Ireland in 1921

•I

'O

•CD

IRELAND IN 1921.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF IRELAND, 1920, by " I.O.
THE MAKING OF A GUNNER, by " F-O.O."
WITH THE GUNS, by " F.O.O."

IRELAND IN 1921

BY

C. J. C. STREET

O.B.E., M.C.,

(" I.O.")

LONDON :

PHILIP ALLAN & CO.,
QUALITY COURT.

I 7 8 S' 3 S'

First published in 1922.

DA

Printed by WHITEFIEAD BROTH K us (WHI.VI-MJIIAMI-TON),

CONTENTS.

OBAI PAOK

I.— THK FIRST THREE M-.vnis 1

II.- -Till- < inYKKNMKNr's CASE 28

III -I IN ULSTER - 50

IV.— A i \ JUNB 74

V. — PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS - 101

VI.— THE TRUCE - I-JT

VII.— UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS - 158

VIII.— ULSTER AND SINN FEIN - 185

IX.— DISCUSSION BY NOTES - 209

X. — THE CONFERENCE - 233

XL— PEACE — AND WAR - 256

XII.— THK SPLIT IN THE DAIL - - 279

APPENDIX . 303

INDBX . 313

CHAPTER I.

To the student of Irish affairs, the year
offers a most fascinating field for investigation. It
was essentially a year of contrast; the first six
months of it witnessed the culmination of the
guerrilla warfare proclaimed against the British
forces by the Irish Republicans, the last six months
saw a treaty negotiated between the contending
parties. Men who in the earlier part of the year
wore murderers hiding from justice with a price
upon their heads were later received as the chosen
leaders of the Irish people; their followers, once
rebels whose extermination was the objective of
sixty thousand British troops, became officers of the
Irish Government forces, and co-operated with
those who had hunted them in the maintenance of
law and order. It was a year of contrasts and
( ontradictions, of grave political errors and of
brilliant feats of statesmanship, of unexpected
unity and still more unexpected dissension. And of
this anmis mirabilis the present book will endeavour
to give a brief account.

It will first be necessary to recall the state of
Irish affairs at the opening of the year. The

2 IRELAND IN 1921.

Government of Ireland Act, which provided for the
establishment of two separate Parliaments for
Northern and Southern Ireland, had become law on
December 23rd, 1920. In Ireland, the Act had few
if any friends. The North, limited by it to six
counties, contemptuously styled " Carsonia " by the
Southern Nationalists, had accepted it without
enthusiasm as the only alternative to inclusion in an
all-Ireland Parliament with its seat in Dublin.
Lord Carson, then the recognised leader of Ulster
opinion, had publicly stated the intention of his
followers to co-operate loyally in carrying out its
provisions, while at the same time voicing their
preference for the long established Union. The
South, on the other hand, unanimous in this as in
nothing else, condemned it root and branch. The
extreme Sinn Fein party refused to consider it; to
their mind it sought to impose upon them a form of
British domination, differing from that imposed by
the Union in form only and not in degree. The
Nationalists, in which term may for convenience be
included the remainder of the Southern population,
terrorised into sympathy with the extremists, but
longing for any measure which would restore peace
to their distracted country, hated the partition of
Ireland into North and South, and saw in the Act no
promise of finality or of the welding of Ireland into
one nation as the result of its provisions. The
Southern Loyalists, who had throughout pinned
their faith on securing protection from the strong
arm of British law, enforced by British authority,
felt their cause abandoned and their position in the
country rendered untenable.

But at the beginning of the year the Act was

THE FEBST THREE MONTHS.

nothing more than a name. It had received the

e <>! law, but from its very intention it was

ions that before its enforcement could even be

begun some time must elapse. The whole machinery

of government and administration of a country

cannot be divided and transferred to other powers

in a week, especially when one of those powers is

non-existent and the people of the territory it is to

represent are in open rebellion against the transfer.

Since the Union, the whole of the services of

government had been concentrated in Dublin Castle,

rightly or wrongly a byword in Ireland as the very

birth-place of circumlocution and * red tape.' This

administrative web had to be unravelled, and its

\arious threads split between Dublin and Belfast.

1 1 must be remembered that the proportion of British

officials in the Irish Government has always been

infinitesimal. Viceroy, Chief Secretary, and Under

retary have usually been of British birth, and

these were the officials who directed the main lines

of policy. But the men who carried out this policy

re practically Irish to a man, and in this fact lay

a difficulty. It was obvious that the policies of the

Governments of Northern and Southern Ireland

would be widely divergent, yet that men must be

;iid from the existing services to staff the offices

in Dublin and Belfast. This was merely an example

of the difficulties underlying the preliminaries of the

Act. Even when the administrative services had

n prepared for the use of the new Governments,

the setting up of one of those Governments, at le;

a task of superhuman effort.

The state of Southern Ireland was actually,

though the fact was never acknowledged in so many

4 IRELAND IN 1921.

words, one of open rebellion against British
authority. The Extremist leaders, who had opened
a campaign of ambush against the police in
January, 1919, had, during the two intervening
years, developed that campaign into a moderately
successful guerrilla warfare against the British
forces in general. The only effective reply to such
warfare, from the purely military point of view, is
a sharp punitive campaign which must necessarily
involve the whole population of the country. Such
a campaign the military authorities were quite
prepared for, their plans were drawn up and their
dispositions laid. But the politicians would not
sanction it. The cause of Ireland looked too much
like the cause of other small nations striving for that
strange new birth of the Great War, self-determina-
tion, and they feared that declared and open war
would blacken the face of England before the world.
Apart from this was the question of expense. A
campaign on a scale large enough to stamp out
rebellion throughout the South of Ireland was an
undertaking whose limits no man might foresee, and
although the estimates of its cost given at the time
by men whose interest it was to dissuade the
British public from demanding war were excessive,
England, recovering from the effects of the greatest
war in history was in no position to embark upon
fresh military expeditions.

A compromise was therefore in operation, which
displayed to perfection all the disadvantages of
repression by force of arms with none of the
advantages of success. To the ambushes and
shootings of the Republicans were opposed a policy
of reprisal, official and unofficial, and of the

T1IK FIB8T THREE MONTHS.

rnment of men against whom rebelli
tcmi could be proved. Kvprisal is

ini|)ossible policy, it has none of the forms of 1
ami lays itself open to attack by even the dul
propagandists Hut, as affairs stood, it was the
only safety-valve. Men composing a military force,
however well disciplined they may be, will not stand
by and see their comrades and their officers brutally
murdered without bein<^ allowed to lift a hand in
revenge. In proclaimed warfare vengeance

rded in the opportunities of engagement with an
open enemy. In Ireland there was no definite

my, there being no war, and consequently the
opportunity for engagements with him were limited
to the occasions on which he took the offensive, and

; Id be identified with arms in his hands. Reprisals
though ineffective were unavoidable, and as a matter
of fact were inspired by rough and ready justice.
The men who carried them out, whether acting under
the orders of the authorities or upon their own

{HDnsibility, almost invariably knew the victims
they selected, knew that they wrere guilty although
their knowledge would not convict in a court of
justice.

If reprisals wrere ineffective and harmful to the
Hritish cause, internment was almost equally so.
lu the internment camps were gradually collected
the most extreme of the republicans, the majority of
nhom had never known such luxury in their lives,
'd from the necessity of earning their own living.

v set themselves to educating one another in the
Republican code of ethics, and the camps became the
finest schools of the Irish Republican Army. That
this statement is no exaggeration tan be proved by

6 IRELAND IN 1921.

reference to letters written by internees, of which
an enormous number passed through the hands of
the authorities. Such phrases as " our drill is
improving every day, we shall be a crack company
when we get out ' ' and ' ' tell mother we get plenty
of spuds to our dinner and plenty of beef too, so we
don't want anything except an odd cake for supper
as we only get three meals a day ' ' occur throughout
these letters, and their general tenor is one of
thankfulness, tempered with some fear lest their
comrades at large should eventually accuse them of
getting arrested on purpose to avoid the discomforts
of the field. There is also evidence that the agitation
started by the Republicans for the purpose of calling
attention to the " horrors of the prison camps '
had no support from the internees themselves.

But at the beginning of 1921 it was evident that
these measures alone would never restore order to
Ireland. In December, 1920, four counties of the
South had been proclaimed as being subject to
martial law, namely, Cork, Tipperary, Kerry and
Limerick, and to these were added on .January 4th
Clare, Water ford, Wexford and Kilkenny. Thus
the whole south-west was brought under the
orders of Military Governors, whose power was
theoretically absolute. But in practice these powers
were rarely exercised, and conditions were no
different in the Martial Law Area than they were
in other disturbed counties. The Government still
withheld the executive hand from the imposition of
decisive measures, and the instructions to the
Military Governors strictly limited their powers.
The programme of ambush and assassination con-
tinued, and was countered as before by a defensive

Till: FIRST THREE MONTHS. 7

policy and the hall hearted offensive of reprisals.
The outrage stat igtiofl !'<»r tlie first few months of the
year will give some idea of the state of the country.

ICE. -ILS.

Killed Wounded Fired at Killed Wounded Fired at

Jsnuftn I1' K'

ruary -I1,' 28 7 K> 17

Map -m 35 50 20

April 27 79 4 29 23

May ... 70 HO 1<; -J-J 23

79 72 19 48 28

July ... 51 37 11 25 17

Murders became so frequent that it would be
practically impossible to enumerate them all, and in
the course of this book reference will only be made
to such as have a particular significance. But the
condition of the country is best described by the
statement that the horrors of the past year were
being repeated daily upon an ever increasing scale,
and were at their height when the conclusion of the
truce imposed a sudden reduction upon them.

The delay in the enforcement of the Government
of Ireland Act and in the concerting of effective
military measures to deal with the situation becomes
still further explicable in the light of an event
practically unnoticed at the time, but, as it proved,
of supreme importance. During the night of
December 30th-31st, 1920, Mr. de Valera landed in
Ireland, and the possibilities of securing peace in
Ireland by negotiation became more tangible. Not
that de Valera himself had arrived for the purpose
of making advances. His mission to the United
States was over, and he returned to the country of
which he was self-styled ' president ' in the natural
course of affairs. His first letter, dated January
1st, is worth quoting. It is addressed to Harry

8 IRELAND IN 1921.

Boland, the representative whom he had left behind
in America, and is as follows : —

* Arrived safe after a little excitement.
Am setting to work to establish an Irish
White Cross; this name will avoid inter-
national complications, an American Branch
can be established and we can look later to
have it recognised by Geneva as a Red
Cross."

The letter continues to enumerate by name the
people to be approached in the matter, " as well as
prominent people in the Society of Friends, etc., so
as to tone down the strong political color that our
own names will give." The letter concludes :—

1 Don't let the peace talk influence you
in any of your statements. Deal with it as a
trick of LI. G. to mislead the people here and
elsewhere. The people will not be fooled.
He talks of peace whilst secretly he plots
to murder, destroy the lives and property of
the Irish people. . . ."

The whole story of the negotiations between the
British authorities and the leaders of Sinn Fein
will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter. It is
only necessary to draw attention to the effect of
de Valera's landing upon the situation in the country
at large. From the evidence available, it appears
that this influence was very small. During his
absence abler hands than his had built up the various
departments of the Republican system of govern-
ment, and although these departments could only
carry out the outlines of administration in the face
of British suppression, the event proved that their

TilK PIBBT THREE MONTH,-. 5)

duties \\crc already allocated, and that the President

,Ui do little more than issue general instructions

to them. He seems to have confined himself to

Iviiuj fresh schemes for the liberation of
Republic, schemes which met with varying degrees
. i amoii^ his colleagues. Even at this
ly date there a us of disagreement between

the various Sinn Fein leaders, and of a lack of
co-ordination among them. De Valera seems to
have been living in a world of dreams, and to h
taken no heed of the warnings of those who were in
touch with the realities of the situation. His i
i ds addressed to the men with whom he came in
tact on his return were in the form of encourage-
ments to continue the struggle for the establishment
the Republic. The reason for this blindness
seems to have been that during his stay in America
he had never been in touch with the true spirit of
that nation. Surrounded only by those who, for
their own purposes, desired the success of his
|K)licy and who flattered him with tales of the vast
and increasing volume of sympathy that the Irish
cause was inspiring, he would listen to no advi
even from those whose ideals of Irish Republican!

o as fervid as his own. and their experience of
the trend of opinion in the United States far riper.
h men as John Devoy and Judge Cohalan had
ntcd out to him the most promising means of
iring support in America, but he, impatient of
advii-e and restraint, had <i d with them ;

ipitated a split in the ranks of the 1;
Americans which promised disas* the can

Yalera. fresh from the plaudits of
"phants. returned to Ireland a dreamer an

10 IRELAND IN 1921. .

visionary, enthusiastically followed by those whose
Celtic imagination outran their sense of possibilities,
and causing grave concern to the men who in his
absence had learnt that the continuation of the
struggle against England was hopeless, should
England at last determine to put forth her strength.

The mass of the people were heartily sick of the
state into which Ireland had been thrust. Apart
altogether from the danger to life and limb, the
operations of the contending forces interfered in
every way with the prosperity of the country. It
is probable that the majority of the country people
would have welcomed any solution which would have
freed them from the presence of the Irish Republican
Army, whose operations brought nothing but disaster
to them. Their produce was levied to support the
Republican troops, their houses must be available to
shelter them when " on the run/' their barns and
outhouses were impressed as hiding-places for illicit
arms. It was becoming abundantly clear to them
that they were suffering far more from the Irish
forces than from " the enemy," as the Republicans
styled the British throughout.

De Valera's ' Presidential Message to the
Farmers of Ireland ' sets out to combat the feeling
of weariness which was already finding expression
in mutter ings of discontent : —

" You are suffering with dignity and patience the most
appalling persecution, the most atrocious infamies, at the
hands of a barbarous and uncivilized enemy. . . . Your
homesteads have been burnt, your crops and stock
destroyed, your sons and daughters flung into prison . . .
and many of them cruelly and callously murdered. Every-
thing that demons incarnate could do has been done to make
you forsake your principles and surrender to the forces of

THE FIRST THREE MONTHS. 11

unrighteousness. . . . England will be rem<

•he crimes ami atrocities of her licensed and State-

« ted freebooters.
The policy of England is to destroy for ever the

i Nation. She hopes by the systematic hum mi:
farms and farm pr-Mlm-,-. by the destruction ot inilN,
factories, and creameries, by the levelling- of great centres
of industry and by the robbery of public monies for
compensating1 the malicious injuries caused by her minions
to create a state of unemployment so general and so grave
that the vigorous youth of the nation, whom she so much
dreads, must leave in thousands the Land of their
Fathers. . . ."

And so on. But even de Valera himself does
not venture to hold out to these men the hope that
if they continue the struggle they will drive the
hated English into the sea. England has always
been the market for Irish produce, and it was very
largely the fear of the loss of this market which
made the Irish farmer mistrustful of the policy of
the extremists.

For the Sinn Fein leaders had already made
dangerous experiments in the direction of tampering
with the natural flow of commerce. Ulster was loyal
to the Union, and therefore Ulster was in alliance
with the enemy. Further than this Ulster was
a very awkward object lesson on the Republican
flank. The world was apt to ask why, if one section
of Ireland was content to live and prosper under
British rule, another section should not do likewise?
As neither entreaty nor the shooting of innocent
citizens in the streets of Belfast seemed capable of
persuading Ulster that her true interest lay in
throwing in her lot with the Republicans of tlu*
South, the latter determined upon a more subtle
method of argument. Ulster is an industrial
district, the South is almost entirely agricultural.

12 IRELAND IN 1921.

It follows that there is a constant stream of manu-
factured goods flowing from North to South, and
this stream is unbalanced by a counter current of
agricultural produce from South to North, the
agricultural districts of Ulster being able to supply
the demand of her cities. These circumstances
seemed to offer an admirable opportunity for
striking a blow at Ulster. A boycott was proclaimed,
under which it was forbidden to the Southern people
to purchase Ulster goods or to expose them for sale
in their shops. In pursuance of this boycott, raids
were made upon stores and trains, and Ulster goods
destroyed in stock and in transit. Ulster banks were
entered and robbed at the point of the revolver, and
those suspected of dealing in any way with the
proscribed Province were ill-treated and in some
cases murdered.

The net result was to intensify the feeling of
bitterness between the two sections of the country,
and so to perpetuate the hated partition. The
damage done to Ulster's trade was inconsiderable,
the loss, as might have been expected, fell mostly
upon the small shop-keepers of the South, who were
debarred from selling their goods, and were unable
to replace those of Northern manufacture by others
produced elsewhere, owing to the lack of facilities
for their purchase. Undeterred by this experience,
the Republicans proceeded to extend the scope of
their experiment. By a series of decrees, Bail
Eireann, the Parliament of the Republic, imposed a
similar ban on goods manufactured in Great Britain,
beginning with articles such as soap and tobacco
which are produced in the South. Again the effect
was felt more by the Irish consumer than by the

THE FIRST THREE MONTHS.

lish producer, and the ban, though wi<i
advertised, vsas never seriously « rd.

Another weapon brought into action by the I:
publicans to intimidate England was incendiarism.
( citain of the extremists professed to believe that if
Englishmen were attacked in their own country they
would be the more willing to concede the demai
of Ireland. An epidemic of farm and factory ti
broke out throughout the country, the work of age.
<>f the Irish malcontents. None of these fir.-s
had any very serious results; the tactics of the
incendiaries being to select the scene of their
operations with the primary regard for safety for
their own flight rather than for the value of the
damage they were likely to inflict. In some cases*
definite objectives were attacked, as when at temp's
were made to discover the addresses of the relatives
of men serving in the Crown Forces in Ireland. In
a few cases attacks were made upon the persons or
property of such relatives. As might have been
expected, the net result was to intensify the growing
feeling in England that sterner measures must be
taken by the Government to deal with the rebels.

When Parliament opened on February 16th, the
Prime Minister took the opportunity of making a
statement on the condition of Irish affairs, which
reflected the policy of the Government at the time.
He dealt with the negotiations of the previous year,
carried on through the mediation of Archbishop
Clune of Perth, Western Australia, and explained
that these negotiations had proved abortive owinij to
the insistence of the Government that no truce could
be concluded with the rebels until the latter had laid
down their arms, as had the truce failed to result in

14 IRELAND IN 1921.

a final settlement, the rebels would have been able to
utilise the intervening period for the purpose of
perfecting their organisation. It is interesting to
compare this official statement of Government policy
with the events of five months later. The Prime
Minister continued by expressing his opinion that
the rebels had not yet abandoned the hope of winning
independence by force of arms, but eulogised the
efforts of the Crown Forces during the past few
months. He stated that the boycott was at an end,
that Sinn Fein Courts and police patrols were at an
end, that resignations from the R.I.C. had been
stopped and recruiting for this Force resumed in
Ireland, and that nearly everyone in Ireland was
now anxious for the break up of the reign of terror.
As events proved, this statement was too optimistic,
but it was based upon the reports of those
Government officials in Ireland whose business it
was to keep the Chief Secretary informed of the
state of affairs in the country.

Meanwhile Ulster was loyally preparing to carry
out the provisions of the Act, and, indeed, showing
some impatience at the delay in bringing it into
force. Ulster felt that the passing of the Act had
destroyed the Union and that the sooner the new
regime was inaugurated, the sooner could she take
the necessary measures for her protection from the
Republican agents who were endeavouring to stir up
dissension in her capital and elsewhere. From the
first she realised that her task would be no easy one.
The Ulster of the Act had been reduced to six
counties, in two of which the Protestant and
Catholic populations were approximately equally
balanced. The ancient boundaries of the counties

THE FIRST THREE MONTHS 15

had been determined by the limits of the baronies,
which tor the most part depended upon no definite
ph\Mr;il 1- hut merely upon t he extent of the

land owned by the large proprietors. As a result

i his, the i K.utier of Northern Ireland was an
ini|x)ssibleone, from the standpoint of either poll
or strategy. It meandered from Carlingford Lou^h,
dividing the counties of Louth and Down, in the

st, to Lough Melvin, dividing the counties of
Leitrim and Fermanagh, in the West. Then, in
order to include Donegal in Southern Ireland, it
turned back once more in a north-easterly direction
and after many windings reached Lough Foyle in
the North. Even within this boundary there were

uy sources of discontent. The Nationalists of
Tyrone, whose active sympathy was with the
Republicans of the South, were isolated in the
centre of a preponderatingly Unionist population;
a considerable district of Unionist Fermanagh was
completely cut off from the remainder of Northern
Ireland by the natural obstacle formed by the river
and lake of Erne.

Any attempt to close such a frontier against the
incursion of Republican marauders was of course
impossible. The border Unionists were perpetually
liable to attacks, in the course of which their farms
were burnt and their families ill-treated. In Belfast
and Derry, the sedition which in the previous year
had broken out in open rioting was by no means
overcome. The old religious problem had merged
itself into the political quarrel. As a rule, the
Protestant was a Unionist, a term which survived
the passing of the Act destroying the Union and
came to be synonymous with Loyalist, as defining a

16 IRELAND IN 1921.

man faithful to the British Crown and opposed to
the aims of the Sinn Feiners. The Catholic, on the
other hand, was usually a Nationalist, closely allied
with Sinn Fein, the Ancient Order of Hibernians
having, by one means or another, become identified
with Sinn Fein. Where the two parties lived in
close proximity, as in Belfast, trouble was bound to
arise, usually on a scale which defied the efforts of
the police, and called for military intervention.

Hence the eagerness of the Northern Unionists
to set the Act in operation. During the interim
they had no Government of their own with which
to deal with disorder, and were entirely dependent
upon the British authorities, whom they shrewdly
suspected of being willing to sacrifice the interests
of Ulster in the attempt to find a solution for the
problems of chaos in the South. The men of the
North fully realised that so long as the provisions of
the Act remained unfulfilled, the danger remained
of some bargain being struck with the rebels above
their heads which would nullify the safeguards of
the Act. They had accepted the Act, under protest,
but as a sincere contribution to the peace of the
country. But they were not prepared for the
British Government to trade upon this acceptance
to extort from them further concessions.

Their first step was to choose a leader under
whose guidance they could embark upon the stormy
political voyage which lay before them. Sir Edward
Carson, as he then was, had already expressed his
decision not to accept the post should it be offered to
him, on the score of age. The Standing Committee
of the Ulster Unionist Council met at the Constitu-
tional Club in London on January 26th, under the

THE FIRST THREE MONT]] 17

Sir Ed and passed a unanimous

-lut ion inviting Sir James Craig, M.P., at that

6 Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, to

•mit himself for appointment to the position. On

February !th the Mill Council met in Belfast, and

el anics was unanimously elected. Sir Edward

Carson's words on this occasion are worthy of

record. n I'lster may be won by argument," he said,

referring to the attempts then being made by the

Republicans to coerce the North, ' Ulster may be

i hy a sincere profession of the same id-
loyalty and attachment to the Throne and Cou-
nt ion, and Ulster may be won by a pride in
Fmpire and an acceptance of the glorious principles
whieh have made our country great throughout the
Id. But Ulster will never be coerced." It waa
at a subsequent luncheon that Sir James Craig made
the first suggestion of a royal opening of the first
Northern Parliament. He assured His Majesty the
King or in his stead the Prince of Wales of a hea
welcome from the people of Ulster should he come
to Belfast for such a purpose.

The first move in the direction of putting the
Act into operation was at a meeting of the Privy
Council on March 24th, when an Order was made
fixing * appointed days ' for the purpose. The
term ' appointed day ' has always been rather loosely
used in this connection. The original Act was
drawn up when Ireland was in a state of rebellion,
and it was impossible to foresee when it would be
isible to enforce any particular provision of the
Act. Again, the Act w-as of so revolutionary a
nature, (hanging as it did the whole constitution of
I reland, that it could not take effect as a whole upon

c

18 IRELAND IN 1921.

any given date, but must be introduced gradually as
the process of transfer proceeded. Hence the Act
was drawn up in such a way that it empowered the
Privy Council to make Orders bringing successive
provisions into operation as convenient. The dates
appointed under these Orders in Council were known
as * appointed days, ' and were necessarily numerous.
But so far none of the administrative provisions
of the Act were in operation. It was therefore
necessary to appoint a day upon which the clause
giving power to issue Orders in Council should take
effect. April 19th was chosen as this date. A
further date, May 3rd, was appointed for bringing
the general provisions of the Act into operation, but
it was explained that there were still several matters
upon which the new Governments of Northern and
Southern Ireland would have to be consulted as soon
as they were set up, which matters were excluded
and for which other * appointed days ' would be
fixed. One important provision which became
operative on April 19th concerned the office of Lord
Lieutenant. In the past this office, had been a
political one, and its holder was debarred from
professing the Roman Catholic faith. From this
date the religious disqualification was removed, and
the office became non-political, its tenure being fixed
at six years, irrespective of change of Ministry.

From the time of the first symptom that the
Government really intended to persevere with the
Act, the Unionists of the South had brought every
available means of pressure to bear upon it to delay
the holding of elections in the South. They repre-
sented that with the country in the state it then was,
it would be more than a man's life would be worth

THE FIRST THREE MONTHS. 19

to vote for any other than an official Sinn Fein
candidate. An election held under these conditions,
they argued, would result in the return of a Southern
Parliament unanimously rebellious, and the result-
ing state of affairs would be no better than the
present. The Government refused to listen. In the
House of Commons on April 28th both the Prime
Minister and the Chief Secretary reiterated their
determination. They would be parties to no
surrender to the argument of murder, and they
intended to put the Act into operation at once, both
in the North and in the South of Ireland.

On May 4th the Lord Lieutenant issued the
Proclamations summoning the Parliaments of
Northern and Southern Ireland, and on the 13th
of the month the nominations for candidates of both
Parliaments took place. The course of events in the
North will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter.
In the South, events fell out as the Southern
Unionists had predicted. Out of 128 seats in the
Southern Parliament, 124 were uncontested, neither
tin4 old Parliamentary Party, as the Nationalists of
the South began to be called some years before, nor
the Unionists, venturing to put forward candidates
to oppose the Sinn Fein nominees. The remaining
lour seats were also uncontested. They were those
of Dublin University, which constituency had
nominated four candidates, none of whom was a
Sinn Feiner. and all of whom were nominated on the
f the interests of the University rather than
on political grounds.

Among those elected to the new Parliament were
Mr. de Valera, for his old constituency, County
Clare, Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith. The

20 IRELAND IN 1921.

remaining members were practically those who had
been elected to the Imperial Parliament in 1918,
with the addition of 53 Sinn Feiners owing to the
increased number of constituencies. In fact the
new Southern Parliament was merely an enlarged
version of the old Bail Eireann. As this fact
became of importance later, it may be as well to point
out the essential differences in the constitutions
of the Dail and of the Southern Parliament
respectively. The Republicans regarded the elections
to the Southern Parliament as Dail elections, with
the exception that as the University members did not
take the oath of allegiance to the Republic,
their constituency was unrepresented in the Dail.
Further, the Republicans refused to recognise the
existence of Northern Ireland as apart from the
South. Any Sinn Feiners elected to Northern
Constituencies were therefore free to sit in the Dail
on taking the requisite oath. As a matter of fact,
of the Sinn Feiners elected in the North, only one
did not already represent a Southern Constituency
in the Dail. The net result was that four members
of the Southern Parliament could not sit in the Dail,
and one member of the Dail could not sit in the
Southern Parliament.

Mention has already been made of the fact that
the Act altered the conditions surrounding the
appointment of Lord Lieutenant. At the end of
April it was announced that Lord French was about
to retire, and that Lord Edmund Talbot would
succeed him. Lord Edmund Talbot was by birth a
Howard, and therefore a member of the premier
Roman Catholic family of England. This con-
cession to Catholic feeling in Ireland met with a

T11K FIRST THREE MONTHS. iM

srmewhat j/nnliring reception. The Nationalist
newspapers took pains to draw attention to the fact
that English and Irish Catholics differed widely in
political views, despite their common faith, and set
to work to attack him with the impartiality with
which they attacked every Englishman connected
with Irish politics. Lord Edmund Talbot was
elevated to the rank of Viscount Fitzalan, and
proceeded to make preparations for the enforcement
of the various stages of the Act.

As though the Appointed Day had been the
signal, the fury of the Republicans burst out with
renewed vigour during the months of April and
May. The City of Dublin itself became the battle
ground for some of their most extraordinary
exploits. On April llth at 8 o'clock in the
morning, when the dock labourers were going to
their work, a large party of armed civilians,
mingling with the crowd, made their way along the
North Wall, the range of quays running along the
North side of the harbour. The London and North -
Western Railway owned a hotel on the quayside,

•osite the berth at which their steamers loaded.
This hotel had recently been taken over by the
company of Auxiliary Cadets engaged in the duty of

fching vessels entering the port. The armed
civilians collected gradually round the hotel, and at a
given signal attacked it with revolvers and bombs.
The fi^lit was short and sharp. Despite the i
that the fire of the Auxiliaries was restricted <>\\
to the quayside being thronged with innocent
lalxmrers, they contrived to drive off their attackers
and to save the hotel, the woodwork of which had
been assailed with incendiary compounds. One

22 IRELAND IN 1921.

Auxiliary was wounded and one of the attackers
killed. The incident had no great result, but it
showed that the Republican forces were prepared to
take the offensive even in Dublin, the seat of the
British power.

But the most sensational outrage in the City
took place shortly after noon on May 25th. The
Dublin Customs House stood at the City end of the
harbour, and was used for housing the Local
Government Board and the offices of the Inland
Revenue, Income Tax, and other branches of the
administration. When the staffs of these offices
were mostly away at lunch, a large party of I.R.A.
arrived, and made their way into the building,
holding up those inside. Other men proceeded to
the Fire Station and prevented the brigade from
leaving it. The men who had taken possession of
the building proceeded to pour petrol and other
inflammable substances over everything that would
burn, and then to set fire to the premises at many
points simultaneously. Meanwhile a company of
Auxiliaries received warning that the Customs
House had been raided, and rushed direct to the
place in their cars. They were met by a fierce fire
from pickets placed to guard the approaches, but
engaged them and succeeded in dislodging them
without much trouble. They then rushed into the
burning building, where they met with further
resistance. By this time they had been reinforced,
and the building was surrounded. Such members
of the office staffs who happened to have remained
in the building were escorted to safety, and a large
number of civilians whose presence in the place could
not be explained were taken into custody. The Fire

THE FIRST THREE MONTHS.

had been released, and rame into action
hour or so after the building had started to burn,
too late to save it Only the shell remained of one
of the finest buildings of a city whose architectural
beauties were never at any time conspicuous. The
object of the outrage \\as the destruction of records
and the hampering of the business of government.
Jn this it was certainly successful, for many valuable
records were irretrievably lost. But the principal
loss inevitably fell upon the country whose cause the
incendiaries professed to uphold. The responsi-
bility for this outrage is determined upon the
authority of the Irish Bulletin, the organ of the
Propaganda Department of Dail Eireann. In its
issue of May 27th, the Bulletin announced that " in
accordance with a decision arrived at after due
deliberation by the Ministry of Dail Eireann, a
detachment of the Dublin Brigade of the Irish Army
was ordered to carry out the destruction of the
Dublin Customs House."

Nor were outrages confined to Ireland. The
raids and burnings in England to which reference
has already been made reached a climax on the
night of May 14th-15th. The following account
of the events of that night in the London district is
taken from the Daily Telegraph of May 16th.

At 9-45 p.m. on the 14th five men called at :W.
Stowe Road, Shepherd's Bush, London, and asked
for Mr. Birthwright, a former member of the
R.I.C. Upon being informed that he was not at
home, they produced a card purporting to be a
warrant for his arrest, and forced their way into the
front passage. Here they were stopped by a visitor
to the house, and while covering him with a revol

24 IRELAND IN 1921.

they smashed a bottle of paraffin on the floor, set
it alight, and decamped. The fire was easily
extinguished, and little damage was done.

Another outrage occurred in the same neighbour-
hood at 10-15 p.m. when four men called at 42,
Bloemfontein Road, Shepherd's Bush, and asked for
Mr. Charles Corms, of the R.I.C., who was at the
time in Ireland. His father-in-law, the occupier
of the house, endeavoured to persuade the men to
leave, but they shot him in the abdomen before they
made their escape. A revolver and two bottles of
paraffin were afterwards found outside the house.
The perpetrators of this outrage are believed to be
four of those who were engaged in the affair at Stowe
Road.

A house at 44, Coverton Road, Tooting, was
visited by three men at 9-45 p.m. The house was
occupied by Mr. William Dawner, whose son was
in the R.I.C., and he was held up at the point of
the revolver while the men entered the house, threw
petrol about various rooms, and set them on fire.
They then decamped. The Fire Brigade had to be
called before the flames were extinguished, but the
damage was not very serious.

Similar tactics were employed by a gang of eight
men who called at 3, Fairholme Road, West
Kensington, about 9-50 p.m. Here they inquired
for Captain Wood, pushed their way into the house,
produced a revolver, and searched the place under
threats. After they had gone the bedding and
furniture in two rooms were found to have been
saturated with petrol and ignited, and considerable
damage was done.

At eleven p.m., four men, wearing light over-

I UK FIRST THREE MONTHS.

coats, were seen to be art in^ suspiciously in 1 1
! (ireenwich. Two of them. A
masks, called at the house of a constable of the
R.I.C. Alarmed by the screams of the constaM
wife, they slammed the door and made off, leaving
behind a loaded revolver and a bottle of petrol.

Masks were also worn by three men who knoi
at the door of 141, Wellmeadow Road, Catford.
about 10 p.m. The occupiers of the house are Mr.
and Mrs. Duffield, whose respective ages are 61 and
56. Upon opening the door in response to the
knock, they were immediately shot at. Mr. Duffield
was wounded in the thighs and his wife in the
wrist, but not dangerously. The men rode away
on bicycles, and later a bottle containing petrol was
found outside the house, and close by a pistol with
two chambers discharged.

At 12-10 a.m. a fire was discovered at the
premises of Messrs. Launders and Nucoline,

i^arine manufacturers, North Woolwich. The
damage, however, was not extensive. A * life-
preserver/ bottles of paraffin, cotton-waste, and
{•a per soaked in petrol were found.

Another attempt at incendiarism, at Batter

s nullified by the lack of forethought of the
perpetrators. A visit was paid to a house in
Belleville Road, Battersea, and a bottle of petrol
placed carefully inside the front door. The bottle
was wrapped in an Irish newspaper, laid on its side,
and the paper set alight. The cork, however, could
not have been withdrawn, for the heat burst the
bottle and the explosion that resulted alarmed the

npier. He immediately rushed to the door and,
discovering what had occurred, was able in a ^

26 IRELAND IN 1921.

short time to defeat the attempt to set his house on
fire.

On the same night numerous raids were made in
Liverpool by groups of armed and masked men upon
houses where resided friends and relatives of men
in the R.I.C. and Auxiliaries in Ireland. Some
desperate encounters took place between the raiders
and the occupants of the houses, but no one was
injured, although in certain cases considerable
damage was done to the houses, which were set on
fire. The raids were carried out simultaneously in
six different districts of the city, one and a half
hours before midnight.

In every instance the method adopted by the
raiders was identical. Appearing in gangs of six
to as many as fifteen, they were all masked and all
carried revolvers. The usual ruse for getting the
door opened was the announcement of a desire to
deliver a very important message. The next move
was to overpower the person who opened the door
and cover with revolvers anybody who came to the
rescue. Then paraffin was produced and carpets,
clothing, and curtains were saturated with the
inflfljnTnfl.b1ft liquid; but the plan did not always
materialise, although in two cases much damage was
done by fire before the brigade arrived on the scene.
In other instances desperate resistance was made,
and on the alarm being given the raiders fled. There
were two striking instances of remarkable valour.

At a house in Clifton Road, a residential district
of Anfield, a Mr. and Mrs. Owen, an elderly couple,
were visited by raiders, who forced their way into
the house, and Mr. Owen, in spite of his age of 60
odd and a row of revolvers pointed at his head,

THE FIRST THREE MONTHS. -7

seized a poker and made an onslaught on the
intruders. He was, however, overpowered, gagged,
his hands tied behind his back, and shut in the
house, which was left on fire. Mrs. Owen managed
to open the door after the raiders had gone, and Mr.
Owen, in his night attire and still gagged and
bound, ran to the police station. In the other
instance a retired Scottish farmer, Mr. David
Wilson, over 70 years of age, immediately accej>
the challenge of the revolvers and threw himself
upon the man who threatened his life. A desperate
struggle ensued, which was only ended when another
revolver was pointed at his temple with the demand
* Let the man go, or out go your brains." In this
house an Airedale dog came to the rescue and bit
several of the raiders, by whom it was shot. Whilst
bleeding and dying, the animal drove the raiders
from the house before they could light the paraffin-
soaked carpet, and when daylight came its body was
found 400 yards away from the house, where its
desperate fight had come to an end. At another
house the * * hands up ' ' demand was met by an
ex -naval man, who had lost a leg at Zeebrugge, with
a sewing machine, which he threw at the armed
raiders.

Such were the events of a single night, and theso
show the determination of the Republicans to ca
the war into British territory. With these examples
of terrorism on either side of the Irish Channel, a
idea may be formed of the state of Irish aiT
the opening of the year 1921 .

CHAPTER II.

Despite the optimistic tone of Ministerial
pronouncements, the condition of Irish afiairs was
daily becoming more serious during the early months
of the year. Slowly but surely the Government were
being driven towards the point when it would be
necessary for them to adopt a firm policy towards the
rebels. Everything had now been tried save giving
the military leaders a free hand. But still the
Government hesitated, with the result that troops
and police, restrained from open measures of
attack upon the men who laid in wait for them
and murdered them, were driven to illegal and
indefensible acts, perforce condoned by their leaders
and by the Government. This policy, or lack of
policy, was responsible for practically all of the
criticism levelled at the Government's management
of Irish affairs. The members of the Crown Forces
themselves naturally failed to understand it. They
were fighting men, presumably sent to Ireland for
the purpose of crushing rebellion. But between
them and their objective they seemed to see a hand
stretched out, the hand of the politician restraining
the arm of the soldier, and naturally they became
mistrustful.

THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE.

Nor were the actions of the Government

••11 la tod to restore confidence among either their
servants or their critics. They seemed to dis]>
a hesitancy which provided their enemies with
unlimited ammunition with which to bombard them
in Parliament and else w he: The most striking

. rnple of such hesitancy was the case of the
burning of the City of Cork on December 12th, 1920.
The whole facts of this matter have never been made

ir, but the incident and the attitude of the
Government towards it were the subject of much
discussion throughout the early months of 1921.

On December 12th, 1920, following an ambush
of Auxiliaries on the previous day, a number of
incendiary fires were started in Cork, which
resulted in the destruction of a large part of the
city. There can be very little doubt that the fires
were started by one section of the Crown Forces as
a reprisal for the many incidents of attack upon
them which were frequently made in the streets of
the city. General Strickland, who commanded the
district, had himself been attacked not 1<
previously, and there is ample evidence that only the
strictest discipline had restrained both military and
}K)lice from avenging themselves on the citizens for
this and other attacks. The ambush of the
Auxiliaries applied the match to this inflammable
spirit. Whatever agency actually started the fires,
there is ample evidence from eye-witnesses that both
military and police were involved in the scenes of
destruction which followed. The Government,
pressed by its critics, ordered a military inquiry, at
which General Strickland presided. Although no
definite promise to that effect was ever made, it was

30 IRELAND IN 1921.

understood that the findings of this report should be
made public. But the Cabinet, having seen the
report, decided that it was better that the findings
should remain a secret. Now, whatever these findings
may have been, it would have been wiser to have
published them. Their suppression gave a handle to
the critics of which they were not slow to take
advantage. It was naturally assumed that the
findings of the report contained matter which would
reflect upon the policy pursued by the Government.
As a matter of fact, it is probable that the findings
of a military court laid an unfair stress upon the
responsibility of the Auxiliaries for the outbreak,
and contained criticism of their actions which would
greatly have heartened the rebels had it been
published at the time.

Mr. Asquith, speaking on February 19th,
referred particularly to this incident, and his words
may be taken as typical of the attacks made upon
this score. He said that the infamies of Irish
administration were kept, as far as they could be,
from public view, behind locked doors of so-called
military tribunals, and any demand for the publica-
tion of their reports, still more for the evidence upon
which those reports were founded, was refused on
the insolent pretext, insolent because in all these
cases the Government was on its trial, that their
production would not be in what was called the
public interest.

It will be as well to examine the general lines of
criticism indulged in by those who disapproved
of the policy of the Government, for the critics
represented a large body of English opinion, which
in the main disliked the somewhat mysterious matter

THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE.

ot repri&i irtimes 'official/ sometimes not,

avowed and disavowed, winked at and never
isfactorily put down. Mr. Asquith returned to
the charge in the House of Commons on Febm
21st

" The real vindication, or attempted vindication of the
policy so unhappily pursued during the last six months is
that it has succeeded, or has good prospr iccesa. The

1'rime Minister pave us an almost glowing, at any rate, an
exuberant description, of the advance which had been made
in the direction of pacification and the suppression of crime.
\Vha' art- the facts? At the very moment that the Prime
-M mister was speaking an hon. friend sitting beside me put
in my hands a telegram which had come from Ireland that
day describing how within a few miles of the City of Cork
\\ere ambushed and a number of soldiers and
civilians lost their lives. If you look in the newspaper
to-day you will >ee that within the last ten days in the City
of Cork, not in the hills, not in the outlying regions, five
citizens were shot dead. Only yesterday there was an open
fight in the town of Midleton, in which thirteen people, I
believe the number has since been added to, were killed.
This is a deplorable commentary on the allegation that the
policy of reprisals has been a success. Only this afternoon
the Chief Secretary himself told us that civilian judges
could not safely be entrusted with the duty of adjudica*
in criminal oases, and that witnesses dare not come forward
and give evidence for fear of their lives."

Mr. Asquith proceeded to give instances of
reprisals, and concluded :

1 The first point I want to make is that it is the duty of
this IlmiM' to demand that the Government shall grant such
an inquiry, and promptly, without delay. The next is to
reinforce as strongly as 1 can, and I believe with the

pathy and consent. T will venture to say, of the .
majority of this House, the need for putting an end to this
ghastly state of affairs in Ireland by a truce, a truce which
means not merely the suspension of this terrible day by day
intensification of passion and multiplication of crim.
truce which may form and ought to form the avenue |
permanent settlement. I hoped very much just bet-in-

rated in December, when the Prime Minister then said

32 IRELAND IN 1921.

there was a prospect of a settlement, and we knew that steps
were taken and negotiations entered into which, for a time
at any rate, seemed to have a hopeful prospect. They
broke down, and if the account which has been given to us
is the correct one, they broke down as they were bound to
break down in the conditions. I would not impose
conditions which no one is in a position authoritatively to
fulfil, but I would have an unreserved truce, binding1 on
both sides, without qualifications or reservations. If that
could be brought about, dark in many ways as the prospect
is, darker even than it was six or even three months ago, I
am still not without hope that we might find ourselves on
the road to permanent peace.'*

Perhaps the best defence of reprisals was
contained in a letter written by Lord Carson to a
correspondent who addressed him on the subject
early in March. The letter is worth reproducing.

11 Sir, — -Whilst I entirely understand your anxieties
about what are called ' reprisals ' in Ireland, with the
possibilities that innocent people may be sometimes the
victims, I do not think you sufficiently bear in mind the
horrible and savage methods which are being adopted by
the organisers and perpetrators of the murder campaign
which is being carried out against the executive officers and
our soldiers who are serving the Government in their
efforts to restore order in Ireland. Open and cowardly
assassination of innocent men by the use of dum-dum
bullets, frequent inhuman torture and injury to wounded
and dying men is the daily routine which the officers of the
law may anticipate at any moment. Any man in the
employ of the Government carries his life in his hands, and
may be at any moment summoned before his Creator with-
out a moment's warning. To expect human nature to be
impassive under such circumstances is to attribute to these
officers a power of self-control which is not given to mortals.

" Always remember that interference by the Govern-
ment forces can be brought to an end by the abstention from
such horrors as I have described. The solution lies with
the murder organisation, and we cannot for a moment
imagine that the Government would not be the very first to
desire that the forces of the Qrown should be no longer
necessary to carry out a service which cannot but be
distasteful and distressing to all concerned.

THE GOVERNMENT'S < A

" 1 1 [•• \ .-! \ . h.-.i p form "i • rii ICIMII 1" at ; • put

the Maine Upon llir e\c«-utive ofiicrrx in their diiiniilt
dangerou> t;i>k uithout air. ! to the TOftlitiM oi

:i, hut I cannot t'«.r a inoim-nt in 'lit- vast

hulk of our countrymen will be led away hy p
propaganda and faNe - tality from supporting

tli our i -lice and soldieix serving in

Iii-laiid. XOUTI faithfully, Ki.u AHD (

Hut the oH'u-ial defence is contained in a letter
addressed by the Prime Minister to the Bishop of
( 'ht'lmsford, in reply to one forwarded by the Bishop
and signed by a number of prominent members of the
Protestant Churches. This letter is of the first
importance, as it may be regarded as the official
answer to the many charges made in various quarters
against the Government, and was intended as a
justification before the wrorld as well as an answer
to the points raised in the Bishop's letter. Although
long, it is therefore quoted in full.

April lf)th, 19:21.

" My Lord Bishop, — I have iv< -rived the letter dated
April 3rd, signed by yourself and nineteen other leaders of

;<>us Protestant religious denominations in G:
Britain, and 1 hav*> given it the seriou< and ear:
•it ion to which it is rightly entitled, both mi ftOOOttnl
tlic responsibility and puhlir influence <>f the signatories
and the urgent iin; of the Mihjrct with which it

deals.

" With tli. ! motive of your resolution, that of

helping to hi-inu- ahoiif peace with a contented Ireland, I
am in the ! mpathy, And it i- beoaiUN I

••Mtial that there B&Ollld h«» a full OOmprel
•' iovrnim- liow this can alone he .i

that bfl deal with your argument^ in >ome detail,

of all. ; rahle

practice of indiscriminate and unauf hoi'i-ed ' | by

the irregular force-, ot the Crown.' There are no ' LITBffulsJ
tin- Crown. The Auxiliary Division of the
il lii-h Con^tahulary. to which no douht you rete-
••LTular force. It muni.- litly under l.."iiH» DO

divided into tifteen compai \cn of the-.

1)

34 IRELAND IN 1921.

are stationed in the martial law area, three in Cork County,
one each in Kerry, Clare, Tipperary, and Kilkenny, where
they are subject to the control and direction of the Military
Governor of the area in regard to all operations and also for
discipline. Of the remaining eight companies, three are
stationed in Dublin City, where they form part of the forces
working under the command of the military officer com-
manding the Dublin district, and the other five, stationed
respectively in Galway, Meath, Eoscommon, Sligo, and
Ixmgford, co-operate with the military and ordinary police
forces, and for purposes of operations are under the control
of the county inspectors and divisional commissioners, who
are high officers of the permanent constabulary. I set
forth these facts because the words ' irregular forces '
convey the impression, which seems to be widely held, that
the Auxiliary Division is an irresponsible, self-contained
unit operating without proper check and control by the civil
and military heads of • the Irish administration, an
impression which is quite unfounded.

" Why was the Auxiliary Division constituted?
Authority for the formation of the Auxiliary Division,
which is composed entirely of ex-officers of the Navy, Army,
and Air Force, was given on July 10th, 1920, after fifty-
six policemen, four soldiers, and seventeen civilians had
been brutally assassinated, and it did not come into really
effective operation until over 100 policemen had been
murdered in cold blood. For all these murders no murderer
was executed, for no witnesses to enable conviction were
forthcoming, largely because of intimidation, although
many of these murders were committed in the open street
in the presence of non-participatory if unprotesting
passers-by. Can it be contended that when a rebel
organisation, which is based on the repudiation of
constitutional action in favour of violence, sets to work to
achieve its ends by the deliberate and calculated murder of
the members of a police force, 99 per cent, of whom were
Irish and 82 per cent, of whom were Roman Catholic,
which had always held an extraordinarily high reputation
for tolerance and good will to the population it served, that
the Government do stand idly by? It seems to me that all
liberal minded and law-respecting citizens must recognise
that any and every Government must take prompt and
decisive steps to protect the police and to bring to justice
those who invoke the weapon of assassination. Hence the
creation of the Auxiliary Division. Further, it would
seem to be not less clear that where, owing to intimidation

THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE.

and murder, tin- ordinary judicial processes employed in a

rful and civili-rd r«>mmunit y have failed, tin- police,

it i! ••• tlie law and bring murderers to

• •• armed with exceptional powers akin
6 entrust, -d to loldim in the field. Hut that there has
been any authorisation or condonation of a policy of
ing murder by giving rein to unchecked violence on the
r side is utterly untrue.

" 1 hat there have been deplorable excesses I will not
rnpt to (h-nv. Individuals, working under conditions
ot extraordinary personal danger and strain, where th* -y
are in uniform and their adversaries mingle unrecognisable
among the ordinary civilian population, have undoubtedly
been guilty of unjustifiable acts. A certain number of
undesirables have got into the corps, and in the earlier
days discipline in the novel and exacting conditions t

time to establish. But the Government has never

• d to press upon the Irish administration and the

military and police heads the paramount importance they

< hed to me enforcement of the sternest discipline.
With your plea for discipline, therefore, I am in the most
complete sympathy. No one is more anxious from
tiadition and position to ensure discipline in the forces
than their official chiefs, if only because indiscipline means
inefficiency. As some evidence of what the Chief Secretary

his colleagues are doing, I may state that during the

three months twenty-eight members of the Royal Iri^h

Constabulary and fifteen members of the Auxiliary Division

have been removed from the force as the result of

< cutions, while 208 members of the Royal Irish
^tabulary and fifty-nine members of the Auxiliary

-ion have been dismissed on the grounds of their being

unsuitable as members of the police force. In addition,

•.ty-four members of the Royal Irish Constabulary and

iliary Division have been -en fenced by court-mart ial.

e is no question that, despite all difficulties, discipline

is improving, the force is consolidating, and that the

of indiscipline, despite ambushes, assassinations and

outrages, often designed to provoke retaliation for the

purposes of propaganda, are becoming- Increasingly infre-

i 1 v.n'iii. to believe that when the history of the

t nine months in Ireland comes to be written, and the

authentic acts of misconduct can be disentangled from the

vastly greater mass of reckless and lying accusations, the

eral record of patience and forebearance displayed by

the sorely-tried police, by the auxiliaries as well as by the

36 IEELAND IN 1921.

ordinary constabulary, will command not the condemnation,
but the admiration of posterity.

1 I turn now to the second point on your resolution.
I must say that I read with surprise and regret the state-
ment that because of a ' long-cherished and deep-seated
sense of political grievance ' which has not been satisfied
by the present Home Eule Act, ' we cannot regard the
cruel and detestable outrages which have given rise to the
whole reprisals policy, authorised and unauthorised alike,
as a mere outbreak of wanton criminality in the ordinary
sense.' Your resolution is emphatic when condemning the
Government, in its statement of ' the absolute unlawfulness
of the attempt to overcome wrong, however flagrant and
provocative, by means of further and equally indefensible
wrong.' Yet practically in the next sentence it condones
the adoption by Sinn Fein of the weapon of wholesale
murder on the ground that the end justifies the means.
It seems to me that this part of your resolution is subversive
alike of order and good government, morality, and the
Christian religion.

' Let us see what it means. I do not wish to minimise
in the least Great Britain's share of responsibility for the
present state of the Irish question. But at long last all
parties in Great Britain had united, in the General Election
of 1918, in asking and securing from the electorate a
mandate to give to Ireland the Home Rule which had been
pleaded for by Gladstone and asked for by all the leaders of
Irish nationalism since Isaac Butt, including Parnell,
Dillon, and Redmond. The only unsettled question was
the treatment of Ulster, and as to that, both the Liberal
party had recognised in 1914, and the Irish Nationalists in
1916, that if theie was to be a peaceful settlement, Ulster
must have separate treatment.

:< Sinn Fein rejected Home Rule and demanded in its
place an Irish republic for the whole of Ireland. Sinn
Fein went farther. It deliberately set to work to
destroy conciliation and constitutional methods, because it
recognised that violence was the only method by which it
could realise a republic. The rebellion of 1916 was its
first blow to conciliation and reason. Its refusal to take
part in the Convention was the second. Its proclamation
of a republic by the Bail Eireann, and abstention from
Westminster was the third. Its inauguration of the policy
of murder and assassination, in order to defeat Home Rule,,
rather than to discuss the Home Rule Bill in Parliament,
or enter upon direct conference outside, was the fourth.

THE GOVERNMENT'S CA>\. 37

1 ilo nut think that air. in doubt that tin* principal

<.n \\ h y tin- war did riot \ iring a peaceful settlem*
why Irrland i> more deeply divided to-day than it ha- •

i, has been the nation of Sinn Fein to piv

such a settlement and to fight for a republic . I

do not con :in Fein's right to its opinions and

aspirat ion->, and 1 have never done so. Hut what amazes

a body of responsible mm, eminent leaders of

Church, should state publicly that Sinn Fein has some
kind of justification for murdering innocent men in cold
blood, because it> novel and extravagant political ideals
have he. -n denied.

" Where does the doctrine end!' There is a small but
vigorous Communist party in these islands, which bitterly

with the most intense conviction believes that it ought

verthow democratic institutions and <eixe power by
force and violence, because of the manner in which i
consider that the ruling classes of the past, the aristocracy
and the owners of capital, oppressed and exploited the poor.
the Communists, because of the sufferings and
grievances of the working classes and the sincerity of their
own industrial ideals, to be justified in employing murder
tion to achieve these ends?

' I write thus plainly because I believe that in t
.1 question — a question which, as you truly say, aft-
public opinion not only in the British Isles, but in the
Fmpire and in foreign lands — it i> e^ential to look at the
fundamental facts unaffected by political prejudice or t he-
sympathetic emotions inevitably aroused by present event-.
1 should like to repeat that 1 fully recognise how action and
inaction by British (lovernment- and political parties have
c'-ntributed to produce the n. Hut do

let u^ therefore blind ourselves to the fact that the other
element in the present m, and I think the la;

element, i^ that Sinn Fein deliberately threw n\ -itu-

tional action at the moment when that emir- ion was

achievii |, and entered upon a campaign

in its most savage form in order to separate Ireland from

Hut there is another aspect of the que-tion to which
1 must allude. Sinn Fein does not confine its actr

<-ks on servants of the Crown. It ha- inaugurated a
reign of terror in Ireland which is certainly equal

•hing in Irish history. IN hold on the country is due
partly no doubt to the fanatical enthusiasm it invokes, but
partly it is due to terrorism of the DO 6 kind. Its

38 IRELAND IN 1921.

opponents in Ireland are murdered ruthlessly, usually
without any form of trial, with no chance of pleading their
case, simply because the Sinn Fein leaders think them
better out of the way.

" The case of the murder of Sir Arthur Vicars is fresh
in everybody's mind. I can pass no better comment upon
it than that contained in the Manchester Guardian of April
16th, which describes it as

' one of the most horrible in the black recent records
of crime and counter-crime in Ireland. For a crowd
of armed men to attack an unarmed man in a lonely
house, take him out of bed and jointly murder him,
they must have debauched their minds with the base
casuistry of a " state of war " to an extent which
makes them a curse to any cause they pretend to
honour. Nothing honourable in public affairs can
spring from anyone's personal dishonour, and anyone,
be he Sinn Feiner or anti-Sinn Feiner, who takes a
part in one of these dastard " executions " writes
himself down a leper for whom no brave and pure
cause has a place in its service. There is nothing as
yet that a court would call proof of the authorship of
this particular abomination. A tag attached to the
corpse is said to boast it for the " Irish Eepublican
Army." It may be a genuine brag; it is a loathsome
one, if so ; or it may be the trick of some enemy of the
alleged braggarts. We cannot know; in either case
the crime, like all its kind, is an act of the foulest
treason to any cause to which those guilty of it profess
loyalty.'

" The case of Sir Arthur Vicars has excited horror
because it is the murder of a well-known man. But it is
only typical of what is going on all over the country. I
may mention two other instances. In the first, William P.
Kennedy, a Nationalist Irishman of the school of Dillon,
refused to close his premises at Borris, county Carlow, on
the occasion of the death of Lord Mayor McSweeney of
Cork. He was boycotted, and thereupon took an action for
damages against a number of his enemies, Michael
O'Dempsey being his solicitor. A short while after, both
Kennedy and O'Dempsey were shot from behind a wall in
front of Kennedy's house. In the second case, William
Good, an ex-captain in the Army, who had resumed his
studies at Trinity College, Dublin, after being demobilised,
returned home to attend the funeral of his father, who had

'HIE GOVERNMENT'S CASE. 39

been murdered at hi- own dour a few days before. He

Kaiidnn on market in;.: business. On his return

he was waylaid by aimed and masked DDUU .-d some

way and done t<» death, the following notice bein^r found:

" Tried, OOQ . and execu and informers

beware." r\ even worse. The first

•'•it ma case recorded in the newspapers of April

Mh, where an unarmed, defenceless, and \\ar-* rippled

ex-soldier wa> murdered with n-vnl-jn^ brutality in

Bother and sister, who were spattered with
Oil blood. The second is in the papers tliis morning, where
a p' i Kitty Carroll, the sole support of her

aged father and mother and invalid brother, was dragged
11 her house by a party of marked men, who murdered
her, and attached to her body the legend: " Spies and
informers beware! Tried, convicted, and executed by

A."

" I cite these cases because I think it is essential that
people should realise the character of the Sinn Fein pol
the principles upon which it acts, and the nature of its

paign. Sinn Fein has never issued any condemnation
of murder. Assassination and outrage are the weapons
which it has deliberately chosen as the means by which i
to tfain its ends. I should like to repeat that it was not
until over 100 of their comrades had been cruelly
assassinated that the police began to strike a blow in
self-defence. Perhaps the most terrible aspect of the Irish
situation to-day is the indifference which has grown up
there to the crime of murder since Sinn Fein entered upon
its campaign, though I cannot help feeling that in their
hearts the Irish people are as shocked by it as we are. It
has been a matter of surprise and regret to me that during
the long agony no organised protest has been made by the
religious bodies who have now addressed the Government

• • leaders of Sinn Fein.

" 1 would therefore most earnestly urir«' th«»s,. who are
responsible for the triiidinjr of the Christian conscience not
to obscure the moral i>sue involved. 1 cordially sympat •
with them in their anxiety that the conduct of th<
of the Crown >hould be above reproach, and I welcome the
pressure which they put upon the (Government to secure
that end. But when they couple with this a condonation
of the policy of employing crime of the most atrocious kind
to serve an end with which they sympathise they are not
only prolonyin^ the strife in Ireland, but, in my judsrn.-
they are striking at the very principles upon which the

40 IRELAND IN 1921.

the liberties, the prosperity, and the honour of civilised
peoples depend.

" I come now to the final point. The resolution pleads
for the adoption of a different line of policy, and especially
for a truce with a view to a deliberate effort after an agreed
solution. If I thought there was a different policy which
would lead to the solution of our difficulties, I should not
hesitate to adopt it, however different it were from that
which the Government is now pursuing1. The present state
of affairs is due to one cause, and one cause only — that there
is still an irreconcilable difference between the two sides.
The one side — or rather the group which controls it — stands
for an independent Iiish Republic; the other stands for
maintenance in fundamentals of the Union, together with
the completest self-government for Ireland within the
Empire which is compatible with conceding to Ulster the
same right of self-determination within Ireland as
Nationalist Ireland has claimed within the Union. Towards
the solution of this problem — the real problem — the
resolution makes no contribution, except the proposal for a
truce. But a truce in itself will not bridge the gulf,
though it might be useful if there were any doubt on either
side as to where the other stands, or a basis for discussion
were in sight. What really matters if we are to attain to
peace is that a basis for a permanent settlement should be
reached.

" I fully admit, and I have always admitted, that the
declared policy of Sinn Fein and the policy of his Majesty's
Government are irreconcilable. I believe that the policy
of establishing an Irish Republic is impossible, for two
reasons : First, because it is incompatible with the security
of Great Britain and with the existence of the British
Commonwealth; and second, because if it were conceded it
would mean civil war in Ireland — for Ulster would
certainly resist incorporation in an Irish Republic by force
— and in this war hundreds of thousands of people, not
only from Great Britain, but from all over the world,
would hasten to take part. On the other hand, I believe
that the policy of the Government — the maintenance in
fundamentals of the unity of the Kingdom coupled with
the immediate establishment of two Parliaments in
Ireland, with full powers to unite on any terms upon which
they can agree upon themselves, is not only the sole
practical solution, but one which is both just and wise in
itself. I further believe that the present Home Rule Act
is a sensible and workmanlike method of carrying this

THE GOVERNMENT'S CASK 41

policy into effect. It confers on Ireland wider powers
than either Glad bills or the .\< • oi \'.n\. It bases

the financial icla' . count r

.hie capacity, and leave- to liishuirn themselves the

.'•hirving unity within their nun land.

" Hut tin- present struggle is not about the Home Rule

.it all. Fundamentally, tin* issue is the same as that in

the war of North and South in the Uin 'es — it is an

• •n secession and union. At the outbreak of the

great Ameri< an struggle, nearly everybody in these Islands

;iathi>ed with the South, and were again-t the North.

n Gladstone took this view. Only John JJright never
wavered in his adherence to Lincoln's cause. That war
lasted four years. It cost a million lives and u.
devastation and ruin. There was more destruction of
property in a single Confederate county than in all the

.klled " reprisals " throughout the whole of Ireland.
Lincoln always rejected alike truce and compromise. As
he often said, he was fighting for the Union, and meant to
save it even if he could only do so at the price of retaining
slavery in the South. Is there a man or a woman to-
who does not admit that the North was right, and does

the calamitous results which would have followed the
break-up of the American Union? I doubt if there is a

•onsible man in the Southern States to-day, however
much he may admire the great figures like Stonewall
.Jackson and Lee, who is not glad that the Union was
preserved even at that terrible cost.

* Is not our policy exactly the same? It is by reason
of the contiguity of the two islands and their strategic and
economic interdependence to fight secession and to maintain
the fundamental unity of our ancient kingdom of many
nations from Flamb«»rough Head to Cape Clear, ami from

B Wrath to land's Knd. I believe that our ideal of
combining unity with Home Rule is a finer and a nobler
ideal than that e\ nationalism which will T

nothing less than isolation, which is Sinn Fein's 01
to-day, and which if it had full play would Balkanise the
world. I believe that once the struggle is over and
bin. ,tten and unity has been preferred, all

classes will ricluding a majority in Ireland itself,

tliat in fundamental! the (iovernment were right and Sinn
Fein were wr»nir.

" I do not see. therefore, how we can pursu rent

line of policy. It has never been our policy to i
compromise about anything but union i ml the i

42 IRELAND IN 1921.

coercion of Ulster. Throughout the whole of last year
when the Home Kule Bill was before Parliament, I invited
negotiations with the elected representatives of Ireland,
stating that the only points I could not discuss were the
secession of Ireland and the forcing of Ulster into an Irish
Parliament against its will. I also added that in my
judgment justice required that Ireland should carry its
share of the war debt, as Irishmen in all other parts of the
world have to do, and not throw an increased burden on
those who are already carrying the largest share of the loss
and cost of the war. To these overtures there was never a
reply. And there has never been a reply, for the good
reason that the real Sinn Fein organisation is not yet ready
to abandon its ideal of an independent Irish Republic,
including Ulster. That there are many Sinn Feiners who
recognise the folly and impossibility of this attitude is
certain. But I regret that it is no less certain that up to
the present the directing minds of the Sinn Fein movement,
who control the Irish Republican Army — the real obstacle
of peace — believe that they can ultimately win a republic
by continuing to fight as they fight to-day, and are
resolutely opposed to compromise. I wish it were other-
wise, but I think that if the signatories of the resolution
would approach not moderate Irishmen, but those who
control the Irish Republican Army, they would find that
what I say is correct. Only a few days ago Mr. Michael
Collins gave an interview to the " Philadelphia Public
Ledger/' and declared uncompromisingly for an inde-
pendent Irish Republic, and added that, in his judgment,
11 the same effort which would get us Dominion Home Rule
would get us a republic/'

" So long as the leaders of Sinn Fein stand in this
position, and receive the support of their countrymen,
settlement is, in my judgment, impossible. The Govern-
ment of which I am the head will never give way upon the
fundamental question of secession. Nor do I believe that
any alternative Government could do so either. I need not
now speak for Ulster, for its people will shortly have a
Parliament through which they can express their views
as to incorporation in a Dublin Parliament for them-
selves. I am willing and indeed anxious to discuss
any and every road which promises to lead to a
reconciliation of the parties to the present struggle.
I recognise, as fully as any man, that force is itself no
remedy and that reason and goodwill alone can lead us to
the final goal. But to abandon the use of force to-day

THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE. 43

Id l»e to surrender alike to violence, rrinn -. and
separatism, and that I am not prepared to do. So long-,
therefore, as Sinn 1'Vin Ireland demand^ a republic
ises to accept Io\;illy membership of the Hi:

!th, coupled with the fullest Home Kule which

'inpatihle with conceding to Ulster the same rights as

it claim-, for itself, the present evils will continue. I do

.nybody to he under any misunderstanding on

that point.

' In conclusion, I should like respectfully to suggest
that the signatories of the resolution should make their own
position clear to the people of Ireland. I have replied to
their address with complete frankness. I venture
believe that the majority of them are in agreement with the
fundamental position set forth in this letter. If they
desire to bring about peace, as they surely do, I believe that
nothing would more rapidly promote it than that they and
those who think like them, whatever they may think about
some aspects of the policy of the present Government,
should make it clear to Irish opinion that they can never
attain their ends by resort to crime, that secession
impossible, and that, if they are to have peace, they must
be willing to concede to Ulstermen the same rights as they
claim for themselves. Those are the fundamental fa
To leave any doubt in the minds of Irishmen on these points
is to prolong and not to shorten the present strife. Once
they are grasped by Irishmen, I have faith that the end will
be in sight, and I believe that nothing is more caloul..
to bring them home to Ireland than that those who are
seeking to promote peace and concord with Ireland, should
make this clear. — Ever sincerely,

D. LLOYD GEORGE.
The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford, &c."

The reply to this letter was despatched on May
4th, anil was as follows : —

" Dear Prime Minister, — We have to thank you for the
very full reply which you have been good enough to send
to the communication recently addressed to yourself and
Sir llaniar Greenwood on the Irish situation. We h
neither the right nor the desire to engage you, amid \
IHUnberleM responsibilities, in further correspondence.
Hut, on the other hand, that we may not seem discoun-
to yourself, and in order to avoid misunderstanding,
permit us the following brief observations.

44 IRELAND IN 1921.

" With regard to ' reprisals/ more especially
unauthorised reprisals, we are not forgetful of the intense
provocation offered. Also we note the assurances given of
the Government's anxiety to prevent or to punish them
condignly. But we venture to impress upon the Govern-
ment anew the distress occasioned by the continued
recurrence of such events. Crime perpetrated by those
i-esponsible for the maintenance of order and right stands
in a category by itself, and the facts stated in your letter
as to the disciplinary measures which it has been found
necessary to take, are of themselves evidence that it has
not been infrequent. The refusal to hold public inquiry
into serious allegations made by responsible persons against
the conduct of the Crown forces, and also the withholding
of the result of inquiries which have taken place, have
deepened the grave disquiet felt by many minds. Reasons,
we recognise, may be offered for the course thus pursued by
the Government, but, as you must be aware, the impression
it is apt to leave, both at home and abroad, is a very
painful one.

" We greatly regret that you should be under any
misapprehension as to the view taken by us of ' the cruel
and detestable outrages ' by which the Sinn Fein
extremists have befouled their cause. That we should
ourselves have thus described them ought to have protected
us from the charge of " practically condoning the adoption
by Sinn Fein of the weapon of wholesale jnurder on the
ground that the * end justifies the means.' With

emphasis we submit that the language we used can bear no
such interpretation. To explain or even partially explain
is by no means to excuse. We are impressed by what
seems to us unimpeachable evidence that the policy of the
Government in Ireland has succeeded only in inflaming the
wound it was meant to heal. We have looked anxiously
but in vain for any ameliorative results produced by it.
On the contrary, active hostility continues unabated,
moderate opinion is more and more alienated, and the
cause of law and order fails everywhere of the support
which is its due. It is this terrible reaction of the existing
situation upon the Irish national mind and conscience
which most of all weighs upon us, this and the fading hope
of reaching along present lines any such agreed and happy
resettlement as all must long to see. Hence our intense
desire to see a new beginning made, to which at least all
the better and more reasonable elements in the Irish people
might rally.

THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE.

challenge us to make clear, to the In-i

•••i;illy, what i- OH] DB with

..f settlement you lay down, and to t
challenge we respond. Hitherto \\ • nly referred

excesses for which tin* authorities might be held responsible,

much as in that responsibility the (iovernment and we

1 to lie involved. Hut it our voice could

carry BO far, we would, and hereby do, urge th< i-'ein

Ian with all the earr IB our power to d RNBt,

and to secure the total suppn-sMon of, vile deeds which are
an oiVence to God and man, and can only bring lasting
disgrace upon their movement and alienate sympathy which
might be felt for it.

" On the fundamental question of secession, we

\ve believe, along with the great majority of
countrymen, at one with the Government . An independent
Irish Republic we hold to be impracticable; and i

it, agreed that Ulster is not to be coerced. At the
same time it is for consideration how far conference and
tiations should be restricted by limiting condit •

rehand, while even within these limits we are of
opinion that an agreed solution is not unattainable. The
Irish are a generous people. It is too much to be asked to
believe that the forces of reason among them are dead,
and even yet, in our judgment, statesmanship and goodwill
might achieve an accommodation. The grievous and
humiliating character of the situation must be the axOQM

the insistence we have shown. But we i
until such an attempt has been deliberately and patiently
tried and has failed, many throughout the land will
unable to acquiesce in any alternative policy •
action.

This correspondence b;is Uvn quoted at length,
not only because it includes the detailed reply of the
Prime Minister to the critics of the Governmei
policy, but also because it contains the main points
of such criticism. In the month of May it
becoming obvious that, despite optimistic forecn-
the line of action pursued by the Government was
failing to produce adequate results. A- has
already been shown, the "Republican fmves v
Incoming more daring in their operations, and.

46 IRELAND IN 1921.

despite frequent reverses in which they suffered
considerable loss, their activities were taking an
ever-increasing toll of the Crown forces. Negotia-
tion seemed for the moment to have failed; the
insistence on a laying down of arms as a preliminary
to a truce would not be considered by the Republican
leaders. The history of negotiations during this
period will be recounted in a subsequent chapter.
For the present it is enough to say that there seemed
little prospect of terminating the conflict by
agreement.

The only alternative remaining was the
untrammelled employment of force. Hitherto, as
has been already explained, the military operations
were subservient to the political situation. The
fiction was maintained that Ireland as a whole was
opposed to the methods of the Sinn Fein extremists,
and that, if the people could be rescued from the
terrorism of the gunmen, they would prove docile
and obedient. As, therefore, the country was held
to be friendly, and only appeared hostile through
fear, military operations on an extensive scale,
which would necessarily have involved considerable
inconvenience to the populace, could not be under-
taken. But at last, at the end of May, the Cabinet
made up its mind that military measures could no
longer be delayed. The Prime Minister announced
that it was proposed to strengthen the Forces of the
Crown in Ireland, and the General Staff prepared
themselves for a campaign which everyone knew
would be difficult and unsatisfactory. That Sinn
Fein could be crushed if the full power of England
were exerted, nobody denied. But equally certain
was it that the process would be long and costly.

THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE. 47

The plan of campaign must necessarily be to declare

: tial law over the whole of the twenty-six count
of the South, which meant in effect the complete
domination of the civil power by the military. The
Commander in Chid would become the sole repre-
sriitative of British authority, acting at the head of
his armies in a hostile country. The people of
Ireland would suffer all the restrictions which
military necessity imposes on the inhabitants of a

te of battle. There could be no reasonable doubt
that the I.R.A. would receive an accession of
strength on this ground alone. Finally, the only
hope of a rapid and successful issue to the campaign

ild be to concentrate the Crown Forces upon
selected bases, and from them to conduct a sweep of
the whole country. This would have the effect of
leaving a large number of loyal inhabitants at the
mercy of the insurgents, and the experience of recent
months was a sufficient warning of what their fate
would be in such circumstances.

There were other serious disadvantages in such
a policy. Despite the fact that Mr. de Valera had
performed a signal service to the British cause
during his residence in America the previous year,
by splitting the Irish- American supporters of Sinn
Fein into two bitterly hostile camps, the disorder in
Ireland was definitely undermining the friendship
between the United States and England. It was not
so imieh that any large party in America supported
the Republicans in their demand for independeii
as the fact that the sympathy of any nation of
An.irlo Saxon origin is bound to incline towards the
cause of a smaller nation struir^liiig airainst the
resources of a powerful State. The sympathy of

48 IRELAND IN 1921.

England with the Confederates during the Civil
War had been a similar instance. In addition, the
feelings of many people were outraged by the
distorted stories of reprisals put into circulation
by the Sinn Fein emissaries. The Republican
propaganda department circulated such documents
as Count Plunkett's Dignified Statement to the
Nations of the World from which a few typical
passages may be quoted :

' The only serious disorder in the country is caused
by the conversion of the police force into a military body
of political anti-Irish agents empowered to commit outrages
against the people in general with a guarantee of immunity
of punishment from the English Cabinet. . . . Terrible
crimes at the hands of the English are of frequent
occurrence, the murder of priests, of women with child,
and the deliberate drowning of unarmed men, the shooting
of many unarmed and un arrested persons under the
pretence that they were attempting to escape, the killing of
untried and unarmed prisoners. . . . The English
Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Chief Secretary and
all the Government officials justify all excesses committed
by their agents. . . . The whole people is driven into a
defensive war through the hypocrisy and savage brutality
of a powerful nation that is striving to extinguish the
nationality of Ireland in blood. "

This kind of thing was naturally damaging to
the British cause when read by people who had no
comprehensive grasp of the situation. There is no
doubt that the continuance of the trouble in Ireland,
and more especially its aggravation into a state of
openly declared warfare, would have considerably
weakened the voice of England in the councils of the
world.

But, notwithstanding the weight of these con-
siderations, the decision of the Government to
augment the strength of the Crown Forces in
Ireland, with all that such a move entailed, was

THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE. 49

received with approval by the great bulk of the
British nation. It was realised on all sides that the
policy of half measures must be put an end to at all

s Reprisal and counter-reprisal were leading
to increased bloodshed, and it was extremely
uncertain how lonir it would take to wear down the

stance of the rebels by such methods of attrition.
Then* were only two alternatives, to come to terms
with Sinn Fein, or to exterminate its armed forces.
The former seemed at the moment impossible, the
latter must be undertaken. At the very time when
a Home Rule Act, having at last received the
approval of the British Parliament, was about to be
put into operation, it must be demonstrated to be
inacceptable to the Irish people, and only to be
imposed upon them by force of arms. To such an
extent had Irish demands grown since the days of
Parnell.

CHAPTER III.

Before proceeding further with the consideration
of affairs in Ireland generally, it will be as well to
deal with the situation in Northern Ireland, and the
events which led up to the formation of the
Northern Government under the Act.

The Six Counties of Northern Ireland are
predominantly Unionist and Protestant in their
population, but they contain centres inhabited by
Catholics, both Nationalist and Sinn Fein, and in
the presence of Unionist majorities Nationalists and
Sinn Feiners show a natural tendency to coalesce.
This fact accounts for the perpetual outbreak of
party feeling, leading to rioting and murder, which
forms a turbulent background to the history of
Ulster during the period under review.

It must be remembered that there was nothing
new in the existence of this intense party
feeling. Despite the contentions of Sinn Fein and
Nationalism that Ireland is an homogenous nation,
it is obvious that the men of Ulster are of entirely
different race and ideals from the men of the South.
Without unduly labouring this point, it may be
indicated that the whole history of Ulster and more
particularly its borders is one of faction fighting and
rivalry. The capture of Sinn Fein by the Irish

EVENTS IN ULSTER. 51

Republican Brotherhood and the consequent trans-

•nation of a comparatively peaceful movement
into an actively militant one merely intensified the
mutual hatred of the factions. But an event of

n greater importance was the introduction of the
pistol and its development into a lethal weapon
capable of being carried in the pocket or otherwise
concealed about the person. In the old days, when
a body of men marched about the country brandish-
ing cudgels or carrying guns, their purpose was
evident, and their plans could be circumvented by
an alert police force. But now, when a party of
men, indistinguishable except by process of search
from the remainder of the population, can carry
with them arms and ammunition sufficient for
manslaughter on an extended scale, the task of
circumventing them has become vastly more difficult.
Further, it is in the nature of things that if one

t ion sees itself menaced by gunmen (to apply the
generally accepted Americanism to the men who

ry loaded revolvers for the purpose of using
them upon unarmed citizens) it will take steps to
arm itself similarly in its own protection. The
eventual result is that armed men abound on both
sides, and the slightest pretext is sufficient to
precipitate a conflict between them which is almost
certain to have fatal results.

At the end of 1920 the Royal Irish Constabulary
in I'lster had Iven reinforced by a body of * special
tallies ' raised from amonir the Unionist
population. Despite careful selection of these men,
and their ^roupin^ under experienced officers, there
was an undoubted tendency for them to abuse

ir official position. Seeing opposed to them

52 IRELAND IN 1921.

Republicans who did not hesitate to use their
weapons upon unarmed Unionists, the special
constables in their turn were apt to forget the
limitations imposed upon them as a branch of the
forces of law and order, and to indulge in vendettas
on their own account against such Republicans as
they knew. An example of this occurred towards
the end of January. On the 22nd of the month,
two constables of the R.I.C. were found dead on the
public road near Monaghan. It appears that the
two men had gone out for a walk, and that on their
way back to barracks they were ambushed by a party
of Republicans and murdered. On the following
night, a body of special constables, about fifteen in
number, set out from Newtownbutler, in County
Fermanagh, just within the borders of the Six
Counties and close to the scene of the murder. They
made their way to Clones, in Southern territory,
and arrived in the small hours of the morning at a
public house owned by a man of the name of
O'Reilly. Here, it is alleged, they called upon the
occupants of the house to come down, but O'Reilly
and another man made their escape by a back way,
and ran to the R.I.C. barracks for assistance. A
party of about a dozen regular R.I.C. immediately
set out for the scene, and when they arrived found
the Newtownbutler party engaged in looting the
premises. They called on these men to surrender,
but were answered by a volley. A fight ensued, in
the course of which one of the raiders was killed
and a second seriously injured. The R.I.C. finally
succeeded in arresting the whole party. The
Commissioner for Ulster at once took the strongest
measures to deal with such incidents. Two platoons

EVENTS IN ULSTEK

-pecial constabulary were immediately disbanded,
the Ne\\ti)\vnl)iitler platoon being one of them, and
the participants in the affray were tried by court-
n.artial.

Another example of rapid reprisal took place in
Belfast itself on the night of the 26th-27th. On
the 2(>th three regular constables of the R.I.C.
arrived in Belfast from Dublin, in connection with
certain investigations then proceeding. They put
up at a small hotel close to the barracks, where they
u ere accommodated in a room having two beds. At

>ing time, a group of men who had been drinking
at the bar made as though to leave the premises, but
suddenly made a dash up the staircase and into the
room where the constables were sleeping. Shots were

rd, and a few seconds later the men returned,
flourishing their revolvers, and compelled the
barman to let them out of a side door, through which
they escaped into the darkness outside. The alarm
\\as raised, and the police on their arrival found
two of their comrades dead and the third so
msly wounded that he died shortly after
admission to hospital.

Some hours later, three men visited a house a

.iderahle distance from the scene of the first
tra.L'edy. in which a man of the name of Garvey,
a chemist's assistant and a reputed Sinn Feiner.
known to lodge. They opened the door of the
house with a latchkey, an action which caused no
suspicion in the mind of the lodging-house keeper,
who knew that one of the lodgers had not yet
returned to the house. Making their way to
(iarvey's room, they shot him dead as he slept, and

iped before they could be detained.

54 IRELAND IN 1921.

Towards the middle of February, signs of danger
began to evince themselves in Belfast. On the 18th
of the month an attack was made by Republicans on
the Protestant shipyard workers as they returned
from work. As they left the yards, they were met
with volleys of stones flung from the side streets of
the Sinn Fein quarter which they were compelled to
traverse. Not unnaturally, they replied with similar
missiles, and a regular skirmish was soon in pro-
gress. The authorities brought an armoured car on
to the scene, and order was soon restored, but not
before considerable damage had been done. Owing
to the vigilance of the police, no further outbreaks
developed from this incident, but it was evident that
the trouble was merely simmering below the surface.

On March llth, while a group of constables of
the R.I.C. were standing outside the Empire
Theatre in Belfast, they were suddenly fired upon,
and two of their number killed and a third wounded.
A Protestant shipyard worker who was standing
close by was seriously wounded and died some days
later. It was believed that the assailants were not
local men, but had been imported by the Republicans
to stir up strife in the city, which had been
comparatively peaceful for some weeks. The death
of the shipyard worker was responsible for a
demonstration in the part of the city in which he
lived, rival mobs coming into conflict and causing
some damage before they could be dispersed by the
police.

On the 16th occurred an incident which showed
how strong the current of party feeling was running.
Works had been started by the Belfast Corporation
for the relief of the unemployed, and several

EVENTS IN ULSTER.

hundred men were engaged upon them. At a pre-
arranged signal, the Catholic members of this party,
who happened to be in the majority, produced

olvers and drove the Protestants from the scene.
During the following days disturbances of varying
degrees of seriousness occurred throughout the city
and its environs. At the same time evidence was
forthcoming that the Republicans were determined
to leave no stone unturned to enforce the Ulster
boycott. During the early morning of the 17th, a
party of raiders descended upon Richhill Station,
on the Great North of Ireland Railway between
Portadown and Armagh. Their first action was to
isolate the station by cutting the telegraph wires,
and they then proceeded to soak the premises with
petrol and set fire to them, devoting the greater part
of their efforts to the goods shed, which happened
to be well filled. They then turned their attention
to the sidings, in which lay a number of laden

j;ons. These they destroyed in a similar manner.
The raiders rounded off their exploit by holding up
an incoming train and purloining the mails, after
which they decamped as suddenly as they had
arrived.

Some days later tame news of the murder of

Loyalists in the country districts of Ulster. On the

21st, a concerted attack was made upon the farms

and houses of Unionists living on the Fermana

Monairhan larder. Two of these were murdered

while defending their property, and much damage

dmie. It subsequently transpired that the

object of this raid was to intimidate members of the

ial constabulary, and to discourage others from

enlisting in the ranks of the force, lest their ho:

56 IRELAND IN 1921.

should be raided in their absence. The outrage
caused considerable excitement in Belfast, and the
smouldering enmity between the factions broke out
into open rioting. The funeral cortege of a Unionist
victim was fired upon as it passed a Nationalist
quarter of the city, and firing ensued on both sides,
resulting in several injuries being inflicted. The
Unionist faction were continually embittered by the
news of the murder of their co-religionists in the
country districts, where the campaign against them
continued. In County Monaghan especially murders
became frequent and in more than one case were
distinguished by circumstances of exceptional
brutality.

Late on the night of April 1st, a determined
attack was made on the military and police
protecting the city of Londonderry. Simultaneous
firing was indulged in by Sinn Fein bands, working
obviously on a pre- determined scheme, at the
barracks and the protection posts throughout the
city. A police sergeant was killed, and several
persons wounded, but through the promptitude of
the authorities, who immediately put the city in a
state of defence, no further casualties were incurred,
although sniping took place for some days further.

On the 4th of the month an attempt was made to
destroy the Ulster Club in Belfast. Two bombs
were flung at the building, but no damage was done,
and the attackers made off before they could be
identified.

It had been known for some weeks past that the
Republicans had organised a certain portion of the
Irish Republican Army in the form of ' Flying
Columns, ' or bodies of men equipped for operations

EVENTS IN ULSTER. :>7

in districts other than those to which they belonged.
These Flying Columns were particularly active on
the Ulster border, where they made the members of
the special constabulary their chief objective. On
the night of April 5th-6th, a wide area in County
Tyrone was the scene of their operations. Police
barracks were attacked, and patrols of police
engaged in carrying out their ordinary duties were
ambushed. On the following night a party of
armed and masked men visited a number of houses
in Dromore, where a special constable had been
wounded in the original affray. Three young men
belonging to the village and suspected of Sinn Fein
sympathies were taken from their homes, and their
dead bodies subsequently found lying on the main
road a short distance from the village.

Throughout April and May a similar state of
a flairs continued, but meanwhile the interest in the
elections for the first Ulster Parliament, and the
e\ ents connected therewith diverted public attention
from other matters. The selection of Sir James
Craig as leader of the Ulster Unionists has already
been mentioned, and it was about him that the hopes
of the Province now revolved. But the campaign
actually opened before he accepted the post of leader,
and the speeches of Sir Edward Carson, as he then
was. struck the key-note of the Ulster Unionist
position. Speaking at Torquay on January 31st,
he said : —

' I do not believe in any policy of what is called Home
Ttule for Ireland. But the 'Government have paood a Bill
into law, and they have given a Parliament to the \orth
and a Parliament to the South. I have undertaken, as the
only alternative left, to do my best to see that the Ulster
people shall welcome that Parliament, for the benefit of

58 IRELAND IN 1921.

the United Kingdom and the benefit of the Empire. And
I believe they will. But there are people going about who
want to upset that. I appeal to them to give us a chance,
to stand by us. Let the Government know that we do not
want to associate with a gang of murderers called Sinn
Fein, with their sham Parliament and a sham cry, all of
which have had their basis in hostility to this country.
Tell the British Government that you believe in supporting
your friends and fighting your enemies, and not sacrificing
your friends for the sake of conciliating your enemies. I
hope to go on in the same course that I have always gone
on. I believe the day will come when Ireland itself will
come crawling to Great Britain and say * For God's sake
restore us to the position we had formerly in the United
Parliament of the two countries/ There is no one in the
world who would be more pleased to see an absolute unity
in Ireland than I would, and it could be purchased
to-morrow, at what does not seem to be a very great price.
If the South and West of Ireland came forward to-morrow
to Ulster and said ' Look here, we have to run our old
island, and we have to run her together, and we will give
up all this everlasting teaching of hatred of England, we
will shake hands with you, and you and we together within
the Empire doing our best for ourselves and the United
Kingdom and for all his Majesty's Dominions will join
together/ I will undertake to say that Ulster would accept
the handshake and would do it for the sake of this country,
our own sake, and the sake of the whole Empire/'

A few days later, addressing His constituents in
Belfast, he explained his reasons for advising Ulster
to accept and work the terms of the Act. He
admitted that he himself and those in Ulster had
never asked for, never wanted, and never believed
in Home Rule in any shape or form. In the old
form in which Mr. Asquith had put it upon the
Statute Book they had been prepared to fight against
it because it not only deprived them of their position
in the United Kingdom, but it claimed the power to
put them under the Sinn Fein Parliament in Dublin.
That, they said, no Government on earth had the
right to do, could do, or would try to do. The

EVENTS IN ULSTI

under the present A s different. They

were not put under the Sinn Fein Parliament. They
had been told that they could govern themselves.
Nobody was ever mad enough to fight against some-
body telling them to govern themselves, therefore he
advised the people of North-East Ulster, and he
never felt any doubt of the advice he gave, that as
they had been offered the right to govern themselves
it was their duty to accept that offer. While that
closed one chapter in the history of Ulster, and if it
closed it not with absolute victory for Ulster, it
closed it, at all events, with this declaration on
U'lialf <>t Great Britain, and, he believed, on behalf
of the whole Empire, that the services of Ulster in
the past had been such, and her loyalty and her
progress had been such, that no Government for
{x)litical or other purposes would have the right to
take away her independence and place her under a
government which she would abhor and detest.
Ulster, therefore, remained as she always had been,
unconquered and unconquerable.

Early in March Mr. de Valera gave an inter \
to the representative of the Associated Press of
America, in the course of which he said :—

" The Partition A< : ii an Act of a foreign and hostile
assembly. The Irish people as a whole will never
it. The people even of the Six Count
consulted about it in any recognised way. It was designed
to perpetuate division and Motional rancour annm^t Irish-
men. . . . When the elect inns come, they will p«-
that industrial I'lster is n«»t so Mind to its owii int<
to court being severed fi in the

Agricultural areas in the rest of the island. The bo
Hel- ,1s which is now operating is but the opening

B • »!' "hat will heroine :l complete and absolute exclusion
"f 1> if the Partition Act is put into etV.

The enormity of Mr. de Valera 's error and

60 IRELAND IN 1921.

the futility of his threat were shortly to be
demonstrated.

On April 25th Sir James Craig issued a
Manifesto to the Loyalist Electors of Northern
Ireland, in the course of which he said : —

" Those for whom I venture to speak place in the
forefront of their ideals and aspirations devotion to the
Throne, close union with Great Britain, pride in the
British Empire, and an earnest desire for peace throughout
Ireland. . . . The first Parliament will be faced with
problems gravely affecting the future. The best way to
extend our resources, expand trade, stabilise agriculture
and other industries, remodel education, amend the
licensing laws, and ensure a brighter future for the great
masses of workers in our midst is to begin by concentrating
on the supreme issue of securing a strong working majority
without which the Government could not be carried on,
and without which disaster must inevitably follow. Upon
that majority will rest the responsibility of nominating the
Northern quota in the Council of Ireland, where our
representatives will be charged with the important duty
of protecting our interests and of guarding the rights and
privileges of the Six Counties against encroachment by the
Southern Parliament. To put it plainly, failure to secure
an effective working majority would mean immediate

submergment in a Dublin Parliament The fate

of the Six Counties hangs in the balance, and with the
Six Counties the interests of Loyalists in other parts of
Ireland. The eyes, both of friends throughout the Empire,
who wish us success, and of enemies who desire our failure,
will be watching our first proceedings. It is our duty,
therefore, not only to lay aside minor issues and, if need
be, to sacrifice personal interests, but to work with whole-
hearted energy and goodwill between now and the day of
the poll in order to secure the election of those candidates
alone who can be trusted worthily to represent the great
cause which we all have at heart. We have overcome many
a crisis, weathered many a storm. Let us together win yet
another victory and lay the foundation of a model
Parliament of our own."

Sir James Craig was not the man to restrict his
efforts to the issue of manifestoes or to incur the
reproach of irreconcilability from the wavering

EVENTS IN ULST1 (if

lion of his electors. The accusation mi^ht at any
time be levelled against Ulster that she alone stood
in the way of lush peace, and that a conciliatory
gesture on her part, which might have reconciled the
South to the Act, had never been made. Sir James
determined that such a gesture should be made in the
most impressive c inn instances possible, with little
hope that it would bear fruit, indeed, but in the
knowledge that the very fact of his having made it
would strengthen his position at the polls and
demonstrate to the world that it was not the fault
of Ulster if Irish unity should be as remote as ever.

The first hint of such a move was made by him at
Banbridge on May 2nd. He declared that he
himself would accept membership of the Council of
Ireland, and that if de Valera's party became
supreme in the South as the result of the elections,
it was for de Valera himself to take a similar step,
in order that mutual discussion might take place on
all matters affecting the welfare of Ireland as a
whole. On the following day at Bangor he put the
matter yet more plainly. If it were considered
necessary to hold meetings between Mr. de Valera
and himself, he said, he was perfectly prepared to
meet Mr. de Valera. But the Act provided for such
meetings. The first duty laid down by the Act was
to found the Council of Ireland. The first duty of
his colleagues and himself would be to select a band
of men to p> down or wait in Ulster for the others.

•me up and meet them on the Council of Ireland.
He promised, with the approval of his colleagues,
to go into that Council himself, and it was for Mr.
de Valera and his colleagues to meet him there, if
they were supreme in the South and West, and

62 IRELAND IN 1921.

discuss all matters which were considered to be for
the benefit of Ireland as a whole.

That Mr. de Valera would not accept Sir James
Craig's challenge to meet him in the lists of the
Council was already evident. Not more than a
couple of days earlier the Bail had issued a
proclamation to the effect that although that body,
as the Representative Assembly of the Irish
Republic, had consented to recognise the popular
elections under the Act, " in order that the will of
the people may once more be demonstrated," they
forbade the electoral bodies specified in the Act to
take any steps in the election of candidates to the
Senate of Southern Ireland. It was hardly likely
that the Dail would be inclined to recognise the
Council any more than the Senate. But the
gauntlet had been flung, and the challenger had
reason to know that it would not be allowed to
remain unheeded. On May 4th Sir James left
Belfast hurriedly at the request of Lord Fitzalan,
and proceeded to Dublin to meet the new Viceroy.
In Dublin came the answer to the challenge, in the
form of an invitation from Mr. de Valera to meet
him at a rendezvous close by. Sir James accepted,
and an informal conference between the two leaders
took place.

The incident caused a considerable sensation at
the time, and in England, at least, high hopes were
entertained that the meeting might be repeated and
that a more formal conference might ensue between
representatives of North and South, which would
result in a compromise over the working of the Act.
It was suggested that the British Government had
arranged the meeting, that it was part of the secret

EVENTS IN ULSTER. «3

" peace moves ' then snp{>osed to be proceed)
As a matter of fact, it was nothing more than the
answer to Sir James Craig's challenge, and it
displayed a hiLrh degree of courage and statesman-
ship on the part of the Ulster leader that the
meeting took place. Although nothing further came
of it. although Sir dames must from the first have

in led n as a forlorn hope, the position of the
I'nionists and their programme were immensely
strengthened both in Ulster and in the eyes of the
world. The challenge had emanated from them, no
longer could it be said that the obstinacy of Ulster
blocked the way to peace.

Speaking at Holywood on his return, Sir James
made able apology for his action. Could he, as the
leader of the men and women of Ulster, refuse the
invitation of Mr. de Valera to meet him and to do
\\ hat he could to bring peace to the land, to discuss
the whole future of the country and to do what he

id to try to come to some understanding whereby
the foul campaign of murder could be mitigated?
So the incident terminated, and the eyes of Ulster
nore centred upon the elections.

The nominations took place on May 13th. The

had established fifty-two seats in the Northern

Parliament, and for these the Unionists put forward

forty candidates, the Nationalists twelve, Labour

and Sinn Fein twenty. Mr. de Valera was

nominated for County Down, and Mr. Michael

Collins for Anna The uii|x>pularity of the

Labour candidates was displayed from the outset.

On the 17th, a hand of Unionist shipyard workers

A possession of the Ulster Hall in order to piv\
its use by a Labour demonstration. On the arrival

64 IRELAND IN 1921.

of the Labour candidates they were invited to lay
their views before the gathering, but this, probably
wisely, they declined to do. The invaders proceeded
to hold a meeting of their own, and their temper was
shown by the fact that an interrupter was severely
handled and had to be removed to hospital. On the
same day armed and masked men attacked Mr.
Robert Moore, a prominent Belfast Labour leader,
in his office, fortunately without fatal results.

Despite all the signs of the superior strength of
their party in Ulster, the Unionists were extremely
nervous lest they should fail to secure the overwhelm-
ing majority necessary to justify in the eyes of the
world their insistence on partition. The usual
danger of over-confidence seemed to offer a
possibility of the overthrow of their hopes. The
mass of the Unionist electors were so certain that all
men must subscribe to the policy they themselves
had held since childhood, that it seemed to them
unnecessary to go to the trouble of recording
their opinions at the poll. This spirit gave hope
to the Nationalist-Sinn-Fein combination. The
election was to be conducted under the system of
proportional representation, and it was argued,
rightly or wrongly, that in the event of a small poll
the minority parties obtained more than their fair
share of the members elected. The Nationalist
leaders were determined to bring into the field every
ounce of their strength. Their voters were told that
under the system of proportional representation
there was a probability, almost amounting to a
certainty, of killing partition if all the people who
dreaded and abhorred it asserted and exercised their
right to vote. Sir James Craig even allowed a note

EVENTS IN ULSTEl: 65

of anxiety to creep into his public utterances. His
oppoii, capital out of his remark to the

effect that it I'l sin-men could not stand together
they must fall together rather tlian pay tribute to
the terrorists of the country.

On May ±>rd, the eve of the poll, Sir James

••(1 his final message.

" The cause is sacn-d and worthy of «-very personal

sacrifice. . . . The Union -lark must sweep the polU.

! he eyes of our t throughout the Empire

an- upon u^. I^-t them s«'*» that we are as determined as

they to uphold the cause of loyalty."

This was supplemented by a message received
from Sir Kduard Carson.

" I rely up , loyalist man and woman in I':

t<» rally round you to morrow in your «^reat fight for civil
and DI iih.'rty. Ulster must be saved from the

tyran he assassin vote.'*

Sinn Fein agencies published a rival message
from Mr. de Valera.

" Men and women of North-East Ulster, politicians
and stat»'snn'ii d*'< -lare the Irish problem to be insoluble,
Km you plain people ran solve it in a few hours to-morrow

in tin' quirt and privacy of the polling booth. Vote
to-nmrrow avrain>t war with your fellow countrymen. Vote
that brother's hand may not have to be raised against
brother'*. Vote so that there may be an end to boycott
and retaliation, to partition, disunion, and ruin. Orange
and (IHM-FI together ran command the fiitur
i> Ireland p»'a»-«'ful. jirospt-rous, and happy. Vote for it."

In I VI fast it^lf the Unionists seemed to be full
of confidence. Throughout the city triumphal
aivht's wero orvi'trd, and in some places Unionist
enthusiasts painted the pavements in stripes of red
white and hlue. The supply of Union Jacks ran
cut at an early stai;e of the proceedings, and a
stranger would hardly have imagined that tl
could be any doubt as to the result. But the Sinn

i

66 IRELAND IN 1921.

Fein preparations were as earnest if less demonstra-
tive. Unionist voters were inundated with leaflets,
and the walls plastered with posters, containing the
wildest prognostics of the fearful things that would
happen if partition should be perpetuated. More
practical steps to secure a majority were taken by
them in the outlying districts. Bridges over which
Unionist communities would have to pass in order
to reach the polling stations were destroyed, nails
were scattered on the roads to make them impassable
for motorists. The influence of the Roman Catholic
Church was brought to bear to ensure that all
Catholic voters supported the Nationalist or Sinn
Fein candidates, the particular brand of non-
Unionism being left to the voter's personal
preference. The Labour candidates were disre-
garded, the coming fight at the polls was to be a
straight one between Partition and Non-Partition.
May 24th, Empire Day, opened in a blaze of
colour and excitement. The polling booths were
thronged long before their hours of opening by
constituents anxious to record their votes. Early in
the day more than half the electors had polled, and
it was estimated by evening that ninety per cent., an
unprecedented proportion, of the electors in the
Province had voted. A certain amount of rioting
and disorder took place, as might have been
expected, considering the height to which party
spirit had been raised by the prospects of the election
and all that hung upon it. The most elaborate
precautions were taken by the authorities to prevent
serious outbreaks and to protect the ballot-boxes.
Military and police patrolled the city of Belfast and
mounted guard at the polling stations; in the

EVENTS IN ULSTER 67

utry districts they were reinforced by the special
constables. As It of these precautions the

election passed olT \\itlmut serious incident.

On the 'Jiith the returns began to be made public.
The Act had allotted sixteen seats to the city of
I M fast, and for these sixteen vacancies fifteen
Unionist candidates had stood. Against them had
ed five Nationalists and five Sinn Feiners.
The whole of the fifteen Unionists were returned,
and of their opponents one Nationalist only, Mr.
Devlin, in the West Division of the city. The total
defeat of the Sinn Fein element caused widespread

u-ing throughout the city, except in the
Nationalist quarters, where some slight rioting took
place. During the following days, the results in
the provincial constituencies came in. Queen's
University returned four Unionists; County Antrim,
out of its seven allotted seats, returned five
Unionists, one Nationalist, and one Sinn Feiner;
County Armagh, out of four seats, returned two
Unionists. <>ne Nationalist, and one Sinn Feiner;
the combined counties of Fermanagh and Tyrone,
out .;ht seats, returned four Unionists, one

Nationalist, and three Sinn Feiners; Derry City and
County, out of five seats, returned four Unionists
and one Nationalist ; and County Down, after a

ies of recounts and final allotments necessitated
by the system, six Unionists, of whom Sir James
Craig headed the poll, one Sinn Feiner, Mr. de
Valeni, and one Nationalist. Mr. Devlin, already
returned for West Belfast, was again returned

lie Nationalist member for County Antrim. The
Sinn Fein members returned included Messrs.
Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith. Of the total

68

IRELAND IN 1921.

of forty Unionist candidates nominated, not one
failed to secure election. This fact in itself is a
striking demonstration of the antipathy of Ulster
to the policy and methods of Sinn Fein, and of the
determination of the Province to resist to the utmost
any attempt to incorporate it in an united Ireland,
so long as the South adhered to the domination of
Sinn Fein. In Tyrone and Fermanagh alone was
there any doubt as to the issue. Here the Unionists
and the Nationalist-Sinn Fein group had shared the
honours, an omen of the dissension and warfare
which were to arise later.

All was now ready for the first meeting of the
first Northern Parliament, except the possession of
a suitable building. The Belfast Corporation was
approached for the loan of the City Hall, pending
the provision of other premises, and the request was
readily granted. The preliminary meeting was
fixed for June 7th, and the formal opening for the
21st of the same month. An unpleasant reminder
that the irreconcilable element were unlikely to abide
peacefully by the result of the elections came on
May 31st. A determined effort was made to destroy
the premises of the firm who supplied the transport
for the removal of the ballot-boxes after the election.
A number of raiders held up the caretaker on the
premises and poured paraffin over the offices and set
them on fire. The fire was fortunately extinguished
before any great damage was done.

On June 4th Sir James Craig had a magnificent
reception on the occasion of his addressing the Ulster
Unionist Association for the first time since the
election. In his speech he thanked the people of
Ulster for securing such a decisive result, and

EVENTS IN ULSTER. 69

continued by appealing to the South to follow their
example, and instead of standing aloof from the
Act, to grapple with the machinery which lay to
their hand, and so work out the salvation of the
country. If that were done he would guarantee
that the men of the South and West would find the
men of the North rejoicing with them, and not
jealous of their success. They in the North would
be only too delighted to see the harbours of Cork and

•w here turned into great engines of industry, the
same as they had in the North of Ireland. But
having said so much, let it be clear that there was to
be no tampering whatever with the rights Ulster had
been granted under the Act. There were persons
who were continually attempting to fritter away
those rights, but the position he had been placed in
an impregnable position, because, instead of
dealing with those who in the past had ever been
ready to give away the rights of Ulster, their

i lies would now have to deal with a man who
would p;> down into the grave sooner than betray by
one single inch the rights of Ulstermen as British
citizens.

The first Northern Parliament was assembled in
t he City Hall at Belfast on June 7th for the purpose
of transartini: preliminary business, in the presence
of the Lord Lieutenant. The Nationalist and Sinn
TYin members did not attend, and the proceedings
were purely formal. But at a luncheon held subse-

ntly, Sir James Craig announced the event which
he had previously foreshadowed, namely, that the
King had consented to open the Parliament of
Northern Ireland on June 22nd.

The announcement was greeted with the wildest

70 IRELAND IN 1921.

enthusiasm throughout loyal Ulster. Preparations
were at once begun to give the Royal party a
reception such as had never before been witnessed in
Ireland. It was evident that the great majority of
the people meant to utilise the occasion as an oppor-
tunity of displaying the traditional affection of
Ulster for the Throne, as well as their individual
loyalty to its occupant. At the same time the
leaders of Sinn Fein determined to do everything in
their power to mar the demonstration of unanimity
which it was the desire of the Unionists to present.
Their opportunity soon came. On the night of
Saturday, the llth, a quarrel between a group of
men in one of the areas of the city in which Unionists
and Nationalists lived in close proximity developed
with extraordinary rapidity into a battle in which
revolvers and stones were freely used. Some twenty
people were injured, and it was not until some hours
had elapsed that the police were able to restore
order. The incident in itself was of no particular
significance in the long and unhappy list of such
affrays which disfigures the history of Belfast in
recent years, but it led to a series of murders which
necessarily embittered the feeling between the
factions. In the early hours of the morning a
motor-van drove up to the door of residents in the
northern part of the city, three of whom were
dragged from their beds and murdered in cold blood.
On the following night the rioting was renewed,
and in the course of it four persons were killed,
including a special constable of the name of Sturdy.
On the 13th matters looked very serious. At the
time when the workers were making their way to
the shipyards, they were held up by a gang of Sinn

EVENTS IN ULSTER. 71

Fein gunmen, who had taken up a position com-
manding their line of approach to their work. The

!<j were not dislodged until several men had been

,mled. On the same date the funeral cortege of
Special Constable Sturdy was molested as it passed
a Sinn Fein quarter, and in the fracas which ensued
several people were injured. News was also
received of an k upon the source of the city's

water supply in the Mourne Mountains, in the course
of which considerable damage was done. For some
days the rioting continued. At the height of the
trouble the gunmen actually entrenched themselves
in the smaller streets, firing upon all who passed,
and necessitating a regular assault by the Crown
Forces to dislodge them. It was obviously the
intention of the Sinn Feiners to reduce the city to
such a state of disorder that the visit of the King,
and possibly the opening of Parliament itself, would
have to be postponed. However, by means of a
concentration of troops and police, the authori:
managed to avert such a calamity, and the ferment
iually died down.

In the meanwhile the business of election of the
Northern Senate had been completed. The Act
provided that twenty-four senators were to be elected
on the system of proportional representation by the
members of the Northern House of Commons. On
this principle, the parties would have been entitled
to representation in the Senate to the extent of
eighteen Unionist monitors, three Nationalist
members, and three Sinn Fein memK No

nominations \ eived from either the Sinn Fein

\ationalist members of the Commons, and finally
the required number of senators were nominated

72 IRELAND IN 1921.

unopposed from the ranks of the Unionist party.
The Senate held its first session on June 20th.

On the 23rd the King opened the Northern
Parliament in state, amid scenes of the greatest
enthusiasm. The enthusiasm was in the first place
for the King, who had by his action in opening
Parliament in person paid the highest possible
compliment to the new State of Northern Ireland.
No doubt many of those who cheered the Royal
route through the city had had misgivings as to the
success which should ultimately attend the great
experiment of Home Rule and partition. But in
the main the city, and with it the whole of Ulster,
realised the significance of the event which was
responsible for the visit of the King, and acclaimed
it as the charter which would guarantee them from
all further danger of aggression. The mind of
Ulster was made up. Rightly or wrongly she
regarded all attempts to induce her to co-operate
with the South except on her own terms as
aggression, and rightly or wrongly she believed that
the powers given her under the Act defended her
from the irritation of English inducements to alter
her position. In her eyes the pomp attending the
opening of her first Parliament was the bright robe
adorning the fair form of the new-born Ulster
Liberty, liberty to continue her glorious resistance
against the powers of evil, or, as her enemies had it,
to continue in her path of obstinacy and bigotry.

But, as events proved, the historical importance
of the King's visit was due not so much to its effect
upon Ulster, but to its effect upon the rest of Ireland.
The King's Speech contained the first hint of the
altering circumstances which ended in the signing

EVENTS IN ULSTER. 73

of the London Treaty of December. From the
moment of its delivery, a change took place in the
relations between Britain and the South, a hope
e that in negotiation rather than by force of
arms peace would be attained. The passages con-
taining this hint were as follows:—

" Full partnersli ij> in the United Kingdom and

religious freedom Ireland has long- enjoyed. She now has

conferred upon her the duty of dealing- with all the

i tasks of domestic legislation and government;

I f» .1 no misgiving as to the spirit in which you who

stand here to-day will carry out the all-important functions

entrusted to your care.

" My hope is broader still. The eyes of the whole
Kmpire are on Ireland to-day. ... I speak from a full
iien I pray that my coming to Ireland to-day may
prove to be the first step towards an end of strife amongst
her people, whatever their race or creed. In that hope I
appeal to all Irishmen to pause, to stretch out the hand of
forebearance and conciliation, to forgive and to forget, and
to join in making for the land which they love a new era of
peace, contentment, and good-will. It is my earnest desire
that in Southern Ireland too there may ere long take place
a parallel to what is now passing in this hall; that there a
similar occasion may present itself and a similar ceremony
be performed.

" For this the Parliament of the United Kingdom ha>
in the fullest measure provided the powers; for this the
Parliament of Ulster is pointing the way. The future lies
in the hands of my Irish people themselv May this

historic gathering be the prelude of a day in whirh the

;! prople. North and South, under one Parliament or
tun, as those Parliaments may themselves deride, shall
worV n romnion 1 Ireland upon the sure

foundation of mutual justice and respect.*'

The of the King passed off without

untownrd incident, and Ulster set to work to govern
ording to her lights.

CHAPTER IV.

In order that we may fully realise the magnitude
of the change in the Irish situation during the
following month, it will be necessary to examine in
some detail the events of the month of June. We
have already dealt with the course of events in the
North, and have seen the birth of the new State
created by the Government of Ireland Act. It is
now time to survey the very different conditions
which obtained in the South.

It must be repeated that the passing of the Act
and the elections held under it in the South had no
influence on the state of the country. Sinn Fein
had, as already mentioned, sanctioned the elections,
and the members so elected regarded themselves as
members of the Dail to which they were entitled to
entry on taking the oath of allegiance to the
Republic. But Sinn Fein refused to allow elections
to take place for the Senate of Southern Ireland,
or to carry out any of the provisions of the Act.
The Act provided that unless at least half of the
members of the Southern Parliament took the oath
within a fortnight of the summoning of Parliament,
the Lord Lieutenant had power to dissolve that
Parliament, and to take steps to govern the South
with the assistance of a legislative assembly, a
process which would have been tantamount to a

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 75

continuance of British rule. This was the prospect
facing the South throughout the month, for it soon
became obvious that Sinn Fein had no intention of
allowing the Southern Parliament to function.
Both sides knew that a crisis was inevitable, that
the failure of the Act and open and declared war
were inseparable. The only hope of averting the
catastrophe lay in negotiation, and the prospects
of success by this means seemed too slender to hang
the smallest hope upon.

Meanwhile the Republicans proceeded with an
ever intensified campaign of outrage, to which the
Crown Forces replied by a policy of burning the
houses of those suspected to be in collusion with the
rebels. This policy failed as it was bound to do.
The rebels merely imitated it on a larger scale, and
for every house burnt by the Crown Forces, they
destroyed the mansion of some well-known loyalist.
Is was merely a matter of time before the country
must become uninhabitable from lack of housing.
Public opinion in England had no patience with
such methods. It was obvious that the burning of
houses could have little or no deterrent effect upon
the operations of the I.R.A., and it was far too late
to suppose that the people as a whole were in a
position to refuse aid to the rebels even though the
penalty were the destruction of their homes.

In the course of a debate in the House of
Commons on June 1st the objections to the Govern-
ment's policy were voiced from all quarters of the
House, and the futility of the proceedings was
displayed. General Seely, in opening the debate,
prefaced his criticism by the statement that no blame
attached to the troops themselves, who acted stn

76 IRELAND IN 1921.

in accordance with their orders. He raised the issue
that the Government had failed to issue orders in
accordance with the general principles laid down by
the Chief Secretary, namely, that there should be
no destructions except on purely military grounds,
for instance, that the premises had been used as
cover for an ambush, or that the occupants were
known to have participated in operations against
the Crown Forces. He alleged that people's homes
were destroyed as reprisal pure and simple, in the
absence of incriminating reasons. He cited an
instance of the destruction, under orders of the
Competent Military Authority, of a house in
which were residing two women of known loyalist
sympathies. The question was, who ordered the
reprisals? There were two authorities in Ireland,
and there was a divergence of policy between them.
One man commanded the troops, and another
commanded the police, and there was no proper
co-ordination between them. To end the trouble
the authority must be put in the hands of one man.
In the latter part of his speech General Seely
approached the source of the trouble very nearly,
but failed to put his finger on the exact spot. The
difficulty was, not that one man commanded the
troops and another the police, but that there were
two authorities in Ireland, the civil and the
military, and that their opinions frequently clashed.
Indeed, the cleavage began even higher. In the
Cabinet itself there was no unanimity as to the
measures to be taken to meet the conditions in
Ireland, and as a result the policy of the Cabinet
itself fluctuated, leaning alternately to coercion
and conciliation. This vacillation was naturally

AFFAIliS IN JUNE. 77

reflected in the ranks of those in who.-*' hands lay
the administration of the country. Dublin Castle,
the seat of the civil power, was staffed almost
entirely by men who had never seen active ser\j
and whose ideas of the conditions under which the
Crown Forces served was academic in the extreme.
The police forces were under the command of men
with distinguished military records, controlling a
comparatively small force split up into small detach-
ment s scattered all over the country. The Army in
Ireland was naturally part of the military forces of
the Crown, and received the instructions of the
Cabinet through the Secretary of State for War.
Further, in Ireland generally the civil power was
naturally supreme, as in the case of all countries
nominally at peace. But the South-West had been
proclaimed under martial law. If martial la\s
means anything, it means the supersession of the
civil power by the military, and the release of the
Commander in the field from all restraint. The
remedy of the civil government, should the Com-
mander act in contradiction to the general policy
laid down for his guidance, is to replace him or to
terminate the state of martial law and resume the
reins of government. But in Ireland martial la\v
became little more than a name. The Commander
was perpetually hampered in his actions by the
nts of the civil power; the Courts were permitted
to question and suspend the sentences imposed by
Courts Martial convened by him. Division of
authority caused friction and mutual suspicion
botwoen the administrators on the civil and military
sides resjHvtively. The police were normally
controlled by the Chief Secretary's department, but

78 IRELAND IN 1921.

in the martial law area they acted under the orders
of the Competent Military Authority. With such
division of control, there was naturally deviation of
policy. And the position was further complicated
by the fact that the Chief Secretary was answerable
to Parliament for events which took place through-
out Ireland, although a large part of the
country was under martial law, and therefore
technically beyond his jurisdiction. His position
was unenviable, and a weaker man might well have
been overwhelmed by the unequal burden.

But to return to the debate, which abounded in
competent criticism of this strange policy. Colonel
Guinness maintained that it was contrary to British
justice that anyone should be punished unheard.
He quoted evidence to show that the policy of official
reprisal was costing more to the friends of England
than to her enemies. The military authorities
burned down a house whose value was some hundreds
of pounds, whereupon the rebels retaliated by
destroying the property of some unfortunate loyalist
to the value of tens of thousands. This policy was
driving the few friends of England left in Ireland
into the arms of Sinn Fein. Further, it was not
fair to put this work upon the troops. There was
nothing more repugnant to their nature than the
destruction of houses in cold blood.

Lord Winterton held that if there must be
military action in Ireland it should be short, sharp,
and decisive. A continuance of guerilla warfare
was intolerable, and was producing no good effect.
The leader of the Labour Party appealed to the
Chief Secretary to reverse his disastrous policy.

The Chief Secretary, in his reply, endeavoured

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 79

to deal with this critieism. He declared that in the
martial law area there was absolute unity of
command. This was only possible under martial
law, and it might be necessary to extend that system
of Government. He still hoped that the Southern
Parliament would meet and assume responsibility
for good government. If it did not, the Govern-
ment would have a new situation to deal with.
Oilk-ial reprisals were treated as most serious and
abnormal acts. In that part of the country where
martial law had not been proclaimed there had
never been official reprisals. He admitted that it

8 an open question whether reprisals were
satisfactory in the long run. He was prepared to
discuss the question with the Commander-in-Chief ,
and to bring before him the points raised in the
debate.

Meanwhile the Republican campaign against
the Forces of the Crown was becoming ever more
intense. During the first days of the month, the

nalties of the R.I.C. reached the appalling

ire of fourteen killed, including two District
Inspectors, and twelve wounded, all incurred in
three ambushes within two days. On the last day
of May a mine was exploded beneath a road by
which the Hampshire Regiment were marching to
musketry practice at Youghal, in County Cork,
soldiers were killed and twenty-one wounded.
Throughout Ireland the number of outrages in-
creased. Nor were the activities of the rebels

ifined to their own country. On the night of the
7th, roving gangs of Sinn Fein sympathisers
conceived the idea of venting their spite on England
by the wholesale cutting of telegraph and telephone

80 IRELAND IN 1921.

wires, both in the metropolitan district and round
Liverpool. The culminating point of the outrage
campaign was the mining and derailment of a train
in which a portion of the troops which had formed
the King's escort during the opening of the
Northern Parliament were returning to their
stations in the South. The outrage took place on
the 24th, at a spot where the railway passes through
hilly and uninhabited country on the border between
North and South. Four troopers of the 10th
Royal Hussars were killed and twenty wounded,
and in addition eighty horses were killed or had to
be destroyed. It was evident that, from a military
point of view at least, the Government's policy in
Ireland had failed, and that it was no longer capable
of protecting its servants from the increasing danger
of assassination.

Even the Ministers who had initiated the policy
were now prepared to admit its failure. In the
House of Lords the Lord Chancellor replied on the
21st to a debate on Lord Donoughmore's motion
" That this House is of the opinion that the
situation in Ireland urgently requires that his
Majesty's Government should determine forthwith
what amendments they are prepared to propose, and
authorise negotiations to be opened on such terms
as they think calculated to terminate the present
deadlock." His speech was a careful exposition of
the attitude of the Government at that time, and
the gist of it is as follows : —

" I cannot see that in any way the breakdown of our
proposals in relation to the South would aggravate very
seriously the situation. ... If this Bill had never
become an Act we should have seen the same system of
government continued in force. It is a system to which

A I FAIRS IN JUNE. 81

no I :aan can look with - ... How

it l>e worse if for the moment our proposals are not

pted in tin- Smith-' Not only did we anticipate I
this fa,1 place, hut 1 was at pains dur

the .sec, make it plain that the

rnment seriously entertained the apprehension of
what has taken place.

" The noble Marqu how we shall deal with thai

situation. The Viceroy in the South of Ireland will ho in
tin* JM. >it ion of a constitutional monarch. He will he
assi^ ;-s who are described in the Act itself.

, will' In- larTantl oi the Crown, and it would be n

ect if they were described as members of a council

advising th- y and holding office at the pleasure of

the Crown. The machinery by which they will carry on

the p»ve rnment of the country will not differ very

-ably from the machinery by which it has !••

mpted to carry out the government of the country under
the circumstances which exist to-day.

"It cannot he said, and ought not to be said, that the

has failed 1 it has not in itself ameliorated the

conditions of Irish life. The mischiefs which it found in

Ireland were mischiefs little likely to be corrected by Act

of Parliament.

" In Ireland — in the words of an illustrious pre-
decessor of mine — there is no longer ' a kind of war '; it

. >mall war that is •roing1 on there. Week by week
month by month its true character has developed, and if I
nui- frankly I think that the history of the last

three n ;as been the history of the failure of our

military methods to keep pace with and to overcome the
military methods which have been taken by our opponents.
This leads quite clearly to the conclusion that whatever
ctTo }„• required to deal with the situation in Ireland

will }>e fort1 --e of sacrifice it inv.>

to the inhal ... If I am ri^ht

s a war in which those who direct it will

be content with nothii lian that which they have

repeatedly I W require, namely, open independence

and a Hepuhlic for Ireland, if that he true then it is at least

ain that these are claims which it has i
hern possible for this count i •. and which it never

will bfl possible for this country to concede, :n»d which,
however long the struggle lasts, this country never will
concede."

82 IRELAND IN 1921.

The Parliament of Southern Ireland had been
summoned to meet on June 28th, and despite the
change which had come over the face of affairs on
the eve of this meeting, a change to be described in a
subsequent chapter, it was not considered advisable
to alter one of the * appointed days ' under the
Act. The Council Room of the Department of
Agriculture and Technical Instruction was chosen
for the purpose, and the whole ceremony occupied
but a few minutes. The only persons who obeyed
the summons were, in the Upper House, the senators
nominated by the Lord Lieutenant, and in the Lower
House, the four members for Dublin University.
The Lord Chief Justice addressed those present as
follows : —

" Senators and members of the House of Commons of
Southern Ireland, — I have it in command from his Majesty
to let you know that as soon as senators and a sufficient
number of members of the House of Commons have been
sworn, the causes of his Majesty calling this Parliament of
Southern Ireland will be declared to you.

1 Members of the House of Commons, — You will be
sensible that the co-operation of a larger number of
members of your House than are present here to-day is to
be desired for the election of a person to whom the office
of Speaker should be entrusted. You will, however,
choose one of your number to act as your chairman for the
time being, and it will fall to the person so chosen to direct
the times and manner in which the oath may be taken in
your House. I am charged to remind you that by law the
continuance of this Parliament is not assured unless the
oath is taken by one-half at least of the total number of
members of your House within fourteen days from to-day.

:< Members of the Senate, — Your presence here to-day
testifies to the willingness of considerable and influential
sections of the population of Southern Ireland to accept
the powers and responsibilities of self-government. You
will doubtless wish to ratify this acceptance and confirm
your position as senators without delay, and the necessary
arrangements will be made for the purpose. "

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 83

The Lord Chief Just ire then retired from the
House, followed by the four members of the House
of Commons. The senators were then sworn, and
Parliament adjourned until July i:Uh. The event

ited no interest whatever in the city or in the
South of Ireland.

We must now turn to an event which, while of no
particular significance in itseli', \sas imjx>rtant from
the point of \ie\v of the results \shirh followed it.
One of the first acts of the authorities as soon as the

ent of the Sinn Fein campaign became manifest,
the establishment of an Intelligence Service.
A lai-Lv part of the duties of this service was to
secure information which would lead to the capture
of the rebel leaders, or at all events to the discovery
of their plans. Considering the extreme difficulty
of operating in such a country as Ireland, where
every man's hand is against the police under any
circumstances, and where no man dare be even
suspected of giving information, this service per-
formed brilliant work. Although it never succeeded
in laying its hands upon any spectacular individual,
tin* amount of useful information secured by it

1 a ordinary, and it is not too much to say that by
the middle of the year there was very little of the
organisation or objectives of the rebels which was
unknown to the authorities. Indeed, had the
authorities acted more frequently upon the informa-

ipplied to them by the Intelligence Servi
many of the tragedies of the war period mi^ht have
been avoided. Be this as it may, the Intelligence

vice had been ordered not to employ their
information to secure the arrest of certain
individuals, amongst whom was Mr. de Valera. It

84 IRELAND IN 1921.

was considered better that he should remain at large,
in order that the authorities might have the head of
the Sinn Fein organisation with whom to treat
should occasion arise. This order was loyally
obeyed, despite the difficulty of trying not to see him.
But it proved impossible to secure so distinguished
a person from accidents. On the evening of the
22nd, a party of the Worcestershire Regiment
engaged in searching houses at Blackrock, near
Dublin, stumbled upon a suspicious individual
who, upon further investigation, proved to possess
some incriminating documents. He was therefore
arrested, and the party took him to the military
barracks. Here he was for the first time recognised
as the " President," and detained until further
orders. He was released next day, upon the orders
of the civil authorities, but the papers found in his
possession were retained.

From them may be gleaned a very good idea of
the state of affairs as seen through Sinn Fein eyes
during the first six months of the year. The
position in which Mr. de Valera found himself upon
his return from America has already been suggested,
and the documents to be quoted below must be read
in that light.

Dealing first with the I.R.A. Throughout the
whole warlike period the status of the I.R.A. had
been a disputed point. Its operations were not
carried out in uniform, and there was no means of
distinguishing its members from the remainder of
the civilian population. Further, the Dail had
always been very chary of accepting responsibility
for the campaign of outrage. But it was evident
that this attitude could not be continued with the

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 85

intrnsifiration of the I. R.A. campaign, even if this
did net result in ojM'ii war with the British troops.
Mr. Erskine Childers examined the matter, and
produced as a result a thesis of some twenty pages
on the advisability or otherwise of assuming the
belligerent status, in the course of which he came to
the conclusion that there was nothing to be gained
by avoiding the responsibility of the Dail for the
ions of the I. R.A. This suggestion appears to
have been favourably received, for on June 22nd
Mr. de Valera wrote as follows to the Minister of
Defence, Mr. Cathal Hrugha, or Burgess:—

" To counter the faction move in America, which, as

\«»u notice, i> heing brought to affect even Labour, and to

on <>t the Army clear for the Bishops and

is. 1 think that something like the enclosed draft should
be - hy you and the two General Officers and

published in conjunction with the Cabinet statement."

The draft on closed runs as follows :

- an attempt is being made by British Propa-

gaii'i to misrepresent the Position of the

•I the KepuMir, we. the underpinned ( HHcers-in-

Chiet', declare that the Army <>t the Republic lias but one

alle; namely, to the elected Government of the

'itdic \\ --ular military arm it is, by \\\

authority we and all subordinate officers hold our
Commissions, and whose orders we have sworn to obey.
(Signed T.D. Miniver of Defence.

! I) Chief of General Staff II. (I
T.I). Adjutant General."

The initials ' T.I).' stand for the Erse form of
4 Members <>i the Dail." The ' faction move '
• •rred to by Mr. de Valera in his covering letter
I the (jiiarrel instituted by himself between the
ions organisations of Irish- Americans, in whieh
John Devoy, the old Fenian, was his ehief oppon*
Mr. de Valera's draft for the " Cabinet statement

86 IRELAND IN 1921.

in conjunction with which the military statement
was to be published is as follows : —

" In order to contradict in the most explicit manner
possible the British suggestion that there is, or has been,
a split, division or difference of opinion as regards method
or policy between the President of the Republic and any
members of the Cabinet, we, the entire MEMBERSHIP
OF THE MINISTRY OF BAIL EIREANN, individually
declare that the Republican policy as set forth by the
President is our policy, and that we have not, nor have we
had at any time, either individually or collectively, any
difference with the President, who speaks authoritatively
for all of us in these matters.

" In witness whereof we append our signatures, and
trust that this will be accepted as final by everybody, and
that no one who professes to be our friend, whether in the
United States or elsewhere, will continue to give comfort
to the enemy by propagating false suggestions of rivalry
and division.

(Signed) MEMBERS OF THE CABINET. "

There is a certain pleasing finality about this
document, which is somehow lacking in the contem-
porary pronouncements of the British Cabinet when
faced with similar accusations of disagreement.

The complicity of the " President ' in the
outrage campaign is proved beyond question by the
fact that reports of operations by the I.R.A. were
regularly forwarded to Mr. de Valera by the
Minister of Defence. One of these concerns the
ambush of a troop train at Drumcondra, on the
outskirts of Dublin, on June 16th, in the course of
which three soldiers were wounded, one seriously.

The report is minuted " to President from
M/D ' (M/D is Minister of Defence) and was
obviously made out by the I.R.A!. officer in charge of
the ambushing party for the information of his
superiors. It is as follows : —

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 87

"In lum! dance with orders received tin* troop t
was attacked th. JO a.m. at a point half way

••en Druni'-ondni Road and Botanic Road. The
Ambu-hintf Tarty ron-i>trd of the 0/C and 11 m«-n, 2
mpson Gunners, 8 bombers, on< driver.

ill.- l.uii m 150 yards on the

M' lailway; from St. Joseph's Avenue to

I'pp- >.ld.

" The attack was opened liy liombers, two of them put
two large grenades into two separate carriages. I cannot
say how successful r linder of the bombers were as I

(••mid not see them all from my position. The bombers had
a very good p<»ition and should have done good work as
the train was moving at a slow rate, approx. 12 miles an
hour, and they bom 1 »</d at 15 yards' range.

" Of the two machine guns that were engaged, one
failed to come into action. The reason being that the

mat gunner turned up late, and the substitute man
never handled a gun before and he perhaps made some
mi-takr. Thr M< ..ml Thompson gun checked when four
burst.- had been fired. The 50 or 60 rounds that were fired
appeared to take good effect. I know for a fact that the
enemy had casualties in four carriages. We suffered no
casualties and all our men and guns returned safely.

(Signed) 0/C Guard.

" NOTE.— -I went to Kingsbridge after the attack,
tnree enemy ambulances arrived after 9 a.m. There was a
lot of enemy activity so I retired.

(Signed) 0/C Guard.
10 i m id-day)
h;th June, 1921."

We may now turn from the President's connec-
tion with the I .It. A. to the part played by him in the
elections to the Parliament of Northern Ireland.
On June 14th Mr. Austin Stack wrote to the
President : —

" Memo 45 to hand.

North Fermanagh, We cannot win eit:

d Armagh. of these se;i

To \vhu h Mr. de Valera adds the note : —
" N.F. and Mid. A. The only justification of co:
short of victory would be the consideration of all the

88 IRELAND IN 1921.

Nationalist vote as definitely Republican. If victory
altogether out of the question I do not think a contest
advisable. "

Previous to this, during the end of April and the
beginning of May, Mr. de Valera had been in
communication with Mr. Devlin on the subject of the
alliance between the Nationalists and Sinn Fein.
Mr. de Valera complains that the Nationalists are
making no effort to secure the second preference
votes (under the proportional representation system)
for the Sinn Fein candidates at the forthcoming
Northern elections. Mr. Devlin replies to this
complaint with an assurance that the greatest
possible efforts have been made to bring home to the
people the necessity of giving their second preference
votes to the Sinn Fein candidates. There was also
an amusing correspondence between Messrs, de
Valera, Devlin, Dillon, and Cosgrave, concerning
the disposition of the balance of the Anti-Conscrip-
tion Fund (a fund raised by collection during the
war to fight any attempt of the British Government
to introduce conscription into Ireland). It is
suggested that it might well be used in the Northern
Elections, and that for this purpose it should be
divided equally between the Nationalist and the Sinn
Fein parties. Unfortunately it was impossible to
discover the amount of this balance, until the
correspondents resigned themselves to the fact that
the only man who knew anything about it was the
Lord Mayor of Dublin, who was absent in America.

Shortly before the date of the elections the
President wrote to his Director of Publicity as
follows : —

" I have been told that you intended on the eve of the

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 89

election to puMish a report of a suj mg between

mislead the 1 on

day i n<l« r uould the Independent and

:<tf like •

I an is a strange rumour ufloat that an effort is to

be made by the British Mment and its supporters to

electors on polling <l^y U representing to them

r a meeting between President de V., L.G. and Sir J.

Craig* has just taken place."

Two days later the President made the next move
in this tortuous ami complicated policy. He wrote
suggesting that it the paragraph had not already
been published the Publicity Department might
amend it by transforming it into an official
contradiction, which might run : " The suggestion
emanating from Belfast that President de Valera
and Premier Lloyd George are in direct negotiation
is without any foundation whatever. For some time
\se have known that a rumour was afloat to the effect
that an effort was to be made by the British Govern-
ment and its supporters to mislead the constituents
on polling day by representing to them, when it

ild be too late for contradiction, that a meeting
had actually taken place betwreen President de
Valera, Premier Lloyd George and Sir James

•>g."

We may agree that the method suggested by the

I 'resilient of misleading the electors was at li-

re subtle than the original suggestion of his
Director of Publicity. The eleetion over, the lat
gentleman was once more brought into action. He
ived a note from the President instructing him
to issue a statement on the Northern elections, with
an analysis of the voting, whieh should prove how
the <>l>jerts of proportional representation had !•<
defeated by the tactics of the Unionists. He should

90 IRELAND IN 1921.

also draw attention to the intimidation practised by
the latter party, and he must declare that the agree-
ment between the Nationalists and Sinn Fein was
entirely one-sided, that it entailed no compromise
whatever of their principles on the part of Sinn
Fein, while the consent of the Nationalists to ignore
the Act was a distinct advance by them in the
direction of Republicanism. Meanwhile it was
suggested that a certain expert in proportional
representation should be approached in order that
he might analyse the results of the election with a
view to showing how Sinn Fein might have improved
its position. As the President justly says, this
might be useful for the future. Finally we learn
that the estimated cost of propaganda, in the shape
of posters and pamphlets, incurred by the Sinn Fein
party in the Northern elections was only just under
six thousand pounds.

A matter upon which Mr. de Valera placed great
importance was the publicity obtained for the Sinn
Fein cause by the interviews which he gave from
time to time to representatives of the press. Some-
times the words he employed became distorted, and
then trouble arose, especially when the distortion
took place in the Dublin papers. He writes to that
hard worked official the Director of Publicity :—

" I think we should inform the Independent and Fr.
that interviews which I give are always obtainable in the
exact form in which I give them and that therefore when
they propose to reproduce any of these interviews they
should secure the copies from us in order that I may be
quoted exactly. It ought to be made clear to them that the
aim of the British is to put us in the wrong1 position before
the world *s opinion; that the questions which I have to
answer are purposely defined to put us in that wrong
position if possible. And that it is so plain that if they

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 91

u? any at all to quote me accurately. I would like to
l»;ive a personal interview sometime with the editors of
se newspapers.1'

Later he writes, in answer to a note received from
his faithful henchman : —

" I cannot promise to give notice of matter that I wish
put in the evening press. While the Publicity Department
is one of the most important of all there are urgent mat
from several of the otner departments to be dealt with daily
by me. ... I should be glad if you arrange for that
interview with the editors of Freeman and Independent
early next week. The general tone of these papers is not
at all what it should be."

But interesting as are the relations between the
President and his Director of Publicity, there are,
to quote the President himself, urgent matters from
several of the other departments. One of these
matters was common to them all, and that was the
danger of being raided by the Crown Forces. The
disaster which overtook the Publicity Department*
caused the issue of a circular letter to all depart-
ments, headed " Instructions in view of raids on
Offices."

'* 1. No dominants which lead di: > the capture

of other offices or individuals to be filed. Lists of impor
persons in our organisation, and their addresses, obviously
come under this head.

" Officials should be addressed by their title in their
departments rather than by personal name.

" Documents coming from Army Departments to
Civil Departments in particular must not be filed in the
latter's offices. When communications from an Army
Department reaches a Civil Office it should receive pri<>
as regards attention, and be destroyed immediately when
dealt with.

' 2. Files should be reduced to a minimum, only
such documents as are absolutely v t«»r i

should be kept. Even in the case ot the>e. a summary in

* See note A in Appendix.

92 IRELAND IN 1921.

rough code would do as well as the original documents and
would of course be much safer.

"3. Documents which it would be difficult to replace
should be duplicated and the originals put away in special
places of safety. In the case of documents vital for proof
and evidence, it may be necessary to have photographic
duplicates made.

"4. In the event of an office being raided and
material captured which would affect any other office, the
head of the raided office is responsible for communicating
at once full details of the capture so as to enable the offices
affected to take counter measures.

" In addition to the above precautions the head of each
department is responsible for devising such schemes as
would prevent the enemy from obtaining important infor-
mation from the accidental capture of his offices.

" Carelessness in this matter must be regarded as a
very definite neglect of duty."

The same danger of being raided made the
meetings of the Bail somewhat difficult things to
arrange. Mr. Collins wrote to the President on
June 2nd : —

" I mentioned in a note to you the other day that I had
written you a memo about Dail meetings. This was
captured by the enemy, but of course this does not affect the
scheme. Supposing there are 100 members available for
meetings we could, I think, accommodate numbers up to
51, this is one more than half, or a majority of the entire
assembly. Then at that meeting a sufficient number of
people would be asked to volunteer to stay away from the
next meeting. If a sufficient number of volunteers were
not forthcoming, then draw lots."

Mr. O'Higgins, of the Department of Local
Government, had another suggestion, which was
that one-third of the members should be summoned
in rotation. If any contentious matter arose, the
Secretary could send out a precis of the discussion
to all members and ask for their views.

Complaints between various departments seem
to have been not infrequent. Mr. Collins, as

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 93

Minister of Finance, complains to the President of
the way the Minister of Labour conducts his

business :—

It seems that the depart men! works in .-.mtinuous
fear of a r;u«L Nobody ever seems to be there, and

generally speaking, the Accountant General finds it
imp work d<»rie in ordinary time. Yester-
day lie \\nite Hie tin- t'< »1 1- )W i I1«T Iiote I •

I was at the Dept. of Labour to-day. Dirk was not

there — he was due in a quarter of an hour — I waited half

an hour and he did not turn up. On the past three

.-ions I was there Dick was there onre. The Minister

is never there. I think it would be well if you wrote him

asked him to define the duties of the different members

of the staff. If the Minister cannot attend at the office his

rhief derk ought to be there and he should not leave

cheques to be signed by Dick.' I am not at all satisfied

with the way this department is being worked."

The Minister of Labour appeared to find more
congenial occupation in devising new methods of
propaganda. On the 20th he wrote a long
memorandum to the already sorely-tasked Director
of Publicity containing a long list of suggestions.
Pillar stones should be erected in suitable positions
in New York, Paris, and Rome, upon which should
be inscribed from day to day the names of convicted
rebels executed by the British. A great deal of
propaganda could be done from Moscow in collab<
tion with the Turks, Egyptians, Indians, Persians
and Russians. An anti-Ulster linen boycott should
be started in Ameri It is pointed out that

Belfast travellers go through the States for their
yearly orders in July, and that 70% of the Ul
linen trade is done with that country. A film
censorship, ostensibly under the auspices of the
Dublin Corporation, but actually controlled by the
Publicity Department, should Iv started to prevent

94 IRELAND IN 1921.

the showing of films of " English tendencies " in
Ireland. Any evasion of this censorship to be met
by the destruction of operating machines. " One
blow of a hammer will do this and damage to the
extent of at least £100. " At the same time cinema
propaganda should be started in America, supported
by the production of plays showing up English
methods. Finally, " an effort should be made to
definitely harness country newspapers to our side/7
The tendency to destruction is visible even in the
split infinitive. On receipt of this memorandum
the Director of Publicity must have felt what all
who have been engaged in publicity have so often
felt, namely, that everybody else seemed to know
his job better than he did himself.

The Department of Agriculture, which proclaims
the policy of the Dail on the land question as being
directed towards " removing the incubus of land-
lordism ' ' and * ' putting the non-possessing class or
the landless men in effective possession of the large
nn tenanted ranches/' was, pending the execution
of this policy, sorely disturbed over the question of
giving tribute to Caesar. On the 14th, the President
writes a note to the Minister, enclosing a letter he
has received from Miss Barton, who suggests that
efforts should be made to get farmers to refuse to pay
Income Tax, and who anticipates the possibility of
trouble in the near future owing to the fall in prices
of agricultural produce. The Minister's reply is
interesting.

" Re Income Tax. This is a matter which in its
general application is within the province of the Minister
of Finance. I quite agree with Miss Barton that if a
general movement could be set going amongst the farmers
not to pay Income Tax, that we would hit the British in a

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 95

">ihly nii^M be al>l«- ! <>ple

tou uho otherwise would not be sympathetic. It,

however, would need a great deal of organisation, as some-
tiling should I- he fears of the farmers who

thir i mild In- sold out of house and home in order

to rtOOYt dly, arrangements should be

made by us to c.,llrct a portion of it at least.

11 As regards point one I do not think there would be

danger of excessive seizures of stock, etc., under

judgments for non-payment, so that a guarantee of

oizure or second payment would be an

ve proposition.

" As regards the second point I find it hard to venture
an opinion. I believe if the Minister of Finance had the
Warrant Books on which the existing collections are made
that the organisation of the collection would be an easier
mat 1IH9 loan.

" There is one point on which on calm consideration I

_rree with Miss H., although I have done it myself,

that is when she says the Demand Note should be just put

in a drawer. I think every farmer should pretend that he

intended to pay, and fill up and return his income, etc.,

have his assessment brought down to as low a

figure as possible by abatement, and then when he gets the

id Note to pay, after putting them to all the

trouble possible, he could proceed to light his pipe with

the application and pay on the assessment to our Govern-

procedure would not merely save the individual

it by any chance his goods were seized later, but it would

lessen the set-off in the halain •«• sheet against any Govern-

ment which will ultimately be allowed to function fr-

I \\ill look more fully into the matter and bring it
Meeting.

" Farmers and Labour. I am afraid we are in for a
good deal of friction in the farming world soon. Howe
I think we can head it off if we hrin^ into being as soon as
possible the Fc.momic Council which we proposed to set
up la<t \ear and which was dropped for some unaccountable
reason. I am ! ly in touch with the Fann

I'nion BQ as to lie i • all dangers, and I will |^et in

touch with the Ministry of Labour loo."

One wonders \\hether the Minister realised the
ditlirnlties surrounding the fulfilment of the under-

taking contained in his last senten

96 IRELAND IN 1921.

Another of the difficulties under which the
Government of the Dail laboured was that of com-
munications. Perpetual complaints were made by
the departments that their instructions took far too
long to reach their destinations. A scheme of
communications was therefore drawn up to meet the
case. Three girl couriers were to be appointed, and
seven circular routes made out, six centred upon
Dublin and the seventh upon Cork. The couriers
between them would make each circular journey
twice a week, and would be met at various stations
on their route by " distributors " who would convey
their despatches to their destinations. To avoid
suspicion, the couriers would be constantly changed.
The cost of such a service is estimated at £156 per
week, and the scheme which is dated June 13th
concludes with the words " in view of the tightening
up which will follow the general application of
Martial Law some such scheme is urgent. "

During this period the relations of Sinn Fein
with the Catholic Bishops is interesting. The
President's correspondence gives some side-lights
upon this subject which are worth reproducing.
From the beginning of the year, ever since his arrival
in Ireland, in fact, he had been doing his utmost to
induce the Church to recognise the Republic. On
February 2nd he wrote to the Archbishop of
New York, who was then in Rome, begging him to
use his influence to prevent the Pope from making
a pronouncement which would be detrimental to the
Republican cause.

A little later the Ministers of the Government
drafted an appeal to " the Cardinal Archbishop of
Armagh, the Archbishop of Dublin, and all the

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 97

Most Reverend and Venerable Prelates of Ireland,"
sett, 'th the claims ot' the Republic ami as!.

them n. .t to denounce crimes until they had heard
an explanation from the Republican Government.
The Minister of Home Affairs, under whose control

!i mutters came, was ulways nervous lest the
bishops should make some declaration which would
tend t«> alienate their flocks t'rom the Republic. On
May 20th he sends the President an article advi^
a in D the Bishops and the Bail Cabi

in order to bring about a clearer understanding
between the heads of Church and State, explaining
that the article has been written by " a learned
Jesuit who is very fearful of the Bishops sayi
something next month which may be hurtful to us."
Four days later he calls attention to a newspaper
euttin-j- in which is a report of the denunciation of
the murder of policemen by Dr. Hoare. Next day
arrives a typed letter for the President's signature,
addressed to Cardinal Logue and the Archbishops
and Bishops of Ireland, asking for a campaign of
prayer — a National Novena. The explana:
accompanies it. " A Father Cahill asked me to

-sard this document to you. Although he was not
clear on the subject he suggested the Ministry should

•! it. I am certain that if such a document went
to the Bishops it would be taken as an indiea'
of weakness on our part and I am sure you will
agree with this view."

The President became more optimistic later. On

June 1i)th he writes to the Publicity Department :—

"I am working- hartl to pet the Bishops to
straight ignition to the Republic in their pronmr

ment on Tu If any statement of tl. D at all

H

98 IRELAND IN 1921.

be construed as recognition, you should be ready on
Tuesday to see that the newspaper headlines are : —
THE IRISH BISHOPS RECOGNISE THE REPUBLIC.

" Do not move in this matter until the last moment.
A step too soon might spoil everything/'

Typical of the President's efforts to induce the
Bishops to recognise the Republic is his letter of the
same date to the Most Eeverend Dr. Fogarty, Bishop
of Killaloe, urging that the Bishops should make a
" straight out recognition " of the facts concerning
Ireland's cause in order to startle the world into a
consciousness of the real issue, to hearten the people
to continue the struggle, and to nullify the propa-
ganda " which is almost as much Britain's right
arm against us as her military forces." He goes
on to say that such a pronouncement, if the present
struggle goes on, will prevent it from degenerating
to a squalid civil riot, and maintain it at its proper
level in the eyes of the world in its true character
as a " national war of liberation."

A few words must be said as to the relations
between Mr. de Valera and the men who represented
Sinn Fein in America. On his return to Ireland,
the President had charged Harry Boland, who had
acted as his secretary during his visit to the States,
to remain and represent him more or less unofficially.
The representative appointed by Bail Eireann was
Dr. McCartan, and there seems to have been a
certain amount of ambiguity, for Boland writes to
the President on January 13th : —

" I have not officially announced that I am here as
representative, and think it advisable not to do so. . . .
I have lodged three protests with the State Department and
Embassies in the name of Pat McCartan, and will continue
to do so."

AFFAIRS IN JUNE. 99

The rind' concern of Sinn IVin in keeping in
i< ihh \\ith America was the provision of funds. On
Marvh 1st the President asks Mr. James O'Mara,
of the Ameruun Commission on Irish Independence
for his " views about the possibility of raising a
further loan." On March 30th, Boland writes his
s on the subject : ' ' I am confident that if the
Bail authorises another loan, we can put it across
here big." On April 8th the President write
O'Mara :-

" You are to be the keystone of the new Arch if you
accept the JUKI <>f Representative of the Republic in the
U.S.A. which I hereby offer formally to you."

On the same day he writes to Boland :—

* We have to cut down considerably our American
establishment and expenditure. . . . We cannot afford
even as a maximum an outlay of more than 100,000 dollars

the maintenance of diplomatic and political side of
U.S. service during the coming year."

Hut O'Mara was not to be caught with the chaff
of office. On April 25th he writes angrily to the
President, finding fault with a cable sent by the
hit tor to the Convention of the American Associa-
tion for the Recognition of the Irish Republic,
u.^Uing for a guarantee of 1,000,000 dollars yearly.

' Your appeal now makes impossible any attempt later
0 raise the 20,000,000 loan which was contem-
plated. ... I would advise you to promptly send to
country Miim»nm> \vlm has your confidence, if such a
-on exists; and having done so, don't constantly
tere with his work."

On the 30th he follow^ this up with another

Utter in which he says: —

" Your despatches indicate your final decision to force
through your policy which last December r the

almost unanimous condemnation of the Irish Mission

100 IRELAND IN 1921.

here. ... I tender my resignation a8 the most emphatic
protest that I can make against what must be the utter
disruption and destruction of organised American aid/'

We have no space in which to follow the progress
of the quarrel between O'Mara and the President,
entertaining as the details are. But amongst the
President's papers was found a copy of a cable :—

" Dad once expressed a wish to be fired by cable this
is it Kahn."

It must be explained that Dad and Kahn
were the code names of O'Mara and de Valera
respectively.

The President's private views upon the subject
of spending money in America are revealed in a
private letter to Boland, in which he says, with
startling candour : —

" If official recognition by the U.S. Government could
be secured I would consider any money spent in informing
the American people of the justice of our cause and
converting them to our side money well spent, but I do
not believe that, except in a crisis in which America's own
interests are involved and when it might be convenient to
hit England through us, is there any chance of securing
recognition. "

This is confirmed by a sentence in a letter written
by the President to Miss Mary MacSwiney during
her visit to America.

" I for one am yet to be convinced that any effort which
we could put forward or any money we could spend upon it
would actually secure Governmental recognition for us/*

CHAPTER V.

Throughout the first half of the year both the
British authorities and the leaders of Sinn Fein
\\ere ski Finishing on the extreme edge of negotiation,
if such a phrase may be employed. Despite
their assertions to the contrary, both parties were
pessimistic as to the results to be obtained by a

tinuance of hostilities. It was perfectly obvious
that in the end the British must succeed in crushing
the rebels, that without outside intervention Ireland
had no chance of withstanding much longer the

es which could be arrayed against her. Sinn
IV in was fared by a constant depletion of the
I.Ix.A. as a result of casualties sustained and of
ninent. The intensification of the outrage
campaign in May and June was in reality a last
desperate effort. Every day the problem of organi-

lon and supply was becoming more difficult, and
with the threatened extension of Martial Law to
tin* whole country the end of armed resistance was
in sii^ht. Protracted guerilla warfare mi^ht
kit the ultimate defeat of the I.R.A. in that
warfare was a foregone conclusion. Even the rank
and tile had tvunin to suspect this fact; the leaders
had used it by the beginning of the year.

102 IRELAND IN 1921.

On the other hand, the British Government was
equally averse to the continuance of strife. A
settlement reached by force of arms would be
temporary only, and would leave behind it a legacy
of bitterness which would flame up into rebellion
once more upon the first favourable opportunity.
Apart from this, the expense of a war in Ireland
would be far greater than the country should rightly
be called upon to bear. Moreover, the suppression
of rebellion is synonymous with coercion, and
coercion is an ugly word at a time when the phrase
of the moment is the right of small nations to
self-determination. The enemies of England had
already done their best to use the Irish situation as
a means of blackening the face of the nation ; it was
more than probable that the sympathy of America
and Europe would be given to the cause of Sinn
Fein should open war be declared. Finally, the past
had already given some indication of the terrible
bloodshed that such a course would entail.

The attitude of the British Government was
simple and frequently expressed. The Prime
Minister was prepared to meet any one who could
speak on behalf of the majority of the Irish nation,
in fact with the leaders of Sinn Fein. But at the
same time whoever accepted this invitation must
realise that there could be no discussion on the lines
of the establishment of an Irish Republic. The
Government of Ireland Act had failed to find a
solution, so much was tacitly admitted. It remained
to find an alternative which would be acceptable to
the majority in Ireland and at the same time would
be compatible with the duties of the Government
towards the Crown, the Empire, and Ulster.

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. 103

att i tude of Sinn Fein was not so clear. The
lenders of that party had not yet abandoned the hope
thatsomehou tin- Republic nn^ht be retained. To the
word Republic they were pledged; their supporters
throughout the world looked to them to establish the
Republic in fact as well as in theory. The actual
form of this Republic they might be prepared to
compromise upon. They dallied with Erskine
Childers' "Neutral Irish Republic within the
Kinpire," de Valera himself had brought much
critieism about his head while still in America by
discussing " Cuban Independence." Their efforts,
therefore, were at first devoted to securing some
intervention which should induce the British
Government to abandon its declared attitude and to
enter into negotiation upon some scheme of whirh
the completion would exhibit Ireland to the world
in some form which Sinn Fein could plausibly
declare to be Republican.

These are the general principles which underlay
the " peace moves " of the early months of the year.
At first sight the gulf between the two parties

••led insurmountable. Before any advance could
be made, some intermediary between the Govern
ment and Sinn Fein must be found who should make
him.self familiar with the limits of concession fixed
by either side and who should then set to work to
st retell those limits until they met at some one point
upon whieh a meeting between representatives could
be founded. The first essential to a settlement by
agreement was surh a meeting; the difficulty was to
induce either side to agree to a meeting under
conditions whieh the other would accept.

Many men, both of English and Irish descent,

104 IRELAND IN 1921.

earnestly desiring to end the struggle between the
two countries, offered themselves in the role of
intermediary, but all found themselves unable to
reconcile the divergent aspirations of the two
parties. But it must not be supposed that either
the Government or the Eepublicans relied only upon
the chance of independent men hitting upon some
means of " building a bridge," to use the Prime
Minister's simile. Both sides from time to time
flew their own kites, into the higher or lower regions
of the atmosphere as the tendency of the moment
seemed to warrant. But all the time there was a
subtler influence at work, and one which in the end
achieved the desired result.

From the time of his first appointment, in
the early days of Sir Hamar Greenwood's Chief
Secretaryship, the Assistant Under Secretary, Mr.
A. W. Cope, had believed in the possibility of peace
by negotiation, and had set himself to achieve this
end. Mr. Cope was a Civil Servant who had proved
his ability in the Customs and Excise and as Second
Secretary to the Ministry of Pensions. Whatever
criticism may have been directed against him during
his tenure of office at Dublin Castle, there can be no
doubt that he threw himself with his whole heart and
soul into the task of bringing peace to Ireland, and
persisted in his efforts, even at the risk of
jeopardising his career, at a time when things
seemed hopeless and the opinion of his superiors
was against him. Such mistakes as he made were
the mistakes of a strong character, and were due to
his concentration upon a single end, making it
difficult for him to appreciate the points of view of
other people. This tendency undoubtedly caused

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. LOB

friction between him and the other authorities
existing in Ireland at the time, which might perhaps
have been avoided by a man of greater taot< As a
consequence, he was accused of favouring the cause
of Sinn Fein to the detriment of the interests of the
( r< >\\ n Forces and of Ulster. But whatever opinion
i nay be held as to the details of the Truce of July, a
Truce which it may safely be said would never have
been reached but for his efforts, there can be no
denial of the fact that Mr. Cope's success in
establishing relations with the leaders of Sinn Fein
at a time when the Government which he represented
was engaged in a policy of repression of that party

I a diplomatic feat of a very high order.*

Mr. Cope's method was to get into personal
relation, very often at considerable risk to himself,
\\ith such of the leading men of the Sinn Fein
movement as might show any signs of listening to
reason. Throughout the whole of the year, this
link, frail as it might seem, and often on the point
of breaking under the stress of passion aroused by

tits in England or Ireland, existed between the

Government and its opponents. And it was the

e of this link, with the influence which could

be exerted through such a means of communication,

that decided the Cabinet, at the very time when the

methods of combating Sinn Fein by a concentration

Acre under discussion, to make one last

effort in the di !i of negotiation.

But before the tinal at ions are discussed,

it will l>e useful to i:ive a short account of the
attempts made from time to time to find some K
of discussion through the efforts of an intermediary.

* Note B in Appendix.

106 IRELAND IN 1921.

The transactions entered into by Father 0 'Flanagan
and Archbishop Clune belong to the previous year,
and the Prime Minister's explanation of their
failure has been already stated. But this failure
was no deterrent to others who believed that the
problem was not incapable of solution. On January
3rd, two motions in favour of a truce were placed
upon the agenda paper of the Dublin Corporation
by Unionist members of that body. They were
defeated by the Sinn Fein majority, who refused to
allow discussion upon the point. Some days
later, it was believed that the Dail showed a
tendency towards willingness to institute negotia-
tions towards a truce, but if this tendency ever
existed, which is extremely doubtful at that time,
it bore no fruit. The Government on its part once
again made it clear that it was willing and anxious
to treat with anybody who could, in the phrase of
the moment, " deliver the goods," by which was
meant anyone who could guarantee that any agree-
ment reached by him would be observed by the Sinn
Fein leaders. The only conditions laid down were
that the Government's limits of concession, which
stopped short of independence, must be accepted as
a condition precedent to a conference. Further
than that, the Government undertook to give safe
conducts to any accredited negotiators who had not
placed themselves beyond the pale by criminal action,
and if necessary to give notice in advance of such
names as were included in this prohibition.

In reply to this, Mr. de Valera issued an inspired
statement through the medium of the Freeman's
Journal, in which he maintained that any peace
move must have for its basis the recognition by the

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. 107

Government that Ireland was an independent
nation, and that \\hen the representatives of the
English nation werv prepared to meet the repre-
sentatives of the Irish nation on an equal footing,
peace talk \vmild be possible. He denied that Sinn
Fein was making any overtures for peace, but stated
on behalf of the movement that he would not turn
a deaf ear to proposals from the British Government
if they had as their basis these conditions.

For the next three months little more was heard
of peace. Various organisations and individuals
made strenuous efforts to cause one party or the other
t<> modify its standpoint, or to induce the Bail to
allow a referendum of the people to be held upon the
subject. At the end of March Cardinal Logue was
approached by a deputation of Southern Unionists
with a view to his using his influence to open
negotiations between the Cabinet and the Bail. A
fortnight later Mr. James Brady, a member of the
Bublin Chamber of Commerce, made an attempt to
approach the problem from the point of view of the
business men of Ireland, whose interest in securing
peace was naturally greater than that of any other
section of the community. He prepared a requisition
to the President of the Chamber in the following
terms :—

r, — We, the undersigned members of the Chaml-
hereby request you to summon a special meeting- of the
( 'h amber to consider and do, or cause or direct all necessary
acts to be done upon or in relation to the following
resolution: That in the best interests of Ireland and the
lives and fortunes of her people it is necessary for th'>>,»
who control the agricultural, industrial, and trading1
interests to assist and co-oj» n endeavouring to

terminate the existing industrial and political turmoil,
and take an active part in reference to future methods of

108 IRELAND IN 1921.

Irish government and Irish legislation; that with this
object the Council of this Chamber be requested forthwith
to convene a conference consisting of delegates from the
various Chambers of Commerce in Ireland, the Irish Labour
Party and Trade Union Congress, and the elected repre-
sentatives of all Irish political parties, with a view to
formulating an agreed scheme of Irish self-government
suitable to the dignity and aspirations of the nation."

Unfortunately nothing came of this scheme; the
power of Sinn Fein was more than sufficient to crush
it at its birth.

But towards the end of April was published the
most sensational story of negotiation which had
hitherto appeared. On the 21st of the month Lord
Derby left England for Ireland, stayed one day
there, and returned to London that night. On his
return he paid a visit to the Prime Minister, who
was then staying at Lympne. These events were
sufficient to cause a strong impression that he had
been sent on a special peace mission by the Govern-
ment, and that negotiations were actually in
progress. As a matter of fact, the proposed visit
was unknown to the majority of the Cabinet,
although it was probably communicated to some at
least of the Sinn Fein leaders. A note was found
later in Mr. de Valera's handwriting: " If
Mr. comes over I will see him. As he

stays at the Gres. we can make arrangements."
Considerations of date and place make it possible
that this note refers to Lord Derby, and that " the
Gres." means the Gresham Hotel in Sackville Street,
where Lord Derby did actually stay. But the most
straightforward account of his visit was given by
Lord Derby himself, in a speech delivered at Liver-
pool on the 25th. He said that a mountain had

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

been made out of a molehill, and that he proposed to
reduce the mountain to its proper proportion of a
molehill. It was said that he went incognito as
'Mr. Edwards ' That was perfectly correct. If
he had gone in his own name he would never have
been free from the ubiquitous reporters, and he had
wanted to go and see for himself in Ireland and
learn everything he could with regard to the position
in that country. But the ubiquitous reporter would
have prevented him. It was also said that he was
disguised, and was supposed to have worn spectacles
to hide his identity. Unfortunately, advancing
years had added to them the faculty of not being able

rrad without glasses. (At this stage Lord
Derby put on the glasses which he had worn in
Ireland, with the remark that "even Dr. Watson
would probably have discovered one without any

at strain on his imagination.") Continuing, he
said that to say whom he saw, or repeat what was
told him, would be an absolute breach of confidence.
Hut he might say, with the permission of those he

, that he had given the gist of the information
he had gathered to the Prime Minister. Lord
Derby then explained the origin of his visit.

" Let me do away with a mystery caused by my vi-it

to Lviiipne on Saturday aftenmon. 1 want you clearly to
understand I had no mission from the ( lovernment . Some
month or six weeks ago I told the Prime Minister 1 thought
I would go to Irelar >ee and learn for myself the

conditions, and he approved of it and --aid : ' When you
come back, will you tell me what you think? ' There [fi
extent of my mission. I want to say one thing also in

to those whom I saw. I want it to 1 m:

dnirle interview I had that was not

at my own request. I a-k.-d for the interviews. Nobody
asked to see me. I want to make that clear, for fear that
anyone should take it that o were being made to me

110 IRELAND IN 1921.

to come there and act as mediator. Nothing of the kind.
It was purely a private visit. It was undertaken for one
reason, and one reason only, that when one sees the
lamentable state of affairs in Ireland one feels one is
justified in speaking of it only if one has taken every
possible step one can to really make himself conversant
with the subject, and to know the views of both sides and
all sides — with that intention alone I went to Ireland. . . .
I tell you perfectly candidly it may not be the last of the
visits I shall pay, but I equally tell you, none of those
visits will be taken except on my own initiative. They will
not be a mission from the Government or at the invitation
of anyone on the other side who might wish me to act as
mediator/'

Meanwhile the Irish Dominion League, a society
formed under the distinguished presidentship of
Sir Horace Plunkett, a man whose constructive work
for Ireland has brought her greater benefit than she
has ever gained from her political leaders, had
drawn up a memorial for submission to the Prime
Minister. This memorial contained a scheme of
which the principal points were as follows : The
Government should make a firm offer of Dominion
status for Ireland. Ulstermen should then be
asked, without abandoning the powers and privileges
secured to them under the Government of Ireland
Act, to join with their fellow-countrymen in an
assembly with the aim of keeping Ireland
contentedly in the Empire. On the other hand,
those entitled to speak for the majority of the Irish
people, in other words the Sinn Fein leaders, should
be asked to abandon separation for the sake of
securing Irish unity. The offer of the Government
should be subject to only two conditions, that an
agreement should be reached between Great Britain
and Ireland in regard to Defence and Foreign
relations, and that Ulster should not be compelled

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. Ill

to accept such form c ' iiment should she prefer

the position given her l>\ the Act.

The scheme provided that it the two parties
agreed to meet, the Government should facilitate the
meeting of the present elected representatives from
the South, in other \snnls the Bail, so that they
i-ould appoint delegates to meet the Government and
arrange a cessation of hostilities. The elections
\shirh were to take place under the Act should
then take place on the understanding that the
members elected for North and South should
immediately meet as a Constituent Assembly, with-
out the necessity of taking their seats in either
Parliament. It would be open to the Northern
members at any time to declare by a majority that
they preferred to abide by the Act, in which event
the Southern members might adopt or reject
Dominion status for the South.

The Constituent Assembly scheme, as it was
called, attracted considerable attention at the time,
and was favourably received by the majority of
Englishmen. The opinion of the Sinn Fein leaders
is best shown by the fact that it was considered in
the Bail, which agreed to consent to it on the
following conditions : —

' 1. That the members of the proposed assembly be
chosen by the Irish eleetorate in an open and free election,
in which all political opinions might be advocated.

2. That there be no limitations or restrictions, su<-h
as inclusion within the British Empire, etc., to the sei
ment that might be proposed.

3. That all members before election and on entering
the assembly pleoV. i and those they represent
to accept and support unreservedly whatever decision
arrived at by a majority v<>

4. That the British Parliament should by Act

112 IRELAND IN 1921.

in advance, and in anticipation, make this decision
automatically legal and binding- on Britain."

It need hardly be pointed out that an
Assembly meeting under these conditions would
have established a Republic for the whole of Ireland
at its first session.

During May the Prime Minister met a
distinguished American citizen, Mr. Martin Glynn,
ex-Governor of the State of New York, and in the
course of conversation explained the position of the
Government, so frequently reiterated, regarding the
willingness of the Prime Minister to meet and
discuss the Irish situation with anyone who could
speak with authority. Mr. Glynn conveyed the
essence of this conversation to Mr. de Valera,
through the London correspondent of the New
York Herald, who in the course of an interview with
Mr. de Valera obtained the following reply :—

* If Mr. Lloyd George makes this statement in public
I shall give him a public reply. The fundamental question
at issue between the two countries is the question of
Ireland's right to choose freely and independently her
own government and political institutions at home and
her relationships with foreign nations as well. This
independent right may as well be acknowledged first as last,
for there can never be a settlement as long as it is denied.
Any particular proposition put forward by Britain
affecting the welfare of the peoples of the two islands will
then be a fit subject for consideration and discussion
between the representatives of the respective peoples. We
have never denied that we have certain interests in common,
but we must be free and independent judges of what our
own interests are, and not compelled simply by Britain's
superior brute force to enter into engagements which we
may deem to be detrimental to us."

Towards the end of May the Pope, in sending a
donation to Cardinal Logue towards the relief of

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. li:>

distress in Ireland, included a letter in which he
dealt \\ith the state of the country. This letter
concluded : —

" We think it \\nuld be opportune if effect were given to
the plan ingested by «li-t inguished men as well as

lr*! {• - say, that the question at issue

IK- ! '-u^sion to some body of men

by the whole Irish nation. And when this
:'orence has published its findings let the more influent in!
amon^ both parties meet together, an«l having put forward
discussed the views and conclusions arrived at on both
sides, let them determine by common consent on some means
of h> the question in a sincere spirit of peace and

reconciliation."

We may now turn to a more detailed examination
of the efforts to secure such intervention as would
induce the Government to open negotiations on the
basis of the establishment of an Irish Republic.
That some intervention of the kind was becoming
urgent is obvious from Mr. de Valera's attitude as
early as February. At that time his supporters

v taking the line that the Dail could not consider
negotiation with the British Government on any
other basis but the immediate proclamation of a
Republ nur to the fact that the Irish people

had at the last elections given it a mandate to secure
a Republic or die in the attempt. Mr. de Valera
was sutlieieiitly awake to political realities to see
the danuvr of this argument. On February 28th he
v to Harry Boland in America : —

"There is no use in saying that Dail Eireann cannot

negotia' : nf the mandate which it. that

1.1. .yd (Jenru-e will be put in a pOtttlO]

being- able i an Irish party into existence to oppose

elections on the platform of freed- .m to
otiate."

This is a most instructive admission. It

114 IRELAND IN 1921.

shows that Mr. de Valera, at least, still feared
the resurrection of the old Nationalist or
" Parliamentary " Party which had apparently
been overwhelmed for ever at the elections of 1918.
It was well known to him even then, despite his
public declarations that Ireland unanimously
supported Sinn Fein, that there was a very large
section of the country which was sick of bloodshed
and was longing for the large measures of Home
Rule conferred by the Government of Ireland Act.
Once the menace of the I.R.A. was removed, an
election fought upon the issue of resistance or
negotiation would spell the downfall of Sinn Fein.
As it happened, the issue at the elections of 1921
was never so put, and the vigilance of the I.R.A.
was sufficient to avert the danger of opposition.

Some weeks later, Mr. de Valera complained of
the methods used by certain would-be intermediaries.
He writes : —

" As lie was leaving for the country Father O'Flanagan
sent me a note to the effect that a British official wished to
find out from me whether if certain propositions were
submitted in writing we would accept them. I am refusing
to deal with the matter in this way. I want to see
definitely in writing what they propose before I commit
myself to any answer. The disadvantages to us of the mode
they are trying to proceed on are obvious."

Early in the year, the leaders of Sinn Fein had
decided that some small hope of securing the inter-
vention upon which they had set their hearts lay in
an appeal to the Dominion Premiers about to
assemble for the Imperial Conference. Of these
Premiers, General Smuts seemed the most likely to
lend a favourable ear to their proposals, despite the
reports they received from their agents in South

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. LIB

Afrira. The general tone of these reports was that
in Fein had link* to hope for from Smuts, who,
although not unsympat lietic, had already turned his
back on Republicanism in his own country, and was
tluTrt'niv unlikely to advocate it for Ireland. Despite
this cxtivmrly sane warning, the President deter-
mined to concentrate his efforts on winning Smuts
over to his own peculiar views, and left no stone
unturned to that end. Hut at the same time the
question arose as to the best way of influencing the
Premiers in a body. The fir :estion was that a

letter should be despatched to each individual,
setting forth the justice of Ireland's demands.
This letter, which, although never despatched, is
interesting, was drafted as follows : —

.e Premier of

As one profoundly convinced that much of man's
inhumanity to man has its origin in misunderstanding1 and
ignorance on the one hand and the pride that suspends the
dispel it on the other I address myself to you. I
feel it easier to do so believing that though a war is b«
waged upon our nation by the British Government in the
10 of the whole British Empire it is being waged in
;ince of rather than by the desire of the people whom
represent.

Nowhere has the repudiation of embarrassing external
•ml been more strenuous and persistent than among
tin- nations within the British Empire. To the point of
rebellion and open war all MK h emit ml has been conte
and all attempts to exercise it have long ceased. The
Britiih Dominion! have won the acknowledgment of their
claims as c states with Great Britain in an

association founded on common interest and common
•intent, on confidence, not on compulsion. It would be
IndetGriWbly selfish and altogether unworthy of any of
them, at \ with their own traditions and the

principles which they ;• v to

deny to Ireland that right to freedom upon which alone
the ordered and peaceful development of peoples can rest.

116 IRELAND IN 1921.

I do not therefore suppose such a desire, but the fact is
that in your name an attitude is adopted and a cruel war is
in progress in a flagrant infraction of that principle which
is the foundation of your own progress, security and
happiness. Here in Ireland the principle of resistance to
tyranny is enshrined in the Republican Army which I have
the honour to represent. Our Parliament and Government
derive their validity from free popular choice expressed by
overwhelming majorities in three national plebiscites
within the space of two years, wherein in spite of penalties
and supervision which grew constantly heavier the great
mass of our people gave that authority their allegiance.

Our chosen institutions are valid by every function
which you claim for yourself. What we are defending
with our life's blood is the same freedom that your people
would defend with theirs. Irrespective of their births and
race your fellow countrymen would resist a British tyranny
with as much spirit and tenacity as a foreign conquest.
We expect that you apply to us the same sentiments you
would choose in your own case, and that you remember
that we are not a modern but an ancient nation with a
distinct origin, history and culture, clearly defined by
nature to bring up its own civilisation and shape its own
destiny in freedom from the perpetual thwarting and
coercing of alien rule.

For the continuance of this rule sustained solely by
superior military force no justification is put forward save
that the strategical safety of Great Britain demands it.

On second thoughts this draft was too much even
for Mr. de Valera. Instead of circularising the
Premiers, he decided to give an interview which
should set out the same ideas and would probably
achieve at least an equal publicity.

An alternative method of approach to the
Premiers was afforded by a suggestion put forward
by the Women's International League that they
should send a deputation. Mr. de Valera took up
the suggestion with avidity. His note on the
subject is as follows : —

" The Women's International League would like to

PJiiMiKESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. 117

send three or four <>t their members on a deputation to the
miers with regard to the present British regime

in Irvi.irnl. hut \\mild need to have their expenses franked.
I think the publicity they would secure would be worth it."

The matter having been approved, the President
lost no time in issuing the necessary instructions.
On June 13th he wrote to the Minister of Finance,
Mr. Collins :-

" The Secretary of the Ministry has probably sent you
a circular letter on the proposal of the Women's Inter-

onal League to interview the British Colonial Premiers.

They cannot go unless we frank their expenses. I have a

from Mrs. Skeffington that it would probably be £20

each person. 1 think we should put £100 at their disposal.

ould really be regarded as money on propaganda. As
they wish to leave on Wednesday they will need the money
at once. Mrs. Skeffmgton as Chairman could be put in

rge and she can be reached through the Secretary of
Sinn Fein, or better at the Irish Women's Franchise
League, Westmorland Chambers."

Mr. Collins, in his reply to this note, gave a hint
of that siiner outlook on affairs in which he differed
so markedly from the I 'resident. In acknowledging
the receipt of these instructions, he says:—

"1 • ly t<> have the i'l(H) pi

at Mrs. Skeffington's disposal. It will properly be charged,
I liink, as Foreign Affairs (Propaganda). It could
scarcely IM» culled Home Affairs Propaganda, but that is a
HI had time to send you a note about the
:ig I would not have favoured this expenditure,
although I think we should take every opportunity

Premiere from the Bnffliu ('"l«>nirs. I am
hat we shall get value in this particular
ndeed that the case will be presei,
effect ively."

Mr. Collins was right. The Dominion Premiers

•aally refused to receive the deputation, although
individual members of the Conference held conver
tions with Mrs. Skeffington and her satellites. The

118 IRELAND IN 1921.

deputation sent each Premier a report with a cover-
ing letter, to which General Smuts replied as
follows : —

" The Dominion Premiers will, no doubt, when an
opportunity presents itself, tender such advice to his
Majesty's Government as they think fit, and in view of this
I do not propose to meet any associations connected with
the present political affairs in Ireland to discuss the matter.
My views are well known, and I do not think that any
advantage will be gained by the reception of a deputation
at the present time/'

For some time prior to this, however, the Sinn
Fein leaders had been laying their plans for
approaching General Smuts. On June 4th Mr,
Art O'Brien, the President of the Irish Self-
determination League, which acted as the emissaries
of Sinn Fein in London and elsewhere, wrote to the
President as follows : —

" I have been intending for some days past to write you
on the subject of Smuts and the Imperial Conference.
Smuts is due here next Saturday. Tom Casement (a
brother of Roger) is a very intimate friend of Smuts; it
would be possible therefore for him to introduce anyone in
a quite friendly way to Smuts. . . ."

The letter concludes with directions how to get
in touch with Tom Casement. The further corres-
pondence between Mr. de Valera and Mr. Art
O'Brien is interesting. On the 14th, the President
writes : —

" Imperial Conference. I think the best statement to
give the Press is something like this, that you are not aware
of any intention of the representatives of the Irish people
to approach the Premiers of the self-governing Dominions,
but that these Premiers have clearly a duty to perform to
their peoples inasmuch as the British Government are
making war on Ireland in the name of the whole British
Empire.

Others. Erskine Childers will strive to have an oppor-
tunity of meeting Smuts informally.

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. l H)

Note particularly. We are taking <'t or oi:

on. The British are trying to get in t.m< -h tin >ugh
les of course, to learn whether we would accept
the following1. Thf i u-mg Smuts in the matter: —

1. Fiscal autonomy for the whole of Ireland .

hern Parliament to be elected.

.- liainrnt to retain its present powers
unl«-» 1»\ mutual agreement with the rest of
Ireland.

4. Free trade D England and Ireland.

6. No Reserve <'es.

1'oitioi; National Debt (the amount to be

ascertained by a Commission) to be taken over.

The best line to pursue is to indicate that they are going
on the wrong track, that the right way is to propose a
treaty with Ireland regarded as a separate state. Irish
represen .v.mld then be willing to consider making

i in concessions to England's fears and England's
interests, that there is no other way. ... As regards
you see Smuts it would be in your capacity as
President of the Self-determination League. . . ."

This letter was followed by another two days
later. In it occurs the passage " I think I told you
of the Women's deputation going to protest about
atr< The only value will be the publicity it

receives. . . .If you see Mrs. Skeffington,
impress this upon her. The line that should be
taken is. that the Premiers . . . must share the
responsibility for the acts of the Hritish Govern-
ment in Ireland.0

Mr. Art O'Brien replied to these letters on the
iMh in the following words:—

' The last paragraph in your letter was what I was
most ;n hear. When I wrote you first suggest

th;it Tom Casement should come over for the purpose of

putting me in toiidi with SmuN I had in mind that I
him informally as the representative of the
IrUh K.'piiMir here. 1 n«>te now that if I do see Snr

-ee him in my capacity as an oHirer of the
ii Self-determination League here. I note that you are

120 IEELAND IN 1921.

not taking any direct or official action, but that endeavours
are being made by the English Cabinet to try and get in
touch through intermediaries. I also note the way in
which they intend using Smuts. ... I note that
Erskine Childers also will strive for an opportunity of
meeting Smuts.

" Tom Casement has already seen Smuts a couple of
times. He (Tom Casement) is very enthusiastic with the
result of these chats. . . . He says Smuts speaks most
feelingly and genuinely with regard to Ireland, and,
according to T.C. says that he is determined to get the
matter settled."

This particular correspondence closes with a
note of panic on the part of Mr. O'Brien. The
British police were fully aware of the activities of
the Self-determination League — or, as certain wits
called it from its habit of suddenly closing its offices
and disappearing in alarm, the Self -extermination
League — and had no intention of leaving it in peace.
On the 20th its President writes to Mr. de Valera :

" It may not be possible for me to attend to any
business for a day or two. My host and hostess have during
the past week become very alarmed over an incident. . . .
My work has in consequence been considerably upset.
To-day they request me to make a move at once. I am
therefore making a temporary move to some place where I
may be safe for the moment, and I must then endeavour to
mate plans for a more permanent base. ... I shall
advise you directly I have something permanently fixed."

Meanwhile an agent of the British Government
had issued a solemn warning in a quarter where he
knew its gravity would be appreciated. On the 16th
Mr. Collins writes to the President as follows : —

" Yesterday my man interviewed . He is very

gloomy about the situation. His story more or less is as
follows : Southern Parliament to be summoned on the 28th
June. Fourteen days later the Viceroy will be officially
aware that it has not answered — will then immediately
issue the order for its dissolution. That order is already

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS.

in print. Martial Law will thru In* proclaimed for th«
(''•unties and that prnclainatinn i> al>o in print. It is to
be of the most vigorous, and will put the Civil ('«
entirely nut <>\ cMinmi^mn. It will In- Mippnrted hy three
times the present military strength who will operate on a
M -lieme nl intense investment of areas, search and im
ment. All means of tran^pnrt t'mm push bicycles up will
be commandeered, and all»ue<l only on permit. He is in
niable panic to avert the awful times. He wants to

see you as man to man. It is quite possible that this is

part of the -Hove, although I don't accuse him of

oeing- aware of it. Cope I should say would be aware of it.

^e, a measure of Martial Law for the whole of the

Unities is not unlikely."

The reference to Mr. Cope in this note shows how
successful he had been in establishing a channel of
communication between himself and the Sinn Fein
leaders.

There is no doubt that public opinion, both in
England and Ireland, was by now far more in favour
of negotiation than it had been at any period since
the outbreak of the rebellion. In Ireland it was
realised by the majority of those who knew the real

ts of the situation that the attainment of the
L'« public by resistance to the forces of Great Britain
was impossible. The long hoped for intervention

B no nearer than before; the resources of
Sinn Fein were bound to disappear before the
threatened intensification of military repression.
The Republicans were not yet beaten, but their
defeat -rtain and could not long be delayed.

It was hardly to be hoped that, once defeated, Sinn
Fein would be offered better terms than those
contained in the Act. On the other hand, were
negotiations to be set on foot while Sinn Fein, in
the shape of the Irish Republican Army, was still
in the field, it was practically certain that any terms

122 IRELAND IN 1921.

could be secured, provided Ireland remained within
the Empire, and Ulster were allowed to stand apart
if she so desired. Allegiance and Ulster's right to
Partition, these were the two points to which the
Government must and did always cling. To the
extremists it seemed that surrender on these points
meant surrender of all those principles for which
Sinn Fein stood. To the more moderate men, who
remembered the aims of the movement before its
alliance with the Irish Republican Brotherhood, it
appeared that the establishment of a practically
independent Ireland within the Empire was a
sufficient realisation of their ambitions for the
present.

It must not be inferred that as yet there was any
grave dissension in the Sinn Fein ranks. Differences
of opinion there were and always had been, but
under the pressure of coercion the Sinn Fein leaders
had been moulded into an homogeneous whole. Each
could be trusted loyally to carry out the policy
decided upon by the majority; it was not until the
Truce had removed the immediate menace of danger
that internal differences revealed themselves in
public dissension.

Similarly a distinct change had come over the
English attitude towards the Irish problem. The
actions of Sinn Fein throughout the War and the
rebellion of 1916 had alienated the sympathy of the
majority of English people. Had the Government
succeeded in crushing the rebels in a short, sharp
campaign in 1919, there is no doubt that the country
would have supported it. Home Rule in any form
would once more have been relegated to the back-
ground, and Sinn Fein would have been forgotten

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. 123

as the Fenian movement had been forgotten before.
Hut the long drawn out struggle, wit h its hesitating
policy and the reproaches such a policy brought in
its train, wearied the nation, which urgently
required peaceful conditions in which to recover
from the exhausting effort of the War. If, as it
appeared, coercion was impotent to end a struggle
whieh to the majority of Englishmen seemed utterly
purposeless, then by all means give the Irish their
own country to govern. But let it be clearly
understood that such an experiment must involve no
disruption of the Empire, nor must Ulster be made
to suffer for the sins of the South.

For the aspirations of Sinn Fein, Englishmen as
a whole had little sympathy. The argument that
Ireland was a separate nation some hundreds of
years ago and had therefore a right to revert to that
status carried no weight. The same might be said
of many other tracts of territory now forming parts
of a great nation. The establishment of a republic
would be secession, and the rights and wrongs of
secession had already been decided. Nobody now
believes that the secession of the Southern States of
America would have benefited the American nation,
however much they may admire the magnificent
resistance those States made to a superior foi
Nor is it held that the Federal States were guilty of
an act of tyranny in reasserting the allegiance of the
South by force of arms, whatever criticism may be
made of the methods employed during the first years
of the peace that followed. The words of Professor
Paxson which refer to the American Civil War may
well be applied to the struggle for the establishment
of the Irish Republic. " Only the calm judgment

124 IRELAND IN 1921.

of posterity can determine which side was wrong.
. . . Yet, after all, one side was right and one was
wrong. Though advocates of either were frequently
mistaken in their application of historic facts,
though partisans of both were always more honest
tjian informed, one side of the quarrel harmonised
generally with the trend of human experience and
the laws of economic and political evolution; the
other was reactionary and as such condemned by
time."

From bitter controversy about the Home Rule of
the latter part of the nineteenth century, which was
a measure of parochialism compared with the Home
Rule of the December Treaty, British opinion in
1921 had approached acceptance of the principles of
Dominion Home Rule. It seemed incredible that
Dominion status should not satisfy the aspirations
of all Irishmen who desired the end of the Union.
So many races and nationalities had accepted this
status, and had proceeded to evolve for themselves
out of it a scheme of existence which suited the
particular needs of development of each. Why
could not Ireland do the same? What could she
hope to gain as a Republic tkat she could not secure
with greater ease and with the powerful assistance of
the whole Empire as a Dominion of that Empire?
Her aspirations, or rather the aspirations of
the Republicans, seemed to the English mind
reactionary and tending towards the decline of her
prosperity. Which was the more likely to favour
the development of the commerce and industries of
a country whose greatest and most important market
had always been, and in the nature of things must
always be, Great Britain — her establishment as a

PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. 125

petty and uniinj>ortaiit state, which could be ruined
at any moment by a change in the tariff laws of a
country in whose affairs she would no longer have
any voice, or her inclusion in momU'rship of Empire
with that country? So Englishmen, and probably
the world at large, reasoned. From every point of

v the republican status was unsound.

Indeed, as events proved later, the majority of
Sinn Fein preferred a Dominion to the maintenance
of the struggle for a Republic. Mr. de Valera's oft
repeated claim that his party held a mandate from
the electors for the establishment of the Irish
Republic was utterly false. As late as June, 1921,
he claimed this mandate as having been given him
by the whole of Ireland, not the South alone.
" Bail Eireann, the body for which I speak
directly," he wrote, in reply to enquiries by a Press
representative, " is the constitutionally elected
Parliament of the Irish nation. This Parliament
was set up as the result of a direct vote of the
people at the general election of 1918 when the
establishment of the Republic was approved by an
overwhelming majority, barely twenty per cent,
of the popular vote of that election favouring
connection with England. At these elections the
Republicans secured a total of 72 out of 101
members, whilst at the local government elections
held later the percentage reached 77 in the case of
the city and urban councils, 88.14 in the case of the
rural district councils. At the elections just now
held, despite geremanderin^ and brazen intimida-
tion, of the 168 members elected on the popular
franchise, that is excluding the privilege and
duplicate vote, 126 were pledged Republicans or

126 IRELAND IN 1921.

exactly 75 per cent, of the representation, while the
Connectionists secured only 36, or slightly over 21
percent."

The influence of the Truce in the modification of
this claim is interesting to trace.

CHAPTER VI.

The King's speech at Belfast, already quoted,
carried the first promise of one last attempt to be
made to end the Irish trouble by negotiation before
the ultimate pressure was applied. The Prime
Minister, in a message sent to their Majesties on
their return from Ireland, took the matter a step
further. This message was as follows : —

" I am confident that I can speak not only for the
Government of the United Kingdom, but for the whole
Empire, in offering your Majesty and the Queen the hearty
congratulations of all your loyal subjects on the success
of your visit to Belfast. We have been deeply moved by
the devotion and enthusiasm with which you were greeted,
and our faith in the future is strengthened by the reception
given to your Majesty's words in inaugurating the
Parliament of Northern Ireland.

" None but the King could have made the personal
appeal; none but the King could have evoked so
instantaneous a response. No effort shall be lacking on
the part of your Ministers to bring Northern and Southern
Ireland together in recognition of a common Irish
responsibility, and I trust that from now onwards a now
spirit of forbearance and accommodation may breathe upon
the troubled waters of the Irish question. Your Majesty
may rest assured of the deep gratitude of your peoples for
this new act of Royal service to their ideals and interests."

The King's speech had been made at a most

128 IRELAND IN 1921.

critical moment. The Cabinet was engaged in
considering the measures to be taken to meet the
certain refusal of Sinn Fein to work the Act, and no
one doubted that this refusal meant the application
to the South of a far sterner policy than had yet
been put into force. Mr. de Valera had just been
submitted to the indignity of arrest, and although
the civil authorities promptly disavowed the action
of the military, into whose hands he had fallen, the
incident was not likely to produce in him a more
conciliatory frame of mind than before. But
Dublin Castle, inspired by Mr. Cope, still insisted
that if only one more concession were made, if only
a conference could be proposed without restrictions,
there was still hope of peace. One side or the other
must modify its conditions; either Sinn Fein must
abandon the principles it had so widely proclaimed,
or the British Government must waive certain of
their stipulations. Sinn Fein remained unyielding,
but the Government believed that the prospect of
obtaining peace in Ireland justified a reversal of its
policy. If Paris was worth a Mass, Dublin was
worth a recantation. On the very day following
the King's return, the Prime Minister addressed
the following letter to Mr. de Valera and Sir James
Craig : —

" Sir, — The British. Government are deeply anxious
that, so far as they can assure it, the King's appeal for
reconciliation in Ireland shall not have been made in vain.
Rather than let another opportunity of settlement in
Ireland to be cast aside, they feel it incumbent upon them
to make a final appeal, in the spirit of the King's words,
for a conference between themselves and the representatives
of Southern and Northern Ireland.

' I write, therefore, to convey the following- invitation
to you as the chosen leader of the great majority in

THE TRUCE. 129

hern Ireland, and i l ;imes Craig, the Premi*

Northern Ireland: —

1. .11 Id attend a conference here in London
in - with Sir James Craig to explor
utmost the possibility of a settlement.

2. That you >houhl bring with you for the purpose any
colleagues whom vou may sel«

The Government will, of course, give a safe conduct
to all who may be chosen to participate in the conference.

We make this invitation with a fervent desire to end
the ruinous conflict which has for centuries divided Ireland
and embittered the relations of the peoples of these two
islands, who ought to live in neighbourly harmony with
c ich other, and whose co-operation would mean so n;
not only to the Empire but to humanity. We wish that
no endeavour should be lacking on our part to realise the
King's prayer, and we ask you to meet us, as we will meet
you, in the spirit of conciliation for which his Majesty
appealed. — I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

D. LLOYD GEORGE."

This was the letter to Mr. de Valera; that
addressed to Sir James Craig was couched in
precisely similar terms.

The publication of this letter caused a profound
sensation throughout the world, and much specula-
tion was indulged in as to the reception it would
receive from the Sinn Fein leaders. Much had been
conceded to them . There was no longer any question
of a * black list ' of men who had been engaged in
criminal enterprises, and who would consequently
not be granted safe conducts. Any colleague of Mr.
de Yalera was to be admitted to conference with the
British Government on equal terms. The old
designation of murderers could no longer be applied
to them. This was indeed recognition, in a form
peculiarly acceptable to the extreme party among
Mr. de Valera's followers. But, of far more
importance even than this, there was no mention of
the elimination of any subject of discussion at the

j

130 IRELAND IN 1921.

proposed conference. It was not postulated, as
hitherto, that the retention of Ireland within the
Empire must be conceded before discussion could
take place. The Sinn Fein leaders knew well enough
that if they insisted upon secession, the conference
must come to nothing, but for the moment that was
not the point. On the letter of the invitation, they
were not violating any of their pledges to their
followers or to Dail Eireann if they accepted.
Against their acceptance there was only one
argument. It must once more be repeated that the
whole aim of Sinn Fein was the establishment not
of a Republic merely, but of a Republic of the whole
of Ireland. In the eyes of Sinn Fein the divisions
of Northern and Southern Ireland did not exist,
having been imposed by the British Government,
whose authority it did not recognise. But acceptance
of the terms of the Prime Minister's letter meant the
tacit recognition of Sir James Craig as Premier of
Northern Ireland. Would the advantages of
acceptance outweigh the disadvantages, or, in other
words, how far was Sinn Fein prepared to advance
from its position in order to secure peace ?

There could be no doubt that the issue of peace or
war depended upon Mr. de Valera's reply to this
letter. Nor was there any doubt that a refusal to
attend the conference would destroy any lingering
chance of Sinn Fein being able to secure outside
intervention. Almost without exception the Press
of the world acclaimed the action of the Prime
Minister ; even in quarters sympathetic towards the
Sinn Fein point of view it was held that this was
more than the Southern Irish leaders could have
dared to hope for. Refusal of the ofier would have

THE TRUCE. 131

meant the alienation of more friends than Sinn Fein
could afford to lose.

These were some of the considerations which
faced Mr. de Valera and his colleagues. Meanwhile
Sir James Craig had replied to the letter
immediately upon its receipt in the following
terms : —

" My Dear Prime Minister, — I am in receipt of your
letter of the 24th inst, conveying an invitation to a
conference in Ixmdon at an early date, and I avail myself
of the services of your courier to intimate that I am
summoning1 a meeting of my Cabinet for Tuesday, when I
hup*' tn be able to secure the presence of all the members.
You may rest assured no time will be lost in conveying the
result of our deliberations. — Youro sincerely,

JAMBS CEAIG.

Following this promised meeting of the Northern
Cabinet, a telegram was sent to Mr. Lloyd George
by Sir James Craig containing the words " In view
of the appeal conveyed to us by his Majesty in his
gracious message on the opening of the Northern
1 'arliament for peace throughout Ireland, we cannot
refuse to accept your invitation to a conference to
discuss how best this can be accomplished."

This acceptance, even couched in the above terms,

did not meet with unqualified approval in Ulster.

I he more bitter opponents of Sinn Fein saw no

son why they should be called upon to " shake
hands with murderers " in a conference which had
for its object the attainment of peace in Ireland.
Their argument was that Ulster had done all that
<-<>uld be expected of her by accepting the terms of
the Act, and that the North of Ireland had no hand
in the rebellion which was responsible for the lark
<>f peace. It was no affair of theirs that Sinn Fein
prosecuting a campaign of violence; the affairs

132 IRELAND IN 1921.

of the North had been settled by the establishment
of the Northern Government, peace in Ireland was
capable of attainment by similar action in the
South, with which area they had no longer anything
in common. They eyed the terms of the invitation
with suspicion; why should they be called upon to
join these negotiations, unless the British Govern-
ment contemplated asking them to make concessions
in order to placate Sinn Fein? The majority of
Ulstermen were agreed upon one point at least
beyond dispute — a determination to concede nothing
of the position Ulster had won.

Meanwhile the British authorities had removed
every bar to free consultation between Mr. de
Valera and his colleagues, many of whom were at
that time in gaol or engaged in evading the
attentions of the police. Orders were given that
police surveillance should cease, and facilities were
given to Mr. de Valera to visit Mr. Griffith in
Mountjoy prison.

The first endeavour of the Sinn Fein leaders was
to alter the nature of the conference in the direction
of removing the difficulty of Ulster's recognition.
If Mr. de Valera could appear in London as the
representative of the Irish people, with Sir James
Craig apparently one of his colleagues, the position
would be entirely altered and the necessity for
acknowledging partition averted.

In pursuance of this policy, Mr. de Valera
determined upon a preliminary conference in
Dublin. On the 28th he sent the following telegram
to Mr. Lloyd George : —

" Sir, — I have received your letter, and am in
consultation with such of the principal representatives of

THE TRUCE. 133

our nation as are available. We most earnestly desire to
help in bringing1 about a lasting peace between the peoples
MI these two islands, but see no avenue by which it ran
be reached if you deny Ireland essential unity and set aside
the principle of national self-determination. Before
replying more fully to your letter, I am seeking a
conference with ce --presentatives of the political

minority in this country."

At the same time Mr. de Valera wrote to certain
prominent Southern Unionists, including Sir James
Craig — a member for Dublin University in the
Southern Parliament and not to be confused with
Sir James Craig the Ulster Premier — the Earl of
Midleton, Sir Maurice Dockrell, Sir Robert Woods,
and Mr. Andrew Jameson. His letter was as
follows : —

" The reply which I, as spokesman for the Irish nation,
shall make to Mr. Lloyd George will affect the lives and
fortunes of the political minority in this island no less than
ot the majority. Before sending that reply, there-
fore, I would like to confer with you and to learn from you
at first hand the views of a certain section of our people of
you are representative.

" J am confident that you will not refuse this service
to In-land, and I shall await you at the Mansion House,
Dublin, at eleven a.m. on Monday next, in the hope that
you will find it possible to attend/'

Mr. de Valera also sent a telegram to Sir James
Craig, the Ulster Premier, which did not reveal his
intentions quite so openly. It ran :—

" Can you come Dublin Monday next, eleven a.m.?
On receipt of your reply will write you/'

It was an astute move, but Mr. de Valera could
have cherished any great hope that the Northern
Premier would t'nll into the trap. By inviting the
Unionists of both North and South to a conference,
lie classed them as a single minority party in
an undivided Ireland. Had the Ulster Premier

134 IRELAND IN 1921.

accepted his invitation, he could hardly have
appeared at a subsequent conference in London as
the representative of a State independent of the
South. Of this fact he was fully aware, as his
reply indicates : —

" Impossible for me to arrange any meeting. I Lave
already accepted the Prime Minister's invitation to London
Conference."

But Mr. de Valera was not to be driven from
his attitude. The world at large should have no
doubt that he considered himself as the leader of a
deputation representing Ireland as a whole. In a
further telegram to the Ulster Premier he defined
the point more fully : —

'' I greatly regret you cannot come to conference here
Monday. Mr. Lloyd George's proposal, because of its
complications, impossible of acceptance in its present form.
Irish political differences ought to be adjusted, and can, I
believe, be adjusted, on Irish soil. But it is obvious
that, in negotiating peace with Great Britain, the Irish
delegation ought not to be divided, but should act as unit
on some common principle."

The Southern Unionists accepted the invitation,
Lord Midleton stating that he had done so " after
consultation with his Irish colleagues and under
pressure from other quarters/' and the meeting
duly took place. In the absence of the Northern
Premier it attracted comparatively little attention,
despite the fact that it was made to appear some-
thing of a Sinn Fein triumph. The Southern
Unionists were treated as subjects of the Republic
owning allegiance to the Dail, rather than as equals
in a conference between the representatives of two
different political ideals. The terms of the report,
issued by the ' Publicity Department of Dail
Eireann ' sufficiently indicate this : " The informal

THE TRUCE. 135

conference called by President de Valera was held
this morning at the Mansion House. . . . The
President was accompanied by Mr. A. Griffith, T.D.
Views were exchanged upon the situation created by
the British Prime Minister's proposals. . . ."

It will be observed that the British authorities
had carried their policy of conciliation to the extent
of releasing from gaol certain of the leaders of Sinn
Fein who were in their custody, including Mr.
Griffith.

As a matter of fact, Mr. de Valera's invitation
had caused considerable discontent among a section
of the Irish people who had recently given valuable
support to Sinn Fein. The Nationalists of the
North felt that they represented quite as large a
section of opinion as the Southern Unionists invited
to the conference, a view which was probably
correct, and that therefore they too should have been
invited. Opinion in Ulster as a whole inclined to
the belief that the Dublin conference had been
adjourned for the purpose of giving time for another
attempt to be made to induce the Northern Premier
to attend. The Right Hon. John Andrews, the
Ulster Minister for Home Affairs, put the Ulster
position with characteristic bluntness. ' If de
Valera and his people want to give Ireland peace,
let them give her peace," he said. " It is up to
them, not to us. In the interests of peace we have
taken a Parliament we never wanted. We have
functioned that Parliament. We intend to work
it, and we intend that blessings shall flow from it
for the benefit of the whole community under our
control. If they want peace, why don't they do
the same? Why don't they function their Parlia-

136 IRELAND IN 1921.

ment and bring it into being, and legislate with the
same spirit of determination and loyalty and
temperance as we propose to do? Why don't
they bury the hatchet, and let us go forward
constitutionally according to the law of the land,
and make Ireland the happy, prosperous country it
should be ? They forget that the Council of Ireland
is there for the express purpose of bringing Irish-
men of all opinions into one body, and I cannot for
the life of me see what good can come of this
conference in Dublin. I tell them to-night that
Ulster has nothing more to give, and that Ulster is
going to give nothing more/'

As a matter of fact, the conference had had a
certain result. Lord Midleton expressed his views
in the words : " I am not unhopeful. The door is
open, that is the great thing. There would have
been no chance if we had not had the conference.
There is an universal desire for peace in Ireland,
and I was much struck by the enthusiasm of the
Dublin crowd outside the Mansion House on
Monday."

The influence of the Southern Unionists had been
enlisted in favour of an abatement of the activities
of the Crown Forces. So far the Irish Republican
Army had given no signs of improving the peace
atmosphere by a cessation of the outrage campaign.
The casualty lists of the early days of July were
fully as severe as those of the preceding weeks. But
in spite of this the Sinn Fein leaders were using
every influence which could be brought to bear to
induce the British authorities to suspend the counter
measures of the military and police. It was
essential to their purpose that the members of the

THE TRUCE.

I.R.A. should believe that any truce which mi
be arranged was the result of their efforts in the
held. Not that the Sinn Fein leaders used this
argument in their suggestions directed to the
Hritish authorities. Their contention was that a
relaxation of the activities of the Crown Forces
would make it easier for them to induce their
followers to listen to those who were to preach peace
to them. The attitude of the Irish Republican
Army they could not guarantee. It might take
some little time before its patriotic fervour could
be curbed, but every endeavour would be made to
limit their operations as much as possible. The
Irish Hull ft In, the organ of the Propaganda
Department of Bail Eireann, commented on the
Dublin conference in the following terms : —

" Whatever the ultimate issue of the present movement
for peace, the conference held at the Mansion House

frday has remarkable interest and significance. It is
the first to be held between the national leaders of Ireland
and representatives of minority sections within Ireland
since the war of independence began. The fact that the
conference was adjourned to next Friday after an inter-
change of views is a proof that Irishmen of hitherto widely
divergent opinions c;m ' •ontinue to deliberate upon the l
means of showing an united front to England at this crisis."

The Bulletin also referred to " the unvarying
spirit of tolerance extended in Republican Ireland
to minorities of whatever class or creed." The
idea of tolerance conceived by the editor of the
Bulletin appears to have been a peculiar one. The
destruction of Loyalists' property was at that time
at its height in the South of Ireland. On the very
day of the conference, the house of a Deputy
Lieutenant for County Clare was burnt to the
ground while its occupants were held up by armed

138 IRELAND IN 1921.

men, and such outrages were of daily occurrence.

On the resumption of the Dublin Conference on
July 8th, Lord Midleton read a letter which he had
received from the Prime Minister during the visit
to London which he had paid between the sittings
of the conference. This letter was as follows : —

" Dear Lord Midleton, — In reference to the conversa-
tion I had with you this morning, the Government fully
realise that it would be impossible to conduct negotiations
with any hope of achieving satisfactory results if there is
bloodshed and violence in Ireland. It would disturb the
atmosphere and make the attainment of peace difficult.

" As soon as we hear that Mr. de Valera is prepared to
enter into conference with the British Government and to
give instructions to those under his control to cease from
all acts of violence, we should give instructions to the
troops and to the police to suspend active operations against
those who are engaged in this unfortunate conflict. — Tours
sincerely, D. LLOYD GEOHGB."

General Macready, the Commander-in- Chief in
Ireland, had already been warned of this develop-
ment of policy. He was admitted to the Mansion
House during the second meeting of the conference,
and joined in the deliberations. As a result, the
following communiqu^ was issued by the Sinn Fein
leaders at the close of the conference : —

" President de Valera informed the conference of the
terms in which he proposed to reply to the British Prime
Minister's invitation. At its previous session the conference
had expressed the view that it would be impossible to
conduct negotiations with any hope of achieving satisfactory
results unless there was a cessation of bloodshed in Ireland.
A letter to Lord Midleton from Mr. Lloyd George
was read, concurring in this view, and indicating the
willingness of the British Government to assent to a
suspension of active operations on both sides. It is
expected that an announcement of a truce, to take effect
from Monday next, will be made early to-morrow."

The terms of Mr. de Valera 's reply were as
follows : —

THE TRUCE. 139

" Sir, — The desire you express on the part of the

Itritish (rovernment to end tin- • • of conflict bet\\-

the peoples of these tvso islands and to establish relations
< f neighbourly harmony is the genuine desire of the people
<>f Ireland. I ha-. ;lted with iny colleagues and

secured the views of representatives of the minority of our
nation in regard to tin- invitation you have sent me. In
reply I desire to say that I am ready to meet and dis<
with \<»u on what basis such a conference as that proposed
reasonably hope to achieve the object desired. — I am,
Sir, faithfully yours, EAMON DH VALKRA."

The terms of the truce were finally settled at the
British Military Headquarters at three o'clock
on the afternoon of Saturday, July 9th. The
negotiating parties were General Macready, Colonel
Brind, and Mr. Cope on the British side, and
* Commandants ' Barton and Duggan of the I.R.A.
on the Sinn Fein side. By some curious oversight
the terms of the truce do not appear to have been
signed, and the versions issued by the British
authorities and Sinn Fein differed slightly, a fact
which caused some argument at a later date. The
version issued by British G.H.Q. at the time was

ollows : —

" Mr. de Valera, having1 decided to accept the Prime
Minister's invitation to confer with him in London, has
issued instructions to his supporters: (a) To cease all
attacks on Crown Forces and civilians, (D) to prohibit the
use of arms, (c) to cease military manoeuvres of all kinds,
(d) to abstain from interference with public or private
property, (e) to discountenance and prevent action likely to
cause disturbance of the peace which might necessitate
military interference.

In order to co-operate in providing an atmosphere in
which peaceful discussions may be possible, the Governii-
has directed (a) all raids and searches by military or p«
shall cease, (b) military activity shall be restricted to the
support of the police in their normal civil duties, (c) curfew
restrictions shall be removed, (d) the despatch of reinfo
ments shall be suspended, (e) the police functions in

140 IRELAND IN 1921.

Dublin to be carried on by the Dublin Metropolitan
Police.

In order to give the necessary time for these instruc-
tions to reach all concerned, the date from which they shall
come into force has been fixed at twelve noon, July llth. "

The Sinn Fein official version expressed the
terms as follows :—

" On behalf of the British Army it was agreed as
follows : — -

1. No incoming troops, K.I.C., and Auxiliary Police
and munitions except maintenance drafts.

2. No provocative display of troops, armed or unarmed.

3. It is understood that all provisions of this truce
apply to the martial law area equally with the rest
of Ireland.

4. No pursuit of Irish officers or men, or war materials
or military stores!

5. No secret agents noting descriptions or movements,
and no interference with the movement of Irish
persons, military or civil, and no attempts to
discover the haunts or habits of Irish officers and
men. NOTE. — This supposes the abandonment of
curfew restrictions.

6. No pursuit or observance of lines of communication
or connection.

On behalf of the Irish Army it is agreed : — •

(a) Attacks on Crown Forces and civilians to cease.
(6) No provocative displays of forces, armed or
unarmed.

(c) No interference with Government or private
property.

(d) To discountenance and prevent any action likely
to cause disturbance of the peace which might
necessitate military interference."

In a proclamation to his followers Mr. de
Valera said : —

' In the negotiations now initiated your representatives
will do their utmost to secure a just and peaceful
termination of this struggle, but history, particularly our
own history, and the character of the issue to be decided,
are a warning against undue confidence. An unbending
determination to endure all that may still be necessary,

THE TRUCE. 141

and fortitude such as you have shown in all your re<
sufferings may be required. These alone will lead you to
the peace you d< h<>ul<l force be resumed against our

ready on your part once more to resist.

Thus alone will you secure the final abandonment of force
and the acceptance of justice and reason as arbiter."

We must now return to an event of great
significance which occurred on the previous Tuesday,
July 5th. General Smuts, upon whose mediation
the Sinn Fein leaders had placed so many hopes,
arrived in Dublin at their invitation. Matters in
political circles in the city were already somewhat
easier. The Dublin Castle authorities were now in
open communication with Sinn Fein, and there was
no need for secrecy of the ' Mr. Edwards ' type.
General Smuts went openly to the Mansion House,
which had now become to all intents and purposes
the headquarters of Mr. de Valera, and here he met
the Sinn Fein leaders. He also met Mr. Cope and
other representatives of the British power. That
night he returned to London, and on the following
morning made a report to the Prime Minister, \vlio
immediately called a conference of Ministers to
discuss the views he had put forward in this report.
General Smuts' advice was all in favour of a truce,
perceiving as he did that the only chance of
improving the bitter feeling which had arisen as a
consequence of the outrage campaign was a cessation
of hostilities. The proclamation of a truce would
be a groat point gained. Once fighting had cease. 1.
there was reason to hope that the good sense of the
Irish people could be trusted to ensure that it would
not break out again on the initiative of the I.R.A.,
and the desire of the British Government for a
settlement was sufficient guarantee that the Crown

142 IRELAND IN 1921.

Forces would not be put into motion again in the
absence of fresh provocation.

The views of General Smuts on the prospects of
an eventual settlement were expressed in a speech he
made to the South African community in London
on his return from Dublin. " I looked for a moment
at that problem/' he said, ' a problem which is
engaging the attention not only of this country, but
very largely of the British Empire. I am not going
to speak to-night on that problem except to say this,
that, in my opinion, it is a soluble problem. In
itself it is soluble. If there were a better
atmosphere, if we all helped to create that better
atmosphere, if we were all actuated less by ancient
feeling and antipathies and more by human good-
will and the determination to wipe out what is really
a stain on the record of the Empire, then we would
be sure to succeed. Therefore, though not over
sanguine, I am hopeful. "

The influence of the Government's advisers had
induced them to agree to a truce, but it cannot be
denied that it was a truce of such a nature as to
lead the rank and file of the I.E. A. to believe that it
was their prowess and successful arms which had
led to the cessation of hostilities. The truce tacitly
acknowledged the belligerent status of the Irish
Republican Army as a disciplined force entitled to
recognition. The Sinn Fein version of the agree-
ment was accepted as the official one, even to the
extent of being quoted in the Weekly Summary, a
journal published by the police authorities for the
benefit of the force, as the authentic text. This
document assumes the existence of the Irish Army
as a belligerent force in the field, and refers to it as

THE TRUCE. 143

such. It speaks of " Irish officers and men " and
of " lines of communication." The whole argument
of the British authorities in the past had been that
their opponents were rebellious civilians, who could
not be entitled to belligerent status. This argument
had now been abandoned for good. In the event of
a failure of negotiations and a resumption of
hostilities, there could no longer be any question of
the suppression of gangs of armed rebels. The
British military authorities would have had to face
the prospect of open and declared war with an army
which they had themselves recognised, with all the
disadvantages which such a state of warfare
entailed. That such was the case was very soon
apparent. In order to settle disputes as to the
proper observance of the truce, a liason system was
evolved, by which officers of the British and Irish
forces met on equal terms as arbiters. The people
of England as a whole were too relieved at the
prospect of the termination of an unhappy situation
to pay much attention to the methods by which such
a result had been achieved, although a minority saw
in the proceedings a blow at the prestige of the
British Empire. The change of policy of the
Government had been apparently so sudden that it
could not but appear as a surrender to the forces of
misrule. Malcontent minorities in the Empire
could hardly fail to profit from the lesson which
Sinn Fein had taught them, a lesson which the
leaders of that party lost no time in proclaiming to
the world. Within a fortnight of the proclamation
of the truce Mr. de Valera, addressing the people of
Ireland, said : " We have learned one magnificent
lesson in Ireland in the last couple of years, and that

144 IRELAND IN 1921.

is that it is by acts and not by talk that a nation
will achieve its freedom/* The remark was
perfectly true. Ireland, under leaders who advocated
and organised an armed rebellion, had secured far
more than she had ever dreamed of obtaining
under leaders who confined themselves to obsolete
constitutional methods. It was for the first time
definitely established that force could wrest from
the British Empire concessions that years of
peaceful advocacy had failed to win. The god of
expediency had won, the statesmanship of England
had proclaimed the wisdom of settling the
difficulties of the moment by compromise, regardless
of the precedent set up by such an action or of its
effect upon the future. That Sinn Fein regarded
the truce as the first step towards a Republic,
nobody doubted at the time and nobody has found
cause to doubt since. But for the moment the
truce was hailed with relief in England, the
Morning Past, almost alone among the British Press,
pointing out the dangers involved in it. But in
Ulster, nearer to the heart of things, profound
apprehensions were aroused. The Belfast News-
letter expressed these apprehensions as follows :
1 There are implications in the truce communication
which are disquieting to all loyal subjects of the
King and repulsive to all honourable men. The
public will feel that even if a permanent peace were
to result from this agreement it would be dearly
purchased by the sacrifice of honour — not merely the
honour of Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues, but
the honour of the British nation."

Whatever may be the verdict of history upon
the wisdom of the change of policy, the Government

THE TRUCE. 148

had embarked upon it, and. rather than incur the
reproach of further indecision, it was their duty to
make the utmost endeavours to transform the truce
into a permanent peace. These efforts will be
described in subsequent chapters. For the moment
may confine ourselves to the effect of the truce
upon the internal situation in Southern Ireland.
In the first place it may be stated that the letter
of the truce was at first obeyed with commendable
strictness on both sides. The Crown Forces,
accustomed to discipline, continued this observance
throughout, despite the annoyance caused by the
policy of provocation indulged in by some of their
late enemies. The I.R.A., on the other hand,
probably owing to the fact that their discipline had
never been developed beyond the most elementary
stages, gradually became more careless in their
interpretation of their undertakings. The follow-
ing statement, prepared by the British Military
Authorities, provides an excellent picture of the
situation as it had become towards the end of
September : —

1 Ever since the agreement which came into
force on July llth, the Sinn Fein authorities have
acted in a manner entirely contrary to the spirit of
that agreement.

They have encouraged and allowed military

imps to be formed throughout the country.

These \vere in the first instance for the training of

officers of the I.R.A., who, when their training was

•ipleted, returned to their units and imparted

ins: :i to them.

1 In the 5th and 6th Division and Dublin
District areas no fewer than 81 such camps have

K

146 IRELAND IN 1921.

been located ; and bombing, engineering, signal and
musketry schools have also been formed. There is
a military college for officers at Galtee Castle, a
signalling school at Dromore Castle, an engineering
training camp at Castle Magner, a school of
musketry at Grotta, and a machine gun course has
been held at Kinsale. Musketry practice has also
been carried out at Ardsullagh and elsewhere.

11 These are just a few instances, and many
others have been reported. Drilling and manoeuvring
are being carried out all over the country. In the
aforementioned areas, 139 cases of drilling have been
observed, in which a total estimated number of over
17,000 men took part.

' Attempts to improve recruiting continue. In
Dunmanway, Co. Cork, both the loyal and the rebel
population were ordered to undergo a week's
training with the I.R.A. or submit an excuse in
writing. The numbers which are actually seen
drilling or manoeuvring are now very considerable,
and as many as 800 men have been seen together on
more than one occasion.

* * Apart from the military effect of this training
and organisation, which have been carried out for
Inore than two months, the moral effect on the I.R.A.
and on the people of the country is considerable.
The I.R.A. are firmly convinced that they have
' won the war.' Statements to this effect are
constantly reported in the Press as having been
made at Sinn Fein meetings all over Ireland; and
in several instances in Galway, farmers have
commiserated with the police and troops on account
of being beaten in spite of their plucky fight against
the ' Boys of the I.R.A.' Patrick O'Keefe, T.D.,

THE TRUCE. 147

speaking in Cork, said " Practically alone, the
County of Cork beat the British Army," and he
referred to his colleague Sean Moylan " whose fame
and bravery excelled those of the best generals in
Europe." An T'Oglac (the official publication of
the I.E. A.), dated August 26th, stated: " It is
the courage, zeal and efficiency of the Irish
Republican Army that has caused the enemy to
abandon, at least temporarily, his campaign of
aggression ; and that courage, zeal and efficiency will
not be found wanting in the future, if and whenever
it is required." The same paper in its issue of
September 9th stated : " The work of training and
organisation is being carried out with all the vigour
at our disposal, and should the necessity arise
immediately for a fresh campaign the benefit of this
improved training should be made manifest in
action." As a matter of fact the I.R.A. were in a
very uncomfortable military situation at the time of
the commencement of the truce; operations in which
concerted action was required, such as ambushes,
had almost wholly ceased, having been replaced
by mean and contemptible acts, described in
An T'Otjhw as * small jobs,' in performing which no
risk was run, the victims being for the most part
individuals and unarmed. The Crown Forces on
the other hand had recently been reinforced and were
steadily improving in their methods of dealing with
a difficult and elusive enemy.

' Actual proof exists that arms have been landed

in Ireland, reliable reports having been received in

fit'Uvn separate cases of the landing of arms,

ineludini: Thompson sub-machine guns. An T'Oglnc

July 'J'Jnd openly referred to the Thompson sub-

148 IRELAND IN 1921.

machine gun " of which a large number are now in
the hands of the I.R.A." It is known that arms
were landed at Arklow, Co. Wicklow, on August
21st, and also at Liscannor Bay (Co. Clare), from
fishing smacks; while on September 5th and 6th arms
were landed at Bantry. In an unofficial Sinn Fein
estimate, the number of Thompson sub-machine
guns landed in Ireland during the month of
September was 2,250. A consignment of Thompson
sub-machine guns arrived at Donnemark on Septem-
ber 5th, in a boat belonging to the Congested
Districts Board.

" Another marked phase of Sinn Fein activity
during the truce has been the incessant collection of
money throughout Ireland in order to finance the
I.R.A. Much of this collection has been accom-
panied by threats and intimidation. The following
are examples of many similar incidents which have
been reported : —

£1,000 were collected in Ennis on August
5th and 6th, the average assessment being 2/-
in the £.

July 21st at Castlecomer the rebels
attempted to collect subscriptions by threats.
July 27th. A levy of I/- in the £ was
imposed on all residents in Co. Wexford.

At Kilnaleck the Rev. Father Meehan of
Ballinarry compelled his parishioners to supply
money and provisions to the I.R.A. in camps.
He also levied a rate of I/- in the £ for the
White Cross.

July 27th. The Cork Examiner admitted
rebel levies for funds.

July 21. A family in Boyle was asked to pay

THE TRUCE. 149

£5 by members of the I.R.A. They paid in
fear.

The following notice was posted in Killaloe
on September 18th : " To the people of County
Clare. ... A levy according to what we
think each can afford will be taken from all
people and will be collected in due course.
(Signed) LIDDY, Commandant/'

In the 5th and 6th Division areas and in
Dublin District 23 definite cases were reported
of money having been collected by force.
" In addition to these purely military activities
the civil department of the Sinn Fein Government
has been very busy instituting Courts all over the
country. Before July llth the people were beginning
once again to bring their cases to the ordinary
Courts, but, since that date, by open or secret
intimidation they have been compelled to take them
to the Sinn Fein Courts. In a village in Co.
Cavan the following notice was posted: " Any
person attending English Courts as plaintiffs,
<lrtVn<lants or witnesses will be treated as spies and
in termers. Competent Military Authority/' and
in a Dail Eireann Local Government Board
circular dated 9/9/21, " Any attempt to obtain
payment of these claims (in English Courts) will be
resisted and punished by the elected Government of
the j)eople." In the 5th and 6th Division areas and
in Dublin District, from July llth to the end of
September, 45 Sinn Fein Courts are known to have
Ambled, and in some cases the proceedings have
been reported in the daily Press; while many of the
leading barristers in Dublin now practice in the
Republican Courts. The Freeman? Journal dated

150 IRELAND IN 1921.

12/10/21 reported a Republican Court which opened
in Dublin at the same time as the Peace Conference
in Downing Street. When the magistrates had
taken their seats the Registrar said : " I now declare
this Court open in the name of the Irish Republic.''

" Several cases have occurred of the Dublin
Metropolitan Police and Military Foot Police
having been assaulted and kidnapped by the I.R.A.
while attempting to carry out their duties.

" Owing to these activities the people are
becoming convinced that Sinn Fein is the de facto
governing power and that the I.R.A. is what
counts in the country rather than the Crown Forces ;
in many districts the former have established a
reign of terror to which Loyalists, Protestants and
ex-soldiers submit in silence, in the hope that an
agreement of some sort will be reached which will
afford them adequate protection. They have no
safety in the present state of affairs, and in the
event of the renewal of hostilities neither their lives
nor their property would be secure.

' Cases of provocative action towards the Crown
Forces have been numerous and range from the open
carrying of arms and wearing of uniform to spitting
at the sentries of the Crown Forces; 20 cases have
been reported of attacks on police and soldiers. The
police have been especially singled out for insults of
this sort, but their discipline has been beyond all
praise. At the same time the strain on their patience
and temper has been almost unendurable, and the
policy that nothing must be done to risk a break-
down of the agreement has compelled them to
inactivity. This has made it exceedingly difficult
for them to carry out their proper police functions,,

THE TRUCE. 151

and their seemingly supine attitude has led the
I.R.A. to more and more flagrant breaches of the
spirit of the " truce," which, indeed, has been kept
only in the fact that members of the Crown Forces
have not been murdered or ambushes carried out.

I he following are some of the attacks on the
Crown Forces that have occurred : —

September 28th. Unarmed R.I.C. and
Military Police were fired on in Tipperary, one
military policeman being dangerously wounded
and one R.I.C. stabbed with a knife.

September 10th. R.I.C. constable knocked
down and kicked about the head by rebels in
Cork.

July 17th. District Inspector and three
R.I.C. constables fired on between Lahinch and
Miltown Malbay.

August 30th. Unarmed soldiers assaulted
and beaten in Clonakilty.

August 24th. Two unarmed R.I.C. con-
stables kidnapped at Bandon.

September 12th. Two constables kidnapped
at Roskerry.

September 15th. Two constables kidnapped
at Bandon.

September 21st. Two unarmed soldiers of
the Gloucesters cycling near North Cork were
fired on by rebels with rifles and revolvers.

September 26th. Attempted murder of

Constable Cassidy, R.I.C., at Limerick.

' As an example of the provocation offered to the

Crown Forces during the truce, the case occurred at

Bandon on July 24th of a hundred rebels in lorries

and cars stopping outside the police barracks singing

152 IRELAND IN 1921.

rebel songs and spitting on the sentry. In short the
truce has been taken full advantage of by the
I.E. A., and, to quote part of a letter from a Sinn
Feiner, " Taking the truce as a whole it has been a
decided gain for our side. It has given the Army
time to breathe, it has taken some, its bravest
officers, from the prison and almost from the grave,
and it has allowed Dail Eireann to meet in public
and show the world that they are capable of
governing, not this little country of ours, but the
greatest nations of the world."

" A large proportion of the youth of Ireland is
indeed utterly demoralised. They are drunk with
the heady wine of revolt and they have now reached
a stage when they have persuaded themselves to
believe that they have brought England to her knees.
There is no sign that there is any recognition by this
class that the terms offered by the Government are
generous, and they are insanely confident that a
renewal of hostilities would lead to further and
greater concessions. That this is not a mere matter
of opinion is proved by extracts of letters written to
and by men in internment camps.

1. " The boys are mad for fighting and are
full of spirits. They think they are too long
at home. For every one man before they will
have six now, and they think of nothing now
only fighting. The truce only gave them an
opportunity to get more men, more arms and
ammunition. Machine guns will soon be as
plentiful as pianos in Ireland."

2. "I had a great time on the run, plenty
of everything and in much better health than I
am now."

THE TRUCE. 153

3. " The I.K.A. are now encamped all
over the country and it would make your heart

id t«> see them. I was down Ballinamore way
last week and I met about three dozen lorries
of them in full uniform. They are especially
concentrating in evacuated districts such as
( HlTony where all the R.I.C. were wiped out.
. . . The police courts are functioning all
over now, and the new police force is the best
and most effective for one thousand years. . . .
Peace conversations are going extremely well,
the enemy will evacuate any day and the Irish
people are in ship-shape for taking over the
country."

4. " I never saw Dublin in such a happy
state. You need not think that the opinion of
Dublin is different from yours. Dublin, with
the rest of Ireland, will accept nothing but a
Republic, and if we do not get that we are
willing to fight on for another few years. ' '

5. " All the boys without exception are in
the I.R.A. (in Co. Carlow), and quite prepared
for anything, in fact they will be disappointed
very much if there is no more fighting to be
done."

In the third extract the " three dozen lorries '
referred to must have been commercial vehicle-,
commandeered or stolen. Many cases of this have
been reported. For instance :—

July 17. Country carts were commandeered
at Newmarket by the rebels.

July 23rd. Motor cars seized with thiv
of violence at Cashel by John Lowney, in full
rebel uniform.

154 IRELAND IN 1921.

August 18th. Two unarmed R.I.C. were
held up and their car taken at Bandon.

July llth (4-30 p.m.). Motor car belonging
to William Slattery, of Bandon, was seized at
Bishopstown and 35 /- in money also taken.

Altogether at least 16 cases of the com-
mandeering of transport have been known to
have occurred.

" While making every allowance for the fact
that these letters were written by Sinn Feiners to
interned Sinn Feiners to keep up their spirits, and
are therefore couched in somewhat extravagant and
exaggerated terms, it is clear that there are many
among the younger generation who imagine that by
continuing the methods of the past and by physical
force they will obtain from H.M. Government
practically any concession and even a recognition of
Ireland's claim to independence. This is mainly
due to the national temperament, which interprets
the conciliatory attitude of H.M. Government as a
sign of weakness. It should always be remembered
that the Irish in some respects have a curiously
oriental outlook, and that conciliatory methods, if
it is not clearly understood that there is strength
and determination behind them, may produce most
unsatisfactory results.

* But it must also be borne in mind that there are
many who are in favour of acceptance of the present
terms and are against the attitude of extreme and
militant Sinn Fein, but who dare not say so openly.
Occasionally, however, a letter to an internee reveals
this. The following are examples : —

1. ' The offer far exceeded any measure
of Home Rule, and in my humble opinion

THE TRUCE. L66

should be accepted. It will IK* the last chance
Ireland will have to get control over her o\\n
affairs. I low it hurts me to see this one chance
being lost, but it will be. I have ever stood my
<>und as a fervent Home Ruler and would die
with you for it, but I cannot support anything
that would imperil my country, so, if this entire
separation is insisted on, I shall have to stand
apart from you/*

2. " I cannot understand why they won't
make peace at once and finish the business.
They have too good a time here and, if I don't
make a big mistake, when some of the boys get
back from Spike (internment camp) there will
be some trouble and rightly too, as the ring we
have here don't want any prisoners to be
released."

" Even though the present Dail Eireann w,is
elected when the Sinn Fein policy was one of
violence, hatred and physical force, and its members
are therefore almost all extremists, there are
indications that there are two parties in it. One in
favour of peace, some form of Dominion Home Rule
and alliance with the Roman Catholic Church, and
the other in favour of a continuance of hostilities
unless and until all their demands for an
independent Republic are granted. The opinions
held by these two parties are to a certain extent
reflected in the letters of their supporters, and it is
quite possible that the struggle between them would
become intense were it not for the fact that they
must kold together in the face of the growing danger
which Irish Labour presents.

" At the Irish Trades Union Congress on

156 IRELAND IN 1921.

August 2nd, Mr. Cathal O'Shannon declared that
' labour was not tied to the tail of Dail Eireann, or
to the tail of the Irish Eepublican Army, because
they might at any moment have to fight them and get
as clear of them as they had of the British Army/*
This independent attitude was exhibited a month
ago when 150 members of the Irish Transport and
General Workers' Union, employed by the Cork
Harbour Board, went on strike. These men, many
of them members of the I.R.A., formed a Soviet and
took over control of the port, defying the Dail or
the I.R.A. to interfere. This strike ended on
September 7th. A similar occurrence was reported
from Bruree, Co. Limerick, on August 30th, where
the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union
took possession of Cleeves' Creamery Incorporated
Stores in opposition to the Dail, and hoisted the red
flag on it. The danger from the extreme wing of
the Irish Labour Party is a very real one and cannot
have escaped the attention of the Sinn Fein leaders.
On one occasion at the end of September a man with
a red flag was addressing a crowd at Bartlemy on
Bolshevism, when a well-dressed stranger produced
a revolver and informed the speaker that he was
acting under orders from Dublin and that he must
hand over his flag and be clear of the town in five
minutes under penalty of being shot."

So ends this report, which was never intended
for publication in the form in which it stands. It
has been given in its original words, as thereby a
truer insight into the conditions in Ireland at the
time and the military attitude towards them may be
gained. Without expending any more space upon

THE TRUCE. 167

the subject, it may be said that the position of
affairs from the jxiint of view of the maintenance of
law and order grew worse rather than better towards
the (lose of the year. By December the casualty
list of tlu» Crown Forces had again begun to grow,
in that month two policemen being murdered and
wounded, while two soldiers were also wounded.
The spirit of the truce was fast losing its hold upon
the members of the I.R.A.

CHAPTER VII.

The reply of Mr. de Valera to the Prime
Minister's invitation to a conference has already
been quoted. But the last and most significant
sentence must be repeated if a clear idea is to be
obtained of the complicated negotiations which
followed it. This sentence is as follows: — " In
reply I desire to say that I am ready to meet and
discuss with you on what basis such a conference as
that proposed can reasonably hope to achieve the
object desired.'' It will be observed that Mr. de
Valera did not accept the invitation to the
conference as originally proposed, but merely
expressed his willingness to meet the Prime
Minister in order to discuss the preliminaries for
such a conference. This being the case, there could
be no question of the attendance of representatives
of Ulster at the meeting between the Prime Minister
and Mr. de Valera until the preliminaries of the
conference had been settled.

This point is most important. It must have been
obvious to both sides that the main question, which
was the matter of the retention of Ireland within
the Empire, was the only obstacle to the holding of a
conference, and that if some understanding on this

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. LM

matter, sufficient to allow the conference to be hold
were reached in the preliminary discussions, the
result of the conference itself would be a foregone
conclusion. Whether or not the Ulster representa-
tives attended at tli. :e would be immaterial.
The main question would have been settled, and the
conference would be merely a committee sitting for
the purpose of arranging details. Mr. de Valera's
contention would have been justified, and he would
be in the position of having met the Prime Minister
and negotiated with him as the sole representative of
the whole of Ireland.

As a matter of fact, events took place very much
on these lines. The conference to which the Prime
Minister invited both Sir James Craig and Mr. de
Valera never took place, and it was natural that the
Ulster leaders should have displayed uneasiness at
the manner in which the " preliminary " conference
between the Prime Minister and Mr. de Valera was
allowed to usurp its place. They felt, what was
indeed the truth, that Mr. de Valera had so
manoeuvred as to exclude them from the most
imfxirtant stage in the negotiations.

But the Government had embarked upon its
perilous enterprise, and no considerations of strict
honesty could be allowed to override those of
expediency. The Prime Minister skilfully passed
over the qualified acceptance of Mr. de Valera, and
replied to him as though this acceptance had K
unconditional ' I have received your letter of
acceptance," he telegraphed, " and shall be happy

see you and any colleagues whom you wish to
bring with you at Downing Street any day this
week. Please wire date of your arrival in London. ' '

160 IRELAND IN 1921.

To which Mr. de Valera replied : " Telegram
received. I will be in London for conference on
Thursday next." The fact that this conference
was not the one originally proposed had already been
lost sight of. To those who ventured to remind
them of it, the Government replied in fair words.
Of course both sides realised that this was only a
preliminary, it was far better that the two main
parties to the dispute should meet in private before
the main question was put before a formal
conference. No definite step would be taken in the
absence of the Northern delegates.

The first meeting between the Prime Minister
and Mr. de Valera took place on July 14th,
and lasted two and a half hours. The official
communiqu^ issued at its close was as follows : —

" Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. de Valera met as arranged
at 4-30 p.m. this afternoon at 10, Downing Street. They
were alone, and the conversation lasted until 7 p.m. A
free exchange of views took place, and relative positions
were defined. The conversation will be resumed at 11-30
a.m. to-morrow."

As a result of this meeting, the Prime Minister
telegraphed to Sir James Craig inviting him to
London to confer with him. No mention of the
assembly of the original conference was made in this
telegram.

It was obvious that the meeting of Mr. Lloyd
George and Mr. de Valera had resulted in the
expression by the latter of a point of view which
necessitated consultation between the Prime
Minister and the Ulster leader, and that this point
of view prohibited this consultation taking place
at a full conference. As a matter of fact, the
expression of Mr. de Valera's views made it

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS.

perfectly plain that he would not consent to such a
conference. If an offer were to come from England,
that offer must be addressed to him alone, in order
that ht». as {.resident of the Bail, might refer it to
that body for consideration. The fiction could
then he maintained that the offer had been made
i relaixl as to a state independent and undivided,
and Sinn Fein could consider it without abandon
the position they had taken up. The Prime
Minister, that very evening referred to the meeting
in words which showed the effects of inoculation
with Mr de Ynlera's pretensions. " Mr. de Valera,
the chieftain of the vast majority of the Irish race,"
he said, " has been in conference for very nearly
three h ;th the Prime Minister of this country,

discussing the various methods and suggestions
which have been put forward for a settlement of the
long, long controversy between the Irish and the
British people."

A second meeting between Mr. Lloyd George and
Mr. de Valera took place on the 15th, and v.

ipied mainly in skirting round the difficult
problem of the unity of Ireland. In the afternoon
of the same day, Sir dames Craig, who had arrived
in London in response to the Prime Minister's
telegram, called at Downing Street, and as a result
of the conversation he had with Mr. Lloyd Geor
summoned the members of his Cabinet to Lond
The utmost reticence wras observed by all the parties
to this triangular duel. Each felt that his
supporters \\erv HI.MV than anxious as to the
influences which mi^ht be brought to bear upon him,
and this nervousness was reflected in such brief
utteran were made by each. Mr. de Valera

L

162 IRELAND IN 1921.

was the first to declare his adherence to principle.
On the 16th he issued a statement as follows : —

* The Press gives the impression that I have been
making certain compromise demands. I have made no
demand but one — the only one I am entitled to make — that
the self-determination of the Irish nation be recognised. "

On the same day a message from Sir James Craig
was read at a Unionist meeting in Ulster. This
message was as follows : —

" You may all rest assured that I will see to it that
the Empire in whose cause our heroes so nobly laid down
their lives is not weakened by any action of mine. They
trusted us to give nothing away, and their trust will never
be betrayed."

On the 18th the Prime Minister again met the
representatives of the North and of the South, in
separate interviews. Subsequent to the former
interview, Sir James Craig issued the following
statement, which disposed finally of any hope of a
full conference taking place in the immediate
future : —

" I am returning home well satisfied with the efforts
being made towards peace. Mr. de Valera has broken
silence and cleared the ground by his statement to this
morning's press that he proposes to found his claim upon
the recognition of the right of * self -determination.' By
an overwhelming majority at our recent election — the
constitutional method of expressing ' self-determination '—-
the people of Northern Ireland have ' determined ' their
own Parliament, which was opened by his Most Gracious
Majesty in person. Mr. de Valera and his colleagues have
already admitted the right of such ' self-determination '
on the part of Northern Ireland by the fact that they
themselves stood as candidates for the Northern Parliament
and submitted their policy of ' No Partition.1 This was
the only issue placed before the electorate, and ' No
Partition ' was rejected by the largest majority which, as
far as I am aware, has ever been secured at a General
Election in any part of the world.

" Such being the true facts, it now merely remains for
Mr. de Valera and the British people to come to terms

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. L63

regarding the area outside of that of which I am Prime
ICinitter, The people of Northern Ireland, on Behalf of
whom I speak, while claiming1 in the most absolute way
possible — as has been done — to ' determine ' their own
fate, do not make any claim whatever to ' determine ' the
terms of settlement which Great Britain shall make with
Southern Ireland.

\Vh.-n this is accomplished I can promise cordial
•[•eratinn on eijual terms with Southern Ireland in any
matters affecting our common interest. Having- reached
the present stage, I go back to Ireland to carry on the
practical work of government. I feel that our interests
are ably rep 1 in the Imperial Parliament, and, of

course, our services are available at any moment."

With this valedictory message, Sir James Craig
and his Cabinet left London.

It is almost unnecessary to point out that the
assumption contained in the first paragraph of this

-sage was not likely to be accepted for a moment
l.y Sinn Fein. In claiming the right of self-
determination for Ireland as a whole, and not for
its divisions, which divisions he did not recognise,
Mr. de Valera had made no advance upon his
utterances. Further, Sinn Fein had participated
in the elections in the North under exactly the same
conditions as it had participated in those of the
South. Dail Eireann had agreed to the elections
held under the provisions of the Act for the purpose
<>i the formation of a new Dail. The elections had
U-en, in the eyes of Sinn Fein, elections to the

publican Parliament of the whole of Ireland, and
had resulted in a lar^e majority for Republicanism,
v. ith a small local minority, whose members refused
to take the oath of allegiance to the Republic, in the
e< unities in the North-East. By this argument,
Ireland had expressed its determination for a
Republic.

164 IRELAND IN 1921.

The Publicity Department of Dail Eireann,
whose head, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, had joined
Mr. de Valera 's staff in London, did not hesitate to
reply in these terms to Sir James Craig's message.
It also took the opportunity of declaring that the
conference as originally suggested had not taken
place. There had been discussions between the
representatives of the British and Irish nations,
that was all. The Sinn Fein official statement had
better be quoted in full.

' There has been no conference yet. What haa
happened is merely this: there have been discussions at
Downing Street between Mr. Lloyd George and President
de Valera on the possibility of discovering a basis for a
confeience. The basis of such a conference must be that
Ireland is an independent nation, and as such may have an
agreement with the British Government. It is not a
question of Belfast being subservient to Dublin, as Sir
James Craig has suggested, or of Dublin being subservient
to Belfast. What it means is that both Dublin and Belfast
must be subservient to the Irish nation.

* The whole basis of the claim of the Irish nation ia
the fourteen points of ex-president Wilson, and the right
of small nations to self-determination. The Ulster Cabinet
represents a very small minority of the Irish people, and
we claim that that small minority has been systematically,
wilfully, and fundamentally misled by a foreign Power.
It has been led to believe that its actions would be
supported by a strong foreign Power, and, in fact, it
always has been supported by that foreign Power — »
England. There may, or may not, be a conference, but
if a conference takes place it must be on the basis of an
independent Irish nation.

' I cannot emphasise too strongly that there has been
no conference yet. There have been merely discussions
between the two sides — between President de Valera as
the representative of the Irish nation and Mr. Lloyd George
as the head of the foreign Power.

" We have no comment to make on Sir James Craig's
statement. Sir James Craig is in the same position as were,
the Southern States in America in 1861."

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. 165

On the 20th a prolonged meeting of the British
Cabinet was held, at which Mr. Lloyd George
secured approval of the offer he was about to make
to Mr. de Valera on the following day. This offer,
which was not made public for some weeks, was
contained in the following document, which was
entitled Proposals of the British Government for
nit Irish Settlement } July With, 1921: —

" The ! - niment are actuated by an ear

desire to end the unhappy divisions between Great Britain
and Ireland, which have produced so many conflicts in the
p.t^t, and which ha more shattered the peace and

well-heing d at the present time. They long, with

his Majesty the King, in the words of his gracious speech
in Ireland last month, for a satisfactory solution of ' those
age-long Irish problems which for generations embarrassed
(»ur inn-fathers, as they now weigh heavily upon us '; and
-h t<» d<» their utnn> are that * every man of

\\ hirth. wi he his creed and wherever be his

home, should work in loyal co-operation with the free
communities on which the British Empire is based.'

" They are convinced that the Irish people may find as
worthy and as complete an expression of their political and
spiritual ideals within the Empire as any of the numer
and varied nations united in allegiance to his Majes
Throne; and they desire such a consummation, not only for
the welfare of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Empire as
a whole, but also for the of peace and harmony

throughout the world. The? part of the world

whei Mien have made their homo hut suffers from our

-lit tmds; no part of it hut looks to this meet
between the British (iovernment and the Irish leaders to
•id* in a new understanding honourable and
!1 the peoples invoh .

" Til-- tree nations which compose the British Empire
from many races, with different hi

In the Dominion of Canada

ish and French have long forgotten the hitter emit!
which divided their I In South Africa the

.:il Kepuhlic and th» have joined

h ColoniM to make a grea* ''ing

Union under his V. ;i people

cannot believe that where Canada and South At:

166 IRELAND IN 1921.

with equal or even greater difficulties, have so signally
succeeded, Ireland will fail ; and they are determined that,
so far as they themselves can assure it, nothing shall hinder
Irish statesmen from joining together to build up an Irish
State in free and willing co-operation with the other peoples
of the Empire.

" Moved by these considerations, the British Govern-
ment invite Ireland to take her place in the great
association of free nations over which his Majesty reigns.
As earnest of their desire to obliterate old quarrels and to
enable Ireland to face the future with her own strength
and hope, they propose that Ireland shall assume forthwith
the status of a Dominion, with all the powers and privileges
set forth in this document. By the adoption of Dominion
status it is understood that Ireland shall enjoy complete
autonomy in taxation and finance; that she shall maintain
her own courts of law and judges; that she shall maintain
her own military forces for home defence, her own
constabulary and her own police; that she shall take over
the Irish postal services and all matters relating thereto,
education, land, agriculture, mines and minerals, forestry,
housing, labour, unemployment, transport, trade, public
health, health insurance, and the liquor traffic ; and in sum,
that she shall exercise all those powers and privileges upon
which the autonomy of the self-governing Dominions is
based, subject only to the considerations set out in the
ensuing paragraphs. Guaranteed in these liberties, which
no foreign people can challenge without challenging the
Empire as a whole, the Dominions hold each and severally
by virtue of their British fellowship a standing amongst the
nations equivalent, not merely to their individual strength,
but to the combined power and influence of all the nations
of the Commonwealth. That guarantee, that fellowship,
that freedom the whole Empire looks to Ireland to accept.

* To this settlement the British Government are
prepared to give immediate effect upon the following
conditions, which are, in their opinion, vital to the welfare
and safety of both Great Britain and Ireland, forming as
they do the heart of the Commonwealth : —

" 1. The common concern of Great Britain and
Ireland in the defence of their interests by land and sea
shall be mutually recognised. Great Britain lives by
sea-borne food ; her communications depend upon the
freedom of the great sea routes. Ireland lies at Britain's
side across the sea-ways North and South that link her with

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. l')7

the sister nations of the Empire, the markets of the world,
ami the vital MNTOM of her food supply. In r.M-ognitior
this fact, which nature ha> imposed and n nanship

•hange, it i> essential tliat the Royal Navy alone should
control tin- ^eas around In-land and Great Britain, and i
such rights and lib«-rtie> -liquid be accorded to it \i\- the
Irish State a> are essential for naval purposes in the Irish
harbour* and (in the Irish coasts.

In order that the movement towards the
limitation of armaments which is now making progress in
the world should in no way be hampered, it is stipulated
that the Irish Territorial Force shall, within reasonable
limits, conform in respect of numbers to the military
establishments of the other parts of these islands.

" 3. The position of Ireland is also of great
importance for the air services, both military and civil.
The I'oyal Air Force will need facilities for all purposes
that it serves; and Ireland will form an essential link in
the development of air routes between the British Isles and
the North American continent. It is, therefore, stipulated
that Great Britain shall have all necessary facilities for
the development of defence and of communications by air.

" 4. Great Britain hopes that Ireland will in due
course, and of her own free will, contribute in proportion
to her wealth to the regular naval, military, and air forces
of the Empire. It is further assumed that voluntary
recruitment for these forces will be permitted throughout
Ireland, particularly for those famous Irish regim-
which have so long and so gallantly served his Majesty in
all parts of the world.

" 5. While the Irish people shall enjoy complete
autonomy in taxation and finance, it is essential to prevent
a recurrence of ancient differences between the two inlands,
and in particular to avert the possibility of ruinous trade
wars. With this object in view, the British and Irish
Governments shall agree to impose no protective duties or
other r« Df upon the flow of transport, trade, and

commerce between all parts of these islands.

11 G. The Irish peonle shall agree to as-
responsibility for a share 01 the present debt of the Ti
Kingdom and of the liability for pensions arising out of
the (treat War, the share, in default of agreement between
the (invernments concerned, to be determined by an
independent arbitrator appointed from within his M
Dominions.

168 IRELAND IN 1921.

" In accordance with these principles, the British
Government propose that the conditions of settlement
between Great Britain and Ireland shall be embodied in
the form of a treaty, to which effect shall in due course be
given by the British and Irish Parliaments. They look to
such an instrument to obliterate old conflicts forthwith, to
clear the way for a detailed settlement in full accordance
with Irish conditions and needs, and thus to establish a
new and happier relation between Irish patriotism and that
wider community of aims and interests by which the unity
of the whole Empire is freely sustained.

" The form in which the settlement is to take effect will
depend upon Ireland herself. It must allow for full
recognition of the existing powers and privileges of the
Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland, which
cannot be abrogated except by their own consent. For
their part, the British Government entertain an earnest
hope that the necessity of harmonious co-operation amongst
Irishmen of all classes and creeds will be recognised
throughout Ireland, and they will welcome the day when,
by these means, unity is achieved. But no such common
action can be secured by force. Union came in Canada by
the free consent of the Provinces. So in Australia; so in
South Africa. It will come in Ireland by no other way
than consent. There can, in fact, be no settlement on
terms involving, on the one side or the other, that bitter
appeal to bloodshed and violence which all men of goodwill
are longing to terminate. The British Government will
undertake to give effect, so far as that depends on them, to
any terms in this respect on which all Ireland unites. But
in no conditions can they consent to any proposals which
would kindle civil war in Ireland. Such a war would not
touch Ireland alone, for partisans would flock to either side
from Great Britain, the Empire, and elsewhere, with
consequences more devastating to the welfare both of
Ireland and the Empire than the conflict to which a truce
has been called this month. Throughout the Empire there
is a deep desire that the day of violence should pass, and
that a solution should be found consonant with the highest
ideals and interests of all parts of Ireland, which will
enable her to co-operate as a willing partner in the British
Commonwealth .

" The British Government will therefore leave Irish-
men themselves to determine by negotiations between them
whether the new powers which the pact defines shall be
taken over by Ireland as a whole and administered by a

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS.

single Irish body or tak.-n over separately by Northern and
Southern In-lund. \vnh or without a joint authority
harmonise their common interests. They will willingly
assist in the negotiation ot Mirh a settlement, if Irishmen
should so de-
li y these proposals the British Government sincerely
U'lieve that they will have shattered the foundations of that
ancient hatred and distrust which have disfigured our
tor centuries past. The future of Ireland
within the Commonwealth is for the Irish people to shape.
" In the foregoing proposals the British Government
have attempted no more than the broad outline of a settl*--
ment. The details they leave for discussion when the Irish
people have signified their acceptance of the principle of
;.act."

Armed with this portentous document, Mr. de
Valera returned to Ireland, there to confer with his
colleagues. Despite official declarations to the con-
trary, there is no doubt both from internal evidence
and from a study of subsequent events, that the offer
of the British Government was far more liberal than
the Sinn Fein leaders had anticipated. The Home
Rule of the Government of Ireland Act had
been enlarged almost beyond recognition, and this
enlargement was a measure of the British weariness
of Irish strife and desire for peace. Denunciations
of murder and threats of condign punishment v>
replaced by words which were practically an
entreaty to the Irish leaders to behave themselves
and to assume the silken cord which should bind
them to the Empire. By the great inart ieulate mass
of educated I risli opinion, the terms of the offer v*
hailed with rapture modified by concern that such
men as the leaders of Sinn Fein should be in\
form a Dominion Government. Had Sinn Fein
accepted the offer then and there, and by so dointj
abandoned the Republican standpoint from which
they professed to view the relations between

170 IRELAND IN 1921.

England and Ireland, there was not one of their true
supporters who would have reproached them with
abandoning their ideals or betraying their faith. A
certain section of their followers would, no doubt,
have done their best to secure a renewal of the strife
which had been so advantageous to them; an
unimportant body of opinion, represented by the
Clan na Gael and anti^British societies abroad,
would have railed at them for their abandonment of
a cause. But the world at large would have
applauded them as men who had the statesmanlike
wisdom to abandon the unattainable in favour of a
reality which their own efforts had brought about.

The very generosity of the offer, however,
militated against its acceptance. To the more
extreme Eepublicans, it seemed that it only just
fell short of their demands, that so much had
been gained by a policy of violence and disorder
that a continuance of such a policy could not
fail to succeed in bringing them the acceptance
of their demands in their entirety. They argued
that Great Britain must have yielded so much
because she felt herself unable to resist the
demands made upon her ; that the terms of the offer
were signs of weakness rather than of generosity.
Mr. de Valera said as much on the very day he
returned to Ireland. " This is not a time for talk, "
he said. " We have learned one magnificent lesson
in Ireland in the last couple of years, and that is
that it is by acts and not by talk that a nation will
achieve its freedom. I do not want, therefore, to
begin a bad example by starting speech-making. If
we act in the future as we have acted for the last
couple of years we will never have to talk about

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. 171

freedom, for we will have it." The Irish Bull-
of July 25th contained the following words :—

" During the last ten days the London Press,
in its comments upon the negotiations now in
progren, has displayed almost unanimously a total
inability to understand Ireland, her ambitions, or
the determination of her people to realise them. All
the ini{)ortant London journals represent the British
Cabinet as about to offer 'liberal/ * generous.
' almost prodigal ' terms to the Irish people, and
then explain that the terms in question * concede '
to Ireland ' Dominion Home Rule, with modifica-
tions.' It is more accurately described as a denial
of justice and a negation of the right of self-
determination which British statesmen during the
Great War considered essential to world peace.
This is, indeed, understood by some of the British
newspapers, which actually threaten the Irish
people with a revival of the military terror if we do
not gratefully accept what is being offered to us.
Ireland understands what a refusal of so-called
1 reasonable ' offers would mean, but the Irish people
have their own views of what offers are reasonable,
and, threats of a new terror notwithstanding, they
will agree to nothing which denies the ancient unity
of Ireland or seeks to impose upon the nation alien
domination of any kind.

The Hritish Press should have learned by this
time that menaces carry little weight in Ireland.
Our country is now inured to for Moreover,

threats are silly weapons to use if there is any
sincerity behind the British pr us of a de

for peace in Ireland. England may or may
want an understanding between the two peoples, but

172 IRELAND IN 1921.

there is no doubt that England has force enough to
continue indefinitely the torture of Ireland. Never-
theless, the people of Ireland have their minds made
up. They will accept a peace which is just and does
not betray the dead and the living. They will
return to the wilderness of hardship, suffering, and
death before they compromise in the slightest degree
the national honour.

" Since it is Ireland's right to be free, it is
Ireland's right to control her own finances. But the
primary demand, inclusive of all others, is that
Ireland should be free. Nothing can satisfy that
demand but full national independence. The Irish
question dates back to far beyond the times when
English kings extracted tribute from our people.
Were the taxation of the Irish people by the British
Government henceforth to cease the Irish question
would remain and the Irish people would fight as
resolutely as before."

Mr. de Valera's first step in consulting his
colleagues was to call a meeting of the Ministry of
Dail Eireann, which took place on July 27th.
Further meetings between the Sinn Fein leaders
resulted in a decision to call together the members
of Dail Eireann for a full consideration of the
Government's terms. This meeting was called for
Tuesday, August 16th, and the announcement caused
considerable interest in Dublin, if only for the
reason that an open meeting of the Dail, which,
until the truce, had been an illegal assembly, was a
tangible sign of peace. Further, it was known that
the Sinn Fein leaders had the assurance that every-
thing would be done to facilitate the meeting, even
to the extent of releasing from gaol the members

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSION 173

then in custody, of whom tin -re at that time

cither in prison or interned.

The actual order for the release of these men
I made on August Oth, and provided yet another
opportunity for the (Government to perform one of
those acts of crass stupidity which have done more
to embitter the Irish question than resolute enforce-
ment of the most unpopular policy. The order was
as follows : —

"In keeping with the public umh'rtaking- given by
the Prime Minister that his M Government would

facilitate in every practicable way the steps now b»
taken to promote peace in Ireland, it has been decided to
lelease forthwith and without conditions all member
Dai I Kireann who are at present interned or who are under-
going- sentences of penal servitude or imprisonment
enable them to attend the meeting of Dail Kireann which
has been summoned for August 16th. His Maje>
Government has decided that one member, Mr. -I. 1
McKeown, who has been convicted of murder, canno;
released."

Now McKeown was at this time one of the
popular heroes of the rebels. He was a man with a
fanatical belief in the justice of the Republi
cause, and one of the few I.R.A. leaders who took
up arms from stern conviction. Subsequent to an
ambush of Auxiliaries at Ballinalee on February
2nd, in which he had played the part of leader and
had behaved with marked chivalry to the wounded
cadets, he was surrounded in a house, and in the
course of his capture had shot a District Inspector.
For this he had been tried by Court Martial and
condemned to death, although the sentence had not
been confirmed. The point lay not in the justice of
his exclusion from the act of pardon, hut in
expediency. Although McKeown happened to be
the only member of the Dail actually under sentence

174 IRELAND IN 1921.

for murder, there was no reasonable doubt that
others were equally guilty individually, even if the
collective guilt of the Bail as the body to whom the
I.E. A. was responsible was not sufficient. At all
events, the exception once made should have been
adhered to. Sinn Fein, however, made representa-
tions to the Government through the Dublin Castle
authorities that if the exception were not cancelled
they would give notice of the termination of the
truce. Before this threat the Government gave
way, and McKeown was released on the morning of
the 8th. The net result of the incident was to
render the Sinn Fein leaders more suspicious than
ever of the Government's intentions, and to afford
them one more reason to believe that by adopting a
high hand they could extort what terms they pleased.
On August llth Mr. de Valera's reply to the
Government's offer was delivered at No. 10,
Downing Street, and the Prime Minister being in
Paris, it was forwarded to him there. The fact
that the reply had been made before the meeting of
the Dail occasioned some surprise. But it must be
remembered that the Dail was not, and never had
been, a deliberative assembly, and that its members
were unaccustomed to the discussion of high
politics, as they proved before the year was out.
The rank and file of the Dail had been nominated
by the Sinn Fein leaders, and at this stage were quite
prepared to leave the decision upon matters of
policy to them. The Dail Cabinet had some days
previously drawn up their reply, and although Mr.
de Valera took the opportunity of consulting some of
the Dail members who were released by the British
authorities, there could be no doubt that a reply

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. 175

drawn up by him and his ministers would be
acceptable to the Bail at its full meeting. The
reply was dated from the li Office of the Pre
Mansion House, Dublin," and bore the caution
" Official Translation," which may have implied
that it was originally drawn up in the language of
diplomacy, or else in Erse, both unlikely supposi-
tions, owing to the ignorance of the majority of the
Dail Cabinet of these languages. It was addressed
to Mr. Lloyd George, and ran as follows :

" Sir, — On the occasion of our last interview I gave it
as my judgment that Dail Eireann could not, and that
the Irish people would not, accept the proposals of your
Government as set forth in the draft of July 20th which
you had presented to me. Having consulted my colleagues,
and with them given these proposals the most earnest
consideration, I now confirm that judgment.

" The outline given in the draft is self-contradictory,
and " the principle of the pact " not easy to determine.
To the extent that it implies a recognition of Ireland's
separate nationhood and her right to self-determination we
appreciate and accept it. But in the stipulations and
express conditions concerning the matters that are vital
the principle is strangely set aside, and a claim advanced
1>\ your Government to an interference in our affairs, and
to a control which we cannot admit.

" Ireland's right to choose for herself the path she
shall take to realise her own destiny must be accepter
indefeasible. It is a right that has been maintained
through centuries of oppression and at the cost of
unparalleled sacrifice and untold suffering, and it will not
be surrendered. We cannot propose to abrogate or impair
it, nor ran Britain or any other foreig-n State or group of
States legitimately claim to interfere with its exercise in
order to serve their own special inter.

" The Irish people's belief is that the national destiny
can best he realised in political detachment, free from
Imperialistic entanglements, which they feel will involve
enterprises out of harmony with the national character,
prove destructive of their ideals, and be fruitful only of
ruinous wars, crushing burdens, social discontent, and

176 IRELAND IN 1921.

general unrest and unhappiness. Like the small States of
Europe, they are prepared to hazard their independence on
the basis of moral right, confident that as they would
threaten no nation or people, they would in turn be free
from aggression themselves. This is the policy they have
declared for in plebiscite after plebiscite, and the degree
to which any other line of policy deviates from it must
be taken as a measure of the extent to which external
pressure is operative and violence is being done to the
wishes of the majority.

(* As for myself and my colleagues, it is our deep
conviction that true friendship with England, which
military coercion has frustrated for centuries, can be
obtained most readily now through amicable but absolute
separation. The fear, groundless though we believe it to
be, that Irish territory may be used as the basis for an
attack upon England 's liberties can be met by reasonable
guarantees not inconsistent with Irish sovereignty.

" ' Dominion status ' for Ireland everyone who under-
stands the conditions knows to be illusory. The freedom
which the British Dominions enjoy is not so much the
result of legal enactments or of treaties, as of the
immense distances which separate them from Britain and
have made interference by her impracticable. The
most explicit guarantees, including the Dominions'
acknowledged right to secede, would be necessary to secure
for Ireland an equal degree of freedom. There is no
suggestion, however, in the proposals made of such
guarantees. Instead, the natural position is reversed; our
geographical situation with respect to Britain is made the
basis of denials and restrictions unheard of in the case of
the Dominions; the smaller island must give military
safeguards and guarantees to the larger, and suffer itself to
be reduced to the position of a helpless dependency.

" It should be obvious that we could not urge the
acceptance of such proposals upon our people. A certain
treaty of free association with the British Commonwealth
group, as with a partial league of nations, we would have
been ready to recommend, and as a Government to
negotiate and take responsibility for, had we an assurance
that the entry of the nation as a whole into such association
would secure for it the allegiance of the present dissenting
minority, to meet whose sentiment alone this step could be
contemplated.

" Treaties dealing with the proposals for free inter-

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. 177

trade ami mutual limitation of armaments we are ready at
any time to nejj -ual agreement for facilitating

•omiiiun. . ;is \\ell a> railway and other comii; .

teel certain, also be effected. No obstacle
of any kind will be placed by us in the wav of that Mnooth
:nercial intercourse \\hich is essential in the life of
In* tli i -lands, each the best customer and the best market
of the other. It must, of course, be understood that all
treaties and agreements would have to be submitted for
ratification to the national legislature in the fir .nee,

and subsequently to the Irish people as a whole, under
s which would make it evident that their
decision would be a free decision, and that every elen.
of military compulsion was absent.

Bastion <>i Ireland's liability " for a share of
the present debt of the United Kingdom " we are prepared
to leave to be determined by a board of arbitrators, one
appointed by Ireland, one by Great Britain, and a third to
be chosen by agreement, or, in default, to be nominated,
say, by the President of the United States of America, if
the President would consent.

" As regards the question at issue between the poli
minority and the great majority of the Irish people, that
must remain a question for the Irish people themselves to
settle. We cannot admit the right of the Hi;
Government to mutilate our country, either in its own
interest or at the rail of any section of our population.
We do not contemplate the use of force. If your Govern-
ment stands aside, we can effect a complete reconciliation.
We agree with you " that no common action can be secured
by force/' O\u hat this wi^e and true prii,

which your Government piv r the settlement

of our local problem it >eems unwilling to apply mii-i^tent 1 y
to the fundamental problem of the relations between our
inland and yours. The principle we rely on in the one case
we are ready to apply in the other, but should this prin<
not yield an immed ement, we are willing that this

. be -ubmr nal arbitration.

" Thus we are ready to meet you in all that is

-onable and just. The responsibility for initiating and

•ting an honourable peace rests primarily, not with

our Government, but with yours. We ha\

to impose, no claims to ad ut the one, that we be

freed from aggression. We reciprocate with a sincerity to

be measured only by the terrible sufferings our people have

M

178 IRELAND IN 1921.

undergone the desire you express for mutual and lasting
friendship. The sole cause of the " ancient feuds " which
you deplore has been, as we know, and as history proves,
the attacks of English rulers upon Irish liberties. These
attacks can cease forthwith, if your Government has the
will. The road to peace and understanding lies open. — I
am, Sir, faithfully yours, EAMONN DE VALERA."

The Government's offer of July 20th and Mr. de
Valera's reply of August 10th were published in
the newspapers of August 15th, the day before the
meeting of the Dail. Despite the unfavourable
nature of the reply, it was certain that something
had been gained. Both sides were manoeuvring for
position; were, nominally at least, endeavouring to
find a basis for a conference. The lines of approach
to this conference were now defined. The Govern-
ment offered Dominion status, Sinn Fein held out
hopes of close alliance with the Empire provided
that the question of allegiance was not raised and
that British protection of Ulster was withdrawn.

To Mr. de Valera's letter the Prime Minister
replied as follows, on August 13th. This letter
was published at the same time as the previous
correspondence :—

* ' Sir, — The earlier part of your letter is so much opposed
to our fundamental position that we feel bound to leave you
in no doubt of our meaning. You state that after
consulting your colleagues you confirm your declaration
that our proposals are such as Dail Eireann could not, and
the Irish people would not, accept. You add that the
outline given in our draft is self-contradictory, and the
principle of the pact offered to you not easy to determine.
We desire, therefore, to make our position absolutely
clear.

" In pur opinion, nothing is to be gained by prolonging
a theoretical discussion of the national status which you
may be willing to accept as compared with that of the great
self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth,
but we must direct your attention to one point upon which

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. 179

lay some emphasis, and upon \\hich no i (jovern-

>mpromise, nanul \ . tin- claim that we should

•.ow ledge tne r land to secede from her

allegiance to tin- King. No such riirht can ever be
acknowledged by us. The geographical propinquity of
In-lain! to tin- British Isles is a fundamental fact. The
history of the two islands for many centuries, however it
- sufficient proof that their destinies are
indissoluhly linked. Ireland has sent members to the
British Parliament for more than a hundred years. Many

>ands of her people during all that time have enlisted

iy and servecf gallantly in the Forces of the Crown.

it numbers, in all the Irish provinces, are profoundly
attached to the Throne. These facts permit of one answer,
and one only, to the claim that Britain should negotiate
wuh Ireland as a separate and foreign power.

" When you, as the chosen representative of Irish
national ideals, came to speak with me, I made one
condition only, of which our proposals plainly stated
the ehVct that Ireland should recognise the force of
geographical and historical facts. It is those facts which
the problem of British and Irish relations. If
they did !, there would be no problem to discuss.

11 I pass, therefore, to the conditions which are imposed
by these facts. We set them OUT clearly in six clauses in
our former prop<>^N. and need not re-state them here,
except to say that the British Government cannot consent

to the ret. uch questions, which concern

it Britain and Ireland alone, to the arbitration of a
foreign Power.

" We are profoundly ^lad to have your agreement that

•hern Ireland cannot l»e coerced, 'fhis point is of great

imp' . because the resolve of our people to resist with

i- full power any attempt at secession by one part of

Ire! rflM Witt it of necessity an equal resolve to

another part of Ireland to abandon

its alleiriar n. We gladly give you the

ricur in any settlement which
'and may make for Irish unity

in the six conditions already laid down, which apply
southern and Norn- 'and alike; but we cannot

on of your relations with Northern
I reland to f«»reiirn arbitration.

" The conditions of the proposed settlement do not arise
:u any desire to force our will upon people of another

180 IRELAND IN 1921.

race, but from facts which are as vital to Ireland's welfare
as to our own. They contain no derogation from Ireland's
status as a Dominion, no desire for British ascendancy
over Ireland, and no impairment of Ireland's national
ideals.

" Our proposals present to the Irish people an
opportunity such as has never dawned in their history
before. We have made them in the sincere desire to achieve
peace ; but beyond them we cannot go. We trust that you
will be able to accept them in principle. I shall be ready
to discuss their application in detail whenever your
acceptance in principle is communicated to me. — I am,
yours faithfully, D. LLOYD GEORGE."

In order to complete the documents relating to
the Government's offer, a fourth letter must be
added. This letter was written by General Smuts
to Mr. de Valera on August 4th, and a copy of it
had been given by General Smuts to Mr. Lloyd
George, with permission to publish it. The text of
the letter was issued to the public at the same time
as the three already quoted, that is to say, the day
before the meeting of the Dail.

General Smuts' letter was written from the Savoy
Hotel, London, and dated August 4th. It was as
follows : —

" My dear de Yalera, — -Lane* duly reported to me the
substance of his conversations with you and handed me
your letter of July 31st. He told me of your anxiety to
meet and discuss the situation with Ulster representatives.
Since then I have, as I wired you yesterday, done my best
to bring about such a meeting, but Sir James Craig, while
willing to meet you in a conference with Mr. Lloyd George,
still remains unwilling to meet you in his absence, and
nothing that I have been able to do or say has moved him
from that attitude. If you were to request a meeting with
him he would reply setting forth his position, and saying
that Ulster will not be moved from the constitutional
position which she occupies under the existing legislation ;
she is satisfied with her present status and will on no
account agree to any change.

* General Smuts' private secretary.

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. 181

" On the other hand, both in your conversation
l-ine and in your letter you insist on I'l-
a United Ireland Constitution, ami unless that is done
say that no further progress can be made. There is, there-
fore, an impasse which I do not at present know how to
over. Both you and Craig are equally immovable.
•ce as a solution of the problem is out of the question
both on your and h >.\e process of arriving at

an agreement will therefore take time.

" The result is that at this stage I can be of no further
TIM- in this matter, and I have therefore decided to adhere
to my plan of sailing for South Africa to-morrow. Th
regret most deeply, as my desire to help in pushing the

•ment one stage further has been very gr<
Hut I must bow to the inevitable.

" I should like to add a word in reference to the

situation as 1 have < -ome to view it. I have discussed it

fully with you and your colleagues. I have also

probed as deeply as I could into the Ulster position. My

notion is that lor the present no solution based on

Ulster coming into the Iri :11 succeed. Ulster

will not agree, she cannot be forced, and any solution on

those lines is at present foredoomed to failure.

" I believe that it is in the interest of Ulster to come
in, and that the force of community of interests will •
a period of years prove so great and compelling that Ul
will her-flt decide to join the Irish State. But at present
an Irish settlement is only possible if the hard facts are
calmly faced and VNt«-r is lett alone. Not only will
m-t consent to oomfl in, hut even if she does the Irish S-
will, I fea under such a handicap of internal

friction and discordance that the result may \vell be failure
once more.

" My strong advice to you is to leave Ulster alone for

as the only line along which a solution is

practicable; to concentrate on a free Constitution for the

remaining twenty-six counties, and through a successful

running of the Iri->h State and the pull of economic and

••:• peaceful forces, eventually to bring Ulster into t
State. I know how repugnant such a solution must be to
all Irish patriots, who look upon Irish unity as a sinr i}\t>i
mm of any Irish settlement. Hut the wise man, while
fi- ht ing for his ideal to the uttermost, learns also to bow

he inevitable. And a humble acceptance of the facts
is often the only way of finally overcoming them. It

182 IRELAND IN 1921.

proved so in South Africa, where ultimate unity was only
realised through several stages and a process of years;
and where the Republican ideal, for which we had made
unheard-of sacrifices, had ultimately to give way to another
form of freedom.

" My belief is that Ireland is travelling the same
painful road as South Africa, and that with wisdom and
moderation in her leadership she is destined to achieve no
less success. As I said to you before, I do not consider
one single clean-cut solution of the Irish question possible
at present. You will have to pass through several stages,
of which a free Constitution for Southern Ireland is the
first, and the inclusion of Ulster and the full recognition
of Irish unity will be the last. Only the first stage will
render the last possible, as cause generates effect. To
reverse the process and begin with Irish unity as the first
step is to imperil the whole settlement. Irish unity should
be the ideal to which the whole process should be directed.

" I do not ask you to give up your ideal, but only to
realise it in the only way which seems to me at present
practicable. Freedom will lead inevitably to unity;
therefore begin with freedom — with a free Constitution
for the twenty-six counties — as the first and most important
step in the whole settlement.

" As to the form of that freedom, here, too, you are
called to choose between two alternatives. To you, as you
say, the Republic is the true expression of national self-
determination. But it is not the only expression ; and it is
an expression which means your final and irrevocable
severance from the British League. And to this, as you
know, the Parliament and people of this country will not
agree.

" The British Prime Minister has made you an offer of
the other form of freedom — of Dominion status — which is
working with complete success in all parts of the British
League. Important British Ministers have described
Dominion status in terms which must satisfy all you could
legitimately wish for. Mr. Lloyd George in his historic
reply to General Hertzog at Paris, Mr. Bonar Law in a
celebrated declaration in the House of Commons; Lord
Milner, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, have stated
their views, and they coincide with the highest claims
which Dominion statesmen have ever put forward on behalf
of their free nations.

" What is good enough for these nations ought surely
to be good enough for Ireland, too. For Irishmen to say

UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS. 183

to the world that they will not be satisfied with the
of the great British Dominions would be to alienate all
that -\iiipathy which has so far been the main support of
tin- [rub

" The Briti-h Prime Minister offers complete Dominion

;o the twenty- to certain

strategic safeguards which you are asked to agree to

voluntarily as a free Dominion, and which we South

agreed to as a free nation in the Union of South

Africa. To my mind, such an offer by a British Prime

Mil. ho — unlike his predecessors—is in a position to

deliver the goods, is ' of unique importance.

" You arc no longer offered a Home Rule scheme of the
(iladstone or Asquith type, with its limited powers, and
reservations of a fundamental character. Full Dominion
status with all it is and implies is yours — if you will but
take it. it is far more than was offered to the Transvaal
and Free State, who fought for freedom one of the greatest
wars in the history of Great Britain, and one which
reduced their own countries to ashes and their little people
to ruins.

11 They accepted the far less generous offer that was made
to them; from that foothold they then proceeded to improve
their position, until to-day South Africa is a happy,
contented, united, and completely free country. What they
have finally achieved after years of warfare and political
evolution is now offered you — not in doles or instalme
but at once and completely. If, as I hope, you accept,
you will b.-come a sister Dominion in a great circle of equal
States, who will stand beside you and shield you and
protect your new rights as if these were their own rights;
who will view an invasion of your rights or a violation of
your statu< as it it was an invasion and a violation of their
own, and who will thus give you the most effective
guarantee possible any possible arbitrary inter-

ference by the British Government with your rights and
•iuii. In fact. the British Government will have no
further basis of inter: rs, as y

relationi with (Jroat Britain will be a concern not of the
British (TO\ • but of the Imperial Conference, of

which Great Britain will be only one of seven members.
Any qua .m<l the British Govern-

ment will bo for the Imperial Conference to decide. You
will be a five member of a . <>ague, of which most of

the other membeis will bo in tho same pomUHl ^lf ;

184 IEELAND IN 1921.

and the Conference will be the forum for thrashing out any
questions which may arise between members. This is the
mature and the constitutional practice of Dominion
freedom.

" The difficulty in Ireland is no longer a constitutional
'difficulty. I am satisfied that, from the constitutional
point of view, a fair settlement of the Irish question is
now possible and practicable. It is the human difficulty
which remains. The Irish question is no longer a
constitutional, but mostly a human problem.

' A history such as yours must breed a temper, an
outlook, passions, suspicions, which it is most difficult
to deal with. On both sides sympathy is called for,
generosity, and a real largeness of soul. I am sure that
both the English and Irish peoples are ripe for a fresh
start. The tragic horror of recent events, followed so
suddenly by a truce and fraternising all along the line,
has set flowing deep fountains of emotion in both peoples,
and created a new political situation.

* It would be the gravest reflection on our statesman-
ship if this auspicious moment was allowed to pass. You
and your friends have now a unique opportunity — such as
Parnell and his predecessors and successors never had — to
secure an honourable and lasting peace for your people.
I pray to God that you may be wisely guided, and that
peace may now be concluded, before tempers again change
and perhaps another generation of strife ensues. — Ever
yours sincerely, J. C. SMUTS/'

With these letters before them and before the
eyes of the world that watched them, the members
of Dail Eireann proceeded to their first unhindered
session.

CHAPTER VIIL*

The first full meeting of Bail Eireann was
necessarily an event of powerful appeal to the
Irish imagination. Hitherto, the Bail had never
assembled as a whole; the nearest approach to
deliberation had been the hurried and restricted
meetings mentioned in a previous chapter. The
members of the Bail themselves had been elected
upon one qualification, and one only, that they
had proved themselves ardent supporters of the
I.K.A. That such an assembly, composed of
such persons, should not only be permitted to
meet, but should indeed be encouraged to do
so by the British Government, was proof posit ive
to the people that England had made up her mind
t<> nvo-nise the Bail as the de facto Government
of Ireland. And it must be remembered that the
Bail was pledged to the Republic, to which every
member had taken an oath of allegiance. The
int( was obvious to the rank and file of Sinn

Fein.

It was also unlikely, in the nature of things, that

* See Note C in Appendix.

186 IRELAND IN 1921.

the Dail would content itself with meeting and
proceeding at once to consider the political situation
without further preamble. The ' back benchers/
if we may so term them, of the Dail were certainly
prepared to vote blindly and from a spirit of
discipline and allegiance to the cause for anything
that their leaders might propose. But those leaders
themselves, the Ministers of Dail Eireann, were
more than anxious to give an account of their
stewardship, to demonstrate the work they had
accomplished in building up the skeleton of Govern-
ment during the months of oppression. If the
Dail were to meet, and forthwith to issue a message
of defiance to the British Government, there was
every likelihood of its forcible dispersion. Prudence
suggested that if it wished to remain in session, it
should waste as much time as possible in the
examination of the events of the past.

The traditions of Sinn Fein were illustrated at
the opening of the Dail, which met in the Round
Room of the Dublin Mansion House. All members
elected to the Southern or Northern Parliaments
were summoned to sign the roll, thus demonstrating
the contention that these elections were regarded
by Sinn Fein as elections to the Dail of an undivided
Ireland. Those who replied to this summons, or
practically all the Sinn Fein members for North
and South, then recited the oath of allegiance to
the Republic, which was as follows :—

" I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I do not,
and shall not, yield a voluntary support to any
pretended Government, authority, or power within
Ireland hostile and inimical thereto; and I do
further swear (or affirm) that to the best of my

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN. 187

knowledge and ability I will support and defend
the Irish Republic and the Government of the Irish
Republic, which is Dail Eireann, against all
enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true
faith and allegiance to the same; and that I take
this obligation freely, without any mental reser
tion of purpose of evasion. So help me God."
The first business of the meeting was the election
a Speaker. Mr. Sean O'Kelly, who had been
aker of the previous Dail, pleaded that he
could no longer duplicate this office with that of
Representative of the Republic in France, and
Professor MacNeill was elected in his place. Then
Mr. de Valera addressed the assembly. He said
that he would deal with the general course of
negotiations at a future time, and announced that
the reply to be sent by the Irish nation to the British
Prime Minister and his Government would be
discussed by the Dail in private. " You all under-
stand," he said, " that it is intended by the British
Government to make that reply an issue of peace or
war with this nation, hence it is that we have to
discuss that matter first in private. Later on, when
reply is sanctioned and ready for despatch.
there will be another public session." In the course
of his speech he made an interesting reference
the doctrine of Republicanism. Tie said :—

' In the General Election of two and a half years a.
which was in Affect a p

the Irish people what t'onu of Lroverninent they wai
how th»-\ wished in live. BO that they ini^lit have an
opportunity of working out tor theniMd\ »•> their own
national life in their <>wn \\ay. and ihe I hat the

people <:av | 1 »!<> not say th;»r the

ansv i form of provernnieiii so much he

not Republican doctrinaires — hut it was for 1

188 IRELAND IN 1921.

freedom and Irish independence, and it was obvious
to everyone who considered the question that Irish
independence could not be realised at the present time in
any other way so suitably as through a Republic. . .
The first duty, therefore, of the Ministry was to set about
making that de jure Republic a de facto Republic/'

This is the first hint from any Sinn Fein leader,
since the adherence of that party to the principles
of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, that the
Republican form was only chosen because it offered
the only suitable means of securing Irish freedom
and independence. It was, in effect, if not in
intention, an admission that if the British
Government could offer equivalent freedom and
independence under some other form than that of
the Republic, this offer might conceivably be made
to fit in with the aims of the movement. To some
extent these words of Mr. de Valera explain the
course he took in the negotiations which led up to
the Conference. Mr. de Valera has been freely
accused of inconsistence, but as a matter of fact his
adherence to his expressed policy was, on the whole,
closer than that of any of the other personalities
involved, British or Irish, except the Ulster leaders.

On the following day, Mr. de Valera turned
from the first of the objections standing in the way
of acceptance of the British Government's offer,
that of allegiance, to the second, that of partition.
He dealt with the offer in the form in which it then
stood in one sentence: " We cannot, and we will
not, on behalf of this nation, accept these terms."
Then, after dealing with some points in the offer
and demonstrating the impossibility of their
acceptance, he made an appeal to Ulster to abandon
her demand for partition.

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN. H'J

" The North of Ireland can recor;
they want to, as we recognise ourselv. ., and if ne<j"
<an only begin when we give up the right to live our own
lift* in our nun u ;i y then- can be no n» MS unit

h or anywhere. Tin* people of the. North are
regard thiN from their ou n point of view. In coming1 :
negotiations with us they have not to give up that point

lew, A^ l';ir a-* I am concerned I would he williiu
suggest to tin- Iri^h people to give up a good deal in order
to have an Ireland that could look to the future without
anticipating distracting international problems. That is
what these negotiations have been, as far as I am concer:
directed towards all the time — to get into touch with
people of the North of Ireland, and to tell them '

ki-ds them we have no enmity, because they are Irishmen
living in Ireland, and that we would make sacrifices for
them we would never think of making for Britain. We
have not been able to secure that, because, unfortunate! v.
the major problem between Ireland and Britain
engendered another problem in a section of our own pe<>;

" England's solution of that has been to suggest that
there should be an arrangement by which the minority of
the island might have their interests safeguarded. And
would be able to give them every safeguard which any
reasonable person could say they were entitled to. As I
have said, we are ready to leave this question to external
arbitration, because we are basing our claims only on right,
and berause we know perfectly well that pleaded befon
impartial tribunal there could only be a verdict in
direction.

" England's claims in Ireland are unreasonable. The
claims of the minority are unreasonable, but evei,
unreasonable claims we will be ready t ST. And I

for one would be ready to go a long way to give wa\
them, particularly to their sent in f we could get

them to come with us and to consider the necessities of
their own country, and not be allying themselves win:
foreigner."

The sentiments of this speech met with no
sympathetic- response in Ulster, where it wasobvi
that not only the Ulster leaders, but their followers
throughout the Province, had finally made up their
minds to have nothing to do with any negotiati
between the British Government and Sinn Fein

190 IRELAND IN 1921.

The Bail went into secret session, not so much to
discuss negotiations, but to consider the detailed
reports of the Ministers, which had been given in
general terms in public. Meanwhile the Irish
Bulletin was at pains to prove, through the medium
of long and involved argument, that the offer made
to Ireland was not that of true Dominion status,
but differed from it in many important particulars.
Among the people of Ireland, opinion of the offer
had not yet crystalised into any definite movement
for or against. The only feeling of the country
was one of relief that outrage and reprisal had
ceased, and of determination that by hook or by
crook some means must be found to prevent their
renewal. Anxiety on this score was felt as the Dail
continued to make no sign. It was remembered
what manner of men its members were, and how
little they represented the men who had a stake in
the country. Those who owned the land, from the
great landlords to the smallest peasant proprietors;
business men, from the largest down to the village
shopkeepers; labour itself, as representing any group
of organised workers; all felt that their opinions
would carry no weight in the discussions of the Dail,
which would be swayed by the dictates of men who
had made, during recent years at least, a trade of
resistance to authority. These men might or might
not have the theory of Irish independence at heart.
What was almost certain was that they would fail
to give adequate weight to the importance of
Ireland's peace and prosperity.

On the 19th Parliament adjourned, the Prime
Minister utilising the occasion to emphasise the fact
that the British Government had made an offer

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN. 191

\\hirli ivarhcd tlif limits of concession, and must not
be regarded as tin- first step in a bargain, to be
extended t<> meet the demands of the other side
The outline of the terms could not be changed, nor
their basis altered. Details alone could be the
subject of negotiation.

The decision of the Dail was delivered at
Downing Street on the 25th, in the form of a letter
from Mr. de Valera to the Prime Minister, which
was as follows : —

MF, — The anticipatory judgment I gave in my reply
of August 10th has been confirmed. I laid the proposals
of your nment before Dail Eireann and, by an

unanimous vote, it has rejected them.

" From your letter of August 13th it was clear that
the principle we were asked to accept was that the
' geographical propinquity ' of Ireland to Britain imposed
the condition of the subordination of Ireland's right to
Britain's strategic interests as she conceives them, and that
the very length and persistence of the efforts made in
the past to compel Ireland's acquiescence in a foreign
domination imposed the condition of acceptance of that
domination now.

" \\ '»• cannot believe that your Government intended
to commit itself to a principle of sheer militarism
•ructive of international morality and fatal to the
\\oi-M'- peace. If a small nation's right to independence
is forfeit when a more powerful neighbour covets it-
territory for the military or other advantages it is supposed
to confer, tlieiv nd to liberty. No longer can

small nation claim a right to a separate sovereign exigence.
Holland and Denmark can be made subservient to Germany,
Belgium to Germany or to 1 tugal to Spain.

nations that h:. :vibly annexed to empires lose

therein their title to independence, there can be for them no
re-birth to freedom. In Ireland's case, to speak of her
seceding from a partnership she has not accepted, or from
an allegiance which she has not undertaken to render
fundamentally lal<e. jiHt a< the claim to subordinate her
independence to British y is fundamentally un

192 IRELAND IN 1921.

To neither can we, as representatives of the nation, lend
countenance.

"If our refusal to betray our nation's honour and the
trust that has been reposed in us is to be made an issue of
war by Great Britain, we deplore it. We are as conscious
of our responsibilities to the living as we are mindful of
the principle, or of our obligations to the heroic dead. We
have not sought war, nor do we seek war, but if war be
made upon us we must defend ourselves, and shall do so,
confident that, whether our defence be successful or
unsuccessful, no body of representative Irishmen or Irish-
women will ever propose to the nation the surrender of its
birthright.

" We long to end the conflict between Britain and
Ireland. If your Government be determined to impose its
will upon us by force and, antecedent to negotiation, to
insist upon conditions that involve a surrender of our
whole national position, and make negotiations a mockery,
the responsibility for the continuance of the conflict rests
upon you.

" On the basis of the broad guiding principle of
government by consent of the governed, peace can be
secured — a peace that will be just and honourable to all,
and fruitful of concord and enduring amity. To negotiate
such a peace Dail Eireann is ready to appoint its
representatives, and, if your Government accepts the
principle proposed, to invest them with plenary powers to
meet and arrange with you for its application in detail. —I
am, Sir, faithfully yours, EAMONN DB VALERA."

The Dail met in open session once more on the
26th. The first business in which it indulged was
the election of a new Ministry, in conformity with
the principle that the present assembly was a new
Dail. Mr. de Valera, proposed by Mr. McKeown
and seconded by Mr. Mulcahy, both prominent
I.R.A. leaders, was unanimously re-elected Presi-
dent. His speech in acknowledging this re-election
was devoted mainly to emphasising the unity which
existed in the ranks of the Sinn Fein leaders. A
single extract from this speech will suffice. " The
very night that the British arrested me in Black-

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN. 193

rock," said the newly re-elected President, " they
found something which will have taught them t!
there are no differences of opinion amongst us, and
they know it. They found a statement which had
been drawn up in order to contradict the state-
ments which were being issued in America and
elsewhere. They found a statement signed by every
one of the Ministry of Bail Eireann, by all the
Ministers who could be got into communication
with, and the Ministers who were acting at the
time. Every one of them had signed a statement
saying that never at any time during the whole
period of their office had there been any difference
of opinion between me and them as regards policy
and method."* Then, at twelve noon, the agreed
time, he read the Bail's reply to the British
proposals, first in Erse, then in English. It was
remarked at the time that the passage which secured
most applause was that in which the Bail signified
its willingness to appoint representatives to
negotiate peace.

Mr. Lloyd George's reply was dated August
26th, and was considered by the Bail in secret
session on the next day. I forbear to quote it in
full, as it has already been published in Command
Paper No. 1502, but the following passages are
important :

1 ' The proposals which I made to you . . . were
based upon full and sympathetic consideration of
the views which you expressed. As I have already
said, they were not made in any hai^linu: spirit.
On the contrary, my colleagues and I went to the

* For this document see page 86.

N

194 IRELAND IN 1921.

very limit of our powers in endeavouring to reconcile
British and Irish interests.

" Our proposals have gone far beyond all
precedent, and have been approved as liberal by the
whole civilised world. Even in quarters which have
shown a sympathy with the most extreme of Irish
claims they are regarded as the utmost which the
Empire can reasonably offer or Ireland reasonably
expect. . . . We consider that these proposals
completely fulfil your wish that the principle of
" government by consent of the governed " should
be the broad, guiding principle of the settlement
which your plenipotentiaries are to negotiate/1

The Prime Minister went on to refute the Sinn
Fein claim that Ireland had a right to be treated as a
separate sovereign Power, and in support of his
refutation quoted the Irish leaders of the past, from
Grattan's famous " the ocean protests against
separation, and the sea against union,'* to Daniel
O'Connell and Thomas Davis. He pointed out that
Ireland was now offered more than these had ever
demanded, and showed the futility of the new claim
to separate nationality. " It is playing with
phrases to suggest that the principle of government
by consent of the governed compels a recognition of
that demand (for separate nationality) on our
part, or that in repudiating it we are straining
geographical and historical considerations to justify
a claim to ascendency over the Irish race. There is
no political principle, however clear, that can be
applied without regard to limitations imposed by
physical and historical facts. Those limitations
are as necessary as the very principle itself to the
structure of every free nation; to deny them would

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN. 195

involve the dissolution of all democratic States."

Towards the end of his letter the Prime
Minister adopted a sterner tone. " We are reluctant
to precipitate the issue, but we must point out that
a prolongation of the present state of affairs is
dangerous. Action is being taken in various
directions which, if continued, would prejudice the
truce and must ultimately lead to its termination.
This would indeed be deplorable. Whilst, there-
fore, prepared to make every allowance as to time
which will advance the cause of peace, we cannot
prolong a mere exchange of notes. It is essential
that some definite and immediate progress should
be made towards a basis upon which further
negotiations can usefully proceed. Your letter
seems to us, unfortunately, to show no such progress.
" In this and my previous letters I have set
forth the considerations which must govern the
attitude of his Majesty's Government in any
negotiations which they undertake. If you are
prepared to examine how far these considerations
can be reconciled with the aspirations which you
represent, I shall be happy to meet you and your
colleagues."

It was becoming obvious that Mr. de Valera, in
invoking the genius of self-determination, was
raising an argument which might easily lead him
out of his depth into a political morass so deep that
no man has yet succeeded in plumbing it. For if the
principle of self-determination be admitted, what
restriction is to be placed upon those who claim to
exercise it? Ireland itself, in subsequent months,
formed a perfect illustration of this difficulty, which
must infallibly hamper any attempt to put the

196 IRELAND IN 1921.

theory into practice. Pursuing Mr. de Valera's
line of argument, Ireland as a whole might be
admitted to be a small nation which, by a majority,
centred in the South and West, had determined upon
separation from Great Britain. But the minority,
centred in the North-East, and forming a community
distinguishable by birth, dialect, and pursuits from
the majority, had equally conclusively determined
for union with Great Britain, involving partition
from the majority in the South and West. How far
was the principle of self-determination to extend ?
If Ireland had a right to secede from her union with
Great Britain, surely Ulster had a right to secede
from the rest of Ireland? Mr. de Valera implied
that self-determination must be limited to nations;
that Ulster's claim had no validity because she
formed part of the same nation as the rest of Ireland.
Apart from the fact that it is extremely difficult to
find any evidence in Irish history that Ireland as
a whole was ever united as a nation to an extent
sufficient to justify this assumption, ,Mr. de Valera
disregarded the limit he had himself set when the
principle involved still further subdivision of his
country. During the latter months of the year,
various local bodies in the six counties proclaimed
their allegiance to Sinn Fein, and on the strength
of this allegiance petitioned the Dail for inclusion
in the twenty-six counties of the South. Mr. de
Valera was the first to support these petitions, and
to demand that a Boundary Commission should be
set up in order to determine the inclusion of the areas
represented by these local bodies in Southern
Ireland. But, in their turn, certain parishes in the
dissentient areas protested against such a course,,

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN. 197

and, to go a step further, individual Sinn Feiners
\vithin these parishes evinced a disposition to
determine themselves in opposition to their
neighbours.

Once again, where was the line to be drawn
across this chain of self-determination? If the
right to secede were granted to Ireland, it would
appear logically that the right to secede must be
granted to the individual, and with it leave to
disregard the laws and ordinances in force in his
parish. This is, of course, a reductio ad absurdum,
but it admirably illustrates the difficulties into which
Mr. de Valera was plunging. The whole crux of
the phrase * self-determination for small nations '
lies in the definition of the word * nation/ Mr.
Lloyd George, speaking at Barnsley on the 27th,
touched upon this very point.

"If Ireland has the right to separation, so has

!;ind, so has Wales. I belong to a small nationality of

tht^e islands. There is a larger number of people in that

small country conversing in the native language of the

race than you have got in Ireland talking their language.

It is an emphatic, nationality, it is a distinguished

TKitioiKility, it is a proud nationality, and if that is claimed

for us to set up an independent republic we have got a

greater rluim than anybody in the whole British Empire

to do so."

Mr. Lloyd George continued to speak of the
nationality of the great Dominions : " They have got

sense of nations, they have got the sense of being a
separate and distinct people. All the same they
have got the great sense of pride of belonging to
this, the greatest family of nations in the world,
known as the British Empire." Between the
individual and the family of nations, there is an
almost limitless range. At what point within it

198 IRELAND IN 1921.

can we determine the unit of community, the
indivisible atom of self-determination, in which the
minority can claim no right to separation, but must
perforce bow to the will of the majority ?

We may take advantage of the short pause in
negotiation which followed the despatch of the
Prime Minister's letter of August 26th to review
the sequence of events in Ulster since the opening of
the first Northern Parliament by the King on
June 22nd.

The peaceful establishment of Northern Ireland
was from the first a source of profound irritation to
the whole body of Sinn Fein, which saw in it the
negation of all its arguments against partition.
The North, working the Act in peace and prosperity,
formed an awkward contrast to the South, where
chaos reigned as a result of the policy of the Dail.
Mr. de Valera expressed himself as averse to the
coercion of Ulster, but it is doubtful what he
included within that term. Certain it is that
throughout the year, the truce notwithstanding, the
efforts of the I.R.A. were directed towards making
the position of Ulster untenable. The boycott of
Ulster goods, which was continually lapsing owing
to the damage it wrought to the Southern shop-
keepers, was as frequently enforced by armed bands.
Throughout the Six Counties roving bands of
I.R.A. made it their business to molest Protestants
and Unionists and destroy their property. In the
city of Belfast itself, the Sinn Fein faction left no
stone unturned to stir up that faction rioting for
which the city is unhappily so notorious. These
tactics were all designed to one end, which was to
demonstrate to the people of the North that

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN. 199

insistence on partition would result in such constant
aggression from the Smith as would end in the ruin
of I

This compaign, which had been kept in cli
during the King's visit by the vigilance of the
military and police authorities, began again with
the dispersal of the Crown Forces. Newry, on the
borders of Armagh and Down, was the scene of the
first on' Here, during the early hours of the

morning of July 6th, an armed gang took four young
Unionists from their beds and shot them by the
roadside. At about the same time, another band,
operating from the Clogher Valley, a Sinn Fein
district of County Tyrone, raided a mail and goods
train on the main Great Northern of Ireland line
between Belfast and Londonderry. Having secured
the mails, they set the train on fire, and succeeded in
destroying a very large quantity of Belfast goods.
Two days later an organised attack was made on
Post Offices in Belfast for the purpose of securing
cash. The attack was only partially successful.
Indeed, the announcement of the impending truoe
seemed to act as an added incentive to murder. The
military authorities proclaimed the raising of the
curfew in the three Northern to\\ns where it was
in operation, Belfast, Newry, and Derry, from the
11th. But on the 9th and 10th the situation
ielv grave. In the provinces isolated
Union i c murdered, and in the city of Bell

an attack upon a police patrol while they were
passing through a Sinn Fein area developed into an
outbreak of rioting in which the death roll had
reached fourteen by the evening of the 10th.

The period aKnit the twelfth of July has always

200 IRELAND IN 1921.

been apt to breed trouble between the factions in
Ulster, and it was unfortunate that in this year it
coincided with the announcement of the truce, which
the Northern Sinn Feiners were determined should
not interfere with their campaign. Despite the fact
that on the llth the Special Constabulary were
disarmed and left with only their truncheons, in
recognition of the existence of the truce, at a hurried
meeting of the civil and military authorities it was
decided to cancel the order raising the curfew, a
measure very necessary in view of the fact that the
rioting which had begun the day before had spread
over the city, resulting in the destruction of over a
hundred houses in the Sinn Fein quarter by the
infuriated Unionists. Throughout the following
week the state of Belfast resembled that of a city in
a state of siege, the streets being infested with
snipers, who were constantly driven by the police
and military from their positions and who as
regularly found new ones from which to pick off
those who ventured into the disturbed areas.

Meanwhile strong protests had been made by the
Dublin Castle authorities to Mr. de Valera on the
way the truce was being observed in Ulster, and as a
result Mr. Eoin 0' Duffy was appointed Sinn Fein
liaison officer for Ulster, a post which made him the
channel of communication between the I.R.A. and
the Crown Forces. On the 16th he announced that
sniping on the part of the Roman Catholic popula-
tion of Belfast would cease, except when undertaken
in defence of their property. He also protested
that the Catholics were not the aggressors, but were
acting purely on the defensive, pointing out that
trouble only arose in those areas where Catholics

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN.

were in the minority. The trouble died down, and
for a time all was quiet.

The outlook of the Northern Government on the
negotiations between Mr. de Valera and the British
Prime Minister caused considerable speculation at
this time. Sir James Craig, in the course of a
speech made in London on August 3rd, said : —

' We who are in the midst of difficult times, and are
quite ojM-n to take a leading part in them, would be indeed
foolish if we were to say a single word that would interfere
with the realisation of p«-;i< •«• throughout Ireland. We are
all asking for peace in our own ways, but in regard to that
I believe it would be the height of wisdom on the part of
individuals, leaders, and of the Press especially, to say
nothing in the meantime, because even a slip, even a guess,
sometimes creates much more mischief than the originator
of it has any idea.'*

This policy of silence was well observed by the
Northern leaders. They were, of course, aware of
the offer that had been made to Sinn Fein, and they
• ually aware that upon the publication of this
offer there would be a certain resentment in Ulster.
The Unionists of the North were bound to feel that
to some extent they had been unworthily treated by
the British Government. They had accepted the
provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, and
had loyally put them into operation. Sinn Fein,
which had rejected the Act and made war upon the
Crown, had, by its rebellious actions, extorted more

»urahle UTIMS than had been given to Ulster.
There was already a suspicion that if the North
Were t<» ask for a status similar to that offered to the
South, she would be told that this could be obtained
by abandonment of partition, and by this means
alone. Extreme Orange men had no doubt
whatever that the British Government would

202 IRELAND IN 1921.

willingly sacrifice Ulster in the cause of an Irish
settlement, not perhaps by active coercion, but by
offering the South such advantages that Ulster would
be faced by the alternatives of ruin or surrender to
her enemies.

On August 6th an ominous incident took place in
Belfast. A police constable challenged two men
whom he suspected of acting suspiciously. They
replied that they were soldiers of the I.R.A. On
attempting to arrest them, the constable was fired at
and wounded. The noise of the shot brought out a
crowd, who succeeded in capturing the men. Mr.
Eoin O'Dufiy came to the rescue. He said that the
men were on regular patrol, in the interests of law
and order, and under the protection of the truce,
but that they should not have been carrying arms.
The suggestion that Belfast was being regularly
patrolled by the I.R.A. was hardly calculated to
reassure the loyal population.

On the 15th the observations of the Northern
Cabinet on the Government offer to Mr. de Valera,
in the form of a letter from Sir James Craig to Mr.
Lloyd George, became known : —

" My dear Prime Minister, — Tour proposals for an
Irish settlement have now been exhaustively examined by
my Cabinet and myself. We realise that the preamble is
specially addressed to Mr. de Valera and his followers, and
observe that it implies that difficulties have long existed
throughout the Empire and America attributable to persons
of Irish extraction. In fairness to the Ulster people, I
must point out that they have always aimed at the retention
of their citizenship in the United Kingdom and Empire of
which they are proud to form part, and that there are not
to be found in any quarter of the world more loyal citizens
than those of Ulster descent. They hold fast to cherished
traditions, and deeply resent any infringement of their

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN. 203

rights and privileges, which helony equally to them an<;
the other citizens within the Kinpire.

"In order that you may correctly understand the
attitude we propose to adopt it is necessary that I should
rail to your mind the sacrifices we have so recently made in
agreeing to self-government and consenting to the establish-
mein >rthern Ireland. Much against

wish, hut in the interests of peace, we accepted this as a
final settlement ot the lonjr-oiit standing difficulty with
which Great Hrituin had been confronted. We are now
busily engaged in ratifying our part of this solemn bargain,
while Irishmen outside the Northern area, who in the past
struggled for Home Rule, have chosen to repudiate the
Government of Ireland Act and to press Great Britain for
wider power. To join in such pressure is repugnant to
the people of Northern Ireland.

" In the further interest of peace we therefore respect-
fully decline to determine or interfere with the terms of
settlement between Great Britain and Southern Ireland.
It cannot, then, be said that " Ulster blocks the way."
Similarly, if there exists an equal desire for peace on the
part of Sinn Fein, they will respect the status quo in
Ulster and will refrain from any interference with our
Parliament and rights, which under no circumstances ran
we permit. In adopting this course we rely on the British
people, who charged us with the responsibility of under-
taking our parliamentary institutions, to safeguard the
ties that bind us to Great Britain and the Empire, to
ensure that we are not prejudiced by any terms entered
into between them and Mr. de Yalera, and to maintain the
just equality exhibited throughout the Government of
Ireland Act.

" Our acceptance of your original invitation to meet
in conference still holds good, and if at any time our
assistance is again desired we are available, but I feel bound
to acquaint you that no meeting is possible between Mr. de
Yalera and myself until he recognises that Northern
Ireland will not submit to any authority other than his
Majesty the King and the Parliament of the Unite,}
Kingdom, and admits the sanctity of the existing powers
and privileges of the Parliament and Government of
Northern Ireland. In conclusion let me assure you that
peara is as earnestly desired by my Government and my-elf
as by you and yours, and that although we have nothing
left to us to give away, we are prepared, when you and
Mr. de Valera arrive at a satisfactory settlement, to

204 IRELAND IN 1921.

co-operate with Southern Ireland on equal terms for the
future welfare of our common country. In order to avoid
any misunderstanding or misrepresentation of our views I
intend to publish this letter when your proposals are made
public. — Yours sincerely, JAMBS CRAIG."

The publication of the Government's oSer caused
considerable surprise in Ulster. It was stated that
the terms were far too generous, and that they must
express the very last inch of concession. It was
felt, however, that the matter did not concern
Ulster, and that the progress of the negotiations
must be left to the British Government. But great
annoyance was caused by the fact that the Sinn Fein
boycott of Ulster was being redoubled at the very
time when Mr. de Valera was appealing to her to
abandon her attitude upon partition. On the 17th
the Sinn Fein Minister of Labour stated in the
Bail that as a direct result of the boycott more
bankruptcies had taken place in Belfast than had
ever been recorded previously. This statement was
indignantly refuted by appeal to the statistics of the
Courts, but that it should have been made at such a
time was an indication of the hatred of Sinn Fein,
and a strange commentary on Mr. de Valera's words
of conciliation.

Throughout the exchange of notes which followed
Mr. de Valera's reply to the Prime Minister, Sir
James Craig and his Government remained firm in
their determination to treat with Sinn Fein only
through the medium of the conference to which Mr.
Lloyd George had invited both. In reply to a letter
from a correspondent who urged upon him ' a
tentative offer on the part of Ulster to sit in
deliberation with the rest of Ireland," Sir James
said : —

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN.

' This is provided for in a practical form in the
Government of in-land A«-t, I'.r.; ng a

Cuiim-il ot In-huid t.» wlii.-h tin- Parliament of Northern
duly t? !••• representatives,

U» ing one of the number. We relu< Accepted

in the i: of peace and as a final settlement of

ihc long-iiutstaiulintf difficulty with which Great Jin-
has been confm -id now having- made that su< n
we are busily engaged in ratifying "in- p;n*' of the solemn
bargain. Y«»ur tVars of 4 fuui- >u between fellow-
Irishmen ' are unfounded so far as we are concerned, and
he extent that we can control future events. Equally
unfounded is your inference that * the domrstir link with
England will be severed.' We have always aimed at th««
closest possible connection with Great Britain and the
retention of our citizenship in the British Empire, of whi<-h
we are proud to form a part."

On August 29th fresh rioting broke out in
Belfast between the rival factions, despite the
utmost efforts of police and military to keep them
apart. Two people were killed and twelve wounded,
and the city immediately displayed signs that this
was only the prelude to another period of strife. It
is practically impossible to allocate the blame for
these continued outbreaks. In a city where two
bitterly opposed factions live in such close proximity,
the smallest incident is sufficient to start stone
throwing, which must rapidly develop into an inter-
change of revolver shots and the hurling of bombs.
Both sides have always declared that the other is to
blame; the rival partisans are ready to deelare that
the provocation came from their adversaries. The
tendency was f<»r the Northern Government to be
criticised for the bloodshed in the streets of thru
capital, but it must be remembered that at this
time the provisions of the Ail handing over to them
the responsihilit y tor law and order had not yet come
into force. The police were still reserved to the

206 IRELAND IN 1921.

British Government, the troops could only be brought
into action on the authority of their commanding
officer.

On this particular occasion, whichever party may
have been to blame originally, the Sinn Fein element
took the offensive into their hands on the second day.
Their snipers took up positions from which they
could overlook the Protestant workers as they went
to their work, and from these positions they poured
a heavy fire into their enemies. During the day the
authorities did their best to dislodge them, but as
soon as they were driven out of one position they
took up another. As the workmen returned home
they were again subjected to a rain of fire, of which
they had to run the gauntlet, with the result that six
were killed and some fifty injured.

The morning of the third day, August 31st,
opened under exactly the same conditions. The
snipers were to all intents and purposes in
occupation of the city, and no Protestant could
reach his place of employment without serious risk
of being shot. It was evident that far more drastic
steps would have to be taken to suppress the snipers
if any sort of order was to be restored to the city.
But the British officials were reluctant to take any
steps which might endanger the truce. Already
bitter comment had been made on the fact that
though plenty of troops were available in the neigh-
bourhood, very few had been drafted into Belfast.
The Ulstermen, always suspicious, were ready to
declare that the British Government cared nothing
for the lives of the citizens of Belfast so long as the
susceptibilities of Sinn Fein were not offended by
any action on their part which might be construed

ULSTER AND SINN FEIN. 207

as a breach of the truce. To some extent they were
right, and the condition of the city was another
example of the evils of hesitation which a firm
policy might have checked at the start. The Lord
Mayor of Belfast, Sir William Coates, called on
the officer commanding the 15th Infantry Brigade,
\N ho was the Competent Military Authority for the
district, and also on the City Police Commissioner,
in order to appeal for more vigorous measures to be
taken. In the evening a conference was held
between the Cabinet of Northern Ireland and the
Lord Mayor on the one hand, and Mr. Cope, who
had come from Dublin for the purpose, and the
military and police chiefs on the other. As a result
of this conference the troops in the city were
reinforced, and sterner preventive measures were
immediately taken. The unrest died down at once,
and conditions in the city resumed their normal
aspect. Strong pickets of soldiers lined the principal
streets, and the workers were enabled to go to and
from their employment with safety. But considerable
indignation was expressed at the delay which
had occurred before these measures were taken.
The Lord Mayor, at a meeting of the Corporation
on September 1st, made a reference to the general
opinion of the loyalist section of the city, which was
heartily applauded. He said that a very regrettable
occurrence had disgraced the city during the past
few days, and that the feeling on all sides was that
the police did not take adequate steps to secure the
safety of the population until the previous day.
There could be no doubt that the Lord Mayor was
correct in his statement. As soon as an adequate
military force was posted in the city the disturbances

208 IRELAND IN 1921.

ceased, and it is hardly to the credit of the British
authorities that these necessary steps were not taken
until the riot had lasted three days and the casualty
list had reached the appalling total of eighteen
killed and over a hundred wounded.

An interesting light was thrown upon the
responsibility for the rioting by Mr. Eoin 0' Duffy,
who on the conclusion of the outbreak made an
official statement in his capacity of Liaison Officer
for Northern Ireland. He said that after the
refusal of the military and police to act, the
situation on the morning of the 31st was such that
he ordered the I.E. A. to take action for the
protection of Catholics, as it was quite patent to
everyone that the police authorities were conniving
with the Orange mob. I.R.A. sentries were placed
at vantage points in the city, and in a few hours
made their presence felt. On the 1st, as the result
of representations made to him, he ordered his
troops to cease firing. This statement was not
unnaturally taken as an admission of guilt on the
part of the I.E. A., and a demand was immediately
made that action should be taken against Mr.
O'Duffy. But he was protected by the truce, his
arrest would have been regarded by Sinn Fein as
a breach of its terms, and once more the British
authorities were helpless in face of the agreement
they had made. Mr. O'Duffy remained at liberty,
to make an even more surprising statement, which
will be referred to later.

CHAPTER IX.

On September 1st Mr. Lloyd George, who was
spending a holiday in Scotland, arrived at Gairloch
in Invernesshire. Owing to this fact, and to the
likelihood that the state of the Irish negotiations
would require further meetings on the part of
Ministers, the majority of the Cabinet had also
elected to take their holidays in Scotland, in order
to be within call. On the very day of his arrival,
Messrs. Barton and McGarth reached Scotland as
the bearers of a message from the Dail to Mr. Lloyd
George. This message, which was dated August

h, and was in the form of a letter from Mr. de
Valera, contained a reiteration of the contention

t the Prime Minister had not offered Ireland true
Dominion status, but something greatly inferior.
The last paragraph, however, suggested a meeting of
pknipotentiari

" The hre plenipotentiaries must meet un-

trammelled by any conditions save the facts themselves,
and must be prepared to reconcile their subseqi;
differences not hy appeals to t ert or open, but by

reference to some guiding principle on which there is
common agreement. We have proposed the principle of

O

210 IRELAND IN 1921.

Government by consent of the governed, and do not mean
it as a mere phrase. . . . That you claim it as a
peculiarly British principle, instituted by Britain, and
" now the very life of the British Commonwealth " should
make it peculiarly acceptable to you. On this basis, and
this only, we see a hope of reconciling * the considerations
which must govern the attitude ' of Britain's representa-
tives with the considerations which must govern the
attitude of Ireland's representatives, and on this basis we
are ready at once to appoint plenipotentiaries/'

On receipt of this message, the Prime Minister
summoned a meeting of the Cabinet at Inverness on
September 7th. At this meeting it was resolved
to ask for a definite reply from Mr. de Valera as to
whether or not he was prepared to appoint repre-
sentatives to discuss with the British Government
the offer originally made, and, if the reply should
be in the affirmative, to appoint a time and place for
such discussions. The message conveying these
resolutions is worth quoting in full.

" His Majesty's Government have considered your
letter of August 30th, and have to make the following
observations upon it : —

" The principle of government by consent of the
governed is the foundation of British constitutional develop-
ment, but we cannot accept as a basis of practical conference
an interpretation of that principle which would commit us
to any demands which you might present, even to the extent
of setting up a Republic and repudiating the Crown. You
must be aware that conference on such a basis is impossible.
So applied, the principle of government by consent of the
governed would undermine the fabric of every democratic
state and drive the civilised world back into tribalism.

" On the other hand, we have invited you to discuss
our proposals on their merits, in order that you may have
no doubt as to the scope and sincerity of our intentions.
It would be open to you in such a conference to raise the
subject of guarantees on any points in which you may
consider Irish freedom prejudiced by these proposals.

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. 211

" His Majesty's Government are loath to believe that

you will insist upon rejecting their proposals without
lining them in conference. To decline to discuss a
lenient which would bestow upon the Irish people the
fullest freedom of national development within the
Kmpire can only mean that you repudiate all allegiance to
th»- down and all membership of the British Common-
wealth. If we were to draw this inference from your
r, then further discussion between us could serve no
useful purpose and all conference would be vain. If,
however, we are mistaken in this inference, as we still hope,
and it your real object ion to our proposals is that tl
offer Ireland 1« — than the liberty which we have described.,
that objection can he explored at a conference.

" You will agree that this correspondence has lasted
long- enough. His Majesty's Government must, therefore,
ask for a definite reply as to whether you are prepared to
enter a conference to ascertain how the association of
1 1 eland with the community of nations known as the British
Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national
aspirations. If, as we hope, your answer is in the
affirmative, I suggest that the conference should meet at
Inverness on the 'JOth inst."

This was, in effect an ultimatum in a mild form.
It was natural that British opinion should be
becoming impatient at the circumlocution of Mr. de
Valera and the Dail, but there were good reasons
why a stronger line should not be taken with them.
In the first place, many people, including the Chief
Secretary, had always been of the opinion that the
first step in Ireland towards ultimate peace must be
directed touards securing a cessation of the murder
of members of the Crown Forces rather than towards
securing any permanent political agreement. The
murders had ceased with the truce, but it was certain
that they would break out again at the first symptom
of this truce being threatened. The longer the truce
endured, the more likely it was that the good sense
of the country would organise to prevent hostilities

212 IRELAND IN 1921.

again. Therefore, for this reason, a prolongation
of negotiations was not an unfavourable circum-
stance. On the other hand, the truce was only
intended as the device of a moment, and it was very
necessary that it should be replaced as soon as
possible by some more precise arrangement. As
matters stood in Ireland, no form of government
was in practical operation. The Crown Forces
were restrained by the uncertainty of their position
under the truce, and by the knowledge that the
Government would fail to support them in any
action, however proper and justifiable, which would
result in a threat by Sinn Fein to break off
negotiations. The longer Ireland remained an
administrative no - man's - land, in which every
individual was free to interpret the law as he
pleased, without much fear of punishment, the more
difficult it would be to enforce order for any
permanent Government which might eventually
secure the reins.

There was another consideration .which weighed
very heavily with the Government. The eyes of
the world, and especially those of America, were
upon the conduct of the negotiations. Both sides
were to a large extent ' playing to the gallery. ' If,
as many people believed at the time, the negotiations
must fail and war ensue, blame for their failure
would fall upon the side that took the initiative in
bringing the negotiations to a conclusion. The
Prime Minister had at all times been peculiarly
sensitive to American opinion; at this moment, with
the Disarmament Conference looming in the future,
he was doubly so. The net result was that the
Government were prepared to endure a certain

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. LM;>

measure of the humiliation which must attach to
the continuance of the battle of words and phraaes
uitli Mr. de Valera, as an alternative to the risk
attending a firm intimation that he must consent to
a conference or takr the consequences.

Before dealing with the reception of the
Inverness Cabinet's letter by the Dail, it will be as
well to deal with the attitude of the Sinn Fein
leaders subsequent to Mr. de Valera 's letter of
August 30th. Mr. Collins, who, having secured one
of the seats for County Armagh in the elections for
the Northern Parliament, described himself as the
member for County Armagh in the Dail, addressed
his constituents on September 4th at the town of
Armagh, where, as it happened, most of the Sinn
Feiners in the constituency lived. His speech
naturally dealt with the two essential difficulties,
allegiance and partition. In regard to the first he

" You will have read of the English offer. You will
have read all the correspondence which passed between the
two Governments with regard to the terms themselves. I
little to add to what has been said in our letters to the
British Government. These terms are not acceptable to
us. They do not give us the substance of freedom."

In regard to the second, he warned Ulster that
the South would shortly achieve its freedom, and
pointed out what this freedom would involve.

It is obvious that an artificial excuse is being made
of the existence of the Northern Parliament to keep
Ireland asunder. There, again, is England using the
Orangemen for her own interests, and the interests of the
Orangemen have never been the same as those of England.
The Orangemen have been used as a tool in preventing up
to the present what is now inevitable. The moment is near
when they will no longer be of use as a tool — when they
will, in fact, stand in the way of an agreement with

214 IRELAND IN 1921.

Ireland, which has now become essential to British
interests. Then they will be thrown aside, and they will
find their eyes turned to an England which no longer wants
them. I say freedom is coming, and nobody can stop it.
With this freedom Ireland is on the verge of an era of
prosperity and development. We see ahead growing
industries, improved agriculture, increasing wealth. Are
those counties really going to deprive themselves of the
benefit of economic association with the new Ireland? Sir
James Craig has said that he is responsible for peace in
Northern Ireland. In Ireland to-day there is peace
everywhere except in the domain of his Parliament. Our
proposal is, as I have said, that they should come in. We
can afford to give them even more than justice. We can
afford to be generous. That is our message to the North,
and it is meant for those who are opposed to us rather than
for those who are with us. But to those who are with us
I can say that no matter what happens, no matter what the
future may bring, we shall not desert them. The
Parliament, in its doomed building, does not, or cannot,
control its unruly element, and already that doomed
building is shaking. "

It is interesting to compare Mr, Collins' speech
with certain statements made by Mr. de Valera in
reply to the question whether or not he had a
'will to peace.' Mr. Collins was jbo some extent
prophetic, and his predictions of the future were
practical and largely justified by the events. Mr.
de Valera, though consistent, was as usual utterly
unpractical, and invoked the shade of circumstance
rather than circumstance itself. A single extract
from a long statement will suffice as illustration.

" Peace will never be founded on make-believe. Let
us tear aside the camouflage, and put away the hypocrisy.
If England is issuing an ultimatum, let it be an ultimatum.
Brute force, naked and unabashed, has been used against
small nations before. Our nation has known it for long.
The present generation, even our little children, have
experienced it, and no pretence will hide a threat of force
from being recognised for what it is. England has no
basis in right for a single one of the demands she is making-

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. 215

upon Ireland. She would not dare to make them to a
Power even nearly as strong as herself. They are made to
us simply because it is felt that H

to enforce them, and that Ireland is too weak to resist
successfully. '1 the naked truth, and it is useless

Miptm-r to hide it, for a peace secured in these
( irciiinstiiiiccs would have no one's slightest respect.

iiinly no Iri.-hiiian \\nuld !«•<•! l.oiind by any arrange-
ment thus arrived at. With this background of force war,
not peace, would surely be the outcome."

But the most astonishing pronouncement on the
situation was that of Mr. Eoin O'Duffy, who
spoke of Mr. Collins' meeting at Armagh. This

tlt'inan, who, it will be remembered, held the post
of liaison officer for the I.R.A. in Ulster, made a
violent attaek upon the Unionists of the North :—

" These people are standing as a bridgehead for th»»
British Government in this country. So far as these
people are concerned they should have an opportunity very
soon of declaring whether they are for Ireland or the
British Empire. If they are for Ireland we will extend
the hand of welcome as we have done in the past. If they
decide that they are against Ireland and against their
fellow-countrymen we will have to take suitable action.
We will IKW to put on the screw. The boycott of Bel:
— we will tighten ' -«w, and, if necessary, we will

havt the lead against them."

These words, coming from the man who was
responsible for the whole policy of the I.R.A. in
Ulster, r a used great indignation in the North, and
were considered inadvisable even by the more ardent
of the Sinn Fein leaders. Mr. O'Duffy was removed
from his post in Ulster and received an appointment
in Cork, where his spevehes would not be so likely to
bring retribution upon his supporters.

An incident, instruetive not because it was the
first or the last of similar neeurrences, but because
it throws a light upon the attitude of that section

216 IRELAND IN 1921.

of Irishmen who followed the teaching of Mr.
Cathal O'Shannon occurred about this time. This
incident has already been referred to (page 156), but
a slightly fuller account may not be out of place.
On September 2nd the employees of the Cork
Harbour Board struck work on the refusal of the
Board to grant them a certain minimum wage. On
the 6th they proclaimed a Soviet, and took over the
management of the port. They began collecting
dues, and expressed the intention of carrying on as
before, paying themselves the wage they demanded
out of the monies they collected. Unfortunately for
their intentions, trade completely deserted the port,
and ships used competing harbours, such as Water-
ford. In the end the strikers were glad to abide by
the arbitration of the Bail Ministry of Labour.

The Dail Cabinet was undoubtedly influenced in
its answer to the Prime Minister's last note by the
almost universal desire expressed in Ireland that a
conference should be held. Without outside
influence, there is no doubt that at this particular
stage the extremist party would have carried the
day, and a defiant answer, leaving no alternative to
war, would have been sent. All reports received by
British Ministers pointed to this, and there was no
doubt that Sinn Fein as a party would stand by
whatever message the Dail sent. The days when a
split in the Dail was possible were not yet. But,
reinforced by the universal demand of the Irish
Press and nation, the moderate party was the
stronger. Even such a paper as the Independent
had said •" Nomenclature does not now count so
much as a scheme which in substance and reality
gives Ireland control of all her own affairs. We

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. '217

trust the conference will be held. The Bail's
methods were therefore based on caution. They
sent Messrs. Boland and Mdirath to Gairloch with
their letter, and instructions to inform Mr. Lloyd
George of the substance of its contents and secure his
opinion upon them. These envoys arrived at
(iairloch on the 13th, and after an interview with
the Prime Minister returned to Dublin, leaving the
letter with Mr. Lloyd George, who agreed to
disregard it should the Bail so desire after the
return of their envoys. But on the 15th Mr. de
Valera decided to publish the letter in the original
form. An extract from it will be sufficient to make
its purport clear.

' We have no hesitation in declaring- our willingness
to enter a conference to ascertain how the association of
Ireland with the community of nations known as the
British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national
aspirations. . . . We have accordingly summoned Dail
Eireann that we may submit to it for ratification the
names of the representatives it is our intention to propose.
We hope that tnese representatives will find it possible to
be at Inverness on the date you sug-gest, September 20th."

So far so good, and had the note concluded with
this consent without further qualification, the
conference could have met. But the Dail Cabinet,
fearful of the extremists' warning that upon the
meeting of the Dail they would declare that Ireland
had been betrayed, and that the representatives
\\ould l>o accredited to a conference at which
Ireland's rights had been surrendered beforehand,
dared not refrain from once more stating its
position. The note continued :—

41 In fli is final note we doom it our duty to reaffirm that
our position is, and only can be, as we have defino<i
throughout this correspondence. Our nation has formally

218 IRELAND IN 1921.

declared its independence, and recognises itself as a
sovereign State. It is only as the representatives of that
State, and as its chosen guardians, that we have any
authority or powers to act on behalf of our people/'

Here Mr. de Valera, against his better judgment,
perhaps, was led into the trap which he himself had
been the first to point out in a letter to one of the
very men who carried the note to Gairloch (see page
217). It was already practically certain that if the
power of the Dail to negotiate on the British
Government's terms were challenged, and a new
Dail elected on the issue of negotiation or war, the
result would be the defeat of the Republican party,
if anything like a free election could be secured.
The Dail Cabinet also made itself look somewhat
ridiculous by the assertion that Ireland " recognised
herself ' ' as a Sovereign State, emphasising the fact
that no other nation did so. Mr. Lloyd George
replied by telegram to the publication of this
letter, expressing surprise that the objectionable
paragraph, of which he had warned the envoys, had
not been removed. His telegram continued : —

" I must accordingly cancel the arrangements for
conference next week at Inverness, and must consult my
colleagues on the course of action which this new situation
necessitates. I will communicate this to you as soon as
possible, but as I am for the moment laid up here, a few
days' delay is inevitable. "

To this Mr. de Valera replied, also by telegram,
in a spirit of injured astonishment that Mr. Lloyd
George did not realise that if Ireland entered
the conference without previously defining her
position, her right would thereby be " irreparably
prejudiced." A wave of consternation swept over
both England and Ireland at this seeming deadlock.

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. 218

It appeared for the moment that negotiations had
definitely broken down But during the next few
days an intense telegraphic bombardment on both
sides did something to restore confidence. So long
as vi<-\ss mm mued to be exchanged there were
grounds for hope.

On the 17th Mr. Lloyd George telegraphed to
Mr. de Valera, pointing out the impossibility of a
miitVrenro between the British Government and the
representatives of a Sovereign State, as this in itself
would be an admission of Ireland's severance from
the Empire, and reasserting that insistence upon
this point would make conference impossible.

On the same day Mr. de Valera replied to the
effect that Mr. Lloyd George was inconsistent.

14 I have already had conference with you, and in
these conferences and in my written commun legations I have
never ceased to recognise myself for what I was, and am.
If this involves recognition on your part, then you have
gnised us. ... Believe me to have but one
object at heart, the setting of the conference on such a
basis of truth and reality as would make it possible to

.!•<• thrmiLrh it the result which the people of these two
islands so ardently desire."

To this Mr. Lloyd George replied on the 18th,
pointing out that he had met Mr. de Valera as " the

son leader of the great majority in Southern
Ireland." " I am prepared to meet your delegates
as I met you in July, in the capacity of * chosen
spokesmen ' for your people to discuss the associa-
tion of Ireland with the British Commonwealth."

On the next day, Mr. de Valera replied in a
telegram which was the result of a meeting of the
Bail ('al'iiiet, in whirh the more moderate party
succeeded in demonstrating the danger of going too

220 IRELAND IN 1921.

far. They had been warned that insistence upon
recognition of the Irish delegates as representatives
of a Sovereign State must result in the breaking off
of negotiations and a resumption of hostilities.
The secret liaison system between them and the
British Government via Dublin Castle was now
complete, and a virtual ultimatum could be conveyed
to them without the observance of official forms.
The Dail Cabinet, faced with this knowledge that
further obstinacy meant war, decided to take a more
temperate line. The telegram was as follows : —

" We have had no thought at any time of asking you
to accept any conditions precedent to a conference. We
have thought it as unreasonable to expect you, as a
preliminary, to recognise the Irish Republic, formally or
informally, as that you should expect us, formally or
informally, to surrender our national position.

"It is precisely because neither side accepts the
position of the other that there is a dispute at all, and that
a conference is necessary to search for and to discuss
such adjustments as might compose it. A treaty of
accommodation and association properly concluded between
the peoples of these two islands, and between Ireland and
the group of States in the British Commonwealth, would,
we believe, end the dispute for ever and enable the two
nations to settle down in peace, each pursuing its own
individual development and contributing its own quota to
civilisation, but working together in free and friendly
co-operation in affairs of agreed common concern.

" To negotiate such a treaty the respective representa-
tives of the two nations must meet. If you seek to impose
preliminary conditions which we must regard as involving
a surrender of our whole position they cannot meet. Your
last telegram makes it clear that misunderstandings are
more likely to increase than to dimmish and the cause of
peace more likely to be retarded than advanced by a
continuance of the present correspondence.

" We request you, therefore, to state whether your
letter of September 7th is intended to be a demand for a
surrender on our part or an invitation to a conference free
on both sides and without prejudice should an agreement

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. 221

not be reached. 1 r, we readily confirm

accej)(;iiH •<• ot the in\ itution, and our appointed delegate*
will meet your Government's representatives at any time in
the immediate future that you designate."

To this telegram Mr. Lloyd George did not reply
at once, wisely deciding to let its more pacific tone
produce its effect in Ireland. Although the Cabinet
as a whole did not perhaps trouble much about the
details of Irish affairs, and concerned itself mainly
with broad outlines, it was dimly aware that two
schools of thought were evolving among the leaders
of Sinn Fein, who had hitherto sunk their differences
in furtherance of a common policy. English
officials had often classed individuals in the Sinn
Fein movement as more or less advanced in their
views, a useless and usually incorrect classification
while hostilities lasted. But this unity, which had
stood the strain of war, could not stand the strain
of peace. Although the members of the Bail
Cabinet remained on perfectly friendly terms with
one another, and had between them private under-
standings which were not apparent in their official
relations, they now began to be divided on the
question whether or not it was desirable to force a
fight to a finish on the technical issue of a Republic.
Mr. de Valera, supported by such men as Cath.il
Brngha, the Minister of Defence, in the Cabinet,
and by the fanatical element in the country,
W;LS bitterly opposed to any retraction from the
Republican attitude. lie himself was sincerely
convinced that anything less would be merely a
decently veiled form of the English domination
of Ireland; his followers were {>ossibly not quite
so disinterested in their outlook. On the other

222 IRELAND IN 1921.

hand, Mr. Griffith, the founder of the original
Sinn Fein party, was by now convinced that the
republican ideal was not possible of achievement
through the present negotiations. Mr. Collins, and
with him the older men of the I.R.A., knew that if
it came to war, the final victory must necessarily
rest with the British troops. These men were
inclined to accept the British offer, and to
endeavour to extend it until they had secured the
very utmost that England was prepared to concede.
The peace party, as we may call them, had no idea
of regarding any settlement upon these lines as a
permanent one. But they were beginning to realise
that from the Union to a Republic was a far political
journey, and that Dominion status was a long step
in the desired direction. And the peace party,
which had already secured the selection of a majority
of delegates to a conference, should such be held,
employed their utmost efforts to produce a demand
for the holding of the conference among the Press
and people of Ireland.

Mr. Griffith himself, in the course of an inter-
view on the 24th, declared that at no time had the
Sinn Fein leaders asked the British Government to
recognise the Sovereign State claim as a preliminary
to conference. He understood a conference to be an
occasion for an exchange of views, and that the only
thing that mattered was the final agreement. On
the same day, Mr. Churchill, speaking at Dundee,
gaid : " No mere pedantry or hair-splitting, no
quibbling about words and phrases, will be allowed
by us to stand in the way of practical steps to
peace."

It was not until the 29th that Mr. Lloyd George

DISCUSSION BY NOT1 ±>3

n snmed the correspondence. On that date he
telegraphed to Mi <le Valera as follows:—

" Sir, — His Majesty's Government have given close and
earnest consideration to the correspondence which has
passed between us since their invitation to you to send
delegates to at Inverness.

' I n spite of their sincere desire for peace, and in spite
of the more conciliatory tone of your last communication,
they cannot enter a conference upon the basis of thi.s
correspondence. Notwithstanding your personal assurance
t<> tin* contrary, which they much appreciate, it might be
argued in future that the m •< -eptunce of a conference on
this basis had involved them in a recognition which no
.British Government can accord.

" On this point they must guard themselves against
any possible doubt . There is no purpose to be served by
any further interchange of explanatory and argumentative
roinmuiiif -at ions upon this subject. The position taken up
by his Majesty's Government is fundamental to the
existence of the British Empire, and they cannot alter it .

11 My colleagues and I remain, however, keenly
anxious to make, in co-operation with your delegates,
another determined effort to explore every possibility of
settlement by personal discussion. The proposals which we
have already made have been taken by the whole world as
proof that our endeavours for reconciliation and settlement
are no empty form ; and we feel that conference, not
correspondence, is the most practical and hopeful way to
an understanding such as we ardently desire to achieve.

" We therefore send herewith a fresh invitation to a
conference in London on October llth, where we can meet
your delegates, as spokesmen of the people whom you
represent, with a view to ascertaining how the association
of Ireland with the community of nations known as th»«
lliitish Kinpiiv may best be reconciled with Irish national
aspir

The last paragraph of this note contains the
final definition of the British Government of the
purpose of the conference and the status of the
delegates who should attend it. This definition
left no loophole for any pretence on the part of the
Sum Fein leaders that the issue of the conference

224 IRELAND IN 1921.

could be a Republic, or that their representatives
were those of a Sovereign State. But the peace
party in Dublin had gained sufficient ground to
enable them to insist on an acceptance by the Dail
Cabinet of the British Government's invitation,
without a reaffirmation of the Republican position
which would render this acceptance tantamount to
a refusal. Mr. de Valera replied as follows :—

" Sir, — We have received your letter of invitation to
a conference in London on October llth with a view to
ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the
community of nations known as the British Empire may
best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations.

lt Our respective positions have been stated and
are understood, and we agree that conference, not
correspondence, is the most practical and hopeful way to
an understanding. We accept the invitation, and our
delegates will meet you in London on the date mentioned
to explore every possibility of settlement by personal
discussion. "

Mr. de Valera had satisfied himself with the
phrase " our respective positions have been stated
and are understood," which was capable of diverse
interpretation according to whether the word
* understood ' was applied severally or mutually.
The British Government was content to accept
it in the former sense, and the way lay open
to a conference. But, during the period of
correspondence, the basis of the conference had
insensibly altered. The Prime Minister's original
invitation had been addressed to both Mr. de
Valera and Sir James Craig, and had been to a
joint conference to explore to the uttermost the
possibilities of a settlement in Ireland. This
invitation had been accepted by Sir James Craig
but refused by Mr. de Valera, whose position as
representative of the great majority of the Irish

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. 225

people would have been compromised by meeting
Mr. Lloyd George on equal terms with Sir .James.

The original invitation had now been allowed to
lapse, and a conference was about to open between
thf Hritisli (invernment and the Sinn Fein delegates
in which Ulster was to have no part. If the
conference were to be strictly confined to securing
a settlement between Great Britain and Southern
Ireland as defined by the Government of Ireland
Act, this was in every way right and proper, and
had the approval of Ulster, whose leaders had
already declared their intention of standing aside
from such a settlement. But should the conference
ai^ree to any measure which would in any way affect
the position of Ulster as defined by the Act, this
would be a breach of faith with the Northern
Government which no consideration of expediency
could palliate or excuse. The Northern Government

ived its jurisdiction and its powers from an Act
of Parliament which had duly become law, and this
jurisdiction could not be curtailed, nor these powers
limited, without the consent of Ulster, and under
no circumstances by simple agreement between
delegates from Southern Ireland and the British
Government respectively, even though siu-h
ment should subsequently be ratified by Parliament.

Ulster was already becoming impatient at the
delay eaused by the negotiations. The provisions
of the Act could not be put into force until some
settlement was come to in the South. During the

• itiations the Act was suspended in the air. The

regime was practically, it' not in theory, at an
end. The Southern Parliament could not show the
necessary number of members who were prepared to

p

226 IRELAND IN 1921.

take the oath, but the Lord Lieutenant could not
take the necessary steps to dissolve it and appoint
a legislative Assembly in its stead, as such an
act would have immediately terminated the
negotiations.

In the meanwhile, the Bail was functioning
openly and governing the country by its edicts : a
situation which the Act had never contemplated.
It was not possible to apply the Act in Ulster and
repeal it in the South. The result was that the
Northern Government found itself in a position of
ineffectiveness through no fault of its own. Ulster,
much against her will, had consented to the breaking
of the Union. Her reward was to find herself in
an impossible and ambiguous position, neither a
part of Great Britain nor free to develop along the
lines which the Act had foreshadowed. The
liberty she had been promised as the reward of her
acquiescence, and whose coming birth had been so
loudly proclaimed by British politicians, was still-
born, and the heart of Ulster was bitter accordingly.

The Northern Parliament met on September
20th, at a time when the negotiations were in
suspense and the British Cabinet were considering
the form which their final offer to the Sinn
Fein leaders should take. The Sinn Fein and
Nationalist members had boycotted the Parliament,
to use their own expression, and the House of
Commons contained only Unionist members, who
were obviously deeply concerned at the position of
affairs while anxious to say nothing which might
compromise the position of the Six Counties. In a
statement on the situation Sir James Craig said
that at the time of the adjournment of the House

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. 227

in June he expected that when they reassembled the
full machinery of government would be in their
hands. The invitation to a conference issued by
Mr. Lloyd George to the representatives of Sinn
Fein and to himself was as great a surprise to him
as to any member of the House. They thought that,
failing the functioning of the Southern Parliament,
Crown Colony government would be established
within a reasonable time, which he interpreted to
mean weeks, and not months. With the advice of
his Ministers he had concluded to accept Mr. Lloyd
George's invitation. By refusing they would have
risked a settlement behind their backs. Further,
Sinn Fein might have taken a refusal by Ulster as
a model for their own answer. But the supreme
consideration which had determined him to accept
NN as that Ulster had nothing of which to be ashamed,
and a good cause which she was prepared to discuss
at any time. The Northern Parliament could not
modify its position, nor did it wish to enlarge upon
the terms it had laid down. Ulster had determined
land aside while the British Government and the
tives of Sinn Fein endeavoured to reach
some settlement, and they had adhered loyally to
that determination. He believed that their action
had been fully justified, and that feeling across the
Channel in favour of the people of Ulster was better
than at any time in the political history of the
country. Everything pointed to the fact that Sinn
Fein was better understood than ever before, and
that the Imperial attitude of Ulster had penetrated
even to the densest brains. In years past the
invariable criticism was that Ulster blocked the
way to peace. Now Ulster stood aside, and the

228 IRELAND IN 1921.

British Government had to come face to face with
the republicans and rebels and bear upon its
shoulders the Imperial responsibility. Ulster by
her sacrifice in accepting the Government of Ireland
Act had gone to the very furthest limit in meeting
the difficulties with which Great Britain was faced.
How the situation would work out no man could say,
for with such conflicting interests it was impossible
to forecast even for one day the progress of the
negotiations. But there should be no further delay
in bringing the last Orders in Council into force so
that Ulster could grip the reins of government and
get on with the business.

Some members referred to the activities of the
gunmen, and in reply to a question as to whose was
the responsibility for the maintenance of law and
order, Sir James said that the duty rested entirely
on the British authorities under the Government of
Ireland Act. The control of the police would be
transferred to the Northern Parliament within three
years. Members of the Cabinet had met the Lord
Mayor and the military and police authorities in an
advisory capacity, and their united efforts would be
continued.

One member made a bitter complaint of the
inactivity of the British Government. He said that
the average Sinn Feiner imagined that he had beaten
the British Government to its knees. But that
Government had in reality never started to operate.
The Irish people should realise that, patient and
tolerant as Great Britain always was, there was a
limit to tolerance, and that the time might come
when the British people would take in hand the
restoration of order in Ireland, and would carry it

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. 229

out as effectively as they had always carried out any
serious undertaking in the pa The Sinn Feiners
\\ere playing on the tolerance of the British
Government, and on the tolerance of the people of
Ulster as well. The moment the truce had been
announced, there had been an intensified campaign
in Ulster. Gunmen had been imported during July
and August, together with large quantities of arms
and ammunition. At the time he spoke there were
large Sinn Fein camps over the Six Counties, where
all kinds of military exercises, including bomb-
throwing, were indulged in. Was there any other
Government save the Government in Dublin Castle
that would tolerate that sort of thing?

These facts were not exaggerated, and were
hardly in dispute. During the very week that the
above speech was made the military authorities
reported " Camps are being formed in Ulster, at

forde, Castlewellan, and Torr Head. The
object of these camps is probably twofold. Firstly
to extend the influence of Sinn Fein and secondly to
provoke Ulster as much as possible." In the
following week the same authority reported " The
I.R.A. camps all over Ulster are causing general
irritation, unrest, and a sense of insecurity." But
stringent orders were issued by the Government of
Dublin Castle that no measures were to be taken to
disperse these camps. The " general irritation,
unrest, and sense of insecurity " of Ulster could not

:1 lowed to interfere with the policy of smoothing

Sinn Fein the path which led to the conference
table.

This is not the place to discuss the merits or
demerits of such a policy, we need only notice the

230 IRELAND IN 1921.

effects it produced, which were, in Ulster, a
profound distrust of the intentions of the British
Government, and among the Forces of the Crown a
settled conviction that a " hidden hand ' was
deliberately frustrating their efforts to keep order
and to protect the loyalist population. A single
instance of the existence of this feeling among the
military authorities will suffice. During the first
week in October the Officer in Command of a district
in County Cork received a letter giving particulars
of the persecution of the loyalists in the neighbour-
hood by the I.E. A. The letter concluded " Why
not visit the place and see? What are the R.I.C.
doing? In God's name come and do something! '
The officer referred this letter to headquarters, with
the following covering note: " I attach hereto a
copy of an anonymous letter received on the 1st
October. This letter has been shown to the local
D.I. (District Inspector), R.I.C., but apparently no
action has resulted beyond the making of a report to
higher police authority. As far as I can gather
the police in this district have practically ceased to
function, apparently on the orders of a Mr. Cope of
Dublin."

Before dealing with the sittings of the
Conference in London, it will be necessary to make
brief reference to the delegates appointed to attend
it. The Dail Cabinet had chosen its delegates at a
very early stage in the negotiations, and this choice
was ratified at a Dail meeting on September 14th.
In the words of the Sinn Fein official announcement :
' In view of a possible conference with representa-
tives of the British Government, the following
delegation of plenipotentiaries was unanimously

DISCUSSION BY NOTES. 231

ratified. " This wording is important, for reasons
which will appear later, The delegation consisted
of Messrs. Arthur (iriilith (Chairman), Michael
Collins, R. C. Barton, E. J. Du^r ad George

Gavan Din Of these, Mr. Griffith was the
founder of Sinn Fein, and was universally

sidered to be the luain of the movement. He
had been elected " Vice-President of the Republic '
: n 1917 through the efforts of the moderate section of
Sinn Fein, who desired a counterpoise to the more
erne de Valera. He occupied the post of
Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Dail Cabinet.
Mr. Michael Collins, who had already shown signs
of capacity for leadership in difficult situations,
had for some time past duplicated the posts of
Minister of Finance in the Dail Cabinet, and
Adjutant General of the I.R.A. Mr. Barton was
Minister of Economic Affairs and a Commandant of
the I.R.A. Mr. Duggan held no office in the
ministry, but was one of the members for the
Constituency of Meath and Louth in the Dail. Since
the truce he had been appointed chief liaison officer,
in which capacity he represented the I.R.A. in their
dealings with the British authorities. Mr. (iavan
Duffy was one of the members for Dublin County in
the Dail, and Sinn Fein Envoy at Rome. His chief
daim to fame was that he had defended Casement
in 1916.

Some surprise was evinced at the time that Mr.
de Valera was not included in the delegation. The

son for his exclusion is to be found in his own

rorrespondence with the Prime Minister. He

••uriiised himself," in his own words, as

President of the Irish Republic, and from his point

232 IRELAND IN 1921.

of view it was impossible that the President of a
Republic should attend a conference where the very
existence of that Republic would be in question.
There is no doubt that even at this stage the
constitution of the delegation caused him some
uneasiness. Messrs. Griffith and Collins were
known to favour the abandonment of the Republic
if sufficiently favourable terms could be secured.
The extent to which the three remaining members
might be influenced in conference with trained
politicians was doubtful. Among the entourage of
the delegation accompanying them to London the
only man he could count upon with absolute certainty
was Erskine Childers, an Englishman who had
adopted Sinn Fein as a hobby. Mr. de Valera felt
that his wisest course was to remain in Ireland in
order to counteract any lukewarmness towards the
Republican ideal which might result from national
delight at the improved prospects of peace.

The British delegation consisted of the Prime
Minister, Mr. Austen Chamberlain (Lord Privy
Seal), Viscount Birkenhead (Lord Chancellor, who
as Mr. F. E. Smith had been prominent in Irish
affairs in 1914), Mr. Churchill (Secretary for the
Colonies), Sir Laming Worthington-Evans (Secre-
tary for War), and Sir Hamar Greenwood (Chief
Secretary for Ireland). Sir Gordon Hewart, the
Attorney General, would, it was announced, be a
member of the conference when Constitutional
questions were under discussion.

CHAPTER X.

From the moment of Mr. de Valera's acceptance
of the Prime Minister's invitation to a conference,
one thing at least was certain, that success or failure
depended upon two points, and two points only —
allegiance and partition. No doubt existed that
the conference would find means of adjusting such
matters as the financial arrangements between the
two countries, or the arrangements for the defence
and policing of Ireland. There was no vital
disagreement upon these matters, and nothing that
hindered compromise upon them. But the attitudes
of the two parties upon allegiance and partition
were diametrically opposed, and failure to agree
upon either meant failure of the whole conference
and in all probability a renewal of hostilities.

The lush delegates had not only taken the
oath of allegiance to the Republic, but they had
subscribed to the Constitution of Sinn Fein,* which
contains the statement " Sinn Fein aims at securing
the International recognition of Ireland as an
Independent Irish Republic." This statement was

i (firmed at a meeting of Ard Fheis (the supreme
council of Sinn Fein) during the actual period of

* See Note D in Appendix.

234 IRELAND IN 1921.

negotiation. The whole tradition of the Sinn Fein
movement since 1916 had been the establishment of
a Republic of the whole of Ireland, and at this very
time the Dail Ministry " recognised themselves '
as governing such a Republic. It was obvious that
any recession from this standpoint would be hailed
as a betrayal by the extreme body of Sinn Fein and
by the members of the Irish Republican Brother-
hood, who had sworn an additional oath to the heads
of their own organisation, and who would not feel
themselves bound by any surrender on the part of
delegates not appointed by that organisation.

That the delegates themselves hoped to secure
any such terms as could be construed into
independence and unity is not likely. As a whole
they represented that section of Irish opinion which
desired peace beyond all things, either for the
development of Ireland's prosperity or because they
knew that success was not to be attained by recourse
to arms. It is probable that from the first they
intended to accept a settlement which would
entail their acceptance of allegiance and partition,
although such an intention had never been revealed
in the most secret session of the Dail Cabinet. But,
at the same time, they meant to make this surrender
as easy as possible for themselves, and to bring back
to their supporters in Ireland such fruits of freedom
as would sweeten the draught of their disappoint-
ment. According to the letter of their oath and of
the Constitution, they would have betrayed Sinn
Fein. But they knew that a large section of the
party and of the Dail had at last learned to look
beyond the narrow circle of idealism and make-
believe towards the larger horizon of practical

THE CONFERENCE.

polities. The success of their endeavour depended
upon the strength of this section, which could be
relied upon to support any settlement which would
bring peace and self-government to the South. 'I
argument that this s* ttlement was only intended as
a step towards the eventual establishment of the
Republic could then be thrown as a sop to the
oncilables The rigid Republicans might
denounce them, but there was no doubt that the
country would support them if it were given the
chan

It must not be supposed that the Irish delegates
entered the Conference with this intention as a cut-
and-dried programme, or that it had been openly
discussed among them. It was rather an intention
which the only two delegates who really mattered—
Messrs. Collins and Griffith — held more or less

vtly, and from rather different motives. Mr.
Griffith had seen the Sinn Fein ship, which, under
his guid;i had been steadily sailing a

predetermined course towards a distant but not
unattainable port, boarded by the far 1
e\[)erienced navigators of the I.R.B. and the

msport Workers, and steered by dead -reckoning
for a harbour not marked upon the chart
possibility. He knew that the only method of
getting the ship back upon her true course was the
tnce of a settlement, which would eventually
result in the helm being entrusted once more to
himself or to those who would submit to his pilota

Mr. Collins' outlook was somewhat different
As Adjutant General of the I.R.A. he knew very
well that in a declared war the I.R.A. had no chance
of defeating the British Forces, and that, after a

236 IRELAND IN 1921.

period of truce, the country, upon which his troops
had hitherto lived, would refuse to support them
if the inhabitants were assured of adequate
protection against their revenge. Surrender would
be inevitable sooner or later, and surrender in the
guise of the acceptance of a settlement promised
more favourable terms than could be obtained by
surrender subsequent to defeat in the field. The
rank and file might believe that they had defeated
the British Army already and could do so again,
and might therefore be opposed to a settlement
which denied them the objects for which they had
fought. But Mr. Collins was aware that their
leaders knew the truth as well as he did himself,
and he relied on their influence to retain the loyalty
of the majority, at least.

But it was essential, if the majority of the Sinn
Fein party were to be won to acceptance of the
only status for Ireland that the conference could
confer, that the delegates should fight tooth and
nail for every concession which would give the
appearance of victory on every other point but those
of allegiance and partition. The conference must
be a long struggle, with the threat of war ever
hanging over the failure that must seem inevitable
from day to day. The delegates must return to
those who sent them with the words " This is the
best we could do, the only alternative to its
acceptance is war." There was also another
consideration which made it in the interests of Sinn
Fein to prolong the conference. It was known that
the Prime Minister was anxious to attend the
Disarmament Conference in Washington, and Sinn
Fein was openly alarmed at the effect his personality

THE CONFERENCE.

might have upon Irish propaganda and sympathy
in the United States. That Mr. Lloyd George
would not leave England while the Irish negotia
tions were in the balance was certain; if these
negotiations could be prolonged until it was too
late for him to go to America the menace to the Sinn
Fein cause would be averted.

In addition to the representatives,
secretaries were appointed to the Irish delegation,
Messrs. Erskine Childers and John Chartres. The
appointment of the former has already been
referred to. Mr. Chartres had performed valuable
service in the Ministry of Munitions during the

r, but at its close had drifted into rebellion. He
was one of the few men of real practical experience
of affairs on the Sinn Fein side, and as such was
highly valued by them. There had been a proposal
in Sinn Fein circles earlier in the year to send him
as representative to Berlin, but he was considered
too useful in Ireland, and was employed in an
advisory capacity to the departments of Propaganda
and Foreign Affairs. If Mr. Childers was the
appointment of the extreme Republicans, Mr.
Chartres was the counterpoise added by Mr. Griffith
and his moderates.

It is not proposed to chronicle the proceeding
of the Conference from day to day, but the leading
events during its sitting must be mentioned and
their reaction upon the many issues at stake studied.

The Conferring met for the first time on October
llth, and its first business was to appoint a
committee to deal with complaints of breaches of
the truce, which were becoming more numerous
every day. To these complaints the Irish delegates

238 IRELAND IN 1921.

replied with counter charges as to the treatment of
the prisoners in the internment camps. These
preliminary matters were disposed of during the
first week, and resulted in the organisation of
further liaison arrangements. A lull in the
proceedings followed, due ostensibly to the pressure
of other business to which the British delegates
were obliged to attend, but largely to the necessity
for approaching the real purpose of the conference
with the utmost delicacy. But circumstances and
Mr. de Valera brought the question of allegiance to
an immediate issue. On October 19th the Pope sent
the following message to the King : —

" We rejoice at the resumption of the Anglo-Irish
negotiations, and pray to the Lord with all our heart that
He may bless them and grant to your Majesty the great
joy and imperishable glory of bringing to an end the
age-long dissension/'

To which the King replied : —

" I have received the message of your Holiness with
much pleasure, and with all my heart I join in your prayer
that the Conference now sitting in London may achieve a
permanent settlement of the troubles in Ireland and may
initiate a new era of peace and happiness for my people."

Upon publication of these messages, Mr. de
Valera telegraphed to the Pope as follows : —

" The people of Ireland have read the message sent by
your Holiness to the King of Great Britain, and appreciate
the kindly interest in their welfare and the paternal regard
which suggested it. I tender to your Holiness their
gratitude. They are confident that the ambiguities in the
reply sent in the name of King George will not mislead
you, as it may the uninformed, into believing that the
troubles are ' in ' Ireland or that the people of Ireland
owe allegiance to the British King. The independence of
Ireland has been formally proclaimed by the regularly
elected representatives of Ireland and ratified by subsequent
plebiscites.

THE CONFERENCE. 239

11 The trouble is between Ireland and Britain, and ito

Britain have sought to impose

tli.-ir will upon I n-land and liy British force have
endeavoured to rob her people of the liberty which is their

iral ritfht and their ancient heritage. We long to be
at peace and in friendship \\ith tin- JHM.J,!,. <>f Britain, as
othrr peoples, but the same constancy through
persecution and martyrdom that has proved the reality of
our people's attachment to the faith of their fathers proves
the real ichment to their national freedom,

and no consideration will ever induce them to abandon it."

Mr. de Valera's message, on the eve of the
discussion in the Conference on the question
of allegiance, could hardly be regarded in any
other light than as a positive declaration; and
during a short meeting on the day following
its publication, the issue was put to the Irish
delegates directly, and they were asked whether
or not this message was a true interpretation of
their own standpoint. The Government's attitude
was made clear by the Prime Minister in reply
to a question in the House of Commons: " I
have read the telegram referred to ' (Mr. de
Valera's message to the Pope), he said, " and its
publication, especially in the middle of peace
negotiations, constitutes a grave challenge. The
position of the Government on the question involved
in that telegram has been made abundantly clear.
We do not propose to recede from it, and the
ContVivme cannot proceed on any other basis."

This incident might in itself have been sufficient
to wreck the Conference had it been pushed to its
logical ixsue. Of the two main points, allegiance
and partition, deadlock appeared to have ensued
upon the first. It appeared to those few Union i
who disapproved of the Government's policy of

240 IRELAND IN 1921.

negotiation with Sinn Fein that this was a
favourable moment to open their attack in the House
of Commons. On the last day of October a vote of
censure moved by them was defeated by a majority
of ten to one. The issue of allegiance was never
pressed, it was allowed to recede into the background
pending the discussion of other matters, both in the
House and in the Conference. In the latter the
Irish delegates diverted the proceedings to the
second essential point, partition. Here, again,
they did not anticipate that they could secure
complete success. But, if they could secure a
reduction of the area controlled by the Northern
Government, the remaining territory could hardly
escape falling into their hands. They intro-
duced the contention that two counties at least,
Fermanagh and Tyrone, were preponderatingly
Catholic and non-Unionist in their population, and
should therefore be transferred to the jurisdiction
of the South. They were, in fact, prepared to
strike a bargain. Let them be given so much of
Ulster that the rest must eventually follow, and they
would recommend the Bail to accept a form of
allegiance which would satisfy the British people.
So the Conference dragged on, struggling from one
difficult position to another, saved from disaster
only by the fear of the events which must inevitably
follow its collapse.

Meanwhile Ard Fheis, the supreme council of
Sinn Fein, had met in Dublin behind closed doors.
Ard Fheis was composed of delegates from the Sinn
Fein clubs all over Ireland, and there was at least
a hope that moderate opinion in the country would
find expression in the deliberations of this body.

THE CONFERENCE. 241

Hut, as has already been mentioned, Anl Fheis
re-affirmed the Republican standpoint and pledged
its " undivided allegiance and entire support to
Dail Eireann, the duly elected Parliament of
Ireland." This resolution was to some extent a
triumph for Mr. de Valera and a setback to the
undeclared policy of the moderate party. But it
could not be expected that the moderate members of
the Ard Fheis could formulate a new policy until the
possibilities of such a policy should be revealed to
them, or until they saw the certainty of a settlement
as the result of such a policy. To moderate the
demands at this juncture might prejudice the efforts
of the delegates in London, who might find it harder
to obtain concessions as the threat of war receded.
It was felt by moderates and extremists alike that
the whole weight of Sinn Fein must be used to back
up their representatives at the Conference, at least
until it was seen what sort of a bargain they would
bring back.

In the first week in November Sir James Craig
visited London for the purpose of conferring witli
the Prime Minister, and once again the impression
abroad that Ulster was to be asked to sacri
position in the interests of a settlement. During
the next few days Sir James Craig summoned
members of his Cabinet to London in order to
consider certain proposals of the Prime Minister.
There was no question of their participation in the
Irish Conference itself, or even of their meeting the
Sinn Fein delegates. In fact, the Propaganda
department of Dail Eireann, which had transferred
its Chief to London during the Conference, took
this opportunity of declaring Sinn Fein's triumph

Q

242 IRELAND IN 1921.

in the constitution of the Conference. Sir James
Craig having been reported as having said that if
and when Ulster's interests were reached in the
Conference her representatives would be asked to
attend, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, Minister of
Propaganda of the Dail, replied as follows :—

" Presumably Sir James Craig means that as the
British Government is responsible for the situation created
by the Partition Act, it will consult with himself and his
colleagues as to satisfactory means of rectifying the
blunder. The Conference is, of course, confined to the
accredited representatives of the British and Irish nations."

This implication was not denied by the British
Government, and, so far as Ireland at least was
concerned, the contention that the Sinn Fein
delegates were recognised as the representatives of
the whole of Ireland was established.

On November 12th Orders in Council were issued
dealing with the appointed days for the handing
over to Ulster of certain of the powers granted to
her under the Government of Ireland Act. Of
these the most important was November 22nd, on
which date were to be handed over " Irish services
in connection with the maintenance of law and
order and the administration of justice." From
that date the responsibility for the suppression of
disturbances in Belfast and elsewhere was in the
hands of the Northern Government, who could, of
course, call upon the assistance of the British Forces
in case of need. On the same day, Mr. Milne
Barbour, one of the Northern Ireland members of
the delegation which had seen the Prime Minister,
made a very interesting statement in Belfast. He
said that Sir James Craig had been put in possession

THE CONFERENCE. 243

of the heads of negotiation between the Sinn Fein
delegates and Mr. I 1< >yd George.

" While it is impossible at this stage," said Mr.
Bui-hour, " to reveal the contents of a confidential
document, I should like to take this, the earliest opportunity
of assuring the people of Northern Ireland that the
Northern Cabinet are absolutely unanimous in the finding
at which they have arrived. They are as determined as
ever that it the allegiance of Southern Ireland is to be
purchased the price to be paid shall not consist of the
sacrifice of any of the rights, whether territorial or
administrative, recently conferred on the Northern
»1 that while they are satisfied that the
Northern province is absolutely unswerving in its allegiance
to the Crown and its devotion to the best interests of the
Empire, they will never submit to any authority being
placed either directly or indirectly above the Northern
Parliament that would in any way detract from the
authority exercised by his Majesty through the Imperial
Parliament.

" Moreover, it is perfectly clear that if the position of
the powers at present reserved to the Imperial Parliament
is to be altered it can only be done by the transfer of similar
powers to the Northern Parliament, and the expression

•minion Government ' must always be construed in the
li^rht of Ulster remaining a separate and distinct unit in
the free nations composing the British Empire. The only
concession Ulster could make would be to accept Dominion
Home Rule for herself, but as a separate and distinct unit.
In any case, we expect from the Imperial Parliament that
it they in order to restore peace in Southern Ireland have
to give any terms which are more advantageous than are
already possessed by the Northern Parliament, that equally
advantageous terms should be extended to Ulster."

Three days later Mr. Andrews, the Northern
Minister of Labour, went even further. In the

courso of an interview he said :—

" A di^rarehil betrayal of Ulster has been attempted
by the Coalition Cabinet. A suggestion has been made that
we should agree to a Parliament for all Ireland with
Dominion powers. We have informed his Majesty's
Government that we are not prepared to admit the

mlency of any Parliament other than the Imperial

244 IRELAND IN 1921.

Parliament over ours. Our Prime Minister and his
colleagues have pointed out to his Majesty's Government
in the clearest possible way that any discussion based on a
Parliament for all Ireland must prove fruitless, and we
have asked that this proposal shall be withdrawn before
any conference takes place between his Majesty's Govern-
ment and the Ulster Cabinet.

" In the interests of peace, which every right thinking
person desires, we, the loyalists of Ulster, accepted the
Parliament of our own as a compromise, and as a final
settlement. It is for our opponents, if they desire peace,
to accept and work their Parliament in Southern Ireland
in the same spirit and with the object of producing a happy,
prosperous, peaceful and loyal Ireland. Immediately on
my return from London I again desire to state that our
representatives will not agree to any surrender of Ulster's
rights."

The Unionist dissentients in England from the
Government's policy made an attempt at the meeting
of the National Unionist Association at Liverpool
on November 17th to pass a vote of disagreement
with the policy of the leaders of their party in
supporting Mr. Lloyd George, which was defeated
with almost the same ease as the vote of censure
in the House of Commons had been overwhelmed.
Public opinion in England was at the moment not
concerned with the theory of right or wrong involved
in negotiating with Sinn Fein. The average man,
while disliking the necessity for treating with
the representatives of an organisation which he
despised, was prepared to accept it for the chance
it offered of saving his pocket and gaining credit
for Great Britain in the eyes of foreign nations.
He rarely understood the attitude of Ulster, largely
owing to the fact that Ulster contented herself with
somewhat bombastic statements and made little
attempt to put her point of view before the British
public. Once more Ulster had been manoeuvred

THE CONFERENCE. 946

into the position of seeming to be the stumbling
Mock in the way of Irish peace, and had the Sinn
Fein leaders had the acumen to show an attitude of
conciliation towards her by removing the boycott
and putting an end to the operations of the I.R.A.
within her borders, she would have lost all sympathy
in (Ireat Britain. But, as usual, Sinn Fein
displayed its aptitude for producing an atmosphere
unfavourable to its interests. On the very day that
the Northern Government took over responsibility
for law and order, an outbreak of bombing began in
Belfast, to which several loyalists fell victims.

But by now the tedious sittings of the Confer-
ence, with the cloud of rumour which surrounded
them, were coming to an end. The Irish delegates,
finding, as they had expected, that the British
Government would not consent to an abrogation of
allegiance or to open and direct coercion of Ulster,

an their preparations for surrender. But that
this surrender should sufficiently simulate a victory
for it to secure the necessary support in Ireland, it
must be staged and manipulated in such a way as
to make it quite clear that the only alternative was
\sar, and that Ireland had secured independence in
all but name. That the extremists with Mr. de
Valera would stand out from a settlement on these
lines was certain : the only hope was that this settle-

;it should appeal to the body of Sinn Fein
sufficiently for it to rally to the support of the
moderate party which would immediately emerge
upon the publication of its terms.

The commencement of the critical week was
announced by Sir James Craig at the opening of a
special session of the Northern Parliament, in a

246 IRELAND IN 1921.

speech which must be quoted at some length, if the
position of Ulster in regard to the settlement is to
be understood.

He explained that on November 5th he had
arrived in London, and that on that day he had
received an urgent message from Mr. Lloyd
George to meet him and talk matters over. As a
preliminary to this meeting he had insisted that the
transference of the services under the Government of
Ireland Act should be carried out, and this had been
done. In the afternoon of the same day he met Mr.
Lloyd George, who ran roughly through the scheme
which he proposed should be the basis of discussion
between the Ulster representatives and the British
Cabinet. " I told Mr. Lloyd George that the thing
was impossible, utterly impossible, and I went
further. I said instinctively that this was not so
much a matter between the Six Counties and the
rest of Ireland, but it was a matter that went to
the root not only of Great Britain, but of the whole
Empire, and I said that if it were entertained by
the members of my Cabinet or by this Northern
House of Commons, or by the people of Ulster, they
would have to get somebody else to lead them, because
I would not touch it." Since that day, continued
Sir James, there had been a Press campaign without
parallel in the history of Great Britain against the
people of Ulster. Sinn Fein was held up to the
world as the good boy, while they in Ulster were
pictured as the bad boy. What the Press had asked
for was concession; what they really meant was
surrender. Sir James and his colleagues had
pressed in every communication they had had with
the British Government for full publication of the

THE CONFERENCE. 247

correspondence which had passed between them.
They felt strongly that the malicious representations
in the Press would very soon give place to a

-onaMe examination of the case which the Ulster
Cabinet had put tWuard on their behalf. They
\\crc extremely anxious that no words of theirs, and

•ainly no action of theirs, should in any way be
thrown up against them as being the cause that had
broken down negotiations between the British
authorities and Sinn Fein. Therefore, if it was in
any way to help towards peace in Ireland they would
acquiesce in the request of his Majesty's Govern-
ment, and not press to have the correspondence
published at that moment. But he would say this,
that if he observed the necessity for doing so he
would not ask for permission, no matter what the
consequences might be.

Sir James Craig let it be known that the scheme
put forward by the British Government had involved
t he establishment of an all-Ireland Parliament. He
wanted the British Government to understand
finally that it was not the determination of the
Northern Cabinet or of that House alone, but that
it was the determination of the whole people of
Ulster, that under no circumstances whatever would
they contemplate entering a Sinn Fein Parliament
under the present conditions. Ulster would neither
be intimidated nor coerced. The only way their
opponents could ever hope to secure Ulster was by
winning her, by starting out upon such a path as
they in Ulster had taken to tread, the path at the
end of which lay happiness, {>eaee, and prosperity
throughout the land, showing to all classes and to
all creeds firm justice and upright government,

248 IRELAND IN 1921.

throwing altogether to one side the abominable
machinery of crime and outrage, and asking
forgiveness for the dastardly deeds done in the past,
and which had so recently stained the fair name of
Belfast. How could they be asked to clasp hands
with people who at the same time that they were
pretending to come to a settlement were flinging
their bombs and shooting behind the chimneypots of
Belfast? It was preposterous. Ulster was not
blocking the way to a settlement. She wanted to
have a settlement, and if there was any prospect of
Sinn Fein showing common-sense, even at that late
hour, her leaders would renew the offer they made
before, that through the machinery of the Council
of Ireland they were prepared to meet them, talk
round the table, and discuss those matters which
were of interest to the prosperity of their common
land.

But the most important statement of Sir James
Craig's speech was contained in an announcement
which Mr. Lloyd George had authorised him to
make. " By Tuesday next either the negotiations
will have broken down or the Prime Minister will
send me new proposals for consideration by the
Cabinet. In the meantime, the rights of Ulster
will in no way be sacrificed or compromised/' Sir
James spoke on November 29th, which implied that
the decisive day would be December 6th. He went
on to explain the significance of that statement,
which he said was that one more week only was given
to say either yes or no. It meant that Sinn Fein,
fully alive, as it was now, to Ulster's unflinching
determination not to go into an all-Ireland
Parliament, had got to say by Tuesday next that

THE CONFERENCE. 249

she would continue to work for a settlement or
negotiations would be broken off.

The imposition of this time limit was a warning
to the Irish delegates that the patience of the
Government was exhausted, and that they must face
facts at last. The position immediately became
crit ical. Nobody, not even the delegates themselves,
knew the strength of the moderate party in Ireland,
nor how it would be represented in the Bail. In
fact, it is not too much to say that the moderate
party as yet existed only in theory. It was
composed of those who desired peace in Ireland,
but the numbers of its adherents would depend
entirely upon the terms of the settlement, and
could not be forecasted in advance. The more
nearly the terms approached the Sinn Fein
ideal, the stronger would be the support for
them among the members of that party. Mr.
de Valera and his adherents would no doubt
oppose any settlement which did not recognise the
Republic. Speaking at Ennis, Co. Clare, on
November 30th, Mr. de Valera re-affirmed his
adherence to his principles, without, however,
specifying those principles in any detail. It was
evident from his words that he knew of the likelihood
of a moderate party accepting the settlement secured
by the delegates, even if that settlement were not in
acc< with his own principles. When Ireland

gave her delegates work to do, he said, it was not
r others to cut into that work.

" There is one thing- they know. It is this, that we
stand in the movement for certain principles, and there is
no power on earth that can make us change those principles.
All the power of the Empire cannot break the spirit of one

250 IRELAND IN 1921.

true man, and they cannot break the spirit of one true
nation. ... If there is anybody in Ireland, or in any
country beside Ireland, who thinks we can be driven beyond
the point we are entitled to hold by our principles, then
the sooner they know we cannot the better, because they
certainly will be disappointed. We are going to stand
on the rock of truth and principle. We will face the
future with exactly the same confidence and knowledge as
we faced our work four years ago. We know what can be
done by the same powerful nation against us. We know the
terrorism, we know the savagery, that can be used against
us, but we defy it. When the report of the work done by the
nation's representatives in London is published this nation
will find that we have gone as far as we can possibly go to
make peace, and if peace is not made it is not because
there is not the will on the part of Ireland or its
representatives to make it, but because those who are
opposed to us in Ireland do not want to make peace with
us. I may tell you we stand to-day, no matter what other
people say, exactly where we stood and for the principles
for which we stood four years ago. We have gone as far
as we can go, consistently with those principles, for peace.
We cannot go and will not go any farther. If we go any
farther it would be for us to betray those principles which
have been fought for by generations of Irishmen for the
past six or seven hundred years. "

During the week-end before December 6th hope
of a successful termination of the negotiations had
been practically abandoned in all quarters except
those where the belief that the delegates might
challenge the official policy of Sinn Fein was
held. Extreme Republicans throughout Ireland
were clamouring for war and doing their utmost
to incite the I.E. A. to breaches of the truce
which would terminate negotiations and precipitate
hostilities. Extracts from a circular distributed in
County Mayo form an excellent example of the
methods employed.

" The Irish people forget too easilv, they forgive too
easily. Let Ireland's wrongs, financial, social, economic,
and moral, be borne in mind."

THE CONFERENCE. 251

" The Iriyh envoys must not forget that ' He who supa
v\ 1th the devil needs a long spoon.'

"In England's envoys, the world, the flesh, and the
devil are personified."

' \\> would just as soon trust the shark to be just as
to tru>t the English politicians or the English Press on the
subject of Ireland."

" < »ur advice then to the Irish representatives is, do
not trust the men with whom you have to deal, they will
deceive and swindle you if they can."

" The Irish representatives are face to face with an
unprincipled gang, who would do nothing for God if the

.1 was dead."

" The double turncoat Churchill, the double distilled
liar Greenwood, the Prime Minister who has sold everyone
and every party in turn, Galloper Smith, and one of the
foulest and rottenest of them all, Gordon Hewart, who

d trust these men? "

" Uoyd George sent Balfour to Washington, the same
Balfour who lied to and tricked Wilson into the war."

" We fear treachery and bad faith on England's part,
and not without cause, she is represented by men as
infamous, as treacherous, as unscrupulous, as unprincipled,
as ever broke faith on her behalf with Ireland, or Egypt,
or India, or any other nation. Never has she failed
to take her advantage to use brutality, duplicity or
deception."

" We warn the Irish leaders and the Irish people that
they are dealing with men who have no honour, no
principles, no scruples. The men who let loose the Blark
and Tans upon the Irish people are the same who still
direct England's destinies."

" The key is now in the hands of the Irish Republican
leaders, but they must have the cunning of the serpent,
and the gentleness of the dove."

" I.« t it not be said that we write harshly or bitterly.
we have no wish to do so. Again let it not be said that we
are influenced l.\ the long gone past."

This kind of utterance sounds merely stupid to
English ears, and it is difficult to realise that it could

: y any weight in so large a matter as the settle-
ment of the Irish question. But its influence, and

252 IRELAND IN 1921.

the influence of a thousand pamphlets of the same
nature, must always be exceedingly grave upon a
population such as inhabits the remoter districts of
the South and West of Ireland, a large proportion
of which would accept its statements as they would
the gospel. Spreading from these remoter districts
towards the cities, a wave of unrest and longing for
war rolled over the whole country during the last
days of the Conference. In the same county as the
circular just quoted was published, Mr. J. J.
McKeown had said a short time previously : —

" Do not imagine that the fight is over yet. Our
representatives have not gone to England for a settlement,
but for a Republic, and we will accept nothing less. It is
not certain that we will get this, so we must go on training
and preparing for the continuation of the war."

The military reports of the condition of the
country pointed to a condition of affairs rapidly
approaching a complete disregard for the truce on
the part of large sections of the I.E. A.

On the other hand, a very large .section of the
population, including all those who had a stake in
the country, although they too had almost given up
hope of a successful termination to the negotiations,
were desperately seeking some alternative to a
resumption of hostilities. " The truce must be
preserved at any cost," was their cry, and it voiced
the feeling of a large section of the people of
England as well as their own. But how this was to
be accomplished if the Sinn Fein leaders refused to
accept the British offer it was difficult to see. Even
if neither side formally denounced the truce, events
must necessarily lead to a catastrophe. Some form
of administration would be set up by the British

THE CONFERENCE.

Government which would necessarily involve the
dissolution or proclamation of the Bail. That the
I.R.A. would submit to this was hardly to be
imagined. During the first week in December there
seemed hardly any hope that war, on a greater scale
than Ireland had ever yet known, could be averted.

Such was the position on December 5th. The
final proposals of the British Government had been

veyed to the Irish delegates, who had carried
them to Dublin and laid them before the Dail
Cabinet. Allegiance and Partition, the t
eternal questions, were still unsolved. The first
remained in its original and unalterable form, the
second, although somewhat weakened, was still in a
form which could not be said to agree with
Republican principles. The attempt to bargain
one for the other had been demonstrated as hopeless.
The problem before the delegates was this : Were the
terms they must decide upon within the next
twenty-four hours sufficient inducement for a
majority of Sinn Fein to abandon the Republican
standpoint and adopt a policy based upon Dominion
status ?

Six months before this time the problem would
have been capable of immediate solution in the shape
of a reply in the negative. But, during the period
of negotiation, the leaders of the party had had
time to think out the true welfare of Ireland, and
the rank and file to wonder whether, after all, peace
was not preferable to a state of guerilla warfare.
Sum Fein, and from its inception, the Irish
Republican Brotherhood, had been formed in the
first instance to destroy English domination of
Ireland. The assumption of republican status by

254 IRELAND IN 1921.

the latter country had been for the purpose of
rendering that destruction absolute. The proposed
terms of settlement removed every vestige of English
control from Irish government, drove from Dublin
Castle every official in English pay. The sole
vestige that should remain was henceforth a splendid
figurehead in the Viceregal Lodge. Was not this a
sufficient realisation of independence ?

Again, Sinn Fein had never secured its support
from the people of Ireland because of its Republican
tendency, but rather in spite of it. The Irish people
as a whole are not, and never have been, advocates
of any other form of government than a monarchy.
Sinn Fein had attracted the masses because it was
' agin the Government/1 because it promised in
some vague way relief from the unsatisfactory
conditions of Irish life and conditions, which the
Irish people attributed, rightly or wrongly, to
" Castle Rule/' Sinn Fein had secured for the
Irish people the abandonment of English control.
Would they continue to support it if it abandoned
the advantages which it had gained in the pursuit
of an unattainable Republic ?

The delegates themselves were divided in their
opinion. Each knew that acceptance of the terms
would split the Sinn Fein movement, and with it
the Dail and the Dail Cabinet, from top to bottom.
If the majority supported them in their acceptance,
then, despite the inevitable opposition of the
Republicans, who would carry with them all the
disorderly and dangerous elements in the popula-
tion, it might be possible for them to evolve an Irish
State within the Empire, with themselves at its
head. If, on the other hand, the majority went

THE CONFERENCE.

against them, they would be proclaimed as the
would-be betrayers of their country, and might
expect short shrift at the hands of ' patriots,' who
\sould consider their assassination a blow struck for
Ireland. They would have disobeyed the injunctions
of the President and of the men who had selected
them as their representatives, and any defence of
their actions at the bar of the Bail would have been
impossible.

At half-past seven on the evening of December
5th the Irish delegates left No. 10, Downing Street,
after a four and a half hours' discussion with the
British representatives, to consider the question of
acceptance or rejection of the final terms of the
British Government. At twenty minutes past
eleven they returned, and for three hours the world
awaited the issue of peace or war. At last, shortly
after a quarter past two on the morning of the 6th,
the Conference broke up, a courier was despatched
to Belfast bearing a copy of the terms to Sir James
Craig, and the announcement that an agreement had
been reached was made. The Irish delegates had
taken the decisive step. It remained to be seen how
far Sinn Fein and the Irish nation would support
them.

CHAPTER XI.

The agreement which had been reached as a
result of the London Conference was officially
described as Articles of Agreement for a Treaty
between Great Britain and Ireland, and became
popularly known as ' The Treaty.' It was as
follows : —

1. Ireland shall have the same constitutional status
in the Community of Nations known as the British Empire
as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of
Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union
of South Africa, with a Parliament having power to make
laws for the peace order and good government of Ireland
and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall
be styled and known as the Irish FrejjStaie.

2. Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the
position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial
Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that
of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice and
constitutional usage governing the relationship of the
Crown or the representative of the Crown and of the
Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall
govern their relationship to the Irish Free State.

3. The representative of the Crown in Ireland shall
be appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of

-Canada, and in accordance with the practice observed in
the making of such appointments.

4. The oath to be taken by Members of the Parliament
of the Irish Free State shall be in the following form : — •

I .... do solemnly swear true faith and
allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State

PEACE— AND WAR.

as bv law established and that I will be faithtu
H.M. King George V., his heirs and successors bv law,
in virtue i.t tin- <•, linn. .-n-hip of Ireland with

Great Britain and her adherence to and membership
of the group of nations forming the British Common-
wealth of Nations.

5. The Ii-i-h ! hall assume liability for the

service of tin* 1'uldic Debt of the United Kingdom as
existing at the date hereof and towards the payment of
uar pensions as existing at that date in such proportion as
may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just cli>
(m the part of Ireland by way of set off or counterclaim,
the amount of such sums being determined in default of
agreement by tin' arbitration of one or more independent
persons bein^r citizens of the British Empire.

Tnti! an arrangement has been made between the
British and Irish Governments whereby the Irish Free
State undertakes her own coastal defence, the defence by
sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be undertaken by
his Maj- 'nperial Forces, but this shall not prevent

the construct i«»n or maintenance by the Government of the
Irish Free State of such vessels as are necessary for the
protection of the Revenue or the Fisheries.

The foregoing provisions of this article shall be
reviewed at a conference of Representatives of the British
and Irish Governments to be held at the expiration of five
years from the date hereof with a view to the undertaking
by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence.

7. The Government of the Irish Free State shall
afford to his Maie-'y's Imperial Forces: —

(a) In time of peace such harbour and other
facilities as are indicated in the Annex* hereto,
or such other facilities as may from time to time
be agreed between the British Government and
the Government of the Irish Free State ; and
(6) In time of war or of strained relations with a
Foreign Power such harbour and other facilities
as the British Government may require for the
pii h defence as aforesaid.

i view to xecurinjjr the observance of the
principle of international limitation of armaments, if the
• •niiiient of the Irish Free State establishes and
maintain- a milit;. ablishni'

thereof shall not exceed in size Mich proportion of the
military MtaUithmentl maintained in Great Britain as
* See Note E in Appendix.

R

258 IRELAND IN 1921.

that which the population of Ireland bears to the population
of Great Britain.

9. The ports of Great Britain and the Irish Free State
shall be freely open to the ships of the other country on
payment of the customary port and other dues.

10. The Government of the Irish Free State agrees to
pay fair compensation on terms not less favourable than
those accorded by the Act of 1920 to judges, officials,
members of police forces, and other public servants, who
are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the
change of government effected in pursuance hereof.

Provided that this agreement shall not apply to
members of the Auxiliary Police Force or to persons
recruited in Great Britain for the Royal Irish Constabulary
during the two years next preceding the date hereof. The
British Government will assume responsibility for such
compensation or pensions as may be payable to any of these
excepted persons.

11. Until the expiration of one month from the
passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this
instrument, the powers of the Parliament and the Govern-
ment of the Irish Free State shall not be exercisable as
respects Northern Ireland, and the provisions of the
Government of Ireland Act, 1920, shall, so far as they
relate to Northern Ireland, remain of full force and effect,
and no election shall be held for the return of members to
serve in the Parliament of the Irish- Free State for
constituencies in Northern Ireland, unless a resolution is
passed by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern
Ireland in favour of the holding of such elections before the
end of the said month.

12. If, before the expiration of the said month, an
address is presented to his Majesty by both Houses of the
Parliament of Northern Ireland to that effect, the powers
of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free
State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the
provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 (includ-
ing those relating to the Council of Ireland), shall, so far
as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue to be of full
force and effect, and this instrument shall have effect
subject to the necessary modifications.

Provided that if such an address is so presented a
Commission consisting of three persons, one to be appointed
by the Government of the Irish Free State, one to be

PEACE— AND WAE. 259

appointed liy the Government of Northern Irelaml, and one
who shall l>e Chairman, to be appointed by the Bri
Government, shall determine, in accordance with the
u i.shfs of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with
economic and geographic conditions, the boundaries
l)«-t ween Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for
the purposes of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920,
and of thi.- instrument, the boundary cf Northern Ireland
shall be such as may be determined by such Commission.

1'f. For the purpose of the last foregoing article, the
powers of the Parliament of Southern Ireland under the
Government of Ireland Act, 1920, to elect members of the
Council of Ireland, shall, after the Parliament of the Irish
Free State is constituted, be exercised by that Parliament.

14. After the expiration of the said month, if no such
address as is mentioned in Article 12 hereof is presented,
the Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland shall
continue to exercise as respects Northern Ireland the powers
conferred on them by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920,
but the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free
State shall in Northern Ireland have in relation to matters
in respect of which the Parliament of Northern Ireland has
not power to make laws under that Act (including matters
which under the said Act are within the jurisdiction of the
Council of Ireland) the same powers as in the rest of Ireland
subject to such provisions as may be agreed in manner
hereinafter appearing.

16. At any time after the date hereof the Government
of Northern Ireland and the provisional Government of
Southern Ireland hereinafter constituted may meet for the
purpose of discussing the provisions subject to which the
last foregoing Article is to operate in the event of no such
*M I dress as is therein mentioned being presented, and those
provisions may include: — •

(a) Safeguards with regard to patronage in Northern

Ireland,

(6) Safeguards with regard to the collection of

ivvrnue in Northern Ireland,

(r) Safeguards with regard to import and export
duties affecting the trade or industry of Northern
Ireland,

(d) Safeguards for minorities in Northern Ireland,

260 IRELAND IN 1921.

(e) The settlement of the financial relations between

Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State,
(/) The establishment and powers of a local militia
in Northern Ireland and the relation of the
Defence Forces of the Irish Free State and of
Northern Ireland respectively;

and if at any such meeting provisions are agreed to, the
same shall have effect as if they were included amongst the
provisions subject to which the powers of the Parliament
and Government of the Irish Free State are to be exercisable
in Northern Ireland under Article 14 hereof.

16. Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor
the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall make any law
so as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or
prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or give any
preference or impose any disability on account of religious
belief or religious status or affect prejudicially the right of
any child to attend a school receiving public money without
attending the religious instruction at the school or make
any discrimination as respects State aid between schools
under the management of different religious denominations
or divert from any religious denomination or any
educational institution any of its property except for public
utility purposes and on payment of compensation.

17. By way of provisional arrangement for the
administration of Southern Ireland during the interval
which must elapse between the date hereof and the
constitution of a Parliament and Government of the Irish
Free State in accordance therewith, steps shall be taken
forthwith for summoning a meeting of members of
Parliament elected for constituencies in Southern Ireland
since the passing of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920,
and for constituting a provisional Government, and the
British Government shall take the steps necessary to
transfer to such provisional Government the powers and
machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties, provided
that every member of such provisional Government shall
have signified in writing his or her acceptance of this
instrument. But this arrangement shall not continue in
force beyond the expiration of twelve months from the
date hereof.

18. This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by
his Majesty's Government for the approval of Parliament
and by the Irish signatories to a meeting summoned for the

PEACE— AND WAR. 261

purpose of the members elected to sit in the House of
( 'miniums «,[ Southern Ireland, and, if approved, shall be
•••I liy the necessary legislation."

This document was signed by Mr. Lloyd George,
Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead,
Mr. Winston rhuivhill, Sir Laming Worthington-
Evans, Sir Hamar Greenwood, and Sir Gordon
ilevvart, on behalf of the British Government, and,
in Erse, by Messrs. Griffith, Collins, Barton,
Duggan, and Gavan Duffy, on behalf of the Bail.

We have no space for a detailed examination of
these articles of agreement, but there are certain
phrases in them which will repay a passing notice,
by reason of their influence upon the situation
brought about by these terms of settlement. The
method of appointing the " representative of the
Crown in Ireland " and the title of that representa-
tive is left as indefinite as possible, in order that
the Irish people should be free to indicate their
wishes on these points and to suggest the name
of the occupant of that post. In Article 5 the
limitation of membership of the Board of
Arbitration to " citizens of the British Empire '
disposed of Mr. de Valera's suggestion as to
i nal arbitration on this very point, contained in
his original reply to the Prime Minister's offer
(see page 17 The inclusion of the harbour
defences of Belfast Lough in the Annex to the
Articles dealing with naval facilities gave
.siderable offence in Ulster, where it was
.sidered that this was a matter concerning the
Northern Government exclusively, and that should
not have been discussed at a conference I"
the representatives of the British Government

262 IRELAND IN 1921.

and Sinn Fein. In Article 8 the phrase " military
establishments maintained in Great Britain '
is important. The intention was that if, for
the sake of argument, the population of England,
Scotland, and Wales together were taken as forty
millions, and of Ireland as four millions, and
at the same time the establishment of troops
actually maintained as the home establishment in
Great Britain as fifty thousand, the strength of the
Free State defence force should not exceed five
thousand. With reference to the phrase " not less
favourable than those accorded by the Act of 1920 '
occurring in Article 10, the terms in question are
contained in the seventh, eighth, and ninth Schedules
of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920. In the
same article, ' ' persons recruited in Great Britain
for the Royal Irish Constabulary during the two
years next preceding the date hereof " means the
1 Black and Tans/ who were men recruited in
Great Britain for regular service in the R.I.C.*
Recruitment for the R.I.C., hitherto confined to
Ireland, was opened in Great Britain on January
1st, 1920. In Articles 11 and 18 the distinction
between approval and ratification must be carefully
noted. The first was a proceeding to be undertaken
as soon as possible after the signing of the treaty,
the second must be deferred until the arrangements
contemplated by the treaty were complete. It was
not until after ratification that Ulster's month
of grace was intended to begin. The phrases
' members of Parliament elected for constituencies
in Southern Ireland since the passing of the
Government of Ireland Act, 1920 " (Article 17)

* See Note F in Appendix.

PEACE— AND WAI:

and " Members elected to sit in the House of
Commons of Southern Ireland ' (Article 18) are
euplit'inist i >ns for describing the Southern

members of the Bail with the four Dublin University
representatives. The distinction between the
Southern Parliament and Dail Eireann has already
been explained (pa#» ^()). With these few explana-
tory notes, we may pass to the reception of the
treaty by the various parties concerned.

That Mr. de Valera would express strong
disapproval of the treaty was certain from the first,
although the belief at the time was that he had
instructed the delegates to sign it if they were faced
with no other alternative but war. The fact that
they had been to Dublin to attend a meeting of the
Dail Cabinet two days before the treaty was signed
lent colour to this view, for the extent of the
divergence between the extremists and the potential
moderate section was not yet generally known. Any
optimism in this direction was shattered by the
issue on the evening of the 8th of Mr. de Valera's
statement, which was as follows : —

" Fellow Gails (sic), — You have seen in the public
Press the text of the proposed Treaty with Great Britain.
The terms of this agreement are in violent conflict with
the wishes of the majority of this nation, as expressed
freely in BII- Ol during- the past three y>

I feel it my duty to inform you immediately that I cai
recommend ince of thi- Dail

Kin-ami or to the country. In this attitude I am supported
by the Ministers for Home Affairs and Defen* (These

were Messrs. An k and Cathal Brug-ha respe-

" A public session of Dail Eireann is beinir summoned
for Wednesday next, at eleven o'clock. I ask the people
to maintain during the interval the same disciplin*
heretofore. The members of the Cabinet, though divided
in opinion, are prepared to carry on the public services as
heretofore. The army is, of course, as such, not affected

264 IRELAND IN 1921.

by the political situation, and continues under the same
orders and control.

" The great test of our people has come. Let us face
it worthily without bitterness, and above all without
recriminations. There is a definite constitutional way of
resolving all our political differences. Let us not depart
from it. Let us all abide by it, and let the conduct of the
Cabinet in this matter be an example to the whole nation."

An T'Oglac, in its issue following the announce-
ment of the treaty, enlarged upon the words of Mr.
de Valera respecting the Army as follows : —

" Within the next few days, perhaps before this issue
of An T'Offlac reaches the hands of the Irish Volunteers,
fateful and far-reaching decisions will have been taken by
the Government and Parliament at present in control of
Ireland's destinies. The future of Ireland and consequently
the future of the Army of Ireland may be profoundly
affected bv these decisions. Now, as in the past, it is the
duty of the Army not to allow its discipline or efficiency
to be impaired by political happenings.

* The Armv is the servant of the nation and will obey
the national will expressed by the chosen representatives of
the people and interpreted through the proper military
channels.

* Whatever that decision may be, the soldiers and
officers of the Army of Ireland will accept it in the true
spirit of disciplined soldiers loyal to the nation in defence
of whose rights and liberties they have been enrolled, and
will obey their orders cheerfully and unflinchingly what-
ever the consequences.

"As in the past, they will not shrink from any risks
they may be called upon to face, nor will they allow their
own personal views and feelings to interfere with their
loyalty to the nation. It is the duty of officers, at a time
like this, to see that nothing is allowed to lower the sense
of discipline, loyalty, and unity of the soldiers of the Irish
Army. One of the first virtues of the soldier, one of the
sources of the strength of a military organisation, is
obedience to superior authorities.

" The Army of Ireland has at its head men who are
fully conscious of their responsibilities and are prepared to
carry out their duty as soldiers and as citizens; they look
to the officers and men of the Army for disciplined

PEACE— AND WAR. 265

obedience in the same spirit, the spirit which we have
called the ' Volunteer Spirit.'

" The strength of the Army lies in its having acted as
an organised and disciplined whole, under a single
authority, in support <»f the national will constitutionally
expressed It will continue to act as such. It will never
be a menace to the people of Ireland, but a defender of the
rights and liber the whole nation. No political

influences, no personal differences among officers or men
will be allowed now, any more than in the past, to impair
its discipline and efficiency."

These words form interesting reading in the light
of the sharp divisions in the I.B.A. which so soon
followed them.

Mr. de Valera's words found an echo in the
advice given by Mr. Art O'Brien, the President of
the Irish Self-Determination League of Great
Britain, ' to the Irish in Great Britain.'

" Be not misled into rejoicing and thanksgiving
without cause or reason," says this faithful hench-
man of the Republic ;

" The claims of the people of Ireland is, and always
has been, the recognition of the complete independence of
their country. That is a claim no nation can foregx), and
until it is met in their case, the Irish race cannot rejoice.
If, under the threat of renewed and intensified warfare,
and as an alternative to seeing their country ravished and
laid waste by fire and sword, and their race exterminated,
five Irishmen have been compelled to sign their name
the document published yesterday, that is not a cause for
us to rejoice or a reason for us to offer thanksgiving. The
7M) years' war is not ended, because no war can be ended
by an enforced peace, nor can understanding between two
peoples he attained where one people uai
might to hinder the attainment of the other's moral right.
The Knirlish people have cause — at all events a superficial
OatUM Do not let us interfere with their

cing and thanksgiving. They have won another round.
We could even, in accepting the fall of the dice, congratu-
late them; though we could not congratulate 01;

266 IRELAND IN 1921.

It should perhaps be mentioned that the
Self-Determination League, and particularly its
President, had been somewhat in the background
during the period of the Conference. The delegates
mistrusted its influence, which they knew to be
extreme rather than moderate, and they had usurped
its functions as the mouthpiece of Sinn Fein in
England by importing their own Minister of
Propaganda for that purpose. This may to some
extent explain the adherence of the League to the
extremist party.

But, on the whole, the access of support to the
delegates upon which they had counted, and without
the assurance of which they would never have signed
the paper, was even greater in appearance than they
can have suspected. The great mass of the people
of Ireland, the Catholic Church, and the Irish Press,
including the great majority of the provincial
papers, rallied to them at once. The people were
naturally inarticulate, but the symptoms of joy
visible throughout the South and West could not be
misinterpreted. A competent observer, very closely
in touch with Sinn Fein and with the people in
general, wrote at the time : * ' The immediate effect
of the treaty was one of intense thankfulness, but
contrary to the expectation of most people there was
no flag-waving or ' maffiicking ' ; the news was taken
calmly and quietly, but nevertheless thankfully, and
the churches were filled the next morning, which, in
Ireland, is a sure barometer."

The Nationalist papers were outspoken in their
joy. The Freeman's Journal said : " In the articles
of settlement will be found every essential of that
freedom for which the Irish people have fought for

PEACE— AND WAR. M7

over seven long and sorrowful centuries. Let the
people of Ireland make it their own." The
Independent said: " The feud and friction of
centuries come to an end, and after the terms
have been ratified by the Parliaments of both
countries, as we have no doubt they will be, the
Irish Free State will be master in her own house,
and in a position to work out her own salvation in
full and without hindrance."

The Catholic Hierarchy were less outspoken,
from their natural reluctance to bind the Church
to the support of any one political party. On the
KJth the Bishops met at University College, under
the presidency of Cardinal Logue. At the close of
the meeting a statement was issued, signed by the
Cardinal, as follows : —

" At a general meeting of the Archbishops and Bishops
of Ireland, held in Dublin on December 13th, his Eminence
Cardinal Logue in the chair, the following statement was
unanimously adopted : ' The Bishops of Ireland hold in
the highest appreciation the patriotism, ability and honesty
of purpose in which the Irish representatives have
(•••nductril the struggle for national freedom. Now Dail
Kin-ail n have the responsibility of deciding the destiny of
Ireland in the approaching deliberations, in the course of
vhicli they will oe sure to have before their minds the
interests of the country and the wishes of the people to
whom they and we happily belong. We most earnestly
beff of God that they may be guided by wisdom from above,
and to implore the divine blessing on their counsels we
ask every priest in Ireland who is free to offer up the holy

ti< r one of these days, and all our people, to join in
prayer with unfailing perseverance.'

The observer already quoted comments as foil
upon this statement : " The Church in Ireland is
unquestionably whole-heartedly in support of the
Treaty. It has been stated broadcast in England
that the Bishops of Ireland made a great mistake

268 IRELAND IN 1921.

in the statement they issued since the signature of
the Treaty, by not according it whole-hearted and
unequivocal support. The reason for this is that
although individually they thoroughly approve they
do not proclaim this collectively because very great
pressure was brought to bear on them to adopt this
attitude by those in favour of ratification, including
Griffith himself. The latter hopes for a united
and peaceful Ireland in the future, and knowing
how every move of the Hierarchy in Ireland is looked
upon with suspicion by Ulster did not wish Ulster
to get the impression that as the Bishops had
recommended the ratification of the Treaty it must
therefore tend towards producing some sort of a
one-sided religious solution. To those who know the
situation in Ulster and in Ireland generally this
argument seems perfectly logical."

The Southern Unionists, whatever may have
been their private feelings, welcomed the Treaty
officially. The Irish Times, which may be considered
as their organ, said : " Nobody will welcome it more
gladly than the loyalists of Southern Ireland."
Mr. Griffith wrote to the Prime Minister as follows :

" I write to inform you that at a meeting I had with
the representatives of the Southern Unionists I agreed that
a scheme should be devised to give them their full share
of representation in the first Chamber of the Irish
Parliament, and that as to the Upper Chamber we will
consult them on its constitution, and undertake that their
interests will be duly represented.

" I wish also to take this occasion to say that we desire
to secure the willing co-operation of Unionists in common
with all other sections of the Irish nation in raising the
structure and shaping the destiny of the Irish Free State.
We look for their assistance in the same spirit of under-
standing and goodwill which we ourselves will show towards
their traditions and interests. "

PEACE— AND WAK

The Voic< tin* organ of the Ii

nsj)ort and General Workers' Union, in a
leading article urged that there should be no
bitterness in spite of the divergence of opinion
ainoii^ the Sinn Fein leaders, and stated that until
the Dail had had an opportunity of debating the

stion of the Treaty the Voice of Labour did not
propose to intervene, because the responsibility of

ision rested on the Dail in the first instance and
after that, if need be, upon the whole body of the
people whose representatives were the members of
the Dail. All Unions were advised not to take
sides in the matter lest labour in Ireland should be
split, which would be disastrous in view of the
coming attack by employers. " Already we have
too little unity and solidarity in our ranks." The
same issue of the paper contained a most bitter
attack on the Southern Unionists, and a heated
protest against their having any special privileges
in future because they were ' * the miserable remnants
of the landlord ascendency," of whom the country
would be well rid. The cause of this attack v
the letter from Mr. Griffith to the Prime Minister
(pioted above. On the other hand, the WorJ;

.mblic, the organ of the communist party of
Ireland, had a most violent manifesto against the
terms of the agreement as a " most shameful
betrayal of Ireland's fight for national independence
and of the cause of Irish Republicanism." The
observer already quoted comments: " The Citizen
Army and the Transport Workers undoubtedly
intend to rreate as much trouble as they possibly
can: and it remains to be seen whether as a party
they are as strong in reality as their boasted paper

270 IRELAND IN 1921.

strength. If composed of Transport Workers only,
they would be almost negligible and local, but their
aim and ambition are to affiliate all the agricultural
labourers of Ireland/'

The reception of the Treaty by the Bail will be
dealt with in the following chapter. We must now
consider its effect upon the attitude of Ulster. Press
comment in Northern Ireland may be exemplified by
the Belfast Telegraph, which took the line that the
British Government had resolved to purchase peace
with Sinn Fein, however desperate the price and
disgraceful the surrender of honour might be. That
fact Ulster must look squarely in the face and direct
her own course accordingly. This paper also
recalled a saying of Mr. Birrell's : " It is a British
characteristic, though not an agreeable one, that
once we are beaten we go over in a body to the
successful enemy and too often abandon and cold-
shoulder and snub both in action and in writing
the suffering few who adhered to our cause in evil
and difficult times/' The cry of the Representative
Body of the R.I.C. came as an echo to these words.
In a telegram to the Prime Minister its members
declared that " all ranks of the R.I.C. view with
the greatest consternation the terms of the agree-
ment between the British Government and the Sinn
Fein delegates as far as these terms affect the
R.I.C/' They had good cause for their consterna-
tion. The R.I.C. was disbanded in the year of
its centenary, but not before many of its members
had paid with their lives, which the Treaty did not
protect, for their adherence to the British cause in
evil and difficult times.

The Belfast correspondent of the London

PEACE— AND WAR 271

Daily Telegraph, always impartial and well-
informed, wrote on the 7th :

" A night's reflection on the peace terms has not
minimised the diilu -allies now confronting the Northern
P;irli:iin«Tit. On the one hand, if it abides by Westminster
it sees its boundaries r<'du< •<•<!, its taxes probably higher
than the South, and a probable tariff against its goods; if it
reverses its previous decision and goes under Dublin, its
finances pass virtually under the control of Sinn Fein,
which all here believe will do all in its power to squeeze
the Parliament out of existence. In either event the
boycott goes on, so that it is not surprising that there is
more or less bewilderment at the position in which the
Six Counties find themselves placed."

As a matter of fact the terms of the Treaty were
a form of coercion of Ulster, whether justified by
the issue at stake or not. In theory if not in practice
the right of the Irish delegates to speak for Ireland
as a whole had been recognised, and, again in theory,
Ulster had been regarded as a part of the Free State
which might legally exercise the right of secession.
Two words, here italicised, in Article 12, are
sufficient to prove this. That Article reads: " If
. . . . an address is presented to his Majesty by
both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland
to that effect, the powers of the Parliament and the
Government of the Irish Free State shall no longer
extend to Northern Ireland. . . ." Further,
Ulster was compelled to buy immunity from the
Treaty at the price of rectification of her frontier,
which both Sinn Fein and Ulster understood as
involving the transference of parts of Tyrone and
Fermanagh to the South, or, as it must now be
called, to the Free State. And this act of purchase
must be on the initiative of Ulster. Northern
Ireland had been promised that if she accepted the
Government of Ireland Act in the interests of Irish

272 IRELAND IN 1921.

Peace, this would be the utmost demanded of her.
Her Parliament was by this Act given certain
powers, and the remainder were reserved to the
Imperial Parliament. But the Treaty, without
Ulster's consent, took the reserved services from the
Imperial Parliament and handed them over to the
Government of the Free State. In order to recover
the rights awarded her under the Act, Ulster must
present an address praying for the continuance of
partition, an action which would certainly be
displayed by British and Free State propagandists
as yet another example of Ulster standing in the way
of Irish settlement.

That it would be to Ulster's economic advantage
to join forces with the Free State few doubted at
the time. In the words of a prominent Nationalist :
* Although there are extremists in both Ulster and
the South, there can be little doubt that they will
come together in the future, provided the South of
Ireland plays the game and proves herself able to
govern. If this takes place it is obviously to the
advantage of both. The boycott had seriously
disturbed the business men of the North, although it
had not so far had any far-reaching effect on
Ulster's prosperity. A report upon it by a
disinterested observer says : " No matter what has
been said to the contrary, the Belfast boycott has
not had the effect that it was meant to have, it has
hit the wrong people. It has affected the tobacconists
and grocers and smaller shopkeepers, but Belfast
works and thrives on its linen and shipping, and no
boycott by the South of Ireland can in reality hit
those engaged in these trades, either magnates or
workers. The Sinn Feiner has stated that he is

PEACE— AND WAR. 273

aware that the linen ;m<I shipping of Belfast has not
been affected by Southern Ireland, but that America
is Belfast's chief customer and has been Belfast's
chief customer in the past, and that with regard to
linen America no longer buys as she did formerly.
The Amrrieans. however, although they have
allowed Sinn Fein flags to be waved, Sinn Fein
placards to l>e displayed, and Sinn Fein loans to be

vd. have bought linen every time they wanted it
and will continue to do so." It is interesting
compare this opinion with the suggestions of the
Dail Minister of Labour referred to on page 93.

The first important official pronouncement on the
part of Ulster was made by Sir James Craig. He
had proceeded to London immediately on the
publication of the terms of the Treaty in order to
interview the Prime Minister, and on his return to
Belfast he made a statement in the Northern House
of Commons. He said that never before had th
been so complicated a situation as that which had
been created by the signatures which had been
hed to what was called a treaty between the
British representatives on the one hand and the Sinn
Fein r< on the other. Ulster was ;

included in the treaty. In pursuance of their
attitude throughout her leaders refused either to
intt \\ith or to determine the settlement that

miudit U» arrived at t>< those two parties. But

they had i to go into

with British Mini-' lieresoever

Ulster's rights and privileges herame affected. On
that clear and distinct understanding the Prime
Minister of England had assured them, and had

11 red the Northern House of Commons, by the

s

274 IRELAND IN 1921.

statement he had permitted to be read at that table
that by December 6th either negotiations would
have broken down or fresh proposals would have
been submitted, and that in the meantime the rights
of Ulster would not be sacrificed or prejudiced.
" I think those are the exact words," continued Sir
James Craig. " Without going into exact details,
I must confess that the treaty has not carried out
that solemn pledge to this House, the Northern
Parliament, and the Ulster people that their rights
would not be prejudiced or sacrificed."

Space will not permit the reproduction of the
complete correspondence between Mr. Lloyd George
and Sir James Craig relating to the negotiations
which ended with the treaty. It may be found in
the Press of December 14th. 1921. It is sufficient
to state that it discloses the fact that the British
Government entirely failed to remove Ulster's
objection to an all-Ireland Parliament. But Sir
James Craig's reply to the British Prime Minister's
letter informing him of the terms agreed to by the
Conference must be quoted in full in order that the
official attitude of Ulster may be understood.

Sir James Craig's letter is dated December 14th,
and is as follows : —

" My dear Prime Minister, — I duly received your letter
of December 5th covering the articles of agreement for an
Irish settlement, which latter have been most carefully
considered by my colleagues and myself. Our formal reply
had to be deferred until I had had an opportunity of clearly
understanding through informal conversations with you
certain matters in the agreement which were not quite
definite, and also until I had consulted my party here.

' In earlier correspondence my colleagues and I had
made it plain that we did not wish to impede negotiations
between the British Cabinet and the representatives of

PEACE— AND WAR. 275

Sinn Fein, or intervene until matters which concerned
( Uter were reached. In the agreed statement which you
• • me on November £;'>th t<> take back to the Parliament
of Northern Ireland you promised that the rights of Ulster
will be in no way sacrificed or compromised until new

? reposals had been placed before the Cabinet of Northern
refund. It was with grave concern, therefore, that we
noticed that an agreement, which materially involved
Ulster's interests, had been signed by his Majesty's

eminent without our having previously been consulted.

" A question which vitally affects our interests is the
decision to establish a commission to revise the boundaries
between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. There

I believe, no precedent in the history of the British
Empire for taking- any territory from an established
Government without its sanction. Moreover, this is a
breach of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, which was
put into operation only last June, when his Majesty the
King in person opened the Parliament of Northern Ireland.
At our meeting on December 9th you explained that it was
only intended to make a slight readjustment of our
boundary line so as to bring into Northern Ireland loyalists
who are now just outside our area, and to transfer
correspondingly an equivalent number of those having Sinn
Fein sympathies to tne area of the Irish Free State. The
Lord Chancellor's speech,* however, has given encourage-
ment to those endeavouring to read into it a different
interpretation. As I intimated to Mr. Austen Chamberlain
by telephone before leaving London, I reserved to my
Government the right of dissenting from the appointment
of any boundary commission.

" We protest against the declared intention of your
Government to place Northern Ireland automatically in the
Irish Free State. Not only is this opposed to your pledge
in our agreed statement of November 25th, but it is also
antagonistic to the general principles of the British Empire
in regard to the 1 HUM ties of her peoples. It is true that
Ulster is given the ri^ht to contract out, but she can only
do so after automatic inclusion in the Irish Free State.
The action of the British Cabinet in this matter is a
complete reversal of their own policy as declared in the
King's speech at the opening of the Northern Parliament
last June, and also in the published correspondence between
you and Mr. de Valera. This policy was that Ulster should

* See Note G in Appendix.

276 IEELAND IN 1921.

remain out until she chose of her free will to enter an all-
Ireland Parliament. Neither explanation nor justification
for this astounding change has been attempted. We can
only conjecture that it is a surrender to the claims of Sinn
Fein that her delegates must be recognised as the
representatives of the whole of Ireland — a claim which we
cannot for a moment admit.

" The reference to the future of Belfast Lough in your
agreement with Sinn Fein is gravely resented by the people
of Ulster, although they fully concur with the decision that
the harbour defences should remain under British control.
What right has Sinn Fein to be recognised as parties to an
agreement concerning the defences of Belfast Lough, which
touches only the loyal counties of Antrim and Down?

" The principle of the Government of Ireland Act,
1920, was to give equal rights and privileges to the North
and to the South of Ireland. This principle has been
completely violated by the agreement made with Sinn Fein,
whereby the Irish Free State is relieved of many of her
responsibilities in regard to the British Empire, and is to
be granted financial advantages which, you have made
clear, are expected to relieve her considerably from the
burden of taxation which must be borne by us and other
parts of the United Kingdom. Ulster, on the other hand,
is only to obtain such concessions if she first consents to
become subordinate to Sinn Fein Ireland.

" We note with apprehension that you have abandoned
the condition laid down in your original maximum
concessions to Sinn Fein that there should be ' no protective
duties or other restrictions upon the flow of trade and
commerce between all parts of these islands.' We foresee
in this abandonment the beginning of friction and tariff
wars in which the United Kingdom, and more especially
Ulster, must be gravely involved.

' We are forced to conclude that in refusing to accept
the same oath of allegiance taken by Canada, South Africa,
and all other parts of the British Empire, Sinn Fein has
demanded, and the Government conceded, a different oath,
and therefore a different standard of loyalty, which appears
to us to make it impossible for Ulster ever to enter the
Irish Free State.

" In spite of the inducements held out to Ulster under
your arrangements with Sinn Fein, we are convinced that
it is not in the interests of Great Britain or the Empire
that Ulster should become subordinate to a Sinn Fein
Government. We feel that in years to come the British

PEACE— AND WAR. 277

nation will realise the advantages in having i iiern

1 it-land a ])<>j>ul;it ion \\hich is determined to remain loyal
i" Hriti-h ii.i.ln i«ins and citizenship, and we are glad to
think that our decision will obviate the necessity
nun i hit ing the Union Jack — the flag of the British Emj
In the long run the British nation will come to recognise
that the action we an- taking is in their interests, and will
accord to Northern Ireland such measure of protection
and >uch tan- «•< mMderat ions as will counteract any
disadvantages due to her position as a frontier State of the
Uiii igdom.

There are very many further adverse criticisms we
might justifiably advance against the terms of the Treaty
such as the anomalous position created by the clause
relating to the Council of Ireland and the Judiciary, but
they can fittingly stand over until the introduction of the
bill embodying the terms of the Treaty."

On the 19th, the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland
issued the following manifesto : —

11 Brother Orangemen, — This meeting of the Grand

nge Lodge of Ireland, representative of Orangemen

from all parts of their native land, is of opinion that the

so-called Treaty entered into between the representatives

of his Majesty's Government and the rebel forces of

I r. land will break up the Empire and deprive many loyal

/ens of their positions in the Empire without their

consent. It is the opinion of this Grand Lodge that i:

up loyalists will be compelled to
defend their lives and liberties by force — a result u

' ul to them, but is the only argument accepted by
Majesty's Government. The insincere and ambiguous
iment called * a Treaty ' will receive conflicting
interpretations and be a cause of further trouble betw
Great Britain and Ireland, and that treason will brinir
misery to its deluded followers, for a close politi* al
connect ion i- e— -ntial to the prosperity of both islands."

Sir James Craig's letter and the pronouncement
of the Grand Orange Lodge give some idea of the
reception arronled to the Treaty by the Uniom
of Ulster. On the other hand, the Sinn Fein and
Nationalist population of the Six Counties were in
favour of its ratification, although objecting to the

278 IRELAND IN 1921.

clause giving Ulster the power to contract out of the
Free State.

The actual effect of the Treaty in Belfast may be
gathered from the following extract from a military
report : —

"It is reported that the feelings of the rank and file
of the Unionist party are turned against the military and
that resentment is shown whenever they intervene on behalf
of Roman Catholic persons or property. This resentment
evinced itself by the murder of a soldier of the Norfolk
Regiment and the attempted murder of another, when
both were on patrol duty.

" All the disturbances are caused by the low class
hooligan section of each party, and the better class working
men and business men are not in sympathy with them.
Unfortunately, however, they are not denounced and
decried by the public men or the Press of either party. "

Ulster, in fact, believed that she had been
betrayed by the British Government, and a wave of
resentment against Britain and her people swept
over the Province. But, despite this bitterness, it
was Ulster's intention to cleave to the Union, rather
than to adventure herself in the dreaded atmosphere
of an all-Ireland Parliament.

CHAPTER XII.

The Treaty having been signed, the next step was
to secure its approval by the British Parliament
and by Bail Eireann. The British Government
immediately made the necessary arrangements for
summoning Parliament on December 14th for the
purpose, and when the matter was put to the vote
the majorities for approving the Treaty were large
in both Houses, despite the efforts of the independent
Unionists, or * Die-hards ' to give them their
topical nickname. This party put down an
amendment in the House of Commons as follows :—

* This House regrets that the proposed settlement of
the government of Ireland indicated in the gracious
Speech, from the Throne involves the surrender of the rights
of the Crown in Ireland, gives power to establish an
independent Irish army and navy, violates pledges given to
Ulster, and fails to safeguard the rights of the loyalist
population in Southern Ireland. "

This amendment was defeated by 401 votes to
58, and a similar amendment in the House of Lords,
standing in the name of the Duke of Northumber-
land, was defeated by 166 votes to 47.

But a very different fate awaited the Treaty at
the hands of the Dail. The first move on Mr. de

280 IRELAND IN 1921.

Valera 's part was to issue on December 7th a state-
ment as follows : —

" In view of the nature of the proposed Treaty with.
Great Britain, President de Valera has sent an urgent
summons to the members of the Cabinet in London to report
at once, so that a full Cabinet decision may be taken. The
hour of meeting is fixed for twelve noon to-morrow. A
meeting of the Dail will be summoned later."

The statement issued by Mr. de Valera as a
result of the meeting of the Dail Cabinet has already
been quoted (page 263). This was the first indica-
tion that the long-expected split in the ranks of
Sinn Fein had at length occurred. At last the
answer was to be given to the question which had
been agitating the minds of all Irishmen : to what
extent would the Sinn Fein leaders rally to the
moderate party ? The country as a whole was
warmly in favour of the Treaty. Would the
common-sense of its leaders rise to the occasion and
induce them to forsake the shadow for the substance ?

Mr. Griffith promptly replied to Mr. de Valera 's
manifesto in the following statement, in which he
was supported by Mr. Collins : —

" I have signed the Treaty between Ireland and Great
Britain.

" I believe this Treaty will lay the foundation of peace
and friendship between the two nations.

" What I have signed I shall stand by, in the belief
that the end of the conflict of centuries is at hand/'

The Publicity Department of Dail Eireann
issued the following a few hours later : —

" President de Valera to-day made the following state-
ment. To prevent a misunderstanding the public should
realise : —

1. That the Treaty signed by the plenipotentiaries

THE SPLIT IN HIE DAI I. 2s 1

must be ratified hy Dull ) no less than by

tin- HriiMi i -Hi in order to take effect.

2. That the usual r..ur>»» would be for the Cabinet
mtrodiK •«• a treaty agreement as a Cabinet
measure.

In the present case, owing- to the fact that in the later
stages of the negotiation^ the views of the plenipotentiaries
d liter from those of certain members of the Cabinet, this
course cannot he taken. A motion tor the ratification will
now he introduced by Mr. Griffith, as Chairman of the
Delegates.

In the interval before the Dail meeting, which
NN us timed to coincide with the meeting of the
British Parliament, the case at issue between the
two parties in Sinn Fein, which may now be
termed without reservation the extremists and the
moderates, became clearer. The moderate section
of the people of Ireland took the line that since
Ireland had sent plenipotentiaries to London to come
to terms with the British Government, the honour of
the country demanded that the terms which bore
the signature of those plenipotentiaries would be
ratified. To this Mr. de Valera made the following
reply :-

" I have been asked whether the honour of Ireland
is not involved in the ratification of the agreement arrived
at. The honour of Ireland is not involved. The
plenipotentiaries were sent on the distinct understanding
that any agreement they made was suhjert to ratification
by Dail Eireann and by the country, and could be rejected
by Dail Eireann if it did not commend itself to Dail

•ann, or by the country if it did not commend itself to
the nun The Parliament of Britain and the people

of Britain will, on their side, similarly consider the
agreement solely on its merits. If the English Parliament

res, it can reject it; so ran the British people. Ratiti-

>n is, then, no mere empty formality. The United
-ed to ratify a treaty signed even by its
President. The honour of the nation is not involved unless
and until the treaty is ratifi-

282 IRELAND IN 1921.

Mr. de Valera was correct in his contention.
The delegates had signed the Treaty as a gamble, if
it may be put so crudely. They knew that a section
of their own Cabinet would not accept it, but they
counted upon sufficient support both in the Cabinet
and in the body of the Bail and of the country to
enable them to carry out the approval of the Treaty
despite opposition. Opinion in Dublin and indeed
throughout Ireland was at this time that the Treaty
would be approved in the Dail by a majority of at
least two to one.

When the Dail met the first speaker was Mr. de
Valera. He set out the circumstances under which
the delegates were appointed, and explained the
terms of reference and the directions given to them.
It was understood when the plenipotentiaries were
appointed that they would report to the Cabinet,
which would frame a policy. It was necessary that
the plenipotentiaries should be either the whole
Cabinet or some persons themselves members of the
Cabinet. What they did was to select three
members of the Cabinet and two others. It was
obvious that if these were to be in a position to do
the work they should have full powers of negotiation.
At the two meetings of the Dail at which they
were appointed, he had made it quite clear that
the plenipotentiaries should have full power to
negotiate, with the understanding that when they
reported the Cabinet would decide its policy, and
whatever arrangements they arrived at would have
to be submitted to the Dail for ratification. The
question of committing the country without
ratification by the Dail was out of the question.
In the event of a difference of opinion among the

THE SPLIT IN THE BAIL. 283

plenipotentiaries it was the plenii>otentiarie8 tin-
selves \vh<> had the responsibility of making up their
minds and deciding. The Bail had the right of
refusing to agree if it thought right. It was
obvious that the Cabinet and the plenipotentiaries
must keep in the closest touch. They did that
They were in agreement up to a certain point. A
definite question had to be decided and they did
not agree.

Mr. de Valera then gave the actual text of the
instructions which he wrote at a Cabinet meeting
on October 7th, on the eve of the delegates' departure
for London. It was as follows : —

"1. The plenipotentaries have full powers, as defined
in their credentials.

It is understood, however, that before decisions
are finally reached on the main questions that a despatch
notifying the intention of making these decisions will be
sent to the members of the Cabinet in Dublin, and that a
reply will be awaited by the plenipotentiaries before the
final decision is made.

"3. It is also understood that the complete text of
the draft Treaty about to be sigried will be similarly
submitted to Dublin and reply awaited.

"4. In case of breakdown, the text of the final
proposals from our side will be similarly submit

" 5. It is understood that the Cabinet in Dublin will
be kept regularly informed of the progress of the
negotiations.'*

Mr. de Valera went on to explain that this was
all done with the exception of paragraph 3. It
was obvious that a Treaty that would be a lasting
agreement between the two nations, and which
might have the effect of governing the relations of
the nations for centuries, was a document which,
even when the fundamental principle had been
agreed upon, should be most carefully examined.

284 IRELAND IN 1921.

He had to say that the final text was not submitted,
and that there was a previous draft before the final
text. On that he could not sign, and he did not
think the other members of the Cabinet would. He
felt that if paragraph 3 had been carried out to the
letter they might have got complete agreement
between the Cabinet and the plenipotentiaries.
This was a case of a difference of opinion between
two bodies which might naturally arise, and
therefore he was anxious that it would not in any
way interfere with the discussion on the merits of
the Treaty which the plenipotentiaries had brought
back. The vital question, the main question at
issue, was decided about the third week in October
by the Cabinet, and those in favour of the decision
then taken were certainly a majority of the Cabinet,
though the whole Cabinet was not present at the
meeting. Mr. de Valera closed his speech with a
repetition of his offer to explain the circumstances
more fully at a private session.

This speech was highly interesting, in that it
revealed Mr. de Valera's desire to avoid the split
between the moderates and the extremists extending
by the charge of bad faith against the delegates.
His one hope of uniting Sinn Fein once more lay in
conciliation and in the avoidance if possible of a
direct vote for or against the Treaty as it stood.
His attitude throughout the deliberations which
followed must be considered in this light. Another
interesting fact revealed in this speech is that the
Bail Cabinet had considered the question of
allegiance at the time of the first * crisis * in the
Conference, and had decided against its acceptance.

In the course of subsequent discussion Mr.

THE SPLIT IN THE BAIL.

Collins read the uvdnitials served on each member
of the (It-legation, and referred to by Mr. de Valera,
as follows :-

11 In virtue of the auth<.> •«•(! in me by Dail

inn. I hereliy appoint « here follow the names and

designations of the delegates) a^ Knv<»\> Plenipptentiariai

•he circled (Miveniineiit ot tlie Republic of Ireland
negotiate and conclude on Kehali <d' Ireland with the
irprrM'niatives of his JJritannir Majesty George V. a
treaty or treaties of settlement, association, and
accommodation between Ireland and the community of
nations known as the British Commonwealth. In witness
hereof I hereunder sul»>cril>e my name as President,
.rned) EAM«.N i»i. V \i KKA."

It also transpired in the course of debate
that Mr. Lloyd George had ' seen ' this precious
document, \vhuh a^ain asserted the position of the
delegates as the representatives of an independent
nation. But the credentials had never been
' presented ' to him, nor had he ' accepted ' them.
The blind eye had once more been put to the
telescope.

The Dail then went into private session, with
the intention of resuming public discussion on the
motion for the ratification of the Treaty on the
following day. But it appeared that in private
session the members of the Cabinet had more to say
to one another and to their supporters in the Dail
in justification of their views than had been
anticipated. For the rest of the week the private
session continued, and it was not until the 16th that
announcement was issued under the joint signatures
of Messrs, de Valera and Griffith, in itself a
significant innovation. This announcement ran : —

" The private session of Dail Eireann will end
to-morrow evening. The motion for ratification of the

286 IRELAND IN 1921.

treaty will be taken up at the public session on Monday
next at eleven a.m. We are confident that the Irish people
will continue to maintain the same calm dignity and
discipline which they have heretofore display ed."

During this period of private session, Mr. de
Valera produced and expounded an alternative to
the Treaty, which did not include the recognition
of the Republic. There seems no doubt that this
was merely a tactical move, and that neither Mr. de
Valera or his followers desired for a moment the
acceptance by the Dail of this alternative. The
idea at the back of Mr. de Valera's mind throughout
was the avoidance of a direct vote on the Treaty.
The submission of an alternative might accomplish
this. Rejection of the Treaty meant war, and Mr.
de Valera knew that the prospect of a renewal of
hostilities was the most powerful argument on the
side of the delegates. If he could so contrive
matters that the Treaty could be rejected and at
the same time the British Government committed
to a fresh period of negotiation, his own supremacy
would prevail, and the moderate party in the Dail,
which had, so to speak, sprung up in the night,
would return to its allegiance. Mr. de Valera's
alternative, which become known as ' Document
No. 2,' is printed in the Appendix to this book.*

The Dail met again in public session on the 19th.
Mr. Griffith, in moving the ratification of the
Treaty, referred to Mr. de Valera's alternative as
' a mere quibbling of words.' By it the President
was asking them to throw away the Treaty and to
go back to war. What had the delegates got ?
They had come back from London with the
evacuation of British troops, who had been in
* See Note H in Appendix.

THE SPLIT IN THE BAIL 2S7

Ireland 700 years; they had got a full right of fiscal
control; equality for Ireland with all the other
nations of the Commonwealth ; and equal views with
others in peace and war. Yet they were told that
the Treaty was a poor thing, and that the Irish
people were to go back on it and fight for a quibble.
But the people were not sophists, and the men of
words would not deceive them. Mr. Griffiths then
read a letter from Mr. Lloyd George undertaking
to withdraw the Forces of the Crown from the South
of Ireland when the articles of agreement were
ratified, an announcement which was greeted with
cheers.

But the most dramatic moment of the day came
when Mr. Barton, one of the delegates, was
speaking. He told the story of the last hours of the
Conference. " Mr. Lloyd George gave us till ten
o'clock to make up our minds whether we should
stand by our proposals for external association, face
war, and maintain a Republic, or whether we should
accept inclusion in the British Empire and make
peace. The responsibility for that war was to rest
directly on two of the delegates who refused to sign.
For myself I declared I could not accept that
responsibili And accordingly he had signed

the agreement.

The following day was devoted to public session,
with a short interval for discussion of military
matters in private. During the public session the
most notable contributions to the debate were those
of Mr. Etchingham, who denounced the Treaty; Mr.
Finian Lynch, who in supporting it deplored the
emotional element that had Uvn introduced into the
discussion, saying " The bones of the dead have been

288 IRELAND IN 1921.

rattled indecently in the face of this Assembly ' ' ;
and Mr. Sean Milroy, who stigmatised the
manoeuvres of Mr. de Valera as asking members to
withhold their support to the Treaty in the
expectation that something better would follow.
Dr. McCartan, who had been the Sinn Fein envoy in
America, made a speech in the course of which he
expressed the sentiment of a large section of
American sympathisers with the movement. He
said that a Republic for Ireland was dead. They
had not a united people, nor had they a united Dail,
and he questioned whether they had a united army.
The Republic was no longer a factor in international
politics. It was the duty of the Cabinet to submit
a policy, and they had failed in this duty. As a
Republican he could not endorse the Treaty, but he
would not vote for chaos and that meant that he
would not vote against ratification. Rejection
meant war, and every man who voted for rejection
should be prepared for war.

On the 21st Mr. Gavan Dufiy, one of the
delegates, was the first speaker. He said that he
was going to recommend the Treaty very reluctantly,
because he saw no alternative. The Treaty inflicted
a grievous wound on the dignity of the Irish nation
by inflicting an alien king upon them. This fact
remained, although the framers of the constitution
could subsequently relegate the King of England to
exterior darkness, which was within their powers
to a large extent. " Yet I signed. I will tell you
why. On December 4th a Conference was held,
attended by Mr. Griffith, Mr. Barton, and myself,
at which Lloyd George broke with us definitely,
subject to confirmation by his Cabinet next morning.

THE SPLIT IN THE DAIL 2*9

That rnijjht or might not have been final. On the
in-xt day another Confereno held, attended by

Mr. Griffith. Mr. Collins, and Mr. Barton, and

er four and a half hours' discussion our delegates
returned and informed us that four times they had
all but broken, and that the fate of Ireland was to
be decided that night. Lloyd George had issued to
them an ultimatum to this effect : * It must now be

;ee or war. My messenger goes to-night to
Belfast. I have here two answers — one the Treaty,
the other a rupture; and if it be rupture it is
immediate war. The only way to avert that
immediate war is to bring me the signature of every
one of the plenipotentiaries with a further under-
taking to recommend the Treaty to Dail Eireann and
to bring me that by ten o'clock. ' * * I shall not forget
the anguish of that night. Again this ultimatum
may have been bluff, but every one of those who had
heard the Prime Minister believed beyond doubt
that this time he was not play-acting, and that he
meant what he said." Mr. Duffy concluded by
recommending the Dail to ratify the Treaty, on the
grounds that there was no possible alternative.

Mr. Duggan, another of the delegates, said that
in recommending the acceptance of the Treaty he
was acting in accordance with the wishes of the
people who had elected him. If under the terms of
the Treaty the Irish people could not achieve their
freedom, it was the fault of the Irish people, not of
the Treaty. Mr. Cosi/rave supported the Treaty on
the grounds that it Lra\v Ireland far more than all
the patriots from O'Connell to Parnell had hoped
for. After a final speech by Miss McSwinoy. whieh
full of fierce denunciation of the Treaty and

T

290 IRELAND IN 1921.

lasted for nearly three hours, the Dail adjourned
for the day.

The most important speech on the morrow was
that of Mr. Mulcahy, Chief of Staff of the I.R.A.
He said that none of the men wanted the Treaty,
or the Crown or the representatives of the Crown.
No one wanted harbours occupied by the forces of
the enemy, and no one wanted Partition. But he
saw no alternative to the acceptance of the Treaty,
because it definitely secured to Ireland a Parliament
with full executive and administrative powers,
and an executive in Ireland responsible to that
Parliament. They in Ireland were not in a
position, military or otherwise, to drive the enemy
from their ports. They had not been able to drive
the enemy beyond a good-sized police barracks.
Should they grow to equality with their old enemy
by taking complete control of their resources, or
should they take the chance of war not with an
adequate kind of military force, but with a very
small force, sufficient to make their country a
resisting people for many years, but certainly not
sufficient to win the war? They had suffered a
defeat, but even in that defeat they had got great
powers for the Irish people.

At the close of the day's debate the question rose
as to its continuation, and it was agreed to adjourn
until January 3rd. The Cabinet would continue to
do its duty in the meanwhile, and no speeches were
to be made on either side during the interval.

The prolongation of the debate in the Dail was a
great disappointment to those in England who
desired the ratification of the Treaty. It was felt,
with some show of reason, that the Dail was standing

THE SPLIT IN THE BAIL. 291

entirely aloof from the known wishes of the Ii
people, and, for the matter of that, that its members
\\rre entirely out of touch with the views of their
constituents. The majority of the I.R.A. leaders
had declared themselves on the side of the Treaty,
but it was very doubtful how far they spoke for
their followers. It was not likely, even if the
Treaty were rejected by the Dail, that this would
be the end of discussion. Mr. de Valera's Document
No. 2, which had not yet been published but of which
every Dail member possessed a copy, must be
discussed as an alternative, and if accepted by the
Dail, would no doubt form the basis of a second
delegation to the British Government, the members
of which would be selected from those known to be
faithful to the ideas of the President. Probably,
even at this period, none of the leaders of Sinn
Fein believed in his heart that either the Treaty or
Document No. 2 could afford a permanent solution
of the Irish question. The idea of an eventual
Republic was too deeply ingrained in the rising
generation of men of the type that joined the ranks
of the I.R.A. for its abandonment without a
struggle. After the disclosures of the Minister of
Defence in private session, and the frank speech of
Mr. Mulcahy, few even of the most desperate in
Ireland can have continued to believe that the best
\\ay to secure the Republic was by force of arms at
that time. The question was whether it were better
to accept the Treaty or Mr. de Valera's alternative

i stepping

On the iMUh a statement by Mr. Lloyd George
\sas published in the Press, \\hich contained a
warning to those who supported Mr. de Valera's

292 IRELAND IN 1921.

scheme. It is worth quoting in full :—

" No British statesman could go further than we have
gone. No British statesman could consider any proposal
involving Ireland being out of the Empire.

* The Treaty places Ireland on an equality with the
other States of the Empire, gives Ireland the same claim to
membership of the League of Nations, and every right that
Canada has in law, fact, and constitutional practice; and
not merely the rejection, but the alteration even of the
Treaty by Ireland or Great Britain would render it null
and void. This would indeed be deplorable in the interests
of both countries. The British Government have gone to
their utmost limit in the Treaty, and to re-open the
discussion which was closed only after the most exhaustive
consideration of every point would be a fruitless proceeding
and is impossible.

" A committee consisting of British Ministers, presided
over by the Colonial Secretary, has been set up to deal with
the evacuation of the British Forces, the settling of an
amnesty, and the making of all necessary arrangements
on the British side for transferring full executive
responsibility to an Irish provisional Government. The
work of this committee, which has been in continuous
session up to Christmas and had proposed to sit through
the Christmas holidays, is now unavoidably held up pending
approval of the Treaty ; but on approval it would be carried
through with the utmost possible despatch.

" It is the intention of the British Government to hand
over without delay their responsibilities to the provisional
Government which will function during the period of
transition required for the setting up of the Irish Free
State Administration. "

Stronger inducement could hardly have been
held out to the members of the Bail to ratify the
Treaty. After a blunt announcement that the
British Government were prepared to go no further,
and would not even consider Document No. 2, Mr.
Lloyd George goes on to catalogue the advantages to
be secured for Ireland by the ratification of the
Treaty, and gently deplores the fact that the
delay is withholding him from pouring out these

THE SPLIT IN THE BAIL. 293

advantages with both hands. It sounded so idyllic
that, its one of the members of the Bail remarked
at the time, it seemed as if ' there must be some
catch in it somewher

There is one reference in the Prime Minister's
statement which requires some explanation, the
phrase relating to the settling of an amnesty.
Immediately upon the signing of the Treaty, the
British Government had issued an order as follows :

" In view of the agreement signed yesterday between
the represei <>f the Hriti>h Government and the

Irish Delegation of Plenipotentiaries, his Majesty has
approved of the release forthwith of all persons now

rued under Regulation 14b of the Restoration of Order
in In-land Regulations. Instructions have been given
ar • ordingly."

Regulation 14b covered the cases of those who
had been interned without conviction of definite
offences, but not those who had been imprisoned by
sentence of Court Martial or otherwise. The
release of these men had been effected at once, this
step having been insisted upon by the Irish
Delegates. An agitation immediately began for the
release of political prisoners who were actually
serving sentences, and it is to these men that the
Prime Minister referred.

During the days that elapsed between the
adjournment of the Bail and its reassembly, frantic
efforts were made by both parties to determine the
extent of their support. On the surface it appeared
that the moderates were gaining strength, and that
the body of Sinn Fein opinion was behind them.
Resolutions in favour of the Treaty poured in from
local bodies in the provinces, and no observer could
form any other conclusion than that the people of

294 IRELAND IN 1921.

the cities were almost unanimously in support of it.
But the extremists bided their time and made very
little show of their views, trusting rather to the
argument of the pistol than to eloquence, should the
split lead to an appeal to the country, as seemed
probable. The opinion of the average Dublin
citizen at this time is ably presented in the following
words, which are those of a contemporary report :—

" The phurch in Ireland is unquestionably whole-
heartedly in support of the Treaty, in spite of the
apparently neutral attitude of the hierarchy at their late
meeting." (For the statement issued after this meeting
see page 267). " Various reasons are given for this attitude.
It is said that the Bishops from the North are so strongly
opposed to partition that a unanimous approval was
impossible. It is also said that though individually all
approved they could not do so collectively because of the
pressure brought to bear on them chiefly by those in favour
of ratification. This may have been in deference to the
prejudices of Ulster and with a view to future Union, or it
may have been felt that any appearance of active inter-
vention by the Church would have been resented in Dail
Eireann and would prejudice approval of the agreement.

" There is every sign that at least Arthur Griffith
and Michael Collins will keep their word and that their
oaths may be trusted, but it is doubtful whether the same
can be said of all their followers. Richard Mulcahy's
speech is likely to have irritated many of the I.R.A. who
had persuaded themselves to believe that they did defeat
or could have defeated the Army and Police in open fight,
but it probably had a great and steadying effect on both
the extremists and the people.

" It should be remembered that the Dail is, considered
as a Parliament,. very much in its infancy and consequently
both very much on its dignity and very confused in its
notions as to how that dignity should be maintained. Also
that probably every member wants his or her constituency
to hear their words. This, coupled with the weakness and
inefficiency of the Speaker, resulted in the astonishing flow
of words and the almost complete failure to keep to the
point either in speeches or interruptions which have made
them the world's tragi-comedy of Christmas 1921.

THE SPLIT IN THE BAIL. '295

' Ih. t'lture must depend on what support the
(iriflith-('<>ll ion can pet in Ireland. It would

be pnv.ible t«» mobilise nearly all the brains and all the
{'[•"I- - classes on their side, and, if they are

siipp..rte<l, hut not obviously, by his Majesty's Government,
it is quit.- pi.s>ihl«- that eventually they may he raOOWfal,
though at present their difficulties are considerable."

Just before the reassembly of the Dail the
extremist party began the publication of their o\vn
organ, which they called The Republic of Ireland.
The policy of this paper was outlined in a leading
article in its first issue, dated January 3rd, 1922 :

' We shall labour to unite the Irish people, temporarily
disunited under duress and the temptation of an easy
peace, upon the only basis upon which unity is possible —
loyalty to the lri>h Republic established once for all in
1919 and never to be forsworn without dishonour. We
fear a peace which destroys our nationhood and
disestablishes the Republic of Ireland. That peace we
cannot and will not accept. Britain can have her safe-
guards if she wants them, but we shall give them as one
independent nation to another.

" We are ready to associate ourselves with Britain as
one sovereign people with another, but to be included
among the possessions of Britain, to derive our rights as
a people from the Parliament of Britain — these are things
our nation will not do. No representative of our people
had, or could have, the right to enter into a treaty
annulling our national independence.'*

The first day of the reassembly of the Dail gave
an opportunity for a display of bad manners by the
Countess Markievicz, and an offer to the extremists
by Mr. Collins.

' I will make a suggestion," said the latter, " whereby
the Dail can avoid division. Rightly or wrongly, deputies
or no deputies, h people have accepted the Tre.

I have my own feelings about this Treaty, feelings about
it very much keener, perhaps, than those of the deputies
who are against it. But I believe that the Treaty was
inevitable. . . . The proposition is that you should
allow the Treaty to go through, that you * allow the

296 IRELAND IN 1921.

provisional Government to come into existence, and if
necessary fight the provisional Government for a Republic
afterwards.*'

In reply to this speech Mr. de Valera issued an
appeal " To the people of Ireland," in which he
implored them not to support the Treaty, which he
denounced in the strongest possible terms.

" To the utmost limit to which they could go our
delegates had gone to arrive at an agreement such as this
nation could fullv accept and in full appreciation of the
governing conditions. By the threat of war they were
dragged beyond that limit, and the deed and circumstances
will ever be remembered by Irishmen as the crowning act
of infamy of England's rulers against Ireland.
You, the people, can retrieve the position even at this
eleventh hour."

After this there could be no further talk of
compromise or agreement between the two parties.

Very little of interest was said during the course
of the discussion on the 4th, but at the end of the
session the famous Document No. 2 was released for
publication, not without criticism that it had been
so amended since it was originally circulated to
members of the Dail that it was in effect Document
No. 3. On the following day the most important
speech was that of Mr. 0' Duffy, who said that he
was a member of an unofficial committee of the Dail
which had been trying to find common ground. On
the previous night substantial agreement had been
reached on a number of very vital questions, making
it possible to retain the services of the President for
the nation and possibly avoiding a split in the
country. Mr. Mulcahy moved that the Dail should
meet in private the following day, in order to discuss
a statement to be prepared by Mr. 0' Duffy's
Committee.

THE SPLIT IN THE BAIL. 297

But an extraordinary enterprise carried out by a
party of Republicans from Cork on the 4th seemed
to show that there was very little likelihood of
their being bound to any agreement that could be
entered into. The correspondent of the London
Times was calmly kidnapped while he was lunching
in the heart of Dublin, and taken in a motor car to
Cork to " stand his trial " before a Republican
court. His offence was presumably contained in a
series of articles which he had written in the Times
during the previous few days, in which he had
fearlessly described the conditions in various parts
of Ireland. In the course of these articles he had
referred to the attitude of the I.R.A. towards the
Treaty. Mr. Kay was subsequently released and
brought back to Dublin, but not until an energetic
protest had been made to the Dail by the corres-
pondents of the world's Press then assembled in
the city.

On the morning of the 6th the Dail met in
private session and refused to accept the suggestions
of Mr. O'Duffy's Committee, on the initiative of
the extremists, who had all along been opposed to
compromise. This matter having been disposed of,
the public session was resumed in the afternoon.
Mr. de Valera opened the debate with a speech which
began with an explanation of the difficulty of
governing the country with a divided Cabinet and
ended with the declaration of his intention of
resigning from the office of * Chief executive officer
of the Irish Republic.' So much of interest to the
student of recent Irish history was revealed in his
speech that it must be quoted at some length.

" I entered politics as a soldier, as one who stood for

298 IRELAND IN 1921.

the principles of those who proclaimed the Republic in
1916. . . . When I came out of prison I found the
present Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Griffith) was the
head of the Sinn Fein organisation, while the present
Minister of Defence (Mr. Burgess or Brugha) was the head
of the Irish Volunteers. I found that they differed then
as fundamentally as they do to-day, and I found that I was
a sort of connecting link between the two. At the first
Convention of Sinn Fein we devised a basis on which we
have worked so successfully for four years — the basis of
the Sinn Fein Constitution. Since then I have been the
link between the two, and at the Convention Mr. Griffith
surrendered his position as head of the Sinn Fein
organisation to me, and I was elected to the headship. Mr.
Burgess also surrendered to me, as the senior officer in the
Army at the time, the headship of the Irish Volunteers,
and it was the combination of these two in me which
enabled the two sides to work together. When I went to
America to try to get recognition for the Republic, I
nominated as Acting President Mr. Griffith. In every
Cabinet I formed I took care to have the two sides properly
represented. ... I felt that the unity of those forces
was absolutely essential to national success, and until
December 6th last I succeeded. On December 6th a
document was signed which irrevocably sundered that
connection. On October 25th I saw the danger and I found
it my duty to send to the delegation in London what I
regarded as a warning. I wrote to the head of the
delegation : ' I received the minutes of the seventh
session and your letter of the 24th. We are all here
at one that there can be no question of asking the Irish
people to enter into an agreement which would make them
subject to the Crown or demand from them allegiance to
the British King. If war is the alternative we can only
face it, and I think the sooner the other side is made to
realise it the better/

" That was definite. On December 2nd the plenipo-
tentiaries came back with a document which represented the
proposals of the British Government at that stage — a
document which was clearly inconsistent with our position
and my position. ... I therefore rejected that
document and made it clear to the Chairman of the
delegation that it would be unacceptable to us."

Mr. de Valera then tendered his resignation, but
offered himself for re-election.

THE SPLIT IN THE BAIL.

"If you re-elect me, I will have to have the rig]
have a Cabin- > <>t those with me and arting as a unified
body. Next I will have to have the full use of the
resources of the IN-puhlu- to defend the Republic. If you
elect me by a majority I will throw out that Treaty, even
if my Government goes down. Next I will bring from the
Cabinet that document I have mentioned (' Document No.
2 ')> and will offer it to the British people as a genuine
Pea< - a generous offer of peace, and if it is

turned down we will utiek to the Sinn Fein Constitution as
we have done, deny the right of the British Parliament to
legislate for Ireland, and will make use of any and every
means available to make the power of England impoten
hold Ireland in subjection by force or otherwise."

On the following day, January 7th, after a
powerful speech by Mr. Griffith, the original motion
was put to the vote, and the Treaty was ratified by
64 votes to 57. The moderate party had won, and
the policy of Mr. Griffith was justified. Ratifica-
tion of the Treaty was the first step in the ultimate
triumph of Sinn Fein as conceived by him and
by his followers over Fenianism and the Irish
Republican Brotherhood. Both moved towards the
same end, the independence of Ireland, but by
different paths. The original Sinn Feiners believed
that their object could be secured by peaceful means,
but more drastic than those of the Nationalists whom
they superseded. The extremists of all shades
believed that their object could only be secured by
violence. As Mr. de Valera had said in his speech
quoted above, the alliance between the two had
endured for four years, and this alliance might have
ended in a compromise, had the extremists been of a
nature that admitted argument. But the signing
of the Treaty made the support of the extremists
unnecessary to the moderates, and the latter, feeling
their support in the country, determined to strike

300 IRELAND IN 1921.

out for themselves, and if possible to form their
Free State without further aid from the powers of
violence. The coalition which had been known as
Sinn Fein, and which had worked together with
greater devotion than any other coalition recorded in
history, was irremediably split into its component
parts. Henceforth the originators of the movement,
the original Sinn Feiners, were to be on the side of
law and order, the men who had inherited the spirit
of the Fenians and were imbued with the teaching of
the Secret Societies* continued upon their path,
which must inevitably lead to chaos and to the
subversion of all established government. But now
the Government which they attacked was no longer
English but Irish, the men killed in defence of
it were men acting under the authority of their
own nation.

It is beyond the scope of this book to record the
events that followed the ratification of the Treaty
by the Dail, but it may be mentioned that on the
following day Mr. de Valera was defeated upon his
offering himself for re-election, by the narrow
margin of two votes. Almost exactly a year before
his defeat he had landed in Ireland from America,
having failed in his mission to that country, but
prepared for a prolonged struggle which should
somehow, he knew not how, end with the recognition
of the Irish Republic. In the short space of that
year he had seen the people of Ireland abandon the
Republic and become reconciled to Partition as a
means to an end. Abandoned by Irishmen at home
and abroad, he still continued unshaken in his belief
that the destiny of Ireland was to be found in the

* See Note I in Appendix.

THE SPLIT IN THE BAIL. 301

i>lishment of an all-Ireland Republic, and that
no other status ou^ht for a moment to be considered
f'v her people. But in spite of his efforts, in spite of
the powers he represented, he saw Ireland become a
nation before his eyes, and the dream of the
Republic, to which he had adhered with fanatical
t'ervour throughout his career, relegated once more
to the distant and uncertain future. The year 1921
had indeed witnessed the birth of the Irish nation,
but it had also witnessed the downfall of the
Republican cause and the return of Sinn Fein to
the realisation of practical politics.

APPENDIX.

NOTE A.

On March. 26th premises situated at 11, Molesworth
Street, Dublin, were entered by a party of Auxiliaries, and
were found to contain the Publicity Department of Dail
Eireann. Literally tons of papers and documents were
seized, and among1 them the whole apparatus for the
production of the Irish Bulletin, together with the list of
its recipients. It occurred to one of the officers on the staff
of the Chief of Police that a very good way of countering
the Sinn Fein propaganda would be to continue the issue
of the Bulletin, imitating its style, and attributing to it
the most astounding sentiments. I cannot forebear quoting
a passage from one of these bogus Bulletins, which almost
exactly follows the verbiage of a passage in an issue of the
genuine Bulletin a few days previously.

" The tactics of the Republican Forces have been
masterly in handling the situation created by the English
Government in flooding Ireland with ex-soldiers in the
uniform of police. In no single recorded case have the
Republican Forces attacked a single policeman with the
odds less than six to one. By this strategic handling of
all combats victory has invariably rested with the
Republicans. Science in war, as practised by the young
men of Ireland, has staggered humanity — and it will be a
long time ere humanity recovers from the blow."

This example is merely typical. The Publicity Depart-
ment then set to work to resume publication of the genuine
Bulletin, stamping their issue ' Official Copy/ a measure
immediately imitated by the editor of the bogus Bulletin.
Both genuine and bogus then proclaimed their productions
as the only original, and denounced the contents of the
opposition sheet as forgeries. During the period of this
comedy the BuUftiji lost any authority it may have had,
owing to the impossibility of distinguishing false from true.

304 IRELAND IN 1921.

NOTE B.

The part played by Mr. Cope in the negotiations was
recognised by General Smuts, who sent him a hearty letter
of congratulation and appreciation on the occasion of the
signing of the Treaty in December.

NOTE C.

I have not thought it necessary to reproduce in full the
correspondence between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. de
Yalera. The full text of the various letters and telegrams
will be found in Command Papers Nos. 1502 and 1539
entitled Correspondence relating to the Proposals of H.M .
Government for an Irish Settlement and Further Corres-
pondence relating to the Proposals of H.M. Government
for an Irish Settlement, respectively.

NOTE D.

For details of the constitution of Sinn Fein, the
authority and composition of Ard Fheis, and the aims of
the Irish Eepublican Brotherhood, see H. B. C. Pollard's
Secret Societies of Ireland and my Administration of
Ireland, 1920.

NOTE E.

The following is the Annex to the Treaty : —

1 . The following are the specific facilities required :
(a) Dockyard Port at Berehaven. Admiralty
property and rights to be retained as at the
date hereof. Harbour defences to remain in
charge of British care and maintenance
parties.

(fe) Queenstown. Harbour defences to remain
in charge of British care and maintenance
parties. Certain mooring buoys to be retained
for use of his Majesty's ships.

(c) Belfast Lough. Harbour defences to remain
in charge of British care and maintenance
parties.

APPENDIX 305

(d) Lough Swilly. Harbour def< remain

in < (large of British care and maintenance
part

(e) Av Facilities in the neighbourhood
of the above ports for coastal defence by air.

(/) Oil Furl Morage—

To be offered for sale

Haul bowline

Rathmullen

to commercial companies
under guarantees that pur-
chasers shall maintain a
certain minimum stock for

Admiralty purposes.

2. A Convention shall be made between the British
Government and the Government of the Irish Free S

to give effect to the following conditions:

(a) That submarine cables shall not be landed or
wireless stations for communication with
places outside Ireland be established ex<
t>y agreement with the British Governmc
that the existing cable landing rights and
wireless concessions shall not be withdrawn
except by agreement with the British Govern-
ment; and that the British Government shall
be entitled to land additional submarine
hies or establish additional wireless stations
for communication with places outside
Ireland.

(6) That lighthouses, buoys, be. >nd any

navigational marks or navigational aids shall
be maintained by the (i'.vernmeiit of the
Irish Free State as at the date hereof and
shall not l<c removed or added to except by
agreement with the British Government.

(c) Tli signal stations shall be ch^ed down

and left in charge of care and maintenance

panic*, the (iovernment of the Irish Free

1 the option of taking them

n and working them for commercial

purpose^ subject to Admiralty inspect imi

and guaranteeing the upkeep of existing

tele.LM-aphie comm uii ication therewith.

3. A Convention shall be made between the same
Governments for the regulation of ( mmunication l»y
Air.

306 IRELAND IN 1921.

NOTE F.

The " Black and Tans " and the Auxiliary Division of
the R.I.C. are frequently confounded. For a detailed
description of the two forces see my Administration of
Ireland, 1920.

NOTE G.

The Lord Chancellor, speaking at Birmingham
on December 6th, had said : —

" If Ulster elects to remain more closely associated
with us, there must, in our judgment, be rectification of
frontiers. We do not propose to interfere with the
arrangement of a year ago in relation to counties, but we
propose that a boundary commission shall examine into the
boundary lines with a view to rendering impossible such
an unhappy incident as that of a few days ago, in which
the popularly elected bodies of one or two of these districts
were excluded from their habitations by representatives of
the Northern Parliament on the ground that they were not
discharging their duties properly. I am making no
criticism, but such a system cannot be consistent with the
maintenance of order. That boundary must be rectified.
It may be rectified on one side or the other. It is not an
artificial boundary, but one which can be worked out with
infinite flexibility."

The incident referred to by the Lord Chancellor
was the action of the Northern Parliament in
passing a Bill dealing with the situation created by
the action of certain public bodies which had
proclaimed their intention of ignoring the Northern
Parliament. Under this Bill powers were sought
to exclude the members of these bodies from their
offices.

NOTE H.

The following were Mr. de Valera's alternative
proposals, known as ' Document No. 2 ' : —
PROPOSED TREATY OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN
IRELAND AND THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH.

APPENDIX 307

In l>ring to an end the long and ruinous conflict

between Great Britain and Ireland by a sure and lasting
peace, honourable to both nations, it is agreed :

n>,

I That the Legisla executive and Jud.

Authority of Ireland shall be derived solely from the people

«'t In-lain!.

TERMS OF A

2. That for purposes of common concern Ireland shall

be associated with the States of the British Commonwealth,

, the Kingdom <»1 (ireat Britain, the Dominion of

ida, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of

New Zealand, and the Union of South Afri<

That when acting as an associate the rights, status,
and privileges of Ireland shall be in no respect less than
those enjoyed by any of the component States of the British
Commonwealth.

4. That the matters of " common concern " shall
include defence, peace and war, political treaties, and all
matters now treated as of common concern amongst the

•es of the British Commonwealth, and that in these
matters there shall be between Ireland and the States of the
British Commonwealth such concerted action founded on
consultation as the several Governments may determine.
That in virtue of this association of Ireland with the States
of the British Commonwealth, citizens of Ireland in any
of these States shall not be subject to any disabilities which
a citizen of one of the component States of the Briti>h
Commonwealth would not be subject to, and reciprocally
for citizens of these States in Ireland.

5. That for purposes of the association Ireland shall

his Britannic Majesty as head of the association.

DEFENCE.

That so far as her resources permit Ireland shall

provide for her own defence by sea, land, and air, and shall

roe any attempt by a foreign power to violate

the integrity of her soil and territorial waters or to use

them for any purpose hostile to Great Britain and the other

ites.

I . That for five yeas, pending the establishment <>f

Irish coastal defence forces or for such other period as the

Governments of the two countries may later agree upon.

.1 defence of Ireland shall be given

to the British Government as t'ollov.

(a) In time of peace such harbour and other facil

308 IRELAND IN 1921.

as are indicated in the annex hereto, or such other
facilities as may from time to time be agreed upon
between the British Government and the Govern-
ment of Ireland.

(6) In time of war such harbour and other naval
facilities as the British Government may reason-
ably require for the purposes of such defence as
aforesaid.

8. That within five years from the date of exchange
of ratifications of this Treaty a conference between the
British and Irish Governments shall be held in order to
hand over the coastal defence of Ireland to the Irish
Government, unless some other arrangement for naval
defence be agreed by both Governments to be desirable in
the common interests of Ireland, Great Britain, and the
other associated States.

9. That in order to co-operate in furthering the
principle of international limitation of armaments the
Government of Ireland shall not

(a) Build submarines unless by agreement with Great
Britain and the other States of the Commonwealth.

(b) Maintain a military defence force the establish-
ments whereof exceed in size such proportion of
the military establishments maintained in Great
Britain as that which the population of Ireland
bears to the population of Great Britain.

MI S CELL ANEOU S .

10. That the Governments of Great Britain and of
Ireland shall make a Convention for the regulation of civil
communication by air.

11. That the ports of Great Britain and of Ireland
shall be freely open to the ships of each country on payment
of the customary port and other dues.

12. That Ireland shall assume liability for such share
of the present public debt of Great Britain and Ireland and
of the payment of war pensions as existing at this date, as
may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just claims
on the part of Ireland by way of set off or counter claim,
the amount of such sums being determined in default of
agreement by the arbitration of one or more independent
persons, being citizens of Ireland or of the British Common-
wealth.

13. That the Government of Ireland agrees to pay
compensation on terms not less favourable than those
proposed by the British Government of Ireland Act of 1920

APPENDIX 309

hat Government's judges, officials, members of po

M, and other public servants who are discharged by the

crnment of Ireland, or who ret in- in consequence of
tin- change of Government effected in pursuance her.
provided that this agreement shall not apply to members

•he auxiliary p«.li«-e foiv»< or to persoi ated in

Great Britain for the Royal Irish Constabulary during the
two year ;»iv,-ding the date hereof. The Bri

Government will assume responsibility for such compensa-
tion or pensions as may be payable to any of these excepted
persons.

14. That neither the Parliament of Ireland nor any
subordinate legislature in Ireland shall make any law so
as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or

ilut or the free exercise thereof, or ^

preference or impose any disability on account of religious

is or affect prejudicially the rights

of any child to attend a school receiving public money
without attending the religious instruction at the school,
or make any discrimination as respects State aid between
schools under the management of different relifr
denominations, or divert from any religious denomination
or any educational institution any of its property except
lor public utility purposes and on payment of compensation.

16. That by way of transitional arrangement for the
administration of Ireland during the interval which must
elapse between the date hereof and the setting up of a
Parliament and Government of Ireland in accord^
herewith the members elected for constituencies in Ireland

e the passing of the British Government of Ireland
in 1920 shall at a meeting summoned for the purpose
elect a transitional Government to which the British
Government and Dail Kireann shall transfer the author
powers, and machinery requisite for the discharge of it*
duties. Provided that every member of such transitional
Government shall have signified in writing his or her
of this instrument. But this arrangement
>hall not continue in force beyond the expiration of twelve
months from the date hereof. That this instrument shall
be >ubmitted tor ratification forthwith by his Britannic
Majesty's Government to the Parliament at Westminster,
and by the ('a I Dail Kireann to a meeting of the

ubers elected for th- in Ireland set forth

in the British Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and when
ratifications have been exchanged shall take immediate
effect .

310 IRELAND IN 1921.

ANNEX 1.

The following are the specific facilities referred to in
Article 8 :

(a) Dockyard Port at Berehaven. British Admiralty
property and rights to be retained as at the date
hereof. Harbour defences to remain in charge of
British care and maintenance parties.

(b) Queenstown. Harbour defences to remain in
charge of British care and maintenance parties.
Certain mooring buoys to be retained for use of
his Britannic Majesty's ships.

(c) Belfast Lough. Harbour defences to remain in
charge of British care and maintenance parties.

(d) Lough Swilly. Harbour defences to remain in
charge of British care and maintenance parties.

(e) Aviation. Facilities in the neighbourhood of the
above ports for coastal defence by air.

(/) Oil Fuel Storage. Haulbowline, Rathmullen,
to be offered for sale to commercial companies
under guarantee that purchasers shall maintain a
certain minimum stock for British Admiralty
purposes.

ANNEX 2.

A convention covering a period of five years shall be
made between the British and Irish Governments to give
effect to the following conditions :

(a) That submarine cables shall not be landed or
wireless stations for communication with places
outside Ireland be established except by agree-
ment with the British Government. That the
existing cable landing rights and wireless con-
cessions shall not be withdrawn except by
agreement with the British Government, and that
the British Government shall be entitled to land
additional submarine cables or establish additional
wireless stations for communication with places
outside Ireland.

(b) That lighthouses, buoys, beacons, and any
navigational marks, or navigational aids shall be
maintained by the Government of Ireland, as at
the date hereof, and shall not be removed or added
to except by agreement with the British Govern-
ment.

(c) That war signal stations shall be closed down and
left in charge of care and maintenance parties,

APPENDIX.

the Government of Ireland being offered the

option ,,t taking them over and working theiu
! purposes, s h Admir

.on and guu rig the upkeep of e.\

ing telegraphic communication therewith.

ADDENDUM.

NORTH-K TEE.

Resolved that whilst refusing to admit the righ
any part of Ireland to be excluded from the supreme
authority of the Parliament of Ireland, or that the relat
•A pen the Parliament of Ireland and any subordii
legislature in Ireland can be a matter for treaty with a
Government outside Ireland. Nevertheless, in sincere
regard for international peace, and in order to make
manifest our desire not to bring force or coercion to bear
upon any substantial part of the province of Ulster, whose
inhabitants may now be unwilling to accept the national
authority. we are prepared to grant to that portion of
Ulster which is defined as Northern Ireland in the British
Government of Ireland Act of 1920 privileges and s
guards not less substantial than those provided for in the
articles of agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain
and Ireland, signed London, on December 6th, 19'Jl

NOTE I.

Through the courtesy of the author and the publishers,
I have been enabled to consult the proofs of Captain
H. B. C. Pollard's Secret Societies of Ireland, in which the
significance of the Secret Societies is described as follows:

* The problem of the Irish Secret Societies raises a
vital question for solution by statesmen rather than by
politico t* there exists a powerful criminal

organisation rooted in the United States, as well as in
Ireland, and with ramifications all over the globe, whose
avowed object is the establishment of an independent Iri>h
Republic by methods of political assassination and secret
murder, then how long will any settlement of * The Iri>h
D ' en. lu

INDEX.

Agriculture, Department of, 94.
American opin 288.

Andrews, Rt. Hon. John, quoted.

-6.

Andrews, Mr., Statement on Con-
ference. 'J43 — 4.
Anti-Conscription Fund, 88.

17, 264-5.

' Appointed Days,' 17—18.
Ara Fheis, Supreme Council of
K>— 1; authority
and composition, App. D.
Arklow, arms landed at, 148.
Anns landed, 147—8.

les of Agreement, 256—261.
Asquith, Mr., on reprisals, 30—32.
Associated Press of America,
• with de Valera, 59.

Ban try, arms landed at, 148.

Barbour, Mr. Milne, his state-
:it in Belfast, 242—3.

Barton, Miss, suggestions re
Income Tax.

Barton, R. C., delegate to Peace
Conference, 231 — 2; signs
Treaty, 261; reason for signing,

BELFAST, Post Office raided, 199;

rioting, 199—200; 205—208;

patrolled by I.R.A., 202; sniping

by Sinn Feiners, 206; Lord

Mayor calls for troops, 207;

meeting between Northern

:net and military and police,

troops rc-r 207;

statement by Lord Mayor,

207 — 8; bombing by Sinn Fein,

effect of Treaty, 278.
Belfast Xeirsletter, The. 1 n
lielfast Telegraph, on Treaty, 270.
Birkenhead. Lord, replies to
reprisals debate, 80 — 81 ; is dele-
gate at Conferen signs
his speech at Bir-
mingham, App. G.

Birrell, Mr., quoted, 270.

4 Black and Tans,' description of,

Apr
Boland, Harry, 7-8, 98. 99, 100,

Boycott of Ulster, 12, 55, 93, 198.

245, 272; of England, 12—13,

effect of, in Ulster, 204; Eoin

O'Duffy's statement on, 215.
Brady, Mr. James, petitions

amber of Commerce, 107.
Bruga, Cathal, letter from de

Valera, 85; supports de Valera

against Treaty, 263.
Bruree, I.T. and G.W. Union

takes possession of Cleeves

Creamery at, 156.
Burgess, Charles, tee Bruga,

Cathal.

Camps, Sinn Fein, formed, 145—6,
229; I 1,

Carson, Sir Edward, 17; his letter
on reprisals, 32 — 3; his speech
at Torquay. 57—8; and at
Belfast, 58—9; his message to
Electors, 65.

Casement, Tom, 118 — 120.

Castlecom ipt to collect

money at, 148.

' Castle Rule,' 264.

Chamberlain, Mr. Austen, dele-
gate at Conference, 232; signs
Treaty, I

Chart res, John, Sec. to Irish dele-
gation, 237.

Childers, Mr. Erskine, 85. 831,
237.

Church, The, and the Treaty.
267—8, 294 ; statement signed by
Cardinal Logue, 267.

hill, Mr., at Dundee on
Pea lelegate to Confer-

ence, 232; signs Treaty, 261.

Coates, Sir William, calls for
troops in Belfast, 207.

314

IRELAND IN 1921.

Collins, Michael, elected to North-
ern Parliament, 19, 67; his letter
to de Valera on danger of Dail
being raided, 92; complains
as to conduct of Ministry of
Labour, 93; his letter regarding
Women's deputation to Domi-
nion Premiers, 117; his letter
to de V., 120—1; his address to
constituents, 213—214; split in
Dail cabinet, 222; delegate to
Conference, 231 — 2; his aims at
Conference, 235—236 ; signs
Treaty, 261; replies to de V.'s
Manifesto, 280; credentials as
delegate, 285 ; offer to extremists,
295—6.

CONFERENCE, SEE DUBLIN
CONFERENCE, LONDON
PEACE CONFERENCE.

Congested Districts Board, boat
belonging to, lands arms at
Donnemark, 148.

Constituent Assembly Scheme,
111—112.

Cope, Mr. A. W., 104—5, 121, 139,
230, App. B.

Cork, burned, 29—30; Harbour
Board strike at, 156, 216; Soviet
formed at, 156, 216; loyalists
persecuted by I.R.A., 230;
Times correspondent kidnapped
by I.R.A., 297.

Cork Examiner, The, 148.

Craig, Sir James, Member for
Dublin University, 133.

Craig, Sir James, elected leader,
17; issues Manifesto, 60; his
speeches at Banbridge and
Bangor as to meeting de Valera,
61; meets Lord Fitzalan at
Dublin, 62; Conference with de
V., 62—3; his statement thereon
at Holywood, 63; his message to
Electors, 65; addresses Ulster
Unionist Assn., 68—9; letter
from Mr. LI. G. suggesting
Conference, 128—9; his letter
and telegram in reply, 131;
telegram from de V., 133; and
his reply, 134; further telegram,
ib.; visits Downing Street, 161;
summons his Cabinet to Lon-
don, tb.; his message read at
Unionist meeting in Ulster, 162;
meets Mr. LI. G. again, tb.;
issues Statement, 162—3; de V.'s

reply, 164; (see also LONDON
PEACE CONFERENCE); his
speech on policy of silence, 201 ;
his letter to Mr. LI. G., 202—3;
his letter to correspondent on
deliberation with rest of Ire-
land, 205; his statement on
situation of Northern Parlia-
ment, 226 — 228; summons his
Cabinet to London, 241; his
speech at special session on
position of Ulster, 245—248; his
letter to Mr. LI. G. on official
attitude of Ulster, 274—277.
Customs House, Dublin, attacked,
22—3.

DAIL EIREANN, How it differs
from Southern Parliament, 20;
issues Proclamation, 62; accepts
responsibility for I.R.A. put-
rages, 85; danger of meetings
being raided, 92; suggests that
farmers should pay no Income
Tax, 94—5; scheme of com-
munication, 96; efforts to make
Catholic Bishops recognise
Republic, 96—98; Corres. with
O'Mara, Boland and Miss
MacSwiney on American Loan,
99—100; Peace negotiations,
101 — 112; Constituent Assembly
Scheme, 111—112; de. V. on
mandate from the people, 125
—6; (see LONDON PEACE
CONFERENCE) ; meeting on
Peace Proposals, 172; reply
thereto, 174—178; first full meet-
ing, 185— 188; Oath of allegiance,
186—7; Prof. MacNeill elected
Speaker, 187; de V.'s speeches,
187—8, 188—9; holds secret
session, 190; decision on Peace
Proposals, 191 — 2; holds open
session, 192; de V. re-elected
Pres., 192; de V.'s speech on
unity, 192—3; Mr. LI. G.'s reply
considered in secret session,
193—5; letter to Mr. LI. G. on
appointing plenipotentiaries,
209—210, 217—218; Cabinet's
reply, 210—211, 218—219; tele-
grams between de V. and Mr.
LI. G. on status of delegates,
21&-221, 223—4; split in Dail
cabinet, 221—222; scope of Con-
ference, 225; list of Irish dele-

eir status, 231—2;

;mce,

r of Propaganda's
raig, 242;

to consider Treaty,
ment summon-
thths' and
!y, 280; de

fur: ments as to ra-

Ireaty, 281; instru
to (1 282—3; Credentials

of delegates, 285 ; announcement
r private session, 285—6;
rnative to Treaty. 286;
British undertaking to with-
draw Crown Forces on ratifica-
tion :y, 287; debates on

281—291; 295— f.\
299; Btfmbta QJ Ireland pub-
is' offer to

ts. 295—6; de V

appeal to the people not to

aty, 296; de V.

resignation, 298;

•ty ratified, 299; de V. de-

'••d on re-election vote, 300.

Telegraph upon effect of

• land, 108;

his iverpool, 108—

!!•'

n, Mr., returned for \V.
Belfast, 67; in connuunication
wit 88.

Disarmament Conference in
Washington, 236.

' Document No. 2,' 286, 296, App.

\ \
Dominion Premiere, 114—119.

Donnemark, Thompson machine

guns landed at, 148.
Donoughmore, Lord, motion in

H. «-f Lords by, 80.
Drurncorulra, troop train am-

l.ushfd at, 86.

E between

J Craig and de Valera,
62- • .them

•a and Sinn Fein, 134
-138.

Duggan, E. J., delegate t<
fer* : signs Treaty,

George Gavan, delegate to

.1— '2, signs Tr

261; recommends ratification in
Dail, 288-9.

Ennis, Sinn Fein collect money

148.

Etchingham, Mr.. denounce*
Treaty in Dail, 287.

ilan. Viscount. 20. 21, 62.

raid, Mr. Desmond, 164,
242.

Freeman* Journal, de Valera's
statement in, 106; on Treaty.
906—7.

u'h. Lord, retires, 20.

George, Mr. D. Lloyd, Stat«-
as to Govt. policy. 13—14; his
letter to Bishop of Chelmsford
reprisals,^ — 43; the Bishop's
reply, 44 — 6; Peace negotiations,
101 — 112; his messag*
and Queen, 127; his letter to
de V. and Sir J. Craig suggest-
ing Conference. 128—9; calls
ference on Gener
rt. 141; (ure. also LONDON
hia

speech at Barnsley on self-
determination, 197; is delegate
at Pea< • -nee, 232; de-

fines Govt. attitude in H

vote of censure again
H. of C., 240; vote of disagree-
ment by National Unionist

n., 244; signs Treaty, 261.
Glynn, Mr. Martin. Ill'

-nment of Ireland Act, diffi-
culties in enfonMiip, 2. .'*; 114.
Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland,

manifesto ny, on Treaty, .
Green woo< mar, his reply

on reprisals, 79; is delegate at
.ference, 232; signs Treaty,
2f>l.

Griffith. Arthur. 1"
222; is delee onference.

231—2; his aims at Conf.. 235;
sipnB Treaty, 261; his let:

LI. G. on 268;

replies to de V.'s manifesto,
280.
Guinness, Colonel, speaks in H.

of C. on reprisals, 78.
(hm-running, 148.

316

IRELAND IN 1921.

Hampshire Regiment, in mine
explosion at Youghal, 79.

Hewart, Sir Gordon, is member
of Conference on Constitutional
questions, 232 ; signs Treaty, 261.

Incendiarism in England, 13,
23—27.

Income Tax, 94—5.

Independent, The, 216—7, 267.

Intelligence Service, established,
83.

Internment Camps, letters to and
from, 152—153; 154—5.

Internment, Policy of, 5, 6.

Irish Bulletin, The, 23, 137, 171—2,
190, App. A.

Irish Dominion League, 110.

IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY,
attacks L. & N.W. Rly. Hotel,
Dublin, 21—2; attacks Customs
House, Dublin, 22—3; Irish
Bulletin statement, 23; incen-
diarism in England, 13, 23—27;
attacks on Protestants and con-
stables, 54—56; forms Flying
Column, 56—7; its campaign of
outrage, 75; attacks on R.I.C.,
79; explodes mine at Youghal,
tb.; mines train containing
King's escort, 80; responsibility
for its outrages taken by Dail,
85; reports to de V. on train
ambush, 86—7; Truce, 139—142;
disregards truce, 145—157, 252;
Military training, 146; An
T'Oglac quoted, 147; terrorism
in Ulster, 198—200; patrols
Belfast, 202, 208; persecutes
Cork Loyalists, 230; distributes
Circular in Co. Mayo, 250—252;
divisions on the Treaty, 265;
Mr. Mulcahy, Chief of Staff,
recommends Treaty, 290; majo-
rity of Leaders for Treaty, 291;
Times Correspondent kid-
napped, 297.

Irish Self-Determination League,
118, 120; on the Treaty, 265-6.

Irish Times, The, on the Treaty,
268.

Irish Transport and General
Workers' Union, strike by, 156,
216; takes possession of Cleeves
Creamery, 156; Voice of Labour
on Treaty, 269.

Kay, Mr., kidnapped, 297.
Kilnaleck, compelled to supply

money and provisions, 148.
King, H.M. the, consents to open

Northern Parliament, 69—70;

72; extracts from speech, 73;

message from the Pope and his

reply, 238.

Labour, Northern Ministry of,
statement on Conference by,
243—4.

Liscannor Bay, arms landed at,
148.

Lloyd George, Mr. (s«e George,
Mr. D. Lloyd).

Logue, Cardinal, 112—3; state-
ment by, 267.

L. & N.W. Rly. Hotel, Dublin,
attacked, 21—2.

LONDON PEACE CONFER-
ENCE, Prime Minister suggests
Conference to de Valera and
Sir J. Craig, 128—9; Sir J.
Craig's reply, 131; de V.'s, 132
— 3; de V.'s letter to Southern
Unionists and telegram to Sir
J. Craig, 133; Sir J. Craig's
reply, 134; de V.'s further tele-

fram to Sir J. Craig, 134; de
. consents to Conference, 139;
negotiations between de V. and
Mr. LI. G. for ' Preliminary '
Conference, 158—160; first meet-
ing between de V. and Mr. LI.
G. and official communique], 160;
second meeting, 161; Sir J.
Craig visits Downing Street,
161; second visit, 162; his state-
ment, 162—3; reply by de V.'s
staff, 164; British Cabinet meets,
165; Proposals for Settlement,
165—169; de V. returns to Ire-
land, 169; Irish Bulletin on
Peace Proposals, 171—2; de V.'s
reply, 174—178; Mr. LI. G.'s
letter to de V., 178—180; General
Smuts' letter to de V., 180—184;
decision of Dail, 191—2; extracts
from Mr. LI. G.'s reply, 193—
195; letter from Sir J. Craig to
Mr. LI. G., 202—3; Dail's letter
to Mr. LI. G. on appointing
plenipotentiaries, 209—210, 217
—218; Cabinet's reply to Dail,
210—211, 218—219; the Indepen-
dent on, 216 — 7; telegrams

INI

de V. and Mr. LI. G.

on .--.VMS of delegates, 218—821.
scope ol

ilelegateft an<i
slat

• gates. 232; aims of Irish

to deal v

237 — g; message ' Pope

to t

and de V. s telegram t«

.-iiKur.- in

1 1 delegates

request transference of Tyrone
inanagh. 240, L

-ir .1.
Mr.

Mi'' .;r in R,-lfa.--

— 3; sta( ' 'Irews

(Northern M

243 — *; v ABsn.

vote of
pool, 24-1

in Northern Parl. on position
rister, 245—248; press cam-
paign against Ulster, 246;
imj» limit on

delegates, 248—9; hostile
lar in Co. Mayo, 250—252;
agreement reached, 255; copy of
ma sent to Sir .1 CraiLT. 255.
(Now

supports
Treaty in Dail, 287—8.

McCa , 98—99, 288.

Mi-K- British Govt.

refuse to release, 173; released,
174; on preparing for war, 252.

1 Speaker
187.

Mac ready,

MacSwiney. Miss M , 100; de-
nounces Treaty in Dail, 289—

Mark imtess, 296.

under, 6;
working of, 77—
Midi* Earl of, 133, 134.

138.
Milroy, Sean, supports Treat v in

Dail, 288.

Morning Post, The. 144.
Moylan, Sean, 147

Mulcahy. Mr, recommends rati-
on of Treaty, 290.

National Unionist Assn., vote of
disagreement at Liverpool. 1M4.

Ne*r lists shot at, 199.

NOR'im PARLIAM1

summoned, i n of

manifesto, 60; polling day, 66;
results of election, 67—8; formal
opening, 68. 69; the King con-

i, 69 — 70, 72; repre-
sentation in tl.- 71.
extracts from the King's speech,

Craig's speech on
<y of silence, 201; observa-
tions on Govt. offer to de V.,
202 — 203; i

cabinet and military and i
upon reinforcing troops in
Belfast, 207; scope of Peace
Conference, 225; position of
Ulster, 225- ;irliament

meets, 226; boycotted by
Fein and Nat ion. i hers,

•it l>y Sir J. Craig
on the sit nation, "226— 228;
delegates request transf.
of Tyrone and Fermanagh, 240,
271 .rnons

cab;

in Council on Appointed Days,
242; statement by Mr. Milne
Barbour in Belfast, 242—3;
statement by Mr. Andrews,
243 — I; on bombing in Belfast,
245; Craig's speech at

special session on position of
Ulster in regard to Conference,
245—248; press campaign against
Ulster, 246; copy of peace terms
sent to raig, 25;'>

sees Mr. 1.1. <i., 273;
his statement in Farliar:

official attitude of Ulster, 274—

O'Brien, Art, 118—120; on the

Treaty, 265—6.
O'Duffy, Mr. Eoin, 200, 202, 808,

296; attacks Unionists

Mr., 92.

i'atrick, quoted, 146—7.
O'Mara, James, 99—100.

318

IRELAND IN 1921.

O'Shannon, Cathal, quoted, 166,

216.
Outrage statistics, 7.

Paxson, Prof., quoted, 123 — 4.

Plunkett, Count, his Dignified
Statement, 48.

Plunkett, Sir Horace, 110.

Pollard, H. B. C., App. D.;
quoted, App. I.

Pope, letter to Card. Logue, 113;
his message to the King and the
King's reply, 238 ; telegram from
de V., 238—9.

Proposals by H.M. Government
for Irish Settlement, Corre-
spondence and Further Corre-
spondence relating to, App. C.

Proposals for settlement of Irish
question, by British Govt., 165
—169; Irish Bulletin on, 171—2.

Publicity, Director of (Bail
Eireann), 88—9, 90, 91, 164;
App. A.

Reprisals, Policy of, 4—7; burn-
ing of Cork, 29— n30; Mr. Asquith
on, 30—32; letter from Lord
Carson on, 32—3; letter from
Mr. LI. G. to Bp. of Chelms-
ford, 33—43; the Bishop's reply,
44—5; Count Plunkett's state-
ment, 48; reprisals by Ulster
Special Constables, 51 — 3.

Republic of Ireland. The, quoted,
295.

ROYAL IRISH CONSTABU-
LARY, telegram to Prime
Minister on Treaty, 270; is dis-
banded, ib.; description of,
App. F.

Secret Societies of Ireland, App.
D. and I.

Seely, General, opens reprisals
debate in H. of C., 75—6.

Skeffington, Mrs., 117.

SINN FEIN, rioting in Belfast
by, 70—1; attacks Belfast water
supply, 71; refuses to allow
elections, 74; outrages in Eng-
land, 79—80; alliance with
Nationalists, 88, 90 ; instructions
in view of raids on offices, 91
— 2; effort to make Catholic
Bishops recognise Republic,
96—98; correspondence with

O'Mara, Boland and Miss
MacSwiney on American loan,
99 — 100 ; Peace negotiations,
101—112; draft letter to Domi-
nion Premiers, 115—116; Corres.
between de Valera and O'Brien,
118—120; internal differences,
122; majority prefer Dominion
status, 125; Mr. LI. G. suggests
Conference, 128—9; police sur-
veillance ceases, 132; de V.'s
telegram re Conference, 132—3;
his letter to Southern Unionists
and telegram to Sir J. Craig,
133; Dublin Conference, 134—
138; communique on Confer-
ence, 138; de V. consents to
London Conference, 139, 158;
terms of truce, 139, 140; General
Smuts in Dublin, 141; activity
during Truce, 145—157; camps
formed, 145—6; Courts insti-
tuted, 149; attacks on police
and soldiers, 150 — 151; extracts
from letters to and from intern-
ment camps, 152—153, 154—155;
London Conference negotia-
tions, 158—160 (see also LON-
DON PEACE CONFERENCE);
prisoners released, 172 — 4; oath
of allegiance to Dail, 186—7;
terrorism in Ulster, 198—200;
sniping at Protestant workmen
in Belfast, 206; meeting of Ard
Fheis, 233, 24O— 1; bombing in
Belfast, 245; Republican circu-
lar distributed in Co. Mayo,
250—252; split in ranks, 280;
constitution, App. D.

Smuts, General, 114, 115, 118, 119,
141, 142, App. B. ; letter to de V.
on peace proposals, 180—184.

SOUTHERN PARLIAMENT,
summoned, 19; nomination of
candidates and results of elec-
tions, ib., 20; how it differs
from the Dail, 20; Sinn Fein
refuse to allow elections, 74;
summoned, 82; Lord Chief
Justice's address, 82.

Soviet formed at Cork, 156, 216.

Stack, Austin, memo, to de V.,
87; supports de V. against
Treaty, 263.

Strickland, General, 29.

INDKX.

319

Transport and
156.
•216.

Sturdy. Special Constable, mur-
dered. 70. 71

Talbot. Lord Edmund, tec Fitz-
alan, Viscount.

Thompson sub-machine guns. 147.
Times, The, correspondent, kid-

TREA1Y. IHK >" oJ«o LON-

NCE);

to be called

266; Dominion status. »b. ;

i sral, i - , 261;

.,-7. public Debt and

I by arbitration, 257,

after 5 years, \b. ; harbour

HI] defence force,
orts, 268;

Cation to officials (R.I.C.

•S, 262; powers not

:i Northern Ireland

for one month, 258, 262; address

:i Parliament on

J;>8— 9.

to determine boundaries,
259, 271 , power to elect mem-
bers of Council of Ireland, t&.;
Northern and Southern (iovts.
meet to discuss Provisions,
LV,u. Trillions status, 260;
visional Govt. in S. Ireland,
Treaty to be submitted to

• ' for approval, 260—1,

t of signatories, 261;
de V.'s stat

-4; An », 264—6;

sident of Irish &
League on Treaty, 265—6; effect
of Treaty on the Irish p
irch and the Tr
'

86; Sir .i
Mr. LI
in N

• •r to Mr

of Ulster, 274
Manifesto by Grand Or
T.odge of IrelanH
ment to Treaty defeated in H

of C , 279; similar amendment

defeated , »&.;de V/s

manifesto summoning his

280; Griffiths' and

:y. 280; de V.'s

her statements as to ratifi-

•n of Treaty. 281; in*

•* to delegates, Mfc-S;

tls of delegates, 186;

Mr. LI. (i undertakes to

withdraw Crown Forces on

fication of Treaty. 287; his

ultimatum to delegates, 287,

ates in Dail on Treaty.

291; Mr. LI. G.'s statement

on advantages of Treaty. 291—2.

interned persons to be rejoined,

average citizen's view of

Treaty, 294—6; de V.'s appeal to

;>le not to support Treaty,

iders his resign-

ity ratified. 299; de V.

uted on re-election vote,

300; Annex to Treaty, App. E.

TRUCK. THK. BB-lttj disre-

led by Sinn Fein, 14f>
10&— 200; Committee appointed,
8; disregarded by I.R.A..
•ft

i ER, Trade boycott of. 12. 55,
90, 198; prepares to carry out
Govt. of Ireland Act, 14—15;
its boundaries defined, 15;
Standing Committee inaeil.
16—17; Sir J. Craig elected
Lead-' 17; suggests Royal
opening of Par
special constables raised and
their reprisals, 61 — 3; Sir E
Carson's speech at Torquay.
67—3; and at Belfast, 68—9;
terrorism nn Fein and

I.R.A. during truce, 198—200;
special constables disarmed,
ing in Belfast, 199—200,
206—208; anij.inc by

iers, 206; call for troops in
Belfast, 207; troops reinforced,
207; scope of Pea
225; positio: 226—

Irish delegates request
transference of Tyrone and

press

campaign at ster, 246;

effect of 1
270—278; effect of boycott, >72.

320

IRELAND IN 1921.

Unity, Bail statement on, 86;
de V.'s speech on, 192—3.

VALERA, DE, lands in Ireland,
7; letter to Boland, 7—8; effect
of his presence in Ireland,
8—10; his message to farmers,
10 — 11; elected to Parliament,
19; his interview with Ass.
Press of America, 59; Confer-
ence with Sir J. Craig, 62—3;
his message to electors of
Northern Parliament, 65; orders
not to arrest, 83 — 4; arrested
and released, 84; his letter on
position of I.R.A. to Cathal
Bruga, 85; his draft for Cabinet
statement, 86; memo, from Mr.
Austin Stack and de V/s note
thereto, 87—8; alliance with
Nationalists, 88, 90; his letters
to Dir. of Publicity, 88—9, 90,
91; instructions in view of raids
on offices, 91 — 2; complaints as
to conduct of Min. of Labour,
93; his letter t9 Boland, 113;
negotiations with Dominion
Premiers, 114—120; letter from
Collins, 120—1; statement on
mandate from the people, 125—
6; letter from Mr. LI. G. sug-
gesting Conference, 128 — 9; his
telegram in reply, 132 — 3; his
letter to Southern Unionists
and telegram to Sir J. Craig,
133; further telegram to Sir J.
Craig, 134; Dublin Conference,
134—138; de V. consents to
London Conference negotiations,

158—160; (see also LONDON
PEACE CONFERENCE) ; his
return to Ireland, 169; his state-
ment, 170; calls Dail meeting
on Peace proposals, 172; reply
thereto, 174—178; Mr. LI. G.'s
letter to, 178—180; General
Smuts' letter to, 180—184; his
speeches in Dail, 187—8, 188—9;
decision of DaU sent to Mr.
LI. G., 191—2; re-elected Presi-
dent of Dail, 192; his speech on
unity, 192 — 3; protest from
Dublin Castle on breaking of
truce in Ulster, 200; his state-
ment on Peace, 214—215; his
telegram to the Pope, 238—9;
his speech at Ennis, 249—250;
appeals to the people not to
support Treaty, 296; tenders his
resignation, 298; defeated on
re-election vote, 300.

Voice of Labour, on the Treaty,

Weekly Summary, The, 142.

Wexford, Co., levy on residents,
148.

' White Cross/ The, 8.

Winterton, Lord, on reprisals, 78.

Workers' Republic on Treaty, 269.

Women's International League,
116—117.

Worthington-Evans, Sir L., dele-
gate to Conference, 232; signs
Treaty, 261.

Youghal, mine exploded at, 79.

DA Street, Cecil John Charles

Ireland in 1921
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