An introduction to mental philosophy : in two parts

GIFT OF
JAMES K.

AN INTRODUCTION
TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY,

AN -INTRODUCTION
TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY-.

IN TWO PARTS.

INTENDED ESPECIALLY FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS
IN UNIVERSITIES.

IN PART SECOND IS CONTAINED

A PARTICULAR INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
VALUE OP THE SYLLOGISM.

BY GEORGE RAMSAY, B. M.

AUTHOR OF " AN ESSAY ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH/

"ANALYSIS AND THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS,"

"A CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES,"

ETC. ETC.

EDINBURGH : ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK.

LONDON : LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS.

RUGBY : CROSSLEY AND BILL1NGTON.

M.D.CCC.LIII.

w^

L'homme n'est qu'un roseau le plus
faible de la nature, mais c'est un roseau
pensant.

Toute la dignite* de 1'homme
est en la pense'e. — PASCAL.

PREFACE.

THE attempt made in the following pages to
determine the meaning of some of the principal
terms employed in Philosophy, may, to some,
appear an ambitious undertaking ; while, to
others, it may seem merely a verbal affair. If
to emulate the " Great of old" be ambition, to
that the author must plead guilty; for Aristotle
himself composed a Philosophical Vocabulary ;
and, on the other hand, that the object of such
a work is useful and dignified, will be allowed
by those who are best acquainted with the
difficulties of Philosophy. I may mention in
particular two distinguished philosophers of the
present day, who have thus expressed themselves

on this subject.

A 3

VI PREFACE.

Dr. Whewell observes, that " Discussions and
speculations concerning the import of very ab-
\ stract and general terms and notions, may be,
and in reality have been, far from useless and
barren. Such discussions arose from the desire
of men to impress their opinions on others, but
they had the effect of making the opinions much
more clear and distinct. In trying to make
others understand them they learnt to understand
themselves. Their speculations were begun in
twilight, and ended in the full brilliancy of
day."*

Again, Mr. Mill remarks, that "Although ac-
cording to the views here presented, Definitions
are of Names only, and not of Things, it does
not follow that definition is an easy matter.
How to define a Name, may not only be an
inquiry of considerable difficulty and intricacy,
but may turn upon considerations going deep into
the nature of the things which are denoted by
the Name. Such, for instance, are the inquiries

* " Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," Part II.
Book xi. Chap. 2.

PREFACE. VI 1

which form the subject of the most important of
Plato's dialogues. * * # # * *
It would be a mistake to represent these diffi-
cult and noble inquiries as having nothing in view
beyond ascertaining the conventional meaning
of a Name. They are inquiries not so much to
determine what is, as what should be, the meaning
of a Name ; which, like other practical questions
of terminology, requires for its solution, that we
should enter, and sometimes very deeply, into the
properties, not merely of names, but of the things
named." *

The part of the work likely to meet with
the most opposition is that wherein are discussed
the nature and value of the SYLLOGISM. The
importance of correct opinions on this subject ;
the long, and still fondly cherished errors, as I
conceive, concerning it; the great names, from
Aristotle down even to the present day, arrayed
against me; the authority and teaching of one
venerable University; all induced me to devote
patient and oft repeated thought to this question.

* System of Logic, Book I. Chap. viii. Sec. 8.

Vlll PREFACE.

Well pleased, indeed, should I be, could I
have arrived at a conclusion supported by some
of the first men of our times; and sorry above
all am I to oppose the deep convictions of ONE
EMINENT MAN, whom I rejoice to call a friend:
but, my apology shall be given in the words of
his favourite author, Aristotle; words adopted as
his own ; namely, " That a philosopher, a lover of
wisdom, is bound in the cause of Truth, to refute
all error, be it the error of himself or of his
friends ; for though friends be dear, it is still his
hallowed duty to give the higher reverence to
Truth." To that sentiment I fully subscribe;
and I feel confident that nothing here said will
interrupt for one moment that friendly intercourse
which has so long subsisted between us, and
which, by me, has ever been considered as a
pleasure, a profit, and a privilege.

RUGBY, NOVEMBER, 1852.

CONTENTS.

PART FIRST.
PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

I. SUBSTANCE :

MIND OR SPIRIT, BODY OR MATTER . 1

II. QUALITY ..... 6

III. QUANTITY ..... 14

IV. RELATION ..... 27
V. POWER, CAUSE AND EFFECT . . .40

VI. LAW ..... 55

VII. LAW OF NATURE :

EXPLANATION OF PHENOMENA . . 58

VIII. PRINCIPLE ..... 65

IX. A REASON ..... 73

X. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY ... 76

XI. HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY . . .95

XII. METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR :

THEIR RESPECTIVE PROVINCES . 104

: CONTENTS.

PART SECOND.

I. THE CATEGORIES . . . .131

II. PROPOSITION, — THE PREDICABLES . 145

1. DEFINITION OF A PROPOSITION . . 145

2. WHAT THINGS ARE SIGNIFIED BY THE

TERMS OF A PROPOSITION . 151

3. WHAT WE AFFIRM OR DENY CONCERNING

THESE THINGS . . : 161

III. REASONING . . . . . 176

1. REASONING IN GENERAL . 177

2. DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING . 179

3. PROBABLE REASONING . . .184

INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE REASONING 184
PLAIN REASONING . . .219

4. THE SYLLOGISM . . . 220

5. DIFFERENT RELATIONS TRACED BY

DIFFERENT SORTS OF REASONING . 254

6. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF REASONING 257

AN INTRODUCTION
TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

SUBSTANCE.

SUBSTANCE is a word applied to two things,
apparently as different as any can be, namely,
Matter and Mind, or Body and Spirit. But in
spite of this great difference, there must be some
resemblance, however faint ; otherwise a common
name would hardly have been given to them.
What, then, is this circumstance belonging to
both, on account of which each is called a Sub-
stance? This, it would appear, is nothing but Per-
manence — permanence amid innumerable changes
or modifications. Matter may undergo very
great changes; from a solid it may become a
liquid ; from a liquid, an air or gas ; or two
gases may unite, and in so doing may lose their
own properties ; or acids, with alkalis, may form
neutral salts ; but something still remains con-

2 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

stant. So the Mind may pass through an innu-
merable variety of conditions — far more than
we can express in words ; such as Sensations,
Thoughts, Emotions, which comprise vast classes
of phenomena; but, through all this variety,
there is something fixed or permanent. It is on
this account we conceive that the term SUB-
STANCE has been applied to both Mind and Body.
A Substance, then, may be defined as something
permanent or constant amid innumerable modifica-
tions.

From the above it appears that, widely dif-
ferent as the Substances, Matter and Mind, un-
doubtedly are, there are still things more different.
Such are Mind, and the modifications of Matter
or its qualities ; Matter, and the modifications or
qualities, and the phenomena of Mind, for these
have not even the common property of per-
manence or constancy; and consequently they
have no common name.

Substance is a genus comprehending two
species^ MIND or SPIRIT, and BODY or MATTER.
So far as each is a Substance they have some-
thing in common ; but by what differences are
they separated 3

Matter has sometimes been defined as the
outward and unknown cause of our Sensations ;
but when we. -come to, epcjuire what is a Sensa-

SUBSTANCE. .5

tion, we say that it is a Mental phenomenon, of
which the cause, or at least the invariable ante-
cedent, is some change in the state of our body.
Hence Matter, or Body, is defined as the cause of
Sensation, and Sensation as the Effect of Body,
or we define in a circle. Let us then see whether
we have not some less vague notion of Matter.

Matter certainly gives occasion in us to in-
numerable sensations, and notions consequent
thereon ; and there are a few of these sensations
and notions which we never fail to experience
whenever Matter is present, and on which, there-
fore, we have fixed as serving to distinguish it
from other things. But in this case it is not on
the sensations that we fix, but on the notions
thence derived; the former being quite over-
looked.

Thus, first, all Matter gives us the notion of
Extension, and therefore we say that all Matter is
extended, and thus we distinguish it from Spirit.
Secondly, all Matter gives us the notion of So-
lidity or Impenetrability ; which means that it
fills space, or that two bodies cannot occupy the
same space at the same time. Thus is Matter
distinguished from simple Extension.

Now, our notion of Matter always compre-
hends these two notions, together with the notion
of Substance before stated ; and from these we

PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

cannot doubt that it originated ; and we think
from these alone, and not from colour, sound, or
taste. As for the two latter, we can conceive
Matter without them at all ; and, indeed, there
are not a few born deaf who yet know Matter ;
and we cannot suppose that a mere want of taste
would be attended by a total ignorance of the
world without. Nay, there have been children
born deaf, dumb, and blind, who yet were ac-
quainted with Matter. If this be so, the notion
of Matter does not necessarily embrace colour,
and was certainly not derived from it, though
those who enjoy sight may not, from constant
association, easily abstract colour from Matter.
The power of conceiving a thing without another
thing is a proof that the conception of the former
is independent of the conception of the latter ;
but our inability to conceive the one without the
other is no proof that the two conceptions are
necessarily inseparable ; for the inability may be
owing to long continued association.

From the above it follows that Matter may be
defined to be an Extended Solid Substance. Spirit,
on the other hand, is supposed neither to be ex-
tended nor solid, but its existence is known to us
from the various mental phenomena of which we
are conscious, — Sensations, Thoughts, Emotions.
Amid the constant and rapid succession of these

SUBSTANCE.

phenomena, we cannot help believing that there
is something permanent, which is therefore a
Substance, and which I call Self. The existence
of this substance is more intimately known, is
brought more home to us ; in other words, is
known more immediately than that of Matter, for
the former is known by phenomena which are
states of its own being ; the latter through the
medium of those mental states, called sensations,
which are totally distinct from matter itself.

From all this it appears that spirit may be
defined to be a Substance, neither extended nor
solid, but susceptible of Sensations, Thoughts, and
Emotions.

Here it is not said that the word Spirit, or
Mind, implies a Substance which at all times
thinks or feels, for it is a disputed point whether
or not there be always some consciousness, as in
deep sleep, or in a swoon ; but we should never
give the name of Mind to that which either had
never been conscious, or which had ceased to be
capable of consciousness. It is then the capa-
bility which the term implies, and not the con-
stant exercise of that capability.

PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

QUALITY.

THE word Substance, simply signifying perma-
nent existence, seems to be one out of a very
small number of terms which are strictly non-
relative. Not so QUALITY, which is synonymous
with POWER, and implies the relation of cause
and effect. All our knowledge of Matter is derived
from its effects upon us ; that is, from our sensa-
tions ; and all our knowledge of Spirit is obtained
from its own sensations, thoughts, and emotions ;
and though these sensations, thoughts, and emo-
tions, be ever changing, yet we believe not only
that there is something permanent which gives
rise to them all, and which in the one case we call
Matter, in the other Mind, but also that each sen-
sation, thought, and emotion, has a peculiar per-
manent cause, either external or internal, material
or mental ; and this we call a duality. But as our
experience tells us that outward objects, as well
as our own minds, undergo, in the course of time,
considerable changes : we do not attach the same
degree of permanence to a Quality as to Matter
or Mind itself. The Quality, however, is nothing
, distinct from Matter or Mind : it is one or the
other in a certain state ; — in other words, it is a

QUALITY. /

modification of either, less constant than Sub-
stance— more so than a mere phenomenon. When
I experience a sensation of redness, I say that the
object before me is red, or has the quality of red-
ness ; meaning that I believe that the cause of the
sensation is an outward object, and that the object
which now affects me thus will always affect me
in like manner (my eyesight and my distance from
the object remaining the same) ; and not me only,
but all persons similarly situated. I can clearly
distinguish between the passing sensation of red-
ness and the cause, which I believe to be perma-
nent, and which for a thousand years may arouse
similar sensations in successive generations of
men. But wind, rain, or other casualties, may in
time change the colour from red to black, or en-
tirely alter the figure, or even the intimate nature
of the object; and it is conceivable that our sen-
sations from the same object may vary; and
consequently a Quality has not necessarily the
permanence of simple substance. Substance has
been defined to be something permanent among
innumerable modifications Now these modifi-
cations are either qualities or phenomena, and the
former are permanent as compared with the latter.
But were all animated nature at once destroyed,
there would be an end to the qualities of matter,
as we comprehend them ; because Quality supposes

8 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

two things — an outward object and a percipient
mind ; though there might still be Substance.

This account of Quality agrees perfectly with
the doctrine of Locke, contained in the following
passage. And I am the more desirous of quoting
that passage, because the opinions of Locke have
been so much misrepresented, and this subject in
particular has been so much mystified by suc-
ceeding writers : — " Whatever the mind perceives
in itself, or is the immediate object of perception,
thought, or understanding, that I call Idea ; and
the power to produce any idea in our mind I call
^Quality of the subject wherein that power is.
Thus a snowball, having the power to produce in
us the idea of white, cold, and round, the power
to produce those ideas in us as they are in the
snowball I call Qualities ; and as they are sen-
sations or perceptions in our understandings, I
call them ideas ; which ideas, if I speak of them
sometimes as in the things themselves, I would
be understood to mean those qualities in the
objects which produce them in us." — Essay con-
cerning Human Understanding, Book ii. chap. viii.
sec. 8. See also sec. 2.

Had Locke written nothing more on the
subject of duality than this section, it seems
impossible that his opinions could have been mis-
understood ; and we can attribute the disputes

QUALITY. 9

which have arisen with respect to him, only to
some unguarded expressions in the remainder of
the chapter, and in particular to his observations
on primary and secondary dualities. " Fro"m
whence I think it is easy to draw this observation,
that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies, are
resemblances of them, and their patterns do
really exist in the bodies themselves, but the
ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities
have no resemblance to them at all. There is
nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies
themselves. They are, in the bodies we denomi-
nate from them, only a power to produce those
sensations in us ; and what is sweet, blue, or warm
in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion,
of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves,
which we call so." Sec. 15.

This distinction does not seem well founded.
The ideas of primary qualities no more resemble
the qualities themselves, than the ideas of se-
condary qualities resemble these. The quality,
the cause, is always external ; the idea, the effect
resulting from it, always internal, and the one
can bear no resemblance to the other ; the former
appertaining to Matter, the latter to Mind. The
secondary quality is quite as real as the primary,
and we have quite as much reason to believe the
one as the other. Either both exist outwardly, or
c

10 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

neither. We are as firmly convinced that there
exists something without, the cause of the sen-
sation of blueness, as we are that there is an
outward cause of the sensation of resistance.

Nevertheless, there is a good distinction be-
tween the primary and secondary qualities of
Matter, and it consists in this, that the former
alone are sufficient to constitute what Locke calls
the Nominal Essence ; in other words, sufficient to
our notion of matter ; so that wherever these
qualities exist, there we say is Matter, and
wherever these qualities exist not, there we say
is none. The primary qualities, then, are those
to the union of which we have given the name
Matter, and the statement of them is the defini-
tion of this term. Of course then they must be
inseparable from matter, under all its modifica-
tions, for were they not present, we should not
apply the name. When we say that they consti-
tute our notion of Matter, we imply that they
are inseparable from it ; and afterwards to state
that they are so, is a truism, and nothing more.

What those qualities are which are sufficient
to induce us to give the name of Matter, we have
already seen. They are Extension and Solidity,
or Impenetrability. All other qualities are se-
condary, for they do not of necessity enter into
our notions of a material substance. Bodies may

QUALITY. I 1

be without, colour, as in the dark; without sound,
as in a vacuum ; without smell, without taste, but
still they are Matter.

It is, no doubt, very difficult, for us who see,
to conceive Matter without colour, but this is
only the result of constant association, for we
know that those born blind are acquainted with
colourless Matter. A druggist or apothecary
cannot easily conceive senna apart from its pur-
gative effect ; but a botanist is wholly taken up
with the marks which determine its class, order,
genus, and species, and thinks not at all of its
medicinal virtues. Facility or difficulty of con-
ception, then, proves only frequency or infre-
quency of association, and is no test of what is
required and alone required : in other words, of
what is sufficient or essential to our notion of
that thing to which we give a name, whether it
be Matter or any other.

There is another division of Qualities which
deserves to be attended to, viz., that into Simple
and Relative. The Simple Qualities of bodies
are those which affect our senses, without chang-
ing other bodies, as redness, blueness, hardness,
softness, roughness, smoothness, &c., smells and
tastes, &c.

The Relative Qualities are such as first change
other bodies, and then operate anew upon our

12 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

senses, as an acid, which changes a vegetable
blue to red, or by mixing with an alkali, ^produces
a new substance, a salt ; or as fire, which melts
lead, or causes the explosion of gunpowder.
Though this distinction be well founded, yet we
must not suppose that Simple Qualities involve
no relation. They certainly imply a relation
between the outward object and the percipient
mind, for when we say that blood is red, or has
the quality of redness, we mean that it is a sub-
stance which rouses in us a sensation of redness.
But Relative Qualities imply no less than four
relations. To take the case of an acid uniting
with an alkali to form a salt : there is first the
simple relation between the acid and our per-
cipient mind ; secondly, the relation between the
alkali and our mind ; thirdly, the relation be-
tween the acid and the alkali, resulting in a
mutual transformation ; which third relation is
known to us by a fourth, that between the new
product, a salt, and our mind which perceives it.
Therefore, there is a well-marked distinction be-
tween Simple and Relative Qualities, and the
names seem sufficiently well chosen for the pur-
pose ; the one set of Qualities being so much more
simple than the other.

The word ATTRIBUTE seems to be nearly, if

V »

not quite, synonymous with QUALITY, only it is

QUALITY. 1 3

not so often used in reference to Body, being
mostly confined to Spirit, and often applied in
particular to that Great Spirit which created and
governs the universe.

Attribute of mind, like duality of body, means
something less constant than Simple Substance,
more so than a mere phenomenon, and yet not
distinct from substance any more than phenome-
non is ; but only that substance existing, not in
any state whatever, for then it would be simply
substance ; nor yet in a fleeting state, for then it
would be merely phenomenon ; but in a state
which may be called habitual, being apt to recur,
and to continue for some time. An Attribute
may, therefore, be defined as an habitual state of
mind. The assemblage of the moral Attributes is
called the disposition '.

a For other meanings of the word Attribute* and in particular
the distinction between the logical and the metaphysical sense, see
the article on the Categories. Part ii. Art. 1.

14 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

QUANTITY.

The word QUALITY necessarily implies Sub-
stance, mental or bodily ; for a quality is nothing
but a substance, existing in such a state as to
render us conscious of its existence, whether by
means of sensation, as in the case of body, or of
any mental phenomenon whatsoever, as in the
case of Mind. Quality, then, is inseparable
from Substance ; but not so QUANTITY : for
time and space have Quantity, since we under-
stand what we say when we talk of the length of
a mile or of a day, and neither time nor space
necessarily imply Substance. And though Quan-
tity belongs to all Bodies, yet is it not peculiar to
Body ; for neither time nor space is material.
To know, then, what is meant by Quantity, we
must consider it where it exists with the least
possible complication with other things.

Since Quantity belongs to both space and
time, these have something in common. But
what is that something *? Time and space agree
in this, and in this only, that they have parts,
and are capable of increase or diminution, by
the addition or the subtraction of the parts ;
and this addition or subtraction may go on to

QUANTITY. 1 5

infinity, in other words, without any limit which
we can assign. Who can set bounds to the
multiplication or division of miles or of years ?
Quantity, then, being that which is common to
space and time, means this capability "? When a
thing can be increased or diminished ad infinitum,
by adding or subtracting similar parts, there is
Quantity ; but where it cannot be so increased or
diminished, there we have Quality, which admits
of Shades, or degrees, not accurately fixed, and
that soon find a limit. Thus we talk of degrees
of excellence in tastes, degrees of hardness and
softness, the shades of colour, or of good and
evil, &c. &c.

In all these we soon reach a limit, beyond
which if we attempt to go, we change the Quality
into something else. What is whiter than snow ?
Do we attempt to produce greater whiteness, we
change it altogether.

Quantity, on the contrary, has no Shades, be-
cause one Quantity is perfectly distinct from
every other, and no limit. Shades suppose
gradual and insensible approximation, and hence
indistinctness ; but one is as distinct from .two as
from two thousand.

This is the reason why the relations of Quan-
tity alone admit of demonstration. Here every
difference is distinct ; whereas, in other things,

16 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

each difference is not distinct. Therefore Mo-
rality does not admit of demonstration, as Locke
supposes. The shades of action are innumerable,
and indistinctly marked. In questions respecting
Quantity there is but one alternative, — either a
thing is, or it is not ; but in all other subjects
there may be a middle term, or many middle
terms, partaking of the character of the two op-
posites. Either the two angles of a triangle are
equal to two right angles, or they are not : but
who shall say that one form of government is
always good, another always bad ; that one line
of policy, or one mode of action, is invariably the
best, another always the worst? These very
words, best and worst, suppose many intervening
degrees of goodness. Quantity, then, is the sub-
ject of demonstrative, Quality of probable rea-
soning ; because the differences of the one are
determinate, of the other indeterminate.

Quantity is particularly interesting and im-
portant, as forming the subject of the only perfect
science we possess — Mathematics. From what
has been above said, it follows that if pure Mathe-
matics be really the science of Quantity, as is
universally allowed, then that science is alto-
gether independent of Matter. The definitions of
Euclid prove the same thing. A point, we are
told, is that which has position, but not magni-

QUANTITY. 1 7

tude. A line is length without breadth. But in
the material world there are no such points and
lines ; therefore pure Geometry is not a science
of Matter. Is it, then, a branch of Mental
Science ? Certainly not, in the general accepta-
tion of that term ; for Quantity has nothing to
do with Mind or Spirit, either with the Substance
thereof or the phenomena. Who ever heard of
half a soul, or of two-thirds of a sensation,
thought, or emotion ? But if pure Mathematics
be neither a material nor a mental science, what
can it be ? for that division seems to exhaust
the subject. We answer that it is the science of
Quantity, under its three modifications of Space,
Time, and Number. Arithmetic is the Science
of Number ; Geometry, of Extension, whether of
one, two, or three dimensions ; while Algebra
comprehends Number, Extension, and Time ; for
letters may apply to any of these. Such is pure
Mathematics ; which ought to be classed apart,
in a comprehensive division of the sciences, and
not to be confounded either with mental or with
material or physical science, with which last it is
commonly joined. It is a science strictly sui generis,
or a summum genus, embracing three species, Arith-
metic, Geometry, and Algebra. According to this
view, science would embrace three leading di-
visions, Metaphysics, Physics, and Mathematics. b

b See Ramsay's " Classification of the Sciences."

18 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

Belonging to this subject there is a very in-
teresting question, as to the foundation and
nature of Mathematical certainty. Since that
science treats neither of Mind nor of Matter, it
follows that its certainty depends not upon the
existence of either of these. Let the earth be
dissolved, and all that live thereon, still the truths
of Mathematics will remain. Whatever exists as
Matter or as Mind may change, or cease to be,
and therefore the science thereof may fail ; but
we must alter or set bounds to time and space
before we can change the certainty of Mathe-
matics.

It has been said by an exceedingly able writer
of the present day, (See Mill's System of Logic,
Book ii. chap, v.) that the certainty of Mathe-
matics is merely hypothetical ; that its propo-
sitions are true in the sense that they follow
^ irresistibly from an hypothesis, and in that sense
only. Thus, when a line is defined as length
without breadth, or a triangle as a figure with
three sides and three angles, we are told that the
tacit assumption is made, " and such a thing
exists." On this assumption, and others simi-
lar, it is said, rest all the demonstrations of
Mathematics. When we define a line as
above, do we then really mean to imply that
such a line exists in the world of matter?

QUANTITY. 1 9

If we do, then we enounce, at the very be-
ginning, a notorious falsehood ; and no con-
clusions drawn from it can be worth attending
to. The boasted science of Mathematics be-
comes like the ravings of a madman, who first
fancies himself a king, and then reasons well
accordingly.

But if what we have above said, as to the na-
ture of Quantity, be correct, then Mathematical
demonstration is quite independent of Matter ;
and consequently we do not assume that the
points, lines, triangles, circles, &c. as defined in
books of Geometry, have any existence in the
material universe. No doubt it was by the ma-
terial world that we first became acquainted with
points, lines, triangles, &c. approximating to those
defined ; but having once got these ideas, through
our sensations, we can afterwards detach them
from Matter, and consider them as modifications
of pure space. Look at the arch of a bridge.
Without the stone and lime which form the arch
I might never have conceived a curve ; but, having
once seen a curve in Matter, I can imagine one
immaterial. What is included between the arch,
the piers, and the water below, forms a definite
figure in empty space, the air being invisible.
From constant association with Matter it is, no
doubt, difficult, if not impossible, to avoid think-
D 2

20 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

ing of Matter when we wish to think of figure
only, and sensible diagrams are even put before
us ; but in framing or following the reasoning,
we can attend so little to what is material, as not
to be at all disturbed thereby in our calculations,
I have, then, a notion of a Mathematical line,
triangle, circle, &c., and a notion sufficiently clear
to conduct me through the longest chain of rea-
soning without any confusion ; and what more
can I wish ^

But, if such points, lines, and circles, &c.,
exist not in any material object, and if spirit be
altogether inconsistent with extension and figure,
can these points, lines, and circles, be said to
exist at all ? and if not, is the science purely
imaginary ? The only answer to this is, that if
space can be said to exist, then do the figures of
Geometry. They rest upon the same foundation,
they must stand or fall together ; and if Space
and Time be not imaginary, neither is the science
of Mathematics. Surely no one will say that the
terms, Space and Time, have either no meaning
at all, or mean what exists only in fancy, as the
words Centaur, Mermaid. The same exactly may
be said of the lines and figures of Geometry.
That these terms have a meaning is evident, for
otherwise how could we reason about them*?
and if they have a meaning, then we have notions

QUANTITY. 2 1

corresponding to them, for these are but different
phrases for the same thing. And will any one
pretend that those notions are fanciful, like the
notions of Centaur and Mermaid ? We have
then notions, and notions which are not fantastic,
what more can we desire for Truth *?

With all respect for the abilities of the above-
mentioned author, I cannot but think that his
doctrine, with respect to necessary truths, is
fundamentally erroneous. Certain it is that phi-
losophers have long made a distinction between
necessary and contingent truth, a distinction
which Mr. Mill would confound. Hume clearly
marked out the difference, under the names of
relations of ideas, and matters of fact, the latter
known by experience, the former not. Dr.
Whewell's account of this, as quoted by Mr. Mill,
is as follows : " Necessary truths are those in
which we not only learn that the proposition is
true, but see that it must be true ; in which the
negative of the truth is not only false but im-
possible, in which we cannot, even by an effort
of imagination, or in a supposition, conceive the
reverse of that which is asserted. That there
are such truths cannot be doubted. We may
take for example all relations of number. Three
and two, added together, make five ; we cannot
conceive it to be otherwise ; we cannot by any

22 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

freak of thought imagine three and two to make

seven."0

From this passage Mr. Mill deduces that, ac-
cording to Dr. Whewell, a necessary truth may
be defined to be a proposition, the negative of
which is not only false, but inconceivable. Start-
ing from this idea, Mr. Mill goes on to show
that as the power of conception depends very
much upon association, and as many things
formerly supposed inconceivable, are now not
only conceived but believed ; for instance, the
action of bodies on each other at a distance ; of
Matter on Mind, &c., he thence infers that incon-
ceivability of the contrary is a very poor test of
truth, and that what is called necessary truth
rests, like every other, solely on experience.

Is there then no difference in the evidence on
which these two propositions rest ? The sun will
rise to-morrow ; the three angles of a triangle
are equal to two right angles. Are they both
contingent, or both necessary"? Do they both rest
upon experience ? Consult your own mind. Why
do we believe that the sun will rise to-morrow *?
Because as far as I know personally, or can learn
from the testimony of others, alive or dead, it
always has in time past. But can you see in that
any irresistible reason why it should rise to-

r Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Part i. Book i. Chap. 9.

QUANTITY. 23

morrow ? Must you not allow, that, for aught
you know, the sun may be dissolved, and scat-
tered throughout boundless space before another
day ? Ere you can say positively it will not, your
knowledge must be far far more extended than it
is at present, it must approximate to the know-
ledge of Him who created the sun and all things.
But why do you believe that the three angles of
a triangle are equal to two right angles ? Because
I have seen it demonstrated ; that is, starting
from some self-evident truth, I have followed a
chain of reasoning, each link of which was an
irresistible inference from the preceding, until I
arrived at the conclusion, which was the last
irresistible inference. The demonstration finished,
I can no more doubt the truth in question, than
I can doubt the existence of that feeling of
which at the moment I am conscious. I see
clearly that the conclusion holds good, and always
will hold good ; in short, that it must be true.

But how do you know that ? All I can answer
is that I see it to be so. I assert that to me the
first proposition is self-evident, and that the in-
ferences flow from it irresistibly, even to the con-
clusion. If you deny this, I can only bid you to
study the theorem. Should you still persist in
your doubts I can say no more, for I cannot give
a demonstration of a demonstration. What is

24. PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

self-evident not only requires no proof, but ad-
mits of none ; and if the inferences from the first
proposition be not directly felt to be irresistible,
no arguments remain to make them so.

Having read and mentally followed the theorem
in which the above conclusion is established,
can any man doubt its truth ^ If he cannot,
then the truth is necessary, not contingent. And
if he cannot doubt its truth, then is it not derived
from experience; for experience tells us only of
the past ; and we can always doubt whether what
we have experienced in the past shall happen
again.

If this be correct, it is absurd to ask for any
test of self-evidence, or of demonstrative inference.
You either see it, or you do not. A necessary
truth is that which is either evident at once, or
becomes so by means of a demonstration. The
criterion is not that the opposite is a contradic-
tion in terms, for I see no contradiction in sup-
posing, previous to enquiry, that the three angles
of a triangle are greater or less than two right
angles; no contradiction to the definition of
triangle. It is not as if I said that black is white.
Neither is inconceivability of the contrary a cri-
terion ; for, beforehand, I can just as well conceive
that those three angles are unequal as equal to
two right angles. But Dr. Whewell having made

QUANTITY. 25

use of the word conceive, Mr. Mill has founded
thereon a supposed refutation of the doctrine
that there are truths, necessary truths, which
we know for certain, but not from experience.
No doubt when truths are seen to be necessary,
the contrary is inconceivable ; but it is not be-
cause they may be inconceivable that we deem
them necessary.

When we say that a truth is necessary, we
imply that the contrary is impossible, the one in-
volves the other ; and if we require a criterion of
necessity, so do we of impossibility. But neither
admits of any that can be stated in words : the
mind alone supplies it.

The distinctions between Quantity and Quality
may be here summed up.

1. Quality varies by insensible shades or de-
grees ; whereas one Quantity differs from another
by a fixed or determinate difference.

2. Quality generally, but not always, admits
of a contrary, as black is the contrary of white,
wetness of dryness, hardness of softness, vice of
virtue, ugliness of beauty : but Quantity has
never a contrary. One Quantity may be double,
triple, four times, another quantity ; but in all
these there is no opposition ; but only more or
less of the same thing.

3. Qualities are like or unlike ; but Quanti-

E

26

PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

ties are equal or unequal. This last distinction,
however, is comprehended under the first ; for
where the degrees of difference are insensible,
there will be likeness or unlikeness ; and where
the differences are fixed, there will be equality or
inequality.

RELATION. 27

RELATION.

In treating of Quality we have been led, un-
avoidably, to mention RELATION ; but this word
now demands a separate head.

In classifying the phenomena of Mind, Rela-
tions are opposed to Conceptions, and they are
thus distinguished : Conceptions being those in-
ward phenomena which do not necessarily imply,
or at least do not evidently imply, the existence
of two things ; while Relations do manifestly sup-
pose more things than one. I look at a horse pre-
sent before me, and admire his form, colour, and
activity, without thinking of any other horse ; and
[ have a Perception of him, which, in his absence,
may suggest a Conception. I consider him along
with a pony, and I compare them ; in other words,
I am conscious of a Relation between them. And
this state of mind which I experience is quite dis-
tinct from the Perception or the Conception, either
of the horse or of the pony ; though but for those,
it never would have arisen. It is a state more
removed from Sensation, in the order of time,
than either Perception or Conception, of which it
is the consequence.

28 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

So far the distinction between Conception
and Relation seems very clearly marked ; though
when we examine the matter more deeply we
shall find that there are but very few concep-
tions which do not at least imply, that is suppose
in a covert way, the existence of more things
than one. Thus, all the qualities of Substances,
even those which we have called Simple, as op-
posed to Relative, suppose not only that there is
an outward or material object, but also a per-
cipient mind. A blue object is one which rouses
in me the sensation which I call blueness, and
therefore there is a relation between that object
and myself. Still, there is a difference between
this case and that of a Relation, commonly so
called ; a difference on which we have enlarged,
in treating of Quality. Besides the more com-
plex nature of the Relation in the latter case, it
is also manifestly /<?// ; whereas in the former, it is
discovered only by those who study the subject
metaphysically. No one, generally speaking,
when looking at a green field, thinks of the field,
then of his sensation, and lastly of the Relation
between them. It would be a bad use of meta-
physical subtlety to confound distinctions re-
cognized by the common sense, as well as the
common language, of all mankind. The words
blueness, redness, hardness, softness, wetness,

RELATION. 29

dryness, suggest no Relation to ordinary men ;
but those of father, mother, brother, sister,
cousin, tutor, governor, servant, slave, cannot be
heard by any one without calling up the notion
of two persons somehow connected. A Relation,
then, considered as a mental phenomenon, is an
inward state of mind, which manifestly supposes
the existence of two things at least, having some-
thing in common ; and according to the nature
of that something, there are different kinds of
Relations.

But do Relations exist only as mental phe-
nomena *? Have they no existence outwardly *?

Objects there are, we allow, having an indepen-
dent existence without ; but it would be palpable
nonsense to say that a Relation exists as Matter
exists. That it is, however, something more
than a mere state of mind, every one is con-
vinced. When I think of a mare and her foal, I
am conscious that there exists a connection be-
tween them, (the nature of which every dolt
knows as well as the wisest of men), consisting of
a long series of material changes in which the
two participate ; but if you ask me to put my
finger on the Relation as on a lump of Matter,
then I am quite at a loss, I must allow that the Re-
lation exists not as the mare and her foal exist —
objects which can be seen and touched. Must

30 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

I then be driven to confess that the Relation be-
tween them is a mere state of my Mind? But this
conclusion is as opposed to the universal sense of
mankind as the other. How then can the Rela-
tion exist if it be neither material merely nor men-
tal merely ? This is a question which I will
answer when any one shall inform me how Space
and Time exist.

Having explained, as far as we are able,
the nature of Relation, let us see what are the
different kinds thereof.

There is one distinction among Relations which
is very well marked. Some Relations suppose the
things related to exist simultaneously or together ;
others imply that they exist in succession : con-
sequently the latter do, and the former do not,
necessarily involve the notion of time. We have,
therefore, Relations of co-existence, and Rela-
tions of succession ; these always supposing time,
while those may or may not suppose space, ac-
cording as the objects related are outward and
material, or inward and mental. The following
are the principal relations of co-existence.

1. Relations of Position. I stand on a moun-
tain commanding an extensive prospect. I descry
hills, dales, woods, towers, steeples; I remark
how they lie one with another, east, west, north,
or south; some nearer, some farther off; some

RELATION. 3 1

above, some below ; and I am conscious that they
are related in space, related by position. This
relation is the foundation or subject of Geography
and descriptive Astronomy ; of Zoology, so far as
the mere collocation of parts, as known by
Anatomy, is concerned ; of Botany also to a con-
siderable extent ; and of Geology likewise in part,
one object of which is to determine the relative
position of strata.

2. Relations of Comprehension. I look down
from the top of St. Paul's, and I see a vast city,
which in a certain sense I consider one, but which
embraces or contains within it an immense num-
ber of streets, squares, houses, churches, &c., and
I am conscious of a relation between the whole
and the parts, between things existing in space,
a Relation of Comprehension. This is the subject
of all those sciences which are properly called
analytic, or which investigate the constitution of
things, such as Analytic Chymistry, which searches
after the hidden ingredients of material objects,
and Analytic Metaphysics ; though in this case the
things related, viz., the compound feeling, and
the simple feelings which it comprises, cannot be
said to have any existence in space.

3. Relations of Quantity. Quantity being,
as we have seen, that which hath parts, and which
may be increased or diminished without limit, by

32 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

adding or subtracting parts, it would seem to fol-
low that, as in this sense, both time and space
have Quantity, therefore the Relations of Quan-
tity ought to be classed, some as co-existing, others
as successive. But in reality it is not so. As for
the theorems of pure Geometry, these are evidently
concerned with the Relations of things in space,
for they may be represented to the eye, though
with some imperfection. And though the num-
bers of Arithmetic and the letters of Algebra may
apply to the divisions of time as well as of space,
yet while making our calculations, while feeling
the Relations in question, the Quantities are sup-
posed to co-exist. While we are conscious that
2 : 4 : : 4 : 8, all these numbers exist together,
and though we may afterwards insert the word
hours, and say that 2 hours : 4 hours : : 4
hours : 8 hours, yet this insertion cannot change
the nature of a Relation previously felt.

Relations of Quantity, then, and the science
of those Relations, viz., pure Mathematics, do
not, in any case, involve the notion of Time.d

d Since writing the above, I am glad to find my opinion con-
firmed by that of Mr. Mill. " The laws of number," says he,
" are common to synchronous and successive phenomena." Again,
" the laws of number, though true of successive phenomena, do
not relate to their succession." — See Mill's System of Logic,
Book iii. Chap. 5.

RELATION. 33

4. Relations of Indeterminate degree. I look
upon two tulips, and pronounce one to be more
gaudy than another; upon two geraniums, and
perceive that the one has the more brilliant co-
lours ; upon two horses, a racer and a cart horse,
and am conscious that the former is the more
finely formed ; upon two women, and am sensi-
ble that the one is much more beautiful than the
other.

So, I partake of two loaves of bread, and am
aware that they are of different degrees of good-
ness, or of different qualities, as the phrase is.

All these are Relations of Indeterminate de-
gree ; for by what standard can we measure them ?
We may be sure that one thing surpasses an-
other in brilliancy of colour, in beauty, in taste,
or in nutritive power, but who can say how
much 2 The qualities or properties compared
must, of course, be similar, for between different
qualities, as between colour and taste, beauty and
nutritive power, there can be no comparison.
True it is that the word Quality is sometimes
used to signify degree, as when we speak of
different qualities of bread or meat, meaning
different degrees of goodness, as to taste and
nutrition ; and in this sense diverse qualities or
degrees may be compared ; but this is a popular,
not a philosophical sense of the word. And as
F

34 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

the word degree is often used to express Relations
of Quantity, as in the case of the degrees of a
thermometer, therefore it is necessary to distin-
guish the Relation now in question by the phrase
Indeterminate degree.

In popular language the word Quality, in the
sense of Degree, is very commonly opposed to
Quantity ; as when we say that the food of the
poor is both deficient in Quantity, and bad in
Quality ; that is, inferior either in taste or in
nutritive power to the food consumed by the rich.
But we must be careful not to confound this sense
of the word Quality with the philosophical one.
In the philosophical sense, different Qualities or
Properties, as Taste, and Nutritive Power, cannot
be compared together ; but in the popular sense
different Qualities may be compared, because
Quality then signifies degree of a common Pro-
perty ; as the degree of excellence in food as to
the common Property Taste, or else as to Nutri-
tive Power.

Here we again see the difference between
Quality in the strict or philosophical sense, and
Quantity ; the former admitting of Relations of
Indeterminate degree, and of those only ; the
latter of Relations only of determinate degree.
This distinction is of the utmost importance, as
it at once separates Mathematics, or the Science

RELATION. 35

of Quantity, as susceptible of demonstration and
certainty, from all other Sciences, which admit
only of probability.

Some Qualities are much more determinate
than others. Thus Justice is much more so than
any other duty ; and consequently, the Science of
Law is the most exact department of Moral Philo-
sophy.

These four are perhaps the only orders of
Relations which are always between things co-
existent. The second class, or Relations of Suc-
cession, is divided into two orders, according as
the sequence is invariable or casual. The former
is the important relation of Cause and Effect,
which will be treated at length by and by.

How important to Philosophy is a right notion
of Cause and Effect, may be judged from the fact
that this is the object of Philosophy properly so
called^ as distinguished from simple Science.
And what wandering in the dark do we find
among philosophers from not knowing what they
were seeking ! To trace the sequences of Cause
and Effect is one object, but to mount up to
General Causes or Principles is the highest scope
of philosophy. The whole is comprised in two
words — Causation and Generalization.

The second order of successive Relations is that
of casual succession, one of little importance, be-

36 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

cause, as the name implies, it cannot be calculated
or foretold.

But though not important in itself, it has never-
theless been the occasion of most of the errors in
philosophy as well as in daily life. As I have
elsewhere observed, so great is the tendency to
connect things as Cause and Effect, that with
children, and ignorant adults, one instance of
sequence is enough to create the belief of invaria-
bility ; and nothing but a wider experience can
correct this tendency. There is perhaps not a
man, however experienced, who does not still
make such mistakes; though certainly he will
not believe that Tenterden Church Steeple was
the cause of the Goodwin sands, because it was
built just before their appearance. We must not
confound casual succession with accident, for
the latter implies a real sequence of Cause and
Effect, but one which could not have been fore-
told, owing to the great complication of causes in
the world, and our ignorance of most of them ;
whereas in Casual Succession there is no con-
nection of the kind between the two events, no
more than between Tenterden and Goodwin.
The one simply precedes, and the other follows,
on a single occasion, and that is all ; and ten
thousand things, as well as the one in question,
may have preceded the latter. How many events

RELATION. 37

must have immediately gone before my act of
writing these lines on paper !

Besides these two classes of Relations, the
co-existent and the successive, there seems to
be a third class, comprising Relations, some of
which are co-existent and others successive. This
may be called the mixed class. To it belongs
but one order, exceedingly comprehensive, the
Relations of Resemblance.

Resemblance may be felt either between things
co-existent, as between two horses, or two sheep,
placed side by side, or between two sequences of
phenomena; as when two billiard balls are each
impelled by another ; or as when two salts are
produced, in the one case by mixing sulphuric
acid with potash, in another muriatic acid with
soda. Here not only the products of the chemi-
cal action are alike in some important particulars,
but the actions themselves are very similar. So
we say that there is a striking resemblance be-
tween the revolutionary changes which took place
in England, in the seventeenth century, and those
which occurred in France, in the eighteenth and
nineteenth ; meaning not only that the results
were alike, but that the events succeeded each
other in a like order.

No Relation is more generally felt than that of
Resemblance. Though we frequently say of two

38 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

things, that they are not the least alike, yet this
is only in comparison with others that are more
like ; for, strictly speaking, almost all things have
something in common ; some one point, at least,
of resemblance.

To determine important Resemblances is one
grand object of Science. All classification is
founded on Resemblance, and in many Sciences
classification is everything. When we shall have
classified all the objects of the animal, vegetable,
and mineral kingdoms, according to their resem-
blances, descriptive natural history will be com-
plete. In Mental Science also classification of
the phenomena of mind is an important part.
But more than this, all our reasonings from ex-
perience, all induction, as it is commonly called,
is founded on this same relation ; for the funda-
mental axiom of inductive reasoning is that
nature is uniform in her operations ; that like
causes will be followed by like effects, and that
things which have constantly co-existed, will
always co-exist; for instance, that a creature
having the outward appearance of a man, will
always have a heart, liver, lungs, &c., formed like
other men. whom we have actually examined.
The grand object of inquiry then, becomes, to
detect in any new case sufficient similarity with
an old case, that is sufficient to warrant us in in-

RELATION. 39

ferring similar co-existence of things, or similar
succession of phenomena, without actual obser-
vation. Resemblance, then, and Causation are
Relations of the utmost importance in Science
and Philosophy.

It seems scarcely necessary to add that the
study of Resemblances belongs as well to the
Poet as to the Philosopher. How much of the
charm of the fine arts depends upon the likeness
between their creations and those of nature!
And are not the finest parts of poetry the
similes ? For the sake of beauty, a simile must
be neither very near nor very far fetched ; for
in the one case it is indifferent, in the other
ludicrous. A simile scientifically correct would
be about as bad in poetry as one that is absurd.6

e Relations of Resemblance may be considered either as a
class distinct from those of co-existence, and those of sucession,
or the Resemblances of co-existence may be looked upon as an
order of the former class, and resemblances of succession as an
order of the latter. This however would be not at all a logical
arrangement, for then we should separate the species of the genus
resemblance, and place them under different classes.

40 PHIFX)80PHICAL VOCABULARY.

POWER, CAUSE AND EFFECT.

Though we have made mention of Cause and
Effect under the head of Relation, yet, as this is
the most important of all relations, and probably
the least understood, it seems necessary to con-
sider it now at large under a separate head.
A Power is the word which expresses that pe-
culiar relation which a Cause bears to its Effect,
the nature of which we are now to investigate.
What then is the notion which we actually have
of Power 3

In the first place it is evident that by Cause
we mean something which precedes something
else, which something else we call Effect. The
relation between them then, or Power, is a rela-
tion of antecedence and consequence, in other
/ words, of Succession, involving the notion of
Time ; and the order of this succession is uni-
form, the Cause being the antecedent, the Effect
always the consequent. But ten thousand things
may precede any change, only one of which we
look upon as the Cause of that change. There-
fore, a Cause is not a mere antecedent ; an Effect
not a mere consequent

POWER, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 41

When we have determined the cause of any
phenomenon, we believe that it will be followed
by that effect, not only once, not only several
times, not only most times, but always ; and if per-
chance we be deceived, and at any time the cause
appear without the effect, we draw one or the
other of the following conclusions. Either we
were altogether wrong in the supposed cause, or
the one now before us differs in some respect
from that which we formerly observed ; or,
what is nearly the same thing, there are other
counteracting causes at work which we wot not
of. But, however we may account for the
failure of the effect, we never for a moment sup-
pose that there is any want of uniformity in
Nature, or that causes really alike in all respects
will not always be followed by like Effects. A
man who should hazard such an opinion would
be considered out of his mind. So far then we
tread upon indisputable ground ; and we can
pronounce, without doubt, that Power involves
the notion of Invariable Antecedence and In-
variable Consequence.

But is this the whole of the Relation, as
some philosophers assert, particularly Thomas
Brown *? That acute metaphysician, treading
in the steps of Hume, wrote a book to prove
that all we know, or ever can know, of Cause
G

42 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

and Effect, is, that the one invariably precedes,
the other invariably follows. Events, as Hume
observed, are conjoined, but as far as we can
trace, unconnected. Nothing seems to bind
them together. They succeed each other, some
invariably, others casually, but we never can
say why any order prevails, why fire warms
\ or cold freezes, why acids and alkalis combine
to form salts. Pursue your investigation as far
as you can, says Brown, try and find out some
connection between any cause and its effect,
and if you seem to succeed, what will you have
learnt ? Simply this : that between the two there
is a link, (if we may so call it), formerly unknown,
a change previously undiscovered ; so that instead
of A followed immediately by C, we have A
followed by B, followed by C, a sequence more
full, but merely a sequence, and quite as incom-
prehensible as before. The only difference is,
that A is no longer considered the Invariable
and Immediate Antecedent of C, but simply an
Invariable Antecedent, while it is the Immediate
and Invariable Antecedent of B.

This doctrine may be true, but it must be al-
lowed that it sounds strange in the ears of untu-
tored men, and at first, at least, appears unsatisfac-
tory to all. That a Cause is something more than
an Invariable Antecedent, an Effect than an In-

POWER, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 43

variable Consequent, we cannot help believing,
though what it can be may transcend our limited
intelligence. But if the above be the only defi-
nite notion of Power which we possess, we ought
not to find fault with the doctrine because it
openly acknowledges our ignorance. Is it how-
ever certain that we have no other notion of
Power ? The general sense of mankind would
induce us to think that we have, for those who
cannot refute the above doctrine are still unsatis-
fied, and though silenced, are not convinced. But
where interest or passion does not intervene,
truth, though long undiscovered, when once
pointed out is apt to seize upon the mind with
the force of intuition. This is particularly the
case with metaphysical truth, which is known to
us ultimately by consciousness. To the mind of
each individual must we appeal, as to the highest
tribunal, in all questions relative to mental phi-
losophy ; and this tribunal seems to decide that
the above doctrine of Cause and Effect is not
altogether satisfactory.

This general consideration may make us
suspect the doctrine of Brown, but,, to refute
it, some definite objection is necessary. And
this objection has been furnished by Reid,
who remarks that if a Cause be merely an
Invariable Antecedent, an Effect an Invariable Con-

44 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

sequent, then, as no two events have more con-
stantly succeeded each other than day and night,
night and day, it will follow that day is the
Cause of the succeeding night, night the Cause of
the succeeding day. Nor does it seem easy to
answer this objection. It is quite conceivable
that a common cause, or union of causes, as in
this case the existence and fixity of the sun, com-
bined with the rotation of the earth, may give
rise to a series of changes, succeeding each other
invariably, though unconnected as Cause and
Effect. The very power of conceiving such an
occurrence proves that there is no inconsistency
in the notion of invariable succession without
causation, and here we produce a case where
such a succession actually takes place. We must
then conclude that the doctrine of Hume and
Brown, as to Cause and Effect, is, to say the least,
incomplete. That invariable antecedence belongs
to a Cause, invariable consequence to an Effect, is
undoubtedly true ; but it is not the whole truth.
Mankind seem to be generally convinced that
x there is what they call a necessary connection be-
tween Cause and Effect. But what is meant by
this phrase *? The only sense which I can here
attach to the word necessary is that of indispen-
sable. When we say that the truths of Mathe-
matics are necessary, we mean either that they

POWER, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 45

are self-evident, or that they follow irresistibly
by reasoning from self-evident truths. This ne-
cessity the mind sees intimately ; it sees that the
truths are not contingent, not liable to change
now or hereafter ; unchangeable even by omnipo-
tence. The same can be said of no matters of
fact. The world and all that it inherits may
change in the twinkling of an eye, for aught that
we can see to the contrary, and, therefore, in this
sense of necessity we can see no necessary con-
nection between any two successive events.
This, however, we do find out by experience, that
in the present state of existence, at any rate, and
until some grand change shall ensue, certain
events are indispensable to certain others ; in
other words, unless the former occur, the latter
will not follow. The one we call Cause, the other
Effect ; and we say that the one has Power to
produce the other, meaning that it is an indis-
pensable condition of its existence. A Cause,
then, is not a mere invariable antecedent, but it
is an invariable and indispensable antecedent ;
and as the word Indispensable evidently includes
invariability and something more, the word In-
variable becomes unnecessary ; and we may define
a Cause to be an Indispensable Antecedent, an
Effect, an Unavoidable Consequent.

Having determined the nature of Cause and

46 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

Effect in general, that is to say the general notion
which we have of the relation between them, it
remains to be seen whether Causes may not be
divided into different species. Aristotle mentions
four kinds of Causes — the Material, the Formal,
the Efficient, and the Final; but we need not
long be detained with these, for most of them
would not now be regarded as Causes at all/

What he calls the Material Cause, is the sub-
stance of which a thing is made, as the material
cause of a silver spoon, is the metal silver ; and
if the substance be a compound one, as brass,
then the material causes thereof are the simple
bodies or elements, in this case copper and zinc.
This, then, is not a cause in our sense of the
word. Again, the Formal Cause, as the ancients
understood it, is purely imaginary ; and the
Final Cause is properly not a cause, but an effect
which we see, an useful effect, the foresight of
which, as we presume, induced the Great Creator
to provide means suitable to the end in view.
It is only as offering a motive to the mind of the
Deity that an end in view, an effect anticipated,
becomes a Cause. Of the four Causes of Aristotle

f These four Causes were very neatly expressed in Greek, by
four prepositions. The Material Cause was the «f ov (out of
which) ; the Formal, the %a6 o (according to which) ; the Effi-
cient, the uqp'ou (by which); and the Final, the dia o (for which.)

POWER, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 47

there remains then only the Efficient which we
should recognise as such ; the principle of motion,
the indispensable antecedent of any change.

The first and most obvious division of causes,
is that into Immediate and Remote. Since causes
form a lengthened chain, reaching from visible
effects up to the great First Cause, it follows
that some are nearer to the effect, others farther
off. Properly speaking there is but one immediate
cause, and all the others are remote, though in
different degrees.

Often do two men differ as to the causes of
any phenomenon, but both may be right; for the
cause hit upon by the one may be more remote
than that assigned by the other, and each may
exist in its order. Thus, while some maintain
that value and price are regulated by the demand
and supply, others insist that cost of production
is the determining cause. Nor is there here any
real opposition, for cost of production regulates
the demand and supply, and these again regulate
price.

Causes are also divided into Proximate and
Ultimate. Judging by Etymology or the deriva-
tion of the words, we might suppose that Proxi-
mate and Ultimate mean exactly the same thing
as Immediate and Remote ; and such is the un-
certainty in the use of words that we cannot

48 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

affirm that they never are so employed ; but
generally speaking the sense is very different,
For Immediate and Remote refer to the real order
of succession of phenomena in causation, (one
after another), whereas Proximate and Ultimate
relate to the order according to which we arrive
at the knowledge of causes. Thus Proximate
corresponds to palpable or apparent ; Ultimate, to
hidden or real. For the real causes of change
are not always manifest, often far otherwise,
being enveloped, and so hidden from view, by
masses of inert matter. As a remedy for ague
the value of bark was known for ages, but of late
years only has it been discovered that the whole
virtue resides in a very small portion of the mass,
in a substance that can be separated from the
rest, and which is called Quinine. So the whole
narcotic virtue of opium has been found to reside
in Morphia, and the poisoning property of nux
vomica in the alkali Strychnia: -and bark, opium,
and the nux vomica, are the Proximate or pal-
pable causes ; quinine, morphia, and strycknia, the
Ultimate, hidden, or real causes.

Proximate and Ultimate, then, refer not to the
order of succession among the phenomena of
causation, but to the order in which we discover
them. The compound substance bark is not
nearer in time to the effect, viz. the cure of

POWER, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 1 (J

ague, than is the simpler substance quinine ; but
the whole effect, as we find by experience, is
owing to the latter, and the former deprived of
this contributes nothing. If anything, the woody
matter rather hinders than promotes the good
result. Bark is indeed still a cure for ague ; but
it is so only because it contains the alkali
Quinine. The rest is merely the covering of the
real cause, the garment which conceals it from
view.

The grand object of philosophy, mental or
physical, is to trace ultimate causes, to ascend
to them, as the phrase is, from the proximate and
palpable causes which lie upon the flat before us.
It is therefore of the utmost consequence clearly
to understand their nature. This, it is hoped,
will in part appear from the above remarks. The
examples derived from chemistry are particularly
valuable as illustrations, because the proximate
and ultimate causes of change can there be ac-
tually exhibited as substances. But it is not so in
all sciences. Very frequently the ultimate causes
of change are not substances but tendencies;
tendencies inseparable from mind or matter, but
not to be seen or felt, and known only from the
result. Thus we attribute the motion of the
earth round the sun to two Tendencies at present
supposed ultimate, a projectile rectilinear, or tan-
H

50 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

gential force, and the force of gravity. These
tendencies being given, we can from their union
account for the motion of the earth as their
common result ; though the latter only is strictly
proved, the former being only hypothetical.

Whatever may be the point which we have
reached in the progress of our enquiry, whether
the causes already discovered be the most general
and simple that can be traced by man or not, for
the time at least they are ultimate causes ; like
those fifty or sixty bodies which chemists call
simple, because they have never been analyzed.
But is it not often said that man can discover
proximate causes only, ultimate being beyond his
ken "? When this is asserted, it must mean that
the Deity is not only the great first, the original
or remote cause of the phenomena of the uni-
verse, but also the real or ultimate cause of
every event; that nothing takes place, not only
without his permission, but without his direct
agency.

This may be the case, and it may be that God
is thus the one ultimate or real cause of every
change, but the question is clearly beyond the
sphere of human intellect ; and whatever opinion
we may adopt on this point, we are justified in
distinguishing between those causes which lie
more open to view, and those more hidden ; and,

POWEH, CAUSE AND EFFECT. 5 1

speaking comparatively, we may call the former
proximate, the latter ultimate, though these may
not be strictly such, not ultimate even to our
limited capabilities, but so only provisionally.

The words Proximate and Ultimate, as here
explained, exactly correspond in meaning with
the use of them in analytic chemistry. What
are called the proximate principles of any com-
pound are those constituent parts which meet us
first in the order of analysis, they being them-
selves compounded of the ultimate principles or
elements, and much more like to the compound
than are those elements. Thus the proximate
principles of animal substances — of muscle, cel-
lular tissue, serous membranes, nerves, blood,
lymph, &c., are found to be fibrin, gelatin, gluten,
&c., all which principles are made up chiefly, if
not entirely, of four elements — Carbon, Oxygen,
Hydrogen, and Nitrogen or Azote, in different
proportions.

Another division of Causes is that into Pri-
mary and Secondary. As immediate and remote
relate to the real order of succession, and proxi-
mate and ultimate to the natural order of
discovery, so primary and secondary refer to
the order of importance. Since few, if any
events, are owing to one cause alone, a dis-
tinction is made according to the degree in

PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

which causes are supposed to contribute to-
wards the common result, and one is called
Primary, while others are styled Secondary or
Auxiliary. In this sense Gibbon professedly uses
the term Secondary in his celebrated chapter on
the Propagation of Christianity ; though the
writer insidiously endeavours to instil into his
readers that his five causes were sufficient to
account for the marvellous effect, that in short
they were primary, not secondary causes. Since
secondary causes are often subsequent in the
order of time to the primary, they may be at
once auxiliary and immediate, and the word
secondary may be sometimes used in one sense,
sometimes in the other ; being now opposed to
primary or principal, now to remote or original.
Thus, when we talk of the secondary causes of
moral sentiment, we may mean to distinguish
them from primary, in the sense of original, or
in the sense of principal or chief; and as the
same causes which are secondary in the one sense
are so likewise in the other, neither the reader
nor the writer may be always aware in which
sense the word is used. The Original Causes of
moral sentiment, which are also the most impor-
tant, are certain tendencies deeply and indelibly
seated in the human mind ; whereas the se-
condary or subsequent causes, which are likewise

POWER, CAUSE AND EFFECT.

of less consequence, are such fluctuating circum-
stances as Education, Passion, Local Utility, &c.
The word Circumstance is commonly used to ex-
press a secondary or auxiliary cause, which, along
with others of the same sort, is supposed, as it
were, to stand around the primary or principal
cause.

What is called an OCCASION is nothing but a
secondary or auxiliary cause. Thus, I say that
it was on occasion of my being in London that I
went to see the British Museum ; meaning that
this circumstance went along with the principal
cause, which undoubtedly was my desire to see
the curiosities therein contained. But had this
desire been very strong, I might have gone up to
London on purpose. So we pray against all
" occasions of evil ;" that is, all outward circum-
stances which may help to stir up the great source
of mischief — our own bad propensities.

An OPPORTUNITY is also an auxiliary cause,
one that facilitates the acquisition of any object
which we are supposed to have previously desired,
v The keener the desire, the quicker generally is
the intellect in seeing opportunities, and the
greater the readiness in seizing upon them. The
grand art of life is that of perceiving and profiting
by opportunities. "Ideas come again, convictions
perpetuate themselves, opportunities never recur."

54 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

There is another distinction which deserves to
be mentioned ; one dwelt upon chiefly by medical
writers, viz., the division of causes into Predis-
N ponent and Exciting.

Two men go out together and are exposed to
the same weather ; with the same precautions, or
want of precautions, both get wet to the skin,
return home, and both immediately change, or
not, as the case may be ; but the one catches only
a slight cold, and the other falls ill and dies of
consumption. Here medical men would say that
the one had the seeds of consumption undeveloped
in his frame, before he was exposed to the exciting
causes of cold and wet, the other not ; or that the
former was predisposed to that fatal malady. And
assuredly there are great diversities of constitu-
tion— original tendencies to different diseases in
different persons, or we never could account for
the diverse effects of the same outward causes.
But those tendencies may be long hidden, or even
may never be known, in the absence of any out-
ward or exciting cause ; as a consumptive habit
may never actually fall into consumption, if fatigue,
cold, and wet, be carefully avoided. Therefore
the division of causes into Predisposing and Ex-
citing is not only very useful, as a guide to the
medical practitioner, but it may lay claim to no
small degree of philosophical accuracy.

LAW. .").">

LAW.

WHAT is a Law ^

A Law, in its most general sense, means a
General Rule, proceeding from an intelligent being.
Now Laws are of two sorts— Speculative and
Practical. Speculative Laws, often called the
Laws of Nature, are those general rules or plans
which we suppose to have been present to the
mind of the Deity, or great First Cause, before
he formed the universe, and according to which
he afterwards did form the same. To us, these
laws are in the first instance merely an object of
speculation ; though the knowledge of them may
subsequently be turned to the most important
practical purposes. To discover these laws is the
grand object of Natural and Mental Philosophy.

When we talk of the laws which govern the uni-
verse, or any department of the universe, we must
remember that though in one point of view these
laws are causes, yet in another they are themselves
effects, and therefore requiring explanation quite
as much as the phenomena which they help to
explain. Therefore these laws only remove the
difficulty a few steps, and to a great self-existent
cause we must have recourse at last. Laws then,

56 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

after all, are but God's deputies ; and their
government is only delegated/

A Practical Law, on the other hand, is a general
rule proceeding from an intelligent being or
beings, whereby something is commanded to be
done, or not to be done, under the sanction of
reward or punishment. This law may be written
or unwritten, expressed or understood, partial or
universal, temporary or eternal. Practical Laws
are also divided into the Ethical and the Political.

In an Ethical Law, or as some call it, a Natural
Law, (because the knowledge of it is obtained by
the use of natural, i. e. our common or ordinary
faculties, without any peculiar study), the rule is
supposed to proceed from all men, or what comes
to the same thing, from God ; for whatever is
held by all men, at all times, must be derived from
unchangeable principles of human nature, which
we must suppose implanted in us on purpose by
Him. The rule, then, which here is a command,
proceeds from all men, or from God, and the
sanction is fear of punishment, or hope of reward,
from man or from God ; from man individually,
not from men united in a body politic or common-
wealth. The principal sanction of man indi-
vidually is approbation or disapprobation, moral
love, or moral indignation, and their consequences.

s For a further account of Law of Nature see next article.

LAW. 57

These Laws may admit of some modifications,
according to times and circumstances, but no fur-
ther than the nature of man himself for whose use
they are framed, is liable to change. As compared
with those which follow, they may therefore be
called immutable and eternal.

A Political law is a general rule, whereby the
sovereign of a state or commonwealth commands or
forbids something, under the sanction of reward or
punishment. Laws of this sort may vary very
widely according to the will of the sovereign, either
in the same country at different times, or in
different countries at the same time ; though it
follows directly from what is above said, that a
Political ought never to be contrary to an Ethical
Law.h

h The term Political, as here used, means the law of the State in
general, and comprises, not only constitutional or organic law, but
the criminal, as well as what is particularly called the civil law.
All laws, in short, made by the governing power of a State, I call
Political

58 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

LAW OF NATURE.
EXPLANATION OF PHENOMENA.

FEW phrases are more used in Philosophy, and
few are more imperfectly comprehended than LAW
OF NATURE. This then requires a separate article.

A Law of Nature may be defined to be a
General Effect, or Tendency to an Effect, of which
the Cause is unknown.

From this it follows that a Law cannot be ex-
plained ; it can only be stated, not accounted for.
But this general effect or tendency must in the
course of nature be a cause of other phenomena ;
and consequently, though itself unaccountable, it
may serve to explain other things.

There is then no absurdity in assigning a Law
in explanation of any Phenomenon ; for though in
one view it is an effect inexplicable, in another it is
a cause. Nay, a law is the ultimate explanation
of any phenomenon, in other words, the ultimate
cause3 so far as we know, the most simple and
general that can be pointed out by us ; always
excepting the first Great Cause of all, which alone
is really ultimate. Once more, to explain a
x phenomenon is to assign the cause thereof. But
the cause first observed may be only proximate or

LAW OF NATURE. 59

palpable, containing the simple and general, or real
cause, along with other things of no moment ; and
when we have separated these last we have detached
the ultimate cause, which, if it be a tendency
and not a substance, is called a law of nature.
Therefore, in this sense of the word Law, explana-
tion by assigning a cause, and explanation by
pointing out a law, are not different in kind, and
not opposed; but explanation by cause compre-
hends two species, explanation by proximate causes,
and explanation by ultimate causes or laws.

A complex effect may be explained by pointing
out the simple or elementary causes or tendencies
from what it results ; as the motion of the earth
and other planets round the sun is explained on
the supposition of a rectilinear projectile, or
tangential force, combined with the tendency to the
centre. We know that two such tendencies would
produce such an effect ; and as we have proofs of
the one, we allow the other. But the elementary
tendencies themselves cannot be explained, they can
only be ascertained to be real, and to be generally
diffused ; and when a case of them occurs, as when
a stone falls to the ground, all we can say is, that it
is a particular instance of a general tendency, not
an isolated fact. Here we generalize, but we do
not assign a cause. These tendencies, which can-
not be determined to be the result of more general

60 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

causes, are sometimes called ultimate facts, as
well as laws, and they are properly inexplicable,
i. e. they cannot be unfolded and shown to be com-
pound results of more simple tendencies. Such
are Cohesion, Gravity, and the three Laws of
Motion.

We have shown that the division of Causes into
Immediate and Remote, differs from that into
Proximate and Ultimate. Accordingly, there is
another way of explaining by causes ; and instead
of ascending in the scale of generalization from
compound and palpable causes to simple and
concealed, we may trace the order of the former,
from the last effect up to the most remote cause,
in other words, the sequence of causation. Thus,
starting from the movement of the hands on the
dial-plate of a watch, we may follow the series of
motions through wheels and other mechanical con-
trivances up to the first power, the spring. So, the
process of digestion in the animal frame may be
traced from the mastication of the food in the
mouth, till it is converted into chyme and chyle,
and finally lost in the blood.

But, when with a wish to enlarge our knowledge,
we enquire what is the cause of motion in all
watches, or in all clocks, we find that, in the one
case, the general cause is that tendency in certain
bodies which we call elasticity, in the other gravity :

LAW OF NATURE. 61

while, as to digestion and nutrition, the general
causes of these results are, as yet, involved in much
obscurity ; though the series of sensible changes,
the uniform sequence of phenomena, can be traced
throughout.

These different modes of explanation agree in
this, that they assign a cause of one sort or another.
But the word explanation is sometimes used when
no cause at all is pointed out. It is so used when
we profess to account for some effect by means of a
general law of which it is merely a particular
instance ; as when we think to explain the fall of a
stone, by saying that it is owing to gravity. This
is a case of gravity certainly; and if so, it cannot
at the same time be the effect thereof. But this
sense of the word explanation is very common in
works of philosophy, though it cannot he considered
a proper one, for it differs essentially from the other,
and so leads to much misconception. No doubt,
even in this way of explaining, a great truth may be
enounced ; for instance, that the fall of an apple from
a tree is an effect not singular in nature, but a
particular case of a tendency common to all matter.
This was the grand generalization of Newton. To
explain the tendency itself, he supposed the
existence of a fluid called ether; but this conjecture
has met with little favour,1 and gravity is still an

1 The hypothesis of the existence of ether has been revived of

62 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

ultimate and unaccountable fact. It is not however
a barren fact ; for though itself an effect inexplicable,
it is also a mighty cause, which helps to account
for the more complicated phenomena of the universe,
for the movements of a common clock, as well as
the revolutions of Jupiter and Uranus.

Though Newton failed in discovering the whole
cause of the grand tendency, gravitation, yet he
may be considered as having made some approxima-
tion towards it, when he determined the circum-
stances which regulate the force of the tendency ;
for he proved that the force varies directly as the
quantity of matter, and inversely as the squares of
the distances. Therefore the quantity of matter and
the distance being given, the resulting force may be
determined. So far the cause of gravity is known ;
and this knowledge may lead to the most important
discoveries. This it was which led Adams and Le
Verrier to the grand discovery of the new planet.
It was from the perturbations of Uranus that those
profound inquirers not only suspected the existence
of a planet beyond, but even assigned its position,
magnitude, and distance from the sun, before it was
seen by mortal eye. For those perturbations im-
plied a disturbing force, and this force implied as
the cause a certain quantity of matter at a certain

late years in order to explain light, which upon this supposition
consists in Vibrations of Ether.

LAW OF NATURE. 63

distance, in other words, a planet of a determined
mass, removed from Uranus by a determined space.

The law of the proportions in which bodies com-
bine, or, as it is now usually called by chemists,
the Atomic Theory, is another grand instance of a
general effect, or tendency to an effect, of which the
cause is unknown ; though an attempt has been
made to account for that effect also by means of an
hypothesis. To have discovered that when one
body enters into combination with another in
different proportions, the greater proportions are
always exact multiples of the smallest, was certainly
a grand step in the science of chemistry ; but this
is only a general effect ; to explain which, that is
to assign a cause for it, Dalton hit upon atoms, as
Newton imagined ether to account for gravitation.

Before concluding this article, we may remark
that the phrase, Law of Nature, is often employed
in a more extensive sense than the one here given,
being used to signify any general fact, any general
uniformity of succession, whether the cause be
stated or not ; or even, as it appears, any uniformity
of co-existence. Thus the laws, as they are called,
of Kepler, tell us nothing concerning causes ; they
merely state some general facts with respect to the
motions of the planets ; for instance, that they move
in elliptical orbits, without pretending to explain
them. These and others similar are sometimes

64 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

called Empirical Laws.k In this sense the perpetual
recurrence of day and night, of night and day, may
be called a law of nature.

Lastly, were we to say that it is a law of nature
that all warm blooded animals have internal lungs,
we should be thought to use no unwarrantable lan-
guage ; though here we state mere uniformity of
co-existence, without any reference to motion or
change, much less to causation.

It is necessary, therefore, to bear in mind that
Law, Law of Phenomena, and even Law of Nature^
are frequently used to signify any uniformity,
whether of succession or of co-existence, and whether
a cause be apparent or not.

And we must remember that the word explanation
is not always used in its proper sense of assigning
a cause, but often where there is generalization only,
where a fact is classed as a particular instance of
one more general, or of a Law in its widest sense.
Thus, when Kelper deduced from the observed
positions of the planets, that they move in elliptical
orbits, he might be said to explain those positions ;
though the explanation amounted simply to this,
that the observed positions were particular points of
the general figure ellipse, which embraced them all.

k By Dr. Whevvell they are called Laws of Phenomena, and
as such, are distinguished from the Causes of Phenomena. — See
" Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences." Book xi. chap. 7.

PRINCIPLE. 65

PRINCIPLE.

WHAT are we to understand by that word of so
frequent occurrence, Principle?

One meaning of principle certainly is a General
or Ultimate Cause, as when we talk of the principle
of heat, of magnetism, of electricity, meaning thereby
the unknown cause of certain well-known phe-
nomena, such as expansion, a peculiar sensation,
the attraction of iron, a violent shock to the frame,
&c. So we art wont to talk of the principle of life,
the thinking principle, &c.

In chemistry, the word principle is sometimes
used in its proper signification of general or ultimate
cause, as when we speak of Tannin or the tanning
principle ; morphia* or the narcotic principle ;
quinine or the anti-febrile principle. In these cases
we can actually produce the cause as a substance,
and operate therewith.

But in chemistry, the word principle is more fre-
quently used in another sense, as when we mention
the proximate principles of animal and vegetable
substances, such as gluten, gelatin, albumen, &c.
Here the word Principle means constituent part or
ingredient, that which serves to make up the more
compound substances, muscle, cellular tissue,

K

66 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

and the rest. Constituent parts or ingredients,
when we can analyze them no further, are called
ultimate principles or elements, as the metals,
oxygen, hydrogen, and chlorine gases.

Though these two senses of the word Principle
are not the same, yet it is evident that the same sub-
stance may unite the two characteristics, that it may
be at once a cause and a constituent part. Thus
morphia is a constituent part of opium, and likewise
the cause of its narcotic effects. So with quinine,
strychnia, &c ., which are chemical ingredients of
bark, and nux vomica, and also the sources of their
medical virtues.

In pure metaphysics generally, and in moral and
political sciences very frequently, the word Principle
is used in its proper, primary, or original sense.
Thus, when Montesquieu maintains that virtue is
the principle of democracies, moderation of aris-
tocracies, honour of monarchies, he means that such
are the causes which preserve each of these sorts of
government, or, which are essential to their pros-
perity and continuance. So when we talk of liberty,
activity, variety, and contrast, as principles of human
happiness, we mean that they are general causes of
the same. In a like sense we say that division of
labour is a principle favourable to the increase of
wealth. The discovery of such principles is the
highest object of philosophy.

PRINCIPLE. 67

But in religion, morals, and politics, principles
are sometimes distinguished into speculative and
practical; the former relating to the existence of
things as they are, the other to things as they may
be, or ought to be. When we say that moral senti-
ment springs from sympathy and reason, we state a
speculative principle, but when we affirm that
moral sentiment ought to be regulated by views of
far-sighted and comprehensive utility, we lay down
a practical principle, as it is often called, or rule of
action.

In this case, the rule is a moral one, that is, it
tends to regulate the emotions so as to produce
happiness : but there may also be rules for directing
the understanding, or logical rules. What is
essential to a rule is, that it point out something
whereby practice may be improved ; meaning by
practice, not merely outward actions, but also the
play of emotions, and likewise the exercise of the
intellect.

A rule then acts, or is intended to act, either on
the understanding or the emotions, or rather on the
understanding always in the first instance, and then,
if it be a moral rule, on the emotions.

In this sense, Principle is not synonymous with
General Cause, but with general reason. And as
all rules are stated in the form of general pro-
positions, a practical principle or rule may be
defined to be —

68 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

A general proposition, intended to direct the
understanding, or the emotions, or both.

In this sense, we talk of a man of liberal prin-
ciples, or of religious principles, meaning that the
rules which direct his understanding, his emotions,
and probably his actions, are of the kind designated
by these epithets.

Sometimes any general proposition, supposed to
be pregnant with consequences, is called a Principle.
Thus Locke begins his essay with an account of
what he calls speculative principles, such as " it is
impossible for the same thing to be and not to be ;"
but the proper name is Axiom. In a like sense, the
major premiss of a syllogism, according to Arch-
bishop Whately, is sometimes called the principle.1

This meaning of the word as well as the pre-
ceding, seem to have arisen from a supposed
analogy between the relation of a general cause to
its particular effects, and that of a general proposi-
tion to the particular conclusions .that may be drawn
from it. But these are very different relations; and
the use of the same word to express both is apt to
lead to great confusion.

From the above detail, it appears that the word
Principle may mean either an ultimate cause, or a

1 Elements of Logic, Book i. Sec. 2. But the able Reviewer
of Whately's Logic, Edinburgh Review, No. cxv., says, that the
major premiss is often called the Proposition, never the Principle.

PRINCIPLE. 69

constituent part, whether proximate or ultimate, of
any compound, that which helps to make it up ; or a
rule to direct us ; or even a general proposition of
any kind, from which consequences logically flow.
In this latter sense, we talk of the principles of a
science, as the principles of morals, of political
economy, &c. ; meaning the most important, the
fundamental propositions, from which the rest may
be deduced. Though it is vain to suppose that we
can accurately limit the sense of words in daily use,
yet in philosophy we may be more precise, and
ought to be so, for without precision of language
there is no science. I would therefore exclude
principle from a philosophical vocabulary, in the
sense either of rule, or axiom, or general proposition
of any kind, from which particular consequences
flow.

Omitting, for the present at least, these significa-
tions as improper, we shall then find that the term
Principle, besides the notion of generality, always
has a reference to origin, and hence implies priority;
for though we certainly cannot prove that the
elements of any compound existed before the com-
pound, yet we suppose so, and having first the
elements, we can in many cases unite them so as
afterwards to obtain a new product ; as when from
copper and zinc we obtain a new substance, brass.
Where then Principle does not mean cause, in the

70 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

proper sense of the word, or the indispensable
antecedent of some change, it at least means that
which is essential to the being of any thing, that
which is supposed to have preceded the existence of
something else, and without which the latter could
never have been. It is on account of this supposed
priority, that the term Principle is applied to the
elements of bodies, as well as to the causes of
manifest changes in matter or in mind. This notion
of priority then belongs essentially to Principle. The
two notions then essential to Principle, are generality
and priority ; and accordingly it may be defined to
be that from which many particular things originate,
or at least are supposed to originate ; that without
the prior existence of which many particular things
could not be.

In this sense, Principle comprehends two species.

Active Principle or Cause, and Constituent
Principle.

Now were we to allow the word Principle in the
sense of general proposition leading to particular
conclusions, what analogy could we find between this
and the other signification just given ^ Generality,
no doubt, belongs to both, and even priority,
in a certain sense^ inasmuch as a general proposition
is a premiss from which conclusions follow. But it
is evident that this is a very different sort of priority
from the real priority of a cause to its effect ; it is

PRINCIPLE. 7 1

in technical language, a Subjective, not an Objective
priority; or, in plain words, it is a priority in reference
to our view of it, while the other is a real priority
in the phenomena themselves. We must first see
the general proposition, before we can draw the
inference, and in that sense it is prior, and in no
other.

This distinction must be kept in mind, in case
we persist in using the word principle to signify a
general premiss. If that sense be retained, though
generality and even priority in a certain sense may
still be the characteristics of a principle ; yet
we must draw a line between the genera, which
will be two in number ; namely,

I. A general and ultimate cause3 from which
many effects follow; or else, an elementary body
from which compounds result.

II. A general proposition from which, as
premiss, particular conclusions follow.

The first is either a purely metaphysical or a
physical Principle, as the case may be ; the latter is
a logical Principle.

Lastly. A Principle, whether metaphysical or
physical, comprehends, as we have seen, two species :

1. Active Principle or Cause.

2. Constituent Principle : while a logical
Principle is either speculative or practical, otherwise
called rule, according to the division of Locke.

72 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

Those Principles or general propositions which ex-
pressly direct our thoughts, emotions, and actions, are
called practical ; while those that do not are specu-
lative : in other words, speculative principles relate
to the existence of things as they are, practical, to
things as they may be or ought to be ; as before
illustrated by the case of speculative and practical
principles of morals.

A REASON. 73

A REASON.

What is called a Reason is a cause of a pecu-
liar sort, a cause suited to act on the understand-
ing, so as to produce conviction, or a lower degree
of belief. The question, why do I approve of
such an action ? may mean either what is the
cause that actually rouses my sentiment of appro-
bation, or else, what is the reason (or cause)
which on reflection fixes my conviction of the
worthiness of the actor, and hence tends to rouse
emotion in his favour ? It certainly may happen
that these two causes coincide, but they also may
differ.

Why did Caesar overthrow the constitution of
his country *? Through ambition or desire of
power. Why was Tiberius a tyrant *? or why do
you call him a tyrant *? Because he perpetrated
arbitrary and cruel acts. The former is evidently
a cause, usually so called ; the other a reason, or
a cause of my opinion. The one sort of causes
may be called physical, or metaphysical, as the
case may be ; the other logical, being addressed
solely to the understanding. Another classifica-
tion would be to divide causes into the physical,
and the mental or metaphysical ; and then to sub-
L

74 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

•

divide the latter into pure metaphysical and
logical causes, otherwise called Reasons. But it
is more agreeable to the real distinctions of things,
to divide causes into causes proper, and reasons,
or logical causes ; the former being subdivided
into the physical and the mental or metaphysical.

Sometimes, however, a reason means the final
cause, or purpose. Why, or what is the reason
that the eye has a lens, means this. But final
causes, as we have seen, are, in reality, effects ;
and they are called causes only because the fore-
sight of such effects is supposed to have created
a motive in the mind of the Deity to provide
means adapted to the end in view. Therefore
final causes, if they be entitled to be called causes
at all, are of the nature of reasons ; they are the
supposed reasons of the Deity for such and such
creations.

Having determined that a Reason generally
means that which acts on the understanding, and
produces belief, it is easy to see that this, when
expressed in words, must be a proposition ; for
propositions alone are addressed to the intellectual
faculties. And as those are supposed to influence
the understanding, therefore they partake of the
nature of causes. But they must be carefully dis-
tinguished from causes physical, as well as from
causes purely metaphysical. Now a proposition

A REASON. 75

from which we draw an inference, is called, in
logical language, a premiss ; and hence we see
that a reason expressed in words, and a premiss,
are the same.

Were we to adopt that distinction before
pointed out, between the objective and the sub-
jective, then causes, properly so called, would be
objective, and reasons subjective ; for the former
relate to the being of things in themselves, the
latter to our way of knowing them. In short, a
cause physical, or one purely metaphysical, is the
indispensable antecedent of any event; a cause
logical, or reason, is the indispensable antecedent
of our belief of that event.

Though the above be, as we conceive, the
proper use of the word Reason, yet we cannot
assert that it is the only one ; for reason is often
put for cause physical or purely metaphysical.
Thus one might ask, without any flagrant de-
parture from the common use of words, what is
the reason that Sirius twinkles and Jupiter not 3
meaning, what is the physical cause ? But it is
vain to attempt to tie down the common use of
words, all we can hope to do is to fix their
philosophical sense, and to shew that a certain
analogy runs through all the senses, though it
may be far-fetched. Thus, in the present instance,
we have shewn that a reason, after all, is a cause
of a peculiar sort.

76 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.

Science differs from other knowledge, in this,
that it is the knowledge of general facts, i. e. facts
common to many individual existences. Civil
history, and geography, so far as mere topography,
are not sciences, because the knowledge they give
is particular; the history of one kingdom not
being the history of another; the geography of
this country not being the geography of that.
The history of Rome is not the same as that of
Greece ; nor the geography of England as that of
Italy. This is the reason why civil history and
geography are so lengthy. A man may read his-
tory all his life, and still have very much to learn.
No doubt, sciences, such as physical geography in
its general bearings, and politics, may be founded
on these, but in themselves they are not sciences.

Natural history, however, is science, because
the facts of which it treats are general, or com-
mon to innumerable particular existences. When
we describe and class a horse, or an elephant, we
describe and class all horses, or all elephants.™

m Hence we see the great imperfection of Bacon's classification
in this particular ; for he considers natural history as no science
at all, as requiring only an effort of memory, and he arranges it
along with civil history as a species of the same genus. The

SC1ENCK AND PHILOSOPHY. 77

Natural history, in all its branches is principally
a science of description and classification ; and
therefore it does not come up to the dignity of
philosophy. For all science is not entitled to the
name of philosophy, though all philosophy be
science.

I. What then, are the peculiar objects of
philosophical enquiry ?

In order to answer this important and difficult
question, let us consider that everything in nature
may be regarded in two points of view ; as exist-
ing with or without reference to what went before
or what will come after ; that is, with or without
reference to time. In the one case, the objects
of inquiry are considered as co-existing, in the
other as successive ; there we wish to know them
as they are at the present moment, without
change; here, as preceded or followed by other
phenomena.

Agreeably to this well marked distinction, and
according to what was said above, that science
treats of general truths, we find that the object of
all science is two-fold, viz:—

To discover uniformities of co-existence and
uniformities of succession in nature.

common use of language seems to have led him into this mistake.
There may be some analogy between civil and natural history,
according to which they have, in ordinary language, been classed
together, but this analogy is not sufficient for an exact classification.

78 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

Commencing with uniformities of co-existence,
or in other words, the constitution of nature, we
shall find that these uniformities are of two sorts,
the palpable or apparent, and the latent or hidden.
The former we may discover by our senses, with
or without artificial assistance, including proper
instruments, while the latter can be ascertained
only by reflection, or by a peculiar agency called
chemical, which operates upon the insensible
particles of matter. Thus the different tissues
and the different organs of a horse or a dog can
be separated by anatomical skill, and seen by
anybody, as may the parts of a rose or a tulip ;
but the intimate composition of these parts and
organs can be detected only by a power which
shall resolve them into their elements. Now,
though it is the object of science in general to
trace both these sorts of co-existence, yet we
conceive that to philosophy alone, properly so
called, it appertains to determine the intimate
composition of things. But natural history treats
of palpable co-existence alone, and therefore, so
far at least as co-existence is concerned, it is a
branch of science, but not of philosophy. To
philosophy, then, belongs the knowledge of the
intimate composition of things.

But things are of two grand sorts, mental and
bodily, or spiritual and material. Therefore one

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. $

grand object of philosophy is the discovery, by
analysis, of the intimate composition of things
existing, whether bodies or mental phenomena."

The sciences employed upon this object are
pure mental science, or metaphysics, and chemis-
try ; the one having reference to mind, the other
to bodies or material substances. Thus, we find
out by chemistry that the air we breathe is com-
pounded of three elements, oxygen gas, nitrogen
or azote, and a very small quantity of carbonic acid
gas : while by metaphysical analysis we discover
that love, and some other passions, are made up
of various elementary feelings.

II. The next grand object of science is to
determine uniformities of succession, or in other
words, the course of nature. Now, in treating of
cause and effect, we remarked that there are some
uniformities of succession in which the events are
connected together as cause and effect, and others
in which they are not ; and we instanced the suc-
cession of day and night, night and day, as one
quite uniform, but not a case of causation. Many
other cases are there where the successive changes
may depend in some degree one upon another, as
cause and effect, though we know not in what
degree ; but the probability is, that like the suc-

n So far as bodies are concerned, this is called by Bacon the
Latens Schematismus.

80 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

cession of day and night, they depend chiefly upon
one or two general causes, modified by circum-
stances, that is, by auxiliary or secondary causes,
such as the palpable changes immediately preced-
ing. Thus, the growth of man from infancy to
childhood, from childhood to youth, from youth
to manhood, is a long series of changes, uniform
in all ; of changes every one of which may be
indispensable to the next following, but still
contributing to it only in a small degree; the
principal cause of growth being hid far from
our view. In tracing the changes that go on
during digestion, we follow the food from the
mouth to the stomach, where it meets with the
gastric juice, and is changed into Chyme; from the
stomach to the smaller bowels, where it meets
with the bile and the pancreatic juice, and be-
comes Chyle; from the bowels to the lacteal
vessels, by which it communicates with the
blood, when digestion is completed. The whole
of these changes constitutes the process of diges-
tion. So, the discovery of Harvey consisted in
tracing the blood from the left side of the heart,
into the great vessel, the aorta ; from the aorta
by perpetual subdivision into innumerable small
arteries ; from these back again by veins, at first
numberless and minute, but at last all uniting
into one, and pouring their contents into the

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 81

right side of the heart. From this right side,
Harvey""again traced the blood, issuing in one
great trunk, to be subdivided in the lungs into
ten thousand branches, which afterwards re-unite
and discharge the fluid by one vessel into the
left side of the heart. Thus is the circulation
completed. In these and similar instances, it
will be observed that there is no attempt to trace
general causes ; there is only a history of successive
phenomena.

Let us now take an instance from chemistry.
When we are introduced for the first time into a
chemist's laboratory, we are surprised at the various
changes that ensue on his mixing different sub-
stances together, but we feel to have no knowledge
until he has explained to us the latent process. He
shows us a fluid now clear as water, into which he
pours another fluid equally clear ; when suddenly
an inward commotion is perceived ; bubbles of gas
rise to the surface, and at last there is found at the
bottom of the glass a solid substance. Then he
informs us that the original liquid contained, in
solution, a salt, compounded of carbonic acid and an
earth or oxide ; that the other liquid was a stronger
acid, which combined with the earth or oxide, and
forming an insoluble compound, fell to the bottom ;
while the carbonic acid, being set free, ascended
through the liquid and mixed with the atmosphere.

M

82 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

Now we feel to know something, for the latent
process, or sequence of phenomena, has been laid
open to us. Still, in all this there is no attempt
to trace general causes. No doubt, in knowing
this sequence we do know something of causa-
tion, inasmuch as we know some change indis-
pensable to the next following ; but this change
is but the proximate, not the ultimate or general
cause.

Now, the knowledge of the uniform sequences
of phenomena is an important part of science,
whether these be sequences of causation or not.
Sometimes, as in the case of the succession of
day and night, there is no relation of power be-
tween the two successive events ; at other times
there may be some relation, the preceding change
being a secondary or a proximate cause of the
following change ; but be that as it may, the
knowledge of uniform sequence is interesting
and important, though it be not the highest
object of science. The sciences which treat of
these sequences are natural history and concrete
chemistry, so far as they treat of sequence at all ;
for, as we have seen, another object of these
sciences is to trace the constitution of bodies,
apparent and latent. Natural history, then, treats
of the apparent or sensible constitution or struc-
ture of bodies, as well as of the sensible pro-

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 83

cesses or changes which they undergo, without
tracing these to general causes; while concrete
chemistry investigates the hidden or insensible
constitution of bodies, and likewise the latent
processes which they go through when different
substances are brought into contact. Thus,
natural history consists of two parts, one of
which describes the sensible constitution or struc-
ture of bodies, and arranges them accordingly
into classes, orders, genera, and species; while
the other traces the sensible changes which they
undergo, and, at most, the proximate causes of
those changes. On natural history, as its foun-
dation, arises the philosophy of natural history,
which attempts to trace general causes.

The philosophy of zoology is commonly called
physiology ; of botany, physiological botany ; of
mineralogy, and physical geography, of fossil
zoology and fossil botany, geology is the philo-
sophy ; of descriptive astronomy, physical
astronomy.

The differences in the outward form and
colour of animals are of much less importance
than differences in their inward structure ;
and they are also more variable in the same
species. But the former are visible to all, and
are therefore remarked ; while the latter can be
known only by dissection and patient examina-
tion. Often, with a striking difference in outward

84 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

appearances, we can connect no sensible differ-
ences in the inward structure. How different in
appearance is a pug dog from a Newfoundland,
a Shetland pony from a race horse ; much more
a horse from an ass, a sheep from a goat ; but we
can trace no difference in anatomy. There is
then a loose distinction in descriptive zoology be-
tween the strict and the popular; the former
treating of the sensible though inward structure
of animals, and of the sensible though inward
changes which they undergo; while the latter
dwells chiefly upon their outward form and colour,
their movements, their habits of life, their rela-
tions with other animals, &c. Thus, the Regne
Animal of Cuvier contains only a short charac-
teristic description of each animal, founded on its
anatomical structure, and sufficient to distinguish
it from all other species : while the great work
of Buffon is an amusing literary production, em-
bracing all that he knew about animals, their
modes of life, instincts, and dispositions. Such,
also, is Goldsmith's Animated Nature. Works of
this kind, though not very exact, may still be
called works of science, inasmuch as they treat of
general facts —facts common to all species, or
at least to the greater number ; though they have
no pretension to the name of philosophy ; for
they investigate neither the concealed elements,
nor the hidden causes of things.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 85

Here it may not be out of place to consider
from what analogy, civil and natural history have
been classed together as species of the same
genus, not only in common language, but even in
the arrangement of Bacon.

Simple civil history, or annals, consist of a
narrative or relation of particular facts, either
successive in the same place, or contemporaneous
in different places, with as little reference to
causes as may be ; for it is scarcely possible to
relate events without some suggestion concerning
their causes— their palpable or proximate causes
at least. The tracing of the hidden or ultimate
causes of events belongs to the philosophy of
history.

Natural history, on the other hand, relates
general facts, facts common to whole classes,
orders, genera, or species at the lowest ; facts
either simultaneous, as the parts of an animal or
a plant shown by dissection, or else successive, as
the circulation of the blood and the process of
digestion. The knowledge of simultaneous facts
is one of position only, not of causation at all ;
and even the knowledge of an uniform sequence
may give us little insight into causes, at least into
general causes. These last are the object of the
philosophy of natural history, of physiology,
geology, and physical astronomy. Such is the

86 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

analogy between civil and natural history, and
such the difference. Both, when properly called
history, relate facts, simultaneous or successive,
as simply as possible, without tracing hidden
causes ; but the facts in the one case are par-
ticular, in the other general. Therefore, the one
is science, the other not. Let us take two in-
stances to illustrate the above distinctions, the
one from civil, the other from natural history.
No historian, no mere annalist, can relate the
events which preceded the great American war
without mentioning the stamp act and the duty
on tea, as causes of the outbreak. These are
causes which strike every one, even the least
clear-sighted ; they are then palpable or proximate.
But the philosophic historian will stop his narra-
tive for a moment to inquire into the more hidden
causes of the war, the causes which predisposed
the American mind to so decided a step ; and this
he will probably determine to be the yearning of
a people, now no longer in infancy, for indepen-
dence and political importance. This, then, was
the ultimate cause, and it is also a general one,
not confined to this particular case, but operating
among different nations at different times.

Again, in tracing the process of digestion, it
is easy to see that the teeth, the saliva, the gastric
juice, the mascular motion of the stomach, the

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 87

bile, and the pancreatic juice, all produce certain
changes in the food, changes evident to the senses,
and universally attributed to the above as causes,
to a certain extent at least ; for without them the
same changes would not ensue; but we cannot
doubt that there are more hidden causes at work,
upon which the vitality of all these agents, and
the peculiar effects of each depend. The former
causes are palpable or proximate, and a subject
merely for history ; the latter, hidden or ultimate,
and they belong to the philosophy of the science,
that is, to physiology.

Here it must be observed, however, that as
classes nearly related are apt to run. one into
another, so, simple or descriptive natural history
of animals for instance, and physiology, cannot
always be clearly distinguished. So far as natural
history treats of structure only, of what is sim-
ultaneous and not successive, it is quite distinct
from the philosophy of natural history, which
investigates general causes. But when natural
history relates uniform sequences of phenomena,
it cannot always avoid mentioning causes of some
sort ; and here, therefore, it will sometimes be
confounded with philosophy. Uniform sequences
then are the ground where descriptive natural
history and philosophy meet. The more apparent
sequences would by all be attributed to the for-

88 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

mer, such as the outward changes which animals
undergo from their birth to maturity, from ma-
turity to old age ; their different movements, their
modes of life, and their relations to each other;
but the inward and more concealed changes, such
as take place in digestion, may be said to belong
to physiology. Indeed, they generally are so
considered, though when related as known facts
without any theory, without reference to general
causes, they belong more properly to history.

Physiology, then, as generally understood,
comprehends more than what can well be called
philosophy. It is the science of function, as
opposed to structure, and treats of the actions or
uses of all the organs of the body, from the most
apparent to the most concealed, from the con-
traction of the muscles, to the very obscure
agency of the brain, nerves, and ganglia. It
treats of causes of all kinds operating within the
frame, whether they be palpable and proximate,
such as the saliva which softens the food, the
gastric juice which dissolves it, the bile which
changes it still more, the synovia which moistens
the joints, &c. &c. ; or whether they be hidden
and ultimate, such as the general causes of the
heat of the body, of nutrition, motion, and sen-
sation. These last form certainly one of the most
difficult subjects for human inquiry.

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 89

The highest, that is, the most important and
the most difficult object of science, is the dis-
covery of hidden, ultimate, or general causes, for
all these words apply to the same thing ; and to
the search after such causes, the name of Phi-
losophy has always been given. These causes
never present themselves open and naked before
us ; they are always surrounded, as it were, by a
thick veil, which hides them from our eyes. To
pierce this veil, to tear asunder this covering, is
then our grand object, and our grand difficulty.

The proper name for these causes, as we have
seen, is principle, or active principle, to distinguish
them from the hidden elements of things, con-
sidered merely as component parts, to which we
have given the name of constituent principle. The
knowledge of principles, then, in both these
senses, is the object of Philosophy as distinguished
from other Science. We have already illustrated
the meaning of principle, by reference to quinine,
morphia, and strychnia, which are, at one and
the same time, component parts of bark, opium,
and nux vomica, and the real or hidden causes
of their medicinal effects. We may now also
mention bitter almonds and bay leaves, the
poisonous influence of which depends upon a
minute quantity of prussic acid present in those
substances. No science affords us illustrations

N

90 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

better adapted for our present purpose than that
of chemistry. Chemical science is generally
divided into two parts ; the first treating of all
the particular substances in Nature, their intimate
composition, and the hidden changes which they
undergo when brought into contact with each
other, in other words, the latentes schematismi,
and the latentes processus ; the second, investi-
gating the effects of certain general principles
or causes, widely diffused throughout nature,
such as caloric and electricity. These principles
are known from their effects, but we cannot
arrest and examine them by themselves ; and it
is even disputed whether caloric be a peculiar
matter, or merely a modification of ordinary
matter.

Some of the greatest discoveries consist not
in the detection of any new principle, but in
generalising and diminishing the number of
principles or causes already known, or rather in-
ferred ; for often from their effects alone we know
them. When Franklin drew down lightning from
the clouds, he did not discover the existence of
any new principle ; he proved that the phenomena
of lightning and those of electricity excited by
our machines, depend upon one and the same
cause ; yet this is looked upon as one of the
greatest discoveries of modern times. So, should

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 91

philosophers succeed in ^establishing the identity
of the principle of electricity and that of mag-
netism, this also would be a great discovery.

From these examples, drawn from the material
world, we may judge what is meant by general
causes or principles in the world of mind. Since
the beginning of authentic history, we every-
where hear of the poverty of the mass of the
people. The prophecy, " the poor shall never
cease out of the land," has amply been fulfilled.
Poverty has existed, more or less, not only in
cold climates, but in the warmest and most
genial ; not only in barren countries, but in the
most fertile ; not only under despotic sway, but
under free and constitutional governments ; not
only among barbarous nations, ignorant of the
arts of life, but among the most polished and
civilized, well acquainted with implements and
machinery to facilitate the production of wealth ;
finally, not only among indolent people, but even
among the most industrious. Poverty is known
among the hard-working population of Man-
chester, as well as among the wild inhabitants of
Connemara. These facts had been present to
man for a long series of ages ; and though some
may have guessed the real cause of the mischief,
it was reserved for MALTHUS to prove, that the
principle of population, that is, the tendency of

92 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

population to increase faster than subsistence, is
the grand general cause of the poverty and
misery of the people. Surely such a man ought
to be considered as great a benefactor to man-
kind as the most sublime mathematician and
astronomer that ever lived.

Though this principle is not an ultimate one,
for it can be traced to more general principles ;
yet it is not the less valuable on that account,
and it forms a good illustration of the remark of
Bacon, that prindpia media are often more fruit-
ful than prindpia generalissima.

The ultimate object of philosophy is the dis-
covery of the general laws of nature ; that is, as we
formerly explained, of general effects, or tenden-
cies to effects, which, as such, cannot be traced to
any cause, being themselves the most general
causes, that we know, of the other and more com-
plicated phenomena of the universe. Such are
gravitation, cohesion, and the three laws of mo-
tion. All these are inexplicable, at least for the
present, that is, we know not their causes, but
they are themselves causes acting universally.
Thus, at length, after all our labour, we arrive at
facts which we cannot explain, except upon a
supposition of a self-existent, first cause. It is
like the world supported on a tortoise, the
tortoise on an elephant, the elephant on a whale ;

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 93

but what supports the whale ? There we are
stopped short. We are as far from a satisfactory
explanation as ever.

Taking this into consideration, what shall we
think of the wisdom of those philosophers, those
famous physical astronomers, who think, when
they have found out a general law, that there is
no longer any occasion for a law giver? Do
they not perceive that their boasted law is itself
an eifect requiring explanation as much as any
other ; and that the only rational questions are,
first, whether any cause thereof be traceable by
us; and secondly, whether ultimately we must
rest on a material or a spiritual first cause ? in
other words, whether matter arranged itself into
the most beautiful and beneficial order, or
whether this was the work of mind ? Do not
these philosophers see that the law which they
have discovered, far from weakening the proofs
of an intelligent first cause, decidedly strengthens
them ? for a law supposes order, and order argues
design, and design a designer ; so that unless the
law made itself we must have recourse to Deity.

But so natural, so unavoidable, is the idea of
a Great Intelligent First Cause, that those who
deny the same in words have been obliged to
admit His existence, though in a covert manner.
For this purpose, the term Nature has been

94 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

found convenient; and instead of saying that
such and such phenomena are the work of God,
they pronounce them the work of Nature, thus
substituting a metaphorical person for a real ; for
the word Nature properly means the very effects
to be explained ; which are thus put for the one
great and unseen Cause of all.

In concluding this article, I may observe that
whether the sense I have given to Philosophy, as
distinguished from other Science, be generally
approved or not, yet the statement as to the
objects of all Science will not be thereby affected.
That statement may be correct, whatever more
limited sense we attach to the term Philosophy.

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY. 95

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY.

As no words occur more frequently in phi-
losophy than these, it is necessary to fix their
meaning, if possible, with accuracy.

Hypothesis and Theory agree in this, that they
both pretend to explain phenomena, in other
words, they assign a cause or the causes thereof.
We cannot, therefore, be surprised that those
words should occur so often in philosophy, which
has for its special object to discover the causes
of things. And as causes, as we have seen, are
of different sorts, so there may be as many
hypotheses, or as many theories corresponding,
relative to the immediate, or the remote, the
proximate, or the ultimate cause.

Secondly, Hypothesis and Theory agree also
in this, that both imply more or less of uncer-
tainty as to the accuracy of the explanation ; for
when the investigation is thought complete, and
all doubt is at an end, Theory is changed into
Fact. Theory is not distinguished from Fact by
the circumstance that the one enounces a cause,
the other not ; for though a fact may imply no
cause, yet it frequently does imply one. Thus,
when I say that I can move my arm when I will,

96 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

I state what every one would call a fact, though
this fact implies that my will is the cause of the
motion. So when I affirm that heat and moisture
are causes of vegetation, I state what all will
allow to be facts, just as much as when I inform
any one that the heart of man contains four
cavities, and that the chest is separated from the
abdomen by a muscle called the diaphram or
midriff, facts relative to structure only, not to
causation. Hypothesis and Theory differ then
from Fact in this, that they imply some uncer-
tainty with respect to the causes assigned, while
Fact supposes none.

Thus far Hypothesis and Theory agree ; but,
wherein do they differ4?

There is no very definite distinction between
Hypothesis and Theory. The distinction, such as
it is, turns entirely upon the degree of evidence
possessed by each respectively; for an Hypothesis
is only a doubtful Theory ; and, on further in-
vestigation, and by means of new evidence, the
former may be raised to the dignity of the latter.
Thus, as we pass from Theory to Fact involving
causation, so do we pass from Hypothesis to
Theory, according as the cause in question is
doubtful, probable, or certain ; Hypothesis being
at one end of the series, and Fact at the other.

From the above it follows, that in many cases,

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY. 9/

it may be difficult to say whether the term Hypo-
thesis or the term Theory be most applicable.
But in other cases there can be no doubt. Where
the existence of the supposed cause, in the case
in question, rests only upon some faint analogy,
and still more where such a cause is not known
with certainty to exist in any case, there we have
only an Hypothesis. Thus the Vortices of
Descartes were hypothetical, because though
some sort of Vortices, as whirl-pools, were known
to exist, yet the analogy between these motions
and those of the earth and planets was very far-
fetched. So the nervous vibrations of Hartley,
to which he attributed the phenomena of sensa-
tion, were purely hypothetical ; for what analogy
is there between a nerve and a musical chord?
In like manner, some physiologists have attributed
all the phenomena of life to mechanical causes
known to exist, others to chemical alone ; as if
the human frame were either a mere machine, or
a mere laboratory. Nay, such has been the wild-
ness of Hypothesis, that the world itself has
sometimes been supposed to be an animal, some-
times even a God.

In other instances, a cause not known with

certainty, or even with probability, to exist in any

case, is supposed, in order to account for some

phenomena. Thus, Newton imagined that the

o

98 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

phenomena of gravitation might be accounted for
by the impulse of an unknown substance, which
he called Ether; and some philosophers in the
present day attribute the phenomena of light to
the vibrations of the same mysterious fluid. But
as the existence of Ether in any case has never
been shown by the proper proofs, by the only
proofs by which we can in the first instance ascer-
tain the existence of any body, namely, by the
senses ; as no one has ever seen, touched, smelt,
heard, or tasted Ether, we have a right to say
that it exists only hypothetically. The proper
evidence of the existence of matter, in the first
instance, is sense, or more correctly, perception ;
that of the existence of spirit is consciousness.
We believe in the existence of our own spirit,
and of other spirits around us, and above us,
which we have not seen; for spirits cannot be
seen or touched, and there are other proofs of
their existence; but we are not justified in be-
lieving implicitly in any species of matter which
no one has ever descried by the senses.

For the same reason, the existence of caloric
and electricity, as distinct sorts of matter, is hypo-
thetical. They are called Imponderable ; but
what kind of matter can that be which has no
weight ? For a long time, sensation and muscular
motion were attributed to animal spirits, a fluid

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY. 99

remarkably rare and volatile, which was supposed
to be always flying about between the brain and
the organs of sensation and motion ; but as no
one has been able to detect this fluid, its existence,
which was always hypothetical, is now disbelieved
altogether. In the present day, atoms find more
favour, and on them is founded a famous Theory ;
but as no one has seen or touched such particles,
we may be allowed to doubt their existence, and
call it hypothetical.

In these and similar instances, we see a
marked distinction between Hypothesis, Theory,
and Fact ; for no one could compare the Theory
of gravitation with the Hypothesis of ether ; or
the Fact of muscular motion simply by means of
nerves, with the supposition of animal spirits.
That muscular motion is performed, some how or
other, by means of the nerves, is an established
Fact involving causation ; that all bodies tend to
each other, is a Theory ; that the cause of this
tendency is the impulse of a subtle fluid, Ether,
is an Hypothesis. But the only difference be-
tween these three consists in the degree of
evidence on which our belief is founded.

Though Hypotheses be in their nature doubt-
ful, yet are they far from useless. The use of
Hypothesis is not to terminate, but to direct
inquiry ; for our inquiry must have some object,

100 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

something to prove, or disprove, and therefore
a supposition or provisional solution may be
necessary. We assume something to be true,
and then observe, make experiments, and argue,
to determine whether it be true. If our observa-
tion and experiments tally with the assumption,
or if no absurd inferences follow from it, our
Hypothesis may be raised into a Theory.

Though Hypotheses, properly so called, have
no place in pure mathematics, which treat only
of things co-existent, and not at all of causation,
yet provisional assumptions are made, and the
accuracy of them tested afterwards. Thus in the
sixth proposition of Euclid, it is assumed, in the
first instance, that the two sides which subtend
two equal angles of a triangle, are not equal;
and then, arguing on this supposition, we arrive
at the absurd conclusion, that the less triangle is
equal to the greater ; whence we infer for certain
that our assumption was false ; and as there can
here be but two suppositions, the other must be
true. In mathematics, this mode of proof is
quite satisfactory, because only two suppositions
can be made, but in questions which admit of
many solutions, where the boundaries of truth
and falsehood are not strictly defined, there the
disproof of one alternative proves not the other.
Thus, were we to say that Cromwell was either

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY. 101

an impostor or an enthusiast, and having proved
him not to have been wholly an impostor, were
we to conclude that he must have been wholly an
enthusiast, our conclusion would not be certain,
for he might have been partly the one, partly the
other. We ought, therefore, in subjects which
admit only of probability, always to distrust those
arguments which are stated with mathematical
precision, as in this form, either such a thing is,
or is not ; for generally there is a third alter-
native, which thus is kept out of sight.

Some may be unwilling to allow, that the only
difference between Hypothesis, Theory, and Fact
involving causation, consists in the degree of
evidence on which they rest respectively. But
if there be any other difference, I should like
to know what it is. Theory, it may be said, is
used to explain facts, to account for them ; but
what is meant by these phrases *? To explain a
phenomenon or fact, or to account for it, properly
signifies, as we have seen, to point out the cause
thereof; and the cause, when proved, must be
another fact, or, until fully proved, a theory. Cer-
tainly, our speculative knowledge is thus enlarged,
and possibly the cause may be one which we can
apply to practice; but we are not to suppose
that the fact explained is one whit less mysterious
than before. It may be less anomalous, more

102 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

akin to facts formerly known, but it is not the
less incomprehensible.

Suppose it proved that gravitation is owing
to impulses of ether, what do we learn by the
discovery? We learn that gravitation is the
effect of impact, that, therefore, it is a fact similar
to others with which we are well acquainted,
instead of being different from them. Thus, we
simplify our knowledge, we reduce two modes of
motion to one ; but impulse, though more fami-
liar, is quite as incomprehensible as attraction.
It seems to us, no doubt, less mysterious, because
it is more familiar ; but this is a mere delusion,
and the effect of custom. Why does one billiard
ball, when put in motion, drive another before
it *? Could we have predicted such a result had
we never seen it ? Can we give any reason why
it should be so ^ Or, if we could give a reason,
what would it amount to ? It would amount to
this, either that some change intervenes between
the impact of the one ball and the motion of the
other, a change before unknown, a new fact or
link in the chain of causation ; or, that the real
or ultimate cause of the motion is not impact, but
something involved in the act of impact, some-
thing hidden from our sight, as morphia is hidden
in the substance of opium. But whatever the
explanation, the why, of impulse may be, it can be

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY. 103

only the statement of some other fact as a cause ;
and not at all a reason, such as the reasoning of
mathematics consists of, whereby we see, by the
mind's eye, without actual experiment, that the
angles at the base of an Isosceles triangle are
and must be equal. All facts then involving
causation are incomprehensible in this sense, that
we can never see any Reason, properly so called,
why any cause should produce any effect, or why
it might not have produced one altogether dif-
ferent.

104 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR,

THEIE RESPECTIVE PROVINCES.

It is not a little remarkable, that, although so
much has been said and written on the subject of
Logic, from the days of Aristotle downwards, yet
few branches of knowledge are so ill defined.
By some, Logic is understood to embrace a very
extensive territory, while by others, it has been
restricted to very narrow limits. Thus, accord-
ing to Watts, " Logic is the art of using REASON
well in our enquiries after truth, and the com-
munication of it to others." And in a note to
this, we are told, " The word Reason, in this place,
is not confined to the mere faculty of reasoning,
or inferring one thing from another, but includes
all the intellectual powers of man."

Against this definition, as too extensive and
too vague, Archbishop Whately rebels; and says
that " Logic, in the most extensive sense which
the name can with propriety be made to bear,
may be considered as the science, and also as the
art of reasoning." According to this definition,
which the author considers sufficiently extensive,
several important subjects usually considered as
belonging to Logic, are excluded from it, for

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 105

instance, all appertaining to conceptions and
names, to judgments and propositions, to defini-
tion and classification ; though it appears from
the work itself, of which the above is the opening
sentence, that the author considered these sub-
jects as comprised within the province of Logic.
The definition, however, does not say so ; and
accordingly, this may be taken as a specimen, not
of an enlarged, but on the contrary, of a very
narrow definition, as that of Watts is of a very
extensive one. Between these two extremes, a
proper definition of Logic will probably be
found. Moreover, Archbishop Whately seems to
contradict what he had before laid down, when
he says, that Logic is entirely conversant about
language,0 thereby lowering Logic to the level of
Grammar, and breaking down the distinction
between them; whereas, in the introduction, he
had said that the "most appropriate office of
Logic is that of instituting an analysis of the
process of the mind in reasoning."

The third book of Whately' s Logic treats of
Fallacies ; and a considerable part of it is taken
up with what the author calls non-logical Fal-
lacies. Why then, it may be asked, are they
treated of in a work professedly on Logic ^ The

0 See Whately 's Logic, Book II. Sec. 2, note.
P

106 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

truth is, that the author is obliged to include
more under Logic than he is willing to allow.

But if Whately's definition of Logic be narrow,
that given by Barthelemy Saint Hilaire, the
translator of Aristotle's Organon, is still more so.
According to Saint Hilaire, Logic is a science,
not an art, and the , object of that science is
demonstration. To justify this definition, the
words of Aristotle at the commencement of the
Prior Analytics are quoted. " First we shall
mention the subject and the end of this study ;
the subject is demonstration; the end is science
demonstrated."

Haying first shown that Logic is a science,
Saint Hilaire then inquires, what is the object of
that science ? To this question, Aristotle replies,
si it is demonstration." " Nothing," says Saint
Hilaire, "more simple nor more true than
this answer."

If this be so, the limits of Logic are indeed
narrow. For demonstration is to be found only
in Mathematics, the science of quantity ; therefore
Logic treats only of Mathematical reasoning.
But this is not true of any system of Logic with
which we are acquainted. No writer on Logic
confines himself to Mathematical reasoning ; con-
sequently demonstration is not the sole object of
Logic, as universally understood. Reasoning, in

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 107

general, not demonstrative reasoning only, is
always included under Logic. But we must not
suppose that the above is really given by Aris-
totle as a complete definition of Logic. It is the
opening sentence of the Book, entitled Prior
Analytics, and professes to state nothing more
than the subject and end of that and the following
Book, the Posterior Analytics, which treat indeed
of Logic, but not of all Logic. We cannot,
therefore, blame Aristotle for having given too
narrow a definition of the whole science. Nay,
further on, (Prior Analytics, Chap. IV.) Aristotle
says expressly that the work on which he is
engaged will comprehend more than demonstra-
tion ; that it will contain the whole doctrine of
the syllogism, which, says he, "is more general
than demonstration, which is only a sort of
syllogism, whereas every syllogism is not a
demonstration." Hereupon he enters upon the
syllogism, purporting to treat of demonstration
afterwards, as he actually has done in the
Posterior Analytics.

Of late, other definitions have been given of
Logic, and by high authority. The very highest
of all, on this subject, has defined Logic to be
" The science of the formal laws of thought."
With all due deference to that authority, I cannot
but remark, that this definition, were it even cor-

108 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

rect, could not answer the purpose of a definition
to others, to the unlearned at least ; because the
definition is more obscure than the thing defined.
It contains a word, one of the most ambiguous in
all Philosophy, the word formal ;p and though
most men have some idea of Logic, the great
majority know nothing at all about form, except
in the popular sense ; so that to them the above
definition would only be a bewilderment and a
puzzle, rendering their previous conception not
more clear, but more confused. Another able
author, adopting this definition, explains formal
to mean necessary or essential ; so that according
to him, Logic is the science of the Necessary
Laws of Thoughts, and so he has entitled his
Book. How then, it may be asked, is Logic dis-
tinguished from Metaphysics4? Surely, Meta-
physics treat of the necessary laws of thought,
as well as of the laws of sensation and of emotion.
Logic, then, is not a science distinct from Meta-
physics, but only one part of it. Such a con-
clusion we can by no means admit, and therefore,
the above definition must fall to the ground.
But, if by the term formal, reference be made to
words, and words be styled the forms of thoughts,

p For some account of the various senses in which the term
Form has been used, see Thomson's " Outlines of the Necessary
Laws of Thought." Introduction, section 5.

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 109

then, whether the above definition be full and
adequate or not, it is at all events correct as far
as it goes ; for it points out one distinctive
feature of Logic, namely, the alliance of thought
with words. For Logic treats not of language
merely, for then it would be Grammar; nor of
thoughts only, for then it would be a branch of
Metaphysics ; but it treats of thoughts combined
with words, or expressed in words. Thus, while
letters, words, and sentences, belong to Grammar ;
conceptions, judgments, and reasonings, to Meta-
physics ; names, propositions, and arguments, are
the subject of Logic.

Names suggest, or are meant to suggest things,
whether material, as trees and stones, or imma-
terial, as sensations and conceptions ; proposi-
tions express the relation of things ; while argu-
ments are propositions as inferred from other
propositions.

According to this sense of the word formal,
the definition of Sir William Hamilton would
mean, that Logic is the science of the laws of
thought in alliance with language. In this sense,
I consider it correct, as far as it goes. Whether
it be full and adequate is another question : as
also, whether it be not too obscure for ordinary
comprehension.

When Logic is styled the science of the

110 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

necessary laws of thought, there is a sense that
might be given to the words which would ex-
actly explain the object of one branch of the
science, Logic proper or pure. Did these words
imply, that the peculiar object of Logic was to
teach us as much of the laws of thought as is
necessary to maintain consistency in thinking,
then the statement would be quite accurate.
Consistency in thinking, as we shall see presently,
is the especial object of simple Logic, not truth
or agreement with the nature of things, which
appertains to mixed or applied Logic. All the
laws of thought belong not to Logic, but those
only which maintain consistency in thinking.
Thus Logic knows nothing of association, so im-
portant among the laws of thought.

Logic seems to hold a middle place between
Metaphysics and Grammar. Metaphysics treat
of the human mind and all its phenomena, which
are comprised in three words, sensations, thoughts,
and emotions ; Logic treats only of thoughts
combined with words, or expressed in words;
while Grammar treats of words, all words, of
which there are several sorts, — nouns, adjectives,
verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, &c. Thus Logic
agrees with Metaphysics, inasmuch as it treats of
thoughts ; but it differs in omitting sensations
and emotions, and in treating of thoughts only

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 1 I 1

in connection with words ; while it agrees with
Grammar in considering thoughts combined with
words ; but, whereas in Logic thought is the
subject, and words are regarded only as subsidiary
to thought ; in Grammar, words are the subject,
and thought is considered only as subsidiary to
words, that is^as necessary to determine that a
word is truly a word, meaning something, and
not a mere sound, or a mere number of letters
thrown together, and also to fix of what sort any
word may be, as noun, verb, or adverb.

The definition of Logic, as the science of the
laws of thought in alliance with language, agrees
with these views. But though accurate as far as
it goes, in one respect at least it appears deficient,
inasmuch as no allusion is made to Logic as a
mixed science, combining speculation with prac-
tical application. On the contrary, by that defi-
nition, it would appear to be a science of pure
speculation, like Metaphysics. But assuredly
such is not Logic as generally understood.
Whatever difference of views may be entertained
as to the exact province of Logic, on one point,
at least, almost all are agreed, namely, that Logic
has a direct practical end in view, the improve-
ment of our intellectual faculties, either in whole
or in part. Now, though men may give any
meaning to words they please, provided they

112 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

explain their meaning, yet there is seldom any
advantage in taking a well known word in a sense
very different from the usual. At least, it ought
to be done with great reserve. In the present
instance, we see no sufficient reason for departing
from the established meaning of the word Logic,
and consequently we can by no means accept of
the above definition as a full and adequate one,
omitting, as it does, an essential element of the
subject. At most, if Logic be divided into two
parts, pure and mixed, that definition may suffice
for the former, but it cannot embrace the whole.q
We have, therefore, still to seek a full and ade-
quate conception and definition of Logic ; and
for this purpose we must take a general survey of
the mental sciences.

Those sciences, the subject of which is the
human mind, may all be classed under one or

q Mr. De Morgan has written a treatise on Formal Logic,
thereby implying that there is a Logic not formal; and Mr.
Thomson, who considers Logic as the science of the necessary
laws of thought, still divides it into pure and applied Logic.
Saint Hilaire, in the preface to his translation of Aristotle's
Organon, says, at one time, that Logic treats only of the form of
thought; but he afterwards allows that there is such a thing as
applied Logic, which treats of something else than form. There-
fore, by his own showing, Logic, in its generic meaning, is not a
mere science of form ; pure Logic may be, but not all Logic ;
otherwise there is a contradiction.

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 1 1 3

other of the following heads:— I. Pure Mental
Science. II. Mixed or Applied Mental Science.
To the former, the term Metaphysics properly
belongs, to the latter no common term is attached;
but should we extend the meaning of the word
Metaphysics, so as to comprise all mental science,
then the one class would be pure, and the other
mixed or applied Metaphysics. At present, how-
ever, for fear of ambiguity, we shall use Meta-
physics in its more usual and restricted sense of
pure mental science. This treats of the human
mind, as it is, without any reference to direction
and improvement. It is, therefore, purely specu-
lative, and comprises :— I. The Analysis and
Classification of the Mental Phenomena. II. The
Theory of the origin and succession of the
Mental Phenomena/

The second class of the mental sciences is of
a mixed nature, combining speculation with
practical application. These sciences rest not
in the knowledge of the human mind, as it
is, but they have a further object, namely,
to direct it, to direct thoughts, emotions, and
through them, outward actions. This great class
naturally divides itself into two, agreeably to

r As a specimen of Pure Mental Philosophy, I may be
allowed to refer to my own " Analysis and Theory of the
Emotions."

Q

114 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

those two grand departments of the mind, THE
UNDERSTANDING, and the EMOTIONS. To the
latter, which has for its object to direct the Emo-
tions in the pursuit of happiness, the term MORAL
PHILOSOPHY may be applied, taken in the most
extensive sense in which it can properly be used.
In this sense, it includes not only Morals, strictly
so called, or Ethics, but Politics in all its branches,
as well as the science of Taste, of all which, the
emotions of the human mind are the subject.

But what name belongs to the former branch
of the mixed mental sciences, viz : that which
professes to direct the understanding ? Has it a
name, or must we invent one ? I confess that I
see no occasion for a new term when an old one
readily presents itself; and here the word LOGIC
naturally occurs. This sense of the word may
be very extensive, very vague if you will, but
some word is required for this class of sciences,
and whatever may be hit upon, the same objection
may be made, which after all is no valid objec-
tion, for an extensive class must have a co-exten-
sive name The only serious questions are two :
are there sufficient grounds for the formation of
a class of sciences, opposed to moral philosophy,
and having for its object to direct the under-
standing, as the other has to direct or regulate
the emotions ; and if so, by what name shall we

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 1 1 5

call it? Supposing that we adopt our known
friend LOGIC, shall we be employing the term in
an unwarrantable or very unusual sense ? I think
not At least, the great father of modern phi-
losophy, the immortal Bacon, has employed it in
a sense no less extensive, for in his glorious work,
the De Augmentis, he divides all the sciences
which treat of the uses and objects of the mental
faculties, into the two great classes of Logic and
Ethics. The former of these he subdivides into
the arts of discovering, judging, retaining, and
communicating truth. Here, then, we have the
word Logic used in a sense as extensive as that
which I propose. Supported by so great an
authority, I shall not scruple to define Logic,
taken in its most comprehensive sense, as the
science which directs the understanding in the pur-
suit of Truth.

Thoughts, then, are the subject of Logic,
Truth the Object.

II. It must be allowed that Logic, as thus
defined, comprehends a great deal, and, therefore,
it will probably admit of several subdivisions. In
tracing these subdivisions, we shall best discover
what it comprises.

We must observe, in the first instance, that
there is a branch of philosophy which seems to
occupy a middle place between Metaphysics and

1 1 6 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

Logic, comprising, as it does, the first principles
of human knowledge, principles, some of them
strictly self-evident, others not strictly self-evident,
nor yet capable of proof, which, nevertheless,
must be taken for granted before we can advance
one step. Of the first kind, are the axioms
of mathematics, such as, things which are equal
to the same thing are equal to one another; two
straight lines cannot enclose a space ; all right
angles are equal to one another, &c. Of the
second kind, are the folio wing articles of belief : —

1 . Belief in our own personal identity.

2. Belief in the faithfulness of memory ; or
in other words, trust in memory.

3. Belief in the existence of the external
world.

4. Belief in the uniformity of nature.
Now, there is a branch of philosophy which

has for its object to determine what are, and what
are not, first principles, and on what ground they
must be received. This, as I have observed,
seems to hold a middle place between Metaphy-
sics and Logic; but it belongs rather to the
latter. If treated speculatively, as a matter of
mere curiosity, it may be a branch of Metaphysics ;
but, in such a case, pure speculation without re-
ference to application is hardly possible ; and as
the solidity of all our subsequent knowledge must

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 1 1 7

depend upon the goodness of the foundation, and
nothing can be raised without a foundation, there-
fore, the science which treats si first principles
must be closely connected with that which treats
of secondary principles, and the advancement of
knowledge. For these reasons, we shall divide
Logic, in the first instance, into Primary and
Secondary Logic ; the former being entirely de-
voted to the settlement of first or fundamental
principles of belief. This may be otherwise
called Philosophia prima.

III. We come now to the subdivisions of Se-
condary Logic. This, to which, by many, the term
Logic would be confined, may be divided into two
parts, the one of which we shall call pure, the other
applied Logic. But though in reference to the
latter, the former may well be called pure, yet it
is not strictly a pure or unmixed science, like
Metaphysics ; for Metaphysics treat only of the
phenomena of the human mind, whereas pure
Logic treats of the phenomena of thought in
connection with words. Moreover, as we shall
see presently, even pure Logic has a direct prac-
tical object, which Metaphysics have not. It is
called by some Formal Logic, words being con-
sidered as the forms of thought.

Pure or formal Logic is usually divided into
three parts, which treat respectively, not of pure

118 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

conceptions, judgments, and reasonings, as Meta-
physics would treat, but of these united to words,
that is, of names, propositions, and arguments.
The former then are Metaphysical, the latter
Logical terms. Pure Logic considers not how
far names and the conceptions they raise corres-
pond with the reality of things, nor yet whether
propositions be true or false, nor even whether
the conclusion of any argument be sound : but it
determines what a name in general is, and what
different sorts of names there may be, as singular
or proper, and common or general, generic and
specific, abstract and concrete ; it analyzes a pro-
position, and shows of what parts all propositions
are composed, and it also enumerates various
kinds of propositions, such as categorical and
hypothetical, affirmative and negative, universal
and particular ; and lastly, it analyzes the process
of reasoning, points out different species thereof,
and shows in what cases the conclusion does, and
in what cases it does not follow from the
premises, either demonstratively or probably.
Thus the name Centaur answers to nothing in
nature, but we have a conception thereof; the
proposition, Agamemnon slew Hector, is false, but
still, as a proposition, correct ; the reasoning, the
mind of man is material, therefore, like other matter,
it will enter after death into other combinations, and

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 119

perish, as mind, is correct, for the conclusion is
fairly drawn, though it be false, because the
premises are false. The words true and false, as
applied to propositions and conclusions, do not
belong to pure Logic ; and instead thereof, we
have correct and incorrect, consistent, inconsistent,
and contradictory. Neither do the words real and
imaginary, as applied to conceptions, appertain to
Logic; instead of them, we have clear and confused.

According to the above view of the province
of pure Logic, it may be defined as the science
which contains the rules of consistent thinking, as
inferred from the verbal expression of thought.
Grammar, on the other hand, contains the rules
of correct expression, as inferred from the common
use of language.

Pure Logic and Grammar have both, then, a
direct practical object, as implied by the word
rule; the object of the one being consistent
thought, of the other correct expression. Now, the
rules of Grammar, though derived from the daily
use of words, and liable to considerable varieties
in different languages, have yet something com-
mon to all languages, and therefore, we may be
sure, derived from the fundamental laws of
thought. Consequently, there must be an inti-
mate alliance between consistent thought and
correct expression, between Logic and Grammar.

120 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

Both Logic and Grammar, as containing rules,
partake of the nature of an art as well as a
science. Pure Metaphysics, on the contrary,
contains no rules, laws only ; for it pretends not
to direct, but simply to state what the mental
phenomena are, to analyze and classify them, and
to trace the general order of their succession.

IV. Applied Logic is opposed to pure, and
forms the other part of secondary Logic. This is a
much more comprehensive, as well as a less exact
science than the former, for it applies the know-
ledge of the human mind and its processes,
derived from Metaphysics and pure Logic, to the
acquisition of objective truth, that is, the truth in
all objects which the mind contemplates. Pure
Logic contents itself with ascertaining that con-
ceptions are clear, propositions correct, and not
inconsistent with each other, and conclusions ac-
curately drawn from premises ; but applied Logic
wishes to determine whether conceptions be agree-
able to the reality of things, whether propositions
and conclusions be true. Thus, the whole field of
science is open to applied Logic, and consequently
its scope is very extensive.

Though the sphere of applied Logic be so
comprehensive, yet it does not seem to admit of
any exact Logical division. But we can enume-

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 121

rate the principal subjects that fall within its
province, which are as follows : —

1. A statement of the real object or objects
of philosophy and science, and wherein these
differ from other knowledge. Under this head,
the words cause and law of nature must be ex-
plained.

2. A general account of the means whereby
the sciences may be advanced, viz. experience,
(including observation and experiments) and
reasoning. Here the different sorts of reasoning
must be mentioned, demonstrative and probable,
inductive and deductive, and some general prin-
ciples laid down, whereby it may be known what
sort of reasoning is most applicable to any
branch of science, and what degree of certitude
it admits of. Here also an account should be
given of the different methods used in scientific
inquiry, such as the analytic and the synthetic.
But the principal object of this department
should be to trace the laws of induction, those
of deduction belonging more particularly to pure
Logic.3

3. An account of the various predisponent

8 Mr. Mill has treated the subject of induction at length in his
excellent work on Logic. The same subject had previously
engaged Dr. Whewell in his great work, " the Philosophy of the
Inductive Sciences.'*
R

122 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

causes of error or idola which beset the human
mind.

4. An enquiry into the nature, use, and
abuse of language, that great organ of human
knowledge.

5. A general classification of the sciences,
showing what sciences exist, how they are re-
lated, and pointing out new ones to the curiosity
of mankind.

The first Book of Bacon's Novum Organum,
and the fourth Book of Locke's Essay, may be
taken as specimens of the art of attaining truth
in general ; while the second Book of the Orga-
num contains special rules for induction ; and
the De Augmentis Scientiarum comprises a gene-
ral classification of the objects of knowledge.
The third Book of Locke, on the other hand,
which treats of words, is for the most part a
discourse on pure Logic, and perhaps the most
valuable that ever was written on Names, the
first division of the science. Indeed, the great
work of Locke comprises pure Metaphysics, as
well as Logic, in both its branches. The first and
second Books, which treat of the mental phe-
nomena, or ideas, as Locke calls them, their
origin, nature, and succession, are purely Meta-
physical ; great part of the third Book, of Words,
is pure Logic ; and the fourth, of Knowledge
and Opinion, is applied Logic.

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 123

Mr. Thomson, in his Outline of the Necessary
Laws of Thought, has divided Logic into pure
and applied, and has well pointed out the dif-
ference between them. The distinction is im-
portant. Formerly, as Mr. Thomson observes,
applied Logic was treated of under the name of
method, as a fourth branch of Logic in general;
and classed along with the three branches of pure
Logic.

The distinction here insisted on has been dis-
regarded even by the best writers. Thus, Arch-
bishop Whately considers all Logic as pure or
formal, and makes no account of applied Logic.
So does Sir W. Hamilton, who defines Logic to
be the science of the formal laws of thought.
Even Mr. Mill, in his great work, alludes not to
this distinction. His division of the subject into
ratiocinative and inductive Logic might seem
indeed to point to it, were it not that under the
former he treats of some things which do not
belong to pure Logic. Watts makes a jumble of
pure and applied Logic, for, after treating of
Propositions logically, he has a chapter on Pre-
judices. Now, pure Logic treats indeed of
sophisms, but knows nothing of the predisponent
causes of error, idola, or prejudices. Even Bacon,
in his De Augment**, makes no distinction between
pure and applied Logic.

124 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

Though the distinction between pure and
mixed Logic be well founded on principle, yet we
must not suppose that it is always easy to keep
them separate in a logical treatise. The subject
of Fallacies in particular shows how the one runs
into the other. Though these have been distin-
guished into two sorts, fallacies in Dictione, and
fallacies extra Dictionem, according as the sophism
is supposed to lie in the expression or in the matter,
yet there occur some which may be classed
either with the one or with the other, or more
properly with neither. These are when the mid-
dle term is ambiguous in sense, and they are
called by Whately semi-logical fallacies.

V. Closely connected with applied Logic are
the arts of retaining and communicating truth.
These, indeed, have been classed by Bacon under
the general name of Logic, and treated of accord-
ingly ; * but as this may be considered as too
wide and vague a sense of the word, we prefer to
consider these arts, not as integral parts, but as
appendages of Logic.

Concerning the art of retaining truth, little
need here be said. I shall observe only that it
mainly depends upon three things, — ATTENTION,
REPETITION, and ASSOCIATION.

1 See the De Augmentis Scientiarum, Lib. V. Cap. 1, and
Lib. VI. Cap. 1.

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR. 125

In these three words nearly the whole art is
comprised.

The art of communicating truth may be sub-
divided into three branches : —

1. The general art of Teaching. — 2. Gram-
mar.— 3. Rhetoric.

It is proper, in a logical point of view, as well
as highly useful, that the art of teaching should
be considered as a separate special branch of
knowledge, requiring a particular education, and
not an art which any one may exercise who has
acquirements, whether he have learnt how to
communicate them or not. This is a principle
which now seems recognised by the general
adoption of training schools. We train school-
masters for our village schools ; but we have not
yet begun to train them for schools of a higher
order. If a man have taken a high degree at
Oxford or Cambridge, if he be a good scholar, it
is thought that he must needs be a good school-
master. A great mistake ! The general art of
teaching must give an account of the various
modes as well as methods of teaching, their
advantages and disadvantages : such as

1. Discourses written or unwritten, read or
heard.

2. Questionings viva voce, or written : compos-
ing in prose or verse : learning by heart.

126 PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY.

3. Ocular representations, such as pictures,
maps, &c.

4. Experiments in mechanical philosophy and
chemistry.

5. Dissections and demonstrations, as in
anatomy.

6. Simple exhibitions of specimens, as in
natural history.

Such are the modes of teaching. As for the
methods, they are either public or private, solitary
or simultaneous, magisterial or mutual; self-depen-
dent for the most part, or dependent on assistance
from others ; between which last the difference is
highly important.

We may also distinguish different systems of
teaching ; that for instance which tends to unity,
simplicity, and concentration; and that which
tends to multiplicity and diffusion; the former
being the system of our ancestors, the latter that
of the present day : the one calculated to make
deeply learned and thoughtful students; the
other to rear up imposing talkers and showy
men of the world.

The second branch of the art of communi-
cating truth is GRAMMAR, or the art of using
language correctly; language being the grand
organ of communication. Of the connection
between pure Logic and Grammar, as well as of

METAPHYSICS, LOGIC, GRAMMAR, 127

the difference between them, we have already
spoken.

The third branch of the art of communicating,
is RHETORIC, or the art of using language
effectively, as Grammar is the art of using it
correctly. Here we come to the very verge of
our proper subject, if not beyond it ; for the
object of Logic and its attendant arts is simply
truth ; while that of Rhetoric is to render truth
effective, that is acceptable or agreeable to those
whom we address. Thus, Rhetoric speaks not
only to the understanding, but also to the emo-
tions, and therefore it really holds a middle place
between Logic and Moral Philosophy.

To sum up all in a few words. The object of
pure Logic is consistency in thought ; of applied
Logic, truth, or agreement of thought with the
nature of things ; of Grammar, correctness in
language ; of Rhetoric, effect.

INTRODUCTION
TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY

PART SECOND.

COMPRISING :

I. THE CATEGORIES.

II. THE PROPOSITION.

III. REASONING.

Ce n'est pas Barbara et Baralipton qui forment le raisonne-
ment. II ne faut pas guinder 1'esprit ; les manures tendues et
pe*nibles le remplissent d'une sotte pre"somption par une elevation
e*trang£re et par une enflure vaine et ridicule, au lieu d'une nourri-
ture solide et vigoureuse. — PASCAL.

THE CATEGORIES.

HAVING completed our Philosophical Vo-
cabulary, we are now better prepared for the
consideration of the CATEGORIES. The term
Categories, or rather the Categories, has been
applied especially to the famous classification of
Aristotle, under which he professed to include
every object of human thought, every thing
capable of being named. In other words, the
Categories were the Summa genera, or highest
classes, under which all things might be compre-
hended, all things of which we could think, or to
which we could give a name. The Categories of
Aristotle were the following : —

1. Ova-la SUBSTANCE.

2 Ilocrov QUANTITY.

3. Uolov QUALITY.

4. IIpo? TI RELATION.

5. ndv WHERE OR PLACE.

132 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

6. Tlore WHEN OR TIME.

7. KelaOai SITUATION.

8. "EX*™ HAVING, HOLDING, OR POSSESSING.

9. Tloielv ACTION.
10. Udor^Lv PASSION.

Such is the celebrated classification of Aris-
totle ; which, for the time when it appeared, may
be considered as not unworthy of that great
philosopher, though to us, at the present day, it
appears very far from perfect, erring, as it does,
by omission, as well as by redundancy.

First, as to omission. Among these Categories
we look in vain for some things which have
received names in all languages under the sun,
things which are present to us during all our
waking hours, and often even when asleep, which
alone are intimately and immediately known to
us, and by means of which alone we become
acquainted with all other things. Such are the
various sensations, thoughts, and emotions, which
together make up our consciousness. Of these,
which we may call in general mental phenomena,
we find no mention in the above classification.
Quality and Relation may no doubt apply to
mind as well as to body; but sensations, emo-
tions, and conceptions, are overlooked. This is
the one great omission. The other faults are
faults of redundancy.

THE CATEGORIES. 133

Allowing that the first six genera are well dis-
tinguished, what can we think of classing Action
and Passion as genera distinct from Relation?
Both action and passion mean the relation of
power, or of cause and effect, only with this
difference, that action refers particularly to the
cause or antecedent, passion to the effect or conse-
quent ; both being names of relation. Consequently,
the ninth and tenth Categories must be expunged
as redundant, being included under the fourth.

The fifth and sixth Categories, or Place and
Time, are quite distinct ; but how does Situation
differ from Where or Place *? Situation, Position,
and Place, all mean the same thing ; all relate to
space, and to something existing in space, con-
sidered in reference to something else so existing.
These somethings, being not named, must be
supposed included under one of the other Cate-
gories, as Space is included under Place or Where.
Consequently, the seventh Category may be ex-
punged as redundant.

And surely the eighth, Having, Holding, or
Possessing, can have no pretence to a Summum
genus, expressing, as it does, not a simple thing,
but something very complex, the elements of
which must be comprehended under the other
Categories, Therefore, the eighth Category may
also be expunged.

134 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Aristotle's chapter on the eighth Category, on
Possession, is rather curious. It resembles more
an article in a dictionary, giving the various
senses of the Greek word "E^et^, than a chapter
in a scientific work. Thus, we are told that ".E%eM>,
to have, is variously used : — -1 . First, as a mode of
being, a disposition or habit, as when we say
that a man has science or virtue. 2. As quantity,
for instance, the height we have. 3. As having
what surrounds the body, a garment, a cloak.
4. Having in or on a part of the body, as having
a ring on one's finger. 5. Or, in relation to a part
of the body, as having a hand or a foot. 6. Con-
taining any thing, as a cask has wine. 7« Possess-
ing, as having land or houses. 8. Having, as a
wife or a husband. There may be some faint
analogy between all these significations, but none
sufficient to establish a definite meaning of the
word, fit for scientific purposes. Indeed this
chapter is quite unworthy of Aristotle.a

From the above examination it appears that,
of the ten Categories of Aristotle, four must be
expunged as redundant; while one must be
added to render the list complete. The amended
classification will then be the following: —

1. MENTAL PHENOMENA.

•

a Categories, Chap. XV.

THE CATEGORIES. 135

2. SUBSTANCE, divided into two species,
Mind or Spirit, and Body or Matter.

3. QUANTITY.

4. QUALITY, also divided into two species,
Mental Quality, and Bodily Quality.

5. RELATION.

6. PLACE, or more simply SPACE, Place in-
volving a Relation.

7. TIME.

This new classification must be allowed to be
an improvement upon the old ; but we may far-
ther inquire whether it may not be rendered still
better. It is clear that if Space and Time be
allowed to stand distinct from Quantity, then we
must add to these Number, for otherwise it will
not be included under any Category. Therefore,
to the above seven Categories we shall add

8. NUMBER.

Two questions, however, still remain to be dis-
cussed : first, whether Time, Space, and Number
should be classed distinct from Quantity; and
secondly, whether Relation should be separated
from Quality.

We have seen in the First Part, the Philoso-
phical Vocabulary, that Quantity belongs not
only to Material Substance, but to Time, Space,
and Number, considered without any reference
to Substance. With all these, Quantity is in-

136 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

separably connected ; that is, wherever Material
Substance, Time, Space, or Number exists, there
is Quantity. Still, Quantity does not necessarily
suppose Substance, for there may be Quantity of
Time or of pure Space; nor does Quantity
necessarily suppose Time, for there may be
Quantity of Space ; nor does Quantity necessarily
suppose Space, for there may be .Quantity of Time
or of Number; nor finally, does Quantity neces-
sarily suppose Number, for there may be Quantity
of Time or of Space. Therefore, Quantity is
something which is neither Substance, nor Time,
nor Space, nor Number, and therefore it is pro-
perly classed apart.

With respect to the second question, whether
Relation should be classed apart from Quality, it
may at first appear that such separation is incor-
rect, because we have seen in the former part,
the Philosophical Vocabulary, that at bottom
every Quality does suppose Relation of some
kind or other. But at the same time we re-
marked, that there was a real difference between
Qualities, commonly called Simple, and Relative
Qualities, inasmuch as the Relation in the former
case, though it may be discovered by Meta-
physical analysis, is commonly not attended to,
our thoughts being centered, sometimes on the
cause, sometimes on the effect, not on the Re-

THE CATEGORIES.

lation between them. This is one reason why
Relation should be classed apart from Quality ;
but there is another more satisfactory.

Though, strictly speaking, there is no Quality
without some Relation, yet, in the case of Quantity,
there is Relation without Quality. The Relations
of Quantity in Space, Time, and Number, are the
subject of pure Mathematics ; the Relations of
Quantity in Body, of mixed Mathematics ; and
these are quite distinct from Quality. Therefore
Quality and Relation ought not to be classed
together.11

Some there are who class Quality, Relation,
and Quantity, all together,under the common name
Attribute ; but this classification must be purely
verbal, unless it can be shown wherein these three
agree ; and for my own part I can see no agree-
ment, nor do I find that Logicians have been able
to define Attribute so taken. Mr. Mill allows
that Logicians have not given any satisfactory
account of Attribute when taken to comprehend

b The difficulty of distinguishing between Quality and Relation
was well seen by Aristotle ; for after some discussion on the
subject, he ends by saying " After all, if the same thing may be
at the same time a Relation and a Quality, there is nothing absurd
in classing it under both genera." — Categories, Chap. VIII. —
In this case there certainly would be a Logical imperfection, for
no one genus should over-lay another.
T

138 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Quality, Relation, and Quantity. (System of Logic
Book I. Chap. iii. s. 6.) Another Author, and one
of very high authority, classes Quantity, Quality,
and Relation, under the common head Ens per
accident, in opposition to Ens per se or Substance ;
but I do not see that Ens per accidens admits of
any better definition than Attribute.0

Attribute is generally supposed to belong to
Substance, and to be inseparable from it, as when
we talk of a Substance and its Attributes ; but
then, Quantity is not an Attribute, for Space,
Time, and Number have Quantity, though they
are not Substances. So Space, Time, and Number,
have Relations quite independent of Substance,
which Relations cannot therefore be Attributes'.
Therefore, in the vocabulary, I have restricted
Attribute to the sense of Quality alone, and more
particularly to one species of Quality/

Moreover, the word attribute is liable to am-
biguity, for it has two senses, a Metaphysical and
a Logical. When we divide things into Sub-
stances and Attributes, it is clear that we speak
metaphysically ; and the division is incomplete,
for Time, Space, and Number, are not Substances,
nor Attributes of Substances. But when we talk

c See notes to Reid's Brief account of Aristotle's Logic, p. 688
of Reid's works, edited by Sir William Hamilton.

d See article QUALITY.

THE CATEGORIES. 139

of Subject and Attribute, then we speak Logically,
and Attribute becomes synonymous with Predi-
cate: whereas in the former sense it corresponded
to Quality or Property. To avoid this ambiguity,
the word Accident, or Ens per accidens, has been
substituted for Attribute, in the metaphysical
sense.

Upon the whole, until a better division be
pointed out, I must be satisfied with the eight
Categories given above, for I cannot see that they
err either by omission or by redundancy. It
appears to me that all the objects of thought, all
that may become the subject of science, can be
classed under one or other of these Categories.
But in order fully to ascertain this point, let us
consider first our various mental Phenomena,
and their Objects, and secondly the various
Sciences.

Since the above professes to be a complete
enumeration of the elementary objects of thought,
there should be a thought, or, in the language of
Locke, a simple idea, corresponding to each of
these objects, and to none besides, while all other
or complex ideas should be made up of these
simple ones. This is only to say that thoughts
and the objects of thoughts must correspond.
Let us then see whether the former do tally with
the enumeration above given of the latter.

140 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

All the Phenomena of Mind may be divided
into two great Classes, the one of which may be
called the Class of Outward, the other that of
Inward Phenomena ; not that the former are less
mental than the latter, but that it is by those
alone we become acquainted with the world
without. Outward Phenomena may be divided
into two genera, Sensations and Perceptions.
Inward Phenomena are divided into two orders,
Intellectual Phenomena, or Thoughts, and Emo-
tions, which are distinguished from each other by
the absence or presence of Feeling, in the strict
sense of the word, that is of Pleasure or Pain,
Happiness or Misery. Thoughts, again, are sub-
divided into Conceptions and Relations, according
as they do not, or do, necessarily suppose two
things compared together. Conceptions are either
simple or compound, the latter comprehending
conceptions of Substances and their qualities,
and conceptions of Modes, or modifications of
things independent of Substance ; while Relations
are either of co-existence, of succession, or of re-
semblance. Such, in short, is a classification of the
Mental Phenomena, made without any reference
to the above classification of Things or Categories,
the same in fact which appeared some years ago in
my Principles of Human Happiness, and differing
little from that of the late Dr. Brown. Let us

THE CATEGORIES. 141

then see whether the two classifications agree.

To begin with the Phenomena of Mind gene-
rally; these find a place, the first place in the
Categories. It is clear that the Phenomena of
Mind may themselves be objects of Thought.

Sensations, in the strict sense of the word,
have no Objects, we are conscious of them, and
that is all ; for they do not suggest their causes
directly, but indirectly, through our perceptions.
Now the objects of our Perceptions are the
Qualities of Matter, and these find a place among
the Categories. Among the Inward Phenomena,
Emotions, like Sensations, are felt, as pleasurable
or painful, but they also have no proper objects ;
for what are called objects of desire are known
to us not by our Emotions, but by our perceptions
or conceptions, which inform us of things suited
to rouse Emotion. The other order of Inward
Phenomena is that of Thoughts, divided into Con-
ceptions and Relations. These last are also
among the Categories. They are divided into
Relations of co-existence, of succession, and of
resemblance, a classification which holds good, as
we have seen, whether Relation be taken in the
restricted sense of a Mental Phenomenon look-
ing to two other mental phenomena, or gene-
rally, of something common to two other things.
Now, of the Relations of co-existence, some

142 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

necessarily suppose Space, as Relations of Position ;
others Number, as the Rules of Arithmetic ; and
both of these Quantity ; while Relations of Suc-
cession necessarily suppose Time. But Space,
Number, Time, and Quantity, are among the
Categories.

Lastly, Conceptions are either simple or com-
pound. Our knowledge of the former is obtained
by analyzing the latter, which are divided into
Conceptions of Substances, with their Qualities,
and what I call Conceptions of Modes, or modi-
fications of things which do not necessarily
suppose Substance, namely, of Space, Time, and
Number. From the conceptions of individual
Substances, and different species of Substances,
with their respective qualities, we rise to the
conception of Substance in general, which alone
remained to complete our eight Categories.

Thus it appears that all the eight Categories,
and as far as we can see, no others, have Mental
Phenomena corresponding to them, Phenomena
of which those are the Objects; and if so, the
correctness of the above enumeration of Cate-
gories is confirmed.

Let us now compare the various Sciences with
the Categories above given. For this purpose I
shall take that Classification of the Sciences
which I published some time ago, and which had

~1kn& I* i'hjfftf

/

THE CATEGORIES. 143

engaged my attention for years, long before I
thought of these Categories. According to that
Classification, the Sciences are divided into the
Mental, the Physical, and the Mathematical, or
Metaphysics, Physics, and Mathematics. The
Mental Sciences treat either of the Substance
Mind, or of its Qualities, Relations, and Phe-
nomena, all of which are included in the Cate-
gories ; while the Physical Sciences treat of the
Substance Body, its Qualities and Relations,
which also are contained in the same. Lastly,
Mathematics treat of Quantity, whether of Space,
Time, or Number, and these make up the rest of
the Categories.

The Book of Categories, divided into fifteen
chapters, forms the first part of Aristotle's great
Work on Logic— The Organon. Notwithstanding,
an eminent Logician of the present day, and
at the same time a great admirer of Aristotle,
maintains that the doctrine of the Categories
belongs not to pure Logic, because it treats of
THINGS. It cannot be denied, however, that the
doctrine of NAMES appertains to pure Logic, and
if so, the classification of names. Therefore the
Categories of Names, at least, belong to pure
Logic. But the Categories of Names are the
same as the Categories of Things, and in classify-
ing the one, we classify the other also. A Name

144 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

without a thing corresponding to it, is a contra-
diction. Mere Articulate sounds, expressed by
letters and syllables, such as Fanfarom, are not
Names, for they stand for no Thing. Con-
sequently the Categories do belong to pure Logic.
Indeed, the doctrine of the Categories belongs
to that branch of Philosophy which I have called
Philosophia prima, as well as to pure Logic. It is
the connecting link between them. Philosophia
prima, or Primary Logic, treats, as we have seen,
of the first Principles of human knowledge, the
fundamental Principles of belief; and it must
also include the Elements of all knowledge, the
Categories of things. Pure Logic, on the other
hand, begins with Names, and in classifying them
classifies Things also. Thus the two Sciences
meet.

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLE9. 145

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES.

THE doctrine respecting Proposition has been
involved in some obscurity, from a want of atten-
tion to three fundamental distinctions ; for there
are three important questions which ought to be
discussed separately. The first, what is a Pro-
position ? What is the definition of a Proposition
in general?

I. A Proposition may be considered under
two points of view. We may look more par-
ticularly to the mind which frames it, or else to
the form of words in which it is expressed. For
every Proposition supposes a mental act, and a
verbal expression. Or what comes to the same
thing, we may attend chiefly to the mental opera-
tion necessary to a Proposition, or else to the
formal result. The first belongs to the province
of the pure Metaphysician, the second, to that of
the Logician and Grammarian. It appertains
then to pure Metaphysics to determine the nature
u

146 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

of those faculties necessary to form a Proposi-
tion; while to Logic, and Grammar, belongs the
result, viz. the Proposition itself. Now, as Con-
ception and Judgment are universally allowed to
be indispensable to the framing of any Proposition,
and as the latter of these faculties supposes the
former, as, moreover, there is no Proposition
without words, it follows that, metaphysically, a
Proposition may be defined a judgment expressed
in words.

This, though a correct metaphysical definition,
will not be of any use until judgment itself be
defined ; and therefore we must adopt another
method of ascertaining the nature of a Proposi-
tion. While the Metaphysician analyzes the
phenomena of mind in order to determine the
nature of judgment, the Logician must analyze
Propositions themselves. As examples take the
following : —

1. Man is mortal.

2. The Elephant is long lived.

3. The Lion is carnivorous.

4. The Hare is timid.

5. Courage is admired.

6. Virtue is esteemed.

7. Generosity is beloved.

8. Deer are not carnivorous.

9. Cowardice is not respected.

PROPOSITION, THE PHEDICABLES. 147

10. Napoleon was not a saint.

1 1 . Washington was not an usurper.

12. Brutus killed Caesar.

1 3. Antony loved Cleopatra.

14. Alexander conquered Darius.

15. The three angles of a triangle are equal
to two right lines.

16. Any two sides of a triangle are together
greater than the third side.

17. The French Convention treated Louis
XVI. cruelly.

18. The Chamber of Peers condemned Ney
to death ungenerously.

19. Italy may be free.

20. No one can say.

21. Napoleon might have conquered Russia.
All these, however different, will be universally

allowed to be Propositions, and if so, there must
be something common to them all.

In the first place, they are all composed of
words, and of words which, taken together, make
perfect sense, one of them being a verb. In short,
they are all sentences. But, there are sentences,
such as a question, a prayer, a command, which
are not Propositions. Secondly, each of these
Propositions has two extremes or terms, as they
are called, such as Man and Mortal, Generosity
and Beloved, Brutus and Killed Ceesar, three

148 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

angles of a triangle and equal to two right
angles, &c., one of which is called the Subject,
the other the Predicate. Thirdly, these two
terms are connected by means of a verb, which
is sometimes the simple copula or sign of affir-
mation is, at other times a word of a more com-
pound signification, such as killed, loved, conquered,
which involves an affirmation, and may be ana-
lyzed into was the killer of, was the lover of, was
the conqueror of. Sometimes to the verb is added
the sign of denial w0f; sometimes other words
which modify the sense, such as equal to, and
greater than, cruelly, ungenerously; or some mo-
dification of the verb is used, as may be, can say,
or might have. From all this it follows that a
Proposition may be defined to be a sentence, or
combination of words with meaning, whereby some-
thing is affirmed or denied of some other thing,
either simply, or with some modification.

This is the proper Logical definition of a
Proposition ; the Metaphysical definition of the
same being as above stated, a judgment expressed
in words.

The Logical definition might be expressed
more shortly, but rather obscurely, as a sentence
declaratory or enunciative. Different modes of
declaration are called in Grammar, MOODS, as the
Indicative, Subjunctive, Potential, Optative. The

PROPOSITION, TlIE PKEDICABLE8. 149

close connection between Logic and Grammar
everywhere appears.

From the above we see that every Proposition
must have two terms at least. But there are
sentences which all allow to be Propositions,
though they seem to have only one term, such as
it rains, it snows, it thunders, and God is, the
Lion exists, &c. With respect to the first class
of these, we may observe that the indefinite word
it refers to some subject or other understood,
though it does not at once appear to what subject,
whether sky, cloud, or air. The pronoun it came
to be used, either for brevity, or because the
proper subject was doubtful, but it evidently
points to something ; and the phrase, it rains, is
exactly equivalent to the sky rains, or the cloud,
or the air rains. Again the word rains is an
abbreviation of is raining, and the one may be
substituted for the other, without the least in-

X \

accuracy. Therefore, at full, the sentence it rains
becomes, the air, or sky, or cloud is raining, which;
is a Proposition in due form.

As to the second class of Propositions, ap-
parently incomplete, God is, the Lion exists, &c.,
we must remember that the word is has two
distinct meanings. Sometimes it is a mere copula,
the sign of affirmation, connecting the Predicate
with the Subject, as when we say a triangle is a

150 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

three sided figure ; but at other times it compre-
hends besides this the notion of real existence.
Thus, the sentence God is, means God exists, or
at full, God is existing, which is a regular Proposi-
tion. In like manner, the Lion exists, is equivalent
to the Lion is existing ; and so with all other
Propositions of the sort in which real existence
is predicated of something, whether by means of
the verb to be, or of the less ambiguous verb to
exist.

As there are some Propositions which seem to
contain less than two terms, so are there others,
or Compound Propositions, which contain more
than two; but these can all be resolved into
simple ones. Thus, the compound proposition,
Brutus and Cassius waged war with Octavius and
Antony, comprehends the following simple propo-
sitions : —

Brutus waged war with Octavius.

Brutus waged war with Antony.

Cassius waged war with Octavius.

Cassius waged war with Antony.
Those two together waged war with these two
together.

This example may suffice to show how Com-
pound Propositions may be analyzed. Here we
see that the first particle and replaces one entire
proposition, the second and two propositions, the

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES. 151

two taken together one more ; so that this one
compound proposition contains five simple.

II. Having determined the nature of a Pro-
position, and having seen that it is always
composed of two terms at least, connected
together by an affirmative or negative copula, the
second principal question presents itself, viz.
What things may be signified by those terms ?

Now, whatever may be of itself an object of
Thought, and as such can receive a fully signifi-
cant name, may be the subject or predicate of a
Proposition ; for of such an object something or
other may be affirmed or denied, or that object
may itself be affirmed or denied of something
else. Therefore, the terms of all Propositions
must correspond to one or other of the Cate-
gories of Things, which we have already deter-
mined.

With reference to Things compared, there
must then be at least as many sorts of Pro-
positions, as there are Categories. Thus, we
may have Propositions where Mental Phenomena
are compared with Mental Phenomena, Spirit with
Spirit, Body with Body, Quality with Quality,
Relation with Relation, Quantity with Quantity,
Space with Space, Time with Time, and Number
with Number.

This only we must remember, that, while the

152 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

subject of a Proposition may be either a general
or a singular Name, as, Man is a religious being ;
Socrates was a Moral Philosopher ; the predicate
must be general, for predication means that
something common to many things is affirmed or
denied of one or more. No proposition then
can exist without a general term. We can make
no proposition out of proper names alone, but
only the unmeaning form of, Socrates is, or was,
not Solon.

When we consider attentively these various
sorts of Propositions, we shall find, however, that
they may be reduced to a smaller number. All
Propositions relative to Mind and its Phenomena
may be properly considered as forming but one
class, that of Mental Propositions ; all relative to
Body, its qualities and relations, another, under
the name of Physical Propositions ; while those
which relate to Quantity, whether of Space, Time,
or Number, may be called Mathematical Proposi-
tions; a classification exactly corresponding to
that of the Sciences.

According to this view, the above eight Cate-
gories might be reduced to three, Mind, Body,
Quantity, under one or other of which all things
might be comprehended. In this view, under
the term Mind, would be comprised not only the
permanent thing, or substance, Spirit, but also

r^Jlu^uX <
. te

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES. 153

its qualities, and its fugitive phenomena ; under
Body, not only the substance Body, but all its
qualities and relations ; while all the relations
of Space, Time, and Number, would be compre-
hended under Quantity.

But whether we adopt this classification of
Categories or not, as preferable to that before
given, the division of Propositions into Mental,
Physical, and Mathematical, seems agreeable to
the nature of things, as well as to the natural
division of the Sciences, which are made up of
Propositions, and of nothing else. Other Propo-
sitions, no doubt, there are, of a mixed nature,
such as all those relative to the influence of
Mind on Body, or of Body on Mind; where
the things are widely different, though there be a
relation between them. These may be called
mixed Propositions, the terms corresponding to
things belonging to different Categories.

We see from the above the futility of those
discussions which have so much occupied Lo-
gicians, respecting the terms of a Proposition,
whether they correspond to Ideas, to Things, or
to Names. Some Propositions, it is clear, relate
to Ideas, others to things different from Ideas.
In the proposition, " ambition is a more durable
passion than love," it is quite evident that the
terms Ambition and Love stand for Emotions,

154 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

which are Feelings, or Mental Phenomena. But
in the proposition, "gold is heavier than lead," it is
no less evident that the terms gold and lead
stand for material substances3 which all mankind
believe, whether with or without reason, to have
an independent existence without the mind.
True it is that gold and lead are known to us
only through our Sensations and Perceptions,
and that we can form no Proposition respecting
them, but through the notions of our mind.
But, the common observer, as well as the physi-
cal enquirer, does not stop to analyze the notion,
as the Metaphysician does, but he passes on at
once to the material object ; of that he thinks,
concerning that he forms an opinion, and makes
a proposition. Can any one really maintain that
there is no difference in the terms of the two
propositions above stated, that gold and lead, no
less than love and ambition, stand for Ideas or
Mental Phenomena, and nothing else? Surely
common sense is sufficient to settle this question.
Without entering upon the grounds of our con-
viction, it is certain that, in speaking of gold and
silver, we speak of things which we believe to be
distinct from the mind and its phenomena.

One very celebrated Metaphysician6 has main-
tained that in all Propositions the terms of com-

e Hobbes.

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES. 155

parison are Names, and nothing but Names.
Let us examine the meaning of this statement,
and see how it applies. To suppose that in the
Proposition, " ambition is a more durable passion
than love/' all we assert is that the name ambition
is more durable than the name love, is an ab-
surdity too palpable to be maintained by any one.
Do we then compare the meaning of the names,
and do we assert that the meaning of the name
ambition is more durable than the meaning of
the name love ? This also is an absurdity. We
must assert then that the name ambition means
something which is more durable than what is
meant by the name love. The question then
comes to be, do we here assert that the name
ambition, in the proper, that is in the usual
signification of words, implies a passion more
durable than love, as a part of its definition4?
or, do we assert a new fact not supposed to be
included in the common sense of the word *? If
the former, then our Proposition is one relating
to the meaning of a word, or verbal ; if the latter,
then our Proposition is real, where one thing is
compared with another thing, not a name with a
meaning or thing. For this is a verbal Pro-
position, where the two terms are a name, a mere
name, and a thing ; and the assertion is that the
one is, or is not, generally employed to mean the

156 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

other. To which of these kinds of Propositions,
"ambition is more durable than love" belongs,
the reader will at once determine ; and if this be
a real Proposition, then all Propositions are not
verbal.

Though all Propositions be not verbal, yet
some are. A verbal Proposition, as we have said,
is one where one of the terms is a mere Name,
and the other a Name or Names suggesting a
Thing; so that even in verbal Propositions one
of the terms is a Thing. Thus, in the verbal
Proposition, " a triangle is a figure with three sides
and three angles," the assertion is that the word
triangle, either in ordinary discourse, or else in
books of Science, means the thing here described.
The word triangle may be supposed to convey no
meaning at all before one meets with this Pro-
position ; it is a collection of letters, an articulate
sound, but it may be nothing else. This Pro-
position makes it a true word, that is, gives it a
meaning which it had not before, states a Thing
to which by convention it is applicable. Such is
a verbal Proposition.

Though some verbal Propositions are alto-
gether trifling, the bane of science, and the source
of endless and unprofitable disputes, because
they are not at once seen to be verbal ; yet we
must not suppose that all verbal Propositions are

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES. 157

vain and futile. On the contrary, some of the
most important Propositions are strictly verbal.
Such are all definitions. The object of a defi-
nition, such as that of a triangle above given, is
to give a meaning, a definite meaning, to a word
before supposed either to have none, or one un-
certain and fluctuating. Consequently, a Name,
a mere Name, is one term of the Proposition, and
a Name or Names which stand for Things is
another. Now, in order to determine to what
Things a Name should be applicable, we must
have clear notions of the nature of Things, their
resemblances, and differences ; for to things simi-
lar we give a common name, to things different,
different names. Therefore, a good definition
often requires a long and painful investigation
into the nature of Things, and ought to be not
the beginning but the end of our inquiries, the
summing up of all that we have learnt. Thus, it
appears that definitions, though verbal Proposi-
tions, are not inferior in importance to real.

Some verbal Propositions are evidently so, but
not all. Where one of the Names is a new
word suggesting nothing, then any assertion con-
cerning it must be seen to be verbal ; but where
both are old and well known, we are apt to think
that neither requires definition, and therefore
that whatever is said of one of them must be a
fact not referring to the meaning of the Name.

158 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Since verbal Propositions are so insidious, it
becomes very desirable to have some ready
criterion, whereby we may discover them. As
one criterion, I may mention the employment
of a definition. If a dispute be at once termi-
nated by a definition, then we may be sure that
the Proposition contested is purely verbal. Sup-
pose the question to be, whether Prudence be a
virtue. Define Virtue, and the dispute is settled
at once ; therefore the question is verbal.

I may suggest another criterion. Since the
simple copula is is alone employed in definition,
and alone necessary, wherever we find a Proposi-
tion containing that copula as the only verb, there
we should be on our guard. Substitute for the
verb is, the word means, or the words means some-
thing comprehended under the meaning of, and if
the Proposition then make sense, we may be
sure that it is verbal.

Thus, in the Proposition, " a triangle is a figure
with three sides and three angles," substitute
means for is} and the sense is the same. So in
the Proposition u prudence is a virtue/' substitute
the other phrase, and we have " prudence means
something comprehended under the meaning of
virtue," which is also sense. Both these then are
verbal Propositions. But substitute either of
these phrases in the Proposition, " ambition is a

yU^^TM -A-/ <W <A^W

'•

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES. 159

more durable passion than love," and the result
is nonsense. This, therefore, is not a verbal Pro-
position. Ambition may be a more durable
passion than love, but certainly that is not the
meaning of the word ambition.

Wherever the Predicate contains the whole of
the definition, there the copula is or means is em-
ployed ; but where it contains only a part of the
definition, there the longer form of words must
be used. Thus in the Proposition, "a triangle
is, or means, a figure with three sides, and three
angles," the Predicate is a complete definition ;
while in this, " prudence is a virtue, i. e. means
something comprehended under the meaning of
virtue," the predicate is only a part of the defini-
tion, the genus, of which prudence is a species.

We must here observe that the distinctions of
Propositions into Mental, Physical, and Mathe-
matical, into real and verbal, are Metaphysical,
not Logical distinctions ; for they relate to the
nature of Things which the terms stand for ;
whereas pure Logic looks only to the Form or
{ Expression. Thus, in pure Logic, Propositions
are divided into Categorical, and Hypothetical,
according as they enounce absolutely, or under
a condition ; as, " man is a rational animal/' is
Categorical ; " the boy may learn," Hypothetical.
Propositions are again divided, in pure Logic,

160 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

into Affirmative and Negative, Universal and
Particular, words which explain themselves. These
distinctions need not here be dwelt upon, as they
are found in all books of Logic : but what is
necessary to attend to, is the difference between
the Logical and the Metaphysical nature of Pro-
positions. It is the latter of these that I here
treat of.

It was necessary in the first instance to
determine the nature of a Proposition, both
Metaphysically, and Logically, and to define it
accordingly: but the rest of this article relates
to Propositions considered Metaphysically. The"
Logical divisions of Propositions, and the Logi-
cal Predicables also, as we shall see presently,
must not be confounded with the Metaphysical
divisions and the Metaphysical Predicables.

Here it may not be out of place to remark,
once for all, that the word Metaphysical is used
in three different senses at least, which may be
determined by the context. We shall know the
meaning of the word, by considering to what it is
opposed. When Metaphysical is opposed to
Physical or Material, it means Mental. In this
sense, Metaphysics is sometimes called Psychology.
But when Metaphysical is opposed to Logical,
then, as, on the one hand, Logical refers to con-
sistent thinking, Metaphysical, on the other, relates

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLE8. 161

to the correspondence between our thoughts and
the nature of things. In this sense, Metaphysi-
cal and Real are synonymous. Logical truth is
sometimes called subjective, as confined to the
subject who thinks, and Metaphysical objective,
as relating to an object, either really distinct, or
considered for the time as distinct from the sub-
ject. Lastly, Metaphysical sometimes means
nothing more than exact, and Metaphysically true
is exactly true. Thus, Mr. James Mill, in his
Elements of Political Economy, says, "the objec-
tion is not only practically immaterial, it is
metaphysically unsound."

III. Having determined the nature of a Pro-
position in general, and also having seen what
the two terms of a Proposition stand for, what
things they are meant to represent ; it now
remains in the third place, to ascertain what it is
which we affirm or deny concerning these things.
This is the doctrine of Predication, or of the
Predicables, as it is commonly called in books of
Logic, an acquaintance with which will complete
what is here necessary to be known with respect
to Propositions. We have seen that in every
Proposition there are at least two terms, and that
the thing suggested by one of these terms is
affirmed or denied of the thing suggested by the
other. But this we cannot do with meaning,
Y

162 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

unless we see that there^is, or is not some relation
between them. The feeling of relation is dis-
tinguished from conception by this, that it
necessarily implies three mental states, two con-
ceptions, and the relative feeling which connects
them. So, the objects which correspond to those
conceptions are considered, either each alone and
separate, or else as bearing one upon the other,
as somehow connected, or related. Now what a
Proposition sets forth in words is, that such and
such a relation does or does not subsist between
two things which are named. In short, there are
two things, and not one alone mentioned, and an
assertion is made concerning these two things,
that they have or have not something in common.
Consequently, what is asserted, or predicated, is a
relation.

This being determined, our task may be con-
sidered as nearly accomplished, for we have
already considered the subject of relation, and
the various kinds thereof. Relations, we have
seen, are either of Coexistence, of Succession, or
of Resemblance, and consequently, if Predication
mean the affirmation or denial of a relation, then,
in every Proposition, what we affirm or deny is,
that some coexistence, or some succession, or
some resemblance, subsists between two things.
Such is the nature of Predication ; and these are
three Predicables.

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES. 163

Are these then the only Predicables? If all
propositions contained two terms respecting two
things really different, and not one and the same,
then every affirmation or denial concerning them
would be the predication of some Relation, which
would be one either of coexistence, of succession,
or of resemblance. But there are some proposi-
tions, regular in form and real as to matter, in
which the two terms stand for one and the same
thing. When I say, " this is the man whom I met
yesterday," I state two propositions, both regular,
and taken together instructive ; though the terms
of the first stand for the same thing, the same
individual man. But between an individual and
the same individual there cannot be, properly
speaking, any Relation, for relation supposes two
things and not one only. Therefore, to meet
such cases as this, we must allow another Pre-
dicable, distinct from those above mentioned, viz.
that of Identity, or Sameness ; meaning by this,
real sameness, and not merely close resemblance,
as the word often signifies. Propositions pre-
dicating identity may no doubt be verbal, but
they are not so necessarily. When I say, a this
is the man who won the prize," the proposition,
or rather the propositions, are real ; but when I
state that "Setubal and Saint Ubes are the same,"
what I affirm is that the proper names, Setubal

164 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

and Saint Ubes denote the same place, an affirma-
tion evidently verbal.

We must not confound propositions predicat-
ing identity with those which have been called
identical propositions ; such as " a square is a
square," "a man is a man," "an elephant is an ele-
phant," wherein a term is affirmed of itself. These
are the very perfection of trifling, for they give us
no information, even as to the meaning of names.
But it is unnecessary to add one word to what
Locke has written on these frivolous propositions.

There is still another sort of propositions,
where we look in vain for any proper relation
between two things. This is the case where ex-
istence alone is predicated, "God is," is assuredly
a proposition, and one of vast importance, though
in form it be so simple ; it is, as we have seen,
equivalent to "God exists," or "is existing," or
" is an existing Being ;" a proposition, in which it
is not easy to trace any coexistence, succession,
or resemblance. If " God is" were equivalent to
" God is one of existing beings", then it might be
said that the proposition stated a resemblance be-
tween God and other beings, a resemblance in
their common existence, though this would be far-
fetched ; but " God is," does not seem to refer to
any other being ; it is, as far as possible, an abso-
lute Proposition. Therefore, to those Predicables

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLE8. 165

before mentioned we must now add that of Ex-
istence. The complete list of the Predicables
will then be, RELATION, whether of Coexistence,
Succession, or Resemblance, IDENTITY, EXISTENCE.

Is it possible to explain what we mean by
Existence, or is our notion thereof too simple to
admit of analysis ? With the word Existence is
often joined the word Real, as if Real Existence
were different from Existence simply. Real
Existence then may admit of analysis, though
Existence do not. By Real Existence, I conceive
we mean Substantial Existence, Existence as a
substance, that is, as something permanent
among innumerable modifications. Now sub-
stances are of two sorts, Spirit and Body; and
therefore Real Existence means Existence as a
Spirit or as a Body.

Simple Existence seems to me to defy analysis.
Many things are allowed to exist which have
no Real or Substantial Existence, such as the
thoughts which flit across our mind. Even Time
and Space are said to exist; though, wherein
empty space differs from nothing no one can
tell ; and if time and space exist, then do their
modifications exist, and the figures of Mathe-
matics exist, though not bodily. On the other
hand, we can conceive things which no one now
allows to exist, as centaur, mermaid, land unicorn.

166 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

These are said to exist only in idea or in imagina-
tion ; that is, the idea exists, but nothing corres-
ponding thereto, absolutely nothing. But when
we say that mathematical triangles and squares
do not exist, all we mean is, that they do not
exist bodily ; we allow that they exist somehow,
though how we cannot tell ; we do not look upon
them as chimeras, centaurs, and unicorns, which
have no sort of existence.

When existence is predicated of any thing,
real existence is almost always meant. Thus " God
is," means, God exists as a substantial or per-
manent Being, endowed with innumerable attri-
butes. The question whether time and space
exist, may be regarded as, at bottom, but verbal,
or a question as to the applicability of the word
exists ; though, like many other verbal disputes,
it touches hard upon things. For if, by denying
that space and time, and the figures of Mathe-
matics, exist, we are led to infer that the science
of Mathematics has no base, a question that
might seem but verbal, becomes raised to one of
real importance.

These, then, we propose as a list of the Predi-
cables, of all that can be affirmed or denied of
any thing. When we affirm that " the wild rose
has five petals," we state a Relation of Co-
existence ; when we say " opium causes sleep,"

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES. 167

we bring forward a Relation of Succession, in
this case, of Cause and Effect ; when we assert
that " a bat is like a bird," or that " blue is like
green," we enounce a Relation of Resemblance ;
when we say " this is the same man who kept the
inn ten years ago/' we declare Identity; and
lastly, when we conclude from the innumerable
proofs of design in the universe, that u there is a
God," we proclaim His real existence.

2. I shall conclude this subject with a few
remarks on some former lists of Predicables.
The most ancient, and the most celebrated of
these, is contained in " Prophyry's Introduction
to the Categories/' which for many ages was
adopted by Logicians as the standard work on
this subject, adopted as of equal authority with
the Organon of Aristotle, to which it was prefixed.
According to this famous classification, all that
could be predicated of any thing was, its

GENUS,

SPECIES,

SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE, Or DIFFERENTIA,

Some PROPERTY,
Or some ACCIDENT of the same.

When I say, "a triangle is a figure," I pre-
dicate the Genus to which triangle belongs;
when I state, " a triangle is a figure with three
sides and three angles/' I enounce the Species ;

168 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

when I affirm, " a triangle has three sides and three
angles/' I mention the Difference which distin-
guishes it from other species of the same genus,
Figure; when I declare that uin every triangle
any two of the sides are together greater than
the third side," I assert a Property ; and when I
observe, " this triangle is large," I state an
Accident.

Now what first strikes us with respect to this
famous classification, is, that three of these Pre-
dicables are applicable only to verbal Propositions,
i. e. to Propositions concerning the signification
of names. The first three are all about definition,
and nothing else. In saying that a triangle is a
figure, I so far define a triangle as to distinguish
it from a host of other things which are not
figures, and in stating farther that it is a figure
with three sides and three angles, I complete the
definition by mentioning how it differs from other
figures. But in all this, the question is merely
as to the meaning of the word triangle, as to
what it is used to represent. So when I say that
a man is an animal, or a rational animal, I state
only -what the name man generally means, what
it is supposed usually to suggest ; I affirm nothing
more. In short, the Genus is a part of the defi-
nition, the Specific difference is the other part,
and the two together make up the complete

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES. 1 (J<)

definition of the Species, so that one and all give
only the meaning of names, and their place in
the scale of classification as Genus or Species.
Therefore, these three ought to be excluded from
a list of real Predicables, whereby some informa-
tion is afforded not comprised in the received
signification of a name. In opposition to the
latter, the former may be called verbal Predicables.
Real Predicables belong to Metaphysics, verbal
to Logic.

The case of PROPERTY is different. A Pro-
perty supposes something not contained in the
definition of the name ; though it constantly
accompanies the thing signified. That any two
sides of a triangle are together greater than the
third side, is always true ; but the truth is not
comprised in the meaning of the word triangle;
nay, three previous Mathematical Propositions
are required to prove it. So, when we say that
heat causes expansion, we state a Property or
heat, certainly not comprehended under the usual
meaning of the word.

Thus, as we see, there are Properties of two
kinds, one where Uniform Coexistence, another
where Uniform Succession, or Causation is an-
nounced. The Property of triangles, above men-
tioned, is a case of the former sort ; that of heat,
of the latter. Property then, taken in its largest
z

170 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

sense, comprehends the relation of Uniform Co-
existence, as well as of Uniform Succession.

Lastly, as to Accident. Accidents are divided
by Logicians into Inseparable, and Separable. An
Inseparable Accident is something which, so far
as we have observed, always attends a subject,
but which we could conceive to be wanting,
without the loss of the characteristics peculiar
to the subject, or of any Properties thereto be-
longing. Thus, we may have never seen, nor
heard of, any but white swans; but we can
conceive birds similar in all other respects to
swans, and having all the properties of the same,
except whiteness. There is nothing evidently
absurd in the line of the poet,

" Kara avis in terris nigroque simillima cygno,"

as there would be if whiteness were either in-
cluded in our definition of swans, or supposed to
be of necessity inseparable from them.

From this it appears, that an Inseparable
Accident is nearly allied to a Property ; and in
many cases it would probably be difficult to
distinguish the two. At all events, the Accident,
like a Property, is something supposed, at least,
to be uniform, whether it be so actually or not,
generally some uniform coexistence, as of the
colour whiteness, with the other properties of
the swan.

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLES.

A Separable Accident, on the other hand, is
not always found, even within the limited range
of our experience, not in all the individuals of a
species, not even in the same individual at all
times. There is a flower called Lychnis dioica, or
bachelor's button, some specimens of which in the
wild state are red, others white, though of the
same species. Colour then, here, is a separable
accident. " John is at dinner," expresses an ac-
cident separable even from the individual, for
John is not always at dinner. A separable
accident then differs from an inseparable accident
as well as from a property, in this, that it is not
an invariable but a casual coexistence, or a
casual succession of things.

Upon the whole, it appears from this inquiry,
that the first three of the scholastic Predicables
are merely verbal ; while the two latter, if largely
understood, comprise a great part of the Pre-
dicables which I have proposed. Identity how-
ever, and real Existence, find no place in the old
classification. Thus, the old classification of
Predicables is neither Ct a purely formal general-
ization," as it has been styled by a very high
authority in Logic/ nor yet entirely real, but
partly the one, partly the other. The first three

f See notes to " Reid's Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic,"
p. 687 of Reid's works, edited by Sir William Hamilton.

172 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

of these Predicables are Logical, Formal, or
Verbal ; the two latter Metaphysical or Real.

In the Essay concerning Human Understand-
ing/ Locke reduces all that can be affirmed or
denied about two things, one of another, or, in
his language, about two Ideas, to four heads, viz.
1. Identity or Diversity. 2. Relation. 3. Coexist-
ence, or necessary connexion. 4. Real Existence.
With respect to the first, Identity, it appears by
Locke's own explanation, that he meant not
Identity properly so called or absolute sameness,
but close resemblance. It is clear also from the
context that under Coexistence, or necessary
connection, he included invariable succession, or
sequence in time ; for, as an instance of Coexist-
ence, he brings forward the fact that iron is
susceptible of magnetical impressions. And he
openly allows that u Identity," in his sense of close
resemblance, "and Coexistence, are truly nothing
but Relations," of a peculiar kind indeed, and
therefore, as he thinks, to be classed apart from
Relations in general. Therefore, these Predicables
of Locke, though differently classed, comprehend
in reality nothing different from mine, and all
mine, with one exception, that of absolute identity
or sameness, which he has omitted.

Hume, in his first work, "A Treatise of Human

*Book IV. Chap. 1.

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLE8. 173

Nature,"1' observes that " it may perhaps be
esteemed an endless task to enumerate all these
qualities, which make objects admit of comparison,
and by which the Ideas of Philosophical relation
are produced. But if we diligently consider
them, we shall find that without difficulty they
may be comprised under seven general heads,
which may be considered as the sources of all
philosophical relation." He then proceeds to
enumerate these seven, which are, I. Resemblance.
2. Identity. 3. Relations of Space and Time.
4. Relations of Quantity and Number. 5. De-
grees of Quality, 6. Contrariety. 7- The Rela-
tion of Cause and Effect. Now the first and
second of these are contained in my classifica-
tion, the third and fourth come under the more
general head of Relations of Coexistence, while
the fifth and seventh are included under Rela-
tions of Succession. There remains, then, only
the Relation of Contrariety, which is but a striking
difference, a difference which always supposes
some resemblance. Were there no resemblance
there would be no contrast. A dwarf contrasts
well with a giant, less with an elephant, and not
at all with a mountain. Contrariety then is in-
cluded under resemblance. It supposes resem-
blance in some particulars, perhaps in many, the

h Book I. Sect. 5.

174 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

absence of it in others. But the mere absence of
a relation is no new relation.

In truth, resemblance as much supposes dif-
ference as difference resemblance. When we
say that one thing resembles another, we in fact
affirm that they are not one and the same, and
if not the same or identical, there must be dif-
ferences as well as resemblances. The mind of
one man resembles that of another; but how
many are the differences ! The idea which the
same man is conscious of at one time may be as
like as possible to the idea which he holds at
another ; but still there must be between them
the difference in the time of their appearance.

Upon the whole then, it appears that the Pre-
dicables of Hume are fundamentally the same as
mine, only differently arranged, with one excep-
tion, that of Real Existence, which he has omitted,
probably as not agreeable to his sceptical views.
Locke mentions Real Existence, which Hume
omits, while Hume mentions absolute Identity
omitted by Locke.

Lastly, Mr. Mill, in his System of Logic, enu-
merates Existence, Coexistence, Sequence, Causa-
tion, and Resemblance, and observes that one or
other of these is asserted or denied in every pro-
position, without exception.1 This classification

1 System of Logic, Book I. Chap. 5.

PROPOSITION, THE PREDICABLE8. 1 75

differs from the one proposed above, in two par-
ticulars ; first, by classing Causation apart from
Sequence, under which I have comprehended it ;
and secondly, by omitting Identity. This last
then is the only important difference.

With these remarks I conclude the subject of
Proposition and the Predicables.

176 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

REASONING.

GOD has given to man two grand means for
the advancement of knowledge, and the discovery
of truth, OBSERVATION, and REASONING. Some
truths are learnt by observation alone, a§ par-
ticular facts submitted to the senses ; others, by
reasoning alone, as the truths of pure Mathema-
tics ; others again, and by far the greater number,
by observation and reasoning together. All men
know what is meant by observation. Suffice it
then to remark that observation is of two kinds ;
the one exercised upon phenomena over which
we have no control; the other, upon changes
which we ourselves have induced. The former
m&y be called natural, the latter artificial obser-
vation, for it is exercised upon experiments.

Though all men know what observation is,
but few, comparatively, know how to observe to the
best advantage. For observation simply is of
very limited use: it may certainly prevent us

REASONING. 177

from falling into a pit, or sinking in a quagmire
before our eyes ; but unless some inference be
drawn from it, no general truth, no science can
be established. Consequently, observation is
useful, chiefly as a ground for inference, or
reasoning ; and in common discourse, as well as
in many popular works, they are so blended, that
it does not readily appear where the one ends
and the other begins. Facts, and inferences from
facts, are continually confounded by inaccurate
speakers and writers.

The nature of Reasoning, and its different
kinds are not so generally understood. Though,
as we shall afterwards find, there are different
sorts of reasoning, yet there must be something
common to all, or the name reasoning would
never have been given to the process in all cases.
Our first question then is, what is common to all
reasoning ?

I. All reasoning is concerned with tracing
the relations of things, and inferring a certain
relation of two things from a relation of two or
more other things. Such, in Metaphysical lan-
guage, is the business of Reasoning. In Logical
language the same is expressed otherwise, and
from one or more propositions we are said to
infer another. What, then, is common to all
reasoning, is, that belief in one or more relations,
A A

178 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

or, when expressed in words, in one or more pro-
positions, leads us on immediately to the belief of
another relation, or another proposition, as a
cause leads on to its effect.

In all Reasoning, then, some relation or rela-
tions, or, when stated in words, some proposition
or propositions are granted, and these are called
the PREMISES, from which another relation, or
another proposition is inferred, that is called the
CONCLUSION.

Thus, in order to understand thoroughly the
nature of Reasoning, we must know what is
meant by a relation, and a proposition. But these
terms have already been explained in full.k
Suffice it here to repeat, that a relation differs
from a perception, or a conception, in this, that
it necessarily supposes two things, between which
a relation is felt ; that the relation, as felt, is a
state of mind quite distinct from the conceptions
out of which it arises, and that as conceptions
are various, so are relations.

These last may all, however, be classed under
three heads :

I. Relations of Coexistence ;

II. Relations of Succession ;

according as they do not, or do, involve the
notion of time ; and

k See these words in Philosophical Vocabulary, Part I.

REASONING.

III. Relations of Resemblance, which may,
or may not, involve the notion of time.

The Relations of Coexistence are various,
such as

1. Relations of Position.

2. Relations of Comprehension, or of a
whole to its parts.

3. Relations of Quantity, or more, equal,
less, which may be called exact Relations, in
contradistinction to

4. Relations of Indeterminate Degree.
Relations of Succession, on the other hand,

are either of Invariable Succession, or of Casual
Succession.

These distinctions will be useful to us in de-
termining the different kinds of Reasoning ; but,
in the mean time, they are sufficient to show how
vast is the field which it embraces.

II. Among the relations now enumerated.
those of Quantity deserve peculiar attention, as
they alone are exact relations, whereby they are
clearly distinguished from all others. And as the
relations are exact, so likewise is the reasoning
built upon them. All reasoning, therefore, may
be divided into two sorts ; the Demonstrative, or
strictly a priori Reasoning, and the Probable, or
strictly a posteriori Reasoning ; the one indepen-
dent of experience, the other dependent thereon,
either immediately or remotely. Demonstrative

180 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Reasoning is confined to Mathematics, or the
science of Quantity, and contrary to what is
often thought, is not founded on general prin-
ciples or axioms, but on self-evident particular
truths. The evidence of the propositions of
Euclid does not rest upon the axioms placed at
the beginning of the work, but upon the par-
ticular instances of those axioms which occur in
any proposition. Thus, when in the first propo-
sition we show that, in the triangle

ABC, the side A B is equal to the side B C,
and the side AC to B C, we conclude at once,
without the intervention of any general axiom,
that the side A B is equal to the side A C. The
general axiom, that things which are equal to the
same are equal to one another, cannot make the
conclusion one whit more evident than it was
before. We see at once from the particular data
that such must be the conclusion, or if we do
not, no general axiom can convince us. The
truth then of the Propositions of Euclid does
not rest upon the axioms, nor were they first
demonstrated from these. The axioms are placed
there pro forma, and give a more scientific air to
the whole, but they are not necessary.

REASONING. 181

As particulars must be known before we can
generalize, so particular instances of the truth,
that " things which are equal to the same are
equal to one another," must have been noticed,
before we could state it in the form of an uni-
versal axiom. Not that the axiom is proved by
an induction of particulars, as some affirm, but
only that particulars were necessary to allow us
to conceive the general proposition. As soon as
conceived, its truth is self-evident. Still less, (if in
such a matter degree were possible) is the general
proposition required to prove the particular
instances. In like manner, having proved any
proposition of Euclid, in a particular case, the
mind instantly generalizes the truth ; for it sees
that what has been proved in the instance before
it, must hold good in all other instances where
the data are exactly similar.

All the Reasonings of pure Mathematics are
Demonstrative, and the conclusions arrived at are
alone certain and eternal; for first, they start
from self-evident or necessary truths, and the
mind sees that they are, and always must be so ;
secondly, the names employed are names of
universals, which exist not as real matters of
fact ; thirdly, these universals belong to Quantity
alone, and so admit of an exact definition, or, in
other words, they can be accurately distinguished
one from another ; and lastly, the deductions from

182 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

these self-evident truths and these definitions are
seen at each step to be also irresistible, and un-
changeable even by Omnipotence.

Since each step in the deduction is self-evi-
dent, as well as the first position, the conclusion
must be true.

Why do the relations of Quantity, or of
Equality and Inequality, alone admit of demon-
stration*? Because the modes or modifications
of Quantity alone can be accurately distinguished.
One is as distinct from two as from two thousand.
This is the case with no other modes. Other
modes admit of indefinite graduation ; not so those
of Quantity. These do not shade off one into
another. It is on account of this indefinite
graduation that other relations are not susceptible
of demonstration.1

Taking the above as a specimen of Demon-
strative Reasoning in general, and it may be so
taken without any danger of error, we see that
two previous propositions are necessary to esta-
blish any Mathematical conclusion. First we
have A B equal to B C, then A C equal to B C,
and lastly A B equal to A C. B C may be called
the middle term or medium of comparison be-
tween A B and A C.

The range of certainty is very limited, com-

1 See Article QUANTITY, in First Part, Philosophical Vocabulary.

REASONING. 1 83

prising only the pure Mathematics ; for even
Mechanical Philosophy, which uses Demonstrative
Reasoning, is based upon experience, and there-
fore it may err ; though granting certain prin-
ciples, such as the Laws of Motion, the deductions
from these are infallibly true. That is to say,
they are infallibly true, granting these principles,
and supposing that no others come into play ; for
it often happens that the conclusions of the Me-
chanical Philosopher are wrong in reality, because
there are in nature other principles which he has
not taken into account. Even the pure Mathe-
matician sometimes arrives at absurd conclusions,
absurd in material nature, though true in the
world of universals, for they follow irresistibly
from his data, i. e. from self-evident truths, and
from his own definitions, which correspond not
with things really existing. Such a conclusion is
that of the Asymptote, or a straight line, which,
though continually approaching, can never meet
a certain curve.™

m If even perfect Ratiocination, such as the Mathematical,
may lead to conclusions absurd in material nature, surely the best
possible Ratiocination on other subjects may also lead to absur-
dities. Some German Philosophers of the present day, men of
much thought, have reasoned themselves into PANTHEISM ! It is
the business of Experience to correct the errors of pure Reasoning.
Bacon has admirably pointed out the dangers of Rationalism as
well as of Empiricism. Nov. Org. Lib. I.

184 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

III. All Reasonings, other than those already
mentioned, lead to probable conclusions only ;
because they are all ultimately based upon facts
known by experience, which is always fallible;
for facts may be inaccurately observed, wrong
conclusions may be drawn from them, and even
what once was fact may cease to be so.

Although all probable reasonings are based
ultimately upon facts, real or supposed, yet they
do not all arise immediately from the experience
of particular things, which alone is properly ex-
perience. Some reasonings, no doubt, do so spring,
but others start from general principles, or general
facts, which had been inferred from many particu-
lars by a previous mental operation. Hence, a
well-marked distinction between the INDUCTIVE
and the DEDUCTIVE method. The one brings in
particular facts in order to establish a conclusion,
whether general or particular; the other, from
some general proposition, deduces or draws out
a less general proposition. Induction may pro-
ceed not only from particulars to particulars, and
from particulars to the general, but also from the
general to the more general; while Deduction
always proceeds from a general proposition to one
less general. The latter is often called a priori
reasoning, in opposition to the former ; though, in
reality, the general proposition from which it

REASONING. 1 85

starts, is known only by induction based upon ex-
perience. For instance, when we speculate on
the advantages and disadvantages of any form of
civil government, we may either consult the history
of nations, in order to determine the result of
such a scheme in times past, and then conclude
that the same would follow now ; and here we
reason from immediate experience, or inductively ;
or we may draw our inferences from the acknow-
ledged principles of human nature, and in this
case we reason from remote experience or de-
ductively ; for the principles of human nature are
known to us only by experience.

It is evident that both these methods of in-
quiry lead not to infallible, but only to probable
conclusions. For, besides false accounts of facts,
the connection between the premises, namely, a
number of particular effects, and the inference
that such a thing is the cause of these effects,
and of innumerable others similar, is never irre-
sistible ; because there is no self-evident absurdity
in supposing any thing to be the cause of any
thing, and also, because we never can be sure
that the cases actually tried, and those not yet
tried, are in all respects similar. And though
the axioms established by induction be true
generally, yet, as they seldom are universally, as
their limits are not defined with perfect accuracy,
B B

186 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

and as there may be other and counteracting
principles at work, therefore, reasoning from
these general axioms cannot lead to certain
conclusions.

Instance of a general law of nature established
by induction.

From the fall, first of an apple, then of other
bodies to the earth, Newton inferred, first, that
all bodies tend to the earth, and then, that all the
bodies in nature tend to each other, the earth,
the moon, the planets, the sun, and all that
therein is, in a word, that gravitation is universal.

Instances of a general practical maxim ob-
tained by induction.

"For this, Thou shalt not commit adultery,
Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou
shalt not bear false witness, Thou shalt not covet ;
and if there be any other commandment, it is
briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou
shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.""

The superiority of a standing army over a
militia, as to warlike efficiency, is proved induc-
tively from the history of many nations, par-
ticularly of the ancient world, when standing
armies were not universal, and when those who
had them conquered the rest ; and deductively
from the general principle of division of labour.

n Romans xiii. 9.

REASONING. 187

There is an antecedent improbability against
miracles, founded on our experience of the uni-
formity of the course of nature ; but the truth of
a particular miracle, as the raising of Lazarus,
may be proved by particular facts in evidence.
Here we have first a deduction, then an induc-
tion.

The necessity, or, at least, the utility of local
government in general, is proved inductively from
the history of particular nations, some being the
seat of government, others ruled as provinces ;
and the same conclusion is arrived at deductively
from the known principles of human nature ;
such as, that persons on the spot better under-
stand, and are more interested in their own affairs,
than strangers. Again, the utility of local govern-
ment in general being proved, the expediency of
the same in a particular case, as in that of
Ireland, follows by deduction ; and a like conclu-
sion is established inductively, by a reference to
the particular history of Ireland.

Take another specimen of deduction. A man
is accused of a certain crime, say of murdering
another. Starting from certain general princi-
ples of human nature, or from the previous
general character of the individual in question,
we argue that it is very improbable that he com-
mitted the murder. This is often called a priori

188 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

reasoning, because it draws a conclusion prior to
an examination of the particular parts of the
case ; though in reality it is founded on experi-
ence, on experience of human nature in general,
or of the individual more especially. Afterwards,
many particular facts are brought forward to
prove that he actually committed the deed ; and
from these facts we draw our particular con-
clusion inductively.

What is called Analogical Reasoning, is no
distinct species, but only a variety of inductive
reasoning. It may be called indirect induction.
No better specimen of this can be given than the
general strain of the Reasoning contained in
Butler's Analogy, of which I shall here give one
or two instances. It is supposed to be known by
experience that even here there is a moral govern-
ment, that the good, generally speaking, if not
more prosperous outwardly, are more happy in-
wardly than the wicked. Hence the inference
that the same will hold good hereafter ; in other
words, that the future state will be one of rewards
and punishments according to desert.

Again, natural religion is attended with great
difficulties : hence, it is probable from analogy,
that a system of revealed religion shall not
be altogether free from them.

Our own existence, particularly the union of

REASONING. 1 89

soul and body is a great mystery, and even seems
to involve contradictions ; surely then, it is pro-
bable that religion shall have mysteries. The soul,
.from the nature of spirit, can exist in no place :
but we believe that it is united to our body, which
does exist in space ; that where our body is, there
also is our soul, and nowhere else. Is the mys-
tery of the Trinity more incomprehensible than
this?

Since analogy signifies likeness or resem-
blance, and analogical reasoning is reasoning
from like things to like ; wherein, it may be
asked, lies the difference between this and other
varieties of inductive reasoning? For all induc-
tion is from similar to similar ; whether from
similar causes we infer similar effects, and vice
versa ; or whether from likeness in some part of
the chain we infer likeness in the whole chain,
without knowledge of causes ; as when, from cer-
tain appearances of the sky, we predict, perhaps
long beforehand, the coming weather ; or whether
from certain parts we infer the coexistence of
other parts, as the experienced anatomist, who,
from a single bone, or even fragment of a bone,
can construct the whole animal. Inductive
reasoning is a species, of which analogy is a
variety ; nor can we lay down any very definite
distinction between it and other varieties. Only,

190 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

when along with the similarity there is also a
good deal of difference, there we call the reason-
ing analogical ; as when we reason from the
order of things in this life to that in a future
state. Perhaps, the argument by which we estab-
lish the existence of the great Creator may be
classed under the same head; for the instances
of design in the universe, though palpable and
innumerable, differ in many respects from those
which we find in the works of man. But the
similarity is sufficient to render the argument
quite convincing; while the differences prove
only the immeasurable superiority of the great
First Cause.0

As a specimen of a chain of Deductive Rea-
soning, take the following: —

The capacity of the mind is limited ;

Therefore, the more it is occupied with one
thing, the less can it be occupied with another ;

Therefore, the more it is taken up with intel-
lectual pursuits, the less can it be taken up with
the affections, and vice versa.

Therefore, again, the more it is occupied with
general benevolence, the less can it be occupied

0 For an admirable specimen of Analogical Induction, see the
opening chapters of Paley's Natural Theology. Never was argu-
ment better put. Man ought to consider it as his greatest
privilege, that he can by reason find out God.

REASONING. 191

with private attachments, and vice versa. In this
reasoning, each proposition is less general than
the preceding, and each is an inference from what
went before.

From the above examples and observations,
the distinction between the inductive and the
deductive method of inquiry seems to be clearly
established. But when we come to examine the
matter more narrowly, we shall perhaps find that
there is not so much difference between the
reasonings employed in these two cases, as we
might at first suppose.

Let us remark that the term Induction com-
prehends two distinct mental operations; first,
the observing, the comparing, the selecting of
facts ; and secondly, an inference drawn from
them. The first part of this process is peculiar
to induction ; for deduction collects not particu-
lar facts, it states a general proposition ; but both
agree in drawing an inference from premises.
Now the question is, whether this inference be
or be not drawn upon the same principle in both
cases ?

In Deductive Reasoning, having stated a
general proposition, our object is to show that the
particular case which we have in view is really
comprehended under the general rule ; so that if
the one be true, so must the other. Thus, our

192 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

general proposition being, that " the more the
mind is occupied with one thing, the less can it be
occupied with another/' we then consider that in-
tellectual pursuits are an occupation ; and again,
that the affections are another occupation ;
whence it appears that the less general proposition
u the more the mind is occupied with intellectual
pursuits, the less can it be occupied with the affec-
tions/' is a case of the general rule, or compre-
hended under it.

Now, how stands the case with Inductive
Reasoning ? Suppose a traveller in a new coun-
try to meet with a troop of animals hitherto
quite unknown to him ; that he catches one,
kills and dissects it with the skill of a practised
anatomist. One specimen contents him, for he
confidently believes that all the rest, so like out-
wardly, are also alike inwardly. Now, what
reason has he for this belief? The mental pro-
cess necessary to justify his conclusion seems to
be as follows.

Here is an animal of a certain make. There
are many other animals, to all outward appear-
ances exceedingly like to this and to each other.
But, nature is uniform in her operations, and never
deceives us by uniting great differences with such
striking resemblances ; therefore, all these animals
are alike within as well as without.

REASONING.

Here it is evident that a general proposition
is assumed, tacitly or openly ; and from this the
conclusion is drawn.

Now this is the case in every instance of In-
ductive Reasoning. Some general principle is
always taken for granted, and with this the par-
ticular facts are compared before the conclusion
is drawn. The general principle assumed is com-
monly, " that nature is uniform in her operations ;"
or, where human testimony is relied on, tc that men
will tell the truth where they have no interest to
the contrary." Thus, in examining the evidences of
Christianity, we are careful to observe whether
the first witnesses could have had any motive to
spread a false story ; and when we have deter-
mined that they had none, we infer from the
above general principle that they actually spoke
the truth. Unless that general principle be
sound, there is no reason why they should have
given a true rather than a false account ; just as
there is no reason why we should believe one
quadruped to be organized inwardly like another
quadruped, unless nature be in general uniform
in her works and operations.

If the above statement be correct, it follows that

induction, when taken to comprise not only the ex-

amination of facts, but also an inference from them,

always embraces a deductive process of reasoning.

c c

194 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Wherein then, it may be asked, consists the
difference between Induction and Deduction pro-
per ? The difference is,

First, that the facts from which induction
springs are never more general than the con-
clusion ;

Secondly, that the conclusion always seems to
follow at once from the facts ; for

Thirdly, the general propositions, being always
the same, and universally acknowledged, are
never stated ; and

Fourthly, there is no such thing as a long
chain of inductive reasoning, as there may be of
deduction proper, where one inference may
follow upon another till we get far away from
the original premises ; whereas, on the other
hand,

Fifthly, in induction, the detail of facts may
fill volumes. There is, in short, in induction, far
less reasoning than in deduction proper, the
process consisting in the former of one step
only.p

Lastly, since particulars occur first to the
mind, it follows that the inductive must precede

p Take, as an instance of the one, Malthus on Population, who
fills three volumes with facts in support of his principle ; of the
other, the writings of Ricardo and James Mill on Political
Economy.

;r£ e^C ,7 IW A'

HKASON1NG. I!).")

the deductive process. The general notions and
general propositions, from which the latter sets
out, must have been established by a previous
process of inductive generalization, well or ill
performed. Thus, in the order of time, induction
comes before deduction.

By many, Bacon has been called the inventor
of the inductive method, a method, however, as
old as the creation, which that eminent genius
only brought more into notice, restored, im-
proved, and illustrated.

The general principle which runs through
deductive reasoning, and of which every such
argument is only a particular application, is, that
what is allowed to be true in general will be true
in a particular case. Thus, suppose it granted
that trade ought to be free, we may infer that the
corn trade ought to be free. But some one may
object that here there is a reason for an ex-
ception, that the rule is not applicable to this
case. Hereupon issue is joined, and the dis-
cussion turns upon the point, not whether trade
in general ought to be free, for that is granted,
but whether there be any circumstances peculiar
to the corn trade, which take it out of the
general rule ; and according to the solution of
this question, the above inference will, or will
not, hold good.

196 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Now, as we have seen that every case of in-
duction comprises a process of deductive reason-
ing, it follows that the general principle just
mentioned must be common to both deduction
and induction. But, besides this common prin-
ciple, every purely deductive argument has its
own less general principle, such as in the above
instance, " trade ought to be free," from which a
special conclusion is drawn.

In induction, on the other hand, each argu-
ment has not a principle peculiar to itself; it has
only one or other of two or three very general
principles, common to all cases of induction,
such as " nature is uniform in her works and
operations." Thus we rise from the particular to
the general by a process, which, comparing the
expressed premises with the conclusion, is the
reverse of the deductive ; though, as we have
seen, the inference from the particular facts to
the general law cannot be logically drawn with-
out the intervention of a much more general
but universally acknowledged principle.

The object of general induction is to establish
a general conclusion, by means of instances so
divested of peculiar circumstances as to obviate
the mistake of stating as general what is only
particular. One instance would be as good as a
thousand, if we could be sure that it was quite

REASONING. 197

in point, that is, free from any peculiar circum-
stances, and it is only because we are not sure of
this, that we must multiply instances. The grand
point then is to prove similarity, perfect, or at
least sufficient similarity, between cases observed
and others not observed. The uncertainty of
induction depends partly on the difficulty of
determining the degree of similarity between
cases observed and others which have not been
observed in all points, partly on the mistakes to
which the original observation was liable. In a
word, we may observe ill in the first instance, or
the new cases may not be in all respects similar
to the old.

There is a strong tendency in the human mind
to draw a general conclusion, even from a single
instance. Thus, when a child first sees a pool of
water, he can form no idea of the effects of water
on man ; but let him once see a person drowned,
and he will ever afterwards act on the belief that
water will drown those who get over head and
ears. Here the child reasons inductively, and
from a single instance, and yet, in this case, cor-
rectly. This, and innumerable similar cases,
show us the natural tendency, which is to leap at
once to a general conclusion, even from one fact
observed, a tendency which a wider experience
alone can check, and which, in many, if not in

198 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

all, is checked but imperfectly during the whole
course of their lives.

We have seen that the validity of Inductive
Reasoning rests fundamentally upon the tacit
assumption, that nature is uniform in her opera-
tions ; that things which have coexisted will be
found again to coexist, and that those which have
succeeded each other will continue to succeed in
the same order. Now, this assumption is not
self-evident, neither does it admit of proof; but
we implicitly believe, and cannot help believing
it to be true. It is then one of the first princi-
ples of human knowledge, though not a necessary
or self-evident proposition. That the sun which
has risen every day of our lives will again rise
to-morrow, that when it shines it will give sen-
sible heat, that a stone thrown up into the air
will speedily fall back to the earth, we cannot
doubt, though the only ground for this belief is,
that such has always been the case in time past.
Between the assertion, this has always been, and
the inference, this will always be, there is a wide
gulf, which we must leap across, for we never can
bridge it over. The inference is not logical, for
we can see no connection between the premises
and the conclusion, but it is irresistible. This,
then, is a primary article of belief, totally inde-
pendent of reasoning ; neither self-evident, nor

REASONING. 1 99

known by experience ; for experience is only of
the past. All inferences from experience, how-
ever, take it for granted ; and on this assumption
alone are they logically drawn.

As the subject of induction has lately given
rise to a controversy between two eminent
philosophers, I shall conclude what I have to say
under this head by a reference thereto ; and by
examining the points in dispute, I may perhaps
be able to throw some additional light upon this
fundamental question. The points in dispute
between Dr. Whewell and Mr. Mill, so far as the
nature of induction is concerned, seem to be the
following.q

1. Whether the term induction may with
propriety be applied to the case where particular
facts are brought in to establish not a general,
but a particular conclusion.

2. Whether general facts of every day no-
toriety, learnt without effort, and commonly
called practical knowledge, such as the freezing of
water by cold, and its evaporation by heat ; the
fact that water will suffocate, and fire consume ;
and the like, be known by a process similar to
that whereby truths less familiar, commonly called
scientific, are established.

q See Dr. Whewell's little work " Of Induction," and Mr.
Mill's " System of Logic."

200 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

3. Whether the skill which is gained by
practice, without formal study, skill in playing
cricket, tennis, billiards, &c., skill in shooting
with the gun or the bow, &c., when not derived
from scientific principles of which the mind is
conscious, be, or be not, acquired by a process
similar to induction, so similar as to warrant us
in applying to it the same name.

Now, in order to solve these questions, we must
call to mind what was stated at the opening of
this inquiry into reasoning, viz. that God has given
to men but two means for the acquisition of know-
ledge, and the discovery of truth, — observation
(including experiments,) and reasoning. There-
fore, all knowledge must be acquired either by
observation alone, or by reasoning alone, or by
the two combined.

Particular facts cognizable by the senses are
known simply by observation ; as the geographi-
cal features of any country, the form of the
coast, the course of the rivers, the position of
the mountains. That Cambridgeshire is a flat
country, Wales mountainous, and Westmoreland
abounding in lakes, are facts known by observa-
tion alone, at least in the first instance. Here
no reasoning is required. On the contrary, the
truths of pure Mathematics are known by rea-
soning alone ; for, except the definitions, axioms,

REASONING. 201

and postulates, the first of which are, of course,
propositions merely explaining the meaning of
words ; the second, truths self-evident ; the third,
self-evident possibilities ; the whole process is
reasoning.

All other truths, whether general or particular,
are acquired by observation, together with reason-
ing ; either by the close union of the two, or by
reasoning, based indeed upon observation, follow-
ing it for a season, but afterwards emancipated
from it. To the former of these we conceive
that the term induction properly belongs. At
least, as the process is similar, whenever obser-
vation and reasoning closely unite, there the
same name should be applied, whether Induction
or any other.

In the case of Induction, (upon which Pro-
bable Deduction is always founded) the reasoning
is based not on necessary or self-evident truths,
but on what may be called primary, universal
articles of belief, articles neither self-evident, nor
capable of proof, which nevertheless we hold
with unshaken constancy ; such as, belief in the
existence of the material world, belief in the
uniformity of nature, &c. Starting from these
fundamental articles, and taking observation as
our guide, we arrive at the knowledge of general
truths, not cognizable by the senses, by a process
D D

202 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

combining reasoning with observation, to which
the name Induction is always applied. Now, the
question is, whether, by a process exactly similar,
we may not obtain the knowledge of particular
facts also, not cognizable by the senses of the
inquirer.

Let the particular fact to be established be the
genuineness of the Gospel according to St. John.
This is a fact certainly not cognizable by the
senses of any one now alive, and which cannot
therefore be known by observation alone. Neither
can it be known by reasoning alone. Therefore,
if it can be established, it must be by observation
and reasoning together. The particular kind of
evidence to which we here have recourse is that
of testimony, the testimony of many ancient
authors, who cite that Gospel as the undoubted
production of St. John. Here we have a number
of particular facts, brought forward to establish
another particular fact, the principle being always
assumed, (though tacitly,) that, generally speaking,
human testimony is worthy of credit. Thus, we
arrive at the conclusion, that the Gospel attributed
to St. John was really written by him. Now,
in what does this differ from any case of Induc-
tion where the conclusion is general ? Simply in
that, not in the process whereby the conclusion
is established. We select a great number of

REASON 1N(I. 203

particular facts, in this case particular testi-
monies, all tending to the same conclusion ; we
then assume, tacitly indeed, the general principle
founded on observation, that men will speak
truth when they have no decided motive to the
contrary ; and lastly, we infer that the Gospel of
St. John is a genuine work.

The whole process consists, first, in the
selection and bringing forward of particular
facts ; secondly, in the assumption of a general
principle universally acknowledged, and there-
fore seldom openly stated; lastly, in drawing the
inference from these premises. We may if we
please establish a specific difference, and call this
a case of Particular Induction, but we cannot
allow that there is a generic distinction between
it and General Induction.

In Paley's Evidences of the Truth of Christi-
anity, we find distinct specimens of both Induc-
tive and Deductive inquiry. In chapter i. the
author produces evidences of the sufferings of
the first propagators of Christianity, from the
nature of the case, that is, he endeavours to
show from the known principles of human nature,
that persons situated as were undoubtedly the
first propagators of Christianity, were likely to
endure much persecution. Here he proceeds
Deductively. He afterwards brings forward the

204 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

testimony of both heathen and Christian writers
in proof of the same ; and here he adopts
the Inductive method ; as also in the great
chapter ix. divided into eleven sections, wherein
he enumerates so many direct testimonies in
favour of the genuineness of the Books of the
New Testament. These we conceive are speci-
mens of Particular Induction, for the facts estab-
lished are of that order.

To take another and familar instance. Sup-
pose a man, previously in good health, to change
his residence. Not long after, he feels indisposed,
and he begins to think that the air of his new
abode is unwholesome. This is a mere suspicion,
for many other causes may have injured his
health. However, he leaves his new house, and
soon after his usual good health returns. His
suspicion is now strengthened ; but he is not yet
certain. He returns, and again falls ill ; now, he
has but little doubt. Again he leaves, and again
he recovers ; at last he is convinced. If the ex-
periment were tried upon other persons, and
always with like results, one must be almost as
sure of the unhealthiness of the spot, as of a
proposition in Geometry. The conclusion in this
case is particular, and if it have not been arrived
at by induction, I should like to know what name
must be given to the process.

KKA.SONINIJ.

The second question is, whether general facts
of every day notoriety, learnt without effort, such
as the freezing of water by cold, and its evapora-
tion by heat, the fact that water will suffocate,
and fire consume, and other such, be known by
a process similar to that whereby facts less
familiar, commonly called scientific, are estab-
lished? Dr. Whewell seems to think that the
term Induction should be applied only to the
process whereby scientific facts are discovered.
But we must remember that there is no accurate
distinction between scientific and other general
facts, no difference except in the degree in which
they happen to be familiar. Thus what is con-
sidered a vulgar ordinary fact in one country, or
in one age, may be science in another place, or at
another time. The freezing of water at a certain
temperature is a common occurrence in England,
but to a native of the coast of Guinea it may be
a scientific fact. But will it be said that the
knowledge of a familiar fact is obtained in a
different manner from a non-familiar one % The
only difference, as I conceive, is in the degree of
effort, and in the degree of attention required in
the two cases. The one we cannot help knowing
if we have our eyes open, and enjoy a common
share of intellectual faculties ; the other may
require long and painful investigation.

206 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Still the nature of the process may be essen-
tially the same. The degree of attention and of
effort are variable accidents, not essentials, and in
no two cases may they quite agree. But what we
conceive to be alike in all these cases, is, that we
begin by observation, whether with a previous in-
tention or not, and from this observation, combined
with a general article of belief, either original or
derived, we draw a conclusion less general, which
we afterwards apply in particular instances.

Thus, to recur to an example formerly given,
there can be little doubt that, were a child of a
certain age, with his faculties well developed, to
see a man drowned, he would avoid deep water
ever afterwards. But why should he avoid it^
Surely because he thinks that it would drown
him too. And why does he think so ? Because
he has seen a man drowned. But that alone is
no reason. He must conclude from that particu-
lar event that water will drown all men, and
therefore himself, before he can be said to believe
or act rationally. And how can he draw such a
conclusion but by means of an original principle
of belief, that what has been, will be, or that
nature is uniform in her operations ? And here
we have an exact specimen of the inductive pro-
cess. Observe well, that this is not instinct, for
instinct acts prior to experience, and uniformly,

REASONING. 207

as bees, who, all over the world, build their cells
in the form of hexagons ; and as some animals,
who avoid poisonous plants without trying them.
But the child, before experience, does not know
that water will suffocate, or fire give pain; for
children who have learnt no better will put their
fingers into the candle.

Neither can we allow, with Dr. Whewell, that
the mere badness or insufficiency of the investi-
gation, or that the falsity of the conclusion, is a
sufficient reason for denying that the process is
inductive. We constantly say, that a man rea-
sons ill, that his conclusions are erroneous ; but
we do not for that contend that he does not
reason at all. So, a man may content himself
with a very wretched induction, and yet he may
use it after a fashion of his own. Even the
Kentish clown, who said that Tenterden Church
Steeple was the cause of the Goodwin Sands,
because it was built just before the sea rose and
swallowed up the land, may be said to have
reasoned inductively. If we adopt the maxim
post hoc, ergo propter hoc, we may prove any ab-
surdity.

I am glad to find that the opinion here
stated is held by a distinguished Metaphysician,
Dr. Reid: — "The last kind of probable evidence I
shall mention, is that by which the known laws

208 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

of nature have been discovered, and the effects
which have been produced by them in former
ages, or which may be expected in time to come.
The knowledge of some of the laws of nature is
necessary to all men in the conduct of life.
These are soon discovered even by savages.
They know that fire burns, that water drowns,
that bodies gravitate towards the earth. They
know that day and night, summer and winter,
regularly succeed each other. As far back as
their experience and observation reach, they
know that these have happened regularly, and
upon this ground, they are led, by the constitu-
tion of human nature, to expect that they will
happen in time to come, in like circumstances.

The knowledge which the philosopher attains
of the laws of nature differs from that of the
vulgar, not in the first principles on which it is
grounded, but in its extent and accuracy. He
collects with care the phenomena that lead to the
same conclusion, and compares them with those
that seem to contradict or to limit it. And what
conclusions does the philosopher draw from the
facts he has collected ? They are, that like events
have happened in former times in like circum-
stances, and will happen in time to come; and
these conclusions are built on the very same

REASONING. 209

ground on which the simple rustic concludes that
the sun will rise to-morrow."r

But the dignity of science is thought to be
lowered by applying a scientific term to a process
in use among the vulgar; and hence, we may
suppose, the unwillingness of some peculiarly
distinguished in the paths of science, to allow
that common knowledge is really acquired by
Induction.

The third question is, whether the skill which
is gained by practice, without formal study, skill
in playing cricket, tennis, billiards, &c., skill in
shooting with the gun or the bow, &c., when not
derived from scientific principles of which the
mind is conscious, and which it can state in
words, be or be not acquired by a process simi-
lar to Induction, so similar as to warrant us in
applying to it the same name.

It is supposed then, that the skill is acquired,
not instinctive, and therefore, so far, it agrees
with knowledge the result of Induction. And
how is it acquired^ By practice, as the phrase
is ; that is, by experience ; not by simple observa-
tion, but by numerous intentional trials or
experiments. So far, again, it agrees with induc-
tive speculative knowledge. And the performer
is supposed to improve by experience. But how

1 Reid on the Intellectual Powers, Essay vii.
E E

210 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

can he improve unless he have paid attention to
the circumstances attending his successes, and
his failures, and have thence drawn some general
conclusions, some rules applicable to future
occasions ? What though these rules be not
formally stated in propositions? What though
they cannot be imparted to others ? They may,
notwithstanding, exist in his mind in a shape
sufficiently definite to act upon, and indeed we
may be sure that they do so exist, otherwise no
practice would make him better.

Very similar is the case of what is commonly
called practical knowledge in a learned profession,
as in that of the Physician. All the study in
the world will never make a good physician
without experience of the treatment of diseases ;
and some gain more from the same experience
than others. The same outward facts are before
all, but some learn much from them, others little,
that is to say, they make more or fewer, better or
worse inductions. Much of this knowledge is
incommunicable, and so dies with the individual,
because it is not sufficiently definite, subject to
too many exceptions, to be formally stated in
propositions. So it is with games of skill, such
as cricket, or tennis. Some rules of good play
may certainly be stated in words, but others
cannot for the reason just given. But, because

REASONING. 2 1 1

they cannot be enunciated, we must not con-
clude that they exist not mentally ; and that
they do exist, the best proof is that progress is
made.

How can progress be made in any thing, spe-
culative or practical, without an operation of
mind? To move our limbs requires a previous
mental change, and though muscular strength
must exist, it is the mind that directs. To sup-
pose that the mere muscular fibre can prefer one
action to another, is as contradictory as to affirm
that body is mind, that matter is spirit. Skill in
bodily motion, then, always supposes a previous
mental training ; but there can be no mental
training without rules, and no rules without
induction.

On each of the three questions above stated,
I am thus led to a conclusion the reverse of that
at which Dr. Whewell has arrived. On other
points, however, I am glad to find that I agree
with that eminent philosopher. It is debated
between him and Mr. Mill, whether Kepler's
discovery of the law, that the planets move round
the sun in ellipses, be, or be not, an instance of
Induction. That it is, I completely agree with
Dr. Whewell. Why is the contrary maintained by
Mr. Mill ? " Because," says he, " it is a fact, surely,
that the planet does describe an ellipse, and a

212 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

fact which we could see, if we had adequate
visual organs, and a suitable position."8

The whole pith of this objection lies in the
Conjunction if.

It is quite true that if we had such organs,
and such a position, we should have no need of
induction to establish the fact in question; we
should require our senses only, and the faculty
of perception. We require no induction to
prove that the Pantheon at Rome is round, and
the Colosseum oval. But these we can take in
with a glance ; and it is exactly because we can-
not so embrace the orbits of the planets, that
Induction is necessary to establish the fact of
their ellipticity. What Kepler really saw was a
planet in many different positions, and no.thing
more ; he could not see it moving, still less could
he see its whole course at once. How then
could he possibly describe its orbit, as Mr. Mill
supposes? for we describe only what we see.
From many different positions then, which he
actually saw, he inferred innumerable other posi-
tions which he did not see, all which together
made up this figure of an ellipse. I cannot
conceive a fairer specimen of Induction ; though
in this case, no law of causation was established.
But the discovery of causes, though the highest

9 System of Logic, Ratiocinative, and Inductive, Vol. I. p.p. 363.

REASONING. U 1 .'*

end of Induction, is not essential to the process.

Can it be that Mr. Mill will allow this to be
only a description, because the elliptical form of
the orbit is a factl But as I have shown under
the article u Hypothesis and Theory," and as
Dr. Whewell also maintains, a fact differs from a
theory only in the degree of evidence on which
it rests. A theory well established, and generally
received, becomes a fact. This is a truth without
the knowledge of which, there can, as I conceive,
be no correct estimate of the object of science
and philosophy.

I also entirely agree with Dr. Whewell, that a
conception is an essential part of induction.
Indeed, I am at a loss to imagine how the con-
trary can be maintained by any metaphysician.
If we do not conceive a general fact before enun-
ciating it in words, we must then, I suppose,
perceive it. We may certainly perceive particular
facts, such as the fall of a stone to the earth, but
how can we perceive that all bodies within a cer-
tain distance would fall to the earth, or that all
bodies in nature tend to each other ^ These are
general facts far removed from our senses, and
therefore from our perceptions, which are closely
connected with our sensations. A simple tendency
cannot be seen even in a particular instance, still
less a general tendency. But the mind conceives

214 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

it, otherwise how could we know if? If it be
allowed that we know anything, and yet we do
not perceive it, I should like to know what word
we ought to employ better than conception to
express that knowledge ?

Unless we revive the exploded and unphilo-
sophical notion of Condillac, that all our mental
states are only transformed sensations ; unless we
allow with Destutt de Tracy, that " Penser c'est
sentir et rien que sentir," we cannot get rid of
conceptions, in cases where we know, suppose,
conjecture, or imagine, but do not perceive.

It is allowed that Kepler did not see, did not
perceive the elliptical orbit of the planets, or of
any one planet. Yet he affirmed, with more or
less certainty, that the orbit was such. But how
could he affirm that of which he had no notion
or conception *? The supposition is a palpable
contradiction.

I likewise think with Dr. Whewell, that Mr.
Mill has made a great mistake in supposing that
the future progress of science will depend more
upon deduction than induction. Nothing appears
to me more unlikely. If we compare the slow
progress of physical science before the triumph
of the inductive method under Bacon, with its
rapid progress since, we shall be convinced that
its future advancement must still depend upon

REASONING. 'J 1 .")

the same method. Every year, almost every
month, some new discovery is announced as thus
obtained, and who shall say when these dis-
coveries shall be exhausted ? If we consider that
it is little more than two hundred years since
men began seriously and patiently to investigate
nature, we shall rather conclude that inductive
science is, as yet, in its infancy. In the history
of the human race, two hundred years is but a
point.

To many of the physical sciences deduction
is applicable in a very limited degree, and no
reason at present appears why it should ever be
much more applicable. It enters little into the
sciences of Chemistry, Physiology, Geology,
or Meteorology ; still less into the purely
descriptive sciences of Zoology, Botany, and
Mineralogy.

Before the triumph of the Baconian Philoso-
phy, physicians attempted to account for all the
phenomena of life from a few principles of
Chemistry or of Mechanics ; with what success
all are now agreed.

It is chiefly in the Mental Sciences, and in
Mechanical Philosophy, which treats of sensible
motions, that deduction plays an important part.
In morals, and politics, innumerable volumes
have been filled in deducing conclusions from a

216 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

few general principles. The whole philosophy of
Bentham is a deduction from his one principle of
self-interest.

So it is likewise in Mechanical Philosophy ;
where, from a few general facts established by
experience, such as the laws of motion, we are
able to deduce innumerable conclusions by rea-
soning strictly demonstrative. The sensible
motions of inanimate matter, and the actions of
rational voluntary agents, seem then to afford the
greatest scope for deductive inquiry. Insensible
motions, on the other hand, such as those of
Chemistry, and even the sensible motions of liv-
ing bodies, cannot be traced far in this way.

It would, however, be a fatal mistake to sup-
pose, that little. or nothing remains to be done in
the mental sciences by means of induction.
Pure Mental Philosophy or Metaphysics, is more
of an inductive than of a deductive science. It
is by observing the operations of our own minds
that we come to know them, and it is exactly
because that observation was so neglected, that
Metaphysics made so little progress.1 And who
shall pretend to say, that all the social and
political lessons of history are exhausted, that no

* For an example of the application of the inductive method to
mental philosophy, see the Author's " Analysis and Theory of the
Emotions."

REASONING. 2 1 7

new principles remain to be discovered, that we
have only to apply the old ? It is not many years
since Malthus established the principle of popu-
lation by a very copious induction. It seems to
me the more remarkable that Mr. Mill should
have undervalued the probable efficacy of induc-
tion in the future progress of science, seeing that
so large a part of his own great work is devoted
to the subject. I cannot but consider this as the
most important part of his system of Logic.
His attempt to reduce induction to a scientific
form appears to me worthy of all commendation.
Dr. Whewell, I am aware, thinks otherwise, and he
is fortified by the opinion of Sir John Herschel,
as well as by another eminent author, who look
upon the corresponding efforts of Bacon, the
" prerogatives of instances," contained in the
second book of the Novum Organum, as more
curious than useful. But the objections made to
such attempts are nothing new ; they are the
same as have been started against Logic in gene-
ral, as well as against scientific systems of morals,
viz., that men use induction naturally, reason
naturally, praise and blame naturally, and there-
fore there is no occasion for science in these
matters. We grant the premises, but deny the
conclusion. Men, it is true, use induction natur-
ally, but often imperfectly ; they reason naturally,
F F

218 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

but often inconclusively ; they praise and blame
naturally, but not always justly. Hence the
utility of general rules applicable to induction,
to reasoning in general, and to moral senti-
ment. u

I shall conclude this head with one of the
Aphorisms of Bacon, wherein the two methods,
the Deductive and the Inductive, are well des-
cribed.

" There are and can be but two ways of
seeking and finding out truth. The one, from
sense and particulars flies to the most general
axioms, and from these principles, firmly esta-
blished, finds out and judges of intermediate
axioms ; and this is the way now in use. The
other raises axioms from sense and particulars,

u The argument in favour of the application of Science to
Reasoning, as well as to Morals, may be seen, for the one, in the
Introduction to Whately's Elements of Logic ; for the other, in
the Introduction to my own Principles of Human Happiness and
Human Duty. With respect to the utility of the rules of the
Novum Organ urn in particular, the opinion of Dr. Reid differs
widely from that of Dr. Whewell and Sir John Herschel.
Among those philosophers who have most closely pursued the
path pointed out in that great work, he mentions Sir Isaac Newton
as holding the first rank ; " having in the third book of the
Principia, and in his Optics, had the rules of the Novum
Organum constantly in his eye." " Brief account of Aristotle's
Logic, Chap. vi. Sect. 2.

REASONING. 2 1 9

ascending continuously and gradually, so as at
last to arrive at the most general; which is the
true but untried way."x

Though these two modes of inquiry, Induc-
tion, and Deduction, embrace a very large part
of probable reasoning, yet there seem to be
some reasonings, which cannot properly be
classed under either. As instances, take the
following :

A is the cause of B ; but B is the cause of C :
Therefore, A is the remote cause of C.
Application depends upon the will ; but in-
tellectual advancement depends much upon
application :

Therefore, intellectual advancement depends
much upon the will.

Romulus founded Rome; but Rome con-
quered great part of the known world, and rose
to an unexampled pitch of power and grandeur ;
Therefore, Romulus was the original cause of
the power and grandeur of Rome.

In these, and similar reasonings, we neither
rise from particulars to generals, nor descend
from generals to particulars ; but we remain as
it were, on a plain, as in pure Mathematics ; and
from two previous propositions, likewise as in
pure Mathematics, we infer a third : whereas in

T Novum Organum, Aph. xix.

220 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

deductive reasoning, though there may be three
propositions when the argument is stated in full,
yet, one is very often suppressed ; in inductive
reasoning always. This, then, I shall beg leave
to call plain reasoning. Thus, we find, that pro-
bable reasoning embraces at least three kinds ;
the Inductive, the Deductive, and the Plain; and
the last seems to approach nearer to the nature
of demonstration, than either of the others. In
it, no general principle is tacitly assumed and
reasoned from, but all is openly stated; and
though the last proposition follows from the two
former, it is not comprehended under either
of them.

Plain reasoning, then, differs much more from
the Deductive and the Inductive, than these two
from each other. Therefore, they ought not to
be classed on the same line. Indeed we have
seen, that though the whole process of Induc-
tion differs widely from Deduction, yet, the
reasoning, strictly so called, contained in both, is
very similar. Consequently, we ought to class
Inductive and Deductive Reasoning together, as
species of a common genus, opposed to which,
will be Plain Reasoning.

IV. After these remarks on the nature of
reasoning in general, as well as its different kinds,
we shall be better able to answer that oft-

REASONING. 22 1

debated question, what are we to think of the
SYLLOGISM ? In the whole history of philosophy,
there is not a more singular fact than this, that
the syllogism is still a matter of dispute.

Since the days of Bacon, however, the empire
of Aristotle has gradually been going to decay,
and faith in the all-sufficiency of the syllogism
has more and more been shaken. Bacon him-
self, in his Novum Organum, frequently decries
the syllogism ;y Pascal depreciates it ;z and Locke,
with some succeeding philosophers, particularly
Thomas Brown, scoffs at it altogether. But in
our days, an attempt has been made to restore
the logic, as well as the religion of the middle
ages, and the same university which nursed a
Newman, has produced a Whately.a The latter

y See Novum Organum in Distributione operis, and Aph.
xi. xii. xiii. xiv. and Ixiii. where Aristotle is blamed for corrupting
Physics by his Dialectics. See also De Augmentis Scienti-
arum, Lib. V. Cap. ii.

1 See Pascal "De Tesprit Geometrique," and " De Tart de
persuader," contained in the last and best edition of the "Pense"es
de Pascal," by Prosper Faugere, Paris 1844.

a It is worthy of remark, that Whately, in the Preface to his
" Elements of Logic," acknowledges that the Rev. J. Newman
" actually composed a considerable portion of the work, as it now
stands, from manuscripts not designed for publication ;" and that
he is " the original author of several pages."

222 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

has written a work, chiefly to prove, that the
Logic of Aristotle is the only Logic, and syllo-
gism the only reasoning; that, in fact, the
syllogism is not a particular kind of reasoning,
but the form to which all sound reasoning may
be reduced, by whatever name it be called.
Thus, according to the Archbishop and Phi-
losopher, there are no different sorts of reasoning,
but all are alike, whether certain, or probable, a
priori9 or a posteriori, demonstrative, inductive,
or deductive ; all are exactly similar. That the
reasoning, strictly so called, contained in induc-
tion, is akin to deduction, I am willing to allow,
and indeed, have endeavoured to show ; but, that
mathematical or demonstrative reasoning differs
not specifically from either, I can by no means
admit. This, Dr. Whately assumes without any
attempt at proof. What I have called plain
probable reasoning seems to me also to differ
materially from the deductive, as well as from
the inductive.

No doubt there must be something common
to all reasoning, or the same name reasoning
would not have been given to the process in all
cases ; but had there been no differences, neither
would there have been any specific names, such
as probable, demonstrative, inductive, &c. What is

REASONING. 'J'J.'f

common to all reasoning, what it is which makes
reasoning a genus, we have seen in the opening of
this article ; and that account we must bear in
mind during the following discussion. Wherein
consist the differences which mark out several
species of reasoning, we have also seen ; and if
these differences be real, especially the grand
difference between demonstration and proba-
bility, then it follows, contrary to the opinion of
Whately, that all reasoning is not specifically
the same. Consequently, unless the word syllo-
gism mean nothing more than a sound argument
in general, stated in full, unless it be merely a
generic word, then all sound reasoning, stated
explicitly, cannot be syllogistical.

But, in order to know what the word syllogism
really does mean, we must refer to the definitions
which have been given of it, the examples
brought forward in illustration, and the general
principle said to pervade all syllogisms. When
we know what a syllogism really is, then, and not
till then, can we determine whether it include all
reasoning, or any.

Let us first take Aristotle's own definition of
the Syllogism, which is as follows : — "A syllogism
is a speech in which certain propositions being
stated and granted, some other proposition dif-
ferent from these follows of necessity ; and this

224 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

solely in virtue of the propositions stated " b
And this definition is thus explained by Alex-
ander, one of Aristotle's commentators. "But,
when Aristotle says, follows of necessity r, this does
not mean that the conclusion, as a proposition in
itself, should necessarily be true ; for this is the
case only in syllogisms of necessary matter ; but,
that the conclusion, be its matter what it may, actual,
contingent, or necessary, must follow of necessity
from the premises'' c

Reid's definition of syllogism, as completed by
Sir William Hamilton, varies a little from the
foregoing, but is perfectly consistent with it.
"A syllogism," says he, "is an argument, or
reasoning, consisting (always explicably or im-
plicibly) of three propositions, the last of which,
called the CONCLUSION, is (necessarily) inferred
from the (very statement of the) two preceding,
which are called the PREMISES." d

According to the above definitions, all pure
mathematical or demonstrative reasoning is syllo-
gistical ; for here, assuredly, each argument con-

b Prior Analytics, Book I. Chap i.

0 See Sir William Hamilton's edition of Reid's works, " A
brief account of Aristotle's Logic." — Chap. iv. Sect. 5, Note.

d The words in brackets have been supplied by Sir William
Hamilton in his edition of Reid's works.

REASONING. 225

sists of three propositions, and the conclusion fol-
lows irresistibly, or of necessity, from the premises.

/4\

In the triangle ABC, let the side A B be
equal to B C, and AC to B C. Then the side
A B will be equal to the side A C. Here there
are three propositions, the two former being
called the premises, from which the conclusion
follows irresistibly. And as this is a specimen
of all pure mathematical reasoning, therefore,
according to the above definition, all such rea-
soning is syllogistical.

But, in all other reasonings, generally con-
sidered sound and valid, does the conclusion
follow of necessity from the conclusion ?

Take the following as a specimen : —
"Trade (in general) ought to be free,"

Therefore, the corn trade ought to be free.

Is this reasoning, or is it not ? Is it good rea-
soning? Most people, I conceive, would allow
that the reasoning is fair, though not infallible.
From the assumption that trade ought to be free,
we are entitled to infer, probably indeed, not
necessarily, that the corn trade ought to be free ;
probably only, because, though trade in general
ought to be free, there may still be circumstances
G G

226 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

peculiar to the corn trade which take it out of
the general rule. Therefore, here we have a
specimen of what all would allow to be reason-
ing, where the conclusion does not follow of
necessity from the premises, and which, there-
fore, does not agree with the definition of the
syllogism. Consequently, all reasoning is not
syllogistical in the sense above given.

Moreover, can we say that the argument
consists implicitly of three propositions'? If
there be three, then explicitly they are as
follows : —
" Trade (in general) ought to be free."

The corn trade is a trade.

Therefore, the corn trade ought to be free.

Does not every one see that the second pro-
position is a mere truism, or identical statement,
where nothing is told which is not implied in
the meaning of the subject of the proposition?
It cannot, therefore, be an essential part of the
argument ; and if not, then we have a valid
piece of reasoning, consisting only of two pro-
positions. Here again, then, we miss one of the
characteristics of the syllogism. But the above
is only a specimen of ten thousand arguments of
the same kind ; and therefore, we must conclude
that all reasoning cannot be stated in syllogisms,
as above defined.

REASONING.

Let us now take another method of arriving
at the nature of the syllogism, and instead of a
definition, let us examine what is allowed by
dialecticians to be the fundamental principle of
all syllogisms, the famous dictum of Aristotle,
which is, that whatever is affirmed or denied uni-
versally of any class of things, may be affirmed or
denied of anything comprehended in that class.
This, according to Archbishop Whately, is the
UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of Reasoning ; for, as he
thinks, all reasoning is syllogistical.6 Now, can
this principle be applied to all reasoning ? In the
first place, be it remarked, that this celebrated
dictum is, in reality, no principle or axiom at all,
for it affirms nothing which is not already com-
prehended in the meaning of the word class. It
is, in fact, a definition of a class, and so a
merely verbal proposition. How a mere defini-
tion can be the universal principle of reasoning,
passes all conception.

But, waving this objection, which meets us at
the very outset of the inquiry, and allowing the

e Let it not be supposed that I assert that Aristotle thought
that he had discovered in this dictum the Universal Principle of
Reasoning. My remarks apply to one of the most distinguished
of his modern disciples, and we all know that disciples often go
beyond their masters. Aristotle said only that the above dictum
was the Universal Principle of Syllogisms.

228 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

above to be entitled to the name of a principle,
let us see whether it be applicable to all, or any
kind of reasoning. When we refer to the various
sorts of relation, about which reasoning is con-
versant, that are mentioned above, we see but
one kind, at most, to which the principle of the
syllogism can be applicable, namely, relations of
comprehension. This, no doubt, is a very im-
portant class, but it is only one class; and
certainly not more important than relations of
cause and effect. If A be the cause of B, and
B of C, then A is the remote cause of C. This is
surely reasoning, and correct reasoning ; but how
the conclusion is here comprehended under either
of the premises, I am quite at a loss to perceive.
So likewise in the reasoning,
Application depends upon the will :
But intellectual advancement depends much
upon application :

Therefore, intellectual advancement depends
much upon the will.

Here it will be allowed that the conclusion fol-
lows fairly from the premises ; but surely, it is not
comprehended under either of them. According
to the syllogistic theory, application is here the
middle term, and this is a class under which the
subject of the conclusion, namely, intellectual
advancement, must be brought, in order that

REASONING. 229

what had previously been asserted of the former,
may be asserted also of the latter. But, how
intellectual advancement is a particular instance,
or a species, of the genus application, I am at a
loss to see. By the supposition, the one, appli-
cation, precedes as cause, and the other, in-
tellectual advancement, follows as effect ; and
therefore, the latter cannot be an instance of
the former.

Again, taking relations of quantity,

in the triangle ABC, if the side A B is equal
to B C, and A 0 to B C, then is the side A B
equal to A C. This, it will be allowed, is demon-
strative reasoning ; but here also the principle of
the syllogism is quite inapplicable. The con-
clusion certainly follows irresistibly from the
premises, but it is not comprehended under
either of the previous propositions.

It appears, then, from the acknowledged
general principle of the syllogism, and from
the particular instances of demonstrative reason-
ing, and probable plain reasoning, now given,
that to neither of these species of reasoning is
the syllogism applicable. But we found before,
that it follows directly from the definition of the
syllogism, that all probable reasoning cannot be

230 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

stated in syllogisms. Therefore, whether we
start from the definition, or from the acknow-
ledged general principle of the syllogism, we
arrive at the same conclusion. Mark, however,
this difference, that whereas, according to the
definition, demonstrative or pure mathematical
reasoning is certainly syllogistical ; according to
the general principle above stated, it certainly is
not syllogistical. Therefore, the definition and the
general principle are inconsistent ; but, whether
we adopt the one or the other, it equally
follows that all reasoning cannot be expressed in
syllogisms.

The question is now reduced to much nar-
rower limits. Having seen that the syllogism is
not the form in which all correct reasoning can
be stated, it only remains to inquire whether any
legitimate reasoning can be so expressed.

If we take the definitions above given of the
syllogism, that question is already answered ; for
we found that demonstrative or mathematical
reasoning agrees perfectly with those definitions.
But, as they are in accordance neither with the
so-called general principle of the syllogism, nor
yet with the examples thereof generally brought
forward, we shall adopt these in order to deter-
mine whether any reasoning be really syllogistical.

Agreeably to that fundamental principle, as

REASONING.

given above, it would appear, that, to relations of
comprehension, if to any, the syllogism must
apply ; for the principle is, that what is true of a
class, is true of all individuals comprehended un-
der that class. To deductive reasoning, then, as
tracing relations of comprehension, the syllogism
may be applicable.

Observe, that, in reference to reasoning, there
are two questions to be solved, the one purely
metaphysical and speculative, the other logical
and practical : the first, what is really the pro-
cess which goes on in our minds in reasoning'?
The second, how are we to test the validity of an
argument"? Each of these questions must be
treated separately.

This distinction may be illustrated by refer-
ence to Ethics, in which also there are two grand
questions ; the one, what are the causes present
to the mind, which actually regulate our moral
sentiments? The other, what are the circum-
stances which justify us, on mature reflection, for
awarding approbation or disapprobation to any
action? The former question relates to the
origin of our moral sentiments, the latter to the
criterion of morality.

The first question is, whether the syllogism be
a full statement, founded on a correct Analysis,
of the mental process in deductive reasoning.

232 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Having already mentioned the general principle
of the syllogism, let us now bring forward some
examples.

1. Whatever exhibits marks of design had an

intelligent author.

The world exhibits marks of design :
Therefore, the world had an intelligent author.

2. All tyrants deserve death.
Caesar was a tyrant :
Therefore, Caesar deserved death.

3. Every dispensation of providence is beneficial.
Afflictions are dispensations of providence :
Therefore, they are beneficial.

4. Every creature possessed of reason and liberty

ought to practice justice.
Man is a creature possessed of reason and
liberty :

Therefore, he ought to practice justice.

5. No vicious man is worthy of esteem and

reward.

John is a vicious man :

Therefore, John is not worthy of esteem and
reward.

6. No tyrannical government is good.
The Turkish government is tyrannical :
Therefore, it is not good.

These are instances of regular syllogisms, in
the first Figure, to which, we are told by Aristotle

REASONING. 233

and his followers, all legitimate syllogisms may
be reduced. Here the middle term is the sub-
ject of the major, and the predicate of the minor
proposition/ We shall also give a specimen of
the second and of the third figure.

7. Whatever is bad is not the work of God.

All the natural passions and appetites of men
are the work of God :

Therefore, they are not bad.

In this instance, the middle term is the
predicate both of the major and of the minor
proposition, or the syllogism is of the second
figure.

The next is from Reid.

8. All Africans are black.
All Africans are men :
Therefore, some men are black.

Here the middle term is the subject both of
the major and minor, or the syllogism is of
the third figure.

These instances may suffice to show us the
nature of syllogisms. In all, the conclusion is

f The first three are taken from Whately's Logic. The first
in particular is his favourite specimen. In the Prior Analytics,
Book I. Chap. vii. Aristotle proves that all syllogisms may be
reduced not only to the first figure, but to the two universal moods
of the first figure, either directly by conversion, or indirectly by
reductio ad absurdum.
H H

234 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

evident, provided the premises be granted ; and in
all, the validity consists in the same thing, which,
when stated generally, constitutes the dictum
above mentioned ; namely, that whatever is
affirmed or denied universally of any class of
things, may be affirmed or denied of any thing
comprehended in that class. In framing the
argument, then, the object is to refer the subject
of the conclusion to some class, (middle term)
of which class something can be affirmed or
denied universally. Thus, in the first syllogism,
the subject of the conclusion, " the world," is
referred to a class of things, " those which exhibit
marks of design," of which it can be universally
affirmed that " they had an intelligent author."
And so with the rest.

Now the question is, do men actually reason
thus ? That they do not openly or apparently so
reason, every one's experience may convince
him. Taking each of the six syllogisms in the
first figure, to which form the other figures may
be reduced, we shall see that in every case
the natural or usual way of reasoning would
be confined to the second and third propositions,
omitting the first. In order to prove that the
world had an intelligent author, none but a
dialectician would think of beginning by stating,
" whatever exhibits marks of design had an

REASONING.

intelligent author;" but an ordinary reasoner
would say,

The world exhibits marks of design :

Therefore, it had an intelligent author. And
so in the other cases.

But though, not expressed, is not the first or
major proposition understood? Mentally em-
braced, though not stated in words ? There lies
all the question.

When we examine these six syllogisms, we
find that the major is always an universal pro-
position, and this, in fact, is one of the laws of
the first figure, as it is of syllogisms in general
that one of the premises must be universal.
Unless this be the case, no infallible inference
can be drawn. If the major proposition be uni-
versal, it must embrace the conclusion, for this is
only a particular instance of the same. Con-
sequently, by assuming the major, we assume the
conclusion ; or, in other words, our first propo-
sition takes for granted the very thing to be
proved. And this, we are told, is the legitimate,
nay, the only legitimate mode of reasoning !
Certainly, of all the delusions that ever passed
current in the world, this is the greatest ; for it
is a delusion not peculiar to the vulgar, but
shared, even now, by some of the highest names
in philosophy. It is engendered between rever-

236 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

ence for antiquity and respect for Aristotle and
Greek, and in many instances it has proved too
strong, not only for common sense, but for high
intellectual powers. On that account it is the
more important that the delusion should be
expelled.

Aristotle shows (Prior Analytics, Book I.
Chap, xxiv.) that unless one of the two proposi-
tions which compose the premises be universal,
there can be no syllogism. "Thus," says he, "if
we have to demonstrate that music is a dignified
pleasure, if we state only that pleasure is digni-
fied, without saying all pleasure, there is no syllo-
gism." Strange that this acute philosopher
should not have put the question to himself, if
all pleasure be dignified, what occasion is there
for reasoning to prove that the pleasure of music
is so ? That question once fairly answered, he
might have spared himself the immense trouble
of writing the Prior Analytics, a mighty monu-
ment of useless ingenuity.

Who, I would ask, starting from the major
proposition of the syllogism, would think of
proving that Caesar, as a tyrant, deserved death,
because all tyrants deserve death % That is the
very thing to be proved. Whether we use the
singular or the plural, it makes no difference ;
for the general term Tyrant comprehends as

REASONING.

many particulars as the phrase all Tyrants.
What can be more silly than the statement, a
tyrant, any tyrant, deserves death, because all
tyrants deserve death ? But such, and no other, is
the proof afforded us in this syllogism. These
two propositions are in reality identical ; they
differ only in form. We conclude that what,
instead of proving any thing, begins by taking
for granted the very thing to be proved, cannot
be the natural mode of reasoning.

Moreover, the above specimens of syllogism,
and others, such as are usually found in books of
Logic, in all the varieties of figure and mood, do
not answer to the definition of syllogism given
by Aristotle above, viz. that "a syllogism is a
speech in which certain propositions (the pre-
mises) being stated and granted, some other pro-
position (the conclusion) different from these,
follows of necessity ; and this solely in virtue of
the propositions stated." Now, we have seen that
the syllogisms constructed according to the rules
of figure and mood, and in agreement with the
Dictum of Aristotle de omni et nullo, as it is
called, really bring out in the conclusion nothing
different from the premises. Therefore, they do
not correspond with the above definition, which,
as we have shown, agrees with demonstrative or

238 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

mathematical reasoning only.g That definition is
a definition of perfect or demonstrative reason-
ing, and if we please to call it syllogistic, well
and good : but then we must remember that such
syllogisms are very different from the syllogisms
of the schools, which alone we are now combat-
ing. In these last, the connection between the
premises and the conclusion is no doubt irre-
sistible, because the latter is assumed in the
former; but for that reason it can contain no-
thing new, nothing different. Not so in real and
perfect reasoning, such as that of Geometry,
where the conclusion not only follows irresistibly
from the premises, from both together, but where
it also contains something different from either.

" In what, then, consists this admirable
discovery of the syllogism ? " asks Barthelemy
Saint Hilaire, in the Preface to his Translation of
Aristotle's Organon ? " In this," answers he,
" that Aristotle first established that reasoning
was possible on the one condition alone of start-
ing from a principle, to arrive by the aid of a

3 What we have called Plain Reasoning approaches more
nearly to the Mathematical than any other, and in some cases
seems not to fall short of demonstration : though the matter
about which it is conversant be contingent, not necessary.
Therefore, though the conclusion follows irresistibly from the
premises, it may still be false.

REASONING.

middle term at a conclusion resulting necessarily
from that principle." According to this state-
ment, there can be none but demonstrative
reasoning; first mistake. Again, by this, the
conclusion in demonstrative reasoning follows
necessarily from the principle, as Saint Hilaire
calls it, or major proposition ; whereas, in mathe-
matical reasoning, it follows not from one of the
premises alone, but from both together ; second
mistake. In the simple reasoning, A is equal to
B, and B to C ; therefore, A is equal to C ; the
conclusion certainly follows not necessarily from
either of the two premises, but from both, and
the one is no more entitled to be called a prin-
ciple than the other. It is only in the fictitious
reasoning of the syllogism, that the conclusion
follows necessarily from the major proposition,
because in that proposition the conclusion is taken
for granted beforehand. It may be remarked, that
Logicians of a certain class are often at war with
the Mathematicians. No wonder; for no science
so clearly refutes the absurd pretensions of the
School Logic as Mathematics.

I am well aware that a very high authority in
Logic maintains that we cannot draw the simplest
inference in Mathematics without the use of an
universal principle ; and that even the reasoning
A is equal to B, and B to C, therefore A is equal

240 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

to C, is elliptical. Stated in full, we are told
that reasoning would be as follows : —

What are equal to the same, are equal to each
other ;

A and C are equal to the same (B) ;

Therefore, A and C are equal to each other.

How is this question to be determined ? By
an appeal to consciousness, the supreme tribunal
in Metaphysics. To consciouness, then, we do
appeal, and we maintain that the reasoning A is
equal to B, and B to C, therefore, A is equal to C,
is not elliptical ; that nothing is wanting to the
evidence of the conclusion, that the mind sees
that conclusion as resulting from the premises
at once and irresistibly. Does any one deny this
evidence, and ask for more proof ? We have no
more to offer, for we cannot give a demonstra-
tion of a demonstration. As for what is called
the full statement, we deny that it is one whit
more satisfactory than the other, or that it is the
natural mode of reasoning. It is an artificial
mode, invented to prop up a theory by reducing
mathematical reasoning to the syllogistic form.
We cannot of course support our denial by a
formal proof, for the first principles of reasoning
admit not of proof; but we confidently appeal to
the consciousness of every man of common un-
derstanding.

REASONING.

We must not confound analysis with general-
ization. The reasoning, A is equal to B, and
B to C, therefore, A is equal to C, seems to
admit of no analysis, it is complete in all its
parts, all is expressed ; but, when we come to
compare this with other examples of reasoning,
we find that there is a striking similarity between
them, which similarity, or point of agreement, may
be stated as a general principle, and formalized
in words, thus, "things which are equal to the
same are equal to one another." This general
principle, then, is said to pervade all such
specimens of reasoning; that is, each is a par-
ticular instance thereof. But we must not
therefore suppose that each is proved from the
general principle. On the contrary, but for the
particular instances, the general proposition would
never have been thought of. It comes after the
particular proofs, by a process of generalization,
forming an axiom convenient for the purpose of
communicating knowledge, and satisfactory to
the mind of the learner, as showing at a glance
all that he is called upon to take for granted in
the ensuing demonstration; but it cannot be
necessary to a proof which is evident without it,
and which actually was established without it ;
for few will maintain that the geometrical dis-
coverer began by laying down axioms.
i i

242 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

One question only now remains. Though the
syllogism be not an accurate detailed statement,
derived from a correct' analysis of the process of
reasoning, is it of any use as a test, a criterion of
the validity of an argument? In other words,
though false metaphysically, can it serve any
purpose logically ?

If the syllogism be not an accurate statement
of the full mental process in reasoning, there is
surely a strong probability, a priori, against its
logical utility. But let us examine this point
separately.

When we consider the specimens given above,
or any others that are in due form, we shall find
that what the syllogism does, is to point out in
the major proposition what must be taken for
granted, in order that the inference may be
irrefragable, in other words, that the conclusion
may follow necessarily from the premises. In
order to show this necessary connexion, or want
of connexion, the syllogism so states the case, that
the conclusion is evidently comprehended, or not
comprehended, under the premises. But then,
the major premiss, taken for granted, requires
proof, quite as much as the conclusion, nay,
more, for it comprehends it, and more also ; and
therefore, though the inference be correct, the
conclusion may be utterly false ; and the reason

REASONING *J j.'i

why the inference is irrefragable, is because, the
conclusion is taken for granted in the premises ;
and if it be not taken for granted, then the
inference is not irrefragable. The syllogism, in
fact, shows nothing more than this ; that unless
such a preliminary proposition be true, we
cannot be quite sure of the conclusion But, as
we can be quite sure of no matter of fact, at
least of no universal fact, the conclusion must,
after all, be hypothetical ; though we are apt
erroneously to suppose that it is certain, because
the inference is correct.

The only conceivable use of the syllogism, is
to show us what large assumptions must be made,
if we would have a semblance of certainty ; and
consequently, that there is no real certainty, but
only probability. "The world exhibits marks of
design," (that is which look like design) : "there-
fore, the world had an intelligent author." It is
true that this conclusion cannot be quite certain,
unless, " whatever exhibits marks of design had
an intelligent author." Neither is it perfectly
certain, because " Caesar was a tyrant," " there-
fore, he deserved death," unless "all tyrants
deserve death ;" but what ought we to infer from
this, but that all our reasonings on matters of
fact are fallible, and liable to exceptions ; for, in
order that the conclusion may follow irresistibly,

244 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

universal propositions must be assumed to be
true, though as such, they may be false ^ To
impress this truth on the mind, seems to me the
only possible advantage to be derived from the
syllogism ; though its effect has been just the
contrary ; for it has an appearance of perfect
proof and certainty, and though only an appear-
ance, the fiction, like other fictions, is apt to
impose upon the understanding, and lead it into
error.

The grand mistake of the syllogistic theory,
then, is the notion that we can ever arrive at
demonstration in reasonings about matters of
fact ; and in carrying out this notion, a form of
reasoning was invented, (for invented is the word)
whereby the appearance, and only the appearance
of infallibility, was given to an argument. The
very perfection of the proof in a regular syllo-
gism shows the futility of the argument; for
we know that, except in mathematics, there is no
perfect proof; and consequently, the perfection
can be only apparent, and therefore, the result of
a trick. This trick, as we have seen, is assuming
the conclusion in the premises.

That a system of logic, raised on such a basis,
should so long have stood its ground, and that
even at the present day it should have eminent
supporters, is certainly one of the most extra-

KDASONING. 245

ordinary facts in the history of the human mind.

To the name, the truly great name of Aristotle,
must chiefly be attributed this long delusion ; a
man distinguished in so many branches of
science, in Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics, Rhe-
toric, Criticism, and Natural History; the tutor
of Alexander, the founder of the peripatetic
philosophy. Assuredly, the writings of Aristotle
have shed a light on the world ; but the great
power of the philosopher is chiefly shown in this,
that he bewildered it so long.

To take an instance formerly given. Suppose
that, either by induction, or otherwise, we have
arrived at this general proposition, that

Trade ought to be free :
we may thence infer directly, that

The corn trade ought to be free.

Here the conclusion follows from the premises,
follows probably, but not infallibly ; for the pro-
position tc trade ought to be free," though general^
is not stated as universal-, and therefore there
may be circumstances peculiar to the corn trade,
which make it an exception to the rule. But
this is the natural mode of reasoning. Now, if
we wish to convert this into a syllogism, we must
state the argument thus :

All trade ought to be free.

The corn trade is a trade :

246 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Therefore, it ought to be free.

Here, by assuming too much, we render the
argument insignificant, for we assume the con-
clusion in the major premiss.

It is a very fair argument to infer, because
trade in general ought to be free, that the corn
trade ought to be free ; it is an argument drawn
from a general proposition or a general principle,
as the common phrase is ; in other words, an in-
stance of deductive reasoning ; but it is no
argument to say that the corn trade ought to be
free, because all trade ought to be free. This is
simply a begging of the question ; it is to say,
that there can now be no dispute about the mat-
ter, that it has been already decided. Take another
instance. Our general proposition may be,

" A local legislature is advantageous to a
country/' whence we may infer, that

" A local legislature in Ireland would be ad-
vantageous to that country."

This is a fair argument ; but, as the proposition
pretends not to universality, there may be cir-
cumstances peculiar to Ireland, which render the
general rule inapplicable ; or, on the contrary,
there may in this case be circumstances which
render a local legislature peculiarly desirable.

When brought to the form of a syllogism, the
argument becomes as follows :

It E A SON ING. '2 \ 7

Every country is benefited by a local legis-
lature.

Ireland is a country :

Therefore, Ireland would be benefited by a
local legislature.

Here, again, it is evident that by assuming
too much, we do away with the argument alto-
gether. We prove nothing, we show the pro-
bability of nothing; we suppose the question
already settled.

Again, supposing ourselves convinced of the
truth of this general proposition, that the law
ought to favour the equal partition of property
among all the children of a family, daughters as
well as sons ; it may still be a question whether
there be any circumstances peculiar to land,
which justify an exception: but, if we begin by
an universal affirmation, that all property ought
to be equally divided, there is an end at once to
reasoning.

Hume's famous argument against miracles,
which is contained in a single sentence, may be
easily reduced to the form of a syllogism in the
first figure ; and for that very reason it is nuga-
tory. " A miracle is a violation of the laws of
nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience
has established those laws, the proof against a
miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as

248 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

entire as any argument from experience can
possibly be imagined." In due syllogistic form,
the argument would stand thus :

Whatever is opposed to a firm and unalter-
able experience is unworthy of credit.

But a miracle (being a violation of the laws
of nature) is so opposed :

Therefore, a miracle is unworthy of credit.

The fallacy here lies in assuming in the minor
premiss, that there is a firm and unalterable ex-
perience against a miracle; for there exists a
great deal of testimony for miracles ; and until
it be proved that all that testimony is false, it
cannot be assumed that there is an invariable
experience against them ; for testimony is in-
direct experience, and upon it, by far the greater
part of our knowledge depends. Even the major
premiss may be contested. If by firm and
unalterable experience be meant (and what else
can be meant ?) the experience of ourselves, our
ancestors, and all whom we have known or heard
of, then those born and bred between the tropics,
and who have never wandered from thence, ought
not to believe in ice. In fact, there is scarcely
any universal proposition that may not be con-
tested; and therefore, dialecticians have been
obliged, in order not to expose the hollo wness of
their art, to have recourse to trifling examples,

HKASONINii. 249

such as, " All men are mortal." James is a man :
therefore, he is mortal. " All men are sinners."
John is a man : therefore, he is a sinner : where
they knew that the major would not be dis-
puted. Aristotle was more wary, for he stuck to
letters, and thus concealed the insignificance of
examples.

Thus, the major premiss of the syllogism is,
in general, either a truism, or an unwarranted
assumption ; and therefore, though the inference
be irresistible, yet the conclusion must be either
trifling or uncertain. But, whatever it be, it is
no more, as we have already seen, than what was
previously known, being assumed in the premises.
We cannot, therefore, wonder, that the syllogistic
art, in spite of its great pretensions, should have
contributed so little (or rather not at all) to the
advancement of knowledge.

If the argument of Hume had not laid claim
to infallibility, it could not have been reduced to
the form of a perfect syllogism. It would have
remained a good, but an obvious argument,
namely, that prior to the examination of the
particular fact, there is a probability, nay, a
strong probability, against any one miracle, on
account of the general uniformity of nature.
But general experience could not answer the
purpose of an infallible conclusion ; and there-
K K

250 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

fore, unalterable or universal experience was
assumed; and it is exactly by reason of this
assumption, that the argument becomes re-
ducible to a syllogism, and, as a demonstration,
is deceitful.

We have seen that the grand error which lies at
the bottom of the syllogistic theory, is the notion
that we can ever arrive at demonstration about
matters of experience ; and in carrying out this
notion, it was found necessary to assume, for
premises, universal propositions instead of general
ones. This is the precise difference between
the ordinary, or natural mode of reasoning, that
is, of deductive or general reasoning, and the
artificial or syllogistic. We may reason from
general propositions, that is, we may attempt to
show that any particular case is comprehended
under a general truth; but, we cannot reason
from universal propositions ; for these obviate
the necessity of reasoning. We reason in order
to prove something not known before ; but if it
be already known, why reason ?

So far concerning deductive reasoning, and
the syllogism, the insuperable objection to which
last is, that it presents a form of reasoning in-
applicable to any real discourse ; that, under the
semblance of a perfect or infallible argument, it,
in fact, does away with all argument.

REASONING.

When I consider the reasons on which this
conclusion is built, they appear to me so clear
and cogent, that here I could rest in full con-
viction. But when I reflect on the fact, that for
many ages, and throughout all civilized Europe,
the syllogism was adopted, and that still some of
the greatest thinkers defend it, I am almost
tempted to fall back into scepticism, and to dis-
card metaphysics and logic altogether, as destined
perpetually to puzzle, never to satisfy mankind.
To avoid this scepticism, this unmanly despair,
I am forced to rebel against authority, and main-
tain the liberty of thought.

When men have been wedded to a system,
they will not desert it, even when it leads them to
absurdities. One might have thought that the
following passage was a pretty good refutation
of the syllogistic theory of the schools, a real
reductio ad absurdum ; but no, the author adopts
the conclusion. "Since all reasoning (in the sense
above defined,) may be resolved into syllogisms,
and since even the objectors to logic make it a
subject of complaint, that in a syllogism the
premises do virtually assert the conclusion, it
follows at once that no new truth (as above
defined) can be elicited by a process of reason-
ing."11 Thus, in order to maintain the Syllogistic

h Whately's Logic, Book IV. Chap. ii.

INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Theory, we must allow that no new truth can be
elicited by reasoning ! The only use of reasoning,
then, as we are told, is " to expand and unfold the
assertions wrapt up, as it were, and implied in
those with which we set out, and to bring a
person to perceive and acknowledge the full
force of that which he has admitted; to con-
template it in various points of view; to admit
in one shape what he has already admitted in
another, and to give up and disallow whatever is
inconsistent with it."1 According to this theory,
when Pythagoras established by reasoning that, in
any right angled triangle, the square of the side
subtending the right angle is equal to the squares
of the two other sides, he made no discovery, he
only unfolded what was before wrapt up in some
general notion common to him and other men,
some one or more of the mathematical axioms.
Must we, then, allow that the above famous pro-
position is as much contained within the axiom,
Things which are equal to the same are equal to
one another, or some other similar, as that the
proposition, "James is mortal," is contained
within "all men are mortal?" No one, not
blinded by system, will maintain such a doctrine
for a moment. But, the syllogistic theory was
to be supported, even at the expense of reason-

1 Whately's Logic, Book IV. Chap. ii.

REASONING. 253

ing, which required to be depreciated in order to
suit an artificial and futile system.

As reasoning is depreciated in order to suit
the syllogistic theory, so are the truths of pure
mathematics. We are told that all the proposi-
tions of pure mathematics are what Locke calls
4t trifling," wherein the predicate is merely a part
of the complex idea implied by the subject.
Thus, when we assert, taking the above example,
that in a right angled triangle the square des-
cribed on the side which subtends the right
angle, is equal to the squares described on the
two sides containing the right angle, we state
merely a trifling proposition, one included in the
meaning of the word right angled triangle ! If
so, it ought to be included in the definition
thereof. But the definition says nothing about it.
The supposition is evidently preposterous.

Again, the truths of mathematics are repre-
sented by the same author, as in conformity, not
with the nature of things, but only with our own
hypotheses, our own definitions, and therefore
comparatively insignificant. There is some founda-
tion no doubt for this statement. The truths of
mathematics are not quite conformable to the
nature of things ; they are strictly true, only on
a given hypothesis or definition ; but then, they
are so far in agreement with the nature of exter-
nal things, that the nearer things external ap-

254 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

proach to the things defined, the more nearly
does the practical result correspond to the ideal
conclusion. Therefore, mathematical truths are
not mere ingenious theorems, but pregnant with
useful application.

Before me, the author of the Philosophy of
Rhetoric, as well as Dr. Thomas Brown, objected
to the syllogism, as necessarily involving a petitio
principii. Dr. Whately does not attempt to prove
the contrary, but he answers that the same ob-
jection lies against all arguments whatever.* All
arguments involve a petitio principii/ Am I
wrong, then, in saying that all reasoning is de-
preciated in order to suit an artificial and futile
system ? After this, I need not add another
word upon the syllogism.

V. Thus, we have been able to distinguish
three kinds of probable reasoning ; the inductive,
the deductive, and the plain, of which the two
former have more affinity to each other than to
the third. We are aware that, according to some,
all reasoning is of two kinds, the inductive and
the deductive ; that one author maintains all pro-
bable reasoning to be deductive, or, as he calls it,
analytic ; and another, that all is inductive.1

k The words in italics are so printed in the original.

1 Dr. T. Brown maintains that all reasoning, except the
Mathematical, or Proportional, as he calls it, is analytic; while
Mr. Mill seems to think that all reasoning is in reality inductive.

REASONING. 255

But it certainly does not appear from an ex-
amination of particular instances, that all pro-
bable reasonings can be classed under these two
heads, much less all reasonings whatsoever.

Premature generalization is the bane of science;
and principia media are more applicable and more
fruitful than principia generalissima. By general-
izing prematurely we have always to begin
afresh, nothing is gained ; whereas, by advancing
more cautiously, we establish one position at
least, whence we may hope in time to take a
higher flight. Bacon has observed, that the
grand error of philosophers before his time
consisted in this, that from particulars they rose
at once to extreme generalities, whence they
endeavoured to deduce every thing ; whereas,
the true method of progress is to advance by
degrees from one step of generalization to
another, even unto the highest.

Meanwhile, let us examine what relations are
the proper subject of each of these sorts of
reasoning ; for we have seen that all reasoning
consists in the tracing of relations.

The subject of demonstrative reasoning is the
relations of Quantity and those alone. The first
subject of inductive reasoning is the relation of
Resemblance, one of amazing extent, by means of
which we arrive, also by induction, at the know-

256 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

ledge of other relations, those of Cause and
Effect.

The relations traced by deductive reasoning
are those of Comprehension, of a whole to a
part, as when we show that a particular proposi-
tion is comprehended under a general one ; the
policy of a free trade in corn, for instance, un
der the policy of free trade in general. Se-
quences of cause and effect are traced by plain
reasoning, as in the examples above given. A is
the cause of B, and B of C, therefore, A is the
remote cause of C. Relations of Position also
are traced by this sort of reasoning, as in the
following instance :

York is further from London than Stamford ;
and Edinburgh is further from London than
York; much more then is Edinburgh further
from London than Stamford.

From the first proposition, a person totally
unacquainted with the position of Edinburgh
could infer nothing ; and from the second propo-
sition, one unacquainted with the position of
Stamford could infer nothing ; both, therefore,
are necessary to the conclusion, which is not
comprehended under either.™

m Such relations of Position are, in reality, relations of
Quantity, and so, admit of demonstrative reasoning.

REASONING. 257

VI. It will be observed that we have not
attempted, (as some have) to establish an univer-
sal principle of reasoning, because we very much
doubt whether any such principle exist. We
have seen that all reasoning consists in tracing
relations, and since these are various, it is natural
to presume that the principles of reasoning may
be so too. Even in mathematical reasoning, the
most simple of any, for it embraces but one kind
of relation, clearly distinguished from all other
relations, and having its own differences ac-
curately marked out, there is more than one
fundamental principle or axiom. Surely then it is
unlikely that there can be but one principle for
all probable reasoning, which embraces various
and complicated relations. The case of mathe-
matics proves, at least, that all reasoning is not
based upon one principle. "Things which are
equal to the same are equal to one another ;"
and " if equals be added to equals the wholes are
equal ;" are not one axiom but two.

Do we clearly understand what is meant by a
principle of reasoning P It is a general truth, of
which each inference is a particular instance, a
truth either self-evident, as in mathematics, or,
at least, to be taken for certain, since it is in-
capable of proof, and at the same time indis-
pensable to the proof of other propositions. In
L L

258 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

this, the validity of an inference consists, and
upon it, conviction depends. Considered in
respect to the reasoning itself, it is an invariable
constituent or element; in respect to the in-
fluence on the mind, a cause ; for, as we have
seen,n a principle may be either constituent or
elemental, or else causal.

Although we do not pretend to lay down one
universal principle of reasoning, yet we may
arrive at some general truths on this subject.
Since all reasoning consists in tracing relations,
and since these are either of coexistence or of
succession, it follows that the object of reasoning
is to prove either that two or more things coexist
or do not coexist ; or that two or more things
succeed or do not succeed each other ; generally,
if not invariably. The object of science, in
particular, is to determine the permanent or
invariable coexistence, and succession of things,
partly by direct observation, and where that
fails, by reasoning or inference. Where one
thing is known certainly to exist, there to expect
another along with it ; or where one thing is
ascertained, to look for another after it ; such
are the anticipations of human science.

Coexistence and succession being two such
different relations, it does seem improbable that
n See Article PRINCIPLE.

REASONING. 259

the very same maxims of reasoning should apply
to both. But let us see whether we cannot deter-
mine some which are applicable separately to each.

Relations of Coexistence :

Under this head come all the axioms of pure
mathematics, which are well known, and there-
fore, need not here be stated. The following
maxims are applicable to other sorts of reasoning.

1. If the first always coexist with the
second, and the second with the third, then will
the third always coexist with the first.

2. And vice versa. If the first never coexist
with the second, and if the second always coexist
with the third, then will the third never coexist
with the first.

Relations of Succession :

3. What has been will be.

4. Every effect has a chain of causes.

5. One effect may have many concomitant
causes.

6. An effect may be prevented not merely by
the absence of the cause or causes proper to it,
but also by opposing causes. Therefore, the
absence of an effect proves not the absence of
a tendency.

Maxim applicable to loth kinds of Relation :

7. Two or more things, which resemble each
other in many observed particulars, will be found

260 INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

to agree in other non-observed particulars. From
the appearances of agreement we may infer,
either that the composition of the things in
question is similar, or that the changes which
they undergo or produce are similar. The rela-
tion of resemblance is peculiar in this, that it
may be a relation either of coexistence or of
succession ; for there may be similarity of
sequence as well as of composition.

Relations of resemblance are the foundation
not only of all classification, and hence of the
descriptive sciences or natural history, but also
of reasonings concerning cause and effect, and
therefore, of philosophy. Nay, it is the peculiar
office of the Imagination to trace relations of
resemblance, not so much for the sake of truth,
as of effect or emotion. Fortunate, then, is that
mind which is alive to relations of resemblance,
whether it thread the mazes of science, or follow
the flowery paths of eloquence and poetry : and
valuable is that memory wherein things suggest
others from similarity, and not from mere con-
tiguity in place or in time.

THE END.

< V

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