y
J'ACCUSE
*?jy
J'ACCUSE
BY
A GERMAN
TRANSLATED BY
ALEXANDER GRAY
*'Jl pitiable wretch is he
Who \noWi the truth and yet can silent be '
HODDER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXV
D
5i l
PREFACE
J'Accuse, a work recently published anonymously in
Lausanne, has deservedly attracted much attention on
the Continent on account of the independent standpoint
of the author, the pénétration shown in his analysis of
the critical events of last year, and the vigour and
clarity which characterise his présentation of the case.
The German édition is prefaced by the following
note : —
"The book J'Accuse, written by a German
patriot, and entrusted to me, is herewith presented
to the public.
"I regard this work as an act which can only
confer a blessing on the German people and on
humanity, and I accordingly assume responsibility
for its publication.
"Dr. Anton Suter.
"Lausanne, April 20th, 1915. "
A further note is added in the following terms : —
" Having regard to the situation arising from the
war and the conditions of the censorship, certain
passages in the manuscript hâve for the présent been
omitted. Thèse passages are indicated by blank
spaces."
In the présent translation the censored passages hâve
been indicated in the same way.
The very few explanatory footnotes added in the
course of translation are indicated by square brackets.
I désire to express my indebtedness to Mr. T. Lindsay
for his assistance in the work of revision and correction
of proofs.
July, 1915. A. G.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
i
GERMANY AWAKE
PAO»
Can the Victory of Germany and Austria be expected? — The
économie position of belligerent countries — The political
and military position of the belligerent countries — The
situation in France — Partie Remise — The question of
guilt 1—25
II
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME
Our Imperialists : Bernhardi and Co. — Hâve we been attacked
or were we going to be attacked? — The head of the War
Party — The Impérial War — The place in the sun — The
chosen people — Germany 's brilliant development — In-
crease of population and the colonies — Our true colonies
— What advantage has France drawn from her colonies?
— The Germans abroad : France, England, America — The
place in the sun for us, the place in the shadow for the
others — The fear of Germany — Diplomatie success of the
Triple Alliance — Austria 's Balkan policy — The Crown
Prince and the war party — The policy of encirclement —
England and Germany : The first Hague Conférence — Be-
tween the first and second Hague Conférences : The
English Libéral Government — Second Hague Conférence :
England and Germany — English proposais for a political
understanding and for a naval agreement with Germany
— What are we fighting for? — The freedom which they
mean — The end of peace : Security? — Did France mean
to attack us? — Did Russia mean to attack us? — The
Triple Entente a défensive alliance — Giolitti's révélations
— The change of front in Berlin; the war party . . 26—134
Vlll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
III
nu
THE CRIME .... 135-353
A. Austria . 139
B. Germany 164
C. England 242
D. Russia 287
E. France 294
F. Appendix : The Austrian Red Book .... 315
IV
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED
How beautiful to die for the Fatherlandl — Prestige — Prole-
tarians of ail countries massacre each other ! — Political
morality : Moral politics — Quidquid délirant regeg, ylec-
tuntur Achivi — Dreams of world-power — Who will pay
the cost of the war? — Quousque tandem? . . . 354-885
THE FUTURE
What should peace bring us? — The system of armed peace —
A covenant of peace between free nations — Is this a
Utopia? — The coercive force — What will peace bring us?
— Should it happen otherwise — The twilight of the
Goda 886-421
EPILOGUE
. 422-425
APPENDICES
Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, August
4th, 1914 426
Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, December
2nd, 1914 432
Circular note of Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, December 24th,
1914 443
I.
GERMANY AWAKE !
La vérité est en marche.
If there were in Prussian Germany a System of Minis-
terial responsibility such as exists in ail other countries
with effective Parliamentary Government, and such as
has been held out with many other fair promises to
the Prussian people for more than sixty-four years, the
Impérial Chancellor and Président of the Prussian
Council, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, would hâve to be
arraigned and
condemned.
It might be allowed in his favour, as an extenuating
circumstance, that he was not the driving force of the
war, but that he was driven to it — driven from above
and from below. But a Minister who yields himself
as the tool of those who instigate war, who covers those
who are irresponsible with his responsibility, who
accepts the despicable task of representing to his nation
and to ail the world as a war of defence the
offensive war which was prepared long in advance,
who by this falsehood unchains the most fearful disaster
which has ever fallen upon our globe, and which is
inflicting on his Fatherland, whether victorious or
defeated, wounds which will be incurable for généra-
tions to corne, who delivers over to death and to mutila-
tion hundreds of thousands of his countrymen in the
flower of their âge, annihilâtes at a stroke the arduous
labour of half a century, suddenly wrenches asunder the
B
% <T ACCUSE
bonds of culture between civilised nations, and trans-
forms prosperous régions of Europe into ruinous wastes
— such a man must bear the punishment which is due to
his crime.
In gathering together in the following pages the
various points in the indictment which reveal the exclu-
sive guilt of Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary,
in provoking the universal war, I am well aware of the
fact that I will expose myself to the disapproving
criticism of a large section of the German public, which
proclaims it to be a patriotic duty to shut one's eyes to
the truth, or if the truth be recognised, to conceal it
in silence for the duration of the war.
Only by bearing in mind thèse two points of view
is it possible to understand the présent frame of mind
of such a highly intelligent people as the German nation.
The " State of War " (Kriegszustand), proclaimed on
the 31st July, which placed the intellectual life of
Germany under the supervision of Gênerais, and which
even to-day, after more than six months hâve elapsed,
carefully keeps watch on the frontiers lest there should
GERMANY AWAKE ! S
penetrate into the country so much as a suggestion of
the intellectual life or of the views of foreign countries
which might disturb the unity of Germany, or of
foreign information or évidence which might illumine
the German people — this M state of war " has produced
the resuit that nine-tenths of the whole German people
hâve blindly followed the dexterously coined phrases
about the "state of defence which is forced upon us,"
about " the struggle for our freedom and culture against
aggression and oppression." " The French and the
Russians hâve already pressed over our frontiers " ;
" The Fatherland is in danger '* ; *' They mean to humi-
liate us " ; "In the midst of peace the enemy falls
upon us " ; " The existence of our Empire is
at stake " ; " We are called upon to défend our holiest
possessions, our Fatherland, our very hearths against
an unscrupulous attack " ; " We are fighting for the
fruits of our works of peace, for the inheritance of
a great past and for our future." Thèse and similar
phrases (ail taken from officiai documents) hâve been
used with the conscious intention of deceiving the
German people, of inflaming its patriotism, and of
inspiring it to unutterable and incalculable sacrifices in
wealth and in life.
" The f ew, who hère hâve aught of Truth divined,
Yet foolishly revealed their inner heart,
Who showed the mob their feeling and their mind —
The cross, the stake hâve always been their part." 1
The few who, after the first days of intoxication,
gradually returned to their sensés, and who were able
to procure foreign documents and représentations behind
1 ["Die wenigen, die was davon erkannt, J<
Die toricht g'nug ihr voiles Herz nicht wahrten,
Dem Pôbel ihr Gefùhl, ihr Schauen ofîenbarten,
Hat man von je gekreuzigt und verbrannt." — Faust.]
B 2
4 J'ACCUSE
the backs of the military censors, and by careful study
and comparison of thèse slowly arrived at the truth, —
thèse h ad to shut the truth within them, since it was
and is considered unpatriotic to give expression to it,
since every utterance in word or in writing would
be suppressed by the military authorities, and the
offender would expose himself to the risk of punishment.
It is to escape this fate that those who know the facts
hâve kept, and still keep, silence. Those however who
do not know the truth, or do not wish to know it,
cry out ail the more loudly, and as a work of illumina-
tion scatter broadcast the foolish products of their
minds throughout the world, where no one believes
them, even if they were to repeat the German lies a
million times. What are we to say when Germans of
the highest eminence, from Bode to Dehmel, 1 from
Haeckel to Hauptmann, 1 from Liszt to Sudermann,
from Laband to Liebermann 2 (in ail nearly a hundred of
them), distribute in foreign countries an appeal, which
immediately after the opening words contains the folio w-
ing sentence ?
"Germany on the other hand made every effort to avoid
1 Decorated on the Emperor's hirthday, 1915, Fourth
Class of the Eed Eagle.
2 [Wilhelm von Bode, General Director of the Boy al
Muséums, Berlin, a leading authority on art; Richard
Dehmel, a distinguished poet; Ernst Haeckel, the celebrated
Professor at Jena; Gerhardt Hauptmann, perhaps the most
eminent of contemporary poets; Franz von Liszt, Professor
of Jurisprudence at Berlin, a leading criminologist ; Her-
mann Sudermann, the novelist; Paul Laband, Professor
of Jurisprudence at Strassburg; Max Liebermann, a distin-
guished painter.]
GERMANY AWAKE ! 5
war. The incontestable évidence in support of this fact is
open to ail the world. . . . Only when the overwhelming
forces of the enemy, who had long been lying in ambush on
our frontiers, fell into our country from three sides( 1), only
then did the German people rise like one man."
And with such robber-stories as thèse about the enemy
lurking in ambush — one thinks involuntarily of Leder-
strumpf and Ali Baba — they dare to humbug such
highly educated, cultured nations as, for instance, the
Italians (among whom even a street-porE er has to-day a
better knowledge of the historical truth about the
war than a Harnack has among us), a people whose
Government, with the approval of the whole country,
declared that the war was an offensive war on the part
of Germany and Austria, and rightly and of necessity
so declared unless it wished to charge itself with faith-
lessness and the breach of its own word.
It is to thèse men a self-evident fact that we are the
leading culture-people of the world, and consequently
(such is the logic of thèse gentlemen !) we are called
upon to impose our culture forcibly on the other inferior
races and even on neutrals by means of bombs and
shells, by fire and dévastation. This is the mission
which Providence has pointed out to us, as it called
upon the Crusaders to fight against the Crescent (which
now we hâve gained as an ally in the struggle against
Christian nations), and as it instigated the Catholics in
the Thirty Years' War to cast out of the Protestants by
fire and sword their new-won faith. In the view of our
leading spirits, in place of the wars of religion there has
suddenly arisen since the lst August, 1914, a culture-
war, in which the nations are fighting for the equal
privilèges or the supremacy of the various "hostile
cultures." Has ever a greater madness than this been
conceived? In 1870 when France was defeated and
6 J'ACCUSE
crushed, did we suppress, did we so much as touch,
the culture of that country ? Did the foreign domina-
tion of Napoléon wipe out even a trace of our German
spiritual culture, which just then had reached an
incomparable height ? When the Romans conquered
Greece did they at the same time overthrow Greek
culture? Precisely the opposite took place. The
captor was made captive. The mind of Greece, the
art of Greece subdued Rome. And we find the same
thing in the history of Christianity. In the end was
it not the small province of Galilée that imposed its
spirit on the world-empire of Rome ? How indeed is it
possible for anyone to speak of the présent struggle as
a struggle of cultures when what we really hâve before
us is merely a struggle of anti-cultures, of barbar-
isms, against each other, — a struggle which from day to
day becomes more bitter, more cruel, and more
murderous, — a struggle in which ail the principles of
international law and of humanity are more and more
forgotten, if indeed it is still possible to speak of
humanity in face of this inhuman massacre ? What
has ail this got to do with culture ? Do we intend
in any way to suppress the culture of England and
France, of Russia and Belgium ? Do we mean to
renounce Shakespeare, Darwin, Newton, and Spencer,
Tolstoy and Dostoiewsky, Voltaire, Rousseau,
Zola, Goncourt, Rubens, Van Eyck, Meunier, and
Maeterlinck, or do we mean to rid the world of their
achievements ? With what right, then, do we impute
to the others intentions against us which we do not
hâve against them, and to which we could not give
effect even if we entertained them ? If we had not read
it daily in print, we would not hâve believed that the
intellectuals of Germany could hâve persuaded them-
selves and the German people that German culture is in
GERMANY AWAKE ! 7
danger, and that it must be defended with Zeppelins
and with 42-centimetre artillery.
The " neurosis of war " has indeed become épidémie,
like St. Vitus's dance or flagellantism in the Middle
Ages. As the Dervishes in the East for hours at a time
utter the same formula? of prayer and go through the
same contortions with their arms and legs and their
bodies until at last they fall down foaming at the mouth
and overpowered, so now we hâve seen the learned men
of Germany repeating for months past the same
patriotic litanies, the same unproved assertions (asser-
tions indeed of which the contrary is proved) ; at ail
times reaching upwards with their arms and their legs
and indeed their whole body, until in their opinion they
and their people surpass ail other nations of the earth,
and if they do not become like to God, they at least
become the chosen people of God. They overpower
themselves with their own phrases, until they foam at
the mouth from sheer patriotism and fall down in adora-
tion of themselves. . . . But they will in time awake
from their stupéfaction, and the wild intoxication will be
folio wed by the terrible discomfort of returning sobriety.
The purpose of this book is to hasten this awakening.
This 7 regard as a patriotic duty; for the longer the
intoxication lasts, the worse will be the conséquences
for the German people, and the process of awakening
will be more difficult and more terrible. It is only a
better knowledge of the origins and objects of this war,
a récognition of the guilt and responsibility for this
war, that can bring about a change for the better.
8 J'ACCUSE
CAN THE VICTORY OF GERMANY AND AUSTRIA BE EXPECTED?
The Economic Position of Belligerent Countries.
To-day it is no longer permissible to imagine the
possibility of the victory of the Allied Empires. The
financial and military superiority of the countries allied
against them is so great that they cannot be counter-
balanced by military efficiency on the part of Germany,
nor even by the greatest sacrifices in life and well-
being. No declamatory statements about " holding out
till the last breath," no false and dazzling promises
about the economic resisting power of Germany can in
any way alter this fact. The balance of gold in the
impérial bank is no proof that the economical position
is still tolerable ; for indeed nearly ail the gold in circu-
lation has flowed to the bank, and the notes for the
hundred and fifty million pound sterling issued by
the loan fund hâve been covered not by gold but by
unrealisable goods and effects. Manufactures find
employment only in so far as they are engaged for the
internai needs of the country and for military purposes.
The money required for the supply of military stores
is, however, raised from the German taxpayer, and as it
represents an unproductive investment it must be
entered in the books as a pure loss. One class at least
has nothing to complain of ; I mean the agrarian class.
It is they who hâve sounded the call to the battle, who
hâve stirred up war, the imperialists and the chauvinists,
wh'om the German people hâve to thank for this hideous
war. From their ranks corne the colonels and the
gênerais, the Bernhardis and the Frobeniuses, who
prescribe to the German Empire its historical mission,
"world-power or downfall," and who announce to it its
"hour of destiny." Thèse are the men who possess
the ear of the highest in the country, and who instil
GERMANY AWAKE ! 9
into them the poison of their selfish ideas. Thèse are
the men who at the same time are making the best
profit dut of the war. They and their comrades must
of course also bleed, but what they lose in blood flows
back to them in gold, gold in the forai of gold-lace and
in glittering coins. They are also making a career for
themselves, and the more ofïicers fall, so much the better
for the younger men. They are, too, succeeding in
business more brilliantly than they could ever hâve
done iri time of peace. The priées of their produce,
grain, potatoes, and cattle, would hâve risen immeasur-
ably if the Government had not in the end seen the
necessity of fixing maximum priées. But even thèse
maximum priées are already enormously above the
priées ever paid in times of peace. 1
The workmen and the middle classes however perish
and decay. The longer the war lasts, the more surely
will German trade, the German System of finance and
German manufactures, be deprived of their connections
with foreign countries. The seas of the world are open
to our enemies, En gland and France, as well as to
neutral States, and it would be a surprising fact if they
did not gradually usurp our place in markets abroad.
The exports and imports of Italy and of Holland must
necessarily show an upward tendency after Germany
is ruled out of account. The longer the war lasts, the
more successful will be the efforts of England to drive
our trade out of America, Asia, and Africa, and in any
case décades will pass before we again reach the position
we occupied before the war. And while the économie
life of Germany is thus advancing to a stage at which
it will slowly bleed to death, this process can only
1 Bread has meanwhile become constantly scarcer, and
the monopoly of grain and the distribution of bread by the
State has already been introduced.
10 J'ACCUSE
be accelerated by the necessity of producing the
enormous stores of materials required for the mainten-
ance of our armies of millions, and for the conduct of
the war. It has been estimated by an expert that the
cost of maintenance per man per day may be reckoned
at 10 marks, and this estimate takes no account of the
wear and tear of materials, the ammunition used up
(a single shot from our 42-centimetre guns is said to cost
thousands of marks), or the loss of ail kinds of instru-
ments of war. If we maintain five million soldiers under
arms, the war will cost us in ready money paid out of
our pockets two and a half million pounds sterling a day ;
it will cost monthly 75 million pounds, it will cost in a
year 900 million pounds sterling. If we include in our
estimate the sums indicated above, for ordinary wear
and tear, for material used up or lost, it will be impos-
sible to estimate the yearly cost of the war at anything
less than 1,250 million pounds sterling, that is to say
250 millions more than the sum-total of the debts of
the German Empire and of the individual States in
1912.
Further, the justice of this calculation is more or less
confirmed by the war-credits which so far hâve been
asked and approved in the German Empire, amounting
to 500 million pounds, to which the war contribution
of 1913 amounting to 50 millions must be added. Thèse
war loans were intended to reach until somewhere about
the end of the financial year, that is to say until about
31 st March, 1915, but doubtless they are not intended,
and are not sufficient to provide for a complète current
renewal of the material of the war which has been lost
or used up. If we add the sums necessary for this
purpose we will arrive more or less at the sum estimated
above, as that required for the conduct of the war for a
year, that is to say 1,250 million pounds sterling.
GERMANY" AWAKE! 11
The countless millions of pounds which the war is
costing and has already cost our économie life surpasses
ail estimation. The Exchanges are closed. No one
knows to-day what he possesses. In any case nearly
ail effects are as good as unrealisable ; and without the
cunningly devised system of loan-funds, a System in
essence supported on feet of clay, without the protective
laws of the 4th August and ail the other conceivable
measures which were passed, intended partly to stave
off the malady and partly to conceal it, the collapse of
our German économie life would within a short time
become an accomplished fact.
At the same time England is abused in every key
because she avails herself of the advantages conferred
on her by her geographical and économie position.
Had we been in England 's place would we hâve behaved
otherwise ? "A la guerre comme à la guerre." Every-
one défends himself to the best of his ability, and if the
English, apart from their land forces and their navy,
can make use of their économie superiority to defeat us,
who has any right to reproach them with the fact ?
Are we not speculating on the possibility of Mohamme-
dan risings in English colonies, behind which we
stand as spiritus rector} Are we not levying from
wretched and desolate Belgium, the prey of penury and
soon to be the prey of famine, — a country which after
ail is only defending its independence and freedom (a
war of libération in the true sensé !) — are we not levying
from this exhausted country and from its wholly or
partly devastated cities many hundreds of millions of
marks as a so-called "war contribution"? From my
own point of view the économie war which England
is waging against us is far préférable to the warfare of
blood which we hâve brought upon the world. The war
of blood involves the loss both of human life and
12 J'ACCUSE
of économie values; the war of trade demands only
économie sacrifices, but spares that which in the end
has the greater value, the life of men. In this it to a
certain extent approaches the conditions of peace which
exist between eountries whose relations are not regu-
lated by treaties of commerce ; in this case also we find
économie struggle without loss of life. Hère there is
indeed opened to our vision a prospect of the form
which struggles will assume in the future configuration
of human society. It will no longer be a struggle
with weapons forged of steel and of iron, but a struggle
of the nerves and of the brain, a more refined struggle
between civilised men, who will become more and more
removed from the brutal bodily struggle of wild beasts
and of barbarie nations, among whom Europe to-day
assumes the first place.
It is of course a feeble consolation that the other belli-
gerent eountries are also exhausting themselves. A
country so economically undeveloped as Russia, whose
exports and imports, in spite of her 180 million inhabi-
tants, amounted in 1912 only to 300 million pounds
sterling, need scarcely be considered in such a compari-
son. The more developed the économie life of a
country is, the more extensive its trade and its indus-
tries, the more sensible is it to the effects of war. So
far as England and France are concerned, thèse eoun-
tries are in the first place much more wealthy than
Germany, and in the second place, as we hâve already
observed, after the disappearance of the few German
commerce raiders ail fhe seas of the world are open to
them, so that they can export their produce and bring
back again from foreign eountries the necessary raw
material, the means of subsistence and any other
articles that may be required. It is at once foolish and
pernicious when the German Press and the public
GERMANY AWAKE ! 13
opinion of Germany seek to deceive themselves and
others on this point.
The crédit of the countries at war with us, so far as
France and England are concerned, has so far scarcely
suffered in any way. In foreign countries French and
English notes hâve maintained their rate of exchange
almost unaltered, whereas German notes are constantly
sinking in value. A 100-mark note can already be
purchased abroad for 112 francs (instead of nominally
125 fr.), whereas English £1 notes cost at the same time
26 francs (instead of nominally 25 fr.).
The German ,5 per cent, war-loan was issued at
97 J per cent, whereas the English 3j per cent, war-loan
was issued at 95 per cent. If the wealth and crédit of
the German Empire were equal to that of England, the
German 5 per cent, impérial loan would hâve been
about 40 per cent, more valuable than the English
3j per cent., and instead of being issued at 97^ per cent,
it could hâve been issued somewhere about 135 per cent.
In this enormous différence there is clearly revealed
the comparative économie strength and the power of
résistance possessed by the two countries. No patriotic
talk, no stifling of the truth will help us hère. Hard
facts are the best arguments. The more we ignore the
facts, the worse will it be for us. We do not succeed in
throwing sand into the eyes of others, but in lying
to ourselves we lull ourselves in hopes impossible of
fulnlment, we become ever more stiff-necked in the
pursuit of the unholy struggle, and in the end we will
accomplish our own destruction.
The Political and Military Position of the
Belligerent Countries.
The political and military aspect of affairs is precisely
similar to the économie aspect.
14 J'ACCUSE
The whole of our Colonies, built up by the expendi-
ture of many hundreds of millions of marks, and tended
with something of a mother's love, hâve been lost.
Austria has lost Galicia and part of Bukovina, and
Hungary is in danger of being overrun by the Russians.
On the other side, Belgium and the eastern corner of
France are occupied by the Germans and a small part of
eastern Poland is occupied by the allied German and
Austrfan forces. But we must not forget that French
troops are still in Upper Alsace and that until a few
days ago Russian troops were still in East Prussia. 1
Thus we see that both sides hâve in their possession
a number of objects of barter which at the end of the
war should be mutually returned as is done in the case
of prisoners. The longer the war lasts and the more
extensive it becomes, the more other countries unité
themselves to the belligerent parties, the more will the
number of thèse objects of barter increase. While the
Turks are pressing forward towards the Suez Canal, the
English are making progress in Persia, Mesopotamia,
and Arabia ; hère also it may be presumed that territory
will be seized on both sides, which on the conclusion of
peace will hâve to be exchanged.
The world-war, notwithstanding the fearful daily
impacts and loss of blood, is, as it were, being conducted
in such a way that the opponents pass each other by,
and it would be the best, because the most humane
solution, if the impacts were to become constantly
less, and, on the other hand, the possession of
territory belonging to the other side were to become
constantly more extensive. The resuit would be
the same as now, only with less loss of blood. For
1 This book was completed in February, and cannot there-
fore take account of later events; thèse, bowever, cannot
afïect tbe final resuit of tbe war.
GERMANY AWAKE ! 15
from the military, just as little as from the économie,
point of view no one can still entertain the illusion that
the war may end with a victory of the allied empires.
To-day the possibility of such an issue must already
be regarded as completely excluded. The battles in the
East are essentially no more than a défensive, unsuc-
cessfully conducted so far as Austria is concerned, but
hitherto maintained with success by Germany after the
first blows fell. What does the occupation of Lodz,
and even, so far as I am concerned, the conquest of
Warsaw mean against such a Colossus as the Russian
Empire ? Will Russia be defeated when we get posses-
sion of the half or the whole of Poland ? It will be
nothing but a new object of barter given into our hands ;
but will it mean the conquest of Russia ? Not in the
slightest.
And what about the situation in France? What
difficulties hâve we to overcome to gain possession of
even the small north-western corner of Belgium ! What
unspeakable sacrifices does that involve ! How many
thousands of poor, deluded, heroic soldiers hâve miser-
ably perished in snow and in ice, in the trenches and in
the canals, in mud and in mire, on their lips a last
whisper of f arewell to wif e and child and mother, in
their hearts a last thought of peace and home !
And why ? To gain possession of a few square mètres
of inundated and impoverished country with ruined
towns and villages, and then on to the pursuit of the
great illusion : on to Calais ! on to England ! Ail this
reminds me of a picture by Spangenberg entitled " The
Pursuit of Happiness," which thirty years ago was
rightly the subject of much admiration in the Berlin
Art Exhibition. A beautiful naked woman was repre-
sented hovering over a shining iridescent bail of glass
before a troop of wild horsemen who, with gestures of
16 J'ACCUSE
passion, are seeking to reach the crown of laurels which
she holds aloft in her right hand. She entices them
on with her ensnaring eyes; her golden-yellow hair
flutters in the wind, almost reaching the horsemen who
are nearest to her. But the crown, the object of
their passionate desires, ever éludes their longing
grasp. An abyss yawns in front, crossed only by a
narrow bridge, just broad enough to ensure a passage
for the Bail of happiness and the goddess who hovers
above it, but which means inévitable death for the
warriors in pur suit. The first is already tottering into
the chasm, the others will folio w, and the vision of
happiness dissolves, never to be seen again.
So will it be, I fear, with the invasion of England
which since the beginning of the war has been held out
to the German people as a seductive magie picture.
Near as the other side may appear, we shall not succeed
in getting over, "the water is much too deep." Hun-
dreds of thousands of men might perish in the effort,
were the venture risked, and even if we were over
there, a war of the people would be let loose, and our
troops, deprived of their connections with the home
country, would be crushed by the enemy. What every
German for months back has been whispering to his
neighbour in désire and in hope appears to me to be
nothing but a daring flight of the imagination, which
will break miserably on England's unbroken sea power.
Notwithstanding ail the admiration we may feel for
the achievements of our heroic navy, it would be foolish
to close our eyes to the fact that the gigantic superiority
of the English fleet cannot be equalised by means of
Zeppelins and submarines — of which latter, be it
observed, England possesses a greater number than we
do (in 1912, 85, to which must be added 90 French).
And in ail this we hâve to bear in mind the
GERMANY AWAKE ! 17
fact that the English fieet would be the assailant,
the German fieet would be the fleet assailed, in so far
as it managed to press forward to the Channel. The
German fleet would, however, hâve to protect not only
itself, but also clumsy cargo-boats, incapable of self-
defence, on which there would hâve to be transported to
England a number of army corps, with the appropriate
light and heavy artillery, cavalry, trains, pioneer troops,
automobiles, and air-craft material. Is such an attempt
at ail conceivable ? Is it possible that there are human
beings who are prepared to expose to destruction at a
blow, on such a scale as this, hundreds of thôusands of
their fellow men,
It should be enough for us to hâve those mountains of
corpses and of mutilated bodies which to-day already
cover the battle-fields of Europe, Asia and Africa, and
which for centuries, in virtue of their fertilising proper-
ties, will be an advantage to agriculture. Must even
the bottom of the sea also be covered with human
bodies ? Are the thôusands of brave mariners who hâve
already found death in a watery grave not sufficient ?
Must whole army-corps at one stroke be swallowed up
in the waves ?
And even assuming that we were on the other side,
would the war then in any sensé be won, would England
thereby be defeated ? Will the English nation allow
terms of peace to be dictated to them by the Germans
in London, as one can daily hear from every babbler
C
18 J'ACCUSE
and every seer of visions in Germany ? Will the English
colonies then fall into our possession ? Nothing of the
sort will happen. I should like to see how Canada,
India, Australia, and New Zealand would acclaim the
German conqueror, who, as the Chancellor has so
beautifully expressed it to an American journalist, is
destined to bring freedom to the world. Charity begins
at home. He who imposes bondage in his own house
cannot bring freedom to the world. What country
politically is so undeveloped and so gagged as Prussian
Germany, if we except Russia and our illustrious ally
Austria-Hungary ? What country has as little under-
standing as Germany of the art of assimilating to itself
foreign nationalities, of allowing them to live according
to their own habits and customs, according to their own
culture and language, of making them happy and there-
fore making them faithful? Our policy towards the
Pôles and the Danes, and towards Alsace-Lorraine,
speaks volumes on this point. Ail opposition to this
species of Germanisation has exhausted itself without
fruitful resuit. Zabern is the illuminating zénith of this
policy in the west. The Polish laws with their compul-
sory expropriation of land possessed by inheritance,
laws which hâve uselessly cost us hundreds of millions
of marks, and which hâve only produced the opposite
effect of that intended, will remain a perpétuai mémorial
of this policy in the East. In the North, against
Denmark, things are no better. At présent, of course,
in the necessity of war, this vexatious policy is being
mitigated. The Pôles hâve now suddenly become the
good child of the family. If formerly they protested
that they had no sympathy with efforts hostile to
Prussia, and that they were only urged to join the
opposition in defence of their speech and of their
nationality, their protests were constantly answered by
GERMANY AWAKE ! 19
new coercionary measures, and by an extension of the
Polish laws. Since there cannot be a Parliamentary
opposition in the misérable Junker-Parliament of
Prussia, ail warnings of the left wing were constantly
scattered to the wind, and a courageous advance was
made along the false and the costly path of Germanisa-
tion.
And is it supposed that this Germany, conducted on
Prussian principles, is endowed with the gifts necessary
to assume England 's position as a world-Power, the
position of England which owes its world power not
merely to the cold pursuit of her interests in the course
of the centuries, but above ail to her genius in under-
standing how to link foreign nations to her world
empire, without oppressing them, without even wishing
to assimilate them ?
The English language does not know the word
" Anglicisation," because the idea is absent in English
politics, as indeed language, at least in politics, ever
halts behind the " thing," and only gives expression to
what already is. Hère the saying of Goethe does not
hold:
"For where the understanding falters
A word steps in to take its place." 1
In politics the reverse is the case. The word is
discovered, when the idea exists. The word culture-
struggle (Kulturkampf) arose only when this struggle
had already broken out.
And so the English colonies will fly to us and hail us
as liberators, should we ever succeed in penetrating to
England ? Far from it. They also will défend them-
selves to the last ship and the last man, before they
1 ["Denn eben wo Begrifîe fehlen,
Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein." — Faust.]
C 2
20 J'ACCUSE
give up English freedom and independence, and surren-
der to German bondage and oppression.
The Situation in France.
So far as can be foreseen, the war in France also will
lead to no resuit which could be regarded as a victory
for Germany. A war of offence which ends in the
trenches has in advance failed in its purpose — in trenches
whose amenities hâve been enjoyed by our brave troops
for more than five months, in wind and weather, in rain
and in snow, in a monotony destructive of the body and
of the soûl, a monotony, however, agreeably inter-
rupted from time to time by bombs, shells, and
airmen's darts. On the eastern frontier of France the
line of fortifications Verdun, Toul, Nancy, Epinal, and
Belfort still stands almost unshaken, so little affected
by the besieging German armies that the French
Ministers and the Président can undertake continuous
tours of inspection from one fortress to the other. For-
tunately for a long time nothing has been heard of the
victor of Longwy, the "heroic son," as the Emperor
Francis Joseph called him in his telegram to the
Emperor William. The famous saying of Count
Hâseler, passed from mouth to mouth in Berlin, that he
intended to breakfast on Sedan day in the Café de la
Paix in the Place de l'Opéra, has not proved true.
Perhaps the Field Marshal has postponed his breakfast
until next Sedan day, unless indeed, as I fear, he has
had to postpone it ad calendas teutonicas. The French
Government and the entire diplomatie circle are back
again in Paris, and it does not look as if they had any
intention of making a speedy return to Bordeaux. As
every honest observer of the situation must admit, the
war with France has come to a standstill, and hère, if
anywhere, a standstill amounts to a withdrawal.
GERMANY AWAKE ! 21
The plans of our General Staff, weighed and matured
for years in advance, contained as the cardinal point of
the long-intended European war the rapid overthrow of
France, folio wed by a violent attack on the Russian
Colossus, with our liberated forces united with those of
Austria. Providence — almost involuntarily one falls
into the jargon of the German despatch — Providence has
ruled otherwise. After seven months of fearful conflict
France is not overthrown. Our victorious career has
been unexpectedly checked by the brilliant strategy of
Joffre, the French Moltke — (the uncle, be it observed,
not the nephew, who at présent is being medically
treated at Homburg for biliousness) — and our conquer-
ing army has been forced to a fortification war in the
trenches. The fluctuations of this fortification war,
which for the most part oscillate over advances or with-
drawals of kilomètres or half -kilomètres, are so insigni-
fiant that a décisive turn of events is scarcely to be
expected, unless our leaders résolve to throw aside every
considération for human life, unless they call our brave
German soldiers from the trenches and expose them in
frontal attacks to the devastating fire of the hostile
rifles, machine-guns, and artillery. In a few places this
has already happened, 1 and to judge from the views
and sentiments of those in our leading circles (has not
the telegram of the German Crown Prince to Colonel
1 Just before this book went to press I read the officiai
report of the General Stafî of January 15th, 1915, in which
it is pointed out with pride that in the battles around
Soissons from 4,000 to 5,000 French bodies had been found
on the field of battle. And how many German bodies were
there? And how many wounded on both sides? The
Germans as the attacking party will certainly hâve sufîered
as severely as the defenders. So altogether there would be
10,000 dead. To this, as expérience has shown, there must
be added at least three times as many wounded. There
would thus be 40,000 soldiers sacrifiçed in one battle !
22 J'ACCUSE
Reuter, so full of wit and taste, "hammer away,"
become the catchword and the watchword of the nation
of poets and thinkers ?) the gênerais will soon lose ail
patience
And if thèse further incalculable hecatombs in human
blood and human happiness are sacrificed, shall we then
hâve gained the victory ? In no way. Even if we should
succeed with ail thèse sacrifices in making a considér-
able advance, we shall only hâve gained what in the
war of 1870 we had achieved in four weeks. Without
doubt the French hâve made use of the nve months'
standstill to increase still more the strength of their
fortifications and their possible lines of retreat. Con-
stant reinforcements of English and French Colonial
troops, of which the end cannot be foreseen, fill up the
gaps and increase the number of the troops in the field.
With every week which passes in the iridecisive trench
warfare, the difficulties of our victorious advance are
increased. Even in the Boer war the English showed
how many troops they could raise in the event of war,
in spite of their small standing army. Then they carried
out the long-distance transport of troops to South
Africa; to-day they hâve only to cross the narrow
Channel. Our opponents continue to increase, and to-day
we hâve with luck already got as far as the second levy
of the Landsturm.
Partie Remise.
How is it to end ? In the most favourable circum-
stances as partie remise, — with a conclusion of hostili-
GERMANY AWAKE ! 23
ties which for both sides will mean a complète exhaus-
tion in men and in wealth, but which will mean for
neither side a victory.
According to my sure and earnest conviction that is
the most favourable resuit which Germany can still
expect. The possibility of an issue which could more or
less be designated as a victory, I regard as wholly
excluded. And the longer the war lasts the less chance
will there be of this relatively favourable issue, the
greater will be the probability of a development, which
if not a décisive defeat of Germany, would yet represent
an overwhelming exhaustion of her resources in com-
parison with those of her opponents, and which would
therefore inevitably lead to the conditions of peace
being framed on less favourable lines than would now
be granted.
Austria has already reached the limits of her strength.
In the case of Germany it is not yet possible to speak
of any décisive weakening. We still stand erect; we
can still offer everywhere a bold forehead to the enemy.
Our resources in men and in money are not yet
exhausted. But this condition of " not yet " cannot
now endure for long. It is foolish to pursue an ostrich
policy. No matter how dexterously, folio wing the
watchword that has been issued, we hide our head in
the sand, the enemy still sees the weaknesses which
shake the body of our people, they still see the seeds
of that malady which must lead to our destruction.
We can still ask for an honourable peace. If we
from our side freely ask it we shall atone for a small part
of the wrong which we hâve committed by conjuring
up this world catastrophe, the wrong which has drawn
upon us the hatred and the loathing of the whole
civilised world, not of our enemies merely, but also of
neutral nations.
34 J'ACCUSE
THE QUESTION OF GUILT.
That we hâve forfeited the sympathies of the world is
not due to malevolence, envy, and lies ; our own actions
must bear the responsibility for this. Foreign countries,
and above ail those which are neutral, know better than
the German nation the development of e vents, they
know who bears the guilt of the world catastrophe.
Foreign neutral countries know well enough our political
conditions. They know that under a mask of constitu-
tionalism we are in fact ruled absolutely. Recently
they observed how an Impérial Chancellor of Germany,
against whom Parliament by a three-fifths majority
passed a vote expressive of its lack of confidence, could
yet continue to hold office unshaken, secure in the
support of the Court and the military circles, — an occur-
rence which, apart from Russia, is no longer possible in
any other civilised country. They know that the Prus-
sian people are politically without rights, and that they
are governed by a small clique of Junkers who hâve
taken in fee ail the high offices in the Government and
in the army.
Above ail neutral countries know — and now I corne
to the cardinal points in what I hâve to say —
that the plans and the préparations for this war
hâve long been made by Germany and Austria not only
from a military but also from a political point of view ;
that for long it had been resolved to represent
this offensive war to the German people as a war
of libération, because it was known that only
thus could the necessary popular enthusiasm be
awakened ;
that the object of this war is an attempt to establish
a hegemony on the continent and, as a later sequel,
the acquisition of England's position of power in the
GERMANY AWAKE
25
world according to the principle "ôte-toi de là que je
m'y mette.' '*
For thèse facts and endeavours there is in existence
évidence of so convincing a character written by our-
selves in the German language, that it is a task as
infatuated as it is hopeless to try to combat the convic-
tion of the whole world by the untenable publications of
those who take it upon themselves to " enlighten " the
world about Germany.
II.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME
Our Imperialists : Bernhardi and Co.
The writings of Bernhardi, Germany and the Next
War, of Frobenius, The German Empire 9 s H our of
Destiny, the books of Treitschke, German History and
Politics, are as well known abroad as in Germany, and
they hâve in part been translated into foreign lan-
guages. The imperialistic tendencies of a political
clique hâve never been more distinctly expressed than
in thèse writings, and, in the view of their originators,
justified.
A few quotations from Bernhardi may sufnce. This
man is a Prussian Cavalry General, and, if I am not
mistaken, has been entrusted with a command in the
East, and he has already been decorated with the Iron
Cross of the First Class. That he is compétent and
authorised to give expression to the views of authorita-
tive German circles can scarcely be disputed.
On page 255 of his book we find ' :
" The Government will never be able to count upon a well-
armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or
necessity, if it calmly looks on while the war-like spirit is
being systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble
peace policy preached, still less if it allows its own organs to
join in with the same note, and continually to emphasise the
maintenance of peace as the object of ail policy. It must
rather do everything to foster a military spirit, and to make
the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an impérial
policy.
1 [Références are adapted to the English translation
(popular édition). Edward Arnold, London.]
26
HISÏORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 27
"It must continually point to the significance and the
necessity of war as an indispensable agent in policy and
civilisation together with the duty of self-sacrifice and
dévotion to State and country."
Page 257 :
"The soûl of our nation is not reflected in that part of
the Press with its continuai dwelling on the necessity of up-
holding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and corn-
prehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness.
" On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place
among the Powers and for manly action fills our nation.
Every vigorous utterance, every bold political step of the
Government, finds in the soûl of the people a deeply felt
écho, and loosens the Bonds which fetter ail their forces.
In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again
and again found noble expression. But the statesman who
could satisfy this yearning, which slumbers in the heart of
our people undisturbed by the clamour of parties and the
party Press, would carry ail spirits with him."
Page 258 :
"Such a policy (i.e., a military policy) is also the best
school in which to educate a nation to great military achieve-
ments. When their spirits are turned towards high aims
they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely,
and to prépare their minds to it:
' The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims.' "...
. . . "We Germans hâve a far greater and more urgent
duty towards civilisation to perform than the Great Asiatic
Power. We, like the Japanese, can only fulfil it by the
sword.
" Shall we, then, décline to adopt a bold and active policy,
the most effective means with which we can prépare our
people for its military duty ? "
On page 275 :
"A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without
taking chances and facing risks. It must be conscious of
its goal, and keep this goal steadily in view. It must press
every change of circumstances and ail unforeseen occurrences
into the service of its own ideas. Above ail things, it must
be ready to seize the psychological moment, and take bold
action if the gênerai position of affairs indicates the possibility
28 J'ACCUSE
of realising political ambitions or of waging a necessary war
under favourable conditions."
Pages 275-6 :
" ' Old Fritz ' must be our model in this respect (i.e., in
disregarding historical rights), and must teach us with re-
morseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of
the political world may be favourable for us, and that we do
not miss the golden opportunity .
" It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising âge tries
to stigmatise that energetic policy which pursued positive
aims as an adventurist policy."
On page 277 the author points out that the military
and political préparation for war must go hand in hand
in order to make it possible to strike at the moment
which from the military point of view is the most
favourable,
"The obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof
from politics in peace as well as in war only holds good in a
limited sensé. The War Minister and the Head of the
General Staff must be kept au courant with the all-fluctuating
phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certain
influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its
needs, and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if
the military situation is peculiarly favourable."
Page 280 :
"The disadvantages of such a situation (i.e., the war on
two fronts) can only be avoided by a policy which makes it
feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to overthrow
the one antagonist before the other can actively interfère.
On this initiative our safety now dépends just as it did in the
days of Frederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly
in the face."
On the same page our diplomacy is entrusted with
the task of so " shuffling the cards that we may be
attacked by France." The author then continues :
"This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must
not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively.
Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in
order to further their interests. So long as we sbrink from
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 29
attack they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy,
as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows, and as the
issue of the Balkan crisis will probably also demonstrate.
" If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we
must initiât e an active policy, which, without attacking
France, will so préjudice her interests or those of England,
that both thèse States would feel themselves compelled to
attack us. Opportunities for such procédure are offered both
in Africa and in Europe."
That is plain enough, is it not ? Not only the ten-
dencies of German policy are revealed without any
disguise, but the manner in which thèse tendencies are
to be realised is prescribed with the minutest détail. The
Chancellor, it must be admitted, has been an apt pupil
of the General and has fulfilled in a masterly fashion
his task of so shuffling the cards that out of the offen-
sive war there has been created a war of libération. At
least that is how it appears in the eyes of the simple
Michael, 1 for the rest of the world has long ago seen
through the gigantic fraud.
But let us hear further how Herr Bernhardi chatters
out of school.
Page 286:
"The worst resuit of our Morocco policy is, however, un-
doubtedly the deep rift which has been formed in consé-
quence between the Government and the mass of the
nationalist party, the loss of confidence among large sections
of the nations, extending even to classes of Society which, in
spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had
heartily supported it as the représentative of the Empire
abroad. In this weakening of public confidence, which is
undisguisedly shown both in the Press and in the Reichstag,
lies in my opinion the great disadvantage of the Franco-
German understanding."
1 [Michael, a name commonly given to the German
people, somewhat analogous to John Bull. The chief features
of the German Michael are simplicity and honesty, amount-
ing almost to stupidity.]
30 J'ACCUSE
Bernhardi would naturally hâve preferred that we
should even then hâve allowed a European war to break
out on account of the Morocco dispute, but he consoles
himself with the thought that ail chances are not yet
past.
Page 285 :
"We need not, therefore, regard this convention as défini-
tive. It is as liable to revision as the Algeciras treaty, and in-
deed ofEers, in this respect, the advantage that it créâtes new
opportunities of friction with France/'
That is the Record : an International treaty which
has prevented a world-war, meets with the conditional
approval of the author, only because it offers new
sources of friction, and so, it may be hoped, will soon
lead to the world-war which he desires.
Particularly instructive is his discussion of our
relations to England and of the negotiations then being
conducted in Berlin by Lord Haldane. Thèse negotia-
tions along with the previous and subséquent English
proposais with a view to arriving at a political and
naval understanding with Germany deserve a spécial
chapter, in which it will be clearly shown that England
constantly and in the most earnest manner took the
initiative in thèse negotiations, but that thèse were
always wrecked on the refusai of Germany or on the
impossible conditions which she sought to impose.
Perhaps on this point also they were following the
prescription of Bernhardi, which runs :
Page 287 :
"Even English attempts at a rapprochement must not
blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them
to delay the necessary inévitable war, until we may
fairly imagine we hâve some prospect of success."
In the concluding apostrophe of his book the author
emphatically exclaims :
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 31
Pages 287-8:
"If the Impérial Government was of the opinion that it
was necessary in the présent circumstances to avoid war,
still the situation in the world generally shows there can
only be a short respite, before we once more face the question
whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world
or renounce such position once and for ail. We must not in
any case wait. . . . The political situation offers many
points on which to rest our lever. England, too, is in a
most difficult position. . . . The disturbances in the Far
East will probably fetter Russia's forces, and England 's
interests will suffer in sympathy. Thèse are ail conditions
which an energetic and far-sighted German policy can
utilise in order to influence the gênerai political situation in
the interests of our Fatherland.
"If people and Government stand together, resolved to
guard the honour of Oermany and make every sacrifice of
blood and treasure to insure the future of our country and
our State . . . we need not fear to fight for our position in
the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz Arndt, raise our
hands to heaven and cry to God :
' From the height of the starry sky
May thy ringing sword flash bright;
Let every craven cry
Be silenced by thy might ! ' "
In conclusion I should further like merely to draw
attention to the headings of the chapters of Bernhardi's
book, which afford so clear an insight into the tendencies
of the author, that it might appear almost superfluous
to read his work.
Chapter 1. The right to make war.
Chapter 2. The duty to make war.
Chapter 3. A brief survey of Germany's historical
development.
Chapter 4. Germany's historical mission.
Chapter 5. World power or Downfall.
Chapter 6. The character of our next war.
Chapter 7. The next naval war, &c.
S2 J'ACCUSE
I wish once more in as emphatic a manner as possible
to draw attention to the fact that Bernhardi expressly
excludes an offensive war on the part of the Triple
Entente, and he indicates that the only method of
arriving at the desired world-war, and at the same time
at world-dominion, is that Germany must act as an
agent provocateur and must so shuffle the cards that
the other side will be compelled to attack.
This of course does not prevent Bernhardi and his
comrades in the faith, especially Frobenius, from speak-
ing elsewhere of the aggressive intentions of the Triple
Entente, and from depicting the dangers to which
Germany is exposed, unless she anticipâtes thèse inten-
tions.
Hâve we been Attacked or were we Going
to be Attacked ?
This is the same logic as we hear to-day in every
corner of Germany, if indeed what is heard in Germany
can still be designated as logic. The officiai version
states that the Triple Entente has attacked us. " We
hâve to protect our holiest possessions, the Fatherland
and our own hearths against a sudden ruthless attack. ,:
(The appeal of the Emperor on the 6th August to the
German army.) " The sword must then décide. In the
midst of peace the enemy falls upon us, therefore to
arms ! Every hésitation, every delay, would be
treachery to the Fatherland. The existence of our
empire is at stake — the existence of German power and
German character."
Such is the officiai version which crops up in a
thousand various forms from the Chancellor down to
the last street-sweeper.
Semi-officially however and in the confidence of
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 3$
secrecy many Germans can be heard asserting that we
were not, it is true, attacked, but that we would hâve
been attacked later, if we had not now begun the war
at a moment favourable for us. Should we then ask
for évidence in support of this hypothesis, most of
those who maintain this view hâve nothing to say, or
else they déclare that the intention of the enemy to
attack us was so obvious that any proof would be
superfluous. " What did they mean by their enormous
préparations ?" is what they most frequently say.
And what about our préparations ? I reply, which
were certainly greater and more comprehensive than in
any other country in the world. Did ever any country
in time of peace act as we did in 1913 when we suddenly
raised the strength of our army on a peace footing by
140,000 men, that is to say, from 720,000 to 860,000,
and when we rose to an extraordinary war tax of
£50,000,000 ? " What was the meaning of the Entente,
the celebrated policy of ' encirclement ' (Einkreisung),
if they did not mean to attack us ? " is what they next
say. And what, I reply, was the meaning of the Triple
Alliance which involved even stricter obligations than
the Entente, and in spite of this, according to our
assertions, was défensive in its nature? " Yes, but
think of the Pan-Slavs !" is urged as an objection
against me. And what about the Pan-Germans ? I
venture to answer. Are our " Alldeutschen," our
national party, our Pan-Germans of the school of
Treitschke and Bernhardi, in any way better or less
aggressive than the Pan-Slavs ? Such " Pan-tenden-
cies ' are to be found in ail countries. They are
harmless, so long as they do not advance to action.
The décisive act was however taken by our Pan-
Germans, when they drove us into this horrible war — a
war desired and openly proclaimed by them.
D
M J'ACCUSE
The Head of the War Party.
And they had and still hâve friends and patrons in
high places. They hâve gradually acquired more influ-
ence in our authoritative circles than ever the Pan-Slavs
exercised at the Russian Court. I need not mention by
name the person who for years has been the influential
head and the battering-ram of this movement against
the originally peace-loving mind of the Emperor.
Everyone knows to whom I refer. The Zabern telegram,
the message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars, the open
démonstration from the tribune of the Reichstag against
our Morocco policy, which was at the time still peaceful
in intention — thèse and countless other occurrences and
suggestions leave not the slightest room for doubt as to
the quarter and the camp from which the inciters to
war hâve discharged their destructive missiles over
Germany. One has but to wander along the streets of
Berlin to see in ail bookshops the work of Frobenius
entitled The German Empire' s H our of Destiny, with
the commendatory telegram of the exalted gentle-
man on the outside. In his recommendation he
expresses the désire that this " distinguished book '
which he has "read with the greatest interest" will
find the widest circulation among the German people.
And this Frobenius is a comrade in thought of Bern-
hardi, and the whole purport of his book is that we
should strike bef ore it is too late ; since the others mean
to attack us, we must anticipate them and attack them.
Of course no proof, not the shadow of a proof, is
advanced in support of this premise, which in reality
is but a pretext, and which is denied by Bernhardi
himself in the passage quoted above (page 280).
But that does not inconvenience thèse great minds;
they do not recognise the defects of their logic. They
do not see that of the two assertions only one can be
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME B5
true. Either we hâve been attacked, in which case we
are conducting a défensive war, or else we were going to
be attacked, and in that case we are conducting a
préventive war. If the second statement is true the
first must be untrue; and in that case ail officiai utter-
ances from the Impérial speech from the Palace on the
31 st July down to the speech of the Chancellor on the
2nd December are branded as lies.
If the assertion that it is a défensive war is true, the
idea of a préventive war is at once put completely aside,
and it is superfluous to discuss further whether the
presuppositions of a préventive war in fact existed, or
whether such a préventive war politically and morally
can be defended. Bismarck, who after ail knew some-
thing about politics, emphatically answered this latter
question in the négative, in stating that " even victori-
ous wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon
one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence
far enough ahead to anticipate historical development
according to one's own calculation." 1
This dictum of the great man of the past appears to
hâve f ail en into oblivion. While monument after
monument has been erected to his memory, this
sentence might hâve been inscribed in brass and in
marble in the walls of the palaces of kings and of
Government s, in places where it would at ail times hâve
been visible; then perhaps the German people and the
world might hâve been spared this most terrible of
evils. Bismarck also after 1870 was repeatedly urged
by Gênerais and by the instigators of war to undertake
a new campaign against France in order to crush once
for ail and to make harmless for ail time the country
that was again raising its head. Ail such efforts he
1 Bismarck Gedanken und Ennnerungen [Vol. II. p. 102
of the English translation. Smith, Elder and Co.]
D 2
M J'ACCUSE
cnn.slantly rvjrrlnl w il!» unyioldin^ «mr^y, and the ïdtà
of initiating a war because it must corne sooner or latcr
he declarcd to be "criminal" and "insané. 99
The saying is apposite» and those whom it fits will
DOt be able to escape its application.
THE IMPERIAL WAR.
The Place in the Sun.
It will be obvions from ail that I hâve so far said
that I regard the présent war neither as a défensive nor
as a préventive war. Thia war is purcly a war of
conquest, born of impcrialist ideas and serving
imperialist ends. It is nothing else.
It is a war for the celebrated "Place in the sun,"
which it is supposed is bcing refused us, and which wc
must take forcibly with the sword in our hand.
What is the meaning of the " Place in the sun " ?
No one says clearly what it is, and everyone under-
stands the phrase in a différent sensé.
The idea is so alien to the pcople that it may bc
prcsumed that they would not hâve allowed themselves
to hâve been sacrificed, if it had been said to thcm :
" You must gain for us a place in the sun."
For the initiated however it is the magie spell which
unités their imperialistic desires. " Only thus relying
on the sword, can we gain the place in the sun, which
is our due, but which is not voluntarily accorded to us "
(Crown Prince Wilhelm). With this inscription, and
with the motto "pro patria et gloria," the photograph
of the German Crown Prince is sold in German book-
shops.
The Chosen Peuple.
The place in the sun is the world-power which is due
to us, as to the chosen people of God. From the point
IIISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 37
of vicw of the psychology of the nation it is remark-
ahle how the old Jewish idea has mastered the good,
Christian, Protestant, anti-semitic Empire, and how it
bal ousted the true teaching of Christ, that ail men are
brothers.
We change our religious ideas, like our uniforms,
according to our needs and our circumstances.
The God, whom in war we invoke every day, whom
we entreat to grant that we may destroy as many of the
enemy as possible, and to whom we give thanks when
he fulfils our prayers, is the old Jewish God, Jehovah,
the God of battles and of vengeance, to whom no sacri-
fice appears too grcat, if it is to serve the power and
the dominion of His chosen people. The Christian God,
however, and His " only-begotten Son," who wandered
about on earth preaching love and sacrifice, whose king-
dom is not of this world — they hâve nothing to do with
this shedding of blood, which is entirely contradictory
to the doctrine they taught. ,
The observations of Kant in his essay on Perpétuai
Peace are entirely in the spirit of the Christian
religion.
"On the conclusion of poaoe at the end of the war it
might not be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of
humiliation, after the festival of thanksgiving, on which
to invoke the morcy of Heaven for the terrible sin which
the human race are guilty of , in their continued unwillingness
to submit (in their relations with other States) to a law-
governed constitution, preferring rather in the pride of their
itxlependence to use the barbarous rnethod of war, which
aftor ail does not really settle what is wanted, namely,
the right of each State in a quarrel. The feasts of thanki-
f^iving during a war for a victorious battle, the hymns which
38 J'ACCUSE
are sung — to use the Jewish expression — ' to the Lord of
Hosts,' are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea of
a father of mankind; for, apart from the indifférence thèse
customs show to the way in which nations seek to establish
their rights — sad enough as it is — thèse rejoicings bring in an
élément of exultation that a great number of lives, or at least
the happiness of many, has been destroyed." 1
That is true Christianity, and at the same time it is
the true crown of German culture. Those same people,
however, who profess that they are drawing the sword
on behalf of this culture trample its finest products in
the dust, and rattle over it with their cannons.
If it were known in certain places in Germany how
educated men and religious people throughout the whole
world judge thèse continuai blasphemous appeals to
God,
1 [Perpétuai Peace. English translation by Miss Camp-
bell Smith (George Allen and Unwin), pp. 136-7. Later
références to Kant's essay are also adapted to this édition.]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 39
Luigi Luzzatti, one of the most distinguished politi-
cians and most important thinkers in Italy, who, as is
well known, has more than once been Prime Minister
(be it observed a strict Jew — this I mention as an
example to Germany whose mission is to " bring free-
dom," although in time of peace it does not go so far
as to promote a Jew to be a Second Lieutenant), Luigi
Luzzatti has recently published in the Cornière délia
Sera a remarkable article bearing the title "The abuse
of the name of God," from which I quote some
sentences :
" From the day on which this fearful war broke out Princes
(not the people, it must be said) hâve bored everyone by the
use and abuse of the name of God. In the telegrams which
were recently exchanged between the Austrian Emperor and
the Sultan the Almighty makes His appearance. The matter
would take on an ironical tinge if up in Heaven the con-
querors and the defeated of Lepanto and the soûl of John
Sobieski were to hear of it. One could hâve wished that at
least on this occasion they might hâve felt enough shame to
induce them to leave heaven in peace out of the question !
. . . Fortunately God has not yet appeared in the telegrams
exchanged between the monarchs of England and Japan.
And indeed it would hâve been a difficult matter to recon-
cile in the same fearful uproar of war Jésus and Buddha, a
religion without God and a religion which rests on a personal
God and Saviour. We are reminded of a bitterly ironical
saying of Voltaire, who observed ' Since God created man in
His own image, how often has man endeavoured to render a
similar service to God. ' . . . Let us save God from such pro-
fanation ! Let us leave in peace the Father of ail mankind
who punishes guilt and rewards virtue, and who gives no one
the right to represent Him on earth, and to claim for himself
His omnipotence in this tragedy of war."
Such is the judgment of serious men abroad on certain
German peculiarities and on. the presumption of
Germany to be the chosen people of God.
The place in the sun which is due to us as the chosen
40 J'ACCUSE
people, thus represents the true object of this war, even
if it is not admitted to the nation that this is the object.
Germany 's Brilliant Development.
If anyone seeks a place in the sun, and seeks it sword
in hand, it must be assumed that hitherto he has stood
in the shadow. Is this so in the case of Germany? I
maintain that the opposite is the case, and in support
of this assertion I rely on those very people, who hâve
pressed the sword into our hand to enable us to seek
a place in the sun. In the chapter entitled " Financial
and Political Préparation for War " (p. 260 et seq.)
Bernhardi gives a comprehensive view of the brilliant
and unprecedented économie development of Germany
since the Franco-Prussian war. He points out, and
supports his assertion freely with statistics, that the
increase of wealth continues on an ascending scale, and
that the advance in trade and industry since the founda-
tion of the Empire has been extraordinary. He quotes
a lecture delivered by Prof essor Dade before a gênerai
meeting of the Finance and Tax-Reformers held on the
22nd February, 1910, from which we gather that the
value of German imports and exports in the last years
before 1910 had increased from 300 million pounds
sterling to between 725 million pounds and 800 million
pounds. In 1912 German imports and exports reached
a value of approximately 1,200 million pounds sterling.
The value of the import of raw material for industrial
purposes rose from 75 million pounds in 1879 to 225
million pounds ; the import of manuf actured goods rose
from 30 million pounds in 1879 to 62j million pounds in
1908, and the export of manufactured goods during the
same period rose from 50 million pounds to over 200
million. The amount of coal raised in 1879 was only
42 million tons ; in 1908 it was 148J million tons, and the
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 41
value of the coal raised increased from 5 million pounds
to 75 millions. The production of iron ore rose from
6 million to 27 million tons, and in value it rose from
£1,350,000 to £5,950,000. From 1888 to 1908 the
amount of coal raised in Germany increased by 127 per
cent., as against only 59 per cent, in England. The
production of pig iron in Germany in the twenty years
mentioned above rose 172 per cent., as against only
27 per cent, in England. Similar figures, according to
Dade and Bernhardi, can be adduced in ail other
sphères.
At the same time there took place a continued growth
in revenue and a progressive capitalisation. From 1892
to 1905 an increase in national wealth of about 100 mil-
lion pounds sterling has taken place annually in Prussia
alone. In the grades of the Property Tax ranging
from £300 to £5,000 the number of those taxed and the
number of properties on which taxes are paid has
increased in thèse fourteen years by 29 per cent.,
whereas from 1905 to 1908 the increase was 11 per cent.,
that is to say, in the first period the yearly increase
was 2 per cent., but in récent years 3 per cent.
An even greater increase has taken place in the case
of the large fortunes. In the grades of the property
tax ranging from £5,000 to £25,000 the increase in the
numbers paying, and the properties on which payment
is made, has been about 44 per cent., that is, on an
average of the fourteen years, 3 per cent, annually; in
the last three years however it has been 4*6 per cent.
The higher the grades of the tax, the greater is the
increase; in the grades from £300 to £5,000 the increase
per head of the population has been £32 10s. ; in the
grades from £5,000 to £25,000 there was an increase per
head of £320, and in the grades above £25,000 there
was an increase of £3,522^ per head per year.
42 J'ACCUSE
Emphasis is further laid on the increase of wages, on
the decrease of unemployment and of émigration as
signs of our économie prosperity, and statistics are
adduced in support of thèse contentions. In 1908 only
20,000 emigrants left our country, whereas in the same
year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain.
The investment of capital in State railways amounted
at the end of March, 1908, in Prussia to £494,400,000
and at the end of 1911 to £552,500,000.
This br illiant picture of our indus trial development,
which could be supported by a séries of other figures, is
naturally of use to General Bernhardi, only in so far as
it enables him to represent as tolerable a further
increase of military burdens. He forgets, however, that
in thus demonstrating our continuous increase of
national wealth, and in particular in emphasising our
increasing advantage over England, he cuts from under
his own feet the ground on which there should be
erected the édifice of his Imperialism. If we already
hâve such a sunny corner in the sun, what is still
lacking? What more do we want?
If in many respects we, the most récent industrial
State in the world, the growth of scarcely more than
two générations, are already placing England, the
oldest industrial State, in the shadow, we certainly
cannot complain of any deficiency of sunshine.
What about extension of territoryf What about
Colonies? Does the happiness of nations dépend on the
number of square miles which they possess, or does it
dépend on their Colonies ? If that were the case, small
countries like Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Den-
mark, Sweden, and Norway would necessarily be poor
in comparison with Great States, whereas as a matter
of fact the opposite is the case. The highest figures for
imports and exports per head of the population is
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 43
shown by Holland, followed by Belgium, Switzerland,
and Denmark, and then only after thèse corne the great
Powers. The Belgian 3 per cents, stood at 96 when
the German stood at 83 per cent. The Norwegian
3j per cents, stood at 102, when the Russian could be
had at 81. Similar figures may be adduced in
every sphère of économie life. The greatness of a
country, and in particular the eœtent of its Colonial
possessions, has no relation to the prosperity of a
country.
The best proof for this fact is found in Germany
itself. No one, not even the most fanatical nationalist,
will or can dispute the fact that the increase in pros-
perity of Germany in the last forty years, and in parti-
cular in the twenty-six years which hâve elapsed since
the présent Emperor ascended the throne, has been
without précèdent in the history of the world. On the
occasion of the célébration of the twenty-fifth anniver-
sary of the accession of William II. a compilation
appeared under the title, Social Culture and the Well-
being of the People during the first 25 Years of the
Reign of William IL This work describes, and supports
with statistics, the prosperity of Germany in ail branches
of human culture during this period. It is superfluous
to reproduce hère thèse well-known figures. Only a few
need hère be cited. The population has increased from
forty-eight millions in 1888 to sixty-seven millions in
1914. The yearly increase due to births amounted in
1911 to 11*8 per thousand inhabitants, and was only
exceeded by Russia with 17 per thousand. The produc-
tion of pig-iron (estimated in thousands of tons) rose
from 4,024 in 1887 to 17,853 in 1912, that is to say, by
343*6 per cent., whilst the production of Great Britain
in the same time only increased by 176 per cent.,
namely, from 7,681 to 9,031. The production of
44 J'ACCUSE
America in pig-iron increased in the same time by
363*2 per cent., that is, from 6,520 to 30,203, and thus
America still takes the first place in this field of produc-
tion, while Germany has advanced from the third place
in 1887 to the second place in 1912, thereby outstripping
England and attaining a percentage of increase twenty
times as great.
A development on exactly similar lines is shown in
the production of steel, which (also estimated in
thousands of tons) has risen from 1,1639 in 1887 to
17,302 in 1912. Hère also we hâve advanced from the
third place to the second in the production of the world,
and hâve considerably outstripped England, whose
production has only increased from 3,196*8 in 1887 to
6,563*3 in 1911. Estimating the increase by percent-
ages, Germany hère takes the first place, and leaves far
behind both of her competitors America and England.
The increase in percentage amounted in the twenty-five
years mentioned in Germany to no less than 1,377 per
cent., in America 835 per cent., and in England only
105 per cent.
The net tonnage of our German mercantile fleet has
increased from 1,240,182 in 1888 to 3,153,724 in 1913,
and at the same time it is specially to be noted that the
commercial value of the individual vessels has been
enormously increased by the transformation from sail-
ing ships into steamships. The net tonnage of steam-
ships alone has almost increased six-fold in the period
mentioned ; it has risen from 470,364 in 1888 to 2,655,496
in 1913.
The increase of the national income and the national
wealth correspond to the commercial and industrial
development of Germany. Dr. Karl Helfferich, Director
of the German Bank, 1 in his contribution to the compila-
1 Now Secretary of the Treasury.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 45
tion mentioned above summarises his conclusions in the
folio wing words :
"The German national income amounts to-day to 2,150
million pounds annually as against from 1,150 to 1,250
million pounds in 1895.
"Of thèse 2,150 millions about 350 millions, that is to say
a bare sixth, are applied annually for public purposes; from
1,350 to 1,450 million pounds are used privately, and about
400 to 425 millions, which may be raised by the automatic
increase in value of wealth now in existence to 500 million
pounds, grow as an increase of the wealth of the nation as
against a sum of from 225 to 250 millions 15 years ago.
• The wealth of the German people amounts to-day to more
than 15,000 million pounds, as against about 10,000 million
pounds about the middle of the nineties of last century.
'Thèse solid figures summarise, expressed in money, the
resuit of the enormous économie labour, which Germany
has achieved under the government of our Emperor."
That is the place in the sun which we occupy, which
no one has disputed, can dispute, or means to dispute,
a place in the sun for which we are indebted to the
spirit of enterprise, the pertinacity and the skilful
methods of our merchants and our manufacturer s, but
not to the braggart company of our nationalists, and
just as little to the sword of our Gênerais or the plans
of campaign of our General Staff.
It is exclusively the work of the German merchant
and his motto "My field is the world," exclusively the
resuit of the long-enduring condition of peace, which,
to judge from the expérience of the past, the longer it
lasted would hâve more and more promoted the pros-
perity of the German people.
Increase of Population and the Colonies.
The objection is advanced that it is indeed precisely
the increase of the German people, the yearly accession
to our population of about 800,000 soûls, which neces-
sarily demands such an extension of territory. Where,
46 J'ACCUSE
it is asked, are ail thèse new people to find sustenance
and a home ? The objection is as insecurely founded
as ail the others. If Germany were too small to support
its increasing population, the émigration statistics would
show a constant rise. The opposite, however, is the case.
The number of emigrants from 1881 to 1890 amounted
yearly to 134,200, from 1891 to 1910 to only 52,800
yearly, and in 1912 only 18,500 people emigrated from
Germany.
On the other hand, the number of immigrants has
increased. Whereas, formerly, immigrants were con-
siderably fewer than emigrants, in the last fifteen years
or so they hâve exceeded the latter so that the stream
of émigration is on the point of flowing towards instead
of away from Germany. 1
From thèse figures it may be deduced that Germany,
so far from not being m a position to give employment
and nourishment to its increasing population, offers, on
the contrary, increasing opportunities of employment
and nourishment, not only for its own population, but
also for those persons who stream to it from abroad.
At the same time wa'ges show a constant, although by
no means a sumcient, rise.
And this fabulous development took place at a time
when other countries, and particularly France, were
substantially extending their Colonial possessions, while
our Colonial possessions remained limited to the few
places in Africa, East Asia, and in the Pacific which
could still be acquired by a Germany which arrived too
late on the scène. What has the importance of thèse
Colonies been in connection with our économie develop-
ment in the last forty years ? In this they hâve played
no part, not the slightest. If we add together the sums
which our Colonies hâve cost us directly and indirectly
» See Helfferich, p. 17.
HISTORÎCAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 47
(in the indirect cost we must allow for the increase of
the fleet abroad rendered necessary for their protection),
and if on the other side we reckon the financial advan-
tages obtained from thèse Colonies, we shall find as the
resuit that we hâve made a misérable bargain.
In this respect also Bismarck saw much further than
his successors. He resolved on the first steps towards
a colonial policy, only when subjected to strong pressure
and almost against his will, and he constantly remained
aware of the fact that this policy is one that cuts both
ways; he realised that it would afford our enemies new
points of attack, while furnishing us with no correspond-
ing advantages.
The présent occurrences hâve proved the justice of his
foresight. Our Colonies hâve delivered into our
enemies' hands objects of exchange, which are indeed
materially of no value to us, but in our imagination,
seeing that we hâve once possessed them, they hâve for
us a certain worth, which our enemies will make us pay
dear for on the conclusion of peace.
Materially they hâve no value for us. Will anyone
venture to assert that our economical prosperity (which
I hâve supported with figures quoted above) would hâve
been diminished by one iota if we had never possessed
either South West or East Africa, Kiao-chau, or
Samoa ? The total white population of our Colonies
amounted in 1913 to something over 27,000, that is to
say, about 3' 5 per cent, of the annual increase of the
population of Germany. Would there hâve arisen in our
country any question of over-population or of a scarcity
of food if thèse 27,000 people had remained in Germany ?
Would this increase, or rather this non-withdrawal,
hâve exercised the slightest effect on our économie life,
on the life of 67 million people ?
Further, the entire commercial intercourse of Ger-
48 J'ACCUSE
many with her Colonies in imports and exports amounts
to-day to something over £5,000,000. The total imports
and exports of Germany in 1912 amounted in round
figures to £1,000,000,000. The trade with the Colonies
thus amounts to 0'5 per cent, of our total foreign trade.
If this 0*5 per cent, fell away, would Germany economi-
cally so much as feel the effect ? But indeed this per-
centage would not fall away, if we did not possess thèse
Colonies. If the Colonies need our products they would
buy them just as much if they were not our possessions,
but were either independent, or were subject to the rule
of another people. We hâve indeed no monopoly of
trade with our Colonies, but they belong to the territory
of the German Empire, and are bound to the commercial
treaties concluded by Germany. In spite of the fact
that we possess our Colonies, we meet within them the
compétition of ail industrial countries, regulated by
commercial treaties ; it f ollows that even if we were not
the owners, they would still buy from us those of our
wares which we could deliver better and at a cheaper
rate than others could.
Our TRUE Colonies.
Our best customers are in fact precisely those countries
which we hâve never possessed, and which we never can
possess: England, Russia, France, Italy, America,
Brazil, the Argentine — thèse are our true Colonies;
thèse are the countries which, in the enormous develop-
ments of exchange in the modem world of trade, make
us rich by the purchase of our manufactures, while we
draw from them as an équivalent the raw material which
we need, as well as manufactures of foreign origin.
Thèse are the countries which open to the German
merchant inexhaustible fields of activity, where in free
compétition with the trading nations of the world he
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 49
can spread his pinions and can make his efficiency felt.
Thèse are the gigantic sponges which absorb millions
in the form of German produce transferred thither by
German merchants settled abroad, and there distributed
through ail the industrial channels. Throughout the
whole world huge German trading firms, either enjoying
a position of independence or acting as the branches of
the central house, may be seen flourishing and develop-
ing their strength in the struggle with English and
American compétition. That is the biological struggle
for existence which to-day rules the world, not the
armed struggle of barbarie times. That is the struggle
that will always remain, the struggle of efficiency against
in efficiency, the struggle of skill against stupidity, the
struggle of endurance against slackness, above ail the
struggle which in reality produces the flower of the
higher modem type of humanity, the spiritually higher
which on the nrm basis of a wellbeing embracing ail
circles of the people can rise even to higher levels of
morality and of culture.
Those who speak for our imperialist party naturally
know nothing of this struggle; for them the merchant
will always remain a term of contempt, no matter how
glad they may be to take home in marriage to their
noble castles the daughters of wealthy merchants. The
officers and the junkers still remain the highest caste
in the country. They remain the props of the throne
and of the altar, of discipline and of morals. They would
not care a brass button if, as a conséquence of their
militant undertakings, ail that the merchant has through
long générations built up as a resuit of arduous daily
labour should perish at a stroke. For them the économie
prosperity of a country exists only in so far as it pré-
pares the means for military undertakings : thèse are the
true aims of national existence, and its prosperity is of
E
50 J'ACCUSE
use only in so far as it assists in the fulfilment of this
end.
What Advantage has France Drawn from her
Colonies ?
Let us however corne back to the question of colonies.
We hâve seen that the lack of important colonies has
not injured Germany ; it has not hindered our enormous
boom of prosperity. What is the position in the case of
France? Has the acquisition of her North African
Colonial Empire, of her East Asian possession, of Mada-
gascar yielded her any profit or furnished her with any
advantage over the German Empire ? None whatever ;
the reverse is indeed the case. The économie develop-
ment of France has in some branches remained at a
complète standstill; on others it has shown a progress
which is out of ail proportion less than in the case of
Germany. The entire foreign trade of France amounted
in 1912 to only 580 million pounds sterling, although her
foreign possessions contain more than four times the
superficial area of those of the German Empire. Her
population of about forty millions has, as is well known,
remained almost stationary. Above ail we should
expect, according to the theory of our imperialists, that
the establishment of a great Colonial Empire would
resuit in an enormous increase in the mercantile navy.
Nothing of ail this has taken place. The tonnage of
French commercial vessels has indeed fallen (expressed
in thousands of tons) from 1,492 tons in 1885 to 1,462 '6
in 1911, whereas in the same period, as shown above,
the tonnage of German vessels has risen from 1,275*5 to
3,023*7.
The production of pig-iron which, as shown above,
rose in Germany in twenty-five years by 343*6 per cent.,
rose in France in the same period only 210*7 per cent.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 51
The production of steel in the same twenty-five years
rose in Germany by 1,377 per cent, on 17,302 (estimated
in thousands of tons), whereas the French production
rose by only 727 per cent, on 4,078*4 (in thousands of
tons).
Similar figures can be adduced in nearly ail branches
of économie life. Where, then, I ask, is the davantage
which France has drawn from her Colonial Empire?
She would probably hâve done better if she had left
the yellow and the black and the brown inhabitants of
her Colonial possessions to themselves, and if she had
kept in her own pocket the enormous expenditure
involved in the military acquisition and the civil
administration of thèse wide territories. Above ail, she
would then hâve had no Morocco dispute, no Agadir
incident, and in conséquence no foaming of the
imperialistic beast in Germany, and very probably no
war to-day. After ail, the dead Archduke has only
had to wipe out the " discomfiture " of Agadir.
The French people were instinctively right when they
constantly moved their Colonial conquerors on a step
and threw them into the lumber-room. So it happened
to Jules Ferry the man of Tonkin, so it happened to
Joseph Caillaux the man of Morocco. This is indeed a
peculiar irony of history ! The French drive away in
disgrâce those who hâve gained for them their Colonies,
and in our country the national party spits out fire and
destruction because France has snapped up thèse won-
derful Colonies from under her nose. In this the French
gentlemen hâve at least the excuse that they hâve
accomplished their extension of territory without draw-
ing the sword in Europe (the modem man scarcely
speaks of the lives of the natives), whereas we consider
thèse same seductive corners of the world of sufncient
value to pour out on their account océans of the best
E 2
52 J'ACCUSE
blood of Europe and to pile up for their sake hecatombs
of corpses.
Truly, we may exclaim with Ulrich von Hutten, " It
is a pleasure to be alive," or better still with Nunne in
Ulk l : " Nowhere do things happen so funnily as in this
world."
The Germans Abroad : France, England, America.
When on the occasion of the Agadir incident someone
observed to a witty Parisian : " Hâve you heard that
the Germans are at Agadir ? " he replied quite coolly,
" I don't care ; they are in the heart of Paris, at the
Champs Elysées; that is what matters."
And in fact, that is what matters. Not only in
countries beyond the océan, but above ail even in
European countries, in those now neutral as well as in
those which are now at war with us, everywhere the
Germans sat in the heart of trade and commerce until
the outbreak of this fearful war — in Germany it is called
the "Dawn of the Great Time." Everywhere they
conducted important undertakings of their own, or
represented German firms, or they managed banks,
manufactories, or trading concerns which belonged to
foreigners. The Paris Bourse, the high finance of Paris,
is full of German names ; Rothschild, Heine, Seligmann,
Porgès, Schickler, and ail the rest of them control the
French money-market. German breweries hâve effected
a révolution in the restaurant life of France, and with
their sumptuous beer-palaces hâve driven out more and
more the fine intimacy of the French eating-house in
honour of which we older people may at least shed
many a tear of joyful-sorrowful remembrance. The same
holds good of countless other fields of activity in
1 [Ulk, a weekly humorous paper, published by the
Berliner Tageblatt.]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 53
France, in which Germans play an authoritative
rôle.
This holds, however, with even greater truth in the
case of England. It is well known how great a section
of the trade and the industry of Manchester, Liverpool,
Birmingham and other industrial centres is in German
hands, and how Germans occupy a leading position
in English firms as well. Anyone who is ignorant
of this should read the reports of the Parliamentary
Committee of Enquiry which was appointed to devise
measures against the threatened dispossession of
Englishmen in their own country, not forcible measures,
it is true, for the Englishman is far too much a practical
man of business not to know that any forcible measure
would eut into his own flesh. Measures were aimed at
whereby the young Englishmen would acquire German
éducation, German methods, German adaptability —
qualities which it was supposed would enable them to
withstand the compétition of young Germans in their
own country.
******
It is scarcely necessary to speak of North or South
America. The différence between the two Americas con-
sists chiefly in the fact that the Germans in the United
States to a large extent assume a new nationality, whereas
those in South America for the most part hold firm to
their German nationality. Both are of use to the Father-
land, and it is one of the many conventional liesto assert,
as is repeatedly done, that the German who assumes a
new nationality is a loss for the German Fatherland.
The opposite is nearer the truth. The German who is
naturalised in the United States does not by any means
lose his German character. He remains German in
blood, in language, in culture, and in thought. Who
will dispute this fact? Are not the artists, writers,
54 J'ACCUSE
and learned men of Germany who tour the American
towns received everywhere with enthusiasm by millions
of German colonists — indeed, often with most exagger-
ated and unjustifiable enthusiasm ? Even the minores
gentes, who in Germany hâve fallen more or less out
of the running, endeavour to rehabilitate themselves
by the naïve undistinguishing national enthusiasm
(which of course they promptly telegraph home).
The Germans in North America, whether naturalised
or not, are politically and economically an enormous
gain for our Fatherland. The intimate political relations
between the two countries rest in no small degree on the
strong percentage of naturalised Germans included in
the American population. The whole American culture
may be designated as a German-Anglo-Saxon mixture.
A section of the American newspapers, which is not
without influence on public opinion, appears in the
German language. The export of German books to
America is enormous. As in democratically-governed
countries the représentatives in Parliament and the
Government must consider the views of the electors more
than in our country, a policy directed in principle against
Germany would over there be impossible.
We are ourselves to blâme for the fact that we hâve
destroyed the favourable attitude of the American
people by this war, the blâme for which is rightly put
upon us by ail Americans, almost without exception,
from Roosevelt down to the last newspaper scribbler;
and this fact represents a new and important entry in
the négative side of our books, in balancing the results
of the war.
The economical advantages which Germanism in
America créâtes for us is so obvious and so universally
known that a more detailed discussion may be regarded
as superfluous. In the high finance of New York, as in
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 55
that of Paris, naturalisée! Germans play a distinguished
part. We need but mention the names of Ladenburg,
Thalrnann, Warburg, Speyer Ellissen, Kuhn, Loeb and
Co., Schiff, &c. The enormous imports and exports of
the two countries, which in union with England occupy
the leading place in the trade of the world, is to a large
extent conducted over there by German merchants who
almost without exception hâve assumed American
nationality — presumably because the political condi-
tions there suit them better than those in our country,
a fact which indeed is not to be wondered at. The
greatest American breweries are in the possession of
Germans, for example, the brewery of Pabst in Mil-
waukee, and of Peter Dôlger in New York. In connec-
tion with the brewery of Pabst there are benevolent
institutions on a large scale as well as schools in which
the children of the employées receive, along with the
children of the proprietors, instruction in the German
and English language. The greatest toyshops, for
example, those of Schwarz in New York, are in German
hands and they naturally obtain their goods from
Germany. A very considérable section of American
doctors are German by birth, and thus they not merely
spread German science in America, but also obtain
from Germany their instruments and their médicinal
supplies.
The greatest warehouses in New York, the American
Gorringe or Peter Robinson, are in German hands. They
bear such names as Altmann, Strauss, Gimbel, Blumen-
daal, &c. It is natural that ail thèse German M captains
of industry" should make use of their knowledge of
German sources of supply which they took over with
them, and should thus take their wares from the
German contractor, so long as he is in a position to
compete with the foreigner. The German contractor
56 J'ACCUSE
thus learns, in his turn, to know the requirements of
the market there, he adapts himself to the circum-
stances, and thus there naturally arises from the German
origin of the American firm a lasting connection between
the German producers and the German-American
consumer.
Whether the latter remains a German or becomes an
American is naturally a matter of complète indifférence.
It is part of the complète ignorance of our nationalist
brawlers that they constantly repeat the foolish asser-
tion — false assertions as is known do not become more
true by fréquent répétition — that Germans who are
naturalised abroad are lost to the Fatherland.
The exact opposite may be maintained and proved by
référence to the example of South America. Whereas in
North America the transition to foreign nationality re-
presents the rule, it is in South America the exception.
The Germans in Brazil, in the Argentine, in Chile only
in exceptional cases become Brazilians, Argentiners,
Chilians; in most cases they remain Germans. They
are thus subject even in times of peace to the disadvan-
tage that they must return to Germany for military
training — many of them are officers of the reserve and
of the Landwehr — and thus they are obliged to interrupt
their mercantile activities. When however a war breaks
out as has now occurred, and suddenly calls them with-
out any préparation to the home country, they hâve
frequently to pay for their adhérence to German
nationality by the complète ruin of their business, even
if they should return alive and unmutilated. This ruin
is accelerated by the fact that, as is well known, the
South American people, like the rest of the neutral
world, brand us as the disturbers of the peace, and
rightly hold us responsible for the severe blow sustained
by their économie life, and thus they are without excep-
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 57
tion sympathetic to the other side. Owing to the
excitable tempérament of the Spanish population of
South America this attitude against Germany mani-
fested itself so strongly against Germans living there,
that frequently even those who were not called to arms
packed up their knapsacks and returned to Europe.
This judgment is based not on newspaper reports but
on my personal observations. About the end of August
while travelling from America to Germany I had an
opportunity of speaking to many Germans returning by
Genoa from Brazil, the Argentine and Chile. They
painted to me the condition of affairs in thèse countries
as I hâve indicated above ; they were naturally glowing
with patriotic enthusiasm (they could not be expected,
in South America in the month of August, to guess at
the gigantic lie about the war, which to-day professors
in Germany hâve as yet failed to recognise), yet they ail
admitted that everything which they had laboriously
built up in the course of many years, in many cases in
the course of décades, had been destroyed at a blow
by the outbreak of war. Young men, who had crossed
at an early âge, and who had slowly worked their way
up by industry and efficiency in the great German
export-houses, had been obliged to leave their situations
to défend their Fatherland " threatened " by Russians
and Frenchmen, to défend the freedom and existence of
the German people.
But even without the order of recall they would
probably hâve lost their situations, since their firms
under the effects of the war, which in thèse countries
has produced an almost universal condition of bank-
ruptcy, would hâve had either to close their doors, or at
least to restrict their business as far as possible. Older
people who through many trials and difficulties had
acquired a position of independence were obliged to
58 J'ACCUSE
give up the conduct of their business in conséquence of
the war and the antipathy felt towards them by the
population, and had to struggle back to the homeland
with wife and child. Thèse also were the innocent
victims of their adhérence to their German nationality.
On the long fifty-two-hours' railway journey from Ala
to Munich it was moving to listen to ail thèse stories
of broken existences, of shattered hopes, and to observe
the quiet spirit of surrender with which ail thèse active
pioneers of Germanism abroad, yielding themselves to
the inévitable, laid down on the altar of the Fatherland
their success and their hopes, built up with so much
labour.
The inévitable ! So they believed thèse good, trusting
people. If they had but known, and if they only knew
how Utile ihere was of the inévitable in ail thisl If
they only knew that they were but the marionettes,
directed by invisible wire-pullers, to pay with their
lives and fortunes for the selfish interests and the insane
dreams of world-power and Pan-Germanism which thèse
men entertain ; if they had but known that ail this was
arranged and prepared by criminal and ignorant men,
who seek to achieve by fire and blood, by murder and
dévastation, what can only be obtained by the patient,
peaceful labour continued through générations of the
merchant and the manufacturer, the man of science
and the man of knowledge — if thèse vigorous men had
but known ail that — men who even across the sea had
not forgotten German dreams and German idealism,
and who had not lost the confidence that the cause for
which the German draws the sword must necessarily
be a just cause— had they but known the truth, they
would scarcely hâve crossed the sea; they would not
hâve left the soil which had given to them and their
families a second home.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 59
They were ail agreed that the thought of rebuilding
their existence in South America could not be enter-
tained, and that the years and décades laboriously
spent by them there were merely thrown away.
Which German then is of most use to the Fatherland ?
He who assumes a foreign nationality, as in North
America, or he who remains by nationality a German, as
iri South America ? The former, in my opinion. If we
survey the collapse into which our business relations
with South America hâve fallen, and if we transfer this
phenomenon to the gigantic proportions of North
America, we may congratulate ourselves on the fact that
the Germans of North America hâve for the most part not
remained Germans, but hâve become Americans. What
would hâve been the resuit if the effects of the war had
revealed themselves in North America in a way similar to
that in which they hâve been manifested in South
America, if nearly ail Germans, those subject to mili-
tary service as well as those exempt from service, had
had to leave North America, their adopted Fatherland,
their positions and their business ? An irréparable
économie disaster for Germany would hâve resulted. As
we shall in any case gradually bleed to death if the war
endures for any length of time, in conséquence of the
breach in our business relations with belligerent coun-
tries which must remain for many years, such a blow
from the neutral country of North America might well
hâve been for us the finishing stroke. Thank God that
our German-Americans hâve always been more sober
and more reasonable in their thoughts than our Pan-
Germans. By giving up their German nationality they
hâve rendered Germany the best service.
This a gain disposes of one of the théories on which
territorial expansion is supported, one of the théories
productive of constant friction between civilised peoples.
60 J'ACCUSE
Oup true colonies lie where we do not possess a square
mètre of territory: in North and South America, in
England, France, Russia, and Italy, in North and South
Africa, in Canada, and Australia. 1
Our commercial intercourse with England amounts
to about 185 million pounds sterling, with France about
77 J million pounds sterling, with both countries together
about 262J million pounds sterling, that is to say, to
more than a quarter of our total foreign trade. At the
same time we sell more to thèse countries than we buy
from them. We sell to them in round figures to the
extent of 162J million pounds, and we buy from them
100 million pounds. The value of our exports thus
amounts to more than 50 per cent, above our imports.
About 44 per cent, of German foreign trade, that is to
say, about 425 million pounds, is accounted for by ail
our enemy countries taken together. What is the signi-
ficance of thèse figures when we contrast them with the
misérable scraps of country — in part wild and unfertile,
uninhabitable by Europeans — over which diplomatists
wrangle, nations are incited against each other, money
is uselessly squandered in gigantic armaments, and for
which in the end, since the bomb must explode sooner or
later, the bloodiest of ail wars has been conjured up ?
When will the peoples of the world at last compre-
hend the madness of this situation? When at last will
they call aloud to their rulers, and above ail when will
the Germans exclaim to the rulers of Germany : " We
hâve indeed already got the place in the sun. Only
leave us alone in peace and quietness to warm ourselves
in the sunshine and to do our work. Do not for ever
oppress us with burdens too grievous to be borne. Free
1 Thèse ideas are developed in an admirable manner in
The Great Illusion, by Norman Angell (William Heinemann,
London).
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 61
yourselves at last from the geographical monomania,
whose ambition is to devour square miles, but which
has already almost devoured us poor nations.' '
The Place in the Sun for Us — the Place in the
Shadow for the Others.
In reality our imperialists are seeking to achieve
something quite différent. They also know, even if they
do not say it to the stupid people (and Bernhardi's book
proves that this is so) that we hâve indeed the place
in the sun, that no one seeks to dispute it, and that if
anyone were to seek to do so, he would necessarily fail.
But it is something else that they want. They want
the exclusive place in the sun; they are striving for
the world-dominion of Germany, and that at any rate
is what the others are not prepared to yield to them.
The German Wehr-Verein, in a meeting held in the
House of Représentatives, has quite recently expressed
this with ail the lucidity that can be desired. In this
manifesto we find the following words :
"We need room and air for the further development of
our German nationality. The time for modération is past.
Eelentlessly thinking only of our interests, we must and we
will dictate peace. Only one peace can be thought of, a
peace which assures the permanent leading world-position of
Germany. . . . The criminal breakers of the peace . . .
Englànd, France and Eussia, must be so weakened that in
future they will cease to be a danger to the peace of the
world."
Thus we find, on the one side, breakers of the peace,
and on the other a permanent leading world-position !
Explain this to me, Count Oerindur ! Hère we find
truth and falsehood mingled in a most dexterous
manner. On the one side the true aims of the war-party
are openly proclaimed, and yet on the other the pretence
that the peace was broken by the other party is boldly
maintained. Nevertheless, thèse gentlemen do not suc-
62 J'ACCUSE
ceed in their somersault over logic. If to extend our
nationality we must obtain for Germany the permanent
leading position in the world, that is équivalent to
saying in other words that we must compel the others
to subject themselves to our leadership, since to-day
we already enjoy equal privilèges with others, but not a
leadership. If, however, we do this, it is we who are
the breakers of the peace, and not the others.
In reality that is the position of affairs, as I shall
point out in the second section of this book. It is
none the less of great value that thèse gentlemen, even
while they attempt to deny this, y et admit it against
their will.
The Fear of Germany.
It is leadership that we seek, not merely equal
privilèges with others. It would be nonsense to say
that we seek the latter, since we already possess in the
fullest measure such equal privilèges. If we are not,
as a German prof essor has expressed it, " morally and
intellectually beyond ail comparison superior to ail
other nations," 1 there is at least one superiority which
has willingly been granted to our Prussian Germany
by the rest of the world for a century and a half. I
refer to our military superiority. While we need only
fear God, but nothing else in the world, Germany has
been feared by ail — almost more than God Himself.
Even Tacitus long ago pointed out that the defective-
ness of the German frontiers was made good by fear
of the Teutons : " A Sarmatia Dacisque mutuo metu
aut montibus separatur." The fear of Germany pro-
duces the effect that our word weighs heavily in the
council of the nations despite ail "encir clément," and
despite the wretchedness of our diplomacy.
1 [Prof essor Lasson.]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 63
On a certain occasion recently the most important
conditions of peace were being discussed in a lively
conversation. Frenchmen, Germans, and Englishmen
living abroad were taking part in the discussion seated
round the common table, and in the end they almost
arrived at an agreement as to the ternis of peace. Then,
however, the German observed in jest, " One more con-
dition ; you French must take over en bloc our German
diplomatists." The Frenchman sprang up in indigna-
tion and broke off the peace negotiations, exclaiming,
" Ah ça, non ! Ça c'est trop. Nous continuerons à
combattre." And with thèse words he left the
restaurant.
DlPLOMATIC SUCCESS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE.
The lack of dexterity shown by our diplomacy —
where could ail the Jiigh-born Borussen and Saxo-
Borussen * be expected to learn skill in business ! — the
defects of our diplomacy are constantly made good by
the weight of the army, standing in the background.
For long the Triple Alliance was indeed only a sham,
but it looked quite well from the outside, and it worked
almost like a being of flesh and blood.
Thus in ail the conflicts of récent years Germany, in
union with Austria and Italy, has corne out quite well
in the end, and her allies, relying on the power of
Germany, hâve been able to bear home spoil, with
which it would scarcely be proper to compare the
acquisitions of the Triple Alliance. Was Austria not
able in 1908 to bag Bosnia and Herzegovina, a fat
morsel of more importance than twenty Moroccos ?
Was Italy not able to appropriate without a European
conflict Tripoli and the iEgean islands — acquisitions
1 [Borussia, Prussia. Borussen, a somewhat flamboyant
word for Prussians frequently used in the nomenclature of
the more aristocratie students' societies.]
64 J'ACCUSE
which it can scarcely be expected to disgorge again?
In addition to the open door in Morocco, which is of
more value than any costly rights of possession demand-
ing the expenditure of blood, hâve we not got into the
bargain a considérable pièce of the French Congo — an
exchange which cost Caillaux, the Minister responsible
for it, his prestige and his position, and which almost
cost his wife her life ? Did we not, acting with our ally
Austria, achieve in her interests the great feat of grace-
fully turning the Monténégrins out of Scutari, which
they had purchased with streams of blood, and of intro-
ducing there an international garrison ? Was not
the création of that mannikin-kingdom of Albania, that
" vile abortion of filth and fire," 1 accomplished exclu-
sively in the interests of our allies Austria and Italy ?
Were we not able to complète with England and Turkey
an agreement that was favourable to us in connection
with Asia Minor and the Bagdad line ?
This list of successes could be considerably lengthened.
I need not emphasise the fact that, from my point of
view, many — indeed nearly ail — of thèse diplomatie
bickerings, thèse altérations and annexations of terri-
tory hâve not the slightest connection with the real
interests of the nations. When we reflect that a Euro-
pean war, like that raging to-day, almost broke out in
1912 on the question whether Serbia should receive her
celebrated " window on the Adriatic" — when we
reflect that nearly every one of the questions mentioned
above brought Europe for the time being to the verge
of an armed conflict, while thèse so-called " vital ques-
tions " frequently had not in any way décisive import-
ance for the well-being, in the true sensé of the word,
of the States immediately concerned, we are constantly
constrained to admire anew the lamb-like patience of
1 [Spottgeburt aus Dreck und Feuer — Faust.]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 65
the nations and the craziness of the diplomatists, and
to concur in the saying of the good Oxenstjerna in
consoling his son who professed himself unfit for the
post of Swedish Ambassador, "An nescis, mi fili,
quantilla prudentia mundus regatur ? "
Austria 's Balkan Policy.
What advantage has Austria derived from her annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina ? — One more worry
added to the many by which she was already plagued.
Would it not hâve been better for Austria and for the
whole world if the Empire had remained content with
an occupation such as had existed since 1878 on the
basis of the Treaty of Berlin ? The Great-Serbian move-
meht was fanned into more vigorous life than ever before
by the formai annexation in 1908, and notwithstand-
ing the propitiatory déclaration of Serbia in March,
1909, it continued to take its course. National
movements in fact cannot be suppressed. The practical
politician must deal with them as facts, and if he
hopes to conduct them in the desired direction, he must
endeavour as far as possible to satisfy their demands
which rest on community of race, of language, and often
of religion, demands which are thus healthy and justi-
fied. Therein lies the skill of the English, and the
true basis of the colonial greatness of this people. They
subdued the South African republics, but almost immé-
diat ely after their subjection they gave them self-
government within the framework of the great South
African Union, and placed at the head of the Union
General Botha, their most distinguished military leader.
They hâve acted in the same way towards ail their other
colonies throughout the world as soon as thèse were
sufficiently far developed for self-government. Under
the flexible suzerainty of Britain, Canada and Australia
F
66 J'ACCUSE
are independent States enjoying merely the advantages
which spring from their connection with the world-
empire, while suffering no disadvantage from this
connection. This is the source of the attachment shown
by ail thèse colonies to the Mother Country, even by the
one most recently acquired by force of arms. This
explains the complète failure of Germany's spéculations
on rebellions or sécessions, which might create difficul-
ties for the English, and drive their colonies into the
arms of the Germans, — thèse same Germans who even
to-day, before they hâve yet annexed Belgium, can find
nothing better to do than banish the French language
from the streets of Brussels and Antwerp and from
public life by command of the military authorities.
If Austria, instead of annexing Bosnia and Herze-
govina to the accompaniment of the rattling sabre of
her German ally, had accepted the Serbian national
movement as a natural fact, and had made reasonable
concessions to it on the principle "naturam expellas
furca, tamen usque recurret," we would to-day — this
can be definitely asserted — we would to-day hâve had
no world-war. But clearly the Austrians understand
thèse things better. They consider it right to treat ail
their foreign nationalities, Italians, Croats, Slavonians,
Rumanians, Serbians, according to the principle :
"A brother's love, sir, ère too late !
Or with this stick 111 break your pâte." *
How far they hâve got with this we see to-day, not
only on the Serbian, but also on the Italian side, and
how long will it be until we see, on the Rumanian
frontier as well, the effects of this extrême reactionary
policy of oppression !
1 ["Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein
So schlag' ich dir den Schàdel ein."]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 67
But the worse Austrian policy has been, the more
astonishing are the diplomatie successes which in récent
years she has everywhere been able to gain, relying on
the armed force of Germany. Germany and Austria
hâve indeed no reason to complain that European
diplomatists hâve constantly trodden on their corns.
Apart from the Morocco question, the questions which
bave cropped up in récent years were ail what are called
"vital questions" for Austria, if indeed it is possible
to speak of vital questions in the case of a corpse. With
this corpse the dexterity of German diplomacy has
linked for weal or for woe (unfortunately more for woe
than for weal) the German national organism, in itself
healthy and vigorous. This is in the interest of the
M Germanie races in central Europe," to use the beauti-
ful expression of our White Book. Does anyone feel
inclined to laugh at this ? Austria, as is well known,
consists only so far as a fourth part is concerned of
inhabitants of the Germanie race, y et with this idea of
"race-protection" we hâve fortunately advanced so far
that thèse Eastern questions, which to a Bismarck were
not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, are
likely to cost us the bones of many hundreds of
thousands of our countrymen in the prime of their life,
and rob us of the labour of many générations.
This is indeed a sorry transaction, y et it is one which
would hâve succeeded brilliantly, if it had been left in
the field of diplomacy, like ail similar transactions in
récent years, and if it had not been transplanted to the
battlefield. The diplomatie success which was attained
on the evening of the 25th July in the Serbian answer
to the Austrian Note was one of the most brilliant in
the whole diplomatie history of Europe. Austria had
gained everything of importance which she had
demanded apart from a few points, and thèse not
F 2
{
68 J'ACCUSE
décisive, on which Serbia expressed her readiness to
negotiate further; moreover, what she had won
exceeded anything that ever one State had obtained
from another independent State by diplomatie means
in time of peace. Further, the humiliation of Serbia
was at the same time a humiliation of Russia, and the
prestige of Austria at the moment when she insolently
and without any grounds recalled her ambassador from
Belgrade, stood higher in the Balkans than it had ever
done before, and certainly higher than it will ever stand
hereafter. This success she owed entirely to the un-
flinching support of her German ally.
Why, notwithstanding this, the situation was allowed
to lead to war, or rather why war was intentionally
produced, can only be explained by référence to German
policy and the tendencies in Berlin, as I will demon-
strate by documentary évidence in the second section of
this work. For the présent discussion it is enough to
establish the fact that the assertion constantly repeated
in Germany that the Triple Alliance was always left
in the cold or beaten over the ears by the diplomacy
of the Entente, rests on a falsehood, and that on the
contrary the policy of the Triple Alliance on ail occa-
sions — even at the very last in July, 1914 — was
brilliantly victorious.
The Crown Prince and the War Party.
Everyone in Germany constantly speaks about the
M policy of encirclement " (Einkreisungspolitik), to
which the présent catastrophe is attributed. Hère also
we naturally meet with the same phenomenon as in the
whole campaign of justification, which seeks to repre-
sent Germany as the innocent lamb and England as
the ravening wolf. Those who are initiated, however,
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 69
know quite well how the matter stands, and if the
Crown Prince were to meet Bernhardi or Frobenius in
the field, thèse comrades in the faith would smile to each
other like Roman augurs. They know quite well that
it is no foreign policy but our own will — or rather their
will — that has urged us into this war, and if they were
to deny it, now that they see the fearful conséquences,
their own writings would rise up against them as bloody
witnesses.
What do we find in the introduction to the Crown
Prince 's book, Germany in Arms ?
"To-day, indeed, we live in a time which points with
spécial satisfaction to the proud height of its culture, which
is only too willing to boast of its international cosmo-
politanism, and flatters itself with visionary dreams of the
possibility of an everlasting peace throughout the world.
^ This view of life is un-German and do es not suit us. The
German who loves his people, who believes in the greatness
and the future of our homeland, and who is unwilling to see
its position diminished, dare not close his eyes in the indul-
gence of dreams such as thèse, he dare not allow himself to
be lulled into indolent sleep by the lullabies of peace sung
by the Utopians. . . . Germany has behind her since the
last great war a period of économie prosperity, which has
in it something almost disconcerting. Comfort has so in-
creased in ail circles of our people, that luxury and claims to
a certain style of life hâve undergone a rank development.
Now certainly we must not thanklessly deny that a wave of
I économie prosperity brings with it much that is good. But
the shady side of this too rapid development often mani-
fests itself in a painful and threatening manner. Already
the appréciation of wealth has gained in our country an
importance which we can only observe with anxiety. . . .
The old ideals, even the position and the honour of the nation,
may be sympathetically affected; for peace, peace at any
price, is necessary for the undisturbed acquisition of money.
But the study of history teaches us that ail those States
which in the décisive hour hâve been guided by purely com-
mercial considérations hâve miserably corne to grief. The
sympathies of civilised nations are to-day, as in the battles
of antiquity, still with the sturdy and the bold fightinç
70 J'ACCUSE
armies 1 ; they are with the brave combatants who, in the
words which Lessing puts in the mouth of Tellheim, are
soldiers for their country, and out of the love which they
bear to the cause for which they are fighting. . . . Certainly
diplomatie dexterity can, and should, postpone the conflict
for a time, and at times disentangle the diffîculties. Cer-
tainly ail those in authority must and will be fully conscious
of their enormous responsibility in the grave hour of décision.
They must make it clear to their own minds that the gigantic
conflagration, once enkindled, cannot be so easily or so quickly
extinguished. As, however, lightning is an adjustment of
the tension between two difîerently charged strata of the
atmosphère, so the sword will always be and remain until
the end of the world the décisive factor. . . . And therefore
everyone to whom his country is dear, and who believes in a
great future for our nation, must joyfully do his part in the
task of seeing that the old military spirit of our fathers is
not lost, and that it is not sicklied o'er with the pale cast of
thought. For the sword alone is not décisive, but the arm
steeled in exercise which bears the sword. Each of us must
keep himself fit for arms and also prepared in his mind for
the great solemn hour when the Emperor calls us to the
standard — the hour when we no longer belong to ourselves,
but to the Fatherland with ail the forces of our mind and
our body ; for ail thèse faculties must be brought to the
highest exertion, to that ' will to victory ' which has never
been without success in history."
That should be sumeient, but there is something better
to corne. The royal author describes a regimental
manœuvre of the guards on the field at Dôberitz :
" The steel helmets glitter in the sunshine ; in the galloping
exercises every individual horseman endeavours to keep on
to the man in front, and to keep the right direction — no easy
matter when there is dust, and the ground is rough. Many
a one stumbles, and away past him gallops the company of
riders. What does it matter! When you plane wood,
shavings must fall. . . . And there the call resounds over
the field, clear and quivering amid the uproar of the gallop-
ing mass, ' Front I ' The reins whirl round, and as if by
a stroke of magie, the Une is formed again, with a front of
five impetuous squadrons of the guards, — and then cornes
1 This has now been shown to be true.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 71
the signal ' Charge.' Then the last ounce is taken
out of the horses, and with bodies strained forward and with
lances in rest, with a ' hurrah ' we ride to the attack. . . .
For anyone who has taken part in such attacks, there is
nothing fairer in the world ! . . . And yet to the true horse-
man there is one thing which appears more beautiful : if
ail that were the same, but if only at the end of the rapid
charge, the enemy were to ride out against us, and the
struggle for which we hâve been drilled and trained, the
struggle for life and death, were to begin. How often during
such attacks hâve I heard the yearning call of a comrade
riding behind : 'Donnerwetter! if that were only the real
thing!' . . . O horseman's spirit ! Ail who are true
soldiers must know and feel : ' Dulce et décorum est pro
patria mori. ' *
The same spîrit of the attack finds expression in the
message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars. The young
war-hero becomes sentimental, because he can no longer
ride through life at the head of his Hussars. Already
he is "bearing his youth to its grave," but he is
consoled by the thought :
"It is indeed possible for me to be separated from you;
but my heart and my spirit remain yours. If some day the
King calls, and the bugle sounds the signal ' Charge,'
then I ask you to think on him whose most ardent wish it
has always been to be allowed to share at your side this y
the suprême moment of a soldier's happiness."
This moment has now corne. It is now, donnerwetter !
the real thing. The deathhead-hussars hâve charged
into death; they hâve been mown down like stalks of
corn. But where at this moment was the gallant colonel
of cavalry? Why did he, who still to-day wears the
effective uniform of his hussars, not put himself at their
head with a " hurrah " against the enemy ? Why did
he allow to pass ungarnered the suprême moment of a
soldier's happiness?
" What are the real merits of this young gentleman ? M
72 J'ACCUSE
asked Bebel in the Reichstag on the occasion of a discus-
sion on the Crown Prince 's démonstration, and this
young gentleman might be left quietly to himself , to his
conscience, and to his further self -éducation, had he not
unfortunately been advanced to the position of a
national hero in the course of this war for which he and
his friends bear the chief load of guilt.
For long he has been the undisputed head of the
H German nationalist party and of the chauvinists, and his
views give the key to the German National Orchestra.
Great is the Crown Prince, and Liman is his prophet. 1
In fighting against him we are fighting against the
tendency which without any provocation, without any
practical attainable end, has dragged Germany into this
unfortunate war, and which, if we do not repent in time,
will irredeemably lead to our destruction.
It is the misfortune of kings that they are unwilling
to hear the truth. But Truth is stronger than they.
With stern finger it knocks at their doors. With rever-
berating sound it pierces their ears, and if Germany,
as the Chancellor says, cannot be crushed, still less is
Truth capable of being thus dealt with. It tears
asunder the veil, with which it is sought to shroud it,
and in triumphant nakedness it advances to meet the
light of day.
The Policy of Encerclement (Einkreisungspolitik).
The policy of encirclement is one of the veils with
which it is sought to shroud the truth. What do we
mean by the phrase : a policy of encirclement ? Every-
one uses the expression, and no one connects with it
any clear idea. If it is supposed to hâve any meaning,
1 The Crown Prince: Thoughts on Germany* s Future, by
Dr. Paul Liman (Wilhelm Kôhler, Minden).
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME Tô
it can only mean a policy which seeks to enclose
Germany and Austria, the central Power s, by an oppos-
ing alliance of the peripheral Powers. That is to say it
is a geographical idea.
What specially aggressive tendency is to be found in
the fortuitous geographical situation of the Powers of
the Entente? Are aggressive intentions in any way
determined or proved by geographical situation ?
Would it not hâve been equally dangerous, or perhaps
even more dangerous, for Germany and Austria, if Italy
in place of one or other of the Entente Powers had
belonged to the opposing alliance ? Or perhaps even
America might hâve been a member. In the case of
Italy or America could we hâve spoken of an " intention
to encircle " ? At the most we could hâve done so in the
sensé in which Fusilier Kutschke maintained that "he
had alone and without assistance surrounded a whole
company of the enemy."
It is clear that geography has nothing to do with the
danger of war or with the intention to make war. Just
as the Triple Entente is called an encirclement, the
Triple Alliance could be called an " excirclement "
(Auskreisung), since indeed Germany, Austria, and Italy
form a sort of central block, from which the Powers of
the Entente are excluded. The one is just as much
défensive or aggressive as the other. The geographical
constellation is a mère fortuitous conséquence of the
chronological development of the alliances. Had Italy
still been free when King Edward transformed the
Victorian policy of splendid isolation into a policy of
alliances, he would probably hâve introduced Italy
rather than Russia into his System of alliances. Without
doubt he would hâve preferred the démocratie Italy,
with which he had no conflicting interest, but merely
interests in common, to an ally whose political back-
74 J'ACCUSE
wardness as well as her conflicting interests in Asia must
necessarily make her a very unwelcome friend for
England. The grouping of the six Powers in Europe has
arisen from historical circumstances and from communi-
ties of interest. Their geographical position is purely
accidentai, and has nothing to do with the character and
the tendency of thèse two groups.
It is thus as false as it is superficial to regard the
circumferential situation of the Powers of the Entente
as merely in itself a danger for the Empires. He who
asserts that aggressive intentions exist is under an
obligation to prove their existence, and further to do
so on grounds other than the geographical situation of
the Powers concerned. Thèse other grounds, however,
are completely lacking. In Germany no matter how
much we inquire, no one is in a position to give a definite
answer. England is said to hâve been envious of our
commercial development. Envy is an attitude of mind,
but not an action. Just as I can compel no one to love,
so I cannot forcibly drive envy and hatred out of any-
one. I must rest content if he does not transform his
evil thoughts into actions, just as I also on my side
would not submit to be called to account by my neigh-
bour merely on account of my disposition. Thoughts
indeed are duty-free, and even in reactionary Prussia
every citizen, according to the constitution, has the right
not only to think as he will, but to give expression to his
thoughts "in word, writing or printing." Criminal law
punishes not the mère will to do the act, but (with few
exceptions) only the attempt to do the act, which it
defines as the " first step in the commission of it."
Where, how and when has England ever attempted to
transform her envy of Germany into action ? In other
words, when has she sought to attack Germany ? Ne ver
at any time. Not one action of England can be pointed
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 75
out, from which the intention to make a military attack,
in common with her Allies, on Germany could be
deduced. You may say that she gave diplomatie
support to France on the occasion of the Morocco
dispute. But England had a right to do so and indeed
a duty, based on the Anglo-French agreement with
regard to Egypt and Morocco. And did our allyAustria
not adhère to us in this conflict ? Hâve we not adhered
to Austria in ail Eastern questions ? Why should diplo-
matie support extended to a friendly or an allied power
in the one case be défensive, in the other aggressive ?
Is England not free in diplomatie negotiations to judge
of her own interests and obligations according to her own
standard, as we ourselves do with regard to our interests
and obligations ? Again I ask : where is the proof of
aggressive intentions on the part of England against
us?
Objection will be taken to what I hâve said on the
ground of the military and naval agreements which
England had concluded with France, and which she was
on the point of concluding with Russia. Hâve we then
concluded no military agreements with Austria regulat-
ing the support to be given on either side in a European
war down to the last cannon and company ? Hâve not
visits and conférences constantly been taking place
between the two General Staffs ? If our much stricter
military agreement with Austria had no aggressive
character, why should there be an aggressive
character in the much looser adjustments between
English and French experts, which scarcely extended
beyond the scope of a discussion ? 1 Thèse discussions
were, as is document arily established, entirely of a non-
committal character, because they did not rest on any
1 See Grey's speech in the House of Commons of August
3rd, 1914.
76 J'ACCUSE
obligation imposed by the terms of an alliance to afford
to each other mutual military support. The Anglo-
French Entente did not contain such obligations, but
left it to each party in any given case to décide freely
according to her own judgment whether she should or
should not afford military support to the other. 1 Even
in the event of an unprovoked attack by a third Power
this freedom remained, and it was only in the case
where both Powers freely decided to co-operate that the
discussions of the military experts were intended to hâve
practical conséquences.
The relations between England and Russia were, so
far as gênerai European politics are concerned, much
looser even than those between England and France.
The adjustments between Russia and England were
concerned exclusively with territorial interests in Asia,
and contained no obligations with regard to Europe.
England had so little concern in the Franco-Russian
Alliance that it was not even acquainted with the word-
ing of the terms of the Alliance. 2
Apart from any obligation or intention to attack us
there was also, so far as England was concerned, a com-
plète absence of any inducement to do so. What davan-
tage could England hope to gain from a war against
us ? We who constantly hâve on our lips "the English
shopkeeper-spirit," and contrast the cold calculating
business-sense of the Englishman with our patriotic
enthusiasm, should really not attribute to this nation of
shopkeepers the insanity of desiring to MU iheir best cus-
tomer in order to improve their business. Such a hare-
brained course of action is indeed possible in a nation
in which cavalry-colonels and gênerais and the opponents
1 See Grey's letter to Cambon, November 22nd, 1912.
English Blue Book, No. 105.
2 See Grey's speech August 3rd, 1914.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 77
of the trading classes hâve the décisive word, but not in
a nation of merchantmen in which even the leading
politicians in part hâve their origins in the world of
trade, and in any case are without exception fully
acquainted with the ideas of the modem commercial
spirit.
The fact is that England has never had aggressive
intentions against us ; she has never concluded an
alliance with aggressive intentions against us, and she
has never done anything whatever to urge on others to
attack us.
Anyone who maintains the contrary is obliged, accord-
ing to gênerai rules of procédure, to prove it. I hâve
hitherto looked in vain in German speeches and writings
for the submission of this évidence. Everywhere there i
is the empty assertion, without the shadow of a proof.
So far, however, as this assertion is advanced in our
country by officiai quarters, that is by people who are
acquainted with the diplomatie history of the last fifteen
years, the assertion is made against their better know-
ledge, that is to say it is a lie.
Thèse last fifteen years, since the first Hague Confér-
ence of 1899, are nothing but a continuons séries of
attempts on the part of England to arrive at a political
entente with Germany, and on the basis of this to effect
a limitation of naval armaments on both sides — attempts
which on every occasion hâve been wrecked on the lack
of judgment or on the evil will of the German Govern-
ment.
It is well known, and does not hère require any
detailed démonstration, that England on the occasion
of the Fashoda incident, when her relations to France
were becoming ever more strained and were almost
impelling her to a conflict of arms, endeavoured to give
up her " splendid isolation," and to conclude an entente
78 J'ACCUSE
with us. Our far-seeing politicians, as so often happens,
did not seize the opportunity. They allowed to slip past
them the favourable moment in which, without ruinous
préparations, without drawing the sword, and in the
enjoyment of a lasting security, they might hâve pro-
moted our further prosperity in industry and in culture,
and gained for the world an enduring peace.
ENGLAND AND GERMANY.
The First Hague Conférence.
On the 28th of August, 1898, there appeared in the
Petrograd Officiai Journal the celebrated Peace Mani-
festo of the Tsar. On the mention of this manifesto our
war-brawlers smile and point in contempt to the "Tsar
of blood " who has now let loose the second fearful
war since that message of peace.
We shall see later how far Russia is concerned in
letting loose the présent war. How far Russia was to
blâme for the Japanese war is a chapter by itself , which
should scarcely be allowed to end with the condemna-
tion of Russia alone. The intention of the manifesto was
in any case correct and honourable, and the aims pro-
posed to the nations of Europe : true and enduring
peace, and the limitation of armaments which even in
peace slowly lead nations to their économie destruction,
— thèse aims will be, and must continue to be, the un-
alterable rule of conduct governing the efforts of ail who
guide the destinies of European States. Even the présent
war, unless it is to be nothing but an insane and purpose-
less shedding of blood, can hâve no other aim than
this.
What was the attitude of England towards this mani-
festo? What was the attitude of Germany? While in
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 79
England public opinion in harmony with the Govern-
ment hailed the manifesto with the greatest sympathy,
and the English Foreign Minister could report to Petro-
grad this unanimous approval, there developed in
Germany also a popular movement in f avour of the ideas
expressed by the Tsar. But the Government main-
tained a frigid attitude, and only the social démocratie
party recognised the epoch-making significance of thèse
ideas — ideas which they had constantly advocated, but
which now for the first time received expression in high
places. That the idea was Utopian, that it was but a
chimaera — thèse were the least reproaches thrown at the
originator of the manifesto. In conformity with the
customary tactics which hâve since been constantly
followed, many rose to the crazy heights of asserting
that Russia only desired to entice other States to a
limitation of armaments in order that she herself might
be able to pile up in secret still greater armaments and
thus with greater security pursue her Pan-Slav efforts.
The record in malicious attacks was naturally achieved
even then by a German prof essor, Stengel, the lecturer
in international law at Munich, who prophesied in
advance the most dismal results of the Conférence which
at the time had not y et assembled. In récognition of
this, he was straightway sent by the Foreign Office to
the Hague Conférence as one of Germany 's représenta-
tives.
After the epoch-making memorials of the Russian
Councillor von Bloch, the Conférence owed its origin
chiefly to English influences. As early as 1891 the
English Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, had had a state-
ment of the cost of European military préparations
compiled, and had transmitted this confidential docu-
ment to the German Emperor without, it is true,
achieving any success. The efforts of Lord Salisbury
\
80 J'ACCUSE
met with success only when they were emphasised by
the inter-parliamentary conférence of 1896. On that
occasion Lord Salisbury in a remarkable speech in the
Guildhall regretted the ruinousness of constantly increas-
ing ar marnent s, and in the end, through the instrumen-
tality of Count Lambsdorf , laid the whole of the material
bearing on the question before the Tsar. 1
The préludes played by Germany and by England
were in harmony with the performances given by thèse
two States at the Conférence itself, which in spite of
ail hostility assembled at the Hague on May 18th,
1899, under the participation of twenty-six States.
Throughout the whole proceedings of the Conférence we
find the same picture, that, namely, of England leading
in ail efforts the aim of which was to diminish the intolér-
able burdens of armaments and, in an ever-widening
degree, to place the différences arising between civilised
nations on a légal basis. On the side of England there
were France, Russia, America, and naturally ail the
smaller States. On the other side, however, there con-
stantly stood Germany with her true ally, Austria-Hun-
gary. The opposition of Germany to ail progressive
efforts was at times so pronounced that if the others had
not repressed their desires, the whole Conférence would
hâve broken up. So it was on the question of arma-
ments; so also on that of arbitration.
By way of introduction to the discussion on arma-
ments the German Emperor delivered a speech in
Wiesbaden in which he declared that the best pledge
of peace was the " sharp, gleaming sword." In the
course of this discussion we shall hâve occasion to
observe that it is a part of the German System to furnish
on every occasion an introduction to the concert of the
1 See Fried. Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, Vol. I,
p. 204.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 81
European pipes of peace by blowing a war-fanfare on
the Prussian bugle.
The Russian proposai was to the effect that the
strength of the Army on a peace basis and the military
estimâtes should not be increased in the next five years,
and that in the case of the navy this respite should be
fixed for three years. This proposai, which was
brilliantly defended by the Russian military pleni-
potentiary — (he emphasised above ail the incontestable
fact that the compétition in ar marnent s was futile, since
the relative strength between the various States still
remained constant) — was energetically opposed by the
German military plenipotentiary General Gross von
Schwarzhof. If the French plenipotentiary Léon Bour-
geois, who represented the restriction of armaments as
a requirement of civilisation and a duty imposed on ail
States, had not succeeded in uniting the votes of the
commission in support of a resolution formulated by
him (a resolution, it is true, wholly without effect in
practice) the negotiations of the Conférence on this point
would hâve been completely wrecked.
The resolution ran : " The Conférence is of opinion
that the restriction of military charges, which are at
présent a heavy burden on the world, is extremely
désirable for the increase of the material and moral
welfare of mankind."
The récognition of this fact has not prevented Euro-
pean Governments, under the leadership of the German
Empire, from inflating their armaments to such an
extent that in the end the balloon, distended to the
bursting-point, was bound to explode and set the whole
world in fiâmes.
Even worse was the fate of the Russian proposai for
the establishment of international arbitration. This
proposai, indeed, was modest enough in what it con-
N G
82 J'ACCUSE
templated ; obligatory arbitration on principle was, it
is true, to be introduced, but this was to be excluded
in ail cases affecting vital interests or the honour of a
State. As each State was to remain its own judge as
to what it should regard as a question of honour or of
vital interests, the Russian proposai cannot be said to
hâve had a revolutionary character, a matter to be
regretted, for the most important steps forward in the
history of mankind are achieved by révolutions and
not by warfare as is maintained by those who pay
homage to war. The proposai, then, secured the
approval of almost ail taking part in the Conférence;
on this point also Germany alone raised objection on the
ground that subjection to a court of arbitration was not,
as Prof essor Zorn maintained, " in conformity with the
traditions of the Bismarckian policy."
The opposition of Germany was so violent that
negotiations camé to a dead stop, and they had to be
postponed for a period of fourteen days to enable
Prof essor Zorn to receive new instructions from Berlin.
The Conférence very nearly proceeded without the co-
opération of Germany. But hère again, rather than
allow the whole proposai to be wrecked, it was resolved
in the end to yield to the will of Germany and in ail
cases to allow optional in place of compulsory juris-
diction.
Hère again Germany had the undisputed merit of
having barred the way to a décisive step forward in the
peaceful organisation of the nations.
The establishment of a perpétuai court of arbitration
at the Hague was similarly refused by Germany from
the outset, and it was admitted only when it was made
optional and not compulsory to summon this court.
Thus the first Hague conférence ended, in spite of
Germany and Austria, and owing to the active exertions
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 83
of France and England in support of the efforts of
Russia for peace, with a final resuit which after ail
represented a first important step towards the aim of an
organisation of States based on law and of a graduai
libération of the nations from the intolérable oppres-
sion of their armaments.
Between the First and Second Hague Conférences :
The English Libéral Government.
Between the first and the second Hague Conférences
— the second was held from July to October, 1907 —
the development of events in the différent European
countries was highly characteristic of the attitude of
thèse countries and of their governments towards the
problems of the Hague, and the occurrences during this
period serve to emphasise in the sharpest manner the
différence between England and Germany.
Even before the first Conférence was held, Goschen,
the First Lord of the Admirai ty, speaking on behalf of
the English Conservative Government, made a definite
déclaration on March 9th, 1899, in favour of a régulation
by treaty of the System of armaments. This déclaration
was confirmed in July, 1903, by Mr. Chamberlain, a
member of the Government, with the observation that
it was still regarded as binding on the English Cabinet. 1
When in 1905 the Libéral party came into power and
Campbell-Bannerman, a convinced pacifist, became
leader of the Ministry, the English Government at once
began to display an energetic and untiring activity on
the same Unes as the efforts which at the first Hague
Conférence had, chiefly in conséquence of the opposition
of Germany, produced only very modest results.
This activity of the English Libéral Government was
1 See Fried. Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, II, p. 767.
G 2
84 J'ACCUSE
on so large a scale and was so comprehensive that it
is impossible within the limits of this work to emphasise
ail their individual acts. In Parliament, at inter-
Parliamentary Conférences, in speeches at clubs and
at the Guildhall, in diplomatie negotiations with other
Powers, in newspaper and magazine articles, English
Ministers never grew weary of laying stress on the
perniciousness for ail nations of the compétition in
armaments by land and by sea, and never flagged
in their efforts to devise remédiai measures for this
ruinous situation. Thèse same men who are to-day
represented to the deluded and infatuated German
people as men refined in the préparation and instiga-
tion of war, whose personal honour German historians
dare to deny, men like Grey, Haldane, Lloyd George,
Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, and the others, thèse
men devoted themselves with the utmost zeal to thèse
problems, which, as they well saw, affected the vital
nerve not only of England, but of ail European states.
"A policy of huge armaments," exclaimed Campbell-
Bannerman in his programme, M keeps alive and stimu-
lâtes and feeds the belief that force is the best, if not
the only, solution of international différences." 1
" I wish," Haldane, then Minister for War, declared
in the House of Commons on March 8th, 1906, " we were
near the time when the nations would consider together
the réduction of armaments . . . only by united action
can we get rid of the burden which is pressing so heavily
on ail civilised nations." 2
On the occasion of a banquet on September 26th in
the same year the Prime Minister expressed the hope
that the understanding then reached with regard to
Morocco (the Algeciras Convention had been completed
» [Albert Hall speech December 21st, 1905.]
2 [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 153, 674.]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 85
on April 7th) would lead to a possibility of reducing the
oppressive military expenditure, and he declared that
England would put itself at the head in this matter.
To this intention the English Government gave
effect. The outline of the Russian programme for the
second Hague Conférence, published in spring, 1906,
contained nothing on the problem of armaments, pre-
sumably because the Russian Government had gathered
from the attitude of Germany at the first Conférence
that any discussion of this question would be useless.
The English Libéral Government now made the most
determined efforts to secure the inclusion in the pro-
gramme of the Conférence of the question of arma-
ments as well as the question of arbitration. A pro-
posai on this point, put forward in the House of Com-
mons by the Labour member, Mr. Vivian, was accepted
unanimously amid applause, and the Foreign Secretary,
Sir Edward Grey, associated himself with the resolution
on behalf of the Government.
"I do not believe," said Grey, "that at any time
has the conscious public opinion in the various countries
of Europe set more strongly in the direction of peace
than at the présent time, and y et the burden of military
and naval expenditure goes on increasing No
greater service coula it (the Hague Conférence) do, than
to make the conditions of peace less expensive than they
are at the présent time. . . . It is said we are waiting
upon foreign nations in order to reduce our expenditure.
As a matter of fact, we are ail waiting on each other.
Some day or other somebody must take the first step.
... I do, on behalf of the Government, not only accept,
but welcome such a resolution as this as a wholesome
and bénéficiai expression of opinion." 1
» [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 156, 1414-5.]
86 J'ACCUSE
When in July, 1906, the Interparliamentary Union,
including 620 représentatives from twenty-three coun-
tries, met in London, the Prime Minister, Campbell-
Bannerman, made a mémorable speech in opening the
proceedings : " Urge your Governments," he exclaimed
to the members, u in the name of humanity to go into
the Hague Conférence, as we ourselves hope to go,
pledged to diminished charges in respect of arma-
ments."
The American politician, Bryan, now Foreign Secre-
tary, who also was présent, expressed himself in the
same sensé. A resolution, corresponding to the views
then expressed, was carried unanimously.
In the following year, some months before the opening
of the Conférence, Campbell-Bannerman spoke even
more strongly in a meeting of the House of Commons
on March 5th, 1907, in support of the idea of a
common restriction of armaments. He declared
that it was the duty of England to bring this matter
forward for discussion before the second Hague Con-
férence, "holding the opinion that there is a great
movement of feeling among thinking people in ail the
nations of the world in favour of . . . some restraint
on the enormous expenditure involved in the présent
System so long as it exists. . . . We hâve desired and
still désire to place ourselves in the very front rank of
those who think that the warlike attitude of Powers as
displayed by the excessive growth of armaments is a
curse to Europe, and that the sooner it is checked, in
however moderate a degree, the better." 1
The leading men in the other countries of Europe and
of America also gave expression to views similar to
those of the English Ministers. Léon Bourgeois in Paris,
Tittoni, then Foreign Minister in Rome, Roosevelt in
i [Hansard, 1907, Vol. 170, 675.]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 87
his message to Congress, ail expressed themselves in
favour of an agreement with regard to armaments,
and a discussion of this question at the Hague
Conférence.
Only Austria and Germany made once again a
glorious exception. In reply to an inquiry on the sub-
ject Count Gulochowski gave in the Austrian Déléga-
tions only an evasive answer. In Germany the mère idea
of an international discussion of thèse questions was at
once enough to let loose the devil of nationalism. Behind
the efforts of the other Powers they scented, as usual,
a cunning trick to deprive Germany of her defences, and
they professed to see the danger of war thfeatening
them in the inclusion of such a point in the Hague
programme. "The nearer the Peace Conférence
approaches," so wrote the Tàgliche Rundschau in a
leading article on April 9th, 1907, "the clearer it
becomes that it is expressly characterised by tendencies
inimical to peace." Herr Bassermann, a représentative
in the Reichstag, did not venture to hope for a more
peaceful situation until after the Hague Conférence had
been safely got over. The Prussian Minister of War os-
tentatiously emphasised Germany's readiness for war.
Liebermann von Sonnenberg, a représentative in the
House, concluded a patriotic Pan-German speech in the
Reichstag with the courageous words : " Let them
corne." And last, but not least, Prince Rùlow did not
allow himself to hope for any results from the discussion
of the problem at the Hague, and publicly expressed
his intention of "leaving the discussion to be conducted
by those Powers alone who hoped that any success
might resuit from it."
That was the answer which Germany gave to the
English proposai for an international agreement on
armaments.
88 J'ACCUSE
Second Hague Conférence : England and Germany.
The negotiations which took place at the Conférence
corresponded to the very promising way in which it
began. Matters took pretty much the same course as
at the first Conférence. England wanted a discussion
of the problem of armaments; Germany, however,
declined it. To avoid a conflict a way out was sought
and found. The first représentative of England, the
Lord Justice Sir Edward Fry, delivered a speech in
which he elucidated the problem from every point of
view, and proposed a resolution which declared that it
was eminently désirable that Governments should
résume their study of the question. This resolution was
unanimously adopted, since according to the arrange-
ment made no discussion could take place.
Once more we see that Germany scored a brilliant
success; once again a pathway to progress was barri-
caded !
When a member of the House, Bebel, interpellated
Prince Bûlow in the sitting of the Reichstag of Novem-
ber 21st, 1907, with regard to the attitude of the German
delegates, the Impérial Chancellor could truthfully reply
that the German delegates had taken no part in a dis-
cussion on the question of armaments, because such a
discussion had not taken place. But he forgot to add
that this exclusion of a debate had been dictated by
Germany.
In England there was naturally universal disappoint-
ment over the failure of the noble-minded efforts of
leading Libéral Ministers. A few months before his
death Campbell-Bannerman gave expression to this dis-
appointment in the words : " We had hoped . . . that
some great advance might be made towards a common
consent to arrest the wasteful and growing compétition
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 89
in naval and military armaments. We were disap-
pointed." *
They were disappointed but not disheartened. After
this failure to arrive at the desired end along the path of
international agreement the method of private negotia-
tions with Germany was adopted. We shall see later
with what success.
Apart from the problem of armaments the question
which chiefly engaged the attention of the second
Hague Conférence was naturally that of international
arbitration. The problem before them was to give to
the torso of 1889 a firmer and more harmonious form.
It was intended that the compulsory élément, which had
miscarried owing to Germany, should be inserted in the
earlier resolutions. In order not to encounter once
more the opposition of Germany a very complicated
proposai had been prepared, which, it is true, made it
compulsory for the contracting Powers to submit to
arbitration, but only subject to the exclusion of ail
questions which affected important interests or the
independence of the parties to the dispute.
Even this limited élément of compulsion encountered
the determined résistance of Germany. The proposai
was remodelled in every direction in order to meet
Germany; but not even this watery proposai gained
the approval of Germany, which voted against it along
with Austria, while the great majority of States, in-
cluding England, France, and Russia, accepted the pro-
posai by 32 votes to 9.
But even then the path of tribulation of international
arbitration was not ended. The proposai was put
forward that the agreement accepted by so great a
majority should be binding at least on those Powers
which had concurred in it. But the German representa-
1 [Guildhall Banquet, Nov. 9th, 1907.]
90 J'ACCUSE
tive, Freiherr von Marschall, protested against this as
a violation of the principle of unanimity, and no other
course was open to the Conférence than to be content
on this question also with a déclaration which, indeed,
expressed the platonic inclination of the Powers to the
principle of compulsory arbitration, but, in practice,
"preserved for each of the Powers represented the
maintenance of its own standpoint."
Thus the number of Germany's successes increases !
Our title of glory, that of being everywhere a drag on
the peaceful under standing between the nations, will
remain undisputed, but it can scarcely contribuée to
making us loved throughout the world.
English Proposals for a Political Understanding
and for a Naval Agreement with Germany.
Scarcely had the sound of the peaceful concluding
words of the Président of the Conférence died away in
the Rittersaal at the Hague when the English Munsters
began to turn their attention to devising new ways
whereby they could attain the object that hovered
before them — an end equally advantageous to ail the
nations. After ail out standing questions between
England and France had been disposed of by the Con-
vention of April, 1904, and the conflicts of interest
between England and Russia had likewise been over-
come by the Agreement of 1907, the Libéral Government,
which, after the death of Campbell-Bannerman, was
now under the leadership of Asquith, regarded it as the
most important task of its foreign policy to establish
its relations with Germany on a basis calculated to
exclude, as far as possible, the occurrence of conflicts.
There were no real conflicting interests or occasions of
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 91
friction between England and Germany, or at most thèse
only existed to a very small extent. The difficultés in
East Africa had been regulated by the treaty concluded
in 1890 by Salisbury and Caprivi whereby Heligoland
was handed over to Germany, and in return concessions
were made to England in East Africa. Questions arising
in Asia Minor scarcely offered enough material for a
serious conflict, and the treaty concluded in the early
summer of 1914, notwithstanding the tension in the
political situation, shows that the peaceful démarcation
of sphères of interest between England and Germany
involved no particular difficulty where there was mutual
good will.
" What, then, is the object of this compétition in
naval armaments, which constantly grows more fatal for
both sides ? " — this was the question which the English
Government and English public opinion was bound to
ask. If both countries desired peace, why should they
ruin each other in armaments ? If, however, one side
proposes limitation of armament by treaty, as England
did at the Hague in 1889 and 1907, and the other
side constantly déclines any such limitation, is it not,
in thèse circumstances, a justifiable suspicion that
the party which déclines entertains unconfessed inten-
tions against the party which makes the proposai ?
The English public were logically bound to propound
such questions to themselves, and they might quite
rightly put the further question : What would Germany,
what would the whole of Europe say, if England, the
leading Power on sea, were suddenly to begin to create
a force by land, which sooner or later might become
equal to the German in strength? Would not this
rightly be regarded as a threat against the Power com-
peting against her on the Continent ? The German naval
law and the constant increases in naval strength effected
92 J'ACCUSE
at short intervais of time, whereby Germany, in the
course of twenty years, has become the second naval
Power in the world, was bound to place the English
Government before the alternative of either answering
Germany 's naval armaments by a corresponding increase
in their own or embarking on the attempt to make
good, by a private agreement between Germany and
England, the gênerai arrangements which had been
wrecked at the Hague. Mr. Asquith's Government
chose in the first place the latter way, which was thorny
enough in view of Germany 's opposition in principle to
restrictions of armaments of any kind, imposed by way
of a treaty.
This disinclination must, indeed, remain entirely
incompréhensible to the ordinary man. It is probably
a part of the superior insight of those who govern by
the grâce of God to be in a position to dispute the
correctness of the folio wing simple calculations. The
English say to the Germans : " We consider that the
présent relation in strength of our two fleets, sixteen to
ten, is a suitable one, and in any case, since we do not
possess an army of any importance, we consider our-
selves under an obligation to stick to this proportion
for the maintenance of our power and for the protection
of our trade and of our over-sea possessions. If you,
Germany, agrée to this proportion being fixed, so much
the better for both of us ; further construction will then
be useless, for the relative strength of the one compared
to the other will always remain the same. If, however,
you do not agrée, so much the worse for you. We on
our side will then lay down two ships for every ship
which you lay down ; the relation of sixteen to ten will
thus be at once changed to y our disadvantage,
absolutely as well as relatively. When you hâve built
ten new ships, that is to say, when you hâve got as far
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 93
as twenty, we will hâve built twenty new ships, and will
hâve reached thirty-six, etc. The absolute distance
between our two fleets will thus constantly increase,
and the relative position will constantly become more
unfavourable for y ou. In the end we will ruin each
other, and will be like the Kilkenny cats which ate
each other up until only the tails were left. It is for
y ou to choose. If y ou décide on our first proposai, in
ten years' time you will be in as safe a position as you
are to-day, and you will hâve spared your money and
your people. If you choose the second proposai your
security will be diminished every year, and at the same
time you will be gradually ruining yourself ; and it will
be but a small consolation to you that you are at the
same time bringing us to the verge of ruin also."
One would hâve thought that a ragged schoolboy, who
had just learned the first éléments of the multiplication
table, would hâve understood this calculation, and would
hâve been overjoyed to accept the first proposai. The
German Impérial Government could not rise to this
height, and so the wearisome negotiations constantly
renewed from the side of En gland — they might be called
the seven years' armaments war of 1907-14 — collapsed
without resuit. Indeed, it may be asserted that the
failure of the negotiations, the constant increase of
armaments caused thereby, and the increasing tension
in the political situation due to the increased armaments,
are to a considérable extent responsible for the fact that
a real war has at last grown out of the war of arma-
ments.
The responsibility for this is exclusively Germany's,
as a short account of the relevant events will reveal.
At the seventeenth World Peace Congress, which met
in London in July and August, 1908, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, advocated with
94 J'ACCUSE
passionate words an understanding between England
and Germany, and lamented M that it should be necessary
in the twentieth century of the Christian Era to hold
a meeting in a civilised country to protest against the
expenditure by Christian communities of 400 millions a
year upon preparing one nation to kill another." Mr.
Asquith, the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the Lord
May or 's banquet in 1908, gave the assurance that
England would "not be reluctant to grasp any hand
that is extended to us in good will and in good faith."
On March 16th in the following year Mr. Asquith stated
to the House of Commons that the question of a mutual
réduction of expenditure for naval purposes had more
than once formed the subject of communications between
the two Governments, but unfortunately without resuit. 1
This utterance of the English Prime Minister led, in the
last days of March, to a discussion in the German Reich-
stag, in the course of which various speakers urgently
besought the Government to grasp somewhat more
energetically the hand offered by England. Bassermann,
a member of the House, felt, of course, ail kinds of
scruples, and prepared the way for Prince Bûlow, who
in the first place denied that any definite proposai had
been made by England, and on the gênerai question
" held out no hope of any effective results from negotia-
tions with référence to the limitation of naval con-
struction."
Thèse utterances of Bûlow occasioned a new discussion
in the English House of Commons, in the course of which
the Foreign Secretary, Sir E. Grey, delivered a highly
important speech on the naval compétition between
England and Germany. For England, declared the
Foreign Secretary, the Navy was what the Army was
to Germany. The superiority of the English Navy must
i [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 2, 1,459.]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 95
be maintained, but on the basis of this superiority an
understanding might very well be arranged between the
two countries. Grey let it be seen that England might
be prepared to alter her attitude with regard to the
question of the capture of an enemy's private property
at sea, if this would be accepted as a starting-point for
a diminution of naval expenditure. 1
In introducing the Navy Estimâtes in 1909 Mr.
McKenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking
in the House of Commons on July 26th, declared that
" the British Government not only expressed its désire,
but by something much stronger than words showed its
détermination to give the lead in restricting armaments,
and for three successive years the British Government
did its utmost to convince the world of the futility of
its race in armaments, and of the desirability of cur-
tailing construction." 2 After enumerating ail the
previous endeavours of England, which unfortunately
had proved fruitless, Mr. Asquith also declared that
even then the door was still open and that they were
anxious and even eager to corne to some arrangement
with other Power s. 3 Every indication that the German
Government desired to enter into such an agreement
would meet with the heartiest réception f rom the English
Government. In answer to a question of a member
Mr. Asquith answered shortly and definitely : H We hâve
taken the initiative."
The more the English Ministers revealed their en-
deavour to arrive at an understanding with Germany on
the question of naval armaments, the more did they
become an object of attack and suspicion to the German
chauvinist Press. On July 14th, 1910, Mr. Asquith was
1 [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 3, 61.]
2 [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 859.]
8 [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 879.]
96 J'ACCUSE
obliged to déclare that the German Government had
evaded further inquiries, stating that they were bound
by a law, and that a modification of this law would not
hâve the support of public opinion in Germany. 1 On
the folio wing day Mr. Lloyd George, speaking at a ban-
quet, denounced in passionate words " the épidémie of
prodigality which seems to be sweeping over the world
and sweeping to destruction."
In reply to thèse earnest and uninterrupted efforts of
the English Ministry the Impérial Chancellor, Bethmann
Hollweg, offered in December, 1910, a few platonic
observations which must hâve acted like a stream of
cold water : England, he said, had indeed made sugges-
tions, but had submitted no positive proposais ; Germany
in the pourparlers had constantly started from the idea
that an open and unrestrained discussion leading to an
understanding with regard to their interests on both
sides was the surest means of overcoming any distrust
due to their relative strength by land and by water.
66 The mère continuance of a free and unrestrained ex-
change of thought on ail questions connected with thèse
matters is a guarantee for the friendly intention . . .
&c.
As Thoas says in " Iphigenie " :
"A flood of words is useless in refusing;
The other hears in ail the one word: ' No.' " 2
This " No ! " resounds again with full distinetness in
the folio wing year. In the House of Commons on
March 13th, 1911, Grey had once more emphasised the
necessity of arriving at an agreement with Germany and
of restricting the continuing increase of the expenditure
on armaments. He foresaw that if this tremendous
i [Hansard, 1910. Vol. 19, 645.]
2 ["Man spricht vergebens viel, um zu versagen;
Der andere hôrt in allem nur das Nein."]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 97
expenditure on, and rivalry of, armaments continued,
it must in the long run break civilisation down. The
burden of armaments was a greater danger than war
itself, since it involved a bleeding to death in time of
peace. 1
This speech of Grey formed the subject of the debate
in the Reichstag on March 30th, 1911, in which the
Impérial Chancellor — now quite plainly and without any
concealment — declared that the question of an agree-
ment as to armaments was insoluble so long as men were
men and States were States.
Thus the décisive word was now spoken, and in view
of Parliamentary conditions in Germany little signi-
ficance could be attached to the fact that the Reichstag
passed a resolution calling upon the Chancellor to enter
into negotiations with other Powers with regard to the
limitation of armaments should the occasion arise.
According to German political law of the Bismarckian
tradition the Impérial Chancellor is, as is well known,
merely the servant of his lord, and is not obliged to pay
any attention to Parliamentary resolutions.
But the English did not y et relax their efforts. E vents
in Morocco had led to the dispatch of a German warship
to Agadir, and to negotiations arising out of this between
the Powers affected — negotiations which put a severe
strain on the peace of Europe. In the autumn of 1911,
the negotiations at last arrived, through many périls, at
the goal, with the resuit that the disputes between
France and Germany with regard to Morocco were finally
composed, and as an équivalent for France 's freedom of
action in Morocco a portion of French Congo was ceded
to the German Empire. Scarcely had this cloud passed
away from the political horizon when Sir Edward Grey
emphasised anew, in the English Parliament on Novem-
i [Hansard, 1911. Vol. 22, 1,985-6.]
H
98 J'ACCUSE
ber 27th, 1911, England 's urgent désire for the
establishment of better relations with Germany. The
existing friendships of England did not constitute a
hindrance to the conclusion of new friendships. England
had co-operated in securing a peaceful solution of the
Morocco crisis, the air was now purified, and he would
gladly welcome any wish on the part of Germany for
better relations with England. 1
In the beginning of February, 1912, the English
Government sent Lord Haldane to Berlin, not as an
officiai plenipotentiary, but with the task of sounding
the ground in conversations with the Chancellor and the
Emperor, with whom Haldane was a persona gratissima,
and if possible of preparing the way for the political and
naval agreement which had been so long sought. The
prélude to Lord Haldane 's activity was not exactly
encouraging; two days before his arrivai in Berlin the
Emperor, in opening the Reichstag, had announced
great increases both in the Army and in the Navy. The
increase in the Navy was to extend to no less than three
capital ships, many submarines, and fifteen hundred
men. On this Lord Haldane put to the Chancellor and
to Admirai von Tirpitz the very proper question : What
would be the use of negotiations aiming at friendly
relations between the two Powers, if Germany was going
at the same moment to increase her battle fleet as a
précaution against England, and thereby compel
England to a corresponding increase on her side ?
Negotiations with a view to friendly relations accom-
panied by increases in the Navy would provoke World-
wide dérision. The German représentatives indicated
that a naval agreement without a simultaneous poli-
tical Entente was purposeless, but they also at once
emphasised that even in the event of a political under-
i [Hansard, 1911. Vol. 32, 43-65.]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 99
standing, there could be no question of a réduction in
the naval programme, but that at the most a certain
retardation in carrying it out might be approved. 1 The
promise of a possible retardation in naval construction
was even further limited in that it was to be an " under-
standing and not a written agreement."
Thus, while on the one hand the aim pursued with
untiring zeal by the Libéral English Government for
seven years, the aim of arriving at a cessation of naval
armaments on both sides, remained unachieved — since
the proposed retardation, which was not even of a
binding nature, would resuit neither in such a cessation
nor in a saving of expenditure — Germany, on the other
hand, demanded, as an équivalent for thèse so-called
concessions, political conditions which it was simply
impossible for England to fulfil. The attitude
assumed by the German Government in connection with
ail Anglo-German negotiations is in itself sufficiently
remarkable, namely, that an équivalent could justifiably
be demanded in return for a concession, which, after ail,
did not represent a sacrifice on one side, but was a duty
implicit in the vital interests of both. With just as much
right an équivalent could hâve been demanded by
England, who was equally ready to bind herself.
But, to pur sue the question, what was the équivalent
demanded by Germany? Germany demanded neither
more nor less — and hère it revived a demand already
formulated in previous years by the Chancellor, Beth-
mann Hollweg — than the obligation for Britain of un-
conditional neutrality in the event of any European con-
flict in which Germany might be involved. England was
1 Thèse and the following facts are taken from Sir Edward
Cook's pamphlet entitled : How Britain Strove for Peace.
A Record of Anglo-German Negotiations 1898-1914. Told
from authoritative sources. (Macmillan and Co., London,
1914.)
H 2
100 J'ACCUSE
thus to free herself from her engagements to the Entente
and was to withhold herself from every co-operation in
European questions. In view of the close alliance with
Austria it was scarcely possible to conceive a conflict
in which Germany might not be involved, either on
account of her own interests or on account of those of
Austria, yet every where England was expected to
remain an inactive spectator, and to allow Germany and
her ally full freedom to rule the roast on the Continent.
Even treaty-obligations to protect neutrals would
hâve been abolished had England concurred in the
German proposai of an unconditional neutrality in ail
disputes affecting Germany.
It is, therefore, not surprising that this suggestion,
which had already been rejected between 1909 and 1911,
should again hâve been rejected in 1912 after Haldane's
visit; indeed, it amounted to no more than a demand
that England should simply renounce her position as a
European great Power. This demand would in any case
hâve been monstrous, even if its fulfilment had been
sought to be purchased at a high price. But what was
the price offered by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg ? An
unbinding, unwritten, temporary retardation, which in-
volved no réduction in naval construction on the basis
of the most récent increase of the fleet in 1912.
This suggestion was really rather strong, and postu-
lated a high degree of simplicity on the part of the shrewd
English men of business. What, indeed, would German
diplomacy hâve said if it had been suggested that
Germany should sell the birthright of her position as a
great Power in Europe in exchange for the mess
of pottage of an English retardation in naval con-
struction ?
Sir Edward Grey was obliged to décline the German
proposai; he did not, however, content himself with
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 101
merely declining it, but he repeated again on this
occasion what he had said in previous years in
public as well as in diplomatie negotiations ; that is
to say :
1. That England could not agrée to an unconditional
obligation to observe neutrality, such as Germany
demanded, but, on the other hand, she would always
be ready, as she had hitherto been, to work in common
with Germany in the interests of the peace of Europe ;
2. That the Triple Entente was not based on gênerai
political formulée, but on a settlement of spécifie ques-
tions affecting the interests of the Entente Powers, and
that only indirectly by the settlement of thèse questions
and by the removal of causes of friction had relations
of friendship resulted ;
3. That thèse relations had neither an exclusive nor
an offensive character against Germany and that there
was no reason why Germany should not enter into
similar relations with England.
In order to give as précise a form as possible to thèse
ideas the English Cabinet resolved to express them in
a short formula, which was handed by Sir Edward Grey
to the German Ambassador, Count Metternich, and
which was intended to serve as a basis for further naval
negotiations. The formula ran as folio ws : —
" The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing
peace and friendship between them, England déclares
that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked
attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is
not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, under-
standing, or combination to which England is now a
party, nor will she become a party to anything that has
such an object."
England thus promised that she would, for herself,
make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and that she
102 J'ACCUSE
would not share in any such venture; she further
declared that an attack upon Germany was neither con-
templated nor permitted by any treaty or convention to
which she was a party. Lastly, England promised that
she would never be a party in any such treaty or agree-
ment. This was thus a promise of non-aggression in the
widest sensé of the word. What more could Germany
reasonably ask ? Germany was secured against every
attack on the part of England, and with this security
any reason or pretence for naval compétition collapsed,
unless — and there's the rub ! — unless Germany herself
had aggressive intentions against her neighbours,
England 's friends in the Entente, and thus indirectly
against England. Hère we hâve the salient point,
on which the year-long negotiations between the
two countries constantly and necessarily came to
grief.
England offered the assurance that she would not
attack. Germany, however, asked for security to he
ahle to attack undisturbed. The English offer had little
value for Germany, since the German Government knew
quite well from the attitude of the English Libéral
Cabinet since 1905 that there was no ground to fear an
attack from the side of England. The only point that
mattered to Germany was that she should be able to
count on English neutrality, under ail circumstances, in
ail Continental conflicts, even if they were provoked by
Germany or her ally, and even if they affected the
independence of neutral countries, and thereby directly
or indirectly affected English interests. By isolating
England, Germany desired to make her path secure, in
the first place, to a hegemony on the Continent, in order
later on to rise from this advantageous position to the
perpétuai leadership of the world at the cost of England.
This idea also dominâtes, as we shall see, Germany's
HISTORIC AL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 103
diplomatie préparations for the war in the last days of
July, 1914.
" The thought is élever — devilishly so !
Apart from that, it might be called damned silly." 1
Neither at an earlier nor at a later date did the English
allow themselves to be entrapped by this lime.
The negotiations of 1912 failed, like ail other negotia-
tions before and after this, on Germany's demand for
neutrality.
But one last English attempt, again along différent
lines, was still to be made. After the new German
navy increase of 1912, after Haldane's visit had
passed without results, and after the last negotiations
between Grey and Metternich, the British Government
resumed an attempt — already undertaken under Camp-
bell-Bannerman in 1906 — to induce in the other side a
better insight into the interests of both parties through
the measures actually adopted by them in connection
with the Navy, without having recourse to any diplo-
matie negotiations. Although in spring, 1906, the German
navy programme of 1900 had again been increased by six
large cruisers, the English Government announced in
July of the same year that the programme laid before
Parliament in March for the construction of new ships
would be reduced by 25 per cent, in the case of battle-
ships, by 60 per cent, in the case of destroyers, and by
33 per cent, in the case of submarines. The reason for
this one-sided voluntary réduction was, as the Govern-
ment expressly declared, on the one hand, to announce
to the whole world, before the meeting of the second
Hague Conférence, England's firm intention to reduce
the burden of armaments, and, on the other, to induce
1 ["Wàr' der Gedank' nicht so verwiïnscht gescheit,
Man wàr' versucht, ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen."]
104 J'ACCUSE
other Powers to folio w the same procédure. This second
object was of course not realised in the case of Germany ;
rather the contrary effect was produced. On three
différent occasions — to the English Ambassador, Sir F.
Lascelles, to the English Under Secretary of State,
Sir Charles Hardinge, who accompanied King Edward
to Germany, and to the English Minister of War,
Mr. Haldane — the Kaiser in the late summer and in the
autumn of the same year personally expressed strong
disapprobation of any attempt to bring the question
of armaments before the Hague Conférence, and
declined to allow the German delegates to take any
part in this super fluous and futile discussion. There
could, as a matter of course, be no question of the
English example being followed on the part of
Germany.
In spite of this failure a similar attempt was made in
1912-1913 by Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the
Admiralty. New negotiations with Germany after
récent expériences appeared futile, but as an alternative
method Churchill declared, in introducing the estimâtes
in the two years mentioned, that he pledged himself
that any retardation or réduction in German construction
should be followed by this country in full proportion.
If Germany decided to take a naval holiday and build
no ships in any given year, England would at once
follow suit and drop her programme for the year like-
wise. In this way "without negotiations, bargain-
ings, or the slightest restriction upon the sovereign
freedom of either Power" relief might be obtained for
both nations.
This déclaration of Churchill, which as we hâve
observed was officially repeated on two différent occa-
sions, remained unanswered and unreciprocated by
Germany, presumably because hère also she was await-
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 105
ing "positive proposais," which would then of
course hâve been answered or reciprocated to no
greater purpose than had been done on previous
occasions.
This is the history of the Anglo-German negotiations
extending over many years, of the vain wooing of
England for Germany's favour — a wooing which was
unattended by success, since the coy beauty would
sell her favour only at a price which the wooer could
not pay unless he were prepared to sacrifice himself.
Once more it appeared as if in this case also circum-
stances were stronger than the will of man. The work
of peace pursued in common throughout the Balkan
crisis, the success achieved in maintaining peace,
attributable exclusively to the co-operation of the two
Empires, had quite automatically given a more friendly
form to the relations of the two countries to each other.
The délimitation of the sphères of interest in Asia Minor
held out the promise of a further favourable develop-
ment of thèse relations, but unfortunately this did not
touch the kernel of the question ; the constantly increas-
ing danger involved in the compétition in naval arma-
ments, occasioned by Germany's infatuated refusai of
every agreement.
What would the world hâve looked like to-day if
Germany had accepted the last proposai put forward by
Grey in 1912 ? The security from every attack on the
part of England and her Allies would not indeed hâve
diverted Germany from her imperialistic ambitions,
which in their nature were bound to be aggressive, but
it would hâve deprived the German Government of the
pretext which has enabled them to represent their war
of prestige and expansion as a war of defence, and with-
out this pretext it would hâve been impossible to hâve
urged into so fearful a war the German people, the
106 J'ACCUSE
great majority of whom are attached to peace. The
truce in naval armaments would in addition hâve
created a more friendly atmosphère between Germany
and England, and as a conséquence between the Triple
Alliance and the Triple Entente. It may be presumed
that in Germany the last enormous increase in the army
and the measure providing for the raising of millions of
pounds would not hâve corne into being. France would
not hâve introduced her System of three-years service,
and the Austro-Serbian dispute — which, as we shall see
later, any child could hâve solved — would not hâve led
to the universal war.
WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR?
If Germany really had no other objects than those
constantly advanced in ail Impérial and princely
speeches and in ail speeches by the Chancellor,
" Security from attack, free development for her forces,
unhampered attention to her culture," how could ail
thèse possessions hâve been obtained more surely or
more cheaply than by accepting the English pro-
posais ?
" We will persévère until we hâve the assurance that
no one will again disturb our peace, a peace in which
we mean as a free nation to tend and develop our
German character and our German strength," — with
thèse words the Impérial Chancellor concluded his speech
on the 2nd of December. A few days later the Emperor
delivered an address on thé Eastern scène of war to
the delegates of the German and Austrian divisions :
"We are fighting," he exclaimed "for a just cause, for
freedom, for the right of our nation to exist, for a long
future peace." His Majesty might hâve been respect-
fully answered in thèse words, "May it please your
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 107
Majesty, what we are supposed to be fighting for we
had before the war began. We had our freedom, the
right to our national existence, which no one disputed,
and we had had a long undisturbed peace. Why then,
y our Majesty, are we fighting ? " And one might hâve
added : If Germany believed herself to be imperilled —
which is not proved, and which cannot be proved — why
then did she not gain for herself the greater security
offered by England ? The security, which was then
offered in peace, can ne ver again be achieved by victory
on the battlefield. It could not only hâve been obtained
at less expense — for then it would hâve cost neither life
nor treasure — it would also hâve been more enduring
and more tenable. According to the dictum of Sallust,
Kingdoms can only be maintained by the means by
which they were created, and in the same way an
international treaty, which is intended to regulate the
relations of nations in peace is more surely cemented
by peaceful than by military means. Treaties of Peace
after war al way s contain the tacit clause, rébus sic
stantibus, which Kant, in his first preliminary article
of his work On Perpétuai Peace, regards as a hindrance
to an enduring condition of peace. Treaties of peace,
however, established in time of peace, which arise out
of common interests and which do not bear on their
forehead the remembrance of death and destruction,
of hatred and vengeance, like the mark of Cain, such
treaties hold aère perennius, and like ail good things
carry in them the seeds of further good.
So I again say that what we are supposed to be
fighting for, we already possessed. We possessed it
more securely than we shall possess it for générations
even after a victorious war, and anything that we
lacked we could hâve obtained without war by a treaty
in peace.
108 J'ACCUSE
THE FREEDOM WHICH THEY MEAN.
But as we hâve said the questions at stake are quite
différent from security, freedom, and the right to exist.
The word " freedom " is to-day very often heard in the
mouths of men who formerly crossed themselves thrice
on hearing the forbidden word from any other quarter.
We hâve ail, without exception, become lovers of
freedom overnight, — above ail those who previously
extolled the " state of dependence willed by God." We
hâve become so enamoured of freedom that we mean to
bring it not only to our nation, but also to ail the other
nations in the world. (See the explanation of the
Impérial Chancellor to the American people.) We
simply no longer know how far the impulse to freedom
will carry us. . . .
" Be embraced, ye countless millions 1
With the wide world 's ardent kiss." 2
Social democrats, clericals, progressives, Pôles, Danes,
Alsatians — ail who were formerly enemies of the Empire
are now pressed by the Prussian Junker to his sensitive
heart — that is, on the assumption that they keep the
"peace within" 3 which, as is known, consists. in think-
ing, speaking, and writing as the Junkers think, speak,
and write. The transaction, however, is not a mutual
one, it is a societas leonina in the worst sens of the
word. Any one who allows himself to think, or write, or
speak otherwise than is pleasing to the governing class
1 [The title of this section is an adaptation of Max von
Schenkendorf's song : "Freiheit, die ich même."]
2 [" Seid umschlungen, Millionen 1
Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt!"
— Schiller. An die Freude.]
8 [Burgfrieden. The jurisdiction of a castle, the peace
within the castle, hence almost équivalent to the "civil
truce."]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 109
is suppressed, punished, or if need be, shot dead. That
is the freedom which they mean.
The German people will in time realise to what bondage
thèse apostles of freedom are leading them. After every
period of exaltation of the 1 German people a period of
bitterest bondage has always followed. It was so after
1813, after 1848, and after 1870, when the first years of
the intoxication of victory had passed away. It will be
precisely the same after 1914. The soldiers and the
Junkers, who in essential matters form one class, feel
themselves entirely in their élément in war ! It is quite
to their liking to suppress the freedom of the Press, to
suppress the right of free assembly, to throttle trade and
industry — the représentatives of which had already
taken up too much room at the Impérial Court.
" Certain barriers of Court étiquette " — we find in Liman,
the apostle of the Crown Prince — u still make inacces-
sible to wealth certain pathways which are only open
to the sons of the old agnati of the kingdom and to
officers; otherwise the millionaire has carried off the
victory, and the society of the Court jostles in the salons
of lucky speculators or their heirs. The nobility of
wealth grows up, a new Junkerdom, which ne ver saw a
battlefield; it is even spreading to the country, and
already the capital of the Empire is surrounded with a
golden girdle of luxurious estâtes. The list of guests
invited to accompany the Emperor on his northern
tours shows the names of numerous financial magnâtes.
The new aristocracy carries instead of the sword the
dividend warrant, instead of the shield the company
prospectus, and it bears as its weapon the bill of ex-
change. The nobility of the sword, however, withdraws
into the background ; the sons of those men who once
won the battles of the Hohenzollerns sit embarrassed
on their fathers' acres. And capital increases in the
110 J'ACCUSE
hands of a few until it assumes gigantic proportions,
and with it respect for money whether it has been
inherited or graspingly acquired."
Thèse are the thoughts of authoritative circles in
Prussia and in Germany on the subject of trade and in-
dustry. The dividend warrant and the bill of exchange
are for them the contemptible emblems of thèse ranks
of the nation on which Germany 's greatness and her
position in the world are built, and which in the end
must provide the means of satisfying the military
megalomania of her " nobility of the sword." And is
it likely that those who entertain thèse thoughts will
bring to the German people freedom and equal privi-
lèges? When the Moor has done his duty, he will be
allowed to go, 1 just as after 1813, 1848, and 1870. Even
to-day, during the war, the smelling-out of démagogues
has begun. Everywhere good Prussians are ferreting
about for suspicious people who do not think like good
Prussians or good Germans. This can be seen at home,
and even more among Germans abroad. A military
and a Junker reaction will set in after the war such as
the présent génération has ne ver seen. And that is
called fighting for freedom, for German culture !
The End of Peace : Secueity ?
The trend of thought of thèse circles will be notice-
able and will make itself felt on the conclusion of peace.
While German professors are bending over their maps
at their study-tables and are elaborating international
plans for the future formation of Europe, thèse men of
action are laughing at the crazy ideas of the Utopians,
just as they described the negotiations of the Hague
1 ["The Moor has done his work, — the Moor may go."
— Schiller, Fiesco.]
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 111
Conférence as M chatter about everlasting peace "
(General-Major von Deimling) and the English pro-
posais for agreement as lies and déception. For them
there is only one end of peace : oppression and security
— security, with the same brilliant success as has been
secured for us by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine ;
that annexation which, so far, has brought us only
difficulties and no advantages either of a political or
of an economical nature, which has, indeed, from a
military point of view, been directly injurious to us,
since it led to the création of that new, and apparently
impregnable, line of fortresses, before which we hâve
now been sitting for more than fîve months. Security
of our frontiers : beyond this the train of thought of our
authoritative circles does not go, but with security
they include, of course, expansion in and outside
Europe. They mean security at any cost, without
respect to the rights of nationalities, the free destinies
of nations, which after ail we prétend that we are
defending, and without respect to the fact, revealed by
expérience, that such a brutal policy of security con-
stant ly bears within itself the germs of new wars.
This security we could hâve had at a cheaper rate
and with a better prospect of permanence by an agree-
ment with England. France and Russia were as far
from entertaining aggressive intentions against Germany
as England was. He who maintains that such inten-
tions existed is bound to produce évidence to prove
their existence. He who dénies their existence is not
obliged to prove the contrary.
Did France Mean to Attack Us ?
So far as England is concerned I hâve been able to
produce conclusive rebutting évidence. With regard to
France I may be allowed to deal with the matter briefly,
112 J'ACCUSE
since there is scarcely anyone in Germany — apart, of
course, from the Government — who seriously maint ains
the assertion that France intended to attack us. That
France is not abused, but that, on the contrary, regret is
expressed that she was drawn into the war, innocently
and against her will, is one of the few remaining sympa-
thetic traits in the public life of Germany of to-day. As
a matter of fact, anyone who should advance the asser-
tion that the French Republic of 1914 entertained even
the remotest idea of reconquering Alsace-Lorraine by
force of arms, would merely prove that he knows nothing
of the history or of the tendency of thought of modem
France, and that his judgment is based on impressions,
which may hâve been correct forty-four years ago, per-
haps even thirty-four or twenty-four years ago, but
which in the last twenty years hâve more and more
faded into a phantom.
In framing this judgment I do not rely on newspaper
articles, but on personal impressions gained in France
during many periods of résidence there, extending over
many years. Until about the middle of the 'nineties
the wound of Alsace-Lorraine still ached ; from that
time it healed more and more, and about the beginning
of the new century scarcely a trace of the old wound
remained. The end of Boulangism rang in the end of
the revanche idea; the worst of the noisy patriots,
Déroulède at their head, were condemned or banished
from France. The resuit of the Dreyfus affair, with
the victory of the party of illumination, purified the
atmosphère from the powers of darkness, from the forces
of political and clérical reaction, which in France were
favourable to a policy of war, as they are to-day in
Germany. Convinced friends of peace like Jules Simon,
Frederick Passy, the Senator Baron d'Estournelles de
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 113
Constant, and, above ail, Jaurès, gained more and more
influence on serious public opinion, and pressed into the
background the noisy patriots of the Boulevard, The
intellectual relations between France and Germany con-
stantly became more intimate. Politicians, writers,
actors and actresses of distinction, learned men and
artists, brought about this exchange in matters of the
mind on this side and on that, and by the reciprocation
of visits succeeded in establishing personal relations
between the countries. Coquelin and Sarah Bernhardt
were honoured in Germany and were received by the
Emperor with marks of distinction. In the summer of
1901 two French officers of high rank paid an officiai
visit to Berlin, and were invited by the Emperor to a
military banquet at which one of thèse officers, General
Bonnal, proposed the toast of the German Army and
their soldier-Emperor. Innumerable other phenomena
could be cited to show the increasing understanding and
friendship between the two nations. The speech of
Jaurès in the French Chamber of Deputies, in June,
1902, was, however, epoch-making; in this speech ex-
pression was, for the first time, given, in clear words
and from a responsible quarter, to the thought that it
was at last time to forget the ideas of revanche, to
become reconciled with history, and to free the nations
of Europe from the intolérable burden of armaments.
The speech of Jaurès found almost unanimous approval
in the French Chamber and in the whole of the serious-
minded Press. Certain chauvinistic rags, of course,
which, like similar papers in our country, earn their
daily bread by stirring up passion, expressed their dis-
content with Jaurès, but they could not alter the fact
that the Socialist leader had given expression to the
views of the overwhelming majority of the indus-
I
114 J'ACCUSE
trious and thrifty French nation. In a speech in
November, 1904, Jaurès developed his train of thought
and held up an alliance with Germany based on a
renunciation of ail retaliation by force as an end worthy
of pursuit. A few months later the Morocco dispute
began, when, in March, 1905, the Emperor William
landed in Tangier, and in an address to the Envoys of
the Sultan ran counter to French policy in Morocco.
Was France to blâme for the tension which now arose ?
Must France be held responsible for the fact that this
challenging action on the part of Germany produced —
as in the case of the Krtiger telegram previously, and
the ship sent to Agadir later — the opposite effect from
what was intended ? Thèse theatrical coups are indeed
no proper instrument for use in foreign policy. They
are irritating rather than impressive, and since it is
more dimcult to effect an understanding between people
in a state of irritation than between people who are not
so irritated, it would be advisable to discontinue such
theatrical coups and to convey our wishes to foreign
Government s in a normal, business-like way. The
atmosphère of irritation which since then has almost
continuously governed our diplomatie relations with
France must accordingly be attributed to us and not
to France.
Notwithstanding ail this it was, as is known, possible
to arrive at a definite settlement of the Morocco con-
fusion by means of three treaties in 1905, 1909, and 1911.
France, again, is not to blâme if we came out of this
worse than France did. Success in diplomatie negotia-
tions dépends not solely on military strength, but even
more on the 'diplomatie dexterity of the Governments
negotiating. There can be no doubt that, from a
military point of view, we are stronger than France.
There can be equally little doubt that we are diplomatie-
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 115
ally the weaker. And this, indeed, need cause no
surprise when we consider the manner in which we
recruit and train the scions of our diplomacy. In the
list of French représentatives at European Courts the
names which occur are those of middle-class families
only; in the list of German représentatives there are
exclusively Barons, Counts, and Princes. This, of
course, does not imply that a nobleman may not be as
compétent in business as an ordinary citizen. Since,
however, the percentage of the nobility among the
German people is quite insignificant, whereas the mem-
bers of the nobility claim 100 per cent, of the diplomatie
représentatives, the suspicion is justified that it is not
their compétence in business, but their title of nobility
which is the décisive considération in filling appoint- J
ments in our diplomatie service. Diplomacy is a busi-
ness, like any other ; if it differs from others, it differs
only in the exceptional responsibilities involved, and in
the most stupendous conséquences which may be en-
tailed by errors committed. If even a merchant chooses
a clerk without regard to whether he is of high birth or
an officer in a cavalry régiment, how much more is the
State in filling thèse responsible offices under obligation
to ignore thèse qualities, which may be decoratively beau-
tiful, but which are practically worthless. If the German
Empire had acted from this point of view,the Morocco
negotiations, which, indeed, in the view of our opponents,
were not entirely unfavourable to us, might hâve borne
even richer fruit. Those who are not satisfied with the
resuit should seek for the cause where it really is to
be found, not in England or in France, or in anyone
beyond the German frontier. They may beat the breast
and cry aloud " Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa !" In
any case, however, the German people does not appear
to me to be under any obligation to pay for the failures
I 2
116 J'ACCUSE
of its diplomatists by the sacrifice of its blood and its
well-being. Hère there appears to me to be clearly a
lack of proportion between the offence and the expia-
tion, especially since it is not the guilty but the innocent
who is called upon to bear the punishment. Let
us make better diplomatists, voilà tout! That is the
only practical conclusion which a reasonable nation can
draw from any diplomatie checks which it may hâve
suffered. There is, however, not the slightest occasion
for patriotic anguish and for bellicose shrieks for
re venge.
Where, then, is the évidence for the assertion that
France was evilly disposed towards us ? What évidence
is there for supposing that, apart from the alleged
diplomatie defeats, she intended to inflict on us military
defeats as well ? I seek, but I find none.
Did Russia Mean to Attack Us?
The position is similar in the case of Russia. For a
century and a half there hâve been no conflicts of
interests between Germany and Russia, and such con-
flicts could, indeed, scarcely arise, since the pressure
exercised by the two countries follows quite différent
Unes which nowhere intersect. As we hâve no ambi-
tions, or at least hâve hitherto had none, on the
Russian Baltic Provinces — a Prussian Irredentism for-
tunately does not exist — so Russia never thought of
appropriating East Prussia, West Prussia, or Posen.
Russia is large enough to be able to do without our
provinces. The pressure of her expansion follows a
direction which touches neither our property nor our
interests.
The tension between Russia and Austria I hère leave
intentionally out of the question. It was we who
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 117
declared war against Russia while she was still living
in full peace with Austria, and was, indeed, still
conducting negotiations which held out a rich
prospect of success. The war between Austria and
Russia only broke out on August 6th, whereas we
delivered the déclaration of war at Petrograd on
August lst. We began the war asserting that Russia
meant to attack us, and we hâve succeeded in per-
suading the German people that she had already
attacked us.
I am, then, justified in asking : Why did Russia attack
us ? What end did she hâve in view ? What did she
want from us ? It is no sufficient answer to this ques-
tion to refer to Pan-Slav efforts. Did Russia wish to
make us Slavonic ? Did she wish to suppress German
culture in f avour of Slavonic culture ? No one will
seriously maintain such a foolish assertion. Russian
culture in the last générations has, quite apart from
this, exercised a strong influence on our German spiritual
life ; it would be difficult to mention a German poet of
the last fifty years who has given an impulse to the
literature and to the intellectual tendencies of Germany
similar to that received from Tolstoi. On the other
hand, not merely the intellectual but also the political
and military life of Russia was everywhere permeated
by German éléments, and everywhere in Russia men
of German name occupied leading positions. This,
moreover, need cause no astonishment, for the Rom-
anovs are themselves of German blood and their wives
hâve nearly always been of German stock. It may,
indeed, be asserted that there were scarcely any other
two European countries which were more intimately
connected than Germany and Russia by means of
peaceful pénétration on both sides, thus constituting
a league of peace which was crowned by the tradi-
118 J'ACCUSE
tional friendship of the two ruling houses, and sealed
by the comradeship in arms of a hundred years
ago.
What, then, is the source from which there has
suddenly sprung " the hatred of Germany nourished on
Pan-Slav ambitions," of which the Chancellor spoke on
December 2nd ? Do we suffer from Russophobia ? Had
this hatred of Germany not to be expressly constructed
in order to give a psychdlogical basis for the alleged
Russian attack ? What f acts are adduced in support
of this hatred of Germany ? Out with them ! I f ear
we may hâve long to wait before thèse facts are
produced.
In any case, the hatred of Germany enter tained in
Russia does not appear to be insuperable. Already we
begin to hear the views of well-meaning people who
speak of peace at an early date with Russia, and who
are anxious to gather ail our forces against the chief
enemy, England. On the other hand, there are those
who déclare that Muscovitism and the absolutism of the
Tsar are our chief enemies, and who emphasise our com-
munity of culture with Western Nations. Where is the
truth to be found ? What are we really aiming at ?
Against whom, and for what are we fighting ? Thèse
are ail questions which are answered differently by
différent people, producing a gigantic confusion of the
mind, an océan of lies and of perversions, an océan,
unfortunately, dyed in blood, which threatens com-
pletely to sweep away German happiness and well-
being.
This confusion is to be attributed to the fact that
there is, among those who know, a tacit conspiracy not
to speak the truth, but that they hâve overlooked the
necessity of arriving at a complète agreement as to
what is to be established in the place of truth. So every-
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 119
one tells lies on his own, and the lies impinge on each
other in space like wireless messages from two stations
which are differently tuned ; one saying cancels the
other; one lie drives another out of the field. Old
Swift was indeed right when he said : "As universal
a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems,
it is astonishing that it has been brought to so little
perfection even by those who are most celebrated in
that faculty."
The Triple Entente a Défensive Alliance.
Not only is there thus a complète absence of évidence
in support of the assertion that the Triple Entente in-
tended to attack Germany, but the exact opposite has
been proved in the preceding discussion. The leading
spirit in the Entente was undeniably England. We
hear this asserted daily in every possible key, and quite
recently it was emphatically advanced by the Chancellor
in the meeting of the Reichstag on December 2nd ; the
statement, moreover, rests on the truth. If, however,
this leading spirit has for almost a décade striven only
for peace and an understanding with Germany, if the
other two Entente Powers hâve never in the slightest
degree shown, by word or by action, their intention to
hamper or suppress the initiative taken by their political
friend in the direction of peace, if, on the contrary, they
also hâve given unmistakable expression to their désire
for peace by conciliatory behaviour on great and small
diplomatie conflicts (Morocco, the Balkan War, the
Potsdam Agreements of 1911, etc.), it would not be a
bold conclusion to infer that the Triple Entente has been
a défensive alliance, and that it has in no way whatever
had aggressive intentions, He who asserts the contrary
must submit proofs in support of his statement. Thèse
120 J'ACCUSE
proofs the Chancellor himself was unable to submit in
his two speeches in the Reichstag. The Entente Powers
are reproached on account of their evil disposition
towards Germany, but no actions are instanced which
hâve proceeded from such a disposition. We celebrate
in our enemies such beautiful qualities of the heart as
envy, hatred, race antipathy, the lust of vengeance,
but they cannot be reproached with a single action in
which they hâve endeavoured to translate thèse dis-
positions into deeds. So long as Germany is not recog-
nised as the educator of the world — something after the
style of " Rembrandt as the educator " of the Germans
— we must be content to leave other people in pos-
session of their dispositions, as, indeed, they on their
side hâve neither the wish nor the power to suppress
ours.
We must rest satisfied with combating their dis-
positions only when thèse manifest themselves as
actions. We are not the rectors of foreign nations as
Ahlwardt was the rector of ail the Germans. We are
scarcely called upon to give moral instructions to others
so long as we ourselves need such instruction more than
they do. The hatred, the envy, and rage for revenge
which has been produced in our country — formerly by a
small section of the people of no intellectual standing,
but since the beginning of the war by the greatest and
best part of the German nation — surpass in volume and
intensity ail that has been produced in the three other
countries taken together.
But if there were no aggressive intentions, what was
it that brought the Entente together and cemented them
more and more closely to each other? It was the fear
of Germany and the distrust of Germany 's imperialistic
efforts. It was this fear that united them and gave
increasing compactness to their alliance. The more
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 121
they saw Germany increasing — not our trade nor our
well being, which indeed benefited their trade and
prosperity also, but our military power and our warlike
disposition — the more they saw the danger of German
nationalism raising her head and appearing above
the steps of the throne, the more distrustful and
apprehensive they became, and the more closely
did they draw together for the purpose of common
defence.
Everything combined in récent years to increase their
appréhensions : the enormous naval armaments which,
in spite of English proposais for agreement, were piled
up with constantly increasing accélération, the sudden
increase of our land army, quite unprecedented in
military history, the policy of the mailed fist, which in
ail international questions affecting the interest of
Germany or Austria struck on the table and compelled
the others to give way, above ail, however, certain facts,
which did not take place in public, but which were well
known to European Governments. Thèse facts hâve
only recently received publicity, but must, at an earlier
date, already hâve received from the Entente Powers
the attention they merited.
Giolitti's Révélations.
It is known that, soon after the annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Austrian Government proposed
to take military measures against the growing Great-
Serbian movement, which had been produced as a resuit
of the annexation. This was an act of criminal insanity
on the part of Austria ; it was a crime, because hère the
violator intended to punish the violated because he re-
sisted violation; it was insane, because national ten-
dencies cannot be suppressed by force of arms. But the
122 J'ACCUSE
wise men of Austria thought otherwise. Serbia was
threatened with war, and only through the submission of
Russia and the médiation of England and Germany was
it possible to prevent,bymeansof a propitiatory déclara-
tion on the part of Serbia, the European war which even
then threatened to break out. That was in March,
1909, and is known to everyone. What, however, was
not known, and has only become known by the révéla-
tions of Giolitti on December 5th, 1914, in the Italian
Chamber, is the fact that Austria entertained in August,
1913, the same intentions as in 1909, and was prevented
from giving effect to thèse intentions only by the
opposition of Italy.
Thèse révélations of Giolitti hâve rightly been
regarded in the whole of the foreign Press as epoch-
making, because they revealed in an incontestable
manner the aggressive intentions of Austria. But pre-
cisely for thèse reasons the German and Austrian
Governments hâve preserved, with regard to thèse
révélations, a silence as of death. There is therefore
ail the more reason why I should in this place once
more awaken the dead to life.
In midsummer, 1913, after the second Balkan War,
the relations in the Balkans between those States
immediately concerned were regulated by the Treaty of
Bucharest. Austria-Hungary was not satisfied with the
arrangement to which effect was given, since in her view
Serbia had got too much and Bulgaria too little. She
aimed at accomplishing a revision of the Treaty and
in view of Serbia 's opposition resolved to give effect to
her desires by arms. For this purpose she naturally
required the support of the Powers of the Triple
Alliance and above ail of Italy, who had always
claimed the right to make her influence felt in the
settlement of the Balkan question. The concurrence
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 123
of the allied Powers in military action against Serbia
was, however, regarded as necessary by Austria chiefly,
because the Austrian Government was even then fully
aware of the fact that a war with Serbia must lead to
a European struggle. Austria consequently addressed
inquiries to Italy with a view to ascertaining what her
attitude would be in view of her duties under the Triple
Alliance in the event of a Serbian, and, should it arise,
a European war. As a resuit of the Austrian inquiry
the following exchange of telegrams took place between
the Foreign Minister, Di San Giuliano, and the Prime
Minister, Giolitti, who was then absent : " Austria has
communicated to us and to Germany her intention of
taking action against Serbia, and defines such action
as défensive, hoping to bring into opération the casus
fœderis of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary,
I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to
arrange for a combined effort with Germany to prevent
such action on the part of Austria, but it may become
necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such
action, if it should be taken, as défensive, and that,
therefore, we do not consider that the casus fœderis
arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if y ou
approve."
Giolitti replied to this : " If Austria intervenes against
Serbia it is clear that a casus fœderis cannot be
established. It is a step which she is taking on her own
account since there is no question of defence inasmuch
as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary
that a déclaration to this effect should be made to
Austria in the most formai manner, and we must hope
for action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria
from this most perilous adventure (pericolosissima
avventura)."
On this occasion success, in fact, attended the task of
I
124 T ACCUSE
restraining Austria from a war against Serbia, but
whether this was due to Germany's efforts or to Italy 's
opposition is not known. What, however, is to-day of
the highest interest is the fact that, even a year before
the outbreak of the présent war, Austria was firmly
resolved to initiate, without any urgent reason, a
military conflict with Serbia, for there was then no
question of the death of an Archduke, nor had a
specially dangerous Serbian propaganda been developed
against Austria, since Serbia had been sufficiently en-
grossed by the war against the Turks, and later against
her own ally, Bulgaria.
This fact is of the greatest importance in judging the
question of guilt in the présent war. But there is one
other point which may be learned from the events of
1913; firstly, that the danger of a European war as a
conséquence of an Austro-Serbian war was even at that
time clear to the minds of the politicians of the Triple
Alliance, and, secondly, that it was possible to exorcise
this danger by dissuading Austria from the perilous
adventure, and by refusing to furnish her with assist-
ance. If thèse lessons of the past had been observed
a year later the présent war would not hâve broken
out. Italy has observed thèse lessons, and her attitude
is morally and legally incontestable. Germany, how-
ever, did not désire to do so, and she cannot, therefore,
object if her attitude is described in terms which are
exactly opposite to those applied to Italy. The fact that
Germany in July, 1914, neglected to exercise on Austria
the moderating influence which she had successfully
brought to bear on her a year before is capable of a
simple explanation. Germany at that time did not
désire a European war, or more correctly expressed, she
did not yet désire it, whereas in 1914 she did désire
this war.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 125
The Change of Front in Berlin. The War Party.
The tendencies in Berlin which led to this change of
front are placed in a most interesting light by the
French Yellow Book. 1
If thèse French Reports were the only sources of
information available for this period of contemporary
history they might be regarded with distrust. As, how-
ever, they are in accordance with ail the facts, which
hâve been distinctly manifested in the political life and
in the politico-military literature of Germany, 2 thèse
French Reports on the state of opinion in Germany
must be recognised as entirely accurate, and, indeed,
the clear analysis of German conditions contained in
them can only evoke admiration.
I hâve already in an earlier passage dealt with the
dangers involved in the efforts of the war party whose
exercising ground was exclusively in North Germany and
whose headquarters were situated at the Court of Berlin.
The leaders of this party were for the most part Gênerais
who devoted the pensioned leisure of their retirement
to the création of something approaching a military
organisation of their forces, and both by the spoken and
the written word prepared the German people for the
1 Report of the French Ambassador, Cambon, dated the
17th March, 1913, enclosing two reports of the Military and
Naval Attachés; further, a report of Etienne, the Minister of
War, to Jonnard, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated the
2nd April, 1913, with enclosure; a report of Cambon to
Pichon, the Minister of Foreign Afîairs, dated 6th May, 1913,
a report to the same Minister dated 30th July, and a report
of Cambon dated 22nd November, 1913.
2 After this book was finished a very interesting disserta-
tion came to my notice, entitled " Der deutsche Chau-
vinismus" by Professor Dr. O. Nippold, Stuttgart, 1913.
The book contains a survey of the chauvinistic literature of
récent years, and earnestly points out the dangers of this
movement.
126 J'ACCUSE
war, which they, because they wished it, dcclared to
be inévitable. In addition to the existing naval league
they founded, in 1912, a " Wehrverein," the object of
which was to combat the tendencies in favour of peace
to be found in the German nation, to create a public
opinion in favour of an increase in the land forces, and
gradually to accustom the nation to the thought of a
European war. The natural auxiliary forces of thèse
gentlemen were their social and professional com-
panions, the territorial and the military nobility who
frorn remote times hâve controlled the Prussian State,
and hâve regarded the King of Prussia as their suprême
head. The increasing démocratisation of Germany, which
had already advanced so far as to pass a vote of no con-
fidence in an Impérial Chancellor and a Prussian First
Minister, and to extend protection to the civil powers
in Alsace against the military authorities, the constant
increase in the vote of the social démocratie party, and
of their représentatives in Parliament, the increasing
industrialisation of Germany, which threatened more and
more to repress the économie and the social importance
of the territorial nobility — ail thèse phenomena were an
abomination to the Prussian Junkers, and had produced
in the circles which they frequented a state of mind
which can be expressed in the thought : " Things cannot
go on like this in Germany, and since an amélioration
in the sensé we désire cannot be achieved in peace, we
must be assisted in our need by a lively and jolly war "
(ein frischer, frôhlicher Krieg).
At ail times the Junkers hâve formed the kernel of
the Prussian war-party. More recently, however, they
hâve been joined by various auxiliary forces, colonial
enthusiasts who pursued the foolish madness of terri-
torial expansion as an outlet for our économie and
human surplus, ideologists in whose narrow outlook
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 127
Germany marches at the head of civilisation and who
therefore consider that German culture has a claim to
rule the world, diplomatists still grieving over their own
failures and calling aloud for revenge for Algeciras and
Agadir, but chiefly, as a matter of course, the cannon
kings and the manufacturers of armour plate, who with
the wealth at their disposai can support the venomous
Press not only at home but abroad. AU thèse éléments,
some of them interested and some deluded, the deceivers
and the deceived, formed a compact force which, under
military leadership, fell into line with true Prussian
discipline on the word of command, and steadfastly
advanced to the end in view. The war-party formed
only a minority of the German people. The great
majority was distinctly devoted to peace. The great
mass of the labouring population, the industrious middle
classes, the banking and manufacturing circles, the
national groups of Pôles, Alsatians, etc., the South of
Germany not yet entirely Prussianised, ail thèse sections
of the German people without doubt desired peace and
quiet progress along the path by which Germany had
arrived at her présent height. But thèse, the forces o)
peace, were not organised, They were merely indi-
viduals; they did not form a compact body. They did
not consider it necessary to organise themselves as a
peace-party to oppose the war-party, because until mid-
summer of this year the latter were regarded as a
quantité négligeable ; a European war with ail its horrors
was regarded as an impossibility ; no one realised how
far the instigators of war with their powerful patronage
had already undermined the ground of peace. In the
middle of July any one who had asserted in Germany
that on August lst we would be face to face with a
European war would hâve been in danger of being shut
up in an asylum. The people of rabid views were known,
128 J'ACCUSE
but their outpourings were looked upon as harmless,
and any counter-organisation for the protection of peace
was regarded as a superfluity.
It is true that disappointment over the Morocco
agreement had affected even wider circles. The supposed
diplomatie defeat was regretted, but this was not
regarded as a reason for crying aloud for vengeance in
blood. The diplomatists were criticised, but Gênerais
were not demanded. Criticism was naturally directed
in the first place against the Impérial Chancellor, Herr
von Bethmann Hollweg, who bore the sole responsi-
bility; it did not, however, stop there, but ascended
as far as the Emperor himself. The policy of peace,
which the Emperor William had taken as the guiding
line of his conduct after the first stormy days of his
youth, had for long ceased to find favour in certain
circles. He was not merely criticised, but the attempt
was made — not without success — to procure for him
what was nothing short of unpopularity.
A zealous and well-organised Press praised the son at
the expense of the father and increased the dissensions
between the two which had found open expression in a
number of well-known serious disputes. With diabolic
dexterity they succeeded in playing upon the most sensi-
tive chords in the Emperor's soûl, his personal vanity, his
thirst for popularity, his ambition to be the first amongst
his people, living in no man's shadow, the conscious-
ness he had of his authority, which had led him to adopt
as his motto the dictum suprema leœ régis voluntas.
Like the poison poured into the ear of Hamlet's father
the poisonous thought was instilled into him that the
times demanded deeds, not words, that only a purifying
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OE THE CRIME 129
war could drive away the sultry heat and restore to
the German Empire and to its Emperor the old prestige
within and without.
In the end a continuai dropping will wear out a stone.
It is interesting to observe the graduai change in the
Emperor 's views during the last three years, from 1911
to 1914. In 1910 the Emperor William could still
discuss with the French Minister, Pichon, the idea of
a union of ail civilised States and express his approval
of the idea. In the previous year, in 1909, speaking
at Cuxhaven, he emphasised that peace was needed in
equal measure by ail civilised nations " to enable them
to discharge undisturbed the great tasks of culture
involved in their économie and commercial develop-
ment." 1 In 1911 he emphasised, in a speech delivered
in Hamburg, that économie compétition between nations
could not be fought out by one party striking at the
other, but only by each nation straining their capacity
to the highest point. On New Year 's Day, 1911, in an
address to the diplomatists, he still eulogised the peace-
ful understanding existing between the nations, which
was more in accordance with their interests than the
conduct of dangerous wars. But in his speech at
Hamburg on June 18th, 1912, a différent note is aiready
sounded : " Not inconsiderately must we raise the
standard where we are not sure that we shall be able
to défend it." This speech was delivered six months
after the Morocco Convention, and anyone who can read
between the lines may aiready detect the influence which
the criticism of the Emperor ? s peaceful policy had begun
to exercise on the thoughts of the Emperor; he no
longer rejects war under ail circumstances, but if war
must corne, it is to be, according to the saying of
Clause witz, a continuation of policy by other means —
1 Fried: Der Kaiser und der Weltfriede, Berlin, 1910.
K
130 ,rACCUSE
that is, of course, on the assumption that the standard
can be defended, in other words, that we are stronger
than the other side. In the next year, at the boisterous
banquets in commémoration of the War of Liberation
of 1813, this military note more and more suppressed
the notes of peace. An intoxication appeared to hâve
seized the whole of Germany — a new intoxication of
freedom — from what bondage no one knew. This
drunkenness was artificially produced by the fiery
beverages which an unscrupulous patriotic Press had
for many a year and day poured out to the German
nation. Even those occupying the highest positions
were unable to escape this condition of intoxication. A
true épidémie of patriotism broke out, setting high and
low, young and old, in a fever of eestasy. No one any
longer inquired as to the grounds or the object of this
popular movement prepared long in advance and skil-
fully staged by the Nationalist wire-pullers, a move-
ment in which the Emperor and the Chancellor were at
first victims carried away by the stream, a movement
in which later they were voluntary participators, and of
which in the end they became the conscious directing
leaders.
Herr von Bethmann certainly made a long résist-
ance before capitulating to the war-party. But in
the end he was obliged to yield, that he might not
fall a victim to the Camarilla of the Crown Prince and
to the company of Gênerais. Even in 1910 and 1911
he vigorously defended himself against his opponents,
who more and more were digging the ground from under
his feet. When he was accused in the Mannesmann
affair of showing excessive pliability towards foreign
countries he exclaimed to his critics in the Reichstag :
"I will ne ver make myself a party to a policy of
breaking treaties." When the great debate took place
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 131
in the Reichstag on March 30th, 1911, on the question
of armaments, Bethmann turned almost in supplication
to the représentatives of the German people and urged
them to protect the German people against irresponsible
Press agitations, to which, unfortunately, it often
weakly succumbed. "A counterpoise against ail thèse
and similar influences," exclaimed the Chancellor,
M cannot be otherwise than désirable, and if inter-
national labour succeeds in creating such a counter-
poise, I will be the first to extend it a hearty welcome."
But, as we hâve said, the éléments which might hâve
formed such a counterpoise against the war-movement
were too few. The opposition of the Chancellor, as
previously that of the Emperor, was soon borne
down, and the great military law of 1913 was the first
beacon-signal of the victory of the enemy along the
whole line.
That war was not, in accordance with Austria's
desires, brought about as early as the summer of 1913,
rested no longer on grounds of principle, but merely
on motives of opportunism. The occasion for striking
the blow which Austria believed, or professed, that she
had — a régulation of the frontier between Bulgaria and
Serbia, and similar matters — was too threadbare to
justify to the German people a murder of the European
nations, and too little designed to enkindle patriotic
enthusiasm. " Wars which are not supported by popular
sentiment are no longer possible in our time " — to this
extent the political thought even of thèse reactionaries
had already advanced. The question whether this or
that place with an unpronounceable name situated
somewhere in the south-east of Europe should be
governed by Serbian or Bulgarian officiais was of too
little importance for the German people to permit of it
being stamped as a war for the holiest possession of the
K 2
132 J'ACCUSE
nation. Thus the word went from Berlin to Vienna :
"Not yet."
Moreover, military considérations were clearly décisive
in favour of this "Not yet." We were not yet suffi-
ciently prepared. We were, it is true, considerably
superior to ail others, but this superiority had to be
increased still further by bringing into force the new
law of defence, which had just received preliminary
approval from the Reichstag. The extension of the
Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which was intended to provide
unhampered movement from the North Sea to the Baltic
for even the largest ships of war, was not yet ready.
The newest instruments of death were probably still
awaiting the hour of their birth. Zeppelins and sub-
marines had still to be built, and in many other ways
our military préparations had still to be carried to the
stage of perfection. In a word, we were not yet ripe
for striking the blow, which in principle had even then
been decided upon. We were only waiting for the next
favourable opportunity, and for a condition of perfect
preparedness, to be able to make use of this opportunity
with success. Meanwhile, the change in the views of
the Emperor made further progress ; his entourage, with
von Moltke, the head of the General Staff, as their
leader, the Minister of War, the Crown Prince, and his
influential adhérents, ail laboured — although still to a
certain extent in opposition to the Chancellor, who had,
it is true, taken part in the whole development, and
covered it with his responsibility, but who was now still
shrinking from the décisive step — ail laboured for the
one end — that of bringing about the " inévitable " war
as speedily as possible, and of gaining the entire sup-
port of the Emperor for their efforts. " We must put on
one side," said General von Moltke on one occasion, " ail
commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor.
HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 133
When war has become necessary it is essential to carry
it on in such a way as to place ail the chances in one's
favour. Success alone justifies war." 1
What success had attended the activity of the War
Party is seen in Cambon's report of November 22nd,
1913, to the Minister, Pichon. Cambon tells of a con-
versation which the Emperor William had in the
présence of the Chief of the General Staff with King
Albert, an account of which was communicated to
the French Ambassador " from an absolutely reliable
source." King Albert found a complète change in the
Emperor, whom he had formerly known as an honour-
able lover of peace. He had given up his pacifie
tendencies, and had made the ideas of the war-party his
own. War now appeared to him inévitable, and he
agreed with his Chief of the Staff when the latter
declared that this time the matter must be settled, and
that the Emperor could be sure that his people would
folio w him with irrésistible enthusiasm. The thoughts
of the Emperor were directed chiefly against France,
and King Albert made fruitless efforts to convince him
of the peaceful intentions of the French Government
and of the French people. Cambon also confirmed from
his own observation the altered train of thought of the
Emperor, which he attributed to the increasing impa-
tience of the soldiers, to the influence of the Pan-
Germanists, ,and to a certain extent to jealousy at the
popularity acquired by his son in thèse circles. "The
Emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which
were formerly foreign to him"; with thèse words
Cambon concludes his report. It is impossible to deny
that the shrewd Frenchman was a careful observer.
Scarcely eight months later the conséquences of the
change in the views of the Emperor were revealed. But
1 French Yellow Book, No. 3.
134 J'ACCUSE
even in the critical days which preceded the outbreak
of the European War, the forces of good and of evil, of
Ormuzd and Ahriman, still struggled with each other
in the soûl of the Emperor. Now that the portentous
décision had to be taken which was to set the world in
fiâmes and bring upon mankind unprecedented evils,
now that the project which had been so long prepared
and resolved upon was at last to be transformed into
an act, the Impérial hand shrank from the décisive
stroke of the pen, and as in a mist the old ideals of
peace and of the happiness of nations once more arose
in the soûl of the monarch. To this must be attributed
the oscillations of the last days, the continuai change in
the actions of the Emperor, fluctuating to and fro
between the désire for peace and the threat of war,
between intimidation and sincerity, pursuing so long
the policy of the mailed fist, until gradually ail policy
disappeared and only the mailed fist was left.
ni.
THE CRIME.
The detailed discussion in the previous chapter of the
antécédents of the war was necessary in order to under-
stand the rapid development of events which in the ten
short days from July 23rd to August lst, 1914, led to
the greatest war in the history of the world.
The whole attitude of Germany from the first Hague
Conférence onwards, her consistent refusai of ail restric-
tions of naval or military armaments, her opposition to
the formation of a court of compulsory arbitration, her
constantly renewed efforts to secure for herself the
neutrality of England, without on her part giving up in
any way her own freedom of action, the gigantic
increase in her land and naval forces, the toleration
shown for years to a criminal chauvinist movement, and
the approval extended to this movement at a later date
— thèse ail indicate that for long Germany had reckoned
on the European war as a matter of fact, and that she
had resolved to bring about the "inévitable " in the
moment most favourable for her.
The antécédents of the war down to 1914 thus give
rise to what in criminal proceedings would be called a
prima facie case, that Germany, in common with her
ally Austria, desired a European war sooner or later —
Germany, in order to give effect to her plans of world
power ; Austria, in order to improve her position in the
Balkans.
135
136 J'ACCUSE
Such a prima facie case, however, does not amount
to a certainty. The probability which may be inferred
from the antécédents of the war is not in itself a proof
of guilt. This proof of guilt can only be deduced from
the circumstances of the case, that is to say, from the
diplomatie documents which place before us the histori-
cal origins of the war.
The indictment to be brought against the Empires of
Germany and Austria is that in the summer of 1914
they intentionally brought about the war which they
h ad long prepared and desired, because they thought
that the moment was specially favourable for striking
the blow. This time the occasion of the dispute was
not, as in previous years, a paltry territorial question
in the Balkans, a squabble about a harbour or a stretch
of sea-shore, questions which could neither arouse public
interest nor kindle the enthusiasm of nations. The
issue raised on this occasion related to the murder
of an Arch-Duke and his Consort, a tragic event which
was bound to awaken the indignation of the whole
world, and, so they calculated, could not fail to enlist
universal sympathy on behalf of the Powers who
appeared as the a venger s of such a crime.
Thus, in the first place, the moral advantage was on
their side. But they believed that they could also rely
on a similar military advantage. Certain matters just
about this time had corne to light which were regarded
as proving the disorganisation of the French and the
defective préparation of the Russian army. The révéla-
tions of Senator Humbert had just made public the
existence of serious defects in the French Army, and it
was believed that the Russian Army, quite apart from
its defective equipment, was still required to cope with
internai unrest and weakened by civil dissensions.
England's neutrality was still hoped for, in spite of
THE CRIME 137
previous failures in this direction, and the Italians were
thought to be foolish enough to draw the chestnuts out
of the fire in the Balkans for the hated Austrian, and to
risk their whole national existence "pour le roi de
Prusse."
Ail this was a complète miscalculation. But as the
art of calculation was not understood in Berlin and
Vienna, it was thought that the moment was favour-
able for striking — and they struck.
This is the accusation which is now to be proved.
The events connected with the assassination of the
Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort are in their
main features universally known, and do not hère
require any detailed discussion. For my purpose it will
be sufficient to examine critically the diplomatie trans-
actions, and to emphasise those points which are of
décisive importance in considering the question of the
guilt and the responsibility for this war. The démon-
stration which I will submit will rest only on officiai
documents, and référence will chien 1 y be made to the
five volumes of diplomatie correspondence which hâve
been published in white, blue, yellow, orange, and grey
by Germany, England, France, Russia, and Belgium
respectively. A book in red has not yet appeared ; it is
left to the nations to write this volume in blood.
Other diplomatie documents which hâve appeared
apart from thèse books will also be considered.
At the very outset surprise is occasioned by the
meagre contents of the German White Book and by
the fact that Austria, unlike ail the other belligerent
countries, has not considered it advisable to publish a
volume of diplomatie correspondence. The telegrams
exchanged between the German and the Austrian
138 J'ACCUSE
Governments are, further, almost completely absent
from the German White Book, whereas those between
the Entente Powers are reproduced in their publications
with the utmost détail. The German White Book
contains only 36 documents ; the English Blue Book, on
the contrary, contains 161 ; the Russian Orange Book,
79 ; the French Yellow Book, 161 ; and the Belgian Grey
Bookj 79. The statements of our opponents are thus
far more detailed than those of the two allied Empires,
one of which has until to-day maintained a complète
silence. This fact is in itself very illuminating. 1
The historical investigator is frequently obliged to
complète the gaps revealed in the German White
Book by référence to the comprehensive accounts of the
Entente Governments. There is, however, gênerai
agreement between the various publications in their
reports as to fact, and it is only from the spirit of the
narrator that they assume varying complexions. In my
critical discussion I will completely ignore thèse différent
complexions. It will be sufficient if I restrict myself to
the bare facts reported by ail parties alike, facts which
indeed are in themselves éloquent enough. One cannot,
of course, assert that of the various publications some
are more deserving of credence than others. Diplomatie
documents are merely documents, and they are ail
equally crédible. Moreover, they are mutually sup-
ported by each other, and taken together they form so
complète a chain, each link so fits into the other, that
the truth appears clear and incontestable.
I will deal in succession with the various points which
are décisive on the question of guilt, and I will take
1 An Austrian book has just appeared in the beginning of
February when this work was in the press, that is to say,
six months after the beginning of the war. I will discuss
this book in a separate appendix.
THE CRIME 139
each State separately. Each State will receive its own
débit and crédit account, and each account will be
closed with a balance which will show the guilt or the
innocence of the State in question.
A.
AUSTRIA.
At 6 o'clock on the evening of July 23rd the Austro-
Hungarian Government handed to the Serbian Govern-
ment a Note, in which the Government presented a
séries of demands, with référence to the Great Serbian
propaganda which it was suggested had reached its
highest point in the assassination of the Grand Ducal
couple ; thèse demands were intended to bring about the
suppression of thèse efforts which, as was alleged, were
tolerated by the Serbian Government. There were con-
tained among the ten demands made by Austria
some (and, indeed, a considérable number) of a
character such as had never before been presented
to an independent State, and such as hitherto
had only been imposed on subject nationalities.
The Serbian Government were required to publish
on a certain day on the first page of their officiai
journal a déclaration the wording of which was
prescribed. This déclaration had in view the most
rigorous suppression of every form of Great Serbian
propaganda, and threatened with severe punishment the
whole population, but more particularly those omcers
and officiais who should in future take part in this move-
ment. This threat was simultaneously to be communi-
cated by the King to the Army as an order of the day,
and published in the officiai bulletin of the Army. A
séries of detailed demands followed : the suppression of
140 J'ACCUSE
publications ; dissolution of societies and the prévention
of the formation of similar societies; élimination from
school-books of ail statements hostile to Austria;
removal of ail officers and functionaries guilty of the
propaganda mentioned; arrest of certain persons com-
promised by the inquiry into the assassination ; préven-
tion of illicit trame in arms across the frontier ; explana-
tion regarding unfriendly utterances of high Serbian
officiais, &c. Under numbers 5 and 6 of the Austrian
demands it was exacted of the Serbian Government that
they should " accept the collaboration in Serbia of
représentatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for
the suppression of the subversive movement directed
against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy," and
further, that they should "take judicial proceedings
against accessories to the plot of June 28th who are
on Serbian territory." "Delegates of the Austro-
Hungarian Government," it is further stated, "will
take part in the investigation relating thereto."
A mémorandum on certain conclusions of the inquiry
at Serajevo on points 7 and 8 was added to the Note,
and an answer was required within forty-eight hours,
that is to say, before 6 o'clock in the evening of July 25 th.
The Note was communicated to the European Powers
on July 24th — without the addition of the évidence in
support of the accusations — and on July 25th it was
published in the European Press. It is well known that
the unusual contents and the abrupt form of the Note
created excitement everywhere, not only in Govern-
mental circles, but also among the gênerai public.
Everyone expected an abrupt refusai on the part of
Serbia, folio wed by a war between Austria and her
neighbouring kingdom, the intervention of Russia in the
conflict, and in further séquence a European war. Ever
since a Balkan question had existed the close relations
THE CRIME 141
between Russia and Serbia were known to everyone.
From time immémorial community of race and religion,
political traditions and interests, had united the two
countries, and had created a kind of relationship extend-
ing far beyond the framework of the usual " sphères of
interest." Russia had during and after the Balkan War
officially declared that any attack by Austria on Serbia
would lead to her intervention. 1 On this occasion also
it was announced in the officiai journal that Russia
could not remain indiffèrent to military action on the
part of Austria. 2
At the same time, however, Russia, England, and
France made the most urgent endeavours :
(1) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meet-
ing the demands of Austria. 3
(2) To obtain an extension of the time limit from
Austria, which would enable the Powers to study the
documentary material promised by Austria, and thus to
exercise a moderating influence in Belgrade. 4
The extension of the time limit was sharply refused
by Austria, 6 although England and Russia rightly
pointed out that the communication of the Note to the
Powers was purposeless and contradictory to inter-
national usages if they were not allowed time and oppor-
tunity to study the documents, and to intervene at
Belgrade. Herr von Jagow had from the beginning
expressed " doubts " as to whether Austria could concur
in the extension of the time-limit. 6 Count Berchtold
1 Blue Book, No. 139, and p. v. [popular édition]. Subse
quent références in Roman figures are to the introduction to
this édition.
2 Orange Book, No. 10.
3 Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 22, 30. Orange Book, Nos. 4,
25, 40, 92. Yellow Book, No. 26.
4 Blue Book, Nos. 13, 17, 26. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 16.
5 Orange Book, No. 12.
6 Orange Book, No. 14. Blue Book, No 18.
142 ,FACCUSE
was at Ischl. No grounds were given for the
refusai.
Nevertheless, Anglo-Russian influence in Belgrade
succeeded in obtaining from the Serbian Government
an answer which caused throughout Europe even
greater astonishment than the Austrian Note itself.
Serbia concurred in nearly ail the demands of the neigh-
bouring monarchy. She declared herself ready to hand
over for trial, without regard to his situation or rank,
anyone whose complicity in the assassination should be
proved. She pledged herself to publish the desired
déclarations in the officiai journal and to the Army, to
introduce new criminal laws and an amendment of the
Constitution to f acilitate the prosecution and confiscation
of hostile utterances in the Press. She promised to dis-
solve hostile societies, to revise the instruction in schools
in the sensé desired by Austria, to punish guilty officers
and officiais, to prevent the illicit traffic of arms, &c.
Only on two points did the Serbian Government
permit itself in ail submissiveness — the tone of the whole
Note is, in fact, that of a subject to his over-lord, not
that of one independent State to another — only on two
points (5 and 6 of the Austrian Note) did the Serbian
Government permit itself to raise a few modest objec-
tions. In reply to point 5 it observed :
11 The Royal Government must confess that
they do not clearly grasp the meaning of the scope
of the demand made by the Impérial and Royal
Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept
the collaboration of the organs of the Impérial and
Royal Government upon their Territory, but they
déclare that they will admit such collaboration as
agrées with the principle of international law, with
criminal procédure, and with good neighbourly
relations."
THE CRIME 143
In reply to point 6 :
" It goes without saying that the Royal
Government consider it their duty to open an
inquiry against ail such persons as are, or eventually
may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June,
and who happen to be within the territory of the
kingdom. As regards the participation in this
inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities
appointed for this purpose by the Impérial and
Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot
accept such an arrangement, as it would be a viola-
tion of the Constitution and of the law of criminal
procédure; nevertheless, in concrète cases, com-
munications as to the results of the investigation in
question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian
agents."
The conclusion of the Serbian Note runs as follows : —
"If the Impérial and Royal Government are not
satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government,
considering that it is not to the common interest
to precipitate the solution of this question, are
ready, as always, to accept a pacifie understanding,
either by referring this question to the décision
of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to
the Great Powers which took part in the drawing
up of the déclaration made by the Serbian Govern-
ment on the 18th (31st) March, 1909."
The Serbian Note was handed to the Austrian Ambas-
sador at Belgrade on the afternoon of July 25th. Thirty-
two minutes later the Ambassador with his staff had left
the Serbian capital. The Serbian answer appeared to
the Austrian Government to be insufficient. Diplomatie
relations with the neighbouring country were broken off
by Austria.
Why ? European diplomacy — apart, of course, from
144 J'ACCUSE
that of Germany — was confronted with a riddle for
which only one solution was possible, the assumption
that Austria, under ail circumstances, desired war with
Serbia. And as the Austrian Note was unique in its
exorbitant demands, both in form and substance, so
the Serbian Note also was unique in its essential and
formai submissiveness. Never in tinte of peace had an
independent State allowed itself to be dictated to in
this way ; never had an independent State submitted to
similar intrusions in its internai life. Education, the
army, administration, justice, the Press, the right of
association — ail were to be trimmed to meet the wishes
of Austria, and even where it was not possible to comply
with thèse wishes to the last iota without being debased
to the position of a vassal State — even then Serbia did
not résolve on a bare refusai, but humbly asked for
further explanations, and professed herself ready to go
to the limits permitted by international law, and in
thèse few points still in dispute she submitted herself
to the décision of the International Tribunal at the
Hague or of the Great Powers.
What more could Austria désire ? Why did she refuse
to give the explanations asked for ? Why did she not
accept décision by arbitration in questions which, ac-
cording to the transactions and the resolutions of the
Hague Conférence, were in a peculiar sensé suitable for
référence to the Court of Arbitration — questions,
namely, of law and of interprétation ?
On July 27th the Austrian Government published the
Serbian answer with observations in such a form that
the text of the Serbian Note is throughout broken up
by the Austrian observations. Even the Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung only published the text broken up
in this way. The intention of this mutilation was
obviously to preclude an appréciation of the submissive
THE CRIME 145
form and the extremely conciliatory contents of the
Serbian answer by the insertion of the Austrian observa-
tions. The pedantic nature of thèse observations was
described by the Italian Minister, Di San Giuliano, as
"quite childish." 1 The expression is indeed much too
mild, when one reflects that the fate of Europe, and
indeed of the world, depended on thèse discussions. A
hedge-lawyer would be ashamed to produce in the
paltriest case quibbles such as those to which Austria
descended in order to find grounds to justify her dissatis-
faction with the Serbian answer. It is not worth while
to discuss the détails of this composition, which is
misérable even in style. In part, the Austrian observa-
tions amount to an assertion that misunder standings,
more or less intentional, existed on the side of Serbia.
Point 5, for example, was said to hâve nothing to do
with international law or criminal procédure; it was
rather " purely a matter of State police which must be
settled by way of a separate agreement." Point 6, it
was stated, was concerned only with the collaboration
of Austrian officiais at the preliminary police investiga-
tions, not in the judicial proceedings. In thèse two
points then, the only ones in which Serbia had made
any réservations — ail the other points were in essence
agreed to — in thèse, the only points still at issue, there
were, according to the assertion of the Austrian Govern-
ment itself, misunderstandings (due to the want of
clearness in the Austrian Note), but thèse misunder-
standings were of such a nature that they could hâve
been removed in half-an-hour's discussion between
experts, or, at the worst, they could hâve been sub-
mitted to the décision of a court of arbitration. Why did
Austria not take steps to bring about such a discussion
or such a décision? Why did she at once hâve recourse
1 Blue Book, No. 64.
L
146 J'ACCUSE
to a measure as sharp as any that could hâve been
adopted in the event of a flat refusai of her demands —
to a rupture of diplomatie relations ?
This was the third incomprehensibility in the course
of three days — an incomprehensibility, that is to say,
except on the assumption that Austria intended under
ail circumstances to begin a war against Serbia, even
at the risk of a European war. The Note itself was in
reality nothing but a déclaration of war in disguise. No
one, least of ail Austria herself, could hâve expected
from Serbia that she should give to demands so humi-
liating as those contained in the Note more careful
attention than she did in fact dévote to them. That
Serbia, nevertheless, considered thèse suggestions, and,
indeed, concurred in most of the Austrian demands, was
a sign of an extraordinary dévotion to peace on the part
of this country, exhausted by two wars, and was at the
same time the effect of the energetic summons to assume
a compilant attitude issued by the Entente Powers with
Russia at their head. The appeal for help which Alex-
ander, the Prince Régent of Serbia, addressed on July
24th to the Tsar Nicholas emphasised the readiness of
Serbia to accept everything that was compatible with
her position as an independent State, and asked Russia
for ad vice as to the course to be pursued. 1 The ad vice
thus elicited led to the Serbian Note of July 25th, that
is to say, to a humiliation unprecedented in the history
of diplomacy. This in itself is enough to prove beyond
ail doubt the désire for peace which animated Serbia
and Russia. On the other hand, the facts that Austria
regarded the Serbian Note as a negligible quantity, and
that she did not even consider it of sufïicient value to
be accepted as the basis of further discussion, and flatly
broke off diplomatie relations, prove that Austria
1 Orange Book, No. 6
THE CRIME 147
under ail circumstances desired war. Her intention to
provoke a war is manifest in the first three acts of the
tragedy : in the Austrian Note, in the refusai to extend
the time-limit, and in the recall of the Ambassador.
The compliance of Serbia which the whole world
longed and hoped for, and which the diplomacy of
Europe — again, of course, with the exception of Ger-
many — had endeavoured to bring about by ail possible
means, was for Austria the greatest of disappointments.
In Vienna they had desired and hoped for a flat refusai,
which would hâve justified a breach of diplomatie
relations and a déclaration of war. It was precisely for
this reason that the Note had been couched in such
sharp terms, in order that it might provoke a refusai.
Thèse expectations were disappointed because the love
of peace on the part of Serbia and Russia was greater
than the désire for war on the part of Austria. The
authorities in Vienna thus found themselves in straits,
since the expected ground for war had failed, and they
saw themselves obliged to construct artificially a ground
for war by seeking to transform the patent submission
into a refusai by means of pettifogging and sophistical
quibbles.
Until the Serbian Note was known to the public,
everyone believed in a Serbian refusai, which was
universally regarded as the only possible answer to
the veiled déclaration of war made by Austria. When,
however, the European chancellories and the gênerai
public became acquainted with the Serbian Note on the
26th and 27th of July everyone was amazed at the atti-
tude of Austria, for which no other explanation could be
found than that she intended unconditionally to provoke
a war, and everyone looked with horror to the approach-
ing danger of a European war.
Sir Edward Grey was the first who sought to meet
E 2
148 J'ACCUSE
this danger. He proposed a conférence of the ambassa-
dors of Germany, France, and Italy under his presi-
dency in London with the object of devising ways and
means of arrîving at a settlement of the différences
between Austria and Serbia. France and Italy at once
accepted the proposai of Grey with great alacrity, and
Russia also declared without hésitation that she regarded
a conférence of the ambassadors of the four Powers not
directly concerned as the best method of maintaining
peace, and that she herself would accept the décision
of this conférence. 1 In fact, the composition of a con-
férence consisting of two représentatives of the Alliance
and two of the Entente guaranteed an impartial exam-
ination of the questions at issue, which, in view of the
Serbian answer, were reduced to a minimum, and were
easily capable of solution in the shortest possible space
of time. If it is borne in mind how incomparably more
difficult problems had been successfully solved by the
Conférence of Ambassadors at London during the Balkan
crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement between
the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions in
July, 1914, was child's play compared with the previous
achievements of the London conférence, which, apart
from arriving at a décision on many other questions
affecting land and sea, race and nationality, had to
undertake the task of bringing into the world nothing
less than a whole kingdom.
But the idea of a conférence of ambassadors encoun-
tered the opposition of Germany and Austria, precisely
because it would hâve been such an easy matter to
arrive in this way at a solution of the questions at issue.
If the représentatives of the four Powers not directly
1 Blue Book, Nos. 17, 24, 35, 36, 42, 51, 53 (Russia would
be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the
hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy).
THE CRIME 149
affected had sat down round a table in London to
compare the verbal différences of the two Notes and to
explain the misunderstandings, it was absolutely certain
that they would hâve been successful in arriving at a
solution, and Austria could not then hâve withdrawn
from the proposais decided on by the ambassadors
when Russia, speaking both for herself and on behalf of
Serbia, had in advance expressed her readiness to
accept thèse suggestions. Such a course would hâve
frustrated the war, and for this reason it was unaccept-
able to Austria. For this reason Germany was in the
first place entrusted with the task of stepping forward
with the objection that they " could not call Austria
before a European tribunal." 1 And when this objection
was reduced by Grey to an àbsurdity with the observa-
tion that " it would not be an arbitration, but a private
and informai discussion to ascertain what suggestion
could be made for a settlement," 2 Austria came out
with the flat déclaration that she must décline the
English proposai. 8
This was the fourth action within five days whereby
Austria, with the support of Germany, had brought to
failure the efforts of the other Powers to préserve peace.
The Austrian refusai was ail the more glaring inasmuch
as it was expressly intended that the conférence should
cnly discuss those points which affected Serbian
sovereignty and independence, and since Austria had
from the very beginning given assurances that she
did not désire to touch the sovereignty or the
independence of Serbia. The proposai thus, in fact,
1 White Book, p. 409 [The références to the White Book
are adapted to the reprint in the Collected Diplomatie Docu-
ments relating to the outbreah of the European War]
2 Blue Book, No. 67.
3 White Book, p. 409
150 J'ACCUSE
related only to an investigation from the point of
view of public law into the question of the extent to
which the Austrian demands, especially those in
Articles 5 and 6 of the Note, were compatible with the
sovereignty of the neighbouring State. The voluntary
acceptance of the resuit of such an inquiry — which was
not in any way an arbitration — could hâve done as little
damage to the prestige of Austria as is done to the
honour of a private citizen when in a civil action he
accepts a compromise on expert ad vice. But Austria
did not désire any settlement, and thus the idea of a
conférence failed.
Simultaneously with her objections to the conférence
of ambassadors, Germany had proposed direct discus-
sions between Austria and Russia as the best method of
preventing the Serbian question from developing 1 to a
European conflict. This proposai was readily concurred
in by England, Russia, and France, and Grey was at
once prepared to withdraw his proposai for a confér-
ence of the four Powers until the direct discussions
between Vienna and Petrograd had led to a resuit,
whether positive or négative. 2 If the resuit were posi-
tive, the conférence would then be superfluous. If it
were négative, the conférence could still seek to attain
what direct discussions had been unable to achieve.
So hère again there was a new ray of hope ! But
unfortunately hère again they reckoned without
Austria. It is scarcely crédible, y et it is true — the docu-
ments incontrovertibly prove it — Austria declined the
direct discussions with Russia, proposed by her ally
Germany, and Count Berchtold declared to the Russian
ambassador Schebeko, who had impressed upon him
in the most friendly manner the desirability of a free
1 Blue Book, No. 43. White Book, p. 409.
2 Blue Book, No. 45.
THE CRIME 151
discussion in Petrograd, that Austria could neither
"recède nor enter into any discussion about the terms
of the Austro-Hungarian Note." 1
Hère there is either a lack of harmony between Berlin
and Vienna, or else we hâve an instance of preconcerted
collusion. Since a lack of harmony, for the existence of
which there is no évidence, cannot be accepted, there
only remains the other alternative, that of preconcerted
collusion. The matter is ail the more suspicious because,
as already observed, the correspondence between Berlin
and Vienna has not so far been published, and may
therefore be presumed to contain things which it is
desired to keep silent. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg,
who every day of his life publishes ail possible kinds of
unofficial documents — extracts from the archives of
Brussels, intercepted letters, and so on — would certainly
hâve published long ère now his correspondence with
Vienna if it had contained any confirmation of the truth
of his ever-repeated but ever-unproved assertions, that
he earnestly pressed for modération in Vienna and
carried this labour to the "utmost point."
In any case the fact remains that the direct under-
standing between Austria and Russia, proposed by
Germany, came to nothing in conséquence of Austria 's
refusai. On July 28th, the same day as that on which
the décisive conversation between Berchtold and
Schebeko took place, Austria declared war against
Serbia, and on the next day the bombardment of
Belgrade began.
This déclaration of war made the European situation
almost desperate. Austria's intention to crush under ail
circumstances the inconvénient neighbouring State,
regardless of the European conflagration which must
1 Blue Book, Nos. 61, 74, 75, 78, 81, 93. Orange Book,
Nos. 45, 50. White Book, p. 409.
152 J'ACCUSE
resuit, had now revealed itself in action, and it appeared
that ail further attempts to quench the fire or to prevent
its extension would be void of any prospect of success.
Austria had mobilised, not only against Serbia, which
could be regarded as a matter of course, but against
Russia as well. The views vary as to the extent of her
mobilisation towards the north and north-east. The
Russian reports maintain that more than half of the Aus-
trian army had been mobilised, 1 whereas the Chancellor,
von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of August 4th
admits the mobilisation of anly two army corps u against
the north. 992 In any case it is clear that on June 28th
Austria was the only great Power which had mobilised,
and that its mobilisation was directed, not only against
her small neighbour, but also against the great Russian
Empire.
This fact was bound to compel Russia to take counter-
measures, the necessity for which was based not merely
on the military measures taken by Austria, but even
more on her systematic frustration of ail attempts to
bring about an understanding. The Russian Govern-
ment on the 29th of July officially communicated to
foreign Governments that they had ordered mobilisation
in the army districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and
Kasan, and that this was designed as a protec-
tive measure against Austria 's mobilisation and with-
out any aggressive intentions against Austria or
Germany. 8
Simultaneously with thèse events, renewed efforts
were being made by Russia and England to find a
formula whereby a settlement could be arrived at
1 Orange Book, No. 49.
2 The Collected Documents, p. 937.
3 White Book, p. 409. Orange Book, No. 51. Blue Book
No. 78.
THE CRIME 153
between the conflicting interests of Austria on the one
hand and of Russia on the other. War had now broken
out. The question to be discussed was no longer that
of inducing Austria to withdraw, but only that of bring-
ing about a cessation of military opérations, of leaving
to Austria as a pledge any Serbian territory which she
had meanwhile occupied, and of making an attempt on
this basis to satisfy as far as possible the demands of
Austria.
In this direction Grey and Sazonof showed indefatig-
able activity, and were most energetically supported by
Viviani, the French Prime Minister. The first formula
in this sensé was proposed on July 29th by Grey to the
German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. It amounted
to the suggestion that Austria should express herself as
satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neigh-
bouring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory
seulement of her demands, and should allow the other
Powers time and opportunity to médiate between
Austria and Russia. 1
This proposai of Grey was insistently urged on the
Emperor in the telegram despatched on July 30th by
King George to Prince Henry of Prussia, and the hope
was expressed that the Emperor would apply : —
"his great influence in order to induce Austria to
accept this proposai. In this way he will prove that
Germany and England are working together to
prevent what would be an international catastrophe.
Please assure William that I am doing ail I can, and
will continue to do ail that lies in my power, to
maintain the peace of Europe."
The Secretary of State, Sir E. Grey, exerted himself
with the same zeal as the King to move the Powers to
the acceptance of his proposai, which, in fact, offered
1 Blue Book, Nos, 76, 88, 90, 98. White Book, 410
154 eTACCUSE
satisfaction to ail, and a way of escape from the
dangerous confusion which had resulted.
Meanwhile the Russian Minister, Sazonof, had also
dictated to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, a
formula as the basis of a settlement, which was directed
to the same objects as Grey's proposai. The formula
runs : —
11 If Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian
question has assumed the character of a question of
European interest, déclares herself ready to elimin-
ate from her ultimatum points which violate the
sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop
her military préparations. 991
This proposai of Sazonof dates from July 30th, that
is to say, two days after the Austrian déclaration of war
against Serbia, and after the bombardment of Belgrade
and the invasion of Serbian territory had already begun.
The proposai contained no obligation on the part of
Austria to cancel the military action taken by her; it
merely imposed on Austria the requirement that she
should leave untouched the sovereign rights of Serbia,
that is to say, an obligation which could well be accepted
by Austria, if she desired honourably to observe the
déclaration given by her at the beginning of the crisis.
What, however, took place ? The Russian Ambassa-
dor at Berlin, Swerbeiev, on July 30th handed to von
Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, the proposai made by
Sazonof, which had simultaneously been telegraphed to
the Foreign Office through the German Ambassador,
Count Pourtalès. The answer of Jagow was a flat
refusai: "it was impossible for Austria to accept the
proposai." 2 This refusai, be it noted, was given at
once, without any previous inquiry in Vienna. Herr
1 Orange Book, No. 60.
2 Orange Book, No 63,
THE CRIME 155
von Jagow obviously regarded himself as the guardian
or man of business of the Austrian Government, which,
since the déclaration of war against Serbia and her
refusai of any kind of discussion, no longer stood in any
direct relation with Petrograd.
One more attempt thus ended in failure ! But even
this further failure did not deter the English and Rus-
sian Governments from making renewed attempts to
bring about an under standing. There were two formula?
in the field, that of Grey of July 29th and that of
Sazonof of July 30th. The latter had been refused
by Jagow without any reasons being given, whereas the
former was still awaiting an answer. The English
Ambassador in Berlin constantly pressed for an answer,
and was repeatedly put off with empty phrases. Owing
to the Austrian refusai of ail direct discussions, diplo-
matie intercourse was rendered extraordinarily difficult.
Ail inquiries had to go via Berlin, and Berlin was never
able to give a positive answer, since, as was professed,
an answer had not been received from Vienna. Whether
the agent in this case was honest or dishonest cannot be
proved with full certainty. But in any case the suspi-
cion in favour of the second alternative is overwhelming
— a point with which we shall deal in greater détail
later in stating the grounds for the indictment against
Germany. The peacemakers were put off from day to
day. On one occasion Jagow had received no answer
from Vienna ; on another, Bethmann regrets that he had
pressed the button so vigorously in Vienna that he had
perhaps gone too far and produced the opposite effect
from what was intended. On a third occasion, when
Goschen was still urging that an answer should be given
and was recommending that an even more violent pres-
sure should be applied to the button in Vienna, the only
answer which he got from Bethmann was that Count
156 J'ACCUSE
Berchtold would take the wishes of the Emperor Francis
Joseph in the matter next morning. 1
Thus three complète days, from the 29th to the 31 st
of July, glided unprofitably into the past without any
answer being received from Austria in reply to Grey's
proposai which the English King had so fervently urged
on the Emperor William. Three days glided unprofitably
into the past while Europe in suspense and in horror
watched the approach of the dreaded catastrophe. The
diplomatists of Germany and Austria were in no haste.
They knew what they wanted, and with complète com-
posure they prepared the drama behind the scènes,
while in front everyone was running to and fro in agita-
tion, calling aloud in terror for the fire brigade.
Grey, Sazonof, and Viviani persevered, notwithstand-
ing ail their failures, in the earnest endeavour to prevent
the outbreak of the conflagration. Scores of telegrams
flew backwards and forwards between London, Paris,
and Petrograd. Night and day men laboured in the
Chancellories of the Entente Powers to préserve peace.
Since Sazonof's proposai had been declined, and no
answer had been sent in reply to Grey's proposai — even
to-day no answer has been received — an attempt was
made to devise a third formula which would represent
a middle way between the first two formulai. This third
formula — the resuit of the zealous action taken by
Viviani in the cause of médiation 2 — went even further
to meet the wishes of Austria than the first proposai of
Sazonof, and thus appeared to offer every prospect
of a favourable resuit. It was communicated by
Sazonof to the Great Powers of Europe on July 31 st,
and runs as follows : —
" If Austria consents to stay the march of her
1 Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, 112
3 Yellow Book, No.!112,
THE CRIME 157
troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognising that
the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the char-
acter of a question of European interest, she admits
that the Great Powers may examine the satisfac-
tion which Serbia can accord to the Austro-
Hungarian Government without in jury to her
rights as a sovereign State or her independence,
Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting
attitude." 1
This formula, which now represented the utmost
extent to which it was possible to go in meeting
Austria's wishes, and could only hâve been sug-
gested by Russia 's décisive désire for peace, has
never received an answer from Austria or Germany.
While Sazonof in a despatch to London still expressed
the hope that a peaceful issue to the situation had been
found, 2 while Grey in his despatches to Berlin most
urgently recommended the acceptance of the second
formula of Sazonof, 3 Germany and Austria maintained
an unbroken silence. In place of the Serbian question,
which was in danger of being amicably settled, another
question was put forward, which was bound to lead
inevitably to war — the question of the Russian mobilisa-
tion. Germany appeared no longer as Austria's man of
business, but took her place as a party to the case in
her own name. The understudy assumed the leading
rôle. Austria's book of guilt was closed, and a new
book of guilt for Germany was opened.
The Russian gênerai mobilisation undoubtedly took
place on July 31 st. On this ail the diplomatie publica-
tions agrée. 4 It was, however, occasioned by the previous
1 Orange Book, No. 67.
2 Orange Book, Nos. 69, 71.
3 Blue Book, Nos. 111, 120, 121, 131, 132.
4 White Book, p. 412.
158 J'ACCUSE
Austrian gênerai mobilisation. This fact requires to be
decisively emphasised, since in Germany an intentional
silence has been preserved on this point officially and
unofficially. This silence is only natural, for the guilt
of Russia would hopelessly collapse like a house of
cards if it were proved that the Russian mobilisation
not only folio wed the Austrian in point of time, but was
also its necessary conséquence; not merely because of
the military measures of Austria, but equally because
of the whole diplomatie attitude of the two Empires in
the days between July 23rd and 31 st.
I hâve already shown that the first of ail the mobilisa-
tions was the Austrian partial mobilisation against
Serbia and against the Russian frontier. This mobilisa-
tion, according to Russian and French reports, com-
prised against Russia more than a half of the entire
Austrian army, and according to Bethmann's admission
at least two army corps. The précise time of the com-
plète mobilisation of Austria is differently given ; accord-
ing to the report of the Russian Ambassador in Vienna
it had already taken place on July 28th. 1 Accord-
ing to French and English reports it took place at
1 o'clock in the morning on July 31st. 2 To be on the
safe side, I will assume that the latter date only is
proved. Of the correetness of this date there can be no
doubt in view of the reports of Dumaine, the French
Ambassador in Vienna, of de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador in Vienna, and Bertie, the English Ambas-
sador in Paris.
The Russian gênerai mobilisation was ordered, at the
earliest, towards midday on July 31st, that is to say,
after the Austrian mobilisation.
1 Orange Book, No. 44, 47.
2 Yellow Book, No. 115. Blue Book, Nos. 113, 118, 126,
134.
THE CRIME 159
On the same day — the exact hour is unknown — the
" threatening danger of war" (drohende Kriegsgefahr)
was proclaimed in Germany. In the evening about
7 o'clock the ultimatum to France was delivered in
Paris, and about midnight the ultimatum to Russia
was delivered in Petrograd.
An eventful day ! But the most remarkable occur-
rence was contributed by Austria, when, in the course of
the same day, unperturbed by gênerai mobilisation,
the state of war (Kriegszustand), and ultimata, she
suddenly gave simultaneous expression in Paris and
Petrograd to her readiness to enter into negotiations
with Russia and the oiher Powers with regard to the
contents of her ultimatum to Serbia. Austria thus at
last declared herself ready at the eleventh hour to do
something which up till then she had most energetically
refused to do, that is to say, " to discuss the grounds of
her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers." 1
In Paris, London, and Petrograd this final apparent
conversion of Austria was received with feelings of
intensely pleasant surprise. Everyone hailed what was
regarded as a new ray of hope. Grey and Sazonof at
once seized the opportunity of guiding the apparent
goodwill of Austria into paths which held out the
guarantee of a happy issue.
As a shopkeeper spreads out before a fastidious
customer ail his available wares in the hope that she
will in the end find something to suit her taste, so Grey
and Sazonof submitted to Austria, even at the eleventh
hour, every possible proposai in the hope that at least
one would gain the approval of this fastidious customer.
Grey promised to support in the capitals of the other
Powers any reasonable proposai of peace put forward
by Germany and Austria. He offered to support in
1 Yellow Book, No. 120. Orange Book, No. 73.
160 J'ACCUSE
Petrograd a proposai which would satisfy ail Austrian
demands without exception, in so far as the sovereignty
and integrity of Serbia were not thereby impaired. 1 In
answer to the Austrian overture, Sazonof not only
declared himself ready to discuss with Austria the
substance of the Austrian ultimatum, but he made the
further proposai — in order to guarantee as far as possible
that the discussion would hâve a chance of success — that
the proceedings should take place in London under the
"participation" of the Great Powers. He added that
it would be very important if Austria, during the nego-
tiations in London, were to put a stop provisionally to
her military action on Serbian territory. 2 "It would
be very important," be it observed; it was not made a
conditio sine qua non. This represents a further sub-
stantial concession to Austria as compared with previous
proposais which had made the cessation of military
action a condition.
But ail thèse proposais made in the last hour
remained without success. They were bcund to be
fruitless, because the assumption under lying them,
namely, that Austria was honestly prepared to corne to
an understanding, was illusory. Why did Austria in
the critical days between the 23rd and 31 st of July
refuse ail discussions on the facts of the Serbian dispute ?
Why did she with unyielding obstinacy constantly
déclare only what she did not intend against Serbia, but
never furnish any explanation as to what she really did
intend ? She did not intend to touch the integrity and
independence of Serbia. This négative déclaration
she constantly repeated. But what did she mean
to do positively ? Even to-day we hâve no infor-
mation on this point. The German Emperor himself
1 Blue Book, No. 111.
2 Blue Book, No. 133. Orange Book, No. 69
THE CRIME 161
did not know when he telegraphed to the Tsar on
July 29th:—
" According to my opinion the action of Austria-
Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to
receive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia
are effectively translated into deeds."
Herr von Schoen also, the German Ambassador at
Paris, knew just as little as his Impérial Master how to
furnish Viviani with a positive answer to the question
as to what Austria really did want. 1
What precisely was the nature of the guaranties of
which the Emperor William speaks, and of which the
German White Book is constantly making mention ?
Were they contained in the Austrian Note, or did they
go beyond the Austrian Note ? If they were contained
in it, then they were conceded, apart from the demands
contained in Articles 5 and 6, with regard to which
Serbia was prepared to negotiate. If, however, they
were not contained in the Note, then they extend still
further the scope of the Austrian demands, which apart
from this were in ail conscience sufficiently far-reaching.
If this extension of the Austrian demands were to be
made the subject of negotiations, it should clearly hâve
been stated in précise language; but until the evening
of July 31 st this had not been done, and even to-day
we are no further forward.
How then, I ask again, are we to explain this sudden
change on the part of Austria? I can find no other
explanation than this, that the readiness of Austria to
negotiate, which if expressed at an earlier date would
without doubt hâve led to a peaceful settlement, was, in
the moment when it was finally expressed, completely
harmless. A peaceful solution was no longer to be
dreaded; by the independent lead assumed by the
1 Orange Book, No. 55.
162 J'ACCUSE
Cabinet of Berlin war was already completely
assured.
Hère, again, the question arises whether there was a
divergence between Berlin and Vienna, or whether
the events which took place are to be attributed to
preconcerted duplicity. The paths followed by the two
Cabinets apparently led in opposite directions on the
evening of July 31 st. Austria, in virtue of her readi-
ness to negotiate, was moving in the direction of peace.
Germany with her "threatening danger of war," with
her Impérial speeches, and the speeches of the Chan-
cellor to the people of Berlin, advanced consciously and
intentionally in the direction of war. It is impossible
to believe that there was any divergence between the
two Cabinets. Had such a divergence existed it must
hâve revealed itself at an earlier date than the 31 st of
July. The coincidence in time between the two ap-
parently opposed actions, the sudden overnight conver-
sion of Austria as though by an illumination — in indi-
viduals as in States such sudden illuminations are highly
suspicious, and only slow conversions inspire confidence
— the conversion of Austria calculated to take effect at
the moment when it could no longer lead to salvation —
ail thèse circumstances raise to a certainty the suspicion
that hère there was preconcerted duplicity between the
two Governments intended to shift the guilt of the war
from themselves to Russia.
It must and had to corne to war. The further discus-
sion of the question will completely convince anyone
who has so far been able to entertain doubts of the truth
of this assertion. Ail diplomatie negotiations were thus
bound to remain fruitless even if they resulted in the
whole of Europe being forced to her knees before
Germany and Austria. It was not enough to achieve a
diplomatie victory; a military victory had to be added
THE CRIME 163
in order to assure the supremacy of Austria in the
Balkans and to pave for Germany a path to the stars
where she dreamed that her destiny was written.
The indictment which I bring against Austria may be
summarised in the following sentences :
(1) Austria, after having already planned an attack
on Serbia in August, 1913, presented to Serbia in July,
1914, a Note containing demands of such an exorbitant
nature that a war with Serbia, and as a further consé-
quence a European war, was to be expected.
(2) She refused the prolongation of the forty-eight
hours' time-limit which was sought for by the Entente
Powers.
(3) She recalled her Ambassador, and declared war
against Serbia, although the Serbian Government h ad
submissively conceded nearly ail the Austrian demands,
and so far as the others were concerned declared herself
ready to negotiate and to submit the outstanding points
to arbitration.
(4) She flatly refused every discussion with Russia
and with the other Powers on the contents of the
Serbian Note, and only expressed her readiness to take
part in such discussions on July 31st when it was too
late.
(5) She refused the proposai of Grey to accept média-
tion, or at least advice, from the four Powers not
directly concerned, although Russia had agreed to this
proposai.
(6) Notwithstanding repeated urgent requests from
England, she left unanswered the formula of agreement
proposed by Grey.
(7) She declined, through Herr von Jagow, the first
formula of agreement proposed by Sazonof .
(8) She gave no answer to the second formula of
agreement proposed by Sazonof.
M 2
164 «T ACCUSE
(9) The last proposais for an agreement made by
Grey and Sazonof were also not considered worthy of
an answer by Austria.
(10) In so far as she furnished any explanations, she
restricted herself to saying what she did not wish, but
she ne ver said what she did wish.
(11) She was the first of ail the Great Powers to begin
mobilisation and military opérations; she preceded ail
the other Powers, first with her partial and then with
her gênerai mobilisation.
Thèse points in the indictment are proved, and
justify the judgment :
" Austria is guilty, either alone or in common with
others, of having provoked the European war. M
We shall now see who the others are.
B.
GERMANY
The guilt of Germany is even easier to prove than that
of Austria, since Germany has composed her own bill
of indictment. Properly read, the German White Book
contains almost the whole of the accusations which can
be brought against Germany, and I will undertake to
produce overwhelming proof of guilt by means of the
contents of the German White Book taken along with
the complementary officiai documents, so that it will be
unnecessary for me to do more than emphasise her self-
accusations.
Thèse confessions are, of course, unintentional. They
do not hâve the purifying intention and the force of
self-accusations as known to Christianity, and as
represented on the stage by the most Christian of ail
THE CRIME 165
modem poets, Tolstoi. They are confessions arising
from imprudence; he who is confessing believos that
he is justifying himself, whereas he is really accusing
himself. He believes that he is defending himself, and
he delivers into the hands of his accuser priceless
material for his condemnation.
Let us begin at the very opening passage in the
White Book. After depicting the position of the
Austrian Government towards the Serbian agitation
and the impossibility of " viewing any longer this agita-
tion across the border," the White Book continues : —
"With ail our heart we were able to agrée with
our ally's estimât e of the situation, and assure him
that any action considered necessary to end the
movement in Serbia directed against the conserva-
tion of the monarchy would meet with our
approval. We were perfectly aware that a possible
warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia
might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might
therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with
our duty as allies. We could not, however, in thèse
vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at
stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude
not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our
assistance in thèse trying days. . . . We, therefore,
permitted Austria a completely free hand in her
action towards Serbia, but hâve not participated in
her préparations."
What does this amount to ? It means : —
(1) That the German Government gave the Austrian
Government a completely free hand to take against
Serbia whatever action might appear to her to be suit-
able in the circumstances, whether the means adopted
were diplomatie or military in their nature.
(2) That Germany intentionally refrained from parti-
166 J'ACCUSE
cipating in the préparations for action in either of thèse
ways; that is to say, she was prepared, in conséquence
of her duty as an ally, to folio w blindly the lead taken
by Austria.
(3) That Germany was perfectly well aware that mili-
tary action on the part of Austria against Serbia might
bring Russia into the field, and might therefore in volve
Germany also in the war, which, in conséquence of the
obligations imposed by alliances on both sides, was
bound to assume the character of a European war.
Thus the German Government acknowledges that it
bears the responsibility (dolus) for the European War,
the ultimate responsibility (dolus eventualis) which,
according to juridical and moral ideas, is placed on the
same footing as the direct responsibility (dolus purus),
At the same time she further admits that she herself
from the beginning regarded her effort to localise the
military conflict between Austria and Serbia as having
had no prospect of success, It follows that, in
rejecting the promising proposais for arriving at an
understanding put forward by the other Powers and in
seeking to substitute for them one for localisation,
Germany was proposing an expédient which, in her own
view, could not lead to a successful issue. In other words,
her désire was to produce the appearance that she was
anxious to prevent the European conflict, but she
refused every method calculated effectively to prevent
it, and in their place proposed a method which in her
own opinion was completely unfitted to achieve this
end.
The view that Russia would be brought into the field
by an Austro-Serbian war, to which free expression is
given in the White Book, was but too well founded.
One can only be amazed that Germany did not crédit,
or pretended not to crédit, the other Powers with the
THE CRIME 167
foresight with which she was herself endowed. Had it
not become a commonplace in European diplomacy,
and indeed a commonplace to everyone in Europe who
thought about politics, that Russia, in view of the
intimate bonds of blood and of faith and of the two
hundred years of history by which she was linked with
Serbia, could ne ver be a silent witness of the establish-
ment of an Austrian hegemony over that country, that
she could ne ver consent to it being crushed by arms,
but would corne to the assistance of her weaker
brother ? 1 Russia 's interest in the Balkans was known
to ail, and had been confirmed by the Russian
Government in countless déclarations and actions.
After the first and the second Balkan War the opposi-
tion between the interests of Austria and Russia had
once more, as on so many previous occasions, stood out
in full relief. Russia's interest on behalf of Serbia and
Austria 's interest against Serbia had corne into such
violent collision that even then they almost occasioned
a European war. The same danger existed in August,
1913, when Austria planned the attack on Serbia which
has been disclosed by Giollitti. Even at that time the
intervention of Russia was looked upon as a matter of
course ; otherwise the inquiry addressed by Austria to
her ally Italy would hâve had no meaning. As late as
May, 1914, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonof, in a
speech in the Duma, professed his adhésion to a policy of
" the Balkans for the Balkan people," that is to say, to a
policy which opposed any intention on the part of
Austria to establish a hegemony, and which promised
the support of Russia in the maintenance of the inde-
pendence of the Balkan peoples. The question hère was
1 See Blue Book, p. v. Grey called this " a commonplace
in European diplomacy n in a speech in Parliament in
March, 1913.
168 J'ACCUSE
not a political one pure and simple ; it was rather a
question of national sentiment and of blood-relation-
ship. This link betwen Russia and Serbia was an
ancient historical fact, with which European diplomacy
was bound to reckon, and with which it always had
reckoned. 1 Germany and Austria also reckoned with it,
as the White Book testifies.
And was it now supposed that thèse bonds were
suddenly to be wrenched asunder ? Was it expected
that Russia would be a placid spectator while Austria
crushed the small State connected with Russia by blood ?
Was Russia baldly to renounce her interests in the
Balkans and her prestige among the Balkan nations in
f avour of Austria ? This was a strong suggestion to
make, if it were seriously meant. But the suggestion
was indeed so strong that it cannot hâve been seriously
meant.
Germany herself never believed, and never could
hâve believed, in the possibility of localisation from the
moment the conflict assumed a military aspect. My
little brother annoys a strong man, who is on the point
of striking him dead. I intervene to protect the little
one against the superior strength of the big man. A
third, who is even bigger, bars my way, saying that the
conflict between the small boy and the big man must
remain localised. Would I therefore restrain myself
from protecting my brother? This was Russia 's
position.
Certainly it would hâve been a good thing if the
conflict could hâve remained localised, and this would
also hâve been quite possible if it had remained on a
diplomatie basis. On this basis the great man had
already obtained a complète victory over the small.
But it was really too much to ask that the little one
1 See Blue Book, p. v.
THE CRIME 169
should be crushed after he had tendered copious apolo-
gies, and had humbly promised to behave better in
future. It was impossible to ask this of Russia, and if
such a demand were made it was known from the outset
that it could not be satisfied.
Thus the only title to glory which Germany claims
for herself in this diplomatie tragi-comedy falls to the
ground. No one believed in the possibility of localisa-
tion, least of ail Germany herself.
After this, the only proposai made by Germany, a
proposai advanced by her in the full knowledge that it
had no prospect of success, had, as a matter of course,
failed, Germany 's whole attitude during the critical days
was one of perpétuai passivity ; if in any way she aban-
doned this attitude, she restricted herself to the frus-
tration of ail attempts to arrive at an understanding.
The more the German Government assures us that it
earnestly laboured " shoulder to shoulder with Eng-
land " in the interests of médiation, the less support
do thèse assurances find in the facts. The impartial
inquirer sees only the one shoulder, that of England,
pressing in the direction of peace, while the German
shoulder, butting against the English, is seen pushing
in the opposite direction.
Why did the German Government allow the Austrian
Note to be despatched without being acquainted with
its contents, without previously submitting thèse to ex-
amination ? Among foreign Governments the suspicion
had made itself manifest that Germany had already
had a hand in the game when the Note was
drafted. In particular, the Italian Government
adduced as one of the grounds for her resolution to
remain neutral that she had not been informed of
Austria's intentions and of the contents of the Note —
in contrast to Germany, the other member of the Triple
170 eTACCUSE
Alliance. The German Government promptly denied
this. It assured foreign Governments that it had
received no information with regard to the Note before
the time of ifs delivery, and this assurance is repeated
in the White Book. 1 It is open to anyone to believe or
disbelieve this assurance. If it is true, it reveals an
unprecedented levity, for which there is no adjective in
the German language sufficiently severe. Hère we hâve
a Note which in itself almost amounted to a déclaration
of war, which would almost certainly lead to a Serbian,
and in the sequel to a European war; are we to
suppose that the German Government did not require
such a Note as this to be laid before it previous to its
delivery that it might hâve the opportunity of examin-
ing it, and of abating any excessive harshness which it
might contain? If, however, Herr von Bethmann had
knowledge of the Note, and notwithstanding allowed it
to be delivered without demur, this affords proof that
he saw clearly the possibility of war, and intentionally
did nothing to prevent it. Thus levity, irresponsible
levity, or the commission of a crime, are the alternatives
which must be placed before Herr von Bethmann. It
may be left to him to make the choice.
At the other stages of the negotiations the same
alternatives hâve to be placed before him.
Why did the German Government not support the
request of England and Russia for an extension of the
time-limit? Why did Herr von Jagow content himself
hère, as on so many other occasions, with the
platonic promise that he would transmit this request to
Vienna, without being able to support it ? Why did he
at once express doubt whether Austria would be able
to meet this request ? 2 Was it not entirely reasonable
1 White Book, p. 406.
2 Blue Book, No. 18.
THE CRIME 171
that the Powers concernée! in the cause of peace, who
only received knowledge of the Austrian Note on July
24th, should hâve sought for a somewhat longer time-
limit in order that they might be able successfully to
exercise their influence on Serbia in the direction of
securing compliance ? Was it not reasonable that they
should first of ail désire to become acquainted with the
Austrian documentary évidence, which was not annexed
to the copy of the Note communicated to them, and
which was only made accessible to the English Govern-
ment on August 7th, that is to say, long after the out-
break of war? 1 What objection could Germany raise
against the extension of the time-limit, a course which
could only be serviceable to the interests of peace, if like
the others she also desired peace ?
If the Serbian answer, as up to the evening of July
25th there was reason to fear, had amounted to a refusai,
would not Germany hâve had to reproach herself with
the fact that her failure to support the request for an
extension of the time-limit had in part to bear the
responsibility for the unfavourable answer ?
The Serbian answer became known, and the whole
world breathed more freely. No one had expected that
Serbia would hâve so humiliated herself. Whereas the
Austrian Note is rightly characterised in the English
Blue Book in the statement that "No independent
nation had ever been called upon to accept a greater
humiliation," 2 the Serbian answer is accorded the well-
merited testimony that " The reply went far beyond
anything which any power, Germany not excepted, had
ever thought probable." 3 Russia and France were
equally satisfied with the attitude assumed by Serbia.
1 Blue Book, p. v.
2 Blue Book, p. vi.
3 Blue Book, p. vii.
172 ,T ACCUSE
In a circular telegram of July 27th Sazonof describes
the Serbian answer as follows : —
" It exceeds ail our expectations in its modéra-
tion and in its désire to afford the fullest satisfac-
tion to Austria. We do not see what further
demands could be made by Austria, unless the
Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war
with Serbia." 1
Ail were agreed that just as the Austrian Note had
surpassed the limits of what was permissible and had
violated ail précédents, so the Serbian answer surpassed
in its spirit of compliance and submissiveness everything
of which there was previous record. Germany alone
was of a différent opinion. The Austrian demands
appeared to her moderate and justifiable; the Serbian
answer, on the contrary, appeared insufncient, as it
" showed in ail essentials the endeavour through pro-
crastination and new negotiations to escape from the
just demands of the Monarchy." 2 The German Govern-
ment undertook to " pass on" to Vienna the request of
Grey that Germany would use her influence in Vienna
in support of a favourable réception of the Serbian
Note, but they did not see their way to identify them-
selves with the request. 3
Why was it impossible to support this request? Why
was it not possible for Germany to exert her whole influ-
ence in Vienna in order to secure that negotiations on the
basis of the Serbian answer would at least take place ?
Were the few réservations made, in the most conciliatory
form, by Serbia of so great importance that on their
account the whole answer had to be rejected, diplomatie
relations broken off, and a war declared, the further
1 Orange Book, No. 33.
2 White Book, p. 406.
3 Bine Book, p. viii and No. 34
THE CRIME 173
conséquences of which were distinctly foreseen by Ger-
many ? Did the Serbian answer really hâve the appear-
ance of quibbling and procrastination ? Was it not full of
positive promises, the non-fulfilment of which had first
to be waited for before the answer could be rejected as
insufficient ? What else could Serbia do within forty-
eight hours than promise everything — everything with a
f e w exceptions — asked of her ? The intention to procras-
tinate could only manifest itself later, in the event of there
being an undue delay in giving effect to the promises.
Why, then, did Germany tolerate the recall of the
Austrian Ambassador, and later the Déclaration of War?
If the objection is raised that Germany could not
hâve prevented it, I answer that she could, but that she
was unwilling to do so. That she was unwilling to do
this, or indeed anything else, in the service of peace
may already be inferred from the preceding e vents, and
is confirmed by ail that follows. To assert, however,
that she was unable to exercise a décisive influence on
Austria 's action is so ridiculous an évasion that it does
not need to be seriously contradicted. With regard to
Austria, Germany was in a position to give effect to
her every wish. Austria was a cipher in the European
international concert, in which Germany played the first
fiddle. Only if Germany stood behind her could Austria
run the risk of a conflict with Russia, which was bound
to arise out of the Serbian conflict. A nod from Ger-
many would hâve been enough, and Austria would hâve
left her Ambassador in Belgrade, and continued to
discuss the Serbian Note. It was unnecessary for Beth-
mann to say a word. A frown would hâve been enough
to restrain Austria from declaring war against Serbia,
an action which no Austrian statesman could hâve taken
unless he had had in his pocket the previous concurrence
of Germany.
174 J'ACCUSE
Ail that England might hâve prevented by a timely
déclaration of neutrality in Petrograd and in Paris is
constantly emphasised in the German Press, as also
in the Chancellor's speech of December 2nd. This
question I will deal with later in discussing the attitude
of England. The other question, which lies nearer
home, is, however, never raised : What might not
Germany hâve prevented if at the right time she had
checked the impetuosity of her Austrian ally, if she had
moderated the terms of the Note, required that nego-
tiations should take place on the basis of the Serbian
answer, and had thus prevented the déclaration of war ?
This is the crucial point in the whole question. Hère
lies the germ of the whole tragedy. Austria, blindly
and without so much as the qui ver of an eyelash, did
whatever Germany wished. Ail the sugary phrases
used by Bethmann and Jagow, that they could not
ask this or that of Austria; that they feared that they
had already gone too far in their suggestions; that
they had pressed the button too violently, and that in
so doing the opposite from what was intended might be
produced; that they had gone to the utmost limit in
Vienna, and so on, ail thèse statements are but empty
falsehood and deceit. I repeat, a frown would hâve
been enough to restrain Vienna from measures not
desired in Berlin. The question again reduces itself
simply to this : What was and what was not desired in
Berlin? I hâve already given the answer to this ques-
tion.
Thus with Berlin 's concurrence matters advanced to
a déclaration of war for which, as has been shown
above, not the slightest ground could be advanced;
with Berlin 's concurrence, also, ail the further develop-
ments took place. The attitude of Germany in the days
between July 28th and August lst was in conformity
THE CRIME 175
with that during the preceding days. The English
proposai for a conférence of Ambassadors in London
was, as we hâve already seen, rejected by Germany on
formai grounds without any inquiry being addressed to
Austria. 1 The direct negotiations between Austria and
Russia, proposed by Germany, in which Sazonof was
ready to participate, were rejected by Austria with the
observation that the suggestion, " after the opening of
hostilities by Serbia and the subséquent déclaration of
war . . . appears belated." 2 Hère, again, is another
charming expression : " Serbia had opened hostilities,"
and not Austria. The déclaration of war against Serbia
which had wantonly proceeded from Austria prevents
this same Austria from negotiating with Russia in the
interests of the maintenance of European peace ! Ail
this Germany passively endures, except in so far as she
herself abandons her passivity in favour of an attitude
of active rejection, as in the case of the conférence of
the four Powers. In essential matters Germany contents
herself with the rôle of a postman, merely handing on
the English proposais to Vienna, and with the muteness
proper to a postman takes no further interest in the
fate of thèse proposais. " We further declared ourselves
ready . . . to transmit a second proposai of Sir Edward
Grey's to Vienna." 3 "We even as late as July 30th
forwarded the English proposai to Vienna " 4 — such are
the expressions we find everywhere in the White Book.
It is indeed in gênerai maintained that the proposais
which were handed on received support, but nothing is
adduced to prove the assertion. The correspondence
between Berlin and Vienna on which the proof of this
1 White Book, p. 409.
2 White Book, p. 409 and Exhibit 16.
3 White Book, p. 409.
4 White Book, p. 410.
176 J'ACCUSE
rests is lacking. The lukewarm observations uttered by
Messrs. von Bethmann and von Jagow to Goschen, the
English Ambassador, on the réception of each new
English proposai do not indicate that they felt any very
lively interest in thèse proposais. The négative results
achieved in Vienna, however, incontrovertibly prove
that they not only did not support the English pro-
posais, but that in ail probability they thwarted them.
Any course which they earnestly supported in Vienna
was bound to hâve been accepted there. If it was not
accepted, this affords proof that they did not earnestly
support it.
The evil intention of the German Government is
clearly shown by the folio wing occurrence. When on
July 27th Sir Edward Goschen laid before von Jagow,
the Foreign Secret ary, Grey's proposai of the confér-
ence of the four Powers, Herr von Jagow, as is well
known, at once declined this "court of arbitration,' :
and persisted in his refusai, even when Goschen
explained to him that the question was not one of
"arbitration," but that the object was merely "to
discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous
situation." 1 But Grey refused to be discour aged. He
inferred from Jagow 's answer and from a déclaration
made by Lichnowsky that Germany did not in prin-
ciple refuse his proposai, but that difficulties werebeing
advanced only against the jorm of a Conférence. He
therefore commissioned his Ambassador to request Herr
von Jagow himself to suggest the form which would be
agreeable to the German Government. 2 Viviani made
the same suggestion to Baron von Schoen, and Sazonof
to Count Pourtalès. Ail three Governments expressed
1 Blue Book, No. 43.
2 Blue Book, No. 46, 60, 68. Yellow Book, No. 81
Orange Book, No. 54.
THE CRIME 177
themselves as ready to accept any form of médiation
which Germany might propose, and Viviani, as well as
Grey, emphatically added that the European situation
had now become so serious that they dared not allow
formalities or quibbles to wreck the peace of Europe. 1
To-day Europe is still waiting in vain for Jagow's
answer. Grey did not desist; he reminded Herr von
Jagow of the matter, and returned to it again and
again, urging on him the desirability of at length
suggesting the form agreeable to him, which had already
been accepted by ail in advance. It was ail in vain. No
answer came from the Wilhelmstrasse. The White Book
expressly confirais the fact that the idea of Grey's
proposai was approved. 2 It intentionally passes over in
silence the fact that this idea could hâve been realised
in any form desired by Germany, if Germany had put
forward any proposais on the subject. Thèse proposais
were never made. Is not this an overwhelming proof oj
guilt? The fact is that the diplomatists of Germany,
as I hâve already pointed out, had no wish to sit round
a table in London with the diplomatists of other coun-
tries. It was known how easy it would be to find a
solution of the Serbian question, and how much more
difhcult questions had been solved in London in 1912
and 1913. It was feared that a peaceful solution might
again be arrived at in London, and for this reason,
whatever might happen, the London Conférence had to
be prevented.
We now corne to the history of the various formulée
proposed by Grey and Sazonof which aimed at bringing
about a peaceful understanding between Russia and
Austria with or without the participation of the Powers.
I hâve already dealt with the fate of thèse proposais
1 Blue Book, No. 78. Orange Book, No. 55.
2 White Book, p. 409.
N
178 ^ACCUSE
in the previous section relating to Austria, and I hâve
also pointed out the rôle played by Germany in thèse
negotiations. In the German White Book only one of
ail thèse proposais and negotiations, that of Grey, is
mentioned, and this is done in such a superficial and
ambiguous manner that without référence to the
telegram from the English King to Prince Henry of
Prussia one could scarcely realise how far-reaching and
how rich in prospect was the peace proposai in question.
Hère, again, Germany restricted herself to the discharge
of a postman's duties. She handed on the English pro-
posai to Vienna. The White Book contains not a word
of recommendation, nor even of criticism. 1 It contents
itself with adding, " we had to assume that Russia would
accept this basis," and in another place it speaks of a
proposai of médiation " whose tendencies and basis
must hâve been known in Petrograd." 2 That is ail
that is said. Nothing is told us with regard to the fate
of the proposai, and it is only from the English Blue
Book that we learn that Grey 's proposai, like so much
else that was calculated to serve the cause of peace, was
simply buried in silence. In this case also e vents took
exactly the same course as had previously been followed
with regard to the question of the form of the confér-
ence of the four Powers, the only différence being that
on that occasion Germany alone was responsible for
1 White Book, p. 410. [The translation of the White
Book used in the text is that officially published by the
German Government, reproduced in the Collected Diplomatie
Documents. There is, however, a slight différence in the
meaning between the officiai translation of this passage :
" We thought that Russia would accept this basis," and the
original German which lias hère been followed in the text :
" Wir mussten annehmen dass Russland dièse Basis akzeptiren
wurde."]
2 White Book, p. 411
THE CRIME 179
the failure to give an answer, whereas hère the responsi-
bility for the absence of an answer was pushed on to
Vienna. " He has up till now received no reply " ;
"they had not had time to send an answer yet"; "no
answer had yet been returned." 1 Such were the answers
given by Jagow to Goschen in the critical days in which
the fate of Europe depended on hours, and indeed on
minutes.
The sentence in the White Book which speaks of the
consent of Russia to Grey's proposai as an indefinite
assumption only, and which is thereby designed to
make it appear as if the fate of this proposai was
uncertain on the other side also — this sentence can only
rest on mala fides. The German Government knew
quite well that Sazonof also, as well as Grey, had
energetically sought for a formula to serve as the basis
of agreement, that a first formula of this kind, as I hâve
already stated, had been dictated by Sazonof himself
to Count Pourtalès on July 30th, 2 that Germany had
refused this proposai on the ground that it was " impos-
sible for Austria to accept it," 3 and that Sazonof, at
Grey's suggestion, had forwarded to the German Govern-
ment an even more conciliatory formula. 4 AU this was,
and is, known to the German Government. It is, how-
ever, hidden in silence from the German public. It
may be said generally that the German Government
has, consciously and intentionally, maint ained silence
with regard to ail the efforts for peace made by Russia
and France, because thèse do not suit their case and
would lead to the collapse of the whole of the labori-
ously constructed édifice of the Russian-French attack.
1 Blue Book, No. 28, 107, 112.
2 Orange Book, No. 60.
3 Orange Book, No. 63.
4 Orange Book, No. 67.
N 2
180 J" ACCUSE
The second formula of Sazonof experienced the same
fate as Grey's proposai. No answer has in fact been
given. And the last desperate efforts of Russia and
England on 31 st July and August lst hâve also not been
considered worthy of any kind of an answer from
Germany. 1
Germany acted according to the principle :
" Words, words, enough hâve now been bandied
At last the time has corne for deeds." 2
The décision to act had already been taken on July
29th, on the third day after the return of the Emperor
from his tour in the north. To judge from the tele-
grams exchanged between the Emperor and the Tsar
there appears to me to be no doubt — justice requires
that this should be placed on record — that the Emperor
at the moment of his return had not yet personally re-
solved on war. His first telegrams to the Tsar despatched
on July 28th and 29th, 3 and especially the former, strike
a tone of f riendship and of an inclination to peace which
scarcely leaves room for doubt that they were honour-
ably intended. I hâve already shown that a large and
powerful party at the Court and in the country had
for long striven for war. I hâve also endeavoured to
prove that the Emperor had in principle been won over
to thèse efforts. But there is a long step between enter-
taining a conviction on principle and translating this
conviction into action. The step is greater the more
responsibility attaches to the act, the more serious the
conséquences to which it may give rise. It need, there-
fore, cause no surprise that days of inner and of outer
1 Blue Book, Nos. 111, 120, 121, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138,
139. Orange Book, Nos. 69, 71, 73.
2 [Der Worte sind genug gewechselt,
Nun lasst uns endlich Taten sehen. — Faust.]
3 White Book, Exhibits 20 and 22.
THE CRIME 181
struggle had to pass before the resolution to act came
to fruition. The inner struggles are reflected, easily
recognisable by the psychologist, in the telegrams which
were sent by the Emperor between July 28th and
August lst to the Tsar and the King of England. 1
At the outset the Emperor recognises the difficulties
for the Tsar and his Government of " stemming the tide
of public opinion in Russia." On the other hand, he
défends the action taken by Austria against Serbia, and
promises to use ail his influence in bringing about a
direct understanding between Austria and Russia. As
the exchange of telegrams advances we see more and
more the original subject of negotiation — the substantial
différence between Austria and Russia — disappear, and
the formai question of the menace involved in military
préparations takes its place. In the telegram sent by
the Emperor on the afternoon of July 29th there can be
heard the first ominous notes of the menace of military
préparations. 2 Références to this question constantly
1 White Book, pp. 412, 413, pp. 431, 432; Collected Docu-
ments, pp. 539, 540.
2 It is surprising that in the German White Book there
is no answer from the Tsar to this telegram. The White
Book inserts immediately after the Emperor William 's
telegram of July 29th (Exhibit 22), a further telegram
of the Emperor of July 30th (Exhibit 23). This gap has
now been filled by an officiai publication of the Russian
Government. The Tsar, in fact, answered on July 29th, in
reply to the Emperor's telegram of the same day, in the
folio wing words : — " Thanks for your telegram which is
conciliatory and friendly whereas the officiai message pre-
sented to-day by your ambassador to my Minister was con-
veyed in a very différent tone. I beg y ou to explain this
divergency. It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian
problem to the Hague tribunal, I trust in your wisdom and
friendship." This telegram of the Tsar was omitted by the
German Government, obviously because it contains the sim-
plest and most natural proposai in the world — already made
182 J\ACCUSE
increase until in the end the only subject of discussion is
that of military préparations. On July 30th ail discus-
sion of the substantial issue had already completely
ceased, and everything turned on the question as to
which of the three Emperors had been compelled to mobi-
lisation by the others. On July 30th the Emperor Wil-
liam maintains that Austria had only mobilised against
Serbia — in opposition to the Chancellor, who admits
that there had also been a mobilisation against Russia.
The Emperor Nicholas, on the other hand, maintains
that the partial mobilisation of Russia which took place
on July 29th was only decided upon " for the reason
of defence against the préparations of Austria." He
promises to send " Tatisheff with instructions to-night
to Berlin." 1 In his telegram of July 31 st the Tsar
announces that the discontinuance of military prepara-
by Serbia in her reply — namely, that the question at issue
should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. The excuse
put forward by the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, that
the telegram had been omitted on account of its unimportance,
is adapted to the présent intellectual level of the German
newspaper reader. It was omitted because, along with many
other things, it was of décisive importance for the formation
of a judgment on the attitude of the Tsar. The acceptance
of the Tsar's proposai would doubtless hâve led to peace, and
for this reason it was declined. As, however, it was impossible
to give reasons for this refusai, the Emperor William was
induced simply to ignore the Tsar's proposai, and to put
forward in place of the Austro-Serbian problem the question of
military préparation by means of which war could be brought
about at will. The German Government is led by evil conscience
to omit from the White Book the Tsar's telegram of July 29th.
The telegram itself and its suppression afïords a new proof that
Russia desired peace, but that Germany desired war.
1 What happened to this mission of Tatishefî ? Did he
arrive in Berlin ? What message did he bring ? Why did
Berlin not delay her ultimatum until the arrivai of the spécial
envoy of the Tsar, who could not arrive at the earliest until
August lst ? Thèse, among other questions, will suggest
themselves to the reader.
THE CRIME 183
?>
tions " made necessary by the Austrian mobilisation
was " technically impossible," but he gives his solemn
word that no provocative action will be taken so long
as negotiations continue. The Emperor William again
demands unconditional discontinuance of the military
préparations of Russia, whereupon the Tsar submits
that he may take the same measures without war neces-
sarily following. The Emperor William, however,
mobilises, and déclares war.
This rapid development of events can only be
explained by the fact that there must hâve taken place in
the authoritative circles in Berlin a change of front
leading from the oscillation which characterised the
earlier days to a firm resolution to embark on war. In
ail probability this change of front took place on the
evening of July 29th, on the occasion of the interview
which the Chancellor had with the Emperor in Potsdam.
The influences which drove the still-hesitating Emperor
to résolve on war cannot be proved, but it is possible
to guess at them. People who are in a position to know
say that those occupying the leading military positions,
supported by the Crown Prince and his retainers,
threatened the Emperor with their résignation en bloc
if war were not resolved on. 1
1 We hâve less difficulty in understanding thèse events in
Berlin when we bear in mind an observation which Count
Pourtalès made, in passing, to Sazonof : measures of mobilisa-
tion were, he said, highly danger ous nowadays, " for in that
event the purely military considération of the question by the
gênerai staffs would find expression, and if that button were
once touched in Germany the situation would get out of con-
trol." The German Government takes very good care not to
include in its White Book this self -confession, which throws a
very characteristic light on the occurrences in Berlin in the
last day before the outbreak of war. The Austrian Govern-
ment, however, with less prudence reports the observation of
Pourtalès in No. 28 of the Red Book.
184 «T ACCUSE
What is certain is that the Chancellor on the same
evening, after his return to Berlin, summoned Sir
Edward Goschen, the English Ambassador, and fer-
vently submitted to him a proposai that England in
the event of a European conflict should under certain
conditions remain neutral. 1 The conditions which Herr
von Bethmann offered were as folio ws : —
(1) Germany in the event of a victorious war would
aim at no territorial acquisitions in Europe at the
expense of France. The Chancellor said he was unable
to give a similar assurance with regard to the French
Colonies.
(2) The neutrality of Holland would be respected
by Germany so long as it was respected by Germany 's
adversaries.
(3) With référence to Belgium it would dépend on
the action of France what opérations Germany might
be forced to undertake against Belgium, but in any
case, when the war was over, Belgium 's integrity would
be respected if she had not sided against Germany.
This proposai for neutrality made on July 29th is
in the highest degree surprising, and is very illumin-
ating.
What so far had happened, we may ask, to awake
in Herr von Bethmann this urgent fear of a Euro-
pean war? Austria had opened hostilities against
Serbia, and had partially mobilised against Russia.
Russia had thereupon answered with a mobilisation
of four southern army districts. At that time there
was absolutely no question of a mobilisation against
Germany. The White Book itself only dates this
from July 31 st. Ail the diplomatie forces of Europe
— at any rate, with the exception of Germany and
Austria — were active in endeavouring to relieve the
1 Biue Book, No 85.
THE CRIME 185
tension between Austria and Russia. The proposai of
the conférence of the four Powers was still hanging
in the air. Grey's formula of agreement had just been
proposed to Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador.
Russia was then, as she had been previously, ready to
treat directly with Austria, and was waiting to begin
negotiations. France was supporting in the most ener-
getic manner the efforts for peace made by Grey and
Sazonof. In short, ail forces were labouring at the
task of maint aining peace, and it only required that
Germany should energetically intervene to move Austria
to adopt the conciliatory attitude demanded by the
European situation, and peace would hâve been
assured. And in such a moment as this, when every-
thing depended on the peaceful intentions of Germany
alone, the Chancellor was thinking merely of how best
to make his position secure in the event of war! There
is only one explanation for this bid for neutrality made
at this juncture. The Chancellor regarded peace as in
danger, and could not do otherwise than regard it as
in danger, because he knew, as the other Govern-
ments could not then know, that war had been decided
on in Berlin. The war was bound to corne, since this
was the wish of Germany. And since it was bound to
corne, only one thing gave Herr von Bethmann cause for
anxiety, the task, namely, of fashioning the chances of
war as favourably as possible for Germany, and of
excluding England for the présent from the ranks of
her enemies, in order to be in a more secure position
to defeat her on the next favourable opportunity. The
" policy of the free hand on the Continent," which the
Chancellor had unsuccessfully pursued with regard to
En<r!and in 1912 forms the basis of the bid for neutrality
of July 29th, 1914.
The English answer was as négative in its nature as
186 T ACCUSE
that given two years previously. The significant
importance of Bethmann's overtures were at once
realised in London. In return for the prospect of a
future agreement of neutrality with Germany, vaguely
held out, the English Government refused to allow itself
to be eliminated for the présent from European politics
and to be obliged to stand aside an inactive spectator
while France was crushed or Belgian neutrality violated.
In the opinion of Grey (and it must be admitted that
in this he is right) such a bargain would be bound to
break the friendly relations existing between England
and France, would be inconsistent with the duty of
protecting Belgium imposed on every signatory of the
guarantee of neutrality of 1839, and would imperil, not
merely the interests, but also the good name of
England. Grey instructed his Ambassador to add most
earnestly to this refusai of the German proposai that
the one way of maintaining the good relations between
England and Germany was that they should continue to
work together to préserve the peace of Europe; if this
were successful, the relations between the two countries
would be, ipso facto, improved and strengthened. The
English Government in any case was ready to work
in that way with ail sincerity and goodwill. It is impos-
sible to omit référence to the concluding paragraph in
Grey 's instructions to his Ambassador, a passage which
must be regarded as of the deepest significance in
arriving at a judgment with regard to the attitude of
England and Germany in this struggle. The Ambassa-
dor was to communicate with the Chancellor in the
following sensé : —
" If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and
the présent crisis safely passed, my own endeavour
will be to promote some arrangement to which
Germany coula be a party, by which she could be
THE CRIME 187
assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would
be pursued against her or her allies by France,
Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I hâve
desired this and worked for it, as far as I could,
through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany
having a corresponding object, our relations
sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too
Utopian to form the subject of definite proposais,
but if this présent crisis, so much more acute than
any that Europe has gone through for générations,
be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and
reaction which will follow may make possible some
more definite rapprochement between the Powers
than has been possible hitherto." 1
The significance of this déclaration of Grey is obvious.
It contains a moving appeal to common action in the
cause of peace, such as had been maint ained throughout
the Balkan crisis to the advantage of the world and of
the two countries, who in pursuing the same high aim
had without compulsion approached each other and
become more intimately connected. The vision of the
future outlined by the English Minister nevertheless
went far beyond anything attained in the past ; an agree-
ment was to be concluded, with the participation of
Germany, which would afford Germany and her allies
formai guarantees against any aggressive or even hostile
policy on the part of the Entente Powers — in other
words, a Treaty which would guarantee the peace of
Europe, which would draw together the Triple Entente
and the Triple Alliance, and would hâve substituted for
the dangerous System of the balance of power a gênerai
alliance of peace.
How did the Chancellor receive this proposai ? When
Goschen had read to him Grey 's words in the form of a
1 Blue Book, No. 101.
188 J'ACCUSE
mémorandum he received the communication " without
comment," and only expressed a désire to receive a
copy in order that he might reflect upon the matter at
leisure. The copy was handed to him. No answer has
ever been given. 1
What would Europe hâve looked like to-day if Herr
von Bethmann had concurred in Grey's proposai ? It
is superfluous, and indeed too painful, to allow our
imagination to conjure up such a picture to-day. Every-
thing that Germany is supposed to be struggling to
achieve in this war — the security of her existence, free-
dom for her development, unhampered progress in
culture and wellbeing — ail thèse things were magnani-
mously offered. In reality thèse possessions had never
been in danger, but Grey's offer destroyed every possi-
bility of believing that they were in danger and every
pretext for persuading others to this belief . The alliance
of peace proposed by Grey was merely a first step out
of the atmosphère of enmity, distrust, and tension
towards that of friendship, confidence, and composure.
This first step would certainly hâve led to other
advances. The feeling of confidence thus revived and
strengthened would hâve rendered it possible to diminish
the costly precautionary measures, which are based
merely on uni versai and mutual distrust. Agreements on
the subject of the cessation and graduai diminution of
armaments would hâve become possible on the basis
of an agreement of friendship. In short, the way was
opened to a new and a better Europe, if Germany had
but grasped the hand offered by England.
But Herr von Bethmann thought otherwise. Having
placed the mémorandum in a pigeon-hole, he quietly
chuckled to himself at the stupidity of the Englishman
who, with his insular restricted vision, still believed in
1 Blue Book, No. 109.
/
rti
THE CRIME 189
the peaceful intentions of Germany. We hâve over again
the same performance as in 1912. England desires the
peace of Europe; Germany, however, desires the
neutrality of England, in order to be able to disturb this
peace at her own sweet will. And this same Chan-
cellor, who knows this and innumerable other similar
occurrences of an earlier and of a later date, dares to
burden the English Government with the " inner
responsibility for the European war"! We shall see
later that in making this statement he cornes into
violent conflict, not merely with facts, but also with his
own officiai publications. For the présent inquiry it is
sufficient to make it clear that the resolution to go to
war had already been taken in Berlin on the evening
of July 29th. Only on this assumption is it possible
to explain Bethmann's bid for English neutrality and his
failure to take any notice of Grey's proposai.
On the same day on which Herr von Bethmann re-
ceived without comment Grey's proposai for a perma-
nent European state of peace, the "threatening danger of
war " was proclaimed in Germany, arid the Ambassadors
in Petrograd and Paris were instructed to deliver ulti-
mata to the Governments to which they were accredited.
From Russia it was demanded that she should " stop
every measure of war against us and against Austria-
Hungary within twelve hours, and notify us definitely
to this effect." From France a déclaration was required
within eighteen hours " whether she would remain
neutral in the event of a Russo-German war." The
ultimatum was delivered in Petrograd about midnight;
that in Paris about 7 o'clock in the evening.
When the news of thèse ultimata became known in
and outside Germany, the report was at first generally
disbelieved, since no one could adduce any ground for
such drastic action at that précise moment. The diplo-
190 J'ACCUSE
matists were even more astonished than the public.
What, then, could hâve taken place to drive Germany
to this extrême step, which without doubt would inevit-
ably lead to war ? Was it not just on July 31st that the
diplomatie negotiation between the Powers had appa-
rently reached so favourable a point that the whole
world once more began to entertain hope, and looked
forward to a peaceful settlement at an early date ? On
July 30th Count Berchtold had expressed in the most
friendly tone to the Russian Ambassador, Schebeko, his
willingness to agrée to a resumption in Petrograd of the
negotiations which had for some time been discontinued
between Austria and Russia. 1 Thèse negotiations had,
in fact, begun on July 31 st between Sazonof and the
Austrian Ambassador, Szâpâry, and this time they
promised a greater measure of success than on any
previous occasion, since Austria for the first time had
professed her readiness to submit for discussion the
contents of the Note addressed to Serbia. Sazonof him-
self, in a communication addressed to London, expressed
the hope that a peaceful issue out of the crisis might
y et be found. The French and the English Governments
were agreeably surprised at the final change in the
attitude of Austria, and Grey expressed the hope that it
"may lead to a satisfactory resuit." 2 In Grey 's
despatch to Goschen it is possible to trace in every word
the sincère satisfaction which he felt in conséquence of
the new turn of e vents. He at once redoubled his efforts
to shorten the pains of childbirth, and to bring speedily
into the world a healthy child of peace. Austria was to
receive M jull satisfaction of her demands on Serbia," ail
Powers were at once to suspend further military prepara-
1 Yellow Book, No. 104. Blue Book, No. 96.
2 Blue Book, No. 111. Orange Book, Nos. 66, 69, 73
Yellow Book, Nos. 114, 120.
THE^CRIME 191
tions, Germany and Austria had only to make " any
reasonable proposai," and he would support it. If, how-
ever, Russia and France would not accept such a reason-
able proposai, the British Government would hâve
nothing more to do with the conséquences. Sazonof
at once outlined a formula of agreement which went
further to meet Austria than that first formulated. 1 He
proposed a discussion in London, under the participa-
tion of the Powers, in which he represented a cessation
of Austrian opérations in Serbia, not as a condition, but
merely as " very important." 2 Everywhere there was
activity, hope, and the zeal to save. Then suddenly
the German ultimata exploded like a bombshell, and at
a stroke ail hopes were annihilated.
What induced Germany to take this step? Professedly
it was due to the Russian mobilisation. What are the
facts bearing on this point ? I hâve already pointed out
that the Russian mobilisation was merely the consé-
quence of two facts; firstly, the Austrian mobilisation
which had preceded it, and secondly, the more than equi-
vocal attitude assumed by Germany and Austria
throughout the crisis.
Both grounds were completely sound, as I believe that
I hâve proved. The Russian mobilisations were in no
way kept secret; they were carried out with complète
publicity, the partial mobilisation in the four southern
Government al districts on July 29th, the gênerai mobi-
lisation on the morning of July 31st. 3 The Austrian
partial mobilisation had already taken place before the
déclaration of war against Serbia, that is to say before
July 28th. The gênerai mobilisation was ordered at the
1 Orange Book, No. 67. Blue Book, No. 120. Yellow
Book, Nos. 113, 120.
2 Yellow Book, No. 120. Blue Book, No. 133
8 White Book, p. 409, 412.
192 J'ACCUSE
latest at 1 o'clock on the morning of July 31st;
indeed, according to the report of the Russian
Ambassador at Vienna, it took place as early as July
28th. 1 The Russian partial mobilisation was officially
communicated to Berlin on July 29th, and the gênerai
mobilisation was publicly proclaimed in Petrograd on
July 31st.
The story of the false Russian words of honour is
itself a falsehood. According to the account given in the
German White Book, no fewer than two Russian gentle-
men are assumed to hâve broken their word of honour,
the Russian Minister of War and the Chief of the General
Staff. In addition to thèse, it is known that the Russian
Emperor, the " most sincère and devoted friend and
cousin" of the Emperor William, also broke his word
(" betrayed Germany's confidence," as it is expressed in
the officiai English édition of the German White Book).
Thèse insinuations of broken words constitute, along
with many other features, a pleasant method of distin-
guishing between the German publication and those of
other countries. This also provides for people abroad a
" culture-barometer " indicating a position which is in
no way specially favourable for Germany.
But if only the assertions were at least true ! They
are, however, untrue. The Russian Minister of War
declared on July 27th to the German Military Attaché
that no order to mobilise had as yet been issued, but
that preparatory measures only were being taken ; if
Austria were to cross the Serbian frontier the four
military districts directed towards Austria would be
mobilised, but not those on the German frontier, since
"peace with Germany was desired very much." 2 This
communication of the Minister for War was in full
1 Yellow Book, No. 115 Orange Book, Nos. 47, 49.
2 White Book, Exhibit 11.
THE CRIME 193
accordance with the truth. The alleged " déclaration
of the state of war" in Kovno referred to in the
telegram from the Impérial Consulate on July 27th, J
is not the same as mobilisation. This should
be known in Germany at least, since we also
expressly distinguish between a "state of war" and
"mobilisation."
The mobilisation of Kieff and Odessa, which is pre-
sumed to hâve taken place on July 26th, is reported by
the German military attaché only in a very vague form,
and cannot therefore be regarded as established. The
militarv attaché " deems it certain that mobilisation has
been ordered " in the two districts. 2 His assumption
may, however, be false, and may be based on the
receipt of erroneous information, not an improbable
occurrence in view of the great distance between thèse
two districts and Petrograd. Nevertheless, it is possible
(and indeed it would hâve been more than reasonable)
that Russia on July 26th, that is to say, on the day
after the rupture of diplomatie relations between Austria
and Serbia, should hâve made préparations for mobilisa-
tion. The Minister for War expressly acknowledges
this. It is thus as audacious as it is unjust to reproach
the Russian Minister of War with a breach of his word
of honour on the ground of such évidence.
The second guilty person is the Chief of the General
Staff, and the accuser is again the military attaché. In
this case the conversation took place on July 29th, and
the statement made by the Chief of the General Staff
is reported to hâve been to the effect that " everything
had remained as the Secretary had informed me two
days ago," that nowhere had there been mobilisation.
For this he gave his word of honour in the most solemn
1 White Book, Exhibit 8.
2 White Book, Exhibit 7.
o
194 J'ACCUSE
manner, but he " could not assume a guarantee for the
future." 1
The Chief of the General Staff did not say this, and
cannot hâve said this, for on the same day, July 29th,
the Russian Government officially informed Berlin that
they had mobilised four army districts, It will be seen
how much love of truth is involved in the composi-
tion of the German White Book. On the same page,
page 10, 2 there is printed, at the top the officiai com-
munication of the mobilisation, and below the officiai
déniai. What purpose is the Chief of the General Staff
supposed to hâve had in view when he uttered this lie,
seeing that at the same moment the Russian Ambassa-
dor was informing Berlin of the truth? What, on the
other hand, must we think of a Government which in a
matter of life and death manifests such levity in the
compilation of officiai documents ?
What the Chief of the General Staff really said is
indeed quite clear. He confirmed the mobilisation
against Austria, and denied that against Germany.
This agrées with the officiai communication made in
Berlin, and also with a report despatched on July 30th
by Paléologue, the French Ambassador. 3 The military
attaché had either failed to understand the Chief of the
General Staff, or else he intentionally reported what was
not true.
Notwithstanding a diligent study of the évidence it is
not clear to me in what point the Russian Emperor is
supposed to hâve lied. The whole of thèse questions of
mobilisation and of mutual récrimination stand for the
1 White Book, p. 410.
2 [Pages 409 and 410 in the collected English correspondence.]
3 Yellow Book, No. 102 : " gave him his word of honour
that the mobilisation ordered this morning was exclusively
directed against Austria."
THE CRIME 195
most part on such an uncertain foundation that it is
hazardous to utter censorious judgments in this matter.
The Emperor William, for example, telegraphs on July
30th to the Tsar : " Austria has mobilised only against
Serbia." In opposition to this, the Impérial Chancellor
admits in his speech of August 4th that Austria had
also mobilised against Russia. It is impossible to
ascertain the truth with regard to this or that mobilisa-
tion, since measures of mobilisation are différent in
différent countries, and, since further, even without an
officiai mobilisation it is possible to carry out a secret
mobilisation. In French reports, for example, it is
maintained, and the assertion is supported by facts,
that Germany had begun to mobilise as far back as the
recall of the Austrian Ambassador from Belgrade. 1 The
proclamation of the "danger of war" is a German
speciality, which, as a matter of fact, conceals the most
serious measures of mobilisation.
Where and when, however, is the Russian Emperor
supposed to hâve lied on the subject of his mobilisa-
tion? In his telegram of July 30th he acknowledges
"the military measures now taking form," which were
being carried out "for the reason of defence against
the préparations of Austria." In his telegram of July
31 st he déclares that a discontinuance of his military
préparations was "technically impossible" — an expres-
sion which it is remarkable to note occurs in almost the
same words in the telegram of the Emperor William to
the King of England on August lst : " For technical
reasons the mobilisation which I hâve already ordered
this afternoon on two fronts — east and west — must
proceed according to the arrangement made." In his
last telegram of August lst the Tsar in no way dénies
the mobilisation on the German frontier, with which
1 Blue Book, No. 105 (Enclosure 3).
o 2
196 J'ACCUSE
he is reproached by the German Emperor, but, on the
contrary, he leaves it open to the latter to mobilise also,
asking only that the Emperor should give the same
guarantee as he himself had given, namely, that
" thèse measures do not mean war," and that both
rulers should continue to negotiate in the interests of
peace.
I do not find anything in thèse telegrams which can
even in the slightest degree throw doubt on the honour
of the Russian Emperor. On the contrary, I see in
the whole exchange of telegrams — above ail, in the sup-
pressed telegram of July 29th — the most honourable
inclination to peace on the part of the Tsar, as con-
trasted with the ultimatum-policy of Germany which,
in spite of ail the German Emperor 's peaceful assur-
ances, was necessarily bound to lead to war.
The conclusion at which I arrive is, then, that the
Russian mobilisation was justified, since it was occa-
sioned by the Austrian mobilisation. It was not kept
secret, but was officially communicated to foreign coun-
tries, and was publicly proclaimed within the country.
There is no manner of proof for the assertion that it
was aggressive in character. With as much reason, and
indeed with more reason, an aggressive character could
be ascribed to the previous Austrian mobilisation and
the German mobilisation concealed under the name of
the " State of War." The attitude of the various
Governments up to the moment of mobilisation, and
their subséquent behaviour, can alone show thèse mili-
tary acts in their true character. From this point of
view the Austro-German mobilisations which were in
full swing even before the proclamation of the " state
of war," hâve a much more aggressive character than
the Russian, because the Austro-German mobilisation
served an aggressive policy, whereas the policy which
THE CRIME 197
called forth the Russian mobilisation was défensive in
its nature.
The aggressive character of the German attitude is
in particular confirmed by certain events which took
place on the western frontier against France, before the
despatch of the two ultimata. As early as July 30th
German troops were concentrated at Thionville and
Metz. Garrison troops from Metz were pushed up to
the frontier, reinforced by troops from Trêves and
Cologne. The frontier-defences were strengthened and
fortified. From July 25th railway stations were occu-
pied by the military classes of the reserve (1903-1911)
recalled by individual summons, roads on the frontier
were barricaded, and the circulation of motor-cars for-
bidden. Most important of ail, as early as July 29th
German patrols had in two instances penetrated into
French territory. The French Government had officially
announced that, in order to avoid collisions on the
frontier, a zone of territory extending to 10 kilomètres
would be left unoccupied. The German Government
did not issue a similar déclaration, but pushed forward
their advance-posts to the French frontier. We shall
later hâve occasion to notice other occurrences, even
more provocative, which took place between the lst and
3rd of August.
From the political and military events previous to
the despatch of the ultimata one thing émerges with
certainty, namely, that the Franco-Russian military
préparations furnished no support for the view that
aggressive intentions existed on the part of thèse States,
and that if aggressive intentions existed anywhere it
can only hâve been on the side of Germany.
What right, then, had Germany to demand that
Russia should démobilise? This demand was in itself
unjustified, and, when addressed to a Great State, was
198 J'ACCUSE
a departure from the conventions usually governing
international relations ; the situation was, however,
rendered more difficult by the conditions imposed by
Germany, specifying the manner in which it was to be
carried out. The discontinuance of Russia 's military
measures was to take place : —
(a) Within twelve hours, and
(b) not only against Germany, but also against
Austria.
The first request was " technically impossible," since
a great State covering an enormous superficial area
cannot within twelve hours put a stop to measures
of mobilisation which hâve been initiated (see the tele-
grams of the Emperor Nicholas of July 31 st, and that
of the Emperor William to the King of England of
August lst).
The second demand, however, that démobilisation
should take place against Austria as well, was so mon-
strous that one is almost tempted to doubt the sanity
of the people who dared to propose it. Was Russia
really expected to cancel her mobilisation against
Austria, while Austria herself had been partially
mobilised for over eight days, and had been completely
mobilised against Russia and against Serbia since
the early morning of July 31st, perhaps even from
July 28th ? Could Russia be expected to lay down her
arms before Austria ? This suggestion is ail the more
remarkable inasmuch as Austria herself had no idea of
addressmg such a demand to Russia, Jaut, on the con-
trary, she renewed negotiations with Russia on July
31 st, the same day on which both States carried out a
gênerai mobilisation.
Germany thus was " more Austrian than the
Austrians." Speaking generally, what right had she
to make demands on behalf of Austria? Did she inter-
THE CRIME 199
vene as Austria 's guardian, was she clothed with the
powers of a plenipotentiary, or on what other légal
title did she rely ? In any case, the situation which
arose from this arrogant tutelage was — I can find no
other word for it — an abortion of madness. Austria
found nothing to astonish or inconvenience her in
carrying on negotiations with Russia under arms. And,
as a matter of fact, it was not the first time that nego-
tiations had taken place between the two countries
under thèse circumstances. During the Balkan crisis
both Powers had remained mobilised for months at a
time, and nevertheless negotiations had been success-
fully carried on. Germany, however, whose interests
were not involved in the présent negotiations, who
participated in the whole dispute merely as the ally of
Austria, believed it to be her duty to afford more
protection to Austria than Austria herself considered
that she required, and she demanded from Russia a
démobilisation to which the Double Monarchy attached
no importance whatever.
The complète madness of the whole situation may be
gathered from the folio wing hypothesis. If Russia —
as, indeed, theoretically might hâve happened — had
agreed to démobilise so far as Germany was concerned,
but had declined to do so with regard to Austria — what
would hâve been the position ? The German ultimatum
would then hâve been partially complied with and par-
tially declined, and Germany would hâve declared war
against Russia because Russia had not demobilised
against Austria. But Austria had in no way asked her
to démobilise !
We see by what kind of men Germany is governed.
How long will the people still submit to this condition
of affairs ?
But to go further. Is then mobilisation in itself a
200 J'ACCUSE
hostile or a threatening act against which a neighbour-
ing country is justified in taking action by means of an
ultimatum ? In no way. Mobilisation in itself is
nothing else than the process by which the military
forces of a country are prepared against the contin-
gency of a conflict arising with another country. It is
a measure of security and foresight, which can only
assume a threatening character by simultaneous or
antécédent political measures taken by the Power
mobilising. What political measures had Russia taken
which could attach to her mobilisation the suspicion of
aggressive intentions ? None. The aggression, the
gênerai initiative to the whole conflict had issued from
Austria, with the approval and support of Germany.
Russia was politically acting on the défensive when she
gave expression to her legitimate interests in the
Balkans. She was bound to support this political défen-
sive by military measures of security, since the aggres-
sor also had made military préparations.
This is the situation viewed from the abstract stand-
point of international law. In the concrète case before
us we hâve seen that Russia up to and even beyond
the day of her gênerai mobilisation had, in union with
England and France, done everything to maint ain
peace, whereas Austria and Germany had done every-
thing to disturb it. Thus the concrète circumstances
of the case also prove that the Russian mobilisation —
which in theory was no menace to Germany — could also
in this practical case contain no such menace. To this
must be added that Russia, as we hâve already seen,
had no recognisable interest in attacking Germany or
Austria. Her interest was exclusively confined to
guarding herself against being checkmated by Austria
in the Balkans; the question was one of defence, not
défiance.
THE CRIME 201
That mobilisation in itself is in no way a hostile act
can be proved even from the testimony of an Austrian
witness. Count Forgach, the Austrian Foreign Under-
Secretary, declared, on July 31st, to de Bunsen, the
English Ambassador, that "mobilisation was not to be
regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side." 1
Nevertheless, it suited Germany to represent the
Russian mobilisation as a menace, and, indeed, as a
menace against Austria and Germany alike. What was
announced as the conséquence which would fall upon
Russia if she did not comply with the demands con-
tained in the ultimatum ? Mobilisation in Germany
was also to take place. In the telegram sent by the
Chancellor to Count Pourtalès on July 31 st we read :
u On account of thèse Russian measures we hâve been
forced, for the safety of the country, to proclaim the
'threatening state of war,' which does not yet imply
mobilisation. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow
if Russia does not," 2 &c, &c. Up to this point the
matter is still quite logical if it is admitted that the
despatch of the ultimatum was justifiable or necessary
(which is, however, an erroneous assumption).
If this is madness, there is, at any rate, method in
it. Germany says to Russia : " You hâve mobilised ;
if you do not draw back, I will mobilise also." This
is, indeed, the course which the Tsar advised the
Emperor William to adopt : that there should be mobi-
lisation on both sides, but without war or intention to
make war, and that negotiations with the view of arriv-
ing at a peaceful understanding should go quietly
forward. That such a course is possible requires no
proof . That it has happened countless times is a histori-
cal fact. What reason was there for supposing that it
1 Blue Book, No.118.
2 White Book, Exhibit 24
202 J'ACCUSE
could not happen on this occasion ? Indeed, there were
now stronger reasons than ever before, since greater
interests were at stake, and greater composure and pru-
dence was therefore required on the part of ail con-
cerned. If Germany had remained content with the
mobilisation which she threatened, and had given full
scope to the apparently hopeful negotiations taking
place in Vienna and Petrograd, if she had only waited
for a day or two — mobilised like the others — it is certain
that Europe would hâve been preserved from the
gravest of ail catastrophes. As de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador, states in his report to the English Govern-
ment 1 : "A few day s' delay might in ail probability
hâve saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities
in history."
The mobilisation of Germany would indeed hâve
given a new impulse to the negotiations; for everyone
feared us. Up till then there was no one who had seen
us in arms ; no one would hâve dared to quarrel with
a Germany ready for battle.
The fact that it is possible to be mobilised and that
negotiations may nevertheless be carried on without
war resulting is confirmed, quite apart from countless
historical incidents, by the e vents which took place in
the beginning of August, 1914. Germany and France
mobilised on the afternoon of August lst; notwith-
standing this, the Emperor William and the Chancellor
in their telegrams to London on August lst expressed
their readiness to delay crossing the French frontier
until 7 o'clock in the evening of August 3rd. 2 As a
matter of fact, war was only then declared against
France ; the two countries were thus mobilised for three
days without being at war with each other.
1 White Book, No. 161
2 Collected Diplomatie Correspondence, p. 540
THE CRIME 203
A much more striking and even humorous example
of this kind is presented by the relations between
Austria and Russia. Thèse, the two leading parties in
the quarrel, had been mobilised since July 31st, and
war did not break out between them until August 6th,
when the state of peace was ended by the déclaration
made by Austria. For days after the outbreak of the
war between Russia and Germany the Austrian and
Russian Ambassadors remained quietly in the capital
of their enemies, and, who knows, may even hâve con-
tinued negotiations. In any case the mobilised condi-
tion of their armies did not disturb them in the enjoy-
ment of the comforts of peace. Surely nothing equally
insane — I can again find no other expression which is
applicable, and there is no reason why I should refrain
from calling a spade a spade — has ever occurred in
diplomatie history. The two chief duellists hâve not
yet crossed swords, but the second of one party has
already attacked the other. If in the six days between
the lst and the 6th of August Austria and Russia had
after ail succeeded in arriving at an agreement — a con-
summation which at the time was still hoped for by the
whole of Europe, and which could easily hâve been
realised but for the provocative intervention of Germany
— where in that case would hâve been the sensé of
Germany 's war against Russia ? It would hâve been a
sort of war in the air, a tilting against windmills in the
manner of Don Quixote, a war without any substantial
ground. I will again merely ask : How long will the
nation continue to tolerate such a Government ?
An answer to this peculiar ultimatum does not appear
to hâve been received from the Russian Government,
although a reply was received personally from the Tsar
in the telegram despatched by him about noon on
August lst, and received in Berlin about 2 o'clock in
204 J'ACCUSE
the afternoon. 1 This is the telegram quoted above, in
which the Tsar states that he regards the German
counter-mobilisation as reasonable, but expresses anew
the désire and the hope that it will not lead to war, but
that " with the aid of God it must be possible to our
long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood."
Three hours later the déclaration of war was handed
over in Petrograd by the German Ambassador, Count
Pourtalès.
Never in the history of the world has a greater crime
than this been committed. Never has a crime after
its commission been denied with greater effrontery and
hypocrisy.
"The Russian Government destroyed through its
mobilisation, menacing the security of our country, the
laborious action at médiation of the European Cabinets,
just as it was on the point of succeeding. The Russian
mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which the
Russian Government was never allowed by us to enter-
tain a doubt, in connection with its continued déniai,
shows clearly that Russia wanted war " (see the German
White Book, page 412).
Nothing of this is true:
The Russian Government did not menace the security
of the German Empire by its mobilisation.
It did not destroy the action at médiation of the
European Cabinets just as it was on the point of suc-
ceeding.
It did not deny its measures of mobilisation.
It did not want war.
Everything that is hère flung as a reproach at the
Russian Government was, in fact, committed by
Germany.
1 White Book, p. 413
THE CRIME 205
Germany wanted war, and brought it about by her
ultimatum and by her déclaration of war.
This déclaration of war is a Cabinet paper in a class
by itself, both in substance and in style. We hâve
already considered the view that must be taken of the
"part of mediator " played by Germany, and of "the
grave and imminent danger " threatened from the side
of Russia. The contents of the document would not
merit any spécial discussion, if it were not necessary to
emphasise a point which is as yet completely unknown
in Germany. Germany — it is incredible, but true ! —
delivered the déclaration of war with an alternative
teoct in the passage of most importance, leaving it to
Russia, so to speak, to choose which she preferred, and
thus acknowledging that she herself did not know why
she declared war against Russia. In the German White
Book the words in question run : " Russia having
refused to comply with this demand, and having shown
by this refusai," &c. On the other hand, in the déclara-
tion of war as delivered in Petrograd the words run :
"Russia having refused to comply with (not having
considered it necessary to answer) this demand, and
having shown by this refusai (this attitude) that her
action," &c. You can see how they must hâve
sweated in the Wilhelmstrasse in the dog days to con-
coct a formula for the déclaration of war which would
sound fairly well. As it was not known whether Russia
would hâve to be reproached with a direct refusai or
only with having ignored the demands contained in the
ultimatum, as obviously no one knew very definitely
by what name they were to call the Gorgon child with
snakes for hair and breath of fire, whom they were
bringing into the world, they left it to the addressee
to whom the monster was despatched to make the
choice of his "name and description."
206 J'ACCUSE
Why was war declared against Russiaf According to
the words used in the déclaration of war, it was because
Russia had declined or ignored the demands contained
in the ultimatum. According to the mémorial contained
in the White Book it was because Russia had begun the
war against us. 1 This last point is particularly to be
noted because the assertion that Russia and France had
attacked us forms the basis on which has been con-
structed the flimsy édifice of German popular enthusi-
asm. " Gentlemen, we are now in a state of defence
(Notwehr)," exclaimed the Chancellor on August 4th,
"and necessity (Not) knows no law." It is not only
the war against our real opponents that is justified on
the grounds of necessity, but also the violation of the
neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium. " He who is
menaced as we are, and is fighting for his highest
possession, can only consider how he is to hack his way
through." 2
Menace and defence; thèse, then, are the watch-
words. It is indeed quite true that even the highway-
man is in a certain sensé menaced, and in a state of
defence, when he attacks a traveller and suddenly
becomes aware that other well-armed men are hurry-
ing to help the traveller who had looked so lonely. In
such a case the highwayman also is fighting a life and
death struggle for his freedom and his existence. In
this sensé Germany also was in a state of defence. She
would not, however, hâve found herself in such a
position of constraint if she had not herself begun
the attack. To get rid of this disagreeable fact and
to construe for the use of the people a real state of
defence other facts were adduced which were sup-
posed to fulfil this end, apart from the menace involved
1 White Book, p. 413.
2 Collected Documents, p 438
THE CRIME 207
in mobilisation — which it was realised was insufficient
to serve as a basis for this purpose.
It is asserted with regard to Russia and France alike
that they had begun the war, that they had " opened
hostilities." l
How did Russia begin the war? One single fact is
cited in the mémorandum. Russian troops had
" already in the afternoon of August lst " crossed our
frontier and " marched into German territory." Be it
observed; already on the afternoon of August lst. Is
there anything remarkable about this ? Did we not at
5 o'clock on the same afternoon hand over a déclara-
tion of war in Petrograd ? Was there not in conséquence
a state of war between Germany and Russia as from
5 o'clock in the afternoon ? Were not Russian troops,
therefore, perfectly entitled to cross our frontiers after
5 o'clock? If the Chancellor wished to construe an
attack which would hâve been in violation of inter-
national law he should at least hâve been sufficiently
astute to insert after the words "in the afternoon of
August lst " the further words " before 5 o'clock."
Only in such a case would it hâve been possible to
speak of an attack, and consequently of a state of
defence. If the frontier was crossed only after the
déclaration of war, it was no longer an attack, but a
natural and justifiable conséquence of the state of war
which we had brought about.
On this point also we can again dispose of the Chan-
cellor by means of his own mémorial. What he asserts,
even if it were true — which is still to be proved — in no
way supports the conclusions which he draws, and the
theory of defence collapses miserably like a house of
cards.
And in arriving at this conclusion I hâve left com-
1 White Book, p 413
208 J'ACCUSE
pletely aside the question whether it is in any way
possible from such collisions on the frontier to draw the
conclusion that attacks hâve been intentionally made by
the neighbouring State. Such inferences cannot, of
course, be drawn. When nations are opposed to each
other in arms, and, indeed, even in time of peace without
mobilisation when there is merely a state of tension
between neighbouring States, expérience shows that
crossings of the frontier, collisions between advance-
posts, and similar incidents constantly take place. Thèse
are occurrences which reasonable men view as they
deserve to be viewed, as unimportant incidents for which
neither of the States concerned can be held responsible.
The suprême military command is, in such a case, in
no way responsible, for incidents of this nature invari-
ably arise through the arbitrary action of subordinate
officers without — indeed in most cases contrary to — the
instructions of their superior officers. This is, indeed,
the first occasion in the history of war in which such a
frontier incident has been interpreted as an intentional
attack by a neighbouring State and the people hâve
been deluded into the idea that they are in a state
of defence. The most remarkable feature in the whole
business is, however, as we hâve said, that there was
not even an illegitimate passage of the frontier, if this
only took place after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of
August lst.
Equally threadbare are the assertions which are
advanced with the object of construing an attack from
the side of France.
The déclaration of war against France took place
on August 3rd at 6.45 p. m. The letter from Herr von
Schoen, containing the déclaration of war, bases it on
the folio wing grounds : " A certain number of flagrantly
hostile acts committed on German territory by French
THE CRIME 209
military aviators; several of thèse hâve openly violated
the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory
of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings
near Wesel ; others hâve been seen in the district of the
Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carls-
ruhe and Nuremburg." 1
French military aviators who had " openly " passed
over Belgium are thus in this case alleged to be the
guilty persons. In the case of France it was impossible
to suggest that the mobilisation amounted to a menace,
since the White Book itself is obliged to admit that
France mobilised at the same time as we did. 2 Since it
was then of no avail to assert hère, as in the case of
Russia, the existence of a menace, it was necessary for
the Government to restrict themselves, in the case of
France, to saying that Germany had actually been
attacked. According to the déclaration of war, the
actual attack was effected by military aviators, who
were further perceived to hâve crossed over Bel-
gium. How anyone can tell by looking at an
aviator who drops bombs on Wesel, Carlsruhe, or
Nuremburg that he came from Belgium remains a
secret locked in the breasts of the gentlemen in the
Wilhelmstrasse. It is, however, very interesting to
observe how Herr von Schoen's bomb-throwing aviators
are transformed by Herr von Below-Saleske into " diri-
gibles " (see the mémorandum of his interview on
August 3rd with the Belgian Foreign Office 3 ), and how
further in the Chancellor's speech of August 4th they
become u cavalry patrols and French infantry detach-
ments ' breaking into the territory of the Empire. 4
1 Yellow Book, No. 147
2 White Book, p. 413.
3 Grey Book, No. 21.
4 Collected Documents, p. 438.
210 «TACCUSE
What, we may ask, really took place? Did the
French merely send across aviators, as Herr von Schoen
mantains, or dirigibles as Herr von Below-Saleske says,
or companies and cavalry patrols as the Chancellor
asserts ? An English proverb which the Empress
Frederick was in the habit of quoting tells us that "A
liar should hâve a good memory." The German diplo-
matists lie, but unfortunately they hâve a bad mernory.
The contradiction between the statements of thèse three
gentlemen is sufficient to prove that ail thèse French
attacks are imaginary. It is, in fact, the Germans who
were the aggressors, not merely because they declared
war against France — which even if a crime was, at any
rate, within their rights under international law — but
also because they had violated French territory days
before the déclaration of war. This fact is proved, not
only by French assertions, the credibility of which
might be disputed, but also by German confessions,
which are of course unintentional. As early as July
30th and again on August 2nd the French Government
lodged complaints in Berlin with regard to quite
definite occurrences of this nature 1 : at Délie, near
Belfort, the French custom house was twice fired upon
by German soldiers; north of this town two patrols of
mounted Jâgers crossed the frontier and advanced as
far as the villages of Joncherey and Baron ; their ofïicer
shot a French soldier in the head, and his men carried
off some French horses. On the same day, August
2nd, German troops violated French territory at Ciry
and Longwy, and marched against Fort Longwy, &c.
Thèse are some of the French complaints. That there
must be some truth in ail this is clear from the Chan-
cellor 's speech of August 4th. Herr von Bethmann
expressly admits one of the French complaints (cross-
1 Yellow Book, Nos. 106, 136, 139.
THE CRIME 211
ing of the frontier by a patrol, and the occurrence of a
conflict) on the ground of the report of the German
General Staff. 1 One may reasonably suspect that other
violations of the frontier " against express orders," as
Herr von Bethmann puts it, also took place. This sus-
picion appears ail the more reasonable, and indeed
becomes a certainty, when we read the concluding
sentence of the telegram sent on August Ist by the
Emperor William to King George : " I hope that France
will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are at
this moment being kept back by telegraph and by
téléphone from crossing the French jrontier." 2, This
telegram proves two things : —
(1) that France on August lst had not yet become
nervous ;
(2) that the German troops on August lst, that is
to say two days before the déclaration of war, would
hâve crossed the French frontier, if they had not been
kept back by telegraph and by téléphone.
The fact that they were thus kept back was caused
by the negotiations which took place at the last hour
with England. Thus had it not been for thèse negotia-
tions German troops would hâve penetrated into France
en masse forty-eight hours before the déclaration of
war.
What then becomes of the assertion of the Chan-
cellor that France broke the peace, and that, in fact,
she attacked us ? The statement does not deserve
credence because of the triple contradiction between the
various statements constituting the charge, and in any
case it remains unproved. On the other hand, the
counter-assertion of France, that we were the aggressors
and the violators of the frontier, is crédible because it is
1 Collected Documents, p. 438.
2 Collected Documents, p. 510.
P 2
212 J'ACCUSE
in itself free from contradiction, because it spécifies in
the most detailed manner the time, the place, and the
circumstances of the cases cited, because the German
General Staff itself admits one of thèse frontier viola-
tions, and because the telegram of the Emperor admits
that even violations of the frontier en masse were con-
templated.
The French Government, on the other hand, hâve
strictly denied the charges brought against them, and,
above ail, by fixing the ten-kilometre zone they gave
proof of their sincère intention to avoid violations of
the frontier.
In my opinion the objective investigation of the facts
can lead only to the acquittai of France and to the
condemnation of Germany. And this view is strength-
ened if the previous course of diplomatie negotiations
and the attitude of the two parties is taken into con-
sidération. May we not assume that perhaps the
doctrine of Bernhardi was followed in the measures
taken by Germany, that the cards had to be so shufiled
that their opponents would be so provoked that a
déclaration of war was bound to corne from their side ?
May it not be assumed that it was hoped in this way to
achieve the double advantage of moving the odium
on to the shoulders of their opponents, and of bringing
the case under the terms of the alliance with Italy ?
One thing, at any rate, is certain : the assertion that
we were attacked by France, and were therefore in a
state of defence, is an invention fit to be placed along-
side of the corresponding assertion made with regard to
Russia. No one attacked us. No one placed us in a
state of defence. This war is but a pseudo-war of
libération,
What took place now, after the outbreak of war with
Russia and France, has no connection with the central
THE CRIME 2Ï3
question : " Who is responsible for the European war ? "
The European war was there, as soon as Germany and
Austria on the one side stood opposed to France and
Russia on the other. No one can become guilty of an
act after it is committed. Guilt can, however, be
increased in so far as the act committed may involve in
its train the commission of other acts. The more por-
tentous thèse further acts are, the greater and heavier
will be the load of guilt.
THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE
PARTICIPATION OF ENGLAND IN THE WAR.
After having presented to Belgium on the evening of
August 2nd an ultimatum in which a free passage
through this neutral country was demanded and after
receiving a refusai, Germany invaded Belgian territory
on the morning of August 4th.
The neutrality of Belgium was established by the
Treaty of London of 1839, and guaranteed for ail time
by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.
Article 7 of the Treaty of London provides that Belgium
shall be an independent and perpetually neutral State,
and that it shall maintain its neutrality against ail other
States. The first and most obvious duty of a neutral
State is to refuse to belligerent parties a right of passage
through its territory. This is one of the fundamental
principles of international law, and it has been again
formally confirmed, with the concurrence of ail the
Power s, by the Hague Conférence of 1907. Article 5
of the Hague Convention on the rights and duties of
neutral States prescribes that " A neutral State oufiht
not to allow on its territory any of the acts referred to
in Articles 2 to 4." Article 2 pro vides that u Belligerents
are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral
214 J'ACCUSE
Power troops or convoys, eithër of munitions of war or
of supplies." Lastly, Article 10 of the same Convention
déclares that the fact of a neutral Power repelling, even
by force, attacks on its neutrality cannot be regarded
as a hostile act,
This is the légal position. Herr von Bethmann seeks
to avoid the conséquences which flow from the légal
position by constructing in this case also the case of
Defence, which he has already advanced against France
and Russia.
I believe that I hâve proved that as against France
and Russia the state of defence did not arise, but that
it is merely a German invention. If this is correct, then
there can also hâve been no state of defence against
Belgium, for hère at least it is not asserted that Belgium
had attacked us by military aviators, infantry, and
cavalry. The state of defence against Belgium stands
and falls with the state of defence against the other
countries already mentioned, and is thus to be denied
on grounds of fact.
But even if Germany had in fact been in a state of
defence against France and Russia, the wrong done to
Belgium would not thereby hâve been diminished. The
state of defence (Notwehr) against enemies in war
would, it is true, in gênerai justify an act of defence
(Verteidigung), but under no circumstances would it
justify an act of defence involving injury to a third
party, that is to say, a breach of neutrality.
The criminal code defines a state of defence as " that
defence (Verteidigung) which is necessary to ward off
from oneself or from another an actual attack in viola-
tion of the law." A transgression of the limits thus
indicated can only claim immunity from punishment if
the actor " in consternation, alarm, or terror exceeded
the limits of defence (Verteidigung)." As this définition
THE CRIME 215
of the state of defence is the only one which we possess
in our laws, and as, moreover, it corresponds to ail
logical requirements, we may be permitted to apply the
principles so enunciated to the actions for which the
German Chancellor bears the responsibility. Thus even
if we assume that Germany was in a state of defence, it
was nevertheless open to her to take only such actions in
her defence as were unconditionally necessary, not, how-
ever, such actions as were convenient or advantageous
for her. Under no circumstances can the passage through
Belgium be said to hâve been necessary for her, for
indeed the whole of the eastern frontier of France from
Verdun to Belfort stood at the disposai of the German
army. It was, of course, more advantageous and con-
venient to avoid this strong line of fortresses, and to
fall into France from the north. But advantage and
convenience do not form the standard by which the
limits of the state of defence are determined; on the
contrary, the only test is necessity. If anyone wishes to
maintain that we were in a condition of consternation,
alarm, or terror, then the transgression of the limits
of the state of defence would be forgiven to us. But I
was under the impression that we Germans fear only
God, and not the French. So that even this objection
does not excuse us.
To this there must be added the further ground
already pointed out, which must unconditionally lead
to our condemnation : the state of defence never excuses
the violation of the rights of a third party. The state
of defence against France could not excuse the viola-
tion of the rights of Belgium.
From every point of view then we are in the wrong,
on grounds both of fact and of law. Viewed from the
political point of view, the matter is even worse for us.
What is the meaning and the purpose of the neutralisa-
216 J'ACCUSE
tion of a small State which an unrighteous Providence
has planted in the middle of great States and made
the natural cock-pit for their struggles ? The purpose
can only be to protect this State in war, not in peace,
when it needs no protection. If, however, when war
cornes each of the neighbouring States is justified in
falling into the neutral State, on the ground that it is
in a state of defence — in a gênerai sensé, although not
in a juridical sensé, every war is a state of defence —
then the whole process of neutralisation has no longer
any purpose, and is, in fact, nothing but a " scrap of
paper," as the Chancellor said to Sir E. Goschen. The
dictum that " necessity knows no law " may be used
to justify any crime. The précise purpose of a treaty
of neutrality is, however, that of making necessity
subject to the commands of law. Its object is to replace
the maxim : "La force prime le droit" by the con-
trary maxim : "Le droit prime la force."
Now it is true that the attempt has been made to
justify the violation of Belgian neutrality on two
ground s. It is maintained : —
(1) that France would hâve invaded Belgium if we
had not anticipated her, and
(2) that Belgium long ago concluded military agree-
ments with France and England with the view of
taking common action against Germany.
Both thèse arguments are entirely unsupported.
There is a complète absence of any proof that France
intended to invade Belgium.
Sir Edward Grey is known to hâve addressed on July
31 st an inquiry in identical terms to France and to Ger-
many with a view to ascertaining whether, in the event
of a war, they would respect the neutrality of Belgium
so long as no other Power violated it. 1 The answer of
1 Blue Book, No. 114
THE CRIME 217
France was received without delay, and was an uncon-
ditional affirmative. 1 The answer of Herr von Jagow,
on the other hand, was one of the many awkward
excuses which this child of misfortune had throughout
the whole affair to produce by command from above.
He had to consult the Emperor and the Chancellor
before he could possibly answer. He was very doubtful
whether they would return any answer at ail, since
any reply they might give could not but disclose a
certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event
of war ensuing. 2 Herr von Jagow did not neglect even
on this occasion to draw attention to a presumed hostile
act of Belgium, namely, an embargo on a consignment
of corn for Germany — an incident which is explained as
perfectly correct by the Belgian Government in their
Grey Book. 3
This early hint on the part of Jagow of the hostility
of Belgium was merely the prélude to the campaign
which was later systematically pursued, and which
reached its culminating point in the assertion of the
Chancellor that a violation of neutrality had not in fact
taken place, since Belgium, in conséquence of military
conventions with England and France had already sacri-
ficed her neutrality before the German invasion. This
campaign was opened after the conquest of Belgium,
and even to-day it is being continued with unabated
energy.
On what is this charge based ? It is, in the first
place, a matter for surprise that the Chancellor in
his speech in the Reichstag on August 4th had not
the slightest information about the sale of Belgium 's
soûl. In this speech the violation of Belgian neutrality
1 Blue Book, No. 125.
2 Blue Book, No. 122.
3 Grey Book, No. 79, Enclosures
218 J'ACCUSE
was explained exclusively by référence to the intended
invasion on the part of France, and against Belgium
herself not the shadow of a reproach was raised. On
the contrary, Herr von Bethmann declared that the
invasion of Belgium was a "wrong" which they would
endeavour to make good later on. If the facts now
asserted were true, is it not remarkable that they so
completely escaped the notice of our Ambassador in
Brussels ? At least a suspicion ought to hâve arisen,
and should hâve been conveyed to Berlin through the
Brussels Embassy. Had this happened, the Chancellor
would certainly not hâve failed to bring forward as
early as August 4th this weighty argument in favour
of our violation of Belgian neutrality; for in other
matters he was certainly free enough with unproved
assertions.
We may then assume as a certainty that in Berlin
nothing was known of treacherous agreements of this
character. It was necessary to ferret about among the
Belgian archives after the capture of Brussels before it
was possible to get on the track of the treachery of the
Belgians. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was
then in a position to publish some documents from the
archives of the Belgian General Staff which, in the
view of the German Government, were supposed to
reveal the fact that a plan of war against Germany had
been concluded between Belgium and England. If the
documents are authentic and complète — which has yet to
be proved — it is true that they show that certain conver-
sations took place between Belgian officers and English
military attachés on the co-operation which might ulti-
mately take place between England and Belgium; on
the other hand, they incontestably prove that this
co-operation would only take place in the event of
Germany violating Belgian neutrality, The Nord-
THE CRIME 219
deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung does not publish in extenso
the documents which were found, in itself a suspicious
circumstance, but only gives extracts from their
contents. But even thèse extracts cannot conceal the
fact that the disembarkation of English troops in
Belgium was only to take place after the violation of
her neutrality by Germany. An officiai Note of the
Belgian Government issued from Le Havre on Decem-
ber 9th, 1914, incontrovertibly establishes the truth of
this assertion. 1 The same procédure is thus adopted in
this case as was done with référence to the military
discussions between England and France; discussions
to meet the case of an attack from Germany are
denounced as a conspiracy for a common attack, défen-
sive intentions are falsely represented as offensive.
Germany, whose plans were known and feared by ail,
is represented as the innocent victim of the evil designs
of others, whereas in fact the others were only con-
cerned that they themselves should not fall a victim to
German plans of aggression. 2
Why did similar discussions not take place between
1 This note, which has been passed over in complète silence
by the German Press, has been published everywhere in the
Press of foreign countries. The document of April lOth, 1906,
published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, is entirely
consistent with the contents of this note. It contains the
express remark : " The entry of the English into Belgium would
only take place after the violation of our neutrality by Germany ,"
This in itself at once confutes ail reproaches to the effect that
an offensive agreement against Germany existed between
England and Belgium.
2 The Dutch " Agence Van Diaz " of November 17th,
1914, quotes the words of a speech which Broqueville, the
Belgian Minister for War, delivered in January, 1913, in
a secret session of the Belgian Chamber, and in which the
German plans for the invasion of Belgium were revealed in
full détail and put forward as the ground for new military
requirements.
220 J'ACCUSE
Belgium and Germany to provide for the case of a
French attack ? The answer is quite simple. It was
confidently felt that there was no need to fear a French
attack. Expérience has proved that the view so formed
was correct, and that a just estimate both of France
and of Germany had been framed.
The English Foreign Office has published a letter of
Sir Edward Grey's addressed to his Ambassador at
Brussels on April 7th, 1913, in which Grey dismisses
every idea of being the first to violate the neutrality of
Belgium. No British Government would do so, and
public opinion in England would never approve of this
step. The violation of Belgian neutrality by England
would be not only a wrong, but a great folly, since it
would afford Germany a motive and a justification for
folio wing the same procédure. So long as the neutrality
of Belgium or any other neutral countries was not
violated by any other Power, England would never send
troops into their territory. This letter was written
fifteen months before the outbreak of war, and was
therefore not written with the express purpose of
creating a favourable position for England in the
présent controversy. It therefore deserves credence in
every respect, and is, moreover, confirmed by the events
of the last months. 1
After the German ultimatum had been handed to
the Belgian Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock in the evening
of August 2nd, the French Government on the morning
of August 3rd offered to the Belgian Government,
through lier military attaché, the support of rive French
1 For this and for ail other matters afïecting the Belgian
question référence should be made to the work written by
M. Emile Waxweiler, Member of the Royal Belgian Academy,
La Belgique neutre et loyale — a volume distinguished both
by its détail and its scientific objectivity. (Lausanne. Payot,
1915.)
THE CRIME 221
Army Corps. Belgium, nevertheless, declined this offer
of support, although she had already rejected the
demands of Germany, and must hâve been expecting
every moment the violent entry of German forces.
Particular interest attaches to one passage in the answer
of Belgium to Germany. The German Government had
explained their demand for a free passage by référence
to the intention of France to attack Germany
through Belgian territory. The Belgian Government
decisively rejects the reasons thus assigned, and adds
thereto :
" The intentions attributed to France by Ger-
many are in contradiction to the formai déclara-
tions made to us on August lst in the name of the
French Government.
"Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation,
Belgian neutrality should be violated by France,
Belgium intends to fulfil her international obliga-
tions, and the Belgian army would offer the most
vigorous résistance to the invader" (Belgian Grey
Book, No. 22).
Belgium thus déclares that she is prepared to défend
her neutrality against France with the same resolution
as against Germany, but that she considers that the
possibility of a French attack is excluded in view of the
formai déclaration given by France. Does that sound
like a secret alliance ? Further, on August 3rd King
Albert addressed to the King of England a telegram in
which he made an appeal for diplomatie, not for mili-
tary, intervention. Does that sound like a secret
military convention ? 1 Sir Francis Villiers, the English
Ambassador, handed on August 4th to Davignon, the
Belgian Minister, a Note, in which England declared
herself ready in the event of a Ggrman attack to render
1 Grey Book, No. 25
222 J'ACCUSE
Belgium joint assistance with France and Russia,
" should Belgium so désire." 1
Should Belgium so désire! In making this limitation
England indeed fell short of her international rights
and duties. It is a recognised principle in international
law, and is, moreover, a principle based on logic, that
in the case of a collective guarantee, such as the Belgian
treaty, each guarantor, in the event of neutrality being
violated by another State, is at once entitled, in her
own right, to assume protection of the neutral State,
and indeed has a duty towards the other guaranteeing
Powers to adopt this course (Bluntschli, Vôlkerrecht,
VI. , Nos. 432 and 440). Even without awaiting an
expression of the désire of Belgium, England was
entitled to intervene with armed force for the protec-
tion of the violated neutrality. In making her interven-
tion dépendent on the désire of Belgium, England
manifested a measure of circumspection to which she
was not pledged in international law, and she proved
beyond dispute that there was no kind of previous
agreement between England and Belgium directed
against Germany.
It was not until August 5th that the Belgian Govern-
ment issued to the Great Powers a formai appeal which
led to their actual intervention. 2
The weakness of the German reproach that Belgium
had already sold her neutrality is thus completely
proved. But even if the reproach were in itself justi-
fied, it would furnish no manner of excuse for Germany.
The defence of the German Government is suggestive
of that of a v thieving murderer who seeks to excuse his
action by asserting that the murdered man was a bad
lot who had himself gained by theft the property which
1 Grey Book, No. 28.
2 Grey Book, No. 42
THE CRIME 223
he had stolen. True, if he was aware of the depravity
of his victim before he committed the murder he might
be allowed, not immunity, but the benefit of mitigating
circumstances. But if he only learns afterwards what
sort of a man he has murdered, his act morally remains
the same, whether his victim was a devil or an angel.
Germany invaded a neutral country. hâter, she pro-
fesses to hâve learned that this country was no longer
entirely neutral ; she cannot on thèse grounds be allowed
the advantage of mitigating circumstances.
This is the moral aspect of the question. Let us now
consider the practical side. Let us for the moment
assume that Belgium, so far as the obligations of
neutrality imposed upon her are concerned, had been
"a child, no angel is so pure"; let us assume that she
had never entered into even the slightest military défen-
sive discussions with her neighbours. Would this in
any way hâve prevented our invasion of Belgium?
Would this hâve induced us to leave in their despatch-
boxes the plans of our General Staff which had been
ready for years ? Would we in this case hâve felt
constrained to take up our position in front of the
imprenable line of fortresses from Verdun to Belfort ?
No one will venture to maintain this. Ail the déclama-
tions and publications on the crimes committed by
Belgium thus merely represent so much waste of paper
and printer's ink. We were resolved to overrun
Belgium, either in kindness or by force of arms, whether
she behaved well or ill towards us. That is the essential
point. From this reproach no rain will ever wash
us clean, and the more we blacken our victim after the
event, the more damning will be the judgment which
the world will pass upon us.
It would appear that the effect which our behaviour
towards Belgium has exercised on the public opinion
224 J'ACCUSE
of the whole world, and is still exercising in a daily
increased measure, is not yet properly realised in
Germany. It is necessary to live abroad in order to
see and grasp this effect. It shows itself even more
strongly in neutral foreign countries than in those
countries which are at war with us. In particular, the
small countries which are adjacent to great States,
Switzerland, Holland, and Denmark, feel that the fate
which befel the unfortunate Belgium might hâve been,
or may in future be, theirs. The great neutral coun-
tries, however, throughout every rank of society, are
seized with deep commisération when they read of the
dévastations brought upon this prosperous small
country, on th se ancient and glorious homes of
art, on thèse diligent and laborious centres of
industry, when they see in their illustrated papers
the fearful pictures of fire and destruction, of
misery and homelessness, of smoking villages and
towns, when they see families wandering about in
the streets, who in hunger and penury beg for bread
from the German soldiers. The innocent country has
fallen a victim to the barbarians. That is how the world
views the facts, and it only becomes more incensed
when the authors of ail this horror seek to excuse their
actions by saying that once upon a time a Belgian
ofïicer had a consultation with an English military
attaché with regard to the steps which might ulti-
mately be taken to défend the country in the event of
a German invasion.
And to commisération there is added admiration —
admiration for this small, heroic nation who, with sword
in hand, courageously défends her independence and
her honour against the superior forces of the intruder.
"Belgium," we read in the answer to the German
ultimatum, "has always been faithful to her inter-
THE CRIME 225
national obligations ; she has carried out her duties in a
spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing
undone to maintain and enforce respect for her
neutrality.
" The attack upon her independence with which the
Gerraan Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant
violation of international law. No stratégie interest
justifies such a violation of law.
" The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the
proposais submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour
of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.
" Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for
more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world,
they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium
can only be preserved at the price of the violation of
her neutrality.
M If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Govern-
ment are firmly resolved to repel, by ail the means in
their power, every attack upon their rights " (Belgian
Grey Book, No. 22).
Thèse are the proud words with which a free nation
défends its honour and its independence.
Even Germany is not without an understanding of
such heroism when it shows itself against the other side.
When, on the same day as that on which German troops
invaded Belgium, the Swiss Government informed the
Governments of belligerent countries of its resolution
to défend by ail possible means its neutrality and the
inviolability of its territory, the German Government
in their acknowledgment expressed their sincère satis-
faction and their confidence that the Confédération
' thanks to its strong army and the unconquerable
détermination of the whole Swiss people, will repel any
violation of its neutrality." 1 What in the case of
1 Waxweiler, p. 52.
Q
226 <T ACCUSE
Belgium was a crime worthy of death, because it was
directed against Germany, was in the case of Switzer-
land a highly meritorious proposai, because if ever the
moment should corne to give it effect, it could only be
directed against France.
The attitude of the Belgian Army and the Belgian
people was in conformity with the proud words in
which the Belgian Government had rejected the dis-
honouring suggestion of Germany.
The Belgians hâve defended their country and their
fortresses with unconquerable courage and with gigantic
sacrifices. To-day in the extrême west corner of
Flanders they still continue to offer a desperate
résistance, under the personal leadership of a King of
German blood, married to a German princess — a King
who exposes himself to ail the dangers of the struggle.
It is not surprising that such heroism should enkindle
the admiring enthusiasm of the whole world. This is
the true struggle for freedom and independence ; not
the counterfeit struggle which is instilled into the
deluded German people.
To what has this German nation corne — a nation
which in the past, before the présent corruption, had
some understanding and enthusiasm for noble and
heroic actions ? Did not the work of libération achieved
by the Swiss franc-tireur William Tell inspire our
greatest poet to his noblest drama? Were we not
brought up in the admiration of the courage of the
small against the great, of the struggle of the Spartans
against the Persians, of the struggle against the
Spaniards carried on by the Dutch, whose rising Schiller
described with such deep sympathy and whom Goethe
immortalised in Egmont ? And what are we doing
now, we Germans of 1914, who see and expérience the
same heroic struggle of the same people against us the
THE CRIME «m
oppressors ? Not a word of sympathy is heard, not a
word of admiration, not even of understanding.
Instead of this we utter slanders and accusations
intended to justify our crime. Let any one read the
appeal issued to the civilised world signed by ail
Germans of distinction. Apart from the falsehood that
Belgium had entered into a conspiracy with France
and England, there is nothing but purely unproved
assertions about the acts of francs-tireurs, the mutila-
tion of the wounded, the murder of doctors, and so on.
In the eyes of those gentlemen who, a few years ago,
were stirred to enthusiasm — and rightly so — at the sight
of the heroic struggle of the small Boer nation against
the might of England, those Belgians who are now
defending their Fatherland, if they do not happen to
hâve uniforms, are but common criminals, who may
be shot like mad dogs. 1 Hâve you quite forgotten,
you leaders of the German spirit, our heroes of 1813 in
whose honour you were still holding banquets and
delivering enthusiastic speeches a year ago ? Were not
the men whom you celebrated like the Belgians of to-day,
the nation in arms throwing themselves with and with-
out uniforms against the intruder? Who will explain
to the man from among the people the différence
between a soldier and a defender of the Fatherland,
between civilians and men in uniform, when the enemy
is in the land, devastating farmyards and crops,
1 Cardinal Mercier, the Archbishop of Malines, in his
pastoral letter addressed to the Belgian people on Christmas,
1914, states after " careful investigation that in his diocèse
13 priests, and in the diocèses of Namur, Tournai, and Liège,
30 priests were shot, and in ail cases ne gives their names,
and their place of résidence. In Aerschot, according to
the findings of Cardinal Mercier, 91 civilians, and in Louvain
and the surrounding district, 176 civilians were shot or burrit.
Thèse include men and women, people of advanced years, as
well as children.
Q 2
I
228 J'ACCUSE
driving away cattle and provisions, making women and
children roofless ? The man of the people sees only
the enemy, the housebreaker, and when he seizes his
rifle he does n^t care a brass f arthing ' whether he is
wearing a coat with shining buttons or the blue smock
of a peasant. This is a point one ought to understand,
and it is a point which we did understand in the past
while we were still capable of enthusiasm in a good
sensé, so long as our enthusiasm had not been diverted
into the corrupt morass of national pride and megalo-
mania, which is constantly associated with contempt
and barbarism towards others. Especially must this
point be kept in view in thinking of a people like the
Belgians who had never anticipated a war, had never
believed themselves menaced by a war, and for a hun-
dred years had never witnessed a war within their
frontiers. Thèse facts hâve to be grasped, bearing in
mind that men are men, and that our actions must be
framed accordingly.
The German soldiers were certainly free to protect
themselves against underhand attacks, but they should
hâve kept constantly before them the fact that their
assailants were defending the highest things on earth,
their house and their hearth, their home and their
Fatherland. It was on this fact that they ought
to hâve based their counter-measures, not on
the so-called law of war, which they fashioned
for themselves, which is nowhere committed to writ-
ing, and nowhere recognised. If in a village of a few
thousand inhabitants and a few hundred houses some
shots are fired from the Windows, perhaps by con-
cealed soldiers and not by civilians, by what right do
we burn down the whole village, and place a number of
the maie inhabitants, innocent and guilty, against the
wall and shoot them dead ? If you believe it necessary
THE CRIME 229
for your protection — I cannot admit in this case a right
of punishment — burn down if you like the individual
houses, punish the individual civilians whom you recog-
nise as guilty, but spare the village and spare the inno-
cent. That is the least demanded by justice, if indeed
we can speak of justice, in favour of the assailant and
against the defender. What they are opposing to you
is the true state of defence, the state of defence of the
French and the Belgian citizens against the German,
against the German intruder — the state of defence of
Belgium and France against Germany. Hère it may be
said with justice, " Necessity knows no law. He who is
fighting for his highest possession can only consider how
he is to hack his way through." This sentence of the
Chancellor, in itself correct, but wrongly applied to
Germany, is applicable to our opponents. Only, when
applied to them, it is unfortunately inverted : he who is
fighting for his highest possession is placed against the
wall and shot dead.
I was able to observe in a picture palace in Berlin
shortly after the outbreak of war the unspeakable
confusion of thought which has spread throughout
Germany. Since the military censor allowed only
patriotic subjects, two war dramas were thrown on the
screen one after the other. The first represented the
rising of the Tyrolese in 1809 under Andréas Hofer, and
the second franc-tireur scènes from the war of 1870. In
the Tyrolese drama the whole nation was in arms
against the French conqueror. Andréas Hofer himself,
the leader and the hero (no gênerai, but an innkeeper),
and ail the others were peasants, craftsmen, and ser-
vants, even the wives and daughters were armed,
playing their part in the struggle, the whole nation
kindled to a war of libération. The sympathies of the
author of this drama were, of course, entirely on tbe
230 J'ACCUSE
side of the Tyrolese. The French were shot down from
hiding places, from behind houses, trees, and blocks of
rock. And it ended, of course, with a victorious libéra-
tion of the nation. Then there folio wed the franc-tireur
drama of 1870, and behold " the scène was changed ! "
The French defenders of the Fatherland hâve now
suddenly become knaves and criminals. Their very
visages reveal their evil instincts. They also shoot from
ambuscades as did the Tyrolese in 1809, but what was
then a fight for freedom is now crime and treachery.
Punishment, consequently, does not fail to be meted
out. German reinforcements rush into the village, fire
is laid to the walls, and amidst the lamentations of
the women and children a dozen men and boys are
placed against the church wall and, as it is beautifully
expressed, shot according to martial law. Yes, indeed,
that was quite a différent story ! Against the French
we are shown a nation in arms; against the Germans
they are gallow-birds ! The same confusion of ideas is
met everywhere from the highest summits of German
intelligence down to the last producer of cinéma films.
The effect of this intellectual perversion abroad may
be imagined; it is the reverse of what is intended. In
thèse six months of war the German professor has
become a comic figure abroad, or rather a figure of
tragi-comedy as the Prussian Junker and lieutenant
hâve been in the past. The sympathies which were
formerly ours hâve been buried under ridicule and aver-
sion, and hâve turned to our opponents, above ail to the
unhappy Belgians. Karl Spitteler, who is certainly not
anti-German in sentiment, writes in his pamphlet Our
Swiss Standpoint 1 : "Belgium in herself does not con-
cern us, but her fate concerns us very intimately. That
a wrong was done to Belgium was originally openly
1 Published by Rascher & Co., Zurich, 1915.
THE CRIME 231
confessed by the perpétrât or. As an afterthought, in
order to appear whiter, Cain blackened Abel. In my
opinion it was a spiritual blunder to rummage for docu-
ments in the pockets of the quivering victim. It was
amply sufficient to throttle the victim. To calumniate
her in addition is really too much." Thèse are the words
of a Swiss. And everyone abroad, everyone without
exception, writes and thinks to the same effect. Belgian
artists, poets, and politicians are received with enthusi-
asm in Italy and America, in Switzerland and in
Holland. They are acclaimed in gigantic assemblies such
as we held in 1902 in honour of Oom Paul and the Boers
who accompanied him. Belgium to-day is trump
throughout the world. And woe to us if, after the war,
we so much as touch a hair of a Belgian head ! This
trump card in the hands of our enemies will defeat us
morally, even if we gain the victory in arms.
A part of the dévastation we hâve accomplished in
Belgium we explain by référence to the state of defence.
The state of defence meets us everywhere; there is a
state of defence when we invade Belgium, a state of
defence when we set fire to the ancient cities of art. I
will accept it as proven that shots were fired on German
soldiers from the houses in Louvain. Does that justify
us in destroying whole districts of the city by fire ? Does
that justify us in exposing the celebrated Town Hall
and the Cathedral to the fiâmes, and in doing them at
least serious damage ? Where is it written that shots
from a rifle must be answered by arson? Where and
when was such a law of war codified ? That is the
Prussian law of war, but it is not international law.
When the Cossacks act in this way in East Prussia we
speak of wild Muscovite hordes, but thèse hordes hâve
at least this excuse, that in Stallupônen and in Neiden-
burg no centres of culture and of art are ruined. What,
232 J'ACCUSE
however, is the world to say of our handiwork in
Belgium, the ancient land of culture and of art — in
Belgium where every hamlet contains artistic jewels,
Gothic cathedrals and town-halls and market-places sur-
rounded by gorgeous patrician houses, with luxurious
old-German Renaissance façades, adorned with gold ?
Ail thèse flowers of the créative power of man, which
hâve afforded instruction and enjoyment to unnumbered
générations and which should hâve served as a glory
and as an example to générations yet to come — thèse
hâve been ruined, destroyed, burned, because, owing to
a state of defence, Germany was obliged to invade
Belgium, and owing to a state of defence was obliged to
apply the torch to the walls.
But let that pass. Let us assume that thèse things
had to be. But is it also due to the state of defence
that we hâve imposed contributions amounting to more
than £25,000,000 on the State, the towns and the pro-
vinces of Belgium? How are we to excuse this act of
violence ? How are we to justify the enormous fines
recently imposed on Belgian citizens, who, availing
themselves of their right of free locomotion, preferred
résidence abroad to life under the German occupation ?
What justification hâve we for burdening the exhausted,
impoverished country with further exorbitant sacrifices
in money? What crime on the part of Belgium has
merited this punishment? Was it the crime of having
defended themselves against us, or, so far as I am con-
cerned, even the crime of having prepared this defence
with others ? In either case we can allège only defence,
not attack, for that Belgium meant to attack us no one
in Germany has yet maintained.
I therefore ask again : How do you explain and justify
the contributions, amounting to a sum which you keep
concealed in the silence of shame, but which, when
THE CRIME 233
everything is taken into account, considerably exceeds
half a milliard marks (£25,000,000) ? Hère your pretext
of the state of defence no longer holds good. The
accused who pleads in excuse a state of defence, but is
found to be in possession of his opponent's purse, will
plead in vain for immunity. Give back the contribu-
tions ! That is the least that can be required of y ou,
and is without doubt, when peace returns, the least
that will be required of y ou.
The objection will be raised, and has in fact been
raised : Why did Belgium not allow us a free passage,
for then she would hâve been spared ail the horrors of
war ? This is a noble question, worthy of the new
German national psychology. u Why did you not
submit to the insuit?" exclaims the slanderer to the
slandered; "now you get in addition a blow on the
head." Why did not Germany submit to the Napoleonic
occupation ? If she had remained quiet she would hâve
been spared much bloodshed and the horrors of war.
Why did not Leonidas and his Spartans allow the
Persians to pass through Thermopylae ? If they had
done so they would ail hâve remained alive. Thèse and
similar quœstiones Domitianse might be asked without
number. They are not more foolish than the reproach
which is raised against Belgium in Germany to-day.
Belgium defended herself for the quite simple reason
that her honour, her independence, and her international
obligations compelled her to offer a defence. In sum-
moning Belgium to allow Germany a free passage, the
demand addressed to her was that she should sacrifice
her honour and her independence, and scatter to the
wind her international obligations.
Thèse obligations rested on a basis not merely moral,
but also to a very considérable extent practical. As
soon as Belgium, by showing préférence to Germany,
234 J'ACCUSE
took sides on her behalf, she would hâve destroyed for
ever her neutral position, and would ne ver again hâve
been in a position to regain it. The other Powers could
never again hâve trusted Belgium to remain neutral
if on this occasion she had light-heartedly been faith-
less to the duties imposed by neutrality. Belgium
would thus hâve fallen into a kind of dependence
on her great neighbour Germany, who, it is true,
promised to respect her independence, but certainly
offered less security for the observance of this inde-
pendence than was furnished by the guarantee of the
collective Great Powers. Germany's designs on Belgium
were not unknown in the world. Our politico-military
literature had copiously contributed to the dissémina-
tion of this knowledge. General von Bernhardi ex-
pressed in gênerai terms the view that the " conception
of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the
essential nature of the State," and in particular he was
of the opinion that Belgium, in adding to her small
territory the vast Congo State, had already violated her
own neutrality. 1 There was therefore a certain danger
involved in trusting her voracious neighbour, in confid-
ing in her grâce alone, and in pushing aside ail other
protectors. The lamb can indeed feel no great con-
fidence when the wolf promises to respect his
independence.
Thus the attitude assumed by Belgium is attributable
not merely to an idealistic point of view, but to
extremely tangible and practical interests, and for thèse
at least there should be some understanding in Ger-
many, even if the nose is turned up in scorn at the
idealism — of other people.
Precisely the same considérations which were bound
to lead to Belgium's refusai to accord Germany a free
1 Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, p. 110, 11}
THE CRIME 235
passage through her territory would hâve caused her
to reject any suggestion made by France or England
that she should make coramon cause with them against
Germany. No one in Germany takes the trouble to
reflect for a moment what could hâve induced Belgium
to give up her neutrality, and to sell her self body and
soûl to the Entente Powers. What advantage could she
eœpect from such behaviour? Did Belgium entertain
any designs to conquer the Rhine provinces ? Did she
wish to round off her territory towards Aix-la-Chapelle
or Trêves ? What in the world could she gain by assum-
ing a hostile attitude towards Germany ? Clearly she
could gain nothing. On the contrary, by siding with the
Entente Powers she would hâve exposed her position in
Europe to the gravest danger. So long as Belgium
continued neutral and discharged the duties imposed
by her neutrality, she would hâve been quite indepen-
dent of the issue of the war, and could hâve awaited the
resuit with composure, indiffèrent whether Germany or
France emerged as victor from the struggle. The
moment she sided with one of the parties, her whole
future fate became dépendent on her ally's success
in war, and her fate would hâve been sealed with this
ally's defeat. Why should Belgium hâve run this risk?
Why should she hâve exposed herself to the vengeance
of her powerful German neighbour, and make herself
liable in the event of a defeat to be the first to pay the
piper ? For there could be no doubt that if Belgium
were the ally of France, with obligations imposed on her
by treaty, she would certainly hâve been annexed by
Germany in the event of a defeat — a fate which, even as
things are, is held over her head on the ground of her
merely imaginary alliance. I therefore again ask : What
reasonable ground could Belgium hâve had to expose
herself needlessly to this danger, instead of awaiting
236 J'ACCUSE
the issue of events with a calm conscience under the
sure shield of neutrality ? No one can give a plausible
answer to this question. Thus by the application of the
simplest logic it is possible to demonstrate how weak is
the foundation of the German accusations against
Belgium.
As against Germany, Belgium has exercised her
rights, fulfilled her duties, and protected her interests as
she would hâve done, had a breach of her neutrality
been demanded from any other quarter. It is Germany
that has acted wrongly, contrary to her duty, and
against her true interests.
The imponderabilia which a Bismarck kept in mind in
ail his political measures count for naught with the
leaders of the Germany of to-day, who "hâve exactly
caught his manner of clearing his' throat and spitting," 1
but hâve not caught even a breath of his spirit. The
imponderabilia in the case of Belgium were the respect
due to the rights of others and regard for the moral
judgment of the world. The neglect of thèse imponder-
abilia will be bitterly avenged on Germany. It has
already been avenged in so far as it has influenced the
attitude of England in this war, and has thereby
increased the coalition of our enemies to our disad-
vantage.
• •••••
After this section was finished a manifesto of the
Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, issued on Decem-
ber 24th, came to my notice. This document, written
in answer to a speech of Viviani, once more achieves the
utmost limits in perversion and in falsification, in order
to shift the clearly-proven guilt of Germany on to the
Entente Powers. 2 We should be doing this production
l 1 Schiller. Wallenstein's Lager.]
2 See Appendix III.
THE CRIME 237
too much honour if we were to bestow upon it any
spécial considération. Everything contained in it is
contradicted by the diplomatie correspondence, by the
German White Book itself, and by the earlier speeches
of the Chancellor. The great feat whereby Herr von
Bethmann endeavours to wash himself clean consists in
confusing the séquence of e vents in time, in suppressing
everything that does not suit his case, in advancing
assertions which are in contradiction with the proved
facts, and in ascribing to the Entente Power s motives
which are inconsistent with their actions.
A few test examples may illustrate the love of truth
which inspires Herr von Bethmann, and may at the same
time indicate the shortness of his memory. He now
maintains that, to begin with, Austriahad only mobilised
against Serbia, whereas on August 4th he himself
admitted that a partial mobilisation — and that before
the Russian partial mobilisation — had taken place
against Russia as well. To take a further instance, this
time of his tactics of suppression : he admits that Ger-
many raised objections only against the form of a
conférence, but passes over in silence the important fact
that Germany, notwithstanding repeated pressure from
the Entente Powers, did not consent to suggest a
form in which the Conférence would be agreeable
to her. Amongst much more that is ignored, he
keeps silence with regard to the fact that up to the
last moment (July 31 st), when in conséquence of the
German ultimatum it was then too late, Austria declined
the direct negotiations with Petrograd which Germany
her self had recommended in place of the Conférence.
The whole of the document is thus, as is shown by thèse
examples, nothing more than a continuous séries of
falsifications and suppressions of the truth.
I should only like to draw attention to one more asser-
238 J 1 ACCUSE
tion, which also deserves no other désignation — an
assertion which now appears for the first time, and,
which for the sake of variety, ascribes to England the
guilt of being the first to mobilise, a guilt which has
hitherto been supposed to fall on Russia alone. What
is the ground for this terrible accusation, which, even
if it were true, would not dispose of Grey's continuous
efforts for peace ? It is based on the fact that the
English Fleet was not disbanded on the conclusion of
their normal manœuvres near Portland, but was kept
together (July 27th). As a matter of fact, this had
nothing to do with a "mobilisation," a "collection of
the Fleet at Portland," a "military préparation on a
great scale," as Herr von Bethmann asserts against his
better knowledge; it was merely a keeping-together, a
non-dispersal of the manœuvre-fleet, caused by the state
of tension in the European situation, by the recall of the
Austrian Ambassador from Belgrade, and the refusai
of Austria and Germany to enter with the other Powers
into any negotiations on the Serbian question. 1 Grey
openly communicated to Count Mensdorff, the Austrian
Ambassador, the reason for not dispersing the Fleet,
adding that there was no menace in what had been
done but that it was merely a measure of security
owing to the possibility that a European conflagration
might be brought about by the incompréhensible
manner in which Austria treated the conciliatory answer
of Serbia as a blank négative. England took no other
measure of security on sea or on land. Herr von Beth-
mann, however, makes out of this a "mobilisation on a
great scale," which aimed at a "humiliation of the two
Powers in the Triple Alliance," and which produced a
militant frame of mind in France and Russia. Who is
deceived by this ? No one, Herr von Bethmann.
1 Blue Book, p. xi. No. 48. Yellow Book, No. 66.
THE CRIME 239
Turn over the Yellow Book and the Blue Book, 1 and
you will find that from the morning of July 26th — that
is to say, immediately after the expiration of the
Austrian ultimatum — Germany had prepared her
mobilisation, the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine were
concentrated, the fortresses on the frontier were put in
a state of defence, reservists were called in by
individual summons, German ships were called back
from Norway, officers on leave were summoned from
Switzerland, and private automobiles were reserved
in Baden for military purposes, &c. You will there
find that Germany in Alsace-Lorraine, in Strass-
burg, and in Metz, and that Austria in Hungary and
Galicia were already fully, if secretly, engaged on mobi-
lisation as early as July 29th.
Read further how on July 30th — that is to say, before
the officiai announcement of the " state of war " — the
German provinces on the frontier were already in fact
in the last stage before mobilisation; how on the pre-
vious day the frontier had already been crossed by
German patrols ; how the whole 16th Army Corps, rein-
forced by part of the 8th from Trêves and Cologne, had
already occupied the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg.
Ail this took place on July 30th, although France had
voluntarily given an obligation to keep her own troops
ten kilomètres from the frontier, 2 and had observed this
condition to the détriment of her own stratégie interest.
Compare thèse German military measures with the assur-
ances of peace which the hapless Herr von Schoen had
daily to deliver at the Quai d'Orsay. Read and compare
ail thèse things, and then on the strength of this solitary
1 Yellow Book, Nos. 58, 59, 60, 88, 90, 91, 106, 108. Blue
Book, No. 105 (Enclosure 3).
2 Yellow Book, No. 106. Chancellor's Speech, 4th August.
Blue Book, No. 105.
240 J'ACCUSE
fact of the non-dispersion of the English Fleet, openly
acknowledged by the English Government, dare if y ou
still can, to draw the conclusion that England intended
to break the peace. No, Herr von Bethmann, y ou would
hâve shown greater wisdom if you had kept silent :
si tacuisses, philosophus mansisses, You would hâve
shown more considération for your réputation as a
" philosopher " if you had patiently borne the fate which
you hâve brought upon yourself and your country
instead of clutching nervously at straws which, after ail,
will not save you from plunging in the depths of
universal damnation. Keep silence — for your own sake
and for our sake — and rest content with the well-sound-
ing testimonial which Professor Lasson has bestowed
upon you, that you are " by far the most eminent
among living men, knowing no motive other than those
of truth, fidelity, and right."
• •••••
The points in the indictment against Germany I
summarise in the folio wing sentences : —
1. Germany gave Austria a free hand against Serbia,
although she was well aware that a European conflict
must arise out of that between Serbia and Austria.
2. She allowed Austria to address to Serbia an ulti-
matum with exorbitant demands and, notwithstanding
an almost complète compliance with thèse demands, she
allowed her to recall her Ambassador and to déclare
war.
3. By suggesting a localisation of the war she sought
to create the appearance of mediating in the interests of
peace, but that this proposai had no prospect of success
must hâve been known to her from the history of diplo-
macy, and from the récent évidence of the Balkan crisis ;
that as a matter of fact it was known to her is clear
from the confessions contained in the White Book.
THE CRIME 241
4. She declined the proposai for a conférence of the
four Powers.
5. She herself then advanced the proposai for direct
discussions between Vienna and Petrograd, but at the
same time she suffered Austria to décline to take part in
thèse discussions, and instead to déclare war against
Serbia.
6. She left unanswered the frequently repeated
request of the other Powers that she should herself
propose an alternative method of médiation in place of
the proposai of a conférence which she had declined.
7. She left unanswered and undiscussed the various
formulée for agreement proposed by Grey.
8. In part she refused, and in part she left unanswered,
the formulée of agreement proposed by Sazonof.
9. In spite of ail inquiries, she ne ver said what
Austria wanted, but constantly restricted herself to
saying what Austria did not want.
10. She made to England a bid for neutrality, and
thus announced her intention of making war at a time
when the Entente Powers were still zealously labouring
in the interests of peace.
11. When at last negotiations on the Serbian Note
were opened with a prospect of success in Petrograd
between Austria and Russia, she upset thèse negotiations
by her ultimata to France and Russia, and made war
inévitable.
12. In the ultimatum to Russia she demanded that
démobilisation should also be carried out as against
Austria, although Austria herself had mobilised the
whole of her forces.
13. In place of the counter-mobilisation which she
had threatened to carry out, she at once declared war
without any ground, first on Russia and then on
France.
B
242 J'ACCUSE
14. As an afterthought she based thèse déclarations of
war on the fact that the powers opposed to her had
begun the war, whereas, on the contrary, the first acts
of war were committed by Germany.
15. She violated the neutrality of Belgium, and thus
in addition brought about war with England.
Thèse points in the indictment are proved, and justify
the judgment : Germany is guilty, along with Austria,
of having brought about the European war.
C. *
ENGLAND.
The attitude of England, up to the moment when the
question of Belgian neutrality arose, is so clear from
what I hâve already said that it would be a vain répéti-
tion to deal with it again in this connection. From the
beginning of the conflict Sir Edward Grey, the English
Foreign Minister, took the leading part in ail efforts to
préserve peace, and did everything within the power of
man to prevent war : —
1. He urged the Serbian Government to assume an
attitude of modération, and in this succeeded in his
efforts. 1
2. He endeavoured, although in this case without
success, to obtain from the Austrian Government an
extension of the time-limit. 2
3. He thereupon put forward the proposai for a con-
férence of the four Powers, which was accepted by
1 Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 16, 22, 27.
2 Blue Book, Nos. 13, 26.
THE CRIME 24S
France, Italy, and Russia, but was declined by Austria
and Germany. 1
4. He repeatedly called upon the German Govern-
ment to propose, in place of the conférence declined by
them, any other form of co-operation of the four Power s
not directly concerned. His request, however, remained
unanswered. 2
5. He endeavoured to promote the direct conversa-
tions between Vienna and Petrograd which were pro-
posed by Germany, but which, after the déclaration of
war against Serbia, were declined by Austria. 3
6. He then proposed a formula of agreement, accord-
ing to which Austria should occupy Serbian territory,
including Belgrade, and should from there dictate her
conditions. Thèse conditions were to be communicated
to the Powers, and in so far as they did not affect the
integrity and sovereignty of Serbia, they were to be
recommended to Serbia for acceptance. To this pro-
posai no answer was ever received either from Austria
or from Germany. 4
7. He supported the first formula of agreement
advanced by Sazonof, and as it was declined by Ger-
many as unacceptable, he obtained the consent of
Sazonof to a second formula of agreement, which went
even further to meet the views of Austria. This proposai
remained unanswered. 5
8. On July 31 st he promoted with the utmost energy
the negotiations which had begun between Austria and
Russia, and sought to guide them to a successful issue
1 Blue Book, Nos. 17, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 51, 53, 111.
2 Blue Book, No. 60, 68, 80, 84, 88.
3 Blue Book, Nos. 45, 74, 75, 78, 93, 106.
4 Blue Book, Nos. 88, 98, 103.
6 Blue Book, Nos. 97, 103, 120, 131, 132, 139. Orang©
Book> No. 60, 63, 67.
B 2
244 J'ACCUSE
by further proposais which contained full satisfaction
for Austria. Ail his proposais contained the stipulation
that further military préparation should be stopped on
ail sides. 1
9. He ultimately declared himself ready to support in
Petrograd and Paris any reasonable proposai of Ger-
many or Austria which might serve to préserve peace,
and, in the event of such a proposai not being accepted
by France or Russia, he declared that he would withdraw
from the negotiations. No such proposai was made,
since in the meantime Germany had despatched her two
ultimata and declined further negotiations on the
subject. 2
10. On August lst, the day of the German déclara-
tion of war against Russia, he despatched proposais,
représentations, jand warnings to ail the capitals in order
to arrive at an agreement between the Powers even at
the last moment before the outbreak of hostilities. 8 The
English Blue Book contains no fewer than seventeen
telegrams from and to the various capitals dated August
lst, sixteen of July 31 st, and thirty-three of July 29th
and 30th.
Sir Edward Grey deserves more than any other the
name of the "peacemaker of Europe," if there is still
any meaning in the saying in magnis voluisse sat est,
His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having served
the cause of peace with indefatigable zeal, with skill and
energy will remain inextinguishable in history.
Even Herr von Bethmann Hollweg will be unable to
contradict this judgment of history. I mean the Herr
von Bethmann of August 4th, not him of December 2nd.
1 Blue Book, Nos. 110, 111, 131, 133, 135, 137
2 Blue Book, Nos. 111, 112, 121.
8 Blue Book, Nos. 126, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 138,
139, 141
THE CRIME 245
What did he of August 4th say ? Let us hear the
White Book :
"On July 26th Sir Edward Grey had made the
proposai to submit the différences between Austria-
Hungary and Servia to a conférence of the Ambassadors
of Germany, France, and Italy under his chairman-
ship" (p. 408).
"We further declared ourselves ready, after failure
of the conférence idea, to transmit a second proposai of
Sir Edward Grey 's to Vienna in which he suggested
Austria-Hungary should décide that either the Serbian
reply was sufficient or that it be used as a basis for
further negotiations " (p. 409).
" Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured
incessantly and supported every proposai," &c. (p. 411).
"We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the
English proposai to Vienna, as basis for negotiations,
that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in
Serbia, i.e., after her march into Serbia " (p. 410).
"During the interval from July 29th to July 31 st
whilst thèse endeavours of ours for médiation were being
continued with increasing energy, supported by English
diplomacy," &c. (p. 411).
" Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding
the Anglo-German médiation . . . could possibly hâve
been received," &c. (p. 411).
"In the meantime, Great Britain tried to médiate
between Vienna and Petrograd," &c. (Chancellor's
speech of August 4th, p. 436).
Thèse quotations from the German mémorandum are
in agreement with the telegrams annexed to it, and in
particular to the exchange of telegrams between the
King of Èngland and Prince Henry and the Emperor
William. The most interesting point, however, is that
even the solemn déclaration of war against Russia
246 J'ACCUSE
ccntains an equally solemn testimony to the efforts for
peace made by England in the following words : —
" His Majesty the German Emperor had under-
taken in concert with Great Britain the part of
mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and Petro-
grad." 1
So spake and so thought Herr von Bethmann Hollweg
on August 4th.
But how did he speak and what were his thoughts —
or, rather, what did he prétend that his thoughts were —
on Deoember 2nd ?
" Where the responsibility rests for this, the greatest
of ail wars, is to us clear. The external responsi-
bility is borne by those men in Russia who inspired and
carried out the mobilisation of the entire Russian army.
The inner responsibility, however, lies on the Govern-
ment of Great Britain. The Cabinet of London could
hâve made this war impossible by declaring with-
out ambiguity in Petrograd that England was not pre-
pared to allow a Continental war in Europe to develop
out of the conflict between Austria and Serbia. . . .
England did not do so. . . . England saw how things
were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel. In
spite of ail protestations of peace London gave it to be
understood in Petrograd that she was taking her stand
on the side of France and Russia."
As many lies as words!
In the first place the Chancellor is contradicted by
himself. In the case of Bethmann v. Bethmann the
Chancellor of December 2nd is knocked out by the Chan-
cellor of August 4th. Ail the e vents which preceded the
out break of war had taken place before August 4th, that
is to say, before the day on which Herr von Bethmann
laid his documentary évidence before the Reichstag.
1 White Book, Exhibit 6.
\
THE CRIME 247
If England had in fact played the rôle which is ascribed
to her by the Bethmann of December 2nd, the Beth-
mann of August 4th was bound to hâve known of it,
and he could not hâve delivered his eulogies on Eng-
land 's services in the cause of peace. He praised
England because she was worthy of this praise. He
knew that she was worthy of this praise, because as
the suprême conductor of foreign policy he had person-
ally taken part in ail that had happened. The account
he gave on August 4th corresponded to the truth, and
the only reproach, if any, which can be urged against
it is that it does not disclose the truth in its full extent,
and that it expresses in too moderate a form the praise
due to the English Government.
Is it possible that the man who, under specious pre-
tences, declined ail the proposais for agreement
advanced by England, or failed to answer them, or did
not even send them on to Austria, who on July 31 st
when agreement between Austria and Russia appeared
to be at hand, forced war by despatching ultimata to
Russia and France, who on July 29th had already
resolved on war, and gave expression to this resolution
in his bid for England's neutrality, who, however, re-
ceived from Grey in reply that noble manifesto of peace
which would hâve brought to the nations of Europe a
sure prospect of a lasting condition of peace — is it
possible that this man had the effrontery in contradic-
tion of his own printed testimony to hold England
responsible for this world-catastrophe, for which he
alone bears the fearful responsibility ? It is possible,
for it has happened. But the world knows what view to
take of his statements, and the lie goes home to roost.
According to the assertion of the Chancellor the
English Blue Book itself proves the guilt of the English
Government. It is supposed to show that England
248 J'ACCUSE
supported the war party in Petrograd, and that she
declared at the outset that " She was taking her stand
on the side of Russia and France,"
What, in fact, does the Blue Book prove ? The exact
opposite.
What is true is merely that Russia and France, cor-
rectly recognising Germany's aggressive intentions,
endeavoured to induce Sir Edward Grey to assume, in
the event of the conflict becoming acute, a décisive
attitude in favour of her friends in the Entente. It was
hoped in Paris and in Petrograd that by such an
attitude on the part of England Germany would be
restrained from her intentions to make war.
It was thus intended that England, in assuming this
attitude, was to use her influence, not in promoting war,
but in preventing war. Sir Edward Grey declined the
suggestion, and in reply to their repeated endeavours he
emphasised afresh that England was, and desired to
remain, free from obligations. He even went further;
he most earnestly warned his friends in the Entente
not to rely on England making a déclaration of solid-
arity with them.
As early as July 24th Sazonof, along with the French
Ambassador in Petrograd, had represented to Sir G.
Buchanan, 1 the British Ambassador, that in view of the
provocative attitude of Austria, which could only be
explained by assuming that she was supported by
Germany, a déclaration of solidarity of England with
France and Russia was the best and the only means of
preventing a European conflict; the tone of the Aus-
trian Note, the exorbitant demands, the short period
of time allowed, everything indicated that Austria
desired war against Serbia, and this in itself constituted
a danger that a European conflict would arise. Only
1 Blue Book, No. 6.
THE CRIME 249
by England taking common action with France and
Russia could the European war which was threatening
be prevented. The English Ambassador at once replied
that, while reserving until a later date the officiai
déclarations of his Government on the subject, he person-
ally saw no reason to expect any déclaration of solidarity
from England; direct British interests in the Serbian
question were nil, and a war on account of such a
question would never be sanctioned by British public
opinion. The only promise which Buchanan made was
to endeavour to induce Austria to extend the time-
limit.
Sir Edward Grey is his telegram of July 25th sent
in reply to Buchanan 1 fully approved the déclaration
of his ambassador : " I entirely approve what you said
as reported in your telegram of yesterday, and I cannot
promise more on behalf of the Government." In place
of the desired déclaration of solidarity, Grey at once
proposed the exact opposite, namely, médiation by the
four Powers not directly concerned — England, Germany,
France, and Italy. During the whole of the further
negotiations the English Government emphatically
maintained this attitude against ail wishes that they
should act otherwise. On July 27th Buchanan explained
the English point of view to M. Sazonof as folio ws 2 :
It would be a mistake to assume that the cause of peace
could be promoted if England placed herself on the
side of France and Russia against Germany. The atti-
tude of Germany would merely be stiffened by such a
menace; only in the capacity of a friend who was
anxious to préserve peace could England approach Ger-
many, and endeavour to exercise a moderating influence
in Vienna through Germany.
1 Blue Book, No. 24.
» Blue Book, No. 44.
250 <T ACCUSE
On July 27th Grey declared to Prince Lichnowsky
(still with référence to the four-Power proposai) that so
long as Germany would work to keep the peace he would
keep closely in touch with Germany. 1
On July 29th Grey had a lengthy discussion with the
French Ambassador, Cambon, 2 in which he clearly
pointed out the différence between the Morocco question
and the existing Serbian difïiculty. In the Morocco
question the dispute was one in which France was
primarily interested, and the dispute turned about
matters which were regulated by a spécial treaty
between England and France. None of this applied to
the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Even if this
conflict should extend to one between Austria and
Russia, England would not feel called upon to take a
hand in it. The question whether Teutons or Slavs
should hold supremacy in the Balkans had always been
of so little interest to England that she had never
allowed herself to be drawn into a war on account of it.
But Grey went still further in refusing an expression of
England's solidarity; even if France and Germany
became involved in the struggle the fact still remained
that it was not France's own interests, but in the first
place her duties under her alliance towards Russia
which had been décisive in determining her action.
Even in this case England was free front any engage-
ment, and her action would only be decided by what
British interests required her to do.
As the European situation, notwithstanding ail the
efforts for peace made by the Entente Powers, became
constantly more strained, Président Poincaré himself in
a discussion with Bertie, 3 the British Ambassador, on July
1 Blue Book, No. 46.
2 Blue Book, No. 87.
8 Blue Book, No. 99.
THE CRIME 251
80th, returned to the proposai that England might avert
the danger of war by an unambiguous déclaration to the
effect that she would support France in the event of a
conflict with Germany. France was pacifie, and did not
désire war ; Germany, however, could only be restrained
from her intention to go to war if England were to
assume a décisive attitude. 1 Even Di San Giuliano, the
Italian Minister, shared the opinion of Poincaré, and
also suggested the effectiveness of an intervention by
England on behalf of the Entente Powers. 2
Once more Grey decisively rejected every obligation
to intervene on behalf of Russia and France. In view of
the importance of the déclarations of Grey in forming a
complète judgment on the attitude of England, I give
at length a few sentences from the telegrams addressed
by Grey on July 31 st to Bertie, his Ambassador in
Paris : —
" Nobody hère feels that in this dispute, so far as it
has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved.
Feeling is quite différent from what it was during the
Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute
directly involving France, whereas in this case France
is being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. . . .
We cannot undertake a deflnite pledge to intervene in a
1 Poincaré advanced the same reasons for a déclaration
of solidarity of England with France and Russia in a letter
addressed directly to the King of England on July 31st,
and only published in February, 1915. Even this step of
Poincaré was without success. The answer of King George
avoided giving any précise answer on the chief point in the
French letter, and the attitude of England, which was still
continuously striving for peace, was made contingent on the
development of events. The most sincère pacifie intentions
of the two Powers appear in both the letters, even if there
were a divergency of opinion as to the path by which the goal
could be reached.
2 Blue Book, No. 106.
252 J'ACCUSE
war. I hâve so told the French Ambassador, who has
urged His Majesty's Government to reconsider this
décision." 1
" M. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had
been shown to Sir Arthur Nicholson this morning from
the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was
the uncertainty with regard to whether we would inter-
vene which was the encouraging élément in Berlin, and
that, if we would only déclare definitely on the side of
Russia and France, it would décide the German attitude
in favour of peace. ... I said that we had corne to the
conclusion in the Cabinet to-day that we could not give
any pledge at the présent time. . . . Up to the présent
moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not
feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country
were involved M. Cambon repeated his question
whether we would help France if Germany made an
attack on her. I said that I could only adhère to the
answer that, as far as things had gone at présent, we
could not take any engagement." 2
On the same day, July 31st, Grey, as he had already
so frequently done in the preceding day s, directed to
Prince Lichnowsky an urgent request that if Germany
and Austria " could get any reasonable proposai put
forward " he would support it at Petrograd and Paris,
and if Russia and France would not accept the proposai,
he would hâve nothing more to do with the consé-
quences. 8
This is the documentary évidence found in the
English Blue Book, which aecording to Herr von Beth-
mann's assertion is supposed to prove " clearly and
incontrovertibly " that London had given it to be under-
1 Blue Book, No. 116.
2 Blue Book, No. 119.
3 Blue Book, No. 111.
THE CRIME 253
stood that " she was taking her stand on the side of
France and Russia." The assertion of the Chancellor is
exactly the reverse of the truih, and we can but admire
the courage of a man who asserts in the face of the
whole world facts which, as is clear to everyone, are
diametrically opposed to the truth, and who appeals to
documents which prove the reverse of his assertions.
Everything contained in the English Blue Book with
regard to the attitude of England during the diplomatie
negotiations is confirmed by the Russian and French
publications. The refusais of Grey were directed, as we
hâve seen, simultaneously to France and to Russia.
The déclarations made to the one Power held good as a
matter of course for the other, and through the Em-
bassies were conveyed to the other capital.
Parallel with Grey 's Une of conduct towards the
Entente Powers was the attitude he assumed towards
Germany. It is highly interesting to study this double
action of Grey 's which bears testimony to as much skill
as integrity and true love of peace. When I read this
séries of documents, so dramatically tense, there always
cornes before me the picture of the old councillor of the
district court, F., who thirty years ago used to préside
in a court of minor jurisdiction in the Jûdenstrasse, in
Berlin. As it was highly distasteful to him to
proceed to a judgment he sought in every way, in
season and out of season, to effect compromises,
which would reduce his work. He used the most
diverse means to attain this end. If he did
not succeed in moving the parties to a pliable
attitude by keeping them waiting for hours beside a
baking fire in his office, he had resort to the folio wing
stratagem : he dismissed the défendant for a few
minutes, and pointed out to the plaintiff the weakness
of his case, which could only be expected to lead to its
254 «T ACCUSE
dismissal. Then he called the défendant before him
and pointed out to him the weakness of his reply, and
impressed upon him that he would almost certainly lose
the case. When he had worn each of them out in this
way by separate ad vice, he called them both before the
bench, and, presto ! in nearly every case a compromise
was arrived at. Precisely similar was the course pursued
by Sir Edward Grey with regard to the European
parties with the object of moving them to a peaceful
compromise, and of preventing an armed conflict. He
said to the French and the Russians : "Give way; do
not count on my help ! " And he said to the Germans
and the Austrians : " Give way, do not count on my
neutrality ! "
As the former expected his help — not, be it observed,
jor war, but against war — so the latter sought his
neutrality, the considération of which naturally postu-
lated the outbreak of war.
Grey never wearied in the task of warning the German
Government against the delusion that England would,
in any circumstances, remain neutral in a European
conflict. He warned Prince Lichnowsky; he warned
Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow through Sir E.
Goschen, the English Ambassador. The English Blue
Book is full of proofs for thèse statements. 1 The warn-
ings continued throughout the whole of the critical days
between July 27th and 31st, and reached their culmin-
ating point in the answer of Grey on the 80th of July,
already mentioned on several occasions, a distinguished
document which will always remain a title to glory for
English diplomacy and an ignominy for German diplo-
macy. M We will hâve nothing to do with a neutrality
which would only increase your lust for war, since it
would make it more easy for you to succeed in war !
1 Blue Book, Nos. 87, 89, 101, 102, 111, 116, 119, 123.
THE CRTME 255
Instead of this we propose a joint-labour in the cause
of peace, now and for ever, a labour directed to the
protection of Europe against ail further catastrophes.
We will hâve nothing to do with guarantees such as
you offer ; even if thèse guarantees were more f ar-reach-
ing than they really are, England will hâve nothing to do
with such guarantees, which would only protect you in
your delight in war. England wants peace for ail, and
if you break the peace, do not count on our standing
aside! " Such are the thoughts which Grey in his Note
of July 30th expressed so passionately and so convinc-
ingly.
Even on July 81 st, immediately before the outbreak
of war, he threatened both sides; he called on both
sides to make reasonable proposais, and threatened
each of them that he would leave them in the
lurch if they declined the reasonable proposais of the
other. 1
We know that ail his efforts were in vain — not
through any blâme attaching to France and Russia,
but owing to Germany and Austria. The European
war was there, as soon as Germany had declared
war against Russia. Ail further developments were
bound to follow mechanically according to the treaties
of alliance.
The assertion of the Chancellor that England bears
the responsibility for the European war is not supported
by the English publication, as Herr von Bethmann
believes, but is flatly contradicted by it. But there is
another pièce of évidence which the Chancellor has at
his disposai : the celebrated letter front the Belgian
chargé d'affaires in Petrograd to the Minister Davignon,
which was seized in Berlin on July 31 st and was opened
at a later date. This letter is supposed to contain
1 Blue Book, No 111
Z56 J'ACCUSE
incontrovertible proof of the guilt of England. What
does it really show?
The history of this letter and of its discovery is so
remarkable, and there is such an air of Sherlock Holmes
about the whole story, that some doubts as to its
authenticity may well be allowed. It is extraordinary
that the Berlin Government has always the luck to get
possession at the right moment of documents which
are compromising for others ! The Belgian chargé
d'affaires in Petrograd writes to his Minister under a
covering address, and posts the letter, not in Petro-
grad, but through an intermediary in Berlin. Ail this
is strange, passing strange ! There is no officiai
confirmation of the authenticity of the letter. The
signature of the letter-writer has neither been acknow-
ledged nor proved to be genuine. In a civil action at
law this document would not be admitted to hâve any
force as évidence.
But let us assume for the moment that the letter is
genuine; it contains the observations of the chargé
d'affaires of a small State on events in which he played
no part, and which he only knows from hearsay. The
fact that the witness only reports de auditu, and not
from his own direct observations, deprives his testimony
of any value as évidence as against those witnesses
who report de facto, that is to say, in the case now
under considération, against the officiai documents
which give an account of the diplomatie events them-
selves. If the man who has been robbed testifies before
the judge to ail the détails of the theft, and confirms
his évidence by oath, the judge will from the outset
refuse to listen to any witness who proposes to report
from hearsay that the theft ne ver took place at ail. He
refuses to accept his évidence, let alone give it credence.
From this it follows in the case we are considering
THE CRIME 257
that the facts proved by the diplomatie publications of
England, France, and Russia, and also by those of
Germany, cannot be disposed of by the évidence of the
Belgian chargé d'affaires. Where there is a contradic-
tion between the officiai publications and the Belgian
report we must décide in favour of the former and
against the latter.
Are there, however, contradictions of such importance
between the officiai books and the Belgian report that
the whole édifice consistently constructed out of the
diplomatie publications may thereby be at once over-
thrown? No such contradictions exist. The report
gives her due to each of the States concerned, like an
old gossip who abuses everyone. The writer himself
offers his apologies, so to speak, in saying at the very
outset that the most contradictory reports were circu-
lated without it being possible to distinguish what was
true and what was false as regards the intention of the
" Impérial (Russian) Government." He then praises
Germany, which has indubitably laboured in Petrograd
as in Vienna to find some means of avoiding a gênerai
conflict. He then blâmes Austria, which has shown the
firm détermination " not to draw back a step " ; he refers
to the déclaration of Sazonof that the mobilisation of
Russia was not directed against Germany; he mentions
that the Reservists hâve been called to the colours only
in certain governmental districts, but maint ains
" quietly " as his own personal impression that mobilisa-
tion is going on e very where. England, he says, has
proposed arbitration; Sazanof has done the same.
Austria, however, has rejected both proposais. To the
proposai for a conférence Germany had answered by a
counter-proposal for a direct understanding between
the Cabinets. With ail thèse proposais and counter-
proposals " one might in truth ask whether the whole
s
258 J'ACCUSE
world does not wish for war, and is not merely attempt-
ing to postpone the déclaration of war to some extent
in order to win time." England had at first openly
declared that she would not allow herself to be drawn
into a conflict. To-day, however, people in Petrograd
were convinced, indeed they had assurances, that
England would stand by France. "This support has
an extraordinary influence, and has done not a little
to gain the upper hand for the war-party." The
Russian Army felt itself strong, but her navy could
hardly be counted; this was the reason why the assur-
ance of English support has acquired such great import-
ance.
This document, to which greater importance is
attached by the German Government than to their own
White Book, was published by the Norddeutsche All-
gemeine Zeitung with particular passages emphasised
by heavy type. As a matter of fact, in appraising this
document the resuit is entirely dépendent on the
passages chosen for emphasis in heavy type; according
to the emphasis attached to the various phrases, this
hotch-potch of tittle-tattle, which the writer must hâve
gathered in fhe corridors of the various embassies, for
he himself stood apart from ail the negotiations, can be
used to incriminât e any of the great Powers. If we
emphasise with heavy type that the Cabinet of Vienna
had shown the firm détermination not to draw back a
step, that Austria and Germany had rejected ail pro-
posais for a conférence, arbitration, 8çc, that apparently
the whole world wished for war and only sought to gain
time for préparation, Germany and Austria will be
revealed as the guilty parties. If, on the other hand,
we rely on the observation that England had assured
France that she would stand by her, and had thereby
strengthened the war-party in Petrograd, the responsi-
THE CRIME 259
bility will fall at least in part upon England. The docu-
ment thus proves as much against one side as against
the other — only with the great différence that the
observations directed against Germany and Austria are
confirmed by ail the diplomatie publications, and, above
ail, by the German White Book itself, whereas the
observations against England are contradicted by ail
the publications of the European Governments, and
especially by the German White Book.
I hâve already collected elsewhere the meed of praise
which the German White Book accords to England's
love of peace, and the efforts by her in the cause of
peace. The White Book was closed on August 2nd,
and contains ail the diplomatie occurrences up to that
date — only, of course, in so far as their publication was
considered expédient. If England had comported herself
in Paris and in Petrograd as the Belgian letter-writer
reports from hearsay on July 30th, Germany as the
party chiefly concerned was bound to hâve known this
on August 2nd, and could not hâve maintained the
contrary in the White Book. If there had been so much
as a grain of truth in thèse Belgian back-stair stories
the German Government would hâve seized upon it with
joy, and would hâve mentioned the relevant facts in
their mémorandum. England 's participation in the war
was directly imminent when the Chancellor on August
4th laid his White Book before the German Reichstag.
We were at war with England the same evening. The
Chancellor had every interest in saddling the responsi-
bility in advance as far as possible on England, of
whose participation in the war there could no longer
be any doubt on the morning of August 4th after the
violation of Belgian neutrality. If he did not do so,
but contrariwise lavished praise on England, and indeed
even emphasised in the déclaration of war against
S 2
260 ■ J 1 ACCUSE
Russia the efforts made by England in the cause of
peace, we may regard it as fully proved that he had
nothing before him which coula incriminate England,
The proof of this, as we hâve seen, can also be incon-
trovertibly deduced from the diplomatie publications
of the Entente States, and it can ne ver be disposed of
by the unauthenticated gossiping taies of a chargé
d'affaires who took no part in the proceedings. What
Grey in fact did to préserve peace before and after July
30th, the date of this Belgian letter, is an historical fact
proved by public documents; he promised support
neither to France nor to Russia, but, on the contrary,
in reply to repeated invitations from thèse Powers, he
definitely and decidedly refused to give any promise on
the subject. The Chancellor knows this as well as we
do, and if, disregarding ail authentic diplomatie occur-
rences and rejecting his own previous utterances, he
cites a non-authentic, highly suspicious document in
order unjustly to incriminate England, he is not acting
like a gentleman, and speaks against his better know-
ledge.
The truth is contained in the sentences in the Eng-
lish Blue Book 1 : "Sir E. Grey had consistently de-
clined to give any promise of support to either of our
présent allies. He maintained that the position of Great
Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence
for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by
the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely
to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to
believe that the best road to European peace lay through
a show of force. . . . We gave no pledge to our présent
allies, but to Germany we gave three times — on the 30th
July, the 31st July, and the lst August — a clear
warning of the effect which would be produced on our
1 Blue Book, p. xi.
THE CRIME 261
attitude and on the sentiment of the British people by
a violation of the neutrality of Belgium."
That England acted as is hère represented, and not in
accordance with the knowledge professed by the writer
of the Belgian letter, is proved by ail the diplomatie
documents. That, however, Germany, as is equally
asserted in the letter, exerted herself in Vienna in the
cause of peace, is not proved by anything since, as I
hâve already pointed out, no correspondence between
Vienna and Berlin has been published. We are referred
to the unproved assertions of Germany, which deserve
no belief, if only because the sincère intention of Ger-
many to move Vienna to modération was bound to hâve
been unconditionally successful.
The Chancellor in his speech of December 2nd stated :
M The Cabinet of London could hâve made this war im-
possible by declaring in Petrograd without ambiguity
that England was not prepared to allow a Continental
war in Europe to develop out of the conflict between
Austria and Serbia. . . . England did not do this. . . .
England saw how things were moving, but did nothing
to spoke the wheel. In spite of ail protestations of
peace, London gave it to be understood in Petrograd
that she was taking her stand on the side of France
and Russia."
Thèse sentences are untrue from beginning to end.
They become true if everywhere in place of England
we read Germany, and in place of Petrograd we read
Vienna. The truth then runs as folio ws : —
" The Cabinet of Berlin could hâve made this war im-
possible by declaring in Vienna without ambiguity that
Germany was not prepared to allow a Continental war
in Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria
and Serbia. . . . Germany did not do this. . . . Germany
saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke
262 J'ACCUSE
the wheel. în spite of ail protestations of peace Berlin
gave it to be understood in Vienna that she was taking
her stand on the side of Austria."
• • • • • •
The e vents between the lst and 4th August, between
the German déclaration of war against Russia and the
English déclaration of war against Germany, require a
spécial discussion. The question to be answered in this
discussion is no longer " Who brought about the Euro-
pean War ? " For this already had broken out with the
German déclaration of war against Russia, which neces-
sarily entailed a war between France and Germany and
a war between Russia and Austria. In thèse cases there
were binding treaties of alliance which made war inévit-
able between the four Powers mentioned.
I hâve already indicated the attitude assumed by
Italy. The obligations of this country extended only to
participation in a défensive war, and she declined to
take part on the express ground that this war was on
the part of Germany and Austria an aggressive war —
a reason, be it observed, to which spécial weight must
be attached in the mouth of an ally, and precisely for
this reason it appears to hâve been taken very airily by
Herr von Bethmann ; for in his writings and speeches he
glides over it in silence.
England was the only country which was not con-
strained by any kind of treaty obligations to take part
in a war. I hâve already indicated in an earlier passage
that England, it is true, had concluded spécial treaties
with France and Russia on definite questions affecting
their interests, but that she had not concluded any
gênerai treaty of alliance with either of thèse parties,
and that consequently she was also not a party to the
Franco-Russian Alliance. On the basis of thèse spécial
treaties which had overcome the friction existing
THE CRIME 263
between Englanû and the two other States, a political
approximation had arisen which established a relation
of friendship without treaty obligations.
England was thus free, and had to décide according
to her own point of view whether she would or would
not take part in the European War. The question
of her participation or non-participation had not the
slightest connection with the other and far more impor-
tant question, both from a moral and historical point
of view, the question of the responsibility for this war.
In this respect, as in so many others, the logic of the
German people, and especially of its leading men, has
completely disappeared; they will not, or cannot,
understand that what England did after the out-
break of war has nothing to do with what she had
done previously. The one is entirely distinct from the
other, and must be measured by an entirely différent
standard.
I will prove that, just as England before the outbreak
of war had done everything to prevent it, so afterwards
she did nothing to extend the war by participation in it,
but rather that she was compelled to do so, owing to the
action taken by Germany. But even supposing, as I
will assume for the moment, that this could not be
proved, it would not be demonstrated in the slightest
degree that England was responsible for the outbreak
of the European War. It is theoretically quite possible
that England may hâve caused the war and nevertheless
later remained neutral, and, on the other hand, it is
equally possible that she did not cause the war and yet
later on took part in it. There is no logical connection
between the two points involved in causing and parti-
cipating in the war.
This private lecture on logic is directed in the first
place to the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg,
264, J'ACCUSE
who in his speech of December 2nd treats ail thèse things
as being identical. An assurance given by England to
France on August 2nd, that is to say, after the outbreak
of war, a reason advanced in explanation of the English
déclaration of war on August 4th, thèse subséquent
occurrences are for him so many proofs that the war
was intentionally instigated by England. Thèse proofs
are defective, if only because they are contrary to the
simplest logic. Acts which prove guilt can ne ver be
subséquent in time to the décisive event; they must
précède it, or at least happen contemporaneously
with it.
For this reason it is difïicult to understand the purpose
of thèse interminable and constantly repeated discus-
sions in Germany on the ground which moved England
to take part in the war. Thèse grounds are exclusively
England 9 s own business. They may be more or less
tenable, they may be more or less hypocritical, but they
will not because of that remove one jot of the guilt and
the responsibility which rests on Germany for having
provoked the war. The question whether England should
take part or should remain neutral in the war only arose
in conséquence of the war. The party then which bears
the blâme for the war is also responsible for its consé-
quences, that is, for the participation of England in
the war, even if he did not directly provoke this partici-
pation. This responsibility is, however, doubled if it
can be proved that in addition to being the prime
originator of the war this party is also the originator
of the participation of England in the war.
I summarise, then, as follows : —
(1) Germany and Austria are responsible for the
world war; their guilt has been proved.
(2) Their guilt cannot be lessened by actions taken by
England after the outbreak of war.
THE CRIME 265
(3) Their guilt will be increased if they themselves
provoked thèse actions.
Let us examine the facts in the light of thèse guiding
principles.
England declared war against Germany on the even-
ing of August 4th because Germany had furnished a
négative reply to her demand to refrain from a further
violation of Belgian neutrality. On the morning of
August 4th German troops penetrated into Belgian
territory after Belgium had refused to comply with the
German request for a free passage. 1 England, as one
of the guarantors of the Treaty of London of 1839, had
the right and the duty to intervene, on the appeal made
by the Belgian King on August 3rd, on behalf of the
neutrality of Belgium, which it had guaranteed in
common with Prussia and other Power s. Such a step
on the part of England could surprise no one who had
even a superficial knowledge of the history of Belgian
neutrality. Herr von Bethmann was, however, so
enraged at the action of England that on the last visit
of the Ambassador, Sir E. Goschen, on August 4th,
he was unable to control his agitation, and spoke in a
contemptuous manner of the word " neutrality," which
is so often disregarded, and of the " scrap of paper " on
account of which England was about to begin a war. 2
Herr von Bethmann appears to be badly informed in
the history of his own country. Was he not aware of
the fact that Belgian neutrality had in 1870 been the
subject of one of the fmest diplomatie manœuvres of
the Bismarckian statecraft ? Did he not know that then
also England intervened at the beginning of the war as
the protector of Belgian neutrality, just as on the présent
occasion, only with the différent resuit that Bismarck
1 Grey Book, No. 22.
2 Blue Book, No. 160
266 J'ACCUSE
not only promised that he would respect Belgian
neutrality, but also denounced the intended disregard of
it by France, and thus brought England on to his
side ? Shortly before the beginning of the war, as is
well known, he published an outline of a treaty drawn
up by Benedetti, the French Ambassador, in which
France claimed the annexation of Belgium as a return
for compensation to Prussia in North Germany. The
resuit of this astute move was nothing more nor less
than the neutrality of England, and the conclusion of
identical treaties between England on the one hand and
Germany and France on the other (August, 1870), in
which England expressly declared that, if either of the
belligerent Powers violated Belgian territory, she would
associate herself with the other in defence of Belgium.
The treaty was so strictly observed and interpreted
that Germany after the Battle of Sedan was obliged to
give up the idea of transporting wounded troops through
Belgium.
Is Herr von Bethmann completely ignorant of ail thèse
events ? Or, if he knows anything of them, does he
believe that he, the dwarf on whose shoulders the mantle
of the mighty has fallen, can scatter to the winds the
considérations to which his great predecessor, the giant
Bismarck, willingly and profitably submitted ? Was he
not bound to hâve said to himself , when he allowed the
General Staff to include in their plans the march through
Belgium, that there would resuit from this stratégie
advantage political and military disadvantages for
Germany incomparably greater ? Had he learned
nothing from the past ? Did he not know, as Bismarck
knew quite well, that it had been from time immémorial
one of the elementary principles of English policy to
maintain and to protect the inviolability of the neutral
small States in Northern Europe ? Did no one remind
THE CRIME 267
him of the passionate words with which Granville and
Gladstone — Libéral Ministers like those now in power —
had intervened in August, 1870, for the inviolability of
Belgium, and had described an attack on this country
as "the direst crime that ever stained the pages of
history " ?
Herr von Bethmann appears to hâve been ignorant
of ail this when, in his speech in the Reichstag on
December 2nd, he described the violation of Belgian
neutrality, as not the ground, but the pretext for the
English déclaration of war. It was, in fact, the real
ground to such an extent that England would hâve
declared war against us forty-four years ago if we had
dared to violate Belgium. What is not permitted to a
Bismarck is certainly not allowed to a Bethmann — or
else we must invert the well-known phrase, and say :
" Quod îicet bovi, non licet Jovi."
What purpose is served by inquiring — as the present-
day German professors love to do — whether the protec-
tion of Belgium was for England a moral question or a
question of interests ? Probably it is simultaneously a
question of morals and of interests; in observing her
pledged word England is at the same time protecting
her own interests, which, as has always been openly
admitted, imply in the nature of things that the coast
of the North Sea lying opposite England should be in
the possession of small neutral States. The man who
acts honestly is not obliged to render to anyone an
account of the extent to which his action corresponds
to his own interests. Qui jure suo utitur, neminem
laedit. We cannot scrutinise the soûls of men, much less
the soûls of States, which. indeed, as collective bodies,
do not possess soûls.
In any case, having regard to historical expérience as
well as to the earnest and repeated warnings communi-
268 J'ACCUSE
cated to the German Government, there could not be
the slightest doubt that a violation of Belgian neutrality
would so strongly affect the feelings of the English
people and English interests that England could not
stand aside in silence. In the course of his conversations
Sir Edward Grey repeatedly drew the attention of Prince
Lichnowsky to the conséquences which would follow the
violation of Belgian neutrality which had been brought
into ominous propinquity by the evasive answer which
Herr von Jagow gave to the English inquiry of July 31 st.
Grey had particularly drawn attention to the fact that
" the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this
country." 1 The German Government then endeavoured
to assure the English Government that they had in no
circumstances any intention of annexing Belgian terri-
tory 2 — a soothing pill which, as a matter of course,
England could not swallow; for neutrality is not the
same as "not being annexed," but signifies that the
country which is neutral shall be spared the effects of
war in every respect, and shall not be used even as a
passage for troops. The demand for a right of passage
as an innocent act was, in fact, more than naïve; the
passage of German troops would also hâve justified
France in entering the country, and Belgium would thus
hâve fallen into as evil a plight as can be conceived;
if she had yielded to the German ultimatum she would
hâve run the risk of being obliged to surrender her
country as a battlefield for the combatant Powers, and
she herself would not hâve been in a position to do
anything for the protection of her soil. She would hâve
been crushed between the two armies, and would hâve
been lost, no matter which side had been victorious.
It need therefore cause no surprise that England was
1 Blue Book, No. 101, 123, p. x.
2 Blue Book, No. 157.
THE CRIME 269
not satisfied with the soothing assurances of Germany,
but demanded unconditional respect for Belgian
neutrality. Germany, however, was not in a position
to give an assurance in this sensé, since the long-pre-
pared plans of the General Staff made the passage
through Belgium an imper ative requirement.
As late as August 4th, when the German troops had
already crossed the Belgian frontier, Sir Edward
Goschen, acting on the instructions of his Government,
inquired of Herr von Jagow whether it was not possible
even then to desist from breaking into Belgium and to
withdraw the troops. When this inquiry was answered
in the négative, the English Ambassador entreated the
Secretary of State to consider the matter further, and
to give him a satisfactory answer before 12 o'clock at
midnight. Herr von Jagow replied that his answer
must remain the same, even if twenty-four hours or
more were given him for reflection; thereupon Goschen
asked for his passports.
If we survey the whole behaviour of German diplo-
macy in this question of Belgian neutrality, there is
only one possible explanation of the inexplicable,
namely, that diplomacy had completely resigned in
favour of the chiefs of the arniy. The military situation
was without doubt improved by marching through
Belgium ; the diplomatie situation, however, and in con-
séquence of this the military also in its turn, was enor-
mously worsened by the danger that to the two enemies
in the field there might be added a third, the most
dangerous. Taken altogether, the disadvantages greatly
outweighed the advantages. It was the duty of the
statesman who was controlling the destinies of the
Empire to balance thèse advantages and disadvantages
against each other, and if the calculation yielded an
unfavourable resuit, he should hâve preferred to give
270 ,r ACCUSE
up his office rather than bring his country into a deeper
danger.
In the Germany of to-day it is not, however, possible
to find men capable of décisions such as thèse
demanding strength of character. The Chancellor has
f ailed either in character or in insight ; either he f ailed to
recognise the conséquences which would flow from the
violation of Belgian neutrality, or he did not possess the
energy to give effect to the political point of view against
the view of the military authorities, if need be at the
sacrifice of his office. Now that the disaster has occurred
he endeavours, supported by his faithful folio wers, to
excuse himself with many "ifs" and "buts." "If we
had not violated Belgian neutrality, France would hâve
done so." I hâve already shown that there is nothing
to indicate that this is the case. If, however, France
in fact also intended to enter Belgium, the best course
which Germany could hâve adopted was to wait for this
to happen and allow the fatal conséquences to ensue
for France. There can be no doubt that England would
hâve opposed an invasion of Belgium by France just as
she did in the case of Germany; this may be definitely
inferred from the treaties concluded in August, 1870,
and from the identical inquiry addressed to France and
Germany on July 31st. The situation of France with
regard to England would hâve been morally still more
unfavourable than ours, since France on July 31st had
given a defmite promise, whereas Germany had declined
to do so. If a few days later France had broken her
word, England, if she had not sided with Germany,
would, at any rate, hâve remained neutral.
If, further, it is maintained in exonération of our
diplomacy that England would hâve taken the field
against Germany, even apart from the violation of
Belgian neutrality, it can only be observed that this
THE CRIME 271
assertion is so complètely untenable and unsupported
that it does not even deserve considération. What Eng-
land did to maint ain peace is a historical fact. What
England would hâve doue if this or that had happened
or had not happened, is a mère supposition, which is
not amenable to serious discussion.
To prove that it was not on account of the viola-
tion of Belgian neutrality that England took part in
the war, but in order that she might under ail circum-
stances lend assistance to France, the Chancellor invokes
in his speech of December 2nd an occurrence which took
place in London on August 2nd between Sir Edward
Grey and Cambon, the French Ambassador. 1 What is
the object of this démonstration? It is supposed, as
Herr von Bethmann explains, to prove that England was
now, as always, the perfidious Albion, and under the
mask of moral action was pursuing only her naked
interests. Thèse interests, however, were said to be
comprised in the destruction of the vital nerve of her
greatest industrial competitor : " Thus England and
Russia bear the responsibility for this world war."
A similar jumble of defective logic and of the perver-
sion of truth has seldom been emitted in so pregnant a
moment by anyone in such an authoritative position.
We clutch our heads and seek in vain to f ollow the mean-
derings of this mind. What does it ail mean ? England
is responsible for the world-war because she adhered to
one of the two combatant parties after the outbreak of
the war, which she did not cause, but which, on the
contrary, she sought to prevent by ail the forces at her
disposai. Even if this adhésion took place without any
reason, out of mère caprice on the part of England, it
would be impossible to deduce any responsibility for
the war. To make the antithesis compréhensible, even
1 Blue Book, No. 148.
272 J'ACCUSE
for the dullest intellect, I formulate it in six Latin
words : —
Culpa — ante bellum :
Participatio — post bellum.
England was in no way obliged to adduce to anyone
grounds for her participation in the war. The grounds
which she has adduced may be believed or disbelieved ;
in any case they are, and must remain, grounds for the
participation of England after the war was begun; in
no case can they be reasons which lay on England ? s
shoulders the responsibility for beginning the war.
Certainly there was, as the Chancellor rightly empha-
sised, " no fraternal duty, no compulsion, not even any
menace of their own country." No fraternal duty!
So, then, fraternal duties justify an intervention in the
struggle ! Why, then, Herr von Bethmann, did you not
recognise the fraternal duties of Russia to intervene on
behalf of Serbia ? Why did you seek to prevent Russia
from fulfilling such a fraternal duty by advancing your
proposai for localisation ? Now that you recognise that
fraternal duties may constrain to armed intervention,
will you still try to persuade us that your attempt to
keep back the big brother from the protection of the
small was intended to be seriously taken?
There is said to hâve been nothing which compelled
England to war. True, there was no material compul-
sion. But in what case is there really material com-
pulsion except in a true, genuine war of libération, not
the counterfeit presentment of it? On the other hand,
there was a moral compulsion, a solemn duty imposed
by treaty, to which greater importance attached, inas-
much as its object was the protection of the small
against the great, a treaty signed by ail the Powers,
the aggressor included, and at a later date sealed again
by a new treaty. A duty imposed by treaty — a scrap
THE CRIME 273
of paper ! says Herr von Bethmann. Indeed, what has
induced us to intervene on behalf of Austria in a con-
flict as remote from our own interests as any Albanian
kingdom ? Only a treaty, a scrap of paper, which
imposed upon us obligations as allies. What is right
for us must surely be allowed in the case of England.
If in our case the scrap of paper was enough to justify
us in setting the whole world in fiâmes with this paper-
lighter, why should it not be enough in the case of
England to justify her in bringing further combustible
material to extend the fire which had already broken out ?
If, however, anyone urges against me the arguments
in the White Book : " Yes, but our interests also were
at stake — the Germanie races in Central Europe. . . .
(please don't laugh !). — We dare not allow Austria to
be weakened, &c." — I reply that England also had her
own interests to safeguard, for England also the Treaty
of London of 1839 was not only a moral tie, but also a
guarantee of her interests, a hundred times more impor-
tant for England than ail south-eastern questions taken
together are for us.
We also could hâve remained neutral in a war
between Austria and Russia. Had we remained neutral
the war would hâve been really localised, localised
between Russia and Austria, and neither France nor
England would hâve been drawn into the struggle.
We could not remain neutral, and did not wish to do
so, because we were bound by a Treaty of Alliance, and
the fulfilment of our duties under the Treaty was at
the same time in agreement with our interests.
The position was precisely the same in the case of
England. England could not remain neutral, and did
not wish to do so when confronted with a violation
of Belgian neutrality, because she was by treaty
obliged to the protection of Belgium, and this protec-
T
274 J'ACCUSE
tion was at the same time in agreement with her
interests. The rôles are thus equally shared. Germany
and England from the standpoints proper to each
adopted the same course of action for the same reasons.
The fundamental différence is to be found merely in the
fact that England intervened on behalf of an innocent
small State, whereas Germany took under her wings a
guilty great State; that Germany thus provoked the
world-war, whereas England sought to prevent it by
every possible means.
But let us just make the attempt to folio w the logic
of Bethmann and examine the fact which is supposed
to prove that Belgium neutrality was only a mask. Sir
Edward Grey on August 2nd gave to Cambon, the
French Ambassador, the following assurance based on a
resolution of the Cabinet : —
"If the German Fleet cornes into the Channel or
through the North Sea to undertake hostile opérations
against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will
give ail the protection in its power.
"This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy
of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of
Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His
Majesty's Government to take any action until the above
contingency of action by the German Fleet takes
place." 1
In explanation of this déclaration Grey expressly
pointed out that even in the event of a war breaking out
between France and Germany England could not bind
herself to déclare war upon Germany. Only in the case
expressly foreseen, that is, if the German Fleet should
corne into the Channel or through the North Sea and
undertake hostile opérations against French coasts or
shipping, only in this case would the British Fleet corne
1 Blue Book, No. 148
THE CRIME 275
to the help of France — ail this, of course, being dépen-
dent on the approval of Parliament.
This is the latest missile by means of which Herr von
Bethmann endeavours to despatch English statesmen
from life to death (moral death, that is to say). He
attaches spécial importance to the fact that this déclara-
tion of Grey's was given before the ultimatum was sent
to Belgium, and he infers from this that England, even
before the violation of Belgian neutrality, had taken
the field as a belligerent, and in conséquence that this
violation was not the true ground for England 's parti-
cipation in the war. To ail this I answer in popular
phraseology : "I don't think."
Even if the whole of this déduction were just, it would
be entirely superfluous. The décisive question, "Who
is to blâme for the European war ? " is neither answered
nor influenced by the events of August 2nd. On August
2nd the war was there, owing to the guilt of Germany
and Austria and against the will of England. It could
no longer be prevented. Its extension to France was
inévitable, and in fact had already taken place, even
if the déclaration of war was not delivered at Paris until
the following day. The ultimatum to France had
expired at 1 o'clock on the afternoon of August lst,
and had been answered by France by a refusai. The
déclaration of war between Austria and Russia was a
formality which was bound to take place at any moment,
but which — mirabile dictu! — to increase the madness of
the whole affair, was delayed until August 6th. In short,
the war between the four Powers had corne, and England
was free to act as her interests required. If her interests
required her to support France in gênerai or in certain
cases, well and good, she was free to act in accordance
with thèse interests. If her interests required her to
take part in the war only in the event of the violation
T 2
276 J'ACCUSE
of Belgian neutrality, she was free to act in this way
also. In either case not the slightest reproach can be
made against England. If we took our stand beside
Austria, England also could stand by France.
The fact that there existed between England and
France no alliance which imposed obligations did not
prevent England from promising asistance to France
on the ground of the friendly relations between them,
and, above ail, on the ground of her own interests. We
also acted exclusively in accordance with our own
interests, which, when occasion required, folio wing the
celebrated example of Austria, we designated as " ques-
tions of life and death." Thus the invasion of Belgium
was for usa question of life and death (see the despatch
of Jagow to Lichnowsky of August ^h 1 ), or, more
modestly expressed, a question of our military interest.
So also the neutrality of England, if not a question of
life and death, was at any rate for us a question of far-
reaching importance, and for this reason we endeavoured
in every possible way to secure this neutrality both
before and after the outbreak of war. And earnestly as
we desired peace with England, with equal earnestness
and persistence we sought for war with Russia and
France. In the first place, our désire was to be lords on
the Continent, and then — every thing else would follow.
What, then, I again ask, is the object of this entirely
superfluous discussion as to this or that reason which
may hâve moved England to war ? Is Europe a court
of moral jurisdiction to pass condemnation on hypo-
crites and Pharisees ? Woe to us, if such a court
existed ! How should we stand before such a tribunal ?
We should be unmasked, the conquerors in the mask of
liberators, the aggressors in the mask of the attacked,
the wolf clothed in sheepskin !
1 Blue Book, No. 157
THE CRIME 277
Yes, indeed, if we had only enough honesty to confess
the unspeakable crime ! If like the great conquerors of
the past who took the world by storm, like Alexander
the Great, or the Romans, or Napoléon the First, we
openly proclaimed our right to possess and to rule the
world, because we were better, more valiant, and
stronger than the others ! There would be something
great in that, something fascinating, something which
would compel respect, for everything that is great
captures the imagination, even if it is in the service of
pernicious ends. A Rinaldo Rinaldini, a Richard III.,
a Cesare Borgia are monsters, but they are great in their
kind, and awake admiration like every human type
which has achieved perfection. But we, how petty we
are! In our writings and our speeches at home we
preach a policy of world-power, of conquest, and of
world-dominion — of course, only among the initiated —
but to the stupid people and to foreign countries we
profess that it is we who hâve been attacked and fallen
upon, that we are the victims of treacherous enemies.
We also " secretly preach wine and publicly drink
water." In the intimate circle of our Junkers, our
courtiers, and our Gênerais we raise the intoxicating
wine of enthusiasm for war, but in public before the
people and beyond the frontiers we drink the water of
peacefulness, of meekness, and of innocence.
It therefore does not become us to reproach the
English Government with double-speaking and with
hypocrisy. In this case also we seek the mote in
another's eye and do not see the beam in our own.
How complète a master Germany is of ail the arts of
hypocrisy is proved, apart from the events of 1914, by
a séries of déclarations made by German diplomatists
between the years 1911 and 1913 on the subject of
Belgian neutrality. As far back as 1911, in connection
278 ,r ACCUSE
with the discussion of the Dutch scheme for the forti-
fication of Flushing, the fear was frequently expressed
in the Belgian Press that Germany would violate
Belgian neutrality in the event of a Franco-German
war. In the interests of good neighbourly relations with
Germany the Belgian Minister gave expression in Berlin
to the désire that the Impérial Government might dispel
thèse fears by a public déclaration in the Reichstag.
Through Herr von Flotow, who was then Ambassador,
Herr von Bethmann conveyed his warm thanks for the
friendly sentiment of the Belgian Government, but
replied that he could not make the desired public
déclaration for fear of weakening the military situation
of Germany with regard to France. If she were
assured against an attack from the north, France could
concentrate ail her energy on the eastern frontier, and
thereby render invasion by Germany a more dimcult
undertaking. 1 This evasive answer of Bethmann is
to-day compréhensible. It is clear that even theri the
plans for the invasion of Belgium were ready, and the
Chancellor had in conséquence scruples about declaring
publicly in the Reichstag that he would respect a
neutrality, the violation of which had already been
decided upon.
Less prudence was, at any rate, shown by Herr von
Jagow, who, in the financial committee of the Reichstag
on April 29th, 1913, did not shrink from making the
untrue déclaration that the neutrality of Belgium was
established by treaty, and that Germany intended to
respect this treaty. 2 The utmost limit in unscrupulous-
ness was, however, reached by Herr von Below-Saleske,
who, as late as August 2nd, some hours before handing
over the German ultimatum, gave to Davignon, the
1 Grey Book, No. 12.
2 Grey Book, No. 12.
THE CRIME 279
Belgian Foreign Minister, the most quietening assur-
ances with regard to the intention of her German neigh-
bour. When M. Davignon expressed his satisfaction
on this point, but notwithstanding stated that, for the
purpose of reassuring his country, he would be glad to
receive from the German Government an officiai déclara-
tion such as France had already formally given on July
31 st, Herr von Below contented himself with declaring
that he had not yet received any instructions in this
sensé. 1 On the same evening about 7 o'clock he handed
over the ultimatum. This certainly is a model of " fair
play " which cannot be excelled ! But it is only in
keeping with the whole.
In this chapter mention should also be made of a fact
which is still quite unknown in Germany. In the
summer of 1913 the Belgian King and Queen with their
children paid an officiai visit to Liège on the occasion
of some célébration or other. The Emperor William —
— made use of this opportunity to send
a spécial envoy to greet the royal couple and to convey
to the Royal Family an assurance of his sincère friend-
ship. The envoy was not, as is usual in such cases, a
General attached to the Court, but General von Emmich,
who was later the conqueror of Liège.
Let us, however, return to the reproaches directed
1 Grey Book, No. 19.
280 J'ACCUSE
against England. England, it is suggested, by the assur-
ance given on August 2nd had already abandoned her
neutrality, and had placed herself on the side of
France. The violation of Belgian territory is, in consé-
quence, supposed to hâve been a negligible factor in
moulding her décisions. What, then, in reality was the
assurance given to the French Government ? It did not
eoctend beyond a conditional and restricted protection.
The protection was linked to the condition that the
German Fleet should corne into the Channel or through
the North Sea to undertake hostile opérations against
French coasts or shipping. The protection was further
subjected to the restriction that it should be given only
by the English Fleet. It was expressly pointed out
that this protection was not to be taken as being équiva-
lent to a déclaration of war against Germany.
This conditional and restricted promise on the part
of England did not issue from the free will of the
English Government, but from a treaty obligation which
she had assumed with regard to France. The two
countries had for a long time agreed that France should
concentrate almost the whole of her Fleet in the Medi-
terranean for the protection of the common interests of
France and England, and that England in return for
this should assume the protection of thèse interests in
northern waters. This agreement was not based upon
any kind of military designs against any other Power,
least of ail against Germany. Had any aggressive
tendency against Germany been influential in forming
this naval agreement, the two fleets would probably
not hâve been separated, but at least the greater part
of their combined forces would hâve been united in
northern waters. The Anglo-French agreement had as
its exclusive object the protection of the commercial
interests of the two countries.
THE CRIME 281
The actual position, however, now was that the French
Fleet, with the exception of a few units, was in the
Mediterranean, where it was of service, not only to
French interests, but also to the interests of England.
The north and west coasts of France were consequently
unprotected. In thèse circumstances it was the duty
of England, in the imminent war between France and
Germany which had already becôme inévitable on
August 2nd, to take over the protection of the French
coast, which France with her Fleet tied to the Mediter-
ranean could not in fact assume. This was the meaning
and the reason of Grey's promise of August 2nd.
In making this promise, England had not in the
slightest degree departed from her neutrality, for it
depended on the free will of Germany to refrain from
attacking the coasts and the shipping of France, and
thereby to avoid any ground for an intervention on the
part of the British Fleet. It was open to the German
Government to make the English promise to France
ineffective, and Prince Lichnowsky, in fact, negotiated
in London on August 3rd on the question whether
England would remain neutral should Germany refrain
from attacking the northern coasts and the shipping of
France. 1 Had this been the only question which con-
cerned England thèse negotiations might perhaps hâve
beèn completely successful, but England had other and
more important interests to défend which Germany
could not, or would not, satisfy. Thèse interests were
of two kinds : —
1. The maintenance of France as a great Power in
Europe and as a Colonial Power, and
2. the non-violation of Belgian neutrality.
On the question whether thèse English interests were
legitimate or not, no one apart from England herself
1 Grey's speech of 3rd August.
282 J'ACCUSE
has the right to pronounce judgment. As we made it
our task to maintain Austria-Hungary, so it was open
to England to consider the maintenance of France and
her Colonies as serviceable to her interests. Every great
Power has the right to form an independent judgment
as to what course it may or may not be expédient for
her to adopt, and she is entitled to reject any tutelage
from any other quarter. The interests of States also
are in no way static, but vary according to time and
circumstance. What to-day appears profitable may
appear to-morrow to be disadvantageous or indiffèrent.
Until the agreement of 1904 the maintenance of France
as a Colonial Power was, at any rate, not more than a
matter of indifférence to England. After that agreement
it became an élément in English policy, and formed the
central point in the Anglo-French agreement. This
explains the question put by Goschen to the Chancellor
when the latter made, on July 29th, his well-known bid
for the neutrality of England, and offered in return for
this to guarantee the integrity of French territory — the
question whether this guarantee also extended to the
French Colonies. From the négative answer of Beth-
mann it appeared that Germany intended to make
Colonial acquisitions at the expense of France. 1 But
even apart from any such intention England could not
but fear that the crushing of France from a military
point of view would profoundly shake her position as a
great Power, her well-being, and her independence.
If even in this case England 's interests were im-
perilled, they were still more deeply involved in the
question of Belgian neutrality. From the beginning of
the negotiations the English Government had never Ieft
room for the slightest doubt that the violation of Belgian
neutrality would be a casus belli for England. This was
1 Blue Book, No. 85.
THE CRIME 283
the only question which was bound certainly, uncondi-
tionally, and completely, to lead to a war between
Germany and England, whereas the French question
admitted of accommodation up to a certain point. In
the Belgian question popular sentiment in England
played a décisive part, whereas in the French question
this was not the case. // Germany had respected Belgian
neutrality, and had at the same tinte refrained from an
attack on the coasts and on the shipping of France,
peace between Germany and England would hâve been
maintained. Thèse conditions, however, Germany would
not and could not fulfil, since in order to comply with
them she would hâve had to renounce a naval war with
France, and would hâve encountered insuperable diffi-
culties by land.
War became inévitable when German troops crossed
the Belgian frontier, and the German Government
rejected the English summons to withdraw them. That
was on the evening of August 4 th.
The war, however, could still hâve been avoided when
the English Government on August 2nd gave the well-
known assurance to the French Government. It could
hâve been avoided by the passivity of the German Fleet
against the coasts and the shipping of France, as this
course would hâve excluded any intervention by the
English Fleet. It is therefore untrue, as is maintained
by the Chancellor, that England had already departed
from her neutrality on August 2nd. England 's resolu-
tions had at that time not y et crystallised, and de-
pended on circumstances which, it is true, were then
immédiat ely imminent, but which Kad not y et occurred.
How prudent the English Government was, and how
imprudent the German, appears clearly from a con-
sidération of the situation on August 2nd. England
could hâve definitely decided as to her course of action
284 J'ACCUSE
on August 2nd had she not, up to the very last moment,
clung to the hope that she would not be involved in
the war; for there was then no longer the slightest
possible doubt that the German Army would invade
Belgium. The Chancellor attaches spécial importance
to the fact that the assurance of August 2nd was given
on the afternoon of that day, whereas the ultimatum to
Belgium was only delivered in Brussels at 7 o'clock in
the evening. Still starting from the false assumption
that the English assurance amounted in itself to a parti-
cipation in the war — which is not the case — the Chan-
cellor draws the naïve conclusion that expression had
already been given to this participation in the war at a
time when nothing was or could be known in London
of the intended violation of Belgian neutrality. This
is indeed the height of naïveté ! Ever since July 31st,
when Jagow so evasively answered the English inquiry,
indeed ever since Julv 29th, when Herr von Bethmann
made his bid for English neutrality, ever since the
tortuous déclarations of German diplomatists in Berlin
and London, a blind man must hâve seen how matters
stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium. In addi-
tion to this, there was the entrance of German troops
into Luxemburg early in the morning of Sunday, August
2nd, which put beyond ail doubt the further advance
towards Belgium.
When the English Government gave its assurance to
France, it could therefore no longer hâve any doubt that
the neutrality of Belgium would be infringed by Ger-
many, as indeed was done a few hours later by the
delivery of the ultimatum. If Germany regarded
Russian mobilisation as in itself a casus belli, how much
more justification was there for England regarding the
position existing on August 2nd as a menace to Belgium.
Had England sent an ultimatum to Germany as early as
THE CRIME 285
August 2nd her behaviour would not hâve been différent
from that of Germany on July 31 st with regard to
Russia. Instead of the sentence of Bethmann : " There
was no mention of Belgian neutrality," we ought, if
we are to conform with the truth, to say : " Belgian
neutrality was even then mortally menaced."
From this it follows — in opposition to what is said
by Herr von Bethmann — that even an unconditional
promise of English assistance by land and by sea would
at this moment hâve been already justified by the
menace to Belgian neutrality; much more then was
there justification for the conditional promise of assist-
ance by sea to which Sir Edward Grey restricted
himself.
I summarise, then, as follows : —
1. It is untrue that England had already departed
from her neutrality on August 2nd. The promise given
on August 2nd is not équivalent to a déclaration of war
against Germany,
2. It is, on the contrary, true that England only
departed from her neutrality on August 4th after the
actual violation of Belgian neutrality.
3. Even if the assurance given on August 2nd had
connoted a departure from English neutrality, this
would hâve been justified by the cerfainty then existing
that the neutrality of Belgium would be violated by
Germany.
If England then asserts that it was the violation of
Belgian neutrality which caused her to take part in the
war, she merely speaks the truth.
The truth of this is in particular confirmed by the
fact that Sir E. Goschen, the English Ambassador, asked
on August 4th merely for the withdrawal of German
troops from Belgium, and it was only when this was
refused that he declared that England must take those
286 J'ACCUSE
steps imposed upon her by her treaty obligations. It
was thus possible for Germany as late as the evening
of August 4th to avoid war with England. This is the
best proof which can be furnished that she cannot
already hâve been in a state of war with England on
August 2nd.
Ail the conclusions which the Chancellor believes that
he can deduce from the incident of August 2nd are thus
refuted. On the contrary, there is another conclusion
which is justified, and which I will take the liberty
of stating : the conditional and restricted promise of
contingent naval support is a convincing argumentum
e contrario in support of the fact that up to August
2nd more extensive promises of military support
had not been given to France by England. For this
reason the English déclaration was greeted with great
satisfaction in Paris as " a first assistance which is most
valuable to us." 1 The first promise of assistance was
thus the conditional and restricted promise given on
August 2nd ! This is a striking proof that the assertion
of the Chancellor that England had promised France her
assistance even before the outbreak of war is a lie.
In concluding thèse observations I again désire to
point out with the utmost emphasis that ail thèse dis-
cussions on the participation of England in the war
and the causes for her action do not touch the centre
of the question, which is : " Who is guilty of the Euro-
pean war ? " The object of thèse discussions is precisely
to divert attention from the central question. The
participation of England is a conséquence of the war,
with its own spécial reasons. It could not hâve occurred
if war had not broken out. He who provoked the war
is also responsible for its conséquences. We are thus
led back to the question : Who did provoke the war ?
1 Yellow Book, No. 138.
THE CRIME 287
and to this question there can only be one answer :
Germany and Austria.
I am unable to frame any points in an indictment
against England, because there are none. I can only
summarise her defence in the sentences which I formu-
lated at the beginning of this section. Without doubt
history will concur in the words used by Mr. Asquith
on August 6th in speaking in the British Parliament in
honour of his colleague, Sir Edward Grey : "I am
certain that this House and this country — and I will
add, posterity and history — will accord to him what is,
after ail, the best tribute that can be paid to any
statesman : that, ne ver derogating for an instant or by
an inch from the honour and interests of his own
country, he has striven, as few men hâve striven, to
maintain and préserve the greatest interests of ail coun-
tr ies — uni versai peace . ' ■
D.
RUSSIA
The attitude of Russia in the European conflict has
been indicated with sufficient clearness in the account
already given to make it possible to form a judgment
on Russia 's guilt or innocence.
What is the reproach which Germany throws against
Russia ?
I. Russia is supposed to hâve intervened without any
reason and without any right in the conflict between
Austria and Serbia, and is supposed thereby to hâve
occasioned the European conflagration. I hâve already
explained at length that Russia acted reasonably and
288 J'ACCUSE
within her rights in so intervening, and I hâve nothing
to add to what I hâve said. No one in Europe could
hâve been surprised at this intervention, which during
the Balkan crisis had been clearly announced by Sazonof
as inévitable in the event of an attack being made by
Austria upon Serbia. The interest which Russia felt in
Serbia was a fact with which European diplomacy was
bound to reckon, and always has reckoned; above ail,
German diplomacy, as the White Book shows. It was
" a commonplace in European diplomacy. " 1
II. It is further asserted that the Russian military
party from the beginning wished for war and pressed
for it. If such a party really exists in Russia, which is
still to be proved, it is at least certain that it encoun-
tered at the hands of the Russian Foreign Minister a
more successful résistance than the German war party
met in Herr von Bethmann. From the beginning to the
end of the crisis Sazonof served the cause of peace in
the most zealous manner: —
1. He advised Serbia to assume an attitude of
modération, and his success may be seen in the submis-
sive Serbian Note. 2
2. In common with England and France he en-
deavoured to obtain an extension of the time-limit
prescribed in the Austrian ultimatum, but hère he was
unsuccessful. 3
3. When the conflict began to assume a more acute
form owing to the recall of the Austrian Ambassador,
he claimed the assistance of Italy, in the hope that by
refusing Austria support she might assist in moving her
from her unaccommodating attitude. 4
1 Blue Book, p. v. White Book, p. 406.
2 Orange Book, Nos. 4, 25, 33, 40, 42. Blue Book, No. 55
3 Orange Book, Nos. 4, 5, 11, 12
4 Orange Book, No. 23.
THE CRIME 289
4. Notwithstanding the rupture in the relations
between Austria and Serbia, he entered into friendly
discussions with the Austnan Government. He pointed
out in détail to Szâpâry, the Austrian Ambassador, the
points in the Austrian Note which could be accepted by
Serbia, but he also indicated those which could not be
accepted by any independent State, at any rate, in the
form desired. 1
5. He gave urgent expression to the désire to diminish
by further direct negotiations the tension existing
between Austria and Russia, and he pleaded in Vienna
that the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd should
receive the authority necessary for this purpose. This
was on July 26th. The answer to this was the Austrian
déclaration of war of July 28th, and the strict refusai
of Count Berchtold to enter into any discussion whatever
on the Austrian Note. 2
6. After the failure of this attempt Sazonof supported
in every possible way Grey's proposai for a conférence
of the four Powers. 3
7. He expressed himself as ready to stand aside, and
submit to the proposais of the Powers. 4
8. He induced the Emperor Nicholas to send to Prince
Alexander of Serbia on July 27th a telegram urging
upon him any solution designed to avoid the horrors of
war. 5
9. After the déclaration of war against Serbia he
urgently asked the English Government to use their
1 Orange Book, No. 25.
2 Orange Book, Nos. 38, 45, 50, 54, 77. On the 28th July
Berchtold declared to the Russian ambassador that he could
1 no longer recède, nor enter into any discussion about the
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."
3 Orange Book, Nos. 32, 49, 55, 77.
4 Blue Book, Nos. 55, 78. Orange Book, No. 32.
5 Orange Book, No. 40.
V
290 J'ACCUSE
influence in Berlin so that Austria might at least be
induced to take part in further negotiations. 1
10. He repeatedly and with increasing urgency sought
the médiation of England in the sensé of the proposai
for a conférence of the four Power s, and simultaneously
he constantly expressed his readiness to take part in
direct negotiations with Austria. The refusai of both
thèse proposais in Vienna and Berlin did not deter him
from constantly renewing them. 2 Particularly urgent
were the attempts made by Sazonof in a conversation
with Count Pourtalès on July 29th, 3 in which he
endeavoured to obtain the support of Germany in one
or other of thèse directions. He emphasised the expedi-
ency of parallel discussions on the principle of having
two strings to his bow, that is to say, a conférence in
London of the four Powers not directly concerned and
simultaneously direct conversations in Petrograd be-
tween Austria and Russia. He drew attention to the
favourable results which had followed such a double
action during the last Balkan crisis, and he added that
after the concessions made by Serbia it should not be
difficult to arrange a settlement of the other points
which still remained outstanding, if there were only the
least goodwill on the part of Austria, and if ail the
Powers used their influence in the direction of concilia-
tion. In reply to the earnest appeal of Sazonof, Pour-
talès could only reply that Germany had exerted a
" moderating influence " in Vienna, and that she would
continue to do so. In Petrograd, London, and in Paris
alike it was impossible to obtain more from Germany
than such pretended efforts to exercise a moderating
1 Orange Book, No. 43.
2 Orange Book, Nos. 25, 32, 34, 38, 39, 43, 45, 48 (" that
Great Britain should take instant mediatory action "), 77
3 Orange Book, No. 49.
THE CRIME 291
influence on Vienna ; it was impossible to elicit from her
any positive concurrence in the practicable proposais of
peace put forward by the Entente Power s.
11. Sazonof, along with the other Entente Powers,
repeatedly urged the German Government, which
raised apparently only formai objections against the
conférence proposai, that Germany should herself pro-
pose a form which would be agreeable to her, and he
accepted in advance any proposai of this nature. 1
12. On July 29th he prompted the Tsar to propose
in a telegram to the Emperor William that the Austro-
Serbian conflict should be submitted to the Hague
court of arbitration.
13. On July 30th he dictated to the German Ambas-
sador a formula of agreement, which aimed only at the
protection of Serbia's sovereign rights, and which
pledged Russia to stop her military pr parations. 2
14. After this formula had been rejected by Germany,
he outlined, at the request of Grey, a new formula
which went even further to meet Austria. This formula,
indeed, permitted Austrian troops to remain on Serbian
territory during the further negotiations, and obliged
Russia to maintain a waiting attitude. 3
15. On July 31st, when Austria at length declared
herself ready to enter into discussions on the subject-
matter of the Serbian question, Sazonof at once began
thèse conversations in Petrograd, and in a telegram to
London expressed the hope that a peaceful issue might
yet be found. 4
16. Even on August lst, on the day of the German
déclaration of war, he declared himself ready to conclude
1 Orange Book, Nos. 53, 55, 64.
2 Orange Book, No. 60.
3 Orange Book, No. 67.
4 Orange Book, Nos. 69, 73. Blue Book, Nos. 110, 111
U 2
292 J'ACCUSE
an agreement in the sensé of his second formula, pro-
vided that German troops had not previously crossed
the Russian frontier. In no case, he added, would
Russia begin hostilities first. 1
17. Even at the last moment Sazonof moved the Tsar
to give his solemn word to the Emperor William that
the Russian troops would undertake no provocative
action, so long as the negotiations on the Serbian ques-
tion (resumed on July 31 st) should continue with
Austria. 2
18. Even on the day of the déclaration of war he
moved his monarch to give a renewed assurance that the
Russian mobilisation did not mean war, and to urge
that the negotiations for the welfare of both countries
and for uni versai peace should be continued. 3
Thèse were the exertions of the leader of Russian
policy. Any impartial person may judge whether thèse
exertions were directed to peace or to war. That thèse
untiring efforts for peace had their origin in Petrograd
proves that the so-called Russian war-party was power-
less as against the responsible Minister. It is now a
common reproach of ail belligerent States to accuse their
enemies of having been under the influence of a war-
party ; each dénies his own, and places the responsibility
on those of foreign countries. Hère also it is true that
by their fruits ye shall know them. The efforts of the
Russian war-party — if such a party existed — remained
fruitless; it was unable to influence the peace policy of
the Tsar. The efforts of the German war-party, on the
contrary, hâve yielded fruit only too abundantly —
poisonous fruit — which they succeeded in concealing
under a charm of guile and séduction so that the deluded
1 Blue Book, No. 139.
2 White Book, p. 411.
3 White Book, p. 413.
THE CRIME 293
people in their intoxication reached out their eager
hands ; now they must devour the fruit in ail its bitter-
ness, even though it may bring with it the bitterness of
death.
III. A further reproach urged by the German Govern-
ment against Russia is in effect that Russia by her mili-
tary measures frustrated the negotiations for peace.
This reproach also is without justification, for two
reasons : —
1. because Russia, concurrently with her military
measures of security, maintained uninterruptedly diplo-
matie efforts for peace, 1 and
2. because thèse measures were merely measures of
security, which, according to the solemn assurances
given by the Tsar and his Government, had no aggres-
sive character. It was impossible that they could hâve
had an aggressive character, since, as I hâve already
explained, they served only to support a défensive
policy, and there was no reason whatever for aggressive
action on the part of Russia. The partial mobilisation
of July 29th, as well as the gênerai mobilisation of July
Slst, were the answer to previous mobilisations on the
part of Austria, the dates of which I hâve already estab-
lished from the documentary évidence. 2 Moreover,
Russia was compelled to adopt military measures of
security, not only on account of Austrian mobilisation,
but still more owing to the diplomatie attitude assumed
by Austria and Germany. The unaccommodating be-
haviour of Austria, and the frustration by Germany of
ail attempts at médiation, could not fail to arouse the
overwhelming suspicion — which was, in fact, later con-
firmed — that Germany and Austria desired war under
ail circumstances. Against this menace Russia was
1 Orange Book, Nos. 77, 78.
2 Orange Book, Nos. 47, 49, 58, 77, 78.
294 J'ACCUSE
bound to provide for her security, and the reproach,
inferred from the Russian mobilisation, is also shown to
be baseless.
The taies of the broken words of honour and of the
crossing of the frontier before the déclaration of war
I hâve already characterised elsewhere by their proper
terms.
There is thus no charge to be brought against Russia,
and I can only conclude this section with the regret,
which ïs certainly compréhensible in a German, that
Russia is wholly blameless of the European war, and
that the guilt rests exclusively on Germany and Austria.
E.
FRANCE
German utterances, spoken and written, on the
responsibility of France for the war are surprisingly
restrained, and are supported on very scanty material.
The German White Book accuses France merely of
" milifary préparations " during the diplomatie negotia-
tions, and asserts at the conclusion of the account which
it contains that France on the morning of August 2nd,
that is to say, before the German déclaration of war,
had "opened hostilities."
The Chancellor adhères to this reproach in his speech
of August 4th, and cites in support of his assertion
alleged French incursions into German territory. In his
speech of December 2nd he rides off on the old revanche
idea, but hère also he is unable to produce anything
more substantial against France.
I hâve already estimated the proper value of ail thèse
THE CRIME 295
reproaches, and pointed out their flimsiness. In parti-
cular I was able to prove that the most serious viola-
tions of the frontier before the German déclaration of
war were committed by German troops, that thèse were
of fréquent occurrence, and resulted in bloodshed,
whereas the counter-accusations of Germany against
France are not only improbable but self-contradictory,
and are therefore unworthy of credence.
A new accusation against France has been given
currency for the first time in the recently published
Note of the Chancellor dated December 24th, in which
the participation of France in the diplomatie negotia-
tions is subjected to criticism. We can only be grateful
to the Chancellor that he has at length formulated a
charge to which it is possible to submit a defence. This
accusation is supported on the following assertions : —
1. France did not trust German assurances, and
received ail the steps of the German Ambassador with
mistrust.
2. Germany 's wish for mediating influence in Petro-
grad was not regarded.
3. The French Government did not take a single
positive step in the interest of peace.
What is the truth with regard to thèse accusations ?
It is true that the démarches of Herr von Schoen were
received in Paris with a certain mistrust. This mistrust
was, however, only too well founded. Herr von Schoen
was called upon to play in Paris the same misérable
rôle as fell to the lot of Herr von Jagow in Berlin. It
was his task to thwart ail the attempts of the Entente
Powers to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict,
and to put forward threadbare reasons in defence of the
astonishing and ambiguous behaviour of the German
Government. He dared not associate himself with the
endeavours of France to obtain an extension of the
296 J'ACCUSE
time-limit allowed in the ultimatum, but, on the con-
trary, he had to offer to the French Government a blind
defence of the Austrian Note, and of ail the later actions
taken by Austria. 1 Grey's proposai for a conférence of
the four Powers, which had been immediately accepted
by France, and was agreeable to ail the other Powers,
he was bound to reject, and in place of this it was his
duty to recommend as a panacea the impossible German
proposai for localisation. 2 He was bound to assert the
insufnciency of the Serbian Note, which had conceded
ail the material demands of Austria, and he had to
represent as justifiable the recall of the Austrian Am-
bassador; indeed, in compliance with Bethmann's
instructions, he had to impress on the French Govern-
ment the desirability of common Franco-German
pressure on the Petrograd Cabinet, whereas, on the
other hand, he was bound to décline any kind of pressure
from Germany on Vienna. He had to listen in silence
or could give only inconséquent answers during his
fréquent visits to the Quai d'Orsay, when M. Bienvenu-
Martin, the French Acting Foreign Minister, pointed
out to him the illogical nature of this proposai; for, as
M. Bienvenu-Martin indicated, Austria had in nearly
every point achieved her will, but had nevertheless
begun a military action against Serbia; a cessation
might therefore be asked for from Austria, but not from
Russia; pressure might be exercised on Vienna, not on
Petrograd. 8 Russia was indeed ready to negotiate, either
directly with Austria or by the médiation of the four
Powers not directly concerned. Russia was ready to
accept any proposai made by the conférence of the
four Powers. What further pressure did he suggest
1 Yellow Book, Nos. 28, 36.
2 Yellow Book, Nos. 56, 57, 61.
3 Yellow Book, Nos. 61, 62, 77, 78.
THE CRIME 297
should still be exercised on Russia ? Austria, however,
was not ready either for direct negotiations or to accept
proposais made by the four Powers. If, therefore, pres-
sure had to be exercised in any quarter it must be in
Vienna, and Berlin alone was in a position to accom-
plish this. An Ambassador, charged with the task of
upholding the opposite view, is an object calculated
rather to inspire compassion than to evoke condemna-
tion. 1
But he had to go even further in revealing his naked-
ness. When in place of médiation he proposed direct
negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, and was
asked by the French Ambassador what was really the
aim of the Austrian opérations in Serbia (July 29th), he
had to give the mortifying answer that the German
Government did not know, but that it hoped to learn
from Austria. 2 This answer also, as is known, must be
laid at the door, not of the wretched Paris Ambassador,
but of his Government, which up to the présent day
has not explained to the world what Austria really
wanted from Serbia. Meanwhile the Serbians hâve given
the answer which Austria was asked in vain to furnish :
they hâve driven the Austrians out of their country, and
presumably this was what the Austrians wanted.
Thus the whole action of Herr von Schoen in Paris
is nothing but a continuous séries of discomfitures which
he personally had not merited. The constantly repeated
request that he should indicate the form of conférence
agreeable to the German Government, which in principle
had apparently been approved, he was obliged to leave
unanswered, since no instructions in this sensé had
been sent to him from Berlin. 8 He had to maintain a
1 Yellow Book, No. 85.
2 Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 97.
8 Orange Book, No. 55.
298 J'ACCUSE
passive attitude towards ail Anglo-French attempts to
arrive at a settlement between the conflicting stand-
points of Austria and Russia by devising a formula of
agreement, since his Government did not consider that
such attempts were even worthy of a discussion. 1
The worst rôle, however, did not fall to him until
after the fruitless expiration of the ultimata; he had
then to submit to further discomfiture at the hands of
M. Viviani, who held up to him the criminal madness of
the action taken by Germany, which shortly before the
solution of the dispute had, without any reason, driven
Europe into the most fearful of wars. Herr von Schoen
was obliged to limit his answer to saying that he had
received no officiai communication with regard to the
favourable position of the negotiations, but that he was
going to get information. 2 Two days later he had to hand
to M. Viviani a déclaration of war based on the fact that
France had begun hostilities and also that she had
violated Belgian neutrality 3 — assertions which he, more
than anyone, knew to be false : had he not himself
witnessed the sincère efforts made by France for peace ?
Wretched Ambassador ! The mistrust with which he
was received in France was certainly excelled by the
mistrust which he felt towards his own actions.
The further reproach put forward by Bethmann that
the French Government had disregarded Germany 's
désire for mediating influence in Petrograd has already
been deprived of ail force by the previous discussion.
Germany refused to exercise any influence on Austria,
presumptuous beyond ail measure and scoffing at ail con-
sidérations of European peace, and she demanded, on
the other side, that pressure should be exercised by
1 Yellow Book, Nos. 101, 114
2 Yellow Book, No. 125.
3 Yellow Book, No. 147
THE CRIME 299
France on Russia, which had already shown in the good
advice proffered to Serbia an extraordinary conciliatory
attitude, and which was ready to take any further step
necessary to meet her opponent. 1
The demands addressed by Germany to France, and
thus indirectly to Russia, were thus somewhat stiff, but
nevertheless they were complied with by France up to a
certain point. The French Yellow Book and the English
Blue Book both bear witness to this. In a despatch
of July 29th 2 Bienvenu-Martin declared it to be essen-
tial that the Cabinet of Petrograd, whose peace inten-
tions were manifest, should immediately give their
adhérence to the English proposai for a conférence of
the four Powers. This French initiative was at once
attended by success. The French Ambassador in Petro-
grad telegraphed on the same day to his Minister that
Sazonof accepted the proposai for a conférence of the
four Powers without attaching any importance to the
title officially given to the discussions, and that he
would acquiesce in any measures taken by England in
order to maintain peace. B
Another and much more striking instance of French
influence on Russian décisions in the sensé of modéra-
tion may be given. On July 30th, when the Russian
partial mobilisation against Austria had taken place,
and Germany was already threatening to carry out a
counter-mobilisation, Viviani emphatically pressed for
prudence in Petrograd; it would be well, he said, even
in taking measures for security and defence, that Russia
should take no step which might off er Germany a pretext
for a counter-mobilisation. 4 Hère also his efforts were
1 Yellow Book, Nos. 77, 78.
2 Yellow Book, No. 85.
3 Yellow Book, Nos. 86, 91-
* Yellow Book, No. 101
300 J'ACCUSE
crowned with success : Russia suspended further
measures of mobilisation 1 until she was compelled to
act by Austria's gênerai mobilisation.
A further instance of the success of French influence
in Petrograd was seen on July 31 st, when the efforts
of the Entente Powers were directed to finding a middle
path between the formula? of Grey and Sazonof, in
order to gain Austria's consent even at the last moment.
In a Note, 2 distinguished by its pénétration and inspired
by a sincère désire for peace, Viviani proposed such a
middle path, which could not fail to be equally accept-
able to Austria and Russia, and authorised his Ambassa-
dor at Petrograd to make the following communication
to Sazonof :
" Please inform M. Sazonof urgently that the sugges-
tion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful
basis for conversation between the Powers, who are
equally desirous of working for an honourable arrange-
ment of the Austro-Serbian conflict, and of averting in
this manner the dangers which threaten gênerai peace."
There then follows a more detailed explanation of the
modifications in the proposai of Grey and Sazonof, and
he adds in conclusion : —
" I wbuld ask you carefully to be guided by the fore-
going considérations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof
to give his adhérence without delay to the proposai of
Sir E. Grey, of which he will hâve been himself
informed."
The French Ambassador, Paléologue, was able to
report on the same day that Sazonof had accepted the
proposais of Viviani, and that he had modified his
original formula in the manner suggested by Grey. 3 This
1 Yellow Book, No. 104.
2 Yellow Book, No. 112.
3 Yellow Book, No. 113.
THE CRIME 301
new proof of French intervention for peace and of
Rùssia's conciliât ory disposition was furnished, although
during the preceding night and day Belgrade had been
bombarded by Austria and the whole of Russia had been
brought to a high pitch of excitement by Austria 's
provocative and unaccommodating action.
Even after the German ultimatum was delivered
in Paris on July 31 st Viviani directed an urgent appeal
to the Impérial Government in Petrograd that in the
highest interests of peace they would do everything on
their part to avoid anything that might render inévit-
able or precipitate the crisis (Je ne doute pas que le
Gouvernement Impérial dans l'intérêt supérieur de la
paix n'évite pour sa part tout ce qui pourrait rendre
inévitable ou précipiter la crise 1 ).
Many similar examples could be cited from the diplo-
matie correspondence. But Herr von Bethmann says
that France did not exert her influence in Petrograd for
peace, and that in fact she did nothing in the interests
of peace, and — Bethmann is an honourable man.
When we survey the activity of French diplomatists
during thèse critical days and compare them with those
of other European Governments, it is impossible to
avoid the conclusion that their utterances, as given in
the Yellow Book, excel the achievements of ail other
diplomatists in élégance of form and in plastic strength
of représentation. To English diplomacy fell the leader-
ship in the negotiations, and it discharged this task
with the sober quietness and clarity which is peculiar
to the Englishman in ail situations. Russian diplomacy
also kept itself within the limits of fact, and expressed
itself with modération up to the last moment until the
morning of August lst, immediately before the German
déclaration of war. In this critical moment, however,
1 Yellow Book, No. 117
302 T ACCUSE
Sazonof could not refrain from pouring out his heart
to his French and English colleagues, and character-
ising in its true light, without any varnish, the policy
of Austria and Germany 1 ; the policy of Austria had
been both tortuous and immoral, that of Germany had
been equi vocal and double-faced, and she had been
specially unfortunate in her représentatives in Vienna
and Petrograd. The former was a violent Russophobe,
who constantly poured oil on the flame ; the latter an
ignorant person, who allowed his Government to believe
that Russia would never go to war, no matter how much
they trod on her feet.
In contrast to thèse diplomatists of Russia and Eng-
land, who, with few exceptions, remain sober in their
views and confine themselves within the limits of fact,
the genius of the French, their grâce in form, their
adaptability in ideas, their resource in devising new
ways out of difficult situations, appear ail the more
brilliant. It is a pure pleasure for the literary con-
noisseur to read the French Yellow Book. What a
brilliant type is represented by the two Cambons ! How
dexterous and fascinating is the Prime Minister
Viviani ! And even Bienvenu-Martin, who appears less
in the foreground, how précise are his antithèses, how
effective his réfutation of German sophisms, how pene-
trating is his vision in framing a judgment on the
tendencies of Austria and Germany !
And the diplomatists of Germany ? O Du lieber Gott!
This is not a subject to speak about. Herr von Schoen
was not the only one who was condemned to a tragic
rôle. Herr von Tschirschky in Vienna, the Russophobe,
Count Pourtalès in Petrograd, Herr von Flotow in Rome
— what a misérable part they ail had to play ! There was
Herr von Flotow, who knew so little of the mind of the
1 Blue Book, No. 139.
THE CRIME SOS
Italian people and of the views of the Italian Govern-
ment that he considered it possible that Italy might
participate in an offensive war against Serbia and share
in its further conséquences — a view which one dared not
hâve attributed to the most inexperienced German com-
mercial traveller in Italy without running the risk of
an action for personal libel. There was Count Pourtalès,
who thought that a few manifestations of labour unrest
in Russia was sufficient to cause the Russian Govern-
ment to give way to Austrian efforts to establish a
hegemony on the Balkans, and who had the thankless
task of defending in Petrograd the ingenious theory of
Bethmann that the conférence of four Powers M required
of the Austrian Empire just what they had not been
willing to suggest to Serbia, namely, that she should
give way under military pressure." This is a theory
which affords Herr von Bethmann so much pleasure
that he exhibits it once more in his most récent circular
note, which, however, unfortunately, forgets two things :
firstly, that Serbia had already given way beforehand,
so that military pressure was an irresponsible pièce of
presumption, and secondly, that the conférence of four
Powers did not aim at any kind of pressure or any
military measures, but that — as even the thickest head
must hâve begun to realise after the countless explana-
tions which were given — its intention was merely to
obtain the friendly advice of the four Powers uncon-
cerned.
Herr von Ïschirschky-Bogendorf in Vienna had also
a truly thankless rôle to play, in that he had in
appearance and outwardly to press for modération at
the BaÏÏplatz; inwardly, however, in the room where
Count Berchtold laboured, he could give free reins to
the secret instructions of Herr von Bethmann, which
at the same time corresponded to his own personal
304 J'ACCUSE
inclinations, and could there press for war. Sir Maurice
de Bunsen was right when he saw through this double
play of our Ambassador at Vienna, and from ail the acts
of omission and commission of Herr von Tschirschky
— especially from his industrious and suspicious refusai
of ail common action for peace with the Ambassadors of
the Entente Powers — drew the certain conclusion that
our Ambassador at Vienna had from the beginning
worked for war. 1
Of Prince Lichnowsky in London — the only one
among our Ambassadors — we must say this in his
honour, that he earnestly desired peace, and that he
was only the innocent victim of those above him. He
also had to resort to a hundred évasions in order
to conceal the intentions of Germany on Belgium, and
so keep England neutral, if this could in any way be
achieved; he had to discuss with Sir Edward Grey the
hypothesis that we might respect Belgian neutrality, 2
although he knew that our troops were already almost
at the Belgian frontier, and that there was no longer
any possibility of Belgian neutrality being respected.
Again, two days later, after the ultimatum had been
presented to Belgium, he had to run after Sir E. Grey —
just as the latter was on the point of going to the
décisive meeting of the Cabinet on the morning of
August 3rd — and had to plead with him insistently to
be so good as to be willing to remain neutral even if we
should violate Belgian neutrality. 3 Even at the very
last moment he attempted to make an impression on
public opinion in England by an article in the Press, in
which he emphasised Germany 's readiness to refrain
from making the Belgian coast a point d'appui for
i Blue Book, Nos. 141, 161.
2 Blue Book, No. 123.
3 Grey 's speech of 3rd August, Yellow Book, No 144.
THE CRIME 305
naval opérations. 1 In ail thèse desperate efforts at the
eleventh hour the good will of our London Ambassador
may indeed be observed, but even his best intentions
could not prevent the représentative of a bad policy
from necessarily appearing in a bad light.
And now to corne to the highest of ail, to Herr von
Jagow ! From this portrait gallery I omit the Chan-
cellor, whom I hâve already sufficiently characterised.
But Herr von Jagow ! What a lamentable picture of
pitiable helplessness ! It is sumcient to observe how
misérable he appears against his two chief opponents,
the Englishman Goschen and the Frenchman Cambon;
how he was constantly reduced to straits by their
superiority, like a mouse in a trap seeking in vain for a
way of escape. It is true that in his case, as in that of
his German colleagues, we must make allowance for the
fact that they had to défend a bad cause, and their
opponents a good one. They had to resort to loopholes
and ambiguities, whereas the others could advance
openly and honourably to the end in view. But the
worse their cause was the more skill and emciency was
needed to défend it. Anyone who défends a bad cause
with dexterity can at least, as they say in the East,
"save his face." He, however, who by his inemciency
draws spécial attention to the weaknesses of his posi-
tion makes his bad cause even worse, and forfeits ail
claim to personal respect. On a big merchant being
asked why he retained two barristers for his cases, and
why he paid one better than the other, he answered
with a sly smile, "The good one is for the bad cases,
and the bad one for the good." The badness of our
case demanded that we should hâve the best diploma-
tists, not to win, but at least to avoid revealing it
publicly to the whole world in ail its hideousness.
1 Yellow Book, No. 144.
306 J'ACCUSE
In order not to appear unjust, I must support my
judgment by a few examples from the diplomatie corre-
spondence, although the whole course of the negotia-
tions in its main features justifies in the fullest measure
the most unfavourable judgment being passed upon
our diplomacy. The présent diplomatie publications
give us for the first time an accurate insight into the
activity of our Chancellories, which for the profanum
vulgus has hitherto been a book with seven seals. Now
for the first time we realise why we hâve suffered
diplomatie discomfitures, when the rattling sabre did
not make good what the pen had destroyed. Formerly
we saw only the effects; now we see the causes.
Formerly we saw the gentlemen only in their gold-laced
uniforms; now they stand naked before us, and their
failures and weaknesses are seen with appalling clarity.
Let us take at random one of the conversations
between Herr von Jagow and M. Cambon. On July 27th
Cambon supported, in the présence of Herr von Jagow,
Grey's proposai for a conférence of the four Powers. 1
Jagow gave expression to the well-known view, which
is even yet disseminated by Herr von Bethmann, that it
was impossible to subject Austria against her will to the
décisions of a conférence. M. Cambon replied that the
matter was too serious to allow it to be wrecked on any
question of form. The question hère was of a work of
peace, which could be restricted to common démarches
by the four Powers at Petrograd and Vienna. Herr von
Jagow had often expressed to him his regret at seeing
the two allied groups always opposed to one other.
Hère there was an opportunity of proving that there
was a European spirit (esprit européen), if the four
Powers belonging to the two groups succeeded in pre-
venting a European conflict. Herr von Jagow, who was
1 Yellow Book, No. 74.
THE CRIME 307
unable to make any reply to this illuminating explana-
tion, took refuge in the vapid assertion that Germany
had engagements with Austria. To this Cambon
promptly replied that thèse obligations were no closer
than those existing between France and Russia. Jagow
attempted a new line of retreat : He was not refusing
to act in keeping off an Austro-Russian dispute, but he
could not intervene in the Serbian dispute. Whereupon
Cambon observed : "The one is the conséquence of
the other, and it is a question of preventing the appear-
ance of a new factor of such a nature as to lead to inter-
vention by Russia." Jagow emphasised anew his
engagements towards Austria. Thereupon Cambon
asked him if thèse engagements were so far-reaching
that he was bound to follow Austria everywhere with his
eyes blindfolded ? Had he, he asked, taken note of the
reply of Serbia ? "I hâve not yet had time to read it,"
replied Jagow, on July 27th. (The answer had been
handed to the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade as early
as July 25th.) " I regret it," said Cambon. " You would
see that, except on some points of détail, Serbia has
yielded entirely. It appears, then, that since Austria
has obtained the satisfaction which your support has
procured for her, you might to-day advise her to be
content, or to examine with Serbia the terms of her
reply." Jagow, driven more and more into difficulties,
was unable to give any clear reply. Whereupon Cambon
asked him point blank whether Germany wished for
war. On Jagow protesting energetically, Cambon
answered : " You must then act consistently. When
you read the Serbian reply, / entreat you, in the name
of humanity, to weigh the terms in your conscience,
and do not personally assume a part of the responsi-
bility for the catastrophe which you are allowing to be
prepared." In the end the German Secretary of State
x 2
308 ,F ACCUSE
condescended to return to the original subject of the
conversation, the proposai of Grey ; he considered, how-
ever, that it was necessary to find another " form"
which he could accept. He based his hopes more on the
"direct conversations between Vienna and Petrograd,"
which Cambon urged on him to accelerate further by
appropriate pressure in Vienna.
The direct negotiations between Vienna and Petro-
grad proposed by Jagow were, as is well known,
declined by Austria. It is, as I hâve already pointed
out, open to serious doubt whether Berlin exercised any
pressure on Vienna in the sensé of thèse negotiations.
The conférence thus remained as the only expédient.
Cambon put forward this proposai again on July
28th, 1 with the support of the English and Italian
Ambassadors. Jagow, however, was even more inac-
cessible than on the previous day, and even the repré-
sentations of his Italian ally could not prevent him
from absolut ely refusing the conférence, although, as
will hâve been gathered from what I hâve already
said, he had meanwhile been clearly informed by
Goschen (as had also Prince Lichnowsky by Grey) as
to the true meaning and intention of the conférence.
M. Cambon was so much disconcerted by the passivity
of Herr von Jagow that he again asked him if by any
chance he wished for war. Renewed protest by Jagow,
but also renewed passivity. After this ineffective con-
versation Cambon proposed an ingenious method of
drawing Herr von Jagow out of his reserve by " putting
him in a dilemma by asking him to state himself pre-
cisely how diplomatie action by the Powers to avoid
war could be brought about." This proposai was, as is
known, taken up by Grey, and was zealously pushed
by the Entente Powers as well as by Italy, but it came
1 Yellow Book, No. 81.
THE CRIME 309
to nothing, since the proposai which it was eœpected
that Jagow would make, notwithstanding ail the près-
sure put upon him, was never put forward.
It is interesting to observe how Herr von Jagow had
recourse to ail possible subterfuges in the endeavour to
avoid the moral obligation of making such a proposai.
In most cases he took refuge behind inquiries in Vienna
to which an answer had not yet been received. 1 This
performance was constantly repeated like a musical
thème with variations. Above ail, Herr von Jagow was
never in a position to answer any question as to what
Austria really wanted after the opening of hostilities
against Serbia. Until that was known it was, however,
in his opinion impossible to think of a " médiation " in
any form. 2 Every time when he was closely pressed on
the question he took refuge behind the Austrian screen,
or to express the matter in what is perhaps a more
appropriate metaphor, he withdrew from one trench to
another, until finally he disappeared behind the fortress
of the "Russian mobilisation," never to be seen again.
For the quintessence of Berlin tactics consisted in post-
poning as long as possible ail proposais for peace until
they could corne out with the bogey of Russian mobi-
lisation, and were thus saved the trouble of giving any
reason or answer to proposais for peace.
The conversation between Jagow and Cambon on
July 30th is characteristic of thèse tactics. 3 Cambon
again inquired how the matter stood with regard to the
formula of médiation which Germany desired to pro-
pose. Jagow 's answer was that "to gain time" he had
acted directly, and "had asked Austria to tell him the
ground on which conversations might be opened with
1 Yellow Book, Nos. 92, 109.
2 Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 109. Blue Book, Nos. 98, 107, 112.
3 Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 109.
310 J'ACCUSE
her " (de dire sur quel terrain on pourrait causer avec
elle). In other words, under the pretence of gaining
time he pushed aside the Powers which were striving for
peace, and commissioned the instigator of war, Herr von
Tschirschky, to ask the Austrian Government on what
ground she could be treated with. Can anyone believe,
can anyone regard it as possible, that the German
Secretary of State on July SOth did not even ihen know
what Austria really wanted ? Is it not shameful to see
the diplomatie représentatives of the German Empire
playing such a part in an event which concerned the
life and death of European civilisation, and indeed the
fate of mankind ?
But fo go further; scarcely had the proposai for a
conférence corne to nought when Herr von Jagow, in the
course of the same conversation of July 30th, trotted
out the Russian mobilisation, stating that it would lead
as a conséquence to German mobilisation, and inanswer
to an objection advanced by Cambon that the Russians
had mobilised only against Austria, he replied that this
was indeed quite true, but that the heads of the Army
were insisting on German mobilisation, for every delay
was a loss of strength. This last observation is very
significant, although in the mouth of the Secretary of
State, at any rate, it was highly imprudent. It certainly
proves, as is indeed apparent from many other facts,
that the resolution to mobilise, which in the case of
Germany was known to be "équivalent to war," had
already been taken on July 29th in the meeting of the
Council held at Potsdam under the presidency of the
Emperor, in which the Gênerais had taken part. 1 The
General Staff was indeed in a hurry. This also explains
the spécial édition of the Lokalanzeiger, which an-
1 Yellow Book, No. 105. Cf. the remark quoted above
of Count Pourtalès to Sazonof. Red Book, No. 28.
THE CRIME 311
nounced the mobilisation as early as July 30th, but
was seized because it was not considered expédient
that the mobilisation should be made known on
that day. 1 Hinc illx lacrimse. Hence the subterfuges
and the retreats of Herr von Jagow, who in a spirit of
self-sacrifice threw himself, like a second Curtius, into
the abyss which the military party had dug for him.
Mention must still be made of an earlier épisode,
because it illustrâtes in an interesting way the intellec-
tual and moral qualities of the diplomatists concerned.
On July 29th 2 Cambon ventured to allow himself to
make a modest inquiry as to the position of affairs
with regard to direct conversations between Vienna and
Petrograd on which Herr von Jagow had built so great
hopes. Jagow was in a position to give confirmation of
the gratifying fact that Petrograd seemed well disposed,
but that from Vienna " he was awaiting the reply."
Meanwhile he had at last read the Serbian Note, and saw
in it a basis for possible negotiation. Why, then, did
Austria not negotiate, but break off relations in an in-
compréhensible manner ? asked M. Cambon. " Because,
with Eastern nations," such was the view expressed by
Jagow, " one could never obtain sumcient guarantees
for carrying out their promises." (This was, as is
known, the only important point at issue between
Austria and Serbia : the co-operation of Austrian organs
in Serbian police and judicial investigations.) M.
Cambon at once dexterously suggested the establish-
ment of an International Commission — such as fre-
quently exists in Balkan countries — charged with the
duty of controlling the Serbian police inquiry. The
Serbian answer, as he rightly held, was on this point
also a suitable basis for negotiation. Herr von Jagow
1 Yellow Book, No. 105. Orange Book, No. 62.
2 Yellow Book, No. 92.
312 J'ACCUSE
was unable to make any reply to this proposai of
Cambon's, which was certainly ingenious and practic-
able. Had he accepted this proposai and followed it up
— there was no room to doubt but that Russia and
Serbia would concur — we would not to-day hâve been
involved in a European war.
Like master, like man ! On the day on which the
above conversation took place between Jagow and
Cambon the same performance was being transacted
between Herr von Bethmann and Sir E. Goschen. 1 There
were peaceful assurances in abundance, but the idea of a
conférence was declined ; no déclaration was given with
regard to the intentions of Austria; " efforts " to induce
the Government of Vienna to direct conversations with
Russia were mentioned — be it observed it is never more
than efforts with ineffective means which Herr von
Bethmann " poussait autant qu'il pouvait " — but above
everything else there is a threatening référence to the
Russian mobilisation.
Even as late as the night between July 31 st and
August lst 2 Goschen, the English Ambassador, made a
pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of
humanity, to which the latter coldly replied that the
matter had then gone too far, and that they must now
wait for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum.
In reply to Goschen, who asked in astonishment why
they had made their ultimatum completely impossible
of acceptance by asking that they should démobilise
against Austria as well, Herr von Jagow gave the
mémorable answer "that it was in order to prevent
Russia f rom saying ail her mobilisation was only directed
against Austria." Thus in order to bar the possibility
of Russia advancing an impossible objection — impossible
1 Blue Book, No. 75. Yellow Book, No. 92.
2 Blue Book, No. 121. Yellow Book, No. 121.
THE CRIME 313
because the gênerai mobilisation had been publicly
announced and admitted by the Tsar himself in his
telegrams — they demandée the impossible, that is to
say, démobilisation against a State which had itself
already mobilised.
On August lst Goschen had again a long and pressing
conversation with Jagow. 1 He pointed but to him, in
concert with Cambon, the incompréhensible fact that
Germany, a Power not directly interested in the whole
dispute, had made war inévitable by despatching an
ultimatum, although Austria and Russia, the parties to
the dispute, had just entered into negotiations with a
view to effecting a settlement. In reply to this Jagow
merely let it be seen that he considered that that was
ail very fine, but that since Russia had mobilised, war
must corne if the demand contained in the German ulti-
matum was not complied with.
Thus we find the mobilisation as such put forward as
the ground for war ! We hâve already seen elsewhere
how matters really stood with regard to the Russian
mobilisation, by whàt it was occasioned and justified.
In France and Russia, at any rate, a view différent from
that current in Germany prevailed with regard to the
significance of mobilisation on both sides. Neither
of thèse countries would ever hâve declared war on
account of German mobilisation, as they had not, in
fact, done on account of Austrian mobilisation. '* Mobi-
lisation is not war " we find in a communication of
Viviani to Paul Cambon (Yellow Book, No. 127). " In
the présent state of affairs it is the best means for
France of safeguarding peace, and . . . the Government
of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the
negotiations to a conclusion. . . . We shall not cease to
work towards an agreement. . . . We will, in co-opera-
1 Blue Book, No. 138 Yellow Book, No. 121.
314 J'ACCUSE
tion with England, continue to work for the success of
thèse pourparlers." Thèse words we find elsewhere in
the writings of Viviani on August lst, that is to say,
ajter the ultimatum, and after the French mobilisation. 1
This is but a brief epitome of the history of French
efforts for peace. Ail the diplomatie books are full of
them, only Herr von Bethmann remains in ignorance.
He has — if we may use his own words — "had the
courage as a responsible statesman " to accuse the
French Government of not having taken a single posi-
tive step in the interests of peace. We, however, and
impartial history will concur, throw this reproach back
on Germany, on the shoulders of the statesman who,
whether driving or driven — the guilt remains the same —
did nothing for peace, and did everything that was
bound to make this war inévitable. While others
hastened to the spot with fîre engines and water-
buckets to extinguish the beginnings of the conflagra-
tion, he poured oil on the fiâmes and collected brush-
wood so that the smouldering spark mîght develop into
a holocaust. And now that the fire of hell has broken
loose, and the author of it ail sees horror-struck the con-
séquences of his fearful deed, he writes and talks and
he talks and writes in order to charge others with his
misdeed, like the burglar who runs down the street
shouting out " Stop, thief."
Fortunately no one in the whole world believes him,
and the more excuses he offers, the more does he in fact
accuse himself. With ail his sophisms and perversions
he cannot abolish the facts which lie patent to ail eyes.
And the eyes of even the German people, who now
deceived and deluded patiently submit to the unspeak-
1 Yellow Book, Nos. 125, 127 I hâve already elsewhere
pointed out that Austrian diplomatists also did not regard
mobilisation as équivalent to war (Blue Book, No. 118)
THE CRIME 315
able horrors of war, will gradually be opened. Over the
trenches and across the frontiers it will reach out its
hand to the neighbouring nation whose président said
with truth : " The German Empire will bear before
history the crushing responsibility for the war."
F.
APPENDIX
The Austrian Red Book.
In the beginning of February, after the pages of this
book were completed, there appeared an Austrian Red
Book, which, consisting of an introduction and sixty-nine
documents, gives an account of e vent s from the murder
of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand down to the outbreak
of the European war. This book offers no surprises, but
only a confirmation of the conclusions which could not
but be drawn from the previously published diplomatie
correspondence. It is a meritorious work, in so far as it
unveils, by open self-confessions and with an appalling
lucidity, the Austrian attitude, which hitherto could only
be inferred in'directly from foreign publications.
What the Austrian book yields in the way of positive
facts confirais the conclusion that Austria-Hungary was
guilty of the outbreak of the war in a way which must
leave even for the well-disposed no further room for
doubt. What it conceals in silence proves that the
Austrian Government is completely aware of its guilt,
but that it still endeavours — though vainly — to conceal
it from the eyes of the world.
As before the publication of this book, there is still
a complète absence of any kind of évidence that the
316 J'ACCUSE
German Government, as is constantly emphasised in the
White Book, pressed the Viennese Government to
assume an attitude of modération and conciliation. In
the interval between July 28th and July 30th, when ail
relations between Vienna and Petrograd were completely
broken off, the German Government, as I hâve already
indicated, "handed on" to Vienna individual proposais
of the Entente Powers ; they even got so far as to bring
them before the Vienna Cabinet " for their considéra-
tion, 991 but they never defended them, or gave them
energetic support. The German Government, in the
name of Austria and without any previous consultation
with her ally, straightway declined certain other
proposais. Others again she simply kept to her self
without deigning an answer, and without transmitting
them to Vienna.
The proposais which did arrive at Austria were collec-
tively so long refused by the Government in Vienna that
in the end it was too laie, and thus ail the efforts of the
Entente Powers to keep the peace of Europe failed.
I will now take up the various points in the Red Book
which deserve discussion, and first I will deal with what
the Red Book contains, and then with what it does not
contain.
I.
What the Red Book contains.
1. It is now demonstrated by the Red Book itself
that Austria under ail circumstances desired war against
Serbia — a fact already proved by the révélations of
Giolitti, and by many other circumstances which hâve
1 Red Book, No. 43.
THE CRIME 317
already been indicated. In the report from the Austrian
Ambassador in Belgrade, Freiherr von Giesl, dated July
21s!;, 1 that is to say, before the présentation of the
Austrian Note, the Ambassador expresses his convic-
tion :
" that a reckoning with Serbia, a war for the posi-
tion of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its
existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided.
If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia
we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties
and the unfavourable situation in any future war,
which must, however, sooner or later be carried
through. . . . Half-measures, the présentation of
demands, folio wed by long discussions and ending
only in an unsound compromise, would be the
hardest blow which could be directed against
Austria-Hungary's réputation in Serbia and her
position in Europe."
This embodies the programme which governed ail
further developments.
2. As early as July 23rd, simultaneously with the
delivery of the ultimatum to Serbia, Count Berchtold
explains in instructions sent to Count Mensdorff, his
Ambassador in London, that the short time-limit
allowed in the ultimatum was necessary in order to
make impossible the " dilatory arts " of Serbia, and
that the Austrian demands " could not be made the
subject oj negotiations and compromise." 2
The Entente Powers only received information of the
Austrian Note on July 24th, and then without the addi-
tion of the document ary évidence. Their représenta-
tions that the period of time allowed in the ultimatum
might at least be lengthened, to afford them an oppor-
1 Red Book, No. 6.
2 Red Book, No. 9.
818 J'ACCUSE
tunity of studying the évidence and of bringing influence
to bear on the Serbian Government, were flatly refused.
It was indicated that an examination of the data was
superfluous, and that the Austrian communication
" merely bore the character of a statement for informa-
tion," which was regarded "as a duty laid upon them
by international courtesy," and that the Austrian action
was one which concerned the monarchy and Serbia
alone, on which the Powers were not invited "to make
known their own views on the subject." Count Berch-
told disappeared from Vienna in the critical days
between July 23rd and July 25 th, and issued his unac-
commodating déclarations from Lambach and Ischl. 1
3. In an instruction despatched on July 25 th to Count
Szâpâry, the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd, Berch-
told already counted on the refusai of his demands by
Serbia, and on the settlement of the conflict by force
of arms at a time when the Serbian Note had not even
been received. 2 In another Note of the same day to
Szâpâry he explains Point 5 of the Serbian Note in the
sensé that the collaboration in Serbia of Austrian officiais
in the suppression of the subversive movement was
intended to mean the " collaboration " of a " bureau de
sûreté " in Belgrade, 3 but he omits to give any explana-
tions on Point 6, which was much more important (parti-
cipation of Austrian officiais in judicial proceedings
against accessories to the plot). Explanations on the
latter point were only given on July 27th in the déclara-
tion published by the Austrian Government after the
recall of the Austrian Ambassador; it was then stated
that the intention was that Austrian officiais should take
part, not in the Serbian judicial proceedings, but in the
1 Red Book, Nos. 20, 21
2 Red Book, No. 26.
3 Red Book, No. 27
THE CRIME 319
preliminary police investigations leading up to such
proceedings (recherche as opposed to enquête judi-
ciaire).
This raises the question why thèse explanations which
were transmitted on July 25th to Petrograd, and were
published on July 27th, could not hâve been included
in the ultimatum, or at least communicated to Serbia,
after the réception of the Serbian answer. It would
certainly hâve been possible, and in view of the sub-
missive attitude assumed by Serbia it was more than
probable, that the Serbian Government, on the ground
of thèse explanations, might hâve gone still further to
meet the Austrian demands; since Points 5 and 6 were
almost the only réservations made by Serbia, Austria
might hâve received full satisfaction in the further nego-
tiations, and the peace of Europe might hâve been
maintained. Explanations were, however, omitted
because war with Serbia was regarded as necessary, as
so necessary, in fact, that they were resolved, if need
be, to accept a European war into the bargain.
Austria acted according to the prescription of the man
who, to get rid of bugs, burnt down his house.
4. The answer of Serbia produced, as is well known,
the greatest disappointment in Vienna. It had not been
expected that the influence of the Entente Powers in
Belgrade could induce an independent State to accept
such a humiliation. At a stroke ail hopes of the desired
war appeared to hâve vanished. A Government which
can condescend to a public apology in its officiai gazette
inserted in a prescribed phraseology at a prescribed
place on a prescribed day — a King who allows an order
of the day to his army to be dictated by a neighbour-
ing State — a Sovereign State which subjects its public
éducation to the control of another State, which dis-
misses and even arrests officers and officiais at the
320 J'ACCUSE
command of its neighbour, which dissolves national
unions, and suppresses the liberty of the Press, &c., &c.
— such a State and such a Government had never before
been seen in the history of the world. Truly it required
great dexterity (such as Austrian statesmen did not
hâve at command) or an extraordinary evil will (such as
they certainly did hâve at command) to deduce a reason
for war from such an attitude on the part of their small
neighbour.
On July 27th, before he knew the Serbian answer,
Sazonof himself in the course of a conversation with
Count Szâpâry, held that at least three of the ten points
in the Austrian Note could not be accepted, namely,
points 4, 5, and 6, and there can be no doubt that he
was much surprised when he learned later that point 4
(removal of officers and officiais) had been accepted
by Serbia, and also that the two other points had
not been flatly refused, but that it was suggested
that they should be submitted for décision to arbi-
tration. 1
5. I hâve already dealt in an earlier passage with the
process whereby the submissive Serbian reply was arti-
ficially transformed by means of misérable quibbles into
a Note of refusai. In Berchtold's Note of July 28th
intended for the instruction of the English Government
the Serbian submission was represented as being worth-
less, and as intended to deceive : " Serbia accepted a
number of our demands, with ail sorts of réservations, in
order to impress public opinion in Europe, trusting that
she would not be required to fulfil her promises." 2 This
is supposed to justify the action of Austria in ignoring
the Serbian answer. I hâve already suggested the
question : What else, beyond making promises, could
1 Red Book, No. 31.
2 Red Book, No. 39
THE CRIME 321
Serbia do in forty-eight hours ? Was it expected that
the fulfilment of the promises should also be carried out
in forty-eight hours ? After ail, the Austrian Govern-
ment had only demanded from the Serbian Government
an obligation that she would perform certain actions.
This obligation was given in eight points, and in two
points was made subject to further discussion. Clearly,
in the first place, it was necessary to wait and see
whether Serbia would fulfil her promises.
Guarantees in the form that Austria should herself col-
laborate in the fulfilment of the Serbian promises were
asked for only in points 5 and 6. If Austria could hâve
brought herself to discuss thèse points, thèse guarantees
would presumably hâve been provided for in one form
or another ; they could, for example, hâve been provided,
as proposed by Jules Cambon, in the form of an Inter-
national Commission of investigation and control, 1 and
guarantees in this form would hâve been much more
practicable and far more effective than in the form
demanded by Austria. The whole of this idea of colla-
boration of Austrian officiais in Serbian investigations
was, in view of the strained relations between Austria
and Serbia, an intellectual efrlorescence, such as could
only spring from the soil of Austrian diplomacy. Was it
supposed that in this way peace could be established
between Austria and Serbia ? A perpétuai daily state
of feud would hâve arisen between Austrian and Serbian
officiais, numberless irritating incidents, perhaps in vol v-
ing bloodshed, would hâve taken place; in short, there
would hâve been a situation which would indubitably
hâve led in the sequel to war (this was also the view of
Sazonof, Red Book, No. 14).
But notwithstanding ail this, the alleged untrust-
worthiness of Serbia had to suffice to make valueless the
1 Yellow Book, No. 92.
Y
322 J'ACCUSE
answer which in fact had conceded nearly ail the
demands. This untrustworthiness, in the opinion of
Austria, was supposed to be particularly confirmed by
the fact that Serbia, as early as 3 o'clock on the after-
noon of July 25th, had ordered a gênerai mobilisation,
that is to say, three hours before the answer was handed
over to the Austrian Ambassador. 1 We find hère that
Austria, in connection with the question of mobilisation,
plays the same game so successfully put into opération
by Germany. Austria presented to Serbia demands
which could not be complied with, and thereby gave
expression to her indubitable intention to make war.
Serbia concurred in the greatest part of thèse demands,
but feared, not without reason, that the few réserva-
tions made by her would furnish the Austrian Govern-
ment with a pretext for war, and took steps to protect
herself against this possibility by timely mobilisation,
which had been carried out by Austria also, simultane-
ously with the présentation of the ultimatum. This
défensive mobilisation on the part of Serbia was then
treated by Austria as trickery and as an offensive action,
whereby Serbia "publicly proclaimed her hostility,' :
and showed that she had " no inclination for a peaceful
solution," and thus Austria construed the desired
ground for war. 2
6. But the Austrian Government did not rest satisfied
with this; she even raised the further reproach against
Serbia — again in imitation of a celebrated example —
that her opponent had been the first to begin hostilities.
In the telegram sent by Berchtold on July 28th to his
Ambassadors in Petrograd and London it is expressly
asserted that Serbia had opened hostilities on the Hun-
garian frontier as early as July 27th, that is to say,
1 Red Book, No. 39.
2 Red Book, Introduction p. 444, No. 29.
THE CRIME 323
before the Austrian déclaration of war. 1 This assertion
is, of course, unsupported by any facts or by any kind
of évidence, and it is further much more incredible than
the similar assertion which was later advanced by
Germany against Russia and France. Why, indeed,
should a small and weak country like Serbia intention-
ally provoke a war with Austria ? The facts reported
by Giesl, the Austrian Ambassador (removal of gold
from the National Bank, withdrawal of troops from
Belgrade, removal of officiai papers from the Foreign
Office, &c.) prove — as, indeed, is in accordance with
logic and reason, and requires no proof — that there was
nothing which Serbia had less in her mind than an
attack upon Austria; on the contrary, that it would
hâve been glad if only her great neighbour would leave
her in peace. 2 But it appears to be the recognised
custom in this war for the aggressor to accuse his victim
of having fallen upon him.
Ail thèse pretexts furnished the Austrian Government
with priceless material to justify the négative position
which they assumed with regard to the peaceful pro-
posais of the Entente Powers. The grounds of thèse
refusais may be summarised as folio ws : —
(a) Our dispute with Serbia concerns no one, and
must remain localised.
(b) Serbia, by her unsatisfactory answer, by her
mobilisation, and by opening hostilities, has herself
provoked the war.
7. I hâve already dealt in the previous sections of this
book with the question of localisation. This subject,
however, reappears in the Austrian Red Book with such
definiteness and at the same time with so much naïveté
that a further short discussion appears necessary.
1 Red Book, Nos. 39, 40.
2 Red Book, No. 22.
Y 2
324 J'ACCUSE
Austria simply took as her starting point the thought
which Count Mensdorff had openly expressed to Sir
Edward Grey on July 29th that Serbia belonged to the
Austrian sphère of interest (Blue Book, No. 91). The
fact that Russia, by a hundred years of history, by links
of blood and religion, and also by her own interests, was
connected with Serbia by bonds more intimate than
those between any other two allies, such, for example, as
Germany and Austria, was intentionally ignored by the
two Empires, and the ingenious distinction was con-
stantly drawn that while they were quite prepared to
negotiate with Russia on questions arising between
Russia and Austria, they must be allowed to
regulate the Austro-Serbian dispute as they thought
fit. This artificial and meaningless interpréta-
tion is as if one party to a law-suit were to say to
the other: "I am quite prepared to corne to an
understanding with you and hâve no evil intentions
whatever against you, but we must absolutely refrain
from speaking to each other about the subject in
dispute; let us, therefore, talk about something else.
What do you think about Russia ? Fine weather to-day ;
very fine day to-day, indeed." The Serbian question
was precisely the question at issue between Austria and
Russia, and not, indeed, for the first time; it had been
so for many years. Russia regarded her interests as
being identical with those of Serbia, and declared that,
in the interests of Serbia as well as of her own prestige,
she could not tolerate that the Slavonic brother State,
after the deep diplomatie humiliation she had under-
gone, should also be crushed by Austria by force of
arms and should be degraded into a kind of vassal
State. 1 On this occasion the conflict had broken out
more violently than ever, and threatened not merely to
1 Red Book, No. 47. Blue Book, Nos. 48, 91.
THE CRIME 325
divide Austria from Russia, but also to set the whole of
Europe in flame. Only this question was at stake — no
other. If they were prepared to negotiate at ail, it had
to be on the Serbian question ; if they were not prepared
to discuss this question, it was superfluous and purpose-
less to suggest further negotiations. In reality the Aus-
trian proposai that they were willing to negotiate with
Russia on Russian interests was nothing but a pretext
in order to avoid negotiations which could serve any
purpose.
It was in vain that Grey and Sazonof endeavoured
to convince the Austrian Government of their sophisms
— sophisms which might be attended by the gravest
conséquences. Even Count Szâpâry, the Austrian
Ambassador in Petrograd, could not refrain from
observing that the instructions of Berchtold moved in a
vicious circle. 1 Ail représentations were in vain.
Austria, supported by Germany, stood firm in her
refusai until it was too late and war had become inévit-
able.
8. Proceeding from the fundamental principle that
no one had any right to be heard in the Austro-Serbian
dispute, Austria, in the first place, declined to permit
any discussion of the contents of her ultimatum or of
the Serbian answer. On July 27th a conversation, main-
tained in a friendly tone, took place between Sazonof
and Szâpâry, in which the former gave expression to the
désire to discuss the Serbian Note with the Ambassador.
Szâpâry explained that he was ready to receive the
observations of Sazonof, but pointed out that he was
not authorised either to discuss the text of the Note or
to interpret it. 2 On July 28th Schebeko, the Russian
Ambassador, made a formai proposition to Count Berch-
1 Red Book, No. 47.
2 Red Book, No. 31.
326 «TACCUSE
told asking him to furnish Count Szâpàry with instruc-
tions to continue with Sazonof the exchange of thought,
and thus, if it were possible, to arrive at a direct under-
standing with the Russian Government ; the latter would
gladly meet them half-way with this object in view.
Count Berchtold emphatically declined the proposai of
the Russian Ambassador: No one in Austria could
understand negotiations with référence to the Serbian
answer, which had been designated as unsatisfactory,
and, moreover, war had already been declared against
Serbia on the same day. By way of providing a further
ground for the déclaration of war, Berchtold did not fail
to refer to the Serbian mobilisation and to the hostilities
alleged to hâve been begun by Serbia. 1
Thus, ail connections between Austria and Russia
were broken off until further notice. Ail attempts to
effect an understanding could reach Austria only
indirectly by the médiation of the Entente Powers and
of Germany.
9. On the same day on which Berchtold declined
Sazonof 's proposai for a direct understanding, he also
rejected Grey's proposai for a conférence of the four
Powers. As is known, this proposai had already been
declined by Germany, without previous consultation
with Austria, under the threadbare pretext that she
could not summon her ally before a "European Tri-
bunal." Austria declined this proposai, which was
simultaneously submitted by Grey to Count Mensdorff
and by Bunsen to Count Berchtold (July 28th) on quite
différent grounds, namely, that the proposai came too
late, and that in view of the state of war which had
arisen it had been " outstripped " by e vents. 2 This
certainly is a remarkable procédure ! Germany, as
1 Red Book, No. 40. Orange Book, No. 45.
2 |RedBook, Nos. 38, 41.
THE CRIME 327
Austria 's guardian, considers that Grey's proposai is, so
to speak, inconsistent with her dignity. Austria, how-
ever, the party chiefly concerned, is not sensible of this
violation of her dignity, but only objects that the pro-
posai was received too late, and apparently, therefore,
she would not hâve been disinclined to consider it had
it been submitted earlier. This, again, furnishes an
indication of the incredible confusion which reigned in
the minds of German and Austrian diplomatists and in
the Chancellories of the Empires. Both the reasons
urged against the conférence, that expressed by Berlin
and that by Vienna, were, of course, merely pretexts.
But it would, at any rate, hâve been more astute, in the
first place, to hâve corne to an agreement as to the
reasons which they were to put forward to bring to
naught one after the other the proposais of the Entente
Powers for peace. It would then hâve been less easy to
see through the game, and more difïicult to establish
guilt.
10. In an earlier passage I hâve already pointed out
how Germany answered Grey's proposai for a conférence
with the counter-proposal of a direct discussion between
Vienna and Petrograd — a discussion which was then
declined by Vienna. The German White Book naturally
endeavours to conceal this position of affairs, which in
itself offers a complète proof of the guilt of the two
Empires; it was, however, possible to establish this
fact beyond ail doubt by référence to the other diplo-
matie books. The Red Book now présents us with the
self-confession of Austria on this question in the crassest
form, and, moreover, the statement contains highly
aggravating amplifications. Not only did the Govern-
ment of Vienna décline on July 28th to discuss the
Serbian question directly with Russia as proposed by
Germany, but they had already given expression to this
328 J'ACCUSE
refusai with the utmost definiteness as early as July
23rd (Red Book, No. 9). This fact must hâve been, and
was, known to the German Government. The Govern-
ment of Berlin thus declined, with full knowledge of the
facts, a promising proposai put forward by the English
Government in order to set in its place another, which,
in view of the déclaration made by Austria as far back
as July 23rd, was known to them to be futile. Up till
now it was possible only to show that the Berlin
counter-proposal was, in fact, futile, and to infer that
there was criminal collusion between the two Empires.
Now — thanks to the Austrian publication — this collu-
sion is proved, and the guilty are unmasked. If of the
hundred proofs of guilt only this one existed, it would
suffice to lay upon Germany and Austria alone the
responsibility for the war.
11. On July 30th Count Berchtold, as we know, at
last resolved, in view of the increasingly dangerous
aspect of the dispute, to discuss with Sazonof the détails
of the Austrian Note. With this object he sent on July
30th two instructions to his Ambassador at Petrograd
(Red Book, Nos. 49 and 50), and thereupon on July 31 st
negotiations in fact began officially for the first time in
Petrograd on the contents of the Note. The conversa-
tion of July 27 th between Sazonof and Szâpâry was,
as explained above, only an unofflcial acceptance of
Sazonof's observations.
Even in this critical moment Berchtold could not
refrain from speaking of the Note as having been already
" outstripped " by the outbreak of war, from describing
the conversations in Petrograd as " subséquent explana-
tions," and from emphasising that it had never been
Austria 's intention u to départ in any way from the
points contained in the Note."
The phrase about being " outstripped by the out-
THE CRIME 329
break of war," which is ridden to death in the Red
Book, deserves spécial considération. What is it really
supposed to mean ? A insults B ; A offers humble and
plaintive apologies; nevertheless, B raises his sword to
run A through. A third, C, a near relation of A, inter-
venes to restrain the lethal blow, and points out in A's
favoui that he has already offered apologies. B, how-
ever, deprecates this intervention with the observa-
tion that the discussion of the insuit has been out-
stripped by events, and that the state of war which
was produced by raising his sword must now pursue
its course.
This is the point of view of the Ausfrian Government.
It is incredible, but true ! But even if this point of
view were as logical and reasonable as it is illogical and
unreasonable, it would not lead to the conclusion drawn
by the Government of Vienna, that ail attempts at
médiation by third parties — which were promoted in the
interest, not of Serbia, but of European peace — must
give way. The state of war had been brought about by
Austria alone (the Serbian hostilities are, of course, an
invention). This state of war, however, like every war,
could and must sooner or later corne to an end. The
Entente Powers desired to bring about this end sooner
rather than later, in order to prevent an extension of
the conflagration throughout Europe. How, then, was
it possible to urge as an objection against thèse efforts
for peace that war had already broken out ? It was
precisely because war had broken out that efforts were
made in the cause of peace. One is almost ashamed to
hâve to dévote so much space to matters which are so
obvious, but when we find constantly repeated in ail
the Notes contained in the Red Book from July 28th
onwards the same idiotie ideas that ail the efforts for
peace made by the Powers had been outstripped by the
330 J'ACCUSE
Serbian war, needlessly and criminally brought about by
Austria — as may be expected the German White Book
also (page 9) 1 is guilty of this idiocy — it is impossible
to shirk the task of characterising such senselessness by
its true name, as a criminal gamble with the highest
interests of the unhappy nations whose destiny is
entrusted to such men as thèse.
The worst feature in the whole business is, however,
that the assertion that the peace proposais were out-
stripped by the outbreak of war is not even in fact true.
The peace proposais — the Russian request for a direct
understanding as well as Grey's proposai for a confér-
ence of the four Powers — were in reality made and com-
municated to the Government at Vienna before the
outbreak of the Austro-Serbian war. As early as July
24th, immediately after being informed of the Austrian
Note, Sazonof expressed the wish that the period of
time allowed in the ultimatum should be extended, and
that he should receive the Austrian évidence in support
of their charges in order that the Austrian complaints
might be examined, pressure brought to bear on Serbia,
and negotiations opened with Vienna with a view to
arriving at an understanding. In the folio wing days
this désire was constantly repeated by the Russian
Minister to Count Szâpâry, on the final occasion as late
as July 27th. 2 As war was only declared against Serbia
on July 28th, the assertion that the Russian proposai
for an understanding was " outstripped " by the déclara-
tion of war is stamped as a lie.
The same holds true of Grey's proposai for a confér-
ence. The conférence of the four Powers was recom-
mended by Grey from the beginning of the crisis, as
early as July 24>th, and from that time the proposai
[* Collée ted Documents, p. 409.]
2 Red Book, No. 31.
THE CRIME 331
was constantly renewed. 1 As early as July 26th the
proposai was submitted to the German Government,
and was rejected under the well-known pretext that she
could not call Austria before a European tribunal. 2
On July 27th Count Mensdorff reported at length on
tins proposai made and urgently pressed upon him
by Grey. 3 How, then, does Count Berchtold arrive at
the conclusion that the proposai for a conférence, which
dated from July 24th, and which had since then been
constantly renewed, was " outstripped " by the déclara-
tion of war, which took place on July 28th? This
assertion also is a conscious lie, intended to hush up
Austria 's unswerving intention to make war. I résume
as folio ws : — >
(a) even if the Austrian assertion that the pro-
posais for peace only arrived after the déclaration
of war were correct, this would not, in logic or in
reason, constitute any ground for rejecting thèse
proposais ;
(b) it is, however, proved that thèse proposais
reached Austria before the déclaration of war ; there
is thus no support in fact for the premises on which
is based the conclusion — in itself false — drawn by
the Vienna Government.
12. On July 29th Sazonof rightly complained to
Szâpâry that Austria had flatly refused any further
exchange of thought. This, however, did not prevent
Count Berchtold from assuming a " stupid " air in con-
versation with M. Schebeko on July 30th, and from
speaking of a " misunderstanding " on the part of
Sazonof, as he and Schebeko M had discussed the prac-
tical questions two days before," and Schebeko had
1 Blue Book, Nos. 10, 11, 24, 25, 36, 42, 43, etc.
2 White Book, p. 409.
8 Red Book, No. 38. Blue Book, No. 48.
332 J'ACCUSE
reported this to Petrograd (Red Book, No. 50). The
exchange of thought of which Berchtold speaks consisted
in the fact that Schebeko, in the name of Sazonof,
desired the officiai continuation of the negotiations in
Petrograd, whereas Berchtold flatly declined to concur
in thèse. This is what Berchtold calls " discussing the
practical question " !
13. The question of mobilisation was naturally also
among the subjects discussed in the conversation on
July 30th. Berchtold complained about the mobilisa-
tion of the four southern Russian army-districts, which
had taken place on the previous day, and repeated
again the false assertion that Austria had only mobilised
against Serbia (eight army corps), but against Russia
" not a single man." M. Schebeko could hâve answered
to this: "Not a man, it is true, but a ' Beth-mann." >
For Bethmann in his simplicity had chattered in the
Reichstag on August 4th to the effect that Austria had
mobilised, not only against Serbia, but also two army
corps against Russia at a time when Russian mobilisa-
tion was not even spoken of.
Noteworthy is the admission made by Berchtold in
the conversation in question that Austria was now
obliged "to extend her mobilisation too " — an admis-
sion which confirais the Austrian gênerai mobilisation
reported by the Ambassadors of the Entente Powers as
taking place on the night from the 30th to the 31 st July.
That the Austrian mobilisation against Russia was, in
fact, carried out during this night is also expressly
admitted in the telegram sent by Count Berchtold on
July 31st to his diplomatie représentatives abroad (Red
Book, No. 53).
Both States — Austria and Russia — were, however, as
I hâve pointed out elsewhere, at one in the view that
mobilisation was in no way équivalent to war. Although
THE CRIME 333
both States had ordered gênerai mobilisation on July
31st, Berchtold telegraphed as follows to his diplomatie
représentatives : " Pourparlers between the Cabinets at
Vienna and Petrograd appropriate to the situation are
meanwhile being continued, and from thèse we hope
that things will quieten down ail round." They did, in
fact, continue, or rather they only began at the moment
when mobilisation on both sides had already taken
place. They took place in Petrograd on July 31st and
August lst, even after the German ultimatum, and were
only finally broken off in conséquence of the German
déclaration of war. 1 On an earlier occasion also, in a
telegram of July 24th to Count Mensdorff, Berchtold
expressly pointed out that Austria had already mobi-
lised twice (1908 and 1912) because of Serbia. 2 Russia
also had mobilised on each of thèse instances, and,
nevertheless, peace had been maintained on both occa-
sions by diplomatie negotiations. This is a confession
on the part of her own ally which is damaging to Ger-
many ! In spite of ail mobilisations, peace could hâve
been maintained on this occasion also if Germany had
desired to maintain it.
14. In connection with the question of mobilisation
there is one charming épisode which I should not like to
keep from the reader, as it throws a ray of comedy into
the dark tragedy; I refer to the history of Sazonof's
broken word of honour which is dished up for us by
Austrian diplomacy. Hitherto we hâve had knowledge
of only three broken words of honour : the Russian
Minister of War, the Russian Chief of the General Staff,
and the Russian Emperor were the breakers of their
word (see the German White Book). That was not
enough for the Austrian gentlemen ; they felt constrained
1 Red Book, Nos. 55, 56.
2 Red Book, No. 17.
334 J'ACCUSE
to add a fourth breaker of his word, M. Sazonof . Count
Szôgyény, who appears in part to misunderstand ail
important occurrences, and in part to slumber through
them, as we shall see later, reported from Berlin on
July 27th that Sazonof had given the German Ambas-
sador a "guarantee" that as yet no mobilisation had
taken place, but only certain necessary military précau-
tions (Red Book, No. 33). I hâve already shown that
this déclaration was in conformity with the truth. The
déclaration, however, was given, not by Sazonof, but
by the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof (White
Book, page 8). 1 It is amusing to observe how the
imaginary déclaration of Sazonof (of July 27th) develops
in the Note of Berchtold (of July 28th) into a broken
word of honour on the part of Sazonof, and in the Note
of July 29th it is generously recognised that M. Sazonof
" now no longer dénies " what, in fact, he ne ver had
denied (Red Book, Nos. 42 and 48). Who can tell how
many broken Russian words of honour might hâve been
constructed had not the outbreak of war put an end to
this criminal activity !
15. The telegram sent by Berchtold to his Ambassa-
dors at London and Petrograd on July 31 st deserves
spécial considération (Red Book, No. 51). As the two
telegrams of July 30th to Count Szâpâry (Nos. 49 and
50) appeared at last to pave the way for the acceptance
of direct negotiations with Russia, so the telegram
of July 31 st appeared at last to reveal a certain
readiness to accept Grey's médiation. The superficial
observer who does not keep sufïiciently in view the
secret connections between Berlin and Vienna — and even
the Entente Powers were such superficial observers until
the behaviour of Berlin opened their eyes — is, in fact,
compelled to assume that Austria had at last, with
f 1 Collée ted Documents, p. 408.]
THE CRIME 335
the terror of a European war in her heart, repented, and
was endeavouring to maintain peace in both the ways
proposed by the Entente Powers, by means of direct
negotiations with Russia and simultaneously by the
mediatory action of the Powers.
Accurately viewed, the position is quite différent.
Austria was bound to know, and in fact did know, that
in conséquence of the question of mobilisation intention-
ally pushed into the foreground by Germany the tension
between Berlin and Petrograd had meanwhile become
greater than that between Vienna and Petrograd, and
in conséquence that even an apparent concurrence by
Austria in the peace proposais of the Entente Powers
could no longer prevent the coming of war.
This was one reason for Austria 's sudden change of
front. It was harmless; Berlin had already provided
for ail further developments.
The other reason, however — and this explanation is
given us for the first time by the Red Book — was that
the Austrian déclarations themselves were so restricted
and limited that even without the ultimatum-policy of
Berlin they could not lead to a peaceful settlement.
From this side of the question Vienna herself provided
for ail further developments. I hâve already pointed
out the réservations which the Government at Vienna
made in resuming negotiations with Petrograd. When
a negotiating party déclares from the outset that
she is only prepared to give " subséquent explana-
tions," and that she had no "intention to départ"
from her position, negotiations are superfluous and
futile.
Similar réservations were made by the Government
of Vienna with regard to the English proposai of média-
tion. This proposai had its origin in Sazonof's tele-
gram of July 29th, which, having regard to the cate-
336 J'ACCUSE
gorical refusai of the Vienna Cabinet on the previous
day to take part in further negotiations, asked the
English Government for médiation in the interests of
peace in any form that appeared advisable. 1 In the
Note from Vienna of July 31 st we find the folio wing
surprising passage : " Sazonof has informed the British
Government that after the déclaration of war by Austria-
Hungary against Serbia he is no longer in a position to
deal directly with Austria-Hungary ." Is the phraseo-
logy hère used in any way intended to indicate that
Sazonof, for his part, had refused to enter into further
negotiations ? Such an implication would hâve been a
gross falsification, refuted by the Austrian Red Book
itself, as well as by ail the other diplomatie publica-
tions. Sazonof was, in fact, no longer in a position
to negotiate with Vienna, not through any fault of his,
but because Vienna had since July 28th refused to
take part in any further negotiations. Whom did
they really expect to deceive by this ambiguous
phraseology ?
Grey at once communicated Sazonof 's request to
Prince Lichnowsky, and again put forward the proposai
of a conversation à quatre in London, the form of
which he left entirely to the German Government. The
obvious presupposition of this, and of ail other proposais
for médiation, was naturally the preliminary suspension
of hostilities against Serbia; it should, however, be
observed that what was asked was only a cessation of
opérations, and not a withdrawal of Austrian troops
from Serbia.
What attitude did Count Berchtold assume with
regard to this proposai ? Now on July 31 st he for the
first time declared himself " quite prepared to enter-
tain the proposai of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between
1 Orange Book, No. 50. Blue Book, No. 84.
THE CRIME 337
us and Serbia," only, however, under the following
conditions : —
(a) the military action against Serbia should mean-
while continue to take its course;
(b) the Russian mobilisation must be brought to a
standstill, whereupon the Austrian counter-measures in
Galicia would also be cancelled.
Was this an acceptance or a refusai of Grey's média-
tion ? It was a refusai in the form of an acceptance,
Could it be seriously asked of the Russian Government
that it was for them to begin démobilisation while
Austria was prepared to cancel partially in Galicia the
gênerai mobilisation which she had ordered in the
previous night, only after the Russian mobilisation had
been brought to a standstill ? Could it be seriously
asked of Russia that, during the proposed conférence
of Ambassadors in London, of which neither the begin-
ning nor the term could y et be determined, she should
allow Austria to proceed with her measures against
Serbia, and thus in the meantime crush the tiny State ?
In addition to this, Austria had merely expressed in
gênerai ternis her readiness to "entertain" (nâher-
zutreten) Grey's mediatory action, but had not accepted
a conférence in this form or in that. E vents might thus
follow the same course as in Berlin during the preceding
six days, that is to say, the Government of Vienna, on
going more closely into the question, might raise on
their side ail manner of difficulties as to the form, while
neglecting, just as Berlin had done, to propose any
practical or acceptable form. In short, the Austrian
answer to the proposai of Grey which Herr von
Tschirschky " communicated in accordance with instruc-
tions," without in any way support ing it — this answer
was so ambiguous and restricted that it was équivalent
to a refusai of the proposai.
z
338 J'ACCUSE
The Allied Governments could thus feel sure on both
sides that the desired war could not escape them. There
was as little hope of a peaceful issue of the negotiations
with Russia as of the success of the English mediatory
action, in conséquence of the clauses and réservations
attached by the Government of Vienna to their accept-
ance of both proposais. If, however, there was any
danger of a peaceful issue, Berlin, by its ultimatum-
policy, was taking the necessary measures to secure that
under ail circumstances war was bound to corne. The
cards were, in fact, shuffled with such dexterity that the
game could not be lost — the game of war which had so
often been played in peace, and which now they meant
to carry through in earnest.
So far our discussions hâve had référence to what is
contained in the Austrian Red Book, and thèse hâve
confirmed anew the points in the indictment framed
against Austria.
Austria criminally provoked the Serbian war, and, as
a conséquence of that, the European war : —
by addressing to Serbia demands which were impos-
sible of fulfilment,
by refusing an answer which accorded her almost
complète satisfaction,
by the recall of her Ambassador, and by the déclara-
tion of war against Serbia,
by concealing her real objects in making war,
by categorically declining ail negotiations and ail
actions of médiation up to the last moment, when
it was too late,
by imposing conditions on her final consent which
were necessarily bound to exclude from the outset
the possibility of success.
THE CRIME 339
n.
What the Red Book does not contain.
The above accusations may be inferred from the
contents of the Red Book itself.
Much more serious, however, are the accusations
which may be inferred from what is not contained in
the Red Book, accusations against Austria and Ger-
many alike. The Red Book contains nothing, not so
much as a syllable:
(a) of the alleged pressure which Berlin is
supposed to hâve exercised on Vienna in the sensé
of peace;
(b) of ail the proposais for médiation which were
made by the Entente Powers, apart from the con-
férence of the four Powers.
1. The White Book and the Blue Book are, as I hâve
elsewhere shown, full of the emphatic assurances of the
German Impérial Government that it had made every
effort to exert a moderating influence on Vienna in the
sensé of arriving at a peaceful understanding. M Faithful
to our principle that médiation should not extend to the
Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be considered as a
purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the rela-
tions between Austria-Hungary and Russia (this is the
famous distinction dealt with above), we continued our
endeavours to bring about an understanding between
thèse two Powers. We further declared ourselves ready,
after failure of the conférence idea, to transmit a second
proposai of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna. . . ." &c. u In
spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost,
and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance
compatible with the dignity of the monarchy. . . ."
" Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces-
z 2
340 J'ACCUSE
santly, and supported every proposai in Vienna," &c.
" During the interval from July 29th to July 31 st, whilst
thèse endeavours of ours for médiation were being con-
tinued with increasing energy, supported by English
diplomacy," &c. — passages such as thèse are to be found
every where in the White Book. In his speech of August
4th the Chancellor assured his hearers that he had
carried his task of médiation at Vienna " to the utmost
point which was compatible with our position as an
ally."
Similar assurances were given in unfaltering succes-
sion to the English diplomatists in Berlin and London.
It is every where said, especially by the Chancellor him-
self, that he had pressed the button in Vienna as hard
as he could, that he had energetically preached peace
and modération, and that perhaps he had already gone
too far. 1 Herr von Jagow even gives expression to the
fear that the strong pressure which he had exercised
on Vienna in favour of negotiations on the Serbian
answer might hâve produced a contrary effect and
hastened the Austrian déclaration of war. 2 In short,
Herr von Jagow and Herr Bethmann Hollweg bubbled
over with peaceful assurances and alleged efforts in the
cause of peace in Vienna, and posed before the German
people and the English Government as angels of peace
constantly fluttering to and fro between Vienna and
Berlin bearing the palm in their hand.
Even in reading the German White Book one cannot
fail to be surprised that thèse efforts for peace remained
always and everywhere completely unsuccessful. It is
everywhere the same story : Vienna had refused on this
or that ground. Either Vienna was not prepared to
negotiate, or it was too late to do so, or the Russian
1 Blue Book, Nos. 107, 108.
2 Blue Book, No. 76.
THE CRIME 341
mobilisation had intervened, and so on. Everywhere
the total resuit was nil.
I hâve already pointed out that this négative resuit
has in the highest degree a suspicious appearance; if
Berlin had seriously wished, Vienna was bound to give
way in everything without demur, for Vienna by herself
was powerless in Europe. There was hère a mysterious
point in the relations between Vienna and Berlin which
urgently called for an explanation. The assurances that
efforts were made for peace must be elearly proved if
they are to command credence. The failure of the
efforts alleged to hâve been made by Berlin was so
surprising that the efforts themselves became in a high
measure unworthy of belief.
The matter assumed a more suspicious air in view of
the personality of our Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von
Tschirschky-Bôgendorf . He had the réputation of being
an outspoken enemy of Russia and Serbia, who, instead
of advising modération at the Ballplatz, goaded on to
war. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the English Ambassador,
openly expressed the view that Herr von Tschirschky
desired war from the first, and that he allowed his
strong personal bias to colour his actions, that he was
constantly dealing in secret with the Austrian Govern-
ment, and that he ne ver invited the co-operation of the
Ambassadors of the Entente Powers. Sazonof also
emphasised the strongly marked attitude of hostility
towards Russia shown by the German Ambassador,
who was suspected of having known the Austrian Note
before it was despatched, and who openly declared to
anyone who cared to listen that he endorsed every word
of the Note, and regarded the Serbian answer as a
sham. 1 When an Ambassador of this character receives
instructions which in more than platonic form "trans-
1 Blue Book, Nos. 32 ? 95, 139, 141, 161,
342 J'ACCUSE
mit " English proposais, but neither support thèse
proposais nor counsel energetic pressure, we can under-
stand how matters stood with regard to the urgent
efforts for peace of the Berlin Government in Vienna,
and what the action of médiation looked like "which
was carried to the utmost point which was compatible
with our position as an ally."
AU thèse indications and, above ail, the uncondi-
tional failure of the alleged efforts of Berlin, compel us
to entertain doubts as to the veracity of the Berlin
assurances. The certainty, however, that thèse assur-
ances are untrue, and consciously untrue, has for the
first time been furnished by the Austrian Red Book. It
contains nothing, not so much as a syllable, about ail
that Bethman and Jagow so volubly claim to hâve
done ; it contains in ail only a f ew communications f rom
Herr von Tschirschky to Count Berchtold which took
place "in accordance with instructions," and which
only rise on one occasion to the observation that a
British proposai " was brought before the Vienna
Cabinet for their considération." 1 The question at
issue hère was the important and urgent proposai put
forward by Grey on July 27th (Blue Book, No. 46) to
the effect that after Russia, by the exercise of her con-
ciliatory influence in Belgrade, had obtained so favour-
able an answer from Serbia, Austria should at least
accept the Serbian answer as a basis for discussion,
seeing that it went far beyond ail expectation in meet-
ing the Austrian demands. Let anyone read this urgent
request addressed by Grey to Prince Lichnowsky on
such firm grounds, his warm appeal to Germany's love
of peace, his désire to keep closely in touch with Ger-
many, his emphasis on the fact that after the success
which had attended Russia 's advice and the concessions
i Red Book, Nos. 43, 44, 51.
THE CRIME 343
made by Serbia it was now the turn of Vienna to show
some spirit of accommodation, and that Berlin, in the
first instance, could, and must, act in this direction.
Let anyone read this, and compare it with the com-
pletely frigid manner in which Herr von Tschirschky
brings Grey's proposai " before the Vienna Govern-
ment for their considération." No one will then be
surprised that the proposai was declined with equal
frigidity by the Government of Vienna on the ground
that " after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and
the subséquent déclaration of war the step appears
belated." 1
Such is the appearance of the efforts which Berlin
made in Vienna in the interests of peace. Until
to-day no instruction, no telegram, no note has
been printed which offers the slightest proof that any
such efforts were made in the cause of peace.
The expectation that évidence on this point would
be contained in the Austrian Red Book has been
disappointed. Where are the proofs — we hâve the
right to ask Herr von Bethmann — what évidence is
there for your assertion that you earnestly used your
influence in Vienna in the direction of peace ? The
German and the Austrian publications are silent on the
question, if, indeed, they do not support a view directly
opposed to your assertions. A communication is no
recommendation. To bring forward a matter for con-
sidération is not the same as giving it support. Where
is the pressure which you say you asserted at Vienna ?
When your printing press gives us a proof of the pres-
sure you imprinted at Vienna we will believe you, Until
then we will give to thèse assertions, as to so many
others for which you are responsible, the name which is
properly theirs, and déclare them to be falsifications of
1 White^Book, p. 409 ; Exhibit 16.
344 J'ACCUSE
the truth which hâve sprung from your guilty conscience
in the hope of concealing your crime.
2. I now corne to a much more serious point. Where
are the proposais for arriving at an agreement put
forward by Grey and Sazonof which ought to hâve
reached Vienna by way of London and Berlin, but
which never elicited an answer from Vienna ?
Let us recapitulate briefly the position of affairs before
we formulate the charge on this point. On July 29th,
after the outbreak of the Austro-Serbian war and the
rupture of direct negotiations between Vienna and
Petrograd, Grey proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the
German Ambassador, the well-known formula for agree-
ment, which was to allow Austria to rëtain possession
of Belgrade and the neighbouring territory as a pledge
for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, and
from there announce to the four Powers not directly
concerned the conditions under which she was prepared
to arrive at an understanding. 1 This proposai of Grey 's
was forwarded to Berlin by Prince Lichnowsky, and
from there it was alleged to hâve been transmitted to
Vienna. 2 To this proposai, however, no answer was ever
made either by Germany or by Austria. The Berlin
Government was repeatedly urged for an answer by
Grey and Goschen, but it was constantly asserted that
no reply had y et been received from Vienna. 3 The most
varied reasons, or rather évasions, were produced to
explain the absence of an answer, although the time was
pressing and the fate of Europe hung on every hour.
Grey 's proposai, which represented the utmost conceiv-
able point to which it was possible to go to meet Austria,
1 Blue Book, No. 88. Telegram of King George, 30 July,
fCollected Documents, p. 538].
2 White Book, p. 411.
3 Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, 108, 112.
THE CRIME 345
which secured for her in the fullest measure her diplo-
matie and her military prestige — this proposai received
no answer, and is not so much as mentioned in the Red
Book. The actual negotiations, so far as they are men-
tioned in the Red Book, come to an end with the
conversation between Grey and Prince Lichnowsky on
the morning of July 29th (Blue Book, No. 84), to which
Berchtold's telegram of July 31st (Red Book, No. 51)
has référence. Later e vents are not mentioned in the
Red Book, apart from the two conversations which
Count Szâpâry had with Sazonof on July 31 st and
August lst.
Now there were two conversations between Grey and
Lichnowsky on July 29th, the first in the morning — to
which Berchtold's telegram of July 31st relates — and
the second on the afternoon of the same day (Blue Book,
No. 88). The Red Book cornes to an end with the dis-
cussion of the first conversation (Blue Book, No. 84),
and not even a word is said of the second, or, for that
matter, of any later events. The significance of this may
be gathered in figures from the fact that the English
Blue Book contains 161 documents, of which only about
a half, that is to say 84, are considered by the Austrian
Government to be worthy of considération or even of
mention. Ail the events of décisive importance which
took place between England, Russia, and Germany
between the afternoon of July 29th and August lst,
that is to say, during the four critical day s of the Euro-
pean conflict, hâve no existence for the Austrian
Government — apart from the two repeatedly mentioned
conversations between Szâpâry and Sazonof on July 31st
and August lst. The inter change of diplomatie tele-
grams between the European capitals in thèse exciting
days does not appear to hâve disturbed the composure
of the gentlemen in the Ballplatz. They know nothing,
346 J'ACCUSE
or at least they wish to know nothing, of the untiring
efforts of Grey, Sazonof, and Viviani to marshal whole
séries of formulae, each going further than its predecessor
in the direction of meeting the wishes of Austria, and
ail intended to préserve the peace of Europe even at the
last moment. The gentlemen in Vienna continue their
slumbers, or at least affect a slumbering posture, and
this drowsiness is so infectious, even on their foreign
représentatives, that it is possible for Count Szôgyény,
the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, to report to Vienna
on August 2nd that "the Secretary of State has just
informed me that no answer has been received from
Russia to the German demand; Russian troops hâve
crossed the German frontier; Russia has thus attacked
Germany. Germany, therefore, regards herself as at war
with Russia." 1 This communication, remarkable both
for its logic and style, was sent by the Austrian Ambas-
sador to Vienna on August 2nd as the latest sensational
news, twenty-four hours after the delivery in Petrograd
of the German déclaration of war, which, however, was
iiot in any way based on an attack by Russia, but on
her failure to give an answer to the ultimatum. This is
the only sign of life manifested by Berlin since the
communication of the conversation between Grey and
Lichnowsky on the morning of July 29th — this comedy
of buffoonery lagging twenty-four hours behind the
tragedy. This is the only proof of the superhuman
efforts of the Impérial Chancellor to move Vienna to an
attitude of compliance — the only proof of the strong
pressure on the button which went to the utmost point
compatible with an ally's position, which was, however,
unfortunately insufficient to awaken the Austrian Am-
bassador in Berlin from his righteous slumbers.
3. Grey 's formula of agreement was thus allowed to
i Red Book, No. 57.
THE CRIME 347
slip under the table undiscussed. But where are the
formulse of agreement put forward by Sazonof ? Were
they buried in Berlin, or transmitted to Vienna ? If
the second of thèse courses was taken, what attitude
did Vienna adopt towards them? Were they ignored,
refused, or amended ? Nothing whatever is known on
this point. Neither the German White, Book nor the
Austrian Red Book contains one iota about them. We
are obliged to refer to the publications of the Entente
Powers to trace the history of thèse formulae. This
history always leads as far as Berlin ; of the further path
from Berlin to Vienna we know nothing.
With regard to Grey's proposai, there is at least this
much reported in the White Book, that it had been
"forwarded to Vienna," and that Russia, as they
" assumed," had accepted the proposai. 1 We are not
told what attitude was assumed by Vienna towards this
proposai; we only know from the publications of the
Entente Powers that up to the last moment Berlin main-
tained that no answer had yet been received from
Vienna.
The White Book and the Red Book, however, make
no mention whatever of the proposais of Sazonof; they
simply do not exist for them. The first proposai of
Sazonof (Orange Book, No. 60) was, as is known,
verbally dictated to the German Ambassador on July
30th; it was transmitted to the Berlin Government by
their own and the Russian Ambassador; it was sup-
ported by England and France, but was declined by
Jagow without consulting Vienna on the ground that it
was unacceptable to Austria. Among other points
raised, we hâve a right to ask for a definite answer,
Yes or No, to the question whether the Government of
Vienna were informed of this formula of Sazonof which
1 White Book, p. 411, [See footnote on p. 178].
348 J'ACCUSE
satisfied ail their wishes. If so, what attitude did it
assume ? Why did not Austria accept the proposai,
which required of her only what she had herself already
promised, namely, that she should respect the sovereign
rights of Serbia, and which, on the other hand, granted
to her everything that she could in any way désire of
Russia, namely, that Russia should stop her military
préparations (La Russie s'engage à cesser ses préparatifs
militaires).
If, however, the Government of Vienna received no
communication with regard to the proposai of Sazonof,
how is the German Government to justify this, their
omission ? By what right does Herr von Jagow take it
upon him to keep to himself and to décline in the name
of Austria, without giving any reasons, a proposai which
would assuredly hâve guaranteed peace ? What reasons
had he for this refusai, what inner grounds, if the reasons
he had were not such as could be admitted to the world ?
Out with them ! This is a serious, a desperately serious
business. We are no longer dealing with a diplomatie
puppet play, but with the fatal game of dice in which
the stakes are the destinies of nations. The White Book
and the Red Book are silent, but the public conscience
cries aloud, and calls on the guilty to give an account
of their actions.
4. The fate of the second proposai of Sazonof's was
even worse than that of the first. We hâve seen that,
after unending trouble and the despatch of countless
telegrams, the diplomacy of the Entente Powers suc-
ceeded in approximating to each other Grey's formula of
July 29th and that of Sazonof of July 30th. The resuit
was a second formula outlined by Sazonof on July 31st
which, "in accordance with the English suggestion,' 1
expressly permitted Austria to leave her forces on
Serbian territory, and only required her to stay the
THE CRIME 349
mardi of her troops (arrêter la marche). In return for
this, Russia undertook to maintain her waiting attitude
(conserver son attitude expectante), and the Great
Powers would examine the satisfaction which Serbia
could accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government with-
out injury to her rights as a Sovereign State or her
independence. 1 This formula was at once telegraphed
to the Russian Ambassadors accredited to ail the Great
States, including the Ambassador at Vienna, and
received the most energetic support both from Grey and
from Viviani.
I hâve already pointed out that this proposai for
agreement safeguarded in every way the military pres-
tige of Austria, inasmuch as it allowed her, during the
whole further course of negotiation with the Great
Powers, to leave her troops in Serbia, and thus to retain
the occupied territory as a pledge for the fulfilment of
her demands. The proposai, in fact, contains precisely
what the Austrian Government ask of the Entente
Powers in the introduction to the Red Book (page 4), 2
namely, that they should assume a " waiting atti-
tude." This waiting attitude was expressly provided
for in the various formulée of agreement; indeed,
it represented the essential foundation of thèse
proposais.
Between the second formula of Sazonof and the form
in which Austria on July 31st decîared her readiness to
negotiate (Red Book, No. 51), there was only one différ-
ence, namely, that Austria desired to continue her mili-
tary action against Serbia, whereas Sazonof desired that
it should be brought to a standstill — a désire which,
as is known, he later expressed in even more moderate
form in stating that he regarded it only as "very
1 Orange Book, No. 67. Blue Book, Nos. 120, 132
2 [Collected Documents, p. 445].
350 JT ACCUSE
important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop
provisionally to her military action." 1 Thanks to the
Russian spirit of compliance, the différence between the
two points of view had been reduced to so trifling
dimensions that with the least good will a settlement
could not fail to be brought about if — and that is the
question — if this good will in fact existed. In this,
however, Germany and Austria were defective. We
know nothing of the fate of the Russian proposai in
Berlin and Vienna. The White Book and the Red Book
again maintain an attitude of silence on this point,
Without doubt, the proposai got as far as Vienna and
Berlin, but there is equally no doubt that in both places
it remained unanswered. Only in one way can this
silence be explained; it would hâve been impossible to
accept the proposai, or even to discuss it, without bring-
ing about the peace which they did not désire. It was,
however, equally impossible to refuse the proposai,
since it was much too conciliatory to make it possible
to justify a refusai. And so it was decided that the
proposai should simply be ignored, both then and now —
then because peace was not desired, and to-day because
they do not wish it to be recognised how criminally
they avoided peace.
• •••••
Thèse are the facts revealed by the Austrian publica-
tion, the acts of commission and omission which are
chargeable to the allied Empires.
The Red Book and the White Book taken together
constitute the gravest indictment which could be written
against Germany and Austria; they confirai anew the
judgment pronounced on the ground of the earlier publi-
cations : that Germany and Austria are alone and ex-
1 Blue Book, Nos. 133, 139.
THE CRIME 351
clusively guilty of having consciously and intentionally
brought about the European war.
Thèse things being so, it ill becomes the Austrian
Government to take the field with the heavy artillery
of their moral indignation against the " self-seeking
policy of Great Britain " and the " désire for revanche
of the French Republic," and the unscrupulousness of
Russia, and to reproach the Entente Powers with the
fact that they provoked the European war by u ranging
themselves beside the (Serbian) Kingdom with its load
of guilt."
It is untrue that the Triple Entente intervened exclu-
sively on the side of Serbia. The opposite is the case,
and this fact is confirmed, not only by the publications
of the Entente Powers, but also by the Red Book itself.
From the very beginning the Governments of England,
France, and Russia did not restrain their sympathy for
Austria's justifiable demand for satisfaction, nor did
they fail to express their deep horror at the assassination
of Sera je vo. At the same time, after the unprecedented
humiliation of Serbia they could not, and dared not, omit
to urge on the Government of Vienna precepts of
modération, and to warn them of the conséquences
which would ensue from the continuance of an unac-
commodating attitude. The Entente Powers, by their
moderating influence in Belgrade, had already elicited
the submissive Serbian answer. They were ready at the
conférence proposed by Grey to do everything in their
power to accord satisfaction, even to those wishes of
Austria which were of a more far-reaching character.
Bunsen and Grey, Sazonof and Schebeko repeatedly
assured the Government of Vienna of their readiness to
give effect at the conférence to the justifiable wishes of
S52 J'ACCUSE
Austria by every means in their power. 1 Where, then,
is the political selfishness of the Entente Powers ? Where
is the one-sided participation on behalf of Serbia ?
Where is the effort to humiliate the Austrian monarchy ?
The history and the antécédents of the European con-
flict clearly reveal which side was guilty of political
selfishness, who it was who for her own interests
gambled with the well-being of ail civilised nations.
Did not Austria annex Bosnia and Herzegovina in
violation of the solemn obligations contained in the
Treaty of Berlin, and thereby stir into full flame the
Great Serbian national movement ? Did not Austria,
in pur suit of her selfish interests, push to such an
extrême length the question of Skutari, the question of
the Serbian harbour, the Albanian question, that on
two or three occasions in the last ten years a European
war, on account of Austria, was imminent? In
August, 1913, was not Austria prepared to begin a war
against Serbia, without any regard for the European
conséquences, and would hâve done so had not Italy
refused to give her support ? Austria, the accomplice
and the tool of Germany in the présent world-war, has
indeed no reason to reproach the Entente Powers with
the violation of "public morality and humanity." The
accusation which the Austrian Government brings
against the Entente Powers : " It is they who must be
made answerable before history for the immeasurable
sufîering which has corne upon the human race " — the
full weight of this accusation falls back on Austria and
Germany. To bring about a European war in order to
rid herself of an inconvénient neighbour was at once a
crime and a folly. The war against Serbia, whatever
its issue, could only worsen Austria's position in the
1 See Blue Book, Nos. 5, 12. Orange Book, No. 4, 40, 42,
43. Yellow Book, Nos. 26, 27, 30. Red Book, 41, 47, 50.
m
THE CRIME 35S
Balkans ; it could in no way improve it. The European
war, however, which Austria, at Germany's instigation
and with her support, conjured up along with the
Serbian war, could only be for Austria a case of driving
out the Devil by Beelzebub, of décapitation as a cure
for toothache; c'était plus qu'un crime, c'était une
faute.
Like a bull with lowered horns, the Austrian Govern-
ment plunged on against the red cloth of Serbia, without
looking to the right or the left, without troubling about
the conséquences, which a blind man could not avoid
foreseeing.
And now the conséquences hâve corne — now already,
before the war is decided. With the blood oozing from
her heavy wounds the double eagle is lying on the
ground. Serbia is free. But Galicia and part of Buko-
vina are in the hands of the enemy. On ail the frontiers
of the many-tongued empire the neighbouring peoples
are stirring to draw over to them their oppressed kindred
by peaceful pressure, or, if need be, by force of arms.
In every joint the decayed building of the Hapsburg
Monarchy is creaking, and already the process of décom-
position is beginning, which, but for the suicidai policy
of the Government of Vienna, might hâve been deferred
for générations to corne. With the cry of war : " Vivat
Austria, pereat mundus," the struggle began; with the
cry of peace, " Vivat mundus, pereat Austria," it will
come to an end.
A A
IV.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED.
I have arrived at the end of my task. The terrible
thing, which for long hovered before the eyes of the
nations of Europe, but which was never regarded as
possible, has corne to pass. Prosperous seats of the old
civilisation of Europe have been transformed into heaps
of rubbish and ruin. The earth, covered with the snow
of winter, has drained the blood of millions of the
children of men in the prime of life. In common graves,
far from their wives, their children, and their mothers,
hundreds of thousands are laid to rest together without
cross and without mémorial — friend and foe united in
death. Unending trains, filled with wounded, traverse
the country from east to west and from west to east,
and inside, there they lie, the poor men with mangled
limbs, with bruised bodies, with disfigured counten-
ances, moaning and sighing in their pains, many dis-
figured beyond récognition, with arms or limbs wrenched
off ; those denied the light of truth have lost the light
of day ; they still live whom death has claimed.
They form one vast bleeding wound in the body of
humanity.
Millions of women and children weep out their eyes
day and night for the dear ones whom they have lost,
for the dear ones whom they receive back helpless and
crippled for life. Countless dwelling-places of peaceful
354
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 355
m en; countless centres of industrial activity, countless
memorials of the art of man hâve been burned down
and destroyed ! The labour of générations, of centuries,
is transformed into dust and ashes. The fields are
trampled, the crops annihilated, the castles of the great
and the cottages of peasants are levelled with the earth ;
the unforturiate inhabitants, women and children, grey-
headed men and women, wander along the country-
roads without shelter, without a home, in rain and in
wind, in snow and in hail, onward anywhere in the hope
that somewhere there may be a corner where they may
still their hunger and obtain a wretched shelter in their
misery.
And still onward goes the struggle and the task of
murder. Like the ebb and the flow of the tide, the
armies of millions move backwards and forwards, and
every step forward and every step backward costs new
hecatombs of human lives, inflicts new wounds and new
pains, créâtes new widows and new orphans.
And what sort of a life do they lead who are still
living? They are buried in holes in the ground, day
and night, weeks and months, like cave-dwellers of pre-
historic times ; indeed, their lot is worse than theirs !
The water is up to their knees, often they are days on
end without food, crouching down before the bullets of
the enemy, overwhelmed by shrapnel and shells, which
at a stroke destroy their earth-dwellings reared with so
much labour, and cast them down in the trenches dead
and wounded. And then from time to time there is the
signal to attack ! Out of the trenches ! Fix bayonets !
Then there is the rush across the open field, while
exposed to the blattering machine-guns, which, the
scythe-man of thèse days, mow down those who are
advancing to the attack. And then cornes the struggle
of man to man ! Then they throw themselves at each
A A 2
356 J'ACCUSE
other with blows, with kicks, and thrusts with their
sabres or with the butt-end of their guns, one peaceful
man against another — peaceful, that is, until they hâve
been turned to beasts under the influence and the
incitement of their leaders,
under the roll of the drums, the fanfare of trumpets,
under the encouraging summons
"How beautiful to die the death of a hero for the
Fatherland."
And they die like Aies. Hundreds, thousands of
bodies fill up the trenches, and furnish a support across
which those who are following may advance to the
attack. And there are wounded lying among the dead.
And the battle rolls past over their heads. And the
horsemen tramp on them. And the cannons tear them
to pièces. And there is no help. Often for hours and
for days they must lie in the mud, exposed to the fire
of the shrapnel, poor men who cannot move, to whom
no help can be brought. How many bleed to death
there ! How many are there who are only lightly
wounded, but who, in their helplessness, are delivered
over to death !
• •••••
Ail reports agrée that it is impossible to picture in
words the horrors of modem battles. I hâve spoken to
doctors, to people, that is, who are certainly, by their
profession, accustomed to what is horrible, and they
told me that the impression made by a battlefield and
by a hospital behind the Front is enough to drive any-
one mad. It can only be compared with a gigantic
slaughter-house, many thousand times larger than the
largest slaughter-houses in the world. It is impossible
to give correct treatment to each of the thousands of
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 357
wounded who are brought in at the same time, impos-
sible on account of their gigantic number, impossible
also on account of the interruption caused by the shells
which constantly imperil those hospitals situated in the
neighbourhood of the battlefield. What descriptions I
received from other doctors who hâve received the
wounded at the base hospitals or on their return home !
How many wounds, in themselves slight, end fatally or
at least involve amputation because they cannot in time
receive aseptic treatment !
In a report of Surgeon-General Kôrte we find : —
" In the récent fights on the Yser, on the canals as well as
round about Ypres, the most of the wounds, often even those
wounds caused by rifle-fire, are infected. The soldiers lie in
wet trenches, and in conséquence of the violent artillery fire
they can in many cases be picked up only after days hâve
elapsed ; some hâve lain five or six days in turnip-fields or in
deserted trenches before it was possible to bring them to the
field hospital. Serious infections are then not uncommon,
such as phlegmon and tetanus. ... I hâve seen some recover
who hâve been lying for days (6-8) in stables, barns, or hay
sheds in the most wretched externat conditions. There was
one who had been lying helplessly for five days in a turnip
field and had kept himself alive by eating turnips
The roads are broken up, and the villages hâve been so knocked
to pièces in the battles which hâve been going on for weeks
that we hâve difticulty in finding suitable rooms for hospital
purposes." (Berliner Tageblatt 13th December).
Another report, also from a doctor, says : —
" It is a depressing rainy morning ; in the bottom of the
oozy bed of the canal there is the dirty water-channel and in
the slime and the gurgling water lie our brave men, who died
the death of heroes for the Fatherland. This picture has
imprinted itself too deeply in our soûls for it ever to be obliter-
ated. I hâve them constantly before my eyes as they lay
down below us in their neat uniform, stiff and pale with their
bodies in the attitude in which death surprised them, down
below in the muddy canal-bed with its miry clay." (Berliner
Tageblatt, 24th December).
358 J'ACCUSE
Life in the trenches is described in one report as
follows : —
" One has to be listening ail the time until at last we reach
our own section of the trenches ; on the left and the right,
before and behind, there is the terrible roar of artillery.
Lucky for you if none of the shells burst in the trenches.
Quite close to me two of my chums were lying quietly together
under a blanket in the shelter. One was hit in the stomach
by shrapnel : — dead ! The explosion was very defective ;
the other was only burned in the face and the hands. . . .
Some days ago we stormed and took a village ; in the fields
around about many of my chums are still lying unburied.
They are within reach of the enemies' fire and we cannot get
to them by day or by night. . . . Among our fallen chums
there arc heaps of dead cattle which are now swollen. In the
farmyard the sows are eating their own young ; two children
are lying among them, a boy and a girl. Everywhere the holes
caused by the shells are gaping in the ground, some are so
big that 30 to 40 men could find room in them." (Berliner
Tageblatt, 23rd December).
A member of the Landwehr writes from Russian
Poland : —
" Necessity knows no law, and our provisions could not
always be got after us quick enough in the country. But it
was not only their vie tuais, etc., but often also the protection
of their roof and their cattle as well that the inhabitants lost
when we advanced. The military flooded into the needy
houses and into barns and lofts like a wild stream, and took
possession of their rooms and their fire-sides, and often the
population with ail their youngsters wandered about outside
in the pouring rain. ... I ne ver learned what the family did
that night, but for long I hâve been unable to forget that
impression, for I hâve myself got children at home and I
thought with horror that they also might some day be in the
same position, unless we succeeded in protecting the frontier.
As though by chance the words turn up in my brain with an
ironie sound : ' War is glorious, war is beautiful.' If I could
only catch a sight of the writer of thèse lines, I would soon
drive his theory out of him." (Vorwârts, 8th December).
A First Lieutenant in the Reserve describes what
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 359
happened in the beautiful church at Becelaere, in
Belgium : —
M On the evening of the same day I was lying in this beautiful
Church along with hundreds of other wounded men. A bullet
fired by English Infantry had gone through my breast and
my lungs, broken some ribs, and pierced the pelvis bone.
Mattresses were ranged alongside of each other on the stone
floor of the Church, and on each there lay a wounded soldier.
The doc tors were binding up and examining the wounded.
More and more came in, and by nightfall the Church was
quite full. AU night long there coula be heard a subdued
groaning and moaning and quiet prayers and supplication to
God from every corner and from every shady nook. . . ."
A wounded man has just been bandaged by a doctor when a
shell finds its way through the open Church door. The head
of the wounded man sinks back, the shot has penetrated his
forehead and killed him. " Two severely wounded soldiers
are lying together ; both hâve wounds in their stomach and
neither will corne through with his life ; the shadow of death
already flits over their faces." The chaplain gives them the
Holy Communion. The setting sun breaks with gentle
radiance through the stained church Windows and illumines
the features of both the soldiers dying of their wounds. Then
suddenly there is a deafening uproar. The walls fall down
upon the wounded men. " Fragments of shells corne whistling
down Shrieking and groaning is heard. . . . There
is a hopeless tangle of men, débris and mattresses . . . those
who are slightly wounded creep out of the chaos on ail fours ;
those who are severely wounded are brought into the open
air by people belonging to the Médical Corps. Some of the
dead are recovered. . . . The Church of Becelaere is left
standing, lonely and deserted, a picture of désolation."
(Berliner Tageblatt, of the 19th of December).
From a letter from the front written by an infantry
officer : —
" We sufïered very serious losses in men, but also in officers
and in non-commissioned officers. It tugs at one's heart to
remember ail our dear comrades with whom we hâve so often
been happy together. Often the bodies of those who fell could
be buried only after many day s, on one occasion not until 12 day s
after being hit. You can imagine the condition in which
they were then. But the enemy gave us no time and no
360 J^ACCUSE
peace to collect the bodies. Lieutenant S., with whom in our
careless days we drank together in beautiful K. — you remember
him, — and Lieutenant W. fell two weeks ago. They were
found only a few days ago in a little wood, and their bodies
were already completely decayed. . . . The harvest which
death has reaped hère from us and from our enemies reminds
one of the fearfui time which Ypres and the surrounding
country experienced five hundred years ago, when the plague
reduced the population from 200,000 to a tenth of that
number." (Berliner Tageblatt, 14th December).
A soldier of the Landwehr from Charlottenburg
reports as follows with regard to a fight at close quarters
on the Yser Canal : —
" The horrible groans of the wounded resounded through the
night. In hunger and in cold we awaited the morning. One
detachment lay in the trenches ; the rest of us were standing
in the entrance hall. In the grey of the morning a Belgian
Major came out of the house with his bicycle. . . . He had
just gracefully lit his cigarette, when a shot from the trenches
put an end to his life. This was the signal for the fight in the
streets. . . . We were only four mètres distant from the
enemy. The enemy wanted to press us back into the canal.
The leaders of our company and the other officers soon fell.
The command passes from one of us to the other. The
enemy threw sulphur bombs, which lit up the whole canal,
and poisoned the air for us. Our men fell one after the other.
It was an unending struggle of man against man. The enemy
pressed us more and more closely. It was no longer a fight,
it was a mutual butchering. . . .With the butt-end of the rifles
we beat the enemy out of the trenches, and made the dust
fly. The rage was indescribable. Every centimètre of ground
was hère bought with blood. . . . The dead and the wounded
lay together in heaps ; those who could still walk sought to
get back to the hospital over the bridge, but it was a sorrowf ul
business for the poor fellows who had been shot in the legs,
and who could not go with them. They had to put up with
the heavy shrapnel fire of the enemy." {Vorwârts, 24th
December).
Hère is a little genre picture from the Wiener
Arbeiterzeitung : —
A Reservist born in Warnsdorf had had both his feet
frostbitten in the Carpathians ; he was brought back, and
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 361
he asked his wife to meet him at the station at Reichenberg.
As his wife was about to go up the stairs at the station she
saw " an old, broken-down man with white hair painfully
coming along the platform, supported on two sticks with a
bundle in his arm. Out of pity she was going to take the
bundle from the man and help him to walk." In this moment
she recognised him : " it was her own husband ; the woman
collapsed unconscious."
A very interesting contribution to the solution of the
question whether war " develops the noblest virtues of
man" (Field-Marshal Moltke) or whether conversely,
"it makes more bad people than it takes away"
(Kant), is furnished by a report of a battle published
in the Jauer'sche Tageblatt of October 18th, 1914. The
writer of this report is the subordinate officer Klemt, of
the First Company of the 154th Régiment, and his state-
ment is expressly confirmed at the conclusion by his
Lieutenant and the leader of the Company, von Niem.
The heading of the article is "A Day of Honour for our
Régiment, September 24>th, 1914." As a human, or
rather as a bestial, document the report deserves to be
reproduced in extenso ; I regret that for reasons of space
I must content myself with an extract : —
" The first Frenchmen were already discovered ; we brought
them down like squirrels, and gave them a warm réception
with blows of the butt and bayonet : they no longer needed
doctors ; we are no longer fighting loyal enemies, but treacher-
ous brigands. By leaps and bounds we got across the clearing.
They were hère, there, and everywhere hidden in the thicket.
Now it is down with the enemy ! And we wïll give them no
quarter. Every one shoots standing, a f ew, a very f ew, fire kneel-
ing. No one tries to take shelter. We reach a little dépression
in the ground : hère the red trousers dead or wounded lie in a
heap on the ground. We knock down or bayonet the wounded,
for we know that those scoundrels fire at our backs when we
hâve gone by. There was a Frenchman there stretched out,
full length, face down, pretending to be dead. A kick from
a strong fusilier soon taught him that we were there. Turning
round, he asked for quarter, but we answered : " Is that the
362 J'ACCUSE
way your tools work, you — ," and he was nailed to the ground.
Close to me I heard odd cracking sounds. They were blows
from a gun on the bald head of a Frenchman, which a private
of the 154th was dealing out vigorously ; he was wisely using
a French gun so as not to break his own. Tender-hearted
soûls are so kind to the French wounded that they finish
them with a bullet, but others give them as many thrusts
and blows as they can. Our adversaries had fought bravely,
we had to contend with picked men ; they let us get within
thirty, even ten mètres of them — too near. ... At the
entry into the screen of branches they lay groaning and crying
for quarter, but whether wounded slightly or severely the
brave fusiliers spare their country the cost of caring for many
enemies." 1
The report concludes with a description of how the
tired troops, after their labour of blood, lay down in
slumber. "The god of dreams paints for one or the
other a pleasing vision. With a prayer of thanks on
our lips we slumbered on to the coming day."
What makes this report so horrible is not so much the
occurrences which it narrâtes as the brutal naïveté with
which they are represented as glorious actions of
heroism, specially attested by their leader, and pub-
lished in the most prominent place of the officiai news-
paper of the district. It may be that brutalities hâve
also been committed by the other side — when the beast
is let loose in man it need cause no wonder if bestialities
occur — but I hâve looked in vain for the publication of
such " heroic " deeds in the foreign Press. That anyone
should sit down in cold blood after his work of murder
is over and vaingloriously narrate in glowing colours
horrors of this sort to his townsmen at home, his friends,
his own wife and children, makes the matter much more
pitiful even than it is in itself . The " prayer of thanks '
to God could not, of course, be wanting in a German
report of battle. His Royal Highness Prince Oscar of
1 [As translated in the English editionjof M. Bedier's German
Atrocities.]
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 363
Prussia is also quoted by the under-officer Klemt as an
admirer of the heroic deeds narrated : " With thèse
Grenadiers and with the 154th we could take hell by
storm," exclaimed the Prince, and he assured both the
régiments that they were worthy of the name of " Royal
Brigade."
The report in the Jauer newspaper unités in itself —
like the horse afflicted with every conceivable malady,
of which a picture appears in veterinary schools — ail the
"noblest virtues " which war can and must produce :
bestiality, boastfulness, false piety, and so on. Whether
the world " would stagnate and lose itself in Material-
ism," if thèse qualities remained undeveloped, I leave
to be decided by people who are cleverer than I am.
The Russian poet Valerij Brjussow describes as follows
his impressions of the battlefield at Lowitz : —
" The trenches are empty, but near them lie hère and there
the bodies of German soldiers on their backs, face downwards,
or on their side, their arms stretched out or held tight to their
breasts, with strangely peaceful faces. The most of them are
wearing their dark-grey uniforms, some, however, are in their
soldiers' cloaks, which hâve clearly been used to protect them
against the cold. Among the dead I see young men with
soft faces, with the first down on their cheeks, but I also see
older, graver men who hâve entered the forties, who hâve
probably long ago established their life on a firm basis, and
certainly never thought that it would be their fate to close
their life on a snow-covered field in foreign lands, in far-ofE
distant Russia. . . . Our soldiers accompany us in our walk
along the side of the trenches, and look at the faces of the
dead in solemn thought and contemplation. In war one
becomes accustomed to the appearance of death. Death is
so constantly before one's vision that it ceases to awake a
feeling of terror." (Vorwârts, 16th December.)
An infantry soldier thus describes the fearful battles
in Flanders in which he took part : —
" The soldiers were standing up to their ankles in water in
their protected positions when they received the order to
attack. The enemy belched against us their destructive
/
364 J'ACCUSE
shells from 20 mouths of fire. Many were literally torn to
pièces. . . . Ail the time our rage grows more terrible. . . .
There was a thick black powder smoke ; we thought we should
choke ; scarcely anything could be seen of the men. Thèse
were the shells from the English Navy, which was taking part
in the battle. . . . Across the middle of the field eight horses
were galloping, still attached to the gun-carriage, when a shell
burst in the middle of them. A heartrending shriek folio wed
from the animais, and then there was nothing to be seen but
a quivering, tangled mass weltering in a puddle of blood. . . .
Listen, what is that ? A trumpet signal. The sound qui vers,
as if it also felt the pain. ' Fix bayonets.' The clean steel
now shines on the barrels of the gun which spits out fire. . . .
A shell burst beside the third man on my right ; he was
killed, my neighbour was thrown out and severely wounded.
The same thing happened on my left. The drummer beat his
drum. — Up ! Charge ! Hurrah ! I believe that our cheer
drowned the thunder of the artillery. Then we went for the
enemy with the bayonet. I will not describe to y ou the bayonet
charge. It was a butchery. Twice we had to retreat ; on
the third attack we won. When you at home hear of the
victory : ' Fall of Dixmuiden ! ' will you shout hurrah ?
We thought of the sacrifices ; many, many were lying on the
field bleeding." (Vorwârts, llth December.)
How Beautiful to Die for the Fatherland !
That is what war looks like, as it is, and as it is felt
by those who are taking part in it. I seek in vain in
ail the hundreds of letters from the front, and in the
war correspondence which daily fills the columns of the
newspapers, for any expression of the sentiment : "How
beautiful it is to die for the Fatherland! " I find rcpre-
sented everywhere merely the unspeakable horror and
the barbarity of the struggle between men, who nourish
against each other no sentiment of hostility, who hâve
ail left mothers at home ; many, very many, wives
and children ; and who are ail filled with the one
thought : " Oh, that it were peace again ! Oh, that you
were but home among y our dear ones, caressed and
nourished by your children, in the arms of your wife and
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 365
mother, free for ever frora this horrible task of
murder."
The great men behind the front hâve, of course,
différent views on the subject. Their bones are not
broken. Their houses are not burnt down. Their wives
and children are not driven out of house and home.
Their castles and their domains are not destroyed. They
hunger not, neither do they thirst. They sleep in their
beds, not in holes in the earth like wild beasts. When
they hâve a pain in their heart or their liver they cap
go home and get cured by a course at the springs or the
baths ; their wives and fathers and children can hasten
to them, tenderly embrace and care for them, until after
weeks and months they can return once more with
renewed vigour to their posts of security behind the
battle-front.
While in front of the enemy death and destruction are
sweeping away the flower of the youth of ail countries,
the prosperity of many générations, the great men sit
far behind
1 Kant in Perpétuai Peace (p. 145) censures as illogical and
blasphemous the common conception of a co-operation or a
concurrence (concursus) on the part of the Deity, as, for
example, when we say that the physician has restored the
sick with the help of God. " God created the physician as
well as his means of healing, and we must ascribe the resuit
wholly to him." [This footnote appears to refer to the
censored passage.]
366 J'ACCUSE
" Forward ! forward ! Up and at them ! " is the call
. And those at the front answer with
moaning and groaning, with pains and torments, with
longing thoughts of peace and home, which still illumine
their last faltering look. " Gee up ! gee up ! " calls the
driver, and lashes the poor horses who are straining to
move the heavy wagons forward on the clammy roads.
ïhey sink in the mud, but he knows no pity. Only
forward, forward ! Hold on ! No slackening ! And he
would drive the poor brutes to death if there were not
a league for the protection of animais which shields the
wretched beasts against their tormentors. But where
is the league for the protection of men ? It is high
time that such a league were founded.
Prestige.
What does a war mean to the great men of the earth ?
A new émotion added to countless others. A drama of
chivalry played out in earnest, a question of ambition
and of vanity, which they designate by the word
"prestige"; a "great event in their life," 1 like the
victory of their colours at the Hoppegarten or of their
yachts at the Kiel Regatta. "The glory of the ruler
consists in this, that, without his requiring to expose
himself to danger, thousands stand at his command
ready to let themselves be sacrificed for a matter of no
concern to them. The différence between the savages
of Europe and those of America lies chiefly in this, that,
while many tribes of the latter hâve been entirely
devoured by their enemies, Europeans know a better
way of using the vanquished than by eating them ; and
1 See the telegram of the Crown Princess Cecilia to the
Governmental Président in Danzig after the battle at Longwy :
" Please tell ail our dear people in Danzig and West Prussia of
my husband's victory north of Metz, knowing how much
interest the Province which is so near to us will take in this
great event in his life. God protect you ail."
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 367
they prefer to increase through them the number of their
subjects, and so the number of instruments at their
command for still more widely spread war. 1 "
To sacrifice many thousands for a matter of no concern
to them ! That is the true meaning of this and of most
other wars. What does prestige mean to thèse millions
of poor devils who are to-day called upon to lay down
their lives on the battlefields of Europe ? They do not
even know the word, let alone the idea. Prestige is a
luocury for him who is already surfeited with ail the
other gifts of life. It is the obstinacy which refuses to
give way even when one feels oneself in the wrong,
because one is strong enough not to need to give way.
For the common citizen, however, for the peasant and
the labourer, prestige is the daily bread which he must
bitterly earn in the sweat of his face, his health which
renders it possible for him to achieve his labour, his
family which brings sweetness and light into the hours
of his leisure. That is his prestige, and for it he would
fight voluntarily and with enthusiasm if thèse blessings
were imperilled.
It is for this reason that they try to persuade him that
they are in danger. The " cunning of a policy that shuns
the light " exercises the arts of probabilism : it
"attributes evil intentions to others, or even the proba-
bility of their possible superiority."
"It will be well to put an end to this sophistry, and
to bring the false advocates of the might of the earth
to confess that it is not right but might in whose
interest they speak. ... In order to do this, we must
first expose the delusion by which they deceive them-
selves and others " (Kant, Perpétuai Peace, p. 174,
175).
Does that not read as if it had been written to-day ?
Is not every word applicable to our position to-day and
1 Kant : Perpétuai Peace t p 130.
368 J'ACCUSE
to our present-day leaders ? And if the gentlemen who
signed the " Appeal to the civilised world " do, in fact,
" hold the inheritance of Kant as sacred as their hearth
and their soil," then they should read this wonderful
essay on Perpétuai Peace, which, amid ail the storms of
the French revolutionary wars and under the domin-
ance of a Prussian military autocracy, dared to utter
revolutionary truths which to-day would be suppressed
as seditious, and exposed to the persécution of blood
at the hands of the suprême commanders in the Mark of
Brandenburg.
It is for a phantom that millions to-day are bleeding,
that millions are hungering, and that inestimable wealth
is being destroyed. It is for the phantom of prestige,
of world-power, which has been tricked out in the guise
of the deliverer of the Fatherland. The gesta Dei per
Francos are from now to be transformed into the gesta
Dei per Teutones. The " worshipful" German people —
as a privatdocent writes (how will he express him-
self when he becomes a professor?) — is, in fact, to be
worshipped by ail others as the super-nation. The
Germans are to advance "to the front of the world,' :
and ail thèse hallucinations of an endémie swollen-
headedness are then designated " defence against the
enemy's attack," in order thereby to make them palat-
able to the sound sensé of the simple people.
Proletarians of All Countries, Massacre
Each Other !
To beguile the labouring classes to change their peace-
ful battle-cry, "Proletarians of all countries, combine
with each other!" into the bloody battle-cry, "Prole-
tarians of all countries, massacre each other!" is a
political tour de force which demands careful prépara-
tion, great dexterity, and a fabulously brazen forehead.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 369
I must admit that our leading men possess thèse quali-
ties in the fullest measure. Hère, indeed, their achieve-
ment is brilliant, unsurpassable.
The attitude of the Social Démocratie party on August
4th in approving the first war crédit of £250,000,000 has
rightly been subjected to sharp criticism abroad, and
especially by allied international parties. It ought to
be emphasised that in the meeting of the party, which
decided on concurring in the war-credit, there was a
minority distinguished, not in numbers, but by the
importance of its members. The attitude of the
majority is explicable by référence to those reasons
which hâve been active in drawing the whole of the
German people into this war, to the false illusion pro-
duced by the Government that this is a war of defence,
and not of offence. Ever since July 31st Germany has
been barred from ail communication with foreign coun-
tries. No one knew what took place in the world, and
especially in Germany, in the four days between July
31 st and August 4th. The German White Book which
was laid before the members of the House maintained
that the Russians and French had fallen upon us from
the east and the west, and that they had already pene-
trated into Germany. The same assertion recurred in
the speeches of the Emperor and the Chancellor. No
one was in a position to establish what was true and
what was false. Under the impression that Germany
was compelled to fight for her security and her indepen-
dence, the majority of the Social Démocratie Party
supported the war-credit, and, according to the statu-
tory régulations of the party, compelled the minority to
adhère to this décision.
The second approval, given on December 2nd, was
merely the conséquence of the first, and since " it is
the curse of evil deeds, That to ail time they still
B B
370 J'ACCUSE
engender evil," 1 the group in the party which had ap-
proved the first crédit again secured a majority. Never-
theless, the struggle within the party was more violent,
and the minority had grown stronger. As is well known,
Liebknecht alone had the courage and the strength of
character to refuse to subject himself to Party-discipline
and to record his dissentient vote in the sitting of the
Reichstag.
This action has very properly met with the approval
of ail comrades in the whole world, with the unfortunate
exception of the Social Démocratie Party in the Reich-
stag. I regard as extremely regrettable the vote of
censure passed by the Party on February 2nd. It is
universally regarded abroad, not as a disciplinary
measure due to an offence against the internai order of
the party, but as a condemnation of the substantial
point involved in the dissension of Liebknecht, and
therefore as an emphatic approval of the war-credit and
of the whole war policy of the Government. As a
matter of fact, it would hâve been more expédient,
having regard to the future reconstruction of the inter-
national party, if in this fundamental question party
discipline had been ignored; such a course would hâve
avoided the appearance that it was unworthy of a
member of the German Social Démocratie Party to vote
against the war-credit.
It would appear that in Berlin no account was taken
of the effect which such a party resolution was bound to
exercise on their comrades abroad. Above ail, they do
not appear to realise that the sympathy of ail foreign
comrades are on Liebknecht 9 s side, and not on the side
of the nationalist majority of the Social Démocratie
Party. By his action on December 2nd Liebknecht has
become the most popular German socialist abroad, and
1 [Schiller. Die. Piccolomini.]
THE CONSEQUENCES OEgTHE DEED 371
in saying this I hâve in mind neutral countries rather
than enemy countries, whose approval might appear
suspect. The reconstruction of the International Party
will be built on the attitude of Liebknecht, not on the
attitude of those members of the House who, once
deceived, were not possessed of the insight or the
courage to acknowledge or confess their error, and who
hâve gradually rolled down the slippery slope of oppor-
tunism into the camp of the Nationalists and the Im-
per iàlists. They hâve entangled themselves so strongly
with the " National," that they will not again find their
vvay back to the " International," and the International
Party herself will not, as I hope and trust, later on
spread out her motherly arms and exclaim : " Bring him
to me with ail his blight, and tell him I love him still."
The prodigal sons — and it is better so — will hereafter
also remain in a far country.
It is, however, necessary to compliment the German
Government on the fact that they hâve understood in
a masterly manner — at least for the présent, the consé-
quences will be revealed later — how to put in opération
the policy of " divide et impera." "That is to say, if
there are certain privileged persons among the people
. . . bring about a quarrel among them, and make
mischief between them and the people " (Kant,p. 171).
They hâve succeeded in bringing about a quarrel among
thèse leaders, but it is to be hoped that the people will
be one when the day of the great reckoning cornes, the
" day of judgment," when ail guilt will be uncovered,
and every crime will find its expiation.
POLITICAL MORALITY — MORAL POLITICS.
As in matters of foreign policy the German Govern-
ment appears to hâve taken the instructions of Bern-
hardi as their guiding principle, so, in internai affairs,
B B 2
ii
372 J'ACCUSE
they hâve chosen as their model Kant's description of
what a politician should not be. Where moral politics
cease, says the sage of Kônigsberg, political morality
begins. Political morality, however, which is équivalent
to non-morality, acts according to the following
Sophistical maxims n : —
1. Fac et excusa. Seize the most favourable oppor-
tunity for arbitrary usurpation — either of the authority
of the State over its own people or over a neighbouring
people; the justification of the act and exténuation of
the use of force will come much more easily and grace-
fully when the deed is doue than if one has to think out
convincing reasons for taking this step, and first hear
through ail the objections which can be made against
it. . . . Besides, this show of audacity in a statesman
even lends him a certain semblance of inward conviction
of the justice of his action; and once he has got so far
the god of success (bonus eventus) is his best advocate. ,:
" 2. Si fecisti, nega. As for any crime you hâve com-
mitted, such as has, for instance, brought your people
to despair and thence to insurrection, deny that it has
happened owing to any fault of yours. Say, rather,
... in the case of your having usurped a neighbouring
State, that human nature is to blâme; for if a man is
Dot ready to use force and steal a march upon his
neighbour, he may certainly count on the latter fore-
stalling him and taking him prisoner." 1
Is that not a photographically true, almost prophétie,
picture of Bethmann's method of action, which, more-
over, has been characterised, not merely by the philo-
sopher in his cfiair, but also by the philosopher on the
throne ? " When Princes désire war they begin it, and
then summon an industrious lawyer to prove that they
were right " (Frederick II). You begin a war and then
1 Kant, p. 170
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 373
prove that the other side began it, or at least that he
was on the point of beginning it, and that it was neces-
sary to anticipate him. In adopting such a course your
external honour can never be injured — that is, if you
are believed — for either you are compelled to be the
defender of the Fatherland or else you are the prudent
guardian of the peace, who anticipated the certain
attack. Morality, however, which ought to govern the
actions of States as well as of individuals, thereby cornes
to grief, and no words appear to the philosopher of
Kônigsberg to be sufficiently strong to characterise the
perniciousness of such politicians. " But it seems that
by no theodicy or vindication of the justice of God can
we justify Création in putting such a race of corrupt
créatures into the world at ail. . . . Politics in the real
sensé cannot take a step forward without first paying
homage to the principles of morals. And, although
politics, per se, is a difficult art, in its union with
morals no art is required." He who subordinates moral
politics to political morals, that is to say, the principles
to the end, puts the cart before the horse, and acts
against the categorical Imperative. 1
That is the " inheritance " of Kant, and anyone who
exalts this inheritance thereby utters a condemnation
of the policy which has led to this, the most horrible
of ail wars, a policy which has perhaps acted according
to " political morality," but which certainly has not
been an instance of " moral politics."
Meanwhile, however, the work of blood, the hated
task, goes on, and the life blood of our nation is being
sucked dry as though by gigantic leeches, and drained
in the insatiable vengeance of the moloch of war. "To
visit a battlefield is a horrible business," wrote the
Emperor Frederick III. " It is impossible to describe
1 Kant, pp. 182, 175
374 J'ACCUSE
the fearful wounds presented to the eye. War is, in
spite of everything, a terrible affair, and those who,
sitting round a council table, conjure it up by a stroke
of the pen, do not know what they are doing." "The
most horrible side of war should, however, be seen
by those who hâve frivolously brought it about, by
those diplomatists who regard it as a factor in their
calculations, with the same lightness of heart with
which a merchant allows in his calculations for the
possibility of a chance of gain ; thèse men should them-
selves help to storm such a canal-bridge exposed to the
enemy's shell fire"; thèse are the words of a doctor
writing from the scène of opérations. 1
How do you feel, Herr von Bethmann, when you read
such things as thèse ? How did you express it in your
last circular note ? 2 The " idea of a conférence," you
say, was not " sympathetic " to you; the "form" of a
conférence was "disagreeable." And now — are the
fearful conséquences which hâve sprung from your
refusai more sympathetic to you ? Do you find them
less disagreeable ? Do you still dare, even to-day, to
speak of your sympathies and your antipathies, of your
scruples as to this or that form, when your antipathies
and your scruples hâve plunged Europe in a sea of
blood, and hâve made our famous European civilisation
the laughter of savage nations ? " We savages are, after
ail, the better men ! " may be the rightful boast of the
Red Indian to-day. And if, as I recently saw in an
allegorical picture, ail the yellow, black, and brown
primitive nations were to assemble on the edge of
Europe, and, seeing the scènes of murder and destruc-
tion, the smoking villages and towns, were to exclaim
1 Berliner Tageblatt, 24th Sept.
2 See Circular Note of the Chancellor of 24th December
(Appendix III.)
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 375
in dérision : " Voilà votre célèbre civilisation" Europe
could only hide her head in shame, and in justice admit
the higher culture of savage peoples. Hâve we, the
nations of Europe, still any légal title — such a title has,
indeed, never been recognised by morally thinking
m en — to embark on colonial conquests when the only
pretence that we can advance for our predatory excur-
sions, that we are the bearers of culture and civilisation,
has so miserably corne to nought ?
It is to y ou, Herr von Bethmann, that we owe ail
this. Parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. The
mountains are in travail, and a little mouse is born.
Hère it is the other way about; from the little mouse
of your antipathies and scruples there hâve arisen
gigantic mountains of human unhappiness. Go to the
battlefields, go to the hospitals ; see the wounded, the
dead, and the dying ; go into the wasted cities, and pray
before the ruined altars, entreating your Saviour for
forgiveness, that y ou, in place of the words "Peace on
earth, goodwill to men," hâve brought about "Murder
on earth, and for men fire and destruction." Then beat
your bieast and confess aloud and in public, so that ail
the world may hear it : "J am the guilty, I alone!"
This would not bring you righteousness, but it would
be the first step towards it — the pénitence which in
itself is half atonement.
If the Emperor had not found a Chancellor to make
this M war of libération," Germany would hâve
remained unliberated, that is to say, peaceful, molested
376 J'ACCUSE
by none, developing her culture and her well-being in
the labour of peace. And what is now our position ?
still happy if we can keep
from our frontiers the enemy, whom we ourselves called
into being; we should be fortunate if we could to-day
occupy the position we held half a year ago, possessed
ôf our colonies, our wealth, and the youth of our
country, now murdered, and daily wasting away.
QUIDQUID DELIRANT REGES, PLECTUNTUR ACHIVI.
■
But just for this purpose men are needed,
not courtiers; men full of character, who can oppose
the royal will, who can take the side of the Achaeans
against the King. "Immunity from punishment is a
spécial privilège of the kingly dignity, but it in no way
excludes the possibility of deserving punishment." The
task of men who stand beside kings as their responsible
advisers is to keep them from deserving punishment.
" Nor can there be a worse service either to the prince
or his people than enabling a monarch to rule in
his own person, dictating the commands of his own
violence or caprice through servants who dis-
approve of his measures, and yet suffer themselves
to be made instruments for carrying them into
exécution." 1
What in the case of a prince is, at any rate, explic-
able becomes in the
case of a responsible statesman an unpardonable crime.
The prince who from his early youth is brought up in
the mystery of statecraft by the grâce of God, sur-
rounded by flatterers and panderers, by courtiers and
parasites, who are apparently his servants, but are in
reality his masters, a prince who seldom hears the truth,
1 Brougham. Statesmen [Essay on Lord North.]
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 377
and who ne ver desires to hear it, notwithstanding the
words of Mirza Schaffy : —
" The sage needs not the smile of those in high estate,
The wise man's sage advice is needed by the great." 1
— a prince who regards the constrained silence of the
people as a token of unprecedented harmony, because
no one tells him what is living and stirring in the depths
of the nation 's soûl — such a prince is more easily ex-
cused than a Chancellor, if he confuses his ambition for
wider fields of conquest for famé and glory with the
well-being and the happiness of his people. The coun-
sellors of a prince exist, however, for the express purpose
of protecting him against the conséquences of his own
passions, and of reminding him in the words of Junius :
"Before your Majesty subdues the hearts of your
subjects, you must gain a noble victory over your
own." 2
They must be, not the servants of their lord, but
the first servants of the State. A personal attachment
to the monarch can furnish no reason or defence for the
public behaviour of a minister; for the former rests on
sentiment, but the latter on duty, on the categorical
imperative. In the choice between sentiment and duty
the latter only must be décisive. The alternative, " se
soumettre ou se démettre," can only be decided in
favour of the latter resolution.
Worst of ail, however, is when a minister, not only
covers with his shield the
actions of his monarch, but endeavours to justify them
by Machiavellian manœuvres. We hâve become almost
more Machiavellian than Machiavelli himself, and we
hâve quite forgotten that our great ancestor Frederick
1 [" Der Weise kann des Mâchtigen Gunst entbehren,
Doch nicht der Mâchtige des Weisen Lehren."]
2 [Letter 35. I9th December, 1769.]
378 J'ACCUSE
II. wrote the Antimachiavel. "The promise given was
a necessity of the past; the broken word is a necessity
of the présent." Does it not sound as if the élever
Florentine had expressly coined this phrase for the
Belgian question? "A Prince must hâve no other
object, and no other thought, and he must make nothing
else his study than war, its préparation and conduct."
Has this not been from time immémorial the policy of
the Kings 6f Prussia ? " Let the Prince take care to
conquer and to maintain his domination ; the means will
always be declared honourable, and praised by every-
one." Is that not the thread of Ariadne, by which we
hope to escape out of the labyrinth of our présent situa-
tion, that we may not fall victims to the Minotaur of
universal condemnation ? Machiavelli has usurped the
place of Kant, and in our case also the end justifies the
means.
Dreams of World Power.
What is the object and the aim of this war ? I hâve
already repeatedly pointed out that the object of our
rulers is the establishment of a new dominium mundi.
The Prussian Eagle is to spread his pinions over every
sea; a new âge in history is to dawn; the Roman, the
Spanish, and the English world-empires are now to be
followed by the German. 1 The saying of Virgil is
1 Now, of course, when the grapes hâve become sour, every-
one dénies the existence of thèse plans of world power ; hère
again " it was nobody." On the same day, however, on
which it was declared from a high quarter that the supposed in-
tention to found a world-empire was " nonsense," an " Impérial
Journal of the E aster n Army "was issued by the Press
Authorities of the German Military Government in Lodz, in
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 379
adapted for German use : " Tu regere imperio populos
Germane mémento." As Aristotle expected a trans-
formation of the Eastern world, a domination of
Hellenic culture, as a resuit of the expédition of Alex-
ander the Great, so we expect from this war the trans-
formation of the Western world, a domination of
German culture. What a childish, unhistoric view ! If
wars in long forgotten âges, war s between civilised
nations and barbarians, may at times hâve been the
means of bringing culture, their effect to-day among
peoples of equal culture is precisely the opposite; they
célébration of the Emperor's birthday. In this we find the
following : —
" A victorious war — and God be thanked, no one in
our German Fatherland, from the oldest Field Marshal
down to the youngest cobbler's apprentice, has any
doubt that such will be the issue — will create for us a
German Colonial Empire by the annexation of Belgian
and French Congo, and if Portugal should transform
into action her hostile attitude towards us, the Portuguese
Colonies on the East and West Coasts of Africa as well.
This will be an empire such as our f athers who sneered in
laughter at our first colonial beginnings could never
hâve imagined. . . . The most important point, however,
in this not improbable division of the African Continent
is that we shah thereby hâve given the final stroke to
English efforts to establish a sole dominion in Africa,
from the Cape to Cairo ; for between Egypt and East
Africa and the Anglo-Boer South Africa (which to-day
are still English), there will then lie the unending girdle of
our gigantic colonial possessions from the Indian Océan to the
Central African LaJces, and from the Congo to the Atlantic.
Of North-East and South Africa we say that to-day thèse
are still English ; but who knows what will happen if the
word of the poet is fulfilled : " For the world will one day
find Healing in the German mind." (Denn es muss am
deutschen Wesen, einmal noch die Welt genesen).
The Newspaper which contains the foregoing remark is
officially published by the military authorities as a birthday-
present for the Emperor : sapienti sat.
380 J'ACCUSE
are destroyers of culture, promoters of atavistic barbar-
ism. The future of the human race to-day can lie only
in tRe nations of the world living peacefully together.
Ail plans of world-domination, which even in earlier
times bore within them the seeds of their own destruc-
tion, must to-day, even before they achieve réalisation,
be wrecked on the feeling of equality among ail nations,
on the common consciousness that ail are striving after
the same ends in culture and well-being, on the intimate
relations which bind corresponding classes of différent
nations with each other. As geological strata and veins
of iron and minerai are not directed to the surface
according to the dividing lines between properties, but
underneath thèse boundaries pass from one property to
another, so the strata of modem human society are not
broken up by territorial frontiers, but pass from one
country to another. Horizontal interdependence has
taken the place of the vertical Une of division. And if
there is only one truly organised International, there
exist beside it a hundred others unorganised, held
together by equally firra internai bonds. Of such are
the Internationals of trade, of industry, of the technical
and moral sciences, and of literature and art, ail of
which constitute the indestructible spiritual bond Con-
necting the nations; we may say that even crime has
become international. Wars may loosen, but they
cannot destroy thèse bonds. Nature itself, as Kant once
said, "through the natural course of human propensi-
ties guarantees the coming of perpétuai peace, the future
of which we are not, indeed, enabled to prophesy, but
for which it is the duty of mankind to labour." The
path to perpétuai peace lies, not in the domination of
one over others, but in a life lived together with equal
rights.
The dreams of our world-dominion will thus remain
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 381
dreams, even if we had the power to subject other
nations to our will. The aims which a Bismarck kept
in view were reasonable and attainable, because they
lay within the limits of the historical development of
our âge. The formation of national States must first
be achieved before humanity is ripe for other more
comprehensive formations. The effort of the German
people to attain unity was a logical historical develop-
ment, and was therefore successful. The effort of récent
Germany, however, to attain world-dominion represents
historical retrogression, a falling away from the aims
set before civilised nations, and is, therefore, neces-
sarily bound to end in failure.
Our aim is therefore unattainable, and the means
adopted to attain it are criminal. Military success alone,
even if it were probable (which it is not), would not
bring us nearer to our aim by so much as a hairbreadth.
In the twentieth century there can no longer be a world-
dominion, and if one were possible we would be the last
to be recognised as rulers of the world. Any peace
which might more or less accord to us such a dominion
would be but an armed truce, and, as in the case of the
treaties of peace between Greeks and Persians, would
be concluded only with the clause " for the time being."
One war would continuously give birth to another, and
Europe unrestrainably and inevitably would be driven
into the abyss.
There is still time to avoid the worst fate; it is still
possible to
" Bind up the wounds inflicted on your country,
Rebuild the devastated homes of men,
And raise once more the pride of lof ty towns
From smoky ruins. Spring will return again
And clothe the wasted fields with lushy green.
But they who fell the victims of your quarrel,
The dead, rise up no more ; the bitter tears
383 J'ACCUSE
Shed in the issue of your controversy
Will be for ever shed. Another race
In God's own time will prosper, but the past
Will still remain the prey of misery.
The joys of générations still unborn
Cannot recall to life the long-gone dead." 1
The dead rise up no more. But even the wounds
which hâve been infiicted on the économie life of ail
nations will only be slowly healed in many décades.
Who Will Pay the Cost of the Wab ?
The cost and the damage caused by the war during
the first six months hâve been estimated by authorita-
tive writers at more than four thousand million pounds,
apart from ail privaïe expenditure and losses, apart
from the value to the nation of the dead and the muti-
lated, and apart from the labour lost to the State
represented by the soldiers who are under arms. There
can be no question of compensation being paid for
thèse costs and losses of war by the defeated party to
the conqueror — if, indeed, a victory of one side or the
other is conceivable. In Germany, apart from the
Empire, the individual States and communes hâve also
incurred millions of debts. Who is to pay thèse
gigantic sums ? Who is to labour and pay even the
interest on them ? " When I see Princes and States
fighting and quarrelling, it always brings to my mind
1 [" Des Landes tiefe Wunden heilen
Die Dôrfer, die verwûsteten, die Stâdte
Aus ihrem Schutt sich prangender erheben,
Die Felder decken sich mit neuem Grun —
Doch die das Opfer eures Zwist's gefallen,
Die Toten stehen nicht mehr auf ; die Thrànen
Die eurem Streit geflossen sind, sie bleiben
Geweint ! Das kommende Geschlecht wird blùhen,
Doch das Vergangene war des Elends Raub,
Der Enkel Gluck erweckt nicht mehr die Vâter.]
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 383
a match of cudgel-playing fought in a china-shop "
(Hume). 1 The fellows with the cudgels are the belli-
gerent nations ; the china-shop is the économie organ-
isation of the world, and it will not be long before ail
the china in the world is broken into fragments.
Quousque Tandem?
How is it to go on ? How is it to end ?
Every victory is a Pyrrhic victory. " One more such
victory and I am lost." Among the sixty-seven millions
of Germans is there not a single soûl who will dare
to brave the thunderbolts of Jupiter and exclaim,
as Themistocles did to Eurybiades : " Strike, but
listen ! " Must subservient newspaper writers continue
to let their scandalous reports run through the Press,
— while outside on the snow-covered fields, in the damp
earth-huts, the children of their country perish and
bleed to death, while the widow and the fatherless pour
forth a rising flood of tears ?
How long will ail this still go on ? How is it to end ?
The nations are not advantaged if after peace the
" right trusty cousins " fall into each other's arms in
émotion, embrace each other, and once more assume
1 [In the Essay Of Public Crédit.]
384 «TACCUSE
each other's uniforms which they hâve discarded in the
interval. The nation is not advantaged by solemn
entrances through the Brandenburger Tor,
with crowns of laurel and the blare of trumpets.
It is peace the people want; peace they are crav-
ing for, peace for which they hunger and thirst.
There are enough dead and mutilated ; there is enough
misery and ruin. The conscience of the world is stirring ;
the words now being raised in accusation will find the
sword of fulfilment if the stern accents of the voice of
the people remains unheard. Vivos voco, mortuos
plango, fulgura frango; I call the living, I lament the
dead, I defy the lightning — such is the call of the
bell of the world 's conscience to the mighty ones.
And on your head
Turns he the widows' tears, the orphans' cries,
The dead men's blood, the pining maidens' groans
For husbands, fathers and betrothed lovers,
That shall be swallow'd in this controversy. 1
They hâve suffered enough, the Achaeans
The nations hâve never been
enemies. From ail letters written at the front it is
clear that the feelings of hatred and of revenge are
unknown in the trenches. Thèse are the dragon 's eggs
which are hatched at home at the writing-tables in the
coziness of editors' rooms. From trench to trench
friendship and brotherhood are concluded. They visit
each other, make each other small présents, and shake
hands in friendship. And then they return to the
trenches, and shoot at each other on commands from
above. Is that not unspeakable, incredible ?
If we had not known long ago that none of the belli-
1 Shakespeare, Henry V
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 385
gèrent nations desired war, that a few hundred, at the
most a few thousand, criminal men had desired and
engineered this murder of the nations, the fraternisa-
tion between the trenches would prove that between the
nations no enmity exists. But just because it proves
this, just because it might be prejudicial to the energy
of murder, and gradually make it clear to those who
are fighting that they are fighting for nothing which
concerns them, that they are urged on against each
other by higher powers who are pursuing their interests
— for this reason, just as I am writing thèse lines, a
strong prohibition against thèse scènes of fraternisation
has been issued by the suprême German Command.
There must be no fraternisation, no hand-shaking, there
must be no pause in the firing, for God's sake, no ! The
task of murder must go on without loss of time. Nulla
aies sine linea, there must be no day without murder
and arson.
But ail army commands will be of no avail. La
vérité est en marche, Every hour, every day, brings
the illumination nearer. And if they will not — the
gentlemen behind the front — in the end they must.
Peace will corne — soon, as quickly as possible, for it
must corne. Woe to the gênerais who still throw their
sword into the balance — woe to those rulers who will
still refuse to hear the subdued, forcibly restrained voice
of the nations ! Under the placid surface of internai
peace 1 the seething waters are in agitation, boiling and
bubbling. Woe to those who refuse to hear the subter-
ranean noises, and who still confide their bark to the
treacherous waters. They will be devoured by the
waves ! — Discite moniti ! Learn, you hâve been
warned !
1 [Burgfrieden. See footnote, p. 108.]
c c
V.
THE FUTURE
What should Peace bring us ?
The matter is not ended on the mère conclusion of
peace. What should peace bring us ? What will peace
bring us?
It ought to bring what for centuries has been the
object striven after by the most enlightened minds : not
an armed truce, but an enduring state of peace, founded
on a sure basis of law. The system hitherto in force
whereby peace was balanced on the bayonet's point has
gone bankrupt, bankrupt for ever. The insanity of
military préparation, which in 1910 cost the States of
Europe, in direct expenditure alone, provided for in
the Budgets — apart, that is to say, from indirect expen-
diture not so provided — a sum of approximately 500
million pounds, and which since then has become at
least 20 per cent, more costly each year, this insanity
has not fulfilled the purpose which was supposed to
justify its existence. The fact that the States of Europe
endeavoured to outbid each other in an unholy émula-
tion in armaments by land and by water, in the air
and under the sea, constituted a menace to peace, not a
security against war. A perpetually increasing feeling
of distrust has sprung from this iron seed. Ail diplo-
matie negotiations became to the nations of Europe
386
THE FUTURE 387
an object of fear and anxiety on account of the distant
clang of arms, and everyone was swayed by the oppres-
sive feeling that this condition of affairs could not con-
tinue, that at length we would be compelled to alter
our course or be driven to disaster.
The catastrophe has now arrived, the catastrophe
which has been so long the object of prophecy and of
dread. But it has dragged into its whirlpool not merely
the life and the well-being of nations; it has engulfed
also the System, which, it was imagined, afforded to the
nations a deceptive security.
THE SYSTEM OF ARMED PEACE
On the System of armed peace judgment has been
passed. In peace it devoured the marrow of nations,
and it has failed in preventing war. The System of
European equilibrium has revealed itself to be even
more fatal than the previous System, when individual
States, armed to the teeth, confronted each other. The
Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was mère child's play in
comparison with the struggle of the nations in 1914.
A mistaken System cannot be corrected by being drawn
on a large, instead of a small, scale. On the contrary,
the weaknesses and the defects inhérent in it must
thereby be made more patent. The guarantee of peace
supposed to be afforded by military armaments must
work with more fatal effect the greater the number of
States allied with each other in the two scales of the
balance. What in the ratio of 1 : 1 was already uai-
reasonable and pernicious must be thrice as unreasou-
able and pernicious in the ratio of 3 : 3 — pernicious in
peace, even worse in war. By the concaténation of
alliances and ententes a position has now been reached
which enormously surpasses ail the visions of horror
foretold by far-seeing sociologists.
c c 2
388 J'ACCUSE
The prophéties of Johann von Bloch with regard to
the character, the extent, and the horror of a future
European war hâve ail been realised — only the réalisa-
tion is far worse than the gifted Russian statesman
could possibly hâve foreseen. He could not hâve imaged
to himself the development of aeronautics, of sub-
marines, of the gigantic siege-artillery, and of ail the
other récent triumphs of culture. But in his monu-
mental work of 1899 he already prophesied that on the
occasion of the next European war there would be
shown to hâve taken place in the years since 1870 a
greater progress in the mechanism of war than that
represented by the development from the âge of bows
and arrows down to the Franco-Prussian War. Even
then he had prophesied that the new artillery would
exercise such a murderous effect that it would scarcely
be possible to speak of a battle in the former sensé of
the word or of personal bravery, and that war must
develop into a continuous fortification-war between
trenches. He characterised in ail its détails the horror
and the terror of the modem war of machinery, and he
expressed doubts — and his doubts hâve to-day been fre-
quently confîrmed — whether modem civilised Europeans
could bear ail thèse fearful impressions on their mind,
on their sensés of seeing and hearing, without giving
way to insanity. In such a war — so prophesied Bloch —
there would no longer be a conqueror and a conquered,
there would no longer be any possibility of giving proper
attendance to the gigantic number of the wounded,
unless the Army Médical Service was made almost as
strong numerically as the combat ants. There would be
no possibility of obtaining sufficient supplies in the
exhausted countries in which the battles took place.
There would be no possibility of the belligerent States
raising for any length of time even the bare daily
THE FUTURE 389
cost involved in the maintenance of such enormous
armies. Ail this was foreseen by the pacifist Johann
von Bloch, not in virtue of any spécial gift of second
sight, but merely by reason of his profound study for
many years of thèse questions of so vital importance to
the civilisation of Europe.
And now we are experiencing what he foresaw — a
swaying backwards and forwards of thèse armies of
twenty million men — without end, without resuit, with-
out even the possibility of a final décision, notwithstand-
ing ail the inspiring appeals of kings and of the leaders
of armies. Forwards ! Backwards ! Backwards and
forwards ! Such are the constantly changing rallying
cries. Only for the dead is there no retreat. A village,
a farmyard, a trench, a hillock demands thousands of
sacrifices. A single well-directed shrapnel can — with
luck — kill or mutilate a hundred men. The worst of
ail, however, is that this massacre en masse represents
a suicide of the nations, which must gradually perish
from loss of blood and from exhaustion ; it has but one
favourable conséquence, in so far as it is at the same
Urne a suicide of the political System out of which the
war was born — a suicide of this System, not only in
internai, but also in foreign affairs.
After the war it will not be possible — as even the most
infatuated militarist will admit — to effect an increase in
armaments. Even in the past the burden of European
armaments had become an intolérable weight. Emile
de Girardin was right when he said forty years ago :
" Misery could be abolished with the half of present-day
European expenditure on war." The insanity of this
System may be illustrated by the following example :
In the primitive âges of human society, two neighbour-
ing occupiers of the soil, when each had to provide his
own protection, become suspicious of each other. Each
390 J'ACCUSE
fears that he will be attacked by the other, whereas
in reality neither entertains evil intentions against his
neighbour. Instead of tilling their fields and increasing
their herds, they call upon ail their people, their women
and children, their peasants and servants, to dévote
their whole time, day after day, month after month,
year after year, to the préparation of entrenchments
and barricades against their neighbour, to the forging
of arms, to the création of bows and arrows and slings.
Their supplies are gradually used up. The means of
obtaining such supplies elsewhere are exhausted. Both
are on the verge of starvation. At last, in the moment
of suprême need, the distrust ing neighbours résolve to
discuss matters with each other, and, behold ! neither
of them has ever had any intention of attacking the
other, and ail the time each has dreaded only that the
other was going to attack him. At a stroke the shadows
of distrust disappear. But the dark shadows of the
insane dissipation of their strength will long hover about
their house and their home, and for long years to corne
will prevent them from regaining their former state of
prosperity.
The nations of Europe hâve not been able to discover
in time the pathway to reason, and consequently in
the nature of things the other solution of the intolérable
tension was bound to corne about — the solution of un-
reason, the substitution of an open for a latent state
of war. We hâve already seen in the course of this
discussion who is responsible for the fact that this
solution by force had to corne, that ail attempts to
bring about an enduring state of peace were bound to
fail. But even the guilty party will now realise that
ail his military préparations, ail his opposition to every
proposai to bring about an understanding, hâve brought
him no advantage, and that there has to corne to pass
THE FUTURE 391
what we pacifists hâve always prophesied : the relative
strength of the various nations — notwithstanding the
ruin of them ail — lias in essential matters remained
unaltered.
And sa judgment is passed on the System, The possi-
bility of resuming or strengthening this condemned
system is excluded, and — after the final wreck of anarchy
based on force — the only course open to the European
system of States is to return to the thought which for
centuries the most distinguished minds in Europe hâve
preached as the only means of salvation, whereby the
old world of our culture can be preserved from complète
destruction.
That thought is :
A COVENANT OF PEACE BETWEEN FREE NATIONS
based on a mutual récognition of their rights and on
mutual confidence — a fédération of free States, as Kant
calls it. This would be a fédération of nations, not a
State of nations (Ein Vôlkerbund, kein Vôlkerstaat), a
co venant which would leave to the States enjoying
membership their full sovereignty with only the one
limitation, that they should not abuse this sovereignty
by making war against any of the covenanting States.
This fédération would be based, not on force, but on
mutual confidence, on the feeling of duty, on the cate-
gorical imperative. The sage of Kônigsberg considered
that even in his time such a covenant of peace between
European States was possible, without internai political
organisation, without a suprême law-giving power, since
it corresponded to the interests of ail alike, and since
it was for ail alike a command of duty. True, the higher
and stronger unity, the positive idea of a world-
republic, hovered before his vision as an idéal worthy
to be pursued, but, seeing that the world was not ripe
392 J'ACCUSE
for that great idéal, the man of " practical reason "
contented himself with the " négative substitute for it,
a fédération averting war, maintaining its ground, and
ever extending over the world." Kant had no doubt
about the practicability of this Covenant of Peace
(fœdus pacificum), and he only longed for the moment
when a " powerful and enlightened people " would make
themselves the central point of such a fédéral union,
and by the further adhésion of other nations would
extend this fédération more and more among civilised
nations. 1
This Kantian thought, apparently so simple, is the
most profound ever conceived on the subject of the
formation of a European family of States on a basis of
international law. This is not the offspring of an ideolo-
gist dwelling in the clouds, but of one who knew his
fellow-men and looked with undimmed vision on the
world around him, drawing practical conclusions from
the expériences of history and from the conditions of
his own time — the références to contemporary political
affairs may often be traced ironically between the lines.
He expressly states that he is not concerned with theo-
retical constructions, but he only desires that the philo-
sopher should be heard by the King, because " the
possession of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise
of reason." He is, it is true, content with the rôle
which statesmen, with their worldly skill, commonly
assign to philosophy — the rôle of a handmaid — but he
indicates that this handmaid 's rôle should be to bear
the torch before her mistress, not to carry the train
behind her. For the time being he renounces his more
far-reaching idéal, and contents himself, in the first
place, with ends which are practically attainable. 2
1 Kant, p. 134.
2 Kant, p. 160.
THE FUTURE 393
Thèse ends are to-day infinitely more désirable than
they then were, and at the same time they are infinitely
more easy of attainment. They are infinitely more
désirable because the condition of lawlessness and
anarchy which Kant even then deplored must neces-
sarily in volve to-day much more fatal conséquences, in
view of the present-day greatness and the development
of strength of the States of Europe. If the conséquences
of war could imperil the existence even of States of a
few million inhabitants, such as then existed, economi-
cally organised in essential matters on a national basis,
with production and consumption of goods taking place
for the most part within the territorial limits of the
country, what suicidai catastrophes await the European
States of to-day involved in the war, comprising as they
do, within and without Europe, a population of 890
million soûls, or 53 per cent, of the whole population
of the world, indissolubly linked together as they are
like the organs of a vast body by thousands of the finest
nerves and sinews of a spiritual and material nature !
What Kant regarded as necessary for the world of his
time to préserve it from graduai destruction is to-day
a million times more necessary; for then each of
the belligerent nations could at need still continue to
pursue its own independent life — like the separate
sections of a lizard — whereas to-day the gigantic
body of modéra civilised humanity is struck to the
heart by a world- war, and the whole organism
perishes.
While it is thus true, on the one hand, that the con-
dition of the modem world infinitely increases the evils
of war, it must, on the other hand, be remembered that
it offers infinitely more possibilities, in comparison with
the past, of meeting thèse evils. To-day préparations
hâve already been made in very great measure in ail
394 J'ACCUSE
fields of international relations for the réalisation of
the Kantian fédération of free States. Apart from what
are properly regarded as treaties between States, there
exist innumerable international organisations in ail
sphères of intercourse, trade, agriculture, and learning,
ranging from the Postal Union to the agreement for the
protection of seals in the Behring Sea; and there are
innumerable international institutions for carrying out
and supervising the agreements in question. Arbitra-
tion treaties in very great number are already in exist-
ence, with and without the obligatory duty of summon-
ing the court of arbitration, and thèse are in part so
far-reaching that even so-called questions of life and
honour hâve to be submitted to the décision of arbitra-
tion. There exists in the Hague an international court
of arbitration, the constitution, procédure, and jurisdic-
tion of which hâve been approved by the signatures of
ail civilised States in the world. In short, in every
possible sphère the bonds of international community
are already being drawn more closely together; only
in one province, the most important of ail, affecting ail
vital interests of the nations alike, only on the one
question of war and peace between the great States of
Europe, Anarchy and Lawlessness still hold sway; hère
Dame Diplomacy still rules with her out-worn methods,
with her tricks and intrigues of unregenerate days, 1 with
her antiquated devotees, who instead of keeping in view
the common interests of ail, seek only by ail the means
of political morality — that is to say, immorality — to
make petty profits for those from whom they receive
their instructions. This diplomacy is a fossil from
long-gone âges of history, an anachronism which is as
1 [ans vormarzlicJier Zeit : bef ore the Révolution of March ,
1848, hence reactionary.]
THE FUTURE 395
much at home in thèse présent times as an Indian
medicine man is in a modem hospital. As the medicine
man stands helplessly before the sufferer with his hocus-
pocus (notwithstanding that he may perhaps create the
appearance of being able to help him), so the diploma-
tists, as has again been proved, stand helplessly before
the dangerous malady of the nations, incapable of pre-
venting the outbreak of the fatal evil. This is un-
affected by the personal efficiency of many individuals
in diplomatie circles (belonging to foreign nations!);
it is a conséquence of the System on which diplomacy
is based.
For hundreds of years now, from the Outline of Per-
pétuai Peace (1713), written by the Abbé de Saint
Pierre, down to Rousseau and Kant, and on to the volu-
minous modem literature of peace, an organisation of
modem States has been sought for, which would, in
effect, render superfluous the activity of diplomacy in
the former sensé. When the possessions of the con-
tracting States are mutually guaranteed, when their
sphères of interest are apportioned by friendly agree-
ments, when their commercial relations are regulated
by treaties, and when international intercourse is
ordered in accordance with the march of progress, and
when any disputes that may arise are submitted to arbi-
tration — when mutual confidence takes the place of
former distrust, and on this sure basis military prépara-
tions are first brought to a standstill, and then gradu-
ally reduced in ail nations alike — ail points which in the
interests of ail parties concerned are désirable and
attainable — then the old diplomacy may be peacefully
allowed to rest in the cabinet of curiosities, and in its
place a new diplomacy can be established, correspond-
ing to the needs of the time, a diplomacy which needs
no secret arts, no spies in uniform, no palace and back-
396 J'ACCUSE
stair-intrigues, to fulfil its useful purposes. Then diplo-
matists will discharge almost the same fonctions as
those fulfilled to-day by the plenipotentiaries to the
Bundesrat in Berlin. In saying this, however, I désire
expressly to guard against any misunderstanding which
would be involved in the assumption that I consider
that the Covenant of Peace of Free Nations should in
any way be comparable with the political organisation
of the German Empire. This Covenant of Peace is to
be nothing more than a kind of union for an end, a
union whose end is the maintenance of peace and the
promotion of common interests, but without the
slightest sacrifice of sovereign rights. 1
Common interests are already in existence to-day.
They are regulated by international agreements, and
protected by international Commissions. The circle of
common interests will automatically extend ever wider
under the logical compulsion of the development of
civilisation, of technical science, of the conquest of time
and space, in spite of the présent world-war, and in
spite of those of limited vision who shriek themselves
hoarse in acclaiming Germany as the mistress of the
universe in the realms of intellect and of science, or
those who désire to repress Germany into an ante-
diluvian national State. The international relations
between the nations may be for a time interrupted by
the criminal shortsightedness of their leaders and rulers,
but they will again revive like the earth in spring-time
when the snow has melted and the storms of winter hâve
passed away.
The links which already exist to-day between the
nations, and which after peace will sooner or later be
strengthened anew by the might of facts, can only be
1 See also Fried : Kurze Aufklarungen ûber Wesen und
Ziel des Pazifismus (Berlin, 1914).
THE FUTURE 397
extended in one direction ; the contracting Powers must
pledge themselves to the maintenance of peace and to
mutual respect for the independence and the posses-
sions of each other.
Is This a Utopia?
Is this impracticable ? Is this a Utopia ?
Bertha von Suttner once said : " There are three
phases through which every spiritual movement has to
pass; in the first men scoff at it, in the second they
fight against it, in the third the reproach is hurled at it
that it is forcing an open door."
If anyone 400 years ago had said to the Italians of
the sixteenth century : " The day will come when there
will be a united Italian Fatherland, no longer Florence
nor Pisa, nor Genoa, nor Venice," they would hâve
scoffed at the speaker as a Utopian, or would probably
hâve shut him up in an asylum. If anyone had said
in the Middle Ages to those living in the fortresses or
cities of Germany that there would come a time in
which they would no longer possess the right to look
after their interests according to their own strength and
their own caprice, they would with a shrug of the
shoulders hâve left the foolish visionary to his own
dreams. But if anyone had gone further and said that
not only they, the lords of the castle and the town, but
even the lords of wide territories, of whole kingdoms,
would one day lose their right of declaring war, and
that only the whole German Empire would possess such
a right as against foreign countries, they would hâve
had doubts as to the sanity of the speaker, or, what is
even more probable, they would hâve chopped off his
head for high treason. What ! Were they one day to
lose the right of declaring war, the most important
398 J'ACCUSE
and the most essential part of their sovereignty ? Would
they hâve to lay aside their darling plaything, their
soldiers, or place them under the command of a suprême
lord ? Impossible ! Such a thing could not possibly be.
Sovereignty without the right of arms does not exist.
And y et it has corne to pass, and the world has not
perished in the process. And the small and the great
lords in Italy and Germany, and elsewhere are ail still
in existence — except in so far as they hâve disappeared
for other reasons. And they lead a better and happier
existence than they did then, when they were obliged
to expend a large part of their income on their personal
security, and, notwithstanding this, were constantly
threatened by the presumptuous pride of evilly-disposed
neighbours. The community of peace in which they
hâve taken their place has afforded them greater security
and increased well-being, and what they hâve lost in
sovereign rights is abundantly outweighed by what
they hâve gained. The Utopia has become a common-
place, and if the prophet who saw thèse things afar off
would then hâve been the object of mockery and con-
demnation, to-day the laudator temporis acti would
be regarded as a person of irresponsible judgment.
Countless instances of similar cases of development
may be found in history. It may, indeed, be said that
history is in reality nothing more than a continuous
chain of évidence that the impossibilities of yesterday
become the possibilities and the realities of to-day.
Why, then, should a Covenant of Peace, correspond-
ing to the interests of ail nations alike, be regarded as
an impossibility ? If it was possible for the States
included in the présent German confédération, after
being opposed to each other in 1866 in an embittered
civil war, to conclude four years later " a perpétuai
alliance in defence of their territory, and of the law in
THE FUTURE 399
force within their frontiers, and for the promotion of
the well-being of the German people," why should it be
impossible to fashion a league of nations with much
more restricted ends, without any organisation between
the States, only with the external aim of preserving
peace ? Is such a league not reasonable ? Does it not
correspond to the vital interests of ail the nations con-
cerned, of ail in equal measure ? Is a league resting on
the immovable foundation of the need for peace, common
to ail after so fearful a world-war, not infinitely more
tenable than any organisation based on force ? What
would be sacrificed by the signatories to a treaty
establishing such a covenant of peace ? They would
lose merely the right to wage war amongst each other,
nothing more. They hâve truly allowed this right suffi-
cient exercise in the course of the présent war, and
hâve become acquainted with its unspeakable consé-
quences. Has this right brought them, or any one of
them, any advantage whatever? Has it not brought
them ail, conqueror and conquered alike, to the verge
of ruin, and inflicted on them wounds which will not
be healed for générations to corne ? What, then, do they
surrender in renouncing this right ? They surrender the
possibility of ruining themselves and others — nothing
more.
And what do they gain in exchange ? In the first
place, in return for the surrender of his right, each one
will receive a corresponding duty from the other parties.
Rights and duties are compensatory, and to this extent,
then, a balance is effected. But now cornes the crédit
side. Everyone will be secure from hostile attack. For
an unlimited time each nation will be able to allow full
play to its énergies in trade and commerce, in art, litera-
ture, and science; it will be able to develop without
restriction and without opposition ail the capacities
400 r ACCUSE
given to it by nature ; in common with the allied States
it will be able gradually to reduce expenditure for mili-
tary purposes, which can no longer serve for attack and
is no longer needed for defence; and it will be able to
apply the money so economised to éducation, the gênerai
well-being, and to social purposes. A new world would
arise within the old. Millions of pounds will gradually
be liberated each year for the struggle against poverty,
to ameliorate the condition of the working classes, to
disseminate well-being and happiness on ail sides; and
thus by the création of a gênerai spirit of contentment,
European society would be assured against inner catas-
trophes.
......
It is impossible to describe the measure of the bless-
ings which such a league of nations would pour out on
ail peoples. With material well-being, with the feeling
of security against a répétition of such fearful events
as this war has brought in its train, with the enormous
means which would be set free for the objects of culture
and social reform, a nightmare would simultaneously be
removed from the spirits of our European world of
culture. In every country a new day of spiritual life
would dawn. Hatred and revenge would disappear
from the hearts of men, and ail nations, sharing in what
would now hâve become a true community of European
culture, reconciled and made brothers, would go for-
ward to meet their future lot with pride in their eyes
and with gladness in their hearts.
I hear myself hailed as a Utopian, as a visionary.
Naturally; the Utopian of to-day is the realist of
to-morrow. There is nothing Utopian in my proposai,
which has the advantage that it is merely a revival and
an extension of Kantian ideas; even then it was no
Utopia ; to-day it is more practicable than ever.
THE FUTURE 401
A treaty of peace which rejects every idea of annexa-
tion, of security based on force! The fulftlment of this
condition will corne about automatically, since the war
will remain indecisive, and in the most favourable issue
will lead only to the exchange of the objects pledged
on both sides; each side will be glad if it can only get
back its former possessions. Thank God that it is so;
for if a décisive vie tory of the one side or the other — but
especially of the one! — were conceivable, the victor
would certainly merely annex as much territory as
possible inside and outside Europe, crush his enemies
to the utmost extent from a military, political, and éco-
nomie point of view, and on the ruins of the other
States rear a hegemony based on force. Such a resuit
would inevitably contain the germs for constantly
renewed wars; such a treaty of peace would be con-
cluded with the stipulation " until later," and then —
Farewell, League of Nations ! Adieu, Guarantee of
Peace !
Fortunately, however, for the blessing of mankind
such a resuit cannot ensue. The struggle will end with
a non liquet. And what reason would not hâve dictated
to the great the power of circumstances will force upon
them. It will be impossible for them — for any of them
— to dictate the conditions of peace, and thus the record
of the treaty will at least not place in the way of Euro-
pean peace obstacles on which it could not but stumble
straightway.
This resuit, however, is unfortunately, only a négative
one. If nothing more than this is attained, the whole
taie of tribulation will recur. Armaments and distrust,
distrust and armaments in a perpétuai vicious circle —
further exhaustion of the nations, already completely
anaemic, a renewal of diplomatie tricks and dodges, to
enable each to get by stealth as many fat scraps as
D JL>
402 J'ACCUSE
possible out of the great soup-dish of the world. There
will be new conflicting interests, new causes of friction,
and in the end new explosions, each worse than its
predecessor.
In the event of the victory of one side, the policy of
force and oppression would lead to the new explosion.
In the event of the struggle being indecisive, the revival
of competing interests, the renewal of the compétition
in armaments will resuit in a new state of tension and
new discharges.
The resuit will remain the same, unless one thing is
added. In addition to a renunciation of any new order
of things based on force, there must be a fœdus paci-
ftcum, a covenant of peace of free nations, honourably
and sincerely intended, and as the most important con-
séquence of this Covenant there must be a graduai
proportionate réduction in the strength of the existing
armies and navies so far as is compatible with an assur-
ance of the requisite security against those nations still
standing outside the Covenant of Peace. The more this
Covenant is externally extended and internally
strengthened, the more possible will it be to make
progress with the diminution of armaments, and to
take in hand the transformation of the standing armies
into militias. The development in this direction will
take place with logical necessity. Since the league will
correspond to the interests of ail, without doing
violation in any way to the character of their sove-
reignty, since the sovereignty of each individual member
will remain absolutely unimpaired in its true and
essential content, and thus ail the advantages of the
league of peace would be bought gratuitously by each,
it is logically inévitable that the league should become
more intimately knit together, that confidence in its
existence should constantly increase, and that the good
THE FUTURE 403
example thus given should more and more evoke imita-
tion throughout the world.
The only right given up on every side, the right to
wage war against others, appears in the new organisa-
tion as a Right to commit Wrong, and cannot, there-
fore, be regarded as a true right, and thus its loss cannot
be regarded as a true loss. Thus the league with every
year of its existence will become stronger internally
and more comprehensive externally. From a league of
four or nve it will grow to be a league of six or seven,
and finally a multiple-entente, embracing the whole
civilised world. What the wise men hâve dreamed,
what the nations hâve constantly striven after, will
at last become the Truth — not at a stroke, but in the
consciously directed course of historical development,
and a new golden âge, which has hitherto appeared to
us only as the dream of a distant past, will blossom
into reality in a future, which it may be hoped is not
far removed from us.
......
The pathway to this beneficent goal is neither new
nor difficult. If it has hitherto been possible to con-
clude such a league of peace between two or three
States, it must also be possible to do so between four
or five or more States. That the hitherto existing
alliances hâve only served the purpose of creating an
enormous war apparatus for common use is entirely due
to the fact that they were not sufficiently comprehen-
sive, and that the allied groups as collective communi-
ties were opposed to each other in a hostile, or, at least,
in a distrusting attitude. The moment this opposition
disappears and the groups as such become members of
a greater community, every ground for further military
préparations disappears, just as it has already ceased
to exist within the various groups.
D D 2
404 ,rACCUSE
If we assume that Germany and Austria, closely allied
with each other, had existed alone in the world without
having the Triple Entente or any other group of Powers
in opposition to them, further military préparations on
the part of thèse two empires would hâve been void of
purpose even from the military point of view, since
neither of the allies had any reason to expect that she
would be attacked by the other. The same holds good
in the case of the Powers of the Triple Entente, if we
assume that Germany and Austria had not been
opposed to them. Thus if ail five Powers had been
united together in a league of peace, such as now exists
within the two groups, compétition in armaments would
hâve been deprived of ail reason and purpose, and in
the logic of things would hâve automatically ceased.
German principalities and kingdoms, so long as they
were not united to the " perpétuai league" of the
German Empire, were obliged to be armed against each
other. With the création of the German Empire this
military préparation disappeared at a stroke, and now
only exists in so far as it is directed against the outside
world in the interests of the protection of the German
Empire and of its various constituent members. Italy
also has passed through the same development in
various stages in the course of its transition from the
sovereignty of the individual city-territories to the more
comprehensive sovereignty of the individual kingdoms,
and finally to the all-comprehensive kingdom of Italy.
The same process can be traced in Switzerland and in
the United States of America.
In this discussion it is irrelevant whether the alliances
concluded might lead to a unified State, to a federated
State, or only to a fédération of States. It is equally
irrelevant whether such an alliance remains at the stage
represented by the loosest form of a union which would
THE FUTURE 405
serve to prevent war. The central point, which we are
hère discussing, is everywhere the same : the exclusion
by treaty of every war between the allied States.
Whether beyond this immédiate object the league should
fulfil a greater or smaller number of other objects as
well, or whether it will even develop into a unified State,
dépends on innumerable factors, which vary according
to the various forms of the league, and which will thus
lead to différent results. It is unnecessary hère to
discuss thèse factors (community of speech, of race, of
historieal development, of culture, &c). Our idea of a
union in the service of peace represents a minimum,
which appears worthy of our endèavour, and appears
also attainable, even if ail the other factors which
lead to a more intimate union may not be présent.
This minimum is attainable, no matter how greatly the
various States associated in the union may differ in
race, language, development of culture, and historieal
growth. For this minimum of an international union
ail modem civilised nations are ripe, no matter how
greatly they may diverge from each other in the char-
acter of their civilisation.
The more limited the aim and content of such a league
of peace, the more easy must it be to call it into being.
If it has been found possible to weld together sovereign
States into unified States, confederated States, and
fédérations of States, and if in this process they were
obliged to make a greater or less sacrifice of their
sovereign rights, it follows that it must be a much
easier matter to unité sovereign States into a union
created with a certain end, in which, apart from the
right to wage war against each other, they are not
required to make any surrender of their sovereign rights.
Quod erat demonstrandum.
406 J'ACCUSE
In my opinion thèse are ail practical considérations
which it may be hoped are not diminished in value
because they are firmly supported by logic. And let
no one again speak to me hère of Utopias and perpétuai
peace, and so on. The question is not of perpétuai
peace, since the idea of perpetuity is not applicable to
human things, but is a réservation of God himself.
Even the German Impérial Constitution, which is
designated as a perpétuai alliance, will succumb
to the fate of human transitoriness. The question is
to create human institutions which as far as possible
will avoid human evils. The institution represents
the idéal postulate ; human life furnishes the excep-
tions. It is no argument against the necessity or the
usefulness of a political constitution that a king may
indulge in a coup d'état, or that the people may carry
out a révolution. It is no argument against the neces-
sity of a criminal code that crimes are committed. The
prevalence of immorality is no contradiction of the
moral law. Hygiène does not signify the abolition of
death; éducation does not imply the production of
saints and angels.
The Covenant of Peace between the nations, then, is
not intended to guarantee, and cannot guarantee, per-
pétuai peace; it should, and can, prevent wars as far
as possible, and it will exercise this effect because
abstinence from war corresponds, not only to a moral
requirement, but also to the true vital interests of the
nations.
The Coercive Force ?
This at once disposes of the usual question as to the
coercive force which is to bind the league together. This
coercive force is, in the first place, duty, and in the
second place, interest. What is the coercive force which
THE FUTURE 407
keeps the German Empire together ? Who could prevent
Prussia from overrunning Bavaria and putting it in her
pocket ? Could the other States in the fédération, in
union with Bavaria, by any chance prevent her from
doing so ? What thèse States could accomplish against
Prussia was seen in 1866, when Prussia, moreover, had
to fight against Âustria, her présent ally, as well. If,
therefore, the King of Prussia observes the Treaty of
German Fédération, he does so, not because he is con-
strained by any force, but because his duty and his
interest demand that he should do so. On the same
grounds ail treaties between States or nations, howso-
ever wide or restricted be their subject-matter, are
observed so long as duty and interest alike demand that
they should be respected — interest, not, indeed, in the
base sensé of a momentary gain, but in the higher sensé
of a permanent advantage, such as can spring only from
respect for Right and Morality. Who could prevent the
strong and prosperous cantons of German Switzerland
from falling upon and annexing the weaker Italian
cantons, which, further, belong to another com-
munity in race and speech, and therefore, in the
" nationalist " view, are inferior, and therefore destined
to subjection ? No physical force would stand in the
way of such an undertaking; nevertheless, only a mad-
man would entertain such an idea, since reason, duty,
and interest impose on the Swiss people the necessity
of remaining true to their Treaty of Fédération. Why
are commercial, customs, and shipping treaties ob-
served, even in those cases in which they run counter
to the interests of one of the contracting parties ? Why
does not the stronger party denounce a treaty which is
unfavourable to him instead of waiting till it expires
or is terminated? Because the duty of fidelity to
engagements demands it, and because even a transitory
408 ,r ACCUSE
loss would not outweigh the greater disadvantage
involved in the fact that no one would ever again
conclude a treaty with one who had not observed his
engagements. Such examples could be multiplied inde-
finitely. Analogous cases are further to be found, not
only in the external, but also in the internai life of a
State. If a private citizen gains his case against the
authorities in an administrative action, what physical
force compels the authorities to submit to the unfavour-
able verdict ? There is none. The authorities alone
possess the physical force, but the moral power of the
verdict, and the higher interest of the State, the interest
of a State based on law, compel acquiescence in the
judgment.
Exactly the same will hold in the case of the obliga-
tions imposed on its members by the League of Peace.
Duty and interest will impose on the members the neces-
sity of observing their obligations, and if, notwithstand-
ing, thèse should be violated, the close relations existing
between modem States will offer innumerable means
whereby without ha vin g recourse to bloodshed the
treaty-breaker may be recalled to a sensé of his duties.
Among such methods we may note the discontinuance
of commercial relations, boycott of wares, exclusion
from the existing international organisations; stoppage
of post-office, railway, and financial intercourse, &c.
Ail thèse means will not, however, be necessary ; for the
interest of continuing to be a member of the league and
of enjoying its advantages, and, on the other hand, the
dread of the public stigma, which would make it im-
possible for the breaker of the peace to hâve ever
again any other relation of alliance, will prevent even
the most powerful member of the league from frivolously
acting contrary to his duties as a member.
The justice of this view is proved by what has actually
THE FUTURE 409
happened in the case of awards of arbitration. Of the
212 décisions in the course of the nineteenth century,
not one remained unobserved, although there was no
compulsion making it necessary to submit to thèse
awards, and although many of thèse décisions were only
accepted with disapprobation by the public opinion of
the countrv concerned. 1 On no occasion has a State
opposed an arbitration award and refused to give effect
to it. Hère, again, the moving considérations hâve been
the duty of submitting to the décision which had been
voluntarily sought, and the interest of accepting an
unfavourable award rather than risking a war, and being
revealed to the world as a breaker of one 's word.
So also the Covenant of Peace of Free Nations which,
after the horrors of this war, is intended to guarantee
a true and enduring peace and not merely a cessation
of hostilities, will rest securely and immovably on the
mutual confidence of the contracting nations, on the
holiness of the pledged word, and on the common
interest which has welded the league together,
WHAT WILL PEACE BRING US ?
Is such a large-hearted peace policy to be expected
of Germany ? Is it possible, having regard to the
internai conditions of Prussia and Germany? In my
view it is not. So long as Prussia continues to live
under the most reactionary constitution which is to be
found in any civilised country in the world, so long as
a laborious, patient, and intelligent people still con-
tinues to be ruled as it has been for centuries by reac-
tionaries, Junkers, soldiers, and priests, who find their
profit, not in peaceful development, but in military
adventures, so long will it be impossible to think of a
1 Fried,Vol. l,p. 156.
410 J'ACCUSE
sincère and upright peace policy on the part of Prussian
Germany. A family of soldiers, like the Hohenzollerns,
whose rise was due to their military efficiency, will be
convinced only by a strong counterpoise in the people
that the âge of military conquests is past, and that to-day
it is only in the peaceful compétition of the nations that
laurels are to be gained. As is known, this counter-
poise in the people does not exist. The absolutism
which dominâtes in Prussia, which is only imperfectly
masked by an outworn constitution — a constitution
without even a lawful origin, having merely been granted
to the people — this Prussian absolutism extends its
influence even to the German Empire, notwithstanding
the démocratie impérial électoral law and the présence
of confederated States which are governed on démo-
cratie principles. The prépondérance of Prussia in the
Government of the Empire and in the Bundesrat, the
fact that the offices of the Impérial Chancellor and the
Président of the Prussian Ministry are held by one
person, the exclusive military power of the Prussian
King in his capacity of German Emperor, and, above
ail, his right to déclare war and conclude peace in the
name of the Empire — in certain circumstances even with-
out the consent of the Bundesrat — ail thèse facts operate
in such a way as to make the German Empire in reality
only a branch-establishment of the Prussian Kingdom. 1
1 Amongst the minimum demands to be insisted on in the
domain of constitutional law must be included the amendment
of Article 11 of the Impérial constitution. In future it must
be made impossible for the fate of the German people to
rest on the resolutions of one individual man. Even the
concurrence of the Bundesrat in a déclaration of war is
insufficient to guarantee a people, who are of full âge,
against a répétition of catastrophes such as we are now
experiencing in horror. Even to-day it has not become
THE FUTURE 411
Ail the defects and the faults inhérent in the Prussian
constitution exert their influence, like contagious dis-
eases, on the body politic of the Empire. The privi-
lèges of the governing social classes, which from time
immémorial hâve skimmed the cream from the milk
in Prussia, hâve been extended to the German Empire.
Hère, also, the nobility is dominant in the military and
officiai world ; or if the crown of nobility is wanting, its
place is taken by those of trustworthy conservative
views. The agrarian classes from the provinces east of
the Elbe hâve left their imprint on the laws of Germany
dealing with agriculture and taxation, and hâve most
ruthlessly made them subservient to their interests at
the cost of the other classes of the population. The
Prussian land-councillors, whose influence before 1870
was dominant only in Prussia, hâve pressed over the
Elbe, the Weser, and the Rhein as far as the Vosges,
and Herr von Kôller and Herr von Dallwitz T hâve been
called to impart true Prussian discipline and efficiency
of thought to the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine. The
Chancellor shows towards the resolutions of the Reich-
stag the same sovereign indifférence which Présidents of
the Prussian Council, in accordance with an ancient
tradition, hâve always shown towards Parliamentary
resolutions — although they hâve had no reason what-
publicly known whether the Bundesrat was consulted with
regard to the déclaration of war against Russia and
France. Reasoning from the false assumption that an attack
on the territory of the Union had been committed, the consent
of the Bundesrat would not hâve been in any way required.
Nevertheless in future it will and must be arrangea" that war
will be declared in the name of the Empire only by an Impérial
law, that is to say, by concurrent resolutions of the Reichstag and
of the Bundesrat.
1 [E. M. von Kôller, a native of Pommern, Staatssecretâr
for Alsace-Lorraine 1901-8 ; Johann von Dallwitz, born in
Breslau, became Minister of the Interior in 1910.]
412 J'ACCUSE
ever to complain of Parliamentary resolutions in
Prussia, at least since the time of the conflict ; hère, also,
the Chancellor means to be nothing more than the
faithful servant of his lord.
Thus, then, there is Absolutism in both cases — in
Germany, Absolutism ashamed; in Prussia, unashamed.
There is only this différence, that Prussian absolutism,
with its complaisant majority, achieves evil according to
its arbitrary will, whereas German absolutism, face to
face with a majority of a différent character, is obliged
in most cases to restrict itself to preventing the good.
Equal rights of religious confessions is in Prussia and
in Germany alike, merely a provision on paper, which
is daily violated !
Ministerial responsibility in Prussia has not y et been
introduced, notwithstanding solemn promises for sixty-
four years ; in Germany it has not even been promised !
The Prussian électoral law is still unaltered, notwith-
standing a solemn promise in a speech from the throne ;
and no effective altération can be hoped for, if we are
to judge from the most récent utterances of conservative
party-leaders and ministers ! On the other hand there is
the impérial électoral law, which is already undemocra-
tised by an atrociously unjust arrangement of consti-
tuencies, and which is constantly in danger of being
assimilated to the Prussian law, so that in this respect
also Prussia and Germany may, as far as possible,
pursue the same paths !
It is superfluous and impossible to enumerate hère
ail the points in which Prussia is behind the times ; they
are only too well known to ail the world. The only
question which is of interest to us in this connection is
whether a State which is still politically in a primitive
condition is capable of grasping great aims, which
extend far beyond its black and white frontier posts,
THE FUTURE 413
and are designed to bestow a blessing on the whole of
civilised humanity, and whether its leaders will be
prepared unerringly to pursue such aims as may be
recognised as true, in opposition to ail the internai
résistance of the governing classes and cliques.
Thèse aims could hâve been attained before now
without the policy of the mailed fist, without the
insanity of military préparations, and without the out-
break of the présent world-catastrophe. They could
hâve been attained by a radical change in those views
which hâve hitherto controlled Prussian-German policy.
The German Government had only to grasp the hand
so often offered by En gland — from the first Hague Con-
férence down to the last proposais of Grey at the end
of July, 1914 — and ail that we are to-day hoping, long-
ing, and striving for would hâve been gained before now
without shedding a drop of blood, without kindling a
spark of fire, without spreading death and destruction.
Europe would hâve stood in unity to-day, prosperous,
wealthy, and happy, with a brilliant présent, a still
more brilliant future, if it had only pleased the German
Chancellor to listen to the English Minister's exhorta-
tions to peace, and to consider that the proposed
alliance of peace at least merited a trial.
This alliance of peace which was proposed by Grey
was the embryo out of which the Kantian League in
the service of peace would hâve issued, without the pains
and the dangers of travail, in the normal course of
development.
It was not to be so. The itch for world-power had
seized our leaders and governors; the aims of their
ambition — which were at the same time the aims of our
privileged classes, since they held out to thèse classes a
prospect that their privilèges, endangered through the
rise of new national forces, would be maint ained intact
41 4 J'ACCUSE
— thèse aims could only be achieved by force, and on this
" rocher de bronze " ail the barks of peace were bound
to encounter hopeless shipwreck.
Those, however, who by their lack of compréhension
or their evil will, by their madness or their criminality,
prevented the work of peace before the outbreak of this
war must take care, after the fearful storm is overpast,
that they do not deny the sunshine of a lasting peace
to the nations panting for rest and happiness. Let
him who bears the responsibility of having provoked
this war, let him who has committed a crime for which
no punishment on earth or in heaven offers sufficient
réparation, be warned against taking upon his head the
further curse of having denied unhappy nations the
blessings of an enduring peace — a peace which, no
matter who is victorious or defeated, can never be built
on force, but only on the free will of free peoples.
The man who treads this pathway to an enduring
peace cannot recall the past, but he can at least make
the unfading palm of peace spring from the blood-
drenched fields; he will not free himself from his guilt,
but many will think in exténuation of his offence that
he at least showed himself to be a "part of that force
which aye wills evil, but brings forth the good." l
Should it Happen Otherwise.
Should, however, it happen otherwise, should those
who counsel the German Emperor again fail, should the
hopes and expectations of the nation once more be
deceived and the reaction within begin anew, perhaps
stronger than ever — and of this there are already many
indications — should peace without once more be sup-
ported on cannons and bayonets, then — we may safely
say — as Bebel prophesied, the great gênerai march will
1 [Goethe — Faust.]
THE FUTURE 415
be folio wed by the great crash, then the death-knell will
hâve struck, not for the Government alone, but also
for the monarchy.
" Destruction and blood hâve ne'er blessed a nation !
The curse of the down-trodden vanquished — appalling —
Will rest on the victor, exalted in station,
His forehead adorned with the green laurel wreath.
But the strong arm of vengeance is not swif t in f alling,
To smite and destroy the misguided mortal ;
She waits long and watches, and stands at his portai
And appears to his eyes as he wrestles with death." 1
The nations hâve long seen the horrible thing drawing
near, they hâve long urgently warned the mighty ones
of the earth against the crime of a European war of the
nations, which, for those guilty of the outrage, must
necessarily bring in its train the punishment of destruc-
tion. This warning was nowhere uttered so insistently
and so passionately as in the great peace manifesto of
the International Party, adopted at Basel on November
25th, 1912, in which it is stated : —
" The great nations of Europe are constantly on
the point of being urged against each other, while
it is impossible to advance the slightest pretext of
national interests in justification of thèse attacks
against humanity and reason.
"The Balkan crisis, which has already produced
such a terrible taie of horror, would, if extended
still further, constitute the gravest danger for
1 [" Kein Volk noch begliickten
Blut und Plund'rung ! der Fluch fàllt entsetzlich
Auf den màchtigen, lorbeergeschmûckten
Siéger von dem Besiegten zurûck !
Wohl ergreift den Bethorten nicht plôtzlich
Eh'rnen Armes die ewige Rache,
Doch sie wartet, sie folgt, sie hait Wache,
Sie tritt ernst vor des Sterbenden Blick."]
416 J'ACCUSE
civilisation and for the proletariate. It would also
be the gréâtes t crime in history in view of the
glaring contrast between the magnitude of the
catastrophe and the insigniflcance of the interests
involved.
" The Congress therefore notes with satisfaction
the complète unanimity of the Socialist Party and
of the working classes of ail countries in conducting
War against War. ... A war between the three
great leading civilised nations on account of the
dispute about a harbour between Serbia and
Àustria would be an act of criminal madness. . . .
The Governments should not forget that in the pré-
sent condition of Europe, and in view of the attitude
of the working classes, they cannot, without danger
to themselves, embark on a war. . . . It would be
madness if Governments should fail to realise that
the mère thought of the enormity of a world-war
must in itself arouse the horror and the indigna-
tion of the working classes. The proletariate feel
it as a crime to shoot against each other in the
interests of the profits of capitalists, the ambition
of dynasties, and for the greater honour of diplo-
matie secret treaties.
" If the governing powers eut off the possibility
of normal continued development, and thereby
incite the proletariate to desperate measures, they
would themselves hâve to bear the whole responsi-
bility for the conséquences of the crisis provoked
by them."
The speeches delivered to the assembled multitude in
the vénérable minster at Basel by the représentatives
of the working classes of ail countries, Germany,
Austria, England, France, with Jaurès at their head,
THE FUTURE 417
were in agreement with the spirit of this manifesto. It
was not merely socialist leaders, but also strictly ortho-
dox preachers, and Swiss Government officiais, who
uttered earnest words of warning against the folly of a
European war, against this inexpiable crime against
humanity. It was urged that no treaty of alliance could
oblige Germany to shed even a drop of German blood
for the foolish and ambitious policy of certain Austrian
cliques. Ail the conséquences would recoil on the heads
of those guilty of engineering a butchery such as the
world had never seen. Jaurès clearly prophesied that
the more terrible the European war, the greater and
more terrible would be the révolution which would
ensue,
The Twilight of the Gods.
And now that has corne to pass against which
the représentatives of the people of ail countries raised
such insistent warnings. Then the warning could still
achieve success; to-day, however, it must fail because
their tongues are paralysed, their hands are bound, their
footsteps are hampered. It is not because of a squabble
between Austria and Serbia about a harbour, but
because of other trifles, which are far more petty in
character, that twenty million men in the flower of their
âge are to-day rending each other 's flesh. It is because
of a misunderstanding, a question of légal interpréta-
tion, which could hâve been solved by half an hour's
consultation between experts. Had we not experienced
ail this, it would hâve been regarded as the insane
product of a brain in the last stages of advanced para-
lysis. Whether it was to be an enquête judiciaire or
policière, whether the Austrians should be allowed to
collaborate in Serbia in judicial or police investigation
— thèse and similar world-shaking questions — according
E E
418 J'ACCUSE
to the assertion of the guilty parties themselves — for they
do not yet acknowledge their secret intentions to make
war — it is such " vital " questions as thèse which hâve
enabled death to reap her harvest to-day and to pile up
mountains and mountains of bodies. Confronted with
such a situation, even the most placid of our "contem-
poraries " cannot fail to become revolutionary. Even a
Philistine must say that a political or social organisation
which leads to such results is ripe for destruction. Even
his love for the governing powers must be transformed
into hatred; even in his atmosphère Herwegh's words
of a " Living Man " must penetrate : —
" Love cannot help us ! Thrust behind
Love 's vision of salvation !
Hatred ! Break thou thèse chains that bind ;
Judge, and speak f orth damnation !
And if proud tyrants still hold sway,
We'll hurl them to disaster.
Love long enough has had her day ;
Now, Hatred, be our master." 1
From the International of Labour there was bound to
arise, and there must now arise, the International of
hatred, hatred against imperialism and the doctrine of
blood, hatred against the policy of blood and con-
quest. The voices of the people are still paralysed and
suppressed, the sparks are still glowing under the ashes,
1 [" Die Liebe kann uns helfen nicht,
Die Liebe nicht erretten ;
Hait Du, O Hass, Dein jùngst Gericht,
Brieh Du, O Hass, die Ketten !
Und wo es noch Tyrannen gibt,
Die lasst uns keck erfassen ;
Wir haben lang genug geliebt
Und wollen endlich hassen."]
THE FUTURE 419
but the tongues will be released, the fiâmes will leap up,
and the corrupt building of our present-day State will
perish in fire, like so many other glorious works of man
which hâve been less deserving of a fiery destruction.
The blessing will corne, not, however, from above, but
from below, and there will pass into fulfilment Bebel's
prophétie word, the swan song which he uttered shortly
before his death : " They will reap what they hâve sown,
the twilight of the gods of the civil world is breaking."
Once before in the history of mankind deliverance came
from the depths of the people in Jésus of Nazareth, the
Carpenter's son, the Preacher of Love and of Compas-
sion in a time of bloody conquest and oppression, the
protector of ail the weary and heavy laden, the great
revolutionary of peace ; to-day He also would hâve stood
in the ranks of those fighting for peace, and would hâve
turned away with sorrow and indignation from those
who call themselves by His name and yet so contemptu-
ously despise ail His commands.
If the prophecy of Bebel has not yet been realised
to-day, will it be realised to-morrow? It ;vill the
more certainly be realised the more our leaders
continue to pursue, after the war is over,
the criminal blindness which has misled them to this
war. Radical repentance within, organised assurance
of peace without, thèse are the means which perhaps
may even yet postpone the day of vengeance and of
retaliation. But as matters are with us in Germany
it is impossible to imagine such a repentance or such a
change. The System which has led to the war, the con-
séquences of which were prophesied, not only by repré-
sentatives of the labouring classes, but also by many
men of pénétrât ing vision from other social ranks — this
E E 2
420 J'ACCUSE
System will be pursued with increased energy, and will
not end until the people utters its word of might
Then, indeed, and only then, will an enduring condition
of peace be assured among the nations, as the presup-
position of which the sage of Kônigsberg stated a hun-
dred and twenty years ago that the civil constitution
in each State must be republican. For him the institu-
tion of a monarchy was necessarily and inevitably con-
nected with the danger of ever-renewed unholy warfare.
The grounds for this thought hold to-day with undimin-
ished force : —
" Now the republican constitution, apart from the
soundness of its origin, since it arose from the pure
source of the concept of right, has also the prospect of
attaining the desired resuit, namely, perpétuai peace.
And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this
constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to
détermine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is
more natural than that they should weigh the matter
well before undertaking such a bad business. For in
decreeing war they would of necessity be resolving to
bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This
implies : they must fight themselves ; they must hand
over the costs of the war out of their own property;
they must do their poor best to make good the dévasta-
tion which it leaves behind ; and finally, as a crowning
ill, they hâve to accept a burden of debt which will
embitter even peace itself, and which they can ne ver
pay off on account of the new wars which are always
impending. On the other hand, in a Government where
the subject is not a citizen holding a vote (i.e., in a
constitution which is not republican), the plunging into
war is the least serious thing in the world. For the ruler
is not a citizen, but the owner of the state, and does not
THE FUTURE
42
lose a whit by the war 9 while he goes on enjoying the
delights of his table or sport, or of his pleasure palaces
and gala days. He can, therefore, décide on war for the
most trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure
party. Any justification of it that is necessary for the
sake of decency he can leave without concern to the
diplomatie corps, who are always only too ready with
their services."
So said Kant. . . .
Was he right ? It is for the German people to décide.
But if he was right, what follows ?
EPILOGUE.
"They who do not feel the darkness will
never look for the light." — Bucklk.
The man who wrote this book is a German.
He is not a Frenchman, a Russian, or an Englishman.
Ile is a German who is uncorrupted and incorruptible;
who is not bought, and is not for sale.
A German who loves his Fatherland like anyone else,
but, just because he loves it, wrote this book.
Born on German soil, trained in German culture,
German in his ancestry, his speech and his thought, he
knows ail the virtues of the German people, but he
knows also their failings and their weaknesses. In the
German people, as everywhere, virtues produce weak-
nesses. From the virtue of fidelity there springs the
blind confidence which does not inquire whether the good
faith of the nation has been deceived, and from the
virtue of attachment there springs the unconditional
adhérence which does not ask whether the path pointed
out leads to guilt and destruction.
The confidence of the German people has been basely
abused by its leaders and rulers. Their eyes, which once
saw so clearly, hâve been wrapped in the gloom of
ignorance. Her citizens who loved peace hâve been
transformed into combatants full of hatred and ven-
geance ; the représentatives of high culture and of intelli-
gence hâve been changed into blind and benighted wor-
shippers of success ; men whose vision comprehended the
universe hâve become narrow-hearted, clinging to the
422
EPILOGUE 423
soil of their country ; the lights of art and of science hâve
been replaced by " the spirits of the barrack-yard
tricked out in académie freedom."
The German people has been corrupted and blinded
that it might be driven into a war which it has never
foreseen, never intended, and never desired. In order
that it might be liberated, it has been put in chains.
It was to break this charm, to liberate the people from
its "liberators," to fight against falsehood, that I wrote
this book of Truth.
From the populo maie informato I appeal to the
populum melius informandum.
A true son of Germania, I see my blinded Mother
tottering to the abyss ; I leap forward to save her from
the fatal plunge.
• •••••
May truth still be spoken in the Germany of to-day?
Or hâve things already advanced so far that it is counted
moral to utter falsehood, but immoral to speak the
truth ? Does the good old song, which we used to sing
to the sound of the rapier, no longer hold :
te
A pitiable wretch is he
Who knows the truth and y et can silent be." *
Has this ancient glory for ever departed? Should it
now read :
" A pitiable wretch is he
Who knows what's false and cannot silent be." 2
Do you dispute what I hâve declared to be the truth ?
First let me speak, and then disprove what I say. If
you can do so, so much the better for you ! But bear
1 [Wer die Wahrheit kennet und saget sie nicht,
Der ist fûrwahr ein erbârmlicher Wicht.]
2 [Wer die Luge kennt und verheimlicht sie nicht,
Der ist furwahr ein erbârmlicher Wicht.]
424 JTACCUSE
this well in mind : the spoken word is sometimes dan-
gerous ; more dangerous at ail times is the suppressed
word.
Your security within ? l Must the peace within endure
until it becomes the peace of a churchyard ? " Not now
— later," you exclaim. "Precisely now — only now,' : I
tell you. What is later but a word, an unavailing word,
is now an act, an act of salvation. Hundreds of
thousands could be saved from death, the German people
could be saved from destruction — even now, even at
this very moment — if Truth could but force her way into
the German people, for Truth would mean a pause, but
Falsehood is an advance on the path that leads to
destruction.
You say that the Truth helps our enemies ? You great
children, who shut your eyes to escape danger. Long
ago the enemy knew the truth; there is no one in the
whole world who does not know it. It is everybody's
secret.
But you, Germany, you incorrigible, trusting dreamer,
you alone still slumber, you alone continue to sleep, in
ail your unrighteousness, the sleep of the righteous. It
is long since the sun rose and spread her beams. But
you see it not, in the stillness of your night, behind the
closed shutters of your citadel. 2 . . . How long must
Truth stand outside begging and shivering before the
doors of your castle, entreating in vain for admission,
while within Falsehood sits at the garish table ? Open
the doors ! Long enough has Truth been waiting. It
is time to admit her, and to prépare for her the place
1 [Burgfrieden. See footnote p. 108.]
2 [Burgfrieden.]
EPILOGUE 425
of honour. In admitting such a guest, you would
honour yourself.
Make peace without, and within you will not need
peace. Open the doors to the free word, to the light
that it may illumine your darkness, to the air that it
may blow away the unclean vapours ! You are choking
within. Throw open the doors !
Do you believe that the sun would not rise if you were
to wall up your Windows ? Do you believe that the day-
star would not shine because your bat 's eyes cannot
endure its radiance ? Be sure that Truth, in spite of ail
obstacles, will penetrate into your closed dwellings,
through chinks and crevices, like motes of dust ; she will
force her way into the house by the chimneys or the
keyholes ; she will gnaw the floor from under your feet ;
she will strike away the roof from over your head. Open
and let her in ; thus at least your house will be saved.
If, however, you do not hear, if you will not hear —
even now — your house will fall, and you will be buried
under the ruins. For I tell you that if Germany con-
tinues to gain " victories" such as she has attained up
till now, her victories will lead to her death. . . .
To prevent this I wrote my book, a book of enlighten-
ment for the German people.
History, which weighs guilt and innocence in its iron
scales, will, I am firmly convinced, confirai the judg-
ment which, with pain and shame, I as a German hâve
been compelled to pass on Germans, in honour of truth
and for the well-being of the German people. History
also with letters of flame will inscribe the verdict :
weighed in the balance and found wanting.
So I finish my book as I began it, with a clean con-
science, with the sure feeling of having done a good
work, and, if justice is done, of having deserved the
thanks of my country.
APPENDICES.
I.
Speech Delivered by the Chancellor, Dr. von
bethmann hollweg, in the sltting of the
German Reichstag, on August 4th, 1914. 1
A stupendous fate is breaking over Europe. For
forty-four years, since the time we fought for and won
the German Empire and our position in the world, we
hâve lived in peace and hâve protected the peace of
Europe. In the works of peace we hâve become strong
and powerful, and hâve thus aroused the envy of others.
With patience we hâve faced the fact that, under the
pretence that Germany was desirous of war, enmity has
been awakened against us in the East and the West,
and chains hâve been fashioned for us. The wind then
sown has brought forth the whirlwind which has now
broken loose. We wished to continue our work of
peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated
everyone from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier
was this : Only in defence of a just cause shall our
sword ny from its scabbard.
The day has now corne when we must draw it, against
our wish, and in spite of our sincère endeavours. Russia
has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia
and France — a war that has been forced upon us.
Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during
the pressure of thèse last eventful day s, is before you.
1 [As translated in Collected Diplomatie Documents.]
42&
APPENDICES 427
Allow me to emphasise the facts that détermine our
attitude.
From the first moment of the Austro-Serbian conflict
we declared that this question must be limited to
Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and we worked with this
end in view. Ail Governments, especially that of Great
Britain, took the same attitude. Russia alone asserted
that she had to be heard in the settlement of this
matter.
Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its
threatening head.
As soon as the first definite information regarding the
military préparations in Russia reached us we declared
at Petrograd in a friendly but emphatic manner that
military measures against Austria would find us on the
side of our ally, and that military préparations against
ourselves would oblige us to take counter-measures ;
but that mobilisation would corne very near to actual
war.
Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her
désire for peace, and declared that she was making no
military préparations against us.
In the meantime, Great Britain, warmly supported by
us, tried to médiate between Vienna and Petrograd.
On July 28th the Emperor telegraphed to the Tsar
asking him to take into considération the fact that it
was both the duty and the right of Austria-Hungary to
défend herself against the pan-Serb agitation, which
threatened to undermine her existence. The Emperor
drew the Tsar 's attention to the solidarity of the
interests of ail monarchs in face of the murder of Sera-
jevo. He asked for the latter's personal assistance in
smoothing over the difficulties existing between Vienna
and Petrograd. About the same time, and before receipt
of this telegram, the Tsar asked the Emperor to corne to
428 J'ACCUSE
his aid and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands.
The Emperor accepted the rôle of mediator.
But scarcely had active steps on thèse lines begun
when Russia mobilised ail her forces directed against
Austria, while Austria-Hungary had mobilised only
those of her corps which were directed against Serbia.
To the north she had mobilised only two of her corps,
far from the Russian frontier. The Emperor immedi-
ately informed the Tsar that this mobilisation of Rus-
sian forces against Austria rendered the rôle of media-
tor, which he had accepted at the Tsar's request,
difficult, if not impossible.
In spite of this we continued our task of médiation
at Vienna and carried it to the utmost point which was
compatible with our position as an ally.
Meanwhile Russia of her own accord renewed her
assurances that she was making no military préparations
against us.
We come now to July 31 st. The décision was to be
taken at Vienna. Through our représentations we had
already obtained the resumption of direct conversations
between Vienna and Petrograd, after they had been for
some time interrupted. But before the final décision
was taken at Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had
mobilised her entire forces, and that her mobilisation
was therefore directed against us also. The Russian
Government, who knew from our repeated statements
what mobilisation on our frontiers meant, did not notify
us of this mobilisation, nor did they even offer any
explanation. It was not until the afternoon of July 31 st
that the Emperor received a telegram from the Tsar in
which he guaranteed that his army would not assume
a provocative attitude towards us. But mobilisation on
our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of
July 30th-31st.
APPENDICES 429
While we were mediating at Vienna in compliance
with Russia 's request, Russian forces were appearing ail
along our extended and almost entirely open frontier,
and France, though indeed not actually mobilising, was
admittedly making military préparations. What was
our position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we
had, up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up
a single reservist. Were we now to wait further in
patience until the nations on either side of us chose the
moment for their attack ? It would hâve been a crime
to expose G.ermany to such péril. Therefore, on July
31st we called upon Russia to démobilise as the only
measure which could still préserve the peace of Europe.
The Impérial Ambassador at Petrograd was also
instructed to inform the Russian Government that in
case our demand met with a refusai, we should hâve to
consider that a state of war (Kriegszustand) existed.
The Impérial Ambassador has executed thèse instruc-
tions. We hâve not y et learnt what Russia answered to
our demand for démobilisation. Télégraphie reports on
this question hâve not reached us even though the wires
still transmitted much less important information.
Therefore, the time-limit having long since expired,
the Emperor was obliged to mobilise our forces on
August lst at 5 p. m.
At the same time we had to make certain what atti-
tude France would assume. To our direct question,
whether she would remain neutral in the event of a
Russo-German War, France replied that she would do
what her interests demanded. That was an évasion, if
not a refusai.
In spite of this, the Emperor ordered that the French
frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This order,
with one single exception, was strictly obeyed. France,
who mobilised at the same time as we did, assured us
430 J'ACCUSE
that she would respect a zone of 10 kilomètres on the
frontier. What really happened ? Aviators dropped
bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry detach-
ments appeared on the territory of the Empire ! Though
war had not been declared, France thus broke the peace
and actually attacked us.
Regarding the one exception on our side which I
mentioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as
folio ws : —
M Only one of the French complaints about the cross-
ing of the frontier from our side is justifîed. Against
express orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, appa-
rently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August
2nd. They seem to hâve been shot down, only one man
having returned. But long before this isolated instance
of crossing the frontier had occurred, French aviators
had penetrated into Southern Germany and had thrown
bombs on our railway Unes. French troops had
attacked our frontier guards on the Schlucht Pass. Our
troops, in accordance with their orders, hâve remained
strictly on the défensive." This is the report of the
General Staff.
Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (Not-
wehr), and necessity (Not) knows no law. Our troops
hâve occupied Luxemburg and perhaps hâve already
entered Belgian territory.
Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It
is true that the French Government declared at Brussels
that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as
her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that
France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait,
we could not. A French attack on our flank on the
lower Rhine might hâve been disastrous. Thus we were
forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Govern-
ment s of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong — I speak
APPENDICES 431
openly — the wrong we thereby commit we will try to
make good as soon as our military aims hâve been
attained.
He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his
highest possession can only consider how he is to hack
his way through (durchhauen).
Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with
Austria-Hungary .
As for Great Britain 's attitude, the statements made
by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yester-
day show the standpoint assumed by the British
Government. We hâve informed the British Govern-
ment that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral,
our fleet will not attack the northern coast of France,
and that we will not violate the territorial integrity and
independence of Belgium. Thèse assurances I now
repeat before the world, and I may add that, as long as
Great Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing,
upon reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike
measures against French commercial shipping.
Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words
of the Emperor : " With a clear conscience we enter the
lists." We are fighting for the fruits of our works of
peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our
future. The fifty years are not y et past during which
Count Moltke said we should hâve to remain armed to
défend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now the
great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with
clear confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is
in the field, our navy is ready for battle — behind them
stands the entire German nation — the entire German
nation united to the last man.
Gentlemen, you know your duty and ail that it means.
The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask
you to pass them quickly.
II.
Speech Delivered by the Chancellor, Dr. von
bethmann hollweg, in the sltting of the
German Reichstag on December 2nd, 1914.
Gentlemen, His Majesty the Emperor, who is at the
front with the Army, has requested me to convey his
best wishes and heartiest greetings to the représenta-
tives of the German people, with whom he knows that
he is at one until death, in storm and danger, and in
the common care for the well-being of the Fatherland,
and he has asked me at the same time to express to the
whole nation in his name and from this placé his thanks
for the unexampled sacrifice and dévotion, for the
stupendous task which is being achieved at the front
and at home, and will still further be achieved, by ail
ranks of the nation without distinction. Our first
thought, also. turns to the Emperor, to the Army, and
the Navy, to our soldiers who on the battlefield and
on the high seas are fighting for the honour and the
greatness of the Empire. We look upon them full of
pride and with firm confidence, but at the same time
we look upon our Austro-Hungarian brothers in arms,
who fafthfully united with us fight the great fight with
brillianfly maintained bravery. In the struggle which
has been forced upon us we hâve recently been joined
by a new ally, who knows quite well that with the
destruction of the German Empire her political inde-
pendence also will corne to an end ; I refer to the Otto-
APPENDICES 433
man Empire. If our enemies hâve summoned up against
us a powerful coalition, it is to be hoped that they will
also hâve learned that the arm of our courageous allies
reaches to the weak points in their world-position. On
August 4th the Reichstag showed the unyielding will
of the whole people to take up the struggle forced upon
us, and to défend our independence to the uttermost.
Since then great things hâve happened. Who will count
the acts of glory and of heroism of the armies, the
régiments, the squadrons, and the companies, of the
cruisers and the submarines, in a war which flings its
battle-line over the whole of Europe and over the whole
world ? Only a later âge will be able to tell of thèse
things. For to-day it must suffice that in spite of the
enormous superiority of our enemies, the war is being
carried on in the enemies' country, thanks to the uncon-
querable braver y of our troops. There we stand firm
and strong, and we may with ail confidence look to the
future. But the enemy's power of résistance is not
broken. We are not y et at an end of our sacrifices. The
nation will continue to bear thèse further sacrifices with
the same heroism which it has hitherto shown, for we
must, and we will, conduct to a happy end the struggle
which, surrounded as we are by enemies, we are waging
for right and freedom. Then, also, we will remember
the wrongs, some of which hâve been in violation of ail
the dictâtes of civilisation, done to those of our defence-
less countrymen living abroad, for, Gentlemen, the
world must learn that no one can touch unavenged so
much as a hair of a German.
When the meeting of August 4th was at an end, the
British Ambassador appeared hère to deliver to us an
ultimatum from England, and, in the event of a refusai,
a déclaration of war. I was not then able to express
myself on the position final ly assumed by the British
F F
434 J'ACCUSE
Government, and I propose to-day to offer some obser-
vations on the point.
Where the responsibility rests for this, the greatest
of ail wars, is, for us, clear. The external responsibility
is borne by those men in Russia who inspired and
carried out the mobilisation of the entire Russian Army.
The inner responsibility, however, lies on the Govern-
ment of Great Britain. The Cabinet of London could
hâve made this war impossible by declaring without
ambiguity in Petrograd that England was not prepared
to allow a continental war in Europe to develop out of
the conflict between Austria and Serbia. By speaking
thus, France would also hâve been compelled energeti-
cally to advise Russia to desist from measures of war.
This would hâve smoothened the path for our action
of médiation. England did not do so. England knew
the intrigues for war of a small clique, of an irrespon-
sable but powerful group about the Tsar. England saw
how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the
wheel. In spite of ail protestations of peace London
gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she was
taking her stand on the side of France and Russia. This
is proved clearly and incontestably by the publications
of the various Cabinets, and especially by that of the
English Blue Book itself. Then, indeed, it was impos-
sible to hold things back in Petrograd.
On this question we possess a witness who is entirely
above suspicion, the report of the Belgian chargé
d'affaires in Petrograd, written on July 30th. He
reports : " To-day in Petrograd the people are firmly
convinced, indeed they hâve assurances, that England
will stand by France. This support has an extraordin-
ary influence, and has done not a little to gain the upper
hand for the war party."
Up to this summer the English statesmen hâve re-
APPENDICES 435
peatedly assured Parliament that there was no treaty,
no convention, no alliance which bound the freedom of
action of the English Government in the event of war
breaking out. England could freely décide whether it
would or would not take part in such a war. It was,
then, no fraternal duty, no compulsion, not even any
menace of their own country, which caused the English
statesmen to stir up war and then participate in it
themselves. There thus remains only one other possi-
bility : the Cabinet of London allowed this world-war,
this enormous world-war, to arise because it appeared
a favourable opportunity, with the help of her comrades
in the Entente, to destroy the vital nerve of her greatest
économie competitor. Thus, then, England and Russia
bear the responsibility for this world-war, for this catas-
trophe which has broken over Europe and over the
world. And Belgian neutrality, which England pro-
fessed to protect, is a mask. At 7 o'clock in the evening
on August 2nd we communicated in Brussels the fact
that the French plans of war, which were known to us,
compelled us in self-defence to march through Belgium.
But even on the afternoon of the same day, August
2nd, that is to say before our démarche was or could be
known in London, England had promised France her
support, unconditionally promised it in the event of an
attack by the German Fleet on the French coast. There
was no mention of Belgian neutrality. This fact is estab-
lished by the déclarations made by Sir Edward Grey on
August 3rd in the House of Commons, and which was
not known to me on August 4th. This fact is confirmed
by the English Blue Book itself.
How could England maintain that she had seized the
sword because Belgian neutrality was violated by us ?
This is said by English statesmen to whom the past
history of Belgian neutrality was known. When on
F F 2
436 J'ACCUSE
August 4th I spoke of the wrong that we were doing
in invading Belgium, it was not then clear whether the
Government in Brussels might not in the hour of need
agrée to spare their country, and to withdraw under
protest to Antwerp. You will remember that after
Liège was taken, on the proposai of the Army Authori-
ties, a renewed request in this sensé was directed to
Brussels. On military grounds the possibility of such
a development had, in ail circumstances, to be kept
open on August 4th. Wë had, indeed, indications that
the neutrality of Belgium had fallen to pièces, but
positive proof in writing was lacking. English states-
men, however, knew thèse proofs quite well. As a resuit
of the documents found in Brussels it has been estab-
lished how and how far Belgium gave up her neutrality
in favour of England, and two facts, consequently, are
now well known to ail the world. When our troops
marched into Belgium in the night of August 3rd to 4th
they were in a country which had long ago riddled its
neutrality, and the further fact is clear that it was not
on account of Belgian neutrality, which she had herself
broken long ago, that England declared war against us,
but because she believed that with the help of two great
military continental Powers she could become our
m aster. Since August 2nd, since she promised to support
France in war, England was no longer neutral, but was,
as a matter of fact, in a state of war against us. The
reasons advanced by English statesmen for this déclara-
tion of war were of the nature of a spectacular show,
intended to confuse their own country and neutral
States with regard to the true grounds of the war. Now
that the Anglo-Belgian plans of war hâve been unveiled
in ail their détails, the policy of English statesmen is
characterised for ail time in the history of the world.
English diplomacy has, indeed, accomplished one other
APPENDICES 437
achievement. On her summons, Japan tore from us
the heroic Tsingtau, and thereby violated Chinese
neutrality. Did England take any steps with regard to
the violation of this neutrality ? Has she shown in this
case her concern for the maintenance of the rights of
neutral States ? Gentlemen, when I was called to my
présent office five years ago, the Triple Entente stood
firmly opposed to the Triple Alliance. This was the
work of England, intended to assist in giving effect to
the fundamental principle of English policy, pursued for
centuries, that is, to oppose the strongest Power on the
continent for the time being. In this fact lay from the
outset the aggressive character of the Triple Entente
as opposed to the purely défensive significance of the
Triple Alliance; for a nation as great and as strong as
the German cannot be hampered in the free develop-
ment of its forces. In vîew of this political constellation
the way to be folio wed by German policy was clearly
indicated. We had to endeavour, by arriving at an
understanding with the individual Powers of the
Entente, to banish the danger of war; we had at the
same time so to strengthen our défensive forces that,
if war should corne, we would be strong enough to carry
it through. As y ou know, we hâve done both. In the
case of France we always encountered the old thoughts
of re venge. Nourished by ambitious politicians, thèse
thoughts showed themselves to be stronger than the
désire for neighbourly relations with us which was
doubtless entertained by a part of the French people.
In the case of Russia it is true that we arrived at parti-
cular agreements, but the firm alliance between Russia
and France, the opposition of Russia to our ally Austria-
Hungary, and a hatred of Germany nourished on Pan-
Slav ambitions prevented any understanding designed
to avoid the danger of war. The freest position, corn-
438 J'ACCUSE
paratively speaking, was occupied by England. Speak-
ing in Parliament, English statesmen hâve again and
again with the greatest emphasis defended and boasted
of the freedom enjoyed by the British Government in
arriving at a décision. This was the first place in which
an understanding could be sought, which would then, in
fact, hâve guaranteed the peace of the world. In this
direction I was bound to exert mv efforts, and I did so.
The way was strait, as I well knew. In the course of
centuries the insular manner of English thought has
established a political principle with the force of an
axiomatic dogma, the principle that an arbitrium mundi
belongs to England, which can only be maintained by
the uncontested control of the seas on the one hand,
and on the other by the balance of power on the con-
tinent, which has been so often mentioned. I never
hoped to be able to break this ancient English prin-
ciple by force of persuasion. What appeared to be
possible was that the increasing strength of Germany,
the increasing risk involved in a war, would hâve
enabled England to see that this principle, so long repre-
sented by English policy, had become out of date, and
was no longer practicable, and that a peaceful seule-
ment with Germany was to be preferred. This dogma
was, however, so firmly rooted that it paralysed ail
efforts to arrive at a décisive understanding. The nego-
tiations received a new impulse in the crisis of 1911.
The English people recognised overnight that it had
been standing before the abyss of a European war. Com-
pelled by popular sentiment, the English statesman
desired to approach Germany. By long and painful
labour it was possible to arrive at agreements with
regard to économie interests, which, in the first place,
affected Asia Minor and Africa, and were intended
to diminish possible sources of political friction. The
APPENDICES 439
world is wide, it has room enough for the free develop-
ment of both nations side by side, if only the attempt
is not made to hinder and restrict them in their free
development. That is the principle which our policy
has always defended. But, Gentlemen, while we were
so negotiating, England was incessantly intent on draw-
ing closer her relations to Russia and France. The most
décisive point in this is that, apart from the sphère of
politics, closer military agreements were being concluded
to meet the case of a continental war. England con-
ducted thèse negotiations as far as possible in secret.
When anything of this nature trickled through to the
public, as has happened more than once, the English
Government endeavoured to represent the matter to
Parliament and in the Press as entirely innocent. We
did not remain ignorant of thèse agreements of England.
I hâve laid papers on the subject. The whole situation
was, in fact, that England was ready to corne to an
understanding with us on particular questions, but the
chief and the first principle of English policy remained
unaltered : in the free development of her powers Ger-
many had to be kept in check by the balance of power.
That represents the frontier line of friendly relations
with Germany. For this purpose the Triple Entente was
elaborated to the utmost. As her friends desired mili-
tary assurances, the English were at once ready to give
them. The ring was thus completed. England is sure
of France 's adhérence, and therefore of Russia 's also.
But as a resuit of ail this, England also binds her will.
If France or Russia, where the existing chauvinistic
circles find their strongest support in the military con-
nivance of England, if France or Russia désire to strike,
England is morally delivered into the hands of her
friends. And what is the object of ail this ? Germany
must be kept down. We hâve not been remiss in warn-
440 J'ACCUSE
ing the English Government. Even at the beginning of
July of this year I indicated to the English Government
that their secret negotiations with Russia with regard
to a naval convention were known to me. I drew their
attention to the serious dangers which this policy on the
part of England involved for the peace of the world.
Fourteen days later my prophecies were fulfilled. From
ail thèse facts bearing on the gênerai situation of affairs
we drew the conséquences. In rapid séquence I brought
before you the greatest defence proposais known in
Germany history, and in full knowledge of the dangers
which surrounded us you hâve willingly and in a spirit
of self-sacrifice granted to our country what was needed
for her defence. As soon as the war had broken out,
England threw aside ail external show. It was openly
and loudly proclaimed that England would fight until
Germany was crushed economically and by force of
arms. The hatred of Germany nourished by the Pan-
Slavs exultingly applauds the sentiment; France, with
the whole strength of an old soldierly nation, hopes to
be able to wipe out the stain of 1870. Gentlemen, on
this we hâve only one answer to give to our enemies :
Germany cannot be annihilated.
Like our military forces, our financial forces also hâve
given a brilliant account of themselves, and hâve with-
out any réservations placed themselves in the service
of our country. Our économie life has been maintained ;
unemployment is relatively small. Germany's power
and skill in organisation constantly seek in new ways to
avoid coming evils, and to wipe out existing injuries.
No man and no woman seeks to avoid sharing in the
common and voluntary task ; no recruiting drums need
to be beat for this purpose. Everything in life and in
wealth is surrendered for the only, and the great object,
for the land of our fathers, for the hope of our children
APPENDICES 441
and descendants. A spirit is being manifested, a moral
greatness of the nation, such as has hitherto never been
known in the history of the world. If this spirit of
sacrifice shown by millions of our nation in arms against
a world of enemies is despised by our opponents as mili-
tarism, if they abuse us as Huns and barbarians, if they
scatter cursed lies throughout the whole world — we are
proud enough to remain unconcerned. This wonderful
spirit, which glows through the hearts of Germany in
unprecedented unity, in the unquestioning surrender of
each to each, this must and will be victorious. When
a glorious and a happy peace has been achieved, we
will maintain this spirit as the holiest inheritance from
this fearfully earnest and great time. As if by the power
of magie the barriers hâve disappeared which during
a barren and dull âge hâve separated the various parts
of our nation — the barriers which we reared together in
misunderstanding, in envy, and distrust. It brings a
sensé of freedom and of bliss that at last the whole of
this rubbish and trash has been swept away, that only
the man counts, each equal to the other, each holding
out his hand to the other in a single and a holy cause.
I again use the words of the Emperor on the outbreak
of war : "I no longer know any parties. I know
only Germans." Gentlemen, when the war is past
parties will return; for without parties, without politi-
cal struggle, there can be no political life, even for the
freest and the happiest nation ; but, Gentlemen, we will
struggle to see — and I for my part promise to do so —
that in thèse struggles there may be only Germans.
I bring to a conclusion my few observations ; — this is
no time for words — I cannot discuss ail the questions
which move most profoundly the nation and myself.
One word more : faithfully and with a feeling of warm
gratitude we think of the sons of Germany who on the
442 J'ACCUSE
battlefields in the east and the west, on the high seas,
on the shores of the Pacific, and in our colonies hâve
given up their life for the Fatherland. Before their
heroism, which is now stilled, we unité ourselves in the
vow to endure till the last breath, in order that our
descendants and our sons may be able to labour in the
service of the greatness of the Empire in a stronger
Germany, free and assured from foreign menace and
force. This vow will ring out to our sons and brothers
who are still fighting against the enemy, to the heart-
blood of Germany which springs up in countless and
nameless acts of heroism, for which we are prepared to
give up ail that we hâve ; it will ring out to our country-
men abroad, to those kept back, to those in péril, to
those who care for us afar off, to those who are in prison
and to those abused. We will persévère, Gentlemen,
and I ask you to confirm this by accepting thèse
measures. We will persévère, until we hâve the assur-
ance that no one will again disturb our peace, a peace in
which we mean as a free nation to tend and develop our
German character and our German strength.
in.
Circular Note of the Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann
hollweg, to the imperial ambassadors, dated
December 24th, 1914. 1
Headquarters,
December 2Mh, 1914.
In the speech made by Minister Président Viviani in
the French Chamber is contained a passage that France
and Russia had on July 31 st agreed to the English pro-
posai to stop military préparations and to begin negotia-
tions in London. If Germany had given her assent,
peace could hâve been maintained even at this last
hour.
As I cannot at the présent moment contradict from
the Tribune of the German Reichstag this false state-
ment made in the French Parliament, I see myself
compelled to send the following exposition to you with
the request to make an extensive use of it.
The British proposai for a conférence which is printed
in the English Blue Book, No. 36, arises on July 26th.
Its contents say that représentatives of Germany,
France, and Italy should meet with Sir Edward Grey
in London for the purpose of discovering an issue from
the difficulties which had arisen in the Serbian matter.
From the beginning Germany took its stand on the
point that the Serbo-Austrian conflict was an affair
which only concerned the two States immediately indi-
1 [As translated in the Appendix to Mr. J. W. Headlam's
The History of Twelve Days.]
443
444 J'ACCUSE
cated. Sir Edward Grey himself also later recognised
this point of view.
Germany was obliged to reject the English proposai
for a conférence, for it could not allow that Austria-
Hungary should be subjected to a tribunal of the Great
Powers in a question which concerned its national exist-
ence and which only concerned Austria-Hungary. It is
clear frora the German White Book that Austria-Hun-
gary looked on the proposai for a conférence as un-
acceptable. By the déclaration against Serbia it gave
évidence of its firm will to regulate the Serbian question
alone without the intervention of the Powers. At the
same time, however, it declared, in order to satisfy ail
just claims of Russia, its complète territorial disinte-
restedness as regards Serbia. As Russia was not satisfied
with this assurance, European questions sprang out of
the Serbian question, and this first found its expression
in a différence between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
In order to prevent a European conflict developing out
of this différence, it was necessary to find a new basis
upon which immédiate action of the Powers could be
begun. It was Germany to whom belongs the merit of
having first trod this ground.
The Secretary of State, von Jagow, in his conversa-
tion with the British Ambassador on July 27th pointed
out that in the wish of Russia to negotiate directly with
Austria-Hungary he saw an improvement of the situa-
tion and the best prospect for a peaceful solution. From
the day on which it was first expressed, Germany sup-
ported in Vienna with ail the energy which stood at its
command this désire by which the English conférence
idea was according even to the Russian opinion for the
time put aside. No State can hâve striven more honestly
and with more energy to maintain the peace of the world
than Germany had.
APPENDICES 445
England also now gave up the idea of pursuing her
conférence idea and on her side supported the concep-
tion of direct negotïations between Vienna and Petro-
grad (Blue Book, No. 67).
Thèse negotïations, however, met with difficulties,
and difficulties which did not arise from Germany and
Austria-Hungary, but from the Entente Powers.
If Germany 's endeavour was to be successful, it
required good will on the part of the Powers who were
not immediately engaged; it required also that those
who were principally engaged should hold their hand,
for if either of the two Powers between whom médiation
was to be made interrupted, by military opérations,
action which was proceeding, it was from the beginning
clear that this action could ne ver attain its end.
Now how did it stand with the good will of the
Powers ? The attitude of France is clearly shown in the
French Yellow Book. She did not trust German assur-
ances. Ail the steps of the German Ambassador,
Freiherr von Schoen, were received with mistrust. His
wish for mediating influence of France at Petrograd
was not regarded, for they believed that they must assume
that the steps taken by Herr von Schoen were intended
"à compromettre la France au regard de la Russie."
The French Yellow Book shows that France did not take
a single positive step in the interest of peace.
What attitude did England take in the diplomatie
conversation ? She gave the appearance of mediating up
to the last hour, but her external actions were directed
to a humiliation of the two Powers of the Triple Alliance.
England was the first Great Power which ordered mili-
tary préparations on a great scale and thereby created
a feeling, particularly in Russia and France, which was
in the highest degree adverse to mediatory action. From
the report of the French Chargé d'Affaires in London on
446 J'ACCUSE
July 22nd (Yellow Book, No. 66), it follows that as
early as July 24th the Commander of the English Fleet
had discreetly taken steps for the collection of the Fleet
at Portland. Great Britain, therefore, mobilised sooner
even than Serbia. Moreover, Great Britain refused just
what France did, to act in a moderating and restraining
manner at Petrograd.
On the warning from the English Ambassador at
Petrograd from which it was clearly to be seen that
only a warning to Russia to hold back her mobilisation
could save the situation, Sir Edward Grey did nothing
but let matters go their own way.
At the same time, however, he believed that it would
be useful to point out to Germany and Austria-Hun-
gary, if not quite clearly, still sufficiently so, that
England could also take part in a European war. At
the same time, therefore, when England, though letting
drop the idea of a conférence, gave the appearance of
wishing that Austria-Hungary should show itself con-
ciliatory under the médiation of Germany, Sir Edward
Grey directs the attention of the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador in England to the mobilisation of the
English Fleet (Blue Book, 48), gives the Russian Am-
bassador to understand that England also could take
part in a war, and at once informs the Ambassadors of
the Triple Entente of this warning which he had ad-
dressed to Germany, by which action the victory of the
war-party in Petrograd was sealed.
This was just the attitude, which according to the
better informed opinion of the English Ambassador
Buchanan was the worst adapted for bringing about
good feeling between the Powers.
Under thèse difficultés it would be regarded as a
spécial success that Germany succeeded in making
Austria-Hungary inclined to follow the wish of Russia
APPENDICES 447
and enter into separate conversations. Had Russia,
without on her side taking military measures, continued
the negotiations with Austria-Hungary which had only
mobilised against Serbia, the complète prospect of
maintenance of the world's peace would hâve been
maintained. Instead of this Russia mobilised against
Austria-Hungary, by which Sazonof was quite clear
(see Blue Book, 78) that with this ail direct understand-
ing with Austria-Hungary fell to the ground. The
laborious resuit of the German negotiations for média-
tion was thereby overthrown by a single blow.
What happened now on the part of the Entente
Powers in order to préserve peace at this last hour ?
Sir Edward Grey again took up his conférence pro-
posai. In accordance also with the view of M. Sazonof,
the suitable moment had now corne in order, under the
pressure of Russian mobilisation against Austria-Hun-
gary, again to recommend the old English idea of
quadruple conversation (German White Book, page 7).
Count Pourtalès did not leave the Minister in doubt,
that according to his view the Entente Powers thereby
were requiring from Austria-Hungary just what they
had not been willing to suggest to Serbia, namely, that
she should give way under military pressure.
Under thèse circumstances the conférence idea could
not possibly be sympathetic to Germany and Austria-
Hungary. Notwithstanding this, Germany declared in
London that she accepted in principle the proposai for
the intervention of the four Powers, but that it was
merely the form of the conférence which was disagree-
able to her. At the same time the German Ambassador
at Petrograd pressed Sazonof on his side also to make
concessions in order to render a compromise possible.
It is well known that thèse efforts remained fruitless.
Russia herself seemed to take no more interest in the
448 J'ACCUSE
further mediatory activity of Germany at Vienna, which
was continuée! until the last hour. She ordered the
mobilisation of ail her forces in the night between July
30th and 31 st, which must hâve the mobilisation of
Germany and the later déclaration of war as its consé-
quence.
In view of this course of events it cannot be under-
stood how a responsible statesman can hâve the courage
to maintain that Germany, who found herself con-
fronted by Russian mobilisation, military préparations
of France, and the mobilisation of the English Fleet,
could on July 31st still hâve saved peace by the accept-
ance of a conférence which was to be conducted under
the arms of the Entente Powers.
It was not Germany, who continued to médiate at
Vienna up to the last hour, who made the idea of média-
tion by four Powers impossible; it was the military
measures of the Entente Powers who spoke words of
peace while they determined to make war.
v. Bethmann Hollweg.
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