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Full text of "An introduction to Mahayana Buddhism, with especial reference to Chinese and Japanese phases"

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an introduction to 
mahAyana buddhism 



With especial Reference to 

Chinese and Japanese 

Phases 

BY 

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY McGOVERN, Ph. D. 

Lecturer on Japanese and Chinese at the 
School of Oriental Studies {University of London) ; 
Priest of the Nishi Honganji, Kyoto, Japan 
Author of Modern Japan, Colloquial Japanese, 
Elements of Japanese Writing, etc., etc. 



LONDON : 
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & CO., LTD. 
NEW YORK: E. P. DUTTON & CO. 
1922 






6^ 

/ ^2:2 



DEDICATION 

TO 
MRS. C. A. F. RHYS-DAVIDS, M.A., D.LITT. 

Dear Mrs. Rhys-Davids, 

In dedicating to you this exposition of the 
bare essentials of the Mahayana philosophy, I 
feel that I must explain something of its scope 
and aim. 

In its original form the present work was part 
of a thesis which, when presented to the Japanese 
cathedral, the Nishi Honganji, secured me my 
Buddhist degree, and an honorary ordination as 
a Buddhist priest. In consequence I hope that 
it may be considered to represent, as far as it 
goes, what the Japanese Buddhists believe to 
be true, and what they consider accurate. 

In presenting the book in a new dress before 
the Western public, a good deal of revision has 
taken place, but this has been chiefly a matter 
of omission and simplification. All technical 
details have been deleted, and any unusual 
idea or term has had placed after it a few words of 
elementary elucidation. 



^^ 



iv DEDICATION 

I have called it an " introduction " for three 
reasons. First, because it is intended for a guide 
to the general reader of average education, who 
does not care to go into details ; second, because 
it is intended also to point out the chief sign- 
posts to those who desire to take up the subject 
somewhat more seriously ; and third, because 
it serves as a preface to my longer, more serious, 
and more ambitious book on Buddhism, which is 
now in preparation. 

Finally, may I add that though working at 
Buddhism through Chinese rather than Pali 
sources, and from the Mahayana rather than the 
HJnayana point of view, with the consequence 
that I am afraid that you will not always agree 
with my presentation, yet I wish to thank you 
most heartily for your encouragement, discussion, 
and occasional advice. 

Yours sincerely, 

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY MCGOVERN. 
Christ Church, Oxford. 



CONTENTS 



CHAP. PAGE 

INTEODUCTION ; the doctrinal 

EVOLUTION OF BUDDHISM . . I 

I. EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC . . . . 32 

II. THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE AND 

ITS RELATION TO THE UNIVERSE 48 

III. THE TRIKA"yA — THE BUDDHIST 

DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY . . J^ 

IV. THE NATURE AND POWERS OF 

BUDDHAHOOD . . . . • • 99 

V. PSYCHOLOGY — ELEMENTS OF EXIST- 
ENCE 132 

VI. THE WHEEL OF LIFE AND THE ROAD 

TO NIRVANA 1 53 

CONCLUSION: A short history 

OF BUDDHISM AND THE PRINCIPAL 
BUDDHIST SECTS .. .. .. 180 

APPENDIX : the sacred litera- 

TL^RE OF THE BUDDHISTS .. 2! 5 



INTEODUCTION 

THE DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION OF 
BUDDHISM 

Buddhism is divided into two great schools, 
Mahayana and Hinayana. Both systems origi- 
nated in India, but since the former predomi- 
nates in China, Japan, Nepal, and, in a modified 
form, in Tibet and Mongolia, while the latter is 
confined almost exclusively to Ceylon, Burma, 
and Siam, they are often, and rather incorrectly, 
known as Northern and Southern Buddhism. 

Mahayana is again divided into unreformed 
and reformed branches, the unreformed branch 
being found all over Eastern Asia, while there- 
formed branch has its centre in Japan. Eoughly, 
we may compare these divisions of Buddhism 
to those of the principal Occidental faiths. Hina- 
yana, or the earlier and more primitive form of 
Buddhism, corresponds to Judaism ; Unreformed 
Mahayana to Catholicism, and Reformed Maha- 
yana to Protestantism. 

Of recent years, owing to the labours of such 
scholars as Spence Hardy, Gogerly, Prof, and Mrs. 



2 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAY AN A BUDDHISM 

Khys-Davids, etc., Hinayana has become more 
or less known to the Western world, but Maha- 
yana still awaits adequate treatment. Different 
scholars in dealing with Mahayana have spoken 
of it as a ritualistic and animistic degeneration 
of Hinayana ; as sophistic nihilism, as mystic 
pantheism. They have claimed it to be now 
monotheistic, now polytheistic, now atheistic ; or 
finally, they have contented themselves with 
stating that it is a vast mass of contradictory 
ideas, unassimilated and undefined. 

It is obvious that all of these descriptions can 
not be true, while the historical importance of 
the Mahayana philosophy renders it imperative 
to attempt some more concise interpretation of 
its essential elements, for as Christians far out- 
number Jews, so do Mahayanists far outnumber 
Hinayanists ; as Christianity has had far more 
important cultural connections than Judaism, so 
has Mahayana, at the expense of Hinayana, 
ineffaceably linked itself with the civilizations of 
vast parts of Asia ; and as the early fathers of 
the Christian Church and the schoolmen of the 
Middle Ages built up a religious and philosophic 
system far more important than the ideas ex- 
pressed in Eabbinic schools, so is Mahayana the 
outcome of centuries of speculative development, 



INTRODUCTION 3 

enriched by materials from all sources, and ex- 
pounded by the great bulk of the ancient meta- 
physicians of India and China, while Hina- 
yana has remained far more narrow and confined 
in its philosophic evolution. 

Indian TJiought at the Time of the Buddha. 

Any adequate understanding of Mahayana 
must be based upon a comprehension of the 
stages of its development, of the processes by 
which it differentiated itself from the more primi- 
tive Hinayana, of the relation of the latter to 
pristine Buddhism, and of the place of this 
pristine Buddhism in Indian thought. 

The period in which Gautama or ^akyamuni, 
the historical founder of Buddhism, lived (some 
five and a half centuries B.C.) was in many ways 
an interesting one. The earlier child-like beliefs 
of the Vedas had dwindled, and the implicit 
acceptance of the primeval_deities had given way, 
at least among the educated classes, to a keen 
discussion, from a mystico-rationalist point of 
view of the essential problems of existence. It 
was the age of the formulation of metaphysical 
systems. Bands of mendicant teachers went 
forth proclaiming new syntheses of knowledge, 
new outlooks on life. 



4 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

These Indian philosophers, like their contem- 
porary Occidental brethren, were primarily con- 
cerned with problems relating to (I) the nature 
of ultimate reality, and (II) methods of ascertain- 
ing truth. 

I. — Just as the early Greek philosophers were 
divided into (a) a School of Naive Eealists, (6) a 
School of Being, and (c) a School of Becoming, so 
did the Indians divide themselves into (1) those 
who followed the Vedic hymns and accepted the 
universe at its face value, (2) those who taught 
that the ultimate nature of things is quiescent and 
changeless, that beyond the realm of fluctuating 
phenomena is the realm of the absolute, in which 
there is no space and time, but only an eternal 
present, and (3) those who taught that change, 
flux, becoming, integration and disintegration, 
are inherent in the nature of things ; that no 
thing ever remains the same for two consecutive 
moments ; that even the Absolute is ever evolv- 
ing and becoming. 

II. — Consequent upon these differences of out- 
look upon the nature of reality, there arose widely 
divergent theories concerning the basis of truth : 

(1) Truth through sense impression. In early 
days man instinctively believed in the validity 



INTRODUCTION 5 

of his sense impressions. All things were sup- 
posed to be exactly as we see them, and absolute 
truth was to be gained by experience. 

(2) Truth through reason. Gradually, however, 
as the limitations of the senses come to be felt, 
it is recognized that the ceaseless change of the 
phenomenal world prevents our obtaining an 
insight into its nature by means of the senses. 
But the school of Being represented by the 
Upanishads taught that man's soul is not of the 
phenomenal but of the noumenal world, that he 
might, through the exercise of his mental 
powers, gain a direct insight into the 
ultimate nature of reality. This Vedanta doc- 
trine corresponds very closely to certain phases 
of Plato's theory of knowledge. 

(3) Truth through psychological analysis. — 
While the Vedantins and Plato were content to 
accept the validity of reason, supported, no doubt, 
by the seeming absolutivity of mathematics, the 
Indian school of Becoming came to regard the 
mind, not as an independent, unconditioned, and 
eternal entity having a direct insight into truth, 
but as a limited, caused, confined, and con- 
ditioned organism whose data are of purely rela- 
tive value. Acute analysis of the functions of 
consciousness no doubt aided this conception, 



6 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAY AN A BUDDHISM 

and the conflicting nature of all reasoning seemed 
to support it. In spite of age-long disputes, no 
two systems of philosophy agreed, and no single 
rational doctrine could claim universal accept- 
ance. 

Consequently, only the immediate data of 
consciousness could claim assured validity. We 
have no means of ascertaining whether or not 
these data correspond to ultimate reality, or are 
logically consistent, but of the reality of feelings 
qua feelings, there can be no doubt. 

Primitive Buddhism. 

Primitive Buddhism, so far as we can judge 
its doctrines by means of higher criticism of the 
various recensions of the Siitra Pitaka, was the 
supreme example of the Indian Becoming philo- 
soi)hy. Change was the foundation stone on 
which its metaphysic rested. The body was 
considered a living complex organism, possessing 
no self -nature. The nature of the mind was sup- 
posed to be analogous. The percipient conscious- 
ness had no direct insight into truth through a 
stable and transcendent reason, but was a com- 
pound effected by the chain of causality, and 
conditioned by its environment. 

Consequently at the outset Buddhism assumed 
an agnostic position concerning transcendental 



INTRODUCTION 7 

problems. " These problems the Blessed One 
has left unelucidated, has set aside, has rejected 
— that the world is eternal, that the world is not 
eternal, that the world is finite, that the world 
is infinite, etc." 

In a word. Buddhism insisted that we can only- 
deal with facts and data of which we are imme- 
diately conscious ; with states of consciousness ; 
with an analysis of the emotions ; with the 
universe as perceived as opposed to the universe 
as it is. 

The doctrines of primitive Buddhism are all in 
accordance with this psychological basis, as may 
be seen by examining its theory of the Three 
Marks and the Four Noble Truths. 

The Three Marks are not doctrines which are 
to be accepted on faith, or as the result of logical 
reasoning, but are considered the essential charac- 
teristics of life as recognized by every day 
perceptual and emotional experience. 

They are : " (1) All is impermanent. (2) All 
is sorrowful. (3) All is lacking a self." This 
last phrase refers not only to the soul, but to 
the universe as a whole. It consists not of 
simple or self-existing things, but of complex, 
caused, conditioned things. The fourth mark, 
Nirvana, is no less psychological. By means of 



8 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

contemplation certain forms of Samadhi, trance, 
or ecstasy were experienced. Magnify the ex- 
perience, consider it permanent, associate with it 
the abolition of sorrow, sin, and ignorance, and 
the theory of Nirvana is formulated, for it must 
be remembered that originally Nirvana is purely 
a state of mind. 

The so-called four Noble Truths are derived 
from the same basic ideas. Transformed from 
an ancient Indian medical rune, they are: — (L) 
Suffering exists. (2) The cause of suffering is 
desire (and ignorance). (3) There is a possible 
end of suffering — Nirvana. (4) This end may be 
achieved by following the Noble Eight-fold Path, 
which consists of (a) right knowledge, (b) right 
aspiration, (c) right speech, (d) right conduct, 
(e) right means of livelihood, (f ) right endeavour, 
(g) right mindfulness, and (h) right meditation. 

The first and third " truths " (suffering and 
Nirvana) are the same as the second and fourth 
" marks." The fourth (the path to Nirvana) is 
purely a point of ethics, and does not at present 
concern us. The second (the cause of suffering) 
is the most important, and contains the seed of a 
very complete phenomenology, for at a very 
early stage " suffering " became, in this instance, 
synonymous with life, and this " truth " was 



JNTR09UCTI9N 9 

supposed to explain the origin of the experienced 
world — the experienced universe, let it be noted, 
for early Buddhism had no interest in the origin 
of the external universe. 

Primitive Buddhism though agnostic was 
probably realistically inclined. It believed that 
there is an external universe closely corresponding 
to our sense-data, but it realized that in its 
present form the world as we see it is subjective, 
the result of the percipient consciousness 
(vijndna) acted upon by external stimuli. 

The theory of the origin, awakening, and 
development of the Vijhana is explained in the 
obscure Pratitya Samutpdda, or the twelve-linked 
chain of causation. This, though differently ex- 
plained by the various schools of Buddhism, 
always consists of : — 

(1) Ignorance. 

(2) Action. 

(3) Consciousness. 

(4) Name and Form. 

(5) The Senses. 

(6) Contact. 

(7) Sensation. 

(8) Craving. 

(9) Attachment. 

(10) Becoming. 

(11) Birth. 

(12) Old age, disease, and death. 



10 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

The origin of the percipient consciousness is 
ignorance and desire. Without these the indi- 
vidual consciousness would disintegrate, and 
though the experienced universe cannot exist 
without object, it equally cannot exist without 
subject. Consequently when an Arhat (one who 
has attained Mrvana) dies, the experienced world 
for that person comes to an end. 

It will be seen from this that there is a close 
connection between cause and effect. This law 
Buddhism calls Karma, and is one of the funda- 
mental features of the Buddhist faith. Among 
the innumerable divisions of Karma we find the 
following : — 

Des/'re 

Ac//o/j ^ — ^ ffeju/f 

^- 

Another such threefold classification is : — 

1. The Seed. {Retu). 

2. Environment or attendant circumstances. 

(Pratyaya). 

3. The result or fruit. (PJiala). 

The doctrine of Andtman prevents the belief 
in the persistence of the undying personality, 
while the doctrine of Karma, on the other hand, 
demands that there be something that can reap 
the result of a man's good or bad deeds. Accord- 



INTRODUCTION II 

ingly the early Buddhists taught that the fruit 
of a man's deeds will cause the birth of a new 
personality after the dissolution of the old. This 
birth may be in one of the numerous heavens or 
hells, or it may be on the earth again. 
Hlnaydna Buddhism. 

The philosophy of primitive or pristine Budd- 
hism became crystallized in Hinayana Buddhism, 
the Orthodox branch of the faith which was 
matured during the period from the death of the 
Buddha down to about the time of the beginning 
of the Christian era, after which it had to compete 
with the newly-developed Mahayana. Hinayana 
itself was by no means unified, for shortly after 
the death of Gautama it broke up into a number 
of sects, with widely varying interpretations of 
the earlier philosophy. Out of the eighteen or 
twenty such Hinayana sects, two only require 
especial attention at the present time. These 
are, first, the Sthaviravadins (Pali Thervadins), 
and, second, the Sarvastivadins. 

The former is probably the school which keeps 
nearest to the tenets of early Buddhism, but 
soon lost its hold over India proper, 
though it has always maintained itself in Ceylon, 
Burma, and Siam. The Sarvastivadins were of 
a more scholastic nature. They transformed 



12 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

Buddhism into a complete and consistent 
philosophy, and wrote in or translated their 
works into classical Sanskrit, while the more 
simple Sthaviravadins retained the more collo- 
quial, popular, and vulgar Pali. The Sarvas- 
tivadins seem to have gained the upper hand in 
India some time before the birth of Christ, and 
long remained the most important school of 
Indian Hinayana. Most of the Hinayana works 
translated into foreign tongues, such as Chinese 
or Tibetan, belonged to this school, and though 
as a separate school it almost expired with the 
extinction of Buddhism in India, it had an 
enormous influence on the philosophic develop- 
ment of the later sects which survived. In fact, 
the Sarvastivadins may be called the Hinayana 
school par excellence. 

Even the more primitive Sthaviravadin school, 
which prides itself upon its maintenance of the 
letter of the law as preached by Qakyamuni, has 
added several important features. The most 
essential point is that in practice it has abandoned 
the agnosticism of the earlier faith, and depending 
upon the fidelity of sense impressions proceeded 
to systematize objective phenomena. Thus, for 
example, it accepted, in a somewhat modified 
form, the ancient cosmography of India, with its 



INTRODUCTION 13 

geography, astronomy, and account of the in- 
tegration and disintegration of the material {i.e., 
external) universe. Where primitive Buddhism 
had ignored, the Sthaviravadins denied, the 
existence of an Absolute. Those problems which 
the early Buddhists has rejected as being irrele- 
vant were answered by the Sthaviravadins, even 
though the answers were relegated to the body 
of relative, as opposed to absolute, truth. The 
latter consisted only of such doctrines as the 
three marks and the four noble truths. 

One of the most important steps to be taken 
was the analysis of the parts of being, approached 
in the first place from the psychological point of 
view. Early Buddhism had taught that instead 
of an ego entity, the personality consisted of five 
constituent parts (skandha), viz. : — Rupa (Form, 
i.e., the body) ; Vedand (sensation or feeling) ; 
Samjnd (conception) ; SamsMra (here meaning 
various mental qualities) ; and Vijndna (con- 
sciousness). The Sthaviravadins divided Form, 
the material world, into 27 or 28 parts ; Sensa- 
tion into 3 or 5 ; Conception into 6 ; Mental 
Qualities into 52 ; and Consciousness into 89 
parts. 

These divisions were the result of introspective 
analysis, but they were considered absolute and 



14 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

final. These several divisions constituted the 
unchanging elements of existence from which all 
phenomena are compounded. Buddhism was 
thus transformed from an agnostic and positivist 
system, concerned only with suffering and the 
alleviation of suffering, into a realistic and 
materialistic philosophy, though the transforma- 
tion was gradual and could hardly have been 
recognized at the time, for early Buddhism per- 
mitted the analysis of subjective states, and the 
elements of existence of the Sthaviravadins were 
enunciated by merely subdividing the divisions 
of early Buddhism, while maintaining the sub- 
jective or psychological point of view. 

The Sarvastivadins are to the Sthaviravadins 
what the Sthaviravadins were to primitive Budd- 
hism. The materialism and realism of the Stha- 
viravadins was made more explicit and categori- 
cal ; the agnostic and psychological aspect was 
largely lost sight of. Buddhism thus became a 
definite and rigid philosophic system, instead of 
remaining a body of truths which were effective 
irrespective of metaphysics. A most important 
step was made when the elements of existence 
were classified from an external or objective as 
well as from a subjective point of view. The older 
or subjective classification was retained (though 



INTRODUCTION 15 

the subdivisions of each skandha were somewhat 
different from those of the Sthaviravadins), but 
the subdivisions were re-arranged in such a way 
as to constitute a complete analysis of the 
external universe. 

According to the Abhidharma Ko§a these 
elements (or dharma) are 75 in number, classified 
in the following way : — 

1. Unconditioned Elements {AsamsJcrita Dhar- 
ma) or simple elements, so called because they do 
not enter into combinations with other elements. 
They are three in number, of which Space or 
Ether, and Nirvana are two. 

2. Conditioned Elements {Samskrita Dharma)^ 
or complex elements, so called because they 
enter into combinations, though themselves sim- 
ple and permanent. Their compounds constitute 
the phenomena of the universe. These elements 
are 72 in number, divided into : — 

1. Material elements, 11 in number. 

2. Mind, 1 in number. 

3. Mental Qualities, such as love, hate, etc., 

46 in number. 

4. Miscellaneous elements, such as life, decay, 

etc., 14 in number. 
These elements were considered permanent and 
unchanging, as were the eighty odd physical 



16 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

elements of the scientists of a generation ago. 
In their present state all phenomena were sup- 
posed to be impermanent and unstable, but 
consisted of stable and unchanging rudiments. 

TJie Transition from Hinaydna to Mahdydna. 

In its finished form Hinayana laid great em- 
phasis upon two doctrines. These were : — (1) 
It is necessary for all men to strive after Arhat- 
ship, or salvation from the wheel of life and death. 
This was the religious phase. (2) All phenomena 
are unstable compounds of a certain fixed number 
of stable elements. This was the philosophic 
phase. 

Neither one of these doctrines can be said to 
be in strict conformity with the principles of 
early Buddhism. As regards the first, in Hina- 
yana a distinction in hind was made between the 
Arhat, he who has merely attained Nirvana or 
salvation, and the Buddha who had also attained 
supreme enlightenment, or, more correctly, three 
stages were enunciated : — (1) Arhatship, or mere 
salvation ; (2) PratyeJca Buddahood, or private 
Buddhahood, supreme enlightenment for oneself 
alone ; and (3) Buddahood proper, supreme en- 
lightenment gained in order to teach the world. 
According to Hinayana not only is there an 



INTRODUCTION 17 

immense difierence between each stage, but for 
the average man the only possible goal is Arhat- 
ship ; only one out of many millions may aspire 
to Pratyeka Buddhahood, and only one in many 
cycles may attain Buddhahood. In primitive 
Buddhism, on the other hand, little distinction, 
save one of degree, is made between the Buddha 
and his illuminated disciples, and the highest 
goal is open to all. 

As regards the second point, the thorough- 
going anitya or impermanency doctrine of primi- 
tive Buddhism is presumed to apply to all parts 
of the universe. Every thing, even the com- 
ponent parts of being, are in a perpetual flux or 
becoming, so that the doctrine of a number of 
fixed and changeless elements, constituting an 
eternal being, seems a departure from the original 
outlook on life. To be consistent even the 
dharmas or elements should be considered com- 
plex, caused, conditioned, subject to change. 

On both these points Mahayana rose in revolt 
against Hinayana, and attempted to revert to 
the spirit of the original teachings. They 
claimed that their own teachings more perfectly 
expressed the meaning of the Buddha's teach- 
ing, just as the Protestants wished to revert to 
the ideas of Primitive Christianity. It must be 



18 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAyANA BUDDHISM 

confessed, however, that this desire for reform 
resulted only in the formation of a new system 
of religion and philosophy, which retained 
something of the spirit but little of the letter of 
the earlier faith. Let us take for example the 
question of the universality of the Buddha goal, 
whereby the distinction in kind between the 
Buddha and his disciples was obliterated. 

Mahayana, appealing as it does to the emo- 
tional and devotional elements, regarded the Arhat 
ideal as selfish. It was enamoured of the idea 
of self-sacrifice and proclaimed that those who 
were content with self-salvation or self-enlighten- 
ment might aim only at Arhatship or Pratyeka 
Buddhahood, but insisted that its own followers 
preferred to abandon these lower aspirations in 
order that they might become all-saving Buddhas. 
Once this doctrine had been formulated great 
emphasis was laid upon it, and we find many 
passages breathing the noblest altruism. 

Accordingly in early Mahayana all its own 
followers were called Bodhisattvas, Buddhas-to- 
be, as opposed to the adherents of Hinayana, 
who were termed (Jrdvalcas, or aspirants only 
after Arhatship. 

Later Mahayana, the so-called true Mahayana, 
carried this idea still further, and taught that 



INTRODUCTION 19 

supreme and perfect enlightenment (Buddha- 
hood) was the final goal of all. The first half 
of the famous Mahayana scripture, the Lotus of 
the Good Law (Saddharma Pundarika Sutra), 
is given up to shewing that in reality there is but 
one road, that the other goals are but updya — 
devices — on the parts of the Buddhas for the 
purpose of leading the world away from sensu- 
ality and materialism. 

Strangely enough, however, though throwing 
the gates of Buddhahood open to all, Mahayana 
took great pains to exalt the dignity and powers 
of the Buddhas. In Hinayana the Buddhas are 
men pure and simple, while in Mahayana they 
are looked upon as divine incarnations, or as 
material expressions of the Universal Buddha, 
whose existence Mahayana gradually came to 
teach. 

In Hinayana Sutras sermons are delivered 
by ^akyamuni, generally speaking in simple 
and unaffected phrases so as to make the auditor 
feel the presence of a fatherly and serene old 
philosopher, advising those in the battle of life 
as one who has just emerged victorious himself. 
In Mahayana SUtras, on the other hand, we find 
a mysterious and transcendent person far re- 
moved from the levels of ordinary humanity, 



20 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

who is listened to and worshipped by countless 
hordes of beings, celestial, human, and demoniac, 
who shower flowers upon the sage while he per- 
forms his stupendous supernatural deeds. In 
the Saddharma Pundarika Sutra, for example, 
Qakyamuni sits for long ages in meditation. He 
is the Supreme Euler who has himself led count- 
less thousands to Enlightenment during countless 
ages, and who never really dies and who is never 
really born. The only explanation of this is 
that ^akyamuni and all the other Buddhas, as 
well as the Universal Buddha, are one. 

The Mahdydna Buddhism of India. 

The religious aspect of Mahayana developed 
some time immediately prior to the Christian 
era, but its philosophical aspect was formulated 
during the period extending from the first to 
the fifth centuries A.D. Two main schools 
came to be differentiated. One was the Madhya- 
mika school, founded by Nagarjuna and Arya 
Deva in the first and second centuries A.D. 
The other was the Yogacarya school, founded 
by Asanga and Vasubandhu in the fourth 
century A.D. 

The Madhyamika school, which was thus some 
centuries earlier, largely devoted itself to the 



INTRODUCTION 21 

consideration of the second point on which 
Mahayana claimed that Hinayana had departed 
from the original teaching — the question of the 
existence of certain permanent stable elements 
which composed the universe. In accepting 
this doctrine, Hinayana, as we have said, almost 
abandoned its spirit of insistence upon change 
and becoming, and approached the standpoint 
of Western philosophy. The root instinct of the 
religion was too strong, however, and in the 
Madhyamika philosophy a return was made, 
to the principle of eternal transience and im- 
permanence. 

The basis of this undeveloped or early Maha- 
yana is (Junya (literally emptiness or the Void). 
This doctrine has been frequently totally mis- 
understood in the West and taken to mean the 
theory of the non-existence of the universe or 
purely Nihilistic Idealism. In reality Qunya is 
simply an insistence that all things have no self- 
essence ; that they are compounds, unstable 
organisms even in their elemental stage. The 
science of the present generation believes that 
the supposedly rigid physical elements are not 
necessarily permanent ; that they may be broken 
down ; that the elements may themselves prove 
to be compounds possessing the essential quali- 



22 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

ties of transformation and decay. In like 
manner the Qtinya school supposed that the 
Dharmas (elements) are impern^anent and have 
no existence-unto-themselves ; that they may be 
broken down into parts, parts into sub-parts, 
and so on eternally. Accordingly all phenomena 
have a relative as opposed to an absolute 
existence. All of life was once more reduced 
to a single underlying flux, a stream of existence 
with an everlasting becoming. 

In a word, then, the Madhyamika doctrine of 
^unya is that there is no thing-unto-itself, 
nothing with a self essence, nothing that cannot 
be broken up until we reach the great 
transcendent reality which is so absolute that it 
is wrong to say that it is or that it is not. This 
underlying reality — the principle of eternal re- 
lativity, non-infinity — permeates all phenomena, 
allowing expansion, growth, and evolution, which 
would otherwise be impossible. 

It is easy to see that this early and undeveloped 
Mahayana idea of the Eternal Flux was the germ 
of the later doctrine of the Absolute. The 
doctrine of the Madhyamika school, however, 
was largely a negative one. It reduced all 
phenomena to a constantly changing stream of 



INTRODUCTION 23 

life, but concerning the nature of this stream of 
life it tells us little or nothing. 

The next stage of doctrinal development, as 
found in the Yogacarya school, was a very 
important one, and resulted in the formulation 
of a remarkably complete system of idealism. 
The stream of life was supposed to be the Essence 
of mind, a fundamental Mind substance that was 
permanent and yet ever changing like the ocean. 
From this all the elements (and the 75 elements 
of the earlier school became 100 in the Yogacarya 
doctrine) and therefore all phenomena are de- 
rived. It was called the Alaya Vijndna, re- 
pository consciousness, yet it was considered to 
be neither matter nor mind, but the basic energy 
that was at the root of both. 

It is the imperceptible and unknowable 
noumenon behind all phenomena. To quote 
Kuroda : "In contradistinction to the fallacious 
phenomena of existence there is the true Essence 
of Mind. The Essence of Mind is the entity 
without ideas and without phenomena and is 
always the same. It pervades all things, and is 
pure and unchanging . . . so it is called 
Bh utatatJidta — permanent reality . ' ' 

It would be easy to exaggerate the importance 
of this doctrine and falsely to identify it with 



24 INTRODUCTION TO M AH AY AN A BUDDHISM 

more developed systems, but undoubtedly it lia8 
many points of contact with certain phases of 
modern Occidental philosophy. The Alaya 
Vijnana is like the Elan de Vie of Bergson, the 
Energy of Leibnitz, or the Unconscious of Von 
Hartmann. Like the last, though it is the 
essence of consciousness, it is not itself conscious 
in its earlier stages. It is mental, and yet there 
is a certain objective reality about it. Each 
unit of life may be regarded as a vortex in the 
sea of life. The action and interaction of these 
units one with another and with the common 
stream brings about the phenomenal appearance 
of the Universe. 

Accordingly the Alaya Vijnana is regarded in 
three aspects, viz: — (1) as active, or the seed of 
percipient consciousness ; (2) as passive, as the 
sensibilia of consciousness ; (3) as the object of 
false belief, inasmuch as being the root of self- 
consciousness, each person comes to regard him- 
self as an eternal ego unity. 

The Early 3Iahdydna Buddhism of 
China and Japan. 

Buddhism was introduced into China in the 
first century A.D., and was firmly established 
by the fourth century. It was introduced into 



INTRODUCTION 25 

Japan in the sixth century, and was firmly 
established there in the seventh. The important 
sects of Indian Buddhism were introduced into 
those two countries, and we find a Bidon or 
Kusha sect corresponding to. the Sarvastivadin 
school, a Sanron sect corresponding to the 
Madhyamika school, and a Hosso sect correspond- 
ing to the Yogacarya school. These were all 
eclipsed, however, by a number of schools which 
developed in China and Japan itself. In these 
schools we may distinguish two phases, an 
earlier and theoretical or philosophical phase, 
and a later or practical and religious phase. 

The early or philosophic phase is best repre- 
sented by the two schools of Tendai and Kegon. 
The Tendai school is in some ways a further 
development of the Madhyamika school, the 
Kegon of the Yogacarya, but both are synthetic 
philosophies, and have borrowed largely from all 
available sources. The doctrines of the two 
schools closely resemble each other, differing 
chiefly on points of emphasis, so that for the time 
being they may be considered together. 

Their most valuable contribution to Buddhist 
philosophy was the development of the idea of 
the Absolute, which was latent in both the 
Madhyamika and Yogacarya schools. The 



26 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

Essence of Mind, or the Sea of Life is regarded as 
the one fundamental reality. It alone can be 
said to have a permanent existence, all phenom- 
ena being merely ephemeral manifestations there- 
of. It is very frequently called the Middle 
Principle (Chu), since it transcends both Being 
(Ke) and Becoming (Kii). Chinese Mahay anists 
answer the question of Being and Becoming by 
the simile of the ocean. The ocean is the Ab- 
solute, the waves are life's phenomena. The 
ocean is always changing. Waves are constantly 
arising, and no two waves are ever alike. So does 
the stream of life ever go surging past, never 
remaining the same. Yet there is a certain 
stability, a certain being, a fixity, a changeless- 
ness in this very changeability. 

The doctrine of the Absolute of most Western 
philosophies is based upon the idea of pure 
Being. The Mahayana doctrine of the Absolute 
(Bhutatathata) evolved from the idea of be- 
coming, yet the two doctrines are strangely v/ 
similar. In both the Absolute is the sufficient 
reason of the universe ; it is the principle of 
existence which transcends but includes matter 
and mind, life and death, sameness and difference, 
Samsara (the phenomenal world) and Nirvana 
(the noumenal world). The Bhutatathata of 



INTRODUCTION 27 

Mahayana is the norm of life, the acme of being, 
the warp and the woof of the universe. It 
comes near to Hegel's conception of the Absolute, 
inasmuch as it is not only the force behind 
evolution, but also the very process of evolution 
itself. 

Eetaining, as Chinese Mahayana does, the 
conception that all existence is derived from the 
Alaya Vijnana, which, in turn, has its essence and 
supporting principle in the Bhutathata, it 
declares that the Absolute is both identical and 
non-identical with the material universe. It is, 
to quote the ocean simile again, as if the water 
were stirred up by the winds of ignorance where- 
by the waves are produced. The water there- 
fore is both identical and not identical with the 
waves. To quote scholastic verbiage, the Uni- 
verse is but a mode of the Universal. 

Preceding systems had formulated, as we shall 
presently see, the doctrine that every Buddha 
has three bodies, the DharmaMya, the Body of 
the Law, the Sambhogalcdya, the body of Com- 
pensation, and the Nirmanakdya, or the body of 
Transformation. In developed Buddhism the 
Bhiitatathata is regarded as a sort of Universal 
Buddha- Accordingly it was likewise considered 
to be possessed of the three bodies, so that we 



28 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAY AN A BUDDHISM 

find in the later stages an almost Christian idea 
of the Trinity. The Dharmakaya corresponds 
to an impersonalized God the Father, the 
Abstract order of the universe, or better, Mr. 
Well's Unmanifested Deity, the Sambhogakaya 
a more personalized ideation of the Absolute the 
symbol of moral perfection and the object of 
devotion — Mr. Well's God the Invisible King, 
and the Nirmanakaya is equivalent to the 
Christian God the Son, or the Absolute as 
manifested in the world in the guise of a human 
Buddha. 

The Later Mdhdydna Buddhism of China and 

Japan. 

The later schools of Chinese and Japanese 
Buddhism are not so much doctrinal develop- 
ments as various adaptations of the foregoing 
philosophical foundation. The most important 
sects were the Shingon or Mantra sect, the Zen 
or Dhyana sect, and the Jodo or Sukhavati sect. 
All of them agreed in accepting the older philo- 
sophical foundations but gave them a religious, 
and to a large extent mystical bias. 

The Shingon school claims to be the hidden 
or esoteric doctrine of which all outward or 
exoteric doctrines are but symbols. The full 



INTRODUCTION 29 

truth, or the inner mysteries are revealed only to 
those who have been initiated into the order. For 
the uninitiate the Shingon speaks only in terms ol 
parable and symbol. The Absolute and the 
various aspects of the Absolute are represented as 
celestial Buddhas and Bodhisattyas, each one 
with a mystic name, form, colour, and sign — 
each represented by a certain sound. The 
Bhiitatathata itself, as a whole, is generally 
represented as Vairocana or the Sun Buddha. 
The noumenal aspect of the universe is called 
the Diamond World ; the phenomenal aspect the 
Womb World, and sacred charts (mandala) are 
drawn illustrating the nature, attributes, and 
relations of each. The Shingon sect corresponds 
very closely to the Lamaism of Tibet and 
Mongolia. Both are derived from the later 
phases of the Yogacarya sect in India, about the 
sixth century A.D,, when esotericism became 
rampant in both Hindu and Buddhist circles. 

The Zen Dhyana school represents a different 
type of esotericism or mysticism. The basic idea 
of Zen is that all formulated doctrines, whether 
exoteric or esoteric ; all books ; all speech ; and 
even all thought are inadequate to express the 
full nature of absolute truth. Consequently 
Zen refuses to place complete credence in any 



30 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

one book, or collection of books, Buddhist or 
otherwise. It refuses to tie itself to any doctrine 
or creed. It accepts the philosophy of the Tendai 
and Kegon schools from a relative point of view, 
but insists that absolute truth must be found by 
each man for himself by means of intuitional 
realization to be gained through meditation. 
The only definite teaching to be found in the 
Zen sect is that every man is possessed of the 
Bodhicitta (the heart of wisdom) or the seed of 
Buddhahood. Every man is a sleeping Buddha. 
Consequently a man has but to awaken his 
Bodhicitta by meditation for him to gain a 
direct insight into the nature of reality. The 
Zen sect was introduced into China by Bodhid- 
harma in the sixth century, and into Japan by 
Eisai in 1191. 

The Sukhavati doctrine, more particularly as 
represented by the Shin sect, the reformed 
branch of Mahayana Buddhism may be called 
the mysticism of exclusive adoration. In this 
school the Absolute or Universal Buddha is 
symbolized as Amitabha the Buddha of Infinite 
light, or Amitayus, the Buddha of Infinite Time, 
and as such is the object of fervent devotion. 
Enlightenment, or Nirvana, or Buddhahood is 
symbolized by the Paradise, SukhSvatl, or JMo 



INTRODUCTION 31 

of Amitabha. Eebirth in this paradise is to be 
gained by self-forgetting adoration of the 
supreme. In early days Amitabha may have 
been regarded as an historical Buddha, and his 
paradise a place to be gained by death, but, in 
the developed doctrine of Chinese and more 
especially Japanese Buddhism, we are told that 
Amitabha is without beginning and without end, 
that he is but a symbol for an inexpressible 
reality, that rebirth into his paradise is nothing 
more than the awakening of the Bodhicitta here 
on earth, and that this Bodhicitta is to be 
awakened by love and by faith. At the present 
time both Chinese and Japanese Buddhism is 
dominated by the Zen and Jodo ideas — Zen 
being an embodiment of absolute truth for the 
educated, and Jodo its relative symbol for the 
mass of the people. 



f 

CHAPTER 1 

EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC 

All understanding of Buddhist metaphysics 
must be based upon a comprehension of its theory 
of knowledge. This theory we had best consider 
under three aspects : — (1) The nature of truth, 
(2) The methods of ascertaining truth, and (3) 
The methods of demonstrating truth. 

1. The Nature of Truth. 
In Buddhism we find great emphasis laid upon 
the two-fold and the three-fold aspects of truth. 
In a primitive form the two-fold division is to be 
found in Hinayana Buddhism, and probably 
dates back to the time of Qakyamuni himself, 
but was first emphasized by the Madhyamika 
school of Mahayana. 

According to this there are two forms of truth, 
Relative Truth (Samvritti-satya or Zokutai) 
and Absolute Truth (Paramartha-satya or 
Shintai). In earlier days this distinction was 
applied to differentiate those doctrines which 
were an essential and fundamental part of 



EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC 33 

Buddhism (such as the Four Noble Truths,) 
which were absolutely true and changeless, and 
those doctrines which were merely adopted by 
Buddhist metaphysicians to fill out a philosophic 
conception of the universe, and which would 
necessarily be modified as new information came 
to light. To this category belong the various 
theories of cosmography, etc. 

Later Buddhism slightly modified this con- 
ception. Absolute Truth was equivalent to 
complete and perfect enlightenment. Words 
being but symbols are incapable of describing 
adequately or defining it. Thought consists of 
a number of concepts, and any concept being 
equally a symbol and therefore inadequate, it 
follows that a knowledge of Absolute Truth 
cannot be gained merely by a process of ratiocina- 
tion. While, however. Absolute Truth is in- 
conceivable it is not unrealizable for through 
spiritual development we may gain direct 
illumination, more or less adequate, according 
to our nature and the stage of our development. 

Once we have thus acquired a direct insight into 
truth we may inadequately attempt to clothe it 
in words and concepts, and crystallize it into 
dogmas, as a guide to the later seekers after 
truth. It is, however, like trying to describe 



34 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

the colours of the rainbow to a man blind from 
birth. 

This crystallization of truth by formulation of 
doctrine is what the Mahayanists call relative 
truth. Absolute Truth is ever the same, while 
relative truth is ever advancing, coming nearer 
and nearer to an approximation of Absolute 
Truth, as each generation taking the doctrine of 
its predecessors is able more succinctly to 
interpret it and compare it with new realizations 
of Absolute Truth. While, however, the smaller 
circle of relative truth is constantly expanding 
and thereby approaching in size the greater circle 
of Absolute Truth, the two can never coincide, 
since the latter is infinite, and the former must 
ever deal with finite instruments, such as the 
brain or speech. 

Mahay ana declares that all theories, hypo- 
theses, doctrines, whether verbal or incorporated 
in scriptures, whether scientific, philosophical or 
religious, and including its own doctrines of 
Nirvana, the Universal Buddha, etc., belong to 
the body of relative truth, and must, therefore, 
be modified with the course of time. This 
conception of the nature of truth greatly facili- 
tates the doctrinal development of later Budd- 
hism, allowing for the evolution of new theories 



EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC 35 

and interpretations, while the simpler theory of 
truth maintained by the Southern Buddhists 
caused them to stick fast to the letter of the law 
as taught by ^akyamuni. 

The three-fold division of truth is nothing 
more than a restatement of this in other terms. 
The three classes are (1) illusion (parikalpita), 
(2) relative knowledge (paratantra), (3) absolute 
knowledge (parini§panna). The first is abso- 
lutely false, as when a rope lying in the road is 
mistaken for a snake. The second is a pragmatic 
comprehension of the nature of things sufficient 
for ordinarj^ purposes, as when the rope is seen 
to be a rope. The third deals with the real and 
ultimate nature of things, when the rope is 
analysed and its true nature understood. The 
only real difference between the two -fold and 
the three-fold divisions of truth is that finite 
knowledge is separated into falsehood and that 
which is relatively true, and the latter exalted 
to its proper position, since otherwise, by neglect 
of this important phase, intellectual progress 
would be barred. 

2. Methods of Ascertaining Truth. 

Early Buddhism had no elaborate epistemology 
or logic, but in the period of the full development 



36 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

of Mahayana Buddhism we find the following 
classification of the means of evaluating know- 
ledge : — 

7. INDIRECT. 
1. Tradition. 

a. Exoteric. 

b. Esoteric. 
II. DIRECT. 

1. Experience. 

a. Empirical. 

b. Intuitional. 

2. Reason. 

a. Pure reason. 

b. Practical reason. 

A word must be said concerning each of these 
points. 

Buddhism has both an external and an internal 
standard of truth. The saints and sages of the 
past have had a direct insight into the nature of 
reality, and in consequence the truth which they 
expounded must be accepted by all. On the 
other hand such sages have only achieved en- 
lightenment through means which are open to 
us all. By process of experience, both material 
and spiritual, and by reason, both pure and 
practical, we may test the validity of each of 
their positions and reinterpret their meanings 



EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC 37 

into closer accordance with the knowledge of 
the time. 

Tradition is of two kinds, exoteric and esoteric. 
The first is embodied in the external dogmas of 
Buddhism as expounded in the Sutras, Vinayas, 
and the Abhidharmas, which are open so that all 
the world may read, while many branches of 
Mahayana insist that beyond this there is a 
secret tradition which may never be written 
down, which requires proper training and 
initiation before it can be understood. 

Experience was likewise divided into two 
phases. The first is merely the ascertainment of 
truth through ordinary physical sense organs 
and sense objects. Provided the sense organs 
and the sense perceiving aspects of consciousness 
are normally constituted the data which they 
furnish may be taken as valid, at least for the 
establishment of relative as opposed to Absolute 
Truth. Owing to the limitations of the physical 
senses and the brain machine, Absolute Truth 
can only be glimpsed by transcending them and 
gaining knowledge through intuition or direct 
realization. For such purposes all doctrines, 
theories, and scriptures are but fingers pointing 
to the moon, and have no inherent validity. 
This doctrine is called the doctrine of Ton or 



38 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

suddenness, i.e., the means whereby knowledge 
may be gained at one stroke through transcen- 
dental apperception without waiting to piece 
together, one by one, the data of empirical 
knowledge. 

Reason is the means whereby we piece to- 
gether the separate and unconnected sense data, 
whether empirical or transcendental, and thereby 
make a system or a new co-ordination of facts, 
enabling us to lay down generalizations and 
broad formulae. Owing to the whole trend of 
its philosophy Buddhism could not place such 
great stress upon the importance of abstract or 
pure reason as could Plato and Aristotle. Never- 
theless even the Hinayana sutras proclaim that 
nothing is to be accepted that is not in accordance 
with reason, and in the metaphysical systems of 
Mahayana the process of abstract reason was the 
method most frequently employed, more 
particularly in such schools as the Tendai and 
the Avatamsaka or Kegon. 

Yet, inasmuch as Buddhism taught that the 
ephemeral nature of external reality and of 
consciousness was an obstacle to the ascertain- 
ment of Absolute Truth by sophism or bare 
deductive reasoning, we early find a tendency 
towards pragmatism, or a substitution of practic- 



EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC 39 

al for pure reasoning, or a tendency to judge of 
the validity of a doctrine by its effect upon human 
life. Thus for example in the Hinayana sutras, 
in discussing what we might call the freedom of 
the will, we find the Buddha saying " Some 
Qramanas and Brahmins there are who maintain 
that whatever a man has in this life ... is 
purely due to predestination. Others say that 
it is due to the will of Igvara (God), others 
again that it is due to blind chance. Now, O 
monks, when I find Qramanas and Brahmins 
holding or preaching such views I . . . say to 
them, ' So then, you must acknowledge that 
men become murderers, thieves, etc. . . on account 
of Fate, Igvara's will, or blind chance. Accord- 
ingly all attempts at improvement or distinction 
between right and wrong, become of no avail. 
Such being the case the moral regeneration of 
the fallen becomes impossible.' This sort of 
reasoning must silence those who hold any of the 
three views mentioned above ." The pragmatic 
nature of this argument is obvious. 

In Mahayana we find the doctrine carried 
somewhat further, and associated with what we 
might call the symbolic theory of truth, i.e., that 
the nature of absolute truth is so great and so 
infinite that it can never be completelj' and 



40 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

adequately grasped by finite logic, yet neverthe- 
less it may be expressed or indicated by a 
symbol which teaches us something of its essence 
without limiting it by definition. 

Thus the nature of the Absolute (Bhfttata- 
thata) can never be properly formulated, yet 
by symbolizing it as the universal Buddha, 
as Amitabha, Infinite Light, or Amitayut^, 
Infinite Time, we may have a focus for devotion 
which may remain as a living and vital stimulus 
towards the spiritual life even when increasing 
knowledge may cause us to reinterpret our sym- 
bols. This is the doctrine of upaya or hoben, 
means or devices, or accommodations of truth 
to the minds of the hearers, which is really the 
basis of the Sukhavati or Paradise doctrine. 

3. Methods of Demonstrating Truth. 
Buddhist logic which is comprised in a sort of 
inverted syllogism passed through a very inter- 
esting evolution. From the first it was obviously 
a logic of demonstration of ideas already enter- 
tained, rather than a pretence of deduction of 
previously unknown facts, as was claimed, and 
now considered falsely claimed, by Aristotelian 
logic, with which it baa otherwise much in 
common. 



EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC 41 

Again the frankly Becoming and consequently 
anti-rational position of Buddhism hindered the 
evolution of its logic. Hinayana Buddhism, in 
fact, never produced any logical system, and even 
the reasoning of the early Madhyamika and 
Yogacarya scholars with their five-fold syllogism 
is largely based on analogical reasoning, the 
citing of individual homogeneous and hetero- 
geneous examples rather than the proof of a fact 
by citing a universal and invariable law. 

Dignaga or Mahadignaga was the first to 
devote himself almost exclusively to logic, and 
with him Buddhist logic, properly so called, 
begins. His syllogism is as follows : — 

Thesis, e.g. — Socrates is mortal. 

Reason, e.g. — Because Socrates is a man. 

Example, e.g. — And all men are mortal. 
With this may be compared the Occidental 
formula : — 

Major Premise. — All men are mortal. 

Minor Premise. — Socrates is a man. 

Conclusion. — Therefore Socrates is mortal. 
Let us examine each of these features some- 
what more in detail : — 

1. The thesis is divided into the subject or 
minor term (pakga) e.g., " Socrates," and pre- 
dicate or major term (sadhya) e.g., " mortal." 



42 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAY AN A BUDDHISM 

Neither subject nor predicate is itself to be 
disputed, but only the thesis or proposition 
concerning their relationship. 

2. The reason or premise must be a known 
truth, or a truth accepted by all. Consequently, 
Dign^ga wiU place here only those facts known 
directly, i.e., through reason or experience, and 
not those facts which are known indirectly, e.g., 
by tradition, exoteric, or esoteric. 

3. The same thing must hold true of the 
Example, which is of a more abstract nature. 
The word example (drstanta) is singularly un- 
fitted to denote the idea of the major premise, 
and is derived from the period when the universal 
law of necessary concomitance was unknown, 
and in its place there was cited one or two 
analogous examples. Thus the old syllogism 
would have run : — 

Thesis. Sound is non-eternal. 

Reason. Because it is produced. 

Example. Like a pot, and not like space, 
while with Dignaga it is of course : — 

Thesis. Sound is non-eternal. 

Reason. Because it is produced. 

Example. All produced things are non-eternal, 
to which might bo added, purely for purposes 
of elucidation, and not for proof, the homo- 



EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC 43 

geneous example " like a pot," and the hetero- 
geneous example " not like space." 

Dignaga's rule for the formation of his new 
example was to " take the reason for the subject, 
and the major term for the predicate." Thus 
for example : — 

Thesis. AU A is B. 

Reason. All A is C. 

Example. All C is B, 
or, in other words, to cite another syllogism :— 

Thesis. All diamonds are combustible. 

Reason. Because all diamonds are carbon. . 

Example. And all carbon is combustible. 

This brings us to a discussion of the famous 
doctrine of the 3 phases of the reason or middle 
term (hetu). 

1. The first deals with the relation between 
the middle term (C) and the minor term or 
subject (A). 2. The second deals with the 
relation between the middle term (C) and the 
major term or predicate (B). 3. The third 
deals with the relation between the middle 
term (C) and the heterogeneous example (which 
we will call D). 

For a syllogism to be valid : — 1. must 
include the whole of A, e.g.^ the word carbon must 
include all and not merely some of diamonds. 



44 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

2. All C must invariably apply to B, but it need 
not include all B, e.g., all carbon must be com- 
bustible, though combustible things may include 
other things than carbon. 3. C must include 
no D or Non-B, e.g., carbon must possess no 
non-combustible qualities. 

Finally we come to the fallacies, the presence 
of which in either the thesis, the reason, or the 
example would make the syllogism invalid. 
We are told that there are 9 fallacies of the 
thesis, 14 fallacies of the reason, and 10 fallacies 
of the example, but these as lying within the 
realm of pure technicality, are outside the scope 
of our present undertaking. 

4. Absolute Truth, and Buddhist Doctrines. 

Such then is the Buddhist theory of the nature 
of truth, and the means of ascertaining and 
demonstrating it. The question then arises, does 
Buddhism claim a unique possession of truth, 
does it state that its own doctrines are the sole, 
final, and absolute embodiments of reality ? 

Such is far from the case. Its doctrine of the 
distinction between Absolute Truth and relative 
truth, caused it to state that all of its own doc- 
trines, and theories, as well as the sacred works 
containing them, belong exclusively to the 



EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC 45 

realm of relative truth, and are, therefore, liable 
to error, and capable of constant improvement, 
that other systems of thought no less than its 
own are equally but the imperfect embodiments 
of inadequate glimpses of absolute reality. This 
idea, more or less common to all forms of Maha- 
yana Buddhism, is emphasized by the Dhyana 
sect. 

The mode of expression adopted by a modern 
leader of the school, Kaiten Nukariya in his 
" Religion of the Samurai " is very interesting : — 

" The scripture is no more nor less than the 
finger pointing to the moon of Buddhahood. 
When we recognize the moon and enjoy its 
benign beauty, the finger is of no use. As the 
finger has no brightness whatever so the scripture 
has no holiness whatever. The scripture is 
religious currency representing spiritual wealth. 
It does not matter whether the money be gold 
or sea-shells or cows. It is a mere substitute. 
What it stands for is of paramount importance. 

" Away with your stone knife. Do not watch 
the stake against which a running hare once 
struck its head and died. Do not wait for 
another hare. Another may not come forever. 
Do not cut out the side of the boat from which 
you dropped your sword to mark where it sunk. 



46 INTRO DUCT IO\ TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

The boat is ever moving on. The canon is the 
window out of which we observe the grand 
spiritual scenery of spiritual nature. To hold 
communion directly with it we must get out of 
the window. It is a mere stray fly that is always 
buzzing within it struggling to get out. Those 
who spend most of their lives in the study of the 
scriptures are religious flies, good for nothing but 
their buzzing about nonsensical technicalities. 
It is on this account that Einzai declared ' The 
twelve divisions of the Buddhist canon are 
nothing better than waste paper.' " 

After outlining the " Relative Truth " re- 
garding the Absolute Nukariya goes on to say : — 

" Has then the divine nature of the Universal 
Spirit been completely and exhaustively re- 
vealed to our Enlightened Consciousness 1 To 
this question we would answer in the negative, 
for so far as our limited experience is concerned 
Universal Spirit reveals itself as a being with 
profound wisdom and boundless mercy ; this 
nevertheless does not imply that this conception 
is the only possible and complete one. It goes 
on to disclose a new phase, to add a new truth. 
The subtlest logic of old is a mere quibble of now- 
a-days. . . . New theories are formed, new 
discoveries are made only to jfive way to newer 



EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC 47 

theories and newer discoveries. New ideale 
realized or new desires satisfied are sure to 
awaken new and stronger desires. Not an instant 
life remains the same, but it rushes on amplify- 
ing and enriching itself from the dawn of time 
to the end of eternity." 



CHAPTEE II 

THE NATUEE OF THE ABSOLUTE A^'D 
ITS EELATION TO THE UNIVEESE 

1. The Outlook on Life 

Questions concerning the outlook on life have 
always played an integral part in Buddhist 
philosophy. In fact, in its essence, Buddhism is 
not an analysis of the ultimate nature of existence 
or an explanation of the noumenon which lies 
behind phenomena, but it is an interpretation 
of the good and bad of life, taken as a whole and 
unanalysed. 

Like all other phases of Buddhist thought its 
theory of the proper evaluation of life has 
undergone great evolution and modification. 
Its various ramifications may best be considered 
under three stages, which, for want of better 
terms, we may call, (1) absolute pessimism, (2) 
absolute optimism, and (3) relative pessimism. 
The first is associated with primitive and Hina- 
yana Buddhism ; the second with the doctrines 
of the various schools of unreformed Mahay^ua ; 



THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE 49 

the third with the reformed branch of 
MahSyana. 

[a). Absolute Pessimum. 

Primitive Buddhism began by saying, as we 
know, (1) all is impermanent, (2) all is lacking a 
self, (3) all is sorrowful. The very nature of 
phenomenal life is transient, and consequently 
all joys are transient. Where there is birth 
there is necessarily old age, disease, and death. 
Those whom we love are estranged, or are taken 
from us. Achievement is disillusionment. The 
few benefit at the expense of the many, and even 
the few find no real enjoyment in life. 

This state of affairs holds true not merely for 
the present earthly existence, but for all possible 
forms of life, whether in heaven or hell, whether 
in the past, present, or future. Consequently 
for primitive Buddhism, and for Hinayana 
Buddhism life, qua life, has no fascination. It 
can find peace and satisfaction only in emancipa- 
tion from all known forms of existence, in com- 
plete escape from the phenomenal world, in the 
annihilation of bodily and mental existence, 
namely Mrvana. 

Nirvana, to be sure, is purely a state of mind 
obtainable anywhere and at any time, and is to 



50 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAY AN A BUDDHISM 

be achieved while still in the flesh, but as life or 
the corporate personality is only formed as the 
result of ignorance and desire in the past, when 
the Arhat, he who has attained Nirvana, dies no 
new personality can be formed, and certainly, 
from our material point of view, the personality 
is wiped out of existence. 

This is what is known as the 8hd1cyoku-teki no 
Nehan or the negative view of Nirvana, where 
life is compared to the waning of the moon. 
Here the moon is compared to the sins and 
sorrows of life. Gradually it wanes until finally 
there is nothing left. 

(&). Absolute Optimism. 
All this was changed by the formulation of the 
doctrine of the Absolute, the Universal Buddha, 
or the Essence of Mind, the supreme ideal 
which is behind all life and from which all things 
draw their sustenance. 

Every sentient being is possessed of the 
Bodhicitta (the wisdom heart) or the seed or 
kernel of enlightenment. This is the spark of 
Buddhahood which has only to be awakened to 
spring into the flame of perfection or Buddhahood. 
Consequently all forms of life spring from the 
noumenon which is itself good, which is possessed 



THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE 51 

of the four-fold qualities of Jo purity, raku 
pleasure, ga self essence, and jO permanence. 
All phenomenal life is bad only because it is 
relative, incomplete, imperfect, because it in- 
adequately expresses the absolute, because it is 
bounded and conditioned, for latent within each 
phenomenon is supreme bliss. 

Nirvana consists not in escape from the world, 
but in the unlocking of the hidden nature, the 
development of the sleeping Buddha, the un- 
folding of potentialities. It is the fruition of 
life rather than its denial. Sin and sorrow are 
not so much exterminated as transmuted into 
holiness and joy. 

This is known as the Shakkyoku-teki no 
Nehan or the positive Nirvana, in which Nirvana 
is compared to the waxing of the moon. The 
moon is the Bodhicitta, which steadily grows in 
intensity until the full moon of Buddhahood be 
reached. 

(s, 
Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas. It was not created 
in the past, nor is it to be annihilated in 
the future ; it is eternal, permanent, absolute ; 
and from all eternity it sufRcingly embraces in 
its essence all possible merits." (ii) greatness 
of manifestations, " that is to say (the Absolute) 
has such characteristics as . . : — the effulgence of 
great wisdom ; the universal illumination of 
the dharmadhatu ; the true and adequate 
knowledge ; the mind pure and clean in its self 
nature ; the eternal, the blessed, the self-regulat- 
ing, and the pure." (iii) greatness of activity, 
because as a result of its activity all the innumer- 
able phenomena of the universe came into exist- 
ence, and also because through its influence 
aspiring mankind feels a deep compassion for all 
beings, " Bodhisattvas treat others as their own 
self ; wish to work out a universal salvation of 
mankind in ages to come . . . and do not 
cling to the individual existence of a sentient 
being." 

(h). Detailed Explanation. 

The Absolute has two phases or aspects : — 
(1) the Unmanifest or Transcendental phase 
(literally the soul as Pure Form) or the Absolute 



62 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAY AN A BUDDHISM 

proper, and (2) The Manifest or Immanent phase 
(hterally the soul as birth and death) or the 
Absolute become limited. 

(1) The Unvianifested Phase, is the Ideal 
World the underlying unity, the quintessence 
of all being. It is the eternal sameness 
under all apparent difference. Owing to our 
subjective activity (nen) we build up a 
vision of a discrete, particularized universe, but 
in reality the essence of things ever remains one, 
void of particularity. Being absolute " it is 
not nameable or explicable. It can not be 
rendered in any form of language. It is without 
the range of perception." It may be termed 
^iinya or the Void, because it is not a fixed or 
limited entity but a perpetual becoming, void of 
self-existing component parts. It may likewise 
be termed A^iinya, the Full or the Existent 
because when confused subjectivity has been 
destroyed " we perceive the pure soul manifest- 
ing itself as eternal, permanent, immutable, and 
completely comprising all things that are pure." 

(2) The Manifested Phase is the Womb World 
where are stored all the potentialities of every 
form of life. It is identical with the Alaya 
Vijnana, the repository consciousness, or the 
Essence of Mind. This Essence of Mind has 



THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE 63 

likewise two aspects, (a) that of Enlightenment 
in which it is regarded as the focus of purity in 
the phenomenal world, (b) Non -enlightenment 
in which the Alaya Vijnana becomes entangled 
by ignorance, and as the result of consequent 
confused subjectivity gives rise to the formation 
of the phenomenal world, which is, of course, at 
bottom subjective. 

(a) Enlightenment consists of supreme 
wisdom and purity. In one sense it is latent 
in all sentient beings however low their state. 
This is known as Potential Enlightenment, or 
enlightenment a priori. The majority of man- 
kind, however, have still to develop this seed of 
Buddhahood until this enlightenment be made 
manifest and conscious. Enlightenment is then 
known as Active Enlightenment or enlighten- 
ment a posteriori. The various ranks such as 
Common People, Qravakas, Pratyeka Buddha, 
Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas are but stages 
leading to Active Enlightenment. 

(b) N on- enlightenment consists of the fecunda- 
tion of the Essence of Mind by Ignorance which 
results in blind activity and the subsequent 
evolution of units of consciousness, which, 
interacting with one another create for themselves 
the image of the phenomenal world. " There- 



64 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAY AN A BUDDHISM 

fore the three worlds are nothing but the mani- 
festation of the Alaya Vijnana — separated from 
the mind there would be no such things as the 
six objects of sense." In order to explain the 
evolution of the phenomenal world the Mahayan- 
ists have brought in the Pratitya Samutpada 
or the twelve Nidanas, which in Hinayana refer 
almost exclusively to personal origination, to 
explain the evolution of the external world. 
First comes ignorance, which, acting upon the 
Absolute, brings about action, which results in 
the formation of consciousness — and so on 
through the list. 

An examination of the details of this theory 
lies outside the scope of our present undertaking, 
but the following points should be of interest. 
The Bhutatathata quickened by ignorance and 
ready to be realized in the world of the particu- 
lars is known as Tathagatagarbha, literally the 
Tathagata's womb, or store house. It may 
rightly be called the womb of the universe 
which gives birth to the stream of consciousness. 

The stream of life being set flowing, from the 
action arising therefrom we find the beginning of 
the individualization of the particular units of 
latent consciousness. Thus is the Alaya Vijnana 
which as Suzuki says, " is a particularized ex- 



THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE 65 

pression in the human mind of the Tathagata- 
garbha. It is an individual, ideal reflex of the 
cosmic garbha. It is this psychic germ, as the 
Alaya is often designated, that stores all the 
mental possibilities which are set in motion by 
the impetus of the external world." 

The Alaya Vijnana ( Vijndna means conscious- 
ness, and Alaya repository) is not waking or 
normal consciousness. In itself it is more like 
the unconsciousness which is behind matter and 
spirit, thought and extension. Although it is 
individualistic, or the centre of blind activity, it 
has not yet reached the stage of self-consciousness, 
or distinguished itself from other such centres. 
It is but the seed from which the flower of 
consciousness will blossom, or the material 
out of which the world of subject and object 
wUl be constructed. 

Gradually, just as the Unconsciousness of 
Von Hartmann evolves into the Conscious in 
mankind, so does the Alaya Vijndna evolve into 
the Kligtomano-vijnana. Kligto-mano -vijndna 
is literally " Soiled Mind Consciousness " and 
means the state in which the unit of life begins to 
be aware of itself, to distinguish itself from other 
such units, to become a co-ordinated organism. 

As this organism comes more and more into 



66 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

contact with the stream of life around it, it 
begins to react to its external environment, to 
distinguish sensations, to group them together, 
to abstract them into ideas and to associate ideas 
into memory and reason. Instinctively, follow- 
ing the line of self-preservation, it likes certain 
sensations and dislikes others, to crave for the 
pleasant and to avoid the unpleasant. In this 
way the Mano-vijnana (Mind consciousness) 
comes into being. 

The external world has, in its essence, a real 
existence. It is a part of the stream of life 
based in the Essence of Mind. The world as it 
appears, to us, however, is the result of action 
of the Alaya, Kli^to-mano, and Mano-vijndna, 
stimulated by contact with the real external 
world, which in turn is but a phase of the uni- 
versal Alaya. 

Sectarian Views on the Relation between the 
Absolute and the World of Phenomena. 

The foregoing may be said to represent the 
views of all branches of Mahayana irrespective 
of sect. Most of the schools, however, were very 
fond of metaphysical hair splitting, and it may 
be of interest to see something of the manner 
in which they carried on their discussions. As 



THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE 67 

an instance let us examine, for a moment, the 
manner in which some of the sects have vied 
with one another in formulating examples of the 
unity of life, and the identity in essence of all 
phenomena. 

The argument employed is somewhat compli- 
cated, and to understand it at all it is necessary 
to bear in mind two things, one, the old distinction 
between the noumenon and phenomena (the 
Samskrita and Asamskrita Dharmas of the older 
Buddhist phraseology), the other, the three 
states of being, or the three philosophies of life, 
Ke, Kii, and Chu. 

A. In China and Japan the noumenon or 
the Essence of Mind is sometimes called Ri or 
Eeason or Principle, as opposed to phenomena, 
Ji or Thing. These terms should be remembered 
as discussions concerning the nature of the Ab- 
solute, the relationship between the Absolute 
and the material world, and the relation of one 
thing to another, were carried on solely in these 
terms. 

B. The three states of being, it will be re- 
membered, referred to the metaphysical stand- 
point of different stages of Buddhist develop- 
ment. 

1. Ke, stands for Eealism, where the various 



68 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

phenomena of the universe are disintegrated into 
a number of real and self-existing permanent 
elements. 

2. Ku, or Qunya, has no direct European 
equivalent. It is usually expressed by Nihil- 
istic Idealism, but in reality it is neither nihilistic 
nor idealistic. The ^iinya doctrine simply 
asserts that there is nothing-unto-itself, that 
there is nothing changeless and eternal, but that 
every thing is in a state of flux, that there is 
never a Being but only a Becoming. Modern 
European science is nihilistic in asserting that 
there is no changeless and self-existing table, 
as every table is a changing concatenation of 
elements. The Qtinya doctrine, as we have 
already observed, goes on to say that these 
elements are in turn composite, and continues its 
process of desintegration until we reach the 
ceaselessly flowing stream of life. 

3. C?iu, or Madhya is the ontological de- 
velopment of this stream of life. Madhya in its 
metaphysical aspect is equivalent to the Absolute 
or the Essence of Mind, the Bhutatathat§«. It 
is the norm of existence which is ever the same 
and yet ever changing. It is thus the union 
of opposites. In the light of the Madhya 
doctrine we are able to say that the Universe 



THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE 69 

both exists and non-exists. The universe has 
no final existence per se, i.e., it may be broken up 
into component parts, so that to regard it as a 
fixed reality is an illusion. On the other hand 
it has a relative existence. As a complex it 
does exist and being derived from the Essence of 
Mind its existence is based upon ultimate reality. 
The Universe is but a passing phase of the 
Universal Life Essence. 

So much by way of introduction. Now for the 
discussion itself. In Chinese or developed 
Mahayana we find two main systems of thought, 
one that of the Avatamsaka or Kegon school, 
which was adopted by the Mantra school, the 
other that of the Tendai school which was taken 
over by the Dhyana School. 

According to the Avatamsaka School the 
teachings of its rival consists of the Ri-ji-muge 
doctrine and its own the Ji-ji-muge doctrine. 
Let us see exactly what this means. 

Ri-ji-muge Ji-ji-muge. 



_/f/ 



Ri it will be remembered stands for reason, 
Principle, the Noumenon, or the Absolute j 



70 INTRODUCTION 10 MAHAY AN A BUDDHISM 

Ji for the particular, phenomena, the various 
objects of the universe. Muge means undivided. 

Now in Mahayana, as we know, the Absolute 
or the Noumenon and the World of Life and 
Death or the realm of phenomena are identical. 
Accordingly, to use the technical phrase, the 
Ri and the Ji are undivided, the greater including 
the less. The followers of this school try, by 
means of meditation, to unlock the secrets of 
all phenomena (Ji) by fathoming the real nature 
of the one noumenon (Ri). 

We know moreover, that it is not the case 
only for one phenomenon, but that all things 
are one in essence with the essence of mind. 
In consequence, following out the idea on logical 
lines, we have. 

If A =x 
and B =i 
then A =B. 
Substituting for x the Ri, and for A any pheno- 
menon (Ji No. 1), and for B any other phenomenon, 
(Ji No. 2), we have 

Ji No. 1 -Ji No. 2. 
or in other words, the fundamental essence 
of any phenomenon is the same as all other 
such objects. In this school of thought (the Ri- 
ji-muge), however, one thing equals another 



THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE 71 

thing only indirectly, i.e., only because the two 
things are both identical with the one transcend- 
ing Ri and not because of their own essence. 

The Kegon School declares that this doctrine 
is not that of the true immanence of the Uni- 
versal Buddha, which is only to be found in the 
theory of the Ji-ji-muge. Literally, of course, 
Ji-ji-muge means " Phenomena-phenomena- 
undivided " or more freely, the direct identity 
(in essence) of all phenomena. This doctrine 
insists upon what we may call the a priori unity 
of all the material objects of the universe. 

The line of argument employed in working out 
this system is the very opposite of the preced- 
ing :— 

By investigating their basic nature we discover 
that one object is of the same substance with all 
the others, or let us say, 

If Ji No. 1 =Ji No. 2 
And Ji No. 2 =Ji No. 3, etc., 
then we must postulate a universal noumenon 
which is at the back of them all. 

In this system phenomena are emphasized at 
the expense of the noumenon, or let us say that 
instead of trying to understand the nature of the 
particular by comprehending the universal, as is 
done in the Tendai School, we must attempt to 



72 INTRODUCTION TO MAHAYANA BUDDHISM 

understand tlic universal by studying the par- 
ticular. 

It can readily be understood from this that 
while the Ei-ji-muge idea tends to make one seek 
(he Buddha in the mind, the Ji-ji-muge concep- 
tion causes us to look for the Universal Buddha 
in the body. Following out the former idea the 
flesh is regarded as a shackle imprisoning the 
enquiring spirit, so that by retiring from the 
world one should reduce it to proper submission 
and thereby obtain enlightenment, while with the 
Ji-ji-muge School illumination can only be 
found through perfecting the flesh by bringing 
out its latent potentialities, and thereby un- 
covering the Buddha hidden in the human heart. 

As a matter of fact, however, the Tendai and 
the Kegon school have much the same idea on 
the subject, since not only are the two doctrines 
not fundamentally different, but, in addition, 
the Tendai school really teaches the Kegon 
conception of the Ji-ji-muge under another name, 
which it calls Enyu or the doctrine of complete 
identity. 

This introduces the question of the three 
states of being, Ku, Ze, and Chii^ and also the 
fact that later metaphysicians like to distinguish 
between the shallow Tendai and the profound 



THE NATURE OF THE ABSOLUTE 73 

Tendai doctrine. From the fact that the pro- 
found doctrines developed in the home of the 
school (Mt. Tendai, or T'ient'ai) it is called the 
Sange (mt. home) doctrine. The shallow 
doctrine developed in various temples away from 
the centre, so it is called Sangai (outside the 
mountain) doctrine. These names, sange and 
sangaif should be noted for future reference. 

Mahayana scholars like to codify the two 
doctrines regarding the nature of identity in the 
following way : — 

I. The Shallow (Sangai) Doctrine of 
Identity. 

Abso/ufe Trufh / J1_ \ A/oa/ryenon 

/fe/crffoe Traf/i „ /^ „ P/?e/7ome/7ff ^ TAeJOOO l^cr/c/j 

II. The Profound Doctrine (Sange) of 
Identity. 

!/ 

/(e .^^--^^/fe J 
Another way of presenting the^same idea is : — 
I. The Shallow Doctrine. 

f A/ourr/enon j 



"6" 



/ie 
f/^enon7e/y