 

The fact of the matter is that these atrocities occurred during the 
summer of 1950 ; yet Mr. Powell's letter discounting any information 
about atrocities was dated January 10, 1951. That is a fact, is it not? 

Colonel Wolfe. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Welker. Furthermore, in September of 1951, in this tirade 
of attacking this country of which he poses to be a citizen, he charged 
the American troops with the barbarism and criminal action. Direct- 
ing your attention further to another one of his tirades, in the China 
Monthly Review — which is what I am referring to — in December 1951, 
page 275, he had an article attacking Col. James Hanley, United 
States Army, judge advocate in Korea, who formally charged the 
Chinese volunteers with massacring 2,043 U. N. prisoners of war dur- 
ing the "past j^ear." Do you remember that? 

Colonel Wolfe. I do, sir. 



2228 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. Then again on December 5, 1951, on pages 276 
and 277 of the China Monthly Eeview, he had an article containing 
photographs showing the kind treatment accorded American prisoners 
in North Korea and the cruel treatment accorded to Communists by 
the United States. Do you remember that ? 

Colonel Wolfe. I do, sir. 

Senator Welker. Colonel, you heard the testimony this morning 
in which our committee was accused of using some pretty bad methods. 
Could you in the remotest part of your imagination compare any 
methods that our committee has used with the terror of the methods 
used by the Communists in destroying precious American boys that 
could be your boy or the boy of any American in this land ? 

Colonel Wolfe. I could not only not conceive such thing, but know 
it to be utterly false. This committee is giving to each and every per- 
son his right to be heard, wliich is more than the Communists ever 
gave these boys. 

Senator Welker. Thank you, Colonel. 

I shall interrogate our doctor about the matter of the five precious 
boys whose hands were wired behind their backs and shot. I shall 
interrogate later about the 36 Americans whose hands were wired 
behind their backs, facing a slit trench, and shot in the back. I will 
go into that more fully. 

Colonel, it has been an honor and pleasure to have had you here. 
I know that Senator Jenner, the entire committee, and the staff ap- 
preciate your great work. I hope and pray that complacency of the 
American people will not remain as it is and that Americans once 
again will rise up to the days when Patrick Henry said, "Give me 
liberty or give me death," and Nathan Hale said, "I only regret that 
I have but one life to give for my country." 

I am sure you will agree with me that in this dark hour of our his- 
tory we wonder what has happened to that spirit of patriotism. 

Colonel Wolfe. I certainly do agree with you. 

Senator Welker. Thank you, Colonel. 

Mr. Carpenter. Major Daltry. 

Senator Welker. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you shall 
give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and noth- 
ing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Major Daltry. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF EAYMOKD DALTRY, MAJOR, UNITED STATES ARMY 

Senator Welker. You are Major Raymond Daltry, are you? 

Major Daltry. I am. 

Senator Welker. United States Army? 

Major Daltry. I am, sir. 

Senator Welker. How long have you been in the armed services? 

Major Daltry. Twelve and a half years. 

Senator Welker. I notice upon your left breast the decorations that 
all Americans are proud of. 

I shall now ask ^ou to go ahead, because of the shortness of the time. 
I commend you, sir. 

Where are you stationed ? 

Major Daltry. Sixty-fifth Infantry Regiment, Fort Ord, Calif. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2229 

Senator "Welker. Did you take part in the Korean war, or peace 
action i 

Major Daltry. I did, sir. 

Senator AVelker. When did you ^o to Korea? 

INIajor Daltry. In January of 1950, sir. 

Senator "Welker. With what outfit? 

Major Daltry. I Avas over there with the United States military 
advisory group to the Kepublic of Korea. 

Senator Welker. Now, in your own words, can you tell us your 
experiences there ? 

Major Daltry. I was witli tlie Koreans as a military adviser 

Senator Welker. Tlie South Koreans or the North Koreans? 

Major Daltry. The South Koreans during the 6 months of the 
conflict. I was captured by the Communist Chinese forces on the 
1st day of January 1951. I was captured at approximately the 38th 
parallel. After being captured, we moved back and forth in that 
general area for about 5 days and then started moving north. When 
I was captured I was alone, the only American captured at the time. 
Later I was joined by other Americans, until we had a group of 14. 

We started to move north, and moved most of the month of Jan- 
uary, moving at night, until we arrived at a temporary camp called 
the Bean camp. Upon arriving there we joined a group of Americans 
that they had there. We stayed in that camp approximately 10 days 
and then moved north again to camp No. 5, Pyongtong. The distance 
that we moved was approximately 400 miles. 

Senator Welker. Approximately 400 miles in how many days? 

Major Daltry. Not counting the times that we stopped, it would be 
a movement of about 30 days. Some nights we would move 20 miles, 
other nights we might move 5. 

Senator Welker. Were you fed well during that march ? 

Major Daltry. Three meals at that time I had rice. The other 
meals were either corn or millet. Millet is a cereal. The average 
amount was about 8 ounces of watery soup twice a day. 

Senator Welker. Being a military man used to the profession of 
arms and making long marches, was that food sufficient to sustain you 
men in that march ? I mean physically. 

Major Daltry. Physically, no. Quite a few men never arrived at 
camp 5. They became sick or too weak to move. They were left by 
the side of the road. 

Senator Welker. A^Hiat happened when they were left by the side 
of the road ? 

Major Daltry. I do not know. I have never seen any of the men 
who were left there. 

Senator Welker. Have you heard from any of them? 

INIajor Daltry. I never heard from any of the men who were left 
there. 

Senator Welker. Now proceed, Major. 

Major Daltry. After arriving at camp No. 5, I was placed into 
an officer's camp there. An indoctrination period had started before 
I arrived. 

After arriving there I was there approximately a week and we 
had a class. This class was held outside. The weather at that time 
.was approximately freezing weather, and the clothing we had was 



2230 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION EST GOVERNMENT 

the clothing that Tve had when -we were captured — if we had that 
much clothing left, if it had not worn out. 

This indoctrination was on trying to prove to lis that the South 
Koreans had started the aggression, that the United States was back- 
ing the aggression, and that we were the aggressors in Korea. 

Toward the end of March, the indoctrination period increased until 
it lasted 6 to 8 hours a day, still with the main theme of trying to 
prove that we were the aggressors in Korea and that we were war 
criminals because of the fact that we were members of the armed 
services. 

Senator Welker. Now will you tell, for the purpose of the record, 
sir, what you mean by "indoctrination"? 

Major Daltrt. Indoctrination was given by fanatical English- 
speaking Chinese who were making statements against our Govern- 
ment and making statements that we had started the Korean conflict 
and using different publications, such as the Shanghai News, the China 
MonthlyReview, or the China Weekly Review, and Peoples China. 

The method of indoctrination was that they would hold lectures. 
Most of them were held outside at this time. Then if they were not 
holding a lecture, they would give us these publications with certain 
articles marked in red. They would mark them with a red crayon 
or a red pencil. They would insist that we read these articles, and 
after reading the articles insist that we would express our opinion 
on these articles. 

Senator Wei.ker. What happened to those of you who did not ex- 
press a favorable opinion on the article ? 

Major Daltrt. If you did not express the opinion that they thought 
you should, they figured that you would need more indoctrination. 
Therefore, you would be removed from the compound, taken to a sepa- 
rate room or area, and there would be relays of these interpreters 
or English-speaking Chinese who would repeat over and over the 
expressions or the orientation that they wanted you to have. They 
would keep this up until such time as you agreed with them. 

Senator Welker. What did they call those of you who did not in- 
doctrinate properly? 

Major Daltrt. We were reactionaries, or we had a hostile attitude. 

Senator Welker. "Wliat did they call those of our Armed Forces 
who did cooperate with them? 

Major Daltrt. I do not know whether they called them progressive 
or not. Sometimes we did. 

Senator Welker. Now, you did see copies of the China Monthly 
Eeview and the China Weekly Review ? 

Major Daltrt. I did. 

Senator Welker. "Wliat was it used for, again ? 

Major Daltrt. It was used as a publication where certain articles 
of that magazine were marked. They would be given one to a squad, 
a squad composed of anywhere from 10 to 12 men, and we had to 
read — either each one of us had to read it individually, or, two, it had 
to be read out loud and then a discussion would have to be held on 
that material. 

Senator Welker, IMajor, I meant at the outset to ask you your 
hometown. Where did you come from? 

Major Daltrt. At the present time, I have a home in Florida. 

Senator VrELKER. What town in Florida ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2231 

IVrnjor DAT/rcY. I'rndonton; T nm bnyinir a home tliere. 

iSeiuitor A\'ki.ki:i:. "\\'lu'i'e were you born, Major? 

Major Daltry. I was born in riiiladelphia, l*a. 

Senator Welker. Very well. Now you may proceecl. 

INIajor Daetry. This indoctrination period of 6 to 8 hours a day con- 
tinued from JNIarch 11)51 up until api)roximately April of 1952. We 
continued at camp 5 until October, when the oflicers were moved from 
camp 5 to camp 2. 

It was a very extensive indoctrination and very thorou<i;h. They 
nsed all these publications, insisting that you read them, insistino; that 
you woidd discuss them, and insisting that you would give an opinion. 

JNIr. Carpexter. Did you say an opinion ? 

IMajor Daetry. An o])inion. 

Mr. Carpenter. But it was an opinion they wanted, not what you 
thought ; is that correct ? 

Major Daltry. That is correct; it was an opinion that they wanted. 

Senator Welker. Now tell the committee, please, what happened to 
you men who did not give the opinion that they wanted. 

Major Daltry. Men who did not give the right opinion, as I said, 
Avere taken out and given extensive indoctrination until they would 
repeat the words that they wanted to hear. 

Senator Welker. Supposing the intensive indoctrination did not 
work ? Then what happened ? 

Major Daltry. One of their favorite forms of punishment was 
standing at attention. That does not sound like much 

Senator Welker. How long would you stand at attention ? 

JMajor Daltry. It would vary from 2 to 12 hours, standing on ice 
without the proper clothing, such as wearing a pair of shorts; maybe 
20° bslow zero, something of that nature. That would be part of the 
punishment. 

Senator Welker. Many feet were frozen, many people died as a 
result of that ? 

]\fajor Daltry. Many people's feet were frozen, and many people 
died. 

Another method was that you were taken away and placed in 
solitary. Solitary does not sound like much, either, unless you figure 
it might be a 4 by 6 hole with a wooden top over it, without the proper 
clothing, no heat, improper food. 

Senator Welker. You mean a hole in the ground ? 

Major Daltry. I mean a hole in the ground. 

Senator Welker. Bitterly cold? 

Major Daltry. Bitterly cold. 

Senator Welker. How long would they remain there? 

Major Daltry. Until they gave the proper opinion. 

Senator We:lker. And that could last until what? 

Major Daltry. It could last until death, it could last until up in 
the months. 

Senator Welker. Can you describe for us any of the persons, our 
brave men, who came out of the hole after being forced to give the 
proper phrases and statements desired by the Communists { Were 
they changed men? 

Major Daltry. Some of them were. 



2232 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

SeiiPitor Welker. As a matter of fact, IMajor — I have not inter- 
viewed you before this moment. As a matter of fact, they were insane 
men ; is that a fact ? 

Major Daltry. It was. Quite a few of them. 

Senator Welker. They had a wild, staring glare in their eyes, as 
would any person suffering like they did ? 

Major Daltry. They did. And they had to be with us for quite 
a while before they recovered enough to recover their sanity. 

Some had a phobia that they wished to talk because they had been 
so long silent; that any time they had the opportunity they would 
just talk, just to hear a voice or to hear somebody's voice, because 
they had so long been in solitary. 

Senator Welker. Now proceed, IMajor. 

Major Daltry. This indoctrination continued on after we reached 
camp 2 until April, I think, of 1952, In April of 1952 the indoc- 
trination seemed to slow down. In other words, we did not hold 
formal classes in which it was required that everyone would attend. 

Senator Welker. Why did it slow down? 

Major Daltry. In my personal opinion, it was because of the fact 
that the publications were starting to scream that the Americans 
were using forced screening and forced indoctrination of the Korean 
and Chinese prisoners. So therefore they stopped it so they could 
say, "See, we do not do that to our prisoners." 

Once in a while, approximately once a week, they would have a 
group of maybe 10 or 12 persons, take them from the compound 
over to one of the Chinese-occupied houses, and have a publication — • 
maybe the Shanghai News or the China Monthly Review or the 
Peoples China, with articles on germ warfare. These articles then 
they would make us read. One of the group would have to read 
them out loud, and then they would ask, "Are there any questions 
or any discussion on this article?" Most of the time we would not 
say anything, and they would say, "That is all," and return us to 
tlie compound, taking another group, repeating the same procedure. 

Also, in the library of the camp, which they set up, which was 
supposed to be the reading matter for the camp, they had all the 
magazines, China Monthly Review, the Peoples China, Shanghai 
News, Daily Worker, the Peoples World, and other publications of 
that nature, plus books, novels which followed or brought out the 
"decadent capitalistic system." Those were the only books and the 
only reading matter allowed in the camp. That was one way that 
they continued their indoctrination without holding a formal class. 

Senator Welker. I take it you did not have any articles by General 
Wedemeyer or General Van Fleet or Gen. Mark Clark or any persons 
like that ? 

Major Daltry. We had no articles from any of those persons. 

Senator Welker. As a matter of fact, you received only the Com- 
munist propaganda ? 

Major Daltry. That is correct. 

Senator Welker. And the China Weekly Review and the China 
Monthly Review, in your opinion, would you say it was a Communist 
publication? 

Major Daltry. In my opinion, I would say it is. 

Senator Welker. There is not any question about that I 

Major Daltry. There is no question in my mind, sir. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2233 

Senator "Welker. You saw it, you had to read it. Being tlie f^reat 
soldier you are and having reached a majority in the profession of 
arms, you certainly Avould know something that ivas Communist or 
something that was for America, would you not ? 

JMajor Daltry. I would. 

INIr. Carpenter. Did you see one article in the China INIonthly or 
"Weekly Review that was favorable to the United States? Did you 
see one ? 

IMajor Daltry. No, I did not. I have not seen any favorable to tlio 
United States in that magazine. 

]\[r. Carpenter. And did you look through it quite carefully? 

JMajor Daltry. I did look through it quite carefully. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you know who the editor was of the China 
"Weekly, and, later, the Monthly Review ? 

JMajor Daltry. A man by the name of Powell. 

]Mr. Carpenter. What was his full name? 

Major Daltry. I believe it was John Powell. 

Senator Welker. Major, may I ask you this: How much did you 
weigh when you were captured by the Communists? 

JMajor Daltry. About 150 pounds. 

Senator "Welker. After going through your indoctrination, when 
you were released can you tell us how much you weighed ? 

JMajor Daltry. At August or September 1951, I weighed between 
ninety and a hundred pounds; and upon my release I weighed 117 
pounds. 

Senator "Welker. As a matter of fact, prior to your release, the 
Communists tried to build you up and fed you up, did they not ? 

Major Daltry. I would say that was what they were trying to do, 
yes. 

Senator "\Velker. Certainly. You got more food then. And you 
know, as a matter of fact, they did it to try to impress complacent 
Americans who thought they were so good to you people who were 
serving there ; is that correct ? 

JMajor Daltry. That is a correct statement. 

Senator "Welker. Very well. Now will you proceed. Major? 

Major Daltry. After the formal indoctrination or the formal 
classes of indoctrination, the normal day, they allowed us more or 
less to fulfill our own wishes or do what we pleased within the camp, 
as long as there was no organization. In other words, we covdd have a 
Softball game provided we made our own softball equipment. 

Senator "Welker. And provided they could photograph it and 
use it for propagandizing the freedom-loving peoples of the world; 
is that a correct statement? 

Major Daltry. That is correct. 

Senator AVelker. JMajor, I would like to ask you this question: 
Based upon your experience, your hardships, your dedication to ♦your 
country in your great profession, what would you think about the 
recognition of Red China in the United Nations? 

Be frank; come on. 

JMajor Daltry. This is my own personal statement and my own 
personal opinion. I would hate to see Red China made a member of 
the United Nations because of the fact that if you did, you would 
have 1 man speaking for GOO million people and the}' would have no 
voice in the decisions that would be made ail'ecting their country. 



2234 INTERLOCKIKG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. And it could also result in nest and haven of 
spies and saboteurs and espionage agents witliin our country; is that 
correct ? 

Major Daltry. That is correct. 

Senator Welker. Now will you proceed with anything else you 
desire to tell us, Major ? 

Major Daltry. We received new^s. They would broadcast over 
their loudspeaker news which they wished us to hear concerning the 
negotiations, which was to the effect that if the negotiations were 
broken off they would let us know, making sure to tell us that it was 
the American side which had broken off the negotiations. They would 
make sure that we were able to read or able to hear the replies to all 
the discussions at Panmunjom made by Nam II, and never gave 
us the opportunity to see the original discussion or the original re- 
marks, but only the replies they would make. 

Senator Welker. Major, you fought in World War II ? 

Major Daltry. I did, sir. 

Senator Welker. In what theater? 

Major Daltry. Pacific tlieater. 

Senator Welker. In your ex]5erience as an officer of the United 
States Army, have you ever had such a difficult war to fight as in 
Korea, keeping in mind the bitter cold, the lack of equipment, and 
things of that nature ? 

Major Daltry. That is a hard question to answer. 

Senator Welker. I realize that all wars are hell. I think someone 
made that statement many years ago. 

Major Daltry. The difficulty is of the two extremes. One was the 
extreme heat, because I was around the Equator most of the time, 
and in Korea it was extreme cold. It was below zero most of the time. 

Senator Welker. And high and difficult mountains ? 

Major Daltry. That is right. 

Well, in the Pacific it was diftlcult mountains down there, too. The 
islands are full of mountains. 

Senator Welker. The colonel here is nodding his head because he 
was one of the great officers in that theater, as you well may know. 

Major Daltry. I will say one was as difficult as the other. The 
Korean war was as difficult as the war I was in in the South Pacific. 

Senator Welker. Major, you were captured before the break- 
through, were you not ? 

Major Daltry. No. I was captured January 1, 1951. 

Senator Welker. When did the Eed Chinese come across the 
bridges? 

Major Daltry. In November of 1950. 

Senator Welker. Did you have any experience there? Did you 
know the suffering that took place, the bitterly cold battles ? 

Major Daltry. No. I was not up in that area at the time they 
came through. 

Senator Welker. Of course, it was so cold that the blood given by 
loyal Americans to save our boys had been frozen and could not be 
used. Furthermore, when brave Americans went out and tried to 
pick up a wounded comrade, they were shot at with every kind of 
armament by the Red Chinese and others. 

Major Daltry. I had that information; yes, sir. 



INTERL0CK1^'G SUBVERSIOX IX GOVERNMENT 2235 

Senator "Welker. And you furtlior realize that our command was 
accused of bombing the bridges of the Yalu to keep these people from 
crossino- in hordes'^ 

JNfajor Daltky. I had heard that. 

Senator A^'ELKEI^. They called it the people's army, but I ask you 
if it is not a fact that you knew they carried arms manufactured by 
the Soyiets. 

Major Daltry. Yef?. 

Senator Welker. And further across the Yalu, you were informed 
and you knew that the lights were on for the buildup of thousands of 
MIG airplanes manufactured in Russia — they were the sitting ducks, 
and you people were not permitted to retaliate although from across 
the Yalu, in INIanchuria, antiaircraft fire was shooting down our own 
fliers? You heard that ? 

Major Daltry. I heard that. 

Senator Welker. It is a pretty tragic day for men who haye dedi- 
cated their liyes to your profession when you hear that; is it not? 
We hope and pray that it will neyer happen again. 

1 am sorry for the interruption. You may proceed, sir. 

Major Daltry. I belieye that covers the period of time that I was in 
capitivity, as far as an overall statement goes. If you have any 
definite questions to ask, I will try to answer them. 

Mr. Carpenter. Major, were the prisoner-of-war camps marked ac- 
cording to the Geneva Convention so that they would be safe from 
bombing attack ? 

Major Daltry. I never saw the prisoner-of-war camps marked up 
to 1953. In other words, to my knowledge, there was no marking of 
those camps until 1953. 

Mr. Carpenter. Of your own knowledge, did the Communist forces 
have ammunition dumps and personnel of their forces in the prison 
compound or adjacent thereto? 

Major Daltry. To my knowledge, which I have heard. I person- 
ally never saw a dump, but I do know there seemed to be quite a bit 
of activity from vehicles and things of that nature around the camp. 

Mr. Carpenter. ]\Iajor, you are familiar with the expression, "Giv- 
ing aid and comfort to the enemy" ; are you ? 

Major Daltry. I am. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you tell this committee, after reading the ma- 
terial of the China Weekly Review and later the Monthly Review, do 
you belieye that a man who would publish material like that and force 
it onto the American soldiers to read and give the indoctrination that 
you have testified to here, would you believe that a man in that ca- 
pacity would be giving aid and comfort to the enemy ? 

Major Daltry. In my opinion, any man who published material 
of that nature, whether it was giyen to American soldiers or whether 
it was given to Americans, or whether it was given to any race that 
believes in the things we believe in, would be giying aid and comfort 
to the enemy, because of the fact that he is publishing and encouraging 
the communistic line which they believe in. 

Senator Welker. What do you think about the fact that a man 
who should publish such material now enjoys a haven in the best 
country in all the world ? 

Major Daltry. I think he should figure himself very lucky that he 
is able to be here. 



223G mTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. I can quite well assure you, sir, that if he came 
to my home State of Idaho he would consider himself very lucky, 
indeed. 

That is all, Major. Thank you. 

Mr. Carpenter. Major Anderson, please. 

Senator Welker. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will 
give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Major Anderson. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF CLARENCE L. ANDERSON, MAJOR, MEDICAL CORPS, 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

Senator Welker. Will you give the committee your name, please? 

Major Anderson. Clarence L. Anderson. 

Senator Welker. And your profession ? 

Major Anderson. Physician, major, Medical Corps, United States 
Army. 

Senator Welker. I notice upon your left breast tributes given to 
you by a grateful country. The committee commends you, sir. 

I will ask you this question : Were you ever a prisoner of war in 
Korea ? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. When were you taken prisoner of war ? 

Major Anderson. On the 3d of November 1950. 

Senator Welker. Will you describe for the record, please, how you 
were captured ? 

. Major Anderson. I was serving as a battalion surgeon for one of 
the battalions of the 8th Cavalry Kegiment, and we Avere surrounded 
and overcome by tremendous numbers of Chinese whom I had not 
previously seen before. 

Senator Welker. Where were you taken after your capture? 

Major Anderson. We were taken deep into North Korea to Pyong- 
tong, which later became camp No. 5, first ; then a few days later, about 
6 or 8 miles south of Pyongtong to a small valley community. 

Senator Welker. Were you permitted to practice your profession 
in attempting to save the lives of your comrades in arms? 

Major Anderson. For the first month and a few days after capture; 
no. Then I was allowed to practice in the sick call, and later in their 
so-called hospital compound for the next about 7 months of captivity. 

On the 10th of May 1951", I was taken back to the prison compound. 

Senator Welker. What sort of instruments and medical facilities 
were given to you to help you in your profession of medicine ? 

Major Anderson. As far as medications are concerned, compared 
to the number of sick whom it was necessary to treat, virtually no 
medication. There were occasional shipments of small quantities of 
sulfanilamide and prontosil, both antiquated sulfa drugs which are 
no longer used for those purposes in this country. 

Senator Welker. As I did in the case of the major who preceded 
you, I meant to ask where is your home State ? 

Major Anderson. Iowa. 

Senator Welker. "What city, please ? 

Major Anderson. Creston. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2237 

Senator Wklker. Major, do you subscribp to the "-(Micral statements 
of Major Daltry regarding the treatment of prisoners of war'^ 

JMajor Andeuson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker, Are you as familiar, perhaps, as Major Daltry, 
and will you agree with him and so testify to your God that he is cor- 
rect? ^ 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Do you believe that the treatment of American 
prisoners, as described by Major Daltry, was unusual or isolated? 

Major Anderson. No, sir. So far as we could determine, the group 
of tive medical officers who returned from Korean prison camps, so 
as far as we could determine, this was a general overall plan of in- 
doctrination. 

Senator Welker. In other words, a matter of official policy of the 
Communists? 

Major Anderson. It seems so; yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Have you reached any conclusion as to tlie tech- 
nique used in the indoctrination program? 

Major Axdkrson. Yes; I have. 

Senator Welker. Would you be so kind as to tell the committee 
that? 

Major Anderson. I believe that Communist indoctrination, as it 
was applied to the prisoners of war in Korea, is a general plan of 
Communist indoctrination, applying to our group, to the fringe Com- 
munist subject nations, and elsewhere. 

This has been stated by some of the English-language Korean 
periodicals which I came in contact with. It is based essentially on 
the Pavlov condition reflex theory. If I may, I will give you a very 
brief background on that theory. 

In the original experiments, experimental animals were subjected 
to certain basic stimuli. The one picked out was the taking in of 
food ; the seeing, the smelling, and the taking in of food. The parotid 
gland, one of the salivary glands, was intubated so that the quantity 
of flow from this gland could be measured. 

Under experimental conditions, then, the animal was allowed to 
see, smell, and taste the food and the quantity of salivary flow from 
this parotid gland was measured ; then a period of conditioning, dur- 
ing which time, let us say, a bell would be rung at the same time that 
the animal was allowed to see, smell, and take in food. 

After a period of time of the conditioning interval, the animal 
would respond to the bell alone in the same way that he had responded 
to the food previously. 

Now, to make it more applicable to human experimentation, as it 
was used in our prisoner group, deconditioning can also be carried 
out in which, if the condition stimulus which produces salivation, the 
bell, for instance, is rung and at the same time a pnmful stimulus — any 
sort of an electrical stimulus — is used, then the animal will more or 
less forget his previous conditioning; so that this condition reflex is no 
longer in existence, he has been deconditioned. 

Now, to apply this principle to the indoctrination of the prisoners 
of war in Korea, it is my feeling that every day of captivity from day 
one of the prisoners' existence as prisoners to the time of their release 

32918°— 55— pt. 27 6 



2238 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

was a part of a planned indoctrination program wliicli was based on 
this Pavlov conditioning system. 

Senator Welker. Maj I interrupt, Major? 

Major Anderson". Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Did not, in some of your temporary practice of 
medicine in the city of San Francisco, you discuss this matter before 
the American Medical Association ? 

JMajor Anderson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. And has it successf idly, or has it been remotely 
contradicted ? 

Major Anderson. No, sir; I do not think it has been contradicted 
at all. 

Senator Welker. Tell me this: Of the many sick patients that you 
treated, what elt'ect did the propaganda statements, literature con- 
tained in the China Weekly Eeview, the China Monthly Review, the 
Daily Worker, the Peo])les World, and all the other publications have 
upon those weakened soldiers ? 

Major Anderson. Your question is what effect ? 

Senator Welker. Yes. 

Major Anderson. I probably am stating a minority opinion. I am 
stating my own opinion here. I think that this propaganda material 
and this general indoctrination program had a tremendous effect on 
all the prisoners. I think that it was effective not in making Com- 
munists or Progressives out of them but in neutralizing them as an 
effective counterpropaganda group. 

Senator Welker. Now, may I refer you specifically to November 
of 1951, to an issue of the China Monthly Review, and call your atten- 
tion to the article regarding a prisoner-of-war hospital, on page 253. 
Will you read this article aloud and make whatever comment you 
desire concerning it, sir? 

Major Anderson. This article, appearing in the November 1951 
issue of the China Monthly Review, on page 253, signed by an Ameri- 
can prisoner of war in POW camp No. 5 in Korea, is entitled "What 
Makes Up a POW Hospital?" I will read the article; it is brief: 

Here in the hospital one finds a very pleasant and cheerful atmosphere which 
to a great extent is due to the personnel and staff of the establishment. Basically 
our conditions are due to several important factors and these we shall deal witli 
here individually. 

First let us take up the care given by the doctors. Not one dissenting voice will 
be heard in regard to this matter. All the doctors have more than once proven 
how competent and efficient they are. 

May I intersperse with appropriate comments ? 

Senator Welker. Certainly, at any time. 

Major Anderson. In my experience I have seen a fair number of the 
so-called Chinese doctors who practiced on our prisoners in Korea. 
For the most part, these men did not have any formal medical training. 
Some of them had formal medical training which would be similar 
to that which is given a nurse's aide in this country. 

Senator Welker. Do you think a nurse's aide would do a little sur- 
gery and insert a chicken liver in the body of a human being ? 

Major Anderson. I certainly hope not. 

Senator Welker. You are familiar with that, are you not? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Will you tell us about that ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2239 

Major Andf.rson. Tliis particular man had that troatmont. A sub- 
cutanoous transphint of a small bit of chicken liver about the size of a 
quarter, which had been previously incubated in a weak penicillin 
solution, was made; a slit being made between certain ribs and the 
chicken liver placed under the skin and the skin sewed back toL'Other. 

I was able to talk with a oood number of these people, and remark- 
ably enough none of them died, which was a source of great interest 
to me. It seems that those people who had been given the chicken- 
liver-tissue transplant were, prior to and at the same time they were 
given this operation, put on a relatively high-calory, high-protein, 
high-vitamin, and a relatively attractive diet. These men all survived, 
as any other prisoner would have survived had he been given this 
particular diet. 

In all cases, the chicken liver either liquefied and erupted as pus or 
developed as a hard, calcified nodule. In no case was the chicken-liver 
transplant effective in medical treatment. 

This is a pretty thoroughly disproven form of medical treatment. 

Senator Welker. Now you may proceed, Major. 

Major Anderson. All right, sir. 

I mentioned about the qualifications of the Chinese doctors. 

Alons: with these two qualities so important in a doctor's makeup must be 
added devotion to duty. These men are devoted to the task of saving human 
life. I have seen them toil from sunup until late at night fighting for a man's 
life. 

Senator Welker. Have you seen them doing that ? 

Major Anderson. No ; I do not think I can say that. 

Senator Welker. That was the propaganda contained in the China 
Monthly Review ? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

These men were politically oriented. They spent a vast majority 
of their evening hours attending little political-study sessions. There- 
fore, I think that that statement is incorrect. 

One of the finest tributes one can offer is to say that these men would make 
Ideal "country doctors." I'm sure everyone will understand this term of 
praise. 

Second in importance is the nursing care received here. From the date of 
my entrance the caliber of the nursing has been of the highest. Since the arrival 
of the Chinese Red Cross it has become even better. 

Senator Welker. What do you have to say about that? 

Major Anderson. As nurses at this hospital during the time I was 
there, we had some local Korean farm girls, some of whom tried to do 
the best they could, many of whom were very sadistic in handling the 
wounds of the men, for instance. 

Senator Welker. Now just describe for the committee what you 
mean by the word "sadistic." 

Major Anderson. As an example, I remember one — well, I remem- 
ber several cases, one man who had a severe wound of his arm and 
whose bandage had been draining a good deal and was stuck to the 
wounded area: In taking this bandage oti' for purposes of redressing 
the arm, this Korean nurse would very carefully pick off little bits 
at a time and laugh while the man screamed in pain. This is a very 
painful way to take off such a dressing. It should be soaked. Again-, 
water was available for that pui-pose but was never used. 



2240 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. Incidentally, I would like to ask you this ques- 
tion : "Were you permitted to use the old country variety of practice 
of medicine, like hotpacks or something of that nature ? 

Major ANDERSOisr. No, sir; for the most part we were not. The hot 
water that was available to us for the most part had to be taken from 
the total quantity of hot water which was available to the men for 
drinking ; that is, boiled water. "We felt very strongly that all of the 
drinking water was contaminated and that we must first provide them 
with sufficient boiled water for drinking. No additional supply was 
allowed us for either cleansing the wounds, using hotpacks, or steri- 
lizing, boiling the clothes which had been contaminated. 

Senator "Welker. Now, continue in that discourse on those learned 
country doctors. 

Major Andersox. All right, sir. This is on the nurses: 

It is extremely difficult to look after people you cannot speak to, but these 
girls have tried diligently to minister to the sick. Now it is the rainy season 
and one can truly appreciate the problems encountered by the nurses as they 
rush through the rain and the mud to treat the sick. 

Thirdly, I'd like to speak of living conditions. Originally the rooms here were 
dark, dreary, and crowded. Today they are cleaned regularly, the crowded 
condition has been relieved —  

I might add by the simj^le expedient of most of the sick men 
dying off — 

and windows have been installed to permit more light and provide better venti- 
lation. All in all, our living conditions have been improved by better than 
100 percent. 

Finally, but certainly not of the least importance, is the matter of food. Our 
food definitely has improved tremendously. Men who are unable to take regular 
food are given special rations and the sickest are now segregated and receive 
special supplemental feedings. 

The "special rations'' referred to is a mixture of white rice and 
water into a sort of "gooish" souj) and with no additional seasoning or 
flavoring of any sort. 

Senator "Welker. JVIajor, may I interrupt you at this point? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

Senator "Welker. I want to make a statement before I leave, and 
I am going to continue to go on with the remaining witnesses here. 
It will be a statement by Senator Herman "Welker, acting chairman, 
Senate Internal Securit}' Subcommittee. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HERMAN WELKER, ACTING CHAIRMAN, 
SENATE INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE, MADE IN SAN 
FRANCISCO, CALIF., DECEMBER 13, 1954 

Senator "Welker. On September 27, 1954, the Senate Internal 
Security Subcommittee heard the testimony of Mr. John "W. Powell. 
In addition, it heard the testimony of Mrs. Dolores Gill, the widow 
of an American officer who died in a Chinese Communist prison camp, 
plus a number of prisoners of war who had suffered incredible torture 
in these camps. 

i Today we have an additional number of prisoners of war as wit- 
nesses. Supplementing this, the staff of the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee has analyzed with care the China Weekly — later 
Monthly — Review, of which John "W. Powell was the responsible 
editor. From the evidence thus obtained we have established that — • 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNAIENT 2241 

(1) Joliii W. PowpU was the rosponsible editor of the China 
Monthly Keview, Avhich was used for indoctrination pnrposes and 
compulsory reading by the Chinese Communist armies among Ameri- 
can prisoners of war. Failure to comply with Communist indoctri- 
nation orders resulted in severe punishment, torture, and deprivation 
of food and medical supplies for American prisoners of war, result- 
ing, in some cases, in death. 

(2) Plis magazine printed false and glowing descriptions of con- 
ditions within Chinese ('ommunist prison cam])s in Korea, which 
were circulated both to GI's in Korea and to their relatives in the 
United States. These articles could be intended only to encourage 
defection and desertions among American troops and the encourage- 
ment of such action by their loved ones in the United States. 

(3) His magazine consistently supported the policies and activities 
of the Chinese Communist government and opposed those of the 
American Goverment during the entire period of the Korean war. 
Articles to this effect were circulated to GI's in Korea and to their 
relatives in the United States, 

(4) His magazine carried accounts alleging American atrocities 
and bombing of Korean civilians and American prisoners of war. 

(5) His magazine attacked so-called American intei-vention in 
Korea, demanded the withdrawal of American troops, and praised 
the Chinese Communist "volunteers." 

(6) His magazine carried clumsily concocted tales to the effect that 
the United States was engaged in germ warfare in Korea. 

(7) His magazine attacked American civil and military leaders 
during the Korean war, including President Truman and General 
MacArthur, while praising the Chinese Communist leaders. 

(8) His magazine carried articles featuring American losses and 
defeats in the military field. 

(9) The China Monthly Review, edited by John W. Powell, was 
regularly used as a medium for the circulation of official statements of 
the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist govern- 
ment. 

(10) The contents of Powell's magazine and the conditions under 
which it was published in Communist China indicate strongly that 
the publication was controlled and supported by the Chinese Com- 
munist government. 

(11) His magazine cooperated with Chinese Communist police 
authorities against American personnel in trumped-up charges ; wit- 
ness the cases of William Olive and Angus Ward, both United States 
State Department employees. 

(12) John W. Powell established communication with relatives of 
American prisoners of war and circulated his magazine within the 
United States in furtherance of the above objectives. 

(13) His magazine promoted Communist front organizations oper- 
ating both on an international scale and within the United States as 
part of the vast international Communist apparatus. 

(14) His publication supported Comm.unist leaders on trial in the 
United States under the Smith Act and the defendants in the Rosen- 
berg atomic es])ionage case. 

(15) His magazine supported the Communist contention against 
the American policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war in 
Korea. 



2242 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN" GOVERNMENT 

(IG) Ilis magazine featured statements against the American Gov- 
ernment carrying the names of American prisoners of war as signa- 
tors. Testimony disclosed that these names were, in many cases, 
obtained under duress or that they were false. 

(17) The China Review published from time to time, and caused 
to be reprinted within the United States in a pro-Communist publi- 
cation, lists of American prisoners of war obtained from Communist 
sources and independently of the American Government. In some 
cases, the information circulated was definitely false. The publica- 
tion of these lists through nongovernmental channels tended to cast 
doubt upon the reliability of American Government channels. It 
could be interpreted as a move to encourage relatives of American 
POW's to consult publications filled with Communist propaganda 
for news in regard to their loved ones — a dastardly plot indeed. 

(18) Powell circulated his magazine in the United States despite 
rulings by United States post-office authorities as to its nonmaila- 
bility. 

(19) Pie refused to say under oath whether his sworn statements 
as to his Communist affiliations in the passport application and in 
his application for Government employment were true or false. 

(20) lie is presently lecturing in the United States in support of 
the Communist government in China although not registered as a 
foreign agent. 

The case of John W. Powell was called to the attention of the De- 
partment of Justice on October 1, 1954, and the Department still has 
the case under consideration. 

That an American should be allowed to engage in such activities 
as those of John W. Powell, so detrimental to the welfare of his coun- 
trymen and his country itself, without any punishment, is an insult 
to the prisoners of war who faced the tortures of the Chinese Com- 
r.iunist prison camps in Korea. 

And I may sav it is an insult to freedom-loving Americans all over 
our land and to freedom-loving people all over the world. 

It is, in a sense, an encouragement to other conspirators to act like- 
wise without fear of punishment. If this is an expression of our de- 
sire for coexistence, then God help America. I believe I am express- 
ing the sentiments of every member of the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee, of every POW who suffered in Korea, and of the 
great mass of the people of the United States when I say that con- 
duct such as has been established in the case of John "VV. Powell 
should be subject to most severe penalties. 

Unless the Dspartment of Justice can deal adequately with this 
man under existing legislation, then the Congress should take the 
necessary legislative steps to assure that such conduct as his will be 
subject in future to the heavy sanctions it merits. 

Furthermore, I might say to you, for the record, that if such con- 
duct is condoned in this country of ours, people like John W. Powell 
and others, who are lecturing throughout the United States and tak- 
ing the fifth amendment, if you please, when asked what organiza- 
tion they are lecturing for — then it is a dark, a sad day for our Re- 
public and freedom-loving people everywhere. 

I am sorry for the interruption. Major. "Will you continue, sir? 

Major Anderson. Just the concluding statements in this printed 
statement : 



INTERLOCKIXG SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2243 

These four factors are basically what makes np life in a hospital. Of course, 
medical supply is of jireat importance, and I can assure you tliat medical facili- 
ties used for us here are excellent, renicilliu and streptomycin are not mere 
words, they are articles which are used. 

All of this serves to make up a very efficient hospital with an equally capable 
staff of doctors and nurses. Here a man is given every chance in the world to 
live so that when the all-important peace comes he will be safely sent on his 
way home. 

Xow, there were many, many statoments which came out as a re- 
sult of hospital treatment by the Chinese. These statements were, 
for the most part, solicited statements by the Cliinese. 

Generally speakin*;, it was not necessary for them to point a p:un at 
the man and say "we demand that you write a statement tliat is 
flattering- to us," because this was a man who had seen death for a long, 
long- time, and he realized that he was completely at the mercy of these 
people who were asking him for a flattering statement. He realized 
that they could very quickly cut him otT from food and medications 
and shelter, and he had seen that clone to other prisoners. 

Therefore, many men wrote statements which I consider were under 
marked duress. 

Senator "Welker. Now, ]\fa]or, in conclusion, with respect to that 
aspect of your testimony, it is your opinion that that article written in 
the China Monthly Eeview was nothing but pure and simple Com- 
munist propaganda ? 

JSIajor Anderson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker, And not based upon truth and fact? 

Major Anderson. Eight. 

Senator Welker. Major, did any of the camps in which you were 
imprisoned contain markings to show aviators that they were prisoner 
of war camps ? 

INlajor Anderson. I saw no markings, no such markings, until I 
believe sometime in the fall of 1952. After that time my camp was 
marked. 

Senator Welker. Can you tell us why it was marked then, while 
they were doing Little Switch and Big Switch ? 

Major Anderson. Actually, this was preparatory to the big discus- 
sion of the POW question, and they were repairing their bridges at 
that time. They were trying to make everything look very good. 

There was also at that time considerable discussion at the Panmun- 
Jom conference concerning the exchange of Red Cross personnel to go 
up and investigate these camps. 

Senator Welker. I have already interrogated you with respect to 
your medical ideas. I will ask you this further question: Did you 
ever have any reason to think that the poor quality of your medical 
equipment and supplies caused an epidemic? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

May I give you a specific example? 

Senator Welker. I want that ; yes, sir. 

Major Anderson. Sometime during the summer of 1951 — I can't 
give you the exact date — the Chinese came up to the company, of which 
I was a member, in Camp 5 and said they were going to give immuni- 
zations. They brought with them one syringe, two needles, and they 
had a bit of alcohol ; and in switching from one patient to the next they 
used the same two needles for our group of approximately 120 men, and 
just rubbed the needle off with an alcohol sx^onge. 



2244 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

There were five doctors in this particular camp at this time. All 
of us pointed out to these men that there were cases in our company of 
hepatitis, that is, infectious yellow jaundice. 

We pointed out that by means of unclean needles this condition 
could be spread and that it could become quite dangerous, that al- 
though it is usually a relatively benign disease ; well, out of a thousand 
people who get it, 3 or 4 die. 

The Chinese refused to listen to us on this, insisted on giving the 
immunizations in that particular manner, and within 6 weeks I think 
DO percent of our group had hepatitis. 

Senator Welker. Now, Major, can you give me some observations 
with respect to the sanitation of these so-called wonderful hospitals, 
as printed in the China Monthly Eeview? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

In general, water, and particularly hot or boiled water, was at a 
marked premium in these hospital compounds. The men who were 
captured, generally speaking, were captured just before the winter had 
set in and Avere not in clothing at the time of capture which sufficiently 
would carry them through the North Korean winter. 

Of course, during the time of the final combat, their capture and 
their subsequent marches in captivity, some of this clothing had 
deteriorated. 

During this crucial time — I am speaking specifically now of the 
early months of 1951, it is the most critical time in our POW lives; 
during this crucial time there was a tremendously high death rate. 
We repeatedly asked that we be allowed to take clothing from tlie men 
who had died and redistribute it to the living, that it could no longer 
do the dead men any good. This was denied us. The clothing was 
collected and put aside. We were allowed no contact with the clothing 
whatever. 

The men who had dysentery and whose clothes had become soiled 
were not allowed to boil these clothes or were not given sufficient water 
to wash these clothes. Lice were our closest associates, and all of us 
had many, many body lice. 

A very simple way to get rid of body lice is to boil the clothes that 
the individual has. The louse lives on the clothes and lays eggs on the 
clothes. We asked for this ; it was denied us. 

Senator Welker. I am going to try to cut things short here because 
I have to leave and the committee has to finish with some other 
witnesses. 

Did you ever see any evidence of germ warfare practiced on Korea, 
North Korea, by the United States Government? 

Major Anderson. No, sir. 

Senator Welker. That was another bit of vicious, false, lying 
propaganda. 

Major Anderson. Yes. 

Senator Welker. I want to ask you this : Do you recall when some 
36 precious American boys lined up facing a trench and were shot 
with "burp" guns? Some of them dead in this ditch? Do you recall 
that?^ 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Did you interview one survivor of that infamous 
act? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2245 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. I liajiponed to be passinj^ throuf]^li 
Japan on my way to Korea at tlie time and was stationed for a few 
days in one of the station hospitals in Japan. 

The one, or one of the survivors of this particular massacre came 
under my care for a brief period of time at that time. 

Senator Welker. lie had been shot 2 or 3 times in the back ? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. Pie had been shot. 

He was a man who had crawled over and rubbed his head and face 
in the blood of one of his comrades. 

Senator AVelker. I Avant to go into that. 

They did not kill them all when they shot them in the back, so that 
some of them were still alive? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. The American that you interviewed, the soldier, 
did he not reach over and take blood from his dead coinrades, smear it 
all over his face and his body, notwithstanding the fact that the brutal 
Communists came up there, battered him in the head with the butt end 
of a rifle? 

Major Anderson. Yes ; that is the story he told me. 

Senator "VVelker. He took it without moving, and he came out and 
told you and others about that terrible atrocity ? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir; that is true. 

Senator "Welker. "Were you acquainted with a great man, a gi-eat 
soldier, who gave his life to his country, by the name of 2d Lt. 
Charles L.Gill? 

Major Anderson. Yes; I was. 

Senator Welker. I refer to page 1823 in the record of our hearings 
in Washington, D. C, and ask you to read aloud the letter written 
by John W. Powell on January 10, 1951. 

Major Anderson (reading) : 

Dear Mrs. Gill : Perhaps you have already received the original copy of your 
husband's letter to you, but as a fellow Missourian I wanted to make sure that 
you saw it and in good time. We know from the clippings and magazines 
we receive from home that there has been little, if any, news on the American 
POW's except for fabricated atrocity stories, and we felt the enclosed clippings 
from the local papers here might give you some reassurance 

From our own personal observation of the action of the Chinese People's 
Government here in Shanghai, we know it Is the ijolicy to treat all prisoners — 
captured Kuomintang soldiers as well as criminals — with the greatest leniency 
and fairness in order to win over their support, and we are sure this is the 
same policy being carried out by the Chinese volunteers in Korea. This accounts 
for the numerous statements of gratitude and expressions of good will by the 
American POW's which appear in our local newspapers almost daily. 

In addition, there have been several demonstration groups of American and 
British POW's demanding the end of the "dirty war'' for after they have seen 
the hatred of the Korean people against the Syngman Rhee government and 
the help being given by the Americans for that hated clique, they cannot help 
but feel this has all been one tragic mistalce. We imagine many people in 
America must feel the same way. also. 

We should have sent the enclosed clippings of a letter to Mrs. Foss before, 
but we did not think of it at the time. Perhaps you would be kind enough to 
send it on to her. If you would like us to .send any further clippings about the 
POW's or the nev.s on Korea that appears in our local press, please feel free to 
write us. 

Very sincerely yours, 

John W. Powell. 

Senator Welker. What is the date of that letter, ]\Ia jor ? 
Major Anderson. January 10, 1951. 



2246 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. Now I will ask you : "VYliere was Lieutenant Gill 
on January 10, 1951? 

Major Anderson. Lieutenant Gill was in a small valley camp named 
Sombokol, about C or 8 miles south of Pyontong. 

Senator Welker. What was his physical condition at that time? 

Major Anderson. This was a little over 2 months after Lieutenant 
Gill had been captured. He was a sick man. I can describe his con- 
dition more closely to you, if you would like. 

Senator Welker. I want you to describe it as you can do it, as a 
professional man. 

Major Anderson. All right, sir. 

The clothing which he had worn during his period of captivity 
consisted of a coverall, fatigue coverall, and boots. That was the 
clothing in which he was captured and the clothing that he wore 
throughout that winter. 

He was allowed to eat either cracked corn or millet, about a handful 
per day of the dry grain. It was mixed in a soupy concoction. 

Senator Welker. He was starving to death: was he not? 

Major Anderson. Yes, starving to death ; yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. This character named Powell had the temerity 
to write that letter? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

This man, on January 10, 1951, was starving and was sick. 

Senator Welker. And tell me about his sickness, sir. 

Major Anderson. He had the same condition which eventually 
caused his death, a diarrhea or dysentery, which was probably based 
on a vitamin-deficiency disease. 

Senator Welker. You were not able to get any medicine to help 
Lieutenant Gill? 

IMajor Anderson. No, sir. The medicine which he needed was food 
and clothing. 

Senator Welker. But you did not have any trouble getting the 
China Monthly Review? 

Major Anderson. No, sir. 

Senator Welker. That came in by the bundle? 

Major Anderson. That is right. 

Senator Welker. Major, in conclusion : On the basis of your per- 
sonal knowledge, do you believe that John W. Powell gave aid and 
comfort to the enemy of the United States at the time of war in Korea ? 

Major Anderson. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Let me make this observation, sir. I am not un- 
der oath, but I cannot conceive of more aid and comfort to an enemy 
that a human being could give. Do you agree with me on that? 

Major Anderson. I agree. 

Senator Welker. You were there, you suffered, you know far more 
than I do. 

Major Anderson. May I give one brief instance of this? 

Senator Welker. I would like to have it. Major. 

Major Anderson. There was an editorial in the China Weekly 
Review, at that time, some time in July 1950, which stated in essence 
that the South Koreans invaded the North Koreans and so forth. 
This particular editorial was quoted to me in its entirety, or in its parts, 
by virtually every English-speaking Chinese that I talked to. This 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2247 

was quoted. This man was a maker of propaganda. He just didn't 
go along with it; he made it, he manufactured the stuff. 

Senator Wei.kek. In conchision, I would not presume that I had 
the ability to match the intelligence of this man, who I think was a 
traitor to his country. And I say that in view of the testimony given 
here. 

But I hope and pray that God will give me strength that I have 
a chance to meet him — to meet him in a hearing room before Ameri- 
cans, that we might discuss his statements and discuss the fact of why 
he was so high and mighty that he could hold a press conference in 
the National Press Club in "Washington, D. C. As a United States 
Senator, I have only been there once. I am not hurt about that. 

But I want the people of California, I beg the people of California, 
my adopted State — a State that I love — I want the Americans every 
place to stand up and demand that Mr. Powell come forth and see 
the Internal Security Subcommittee, that we might find out the facts 
and the truth. If he is right — and I hope and pray that he is right, 
1 am convinced he is not — if he is right, he will vindicate himself 
in the minds of millions of proud Americans. But as this record 
stands today, it is a record of infamy, it is a record of disgrace in 
the history of our country. And he ought not to be permitted to 
lecture to Americans. He ought not be permitted to hide out wdien 
we have used every effort at cur command to have him come forth 
and tell us the truth. That is all we are seeking. 

Major, you are a fine man; you are a credit to our country. May 
God bless you and yours. You are excused. 

Major Anderson. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Welker. Lt. Col. Carl Aubrey. 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before the com- 
mittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God? 

Colonel Aubrey. I do. 

Senator Welker. You may proceed, counsel. 

TESTIMONY OF CARL L. AUBREY, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, UNITED 

STATES AIR FORCE 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please state your name? 

Colonel Aubrey. Carl L. Aubrey. 

Mr. Carpenter. Your rank? 

Colonel Aubrey.: Lieutenant colonel in the United States Air Force. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long have you been in the Armed Forces, 
Colonel? 

Colonel Aubrey. About 13 years. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you in the Korean war ? 

Colonel Aubrey. Yes, sir. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. And for some time you were a prisoner of war in 
Korea ? 

Colonel Aubrey. Yes, sir. I was shot down the 12th of March 
1951. 

Mr. CARPENiTiR. And you were a prisoner of war then for how 
long? 

Colonel Aubrey. Approximately 30 months. 



2248 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Mr. Carpenter. Colonel, you have listened to the testimony of 
your fellow officers here, and do you believe that the treatment of 
American prisoners, as described by them, was unusual or isolated? 

Colonel Aubrey. No, sir. The statements that they have made were 
common to the prisoners of war that I associated with and that I 
saw. 

Mr. Carpenter. On the basis of your observation, did you believe 
that the treatment was a matter of official policy ? 

Colonel Aubrey. I am convinced of it in my own mind, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. In the course of your imprisonment, was an attempt 
made to indoctrinate you and your fellow prisoners to the effect that 
the United Xations Forces were engaged in germ warfare ? 

Colonel Aubrey. Yes, sir. There is no question that an attempt 
was made on the part of the Chinese to indoctrinate the prisoners of 
war that our forces were engaged in germ warfare. 

It was done in many instances, but in one particular instance that 
I recall, a building was set up with large training aids throughout the 
building, and we as prisoners of war were forced to march through 
this building. It consisted of displays, enlargements of verbatim 
statements, so-called, mads by other American Air Force officers. It 
consisted of statements, or enlargements of photostated pages of the 
China IMonthly and "Weekly Review. It consisted of photographs 
of things that were supposed to have been bombs that were dropped 
by our forces. 

As I say, we were forced to go through this building, the entire camp 
was forced to. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. Colonel, by the way, where is your home? 

Colonel Aubrey. My home is in Santa Ana, Calif. 

Mr. Carpenter. You are a Californian ? 

Colonel i^uBREY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. And you have been in the service 15 years ? 

Colonel Aubrey. About 13 years. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you and your fellow prisoners ordered to 
sign a so-called peace petition? 

Colonel Aubrey. Yes, sir. We were ordered to do so. However, 
the officers compound of which I was a member, and what we termed 
the "first three graders" compound refused to sign this peace petition. 

May I digress just a moment and give a little bit of the story about 
that? 

JMr. Carpenter. Yes. Go ahead. 

Colonel Aubrey. It concerned a feast that they were planning. By 
a feast I mean they were to receive meat for the first time in almost 
8 months, and other choice bits of food. They required, however, 
that we sign this petition in order to obtain this feast. And when 
we refused they told us the feast was off. 

We commented that that was only to get us to sign the petition, and 
stuck by those grounds. As punishment, the officers compound and 
the "first three graders" compound was forced on that afternoon to 
go on a very extensive work detail, which consisted of 2 trips of almost 
6 miles each way up into the mountains, to gather wood for fire-burn- 
ing purposes, for a fire. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did you observe resistance by the POW's to the in- 
doctrinating program ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2249 

Colonel AriiREY. At this particular camp aiul at all of the camps 
that I was in, our statements were — actually, avc were forced to read 
these articles. If we refused to read them, they were read to us. 
However, our answers to those statements were rather strong, in four- 
letter Anf!:lo-Saxon words. 

The treatment which was afforded us consisted pretty much the 
same as has already bo€n described here this afternoon. People were 
thrown in the hole, beaten, or other such treatment, for that sort of 
resistance. 

Mr. Carpexter. Do you recall an instance of someone being forced 
to stand on a cake of ice; can you tell us about that incident? 

Colonel Aubrey. Yes, sir. 

During one of their harrangues, which was, as I recall, from the 
China JNIonthly Review, read to us by one of the Chinese, an officer got 
up to open a window to let in some fresh air. For this, or, at least, that 
was the stated reason for the punishment, he was stood on a block of 
ice for almost 3 hours, at attention. His hands and feet were both 
severely frostbitten. 

Senator Welker. How was he dressed? 

Colonel Aubrey. How was he dressed, sir ? 

Senator "Welker. Yes. 

Colonel Aubrey. He was dressed in very thin soled tennis shoes, in 
the uniform of the day, padded clothes. 

Mr. Carpenter. Colonel, did any of the camps in whicli you were 
imprisoned contain markings to show aviators that they were actually 
POW camps? 

Colonel Aubrey. There were no markings on the camps until about 
January of 1952. Tliere were no markings prior to that time. 

]Mr. Carpexter. Were you at any camp which was bombed as a 
result of this failure to mark them ? 

Colonel Aubrey. I would hesitate to say that the bombing was as 
a result of the failure to mark the camp. It was more likely a 
bombing as a result of supplies and trucks that were passing through 
the village at the time. However, I was in such a camp ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Was any punishment meted out to the injured 
after this raid because they had previously resisted political in- 
doctrination ? 

Colonel Aubrey. Yes, sir. There were several officers injured. 
The bombs, in addition to down the road, went through our com- 
pound. Several of the j^eople of the compound were injured. They 
were refused medical treatment by the Chinese even to such simple 
things as bandages. 

AVhen queried by the senior officer, who was injured, as to why 
they could not have some medical attention, the answer that I was 
told by this individual was they could not have any medical atten- 
tion because their political ideology was not of the proper kind. 

Mr. Carpexti:r. Do you believe that some of the prisoners of war 
died as a result of not getting the proper medication ? 

Colonel Aubrey. It is my opinion that two of them died for that 
reason. 

Mr. Carpenter. In the camps where you were stationed, did you see 
copies of this China Weekly, and later ^lonthly Keview ? 

Colonel Aubrey. Yes, sir. In addition to other publications, such 
as the Peoples World and the New York and London Daily Workers. 



2250 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senntor Welkek. As a matter of fact, they shipped it in by large 
quantities, the China Monthly Eeview ? 

Colonel Aubrey. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Welker. These trucks that were so-called bombed by our 
Air Force, when they were passing you, they were not giving you 
food, they were not giving you medical supplies; they were taking 
arms, ammunition to their soldiers. Is that correct, sir? 

Colonel Aubrey. That is correct. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. Colonel, I would like to ask you : You are familiar 
with the phrase "giving aid and comfort to the enemy," are you not? 

Colonel Aubrey. I am, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. At least on the experience in the indoctrination they 
forced on you through the China Monthly Review, and later the 
Weekly Review, do you believe the editor of that paper, who wrote 
those articles which were later transferred to the prisoner-of-war 
camps ; do you believe that man gave aid and comfort to the enemy ? 

Colonel Aubrey. In my opinion, he did. He made Benedict Arnold 
seem like an amateur. 

IVIr. Carpenter. I do not know how I could improve on that. 

Thank you. Colonel, for your great contribution to America. We 
are proud of you. On behalf of the chairman. Senator Jenner, and 
all the members of the subcommittee and the staff, we appreciate 
your coming before us to help us try in a feeble way to alert America 
as of days of old. Thank you very much. 

Maj. Robert Burns. 

Senator Welker. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are 
about to give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Major Burns. I do, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT J. BURNS, MAJOR, UNITED STATES AIR 

FORCE 

Senator Welker. What is your name? 

Major Burns. Robert J. Burns, major. United States Air Force. 

Senator Welker. I notice that you are a pilot. 

Major Burns. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Did you ever drop any germs on the Communists ? 

Major Burns. No, sir. 

Senator Welker. And you know, as a matter of fact, that that was 
one of the greatest bits of vicious propaganda ever perpetrated upon 
freedom-loving people ? 

]\Iajor Burns. Very definitely, sir. 

Senator Welker. Where were you born? Wliat is your State? 

Major Burns. I was born in Ohio, sir. 

Senator Welker. How long have you been in the Air Force ? 

Major Burns. Thirteen years, sir. 

Senator Welker. Were you a prisoner of war ? 

Major Burns. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. How long? 

Major Burns* Shot down February 28, 1952, repatriated on Sep- 
tember 5, 1953. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2251 

Senator Welker. Now, Major, you hoard the testimony heretofore 
given by these officers and men. Do you believe the treatment of the 
American prisoners, as described by all of these otlicers, was unusual 
or isolated ; or was it general ? 

Major Burns. Some phases of it I am acquainted with. However, 
my case is a little different than theirs in that I was never in a POW 
camp. The entire date of my confinement period was spent in solitary 
with a few isolated days, at which time I was kept with Chinese 
prisoners. 

Now, I don't mean by that, Kuomintan*^ personnel, but their own 
people who I believe most of them were fanatical, and, well, homo- 
sexuals. They were the most filthy individuals that I ever had the 
misfortune of running across, and at one time I was confined with a 
shackled madman and kept in a cave. I spent 3 days and 4 nights in 
that place with this individual. 

Senator Welker. You say you were in solitary ? 

Major Burns. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker, Tell the committee what that was, sir. 

Major Burns. Well, sir, it is just exactly what the word implies. 
You are denied complete freedom. 

Senator Welker. There are many people in our country, unfortu- 
nately, who might think that is a nightclub. 

Major Burns. No, sir. I was going to go ahead and give a little 
explanation here about being denied complete freedom. 

In the earlier days of my capture, up until tlie latter part of May 
of 1952, I was kept in a hole — actually, this is a hole of a little dif- 
ferent type that I am going to tell you about later — actually, just a 
cave inside of a mountainside. I was up in there — well, the only 
time that I would have any contact would be when the English- 
speaking Chinese officers would come up to tell me how the American 
forces were utilizing bacteriological warfare, bombing indiscriminately 
the Korean cities, and the overall atrocities or alleged atrocities com- 
mitted by our Armed Forces. 

I was not permitted to associate W'ith nor even see American prison- 
ers, or any other U. N. prisoners all through this period. 

Then later on, after moving toward the rear lines, which is up 
toward the Pyoktong area along the Yalu Kiver, I was then quar- 
tered in grain rooms in Korean adobe huts, without heat, required 
to stay inside at all times, the only time being permitted outside would 
be to go to the latrine, which was an outdoor affair. 

Then I would be required to return to the confines of this room, 
which was nothing but just a mud floor, four walls, and no window, 
and a door which was covered with parchment paper. 

Senator Welker. How many beds did it have. Major? 

Major Burns. There was no bed, sir. 

Senator Welker. You slept on the floor ? 

Major Burns. Right, sir. 

Senator Welker. Was that cold; bitterly cold? 

Major Burns. Very definitely, sir. 

Senator Welker. Why were you put in solitary ; because they tried 
to indoctrinate you ? 

Major Burns. Very definitely, sir. 

Senator Welker. Were you familiar with the China Monthly 
Eeview and China Weekly Review ? 



2252 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Major Burns. In tlie early stages ; no, sir, I wasn't given any pub- 
lications up until the time of reaching the Yalu River area, which 
was the later part of May, early June. I believe I could safely say 
in June that I really received the first publication of the China 
Monthly Review for indoctrination periods. 

Mr. Carpexter. What period ? 

Major Burns. 1952, sir. 

Senator Welker. Did you ever receive any news of any kind about 
the outside world from your Chinese captors ? 

Major Burns. No, sir. I was deprived of news throughout the 
entirety of my stay in North Korea. One time — I can't say that 
exactly — I received news. However, I received it from another POW 
who vras apparently kept in the same condition, under the same con- 
ditions as I; only he was c(uartered a ways down the street, I would 
say about 150 yards from the Korean home or adobe hut that I was in. 

Senator Welker. Did you make any use of that news ? 

Major Burns. Very definitely, sir. 

Senator Welker. What did you do with it? 

Major Burns. I used it as bait by asking leading questions to the 
interrogators. I had one in particular who was, well, let us say he 
was as "lousy" as they would come, and he took every advantage of 
the opportunity to degrade you to the state of that of an animal or 
lower. 

I asked him questions regarding this information ; in other words, 
who the President of the United States was. I knew that we had the 
election, but I didn't know who was running for the election on either 
ticket, nor who was elected. He declined to give me this information. 
However, I had already received this information from another POW 
through a note-passing system Avhich we devised ourselves, in that 
we both had to use the same latrine and we just took the gamble. 

However, another high-ranking officer came in one day making 
his normal routine inspection, so to speak, and finding out the prog- 
ress, if any, that I was making. I inquired of him the same type of 
information and he, of course, declined to give me these data, and I 
told him "It makes little or no difference whether you give me it or 
not"; that this other one, his comrade had already given the informa- 
tion, that it was already verified. From this time on, I had never 
seen or heard of that man again. 

So they moved me around several times during my period. So I 
thought, well, I had better use that way. I had another "stinker" in 
another camp in the area. So it worked very effectively again. So 
even though the information was old, it was still effective, so I con- 
tinued using it. 

Senator Welker. ]\Iajor, did you ever have reason to believe that 
you were being indoctrinated by the Russians ? 

Major Burns. Very definitely, sir; yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Do you want to comment on that briefly ? 

Major Burns. Well, sir, in this one area, while I was south of 
Pyoktong, in a little farm area south of the city, I was approached 
one day. I was actually peeking through the holes in the paper there. 
You always watch in the event that somebody might come by, an 
American you might be able to yell to or at least just get a word to 
one of the fellows, you know, that might be jDassing through there. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2253 

I saw those 4 approncliinp;, and I rocon;nizo(l tlio 2 as being, 1 of 
them, the conimaiuler of the camp, and the other, the former inter- 
rogator Avho had been working on me. And in tliis company were 
these two other people who I found later to be Russian. They stood 
outside of the door and Avould speak to the commander, who stood in 
the door. lie would talk to the interrogator who was in the room with 
me, and it was just a relay. The commander could talk Russian, he 
would talk Chinese to the interrogator, who would talk English to 
me : and we just kei:)t our channel of relaying going. 

The primary concern and the information that they desired was 
our aircraft control and warning system, our radar sites, locations, 
methods of control of our bombers on bombing runs. 

In other words, I can't go any further because of the security clas- 
sification. 

Senator "Welker. Very well. 

Now, JNIajor, on the basis of your personal knowledge and on the 
basis of the sworn testimony that you have heard here today by those 
of 3'ou who gave the best years of your lives for your country — and 
very sorry years they were — do you feel that John AV. Powell and all 
like him, including Mrs. Powell, gave aid and comfort to the enemy 
of the United States in time of war? 

Major BuRxs. "Well, sir; I am going to express my own personal 
opinion, and it is certainly not the Air Force. 

Senator "Welker. All right, you can open up the throttle. 

Major Burns. I very, very clefinitely would accuse them of being 
one of the most effective means and operated one of the most effective 
news media for spreading these filthy lies and propaganda not only 
to their own people but to some of the boys in the camp who possibly 
were not quite as well educated as the others and were taken in by 
some of their vile propaganda; and then, further, to the low-grade 
Korean personnel who never had an opportunity of study or receiv- 
ing any other type of indoctrination ; of corrupting their minds to the 
point that they made them definitely a hostile enemy of the United 
States. 

Senator "Welker. Do you agree with the acting chairman, Major, 
that because these people disseminated this vicious Communist propa- 
ganda, all of you and hundreds and thousands of others were sent 
through all the hardships and suffering that you have related, and 
they have related ; will you agree with me that we of America should 
go back to that good, old-fashioned form of Americanism, and invite 
them; 3'es, send them back to live with those filthy Communists Avho 
desire to destroy all that is good in this world? 

Major Burns. They have chosen for themselves. I think they 
should have no choice now. They have to go. 

Senator "Welker. They have no choice, but they seem to be, as I say, 
in the words of airmen, living in the high and mighty, some sneak- 
ing — sneaking like coj'otes — out through the countryside, when the 
officials of our country and our committee have tried so hard to get 
them here for only the truth, not to smear and seduce and alnise. But 
the record that they have made will stand forever unless they come 
forth and tell us the truth. 

82918°— 55— pt. 27 T 



2254 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

And as I said this morninf^, I think you heard me, that if they are 
truly repentant they can make up for the sins they have done to our 
country. We will be the first to help them to regain their status as 
proud Americans if they ask forgiveness for their sins. 

Thank you, Major. We are very honored to have had you before 
us. 

Capt. Paul O'Dowd. 

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this commit- 
tee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 
help you God ? 

Captain O'Dowd. I do. 

Senator Welker. Proceed, counsel. 

TESTIMONY OP PAUL T. O'DOWD, JR., CAPTAIN, ARTILLERY, 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you please state your name and rank, Cap- 
tain? 

Captain O'Dowd. Paul T. O'Dowd, Jr., captain, Artillery, United 
States Army. 

Mr. Carpenter. How long have you been in the Armed Forces ? 

Captain O'Dowd. Over 8 years, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Where is your home now ? 

Captain O'Dowd. San Francisco, Calif., sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. You are a native Calif ornian ? 

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. During your military service, did you have oc- 
casion to serve in the Korean war ? 

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. Were you captured as a prisoner of war during 
that period? 

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. When were you captured ? 

Captain O'Dowd. On Lincoln's Birthday, in 1951, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. What unit were you with at that time ? 

Captain O'Dowd. I was a member of the 15th Field Artillery, 2d 
Infanti-y Division, doing liaison work with the 8th ROK Division. 

Mr. Carpenter. Plow long were you a prisoner of war ? 

Captain O'Dowd. Until September 6, 1953, sir. 

Mr. Carpenter. That would be approximately how many months? 

Captain O'Dowd. About 31 months. 

Mr. Carpenter. Captain, you have listened here to the testimony 
of your comrades. I would like to ask you if j'ou believed that the 
treatment of American prisoners, as described by them, was unusual 
or isolated ? 

Captain O'Dowd. 'No, sir. I think most every American prisoner 
at some time or other went through the process described by Major 
Daltry. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you believe, on the basis of your observation, 
that the treatment was a matfer of official policy ? 

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir; definitely. 

Mr. Carpenter. Captain, did you have occasion to see this so-called 
Chinese Monthly Keview in your prisoner of war camp ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2255 

Capt:u'n O'Doavd. Yes, sir. That was the first propaganda I was 
ever exi^osed to. 

I^Ir. Carpenter. Can you elaborate on that and tell us something 
about it? 

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir. 

After capture, we marclied north. I was captured deep in South 
Korea. We marched to within 40 miles of Pyongyanj^. As most of 
the ma relies were, it was rather a death march. We started out with 
about 380 men and arrived with 120. 

The camp was a deserted mininp; camp located about 40 miles south- 
east of Pyonoyano;, the capital of North Korea, and it was there we ran 
into our first Enolish-speaking Chinese political commissars. The 
only propaganda they had at that time was the China Monthly lleview. 
It was required reading. At least portions of it were required read- 
ing by every prisoner, and editorial comment was required after 
reading it. 

The policy of the Chinese at the camp at that time was very strict. 
Such minor" infractions of the rules as leaving the room were punish- 
able by death, and they enforced their indoctrination through this 
infamous publication to a point where every prisoner was — I say 100 
percent of the prisoners were forced to read and to write their "cog- 
nitions"' of it, what was read. 

ISIr. Carpenter. And did that "cognition" of it have to follow a 
certain line ? 

Captain O'Dowd. Initially they asked for our opinions, and they 
said they wanted our real opinions. But it became quite obvious, after 
several men were severely tortured and beaten, that what they really 
were wanting was an echo of the Communist Party line that Avas put 
out in the China INIonthly Eeview. 

Mr. Carpenter. Did any of the camps in which you were im- 
prisoned contain markings to show aviators that they were actually 
POW camps? 

Captain O'Dowd. Initially, no. And as a result of their not mark- 
ing camps, I was in two camps that were severely worked over by our 
Air Force. Both camps, in both occasions, were used for the storage 
of ammunition and fuel or as a stopover point for Chinese troops 
moving to the front lines. Although we begged the Chinese camp 
commanders to allow us to mark with the available brush ancl mate- 
rial around the camp, we were always told that we had no right to 
live so long as Chinese soldiers were dying in the front lines. 

The camps were eventually marked. The last camp which I was 
at was a penal camp at the north end, east of camp No. 5, and it did 
not become marked until late in the last year of the war. 

^Ir. Carpenter. Is it true, Captain, that you were in a hospital 
during an air raid ? 

Captain O'Dgavd. Not during an air raid; no, sir. I was 5 months 
in the hospital that Dr. Anderson described in his testimony. In 
fact, I arrived at tliat hosj^tal the day that Dr. Anderson left the 
hospital, tlie 10th day of May 1951, and I was there until about the 
middle of October 1951. 

Mr. Carpenter. Captain, I would like to call your attention to an 
article in the issue of October 1951 China Monthly Keview. Did you 
know any of the individuals whose letters were quoted in this article? 
If you will refer to the article, please? 



2256 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Captain 0'Do^^^). Yes, sir. I recall tlie article, having been forced 
to read it while I 'was a prisoner. There was a particnlar officer 
here which I knew. He was a patient at the hospital. He died lying 
next to me in the hospital at the time this particular letter was 
published. 

Mr. Carpenter. What is the nature of that letter, Captain, so we 
can get it in the record ? 

Captain O'Dowd. It is apparently not a letter, but a broadcast to 
the brother of a major of the United States Army, to his brother and 
sister in Arlington, Va., in which he told them to write his father 
and tell him not to worry because he was safe, and that he was a 
prisoner of war. 

At the time this particular publication came out that man had been 
dead for several months. 

Mr. Carpenter. I would like to call your attention. Captain, to 
another article in the Review of August 1951. It is entitled "New 
List of American POW's." If you will read the introductory para- 
graph 

Captain O'Dowd (reading) : 

The following names of American POW's are adrlltions to the lists r^Wished 
In the May, June, and July issues of the Review. These names have heen com- 
piled from the iiles of the New China News Agency (Hsinhua) and do not con- 
stitute an official list, being only the names of POW's who have broadcast 
statements over the Peking radio or who have asked Chinese correspondents in 
Korea to publish their names so that their families may learn that they are 
prisoners. 

That is signed by the editor, Powell. 

Mr. Carpenter. Signed by Mr. Powell? 

Captain O'Dowd. It is signed, "Editor," and that refers to Powell. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you have a knowledge of the status of any of 
the men listed there at the time this article was published ? 

Captain O'Dowd. Many of these people I knew while I was prisoner. 
Many are since dead. But at the time this particular issue was pulv 
lished, a lieutenant, an officer of the United States Army, was listed 
here who had been dead for over 4 months. 

Mr. Carpenter. Captain, were you ever subjected to medical ex- 
perimentation while you were captured ? 

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir. I was one of the forty-odd prisoners 
that Dr. Anderson referred to as having received the chicken liver 
treatment. 

Mr. Carpenter. Will you tell us something about that, please, 
Captain ? 

Captain 0'Doa\t). Well, prior actually to the operation, I spent 
roughly 3I/2 months in this Korean hospital. The death rate was tre- 
mendous in the hospital. We had men who died lying next to us 
for 3 or 4 days before their bodies could be removed. Even in the 
heat of summer — and Korea is quite warm in the summer — there were 
men who having defecated were unable to move. The gentle Korean 
nurses came in and threw shovels of dirt over them. An average of 
10 percent of the people living in the room I was in died daily during 
the first 2 months there. 

It was merely in addition to what Dr. Anderson has already said 
Living conditions were extremely hard. In this particular hospital 
the patients eventually started to recuperate. The medicine needed 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2257 

■u-as, as the doctor said, it was clotliin*::: and food. Eventually onr 
death rate cut down to somewhere between 12 to 3 a day. The hospital 
had about 125 men and 50 patients at all times. 

Late in July or early August, a team of so-called Chinese doctors 
arrived at the hospital. They brought with them the lir«t medical 
instruments that I had seen in Korea. Tliey quartered themselves 
outside of the hospital, and after a few days of walking around and 
looking us over they declared the hospital to be closed to all incom- 
ing patients. A large percentage of the patients living in the hospital 
were discharged. 

I would say 43 to 44 of us who were the healthiest at that time — and 
I would say my body weight at that time was 115, 120 pounds — we 
were selected to receive this so-called cure-all. 

Senator Welker. What is your normal weight, Captain ? 

Captain O'Dowd. I was captured in Korea weighing about 170, 172 
pounds. My lowest point was the 10th of May, at which I weighed 
somewhere in the vicinity of 84 or 85 pounds. 

Senator AVelker. Eighty-four or eighty-five pounds from 170? 

Captain O'Dowd. Yes. When I was repatriated, I weighed 137 
pounds. 

The hospital was closed and there were about 40 of us selected. We 
were told we were going to receive a new Russian cure-all that was 
known as the nicotinic acid treatment. 

For a good number of days following that we had no indoctrination, 
we were allowed to do as we pleased. There was a lot of boiled water 
given us, and eventually the ration was improved to a point where it 
v\'as quite palatable and apparently more than sufficient to retain our 
body weight because the average prisoner did put on weight. It was 
bloated, but it was weight. 

The experiment started with injections. We w^ere given 1 cubic 
centimeter of a solution which they manufactured in the hospital in 
the arm per day for the first 10 days. Then it built up to where we 
were receiving io cc's of this solution in the arm daily. 

Now, the injections themselves caused considerable pain, and appar- 
ently some very excruciating pain to some of the patients. They would 
scream, and it was very difficult to keep them from thrashing and 
hurting themselves. 

The solutions were made in our presence. Goats' eyes, chicken 
livers, lungs of pigs and pig livers, human afterbirth on one occasion ; 
anything which apparently had some vitamin B content. The mate- 
rial was chopped finely and put into water, and not brought to a boil, 
but brought to just below the boiling point, and then filtered out 
through cotton until it had no large particles in suspension. Then it 
was shot in our arms. 

This went on for about 2 weeks. Apparently the new Chinese doc- 
tors felt that what they had given us had not accomplished what they 
were looking for, and they told us then that we were going to be oper- 
ated upon with this new Russian operation called the tissue treatment. 
Of course, there was quite a protest to it. Most of us by that time were 
quite willing to leave the better rations or anything to get out of the 
control of these people and get back in the camp. 

We made a demonstration to prevent the operation. It was finally 
fjut down by the Chinese coming in and cutting oil' all rations. We 



2258 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



received nothing to eat. Tliey told us that we would starve to death 
or that we would submit ; that they could wait, there was no rush. 

Eventually the operation took place, about 10 men a day for 4 days. 
The procedure was to strip the upper part of the body. They painted 
one side or the other up to the armpit with iodine, and 1 cubic centi- 
meter of novocaine was injected into the tissue above the rib. They 
made an incision about 2 inches long, probed and formed pockets 
under the skin next to the bone, between the flesh — actually between 
the bone and ribs — and inserted 2 pieces of prepared chicken liver; 
that is, a full chicken liver which has been cut in half, one-half being 
put in the back, one in the front, and then it was sewed up again. We 
were bandaged with Korean homespun. In fact, there was no bandage 
as we think of it, no gauze; it was just a piece of very coarse Korean 
homemade material.; It was wrapped around us, and we were told to 
hang on to it to keep it from falling off. As the doctor explained, the 
material either rotted out or was eventually absorbed by the body. 

Mr. Carpenter. Do you want to show us the scar, Captain? I 
would like it for the record. 

(A photograph of the scar was marked "Exhibit 522" and appears 
below.) 

Exhibit No. 522 




,AIH PAUL O'DOWa 



Senator "Welker. Thank you very much. Captain. 

Mr. Carpenter. Captain, I would like to return to this indoctrina- 
tion program. How many hours a day were you required to study 
and receive this indoctrination ? 

Captain O'Dowd. It depended greatly on the conditions outside 
the camp. I refer to the military condition in Korea. I would say 
a bare minimum of G hours a day and sometimes as long as 12 hours 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2259 

a day, including' sinfjing- which would require revolutionary songs 
and other material which we were forced to absorb in some way. 

Mr. Carpenter. So it averaged 6 to 12 hours a day ? 

Captain O'Dowd. I would say 8 hours a day would be a good 
average. 

Senator Welker. Did you sing Russian Communist songs? 

Captain O'Dowd. Some Chinese songs, revolutionary songs. One 
was Dung Fung-ho and Sung-li-di-chi-chi-wa-la-la-li-bi-oo. There 
were a good number of revolutionary songs of various types that 
were forced upon the prisoners to learn to sing. 

Senator Welker. Captain, I want to make this observation: that 
time is of the essence at this hearing, and you have worked hard. I 
must leave for the East tonight and must go to other places. 

I know it to be a fact that we have thousands of enlisted men 
who went through just as much as you did; do you ? 

Captain O'Dowd. In many cases, more, sir. 

Senator Welkfr. In many cases more i 

Captain O'Dowd. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. And if it were possible, we would have those 
brave men here, too ; I wish it were possible. 

Thank you. Captain, very much. 

Senator Welker. Maj. Paul Bach, please. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give before 
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you God ? 

Major Bach. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE B. BACH, JB., MAJOR, UNITED STATES 

AIR FORCE 

Senator Welker. State your name, please. 

Major Bach. My name is Lawrence B. Bach, Jr. ; major, United 
States Air Force. 

Senator Welker. Where is your home, sir? 

Major Bach. Grand Forks, N. Dak., sir. 

Senator Welker. You are a major airman, 1 see. 

Major Bach. That is correct, sir; major in the United States Air 
Force. 

Senator Welker. And you, like the otliers here, were a prisoner 
of war of the Red Chinese and tlie North Koreans ? 

Major Bach. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Welker. Have you prepared a list in the English-language 
publications which were used in the indoctrination of prisoners? 

Major Bach. I have a short list here, sir; yes. 

Senator "Welker. Would you mind giving them to the committee, 
please ? Just read them. 

Major Bach. The Great Conspiracy; the author is unknown to me. 

High Treason. 

Daily Workers from New York, Chicago, and London.- 

The Peoples Daily World from San Francisco. 

The National Guardian. 

The History of the Communist Party of the United States. I 
believe that is by William Z. Foster. 



2260 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

Senator Welker. And he was what, do you know? 

Major Bach. I believe the official title of William Z. Foster was 
chairman of the Communist Party of the United States. 

History of the Americas. 

Thunder Out of China. 

China Shakes the World. 

The Last Days of Sevastopol, and several books by Howard Fast. 

Freedom Euled. 

The Vanishing American. 

Citizen Tom Paine, and Peekskill, USA. 

Then a monthly publication known as Masses and Main Stream. 

Political Affairs — again a monthly magazine, I believe. 

The very insidious book by Annabelle Carr, called the Truth About 
America's Diplomacy. 

Bases and Empire, by George Merian, referred to by the prisoners 
as "Bases and Umpires." 

Another piece of insidious material, American Imperialism, by 
Victor Perlo. 

Prosco's publication from India. 

Several Soviet periodicals that the spellings I am not quite sure 
of. One was A Cmeha, I believcv 

Another publication, I believe the English translation is the Croco- 
dile ; an English-language publication including Soviet Russia Today. 

I believe there was one, the Soviet Union. 

Most of these books were evidently from the Soviet Union, were 
produced by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow. 

There was a real gem called the Short Course on the History of 
the Communist Party, which was produced again by the Foreign Lan- 
guages Publishing Ilouse in Moscow. 

There was a book on the Soviet Constitution and High Treason by 
Albert Kahn. 

Senator Welker. How about the China Weekly Review and China 
Monthly Review? 

Major Bach. Very definitely, sir; yes. 

Senator Welker. Just as infamous as the others? 

Major Bach. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Major, was there any resistance to this attempt 
at indoctrination by any of the American prisoners? If so, will you 
describe it? 

Major Bach. Yes, sir. You might say there was a continued resist- 
ance to this type of propaganda and indoctrination attempted by the 
Communists from its very inception some time in the very first days of 
Februar}^ 1051 until so-called forced indoctrination ceased in March 
of 1052'. There was a very definite attempt on the part of the vast 
majority of the prisoners to refuse to submit to indoctrination by the 
Communists using this material. 

Senator Welker. Do you recall any of your colleagues who lost 
their lives as a result of resistance ? 

Major Bach. I do remember of one case that I believe has appeared 
before this committee in testimony before. 

Senator Welker. JNIa jor Hume ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2261 

Major Bacti. That is correct, sir. 

Senator Welkkh. Briefly, will you tell us for the record here? 

Major Bach. If" I remember correctly, the story on that -svas that 
one of the so-called study classes was in progress. The subject that 
-was up for discussion at the time was a speech, I believe, made by ono 
of the senior political men in China. I believe it was Ku-Moe Joe,^ 
if the pronunciation is correct. Ke was the same thinn; as the 
State Department man there. This article appeared in the ^lonthly 
lieview, 1 believe, in the form of a su implement. 

Senator Welker. Chinese Monthly lieview ? 

JVIajor Bach. That is correct, sir. 

Senator AVelker. And edited by IMr. Powell? 

Major Bach. By Mr. John Powell. 

Senator AYelker. What hai:)pened to him ? 

Major Bacti. During the subject of discussion of this speech, this 
major made the statement that he did not believe the speech was worth 
the paper it was printed on and that this paper was not any good, 
either. 

Senator "Welker. In other words, he did a 180° turn ? 

IMajor Bach. You might term it that, yes, sir. 

Senator "\Yelker. Proceed, sir. 

Major Bach. Unfortunately, he made the statement before a very 
vile personalit}' who was there at the time, a Chinese Communist who 
was present and monitoring this so-called discussion group. He was 
taken from the compound and punished by being given a term of soli- 
tarv confinement. 

Senator AYelker. Do you have any knowledge of where American 
soldiers were forced to write letters home falsely, stating the condi- 
tions in the camp, saying that they were satisfactory ? 

IMajor Bach. I know of no cases where they were forced to write 
letters home. I do know of many cases where they were informed 
that their letters would not go home unless these letters did contain 
statements that they were being treated well and that they were being 
taken care of. 

Senator Welker. Major, because of the shortness of time, I want to 
commend you again ; to say that we have another ofHcer here of the Air 
Force. He is one of the last that we have today. He was shot down, 
nnd bailed out, after he had made a bombing run. He suffered and he 
witnessed the false propaganda, as you have. 

I would like to make that statement on the part of the chairman 
because we simply cannot take the time to call Capt. Ellis Burton, who 
was stationed at-Andrews Airbase, some 20 miles out of Washington. 
He is a very great soldier like you are. 

Y^ou are excused, and thank you so kindly. 

Xow I would like to call Colonel Kopischkie. 

Colonel, do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before the 
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Colonel KonsciiKiE. I do. 



* Kno Mo-jo is a Chinese Communist writer wlio attcndod some "penoe"' confcrorcps 
as leadpi- of delegations, and whose Report on Cultural and Educatioual Work iu China 
was offered for sale by the China Review iu December 11J50. 

32918"— 5o^pt. 27 8 



2262 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

TESTIMONY OF GAEL E. KOPISCHKIE, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

Senator Welker. Give your name for the record, please. 

Colonel KopiscHKiE, Carl E. Kopisehkie. 

Senator Welker. Colonel, where is your home ? 

Colonel KonscHKiR. Chippewa Falls, Wis. 

Senator Welker. You are a colonel in the profession of the Army? 

Colonel Kopisciikie. Lieutenant colonel in the United States Army, 
sir. 

Senator Welker. How long have you been so engaged ? 

Colonel KopiscHKiE. I have been in the service I3I/2 years now, sir. 

Senator Welker. Were you captured as a prisoner of war ? If so, 
when and at what time ? 

Colonel Kopisciikie. Yes, sir. I was a member of the 38th Field 
Battalion, Artillery, 2d Division, and was captured on the 1st of 
December 1950, and released on the 6th of September 1953. 

Senator Welker. Colonel, I would like to ask you this in the interest 
of saving time, because you know of the dilemma I am in — I really 
must leave for a plane right away. 

Colonel Kopisciikie. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Do you feel and do you testify that the previous 
stories of witnesses parallel your own experience? 

Colonel Kopisciikie. They are true. 

Senator Welker. Do you believe that such treatment of prisoners 
of war was isolated, or general? 

Colonel KoPiscHKiE. No, sir. The treatment of prisoners of war at 
the time of my capture was general. 

Senator Welker. Do you believe it was a matter of official Com- 
munist policy ? 

Colonel KopiscHKiE. Yes, sir ; I believe it was. 

Senator Welker. Can you tell us about how prisoners of war were 
worked in the camps ? 

Colonel KoPiscHKiE. Yes, sir. At first we were mainly engaged in 
going out and cutting our own wood with the crudest equipment that 
could possibly be found, something that we would not think of using 
in the United States. We would cut our own wood and carry it back ; 
prepared our own meals. In addition to that, we carried water, some- 
times great distances, depending upon the distance the camp was from 
the nearest stream or well. Later on we were mainly utilized in mak- 
ing long trips up to the reservoir, where the barges were brought in 
from China, unloading rations, wood, sometimes carrying them back. 

Senator Welker. Now let me ask you a question. Those barges 
unloaded tons, may I say, of Communist propaganda to be used upon 
you and your fellow men-in-arms; is that correct? 

Colonel KoPiscHKiE. Yes, sir. They brought in a great deal. 

Senator Welker. When they did not have room to bring in medical 
equipment, medicine, or things that might give you some comfort, like 
food? 

Colonel KopiscHKiE. Yes, sir. 

I have an incident in mind, if the Senator would like to hear about 
it. One of the first temporary camps I w^as at was in Death Valley, 
which we named for a mining camp in North Korea. 

Senator Welker. Why did you call it Death Valley ? 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2263 

Colonel KopisciiKiE. ^Because of the high death rate among the 
prisoners at that particular temporary camp. Another reason was 
for the small amount of each clay during the wintertime that light 
actually fell within the camp area. 

We were housed a great number to a room ; many sick, many already 
died, and they were dying in addition. After being there a couple of 
weeks, an English newspaper correspondent by tlie name of Shapiro — 
the lirst white man other than among ourselves that we saw 

Senator "Welker. Communist to the ?)tli degree ? 

Colojiel KonsciiKiE. Yes, sir. 

He spent a few days at this camp, and during that time he took 
time out.to talk to the ones that were physically able to be moved from 
their rooms up to a schoolhouse approximately a quarter mile distant 
from our camp. There the question was put to him : Why wasn't food 
and medical supplies being brought to this camp ? 

The statement made by him was that our Air Force was bombing 
the supply route and they could not be brought in ; incidental to the 
fact that at the same time Communist propaganda was coming in, 
including older issues of the China Weekly Review and newer issues 
of the China Monthly Review. 

Senator Welker. Published by John W. Powell, the editor ? 

Colonel Kopischkie. Yes. sir. 

Senator Welker. Now, Colonel, let me ask you this question : "\Mien 
you were ca]3tured, how much did vou weigh ? 

Colonel Kopischkie. I weighed a little less at that time, sir, than 
my normal weight. I weighed approximately 210 pounds. At the 
lowest point of my captivity, as far as weight is concerned, I can only 
estimate. I would consider that I weighed between 140 and 150 
pounds. 

Senator Welker. Did you have any experience in forced marches ? 

Colonel Kopischkie. Yes, sir. From the point of capture just 
south of Cudare, North Korea, we were marched to Death Valley by 
a circuitous route in which I would estimate we covered approximately 
250 miles. 

Senator Welker. How many daj'S was that ? 

Colonel Kopischkie. I was captured on the 1st of December, and 
we arrived at Death Valley Christmas Day 1050; 25 days. 

Senator Welker. Colonel, did you have any experience of a bomb- 
ing incident at camp Xo. 2 on the 13th day of October 1951 ? 

Colonel Kopischkie. Yes, sir. The incident that the Senator re- 
fers to was .also propagandized in the December issue of the China 
Monthly Review, of which John W. Powell was the editor. This 
bombing raid was made on camp Xo. 3, known as Chongsong, North 
Korea. Past this camp quite frequently were going both Korean and 
Chinese troops. In addition, a gieat number of supply trucks were 
going past this camp. At night normally there would be a light in 
the headquarters of our particular area in the camp, and also quite 
a number of lights in a minor Korean headquarters a short distance 
away. 

A bombing incident occurred sometime early in the night of October 
13, 1951. One bombing run was made. Bomb drops, the majority 
of them, landed within our compound or very close to it. xVpproxi- 
mately 7 officers were wounded that night, 2 of them critically. They 



2264 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

■were taken to a Chinese-Korean so-called hospital some distance from 
our particular compound and refused medical treatment because of 
their political beliefs and noneooperation with the Cliinese previous 
to that. 

One of the lieutenants died that night. The next morning his body 
was stripped of all clothing over most parts and his wounds revealed 
so that the public — by "public" I mean the Korean villagers — were 
required to march by and view the wounds as well as a number of the 
companies. Later on some of the companies were required to march 
through our compound to view^ the damage that was clone. 

It appeared in this article in the December issue of the China 
Monthly Review that some of the statements were made by those peo- 
ple that had witnessed both the body and the compound that was 
bombed. The picture of the naked dead lieutenant appears on page 
315 of this December issue 1951, of the China Monthly Review. 

Senator Welker. That is edited by the gentleman who classes him- 
self an American, giving lectures all over the United States, wherever 
he might be, and gives press releases in the National Press Club in 
Washington, D. C. He did that ? 

Colonel KopiscHKiE. Yes, sir. 

Senator Welker. Have you seen the pictures of the atrocities where- 
in some of our precious American soldiers were stuck in the back with 
bamboo sticks so that they might sulfer and die gradually? 

Colonel KopisciiKTE. Yes, sir ; I have seen those photographs. 

Senator Welker. Rather terrible; was it not? 

Colonel Kopischkie. They certainly are. 

Senator Welker. And that was published in the China Monthly 
Review? 

Colonel Kopischkie. Yes, sir. I believe that practically anything 
that John W. Powell thought would be of value to the Communist 
cause was published in the China ]Monthly, and previous to that the 
Weekly Review. 

Senator Welker. Do you have a photograph of the dead lieutenant 
in the China Monthly Review appearing before you ? 

Colonel Kopischkie, Yes, sir ; I do. 

Senator Welker. I would like that to be made a part of the record, 
if possible. 

(The photograph referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 523" and 
appears on following page.) 

Senator Welker. Colonel, I would like you, in concluding this 
hearing, to make any sort of staten>ent you would desire to make to 
the people of the State of California. 

Colonel'KopiscHKiE. Senator, after listening to the statements made 
by a number of the other ex-prisoners of war, I would like to reiterate 
their feelings or make a statement entirely on my own, my own opinion. 
I firmly believe that John W. Powell and others like him, working 
for that same cause, aided, abetted, and gave comfort to the enemy, 
thus committing an act or acts of treason against the United States 
of America. 

Senator Welker.. Colonel, I want to say this in your behalf and in 
behalf of the other fine officers who protect us and our children, our 
heritage, that we might live. It has been my unique honor to have 
had some great, fine witnesses before me, in an attempt, a harel at- 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 



22G5 



tempt, to protect tlie internal sccnrity of the Government of the 
United States. 

ExniuiT No. 523 




It has been a tiresome task to me today, but yet, in my heart, I say 
that I have never had before me such precious, fine witnesses as I had 
today. I commend you on behalf of Chairman Jenner, tlie cliairman 
of the committee of which I am now the acting chairman ; and every 
member of the committee, both Democrat and Eepublican; every mem- 
ber of the staff who has worked so hard that we might, in a small way, 
bring these atrocities, these dark days, to the attention of the American 
people. 

I hope God will give j'ou comfort in the years to come, that you may 
have some happiness for the days and the years that you suH'ered in 
these camps. And that applies to all of the others. 

I hope that I will see 'you again. I know that the Army of the 
United States has precious leadership when it has such great men as 
have appeared before this committee today. 

Thank you. 

Are there any further questions ? 

Colonel KopisciiKiE. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Welker. Counsel has called to my attention one thing. I 
would like to read into the record a statement. 

In view of the fact that a number of local newspapers in various 
parts of the country have selected the names of American soldiers 
Avhich have appeared as attached to statements or broadcasts ema- 
nating from Communist sources in Korea and published in hearings 
by the Internal Security Subcommittee, we feel that, in all fairness, 
we must make appropriate comment. 

Testimony of former prisoners of war in Korea showed that the 
names of POWs attached to written statements or broadcasts were 
obtained as a result of intensive indoctrination under conditions of 
duress. This process is descril)ed in a statement by medical officers 
A\lio were prisoners of war of the Comnumists in Korea, which state- 



2266 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

ment was incorporated into our hearings. This statement declared 
in part, as follows : 

Steps in Indoctrination 

The first necessjiry step was to break down the moral resistance to an alien 
Ideology. This was accomplished by keeping the prisoners cold, hungry, and 
In a state of disorganized confusion until each person realized that resistance 
meant starvation and death. It was emphasized repeatedly that the prisoners 
■were no longer members' of the armed forces of their nation, and all attempts 
to maintain a military organization were harshly punished. The planners of 
this- indoctrinatioii program did not condone the shooting of large numbers of 
prisoners. Instead, they resorted to starvation and exposure to cold. 

After a few months of this treatment- the resistance of the siu-vivors had 
Foftened. The second phase of indoctrination consisted of an intensive formal 
study program. For a period of approximately 1 year, most of the waking hours 
of the prisoners were spent in some form of supervised study. Food was gradu- 
ally improved, and more clothing was issued. It was made painfully clear to 
each prisoner that living conditions would be improved only so long as there 
was no resistance to the study or propaganda program. 

The subcommittee made no effort to pass judgment upon individual 
POW's who, under the conditions described, signed statements or 
made broadcasts. Nor are we in any position to vouch for the accu- 
lacy of such statements as carried by the China Monthly Review or 
similar publications. 

]\Ir. Carpenter. Senator, since the name of Angus Ward's case was 
mentioned here, I would like to have inserted into the record and be 
made a part of the record certain articles that appeared in the New 
York Times. 

One was Sunday, October 30, 1949, and captioned "Mukden Reds 
Seiz3 U. S. Consular Head, Charging Assault." 

The article dated Novembar 1, 1949, says, "Chinese Reds Keep 
5 IT. S. Aides in Jail." 

The article dated November 6, 1949, "U. S. Demands Red China 
Free 5 Held at Mukden." 

Another article dated November 11, 1949: ''Chinese Reds Ignore 
U. S. Plea on Consuls." 

Another article dated November 17, 1949: "Acheson Protests 
Chungking Attack on American Ship." 

Anotlier article dated November 21, 1949, captioned, "Ward Case 
Action by U. S. Due Today." 

Another article of November 22, 1949, headed, "Test of U. S. Note 
to 30 Nations Urging Ward Case Action." 

Another article dated November 22, 1949, headed, "U. S. Bids 30 
Nations Protest to Peiping on Arrest of Ward." 

The last one, dated November 24, 1949, headed, "Communists Re- 
lease Ward, Order Him To Leave China." 

These are all from the New York Times. 

Senator Welker. They will be ordered incorporated into the record 
at this point, 

(The articles referred to were marked "Exhibits Nos. 524 to 532" 
and are as follows :) 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 22G7 

ExiiiniT No. 524 
[From the New York Times, Sunilay, Octobci.- 30, 1949] 

Mukden Reds Sf:ize United States Consular Head, Charging Assault — Bfat- 
ING Chinese Ex-E^[PLOY^;E Is Alleged isy Teiping — Four Consulate Aides 
Also Held — Status Is Now Uncertain — State Dei'art.ment Spokesman 
Thinks Top American May Have Been Released 

(By Walter H. Waggoner) 

•Washington, October 29. — The State Department learned by telegram from 
Mukden, Manchuria, today that Angus Ward, United States Consul (Jeneral 
there, had been arrested by Chinese Communist authorities on charges of beating 
a f^)rmer Chinese employee. 

The official message supported reports received earlier in San Francisco from 
the Chinese Communist radio in Peiping. These reports said that ]Mr. Ward and 
other members of the Consulate General at Mukden would answer to a people's 
court. 

There were indications, however, that Mr. Ward might have been freed, ac- 
cording to a high State Department official. The INIukden telegram, he explained, 
had stated that Mr. Ward had been .iailed for "2 or 3 days," and the possible in- 
ference, he went on, was that the Consul General was now at liberty. 

reminder sent to peiping 

Meanwhile, officials said, the State Department had sent instructions to the 
United States Consulate in Peiping to remind the Chinese Communist authorities 
there of their earlier assurances that Mr. Ward would be allowed to embark for 
the United States. 

The Chinese Communists took Mukden a year ago. and the following May the 
State Department instructed Mr. Ward to close his office. His departure has been 
continually thwarted, however, by his inability to obtain transportation out of 
Mukden. 

Mr. Ward is charged by the Communist authorities with l)eating a former Chi- 
nese employee on October 10. Four other members of his staff, two of them 
United States citizens, were arrested along with him, according to the reports. 
One of the Americans is said to be Ralph C. Rehber, of Rochester, N, Y. ; the 
other was named as Shiro Yatsiuni, who is of Japanese descent. 

Officials here, who have already protested Mr. Ward's arrest through instruc- 
tions to American I'epresentatives at I'eiping, described the charges against the 
consul general as being of "the flimsiest sort." They said that he had been 
virtually a prisoner of tlie Chinese Communists since May, under what amounted 
to house arrest, and that guards would have been in a position to prevent the 
alleged beating. 

The telegram was not signed by the consul general, but "for" him, by a member 
of his staff. 

The department first heard of Mr. Ward's arrest from the Peiping broadcast, 
it was said, but later received the confirming telegram from the consulate in 
Mukden. 

They described it as the second in a series of planned attacks against the 
United States diplomatic mission in IMukden. The first had been a charge by 
the Chinese Communists last June that the consulate had been operating ''a big 
American spy ring," which the Communists had allegedl.v "broken." The situa- 
tion was at that time called by a spokesman for the United States Embassy, 
then at Nanking, "too fantastic for comment." Mr. Ward was able to send 
only a Chinese-language report to the Embassy, saying he was having difficulty 
finding responsible Communist officials with whom to comnnuiicate. 

At the end of June, Mr. Ward reported he had made contact with a Communist 
representative and that conversations for the departure of the consulate staff 
were underway. 

Communist Version Broadcast 

Washington, October 29 (AP). — The Communist radio pictured the IMukden 
population aroused by the accounts of a "savage and brutal act perpetrated by 
American imperialists." 



2268 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

The eommunist account said that on September 27 Mr. Ward told an employee, 
Chi Yu-heng, to do some work he couldn't do, and thereupon ridiculed the work- 
man. Finally he discharged the Chinese and refused to grant him severance pay 
in addition to wages, it was related. 

Mr. Chi came back October 10 to demand the extra money and was beaten in 
the consulate, together with his brother, the Communists said. The Communist 
radio's description of the injuries mentioned only bruises and a small cut but it 
described Mr. Chi as bleeding profusely when the police found him. 



Exhibit No. 525 

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, November 1, 1949] 

Chinese Reds Keep 5 United States Aides in Jail — Call Mukden Consul, 4 
OF Staff "Overbeaking" as They Await Trial on Assault Charges 

Hong Kong, October 31. — The Communist radio said today that Angus Ward, 
United States Consul in Mukden, was being held in jail with four consular em- 
ployees pending trial before a Communist people's court on charges of beating a 
Chinese employee. 

The Peiping broadcast cleared up an impression that Mr. Ward had been 
released after being held for several days for investigation of a beating the 
Communists said Mr. Ward had administered to Chi Yu-heng, a servant in the 
consulate. 

The Communists said Mr. Ward and the other employees, two of them Ameri- 
cans, "put on an overbearing air and refused to admit what they had done'' 
when summoned to the Public Security Bureau after the alleged assault, and 
that they were being detained. 

The broadcast said the incident had caused widespread indignation throughout 
Manchuria and that letters demanding trial of the culprits were pouring into 
the Mukden newspaper, the Northeast Daily News. It also reported Chinese 
employees of the consulate had struck until justice has been meted out. 

Mr. Ward has been under virtual house arrest since the Communist capture 
of ilukden a year ago. 

Edmund 0. Clubb, United States Consul General in Peiping has made repeated 
efforts to arrange for Mr. Ward's departure from INJukden. The State Depart- 
ment said Mr. Clubb had been asked to remind the Communists of their earlier 
assurances that Mr. Ward would be alloAved to embark for the United States, 

State Department Skeptical 

Washington, October .31. — The State Department, still without direct word 
of the incident, commented today it was hard to understand the charges on 
which Consul General Ward and four of his staff had been arrested. The 
consulate was said to have been under Communist guard for the past year. 

An oflicial said INIr. Clubb had been asked to go to the "highest Chinese Com- 
munist authorities" for a report. 

Michael J. IMcDemott, chief press officer of the State Department, said : 

"It is difficult to understand how this incident could have occurred, since 
Mr. Ward and the entire consul general staif have been under strong guard ever 
since the Communists seized the city last November. Communist guards have 
been on duty both inside and outside the two residential compounds and the con- 
sul general's office. Consul General Clubb at Peiping has not yet reported on 
his efforts to take up the matter with the highest Chinese Communists authori- 
ties in Peiping." 



Exhibit No. 526 

[From the New York Times, Sunday, November 6, 1949] 

United States Demands Red China Fbee Five Held at Mukden 

Washington, November 5. — The United States has demanded that the highest 
Chinese Communist authorities help free live arrested members of the United 
States consulate in Mukden, it was disclosed today. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 22G9 

State Dopartiuont officials said that (). Edimiml Clulib, Fnitcd Statos consul 
goiioral in I'eipinp;, had nuido the rt'iJi-esentations to Cliou Endai, Forel{?n Min- 
istor of tlje Chinese Coninninist regime. 

Mr. Cliibl), in a letter left for Mr. Chou on Thursday, asked that the arrested 
men be freed and the entire consulate staff be allowed to leave China, as the 
Conunuuists had promised on July 24. 



ExHiuiT No. 527 

[From the New York Times, Friday, Novemljcr 11, 1040J 

Chinese Rkds Ignore United States Plea on Consii.s 

Washington, November 10. — The State Department said today that It had 
received no reply to its November 3 retiuest to the Chinese Communist authori- 
ties for the release of Angus "Ward, United States consul geenral in Miikdwn. and 
four members of his statl who were arrested October 24. 

A lengthy note was sent to Gen. Chou Kn-lai. foreign affairs chief for the 
Chinese Communists, by O. Ednumd Clubb, United States consul general in 
Peiping, a week ago today, and a spokesman for the State Department reported 
this noon that, "as far as we know," :Mr. Ward and his staff members are still 
being held. 

Mr. Clubb's letter followed fruitless efforts to see General Chou and oth^r 
high oflicials of the Chinese Communists responsii)le for the detention of the 
consul general and four Embassy employees, the State Department said. 

The latest message from jNIukden, dated November 5 and received here yes- 
terday, indicated that all requests to see any of the prisoners had lieen denied, 
but that specific appeals for packages of food and clothing had been permitted 
to go through to the four members of Mr. Ward's staff. 

Mr. Ward, however, has been prevented from sending out his version of the 
arrest. Several telegrams that the Mukden consular staff iiave tried to send to 
this country have b.'eii returned as "unsuitable for transmission." 



Exhibit No. .528 
[From the New York TiniPS, Thursflay, November 17, 1949] 

Acheson Protests Chungking Attack on American Ship — Complaint to 
Nationalists Hits Exoangeuing of Unitkd States Lives in Blockade Shell- 
ing — No Red Recognition Now — Arrests Cited hy Secretary— Bomb Threat 
TO Vessels in FoRjrosA Strait Ricported 

(By James Reston) 

Washington, November 10. — Secretary of State Dean Acheson protested to the 
Chinese Nationalist Government at Chungking today for endangering American 
lives in the shelling of the United States merchant vessel, Flying Cloud. 

At the same time, Mr, Acheson told his news conference that the United States 
would not even consider the possibility of recognizing the Chinese Communists 
until they let United States ofhcials out of jail in Mukden. 

The Secretary of State said he had not received an official report of the shell- 
ing incident in which Chinese Nationalist warships near Shanghai had ordered 
the Filling Cloud to halt, and then fired on her when she had refused to do so. 

He added, however, that he h::d read Walter Sullivan's first-hand account of 
the incident in this morning's New York Times, and had conjpl.-iiiied to the 
Chungking Government on the basis of that account. 

HUMANITARIAN ASPF.CT CITED 

The United States prote.st dealt purely with the humanitarian aspects of the 
incident and not with the Nationalists' legal position under a blockade that is not 
recognized by the United States Government. Mr. Acheson said these questions 
would be studied a iter an ofiicial report had been received. 

[An Associated Press dispatch from Tokyo said the Chinese Nationali-st Gov- 
ernment was reported to have issued a warning that its air force would bomb 
foreign shipping in the Strait of Formosa.] 



2270 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

•Although the Secretary in his first news conference after returning from 
Europe toolj a sliarp line on tbe Flyinc] Cloud incident, lie was even more pointed 
In his remarlfs on the refusal of the Chinese Communists to release Angus Ward, 
United States consul general, and four of his colleagues in Mukden, Manchuria. 
They were arrested last month on cliarges of having beaten a Chinese worker. 

There is now some reason for relieving that INIao Tze-tung, head of the Chinese 
regime in Peiping, is not in complete charge of the Communist authorities in 
Manchuria, where Mr. Ward and his associates are under arrest, and that addi- 
tional efforts will now be made to have the Soviet Union intercede witli Li Li-san, 
the Communist leader in Manchuria. 

The case of Mr. Ward and his four associates in Mukden — Ralph Rehberg, 
clerk ; Shiro Tatham, mechanic, and Franco Cicogna and Alfred Kristan, non- 
American employees of the consulate — is now understood to be affecting not only 
the relations between the t^uited States and the Chinese Communists but the 
relations between the Communists and other governments as well. 

JtATTER OF PKIMAEY CONCEKN 

Tlie detention of the consul general, Mr. Acheson said, was without any 
warrant whatsoever and is regarded here as a serious matter of primary con- 
cern to the United States Government. Mr. Ward is a 56-year-old Foreign 
Service officer with long experience in both Cliina and the Soviet Union. 

He was arrested on October 24 and is being held pending a hearing before a 
"People's Court" on charges of having assaulted a Chinese employee after a 
dispute over wages. These chai-ges have been characterized in official quarters 
here as "fantastic" and "absurd." 

The United States has received no reply to its protests over the matter. The 
United States consul at the headquarters of the Communist regime in Peiping, 
O. Edmund Clubb, addressed a letter to the Communist "Premier," Chou En-lai, 
on November 3, asking for the release of the Americans, but no answer to this 
letter has been received. 

]Mr. Acheson said today that the Russians had not been requested to intercede 
in the case. On the basis of the evidence that the Chinese Communists in the 
south are not in control of the situation in Mukden, however, the State Depart- 
ment is now considering a new approach to the Comnninist authorities in Man- 
churia, who are apparently under the direction of the Moscow-trained Li Li-san, 
and in closer contact with Soviet officials. 

SOVIET TO ACT IX KOREAN CASE 

Secretary Acheson told his press conference that the Russians had agreed to 
take up with the North Korean Communist regime the release of two Economic 
Cooperation Administration officials, Alfred P. Meschter and Albert Willis, who 
have been detained there since September 22. 

IMoscow at first did not respond to United States requests for aid in getting 
the two American ECA officials out of Communist-dominated North Korea, but 
on the basis of their agreement to do so, received today, there is renewed hope 
at the State Department that this approach may open up new possibilities in the 
Ward case. 

Meanwhile, the question of recognizing the Chinese Communists is being held 
up, not only here but in other capitals as well. Mr. Acheson said that he had 
discussed the recognition question with Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin of 
Britain and Foreign INIinister Robert Schuman of France, but that he had not 
requested Mr. Bevin to delay recognition. - • 

Despite this statement, however, it is noted here that the British seem some- 
what less eager to hurry i-ecognition of the Communists than they were a couple 
of weeks ago. They are known to have been doing some informal diplomatic 
exploring to see whether early recognition might have any effect in preserving 
British interests in Hong Kong. They are also known to have been talking not 
ninny days ago about recognizing the Communists after the close of the current 
meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. 

Now, however, altlumgh the diplomatic representatives of the British Common- 
wealth recently met and decided to recommend recognition, the new line is that 
Britain probably will not recognize the Connnunists until after another meeting 
of British officials in the Far East early in the new year. 

]\Ir. Acheson did not speak about the shelling of the American merchantman 
near Shanghai with quite the same acidity as he did in discussing the Ward 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2271 

case, but he difl make clear that the United States Government took a dim view 
of the Flijiiig Cloud incident. 

When asked for comment on the shellins of the American ship, lie said tliat 
he had not yet received any official report on it but had read the very full account 
of it from Mr. Sullivan, the New York Times correspondent, who was aboard the 
Flying Cloud. 

The Secretary of State said that his protest to the Chinese Na(i(uialists would 
not go into the question of the lejJiality of the blockade proclaimed by the (.'Inuig- 
king government. Other questions, he said, would arise after an official reiwrt 
had been received, but meanwhile, knowing "Mr. Sullivan's high qualities," he 
had no doubt that the Times' story was accurate. 

The Secretary expressed the hope that Ambassador Philip C. Jcssup would soon 
go to the Far East in order to review United States Government policy in that 
region. A definite decision on this mission, he added, would probably be made 
within the next few days after consultations with President Truman. 



Exhibit No. .529 

[From the New York Times, Monday, November 21, 1940] 

Ward Case Action by United States Due Today — Pleas to Soviet, British, and 
French and Move in U. N. Under Consideration 

(By James Reston) 

Washington, November 20. — The United States is expected to decide tomor- 
row on various courses of action designed to persuade the Chinese Communists 
to release Angus I. Ward, the United States consul general under a'rrest in Muk- 
den, Manchuria. 

Action under consideration at the State Department over the weekend was 
known to include the following : 

1. New instructions to the United States consul general at Chinese Commu- 
nist lieadquarters in Peiping.to make another effort to see Premier Chou En-lai, 
who is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs in the regime of Mao Tze-tung. 

2. An appeal to the British and French Governments to have their representa- 
tives in Mukden intercede with Chinese officials there for the release of Mr. 
Ward, who was arrested on October 24 on charges of having assaulted a Chinese 
employee of the United States consulate. 

8. A simultaneous appeal to the Soviet Government to use its good offices on 
behalf of Mi-. Ward's release. 

4. An elaboration of the case before the United Nations General Assembly, now 
meeting in New York. 

It is hoped here that by direct negotiations with the Communist regime in Peii> 
ing and indirect appeals through the Russians, British, and French in Mukden, 
Mr. Ward will be released. 

recognition ban 

If these negotiations do not achieve their objectives, however, some officials in 
the State Department believe that the United States should urge the United 
Nations Cicneral Assembly to adopt a resolution recommending that recognition 
of the Chinese Communist regime should be withheld by all member states of the 
United Nations until the Chinese Communists demonstrated in the Ward case 
that they were prepared to meet their international obligations to officials of 
foreign governments. 

The- feeling in official quarters here is that, even if the United States did not 
ask United Nations members to refrain from sending ambassadors to the Chinese 
Communist regime, an appeal could be made to the United Nations on the ground 
that the Chinese Communists were violating human riglits supported by United 
Nations members. 

Plans for Ambassador Philip C. Jessup to go to the Far East for a review of 
United States policy in that region are now virtually completed, but he appar- 
ently has no intention of going into Communist-held China. 

He plans to sail witii his wife and secretary for the Far East between Decem- 
ber 1.") and 20 if liis obligations at the United Nations will albiw him to sail 
that early. 



2272 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

STUDIES COMPLETED 

Ambassador Jessup has completed his preliminary studies of Far Eastern 
policy. He has reviewed all present aspects of United States policy in that 
region not only with Government officials but with a number of prominent private 
citizens, who have special knowledge of the far eastern question. 

These included former Secretary of State George C. Marshall, John K. Fair- 
bank, of the committee on international and regional studies at Harvard Uni- 
versity ; Bernard Brodie, department of international relations, Yale University ; 
Owen Lattimore, director of the Walter Hines Page School of International 
Relations at Johns Hopkins University. Harold Stassen, former Governor of 
Minnesota, and now president of the University of Pennsylvania, gave his views 
on the far eastern question to Ambassador Jessup last month. 



Exhibit No. 530 

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, November 22, 1949] 

Text of United States Note to 30 Nations Ueginq Ward Case Action 

Washington, November 21. — The text of the State Department announcement 
on Secretary of State Dean Acheson's message to 30 foreign governments on the 
Angus Ward case follows : 

The following is the text of a personal message from Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson to the foreign ministers of all countries which have either diplomatic 
or consular representatives in China. The United States chiefs of mission at the 
posts listed below were instructed on the night of November IS to deliver the 
messages to the respective foreign ministers urgently : 

Ankara (Turkey), Athens (Greece), Bangkok (Siam), Berne (Switzerland), 
Brussels (Belgium), Bucharest (Rumania), Cairo (Egypt), Canberra (Aus- 
tralia), Caracas (Venezuela), Copenhagen (Denmark), Habana (Cuba), the 
Hague (the Netherlands), Lima (Peru), Lisbon (Spain), 'London (England), 
Jlanila (the Philippines), IMexico City (Mexico), IMoscow (Russia), New Delhi 
(India), Oslo (Norway), Ottawa (Canada), Panama City (Panama), Paris 
(France), Prague (Czechoslovakia), Rangoon (Burma), Rome (Italy), Sofia 
(Bulgaria), Stockholm (Sweden), Vienna (Austria), and Warsaw (Poland). 

concerted action 

"I would like to emphasize the importance of concerted action by those govern- 
ments which respect international law to protest the treatment being accorded 
United States consular personnel in IMukden, China. 

"Since late November VMS the United States consular staff and their families 
have been detained under house arrest inside the consular compounds. All com- 
munication between the staff and the United States Government have been 
strictly controlled by the local authorities, and there was one period of almost 
7 months when no communication of any kind was possible. 

"At the present time communication is permitted only at the will of the local 
authorities and it is not possible for the consular staff to report their situation 
in an effective manner. 

"Because of this treatment it was impossible for the consulate to perform any 
of its functions, and on May 19, 1949, the United States consul general at Peiping 
under instructions from the United States Government, notified the appropriate 
authorities there that the consulate was being closed and asked that arrange- 
ments be made for the safe exit of the consular personnel and their families. 

"On June 21, 1949, the Communist authorities at Mukden notified the consul 
general that he and his staff would be permitted to depart and that transportation 
facilities would be made available. 

NO REPORT permitted 

"These assurances have not been honored. On October 25 the Chinese Com- 
munist press and radio announced that Counsel General Angus Ward and four 
members of his staff had been arrested on October 24, 1949. So far as is 
J^nown they have been in prison since that time. 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2273 

"The local aulhoriHes at Mnkdon have not pprmittod tJie consular staff to 
make a report concerninj; the fads In the case. So far as this (Jovernment has 
heen ahle to determine, the consular staff has not heen iienuitteri to ^etin touch 
-with Mr. Ward or the four meniljers of his stalf and has not heen infornjed 
of the date of aiij hearing which may he held or permitted to make arrange- 
ments to protect Mr. Ward's interest at such iicjirinf^s. 

"This (loverniuent has not l)ei'ii informed in any way, except hy press and 
radio reports, of the reasons for the arrest of I\Ir. Ward and tlie four memhers 
of his staff. The efforts of the United States consul jreneral at I'eiping to 
determine the facts in the case and secure the release of Mr. Ward and the 
others have heen completely ign<n-ed. 

"The treatment accorded to Mr. Ward and to the American ccmsular staff in 
Mulvden is in direct violation of the hasic concepts of international relations which 
have heen developed throughout the centuries. As such, it is of direct and 
immediate concern to all countries interested in diplomatic intercourse, particu- 
larly to those with missions or consulates in (^hina. 

"I ask you. as a matter of urgency, to express to the hi.uhest Chinese authori- 
ties in Peipins through such channels as may he availahle to you the concei'n 
which your government undouhtedly feels over the treatment of the American 
consular staff in ^Mukden who have been arbitrarily deprived of their freedom 
for one year. 

"I am sending a similar communication to the foreign ministers of other coun- 
tries which have representatives in China. 

"The international practice of civilized countries for many years has recognized 
that consuls should be accorded all the privileges necessary for the proper 
conduct of their duties. Although consuls do not have diplomatic innnunity, 
it has been the universal practice, because of tlie public and official character 
of their duties, to permit them and their staff freedom of movement, and in the 
event that any criminal charge is made, to permit them to remain at liberty on 
proper arrangements for bail, with unlimited freedom to communicate with 
their governments with respect to official business." 



Exhibit No. 5.31 

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, November 22, 1949] 

United States Bids 30 Nations Pkotest to Peipixg on Arrest of Ward — Note 
Asks Coi^ntries to State Concern at Violation of Basic Concepts of World 
Ties — Action Is Unprecedented — Acheson Says Chinese Reds Still Bar 
News on Mukden Consul and Four Aides 

By Clayton Knowles 

Washington, November 21. — The United States made a bid today for a world- 
wide protest to the Chinese Communists against the ill treatment of the American 
consular staff at Mukden during the past year. This treatment was capped 
last month by the imprisonment of Angus Ward, the consul general, and four 
others. 

In a note to 30 nations in every quarter of the globe, including the Soviet 
Union and 4 others within its sphere of influence. Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson asked, that they express to the highest authorities at Peiping their 
concern over a "direct violation of the basic concepts of international relati<ms." 

This action, without known precedent in State Department annals, emphasized 
the urgency and importance of "concerted action by those countries which re- 
spect international law." 

The note, dispatched Friday to all nations maintaining diplomatic or consular 
representatives in China was kept a closely guarded secret until shortly after 
noon today. 

REACTION IS FAVORAHLE 

The immediate reaction to the note here was favorable. Many considered the 
Secretary, while hoping the note itself would bear fruit, was intent upon building 
a case for presentation of the matter to the United Nations, Senator Irving M, 
Ives, Republican, of New York, took this line. 



2274 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

He said this country "sliould use every legitimate pressure we can apply to 
bring about Mr. Ward's release" and envisaged an ultimate appeal directly to 
the United 'Nations. 

[Distribution to United Nations delegations of a message from the Chinese 
Communist regime calling for the unseating of the Nationalist delegation was 
ordered Monday by Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Komulo, President of the General 
Assembly.] 

In the note, the Secretary, beset on all sides with demands for action, said 
the entire consular staff and their families had been detained under house arrest 
inside the consular compounds since November 1948. 

He stated that all communications between the staff and the United States 
had been strictly controlled by local authorities and that for one 7-month period 
no communication of any liind had been possible. 

With Mr. Wai'd and four of his staff held incommunicado in jail, the Secre- 
tary declared that it was not even now possible for others of the staff "to report 
their situation in an effective manner." 

SAYS PROMISE WAS NOT KEPT 

This present tense situation, the Secretary told the other nations, came about 
after the Chinese Communist authorities had reneged on a promise made last 
June, to permit the departure of the consul general and his staff and to provide 
the necessary transportation. 

Withdrawal of the consular staff, the Secretary recalled, had been decided upon 
last May 19 after it had become apparent that it could not possibly function 
properly under the restrictions that had been imposed. 

The first this country learned of the imprisonment of Mr. Ward and the others 
came from Chinese press and radio announcements of the arrests on October 25, 
a day after the event. 

"This Government has not been informed in any way, except by press and 
radio reports," the note said, "of the reasons for the arrest of Mr. Ward and the 
four members of his staff. The efforts of the United States consul general at 
Peiping to determine the facts in the case and secure the release of Mr. Ward 
and the others have been completely ignored." 

Even as the text of the note was released, the department reported that William 
N. Stokes, vice consul at Mukden, had reported that he was still unable to obtain 
permission to visit the prisoners and get their version of what had happened. 

Chinese news sources reported that the consular official had been jailed for 
beating a former Chinese employee when he protested dismissal without sever- 
ance pay. 

As a breach of fundamental concepts of international relations, Mr. Acheson 
said, the whole episode was "of direct and immediate concern to all countries 
interested in diplomatic intercourse, particularly to those with missions or con- 
sulates in China." 

The State Department announced, meanwhile, that the United States Embassy 
staff", evacuated from Chungking to Hong Kong, was awaiting the decision of 
the Chinese Nationalist Government on the site of a new capital. Tlie implica- 
tion of the announcement was that, when a site was selected, the Embassy would 
be reopened there. 

Michael J. McDermott, Department press ofiicer, noted that a similar course 
had been followed when the Embassy staff had been evacuated from Canton to 
Hong Kong in August. 



Exhibit No. 532 
[From the New York Times, Thursday, November 24, 1949] 

Communists Release Ward, Order Him To Lea^-e China — Consul, 4 Aides 
Receive Suspended Sentences of 3 to 6 Months 

(By Walter H. Waggoner) 

Washington, November 23. — The State Department announced today that the 
Chinese Communists in Mukden had freed Consul General Angus Ward and 
ordered him to leave the country. 

Mr. Ward and 4 members of his consulate staff — 2 of them Americans — were 
Imprisoned on October 24 on charges of having beaten a Chinese employee. All 
5 were found guilty by a People's Court, according to the State Department, and 



INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 2275 

sentenced to prison terms ranging from S to G months, witli 1 year parole. All 
sentences were coinninted to doiiortatum, however, and tlie five were released to 
yesterday, according to reports to the State Department. 

INIr. Ward and his staff had been trying for several months to leave Mnkden, 
after a decision by the State Department last November to close the Mnkden con- 
sulate. In spite of promises of cooi)eratiou by the Communist authorities, tlie 
consul general had been unable to obtain transportation fur his departure. 

The consul general reported his.freedom and details of his release in a personal 
telephone call to O. Edmund Clubb, United States consul general in Peiping. Mr. 
Clubb relayed the information to the State Department, with the advice that the 
five men all were "up and about." 

The' Department promptly instructed Mr. Cliibb to tell Mr. Ward and his entire 
staff to "depart from Mukden forthwith." 

Imprisoned with Consul General Wartl were Kalph Rehberg, a Foreign Service 
clerk, of Rochester, N. Y. ; Shiro Tatsumi, a Japanese-American mechanic ; Franco 
Cicognia, and Alfred Kristan. The last two are European employees of the 
consulate. 

The State Department announcement followed earlier reports from Allegan, 
Mich., and Rochester, N. Y., where the families of Mr. Ward and Mr. Rehberg had 
already been notified of their release. 

Mr. Ward was sentenced by the People's Court to 6 months imprisonment; 
Messrs. Rehberg and Kristan, 4 months imprisonment, and Messrs. Tatsumi and 
Cicognia, 3 months imprisonment. All were granted a year's parole, and all 
sentences were then commuted to deportation. 

Mr. Ward also reported to Mr. Clubb that, in addition to the charge of assault 
against the Chinese worker, he was charged with "certain financial obligations, 
including compensation to the injured, severance pay, and extra salary payments." 

"The latter two charges," the State Department said, "apparently are in con- 
neftion with closure of the consulate and discharge of the staff." 

The alleged beating was said to have taken place on October 11, but the State 
Department said today that it still had not received Mr. Ward's telegraphic 
report of "what actually happened" on that day and up to the time of the arrests. 

EFFECT OF APPEAL INDICATED 

D?partnient officials were inclined to withhold comment today on the reason 
for Mr. Ward's release, explaining that the consul general was not yet out of 
the country and implying that nothing should be said that might jeopardize his 
prompt departure. 

There was a feeling in some quarters, however, that the appeal for help made 
to 30 countries by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on Monday had played a 
significant part in the release of the imprisoned consulate members 2 days later. 
The possibility that recognition would be withheld from the Chinese Commu- 
nist regime, not only by the United States but by others moi-e likely to grant it, 
unless Mr. Ward was released was also seen as a factor contributing to yester- 
day's action. 

Secretary Acheson told a news conference 2 weeks ago that there would be 
no consideration of recognizing the Communist regime while ]Mr. Ward and his 
associates were imprisoned. In his 30-uation appeal of Monday he asked that 
the governments express their "concern" over the treatment of the consul 
general by the Mukden Communists. 

Officials here said it was probable Mr. Ward would go by rail to Tientsin 
and then by sea to Hong Kong or Korea. From there his journey would probably 
be by air to the United States. 

They added that there were no plans for Mr. Ward's reassignment at this time. 
He and his fellow prisoners have at least 60' days of leave due them, plus what- 
ever extra leave is necessary for rest, hospitalization, or medical care. 



British Approached Reds 

LoNDOX, November 23 (AP) — A day or two before Mr. Ward and his four 
aides were released by the Chinese Communists, Britain expres.sed her concern 
to the Communist governinejit over the Unittnl States diplomat's arrest and 
mouth-long detention. 



2276 INTERLOCKING SUBVERSION IN GOVERNMENT 

A Foreign Office spokesman disclosed this toniglit and added that "unofficial 
channels" had been used to convey the British views to the Communists. He 
refused to say what those "unofficial channels" were. 

It is an open secret that Britain maintains contacts with the Peiping authori- 
ties on various matters. 

Senator Welker. May I inform the committee's staff and those of 
you who came here to hear the testimony that I will send the record 
of this hearing to tlie Department of Justice. I am convinced that 
our committee unanimously will ask vigorous, honest, fair prosecution 
as a result of these hearings. 

Those of you who would desire to see the photographs, the closest 
things that are here on the wall, you have a perfect right to do so. 

In saying goodbye to you, I want to say I appreciate the fact that 
you came out here to hear what little we could do to try to protect you. 
I am happy to have been here ; my adopted State, California. 

Thank you. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

("Whereupon, at 5:25 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene 
subject to call of the Chair.) 

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