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FACULTY  WORKING 
PAPER  NO.  1421 


Ioffe's  Normal  Cone  and  the  Foundations  of  Welfare 
Economics:  The  Infinite  Dimensional  Theory 

M.  Ali  Khan 


THE 


APR 

Ml    P. 


College  of  Commerce  and  Business  Administration 
Bureau  of  Economic  and  Business  Research 
University  of  Illinois,  Urbana-Champaign 


BEBR 


FACULTY  WORKING  PAPER  NO.  1421 

College  of  Commerce  and  Business  Administration 

University  of  Illinois  at  Urbana- Champaign 

December  1987 


Ioffe's  Normal  Cone  and  the  Foundations  of 
Welfare  Economics:   The  Infinite  Dimensional  Theory 

M.  Ali  Khan,  Professor 
Department  of  Economics 


Ioffe's  Normal  Cone  and  the  Foundations  of 
Welfare  Economics:   The  Infinite  Dimensional  Theory* 


by 


M.  Ali  Khan 
November  1987 


Abstract.   We  establish  the  relevance  of  Ioffe's  normal  cone  for  basic 
theorems  of  welfare  economics  in  the  context  of  a  commodity  space 
formalized  as  an  ordered  topological  vector  space  and  endowed  with  a 
locally  convex  topology. 


Key  Words.   Strong  Pareto  optimal  allocations,  Ioffe's  normal  cone, 
Clarke's  normal  cone,  epi-Lipschitzian  sets,  public  goods. 


AMS  (MPS)  Subject  Classifications  (1979):   Primary  90A14,  90C48, 
Secondary  49B34. 


*I  am  grateful  to  William  Thomson  for  a  stimulating  conversation, 
to  Rajiv  Vohra  for  saving  me  from  an  elementary  error  and  to  Doug  Ward 
for  encouragement  and  correspondence.   It  is  also  a  pleasure  to  acknowl- 
edge ray  indebtedness  to  the  seminal  work  of  Ioffe  and  Rockafellar.   Any 
remaining  errors  are,  of  course,  solely  my  own.   This  research  was 
supported,  in  part,  by  a  N.S.F.  grant. 

'Department  of  Economics,  University  of  Illinois,  1206  South  Sixth 
Street,  Champaign,  Illinois  61820. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2011  with  funding  from 

University  of  Illinois  Urbana-Champaign 


http://www.archive.org/details/ioffesnormalcone1421khan 


1.   Introduction 

In  [18],  Khan-Vohra  have  provided  a  version  of  the  second  funda- 
mental theorem  of  welfare  economics  that  applies  to  economies  with 
non-convex  preferences  and  technologies,  public  goods  and  with  an 
ordered  locally  convex  space  of  commodities.   In  particular,  they 
showed  that  in  economies  without  public  goods  and  with  preferences  and 
technologies  formalized  as  epi-Lipschitzian  sets,  the  Clarke  normal 
cones  to  the  production  sets  and  the  "no-worse-than"  sets  at  the  re- 
spective Pareto  optimal  production  and  consumption  plans  have  a  non- 
empty and  non-zero  intersection.   In  the  presence  of  public  goods, 
they  showed  that  this  statement  has  to  be  extended  to  say  that  the  sum 
of  the  relevant  normal  cones  for  the  consumers  has  a  non-empty  and 
non-zero  intersection  with  those  of  each  of  the  producers,  when  these 
cones  are  projected  into  the  space  of  public  goods.   These  results  are 
generalizations  of  the  classical  statements  that  at  any  Pareto  optimal 
allocation  of  resources,  the  marginal  rates  of  substitution  in  con- 
sumption and  in  production  are  equated  across  all  agents  if  the  com- 
modities are  private  goods,  and  the  sum  of  the  marginal  rates  in  con- 
sumption are  equated  to  those  in  production  if  public  goods  are 
involved;  see,  for  example,  Lange  [19]  and  Samuelson  [24].   These  re- 
sults can  also  be  seen  as  generalizations  of  more  recent,  but  also 
classical,  statements  that,  in  the  presence  of  convexity,  every  Pareto 
optimal  allocation  of  resources  can  be  sustained  through  expenditure 
minimization  by  consumers  and  profit  maximization  by  producers  at 
suitably  chosen  prices;  see  Arrow  [1],  Debreu  [7,  8,  9]  and  Foley  [10]. 


-2- 

In  a  recent  paper  [15]  limited  to  a  finite  dimensional  commodity 
space,  the  author  has  presented  a  reformulation  of  these  basic 
theorems  of  welfare  economics  in  terms  of  the  Ioffe  normal  cone 
rather  than  that  of  Clarke.   Since  the  Ioffe  normal  cone  is  based  on 
the  Bouligand-Severi  contingent  cone  and  since  this  offers  a  better 
local  approximation  to  a  set  than  the  Clarke  normal  cone,  our  reformu- 
lation is  in  keeping  with  a  more  intuitive  notion  of  a  marginal  rate 
of  substitution,  especially  in  economies  whose  technologies  do  not 
exhibit  "free  disposal."  Moreover,  since  the  Ioffe  normal  cone  is,  in 
general,  strictly  contained  in  the  Clarke  normal  cone,  this  reformula- 
tion furnishes  sharper  results.   However,  it  is  natural  to  ask  if  the 
theory  presented  in  [15]  can  be  generalized  from  an  Euclidean  space 
setting  to  that  of  an  ordered  locally  convex  space  of  commodities.   We 
offer  such  a  generalization  here. 

Our  generalization  is  based  on  Ioffe 's  [14]  recent  extension  of 
his  approximate  subdif f erential  to  locally  convex  spaces.   Such  a 
mathematical  object  has  all  the  properties  that  we  require  for  the 
formulation  and  proofs  of  our  results  provided  we  limit  ourselves  to 
Rockaf ellar 's  [21,  22]  epi-Lipschitzian  sets.   Since  this  was  al- 
ready assumed  in  [18] ,  a  satisfactory  generalization  of  the  finite- 
dimensional  theory  is  obtained.   However,  it  is  worth  emphasizing  that 
our  results  neither  imply  nor  are  implied  by  those  of  Khan-Vohra  [18]. 
The  reason  for  the  former  implication  is  twofold.   Firstly,  the 
locally  convex  hypothesis  on  the  topology  seems  to  be  essential  here 
in  contrast  to  the  situation  in  [18];  see  Remarks  4.1  and  4.2  in  that 
paper.   Secondly,  we  either  work  under  a  closedness  hypothesis  on  the 


-3- 

"better-than"  sets  Chat  was  not  required  in  [18];  or  limit  ourselves 
to  a  subset  of  Pareto  optimal  allocations  that  is  precisely  defined 
below.   We  do  not  know  if  either  of  these  limitations  can  be  removed; 
the  second  plays  a  role  in  the  proofs  of  our  theorems  because  of  the 
non-convexity  of  the  Ioffe  normal  cone. 

The  proofs  of  the  results  in  [17,  18],  and  in  [2],  are  essentially 
based  on  the  Hahn-Banach  theorem  and  revolve  around  a  separation  argu- 
ment.  The  difference  from  proofs  of  corresponding  results  for  convex 
economies,  as  in  Arrow  [1]  and  Debreu  [8],  lies  in  the  fact  that  we 
now  separate  the  tangent  cones  to  the  sets  at  the  Pareto  optimal  plans 
rather  than  the  sets  themselves.   One  has  only  to  check  whether  the 
intersection  principle  is  satisfied  whereby  disjoint  sets  have  dis- 
joint tangent  cones.   Since  the  Clarke  tangent  cones  satisfy  this 
principle,  see  [29],  and  since  they  are  always  convex,  we  can  apply 
the  separation  theorem  provided  one  of  the  sets  to  be  separated  has 
a  non-empty  interior.   This  is  guaranteed  by  the  epi-Lipschitzian  hy- 
pothesis.  Unfortunately,  this  line  of  argumentation  no  longer  works 
in  the  set-up  here  for  the  simple  and  obvious  reason  that  the  Ioffe 
normal  cone,  being  generally  non-convex,  cannot  arise  as  a  polar  to 
any  set  and  hence  a  corresponding  tangent  cone  is  not  a  well-defined 
object.   A  way  around  this  difficulty  is  to  appeal  to  the  theory 
developed  in  Ioffe  [14];  in  particular,  we  especially  rely  on  two  re- 
sults.  The  first  of  these  states  that  the  Ioffe  normal  cone  to  a 
point  on  the  boundary  of  an  epi-Lipschitzian  set  contains  a  non-zero 
element.   The  second  states  that,  under  suitable  hypotheses,  the 
Ioffe  normal  cone  to  an  intersection  of  sets  is  contained  in  the  sum 


-4- 

of  the  normal  cones.   It  is  of  interest  that  Ioffe  uses  the  Hahn- 
Banach  theorem  in  the  proof  of  both  of  these  results. 

Two  final  introductory  remarks.   First,  Ioffe  [14]  makes  it  clear 
why  the  definition  of  the  Ioffe  normal  cone  in  a  finite  dimensional 
setting,  as  in  [13] ,  does  not  work  in  the  more  general  context  of  a 
locally  convex  space.   However,  one  may  have  success  for  a  more 
limited  class  of  infinite-dimensional  spaces  such  as  Hilbert  spaces; 
see  Ward  [28,  Chapter  IV].   Second,  in  [2],  Bonnisseau-Cornet  consider 
an  economy  without  public  goods  and  show  that  the  hypotheses  of 
Theorem  1  in  Khan-Vohra  [18]  can  be  weakened  to  the  requirement  that 
one ,  rather  than  all,  of  the  production  and  "no-worse-than"  sets  be 
epi-Lipschitzian.   It  is  natural  to  ask  if  the  same  can  be  accom- 
plished here.   The  problem  with  this  question  is  that  once  the 
epi-Lipschitzian  hypothesis  is  dropped,  we  are  no  longer  guaranteed 
that  the  Ioffe  normal  cone  is  strictly  contained  in  the  Clarke  normal 
cone;  see  the  example  of  Treiraan  [27]  and,  following  him,  that  of  Khan 
[16],   As  such,  a  generalization  along  this  line  may  have  a  mathe- 
matical interest,  but  it  does  not  lead  to  a  better  result  in  terms  of 
the  economics. 

The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.   In  Section  2 
we  present  some  preliminary  material  relating  to  the  Ioffe  cone — most 
of  it  presumably  well  known  but  for  which  we  could  find  no  direct 
reference.   Section  3  presents  the  model  and  results  and  Section  4  the 
proofs. 


-5- 


2.   The  Ioffe  Normal  Cone 

In  this  section  we  define  and  develop  the  basic  properties  of  the 
Ioffe  normal  cone.   We  shall  work  in  a  locally  convex  linear  topologi- 
cal space  E  with  E*,  its  topological  dual,  endowed  with  a(E*,E)- 
topology.   For  any  x  e  E,  .C(x)  is  the  collection  of  neighborhoods  of 
x.   For  any  x  e  E  and  any  f  e  E*,  we  denote  the  evaluation  by  <f,x>. 
For  any  positive  integer  k,  E  denotes  the  k-fold  product  of  E  endowed 
with  the  product  topology.   R  will  always  refer  to  the  set  of  real 
numbers. 

For  any  X  cz  E,  the  polar  cone  X  of  E  is  given  by  {p  e  E*: 
<p,x>  _<  0  for  all  x  e  E} . 

For  any  extended  real-valued  function  f  on  E,  we  set 

epi  f  =  {(a,x)  e  R  x  E:   a  2  f(x)}, 

dora  f  =  {x  e  E:   |f(x)|  <  »}, 

(f(x)    if  x  e  S, 
fq(x)  =  < 

\j»  if  x  i   S. 

We  denote  the  indicator  function  of  S  by 

(O    if  x  e  S, 
Xs(x)  -  \ 

L»    if  x  i   S. 


We  shall  use  the  symbol  u  +f  x  to  mean  that  u  +   x  and  f(u)  ■*■   f  (x).   If 

{Q  }    is  a  set  of  sets,  then  lim  sup  Q  is  the  collection  of  limits 
a  ael  a 

of  converging  subnets  of  nets  {x  },  x   e  Q   for  all  ael. 

a    a    a 


-6- 


We  now  develop  the  notions  of  the  lower  Dini  directional  deriva- 
tive and  the  Dini  subdiff erential.   For  x  e  dom  f,  let 

d~f(x;h)  =  lira  inf  t   (f (x+tu)-f (x) ) ; 
u+h 
t++0 

3~f  (x)  =  {x*  e  E*:   <x*,h>  <  d~f(x;h)  for  all  h  e  E}. 

If  x  i   dora  f,  we  set  3  f(x)  =  0. 

We  can  now  present  a  concept  originally  due  to  Bouligand  [3]  and 
Severi  [26]. 

Definition  2.1.   For  any  XcE  and  any  x  e  X,  the  contingent  normal 
cone  to  X  at  x,  N  (X,x),  is  the  set  3  xv(x)» 

The  following  lemma  is  well-known  and  we  state  it  without  proof. 


Lemma  2.1.   For  any  XCE  and  any  x  e  X,  N  (X,x),  is  given  by  the 
polar  of  the  set  T  (X,x)  where 

T  (X,x)  =  {y  e  E:  -4  a  net  {t  ,y  }  in  R  x  E 
is.  ■*■  * 

V  V  V  V. 

t   4-  0,  y   ■>  y  with  (x+t  y  )  e  X}. 


The  following  definitions  are  taken  from  Ioffe  [14];  also  see  [12] 

Definition  2.2.   Let  J  denote  the  collection  of  all  finite  dimen- 
sional subspaces  of  E.   The  set 

3f (x)  =  I  \   lira  sup  3~f   ,  (u) 
A  r-r       r  u+L 

Le  j    u->-fx 

will  be  called  the  A-subdiff erential  of  f  at  x. 


-7- 


Definition  2.3.   For  any  X  C  E,  and  any  x  e  X,  the  Ioffe  normal  cone 
to  X  at  x,  N  (X,x),  is  the  set  3AXX(X)« 

Using  Lemma  2.1  we  can  now  present  an  alternative  characteriza- 
tion of  NA (X,x). 
A 

Lemma  2.2.   Let  C*-  denote  the  collection  of  all  finite  dimensional 
subspaces  of  E.   For  any  X  c  E  and  any  x  e  X, 

N  (X,x)  =  I  I  {y:  j^  a  net  {xV,yV}  in  E  x  E*  with 
LeJ 

x  -»■  x,  x  e  X,  y   e  N  (X  C\  (x  +L)  ,x  )  and  y  ■*  y}, 

IX 

Proof.   See  Proposition  2.1  in  [14]. 


The  following  two  properties  are  easy  to  prove  and  useful  for  the 
results  to  follow. 


Lemma  2.3.  (i)  For  any  x  e  E,  N  ((x},x)  =  E*.   (ii)  For  any  Xi-E 

and  x  e  Int  X,  N  (X,x)  =  {0}. 

Proof.   For  (i),  observe  that  for  any  finite  dimensional  subspace  L 
of  E 


d  X{x}n(x+D(x;h)  =  °°  for  a11  h  £  E* 

Hence  3  Xr  i  /    ^  \^    =  E*  an<*  therefore  3,Yr  ,  (x)  =  E*. 
A{x}r\(x+L)  AA{x} 

For  (ii),  observe  that  for  any  finite  dimensional  subspace  L  of  E 
and  x  e  Int  X, 


,  0    for  all  h  e  L 

d  Xxn(x*+L)(x  'h)  = 

00    for  all  h  t   L. 


-8- 


This  implies 

9~XY  -  /  k,,^k)  "  (**  e  E*:   <x*,h>  =  0  for  all  h  e  L}  =  L1. 

A  ,'   |  ^  X    '  Li  ) 

Hence  N  (X,x)  =    )  L   =  {0}  where  3    is  the  family  of  all  finite 
A        Le'J- 


dimensional  subspaces  of  E. 


=   (x1,...^)    e    TI^X1  C  Ek.      If    X1 


Lemma   2.4.      Let    x   ■   (x    ,...,x    )    e    TL7_iX    d  E    .      If    X     are    closed    for 
each    i, 

Proof.      We   shall    prove    the    result   only    for   the    case   k  =   2;    the   general 
result    then   follows    easly   by   induction. 
Observe    that 

X(X*   X2)(      ,X    )    =  XXl(x    )        XX2(X    )# 

Since  X  are  closed,  the  indicator  functions  are  lower  semicontinuous. 
We  can  now  apply  Proposition  4.4  of  [14]  to  assert  that 

V(Xl,X2)(xl'x2)  =  W^  X  8AXX2(x2)* 
But  then  the  result  is  proved.  II 

Lemma  2.5.   For  any  convex  closed  set  X   E,  and  x  £  X, 


N  (X,x)  -  {f  e  E*:   <f ,x>  <   <f ,y>  for  all  y  e  X}. 

Proof .   Since  X  is  convex,  xv^*^  -*-s  a  convex  function.   Either  X  =  E 
or  X  is  a  strict  subset  which  is  closed  by  hypothesis.   In  either  case, 
there  exists  a  point  at  which  xv^*^  ^s  continuous.   We  can  now  appeal 

A. 


-9- 

to  Proposition  3.2  in  [14]  to  assert  that  3xx(x)  =  9aXx(x),  where 
3f(x)  is  the  subdif f erential  of  f  at  x  the  sense  of  convex  analysis. 
Since  3xv(x)  -  {f  e  E*:   <f,x>  <   <f ,y>  for  all  y  e  X},  the  proof  is 
complete.  I 

Our  next  set  of  results  involve  epi-Lipschitzian  sets  introduced 
by  Rockafellar  [20].   We  first  recall  the  following 

Definition  2.4.   A  function  f:   U  ■*■  R,  U  '  E,  U  open,  is  said  to  be  a 
Lipschitz  function  if  there  is  a  continuous  seminorm  s(u)  on  E  such 
that 

f(u)  -  f(w)  _<  s(u-w)  for  all  u,w  e  U. 

We  can  now  present 

Definition  2.5.   A  set  X  *  E  is  said  to  be  epi-Lipschitzian  at  x  e  X 
if  either  x  e  int  X  or,  locally  near  x,  X  is  linearly  homeomorphic  to 
the  epigraph  of  a  Lipschitz  function. 

The  following  characterization  is  due  to  Rockafellar  [20]  for  R  . 

Theorem  2.1.   A  closed  set  X  ~  E  is  epi-Lipschitzian  at  x  e  X  iff 

there  exist  y  e  E,  U  e  ;:  (y),  U  e w  (x),  X   >  0  such  that 

y  x 

(x'+yy*)  e  X    for  all  x'  eXr\D  , 

for  all  y'  e  U  ,  for  all  \i    e  (0,X). 

Proof.   A  proof  for  E  =  R  is  given  in  [19].   The  difficult  part  of 
the  proof  is  to  construct  a  Lipschitz  function  given  the  condition  of 


-10- 


,the  theorem.   This  is  based  on  decomposing  R  into  a  direct  sum  of  two 
closed  subspaces,  one  of  which  is  one-dimensional.   It  is  well  known 
that  this  fact  is  true  for  a  topological  vector  space;  see  [6,  Theorem 
1.4.3]  and  [11,  p.  120].  II 

Lemma  2.6.   If  E  =  E.  x  E_ ,  x.  e  X.  ."  E.  and  X.  are  epi-Lipschitzian 
1    2   i    i    i      i 

at  x.  (i  =  1,2),  then  X  x  X  is  epi-Lipschitzian  at  (x  ,x  ). 

Proof.   The  proof  is  a  simple  consequence  of  Theorem  2.1  above.       II 

For  any  X  ~  E  and  x  e  X,  let  H(X,x)  =  {y  e  E:   there  exist 

U  e  ::   (y),  U  e  C  (x),  X  >  0  such  that  (X  \  U  )  +  uU   "  X  for  all 
y  x  x      y 

u  e  (0,X)}.   It  is  clear  that  H(X,x)  *   0  iff  X  is  epi-Lipschitzian 
at  x. 

We  can  now  present 


Lemma  2.7.   Let  x  e  X.  •.".  E  for  i  =  l,...,n.   Then 

r    H(X.,x)  CH(fU,x), 

'  . '    1        .1 

1  1 

Thus,  if  f\  H(X.  ,x)  *   0,  *~,X.  is  epi-Lipschitzian  at  x. 

i    1  i  X 

Proof.   Suppose  y  e   ;H(X.,x).   Since  y  e  H(X.,x),  there  exist 

.1  l 

.  i  . 

U1  eC6(x),  U1  e  '5(y)  and  X1  >  0  such  that  for  each  /  e  (0.X1) 

(X.  nU1)  +  m^U1   C.X.     i  =  1,...  ,n. 
ix       y     l 

Let   U     -PiU1,    U      =r\\]x   and   X    =  Min   X1.      Then   for   each    u    e   (0,X) 
x        .      x        y        .      y 

l  J         i      J  l 

(LAU    )    +  yU    C  X.  i   =   l,...,n. 

i  x  y  l 


-11- 


This  implies 


i  y        i 

Since  U  e  £s  (x) ,  U  e  r  (y)  and  X  >  0,  y  e  H(  ,X.,x)  and  the  proof 
x  y  .1 

J  l 

of  the  first  statement  is  complete.   The  proof  of  the  second  statement 
is  obvious.  II 


We  now  recall  the  definitions  of  the  Clarke  tangent  and  normal 
cones  as  presented  in  [22]. 

Definition  2.6.   For  any  X  ".  E  and  any  x  e  X,  the  Clarke  tangent  cone 
to  X  at  x,  T  (X,x),  is  given  by 

{y  e  E:   For  any  net  {t  ,x  }  in  R  x  E  with  t  \   0,  x   £  X, 


v      ,      .     v   _   .  ,  /  v.  v  vx   „-, 

x  ■*  x,  there  exists  y   e  E  with  (x  +t  y  )  e  X}. 


We  shall  denote  the  polar  of  T  (X,x)  by  N  (X,x)  and  refer  to  it  as  the 
Clarke  normal  cone  to  X  at  x. 


Lemma  2.8.   Let  X^  E  by  epi-Lipschitzian  at  x  £  X.   Then  H(X,x)  = 
Int  Tc(X,x)  *  0. 

Proof.   See  [22]. 


We  can  now  present  the  following  results  of  Ioffe  [14] 
Theorem  2.2.   If  X  C.  E  is  epi-Lipschitzian  at  x  e  X,  then 


N  (X,x)  =  cl  con  N  (X,x). 

L#  A 


-12- 


Moreover,  if  x  is  a  boundary  point  of  X, 

N(X,x)  *    {0}. 
A 

Proof.   See  the  proof  of  Proposition  3.3  and  Corollary  3.3.2  in  [14]. 

II 

Theorem  2. 3.  Suppose  that  X  ,  ...,X  are  closed  subsets  of  E  and  all 
of  them,  except  for  at  most  one,  are  epi-Lipschitzian  at  x.  Suppose 
further  that  the  following  condition  is  satisfied: 

*  *  * 

x.  e  N.(X.,x.)  (i  =  l,...,n)  and  E.x.  =  0 
i    A  i   i  11 

=>    x*  =  0  all  i. 

l 

Then  N.  (AX,  ,x)  c  E.N.(X.  ,x.  ). 
A  .   i       i  A   l   l 

l 

Proof.   See  Corollary  4.1.2  and  its  proof  in  [14].  II 

Our  final  result  relates  to  level  sets  generated  by  A-dif f erentiable 
functions  in  the  sense  of  loffe.   As  above,  let  cf  denote  the  family 
of  finite  dimensional  subspaces  of  E.   For  any  L  e  j  ,  let  II  •  IL  be  a 
fixed  norm. 

Definition  2.7.   Let  E  and  F  be  locally  convex,  linear  topological 
spaces  and  cf> :   E  +  F.  $    is  said  to  be  A-dif  f  erentiable  at  x  e  E  if 
there  exists  a  continuous  linear  operator  T:   E  +   F  such  that  for  any 
L  e  J  ,  and  any  U  e  &-C0)  and  V  e  &-.(0), 


(<j>(u+h)  -  <j>(u)  -  Th)  e  llhll  V    for  all  u  e  x+U,  for  all  h  e  UAL, 

Li 

We  shall  denote  T  by  (j>'(x). 


-13- 

Remark.  Ioffe  [14,  p.  115]  remarks  that:  (})'(x)  is  unique  where  it 
exists  and,  in  a  normed  space,  any  A-derivative  is  also  a  Gateaux 
derivative  and  any  strict  Frechet  derivative  is  an  A-derivative. 

Before  we  present  our  next  result,  we  need  to  recall  (see  [4,  5, 
21]  for  details) 

Definition  2,8.   For  any  Lipschitz  f:   E  -»■  R  the  Clarke  generalized 
derivative  at  x  e  E,  3  f(x),  is  given  by 

3cf(x)  =  {y*  e  E*:   (-l,y*)  e  Nc(epi  f,  (f(x),x)}. 

We  can  now  present  a  corollary  of  a  result  of  Rockafellar  [21]. 

Theorem  2.4.   Suppose  f:   E  ■*•  R  is  Lipschitz  in  a  neighborhood  of 

x*  e   E  and  that  f  is  A-dif ferentiable  at  x*.   Let  X  =  {x  e  E:   f(x)  _< 

f(x*)}.   If  (f'(x*)}  *  0,  then 

N  (X,x*)  =  L  A{f»(x*)}. 

Proof.   We  first  claim  that  0  i    3  f(x*).   Since  f  is  A-dif ferentiable 
at  x*,  by  Proposition  3.1  in  [14], 


8f(x*)  =  f'(x*). 
A 


Since  f  is  Lipschitz  around  x*,  by  Proposition  3.3  in  [14] 


cl  con  8Af(x*)  =  3  f(x*). 
A         C 


But  then  0  e  3  f(x*)  implies  0  =  f'(x*),  a  contradiction. 


-14- 

Next,  we  appeal  to  [21;  Corollary  1  to  Theorem  5]  to  state  that  X 
is  epi-Lipschitzian  at  x*  with 

(1)  N  (X,x*)  -    !  X{3_f (x*)} 

L         X>0    C 

Since  X  is  epi-Lipschitzian  and  f  is  Lipschitz  in  the  neighborhood  of 
x*,  we  can  appeal  to  [14;  Proposition  3.3]  to  rewrite  (1)  as 

(2)  cl  con  N  (X,x*)  ~   '  X{cl  con  9  f(x*)} 

A        X  >0  A 

Next  we  claim  that  x*  is  a  boundary  point  of  X.   To  see  this, 
first  note  that  there  exists  y  e  E  such  that 

ri\  e°(    +  an  -  i4        f(x*+ty)-f (x*)  N  n 

(3)  f  (x*,y)  =  lim  sup   i >  0 

x+fx*,t+0 

If  not,  f°(x*,y)  _<  0  for  all  y  e  E.   Since  3  f  (x*)  =  {z  e  E*:  <z,y>  < 
f°(x*,y)  for  all  y  e  E} ,  as  a  consequence  of  [21,  Corollary  to  Propo- 
sition 2],  we  obtain  0  e  3  f(x*),  a  contradiction.   But  (3)  implies 
that  in  any  neighborhood  of  x*,  there  exists  x  e  E  such  that 

At 

f(x)  >  f(x*).   This  implies  that  x*  is  a  boundary  point  of  X. 

We  now  appeal  to  Theorem  2.2  and  to  the  fact  that  f  is  A-differ- 
entiable  at  x*  to  rewrite  (2)  as 


N  (X,x*)  =     X{f*(x*)}. 
A         X>0 


For  our  final  result,  we  assume  that  E  is  an  ordered  topological 
vector  space  with  a  locally  convex  linear  topology;  see,  for  example, 
-  [25]  for  the  necessary  terminology.   Let  E  be  its  positive  cone  and 

E   =  -E  . 


-15- 


Lemma  2.9.   Let  X  ...  E  and  x  e  X. 

(i)  If  E  ,~_X,  then  p  e  N  (X,x)  implies  p  e  E_. 

* 
(ii)  If  E_c.X,  then  p  e  N  (X,x)  implies  p  e  E+. 

Proof*   We  only  prove  (i).   Towards  this  end,  suppose  p  e  N  (X,x)  and 

* 
p  i   E_.   Then  there  exists  z  e  E   such  that 

<p,z>  >  0. 


Let  F  be  the  one-dimensional  subspace  of  E  generated  by  z.   By  Lemma 
2.2 

—i 

P  £  (y:.ria  net  (x  »y  )  i-n  ExE*  with  x   +  x, 

xV  e  X,  yV  e  NR(X  C\  (F+xV)  ,XV)  and  yV  +  y}. 
Let  {x  ,p  }  be  such  a  net.   Observe  that 


z  £  TK(X  r»(F+xV),xV). 

k    k 
To  see  this,  take  any  sequence  of  positive  numbers  {t  },  t   ■>  0  and 

the  constant  sequence  {z  }  equal  to  z.   Then  for  all  k, 

,   v  k  kx    .   v     k  s   „  „  .„   v, 
(x  +t  z  )  =  (x  +t  z)  e  Xi  »  (F+x  ). 


V  V 

This  proves  the  claim.   Hence,  for  all  v,  <p  ,z>  \   0.   Since  p 
converges  in  the  a(E*,E )-topology  to  p,  <p,z>  <  0,  a  contradiction. 


-16- 


3 .   The  Model  and  Results 

From  now  on  we  shall  assume  that  E  is  an  ordered  topological  vec- 
tor space  endowed  with  a  locally  convex  topology. 

An  economy  consists  of  a  finite  number  of  consumers  and  a  finite 
number  of  firms.   We  shall  index  consumers  by  t,  t  =  1,...,T,  and 
shall  assume  that  each  has  a  consumption  set  X  zz.  E  and  a  reflexive 
preference  relation  >  .   >  denotes  >  and  not  <  .   Let  the  "better- 
than"  set  for  t  at  x  be  given  by  P  (x  )  =  {y  e  X  |y  >  x  }  and  the 
"no-worse-than"  set  by  P  (x  )  =  {y  e  X  |y  >  x  }.   Firms  are  indexed 
by  J  >  J  =  1>*»*>F,  and  each  has  a  production  set  YJ  TIE.   The  aggre- 
gate endowment  is  denoted  by  w  e  E  .   An  economy  is  thus  denoted  by 

-""       t      T     i  F 
'_-  =  ((X  ,  >  )  ,  (Y  )  ,  w)  and  we  shall  need  the  following  concepts 

for  it. 

*t    *i 
Definition  3.1.   ((x   ),(y   ))  is  an  allocation  of    if  for  all 

*t    t  *i    i        *t 

t  =  1,...,T,  x   e  X  ,  for  all  j  =  1,...,F,  y  J  e  YJ  and  Ex 

E.y  J  _<  w. 

*t    *j 
Definition  3.2.   ((x   ),(y   ))  is  a  Pareto  optimal  allocation  of    if 

there  does  not  exist  any  other  allocation  ((x  ),(y  ))  of    such  that 

t   — t   *t  t    t   *t 

x   e  P  (x   )  for  all  t  and  x   e  P  (x   )  for  at  least  one  t. 

*t    *i 
Definition  3. 3.   ((x   ) , (y   ))  is  a  strong  Pareto  optimal  allocation 

of  C    if  there  does  not  exist  an  allocation  ((x  ),(y  ))  of    with 

((x^Cy3))  *  ((x*t),(y*J)),  xl    e  P^Cx*11)  for  all  t. 


-17- 


*t    *i 

Definition  3.4.   ((x   ),(y   ))  is  a  locally  Pareto  optimal  allocation 

of    if  there  exists  a  neighborhood  V  =  ((V  ),(VJ))  of  ((x   ),(y  J ) ) 
and  there  does  not  exist  any  other  allocation  ((x  ) , (y  ))  of  C      such 
that  xC  e  (P^Cx  C)  ",  Vt)  for  all  t,  xfc  e  (Pt(x  t)  HV1)  for  at  least 


one  t,  and  y3  e  (Yj^VJ)  for  all  j. 

*t    *i 

Definition  3. 5.   ((x   ),(y   ))  is  a  strong  locally  Pareto  optimal  al- 
location of  C  if  there  exists  a  neighborhood  V  =  ((V  ) , (V  ))  of 

*t    *i  t    j 

((x   ),(y   ))  and  there  does  not  exist  an  allocation  ((x  ),(y  ))  of 

d  with  ((x^Cy3))  *  ((x*t),(y*J)),  xl    c  (P^Cx^)  ~,  VC)  for  all  t, 

and  y3  e  (Yj  T\  V3)  for  all  j. 


It  is  clear  that  every  Pareto  optimal  allocation  of   *  is  a 
locally  Pareto  optimal  allocation  of  i-  ;  and  given  reflexivity  of  >  , 
that  every  strong  locally  Pareto  optimal  allocation  of  "  is  a  locally 

Pareto  optimal  allocation  of  O .   Figure  la  gives  an  example  of  a  two 

2 
agent  economy  with  E  =  R  in  which  a  locally  Pareto  optimal  allocation 

*1   *1 
(x   ,y   )  is  not  Pareto  optimal  but  a  strong  locally  Pareto  optimal 

allocation.   Figure  lb  exhibits  a  locally  Pareto  optimal  allocation 

which  is  not  a  strong  locally  Pareto  optimal  allocation.   In  either 

1   *1  —1   *1 

figure,  P  (x   )  is  the  interior  of  P  (x   ). 

Since  the  primary  concern  of  this  paper  is  the  derivation  of 
necessary  conditions  for  Pareto  optiraality,  we  shall  confine  our  at- 
tention to  local  allocations.   We  shall  also  need  the  following 
assumption. 


-18- 


(Al)   For  all  t  and  all  xC  e  X1 ,  E   ^Pt(xt).   For  all  j, 
Y  -  E.  --  YJ. 


We  can  now  present 

*t    *j 
Theorem  3.1.   If  ((x   ) , (y   ) )  is  a  strong  locally  Pareto  optimal 

— t   *t       i 
allocation  of  J  ,  (Al)  is  satisfied  and  P  (x   )  and  YJ  are  closed  and 

*t    *j 
respectively  epi-Lipschitzian  at  ((x   ) , (y   )),  then  there  exists 


p*  e  E  ,  p*  *   0  such  that 


(a)  -p*  e  NA(Pt(x  t),x  t)  for  all  t, 

(b)  p*  e  NA(Yj,y  ^  for  all  j. 

For  a  discussion  of  (Al)  and  the  epi-Lipschitzian  hypotheses,  the 
reader  is  referred  to  Khan-Vohra  [18]  and  the  references  therein. 

Our  next  result  extends  Theorem  3.1  to  economies  with  public  goods. 
Recall  from  Samuelson  that  a  public  good  is  a  commodity  whose  consump- 
tion is  identical  across  individuals  and  such  that  each  individual's 
consumption  is  equal  to  aggregate  supply,  see  [24]  and  [10].   Let  E 

IT 

refer  to  the  commodity  space  for  private  goods  and  E   to  that  for 

o 

public  goods.   We  shall  assume  that  both  E   and  E  are  real  vector 

it      g 

lattices  each  endowed  with  a  locally  convex  linear  topology  in  which 

the  positive  cone  is  closed.   Let  E  =  E   x  E  where  E  is  endowed  with 

tt    g 

the  product  topology   and  the  induced  ordering. 

An  economy  with  public  goods  £   =  ((X  ,  >  )  ,  (YJ )  ,  w)  is  such 
that  for  all  t,  X1   =  (XC ,  X1)   where  XtcE  ,  X11  -.  E  are  its  projec- 

Tf      g  TT       TT     g       g 

tions  onto  the  space  of  private  and  public  goods  respectively.   We 


-19- 


assume  that  X  =  X  for  all  t;  that  YJ  c  E  for  all  j  and  that  w  e  E, 
g    g 

w  =  (w  ,0),  w  e  E     Let  x  and  x  refer  to  the  consumption  of  the 

TT         IT      TT  +  IT         g 

*t    *i 
private  and  public  goods  respectively.   ((x   ),(y   ))  is  an  alloca- 
tion for  £,  if  for  all  j ,  y  J  e  YJ ,  x   e  X  ,  x   =  x  for  all  t,  and 

*t   *       *i 
(Ex   ,x  )  -  Z.y    <  w  .   The  definitions  of  a  Pareto  optimal 

t  ir  »  g    y      -  tt  c 

allocation  and  their  local  and  strong  variants  are  then  identical  to 
the  ones  given  in  Definitions  3.2  to  3.5. 
We  can  now  present  our  second  result. 

*t  "*t    *j 
Theorem  3.2.   If  ((x   ,x  ),(y   ))  is  a  strong  Pareto  optimal  alloca- 
tt   g 

tion  of  -    ,  (Al)  is  satisfied,  and  P  (x   )  and  Y  are  closed  and  re- 

*t    *i 
spectively  epi-Lipschitzian  at  ((x   ) , (y   )),  then  there  exist 

*      *      *      *       ■k       *  *t      * 

p      eE      ,p     eE      ,    (p    ,p   )   *   0,    p        eE        such   that 

TT      TT+     g      g+      TT    g  g        g+ 

(a)   E  p   =  p  , 

t  g     g 

*   *t 


(b)   -(p  ,p  t)  e  NCP^Cx  t),x  t)   for  all  t, 

TT    g         A 


*i 


(c)   p   s  N .(YJ,y  J)    for  all  j. 

A 

So  far  we  have  confined  our  attention  to  strong  Pareto  optimal 
allocations.   We  can  also  present 

Theorem  3.3.   Theorems  3.1  and  3.2  are  valid  with  the  term  "strong" 

t   *t      *t  — t   *t 

deleted  and  with  P  (x   )  U  {x  }  substituted  for  P  (x   ). 

Our  final  result  relates  to  the  special  case  when  the  preferences 
and  technologies  are  generated  by  dif f erentiable  functions  as,  for 
example,  in  Lange  [19],  and  Samuelson  [23]. 


-20- 


*i 


Theorem  3.4.   Let  ((x   ),(y   ) )  be  a  strong  locally  Pareto  optimal 
allocation;  P^Cx  C )  =  {x  z   X* :   U  (x)  >  U  (x  *) }  and  Yj  =  {y  e  E: 

F.(y)  _<  0}  where 

t  *t 

(i)  for  all  t,  U  :   X  ■*■  R  is  Lipschitz  in  a  neighborhood  of  x   , 

*t  t 

A-dif ferentiable  at  x   ,  and  x'  £  X  ,  x  >_  x'  implies  U  (x)  _>  U  (x'), 

*1 
(ii)  for  all  j,  F.:   E  ■>  R  is  Lipschitz  in  a  neighborhood  of  y   , 

*1  i 

A-dif  ferentiable  at  y  J  ,  and  F(y')  _<  0,  y  _<  y'  implies  F(yJ)  _<  F(y'). 

If  for  any  t,  U  (x   )  *   0,  or  for  any  j,  F.(y  J)  *   0,  there  exists 

p  e  E*,  p  *  0  such  that 

JL  • 

p  =  u'(x*)  =  F*(y  J)   for  all  t,  for  all  j 

4.   Proofs  of  Results  in  Section  3 

We  begin  with  an  elementary  lemma. 

*k  *k 

Lemma  4.1.   Let  E  '  be  the  k-fold  Cartesian  product  of  E*.   Then  E 

k  i     k 

can  be  identified  with  the  dual  of  E  such  that  for  any  x  =  (x  )  e  E  , 

*i     *k 
x*  =  (x   )  e  E   ,  the  canonical  bilinear  form  is  given  by 

k    ..   . 
<x*,x>    E   <x   ,x  >. 
i=l 

Proof.   See  [11,  p.  266].  II 


Proof  of  Theorem  3.1 

*t     *i      k 
Let  v*  =  ((x   ),(y   ))  e  E   be  the  strong  locally  Pareto  optimal 

allocation  and  V  =  ((V  ),(VJ))  the  corresponding  closed  neighborhood 

of  v*.   Define  the  following  sets 


-21- 

— i-   *t    — t   *t     t 

PCx  )  =  r(x  ) .  \V     t  =  1,...,T 

V 

Yj       =Yj  ,Vj  j  =  1,...,F 

v 

v(x*)   =  n  p^Cx  t)  x  n.Yj 

t  V  j  V 

W       =  {v  £  Ek:  I   xt  <  E.y^  +  w}. 

t     -  y 

The  closedness  hypotheses  of  the  theorem  guarantee  that  V(x*)  is  a 
closed  set.   Since  the  Clarke  tangent  cone  to  a  set  at  an  interior 
point  is  the  whole  space,  we  can  appeal  to  Lemma  2.8  to  assert  that 

HCv'.x  t)  =  H(VJ,y  J)  =  E.   Lemma  2.7  then  ensures  that  "^(x  fc)  and 

i  *t      *i 

YJ  are  epi-Lipschitzian  at  x   and  y   respectively.   Hence  by  Lemma 

2.6,  V(x*)  is  epi-Lipschitzian  at  v*.   Since  E  is  an  ordered  locally 

convex  space,  W  is  also  closed. 

We  claim  that  V(x*)  f\  W  =  {v*}.   If  there  exists  z  t   v*  in  this 
intersection,  we  contradict  the  fact  that  v*  is  a  strong  locally 
Pareto  optimal  allocation. 

Since  W  is  a  closed  convex  set,  we  can  appeal  to  Lemma  2.5  to 
assert  that  N.(W,v*)  is  identical  to  the  set  of  normals  to  W  in  the 
sense  of  convex  analysis.   Thus 


(1)      p  e  N  (W,v*)  =>  <p,x>  jC  p,v*  >  for  all  x  e  W. 


Next  we  show  that  for  any  p  e  N  (W,v*),  p  *  0,  there  exists 


p*  e  E  ,  p*  *  0,  such  that 

(2)      p  =  (p*,...,p*,-p*,... ,-p*)  e  (E*)   x  (E*)  , 


-22- 


i       k 
Toward  this  end,  define  m  (z)  e  E"  to  be  the  vector  of  zeros  in  all 

coordinates  except  for  z  e  E  in  the  i-th  and  k-th  coordinates.   Clearly 

(m  (z)  +  v*)  and  (~m  (z)  +  v*)  are  elements  of  W.   Hence  from  (1)  we 

obtain 


(3)      <p,m1(z)>  =0     i  ■  -  1,...,T 


k  * 


By  Lemma  4.1,  corresponding  to  any  p  e  (E  )  ,  there  exist  p   e  E*, 

t    j      k 
i  =  l,...,k,  such  that  for  any  v  =  ((x  ) , (y  ))  e  E  ,  <p,v>  = 

I    <P  ,x  >  +  Z.<pJ,yJ>.   Thus  from  (3)  we  obtain 

i        k        i        k 
(4)  <p  ,z>  +  <p  ,z>  =  <p  ,z>  +  <p  ,z>    i,j  =  1,...,T. 

Since  z  is  arbitrary,  (4)  implies  that  there  exists  p*  e  E*  such  that 

p   =p*     i=l,...,T. 

— i       k 
Similarly,  by  defining  m  (z)  e  E   to  be  the  vector  of  zeros  in  all 

coordinates  except  for  z  e  E  in  the  first  and  (T+i)-th  coordinates, 

and  using  an  identical  argument,  we  can  show  that  there  exists 

q*  e  E*  such  that 

p     =  q*     l  =  1,.. . ,F. 

Moreover,  (3)  now  implies 


p*  =  -q*, 


Finally,  since  v*  +  (z , 0)  e  W,  z  e  E  ,  we  obtain 


-23- 


<p*,z>  2  o 

* 

and  hence  p*  e  E  . 

Next,  given  Assumption  (Al),  we  appeal  to  Lemma  2.9  to  assert  that 

(5)  p  e  NA(Pt(x*t),x*t)  =>  p  e  E*   for  all  t, 

(6)  p  s  NA(Y:3,y  j)  =>  p  e  E*    for  all  j. 
Furthermore,  by  Lemmata  2.4,  2.3  and  Theorem  2.3,  we  obtain 

(7)  NA(V(x*),v*)  =  n^CP^x^hx*11)  x  ILNA(Yj,y*j). 

Now  suppose  there  exists  p  e  N  (V(x*),v*),  p  *  0  such  that 
-p  e  N  (W,v*).   Then  by  combining  (2)  and  (7),  the  proof  of  the  theorem 

A 

is  complete.   Thus  we  need  only  consider  the  case  when 


(8)      p  e  N,(V(x*),v*),  a   e   N  (W,v*),  p+a=0=>p=a=0. 
A  A 


But  then  we  can  apply  Theorem  2. 3  to  assert  that 


(9)      N(V(x*),v*)  +  N  (W,v*)  =  NA({v*},v*) 
A  A  A 

k.  * 
By  Lemma  2.3,  the  right-hand  side  is  (E  )  .   By  Lemma  2.5,  N  (W,v*)  is 

A 

a  convex  cone.   If  N  (W,v*)  =  {0},  then  N  (V(x*),v*)  =  (Ek)*  and  the 

A  A 

proof  is  complete.   If  not,  pick,  a    e  N  (W,v*),  a    t   0.   Then  by  (8), 

A 

(-a)  t   NA(V(x*),v*).   Since  (-a)  e  (Ek)*,  by  (9)  there  exist  a  e 
NA(V(x*),v*)  and  B  e  NA(W,v*)  such  that 

(a  +  6)  -  -a 


-24- 


This  implies  (a  +  8)  =  -a.   Since  a  *  0,  we  obtain  from  (2)  and  the 

fact  that  N  (W,v*)  is  convex,  (a   +  8)  *   0  and  (a  +  8)  e  N  (W,v*)*.   But 
A.  A 

this  contradicts  (8)  and  completes  the  proof  of  the  theorem. 


Proof  of  Theorem  3.2 

*t    *i      k 
For  the  strong  Pareto  optimal  allocation  v*  =  ((x   ),(y   ))  e  E  , 

define  the  following  sets  in  E  . 

v(x*)  =  nt.p't(xAt)  x  n.Yj 

W  =  {v  £  Ek:  Z   xC  <  E.y^  +  w  ;  xC  <  E.y^  for  all  t}. 

t  TT  —   j   TT      TT     g-Jg 

As  in  the  proof  of  Theorem  3.1,  V(x*)  and  W  are  closed  sets,  and 
V(x*)  is  epi-Lipschitzian.   We  can  also  assert  that 


V(x*)  A  W  =  {v*}. 

Suppose  there  exists  v  =  ((x  ) , (y  ) )  *  v*  in  V(x*) A  W.   If 

x   =  E.y  for  all  t,  we  contradict  the  fact  that  v*  is  a  strong  Pareto 
g    J  g 

optimal  allocation.   Suppose  therefore  that  there  exist  t  and 

v   e  E  ,,  v  *  0  such  that  x  +  v  =  E.y  .   Denote  the  set  of  all  such 
t    g+ '   t  g         2 

t  by  M.   Then,  under  assumption  (Al),  the  allocation  ((x  ),(y  )), 
where 


x   =  x    for  all  t  i   M 


=  (x  ,x  +v  )    for  all  t  e  M, 

*   g 

*t    *i 
can  be  used  to  contradict  the  fact  that  ((x   ),(y   ))  is  a  strong 

Pareto  optimal  allocation. 


-25- 


As  in  the  proof  of  Theorem  3.1,  we  can  show  that 


(1)      p  e  N  (W,v*)  =>  <p,x>  <   <p,v*>    for  all  x  e  W. 

We  can  now  show  that  for  any  p  e  N  (W,v*),  p  *  0,  there  exist 
(p  ,p   )  e  E*   (p  ,p   )  *  0  for  all  t  such  that 

IT    g  Tf    g 

*   *1  *   *T       *     *t 

P  =  ^P^'Pg  >>   '••»   (pTT'Pg  ''      "  (pTT,EtPg  ''   "*' 

"(p  ,S  o  C))  e  (E.)   x  (E  )  . 

IT   t  g  + 

In  order  to  show  p   is  independent  of  i  for  i  =  1,...,T  as  well  as  for 
i  =  T+1,...,T+F,  and  that  p1  =  -pJ ,  i  =  1,...T  and  j  =  T+1,...,T+F, 

IT        TT 

we  use  an  argument  identical  to  that  in  the  proof  of  Theorem  1.   The 

i     — i 
only  change  is  to  let  m  (z)  (m  (z))  to  be  a  vector  of  zeros  in  all 

coordinates  except  for  (z,0)  in  the  i-th  ((T+i)-th)  and  the  last 

(first)  coordinates  and  with  z  e   E  .   Thus  we  need  only  consider  the 

TT 

projections  onto  the  space  of  public  goods.   Towards  this  end,  for  any 

z  e  E  ,  define  nr(z)  to  be  the  vector  consisting  of  (0,z  )  in  every 
g  g  g 

coordinate  from  1  to  T  and  including  T+j ,  and  zero  everywhere  else. 

Then  (v*+m  (z))  and  (v*-nr(z))  are  elements  of  W  and  we  obtain  from  (1), 

g  g 

£  <p  ,z>  =  -<pJ,z>. 
t   g         g 

Since  z  and  the  index  j  are  chosen  arbitrarily,  we  obtain 
Pg  ■  ~ZtPg     J  =1,... ,F, 

which  is  what  we  intended  to  show. 

Now  the  rest  of  the  proof  can  be  completed  using  arguments  identi- 
cal to  those  in  the  proof  of  Theorem  3.1.  II 


-26- 


Proof  of  Theorem  3.3 

The  proof  of  Theorem  3.1  is  valid  with  P  (x   )  I^J  {x   }  substi- 

— t   *t 
tuted  for  P  (x   ).   The  former  set  is  closed  and  epi-Lipschitzian  at 

*t 
x   by  hypothesis  and  we  need  only  check,  that 

V(x*)AW  =  {v*}. 

This  follows  as  a  consequence  of  the  definition  of  a  locally  Pareto 
optimal  allocation. 

Analogous  changes  are  required  in  the  proof  of  Theorem  3.2.      II 

Proof  of  Theorem  3.4 

The  proof  is  a  simple  consequence  of  Theorem  3.1  and  Theorem  2.4. 


-27- 


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