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canitjetsitp of Bonh Carolina
Collection of jRottS Catoliniana
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of t|7e eriajifs of 1889
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00032690954
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be taken from the
Library building.
Form No. 471
i^
JAMES K. POLK
A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
EUGENE IRVING McCORMAC, I>h.D.
Professor of American History in the University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA
1922
TO
THE MEMORY OF
MY MOTHER
PREFACE
In the two standard sets of American biographies— namely,
the American Statesmen Series and the American Crids Bio-
graphies—the name of James K. Polk does not appear in the list
of titles. Evidently the editor of the first set did not consider
Mr. Polk to have been a statesman Avorthy of serious consideration,
and the editor of the second set seems to have been unaware that
Polk had played a conspicuous part in any of the crises of
American history.
Although it is not my purpose to criticize the selection made
by these editors, I believe that the character and success of Polk's
political career entitled him to a place in eitlier series. I believe
that the following pages will show Mr. Polk to have been a con-
structive statesman— a statesman possessed of vision, sound judg-
ment, and unusual executive ability. Surely he was a "crisis"
President. He extended our national boundaries to the Pacific
Ocean and determined the political destinies of the future popu-
lation of the vast area lying west of the Louisiana Purchase. His
request for an appropriation with which to conduct negotiations
with Mexico called forth the Wilmot Proviso; and this proviso
precipitated the "irrepressible conflict," which Avas one of the
greatest crises in American history.
When nominated for the Presidency in 1844, Polk was neither
unknown nor inexperienced in national affairs. He had been
selected to conduct Jackson's bank war in tlie House of Repre-
sentatives, and he had performed this task to the entire satisfac-
tion of the President and the Democratic party. As Speaker of
the House of Representatives, he had displayed alertness of mind,
[V]
sound judgment, and ability as a party leader. And when, in
1844, Van Buren announced his opposition to the annexation of
Texas, General Jackson urged that Polk be nominated, for, as
he said. Governor Polk was the ablest exponent of Democratic
doctrines and the one who would be most capable of carrying
them into successful operation. The General did not overrate
the political ability of his protege. As President, Polk formulated
his policies with precision and confidence ; and despite many
obstacles, he succeeded in canying them into effect.
It has not been my purpose to write a personal biography.
Therefore this volume deals almost entirely with Polk's political
career. In the discussion of the events of his administration I
have attempted to show the part played by the President in
formulating the policy of the nation. In the field of foreign
relations I have been concerned mainly with the President's for-
eign policy and with the motives, viewpoints, and exigencies
which led to the adoption of that policy. For this reason the
history, policies, and motives of other countries concerned have
been treated incidentally only. Polk's policies were influenced
by what he believed to be the facts concerning those countries,
and not by the facts which have subsequently been found to be
true. For example, I did not feel that a biography of President
Polk called for an exhaustive discussion of conditions in Mexico,
either before or during our war with that nation. For similar
reasons, thte discussion of the Oregon question is confined to the
official acts of Great Britain and to the interpretation of those
acts by the government of the United States.
The material used in the preparation of this volume has been
gathered mainly in the University of California Library, the
Tennessee State Library, and the Library of Congress. I am
indebted to Dr. Jolin W. Jordon, Librarian of the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, for placing at my disposal the Buchanan
Papers, and to Professor St. George L. Sioussat for assistance
[vi]
of various kinds. I am under especial obligation to Dr. Gaillard
Hunt and Mr. John C. Fitzpatriek, of the Manuscripts Division
of the Library of Congress. Their never-failing courtesy and
valuable suggestions facilitated my research work in many ways.
Dr. Justin H. Smith's valuable work entitled "The War with
Mexico" was published soon after the manuscript of my volume
had been completed. Altliough it appeared too late to be used
in the preparation of my manuscript, I am gratified to note tliat
on most points covered by the two works we have arrived at
substantially the same conclusions.
Berkeley, California,
December, 1919.
[viij
CONTENTS
PAGE
Preface i-iii
CHAPTER I
Ancestry and Early Life of James K. Polk 1-9
CHAPTER II
Opposition Member op Congress 10-25
CHAPTER III
Polk jvnd the Bank of the United States 2(5— Ki
CHAPTER IV
Polk-Bell Contest for the Speakership 47-61
CHAPTER V
Jutige White and the Prestoency 62-91
CHAPTER VI
Speaker of the House under Jackson 92-112
CHAPTER VII
Speaker of the House under Van Buren 113-138
CHAPTER VIII
Polk versus Cannon, 1839 139-154
CHAPTER IX
Governor of Tennessee 155-179
CHAPTER X
Defeated by Jones in 1841 180-191
CHAPTER XI
Polk in Retirement 192-211
CHAPTER XII
Selection of Candidates, 1844 212-247
[ix]
CHAPTER XIII PAGE
Campaign of 1844 ' 248-283
CHAPTER XIV
President-elect 284-318
CHAPTER XV
Administration and Patronage 319-351
CHAPTER XVI
Completion of Annexation 352-372
CHAPTER XVII
Prelude to the Mexican War 373-414
CHAPTER XVIII
War in Northern Mexico 415-452
CHAPTER XIX
Campaign against the City of Mexico 453-486
CHAPTER XX
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 487-554
CHAPTER XXI
Oregon 555-611
CHAPTER XXII
Slavery and Territorial Governments 612-655
CHAPTER XXIII
Tariff, Internal Improvements, and the Independejjt Treas-
ury 656-689
CHAPTER XXIV
The "Polk Doctrine" and Minor Diplomatic Questions 690-712
CHAPTER XXV
Close op Career 713-725
Bibliography 726-732
Index 733-746
[x]
CHAPTER I
ANCESTRY AND EARLY LIFE OF JAMES K. POLK
The pedigree of the Polk family has been traced back to
1075 — to Fulbert, who was born in the reign of Malcolm III, of
Scotland. In 1153 Fnlbert was succeeded by his son Petrius,
who took the surname PoUok from the estate which he inlierited.
In 1440 Sir Robert de Pollok, a "younger son" of the family,
inherited an Irish estate and rem.oved to Ireland. By common
usage the name of this branch was soon contractd into Polk.
Sometime between 1680 and 1687^ Robert Bruce Polk, or Pollok,
second son of Sir Robert II, left Ireland with his wife, six sons,
and two daughters, and settled in Somerset County, Maryland.
Their oldest son, John Polk, married Joanna Knox and estab-
lished that branch of the family whence came our subject, James
K. Polk.
William Polk, the only son of John and Joanna, after living
for a time in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, removed with his family
to ^Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Colonel Ezekiel Polk,
the seventh child of William, married Mary Wilson, and the
fourth child of this union was Samuel Polk, the father of the
future President. The President's mother was Jane Knox, a
great-grandniece of John Knox, of Scotland. Her father, James
Knox, of Iredell County, North Carolina, was a captain in the
Revolution. Mrs. Polk was a rigid Presbj'terian, and a woman
of keen intellect and high character. From her James inherited
man}' of his well-known traits. She lived to witness the whole of
his successful career, and to assist, during his last moments, in
preparing him for ' ' a future estate. ' '^
1 Authorities differ as to the date.
- Garrett, Pedigree of the Polk familij. Richardson, Messages, IV, 371.
Nelson, Memorials of Sarah Childress Polk, 150 and passim. Cliase, History
of the Polk Administration, 475.
2 JAMES K. POLK
James Kuox Polk, oldest of the ten children of Saniuel and
Jane Knox Polk, was bom on November 2, 1795, in Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina.^ The Polk family had settled in this
frontier region some time before the Revolution, and tradition
has credited Polk's ancestors with a leading part in promulgat-
ing the much-mooted Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence.
His grandfather, Colonel Ezekiel Polk, whom the Whigs in 1844
accused of Toryism, was an officer in the Revolutionary army.
James's father, Samuel Polk, was a plain but enterprising
farmer. At an early age he had been thrown upon his own
resources and had met with the hardsliips incident to frontier
conditions. With the hope of improving his fortunes, he fol-
lowed the trend of emigration westward, and in the autumn of
1806 settled in the valley of the Duck River, Tennessee. He was
one of the first pioneers in a region then a wilderness; but the
valley proved to be fertile and Mr. Polk in time was rated as a
prosperous farmer. He was an ardent supporter of Jefferson,
and his faith in the soundness of Republican doctrines was in-
herited by his son James. The correspondence in the Polk Papers
indicates that the entire family, including the President's mother,
took a keen interest in politics and that all of tliem were firm
believers in the maxims of Jefferson.
James was but eleven years old when his father located in
Tennessee. Had he possessed a strong physique, doubtless he
would have shared the fate of the average eldest son and have
been trained to cultivate the family estate. But he was not
strong* and his first years in Tennessee were spent in making
3 On November 2, 1846, Polk noted in his diary: "This is my birthday.
According to the entry in my father's family Bible I was born on the
2nd day of Nov., 1795, and my mother has told mo that the event occurred,
ag near as she could toll about 12 o'clock, Meridian, on that day." (Dianj,
II, 216.)
4 "I closed my education at a later period of life than is usual, in
consequence of having been very much afflicted and enjoyed very bad health
in my vouth. I did not commence the Latin Grammar until the 13tli of
July, 1813." (Polk, Diary, IV, 160.)
ANCESTBY AND EARLY LIFE 3
good use of such limited educational advantages as were afforded
in a pioneer community.
Young Polk was studious and ambitious,, but Fate seemed
determined to deprive him of the opportunity for satisfying his
desire for an education. His health did not improve, and his
father, believing that a more active life tlian tliat of a student
would be conducive to health, determined to make a business
num of his son. Accordingly, much to the son's disgust and over
his protest, he was placed with a merchant to learn the business.
After remaining but a few weeks with the merchant, however,
the earnest appeals of the son overcame the resistance of the
father, and in July, 1813, James was permitted to continue his
education under the guidance of Reverend Robert Henderson
at a small academy near Columbia, Tennessee. For about a
year Polk "read the usual course of latin authors, part of the
greek testament and a few of the dialogues of Lucian," and,
according to the testimony of his preceptor, he "was diligent in
his studies, and his moral conduct was unexceptionable & ex-
emplary. "^ After spending nine months at Murfreesborough
Academy, where his "literary merit and moral worth" won the
approval of the rector, Samuel P. Black,** James entered the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in the autumn of 1815.
He was naturally drawn to the university of his native state,
and the fact that his cousin. Colonel William Polk, had for many
years been one of its trustees, may have been an additional reason
for selecting this institution.
At college Polk manifested those peculiar traits which later
characterized his career as a statesman. Eschewing the less profit-
able, but usually more attractive, side of college life, his time
was occupied with hard and well directed study. "His ambi-
5 A recommendation dated December 31, 1814. MS in Tenn. Hist. Soc.
Library.
" Eecommendation dated October 5, 1815. MS in Tenn. Hist. Soc.
Library.
4 JAMES E. POLK
tioii to excel," wrote one of his political friends/ "was equalled
by his perseverance alone, in proof of which it is said he never
missed a recitation nor omitted the punctilious performance of
any duty." Numerous remarks in the diary written while he
was President show that, in Polk's own opinion, time spent in
mere pleasure was so much time wasted. He seems to have been
equally serious-minded during his college days. Neither at col-
lege nor at a later time did Polk deceive himself or attempt to
deceive others by assuming great native brilliancy. He never
posed as one whose genius made it easy for him to decide great
questions offhand. He never attempted to conceal the fact that
his conclusions were reached as the result of unremitting labor.
And if his conclusions were sometimes attacked as unsound, he
was, on the other hand, spared the embarrassment of ridicule,
which often fell to the lot of his more brilliant competitors during
his long political career.
Polk was graduated from the university in 1818 and enjoyed
the distinction of being awarded first honors in both mathematics
and the classics. He was very fond of both subjects, as each
appealed to his taste for industry and precision. Of his classical
training he retained the substantial and discarded the ornate.
"So carefully," wrote the friend above cited, "has Mr. Polk
avoided the pedantry of classical display, which is the false taste
of our day and country, as almost to hide the acquisitions which
distinguished his early career. His preference for the useful and
substantial, indicated by his youthful passion for mathematics,
has made him select a style of elocution, which would perhaps be
deemed too plain by shallow admirers of flashy declamation."
After his graduation Polk returned to Tennessee with health
impaired by close application, and early in 1819 began the study
of law in the office of Judge Felix Grundy. A warm personal and
political friendship resulted, which was severed only by the death
7 Democratic Eeview, May, 1838. Polk says that this sketch was written
by J. L. Martin, later charge d'affaires to the Papal States {Diary, TV,
132).
ANCESTBY AND EAELY LIFE 5
of Grundy in 1810. Tlie pupil studied hard, and late in 1820 he
was admitted to the bar. He immediately began the practice of
law at Columbia, in his home county of Maury, among friends
and neighbors whose confidence in his ability assured him, from
the beginning, a profitable practice. "His thorough academic
preparation, his accurate knowledge of the law, his readiness and
resources in debate, his unswerving application to business,
secured him, at once, full employment, and in less than a year
he was already a leading practitioner."^ His account books
show that he continued to enjoy a lucrative practice although
much of his time was spent in public service.^
For three years the young attorney 's time Avas occupied exclu-
sively in the practice of his profession. His only active participa-
tion in politics was to serve for one term as clerk of the state
senate. In 1823, however, he was chosen to represent his county
in the state legislature, and, having thus entered the political
arena, he continued in a very active, and for the most part suc-
cessful, political career to the close of his term as President.
He spent two years in tlie legislature, where he soon established
a reputation for business capacity and for superiority in debate.
He took an active interest in all measures for developing his
state and gave special attention to the providing of better educa-
tional advantages. He enjoyed the personal and political friend-
ship of General Jackson, and it afforded him much pleasure to
assist by his vote in sending that military hero to Washington to
represent the state in the Senate of the United States. Few acts
of his life gave him, in later years, greater pride than his partici-
pation in launching Jackson in his political career; and, as the
General was ever mindful of the welfare of his political sup-
porters, this incident was no impediment to Polk's own political
advancement. His friendship for Jackson was natural, although
the two men differed widely in personal characteristics and in
8 Bern. Rev., sup. oit.
9 His account books are in the Library of Congress.
6 JAMES E. POLE
their attitude toward authority. From early youth Polk had
been an ardent advocate of republicanism. He was a firm believer
in the teachings of Jefferson and shared with his patron an
unbounded faith in individual freedom. Pioneer conditions also
are conducive to a strong belief in practical democracy, and
Jackson seemed to be a leader wiio understood the people 's desires
and sympathized with them.
On January 1, 1824, Polk married Sarah Childress, whose
father w^as a prosperous farmer near Murfreesborough, Tenn-
essee.^° Mrs. Polk was a lady of refinement and ability. Her
sound sense and personal charm aided materially the political
fortunes of her husband and later caused her to be regarded as
one of the most popular ladies of the White House. Many who
rated her husband as inferior, even contemptible, joined in the
unanimous verdict that Mrs. Polk was a lady of culture and
attractive personality. This fact is attested by numerous private
letters. Judge Story was "thunderstruck" to hear of Polk's
nomination in 1844, but he admired Mrs. Polk. When her hus-
band was leaving Washington in 1839 to enter the campaign for
the governorship of Tennessee, Story expressed his admiration for
Mrs. Polk in a poem written in her honor."
One of the young men who attended Polk on his wedding day
was his law partner, Aaron V. Brown, later United States senator
and governor of Tennessee. Their friendship continued to the
end, and to no one else, except Cave Johnson, did Polk more
frequently confide his usually well concealed political plans.
Two years in the state legislature increased the young
attorney's natural taste for politics, and his success in that field
made him determine to seek a wider opportunity for satisfying
his political ambitions. In 1825 he offered himself as a candidate,
and in August of that year was chosen to represent, his district
in Congress. When elected, he was not quite tliirty years of age.
10 Nelson, Memorials of Sarah Childress Folk, Yt
11 Ibid., 54.
ANCESTEY AND EAELY LIFE 7
and on entering Congress, he was, with one or two exceptions, the
youngest member of that body.
]\rrs. Polk did not accompany her husband on his first trip
to Washington. The journey was made on liorseback, in com-
pany with several other members of Congress. At Baltimore they
took the stagecoach, leaving their horses until their return in
March. 1- On his second journey to Washington, Mrs. Polk accom-
panied him in the family carriage. The money paid to members
as mileage in those early days was small compensation for the
hardships encountered on a journey from remote western states.
Still, the pioneer statesmen endured sucli hardships without com-
plaint ; they even extracted pleasure from these tedious overland
journeys.
There was little ostentation in Washington in this early period.
The life of the average congressman's family was extremely
simple. It was customary for two or more families to rent a
single house for the season and "mess" together.^^* Among the
"messmates" of the Polks were Hugh L. White, of Tennessee,
and John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, both of whom later
became Polk's bitter political enemies.
Although in politics a disciple of Jefferson and an ardent
supporter of Jackson, Polk was wholly unlike either man in per-
sonal peculiarities. Jefferson was a born leader of men, and his
exuberant optimism and personal charm attracted hosts of dis-
ciples. He advertised his democracy by extreme informality and
slovenly garb; and he delighted in shocking the "well born" by
disregarding the rules of social etiquette. Jackson, also, was
a born leader of men. He commanded the multitude because he
insisted upon doing so," but the "plain peoi)le'" approved him
^■^ Ibid., 27-28. ^s Ibid., 30-31.
1* Judge Catrou has given such an excellent description of Jackson's
will to command that it seems desirable to rescue his letter from oblivion
in spite of its length. It was written on the day after the General's
funeral.
"One thing may be safely said of Gen' Jackson — that he has written
his name higher on the Temple of fame, than any man since Washington,
8 JAMES K. POLK
mainly for the reason that they regarded him as one of them-
selves. Polk, on the contrary, had few intimate friends. His
associates recognized his ability, but he lacked that magnetism
which alone can attract a wide personal following. He was
naturally formal and punctilious, and he seldom sacrified his
dignity in the pursuit of popular applause. While he was
of those belonging to History in this country. And what is more remark-
able in him than any other American is, that he maintained his power
from seventy to eighty, when he had nothing to give. This he did by the
force of will and courage, backing his thorough out & out honesty of
purpose. His intuitive faculties were quick and strong — his instincts
capitally good. The way a thing should be done struck him plainly — &
he adopted the plan. If it was not the best, it would still answer the pur-
pose, if well executed. Then to the execution he brought a hardy industry,
and a sleepless energy, few could equal — but this was not the best quality
he brought to the task. He cared not a rush for anything behind — he
looked ahead. His awful will, stood alone, & was made the will of all he
commanded; & command it he would and did. If he had fallen from the
clouds into a city on fire, he would have been at the head of the extin-
guishing host in an hour, & would have blown up a palace to stop the fire
with as little mis-giving as another would have torn down a board shed.
In a moment he would have willed it proper- — & in ten minutes the thing
would have been done. Those who never worked before, who had hardly
courage to cry, would have rushed to the execution, and applied the match.
Hence it is that timid men, and feeble women, have rushed to onslaught
when he gave the command — fierce, fearless, and unwavering, for the first
time. Hence it is that for fifty years he has been followed, first by all
the timid who knew him — and afterwards by the broad land, as a match-
less man — as one they were ready to follow wherever he led — who with
them never was weary — and who could sweep over all opposers abroad or
at home, terrible and clean as a prairie fire, leaving liardly a smoke of the
ruin behind. Not even death could break the charm. The funeral yester-
day was a great mass meeting — of women, children, men, black, white
colored — of every grade, mixed up by the acre outside — the House crammed
within. There was not a loud word nor a smile so far as I heard or saw.
See him they would and did — nay they would see the cof[f]in cased in
lead. It was just possible to have room for the sobliers, (a rather tedious
process) they claimed it as a right to see the thing done. The [illegible]
crowd followed him to the Tomb; a stone grave by the side of Mrs.
Jackson 's — laid there in 1828 — covered with a copper roofed canopy some
ten feet high resting on stone pillars. He was tediously put in, and the
tomb-stone left off, so all could look once more. It was a scene for a
painter to see tlie dense crowd at the particular spot — the slave women
in an agony of grief laying their heads on the shoulders and backs of the
lady friends of their old master; leaving laces wet with tears — nor did
the circumstance elicit a single remark so far as I heard. Death did not
make all equal, more completely than did this funeral" (Catron to
Buchanan, Nashville, June 11, 1845, Buclianan Papers).
AN CE ST BY AND FAULT LIFE 9
Speaker of the House, a press correspondent gave the following
sketch of his personal appearance :
I have never seen a man preside over a popular legislative body with
more dignity and effect than Mr. I»olk. In person he is rather below the
middle size, and has a firm and upright carriage which gives great self-
possession and command to his manner. His head is finely formed, with
a broad and ample forehead, and features indicative of a character at once
urbane and decided. He is scrupulous in his dress and always appears in
the chair as if he were at a dinner party.i^
15 United States Magazine, quoted by Nashville Union, July 17, 1839.
CHAPTER II
OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGRESS
On questions of governmental policy which divided the people
of his day Polk entered the political field, as he left it, a con-
sistent Jeffersonian Republican. Like his illustrious patron,
however, he found, when entrusted later Math the highest execu-
tive responsibilities, that theories, however good, must sometimes
yield to the practical solution of the problem in hand. On such
occasions, as in his expansion policy, he did as Jefferson had done ;
he assumed far-reaching power for the executive branch of the
central government, leaving himself thereby open to the same
criticisms which he and Jefferson had hurled at the Federalists.
Polk began his career in Congress as an opponent of the
existing administration, and republicanism is always most vigor-
ous when relieved of responsibility. During his first years in
Congress his republicanism could have free play. He took a
definite stand at once on the side of the states and the people,
and vigorously assailed the autocratic powers alleged to have
been assumed by President Adams, as well as the centralizing
tendencies of that administration.
At a later day Polk's political opponents ridiculed him as
being Jackson's alter ego and asserted that he had ascended the
political ladder on the coat-tails of the "old hero." However
effective such allegations may have been as campaign arguments,
the fact remains that as early as 1825 Polk's political views were
already freely promulgated in Congress, while those of Jackson
on most questions were yet unformulated, or at least unan-
nounced. As to the tariff, the only important question on which
the General seems at that time to have formed a definite idea,
OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGRESS 11
the two men differed widely. That Polk, like others, humored
the whims of General Jackson for political reasons need not be
denied, that he profited by his friendship is beyond question ; but
priority in advocating measures later championed by both men
would seem to absolve Polk from the charge that his opinions
were derived ready-made from his more conspicuous chief. It
does not appear that he gripped more firmly to the General's
coat-tails than did others of his party.
Since the Tennessee land question was the theme of Polk's
first formal speech in Congress, and since this subject was des-
tined to acquire great political significance, it seems desirable to
give a summary of its history in order to show its political
importance.^
North Carolina, the former owner of Tennessee, when ceding
this territory to the United States, had reserved the right to
dispose of certain lands included in the ceded area. Other tracts
were reserved for the Indians. These reservations necessarily
limited the amount of land left at the disposal of Tennessee.
Under the so-called compromise agreement of 1806, much of the
Indian land was procured for the state, and one-sixth of it was
to be reserved for educational purposes. In 1821, however, the
provision relating to school lands was found to be invalid. As a
result, the Tennesseans decided to ask Congress for certain gov-
ernment lands (in Tennessee) which might be disposed of for
educational purposes. As the lands in question were those which
settlers had declined to purchase at the price asked by the fed-
eral government, they were commonly called "waste" lands,
although they were far from being worthless.
Although tlie legislature considered the subject as early as
1821, no definite action was taken until 1823, when it was referred
to a select committee of which Polk was made chairman. From
1 For a more detailed account, see Professor Sioussat 's interesting
article, "Some Phases of Tennessee Politics in the Jackson Period,"
Am. Hist. Rev., Oct., 1908.
12 JAMES K. POLK
this committee the chairman reported resolutions which, in addi-
tion to asking Congress to grant the lands in question, requested
the senators and representatives from Tennessee to work for
this end.^
In 1825, Polk was transferred from the state legislature to
the federal House of Representatives. Realizing that the school
land question was of prime importance to the people of his state^
he embraced the earliest opportunity (January 23, 1826) to call
up the Tennessee memorial — which he had prepared in 1823 — and
moved that it be referred to a select committee rather than to the
Committee on Public Lands ; and despite considerable debate this
course was followed. Polk was made chairman of the new com-
mittee.* The bill which he reported soon afterward failed to
pass the House. As will appear later, however, this Tennessee
land question was revived from time to time by both Polk and
"Davy" Crockett, and it was one of the rocks on which the
Jackson party in Tennessee split into fragments.
Questions less local in character soon presented themselves.
All of Jackson 's supporters asserted, and doubtless many of them
believed, that their hero had been virtually, even if not legally,
cheated out of the Presidency in 1824 by "bargain and corrup-
tion" on the part of Adams and Clay. The well-known fact that
the House of Representatives, whenever it might be called upon
to select the chief magistrate, was intended by the Constitution to
2 Printed copy of the resolutions in Colo7iel JVm. Folk Papers.
3 "You cannot be too industrious," wTote one of his constituents a year
later, ' ' in endeavoring to effect the object contemplated in 3'our Report
of the last session on the subject of those govr n nient lands. To get this
matter through 'is a consumation devoutly to be wished' for it will in a
great measure disarm the opposition." The writer told Polk that the
press did not tell the people very much about his work in Congress, and
he advised Polk to send personal communications to many friends to coun-
teract any assertions by enemies that he is inefficient. He also urged
Polk to make a ' ' thundering speach ' ' against Haynes ' bankrupt bill.
"I do not know what your sentiments are on this subject but I think I
know what your interest is" (Jim R. White to Polk, Dec. 30, 1826, Polk
Papers).
* Megister of Debates, 19 Cong., 1 sess., 1075-1077.
OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGRESS 13
liave a free choice, irrespective of the poi)uhir vote, did not in
the least appease their wrath. They resolved at once on two lines
of policy— to alter the Constitution of the United States in order
to deprive the House of the privilege of choosing a President in
any case, and in the meantime to make it as uncomfortable as
possible for the one who had been so chosen. It is not easy to
determine the degree of their sincerity in the first part of their
program, but in the second part they were in deadly earnest.
The first move toward altering the Constitution was made
by McDuffie, of South Carolina. On December 9, 1825, he offered
resolutions which were referred to the Committee of the Whole
House. His resolutions declared that the Constitution ought to
be so amended that in electing the President and Vice-President
of the United States "a uniform system of voting by Districts
shall be established in all the States," and in no case should the
choice of these officers devolve upon the respective houses of
Congress. The resolutions provided also that the subject should
be referred to a select committee "with instructions to prepare
and report a joint resolution embracing the aforesaid objects."^
On December 29, Cook, of Illinois, offered resolutions nuieh like
those of McDuffie, but providing in addition that the voters in
the districts should vote directly for both officers. If by employ-
ing this method no election resulted, the choice should "be made
by States" from the two highest on the list.'' The last part was
not clear, for it did not specify the manner in which the states
should make the choice.
The resolutions of McDufifie and Cook caused considerable
debate, and afforded an opportunity for others to air their views
on constitutional questions. Some thought that the people were
already intrusted with more power than they could use with intel-
ligence, while others vigorously expounded the doctrine of vox
popiili vox dei. McDuffie was not, he said, ' ' one of those visionary
5 Register of Debates, 19 Cong., 1 sess., 797.
6 Ibid., 866.
14 JAMES K. POLE
advocates of the abstract rights of man, that would extend the
power of the people further than is -conducive to the happiness
of the political society. ' ' Patriotic intentions, he admitted, would
furnish no adequate security for the wise selection of a chief
magistrate, in the absence of sufficient intelligence. ''It would
be a vain and delusive mockery, to invest them with an elective
power, which they could exercise to the destruction of that which
is the end of all government — the national good."' Although
McDuffie himself believed that the people were sufficiently intel-
ligent to make a proper choice, the conservatives could not be
convinced that he was not playing with fire.
Polk spoke to the resolutions on March 13, 1826.^ He apolo-
gized for departing from his usual custom of giving a "silent
vote," and for extending a debate already prolonged. But as
the subject was national in scope and vital in character, he could
no longer remain silent. He attempted no flights of oratory, but
he displayed at once more than ordinary ability as a debater.
His remarks were clear and incisive, both in declaring his own
views and in refuting the arguments of others. Jefferson him-
self never gave more unqualified endorsement to the doctrine of
majority rule. The resolutions involved, said Polk, the question
of the people's sovereignty. ''That this is a Government hased
upon the ivill of the People; that all pmver emanates from them;
and that a majority should rule; are, as I conceive, vital prin-
ciples in this Government, never to be sacrificed or abandoned,
under any circumstances." In theory, all "sound politicians"
admit that "the majority should rule and the minority submit,"
but the majority, in his opinion, did not always prevail under
the existing system of elections.
In his zeal for the popular cause Polk attempted to refute an
assertion made by Storrs, of New York, that it was not intended
by tlie framers of the Constitution to intrust the choice of
7 Feb. 16, 1826. Abridg. of Debates, VIII, 992.
8 Abridg. of Debates, IX, 8-16.
I " OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGRESS 15
^\ urdent and Vice-President to direct popular vote. He made the
rather astonishing statement that, if Storrs were right, "I am
free to admit that I have been wholly mistaken, and totally
wrong, in my conceptions upon this subject." With a shade of
sophistry he held that it was not reasonable to suppose that the
people, having ' ' recently broken the chains of their slavery, and
shaken off a foreign yoke," should in drafting their Constitution
have voluntarily disfranchised themselves. In spite of well-
known facts to the contrary, he tried to prove his contention by
(juoting parts of the preamble,^ and rather unsuccessfully from
the Federalist, Randolph, and Monroe, to show that election by
the people had been intended by those who framed the Constitu-
tion. He was on surer ground when he asserted that it mattered
little whether Storrs were right or wrong, inasmuch as the ques-
tion before them did not concern elections under the present
provisions of the Constitution but an amendment for changing
the present metliod of selecting a President.
In Polk's opinion, there were several good reasons why the
President should never be chosen by the House of Representa-
tives. He is not an officer of the House. He is the chief magis-
trate of the whole people and should therefore be responsible to
them alone, and dependent upon them for reelection. Election
either by the House or the Electoral College always makes choice
by a minority possible, and there is danger that such elections
will become more frequent. Representatives are chosen a long
time before, and not for the purpose of selecting a President.
A Representative maj^ be ignorant of the wishes of his con-
stituents, or he may willfully ignore their preference. The long
period between the election of Representatives and their choice
of a President affords ample time to influence their votes by
bribery or by executive patronage.
Election by districts, as proposed in the resolutions, was, Polk
believed, better than a continuation of the present sj'stem under
9 "We, the People etc. do ordain and establish this Constitution."
16 JAMES K. POLK
which some electors were chosen by state legislatures, others by
districts, thereby making it possible for one-fourth of the people
to elect a President. But he concurred with Livingston, of
Louisiana,^" who preferred to dispense with electors altogether.
"Let the people vote directly for the President without their
intervention ..." then "... there can be no division between
contending candidates for elector, in favor of the same candidate,
and the majority of the people of each district can control and
give the vote of that district . . . the sentiment of each mass of
the community throughout the Union, composing a district, is
fairly elicited, and made to have its due and proportional weight
in the general collected sentiment of all the districts in the
Union."
Although he offered no resolution embodying his ideas he
suggested one^^ for the committee's consideration. His sugges-
tions were more explicit and covered the ground more completely
than the resolutions already before the House. Some of his
arguments on this subject were partisan and sophistical ; but
in no case did he indulge in such absurdities as did one of his
opponents, Edward Everett, who tried to convince his fellow-
members that any attempt to amend the Constitution was itself
unconstitutional. Each member, said the sage from Massachu-
setts, had taken an oath to support the Constitution as it is,
and could not propose to alter it without violating that oath.^-
Neither George III nor John Tyler could plead a more tender
conscience nor display a greater respect for oaths of office than
Everett did on this occasion. No wonder Polk asked if "the
gentleman [were] serious in this puerile conception?"
10 McDuffie favored this also.
11 Each state was to be divided into as many districts as it had members
in both houses of Congress. The people in each district were to vote
directly for President and Vice-President, 'without the intervention of
electors, and a plurality in each district was to count as one vote. If no
election should result, the matter was to be referred back to the people,
who Avere then to select from the tAvo highest on the list (Abridg. of Debates,
IX, 16).
i^lbid., 18.
OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGRESS 17
In attempting to show that members of the House were not
the proi)er persons to ek'ct a President, Polk supported the ex-
treme demoeratie view whieh would divest a member of Congress,
even as a legislator, of his representative character and make
him a mere delegate. "It has been openly avowed upon this
floor," said he, "that there is no connection between the Repre-
sentative here, and his constituent at home ; that the Representa-
tive here is not bound to regard or obey the instructions of those
who send him here. For myself, I have never entertained such
opinions, but believe, upon all questions of expediency, that the
Representative is bound to regard and obey the known will of
his constituent." Any other view would intrust the rights of
the people to "the accidental interest, or capricious will of their
public servants." He no doubt had Jefferson's inaugural in
mind when he added : ' ' Shall we assume to ourselves the high
prerogative of being uncontaminated and incorruptible, when
the same attributes are denied to all the rest of mankind? Is
immaculate purity to be found within these walls and no other
corner of the earth?" Whether representatives endowed with
"immaculate purity" or "angels in the form of kings "'^ can
be intrusted with the government of their fellows may be open
to question, but both Jefferson and Polk must have known that
the framers of the Constitution had consciously placed more
reliance on the discretion of the public officials than on the efficacy
of a count of heads.
A remark made by Everett gave Polk an opportunity to pay
tribute to General Jackson as the champion of the people. If the
government were ever destroyed, said Everett, "it would not be
by a President elected by a minority of the people, but by a
President elected by an overwhelming majority of the people ; by
some 'military chieftain' that should arise in the land." "Yes,
sir," answered Polk, "by some 'military chieftain,' whose only
crime it was to have served his country faithfully at a period
i:^See Jeflferson 's inaugural address.
18 JAMES E. POLK
when that country needed and realized the value of his services."
If the government were ever destroyed, it would be, in his opinion,
by "the encroachments and abuse of power and by the alluring
and corrupting influence of Executive patronage." This was
intended, of course, as a thrust at President Adams ; but in lend-
ing his support to the elevation of the ' ' old hero, ' ' Polk was help-
ing to hasten the demoralizing influence of patronage which he
so much feared.
Some of the northern members objected to the proposed
amendment on the ground that under it slaves would be repre-
sented. During his whole political career, slavery was a subject
which Polk avoided whenever possible. It is interesting to note,
however, that his opinions now expressed for the first time in
Congress were never substantially modified. He regretted ex-
ceedingly "that scarcely any subject of general concern can be
agitated here, without having this important subject of slavery,
either collaterally, or incidentally, brought into view, and made
to mingle in our deliberations." His views now expressed were
reiterated in substance when he had to deal with the Wilmot
Proviso. Both now and later he was unable to see why this
irrelevant topic should be dragged into discussions of public
policy.
In answering his opponents Polk declared his firm belief in
state rights. Storrs and others had alleged that the proposed
amendment would tend to consolidate the people of the Union.
Polk denied this and said that he would oppose the amendment
if he had any idea that it would produce any such result. "No
man," said he, "deprecates more than I do, any violation of
rights secured to the States by the Federal Constitution," and
no one more fears "the yawning gulf of consolidation.'"^'
Polk always referred to himself as a Republican, but it is
plain that he was not a believer in true representative govern-
14 "When 1 speak of State rights, T mean, as I understand the consti-
tution to mean, not the rights of the Executives of the States, hut 1 mean
the rights of the people of the States. ' '
OPPOSITION MEMBEE OF CONGEESS 19
mont, and was in fact a democrat.''' His remarks show clearly
the influence of Jefiferson's teaching. He was an admirer of Gen-
eral Jackson, and used his influence botli publicly and privately'"
to promote the General's interests, but there is no evidence that
he relied on Jackson for political opinions. On the contrary,
Jackson read with approval Polk's speech on the constitutional
amendment and assured him that it was well received by his
constituents and would give him a strong claim to their future
confidence. "I agree with you," wrote the General,'^ "that the
District System is the true meaning of the Constitution, but as
this cannot be obtained any uniform System ought to be adopted
instead of leaving the election of President to Congress."
As a critic of the Adams administration Polk did not rise
above the political claptrap of the day. All that can be said in
his favor in this respect is that he spoke less frequently than
did some of his colleagues. Even his private letters are tinctured
with a bias and a bitterness that do him no credit. A letter
written to Colonel William Polk concerning the subserviency of
the Speaker and of congressional committees is of special interest,
for in it Polk makes the same charges which w^ere later made
against himself when he became the leader of the administration
forces. "The 'factious opposition' as they are termed," said
the letter/^
Avho really consist of the friends of the Constitution, & who do not support
upon the fashionable doctrine of faith every measure emanatinjr from the
administration, merely because it is an administration measure, are to tlie
extent of the poAver of the administration, and its friends literally
proscribed. ' '
Senate committees have been "arranged for effect," although
there is but a small administrative majority in that body.
15 There was, of course, no Democrat party at this time.
ic For example, in a letter to Colonel William Polk, Dec. 14, 1826, he
urged the latter to induce the legislature of North Carolina to give some
public expression in favor of Jackson on January 8 {Colonel tf'm. Polk
Papers).
17 Jackson to Polk, May 3, 1826, Polk Papers.
18 Polk to Col. Wm. Poik, Dec. 14, 1826, Colonel Wm. Polk Papers.
20 JAMES K. POLE
"Studied majorities in favor of the administration have been placed on
each, regardless, it would seem in some instances, of qualifications, talents,
or experience. The selections were no doubt made, in conformity to a
previous secret understanding, among the favorites at Court. ' '
In the House, also, ' ' some remarkable changes have been made in
committees by the Speaker. They too have all been arranged for
effect." The power of patronage, he continued, is corruptly used
to "sustain an administration, who never came into power by
the voice of the people. ' ' How could a man who felt thus, within
three short years, give his unqualified support to the administra-
tion of General Jackson? The answer is simple. Polk was,
despite his ability and generally sound judgment, above all a
party man.
At the close of his first term in Congress, Polk, in his appeal
to his constituents for reelection, laid special stress on .his oppo-
sition to the Panama mission. Soon after taking his seat, he
said it became his duty to act upon a proposition emanating from
the executive, "as novel in its character as it was believed to be
in consequences. ' '^^ - Not believing in entangling alliances, ' ' I
was opposed to the Mission in every possible shape in which it
could be presented, believing, as I did, that the United States had
nothing to gain, but much to lose, by becoming members of such
an extraordinary Assembly. ' ' The administration, lacking popu-
larity, was trying to extend the powers of the federal government
"to an inordinate and alarming extent . . . and substitute
patronage for public will." He was reelected without difficulty
and was, at the beginning of the next session of Congress, made
a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. -°
Throughout the Adams administration Polk corresponded with
General Jackson. He not only supplied the hero of the Her-
mitage with information on passing events, but offered welcome
suggestions and advice. "I feel greatly obliged to you," wrote
I'J Polk's circular letter to his constituents, dated March 4, 1827,
Printed copy in Colonel Wm. Polk Papers.
^0 Jour, of n. E., 20 Cong., 1 sess., 25.
OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGEE SS 21
Jackson on one occasion,-^ "for the information contained in
your letter [on internal improvements] . . . and I trnly appre-
ciate those feelings of friendship which dictated the communi-
cation. ' '
When, in the spring of 1828, the subject of Jackson's execu-
tion of the six militia men was under investigation in Congress,
Polk and Judge White procured and published a statement from
General Gaines and a co])y of Governor Blount's orders to Jack-
son." It was Polk who first notified Jackson of his vindication
by a committee, and it was to Polk that the General forwarded
additional documents to be used in case it should become neces-
sary.-^ Jackson approved Polk's advice that the attack of the
opposition relating to this subject should be met by an active cam-
paign of refutation, but that there should be no defense on the
Burr episode until there had been some definite charge.-* To
another letter from Polk ofifering advice on political matters,
Jackson answered : "I have read your letter with great interest
& attention — the reasons therein contained leaves no reason to
doubt of the correctness of your conclusions, it is such as I had
long since concluded to pursue. ' '-^ It is evident that the General
already recognized the soundness of Polk's judgment and his
shrewedness as a practical politician.
During the session of 1828-29 the Tennessee land bill again
became the subject of animated discussion in the House. When
he first introduced it, in 1825, Polk had the unanimous support
of the people of Tennessee, and of the entire delegation in Con-
gress from that state. But it now met with opposition from an
21 Jackson to Polk, Dec. 4, 1826, Polk Papers.
22 Polk to Jackson, April 13 and 15, 1828, Jackson Papers.
23 Jackson to Polk, March 23, 1828, Polk Papers.
2-1 The six militia men are made a hobby by the opposition, said Jack-
son, by which they "can impose upon the credulity of the ignorant. . . .
The plan there that you have suggested is the only one that can fairly
meet, and effectively put down their hobby." "I think your reflections
on the Burr business is correct, no defence, without a charge ' ' (Jackson
to Polk, May 3, 1828, ibid.).
25 Jackson to Polk, Sept. 16, 1828, ibid.
22 JAMES E. POLK
unexpected quarter — an opposition wliieh resulted in a bitter
political feud. The eccentric David Crockett, for reasons best
known to himself, had come to the conclusion that the "waste"
lands, instead of being sold at a higher price for the support of
schools, should be given or sold at a nominal price to poor settlers.
He therefore offered an amendment to effect this purpose, and
thus assumed the role of champion of the poor, as opposed to
the rich who, as he said, could alone afford to take advantage of
schools. Whatever his motives may have been, his opposition
to a bill which he had ardently supported at the last sgssion was
at once attributed to the influence of Jackson 's political enemies.
The Tennessee delegation, wrote Polk,-" were mortified to think
that Crockett ' ' should have cooperated with some of our bitterest
and most vindictive political enemies, men, some of them of
'coffin hand bill' and 'six militia men' memory, and joined them
in denouncing the Legislature of his state on the floor of Con-
gress." Gales and other "Adamsites, " Polk continued, are urg-
ing him on and reporting speeches that he never made, while he,
it is said, will vote for Gales and Seaton for public printers and
against Duff Green. They are making a tool of Crockett in order
to deal a blow at Tennessee. Other members of the Tennessee
delegation, said Polk, will furnish evidence against Crockett, but
prefer not to do so, because the people might regard such action
as persecution.
Crockett differed from his colleagues not merely on the land
question ; he opposed, also the attempt made by the Jackson party
to introduce viva voce voting in the House so that they might
brand the unfaithful. Several members, including Polk, Judge
White, R. Desha, and J. C. Mitchell prepared statements con-
cerning the boasts and the conduct of Crockett, and addressed
them to Pryor Lea, one of their colleagues. The statements were
based largely on assertions made by Crockett at White's lodgings
in the presence of the men who had i)i'('|)ared tlicm. ('rockctt
20 Polk to McMillan, Jan. 16, 1829, ibid.
OPPOSITION MEMBER OF CONGEESS 23
tlu'iv produced his aineiulinent ami boasted that it would be
adopted. When asked if he were willing to imperil the entire
land bill by insisting upon his amendment, he replied in the
atHrmative. His constituents, he said, wished the land bill to
be killed, for so long as the land continued to be property of
the I'nited States the people might use it free of charge. He
went so far as to avow that, regardless of his instructions from
the legislature, he would support the measures of any man who
would vote for his amendment. All agreed that he had been
fraternizing with Adams men in an effort to procure their votes.
To Mitchell, Crockett openly admitted that Gales had printed —
under Crockett's name — a speech which had never been delivered,
so that the latter might distribute it among his constituents.
As a result, it was thought, of Crockett's opposition, the
House laid the entire land bill on the table. Not satisfied with
his victory, however, the incorrigible "Davy," after returning
to his district in western Tennessee, continued his attacks upon
his colleagues. In public addresses he told the people that the
land bill, had it passed, would have sacrificed the interests of the
poor settlers. He was especially enraged by what he termed
Polk's "officious interference" in the affairs of West Tennessee.-^
Apparently, Polk retaliated by publishing articles hostile to
Crockett in a local paper of the latter 's congressional district.-^
Although Crockett did not succeed in his efforts to obtain
cheap land for his constituents, he nevertheless had the pleasure
of blocking the attempt made by his colleagues to procure school
2TAdam E. Alexander to Polk, April 25; Polk to Alexander, May 1,
1829; ibid.
28 In volume 80 of the Polk Papers is a series of five undated articles
in Polk's handwriting headed "Col. Crockett & his course in Congress."
Thev are signed ' ' Several voters, ' ' and as Crockett is spoken of as " our
immediate representative," it is evident that they were to be understood
as coming from his constituents. They were pro])ably written for ].ubli-
cation in some West Tennessee newspaper. They point out that Crockett
had been elected as a friend of General Jackson, but that he has been
supporting the old Adams-Clay party, "under the orders of Daniel Web-
ster" and other Hartford Convention Federalists. He has been absent
from duty in the House and has done "literally nothing" for the poor
settlers of his district.
2i^^ JAMES K. POLE
V lands for their state.-" Until his defeat bv Adam Huntsman in
•^.'^ • 1835 he remained in Congress and continued to oppose all meas-
ures championed by the followers of Jackson. The importance of
his defection lies in the fact that it was the first breach in the
solidarity of the Jackson party in Tennessee. One of the chief
critics of Crockett's apostasy in 1829 was Judge White, a man
destined ere long to become the center of a political storm that
would overthrow Jackson's supremacy in his state and seriously
weaken it in the nation. For the time being Crockett stood prac-
' tically alone. Tennesseans generally were proud to uphold the
standard of their w-arrior hero.
As General Jackson entered the White House the specter of
executive usurpation vanished through the window and Polk,
like other critics of President Adams, now became a loyal sup-
porter of executive policies. In a letter to his constituents, dated
February 28, 1829,^° Polk congratulated them on the recent
political victory, and dwelt at length on the significance of that
victory. The contest had been "between the virtue and rights
of the people, on the one hand and the power and patronage of
their rules [rulers] on the other." The people, said he, have
spoken with a voice of warning to future aspirants who may seek
to elevate themselves by bargain and intrigue. The country is
still destined to be divided into political parties, and already
there is evidence that the partisans of Adams and Clay are pre-
paring under the leadership of the latter to oppose the incoming
administration. But Jackson has nothing to fear from his
enemies. " He is expected to produce reform, correct abuses, and
administer the Constitution in its purity, and upon Republican
principles contemplated by its wise f ramers. ' ' He has been chosen
by the people, and his administration will be both prosperous and
popular.
29 By the acts of 1841 and 1846 Congress finally granted these lands to
Tennessee (Sioussat, "Some Phases of Tennessee Politics in the Jackson
Period," Am. Hist. Eev., 1908, 58).
30 Pamphlet in Tenu. State Library.
OPPOSITION MEMBEE OF CONGEESS 25
Having pronoiuiewl .tliis encomium on the new regime, Polk
reminded his constituents that he had contributed his "feeble
aid" to the Jacksonian cause because he believed the General's
principles to be orthodox and his purpose to be to serve the whole
Union. According to others, however, the aid which he had
contributed M^as not so feeble as his modesty had h'd liim to
assume. The Adams men in Tennessee gave him "grate credit"
for compassing their mortifying defeat, and resolved, on that
account, to defeat him if possible at the next election.^^
Despite efforts of his enemies Polk was re-elected by a large
majority. On his return to Washington he soon became leader
of the administration forces in the House and, as will appear
in the following chapter, aicted as Jackson's aide-de-camp in
the war on the Bank of the United States. With his customary
discretion he declined to join with those who felt impelled to
give unsolicited advice to the President regarding his social and
his executive duties. Toward the end of Jackson 's first year in
office, and after political Washington had been arrayed in hostile
camps by the crusade against Mrs. Eaton,^- certain members of
Congress met, by invitation of C. A. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, for
the purpose of discussing the situation. Some of those who
attended proposed that the President should be urged to remove
Eaton from the cabinet, and that he should be advised to hold
regular cabinet meetings. When consulted, Polk, White, Grundy,
and other members from Tennessee declined to participate. They
even refused to enter into a correspondence with Wickliffe con-
cerning the subjects which had been discussed at the meeting.''^
By thus declining to assume the role of guardian over the Presi-
dent, Polk and his associates retained his confidence and good
will. While each did his part in supporting Jackson 's legislative
program, Polk, more than any other, aided in his war against
the Bank of the United States.
31 Yell to Polk, Sept. 9, 1829, Polk Papers.
32 See Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, III, chap. xvii.
33 Letters from Wickliffe to White, Grundy, Polk et ah, Dec. 24, 1831.
Also other letters on this subject in the Polk Papers.
CHAPTEE III
POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
In the bank controversy of Jackson's administration, which
Sumner has called "one of the greatest struggles between dem-
ocracy and the money power, ' '^ Polk bore a i)rominent and diffi-
cult part. It was a part which required a thorough knowledge
of the subject, alertness of mind, industry, and sound judgment.
It required, also, an intimate knowledge of the plans and pur-
poses of the President, and a certainty on Jackson's part that
his confidence would not be misplaced. As this is a biography
of Polk, not of Jackson, no attempt will be made to treat the
bank war in all of its phases. Yet it seems necessary to consider
certain aspects of this controversy in order to make clearer the
part played by Polk as a member of the Committee of Ways and
Means.^
It is generally held by historians that Jackson, when he
became President in 1829, harbored no special hostility to the
Bank of the United States, but that he was later won over by his
friends, who had grievances of their own against the bank. But
if Jackson's memory may be relied upon, this belief is contrary
to the facts in the case. In 1833, in reply to a letter of inquiry
from Polk, Jackson stated that the original draft of his inaugural
address, written at the Hermitage, contained a paragraph giving
his views on the bank, and another, his views on surplus revenue.
After he had reached Washington, he said, he was persuaded by
friends to omit both of these paragraphs, as it was thought that
the subjects were better suited to an annual message to Congress.
1 Sumner, Andrew Jackson, 227.
- The summary of the beginnings of the bank war, unless otherwise
noted, is drawn largely from Sumner.
POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 27
"Every one knows," lie added, "tliat I have been always opposed
to tlie U. States Bank, nay all Banks. "^
In his first annual message Jackson questioned both the con-
stitutionality and the expediency of the existing bank, and
vaguely suggested the desirability of a bank "founded on the
credit of the government and. its revenues." This i)art of the
message was referred by each house to a regular committee. In
the Senate, Smith, of Maryland, reported from the Connnittee
on Finance in favor of the bank. In the House, April 13, 1830,
^McDuflfie, of South Carolina, reported from the Committee of
Ways and Means, also in favor of the bank. McDuffie declared
that the constitutionality of the bank had already been settled
by decisions of the Supreme Court, that its expediency was
beyond question, and that a bank modeled on the President's
suggestions would be both inexpedient and dangerous. On May
10, the House, by a vote of eighty-nine to sixty-six, tabled reso-
lutions which declared that the House would not consent to
renew the charter of the bank, and on May 29 it likewise tabled
resolutions calling for a report of the proceedings of the bank.
It was evident that Congress would not support the President
in his opposition to the bank. The defection of McDuffie, who
had taken a leading part in the attack of the Jackson forces on
the Adams administration, made it necessary for the President,
when the time came for forcing the bank question to an issue, to
look elsewhere for a leader on whom he could rely.
In his message for 1830, Jackson again proposed a bank as
a "branch of the Treasury Department." This seemed to indi-
cate a desire for something like the sub-treasury which was later
recommended by President Van Buren. But Jackson's sugges-
tions were vague and Congress gave them little serious consid-
eration. An attempt of the Secretary of War, in July, 1831, to
remove the pension funds from the New York branch of the bank.
3 Polk to Jackson, Dee. 23, 18.3.3. Jackson's reply is undated and
written on the back of Polk's letter {Folic Papers).
28 JAMES K. POLK
met witli opposition and failure. By the end of 1831 the Presi-
dent's message was more pacific in tone, and the report of his
Secretary, McLane, even spoke in favor of the bank.
The tone of the message only encouraged his political oppon-
ents, who were already making plans for the next Presidential
election. The bank took the initiative by addressing a memorial
to Congress, asking that the bank be rechartered. On January 9,
1832, this memorial was presented in the Senate by Dallas and
in the House by McDuffie, both "bank Democrats."* The com-
mittees of the two houses to which the subject was referred both
reported in favor of a new charter, but with certain modifications.
The Jackson supporters now determined to fight a recharter with
every possible weapon and demanded a searching investigation of
the bank's conduct. On February 23, Clayton, of Georgia, pre-
sented a motion in the House asking for the appointment of a
select committee to conduct the investigation. Technical objec-
tions were raised by friends of the bank, but Polk met their
objections point by point and defeated them with their own
weapons.^ In a speech delivered on this occasion, Polk con-
demned the bank for having the audacity to ask for a charter
and then trying to prevent an investigation. The inference to
be drawn from such shrinking from scrutiny, said he, was that
there was something "rotten in the state of Denmark." In justi-
fication of his motion for a select committee, Clayton presented
two lists of charges, which had been prepared for the purpose
by Benton.® The first specified seven instances of charter viola-
tion, involving forfeiture ; the second gave fifteen instances of
abuse, which required correction, though not involving forfeiture.
The investigating committee which the Speaker selected sub-
mitted three reports (that of the majority unfavorable to the
bank), but our present purpose does not warrant a discussion of
either the reports or the charges.
4 Register of Debates, 22 Cong., 1 sess., 54.
fi Benton, Thirty Years View, I, 236.
c Ibid., 237. Tlie charges are jiiveii on the next page.
POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 29
In the Presidential campaign of 1832, Clay, seeing the avail-
ability of the bank (juestion, made it a leading issue. In so doing
he acted contrary to the better judgment of many friends of the
bank, including its president, Nicholas Biddle. A bill passed
Congress, providing for a recharter of the bank, and Jackson
must now either admit defeat or kill the bill by his veto. He
accepted the challenge, vetoed the bill, and appealed to the people
to sustain him. He was reelected by a large majority. Jackson's
triumi)li at the polls was not in reality an endorsement of his
veto, but he so regarded it and resolved to exterminate the
' ' monster. ' '
When the bank question first became prominent, the opinions
of the administration party were not yet clearly defined. This
party ' ' was still only that group of factions which had united in
opposition to Adams."" A large number of Jackson's most
enthusiastic supporters were friends of the bank. Some of the
political leaders, including Van Buren, had even signed petitions
for the establishment of branch' banks. Many politicians, as Niles
said, had to "turn a short corner," when Jackson came out
against the bank. More independent spirits, like McDuffie,
refused to see the light and braved the executive wrath. Opposi-
tion in Congress made Jackson only the more determined to wage
a relentless war upon the "corrupt institution," but his success
would depend, to a considerable degree, on the orthodoxy and
ability of the leaders of the administration forces in that body.
Obviously the administration program could not be intrusted to
the recently converted, whose past record would surely be held
up to embarrass them. The fight must be led by those whose
record was unassailable. Such was James K. Polk, of Tennessee,
the friend and neighbor of the President. He gave to the admin-
istration his unqualified support, and, to quote his eulogist,* ' ' in
"! Sumner, Andrew Jackson, 248.
8 Eulogy delivered at the time of Polk's death, by L. M. Smith, New-
man, Ga. {Papers of Mrs. Polk, I).
30 JAMES K. POLK
the hour of darkness and danger, was unquestionably its chief
reliance. ' '
When Congress convened in December, 1832, Polk was trans-
ferred from the Committee on Foreign Affairs to the Committee
of Ways and Means. A confidential letter written by Jackson
to Polk on December 16 discloses the temper of the President
as well as the intimate relations of the two men:
The president with his respects to Col. J. K. Polk, of Congress, encloses
him a note from Mr. Page of Philadelphia, a man of high character &
in whom confidence may be placed. This is done to add to the information
heretofore given the Col. to show him that the hydra of corruption is only
scotched, not dead, and that the intent is thro' Wolf's recommendation,
to destroy the vote of the people lately given at the ballot boxes & to
rally around the recharter the present Session of Congress two thirds. . . .
Call upon the Sec. of the Treasury who must agree with me that an investi-
gation by Congress is absolutely necessary.
A postscript instructed Polk to have Sullivan, a government
director, brought before the committee, and ended with a per-
emptory order "Attend to this."" Polk did "attend" to it, and
the Secretary of the Treasury seems to have been persuaded that
an investigation was necessary.
Though Jackson in his annual message, December 4, 1832,
informed Congress that the report of the Secretary of the
Treasury "will exhibit the national finances in a highly pros-
perous state," nevertheless he advised the sale of all corporation
(bank) stocks held by the government. He also urged that the
safety of public deposits in the Bank of the United States was
worthy of "serious investigation" by Congress. In response to
these suggestions, the Committee of Ways and Means, of Avhich
Polk was a member, undertook an investigation of the charges
which had been brought against the bank. The directors were
summoned to Washington and examined upon oath,^° and other
testimony was taken to supplement the information which had
0 Polk Papers.
10 Dcm. liev.. May, 1838.
POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 31
been gatlierod by tlic President. Reuben M. Whitney, tlie i)olit-
ical scavenger of tlie administration, wrote to Polk from P>a]ti-
niore, Fel)ruary 9, 1833, urging liini to liaslcii llic investigation,
and warning him tliat Adams and Sergeant had been consulting
with members of the committee. On February 11 Whitney
wrote from Philadelphia advising Polk that the bank relied much
on the ability of Verplanck'^ to outgeneral his opponents on
the committee. While the investigation was in progress, Polk, on
February 13, reported a bill to sell the bank stock owned by the
government, but it failed in the House by a vote of one hundred
and two to ninety-one. On March 1, Verplanck, for the majority
of the Committee of Ways and Means, reported the bank to be
sound and the public deposits safe, although it was admitted that
in interfering with the plan of the government to pay off the
three per cent securities the bank had exceeded its lawful powers.
This report was adopted by the House. The Globe charged the
majority with forcing the adoption of its report without having
considered or presented the evidence which had been collected
by its minority members. Many members, it said, who were not
in favor of the bank had voted for adoption because, on the show-
ing of the majority report, they could not conscientiously say
that the bank was not safe^~ Anticipating the character of the
majority report, Polk prepared and submitted a minority report
for himself and two other members of the connnittee. After
criticizing the majority of the House for wishing to force the
adoption without adequate consideration of evidence, and inti-
mating with some justice that the committee had passed lightly
over certain damaging testimony, Polk went with considerable
detail into the question of the "three per cents." These were
securities bearing three per cent interest issued by the government
11 Chairman of Ways and Means Committee and a friend of the bank.
Whitney urged Polk to see that Gilmore, another member of the committee,
should not be tampered with. A^erplanck, he said, was not to be trusted
and should not be permitted to have access to the testimony already
taken, unless accompanied by "one of our friends" (Polk Papers).
12 Washington Globe. March 6, 1833.
32 JAMES K. POLE
in 1792 for accrued interest on the Eevolntionary debt. The
government had decided to pay off about $6,500,000 of these, and
on March 24, 1832, the Secretary of the Treasury notified the
bank of his intention to pay this amount on the first of July.
Biddle requested the government to postpone payment until
October 1 and agreed to reimburse the treasury for the extra
three months' interest. To this the government agreed. When
asking for postponement, Biddle based his request largely on two
special reasons, neither of which implied that the bank wished any
accommodation for itself. The assigned reasons were : ( 1 ) that
$9,000,000 of duty bonds would be payable on July 1, and mer-
chants would be inconvenienced should the three per cent debt
also fall due on that date; (2) should the much feared cholera
appear, business would be deranged, and if, in addition, the bank
should have to call in its money loaned to merchants, in order
to pay off the three per cents, great distress would result.
The government having agreed to delay payment, the bank
made secret but unsuccessful attempts- to arrange wuth Thomas
W. Ludlow, New York agent of foreign holders, to postpone pay-
ment of part of this debt. It then sent General Cadwallader, a
director of the bank, to Europe. He made an agreement with
Baring Brothers & Co., of London, by which the Barings were
to arrange with certificate holders to postpone payment for one
year. The Barings were to pay all holders who were unwilling
to wait and themselves to assume the debt to that amount. As
a result of Cadwallader 's agreement adjustments were made to
the extent of nearly five million dollars. Every effort was made
to keep the transaction a secret, but it leaked out, and an account
of it was published in a New York paper. Biddle then dis-
avowed the arrangement.
In his minority report Polk showed conclusively that the real
reasons for the bank's desire for postponement could not have
been those assigned by its president. He gave a very clear
analysis of the evidence which had been collected by the committee
POLE AXD THE BANK OF TEH VNITED STATES
33
urI i.uuk- it plniu tluit (!..• bank had no intention o£ applying any
„£ its money to the purpose for which it had said it desired these
funds. He reached the inevitable conclusion that the bank had
desired postponement because of its own weakness.
In his entire report, but especially in his arraignment of
Biddle Polk displayed those <iualities which ever distinguished
him in' debate, and which fully justified the confidence reposed
in him bv General Jaekson. His preparation was exhaustive and
his arguments clear cut and logical. His language was well
chosen and dignified, but at the same time scathing and merci-
less "When the President of the Bank," said Polk, ' not only
induces the board to act for reasons unknown to themselves, but
conceals even from the committees acts done in their names some-
thing stronger than doubt almost seizes on the mmd. When, to
the consideration that the committees know little of tlie proceed-
ings had in their names, is added the fact that every Government
director is excluded from even that little, by being excluded from
every committee, the Government at least has grounds to doubt
whether its interests ar6 safe in such keeping. When a show of
the strength of the Bank is made, consisting of sums in specie
and amounts in exchange, while the debts are secretly contracted
which have enabled the Bank to accumulate these funds, ar
concealed even from those who make the exhibition, there is just
ground to doubt whether there be soundness m the msti nt on,
or proper precaution and responsibility in its management.
When, in the spring of 1832, Benton prepared his catalogue
of charges against the bank for Clayton to present in the House
he strained his imagination in order to make his list as long and
as formidable as possible. Such a course may have been eft etne
for campaign purposes, but many of Benton's charges were easily
Iwn to be exaggerated or unfounded. For this reason his a -
raignment lost force and failed to convince the doubtful Po k,
on «ic contrary, confined his denunciation to points on which the
.sjeporls of CommUtm 23 Cong., 2 sess., No. 121.
34 JAMES K. POLK
bank could offer no legitimate defense of its eondnet. His argu-
ments were then, and are today, unassailable.^* Polk well knew
that neither his report nor his arguments on the floor would have
much weight in the House, as a majority of the members w^ere
resolved to stand by the bank in spite of its faults. He was
speaking to a wider audience and may have been already seeking
popular support for the imj^ending executive assault on the bank.
However this may have been, he significantly pointed out that
the institution might be reached by the executive without any
assistance from Congress. "Whether the existing facts," said
Polk in his report,
are sufficient to justify the Executive in taking any steps against the
Bank, authorized by its charter, is a matter for the decision of the proper
officers, acting upon their own views and responsibility: any opinions by
Congress can make it neither more nor less their duty to act. Whatever,
therefore, the opinions of the members of this committee might be as to
the justice or policy of any Executive action, they deem it unauthorized
and improper to express them officially.
In other words, it was for the executive alone to determine
whether the bank had violated its charter or had been guilty of
mismanagement, and, if so, to apply the remedy.
Whether, at the time Polk made his report, Jackson had re-
solved upon a removal of the deposits from the bank as a proper
remedy, we are unable to say.^^ If he had, Polk, who was cer-
tainly in his confidence, was doubtless aware of the fact. Polk's
remarks on executive responsibility and his indifference to the
opinions of Congress seem to indicate that such was the case.
He may even have suggested removal of the deposits to the Presi-
dent, but of tliis there seems to be no direct evidence. It is
14 "Its facts and reasonings," said the Glohe (March 6, 1833), "are
perfectly irresistible. Jt exposes the subterfuges and self -contradicted
testimony under which that corrupt and corrupting institution has shel-
tered itself, in a manner so clear and convincing, that it must satisfy
every honest man who reads it, of the utter profligacy of its management.' '
13 To quote Sumner on this point: "Lewis says that he does not know
who first proposed the removal of the deposits, but that it began to be
talked of in the inner administration circlej3 soon after Jackson's second
election" (Sumner, Jackson, 297).
POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 3a
Avorth}' of note, however, tliat the well-kiiown paper of September
18, 1833, in whieh Jackson announced to his cabinet his intention
to remove the deposits, makes use of many of the same facts and
employs much the same reasoning that Polk had already used
in his minority report.
The minority report arrayed against its author all the power
and the venom of the bank party, and measures were taken to
prevent his reelection to Congress. Friends of the bank held a
meeting at Nashville and denounced his report. He was accused
of destroying credit in the West by proclaiming that the people
were unworthy of mercantile confidence. Handbills signed
"Muhlenging" were circulated, alleging that Polk as a member
of Congress had been opposed to pensioning Revolutionary sol-
diers.^*' Polk met the issue squarely as a foe of the bank, and
during the campaign stress was laid on the bank affiliations of
Bradford, his opponent. Under the circumstances, Polk's suc-
cess or defeat was regarded as of more than local importance.
"Your friends here," wrote Douelson from Washington, "take
a deep interest in your election and are all well apprised of the
instruments which are employed to defeat you. "^^ Donelson
showed his own interest by inclosing in his letter evidence to be
used against Bradford. In 1827 Bradford had applied to Adams
for an appointment as marshall. His friends had sent letters of
recommendation representing him to be a friend of Adams and
an opponent of Jackson. From the files in the State Department,
without the knowledge of the Secretary, Donelson had copied
extracts, and now sent them to Polk, to be used at his discretion
so long as Donelson 's name was not mentioned. A speech made
by Bradford in the Tennessee Senate in 1831, in favor of rechar-
tering the bank, was also reprinted and circulated among his con-
stituents. It was a spirited contest, but Polk was reelected by a
majority of over three thousand votes.
16 Dem. Bev., May, 1838. Polk's "Circular Letter" to his constituents.
17 A. J. Donelson to Polk, May 30, 1833, Polk Papers. The letter was
marked "Private and for your eye alone." There is nothing to indicate
whether Jackson was cognizant of Donelson 's act.
36 JAMES K. FOLK
As soon as he was safely elected, Polk, with the assistance of
Cave Johnson, began a quiet campaign for the Speakership.^^
He received encouragement from his political friends, but the
expected vacancy^ ^ did not occur and he continued his labors
as a floor member.
The adoption by Congress of Verplanck's report did not in
the least alter Jackson's opinion of the character of the bank.
On August 31, 1833, he-° sent Polk a confidential letter in which
he inclosed a report of the bank directors. Polk was authorized
to use the facts contained in the report, but not to divulge that
they had come from the President. Jackson regarded these facts
as proof positive that Biddle had been using the people's money
for purposes of corruption.
By September Jackson was ready to carry into effect his plan
to deprive the bank of the use of government money. Duane
had in May succeeded McLane in the Treasury Department and
was expected to do the bidding of the President. On September
18, Jackson read to his cabinet the well-known paper in which
he asserted that the deposits ought to be removed. Among the
reasons assigned for the proposed action were the political activ-
ities of the bank, its attempt to postpone payment of the three
per cents, and the fact that it had come into existence by an un-
constitutional law. He would not, he said, dictate to the Secre-
tary, but the President himself, assuming all responsibility, had
i« This subject will be considered at length in another place.
19 Stevenson was expected to accept a foreign mission and not be a
candidate for reelection. He resigned later for this purpose.
20 The signature is cut off, but the letter is in Jackson 's unmistakable
hand. He says: "You will find from the inclosed that I have at last
thro the Government Directors got a Small peep into their expense account,
and the corruption on the morals of the people.
"in two years $80 odd thousand expended to corrupt the people & buy
a recharter of that mamoth of corrujjtion. \ think when these scenes of
corruption are made known to the people and that by an order of the
board of directors, the whole funds of the Bank are ])laced at the disposal
of Mr. Biddle to approjiriate as he pleases [cut out with signature] most
bold specious of corruption ever i)racticed by any body of people in the
most corrupt governments" {PolJc Papers).
FOLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 37
decided that, after October 1, government money should no longer
be deposited in the bank, and that all money there on that date
should be drawn out as needed. Duane declined to give the neces-
sary order to effect Jackson's purpose and later refused to resign.
He was dismissed and Attorney General Taney commissioned to
take liis place, September 23, 1833."^ Taney gave the order, and
the "hydra of corruption" was at last more than "scotched."
Jackson's high-handed act produced much excitement through-
out the country. The bank issued a paper-- in reply to the Presi-
dent's charges, and a bitter conflict was inevitable as soon as
Congress should assemble. ' ' At such a crisis it became important
to have at the head of the Committee of Ways and Means a man
of courage to meet, and firmness to sustain, the formidable shock.
Such a man was found in Mr. Polk, and he proved himself e(iual
to the occasion."-^
Congress met on December 2, 1833, and, as a result of the
recent election, the administration forces w^ere in unequivocal
control of the House. Jackson's message, dealing among other
topics with his removal of the deposits, and accompanied by a
report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the same subject, was
sent to Congress on the third of December. A contest at once
arose over the reference of both message and report. Friends
of the bank wished them referred to the Committee of the Whole
House, wdiere the enormity of the President's conduct might be
discussed without limit. The Jackson supporters, on the other
hand, wanted them referred to the Committee of Ways and
Means, of which Polk had recently been made chairman. On
the tenth, McDuffie succeeded in carrying a resolution to refer
Taney's report to the Committee of the Whole. On the eleventh,
Clay, of Alabama, presented a resolution to refer that part of
the President's message relating to finance to the Committee of
Ways and Means, but to this McDuffie and others offered vigorous
21 Mosher, Executive Begister, 113.
22 Niles' Beg., XLV, 248. =3 Dem. Eev., May, 1838.
38 JAMES E. POLE
objections. On the same day, Polk moved a reconsideration of
the vote which had referred Taney's report to the Committee of
the Whole, and he was at once accused by the opposition of aim-
ing to have it referred to his own committee so that he could
smother the question. Chilton, of Kentucky, who was especially
opposed to a reconsideration, did not wish to see "the whole
weight of this massive Goveriiment imposed on the shoulders of
his friend from Tennessee,"'^ and urged that the question ought
to be left with the larger committee so that all might discuss it.
Discussion was the last thing which Polk desired, and prece-
dent supported his contention that the reference made under
McDuffie's resolution had been entirely irregular. Never before,
he said, had a great subject of national policy been referred, in
the first instance, to the Committee of the Whole on the state of
the Union. The course M^hich he advocated was simply the usual
one. In the argument Polk was the equal of any of his opponents.
When they told him that the Secretary's reasons had been stated
in his report, thereby making investigation by a committee un-
necessary, Polk replied that the report contained various state-
ments of fact which might involve the bank's charter, and that
these facts should be carefully investigated. He also reminded
them of their assertions that the state banks in which the Presi-
dent had deposited public money were unsafe, and that the public
faith had been violated. "Is it not proper, then, for a committee
of the House to inquire by which party the contract was vio-
lated ?"^^ After much discussion the House, on December 17,
decided, by a yea and nay vote of one hundred and twenty-four
to one hundred and two, to reconsider its vote on McDuffie's
resolution.
Having won on the question of reconsideration, Polk now
fulfilled Chilton's prophecy by moving that Taney's report be
24 Cong. Globe, 23 Cong., 1 sess., 24. All arguments made in the House,
unless otherwise noted, are taken from the Globe, and may be found under
dates mentioned in the text.
25 Ibid., p. 25, Dec. 12, 1833.
POLK AND THE BANK OF TEE UNITED STATES 39
roforred to the Committee of Ways and ]\Ieans. McDuffie im-
mediately moved that Polk's committee be instructed to "report
a joint resolution providing that the public revenue hereafter
collected be deposited in the Bank of the United States, in con-
formity with the public faith pledged in the charter of the said
bank." It is not at. all likely that McDuffie expected his motion
to earr>', but he gained what was doubtless his main object — an
opportunity for a discussion of all phases of the question. This
move on the part of the opposition brought from the President
a letter instructing Polk to make a short reply and then to call
for the previous question ;-" but two long months of debate had
yet to elapse before Polk's committee would be able to consider
the Secretary's report, unhampered by annoying instructions.
Binney, of Pennsylvania, interrupted the discussion on De-
cember 18 by presenting a memorial from the bank. The sub-
stance of this document was a declaration that the bank was
entitled to the deposits unless Congress should decide otherwise.
On Polk's motion, the memorial was referred to his committee.
On the same day, Chilton moved to instruct the Committee of
Ways and Means to report a joint resolution directing the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to restore the deposits to the bank, but, on
the request of McDuffie, this motion was withdrawn.
On the main question of referring the Secretary's report with
instructions to Polk's committee, McDuffie made the opening
speech (December 19). The gist of his remarks was that re-
moval of the deposits was illegal because the President had
usurped authority in performing it. Even the President, he
said, had admitted that the authority rested with the Secretary,
and, if so, Jackson could not lawfully assume it. On December
30, Polk replied in defense of the administration. As usual he
had thoroughly prepared himself for his task. He was ready
with authorities and precedents to support his own contentions
as well as to refute those of his opponents. So thorough and
26 Jackson to Polk, Dec. 18, 1833, Polk Papers.
40 JAMES K. FOLK
inclusive was his array of facts and arguments that, although
the debate lasted nearly two months longer, there was little for
any other administration member to add. Every opposition mem-
ber who spoke to the question devoted most of his time to an-
swering the arguments of Polk. He was regarded by all as the
chief supporter, in the House, of the President and his policies.
Jackson himself, on his next visit to Tennessee, told the people
of Nashville that "Polk for the hard service done in the cause
deserves a Medal from the American people. ' '-'
So far as a reference of Taney's report to the Committee of
Ways and Means, as well as the attempt to instruct that com-
mittee, were concerned, Polk showed without difficulty that the
opposition members were clearly in the wrong. The memorial of
the bank setting forth its grievances, and likewise the charges of
the government directors against the bank, had, after full delib-
eration, been referred by the House to the Committee of Ways
and Means ; there was consequently no good reason why the Sec-
retary's report should not be sent to the same committee. Polk
intimated that the real reason for this attempt to interrupt the
normal procedure was the desire of his opponents to "flood the
country with inflammatory speeches," telling the people that
panic must result from the removal of the deposits. Should the
committee be compelled, said Polk, to act under the instructions
proposed by McDufifie, it would be prejudging the question;
investigation would be superfluous, and a report made under
such instructions would be absurd. The task of justifying the
arbitrary conduct of the President was more difficult. By manj^
Polk's argument on this subject may not be regarded as convinc-
ing.-** But wiiether Jackson had acted witliin liis I'iglits or had
27 Eobert M. Burton to Polk, Aug. 27, 1834, Folk Fapers. Polk's speec-h
may be found in Cong. Deb., X, 2.
28 When Polk was a candidate for the Presidency, the National Intel-
ligencer (Sept. 21, 1844) said: "Throughout the whole of Mr. Polk's
course in Congress in relation to the Bank of the United States, there was
exhibited a zeal not only without knowledge, but often, we must think,
against conviction."
FOLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES -tl
been guilty of gross usurpation, no one could have defended his
course more ably than did the chairman of the Committee of
Ways and Means. A slightly new turn was given to the dis-
cussion by the motion of Jones, January 14, 1834, to substitute
instructions for those submitted by McDuffie. McDuffie's in-
structions, as Polk had pointed out, prejudged the whole ques-
tion, and were mandatory as to the findings of the committee.
Those now offered by Jones simply instructed the committee to
"inquire into the expediency of depositing the revenues here-
after collected," not in the Bank of the United States, but in
state banks. -^ It was now a question of compulsory restoration
of the deposits, on the one hand ; on the other, discretion for the
committee as to its findings, after the expediency of deposit in
state banks had been investigated.
While the question of reference with instructions w^as being
debated, memorials from groups of individuals, some for and
some opposed to the bank, were sent to the House. One came
from the Maine legislature, upholding Jackson and pronouncing
the bank unconstitutional. Efforts were made to refer some of
the memorials to select committees, but, usually, on Polk's motion,
they were all sent to the Committee of Ways and Means. Polk
and his committee were therefore the objects of much criticism
and even abuse. The sole purpose of both Taney and Polk,
according to Binney, was to sustain the administration, without
thought of the country's welfare. Polk's object in wishing to
get possession of Taney's report, in the opinion of ]Moore. of
Virginia, was to stifle debate, to put the stamp of approval on
the report, and then to send it forth to deceive the people and
prejudice them against the bank. A motion made by Hubbard
to refer to Polk's committee the President's message on the re-
29 On February 19, Mardis, of Alabama, offered a resolution, "That the
Committee of Ways and Means be instructed to inquire into the expedi-
ency of reporting a bill requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to deposit
the public moneys of the United States in State banks. ' ' There was Tuuch
debate on this resolution, but, as it was later withdrawn by the mover, it
will not be considered in the present discussion.
42 JAMES K. POLK
fusal of the bank to surrender its books and papers as pension
agent, caused Watmough, of Pennsylvania, to think that "the
Committee of "Ways and i\Ieans have got a voracious appetite,
and seem desirous to devour all that comes before the House."
It was a question of law, he said, and should be referred to the
Judiciary Committee. He was supported by Barringer, of North
Carolina, who asserted that Polk's committee was'trying to grasp
all important legislation so that it might be shaped in the ad-
ministration mold. But oppositon was futile ; the message went
Avith the memorials to appease the "voracious appetite" of Polk
and his colleagues. There, too, went Taney's report, the main
subject of discussion. On February 18, 1834, the two months'
debate was closed by invoking the previous question, and Polk's
original motion (of December 17, 1833) to refer to his own com-
mittee Taney's report on the removal of the deposits was at last
carried by a yea and nay vote of one hundred and thirty to
ninety-eight. All motions to instruct the committee had already
been voted down, and the House now refused to hear new reso-
lutions for this purpose. The victory of the committee was com-
plete, and it could proceed, unhampered, to perform its part in
the executive program. Polk's successful defense of the admin-
istration brought him letters of commendation from all parts of
the country, and especially from his own state. Governor Carroll
wrote from Nashville to compliment Polk on his "temperate, able
and successful vindication of the President," and added that
"this is almost the universal sentiment here."^" Polk's services
30 Governor Carroll to Polk, Jan. 23, 1834, FoR- Papers. John H. Dew,
member of the Tennessee legislature, wrote to Polk, Jan. 21: "Your
argument in defence of the Executive for the exercise of an ordinary-
power, expressly conferred on him by the Constitution of the U. S. and
fully sanctioned by precedent & custom evinces a most intimate acquain-
tance with the multifarious movements that have been made upon the
great American political Chess hoard from the organization of the Govern-
ment to the present Cn'.sw. You have shown most incontestibly, from
laborious research into public records and documents that the I*resident
and liis Cabinet have in all things acted strictly within the s])here of their
Constitutional duty and rule of action." There are many similar letters
among the PoUc Papers.
FOLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 43
as guide in the proposed constitutional convention of his state
were eagerly sought, and he was much talked about as a desirable
candidate for Governor of Tennessee, and for Speaker of the
national House of Representatives. Even your enemies say, said
a letter from his home town, that "you could be elected for any-
thing in Maury. "^^
Before the vote on the reference of Taney's report had been
taken, the Committee of Ways and Means had already made it
quite clear that nothing favorable to the bank might be expected
from them. On February 11, Polk reported for the committee
on Jackson's message against the bank — tlie message in Avhich
the bank was denounced for not surrendering the books and
money held by it in its capacity as pension agent.- Polk fully
sustained the President and refuted every contention of the bank.
"The committee," so read the report, "cannot condemn, in terms
too strong, the conduct of the bank in this transaction." He
reported a bill to the effect that, in future, pensions should be
paid by officers of the government, and not left in "the hands of
an irresponsible corporation."
By March 7, the committee was ready to submit its opinions
on the removal of the deposits. These opinions were placed be-
fore the House on that date, and it was generally understood
that they had been drawn up by the chairman. They held that
both the removal of the deposits and the placing of this money
in state banks were unquestionably legal. The committee be-
lieved the bank to be unconstitutional, but, even if it were not,
its conduct had been such that it ought not to be rechartered,
and therefore, the deposits ought not to be restored. They ex-
pressed full confidence in the competence of state banks to per-
form all necessary services, for the government, and revived
Jefferson's well-known arguments to prove that such an institu-
tion as the Bank of the United States had never been contem-
31 T. H. Cahal to Polk, Jan. 2, 1834, Polk Papers. Maury was Polk 'a
county.
44 JAMES K. POLK
plated by the framers of the Constitution. For his own repu-
tation, Polk might well have stopped here ; but he repeated the
arguments of the day that "none can doubt the power of the
bank to create embarrassment," and he proceeded to show that
this had been done by loaning money at a given place during one
month, and then calling it in during the next. Such action may,
indeed, have been within the power of the bank, but banking
institutions seldom resort to that form of amusement. This may
have been one of the occasions noted by the National Intilli-
gencer^- on which Polk's zeal was not supported by either
"knowledge" or "conviction. " However this may be, Polk had
not been foinid wanting in liis defense of the President. His
services as a party leader of the House were none the less effi-
cient because history may pronounce some of his arguments
untenable.
The House, on March 12, suspended the rules so that Polk
might have his report made a special order and thereby hasten
its adoption. This action was denounced by Adams, who said
that Polk, acting under royal prerogative, would soon close all
debate by the previous question and deprive the minority of its
constitutional right of discussion. But Adams could not very
well complain, as Polk pointed out, because Adams himself had
voted for the previous question when the bill to recharter the
bank had been forced through the House.
Polk did not, however, immediately call for the previous ques-
tion, and his critics made the most of the opportunity afforded
them. Instead of reporting on Taney 's reasons for removing the
deposits, said Wilde, of Georgia (March 19), the committee had
reported an argument — that the bank ought not to be rechar-
tered. They had "gone beyond the President and the Secretary,
in claiming power for the Executive." Harden, of Kentucky,
admired the "master-stroke of policy" of the committee in pro-
nouncing against recharter when that question was not before it,
32 National InteUigcnccr, Sept. 21, 1844. See above, note 28.
POLK AND THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 45
but it had given no information except a reecho of Taney's report.
IMcDuffie criticized Poll^ for shutting off debate, but he gave him
full credit for acting "with a tact and skill and zeal worthy of
a better cause. ' '^^ McDufifie concluded his argument on April 4,
Mason called for the previous question, and the debate on Polk's
report was closed. Resolutions prepared by the committee, pro-
viding among other things for a select committee to investigate
the bank, were quickly adopted. The new committee, appointed
by the Speaker on the seventh, repaired at once to Philadelphia
whence Mason, one of its members, kept Polk informed of its
proceedings by confidential letters.^*^ But the bank refused to
submit its books for examination, and the special committee soon
(May 22) reported that it had been unable to perform the duty
assigned to it by the House. While investigation thus ended in
failure, nothing was left undone which in any way depended
upon the vigilance or activity of Polk. On June 13, he succeeded
in sending to the table two joint resolutions from the Senate :
one, disapproving of the removal of the deposits; the other,
directing that the deposits be restored to the Bank of the United
States.
By adopting Polk's report the House had put its stamp of
approval on the President's act in removing the deposits, but
the question of depositing this money in state banks had still to
be considered. Jackson's opponents had always contended that,
without the authority of Congress, the President had no right
to intrust public money to such banks. On April 22, 1834, Polk
reported from his committee a bill for regulating these state
deposit banks. It was based on the report of the Secretary of
33 McDuffie said he had criticized Jackson in the hope of bringing out
Jackson's supporters. "The honorable member from Tennessee did come
out Vjoldly and manfully, took his position, and, whatever views I may
entertain of his generalship, I am ready to bear testimony that the position
which he has assumed is the only one he could assume, without leaving
unprotected and undefended the very part which it was his iluty to de-
fend" (April 3, 1834). I have converted this into direct discourse. It is
reported indirectly in the Cong. Globe.
3-* Mason to Polk, May 5 and May 10, 1834, Polk Papers.
46 JAMES E. POLK
the Treasury. Adams (June 7) attempted to filibuster by mov-
ing a resolution to call on the Secretary of the Treasury to lay
before the House the names of officers and stockholders of such
banks, as well as numerous unimportant details. Polk promptly
met this by moving an amendment which required a similar
statement from the Bank of the United States. A request made
by Adams (June 13) that Polk should withdraw his amendment
gave the latter an opportunity, not only to defend the adminis-
tration, but to employ that sarcasm and scorn which ever made
him feared as a debater. It was far more necessary, Polk be-
lieved, to require information from the old bank than from the
new banks, because the government was a stockholder as well
as a depositor in the Bank of the United States. It was also
more necessary, he said, because that bank
harl set itself uj) iu autagonistic position to the Government, had de-
nounced the Executive as a tyrant, usurper, and despot, and more recently,
had denounced and insulted the representatives of the people, because they
had sustained him in his measures. But, according to the gentleman, this
immaculate and inoffensive Bank of the United States must not be looked
into, though the affairs of the State banks must be thoroughly probed.'^
Polk's bill for regulating the deposits in state banks passed the
House, June 24, 1834, by a vote of one hundred and twelve to
ninety, but it was now near the end of the session and the Senate
at its last meeting, June 30, laid the bill on the table. In the
House, at least, the friends of the bank had been defeated on
every point, and the acts of the President had been fully vindi-
cated. The completeness of this vindication was due, in no small
measure, to the industry and vigilance of the chairman of the
Committee of Ways and Means.
3"' Polk here read from the National Gazette an article in which the
bank directors had denounced Jackson and the House.
CHAPTER IV
POLK-BELL CONTEST FOR THE SPEAKERSHIP
During liis canvass for reelection to Congress in 1833, Polk
seems to have decided to become a candidate for the Speakership
in the event of his success at the polls. Public attention liad
recently been called to this office by a rumor that the Speaker
of last session, Andrew Stevenson, was to be given a diplomatic
api)ointment and would therefore not be a candidate for re-
election.
Whether Polk's idea of becoming a candidate originated with
himself or was suggested to him by friends is uncertain. There
are among his papers letters which show that, soon after his
election early in August, he began to sound his friends on the
subject. Other letters make it equally clear that he was being
considered for the office by men who knew nothing of his own
initiative in the matter. Cave Johnson, his most intimate friend,
aided him by soliciting the support of their political associates.
His first campagn for the Speakership was soon abandoned,
for Stevenson did not go abroad as soon as had been expected.
However, his aspirations met with some encouragement. In
answer to a letter from Polk on the subject, C. C. Clay, of Ala-
bama, wrote: "Should the vacancy, of which you speak, occur,
I know of no other member, whose election to fill it would be
more agreeable to my own feelings than yours." On the same
day Clay said in a letter to Cave Johnson : " I am pleased with
your suggestion of Polk as the successor of Stevenson, and hope
we may be able so to manage, as to effect the object."^ A week
later Leavitt, a member from Ohio, informed Polk of Stevenson's
1 Clay to Polk, Aug. 19, 1833; same to Johnson, same date, Polk Papers.
48 JAMES K. POLE
rumored appointment to a foreign mission. He did not know,
he said, whether Polk had been approached, but he hoped that
he would be chosen to fill the vacancy.- Other letters of similar
imi)ort were received ; one from Cave Johnson^ said that he had
been writing letters to members of the House in an effort to
bring about concerted action in Polk's behalf.
At this early date Jackson seems to have taken no special
interest in Polk's political promotion, although he was ready to
give it his approval. Having corresponded with the President
on the subject, Grundy informed Polk* that he had ''received
an answer from the highest quarter of the most satisfactory &
encouraging character." He advised Polk to induce his friends
to write to members of the House, but to avoid writing such
letters himself. James Walker, a brother-in-law of Polk, went
to Washington in October in quest of a mail contract. After
an interview with the President in relation to Polk's aspirations,
Walker reported that "lie gives in to them I think decidedly and
frankly."^ Jackson told Walker that some persons believed it
would not "look very modest" to solicit the Speakership for
Tennessee, as well as the Presidency. The President himself
ridiculed this objection and assured Walker that Polk's election
would in no respect embarrass the administration. Walker got
the impression, however, that William B. Lewis was in favor of
Bell. Here may have been the beginning of Polk's intense dis-
like for Lewis. Another interview with Jackson convinced
Walker that the President was not only willing but eager to
have Polk chosen Speaker of the House. He was charmed with
the Vice-President and advised Polk to make it known to Van
Buren that he would support him for the Presidency.''
2 H. H. Leavitt to Tolk, Aug. 26, 18.*?3, ibid.
■■i Johnson to Polk, Aug. 26, 1833, ibid.
•i Grundy to Polk, Sept. 13, 1833, ibid.
5 Walker to Polk, Oct. 22, 1833, ibid.
0 Walker to Polk, Nov. 7, 1833, ibid. From Yell, also, came a letter
(Dec. 1) stating that in his o])inion Van Huron couM throw the Speaker-
ship to whom he pleased.
FOLK-BELL CONTEST FOE THE SPEAEEESHIP 49
The tweutj'-tliird Congress convened on December 2, 1833,
and Stevenson was reelected Speaker on the first ballot — vir-
tually Avitliout opposition. As Polk's candidacy had been con-
tingent npon Stevenson's refusal to stand for reelection he ac-
cepted the party program without evidence of disappointment.
The committees were announced on the ninth, with Polk at the
head of the Committee of Ways and Means— the appointment
having been made, it was said, upon the suggestion of General
Jackson. The chairmanship of this committee is an important
position under normal conditions. At this time, when the Presi-
dent was preparing for his last and greatest contest with the
bank, it was undoubtedly the most responsible position in the
House. But Polk was not the man to shirk responsibility, and
his success in outgeneraling the bank party soon demonstrated
that the administrtaion had been fortunate in its choice of a
leader.
Polk had scarcely accepted his new appointment when letters
came from friends at home urging him to become a member of
the proposed Tennessee constitutional convention. "A great
number of people," wrote James Walker,' "will be satisfied in
no other way than for you to be in the Convention.
While there seems to have been a general desire for Polk's
services in the convention and a feeling that he of all men in
the state was best fitted to draft a new constitution, yet some,
even among his friends, appear to have doubted his ability to
cope with his new duties in Congress. His brother-in-law, A. C.
Hayes, wrote from Columbia, Tennessee, that Polk 's friends were
pleased, and his enemies mortified, by his elevation to the chair-
manship of the Conunittee of Ways and Means. But he added :
''I have, however, heard it suggested by some of your good
friends, that you may not leave the present congress with the
same reputation with which you entered — 'they fear, that there is
too great weight of talent against you on the Bank Question.' "*
- Walker to Polk, Dec. 18, 1833, Polk Papers.
8 Hayes to Polk, Jan. 10, 1834, ibid.
50 JAMES K. POLK
Polk himself had no such fears, for self-confidence was one of
his chief characteristics; difficulties never appalled him when
party services were to be performed. He was already occupied
with his committee and therefore declined to serve in the con-
vention.
On June 2, 1834, Speaker Stevenson presented to the House
his long expected resignation. On the same day John Bell, of
Tennessee, was chosen to succeed him. On the first ballot Polk
received forty-two votes to Bell's thirty. Both men gained as
the balloting proceeded, but Bell's gains — due to accessions from
the anti-Jackson camp — were larger than those of his rival.
When the tenth ballot was counted the tellers reported that Bell
had received one hundred and fourteen votes — more than enough
to elect — while his nearest competitor, Polk, had received but
seventy-eight.
The brief official record of this day's proceedings which one
finds in the Congressional Globe gives not the slightest hint of
the heartburnings and bitterness which were associated with this
choice of a Speaker. From this election, however, resulted a
political feud which split the Jackson party in Tennessee, and
materially weakened it in other states. From this day forth Polk
and Bell were uncompromising enemies — each determined to
overthrow the political power of the other. As the opponents
of the President had helped to elect Bell, tlie new Speaker was
forced to ally himself more and more with this element. His
endorsement of Judge White's candidacy aroused the ire of the
President. Regarding both men as apostates and traitors, Jack-
son resolved to employ every means at his disposal for the purpose
of crushing them. Polk profited much by this new turn of af-
fairs. He was already fighting the battles of the President in
the war on the bank. He had always enjoyed the confidence and
good opinion of Jackson ; but Bell's defection still more identified
the Speaker's rival, Polk, with the party of the President. In
a greater degree than ever was Polk now regarded as the adminis-
tration leader of the House.
POLK-BELL CONTEST FOE THE SPEAKEESHIP 51
The antecedents of the Speakership election and the attitude
of Polk and Bell toward adhering to a party program are told
in a statement prepared, at Polk's request, by Cave Johnson.
Johnson Avas, of course, one of Polk's closest friends, but his
statement seems credible and is corroborated by the testimony of
other members of the House. It reads as follows :
It was supposed many months before the vacancy actually happened,
that it would take place & several individual friends of the administration
were spoken of as suitable to fill the vacancy, among the number you &
Col. Bell were esteemed the most prominent. None seemed to doul)t that
if so many friends of the administration were run, that the election would
be finally settled by the votes of the opponents of the administration, who
would of course cast their votes upon the man least acceptable to the
President & his friends. This was a result the friends of the administra-
tion washed to evade — and therefore it was proposed, that the friends of
the administration should have a meeting that the strength of the several
candidates should be ascertained, that the strongest should be run as the
candidate of the administration party & the others should yield their pre-
tensions & support him. You unhesitatingly determined, that you was
willing to have the election submitted to the friends of the administration
& let them decide who should be the candidate & that you would support
the man thus selected. You was considered I believe finally by all parties
as the administration candidate & so far as I knew, heard or believe every
vote which you received except one was given by the friends of the admin-
istration. ... I understood, from members who conversed with Col. Bell
upon the subject whose names I can give if necessary, that he refused to
submit his claims to the Speakers chair to the friends of the President, &
in consequence of his refusal no such meeting was holden. He received
the votes of the opponents of the administration & was elected by them
in conjunction with a few votes received by him among the friends of the
administration. 9
In a similar statement," John McKintry, of Alabama, charged
Bell with having refused to submit his claims to Jackson 's friends
and with having stated "that he did not expect to be elected by
the administration party in the House, that he did not expect to
get of that party more than 25 or 30 votes, [and] that he was
supported by the opposition & elected by them." McKintry was
9 Johnson to Polk, Sept. 12, 1834, ibid.
10 McKintry to Polk, Aug. 13, 1834, ibid. C. C. Clay, of Alabama, in
a letter to Polk (Sept. 13) says that Bell was generally considered to be
an opjjosition candidate.
52 JAMES E. POLE
equally positive that Polk had readily consented to submit his
claims to his party friends and to abide by their decision.
Up to the time that Bell became a candidate for Speaker, he
was considered to be a loyal supporter of General Jackson. He
was so regarded in his own state as well as in the House of Rep-
resentatives. When the rumor that Stevenson would not be a
candidate for reelection was first circulated, it will be remem-
bered that Jackson was consulted as to his attitude toward Polk's
candidacy. Although the President was willing to give his ap-
proval, he did not appear to have any special interest in Polk's
elevation. There is no evidence that the General, at that time,
harbored any ill feeling toward Bell. Indeed, James Walker
gathered from various conversations that INIajor Lewis preferred
Bell for Speaker. But Bell's conduct during his recent cam-
paign for the office changed all this. He was first distrusted,
then openly denounced, by the President and his friends.
Congress adjourned shortly after the election of a Speaker,
and in the final rush of legislation little attention was given to
the contest between the two candidates. It was not apparent at
the time that the controversy would have any vital significance
in national politics. The first important result of the victory
of Bell over Polk was its effect upon the influence of the two men
in their home state.
For some time past Polk had been considered a desirable
candidate for governor, and after his defeat by Bell his friends
in Tennessee renewed their offer to support him for this office.
His ever loyal brother-in-law, James Walker, began on his own
initiative to agitate Polk's claims to the office and to assure him
of the certainty of success. He informed Polk^^ that he had not
lost prestige on account of his recent defeat, and that he could
beat any man in Tennessee if he would consent to run. Letters
offering support and encouragement came from Cave Johnson
and other party leaders of the state. James Standifer assured
11 Walker to Polk, June 30, 1834, Polk Papers.
POLK-BELL CONTEST FOB THE SPEAKERSHIP 53
Polk that he had not "seen the first man but what says they
would rather have James K. Polk's standing than John Bell's
Speaker's place and all, the people are for the man that stands
up boldly for the President and his measures, they are for no
other sort of man these times. "^- The sentiment expressed in
this letter was becoming general in Tennessee, namely, that Polk
and Grundy were the administration leaders in the state, and
that Bell had deserted to the enemy. This view was impressed
upon the President, who was then spending his vacation at the
Hermitage, and it was about this time that he declared Polk to
be deserving of a medal for "the hard service done in the cause."
Much resentment was aroused in Middle Tennessee by a
speech delivered by Bell at Murfreesborough on October 6, 1834.
The circuit court was then in session and Bell took advantage
of the occasion to address the people there assembled. There
are conflicting reports as to the substance of this speech, but in
general the account of it given to Polk in a letter from his brother-
in-law, John "W. Childress, seems to be corroborated by the testi-
mony of many who heard the speech delivered. According to
this letter^^ Bell was very severe in his criticism of all who had
questioned the propriety of his course in Congress, particularly
during his contest for the Speakership. He asserted that all his
competitors except one had treated him in a gentlemanly manner,
leaving it to be inferred that Polk had not. "He vaunted
greatly," said Childress,
his adherence to principle, his unwavering support of the president, and
said distinctly, and in these words, that had he not been true and firm to
the administration, he could have changed the small majority in the house
upon the Bank question by going over and taking his friends with him
and thereby have defeated all the measures of the President.
His enemies, he said, had managed to delay Speaker Stevenson's
appointment to a foreign mission in the hope of weakening his
i2Standifer (member of Congress from Tennessee) to Polk, Aug. 25,
1834, ibid.
13 Childress to Polk, Oct. 7, 1834, ibid.
54 JAMES K. POLK
(Bell's) prospects and strengthening their own (i.e., Polk's), but
of this the President was of course not aware. He alleged that
although other tricks had been employed in an effort to defeat
him, he still had the confidence of the entire party except six or
seven individuals. He said
that he was willing to give Jackson's experiment [state banks] a fair
trial and if it did not answer the wants of the people, that then he might
be in favor of a National Bank. That he had no idea that a metalic
currency would answer the purpose of a circulating medium and almost
said it was Demagogiiic in any one that would say so.
W. R. Rucker, another brother-in-law, said in a letter" that the
speech was "most intemperate and ill advised" and that many of
Bell's friends did not approve such "abuse" of Polk and General
Jackson.
Under the circumstances, Bell's speech was certainly ill ad-
vised, even if every assertion made in it had been true. More-
over, even though reports of the speech may have exaggerated
its abusive character, yet certain remarks attributed to the speaker
were of such a nature that, if skillfully used, they would arouse
the ire of General Jackson against the man who had uttered them.
Protestations of loyalty to the administration had an unwelcome
ring in the General's ears when accompanied by boasts of Bell's
great influence over party members and of the ease with which
he might have defeated administration measures in the House.
The truth of such an assertion would make it all the more galling
to a man of Jackson's temperament. One can imagine his exclaim-
ing: "By the Eternal, I'll show John Bell !" Then, too. Bell's
remark concerning the President's expeHment, and his quasi en-
dorsement of a national bank, were most unfortunate for any
man who wished to retain the friendshii) of "the old liero."
Polk's answer to Rucker indicated clearly the use tliat was
to be made of Bell's speech. If the address has been accurately
reported, said Polk, "it places him clearly and unequivocally at
14 Kucker to Polk, Oct. 12, 1834, ibid.
POLK-BELL CONTEST FOE THE SPEAKERSHIP 55
issue with the policy of the administration."''' He wished the
speech to be reported accurately and published to the world ;
then he would be fully jirepared to meet its author on the issues
wliich it had raised.
Before Bell's Murfreesborougli speech had been delivered,
Polk, as we have seen, had already been collecting statements
from his friends concerning Bell's conduct in Congress. Both
men had also been exerting themselves to get control of the press
in Middle Tennessee. Local newspapers at that time wielded
great infiuenee, and the success of a politician depended in a
great measure on his control over the reading matter of his con-
stituents.
Polk's home was in Columbia; therefore the Observer, a local
paper of that place, supported its townsman and criticized Bell's
maneuvering in the late Speakership election. The two leading
papers of Nashville at that time were the Republican and the
Banner. The Repuhliean defended Bell, and many of Polk's
friends promptly administered the customary punishment of can-
celing their subscriptions to that paper. One of these was Colonel
Archibald Yell, an ardent admirer of Polk and an orthodox party
man. In answer to his protest, Allan A. Hall, editor of the
Repuhliean, defiantly predicted that Polk would soon lose the
friendship of Jackson, Grundy, and Governor Carroll, and would
be driven from power if he should dare to persist in his opposition
to Bell.^«
Bell succeeded in getting control of the Banner, also. Until
the middle of September, 1834, this paper had been edited by
15 Polk to Eucker, Oct. 16, 1834, ibid.
16 Yell to Polk, Sept. 25, 1834, ibid. One part of Hall's letter, as
quoted by Yell, read: "and now mark me Yell for a prophet in less than
six months there will be a split between Carroll & Polk nay there will
be a split between Polk & the President!! Coming events cast their
shadows before. Col. Polk by no earthly possibility can continue to
maintain his present position, iii the event of Certain future Contin.uencies
which are obliged to take jjlace." Yell took this to mean that Polk was
to be driven from the chairmansliip of the Committee of Ways and Means.
Carroll denied that he was hostile to Polk (Carroll to Polk, Dec. 19, 1834).
56 JAMES K. POLE
Samuel H. Laughlin, a friend of Polk, but who, unfortunately
for both men, had been made extremely unreliable by a passion
for strong drink. ^' His contract as editor expired at this time
and the proprietor. Hunt, formed a partnership with Bell. A
new editor was installed and the paper henceforth championed
the cause of the Speaker. ^^ For the time being Polk had to rely
mainly on the support of the Columbia Observer and the Mur-
freesborough Monitor.
Bell seems to have become somewhat alarmed at the result of
his Murfreesborough speech, for both of his Nashville papers
maintained that he had been misquoted, and that he was still a
loyal follower of General Jackson. Thereupon, William Brady,
of Murfreesborough, set about collecting statements from various
persons who had heard Bell deliver the address. These Brady
published in an extra number of the Monitor. Copies of this
number were sent to the President, to members of Congress, to
leading political journals, and to prominent individuals, for the
purpose of removing the "veil which now covers the political
hypocrite [Bell]."^''
Polk and his associates saw the necessity of establishing in
Nashville a paper which would promulgate their own views. "I
think it more desirable," wrote A. C. Hays, of Columbia,-"
that a Newspaper should be established in Nashville, that will fearlessly
speak the sentiments of the people of the State, at this time than it has
ever been, because I believe that the Press is at this time more under the
influence of the BanTc & Bell & Foster faction than it has ever been.
Laughlin had offered to serve as editor of an administration
journal, but Brady-^ was not alone in thinking that "poor Sam"
had already proved himself to be a total failure. "The trouble
1" One becomes accustomed to readiufj in private letters: " Laujijlilin
has been drunk for a week."
18 John W. Childress to Polk, Sept. 18; Wm. Bradv to T'olk, Dec. 2G,
1834, Polk Papers.
10 Brady to Polk, as cited above.
20 Hays to Polk, Dec. 24, 1834, PolJc Papers.
21 Brady to Polk, as cited above.
POLK-BELL CONTEST FOB THE SPEAKEESHIP 57
is," said ho, "Sam lacks moral courage; and when the sound of
the Bugle is heard — and the enemy shall appear in force — Sam's
in the straw." In Brady's opinion, some editor ought to be
found who would be "wholly dc Nashvilleized/' who would stand
by the President and support Van Buren as his successor.-- For
his own purposes, said Brady, Bell is putting Judge White for-
ward to succeed Jackson, with the hope of succeeding White in
the Presidential chair.
Bell's success in getting control of the Nashville papers was
disconcerting enough to Polk's Tennessee friends, but they were
still more chagrined because the Washington Globe seemed also
to be lending its support to the Speaker. "How is it with the
Globe ? ' ' wrote Brady in the letter above cited,
if that print is with the President and his friends, to me it has an awk-
ward way of shewing of it. It is true that Blair sanctions the President
personally, and in the main the measures of his administration; but how
is it, that every apologetic article, which has appeared in the Nashville
papers or elsewhere, in relation to Bell's election to the Speaker's chair,
or his Murfreesboro Speech have found their way into the columns of the
Globe?
Brady thought that Blair ought to give both sides or neither;
Polk should compel him to show his colors by presenting for
publication in the Glohe the account of Bell's speech which had
appeared in the extra Monitor. "Why is the Globe either silent —
or giving support to Bell?" asked Childress.-^ People in Tenn-
essee, he added, are beginnig to believe that the President
prefers Bell to Polk; this is what Bell's adherents claim, and the
attitude of the Globe lends color to their assertions. By all
means, urged Childress, Polk must have his side of the argument
published.
By courting the enemies of the administration and by sub-
sequent indiscretions. Bell had engendered feelings of distrust
22 On December 28 General Samuel Smith, in a letter to Polk, dwelt
on the necessity of starting a new paper. Many in Tennessee, said he,
whom Jackson believes to be his friends are in reality against him.
23 Childress to Polk, Dec. 20, 1834, Polk Papers. Polk received other
letters of similar character.
58 JAMES E. POLE
and hostility that were destined to involve others in serious polit-
ical difficulties. Polk was a man who did not easily forget, and
by lending aid to Bell in 1834 Blair was paving the way for his
own downfall, when Bell 's rival became President ten years later.
Polk's friends believed that they saw the sinister as well as
successful influence of the Speaker in every quarter. Polk him-
self alleged that Bell's exertions in behalf of Judge White were
not due to any love for the judge, but for the sole purpose of
promoting his own political advancement.-*
The project of founding an administration newspaper in
Nashville now absorbed the attention of party leaders. As no
really suitable man could be found to edit such a paper, Laughlin
was considered, although not without misgivings.-^ ]\Iany poli-
ticians who had hitherto shouted for Jackson had deserted to
White, and nearly all of the papers of Middle Tennessee, in-
cluding even the Columbia Ohserver,-^ had come out for the
judge. This fact made it all the more necessary to have an
orthodox journal which would enlighten the people, and Laughlin,
despite his weaknesses, was a loyal party man. After many
tribulations capital was collected, an outfit purchased, and in
March, 1835, Laughlin was installed as editor of the Nashville
Union. Polk and Grundy were the guiding spirits of the new
paper, and to them and Cave Johnson "poor Sam" appealed for
aid in increasing his subscription list. He reported to Polk that
the editor of the Banner was "wallowing in the mire," entirely
under the influence of Bell and Foster; and that efforts were
being made to retard the progress of the Union."-'
During the excitement which was created by Bell's Cassedy
letter, Laughlin — being "himself again "-^ — with his "sharp pen"
24 Polk to James Walker, Dec. 24, 1834, Poll' Papers.
25 Sam'l G. Smith to Polk, Jan. 6, 1835, ibid.
20 James "Walker to Polk, Jan. 17, 1835, ibid.
2- Laughlin to Polk, April 17, 21, 1835, ibid.
2s Grundy to Polk, June 25, 1835, ibid. For the Cassedy letter, see
p. 84.
POLK-BELL CONTEST FOE THE SPEAKEESHIP 59
did effective service for Polk by heaping odium upon Bell. ' ' That
Cassedy letter," wrote Grundy to Polk, "will make you Speaker,
I think."-" It did, indeed, contribute to this result, but in Tenn-
essee the combined influence of Bell and White could not be
overcome. In spite of heroic efforts on the editor's part, the
Union could not pay expenses, and the list of political "apostates"
was steadily growing. Although Laughlin labored without salary,
he was not without hope,^° and his pungent editorials undoubt-
edly aided Polk in his campaign for reelection.
President Jackson viewed with alarm the disintegration of
the administration party in his home state. He was especially
interested in the election of members of Congress. From his
retreat at the "Rip Raps" he asked Polk^^ for reliable infor-
mation concerning the political situation, and directed him to
cooperate with Grundy and Cave Johnson in combating the
schemes of Judge White and John Bell. He was able to get
some news from the Union, although it came irregularly; "the
other Nashville papers, like base coin, circulate freely, but they
have become the mere echo of Duff Green & other opposition
prints. ' '
White's candidacy had irrevocably split the Jackson party
in Tennessee. The President now considered White, Bell, and
all their supporters to be his political and personal enemies.
Polk, Grundy, and Johnson were to a greater degree than ever
looked upon as the administration leaders in the state. It was
certain that Polk would have the President's backing in his next
contest with Bell for the Speaker's chair. From Washington,
Donelson^- wrote to congratulate Polk on his triumphant
29 Ihid.
30 "I am now fairly in a State of belligeraney with my worthy neigh-
bors. I have them, I think, in a good way if I fan keep them so. A
gradual but sure work of reformation in public sentiment is in progress
here, and I hope the same work is going on throughout the State"
(Laughlin to Polk, July 5, 1835, ihid.).
31 Jackson to Polk, Aug. 3, 1835, ibid.
32 Donelson to Polk, Aug. 28, 1835, ibid.
60 JAMES E. POLE
reelection in spite of the "intrigues" of Bell, and he reported
the President to be in good spirits, notwithstanding the defeat of
Governor Carroll. Donelson had, he said, conversed with many
politicians, all of whom wished Polk to be chosen Speaker.
In Nashville, Laughlin, through the columns of the Union and
by letters to individuals, was doing his utmost to discredit Bell
and to present Polk's claims to reward for his loyalty to General
Jackson. Polk had been the intended victim of Bell's "treach-
ery," wrote Laughlin, and therefore "ought to be made the
instrument of his defeat. "^^
While the rivalry between White and Van Buren was of
greater interest in national politics, yet administration leaders
in all parts of the Union had come to feel that Bell — the alleged
instigator of the party schism — was, after all, more guilty than
White, and consequently deserving of punishment. Polk, on the
other hand, was clearly entitled to the support of the adminis-
tration forces in Congress. As chairman of the Committee of
Ways and Means he had borne, in the House, the brunt of the
President's war on the bank. In his home state he had done more
than any other, with the possible exception of Grundy, to oppose
the Bell- White coalition and to uphold the standard of General
Jackson.
When Congress convened in December, Polk's election to the
Speaker's chair was practically assured, and he w^as chosen on
the first ballot by a majority of thirty-nine votes. His triumph
over Bell was regarded by all as a distinct party victory. A
33 Laughlin to Polk, Aug. 30, 18.35, ibid. He quoted several reasons
which he had assigned when urging Polk's election, among them:
"That your election will prostrate Bell and the White influence in this
State, by showing to the people the true position of Bell, and how his
position is received by the Republican party every where else, and that
they are only sustained now by the false opinion which prevails that they
are friends of Gen. Jackson.
"That your election will unmask the White party and exhibit them
as the opponents of the Administration.
"That much is due to you. That you have stuck when others failed.
. . . That your confidential relation to the President ought to be consid-
ered both as a merit and as a necessary qualification in a Speaker &e &c."
POLE-BELL CONTEST FOE THE SPEAKERSHIP 61
"White" nieinber of the Tennessee legislatnre, when writing to
congratulate Polk on his election,^' said that, although Bell's
own friends hardly expected him to win, they did not think that
he would be beaten so badly ; they ' ' attribute Mr. Bell 's defeat
to the influence of the President." Although a White supporter,
the writer said that Polk had gained by his firm stand and that
he was now stronger in his district than either White or Van
Buren. ' ' The election of Speaker, ' ' wrote Judge Catron,"^ ' ' had
an uncommonly great effect on the country people. They had
been lead to believe great strength existed elsewhere — this is now
admitted to be a mistake, and what must follow [defeat of White]
is certain, as I believe." Bell himself had not been sanguine.
He predicted his defeat by Polk before Congress had convened.^*'
Before proceeding with Polk 's career as Speaker of the House
of Representatives it seems desirable to retrace our steps in order
to consider, in the following chapter, Judge White's unsuccessful
campaign for the Presidency. The rivalry between White and
Van Buren was the dominant factor at the time in both state and
national politics. It played an important part in making Polk
the presiding officer of the House, and it helped to shape many
of the issues with which Polk, as Speaker, had to deal.
34 H. M. Watterson to Polk, Dee. 21, 1835, PoUc Papers.
35 Catron to Polk, Jan. 8, 1836, ibid. " The effect of the news [Polk's
election] upon the White cause," wrote Nicholson, December 20, "has
been blighting." Many White men, said he, now think that their candi-
date should be withdrawn.
36 W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, Dec. 21, 1835, Polk Papers. He had seen
a letter written by Bell to Judge Kennedy before the opening of Congress.
CHAPTER V
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY
No biography of a statesman of the thirties — particularly of
a prominent Tennessean — would be complete that did not in-
clude a chapter on the far-reaching effect of Judge White's de-
cision to become a candidate for the Presidency. The importance
of this decision lay in the fact that General Jackson had made
other plans. In the parlance of the day, "King Andrew" had
decreed that the ' ' little magician ' ' must be his successor, regard-
less of the will of the subjects — the "consent of the governed."
When, therefore, the friends of White brought him forward as
a rival to Van Buren, harmony in the Jackson camp was at first
threatened, and finally destroyed. "Davy" Crockett had driven
the first wedge into the solidarity of the Jackson domination of
Tennessee ; the White movement split it asunder. The result
was the birth of the Whig party and a national political re-
alignment.
When White was first mentioned in connection with the Presi-
dency, Jackson 's feelings were those of regret that his old friend
should have been deluded by designing politicians ; but when the
judge was found to be a willing victim — independent even to
the point of defying the President's wishes — the old-time friend-
ship changed to bitter hatred. It was soon made apparent to
politicians that they could not support Judge White without for-
feiting all claim of loyalty to General Jackson. Assurances on
their part that the two things were not incompatible availed
nothing ; all were forced to choose between the two men.
It is not easy to determine just when and by whom Judge
White was first brought forward as a candidate for President,
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PEESIDENCY 63
but his iioinination for that office was considered by the Ten-
nessee legislature as early as December, 1833. Up to this time,
so far as Tennessee polities were concerned. Judge McLean, of
Ohio, seems to have been regarded as Van Buren's most formid-
able rival. Some of the local papers had hoisted the McLean
banner, with either Governor Carroll or Judge White for Vice-
President.^ But before adjourning in early December, 1833, the
legislature seriously considered the feasibility of presenting a
Presidential candidate from their OMai state. A resolution to
nominate "White was actually drawn up ; but it was made known
by a member that White opposed such a proceeding, and the
matter was dropped. None of the members manifested any
interest in nominating either Van Buren or McLean.-
Several causes cooperated in fixing the attention of politicians
on White as a possible candidate. It was well known that Jack-
son had decreed that the Vice-President should succeed him ;
in spite of this, however. Van Buren had never been popular in
Tennessee. Many of the President's most loyal supporters did
not, and could not, share his admiration for the "heir apparent."
State pride caused many to feel that, if possible, another Tenn-
essean should be chosen to fill the office, and, next to Jackson,
White was generally conceded to be the most able and popular
son of the state. It is probable that Jackson's preference for
Van Buren would have been sufficient to cause a split in the
party as soon as the White movement assumed serious propor-
tions, but the rivalry between Polk and Bell, and the support of
White by the latter, lent an added bitterness and political sig-
nificance to White's candidacy. The plan to nominate White
was alleged to have been conceived by Bell for the purpose of
advancing his own political fortunes in both state and national
politics. Whether this allegation was true or false is a matter
difficult to determine ; but whatever Bell's motives may have been.
1 Yell to Polk, Dec. 1, 1833, Polk Papers.
2 A. O. P. Nicholson to Polk, Dec. 5, 1833, Polk Papers. Orville Bradley
to White, Aug. 23, 1836 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 302).
64 JAMES E. POLE
it seems clear that White's conduct was at all times aboveboard
and commendable. He was too honest to seek political prefer-
ment by underhand methods, but he was, also, too brave and
independent to step aside simply because General Jackson willed
that he should do so.
Up to the time when White and Van Buren had been for-
mally nominated and party lines definitely drawn, there was
quite a diversit.y of opinion in Tennessee, even among Jackson's
friends. On December 22, 1833, A. V. Brown wrote to ask Polk
''the signs as to the 'successorship to the throne,' " and spoke
of McLean's popularity. "Personally," said Brown, "I like
McLean myself but politically I fear he is too far off from us in
the South — and how will Van Buren help that matter in the
least?" Between Clay and Van Buren, he continued, "might
not one find refuge in the personal worth & virtue of McLean,
although he would prefer some other than either, if chance or
destiny had not thrown him too far in the rear of probable suc-
cess ? ' '^ Other passages in the letter indicate that it was Calhoun
to whom he referred. Generally, however, those of Polk's cor-
respondents who were "not satisfied" with Van Buren were of
opinion that White was the only man who would bring success to
the party.*
On June 2, 1834, Bell defeated Polk in the contest for the
Speakership. He was supported by many who were openly op-
posed to the administration. In the House Polk had, during the
entire session, been leading the battle against the bank, and when
Congress adjourned on June 30 he had won a signal victoi-y for
the administration. In his defeat by Bell, Polk could easily be
made to assume the role of a martyr who had suffered for his
loyalty to the President and the party. He seems sincerely to
have regarded himself as a victim of the treachery of Bell, M'ho
had solicited opposition votes.
3 PolJc Papers.
* E.g., John W. M. Breazeale to Polk, Marcli 21, 1834, Polk Papers.
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PBESIDENCY 65
As soon as Congress had adjourned, both men returned to
Tennessee to air their grievances on the platform and in the
l)ublic press. Polk, as we have seen, applied to his congressional
friends for statements whicli would prove the perfidy of Bell,
while Hell proceeded to get control of the Nashville papers, the
Republican- and the Banner, in order to defend himself and to
overthrow the influence of Polk. Many of Polk's friends were
desirous of nominating him for Governor, but he preferred to
continue in national politics.
General Jackson, also, spent his sunnner vacation in Tennessee.
The bank question was uppermost in his mind, and in a speech
delivered in Nashville he made it clear that any new federal
bank would be quite as objectionable as the one now in existence.
As yet he seems to have taken no active interest in the quarrel
between Bell and Polk, but he naturally felt grateful to the latter
for his loyal support of the administration during the last sesssion.
It was at this time that he declared Polk to be deserving of a
medal from the American people for his services in Congress.
Bell had not yet broken with the party and gave the President
new assurances that he would continue to support the adminis-
tration.^ Indeed after Jackson's return to Washington there was,
as we have seen, complaint in Tennessee that the Glohe seemed to
show a preference for Bell." But during the fall of 1834 the
political situation in Tennessee became such that the interests of
Polk and the President were closeh^ identified, while Bell cast his
lot with the opponents of the administration. The main cause
of the party cleavage was the renewed effort to nominate Judge
AVhite for the Presidency.
While Jackson was still in Nashville a caucus was held in that
city — by friends of the bank, it was said — for the purpose of con-
sidering the noinin-ation of White.' White was informed that
5 Gen. Sam'l Smith to Polk, Sept. 20, 1884, Polk Papers.
'■' See above, p. 57.
" Burton to Polk, Aug. 27, 18:i4, Polk Papers.
66 JAMES K. POLK
the President threatened to denounce him should he express a
willingness to become a candidate.^ Jackson doubtless noted
many evidences of the popularity of White and of the unpopu-
larity of Van Buren, but at this time it is probable that he had
hopes of preventing disaffection.
While the President was passing through East Tennessee on
his way to Washington, Orville Bradley, a member of the legis-
lature, told him of the attempt made by the assembly in 1833 to
nominate White — an attempt which Bradley, acting under
White's directions, had been able to defeat. He told the Presi-
dent, also, that two-thirds of the legislature had been unfavorable
to Van Buren. Jackson vigorously defended Van Buren. He
said "that White could hardly get a vote out of Tennessee, and
that Tennessee must not separate from the rest of his friends."
He was willing to compromise by supporting White for Vice-
President, and it would be time enough for White to run for
President after Van Buren had retired. *•
Jackson did not at this time harbor bitter feelings toward
White, personally. These did not come until later, and even
then, as will appear, he regarded the judge more as a dupe of
political intriguers than as his personal enemy. His feeling in
1834 was one of annoyance that White should be made the instru-
ment in an attempt to thwart the plans he had made for Van
Buren.
White and Jackson had long been close personal friends.
The judge had loyally supported the "old hero" in his cam-
paigns for the Presidency and during the first part of his admin-
istration was regarded as one of his most able advisers.^'' But
White was no sycophant, and he was too independent to follow
any man's program, even though the man might chance to be
8 White to Polk, Aug. 26, 1834 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White,
254).
9 Bradley to White, Aug. 23, 1836 (Scott, Memoir of IJugh Lawson
White, 302).
10 See letters of Jackson, Overton, Coffee, Polk et oL, in Scott, Memoir
of Hugh Lawson White, 267-269.
JUDGE WRITE AND THE PBESIDENCY 67
General Jackson. As early as 1831, when Jackson was recon-
structing his cabinet so that Van Buren might, under the Presi-
dent's own rule," be made eligible to succeed him, he had invited
White to become Secretary of War, while Eaton, the outgoing
Secretary, was to have White's place as Senator from Tennessee.^'
Thc judge declined the offer, and although no breach between
the two men resulted, White was henceforth made to feel that
he was no longer in good standing in administration circles.^''
Jackson was irritated by various manifestations of White's
independence, and especially so by his disregard of the Presi-
dent's wishes when Clay's compromise tariff bill was before the
Senate in 1833. The Senate had voted to refer Clay's bill to
a select committee. Before White, their presiding officer, had
appointed the committee, he was invited to a conference wdth
the President. Preferring Clay's bill to one which had been sent
to the House by the Secretary of the Treasury, and anticipating
that Jackson had sent for him for the purpose of dictating the
membership of the committee, White, before going to see the
President, selected a committee which he thought would support
Clay's measure. A majority, which included Clayton, of Dela-
ware, were rated as anti-administration men." The President
was much ''mortified" and told Grundy in a letter that "it is an
insult to me, & the Sec. of the Treasury that such a man as
11 This rule was that none of his cabinet should succeed him if he
could prevent it.
12 White's testimony before the House Committee (Scott, Memoir of
Hugh Lawson White, 299; Washington Globe, May 25, 1831).
13 "The true reason why nothing I have said is noticed in the Globe,
I have no doubt is, because I have never assured any man that as soon as
Gen. Jackson 's terms of service are at an end, I will use all my endeavors
to elect the favorite of those who direct the operations of the paper. I am
for Gen. Jackson; but am not either a Calhoun Jackson man, or a Van
Buren Jackson man, and therefore it is pleasing to the Globe and Tele-
graph not to notice favorably anything I can say or do; and as I am
opposed to Mr. Clay, his papers will of course speak disrespectfully of
me." White to F. *S. Heiskell, editor of the Knoxville Register, May 18,
1832 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 269).
14 Testimony of Judge White before the House Committee (Scott,
Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 299).
68 JAMES E. POLK
Clayton should be upon it [the committee]. "^^ Nevertheless,
Jackson held White in high esteem, and, despite this "insult"
and other similar vexations, the two men continued amicable
relations. White was still rated as a Jackson man. and, in the
judge's opinion, it was not until the President visited Tennessee
in 1834 that he became convinced that White would not support
his political program.^" Jackson was willing to compromise by
letting White have the Vice-Presidency, but the judge must not
stand in the way of Van Buren. '
Up to the time that Polk returned to Washington for the
opening of Congress, there is nothing in his correspondence,
except his letter to White, to indicate that he took an active inter-
est in the movement to nominate Judge White. His thoughts
were centered on Bell, and the suggestion made by C. C. Clay^'^
to ''take good care to put your adversary in the wrong" was
entirely superfluous. His task was made comparatively easy by
the indiscretions of the adversary himself. Bell's Murfrees-
borough speech^^ proved a boomerang to its author, for in it he
had criticized the President and given quasi support to the
national bank. Then, too, Hall, of the Nashville Rcpuhlican, had
boasted that there would be " a split between Polk and the Presi-
dent," and that Polk would be driven from power^^ by the
political influence of Bell. Such arrogance, when duly reported
to the President, was sufficient to arouse his resentment, and,
when it soon developed that Bell was one of the most ardent sup-
porters of White, he was denounced as a political apostate.
The determination of White's Tennessee friends to nominate
him, and Jackson's strenuous opposition to sucli a nomination,
placed Polk in an awkward position. White's friends have always
15 Jackson to Grundy, Feb. 13, 1833, Am. Hist. Mag., V, 137.
10 "He no doubt believed that whenever he and those he could control
changed their creed, I would change my creed likewise, and he was never
convinced to the contrary, until after his attempt upon me through Mr.
Bradley, which was in the autumn of 1834." White to the " Freemen of
Tennessee" (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lmvson White, 320).
IT Clay to Polk, Sept. 23, 1834, Folk Papers.
IS See above, p. 53. lo Yell to Polk, Sept. 25, 1834, Polk Papers.
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 69
assumed that Polk treacherously turned against White simply
to please General Jackson, and White himself appears to have
held til is view. Even now, after Polk's entire correspondence
has become available, it is difficult to determine to what extent
this charge is true. His friendship for Judge White he never
attempted to conceal, and that he desired the support of Jackson
is beyond question; but after his defeat by Bell the political
situation, both in Tennessee and in Congress, was such that for
reasons of his own, and irrespective of Jackson's wishes, he could
not support a candidate whose chief sponsor was his rival, John
Bell. He liked White and, like many of his Tennessee friends,
he probably did not share the President's admiration for Van
Buren ; but he was a firm believer in party loyalty ; and besides,
the men who were taking the lead in promoting White's interests
were at the same time endeavoring to undermine Polk himself.
Polk's habitual reticence adds to the difficulty of determining
his thoughts and motives. If possible, he always avoided contro-
versies which did not immediately concern himself, and to his
best friends he was guarded in expressing his opinions. When,
in 1831, there was discord in Jackson's cabinet, Polk discreetly
declined to participate in the effort to force Eaton from the
cabinet, or even to discuss the matter in writing.=° When the
break between Jackson and Calhoun occurred, he forwarded
Calhoun's "defense" to his friends, but without disclosing his
own views. One of his closest friends complained that " I write
you my opinions'freely as I am not disposed with you to conceal
my views, but I must acknowledge that you have been more
prudent with yours for I am not able to even conjecture how your
feelings are after all your long letters. ' '-^
20 Several letters to C. A. Wickliffe declining to discuss the subject
{Polk Papers).
21 A. Yell to Polk, March 13, 1831, Polk Papers. Yell expressed his own
opinions freely enough. He believed Calhoun's defense to be honest and
sincere, and that Crawford was a scoundrel. He had a "bad impression"
of A^an Buren and hoped that he would not be nominated as Jackson's
successor. The attempt to force Van Buren on the people would only aid
"Prince Hal."
70 JAMES K. POLK
Polk and White liad long been personal and political friends.
There is nothing to indicate that their friendship had been in
any degree affected by the coolness between White and the Presi-
dent. To this White's comments on Polk's defeat by Bell in 1834
bear witness. "Both are to me like children ;" he wrote-- "there-
fore I took no part in the contest." Polk's expression of "sur-
prise and astonishment"-^ in September, 1834, when informed
of Jackson's threat to denounce White, should he consent to
become a candidate, was no doubt unfeigned. He was frequently
evasive or noncommittal, but he was not given to flattery.-*
Polk returned to Washington to assume his duties in the
House in December, 1834. Up to this time there appears to have
been no connection between his quarrel with Bell and Jackson's
opposition to White. But he had not been in Washington long
before these two controversies became merged by an effort on
the part of Polk's opponents to bring White out as a candidate.
Polk 's own version of his attitude toward the judge 's nomination
is stated in a ''confidential" letter to his brother-in-law, James
Walker. As his motives in opposing White have often been
questioned, it seemes desirable to insert this letter in spite of its
length.
I have been so busily engaged in preparing the appropriation bills —
and those connected Avith the Banks that I have not heretofore taken leisure
to write to you. I have had nothing to do with the management — and
undercurrents which I understand have been going on here in regard to the
next Presidency. I have considered that it was my first duty to attend
to the important measures committed to the committee of which I am a
22 To editor of Knoxville Eegister (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson
White, 253).
23 Polk to White, Sept. 2, 1834, ibid., 254.
2-t White's biographer in commenting on this letter (of September,
1834) makes the rather astonishing statement that as soon as Polk ascer-
tained "the sentiments of Gen. Jackson in regard to his successor" he
shaped his "course according to the President's wishes, although motives
of personal jiolicy . . . decided him not to define his position until after
his reelection the ensuing August." She then goes on to show that Polk
and Cave Johnson "had determined to pick a quarrel" with White in
February, 1835 !
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PBESIDENCY 71
member. Tliis I have done and shall continue to do, and I am sure my
constituents will appreciate my services more than if I were engaged in
the intrigues of politicians with a view to my own personal advancement.
I liave no doubt that my constituents feel and think as 1 do, upon the sub-
ject of the succession, — but still they have not commissioned me here —
either to engage their votes, to commit them upon the subject or to express
tlieir opinions. As a citizen I shall have a right to my own opinion, — and
whenever there shall be occasion shall certainly exercise it. In regard to our
countryman Judge White I have said this, — that there was no man to
whom personally — I have ever had kindlier feelings, and that if he was
brought forward, or taken up and run by our political party, it would give
mo pleasure to support him, — but at tlie same time I think that the party
now dominant in the country, Avho have recently achieved so signal a victory,
have fought the battle to little purpose, if in the moment of this triumph,
they permit themselves to be divided & distracted about men, and thereby
perhaps enable our political adversaries to take advantage of our divisions, —
throAV the election into the House, Avhen there is danger that the money of
the Bank and the patronage of the Government, — would corrupt & purchase
votes enough to carry the election against us. It must certainly be the desire
of our party, who are emphatically — from the policy Ave advocate, the party
of the country,— if possible to continue united and not divide about men.
I think the party should unite if it be possible and run but one man, and
it would assuredly give me pleasure should Judge White be that man. Sup-
pose Ave divide and select more than one candidate, — and suffer the friends
of our respective candidates to become irritated & exci[ted] against each
other; may not the opposition, and avlU they not take adA^antage of such a
state of things, and at a moment when it shall be too late for us to retrace
our steps, and re-unite our friends in favor of any one, suddenly push out a
candidate of their oAvn, defeat an election before the people, throAV the elec-
tion into the House and thus stand a fair chance to come into poAver
against the popular will. To meet such a state of things I repeat A\'e
should continue united and if possible run but one man. Should Judge
White be the man upon whom the party unite, none Avould support him
with more pleasure than myself. Upon this subject, the present moment
may be an important crisis. As soon as Congress assembled, — many of the
opposition members expressed Avishes that Judge White should be brought
out and announced their intention to support him, — if he Avas &c. Their
motive for this, the game they Avill play hereafter or the subject they hope
to effect, I knoAv not except — that they Avould doubtless do any thing in
their poAver to divide & scatter us. That portion of our delegation in W*
Tennessee, Avho manifested such unprovoked hostility to me during the past
summer — I mean the Speaker, Dickinson &e. probably think they can make
something out of this state of things to my prejudice, and for their OAvn
purposes, — have been zealous, or pretended to be so, to bring Judge White
72 JAMES E. POLK
out at once, and at all events, without waiting to consult any portion of
the democratic party — residing in other states with whom we have so
long acted, — and who have so long acted with us in supporting the admin-
istration of tlie present Chief Magistrate. Ought they not to be at least
consulted before such a step is taken? But that portion of our delegation
probably think that by taking this course they will gain an advantage of
me in Tennessee and that by uniting with the opposition Mr. B[ell] may be
enabled to retain his place here at the next Congress, in the same way he
originally obtained it. The East Tennessee part of our delegation very
honestly and sincerely desire to see Judge White elected. On the day before
yesterday I was informed by Col. Standifer that there was to be a meeting
of the delegation, — on the night following (last night) upon the subject
and was requested to attend. On yesterday Mr. Lea spoke to me on the
subject & told me the meeting was to be at Peyton's room and urged us to
attend. I told him that my attending or not attending was a matter of no
consequence; — that neither my own opinions or that of my constituents of
Judge White would be changed, — whether I attended or not; that I had no
commission from my constituents to speak for them; that, that was a matter
they Avould attend to for themselves, Avhen the time came for them to act;
that I was very laboriously engaged in the discharge of my public duty as a
member of the House; and that I did not regard the proposed meeting as
any part of that duty. I told him furthermore that I could not but suspect
that, that portion of our delegation who are, without cause given by me so
exceedingly hostile to me, were prompted in this movement more in the hope
of injuring me, than for any love they had for Judge White. And further-
more I told him, that what was conducive against my attendance Avas this —
that I could not without losing all self-respect go into a consultation upon
any subject, — (unless public duty required it,) with that portion of our
delegation, — who had during the past summer through their organs and
tools so unjustly and wantonly assailed me, and especially when I was
informed that the meeting was to take place at the room of a coUeaguess
who was certainly unfriendly in his feelings towards me, and had never
invited me to come to it. For these reasons I declined and did not attend.
The meeting was held, Grundy, Blair & myself absent. Johnson attended —
but will probably communicate to the delegation his views in writing; they
entirely accord with mine. I understand that Dunlap (though I have not
talked to him) agrees in his views with Johnson and myself. I write you
very confidentially — that you may be apprised of what is going on Iiere.
From the unfairness -with which I have been treated in other things I liave
reason to suspect that letters may be written homo misrepresenting me upon
25 Peyton, who was White's nephew, had o])i)osed Polk in the Speaker-
ship election and had given as his reason, according to Cave Johnson, that
Polk had worked with the NuUifiers! (Johnson to Polk, July 15, 1834,
Polk- Papers).
JUDGE WRITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 73
tliis; — probably reprosenting from my absence from the meeting, that I am
unfriendly to Judge White &c. — and I look for nothing else than to see
some misinformation in regard to it, through the Nashville papers. I write
you to put you in possession of the facts, — that you may in the proper way,
and without using my letter publicly be enabled to put the matter right.
I wish you to take so much of your time from your business — which I know
to be pressing upon your time, as to write me your opinion fully & freely
upon the subject; — and whether you think I have acted prudently or not.
I have acted upon my convictions of what was proper, — and vnih feelings of
most perfect friendship for Judge White. Can I be affected by it?
James Walker, Esq.,
Columbia, Tenn.
Very sincerely,
Yr friend,
James K. Polkss
This letter seems to give ample reasons why a man of Polk's
well-known belief in party loyalty should not support the appar-
ently hopeless cause of Judge White. It is not fair to assume,
as the friends of White have done, that those who did not come
out for the judge were necessarily the abject creatures of General
Jackson. There was only one man whose support could, by any
possibility, have elevated White to the Presidential chair. That
man was Jackson himself ; and neither Polk nor those who acted
with him could hope, even if they had so desired, to alter the Presi-
dent's determination to aid Van Buren. To support White, as
Polk pointed out, would result in splitting the party and endang-
ering its success, without benefiting the judge in any particular.
It was too much to ask of Polk to cooperate with men whom he
both distrusted and despised as he did Bell and Peyton in sup-
porting a candidate who would inevitably be defeated. There
is no reason for questioning the sincerity of Polk's belief that
Bell was flirting with the opposition, as he had done when he
was a candidate for Speaker. The assertions made by Polk,
Grundy, and Johnson that they would gladly support White if
he could procure the party nomination were said by their oppon-
ents to be pure cant and of course there was no possibility of his
2« The letter is dated Dec. 24, 18.34, Polk Papers.
74 JAMES K. POLE
procuring such a nomination unless Jackson should change his
mind — but there is nothing in their private correspondence to
indicate that they did not really prefer White to Van Buren.
On the day after the above letter was written Polk wrote-^
another "confidential" letter to Walker. Alluding to the former
letter he said:
Since then the fact that a meeting took place and the objects of it has been
communicated to 28 and my course is higlily approved.
The meeting has attracted attention and things as they really are in Ten-
nessee, are beginning to be well understood here. He says that if Judge
White should be united upon and be a candidate of the party — that then he
should be supported by the party — but any portion of those professing to
be the friends of the administration who Avould bring him or any one else
out — without consulting the wishes of the friends of the administration in
other States, ■will eventually not only destroy him but themselves. The
storm I apprehended is to burst upon us, and we in Tennessee must be
I^repared to meet it. Wliatever our personal preferences for men may be, as
patriots we should go for the good of the country, — and to that end should
avoid divisions — and preserve if possible the integrity of the party.
The portion of the letter just quoted clearly indicates that Polk
declined to attend the meeting without having a consultation with
the President. Continuing, he told Walker that the person to
whom he has alluded (Jackson ?)
says he has already heard that it has been dropped out by some one of the
opposition, that the plan of their operation, is upon the Bell system, alluding
to the Speaker's election. I will not be hasty or imprudent in this matter, —
but may venture to communicate what is passing to you.^^
He wished to know whether Tennessee would probably send dele-
gates to the national convention of the party. He instructed
27 Polk to Walker, Dec. 25, 1834, Polk Papers.
2S Blanks in the copy in the Polk collection, but evidently moan Jackson.
-'■> Cave Johnson, Polk told Walker, had written to the Tennessee dele-
gation stating that he would not support White "if he is to be run by
the opposition Nationals and Nullifiers, — aided by a small portion of the
Jackson party." Polk, Dunla^j, and Blair felt the same way, and "Grundy
is more excited than I have almost ever seen him, — and seems almost
ready to come out and denounce the whole movement, — as calculated to
divide and destroy the party. ' '
JVDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 75
Walker to prevail upon the Columbia Observer to support the
regular nominee in ease its favorite should fail to procure the
nomination. To this Walker replied"*" that he preferred White
if he could be nominated by the party, but he feared that a split
would make success doubtful. He promised to induce the
Observer, if possible, to support the national ticket whoever
might be nominated.
In a formal statement prepared by Polk^^ several items con-
cerning the meeting of the Tennessee delegation in Washington
are related which are not mentioned in his letters to Walker.
According to this account, on the Sunday night before Congress
convened, while Polk was calling on Grundy, Duff Green came
in and urged that the Tennessee members should come out for
White. Green expressed his OAvn readiness to support the judge.
Polk remained silent, but Grundy replied that he was not pre-
pared to act on this subject. Although Polk had declined to meet
Mdth the other delegates. Lea, of Tennessee, came to the House
a few days after the meeting had been held and handed Polk a
letter which the delegation had prepared to send to Judge White.
There were no signatures attached and Lea explained that the
delegation had desired to have Polk sign it first. Polk replied
30 Jan. 12, 1835 (Poll: Papers). Walker had already written on Jan-
uary 7 that it had been reported in Tennessee that Bell and others in-
tended to run White whether he is chosen by the national convention or
not. "I believe Judge White is the most popular man in Tennessee ex-
cept Gen. Jackson, but I do not think it is certain that even he can get
the vote of Tennessee in opposition to the regular nomination of the
Eepublican party — it looks like suicide — and how can we mix with such
men as Poindexter and others of the same stamp?" He hopes that White
will not lend his name to the scheme.
31 It is addressed to J. B. & Co. (John Bell & Co.), but is changed into
a letter to Cave Johnson. It is dated January 20, but relates to events
that occurred as late as March 26. It probably is the first draft of his
statement addressed to Johnson under date of March 26. In another letter
to Johnson, dated March 28, Polk gives his reason for addressing him
instead of Bell. Bell's criticisms of Polk had been contained in a letter
written to Johnson, and, as Polk had received no comnninication directly
from Bell, he could not write to him; or, if he should do so, Bell woulil
not publish the letter. So it was sent to Johnson for publication at the
proper time.
76 JAMES E. POLE
that he had nothing against White, but would not act with a
portion of the party. A few days later Hubbard, of New Hamp-
shire, informed Polk that Green was trying to interest members
of Congress in the establishment of a White paper in Washing-
ton. Bell had tried to convince Hubbard that it would benefit
New Hampshire to join with the South and West in forming a
new party, but Hubbard declined to cooperate with liim. May,
of Illinois, told Polk that he had "stumbled on a caucus" com-
posed of Bell, Peyton, and other Tennessee members. To May's
protests against dividing the party, Bell replied that he saw no
sacrifice of principle in winning opposition votes. In all of
this Polk saw — or, at least, pretended to see — a plot of Bell,
Green, and Crockett'^- to use Judge White for the purpose of
overthrowing the Republican party.
The other side of the story is told in letters written to Cave
Johnson by other members of the Tennessee delegation. These.
White's biographer has published for the purpose of showing
the ' ' duplicity of Johnson and Polk. ' '^^ The essential difference
between these letters and those of Polk above quoted is that they
state that Polk and Johnson had expressed a preference for White
over any other man and had agreed to support him "under
any circumstances that he, Judge White, would permit his name
to be used," while Polk maintained that he had promised sup-
port only in case White should be nominated by the party. Which
of the two statements is correct we are unable to determine with
absolute certainty, but Polk's version accords with his invariable
practice of conforming to the party program. '^^
While Polk was declining to meet with Bell, his friend Brady
was sending to Jackson and to members of Congress copies of the
3- Crockett had signeil the letter to White.
33 Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 2;39-262.
34 Standifer asserted tliat the meeting of the delegation held for the
purpose of considering White's nomination "was a project of my own
without being j)roniptetl by any one." Both Polk and Grundy, he said,
after ascertaining that Bell would be there, declined to attend the meeting
{ihid., 260-262).
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 77
Murfreesborougli Monitor containing Bell's Murfreesborough
speech. He also urged upon Polk the necessity of establishing
an administration paper in Nashville. ''•'* The plan of the bolters,
he said, was "White for eight years, and then "the Speaker will
graciously condescend to take upon himself the burthens of
State."
There is abundant evidence that Polk's Tennessee friends
really believed that Bell and his adherents were plotting to divide
the part}'. Daniel Graham of Murfreesborough wrote-^" that,
M'hile he preferred White to any other man, he distrusted his
supporters. "No one here doubts," wrote Polk's brother-in-law,
W. K. Rucker, "that he [Bell] is a thorough Bank man and at
heart (though a dissembling hypocrite) one of Gen^ Jackson's
bitterest enemies."^' In the opinion of James Walker, another
brother-in-law. Van Buren was the only man who could lead the
part}' to victory. "We justly esteem and appreciate Judge
White, but cannot consent to become the tools of the opposition,
or to be associated in political feeling with such as Poindexter &
others. ' '^- A. V. Brown, one of Polk 's closest friends, preferred
White as a successor to Jackson but asked the question,
Do the Whigs really mean to do something finally for him — or is it a part
of their policy to make a present shew in his favor to effect division in the
Jackson ranks & so weaken Mr. Van Buren & then finally press some
favorite of their own & so throw the Election in the House ?39
Childress informed Polk^° that it was rumored in Nashville that
Bell and his friends were confident of throwing the election into
the House, where White would have a majority, and that they
35 Brady to Polk, Dec. 26, 1834, Polk Papers.
36 Graham to Polk, Jan. 2, 1835, Polk Papers.
3' Rucker to Polk, Jan. 5, 1835, Polk Papers. "Don't misunderstand
me," he added, "I like White as w-ell as any of these peoi^le, but 1 don't
like these intriguing friends of his." He urged Polk to inform Jackson
of the intrigues.
3s Walker to Polk, Jan. 15, 1835, Polk Papers.
3!* Brown to Polk, Jan. 15, 1835, Polk Papers.
•*o Childress to Polk, Jan. 23, 1835, Polk Papers. Childress was Mrs.
Polk 's brother.
78 • JAMES E. POLE
were equally confident of defeating Polk and Cave Johnson at
the coming election.
The anomalous situation in Tennessee Avas aptly put by
another of Polk's correspondents.
The more I reflect on the posture of affairs, the more am I provoked at the
success of iniquit)'. Ahiiost every man in the community who takes part
in or cares for public doings, finds himself occupying a false position which
he is compelled to defend. I shall find myself opposed to Judge White,
which is not true, so of Doct Eucker & thousands of others — whilst thousands
will find themselves opposed to Genl Jackson who are sincerely with him.
Furthermore Genl Jackson & Judge White will find themselves in hostile
attitude before the scene closes, whatever may be their hopes and expectations
now.4i
All agreed that John Bell was the man who had created this
embarrassing predicament.
No doubt the intriguing of White's supporters was greatly
exaggerated, but it seemed real enough to those who were striving
to preserve party solidarity. Jackson's determination to force
upon the people an unpopular candidate was after all the main
cause of the difficulty, for many could not pass White by and
support Van Buren without sacrificing their principles. Party
loyalty alone kept others from espousing White's cause, and for
some time many of Jackson's friends had hopes that he might
yet drop Van Buren and acquiesce in White's nomination.^-
The President, however, had no thought of abandoning his
favorite. He vehemently condemned the activities of the Tenn-
essee delegation, and he was beginning to regard Bell as an
enemy. '^ Back of the encouragement given to White by political
opponents was seen the hand of Henry Clay, who was believed
to be ready to seize any advantage that nught result from throw-
ing the election into the House.^*
41 Daniel Graham to Polk, Jan. 29, 1835, Polk Papers.
42 Gen. Sam '1 G. Smith to Polk, Feb. 3, 1835, Polk Papers.
43 Polk to Walker, Jan. 18, 1835, Polk Papers.
44 Copy of a letter from Polk to somebody in Tennessee, dated Feb-
ruary 7, 1835, Polk Papers. The letter was probably written to James
Walker; see Walker to Polk, Feb. 24, ibid.
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PEESIDENCY 79
After the meeting of the Tennessee delegation, White of
course realized that the members had divided on the question
of supporting him. He regretted the discord that had arisen hut
nevertheless declined to forbid the use of his name.*' On Decem-
ber 29, 1834, the delegation had addressed him a letter asking
if he would accept a nomination, and he replied in the affirma-
tive.*" He said afterwards that he would never have consented
to become a candidate but for Jackson's threat to make him
' ' odious to society ' ' if he did.*"
Outwardly, at least, the judge remained on friendly terms
with the Tennessee members of Congress who had opposed his
nomination until a controversy arose over a question of patron-
age. Polk and Johnson had recommended, and Jackson had
appointed, a district attorney for "West Tennessee without con-
sulting Senator White. In a letter to the two raen*^ White inti-
mated that there had been "secret contrivance" to bring about
the appointment. If, as White's biographer asserts, these two
Tennesseans "had determined to pick a quarrel with Judge
White," they now had their opportunity — and they certainly
made the most of it. They replied in a very caustic letter in
which they repelled what they regarded as insinuations against
themselves and the President. White's rejoinder was equally
caustic, and the break was complete.*"
It is quite possible that Polk may have welcomed such an
excuse for openly breaking with the judge. The time had arrived
when he must take a definite stand for one side or the other,
inasmuch as it was now certain that the opposition intended to
45 White to Alexander, Jan. 12, 1835 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson
White, 255).
*6 Correspondence in Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson White, 329-331.
•IT Speech at Knoxville, Aug. 1, 1838 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson
White, 359).
48 Dated Feb. 24, 1835 (Pom Papers).
49 The correspondence may be found in the Polk Papers under dates of
February 24-26. Part of it is printed in Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson
White, 256-259.
80 JAMES K. POLK
use White for the purpose of defeating the nomination of an
administration candidate — that is a regular Republican nomi-
nation/'" Such being the case, both self-interest and party loyalty
beckoned in the same direction, for he could expect no favors
from the men who were promoting the campaign for White's
nomination. Bell was his personal enemy and political rival;
many letters warned him that the White adherents were schem-
ing, as one put it, "to get White & the people upon one side &
Van Buren & my friend Col. Polk on the other. "^^ Having made
the inevitable choice, Polk endeavored, through James Walker
and other local leaders, to hold his constituents in line for the
administration, but White's popularity was already playing
havoc with party solidarity.^- At a political meeting held in
Columbia on February 12, Walker, by resolution, tried to pledge
the meeting to the "party candidate." The resolution was de-
feated by the aid of many who had hitherto been averse to
White's nomination."'^ Not long after this Walker felt certain
that White would carry Tennessee and he cautioned Polk that
"non interference may be your true position.""'*
Nearly all the newspapers in Tennessee favored White 's nom-
ination. Bell controlled both Nashville papers, and late in Feb-
ruary F. K. Zollicoffer, of the Columbia Observer, hoisted the
White banner. Polk and his friends in Middle Tennessee were
without an organ of influence until they established, a month
later, the Nashville Union., which White, in a speech in the Senate,
50 Polk to (probably Walker), Feb. 7, IS.^o, Poll- Papers.
51 James H. Thomas to Polk, Feb. 12, 1885, PoJk Papers. J. W. ChiM-
ress Avroto (Jan. 23) that Polk and Johnson had been marked for defeat.
Similar information came from Gen. Smith (Feb. 13), W. G. Childress and
James Walker (both Feb. 14), ibid.
52 Some in Tennessee, said W. G. Childress in his letter of February 14,
"seem to think or to say that Jackson, the Jackson ])nrty and Jackson
administration will soon be no more, that the whole will be swallowed in
the White party."
5:i "The small politicians arc all on the scent and expect to rise on the
White excitement" (Walker to Polk, Feb. 24, 1835, Polk Papers).
54 Walker to Polk, Feb. 28, 1835, ibid.
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 81
called a "vehicle of slanders and falsehoods, gotten up in this
city [Washington]" for the purpose of distorting the truth.''''
This paper was edited by Samuel II. Laughlin ; its policy was
directed by Polk, Grundy, and Judge Catron, who were mainly
responsible for its financial support.
Polk returned home after Congress had adjourned, only to
find White's prospects daily growing brighter. In a speech de-
livered at Columbia, April 20, he justified his refusal to join
other members of the delegation in asking White to run on the
ground that he had not been sent to Washington for the purpose
of making presidents. His personal preference had been for
-White, he said, if he could have been nominated by the Repub-
lican party.''" Grundy approved this speech, but as to any further
discussion of the subject his advice to Polk was that "the
judicious course is a plain one — say nothing."^'
In Washington, General Jackson was eagerly awaiting news
from Tennessee. He was now fully convinced of Bell's "per-
fidy," but apparently he did not yet realize the strength of the
White movement. In a long letter^^ he expressed a fear that
Polk's promised communication had been delayed by illness,
for I am sure the little noise, and various meetings, got up
by the instrumentality of Mr. Bell and Co. cannot have alarmed
you." After delivering a homily on the iniquity of abandoning
principles, and citing Clay, Calhoun, and Burr as horrible ex-
amples, he said that "Mr. Bell, Davy Crockett & Co. has placed
Judge White in the odious attitude of abandoning principle &
party for office," and with the association of the nullifiers
The eyes of the people soon were opened to this Avicked plan, to divide and
conquer the Democracy of the union, prostrate the present administration
by making it odious by crying out corruption and misrule, and being sup-
ported by office holders, and corruption, thereby to bring into power the
55 Scott, Memoir of Hugh Luicson White. 292.
56 Speech printed in the Washington Globe, May 29, 1835.
5" Grundy to Polk, May 11, 1835, Polk Papers.
58 Jackson to Polk, May 3, 1835, ibid. The letter was marked "private
for your own eye — it is wrote in haste."
82 JAMES E. POLK
opposition, recharter the United States Bank, destroying tlie republican
government & substitute in its stead, a consolidated government under the
controle of a corrupt monied monopoly.
After scanning this doleful picture of a future possibility. Polk
must have felt relieved when he read further on that "Mr. Bell
& Co. have not succeeded — Virginia is erect again." "Surely,"
continued the President, "Tennessee will never put herself in
the false position of joining the piedbald opposition of "Whiggs,
nullifiers, blue light federalists, and Hartford convention men.
It cannot be — heaven and every principle of virtue and repub-
licanism forbid it." Had White remained wath his party, said
Jackson, he might have procured the Vice-Presidency, but
he has been placed by Mr, Bell & Co. as the candidate of the opposition
under the odious imputation of abandoning his old republican principles &
party, for office, and whether he has or not the world has taken up that
opinion, and he never can regain the confidence of that party again. The
opposition never intended that he should be elected, they meant to divide,
that they might conquer for Mr. Clay who, you may rely, is to be their
candidate at last.
He had hopes that "judge White's eyes may be opened and he
will now see that he is in a false position and abandon Bell, Davy
Crockett & Co., and withdraw himself from the odious attitude
intriguing apostates have placed him [in]."
It was doubtless pleasing news that Jackson thus fixed the
blame for disrupting the party upon Polk's own enemies, Bell
and Crockett. Equally pleasing must it have been to read that
You and Grundy, (by the true Republicans in Congress) are looked to, to
take a firm and open stand in favour of the republican principles, a national
convention by the people, and in toto, against nullification & disunion — and
against little caucuses, of a few apostate members of congress, & preserve
Tennessee from the disgrace of uniting with the piebald opposition to put
down my administration, and my fame with it, and gi-ve the reigns of
Government into the hands of those who have recently conspired to recharter
the Bank.
In this fight for pi'inciples, said the President, all must take a
definite stand; "do your duty (as you have done here) at home,
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 83
ami you will stand high with the republicans everywhere." Sav-
ing Tennessee proved to be a more diflficult ta§k than Jackson
had anticipated, but, by attempting to do so, Polk and Grundy
earned his undying gratitude.
In the President's opinion, two mutually antagonistic factions
had joined forces for the purpose of destroying the Republican
party. While Bell and Clay were aiming at consolidated govern-
ment, Calhoun and his friends were using White's name "to build
up a Southern confederacy and divide the union." The President
still spoke of White with regret more than anger. He did not
charge him with being either a consolidationist or a nullifier,
and he still had hopes that the judge would free himself from
the intluence of evil associates.
Jackson was much encouraged by the success won by his party
in Virginia, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. As to Tennessee
he had fears, but he also had hopes. "Can it be," he said in
closing his letter,
that Tennessee Avill abandon republican principles and be ranked -with
apostates, nuUifiers & bluelight Federalist — Tristam Burges says she will —
forbit it virtue, forbit it heaven — Tennessee has sustained me thus far,
and I trust she never will abandon her principles for any person.
In another long letter written to Polk on May 12, Jackson vented
his wrath upon those who held political control of the state for
their refusal to participate in the national nominating conven-
tion.^'' "How it is," he asked, "that there is no man in the
Republican ranks to take the stump, and relieve Tennessee from
her degraded attitude ? ' ' This question may have been intended
as a hint for a more aggressive stand on Polk's part. "If I was
a mere citizen of Tennessee again," he continued, "and wanted
59 For example, the Nashville Banner, denouncing the national conven-
tion, said: "So long as we live and breathe American air, we v\'ill resist
the insidious proposition (whensoever and wheresoever it may originate),
to lay at the feet of village politicians and placemen, who most usually fill
conventions, the inestimable privilege of thinking and acting for ourselves
in the choice of our rulers." Quoted in Niles' Register (March 28, 1835),
XL VIII, 58.
84 JAMES K. POLK
everlasting fame, I would ask no other theatre to obtain it than
before the people of Tennessee. ""^ In this letter Jackson spoke
of the seceders as "White Whiggs, " and although both White
and Bell still claimed membership in the Republican party, the
press of both parties was beginning to class them as Whigs. ^^
It was becoming the custom to apply this name to the National
Republicans, of whom Clay was a recognized leader ; they, Avith
the White supporters, constituted the new Whig party.®-
The desire of the Jacksonites to identify White and Bell with
the Clay faction of the Whigs w^as aided materially by the dis-
covery of Bell's "Cassedy" or "Bedford" letter of May 11,
1835.*'^ There is nothing particularly damaging to either man
in the letter itself, but as construed and placed before the people
by their opponents, it was said to be a pledge that White, if
elected, would not veto any law for rechartering the bank. The
latter part of it was construed as a suggestion that Polk's
00 In Poll' Papers. Jackson 's signature has been cut from this letter.
01 "Elected, if elected at all, by the votes of the Whigs, he [White]
will naturally and necessarily select his councillors from their ranks, and
modify his measures according to their views." Richmond Whig, quoted
by Richmond Enquirer, and reprinted in Washington Globe, May 4, 1835.
02 In his letter of May 3 to Polk, above quoted, Jackson spoke of
"modern Whiggs." He often omitted the h, and invariably used the
double g.
03 It was written to Cliarles Cassedy of Bedford County, Tennessee,
and read as follows:
"Dear Sir: You w'ill receive enclosed, the manifesto of the White
cause and party. I think it contains our principles and the argument upon
which they may be sustanied briefly set forth.
* ' You will see by my letter all I know of Judge White 's views about
the Bank. He doubtless never will swerve from them, but it w^ould be
most unprecedented, and do him, and very justly too, a great injury, to
be declaring before hand, that he would put his veto upon any measure
whatever. It would be said to be an electioneering declaration, and be-
sides Mr. Van Buren has given no such pledges.
"To defeat me for the Speaker's chair, is the main interest which
Mr. Polk and Johnson have in this whole contest, as I believe.
"It would not <io to ask Polk to vote for me against himself, but he
might be made to pledge himself to go for me against any other candidate.
My course in appointing him chairman of the Committee of Ways and
Means could be used to show that 1 have not been influenced by personal
considerations against him, when the country is concerned.
' ' Yours truly, * < j^jjj^ g^LL. ' '
Printed in Nashville Union, April 5, 1839.
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 85
constituents should pledge him to cast his vote for Bell in the
election of a Speaker. Between the lines there was seen a threat
to defeat Polk in his campaign for reelection to Congress unless
he should give such a pledge. The rumored contents — before
its publication — were far worse than the letter itself, and its
appearance in print failed to counteract the effect which the
rumors had produced.*^*
Knowing that the people still believed in Jackson des{)ite their
loyalty to Judge White, Bell, who was himself a candidate for
reelection, published a long letter in the Nashville Republican
denying that he had "brought White out" in the sense and for
the reasons claimed by the Democrats. ' ' I am not against Jack-
son or his administration," he wrote, "but I am opposed to Mr.
Van Buren.""^ As a blow at Polk, however, he published in a
]\IcMinnville paper extracts from the correspondence which had
passed between Cave Johnson and the Tennessee delegation at
the time that White had been invited to become a candidate.
Bell's adversaries now published the entire correspondence in
the Nashville Union, and that journal highly commended the
course which had been pursued by Polk, Grundy, and Johnson.
From T. J. Pew, of Kentucky, Laughlin, the editor, learned that
during the previous autumn Bell had urged Col. R. M. Johnson
to become a candidate on the bank ticket''*^ and this paper now
claimed to have conclusive proof of Bell's affiliations with the
bank. His "Cassedy" letter was published in the Union on
June 26, and Grundy confidently assured Polk that "that letter
will make you Speaker, I think. ' '**'
During this same month (May 20) Van Buren was nominated
for the Presidency by the Baltimore convention, and a bitter
6* A similar letter was written by Bell to a man in Giles Couut.y
(Kineannon to Polk, June 1, 1835, Polk Papers). Kincannon said that he
had seen the letter.
65 Copied by the Washington Globe, May 28, 1835.
06 Lau<,rhlin to Polk, May 30, 1835, Polk Papers. Pew said that he had
seen Bell's letter to Johnson.
cv Grundy to Polk, June 25, 1835, ibid.
86 JAMES E. POLE
national campaign was waged in Tennessee simultaneously with
the contest for supremacy between Polk and Bell. Although
Jackson had, in his "Gwin letter,""® asserted that it was to be a
convention ' ' fresh from the people ' ' to whose will all in the party
ought to submit, it was well known that this body had been called
together for the sole purpose of ratifying the "appointment"
already made by the President. His letter to Gwin had failed to
produce the desired effect, for Tennessee did not even send dele-
gates to the convention at Baltimore. Still unwilling to believe
that the people of his state could fail to do his bidding, Jackson
caused a statement to be circulated to the effect that the contest
was really between himself and White, and not between the
judge and Van Buren.*^^
There was much vituperation on either side during the months
which preceded the congressional elections in Tennessee. Both
parties seemed to realize that, if elected, Polk would be chosen
Speaker of the House. Polk was popular in his district and many
of the "White Whigs" remained loyal to him. Toward the close
of the campaign, the Bell forces became more moderate in their
criticisms, for it had become apparent that by indulging too
freely in denunciations they had strengthened both Polk and
Van Buren.^"
Confident of victory, Jackson, from his retreat at "Rip
Raps," was already planning work for Polk to do as soon as he
had been reelected.'^ Polk, Grundy, and Johnson were to get up
meetings which would instruct Representatives in Congress to vote
against the chartering of any bank. They were also to induce the
state legislature to instruct the Senators from Tennessee to vote
<isNUes' Register, XLVIII, 80-81.
«9 Scott, Memoir of Hugh Laicson White, 385.
-0 Polk to Jackson, Aug. 14, 1835, reporting his victory at the polls,
Poll- Popers.
'1 Clay, said the President, is the real candidate of the opposition, and
Bell will" sacrifice White and try to get votes for himself in the Sjieaker-
ship election. "The Judge will be left politically prostrate as ever Aron
Burr was, and as few to sympathize with him on his downfall."
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 87
for Benton's expunging resolution and against a bank charter.
In order to preclude the charge of persecution, he advised that
the local meetings should draft their instructions before the legis-
lature had convened and before either Bell or White had been
nominated for reelection as members of Congress. In any event,
Bell's "Cassedy letter" would be a sufficient answer to any such
charge.'- And yet the man who wrote this letter vehemently
denied that he ever interfered with the free choice of the people !
Some of the party politicians^^ were inclined to doubt the wis-
dom of having the members of Congress instructed by local meet-
ings. They were not given much choice, however, in the matter
of instructing Senators, for the President himself prepared an
outline of instructions, which he sent to Governor Carroll. Major
Guild was selected to present the instructions in the legislature.
Jackson sent to Carroll, also, two volumes of the Extra Glohe
which contained Benton's speeches and other materials that might
be useful for reference. He instructed Polk to repair to Nash-
ville before the meeting of the legislature for the purpose of
arranging everything for prompt action.'* He also urged Polk
to be in Washington a few days before the opening of Congress,
and "there must be a meeting of the friends of the administration
& select the candidate for Speaker and elect him the first ballott."
He did not state explicitly that Polk would be that candidate, but
his assurance that "the New England states will sustain you"
indicates that Polk was the President's own choice for the office."
72 Jackson to Polk, Aug. 3, 1835, Folic Papers.
73 For example, A. V. Brown (Brown to Polk, Aug. 27, 1835, Polk
Papers).
74 "You must be in Nashville some days before the Assembly meets,
every arrangement ought to be made, and as soon as the House is formed
the resolutions ought to be offered, or the opposition will forestall you by
a set prepared for their own pallate be prompt and do not permit your-
selves to be outgeneraled, the first blow is half the battle, and as they
are preparing to elect a Senator, these resolutions will strike terror &
confusion in their ranks— produce a panic, and blow up all their digested
arrangements, and will add all the doubting members to your ranks.
75 Jackson to Polk, Sept. 15, 1835, PoUc Papers. ' ' When you read &
note burn this" was his final instruction.
88 JAMES K. POLK
Even if there had not already existed a strong personal friend-
ship between Polk and the President, their common desire to
overthrow the Bell-White faction was sufficient to identify their
political interests.
For the next two months Polk kept Jackson well informed on
passing events in Tennessee. With Donelson, also, he kept up
a separate correspondence, concerning which they did not always
take the President into their confidence.'^*' Donelson did not
share Jackson 's belief that the legislature would adopt the Guild
resolutions to instruct the Senators from Tennessee."
In October, while the legislature was in session, Judge White
visited Nashville and other nearby towns, where public dinners
were given in his honor. Without assigning any reasons, Polk
curtly declined to attend any of these, but he reported to the
President that White had taken advantage of the occasions to
electioneer for himself and to censure Polk, Grundy, and other
supporters of the administration. Jackson was much incensed
by this information, but he still believed that the effect of the
judge's speeches would be counteracted by the debate in the
legislature on the expunging resolutions. "Mark these words,"
he wrote to Polk, "have the yeas & nays taken upon them, and
all who votes against them will be taught by the people of Tenn-
essee that they have misrepresented them."'^ White, in Jack-
son's opinion, could not be too severely condemned for attacking
Polk and other members of Congress ; ' ' rouse Grundy & Johnson
into action, and I will vouch for the virtue of the people. ' '~^
The President's wish for prompt action on the expunging
resolutions was doomed to disappointment ; a wearisome discussion
70 Both suspected that Bell had a spy in the President 's household l\y
whom he was supplied with administration secrets, but they give no clew
as to whom they suspect (Donelson to Polk, Sept. 24, 1885, Polk Papers).
-- Donelson to Polk, Oct. 20, 1835, ihid.
7s"T cannot yet believe," he continued, "that the democratic repub-
licans of Tennessee can be so unjust to me, as to unite with Clay & the
opposition in condemning me for preserving the constitution.
7'J Jackson to Polk, Oct. 20, 1835, Pollc Papers.
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 89
followed the introduction of the subject. On the other hand,
the legislature very promptly nominated White for the Presi-
dency, even before Jackson's above-quoted letter had i-eaehed
Tennessee. In his letter of acceptance, White declared emi)hati-
cally that his political principles had undergone no change ; that
the administration forces, and not he, luid deserted the traditional
party standards and become "a mere f action. '"^'^ After the
formal nomination liad been made the people regarded the cam-
paign as a contest between Jackson and White, and the Presi-
dency was the principal topic of discussion at every local gath-
ering. The country people generally stood loyally by the Presi-
dent, while those living in towns were more apt to favor White. ^^
After the congressional delegation had set out for Washing-
ton— Polk to be elected Speaker over his arch enemy. Bell, and
Johnson to frighten his friends by his near approach to a duel
with the much hated Bailie Peyton^- — the legislature continued
the acrimonious debates on Jackson's expunging resolutions. To
add variety, the Wliite supporters in the legislature were accused
by their opponents of fraud in connection with the public print-
ing. While the debate was in progress, Jackson sent appeals for
support to members of the legislature, and it was said that Polk
had prepared the list to be thus solicited. White, also, corre-
sponded with some of the members. He made no attempt to in-
fluence their votes, but his exposure of the methods employed by
the President to defeat him undoubtedly brought him support.
Strong language was used by both sides, and members did not
hesitate to call General Jackson a "dictator" or to accuse him
of trying to appoint his successor.*^
80 The documents relating to White's nomination are printed in Scott,
Memoir of Hugh Lawsnn White, 331-334.
81 J. W. Childress to Polk, Nov. 22, 1835, Poll: Papers.
82Laughlin to Polk, Dec. 1; J. W. Johnson to Polk, Dec. 9, 1835, Polk
Papers.
83 A. O. P. Nicholson to Polk, Feb. 4, 1836, ibid. "It is declared every-
day & by the leaders, that to Mr. Van B's personal character they do not
object— ^but their great objection is, to Pres* Jackson nominating his
successor" (Catron to Polk, Jan. 8, 1836, ibid.).
90 JAMES K. POLE
Both Jackson and Bell were said to have flooded the state
with "franked" political literature for the purpose of influencing
both the legislature and the people. But the command of the
"old hero" was no longer as of yore. The legislature which
had so recently nominated Judge White now declined to instruct
him to vote for Benton 's expunging resolution®*
Polk was elected Speaker of the House by a large majority,
and both in Washington and in Tennessee the defeat of Bell for
that office was expected to injure White's prospects in his own
state. ' ' It was urged by the faithful, ' ' wrote White,
that by the election of Polk, the vote of Tennessee would be changed.
The course of Alabama, ss it was said, will be followed by the legislature
of Tennessee, and in a very short time my name will be dropped every-
where. . . . Everything which can be done to my injury, within their
power, is done by Grundy and Johnson, from my own State, and probably
by Polk, also. 80
Party leaders in Tennessee undoubtedly believed that White
would now withdraw from the race, or that in any case Van
Buren would carry the state. Polk received many letters ex-
pressing this opinion.'*' Their hopes of defeating the judge were
somewhat disturbed by the refusal of the legislature to instruct
him on the expunging resolutions, but they were revived, by the
expected effect of White's votes against some of Jackson's ap-
pointments and by his arguments and vote in favor of Clay's
land distribution bill.®^
84 E. H. Foster to White, Feb. 26, 1836 (Scott, Memoir of Hu(ih Lawson
White, 337).
»-> The legislature of Alabama nominated White, but on the condition
that he should be "the choice of the republican party throughout the Union."
80 White to Geo. W. Churchwell, Jan. 3, 1836 "(Scott, Memoir of Hugh
Lawson White).
•'-"Among the rest Nicholson wrote (January 22) that since Polk's
election the White men had practically given up the struggle; "all ex-
citement here has subsided, and the election of V. B. is given up by all but
Gen. Barrow. ' '
88 Walker to Polk, April 11, 1836. White 's vote on the land bill ' ' must
seal his fate," wrote Laughlin to Cave Johnson on May 9. One of White 's
admirers said at a ])olitical meeting that he "had followed White to his
grave when he [White] voted for the land bill — and that he could not
stand to bo buried with him" (Herndon to Polk, May 25, 1836). All in
Polk Papers.
JUDGE WHITE AND THE PRESIDENCY 91
One of the mosj; serious handicaps of the administration party
in Tennessee was the weakness of their press. The Bell-White
faction had procured control of the leading newspapers in Nash-
ville and elsewhere. The Nashville Union was the main Demo-
cratic organ and Polk was in constant receipt of letters from
Laughlin, its editor, which stated that the paper was approaching
bankruptcy. Laughlin himself was enthusiastic but unreliable.
Many a letter from Nashville politicians reported to Polk that
"Laughlin has been drunk for a week." Near the close of the
campaign he became so untrustworthy that Judge Catron was
obliged to edit the Union.^°
For our present purpose it is unnecessary to follow in detail
the remainder of White's campaign for the Presidency. By
splitting the Democratic party and by bringing to Polk the
powerful support of General Jackson, it was one of the prin-
cipal factors in elevating Polk to the Speaker's chair. In his
attitude toward White, Polk may have in some degree played the
"unscrupulous partisan" which Parton says he was,"° but the
political situation which resulted from White's candidacy left
him very little choice. ^^ He could not cooperate with Bell, and
it would have been political suicide to break with the President.
With the remainder of this campaign Polk's political wel-
fare was not so intimately connected. It will therefore be treated
incidentally only, in connection with his career as Speaker of the
House.
89 Catron to Polk, Sept. 6, 1836, PoJk Papers.
90 Parton, Life of Andretv Jackson, III, 617.
91 That partisan Democrats really believed Judge White to have been
made the tool of designing politicians and his own ambition is well indi-
cated by Laughlin 's entry in his diary on hearing of the death of White.
' ' So, here is the end of ambition — of the ambition of an old politician who
had been betrayed and deceived by his pretended friends, John Bell and
others, into a course of intrigue and tergiversation, which had cast him
from the Senate, had lost him the esteem of all good men in his state, and
had embittered his latter days, and probably shortened his life. What a
warning his example ought to afford to all thinking and candid men!"
(Diary, April 14, 1840). As White carried the state by an overwhelming
majority, there must inded have been a dearth of ' ' good men ' ' and a
surplus of rascals!
CHAPTER VI
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON
Following Jackson's advice Polk went to "Washington late in
November, 1835, in order to prepare the way for his election as
Speaker.^ The twenty-fourth Congress assembled on December
7, and, as the President had planned, Polk was elected on the
first ballot. The coveted office was his reward for party loyalty,
but he soon discovered that he must also pay the penalty of his
success by being the object of more heckling and abuse than had
fallen to the lot of any of his predecessors. The Democrats had
a substantial majority in the House and were able to carry their
measures; but the knowledge of this power only made their op-
ponents more determined to goad the majority by obstructive
tactics and by personal vituperation.
The entire period of Polk's speakership was one of i)olitieal
unrest, sectional discord, and personal animosity. Those who
had so recently been friends and relentless in pursuing the com-
mon enemies, Adams and Tobias Watkins, hated one another all
the more cordially now that the party was disintegrating, for
each faction believed the other treacherously to have abandoned
traditional party principles. On his own account, Polk had to
suffer the slings and arrows of his brilliant but censorious rival,
and of Peyton, Crockett, and other personal enemies. In addi-
tion, all who harbored grudges against the ' ' military chieftain ' ' —
whether Nullifiers or Whigs — took keen delight in vitriolic at-
tacks upon the administration, and in making it personally un-
comfortable for tlie Speaker, whom they charged with being the
President's creature and obedient slave. To this potpourri of
1 Jackson to Polk, Sept. 15, 1835, Folic Papers.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UN DEE JACKSON 93
discord was added the battle between Adams and the southern
fire-eaters over the abolition petitions. Each side accused the
Speaker of unfairness and harrassed him with hairsplitting ques-
tions of i)arlianientary procedure. Fortunately for himself his
knowledge of detail, his methodical mind, and his habitual cool-
ness under the most trying ordeals, enabled him to pi-eside over
the exciting debates with dignit}^ and success when many a more
brilliant man would have met with failure.
The disposition to humiliate Polk was manifested even before
he had been elected. As soon as the House had been called to
order, the clerk announced the first business to be the election
of a Speaker by ballot. To this customary procedure Patton and
others objected, and insisted upon a viva voce election. Except
for showing a disposition on the part of the opposition to resort
to annoying tactics whenever possible, this attempt to alter the
mode of election was of little importance, for the House pro-
ceeded to ballot as usual, and Polk received one hundred and
thirty-two votes to eighty-four for Bell — a vote which Benton
says "was considered a test of the administration strength, Mr.
Polk being supported by that party. ' '-
The President's message was sent to Congress on the second
day of the session. Evidently descrying the gathering war clouds,
Jackson called attention to the dangers that would result from
internal dissensions. He again recommended the adoption of an
amendment to the Constitution which would prevent the election
of a President from devolving upon the House. It is unlikely,
however, that he had much hope that his suggestion would be
followed.
The standing committees were announced by the Speaker on
the fourteenth of December. In forming them, Polk followed
the usual custom of placing safe party majorities on those which
would have the shaping of important legislation. In so doing
he simply followed precedent ; but he had. when a minority
2 Benton, Thirty Tears' View, I, 569.
9-4 JAMES K. POLK
member, condemned the practice, and by adhering to precedent
now he became the object of criticism and abuse.
The first difficult problem which confronted the new Speaker
was the disposition of abolition petitions. On December 18,
1835, Jackson, of Massachusetts, presented a memorial in which
citizens of his state asked Congress to abolish slavery in the
District of Columbia. Hammond, of South Carolina, moved that
the petition "be not received," but Polk ruled that such a motion
had never before been presented to the House and that under
the rules it was not in order. When Hammond offered another
motion to "reject" the petition, Polk ruled that any petition
might be rejected after it had been received. Although his
rulings were logical and fair, they were assailed by the contest-
ants on either side. The Speaker's motives were impugned and
appeals were taken to the House, but even John Bell admitted
that Polk had made the best disposition of a new and debatable
question. This particular petition was sent to the table on Decem-
cember 21 ; but others like it soon appeared, and the ' ' right of
petition" became one of the most heated topics of debate. The
Glohe upheld the cause of the petitioners. Should the House,
it said, yield to the demands made by Hammond and Wise and
refuse to receive such petitions, it would be violating one of the
most sacred constitutional guaranties.^
Nearly all of the northern members held that all petitions
from American citizens must be received and that, after recep-
tion, Congress might dispose of them as it pleased. Southern
members did not deny the right of petition, in the abstract ; they
were willing, they said, to receive '*hona fide" petitions. But
radicals from that section argued that, inasmuch as the peti-
tioners in question were asking something which did not fall
within the power of Congress to perform, tliere could be no obli-
gation to receive requests to do the impossible.
3 Washington Globe, Jan. 1, 1836.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 95
On February 8, Pinckney, of South Carolina, presented a
resolution which prescribed a method for dealing with anti-
slavery petitions. After its passage by Congress it was popu-
larly known as the "gag rule." It directed that all memorials,
already presented or to be presented, praying for the abolition
of slavery in the District of Columbia should be referred to a
select committee. By the same resolution the committee was in-
structed to report that Congress possessed no power to interfere
with slavery in states and ought not to interfere with it in the
District. Regarded as a compromise, tbe resolution was passed,
by a large majority, but its provisions did not win the approval
of extremists on either side. Slavery restrictionists condemned
a measure which to them seemed a combination of cowardice and
tyranny, while southern hotspurs like Hammond and Wise w^ere
dissatisfied because Congress would not reject all petitions re-
lating to this subject. The recalcitrant members raised endless
technical objections and appealed repeatedly from the decisions
of the chair, but only in one instance did the House fail to sustain
the rulings of the Speaker. Of all the objectors, Wise was the
most abusive and unfair. Among other things he accused Polk of
trying to force members to "vote like mules" without affording
them an opportunity to consider the questions to be decided.
Pinckney 's resolution did not succeed in precluding further
debate on the subject of slavery. Briggs, of Massachusetts, pre-
sented another petition on February 15, and, in response to a
question put by Wise, Polk decided that the Pinckney resolution
applied only to petitions which had already been received.. There-
upon Wise moved that the Briggs petition "be not received,"
and the Speaker ruled the motion to be in order. The ruling
was clearly an error on Polk's part, and his decision was over-
ruled by a vote of the House. His apparent concession to Wise
was severely criticized by both northern and southern men.
Among the latter, Manning, of South Carolina, said that the
effect of the Speaker's decision would be to renew the angry
96 JAMES E. POLK
sectional debates which the supporters of the Pinckney resolution
had hoped to obviate ; in addition, it M^as an arbitrary setting
aside of the will of the House. "If the Speaker," continued
IManning, "can b}^ his decision reverse this resolution . . . then
he has power to suspend, alter, or change, any deliberate act of
this House, intended as a rule for its governance."^ The vote
of the House settled the question for the session at least. The
effect of the reversal of Polk's decision was to apply the "gag
rule" to all petitions that might appear, and to refer them auto-
matically to the select committee. It was, of course, well under-
stood that they would not be considered or reported back by the
committee.
The Nashville Repuhlican criticized Polk for being unable to
keep order in the House. It contrasted him unfavorably with
Bell, and proved his incompetence by citing numerous appeals
that had been taken from his decisions. The Globe replied that
the disorder and appeals were machinations of Bell's henchmen,
who had been purposely trying to discredit the Speaker. It
pointed with pride to the fact that only one of his decisions — a
new rule which Polk had construed in favor of the Bell men —
had been reversed by the House.^
The twenty-fourth Congress had not been long in session be-
fore the candidacy of Judge White entered into the debates of
the House. On January 2, 1836, the Globe charged that Nulli-
fiers, like Wise, and Abolitionists were supporting White for no
other reason than to draw votes from Van Buren. For the same
reason, it said, Webster was urged to run on a ticket of his own.
In turn, Wise embraced every opportunity to attack the Presi-
dent and administration members, including the Speaker, and
to accuse them of engaging in political intrigues.
* Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 1 sess., App., 145.
5 "The truth is, Mr. Polk has deserved the confidence of the House by
a firm, faithful, industrious, and able discharge of his duties." This paper
denied that Polk desired or had been offered a place in the cabinet, for
the administration wished him to remain in the Speaker's chair (Wash-
ington Globe, March IC, 1836).
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 97
Such an opportunity was presented when Adams moved that
a certain passage of the President's message be referred to a
sek^et committee. During the hist days of the twenty-third Con-
gress the House had passed, as part of tlie general api)roi)riation
bill, an item of $3,000,000 to be expended for national defense
by order of the President. As the two houses had been unable
to agree on certain details, the measure was defeated in the
Senate. The President in his message deplored the failure of
Congress to pass this necessary measure, and again recommended
the appropriation. Adams moved that the subject be referred
to a select committee for the purpose of ascertaining by whose
fault the appropriation had been lost.® While debating the
question, Wise sarcastically remarked that it was a most import-
ant subject, for "the fate of the presidential canvass is in part
made to depend upon it. ' ' The President, he said, had intended
to use the money as a secret service fund ; had Cambreleng not
refused to accept the reasonable amendments proposed by the
Senate, the measure would have carried. He charged Polk with
having solicited votes for the appropriation on the plea that the
President desired it, and with having requested the members
solicited to refrain from mentioning this fact." Scarcely a mea-
sure came before the House that was not made by Wise the motif
for an assault upon the administration. His criticisms of the
Speaker were many and bitter, and frequent though futile were
his appeals from the decisions of the chair. Polk's friends
thought that Wise and Peyton were trying to provoke the Speaker
into fighting a duel ; even his own family feared that blood might
be shed.^
c The National InteJUgencer had asserted that the House, not the Senate,
had been at fault — a charge which Adams resented.
7 Jan. 21, 22, 29. Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 1 sess.
8 James Walker advised Polk to treat their abuse with contempt. No
one, he said, would doubt the Speaker's physical courage. The whole
matter was, in his opinion, a scheme of Bell to disgrace Polk by drawing
him into a duel with either Wise or Peyton (Walker to Polk, March 14,
1836, Polk Papers).
98 JAMES K. POLK
Although Bell was less abusive than either Wise or Peyton,
he frequently questioned the justice of the Speaker's rulings and
accused him of partisan bias.^ On February 3, 1836, during a
debate on the reference of a Senate bill for limiting the terms of
certain officers, Bell said that never before had so many things
of importance been excluded from the discussions of the House
"by forms and decisions upon the rules." His principal speech
of the session was delivered while the naval appropriation was
being discussed in the House. He had little to say on the sub-
ject under consideration, but, having avowed his intention "to
indulge the privilege of debate to the utmost limit of parliamen-
tary license," he launched into an extended discussion of "the
general policy of the present Administration, as lately devel-
oped."^" He employed the present occasion, he said, because
those who were in control of the House took good care to exclude
any resolution to which such remarks as he desired to make would
be really germane. After twitting the Speaker wdth having
changed his opinions on the subject of patronage," he arraigned
the administration party for having abandoned the principles
on which General Jackson had been chosen President. It was
not surprising, he said, that strange doctrines should appear,
inasmuch as the single principle which is common to the present
majority is unlimited devotion, not to any particular creed, but
to the party. He pointed out with remarkable precision the evils
of abject partyism, and the inevitable abuses which result from
9 Perhaps, as was later suggested by the Boston Age (Aug. 17, 1836),
prudence led Bell to refrain from leading the assault and to delegate this
function to his two associates. Still, Wise needed little urging, and the
fact that Bailie Peyton was a nephew of Judge White was sufficient to
account for his animosity.
10 March 16, 22, 2.5, 18.36. Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 1 sess., App., 722 ff.
11 "It was, I believe, a private scheme [earlier] of my colleague, who
is now the presiding officer of this House [Mr. Polk] to take from the
Secretary of State the power of designating the publishers of the laws,
and to vest it in the House of Representatives; so important at that day
was the purity of the public press regarded by the Jackson party. ' '
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 99
personal government by a popular hero.^- His own speech Avas
no doubt intended for caini)aign purposes, but the picture which
he drew of existing evils was none the less accurate on that ac-
count. If it lacked in any particular, it was in being too char-
itable to the President himself, for after all Jackson was the
individual most responsible for perpetuating those evils in the
interest of party discipline. There were other critics of the
12 "How has it happened that these abuses have not only been suflfered
to exist, but even to increase, under an Administration so decidedly pop-
ular and powerful"? When this problem shall be solved to the satisfaction
of the public, the remedy will be supplied. The true answer to the ques-
tion, how these abuses came to exist under such an Administration, is,
because the Administration is such as it is, because it is popular. Every
man of sound mind and lawful age knows that the President, nor any
other being of created existence, can exercise a personal inspection and
superintendence over all, or even a tenth part of the most important de-
tails of the public service. Yet every important transaction connected
with the public service is so managed by the subordinate officers, as to
throw the responsibility upon the President. If the delinquent officers
do not do this themselves, their defenders in Congress and out of Congress
do not fail, in effect, to fix the responsibility there. Whether in Congress,
or in the country, complaint is made of abuse in any branch of the public
service, the answer is, eternally, that the charge is meant as an attack
upon General Jackson ! His great name and popularity are the shield and
buckler of every official delinquent, whether from incompetency or infi-
delity, from a clerk to the head of a Department — from the register or
receiver of a land office, or an Indian agent, to a Minister Plenipotentiary!
The name and services of General Jackson, I repeat, are invoked to shield
and cover, as with a mantle, every official transgression or omission, from
the highest to the lowest, whenever it suits the interest of party to avail
themselves of them.
"And the people are called upon to rally round — to stand by and
defend — not the individual arraigned — not the delinquent department, but
the President himself, who it is asserted through a thousand channels, is
intended to be struck at and stabbed through the sides of the accused
officer or Department. The people cannot at once detect the artifices of
party. They are jealous of everything which savors of an attack upon
General Jackson, and they in general act upon that suspicion. Those,
therefore, who dare, here or elsewhere, to find fault with the course of
affairs, upon any ground, instead of finding countenance from those in
power, or from the dominant party — instead of being cheered on in the
ungracious task of reform, are met on the threshold, with the charge of
secret and sinister motives — with anti-Jacksonism ! They are told, that
their object is to assail the character of the hero of New Orleans, and the
conqueror of the United States Bank; as if either one or the other of
those victories could be of any worth now or hereafter, except to protect
the Constitution, the country, and its liberties — as if those victories could
be of any value, if as the price of them we are to surrender that very
Constitution, those very liberties — those rich and glorious prizes for which
100 ■ JAMES E. POLK
administration,^^ but none covered the whole ground so thor-
oughly and so accurately as did Bell.
The attacks made by Wise on the Speaker and the adminis-
tration were capricious and, to his associates, extremely enter-
taining. His assertions, however, were more irritating than con-
vincing. His own resolution, which called for an investigation
of the method by which state banks of deposit had been selected,
gave him an opportunity to vent his wrath upon Reuben M.
Whitney, and upon those who had employed Whitney. His time
was ill spent; assailing Whitney's reputation was like slaying
the dead.
Throughout the session the Presidential campaign was a topic
of absorbing interest. Few questions came before the House that
did not elicit a discussion of the approaching election. This was
natural, perhaps, for Van Buren had been nominated for the
avowed purpose of continuing the policies of the present admin-
istration, and it was from these very policies that the White
element of the party had revolted. On this subject personal
animosity increased as the end of the session approached. As
those battles were fought and won. If those who venture to make charges
against any department of the public service are not met precisely in this
way, they are, at all events, told that' General Jackson is the head of the
Government — that he is responsible for all the executive branches of the
public service, and no attack can be made upon any branch of the public
service, therefore, without attacking him, and everybody knows that he
does his duty. A most shameful, egregious, and pernicious flattery. But
the absurdity of the argument does not prevent it from being constantly
interposed. The argument is, that because General Jackson is able, faith-
ful, and patriotic, in the discharge of all his duties, therefore all the sub-
ordinate officers of the Government are so likewise. But more: if anyone
shall rejily to all this, and that he means no attack ujion General Jackson,
that he is willing to exonerate him from any agency in the abuses which
are alleged to exist, he is forthwith denounced as a hypocrite — as a das-
tardly assailant, who wants the courage and independence to make a direct
attack. He is dared to come forward like a man, and assail General
Jackson as the author of all these abuses — his pride is ajipealed to — his
feelings are chafed to draw him on to utter the fatal denunciation; and
the moment he does so, the myrmidons of the party stand ready to hack
him to pieces! These, sir, are the true causes of the continued abuses in
the public service."
i-' Robertson, of Virginia, when sjieaking (April .5) on the same bill,
asserted that the administration desired a large appropriation for tlie
navy so that there might be no surplus to distribute among the states.
SPEAKEB OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 101
if to make amends for the moderation displayed in his speech on
the naval a})propriation bill, Bell, when discussing the river and
harbor bill on June 23, severely castigated both the Speaker and
the administration. He charged the administration with delib-
erate extravagance, and said that the Committee of Ways and
Means had been purposely organized by Polk "upon a principle
of extravagance."^^ His purpose was to show, as Robertson, of
Virginia, had tried to show when discussing the naval appro-
priation bill on April 5 that the administration hoped to nullify
the effect of Clay's "distribution bill" by leaving no surplus
for distribution among the states. However, it is difficult to see
how Polk could have anticipated the passage of this bill when
he appointed the Committee of Ways and Means.
Bell had little reason to complain of Polk's committees, for,
as Gillet, of New York, pointed out (June 24), they were sub-
stantially the same as those appointed by himself.^^ In selecting
his committees Polk had given no greater advantage to the ma-
jority than was customary, yet it is interesting to recall in this
connection that he, too, during the Adams administration, had
complained because "studied majorities" had been placed on
committees, "in conformity to a previous secret understanding,
n"l have said that I regard this bill as the result of a deliberate
system of extravagance — of a plan for increasing the wants of the Gov-
ernment, and exhausting the Treasury. ... I affirm that your Committee
of Ways and Means of this House was organized ujjon a principle of ex-
travagance. Look at the composition of that committee, sir, and then
tell me it was not constituted with a deep design, and expressly with a
view to the largest expenditure for which a pretext could be found, in every
branch of the public service. Was there ever such a Committee of Ways
and Means appointed in this House"? Was there ever a more palpable
desertion of the principle of representation — a more shameful abandon-
ment of the interests of the entire interior of the country?" {Cong. Globe,
24 Cong., 1 sess., App., 745).
15 Gillet scathingly denounced Bell's attitude toward Polk. He twitted
Bell with not having defended his constituent (the President) when
during the last Congress he had been called a toothless tyrant by a member
of the opposition party. Eepelling such attacks upon the President and
declining to attend a caucus of the Tennessee delegation were the only
crimes, said Gillet, of which Polk could be convicted, and as Speaker,
' ' even his political opponents bear testimony to his capacity, honesty, and
impartiality. ' '
102 JAMES K. POLE
among the favorites at Court. "^*' Both men advocated majority
rule, yet neither accepted it with good grace when he chanced to
be numbered with the minority.
In this same speech Bell reverted to the caucus of the Tenn-
essee delegation, which had been called to consider the nomi-
nation of Judge White. He said that the main object of the
meeting had been to test the sincerity of certain members and
that two of these gentlemen, Polk and Grundy, "are at this
moment in the enjoyment of the rewards of their hypocrisy and
their treachery to their colleagues. ' ' He still spoke with respect
of General Jackson and denied that he had ever called the Presi-
dent a tyrant or a crouching sycophant. "He may be the master
of slaves and menials/' said Bell, "but nature has disqualified
him from becoming one himself. ' '
The first session of the twenty-fourth Congress terminated
on July 4, 1836. Among its legislative acts were the admission
to statehood of Arkansas and Michigan, and the reorganization
of the general post-office along lines advocated by Amos Kendall.
Another law approved the President's order for removing public
deposits from the Bank of the United States, and regulated for
the future the method of depositing public money in state banks.
As a result of the payment in full of the national debt. Clay
introduced in the Senate his well-known measure for distributing
among the states the surplus revenue of the federal government.
As it was made to assume the guise of a deposit rather than a
gift, the bill passed both houses of Congress and was signed —
but with reluctance — by the President. On June 7, while the
bill was before the House, an attempt was made to refer it to the
Committee of the Whole, for the purpose, said the Glohe, of pro-
longing the debate and thereby defeating the admission of Ar-
kansas and Michigan. Polk blocked such a reference by casting
his ballot in the negative and making it a tie vote.^^
16 Polk to Colonel Win. Polk, Dec. 14, 1826, Col. Wnu Polk Papers.
17 Washington Glohe, June 10, 1836.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 103
Although tlie Speakership is the most important and respon-
sible position in the House, and although the Speaker's influence
upon legislation is surpassed by few other officers of the federal
government/^ yet, from the very nature of his position, that
influence is difficult to trace. By the personnel of his committees,
by his decisions, by his control over debate by recognizing or
refusing to recognize members who may desire to speak, one may
trace in a general way the part played by the Speaker ; but neces-
sarily he takes little part in the discussions of the House. Polk
did not even avail himself of the privilege of participating in
debate when the House had resolved itself into a Committee of
the Whole. For this reason his views on the various measures are
not readily ascertained, and during this particular period his
pi,'ivate correspondence affords little assistance. That he satisfied
the party which elected him, there is abundant evidence in the
records of the House, and in the public press. That he possessed
the necessary knowledge and coolness of temperament to avoid
the pitfalls prepared lay his adversaries, is equally clear.
' ' Never, ' ' said the editor of the Boston Age,
Avas man more rigidly ami constantly assailed by a pack of untiring pursuers,
than was Mr. Speaker Polk by his uncompromising assailants. They left
no stone unturned that could be moved to his disadvantage. . . . But
notwithstanding all the efforts that were made to destroy Mr. Polk, he
passed the ordeal unscathed, and ultimately triumphed.
The editor said that he did not like Polk personally, and that he
had preferred Bell for Speaker, still "it is but an act of justice
to say of him, that he discharged his duties with great ability,
promptness, and throughout the session was popular with an im-
mense majority of the members," and self-respect compelled
18 Mrs. Polk probably voiced her husband's sentiments when she said,
years afterward: "The Speaker, if the proper person, and with a correct
idea of his position, has even more power and influence over legislation,
and in directing the policy of parties, than the President or any other
public officer." Conversation with Samuel J. Kandall. Quoted in Nelson,
Memorials of Sarah Childress Polk, 206.
104 JAMES K. POLK
northern Whigs to support the Speaker in putting down "Wise
and his friends."
After the adjournment of Congress on July 4, the great prob-
lem to be solved by the administration forces was not so much
how to elect Van Buren, for that seemed certain, but how to save
Tennessee. The prospect of losing the vote of the President's
own state was most humiliating to himself and to the entire party.
At first Jackson could not believe such a calamity possible ; but,
as the campaign proceeded, even he began to realize that, if the
state could be saved at all, it could be done only by heroic efforts.
As usual, Jackson spent his vacation at the Hermitage, and
during the summer he was honored with public dinners at various
places. The people of Nashville entertained him with a barbecue
to which "all creation" was invited.^° The press and the plat-
form of the respective parties vied with each other in regaling
the people with political gasconade and personal abuse of the
opposing politicians. On the President 's side were Polk, Grundy,
Cave Johnson, and Judge Catron, assisted by many lesser lights
who followed their directions. Opposed to them were White,
Bell, Peyton, and Foster, aided by a much longer and much abler
list of second-rate assistants than could be rallied to the Jackson
standard.
The most serious handicap with which the administration
leaders had to cope was the want of an influential press. The
Nashville Tlnion, which had been founded after Bell had obtained
control of the other Nashville papers, had never prospered, and
was now in the final stages of bankruptcy. Long, the proprietor,
had given up in despair and gone to Athens in East Tennessee
to edit an obscure Van Buren sheet of precarious existence.-^
Due to drink, Laughlin, the editor of the Union, had become so
unreliable that Catron, in the heat of the campaign, was forced
ii» Boston Afie, Aug. 17, 1836; copy among Polk Papers.
20 Laughlin to Polk, Aug. 8, 1836, PoJk Papers.
-'1 Long to Polk, Aug. 21, 1836, ibid.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 105
to come to the rescue and edit the paper himself." The Wash-
ington Globe devoted considerable space to political affairs in
Tennessee. It tried to convince the people of the state that White
could not by any possibility be elected, and that his nomination
had been the work of instruments of Clay and Calhoun, who
were conspiring against Jackson and Van Buren and attempting
to deceive the people of Tennessee.-^ Bell, of course, Avas charged
with being the chief conspirator. "It is painful," said the Globe
on October 7,
to a fair mind to deal with petty tricks— the offspring of low cunning—
of a man educated as a pettifogger, and improved into a political Machiavel
by a persevering study of the arts of deception in a seven years ' appren-
ticeship in Congress. John Bell has arrived at a point which entitles him
to a diploma as a political imposter
who is trying to deceive the people of Tennessee. As examples
of Bell's hypocrisy, it cited his original opposition to White and
his attempt to induce R. M. Johnson to run for President on a
bank platform.
Much emphasis was placed on White 's alleged affiliation with
friends of the United States Bank. Bell's "Cassedy letter" was
said to have pledged White, in the event of his election, to sign a
bill for rechartering the bank. In several letters. Van Buren
had already stated his unalterable opposition to such an institu-
tion, and ])y so doing furnished an excuse for the catechizing of
his rival. In a letter addressed to him by one of the local Demo-
crats, White was asked the definite question whether he, if elected,
would sign a bill to establish a bank of discount and deposit, or
one of deposit only. It was hoped that the letter would place the
judge in an embarrasing position, but this hope was not realized.
He met the issue squarely by stating that, while he considered
the bank question to be obsolete, he would nevertheless give his
22 After the campaign was over Catron, in a letter to Polk (Nov.
24) said that, while he hated to desert a man for "that infirmity," they
must have a reliable editor.
23 Washington Globe, Aug. 27 and Sept. 5, 18.36.
106 JAMES E. POLE
views on the subject. He had always believed, he said, that Con-
gress did not possess the power to authorize any bank to transact
business within the states ; moreover, even if the power existed, it
should not be exercised. This was still his opinion.-*
In a speech delivered at Knoxville in August, White had
already given a very complete statement of the principles for
which he stood. He enumerated the doctrines which had been
advocated b}^ himself and the President at the time of the latter 's
first election. For advocating these same doctrines, said he, the
President is now ' ' openly denouncing me as a ' red hot Federalist, '
having abandoned his Administration and being as far from him
as the poles are asunder." The judge claimed to uphold the
Kepublican creed of Jefferson, while the President is on "that
side which leads directly to monarchy, although I hope he does
not so intend it. ' '-^
Not even Jackson could shake the faith of Tennesseans in the
ability and the integrity of Judge White. Even though the
motives of his leading supporters may have been somewhat ques-
tionable, nothing that was ignoble or equivocal could be traced
to White himself. He carried the state in spite of the misrepre-
sentations of his traducers, and never again during the life of the
"hero of New Orleans" was Tennessee to be found in the Demo-
cratic column at a Presidential election — although one of her own
sons was the candidate in 1844.
The President was greatly mortified by the loss of his state.
He declared that White had always been a hypocrite, and that the
"morals of society" demanded his exposure.-" But the mote in
2* Andrew A. Kincannon to White, Sept. 14; White to Kincanuon,
Sept. 19, 1836, Polk Papers.
25 Speech printed in Scott, Memoir of Kugli Latrson White, 340 ff.
Excerpts in Washington Globe, Sept. 23, 1836.
2« "Nothing but falsehood appears to be the weapons of our modern
new born White Whigs of Tennessee in their late political crusade. White,
Bell, Peyton, Murray & Co. appear to have abandoned truth, and now when
the election is over, does not wish to be held accountable for their false-
hoods . . . should I live to get home, a duty I owe to truth & the morals
of society will induce me to expose Judge White, Mr. Bell, Mr. Peyton,
SPEAKEE OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 107
his brother's eye obscured the huge beam in his own own; his
unfair treatment of White had been the determining factor in
making the Judge a candidate and in winning for him the
electoral vote of the state.
Congress reassembled on December 5 and, on the following
day, received the last annual message of General Jackson. This
document criticized the operation of the deposit act passed at the
last session and advised the adjustment of revenue to the actual
needs of the government. It informed Congress of the promulga-
tion of the "specie circular" and asked that the policy therein
adopted be made permanent b.y legislative enactment. It urged
that the finances of the government should be put on a hard
money basis. The tone of the message was optimistic, and indica-
tive of the satisfaction felt by the President with the results of
his administration. It contained no hint that he even suspected
the country to be already on the verge of one of its most disastrous
industrial and financial crises.
To carry the administration program through the House was
a task of little difficulty for the Speaker. Polk arranged his com-
mittees on a political basis, and there was a safe majority in that
body to insure the passage of desired measures. It required both
skill and patience, however, to preserve order and to render harm-
less the assaults of an opposition whose animosity had not been
lessened by their recent defeat at the polls.
Early in the session there appeared a new avalanche of memo-
rials in which Congress was asked to abolish slavery in the District
of Columbia. Generally, but not always, they were presented by
John Quincy Adams. Polk decided that the "gag rule" had
Mr. Murray, and their falsehoods, so that the moral part & truth loving
portion of the citizens of Tennessee may judge what credit can be reposed
in those men, when they make assertions as to the acts & doings of others.
I now believe that Judge White has been acting the hypocrite in politics,
all his life, and individually to me — that he is unprincipled & vindictive
I have full proof — that he Avill willfully lie, his Knoxville speech amply
shows. I can forgive, & will, but I never can forget hypocrisy, or the
individual capable of it" (Jackson to Kev. H. M. Cryer, Nov. 13, 1836,
Am. Hist. Mag., IV, 242-243).
108 JAMES K. POLK
expired with the last session, and so the whole question was once
more open for discussion. After several heated debates, the rule
was reenacted in an aggravated form which sent all such peti-
tions to the table as soon as presented, Avithout even the courtesy
of a reference to a committee. Southern members looked upon
these petitions as the work of fanatics-^ whose sole purpose was
malicious mischief. They failed to realize that abolition was
simply one among the many manifestations of the birth of a pub-
lie conscience and of a desire to reform the world. The old idea
that governments should not abridge personal privileges, even by
eradicating admitted evils, was, during this period, rapidly giving
way to a new belief that society as well as individuals possesses
rights, and that governments are in duty bound to protect them.
It was a period among which "isms" of various sorts flourished,
and among the number, abolitionism. The most important and per-
manent product which resulted from this social unrest and striv-
ing for the ideal was the emergence of a public conscience and a
determination to adjust individual conduct to the standards of
public opinion. A feeling of responsibility for existing evil led
the troubled conscience to seek power to eradicate it, and in seek-
ing the necessary power the reformers naturally turned to the
federal government. Calhoun understood the changed viewpoint
far better than did his contemporaries. He realized that, on the
subject of slavery, a national conscience had developed, although
he may have exaggerated the i)art played in this development by
the Nullification proclamation of General Jackson.-*
27 "Abolition," said Bynum, of North Carolina, Jan. 9, 1837, "is
priestcraft [i.e. New England clergy], concocted and brought into exist-
ence by their unholy alliance with the superstitious and ignorant of both
sexes."
'-S Speaking in the Senate on the Oregon bill, Aug. 12, 1849, Calhoun
said: "Tlie abolition of African slavery in its old form in the British
West India Islands, and the long an<l violent agitation which preceded it,
did much to arouse this feeling at the North, and confirm the impression
that it was sinful. But something more was necessary to excite it into
action, — and that was, a belief, on the part of those who thought it sinful,
that they were resjtonsible for its continuance.
"It was a considerable time before such a belief was created, except
to a very limited extent. In the early stages of this Government, while
SPEAKEE OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 109
The eiiaetnient of gag rules resulted in more harm than good
to the cause which they were intended to benefit. Many who had
little sympathy with abolitionists disapproved of this drastic
method of stifling public opinion. They regarded the gag laws
as a fatal blow to the right of petition, although it is difficult to
see why the southern members were not right in their contention
that this right extended only to those who would petition about
their own grievances, and not those of other persons. The right
of the people to petition for a redress of their own grievances was
never questioned by the most belligerent of the southern fire-
eaters.
Polk was a slaveholder, but he did not let this fact influence
his decisions. When objections were raised because Adams in-
sisted upon presenting petitions from states other than Massa-
chusetts the Speaker decided, on February 6, 1837, that "every
member had a right to present a petition, come from what quarter
it might. ' ' Adams thereupon informed the Speaker that he had
a petition purporting to have come from slaves and asked if it
would fall within the regular rule. The character of the peti-
tioners presented a new point in procedure, which Polk did not
attempt to decide ; instead, he asked for a ruling by the House.
Without seeking to ascertain the nature of the petition — which
it was yet called, ami regarded to be, a federal Government, slavery was
believed to be a local institution, and under the exclusive control of the
Governments of the States. So long as this impression remained, little
or no responsibility was felt on the part of any portion of the North, for
its continuance. But with the growth of the power and influence of the
Government, and its tendency to consolidation, — when it became usual to
call the people of these States a nation, and this Government national,
the States came to be regarded by a large portion of the North, as bearing
the same relation to it, as the counties do to the States; and as much
under the control of this Government, as the counties are under that of
their respective State Governments. The increase of this belief was ac-
companied by a corresponding increase of the feeling of responsibility
for the continuance of slavery, on the part of those in the Is^orth who
considered it so. At this stage it was strengthened into conviction by
the proclamation of General Jackson and the act of Congress authorizing
him to employ the entire force of the Union against the Government an(l
people of South Carolina." Having discovered the extent of national
power, said Calhoun, the abolitionists have, since 1835, been striving to
bring it into operation (Calhoun, Works, IV, 517-521).
110 JAMES K. POLK
turned out to be a hoax, and asked for the expulsion of Adams —
southern members wasted much time in an intemperate tirade
against the venerable ex-President. They at first demanded his
expulsion, and, failing in this, asked that he should be censured
"for giving color to an idea" that slaves might address a com-
munication to Congress. After Adams had riddled their argu-
ments with sarcasm and ridicule, the House finally ended the
matter by deciding simply that slaves had no right to petition.
The charge made by Adams that Polk had exercised arbitrary
authority in his decisions on the subject of petitions seems to have
been wholly unwarranted, for the Speaker accorded him every
privilege which the rules of the House permitted.-^
The Speaker's enemies tried on many occasions to confuse
him by propounding unusual and complicated questions, but in
this they were invariably disappointed. His thorough knowledge
of parliamentary procedure, and his ability to anticipate their
designs and to prepare for them, enabled him to render his deci-
sions promptly and correctly. Never frustrated, he was quick
to see the bearing of an unusual proposition.^" Although he
safeguarded the interests of the administration whenever possible,
yet his rulings were sustained — almost without exception, by a
considerable number of his political opponents.
The most severe charge which was brought against Polk during
the session arose out of the investigation of Reuben M. Whitney 's
connection with the Treasury Department. It was alleged that
"Whitney had given out advance information to speculators
29 Polk's opinion of Adams' conduct and his complaints is recorded in
an undated manuscript in the Polk Papers. It is an answer to letters
written by Adams to the Quincy Patriot. "The Speaker carries out and
enforces the decisions of the majority & therefore he represents in his
letter that the 'Speaker and the majority of the House' have undertnken
to exercise 'arbitrary authority.' If Mr. Adams is unwilling to submit
to the decisions of the majority of the House, he is unfit to be a member
of that body. . . . His complaints that his petitions were not read, —
shows either* a total ignorance of the rules of the House, or is an attempt
to impose on the public" (Polk Papers, undated, vol. 80).
30 For example, Bell's motion of January 10 for leave to bring in a
bill to secure freedom of elections.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER JACKSON 111
regarding the purport of Jackson's specie circular, and that he
had been a partner in tlie resulting speculations. It was said, also,
that he had levied blackmail upon the state banks which had been
selected as depositories for government funds. A majority of the
committee which Polk appointed to investigate these charges
exonerated Whitney, but, in a minority report, Peyton, of Tenn-
essee, accused the Speaker and the majority of the committee
with having deliberately covered the fraud out of subserviency
to the President. Nothing better, he said, could be expected from
a Speaker who had crawled up to his office and had exchanged
principle for power. ^^ Even if these charges had been true, Pey-
ton was not the man to throw stones. Hamer, of Ohio, forced
him to admit that he had himself solicited for Bell the support
of the President on the plea that Bell was a good party man and
that Polk had been seeking votes from the Nullifiers.
The short but stormy session was adjourned by the Speaker on
March 3, 1837. Although Polk had been severely criticized by
some of his enemies, no one — as was done two years later — refused
to join in extending to him the customary vote of thanks. The
administration and its defenders had been denounced in violent
language for alleged interference in elections, abuse of the power
of patronage, and derangement of the finances of the country.
Investigations had been demanded, and in some cases undertaken,
but the charges had not been sustained. Indeed, so long as Polk
had the selection of committees, there was small danger that any
malfeasance would be officially unearthed.
For good or for evil. General Jackson had triumphed over all
opposition. Van Buren had been chosen to succeed him, Taney
31 ' ' The price, in these days, whieli must be paid for power, is the sale
and prostration of every principle of honor, patriotism, independence ; and I
fear, sir, the day is distant when we shall see the Speaker of an American
Congress dare to appoint investigation committees, a majority of which
will be in favor of inquiry, how important soever it may be to the preser-
vation of the institutions and liberties of this country. . . . Any man who
crawls up to that point [Speakership] in these days, will never hazard the
consequences of a patriotic, a generous, or a noble action; it would be fatal
to him." March 1, 1837 {Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 2 sess., App., 349-359).
112 ■ JAMES E. POLE
had been confirmed as Marshall's successor, the mortifying cen-
sure of the Senate had been expunged, and the Bank of the United
States no longer existed as a federal institution. On the last day
of the session Congress passed an act which not only carried out
another of the President's wishes, but which affected materially
the future career of the Speaker of the House. Incorporated in
the civil appropriation bill was a clause providing for the outfit of
a minister to Texas, which meant, in effect, a recognition of Texan
independence. The already approaching financial crisis made
Congress unwilling to continue by law the policy of the specie
circular, as Jackson had recommended in his message ; instead,
that body sent him, on the last day of the session, a bill which
would virtually annul the celebrated circular. But even in this,
"Old Hickory" had his w^ay. He declined to sign the bill on the
ground that its provisions were obscure and contradictory.^-
32 Eichardson, Messages, III, 282.
CHAPTER VII
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN
Judge White's victory in Tennessee humiliated, and for the
time being discouraged, the Democrats of that state. Before the
winter had passed, however, their hopes revived and they began
to lay plans for the future. They were encouraged by the belief
that White would never again be a candidate and that the main
cause of defection would therefore be removed. In a letter to
Polk, Nicholson said that the opposition leaders were determined
to hold the state, and would do all in their power to injure Van
Buren. But the people, said he, had gone over to White for
purely personal reasons and would return to the Democratic
fold.^ Childress, also, had hopes that the people would renew
their allegiance. He believed, on the other hand, that the leaders
of the White party would vote for ''Theodore Dwight himself"
if he were run on the opposition ticket.^ Still another informant
discovered that the White faction was plotting to get control of
the legislature for the purpose of ousting Grundy from the federal
Senate. They were planning, he thought, to run Bailie Peyton
for Governor ; and should this be done, no one except Polk or
Jackson could defeat him.^ At the Hermitage Jackson was busily
engaged in repelling slanders invented and circulated by the
Whigs. One of these slanders was that, as a result of endorsing
notes for relatives, the General had become financially ruined
and now wanted a national bank. Protesting that he never had
and never would favor a bank, Jackson announced his intention
1 Nicholson to Polk, Jan. 22, 1837, Polk Papers.
2 Childress to Polk, Feb. 17, 1837, ibid.
3 J. H. Talbot to Polk, April 21, 1837, ibid.
114 JAMES K. POLK
to prepare an article on the subject which he desired Polk to see
before its publication.^
Democrats were united in their desire to regain control of
the state, but opinions differed as to the better method of pro-
cedure. Grundy advocated a conciliatory attitude toward the
White supporters; this policy was adopted, and was voiced by
John 0. Bradford, the new editor of the Nashville VnionJ' But
the seceders did not respond to kind treatment. Dunlap was
badly beaten in his campaign for reelection to Congress, and his
district sent only bank supporters to the state legislature." Cave
Johnson was likewise unexpectedly defeated by an opponent who
was as "bitter and malignant" as John Bell." The result of the
election caused a tempest at the Hermitage. Still blind to the real
cause of the dissensions within his party, Jackson, in character-
istic fashion, denounced the temporizing policy of Grundy and
the Union.^
The outcome of the state elections and the fact that the sub-
treasury plan was unpopular in Tennessee'' led Catron and
* Jackson to Polk, May 22, 1837, ibid.
5 Catron to Polk, July 7, 1837, ibid.
6 Dunlap to Polk, Aug. 7, 1837, ibid.
"! Johnson to Polk, Aug. 7, 1837, ibid. One gets an interesting glimpse
of the prevailing professional ethics from his remark that he is going
to Mississippi to practice law, for "I cannot charge my friends & my
enemies will not employ me. ' ' In another letter to Polk, August 1-4,
Johnson tells a story which indicates that election methods in his day
were not unlike those of our own: "I was beaten in the last two days
by the almost united action of the merchants & iron makers — who as if
by concert upon my leaving a county for the last time went to work,
under the pretence of collecting their debts, telling the people that they
would be compelled to collect in gold & silver if I were elected — the ])rice
of property be reduced to almost nothing and the people ruined. Some
of the iron makers, told their workmen, that they could not be employed
if I was elected. ' '
8 "Davidson [County] has resulted as I expected, from the imbecile
councils, of the Nashville politicians. The Union has been Muzzled by
some unseen hands, and has been a great help to the enemy instead of
benefit to the republican party. Mr. Grundy will feel the effects, of the
combination, which has been produced by supineness & want of courage"
(Jackson to Polk, Aug. 6, 1837, Folic Papers).
0 James Walker informed Polk on August 27 that if the Van Buren
administration should adopt the sub-treasury plan, it would find itself in
SPEAEEB OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUEEN 115
other prominent Democrats to believe that the state could never
be regained by pursuing Grundy's conciliatory policy. It was a
battle of numbers against wealth, said Catron,'" and war to the
knife was therefore the true Republican policy. He favored the
sub-treasury plan, for "the Treasury is the arm of power" and
must not be placed in private hands ; the possession of government
money by private banks ' ' will convert the keepers into Federalists
in principle & practice in a few years. ' ' Unlike Jackson and Van
Buren, he advocated the emission of paper money by the Treas-
ury, for the people want it and "numbers will govern in fact,
in Congress, & out of it." Although he approved in general the
idea of a sub-treasury, still, after reading the new President's
message on the subject, he pronounced the plan there suggested
to be sound in principle, but hardly possible in practice. The
people, he said, demanded something more tangible, and unless
provision were made for issuing paper money, the party would
surely go down to defeat.^^ "Strike boldly," was his advice to
Polk, "it is your habit, & the means of your elevation; it is
expected of you."^-
The echo of Jackson 's farewell address had scarcely died away
before the long-gathering financial storm burst upon the country,
leaving in its wake the wrecks of shattered banks, ruined busi-
ness enterprises, and a panic-stricken people. So desperate were
the minority in Tennessee, as the plan Avas too unwieldy and costly. White,
he said, had announced that he was not opposed to a bank located in the
District of Columbia, with branches in the states. Walker thought that
this idea would win in Tennessee if states instead of individuals were
made stockholders (Polk Papers).
10 ' ' Open war, & to the knife, has ever been the course for the Eepublican
side — no other position is left for it, nor has there been, since the days
of Jefferson. It is the contest of Wealth against numbers; sapped by the
statutes of descents when wealth consisted of Estates: but the European
policy is here basing itself upon incorporated & merchantile wealth"
(Catron to Polk, Sept. 2, 1837, ibid.).
11 Catron to Polk, Sept. 10, 1837, ibid.
12 "Go in for 30 or 40 millions, to be circulated fast as may be by
the Govt — go for 20ties & over in gradations of tens. Strike out the
interest feature — boldly declare that the farmers will hoard the notes
bearing 5 per cent" (Catron to Polk, September 27, 1837, ibid.).
116 JAMES K. POLK
financial conditions that Van Bnren felt constrained to convene
the twenty-fifth Congress in extra session on September 4, 1837,
for the purpose of laying before that body his plans for relief.
His principal recommendation was the establishment of a sub-
treasury ; for experience had shown, he said, that depositing pub-
lic money in state banks was little better than leaving it in the
hands of the federal bank. The only safe custodian of the public
funds was, in his opinion, the government itself. As a temporary
remedy, he advised Congress to withhold further deposits with the
states under the distribution act, and to authorize the emission of
treasury notes. Although his recommendations were straight-
forward and sensible, they were, for that very reason, unlikely
to be followed. Even the members of his own party were divided
in opinion concerning the cause of the trouble, consequently they
did not agree on remedies to be applied. Catron, as we have seen,
was an advocate of paper money, while Jackson and the President
still believed in hard money. Jackson received advance informa-
tion concerning the character of the message and was delighted
with the news that the President would recommend a separation
of government finances from all banks, and the collection of public
revenues in gold and silver coin."
The members of Congress who had striven so hard to defeat
Van Buren at the polls were not disposed to aid him now by
sympathetic cooperation. In the House they were far more
intent upon making life uncomfortable for the Speaker and the
President than they were on relieving the financial stress of their
fellow-citizens. It was known, of course, that Polk would be
reelected, and before the ballot had been taken, Mercer, of Vir-
ginia, proposed to transfer from the Speaker to the House itself
the power to appoint committees. While the suggestion was not
adopted, Mercer had the satisfaction of insulting Polk by imply-
ing that he could not be trusted. On the other hand, Patton, of
Virginia, wished to have the rules so amended that the Speaker
13 Jackson to Polk, Aug'. 6, 1837, ibid.
SPEAKEB OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUEEN 117
niiglit have a vote on all questions, but his ameudinent was re-
jected by the House. As most of the business of the session would
necessarily pass through the hands of the Committee of Ways
and Means, Polk safeguarded the interests of the administration
by selecting seven of its nine members from the ranks of his own
party.
Although the President, when convening Congress, had defi-
nitely limited the scope of legislation, Adams was more terrified
by the possiblp annexation of Texas than he was by the magnitude
of the financial crisis. On September 13, he moved to ask the
President whether Texas had offered to join the United States,
and, if so, what had been the reply made by our government. Any
proposition to annex it, declared Adams, would be unconstitu-
tional— one which neither the President nor Congress "had any
right to receive, entertain or consider." It was his firm opinion
that "a, very large portion of the people of this country, dearly
as they loved the Union, would prefer its total dissolution to the
act of annexation of Texas." The House, on September 18, cur-
tailed his dissertations on the subject by passing a rule which
limited discussions to questions included in the President's
message. Adams tried by various devices to inject the subject of
Texas into later discussions, but Polk rigorously enforced the rule
just adopted.
The rule for limiting discussion did not deter Wise from offer-
ing a resolution which provided that a committee be chosen by
iallot to investigate the causes, delays, and failures of the Florida
war. Adams approved this method of selecting committees, for,
said he, experience had proved that no real investigation would be
prosecuted by any committee selected by the present Speaker.
Having failed in his attempt to deprive the Speaker of the
power to make appointments, Wise welcomed the appearance in
the House of the Senate bill for creating a sub-treasury. This
subject gave him an opportunity to vent his wrath and sarcasm
not only upon the "Greatest and Best," as he called General
118 JAMES K. POLK
Jackson, but upon Van Buren and Polk as well. The late and
present administrations, he said, ' ' have deliberately and wickedly,
with malice aforethought, wrought this mischief" and should be
indicted by the people for their crimes. He took special delight
in reading one of Jackson's messages which had incorporated a
part of Polk's report — as chairman of the Committee of Ways
and Means — highly commending the safety and efficiency of state
banks. And now we read in the message of Van Buren, shouted
Wise, "that tlie expenment has failed" — the great chief, whom
all had been taught to regard as a god, was after all a weak
mortal whose wisdom was as fallible as that of other men."
Little w^as accomplished during this brief session. The sub-
treasury bill was defeated, and Congress contented itself with
the enactment of emergency measures. The first three install-
ments paid out under the operation of the distribution act were
permitted to remain with the states, but the fourth was postponed
and never paid. To meet the immediate needs of the govern-
ment, the President was authorized to prepare interest-bearing
treasury notes to be issued to an amount not exceeding ten mil-
lion dollars. Having failed to agree upon any permanent financial
policy. Congress, on October 19, adjourned until the regular
session in December.
Before Congress had adjourned, the Tennessee legislature met
in regular session. Governor Cannon assailed with some vehe-
mence both Jackson and his successor. The Whigs began at once
to formulate plans which they hoped might insure Polk's polit-
ical downfall and prevent the reelection of Grundy. Some of
the Democrats were in favor of silently ignoring their critics, but
Polk, who was still in Washington, urged the adoption of an
aggressive course and the prevention of the election of a Senator,
for the present at least. ^^ Before he set out for Tennessee, Polk
was authorized by Grundy to withdraw his name, as candidate
^^Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 1 sess., App., 318.
15 Jonas E. Thomas to Polk, Oct. 5; Polk to Nichol.son, Oct. 9, 1837;
Foil: Papers.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 119
for Senator, should it develop that the interests of the adminis-
tration might be promoted by so doing.^" Grundy was reelected,
but not without difficulty, for the ranks of the "Whigs were
steadily increasing.
The Democrats were alarmed but not disheartened. A new
editor, Cunningham, was put in charge of the Union; for to the
moderation of Bradford, under Grundy's guidance, had Jackson
attributed the recent defeats." Most hopeful of all was Jackson
himself; he prophesied that Tennessee would be "herself again"
in less than two years, in spite of Bell's New England tour,
which was designed to transfer the state to Webster and the
Federalists.^^
When the twenty-fifth Congress met in December for its
second session, a rather unusual problem was presented to the
House for solution. It was a question of settling a contested
election of members from Mississippi, and, as the decision ulti-
mately devolved upon the Speaker, Polk incurred the enmity of
Sergeant S. Prentiss, a man quite as venomous as Wise or Peyton,
and far more able than either.
In July, 1837, the Governor of Mississippi had called a special
election in order that the state might send members to the extra
session of Congress which had been proclaimed by President Van
Buren. Claiborne and Gholson, the men chosen at the special
election, were, at the extra session, declared by the House to be
members for the entire term of the twenty-fifth Congress. Not-
withstanding this decision of the House, Mississippi held another
iG Grundy to Polk, Oct, 17, 1837, ibid.
17 Although removed for the moderation of his editorials, Bradford
was, on the other hand, dropped from the roll of divinity students by
the Whig bishop for being so ardent a Democrat. The incident well
illustrates the political intolerance of the period.
18 ' ' The course of Mr. Bell in attending the aristocratic, federal &
shin-plaster meetings in Boston & New York, & his speeches at those
meetings, which is a transfer of Tennessee to Mr. Webster & the blue
lights, abolitionists and vagrants, is working well here — it has opened
the eyes of the democracy of Tennessee, and none of his Whigg friends
here will guarantee the sale." Jackson to Grundy, Dec. 16, 1837 {Am.
Hist. Mag., V, 138-139).
120 JAMES K. POLK
election in November and chose for Representatives S. S. Pren-
tiss and T. J. Ward. Claiborne and Gholson were supporters
of the administration, and their friends in Mississippi, relying
on the decision made b}^ the House, took no part in the November
election. As a result, Prentiss and Ward were easily elected.
Each side now claimed its representatives to have been lawfully
elected and appealed to the House for a decision. After pro-
longed debate the House reversed its former decision and pro-
nounced the election of Claiborne and Gholson void. It then
proceeded to ballot on the validity of the second Mississippi elec-
tion at which Prentiss and Ward had been chosen. On this ques-
tion the vote stood 117 to 117. Polk cast his ballot in the nega-
tive, and the whole matter was referred back to the people of the
state, who later reelected Prentiss and Ward. The "glorious
infamy" which attached to the Speaker's vote against him,
Prentiss never forgot. In a flight of oratory he told the people
of Mississippi that "the still small voice of James K. Polk de-
prived you of that which a hundred thousand bayonets could
not have forced upon you. ' '" On his return to Congress he had
the supreme satisfaction, not only of harassing the Speaker on
every possible occasion, but of opposing the ordinary vote of
thanks to Polk on his retirement from the Speakership.
Slade, of Vermont, precipitated a stormy debate on slavery
by presenting, on December 20, two memorials which asked for
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. After mov-
ing that the memorials be referred to a select committee, he
entered into a prolonged and scathing discussion of the slavery
question in its various phases. Having recognized the member
from Vermont, Polk found it difficult to prevent his continuing,
since Slade for some time was careful to keep within the bounds
of parliamentary rules. When he finally launched into a dis-
cussion of slavery in Virginia, a member entered a protest and
19 Clipping from some Philadelphia paper, dated Feb. 7, 1838 {Polk
Papers).
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 121
Polk ordered Slade to his seat.-" Wise, Rhett, and other southern
radicals were choking with rage. Several exhorted their colleagues
to leave the hall in a body. After adjournment a meeting was
held, and, although threats of disunion were freely made, few-
members were ready for so drastic a procedure.
On the following day Patton, of Virginia, introduced, as a
"concession ... for the sake of peace, harmony, and union,"
a gag rule more drastic than its predecessor. It directed that
all petitions on the subject of abolition should be laid on the
table "without being debated, printed, read or referred," and
that no further action should be taken thereon. The rules were
suspended, the previous question invoked, and the vote hur-
riedly taken. When his name was called, Adams shouted that
the resolution violated the federal Constitution, whereupon the
Speaker forced him to take his seat. Polk then ruled to be out
of order the demand made by Adams that his reason for not vot-
ing should be entered in the journal. A few days later, Polk even
extended the new "gag-rule," by deciding that a resolution of
the Massachusetts legislature asking for a repeal of the gag rule
also came under the rule itself and could not therefore be
considered.-^
Sectional feeling was still more embittered during this session
by the killing, in a duel, of Jonathan Cilley, of Maine, by another
member of the House, William J. Graves, of Kentucky. The
demands made upon Cilley by Graves and his second, Wise, were
held by many to have been extremely unreasonable. By such
members the killing of Cilley was regarded as little better than
premeditated murder. The appointment of a committee to inves-
tigate the circumstances of the duel with a view to punishing
members who had taken part, led to a strange alignment in
20 Polk said that, while his position would not permit him to state
his own opinions on such agitation of this question, "they might readily
be inferred by the House."
21 January 3, 1838. Polk seems, however, to have felt that he had
gone too far in this matter, for on February 5 he ruled to be in order a
petition of similar purport from citizens of Massachusetts.
122 JAMES K. POLK
defense of the participants. Friends of Graves and Wise charged
that Polk had "packed" the committee to the prejudice of the
defendants; while Adams, declaring the investigation to be "an
administration measure," not only condemned the committee for
having prepared an opinion, but objected to receiving their
report. So intense was partisan feeling that Sawyer, of North
Carolina, objected to receiving a message from the President
which arrived while the clerk was reading the report of the com-
mittee, but Polk promptly decided that the constitutional right
of the President to send a message to the house at any time
transcended the rule which required unanimous consent to its
reception.
Hectoring of the Speaker continued to the end of the session.
On June 23, Adams reached the climax of absurdity by demand-
ing that Polk should reduce to writing some irrelevant remarks
which Adams had made and which the Speaker had declared to
be out of order. On Polk's refusal, Adams appealed from the
decision. Needless to say, the House sustained the Speaker.
While Polk was successfully parrying the shafts of his enemies
in Congress, his friends in Tennessee w^ere compassing the down-
fall of Bell, as well as formulating new plans for the Speaker
himself. Donelson was indefatigable in his efforts to expose Bell's
treachery. From his retreat at the Hermitage "the chief" for-
warded documents to the Speaker and requested him to answer
Bell's charges against himself [Jackson], either in Congress or
througli the Glohe." Desirous of representing Polk's district in
Congress, Nicholson saw in the Speaker excellent Vice-Presi-
ential timber, but Polk was inclined to agree with other friends
that he might be able to accomplish more good in the governor 's
chair. Ex-Governor Carroll had announced to Polk his willing-
ness to become once more a candidate for the office, and promised
to handle Cannon "without gloves";-^ but the politicians, fear-
ing that he would be defeated, did not rally to his support.
22 Doneldson to Polk, Jan. 4; Jackson to Tolk, Feb. 2, 1838; Polk Papers.
23 Carroll to Polk, Feb. 17, 18iS, nhid.
SPEAEEB OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUEEN 123
Even before Polk had consented to run for governor, each
party was striving to strengthen its own position in the state and
to weaken the hokl of its opponent. In Boston, C. G. Greene,
nnder Polk's direction, collected evidence to ])rove that Bell, on
his New England tour, had been entertained by Hartford Con-
vention Federalists;-* while in Tennessee, the Whig legislature
instructed Orundy to vote against any sub-treasury bill that
might come before the Senate. Although the purpose of this
move was to force his resignation, he disappointed the Whigs by
promptly announcing that he would obey his instructions. Much
Whig literature was franked from Washington. White and
Bell scattered widely the speech in which Wise had castigated
Polk and the President.
From many sources Polk was importuned to accept the guber-
natorial nomination, for it was believed that he could regain the
state for the Democratic party.-^ Apparently the office was not
attractive to him, yet duty to his party seemed to point in that
direction. Late in the summer, after mature consideration, he
finally consented to become a candidate. Many letters told him
of the good effect which his acceptance had produced. One from
Cave Johnson reported that in many places "whole neighbor-
hoods" had returned to the Democratic party.-"
The Democrats were still embarrassed by the weakness of
their local papers, for Cunningham had proved to be quite as
unsuccessful a journalist as Bradford. When seeking a more
competent editor for the Unian, Polk offered the position to
24- Green to Polk, Jan. 18, 1838, ibid.
25 One correspondent intimated that prospects of success might be
better in the state than in Congress. Polk, he said, would redeem the
state if any one could, and "If there is any possible chance of the
opposition getting the upper hand in the ensuing Congress, perhaps this
course might be the prudent one; as your friends would as soon be
annihilated at once, as to see that most infamous of all infamous
PUPPIES, John Bell, triumph over you in a contest for the Speaker's chair.
Should the opposition succeed in their views, this must and will be the
result, as you are now the most dreaded and consequently the most
hated by them" (W. S. Haynes to Polk, July 2-i, 1838, ibid.).
2G Johnson to Polk, Nov. 2, 1838, ibid.
124 JAMES E. POLE
several persons iu succession. Among the number were Edmund
Burke-' and C. G. Greene, of Boston. It was Greene, who, when
declining the offer, suggested Jeremiah George Harris, then edi-
tor of the Bay State Democrat.-^ For the Democrats this proved
to be a most fortunate suggestion. In Harris they found a man
in every way suited to Tennessee politics — one who was more
than a match for his adversaries of the quill, with the possible
exception of Parson Brownlow. The Union was enlarged, and
on February 1, 1839, the proprietor, J. M. Smith, introduced the
new editor to the people of Tennessee. In the same issue Harris
announced his policy: namely, to fight for the principles of
Jefferson and his Republican successors, and for the overthrow
of "Federalism" in the state.-^ A week later Smith reported
to Polk that a war of words with Hall, editor of the Banner, had
already begun and that he [Smith] was much pleased with
Harris.^"
The proprietor of the Union had no reason to revise his
opinion. Harris launched at once into a campaign of vitupera-
tion and merciless denunciation of the Whigs which endeared him
to his friends and made him dreaded by his opponents. He was
the type of editor in whom the people of the West delighted. He
and General Jackson became fast friends, but, in the main, it was
to Polk that he looked for counsel and guidance. He plunged
with zeal into the campaign against Governor Cannon and an-
nounced that "Tennessee has not seen so proud a day since the
election of her own Jackson to the Presidency as will that on
27 Burke was later a Eepresentative from New Hampshire. In 1845,
Polk put him in charge of the General Patent Office.
28 Greene to Eives of the Globe, Dec. 3, 1838, Polk Papers.
29 "That tory federalism of 1798, Hartford convention federalism
of 1814, and 'whig' Federalism of this day are identical, so far as they
relate to the two grand party divisions of the country, is too susceptible
of the clearest letter of proof to admit of a doubt."
30 "Mr. Hall of the Banner has commenced the war with the new
editor of the 'Union' and if I am not mistaken he will find that he will
have a little more to do than he at present imagines" (Smith to Polk,
Feb. 7, 1839, PoJlc Papers).
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE VNDEE FAN BUEEN 125
which the sovereigns of her soil shall by their nnboiight suffrage
call ]\Ir. Polk to the gubernatorial chair. "^^
This is not, however, the place for a prolonged discussion of
Polk's gubernatorial campaign. Reserving this for another chap-
ter, we may follow his career through his last session as Speaker
of the House. Selected by the Democrats for the avowed purpose
of bringing Tennessee back into the party fold, Polk, as he called
to order the third session of the twenty-fifth Congress, was more
cordially hated than ever by Bell, Wise, Prentiss, and other
enemies of the administration.
Van Buren's message, which reached the House on December
4, 1838, was optimistic in tone. He informed Congress that the
rapid improvement of financial conditions and the resumption of
specie payment by the principal banks had proved beyond ques-
tion that a federal bank is not indispensable. Reiterating the
belief that a sub-treasury would prove to be the best agency for
collecting and disbursing the public revenue, he again recom-
mended its creation by law. He alluded to Swartwout's defalca-
tion and asked for legislation which would make such peculation
in future a felony.
The lawmaking body of the nation paid little heed to the
President 's recommendations. Jockeying for position suited their
present mood far better than constructive legislation. Having
made gains in recent political contests, the Whigs had high hopes
of carrying the next Presidential election. Without as yet
announcing any program for themselves, they employed all of
31 Nashville Union-, Feb. 8, 1839. In the same issue Harris quoted an
article from the Pennsylvania EepoHer in which that paper urged that
Polk should be made Vice-President. Concerning Polk's record the
Eeportcr said: "Knowing that the Bank of the United States was about
to bring the whole of its mighty influence to bear against the administra-
tion of Gen. Jackson, it was deemed of the highest importance to be well
fortified at the point where the attack was to be made, and the chair-
man of the Committee of Ways and Means, as the financial organ of the
administration, became the most important position in the House. Col.
Polk's known position in opposition to the re-charter of that institution,
his intimate acquaintance with its history and transactions, and his
powers as a ready and able debater, recommended him for its occupancy.
And well did he justify the confidence so reposed in him."
126 JAMES K. POLK
their energies in heaping odium upon the administrations of Van
Buren and his predecessor. In the House the session was stormy
from the beginning. When they could enlist the votes of the
so-called conservatives, the Whigs were able to outvote the Demo-
crats, and the task of the Speaker was made still more difficult.
On the second day of the session, and before the President's
message had been received, Adams fanned the flame of sectional
discord by moving that all petitions, remonstrances, and resolu-
tions, for or against the annexation of Texas, should be referred
to a select committee. His resolution was laid on the table by
a vote of 136 to 61. His solicitude on this subject proved to be
unwarranted, for the President in his message assured Congress
that all proposals for annexation had been withdrawn. Adams
then submitted a resolution which called for a committee to inves-
tigate the controversy of Andrew Stevenson, late Speaker of the
House and present minister to England, with Daniel O'Con-
nell, a member of Parliament. This also was sent to the table,
but it had accomplished its intended purpose of attaching odium
to the administration.
Abolition petitions again made their appearance. The per-
sistence of the reformers aroused the fears as well as the wrath
of southern members, and slaveholders required guaranties for
the protection of their "peculiar institution." On December 11,
Atherton, of New Hampshire, submitted a series of resolutions
the purport of which was to declare unconstitutional any inter-
ference with slavery either in the states or the District of
Columbia, and to reenact the gag rule regarding petitions. After
a brief debate these resolutions were adopted by the House. The
adoption of the gag rule did not, however, eliminate the slavery
question. On the thirteenth, Adams tried to introduce a resolu-
tion to the effect that no enactment of Congress could add to or
deduct from the powers of Congress which had been conferred
by the Constitution. On the same day, Wise offered a series of
resolutions which were designed to deprive Congress of all power
SPEAKEE OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUBEN 127
to interfere A\ith slavery. In both cases perniission to introduce
the resohitions was denied by the House. While Polk applied
the gag rule whenever possible, Gushing, of Massachusetts, won
applause from the reformers by forcing the Speaker to decide
that a protest against the constitutionality of the gag rule,
although itself out of order, must be inserted in the Journal, if
brought up on the following day in the form of a correction of
the minutes."'-
For the Whigs, the news of Swart wout's defalcation was an
unusually sweet morsel, for it gave them an excuse to explore
with telescope and microscope the administrations of Jackson and
Van Buren. And, as the Democrats no longer had a majority
in tlie House, it incidentally gave them a chance to humiliate
Polk by depriving him of the power to appoint the investigating
committee. In disposing of the questions mentioned in the Presi-
dent's message, Cambreleng had moved that the part relating to
the defalcation be referred to the Committee of Ways and jNIeans,
of which he was chairman. On December 21, Garland, of Vir-
ginia, moved to amend by referring the question to a select com-
mittee of nine to be chosen by hallot. In a scurrilous tirade.
Wise asserted that any committee appointed by the present
Speaker would conceal rather than disclose the facts. He had, he
said, been chairman of another committee selected by Polk to
investigate the affairs of the General Post Office, and all his efforts
to ascertain the truth had been defeated. Kendall, the Post
Master General,^^ had declined to furnish information on the
32 Dec. 21, 1838. Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., 59.
33 "Wise called Kendall "the President's thinking machine, and his
writing machine — ay, and his lying machine! Sir, if General Jackson had
been elected for a third term, one great good would have come of the
evil — Amos Kend<iU ivoitid have been worked to death! Poor wretch, as
he rode his Eosinante down Pennsylvania avenue, he looked like Death
on a pale horse — he was chief overseer, chief reporter, amanuensis, scribe,
accountant general, man of all work — nothing was well done without
the aid of his diabolical genius." Shielding Kendall, said Wise, was the
more reprehensible because Jackson had so relentlessly pursued Tobias
Watkins: "When the indictments, the prosecutions, were pressed unre-
lentingly against poor Watkins — when the Administration was crying,
128 JAMES K. POLE
ground that he was responsible to the President alone, and the
majority of the committee had excluded everything that might
reflect upon the administration. "Now, sir," said Wise to the
Speaker,
I propose to show that yoicr committee obeyed the will of their master.
Yes, as you had done, by pacMng and stocking the committee. It was your
committee — peculiarly and emphatically yours — its appointment, its conduct,
its honor or infamy, will forever attach itself, sir, to your name. In illus-
trating the conduct of that committee, I could consume days to show how
the plainest and most obvious and undeniable propositions were voted do^vn ;
how resolution after resolution, question after question to witnesses, going
into the very vitals of inquiry, were unblushingly rejected and stifled by
the majority of the committee . . . ycni, the Speaker, the President of the
United States, the heads of Executive Departments, ymir committee, and
your whole party, combined and conspired to stifle investigation.
Some of Wise 's friends asked him to yield the floor for a motion
to adjourn. He declined on the plea that he might never get it
again, for, said he to the Speaker, ' ' I distrust you, sir. ' '^* Polk
bore the onslaught with dignity and composure, and without
interference until Wise referred to Benton as the "monster"
who was to perpetuate the present dynasty. On January 8, 1839,
he again assailed the Speaker and compared him to a gambler
who plays with loaded dice.^^
It was believed by the Speaker's friends that Wise, Peyton,
and Clay were trying to provoke him into sending a challenge,^®
for the "murder" of Jonathan Cilly had not been forgotten.
Shylock-like, 'my bond, my bond!' against one of Mr. Adams's default-
ers, then 'general and minute inquiries' w'ere not only lawful, but a
duty; but, sir, the moment the band of investigation touched one of his
'little ones,' then inquiry was worse than a 'Spanish Inquisition.' "
34 Dec. 21, 1838. Cong. GJohe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., App., 386-387.
35 "My colleague," said he, "wants the committee appointed by
ballot, in order to avoid imputations on the Speal-er; I want it appointed
by ballot, to avoid the Speaker himself. ' '
3*i According to a story printed in the Globe, August 21, 1844, on the
authority of General Jackson, Clay at one time appeared at the bar
of the House and said to Speaker Polk: "Go home, G-d d-n you,, where
you belong!" In 1844 this ejaculation was made the theme of a cam-
paign song. During a heated debate in the House, Wise shouted to Polk:
''You are a damned little petty tijrant; I mean tJd^ personally — packet
it!"
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 129
But Polk treated their insults with silent contempt, and b>* so
doing did much to establish a new precedent in such "affairs of
honor." His personal bravery was questioned by none except
his bitter enemies, and even the impetuous Jackson commended
him for ignoring such flagrant indignities.^^
The committee was chosen by ballot, and, needless to say, a
majority of its members were opposed to the administration. The
Democrats asked for the privilege of selecting the minority mem-
bers, but their request was denied. Both majority and minority
reports were tabled by the House on February 27, 1839. The
investigation had been successful only in intensifying political
discord. In a letter to Polk, Jackson asked for an account of
the investigation, and expressed the belief that Swartwout could
not have invested all of the million and a quarter which he had
taken. "Where is the balance?" he asked, "The Whiggs have
it. ' '^^ To Grundy he suggested that William B. Lewis and Daniel
Jackson, if put on oath, might tell how Swartwout had invested
some of his money.^^
Defalcations had been both frequent and brazen, and their
cause, as Underwood, of Kentucky, pointed out,^° could be traced
to Jackson's policy of filling offices with those "whose subserv-
iency to the will of the President, and devotion to the interests
of party, constituted their principal recommendation." But
undoubtedly Bynum's statement was equally true— that, when
demanding' that the select committee be chosen by ballot, the
Whigs were less interested in political purity than in blasting
Polk's prospects in his gubernatorial campaign."
3T Jackson to W. P. Kowles, Aug. 24, 1840. Printed in Washington
Globe, July 19, 1844.
3s Jackson to Polk, Feb. 11, 1839, Poll: Papers.
39 "T have no doubt " he continued, "if the truth can be reached,
that the mgVrnecCt^ of New York hold in their hands of the revenue
chargeable to Swartwout, from $60n,000 to $800,000 if not more, and it
s sulges ed that he loaned to our little Whigg printer. Hall of the Banner,
some^thousands." Jackson to Grundy, Feb. 20, 1839 (^m. Mag. of Hrst.,
V, 141-142).
40 Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., App., 375.
4:1 Idem, 125.
130 JAMES E. POLE
Unquestionably disintegration of the Jackson party was due
in part to the jealousy of ambitious politicians who had failed to
obtain what they considered to be an adequate reward for services
rendered. But there was a deeper cause for defection — one based
on the nature and ends of government itself. For example, a
man of Bell's type — one who believed in constitutional govern-
ment, and one whose penetrating mind enabled him so clearly to
see the inevitable results of administering the government accord-
ing to Jacksonian methods — never logically belonged in the ranks
of the party which followed so loyally the dictates of the "old
hero. ' ' Bell, and all others who viewed things as he did, were con-
stitutionalists, and they gravitated naturally to the party which
accepted the precepts of Hamilton, Marshall, and Webster. Dur-
ing Jackson's first term, and to some extent during his second,
there was much confusion of thought on governmental principles
and functions. Admiration for the man had obscured the vision
of many who would otherwise have been quick to detect the
inherent evils of Jacksonism. By the time Van Buren became
President, the personal element had, to a considerable degree,
disappeared from politics. In the party realignment which re-
sulted, personal qualities were not entirely ignored ; but of far
greater importance was the attitude of statesmen and their sup-
porters toward the fundamentals of government itself. On this
question the issue was clear cut.
Several speeches delivered during this session show that their
authors fully understood the nature of Jacksonism and its para-
lyzing influence upon constitutional government. The President
in his message had attributed the success of our institutions to
the "constant and direct supervision by the people over every
public measure." With this as a text, Bell assailed the "demo-
cratic tendencies" of w^hich the administration boasted, and
made an ardent plea for a return to constitutional government :
The People are told that our ancestors, who framed the Constitution in
1789, were half a century in the rear of the improvements of the present
age; that they had not the benefit of the new lights -which experience has
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 131
shed upou the subject of government since that time, and Avhich are now
in full blaze around us. The science of government, we are told, has made
great strides since our Constitution was framed; and, in deed, that instru-
ment is beginning to be looked upon by many rather as a device of bad men,
to advance the interests of the few at the expense of the many, and forming
an actual obstruction to that full tide of happiness and prosperity Avhich
awaits us when the inventions of modern democracy shall be substituted
for it. At all events, it is proclaimed to be the duty of every man who
would improve the condition of the human family to strengthen the demo-
cratic tendencies of the Constitution, and to disrobe or rather strip it of those
limitations and restrictions upon the popular will, with which our unimproved
ancestors have thought it necessary to encumber it. . . . In truth, sir* it
cannot be disguised that there are a class of politicians in the country at
this moment, whose aspirations it does not suit that any restriction, any
limitation whatever, shall exist in the practice of the Government upon the
will or absolutism of the majority; and, in the estimation of all their
followers, our Constitution is defective.*^
Deploring the attempt to bring about more immediate control
by the people, Bell boldly asserted that
according to our system, the People do not, and cannot, exercise any direct
supervision over any public measure. Their power, their influence, their
supervision, can be constitutionally exercised only by petition and remon-
strance, and by the utterance of their voice at the ballot-box.
This was but a simple statement of facts ; nevertheless, it required
temerity to proclaim such a truth in the face of clamor for the
exercise of popular will. To Van Buren's declaration that the
extension of practical democracy had strengthened the Union,
Bell replied that never before had there been such a relaxation
of all ties which bind society together.^^ The power of the
people, he said, had not in reality been increased, for party
discipline had deprived them of all voice in public affairs.^* The
42 Dec. 26, 1838. Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., App., 360-361.
43 "At no former period has so general a spirit of opposition to legal
restraints or requirements manifested itself throughout the country, when
they stand in the way of wlful passions or purposes of any kind. Slight
ret^ard for the Constitution and laws, commencing with the Government
its'elf and its administrators, has gradually diffused itself over society."
44 "Such is and has been the power of party discipline — such the
despotic principle of party association for years, that the mass of the
community have rather stood in the relation of subjects to be governed
than the controlling elements of power. ' '
132 JAMES K. FOLK
truth of this statement, however, only made more deplorable the
fact that the party which Bell himself had helped to organize
should keep up the fiction of popular sovereignty, and even
outdo their opponents in catering to the passions of the multitude.
When discussing an appropriation bill, on February 19, 1839,
Kennedy, of Maryland, diverged from his subject to give a
critical analysis of Jacksonism and to point out its disastrous
consequences. Jackson, he said, had been singularly unlucky
as a reformer, although he had been an innovator ' ' in the broadest
and worst sense":
His adininistratiou was one ceaseless change: change, sometimes steal-
ing along in noiseless advance, sometimes bursting forth in bold, open-day
achievement ; one while sweeping with the breath of spring, at another -with
the rage and havoc of the tornado. We had ever change of men, change
of measures, change of principles. . . . The pervading characteristic of that
most anomalous and extraordinary administration was mutation — uncer-
tainty— experiment. It lived in perpetual motion, defying all hope of
repose; it rejoiced in turmoil, and revelled in paradox. . . . The idea of
political consistency never entered the President's head — he had no per-
ception of the meaning of the term.
Jackson's idol, continued Kennedy, was popularity, and what-
ever sustained popularity constituted the theory of his conduct.
It was not that wholesome popularity based on services rendered,
"but a domineering, wayward, arrogant popularity — an im-
patient, hectoring assumption of the right to lead, which repu-
diates all law, despises all observance, and maintains its supre-
macy by personal and party force:" Jackson, said he, used his
popularity to increase his power ; and, in turn, he used that power
to increase his popularity.^^
45 " The very boldness of his designs seemed to fascinate the public
admiration: he dazzled the popular mind by that fearlessness which we
were, for a time, accustomed to interj)ret as a proof of his honesty and
uprightness of purpose He flattered the People with the address
of a practiced courtier, startled and amused them by the thunderclaps
of his policy, identified liis success with the gratification of tlieir favorite
passions, grappled himself with wonderful adroitness to the predominant
sentiments, wishes, and prejudices of the great and massive majority —
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE UNDER VAN BUREN 133
On February 22, Slade, of Vermont, obtained the floor for
the purpose of discussing the general appropriation bill. His
time was mainly occupied, hoAvever, in a masterful arraignment
of Jackson and Van Buren, and of their methods. He attributed
the gift of prophecy to Benton, Van Buren, and R. M. Johnson,
who, in 1826, had reported to the Senate on the evils of executive
patronage. Patronage, they said, would inevitably lead to one
man power. By exchanging patronage for votes the President
would soon control not only both houses of Congress, but the
entire country.^'' "What was prophecy in 1826," said Slade,
"has become history in 1839."
Under the caption of the "Pretensions of Democracy," he
contrasted the now obsolete Republicanism of Jefferson with
and became a monarch, an autocrat, by the sheer concentration of repub-
lican suffrage. ' '
Having discussed in detail the methods by which Jackson had arro-
gated all authority to himself while professing reverence for the Con-
stitution, Kennedy depicted most admirably the effect of Jaeksonism,
not alone upon the character of the government, but upon society itself.
It Jed not merely to corruption in official circles, but it demoralized the
masses, as well. "We lived," said, he, "in the midst of convulsions.
The public taste was vitiated and fed by the stimulous of constantly
recurring political eruptions; it delighted in strange conjectures — the
heaviugs and spasms of that capricious power which displayed itself in
such fantastic action at the capital. A spirit of insubordination, of mis-
rule and riot became dift'used through the community. Wild and visionary
theories of political duty were disseminated abroad and showed them-
selves, in the most mischievous forms, in the proceedings of the State
Legislatures. The most abstruse and difficult problems of political
economy — questions of currency, finance, constitutional power — were
summarily but authoritatively disposed of by the shallowest pretenders
to statesmanship; and the oldest and best institutions of the country
attacked and beaten down by political charlatans. Knowledge, delibera-
tion, experience, all were obliged to give way to this newly-inspired
intuition; and the greatest pains were taken by party leaders and dema-
gogues to deceive the people into the belief that the profoundest ques-
tions of government might be consigned to the decision of men of the
lowest scale of qualification in political science" (Cong. Globe, 25 Cong.,
3 sess., App., 410-412). The whole speech is well worth reading.
46 ' ' "We must look forward to the time when the nomination of a
President can carry any man through the Senate, and his recommenda-
tion can carry any measure through the two Houses of Congress; when
the principle of public action will be open and avowed — the President
wants my vote, and I want his patronage; I will vote as he wishes, and
he will give me the office I wish for. What will this be but the govern-
ment of one man? and what is the government of one man, but a mon-
archy?" Quoted from their report by Slade.
134 JAMES E. POLE
the madness of Jacksonian Democracy — ''the Democracy," as it
is called. Its chief characteristic, said he, is sham, and it relies
for its success upon fomenting class prejudice.^' He read the
well-known letter to Monroe in whicli Jackson urged the Presi-
dent to crush the "monster, party spirit," and contrasted the
sentiments expressed in that letter with the practice of the admin-
istration of its author. Hypocritical as had been the pretensions
to political virtue of those who had brought General Jackson
forward for the Presidency, Slade did not believe that even they
had fully realized the political debauchery upon which they were
entering.*^
The Speaker, to whom this merciless, but for the most part
well-merited, arraignment of Jacksonism was officially addressed,
listened, undismayed by the perils which were being depicted.
None believed more thoroughly in party discipline than he, and
few had been more closely identified with the administrations of
Jackson and Van Buren. He had effectively served his party
in many capacities, from conducting the bank war in the House
down to establishing local party newspapers. His enemies fully
recognized his skill as a political strategist, even though they
denounced him as the tool of those whom he served.
47 "Thus, the rich are made an object of jealousy to the poor. The
laborer is excited against the capitalist — the indolent and improvident
against the industrious and frugal — the ignorant against the learned and
intelligent — and even the vicious and abandoned against the virtuous and
upright. Associated wealth, no matter how widely it may embrace men
of small means, is declared to be monopolizing and dangerous. Banks,
however prudently and safely managed, are denounced as the money
making machines of the wealthy, designed only to make the rich richer
and the poor poorer. Factitious distinctions are created. Jealousies are
excited. An imaginary aristocracy is raised up in the midst of every
community; and nothing can be heard but the war-cry — down with
monopolies, and down with the aristocracy."
48 "It seems impossible they should have dreamed that General Jack-
son, the author of the noble sentiments I have quoted, could ever be
brought to enact, in his own administration, an utter falsification of every
profession they contained — a falsification so complete, that there should
not be, as in truth, there is not, found a single one of his friends whose
face does not crimson with blushes at an exhibit of the contrast" {Cong.
Globe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., App. 323 fif).
SPEAKEE OF THE HOUSE UNDEE VAN BUEEN 135
Jaeksonisni was not without its defenders, although they
failed to match their opponents in oratorical powers or in logical
arguments. Crary, of Michigan, saw in the Supreme Court a
political body "of the worst character," and he commended
Jackson for having assumed the right to construe the Constitution
as he pleased. As soon as men are elevated to that court, said
Crary, they apply themselves to the study of British law and
British precedents, and "they cannot be operated upon by the
healthy influence of a sound public opinon."'"' Rhett, of South
Carolina, said that the country had always been divided into
two great political parties — one which feared government and
another which feared the people. Inasmuch as strength in the
government could be attained only at the expense of popular
freedom, he believed, like Jefferson, in restricting the functions
of government within the narrowest possible limits.^"
The entire session was characterized by intense party and
personal recrimination. The Democratic party was no longer
omnipotent. It was reaping the harvest of its own misdeeds,
and, in addition, it was held accountable for the distressed con-
dition of the country, although this had resulted from causes
economic rather than political. Hope of success added boldness
to the attacks of its opponents. Twelve years earlier, an attack
upon Jackson and his policies would have meant political suicide
for the assailant ; it was now one of the surest means of acquiring
popularity.
More than any other member of the House, Polk was given
credit by one party, and blame by the other, for the success of
the legislative part of the Jackson program. Consequently his
adversaries were unwilling to permit him to withdraw from na-
tional polities without making one more attempt to humiliate him
in the eyes of the nation. They had been unsuccessful in their
efforts to confuse him in the complexities of parliamentary
49 Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., App., 154.
50 Idem, 134.
13G JAMES K. POLE
procedure. Their insulting invectives and their invitations to
personal combat had been received with a dignity and composure
that did credit to the Speaker. Unable to gratify their desire
to injure the Speaker in a more effective manner, his enemies
resorted to the petty and unprecedented course of opposing the
ordinary vote of thanks on his retirement from office. Prentiss,
who had, at a previous session, been deprived of a seat in the
House by Polk's casting vote, was chief actor and stage manager
in this puerile opera houffe. The resolution which thanked the
Speaker for ' ' the able, impartial, and dignified manner ' ' in which
he had presided over the House, Prentiss moved to amend by
striking out the word impartial. Prentiss did not ''deny the
capacity of the Speaker, his dispatch of business, or his full and
thorough knowledge of parliamentary law," but he could not
agree that he had been impartial. He argued that the House
had expressed its distrust of the Speaker by taking from him the
appointment of the Swartwout committee. On the other hand,
he frankly admitted that his main objection to the resolution
was the favorable effect it would have upon Polk's gubernatorial
canvass in Tennessee. The Speaker, he said, was "playing a
political game," in which this resolution would constitute an
important part. Reviewing the personnel of the House commit-
tees, he condemned the Speaker for having put on all ' ' political
committees" a greater number of administration men than the
small majority of that party would justify. He charged Polk
with being a tool of the President and of the party. "A more
perfectly party Speaker, ' ' said he, ' ' one who would be more dis-
posed to bend the rules of the House to meet the purposes of his
own side in politics, never had pressed the soft and ample cush-
ions of that gorgeous chair. "^^
There was little justification for this intemperate arraignment
and for the conduct of the other fifty-six merabers^^ who co-
operated with Prentiss in opposing the customary vote of thanks.
51 Cong. Globe, 2;j Cong., 3 sess., 251-252.
52 The vote stood 94 to 57.
SPEAEEE OF THE HOUSE UN DEB VAN BUBEN 137
When forming his committees, Polk had simply followed prece-
dent. Many Whigs bore testimony to the justness of his de-
cisions. And yet, he could hardly complain because of this par-
tisan attack, for he had himself, on a former occasion, quite as
unjustly accused a Speaker of subserviency to "the throne. "^^
Polk's farewell address to the House, in response to the reso-
lution of thanks just passed, did much to destroy the effect of
the shafts which had been hurled at him, and to elevate liim in
the opinion of fairminded men of all parties. He did not de-
scend to answer the charges made against him or to indulge in
recrimination. Without boasting, he alluded to his record of
"constant and laborious" service,^* and to the peculiar difficul-
ties which attach to the office of Speaker. All Speakers, said he,
have borne testimony to the impossibility of giving entire satis-
faction to all, but
it has been made my duty to decide more questions of parliamentary law
and order many of them of a complex and difficult character, arising often
in the midst of high excitement, in the course of our proceedings, than
had been decided, it is believed, by all my predecessors, from the formation
of this Government.
Ignoring the minority, he thanked the majority for the evidence
of their approbation. With good-tempered adroitness, he belit-
tled the effect of the negative vote by declaring that he regarded
the resolution just passed "as the highest and most valued testi-
mony I have ever received from this House, ' ' because, under the
circumstances, it was not a mere and a meaningless formality.^^
Many who, for partisan reasons, had voted against the resolution,
as soon as Congress had adjourned, hastened to assure the late
Speaker of their personal good will.^*' Instead of discrediting
53 See pp. 19-20.
5* " I can, perhaps, say what few others, if any can — that I have not
failed to attend the daily sittings of this House a single day since I
have been a member of it [14 years], save on a single occasion, when
prevented for a short time by indisposition."
55 Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 3 sess., 252-253.
56 The Nashville Union, March 22, 1839, quoted a letter from a
person who had been present when Polk made his farewell address : "I
138 JAMES E. POLK
the Speaker, the minority had really made him an object of
interest throughout the Union. Their conduct was generally con-
demned, while his dignified reply raised him in the estimation
of all except the most zealous partisans.^' His ability as a pre-
siding officer was made still more apparent during the following
session by contrasting him with his successor, E. IM. T. Hunter,
of Virginia. In the opinion of Cave Johnson, Hunter displayed
"ignorance of rules and a want of energy & power to command" ;
he feared that the House had chosen a boy to do the business of
a nian.^^ J. W. Blackwell likewise reported that Hunter was
too young for the position. "While you were Speaker," said
he, "your friends praised, and your enemies abused you, but it
is now admitted, on all sides, that Jas. K. Polk was the best pre-
siding officer that we have had for many years, and some say —
the best we ever had.""''
At the close of the session Polk set out for Tennessee to
engage in an active campaign for the governorship. After four-
teen years of service in the House of Representatives, his party
had assigned him duties in a new field of labor. Whatever his
success in the new field might be, no one even dreamed that the
retiring Speaker would next appear in Washington as President-
elect.
never witnessed more enthusiasm tliau the Speaker 's admirable reply to
the vote elicited. Many of those who had voted in the negative expressed
their admiration of it, and gave evident signs of shame and regret at
the partisan course they had pursued. Even Air. Graves, of Kentucky,
declared to a friend at his elbow that the Sjjeaker had done as well as
any one could do under such circumstances, and stepping forward took
manly leave of him — as also did most of the members, a few bitter and
envious partisans excepted. ' '
57 For example, the Worcester (Mass.) Palladium, an independent
paper, said: "The disreputable conduct of the opposition members of
Congress, towards the Speaker of the House, at the close of the session,
makes that gentleman an object of peculiar interest, at the present
moment, to the whole democratic party of the Union. An effort was
made, as violent as it was uncourteous, to prevent the passage of the
usual complimentary resolution to the Speaker on his retiring from the
Chair. But it was an unavailing effort." Quoted by Nashville Union,
April 8, 1839.
58 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 21, 1839, Polk Papers.
59 Blackwell to Polk, Dec. 30, 1839, ihid.
CHAPTER VIII
POLK VERSUS CANNON, 1839
In May, 1838, shortly before he consented to become a candi-
date for the governorship of Tennessee, Polk was examined by
a phrenologist, who, unless he had made a thorough study of his
client beforehand, made some exceedingly shrewd guesses.^ "He
is very quick of perception" ; so reads the prepared statement,
when he enjoys, he enjoys remarkably well, and when he suffers, he suffers
most intently. . . . His is a remarkably active mind, restless unless he has
something of importance to do; cannot be idle for a moment, is by nature
one of the most industrious of men; loves mental labour & hard study as
he does daily food; . . . and is throughout a positive character.
The traits pointed out in another part of the statement are mani-
fest throughout Polk's public career, but especially so during the
four years of his Presidency : He
thinks well of himself; often asks advice, & does just as he pleases; is
one of the firmest of men; slow in committing himself, but once committed,
does all in his power to carry through his measures . . . has many acquain-
tances, feAv bosom friends . . . has an astonishing command of facts and
can call to mind with great precision what occurred long ago.
To those who are familiar with Polk's career in national
politics only, one part of the phrenologist's statement might
seem very wide of the mark. In it, the phrenologist says that
Polk would have succeeded on the stage, for he has ability in
the use of pungent sarcasm and ridicule and "could 'take off'
the peculiarities of others if he would indulge this propensity."
During the campaign which followed, Polk indulged this pro-
pensity to the full — especially against his opponent and Bailie
Peyton — for ridicule and mimicry were among the chief weapons
1 The phrenologist's name was O. S. Fowler, and the statement which
he prepared bears the date of May 30, 1838 (Polk Papers).
140 JAMES K. POLK
used in assailing his adversaries. He is usually regarded as "a
man who never smiled"; however this may have been, he was
very successful in the art of amusing others.
Tliere was rejoicing among the Democrats of Tennessee Avhen,
in September, 1838, Polk announced that he would enter the
contest with Governor Newton Cannon for the highest office of
his state. He received many letters in which the writers ex-
pressed their delight, promised support, and assured him of vic-
tory. It was the general opinion that he alone could restore the
state to the Democratic party. It was, indeed, this belief that
induced him to abandon his career in the national legislature.
The unholy work of White and Bell must be undone ; Old Hick-
ory's state must be redeemed.
While he was still in Washington, presiding for the last time
over the House of Representatives, Polk received many letters
from Tennessee friends urging him to put the chief emphasis
of his gubernatorial campaign on national issues and state in-
ternal improvements. It was pointed out that the Whigs would
confine themselves almost exclusively to an attack upon the na-
tional administration and that the people of the state were much
interested in internal development. The advice seems to have
accorded wuth his own views. At any rate the topics suggested
were the ones on which he placed the most emphasis.
As stated elsewhere, one of the most important events of Polk's
campaign against Cannon was the advent of Jeremiah George
Harris as editor of the Nashville Unian. In response to the pop-
ular taste of the period, the press of the state had been notorious
for extravagance of statement and personal abuse. It now en-
tered upon a campaign of scurrility and abandon that has seldom
been equaled; Mark Twain's employer could scarcely have made
his editorials more "peppery and to the point."- Equipped
with a style that was cutting without descending to mere ribal-
dry, and with a pen dipped in wormwood, Harris goaded his
2 See Mark Twain, "Journalism in Tennossoo, " in Sketches New and Old.
POLK FEESUS CANNON, 1839 141
opponents to a frenzy that was unprecedented. Lacking the
ability to imitate his style, his enemies often resorted to coarse
and vulgar abuse. No Whig editor in the state, except the in-
imitable Parson Brownlow, could cope with him in picturesque
invective. Harris had a spread-eagle woodcut prepared, large
enough to cover a considerable portion of the front page of his
paper. As its appearance in the TJnion was always accompanied
by news of Democratic victory, the Whigs expressed their con-
tempt by calling it "Harris's buzzard. "^
When Harris took charge of the Union, February 1, 1839,
A. A. Hall, of the Nashville Banner, was already making capital
of the charge made in Congress, by Wise and others, that Polk
■had "packed" the committees of the House. The new editor
plunged at once into a vigorous defense of the Speaker and at-
tributed the charges to jealousy of Polk's success and to a desire
to injure him in Tennessee. When the House voted to select the
Swartwout committee by ballot, the Banner exultingly heralded
the event as proof positive that the House, having learned by
experience that ' ' Speaker Polk could not be trusted, proclaimed
the fact to the world. ' '*
Some of the other Whig papers were even more scurrilous
than the Banner. For example, an article in the Knoxville
Register, signed "Curtius," spoke of Polk as "lost to a sense
of honesty, decency and integrity, laboring under insanity and
disgrace, pliant tool, traitor, apostate and tory.'''^ tj^^ Memphis
E7iquirer called him "a crouching sychophant" who lacked even
3 It was said that a leading Whig, who had gone to the Murfrees-
borough post-office in quest of election news, saw through the window a
package of "Unions" and exclaimed in disgust: "It's all over; there is
Harris's infernal buzzard in the mail" (Phelan, Hist, of Tenn., 381).
* " He has been tried by his peers and found wanting. A brand is
upon him that no time can efface. He may cry 'Out d — d spot,' but it
will abide with him for life" (Quoted in Nashville Vnion, February 8
1839.) When criticizing a speech made by Dr. Duncan, candidate for
Congress, the Banner called it "the roaring, staving, bellowing, howling
Doctor's fanfaronade of bombast and nonsense" February 13, 1839.
5 Quoted in Union, March 4, 1839.
142 JAMES K. POLE
the sense of shame.*' A friend had written to Polk that "your
election is dovetailed into that of every candidate for Congress
in the State. "^ The Whigs apparently believed this, also, and
were resolved at all hazard to defeat him.
In April, 1839, Polk formally opened his gubernatorial cam-
paign by publishing a long and argumentative "Address to the
People of Tennessee."^ The address deals almost entirely with
national issues, the nature of the government, and the principles
of the two great political parties. It was pronounced by the
Banner^ to be "a poor enough concern"; but Phelan, with
sounder judgment, has called it "the ablest political document
which appeared in this State up to the time of the war."^" For
the student of history, it is one of the most interesting documents
ever penned by its author, for in it he has stated fully and with
clearness the principles and doctrines which he considered to be
essential to all just government. It was evidently prepared with
great care, and nowhere else does he give so full a statement of
his views on so varied a list of subjects.
6 ' ' Condemned and spit upon by a majority of the U. S. House of
Representatives, in taking from him [Mr. Polk] the power of appoint-
ing committees, freely entrusted to all of his predecessors, but which he
basely prostituted for the benefit of the party — of locofocoism — plainly
told in language of thundering indignation that has been heard even to
the shores of the seas, that he was no longer worthy of the confidence of
Congress, like a crouching sychophant, instead of resigning his narrowed
trust with shame, and disdaining tamely to see his integrity assailed by
even those who exalted him, he submits, ignobly bears the rankling con-
tumely, and in hope of political reward for ' self-sacrifice ' upon the altar
of locofocoism, he still patiently ministers at its shrine reeking in cor-
ruption with a zeal that can only be inspired by a hope of reward." When
quoting this, the Union replied in the same issue that "the raving of
Mr. Prentiss, the ranting of Mr. Wise, and the management of Mr. Bell
in reference to the appointment of the ' Swartwout Committee, ' were
all calculated for effect in Tennessee," and would be so regarded by the
people (Nashville Union, March 4, 1839).
7 A. Balch to Polk, February 21, 1839, rolTc- Papers.
8 A copy in pami)hlet form may be found in the Po/A- Papers, vol. 83.
It is printed in full in the Nashville Union, April 10, 12, 15, 1839, as well
as in other papers.
0 Nashville Banner, April 11, 1839. On April 17 the Banner called it
"an elaborate and ingenious production, but characterized by a want
of manliness, candor and sincerity."
10 Phelan, Hist, of Tenn., 381.
POLK VEESUS CANNON, 1839 143
In stating his reasons for confining his address so largely to
national questions, Polk asserted that the chief objections urged
against him were based on the principles and policies which he
had upheld as a member of Congress. He gave a historical sum-
mary ^^ of the perennial contest between those who distrusted and
ignored the will of the people and those w^ho believed that gov-
ernment should carry into effect the popular will. The popular
party, he said, had triumphed in the convention which drafted
the Constitution, but Hamilton and his adherents soon procured
by construction what they had failed to have embodied in the
Constitution. Democracy triumphed under Jefferson, but under
J. Q. Adams the
latitudinarian doctrines, with all the consolidating tendencies of the
Hamilton school, as practiced under the administration of the elder Adams,
were resuscitated and revived. It was publicly proclaimed that the whole-
some restraints of the public will on the action of the servants of the
people were to be disregarded, and that the * Eepresentative was not to
be palsied by the will of his constituents.' It was declared by the Chief
11 "In the origin of the Government there were two parties. In the
Convention that framed the Constitution one party distrusted the power
and capacity of the people for self-government, and wished a strong
central government. They admired the British Constitution — they were
in favor of a President and Senate for life — they were for forming a
strong government, far removed from the popular control; they wished to
abstract from the power of the States — to restrict the right of suffrage,
and to create other influences than the will of the people to control the
action of their public functionaries. This party was not successful in
the convention, and a constitution was formed which invested the new
government with a few delegated and well defined powers, leaving all
others to the States and the people, to exercise according to their sovereign
will. The parties in the convention were the germ of the two great
political divisions, which afterwards contended, and are still contending
for the mastery in the Government.
' ' No sooner was the government put in operation under the Constitu-
tion, than the enemies of popular control over public authority, attempted
by a latitudinous construction of the Constitution, to make the govern-
ment in practice what they had in vain attempted to make it in principle
and form. Alexander Hamilton, a professed monarchist in principle, and
in the Convention the leading advocate of a strong central government,
was the first Secretary of the Treasury, and immediately began, by
strained and unwarranted constructions of the Constitution, to enlarge
the power and influence of the Federal Government, with the view of
diminishing the power of popular will over the administration of the
Government. ' ' Jefferson himself could scarcely have penned a more
telling indictment against the Federalists.
lU JAMES E. POLK
Magistrate to be ineffably stupid to suppose that the Representatives of
the people were deprived of the power to advance the public weal, thereby
substituting the unrestrained discretion of Congress and of the Federal
Government for the specific grants of power conferred by a Constitution
of limitations and restrictions.
Polk's recital of historical occurrences was accurate and well
put ; but it was begging the question to imply, as he did, that
the framers of the Constitution had intended that representatives
should divest themselves of all judgment and become mere auto-
matons for registering the popular will. Custom and a desire
for reelection m^ay prevent members of Congress from exercising
their own judgment, but undoubtedly Adams rather than Polk
reflected the views of those who drafted the Constitution.
It was thought by many politicians of both parties that Clay
would be the candidate of the Whigs at the approaching Presi-
dential election. Polk, therefore, devoted a considerable portion
of his address to Clay and the policies which he advocated. The
principal achievements of the Federalist administrations were,
in Polk's opinion, the grasping of power by the general govern-
ment and the creation of the money power. Their successors,
the Whigs, likewise stood for these evils, and in addition, had
adopted Clay's "miscalled 'American System' of high tariff and
internal improvements, the result of which combination would
oppress the poor and increase the evils of executive patronage.
The administration of Jackson he eulogized without stint.
The adherents of White were told that they had supported the
judge because he had been represented to be a better ''Jackson
man" than Van Buren, consequently there was no reason now
why they should not return to the party of the people. It was
untrue, said lie, that Jackson had changed since his elevation to
power ; his detractors, not he, had deserted to the enemy. " I, "
continued Polk,
in common with the whole Republican party, am represented to you as
one of these changelings. ]n what have 1 changed? I opposed Henry
Clav on account of his odious Federal doctrines, and his coalition with
POLK VEESUS CANNON, 1839 145
Mr. Adams, and I oppose him still. I opposed the high tariff policy, and
I oppose it still. I opposed Internal Improvements by the General Govern-
ment, and I oppose them still. I supported the removal of the. deposits,
and I have not changed my language or my opinions in relation to that
great measure. In fine, what single point is there, involving the principles
of the great Republican party, in which my course has not been uniform
since 1825, when I was first honored with a seat in Congress, down to the
present day?
From a man Avho had a reputation for concealing his views,
this was certainly a most unequivocal declaration. Moreover,
it was a true declaration, and it required courage to make it
under the existing political conditions in Tennessee. Whether
right or wrong, Polk had not swerved from his original political
platform, although many of the policies for which he stood had
become unpopular in his state. He may have broken with Judge
White for personal as well as political reasons, but on national
issues he had been consistent. He pinned his faith now, as he
had always done, on government by the will of the majority;
and however chimerical this may be in practice, his most private
correspondence indicates that his belief in its practicability was
sincere. Passing lightly over state issues, he asked for approval
or condemnation on his record in national politics — a record
which was being grossly misrepresented by the Whig papers of
the state. ^-
At Murfreesborough, on April 11, 1839, Polk made his first
speech of the campaign. Governor Cannon attended and was
invited by Polk to speak first, on account of his age and office.
This he declined to do, saying that, although he had not come
prepared to speak, he might make a reply. Polk talked for two
and a half hours, mainly on national issues and in commendation
of the Jackson party. He said little on state issues, of which
the Banner (April 15) ungenerously credited him with knowing
"very little more than the man in the moon."
12 "For months past I have been the unceasing and almost exclusive
object of their calumnies and misrepresentation."
146 JAMES K. POLE
Cannon in reply said that he had never "clung to the coat
tail" of General Jackson, and when "danger approached, jumped
into his pocket," but, instead, he had had to "stem the buffet-
ings of his wrath. ' ' Before the Creek war, according to his own
story. Cannon was a member of a jury selected to try one Magnus
on the charge of having murdered Patton Anderson, a personal
friend of Jackson. When Cannon voted for acquittal, Jackson,
pointing his finger at the young juror, exclaimed, "I'll mark you,
young man!" Cannon insinuated, also, that, in fulfillment of
this promise, Jackson had, during the Creek war, purposely ex-
posed Cannon and a small detachment of troops to almost certain
death, while the General himself remained in safety on the other
side of the river. He was a "tyrant by nature and education,"
and no one could be his follower "who would not be his tool and
his slave. "^^
In a brief rejoinder Polk, according to the Union (April 12),
made the "roof ring" with his "power of ridicule." The
Banner, on the other hand, reported that "the locomotive can-
didate seemed to feel deeply that he had caught a Tartar," and
that Governor Cannon "triumphantly overthrew" him.^*
Polk's superiority, both in intellect and debating powers, was
apparent from the beginning of the campaign. Cannon was
slow and prosaic — lacking in force and personal magnetism. He
was unable either to hold the attention or to arouse the s^'mpathy
of the multitude. He had until recently professed loyalty to
Democratic doctrines, and he still seemed uncertain as to whether
he had become a full-fledged Whig.^^ There was, on the contrai-y,
13 Nashville Bep. Banner, April 16; Nashville Union, April 12, 18;59.
1* The Banner made much sjiort of Polk's "firing and grimaces" in
imitation of Bailie Peyton and Henry Clay. "James K. Polk, the nar-
row minded, superficial, little, grimacing politician attempting to expand
his outward man, gesture and voice into something his hearers might
take for Henry Clay!" He tried, also, it said, to imitate Webster (Banner,
April 13, 1839).
15 In his reply to Polk, Cannon said: "I believe I have always been
a Democrat. Indeed, they used to call me an Ultra Democrat, a Radical."
He claimed to be a Democrat still, but not in favor of A'an Buren (Banner,
April 16, 1839).
POLK VERSUS CANNON, 1839 147
no uncertainty about Polk's views, and he knew how to state them
most effectively. He was, says Phelan,^^'
the first great "stump speaker" . . . always full of his subject, ready at
retort, sophistical, quick to capture and turn the guns of the enemy against
him, adroit in avoiding an issue whose result must be unfavorable, thor-
oughly equipped with forcible illustrations, humorous anecdotes, and a
ridicule which ranged through all the changes from burlesque to wit.
With no pretensions to oratory, his strength lay in his ability to
state the issues clearly and forcibly, and to argue these issues in
language that was simple and convincing.
On April 13, the candidates met again at Lebanon. On state
issues they were in substantial agreement, and once more their
time was occupied mainly with a discussion of national affairs.
At the close of the debate Governor Cannon, pleading important
state business, set out for Nashville. Polk informed his wdfe
that the Governor and himself got on "very harmoniously," but
there was little harmony in his relations with Bell.
Polk and Cannon had consumed the entire afternoon, and
Bell, who was not expected to take part, took the stump at 5 :30
in a "rage of passion." He talked until sunset, and then an-
nounced that he would continue at the courthouse after supper.
His first address, as reported, was most abusive in character.^'
Polk wrote home that even Bell's friends were disgusted by the
speech, and that he had no difficulty, in his reply, in putting
Bell in the wrong and winning tremendous applause. ^^
Governor Cannon resumed the debates, at McMinnville, on
April 18, but shortly after he retired from the stump entirely.
At McMinnville, having been taunted with indecision, he at last
icffisi. of Tenn., 377.
1' He said that Hopkins L. Turney, Representative from Tennessee,
"was not good enough for the Penitentiary — that Amos Lane was a
scoundrel — that Dr. Duncan was a moral pestilence — that these were the
tools which Col. Polk set forward to make speeches in Congress, instead
of coming out and answering him [Bell] on the floor of Congress face to
face" {Union, April 17, 1839).
18 Polk to Mrs. Polk, April 14, 1839, Polk Papers.
148 JAMES E. POLK
came out squarely for Clay, in the event of his nomination/*^
Because Polk had declared here and elsewhere that he and Can-
non differed little in their views on state questions, the Banner
called Polk a "Government emissary" and regarded it as ex-
tremely impudent in him to try to depose the Governor for his
dislike of Van Buren.-"
The peoj)le in those days took keen delight in political cam-
paigns. . They attended in large numbers, and no debate was
long enough to be tedious if it were spiced with personal recrimi-
nation and with what passed for witty retorts. The popular ear
in Tennessee of that day w^as not attuned to a very high grade
of humor, while, in argument, pungent thrusts rather than logic
won the sympathy of the audience. The festal side of a campaign
Avas quite as important as the forensic, consequently political
debates were usually held in open air, accompanied by a banquet
or a barbecue. When Polk reached East Tennessee, the Whig
section of the state, special pains were taken by the Democrats
to give his journey the appearance of a triumphal procession.-^
Even though he could not hope to gain many votes in this section,
the appearance of popularity in a Whig stronghold might aid him
in other parts of the state.
19 Nashville Union, April 22, 1839.
20 "Is it not a most impudent, unheard of request, then, on his part,
to the people of Tennessee, that they should turn Governor Cannon out
and put /uTO in, all because the Governor is opposed to Mr. Van Buren's
election f Is it not apparent that he is a Government emissary, traversing-
the State, county by county, with the sole view of revolutionizing it on
the subject of national politics?" (Banner, April 19, 1839). On May 22,
the same paper called Polk a deserter from genuine republican doctrines,
"a political changeling — a weather cock, pointing ever in the direction
from whence comes the breath of the President's nostrils — a devourer,
eater-up of his own sentiments, formerly proclaimed in tones of self-
gratification — a jjalace slave laborer for his master at Washington."
21 The Tennessee Sentinel thus described a Polk meeting at Jones-
borough on May 17, 1839: "As a means of enhancing the enjoyments of
the day, suitable arrangements were made for a dinner, free to all of
each party, without distinction, who might think proper to participate. ' '
After dinner there were toasts to Washington, Jackson, Van Buren, Polk,
Amos Kendall, et. ah, — and one to "Newton Canxon — the friend and
supporter of Henry Clay for the next Presidency. Will the freemen of
Tennessee be thus transfererd by dictation from the mouth of any Cannon?
Cries of No! No!" Quoted in Nashville Union, June 3, 1839.
FOLK VEBSUS CANNON, 1839 149
The political contest was by no means confined to the stump
and the platform. Wherever a group of people gathered, issues
and candidates were freely discussed. Personal encounters not
infrequently resulted'-- when arguments had failed to convince.
Despite his surroundings, however, Polk always maintained his
own dignity ; although his language on the stump was often
scathing and exasperating, he never descended to vulgarity or
mere personal abuse.
Accuracy was not a desideratum in a political newspaper.
That editor was most popular who could hurl grotesque epithets
at his opponents and who always reported as well as prophesied
victory for his own side. Harris of the Union fully measured
up to the Democratic ideal, -^ and for this reason his paper
wielded great political influence.
In June, A. A. Hall, of the Banner, caused consternation in
Democratic ranks by quoting anti-slavery articles which had been
written by Harris while he edited the New Bedford (Massachu-
setts) Gazette.^^ By befogging the issue and heaping abuse upon
his accusers, Harris was quite successful in extricating himself
from the difficulty. Nevertheless, the charge that Harris had
been an abolitionist did Polk some injury in the canvass, for it
was he who had been mainly responsible for bringing the editor
to Nashville.-^ In order to divert attention from his own past
record and to give new impetus to Democratic enthusiasm Harris
22 For example, Polk's brother-in-law, Dr. Eucker, is reported to have
thrashed a "bully" whom the Whigs had brought to Murfreesborough
to provoke a quarrel with him (John W. Childress to his sister, Mrs. Polk,
May 27, 1839, Polk Papers).
23 For example, in reporting a debate between Bell and his opponent,
Burton, the Union said that Bell abused Van Buren, eulogized Clay and
called Polk "the travelling missionary," but Burton "literally dissected
his opponent who has been schooled in the sophistries of partizanship, and
laid the diseased limbs of Modern Whigism bare to the bone" (May
27, 1839).
24 One of them, dated May 13, 1836, in opposing the annexation of
Texas, called slavery ' ' the blackest, the foulest, blot on our national
escutchen, ' ' and said that it would be ' ' the height of madness ' ' to extend
it over more territory {Banner, June 11, 1839).
25 John W. Cliildress to Mrs. Polk, June 18, 1839, Polk Papers.
150 JAMES K. POLE
printed in the Union (June 24) the "Mecklenburg Declaration
of Independence ' ' and suggested its ratification on the Fourth of
July. He dilated at length on the fact that Polk had been born
in Mecklenburg county — a fact which proved that he had come
from pure Democratic stock.
The Whigs hoped for good results from a speech made by
Judge White in Knoxville, on the Fourth of July. He still pro-
fessed adherence to Jetfersonian Republicanism, but denounced
the Democrats, whose whole creed consisted in "always acting
with the same man, or set of men." Far from being democrats
they were, said he, "in reality monarchists."-'^ Harris was hor-
rified because White had talked politics on the Fourth of July,
but concluded from the "claptrap" which the judge had uttered
that he must be in his "dotage."-'
White's warning against monarchists did not produce the
effect which the Whigs had anticipated, for Polk succeeded in
winning back a considerable number of those who had supported
the judge in 1836. Before the close of the campaign he received
many letters telling of the good results which his canvass had
achieved.-^
Cannon was easily vanquished, and he retired from the stump,
but Bell dogged Polk's footsteps, bringing into full play his great
ability and oratorical powers. On July 17 he spoke at Nashville
"from early candle-lighting until midnight" in an effort to de-
feat Polk in Middle Tennessee. He was, however, doomed to
disappointment. On August 1 Polk was elected by a majority
of three thousand votes, and Harris got out his "buzzard" to
adorn the front page of the Union along with the election re-
turns. The result of the campaign was justly regarded as a great
26 Copied from Knoxville Times in Nashville Banner, July 18, 1839.
27 Nashville Union, July 19, 1839.
28 C. W. Hall, writing from Kingsport on July 12, told liim that "one
of my neighbors said the other day, 'Sir, 1 did not understand my
political i)0.sition, until I heard Col. Polk, and I then discovered most
clearly, tluit I iras acting with men, who are opposed to mji principles, and
1 instantly resolved to quit their company'. . . . This is a common
observation" (PoVc Papers).
POLK VERSUS CANNON, 1839 151
personal victory for Polk, inasmuch as the Whigs^elected seven
members of Congress and the Democrats only six.-" The Demo-
crats elected a majority of the state legislature, which gave them
the power to get rid of the Whig Senators by hampering them
with obnoxious instructions.
Up' to the very last the Whigs of the state seemed confident
of victor5^ They were reluctant to admit defeat even after the
election had been held. But the Banner, on August 9, mourn-
fully informed its readers that owing to a lack of proper organ-
ization in Middle Tennessee^" the "Spoilsmen for a season will
have the management of affairs in the State. ' ' Two days before
this, prominent Whigs held a meeting in Nashville. Resolutions
were passed urging the organization of committees in every
county for the purpose of retrieving the state. They invited Clay
to visit Tennessee, but he was unable at the time to accept the invi-
tation. Although the Banner from time to time reported enthu-
siastic Whig meetings, it was several weeks before there were
signs of recovery from the shock of the recent defeat.
In their elation over Polk's election, the Democrats rather
overrated its significance. It has already been noted that they
regarded the result as a personal victory for Polk over his
enemies ; but, in addition, they interpreted it to mean that Tenn-
essee had returned, or at least was returning, to the party of
Jackson and Van Buren. Polk had been nominated for the
avowed purpose of regaining the state for the national adminis-
tration ; he had made his canvass almost entirely on national
issues ; and Bell, as well as others, had opposed him on his record
as an administration member of Congress. As his friend Maclin
said in a letter, more importance was attached to Polk's success
than to the election of any other candidate. There w^as, in his
29 One of these was Cave Johnson. Writing to Polk on August 11
he said that he had been elected by a majority of 1300 votes, and, as
he had entered the race only on account of Polk and Grundy, he expected
to retire from politics at the end of his term {PoJlc Papers).
30 On August 13 the same paper attributed the result to bribery and
illegal voting.
152 JAMES K. FOLK
opinion, but one thing lacking to make the triumph complete —
namely, the success of Burton over John Bell.^^
To no one did the national effect of Polk's victory appear of
greater importance than to General Jackson. As soon as the
news reached him, he hastened to congratulate Polk and the
country on his election and "the return of old democratic Tenn-
essee to the republican fold again." With customary hyperbole
he predicted that "it will be at least a century before she will
permit herself to be again duped into her late false position by
such Jesuitical hypocrites & apostates as Bell, "White & Co. "•*-
Polk was doubtless well aware of the program that was to be
carried into effect in the event of his election, and presumably
he aided in formulating it; therefore Jackson did not allude to
it in the letter just quoted. In a letter to Van Buren, however,
the General outlined the party plans in characteristic fashion.
As the Democrats have elected both governor and legislature,
said he,
of course Mr. Fosterss & his gagg law will not any more trouble the U.
States Senate — Judge White must resign, or he will feel the weight of
instructions & a Senator elected over his head — the precedent set by our
last Legislature will justify this proceedure. My own opinion is, White
will resign — Bell being disappointed in going into the Senate to fill White 's
vacancy, which was the price of his apostacy, if he is disappointed in get-
ting into the Speaker's chair, will resign or cut his throat in despair &
disapi)ointment; and this catastrophy will end the existance of bluelight
federalism in Tennessee.
For so great a triumph, he gave the principal credit to Colonel
Polk and General Robert Armstrong."** As will appear in the
31 Sacfield Maclin to Polk, August 10, 1839, Polk Papers.
32 Jackson to Polk, August 13, 1839, ibid.
33 E. H. Foster was elected to the Senate when Grundy resigned.
3* Jackson to Van Buren, August 12, 1839, Fan Burcn Papcrss "I
hope," wrote Richard Warner to Polk, September 29, "we shall be able
to adopt such measures as will compel Foster to give up the seat he and
his friends usurped at the last session." The legislature should instruct
the Senators to vote for the sub-treasury bill. If this (iocs not bring
"poor old White" to his senses, it should then be ascertained wliether
he is a Senator at all. (On account of ill health, Wliite had tendered his
resignation to Governor Cannon, but it had not been accepted.)
POLK VERSUS CANNON, 1839 153
following chapter, the program here outlined, except the suicidal
role assigned to Bell, was carried into successful operation.
When the election took place, the "old hero" was sojourning
at Tyree Springs, in Sumner County. After it had been ascer-
tained beyond question that the state had been redeemed, the
leading Democrats of Middle Tennessee, including Polk, Attor-
ney-General Grundy, Judge Campbell, and General Armstrong,
reported, with their ladies, to that place in order to join with
the General in celebrating the victory. Burdens of state as well
as the infirmities of age were, for the time being, forgotten, and
the company once more indulged in the frivolities of youth.
Each morning, after breakfast, a mock court was held, of which
Grund}^ was Chief Justice and General Jackson, Associate. From
fines levied by this "court," provisions for the day were sup-
plied— a proceeding which seems to have added much to the
enjoyment of the company. ^^
Polk did not remain long within the jurisdiction of this
improvised court. He soon returned to his home in Columbia
to complete his plans for ousting the Whig Senators, and to
prepare for his inauguration. Unlike many who offered him
advice. Cave Johnson believed that the program of persecution
would do the Democrats more harm than good, and therefore
urged Polk to oppose it. " It is essential, ' ' he wrote,
to the existence of our party that every selfish consideration be laid aside
& act in concert & no man can do so much to eifect this as yourself. . . .
It has struck me with some force, that our friends should go to work &
do the business of the State without the slightest interference with Federal
politics — let White and Foster take their course — go to Washington if
they choose — if Foster adopts that course he is forever disgraced — toward
the conclusion of the Session we can instruct.
He did not "wish our party to have the semblance of coercing
either until it is absolutely necessary." He believed that Foster
would resign even without instructions, but however that might
be, "by all means let the necessity for interference be manifest
33 Nelson, Memorials of Sarah Childress Polk, 60-63.
154 JAMES E. POLK
before it is done, rather let it be urged upon the Legislature by
the people rather than upon the people by the Legislature."''*'
Johnson's advice may have been prompted by political sagacity
rather than by a sense of justice, but whatever the motive his
recommendations were good.
As will appear in the following chapter, other counsels pre-
vailed, and the Democrats elected to make the most of their
political power. Their choice gave them a temporary advantage,
although eventually their unfair treatment of the Whig Senators
helped to transfer votes from their own party to that of their
opponents.
36 Johnson to Polk, Clarksville, September 28. The year is not given.
The letter has been put with the Polk Papers for 1838, but evidently it was
written in 1839.
CHAPTER IX
GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE
In accordance with an absurd custom, a governor of Tenn-
essee, in the closing hours of his administration, enacted the
solemn farce of submitting to the legislature a message in which
he made elaborate recommendations for its consideration. This
was done with a full knowledge that within a few days a new
governor would be inaugurated and that he, in turn, would pre-
sent entirely different recommendations.
On October 8, 1839, Governor Cannon submitted his final
message to a legislature composed of thirteen Democrats to ten
Whigs in the Senate, and forty-nine Democrats to thirty-three
Whigs in the lower house. It is unnecessary to dwell on his
suggestions concerning state affairs, for, needless to say, no heed
was paid to them. For political reasons, however, the Democratic
majority in the new legislature felt that his severe condemnation
of the national administration merited both consideration and
rebuke. Unanswered, the Governor's remarks might tend to in-
fluence the wavering, and a refutation would afford another op-
portunity to herald the glorious achievements of the "party of
the people."
Among other things the retiring Governor had expressed a
hope that "the country will ere long be delivered from the mal-
administration of the present rulers, with its pernicious train of
experiments and spoliations." This part of his message was
referred by the legislature to a "Committee on Federal Rela-
tions" which was created early in the session. The most active
member of the committee was Samuel H. Laughlin, former editor
of the Nashville Union and a personal friend of both Polk and
156 JAMES E. POLE
Jackson, and it was easy to foretell what the verdict would be.
On January 29, 1840, Laughlin reported that his committee had
been
wholl}' unable, from aiiytliiug contained in said message, or in the past
action of the Federal Government, executive, legislative or judicial, during
the late or present administrations, which can, in the slightest degi-ee, even
by implication, afford the least warrant of authority for the imputations
contained in that portion of said message, i
The verdict of the committee was approved by the legislature,
and little attention was paid to a minority report which upheld
the contentions of the former Governor. Laughlin 's report
served as a vindication of the national administration. In addi-
tion, it served as the basis for one of the instructions given to
the federal Senators from Tennessee — the instruction to vote
against the bill to prevent interference in elections by certain
federal officers.
On October 14, 1839, Polk was inaugurated as governor of
Tennessee. Among those present to witness the ceremony it gave
Harris of the Union ' ' great pleasure to notice ex-President Jack-
son, with health apparently improved." The inaugural address,
according to the same writer, was "an effort of great happiness
on the part of Gov. Polk." "It was," wrote Old Hickory, "a
great address well suited to the occasion — there was a great
contrast betwen his and Mr. Cannon 's."-
On account of its supposed influence on national politics,
more importance was attached to Polk's inauguration than is
usually the case when a state executive is installed. Levi Wood-
bury voiced the sentiment of most Democrats when he wrote :
"I have seldom known the result of any election to be more
triumphant & gratifying over the whole Union than that of
yours. ' '^
1 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1839-40, 7, 504.
2 Jackson to Van Buren, Oct. 18, 18.S9, Fan Bnren Papers.
sWoodburj' to Polk, October 20, 1839, PoR- Papers.
GOVEENOE OF TENNESSEE 157
The new Governor's first message was submitted to the legis-
lature on October 22, and the subjects most emphasized in it
were banks and internal improvements. He expressed the belief
that there had been no necessity for the suspension of specie
payments by the banks of Tennessee. On the assumption that
they had suspended such payments simply because eastern banks
had done so, he urged the enactment of measures which would
compel resumption, for "like individual debtors, they should
meet their liabilities honestly and promptly as long as they are
able to pay." Banks often, said he, do their most profitable
business during suspension, while the loss is borne by labor. He
denied that the federal government had been responsible for de-
rangement of the currency or that a national bank could have
prevented it. The main cause of financial distress, he said, was
speculation on borrowed capital. For remedy, therefore, he did
not seek new legislation, but suggested something far more sensi-
ble— a remedy which in no degree depended on governmental
action. "The only substantial and permanent relief," said the
Governor,
is to be found in habits of economy and industry, and in the productive
labor of our people. By the observance of these, another crop would more
than liquidate our eastern debt. We must bring our expenses within our
income. Our merchants and traders must cease to indulge in hazardous
and wild speculations which they are unable to meet.
This was very sound advice, far too sound to be widely accepted
in a period when most people believed that the government was
able to dispense or withhold prosperity at will, regardless of their
own reckless speculative ventures.
Another recommendation was that the legislature should, by
law, prohibit the Bank of Tennessee from emitting notes under
twenty dollars, because excessive issues of paper tended to drive
out metal money, and in addition, to facilitate speculation.
Polk declared himself to be strongly in favor of internal im-
provements made by the state. He asked, however, that existing
158 JAMES K. FOLK
laws on that subject should be so modified as to prevent extrava-
gance. For example, the legislature at the preceding session had
enacted a law which required the state to subscribe for one-half
of the capital stock of all railroads, macadamized turnpikes,
graded turnpikes, and sanded turnpikes for which acts of incor-
poration ''have heretofore been granted or for which acts of
incorporation may be hereafter granted. ' ' Such a law had great
possibilities for evil, and under it worthless enterprises had
already been undertaken. Polk now urged that the law should
be so modified that subscriptions in future must be limited to
works of real improvement, and that a board of public works
should be created to authorize and supervise such enterprises.*
On the whole the Governor's message was a creditable docu-
ment, although it lacked the vigor and elaboration which usually
characterized his written productions. It was evident that his
interests were national rather than local. His recommendations
were duly considered by the legislature, but even the members
of that body seemed to be more interested in "doing practical
politics" for the national party than in enacting laws for the
good of the state. At any rate practical politics was given first
place on their program.
It was well known to all that the main reason for making Polk
the gubernatorial candidate was the belief that he alone could win
the state back to Democratic allegiance. For this same reason
he had consented to make the race. The question which soon
presented itself was: What does he expect as his reward, if he
succeeds? During the campaign the Whigs made the charge tliat
Polk did not care for the governorship, and that his nomination
had been simply a ruse to win Tennessee for Van Buren and the
Vice-Presidency for himself at the approaching federal election.
In such an event he would, of course, resign in the middle of his
term. The charge was repelled by Polk's friends, but the prob-
ability of its ti-uth was so great that many, especially in East
4 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1839-40, 64-68.
GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 159
Tennessee, declined to vote for him under the circumstances. He
was urged"' to make an emphatic denial of the charge, but he fol-
lowed his usual policy of keeping silent. When, therefore, the
state senate, within forty-eight hours after his inauguration,
began to consider the question of nominating Polk for Vice-
President, the Banner charged that this had been the sole pur-
pose of making him governor, and that the people had been
grossly deceived."
The senate with little opposition passed a resolution nomin-
ating Van Buren and Polk, and on October 22, the same day on
which it received the Governor's message, the house proceeded
to consider this senate resolution. Two amendments were offered
by the opposition — one to require the candidates to support a
federal bank, another to strike out the name of Polk — but both
were promptly rejected. After prolonged and animated debate
the house, on November 4, concurred in the senate resolution and
formally nominated the two candidates.' Until the question had
been decided, the local newspapers kept up a war of words on
the subject, each trying to surpass its rival in vulgar abuse, which
doubtless pleased the readers but which made few converts in
the legislature.®
In Washington the Democratic members of the Tennessee
delegation in Congress were busily engaged in an effort to pro-
cure for Polk the second place on the national ticket. His prin-
cipal competitor was the incumbent, Colonel Richard M. Johnson,
of Kentucky. Johnson had the support of the conservative
5 H. W. Anderson, of Bro^vnsville, to Polk, September 10, 1839, Folic
Papers.
6 Nashville Banner, Oct. 19, 1839. One enthusiastic friend urged
Polk not to leave the governorship for the Vice-Presidency : ' ' The plan
that I had laid off was for you to be our Governor six years and then
Senator Six and at the end of Benton's eight years make you President"
(Amos Kirkpatrick, of Meigsville, to Polk, Oct. 17, 1839, Polk Papers).
7 Tenn. House Jour., 1839-40, 68-69.
8 To quote one sample of their ability in vivid description: The Union,
on October 16, informed its readers that John B. Ashe, a state senator,
"came very near bursting his boiler and collapsing his flue on yesterday,"
in condemning the Union.
160 JAMES K. POLK
element of the party — of the class of people whose main rule of
action is leaving well enough alone. But a portion of the party
desired a more vigorous candidate, a man who would conduct a
more energetic campaign, and a man who would be more accept-
able to the southern states. These qualities were especially
desired in the candidate for Vice-President in order to offset the
want of them in Van Buren, their candidate for President.
The supporters of Polk fully realized that it would be difficult
to procure for him the coveted nomination. They knew that there
was little genuine enthusiasm for Johnson in any quarter, still
they feared that he might be nominated by the national conven-
tion simply because that body would not know how to get rid
of him. Their only hope seemed to lie either in preventing ttie
calling of a national convention, or in preventing any nomination
of a Vice-Presidential candidate if such a convention shoidd be
held. A letter outlining the situation Avas sent to Polk by six
Democratic members of Congress from Tennessee." It stated that
a national convention had been recommended by New Hampshire,
and that it now seemed to be a certainty. If so, it was their
opinion that Johnson would probably be nominated, although
New England, New York, Virginia, North Carolina and other
states preferred Polk. Johnson was a "dead weight" on the
party, they said, but it was hard to drop him. It was possible,
they believed, that the convention might fail to nominate any one,
and break up in confusion, but at all events Tennessee should be
fully represented in the convention. In a separate letter (dated
February 4) Brown tells Polk that Calhoun is for him on the
ground of "your position, your abilities & your pnnciples."
A few days after the receipt of the above-mentioned letter
Polk informed Hubbard, a member of the House from New Hamp-
shire,^*' that his position was "passive" — that he would accept
9 The letter was dated at Washington, February 3, 1840, and was signed
by Felix Grundy, A. McClellan, H. M. Watterson, II. L. Turney, C. Johnson,
and A. V. Bro-wn {Polk Papers).
10 Polk to Hubbard, February 7, 1840, Polk Papers.
GOVERN OB OF TENNESSEE 161
the nomination at the hands of his party, but would not seek it.
Such at attitude was in line with his usual adherence to party
unity. His passive attitude, however, seems to have been some-
what affected by his unanimous nomination by a Virginia con-
vention. This nomination was made, it was said^^ at the instance
of the friends of Calhoun. In response to Polk's letter, Hubbard
strongly urged Polk to put aside all delicacy and run. Johnson,
he said, was in favor of both tariff and internal improvements,
and was unpopular with many in the party. For these reasons,
said Hubbard, Democrats should oppose a national convention,
and should nominate Polk in some other way ; Virginia had done
so, and why should other states not follow her example ? Should
the election eventually devolve upon the Senate, he was certain
that Polk would be chosen.^- In Washington, A. J. Donelson was
using his influence to procure Polk's nomination. On March 4
he wrote that, although the South was unequivocally for Polk,
yet he feared that the convention would choose Johnson instead.^^
Polk was willing enough to run, but being a firm believer in
party solidarity, he was reluctant to become the candidate of a
portion of the party unless it should develop that the party as
a whole could not agree upon a choice. Writing to Cave Johnson
on March 27, he said that "up to now" he had maintained that
he would not run unless nominated by the undivided party. But,
said he, the refusal of Virginia and South Carolina to send dele-
gates to the Baltimore convention had changed the situation by
making unanimity in any case out of the question ; consequently
if the convention should fail to make a nomination, in other
words, in the event of there being no party nominee, he might
in that case consent to run.^*
11 Theophilus Fisk to Polk, Eiclimoiul, February 21, 1840, Polk Papers.
In reporting the news to Polk, Fisk added : ' ' Wherever my paper, the Old
Dominion, circulates, and it has a very wide one, the people will hear of
no candidate but yourself. ' '
12 Hubbard to Polk, February 23, 1840, Polk Papers.
13 Donelson to Polk, March 4, 1840, ibid.
14 Polk Papers. He wrote a similar letter to Hubbard on April 5, 1840.
162 JAMES K. POLK
Ready as ever to aid his friends, General Jackson used his
influence in an attempt to procure Polk's nomination by the
national convention. In a letter to Van Buren he said that
A man ought to be chosen that all the republicans in every state would cheer-
fully unite on, and if this is not done it will jeopardise your election — it
ought to be a man whose popularity would strengthen you, not one that
would be a dead weight upon your popularity.
Polk, in his opinion had double the popularity of Johnson, and
his nomination by the party would insure victory. He was
pained to learn from Major Donelson that many in Congress
believed it advisable to make no nomination for the Vice-Presi-
dency ; ' ' surely our friends have not taken a common sense view
of the whole subject. ' '^^
Before leaving Tennessee, Laughlin and some of the other
delegates to the Baltimore convention held a conference in Nash-
ville with Polk, Jackson, and other political leaders. The Gen-
eral was firm in his belief that candidates ought to be nominated
for both President and Vice-President, and that Van Buren and
Polk should be the nominees. Polk, he repeated, would add
strength to the ticket, while Colonel Johnson would be an encum-
brance. On the other hand, Polk made it clear to the delegates
that in no event would he run as a sectional candidate, as Judge
White had done in 1836; should Johnson be nominated, he would
earnestly support him. Should no nomination be made at Balti-
more, and if within a reasonable time a sufficient number of
states had not indicated a preference for himself, he would then
take field in support of Colonel Johnson or any other candidate
that seemed most likely to bring success to the party. ^"
Laughlin arrived in Washington on April 25, and three days
later, after conferences with Tennesseans, he recorded in his
diary that "all were now agreed that Gov. Polk could not be
nominated — that Johnson could not without New York, and that
15 Jackson to Van Buren, April 3, 1840, Van Buren Tapers.
16 S. H. Laughlin, "Diarv," April 14, 15, Teiin. Hist. Mag., March,
1916, 45-47.
GOVEBNOE OF TENNESSEE 163
the best way, if possible, was to make no nomination. This matter
was in treaty between Mr. Grundy and Mr. Wright." On the
day following, Laughlin reported to Polk that Benton and
Buchanan Avere secretly in favor of Johnson and that "such
creatures as Walker and Sevier are only fit to do mischief, ' ' but
that Calhoun was heartily in favor of Polk's nomination.^' At
a meeting held in Grundy's room on May 1 it was agreed that
Polk's only hope lay in preventing any nomination by the con-
vention, and some believed that a refusal by delegates to attend
would be the most effective way of procuring the desired result. ^^
This plan was not followed, however, and a few days later Laugh-
lin wrote from Baltimore that the convention had nominated
Van Buren but, by a vote of one hundred and thirty-two to
ninety-nine, had declared it inexpedient to nominate a candidate
for Vice-President.
After the convention had adjourned without naming a candi-
date for Vice-President, Polk prepared a statement in the form
of a letter to Grundy and requested him to have it published in
the Washington Globe}^ It had been his wish, he said, that the
Baltimore convention might nominate a candidate, but, as it had
not done so, he still hoped that the opinions of the majority could
in some way be ascertained. In that event he would cheerfully
support the choice, but, as he had been nominated by some of the
states, he would let the party decide whether to settle on one or
more. He hoped that some one would be chosen by the electoral
college. In answer, Grundy told him-° that no doubt he would
have won if there had been no convention, but as matters now
1" S. H. Laughlin, "Diary," April 28, 29, op. cit. Laughlin to Polk,
April 29, 1840, Folic Papers. In his diary for May 4, Laughlin recorded
that "Mr. Buchanan from hostility to Gov. Polk's future prospects had
allied himself to King, and by contrivance, their friends Avere trying first
to effect a compromise with the friends of Johnson and Polk and thereby
get King nominated upon the half-way house principle; but if they could
not get this done, they united and were to unite with Johnson's friends
and press for a nomination. ' '
18 Laughlin to Polk, May 2, 1840, Folic Papers.
19 Polk to Grundy, May 27, 1840, ibid.
20 Grundy to Polk, June 1, 1840, ibid.
164 JAMES K. POLK
stood, he thought that Johnson would be elected. The Nashville
Union, he said, had injured rather than aided Polk by calling on
the states to declare their preference. As it would not look well
to withdraw formally from the race, Grundy advised Polk simply
to do nothing.
The contest between Polk and Johnson for second place on the
Democratic ticket was more than a rivalry between the two men.
Back of it was a party cleavage which four years later was to
land Polk in the White House. Despite Jackson 's loyalty to Van
Buren, many of the General 's best friends did not like the ' ' little
magician"; they supported him only from a sense of party duty.
Still less did this wing of Democracy like Colonel Johnson, and,
if they must support Van Buren, they wished at least to have
a Vice-Presidential candidate for whom they could willingly
vote. There seems to be no evidence that Polk himself had, up
to this time, been opposed to Van Buren, nevertheless he was on
very intimate terms with the insurgent faction of the party.
This wing of the party was impelled mainly by a desire to promote
southern interests, although a revolt against "old fogyism" was
already becoming a political factor. Its adherents regarded Polk
as sound on southern questions, while they had doubts in the case
of both Van Buren and Johnson. Party cleavage had existed
before Polk had been suggested for the Vice-Presidency, but the
apparent hostility of the administration to his candidacy aided
in widening it. Although the President himself seems to have
expressed no preference, those who were in his confidence and
who were supposed to voice his wishes were directly or indirectly
supporting Colonel Johnson. Among them were Benton,
Buchanan, Kendall, and Blair. -^ For a second time-- Blair
appeared reluctant to give aid to Polk when he was sorely in
need of it. These instances alone furnish a very good reason
21 Jackson's attitude toward the candidates had no connection with this
party sfjlit. He favored Van Buren and Polk, and opposed Johnson, purely
for personal reasons.
■-*;; The first time Avas when Polk was a candidate for Speaker of the
House.
GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 165
why Polk, when he became President, declined to adopt the Globe
as his official organ.
Shortly after the Democratic convention had adjourned, Cave
Johnson informed Polk^^ that a Life of Van Buren and Johnson
had appeared aiid that he believed it had been published at the
office of the Globe. Blair, he said, had declared himself to be
impartial as to Colonel Johnson and Polk, but "I have no faith
in that establishment so far as your interests are concerned."
For this reason he (Cave Johnson) and his friends were not eager
to extend the circulation of Kendall's "Extra Globes," which
had been prepared especially for campaign purposes. On May
25, five of the Tennessee delegation-* addressed a letter to Kendall
himself. In it they stated that while they were anxious to advance
the cause of the administration, they were unwilling to prejudice
the cause of their favorite candidate, and therefore, "before we
undertake the circulation of the Extra Globe, we are desirous of
being informed, whether the Extra will take any part, & if any
what part, in the election of Vice President." Kendall gave a
rather evasive reply-^ in which he stated that, while he thought
well of their ' ' favorite candidate, ' ' he would attempt to promote
the cause of the party by speaking well of any or all candidates
as the occasion might require. With this reply, which was re-
garded as a virtual endorsement of Johnson, they had to be con-
tent, but the hostility to Kendall and Blair by no means abated.
The element that supported Polk became more and more alienated
from Van Buren and his intimates until, in 1844, they succeeded
in preventing his nomination.
The other question of a purely political nature that engrossed
the attention of the Tennessee legislature was that of forcing
White and Foster out of the United States Senate by the use of
humiliating instructions.
23 Johnson to Polk, May 24, 1840, PolTc Papers.
24 Cave Johnson, A. V. BroAvn, H. L. Turney, A. McClellan, and H. M.
Watterson.
25 June 9, 1840. Both letters are in the Folk Papers.
166 JAMES K. POLK
In White's case another method was first attempted, for the
judge was still popular in the state, and, if he could be eliminated
without resorting to instructions, less odium would attach to his
adversaries. In the fall of 1838 White had, on account of ill
health, tendered his resignation to Governor Cannon. The Gov-
ernor suspended action in the hope that White's health might
improve. As it did improve sufficiently to enable him to make the
journey to Washington, the resignation, at Cannon's request, was
withdrawn without having been accepted.
Kumors of White 's letter of resignation had found their way
to Democratic ears and suggested the possibility of disposing of
the judge by maintaining that by his own action his seat had
become vacant. Accordingly, when the legislature convened in
October, 1839, the senate by resolution asked Governor Cannon
for copies of the correspondence which had passed between him-
self and White relative to the latter 's resignation. Cannon replied
that White's resignation had never been accepted and that his
letter had been returned ; all other correspondence had been per-
sonal, not official, and had not been preserved. Attorney-General
Grundy wrote-*' from Washington urging that White's successor
should be chosen without delay, and expressing the opinion that
Foster would resign if instructed to vote for the sub-treasury bill.
Such a program, if successful, would give the Democrats an
opportunity to choose both Senators, one of whom was to be
Grundy himself.
Notwithstanding Grundy's advice, the difficulty of proving
that White's seat had become vacant seemed to be so great that,
on October 25, Levin H. Coe introduced in the state senate a
series of resolutions which instructed the Senators and requested
the Representatives to carry out the wishes of the legislature on
certain enumerated subjects.-" While the resolutions were being
26 Grundy to Polk, October 17, Polk Pai)ers.
27 (1) To vote against the chartering of a United States bank. (2) To
vote for the sub-treasury. (3) To vote against any bill for the prevention
of interference in elections by certain federal officers, as such a bill would
GOVEENOB OF TENNESSEE 167
discussed by the legislature, Judge White wrote to one of the
members of the lower house stating that he would resign rather
than support the sub-treasury bill.'^ His letter was read to the
legislature, and soon afterwards that body, by a strict party vote,
passed the resolutions. General Jackson's program was thereby
successfully carried into effect, and once more he had the satis-
faction of humiliating the man who had dared to run for Presi-
dent against his wishes. It was a contemptible transaction, and
those who participated in it are deserving of nothing but con-
demnation. It remained to be seen, of course, whether the Whig
Senators would repudiate their instructions, but there was little
doubt that White at least, would resign.
On his way to Washington, early in November, John Bell
stopped at Knoxville to deliver a public address in which he
scathingly denounced the administration and its supporters. In
response to a call from the audience, White addressed the same
meeting in language which was reported to have been violently
intemperate.-^
While White was yet on his journey to Washington, Polk, in
a letter to Van Buren, congratulated him on recent Democratic
victories, and pointed out that they were a good omen for 1840.
"Judge White," said Polk, "forgetting the dignity of his station,
as well as the former character of which he boasted, descended
into the political arena, and became an active partisan and
travelling electioneer." He told Van Buren that the legislature
violate the Constitution of the United States. (4) To vote against dis-
tribution among tlie states of revenue derived from the sale of public lands —
and for reducing the price of such lands. (5) To vote for a repeal of the
duty on salt. (6) To support in good faith the leading measures of the
present administration {Tenn. Sen. Jcmr., 1839-40, 77-79; Scott, Memoir
of Hugh Lawsoii White, 370).
2s White to Jacobs, September 5, 1839 (Scott, Memoir of Hugh Lawson
White, 371).
29 Lewis P. Eoberts to Polk, Nov. 11, 1839, Folk Papers. Eoberts
doubtless exaggerated in reporting that White "characterized the -whole
of the V. B. party as gamblers and blacklegs ' ' and accused Van Buren of
pocketing the money which the people had lost from a derangement of
currency.
168 JAMES K. POLK
had instructed the Senators to support the President 's measures,
and expressed the belief that Foster would resign and White
obey the instructions. Grundy, he said, would be the best man
to succeed Foster ; he therefore urged the President to give up
his Attorney-General for the good of the cause. ^'^
Foster promptly resigned on November 15, thus leaving one
seat in the Senate at the immediate disposal of the Democrats.
Catron, Avho was holding court in Louisville, believed that "White,
too. would soon be forced to resign. Tennessee, he wrote, must
be held loyal to the administration, and the best way of insuring
this was to make Polk the candidate for Vice-President.^^
The legislature by a party vote chose Grundy to fill Foster's
unexpired term. As soon as the news reached Washington, how-
ever, one of his friends, H. C. Williams, pointed out to him that
he was not eligible for the office.^" The constitution required that
a Senator, at the time of his election, must be a local resident,
and it was thought that Grundy was not such a resident so long
as he remained in the cabinet. He therefore resigned his seat in
the Senate, and the technicality was obviated by his reelection
after his return to Tennessee. ^^
On receiving his instructions from the legislature. White
decided that instead of resigning at once he would wait until
some question had been presented which would compel him either
to vote contrary to his principles or to violate his instructions.
The Democrats, therefore, hastened to bring forward an obnox-
ious measure. On January 13, 1840, Silas Wright called up the
sub-treasury bill and thereby forced the issue. White rose and
explained to the Senate the embarrassment of his position, and
then read the letter of resignation which he was about to send
30 Polk to Van Buren, Nov. 11, 1839, Van Buren Papers.
31 Catron to Polk, Nov. 19, (1839 ?), Poll- Papers.
32 Williams to Polk, Nov. 28, 1839, "Most strictly confidential."
On December 1 Cave Johnson gave a similar opinion, and said that Grundy
■would go to Nashville to look after the matter (Polk Papers).
^^Niles' Ecgistcr, Jan. 11, 1840.
GOVEENOE OF TENNESSEE 169
to the Tennessee legislature.^* Gnindy and others had expected
from the persecuted Senator a bitter arraignment of the admin-
istration party. They had come prepared to answer him, but
Grundy himself admitted that White's letter to the legislature
had been "drawn with some ability" and was too respectful to
call for a reply.^"
While no one questioned the legal right of a state to instruct
its Senators, it was generally felt that the legislature had used
its power for the unworthy purpose of punishing White and gain-
ing a political advantage to which the Democrats were not en-
titled. A dinner was given in the deposed Senator's honor at
which all of the prominent Whigs were present. His public career
and his loyalty to principle were exalted in toasts and addresses
made by Clay, Preston, and many others.^" It was his last public
appearance. An attack of pneumonia before his departure from
Washington and the fatigue caused by the journey home greatly
impaired his vitality, and his death occured on April 10, 1840.
White's resignation gave the choice of his successor to the
Democratic majority in the legislature. As the judge was from
East Tennessee, custom required that his successor should be a
resident of the same section of the state. The legislature selected
Alexander Anderson, a lawyer of fair ability but a man without
national reputation.
As noted above, the principal recommendations made by
Governor Polk in his message dealt with banks and internal im-
provements. To these topics the legislature gave its attention
when it was not too busily engaged with practical politics. Like
most banks in the Union those of Tennessee had suspended specie
payments. In response to the Governor's suggestion Yoakum, on
October 28, 1839, presented a resolution which, if adopted, would
3* Both explanation and letter are printed in Scott, Memoir of Hugh
Lawson White, 375 ff.
s5 Grundy to Polk, Jan. 13, 18-40, and other letters on the same sub-
ject in the PoUc Papers.
36 An account of this dinner is given in Scott, Memoir of Hugh Laicson
White, 395 ff.
170 JAMES K. POLK
compel the Bank of Tennessee and its branches forthwith to
resume and continue specie payments on all notes of and under
ten dollars. Another resolution moved by Jennings, an opposi-
tion member, required the committee on banks to interrogate the
president and directors of this bank as to whether financial ac-
commodations were made on the basis of political sentiments. On
November 11, Jennings presented a bill which embodied and
made more explicit the ideas included in his resolution. The bill
required the committee on banks to call on the Bank of Tennessee
for the following items of information: (1) whether the choice of
officers of the branch banks was influenced by politics; (2)
whether contracts were so influenced; and (3) whether politics
was considered in making loans. Another bill w'as proposed by
Wheeler the purpose of which was to compel all banks of the
state to resume specie payments within thirty days on penalty of
forfeiture of their charters. On January 15, 1840, Jennings
proposed an amendment to the state constitution the intent of
which was to prevent the state in future from becoming the sole
proprietor of, or a partner in, any bank, and from raising money
on the credit of the state, except for defense.^''
None of these proposals was enacted into law. The Demo-
crats easily disposed of the political measures of their opponents,
but, with the exception of a few minor remedial regulations, they
were unable to carry their own. Toward the close of the session
Laughlin submitted a report from the committee which had been
appointed by the senate to investigate the banks. It stated that
no evidence of politics in bank transactions had been discovered
and that specie payments would, in the opinion of the banks, be
resumed by July 1, 1840.^* This belief, however, proved to be
erroneous.
In response, also, to suggestions made in the Governor's mes-
sage, the legislature undertook to modify existing laws on the
37 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1839-40, 85-86, 109, 156-157, 407.
38 Ihid., Appendix.
GOVEENOB OF TENNESSEE 171
subject of internal improvements. Yielding to a popular clamor
for state aid, the legislature under Cannon's administration had
made it obligatory for the state to become a partner in all im-
provement ventures regardless of the nature of the enterprise.
Wholesale extravagance had been the result ; nevertheless it was
not an easy matter to eliminate the abuses without doing injury
to those who, relying on continued support from the government,
had invested capital in various projects.'''' The secretary of
state reported to the senate that, under the act of 1836,
$2,732,541% had been subscribed by the state to improvement
enterprises, and under the act of 1838, $889,500 had been sub-
scribed for turnpikes and river improvements, $65,000 to the
Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Rail Road Company, and
a similar amount to the Hiawassee Rail Road Company.^*'
In order to save the state in future from such ruinous expen-
ditures, the legislature repealed all laws which had required the
governor to subscribe for stock in improvement corporations. In
the repealing act provision was made for the withdrawal, so far
as possible, from partnerships already formed. By another act,
passed on January 28, 1840, the legislature recalled $150,000
in state bonds which had been placed with banks to be sold and
the proceeds invested in stocks of improvement companies. This
legislation was substantially what the Governor had recommended,
and, although there was no remedy for the waste that had already
39 In responding to a vote of thanks at the close of the session, Speaker
Coe, of the Senate, stated very clearly the difficulty which confronted the
legislature: "In 1836 and 1838 laws were passed for the encouragement
of Internal Improvement and works of the most extensive character have
been commenced, and are now in progress of erection. If we continued
to advance under the law as we found it, many saAv in it the germ of a dis-
ordered and bankrupt treasury, and a people loaded Aovra with taxes, levied
to pay the interest on an onerous State debt — whilst it was asserted by
others, with much reason, that the State had voluntarily tendered the right
hand of assistance to large bodies of our fellow citizens, and had invited
enterprises, having for their object the cultivation and improvement of our
common country; and under such circumstances the sudden withdrawal
of all aid, would involve individuals in private ruin and consign public
works to dilapidation" (ibid., 545-546).
40 Eeports of Luke Lea, secretary of state, Oct. 25 and Nov. 23, Term.
Sen. Jour., 1839-40, 74, 142.
172 JAMES K. POLK
occurred, so long as Polk remained in the governor's chair care
was taken to restrict expenditures and to reduce the state debt.
During Polk's first year as governor of his state, the people
of the nation were engaged in the whirlwind Presidential cam-
paign of 1840 — the first and most boisterous of its kind. In
every state in the Union the contest was waged with unpre-
cedented fury, and especially so in Tennessee. Reason and logical
argument were cast to the winds, while noise and caricature
became the order of the day. The "stump speech" played a less
important part than usual ; while both sides, but especially the
Whigs, expended their energies in fantastic processions. The
greater the din of deafening and discordant noises, the more
spectacular or grotesque the banners and other devices designed
to excite the emotions of the crowd, the more successful was the
pageant considered.
For sentimental reasons, as well as for the importance of her
electoral votes, the contest in Tennessee was regarded as of
national significance. Failure to redeem "Old Hickory's state"
was thought by Democratic politicians to be nothing short of
disgrace, while the hope of thus humiliating their opponents
spurred the Whigs to untiring effort. But the Whigs had the
advantage from the outset. The rank and file of the Democrats
did not share the feeling of the party leaders; they could not
wax enthusiastic over Van Buren. In the Whig camp, on the
contrary, there was unity.
In 1839, as soon as it became known that Polk had been elected,
prominent Whigs held a convention in Nashville and arranged
for the appointment of local committees throughout the state.
These committees were effective engines of agitation, and the
Umo)i promptly denounced them as "new and strange fermenta-
tions in the body politic to be put down by all lovers of peace
and social order. "^^ Clay was invited to visit Tennessee by a
delegation sent to Kentucky for that purpose by the Nashville
41 Phelan, Hist, of Tcnn., 384.
GOTEBNOR OF TENNESSEE 173
convention, but, the sage of Ashland, pleading illness and press-
ure of private business, declined to make a definite promise
to accept.^- It was expected, of course, that the legislature
would instruct the Whig Senators and force their resignation,
and the Banner was certain that such a course would be of
great advantage to the Whigs in the Presidential campaign.
This paper urged the Senators to remain in office until forced
to resign. In such an event their names were to head the Whig
electoral ticket, and the state was to be "thoroughly and ably
canvassed, in every county and every neighborhood and victory
would be assured.""*^
The national convention of the Whig party met at Harris-
burg, Pennsylvania, on December 4, 1839. Due to prejudice
against national conventions, the Whigs of Tennessee refused to
send delegates, for it will be remembered that opposition to the
convention which nominated Van Buren was a chief factor in the
creation of the ' ' White Whig ' ' party. As their hearts were set on
Clay, they were disappointed, and at first somewhat discouraged,
when Harrison received the nomination. They soon rallied,
however, and throughout the campaign their loyalty and energy
were not surpassed by the Whigs of any other state. Bell was
their most eloquent speaker, although Foster, who canvassed the
entire state, w^as more successful in winning votes. In this cam-
paign the Whigs appealed more to the eye than to the ear. They
relied more on banners and processions than on oratory or argu-
ments. "The fact is," wrote one of Polk's Democratic friends
after the election, "the people like coonery and foolery better
than good argument."**
The great event of the campaign was the Whig convention
held in Nashville on August 17, 1840; Delegations came from
surrounding states, each joining in the spectacular procession
i2NUes' Register, October 12, 1839,
43 Nashville Banner, quoted in Niles' Register, September 7, 1839.
4* Isaac Goladay to Polk, November 9, 1840, Polk Papers.
174 JAMES K. POLK
and each bearing aloft banners fantastically decorated and
adorned with mottoes designed to win popular applause.^^ The
procession wended its way to a grove in the outksirts of the city,
where the multitude was entertained by speeches made by prom-
inent Whigs of Tennessee and other states. Foster, who was
chairman of the meeting, made the opening address, but the lion
of the occasion was Clay himself, whose personal magnetism and
oratorical flights electrified the audience, although his address
was rather commonplace.
The Democrats were not so well organized as the Whigs and
their speakers were decidedly inferior to those of their opponents.
Their most effective debater, Polk, was prevented by his office
from actively entering into the canvass, although he made a
few speeches in favor of Van Buren, which led to his present-
ment as a "nuisance" by the grand jury of Sevier county,^® and
the Whig papers circulated the story that the Governor's grand-
^ father had been a Tory during the Revolution.*' Nicholson met
Bell in debate ; Cave Johnson, A. V. Brown, and H. L. Turney did
their utmost to stem the Whig tide ; Jackson wrote letters in
which he lauded Van Buren, and denounced Harrison as a Fed-
eralist, but the people would not listen as of yore. On the eve
of the election the Democrats tried to brand Harrison as an aboli-
tionist. At the last moment, they distributed handbills on which
they had printed a letter which Harrison was alleged to have
written to Arthur Tappan declaring himself to be such. But
the plot had been discovered, and the Whig was ready with
Harrison 's denial as soon as the handbills appeared.
Tennessee refused to be "redeemed"; the vote for Harrison
was 60,391, while Van Buren polled but 48,289. It was a signal
victory for the Whigs, and, unlike four years earlier, it could
not be said that voters had supported the Whig candidate simply
because he was a favorite son of the state. Undoubtedly one of
45 The parade is described in some detail by Phelan, Eist. of Tcnn., 387 ff.
i<i Ibid.
47 Edwin Polk to Polk, August 27, 1840, Folic Papers.
GOV ESN OB OF TENNESSEE 175
Polk's correspondents was right in saying** that many Democrats
had refrained from voting because they "could not be rallied to
Van Buren, ' ' and that the Democratic loss was much greater than
the Whig gain. Still, any hopes built on such calculations were
illusive, for in national politics the state was irretrievably lost to
the Democrats.
Not realizing the real strength of the Whigs, the leading
Democrats, almost before the smoke of battle had lifted, began
to formulate plans for winning the next state election. First
of all, Harrison and his administration must be vigorously
assailed, regardless of the course he might pursue. The difficulty
of finding anything of sufficient importance to attack caused
them no little anxiety. A. 0. P. Nicholson put the case frankly
in a letter to Polk, written before it had been definitely ascer-
tained that Harrison had been elected. The Democrats, he said,
must
keep up a raking fire upon the whole of Harrison 's inconsistent and imbecile
history. It is unfortunate for us that Harrison's administration (if elected)
will not be developed before our August elections, but still enough will
probably have transpired to present available points of attack. 49
And yet the politicians who uttered such sentiments claimed to
be followers of Jefferson, one of whose cardinal principles was
"absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority."^**
Although the Democrats were hopeful and even confident,
the Whig victory of 1840 made them realize that Polk's defeat in
1841 was within the realms of possibility. When, therefore, in
December, 1840, it was reported in Washington that Grundy
could not live, the Democratic members of Congress from Tenn-
essee counselled together and decided that Polk ought to succeed
him as Senator from his state. In a letter to Polk,^^ Hopkins L.
4s Samuel P. Walker to Polk, November 4, 1840, Folic Papers.
49 Nicholson to Polk, November 6, 1840, Polk Papers. Other letters to
Polk also expressed regret that there would probably be little to attack.
50 See Jefferson 's first inaugural address.
51 Turney to Polk, December 21, 1840. On the same day A. V. Brown
wrote a letter of similar purport. Both in Polh Papers.
176 JAMES E. POLK
Turney pointed out to the Governor that his reelection was doubt-
ful and, even if such were not the case, he would stand a better
chance of promotion if elected Senator. Both Cave Johnson
and A. Y. Brown, he said, concurred in this view. Before this
letter had reached its destination, however, Polk had appointed
Nicholson to succeed Grundy, whose death had occurred on the
nineteenth of the month. So gratified was Nicholson by his
appointment that, on his arrival in Washington, he saw visions
of his benefactor's certain elevation to the Presidential chair.
After telling the Governor of his popularity in Washington and
of the anxiety for his reelection, he added : "I shall be disap-
pointed if your success in this contest does not lead on certainly
to your elevation to the Presidency. ' '^^
While the politicians on either side were speculating on the
probability of Harrison's calling an extra session of Congress,
considerable excitement was caused in Nashville by the shooting
of J. George Harris, editor of the Union, by Robert C. Foster,
a son of the deposed Senator. Harris quickly recovered, but the
affair furnished Democrats with something to denounce while
they were awaiting further political developments.
In case Harrison, after his inauguration, should call Congress
together in extra session, Tennessee would have no representa-
tion in the House^^ unless the Governor should see fit to call a
special election. Anderson, who had been chosen to fill Foster's
unexpired term, would cease to be Senator on March 4, and the
official term of Nicholson, who was serving on the governor's
appointment, would be automatically terminated should Polk
decide to call an extra session of the legislature. Should no
extra session be called, Nicliolson would continue in office until
the regular session which would open in October, 1841. As the
probability of a called session of Congress increased, the Demo-
crats differed as to whether it would be wiser to convene the
52 Nicholson to Polk, Jan. 33, 38-41, ihid.
53 The terms of present members would expire on March 4 and a regular
election would not be held until autumn.
GOVEBNOB OF TENNESSEE 177
legislature and attempt to elect two Senators, or to be contented
with one Senator, Nicholson, leaving the other seat vacant.
When sounded on the subject, Polk expressed himself as
opposed to convening the legislature. He gave, as his reasons,
economy, and the fear that the "Whigs would make political
capital of such a procedure. On the other hand, Jackson, who
had lost none of his political zeal, strongly favored an extra ses-
sion in order that two Senators might be chosen and instructed
as to how they should cast their votes. "If it can be done with
propriety, ' ' he advised Governor Polk,
if tliere is a called session of congress, the Legislature should be convened to
give us a full representation in the Senate; and to instruct our senators &
request our representatives to vote against a high Tariff, a distribution of
the Public Funds, against a national Bank of any kind, or deposits in the
State banks, and against a repeal of the sub-treasury act, and, altho last
not least, to pass a law to compell our Batiks to resume specie payments or
wind up.f'-i
From Washington, Anderson urged the necessity of a full repre-
sentation in the Senate.^^ Turney seconded this appeal and
once more tried to induce the Governor to become a candidate.
Polk, he said, could do much good in the Senate, for since
Grundy's death there was no one able to cope wdth the Whigs.
On this same subject Polk received what appears to be his first
letter from Andrew Johnson.^*^ In it Johnson advises the Gov-
ernor to convene the legislature for the purpose of electing mem-
bers of Congress whose terms, unless he is ' ' rong, ' ' expire on the
fourth of March.
While Nicholson was in Washington, still worrying for fear
there would be little in the Harrison administration to assail,^^
54 Jackson to Polk, Feb. 8, 1841, Polk Papers.
55 Anderson to Polk, Feb. 17, 1841, ibid.
56 At least it is the first letter from Johnson in the Polk collection. It
seems that Polk had written to Johnson, stating that either he or Blair
must run for Congress. Johnson declined to become a candidate (Johnson
to Polk, March 4, 1841, Polk Papers).
5" "I do not calculate that we will be able to make any capital out of
the Inaugural; but the Cabinet Avill be enough for our purposes, if Ave use
178 JAMES K. POLK
the much-reviled administration of Van Buren passed into his-
tory."^ Ignoring his critics, the "littk^ magician" remained
unperturbed and courteous to the end. When his successor
arrived in Washington, an invitation to dine was extended by
Van Buren and accepted by Harrison, and the Nashville Union
marvelled that Harrison could take "vermacilla soup from those
horrible gold spoons!"^'' The Whig newspapers never tired of
contrasting the democratic simplicity and generous hospitality""
of Harrison with the royalistic pomp and cold exclusiveness of
Van Buren. It was unkind of the Whigs thus to purloin from
their opponents the very arguments — almost the exact phrases —
which had done such effective service in winning popular support
for General Jackson. Such utter disregard for the proprietary
rights of others fully justified J. George Harris in trying to
render harmless the stolen implements of war. Shortly after
it with skill. " It is rumored, he said, ' ' that Webster will be Secretary
of State; Granger, Post-Master-General; Ewing, Secretary of the Treasury;
Bell, Secretary of War; Preston, Secretary of the Navy; and Crittenden
Attorney-General. What think you now of the Cabinet! I think you
may set it down as settled that we are to have an anti-war fed. for
Secretary of State, an abolition fed. for Post-Master-General, a uni-
form fed. for the Treasury, a gag-bill Clay fed. for Atty. Gen., a gag-
bill-no party- White Whig fed. for the War, and a Nullification fed. for the
Nav)^ Will not this open the eyes of Tennesseans! If not, then may we
surrender at discretion" (Nicholson to Polk, Feb. 12, 1841, Folk Papers).
Jis" Tomorrow night, at twelve o'clock," said the Madisonian, "the
administration of Martin Van Buren terminates. Tliat administration, acci-
dental in its beginning, and unfortunate and profitless in its career, will
then have gone, with all its powers, its prerogatives, its follies, its malign
influence, and with Avhatever streak of virtue may have been possibly
mingled in its texture, to control us, to agitate us, to injure us, no more.
Four years it has lived, and its principal achievement has been the passage
of the sub-Treasury, by trampling wath contempt upon the broad seal of
a sovereign State. What good it has done, we are unable to point out.
What harm it has accomplished, we may possibly conceive of, by consider-
ing the present condition of the Treasury, of our foreign relations, of our
Navy, of the Army and the defences, of the Post Office, and of the public
morals, and the condition of the peoi)le. But Ave congratulate the country
that it has at last come to an end. It is gone" (The Madisonifni, March
3, 1841).
59 Union, March 4, 1841.
00 Under the heading "Hospitality at the White House" an article in
the New Haven Palladium said: "He [Harrison] keeps his house open
to all comers. . . . The servants at the White House find more difficulty
GOVE EN on OF TENNESSEE 179
his inauguration, the President had directed Webster to issue a
most wholesome order stating that any interference in elections,
state or federal, by federal officers, would be regarded as cause
for removal. The i:)lain farmer of the Whigs was promptly
branded by Harris as a usurper of royal powers and a violator
of the rights of states, for "the Autocrat of all the Kussias never
issued an Ukase more potent. ' '^^ But before these unjust charges
against the President had been put in type, the career of the
"autocrat" had been cut short, and the same issue of the paper
which contained them chronicled, also, the news of Harrison's
death.
As Polk's campaign for reelection began as soon as his com-
petitor had been nominated on March 5, 1841, the incidents of
the remainder of his gubernatorial term will be treated in the
succeeding chapter, which deals primarily with that spirited
political contest and with the transfer of Tennessee to the Whigs.
in ailapting tliemselves to the change of Administration than any other
officeholders. He breaks in on all the elegant aristocratic usages of the
jjalace, and plays the mischief with that systematic courtly etiquette which
with the Sub-Treasury constituted the two great radical reforms of the
late President. He gets up at sunrise, like a plain farmer as he is, and
wants his breakfast within an hour after, (the vulgar man!) — and eats
with an appetite of a common day laborer. He gave one of his servants
a regular ' blowing up ' the other day, for leaving a visitor dripping wet
and muddy in a cold ' ante-chamber, ' because the President was at break-
fast and could not be disturbed, and because the carpet Avould be injured
by the muddy feet of one Avho came on foot! The President brought the
visitor into the breakfast parlor, and insisted on making him comfortable
at the fire at once. At all these things the demooracy are much shocked,
and look aghast at this desecration of the 'palace! ' " Quoted in Nashville
Banner, April 5, 1841.
61 Harris quoted from the Evening Post: "this document has added
the last insult that can be given to a free and independent people, and
will be held up to popular execration by every man who is not disposed to
yield his neck to the yoke of party, or who is not a base and degraded
slave. It is so insolent in spirit and dictation, breathes an air so vile and
debasing, that it is difficult to speak of it without subjecting one 's self to
an unwonted excitement" (Nashville Unions, April 12, 18-tl).
CHAPTER X
DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841
From the day of their defeat in 1839 the Whigs of Tennessee
had been marshalling their forces for the next gubernatorial con-
test, and the great national victory of 1840 gave them reason
to hope for success. It had also, by example, indicated the type
of campaign that would be most likely to win that success. Can-
non's main weakness as a candidate had been his inability to
adjust himself to the guerrilla variety of campaign by which
many a less brilliant politician had endeared himself to the peo-
ple. Capable but painfully serious. Cannon was a shining mark
for the shafts of wit and ridicule which Polk had hurled with
unerring aim whenever they had met in joint discussion. On
the contrary, Polk had demonstrated his adaptability to a degree
that surprised his closest friends. Distinguished for his dignified
and learned discussions in the national House of Representatives,
Polk had, in 1839, discomfited his rival and won the people by a
most skilful use of mimicry and sarcasm. The Whigs were there-
fore familiar with the campaign methods of the Governor as
well as the predilections of the people, and the convention which
assembled at Murfreesborough on March 5, 1841, displayed polit-
ical wisdom by nominating the one man in the state who was
thought to be capable of "beating the governor at his own game."
This man was Major James C. Jones/ a "horny-handed" farmer
from Wilson County, who had represented his county in the
legislature, served as a Presidential elector, and acquired a local
reputation as an effective "stump speaker." Tall and ungainly
in appearance, Jones possessed many of those grotesque personal
1 Jackson declined to call Jones, major, ''for he never ^vas a corporal"
(Jackson to Polk, March 20, 18-41, Po/A: Papers).
DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 181
qualities which had made John Randolph famous. Even the
sobriquet "Lean Jimni}'," with which his admiring friends had
christened him, served as a valuable asset in a contest so closely
following the "great whirlwind campaign" of 1840. Realizing
that, in knowledge and debating powers, he was no match for his
adversary, Jones resorted to hectoring tactics and relied more
on amusing than on convincing his audience. Nevertheless he
was a man of considerable ability, and he displayed a fair knowl-
edge of the political issues of the day. In spite of the picture
drawn by Phelan and others, there was a serious side to the cam-
paign of 1841. Jones did not devote all of his time to "coonery
and foolery, ' ' but at times displayed alertness and skill as a
debater.
As in 1839 the canvass dealt principally with national issues.
In his "Address to the People," Polk stated that his views on
national questions had been given in detail in his address of
1839, and that nothing had since occurred to alter them. He
had, he said, been forced to begin the campaign early because of
the untiring efforts of the Whigs to defeat hira.-
Each side accused the other of being Federalists, and Har-
rison's "autocratic" order against interference in elections, and
Van Buren's regal splendor, were offered as evidence to prove
the opposing contentions. The death of Judge White nearly a
year before did not prevent his name from being dragged into
the contest. Jackson, in exhorting Polk to answer the "false-
hoods" of Bell and Foster regarding Van Buren's extravagance
in furnishing the executive mansion, provided him with a state-
ment that it was Bell's disappointment at not being made a
member of Jackson's cabinet, on White's recommendation, that
had caused Bell to desert the party and to bring White out for
2 "From the moment of my election in 1839, it had been manifestly an
object of no minor importance with my leading political opponents in the
State, to prostrate and destroy me. Their attacks -were constant. Their
presses kept up an incessant war upon me. No calumny or misrepresenta-
tion of my political opinions and course had been too gross to fill their
columns" (Nashville Union, March 29, 1841).
182 JAMES K. POLK
the Presidency.'' A friend in Albany* furnished Polk with sev-
eral letters written by Granger, the Postmaster-General which
Avere to be used for the purpose of proving him to be an Aboli-
tionist. Jones and other Whigs tried to counteract the effect pro-
duced by these by asserting that Polk's grandfather had been
a Tory.
Early in March Jones published a list of his speaking appoint-
ments. He opened the campaign at Murfreesborough, where he
boasted that he could tell a greater number of anecdotes than the
Governor himself." He promptly accepted an invitation from
Polk to meet in joint debate whenever possible," and they met
for the first time at Murfreesborough on the twenty-seventh of
March.
Polk opened the discussion with a spirited attack upon the
Harrison administration. He denounced Granger as an Aboli-
tionist, and Webster as a Federalist who, in 1835, had been so
unpatriotic as to declare that he would not support a certain bill
to appropriate money for defense "though the enemy were batter-
ing down the walls of the Capitol. ' ' Unfortunately for himself,
Polk tried, as he had done in the canvass with Cannon, to weaken
his opponent by making him an object of ridicule. Among other
shafts of sarcasm, he said that his friend Jones was a "promising
young man," but "as for his being Governor, that's all a
notion."^ As soon as Jones took the platform, he referred
repeatedly to Polk as "my venerable competitor." This he con-
tinued to do whenever they met in debate, much to the amuse-
ment of the audience, for Polk at that time was only forty-six
years of age.
Before the candidates met again, Governor Polk issued a
public statement in which he gave his reasons for not convening
3 Jackson to Polk, March 20, 1841, Folic Papcrfs.
4E. Crowell to Polk, March 19, 1841, ibid.
5 Yoakum to Polk, March 15, 1841, ibid.
oPolk to Jones, MarcJi 15; Jones to Polk, March 18, 1841, ibid.
7 Nashville Union, March 29, 1841.
DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 183
the legislature in extra session so that Senators miglit be chosen
in time for Harrison's called session of Congress. He had already
called a special election for the purpose of choosing members of
the House of Representatives. In declining to convene tiie legis-
lature, Polk, as we have already noted, disregarded the wishes,
not only of General Jackson, but of nearly all of tlie leading
Democrats of the state. It was thoroughly characteristic of
Polk to follow his own judgment rather than the wishes of his
friends, even of "Old Hickory," and yet he was often charged
with being a \veak tool of General Jackson.
The main reasons assigned in his public statement for not
convening the legislature were unnecessary expense and the
impropriety of taking advantage of an accident to strengthen his
own party in the federal Senate. The members elected to the
legislature in 1839 had not, he said, been chosen with the selec-
tion of Senators in view, and "my opinion is that the frank, fair,
and honest course, is to leave the choice open for the decision
of the people at the next August election." Harrison, he said,
had given him an opportunity to disregard the popular will, for
it is
certain that if I had availed myself of them that the present General
Assembly, if convened, Avould choose two Democratic Senators. If, how-
ever, the President under the influence and control of inflamed partisans,
maddened with their late success . . . has committ«d a capital political
blunder, it is no reason vi'hj I should commit one also.
He denounced the President for unnecessarily convening Con-
gress, for, as there was plenty of money in the Treasury, the call
must have been made for purely political reasons.*
s ' ' Large and extravagant promises which can never be redeemed had
been made to the people, and it was doubtless deemed to be necessary to
do something, or to appear to do something to keep up the public expecta-
tion, and thereby possibly to operate upon the elections which are to take
place in States during the present yeai-. . . . They probably fear to let
the public mind sober down to a state of calm reflection, le.st perad venture
they may not succeed in their favorite measures of Federal policy, at the
next regular session of Congress. ' ' Printed in Nashville Union, April 1, 1841.
184 JAMES K. FOLK
Whether the Goveruor was influenced solely by a spirit of
fairness, no one but himself could know, but, whatever his motives
were, he received no thanks from the Whigs for his magnanimity.
The Banner bitterly assailed him for impugning the motives of
the President, and for praising himself. It pronounced his action
hypocritical and declared that his forbearance had been due to
a knowledge that the legislature would not dare to choose two
Democrats in the face of the late election, and to fear that an
attempt to make such a choice would injure his own prospects
of reelection." At a debate held at Lebanon shortly after the
publication of Polk's statement, Jones won applause by remind-
ing the Governor that his solicitude for the popular will had not
prevented him from appointing Nicholson Senator after the peo-
ple had repudiated him (Nicholson) by refusing to make him a
Presidential elector. The Whig paper of the town commended
Polk's wit and added that "he makes as much of it with his face
as with his tongue. "^° Most effective of all were his impersona-
tions of Bailie Peyton, the chief feature of which was what the
Whigs called ' ' Polk 's horrible grin. ' '
The candidates visited the principal towns of the state. From
the press notices, one would be led to believe that their time was
occupied almost entirely with the relation of humorous anec-
dotes and the coining of witty remarks. Nevertheless, their
printed speeches show that a serious discussion of political issues
was by no means omitted. Polk, especially, displayed great power
as a debater. He thoroughly understood the questions under
9 Nashville Banner, April 5, 18-il. The most abusive of all papers was
Parson Brownlow 's Jonesborough Whig. In an article addressed to Polk,
the editor said that the Governor while "under the influence of liquor or
opium, being half drunlc" had denounced the Whig for criticising his
ancestors who had been lying in the tomb for forty years. Brownlow
reminded Polk that he had criticized both White and Harrison since their
death, and then continued: "You canting, cringing hypocrito — you dema-
gogue and time-serving politician, you advise mankind as to prudence and
moderation!" Undated in Folk Fapers.
10 Lebanon Chronicle, quoted by Nashville Banner, April 5, 18-11.
DEFEATED BT JONES IN 1841 185
discussion, and few could excel him in clear and logical presenta-
tion. Had his opponent attempted to meet the Governor's argu-
ments by a frank and fair discussion, he would have been easily
vanquished, for his knowledge of political questions was super-
tieial and limited. To Jones, however, ignorance of the subject
was never a cause of embarrassment. By substituting bold asser-
tion for knowledge, he was able to discuss any topic without hesi-
tation, and, so far as his audience was concerned, he had dis-
])roved every contention of his adversary. It availed Polk little
to demolish these assertions by clear presentation of historical
data. Like Douglas in his debates with Lincoln, Jones would
calmly reiterate his assertions, no matter how often they had been
refuted, or else he would divert the attention of the audience by
a humorous anecdote or by a dissertation on the beauties of coon
fur. In either case the effect of Polk's argument was entirely
lost, while his adversary succeeded in winning the vociferous
applause of an uncritical audience. No wonder that a Democrat
who heard their debate at Somerville exclaimed in disgust : ' ' Mr.
Polk made an ass of himself, talking sense to a lot of d — d fools,
and urged that the Governor "ought to get a stick and crack
Jones's skull, and end this tomfoolery ! "^^
One of Jones's most exasperating characteristics was his
never-failing good humor. As he had declined to become em-
barrassed by the most complete demonstration of his ignorance,
so, also, he refused to be angered by sarcasm or ridicule. At
times Polk tried to crush his opponent by belittling his abilities
and by holding him up to scorn. In reply, Jones would solicit
the compassion of the hearers for his "irascible but venerable
competitor." Polk said that he had tried to discuss questions of
state in a serious manner and that his opponent had wisely made
jest of things which were beyond his comprehension. When he
asserted that Jones was better suited to the circus ring than to
the Governor's chair, Jones good-naturedly admitted that they
11 Phelan, Hist, of Tenn., 403.
186 JAMES K. POLK
Avould both do well in the ring — himself as a clown, and the
Governor as "the little fellow that is dressed up in a red cap
and jacket and who rides around on a poney. "^- The Governor
wearied of the travesty, and would gladly have abandoned joint
meetings, but, as they had been undertaken upon his own invi-
tation, there was no way of breaking gracefully with his tritiing
antagonist.
The debates attracted attention in all parts of the state, and
everywhere large audiences greeted the speakers. Much import-
ance was attached to their meeting at Nashville, which was not
only the capital, but the political headquarters of the state.
Here, on May 19, they were greeted by a large and enthusiastic
concourse of people, and each candidate according to agreement
spoke for two and one-half hours. "Polk," as Phelan has well
said, "made a speech that would have swept from the stump any
man who had ever been Governor of Tennessee before him, aud
any man who was Governor after Jones until Andrew Johnson
came forward. "^^ It was a forceful and logical presentation
of the issues, replete with historical data and spiced with humor-
ous illustrations. Jones's address was a. compound of sophistry
and nonsense. Intead of answering Polk's arguments he con-
structed innumerable ' ' men of straw ' ' and then demolished them
to the entire satisfaction of his audience. He misquoted and
distorted everything that the Governor had said, after which
he amused the crowd by poking fun at his opponent and by re-
lating preposterous stories.^* No man of Polk's training and
dignity could cope with such politcal bushwhacking.
Had the people been really interested in political issues,
Jones could not have commanded a lu^aring. But since 1840,
i2 7brd., 402. 1^ Ibid., 404.
14 The Union of May 24 thus describod him: "Maj. Jones is a floater;
amusing at tinu's, but superficial as a bubble. He drifts along on the sur-
faeo of today and plays with the uppermost passions and prejudices of his
heaiers ; trifles with important matters and converts important matters into
trifles. ... In a word, he is (juite possible as an electioneer for his party —
good of the kind, but the quality is none of the best."
DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 187
the Whigs had ahandoned serious discussion and had staked
everything on an appeal to the emotions. For this reason Polk's
training and success were used to prejudice the people against
him. Not only had his grandfather been a Tory, but the Gov-
ernor himself was said to be an aristocrat, who, at heart, held
the people in contempt. Ignorance, uncouth appearance, and
slovenly dress were regarded as attributes of honest statesman-
ship, and Jones always emi)hasized the fact that he had followed
the plow.^^ The Governor, however, deserved little sympathy
on account of these misrepresentations, for with similar weapons
he had aided in "putting down" the able and u'pright John
Quincy Adams.
Up to the close of the canvass, no one could predict, with
any degree of certainty, what the result would be. The Whigs
did most of the shouting. They made extravagant claims, but
many Democrats could not believe that a majority of the people
would be willing to cast out a man of Polk's ability and repu-
tation and put in his place a man whose sole claim to fame rested
on a grotesque personal appearance and low-grade wit. The
Democrats, however, had overrated the people's sense of pro-
priety, and on that account were doomed to disappointment.
At the election, which was held on August 5, Polk was defeated
by a majority of over three thousand votes, but the Vnion con-
gratulated the Democrats on their "signal triumph of prin-
ciple in sweeping away ten thousand of the last year's ma-
jority."^" It was generally conceded, even by the Whigs, that
no other man in the party could have polled so many votes, and
instead of losing prestige, Polk was credited by his party with
15 The Knoxville Register in contrasting the candidates aaid that Jones
was "free, manly, undisguised, plain, and earrjnng conviction with every
sentence." Polk was "hidden, dissembling, artful, shrinking and hypo-
critical in the extreme" Quoted in Nashville Banner, August 2, 1841.
16 "Never," said Harris, the editor, "did Gov. Polk win for himself
more laurels than he has won in this contest. The Democracy of the whole
Union will appreciate his Herculean efforts at the expense of health to
maintain the principles that he has uniformly supported, the principles
of Jefferson and Jackson" (Nashville Union, August 12, 1841).
188 JAMES K. POLK
having won a great personal victory. In a letter to Van Buren,
General Jackson rejoiced in the reduction of the Whig majority
and said that ' ' Gov. Polk deserves the thanks of the Democracy
of the whole union, he fought the battle well and fought it alone,
I may say." Strange to say, Jackson commended rather than
criticized Polk for having disregarded his advice about conven-
ing the legislature. He pointed out to Van Buren that, had the
legislature been called, two Democratic Senators would have been
elected, but "the Governor threw aside policy, and adopted the
real republican creed — that a majority have the right to rule."^'
In the legislature which was elected with Jones, the Whigs
had a majority of three in the lower house. In the senate the
Democrats still had a majority of one. But one of their number,
Samuel Turney, was regarded as rather independent in politics,
and, when the time came for him to take a definite stand with
his colleagues, he proved to be weak and vacillating. Nominally,
however, the Democrats had a majority of one and thereby pos-
sessed the power to block any measure of the lower house that
required their separate approval. But on any question which
required the joint vote of the two houses the Whigs, by virtue
of their majority of three in the lower house, were in a position
to outvote their opponents.
In Tennessee, politics had precedence over legislation. There-
fore the defeated party began at once to devise ways and means
of preventing their opponents from filling the two vacant seats
in the United States Senate. The term for which Judge White
had been elected, and which since his resignation had been filled
by Alexander Anderson, had expired. The other vacancy had
been caused by the death of Senator Grundy, and had been
filled temporarily by A. 0. P. Nicholson, by virtue of the Gov-
ernor's recess appointment.
Following the election, Polk received many letters, the main
object of which was to congratulate him for having reduced the
17 Jackson to Van Bureu, Aug. 16, 1841, Van Buren Papers.
DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 189
Whig majority. In these letters several of his friends expressed
the opinion that the Democrats ought to demand the privilege
of choosing one of the Senators, and that Polk himself should
be the man. Among others, Hopkins L. Turney advised such a
course. He assured Polk, also, that his brother, Samuel Turney,
would vote with the Democrats.^*
When plotting to force the Whigs to concede them one Sen-
ator, Democratic leaders tried to ease their conscience by assert-
ing that in 1840 Whig members of the legislature had threatened,
in the event of Polk's convening the legislature, to remain at
home and thus prevent an election of Senators. It was further
alleged that these threats had been made on the advice of Henry
Clay.^^ It was said, also, that, during the recent campaign,
when it was believed that the Democrats would elect a majority
of the legislature, Jones had boasted that the Whig members
would not permit the Democrats to hold an election for Sen-
ators.-° Polk at first was noncommittal, but he soon made it
known that he was not a candidate for the office. The reason
which he gave for not permitting the use of his name was that
he would not accept any office except one conferred upon him by
a vote of the people.-^ With Polk out of the race, the politicians
turned their attention to other candidates, but nothing could be
done, of course, until the meeting of the legislature and the
inauguration of a new governor.
18 Turney to Polk, Washington, Aug. 24, 1841 {Folk Fapers). Laugh-
lin, Huntsman, and others assured Polk that some of the Whigs had agreed
to vote for him.
19 H. L. Turney to Polk, Jan. 2, 1842, ihid.
20 Alex. Anderson to Polk, Aug. 20, 1841, ibid. Anderson urged that
the Democrats should now practice this plan upon those who had invented it.
21 Geo. W. Smith, of Memphis, advised Polk not to permit the use of his
name for two reasons: (1) possibility of defeat and loss of prestige; (2)
it would lend color to the Whig charge that lie had never cared for the
governorship, and had wished it only as a stepping-stone to a higher office.
(Smith to Polk, Sept. 2, 1841, ibid.) Polk may have been influenced by con-
siderations of this kind.
190 JAMES E. POLK
As soon as the legislature had convened. Polk, on October 1,
submitted his final message as governor." It was a long docu-
ment and filled with detailed information on various topics, but
mainly on banks and internal improvements. For a man who
had only a week longer to serve, Polk was surprisingly free with
advice and suggestions for the future. He expressed satisfaction
with the degree of prosperity which had been enjoyed by the
people during the last two years, and he attributed it to cor-
rective legislation and the consequent elimination of extravagant
speculation. He regretted that banks had not been compelled
by law to resume specie payments, and once more recommended
the enactment of such a law. "There is," said he, "no sound
principle of ethics or of public policy which should exempt Banks
from the moral and legal obligations which rest upon individuals
to pay their debts." He pointed out that the bank note circu-
lation amounted to about three million dollars and that the aver-
age rate of depreciation was eight and one-half per cent ; tliis
unnecessary burden was borne by the people, while the banks
were prosperous — even paying dividends. He reported that the
law recently enacted which provided for "the reduction of the
State debt" had enabled him to recall and to cancel fifteen hun-
dred state bonds of one thousand dollars each. The outstanding
internal improvement bonds amounted to $1,816,916.66%, while,
so far, only one company had paid a dividend to the state — the
small sum of $1620. The currency, he said, had been much im-
proved by the law which prohibited the emission of notes under
ten dollars ; as a further remedy for financial ills, he recom-
mended that commercial houses and improvement companies
should be prevented by law from issuing checks designed to
circulate as money. The internal improvement board had, in his
opinion, accomplished much good by requiring various companies
to reduce their stock and to conduct their affairs in a more
economical manner. Among other things the retiring Governor
22 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 22-42,
DEFEATED BY JONES IN 1841 191
recommendeil that improvements be made in hospitals for tlie
insane, that sexes be segregated in penitentiaries, and that the
governor be given power to commute the death penalty to life
imprisonment.-^' His recommendations were salutary and sensi-
ble. Some of his suggestions indicated grave need for improve-
ment in social conditions.
One paragraph in the Governor's message is especially inter-
esting, for in it Polk expressed his views on the slavery question,
a subject which he usually avoided. He infonncd the legislature
that he had, during the past year, received two communications
from friends of negroes convened in London, on June 12 to 20,
1840, in which they had asked for the abolition of slavery and
the slave trade. Viewing these communications ' ' as an imperti-
nent and mischievous attempt on the part of foreigners to inter-
fere with one of the domestic institutions of the State," he had
declined to enter into any correspondence with this convention.
Doubtless he was governed more by his belief in state rights than
by an interest in the institution of slavery itself; still, he was
ready to resent outside interference with the "peculiar insti-
tution."
On October 14 Polk delivered his valedictory, and on the
same day James C. Jones was inaugurated as his successor.-*
"While it is true that Polk's interests were national rather than
local, yet the state was indebted to him for causing the enact-
ment of beneficial laws. Under his leadership the state had been
freed from a ruinous internal improvement policy, and he had
done much to check currency inflation and to reduce the debt of
the state. His reform measures were all in the line of sound
statesmanship, and, if we may judge from the suggestions made
in his final message, the people might have profited by continuing
him in office.
23 He could now pardon only.
24 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 78.
CHAPTER XI
POLK IN RETIREMENT
On October 14, 1841, James C. Jones became governor of
Tennessee, and on the nineteenth his first message was sent to
the legislature.^ His recommendations differed little from those
which had already been submitted by his predecessor,- and, also
like Polk, he attributed most of the distress of the people to their
own fault — to buying more than they could reasonably hope to
pay for. In one respect only did Jones differ radically from the
former governor. The crisis in the monetary affairs of the coun-
try, he said, had been produced by the destruction of the Bank
of the United States. Such a statement was naturally to be ex-
pected, for some part of a Whig governor's message must needs
indicate the change of administration, and the bank was a sub-
ject of general interest.
As usual the legislature was far more interested in ' ' practical
politics" than in the less sportive business of lawmaking. The
paramount question was the election of United States Senators,
but first of all, the opinions of both legislators and constituents
must be molded so as to accord with those of the leaders. The
Democrats were most active in the senate, for in this branch they
had, counting Samuel Turney, a majority of one. The leaders
in the senate were Samuel H. Laughlin, former editor of the
Union, and Andrew Johnson, who, at the recent election, had
been promoted to the upper house. Johnson had ability and
force, but Laughlin excelled him in political cunning and effec-
tiveness as a manipulator. In the Polk-Bell contest, Johnson
1 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 116-125.
2 Jones was accused of having borrowed from Polk's inaugural of 1839,
and to prove the claim the Vniun published the two addresses in parallel
columns (Laughlin, Diary, Oct. 21, 1843).
POLK IN RETIEEMENT 193
had supported the latter. Laughlin liad ever been subservient
and therefore enjoyed the entire eonfidenee of Polk and other
prominent Democrats.
On October 18, Laughlin, as chairman of the committee on
federal relations, submitted a series of eight resolutions to which
four more were added on the fifth of November.^ The preamble
recited the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and de-
clared that many of the laws enacted by Congress at the late
extra session violated the spirit of the Constitution quite as much
as did the laws against which those historic resolutions had pro-
tested. The first resolution reaffirmed those of 1798 and asserted
that they were "universally true at all times and especially
applicable to the present crisis and state of affairs." The suc-
ceeding seven resolutions condemned the convening of Congress
by Harrison and, also, the various measures* proposed or enacted
by the Whigs at that session. This indictment of the Whigs
was intended to prepare public opinion for the items which were
to follow — the four resolutions that were added on the fifth of
November. The first of these, the ninth of the entire list, de-
clared that the legislature had full power to instruct Senators
chosen to represent the state in Congress, and that it was the
duty of these officials to obey or resign. The second asserted
that it was the duty of candidates for legislative offices to give
explicit answers to queries made by citizens or members of the
legislature concerning their views on public questions. The third
affirmed the right of the people to instruct members of the legis-
lature. The fourth formally instructed the Senators (not yet
chosen) and requested the Representatives from Tennessee to
conform their votes to the opinions expressed by the foregoing
resolutions.
The last four resolutions displayed far more shrewdness than
principle. On their face they contained nothing which any
3 The resolutions may be found in Tenth. Sen. Jour, under the dates given.
4 For example, the "bankrupt bill' and the tariff, distribution, and
bank bills.
194 JAMES K. POLK
advocate of representative government could very well decline to
support. But they were designed, as every one knew, for the
purpose of harassing the Whig candidates with embarrassing
interrogations and for rendering them ineligible should they de-
cline to answer. By asserting the right of the people to instruct
their representatives in the legislature, the Democrats hoped
to hold in line their own members who might be inclined to
follow their individual judgments. Their party had nothing to
lose by obstructive tactics, and, by blocking their opponents at
every turn, they might worry the Whigs into conceding one seat
in the Senate.
Ephraim H. Foster and Spencer Jarnagin were selected as
the Whig candidates and on November 16 the lower house sent
to the senate a resolution urging the immediate election of two
United States Senators lest delay ' ' may lead to bargain, intrigue,
and management, to the detriment of the public interest." As
soon as the resolution was read in the senate, Andrew Johnson
moved to amend by making it read that delay "may lead to
bargain, intrigue, and management, to the great detriment of
E. H. Foster and Spencer Jarnagin, and thereby promote and
advance the public interest, by keeping them out of power for
the next four and six years. "^ The Democratic majority in the
senate soon came to be called "the immortal thirteen" and ex-
cept for an occasional desertion by Samuel Turney they voted
as a body on all questions of party politics.
The customary method of electing Senators in Tennessee was
^J a joint "convention" of the two houses. As the Whigs had
a majority of three in the lower house and the Democrats a
majority of but one in the senate, it was obvious that if the usual
method were to be followed the Whigs would outnumber their
rivals in the convention. The Democrats now made the discovery
that the usual method was unconstitutional, for, as they alleged,
the constitution of the state required that each house should vote
•''' Protests against the amendment were made, but it passed the senate
by a vote of 13 to 12 {Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 227, 232-233).
POLK IN RETIREMENT 195
separately for Senators. For their own purposes it was au im-
portant discovery ; by no other method could they hope to prevent
an election until the Whigs were ready to compromise on choosing
one Senator from each party.
Up to November 22 the Democrats were confident of their
ability to prevent an election unless the "Whigs would yield to
their terms. A few days before, Turney had introduced a reso-
lution calling for an election by convention, but he had subse-
quently voted with the Democrats on the above-mentioned John-
son resolution. On the twenty-second, however, Turney caused
consternation in Democratic ranks by announcing that he would
call up and support his resolution in favor of a convention
election." According to William H. Polk, Turney had, for the
last two weeks, "been shivering in the wind," due to the fact
that the Whigs had "brought every influence to bear on him
within the range of human ingenuity."^ On November 22
Gardner moved to amend Turney 's resolution by fixing the fol-
lowing Saturday as the date on which the Senate would vote
separately for federal Senators. Turney accepted the amend-
ment, but it was the younger Polk 's opinion that, after one trial,
Turney would revert to the convention plan. The Democrats
offered another compromise resolution the purport of which was
to declare elected Hopkins L. Turney and Thomas Brown, a
Whig from East Tennessee. It was hoped that, having passed
the senate, this resolution could be forced through the lower
house.^ On the twenty-third Gardner modified his amendment.
6 "On Saturday last the '13' were safe against the world, and the
Whigs considered themselves as beaten. Guess then, what our astonish-
ment was, when coming into the Senate on Monday morning [November 22],
Sam Turney announcetl that he had changed his mind, and would call up
and vote for his own resolutions to bring on the Senatorial election at an
early day on joint vote in Convention." Turney said that his change of
mind was due to letters from his constituents (Laughlin to Polk, November
24, 1841, Polk Papers).
7 W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, November, 22, 18-41, ibid.
8 ' ' My own impression is, tliat if the resolution passed the Senate, as
now amended, declaring Turney and Brown the Senators elect — we can
force it through the House, by lashing the doubtful men into a redemption
of their former pledges .... can at least produce a tie" (Idem).
196 JAMES K. FOLK
The legislature was now asked to choose one Senator from each
party on the ground that the popular vote at the recent election
had been nearly equally divided. Other modifications were sug-
gested, but these, as well as Gardner's resolution, were rejected.
The Democratic majority in the senate succeeded in passing a
resolution which named Hopkins L. Turney as Grundy's suc-
cessor, but, on December 1, the lower house refused to concur in
its adoption. On the same day Speaker Samuel Turney joined
the Whigs of the senate in making an agreement with the lower
house to meet in joint convention on the second and third of
December for the purpose of electing Senators. It was under-
stood that each of those days would be devoted to filling one of
the vacancies.
On December 2, therefore, Speaker Turney and the twelve
Whigs proceeded, according to agreement, to the chamber of the
lower house to join with that body in choosing one of the Sen-
ators. The other twelve Democratic senators declined to attend
the election. When summoned by the doorkeeper, they sent
written notice to their speaker (Turney) that they were in the
senate chamber, ready for "constitutional business."'' The joint
convention, for want of a quorum, was forced to adjourn. On
the morning of the third the lower house again notified the
senate that it was ready to receive the senators and to proceed
to the election of one of the federal Senators. It had already
been arranged to hold the other election in the afternoon and for
this reason Speaker Turney deemed it to be unnecessary to join
the house in convention twice in one day, inasmuch as both elec-
tions could be held during the same half-day. He therefore
voted with the Democrats in declining to attend the forenoon
session of the convention. This vote so angered the Whig sen-
ators that tliey left the senate chamber in a body. By so doing
they gave a distinct advantage to the Democrats, who now ad-
journed to the following day, thereby nullifying the original
9 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 280.
FOLK IN BETIBEMENT 197
resolution which had designated December 2 and 3 as the days
on which elections by convention should be held.
By seceding from the senate the Whigs had committed the
tactical blunder of releasing Turney from his agreement. He
now blamed them for the failure to elect Senators, and once more
became one of the "immortal thirteen."^" Five of the twelve
Democratic senators submitted a written statement of reasons
Avhy they had refused to participate in the proposed election.
The proposed method of election, they asserted, would violate the
Constitution of the United States, w^hich vests the election of
Senators in the legislature of the state — not in a convention. It
w'ould violate, also, the state constitution, which says that Sen-
ators shall be chosen by the concurrent vote of the two houses
"sitting separately" — not together. Both statements were un-
true, and besides, the convention method had been thoroughly
established by custom, and up to this time its validity had never
been questioned. This new-born solicitude for constitutional
limitations was simply a clever bit of pettifogging.
Before any attempt to elect Senators had been made, two
interesting resolutions for dividing the state were offered in the
senate. The first was introduced by Andrew Johnson, on De-
cember 7, and provided that a joint committee of the two houses
should be appointed to consider the expediency and the consti-
tutionality of ceding East Tennessee to the United States so that
it might be made an independent commonwealth and called the
' ' State of Frankland. ' ' The resolution directed Governor Jones
to correspond with the governors of Georgia, North Carolina,
and Virginia with a view to procuring portions of those states
for inclusion within the limits of "Frankland." On December
15, Gardner offered a similar resolution which provided for the
10 Turney 's explanation, ihid., 304-305. On December 13, J. Geo. Harris
informed Polk by letter that there was no prospect of an election. ' ' Thank
God and the immortal thirteen Epliraim's [Foster] fiddle is broke. No
more will its dulcet strains minister to the desponding faculties of faction ' '
{Polk Papers).
198 JAMES E. POLE
creation of the state of " Jacksoniana. " It was to include the
"Western District" of Tennessee and portions of Kentucky and
Mississippi." The senate rejected Gardner's proposal by a vote
of eleven to fourteen. Johnson's resolution passed the senate
by a vote of seventeen to six (January 18), but after consider-
able discussion and many futile attempts to amend, this too was
finally rejected by the lower house.
In accordance with the Laughlin resolutions,^- Democratic
members of the legislature had addressed queries to all senatorial
candidates concerning their views on public questions. Foster
and Jarnagin treated these queries with silent contempt. Hop-
kins L. Turney, the Democratic aspirant, gave satisfactory an-
swers as a matter of course, and so, also, did Thomas Brown, a
Whig of Roane County, East Tennessee. On December 20,
Laughlin offered in the senate a resolution which differed little
from the one previously submitted by Gardner. Whereas, in
choosing Senators, the popular will should be consulted, so read
the preamble, and, as the recent election had shown the people
to be about equally divided in politics, and as neither party was
able to choose Senators without the cooperation of the other, it
was therefore resolved that Turney and Brown, having responded
to all interrogatories, be declared the Senators to represent the
state in the Senate of the United States. Turney was to fill the
unexpired term of Grundy, and Brown was to have the full term
of six years.^^ The resolution passed the senate but failed in
the other house, and that body once more invited the senate to
join them in an election by convention. The Whigs of both
houses refused to cooperate with the Democrats in electing a
11 Tenn. Sen. Jour., 1841-42, 288, 345.
12 Those which he had introduced on Nov. 5, relating to the interrogation
of candidates for office. See above.
13 Tenn. Sen. Jmtr., 1841-42, 366-67. ' ' Some of our friends here are
of opinion — that after all our Senators should be elected — if the Whigs
can be brought 'to elect one and one' " (A. V. Brown t« Polk, Washing-
ton, Dec. 23, 1841, Polk Papers). This seems to indicate that the Demo-
crats had counted more on preventing an election than on effecting a
compromise.
POLK IN BETIBEMENT 199
comptroller and a treasurer unless the Democrats would agree
to choose Senators by a joint vote. Of this refusal the Democrats
tried to make political capital ;^^ bj' exploiting it they endeavored
to divert the attention of the people away from their own ob-
structive tactics.
Polk kept in close touch with the contest that was being
waged at Nashville and from time to time gave directions to his
political friends. He was one of the first to doubt the loyalty of
his old friend A. 0. P. Nicholson, and to suspect him of courting
an alliance with Foster for the purpose of procuring their elec-
tion to the Senate.^' He was most severe in his denunciation of
Nicholson and predicted that he would follow in the footsteps
of John Bell.^'^ Hearing that some of Bell's friends had made
overtures offering to settle the senatorial deadlock by choosing
Bell and some Democrat, Polk stated to Senator Maclin^^ that it
would never do "to elect Bell by Democratic votes. It would
not only be placing him in a position to do mischief but it would
be rewarding his apostacy." He had heard also, he said, that
similar overtures had been made by Foster's friends. "To no
man in the State," he continued, "would it be more grating than
to myself to be driven to the necessity of making a compromise
by which he might obtain a seat in the Senate, and yet it is not
14 "Our Avhole object is," -vvTote Wm. H. Polk, Avho Avas a member of
the lower house, "to place them [the Wliigs] in the position of refusing to
elect State officers, necessary and essential to the proper administration of
our State Government, because we prevent them from placing in the Senate
men who stand Mum" (W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, Jan. 6, 18i2, Polk
Papers).
15 In answer to one of Polk's letters, J. P. Hardwick wrote from Nash-
ville that ' ' I have no doubt a great effort is being made to carry out an
unholy alliance between F. & N." (Hardwick to Polk, Jan. 16, 1842, ibid.)
16 "Every day convinces me more and more that he [N] is now travelling
in the broad road — that John Bell travelled for several years before Ms
apostacy — Avhilst he was making loud professions of his adhesion to our
principles. We all know where John Bell now is, and mark what I now
say to you, that five years, perhaps not one will pass — before he is where
Bell now is, unless it shall be his personal interest shall make him seem
otherwise. I am not mistaken" (Polk to State Senator Sackfield Maclin,
Jan. 17, 1842, Andrew Johnson Papers, vol. 1).
1- Ibid.
200 JAMES K. FOLK
impossible that our safety as a party in the State might require
such a sacrifice. "^^ Should an agreement with Foster be made,
Polk believed that the Democrat ought to be chosen from East
Tennessee ; but if any western Democrat was to be selected, it
should be Hopkins L. Turney. He preferred a Whig Senator
to Nicholson, because he had ' ' more respect for an open opponent
than a hypocritical friend. "^^ Some of the "immortal thir-
teen," however, were unwilling to accept any compromise which
did not eliminate both Foster and Bell.
On February 7, the last day of the session, Laughlin, prob-
ably acting under instructions from Polk, offered a new reso-
lution "in the spirit of harmony, concession and compromise."
This resolution authorized the Whig members of the legislature
to choose a Senator from any of the three divisions of the state
(east, middle or west), and provided that the Democrats should
then select a Senator from one of the other divisions. The reso-
lution passed the senate by a strict party vote, but not until an
amendment had been added which required that both Senators
must be ' ' selected from men who have not been in public life for
the last four years." Such a limitation had not been contem-
plated by either Laughlin or Polk, but some of the thirteen
would accept nothing less. The lower house would not, of course,
agree to the resolution ; all hope of compromise was at an end ;
and the legislature adjourned without having filled either va-
cancy. On the same day the thirteen had the satisfaction of
18 "It would be a hitter pill," said Polk, "to take Mr. F. even upon a
compromise, and yet if nothing else can be done I have been brought very
seriously to doubt, whether we had not better take him with some good and
true Democrat than to have the State unrepresented in the Senate and tlms
raise up a perplexing troublesome issue of Senators or no Senators in the
State, which may and probably will be the test question in our elections in
1843. Before you can compromise at all with him or any other Whig —
they must jaeld to your mode of elections and agree to obey instructions.
If they will do this and agree to give us a Democratic Senator with him —
my conviction is, that it is the course of safety to yield to it. ' '
19 Polk to James Walker, Jan. 17, 1842, Polk Papers. Whether well
founded or not, the belief in Nicholson's disloyalty was quite general.
H. L. Turney wrote from Washington to Polk, April 25, 1842: "I think
A. O. P. N. has put his foot in it. Can it be possible that he can longer
deceive the democra-^y of Tennessee "t"
POLE IN EETIBEMENT 201
rejecting for a second time a list of persons whom Governor
Jones had nominated to be directors of the Bank of Tennessee,
and as a result, the Democratic incumbents retained their posi-
tions.
In their game of obstruction the Democrats had won a de-
cided victory — much greater than they had any reasonable hope
to expect. Had any of the "immortal thirteen" failed them,
everything would have been lost, and more than once Samuel
Turney had threatened to desert to the enemy. By bad manage-
ment, the Whigs had failed to take advantage of his willingness
to cooperate with them, while the Democrats spared no effort to
hold him in line. The tactics employed by the senate to attain
its ends were as unscrupulous as they were successful. The aid
given by Polk and Jackson was something of which neither man
had reason to be proud, but politicians are seldom overscrupulous
when party interests are at stake.
Just as the Democrats were rejoicing over their success in
thwarting the Whigs, their own party suffered a real loss in the
retirement of J. George Harris from the editorship of the
Union.'° He had taken charge of the paper when it was bank-
rupt and impotent, and under his management it had become
one of the most influential papers in the state. His style was
not always elegant nor his assertions true, but he was peculiarly
fitted to perform the task to which he had been assigned. After
his retirement the Union rapidly deteriorated, until Polk and
his associates had to take its rehabilitation in hand during the
campaign of 1843.
After the adjournment of the legislature, the thoughts of
politicians turned to plans for the future. Although it was an
open secret that Polk would, in 1843, again be the candidate for
governor, both he and his friends were ever on the alert to pro-
mote his prospects for the Vice-Presidential nomination in 1844.
20 In the issue of March 31 Harris announced that he was going to
Europe for a few months and that the owners, Hogau and Heiss, wouhl
conduct the paper themselves.
202 JAMES E. POLE
The more apparent it became that Van Buren would again head
the Democratic ticket, the more necessary it seemed to be to find
a running mate that would be acceptable to the South and "West.
IMaclin, of the Tennessee senate, voiced the general sentiment
when he told Polk that "Our friends intend to fight the battle
with you, and keep Van Buren as much out of sight as possible."
In these two sections of the Union, influential leaders fully ap-
preciated Polk's great services to the party and looked with favor
upon his nomination for the Vice-Presidency, but, as Maclin
frankly told him, it had been urged that he was not well known
to the people in other, parts of the country.-^
Politicians of both parties attached much importance to Van
Buren 's visit to the Hermitage in the spring of 1842. Knowing
Jackson's warm friendship for Polk, the Whigs expected and
many Tennesseans hoped that the visit would result in a formal
agreement between Van Buren and Polk. But, despite the ef-
forts of Polk's friends in his behalf, the New Yorker remained
noncommittal to the point of exasperation-- and left Tennessee
without having mentioned to Polk the subject of the Vice-Presi-
dency.-^
Although Van Buren declined to take any part in promoting
Polk's candidacy or even to discuss it, and even though his in-
different attitude during his visit had still further alienated the
supporters of Polk, yet both the Whigs and the Calhounites were
21 Maclin to Polk, May 4, 1842, Folk Papers. Maclin had just returned
from Mississippi, where he had been sounding Polk's praises and urging
the people to call a convention for the purpose of nominating Van Buren
and Polk.
22 "I am at a loss to know what to say to you, I can learn nothing. . . .
Mr. Van Buren seems disposed to say nothing on the subject we spoke of
when I last saw you. I made an effort througli Donelson again this evening
but it was all Mum. ... It may be that he Avill say to you what he Avill
not say to another person. Tlie old Genl will tell hdm before leaving th-c
Hermitage, to have a conversation with you" (Gen. K. Armstrong to Polk,
May 4, 1842, Polk Papers).
2'-i Polk himself said in a letter that during Van Buren 's visit neither
liad "mentioned verbally or in writing" tlie subject wliicli the Whigs say
brought him to Tennessee (Polk to Elmore, of South Carolina, June 13,
1842, Polk Papers).
POLE IN RETIREMENT 203
certain that an agreement between the two candidates had been
effected and that one of its objects was to crush Calhoun.-* Van
Buren was not popular in Tennessee, and many Democrats felt
that Polk's election would be more certain if some other than
the New Yorker could be nominated for President.-^ Cass was
most frequently mentioned by those who held this belief. Others
were inclined to await developments. Benton, like Van Buren,
had declined to commit himself in Polk's favor, but his denunci-
ation of Richard M. Johnson was regarded by Tennesseans in
Washington as a hopeful sign.-** Realizing the general indiffer-
ence toward Van Buren in southern states, friends of Callioun
began to entertain hopes that he would be nominated for the
Presidency in 1844 r^ but, believing, as they did, that Polk was
in agreement with Van Buren, they did not, it appears, seek
assistance from his friends. Then, too, the adherents of the great
nullifier could hardly hope for the cooperation of a man who was
thought to be under the dominating influence of General Jackson.
"When the Tennessee legislature convened in the autumn of
1842, another futile attempt was made to fill the vacant seats in
the federal Senate. J. George Harris, who had returned to Nash-
ville, reported to Polk that Bell's supporters had offered to make
an agreement whereby Bell was to answer the queries which had
24 " It is thought, ' ' wrote Dixon H. Lewis, ' ' Van has effected his pur-
pose with Polk," while according to Gentry, of Tennessee, no one doubted
that Van Buren and Polk would be the Democratic candidates (Lewis to
Richard Cralle, May 31, and June 10, 1842, CraUe Papers).
25 "I assure vou, sir," A\Tote J. P. Hardwieke, "there is a disinclination
to take up Van' Buren again. I have taken some pains to arrive at tins
conclusion at our little caucuses" (Hardwieke to Polk, Nov. 13, 1842,
Polk Papers).
26 Cave Johnson to Polk, Jan. 29; H. L. Turney to Polk, Jan. 31, 1843,
Polk Papers.
27 One of the hopeful was Dufe Green. He thought that, if the Van
Burenites' plan of an early nominating convention could be thwarted, Cal-
houn would be nominated. * " It has now naiTOwed down, ' ' he wrote, "to a
choice between Calhoun and Van Buren and the demonstrations are
becoming more decided for Mr. Calhoun so that, in my opinion, the con-
centration in his favor will become so apparent as public opinion develops
that the convention will indeed become obsolete" (Green to Cralle, February
8, 1843, Letters of Duff Green- in Library of Congress).
204 JAMES K. FOLK
been ignored by Foster and Jaruagin. Having done this, he was
to be elected as one of the Senators, and the Democrats were to
fill the other vacancy with a candidate of their own choice.
Harris was in favor of such an agreement if Polk would consent
to be the Democratic Senator ; Foster would be killed, politically,
while Bell if properly instructed would be less powerful than at
present.-^ Nothing, of course, resulted from the suggestion.
Polk had already declined to make any compromise with Bell,
and besides, the overtures of Bell's friends were probably made
without his knowledge. During this session the Democrats made
little attempt to force a compromise, but simply contented them-
selves with blocking the Whigs from electing their candidates.
Their greatest fear seems to have been that Nicholson, by some
treacherous agreement with the Whigs, would attempt to pro-
mote his own selfish interests.-"
Feeling that both his own and his party's interests could be
best served by defeating Governor Jones, Polk once more entered
the race. The campaign was opened by a joint debate at Spring-
field, March 25, 1843. Jones scathingly denounced the conduct
of the "immortal thirteen." Polk retorted by charging that
Jones had originated the idea which they had put into practice.
The Umon^° published letters from Whigs Avho claimed to have
heard Jones boast that, in case the Democrats should have a bare
majority on joint ballot, the Whigs would prevent a choice of
Senators by refusing to participate in the election. Throughout
the campaign the Union defended the thirteen for preventing
the election of men who refused to be bound by the wishes of
their constituents. The refusal of the state senate to confirm
Jones's list of bank directors was purely for political reasons.
The truth was reprehensible enough, but on the stump Jones
28 Harris to Polk, Dec. 11, 1842, Polk Papers.
29 W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, February 14, 1843, Polk Papers. Andrew
Johnson, fearinf!^ that his kno^\^l friendship for Nicholson might be mis-
interpreted, wrote to Polk that "you have always been my first choice for
anything" (Johnson to Polk, February 20, 1843, ibid.)
30 March 31, 1843.
FOLK IN RETIBEMENT 205
Avon applause by asserting that the Polk directors Avere corrupt
and time-serving partisans who, for fear of exposure, did not
dare to relinquish their offices.
In many respects the campaign was a repetition of that of
1841. There was, perhaps, more argument and less burlesque,
although botli candidates made use of anecdotes and sarcastic
retorts. Polk was not unmindful of his own powers of wit.
When writing to his wife of a debate held at Jackson with ililton
Brown, he said that his opponent tried to turn the "occasion
into a frolic . . . but I turned the laugh upon him & almost
laughed him out of the Court House. "^^
In his "Letter to the People"^- Polk, as usual, emphasized
national issues such as the tariff, the national bank, and the
general extravagance of the Whigs. Once more Tennessee was
regarded as the pivotal state — the index to the approaching Pres-
idential campaign. As it was practically certain that Clay would
be the Whig candidate, much of Polk's time on the stump was
devoted to Clay and his policies. Incensed b}'- a revival of the
old "bargain and corruption" charge of 1825, Clay challenged
Polk to a discussion of this question at a time and place to be
fixed by the Tennessean himself.^^ Apparently the challenge Avas
not accepted.
Early in the campaign a group of persons in Memphis sub-
mitted to the two candidates a list of questions on political topics.
Jones replied at once, and among other things expressed the
following views. He favored a national bank, but was not fully
satisfied with Clay's bill that had been vetoed by Tyler. He
believed in a tariff for revenue, with incidental protection to
home industries. In his opinion the legislature had full power
to choose Senators in anv manner which it saw fit. The last
31 Polk to Mrs. Polk, April 4, 1843, Polk Papers.
32 It bore the date of May 17, 1843, and was printed in the Union, May
2?> and 26.
33 TypeA\Titten copy of a letter from Clay to Polk dated Ashland, May
20, 1843, Polk Papers.
206 JAMES K. FOLK
answer did not harmonize very well with his condemnation of
the Democratic senate for insisting that each house should vote
separately.^*
In answer to the same queries Polk stated that he believed
in the sub-treasury, and in metal money for the nation supple-
mented by a limited amount of paper issued by state banks.
He opposed direct taxes and endorsed tariff for revenue only.
Like Jones, he thought that the legislature possessed the right
to elect Senators in any manner agreeable to itself. He held,
on the other hand, that all candidates for office were under obli-
gation, when called upon, to express their views before election
on all public questions. ' ' The chief, if not the only value of the
right of suffrage," said he,
consists in the fact, that it may be exercised understandingly by the
constituent body. It is so, whether the immediate constituency consists
of the Legislature, as in the case of the election of United States Senators,
or of the people in their primary capacity, in the election of their Execu-
tive or Legislative agents. In either case the constituent has a right to
know the ojiinions of the candidate before he casts his vote. 33
Except on the bank question the views expressed by the two
men were very much alike. Indeed, the paramount issue was:
Shall Tennessee be returned to the Democratic column in national
politics ?
Throughout the campaign the Democrats were handicapped
by the weakness of their party press. Since Harris's resignation
the Union lacked both spirit and influence, and was rapidly drift-
ing into bankruptcy. On the other hand, the Whigs had several
vigorous papers, the most invincible of which was Brownlow's
Jonesborough Whig. Polk was condemned for the part he had
taken in the administrations of Jackson and Van Buren, and
again it was said that he sought the governorship merely as
a stepping-stone to the Vice-Presidency. Polk's ''Tory"
34 Jones's reply is dated April 24, 1843, and is printed in the Memphis
American Eagle, May 2, a copy of which is among tlie Polk Papers.
35 The answer is dated May 15, and is printed in the Union, June 2, 1843.
POLK IN BETIREMENT 207
grandfather was again held up to scorn, while a Chattanooga
paper charged the Democratic candidate with being an aristocrat
who had ' ' refused to eat with some wagoners who were stopping
at the same tavern with him some years ago. ' '^^
Although Polk made a thorough canvass and demonstrated
his superiority over his rival, Jones was reelected by a majority
of nearly four thousand votes. This time the Whigs elected a
majority of the legislature as well as the governor, and the power
of the "immortal thirteen" had been broken. Polk attributed
the victory of the Whigs to their success in drawing the attention
of the people to local questions and away from great national
issues. He was still confident that his party would carry the
state in the federal election of 1844.^^
Soon after the election the defeated candidate's friends once
more turned their attention to procuring for him the Vice-Presi-
dential nomination. They were interested of course in his per-
sonal advancement, and besides, they had hopes that, with their
favorite on the ticket, Tennessee might be restored to the Demo-
cratic party. On September 5 the Undon, in a series of edi-
torials, urged his nomination and declared him to be "one of
the ablest men in the democratic party in the Southwest." In
a letter to A^an Buren, General Jackson expressed the belief that
the former President would be nominated — and elected, also, if
Polk were put on the ticket with him. Such a ticket, he said,
would surely carry Tennessee; Polk would add strength to the
party in all of the states, while Colonel Johnson would
weaken it.^*
The new legislature met on October 2, 1843. In the senate
the Whigs had fourteen members, the Democrats, eleven ; in the
lower house the Whigs numbered forty, the Democrats, thirty-
five. The two main political questions which confronted the
36 Both articles and a denial are in the Union, June 27, 1843.
37 Polk to Van Buren, August 8, 1843, Van Buren Papers.
3S Jackson to Van Buren, September 22, 1843, ibid.
208 JAMES K. POLK
legislature were fixing a permanent location for the state capital,
and the election of federal Senators. Although now in the
minority, the Democrats planned to prevent the election of Foster
and Jarnagin by supporting two other Whigs, A. R. Alexander,
of West Tennessee, and Joseph L. Williams, of East Tennessee.
Some of the Whigs, especially the Rutherford delegation, M^ere
eager to have the capital removed from Nashville to some more
central location. The Democrats therefore concocted a scheme
by which they hoped to procure a sufficient number of Whig votes
to elect Alexander and Williams by offering to vote for the re-
moval of the capital. Polk was then in Nashville and gave his
support to the plan.^^ Their plotting was in vain. On October
7 both houses voted to retain the capital at Nashville, and on
the seventeenth Foster and Jarnagin were elected Senators, the
former to fill Grundy's unexpired term, the latter to succeed
Anderson.*''
Repeated defeats annoyed but did not discourage Democratic
leaders. Harmony within their own ranks was the first desider-
atum, and Laughlin undertook the task of bringing Nicholson
and his adherents back into the fold.*^ The task did not seem
hopeless, for since the seats in the Senate had been filled by the
Whigs there was no reason why Nicholson should not cooperate
with his former associates. The "little magician" was the chief
cause of embarrassment. Democrats, generally, were ready to
support Polk, but from all parts of the state came reports of
indifference or hostility to Van Buren.
Laughlin 's "missionary" work was not confined to the Nich-
olson faction. As soon as the question of locating the capital
had been settled, it was a foregone conclusion that Foster and
Jarnagin Avould be elected. Freed from the responsibility of
30 S. H. Laughlin, "Diary," October 1-4, 1843.
■io/buZ., Oct. 17. " Jonaldn has gone home a Senator — and Ephe is
running about, grinning and jumping like a pleased monkey — A\ith just
about the dignity of one, at best" (Laughlin to Polk, Oct. 20, 1843,
Poll: Papers).
41 Laughlin to Polk, Oct. 12, 1843, Polk Papers.
POLE IN BETIEEMENT 209
mauipulatiug the scheme to defeat this election, Laughlin could
devote his entire energy to procuring for Polk the nomination
for Vice-President. In letters to influential leaders and news-
paper men, he almost demanded that Polk should be taken up by
"the press and the People." He proposed that the former Gov-
ernor should be nominated by the state convention which was
to meet in November, and that the Tennessee delegation should
go to the national convention "supporting his claims, and un-
committed as to Presidential candidate, but committed to abide
its nomination." He told his correspondents that if Polk were
put on the ticket with Van Buren or any other good Democrat
the party would surely win, "but without Polk's name we would
be beaten and tied down in federal chains in Tennessee for the
next six or ten years. "^- His remark concerning the national
convention seems to be the first indication of the plan, later
adopted, to nominate Polk, and to remain noncommittal as to the
Presidential candidate. The determination to make no nomi-
nation for President was strengthened, no doubt, by a letter
written from New York by Harvey M. Watterson to A. 0. P.
Nicholson. Van Buren was Watterson 's own choice, but, fearing
that his favorite could not be elected, he did not believe it wise
to nominate him. Cass, in his opinion, was the most available
candidate. He said that "the Van Buren party intend to give
Polk the go hy as to a nomination for the Vice Presidency, ' ' and
that Johnson would be nominated by the national convention.*^
On October 18, two days after the receipt of Watterson 's letter,
Laughlin conversed with A. V. Brown. Brown advised serving
notice on the New Yorkers that the Tennesseans would support
Van Buren if his adherents would agree to support Polk ; other-
wise they would go for Cass. To this Laughlin and Armstrong
assented, and Donelson was selected to state their views to Silas
Wright and other friends of Van Buren.** Probably this threat
42 S. H. Laughlin, "Diary," Oct. 9, 1843.
43 Ibid., October 16, 1843.
^ilbid., October 18, 1843.
210 JAMES K. POLK
was not carried into effect. At any rate Polk later disclaimed
any knowledge of a project to drop Van Buren for Cass.^'' In
January, 1844, he asked Heiss to place Van Buren 's name along
with his own at the head of the political columns of the Union,*''
but, for the time being, the editor refused to comply.
The State convention met at Nashville on November 23, 1843.
Polk was nominated for Vice-President by a unanimous vote,
but no one was named for the Presidency. The convention sim-
ply agreed to support whatever candidate the Baltimore conven-
tion might see fit to nominate. The reason assigned for not
nominating Van Buren, as stated to him in letters from both
Polk and Jackson,^" was a fear that the Cass supporters might
resist such action, and that a breach in the party would result.
On hearing from Cave Johnson and A. V. Brown that Van
Buren was stronger in "Washington than Cass and that he would,
in all probability, be nominated at Baltimore, Polk advised the
editors of the Union to come out for the ex-President.*^ His
real feeling toward Van Buren is not easy to determine, but
from his silence rather than his words, one always gets the im-
pression that his support of the New Yorker was based, as in
this case, on expediency instead of admiration for the man. It
was quite natural that this should have been so, for Van Buren
had more than once shown indifference when Polk needed his aid.
Realizing that the party had suffered from the want of a
vigorous newspaper, Polk turned his attention to rehabilitating
the Nashville Union. Since its purchase by Hogan and Heiss,
it had been edited by the senior partner. He had never been a
forceful writer, and of late his health had become so impaired
that the paper was practically without an editor. With the con-
sent of the owners, Polk asked Laughlin to take charge of the
45 Polk to Cave Johnson, March 18, 1844, " Polk-Johnsou Letters."
46 Polk to Heiss, Jan. 21, 1844, "Heiss Papers."
47 Jackson to Van Buren, Nov. 29; Polk to Van Buren, Nov. ."^0, 1843,
Va7i Buren Papers.
48 Polk to Heiss, Dec. 21, 1843, "Heiss Papers."
POLE IN BETIEEMENT 211
paper and promised him financial support from the party. Fear-
ing, however, that he might jeopardize his chances of being
elected to Congress (from his home district), Laughlin at first
declined to accept the position/" His subsequent acceptance
and his editorial services to his party will be considered in the
following chapter.
49 Polk to Heiss, Dec. 21, 1843, "Heiss Papers." Laughlin to Polk,
Dee. 7; Heiss to Polk, Dec. 19, 1843, Polk Papers.
CHAPTER XII
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844
The campaign of 1844 may be said to have opened with the
new year. From early in January announcements from pros-
pective candidates, declarations of principles, and notices of nom-
inations made by local bodies, began to occupy leading places
in the columns of the party journals. There was little doubt
that Clay would be chosen to head the Whig ticket, although,
in response to an inquiry from friends, Webster announced his
willingness to accept a nomination at the hands of the Whig con-
vention. Tyler had been read out of the Whig party, and, since
the Democrats had not shown a disposition to adopt him as their
own, it seemed likely that he would enter the contest as an inde-
pendent candidate. Van Buren's nomination by the Baltimore
convention was fully expected by all parties not so much because
any considerable portion of his party wanted him, as because
there seemed to be no one who had a better claim. He had been
left by General Jackson as a legacy to the party, the position he
had occupied gave him prestige, and, as Dixon H. Lewis re-
marked, he had the advantage of ''being cmisidered the candidate
of tJie party. "'^ These influences combined would insure him'
the nomination unless something should happen before the meet-
ing of the convention to change indifference into active hostility.
For some time, of course, there had been active hostility in certain
quarters, but this came generally from those who were promoting
the interests of some other still more unpopular candidate, such
as Calhoun or Tyler, consequently there was little danger from
that source. Unless something should occur to cast doubts on
1 Lewis to Cralle, June 10, 1842, CraUe Papers.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 213
his orthodoxy or his personal fitness, Van Biiren was reasonably
certain of the nomination, hut unfortunately for him, that some-
thing did occur— the unexpected turn in the Texas question.
Before the appearance of this firebrand, friends of other aspirants
were exerting every effort to weaken his hold on the party and
to strengthen that of their favorites. The most active were the
supporters of Calhoun and Cass; some were ready to join with
the followers of Tyler ; and a few, like W. C. Rives,- announced
that, as Van Buren's nomination seemed assured, they would
vote for Henry Clay.
Early in the year, when Van Buren's nomination seemed to
be a foregone conclusion, the m^ain topic of discussion in Demo-
cratic ranks was the choice for the second place on the ticket.
The persons most frequently mentioned were Colonel Richard
M. Johnson, of Kentucky, and James K. Polk, of Tennessee. As
in Van Buren's case, many were ready to support Colonel John-
son simply because they did not see how the party could drop
him gracefully.^' The Van Burenites favored Johnson, but for
this very reason his nomination was vigorously opposed, especially
in the South and Southwest. It was felt by many that if Van
Buren must be accepted, the Vice-President should be a man
more agreeable to the southern wing of the party. For some
time the Tennessee Democrats had been urging Polk's claims to
this office, and since his second defeat by Jones they were still
more determined to procure for him the nomination.
Ardently desiring this office, Polk began as early as the fall
of 1843 to ask his friends to use their influence with politicians
of other states. In a letter to Donelson he expressed the belief
that Van Buren would be made the candidate for President, and
if so, "the candidate for the Vice Presidency must come from the
West,— and from a slave-holding state." He hoped that the
2 His letter, dated January 1, is printed in Nat. IntelL, Jan. 12, 1844.
3 It was rare to see a person, wrote Cave Johnson, who did not prefer
Polk. The main trouble was getting rid of "Old Dick" (Johnson to Polk,
Jan. 31, 1844, Polk Papers).
214 JAMES K. POLE
press and party leaders would come out early for Van Buren and
himself, at least before R. M. Johnson had yielded his "preten-
sions for the Presidency" and had become his competitor for the
second place. Even this early he expressed distrust for the
Washington Globe.
I do not understand Blair's course. ... I do not think he is inclined to
do me justice. Why I know not, unless it be that he has strong attach-
ments for Col. Johnson, and looks to his restoration with Mr. Van Buren.
The attitude of Ohio and Mississippi, he said in another letter,
would go far to settle the question, therefore Donelson and other
Tennessee friends should send letters to prominent politicians in
those states.*
Early in January, 1844, Laughlin and others procured from
General Jackson letters to political leaders in various states.
These letters were used in an effort to induce state conventions
to declare their preference for Polk.^ A letter signed "Amicus"
that appeared in the Glohe and advocated the nomination of
William R. King, of Alabama, gave Cave Johnson and A. V.
Brown an opportunity to sound Polk's praises and to urge his
nomination. In an article signed "A Tennessee Democrat,"
they pointed out that King, voluntarily, and Van Buren, under
instructions, had voted for the United States Bank, and that it
would never do to have two candidates who had endorsed that
discredited institution. But, they asked, who does not remember
in Jackson 's battle against the bank ' ' the unterrified ability dis-
played by Governor Polk on these trying occasions?" The very
fact that Tennessee was a doubtful state was an additional reason
for nominating Polk.^ To a friend in Tennessee Johnson wrote
that old-line politicians such as Buchanan, Calhoun, Benton, and
Blair were doing their utmost to ruin Polk's prospects, and other
4 Polk to Donelson, Oct. 19, Dee. 20, 1843, "Polk-Donelson Letters."
The Ohio politicians mentioned were Allen, Tappan, Medary, Dawson, and
Medill.
■-' Letters of W. H. Polk and Laughlin to Polk (Polk Papers).
6 Washington Globe, Jan. 15, 1844. Johnson to Polk, Jan. 13, 21, 31,
1844, Polk Papers.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 215
letters told Polk that these men feared hiin as another rival for
the Presidency."
In general, conservatives evinced a preference for either King
or Colonel Johnson,^ but the more aggressive element favored
Polk. The Mississippi state convention at its Jackson Day
(January 8) celebration drank toasts to Polk and nominated him
for Vice-President,^ and in many other states there was growing
sentiment in his favor. The attention of the country had recently
been called to the state of Tennessee by the introduction in Con-
gress of a bill to reimburse General Jackson for the thousand
dollar fine imposed upon him at New Orleans in 1815. "William
H. Polk moved in the Tennessee legislature to instruct the Sen-
ators and request the Representatives from that state to vote for
the bill. Although such an action was only to be expected from
any Tennessee Democrat, it is not unlikely that Polk had consid-
ered the probable effect on his brother's candidacy.^*'
The private correspondence of this early part of 1844 is very
interesting in view of the assertion made later that an anti-Van
Buren plot had been hatched in Tennessee by the intimate asso-
ciates of Polk. The letters show conclusively that instead of
opposing the ex-President's nomination the leading politicians
were trying hard to bring it about. On the other hand, the rank
and file of the Democracy of the state cared little for Van Buren
and feared that he would be a "dead weight" upon the party.
Even Hogan and Heiss, the proprietors of the Vmon, at first de-
clined to place his name at the head of their political column,
7 Levin H. Coe to Polk, Jan. 27, 1844, ibid.
8 In a letter to the editor of the Glohe, dated January 28, Johnson stated
that he had, at various places, been nominated— sometimes for President,
sometimes for Vice-President. He would accept either, he said, if ratifaed
by the national convention, but in any event he would support the regular
nominees.
9 Nashville Union, Jan. 23, 1844.
10 When Polk 's resolution reached the senate, a Whig member moved
that the preamble should be changed to read that the "question is now
brought before the American people not with a view to relieve Gen.
Jackson . . . but alone for political effect" (Nashville Vmon, Jan. .5,
1844).
216 JAMES E. POLK
although Polk had requested them to do so.^^ Urged by Laughlin
as well as by Polk, the editors finally, though reluctantly, con-
sented. His name appeared for the first time on February 8,
1844, and the editors stated frankly that
in placing Mr. Van Buren 's name at the head of our paper, subject to the
action of the National Convention, w^ assume no new position either in
reference to our views or the preferences of the great body of the democ-
racy in Tennessee.
They would support, they said, the nominee of the convention,
whoever he might be.^- On March 12, after much urging by Polk,
Laughlin assumed the editorship not only of the Union but of
the Star Spangled Banner, a weekly campaign journal which
was to be published from the same office.^^ The tone of the Union
now became more favorable to Van Buren, and there seemed to
be little doubt that he would be nominated at Baltimore.
Up to the time that Van Buren 's Texas letter was published,
there was no indication that influential Tennesseans had any
intention of opposing his nomination. Cave Johnson, who, with
R. J. Walker, was charged later wdth having instigated the plan
to defeat him at Baltimore, was a hearty supporter of the ex-
President. In a letter written from Washington he told of a
movement in that city to nominate Cass. This movement, he
believed should be vigorously opposed, for "in my opinion your
only chance for the position we wish" depends upon the nomi-
nation of Van Buren." At a large meeting held at Nashville
on March 15, 1844, to celebrate the anniversary of Jackson's
11 "Tell the General," said Polk in a letter to Donelson, December 20,
1843, "that I had an interview with both Editors of the Union, when I
was at Nashville and both agreed to take decided and bold ground for
Van Buren in their paper. If they do not do so, in their next paper, I
will write to them and urge it upon them. The paper here has done so"
("Polk-Donelson Letters")-
12 Nashville Union, Feb. 8. Polk to Heiss, Jan. 21 "Heiss Papers";
Laughlin to Polk, Feb. 4, Polk Papers.
13 Polk 's letters to Heiss advising the employment of Laughlin are in
the "Heiss Papers." Various letters of Polk and Laughlin on the sub-
ject are in the Polk Papers.
14 Johnson to Polk, March 6, 1844, Polk Papers.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 217
birth and the remission of his fine by Congress/'' efforts were
made to create enthusiasm for both Van Bnren and Polk. Whih^
at Nashville Polk answered Johnson's letter and fully concurred
in the views he had expressed. A few days later he wrote again
on the same subject and said that "the movement which you say
is on hand — to profess publicly to support Mr. Van Buren, with
a secret intention to attem])t to nominate Genl Cass in the Con-
vention,— can receive no countenance." If there is any move-
ment in Tennessee, said he, to couple his name with that of Cass
to the prejudice of Van Buren, he is not aware of it, and if dis-
covered, he will not permit it.
It is now settled that the preference of a large majority of the party is
for Mr. Van Buren, and the whole party should yield to his nomination
and make it unanimous. Such men as Duf Green, and the discontented
in our ranks may attempt to produce confusion by resisting the popular
choice of the party, but their movements can receive no countenance or
support from me.i''>
Immediately following the Nashville meeting Laughlin sounded
the trumpet more vigorously than ever for Van Buren and Polk,
and insisted that four-fifths of the Democrats in Congress were
in favor of the ex-President's nomination. Although a friend
of General Cass, Laughlin deplored the agitation in his behalf.
Cass himself, said he, "has frowned upon the design." Those
who had come out for Cass had, in Laughlin 's opinion, done so
for the purpose of dividing the party, and most prominent among
them was Duff Green, "a renegade deserter."^'
On March 20, the day before the appearance of Laughlin 's
editorial, Polk had declined an unofficial offer of a place in the
cabinet of John Tyler. Abel P. Upshur, Secretary of State, and
Thomas W. Gilmer, Secretary of the Navy, had been killed in
the Princeton disaster of February 28, leaving two vacancies in
15 Laughlin submitted a resolution which declared that revenge had
led Judge Hall, to impose the fine. Polk seconded the resolution and made
a speech on political questions (Union, March 19, 1844).
i«Polk to Johnson, March 18, 1844 ("Polk -Johnson Letters").
1" Nashville Union, March 21, 1844.
218 JAMES K. POLK
the cabinet. Calhoun had been selected to succeed Upshur,^^ but
John Y. Mason, who had been invited to take Gilmer's place de-
clined, at first, to accept the offer. At this juncture Theophilus
Fisk, former editor of the Old Dominion and a friend of the
President, sent a letter to Polk asking whether he would accept
the navy portfolio "without any pledge, shackle, or trammel
being asked of you, other than is already guaranteed by your
exalted character and standing. ' '^'' Mason, however, changed his
mind,-° and by accepting the appointment left no vacancy to be
filled.
Without knowledge of the offer made to JNIason, or of his
accceptance, Polk had already written to Fisk, stating that he
Avould not accept a place in the cabinet. In a letter to Cave
Johnson, which was intended also for the eye of Silas Wright,
Polk gave a twofold reason for declining a cabinet position. In
the first place, it would seem like withdrawing from the race for
Vice-President, and this he had no intention of doing. Again,
Tyler's administration was supposed to be hostile to Van Buren ;
consequently, if he accepted, he would be placed in a false posi-
tion, for he was heartily in favor of Van Buren. This, in effect,
was a notice to the Van Burenites that he was still in the race
for Vice-President and that, as he was loyal to their candidate,
he expected their support in return. He also called attention
to Laughlin's editorial in the Union against the attempted move-
ment for Cass. In another passage of the letter he not only
declared his own views on the Texas question, but he intimated,
also, that he took it for granted that Van Buren would not op-
pose annexation. Speaking of Calhoun's call to the Department
of State, he said :
IS For the circumstances of Calhoun's selection, see Schouler, llhU of
U. S., IV, 455.
10 Fisk to Polk, March 9, 1844, Polk Papers. Fisk said that the i(lea
was his own, but he told Cave Johnson that he was acting by authority
of the President (Johnson to Polk, March 10, ibid).
20 Much to the surprise of both Tyler and Fii^k — so said the latter in
a letter to Polk, March 13 (ibid.).
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 219
T think it probable that he will see that it is his interest to co-operate
thoroiifjhly with the Democratic party, so heartily for Mr. Van Burcn,
harmonize his friends at the South, and make a great effort ujion the
Texas and Oregon questions.^i
At the time that Polk declined to accept a place in Tyler's
cabinet, the Texas question was fast approaching its critical stage.
Since Polk was soon to become closely identified with this im-
portant question, it seems necessary to give a brief summary of
its history up to this point and to ascertain, if possible, whether
he or his friends had any- part in bringing it forward.
The idea of annexing Texas was not new ; but since the failure
of the first attempt, during Jackson's administration, no party
had made annexation an active political issue. That it was made
an issue in the campaign of 1844 was due, according to Benton,--
to the machinations of Calhoun, who hoped by this means to
prevent the nomination of Van Buren and the election of Henry
Clay. The first move in this direction was made in the winter
of 1842-43. At that time a letter, written by Thomas W. Gilmer
but inspired by Calhoun, was printed in a Baltimore paper. It
advocated the immediate annexation of Texas in order to fore-
stall the designs of Great Britain. The letter, said Benton, was
"a clap of thunder in a clear sky," for no one was aware of any
such design. Webster left the Department of State in May, 1843,
and after the brief term of Legare, w^as succeeded on June 24
by Abel Upshur, of Virginia. Upshur was a friend of Calhoun
and interested in the annexation of Texas. It was probably due
to the influence of Upshur and Gilmer that Tyler first became
interested in annexation, but before long the President had de-
termined to use it for his own purposes. In his third annual
message, which was sent to Congress early in December, 1843,
21 In another letter of the same date which was intended for Brown
and Johnson only, Polk made still more explicit the purpose of the first
letter, for he pointed out that Wright, if he would, could certainly prevent
E. M. Johnson from being nominated (Polk to Johnson, March 21, 1844,
"Polk-Johnson Letters").
22 Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 581 ff.
220 JAMES K. FOLK
Tyler alluded to the dangers that might result from continued
war between Texas and Mexico, and hinted pointedly at possible
annexation.
At this stage of the question Aaron V. Brown, an intimate
friend of Polk, became a leading factor in the annexation pro-
gram. Whether or not he was consciously lending his aid to the
Tyler-Calhoun project is not easy to determine. In a conver-
sation with Benton on the first day of the session, Brown spoke
of annexation as "an impending and probable event," and he
was rebuked by the Senator who said that it was "on the part
of some, an intrigue for the presidency and a plot to dissolve the
Union — on the part of others, a Texas scrip and land specula-
tion."-^ In a "confidential" letter to Polk, Brown alluded to
Tyler's message and added: "But this is not all. I have reason
to suppose it will soon be followed up with some definite and
precise proposition — some think a treaty." The Whigs, said he,
think that Tyler has brought the question up as a firebrand be-
tween North and South in order to gain support for himself, and
that nothing will come of it ; but however this may be, it is
Brown 's opinion that neither Whigs nor Democrats of the South
and West should commit themselves against annexation.-*
This was not the first time that Brown had shown an interest
in the Texas question. In January, 1843, he had sent to Jackson
a copy of the Madisonian containing Gilmer's letter and had re-
ceived in reply the famous letter of February 12 in which the
General urged the necessity of immediate annexation. Jackson's
letter was not made public until a year later, about three months
after Tyler had submitted his message on the subject of Texas.
The procurement and the publication of Jackson's letter have
been declared by Benton to be links in the chain of events which
had been forged by Calhoun and his fellow-conspirators for the
purpose of making Texas the leading political issue and Calhoun
the candidate, although he does not say that Brown was fully
23 Ibid., 583.
2-t Brown to Polk, Dec. 9, 1843, Polk Papers.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 221
aAvare of the part lie Avas playing.-"^ He has intimated, also, that
the letter was purposely dated 1844 instead of 1843 ; but Brown's
own letter — published at the same time — explained the circum-
stances under which it had been procured and stated explicitly
that it had been in his possession for a "long time."-" However,
Benton's interest in Van Buren's nomination and his opposition
to annexation seem to have led him to associate events which in
reality Avere not related; on the other hand. Brown's own desire
for Texas is sufficient to explain his soliciting the opinion of
General Jackson on the subject.
If Brown was a conscious participant in any conspiracy to
undermine Van Buren, it is quite evident that his bosom friends,
Polk and Cave Johnson, were not aware of the fact. Although
Johnson looked with favor on the acquisition of Texas, he was
averse to having it made an issue for campaign purposes. At
the time that Polk's name was mentioned in connection with
Tyler's cabinet, Johnson stated his opinions very explicitly in a
letter to Polk :
I fear some secret movements are making here so as to bring up the
Texas question here prominently before the Convention meets & to make
it operate if practicable agt Van in the Convention & agt Clay in the
election — if it can be brought up fairly & properly & with a reasonable
prospect of getting it I should have no objection, but if it is designed
merely as a political question to operate in the ensuing canvass then I
shall deplore it. An effort no doubt will be made to unite the destinies
of Oregon & Texas so as to unite the South & West — may you not be
identified with these movements if in the cabinet? & if unsuccessful what
follows ?27
The friends of Calhoun confidently expected that their leader
would profit from the emergence of the Texas question. Fearing
that "being considered a candidate" would, if left unchallenged,
procure for Van Buren the coveted nomination, they began at
an early date to seek support for their favorite.-^ Due to their
23 Benton, Thirty Years' View, IT, 584.
26 The letters of both Jackson and Brown were published in various
newspapers — among others, the Nashville Union of April 2, 1844.
27 Johnson to Polk, March 10, 1844, Polk Papers.
28 Dixon H. Lewis to Richard Cralle, June 10, 1842, Cralle Papers.
222 JAMES E. POLK
efforts the time for holding the national convention was post-
poned from December, 1843, to a later date, in order that they
might have a longer time to educate public opinion ; for even
before Jackson's Texas letter was written, they were confident
that Calhoun would be nominated.-''
During the summer of 1843 the administration had become
convinced that Great Britain was about to interfere in Texan
affairs and effect, if possible, the abolition of slavery there. Duff
Green was in England gathering information, and his communi-
cations were supplemented by reports which came from Texan
representatives in London. ^° In December, as we have already
noted, Tyler called the attention of Congress to the dangers of
foreign interference in Texas, and soon afterwards he began to
formulate plans of annexation. The supporters of Calhoun co-
operated with the President, and there seemed to be no doubt
in their minds that their patron, and not Tyler, would reap the
political reward. Their hopes of success mounted high when
Calhoun was called to take charge of the Department of State.
Like the President they were interested in annexation per se;
in addition, they fully appreciated its importance as a campaign
issue. "It is the greatest question of the Agc,'^ wrote Dixon H.
Lewis, and he rejoiced that Calhoun was in a position "to direct
its force & control its fury. ' '^^ Three days after Lewis had made
20 In a letter written from Washington, February 8, 1843, Duff Green
told Cralle that although the Van Buren faction wanted an early con-
vention, he hoped that it could be delayed until June. "It has now,"
said he, ' ' narrowed down to a choice between Calhoun & Van Buren and
the demonstrations are becoming more and more decided for Mr. Calhoun
so that, in my opinion, the concentration in his favor will become so
apparent as public opinion developes that the convention will indeed
become obsolete" (Letters of Duff Green, Library of Congress; Benton,
Thirty Years' View, II, 585).
30 Smith, Annexation of Texas, chap. vi.
31 "Every thing depends on the Texas question, which is an element
of Power so much stronger than Clay, V Buren & their conventions that
it unsettles all calculations as to the future course of men & parties. It
is the greatest question of the Age & I predict will agitate the country
more than all the other public questions ever have. Public ojjinion will
boil & effervesce . . . more like a volcano than a cider Barrell — but at
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 223
this assertion Jacksou's Texas letter appeared in the liiehmond
Enquirer. No doubt it fitted into the Calhoun program, yet it is
not at all certain that this was Brown's motive in having the letter
])ublished. Surely General Jackson did not write it for any such
purj)0se.^-
The emergence of the Texas question was not welcomed by
Henry Clay. Early in December, 1843, he stated his opinions on
the subject in a letter to John J. Crittenden.^'' There were, he
said, already a sufficient number of issues without ' ' adding freak
ones" of this character, and he did not think it right to allow
John Tyler to make capital out of this exciting topic. In his
opinion, annexation, either by treaty or by conquest, was entirely
out of the question ; however, unless Tyler should present some
definite project of annexation he did not feel called upon to make
public expression of his views. In the following March, when
it was rumored that the President was negotiating with Texas,
Clay — with his usual faith in his own ability both to shape and
to direct political issues — still felt confident that he could stem
the tide of Texas agitation."*
last will settle down with unanimity for annexation in the South & West
& a large majority in the North. It will in the meantime unite the hitherto
divided South, while it will make Abolition & Treason synonymous & thus
destroy it in the North.
"The beauty of the thing is, that Providence rather than Tyler has
put Calhoun at the head of this great question, to direct its force & con-
trol its fury. It is understood by letters from him that he accepts.
"P. S. ' It is understood the preliminaries of the Treaty have already
been arranged & only awaits the special minister who is daily expected."
(Lewis to Cralle, March 19, 1844, Cralle Papers). Alexander H. Stephens
believed that "the dissolution of the present Confederacy" lay "near
Mr. Calhoun's heart ". (Stephens to James Thomas, May 17, 1844, Sep.
Am. Eist. Assn., 1911, II, 58).
32 Benton says tliat Blair declined to publish the letter in the Globe
(Thirty Years' View, II, 587). Later, however, it was printed in that
paper, along with BroAvn 's letter explaining his reasons for publishing it.
33 Clay to Crittenden, December 5, 1843, Crittenden Papers.
34 Writing from Savannah, he said: "I think I can treat the question
in a manner very different from any treatment Avhich I have yet seen of it,
and so as to reconcile all our friends, and many others to the vieAVs which
I entertain. Of one thing you may be certain, that there is no such anxiety
for the annexation here at the South as you might have been disposed to
imagine" (Clay to Crittendon, March 24, 1844, Crittenden Papers).
224 JAMES E. POLK
The time was fast approaching when candidates must take a
definite stand either for or against annexation. Despite the de-
sire of some of them to eliminate this topic from the issues of the
campaign, every day brought the subject more into prominence.
Calhoun's position was already well known, for in his letter ac-
cepting the cabinet portfolio he had come out strongly in favor
of annexation. Clay would probably be nominated by his party
no matter what position he might choose to take with respect to
the all absorbing topic. Of greater importance, therefore, was
the stand to be taken by Van Buren ; for on this would depend,
in all probability, his success or failure in the nominating con-
vention.
On March 27, 1844, W. H. Hammet, a member of Congress
from Mississippi and an "unpledged delegate to the Baltimore
convention," addressed a letter to Van Buren asking for his
views on the annexation of Texas. In writing this letter Hammet
was evidently cooperating with the most loyal friends of Van
Buren, and not, as Benton has intimated, with the supporters of
Calhoun. ^^ After taking ample time for consideration Van Buren
on April 20, drafted his reply and sent it to his most intimate
friend, Silas Wright. When it reached Wright on the evening
of the 26th, it was read to a number of Van Buren 's friends,
including Fairfield, King, and Benton. They approved it and
decided that it should be published immediately 'in the Glohc.
This course was decided upon before Hammet had even seen the
letter.^^ The ex-President began his letter by asserting his be-
lief that the United States had the constitutional right to annex
Texas, He then gave a history of the quesion and of his own
attempt to purchase it while Secretary of State under Jackson.
35 BentoD, Thirty Years' View, II, 587.
36 Wright to Van Buren, Washington, April 29, 1844, Van Buren Papers.
"Hammet Avas frightened," said Wright, "and it was with some diftieulty
that we induced him to our proposition for publicatiorr, before he had read
it; but lie behaved well and himself and the Major remained at the Globe
offic« until about midnight, to examine the proof. ' '
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 225
But, said he, as conditions are now, annexation would in all
probability bi'ing on a war with Mexico, and
could we hope to staud perfectly justified in tiic eyes of mankind for
entering into it; more especially if its commencement is to be preceded
by the appropriation to our own uses of the territory, the sovereignty of
which is in dispute betwCn two nations, one of wliich we are to join in
the struggle?
He thought not, for "we have a character among the nations of
the earth to maintain. ' ' He did not believe that there was danger
of foreign interference in Texas or that nothing but immediate
action could prevent Texas from being lost to the United States.^^
On the very day that Van Buren penned his answer to Ham-
met, Cave Johnson sent him a letter from Washington.^'^ He
informed the ex-President that within two days the Texas treaty
would be sent to the Senate, and, from all appearances, would
be the controlling factor in the next Presidential election. For
this reason he and other friends hoped that A-^an Buren would
favor annexation, because "they hope such a position will not
injure you in the North, whilst it must overwhelm Mr. Clay in
the South if he hesitates or equivocates." In order to forestall
intrigues to prevent his nomination, Johnson urged him to make
his position known at the earliest possible date.^^ Johnson's
warning, to be sure, came too late ; on the other hand, it seems
3' The letter was published in the Washington Glohe, April 28, 1844.
3s Whether Johnson had any knowledge of Hammet 's letter to Van
Buren, I am unable to say. If he had, Van Buren 's long delay in answering
probably induced him to "WTite.
39 " In the event of your being favorable to the treaty, I entreat you
to take the earliest opportunity of giving your -sdews — we have intrigues on
hand here if practicable, to supersede you in the Baltimore Convention —
and this Cjuestion is one of the means used to arouse some of the Western
& S Western members agt you — from a supposition that you are hostile
to it — the delay of the Globe in coming out — your delay and the opinion of
some of the N. Y. Democrats — all are urged & I fear with some effect among
the members." Already, said he, some are expressing fears of Van Buren 's
"availability" and are talking of other candidates, such as Stewart,
Dodge, and Cass. He is gratified to learn that Nicholson, who had headed
the Cass movement in Tennessee, now says that Van Buren is the only man
Avho can carry that state. Such, also, is the opinion of Governor Polk
(Johnson to Van Bureu, April 20, 1844, Van Buren Papers).
226 JAMES K. POLK
to show that he was sincerely desirous of Van Buren's nomina-
tion until the New Yorker had taken a position which would,
in all probability, render his election impossible. The sin-
cerity of Johnson's regret when Van Buren's opposition to an-
nexation became known is expressed in a letter to Polk. "Many
of us are in rather low spirits today — his course gives great advan-
tage to the discontents over us and they will make the most they
can out of it."*" Two days later he reported that the excitement
over Van Buren's letter was not abating, and that the friends
of Texas had called a meeting at the capitol over which E. J.
Walker had presided. They wanted another candidate — some
w^ere looking to Cass, others to Calhoun.*^
Clay, who was then on a canvassing tour, reached "Wahington
in the latter part of April. "While there his letter on the Texas
question, dated at Raleigh on April 17, was given to the National
Intelligencer for publication. He was decidedly opposed to ar
nexation, because it would surely result in a war with Mexico.
Even if Mexico should agree, he believed that it would be inex-
pedient to admit Texas into the Union.*- Knowing that Van
Buren, whon/ he supposed would be his opponent, did not favor
annexation, Clay had not the "smallest apprehension" in stating
his position.*^
Inquiries were not limited to candidates for the Presidency.
Late in March a nonpartisan, anti-Texas meeting assembled in
Cincinnati and a committee of five, including Salmon P. Chase,
drafted a letter to Polk asking his views on annexation. When
the letter reached Columbia, Polk was on his farm in Mississippi,
40 " A serious & povs-erf ul effort, ' ' he continued, ' ' will be made to get a
new nomination in which I think most of my democratic colleagues will
unite, from the little I can learn. The discontents are moving heaven and
earth & will never stop until the Convention is over if they do so then."
At present, he said, the desertion is toward Cass, but he does not believe
that Cass will get the nomination (Johnson to Polk, April 28, 1844, Polk
Papers).
41 Johnson to Polk, April 30, 1844, ibid.
42 Nat. InteU., April 27, 1844.
43 Clay to Crittenden, April 21, 1844, Crittenden Papers.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 227
but as soon as he liad reached home his reply to the committee
was prepared without hesitation. It bore the date of April 23
and advocated unequivocally "immediate re-annexation."*^ Like
Jackson in his letter to Brown, Polk emphasized the point that our
original title to Texas had been valid beyond question and that
the territory had unwisely been ceded to Spain. He conveniently
ignored the fact that the cession had been made by those who
possessed the constitutional authority to make it. And however
unwise such an action may have been, it is difficult to see the bear-
ing of this lack of wisdom on our subsequent right to re-annex the
lost territory. On account of the danger that Texas might become
a British colony, Polk maintained that all European countries
should be excluded from both Texas and Oregon. "Let Texas
be re-annexed, ' ' said he,
and the authority and laws of the United States be established and main-
tained within her limits, as also the Oregon Territory, and let the fixed
policy of our government be not to permit Great Britain or any other foreign
power to plant a colony or hold dominion over any portion of the people or
territory of either.45
These remarks on colonization are not without interest, for they
are a forerunner of what was later called the ' ' Polk Doctrine. ' '
Polk's letter was written only three days after that of Van
Buren and of course without knowledge of its contents. Indeed,
as late as May 4, after he had read Clay's anti-Texas letter, he
expressed the hope and the belief that Van Buren would "now
take ground for annexation."*" The views which he expressed
coincided with those held generally by Democrats in Tennessee.
On the very day that Van Buren penned his indictment against
annexation, an enthusiastic meeting of Democrats at Nashville
44 "I have no hesitation in declaring that I am in favor of the immediate
re-annexation of Texas to the territory and government of the United
States. I entertain no doubt as to the power or the expediency of the
re-annexation. ' '
45 MS, dated Columbia, April 23, 1844, Polk Papers. Printed in Wash-
ington Globe, May 6, 1844.
4G Polk to Johnson, May 4, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters."
228 JAMES E. POLK
passed resolutions in favor of it by a unanimous vote.*^ It is not
surprising, therefore, that Van Buren's letter had a ''prostrating
and cooling effect ' ' upon his supporters in that state or that many
"who had stuck to him from a sense of duty should now feel re-
lieved from further obligation/''* Individuals could express their
sentiments very freely to one another, but Laughlin, who for some
time had been sounding Van Buren's praises, was now in some-
what of a quandary. As editor of the party organ, he must of
course make some comment. On May 9, therefore, he pointed
out in an editorial that, while Clay's objections to annexation
were permanent, those of Van Buren were temporary — objec-
tions only until certain obstacles had been removed. Laughlin
himself advocated immediate annexation, regardless of conse-
quences; still, if a majority of Democrats should decide to wait,
he was ready to acquiesce. This left the way open for continued
support of Van Buren. Since taking charge of the Union,
Laughlin had been bitter in his assaults upon Clay. The Whig
candidate had perjured himself by challenging Randolph to fight
a duel ; he was guilty of Cilly 's death, because he had written
the challenge for Graves; but neither crime was surprising in a
man who had "defrauded Gen. Jackson out of the Presidency,
for an office wortli $6000 per annum. ' '*^
Before his treaty with Texas had been consummated, Tyler
seems to have given up hope that he. might be nominated by the
Democrats. His official organ indignantly denied the assertion
made by the Glohe that he was knocking for admission to the
Baltimore convention; on the contrary, "the friends of the Veto-
Administration intend having a Convention which will repre-
sent the Republican party more truly than Mr. Van Buren's
47 Nashville Union, April 23, 1844.
48 "Indeed it has given a pretext for doing that Avhieh they have had
in their minds to do — to declare against V. B., and a considerable portion
of them will never be reconciled to him" (Nicholson to Heiss, May 8, 1844,
" Heiss Papers").
40 Nashville Union, March 30, 1844.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 220
Convention, and the nominee will be elected. "'^'^ Still, the Presi-
dent Avas ready to welcome assistance from any quarter, for in
May his friend Fisk sounded Cave Johnson concerning Jackson 's
opinion of his administration, and at the same time Polk was being
considered for the War Department or the British mission. '^^
Cass was the last of the aspirants to declare himself on the
Texas question. In response to a letter from Hannegan, he,
too, came out for immediate annexation. °-
On May 1, four days after Clay's Texas letter had appeared
in print, the Whig convention assembled at Baltimore. One day
sufficed for nominating the candidates and adopting a platform.
Without a dissenting voice, Clay w^as chosen for the first place,
and on the third ballot, Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, was
selected as his running mate. The platform was drawn to suit
the candidate. It avoided the Texas and bank questions and
emphasized tariff, currency, distribution, and usurpation by the
Executive. With one omission — the bank question — Clay took
his stand on the traditional Whig policies, and appealed to the
people to sustain him.
While the Whigs rallied with enthusiasm to the standard of
their chief, harmony within Democratic circles was rendered im-
possible by the appearance of the "lone star" on the political
horizon. The party w^hich had long been distinguished for its
effective discipline and its unity of action now appeared to be
hopelessly divided on the eve of battle. Even the great "chief"
at the Hermitage seemed to be uncertain as to the proper plan
of campaign. His commands were ambiguous, for they resulted
from conflicting emotions; he longed to see his old friend Van
Buren nominated, but his desire for Texas was still stronger.
Although few had a definite idea as to the best means of restor-
ing harmony, as the time for the Baltimore convention approached
50 Madisonian, April 3. 184-t.
51 Johnson to Polk, May 8, 1844, Polk Papers.
52 His letter was dated at Detroit on May 10. There is a copy in Niles'
Register, May 25, 1844.
230 JAMES K. POLK
the conviction that Van Biiren could not be elected became very-
widespread. The Virginia Democratic central committee, by reso-
lution, released the delegates of that state from the obligation
to obey their instructions, and delegates of other states announced
publicly that they would not vote for Van Buren/'^
Before the appearance of his Texas letter Van Buren had been
accepted generally as the candidate; not because he enjoyed a
wide popularity, but because a small minority urgently advocated
his nomination and the rest of the party, being more indifferent
than hostile, simply acquiesced, since they had no substitute to
offer. After the publication of his Texas letter, his downfall
was brought about by much the same process that had procured
his elevation to party leadership. The few who. were violently
opposed to his nomination had little difficulty in convincing
others, and especially the friends of Texas, that he could not
possibly be elected. Those who had supported him from a sense
of duty only, now had no hesitancy in transferring their alle-
giance to another candidate who would be more likely to win.
Amos Kendall emphasized this point in a letter written to Van
Buren. He told him frankly that he had no good news, and that
unless some one else could be nominated at Baltimore the south-
ern delegates would put up a third candidate. Kendall did not
believe that the pro-Texas feeling was due to any organized move-
ment, but rather to the "continued ding-dong sung in their ears"
by a few of the most interested. Van Buren 's letters, he said,
had appeared at the worst possible time ; the guns were being
trained on Clay, and Van Buren appeared just in time to get
the shot.^* Cave Johnson reported the political situation as
apparently hopeless. Benton and the New Yorkers seemed to
53 Many such details are given in Niles' Beg., LXVI, 162-163.
54 Kendall to Van Buren, May 13, 1844, Van Buren Papers, lleudrick
B. Wright, of Pennsylvania, believed that Van Bnren could not be
nominated — and if nominated, could not be elected, and Wni. K. King,
writing from New York, reported it to be generally admitted that the
ex-President could not be elected (Wright to Buchanan, May 13; King to
Buchanan, May 14, 1844, Buchanan Papers).
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 231
be determined not to yield ; Calhoun and his supporters were
equally uncompromising, while each faction claimed a majority
of the convention. ''I see no hope," said Johnson, "unless some
man can be found disconnected with both these fragments of the
democratic party & who will yield to the annexation of Texas. ' ''^^
Polk, the man to whom this letter was written, fulfilled these
requirements; and before the letter had reached its destination,
his availahiUfij had already been discussed at the Hermitage.
The correspondence which passed between Democratic leaders
in Tennessee about the middle of May shows an absence of
definite plans for the future. On May 10 Donelson^° summoned
Polk to Nashville to consult with General Jackson and others in
the hope that they might find some means of preventing a split
in the party over the annexation question. "I feel deeply morti-
fied," said he,
that our wise men should differ so much; and particularly that a measure
of such vast consequences should have been kept so long in the dark and
precipitated with so much haste.
Donelson was fully aware that Jackson's indorsement of annexa-
tion would aid Tyler and Calhoun ; and, apparently, although
his letter is not very clear, he did not approve making Texas a
leading issue.^' Polk accepted the invitation and reached Nash-
ville on the twelfth. On the following day he and General Arm-
strong repaired to the Hermitage. They w^ere met on the road
by Donelson, who was taking to Nashville for publication in the
Union Jackson's well-known letter which appeared a few days
later under date of May 13th. In it, Jackson insisted that Texas
must be annexed.
55 Johnson to Polk, May 12, 1844, Folic Papers.
56 Gen. Armstrong and other politicians wTote, also.
57"! am particularly anxious that the ground occupied by the Genl.
should be thoroughly understood by you. What he may now say if not
modified by disclosures recently made will produce important results. If
the Texas question is urged as it doubtless Avill be by Tyler cfc Caliioun,
and Genl. Jackson gives the weight of his name to sustain their views,
making it a leading question in the South, the sooner we know it the
better. Come and talk over the matter with the Genl. and our friends
generally" (Donelson to Polk, May 10, 1844, Polk Papers).
232 JAMES E. POLK
"When reporting the interview to Cave Johnson,'^ Polk said
that
He [Jackson] speaks most affectionately of Mr. Van Buren, but is com-
pelled to separate from him upon this great question, and says both he and
Mr. Benton have by their letters cut their own throats politically. He has
no idea that Mr. V. B. can be nominated or if nominated that he can receive
any Southern support.
Jackson said that the Baltimore convention must select some
other candidate and that he should be from the Southwest ; and
Polk's letter hinted that the General had suggested that Polk,
himself ought to be placed at the head of the ticket. Polk asserted
that he aspired to the second place only, but that his friends
might use his name as they might see fit ; in any event the party
should unite on some '^one candidate" and he must be in favor
of annexation. "I have stood by 3Ir. V. B./' he continued, "and
will stand by him as long as there is hope, but I now despair of
his election — even if he be nominated. ' ' In another letter written
on the following day,°^ Polk was more explicit concerning Jack-
son's desire to substitute his name for that of Van Buren. The
General remarked, said he, that writing the anti-Texas letter
was the only vital error over committed by Van Buren ; never-
theless, it would be fatal to his election.
He thinks the candidate for the Presidency should be an annexation man
and reside in the Southwest, and he openly expresses (what I assure you I
had never for a moment contemplated) the opinion that I Avould be the
most available man; taking the Vice-Presidential candidate from the North.
This I do not expect to be effected.
Polk thought it was more probable that some northern man
would be nominated for first place, and himself for the second.
If Van Buren should be withdrawn, his friends would doubtless
control both nominations, therefore great pains should be taken
to conciliate them. Nothing, said Polk, could prevent Clay's
election except the harmonious selection of a candidate at Balti-
more. In offering suggestions for bringing about sudi harmony
58 Polk to Johnson, May 13, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters."
59 Polk to Johnson, May 14, 1844, ibid.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 233
he displayed that shrewedness and attention to detail which made
him one of the most astute politicians of his time."" Along with
this went another letter to Johnson, marked "Highly Confi-
dential.""^ Johnson was authorized to show the first letter to
Silas Wright, and we are not left in douht as to the reason.
Mr. Wright 's deelaratiou to you, in the conversation which you detail in
your letter of the 8th that I was ' ' the only man he thought the Northern
Democrats would support if Van Buren was set aside, because I was known
to be firm and true to the cause, ' ' is precisely the opinion which Genl J.
expressed to me when I saw him two days ago. The General had previously
expressed the same thing to others.
He once more asserted that he had aspired to the second office
only and had been loyal to Van Buren ; but since the secret attack
on the ex-President " 'Fortune is in a frolic,' and . . . there is
no telling what may happen. ' ' He recommended General Pillow
to Johnson as a shrewd and reliable colleague in carryijig out
all plans.
In Jackson's letter of May 13 to the Nashville Union, in which
he commented on Van Buren 's Texas letter, the General said his
old friend evidently was unaware that conditions had changed
since he had been President. No difference of opinion could
change his confidence in Van Buren, but as to Texas, "Let us
fio " I have but little hope that union or harmony can be restored among
the members, but I have hope that the Delegates 'fresh from the people' —
who are not members of Congress — and have not been so much excited
can be brought together. Let a strong appeal be made to the Delegates as
fast as they come in, to take the matter into their own liands, to control
and override their leaders at Washington, who have already produced such
distraction, and tMis save the party. The Delegates from a distance can
alone do this. I suggest as a practical plan to bring them to act,- — to get
one Delegate from each State who may be in attendance to meet in a room
at Brown 's hotel or somewhere else, and consult togetlxer to see if they
cannot hit upon a plan to save the party. If you will quietly and without
announcing to the public Avhat you are at, undertake this with energy and
prosecute it with vigor, the plan is feasible and I think will succeed. If
the preliminary meeting of a Delegate from each State can agree upon the
man, then let each one see the other Delegates from his own State, and
report at an adjourned meeting the result. This is the only way to secure
efficient action when the Convention meets. ' ' The essential features of this
plan were followed, and resulted in success.
01 Polk to Johnson, May 17 [14], 18-4-i, "Polk-Johnson Letters."
234 JAMES K. FOLK
take it now and lock the door against future danger.""- His
complimentary remarks about Van Buren were much like an
epitaph for a departed friend. When he penned them he felt
certain that his former protege was doomed. In a letter written
on the following day he told Benjamin F. Butler that nothing
could restore Van Buren except indorsement of annexation, for
''you might as well, it appears to me, attempt to turn the current
of the Miss [iss] ippi as to turn the democracy from the annexation
of Texas to the United States. ' '"^
Texas must be annexed, and Van Buren must be dropped. So
much, at least, was settled ; and if Polk could be substituted, so
much the better. The Union now began to prepare its readers
for the change. Laughlin had been chosen as a delegate to the
Baltimore convention, and Heiss took charge during his absence.
On May 14, Heiss announced that Van Buren 's name had been
placed at the head of the political column because he was thought
to be the choice of the Democracy. It would be left there until
some action had been taken by the convention, although the editor
disagreed with his weak position on the Texas question. On the
18tli, Heiss declared further support of the New Yorker to be
hopeless, and by the 23rd he was ready to hazard some "guesses"
regarding the nomination. The first was that Van Buren w^ould
come out for Texas or withdraw. The second was that one from
a suggested list would be selected as the candidate. Heading
the list was the name of Governor Polk,''* but since Laughlin was
a member of the pre-convention conference held at Nashville,
C2 This letter was dated May 13, aud published iu the Nashville Union,
May 16, 1844.
63 "Clay's letter had prostrated him -svith the Whiggs in the South &
"West, and nine tenths of our population liad decided in favour of Mr. V.
Buren & annexation of Texas — when this, illfated letter made its appear-
ance and fell upon the democracy like a thunderbolt'' (Jackson to Butler,
May 14, 1844, Van Buren Papers. A full copy, also, in Am. Hist. Bev.,
July, 1906, 833-834). The letter was carried to Butler by Donelson. Both
men were delegates to the Baltimore convention.
04 The others suggested were Calhoun, Cass, Stewart, Tyler, and
Buchanan.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 235
the "guess" regarding Polk required no great powers of divina-
tion.®^ On May 28, Heiss made another significant statement in
the Union:
We do not believe Mr. Van Biiren will receive one vote from the Tennessee
delegation. If he does, that delegate who votes knowingly against the wishes
of his constituents, will be marked, hereafter, as a man unworthy of their
confidence.
Nearly all the delegates to the Democratic convention gathered
in Washington on their way to Baltimore. For what transpired
there, we must rely mainly on letters written by Gideon Pillow."®
Pillow and Laughlin reached Washington on May 21 and began
a campaign of interviewing delegates to ascertain their views.
Pillow represented Cave Johnson as being rather apathetic and
without hope of success. It is true that Johnson M'as inclined
to see the dark side ; but he was a shrewd politician and a per-
sonal acquaintance of most of the delegates, and it is probable
that he exerted fully as much influence as either Pillow or
Laughlin.""
Pillow reported the party to be hopelessly divided. The
insurgents declared that they would not attend the convention
unless the two-thirds rule were agreed upon, and that they would
not support Van Buren in any event. The Van Burenites were
equally insistent on a majority rule."^ The pro-Texas Democrats
65 On June 4 the National Intelligencer quoted the guesses made by
Heiss and remarked that the ' ' inference is irresistible ' ' that the arrange-
ment for dropping Van Buren and bringing Polk forward was made in the
neighborhood of Nashville.
06 Pillow was both conceited and unprincipled ; still, if allowance be
made for his exaggeration of his own importance, his account is probably
authentic. His letters to Polk are among the Polk Papers. Copies edited
by Professor Reeves are accessible in the Am. Hist. Ecv., July, 1906, 835ff.
67 In his letter of May 24, Pillow said: "I saw your letter to C — J —
and noted its suggestions." Evidently he refers to the letter to Cave
Johnson, May 14, 1844. See above.
6S In a letter written from Washington to Van Buren, May 26, Wright
said that the Texas men Avere plotting to defeat him by means of the two-
thirds rule. New Hampshire men were told, said he, that Woodbury would
get the nomination in case Van Buren should be set aside ; the Pennsyl-
vanians Avere told the same with respect to Buchanan, and the Tennesseans
with respect to Polk, Van Buren Papers.
236 JAMES K. POLE
tried to commit Polk's friends against A^an Buren, but all except
a few of the Tennessee delegates maintained a discreet silence
on this subject. Two of them, Anderson and Jones, were bitterly-
opposed to the New Yorker and would not cooperate with their
colleagues. Even Andrew Johnson was ready to sacrifice Polk
in order to get rid of A"an Buren. Pillow was satisfied that two-
thirds of the delegates favored Polk for Vice-President ; many
expressed a preference for him as the candidate for President.
No agreements were reached before leaving Washington, yet Pil-
low was quite certain that Van Buren would be forced to with-
draw, and, if so, that his friends would never support Cass. On
the other hand, he thought it probable that they would be willing
to support Polk. If Polk should be brought forward, it must be
done by the North, because it would never do for southerners to
suggest his name.
The Democratic convention assembled in Baltimore on ]\Iay 27,
1844. A large majority of the delegates had been instructed to
vote for Van Buren by state conventions which had been held
before the publication of his anti-Texas letter — in fact, before
Texas had been seriously considered as a political issue. But
Tyler and Calhoun had precipitated the question, and many who
were bitter opponents of both of them were nevertheless in favor
of annexation. Because Van Buren had taken his stand against
annexation, many held that their instructions were no longer
binding, for the conditions under which they had been framed
had changed completely, and Van Buren no longer represented
the will of the people. In a few cases, as in Virginia, steps were
taken to annul the instructions. Some of the delegates from
other states openly repudiated their instructions, and others went
to Baltimore prepared to vote for Van Buren on the early ballots
and then to use their own judgments. Benton, Welles, and other
adherents of the ex-President have asserted that there was whole-
sale intriguing against their favorite. No doubt there was, but
the widespread defection which preceded the convention was not
wholly due to intrigue.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1S44 237
The convention selected as its chairman Hendrick B. Wright,
of Pennsylvania, and as its secretary William F. Ritchie, whose
father was editor of the Richmond Enquirer. The friends of
Van Buren desired a majority nomination, but his opponents
succeeded in adopting the two-thirds rule, which had been used
on former occasions. The Van Burenites complained that the
rule was now adopted for the purpose of defeating their favorite,
but, although the charge was true, the majority merely followed
the usual practice of Democratic conventions. In asking for a
new rule the New Yorkers were requesting a personal favor for
their candidate, which, under the circumstances, they had no
right to expect. Van Buren himself had not been overscrupulous
about accepting a nomination at the hands of Jackson's "made
to order" convention. He had small reason to complain because
the advantage was now with his opponents. On the first ballot he
received a majority of the votes, but not the necessary two-thirds.
In succeeding ballots his vote steadily decreased. After the
seventh ballot had been taken, J. L. Miller, of Ohio, moved, by
resolution, to declare Van Buren the party nominee, on the
ground that he had, on the first ballot, carried a majority of the
convention. Hickman, of Pennsylvania, caused much laughter
by moving that General Jackson be nominated for President by
a unanimous vote. Both motions were ruled to be out of order,
and the convention adjourned for the day without having selected
a candidate.
The evening of May 28, the second day of the convention, was
a momentous one for Polk ; and Pillow and George Bancroft are
in substantial agreement as to what happened, except that each
claims first honors in the transactions which took place. In a
letter to Polk, in which he chronicled the events of the day. Pillow
said : "I have within the last few minutes received a proposition
from a leading Delegate of Pennsylvania and of Massachusetts to
bring your name before the Convention for President." Pillow
explained to them that if done at all this must be done by the
North. "There is, I think a strong probability of your name
238 JAMES K. POLK
ultimately coming up for President. I do not think it prudent
to move in that matter now. I want the North to bring you
forward as a Compromise of all interests. ' '"'* The delegate from
Massachusetts was evidently George Bancroft, for, in a letter to
Polk, Bancroft said that after the convention had adjourned on
the second day "it flashed on my mind, that it would be alone
safe to rally on you."'° Carrol and Hubbard, of the New Hamp-
shire delegation, heartily agreed, and likewise Governor Morton,
of Massachusetts.
I then went to your faithful friends Gen. Pillow and Douelson. They
informed me that if we of N. E. would lead off, they would follow with
Mississippi and Alabama. . . . Certain of this, I repaired with Gen. Donel-
son and Pillow to the house where were the delegates of Ohio and New York,
and I spent the time till midnight in arguing with them.
Medary, of Ohio, was agreeable, and assured Bancroft that Ohio
would go for Polk in preference to Cass. Kemble, of New York,
also agreed to support Polk.
On the morning of the third day, May 29, Tibbatts, of Ken-
tucky, withdrew the name of Richard M. Johnson and, as Pillow
reported to Polk, ' ' we brought your name before the Convention
for the Presidency. "^^ On the first ballot of the day, the eighth
of the session, Polk received forty-four votes.^- As soon as the
69 Pillow to Polk, May 28, 1884 {Am. Hist. Rev., July, 1906, 841).
70 Bancroft to Polk, July 6, 1844 (Howe, Life and Letters of George
Bancroft, I, 253). Years afterward Bancroft wrote a still more detailed
account of his activities during that evening. He stated explicitly that
' ' Polk owed his nomination by the Democratic Convention to me, ' ' and that
"I was the one who of my own mind and choice, first, on the adjournment
of the nominating convention, for the day, resolved to secure the nomina-
tion for Polk" (Bancroft to I. G. Harris, Bancroft Papers, Lrenox Library;
cited by Eeeves in Ain. Hist. Bev., July, 1906, 841). Perhaps, without
realizing it, Bancroft was inspired by Pillow and Lauglilin to suggest
Polk 's nomination.
■J^i Cave Johnson told Polk that John Kettlewell, of Baltimore, was
"the man who first started your name in the Baltimore Convention"
(Johnson to Polk, Jan. 11, 1845, Polk Papers).
72 In his letter of the ■29th to Polk Pillow said 42 votes, but the Balti-
more Sun reported the vote as follows: Van Buren, 104; Cass, 114; Polk,
44; Buchanan, 2; and Calhoun, 2. Polk received 6 from N. H., 7 from
Mass., 2 from Pa., 1 from Md., 9 from Ala., 6 from La., and the 13 votes
of Tennessee.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 239
result liad been announced, Frazer, of Pennsylvania, stated that
he had at first voted for Van Buren because he had been instructed
to do so, and then for Buchanan as the favorite son of his state ;
but seeing that neither could be nominated, he had cast his vote
for "James K. Polk, the bosom friend of Gen. Jackson, and a
pure, whole-hogged democrat, the known enemy of banks and
distribution." His remarks were greeted with applause and
several warm friends of Van Buren now announced that for
similar reasons they were ready to unite upon Polk. Governor
Hubbard, of New Hampshire, and General Howard, of Mary-
land, pleaded for Polk and harmony, and Medary pledged the
vote of Ohio." Roane took the Virginia delegation out for con-
sultation and returned to announce that its vote would be trans-
ferred from Cass to Polk.'-' The ninth ballot had not proceeded ,
far before it became evident that it would be the last. The Polk /
list became so large that Butler withdrew the name of Van
Buren, and many who had supported other favorites now trans-
ferred their votes to the Tennessean. In this way his vote was
made unanimous, and although South Carolina was not repre-
sented officially, Elmore and Pickens were present and pledged
the support of their state to the new candidate. Silas Wright,
of New York, a warm friend of Van Buren, was nominated for
Vice-President; he declined the honor, and George M. Dallas
was chosen in his stead." A series of resolutions was adopted,
one of which declared in favor of ' ' the re-occupation of Oregon
and the re-annexation of Texas at the earliest practicable period."
The committee on resolutions had considered the "one term"
pledge which had been referred to it by the convention, but
reported against such a restriction on the ground that it would
"3 Speaking of Bancroft's influence, Lauglilin told Polk that "he and
old Morton ' ' were mainlv responsible for wheeling the ' ' Yankee States ' '
into line (Laughlin to Polk, May 31, 1844, Polk Papers).
T4 Bancroft to Polk (Howe, op. cit., I, 254).
75 The above details, unless otherwise noted, have been taken from the
report of the convention published in the Baltimore Sun, May 28-30, and
Niles' Eegister, June 1, 1844.
240 JAMES K. POLK
be inconsistent to take such action after so many had been
instructed to support Van Buren for a second term.
When notifying Polk of his nomination, Pillow'" was inclined
to take all the credit for bringing it about. To be sure, he very
modestly said that "I had good help in some true-men in the
North," but that he "got no help" from "our home people."
On the other hand, Bancroft has made it clear that Donelson took
a leading part in procuring votes for Polk, and it is unlikely
that two such veteran politicians as Laughlin and Cave Johnson
were entirely inactive. It appears that the knowledge of Jack-
son's preference for Polk was by no means confined to Tennes-
seans,'^ and it would be interesting to know in what degree this
fact had a bearing on the ultimate choice of the convention.
From the above account it will be seen that Polk's nomination
resulted from a combination of influences originally distinct.
Seeing no hope of their own election, both Tyler and Calhoun
were ready, for two reasons, to lend their support to the new
candidate. In the first place, he believed as they did on the
Texas question ; in the second, so long as the office was beyond
their own reach, they would rather see it go to a new man than
to one of the competitors w^ho had so roundly abused them. In
the long run the Van Burenites were, for similar reasons, con-
strained to acquiesce in Polk's nomination and to contribute
their support to his campaign. The Calhoun faction and the
insurgent element led by R. J. Walker were enemies in other
respects, but they agreed on annexation and therefore combined
successfully to prevent the nomination of Van Buren. There is
plenty of evidence that the Van Burenites had no love for Polk,
T6 His letter bore the date May 30, but obviously it "vvas written on the
29th (Am. Hist. Bev., July, 1906, 842).
77 J. B. Jones, writing from Baltimore to liis paper, the Madisonian,
May 29, said: "It is true I hear it whispered about the streets, that the
nomination of Mr. Polk was agreed upon at the Hermitage, Mr. B. F.
Butler, in behalf of Mr. Van Buren and the Globe, concurring" (Madi-
sonian, May 30, 1844).
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 241
yet their feeling toward him \vas indifference rather than hos-
tility. Though they were not strong enough to nominate their
favorite, they could at least veto the nomination of an objec-
tionable rival like Cass, and, within certain limits, could deter-
mine the choice of the candidate. To Polk they had no specific
objection ; consequently, if all factions would agree to accept him,
his nomination would be less objectionable than that of Cass
or Buchanan. Therefore they made a virtue of necessity and
reluctantly transferred from Van Buren to Polk. They claimed
afterwards that they had been responsible for Polk's nomination,
and this was true in the sense that they could have prevented it ;
still, under the circumstances, Polk had small reason to feel under
obligation to men who, after all, had acquiesced in his nomination
merely as a choice of evils.
Even before the appearance of his anti-Texas letter. Van
Bureau had little real popularity outside of a small circle of
friends. After its publication, his defeat at the polls being
inevitable, his nomination would have meant party suicide. This
fact should have been obvious to his most ardent supporters, and
yet they chose to regard his defeat at Baltimore as the result of
a series of political intrigues. They did not, of course, have all
the information which is now accessible, consequently the motives
of many of their contemporaries were misjudged. Benton's
version of Van Buren 's downfall has already been noted; still
more elaborate and equally erroneous is the version of Gideon
Welles.
In a history of the contest which he prepared but never pub-
lished,^* Welles, like Benton, attributed the shelving of Van
Buren to a many-sided intrigue in which Calhoun, originally,
was the chief actor."'-* In a "last desperate struggle for the
78 MS article, "A Eeview of the Political History of the United States
and Presidential Contests" (Welles Papers, Library of Congress).
79 "If Mr. Calhoun was insatiable in his ambition, he was also fertile
in his schemes to promote it. They were often visionary and startling,
so much so as to forfeit rather than beget general confidence, yet to those
242 JAMES K. POLE
presidency" he brought forward tlie Texas question, and, when
he entered Tyler's cabinet, he believed that the President would
assist him. His main object, up to this time, according to Welles,
was to make Van Buren's nomination impossible. But Tyler
appropriated the Texas question and resolved to stand for reelec-
tion ; and while many Democrats were ready to espouse annexa-
tion, they would not rally to the standard of Calhoun. In other
words, he had succeeded in weakening Van Buren, but had failed
in the attempt to attract support for himself. Robert J. Walker,
said Welles, was interested in the annexation of Texas because it
offered an opportunity for land-scrip speculation. Working
through Mason, Tyler's Secretary of the Navy, Walker had con-
vinced the Richmond politicians that the surest means of defeat-
ing the aspirations of Calhoun was the nomination of some other
pro-Texas Democrat. The preference of the Virginians, said
Welles, was Levi Woodbury, but on arriving at Baltimore they
found that New England would not support him.
Up to this point, with some modification as to Walker's
motives, Welles 's account is apparently accurate, but his state-
ments, concerning the promotion of Polk 's interests are erroneous
in detail and give an unfair impression of the attitude of the
Tennessee politicians.
Although Calhoun had announced before the meeting of the
convention that he would not permit his name to be presented,
Welles believed that he still had hopes of being nominated and
that they had been blasted by the nomination of Polk. After
asserting that Polk was "brought forward" by the friends of
Van Buren who, under the circumstances, would not support any
of the other competitors, Welles then proceeds to tell how the
Tennesseans under the leadership of Cave Johnson and Gideon
with whom he was intini<ate, or who were within the circle of his influence,
there was a charm in his plans that was to the adventurous inviting.
There were always some one or more prominent ]>oints in his intrigues
that enlisted ardent supporters, and on these points he concentrated the
energies of an intellect of unusual power, and pursued his object with an
intensity that had no limits."
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 2-13
Pillow had, for some time before the meeting of the convention,
been playing a "deep and subtle game" to procure Polk's nom-
ination. They "concealed their purpose from Genl Jackson who
would give no countenance to the movement "[!] ; they "fast-
ened themselves on Wright and Benton as friends and partisans
of Van Buren, which they were except in the contingency of
securing Polk's nomination," betrayed their confidence and
secretly intrigued against Van Buren.^°
Many of the items in Welles 's statement may be true enough,
but in one of the main clauses the terms are inverted. He con-
tends that the Tennesseans were ready to support Van Buren
xmless they could nominate Polk ; whereas, they desired to nom-
inate Polk because Van Buren 's nomination, or his election at
any rate, was no longer possible. Their efforts in Polk's behalf
were made not only with Jackson's knowledge, but at his instiga-
tion. Under the circumstances, neither he nor they considered
these efforts to be a betrayal of Van Buren. Surely Jackson had
made it clear to both Van Buren and Butler, as well as to Benton,
that he favored the nomination of some pro-Texas candidate. So
successful, however, were the Tennessee delegates in their decep-
tion, according to Welles, that the friends of Van Buren "had
no conception of the duplicity in that quarter" until all was
over, and then they were forced to support the party nominee.
The "reserve" of Wright and the "indignant resentment" of
Benton were caused by the discovery of this "treachery." The
New York Democrats worked loyally for the ticket, and "few
knew what doubt & repugnance their strongest men entertained
for the candidate " [ !]
The New Yorkers were chagrined by the defeat of their
favorite, and not knowing all the facts, it was natural for them
to suspect the motives of those who had profited by their defeat.
80 Welles admits that for Iavo years the Tennesseans had been loyal^ to
Van Buren while others were intriguing against him. He states that New
Yorkers desired to associate Polk on the ticket with the ex-President,
instead of R. M. Johnson. This is extremely improbable.
244 JAMES E. POLK
It was rumored at Baltimore that Polk's nomination had been
agreed upon at the Hermitage, and "Whig papers made assertions
to this effect." In stating to Polk his reasons for declining the.
Vice-Presidential nomination, Wright said that the people of
New York believed that there had been intrigue against "\"an
Buren in the convention and tliat votes for Polk could be pro-
cured in the state only by asserting that the candidate had had
nothing to do with the intrigue.*^- Doubtless Wright shared the
belief of his associates ; but even if all of the charges against the
insurgent element had been true, Van Buren "s rejection had been
brought about not so much by intrigue as by the application of
the Democratic doctrine of majority rule. To be sure, he received
the votes of a majority of the convention, but the delegates had
been selected before his views on Texas had become known ; and
although there is no means of ascertaining with certainty the
desire of Democratic voters as a whole, there is ample reason for
believing that a large majority of them did not prefer Van Buren
after the publication of his anti-Texas letter. From the first,
Calhoun Democrats had been openly hostile, and those led by
Walker, whom Welles had called the "chief engine" of the con-
vention, made no attempt to conceal their unalterable opposition
to Van Buren. It is not easy to see why their efforts to defeat his
nomination should be termed an intrigue any more than the efforts
of his supporters to procure it. Even "Old Hickory" did not
hesitate to say that no anti-Texas man could possibly win, and
surely he could not be accused of plotting against his old friend
and protege. Naturally Polk's immediate friends did not confide
SI "There is one circumstance, and only one," said the Nashville Union
(June 11, 1844) in denying these charges, "which could impress any
honest mind with the belief that General Jackson controlled the nomi-
nation— that circumstance is this: the work is so iveJl done, that to an honest
mind, it looks reasoncihle that, it might have been done by old Hickory ! "
82 Wright to Polk, June 2, 1844, Polk Papers. It has been said, con-
tinued Wright, that Van Buren was set aside because of his anti-Texas
letter. Better leave it so. Had he (Wright), who held the same views,
accepted the nomination on an annexation ticket, the people would have
concluded that Van Buren had been dropped for some other reason.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 2-45
their secret hopes to Wright or to Benton, and the realization of
these hopes was contingent on the defeat of Van Buren's nom-
ination ; l)ut if this amounted to deception, it should be remem-
bered that the ex-President's doom was sealed by the vote of 148
to lis in favor of the two-thirds rule, and even if the Tennessee
delegates had joined with the minority, such action would not
have altered the result. Van Buren had always been indifferent
when Polk stood in need of assistance, consequently there was no
valid reason why the Tennesseans should continue to follow the
ex-President in his pursuit of a forlorn hope. On the first seven
ballots they voted for Cass, after which they transferred to Polk.
Irrespective of intrigues in his behalf, the selection of Polk
as the compromise candidate was quite natural, if not inevitable.
Apparently, a majority at least had come to Baltimore prepared
to support him for the second place. He was the only aspirant
who was not also a candidate for the Presidency, and for that
reason, objectionable to the different factions. The Van Burenites
would not support any of their hero's rivals, with the possible
exception of Colonel Johnson ; and the other factions would never
consent to make Johnson the Presidential candidate. Some new
man must be selected ; and of these, who had a better claim than
Polk's? As a member of Congress he had done valiant party
service, and had proved himself to be a man of ability and discre-
tion. The statements made by Welles'*^ that he ''was destitute of
personal popularity" and especially that he had "no qualities to
recommend him" are gross exaggerations. Welles himself had
expressed a different opinion in 1844.*^ Even Horace Greely,
although he spoke disparagingly of Polk during the campaign,
had, in 1839, called him "one of the ablest men and most powerful
83 Welles, loc. cit.
84 In a letter written to Van Buren, Nov. 1.3, 1844, he askc.l whether
Polk would have sufficient energry and discernment to make the a.lnnnis-
tration his own, and added that "my own belief is, that he will prove
himself worthv of being: the choice of the democracy, after it could not
have its first choice" (Fan Buren Papers).
246 JAMES E. POLK
speakers in the south west. ' '^^ General Jackson aptly summarized
Polk's qualifications for office when he wrote that
his capacitv for business [is] great — -and to extraordinary i^owers of labor,
both mental and physical, he unites that tact and judgment which are
requisite to the successful direction of such an office as that of Chief
Magistrate of a free people.so
Joseph Storey was "thunderstruck" by the selection made at
Baltimore ; Governor Letcher exclaimed ' ' Polk ! Great God, what
a nomination ! ' ' ;^'^ and the Whig journals predicted an easy vic-
tory. But the Democrats, in the public press and in private cor-
respondence, gave abundant evidence of both satisfaction and
relief because a party crisis had been averted. Of course, due
allowance must be made for partisan zeal, and for a self-seeking
desire to stand well with the nominee. No doubt many professed
a friendship which they did not feel, and, in the hope of reward,
claimed to have been influential in procuring the nomination.**'*
Still, he was scarcely less popular than any of the other aspirants,
and as the campaign proceeded it came to be recognized generally
that the convention had chosen the leader who would be most
likely to win.
The Spectator, which was supposed to voice the sentiments
of Calhoun, while expressing surprise that Polk had been selected,
nevertheless approved the choice which had been made.'^** Its
so Biographical A)imial, 1841, p. 52. When quoting this the Washington
Globe, July 12, 1844, called attention to the fact that Clay lived in the
southwest.
86 Letter dated June 24. Quoted by Nashville Union, Aug. 13, 1844.
87 Story to McLean, Aug. 16, 1844, McLean Papers. Letcher to Bu-
chanan, July 7, 1844, Buchanan Papers.
88 "If you were here," wrote Pillow, "3'ou would imagine yourself
the most popular man in the world, and you would be sure you nercr had
an enemy in the convention. You cannot know how much pains they take
to give in to me their adhesion to j^ou, and to impress me with the great
merit of their conduct." "Never," said Benton, "was such a multitude
seen claiming the merit of Polk's nomination, and demanding the reward,
for having done what had been done before they heard of it" (Pillow to
Polk, May 30 (29?), 1844, Polk Papers; Bcntoii. Tliirti/ Years' Fiew, II,
594).
80 Spectator, May 29, 1844.
SELECTION OF CANDIDATES, 1844 247
editor, John Heart, announced liis intention to publish a weekly
journal, to he called "Young Hickory" in honor of Polk. Tyler
was nominated by a convention of his own, but his letter of
acceptance intimated that he might cease to be a candidate if
Texas should be annexed by treaty or otherwise."" Polk entered
the canvass, therefore, supported by an apparently united Democ-
racy, and with some prospect of eventual assistance from those
who had recently unfurled to the breeze the banner of "Tyler
and Texas."
9oA'af. InteJh, May 31, 1844. Several years later he hinted that his
main object had been to force the Democrats to stand firmly for Texas
(Tyler to Wise, Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 317).
CHAPTER XIII
CAMPAIGN OF 1844
"Who is James K. Polk?" Such was the derisive query
raised by the Whigs as soon as the result of the Democratic con-
vention had been announced.^ It was an effective campaign cry.
More than argument could have done it attached to Polk the
stigma of mediocrity and obscurity, and, to some extent at least,
it appears to have influenced the opinion of later generations.
But as it turned out this very cry recoiled as a boomerang upon
those who hurled it, for this "obscure" person was soon to be
known as the vanquisher of their own renowned "Prince Hal."
Justly or unjustly, both in 1844 and since that time, Clay has
enjoyed the reputation of being a great man. On the other
hand, Polk's opponents have rated him as a man possessed of
scarcely second-class ability — a man whom accident alone had
placed in an exalted position. Even his friends have usually
been rather apologetic — not insisting that he was really a great
man, but that he was more able than he has been represented to
be by his adversaries.
The Whigs entered the campaign full of confidence in tlieir
standard bearer and delighted that the Democratic party had
made the "blunder" of passing over a man of ability like Van
Buren, and had as the National Intelligencer put it, ''let itself
down" to Polk. The Demcrats, on the contrary, while they rallied
loyally to the ticket, were manifestly full of misgivings because
one of the prominent men of the party had not been selected to
1 Writing from Columbia, S. C, to Crittenden, Wm. C. Preston said:
"The democrats here cry hurra for Polk in the street and come round to
ask me who the devil he is" (undated letter in the Crittenden Papers,
vol. 9).
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 2-19
enter the contest with Clay. Some of the newspapers, while ad-
mitting that Polk was not of the first rank, argued that great
men and democracy were incompatible.
And yet, what is a great man, and by what standard is he
measured? In his long career in the political field. Clay had
been an opportunist, and, to a considerable degree, an adventurer.
He had mounted one hobby after another in the hope of political
advancement. There was little consistency in his record, for the
panacea which he advocated on any particular occasion might
differ radically in principle from the one offered only a year or
two before. Many of the policies championed by Clay were vision-
ary and impracticable, and few of them would now be considered
sound. Furthermore, if greatness is to be rated by success.
Clay's claim to it was not very well founded; for although he
frequently succeeded in upsetting the plans of others, he was
seldom successful in inaugurating his own most cherished policies.
His greatest strength lay in his power of persuasion, and his
greatest achievements were in compromising the divergent views
of others and in procuring the adoption of measures after the
compromise had been agreed upon.
Polk early adopted the fundamentals of the Jeffersonian
creed. A conservative by nature, he was wary of experiments
and shaped his course in accordance with the principles of the
party which had been founded by his patron. His record, there-
fore, was consistent, and he could seldom be accused of trimming
his sails to catch the varying winds of popular opinion. He was
not a creator of issues, but his judgment on those which were
presented was far sounder, as a rule, than that of his great
opponent. With no pretense to oratory, he was an effective and
convincing debater, while, his thorough knowledge on public
questions was conceded even by his foes. When he was nominated
for the Presidency, he could point to a career of almost uniform
successes, and as President few have had a more definite program
to carry out or have succeeded so well in accomplishing their
250 JAMES E. POLE
purposes. But in spite of all this Clay was conceded a place in
the first rank of statesmen, while many, even of Polk's supporters,
did not claim for their candidate more than second-rate ability.
The Democratic Review,'^ although it denounced the methods by
which Clay had achieved his fame, did not deny that in the
popular mind Clay was rated higher than Polk, so it made the
best of the situation by saying that ' ' our opponents are welcome
to all their pride in their chief as a 'great man' — we are content
with ours as a good one, and great enough for all practical
purposes. ' '
At the time that the two men were nominated, it was natural
enough that Clay should be heralded as the superior of his rival.
It was a period that was dominated by great personalities, and
spectacular qualities were regarded as essential attributes of
greatness. The influence wielded by Clay, "Webster, and Calhoun,
resulted more from the eloquence of their delivery than from the
soundness of their arguments. Even the tempestuous and gen-
erally illogical conduct of President Jackson was easily mistaken
for statesmanship.
Polk was not possessed of spectacular qualities, and he never
tried to cultivate them. He was by nature secretive, even sly,^
and the degree of his influence in shaping public policies was
known only to his intimate friends. In all of those qualities
which are thought to make men illustrious, Polk suffered by com-
parison with his rival ; but, as the Review pointed out, a Demo-
cratic candidate might succeed without possessing them, however
essential they might be for the Whig.
In no other campaign has Democracy and Whiggery so
definitely contested for victory ; in no other campaign have the
2 Article on "First and Second Eate Men," August, 1844.
3 For example, he made a practice of sending his Nashville correspond-
ence under an extra, cover, addressed to General Armstrong, so that his
opponents, through the Whig postmaster, might not learn its final desti-
nation.
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 251
candidates so clearly represented the principles and policies of
their respective parties.*
Polk was the first "dark horse" ever nominated for President
hy a political party, but while his name had not been previously
associated with that office, it is not true that he was unknown or
that his nomination was entirely accidental. The Baltimore con-
vention did not simply make a grab in the dark, with the hope
that either Providence or Fate would save the party from disaster.
The man who, as chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means,
had borne tlie brunt of the war against the Bank was unknown
to neither party ; a Speaker who was so thoroughly hated that his
opponents had wished to deny him the customary vote of thanks
could not have been so soon forgotten— least of all by the Whigs.
He had never filled any of the great executive offices, but he had
been intrusted by his party, during a most critical period, with
the two most responsible positions in the lower house of Congress.
No faction of his party doubted his ability, but like John Quincy
Adams, his personal following was small. For personal reasons,
many in the party may have preferred another candidate, but, if
a certain newspaper story is to be credited, Clay, at least,
recognized that the wisest choice had been made.^
4 "The two candidates indeed, with a felicity of adaptation and eorre-
spondence, which is no mere accident, may be said in a remarkable manner
to represent, respectively, the spirit and character of the two great parties
by whom they have been chosen. . . . Mr. Clay is truly the living embodi-
ment and incarnation of his party. Eloquent, showy, versatile, adroit^
imperious, ... the first Whig in America. A second-rate man in point ot
eloquence, intellectual force, and eminence of rank, would never hav^e
answered— could never have been adopted— as the head of such a party.
We concede them this credit. They are naturally fond of splendor and
strength— large and sweeping action— bold and brilliant energy and enter-
prise Such is precisely the character their instinct has ever tended and
striven to impress upon the government." Thus abbreviated, this char-
acterization of Clay and his party is by no means an inaccurate descrip-
tion, and it is quite as true that Polk would "have been perfectly satisfactory
to us for the presidency, even if he possessed in a far less degree than he
has alreadv amply proved, the further addition of the latter qualification
[intellectual eminence], for the high office to which he is about to be
called" {Bern. Eev., August, 1844).
5 "When the news of the democratic nomination reached Ashland,
voung Clav, who was impatiently waiting its announcement at the office.
252 JAMES E. POLK
Apparently the Democrats of all sections received the news
of the nominations with genuine satisfaction — only in the Van
Buren camp Avere there signs of resentment and reluctant sup-
port. They had not looked with favor on Polk's claim to the
Vice-Presidency, and now he had beaten their patron in the race
for first place. One of Catron's letters throws some interesting
light on the attitude of political leaders toward Polk. It indi-
cates also that, aside from the Texas question, Polk liad profited
by a desire on the part of the younger Democrats to get rid of
the older leaders, by whom they had "been treated as boys."
Together with others to be cited presently, this letter seems to
make it plain that Polk's desire for a new party organ did not
result from any bargain with Calhoun, but from a real distrust
of tlie Globe, which of course was the organ of Van Buren.''
Polk's nomination was a victory for the annexationists, and
it was also a victory for the younger element of the party. All
factions were in duty bound to support the ticket, but it was
evident from the first that "old fogies" must give way to those
hastened with the news to his father, who remained at home. 'Well, my
son, who is nominated?' * Guess, father. ' ' Why Matty, of course. ' 'No,
father; guess again.' 'Cass?' 'No.' 'Buchanan?' 'No.' 'Then who.
the devil have they nominated?' 'James K. Polk,' said the son. The
old man started from his seat, and rushing across the room, with disap-
pointed hopes painted on his countenance, exclaimed, 'Beat again, by
G-d' " (N. Y. Plebeian, copied in tlie Washington Globe, Oct. 29, 1844).
6 "Mr. Van B.," said Catron, "was out of luck — we again hav* it.
Had the Dem. Con. met a month sooner, we w'd have been ruined in the
west & South for ten years. Clay is out fully — many of the undermen
are out, on annexation — and we have the strength added of a rejection
of our V. P. on the precise ground, drawing in all the Calhoun strength —
a vast, & controlling power, in the South. Among the leaders, you have
many jealousies to quiet; they feared to see you on any ticket as vice, for
fearyou would set up for chief, after the first success. My position has
let me into the deepest recesses of these things. I traversed the city night
after night, last winter, encountering and pledging myself to the contrary
of this opinion: But, sir, I made no converts, as I then believed. Bu-
chanan was for Johnson — Benton for King; the Van B. men for either,
sooner than yourself" [Both Calhoun and Tyler friendly to Polk]. "The
coarse brutality of the Globe, was loathed last ^^'inter, by a large majority
of our party." . . . "Your strength lies mainly as I think in this; you
are of the present generation — the old leaders are thrown off; to do this
has been an ardent wish bv nineteen in twenty of our party in the House
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 253
Avlio were abreast of the times. Old in years, but young in spirit,
Jackson gave his enthusiastic support to both platform and candi-
dates;' nevertheless, even his wishes went unheeded in cases
where he desired to restore any of the ' ' old guard ' ' to power.
Within a few days after Polk's nomination, his Tennessee
friends in Washington began to formulate plans, not. only for
the campaign, but for his course as President of the United States.
The most active — not to say presumptuous — of all was A. V.
Brown, who did not hesitate to draft a list of instructions for the
guidance of the candidate. First of all Polk was told that he
must, in his letter of acceptance, commit himself to a one-term
policy.^ The Democratic platform had said nothing on this
point, but it was evidently thought necessary to checkmate the
Whigs, whose platform had limited their candidate to a single
term. Besides, as Brown seems very clearly to intimate, other
"deserving Democrats"" with high aspirations might be expected
to support the campaign with more enthusiasm if they could be
assured that the way would be open for them at the end of four
E. for two sessions — but they would not do it, as they believed — not as I
believed. They are now gone" (Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844], Polk
Papers).
"! "Although I regret losing Mr. V. B. and the cause, yet I rejoice that
the Convention have made choice of those worthy Democrats, Polk and
Dallas. They are the strongest and best selection that could have been
made" (Jackson to Gen. Planche, June 14, 1844, Polk Papers. Same to
W. G. Beeves et al., June 5, 1844, Wash. Glohe, June 28, 1844). Polk
doubted that the Planche (often spelled Plauche) letter was intended for
publication, and thought it imprudent in Planche to publish it. He feared
the cry of "dictation" (Polk to Donelson, July 11, 1844, "Polk-Donelson
Letters").
8 "In your acceptance you must some way or other express yourself in
favor of the one term system. This is important — 1 might say all im-
portant— you will know exactly liotc it will be highly useful. The thing is
right per so & under all the circumstances I think you ought not to hesitate
to do it" (Brown to Polk, May 30, 1844, Polk Papers).
'■) Laughlin, although not without some doubt as to the wisdom of such
a declaration, thought that "perhaps all in all it may be best — and will
be making assurance doubly sure, and put us on an equality with the
"Whigs on that question" (Laughlin to Polk, May 31, 1844, Polk Papers).
254 JAMES K. POLK
years. Although Brown's suggestion may have been entirely
superfluous, the one-term pledge found a place in Polk's letter of
acceptance.^''
The next instruction was for Polk to prepare data on his life
and career for Brown to turn over to Bancroft, Kendall, or some
other person who would incorporate it into a biography." An-
other thing to be considered, said Brown, was whether the Globe
was to be continued as ' ' the Polk organ ' ' ; and while he was not
yet certain that it should not be so continued, it is apparent that
the discarding of that paper was already being discussed. ^-
Cave Johnson, as well as Brown and Catron, distrusted the
Glohe,^^ but he by no means believed in courting the favor of or
permitting the domination by the southern wdng of the party.
On June 1 he wrote to Polk that the party was more united than
at any time since the election of Jackson, but he pointed out that
danger might result from the fact that the South had been zealous
in procuring Polk's nomination. The Glohc, he said, is noncom-
mittal, and is already expressing doubts of Democratic success —
a new paper of unquestioned loyalty is very much needed. Two
weeks later he wrote that matters are growing worse and must
soon come to a head. "The struggle now is by a few Southern
men to appropriate you & the nomination to their exclusive bene-
fit whilst the northern Democrats are determined to yield no such
10 In 1835 Polk had, on the floor of the House, advocated a single term
for all Presidents (Cong. Globe, 23 Cong., 2 sess., part 2, 292).
11 Brown had asked Laughlin to write the biography and it was he in
turn who had suggested Bancroft (Laughlin to Polk, May 31, 1844, Polk
Papers).
12 "Much is said here by some as to continuing the Globe as the Polk
organ — this we will manage with souml discretion. The Globe will change
its tone & perhaps take back much that it has said & go in warynJy if not
heartily — if so — well. But we will not commit ourselves to it after the
election.' '
13 "Benton & the Globe falls in but not with so good a grace as we
expected" (Johnson to I'olk, May 31, 1844, Poll- Papers). lie referred
to an editorial of the 29th in which Blair had said that the nomination of
Polk would at first be received with disappointment by those who had
stood for favorites, but that a little reflection would convince all that it
was for the best.
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 255
thing. ' ' Johnson had caHed a caucus in the hope of compromising
differences, but the northern men became alarmed for fear the
Calhoun members woukl get control ; and Johnson decided that
the best thing he could do was to prevent anyihing from being
done.
I have been to see S. W. Jr. [Silas Wright] hoping to have it controled
in some way & ended— he is furious and I think determined to push
C[alhoun] and his clique to the wall or finish— in this battle. The object
of both will be to make us take sides— the Northern know, that you have
always been with them, whilst the South think that the question & the posi-
tion of G<'nl J[ackson] ynW take you with them — how both are to be kept
I cannot see — already we have much secret talk of upsetting the Globe —
turning Benton overboard &c. I was disgusted to day, even Eeuben Whit-
ney talked of turning Benton out of the Democratic church. I am sick of
this state of things & see no means of avoiding the explosion & most anxious
to leave here.i*
Johnson's fears increased rather than abated, for a few days
later he expressed a belief that the combined obstinacy of Benton
and the South Carolinians would lead to a southern movement
that might imperil not only the Democratic party but the Union
itself.^^ It seems very evident that Johnson had entered into no
11 Johnson to Polk, June 13, 1844, Polk Papers.
15 He has seen, he said, many prominent Democrats and all are pleased
with the nominations, but "the only difficulty I fear arises from the course
of T. H. Benton, when connected with the movements of S. C. The latter
uses immediate annexation for the purpose of uniting the South and killing
T. H. B. & will if practicable identify you & Genl J. with all their future
movements— fears are entertained in the North, that this may be so—&
if any incident takes place to confirm the suspicion, our cause is jeoparded.
I have given everv assurance to S. W. Jr. & a few others that you could
not be induced to separate yourself from the Northern Democracy— in-
stanced vour former course, in the case of White &c &c and also thought
it impossible that Genl J. should lend himself to any such purpose. The
only danger of the latter taking any step to favor the Southern movement
they think will arise, from some letter from him, that will seem to favor
the" movement without sufficiently weighing the consequences.
"Can not you see him & have a free conversation as to the Southern
movement & put him on his guard?" Johnson fears that there will be a
southern convention called to meet at Nashville, an<l advises that this
should be forestalled bv an earlier meeting to which Wright and other
northern men should be invited. "I have the most serious apprehensions
from the Southern movement not only to our cause but the country.
Mason & Dickson's line now divides the Methodist church & will soon
256 JAMES K. FOLK
agreement with southern delegates to procure Polk *s nomination,
and it is equally clear that he had no desire to see the party
brought under southern domination. He desired harmony, to
be sure, and support from all factions, but harmony that would
leave Polk indebted to neither section — free and unhampered in
shaping his own course. Polk's replies show that he fully agreed
with the views expressed by Johnson. He promptly warned
General Jackson and took other steps to forestall a sectional con-
vention; "no countenance must be given to an}" attempt should
it be made. "^"^ A few days later he asked Donelson to prepare an
article on this subject for the Nashville Union. "The idea,"
said he, "of a Southern convention or a sectional meeting at Nash-
ville or elsewhere must not for a moment he entertained." He
did not believe it to be necessary to allude specifically to disunion
sentiments in South Carolina, but
Let the article strongly enforce the leading idea, that a meeting of the
masses from all sections of the Union is what is intended, and let every
thing giving it the appearance of a sectional or Sonthern affair be expressly
negatived. This would have the effect of allaying the fears of the North,
by satisfying them that we in Tennessee gave no countenance to the sugges-
tion for a Southern Convention upon the Texas or any other subject. i7
While Johnson was warning Polk against the southern wing
of the party, Catron was exhorting him not to listen to those
who insisted that the salvation of Democracy depended upon the
restoration to office of the old guard that had been ousted by
Harrison, "cabinet & all," leaving no place for the rank and
file whose money and talents would be responsible for the victory.
"You who fought in the very van," said Catron,
divide the other churches. This movement will tend to divide political
parties by it. The Texas question brings into the contest the fanaticism
of the North with increased fervor. Our only safety for the country &
our cause depends upon the Southern Democracy maintaining the position
we have hitherto occupied — firm & consistent friends of the Northern
Democracy — yielding much for conciliation & harmony" (Johnson to Polk,
Louisville, June 21, 1844, Polk Papers).
10 Polk to Johnson, June 21 [?], 1844, July 1, 1844, "Polk-Johnson
Letters," Tenn. Hist. Mag., Sept., 1915, 245-246).
IT Polk to Donelson, June 26, 1844, "Polk-Donelson Letters."
CAMPAIGN OF 1S44 257
and wlio tlio wortliy old geiitlotiioii thoufjflit last Avintcr, had died in the
ditch, have been brought out alive, not by their consent, nor help, but [by]
those who look to chances for themselves. "Treason & Traitor," "rotten
to the core, ' ' — liave been the gentle epithets that have greeted every move
tending to -wrench the power, as a party, from the old clique. Mr. Van
Buren thought this public opinion, if Col. Bentou let him think at all,
which I doubt. i'^
Like Johnson, Catron warned Polk against unnecessarily express-
ing his views, and, as he had "a soul to be saved, '^ he should
avoid answering letters of the Sheri-od Williams type.^"
Benton had M-ritten a letter in which he had exonerated Polk
and Dallas from any part in the "intrigue Avhich had nullified
the choice of the people,"-*^ but on June 13 he openly accused
A. Y. Brown of having "vicariously" procured from Jackson
the letter in favor of annexing Texas. -^ While General Jackson
Avas charitable enough to attribute Benton's outbursts to insanity,
caused by the Princeton disaster,-- others knew that he was simply
expressing what Van Burenites generally were thinking; and,
although the appearance of harmony prevailed during the cam-
paign, mutual distrust was manifest in private correspondence,-'^
and a break was almost inevitable as soon as the election had
been held.
In general, the Democratic press of all sections and factions
rallied to the support of the candidates without reservation or
18 Catron to Polk, June 10, [1844], Po]k Papers.
19 In 1836 Williams had catechised Van Buren, Harrison, and White
as to their opinions on certain campaign isues. See Shepard, Martin Van
Buren, 264.
20 Dated June .'5. Nat. InteJL, July 1, 1844; Benton, Thirty Years' View,
II, 595.
21 "A card," printed in the Wash. Globe, June 13, 1844.
22 "Gen. Jackson was a good deal excited at Benton's course — said
'he shall hear from me soon'; and asserts that ever since the explosion of
the big gun Benton has not been in his right mind. I think so too" (J.
Geo. Harris to Bancroft, June 25, 1844, Polk Papers).
23 For example, Sacfield Maclin, of Tennessee, wrote from Little Eock,
Arkansas, to Polk, on June 14, that "Colo Benton and the Globe for the
last eighteen months have done our party more damage than all the Whig
papers in the Union. I have no doubt, and our friemls here believe with
me, that if Colo Benton thought he could hold his place in the affections
of the Democratic party, and go against you, he would do so with all his
energy" (Polk Papers).
258 JAMES E. POLK
qualification. ^Most enthusiastic and influential of all, perhaps,
was the Richmond Euquirer,-* but Calhoun's Washington organ
was hardly less effusive in its praise.-^
Cass bore his defeat with better grace than any of the
other aspirants. At a ratification meeting held in Detroit he
commended the action of the Baltimore convention and promised
his support. He spoke of Polk as a man who would follow in
the footsteps of Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Jackson, a
statement which caused the Charleston Courier to remark that
Polk, in order to do this, would have to "walk all sorts of
ways."-*^ He took an active part in the campaign-' and spent his
energies freely in preaching the Texas gospel in a northern
latitude.
Polk's letter accepting the nomination bore the date of June
12, 1844. In it the most significant phrase, aside from approval
of the Baltimore platform, was that
I deem the present to be a proper occasion to declare, that if the nomination
made by the convention shall be confirmed by the people, I shall enter upon
the discharge of the high and solemn duties of the office with the settled
purpose of not being a candidate for reelection.
This self-denying declaration resulted evidently, as we have
noted, from an effort to checkmate the Whigs and a desire to
24 "Mr. Polk's nomination has been received at Baltimore, at Wash-
ington, and at Richmond, with enthusiasm. It heals all divisions, unites
our party with bands of iron. It thwarts every hope the Whigs had in-
dulged of discord and divisions. It blasts the election of Mr. Clay, and
saves our country from the sceptre of the dictator. Mr. Polk is true to all
our rejiublican principles, and he is the friend of Texas." Quoted by
Nashville Union, June 11, 1844.
25 ' ' The great mass of the people wantd a man pure in morals, sound
in political principles, and in favor of the immediate annexation of Texas,
and such they have in James K. Polk. He is a consistent and sound poli-
tician, of the Jeffersonian Democratic school; talented, firm and discreet"
(Washington Spectator, May 29, 1844).
2« Quoted in Nat. Intel]., June 24, 1844.
2T Geo. N. Sanders to Polk, July 12; Austin E. Wing to Polk, Aug. 2,
1844, Folic Papers.
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 259
harmonize factional discords in Democratic ranks. "I said noth-
ing to commit the party upon the one term principle," he told
Cave Johnson, ' ' but expressed simply my own determination. ' '-^
The pro-Texas Democrats may be said to have included three
fairly well defined groups. The first was made up of the fol-
lowers of Calhoun whose interest centered mainly in promoting
his advancement. The second comprised those who were not
friends of Calhoun, but who were interested primarily in wresting
the control of the party from the hands of the older leaders.
They saw in the Texas question a possible means of accomplish-
ing this purpose; and, in addition, annexation would enlist
southern sympathies and place the party reins in southern hands.
Some of them were accused, and perhaps not unjustly, of being
influenced by prospective profits from Texas land scrip. The
third group was composed of men like Cave Johnson, and appar-
ently Polk, who favored annexation but who, at the same time,
did not desire southern domination. They wished above all things
to harmonize differences which were threatening to disrupt the
party, if not the Union itself. The second group was most active
in the nominating convention, and Robert J. Walker, of Missis-
sippi, was its reputed head. Catron and A. V. Brown were close
friends of Polk but, unlike Cave Johnson, they had strong lean-
ings toward the southern groups. "Walker had long been inter-
ested in Texas. During Jackson's administration he had worked
hard for the recognition of the new republic. In February,
1844, he had written a long letter in which many reasons were
assigned why Texas should be annexed.-^ It was alleged by his
opponents that he was influenced by the hope of profit from land
speculations, but undoubtedly this personal motive was greatly
exaggerated.
28 Polk to Johnson, June 21 [?], 1844, "Polk- Johnson Letters," Tenn.
Hist. Mag., Sept., 1915, 245.
29 For an excellent summary, see Smith, Annexation of Texas, 140-144.
260 JAMES E. POLK
The annexation of Texas was not the only question on which
the Democrats of 1844 were unable to ag-ree. For a time con-
siderable anxiet}' was felt for fear that Polk's well-known views
on tariff might cost him votes in northern states, particularly
in Pennsylvania. The discussion of Polk's views on this subject
M-as precipitated by the so-called Irvin-IIardin correspondence.
Shortly after Polk's nomination James Irviu, of Pennsylvania,
had addressed a letter to John J. Hardin, of Illinois,^" asking
about the candidate's opinions on tariff. Hardin replied that
Polk was a believer in free trade. As soon as Polk read the
letters in the papers, he asserted that, although the second letter
had been signed by Hardin, it must have been Avritten by Milton
Brown, a member of Congress from Tennessee. He asked that
the "trick" be exposed.^^
Walker undertook to instruct the nominee as to the stand he
should take on this perplexing subject, and also as to the proper
treatment of Democrats who had left the party in 1840. He
suggested that Polk should make it known that he would welcome
"all Jacksonian Democrats." On the tariff he was to declare
for a revenue basis, adjusted in such a manner as to give "inci-
dental aid" and a "reasonable profit" to every branch of domes-
tic industries. He urged especially that the word aid should
be used instead of protect ion.^^ But before Walker's letter had
left Wa.shington, Polk had already announced his views on the
tariff in a letter to J. K. Kane, of Philadelphia. When he penned
his "Kane letter," Polk had not of course read AValker's sug-
gestions, but their ideas were practically identical and even
the phraseology of their letters was very much the same. jMore
straightforward than Walker, however, and less southern in his
leanings, Polk did not sugar-coat incidental protection by calling
30 Both men were members of Congress. Their letters, dated May 30,
1844, are printed in Niles' Reg., LXVI, 234.
31 Polk to Johnson, June 8, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters.'"
32 Walker to Polk, June 18, 1844, Folic Papers.
CAMPAIGN OF IS 44 261
it an "aid. "'^^ It was said at the time that Polk in drafting his
letter made a definite attempt to face both ways — that his
emphasis on incidental protection was for the North, while the
substance was for the South. But if the tariff Democrats were
in any sense deluded it must have resulted from a meaning which
they had read into the letter, for, as Polk had pointed out in the
letter itself, his present views were to be found in his own record,
the record of his party, and the declarations that liad been
adopted at the Baltimore convention. In such a statement there
was nothing equivocal — nothing to which a protectionist had
reason to pin his hopes. "On all great questions," wrote Gen-
eral Jackson in a letter commending Polk, "from the Panama
mission to the present day, he has been consistent, orthodox,
and true to the standards of old-fashioned Jeffersonian democ-
racy";"* and the Kane letter promised no departure from such
a course. To an intimate friend Polk wrote that his letter had
been sent to Kane
with a request that he would show it to Mr. Dallas and Mr. Horn, and if in
their judgment, it was absolutely necessary, they were at liberty to publish
it, but not otherwise. It was but a re-declaration of the opinions upon
which I have acted on that subject; it was carefully prepared and upon
its doctrines I am ready to stand.ss
33 "I am," said Polk, "in favor of a tariff for revenue, such a one as
will yield a sufficient amount to the Treasury to defray the expenses of the
Government economically administered. In adjusting the details of a
revenue tariff, I have heretofore sanctioned such moderate discriminating
duties, as would produce the amount of revenue needed, and at the same
time afford reasonable incidental protection to our home industries. I am
opposed to a tariff for protection merely, and not for revenue." [Cites
his votes on tariff bills.] "In my judgment, it is the duty of the Govern-
ment, to extend as far as it may be practicable to do so, by its revenue
laws & all other means within its power, fair and just protection to all the
great interests of the whole Union, embracing agriculture, commerce and
navigation" (Polk to Hon. J. K. Kane, June 19, 1844; copy of original in
Polk Papers; printed copies in newspapers).
34 Jackson to M. M. Jones, Utica, N. Y., June 25, 1844, Wash. Globe,
July 20, 1844.
35 Polk to Johnson, June 21 [?], 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters."
262 JAMES K. FOLK
Shortly after the adjournment of the Democratic convention
the Senate took a vote on Tyler's treaty of annexation. Instead
of the two-thirds in its favor which the President had promised
the Texan diplomats, more than two-thirds (;^5 to 16) voted to
reject it. Many who were not averse to annexation voted against
the treaty, for they resented the manner of its negotiation and
despised the renegade President and his Secretary of State.
Tyler's friends tried to cast the blame for ill feeling on Calhoun
and his Pakenham correspondence, while Calhoun regretted that
the question had been brought forward under such a weak
administration.^" In the Senate, Benton now introduced a bill
of his own for annexing Texas whenever Mexico should be ready
to acquiesce, while McDuffie presented a joint resolution which
would require simply a majority vote of both houses of Con-
gress. Both failed, and without taking further action Congress
adjourned on June 17, to await the result of the pending
campaign.
Wlien, on May 1, Clay was nominated at Baltimore, all signs
seemed to augur success for the Whigs. The party was united
and the choice of the candidate was unanimous. Tyler's annex-
ation treaty had caused some annoyance to be sure, but by his
"masterly" Raleigh letter Clay was thought to have made his
own position unassailable. Besides, it did not appear that Texas
would be an important issue, for Van Buren, whose nomination
by the Democrats seemed a foregone conclusion, had also taken
a stand against immediate annexation. Although Van Buren 's
nomination was fully expected, it was known tliat many Demo-
crats had set their hearts on procuring Texas, consequently
division and weakness appeared to be the inevitable result.
At first it did not seem that Polk's nomination had solved
the difficulties which had confronted the Democrats, for despite
the professions of harmony it was well known that Benton, Van
36 Schouler, Hist, of the V. S., IV, 470.
CAMPAIGN OF 1S44 263
Buren, and their followers were dissatisfied with, if not indeed
hostile to, their party. Tyler had been nominated on an annex-
ation ticket, barring any accessions from Democrats who with
him liad deserted to the Whigs in 1840. His official organ even
insisted that Polk should decline the nomination in favor of the
man who had been responsible for bringing the Texas question
forward.^"
The Democrats had trouble in plenty, but the AVliig program
was likewise going awrj^ Van Buren had not been nominated
as they had expected, and Clay's Raleigh letter, instead of
settling the Texas question, bid fair to cost him many northern
votes. In August, 1843, the Liberty party had nominated James
G. Birney, of Michigan, on an anti-slavery ticket, and, after the
publication of Cla^-'s letter, man}' who under ordinary circum-
stances would have voted for him now announced their intention
to support the Liberty candidate. Although Clay was a slave-
holder and did not oppose the annexation of Texas with the
consent of Mexico, still the Whigs had, originally, no reason
to believe that the Liberty Party would be more hostile to him
than to the Democratic candidate, who was likewise a slaveholder
and, in addition, an advocate of immediate annexation. Never-
theless the unexpected happened, for on the stump Birney
avowed a preference for Polk, arguing that Clay's superior
ability, coupled with his equivocal attitude, made him the more
dangerous and objectionable of the two.^^
The Raleigh letter was denounced even more bitterly in the
South, and, as will appear later, it was defection in this quarter
which caused the candidate most alarm. No wonder that a
leading Whig declared the Texas question to be " an enigma and
37 ' ' Mr. Polk is too wise a man to suflfer the Blairs and Kendalls to set
him up as a mark for the shafts of the Whigs ... to enter the contest,
with Mr. Tyler already in the field, and with the certainty of an over-
whelming defeat awaiting him" (The Madisonian, June 1, 1844).
3s Schouler, Hist, of the U. S., TV, 475; Smith, Annex, of Tex., 306, 308.
264 JAMES K. POLK
a puzzle to the most astute,"^'' for the most ardent advocates
of annexation would lose, economically, by its consummation,
while the opponents of annexation, for the sake of principle,
were indirectly aiding Polk.
After Congress had adjourned, all parties were free to devote
their energies to the campaign. The Democrats fully realized
tliat the contest would be close, that defection must be prevented,
and new recruits gained. Benton and the Globe must be whipped
into line, and if possible, Tyler must be made to withdraw in
favor of Polk. No one was in a better position than Old Hickory
to perform this valuable service, and no one was more ready
to undertake the difficult task. Jackson was much excited by
Benton's heated reply to McDutfie while discussing his own
annexation bill, and still more so by the report that his old
friend had solicited the cooperation of John Quincy Adams.*"
His irritation was increased because Benton had not been con-
vinced by a letter he had sent him stating that the Union could
not be preserved except by annexing Texas and extendiaig the
laws of the United States over Oregon. He was certain that
Benton had induced Van Buren to declare against annexation.
He called Blair's attention to Polk's one-term pledge, and
prophesied that Van Buren would succeed Polk if he should
take the proper course. "My dear friend," he pleaded with
Blair, "permit not Col. Benton to have controle over your
39 Chas. A. Davis to Crittenden, New York, June 5, 1844, Crittenden
Papers. It was a curious fact, said Davis, that on two important questions
party considerations had made people in the South and West blind to their
own interests; they had crushed the bank and thereby driven much needed
capital back to the North and East, and were now clamoring for Texas,
although the other sections would profit more by its annexation.
*o Jackson to Blair (confidential) , June 25, 1844, Jackson Papers. "The
last Washington papers give an account of the very irrated reply of Col.
Benton to Mr. McDuffie on Benton's annexation Bill in the Senate after
which Col. Benton seized J. Q. Adams by the hand & said 'we are both old
men, wo must now unite & save the constitution' — do my dear Mr. Blair
inform me if this can be true — if it is, 1 want no better proof of his
derangement, & it j)olitical[ly] prostrates him."
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 265
editorial column, as he will ruin y'" paper. If he will, he must
pursue his eratic course, which has, & will politicaHly] destroy
him if not already done." I-Jlair assured Jackson that Benton
was zealous in the cause of Polk and Dallas, but that he dis-
'trusted Calhoun and opposed his pro^Tam of Texas with or
without the Union. These views were shared by Blair himself.
Jackson wrote again to Blair on July 12, criticizing Benton's
attitude and urging- Blair to attend the ratification meeting to
be held at Nashville on the fifteenth of August.*^
Before Jackson had received his reply from Blair he
expressed his opinion of Benton in a letter to Polk.*- Benton's
hatred of Calhoun and his jealousy of the growing popularity
of Tyler, said Jackson, had deranged him, but
you ■\\'ill perceive I have estopped Benton or any others from believing that
you or I could countenance nullification or disunion. Every letter I get
gives us joyfull news — You will get 20 states at least & your one term
[pledge] %\ill get you 22.
He told Polk that, while it was quite unnecessary for Cave John-
son to put him on his guard lest he should inadvertently give
aid to the nullifiers, still every Democrat should "put his face
against any meeting of disunion, or nullification — we must & will
have Texas, with & in our glorious Union. The Federal Union
must be preserved — A. J. "*^
*i Blair to Jackson, July 7; Jackson to Blair, July 12, 1844, Jaclson
Papers. The "Texas, with or without the Union," program mentioned
by Benton was an attempt made in South Carolina, while Tyler's treaty
was before the Senate, to call a southern convention and annex Texas to
the southern states if it should be rejected by the federal government.
See Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 616.
•*2 Jackson to Polk, June 29, 1844, Polk Papers. "In my reply to f'ol.
Benton's first letter to me in which he adverted to my toast, — 'The
Federal Union must be preserved,' amongst other things, I said to him.
The Federal Union must be preserved, and to ilo this effectually & perma-
nently— Texas must be reunited to the United States — the laws of the
Union extended forthwith over the Oragon, which would place this Federal
Union on as permanent basses as the Kocky mountains, and preserve our
glorious Union, & our Kepublican system as long as time lasted. ' '
■43 Ibid.
2G6 JAMES K. POLE
Johnson was still much concerned for fear that something
might be said or done at the Nashville meeting which might
be construed as an approval of the South Carolina program of
"annexation or a dissolution of the Union." Doubtless he exag-
gerated both the strength and the determination of the disunion
element. So far as the success of the campaign was concerned,
much more was to be feared from the attitude of Benton, whose
irascible temper could not be held in check. He did not hesitate
to discuss, even with Whigs,** the "villany" of the Baltimore
convention, and no plea for harmony could induce him to abate
his attacks on those who had been responsible for reviving the
Texas question. To be sure he had, in a public declaration
exonerated Polk and Dallas from participation in the "intrigue,"
but in a speech made at St. Louis he said that the Texas question
had been "exploded" only forty daj's before the Baltimore
convention — "just time enough for candidates to be interrogated,
and for the novices to amend their answers."*^ Polk was evi-
dently the novice whom he had in mind.
As the campaign progressed Polk came more and more to
distrust both Benton and Blair. "Since the nominations," he
said in a letter to Donelson,
none can fail to have observed the coldness or indifference of the Globe.
After Blair's professions made confidentially to you, I had expected that
he would come zealously into the support of the nominations, and not
throw cold water upon them.
After quoting a letter in which Dallas spoke of this hostility,
Polk suggested that Donelson and Jackson should urge Blair
to alter the tone of his paper.**^
4-t Letcher to Buchanan, July 19, 1844, Buchanan Papers.
43 Speech printed in Wash. Globe, Nov. 6, 1844. Yoakum, of Tennessee,
in calling Polk's attention to this speech says that he has "no doubt but
Col. Benton has injured us 100,000 votes"! (Yoakum to Polk, Nov. 22,
1844, Polk Papers).
40 Polk to Donelson, July 22, 1844, "Polk-Donelson Letters."
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 267
Toward the end of June certain overtures made by close
friends of President Tyler gave hope that he might yet with-
draw from the race. J. B. Jones, the editor of the Madisoman,
approached A. V. Brown and others with a suggestion that
J. George Harris should be brought to Washington to assist in
editing that paper. Harris was an intimate friend of both
Polk and Jackson, and had made the Nashville Union an
effective party organ. Harris suggested to Polk that a new
paper might be started with which the Madisonian (Tyler) and
the Spectator (Calhoun) might soon be merged. A new paper,
in his opinion, would be more likely to succeed because of preju-
dices against those already in existence. General Armstrong,
like Harris, thought favorably of the plan to merge these papers,
and believed that after the election even the Glohe might be
joined with the rest. Both Johnson and Brown, however, were
opposed to this plan, and especially to putting Harris in charge
of the Madisoniany'
Early in July R. J. Walker, who had from the first urged a
friendly attitude toward the deserters of 1840, called on Tyler
in order to ascertain his views. The President told AValker that
he would withdraw at once were it not for the fact that his
friends felt hurt by the abuse heaped upon them by the Glohe
and other papers. There were, he said, about 150,000 of his
friends who had voted for Wliigs in 1840 ; he would withdraw
and his friends would support Polk and Dallas, provided that
assurance be given that they would be welcomed by the Demo-
cratic party as brethren and equals. "Now I think," said
Walker when reporting the conversation to Polk, "that the
importance of this union & co-operation cannot be overrated";
therefore he suggested that Polk and Jackson might write letters
to political friends, speaking kindly of Tyler and his followers.*^
47 Harris to Polk, June 27, 29; Johnson to Polk, June 28; Armstrong to
Polk, June 30, 1844, Folic Fapers.
48 Walker to Polk, July 10, 1844, ibid.
268 JAMES K. POLK
After reading Walker's letter Polk sent it to the Hermitage
by Gideon Pillow. In a letter of his own, sent by the same
messenger, he told Jackson that, however desirable the object
sought b}' Walker might be, he would not write any letter or
make any promises. He would like of course to see a reunion
of "all the old Jackson Democrats of '28 & '32," but he would
neither write a letter to Tyler nor "make any pledges to any
one — except as it regards my public principles, in advance of
election." He suggested, however, that if the attacks of the
Globe were responsible for Tyler's continuing in the race and
thereby jeopardizing the result in certain states, something
should be done to induce Blair to cease abusing the President.
He told Jackson that he was the onh- one who could influence
Blair, but as to the wisdom of exercising such influence Jackson
must judge for himself.*^
Jackson was disgusted with Walker's "want of common
sense" in suggesting that he and Polk should write letters in
commendation of the President. Such letters, he told Polk,
would "damn you & destroy your election," for the Whigs
would at once charge "bargain & intrigue.""''^ Although not yet
ready to ask favors from John Tyler, he was quite willing to
remove, if possible, the cause of the President's injured feelings.
On tliat very same day he dispatched a letter to Blair in which
he condemned Benton's conduct, urged the importance of annex-
ation, and ordered Blair to "support the cause of Polk & Dallas,
& let Tiler alone — leave Calhoun to himself we in the South &
West will attend to the Federal Union, it must be preserved. "'^^
Indeed, on the same day, he authorized Major Lewis to express
to the President his (Jackson's) wish for the success of the
•10 Polk to Jackson, July 28, 1844, Jackson Papers. See also i'olk to
Bonelson, same date, " Polk-Donelson Letters." In this he doubted the
l)ropriety of Jackson's writing a letter for publication; still, he seemed
anxious that the general should write a private letter "which might reach
the President 's eye. ' '
•'i" Jackson to Polk, July 26, 1844, Polk Papers.
51 Jackson to Blair, July 26, 1844, Jackson Papers.
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 269
administration and the assurance tliat Tyler's friends would be-
received as brethren into the Democratic fold."'-
From various quarters pressure was brouji'ht to bear upon
Tyler, and appeals to his vanit.y were not wanting. Ritchie, of
the Richmond Enquirer, who was called the "king of the Demo-
cratic press," warml}" urged the President to withdraw, while
Democratic electors agreed to support Tyler in case it should
develop that he was stronger than Polk. The Democratic general
committee of New York, on August 6, drafted resolutions laud-
ing the President and asking his support ;'''■'' and on August 1
Jackson sent another letter to Major Lewis in which he argued
that Tyler ought to withdraw, for if he did not, it would be said
'•>- Jaeksou to Lewis, July 26, 1844 (Tyler, Leitera and Times of the
Tylers, III, 143-146). The letter read in part: "You know I have a great
desire that Mr. Tyler should close his term with credit to himself. It is
certain he can not now be elected, and he has now a fair field by with-
drawing, to add great and lasting popularity to himself by the act, and
free himself from the imputation that his exertions to re-annex Texas
were to make himself President, and show that his energy in this ease w^as
from imperious public duty, to prevent a country so important to the
defence, safety and great interest of our whole Union from falling into
the hands of England, our most implacable enemy. On Mr. Tyler's with-
drawal from the canvass every true American will saj'. Amen to his
patriotism in the case of Texas.
' ' Several of Mr. Tyler 's friends yesterday visited me, and wished me
to cause it to be known to him their wishes, as his withdrawal at once
would unite all the Democrats into one family without distinction. This
would render our victory easy and certain by bringing Mr. Tyler's friends
in to the support of Polk and Dallas, received as brethren by them and
their friends, all former differences forgotten and cordially united once
more in sustaining the Democratic candidate.
"... It is impossible now that Mr. Tyler should be elected, and if
he does not withdraw he will be charged with conniving with the Clay
Whigs to defeat the Democratic nominees. Although this would he untrue,
yet really it would have that affect and would do Mr. Tyler much injury.
I told Mr. Tyler's friends I could not write to him on such a subject, but
that I had such confidence in his good sense and patriotism, that I was
sure he would withdraw in due time, as I believe him to be a good Demo-
crat, and that he would do nothing to promote Clay or injure Democracy.
If you think it prudent, you can make these suggestions to Mr. Tyler.
T think he would receive them kindly, be his determination %vhat it may.
His proper dignified course is a magnanamous withdrawal, with such
reasons as his good sense may suggest for the occasion. These hints flow
from a real regard for Mr. Tyler and a sincere wish that he may retire
with much credit. ' '
53 Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 337-339.
270 JAMES K. POLE
that he had adopted the annexation program merely to obtain
a reelection and that he was remaining in the field in order to
defeat Polk. Tyler soon informed Jackson that this letter had
determined him to retire," and on August 20 his letter of with-
drawal appeared in the Madisonian. His present action, he said,
had resulted from changed conditions. The people had vindi-
cated him by driving from power those who had tried to crush
him; the Democrats had adopted his policies, and he no longer
felt compelled to run. On the next day this paper stated that
its sole object all the time had been to defeat Henry Clay, and,
as the principles of Polk and Tyler were identical, it would
henceforth support the Democratic candidates. ^'^ Two years
later Tyler wrote that he had accepted the nomination "for the
sole purpose of controlling events .... for the public good"
and, having accomplished his purpose, he withdrew.^**
The Spectator, also, gave Polk and Dallas its enthusiastic
support, and Calhoun predicted that the results would "equal
the defeat of 1828."" Doubtless he indulged hopes that he, in
the event of Polk's election, would be the guiding spirit of the
administration.
During the summer considerable anxiety was caused by the
fear that British and French influence might induce Houston
to agree to some arrangement with Mexico. Major Lewis was
authorized by Calhoun to communicate "confidentially" to
General Jackson that the State Department was in possession
of reliable information that these nations had offered to acknowl-
edge the independence of Texas without any pledge of abolition.
54 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 310.
55 The Madisonian (Au^. 24) even supplied an election pun: "Change —
It is James Knox Polk now, it will be Polk knocks Clay, about election
time."
56 Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, 11, 341.
57 Alex. Anderson to Polk, Aug. 22, 1844, Folk Papers. "We should
have carried North Carolina," said Anderson, "but for the course and
speeches of that arch Traitor Benton — so say our letters from North
Carolina." Anderson was a strong adherent of Calhoun.
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 271
provided that Texas would agree to remain an independent
nation. Similar information was given to Polk by Calhoun's
friend, Alexander Anderson. Before he had seen these letters,
however, Jackson had written to Houston "as strong a letter
as he [I] could dictate," exhorting him not to yield to the wishes
of foreign nations.^'**
Wliile politicians were emphasizing the foreign menace, the
Democratic Review was trying to win votes in northern states
by maintaining that the area of slavery would be restricted by
acquiring Texas, for slaves would be drawn to the new fields,
leaving the border states to the Yankees.'^^ Some of the slavery
advocates, too, believed that such would be the result, and for
this reason violently opposed annexation.""
There was some defection from their own ranks and there
was fear that annexation might be defeated by an act of Texas
itself, but the Democrats as a party never wavered from
their position in favor of annexation. They had, therefore, the
advantage of a consistent program. Clay, on the other hand,
in order to retain his hold on both North and South, adopted a
shifty course and modified his views from time to time, as the
occasion seemed to demand. In his Raleigh letter of April 17
he had definitely opposed immediate annexation, but he soon
discovered that such a stand had made him unpopular in the
South and West. To retrieve his fortunes in those sections he
wrote to Stephen F. Miller, on July 1, his first "Alabama letter."
* ' Personally, ' ' said he, ' ' I could have no objection to the annex-
ation of Texas; but certainly I would be unwilling to see the
existing Union dissolved or seriously jeoparded for the sake of
58 Lewis to Jackson, Julv 19, 1844, Jaclson Papers. Jackson to Polk,
July 23, 1844, Poll- Papers' See also, Polk to Donelson, July 22, 1844,
"Polk-Donelson Letters."
59 Dem. Bev., July, 1844.
60 Letter of Waddy Thompson to editors of National Intelligencer,
printed in that paper, July 6, 1844.
61 Printed in Nat. Intell, Aug. 8, 1844.
272 JAMES K. POLK
acquiring" Texas. ""^ As this was not strong enough to win votes
in the South, he wrote again on the twenty-seventh that if annex-
ation might be accomplished ' ' without national dishonor, without
war, with the general consent of the States of the Union, and
upon fair and reasonable terms, I should be glad to see it."**-
Both Democrats and Abolitionists seized upon the last phrase
and widely advertised the fact that "Clay would be glad to see
it." Other letters followed in an attempt to show that he had
not changed his original views, but the more he explained the
more he became the target of denunciation and ridicule. The
papers made much sport of his ' ' six manifestoes, ' ' while Jackson
charged that Claj' hy his letters had made a "perfect devill"
of himself.^^
Although this was a campaign in whicli party principles were
clearly defined and important questions involved, nevertheless
the personal element was not wanting. The AVhig ignorance even
of Polk's identity was soon replaced by a minute knowledge not
only of his own shortcomings but of those of his ancestors. It
devolved, therefore, upon the candidate's friends in Tennessee
to enlighten the public on his past record and to defend his
reputation against the slanders of his opponents. As soon as
the news of his nomination had reached Nashville a mass meeting
was called to celebrate the event. Speeches were made by prom-
inent Democrats, and A. 0. P. Nicholson ridiculed the Whig
cry of "Who is Polk?" Arrangements were made for another
meeting in July to be composed of delegates from all parts of
the state.°* Biographical materials had already been forwarded
to George Bancroft under the frank of General Jackson. But as
Bancroft, according to Harris, was "somewhat sensitive on the
62 Fourth Alabama letter, in which former letters are quoted (Nat.
Intell, Oct. 1, 1844). The letter of July 27 is printed in Niles' Beg.,
LXVI, 439.
G3Schouler, Hist, of U. S., IV, 477. Smith, Annex, of Texas, 809.
ci Xasliville Union, June 8, 11, 1844.
07^
CAMPAIGN OF 1S44
point of anthorship," and declined, it was decided tl.at editorials
in tlie Union would do quite as well as a bioKi-aphy.'"
Some of the Whig papers char,'. ,1 Folic with l.eins a duehst,
while ..thers said he was a cringing eoward who had feared to
fi.ht Wise. The first allegation was refuted in letters written
to'the Globe by Cave Johnson and A. V. Brown, and the sec.mV
by the publication of an old letter of Jackson s ni which he ha
expressed approval of Speaker Polk for having «at«<i Wise w U
contempt." For the purpose of injuring Polk in the North the
AVhigs circulated widely the "Koorback" canard the gist of
which was that a gang of slaves branded with the initials J. K.
p •• had been seen on their way to southern markets.-
' Polk was most annoyed by the revival of the sto,^- that us
grandfather. Colonel Ezekiel Polk, Had been a Tory during the
Lvolntioii. The Washington GMe and various northern papers
repelled the charge, and the Na.shville VnU,n printed ^^^
and affidavits from persons who had certain knowledge that he
"to Polk had been a Kevolutionary officer; it P""-'-'';,^-;
a copy of his comnrission dated June 18. 177o. U"der Polk
direTt on this material was printed in pamphlet form under th
tme of "A Vindication of Colonel E.ekiel Polk," and General
Armstrong was instructed to send copies to prominent Demo-
"u over the United States.'' To these Whig campaign
to es he Democratic press retorted in kind. Clay s use of
profIL language wa. emphasized and he was called a drunkard,
a duelist, a gambler, and a perjurer/'^
— , ^ o- T,,Kr 17 19 1844, Folk Papers.
perienee as campaign biographer of Van Buren.
ee Wash. Globe, June 13, 19, 1844.
67 See Niles' Beg., LXVII, 73 Armstrong, Sept.
6s Union, Sept. 11. Polk to Heiss Sept. 13; Jolk to Ar
16, 1844, ''Heiss Papers, ' f^^^^^^^^-'JZl^,, ,i. oath of office
60 The perjury consisted in ^h^ «l\'f ^^Vl for ^-or.is spoken in debate
SL?ifrj-"^,?.a"n.'' CXo? SL-alTalfon t.e flcL of t„e Ho„,e
274 JAMES E. POLK
Naturally Polk was especially desirous of carrying- his own
state, and his energy and skill as a machine politician are mani-
fested in many ways. Realizing, as usual, the importance of a
spirited party press, he induced Heiss to make J. George Harris
joint editor with Laughlin of the Nashville Union. "The
Union," he wrote, "should be made in Tennessee what Medary's
Statesman is in Ohio, and what the Union itself was in 1839.
It is looked to from all parts of the Union and must be a great
paper during this canvass." In another letter he urged that
"fire and spirit and power should be thrown into it" in order
to counteract the Whig falsehoods and m.isrepresentations.'^°
On July 13 a dinner was given in Polk's home town, Colum-
bia, in honor of delegates to the late nominating convention,
Presidential electors, and members of Congress from Tennessee.
To Cave Johnson was assigned the duty of inducing prominent
Democrats to be present in order to counteract the effect of a
Whig ralh^ held at the same place. "^ Early in the campaign
arrangements had been made for a great mass meeting to be
held at Nashville on the fifteenth of August. Both Polk and
Johnson were anxious tliat the northern states should be well
represented at this meeting so that it could not be said that it
was a gathering of disunionists. Once more it fell to Johnson
to send the invitations and to urge the importance of a large
and representative attendance. ^^
On the appointed day the multitudes assembled, and Nash-
ville, according to the Union, "was from sunrise to sunset as
that "the standard of Henry Clay should consist of his armorial bearings,
which ought to be a pistol, a pack of cards, and a brandy djottlc" (Adams,
Memoir a, XII, 45).
TO Polk to Heiss, July 31, Aug. 21, 1844; Heiss to Polk, Aug. 3, 1844,
Folk Papers.
71 Polk to Johnson, July 1, July 6, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters."
"2 Johnson to Polk, June 21, 1844, Polk Papers. Polk to Johnson, July
16, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters." Among those invited were Wright,
Cass, Buchanan, Woodbury, Hubbard of New Hampshire, and Duncan and
Medary, of Ohio.
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 275
a MiWcry Camp."" In tlu- evening the Honorable Thomas F.
AIar.hall, of Kentucky, addressed "thonsands" in front of the
;„,„,house on the annexation of Texas. On the second day,
Au-nst 16, the throng gathered at Camp Hickory where In
„oo;, "the great grove at the Camp, fifty acres '" -*';«■ ^^^
as full as it could hold," and there "were two miles of table
u which the Great Dinner was served." Speaking oUowed the
dhiner, and Cave Johnson, as presiding ofRecr, made he open-
lug address. We have already noted his solicitude lost^a d^^
union character might be attributed to this meeting, and he
now embraced the opportunity
cerned in calling and getting up the present meeting.
The number in attendance was so great that speakers addressed
crowds simultaneously in various parts of the grove; each
speaker, following Johnson's lead, repelled the charge of dis-
union General Case was the principal orator of the day ; among
the others were Gansevoort Melville- Governor Clay, of Ala-
bama; Colonel Terry, speaker of the ho^ise from the same state ;
and J B. Bowlin, a member of Congress from Missouri. Letters
were received from leading Democrats of both sections, regretting
their inability to be present and expressing hearty cooperation '
Among these was Judge Douglas, but within a few days he was
in Tennessee stumping the state for Polk and Dallas.' >
-TT^^^lle ^.io., Aug \l^il%^XfJ^Lf'-o.^^^^^^ tfttairs
every road to the city was to be seen ^PPy^^, j^^^^^n^^^s of music, their
TaiSf S t,;errttoUl tLria;"?.H"s\reat e„ea,np„.ent of t,.e
sovereign people. ' '
74 A Tammany Hall leader. ipffprs from
„Thesa,„e„u.,ber^of.he^»io..co.^u>s.^
Tilu^Z'^ll Sume,'Ko'M X Waier, i' M. Johnson, et «,
"pflklo Johnson, Ang. 20, 22, 26, 1844, " Polk-Johnson Letters.
276 JAMES K. POLK
Despite the absence of so many of the party leaders the
Democratic meeting- was regarded as highl}^ successful, but in
glittering pageantrj^ and boisterous enthusiasm it was far ex-
celled by the "Great Whig Convention" which, on August 21,
likewise essembled in the city of Nashville and was, to quote
Phelan, "the finest of the kind ever held in the Southwest."^''
Wliile the chief feature of the meeting was the display of gor-
geous battalions and expensive campaign banners, there were
soul-stirring addresses by prominent Whig orators. The great
speech of the meeting was made by Sergeant S. Prentiss, of
Mississippi, who was regarded by many as the peer of either
Webster or Clay. On this occasion Prentiss surpassed even his
own brilliant record, for to partisan considerations was added a
personal hatred for the Democratic candidate whose casting vote
had once deprived him of a seat in the House of Representa-
tives.''^
The enthusiasm caused by the Wliig meeting spurred the
Democrats to a still more vigorous effort to win the election in
Tennessee. Custom did not permit Polk to mount the platform
in his own behalf, but from his home at Columbia he directed
the campaign, even to the minutest details. He planned itiner-
aries, assigned speakers, and even arranged for barbecues. "°
Local orators were assisted by prominent politicians from other
states. This list included Douglas, of Illinois, Pickens, of South
Carolina, Melville, of New York, and Claj', Terry, and McClung,
of Alabama. Of local men the most notable were the veteran
campaigners, Nicholson, Brown, and Cave Johnson. Johnson
was much broken in health, but so highly did Polk value his
services that he goaded him to an active part in the campaign.^"
77 Phelan, Hist, of Teniu, 4T9.
78 See above, p. 120.
7» Various letters of Polk to Johnson, Ang.-Oct., ' ' Polk-Johnson Letters. ' '
^'> Ihid. On Oct. 14 he told Johnson that ' ' all our energies are necessary
to keep the State safe, as 1 believe she now is. The least relaxation at the
close of the canvass might loose her."
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 277
Near the close of the canvass Polk was confident of carrying* the
state by a "handsome majority," but, instead, he lost it by the
small margin of one hundred and thirteen votes.
In southern states the Wliigs had little hope of success
in opposing the Democratic annexation program, nevertheless
strenuous efforts were made to prevent defection from their own
ranks because of this annoying issue. The indomitable Prentiss
labored to show that Polk was not entitled to profit from the
revival of this question,^^ and in a speech at Natchez he referred
to Polk as a ''blighted burr, that had fallen from the mane of
the war-horse of the Hermitage." In an attempt to counteract
the work of Prentiss and others, and to win Whig votes in the
South, Senator Walker, of Mississippi, wrote a most inflamma-
tory pamphlet entitled "The South in Danger"**^ in which he
argued that as Whigs and Abolitionists had joined hands in the
North, therefore all parties in the South should unite in the
interest of annexation. The pamphlet probably did little good
in the South, and many Democrats were fearful that it might
do serious damage in the North. "^
In Ohio the contest bid fair to be close, and, after Claj^'s
repudiation of the utterances of his relative, Cassius M. Clay,^*
leading Democrats had hopes that many Whigs would desert him
and vote for Birnev.®^ But the result of the state elections made
81 "If ever I join the Mormons," he wrote in August to the editor of
the Vicksburg Whig, "I shall attach myself to Joe Smith, the founder of
the sect, and not to one of his rival disciples, and should I ever turn
Locofoco on the question of the immediate annexation of Texas, I will
support John Tyler, not James K. Polk" (Memoir of S. S. Prentiss, II, 316).
S2 This pamphlet was issued by the Democratic Association of Wash-
ington, D. C., Sept. 25, 1844. Coi>y in Library of Congress.
83 For example, William E. Cramer, editor of the Albany Argus, in-
formed Polk that New York could never be won on the program outlined
by Walker, while Ohio and other states would surely be lost (Cramer to
Polk, Oct. 4, 1844, Polk Papers).
8* C. M. Clay had represented Henry Clay as opposed to slavery. The
latter in a letter contradicted the former 's statements.
85 Gansevoort Melville to Polk, Oct. .3; Cass to Polk, Oct. 4, 1844, Polk
Papers. Both wrote from Cleveland and expressed the opinion that the
Democrats would carry the state.
278 JAMES K. POLE
it evident that Clay's letter had not produced any defection,^"
while Walker's ill-advised pamphlet added strength to the
Whig-s.®' The so-called "Garland forgery" transferred many
votes from Birney to Clay, and may possibly have brought
victory to Clay in Ohio.^*
Pennsylvania was normally Democratic, yet there were
misgivings lest the strong sentiment in favor of tariff might
jeopardize Polk's success in that state. His "Kane letter" had
been generally accepted as satisfactory, but the Whigs repre-
sented him to be an unqualified free-trader. The Pemisylvanian
refuted this charge and, on October 15, published extracts from
his speeches to prove that he had always favored incidental
protection. As noted above, Polk, in his letter to Kane, did not
pretend to favor tariff except that which might be necessary for
revenue, but by means of construction Pennsylvanians were able
to hold voters in line by representing him to be in favor of tariff.
"We have succeeded," wrote the oily-tongued Simon Cameron,
"in fixing the belief that you 'are as good a tariff man as Clay,' "
and he added significanth' that no man known to be opposed to
protective tariff could possibly carry the state.®^ Polk did not
of course take pains to undeceive his supporters in Pennsylvania ;
on the other hand, he did not, in any of his public utterances,
commit himself to tariff for protective purposes. However,
Cameron's ruse met with success, and Polk's strength in Penn-
sylvania greatly exasperated the Whigs. ^"
86 H. C. Williams wrote from Washington that "the letter repudiating
C. M. Clay has had no effect in the northern states, while it satisfies the
Southern Whigs. The Whig papers will not jniblish it." Democrats, he
said, have to oppose all "fag end" parties, and Greely is now tryino- to
stir up the Irish (Williams to Polk, Oct. 14, 1844, Polk Pa2)ers). ' ^
8" Armstrong to Polk, Nov. 5, [1844], Polk Papers.
88 See Birney, James G. Birney and his Times, 355.
89 Cameron to Polk, Oct. 18, 1844, Polk Papers.
00 Governor Letcher, of Kentucky, scoffed at the idea of Polk l)eing
in favor of tariff, and he tried to persuade Buchanan to refrain from advo-
cating his election. "Polk," said Letcher, "has no more chance to be
elected than if he were dead and hurled, and d — nd, as he will be in due
time" (Letcher to Buchanan, Aug. 3, 1844, BucJianan Papers).
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 279
"Native Americanism" was said to have cost the Democrats
votes in Pemisylvania. Catholics, as a rule, affiliated with that
partv and the Whigs made political capital out of the fact that
Shuuk, the Democratic candidate for governor, had been niduced
to march in a Catholic parade.^^
It was alleged that the Whigs used money freely m Pennsyl-
vania-^ and that they were guilty of practicing frauds,- but it
is unlikely that the Whigs were the sole transgressors m these
respects.
New York was regarded as the pivotal state. There thirty-
six electoral votes were to be won or lost, and the result seemed
to be highlv problematical. In this state various extraneous ele-
ments helped to complicate the political situation. Both "Native
Americans" and Abolitionists commanded a considerable num-
ber of votes in the state, but it was by no means certain just how
these votes would be cast. At the beginning of the campaign it
was feared that the followers of Van Buren might not rally with
enthusiasm to the party standard, and besides, there was lack of
harmonv in Democratic state politics with respect to policies and
candidates. In order to carry the state it was necessary to hold
the Van Burenites in line, and since the Baltimore convention
manv of them had been silently nursing their resentment. Gov-
ernor William C. Bouck wrote that a number of Wright's friends
had tried to get up a secret intrigue to procure Polk s defeat,
but that Wright had been nominated for governor and his ad-
herents brought into harmony.-^ Van Buren told Jackson that
Wright had accepted the nomination reluctantly and not until
—^T^ler to Polk, Oct. 12; J. M. Porter to Polk, Oct. 12, 1844, Folic
Papers; also, newspapers. subseribe.l
92 For example Kane ^"^^^"^f p^^le Iphia^^ nephew, Wm.
Oct. 31, 1844, Polk Papers).
94 Bouck to Polk, Sept. 7, 1844, Po?A- Papers.
280 JAMES E. POLK
he liad been told that it was the only means of saving" New York,"'^
but the supporters of Bouck felt that he had been unceremon-
iously sacrificed to satisfy the ambitions of Wright and his
friends.*^" Some of the extreme anti-Texas leaders in New York
supported the candidates, but repudiated the annexation plank in
the platform.''" This was the policy of the New York Evening
Post.
According to William E. Cramer, of the Albany Argus, the
Democrats in New York "were on a volcano" until Clay repu-
diated the statements of Cassius M. Clay and changed his posi-
tion on the Texan question. The Abolitionists, he said, held the
balance of power and would poll from fifteen thousand to twenty
thousand votes. "Before Mr. C's fatal letter they were hesitat-
ing whether they should not vote for him," but "this puts an
impassable gulf between them."^^ On the other hand, in pre-
dicting victory for Polk and Dallas in New York, Wright re-
ported that "Never have I witnessed an equal degree of enthu-
siasm among our democracy, not even in the days of Genl Jack-
son, nor have I, at any time, known greater harmony, activity or
confidence. ' '''° Late in October another letter from Cramer stated
that the Whigs were putting forth every effort to form coalitions
with "Native Americans," Abolitionists, and Anti-renters, and
that they were confident of winning the election. Prospect of
success, he said, had brought them much campaign money from
manufacturers who desired high tariff.^'"' .
95 Jackson to Polk, Sept. 26, 1844, ibid.
»*5 In a letter to Polk, Sept. 11, Marey stated that Bouck had made a
satisfactory governor, and that Wright had been nominated for political
reasons; while an anonymous letter, Sept. 14, said that Bouck had been
set aside without reason, and that the action might cause Polk to lose the
state.
'■>' See the signed statement of Brvant and others in Nilcs' Beg., LXVI,
371.
OS Cramer to Polk, Sept. 17, 1844, Folk Papers.
09 Wright to Buchanan, Sept. 23, 1844, Buchanan Papers.
100 "The report is that the Bostonians promised $100,000 provided
they could receive ample assurance that it would secure New York for Mr.
Clay! ! " (Cramer to Polk, Oct. 22, 1844, Polk Papers).
CAMPAIGN OF 1S44 281
Still other factors complicated the political situation in New-
York. The Abolitionists who had formerly voted tlie Whig
ticket were appalled when Birney came out in favor of free
trade and opposed to distributing among the states the proceeds
derived from the sale of public lands, and it was feared in Tam-
many circles that his announcement might cause them to vote
for Clay."^ In order to win votes for their national ticket the
"Whigs withdrew some of their candidates for Congress and the
state legislature in favor of the "Native American" candi-
dates.^*'- It availed them little, however, for Polk and Dallas
carried the state. ^°^
It appears that the Democrats, also, withdrew some of their
candidates in favor of "Native Americans, "^"^ and in the process
of rapid naturalization they outrivaled their opponents. ' ' Tam-
many Hall," wrote Melville, "is a perfect jam from 8 a. m. till
after midnight. Naturalization going on among our friends to
an immense extent. On Saturday 260 — all Democrats — rec'd
their papers. "^°^ Charges of wholesale frauds were made by
both parties,^''*' but it may be doubted that such frauds materially
affected the election results.
The Texas question was of course the paramount issue of the
campaign, although it was not, apparently, the chief factor in
winning the election for Polk. Many contemporaries believed that
Clay's defeat w^as not caused by the emergence of this question.
101 Melville to Polk, Oct. 26, 1844, Polk Papers.
102 Alex. Jones to Polk, New York City, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 1844, ibid.
103 Jones told Polk in a letter dated November 21, that some of the
Whigs had been so confident of winning that they had bet all of their
money, and even their homes. One had lost $38,000; another, $40,000.
One Whig's wife lost her mind because of his losses {Polk Papers).
104 John P. Heiss to Polk, Nov. 3, 1844, Polk Papers.
105 Melville to Medary, Nov. 4, 1844, ibid.
108 A correspondent from New London, Conn., informed Polk that in
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island "the lords of the spindle
compelleil the degraded operators to vote their will, and thus obtained
large majorities for your opponent" (Dr. Charles Douglas to Polk, Nov.
22, 1844, Polk Papers). For a useful summary of press opinions on frauds,
see Smith, Annexation of Texas, 316 ff.
282 JAMES K. POLE
and this belief is held by Justin H. Smith,"" who has recently
made a thorough examination of conflicting opinions and care-
fully weighed their value. The Dcmocraiic Review evidently
stated the trutli when it said on the eve of the election that
neither party had won or lost many votes on account of the Texas
issue, and that "the issue is between the principles of the two
parties more than ever before.""* If Polk owed his success in
the election to the Texas issue, it was due to the fact that it
brought him the support of President Tyler and his followers.
While we can not be sure that Tyler would have remained in the
field if the Democrats had not espoused annexation, certainty
that they would continue his Texas program at least furnished
him with a plausible excuse for retiring from the canvass."^
Polk received 170 electoral votes; Clay only 105. In the
North, Polk carried the great states of New York and Pennsyl-
vania, while New Hampshire, also, contributed her six votes.
Much to their delight the Whigs carried not only Polk's own
state, Tennessee, but even the very precincts of both Jackson
and Polk."° The Tennessee Democrats were keenly disappointed,
of course, because they had failed to win the election in their
candidate's own state; but their disappointment soon gave way
to rejoicing over the general party victory. On receiving the
news that New York had gone Democratic, Jackson sent the letter
on to Polk with a marginal note, " 'who is J. K. polk,' will be no
more asked by the coons — A. J. ""^
107 Smith. Annexation of Texas, 317.
108 "One Last Word before the Election" (Dem. Ber., Oct., 1844). It
thanked heaven that Polk was not a "military chieftain" and had never
even killed an Indian; also, that "there is no peculiar eminent 'popu-
larity' attachinfr to him, of a character personal to himself, and distinct
from his simple position as the representative of the general principles
and policy of the party whose candidate he is."
109 See eorresi)ondence, including his letter of withdrawal, in Tyler,
Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 3;58 If.
110 Nashville Banner, Nov. 11, 1844. The Union on the 14th retorted
that these precincts had been carried by non-resident Whigs who had gone
there and voted illegally.
111 Written on a letter from A. C. Flagg to Jackson, Nov. 7, 1844, Polk
Papers. The "coons," of course, were the Whigs. The name had been
attached to them during the "log-cabin" camjiaign of 1840.
CAMPAIGN OF 1844 283
Polk received the news of his election some hours before it
was known to the people of either Columbia or Nashville. The
New York mail arrived at Nashville at nine o'clock in the even-
ing, and on the outside of the package the postmaster at Cincin-
nati had written a note stating that Polk had been elected. This
attracted the attention of General Robert Armstrong, postmaster
at Nashville and one of Polk's most intimate friends. Without
giving out the news, Armstrong sent a messenger to Columbia
with a note for Polk. At dawn he read the glad tidings which the
note contained, but he said nothing about it to his neighbors and
friends. For the next twenty-four hours he went about his work,
and calmly received expressions of sympathy on his defeat.^^-
Sphinx-like silence was a role that Polk dearly loved to play, and
an opportunity to do so on this occasion no doubt added much to
the gratification caused by the information contained in the note.
When the result of the election at last became known there
was great rejoicing in Democratic ranks. On the other hand,
desperado admirers of Clay, both in Tennessee and Kentucky,
threatened Polk's life, and friends warned him to "take some
thought of where you go & eat & drink. ""^ No violence, how-
ever, was attempted, and apprehensions were forgotten in the
din of exuberant celebrations. At Nashville Polk was given an
elaborate reception. A. 0. P. Nicholson made the principal ad-
dress, and there was general rejoicing because the "Young
Hickory" was soon to grasp the helm that had been so firmly
guided by the "Old Hickory.""*
Some of the Democratic factions had little love for Poik, but
all could agree with the Democratic Review in thanking God for
the defeat of Henry Clay. ' ' Had he succeeded, ' ' said the Review,
"it would have stamped him, his ideas and his character upon
the future history of our government, with a fatal depth and
extent of mischief never perhaps to be again effaced."""'
112 Nelson, Memorials of Sarah Childress Polk, 76-77.
113 A. V. Brown to Polk, Nov. 13, 1844. Also Gen. John A. MeCalla,
Lexington, Ky., Nov. 22, 1844; both in Polk Papers.
11* Nashville Union, Nov. 30, 1844. nsDem. Bet:, Nov., 1844.
CHAPTER XIV
PRESIDENT-ELECT
Various individuals and factions claimed the credit for Polk's
nomination and election, and as soon as the result of the ballot-
ing had become known their claims to recognition were presented.
While in one sense it was true that the successful candidate
owed his elevation to a number of discordant elements within the
party, in another sense he was under no obligation to any of them.
With the exception perhaps of the younger element the several
groups within the party had united on Polk, not from choice but
necessity, and not until each had found it impossible to procure
the nomination of its particular favorite. The circumstances
under which he had been nominated — the very fact that he had
not been generally considered for the first place — relieved the
President-elect from the necessity of making pledges to any one.
Although Polk himself fully appreciated this fact and resolved
to make the most of it, others did not and the "jockeying for
position" at once began.
One of the first to congratulate Polk on his victory was James
Buchanan. The Senator from Pennsylvania was usually num-
bered with the old leaders, but his plea, oddly enough, was for
the recognition of young men in the distribution of offices. ' ' The
old office holders generally," said he, "have had their day &
ought to be content. Had Mr. Van Buren been our candidate,
worthy as he is, this feeling which everywhere pervaded the
Democratic ranks, would have made his defeat as signal as it was
in 1840." Even Polk, he added, would have run better in Phila-
delphia had it not been rumored that he would distribute the
patronage among the "old hunkers."^ Such a letter from Robert
1 Buchanan to Polk, Nov. 4, 1844, Polk Papers.
PFESIDENT-ELECT 285
J. Walker Avoukl not have been snrprising, but Buchanan's
solicitude for the younger men \vas significantly of recent origin.
Tyler's withdrawal from the canvass occasioned speculation
as to the recognition which his friends would receive from the
Democratic party, and during the campaign Polk received many
letters which were designed to pledge him in advance. The
candidate discreetly refrained from committing himself, although
his supporters may have given assurance that the followers of
the President would not be proscribed. Special importance was
attached to a letter written by Jackson to Major Lewis- in which
the General said that Tyler's friends would be received as breth-
ren. Then, too, Walker, as chairman of the national Democratic
committee, had made promises to influential adherents of the
President. Nevertheless the Tylerites were apparently unwill-
ing to run any risks, and soon after Polk's election they were
charged by prominent Democrats with having concocted a scheme
Avhereby they hoped to intrench themselves in office. One part of
this scheme, according to H. C. Williams, was to procure the
resignation of Whigs so that President Tyler might fill the offices
with eleventh-hour Democrats whom it would be embarrassing
for Polk to remove.^ Probably such reports exaggerated the
facts, especially as to Whig resignations, but it is certain that
the Tyler faction believed themselves to be entitled to a share of
Democratic patronage. In plaintive note, John Y. Mason,
Tyler 's Secretary of the Navy, expressed a willingness to remain
in the cabinet. He had, he told Polk, from a sense of duty
resigned a judgeship so that he might take charge of the Navy
Department, and had felt "very unhappy" since Tyler had be-
come a candidate. Jackson, whom he had consulted, had advised
him to remain in the cabinet because Tyler would soon with-
draw. He would resign of course on March 3 unless Polk should
2 Dated July 6, 1844. See Tyler, Life and Times of the Tylers, III,
143 ff.
3 H. C. Williams, Washington, Nov. 15; Henry Simpson, Philadelphia,
Nov. 21, 1844, Polk Papers,
286 JAMES K. POLK
dedre otherwise, therefore he desired a "frank statement" of
Polk's intentions. Mason had been a college mate of Polk and
they had since been warm personal friends, but with habitual
caution the President-elect replied that he would leave all such
matters to be settled after his arrival in Washington.'*
Directly and indirectly Polk received much unsolicited advice
on the subject of patronage, and especially on the selection of
his cabinet. Through General Armstrong, H. C. Williams
warned him that rival factions were already planning for the
succession of their respective favorites, therefore he should dis-
countenance all of them.^ As usual, Judge Catron was free with
his fatherly advice. He had been told by Governor Letcher, of
Kentucky, that the Whigs confidently believed Polk to be under
pledges to Calhoun; and that because Calhoun's friends and
those of Van Buren and Benton could never work in har-
mony, discord and disaster would beset the new administration.
Catron assured Letcher that Polk had made no pledges to any
wing of the party, but despite the truth of his statement, the
rumors regarding Calhoun continued to circulate. Since Polk
had been elected without making promises, Catron's advice w^as
that he should "go to Washington entirely unpledged, down to
a post office." The cold shoulder, he said, might at first give
offense ; but no matter, for ' ' you are under no pressure of
obligation to your party, other than to administer the govern-
ment through the agency of men of undoubted strength and
worth of character, frcmi head to foot."^ John Blair, of
4 Mason to Polk, Nov. 16; Polk to Mason, Dec. 6, 1844, ihid.
5 Williams to Armstrong, Nov. 26, 1844, ihid.
« Catron to Polk, Nov. 23, 1844, Polk Papers. Catron, like others, had
his own individual preferences, but he continued to urge I'olk to make
his own selections. Both Johnson and Brown wrote on December 14 that
Catron had suggested Buchanan, Wright, and Cass for the State,
Treasury, and War Departments, reai)ectively. "Of one thing I am abso-
lutely certain," wrote Catron to Polk on February 4, "tliat you must
begin as absolute master of your will, if this be possible, in framing your
cabinet. Strength it must have, and men in it that will work in harmony:
This done and you are perfectly safe, regardless of fretting for a brief
space. The old dare not, as the young will overthrow them — and the
young, set up no claim to such assumptions" (Polk Papers).
PEESIDENT-ELECT 287
Tennessee, offered a liappy solution for sectional discord —
patronao-e in plenty for the North and principles for the South."
Warnings and advice, however well meant, were entirely
superfluous, for Polk felt himself to be fully capable of formulat-
ing his own plans. He could not prevent gossip and speculation,
but he declared emphatically to Cave Johnson that he was
' ' under no pledges or commitments to any of the cliques ( if such
exist) mentioned by the newspapers." The policy which he had
chosen to follow relieved him in a great measure from consulting
the wishes of discordant factions, and his success in executing
it proved the wisdom of his choice. "My object," he told Cave
Johnson,
will be to do my duty to the country, and I do not intend if I can avoid it,
that my counsels shall be distracted by the supposed or not conflicting inter-
ests of those cliques. Another thing I Avill say — that I ^vill if I can have
a united and harmonious set of cabinet counsellors, who will have the exist-
ing administration and the good of the country more at heart than the
question who shall succeed me, and that in any event I intend to be myself
President of the U. S.8
No one can follow his career for the next four years without
being convinced that he held the executive reins firmly in his
own hands.
Selecting a cabinet from men of ability who would subord-
inate their own personal interests to those of the administration
and of the country required an unusual degree of independence.
The desired cooperation could not be obtained without the elim-
ination of recognized leaders of factions ; and such a course would
inevitably subject the administration to attacks from all who
had been disappointed.
The claims of the Tylerites might be ignored with impunity,
but what to do with Calhoun was a more embarrassing question.
7 ' ' North of Mason & Dickson 's line should be plied with patronage
as principles more congenial to the South must of necessity be established
& carried out whatever vour personal predelections" may be (Blair to
Polk, Dec. 2, 1844, Polk Papers).
8 Polk to Johnson, Dec. 21, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters."
288 JAMES E. POLK
Although Calhoun denied emphatically that there had ever been
any understanding between Polk and himself,'' apparently he
was not without hope that he would be invited to remain at the
helm in the Department of State. Late in November one of his
intimate friends, General James Hamilton, sounded Polk on the
subject and dwelt on the desirability of having Calhoun con-
tinued in charge of the Texas and Oregon questions. For a
southern member of the cabinet, said he, the entire South, from
the Potomac to Louisiana, would prefer Calhoun. ^°
The difficulties Avhich might result from any attempt to har-
monize factions were set forth in a letter from Cave Johnson.
He said that it was understood in Washington that Calhoun and
other members of Tyler's cabinet desired to remain. It was also
the general opinion that should Calhoun be retained Benton and
his friends would oppose Polk's administration, while, on the
other hand, the southern element would be hostile unless Calhoun
should be continued in office. Calhoun, said Johnson, is the choice
of southern men for Secretary of State, while many from the
North want Silas Wright ; and Benton is reported to have de-
clared that should Polk retain any of the Tyler cabinet he would
open fire on the "rotten eggs. "^^ General Jackson's advice to
Polk was the exclusion from his cabinet of "all aspirants to the
presidency, or vice"; and the General was so confident that his
advice would be followed that he assured Blair that neither Cal-
houn nor any other aspirant would be appointed. In another
letter to Polk, Jackson urged that Calhoun must not be retained,
because other members of the cabinet could not get along with
him: "England is the place for him there to combat with my
Lord Aberdeen, the abolition question." The entire cabinet,
9 "Nothing has ever passed between Mr. Polk and myself, directly or
indirectly, on the subject. I neither know his views nor he mine on the
subject'' (Calhoun to J. A. Stuart, Oct. 21, 1844, Eep. of Am. Hist., 1899,
II, 626).
10 Hamilton to Polk, Nov. 29, 1844, Polk Papers.
11 Johnson to I'olk, Dec. 1, 6, 1844, ibid.
PRESIDENT-ELECT 289
said he, ought to be composed of new men.^- Writing late in
December, Cave Johnson said that the friends of Benton and
Calhoun feared each other's influence with Polk, consequently
the breach between the wings of the party was widening. Espe-
cially did the northerners fear that Polk would be brought under
the influence of Calhoun. In a similar strain A. V. Brown
wi'ote that all elements were working to induce Polk not to retain
Calhoun. There was, he said, scarcely less opposition to Cass;
while Benton and Wright opposed Buchanan on account of the
stand he had taken at Baltimore in favor of the two-thirds rule.^^
While others were doing their utmost to prevent his retention,
Calhoun himself was telling his friends that there was much
speculation concerning the cabinet and not a little intriguing in
various quarters. He reported himself to be ''perfectly passive"
and "indifferent." Whether he would remain or not, if invited,
would depend on the "probable course of the administration."^*
His supporters, however, were both active and hopeful. Some
of them were sanguine enough to believe that Calhoun would
be able to build up such a strong party following that Polk would
not dare to remove him.^'^ Hearing that Gideon Pillow had re-
marked that Polk's chief difficulty was "how to get rid of Cal-
houn," even Duff Green felt constrained to warn the President-
elect of the dangers which would result from sacrificing Calhoun
in order to conciliate Benton and Wright. ' ' I make no pretense
of friendship for you," he told Polk very frankly; but as a
12 Jackson to Polk, Dee. 13, 16, Folic Papers; Jackson to Blair, Dec.
14, 1844, Jackson Papers.
13 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 26; Brown to Polk, Dec. 29, 1844, Polk Papers.
14 Calhoun to his son-in-law, Thos. G. Clemson, Dec. 13, 1844, Eep. Am.
Assn., 1899, II, 633. Dr. Gwin, who was supposed to be voicing Calhoun's
views, suggested to A. V. Brown the following cabinet: Calhoun, See. of
State; Walker, Sec. of Treasury; Woodbury, See. of War; Eeed, of Pa.,
Atty. Gen.; Flagg, P-M Gen.; Mason, Sec. of Navy. Van Buren was sug-
gested as minister to England (Brown to Polk, Jan. 5, 1845, Polk Papers).
15 C. A. Davis, New York, to Crittenden, Dee. 17, 1844, Crittenden
Papers.
290 JAMES E. POLK
friend of the South, he urged Calhoun's retention.^*' Calhoun
himself continued to remain passive until February 26, when, in
a personal interview, Polk informed him that there was to be an
entirely new cabinet and offered to send him as minister to Eng-
land. On the day following he sent Polk his resignation and
assured him that there was neither dissatisfaction nor abatement
of kind feelings on his own part.^^
New England began at an early date to solicit a place in the
cabinet. In New Hampshire, Hubbard and Woodbury were
mentioned, but her congressional delegation preferred Pierce.^^
Bancroft was suggested as the New England member, but he
informed Polk that he would prefer a foreign mission.^*^ Maine
was especially insistent in her claims for recognition, and Polk
received numerous letters from politicians of that state. In
several of them Governor Fairfield was suggested as Secretary
of the Navy, and Nathan Weston as Attorney General.
The greatest rivalry, however, aside from the solicitation in
Calhoun's behalf, was that between New York on the one side,
and Pennsylvania and the West on the other. In Pennsylvania
Buchanan and Dallas were the recognized heads of two rival fac-
tions, each of which was desirous of gaining a strategic position
in the new administration. In order to accomplish his purpose,
Dallas recommended that Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, be
made Secretary of State.-" Dallas and Walker were connected
by family ties as well as by political sympathies. In addition,
Walker had the support of the aggressive forces in the south-
western states. Richard Rush urged the claims of Buchanan.
18 Green to Polk, Jan. 20, 1845, PoUc Papers. On January 1, Memucan
Hunt wrote from Galveston that leading public men in Texas wished
Calhoun to be retained and Donelson to be made Secretary of the Treasury.
17 Calhoun to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845, Polk Papers. Same to Clemson,
March 11, 1845, Bep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, II, 647.
18 John P. Hale to Pierce, Dec. 3, 1844, Pierce Papers.
19 Lewis Josselyn, of Boston, to J. Geo. Harris, Dec. 4, 1844; Bancroft
to Polk, Jan. 1, 1845, PoUc Papers.
20 Dallas to Polk, Dec. 15, 1844, ibid.
PEESIDENT-ELECT 291
The latter had also received the formal endorsement of the
Pennsylvania electoral college, but Dallas informed Polk that
this action had been procured by the intrigue of a man who
wished to be made collector of the port of Philadelphia. Dallas
once more recommended Walker, dwelling on his command of
foreign languages and upon the fact that he would be especially
acceptable to the Texans.-'
The rejection of Van Buren at Baltimore made it desirable
that the powerful state of New York should be placated if pos-
sible. Polk very naturally, therefore, turned his thoughts in
that direction, and his offer of the Treasury Department to Silas
Wright was the first tender of a cabinet position to any one.
Wright promptly declined the oifer. The reason, as stated in his
letter, was that he had pledged himself to serve as governor, if
elected, and should he fail to do so it would be said that his
nomination had been a trick to enable him to procure a cabinet
position. When expressing regret because Wright had felt con-
strained to decline, Polk stated that while he had not yet decided
upon a person for any of the cabinet positions, he intended to
select either the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treas-
ury from the state of New York. He asked Wright freely to
suggest a man for either position.-^ In his reply Wright recom-
mended Benjamin F. Butler for the State Department and
Azariah C. Flagg for the Treasury. Lest Polk might think that
he would have accepted the State portfolio, he assured the Presi-
dent-elect that he did not feel qualified to fill that office. Had
he been at liberty to fill any such position he would have accepted
the Treasury appointment.
In a letter dated January 4, 1845, Polk assured Van Buren
that his nomination at Baltimore had been unsought and unex-
pected. He prevaricated to the degree of stating that : "Until
21 Rush to Polk, Dec. 27, 1844; Dallas to Polk, Jan. 10, 1845, Hid.
22 Polk to Wright, Dec. 7; Wright to Polk, Dec. 20, 1844; Polk to
Wright, Jan. 4, 1845, ihid.
292 JAMES K. FOLK
the moment it was made, it was very far from my thoughts, that
any state of circumstances could arise, which could lead to such
a result." He thanked the ex-President for his "powerful
support" and requested his advice as to suitable members of
the cabinet. Wright, he said, was the only selection he had
made without consulting anyone, but as that offer had been
declined, he would like to have Van Buren suggest persons for
either the State or Treasury Departments.^^ In reply, Yan
Buren stated that Polk had acted just as he would have done in
offering the Treasury portfolio to Wright, and that Wright's
refusal to accept was due entirely to the political situation in
New York. He knew of no one so well qualified to take charge
of foreign affairs as Benjamin F. Butler, and he believed either
Flagg or Cambreleng to be suitable for the Treasury Depart-
ment. A month later he told Polk that Donelson would be a
good man to have near him. He had desired to have Donelson
in his own cabinet, but had feared that modesty would prevent
him from accepting.-* Jackson believed that Wright 's refusal to
accept a cabinet position had been due to the fear that Calhoun
would be retained. He advised Polk to deliberate well and to
make no final decisions until he had reached Washington. He
believed Mason and Wilkins to be worthy men, but "surely you
will do well to select an entire cabinett fresh from the people
as your own, & leave Mr. Tylers out to be provided for, if thought
worthy otherwise. ' '-^
Before making another tender of a cabinet office Polk pre-
pared a form of invitation to be used in future eases. Its pur-
pose was to make clear to those who might receive it that a
cabinet position was not to be used, during the next four years,
as a stepping-stone to the Presidency, and that each member
23 Polk to Van Buren, Jan. 4, 1845, Van Buren Papers. Also, copy in
PolJc Papers.
2* Van Buren to Polk, Jan. 18, 1845, PoUc Papers and Van B. Papers;
Van Buren to Polk, Feb. 21, Folic Papers.
-■> Jackson to Polk, Jan. 10, 1845, Folk Papers.
PBESIDENT-ELECT 293
must devote his whole time to the duties of his office."" Although
he was not a military man, Polk possessed at least one attribute
of a true soldier. As a private in the ranks of his party he was
ever ready to submit without complaint to the judgment of the
leaders ; and now, as party chieftain, he required from others
a similar respect for authority. Jackson, who knew Polk
thoroughly, assured Blair that "He will have no caball about
him, his heads of Departments must be a unit. This is my opin-
ion of the man, and I think you will, when you know the men
be pleased with his selection."-^
On January 28, 1845, Polk left his home at Columbia and
set out for Washington. The fact that he was going to fill the
highest office of his country did not for a moment overcome his
habitual caution nor prevent him from giving thoughtful atten-
tion to minute details. He had written to Cave Johnson and
other friends and asked them to procure rooms for him at Cole-
man's hotel, but the rates must be reasonable and the bargain
made in advance.^^
When he arrived in Washington in the middle of February
the President-elect had not, with the exception of Buchanan,
definitely decided upon any member of his cabinet.-'' Early in
26 See infra, p. 325.
27 Jackson to Blair, Jan. 21, 1845, Jackson Papers. There were, of
course, those who held a radically different opinion. "Polk," wrote
Prentiss, "was elected by a union of factions. He has neither honesty
nor capacity to be the president even of his party — he will become at once
the tool of those factions" (Prentiss to Crittenden, Dec. 22, 1844, Crit-
tenden Papers). J. K. Paulding, also, considered Polk weak and unable
to cope with the situation, "whether he selects a northern, a southern, or
a mixed cabinet." "He is by no means a great man — nor scarcely one
of extraordinary mediocrity; and if the truth must be told, I admire Mrs.
Polk much more than I do the colonel (Paulding to Van Buren, Jan. 19,
1845, Van Buren Papers).
28 ' ' You know I have no money to spend unnecessarily, — and to avoid
being subjected to an extravagant or enormous charge, it is necessary that
a distinct bargain shall be made in advance" (Polk to Johnson, Dec. 21,
1844, "Polk- Johnson Letters").
20 According to Gideon Welles, he had also settled upon Bancroft for
the Treasurv and Walker for Attorney General, before leaving Tennessee
(MS "Rev.^of Pol. Hist, of U. S. and Pres. Contests," Welles Papers).
294 JAMES K. POLK
the AA'inter, at a meeting held at the Hermitage, Buchanan had
been discussed as a possible premier for the cabinet, but then
it was believed that his appointment would cause too much
jealously on the part of Benton, Calhoun, Cass, and Wright.^"
However, on his arrival in "Washington, Polk immediately invited
Buchanan to take charge of the State Department, and the tender
was promptly accepted. ^^
Having thus provided for Pennsylvania, Polk addressed an-
other letter to Van Buren. When he last wrote, he said, he
intended to look to New York for either a Secretary of State or
a Secretary of War. Subsequently he had decided to call a
citizen of another state to the Department of State, but was still
desirous that a citizen of New York should take charge of the
Treasury. Such had been his intention when he came to Wash-
ington. On his arrival, however, he found that the South had
already united on a distinguished individual from that section
and that Indiana as well as other western states favored the same
person.
I was not satisfied that it was proper to appoint him to that Post — -but became
convinced — that if I did not — great and extensive dissatisfaction would
prevail — unless I could find some individual in some part of the Union who
would be unexceptionable to them & also to the North.
Believing that Bancroft would fulfil these conditions, "my pre-
sent determination therefore is to call him to that [Treasury]
Department." He was inclined, he said, to retain Mason in
charge of the Navy, and would be glad to have either Butler or
Marcy as his Secretary of War.^- Evidently the distinguished
individual mentioned in the letter was Robert J. Walker, of
Mississippi. Writing early in January, A. V. Brown told Polk
30 J. P. Brawles to Buchanan, Dec. 20, 18'44, Buchanan Papers. Brawles
was told this by A. V. Brown, who had been ]>resent when Polk discussed
cabinet appointments with Jackson.
31 Polk's letter was dated at Washington on Feb. 17 (Bucltanan Papers)
and Buchanan rej)lied on Feb. 18 (Polk Papers).
32 Polk to Van Buren, Feb. 22, 1845, Van Buren Papers.
PBESIDENT-ELECT 295
that Joseph A. Wright, Representative from Indiana, had re-
ported that his own section as well as the Northwest wished
Walker to be made Secretary of the Ti'easury so that he might
have the appointment of land agents and other western officials.
If, said he, Silas Wright should be given the office, he would
use it to his own advantage and to the prejudice of Cass. From
Cave Johnson, also, came the information that the "Cass men"
all preferred Walker, and he gave the same reasons for their
preference. ^^
Polk did not yield immediately to the importunities of
Walker's friends; instead he held to his original plan of making
Bancroft Secretary of the Treasury and Walker Attorney Gen-
eral. He even drafted a letter in which he invited Walker to
accept the latter position, but probably it was never sent.^* On
February 25, without awaiting a reply from Van Buren, he
offered the War portfolio to Benjamin F. Butler. Butler
promptly declined because of "domestic and prudential consid-
erations," although he w-ould have made the sacrifice if he had
been tendered either the State or the Treasury Department. ^"^
Van Buren deliberated well before answering Polk's letter
of February 22 ; but on March 1, he drafted a reply and sent it
to Washington by his son, Smith Van Buren. In it he said that
the "honest portion" of the New York Democracy were excited
by a rumor that Woodbury was to be made Secretary of the
Treasury, and that New York was to be passed over entirely. He
did not say, but seemed to assume, that Butler would reconsider
his refusal of the War portfolio."'' Polk appears to have felt
33 Brown to Polk, Jan. 9; Johnson to Polk, Jan. 11, 1845, Polk Papers.
3* Copy, dated Feb. 19, 1845, ibid.
33 Butler to Polk, Feb. 27, 1845, Polk Papers. Mrs. Butler wrote to
Van Buren that she was responsible for her husband's refusing the War
portfolio; that she had promised that if he were offered the State Depart-
ment she would not object, but this promise di<l not apply to other depart-
ments. Her reason was that she did not like to live in Washington (Mrs.
Butler to Van Buren, Feb. 27, 1845, Van Buren Papers).
3c Van Buren to Polk, Albany, March 1, 1845, Polk Papers.
296 JAMES K. POLK
that Butler's prompt refusal and Van Buren's delay had ab-
solved him from further obligation to that wing of the party,
for, on March 1, he informed Van Buren that, as Flagg did not
have a national reputation, he had decided to make Marcy Secre-
tary of War. He hoped that this appointment would be satis-
factory to New York. The rumor that Bancroft was to be made
Secretary of the Treasury had "brought down upon me" the
delegations from New Hampshire and Maine, and many — on ac-
count of the patronage he dispenses — were demanding the ap-
pointment of a southern man to that office. ^^
When Smith Van Buren arrived in Washington with the let-
ter from his father he was chagrined to learn that Polk had
already appointed Marcy. "Well," he reported to the ex-
President,
the letter which you rec'd dated last night from the illustrious cabinet-maker
of our day has advised you of the fate of my mission ; and unless the excuses
& explanations were more skilfully done in writing than in conversation, you
will have seen through the flimsy pretexts — the contradictory & evasive &
trimming character of the business, at least so far as New York is concerned.
Polk, he said, had declined to receive him for half an hour, in
order to give himself and A. V. Brown time to "concoct" an an-
swer. Polk wished that he might have seen Van Buren 's letter a
day earlier, but the matter had now been decided. ' ' The Treasury
arrangement [Walker's appointment] you perceive tells the whole
story for New York. The only chance now is that your letter
may upset the whole concern, & start anew the business to-
morrow." In a letter written on the following day he said that
when he read his father's letter to Polk, the latter, instead of
feeling crestfallen, had the "impudence" to say that he felt
relieved. "I denounced Marcy to him in good round terms" and
37 Polk to "Van Buren, March 1, 1845, Van Buren Papers. Evidently
Marcy had been expecting an offer, for on Feb. 24 he wrote to Dickinson
about "my appointment as a member of the cabinet." This must have
been speculation, because on the day following (25th) Polk offered the
"War portfolio to Butler.
PEESIDENT-ELECT 297
said that he was simply an office seeker in whom honest Demo-
crats had no faith. Polk replied that he had never heard
these things before and was "tliunderstruck," although "Dix
has told him the same thing over and over again. "^'^
Instead of beginning anew with his cabinet making, Polk dis-
patched another letter to A^an Buren. If he had committed an
error, he said, it had been unintentional; and it pained him to
think tliat Van Buren might think he had acted unkindly to him
or his friends. He had acted, he said under no outside influence ;
he had followed his own judgment, and harbored no unkind feel-
ing toward either Van Buren or Wright.^*^ Nevertheless, Smith
Van Buren had formed quite a different opinion. "The sound-
est judges here," he wrote, "think P. came here all right — but
has been be-deviled since he arrived. To a large extent this is of
course evident, but not wholly so."**^
It is scarcely to be wondered at that Polk should have dis-
sembled during the days just preceding his inauguration. He
was beset on every hand by conflicting demands, all of which he
was expected to satisfy. That he strove to harmonize factional
discord so far as his own self-respect would permit, there is no
reason to doubt. He tried to deal fairly with each faction, but
to accept the dictation of none. If the Van Burenites suffered
disappointment they had only themselves to blame, for Polk had
given them more consideration than he had ever received from
them. He had tendered cabinet positions to two of their number.
38 Smith Van Buren to his father, March 2, 3, 1845, Van Buren Papers.
Tilden and O 'Sullivan, who bore letters from Butler to Polk, were, on the
other hand, thoroughly captivated by the President-elect. The latter re-
ported that Polk seemed like "one of us" and evinced great admiration
for both Wright and Van Buren. ' ' He certainly entirely won the hearts
of both of us, and has effectually dissipated whatever slight degree of
anxiety may have rested in our minds in regard to the Adm'n" (O 'Sul-
livan to Van Buren, Washington, March 1, 1845, Van Buren Papers).
39 Polk to Van Buren, March 3, 1845, Polh Papers.
40 Smith Van Buren to his father, March 4, 1845, Van Buren Papers.
"Armstrong," said he, "so far as I can observe, is the only honest man
about him. He [Armstrong] is sick & very much affected by our affairs.
He doubtless sees the approaching storm from Nashville."
298 JAMES K. POLK
and he had kept Van Buren fully informed regarding his plans.
He had even told the ex-President of his intention to appoint
Marcy unless Butler should accept the place offered to him. Van
Buren had delayed in answering his letter, and it was unreason-
able to expect Polk to wait indefinitely when inauguration day
was already at hand. Surely Polk had the right to make his own
choice for the office of Secretary of State, and it was cool effront-
ery on Butler's part to intimate that the position should have
been bestowed upon himself.
"Walker's assignment to the Treasury evidently was contrary
to Polk's own washes, yet he felt constrained to make this con-
cession to the western element after his own choice, Bancroft,
was found to be unpopular even in New England states. A new
adjustment became necessary, therefore Mason was made
Attorney General so that Bancroft might be assigned to the Navy.
Mason's retention in the cabinet was due to personal friendship,
and not to a desire to placate Tyler and his friends. Tyler had,
in January, bestowed a diplomatic appointment upon William H.
Polk, but the latter declined to accept it in order to free his
brother from any obligation to the retiring President.^^ In fact,
Tyler was much displeased by the ingratitude of his successor,
and, in 1846, wrote that Polk seemed to be ''avenging the sup-
posed wrongs to Mr. Van Buren. "*^ Marcy 's acceptance of the
War portfolio" completed the cabinet, for Cave Johnson had
accepted the appointment as Postmaster General shortly after
Polk's arrival in Washington.** Although many persons had
suggested Donelson as the Tennessee member, Polk evidently
preferred Johnson, and Jackson assured Polk that Donelson
■*i Cave Johnson to Polk, Jan. 8; J. L. 0 'Sullivan to Polk, Jan. 20,
1845, Polk Papers.
42 Tyler to Alex. Gardner, Julv 11, 1846 (Tvler, Letters and Times of
the Tylers, II, 342).
43 Welles says that "Gen. [William O.] Butler of Kentucky accom-
paniecl the President-elect to the seat of government in expectation of the
appointment [War Dept.] then tendered him" (MS "Rev. of Pol. Hist.,
etc."). I have seen nothing else to indicate that such an offer was made.
44 Johnson to Polk, Feb. 26, 1845, Polk Papers.
PRESIDENT-ELECT 299
would be satisfied with a foreign mission. Jackson had made it
clear to Donelson, he said, that he was the one who had suggested
a diplomatic appointment in preference to any other. *^ Johnson
thoroughly deserved a place in Polk's cabinet, for no one had
stood by him so loyally or had rendered more efficient service dur-
ing his entire political career. Polk was by nature secretive and
self-reliant, but to Johnson more than to any other person he
disclosed his plans and his aspirations. Johnson had never failed
him in the hour of need, and, both in Washington and in Tenn-
essee, had done much to aid his political advancement. As a
statesman, Johnson was conservative and rather narrow ; but he
was a crafty and capable politician, and a recognized leader in
the House.
In selecting his cabinet, as in distributing the patronage, Polk
had to steer between Scylla and Charybdis. When he tried to
be fair to all wings of the party, he was charged with weakness ;
while independent actions were attributed to vanity and conceit,
or characterized as downright treachery to his benefactors. It
was freely predicted that leading cabinet members Avould dom-
inate the President and reduce him to a mere figurehead, yet,
from the beginning, Polk was master of the situation.
Scarcely less difficult than the selection of a cabinet was the
choice of a party "organ" which Avould give ungrudging sup-
port to the new administration. Historians have indulged in no
small amount of conjecture as to Polk's reasons for discarding
Blair and the Glohe despite General Jackson's vigorous protests.
His action is usually said to have been the consummation of a
preelection bargain to obtain votes. Sometimes Tyler is made
the other party to the contract, sometimes Calhoun ; and in an
attempt to make out a strong case, some have asserted that Blair's
head on a platter had been offered to each of them in return for
his political support. Usually their information has been derived
45 Jackson to Polk, Jan. 10, Feb. 15, 1845, ibid. On account of Donel-
son's delicate health, Jackson asked that he might be sent as full minister
to Spain, Brazil, or Mexico.
300 JAMES K. FOLK
from Benton, and accepted without question. But even von
Hoist, who had no difficulty in believing the Tyler story, balks at
the absurdity of a bargain between Polk and Calhoun.'*" For
very good reasons both Tyler and Calhoun despised the editor
of the Globe, and both supported the nominees of the Democratic
party, but such a coincidence does not imply any bargain between
them and the Democratic candidates. Calhoun 's letter to Stuart
concerning the prospective cabinet*^ seems to indicate that he
had no knowledge of Polk's plans for the future, and Tyler has
specifically and emphatically denied that he and Polk had ever
entered into an agreement by which Tyler's withdrawal from
the canvass was made contingent on Polk's promise not to make
the Globe his official organ. As Tyler very aptly remarked,
"Blair was already dead," and it only remained for Mr. Polk to
chant his requiem. ^^
It is unnecessary to seek some mysterious intrigue or pre-
election pact in order to find Polk's motive for establishing a
new paper in Washington. The obvious reason for establishing
the Union was his desire to have an organ at the capital which
would give his administration its undivided and loyal support.
He had always believed Blair to be hostile or indifferent to his
jDolitical advancement when he had been a candidate for Speaker,
and when he had sought the Vice-Presidential nomination. Both
Polk and his friends believed that the Globe had supported the
nominees of the Baltimore convention with great reluctance and
that its editor was now, and would continue to be, under the
absolute domination of Senator Benton. This belief is the best
of reasons for Polk's refusal to make the Globe his official news-
paper. Walker and others were hostile to Blair and undoubtedly
4« von Hoist, Historij of the United States, III, 7-8.
•»' See above, p. 288, note 9.
■* 8 Tyler to Eitchie, Jan. 9, 1851; same to John S. Cunningham, Mav 8,
1856 (Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 409 ff., 415). In ^the
second letter, Tyler said that the "conspiracy to supplant the Globe, by
substituting Mr. Ritchie or anybody else as the editorial mouth-piece of
Mr. Polk, is the sheerest invention that ever was conceived of. ' '
PRESIDENT-ELECT 301
desired his elimination. Their feelings may have strengthened
Polk's determination to look elsewhere for an editor, but there
is no reason for believing that they caused it. Polk's Tennessee
friends wrote freely concerning the advisability of establishing a
new paper, but in his correspondence there is no letter from
Walker on this subject.*®
Polk's feelings toward Blair are manifested in a letter written
to Cave Johnson on January 21, 1844. "Amicus" had published
in the Glolc an article which urged the claims of W. R. King to
the Vice-Presidency. In reply, S. H. Laughlin and H. L. Turney
prepared an article in Polk's behalf and sent it to Blair for pub-
lication. "Blair," said Polk, "surely cannot do me the injustice
to exclude it from his columns"; if so, he instructed Johnson to
have it published in pamphlet form. After alluding to his nom-
ination by the Mississippi state convention, Polk wondered
whether Blair would suppress this news "or stick it in an obscure
corner as he did the Tennessee and Arkansas nominations?"^'^
Such remarks indicate that he did not, even at that time, regard
Blair as his friend.
Immediately after Polk had been nominated at Baltimore,
A. V. Brown reported from Washington that "much is said here
by some as to continuing the Globe as the Polk organ— this we
will manage with sound discretion. The Globe will change its
tone & perhaps take back much that it has said & go in warmly
if not heartily— if so— well— But we will not commit ourselves
to it after the election."" The last remark might seem to indicate
that Blair's fate after election had already been determined, but
this is disproved by letters written later in the campaign. Cave
Johnson, who was hostile to Calhoun and averse to the Tylerites,
wrote that the Globe was noncommittal and that a new paper was
49 Althoujih Ambler assigns to Walker the chief role in the overthrow
of Blair, he admits his inability to produce any tangible evidence (Ambler,
Thomas Eitchie, 252).
50 Polk to Johnson, Jan. 21, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters."
51 Brown to Polk, May 30, 1844, Polk Papers.
302 JAMES K. POLE
needed ; but two weeks later, when he had come to believe that
the southerners were trying to "appropriate" Polk, he spoke
with disgust of the "secret talk of upsetting the Globe [and]
turning Benton overboard."^- Judge Catron vehemently de-
nounced the Glohe and declared that its "coarse brutality" was
loathed by a large majority of the party.^^
Late in June, J. B. Jones, editor of the Madisonian, invited
J. George Harris to become joint editor of that paper. Harris
and General Armstrong looked with favor upon the offer and
believed that all threeWashington papers — Madisonian, Spectator
and Glohe — might be merged into one. However, A. V. Brown,
who had come from Washington recently, did not approve such
an arrangement.^* It was not yet a question of an administration
organ, for there was no certainty that Polk would be elected, but
many of Polk 's friends felt that Blair 's support of the ticket was
merely perfunctory and that a more vigorous journal was needed.
This feeling was not caused entirely by what appeared or did not
appear in the columns of the Glohe. The campaign leaders be-
lieved Blair to be under the thumb of Benton, and the latter was
vociferously denouncing the "intrigue" which had deprived
Van Buren of the nomination and, also, the annexation program.
Despite the need of a reliable party organ there seemed to be no
satisfactory solution of the difficulty, therefore the matter was
dropped until after the election.
The correspondence does not disclose who it was that first
suggested inviting Ritchie to come to Washington, but Brown
rather than Walker seems to have been the prime mover. In a
letter written to Polk, soon after the election. Brown said that
Walker ' ' entertains the same opinion with us " as to the import-
ance of procuring Blair's half of the Glohe for Ritchie. Blair
would not be approached, he said, until Cave Johnson had gone
52 Johnson to Polk, June 1 [1844?, year not given], June 13, 1844, PoJl:
Tapers.
•"Catron to Polk, June 8, [1844], ibid.
54 Harris to Polk, June 27, 29 ; Armstrong to Polk, June 30, 1844, ibid.
PllESIBENT-ELECT 303
to Richmond to sound Ritchie on the subject. "If that dont
take — then B «& Rives must sink into mere propnctors, with an
able d' competent Editor having absolute controul of the political
character of the paper. "''° Cave Johnson, also, had become con-
vinced that Blair must go. Some of the politicians, said he, fear
that the Globe will be dominated by Benton and they will there-
fore oppose giving it the public printing; "I see no chance of
a reconciliation with them if F. P. Blair is retained." A few
days later he reported that "the Globe is regarded as Benton's
organ by the friends of C [alhoun] & will oppose him to the utter-
most & will in connection with the Whigs defeat him & therefore
B[rown] & myself have been sounding, to learn the prospect of
getting Ritchie . . . . T. H. B[enton] has a great dislike to
Ritchie & I expect will be greatly provoked, if he learns any such
movement."^'' This letter show^s a desire to prevent opposition
from the Calhoun faction, but it indicates, also, that there had
been no preelection understanding. Had there been any such
understanding Johnson would have been one of the first to learn
of it.
As soon as General Jackson heard of the scheme to supplant
the Globe he took immediate steps to thwart it. Assuming that
Polk knew nothing about the matter, Jackson warned him that
an intrigue was being concocted in "Washington which might
divide the party and wreck his administration. Some, he said,
wished to substitute the Madisonian for the Globe; others wanted
to make Ritchie editor of the Globe. He urged Polk to discoun-
tenance such maneuvers for
the first would blow you sky high & destroy the Republican party — The
second would be an insult to the Editor of the Globe & seperate him from
you, whose administration he is determined to support — Keep Blairs Globe
the administration paper, and William B. Lewis, to ferret out & make known
to you all the plotts & intrigues Hatching against your administration and
you are safe.
55 Brown to Polk, Dec. 5, 1844, ibid.
56 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 6, 12, 1844, ibid.
30i JAMES K. POLE
These men had been such a source of strength to Jackson himself
that very naturally he desired his friend Polk to have the benefit
of their services. But battling for Old Hickory was one thing,
and loyal support of the man who had profited by the intngue
against Van Buren was quite another. Polk well knew that both
men had always been ready to throw obstacles in his way, and
he had no reason to believe that their feeling toward him had
undergone any change.
Jackson may have been wrong in his belief that Blair and
Lewis would labor for the glory of Polk's administration, but
another part of his letter showed that he understood Ritchie's
weaknesses better than did those who were so anxious to bring
him to Washington. "Ritchie is a good Editor," he told Polk,
"but a very unsafe one — He goes off at half bent, & does great
injury before he can be set right. "^' Before many months had
elapsed, Polk realized fully the accuracy of the General's state-
ment.
On the following day, Jackson informed Blair of the scheme
to merge the Spectator and the Madisonian into a Polk organ.
He attributed this scheme to Calhoun. Believing that his word
was still law, he told Blair that ' ' I am sure polk when he hears of
it will feel as indignant at the plott as I do."^* In Washington
the "plott" had already been discovered, and Cave Johnson (on
account of his known intimacy with Polk) feared to go to Rich-
mond for the purpose of negotiating with Ritchie. The pre-
mature discovery greatly annoyed Johnson, and he complained
that "even old J. Q. A [dams] asked when we were going to
Richmond. "^^ Brown, who facetiously called himself "the Presi-
dent elect ad interim," was somewhat disconcerted by Johnson's
timidity. He even suspected that his colleague did not desire to
-•7 Jackson to T'olk, Dec. 13, 1844, ibid.
5s Jackson to Blair, Dee. 14, 1844, Jackson Papers.
59 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 14, 1844, Polk Papers.
PRESIDENT-ELECT 305
get rid of Blair."'"^ General Bayly, of the Virginia delegation, and
a personal friend of Ritchie, now undertook to negotiate by letter
with the veteran editor of the Enquirer. "If my road is blocked
there," said Brown, "I shall then go for sinking Blair & Rives
into Proprietors only & putting the political controul (absolute)
into the hands of a new Editor & that man Burke Avould not
be a bad one." Brown believed that Blair would not oppose
the change "if he sees that Benton means to be antagonistic to
your administration as many of his Western friends think likely
enough. He shews no tnitigation of his opposition & nothing but
instructions plain & powerful can subdue him."''^ Here again is
a statement of the main reason for wanting a new party organ —
not pledges to Tyler or to Calhoun, but distrust of Blair and a
fear that he would be controlled by Benton, who was considered
to be an enemy of the incoming administration. Another indi-
cation that Polk had made no bargain with the Tylerites is the
sentiment voiced in a letter written by J. B. Jones, editor of the
Madisonian. The plan contemplated was, in his opinion, the
only sensible one, for he believed that discord would surely result
from the employment of any of the Washington editors.
"When," said he, "Col. Polk shall convince all parties that he
is in his own hands— that he will be the President, and not a
partisan of any aspirant, there will be no door left open for the
ingress of factious schemes. "®-
60 "He feared some newspaper squibs at him & I feared he was rather
indifferent about any matter that was against the Globe Benton & Co
but perhaps I was wrong. ' '
61 Brown to Polk, Dec. 23, 1844, Polk Papers.
62 Party factions can not "object to the [new] paper because its con-
ductor entertains no special partiality for any one of the aspirants to the
succession. But if I were to conduct the paper it would be said that Mr.
Polk had thrown himself into the hands of the Tyler men— if the editor
of the Globe, into the hands of CoL Benton— and if the Constitution
[successor to the Spectaior], into the hamls of Mr. Calhoun" (Jones to
^ Dec. 23, 1844). Apparently this was written to J. Geo. Harris, for
it was inclosed in his letter to Polk, Jan. 4, 1845, Polk Papers.
303 JAMES E. POLK
At first Ritchie did not take kindly to the plan which had been
arranged for him, and, in a letter to Bayl}^, he declined the invita-
tion. He was not able, he said, to purchase the Globe, and rival
Democratic papers would do the party more harm than good.^^
After reading Ritchie 's letter, Brown concluded that ' ' If Benton
goes right on Texas & Calhoun is not in the Cabinet there would
be no insuperable difficulty wdth the Globe — but you would find
it hard to keep in order. ' "^^ Edmund Burke was once more con-
sidered, but his former affiliations with Calhoun were urged
against his selection."^ A few days of reflection seem to have
convinced Brown that neither Benton nor Blair could be kept
in order, for he presented for Polk's consideration an entirely
new solution of the difficulty. He offered to purchase Blair's
share of the Globe and to continue the paper under the firm name
of Brown and Rives. Brown was to have exclusive control, and,
with Kendall's help, to edit the journal in the interest of the
administration.*^" His new scheme, like the others, came to
naught, and no arrangement had been made when Polk reached
Washington. Apparently the President-elect gave no encourage-
ment to the editor of the Globe, for Smith Van Buren reported to
his father that ' ' Blair says — ' Where am I to go ? ' ' '^^
Polk's own opinions concerning a party journal were ex-
pressed in very definite terms before he left Tennessee. In a
letter to Cave Johnson, he said :
As to the pi-ess which may be regarded as the Government organ, one
thing is settled in my mind. It must have no connection with, nor be under
the influence or control of any clique or portion of the party which is making
war upon any other portion of the party — with a view to the succession and
63 His letter, dated Dec. 28, is printed in full in Ambler, Thomas
Ritchie, 247-249.
6-i Brown to Polk, Jan. 1, 1843 [1845], Folic Papers.
"3 Cave Johnson to Polk, Jan. 2, 1844, ihid.
oc Brown to Polk, Jan. 5, 1845, ihid. He told Polk that if this plan di.l
not work out he might consent to run for governor of Tennessee, although
he would rather "rent a brick yard" than go through that campaign!
67 March 2, 1845, Van Buren Papers.
PEESIDENT-ELECT 307
not with a view to the success of my administration. I think the view you
take of it proper and of the proposed arrangement the best that eau be
made. I hope it may be effected.«8
Apparently Polk felt that he was regarded as a sort of charge cV
affaires who was to keep things running while the great men
contended for the prize. He had no intention of playing such a
role, and his determination to make the administration his own
and to have a paper which would promote its interests was both
characteristic of the man and an exhibition of sound sense."''
Even von Hoist, who has found little in Polk's career to com-
mend, obsolves him from the charge of subserviency to factional
leaders. He says,
Obedience to party commands, was certainly one of the principal articles
of his political creed. But if politicians had expected that they were now
going to have the mastery, because he was willing to play the part of a
manikin, they were greatly mistaken in the man.^o
As to patronage in general the President-elect maintained a
discreet silence. There was much speculation concerning future
rewards and punishments, but all had to wait until the new
President had canvassed the situation and was ready to act.
Although General Jackson made no exception to his rule of at-
tempting to provide for his friends, he did not find Polk as
accommodating as Van Buren had been. His solicitation for the
welfare of Blair and Lewis has already been noted, and Polk
had scarcely been elected before Jackson consulted Amos Kendall
in order to ascertain the position which would be most acceptable
to the star member of his "kitchen cabinet." Kendall selected
the Spanish mission and his wishes were forthwith reported to
08 Polk to Johnson, Dec. 21, 1844, "Polk-Johnson Letters." The
"proposed arrangement" evidently refers to the attempt to procure
Eitchie.
69 A rumor that Laughlin was going to Washington to edit the Madi-
sonian caused General Jackson much needless worry. He warned Polk to
keep clear of Tvler influence, for, if he did not, he would be in as bad a
position as Tyler himself (Jackson to Polk, Feb. 28, 1845, Polk Papers).
70 von Hoist, History of the United States, III, 21-22.
308 JAMES K. POLK
the President-elect. Jackson assured Polk that "there can be no
delicacy in recalling Erwin [Washington Irving] — he is only
fit to write a Book & scarcely that, and has become a good
Wliigg.'"^^
Congress had already consented to annex Texas before Polk
became President of the United States. Nevertheless, since one
of the principal planks in the platform on which he had been
elected related to this subject, and since he had been an indirect,
if not a direct, participant in this important transaction, it is
necessary to give a brief outline of the progress of events during
the period between the rejection of Tyler's treaty and the passage
of the joint resolution of annexation.
Tyler's annexation treaty was rejected by the Senate on
June 8, 1844. Calhoun, we are told,'- disheartened by this action,
was ready to abandon all further attempts at annexation. His
dejection was so great that Tyler thought of requesting his resig-
nation, but he soon recovered his spirits and his old-time vigor.
Since the treaty method had failed, nothing could be done with-
out the cooperation of Congress. During the summer, a rumor
to the effect that Tyler was about to convene Congress in extra
session caused the Democratic candidate no little anxiety, and
he appealed to Jackson as the only man who could dissuade the
President from committing such a political error. A month later
Jackson assured him that Congress would not be convened, al-
though it is not clear whether Jackson was instrumental in pre-
venting such a course. '•'' At any rate no call for an extra session
was issued, and no further action could be undertaken until
winter; but the death of T. A. Howard, the American charge
in Texas, gave Tyler an opportunity to strengthen his position
by assigning A. J. Donelson to the vacant post. When notifying
71 Kendall tq Jackson, Dec. 2; Jackson to Polk, Dec. 13, 1844, PoUc
Papers.
72 Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 331.
73 Polk to Donelson, Aug. 27, 1844, "Polk-Donelson Letters." Jackson
to Polk, Sept. 26, 1844, Polk Papers.
PRESIDENT-ELECT 309
Jackson of Donelson's appointment the President expressed the
belief that the selection of "a member of your family .... will
have a controuling influence with Gen^ Houstin and incline
him .... to pause ere he declares against annexation." He
declared his determination to proceed with his Texas program,
and to i)rotect that country from the threatened aggressions
of Mexico. Jackson informed Polk of the President's plans and
remarked that ' ' This is the true energetic course. ' '^*
On December 3, 1844, Tyler submitted to Congress his last
annual message. In it he called attention to the threatening
Mexican manifestoes that had resulted from the treaty which
the United States had negotiated with Texas. Mexico, he said,
had no cause for complaint ; on the contrary, the measure "should
have been regarded by her as highly beneficial." The treaty,
said he, had been rejected by the American Senate on the ground
that the question had not been submitted to the people, but
popular approval had since been expressed at the recent election.
Such being the case, he urged Congress to annex Texas by joint
resolution."^ He followed this up with another message on Decem-
ber 18, and along with it submitted a collection of correspond-
ence. He called attention to the abusive character of this cor-
respondence and to the barbarous measures which were threatened
by Mexico. Especially did he resent Mexico's criticism of south-
ern states, and he declared with emphasis that annexation was
not a sectional question.'" His statement that "the subject of
annexation addresses itself, most fortunately, to every portion of
the Union" was, to say the least, an exaggeration; still, since the
election had been decided, there were many indications of a
change in public opinion, and the question was becoming more
national every day. Could the subject, when it was presented
originally, have been divested of its factional and its sectional
74 Tyler to Jackson, Sept. 17, 1844, Jackson Papers. Jacksou to Polk,
Sept. 26, 1844, Polk Papers.
75 Richardson, Messages, IV, 341-345.
76 Ihid., 353-356.
310 JAMES K. POLK
concomitants, doubtless there would have been little opposition
to annexation. Now that the election was over, those who had
really wished to see Texas admitted into the Union no longer had
the same incentive to oppose annexation for mere factional rea-
sons. They might still cavil over ways and means, yet the pros-
pect of eventual compromise was perceptibly brightening." There
was no certainty, however, that the friends of Texas would be
able to effect annexation during the present session, for those
who had been defeated at Baltimore still harbored a bitter re-
sentment. Late in December, Calhoun believed that the House
would take favorable action, but that annexation would be de-
feated in the Senate. "The real opposition is from the Benton
V. Buren party" who would join with the Whigs against Texas;
still he was not without hope that "publick opinion will force
them to give up their opposition. Its effects are already ap-
parent/''^ It was at this time that Calhoun was ready to make
the "sacrifice" of accepting a place in Polk's cabinet, if the
probable course of the administration should appear to be satis-
factory.
While Calhoun denounced Benton and Van Buren for their
obstructive tactics, others believed that the South Carolinian
himself had sounded the knell of the Texas treaty. A long article
on "Abolitionists" which appeared in the January number of
the Democratic Review held him responsible, in the main, for the
widespread hostility to annexation. Although himself in favor
of annexation, the writer flayed Calhoun for the position he had
assumed regarding the slavery side of the question. In the
writer's opinion, the fanatical demands of the Abolitionists and
the ' ' gag rule ' ' of Congress were equally to be deplored ; but the
climax of absurdity had been reached when Calhoun, in his letters
to Pakenham and King, had represented the United States as
7T See press comments. Smith, Anncxalion of Texas, 323 ff.
78 Calhoun to Clemson, Dee. 27; same to Hunter, Dec. 29, 1844, Jicp.
Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, II, 634-636.
PRESIDENT-ELECT 311
desiring Texas in order to protect slavery. In his effort to nation-
alize slavery, he had also nationalized abolition. Other critics
of Callionn expressed similar sentiments. Since the opposition
had been aimed, for the most part, at the negotiators of the treaty
and their methods, acquiescence in annexation was made easier
when it became practically certain tliat Calhoun as well as Tyler
would soon depart from the scene of action.
Soon after Congress had convened in December various plans
of annexation were offered in each house, some to admit Texas as
a state, others to acquire it as a territory. In the House, after
several projects had met with serious objections, Milton Brown,
one of Polk's Whig antagonists from Tennessee, offered a reso-
lution which, after certain alterations, was eventually adopted by
the House. Brown 's resolution provided that the territory right-
fully belonging to Texas should be admitted as a state. The
federal government was to undertake the adjustment of the boun-
daries of the new state, but was not to assume her debt or take
over her public lands. Slavery was prohibted in all territory
north of 36° 30' ; south of that line the people were to decide the
question for themselves.
In the early days of the session, McDuflfie once more presented
the joint resolution of annexatioji which had failed to pass in the
spring. It voiced the sentiments of the Tyler administration
and was, in substance, a restatement of the rejected treaty. As
such, it was unacceptable to the Senator from Missouri, and Cave
Johnson reported to Polk that "the great battle between Mr.
T. H. B. [enton] & Mr. C. [alhoun] has commenced." Appar-
ently the main reason for presenting the resolution in this par-
ticular form was the desire to embarrass the Van Burenites by
compelling them either to accept a measure which they had de-
nounced or to incur the odium of opposing annexation after they
had endorsed the Baltimore platform. Such, at least, was the
opinion of Cave Johnson :
312 JAMES E. POLE
The friends of T. H. B. Silas Wright, who took general ground before
the people for annexation but against the Treaty are to be forced to take
that Treaty or appear before the people as hostile to Texas. Mr. C.
thinks that he has got the advantage of T. H. B. on this issue & intends
to drive him home upon it. The N. Y. democrats will go en-mass ag't the
treaty & I have no idea, that the friends of C will take any thing but
the Treaty.'!'
On the day following the appearance of McDuffie's resolution,
Benton met the issue by reintroducing his own bill which had
failed at the close of the last session, with a modification for
making the territory half slave and half free. Since this bill
could not by any possibility get but a few votes, Johnson consid-
ered Benton 's conduct to be " outrageous. ' ' He asked the Senator
to cooperate in offering a joint resolution which woidd assert the
determination of the United States to defend Texas against all
assaults, leaving the question of annexation to Polk's adminis-
tration. Benton declined to accept this resolution, and continued
to rage against his opponents.^*^ Late in December Johnson
thought that the hostility between the two factions was increas-
ing; each feared that the other would influence the incoming
President.'*^ Benton blustered, of course, for, under the circum-
stances, he could hardly do otherwise. Since the election, how-
ever, he must have known that he was championing an unpopular
cause. There was also a future ahead, and his course had alien-
ated a large majority of his party — even many of his lifelong
friends. In addition, the legislature of Missouri had, by reso-
lution, requested members of Congress from that state to support
annexation.^- This made it clear that his conduct did not meet
with approval at home ; on the other hand, such a request made
it easier for him to modify his attitude on the subject. About
the same time a letter from Donelson told him "that his course
is injuring his friends and his country, and that I hoped he would
T9 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 12, 1844, Polk Papers.
80 Idem, and Johnson to Polk, Dee. 14, Polk Papers.
81 Johnson to Polk, Dec. 26, 1844, Polk Papers.
82 Meigs, Life of Thomas Hart Benton, 351.
PRESIDENT-ELECT 313
be willing to modify his position.'"*^ No doubt all of those mani-
festations of tlispleasure liad their influence in determining Ben-
ton to retreat, i)rovided he could do so in good order. His avenue
of escape was by way of a new bill, and this he introduced on
February 5, 1845. No mention was made in the new measure of
obtaining the consent of Mexico. It provided for the admission
of a state of suitable size and boundaries, said state to be formed
out of the territory of the republic ; the remainder of Texas was
to be a territory of the United States. The measure was to
become effective as soon as an agreement had been reached by
the governments of the two nations concerned. His plan would
delay, but not necessarily defeat, annexation, although defeat is
evidently what its author desired. His bill and the House reso-
lution seemed hopelessly irreconcilable until R. J. Walker, a few
days later, offered as an amendment a combination of the two
methods, and Haywood proposed to leave the choice between them
to the President of the United States. To this modification
Walker readily agreed.** Calhoun, according to a statement
made later, believed that Benton's bill would have defeated an-
nexation, and he was scarcely less opposed to the combination
measure.®^ He used his "best efforts" to defeat both, but was
unsuccessful in the second instance. Many counseled delay, but
at the evening session of February 27, 1845, the Senate was ready
to vote on Walker's combination amendment. Before the vote
had been taken, however, Archer, of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, offered a substitute bill. This proposed a transfer of
the territory of Texas, with the assent of the people thereof, to
the United States. The vote on the substitute resulted in a tie,
and it looked for a time as if annexation were doomed. Never-
theless, relief was already at hand. When the vote on the Walker
83 Donelson to Calhoun, New Orleans, Dec. 26, 184-4, Eep. Am. Hist.
Assn., 1899, II, 1012.
8-* Smith, Annexation of Texas, 343. Smith gives an exhaustive account
of the various proposals offered in each house (idem, chap. x^-i).
85 Calhoun to Donelson, Mav 23, 1845, i?ep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, IT,
658.
314 JAMES E. POLK
amendment was taken in Committee of the Whole, Johnson, a
Whig from Louisiana who had voted for the Archer bill, now
swung to the Democrats and made the vote twenty-seven to
twenty-five. According to Judge Catron, Johnson had difficulty
in supporting the joint resolution on constitutional grounds, but,
after consulting Catron, finally agreed to do so.'^*' As soon as
the committee had reported the measure to the Senate, Miller,
of New Jersey, offered Benton's original bill as a substitute.
Benton said from his seat that he would vote against this substi-
tute, and when asked if he would destroy his own child, he re-
plied, "I'll kill it stone dead." The substitute failed, and
Walker's amendment passed the Senate by a vote of twenty-
seven to twenty-five, Johnson again aligning himself with the
Democrats. ^^ The amended resolution was transmitted to the
House for approval, and although it met with strenuous opposi-
tion there was never any doubt of its passage. This measure was
given precedence over other matters ; the Speaker, by his rulings,
prevented filibustering; and, in Committee of the Whole, the
debate was limited to five minutes. Milton Brow^n, the author
of the House resolution, tried to "kill his own child," but the
measure as amended by Walker passed by a vote of one hundred
thirty-two to seventy-six.^^
The President-elect had been in Washington since February
13, but whether and to what extent his influence was effective
at this time is very difficult to determine. Before Polk had left
Tennessee, Cave Johnson assured Calhoun that the incoming
President and his friends desired to have Texas annexed during
86 "The amendment offered by Mr. Senator Walker," continued Catron,
"was rather sudden; it left the slave line at ;!6° 30' N. open. To this
Gov. Johnson had most decided objections; it threw Mr. Senator Foster
the other way, and endangered the measure." Johnson, said the judge,
voted for the measure because he had confidence in Polk, and because he
believed that 36° 30' would be definitely fixed as the northern boundary of
slavery (Catron to Buchanan, March 15, 1845, Buchanan Papers).
«" Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 sess., 362; Smith, Anncration of Texas, 344-
345.
s>iCong. Globe (Feb. 28), 28 Cong., 2 sess., 372.
PRESIDENT-ELECT 315
the present session, and Donelson informed Calhoun that both
Jackson and himself hoped for immediate action by the existing
Congress/'* While at Coleman's hotel awaiting liis inauguration
the President-elect, according to his own account,"" freely ex-
pressed the wish that annexation in some form might be effected
before the adjournment of Congress. Should Congress fail to
take definite action, he feared that Texas would be forever lost
to the Union. He did not, he said, have time to examine the
different measures proposed, but thought that any measure would
be better than none. That he desired to have this vexed question
settled before his inauguration, we may very well believe. In-
deed, it was said that he offered rewards and threatened punish-
ments for the purpose of influencing votes. Such charges rested
on no tangible evidence and doubtless, for the most part, were
unfounded, although it is quite probable that he may have let it
be known that the disloyal need not look to him for favors.
Always ready to ' ' play the game ' ' himself, he was a firm believer
in party discipline.
Later, a more serious charge was brought against Polk in this
connection — a charge of base deception instead of party disci-
pline. In a letter printed in the New York Evening Post, July 28,
1848, Senator Tappan, of Ohio, asserted that, in February, 1845,
Polk had personally assured Senator Haywood that, should the
joint resolution pass, he would choose the Benton alternative and
negotiate under it. In a letter to Tappan, F. P. Blair averred
that he, also, had discussed the matter with Polk, and that the
President-elect had promised to choose the Benton plan of nego-
tiating a treaty with Texas. It was charged, therefore, that at
least five Senators had voted for the joint resolution because they
had been deceived by Polk."^ Polk denied all recollection of any
so Johnson to Polk, Dec. 9, 1844, Polk Papers. Donelson to Calhoun,
Dee. 26, 1844, Bep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, II, 1012.
90 Polk, Diary, IV, 41.
91 The essential parts of both letters may be found in Benton, Thirty
Tears' Fiew, II, 636-637.
316 JAMES K. POLE
conversation on the subject with either Blair or Haywood, and
called attention to the fact that no complaint of violated pledges
had been made at tlie time. In addition, he pointed out that in
August, 1846, Blair had expressed to him a warm approval of
the principal measures of his administration."- The members of
Polk's cabinet disclaimed all knowledge of such a pledge, and
even the fine-meshed dragnet of Justin H. Smith has failed to
find any evidence to substantiate the charges made by Tappan
and Blair. On the contrary, Smith offers some valuable sug-
gestions as to why it is highly improbable that the President
elect made pledges to any one.'-*^ Polk had committed himself to
immediate annexation ; and even if he had been as unprincipled
as his enemies alleged, it seems incredible that so crafty a poli-
tician should have made so stupid a blunder. Besides, Polk was
a man who seldom disclosed his intentions until he was ready to
act, and, as Cave Johnson said in his letter, it was extremely
unlikely that he would do so to Blair. It is significant, also, that,
as soon as Texas had approved annexation, Polk wrote a letter
to Haywood in which he commented on the wisdom of choosing
the House resolution and expressed the belief that Texas would
have been lost if the Benton alternative had been selected. "It
was not," wrote the President, "until after I entered upon my
duties that I had an opportunity — deliberately to consider the
92 Polk, Diary, 11, 84.
03 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 347-350. In answer to Polk's request
for a statement on the subject. Cave Johnson (Oct. 6, 1848) said that he
conversed with the President-elect while the joint resolution was before
Congress. Polk said that he hoped one of the alternatives would i)ass,
but e.xpressed no preference. After the measure had passed, he expressed
no preference until the cabinet had met. Walker (Oct. 6) said that when
the measures were before Congress, Blair came to him and, after saying
that the House resolution could not pass, asked him to vote for the Benton
bill. Walker refused. Blair stated that Texas would prefer Benton's
bill. Walker then said that he would combine the two and let Texas take
her choice. After consulting Benton, Blair said that they would support
the combined resolution, if the choice were left to the President instead
of Texas. Walker agreed, and .so it passed. Polk expressed no i>refer-
ence— the cabinet was divided. Bancroft's letter of Oct. l."?. Buchanan's
of Nov. 9, Mason's of Nov. 12, and Marcy's of Nov. 20 all stated that
Polk had not expressed any preference. All letters are in the Folk Papers.
PRESIDENT-ELECT 317
two propositions — and select between them. I acted upon my
own best judgment and the result has proved that I was right. ' '■'*
It is inconceivable that he could write thus to a man to whom
he had given a pledge to select the Benton method of annexation.
When the provision was added to the joint resolution which
gave the choice of alternatives to the President, it was intended
of course to give this selection to Polk. Nevertheless, it was sug-
gested during the debate that Tyler and Calhoun might make the
selection, but McDuffie, who was a close friend of both men, de-
clared in the Senate that they would not have the "audacity"
to do such a thing. When, therefore, the House passed the mea-
sure on February 28, it was fully understood that the choice
would rest with President Polk. But the resolution gave this
choice to the "President of the United States," and for three
days more that office was occupied by "Captain" Tyler. Despite
McDuffie 's assurances Tyler possessed the necessary audacity, for
he immediately took steps both to make the selection and to carry
it into effect. In 1848 he prepared a statement which gives his
version of the transaction and explains his reasons for forestalling
his successor. As soon as Tyler had approved the resolution, on
March 1, Calhoun, the Secretary of State, remarked that the
President now had the power to make his selection. Tyler replied
that he had no doubt of his power, but that he had some doubt
as to the propriety of exercising it. The danger of delay, urged
Calhoun, was sufficient to overrule all feelings of delicacy re-
garding Polk. Next day, at a cabinet meeting, all agreed that
Tyler ought to select the House resolution and act at once. He
decided to do so and requested Calhoun to call upon Polk, after
the meeting, "and explain to him the reasons" for immediate
action. Calhoun complied with the request, and reported that
"Mr. Polk declined to express any opinion or to make any sug-
gestion in reference to the subject." On the third instructions
were dispatched to A. J. Donelson, whom Tyler had recently
94 Polk to Haywood, Aug. 9, 1845, Folk Papers.
318 JAMES K. POLK
appointed to be charge d'affaires at the capital of Texas.^^ When
Polk became President he still had the option of reversing Tyler's
action**" and recalling the messenger or of acquiescing in the choice
made by his predecessor. Since he chose the latter alternative
there was little delay in carrying out the mandate of the Balti-
more platform. The progress of annexation under his adminis-
tration will be considered in another chapter.
95 See statement, Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 364-365.
At a later time Tyler was angered by Calhoun 's assertion in the Senate
that he had selected the House resolution. "//' he selected, then Texas is
not legitimately a State of the Union, for Congress gave the power to the
President to select, and not to the Secretary of State." He referred to
Calhoun as "the great 'I am,' " and to Benton as "the most raving
political maniac I ever knew" Tyler to Gardiner, March 11, 1847, ibid.,
420).
90 There was a difference of opinion regarding this. Walker, and per-
haps other members of the cabinet, believed that Polk had no power to
reverse Tyler's action. See Polk, Diary, IV, 44.
CHAPTER XV
ADMINISTRATION AND PATRONAGE
On March 4, 1845, an unusually large "concourse of people"
congregated in Washington to witness the inauguration of Presi-
dent Polk. The "arrangements were admirable"^ and, in true
American fashion, men who had bitterly assailed each other in
the press and on the platform now joined in doing honor to the
new chief executive. Climatic conditions proved to be the only
disturbing element. Rain began to descend in torrents as the
procession wended its way to the capitol where, according to the
picturesque description given by John Quincy Adams, the new
executive delivered his inaugural address to " a large assemblage
of umbrellas." "At night," said the same writer, "there were
two balls: one at Carusi's Hall, at ten dollars a ticket, of all
parties ; the other of pure Democrats, at five dollars a ticket, at
the National Theatre. Mr. Polk attended both, but supped with
the true-blue five-dollar Democracy. ' '^
Not yet fifty years old, Polk enjoyed the distinction of reach-
ing the highest executive office at an earlier age than any of his
predecessors — a fact which he did not fail to note in his in-
augural address. This address was in the main a reiteration of
Jeffersonian principles and of his own oft-expressed opinions.
Strong emphasis was laid on the value of the Union ; "no treason
V to mankind since the organization of society would be equal in
atrocity to that of him who would lift his hand to destroy it."
On the other hand, he frowned upon the "schemes and agita-
tions" which aimed at the "destruction of domestic institutions
T-Niles' Beg., LXVIII, 1.
2 Adams, Memoirs, XII, 179. He added that "my family and myself
received invitations to both, but attended neither."
320 JAMES E. POLK
existing in other sections, ' ' and urged the necessity of preserving
the compromises of the Constitution.
If the compromises of the Constitution be preserveil, if sectional jeal-
ousies and heart-burnings be discountenanced, if our laws be just and the
Government be practically administered strictly within the limits of power
prescribed to it, we may discard all apprehensions for the safety of the
Union.
Having thus expressed his disapproval of both abolition and
disunion, he again declared himself to be in favor of a tariff for
revenue, but not for "protection merely." He congratulated
the country on the passage of the joint resolution to annex Texas,
and he pronounced our title to Oregon to be "clear and unques-
tionable." Experience, he said, had disproved the old belief that
a federal system could not operate over a large area, and like a
true expansionist expressed the opinion that as the system "shall
be extended the bonds of our Union, so far from being weakened,
will become stronger."
The reference to Texas must have been inserted shortly be-
fore the address was delivered, but certain letters written by
A. V. Brown indicate that the first draft of the inaugural was
written early in December and sent to Washington for criticism
and approval by Polk's political friends. The Brown letters
are too enigmatical to throw much light on the subject, but as
Polk had many times before expressed practically all of the views
contained in his address, there was no reason for believing that
it was not substantially his own product.^
3 On December 14, 1844, Brown wrote from Washington to Polk: "I
received yours of the 7th Inst, our friend called yesterday & informed
me that he would be ready in a few days & 1 shall loose no time after
examination to forward it to you."
On December 23 he wrote: "You must not be impatient — Our friend
has been sick a few days — has sent me for examination about lutlf to be
returned with my comments & then the whole to be finished & polish 'd —
say all by the first January or sooner. So far it is a happy concejjtion
for instance in allusion to the Union.
" ' If this be not enough, if that freedom of thought word and action
given by his Creator to fallen man & left by human institutions as free
as they were given, are not sufficient to lead him into the paths of liberty
ADMINISTEATION AND PATEONAGE 321
Among the rejoicing Democrats none felt more sincere satis-
faction in the defeat of Henry Chiy or expressed a more ardent
wish for tlie snecess of the new administration than did the "old
hero'' at the Hermitage. In a letter written two days after the
inauguration he told Polk that
I have the pleasure to congratulate my country on your now being, really,
president of the United States, and I put up my prayers to the great
Jehova, that he may conduct you thro' your administration with honor to
yourself, and benefit to our Glorious Union.
Success could be attained only by "continuing to take principle
for your guide, and public good for your end, steering clear of
the intrigues & machinations of political clickes."* If the Gen-
eral had any misgivings regarding Polk's independence, they
must have been removed by the receipt of a letter from Judge
Catron — a letter written before his own had reached Washington.
"Our friend," wrote the judge, "is very prudent, and eminently
firm, regardless of consequences. He came here to be — the
& peace, whither shall he turn"? Has the sicord proved to be a safer and
surer instrument of reform than enlightened reason? Does he expect to
find among the ruins of this Union a happier abode for our swarming
millions, than they now have under its lofty arch & among its beautiful
columns? No, my countrymen never, until like the blind Israelite in the
Temple of the Philistines, we find ourselves in chains and dispair, shall
we be justified in thrusting those pillars from their base; for whenever
we do, we shall like him be crushed by their fall. '
' ' It will be surely ready in time & finished with a polish suitable to
the occasion. I shall enclose it to you under an envelope to our friend
J. H. Thomas but securely sealed so that he shall [not] be aware of its
contents." (Compare the part quoted by Brown with Polk's inaugural.
See Messages, TV, 376. Query: Was Brown quoting from Polk's original
draft, or was this paragraph written in Washington and remodeled by
Polk!)
On December 26 Brown wrote: "In a few days now I shall hear from
our friend K again & be ready to meet your wishes. The Major is here
on yesterday we went up to see the President. He is acting very friendly
but I shall encourage the idea of his remaining here but a short time or
the letter writers will be speculating on the purpose of his visit &c."
(Folk Papers).
Probably "K" means John Kane, of Philadelphia, but the identity of
"our friend" and "the Major" is difficult to conjecture. Major Lewis
was not a close friend of either Brown or Polk, and Major Donelson w^as
then in New Orleans.
•* Jackson to Polk, March 6, 1845, Polk Papers.
322 JAMES K. POLK
PRESIDENT — which at this date is as undisputed as that you was
THE GENL at N. Orleans."^
On March 5 the new President submitted to the Senate his
list of cabinet officials. James Buchanan, tlie Secretary of State,
had long been a leader in Pennsylvania politics and for many
years a Senator from that state. His selection was a concession
to that wing of the -party which believed in a moderate protective
tariff, and his subsequent opposition to the tariff of 1846 caused
the President no little annoyance. He was a man of more than
average ability, but he possessed certain traits which made him
the source of constant irritation to the President. With a timid-
ity which caused him to quail before responsibility he combined
an obstinacy and a petulance which manifested themselves in
obstructive tactics and petty insolence. After four years of inti-
mate association Polk concluded that "Mr. Buchanan is an able
man, but is in small matters without judgment and sometimes
acts like an old maid. ' '*^ He was the only member of the cabinet
whom the President found it necessary to discipline, and he was
the only one whom Polk believed that he could not fully trust,
Robert J. Walker, the Secretary of the Treasury, was a man of
ability and industry. He was cordially hated by the Whigs and
was disliked and distrusted by many Democrats. Originally se-
lected for the office of Attorney General, he was called to the
Treasury Department in order to placate the Cass-Dallas element
of the party. He was the only member to whom General Jackson
offered objections,^ but Polk had full confidence in both his in-
tegrity and his ability. As Secretary of War, William L. Marcy
5 Catron to Jackson, March [1845], Jackson Papers.
6 Polk, Diary, IV, 355.
7 "7 say to you, in the most confidential manner, that T regret that you
put Mr. E. J. Walker over the Treasury. He has talents, I believe honest,
but surrounded by so many broken speculators, and being greatly himself
incumbered with del)t, that any of the other Departments would have been
better, & I fear, you will find my forebodings turn out too true, and added
to this, under the rose, he is looking to the vice presidency" (Jackson to
Polk, May 2, 1845, Polk Papers).
ADMIN I ST BAT I ON AND PATRONAGE 323
displayed both ability and tact. He was a leader of that wing
of the party in New York which opposed Van Buren, and his
appointment greatly imbittered the friends of the ex-President ;
otherwise his appointment added strength to the administration.
George Bancroft, the Secretary of the Navy, had had little ex-
perience in practical affairs. His appointment seems to have been
a makeshift, and he was soon .given a diplomatic position, for
which he had originally expressed a preference. His most not-
able achievement as a cabinet officer was his success in procuring
the establishment of the naval academy at Annapolis. John Y.
Mason, a college mate of the President, was made Attorney Gen-
eral. He had served as Secretary of the Navy in Tyler's cabinet
and was again put in charge of that department when Bancroft
was made minister to England. Cave Johnson, the Postmaster
General, had for many years been Polk's closest political friend.
Although he was not considered to be a brilliant statesman, his
good judgment and methodical habits well fitted him for the
office assigned to him. He was a democrat par excellence, and
when a member of Congress he was best known as an enemy of
extravagant appropriations. His friends gave him the sobriquet
of "watch-dog of the Treasury"; some called him the "scourge
of private claimants," and Adams once referred to him as the
"retrenchment monsoon."^
The appointment of an entirely new« cabinet caused general
surprise and considerable press comment. None except his inti-
mate friends realized that Polk was a man of unusual determi-
nation, and that he was resolved to be President in fact as well
as in name. The belief that he would be a mere figurehead—
a pliable instrument in the hands of able politicians-had become
8 Adams, Memoirs, XI, 223. , . , ■, ^
. Mason of coorse, hail been a member ot Tyler's cabinet, but not in
t.e pSn ^^i^:,^^y^ :'^^"?;zs^f-r:^Z
SJX 'e^ennoS;S,."Ru,nor, of it have been in .ircnlat.on for
some weeks, which I .li.l not believe" {ibi4., XII, 180).
324 JAMES K. POLK
SO firmly fixed in the public mind that the most convincing evi-
dence to the contra ly had little weight. Although it is now well
known that Polk dominated his cabinet to a greater degree than
most chief executives, so keen an observer as Gideon "Welles could
at the time write :
In none of his [Polk's] Cabinet, I am sorry to say, have I any confi-
dence. Yet this cabinet appears to me to have more influence and higher
authority than any other I have ever known. The Cabinet is a sort
of council of appointments, and the President is chairman of this council,
instead of being President of the United States. It is, as I wrote our
friend Niles, a sort of joint Stock Company in which the President is, by
no means the principal partner. Yet several of them have been at particular
pains to tell vie that the President has his own way — does as he has a mind
to — makes his men appointments Sec. There is not, however, a man in the
cabinet, except Johnson, who does not believe himself the superior of the
President in abilities & qualifications as a statesman. i"
Writing in 1860, Claiborne says that Polk's cabinet was "one
of the ablest ever assembled around any executive, ' ' but that the
President himself ' ' can only be regarded as 'a man of medioc-
rity."^^ Both statements are exaggerations. Although each
member of the cabinet performed well the duties of his office,
none except Buchanan, Walker, and Marcy can be included
among statesmen of the first rank. On the other hand, an ex-
ecutive who could formulate important and far-reaching policies,
and successfully carry them out despite strenuous opposition,
could not have been "a man of mediocrity." To say that the
President ranked below the members of his cabinet is only to
add praise to his executive ability, for, as a recent writer has well
said: "In the Cabinet Council Polk was the unmistakable guide
and master."^- Welles had been correctly informed. Undoubt-
edly the President had "his own way."
i<» Welles to Van Buren, April 29, 1845, Van Buren Papers. The italics
are mine.
11 Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, I, 229-231.
12 Learned, Some Aspects of the Cabinet Meeting, 128.
ADMINISTMATION AND PAT EON AGE 325
Polk's control over his cabinet was not the result of accident
or of incidental circumstances, for, with his usual forethought,
he had planned to be "guide and master." Before leaving his
home in Tennessee he prepared the draft of a letter a revised
copy of which was sent to each prospective member of his cabinet.
After calling attention to the "principles and policy" which he
expected to carry out it was made very clear that he desired only
such advisers as would "cordially co-operate" in effecting his
purposes. Each member would be expected to give his time and
ability in promoting the success of the present administration;
whenever he should feel that he could no longer do so, he would
be expected to retire. Should these restrictions prove acceptable,
the person addressed was invited to become a member of the
cabinet. The following is a copy of this interesting document:
Sir:
The principles and policy which will be observed and maintained dur-
ing my administration, are embodied in the Eesolutions adopted by the
Democratic National Convention of Delegates, assembled at Baltimore in
May last, and in my Inaugural address this day delivered to my Fellow
Citizens. —
In making up my Cabinet I desire to select gentlemen who agree with
me in opinion, and who will cordially co-operate with me in carrying out
these principles and policy.
In my official action I will myself take no part, — between gentlemen
of the Democratic party, who may become aspirants or candidates — to
succeed me in the Presidential office, and shall desire that no member of
my Cabinet shall do so. Individual preferences it is not expected or
desired to limit or restrain. — It is official interference by the dispensation
of public patronage or otherwise that I desire to guard against. — Should
any member of my Cabinet become a candidate or an aspirant to the
Presidency or Vice Presidency, of the United States, — it will be expected
upon the happening of such an event, that he will retire from the Cabinet. —
I disapprove the practice which has sometimes prevailed of Cabinet
officers absenting themselves for long periods of time from the seat of
Government, and leaving the management of their Departments to Chief
Clerks — or less responsible persons. — I expect myself to remain constantly
at Washington — unless it may be an occasional necessary absence, — and
then for a short time, — It is by conforming to this rule, — that the
President and his Cabinet can have any assurances that abuses will be
323 JAMES E. POLE
prevented — and that the subordinate executive officers connected with them
respectively, — will faithfully perform their duty. —
If Sir: you concur with me in these opinions and views, I shall be
pleased to have your assistance as a member of my Cabinet; and now
tender you the ofBce of and invite you to take charge of the
Dejiartment. —
I shall be pleased to receive your answer at your earliest convenience.
I am with great respect
Your Ob't S'v't.13
To every item of the program outlined in this letter the Presi-
dent rigidly adhered. He had "his own way" despite the in-
credulity of Gideon Welles. Catron's above-quoted remark, and
not the opinion expressed by Welles, is a true statement of Polk's
position as chief executive. Even Welles at a later date, although
he continued to underrate the President's ability, was forced to
admit that "he had courage and determination and shrank from
no labor or responsibility."^* Claiborne has called Polk a "polit-
ical martinet" :^^ he was likewise something of an executive mar-
tinet, but no member of his cabinet except Buchanan seems to
have questioned his right to dictate the administrative policy of
the government. Quite frequently the Secretary of State tried
to substitute his own policies for those of the President, but in-
variably he was forced to submit to the will of his superior. On
several occasions Polk was on the point of dismissing him from
the cabinet for violating his pledge to put aside Presidential
aspirations.
On questions of importance the President sought freely the
advice of his cabinet, members of Congress and private individ-
uals; very often the advice given led to modifications in matters
of detail, but, except in very rare instances, the main essentials
of his policies were carried into effect as originally ])lanned by
13 On the back is written: "Rough Draft of Letter. To be revised
corrected. Jan. 15, 1845" (Polk Papers). The revised coi)y which was
sent to Buchanan is printed in his Works, VI, 110.
1* MS "Review of Pol. Hist, of U. S. etc.," Welles Papers.
13 Claiborne, op. eit., 228.
ADMINISTFATION AND PATRONAGE 327
himself. His habit of considering carefully the problems in-
volved before they were presented for discussion left little of
importance for his advisers to suggest. He felt keenly the indi-
vidual responsibility of his office ; it followed, therefore, that ]m
own, and not the opinions of others, should dictate the policies
to be pursued.
The President yielded his convictions neither easily nor for petty reasons.
Politics influenced him. But he seldom forgot principles even though he
had to sacrifice the friendship and influence of men as powerful as Senator
Benton of Missouri and to some extent the assistance of Buchanan.io
Polk was not indulging in idle flourish when he told pros-
pective cabinet members that he would "remain constantly at
Washington," for during his entire term he was absent from the
capital not more than six weeks." Being a strict Sabbatarian he
abstained from Sunday labor except in cases of absolute necessity.
The other six days of each week were devoted to unremitting
toil, and frequently his labors extended far into the night. Near
the middle of his official term he noted in his diary :
It is two years ago this day since I left my residence at Columbia,
Tennessee, to enter on my duties as President of the U. S. Since that
time I have performed great labour and incurred vast responsibilities.
In truth, though I occupy a very high position, I am the hardest working
man in this country.
A few weeks later he wrote :
This afternoon I took a ride on horseback. It is the first time I have
mounted a horse for over six months. I have an excellent saddle-horse,
and have been much in the habit of taking exercise on horseback all my
life, but have been so incessantly engaged in the onerous and responsible
duties of my office for many months past that I have had no time to take
such exercisers
16 Learned, op. cit., 124.
IT Ibid., 120.
18 Polk, Diary, II, 360, 456. A vear and a half later his story is the
same: "Since my return earlv in July, 1847, from my Northern tour, I
have not been more than two or three miles from my oflice, and during
the whole period (13 months) my labours, responsibilities, and anxieties
have been very great" (ibid., IV, 85-86).
328 JAMES K. POLK
The office of President is never a sinecure, yet why, it may
be asked, did Polk find it necessary to expend his energies more
lavishly than other chief executives. The answer is that he felt
under obligation to make himself familiar with all branches of
executive government. He alone must bear the responsibility
for efficient administration, consequently he alone must direct the
affairs of the various departments. Supervision on so vast a
scale meant a sacrifice of time and energy, but he had the satis-
faction of believing that he had not sacrificed them in vain. "We
are not left in doubt regarding his feeling of self-reliance, for
on September 23, 1848, he observed:
I have not had my full Cabinet together in council since the adjourn-
ment of Congress on the 14th of August last. I have conducted the
Government w^ithout their aid. Indeed, I have become so familiar with
the duties and workings of the Government, not only upon general prin-
ciples, but in most of its intimate details, that I find but little difficulty
in doing this. I have made myself acquainted with the duties of the
subordinate officers, and have probably given more attention to details
than any of my predecessors. It is only occasi[on]ally that a great
measure or a new question arises, upon which I desire the aid and advice
of my Cabinet. At each meeting of the Cabinet I learn from each member
what is being done in his particular Department, and especially if any
question of doubt or difficulty has arisen. I have never called for any
written opinions from my Cabinet, preferring to take their opinions,
after discussion, in Cabinet & in the presence of each other. In this way
harmony of opinion is more likely to exist.i^
Still another passage from his diary may be cited as indicative
of his industry and of solicitude lest some duty might go unper-
formed :
No President who performs his duty faithfully and conscientiously can
have any leisure. If he entrusts the details and small matters to subordi-
nates constant errors will occur. I prefer to supervise the whole operations
of the Government myself rather than entrust the public business to
subordinates and this makes my duties very great.20
Although the excerpts just quoted were written during the
last year of his administration, Polk's painstaking supervision
19 Polk, Diary, IV, 130-131.
20 Ibid., 261.
ADMIXISTBATION AND PAT EON AGE 329
of tlio "whole operations" of the government began as soon as
he had entered upon the duties of his office. His searching ex-
amination of all documents presented for his signature and his
ability to detect errors caused considerable newspaper comment.^'
His thorough knowledge of affairs enabled him to win a wager
from the astute Buchanan in an argument concerning proper
diplomatic usage.'--
The introduction of systematic methods in the handling of
department affairs added greatly to the efficiency of the adminis-
tration. On questions of policy Polk preferred oral discussions
to written opinions from his cabinet, but each member was re-
quired to report regularly on all matters relating to his depart-
ment. In a circular dated April 11, 1845, he asked the head of
each department to furnish him with a monthly report concern-
ing the work of the various bureaus and clerks under his juris-
diction. The tendency of bureau chiefs to favor large expendi-
tures made it necessary for each cabinet oiBcer to ' ' give vigilant
attention" to all estimates, and to pare them down whenever
possible.^3 Such reports, supplemented by discussions at regular
meetings of the cabinet, enabled the President to understand
thoroughly the operations of all departments.
As a rule the cabinet met regularly on Tuesdays and Satur-
days of each week, and there were frequent special meetings on
other days. Frequency of meeting afforded ample opportunity
for the consideration of administrative policies. Apparently the
President never attempted to interfere with a free expression of
opinions, yet by adroitly directing the discussions he was able to
21 For example: "The President is devoted to his official tasks. He
signs nothing without the strictest examination, and has frequently, to
the confusion of clerks, detected serious errors in the papers sent for his
signature" (New York Evening Post, May 3, 1845; quoted by the AVash-
ington Union, May 8).
22 Polk, Diary, TIT, 97-99. The bet was made in a jesting mood and
the President declined to accept his basket of champagne. ' ' I record this
incident," said he, "for the purpose of showing how necessary it is for
me to give my vigilant attention even to the forms & details of my [sub-
ordinates '] duties. ' '
23 Polk, Diary, I, 48, and passim.
330 JAMES K. POLK
"have his own Avay" without causing offense. That his method
of dealing with his cabinet resulted in both harmony and unity
of purpose is corroborated by the testimony of Buchanan, the
most discordant member. "However various our views might
have been and often were upon any particular subject when
entering the cabinet council," he wrote, in advising Pierce to
follow Polk's example, "after mutual consultation and free dis-
cussion we never failed to agree at last, except on a few questions,
and on these the world never knew that we had differed." More
surprising, perhaps, is his praise of the President for having
personally directed diplomatic relations. "Mr. Polk," said he,
' ' was a wise man, and after deliberation he had determined that
all important questions with foreign nations should be settled in
Washington, under his own immediate supervision."-* Another
proof of the President's ability to gain and to retain the good
will of his cabinet is contained in a letter written by Bancroft
in 1887 after he had made an exhaustive examination of the
Polk Papers:
His character shines out in them just as the man he was, prudent, far-
sighted, bold, excelling any democrat of his day in undeviatingly correct
exposition of democratic principles; and, in short, as I think, judging of
him as I knew him, and judging of him by the results of his administration,
one of the very foremost of our public men and one of the very best and
most honest and most successful Presidents the country ever had.25
In a letter written during the following year Bancroft again
sounded the praises of his former chief and gave the reasons for
the success of his administration :
His administration, viewed from the standpoint of results, was perhaps
the greatest in our national history, certainly one of the greatest. He
succeeded because he insisted on being its centre, and in overruling and
guiding all his secretaries to act so as to ])roduce unity and harmonj'.
Those who study his administration will acknowledge how sincere and
successful were his efforts, as did those who were contemporary with him. 20
2* Curtis, Life of James Buchanan, II, 72, 76.
25 Bancroft to J. Geo. Harris, Aug. 30, 1887 (Howe, Life and Letters
of George Bancroft, I, 294).
26 Bancroft to J. G. Wilson, March 8, 1888 (Wilson, The Presidents of
the United States, 230).
ADMINISTRATION AND PATRONAGE 331
With a deep sense of personal integrity and a desire to avoid
everything which might impair his absolute independence, Polk
declined to accept presents of more than nominal value. Shortly
aft(?r his inauguration Thomas Lloyd sent him a valuable saddle-
horse, but he promptly gave orders that it should be returned to
the donor. Another admirer who sent a consignment of wine
and' other delicacies for the President's table was instructed to
send a bill or to take the articles away. It soon became known
that he would accept nothing of greater value than a book or a
cane. The same rule applied to presents for Mrs. Polk.=' The
same scrupulous regard for propriety is shown in his refusal to
invest in government securities a certain sum of money belong-
ing to his nephew and ward, Marshall T. Polk.-« His public
policies were denounced in unmeasured terms, and his political
honesty was frequently impugned, but even his enemies credited
him with personal integrity and purity of character. His own
personal affairs were characterized by simplicity and frugality.
This fact has already been noted in the care with which he
guarded against exorbitant charges at the time of his inaugu-
ration.-^ On the other hand, his generosity is shown by loans
and gifts to friends whenever he believed the recipients to be
deserving.^'' The improvident beggar was unceremoniously dis-
missed, for Polk had no sympathy for the man who believes that
the world owes him a living.
One of the first purely political questions which required the
new President's attention was the establishment of a newspaper
which would serve as the "organ" of the administration. We
27 Letters among FoR- Papers; also, Nelson, Memorials of Sarah Chil-
dress Polk, 89.
28 Polk, Diary, III, 15-17.
29 See above, p. 293, note 28. He was, according to a remark in the
Diary, his "own barbour" {Diary, III, 9).
30 For example, when the news came that Colonel Yell had fallen in the
battle of Buena Vista the President wrote: "His eldest son, and perhaps
his only son, is now at College at Georgetown, and as my impression is that
Col. Yell died poor, I ^nll in that event educate the boy, and shall take
great interest in him" {Diary, II, 451-452).
332 JAMES K. POLK
have seen that the subject had already been discussed, but noth-
ing definite had been accomplished when Polk entered upon the
duties of his office. The refusal of Ritchie to leave Richmond
determined the President to procure, if possible, the services of
Donelson, for in no case would he consent to make Blair the
administration editor. On March 17 he told Jackson in a "con-
fidential" letter that
There is at present no paper here which sustains my administration
for its own sake. The Globe it is manifest does not look to the success
or the glory of my administration so much as it does to the interests and
views of certain prominent men of the party who are looking to succeed
me in 1848. The arrangement which above all others I prefer would be
that, the owners of the Globe would agree to place it in the hands of a
new Editor, — still retaining the proprietorship of the paper if they choose.
You may rely ujion it, that without such an arrangement, the Democratic
party who elected me cannot be kept united three months. If Maj>'
Donelson would take charge of the Editorial Department — all the sections
of the party would be at once reunited and satisfied.
Donelson and Ritchie, he said, were the only ones whom he would
permit to edit his government organ. ^^
Within the next two weeks the President "had full and free
conversation with Mr. Blair and in good feeling frankly told
him, that it was impossible for the whole party ever to be united
in support of the administration whilst the Globe was regarded
as the official organ," and that he must have a new paper. In
sending this information to Donelson on March 28 Polk said that
within the last forty-eight hours the whole matter had "been
brought almost to a head." Ritchie had been in Washington
and Blair had agreed to sell the Glohc and retire, leaving Ritchie
and Donelson to take charge as joint editors. Blair had made
but one stipulation, that the arrangement should be delayed until
he could consult Van Buren and Jackson ; "he says positively
that if Gen^ Jackson assents, he will at once sell and retire."
After repeating the reasons, already given to Jackson, why he
31 Polk to Jackson, March 17, 1845, Jaclson Papers.
ADMINISTEATION AND PATRONAGE 333
could not eiuxiloy the Globe and expressing the hope that the ar-
rangement then pending might be effected, he added that "if it
should fail I am still deeply convinced that it will be indispens-
able to have a new paper and I have so informed Mr. Blair. "^-
After some further negotiation Blair and Rives consented to
dispose of the Globe and retire. The purchasers were Thomas
Ritchie, of the Richmond Enquirer, and John P. Heiss, of Ten-
nessee, formerly editor of the Nashville Union. A new paper
called the Washington Vmon succeeded the Globe with Ritchie
as its chief editor and Heiss as its business manager. The daily
edition of the new "Polk organ" made its debut on May 1, 1845,
and a semi-weekly followed four days later. Among the note-
worthy features of the initial numbers were a eulogy on the late
editors of the Globe, and the first installment of "Mrs. Caudle's
Curtain Lectures, ' ' copied from the London Punch. The humor
of the lectures may have been the more apparent to ingenuous
readers.
General Jackson was quite as unsuccessful in his attempt to
make Major William B. Lewis the "ferret" of the Polk admin-
istration as in his effort to have Blair retained as editor of the
"organ." Lewis had for some time held the office of second
auditor of the treasury, and, as he was considered to be a still
more treacherous politician than Blair, the new President sum-
marily dismissed him. In a letter to Polk, Lewis stated that he
had learned from a private source that
you have intimated that my removal from office was rendered necessary,
because the position I occupied was dangerous to the Government, in as
much as it would enable me to impart information to a foreign power to
the disadvantage of my own country.
He hoped that the report was unfounded but desired to know
whether Polk had made such a remark. As the President made
no reply to this or to other letters on the same subject, Lewis
32 Polk to Donelson, March 28, 1845, "Polk-Donelson Letters."
334 JAMES K. POLE
left for his home in Tennessee and published the correspondence
in a Nashville paper.^^ Polk's reasons for declining to make
explanations are given in a letter to a friend in Tennessee :
As to Maj. Lewis I shall of course enter into no controversy with him.
What he desires most is to make himself conspicuous by such a contro-
versy. His course since his removal from office proves his unworthiness
of which I had full & ample proof before I dismissed him. . . . [Had
Jackson known the reasons he would have approved.] 3*
The enforced retirement of Blair and the dismissal of Lewis
have been given special notice because many have cited them as
evidence to convict Polk of ingratitude and disloyalty to General
Jackson — the man to whom, it was said, he owed his own political
advancement. There is little consistency in some of the criticisms
relating to this matter. The man whom the critics denounced
for being bold enough to ignore the wishes of "Old Hickory"
was, by the same men, said to be weak and temporizing. Such
critics commended Jackson for discarding his old friend Van
Buren on account of the Texan question ; but they condemned
Polk for dismissing his own detractors and obstacles to party
success because these detractors happened to be friends of the
General. •'*•' Jackson himself, when replying to Lewis's complaints,
pointed out that the President had the right to till offices with
men in whom he, and not others, had confidence.^**
Although General Jackson was undoubtedly disappointed be-
cause his two most intimate friends had been dismissed, their
removal does not seem to have impaired his friendship for the
President or his desire for the success of the administration.
The last letter which the General ever penned was written to
33 The originals are among the PoJk Papers. Printed copies may
be found in Niles' Beg., LXVIII, 277.
34 Polk to A. O. P. Nicholson, July 28, 1845, Pollc Papers. In a letter
to Polk, July 19, J. Goo. Harris expressed the belief that both Blair and
Lewis had plotted against Polk.
35 Claiborne, for example, reflects these contrary opinions of Polk. See
Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, I, 228-229.
3« Jackson to Lewis, April 10, 1845 (Niles' Beg., LXVIII, 277).
ADMIN I ST EAT ION AND PATFONAGE 335
Polk on June 6, 1845. It expressed not only personal fi-iendship
for the President, but warned him that certain rumored acts of
Secretary Walker and land speculators might "blow you & your
administration sky high." The letter was characteristic of the
writer and exhibited his well-known traits — solicitude for his
friend and protege, a wish to supervise public affairs, and a
patriotic desire to serve his country, even though his methods
were not always of the best. "Here, my son," he said, as he
handed it to Andrew Jackson Jr., "read this letter, I want you
to be a witness to the fact that I have warned the government
against the disaster with which it is threatened — and have done
my duty." The letter was mislaid under some papers and not
found until October and it was feared it had been stolen. The
high value set upon it by the President, as well as his feeling
toward the writer, is stated in a letter in which Polk asked that
a search be made to recover it :
I shall prize the letter as above all price as being the last ever written
by the greatest man of the age in which he lived — a man whose confidence
and friendship I was so happy as to have enjoyed from my youth to the
latest.37
On the question of ousting Whigs from office in order to
make room for Democrats, Polk's own views accorded with those
of his party,^^ and when making appointments, except a few
military positions, political orthodoxy was a sine qua non. De-
spite the importunities of Buchanan, he refused to appoint John
37 Jackson to Polk, June 6; J. Geo. Harris to Polk, June 28; Polk to
Nicholson, June 28, 1845, Polk Papers. Andrew Jackson, Jr., approved
what the President had done and when writing, on October 10, to explain
how Jackson's last letter had been mislaid said: "Our old friend Majr
Letois has completely killed himself here & I expect else where by his
imprudent publications — he is now very sick of it, and well he may be"
(PoUc Papers).
38 In 1846 an officer who had been notified that he would be removed
protested that, although he had once been a Federalist, he had been a
Democrat for many years. "Although not the only reason for nmking
the change proper,'" the President observed, "I have no doubt he is a
Whig in all his feelings, and that his patronage is bestowed exclusively
on menil:)ers of that party, as far as he thinks he can do so with safety
to himself" {Diary, II, 113-114).
336 JAMES E. POLE
M. Read to a place on the Supreme Bench, because that distin-
guished jurist had once been a Federalist. His remarks in this
connection on the perdurance of original ideas showed his political
sagacity, for Read later deserted the party and became a Re-
publican :
Mr. Eeacl, I learned, was until within 10 or 12 years ago a leading
Federalist, and a Eepresentative of that party in the Legislature. Al-
though he has since that time acted with the Democratic party, I have no
confidence in the orthodoxy of his political opinions or constitutional
doctrines, and was therefore unwilling to appoint him to a station for life,
where he would almost certainly [have] relapsed into his old Federal
Doctrines & been latitudinarian in his doctrines. I have never known an
instance of a Federalist who had after arriving at the age of 30 professed
to change his opinions, who was to be relied on in his constitutional opin-
ions. All of them who have been appointed to the Supreme Court Beuch,
after having secured a place for life became very soon broadly Federal
and latitudinarian in all their decisions involving questions of Constitu-
tional power. Gen'l Jackson had been most unfortunate in his appoint-
ments to that Bench in this respect. I resolved to appoint no man who
was not an original Democrat & strict constructionist, and who would be
less likely to relapse into the Broad Federal doctrines of Judge Marshall
& Judge Story.39
Even Benton's son-in-law, William Carey Jones, w^as denied an
office because he had once edited a Federalist paper in New
Orleans. Like Jackson, Polk seemed to take it for granted that
honesty, except in very rare cases, was not to be found among
the Whigs, and his na'ive remarks about the exceptions which he
discovered are very amusing. Senator Mangrum, for example,
"though a Whig, is a gentleman, and fair & manly in his oppo-
sition to my administration." Senator Crittenden, also, "though
differing wuth me in politics is an honorable gentleman."""' He
does not, however, seem to have found a Whig honorable enough
to hold an appointive office. Still, though he declined to place
Whigs in appointive offices, he did not, on the other hand, dis-
miss them for partisan considerations merely. In his diary he
39 Polk, Diary, I, 137-138.
40 Ibid., Ill, 381, II, 349.
ADMINISTRATION AND PATEONAGE 337
has noted the gratitude of those whom he had retained in office,
despite their political opinions :
Many Whigs whom I retained in office were among those who called.
Though "mauv removals & new appointments to fill vacancies have been
made by me^ny administration has not been proscriptive, and the Whigs
who were faithful & good officers, whom I have retained in their places,
seem to appreciate my liberality towards them and many of them have
called to express their gratitude & to take leave of me.^i
The independence displayed in dropping Blair and Lewis was
characteristic of the policy which Polk endeavored to employ in
all matters of patronage. He was soon to discover, however,
that the dispenser of offices is by no means a free agent, and
that "political considerations" must be taken into account.
Although many at the time alleged that the President had
made preelection pledges to the Tyler and Calhoun factions,
there is now no reason for doubting Polk's oft-repeated assertions
that he was "under no pledges or commitments"" to any of the
political cliques. Even so, their wishes could not be wholly dis-
regarded with impunity. Hostile elements within the party had
united for the purpose of winning the election, and each was ready
to claim its share of the ' ' spoils. ' ' Having no assured ' ' adminis-
tration majority" in Congress, the success of his own program
must depend upon his ability to enlist the support of several
discordant factions. His effort to deal fairly with all of them
resulted in general criticism, for each laid claim to all important
offices and resented all favors accorded to its rivals. To have
allied himself with any one of these factions would have resulted
in disaster; the refusal to do so was attributed to timidity and a
temporizing disposition.
It has been noted in the preceding chapter that there were
three rather well-defined groups within the Democratic party.
The first comprised the followers of A' an Buren and Benton ; the
41 Polk, Diary, March 2, 1849, IV, 360.
42 For example, Polk to Cave Johnson, Dec. 21, 1844, - Polk-Johnson
Letters. ' '
338 JAMES E. POLK
second, the adherents of Calhoun ; and the third, that element
in the South and "West which accepted the leadership of Walker
and Cass.*" Until the appearance of Van Buren's anti-Texas
letter nothing had occurred to disturb the harmony which long
existed between the Van Burenites and Jackson's followers in
Tennessee, consequently Polk had been identified with the first
group even though his claim to the Vice-Presidency had met with
no cordial response.
Due, no doubt, to this affiliation and to a desire to assuage
the disappointment caused by the dropping of Van Buren by the
Baltimore convention, Polk turned first to New York when mak-
ing up his list of cabinet appointments. Wright, as we have
already seen, was invited to take charge of the Treasury Depart-
ment ; and when this invitation was declined, Butler, on the advice
of Van Buren, was tendered the War portfolio. Rebuffed a
second time, Polk ceased his efforts to placate the Van Burenites,
and appointed their rival, Marcy, to be Secretary of War. For
the sake of harmony within the party he had done all that any
self-respecting man in his position could have been expected to
do, and if the friends of the ex-President did not receive their
proper share of the "loaves and fishes," the blame rested entirely
upon their own shoulders. The President's offer, a few months
later, to send Van Buren as minister to England was likewise
declined, and the attitude of the ex-President and his adherents
continued to be one either of sullen reserve or of secret opposition
to the administration. When Polk reached New York on his north-
ern tour in July, 1847, Van Buren sent him a verbal invitation
to call. Believing the invitation to be a mere ' ' formal courtesy ' '
impelled by public opinion, the President promptly declined to
accept it. "The truth is," is the comment in his diary, "Mr.
Van Buren became offended with me at the beginning of my ad-
ministration because I chose to exercise my own judgment in the
*3 With characteristic pungency J. Q. Adams divided Democracy into
two parts: " Soutliern Democracy, which is slavery, and Western Democ-
racy, which is knavery" (Memoirs, XII, 11).
ADMIXISTEATION AND PATHONAGE 339
selection of luv own Cabinet, and would not be controlled by him
and suffer liiiu to select it for me."**
Although the President could not consent to retain Calhoun
in liis cabinet, he was prepared at the outset to deal fairly with
that wing of the party. The British mission was offered first to
Calhoun himself, and after his refusal, to his friends, Elmore
and Pickins. But this faction, like the Van Burenites, declined
to accept anything because their chief had not been permitted to
control the administration.
The Treasury Department with the patronage incident to the
office was assigned to Walker as a clear concession to the South
and West. The selection of Greer, a friend of Dallas, for the
Supreme Bench was likewise a recognition of the claims of this
wing of the party. Apparently Cass did not seek an appointive
office, but preferred to remain in the Senate.
When selecting federal officers the President did not, of course,
overlook his own personal friends. First of all. Cave Johnson
was made Postmaster General, and Donelson, after being consid-
ered as possible editor of the Union, was, on his return from
Texas, sent as minister to Berlin. J. George Harris, whose vitri-
olic pen and exasperating "buzzard" had made the Nashville
Union so effective a party journal, was made purser in the navy.
The loyal but dissolute Laughlin was appointed to be recorder
of the general land office as a reward for his services as editor
of the Nashville Union and for his support of Polk in the Balti-
more convention. The President's old friend and former law
44 Polk, Diary, III, 74. Polk had received information from many
sources concerning the hostility of the Albany regency. For example,
Buchanan, who visited Albany in the fall of 1846, reported that, while
Governor Wright himself was friendly, Cambreleng and others avoided
him. A month later George Bancroft, who had always been a warm friend
of Van Buren, after a similar visit informed Polk that NeAV York poli-
ticians were hostile to the administration and that Van Buren evinced
no desire to renew friendly' relations with the President. Although
Bancroft had originally suggested the tender to Van Buren of the British
mission, he now advised that no further attempt be made to placate the
ex-President (Buchanan to Polk, Sept. 5, 1846; Bancroft to Polk, Oct. 4,
1846, Polk Papers. Van Buren 's correspondents freely criticized the
President, Van Buren Papers, passim).
340 JAMES E. POLK
partner, Gideon Pillow, who claimed to be mainly responsible for
Polk's nomination at Baltimore, was, Avhen the war broke out,
made a brigadier-general of volunteers. Even John 0. Bradford,
whom a Whig bishop had excommunicated for editing the Nash-
ville Union, was. now rewarded by a pursership in the navy.
Most questionable of all, however, in point of propriety, was the
appointment of the President's own brother, William H. Polk,
to be charge d'affaires at Naples.
Having pointed out that the President, in an effort to promote
harmony, assigned to the several factions some of the most de-
sirable appointive positions, and tliat friendship rather than merit
dictated the selection of certain minor officials, we may now con-
sider his general policy in dealing with the public patronage.
The patronage incident to the office of chief executive is a source
of great power, and for this reason the popular belief seems to
be that it is also a source of great pleasure. The corollary is
doubtful in any case and certainly is erroneous when applied to
Polk, for his administration had not proceeded far before he
came to regard patronage and office-seekers as a veritable night-
mare.
Polk was a man of very positive ideas, and one of those ideas
was that public office is an opportunity for public service. Al-
though in the finesse of practical politics he was no more scrupu-
lous than his fellows, he never regarded any position held by
himself as a sinecure and he believed that offices should not be
so regarded by others. The keynote of his policy was foreshad-
owed in the circular letter, already quoted, that was sent to
prospective members of his cabinet. He would aid no aspirant
for the Presidential nomination in 1848 and he would not permit
his subordinates to use their offices for such a purpose ; his and
their energies must be devoted to the ''principles and policy"
of the existing administration. Determined to devote his whole
time to the public service, he required that cabinet members should
do likewise ; intrusting of important business to cliief clerks was
not to be tolerated.
ADMINISTEATION AND PATRONAGE 341
In theory, therefore, the President believed office to be an
opportunity for present service and not a reward for acts already
performed. And if we except the few instances already noted
where appointments were made either for personal reasons or in
an effort to promote harmony it may be said that Polk, at the
beginning of his administration, sincerely endeavored to carry
his theory into practice. The more important appointments re-
ceived his own personal attention, and, in order that he might
conserve his time for affairs of state, the selection of minor offi-
cials was turned over to his cabinet.*' The Union, soon after its
establishment, repelled in an editorial assertions made by poli-
ticians that Polk would have to dispense patronage in accordance
Avith the wishes of the various candidates for the Presidency. On
the contrary, said the editor, the President, in making his ap-
pointments, will take no thought of whether the person is a Van
Buren man, a Calhoun man, a Cass man or a Buchanan man. His
thought will be simply : " Is the man honest and capable ? ' ' Two
months later the following editorial appeared :
Mr. Polk has avowed and acted, and will continue to act, upon the
settled determination not to permit the course of his administration to
interfere with, or influence, the selection of a candidate of the democratic
party to succeed him. That important duty he will leave to be performed
by the people, unbiased and uninfluenced by his official action. Can any
portion of the democracy object to this course ?i6
45 Commenting on this policy, NUes' Register said: "The course adopted
bv President Polk, on taking hold of the helm of state, in relation to
the importunities for office which had grown out of an erroneous course
admitted by some of his immediate predecessors, seems to have gn^en
satisfaction to every body except those who were in full cry for office.
We allude to his having announced semi-officially that personal attend-
ance at the seat of government, and personal importunities for office
would operate against the applicant;— that the papers designed to urge
claims for appointment, must be submitted in the first place to the presid-
ing officer of the department to which the office belonged, and must be
by him deliberated upon and presented in due form, together with those
of all other applicants for the same office, by the chief of the department
to the president, for his deliberate judgment— with the whole subject
before him. , , ^ _,. -nr i • a
This announcement occasioned a general scatterfication. Washington
city immediately lost a large proportion of its transient crowd. It is
to be hoped the position will be adhered to in its genuine spirit, and with
due decision" {Niles' Reg., LXVIII, 51, March 29, 1845).
46 Washington Union, May 13, July 14, 1845.
3-42 JAMES K. POLK
Despite the soundness of the President's position, it was al-
ready apparent that not only ''any portion" but every portion
of the party was displeased. A few days before the appearance
of the latter editorial he had told Silas Wright that dispensing
of patronage was his greatest source of annoyance. Concerning
the general policy of the administration, said he, there seems to
be no complaint, but much dissatisfaction about offices; "I sin-
cerely wish I had no office to bestow."*' Could he have seen
contemporary private correspondence his wish undoubtedly would
have been still more emphatic. For example, old line Democrats
complained because room had not been made for them by the
ousting of all ' ' Federalists, ' ' and because Polk and Walker were
too busy to see their fellow-citizens. One of them in reporting
to Van Buren this sad state of affairs remarked that one "never
had to call twice" to obtain an interview with either Jackson or
Van Buren. *^ Enraged because he had not fared so well as certain
other Tennesseans, Andrew Johnson pronounced Polk's appoint-
ments to be the "most damnahle" ever made by any President,*^
and this fact he attributed to duplicity and the want of moral
courage. Nevertheless, it required greater courage to resist im-
portunities than to gratify them, and dissatisfaction from so
many sources is but evidence that an attempt was being made to
divorce patronage from factional politics, even though that at-
tempt was destined to prove unsuccessful.
We are not left in doubt concerning the President's own
opinions on the subject of patronage, for in making daily entries
in his diary he seldom neglected to express his loathing for the
47 Polk to Wright, July 8, 1845, Polk Papers.
■is John P. Sheldon to Van Buren, Oct. 30, 1845, Van Buren Papers.
4" " Take Polk's appointments all and all and they are the most
damnahle set that were ever made by any president since the government
was organized, out of Tennessee as well as in it. He has a set of inter-
ested parasites about him who flatter him till he does not know himself.
He seems to be acting on the principle of hanging one old friend for
the purpose of making two new ones" (Johnson to ? [someone in
Tennessee], July 22, 1846, Johnson Papers).
ADMINISTRATION AND PAT BON AGE 343
office-seeker. He had the utmost contempt for those whose
'' patriotism" consisted solely of a willingness to draw a salary
from the government ; he regarded them not merely as an in-
cubus but as a serious public menace. The personal boredom
caused by listening to their tales became almost intolerable, but
Polk was even more exasperated because they prevented him
from devoting his time to important governmental affairs.
At the beginning of his administration Polk tried to follow
the program announced in the Union of making his appointments
on the basis of honesty and merit. He attempted also, as we
have seen, to conserve his own time by delegating to his cabinet
the lesser appointments. But for "practical" reasons he was
constrained to modify this salutary program. In the first place
his predecessors had made themselves accessible to the public and
it was difficult for any President, particularly a Democratic
President, suddenly to reverse the precedent. In the second
place he had several important measures which could be carried
into effect only by the cooperation of Congress, and he soon dis-
covered that such cooperation could not be procured by ignoring
the claim of members to their "share" of the patronage. Re-
gardless of his own wishes, therefore, he was forced to give audi-
ence to individual office-seekers, and to make many appointments
on the recommendation of members of Congress. In order to
give a complete history of his patronage tribulations it would be
necessary to reproduce his entire diary ; some selected passages
may serve to illustrate the annoyance experienced not only by
Polk but by every chief executive.
Once the horde had been admitted to his presence the Presi-
dent, being a very courteous man, found it difficult to get rid of
them. A few months' experience, however, taught him that "the
only way to treat them is to be decided & stern. ' ' In February,
1846, Washington was infested with an unusually large number
of persons ' ' who are so patriotic as to desire to serve their country
344 JAMES K. POLE
by getting into fat offices."^" On the anniversary of his inaug-
uration he wrote in his diary :
I am ready to exclaim will the pressure for office never cease! It is
one year to-day since I entered on the duties of my office, and still the
pressure for office has not abated. I most sincerely wish that I had no
offices to bestow. If I had not it would add much to the happiness and
comfort of my position. As it is, I have no offices to bestow without
turning out better men than a large majority of those who seek their
places.si
The inconvenience of possessing a courteous disposition is illus-
trated by an entry made on June 4, 1846 :
When there are no vacancies it is exceedingly distressing to be com-
pelled to hear an office [seeker] for an hour tell his story and set forth his
merits and claims. It is a great and useless consumption of my time, and
yet I do not see how I am to avoid it without being rude or insulting,
which it is not in my nature to be.52
There were times, however, when politeness ceased to be a
virtue, especially after the saime individual had called repeatedly
"on the patriotic business of seeking office." After a trying
experience with "old customers," he observed on August 17,
1846:
I concluded that it was useless to be annoyed by them any longer, and
I was more than usually stern and summary with them. I said no! this
morning with a free will and a good grace. Tlie truth is that the persons
who called to-day, with but few exceptions, were a set of loafers without
merit. They had been frequently here before, and I find as long as 1 treat
them civilly I shall never get clear of them.^s
If, as the Whigs would have it, Polk needlessly precipitated
the war with Mexico, he suffered ample punishment in the form
of renewed scramble for office. Congressmen now not only sought
places for their constituents, but many of them desired military
positions for themselves. For the sake of harmony the President
50 Polk, Diary, I, 158 (Jan. 9, 1846) ; ibid., 255.
r'llhid., 261.
'-2 Ibid., 44(>-447.
53 Polk, Diary, II, 85. See also ibid., 105-106.
ADillXISTBATlON AND PATRONAGE 345
was ready to sutt'er much inconvenience, but when it came to a
matter of principle he was unyielding. The Diary for June 22,
1846, notes that
The passiou for office among members of Congress is very great, if
not absolutely disreputable, and greatly embarrasses the operations of the
Government. They create offices by their own votes and then seek to fill
them themselves. I shall refuse to ai)point them, though it be at the
almost certain hazard of incurring their displeasure. I shall do so because
their appointment would be most corrupting in its tendency. I am aware
that by refusing their applications I may reduce my administration to a
minority in both Houses of Congress, but if such be the result I shall have
the high satisfaction of having discharged my duty in resisting the selfish-
ness of members of Congress, who are willing to abandon their duty to
their constituents and provide places for themselves. I will not counte-
nance such selfishness, but will do my duty, and rely on the country for
an honest support of my administration.
By December 16, 1846, the unscrupulous methods resorted to
by members of Congress in their efforts to procure offices for their
clients had become so appalling that Polk began ' ' to distrust the
disinterestedness and honesty of all mankind. ' ' Complaints and
disatfection over petty offices gave him more trouble than did
great national policies. "There is," he confided to his diary,
"more selfishness and less principle among members of Congress,
as well as others, than I had any conception [of] before I be-
came President of the U. S. ' '^* Every day added new evidence
of congressional depravity, and he was ' ' disgusted with the trick-
ery and treachery" exhibited in recommendations for office. ^^
The way in which patronage had become a menace to both polit-
ical parties and to the country is set forth in the entry for Janu-
ary 7, 1847 :
The passion for office and the number of unworthy persons who seek
to live on the public is increasing beyond former example, and I now
predict that no President of the U. S. of either party will ever again be
re-elected. The reason is that the patronage of the Government will
destroy the popularity of any President, however well he may administer
^ilbid., 278-279.
55 Ibid., 296.
3-46 JAMES K. POLE
the Government. The office seekers have become so numerous that they
hold the balance of power betw^een the two great parties of the country.
In every appointment which the President makes he disappoints half a
dozen or more applicants and their friends, who actuated by selfish and
sordid motives, will prefer any other candidate in the next election, while
the person appointed attributes the appointment to his own superior merit
and does not even feel obliged by it. The number of office seekers has
become so large that they probabl}' hold the balance of power between
the tw^o great parties in the country, and if disappointed in getting place
under one administration they will readily unite themselves with the
I)arty and candidate of the opposite politics, so as to increase their chances
for place. Another great difficulty in making appointments which the
President encounters is that he cannot tell upon what recommendations
to rely. Members of Congress and men of high station in the country sign
])apers of recommendation, either from interested personal motives or with-
out meaning what they say, and thus the President is often imposed on,
and induced to make bad appointments. When he does so the whole
responsibility falls on himself, while those who have signed papers of
recommendation and misled him, take special care never to avow the
agency they have had in the matter, or to assume any part of the respon-
sibility. I have had some remarkable instances of this during my admin-
istration. One or two of them I think worthy to be recalled as illustrations
of many others. In the recess of Congress shortly after the commencement
of my administration I made an appointment upon the letter of recom-
mendation of a senator. I sent the nomination to the Senate at the last
session & it was rejected, and, as I learned, at the instance of the same
Senator who had made the recommendation. A few days afterwards the
Senator called to recommend another person for the same office. I said to
him, well, you rejected the man I nominated; O yes, he replied, he was
without character & wholly unqualified. I then asked him if he knew upon
whose recommendation I had appointed him, to which he replied that he
did not. I then handed him his own letter & told him that that was the
recommendation upon Avhich I had appointed him. He appeared confused
and replied. Well, we are obliged to recommend our constituents when they
apply to us. The Senator was Mr. Atcheson of Missouri, and the person
appointed & rejected Avas Mr. Hedges as Surveyor of the port of St. Louis.56
A week after the above had been written the begging for office
had become ' ' not only disgusting, but ahnost beyond endurance. ' '
5B/bid., 313-315. Polk crossed out the last sentence, but undoubtedly
Atchison was the Senator in question. Members of Congress frequently
signed enthusiastic recommendations for ajqilicants and tlien sent private
letters which requested I'olk to pay no heed to the recommendation. The
ai)plicant of course blamed Polk when the appointment was not made.
See ibid., 278, note.
ADMINISTBATION AND PAT HON AGE 347
''I keep my temper," wrote the President, "or rather suppress
the indignation which I feel at the sordid and selfish views of
the people who continually annoy me about place." The rule
which he had adopted under which no member of Congress was
to be appointed to office, except diplomatic and high militarj^
positions, had already caused twenty disappointed applicants to
oppose the measures of the administration ; nevertheless he was
determined to persist in applying the rule, regardless of conse-
quences. "If God grants me length of days and health," he
wrote in desperation, "I will, after the expiration of my term,
give a history of the selfish and corrupt considerations which
influence the course of public men, as a legacy to posterity. I
shall never be profited by it, but those who come after me may
be. "^' ]More than a year later he again expressed his determi-
nation to write an expose of office-seeking,"^ and it is very prob-
able that he would have done so had his death not occurred a few
months after his retirement. It would have been an interesting
volume, for he possessed both the data and the disposition to do
the subject full justice.
The phrenologist who examined Polk in 1839 stated, among
other things, that "when he suffers, he suffers most intently."
No one who has followed the President's almost daily denunci-
ations of place-hunters will be inclined to deny the truth of this
statement. ' ' I was doomed this morning, ' ' is the diary entry for
February 18, 1847, "to pass through another pressure of impor-
tunate office seekers. I am ready to exclaim God deliver me from
dispensing the patronage of the Government."^'' His suffering
was made the more intense by his efforts to conceal it. His habit
57 Polk, Diary, II, 328-330.
5s Polk, Diary, III, 419. " If a kind Providence permits me length of
days and health, I will, after I retire from the Presidential office, write
the secret and hitherto unknown history of the Government in this
respect. It requires great patience & self command to repress the loath-
ing I feel towards a hungry crowd of unworthy office-hunters who often
crowd my office."
59 Polk, Diary, II, 382.
348 JAMES K. POLK
of reticence and a desire to preserve his dignity led him, for the
most part, to endure the agony in silence ; to his diary alone did
he communicate his real opinions. "It is enough," he wrote on
one occasion, "to exhaust the patience and destroy the good
temper of any man on earth, to bear the daily boring which I have
to endure. I keep, however, in a good humor as far as it is pos-
sible to do so."^" It was this same passive exterior which led
many to believe that he did not have positive opinions on other
subjects.
The severest of weather was no deterrent to the procession of
the office-seeking "patriots," for "neither ice nor fire" could
stop them. Polk "pushed them off and fought them with both
hands like a man fighting fire," but "it has all been in vain. ""^
He felt the need of "one of Colt's revolving pistols" to enable
him to clear the office so that he might attend to his public duties.*'-
Most disgusting of all were those who, on hearing a report of an
officer's illness, rushed to the President with an application for
the sick man's position, "if he should die." Nearly all of them
were ' ' mere loafers who are too lazy to work and wish to be sup-
ported by the public ' ' — in a word, ' ' the most contemptible race
on earth. "®^ So far as members of Congress were concerned.
Senator Breeze, of Illinois, enjoyed the distinction of being the
cliampion pest. "He has," said the President, "no sooner pro-
cured an appointment than he sets to work to procure another, ' '
and his recommendations were governed by his political interests
and not by the public good."*
Although Polk fully realized at the time of his inauguration
that he was entering upon four years of incessant toil, he un-
doubtedly, like all who have not held the office, believed the Presi-
dency to be a position of dignity as well as power. The political
intrigues and factional jealousies with which he Avas beset soon
00 Polk, Dianj, III, 2o0. 63 Polk, Dianj, III, 331, IV, 79.
oi Polk, Diary, II, 3C0-361, 383. 64 Polk, Diary, II, 426.
62 Polk, Diary, IV, 246.
ADMIN 1ST EAT ION AND FAT EON AGE 349
divested the office of much of its glamour ; the political necessity
of enduring the importunities of the office-seeking horde made it
even contemptible. On this subject we may quote his own words :
The office of President is generally esteemed a very high dignified posi-
tion, but really I think the public would not so regard it if they could look in
occasionally and observe the kind of people by whom I am often annoyed.
I cannot seclude mj-self but must be accessible to my fellow-citizens, and
this gives an opportunity to all classes and descriptions of people to obtrude'
themselves upon me about matters in which the public has not the slightest
interest. There is no class of our population by Avhom I am annoyed so
much, or for whom I entertain a more sovereign contempt, than for the pro-
fessional office-seekers who have besieged me ever since I have been in the
Presidential office.ss
Scarcely less obnoxious than the office-seeker was the casual
visitor who had no business to transact but who nevertheless
wasted the President's valuable time. Even though he begrudged
the time spent in pointless conversation he realized that a refusal
to meet callers would cause adverse criticism and weaken his
administration. ' ' I feel, ' ' said he, ' ' that I am compelled to yield
to it, and to deprive myself of the ordinary rest, in order to attend
to the indispensable duties which devolve upon me. ' '®*'
Ceremonious notifications of royal births and deaths added
their share of irritation to the busy and democratic President.
"I confess," he noted on one occasion, ''the practice of announc-
ing officially the birth of Foreign Princes to the President of the
United States, has always appeared to me to be supremely ridicu-
lous."*'" When his attention was called by Buchanan to a grave
65 Polk, Piary, IV, 160-161 (Oct. 19, 1848).
66 Polk, Diary, II, 280-281.
<"■ Polk, Diary, I. 237. When not too much absorbed in affairs of state,
he sometimes saw the funny side as well. E.g. "These ceremonies seem
to be regarded as of Great importance by the Ministers of the Foreign
Monarchies, though to me they are amusing & ridiculous" (ibid., II, 215—
216). The solemn notification of the death in the royal family of Eussia
struck him as being so ridiculous that he could "scarcely preserve his
gravity." "I simply remarked [to the Russian minister] that such
occurrences would take place, and at once entered into familiar con-
versation" (ibid., 374).
350 JAMES K. POLE
communication from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs re-
lating to a dispute between American and French consuls over
their claims to precedence, Polk related with approval a story
of Jefferson's "pell mell" etiquette, and told Buchanan that '"I
was not a man of ceremonies, that he and Mr. Guizot might settle
the dispute between the consuls in any way they pleased."'"*
Although Polk was not, as is generally believed, devoid of all
sense of humor, the austerity of his bearing when President of the
United States very naturally gave rise to this belief. His habitual
gravity was caused in part by ill health, but still more by the
weight of responsibilities. Official cares so filled his mind that
no room was left for amusement. This fact is well illustrated
by an incident which he has noted in his diary. One day a
magician gave an exhibition before a select company at the execu-
tive mansion and the President was persuaded by Bancroft and
Mrs. Catron to attend. The rest of the company derived much
enjoyment from the entertainment, but Polk felt that his time
had been unprofitably spent. "I was thinking," he wrote,
"more about the Oregon & other public questions which bear on
my mind that [than] the tricks of the juggler, and perhaps on
that account the majority of the company might think my opin-
ions entitled to but little weight." He could not, like Lincoln,
find relaxation in a homely anecdote or in a chapter from some
humorous writer. Official cares were constantly on his mind and
he had no time for amusements.
The cares of office added much to the gravity of the Presi-
dent's naturally serious disposition. Indeed, he had become, as
Claiborne has said, "grave almost to sadness."'"' While he will-
ingly spent his energies in the public service, he longed for the
day to arrive when he might relinquish the helm of state ; it
needed no one-term pledge to prevent him fi'om standing for
reelection. "I have now," he wrote on his fifty-second birthday,
<••« Polk, Diari), II, 175.
09 Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, I, 228.
ADMIXISTEATION AND PATRONAGE 351
"passed through two-thirds of my Presidential term, & most
heartily wish the remaining third was over, for I am sincerely
desirous to have the enjoyment of retirement in private life.'""
Polk's success as an executive and as a constructive statesman
will, we believe, be made manifest in the chapters which follow.
The topics to be considered cover the fields of war, diplomacy,
finance, industrial development, and constitutional law. In all
of these fields, the President formulated his own policies and, in
the main, succeeded in putting them in operation. Soon after
his inauguration he announced to George Bancroft that the "four
great measures" of his administration would be: reduction of
the tariff, establishment of an independent treasury, settlement
of the Oregon question, and the acquisition of California.'^ He
carried out this program in spite of vigorous opposition. And
if we except the coercion of Mexico, upon which there is still a
difference of opinion, it is the verdict of history that his policies
were both praiseworthy and sound.
70 Polk, Diary, III, 210.
Ti Schouler, History of the United States, IV, 498.
CHAPTEE XVI
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION
As we have noted in a preceding chapter, the joint resolution
adopted by Congress on February 28, 1845, authorized the annex-
ation of Texas by either of two methods. Under the first — ^the
House resolution — Congress consented to admit Texas as a state
as soon as the government and people of that republic had agreed
to annexation and had conformed to certain requirements
specified in the resolution. The second method — the so-called
Benton plan — provided :
That if the President of the United States shall in his judgment and
discretion deem it most advisable, instead of proceeding to submit the fore-
going resolution to the Eepublic of Texas, as an overture on the part of the
United States for admission, to negotiate Avith that Eepublic.
Three days before Polk's inauguration Tyler, as Ave have
seen, approved the joint resolution and selected the first method
— the one specified in the House resolution. On March 3 Presi-
dent Tyler dispatched a messenger with instructions to Donelson,
the American charge d' affaires, who was residing temporarily
in New Orleans.
The action taken by Tyler did not, of course, effect the annex-
ation of the lone-star republic. There was a possibility,^ at
least, that the new President might recall tlie messenger and
select the Benton alternative of negotiating with Texas. Besides,
annexation in any case was contingent on the acceptance of the
proposed terms by the government and people of the Texan
republic.
1 See p. 318 and note 96.
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 353
When Calhoun called ui)on Polk to inform him that Tyler
had decided to select the House resolution, the President-elect
declined, as we have seen, to express an opinion. And, if we
except the seemingly incredible statements made by Tappan and
Blair, he did not reveal his opinions concerning the method of
annexation up to the time of his inauguration. He says in his
diary- that his mind was not fully made up as to the choice
of method until he met his cabinet on March 10, 1845 ; he then
decided to select the House resolution, or in other words, to
acquiesce in the choice made by Tyler. Additional evidence
that he arrived at no decision until he had consulted the cabinet
is contained in a private letter written to Donelson on the seventh
of March. He said :
A despatch was transmitted to you by the late administration on the 3rd
Ins. In two or three days another will be forwarded to you on the same
subject by a special messenger. But five members of my Cabinet have been
confirmed by the Senate; the remaining members I hope will be confirmed
at the next meeting of the Senate. I write now to say that I desire you, not
to take any definite action in pursuance of the instructions given in the
despatch of the 3rd Inst, until after you receive the one which will be for-
warded in two or three days, and by which the instructions will probably
be modified. I write you this informal note for the reason that Mr. Buchanan
the Secretary of State has not entered the duties of his office, and because
I desire to have the Cabinet complete before definite action is had on my
part.3
Just what the President meant by saying that Tyler's instruc-
tions would probably be modified we can only conjecture. Pos-
sibly he may have been contemplating a reversal of Tyler's
action, although his statement does not seem to warrant such an
inference. More likely he was thinking of the reasoning con-
tained in the instructions sent by his predecessor, for this, as
we shall see, was criticized in the official dispatch which soon
followed.
2 Polk, Dmry, IV, 44.
3 Polk to Donelson, March 7, 1845, "Polk-Donelson Letters." The
endorsement on the letter r^ads: "The President March 7. Reed, from
Mr. Pickett on the 19th at New Orleans."
354 JAMES E. POLE
As soon as the decision to proceed under the House resolution
had been reached Buchanan, by the President's order, delivered
to Almonte, the Mexican minister, an answer to the protest
against annexation which that otificial had addressed to Calhoun.
In his letter Almonte characterized annexation as "an act of
aggression the most unjust which can be found recorded in the
annals of modern history — namely, that of despoiling a friendly
nation like Mexico, of a considerable portion of her territory."
After asserting that Mexico would exert all of her power in
recovering her province of Texas, he concluded by demanding
his passports. In reply Buchanan informed Almonte that while
President Polk desired to continue friendly relations with Mexico,
annexation was "irrevocably decided" so far as the United
States was concerned, and that it was too late to raise the
question of Texan independence.*
On the same day, March 10, Polk sent out another messenger,
Governor Archibald Yell, with new instructions for Donelson.
The instructions from both Presidents reached the charge d'
affaires at New Orleans on March 24, and he set out immediately
for Texas.^
In the new instructions, Buchanan informed Donelson that
Polk did not concur with Tyler in the belief that procedure under
the Benton alternative would necessitate the conclusion of a
treaty which must be ratified by the Senate, "yet he is sensible
that many of the sincere friends of Texas may entertain this
opinion." Should this prove to be the case, dissension and delay
must be the inevitable result. From all points of view, said
Buchanan, the House resolution \vas to be preferred, therefore
he urged Texas to accept it without modification and to trust to
sister states for desired adjustments. He desired especially that
the public lands of Texas should be transferred to the United
4 Almonte to Calhoun, March 6; Buchanan to Almonte, March 10, 1845
(Buchanan, Works, VI, 118-120).
5 Doiielson to Buchanan, March 24, 1845 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1
sess., 45, 46).
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 355
States SO that the federal government might extend its laws
over the Indian tribes.*'
Donelson reached Galveston on March 27 only to find that a
British vessel had arrived there a short time before and that the
British and French ministers had gone to Washington, Texas,
to confer with the government of that republic. As it was
rumored that these diplomats carried with them the promise of
Mexico's recognition of Texan independence and an offer from
England of a favorable commercial treaty, Donelson ''put off
in a hurry after them." When reporting this information to
Polk, Yell said that should General Houston espouse the cause
of annexation, President Jones would also support it. Yell had
conversed with many Texan leaders, including Memucan Hunt.
They talked, he said, of getting the people to demand that con-
gress should be called for the purpose of considering annexation."
Not all of the leaders, however, were pleased with the terms of
annexation offered by the United States. Donelson did not be-
lieve that the people would acquiesce in annexation unless the
proposition were presented to them by their own government,
and he thought that President Jones was not in favor of the
measure. He was not encouraged by the apparent attitude at
the capital when he first reached there, but within a month he
was able to report that he considered the question as settled, so
far as Texas was concerned.*
The people proved to be in favor of annexation, and the
leaders could not ignore their wishes;^ nevertheless, the Texan
government could not afford to disregard the wishes of General
Houston, and he, at first, assumed a hostile attitude. On his
arrival, Donelson found the Texan government disposed to offer
objections to the American terms of annexation, and he had
6 Buchanan to Donelson, March 10, 1845, ihid., 35-38.
7 Yell to Polk, Galveston, March 26, 1845, Polk Papers.
8 Donelson to Buchanan, April 1, 3, May 6, 1845 (Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong.,
1 sess., 47, 51, 56).
9 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 434-435.
356 JAMES K. POLK
reason to believe that, in no small degree, this attitnde was due
to the hostility of Houston. The ex-President was sojourning at
some distance from the seat of government. Donelson paid him
a visit in the hope that he might overcome his objections to
immediate annexation.
In a letter to Donelson, Houston had said that in the House
resolution "the terms are dictated and conditions absolute."
Believing that Texas should have something to say about the
terms of union, he therefore preferred the Benton alternative
of negotiation. The proposed method, in his opinion, left too
many things uncertain. He opposed, especially, the cession of
Texan property to the United States and the ambiguous char-
acter of the northwestern boundary.^" Donelson reminded
Houston that the specifications in the House resolution regarding
property, debts, and public lands, were substantially those which
had been suggested by Houston himself only a few months before,
still the ex-President gave no intimation that he would withdraw
his opposition.^^
However sincere Houston's objections may have been, forces
Avere at work which were likely to modify them. Donelson had
brought to Houston a letter from General Jackson which praised
the work he had already done and assumed that he would aid in
its completion.^- The immediate effect of this letter was not
apparent, but Houston, like Benton, always Mashed to stand w^ell
with "the chief." In addition, he could never quite overcome
a lingering desire to be once more under the folds of "old Glory."
Then, too, the Washington Globe and other newspapers intimated
that he might be chosen President of the United States in the
10 Houston to Donelson, April 9, 1845 {Tex. State Hist. Assn. Quar.,
Oct., 1897, 79 ff). Donelson to Buchanan, April 12, 1845 {Sen. Doc. I,
29 Cong., 1 sess., 52).
11 Donelson to Calhoun, April 24, 1845 {Hep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899,
II, 1029). Houston's memorandum of suggestions is given in Jones,
Eepublic of Texas, 414^415.
12 Jackson to Houston, March 12, 1845 (Yoakum, History of Texas,
II, 441). See also, Duff Green to Calhoun, Dec. 8, 1844 {Eep. Am. Hist.
Assn., 1899, II, 1007).
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 357
event of annexation/^ For the present, however, Houston was
obdurate, and Donelson returned to the seat of government to
continue the struggle with President Jones and his cabinet.
Although Jones was noncommittal and spoke of offers from
T^Iexico, already there were indications that popular pressure
would be brought to bear upon the government.^* Some, it is
said, even threatened to lynch Jones if he should attempt to
prevent annexation. ^^
On the first of April Donelson transmitted the proposals of
his government to Allen, the Texan Secretary of State, and with
them a letter explaining why the House resolution had been
selected. President Jones complained about the terms offered
in the resolution, but on April 15 he issued a proclamation sum-
moning the Texan congress to convene on the sixteenth of June.^*'
As public opinion in favor of annexation rose to a high pitch,
Houston's attitude experienced a noticeable change, and early in
May he set out for the Hermitage to visit General Jackson. After
conversing with him at Galveston, Yell reported to Polk that the
ex-President was now friendly and not the least opposed to annex-
ation-that ''he is now safe." He is, said Yell, the "Power
behind the Throne, greater than the Throne itself." Donelson,
in Yell's opinion, deserved much credit for the "heroic work"
he had been doing ; his relationship to the ' ' old hero ' ' had greatly
assisted him in dealing with the Texans.^^ Whatever the reason
may have been, Houston's conversion to annexation seems to have
been complete, and late in May Jackson wrote with enthusiasm
that "Texas comes into the union with a united voice, and Genl
13 Smith, Annexatioti of Texas, 439.
14 Letters to Jones from Underwood, Norton, Lubbock, Ashbel Smith
et al (Jones, EepuMic of Texas, 442, 444, 44(>-449). Jones's endorsements
on these letters claim that instead of being opposed to annexation, he
was ' ' its chief author.' ' This may be doubted.
15 Smith, op. oit., 441.
10 Donelson to Allen, March 31; same to Buchanan, April 1_2; Procla-
mation of April 15, 1845 {Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 48, 52, o4).
IT Yell to Polk, May 5, 1845, Polk Papers.
358 JAMES K. POLK
Houston, as I know, puts liis shoulders to the wheels to roll it in
speedily. I knew British gold could not buy Sam Houston all
safe & Donelson will have the honor of this important Deed."^^
Houston's conversion did not settle the matter. Another
difficulty now presented itself. The House resolution required
that a convention should be assembled in Texas for the purpose
of framing a new state government, but the Texan constitution
had, of course, made no provision for such proceeding. Presi-
dent Jones could block annexation by declining to exercise extra-
legal authority, and for a time it was feared that he might do
so. On May 5, however, Jones issued another proclamation.
Admitting his want of authority, he nevertheless recommended
that delegates be chosen to meet at Austin on July 4 for the
purpose of considering the offer made by the United States.^**
Allen now pointed out to Donelson that acceptance of the
American proposal of annexation would very likely result in an
invasion from Mexico. He therefore requested that an American
army should be brought to Texas so that it might be ready to
repel such an invasion.-*^ Donelson submitted Allen's request
to his government ; but Polk and Buchanan had already antici-
pated the wishes of Texas, and a promise of protection had
been forwarded to Donelson. Buchanan was instructed by the
President to say that as soon as Texas shall have accepted the
American proposal, "he will then conceive it to be both his
right and his duty to employ the army in defending that State
against the attacks of any foreign power." A force of three
IS Jackson to Polk, May 26, 1845, ibid. Smith thinks it likely that
Houston was influenced to some extent by the belief that the Uniter]
States might seize Texas as it had seized West Florida (Smith, op. cit.,
443).
19 Se7i. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 63-64
20 President Jones maintained later that Donelson, by a "trick," had
induced Allen to make the request for troops. This may be a misrepre-
sentation, yet it is interesting to note that Polk and Buchanan made
an offer of troops before they had received Allen 's request (Jones,
Republic of Texas, 53, 457-458). As to misrepresentation, see Smith,
Annexation, 445, not© 21.
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 359
thousand men, he said, would immediately be placed on the
border, prepared to enter Texas and to act without a moment's
delay.-^
Shortly after this promise to protect Texas had been sent
to Donelson a significant article appeared in the Washington
Union. It may not, of course, have been inspired by the Presi-
dent ; but the coupling of the American claims against Mexico
and the desire for California with the question of annexing Texas
accords so well with Polk's previously announced policy that
one is tempted to assume that Ritchie voiced faithfully the views
of the administration. Polk and his cabinet, said the article, are
fully capable of handling the Texas and Oregon questions. It
is uncertain what course Mexico will pursue, but
Her true interest ^vill be found in peace. Let the great measure of
annexation be aeeomplished, and with it the questions of boundary and of
claims. But if she madly rushes on to the alternative of war, who shall
pretend to set bounds to the consequences?
We infinitely prefer the friendly settlement of the great question now
pending. It wiU secure the peace and welfare of the Mexican nation. It
can now be done, and it should now be accomplished. For Avho can arrest
the torrent that will pour onward to the West? The road to California will
open to us. Who will stay the march of our western people? Our northern
brethren also are looking towards that inviting region with much more
interest than those of the South. They, too, will raise the cry of "West-
ward, ho! " However strongly many of them may now oppose annexation,
yet let California be thrown open to their ambition and the torrent even of
their population will roll on westwardly to the Pacific.22
The preliminary treaty between Texas and Mexico, which
had been arranged by Captain Charles Elliot, the British charge,
was signed by the executive officers of the former country on the
tw^enty-ninth of March. Under pretext of making a visit to South
Carolina, Elliot had, in April, set out for the Mexican capital.'^
His artifice, for the time being, was successful.
21 Donelson to Buchanan, May 6; Buchanan to Donelson, May 23
(Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 40, 56, 69, ff.).
22 Union, June 2, 1845.
23 < ' I shall go out in the ' Electra, ' ' ' Elliot wrote to President Jones
on April 5, "but change ships out of sight of land, and go down in the
360 JAMES K. FOLK
Having sent (May 6) to Buchanan the letter in which he
stated that Texas desired military protection, Donelson left for
New Orleans — partly to get news of conditions in Mexico, and
partly to keep track of Elliot. At New Orleans he heard it
rumored that a British fleet was coming to aid Mexico. He
notified Buchanan immediately and urged that the United States
should take steps to protect Texas. "Of course," said he, "if
war should be declared against us, Texas will be its theatre, and
the earlier we are in possession of the commanding points on the
Rio Grande the sooner Ave shall be able to bring it to a close."-*
While at Iberville, Donelson read in a New Orleans paper that
Captain Elliot had induced Mexico to recognize the independence
of Texas if she would agree to remain a separate nation. He
returned immediately to Texas. Before starting, however, he dis-
patched another letter to Secretary Buchanan in which he
prophesied that
Texas ■will be sure to call the proposal recognizing her independence as
nothing but a ruse on the part of the British government, by which it is
hoped that the people of Texas will be led to reject annexation ; and the.
effect Avill be, still greater unanimity in favor of the United States, and
against all interference on the part of Great Britain in a question truly
American.
He believed that the United States should be prepared for "an
immediate blow upon Mexico" in case that country should
declare war, and that ' ' Texas will be as ready as we are to defend
the 'star spangled banner,' and denounce British dictation."-^
On his arrival at Galveston, Donelson learned that Elliot was
about to leave for Washington, Texas, for the purpose of sub-
mitting to the Texan government the plan of recognition to which
Mexico had consented. The two men discussed the plan freely,
'Eurydice. ' By this means I shall be reported as gone to 'Charleston'
in the 'Electra,' and so hope to arrive imobserved" (Jones, Bepuhlic of
Texas, 443). The preliminary treaty is printed on pp. 473-475 of the
same volume.
24 Donelson to Buchanan, May Tl, 1845 (Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 56).
25 Donelson to Buclianan, May 22, 1845 (ibid., 58-59).
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 361
and Donelson was disgusted by the hypocrisy displayed in tlie
representation that the overture for an agreement had come
from Texas. "Stripped of diplomatic phrase," he wrote, "this
recognition is nothing more nor less than a contrivance of Great
Britain to defeat the measure of annexation, or involve Mexico
in a war with the United States." Since Mexico was reported
to be concentrating troops on the Kio Grande ' ' where Texas has,
as yet, established no posts, ' ' Texas would probably send a force
to remove these intruders and Captain Stockton would be ready
to cooperate after the acceptance of annexation. In "addition
to the suggestions before made on this subject, I would remark
that the route for the infantry or artillery in our service which
may be thought requisite on the Rio Grande, should be by tvater
and not by land." Two days later he wrote again to the Secretary
of State. He had just received Buchanan's letter of May 23
which promised protection, but it did not cover the whole ground.
If Mexico should invade Texas to the Nueces or farther before
the convention has had an opportunity to accept the American
proposal, "are the United States," he asked, "to stand still and
see the country thus invaded, without interposing protection ? ' '-^
In the same mail with Donelson 's dispatches went a letter
from Charles A. Wickliffe, Polk's confidential agent in Texas.
It informed the President that Captain Elliot was boldly assert-
ing that annexation would be followed immediately by a declara-
tion of war by Mexico. Mexico, said Elliot, would declare war
instantly ; the United States would blockade the Mexican ports ;
but Great Britain would not submit to this, and, consequently,
there would be war for twenty years. Nevertheless, said the
agent, Elliot was fully aware that a majority of the Texans were
in favor of annexation. Wickliffe urged that any attempt on the
part of Mexico to invade Texas while negotiations for annexation
were pending should be repelled with vigor by the United
States."
20 Donelson to Buchanan, June 2, 4, 1845, ibid., 64-66.
27 Wickliffe to Polk, June 4, 1845, Folic Papers.
362 JAMES E. POLK
The letter just received from Buchanan authorized Donelson
to guarantee protection after the American proposal had been
accepted, and on June 11, he gave this qualified promise to the
Texan Secretary of State. Elliot's bluster thoroughly aroused
his indignation, and in his letter to Allen he said that
if Texas cannot be allowed to enjoy the blessings of peace and independence,
as one of the sovereign members of the American Union, Avithout asking per-
mission of Mexico or of the monarchies of Europe, the fact is worth volumes
of argument in explaining the duty of those who are struggling to maintain
a system of government founded on the will and controlled by the authority
of the people.28
The tone of this letter had a reassuring effect upon the Texans
and lessened the hazard of an exercise of independent judgment.
The letters which Donelson and Wickliffe had written on the
second and fourth of June procured prompt action on the part
of their government. These communications reached Washing-
ton on the evening of June 14, and on the following day Polk
wrote an interesting and important letter to Donelson. The
threatened invasion, said the President,
increases our solicitude concerning the final action by the Congress and
Convention of Texas upon our proposition of annexation. In vieAv of the
facts disclosed by you, not only as regards the approach of an invading
Mexican army — but of the open intermeddling of the British Charge d'
affaires Avith the question of annexation, I have lost no time in causing the
most prompt & energetic measures to be adopted here. I am resolved to
defend and protect Texas, as far as I possess the power to do so.
This statement makes it clear that Polk did not doubt the
genuineness of the British menace, and that he was prepared
to meet it at all hazards. He informed Donelson that General
Besancon, the bearer of this letter, would be dispatched that
night with instructions and that another messenger would be
sent at the same time to Fort Jessup, bearing orders for the
troops to march at once to the mouth of the Sabine. These
28 Donelson to Allen, June 11, 1845 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess.,
71).
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION
363
troops were to act as Donelson might direct, under his instruc-
tions from the Department of State. The charge was tokl that the
steamer Spencer had been ordered to leave New York to report
to him at Galveston, and that an additional naval force would
be sent immediately to the Gulf of Mexico. Polk urged that the
Texan convention should, on the day of meeting, pass a general
resolution accepting the offer made by the United States. "The
moment they do this," said the President,
I shall regard Texas as a part of the Union; all questions of Constitutional
power to defend & protect her by driving an invading Mexican Army out
of her Territory will be at an end and our land and naval forces will be
under orders to do so.
The convention could then proceed with its deliberations in
safety, without fear of Mexican invasion or of "British intrigue"
.... "The assent of the Convention is all we want." The
question of employing the army and navy of the United States
to repel a I^Iexican invasion during the interval between the
acceptance of annexation by the Texan congress and the meeting
of the convention, Polk left to the discretion of Donelson. He
expressed the hope that there might be no necessity for exercis-
ing such discretion, nevertheless, should anything occur which
was calculated to overawe or interfere with the peaceful delibera-
tions of the convention —
then in my judgment the public necessity for our interposition will be such
that we should not stand quietly by & permit an invading foreign enemy to
occupy or devastate any portion of Texan Territory. Of course I would
maintain the Texan title to the extent which she claims it to be & °ot permit
an invading enemy to occupy a foot of the soil East of the Bio Grande.-^
The troops stationed at Fort Jessup could not, as the letter
pointed out, reach Texas in time to afford immediate protection
to the convention which would assemble on July 4; nevertheless,
as a definite statement of Polk's plans and purposes, this letter
29 Polk to Donelson, June 15, 1845, "Polk-Donelson Letters." Also,
a copy in Folk Fapers.
364 JAMES K. POLK
is extremely interesting. Writing to Donelson on the same day,
Buchanan said that Captain Elliot, by obtaining Mexico's con-
sent to annexation, had ''deprived that power of the only
miserable pretext which it had for a war against the United
States. "^0
The troops to be sent from Fort Jessup were commanded by
General Zachary Taylor. By a confidential dispatch dated May
28, Marcy had given instructions for the general's guidance,
should annexation be accepted by Texas. Taylor sent a messenger
to consult with Donelson concerning the necessity of sending
troops into Texas and to investigate the resources for their sub-
sistence. Donelson reported to him that all branches of the
existing Texan government had assented to annexation, and that
the convention would do so on the fourth of July. If any re-
liance, said hcj is to be placed upon the threats made by Mexico
and the advice which it may be presumed will be given to her
by the British and French governments, "an invasion of Texas
may be confidently anticipated" ; at all events, the General would
be justified in moving to the western frontier in order to give the
protection authorized by President Polk. He advised Taylor to
transfer the troops from New Orleans directly to Corpus Christi,
which is a healthy place and convenient for supplies, "and is
the most western point now occupied by Texas." In the same
letter Donelson remarked that the "occupation of the country
between the Nueces and Rio Grande, you are aware, is a disputed
question. Texas holds Corpus Christi ; Mexico, Santiago, near
the mouth of the Rio Grande. "^^
Von Hoist has made much of the phrases just quoted. Isolat-
ing them from their context and giving to them an erroneous, or
at least an ambiguous, translation, he has used them to sub-
stantiate his assertion that Donelson, in this letter which was
forwarded by Taylor to "Washington, "emphasized the fact that
30 Buchanan to Donelson, June 15, 1845 (Buchanan, Works, VI, 174).
31 Taylor to Adj. Gen., June 18; Donelson to Taylor, June 28, 184.'i
(H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 scss., 800, 805).
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION
365
it was an open question to whom the land between the Nueces
and the Rio Grande belonged. "^'^ His purpose is to show that
Polk provoked a war by claiming unjustly a strip of land the
ownership of which even his own subordinates had questioned.
Whatever may have provoked the war, Donelson's letter conveys
no such meaning. As a matter of fact his chief emphasis was
placed on the healthful conditions at the places designated and
his desire to avoid taking "an offensive attitude in regard to
Mexico, without further orders from the government of the
United States." Taylor was advised to limit his activities to
the defense of Texas unless attacked, in which case he was to
drive the Mexicans beyond the Rio Grande. Donelson spoke of
occupation, not of oicnership; but even if he had meant the latter,
it is clear enough that it was not a "disputed question" so tar
as he was concerned. The paragraph which contained these
phrases was followed by another which said that "the threatened
invasion of Texas, however, is founded upon the assumption that
Texas has no territory independent of Mexico." Von Hoist
found it convenient to omit this paragraph, for it did not har-
monize with the thesis which he had set out to prove.- Donel-
son's views on the subject had already been expressed very
clearly in his letters of May 11 and June 2, above quoted, m
which he advised an early occupation of posts on the Rio Grande.
In this same connection, von Hoist represents Taylor to have
spoken of San Antonio as being situated on the western hoxuidary
("redete gar von San Antonio als an der westlichen Grenze ge-
•legen") ; whereas the General simply spoke of the immediate
occupation of "the western frontier (italics mine) of Texas,
-"^7;;7i"olst, Hisionj of the United States, German ed., II, 72, Eng.
dkl not remotely deserve" {iMd., Bug. trans., Ill, 89).
366 JAMES E. POLE
from the coast to San Antonio, and ultimately further north. "^^
On the same page we are told that the Texan Secretary of War
asked Taylor to protect Austin, on the Colorado "da es an der
Grenze ist," which the translators have made to read "because
it is on the boundary. ' ' But the Secretary had written that
The town of Austin where tlie convention will assemble, and the most of the
archives of our government are now deposited, being on the frontier, and
exposed to Indian depredations and Mexican invasion, would require pro-
tection, as would also San Antonio de Bexar and Corpus Christi.35
In justice to von Hoist it may be said that Grenze is the Ger-
man equivalent of houndary, and that he may have been ignorant
of the distinction drawn by Americans between the words
houndary and frontier; and yet, it seems incredible that he could
have so misunderstood the letters as a whole as not to have known
that the American officials were speaking of a general region,
and were not attempting to fix a boundary line. That von Hoist
himself meant houndary when he used the term Grenze is shown
by the context, and his translators in converting his writings
into English have invariably written houndary instead of fron-
tier, which had been used in the original documents. Wer.e it
not for the fact that this writer's version of Polk's policy has
influenced both writers and teachers of history, it would hardly
be worth while to dwell on his misuse of official documents.
Donelson's belief that Captain Elliot and his government
were striving to prevent annexation was by no means unfounded.
Great Britain was not willing to extend her interference to the
point of risking a war with the United States, but she was deter-.
mined to apply every possible pressure that stopped short of
this limit which she had set for her activities.^" However, the
ailbid., Ger. ed., II, 72. Taylor to Adj. Gen., Julv 8, 1845 (H. Ex.
Dog. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 802).
35 von Hoist, op. ait., Ger. ed., II, 72, Eng. trans., Ill, 90. Cook to
Taylor, June 27, 3 845 (H. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 804).
30 E. D. Adams, Britith Interests and Activities in Texas, chap. ix. It
has been considered unnecessary, in a biography of Polk, to discuss in
detail the acts and the motives of lOnghiinl, France, and Mexico, except
in their bearing on Polk 's policy. The part played by England is well
presented in the volume by Professor Adams just cited.
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 367
officious meddling of Captain Elliot and the Mexican threats of
invasion caused anxiety in Texas, and fear of the latter led the
government to solicit the protection of the United States. By
instructing Taylor to send dragoons to San Antonio and infantry
to Corpus Christi, Donnelson had inspired the people with a
feeling of safety, even though Taylor could not reach these
points before the meeting of the convention.^^
The preliminary treaty which Elliot had arranged between
Texas and ]\Iexico^^ provided for the suspension of hostilities
until the people of Texas had either accepted or rejected the
terms of the agreement. Accordingly, on June 4, President Jones
issued his proclamaation declaring a truce. The general effect
of this proclamation and of the mystery and secrecy employed
by Elliot in bringing the two governments together^*' led the
people still more to distrust both men, and, consequently, aided
the cause of annexation. Donelson handled the question most
skilfully and did much to solidify the sentiment in favor of
joining the United States. On the other hand, he very sensibly
refrained from doing anything which might antagonize the Texan
officials who were still trying to maintain a neutral position.*"
Then, too, the apparent insincerity of Mexico added strength to
the annexationists. As soon as President Jones had proclaimed
a truce, Bankhead, the British minister in Mexico, pressed that
government to issue a similar proclamation. Instead of comply-
ing, Cuevas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, made dire threats
of war on Texas.*^ Even those in the lone-star republic who
were inclined to oppose annexation could no longer contend that
Mexico would peacefully concede independence.
37 Allen to Donelson, June 26; Donelson to Allen, June 30, 18-45 (Sen.
Ex. Boo. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 92, 94). Smith, Annexation of Texas, 451.
3sFor a copy of this document see Adams, op. cit., 210-211, or Jones,
Bepuhlic of Texas, 473-475.
39 Elliot was later reproved by the British Foreign Secretary for the
secrecy of his proceedings because they "laid Great Britain open to the
charge of intriguing in Texas" (Aberdeen to Elliot, July 3, 1845; cited
by Adams, up. oit., 220).
■iiJ Smith, Annexation of Texas, 452-454.
41 Adams, British Interests and Activities in Texas, 221-222.
368 JAMES E. POLK
On June 16 the Texan congress assembled, and President
Jones submitted the American joint resolution ; two days later
he placed before this body the terms of the conditional recogni-
tion of independence which Elliot had negotiated with Mexico.
On the congress now devolved the duty of choosing between the
two proposals ; but as Mexico was already threatening war, there
M-as little probability that any arrangement made with that
country would be selected. Without loss of time the congress
by a unanimous vote agreed to accept the offer made by the
United States, and by a similar vote it rejected the proposed
treaty with Mexico.^-
As the time for the meeting of the popular convention
approached, it appeared that there might be greater difiieulty
in winning the approval of that body. In several respects the
terms offered by the United States were unacceptable to the
Texans. The American joint resolution had not specified a
definite boundary, and there were uncertainties regarding public
lands, Indian policy, and other details. Some suggested, also,
that before it had entered the Union the republic ought to be
divided into several states, in order to increase its political
importance.*^ On the other hand, Donelson had been instructed
by his government to urge upon Texas the wisdom of accepting
the proposed terms without modification, and before the meeting
of the convention he had spared no effort in shaping public
opinion to sanction such a course. In this connection he pointed
out that many of the unsatisfactory matters could be adjusted
after annexation, while haggling over terms would result in
discord and delay.
42 Donelson to Buchanan, June 23, 1845 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1
sess., 83).
43 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 456-457. General Houston, as we have
noted, had had misg-ivings regardino- the boundary question, and altliough
he had left the scene of action Polk deemed it worth while to reassure
him on the subject. "You may have no apprehensions," wrote the
President, "in regard to your boundary. Texas once a part of the
Union & we will maintain all your rights of territory & will not suffer
them to be sacrificed" (Polk to Houston (copy), June 6, 1845, Polk
Papers).
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION
369
An interesting account of the part played by Donelson and
of the attitude of the Texan officials is given in a letter written
to Buchanan from Washington, Texas, by John G. Tod. Tod
had evidently just arrived in Texas from Washington (D. C),
and his letteV is in the form of a daily journal of events from
July 1 to July 11, 1845." Donelson, according to Tod, had no
doubt whatever that annexation would be consummated, and he
could not understand why officials in Washington were so excited
about the question. " 'There has,' said he, 'never been any
difficulty about it at all. President Jones has always been open
and candid upon this subject and there was no room to appre-
hend trouble and difficulty if it is not created by the management
' of the matter in Washington.' "^^ Under date of July 2, Tod
recorded that Jones, Allen, and Raymond^'' had called on Donel-
son. "The President and the latter laughed and joked a good
deal about the excitement on the Potomac." After this meeting
Tod had a long conversation with Jones and told him that Polk
and his cabinet had become suspicious because Ashbel Smith,
on his way to England, had passed right by Washington without
calling on the President. With a remark that he was not
responsible for Smith's acts, Jones proceeded to say that there
never had been any doubt of or opposition to annexation. With
apparent contradiction, however. Tod reported Jones to have
said that "Major Donelson had conducted the affair very ably,
and if it had not been for his prudence and good management,
the last Congress would have involved the measure with much
greater obstacles and probably defeated it." After predicting
that there would be no war if the United States would "only
keep quiet and cool," Jones said that there were two very
.^BucMnan, Papers. Tod was a Texas ^rmy captain and servecl as
bearer of dispatches. Later, he was employed by Polk as special
messenger to Trry to President Jones a copy of the joint i;esolution of
CouSeCwMch admitted Texas into the Union (Polk, Diary, I, 148).
45 This was written on July 1. Evidently Donelson 's opinion of Jones
had undergone a change.
46 Recently the Texan charge at Washington.
370 JAMES K. POLK
unaccountable things connected with annexation: first, that the
United States should feel any uneasiness, when the government
as well as every man, woman, and child in Texas desired annex-
ation ; and second, that Elliot should have entertained any hope
that tlie offer of independence or anything else would prevent
Texas from joining the United States. He had, he said, told
Elliot that he would laj' his offer before the congress and the
convention, but that he did not doubt that Texas would be
annexed. " 'His object in obtaining the offer which he did from
Mexico, was to strengthen the cause of Annexation, and place
us on higher grounds with the world. It was truly a great
advantage to our caiLse, that it disarmed Mexico entirely in the
estimation of other Nations, and Mexico was fully aware of
it.' ^'" Jones's statement that no attempt had been made to
deceive Elliot accords with the reports which the British diplo-
mat made to his own goverimient.'*^ Houston, also, testified that
President Jones had not been guilty of double dealing and denied
that European governments had been intriguing in Texas.*^
This denial does not, of course, mean that the ministers of Eng-
land and France had not done all in their power to prevent
annexation; but whether or not their activities amounted to
intrigue depends upon the definition of the term. "At no time,
in no manner, ' ' said Ashbel Smith long afterwards,
did the British government attempt to exercise or even hint the remotest
wish to exercise any political influence in the affairs of Texas, or to possess
any advantage, obtain any facility, enjoy any privilege that was not equally
and as fully accorded to every other power in amity with Texas.so
On the day preceding that set for the assembling of the
convention, some of the delegates, at an informal meeting.
47 Under date of July 9, Tod said that the people of Texas were sur-
prised because articles in American newspapers — even the Washington
Union — expressed doubts that Texans sincerely desired annexation.
48 Adams, British Interests, etc., 216.
40 J. Geo. Harris to Polk, June 12, 1845, Polk Papers. Harris had just
seen Houston in Nashville.
50 Smith, Beminiseences of lite Texas BepubUc, 38.
COMPLETION OF ANNEXATION 371
drafted an ordinance expressing assent to the American joint
resolution. Thus prepared, the convention, which formally
organized on July 4, promptly voted to enter the Union, and
by another vote agreed to wear crape for a month in memory
of General Jackson. On the tenth, Allen, the Secretary of State,
notified Elliot of the action taken by both the congress and the
convention. Wlien doing so, he pointed out that "these mani-
festations hardly admit of a doubt that the incorporation of
Texas with the Federal Union is destined to an early consum-
mation."^^ By the end of August the convention had finished
drafting a constitution for the new state, and the second Monday
in October was fixed as the day on which this constitution as
well as the question of accepting the American offer of annex-
ation should be submitted to a vote of the people. By Novem-
ber 10 President Jones was able to announce that the people had
approved both annexation and the state constitution.=^-
Since both the government and the people of Texas had
accepted the American offer, nothing remained to consummate
annexation except formal admission into the Union by the Con-
gress of the United States. AVhen, therefore, Congress met in
December, 1845, Polk announced that Texas had agreed to annex-
ation and had submitted her new state constitution. Since this
had been done, "the public faith of both parties is solemnly
pledged to the compact of their union," and "strong reasons
exist" why the new state should be admitted without delay.''
On December 10 Douglas reported from the House Committee
on Territories a joint resolution which declared Texas to be a
51 Alleu to Elliot, July 10, 1845 {Texa^ DipJomatic Correspondence, UI,
120) No further action was taken by Great Britain or her representatives,
and Mexico was made clearly to understand that England ^^ould not support
her in the event of trouble wdth the United States (Adams, op. oit., 224-2Jo).
53 Smith, Annexation of Texas, 459-460. As late as September, W. D.
Lee presented credentials as charge d' affaires from the government ot
Texas but Polk declined to recognize him in that capacity. Insteiul, he
instructed Buchanan to deal with Lee as the agent of a state (Polk, Diary,
I, 17-20).
53 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 386.
372 JAMES E. POLK
member of the Union on an equal footing with the original states.
Although this resolution met with vigorous opposition, it was
adopted eventually by a majority' of nearly two-thirds. It was
transmitted to the Senate where it encountered still further
opposition, although there was small prospect that the dissenters
would succeed in defeating it. Some of the Senators w^ho had
originally opposed annexation now agreed with the President
that the national faith had been pledged, and the measure was
adopted by a vote of thirty-one to fourteen. "Within a short time
the laws of the Union were extended over the new state, and
the Republic of Texas ceased to exist. One important question,
hoAvever, remained to be answered : What will Mexico do about it ?
CHAPTER XVII
PRELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR
Under the promises made by President Polk, Texas, after the
action taken by her convention on Jul}' 4, was entitled to the
protection of the American army and navy. The query was
raised at the time — and pressed vigorously by the Whigs after-
wards— as to what constituted Texas and, consequently, what
the United States was bound to protect. The joint resolution
of the American Congress which Texas had just accepted had
specified no definite boundary, but had consented to annexation
"subject to the adjustment by this government of all questions
of boundary that may arise with other governments." By an
act passed on December 19, 1836, however, the Texan congress
had declared the Rio Grande to be her boundary, although her
territory- as a department of Mexico had extended only to the
Nueces ; and early in his administration Polk expressed his
determination to maintain the claim set up by Texas. Mexico
herself made such a position easier by claiming all of Texas and
by making no discrimination, at this time at least, between the
land lying west of the Nueces and the rest of Texas. As above
noted, however, Donelson did not believe that it would be either
wise or necessary to provoke a war with Mexico by at once
expelling the Mexican settlers on the east bank of the Rio
Grande, or by stationing the military forces beyond the actual
settlements made by Texas. But at the same time he made it
clear that he did not intend by such a policy to abandon the
claim to the Rio Grande as the boundary. On July 11, after his
instiiiction to protect Texas had been made obligatory by the
374 JAMES K. POLK
acceptance of annexation b.y the convention, he again reverted
to the wisdom of such a policy. He told Buchanan that in his
correspondence with Texas he had avoided any discussion of the
boundary between Texas and Mexico, because the joint resolution
had left the question open, and the preliminary treaty of recog-
nition arranged by Elliot had left the question in the same state.
Jones, in his truce proclamation, had in effect agreed to leave
matters as they were — with Texas in possession of part of this
territor}^ and Mexico in possession of another part. "What
the Executive of Texas," wrote Donelson, "had determined not
to fight for, but to settle by negotiation, to say the least of it,
could as well be left to the United States on the same conditions."
He added, however, that although he had not deemed it expedient
to discuss the boundary question,
I have been far from advocating that the claim of Texas to the Eio
Grande ought not to be maintained. This was not the question. It was
whether, under the circumstances, we should take a position to make war
for this clainj, in the face of an acknowledgment on the part of this gov-
ernment that it could be settled by negotiation.
In other words, he did not believe that the promise to protect
Texas made it incumbent upon the United States to expel im-
mediately all Mexicans from the territory'. What the United
States would decide to do on her own account was of course
another matter. Far from questioning the validity of the claim
to the Rio Grande as the boundary, Donelson, in the same letter,
suggested the grounds upon which this claim might be based.
They were the revolutionary rights of Texas, the agreement made
by Texas with Santa Anna in 1836, rights under the Louisiana
Purchase, and the capacity of Texas to maintain her claim by
force. The last, he said, ]\Iexico herself luid admitted but a short
time ago when she agreed to recognize the independence of
Texas.^
1 Donelson to Buchanan, July 11, 1845 {Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess.,
101-103.)
PBELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAB 375
In his letters to Donelson and Houston, Polk had made it
clear that he would insist upon the Rio Grande as the boundary
of Texas The method by which he proposed to deal with the
boundary question may be deduced from the instructions sent
to the military and naval forces of the United States. It was
in effect the same as that proposed by Donelson. On June 15,
George Bancroft, temporarily in charge of the War Department,
informed Tavlor that the Texan convention would, m all prob-
ability, accept annexation on July 4, and that Texas would then
be a part of the United States. Taylor was ordered to move his
troops to the western frontier of Texas, with the Rio Grande as
his ultimate destination. On July 8, Taylor was informed by
Marcy that Mexico had some military posts on the east side ot
the Rio Grande, and that these were not to be molested 'Hmless
an actual state of war should exist." Similar instmctions were
sent to Commodore Conner on July 11, and in these Bancroft
stated still more explicitly the policy of the administration. As
soon as the Texan convention had approved annexation, Conner
was to protect Texas like any other part of the United States,
but it was the President's desire to avoid aggression and blood-
shed.
That you may precisely understand .vhat is meant by the aggression
you^e instated t'o avoid' I will add, that while the annexation of Texas
Extends our boundary to the Del Norte, the President reserves the vuuhca-
tion of our boundary, if possible, to methods of peace.
For this reason, the Mexicans already on the east side of the
river were not to be molested while peace continued. Positions
were to be selected with regard to the health of the officers
and men, and in "such a manner as will be most likely to dis-
incline Mexico to acts of hostility." Should Mexico declare VN^r,
Conner was to dislodge all Mexican troops stationed east of the
mouth of the Rio Grande, and ^i/ your force is sioffioient, [you]
will take the castle of San Juan d'Ulla, it being the determina-
tion of the President to preserve peace, if possible; and, if war
376 JAMES E. POLK
comes, to recover peace b}' adopting the most prompt and ener-
getic measures."- A few daj'S later the Washington Union said
that it would be "difficult to estimate" the importance of Polk's
energetic policy in deterring Mexico from hostile movements,
and in giving confidence to the Texans.^ On the other hand,
the National Intelligencer asserted that Polk had. in order to
induce Texas to accept annexation, made promises which
exceeded his authority under the joint resolution.*
A private letter written by Polk late in July to a friend in
Tennessee indicates that the demonstrations, at this time, of
the military and naval forces on the Texas frontier were intended
purely for defensive purposes. After speaking of the Texan
convention and of sending the American forces to protect the
new state, he said: "I do not however anticipate that Mexico
will be mad enough to declare war. I think she would have done
so but for the appearance of a strong naval force in the Gulf
and our army moving in the direction of her frontier on land. "^
The fact that Polk saw such beneficial results from sending the
troops toward the Mexican border doubtless explains why Marcy,
two days later, wrote to Taylor that the President wished him
to station a part of his army, at least, west of the Nueces." His
2 Bancroft to Conner, July 11, 1845 (H. Ex. Doc. GO, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
232-233. The "methods of peace" which the President wished to employ
meant, no doubt, the vigorous pressing of American claims.
3 "It was most fortunate that President Polk, and our minister, Mr.
Donelson, were known in Texas to have lield, during their whole lives the
most intimate relations with the sage and patriot of the Hermitage, who
had manifested so much solicitude for the re-union of Texas with the
parent country," and they knew that "Young Hickory" would repel
any interference (Union, July 14, 1845).
* But, it added, "why should any thing else be exjiccted than that the
Executive should pay just as little regard to the Joint Resolution as
did they who i)assed it to the Constitution of the United States" (Nat.
Intel!., July 19, 1845).
^ •-■, Polk to A. O. P. Nicholson, July 28, 1845, PoR- Papers.
" Taylor is still ordered to avoid aggressive measures toward Mexico
as long as peace exists. "The Rio Grande is claimed to be the boundary
between the two countries, and up to this boundary you are to extend
your protection, only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof,
M'hich are in the actual occupancy of Mexican settlements over which
PBELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 377
object seems to have been to prevent a hostile act on the part
of Mexico by showing- her at once that the United States would
protect Texas to the Rio Grande at all hazards; but at the same
time, he wished to avoid acts that might unnecessarily precipitate
a war.
On August 6, Taylor was notified by the Adjutant General
that although war might not take place he was authorized to
call upon Texas for additional troops. Such troops were to be
"received into the service of the United States when actuallj'
required in the field to repel invasion, actual or menaced, and
not before."^
On the day after this order was issued, but apparently- witli-
out knowledge of it, the National Intelligencer expressed a fear
that the President was about to make war upon Mexico. It
admitted that necessity might justify Polk in defending Texas,
but
the President is quite indefensible, if, in exceeding the measure of the
necessity, he keep not strictly on the defensive and within the settled limits
of the land, whose proper i)opulation merelj', and not its territorial preten-
sions, it is now necessary to defend. But it is apparent that Texas claimed,
and we fear it is equally apparent that the Executive has granted, the occu-
pation of everything up to the Rio Grande ; which occupation is nothing
short (as everybody knows) of an invasion of Mexico. It is offensive war,
and not the necessary defense of Texas. And should it prove, as we think
it will, that the President has gone this additional length, then the President
will be MAKING WAR, in the full sense of the word, on his own authority and
beyond all plea of need, and even without any thought of asking legislative
leave.^
This is a succinct statement of the "disputed territory" argu-
ment which was arrayed against the President by the Wliigs
the Republic of Texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of annex-
ation or shortly before that event. It is expected that, in selecting the
establishment for your troops, you will approach as near the boundary
line, the Rio Grande, as prudence will dictate. With this view, the Presi-
dent desires that vour position, for a part of vour forces at least, should
be west of the river Nueces" {H. Ex. Doc. 60, *30 Gong., 1 sess., 82-83).
- Ibid., 83-84.
8 Nat. InteJl, Aug. 7, 1845.
378 JAMES E. POLE
tliroug'liout the war period, and which has found its way into
many histories and textbooks. The truth of the AVhig assertion
will be discussed later in this chapter; at this point it is suiRcient
to note that Americans, not Mexicans, first raised the cry of
''disputed territory" as applied to the land lying between the
Nueces and the Rio Grande. Mexico, at this time, laid no greater
claim to this land than to the rest of Texas. In her eyes, the
crossing of the Sabine was an invasion of Mexico and an act of
war. To the assertions made by the National Intelligencer the
TJnio7i answered that "Texas assumed by law" all territory to
the Rio del Norte, including Santa Fe, to which the National
Intelligencer retorted that their fears as to the President's
position were now fully admitted. In reply to the charge made
that going to the Rio Grande would be an offensive and not a
defensive act, the Union, a few days later, cited a letter written
by Robert J. Walker which "proves" that Texas as a part of
the Louisiana Purchase had extended to the Rio Grande. It
cited also a speech made by "Walker in the Senate wherein he
had quoted the organic law of Texas which essayed to fix the
boundary line. Just how Walker's letters and speeches could
prove anything it is not easy to see, but the Union accepted them
as proof and from it argued that Polk was bound to enforce the
law to the Rio Grande." The President was far more disturbed
by the annoyances of dispensing patronage than by the criticisms
of the Whigs, and the success of annexation convinced him more
than ever of the wisdom of the method that had been selected.^"
The officials in Washington were rather in the dark regarding
the plans and purposes of Mexico, yet on August 2.3, Marcy
informed Taylor that there "is reason to believe" that Mexico
is preparing to invade Texas. Upon what this belief was based
8 Nat. Intell., Aug. 9. Union, Aug. 11, 1845. For a discussion of the
Spanish boundaries of Texas, see Garrison, Westward Extcns-ion, chap. vii.
10 Polk to Senator Haywood, Aug. 9, 1845, PoJk Papers. He expressed
the opinion that Texas would have been lost to the Union had the Benton
alternative been selected.
PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 379
the letter does not state, but it was probably based on information
given to the Department of State bj' Baron Gerolt, the Prussian
minister at Washington. In a conversation with George Ban-
croft, Gerolt said that he had received authentic information
from Mexico, under date of June 28, to the effect that Mexico
was making preparations to invade Texas. Gerolt 's informant
stated that General Arista with three thousand men, chiefly
cavalry, had been ordered to move toward the Del Norte, while
Paredes, the commander-in-chief, and General Felisola, were
read}" to follow with a force of ten thousand men. Gerolt him-
self believed that the United States must expect protracted guer-
rilla warfare. Bancroft at once addressed a letter to Buchanan
imparting the above information. Buchanan was away at the
time, but Mason, who was acting in his stead, showed the letter
to the President. Polk accepted the information as reliable. He
thought it likely that the Mexicans would cross the Rio Grande,
for the American forces already on the ground would be unable
to prevent it. He took steps immediately to send additional
forces to Texas, and in a letter to Buchanan he urged the Secre-
tary of State to return as soon as possible to take up his duties,
and especially, to hasten the settlement of the Oregon question.^^
Taylor was authorized by Marcy to accept volunteers from
certain designated states, and, "should Mexico declare war, or
commence hostilities by crossing the Rio Grande with a consider-
able force," he was to lose no time in letting these states know
the number of troops needed.^- This order was followed a week
later by another which was more aggressive in tone. Marcy
complained of lack of information regarding the activities of
11 Bancroft to Buchanan, Aug. 7; Polk to Buchanan, Aug. 7, 1845
(Buchanan, Works, 223-224). Copy of the latter in Polk Papers. Buchanan
did not share the President's apprehensions caused by Gerolt 's information
and views. In reply to Polk 's letter he stated his belief that the American
forces on the Rio Grande should be strengthened, but that the movement
of the Mexican troops was mainly a demonstration to insure Herrera's
election (Buchanan to Polk, Aug. 11, 1845, Polk Papers).
12 Marcy to Taylor, Aug. 23, 1845 {H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
84-85).
380 JAMES E. POLK
Mexico and urged Taylor to write frequently to the War Depart-
ment. "You have been advised," said Marcy,
that the assembling of a large Mexican army on the borders of Texas, and
crossing the Rio Grande with a considerable force, Avill be regarded by the
Executive here as an invasion of the United States, and the commencement
of hostilities. An attempt to cross that river -with such a force will also be
considered in the same light.
In case of war, "either declared or made manifest by hostile
acts," Taylor's main object was to be the protection of Texas,
but in pursuit of this object he was authorized to cross the Rio
Grande and take Matamoras and other places.^^ Polk at this
time considered the propriet}^ of convening Congress in the event
of a declaration of war or an invasion of Texas by Mexico, but
Senator Bagby, of Alabama, and perhaps others, advised against
such a course.^* The new order to Taylor was decided upon at
a cabinet meeting held on the twenty-ninth of August.^^ It did
not, however, result from any sudden panic in administration
circles,^*' and Polk has been condemned for holding that even
an attempt to cross the river would be an act of war. He
has been condemned also for asserting that the crossing of that
river by a Mexican army would be "an invasion of the United
States. "^^ But if it be conceded that Texas extended to the
Rio Grande, then the ground taken in the new order was no more
aggressive than that taken in the former. It w^as certainly the
duty of the President to defend Texas, and if Texas did extend
to the Rio Grande, an attempt to cross the river would indicate
the disposition of Mexico to invade the United States quite as
well as the actual crossing. Nations do not wait until a hostile
fleet is within the three-mile jurisdiction limit before steps are
13 Marcy to Taylor, Aug. 30, 1845, ibid., 88-89.
* "Polk, Diary, I. 12-13.
15 Ibid., 8-10.
16 The Adjutant General had written only three days before, August 26,
that the country was filled with rumors of movements of Mexican troops,
but that they were believed to be exaggerated or untrue (H. Ex. Doo. 60,
30 Coiig., 1 sess., 87).
1" E. g., von Hoist, Histonj of the United States (Eng. ed.). Ill, 98-103.
PBELVDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 381
taken to repel it. Why should they take greater chances when
an invasion by land is threatened ?
Whether the land on the east bank of the Rio Grande was
legally a part of the United States is open to more serions
question. From the first, Polk had claimed it to be a part of
Texas and consequently of the United States. His right to do
so involves points of constitutional law which the writer will
not attempt to determine, although some phases of annexation
may be recalled in order to indicate the questions upon which
such a determination must be based. The joint resolution under
which Texas had been annexed did not specify any territorial
limits, but left that matter "subject to the adjustment by this
government of all questions of boundary that may arise witli
other governments. ' ' The Texan claim to the Rio Grande rested
mainly on the agreement made with Santa Anna after his defeat
at San Jacinto in which he agreed to withdraw beyond the Rio
y/ Grande, ^^^ and on the act passed by the Texan Congress on Decem-
ber 19, 1836, which had declared that river to be the boundary
of the republic. "Wliatever claim these transactions may have
established passed, of course, to the United States. "Without
attempting to determine the effect of these events on the legal
right of Texas to all land east of the Rio Grande, it may be noted
that Santa Anna made his agreement under duress and perhaps
without authority; and it is b}^ no means certain that Texas could
lawfully enlarge her territory by an ordinary legislative enact-
ment. The United States government claimed, also, that Texas
as a part of the Louisiana Purchase had extended to the Rio
Grande; but, as Abraham Lincoln exclaimed in Congress, ''what,
under heaven, had that to do with the present boundary between
us and Mexico ? ' '^^ All claim to this region had been transferred
to Spain by the Florida treaty of 1819. Congress, when passing
the joint resolution, had left the boundary for future settlement ;
IS TMs agreement is printed in Niles' Eegister, L, 336.
19 Lincoln, Wurls (Tandy ed.), I, 322.
382 JAMES K. POLK
and both Texas and Mexico, in the project of a treaty had, in
March, 1845, agreed to settle the question by negotiation. By
declaring all land east of the Rio Grande to be a part of the
United States Polk may, indeed, have exceeded his authority,
but it does not follow necessarily from this, so long as Texas
asserted ownership, that the President was under no obligation
to prevent a hostile army from entering the territory until the
question of title could be determined. General Jackson and his
loyal adherents had always held that the United States could
never be adequately protected until it extended to the Rio
Grande, and Polk had promised the Texans to maintain this
boundary. Apparently the President attached more importance
to these considerations than to an anah'sis of his constitutional
powers.
Various letters written by General Taylor after liis arrival
in Texas in July, 1845, informed the Adjutant General of rumors
that Mexico was preparing to invade Texas. As time passed,
however, he came to regard these rumors as groundless, and by
September he reported that reliable agents had ascertained that
the Mexican government was not mobilizing its forces on the
border. Taylor believed that the assembling of the American
army along the Nueces had had a deterrent effect upon the
Mexicans, but in October he advised a forward movement to the
Rio Grande. "It is with great deference," he wrote to the
Adjutant General,
that I make any suggestions on topics Avhich may become matter of delicate
negotiation ; but if our government, in settling the question of boundary,
makes the line of the Rio Grande an ultimatum, I cannot doubt that the
settlement will be greatly facilitated and liastened by our taking possession
at once of one or tAvo points on or quite near that river. Our strength and
state of preparation should be displayed in a manner not to be mistaken.
As Mexico liad not yet either declared war or conniiitted any
overt act of hostility, lie did not feel authorized to take this step
without further orders from the War Department.-" In a letter
20 Taylor to Jones, Oct. 4, 1845 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 108).
PRELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 383
dated October 16 Marcj^ suggested to Taj'lor the expediency of
putting his army into winter liiits, but in this as in other
military matters the general was given wide discretion. By
the first of November Taylor had received this letter, and on
the fiftli a letter from Commodore Conner informed him that
W. S. Parrott had set out for Washington bearing a message that
Mexico was willing to negotiate the (luestions in dispute between
the two countries. Taylor deemed it unnecessary to build winter
huts for his troops, but, with negotiations about to begin, he
did not believe himself authorized to move to the Rio Grande.
He nevertheless urged the occupation of posts on the boundary
line at the earliest possible date.^^ Parrott was Polk's confiden-
tial agent in Mexico. He had been selected for this position
soon after Almonte, the Mexican minister at Washington, had
demanded his passports, and, on April 3, 1845, had taken passage
on the same steamer that carried Almonte from New York to
Mexico. He had at one time practiced dentistry in Mexico,
and, later, had engaged in business there. He held a much
inflated claim against the Mexican government, but of this Polk
was probably not aAvare.^^ His selection was due no doubt to
his knowledge of the Spanish language, for otherwise he was
ill fitted for such a mission. Parrott 's instructions bore the date
of March 28, 1845, and at that time the President seems to have
believed an immediate declaration of war by Mexico to be highly
probable. On his arrival at Vera Cruz, if he should find that
Mexico had actually commenced open hostilities against the
United States, Parrott was to return immediately. In that
case the administration was determined to "act promptly and
vigorously' in maintaining the rights and honor of the country. ' '
Should hostilities not have begun, the main object of his mission
was to ascertain whether Mexico wovild renew diplomatic rela-
tions, and to do everything that could discreetly be done to
21 Marcv to Taylor, Oct. 16; Conner to Tavlor, Oct. 24; Taylor to
Jones, Nov. 7, 1845 (ibid., 89, 111, 112).
22 Eeeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 268-269.
384 JAMES K. POLK
bring this about. He was to get in touch with the high officials,
if possible, and to let them know that, while Texas under no
circumstances could be abandoned, the United States was pre-
pared to settle other questions " in a liberal and friendly spirit. ' '
He was not to disclose his official character until it liad been
clearly ascertained that Mexico was ready to renew diplomatic
relations, but the nature of his mission was soon discovered by
the Mexican government. ^^ The "liberal and friendly spirit"
included, no doubt, the purchase of California and New Mexico,
although there seems to be no direct evidence that plans for such
a purchase had been definitely formulated at this early date. In
his correspondence with Buchanan, however, Parrott emphasized
the danger of the seizure of Upper California by Great Britain.
He did not believe that Mexico would go to war with the United
States on account of Texas, but he nevertheless recommended a
chastisement of that country. On August 26, he reported that
Herrera and his new cabinet would not go to war, and that there
was a desire, even publicly manifested, to receive a "commis-
sioner" from the' United States. He believed that an "Envoy
possessing suitable qualifications for this Court might with com-
parative ease settle over a breakfast the most important national
question."-* Parrott 's dispatch and others sent by John Black,
United States consul at Mexico, and by F. M. Uimond, United
States consul at Vera Cruz, of similar import, were discussed
at a cabinet meeting held on September 16. It should be noted
that Parrott used both terms, commissioner and envoy, for it
is possible that this may have misled President Polk as to the
desire of the Mexican government. At any rate Polk chose to
regard Parrott 's statement as assurance that Mexico would
receive a "minister," and he determined at once to send an
official of that cliaracter. It would be interesting to know
23 Buchanan to Parrott, March 28, 1845 (Buchanan H'orls, VI, 132-
134) ; Reeves, op. cit., 269-270.
24 Parrott to Buclianan, Aug. 26, 1845; quoted by Reeves, op. cit., 271.
PBELVDE TO THE MEXICAN WAB
38")
Whether Polk had really been misled by Parrotfs letter or
whether he deliberately determined to send a regular minister
regardless of the wishes of Mexieo, for the nature of the creden-
tials oiven to the American diplomat was later given by Mexico
as th^ reason for declining to receive him. At the cabinet meet-
in^ iust mentioned, it was decided that the mission should be
offered to .John Slidell, of New Orleans. The President recorded
in his diarv that one great object of the mission would be
that a better boundary would be the Del Norte ^^^ f ^P^f ^^^^^f o"^:^,
iVl Pasol in latitude 32° North, and thence West to the Paeiie Ucean,
Meli!oTedin^ to the U. S. all the country East and North of these hues.
He believed that such a boundary might be procured for fifteen
or twentv millions of dollars, but he was willing to pay as high
as fortv millions.^-- Here is an explicit statement of P^l^'s deter-
mination to purchase California, if possible. He probably had
this method in mind when, shortly after his inauguration, he
declared to Bancroft- that one of the great measures ot his
administration would be the acquisition of that country.
News of recent threats of war by the Mexican government,
published in the New Orleans papers, led Polk to believe that
Parrott had been mistaken, and he decided that it would be
inexpedient to send Slidell until the facts could be ascertained.
However, he wrote a confidential letter to Slidell asking him
to accept the appointment and to be ready to leave for Mexico
on a day s notice.-'
About a month later the President sent for Benton, and
sought his advice concerning both Oregon and California,
although there had been no intercourse between the two men
since the Missouri Senator had so bitterly denounced the rejection
~^7i^i^iary, I, 33-35. " Polk, Diary, 1, 35-36.
26 See page 351.
386 JAMES K. POLK
of Van Buren by the Baltimore Convention. He told Benton
that he thought of reasserting the Monroe doctrine against the
planting of any foreign colony on the North American continent.
His immediate object was to forestall any contemplated British
colony in California. Benton approved such a course, generally,
but doubted that the doctrine could be applied to the Frazer
River valley in which the British had made discoveries and
settlements.^*^ Polk's anxietj^ about California had been in-
creased by a dispatch received from Thomas 0. Larkin, Ameri-
can consul at Monterey, California, which bore the date of
July 10, 1845.-^ This dispatch stated that the agent of the
Hudson 's Bay Company had formerly furnished the Calif ornians
with arms and money to enable them to expel the Mexicans
from that countrj^ but that now Great Britain was instigating
a Mexican invasion of California. He stated, also, that England
maintained a vice-consul and France a consul in California,
although they apparently transacted no commercial business. It
was inferred from this that the two governments had designs
on that province.
While he awaited developments in Mexico before sending
instructions and a commission to Slidell, and iniiuenced probably
by the news received from the consul at Monterey, the President
caused Buchanan to write a letter to Larkin, under date of
October 17, 1845. Larkin was already consul at ^Monterey, and
he was now, in addition, made a confidential agent in California.
Polk's desire for California and the method by which he hoped
to acquire it are made very clear in this letter. It is made
equally clear that whether or not he should be able to acquire
it for the United States, he was determined to resist its transfer
to either Great Britain or France. "The future destiny" of
California, wrote Buchanan, "is a subject of anxious solicitude
for the Government and people of the United States." For this
28 Ibid., 70-71.
2!) Mentioned in Buc-lianan's letter to Larkin, Oct. 17, 184.1, infra.
PBELVDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 387
reason the President ''eonld not view with indifference the
transfer of California to Great Britain or any other Power. The
system of colonization by foreign Monarchies on the North
American continent must and will be resisted by the United
States." Larkin was told that "tliis Government had no am-
bitious aspirations to gratify and no desire to extend our federal
system over more territory than we already possess, unless by
the free and spontaneous wish of the independent people of
adjoining territories." After reiterating that the United States
would "vigorously interpose" to prevent California from becom-
ing a British or a French colonj'', Buchanan continued :
Whilst the President will make no effort and use no influence to induce
California to become one of the free and independent States of this Union,
yet if the people should desire to unite their destiny with ours, they would
be received as brethren, whenever this can be done without affording Mexico
just cause of complaint. Their true policy for the present in regard to this
question, is to let events take their course, unless an attempt should be made
to transfer them without their consent either to Great Britain or Trance.
This they ought to resist by all the means in their power, as ruinous to their
best interests and destructive of their freedom and independence.
Larkin was asked to assure the Californians of the friendship
of the United States and to ascertain their feelings toward
this and other countries. He was instructed further to gather
various statistics and to inform his government generally regard-
ing affairs in California.^" Clearly Polk had hopes that the
Texas program might be reenacted in California. Apparently,
no conquest of this region was contemplated, unless, perhaps
Great Britain or France should attempt to seize or colonize it.
He was willing, of course, to purchase both California and New
Mexico and thereby settle the whole question both peaceably and
speedily. His constitutional authority to declare the so-called
"disputed territory" to be a part of the United States has been
30 Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845, brought to California by Com-
modore Stockton (MS in Larkin Papers, Bancroft Library, Univ. of Calif.)
There is a printed copy in Buchanan, JVorls, VI, 275-278.
388 JAMES K. POLE
seriously questioned ; it may be questioned, also, whether his
promise to "receive as brethren" the Calif ornians was not a
stretching of executive powers.
The President appointed Lieutenant Archibald H. Gillespie,
of the marine corps, confidential agent and assigned to him the
duty of repairing to California to cooperate with Larkin. He
was given a copy of the written instructions to Larkin, and was
made the bearer of verbal instructions to both Larkin and Fre-
mont. Just what these verbal instructions were no one has been
able to ascertain with any degree of certainty. Buchanan's letter
to Larkin bore the date October 17, but Gillespie was still in
Washington as late as October 30. On that date Polk recorded
in his diary that he had just held a confidential conversation
with Gillespie concerning his secret mission, and added that ' ' his
secret instructions & the letter to Mr. Larkin, — will explain the
object of his mission. "^^ The letter to Larkin tells its own story,
but the "secret instructions" to Gillespie have been the subject
of considerable speculation. The latter will be considered in
connection with the operations of Fremont.
The President did not confine his activities with respect to
California to the sending of Gillespie with instiuctions for
the consul at Monterey. While Buchanan was preparing these
instructions, Bancroft, by the President's order, was inditing
secret orders for Commodores Stockton and Sloat. These, too,
were given the official date of October 17, 1845.
Commodore John D. Sloat had been for some time in com-
mand of the luival forces on the Pacific, and as early as June 24
Bancroft had sent him "secret and confidential" orders to seize
San Francisco and blockade other ports, if he should "ascertain
with certainty" that Mexico had declared war against the United
States.^' By the order of October 17 he was told that "in the
event of actual hostilities" he was to dispose of his entii'o foi-ce
31 Polk, Di<ir}/, I, 83-84.
32 H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 231.
PBELVDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 389
"so as to carry out most effcctuallj^ the objects specified in the
instructions forwarded to you from the Department in view
of such a contingency."^^
Commodore Robert F. Stockton was given command of the
frigate Congress which had been equipped at Norfolk for duty
in the Pacific. His sealed orders, which were not to be opened
until he had passed beyond "the Capes of Virginia," directed
him to proceed to the Sandwich Islands, and, eventually, to join
the squadron of Commodore Sloat. To Stockton were intrusted
the originals of the instructions to Sloat and Larkin, duplicates
of which, as we have seen, were sent overland in care of Lieu-
tenant Gillespie.
On November 9, 1845, Parrott reached Washington bearing
a note from the Mexican Secretarj^ of Foreign Affairs which
expressed the willingness of his government to receive a com-
missioner from the United States.^^ Three days before Parrott 's
letter arrived, however, Bancroft had received a dispatch from
Commodore Conner which stated that Mexico was willing to
negotiate, and the President had directed Buchanan immediately
to prepare instructions for Slidell. Slidell's commission was
signed on the tenth, and this with his instructions was conveyed
to him by Lieutenant Lanier of the navy. Parrott was selected
as his secretary of legation. ^^
Slidell's instructions were an elaboration of the plans for
territorial expansion which the President had laid before his
cabinet on the sixteenth of September.^'' To Larkin had been
assigned the task of winning the good will of the Californians,
and of letting them know that they would be welcomed into the
33 See Eives, United States and Mexico, II, 168.
34 Polk, Diary, I, 93. Polk says that Mexico agreed to receive a minister.
This, however, is an error, for the Secretary clearly said a ' ' commissioner ' '
. . . "to settle the present dispute" (Pena y Pena to Black, Oct. 15, 1845,
in H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 16).
35 Polk, Diary, 1, 91-94.
36 See above, p. 385.
390 JAMES K. POLE
Union should they see fit to declare their independence; to
Slidell authority was given to adjust the boundary question, and
to purchase New Mexico and California, if possible. Taken
together these documents indicate the ardent desire of the Presi-
dent to extend the United States to the Pacific, as well as the
methods by which he hoped to accomplish his purpose.
The instructions to Slidell first of all reiterated the substance
of the Monroe Doctrine and insisted thai the United States could
not permit the establishment of European colonies in North
America. He was instructed to notify Mexico that the United
States had waited long and patiently for Mexico to pa.y the just
claims of American citizens, but that "these claims must now
speedily be adjusted in a satisfactory manner." It was well
known, Buchanan pointed out, that Mexico could not pay in
mone}', but "fortunately" the provision in the joint resolution
of annexation relating to the adjustment of boundaries presented
a means of satisfying these claims, "in perfect consistency with
the interests as well as the honor of both Republics." The means
was the assumption of the claims by the government of the United
States, and the cession of territory by Mexico as a compensation
therefor. With this introduction Buchanan proceeded to discuss
boundaries and the lands that might be claimed or purchased.
The independence and the annexation of Texas must be considered
as settled facts. The United States based her claim to the Rio
Grande as the boundary of Texas on the act passed bj^ the Texan
Congress on December 19, 1836, and on the fact that that river
had been the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase ; altliough
Buchanan himself admitted that all rights under the latter had
been transferred to Spain in 1819 by the Florida treaty. He did
not claim that New Mexico had belonged to Texas or had come
with tliat republic into the possession of the United States. To
"obviate the danger of future collisions," however, the Ameri-
can government would, in exchange for it, assume all claims of
her citizens against Mexico and pay in addition five millions of
PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 391
dollars. In case Mexico should be unwilling to cede any lands
west of the Rio Grande, then the claims would be assumed but
the five millions would not be paid. If either of these objects
could be attained, Slidell was authorized to conclude a treaty
with Mexico.
Reeves, in his American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk,
makes the over-confident assertion that
Parrott's mission and Sli'dell's instructions taken together prove two
things: (1) that the Mexican War was not the result of the annexation of
Texas, and (2) that the reopening of diplomatic relations with Mexico was
for the purpose of securing California by purchase. 37
That one of the motives for seeking to reopen diplomatic relations
was the desire to purchase California may be granted at once.
But precisely how Parrott's mission and Slidell 's instructions
prove that the acquisition of this region was the main purpose
of the administration, or that war did not result from the annex-
ation of Texas the present writer is miable to see. Other evidence,
which will be offered presently, indicates that Polk decided to
wage war because Mexico had failed to satisfy the American
claims ; but instead of proving that the Mexican war w^as waged
"for the fulfillment of Polk's designs upon California, "^^
Slidell's instructions indicate that the President, at the time
these instructions were drafted, was ready to release Mexico from
further obligation if she would cede only a part of New Mexico.
Should he find it impossible to make better terms, Slidell was
specifically authorized to conclude a treaty by which the United
States would assume all claims if Mexico in return would cede
that part of New Mexico lying east of the Rio Grande. Had
Slidell been able to conclude such a treaty, Polk would have
been deprived of all means of bringing pressure to bear on
Mexico, except unprovoked military conquest. To be sure, the
President was eager to acquire California. Larkin had been
37 Eeeves, 275. He is speaking here of Slidell's original instructions.
38 Ibid., 288.
392 JAMES K. POLK
instructed to assure the Californians that they would be wel-
comed into the Union should they see fit to separate from Mexico,
and now Slidell was instructed to purchase that territory, and
was told that "money would be no object when compared with
the value of the acquisition." He was told, also, that his mission
was "one of the most delicate and important which has ever
been confided to a citizen of the United States," nevertheless
there was not the slightest hint that the President had any inten-
tion of resorting to force in the event that Mexico should refuse
her consent to the sale. On the contrary, as above noted, Slidell
was to conclude a treat}' which would assume all claims even
though Mexico should confine her cession to territory on the east
side of the Rio Grande. It would seem that, at this time, Polk's
plan to acquire California was limited to purchase or to "mani-
fest destin}'" of the type that had succeeded so well in Texas.
The outbreak of war was soon followed by the conquest of Cali-
fornia, but this fact alone does not prove that the war "was
waged for the purpose of conquest, for the fulfillment of Polk's
designs upon California." Polk may have welcomed the war —
possibl}^ he may have provoked it — but his offer to cancel the
claims for so small a tract of land seems to show that forcible
conquest was not his intention at the time that Slidell was sent
to Mexico.
Slidell was sent to Mexico in the capacity- of envoy extra-
ordinary and minister plenipotentiary, not simply as a commis-
sioner to settle disputes incident to the annexation of Texas.
The reception of a minister would have the effect of fully restor-
ing diplomatic relations and of paving the way for the discussion
of all questions concerning which that minister might bear
instructions — unpaid claims, for example. For this reason Mex-
ico declined to receive Slidell. According to a statement made
long afterwards by Bejamin E. Green, ^'^ secretary of legation
39 The statement is dated Auj?. 8, 1889 (Tyler, Letters and Times of the
Tylers, III, 17G).
PEELUDE TO TEE MEXICAN WAH 393
at Mexico in 1844, President Polk had been informed, before
sending Slidell, that President Herrera would receive a commis-
sioner, and that he was read}^ to settle all disputes and to cede
New Mexico and California to the United States. He was told,
on the other hand, according to the same statement, that the
Herrera government doubted its ability to sustain itself against
the power of Santa Anna if it should receive an ordinary minister
as though nothing had happened. If this be true, then Polk
nnist have known that, in all probability, Slidell would not be-
received, and his sincerity in sending the envoy may be seriously
questioned. But it seems incredible that the President would
deliberately jeopardize the success of a mission which promised
to procure everything he could desire, even California, simply
to gratify a whim of sending to Mexico the particular kind of
a diplomatic agent which she did not want. Some allowance
should be made for the fact that Green's statement was made
many j'cars after the event and that he was the son of Duff
Green, the champion of Calhoun and the uncompromising
opponent of Polk.*"
On December 2, 1845, before the American envoy had reached
his destination, Polk submitted to Congress his first annual
message. In it he officially informed that body of the annexation
of Texas, despite ' ' British and French interference " ; of the
severance of diplomatic relations by Mexico; and of Slidell 's
mission. While expressing a "sincere desire for a peaceful
adjustment of all difficulties," the message hinted at drastic
measures in the event that negotiations should fail :
40 It is true, of course, that Polk had before him the letter of Pena y
Pefia, which agreed to receive a commissioner and said nothing about a
minister. See p. 389, note 34. It is true, also, that Joel R. Poinsett
wrote soon after war Avas declared that "I took the liberty of remonstrat-
ing to one in the confidence of the government that the Mexican govt
would not and dared not receive our Minister Plenipotentiary but could and
would receive a Commissioner and that any movement of our troops from the
Nueces would lead to hostilities. The reply was not to be uneasy. The
Mexicans would not cross the Rio Grande to attack our troops & Genl Taylor
had orders to remain on this side of the river, that a war with Mexico
depended altogether upon the state of our relations with England" (Poin-
sett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846, Van Burcn Papers).
394 . JAMES E. POLK
The minister appointed has set out on liis mission and is probably by this
time near the Mexican capital. He has been instructed to bring the negotia-
tion •ndth -which he is charged to a conclusion at the earliest practicable
period, which it is expected Avill be in time to enable me to communicate
the result to Congress during the present session. Until that result is
known I forbear to recommend to Congress such ulterior measures of redress
for the wrongs and injuries we have long borne as it would have been proper
to make had no such negotiation been instituted.
This passage indicates that, even at this earl}' date, the President
believed that the United States had ample ground for war and
that he would not hesitate to recommend it if Slidell's mission
should end in failure.
Polk's reference to British and French interference in Texan
affairs and his allusions to the Monroe Doctrine in connection
with the Oregon question were not relished in British official
circles. When reporting this fact to the President, McLane wrote
tliat "a favorate scheme of the leading powers of Europe is to
compose the Mexican troubles by giving her a settled monarchical
form of Government, and supplying the monarch from one of
their own families. "^^ Doubtless McLane greatly exaggerated
the desire for a Mexican monarchy, but his report harmonized
so well with the suspicions already held by the administration
that his opinions were probably accepted at face value.
Slidell arrived at the Mexican capital on December 6, 1845.
His secretary of legation, Parrott, soon followed, accompanied
41 McLane to Polk, Jan. 17, 1846, Polk Papers. Before the receipt of
the message in England, the British press had spoken in praise of Polk's
success in acquiring Texas. For example, the morning Chronicle said:
"That immense question, the annexation of Texas, which seemed so difficult
to solve that it affriglited the boldest men and parties, has been achieved
by Mr. Polk in a thrice. The activity of English envoys, the suppleness
of the French, the efforts of the most able and most eloquent partisans at
home, all pointed at and making against annexation! All obstacles have
been overcome. European interference has given color of reason to the act
of annexation which it wanted before, since the measure was one which
defeated and annulled European intervention. Then the great objection
was that it would produce war. Annexation, however desirable, argiied the
Wliigs, is not worth a drop of blood; but lo! it has not cost a drop of
blood — the Mexicans are paralyzed." Quoted by the Washington Union,
Jan. 2, 1846.
PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR
395
by Gillespie, who was on his way to California as bearer of dis-
patehes to Larkin and Fremont. Black, the American consul
at aiexico, had met Slidell at Puebla and informed him that the
:^Iexican o-overnment was much perturbed by his early arrival,
as he had not been expected until January. President Herrera
seems to have feared that the arrival of the American envoy
would be used by his enemies to undermine his power. There
was foundation for this belief. Broadsides appeared warning
the people that Slidell had come to acquire from the Herrera
government not only Texas but New Mexico and the Californias,
consequently to receive him would be treasonable. Peiia y Pena,
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, promptly refused to receive
Parrott as secretary of legation, because of his former activities
in Mexico; but as to Slidell, he adopted a temporizing policy.
His first objection, as already stated, was the early date of the
envoy's arrival. After the receipt of Slidell's credentials, the
Secretary had a more tangible ground for objection. He pointed
out to Black that Mexico had agreed to receive a commissioner
to negotiate the Texas dispute, but that Slidell's credentials
represented him to be a minister resident. On this ground the
]\rexican government declined to receive the American diplomat.*-
Slidell did not, however, regard this as a final rejection, for on
December 31, Herrera was forced to relinquish the government
of Mexico, and on January 2, 1846, General Paredes became
President, ad interim. It now remained for Slidell to seek recog-
nition from the new government, and he repaired to Jalapa to
await developments.
On January 28, 1846, after he had received Slidell's letter
of December 17 which reported that the Mexican government
had declined to receive him until it had given the matter further
consideration, Buchanan wrote again to Slidell, approving his
42 Black to Slidell, Dec. 15; Slidell to Buchanan, Dee 17; Peua y
Pena to Slidell, Deo. 20, 1845 {H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 23-27,
28-30, 37).
396 JAMES K. POLK
eondiu't and giving him further directions. As it was morally
certain, said Buchanan, that Paredes would gain control of the
government, Slidell was directed to apply again for recognition.
The President, he w^as told, desired to preserve peace, because
botli inclination and policj' dictated this course. .
Should the Mexican Government, however, finally refuse to receive you,
the cup of forbearance will then have been exhausted. Nothing can remain
but to take the redress of the injuries to our citizens and the insults to our
Government into our hands. In view of this serious alternative, every
honorable effort should be made before a final rupture.
Slidell was therefore to wait a reasonable time for Mexico to
decide on his reception, unless he should discover that she was
inclined to trifle with "this Government." The length of time
and the evidence of trifling w^ere left to the envoy's discretion
to determine. It will be noted that the President regarded a
refusal to receive Slidell and a failure to pay the claims imme-
diately as ample grounds for taking redress into his own hands —
in other words, for making war on Mexico. Protection of Texas
from threatened invasion had nothing to do with the question
then under discussion. To make still more clear the President's
intentions, Slidell was told in another paragraph that in case
Mexico should finally decline to receive him he was to demand
his passports and return to the United States. "It will then
become the duty of the President to submit the whole case to
Congress and call upon the nation to assert its just rights and
avenge its injured honor." Additional naval forces had been
sent to the Mexican coast and "should war become inevitable,
the President will be prepared to conduct it with vigor. "^^
While Slidell was seeking an audience in Mexico an agent of
Santa Anna (then in exile in Cuba) appeared in Washington
and obtained an interview with President Polk. This agent was
Colonel Alexander J. Atocha, a Spaniard by birth but a natural-
ized citizen of the United States. As a friend of Santa Anna he
43 Buchanan, Works, VI, 363-365.
PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 397
had been arrested when that wily ruler's government was over-
tlirown, but on proving his American citizenship he was released
and bauislu'd. He had called on Polk in June, 1845, for the
purpose of urging the United States government to press certain
claims which he held against Mexico. He had now returned from
a visit to Santa Anna in Havana, prepared to lay before Polk
the views of the ex-dictator. In his diary under date of Febru-
ary 13, 1846, Polk stated that Atocha called on that day, and
the substance of the conversation was recorded. Atocha repre-
sented Santa Anna to be in constant communication with the
Mexican leaders.
He said that Santa Anna approved the revolution headed by Paredes and
that Santa Anna Avas in favour of a Treaty with the U, S., and that in
adjusting a boundary between the two countries the Del Norte should be
the Western Texas line, and the Colorado of the West down through the
Bay of San Francisco to the Sea should be the Mexican line on the North,
and that Mexico should cede all East and North of these natural boundaries
to the U. S. for a pecuniary consideration, and mentioned thirty millions
of Dollars as the sum.
This amount, Santa Anna believed, would pay the most pressing
debts of Mexico and support the army until conditions had
improved.
Col. Atocha said that Santa Anna was surprised that the U. S. Naval
force had been withdrawn from Vera Cruz last fall, and that Gen '1 Taylor 's
army was kept at Corpus Christi instead of being stationed on tlie Del
Norte ; and that the U. S. would never be able to treat with Mexico, with-
out the presence of an imposing force by land and sea, and this. Col. Atocha
added, was his own opinion. Col. Atocha did not say that he was sent by
Santa Anna to hold this conversation with me; but I think it probable he
was so.
Atocha requested that the conversation should be considered
confidential, and said that he had more to communicate."
Polk was evidently much interested in the views expressed
by Atocha, and at a regular cabinet meeting held on the fol-
lowing dav he related to the membei-s the substance of the
44 Polk, Diarij. 1, 222-225.
398 JAMES E. POLE
conversation. The idea of sending a confidential ag'ent to confer
with Santa Anna was mentioned. Walker was inclined to favor
such a course, but Buchanan was decidedly opposed to it. The
President said that althoug'h he did not propose to send such an
agent, if one sliould be sent, C. P. Van Ness, former minister to
Spain, would, be the best man that could be selected.*^ Atocha
called again to see the President on the sixteenth of February.
After discussing relations with Mexico for nearly an hour the con-
versation was adjourned until afternoon when it was continued
for more than an hour. Atocha repeated what he had said on
February 13. Polk told him that Mexico must satisfy the claims
of American citizens and that if her government had any propo-
sition to make, such as he had suggested, the United States would
consider it after it had been made. Atocha then pointed out
that no government of Mexico would dare to make such an offer
and that it "must appear to be forced to agree to such a propo-
sition." It was the opinion of Atocha himself and of Santa
Anna that
our [United States] army should be marched at once from Corpus Ohristi
to the Del Norte, and a strong Naval force assembled at Vera Cruz, that
Mr. Slidell, the U. S. Minister, should withdraw from Jalappa, and go on
board one of our ships of War at Vera Cruz, and in that position should
demand the payment of [the] amount due our citizens; that it was well
known the Mexican Government was unable to pay in money, and that when
they saw a strong force ready to strike on their coasts and border, they
would, he had no doubt, feel their danger and agree to the boundary sug-
gested. He said that Paredes, Almonte, & Gen'l Santa Anna were all
willing for such an arrangement, but that they dare not make it until it
was made apparent to the Archbishop of Mexico & the people generally
that it was necessary to save their country from a war with the U. States.
He said the last words which Gen'l Santa Anna said to him Avhen he was
leaving Havanna a month ago was, "when you see the President, tell him
to take strong measures, and such a Treaty can be made & T will sustain it. ' '
Atocha said that Mexico owed half a million dollars to the
archbishop, and that he could be reconciled by assurance that
he would be paid as soon as Mexico had obtained tlie money from
40 Ihid., 226.
PBELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 399
the United States. He reported Santa Anna as having said that
he could be in Mexico in April or May and would probably
"go into power again," but that he and Paredes must have
money to sustain themselves. With half a million in hand, they
could make the treaty and retain control until the balance had
been paid. Arista, he said, was friendly to the United States
and in favor of ceding the northern departments to that country
— in fact, he was anxious to do so, as he owned a large plantation
near Monterey. Atocha intimated an intention to return to
Havana and seemed desirous of getting Polk's views to carry
to Santa Anna, but the President remained silent. Polk thought
him to be a man of talents, but one who could not be trusted ;
"I therefore heard all he said but communicated nothing to
him. "^"^ We may well believe the President's statement that
he listened attentively but offered no hint of his own intentions,
for this habit was one of his best known characteristics. Although
he believed Atocha to be a person who could not be relied upon,
events which followed make it evident that he looked with favor
upon the suggestions which had been offered. Some of them
were followed, as we shall soon have occasion to note, in the
new instructions given to Slidell and in the request made to
Congress for money to be used in conducting negotiations.
That Polk was influenced by Atocha 's suggestions there can
be no doubt, and that his first impulse was to follow these sug-
gestions very closely is made evident by the discussion which took
place in the cabinet meeting on the following day, February 17.
In giving an account of this meeting Polk says in his diary that,
after relating the conversation held with Atocha,
I expressed the opinion that it would be necessary to take strong measures
towards Mexico before our difficulties with that Government could be settled;
and I proposed that in addition to Mr. Slidell 's present instructions, he
should be further instructed to demand an early decision of the Mexican
Government, whether they woiild receive him as Minister or not; and, if
they received him, whether they would without unnecessary delay pay the
46 Ibid., 228-230.
400 JAMES E. POLE
amount due to American claimants; and tliat if that Government refused
to do one or both, that he should leave the country, but instead of return-
ing immediately to the U. States as he had beeen instructed to do, he
should go on board one of our Vessels of War at Vera Cruz, and there remain
until he had further instructions from his Government.
I stated that in that event I would send a strong message to Congress
calling on that body to authorize me to cause another demand to be made
by Mr. Slidell, from on board the vessel of war, on the Mexican Government
to pay our demands, and if this was refused by Mexico, to confer authority
on the Executive to take redress into our hands by aggressive measures.
Walker, Marcy, and Bancroft favored the plan suggested by the
President. Johnson was inclined to hold a different opinion, but
was willing to acquiesce. Buchanan objected, because — as Polk
thought — he was peeved over certain appointments and because
he could not control the administration. However, it was decided
that Buchanan should prepare new instructions for Slidell, in
accordance with the wishes of the President. But within an hour
after the meeting had adjourned Buchanan, who was in no
amiable mood, sent to the President by messenger a draft of
instructions, commencing with "I am directed by President" etc.
He requested Polk to make corrections in pencil and return it
in time for the mail. Polk was dissatisfied with the draft and
replied that he would attend to it on the following day. Buchanan
immediately sent the messenger back with a note stating his
reasons for dissenting from the decision of the President. On
receiving no reply Buchanan sent another note on the same
subject, but again he received no response. Polk did not see
Buchanan on the following day, but decided, on account of the
Secretary's hostility, to postpone instructing Slidell for the
present.*^
The Mexican question was allowed to slumber for about three
weeks, and during that time Oregon claimed the attention of
both the President and Congress. On IMarch 9 dispatches from
47 Ibid., 233-236, 238. Polk considered the conduct of his Secretary to
be decidedly reprehensible, and he closed tlic entry for the day with the
remark: "The draft of the despatch and the two notes. Numbered 1 & 2,
I will preserve. ' '
PliELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAB 401
Slidell, for whicli Polk had been waiting, arrived, and were dis-
cussed in cabinet meeting- on the da}- following. The essential
features of new instructions to Slidell were agreed upon, and
Buchanan was directed to draft them/** While the new instruc-
tions, which bore the date of March 12, reflected in some degree
the suggestions offered by Atocha, their tone was somewhat less
bellicose than the declaration made by the President to his
cabinet on February 17. The change was probably due to the
opposition of Buchanan. Slidell was directed to make a formal
demand to be received by the new government. Apparently the
administration had slight hopes that Paredes would comply but
Buchanan pointed out that the demand should be made in order
to satisfy the American people that everything had been done
to avoid the necessity of resorting to war. "On your return to
the United States, energetic measures against Mexico would at
once be recommended by the President, and these might fail to
obtain the support of Congress, if it could be asserted that the
existing Government had not refused to receive our Minister."
Slidell was to make it known to Paredes "in some discreet man-
ner" that the United States was both able and willing to relieve
him from pecuniary embarrassment the moment that a treaty
had been signed and ratified by Mexico. ^^ A rumor was afloat,
said Buchanan, of a design of European powers to establish a
monarchy in Mexico and to place Prince Henry of Spain on the
throne. He thought that these rumors were probably idle specu-
lations, but "should Great Britain and France attempt to place
a Spanish or any other European Prince on the throne of
Mexico, this would be resisted by all the power of the United
States." Whether he should be received or not Slidell was
advised to delay his return to the United States, for the Oregon
question was rapidly approaching a crisis and his return might
influence its settlement by creating public alarm.^° Nothing
4s ihid., 282, 287.
49 This is evidently an echo of the suggestion made by Atocha,
50 Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 18-i6 (Buchanan, Worl<:s, VI, 402-406).
402 JAMES E. POLK
was said about Slidell's repairing to a war vessel for the purpose
of making another demand, as Atocha had advised and Polk had
recommended to the cabinet. Apprehension concerning the
Oregon question as well as the opposition of Buchanan may
have been responsible for the President's change of mind.
Polk seems to have been confident that Slidell would be
received by Paredes. At a cabinet meeting held on March 28,
he expressed the belief that Slidell's dispatches indicated his
reception to be probable. He apprehended that the greatest
obstacle to the conclusion of a boundary treaty, such as Slidell
had been instructed to procure, would be the want of authority
to make a prompt payment of money at the time of signing it.
Paredes was in great need of money to pay his troops and keep
them loyal, and Polk was of opinion that if Slidell could be
authorized to pay a half million or a million dollars as soon as
the treaty had been signed, it "might induce him [Paredes] to
make a Treaty, which he would not otherwise venture to make. ' '
Some of the cabinet members raised the question of how this
money could be obtained from Congress without exposing to the
public and to foreign nations the object in voting it. "That
object," said the President,
ag may be seen from Mr. Slidell's instructions, would be in adjusting a
boundary to procure a cession of New Mexico & California, & if possible all
North of latitude 32° from the Passo [El Paso] on the Del Norte & West
to the Pacific ocean; or if that precise boundary cannot be obtained, then
the next best boundary Avhich might be practicable so as at all events to
include all the country East of the Del Norte and the Bay of San Francisco.
For the boundary desired, see Mr. Slidell's instructions.
The cabinet, except the Secretary of State, agreed. Buchanan
thought the plan of asking for an advance appropriation to be
impracticable. Polk called attention to the act passed in 1806
to enable Jefferson to purchase the Floridas, and suggested that
members of Congress might be consulted informally for the
purpose of ascertaining the probability of obtaining the appro-
priation. He had already broached the subject to Ingersoll, of
PRELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 403
Pennsylvania, and Cullom, of Tennessee. After the meeting had
adjourned Polk summoned Benton and asked his opinion con-
cerning the feasibility of the plan. Benton concurred in the
views of the President and promised his cooperation."'^ On ex-
amining the laws Polk found another precedent for his proposed
appropriation— the two millions voted in 1803 to enable Jefferson
to purchase Louisiana. He conversed with Allen, chairman of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and with Senator
Cass. Both approved his plan. On the advice of Allen and
Benton the President sent for Calhoun and asked his opinion on
the proposed appropriation and on the purpose for which it was
to be used. Calhoun was in favor of procuring a boundary
which would include California, and said that he had contem-
plated trying to procure such a boundary when he was Secretary
of State.' He did not, however, like the boundary suggested by
the President. Neither did he approve the plan to ask for an
appropriation, for fear it might interfere with the settlement of
the Oregon question.^-
While the President was exerting his influence to obtain from
Congress an appropriation to facilitate negotiations, a dispatch
arrived, on April 6, from the American consul at Vera Cruz
stating that Slidell would probably not be received. The dis-
patch was read in cabinet meeting next day, and Polk recorded
in his diary :
I stated that in the event Mr. Slidell was not accredited, and returned to
the U. S., my opinion was that I should make a communication to Congress
recommending that Legislative measures be adopted, to take the remedy
for the injuries and wrongs we had suffered into our own hands.
On the evening of the seventh dispatches from Slidell arrived,
informing the President that he had not been received and that
he had demanded his passports.^^
51 Polk, Diary, 1, 303, 303-308.
52 ihid., 309-313.
53 Ibid., 319, 322.
404 JAMES K. POLK
On March 12, tlie day on which Buchanan penned his final
instructions to Slidell, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Rela-
tions notified the American envoy that he could not be received.
He was told that the annexation of Texas had always been and
was still regarded by Mexico as a casus belli. In spite of this
fact she had agreed to receive a commissioner to discuss this
question, but the United States had sent instead a minister resi-
dent. Should the United States persist in its present course the
Mexican government would "call upon all her citizens to fulfill
the sacred duty of defending their country," and if war should
result, the entire blame would rest upon the United States. As
soon as he received this letter Slidell asked for his passports, and
they were sent to him by Castillo on the twenty-first of March.^*
He had left, therefore, for the United States before the arrival
of Buchanan's instructions of March 12. With one government
maintaining that aggressive measures must follow the refusal to
receive the American envoy, and the other asserting that an in-
sistence upon his reception must be met by an appeal to arms,
it will be seen that Slidell's mission played an important part in
bringing about a collision between the two nations. To be sure,
Mexico still regarded the annexation of Texas as a casus belli and
Castillo did not expressly state that she was prepared to acquiesce
in its incorporation into the American Union, but at least he still
intimated a willingness to negotiate on this limited question.
On receipt of Slidell's dispatch which announced that he had
been rejected and had demanded his passports, the President
consulted Benton concerning "the steps proper to be taken and
especially if the principal Powers of Europe should attempt to
force a Foreign Prince on the throne of Mexico. ' ' He consulted
Houston, of Texas, and Allen, of Ohio, also, and it was agreed that
nothing should be done until it had been ascertained that pass-
ports had actually been given to Slidell.'^"'' About a week later
54 Castillo y Lanzas to Slidell, March 12 and March 21; Slidell to
Castillo, March 17, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 67-72, 79).
55 Polk, Diary, I, 32o-.327.
PBELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 405
(April 18) the President told Calhoun that he "saw no alter-
native but strong measures towards Mexico." Calhoun depre-
cated war and expressed the opinion that if the Oregon question
could be settled first there would be no difficulty in adjusting
the difficulties with Mexico, for he believed that Great Britain
desired to prevent a war between the United States and Mexico.
Polk, on the contrary, believed that the British minister in ]\Iex-
ico had exerted his influence to prevent Slidell's reception. Cal-
houn urged against sending a message to Congress on Mexican
affairs until the Oregon question had been settled. ' ' I told him, ' '
said Polk,
that I would delay a reasonable time, but that whatever the settlement
of the Oregon question might be, I would feel it my duty to lay the
Mexican question before Congress, with my opinion on the subject, in
time for their action at the present Session. so
Three days later Polk told his cabinet that "our relations with
Mexico could not be permitted to remain in statu quo" ; that he
contemplated asking Congress to adopt strong measures, but
thought it prudent to await news from England before taking
this step. He did not have long to wait, for on the following
day (April 22) a dispatch from McLane was received. McLane
was of opinion that Great Britain M'ould take no step on the
Oregon question until the Senate had come to some decision on
the bill to terminate joint occupation of Oregon. On the twenty-
third, the conference committee of the two houses came to an
agreement on the bill to give England the required twelve months'
notice ; and on the twenty-fifth, Polk informed his cabinet that
he deemed it to be his duty to make a communication to Congress
without delay. "I expressed my opinion," the President re-
corded,
that we must take redress for the injuries done us into our own hands,
that we had attempted to conciliate Mexico in vain, and had forborne
until forbearance was no longer either a virtue or patriotic . . . and that
we should take a bold and firm course towards Mexico.
56 Ibid., 337-338.
406 JAMES K. POLK
Buchanan, whose opinion was first requested, thought that the
President shoukl recommend a declaration of war, while the other
members suggested that a message be prepared and submitted to
tliem within the course of a week. After considerable discussion
Buchanan was requested to collect materials and prepare the
draft of a message for the President's consideration.^^ While
Buclianan was preparing "a succinct history" of wrongs on
which to base a message to Congress the President once more
consulted Benton. The Missouri Senator had not yet made up
his mind, but he expressed a decided aversion to a war with
Mexico, if it could be avoided. He advised delay until the
Oregon question had been either settled or brought to a crisis.
"I told him," said Polk, "we had ample cause of War, but that
I was anxious to avoid it if it could be done honourably & con-
sistently with the interests of our injured citizens." He would
delay, he said, until the arrival of Slidell in Washington, but
he could not permit Congress to adjourn without laying the
subject before them.^^
It should be noted that up to this point the President dwelt
entirely on the refusal to receive Slidell and the failure to adjust
the claims of American citizens. These furnished, in his opinion,
ample grounds for war. This fact is significant, for Mexico was
in such dire financial straits that she could not paj^ the claims
except by a cession of territory. In other words, the President
was ready to wage war to procure a territorial compensation for
claims against Mexico. He does not, up to this time, mention
any military aggressions on the part of Mexico. But on May 5
Polk received a dispatch from Taylor, dated April 15, stating
that he had been ordered by Ampudia to fall back across the
Nueces, and the President noted in his diary that "the probabil-
ities are that hostilities might take i)lace soon."^'' On May 8,
" Ibid., 343, 344, 347, 354.
58 lUd., 375-376.
50 Taylor to Adj. G«n., April 15, 184() {H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
138). Polk, Dim-}/, I, 380.
PHELVDE TO THE MEXICAN WAE 407
Slidell, who had just returned from Mexico, called on the Presi-
dent and told him that there was only one course left — for the
United States to take the redress of its injuries into its own hands.
"In this I agreed with him," said Polk, "and told him it was
onl}^ a matter of time when I would make a communication to
Congress on the subject, and that I had made up my mind to do
so very soon."®" The cabinet met on the following day and the
President informed them that, although no open act of aggression
by the Mexican army had been reported, it was imminent that
such would be committed. All agreed that if Taylor's forces
should be molested the President ought to recommend a declar-
ation of war. Polk then asked each member whether, in his
opinion, a message should be sent to Congress on the following
Tuesday,'^^ and whether it should recommend a declaration of
war. All answered in the affirmative except Bancroft, who, how-
ever, favored immediate war should Mexico commit any hostile
act. It was agreed that a message should be prepared and con-
sidered at the next meeting.®- On that same evening a dispatch
from Taylor arrived, giving an account of the killing of Amer-
ican dragoons on the east bank of the Rio Grande. Polk sum-
moned the cabinet to a special meeting, and it was agreed unani-
mously that the President should lay the matter before Congress
and urge prompt measures to enable the Executive to prosecute
the war. At noon on Monday, May 11, the war mesasge was
ready and on its way to the capitol. Mexico herself had removed
the obstacle which had worried both Bancroft and Buchanan.
In addition, she rendered the President a distinct service by
enabling him to base his war message on more tangible grounds —
grounds which all friends of the administration could endorse
with enthusiasm, and those which the opponents, for patriotic
reasons, found it difficult to assail. Before the message was sent
60 Polk, Diary, I, 382.
61 This was on Saturday, May 9.
62 Polk, Diary, I, 384-385. Buchanan said that he would feel better
if Mexico had committed some hostile act, but as matters stood, there was
ample cause for war, so he gave his assent.
408 JAMES E. POLK
to Congress, Benton called, by appointment, and criticized some
parts of it. He was, he said, in favor of defending our territory,
but was not prepared to make aggressive war on ]\Iexico. Al-
tliough he had remained silent, lie had not favored marching the
army from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande, and he doubted
that the territory of the United States extended west of the
Nueces river. •'^
The departure of Slidell from IMexico ended all attempt to
adjust the international dispute by negotiation. Both nations
now agreed on one point at least — that arms alone could settle
the controversy. But which nation was the aggressor? Which
committed the first overt act of war ; and to what extent, if any,
was the American occupation of that strip of territory lying
between the Nueces and the Rio Grande the real cause of the war?
We have already seen that Polk was ready to recommend war
because Mexico would not pay the American claims by a cession
of territory. Let us now consider the effect of Taylor's march
to the Rio Grande upon Mexico's decision to attack the enemy.
As a department of Mexico Texas had extended to the Nueces
only ; the land lying west of that river belonged to the department
of Tamaulipas. Except Santa Anna's agreement of 1836 and
the Elliot treaty of 1845, Mexico never recognized the independ-
ence of Texas, much less the extension of her boundary. Texas
of course claimed everything to the Rio Grande, but throughout
her career as a republic the territory between the two rivers
remained unoccupied by either country except that ^Mexico held
a few posts on the east bank of the Rio Grande. The legitimate
extent and boundaries of Texas, therefore, were not determined
when that republic joined the American Union, and the joint
resolution of annexation left them as vague as before. "What,
then, is Texas?" was the embarrassing question asked by the
Whigs, as soon as the administration took steps to protect the
new state from invasion. Texas, they said, was bounded by the
Nueces, not by the Rio Grande; and they denied the President's
03 Ibid., 386-390.
PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 409
authority to send an anny into the "disputed territory" between
the two rivers." The ocenpation of this territory was later used
by Mexico as an excuse for attacking the American army; but
at the time that diplomatic relations were severed, the (piestion
of boundary was not a definite issue. Almonte demanded his
passports and left Washington soon after the joint resolution had
passed, without waiting to see what boundary would be claimed.
His conduct was approved by his government, and Mexico con-
tinued to assert her determination to reconquer Texas — not sim-
ply the "disputed territory," but all of it. There was no inti-
mation of an intention on her part to acquiesce in the annexation
of Texas until she agreed to receive a commissioner to negotiate
that question, and she declined to receive Slidell because his
credentials were unacceptable.
Although Polk had, before annexation was completed, an-
nounced his intention to claim the Rio Grande as the boundary
of Texas, the western frontier was not occupied immediately.
On July 30, 1845, Taylor was instructed to station part of his
forces west of the Nueces, but it was not until January 13, 1846,
that he was ordered to move his army to the east bank of the
Rio Grande. On receipt of this order, early in February, Taylor
at once made preparations to carry it into effect, and he reported
that he did not anticipate that his advance would be resisted.
Before leaving Corpus Christi, Taylor prepared and had trans-
lated into Spanish an "order" which he caused to be circulated
among the inhabitants dwelling along the Rio Grande. This
order stated that the advance to the Rio Grande was not a hostile
move, and that both the personal and the property rights of the
inhabitants on either side of that river would be respected."'
64 On September 13, 1845, the National Intelligencer said that if the
Army of Observation should be sent beyond the Nueces it woukl not be in
Texas and not defending Texas. "Is the disputed territory, then, a part
of Texas"? No. It was not within Texas, as a part of Mexico. It has not
been since acquired by arms or treaty. ' '
cs Tavlor to Adj. Gen., Feb. 4 and Feb. IG, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60. 30
Cong., l" sess., 116-117). "Order No. 30," dated March 8, 1846 (^ihid.,
119-120).
410 JAMES K. FOLK
The march of Taylor toward the Rio Grande was undisputed
by the Mexicans until he reached the Arroyo Colorado on March
19. Here a party of cavalry was encountered, and their com-
mander warned Taylor that he was under orders to tire on the
Americans should they attempt to pass that river. The warning
was unheeded by Taylor and the Mexicans retreated without
interposing armed resistance, but during the parley one of the
officers placed in Taylor's hands a bellicose proclamation which
had been issued on March 18 by General Francisco Mejia. This
document is of interest, not only as being the first specific chal-
lenge to the advance of the American army, but because it draws
a sharp distinction between Texas and land lying between the
Nueces and Rio Grande. The ' ' degenerate sons of Washington, ' '
said Mejia, not satisfied with annexing Texas, were now advanc-
ing to take possession of a large part of Tamaulipas. This they
had begun "whilst endeavoring to lull us into security, by open-
ing diplomatic relations. " " The limits of Texas, ' ' he continued,
"are certain and recognized; never have they extended beyond
the river Nueces ; notwithstanding which, the American army has
crossed the line separating Tamaulipas from that department."
Even though Mexico might acquiesce in the annexation of Texas,
nevertheless the territory of Tamaulipas would still remain beyond the
law of annexation, sanctioned by the American Congress; because that
law comprises independent Texas, the ground occupied by the rebellious
colony, and in no wise includes other departments, in which the Mexican
government has unintcrj rjujitedly exercised its legitimate autliority.
All Mexicans were therefore exhorted to defend their country. '^^
While Taylor was on the march from the Arroyo Colorado to
Point Isabel he was met by a civil deputation from Matamoras
bearing a protest from the prefect of the northern district of
Tamaulipas. It stated that Taylor's march was regarded as an
invasion of Mexico, and the prefect pointed out that "nothing
has been said officially by the cabinet of the Union to the Mexican
o«/bi(Z., 125-129.
PBELUDE TO TEE MEXICAN WAR 411
government, respecting the extension of the limits of Texas to
the left bank of the Rio Bravo." The citizens of the district,
he said, would never consent to separate themselves from Mexico
and join the United States.'^' To this protest Taylor paid no
heed, but moved on to take a position opposite Matamoras. His
batteries bore directly on the public square of that town, and
"their object," reported Taylor, "cannot be mistaken by the
enemy." A parley was held on the Mexican side of the river
by General Worth and General Vega in which Worth demanded
an interview with the American consul at Matamoras. The de-
mand was refused, and Worth informed the Mexican commander
that he regarded this refusal as a belligerent act. Worth stated
also that Taylor would regard the crossing of the Rio Grande by
Mexican forces as an act of war."^ On March 31, General Mejia
addressed a note to Taylor stating that all Mexicans looked upon
the occupation of the east bank of the Rio Grande as a "positive
declaration of war on the Part of the United States." Taylor's
march could not be viewed as pacific, "inasmuch as a question
of limits is depending between our respective governments." It
could not be so viewed, "because it is not easy to conceive the
reason or justice of taking forcible possession of the very terri-
tory in dispute, pending the negotiation."^'' Had such a com-
munication been addressed to President Polk he might have had
difficulty in explaining the peaceful nature of the advance of the
American army, but it was Taylor's duty to obey orders and not
to justify his movements. He very wisely declined to assume the
role of a diplomat.
On April 11, General Ampudia arrived at Matamoras and
took command of the Mexican forces. By "explicit and definite
orders of his [my] government," he at once summoned Taylor
"TCardenes to Taylor, March 23, 1846 (ibid., 130-132).
68 Tavlor to A<\]. Geu., April 6, 1846; Mimites of the parley held on
March 28 (ibid., 133-138).
60 Ibid., 1204.
412 JAMES K. POLK
to retire beyond the Nueces 'within twenty-four hours, there to
remain until the limits of Texas should be determined by the two
governments. "If you insist in remaining upon the soil of the
department of Tamaulipas, " he was told, "it will clearly result
that arms, and arms alone, must decide the question." Taylor
replied on the same day that he would remain where he was,
"leaving the responsibility with those who rashly commence hos-
tilities." As a result of Ampudia's note, Taylor immediately
ordered a blockade of the Rio Grande, which cut off supplies from
Matamoras.^° On April 24, Ampudia was superseded by General
Arista, who at once notified Taylor that Mexico could not submit
to the indignities heaped upon her by the United States, and that
hostilities had commenced. Taylor replied on the following day
that he had carefully refrained from committing
any act which could possibly be interpreted into hostility, until the per-
emptory summons of General Ampudia to vacate my position within
twenty-four hours, rendered it necessary to take some action, and I then
chose a measure not in itself hostile, but a simple defensive precaution,
viz: a blockade of the Rio Bravo.'i
Although this definition of a blockade may have relieved the
conscience of the man who made it, such a bottling-up of the
opponent is usually regarded as an act of war. Ampudia pro-
tested vigorously and demanded the free use of the river, but
Taylor refused to raise the blockade "unless indeed you desire
an armistice pending the settlement of the question between the
two governments."^"
The Mexican President likewise considered Taylor's blockade
to be an act of war. On April 23, Paredes issued a proclamation
directing a "defensive war" to begin. After a recital of the
injuries which, since 1836, the United States had inflicted upon
the people of Mexico ; the sending of Slidell as minister resident
70 Ampudia to Taylor, April 12; Taylor to Ampudia, April 12; Taylor
to Adj. Gen., April 15, 1846 {ibid., 138-140).
71 Ihid., 1204-1200.
"Taylor to Anipuili:i, April 22, 184() {ibid., 144-147).
PEELUDE TO THE MEXICAN WAR 413
at the very moment when the American troops were occupying
Mexican territory; and the blockade of the Rio Grande by war
■vessels : Parades asserted that
hostilities therefore have been begun by the United States of Amerit-a,
who have undertaken new conquests in the territory lying within the line
of the Departments of Tamaulipas and Nueva Leon while the troops of
the United States are threatening Monterey in Upper California.
He had therefore directed the commanding general to "attack
the army which is attacking us ; to answer with war the enemy
who makes war upon us." Like Taylor, Paredes invented a defi-
nition to suit his purposes, for he declared the proposed hostilities
to be not a war against the government of the United States, but
simply a defense of Mexican territory which had been invaded."^
Arista, who assumed command of the Mexican forces on the
day after Paredes had issued his proclamation, took immediate
steps to cross the Rio Grande. General Torrejon, with all of the
cavalry and a small body of infantry, was sent across the river
above Matamoras, while the main body of infantry and artillery
was to cross below Matamoras and cut Taylor off from his base
of supplies at Point Isabel.'* On April 25, Torrejon encoun-
tered a scouting party of sixty-three American dragoons, under
Captain Thornton. An engagement followed in which sixteen
Americans were killed or wounded and the remainder forced to
surrender. The prisoners were taken to Matamoras and treated
kindly by the Mexicans.'^ The long-threatened war with Mexico
73 "I solemnly announce that I do not decree war against the govern-
ment of the United States of America, because it belongs to the august
Congress of the nation, and not to the Executive, to decide definitely what
reparation must be exacted for such injuries. But the defense of Mexican
territory which the troops of the United States are invading is an urgent
necessity, and my responsibility before the nation would be immense if I
did not order the repulse of forces Avhich are acting as enemies; and I
have so ordered. From this day defensive war begins, and every point
of our territory which may be invaded or attacked shall be defended by
force" (Mexico a traves de los Siglos, IV, 559). Rives, The United States
and Mexico, II, 141-142.
"4 Rives, 02). cit., 143.
75 Taylor to Adj. Gen., April 26, 1846; Reports of Captains Thornton
and Hardee (ibid., 288, 290-292).
414 JAMES K. POLK
was at last a reality. The killing of Thornton's dragoons by the
Mexican forces under Tor re j on was soon described by President
Polk as an unprovoked act of war. In a message sent to Congress
on May 11, 1846, the President asserted that
after reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United
States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon the
American soil. She has proclaimed that hostilities have commenced, and
that the two nations are now at war.
As war exists, and, notwithstanding all our eiforts to avoid it, exists
by the act of Mexico herself, we are called upon by every consideration
of duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision and honor, the rights,
and the interests of our country.
He therefore recommended prompt and energetic measures for
bringing the war to a speedy and successful termination."'^
Whether or not Taylor's advance into the "disputed terri-
tory" was the actual cause of Mexico's refusal to renew diplo-
matic relations and of her determination to resort to arms, it at
least served as an excuse for such a course on her part. Although
she had from the first claimed the occupation of any part of Texas
to be an invasion of Mexico and a casus helli, she had, on various
occasions, intimated that she might acquiesce in the annexation
of Texas and discuss its limits. It was not until Taylor had
crossed the Nueces that she actually took steps to attack the
American forces. Polk may or may not have acted within his
rights in assuming the boundary claimed by Texas, but at least
there was some justification in the contention of the Whigs that
he precipitated the war by ordering Taylor to the Rio Grande.
76 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV, 442-443.
CHAPTER XVIII
WAR IN NORTHERN MEXICO
President. Polk's war message was sent to Congress on May
11, 1846. After a brief debate of two hours the House, by a vote
of one hundred and seventy-four to fourteen, passed a bill which
authorized the President to prosecute the war that exists ' ' by the
act of the Republic of Mexico."^ Garrett Davis, of Kentucky,
denied the truth of the statement just quoted and asserted that :
"It is our own President who began this war" by sending General
Taylor beyond the Nueces river. In defense of the administra-
tion, the Washington Unimi answered this contention by calling
attention to the fact that Mexico had always claimed Texas to
the Sabine, and that there was no reason for believing that her
invading army would stop at the Nueces.-
Greater opposition was encountered in the Senate, and for a
time the President feared that Benton and Calhoun w^ould join
the Whigs and thereby defeat the House bill. However, after a
day's debate, the Senate, having added a few amendments, passed
the measure by a vote of forty-two to two. Benton voted for the
bill and Calhoun, having opposed a declaration of war, declined
to vote either way.=^ Some of the members based their objections
1 Cong. Glohe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 795. Polk, Biarij, I, 392.
2 " No man has yet alleged, so far as we knoAV, that a Mexican invasion
of Texas if permitted by us, would have stopped at the Nueces; or would
have thought of stopping there The claim of Mexico is m terms,
that she owns Texas up to the Sabine. She makes not the slightest diffei-
ence in any one of her state papers between her ownership up to the ^ueces
and her ownership up to the Sabine. In a great multitude of state^papers
of old date, and of most recent date, Mexico says that Texas— a?? , -T^^T
is her soil. This claim to the ivhole of Texas is the claim on which she
refused negotiation. On this claim, and none other, Almonte threw up
his passports. On this claim Mr. Shannon was sent home" {Vnion, May lo,
1846).
3 Cong. Globe, loc. cit., 804. Polk, Diary, 1, 394.
416 JAMES K. POLK
on the lack of information as to what had happened on the Rio
Grande ; others denounced the President for having invaded ter-
ritory which did not belong to the United States. In general,
tlie Van Burenites of both houses supported the administration
with their votes, but in private their criticisms were quite as severe
as those of the Whigs. Although Cambreleng was not a member
of Congress at the time, a letter \Vhich he wrote to the ex-Presi-
dent well expresses the feelings of this faction. The letter is
especially interesting, for when Polk occupied the Speaker's chair,
Cambreleng was his most loyal supporter. Having pronounced
Polk to be worse than John Tyler and invoked divine pardon for
having aided in his election, Cambreleng said :
With regard to Mexico, they make inquiry through a consul — Mexico
projioses to receive a Commissioner to treat about Texas if we will with-
draw our naval forces — then we send in hot haste, and most secretly, a
Minister Plenipotentiary, at a moment too when a revolutionary movement
was going on and when it was obvious, that our minister could do nothing
whatever but help Paredes to overthrow Herera, which he did very effec-
tively and returned home with his credentials. [Taylor marched across
Tamaulipas and blockaded the Mexicans] as if he had instructions [to
make war, and Mexico had no choice but to fight]. ^
The bill which decreed war against Mexico was signed by the
President on IVEay 13, and General Scott was given command of
the army for which it provided, although Polk did not consider
him to be "in all respects suited" for the position.
At a cabinet meeting held on the same evening the President
and his Secretary of State had a sharp disagreement concerning
the scope and the objects of the war. Buchanan had brought to
the meeting the draft of a dispatch which was to be sent to
American ministers at foreign courts. Its purpose was to notify
those governments of the declaration of war, and to announce
the intentions of the American government. In his draft Bu-
chanan disavowed any intention of dismembering Mexico, and
of making conquests. He stated specifically that the war had
* Cambreleng to Van Burcn, Washington, May 16, 1846, Van Buren
Papers.
WAE IN NOETHERN MEXICO 417
not been undertaken "with a view to acquire either California
or New Mexico or any other portion of Mexican territory." Polk
"thought such a declaration to Foreign Governments unnecessary
and improper, ' ' and believed the causes for war set forth in his
message to be entirel}^ adequate. He told his Secretary that while
the United States had not gone to war for the purpose of conquest,
yet it was clear that in niakiiig peace we would if practicable obtain
California and such other portion of the Mexican territory as would be
sufficient to indemnify our claimants on Mexico, and to defray the expenses
of the war which that power by her long continued wrongs and injuries
had forced us to wage, i told him it was well known that the Mexican
Government had no other means of indemnifying us.
Buchanan expressed the fear that Lord Aberdeen would demand
from McLane, United States minister in London, a statement as
to whether his government intended to acquire Mexican territory,
especially California. Should a satisfactory answer be withheld,
he feared that both England and France would join Mexico in
the war against us. Polk replied that the present war did not
concern any European power, a demand such as Buchanan had
mentioned would be an insult, and ' ' if made I would not answer
it, even if the consequence should be a war with all of them."
He would give no pledges as to the terms on which he would ulti-
mately make peace with Mexico. Buchanan insisted that if as-
surances were not givenwe would surely have war with England,
and probably with France, for neither would permit California
to be annexed to the United States. "I told him," wrote the
President, "that before I would make the pledge which he pro-
posed, I would meet the war which either England or France
or all the Powers of Christendom might wage." and that "neither
as a citizen nor as President would I permit or tolerate any inter-
meddling of any European Power on this Continent. ' ' Although
Buchanan still maintained that unless some pledge were given
the Oregon question could not be adjusted and that England
would declare war, the President was immovable and said that
he woidd take the responsibility of a war rather than give a
418 JAMES K. POLK
pledge which would prevent him from "fairly and honourably"
acquiring California. The other members of the cabinet sup-
ported this position, and Polk was "much astonished at the views
expressed by Mr. Buchanan on the subject." The President him-
self drafted a paragraph to be substituted for the one which
Buchanan had submitted."'
^ Scarcely had the President reduced his Secretary of State to
proper subordination when difficulties with his Whig generals
presented themselves.'' He had planned first of all to seize the
northern provinces of Mexico and to hold them until the enemy
had been forced to make peace. Without hesitation Congress
voted the necessary troops and supplies, but the question of se-
lecting suitable commanders to lead the troops to victory caused
the President no little anxiety and annoyance. As Scott was the
ranking general, Polk tendered him the command and consulted
him concerning military arrangements, but he regarded the gen-
eral as "visionary" and his advice as of no great value."
From the beginning of his administration Polk seems to have
looked upon the conquest of Mexico as an easy matter. Like most
civilian executives he did not fully appreciate the time required
to equip an army for active service. On the other hand, General
Scott took both himself and his position very seriously, and was
desirous of making his descent upon Mexico as imposing as pos-
sible. He was a competent officer, and doubtless his intentions
were good, but his vanity and tactless utterances soon involved
iiim in difficulties.
5 Polk, Diary, I, 396-.399. For the dispatcli as finally sent to the
American ministers abroad, see Buclianan, Works, VI, 484.
6 I'olk was told that not only Seott but General Wool and Adjutant
General Jones were using their influence with nienil)ers of Congress to
prevent the passage of a bill to authorize the appointment of two new
major generals and four brigadier generals (I'olk, Diary, I, 418).
7 "I did not think that so many as 20,000 [the number wdiich Scott
had requested for immediate service] volunteers besides the regular army
was necessary, but I <lid not express this opinion, not being willing to take
the responsibility of any failure of the campaign by refusing to grant to
Gen'l Seott all he asked" (Polk, Diary, I, 400-401 ). "
WAR IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 419
Without consulting the War Department, Scott announced
that he probably would not be ready to set out for the seat of
war until the first of September. Through the Secretary of War,
the President notified him that unless he should proceed to the
Rio Grande very soon he would be superseded by another com-
mander.
Polk undoubtedly bore a prejudice against the general from
the beginning and may have been too impatient with his delay ;
on the other hand, Scott's amazing indiscretions soon gave the
President no alternative but to deprive him of his command.
Not satisfied with telling applicants for military positions that
these places had been created "to give Commissions or rather
pay to western democrats," he responded to Marcy's notice that
the President desired greater promptness, by returning a most
insulting and vainglorious letter. Although Polk had verbally
tendered Scott the command of the Mexican expedition, the gen-
eral now complained because he had not received a written order
assigning him to the command; he had, nevertheless, been in-
cessantly employed in making preliminary arrangements. "In
the midst of these multitudinous and indispensable occupations,"
wrote the irate general,
I have learned from you that much impatience is already felt, perhaps in
high quarters, that I have not already put myself in route for the Eio
Grande; and now, with fourteen hours a day of preliminary work remain-
ing on mv hands for many days, 1 find myself compelled to stop that
necessarv'work to guard myself against, perhaps, utter condemnation in
the quarters alluded to. I am too old a soldier, and have had too much
special experience, not to feel the infinite importance of securing myself
against danger, (ill will or pre-condemnation,) in my rear, before advancing
upon the public enemy.
He had no fear of the enemy ahead, but unless he could feel
confident of support in Washington the selection of another com-
mander was advised. For fear that Marcy and Polk might not
have sufficient mental capacity to grasp his meaning, the general
added: "My explicit meaning is, that I do not desire to place
420 JAMES K. POLK
myself in the most perilous of all positions — a fire upon my rear
from Washington, and the fire in front from the Mexicans." So
clear was his explanation that both men saw at once the injustice
of placing the gallant and overworked general in such a danger-
ous predicament. In a very able and dignified — ^but, at the same
time, withering — letter, Marcy notified Scott that, instead of
leading the Mexican expedition, he was to remain in Washington.**
In itself Marcy 's letter was galling enough to the pompous gen-
eral's pride, but, as if to add insult to injury, it was handed to
him just "as he [I] sat down to a hasty plate of soup." In
another letter he made a lame attempt to explain that his allu-
sions to "high quarters" meant members of Congress instead of
the President, but he could not refrain from sneering at Polk's
"magnanimity" in not having him court-martialed." The effron-
tery exhibited in his letters indicates that the general was still
deluded by the campaign cry, "Who is James K. Polk?" Marcy
enlightened him, for the time being at least. Indeed the Presi-
dent felt himself to be fully competent to discharge the duties
which the Constitution had assigned to the chief executive. To
one of his many volunteer advisers he remarked that : " I hoped
my friends in Congress and elsewhere would suffer me to conduct
the war with Mexico as I thought proper, and not plan the cam-
paign for me."^°
As already noted, Polk did not anticipate great difficulty in
defeating the Mexican armies. Apparently, he feared most of
all the influence of the Mexican priests. He thought that de-
signing persons in Mexico had led the priests to believe that the
•^ After calling attention to tlip iniportanco of the position to wiiicli
Scott had been assigned by the President, Marcy said: "How couhl you,
under these circumstances, arrest your labors of preparation, and suffer
your energies to be crippled, for the purpose of indulging in illiberal im-
putations against the man who has just bestowed upon you the highest
mark of his conlideuce ? ' '
» Polk, Diary, I, 395, 400, 413-415, 419-421. The correspondence is
printed in Niles' Reg., LXX, 231-233.
1" Polk, Diary, I, 427.
JIJA' IN NOllTUERN MEXICO 421
United States had planned to pillage their churches and to over-
throw their religion. So long as the priests harbored such fears
they would do much to incite the people stubbornly to resist the
advance of the American army. Being desirous of weakening
the power of the Mexican government by winning the good will
of the people, especially in the northern provinces, Polk attached
great importance to disabusing the minds of the priests. ' ' If the
Catholie'Priests in Mexico, ' ' he told Benton,
can be satisfied that their churches and religion would be secure the con-
quests of the Northern Provinces of Mexico will be easy and the proba-
bility is that the war would be of short duration; but if a contrary opinion
prevails the resistance to our forces will be desperate.
He therefore sought interviews with Bishop Hughes, of New
York, and the Bishop of Missouri and asked them to select priests
who might accompany the army as chaplains and assure the Mexi-
can clerg}^ that their fear of Americans was groundless. A proc-
lamation in the Spanish language which promised religious free-
dom and kind treatment was prepared and sent to General Taylor
with instructions that it should be distributed among the inhabi-
tants.^^
In planning the campaign against Mexico the President at-
tached great importance to getting possession of California. As
early as May 26 he proposed, and his cabinet unanimously agreed,
that an "expedition be immediately fitted out against Upper
California" if it should be found that the mounted regiments
assembled at Independence, Missouri, could reach the Sacramento
region before winter. On May 30 he again impressed upon the
cabinet the importance of having military possession of California
when the time for making peace should have arrived. "I de-
clared," said he, "my purpose to be to acquire for the U. S.
California, New Mexico, and perhaps some others of the Northern
ii/btfZ., 408-411. For the proclamation see H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong.,
1 sess., 284-287. In it the Mexicans were told that their government was
in the hands of "tyrants and usurpers," and that the United States was
doing the people a real kindness by invading their country.
422 JAMES K. POLE
Provinces of Mexico whenever peace was made. ' ' Colonel Stephen
W. Kearny, who had already been transferred from Fort Leaven-
worth to Santa Fe for the purpose of affording protection to
American traders, was now selected to lead the expedition to
California. By a new commission which accompanied his in-
structions he was made a brevet brigadier-general. A requisition
was sent to the governor of Missouri for one thousand mounted
men to supplement the force of dragoons under Kearny's com-
mand. It was agreed that Kearny should be authorized to take
into his service any American citizens whom he might find in
California. He was to be given authority, also, to enlist a few
hundred of the Mormons who were now on their way to California,
"with a view to conciliate them, attach them to our country, &
prevent them from taking part against us." The President di-
rected that arms and provisions should be sent immediately from
New York to the Pacific for the use of Kearny's army.^- About
two weeks later he consulted his cabinet on the propriety of send-
ing from New York by sea a regiment of volunteers to join
Kearny's forces in California. Benton, whose advice was sought
by the President, favored sending such a regiment, but he be-
lieved that the men should go as emigrants and be discharged in
California at the end of their service." This policy was subse-
quently adopted.
Although Polk was interested primarily in the acquisition of
California and New Mexico he desired to procure, if possible, a
much larger area; and the amicable settlement of the Oregon
12 Polk, DUiri/, I, 429, 437-439, 443-444. On June 3, J. C. Little, a
Mormon from Petersborough, N. H., called on Polk for the purpose of
ascertaining the policy of the government towards this sect. He was told
that they would be treated like any other American citizens and that they
wouhl be invited to enlist in the anny. Polk did not mention the projected
expedition under Kearny. Little offered to overtake the Mormons and to
muster .TOO of tliem into the United States army; but fearing that they
might reach California before Kearny and not wishing that the province
should be at the mercy of Mormon soldiers, the President declined the offer.
He decided, also, that Kearny should not enlist any of that sect until after
they had arrived in California {ibid., 445-446, 449-450).
^3 Ibid., 473, 481.
WAli IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 423
question by the treaty signed on June 15 made interference by
Great Britain less probable. The extent of territory which he
wished to acquire is stated very definitely in his record of a
cabinet meeting held on June 30, 1846. At this meeting an ani-
mated discussion arose between Buchanan and Walker regarding
the objects to be attained as a result of the war. Buchanan ex-
pressed himself as being in favor of making the Rio Grande the
boundary up to El Paso, in latitude about 32° ; from this point
a line was to be drawn due west to the Pacific ocean. He op-
posed the acquisition of any land south of 32° because the North
would be unwilling to acquire a tract that was likely to become
slaveholding territory. Walker held very different opinions. He
proposed that the boundary should begin at the mouth of the
Rio Grande, in latitude about 26°, and extend directly westward
to the Pacific. The other members of the cabinet took no part
in the discussion, but Polk agreed with Walker. "I remarked,"
wrote the President,
that I preferred the 26° to any boundary North of it, but that if it was
found that that boundary could not be obtained I was willing to take 6Z ,
but that in any event we must obtain Upper California and New Mexico
in any Treaty of Peace we would make.i*
At this point we may leave the President to develop his pro-
gram of conquest while we consider a parenthetical episode which
affected his policy of territorial expansion but which was not,
apparently, a part of it.
Long before General Kearny could reach California, John C.
Fremont had, by his indiscretions, come into collision with the
Mexican officials of that province, and the famous "Bear Flag"
republic had been proclaimed. These events, however interesting
in themselves, call for small space in a biography of Polk, for,
so far as any known evidence exists, they formed no part of the
President's California program and were in no degree inspired
by him. The only possible link which might connect these events
■^ilhid.. 495-496.
424 JAMES K. FOLK
with the plans of the administration is the "secret instructions"
carried by Gillespie, and Fremont had already resisted Mexican
authority before the arrival of Gillespie in California. Thomas
O. Larkin, American consul at Monterey, who doubtless was cog-
nizant of all instructions brought by Gillespie, continued to use
his influence for peace until after the "Bear Flag" insurrection.
Another reason for believing that Fremont and his adherents
acted without authority from Washington is the fact that the
President, in all of his known instructions to naval and military
officers, laid special stress on winning over the inhabitants by
kind treatment. Fremont adopted the opposite course, and even
went out of his way to antagonize them.
During Tyler's administration Fremont had made two expe-
ditions into the western country, and in the summer of 1845 had
undertaken a third. Early in 1846 he reached California, and,
after making brief stops at Sutter's Fort and San Francisco, he
paid a visit to Larkin at Monterey. He explained to the Mexican
authorities at Monterey that he was bound for Oregon on a scien-
tific expedition, and his statement was accepted as satisfactory.
Instead of proceeding to Oregon, Fremont, having gone as
far north as San Jose, retraced his steps until he had reached a
point not far from Monterey. The excuse for his return south-
ward, long afterward given by Fremont himself,^^ was the desire
to find a seaside home for his mother !
His original entry into the province without passports was a
violation of Mexican law, and when, contrary to agreement, he
returned to the vicinity of Monterey, he was ordered by Jose
Castro, the comandanie general, to retire from the departuKMil.
After sending a verbal refusal to obey this order, Fremont re-
paired to Gavilan Peak, erected a log fort, and hoisted the flag
of the United States. Here he was warned by Larkin of the
danger of such a proceeding, and, after much vain blustering, he
set out for Sutter's Fort, which he reached late in March.
I"' Fremont, Memoirs, I, 4.")7.
IV A E IN NORTHERN MEXICO 425
Breaking camp on March 24, Fremont and his party pro-
ceeded nortliward until they had reached Klamath Lake, where
they were overtaken, on May 8, by messengers who announced
that Lieutenant Gillespie was close behind bearing dispatches
from the government of the United States. The dispatches turned
out to be a letter of introduction from Buchanan, a letter from
Senator Benton, and whatever verbal communications Gillespie
may have conveyed. Despite Fremont's assertions that it was
made known to him ' ' that to obtain possession of California was
the chief object of the President," he has admitted that he learned
nothing from Buchanan's letter and that Benton's epistle was
equally harmless except when "read by the light of many con-
versations and discussions with himself and others at Washing-
ton."^** Concerning the verbal instructions related by Gillespie,
we are told by Fremont himself that they "had for their prin-
cipal objects to ascertain the disposition of the California people,
to conciliate their feelings in favor of the United States. ' '
As Fremont 's subsequent relations with the Calif ornians were
anything but conciliatory, and as he received no communications
from Washington other than those just mentioned, and finally,
as his belligerent attitude toward the California government was
so out of harmony witli Polk's general policy of conciliation, we
must conclude that Fremont's later activities were undertaken
without authority from the President.
After Gillespie's arrival at his camp, Fremont returned to
the Sacramento Valley in California. If further evidence were
necessary to prove that the messenger had brought no orders to
precipitate a revolution, it is furnished in letters written by both
men under date of May 24, 1846. To Benton, Fremont wrote
i6<'The letter from Senator Benton, while apparently of friendship and
family details, contained passages and sugg-estions which, read in the light
of many conversations and discussions with himself and others at Wash-
ington, clearly indicated to me that I was required by tlie Government to
find out any foreign schemes in relation to California and so far as might
be in my power, to counteract them'' (ibid., 489).
426 JAMES K. POLK
that "I shall now proceed directly homewards, by the Colorado,
biit I cannot arrive at the frontier until late in September."
"He now goes liome from here [Peter Lassen's]," said Gillespie
when speaking of Fremont in a letter to Larkin of the same
date.^'
While Fremont was encamped at the ''Buttes of Sacramento,"
General Castro at Santa Clara was collecting a body of troops
for the purpose of going to Los Angeles to attack Governor Pio
Pico, with whom he had had a disagreement. With this object
in view he had sent a man named Francisco Arce to Sonoma to
purchase mules for his troops. American settlers, having con-
cluded that Castro was planning to attack them, reported the
purchase to Fremont. A party led by Ezekiel Merritt set out
from Fremont's camp and, on June 10, captured and brought
back the mules. On the following day Merritt set out for So-
noma and captured the toM^n on the fourteenth. After a lively
debate California was declared an independent republic and the
"bear flag" chosen as its emblem. Fremont did not participate
personally in these acts, but they were performed with his knowl-
edge and consent.
Captain John B. Montgomery, commander of the United
States ship Portsmouth in San Francisco Bay, declined to iden-
tify himself with the "bear flag" episode. The revolutionists
therefore received no assistance from the navy until the arrival
of Commodore Sloat, on July 2, at the port of jNIonterey. While
off the Mexican coast Sloat had heard of Taylor's victories and
of the blockade of Vera Cruz, and, on June 7, had set out for
Monterey. On July 7, Sloat, after five days of hesitation which
was due probably to Larkin 's desire to win California by concil-
iatory methods,^*^ caused the United States flag to be raised at
Monterey. On the following day Montgomery, acting under
IT Letter to Benton, Fremont, Mc^noirs, I, 499. Gillespie to Larkin,
Larkin Papers, Bancroft Library.
18 Bancroft, California, V, 228, note G.
WAB IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 427
orders from Sloat, took possession of the posts on San Francisco
Bay. The party at Sonoma now abandoned their "bear flag"
republic and hoisted the stars and stripes.
After a circuitous voyage via the Sandwich Islands, Com-
modore Stockton, on board the Congress, reached Monterey on
the fourteenth of July. About two weeks later he succeeded
Sloat as commander of the Pacific squadron. More arrogant than
his predecessor, Stockton rejected peace overtures sent from Gov-
ernor Pio Pico and General Jose Castro, then at Los Angeles,
and demanded their unconditional surrender. Seeing that re-
sistance was futile, these officials fled to Mexico, and Stockton,
with the cooperation of Fremont and Gillespie, took possession
of southern California. Having thus completed the "first con-
quest" of California, Stockton, acting on his own responsibility,
undertook to establish a government over the inhabitants.^"
In antagonizing the Californians and in attempting to estab-
lish a civil government Stockton, as we have already noted, acted
on his own responsibility, for nothing in instructions which had
been received by himself or his predecessor authorized his arbi-
trary procedure. Instructions prepared by Secretary Bancroft
under the direction of the President — some prior and some sub-
sequent to Stockton's arrival in California, but of course not
received at the time — expressed very definitely the desires of the
administration with respect to California. One addressed to Sloat
on June 8, 1846, ordered him to "endeavor to establish the su-
premacy of the American flag without any strife with the people
of California." If California should be inclined to separate from
Mexico and establish ' ' a government of its own under the auspices
of the American flag, ' ' he was to encourage such action, but no
authority to make a conquest was given. The United States,
said Bancroft, desired to make California a friend and not an
enemy, "to hold possession of it, at least during the war; and
19 Except where noted, this suniiiiarj' of the first conquest has been
drawn principally from Rives, TI, chap. 34, and Bancroft, California, V.
428 JAMES K. POLK
to hold that possession, if possible, with the consent of the inhabi-
tants." On July 12 he stated explicitly why possession was so
much desired by the administration. "The object of the United
States," Sloat was told,
has lefereiife to ultiiiiate peace with Mexico; aud if, at that peace, the
basis of the uti possidetis shall be established the government expects,
through your forces, to be found in actual possession of Upper California.
A month later, August 13, Bancroft stated that "if the treaty
of peace shall be made on the basis of uti possidetis, it may leave
California to the United States. ' ' Possession at the date of peace
negotiations, and not a revolution as had been effected by Fre-
mont and Stockton, was all that the President had contemplated.
To be sure, Bancroft, in his letter of July 12, spoke of the neces-
sity of establishing some sort of civil government under the pro-
tection of Sloat, and a copy of Kearny's instructions was in-
closed ; but he urged that "in selecting persons to hold office, due
respect should be had to the wishes of the people of California,
as well as to the actual possessors of authority in that province. ' '-°
Necessarily the officers in California did not know the contents
of these letters, for two of them were written after they had taken
I)Ossessiou of California; still, the instructions show clearly that
Stockton and Fremont did not, in the course they pursued, cor-
rectly divine the wishes of the President.
A discussion of tlie uprising of the Californians under Gen-
eral Flores, the second conquest by the United States forces, and
the establishment of a government by General Kearny, acting
under instructions from President Polk, must be postponed while
we follow the advance of the main army into Mexico. While llic
President was' making plans for acquiring new territory, and
while subordinates without his sanction were making conquests on.
the Pacific coast, General Taylor was winning battles for his
government, and laurels for liimsclf, on the banks of the Rio
Grande.
20 Instructions of Bancroft to Sloat, Btockton and Biddlc, .Juno 8,
July 12 and Aug. 13, 1846 {H. Ex. Doo. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 237-241).
WAB IN NOBTHEli'N MEXICO 429
The first bloodshed, as we have seen, occurred on April 25
when Captain Thornton's dragoons, after a loss of sixteen men,
were surrounded and forced to surrender. As a result Taylor,
by authority already vested in him by the President, called upon
the governors of Texas and Louisiana for eight regiments of vol-
unteers. Before these could be available, however, he was obliged
to meet the invading Mexican army with his small force of regu-
lars. First of all lie constructed and garrisoned a fort opposite
Matamoras and with his main army returned to his base of sup-
plies at Point Isabel, which was threatened by Arista.
After strengthening the position at Point Isabel, Taylor set
out on his return to the fort opposite Matamoras, upon which an
attack had been made and the commander, Major Brown, killed.
On the way back to this fort, which now took the name of Fort
Brown, Taylor, on May 8, met and defeated Arista at Palo Alto.
At daybreak on the following morning the Mexican commander
retreated to Resaca de la Palma, where Taylor overtook him in
the afternoon and won another victory. The Mexican army was
completely disorganized, and scattered groups, after a precipitate
flight across the Rio Grande, reassembled at Matamoras. This
place was abandoned without resistance as soon as Taylor began
to cross the river on the eighteenth of May. "The battles of
Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma," wrote General Grant long
afterwards, "seemed to us engaged, as pretty important affairs;
but we had only a faint conception of their magnitude until they
were fought over in the North by the Press and the reports came
back to us."-^
In these battles the Mexican forces outnumbered their adver-
saries more than two to one, but the American army was better
equipped and led by a more capable commander. Fearless and
unassuming, Taylor enjoyed the confidence of his soldiers. They
were always eager to respond to the call of "Old Rough and
Ready."' Ever prepared to do his duty, Taylor had no thirst
for military glory. In a private letter written on tlie day after
^1 Grant, Personal Memoirs, I, 99-100. Grant was tlien a lieutenant.
430 JAMES K. POLK
his occupation of Matamoras he said that "I heartily wish the
war was at an end."--
News of Taylor's victories reached Washington on May 23,
the day on which Polk read to his cabinet Scott's letter about
being fired upon in front and rear. When he received this news
the President made no comment in his diary, except to record
the fact that the news had arrived, but three days later he sent
a message to the Senate nominating Taylor as major-general by
brevet.-^ On May 30, just one week after the receipt of Taylor's
official dispatch, the new commission was ready and Marcy for-
warded it to the general along with an assignment to the chief
command. On the same day the President in a letter to Taylor
praised the general's "gallant conduct and distinguished ser-
vices," and stated that the "battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de
la Palma rank among our most brilliant victories."-*
There is no reason for believing that, at the time of Taylor's
promotion, Polk harbored other than the most kindly feelings
toward the victorious general. The delay in preparing the cor-
dial letter just quoted was due to the pressure of executive busi-
ness such as planning the California expedition and reducing
Scott and Gains-"' to proper subordination. Not knowing the
reason why the President's expression of approval had been de-
layed, Taylor felt slighted, and his distrust of the administration
was aroused. "It is strange passing strange," he wrote to his
son-in-law, "that I have heard nothing from Washing [ton] since
my official report of the battles of the 8th & 9th reached there,
which I have seen published in the National Intelligencer &
Union." He hinted at politics in high quarters, and mentioned
a rumor that members of Congress from the South and West had
protested to the President against his being superseded by Scott.
22 Taylor to his son-in-law, Dr. R. C. Wood, May 19, 18-16, Taijlor
Letters, 4.
23 Polk, Diary, I, 422, 425, 428. Until tliis itroniotion Taylor had been
a colonel in actual rank, but brigadier-general by brevet.
24 fl^. Ex. Boo. GO, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 282-283.
2-'' Gains had, witliout authoritj', been enlisting troops for the Rio Grande
campaign.
WAE IN NOBTHEBN MEXICO 431
He hoped that the report was untrue, for "I consider this com-
mand properly liis, & I have no wish to prevent his exercis-
ing it."-"
When another week brought no word from Washington Taylor
became convinced that the administration was more interested in
plaj'ing politics than in defeating the Mexicans. Merit and long
service, in his opinion, were disregarded at the national capital ;
"the more one does the more they expect of him, and his services
or standing is estimated by political considerations." He was
"perfectly disgusted" with the inefficiency in Washington, for
small boats and wagons could be brought "from Liverpool" in
less time than it had taken the government to supply them.
"Was I a prominent or ambitious aspirant for civil distinction
or honors," he wrote, "I might very readily suppose there was
an intention somewhere among the high functionaries to break
me down ' ' ; and he feared that such would be the result of the
government's policy, "whether from design or not." He re-
garded as ' ' ridiculous ' ' a report which had just reached camp to
the effect that Scott had declined to take command of the army
for fear of injuring his Presidential prospects, and that a quarrel
with Polk had resulted from his refusal. "They need have no
apprehensions," he added, "of being interfered with by me for
that high office, which I would decline if proffered & I could
reach it without opposition. ' '- ' As late as August 4 he expressed
the hope that Scott would be the Whig candidate in 1848, but
he put away the crown from his own head with a far less resolute
hand.-^
2e Taylor to R. C. Wood, June 12, 1846, Taijlor Letters, 9-10. Scott
had already notified Taylor that he [Scott] had been assigned to the com-
mand, but would not go to Mexico immediately.
27 Taylor to R. C. Wood, June 21, 1846, ibid., 12-14. When more definite
news of Scott's quarrel with the President arrived, Taylor expressed regret,
for it would keep him in Mexico "which I by no means desire" (Taylor
to R. C. Wood, June 24).
28 " So far as I am cpncerned I wish to have nothing to do Avith that
high office; & if I had, this is not the proper time to discuss the subject;
let this war at any rate te first brought to a close" (Taylor to R. C. Wood,
ibid., 35).
432 JAMES E. POLE
His attitude toward the administration was based on ground-
less suspicions, for at this early date there was surely no desire
to "break him down." Even the receipt of ]\Iarcy's letter which
assigned him to the chief command and inclosed his new com-
mission did not change his antipathy toward his superiors. The
honor of his promotion, in his opinion, was more than overbal-
anced by his assignment to command an expedition which "must
be a failure owing to the ignorance of some in regard to some
matters, & the imbecility of others, for all of which I shall be
made the scape goat." He must have received Polk's laudatory
letter in the same mail, but of this he made no mention. He
pronounced Scott "crazy" because of his letters to Marcy, and
he was certain that "Gen'l S. will never hear the last of a fire
from his rear, or a hasty plate of soup. ' '-"
While in this mood, Taylor questioned the good faith of the
government in its 'dealings with Mexico. He was confident that
"our ambitious views of conquest .& agrandisement at the ex-
pense of a weak power will only be restrained & circumscribed
by our inability to carry out our view." He did not rate that
ability very high, for he predicted that if the Mexicans should
hold out for six or eight months "we will be fully as anxious to
make peace as they are. ' ' Three weeks later he hoped that peace
negotiations would soon begin, but he feared that the United
States would claim a vast amount of territory as a war indemnity
and for "real & pretended roberies committed on our commerce;
which will no doubt be double & treble award to certain claimants
over & above what they ever lost." No land grabbing act of the
British government had been "more outrageous" than Polk's
plan to take permanent possession of California.-^*'
20 Taylor to R. 0. Wood, June 30 and July 7, 1846, ibid., 18-2.',.
J -w Taylor to R. C. Wood, July 14, Aug. 4, and Aug. 23, 184(i. ibid.. 28,
37, 49. Undoubtedly Taylor's distrust was increased by letters from Whig
friends in the United States. See letters from Scott and Crittenden, in
Ooleman, Life of John J. Crittenden, 2ofi, 278.
WAB IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 433
Taylor had reason enough to complain of the want of trans-
portation facilities,^^ although the cause was to be sought, not in
any desire to ' ' break him down, ' ' but in the lack of preparation
usually experienced at the outbreak of a war, and more especially
in the ignorance of the Washington officials concerning every-
thing in Mexico.
The President and his cabinet knew little of the topography
of the country, or of its seasons, fertility, and accessibility. Even
the geography was something of a mystery. As a result, consid-
erable confusion and frequent misunderstandings were only to
be expected. For the necessary information the executive de-
partments had to depend largely on the reports of General Taylor ;
and the general, fearing that the main object of the administra-
tion was to make a "scape goat" of him, did not feel free to offer
advice or to act without explicit orders.
In a letter addressed to Taylor on June 8, 1846, Marcy stated
that nothing had been heard from him since his brief dispatch
announcing the victories of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma,
but it was assumed that Matamoras had been occupied. He ex-
pressed the hope that Taylor would get possession of all places
on the Rio Grande as far up as Laredo, and that he would be
able to capture Monterey. The measures to be pursued, however,
were left to the general's "own discretion and judgment." The
President very much desired, said Marcy, to have Taylor's "views
and suggestions in relation to the fall campaign. ' ' Being desirous
of prosecuting the war with vigor, the President wished to know
whether, in the general's opinion, the present expedition should
be conducted with a view of striking at the City of Mexico, or
of operating in the northern provinces only. "Your views on
this point, ' ' said Marcy, ' ' will doubtless have an important influ-
ence upon the determination of the government here." Informa-
tion was requested, also, on overland transportation facilities and
31 "I consider there is an entire break down in the Qr M [quarter
master's] department every where" (Taylor to R. C. Wood, June 21, 1846,
ibid., 13).
434 JAMES K. POLK
on the probability of obtaining adequate provisions, and the gen-
eral's opinion was asked concerning the number and character
of troops to be employed. Four days later Seott impressed upon
Taylor the importance of obtaining information regarding move-
ments and designs of the enemy, and authorized him to pay
'^ employes" liberally for procuring such information. Kearny's
expedition to New Mexico and California, said Scott, would neces-
sarily be independent of Taylor's command, but that of General
Wool against the city of Chihuahua would be under Taylor's
general directions. The general was authorized to agree to an
armistice with a view to peace negotiations, provided he was
convinced of the enemy's good faith.^-
In his reply to these letters, Taylor stated that he had little
definite information to impart. He gave, however, his opinions
regarding the probabilities of obtaining supplies in the interior.
Should the inhabitants prove friendly, he thought that his army
might obtain provisions sufficient to enable it to penetrate as
far as Saltillo ; still, in his opinion, the army under his command
should confine its operations to the northern provinces and
should not attempt to reach the City of Mexico. He ' ' purposely"
abstained ' ' from any reference to movements against Tampico or
Vera Cruz. ' ' He complained that he was greatly embarrassed by
the lack of transportation facilities and closed his letter with the
remark that:
I am waiting with the utmost impatience the arrival of steamboats
suited to the navigation of this river to establish a depot at Camargo, and
throw the troops gradually forward to that point.33
Although General Taylor may have been overcautious in offer-
ing suggestions, he seems to have reported all the information in
his possession. But officials in Washington, especially Quarter-
master General Jesup, were inclined to excuse their own short-
comings by pleading lack of information from Taylor, and the
32 fl-. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 323-327.
33 Taylor to Adj. Gen., July 2, 1846, ihid., 329-332.
WAE IN NOETHEKN MEXICO 435
President came to feel that the general did not possess the initia-
tive and the vigor necessary for the command which had been
intrusted to him. Polk admitted that he had no knowledge of
military affairs, but he had "a strong conviction" that necessary
equipments had been too long delayed. He told the quarter-
master general that some of his subordinates had become gentle-
men of leisure who ' ' required to have a coal of fire put on their
backs to make them move promptly." He feared, also, that
Taylor was not the man for the general command :
He is brave but does not seem to have resources or grasp of mind enough
to conduct such a campaign. In his communications to the War Department
he seems ready to obey orders, but appears to be unwilling to express any
opinion or to take any responsibility on himself. Though he is in the country
with means of knowledge which cannot be possessed at Washington, he makes
no suggestion as to the plan of the campaign, but simply obeys orders and
gives no information to aid the administration in directing his movement.
He is, I have no doubt, a good subordinate officer, but from all the evidence
before me I think him unfit for the chief command. Though this is so, I
know of no one whom I can substitute in his place.s*
These remarks greatly exaggerated Taylor's taciturnity, yet the
President was sorely in need of information to aid him in direct-
ing the campaign. When in October an expedition to Tampico
and Vera Cruz was being considered, so little was known of the
character of the coast that Polk found it necessary to send to
Rhode Island for F. M. Dimond, former consul at Vera Cruz,
"believing that from him reliable information could be obtained."
Nearly a month later the quartermaster general just awoke to
the fact that : ' ' Had we foreseen the nature of the Rio Del Norte,
and built suitable steamboats several months ago, a million of
dollars might have been saved by this time."^^
34 Polk, Diary, II, 117-119.
35 Ibid., 180, 196. Jesup to Marcy, Nov. 7, 1846 (H. Ex. Dog. 60, 30
Concr, 1 sess., 564). So vigorously had Taylor complained of inefficiency
in tlie quartermaster's department, in a letter dated September 1, that
Jesup was sent to New Orleans so that he might personally supervise the
equipping of Taylor's army (Corresp. of Taylor, Marcy and Jesup, m
same Doc, 5.57 ff.).
436 JAMES E. POLK
Although the President was lacking in military experience,
and although, according to his own testimony, he found it to be
"impossible to give much attention to the details in conducting
the war, ' ' his brain was most fertile w^hen it came to concocting
schemes for undermining the control of the Mexican government
over its own citizens. Ample proof of this is furnished in a con-
fidential letter sent to Taylor under date of July 9, 1846. The
letter was signed by Marcy, but was drafted by Polk, with some
assistance from Benton. The President approved Taylor's con-
ciliatory conduct toward the Mexicans and urged him to continue
friendly intercourse with the inhabitants. The general was
instructed to
take occasions to send officers to the headquarters of the enemy for military
purposes, real or ostensible .... in which opportunity may be taken to
speak of the war itself as only carried on to obtain justice, and that we had
much ratlier procure that by negotiation than by figliting.
Racial and social discords, he was told, made it possible to induce
a large portion of the people to wish success to invaders who had
no desire to injure them :
In all this field of division — in all these elements of social, political,
personal, and local discord — there must be openings to reach the interests,
passions, or principles of some of the parties, and thereby to conciliate their
good will, and make them co-operate Avith us in bringing about an honorable
and a speedy peace Policy and force are to be combined; and
the fruits of the former will be prized as highly as those of the latter.
Another paragraph, which was penned by the President alone
and which he considered to be the most important, was still more
si)ecific in outlining the policy of the administration :
Availing yourself of divisions which you may find among the Mexican
people .... it Avill be your policy to encourage the separate departments
or States, and especially those wliicli you may invade and occupy, to declare
their independence of the central government of Mexico, and either to
become our allies, or to assume, as it is understood Yucatan has done, a
neutral attitude in the existing war between the United States and Mexico.
WAB IN NOBTHEBN MEXICO 437
After peace had been concluded such departments were to ' ' decide
for themselves their own form of government. " As to temporary
governments Taylor was authorized to follow the course laid
down in the instructions to Kearny, a copy of which was inclosed.
He was informed that an expedition against Mexico City would
probably be sent from Tampico or Vera Cruz, and not from the
Rio Grande. Information was requested, and Taylor was in-
structed to send his answer "directly to the President of the
United States. ""'''' Only two days before this Houston, of Texas,
had introduced in the Senate a resolution which extended the
thanks of Congress to Taylor for his victories on the Rio Grande,
and requested the President to present the general with a gold
medal "as a tribute to his good conduct, and generosity, to the
vanquished."^'
As usual, Buchanan was ready with a dash of cold water for
the President's scheme of benevolent assimilation of Mexican
territory. He was in favor of taking and holding California as
far as Monterey but no farther. "He was opposed, too," said
the President, "to giving the inhabitants of Tamaulipas or of any
of the Provinces South of New Mexico any encouragement to
annex themselves to the U. S." Both Walker and Polk preferred
to extend the boundary farther south, and the President was
sorry to find his Secretary of State "entertaining opinions so
contracted & sectional. "^^
About the same time, members of Congress gave the President
no little annoyance by introducing resolutions of inquiry con-
cerning the purposes of the war and the manner of conducting it.
On June 29 the Senate had passed a resolution, introduced by
Johnson, of Maryland, which called on the President for all
36Marcy to Taylor, July 9, 1846 (H. Ex. Boo. 60, 30 Cong. 1 sess.,
33.3-33(5) >olk, Dmry, II, 16-17. "I will preserve the original draft for
future reference, '' Polk recorded in his diary, "should it become proper.
I do this because it is a document of more than ordinary importance.
37 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 1064.
38 Polk, Diary, II, 15-16.
438 JAMES K. POLE
correspondence incident to the raising of volunteer troops. Polk
sent for Johnson, on July 6, and by showing him the correspond-
ence convinced him that it would be unwise to comply, for the
projected conquest of California would be revealed, and this
would "excite the jealousy of England and France, who might
interfere to prevent the accomplishing of our objects."^'' For
the purpose of ascertaining why nothing had been done by Tay-
lor's army since the occupation of Matamoras, Hannegan, on
July 8, introduced a resolution which purposed to ask the Presi-
dent for information concerning all orders sent to the general
since the ninth of May. By his renewal of friendship wdth Benton
the President had procured an able defender, and the Missouri
Senator was successful in sending this resolution to the table by
asserting that if an officer should furnish the information sought
he would be court-martialed and shot.^*'
In truth, the executive departments had little information to
impart. On August 1, Taylor answered the letter of July 9,
which Benton and Polk had so carefully prepared, by saying that
he had little to add to his dispatch of July second. He still de-
clined to venture an opinion on the practicability of an expedi-
tion against Vera Cruz, for the "Department of War must be
much better informed than I am on that point." He told the
President that he would obey his order to seek friendly inter-
course with Mexican generals, and to induce the people to declare
their independence, but he stated very frankly that he did not
anticipate much success.*^
President Polk's subterranean diplomacy was not confined to
an attempt to undermine the loyalty of Mexican generals and
people. Since his conversations with Atocha, he had never quite
abandoned the hope of making use of Santa Anna, and he now
decided to assist the ex-dictator in regaining power in Mexico.
so Ibid., 13-14.
40 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 1068.
41 Taylor to I'olk, Aug. 1, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
336-338).
WAE IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 439
On May 13, 1846, two days after the President had sent his war
message to Congress, Secretary Bancroft instructed Commodore
Conner to blockade the Gulf ports of Mexico. At the same time,
he inclosed a "private and confidential" order which read: "If
Santa Anna endeavors to enter the Mexican ports, you Mall allow
him to pass freely. " Atocha, it Mall be remembered, had told Polk
that Santa Anna M^ould probably return to Mexico in April or
May, and that he was in favor of ceding territory to the United
States. Apparently the President had this conversation in mind
when he caused Bancroft to issue the order to Conner. ^-
Early in June Polk decided to send a special messenger to
Havana for the purpose of learning the plans of Santa Anna.
The messenger selected M^as Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, a naval
officer and a nephew of John Slidell, the minister whom Mexico
had rejected. He was furnished with a letter from Buchanan
to Campbell, the United States consul at Havana, a copy of Ban-
croft 's confidential order to Conner, and verbal instructions from
the President. Mackenzie gave the purport of these instructions
when reporting to Buchanan the result of his interview with
Santa Anna.^^ He arrived in Havana on July 5 and, by Camp-
bell, was introduced to Santa Anna. From Polk 's verbal instruc-
tions he had prepared a memorandum, and this he read to the
ex-President of Mexico. In substance it stated that the United
States had taken up arms to redress its grievances and was deter-
mined to prosecute the war M'ith vigor, but that the President was
desirous of ending the conflict speedily if an honorable peace
could be made. Believing Santa Anna to be able and willing to
make such a peace, "the President of the United States M^ould see
with pleasure his restoration to poM^er in Mexico. ' ' It was made
clear that Polk M'ould insist on the Rio Grande as the boundary
of Texas and that he must at least have enough of California to
y
42 Ibid., 744. Polk, Diary, I, 229.
43 Mackenzie to Buchanan, June [July] 7, 1846 (duplicate in Polk
Papers). This letter is printed in full in Eeeves, Diplomacy under Tyler
and Folic, 299-307.
440 JAMES E. POLK.
include the port of San Francisco. For the latter concession he
would pay liberally, and his present intention was to demand
no indemnity for the expenses of the war. Although, according
to Mackenzie 's account, Santa Anna aserted that the Nueces was
the real boundary of Texas, he finally agreed to make all neces-
sai-y concessions rather than see Mexico delivered into the hands
of a foreign prince or continue under the monarchistic govern-
ment of Paredes. He even suggested plans under which Taylor
could most easily defeat the Mexican armies, and advised the
occupation of Tampico. Mackenzie considered these suggestions
of such importance that he exceeded his instructions and carried
them directly to General Taylor. He had an interview with
Taylor late in July,'** but it is not likely that the general was
influenced by Santa Anna's recommendations.
Mackenzie's report of his interview wdth Santa Anna, accord-
ing to a note appended by Buchanan, reached Washington on
the third of August. The President did not mention the subject
in his diary either at the time of sending the messenger or when
the report was received. In January, 1848, however, after he
and his cabinet had decided not to include this report with other
documents submitted in response to a call from the House, the
President recorded his version of the mission. In this account
Polk stated that he had given Mackenzie no written instructions,
and that he had sent "no message" to Santa Anna. In reducing
the conversation with the President to writing and in reading it
to Santa Anna, the messenger had acted wholly without authority.
As to wlietlier Mackenzie's memorandum correctly reported his
conversation Avith Polk, the record in the diary is somewhat am-
biguous. "It is fortunate," is the President's connnent, "that
, what he puts into my mouth could do me no injury, if it was
genuine & was published; but it would exhibit me in a ridiculous
attitude." For this reason, he decided to withhold it from the
House.'''
4* Meade, Life and Letters, I, 11(5. 4.-. polk, Diary, III, 290-292.
WAB IN NOBTHEEN MEXICO 441
The President was eager to settle all dift'erenees with Mexico by *^
diplomaey instead of war, provided he could obtain the territory
he most coveted. Without waiting to learn the results of Mac-
kenzie 's mission, he made one more attempt to make a satisfactory
treaty with the government of Paredes. On Sunday, July 20, he
sent for Benton and read to him a dispatch which had been pre-
pared by Buchanan. It was addressed to the Mexican Minister of
Foreign Relations. Benton approved the dispatch and advised
that it should be sent. A week later a revised copy was forwarded
to Commodore Conner with instructions that it should be de-
livered to the Mexican government. The document stated that
the President was no less anxious to terminate the war than he
had been to avoid it in the beginning. To accomplish this pur-
pose he was ready to send an envoy who would be clothed with
power to make "a peace just and honorable for both parties."
Should Mexico prefer to negotiate in Washington, her envoy
would be treated with kindness. "In the present communica-
tion," said Buchanan, "it is deemed useless and might prove
injurious, to discuss the causes of the existing war. ' '■*"
Having decided to seek a settlement with Mexico through
diplomatic channels, Polk revived the plan of asking Congress for
money to be used in negotiating a treaty. When discussing with
Benton the dispatch just mentioned, the President expressed the
belief that he could procure both California and New Mexico if
Congress would furnish him with two million dollars which might
be paid to Mexico as soon as a treaty had been signed. Benton
favored such an appropriation and advised Polk to consult with
members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The President
sent for McDuffie, Cass, and other members of the committee.
He cited the appropriation which had enabled Jefferson to pur-
chase Louisiana and urged the expediency of making a similar
appropriation now. Archer, the Whig member, agreed to take
4« Buchauan to Min. of For. Eel., July 27, 1846; Buchanan to Conner,
same date (Sen. Ex. Doe. 107, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 2-3). The former is also
in Buchanan, Works, VII, 40.
442 JAMES K. POLK
the matter up with Senators of liis party. Having thus paved
the way, Polk sent a confidential message to the Senate on August
4, 1846, and along with it, a copy of the dispatch already for-
warded to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations. Believing
that "the best mode of securing perpetual peace and good neigh-
borhood between the two Republics" would be the acquision of
Mexican territory, he asked for an advance appropriation of two
million dollars as a means of facilitating such an acquisition.*^
After the Senate had given its approval, the message was trans-
mitted to the House so that a bill might be drafted.
As soon as the message had been read in the House, McKay,
of North Carolina, presented a bill which provided that two
million dollars be appropriated "for the purpose of defraying
any extraordinary expenses which may be incurred in the inter-
course between the United States and foreign nations," said
money to be applied under the direction of the President. While
Polk's plans for acquiring California were not, of course, gen-
erally known at the time, the Whigs at once charged that the
money was to be used for this purpose, either by direct purchase
or indirectly by. bribing Mexican officials. The necessarily indefi-
nite wording of the bill gave ample room for partisan interpre-
tations. White, of New York, was the most uncompromising
critic of the President. He asserted that Polk himself had, in his
war message, furnished abundant evidence that this war had
been "projected, planned, and provoked" long before Congress
had been consulted in the matter. He intimated, also, that the
purpose of the bill was to extend slaveholding territory, and he
challenged any Democrat to propose an amendment which would
exclude slaver}^ from the territory to be acquired. During the
evening session of the same day Wilmot accepted this challenge
by offering his famous "proviso" that slavery should not be
permitted in any teritory to be obtained from Mexico.
4' Polk, Dkiry, II, 50-66. Eiehardson, Messages, IV, 456.
WAE IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 443
The position taken by John Quincy Adams is interesting. A
viohnit opponent of the administration on nearly every occasion,
he had supported Polk's claim to 54° 40' as the Oregon boundary,
and he now warmly advocated the appropriation of the two mil-
lion dollars for which the President had asked. For the sake of
clearness, he asked McKay to substitute "Mexico" for "foreign
nations," but, despite his sympathy with Wilmot's amendment,
he was ready to "vote for the bill in any form." He did not
believe an anti-slavery amendment to be necessary, for the insti-
tution had been abolished by Mexico and would not be reestab-
lished." Based on the past, this was sound argument, but he
could not forsee what the future would bring forth.
The McKay bill, supplemented by the Wilmot amendment,
passed the House by a vote of eighty-seven to sixty-four. On the
day following, the last of the session, it was considered by the
Senate, but Davis, of Massachusetts, prevented a vote on the
measure by holding the floor until the session had expired.
Whether the Senate would have pased the bill as amended we are,
of course, unable to say, but the President believed that it would
have struck out Wilmot's "mischievous & foolish amendment"
and that the House would have concurred. "What connection
slavery had with making peace with Mexico," said he, "it is
difficult to conceive." In order to preclude all doubt concerning
his motives, he confided to his diary an explicit statement of his
reasons for requesting the advance appropriation.-'^
48 -There are no slaves in California-slavery is abolished theje- and
if we were to make peace, and in that peace to acquire California, the e
could be no law of slavery' established there, unless it was made an article
"^ ''r-MTobi'ct'in asking this appropriatioii ha. '^^'^''^^'^'XITLi!:
4.1,- r„-.,r Tt WIS thi<? Mexico is indebted to the U. S. m a large sum,
• 1 . : ,„i,;,i, +1,^ TT S can have will be a cession of territory- T^"e U. te.
"^^'SI^^^^^^C^^^, New Mexico; and perhaps son,e territory
Wh of tlfeS Provinces. For a suitable cession of territory we are willing
fo a' ure leleb s to ou; own citizens & to pay an additioiial e-suleration
M^ n onmtion induces the belief that Mexico would be willing to settle the
444 JAMES K. POLK
The disappointment which resulted from the defeat of the
appropriation bill was somewhat assuaged by news of the con-
quest of California which reached Washington on the last day
of August. The welcome information and a copy of Sloat's
proclamation were brought by a messenger who had just come
from Mexico City bearing dispatches for the British minister.
The diplomat reported the news to Buchanan immediately, and
the President noted in his diary: "This important intelligence
comes to us through no other channel. ' '"" The conquest, however,
was of little immediate value, for Polk was soon to learn that
Mexico had declined to accept his proffered "honorable peace."
Santa Anna, and not Paredes, dictated the answer to
Buchanan 's letter of July 27 in which Mexico was invited to open
peace negotiations. Relying on Polk's assurances that he would
not be molested, Santa Anna left Havana on August 8^ 1846, on
diflficulty in this manner. No Government, however, it is believed, is strong
enough to make a treaty ceding territory and long maintain power unless
they could receive, at the time of making the treaty, money enough to sup-
port the army. Whatever party can keep tlic army in its support can hold
the power. The present Government is without any regular revenue, &
without a prompt payment as a part of the consideration would not ven-
ture to make a Treaty. Having no doubt that I could effect an adjustment
of the pending war if I had the command of $2,000,000, I felt it to be my
duty to ask such an appropriation. This I did in the first instance by a
confidential communication made to the Senate in Executive Session on the
4th Instant. The Senate on the 6th Inst, passed resolutions approving my
views and declaring that it was proper to make the appropriation asked.
The Ecsolution approving my views passed the Senate by a vote of ayes 43
to nays 2, and the Ecsolution approving the ajipropriation by yeas 33 to
nays 19 ( . . . ). With a full knowledge of all this Senator Davis had
recourse to the desperate resort of speaking against time, to defeat a
measure which he had been unable to (lefeat by his vote. Had the appro-
priation been passed I am confident T should have made an honorable peace
by which we should have accjuired California, & such other territory as we
desired, before the end of October. Should the war be now protracted, the
responsibility will fall more heavily upon the head of Senator Davis than
upon any other man, and he will deserve the execrations of the country.
I desired when I made the communication to the Senate in Executive Ses-
sion, to consult that body in secret Session, to the end that the appropriation,
if approved, should have been passed quietly and without attracting public
attention, or exciting the jealousy of the Powers of Europe; but contrary
to my Avishes great publicity has been given to it by Congress'' {Dairif, II,
75-78).
^>o Ibid., 108.
WAE IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 445
board the British ship Arab, and eight days later he landed in
Vera Cruz. With him came Almonte, former minister to the
United States, and Rejon and Basadre who had been members of
his cabinet at the time he was forced to leave Mexico. The way
had been prepared for his return by pronouncement of the troops,
and General Salas, the commander-in-chief, stood ready to do
the bidding of the returned exile.
On the day of his arrival, August 16, Santa Anna issued an
address which was tilled with specious promises and high sound-
ing phrases.'' If these were to be accepted at face value, the
ex-dictator had returned a sincere patriot and a champion of the
Constitution of 1824, ready to subject himself "entirely to the
decisions of the constitutent assembly, the organ of the sovereign
will of the nation." For a time, Salas continued to act as chief
executive while Santa Anna, the general-in-chief, sojourned at
a country residence. But the late exile selected the cabinet and
controlled the affairs of the nation.
By the last of August internal affairs were adjusted suffi-
ciently to enable the new government to consider the offer made
by the United States. In reply to Buchanan's note Rejon, the
new Secretary of Foreign Relations, said that the general-in-chief
could not but "fix his attention strongly" on the passage in that
note which suggested the omission of all discussion concerning
the causes of the war. He felt himself unable to negotiate on
such terms; and besides, he was obliged to postpone a definite
answer until the Mexican congress had met on the sixth of Decem-
ber.'- This aggravating snub was Polk's reward for helping to
reinstate Santa Anna in Mexico. Before many months had passed
he had still greater reasons for regretting that he had listened
to the advice of Atocha.
Rejon 's letter reached Washington on September 19 and was
considered by the President as a virtual refusal to negotiate. He
51 A copy in translation, E. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 777-785.
52 Kejon to Buchanan, Aug. 31, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 4, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 43.)
446 JAMES K. POLK
at once decided that the character of the war should be changed
so tliat the Mexican people might be made to feel the conse-
quences of tlieir government's refusal to make peace. The con-
ciliatory policy of paying liberally for supplies was now to be
changed for one of forcible seizures. The President directed
that the towns in Tamaulipas should be occupied and that a
descent should be made upon the coast at Tampico. Contrary
to his usual custom of refraining from all labor on the Sabbath,
Polk held cabinet meetings on September 20 in order to hasten
aggressive movements against the enemy. Colonel SteveiLson,
who had been put in command of the New York regiment destined
for service in California, was reprimanded by the President be-
cause his departure had been so long delayed, and Polk "inti-
mated plainly to Col. S. that if further delay occurred he [I]
would cause the officers who produced it to be arrested & tried."
During the next few days much energy was devoted to war and
naval preparations. Major-General Patterson was selected to
command the Tampico expedition, and Pillow and Shields were
chosen as his assistants. Polk gave personal attention to the
quartermaster's department so that there might be no delay.
The failure of his diplomatic overtures and the lax conduct of
subordinates put the President in a petulant mood. He charged
Whig officials with indifference regarding military operations,
while General Scott, instead of being an aide to the War Depart-
ment, was a constant embarrassment. ' ' I will observe his course, ' '
wrote the President in his diary, "and if necessary will order
liim to some other post."^^
While making preparations for war, Polk still left the way
open for negotiations with Mexico. Under his direction, Bu-
chanan, on September 26, prepared and sent a reply to Rejon's
note of August 31. He charged the Mexican government with
having distorted the meaning of his former letter. He told
Rejon that "the President will now await with patience and
53 Polk, Diary, II, 143-151.
WAB IN NOIiTHEEN MEXICO 447
with hope the final decision of the Mexican Government." He
informed the minister, however, that in the meantime the war
would be prosecuted vigorously, and there was a veiled threat
that Mexico would be required to pay the costs. Buchanan's
original draft had stated explicitly that Mexico must indemnify
the United States for the expenses of the war, but Polk and
Marcy deemed it politic to reserve this blunt demand until nego-
tiations had opened.^* Commodore Conner was instructed to
notify Slidell at New Orleans immediately in the event that the
Mexican government should at any time show a disposition to
negotiate.^^
From the middle of May, when he occupied Matamoras, until
the first of September, General Taylor spent the time in training
and equipping an army for an advance upon Monterey. Due
to General Gaines's unauthorized call for volunteers, Taylor was
overwhelmed with troops, but the quartermaster had failed to
furnish him with adequate supplies or means of transportation.
Commenting on the impatience felt by people in the United States,
and even by volunteer troops, because the army did not advance
into I^Iexico, Lieutenant Meade said in a letter :
These wise people forget that soldiers cannot march or fight unless they
have something to eat, and when in a country totally devoid of resources,
they must carry with them the means of sustaining physical nature, and m
consequence must have the means of carrying their provisions and other
supplies.
He thought that Scott was right in not wishing to go immediately
to the Rio Grande, there to idle away his time "waiting for
wagons and pork"; but "unfortunately, he [Scott] chose to
ascribe political reasons to what, I believe, was simply military
ignorance on the part of Mr. Polk."^*^
54 Polk, Duiry, II, 156-158. Buchanan to Min. of For. Eel., Sept. 26,
1846 ( H. Ex. Doc. 4, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 44-4.0 ).
55 Buchanan to Conner, Oct. 1, 1846 {Works, VII, 90).
5G Meade, Life and Letters, I, 101-111 -This, with ^s 'hasty plate
of soup,' "continued Meade, "has rumed him forever, for it is uch
better?; this country for a man to commit ^f^-. -^^^^^t^?/'^ "^^^'
himself ridiculous; the former he may get over, the latter, never.
448 JAMES K. POLK
By the last of August Taylor had collected his invading force
at Camargo, and within a few days his armj' was advancing on
Monterey. The march was tedious, and on arriving at that place
he found it to be well fortified. The attack upon the city began
on September 20, and on the twenty-fourth Ampudia, the Mexican
commander, offered to evacuate the city if Taylor would permit
the troops to retain their arms and other movable property.
Taylor at first demanded ' ' a complete surrender of the town and
garrison, the latter as prisoners of Avar" ; but he finally consented
to allow the Mexicans to march out with all of their arms and
accoutrements. He also agreed to a truce of eight w'eeks, or
until further orders had been received from their respective gov-
ernments." The period of inactivity was destined to be longer
than that agreed upon in the truce, for the President soon deter-
minted to modify his plan of reducing Mexico to submission.
The special messenger whom Taylor had dispatched with a
report of the battle of Monterey reached Washington on Sunday,
October 11, and the President was much displeased because the
general had agreed to the armistice.^® At a cabinet meeting held
on the following day all agreed that the general had committed
a ' ' great error. ' ' After the meeting, Polk noted in his diary :
But two reasons could have justified the terms granted to the enemy
in the capitulation. The first is, if he believed that he could not capture
them ; & the 2nd. is, that Gen '1 Ampudia may have induced him to believe
that in. consequence of the recent change of i-ulers in Mexico that Govern-
ment was disposed to make peace. If the first reason existed Gen'l Taylor
has not stated it in his despatches, and we have no information to justify
57 Taylor's reports {H. Ex. Doo. 4, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 83-102). A good
account of this battle is given in Eives, United States and Mexivo, II,
chap. 37.
58 "In agreeing to this armistice Gen'l Taylor violated his express
orders & I regret that I cannot approve his course. He had the enemy in
his power & sliould have taken them prisoners, depriving them of tlieir
arms, discharge them on their parole of honour, and preserved the advan-
tage which he had obtained by pushing on without delay further into the
country, if the force at his command justified it. . . . It was a great
mistake in Gen '1 Taylor to agree to an armistice. It will only enable the
Mexican army to reorganize and recruit so as to make another stand"
{Diary, II, 181).
WAB IN NOBTHERN MEXICO 449
the existence of this reason, though it may have existed. If the second
reason Avas the one upon which he acted, then Gen'l Ampudia has over-
reached & deceived him The Cabinet were united in the opinion
that if Gen'l Taylor had captured the Mexican army, deprived them of their
arms, and discharged them upon their parole of honour not to bear arms
during the war or until they Avere regularly exchanged, that it would have
probably ended the war with Mexico It was agreed unanimously
that orders should be forthwith sent to Gen '1 Taylor to terminate the
armistice to which he had agreed, and to prosecute the war with energy
and vigor. 50
Taylor's agreement had, in fact, placed his government in a
most awkward position, but the difficulty was due more to the
sloM^ means of communication than to bad judgment on the part
of the general or the administration. On receipt of Rejon's letter
Polk decided immediately, as we have already noted, to strike a
blow at both northern Tamaulipas and Tampico, and Marcy,*"'
on September 22, notified Taylor of the change in the President 's
plans. General Patterson was at the same time ordered by the
President to invade Tamaulipas. To be sure Taylor had no knowl-
edge of this arrangement when he made the agreement with
Ampudia, but his armistice, if permitted to remain in force, would
paralyze in a great measure the aggressive movement which had
been assigned to Patterson.
The letter in which Marcy instructed Taylor to terminate the
armistice was not so drastic as the comments in Polk's diary
would lead one to expect. In fact, it contained no phrase that
should have given offense to the victorious general. The Presi-
dent, he said, regretted that "it was not deemed advisable to
insist upon the terms which you had first proposed," but he
added that the "circumstances which dictated doubtless jus-
tified the change." After explaining the new plan of campaign
and the necessity of beginning operations at once, he instructed
Taylor to give the notice necessary for ending the truce.®^
59 Polk, Diary, II, 183-184.
60 H. Ex. Doe. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 341-343.
fii Marcy to Taylor, Oct. 13, 1846 {ihid., 355-357).
450 JAMES E. POLK
Although nothing in Marcy 's communication could reasonably
be construed as a reflection upon Taylor, the ever-suspicious
general drew from it evidence of a conspiracy to discredit him
and to deprive him of his command. While admitting that
Marcy 's letter praised him, he detected in it a very cold tone.
He believed that the administration was hostile to him simply
because his friends had been indiscreet enough to connect his
name with the Presidency .^'^ In his reply to the War Department,
l;ie stated that with his limited force he could not have prevented
the escape of the enemy from Monterey, and that his equipment
did not warrant the pursuit of Ampudia into a country devoid
of supplies. He admitted that he had been influenced, also, by
Ampudia 's statement that Santa Anna was in favor of making
peace, and with a thrust at the President, he added : " It is not
unknown to the government that I had the very best reason for
believing the statement of General Ampudia to be true. ' '•'^ This
pointed reference to Polk's part in the reinstatement of Santa
Anna must have been read at the White House with anything but
pleasure, yet Taylor could not be blamed for believing that the
President desired, most of all, a peaceable adjustment with Mex-
ico. All of his instructions had emphasized this point. He was
aware of Polk 's overtures to Santa Anna and of his recent offer to
the Paredes government. Since he had not received Marcy 's in-
structions of September 22 his agreement with Ampudia accorded
very well with the policy of his government, so far as he knew
it at the time. Still, he had no reason to complain because he
had been instr-ucted to end the truce, and the political motives
which dictated these instructions existed only in his own very
active imagination. The main difficulty, as already stated, was
the slow means of communication which made it impossible for
either the general or the administration to know the conditions
62 Taylor to Wood, Nov. 10, 1846, Taylor Letters, 07.
e3 Taylor to Adj. Gen., Nov. 8, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1
sess., 359-360).
WAR IN NOETHEEN MEXICO 451
which governed the actions of the other. Even before the armis-
tice had been disapproved, Taylor felt abused because the Presi-
dent had tried to facilitate the advance upon Tamaulipas by send-
ing orders directly to General Patterson,"* but in this case, also,
Polk's action was governed by military rather than political
considerations.
Santa Anna's declaration in favor of restoring the constitu-
tion of 1824 led President Polk to abandon the hope of inducing
the northern provinces of Mexico to declare their independence
of the central government. Since the main purpose of Taylor's
advance into Nueva Leon and Coahuila, and that of Wool into
Chihuahua, had been to effect this separation, the President
decided that both of these expeditions, especially the latter, had
now become ' ' comparatively unimportant. " Accordingly he sug-
gested at a cabinet meeting that Taylor should be authorized to
remain at IMonterey, and, if he saw fit, to order Wool to the same
place. He suggested, also, that the most effective means of bring-
ing Mexico to terms would be an invasion from Vera Cruz. Marcy
embodied these views in a letter to Taylor and his letter was care-
fully discussed at a special cabinet meeting. In the meantime
Marcy s draft had been shown to Scott whereupon the general
expressed a desire to command the Vera Cruz expedition, and
recommended an army of twenty-five or thirty thousand men.
But Polk had not forgotten Scott's indiscreet letters, conse-
quently the request was not granted. After a discussion of more
than two hours instructions were agreed upon and delivered to
Robert JM. McLane who had been selected as special messenger.
They covered the points already noted, and the choice between
remaining at Monterey or advancing into the interior was left
entirely to Taylor's discretion. He was informed that General
64 < 'I conceive that this mode of regulating details and ordering detach-
ments direct from the Department of "War is a violation of the integrity of
the chief command in the field, pregnant with the worst of evils, and against
which I deem it my duty respectfully but earnestly to protest" (Taylor
to Adj. Gen., Oct. 15, 1846, ibid., 354).
452 JAMES E. POLE
Patterson would probably command the Vera Cruz expedition,
and he was asked to send about two thousand of his regulars to
this commander, if, in his judgment, they could be spared. On
the other hand, he was forbidden to send them if, in his opinion,
his own position would be endangered.*'^
65 Polk, Diury, II, 198-205. Marcy to Taylor, Oct. 22, 1846 (H. Ex.
Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 363-367).
CHAPTER XIX
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO
For some time after instructing Taylor to remain at Mon-
terey the President remained undecided as to what policy he
would pursue. He had difficulty in making up his mind whether,
after the capture of Vera Cruz, the army should simply hold the
territory in possession and wait for Mexico to treat, or whether
an advance to Mexico City should be undertaken. Before any
decision had been reached. Colonel Richard B. Mason was sent
to California via Panama, and instructed to command the troops
in that region until the arrival of General Kearny.^
Financial as well as military considerations impeded the
formation of a definite war policy. Department estimates caused
so much apprehension concerning the cost of the war that the
number of volunteers asked for by Marcy was cut down from
25,000 to 10,000 men. No decision had been reached as to whether
the government should simply preserve the status quo, or "pro-
secute the war into the heart of Mexico." Buchanan advocated
the former policy and, apparently, Polk did not wish to decide
the question either way until he had consulted the Senator from
Missouri. Benton called by appointment on the same evening
(November 7) and expressed himself as strongly in favor of
taking Vera Cruz and of following this up with a crushing move-
ment against Mexico City. To confine the military operations
simply to holding the territory then in possession would, in his
opinion, prolong the war and ruin the Democratic party ; for
"ours were a go-ahead people and .... our only policy either
1 This action resulted from Polk's want of confidence in Colonel
Stevenson who had been sent round the Horn with the New York volunteers
(Polk, Diary, II, 209, 215).
454 JAMES K. POLK
to obtain a peace or save ourselves was to press the war boldly."
He believed that coiiunissioners vested with authority to offer
peace, "before a battle, during the battle, & after it was over,"
should accompany the army headquarters, and he offered to be
one of the number. Three days later the Senator suggested that
some man of "talents and resources" and of military training
ought to be made lieutenant-general, and he modestly offered to
accept the position if it should be created by Congress. After
alluding to his original preference for Van Buren he declared
that he was now ready to give Polk his unqualified support. To
make his declaration more emphatic, he reminded the President
that he [Benton] had quarreled with General Jackson and had
subsequently defended him "in the gloomy period of the Bank
panic. "^ The would-be commissioner continued to urge the
necessity of an advance upon the Mexican capital, but the Presi-
dent was reluctant to undertake such an expedition if it could
be avoided. By November 17, however, Polk had decided to
attack Vera Cruz, although he still "considered it to be an open
question, to be determined according to circumstances hereafter,
whether a column should be sent from Vera Cruz against the
City of Mexico. ' ' If, by that time, Mexico should decline to make
peace, he would be "decidedly in favour" of taking the capital
city.^
The selection of a commander for the Vera Cruz expedition
caused the President great anxiety. He would gladly have chosen
Benton ; but the Missouri Senator would not accept a rank lower
than that of lieutenant-general, and there was no reason for be-
lieving that Congress would create such an office. Polk had lost
faith in Taylor's ability as a commanding officer. He had also
come to regard him a.s the partisan dupe of Bailie Peyton and
George "W. Kendall, "who were cunning & shrewd men of more
talents than himself, and liad controlled liiiii for political pur-
poses." ' ' His constant effort has been to throw the responsibility
2 I'olk, Diarti, II, 221-223, 227-228. 3 jbid., 241.
CAMPAIGN AGAIN til THE CITY OF MEXICO 455
of any disaster which might happen on the administration. In
this he had been most ungrateful for the kindness which he has
received at my hands." These impressions had been derived, in
part, from Taylor's dispatches. In addition, Polk's mind had
been poisoned by adverse criticisms contained in private letters
written to him by his friend and benefactor, General Pillow.*
Taylor had quite a different story to tell about responsibility.
He told Crittenden in a letter that :
When it was supposed I was in great peril from which, had I not suc-
ceeded in extricating myself, the administration & its friends were prepared
to throw the whole responsibility on me— [by sajang that he had no
authority to take a position on the Eio Grande]. •'>
For some time Polk 's aversion for Scott precluded all thought
of assigning him to the chief command. Scott had, in Sep-
tember, requested that he might be sent to Mexico, and at
that time his request was denied.*' When, however, a majority
of the cabinet, at a meeting held on November 17, reluctantly
came to the conclusion that Scott ought to be appointed in spite
of his faults, Polk consented to "think further on the subject,"
although "after his very exceptional letter in May last nothing
but stern necessity and sense of public duty could induce me to
place him at the head of so important [an] expedition." Benton
was consulted, and when he, too, advised that, under present
circumstances, Scott should be appointed, the President at last
felt ' ' constrained to assign him to this command. ' ' When notified
of his appointment Scott was, according to Polk's account, so
grateful ' ' that he almost shed tears. ' '^ If so, his gratitude proved
to be ephemeral.
i Ibid., 227, 229, 236, 241. Peyton, it will be recalled, had been one of
Polk's most hated political opponents in Tennessee. At this time he was a
member of General Worth's staff. Kendall was editor of the New Orleans
Picayune and accompanied Taylor's army in the capacity of war cor-
respondent.
5 Taylor to Crittenden, Sept. 15, 1846, Crittenden Papers.
6 Scott to Marcy, Sept. 12; Marcy to Scott, Sept. 14, 1846 (E. Ex. Boc.
60, 30 Cong., 1 sessL, 372-373).
- Polk, Diary, II, 241-245.
456 JAMES K. FOLK
Meanwhile the President was busily engaged in preparing his
annual message to Congress. The original draft was shown to
Benton, and the Senator suggested certain alterations.
In his Thirty Years' View, Benton stated that the draft con-
tained a "recommendation to Congress to cease the active pro-
secution of the war, to occupy the conquered part of the coun-
try (....) with troops in forts and stations, and to pass an
act establishing a temporary government in the occupied part ;
and to retain the possession until the peace was made." He
stated further that he persuaded the President to give up the
"sedentary project." Apparently these statements grossly ex-
aggerated the facts, for they agree neither with the President's
general war policy, nor with his own description of his original
drafts. His diary for December 1 reads :
I had proposed in my draft to submit to Congress the propriety, at the
same time that the war should be vigorously prosecuted [italics mine] to
establish a line of boundary securing to the U. S. a sufficient territory to
afford indemnity for the expenses of the war, and to our citizens who hold
pecuniary demands against Mexico. I proposed, also, that a more perman-
ent Government should be provided by Congress over the conquered provinces
than the temporary Governments which had been established by our own
Military and Naval commanders according to the laws of war. Col. Benton
thought these passages should be omitted, and submitted to me in Avriting
the reasons for this opinion.
Whether wise or unwise, these recommendations certainly did
not advise a "sedentary" policy. The fact that Walker, who
wanted all of Mexico, preferred Polk's draft to that of Benton is
another indication that the President had no intention of ter-
minating "the active prosecution of the war." Although no sug-
gestion to this effect seems to have been included in Polk's draft,
certain modifications were made in order to please the Missouri
Senator, for otherwise it was feared that he- would oppose, and
probably could defeat, everything which the President was about
to recommend.^
8 Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 693. Polk, Diary, II, 258-260.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 457
On December 7, 1846, the twenty-ninth Congress began its
second session and, on the next day, received the President's
annual message. In it Polk repelled the charge made by some
of his ojoponents that the war with Mexico was unjust and un-
necessary. "A more effectual means," said he, "could not have
been devised to encourage the enemy and protract tbe war than
to advocate and adhere to their cause, and thus give them ' aid and
comfort. ' ' ' The intended application of this quotation from the
constitutional definition of treason could not be misunderstood,
and Polk at once became the object of violent denunciation. In
order to disprove the charges that had been made, he gave a
history of events leading up to the war, laying emphasis on the
fact that Mexico had violated two treaties in which she had
agreed to pay American claimants damages awarded to them by
a joint commission. The first of these treaties was negotiated in
1839. The second, which postponed the dates of payment, de-
clared upon its face, said the President, that " 'this new arrange-
ment is entered into for the accommodation of Mexico.' " "Not-
withstanding this new convention was entered into at the request
of Mexico** and for the purpose of relieving her from embarrass-
ment, the claimants have only received the interest due on the
30th of April, 1843, and three of the twenty installments."
9 In this connection a letter of Waddy Tliompson, who negotiated these
treaties, is of interest: "In the unquestionable vindication of the Mexican
Avar by the President I see that much prominence is given to two points both
of which I claim exclusive credit of as they were both not only without
instructions but in violations of the orders of the state department. By the
Treaty of 1839 the Mexican government liad the option to pay the awards
in cash or in Treasury notes. These latter were worth then not more than
20 cents in the dollar and now are worth even less. But the Avhole debt
could have been paid with less than one fifth of its nominal amount. The
brevity of a letter will not allow me to state to you the various means by
which I managed to close the eyes of Mexico to the advantages which they
possessed. But I did so and on my oivii responsibility made a provisional
arrangement subject to tlie ratification of my government. It was approved
■with certain alterations. Mr. Webster sent me the draft of a Treaty.
The preamble stated that this new arrangement was made at the instance
and desire of the American claimants. I took the responsibility of chang-
ing this and stated in my despatch accompanying the Treaty that if Mexico
failed to comply with the terms of the Treaty it would give us a much
stronger justification for inforcing payment than if it had been stated in
458 JAMES E. POLK
The President maintained that the United States had liad
ample grounds for war long before the Mexican army crossed
the Rio Grande. He asserted, also, that hostilities had not been
precipitated by Taylor's advance to the western frontier, for
'^ Mexico herself had never placed the war which she has waged
upon the ground that our army occupied the intermediate ter-
ritory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande." After an
elaborate argument which proved, to his own satisfaction at least,
the Rio Grande to be the rightful boundary of Texas, he said
that it would be ''difficult to justify the Executive, whose duty
it is to see that the laws be faithfully executed if .... he had
assumed the responsibility of yielding up the territory west of the
Nueces. ' '
One passage in the message relating to conquered territories
was subsequently attacked in the Senate. Having urged a
vigorous prosecution of the war the President went on to say that :
In the Provinces of New Mexico and of the Californias little, if any,
further resistance is apprehended from the inliabitants to the temporary
governments which have thus, from the necessity of the ease and according
to the laws of war, been established. It may be proper to provide for tlie
security of these important conquests by making adequate apijropriation
for the purpose of erecting fortifications and defraying the expenses neces-
sary incident to the maintenance of our possession and authority over them.
the Treaty that the change in the Treaty had been made at the instance of
the claimants. I see that it is so regarded by the President in his message. ' '
Concerning article six of the treaty of 1843, which Polk had also men-
tioned, Thompson said : ' ' The sixth clause of the Treaty which provides
for a new convention for claims not then adjusted was inserted by me not
only without instructions, but it was disapproved by Mr. Webster but
nevertheless retained" (Thompson to Bucliaiian, Doc. 13, 1846, Buchaimn
Papers). In tliis same letter, Thompson spoke of letters which he and
Webster had written to Bocanegra, Mexican Secretary of Foreign lielatious,
in 1842. These are printed in the appendix of his book, EecoUcctions of
Mexico. There Thompson agrees that Webster had written liis letter before
having seen his [ Tliompson 's], but in the letter to Buchanan he accuses
Webster of plagiarism: "Mr. Webster stole my reply to Mr. Bocanegra 's
letter to him and to tlie diplomatic corps and published it as his own — in
a letter to me. He says in his letter to me endorsing his reply to Mr.
Bocanegra that lie had not received mine when he wrote his. In this he
lied. That is tlie word and no other word will express the idea. He had
received it & stole it, and then lied about it. Telling a falsehood to conceal
a larceny — a petty larceny if you please — of tliis I have the proof. ' ' But cf.
Becolleotions, 284^304.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 459
As will bo seen later, some members of Congress interpreted this
as a recommendation to provide for permanent possession, before
any treaty had been made.
So far as it related to the war, the message concluded with a
renewal of the request for an appropriation of two million dollars
to be used at the discretion of the President for diplomatic pur-
poses. The reasons which had induced him to ask for that amount
at the preceding session, said he, "still exist," and he believed
that it would have been granted then if a vote had been taken.^"
When the message came up for discussion in the Senate, West-
cott, of Florida, moved that the part relating to conquered terri-
tories, above quoted, be referred to the Committee on Territories.
Benton objected, and a discussion ensued as to whether the Presi-
dent's recommendation had contemplated the establishment of
permanent governments. Westcott contended that no other mean-
ing could be drawn from it, while Benton insisted that it meant
nothing of the kind. No decision was reached, for, on motion
made by Crittenden, the question was sent to the table."
In the House, Garrett Davis, of Kentucky, caused a heated
debate by introducing a resolution which requested the President
to submit for examination all orders to military and naval officers
relating to the establishment of civil governments in the con-
quered provinces. He had in mind, of course, the governments
set up in New Mexico and California by General Kearny and
Commodore Stockton, and he wished to know whether the acts of
those officers had been authorized by the President; if so, he
demanded to know "by what imperial or regal authority his
majesty undertook to act in the premises." If Polk, said Davis,
had authorized the organization of civil governments in foreign
provinces, he was guilty of usurpation; and if the Santa Fe
region was a part of Texas, as the message seemed to assert, then,
the President had no right to set up a government over a portion
10 Eic-hardson, Messages, IV, 472-495. .
11 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 42-44. *«
460 JAMES E. POLK
of a sovereign state. Similar arguments were made by Schenck,
of Ohio, and by other opponents of the administration. The
defense of the President was led by Douglas, although many
other Democrats rallied loyallj^ to his support. After a week's
debate, the resolution was passed on the fifteenth of December.^-
The establishment of a government in California by Stockton
and Fremont has already been discussed. A brief summary will
indicate the objectionable features of Kearny's conquest of New
Mexico which led the House to call upon the President for
information.
Leaving Fort Leavenworth late June, 1846, in command of a
small force made up of United States dragoons and Missouri
volunteers, Kearny reached Santa Fe on August 18 and, without
resistance, took possession of the capital of New Mexico. Four
days later a proclamation was issued in which Kearny announced
that he would hold the department "as a part of the United
States, and under the name of the 'territory of New Mexico.' "
After promising a representative government at an early date,
the proclamation added that
The United States hereby absolves all persons residing within the boundaries
of New Mexico from any further allegiance to the republic of Mexico,
and hereby claims them as citizens of the United States.
Before tlie end of September he had framed and put into opera-
tion an elaborate civil government under the title of the ' ' Organic
law for the territory of New Mexico. . . ."^•■'
Kearny's authority for thus assuming the role of lawgiver
was based on the following confidential instructions sent to him
by the Secretary of War on June 3, 1846 :
Should you conquer and take possession of New Mexico and Upper
California, or considerable places in either, you will establish temporary
civil governments therein You may assure the people of those
provinces that it is the wish and design of the United States to provide
for tlicm a free government, with the least possible delay, similar to that
^2 Ibid., 12-33.
13 For the proclamation, "organic law," and other documents, see H.
Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 169ff.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 461
which exists in our territories. They will then be called upon to exercise
the rights of freemen in elec'ting their own representatives to the terri-
torial legislature. It is foreseen that what relates to the civil government
will be a difficult part of your duty, and much must necessarily be left to
your own discretion. i*
The explicit directions given in this letter, supplemented as they
were by wide discretionary powers, seem to give ample authority
for the action taken by General Kearny. Furthermore, when
Polk received the news, on October 2, that Kearny had pro-
claimed New Mexico to be "a part of the United States," he
noted in his diary that "Gen'l Kearny has thus far performed
his duty well."^= Whether, had no objections been raised, he
would have given similar approval to the "organic law," we
have no means of knowing. This document did not reach Wash-
ington until November 23, and, according to their own state-
ments, it was not examined by either Marcy or Polk until after
information regarding it had been requested by the House. ^^
Whatever he might have done with respect to Kearny's ter-
ritorial governments had Congress interposed no objections, Polk
now realized that part, at least, of Kearny's work could not be
justified. At a cabinet meeting held on December 19, Buchanan
expressed the opinion that the House resolution ought not to be
answered, but the President decided to transmit the desired
documents. In the evening he made the following comment :
Among them was a document from Brigadier Gen'l Kearney, containing
a form of Government over the conquered territory of New' Mexico, which
among other things declared that territory to be a part of the U. S. and
provided for the election of a Delegate to the Congress of the U. S. In
these and some other respects he exceeded the power of a military com-
mander over a conquered territory. It was agreed that in my message to
Congress I must disapprove this part of the Document, though, without
censuring the Gen'l, who had misconceived the extent of his authority,
but who had, no doubt, acted from patriotic motives.
14 Marcy to Kearny, June 3, 1846 (ihid., 244).
15 Polk," Dwr?/, II, 169-170.
isMarcy's report to the President, Dec. 21, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30
Cong., 1 sess., 151). Polk's Message of Dec. 22, 1846. Nothing is said
in the Diary about this document until the matter had been brought up in
the House.
462 JAMES E. POLE
A message to this effect, with an additional statement that ''such
excess has resulted in no practical injury," was sent to the House
a few days later. And yet, not two months before this, the Presi-
dent had expressed satisfaction because Kearny had proclaimed
New Mexico to be a part of the United States !^^
"While awaiting information respecting territorial govern-
ments, the House engaged in an acrimonious debate on the Presi-
dent's annual message and the causes of the war. Polk was
assailed for having stated in his message that his opponents had,
by their attacks upon the administration, been giving "aid and
comfort" to the enemy. In turn, he was charged with having
given ' ' aid and comfort ' ' to Santa Anna, the most powerful and
unscrupulous of the enemies. Whigs averred that the President
had wantonly plunged the country into a war of aggression in
order to show the world ' ' who James K. Polk was. ' ' Even those
who had voted for the declaration of war now asserted that the
executive was conducting "an unconstitutional war." Most
abusive of all was Gentry, of Tennessee. Polk, he said, was a
"petty usurper" who "had come into power without the will
of the people of these States, and almost without the wish or
knowledge even of his own party" ; and his message was "nothing
but a low demagogical attempt to deceive the nation — to tell just
enough of the truth to cause the people to believe a lie." On
the other hand the President was ably defended by his Demo-
cratic supporters^'^ who maintained, not only that his message
had given a true history of relations with Mexico, but that Polk 's
remark about giving "aid and comfort" to the enemy had been
amply vindicated by utterances which were being made on the
floor of the House. The receipt of the special message, accom-
panied by the orders issued to military and naval officers, pro-
duced no change in the character of the discussion. The Whigs
17 Polk, Diary, II, 170, 281-282. Kichardson, Messages, IV, .50G-507.
If* In defendinf^f tlie I'rcsidcnt, Bayly, of Virfjinia, arraigned the arjifu-
ments and the attitude of Garret Davis in such .scathing terms that a chal-
lenge followed. The arrest of Bayly by the municipal authorities prevented
a duel (Polk, Diary, II, 297).
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 4G3
still continued to fulminate against the "President's war," and
to characterize the establishment of civil governments in the con-
quered provinces as an unwarranted assumption of unconstitu-
tional powers.
The man thus portrayed as a usurper whose imperial ambi-
tions neither Congress nor the Constitution had been able to check
believed himself to be hampered by want of adequate authority.
Upon his shoulders rested the responsibility of military victory,
yet the officers at his disposal were, in his opinion, disloyal to
the administration and interested solely in their own political
advancement. However erroneous this opinion may have been,
there is no reason for doubting that Polk believed both Scott and
Taylor to be incompetent and unreliable. Having arrived at the
conclusion that Taylor was a "narrow minded, bigotted partisan"
who had been "made giddy with the idea of the Presidency," the
chief executive felt the need of a commander more in sympathy
with the administration. He had selected Scott to lead the attack
on Vera Cruz, not because he had great confidence in the gen-
eral 's ability or his loyalty, but for the reason that Scott was the
only man in the army "who by his rank could command Tay-
lor. ' '1^ The admixture of war and politics had created a dilemma
from which the President saw but one avenue of escape, namely,
to follow the advice of Benton, and ask Congress to authorize the
appointment of a lieutenant-general.
Before Scott had had time to reach the seat of war Polk began
to sound members of Congress for the purpose of ascertaining
whether a bill to create such an office could be passed. He even
sent for Calhoun and asked his assistance, explaining that Benton
would be appointed should Congress see fit to create the position.
Calhoun, however, was "decidedly opposed to having such an
officer, "■-'' and Polk's best friends doubted that Congress could
19 Polk, Diary, II, 249, 277.
20 Ihid., 282. Calhoun believed that the President was governed by
political motives — by a desire to deal a blow at Taylor and Scott (Calhoun
to Duff Green, April 17, 1847, Eep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1899, II, 727).
464 JAMES K. POLK
be induced to take favorable action. Indeed, the President him-
self did not believe that the necessary law could be procured, but
Benton urged him to make the recommendation, "and if Con-
gress rejected it the responsibility would be theirs." Influenced
partly by his own desire to have a Democratic commander and
partly by the dread of Benton's opposition, Polk drafted a
message on Christmas day in which he asked Congress for
authority to appoint a lieutenant-general.-^
Although a bill for creating the coveted office was tabled by
the Senate on January 15, the President by his action succeeded
in retaining, for a time at least, the good will of the Missouri
Senator. This in itself was of no small importance, for the de-
fection of Calhoun and his coterie of adherents had converted
the normal Democratic majority into a minority, and Benton
wielded a far greater influence than did Calhoun. On the day
that the Senate tabled the bill, Polk noted in his diary :
With a large nominal majority in both Houses, I am practically in a
minority. The several cliques & sections of the Democratic party are mani-
festly more engaged in managing for their respective favourites in the next
Presidential election, than they are in supporting the Government in pros-
ecuting the war, or carrying out any of its great measures. The only
corrective is in the hands of the people. I will do my duty to the country
and rejoice that with my own voluntary free will & consent I am not to be
a candidate. This determination is irrevocable.'-s
He was greatly discouraged because Congress delayed legislation
on war measures which he had recommended, among them pro-
vision for ten additional regiments of regular troops. ' ' Instead, ' '
said he, "of acting upon the great measures of the country, they
are spending day after day and week after week in a worse than
useless discussion about slaverv."-^ His discomfort was increased
21 "I found Col. B. fixed upon this point,'' said the Diary. " If I do
not propose it, it is manifest from my interview witli him that both he
and his friends will be greatly dissatisfied" (Polk, Diary, II, 275, 28(i, 293).
The message was sent to Congress on December 29.
22 Ibid., 328.
2^ Ibid., 334. He referred to the debate on King's slavei-y restriction
resolution introduced in the House on Jan. 4, 1847.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 465
by cabinet opposition to the advance upon the Mexican capital
and to the acquisition of any territory except New Mexico and
California, although the members believed that other northern
provinces should be encouraged to declare their independence.
Even Walker, Avho up to this time had advocated expansion on a
large scale, now gave his approval to a restrictive policy. Donel-
son, also, from his post at Berlin, entered a protest against unre-
stricted expansion. Since war had come, he believed the Rio
Grande boundary to be necessary and Upper California to be
desirable ; but he was decidedly averse to holding central Mexico.
Even California, in his opinion, was not indispensable, for it
would eventually become an independent nation any way. He
hoped that Polk would not listen to those who desired to incor-
porate Mexico into the Union. ^*
On January 13, 1847, when the President was downcast be-
cause of obstacles which impeded a vigorous prosecution of the
war, a harbinger of peace appeared in the person of Colonel
Atocha. He came not as an avowed agent of Santa Anna, but
as one who professed to have intimate, though unofficial, knowl-
edge of the plans and purposes of his crafty patron. He showed
to Benton personal letters received from Santa Anna, Almonte,
and Rejon, all of which expressed a desire for peace with the
United States. With Atocha 's permission, Benton showed the
letters to Polk and Buchanan. All agreed that he had been sent
by Santa Anna as a confidential agent charged with the duty of
ascertaining the terms on which Polk would make peace. When
asked about the terms which would be agreeable to Santa Anna,
Atocha said that Mexico would consent to the Rio Grande as
the boundary of Texas, but "reserving a space of territory be-
tween that River & the Nueces as a barrior between the two
2ilbid., 301. Donelson to Buchanan, Dec. 22, 1846 (rec'd Jan. 27, '47),
Buchanan Papers. In a letter -written two weeks later, he said that
Europeans did not like Polk 's message and were opposed to his war policy, y
They feared, he said, that Mexico, when defeated, would desire admission
into the Union aad would be admitted (Donelson to Buchanan, Jan. 8,
1847, Buch-anan Papers).
466 JAMES E. POLK
countries." He said, also, that Mexico would cede California for
a consideration of fifteen or twenty million dollars, but on the
subject of New Mexico he seemed to have no authority to speak.
He advised that commissioners should meet in Havana and that,
pending negotiations, the blockade at Vera Cruz should be raised.
As a concession to Mexican pride, he urged that the invitation
to negotiate should come from the United States.
For several days the President held consultations with Benton
and with members of the cabinet. Although willing to open peace
negotiations, he rejected some of the suggestions which had been
made by Atocha. New Mexico as well as California must be
ceded to the United States, and the proposal to create a neutral
zone between the Nueces and the Rio Grande must not be enter-
tained. The blockade of Vera Cruz would not be raised until a
treaty had been made, for if it were raised and no treaty resulted,
the administration would be subjected to ridicule. At a cabinet
meeting held on January 16 Buchanan was directed to prepare
a letter to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations. In it the
Mexican government was invited to appoint peace commissioners
who were to meet similar representatives from the United States
at either Havana or Jalapa. On seeing the letter, Atocha ob-
jected to the passage which said that the war would be prosecuted
vigorously until a treaty had been signed. On his suggestion, the
President consented to vest the commissioners with authority,
"in their discretion after meeting the Mexican commissioners,"
to raise the blockade and to suspend hostilities. The letter was
so modified and delivered to Atocha, and Secretary Walker
arranged to have a revenue cutter convey him from New Orleans
to Vera Cruz. He was not regarded as an official bearer of dis-
patches but as "an individual to whom a sealed letter was
entrusted to be delivered. ' '-^
25 Polk, Diary, II, 323, 325-327, 331-334, 335-336, 339. The letter to
the Mexican Minister is printed in Buchanan, Work.t, VII, 198-199, also in
Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 36.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 407
Polk's desire for a diplomatic victory was strengthened by
obstacles which seemed to preclude military success. Congress
appeared to be more interested in practical politics than in
"strengthening the Executive arm," and the President had no
faith in either the competency or the loyalty of his commanders
in the field. Coincident with Scott's arrival in New Orleans on
his way to the seat of war the newspapers of that city published
a full account of the administration's plan of campaign. No
one except the general could have imparted the information,
and the President at once attributed this violation of secrecy to
Scott's "inordinate vanity."-" To cap the climax a New York
newspaper published a letter, written by Taylor to Gaines, in
which the administration was denounced and its military plans
completely exposed.-" Apparently the "Whig generals" were
determined to prevent the Mexican army from being taken by
surprise. In his private letters, Taylor said that keeping him
"in the dark" seemed to be the "great object" of the adminis-
tration,-^ and generosity may have led him to protect his Mexican
adversaries from similar annoyance !
The President decided that the administration could be vindi-
cated most effectively by the publication of all correspondence
which had passed between Taylor and the War Department, and,
evidently by his request, a resolution calling for these documents
was introduced in the House by Thompson, of Mississippi.-"
Ashmun, of Massachusetts, offered an amendment which solicited
information concerning the secret agent who had been sent to
confer with Santa Anna at Havana. This amendment and the
2Glbid 327-328. "I have no doubt," Polk wrote a few weeks later
''the Mexican Government and Military commanders are as well apprised
of the secret instructions which were given to Gen'l Scott when he lett
Washington as he is himself. His vanity is such that he could not keep
the most important secrets of the Government which were given to him
{ihid., 393-394).
27 Ibid., 393-394.
28Tavlor to Wood, Jan. 26, 1847, Taylor Letters, 82.
29 Polk, Diary, II, 362. Cong. Globe, 22 Cong., 2 sess., 296. Taylor
was reminded by Marcy (Jan. 27) that his offense had made him liable to
dismissal {U. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess, 391).
468 JAMES K. POLK
appointment of the returned exile to the position of "lieutenant
general for Mexico ' ' gave an opportunity for a new assault upon
the President, although the speakers were unable to add many
items to the catalog of iniquities which they had been compiling
since the opening of the session.
The Thompson resolution was passed by the House and the
correspondence was published, yet Congress seemed unwilling to
cooperate with the President by enacting the laws which he had
recommended. "I am in the unenviable position," he wrote on
February 5, "of being held responsible for the conduct of the
Mexican "War, when I have no support either from Congress or
from the two officers (Scott & Taylor) highest in command in
the field. How long this state of things will continue I cannot
forsee." For this state of affairs he blamed factious members
of his own party who were more interested in the next Presi-
dential election than in the welfare of the country. Said he :
In truth faction rules the hour, while principles & patriotism is for-
gotten. While the Democratic party are thus distracted and divided and
are playing this foolish and suicidal game, the Federal Party are united
and never fail to unite with the minority of the Democratic party, or any
faction of it who may break off from the body of their party, and thus
postpone and defeat all my measures. 3o
This statement was verified within the next few days when Cal-
houn and his friends united with Whigs in temporarily blocking
the passage of a bill for raising ten additional regiments of
troops. As a result Polk now regarded Calhoun as the "most
mischievous man in the Senate," and he attributed the South
Carolinian's hostility to the fact that he had not been retained
in the cabinet.^^ Senator Turney, a friend of the President,
charged Calhoun with impeding necessary legislation by depriv-
ing his party of a majority in the Senate. He proclaimed this
fact to the people so that they might "place the responsibility
exactly in the proper quarter."''- However, the rejection of the
30 Polk, Diary, II, 368.
31 Ibid., 371-372. 32 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 395.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 469
ten-regimeut bill, as reported from the conference committee,
proved not to be final ; after a reconsideration, it was passed by
the Senate on the tenth of February. Congress had already
authorized the emission of twenty-three million dollars in treas-
ury notes, for war purposes. The satisfaction which Polk ex-
perienced as a result of this new turn of events was counter-
balanced by his disgust because members of Congress demanded
for their personal friends all offices which had been created by
the military bill. "Take the day altogether," he wrote on Feb-
ruary 15, "I am sure I have never been so wearied and annoyed
in my life."^^
When the Senate voted, in the first instance, to reject the ten-
regiment bill, the Washington Union characterized this action as
' ' Another Mexican Victory " :
If Santa Anna, Ampudia, or any other Mexican general could snatch
from our soldiers a corresponding victory, we should place them upon the
same elevation where their compatriots, friends, and fellow-soldiers in the
Senate of the United States now stand.
By a resolution passed on February 13 the editors, Ritchie and
Heiss, were denied admission to the floor of the Senate — an action
concerning which the President wrote :
It is a second Duane case, & strikes a blow at the liberty of the jiress.
The foul deed was perpetrated by the votes of the undivided Federal
Senators, and Senators Calhoun & Butler of S. C. & Yulee & Wescott of
Florida.34
On March 3, 1847, the twenty-ninth Congress ended its labors.
Although Polk's opponents had filled pages of the Congressional
Glohe in charging him with miscellaneous crimes and misde-
meanors, he had nevertheless been provided with men and money
so that he might continue his "unholy war" against Mexico.
The bill for granting him three million dollars to be used in
negotiating a peace was also enacted into law, but not until the
"Wilmot proviso," which sought to exclude slavery from all
territory to be acquired, had been rejected by both houses.
33 Polk, Diary, II, 380.
^iCong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., S92, 417. Polk, Biarii, II, 378. .
470 JAMES K. POLK
During the last evening of the session, while the President
was at the eapitol for the purpose of signing bills, an incident
occurred which tested not only his patience but his courage as
well. Among the bills which were expected to pass was one
authorizing the appointment of two major-generals and three
brigadier-generals. His original intention had been to ignore
New York, when filling these positions, for he knew that he could
not satisfy both Democratic factions in that state — one led by
Marcy and the other by Senator Dix, the close friend of Van
Buren. However, Marcy insisted that one of the lesser positions
should be given to his friend, General Clark, while Dix emphati-
cally opposed the appointment. As a compromise, Polk decided
to appoint Enos D. Hopping, who, although affiliated with the
Marcy faction, had been recommended for a colonelcy by both
wings of the party. Although both Marcy and Senator Dickenson
threatened to resign if Clark were not appointed, Polk defied
their attempt to "bully" him, and appointed Hopping as soon
as the bill had been signed. "I had become perfectly indiffer-
ent, ' ' was his comment, ' ' whether Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Marcy
resigned or not. I knew that neither of them could be sustained
in such a course for such a cause. "^°
Among the appointments made and confirmed during the clos-
ing hours of the session was that of Benton as major-general.
He had solicited the appointment, and had, at the time, attached
no conditions to his acceptance, but it soon developed that he
had no intention of serving unless the President would assign him
to the chief command of the army and invest him w' ith ' ' plenary
Diplomatic powers to conclude a Treaty of peace." The cabinet
objected to clothing Benton with diplomatic powers, and, besides,
Polk himself had planned to send Buclianan as conuuissioner,
should Mexico consent to negotiate, lie would gladly have put
Benton at the head of the army if he could liave done so without
recalling the four major-generals already in the field. According
S". Polk. Diarii, II, 399-405
CAMPAIGN AGAINST TEE CITY OF MEXICO 471
to his own statement, he would "have no hesitation" so far
as Scott and Tayk)r were concerned, but he thought it would
be unjust to recall Butler and Patterson. When informed of the
President's decision, Benton declined to accept the appointment.^^
Polk was ready to go a long way to avoid offending the Mis-
souri Senator, for Benton was the only man in public life for
whom he seemed to harbor a feeling of awe.=^^ He was influenced
still more, however, by his aversion for the Whig generals and
by his desire to transfer the chief command to a member of his
own party. At the time that Benton was appointed, Polk was
especially hostile to General Scott on account of alleged discrimi-
nation against Democratic officers.^^
Since the congressional batteries had ceased their "fire upon
his rear," the President could devote more attention to the enemy
across the Rio Grande. After consultation with Benton and the
cabinet he decided to raise the blockade of the Mexican ports and
to substitute a tariff, the proceeds of which were to be used for
war purposes. He took steps to hasten the recruiting and equip-
ping of the new regiments which Congress had voted, and to
eliminate the "extravagance & stupidity" of the quartermaster's
department.^''
30 Ibid., 406-413.
37 Rnt there were limits to his concessions. It was about this time
tha he lef sed to appoint Benton's son-in-law (Jones) to office, because
he "was a short time ago the editor of a Federal paper m New Orleans"
(Hid., 455). ,, , , ,
3s He had, said the President, "arbitrarily & without cause degraded
ColoneTHarney, of Tennessee. "Gen'l Taylor had acted with the same
Droscriptive sp rit, not only towards Col. Harney, but other gallant
Eioc atic offi^^^^^^^^^ Against the advice of his cabinet, Polk directed
?ha Hanley should be restored: -I told the Secretary_ of Wa.^ that i
he was unwilling to write the letter ... I would do it myself. . .1
am r^solverthaf Col. Harney ^^-^ -^ be sacrificed o propitiate the
personal or political malice of Gen'l Scott" (ihid., 384-386).
39 -The truth is," he wrote, "that the old army officers have become
so in the habit of enjoying their ease, sitting in parlours and on carpeted
Hoors, that most of them have no energy and are content ^^ jpg on n a
regular routine without knowing whether they are taking care of the public
interest or not" {ibid., 431).
472 JAMES E. POLK
Wliile the President's mind was thus engrossed with details
concerning military contracts and pack-mules, Atocha returned
to Washington, on March 20, bearing Mexico 's reply to his offer
to negotiate a peace. "The question of Texas," said the Minister
of Foreign Relations, "was a cover to ulterior designs, which
now stand disclosed ' ' ; nevertheless his government would ' ' accede
cheerfully" to the invitation to appoint commissioners, but such
appointment would not be made ' ' unless the raising of the block-
ade of our ports and the complete evacuation of the territory of
the Republic by the invading forces shall be previously accepted
as a preliminary condition. ' '*"
For the present this communication put an end to all hope
of a peaceable adjustment, for Polk at once declared the condi-
tions to be "wholly inadmissible," leaving no alternative but a
"crushing movement" against Mexico. Buchanan interposed ob-
jections to an advance upon the Mexican capital, but
I [Polk] replied that I differed with him in opinion, & that I would
not only march to the City of Mexico, but that I would pursue Santa
Anna's army wherever it was, and capture or destroy it. I expressed the
opinion that if I had a projjer commander of the army, who would lay
aside the technical rules of war to be found in books, which required a
long train of baggage wagons; one who would go light & move rapidly,
I had no doubt Santa Anna & his whole army could be destroyed or
captured in a short time.
On the same evening rumors reached Washington that Taylor's
army was in great danger, consequently the President was still
more determined to deal Santa Anna a speedy and crushing
blow.''^
It is necessary at this point to turn aside from the adminis-
trative side of the war in order to give a brief sketch of the
militaj-y operations of Kearny in California, and of Scott *in his
campaign from Vera Cruz to Mexico City.
40 Monasterio to Buchanan, Feb. 22, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong.,
1 sess., 37-38). Also, Buchanan, Works, VII, 223-224.
41 Polk, Diary, II, 432-434.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 473
On September 25, 1846, liaviiig put his "organic law" in
operation in New Mexico, Kearny, with a force of three hundred
dragoons, set out for California. At Socorro, on October 6, he
met the scout. Kit Carson, who was on his way to Washington
with dispatches from Stockton and Fremont announcing the con-
quest of California and the subjugation of its inhabitants.*- As
this news seemed to indicate that no further trouble was to be
expected, Kearny sent back two hundred of his dragoons, and
retained but one hundred as a personal escort. He forwarded
the dispatches by another messenger, and Carson (much against
his will) was required to guide the way to California.
Eeaching the junction of the Colorado and Gila rivers on
November 23, Kearny's army intercepted a messenger bearing
mail from California to Sonora, and from tlie letters examined,
Kearny received his first intelligence of the uprising of the Cali-
fornians under General Flores.*^ On December 2 he reached
Warner's rancho, the most eastern settlement in California. Here
he was visited by an Englishman named Stokes, who volunteered
to carry a letter to Commodore Stockton, at San Diego. On
receipt of this letter (December 3) Stockton sent a small force
of thirty-nine men, under Captain Gillespie, to cooperate with
Kearny. At San Pascual, on December 6, Kearny's army fought
a battle with a Mexican force under Captain Andres Pico. A
greater number of Americans than Mexicans were killed, but as
Pico retreated, leaving Kearny in possession of the field, it was
called a victory.** As soon as the troops had recovered suffi-
ciently, Kearny proceeded on his way to the coast. At several
42 Porter, General Stephen W. Kearny and the Conquest of California,
11. This interesting pamphlet is a strong defense of Kearny 's conduct
in California.
43 Emory, Notes of a Military Reconnoissance ; H. Ex. Doc. 41, 30 Oong.,
1 sess., 9t>. This document gives a detailed account of Kearny's march
from Ft. Leavenworth to San Diego.
*i Bancroft, Hist, of California, V, 341 ff. See also Porter, op. cit., who
criticizes Bancroft and defends Kearny.
474 JAMES E. POLE
points Pico harassed his little army ; but on the evening of De-
cember 10 he was met by a body of marines sent by Stockton, and
two days later he reached San Diego in safety.''^
Kearny's instructions, as we have seen, authorized him to
take possession of California and to establish a temporary civil
government. All orders relating to that country which were
issued by the War Department clearly indicated that the Presi-
dent desired Kearny to have the chief command as soon as he
had reached California. Despite this fact Stockton, who had
constituted himself ' ' commander-in-chief and governor, ' ' declined
to surrender the command, even after Kearny had exhibited his
instructions, and until the arrival of other land forces, the general
was not in a position to assert his rights. He declined to accept
a subordinate command under Stockton, yet in the "second con-
quest" of California, which soon followed his arrival, he loyally
cooperated with the commodore.
When Kearny reached San Diego he found the country, ex-
cept a few of the seaports, in possession of the Flores revolution-
ists, whose headquarters were at Los Angeles. It had already
been planned that Fremont should attack Los Angeles from the
north. After consulting with Kearny, Stockton decided to move
north from San Diego for the purpose of striking Los Angeles
from the south. Having made the necessary preparations the
army left San Diego on December 29 under the nominal com-
mand of Stockton, although Kearny seems actually to have di-
rected the operations. An engagement occurred on January 8 at
San Gabriel River, and another on the following day near Los
Angeles. Flores and Pico now abandoned that city; the former
fled to Mexico, while the latter moved northward and surrendered
to Fremont on favorable terms. Although Stockton and Kearny
were displeased with Fremont 's assumption of authority in grant-
ing these terms to the enemy, they decided to avoid further
4.-. Emory, Notes, etc., 112-113.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 475
trouble b}' ratifying the agreement.^*' The "second conquest" of
California was now complete, and no further resistance was
offered to the authority of the United States.
Stockton and Fremont, still ignoring General Kearny's author-
ity, proceeded once more to set up a civil government. Kearny re-
turned to San Diego, and soon after repaired to Monterey, where
he found Commodore Shubrick, the successor of Stockton. Shu-
brick promptly recognized Kearny's authority, and the general
took steps to organize a civil government. Monterey was made
the capital city and on March 1, 1847, Kearny assumed the office
of governor. Having put the government in operation, he turned
it over to Colonel Richard B. Mason, on May 31, and set out for
Washington. By his order, Fremont accompanied him, under
separate escort, and at Fort Leavenworth the pathfinder was
put under arrest and ordered to report to the adjutant-general
in Washington.^' Both arrived at the capital city about the
middle of September and laid their respective complaints before
the Government. President Polk was very favorably impressed
with Kearny. He regarded the general as "a good officer & an
intelligent gentleman" and one who had "performed valuable
and important services in his late expedition to New Mexico &
California. "*«
After Kearny had filed charges against Fremont, Polk dis-
cussed with the cabinet the propriety of constituting a court of
inquiry instead of a court-martial. The latter tribunal was se-
lected. Benton and his soij-in-law, William Carey Jones, en-
deavored to have the scope of investigation broadened so that
Fremont might bring counter charges against his opponents, but
Polk would grant no favors even though he expected that his
refusal would subject him to the wrath of the whole Benton
40 Porter, op. cit., 25-29.
47 Bancroft, Hist, of Cah, V, 451-452. Porter, op. cit., 32-33.
4s Polk, Diari/, III, 168, 175.
476 JAMES E. POLK
clan/'' Fremont was convicted and sentenced to dismissal from
the army. The President approved the sentence of the court,
except on the charge of mutiny, but remitted the penalty and
ordered Fremont to report for duty. The pathfinder, however,
declined to accept this clemency, and sent in his resignation. As
the President had anticipated, approval of the court's verdict
caused an immediate break with Benton. All intercourse be-
tween the two men ceased as soon as Polk's decision was an-
nounced. About a year later a member of the Blair family told
Secret-ary Mason that Benton was about to publish one of Polk's
letters which would injure him in the eyes of the public. Unter-
rified by the threat, the President noted in his diary :
I told Judge Mason that he had no such letter. I do not know what
this means. I am, however, at the defiance of both Blair & Benton. The
former has proved himself to be unprincipled and the latter, I fear, is no
better. From the day I approved the sentence of the Court martial in
Col. Fremont's case, Col. Benton, for no other cause than that I dared to
do my duty, has been exceedingly hostile to me. He has not called on me,
nor have I spoken to him for more than twelve months. [Also, February
10, 1849.] There is every indication now that he [Benton] will join the
Whigs in the support of Gen'l Taylor, at all events until he can get offices
for his three sons-in-law. If I had failed to do my duty in Col. Fremont 's
case, and given an office which he sought for his Whig son-in-law (Jones)
he would never have quarreled with me. His course towards me and my
administration for more than a year past has been selfish and wholly
unprincipled.50
It was mainly on Benton's recommendation that Kearny had
been selected to lead the expedition to California, yet, after the
*o"i have always been upon good terms "nth Col. Benton," Polk noted
in his diary, "but he is a man of violent passions and I should not be sur-
prised if he became my enemy because all his wishes in reference to his
family" are not gratified. ... "I am resolved that Col. Fremont shall
be tried as all other officers are tried. I will grant him no favours or
privileges which I would not grant to any other officer, even though I sliould
incur his displeasure & that of his friends by refusing to do so" (ihid.,
177, 198, 204). See also page 203 where John Randolph Benton, the
Senator's son, threatened Polk for declining to give him an office.
•"'0 Polk, Diary, IV, 227, 330. For Benton's account of the court-martial,
see his Thirty Years' View, II, 715-719.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 477
court-martial, the Senator embraced every opportunity to deal
a blow at his former friend. When, in August, 1848, Polk nomi-
nated Kearny to be brevet major-general, Benton declared that
he would "speak out the balance of the Session, and defeat all
public measures before Congress, rather than suffer the vote on
Genl Kearny's nomination to be taken." In fulfillment of this
threat he harangued the Senate for thirteen days with execration
of Kearny and laudation of Fremont, at the end of which he an-
nounced that he would "break off," although he had not finished
a third of what he had intended to say.^'^ His effort failed to
produce the desired result, for Kearny's appointment was con-
firmed and he repaired to Mexico for service under Scott.
As already noted, Scott was chosen to supersede Taylor after
Congress refused to create the position of lieutenant-general. He
received notice of his appointment on November 18, 1846, and
within a few days he w^as on his way to Mexico. From New York
he sent an effusive letter to Taylor — praising that general's gal-
lantr^" and achievements but notifying him that he would be
deprived of a large part of his army. He realized that his action
would be "infinitely painful" to Taylor, but he relied upon the
general's "patriotism to submit to the temporary' sacrifice with
cheerfulness."'^^ According to the plans of operation decided
upon in Washington before Scott's departure, Taylor's duties
were to be confined to holding the territory' already conquered,
yet, as will soon appear, Scott greatly misjudged the cheerfulness
with which Taylor would leave himself exposed to attacks of the
enemy.
On November 12, nearly two weeks before Scott had written
from New York, Taylor informed the War Department that he
51 "I mean to show," he said, "that this brevet nomination of Gen-
eral Kearny ought to be rejected ; that the affair of San Pasqual was a
disastrous defeat, through his mismanagement; that his conduct in New
Mexico was unfortunate, and in California criminal; and that infamy, not
honor, settles upon his name" (Polk, Diary, TV, 59. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong.,
1 sess., App., 977-1040).
52 Scott to Taylor, Nov. 25, 1846 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 373).
478 JAMES K. POLK
was about to press forward into the enemy's country. As late
as January 7, 1847, he was only "unofficially advised" of Scott's
presence in Mexico. By that time he had driven the Mexicans
from Saltillo, Parras, and Victoria, while Commodore Perry had
captured the port of Tampico.^^
Althougli Scott arrived in New Orleans on December 19, it
was not until the middle of January that his several communi-
cations reached Taylor, and that the victorious general learned
that he was to be deprived of a large part of his army. With his
usual indiscretion, Scott had not only disclosed his plans to the
newspapers while at New Orleans, but when giving orders to his
subordinates, he intimated that Taylor was purposely keeping
at a distance so that he might avoid the orders of his superior.
In a letter written to Scott, Taylor indignantly repelled this
insinuation and complained of being left to face an enemy twenty
thousand strong with only a thousand regulars and a few vol-
unteers. "I cannot," he wrote,
misunderstand the object of the arrangements indicated in your letters.
1 feel that I have lost the confidence of the government, or it would not
have suffered me to remain, up to this time, ignorant of its intentions, with
so vitally affecting interests committed to my charge.
He felt "personally mortified and outraged" by such treatment,
yet he promised to obey the orders of his government so long as
he remained in Mexico. Soon after this, in a letter to the ad-
jutant-general, he gave vent to his resentment because he had not
been notified by special messenger of the government's determi-
nation to supersede him. He had been assigned to the command
by the President, and had he "chosen to be punctilious," he
would have declined to part with his troops without direct orders
from the same authority. However, he had decided not to follow
this course, and liis only regret was that the "President did not
think proper ... to relieve me from a position where I can no
longer serve the country with that assurance of confidence and
53 Letters of Taylor to Adj. Gen. (ibid., 374^388).
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 479
siippoi-t SO indispensable to success." He requested that this
letter might be submitted to the President." By this time
Tajdor was thinking of srrving the country in another capacity.
Nearly two months earlier he had decided to accept the nomi-
nation for the Presidency, should it be tendered to him.^'"'
Scott's answer to Taylor's letter was conciliatory in tone.
He passed over the caustic remarks which it contained by ex-
pressing a "wish to forget them." After explaining that condi-
tions had made it necessary to deal directly with Taylor's subor-
dinates without previously consulting him, he asked the general
to abandon Saltillo and to make no detachments, except for
reconno'issance beyond Monterey.^"
A few days after Scott had sent this letter, and before it had
reached its destination, Taylor received word that a reconnoi-
tering party which he had sent out on the road to San Luis Potosi
had been captured. He considered this disaster to be a direct
result of the "intrigue" of Marcy and Scott to discredit him,
and he resolved to tight Santa Anna, "be the consequences what
they may."^' His determination to hold Saltillo at all hazards
was not altered by the receipt of Scott's letter asking him to
withdraw to Monterey. It reached him while he was at Agua
Nueva, eighteen miles beyond Saltillo, and he notified Scott that
he would remain there unless "positively ordered to fall back
by the government at Washington. "=^ In a private letter he
alluded to the correspondence with Scott and said that "he &
myself now understand each other perfectly, & there can for the
future be none other than official intercourse between us." His
54Tavlor to Scott, Jau. 15; Taylor to Adj. Gen., Jan. 27, 1817 {ibid..
863, 1101).
55 Taylor to Wood, Dee. 10, 1846, Taylor Letters, 76.
56 Scott to Taylor, Jan. 26, 1847 {H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 864).
57 ' ' We now begin to see the fruits of the arrangements recently niaile
in Washington, by an intrigue of Marcy, Scott & Worth to take from me
nearly the whole of the regular forces under my command, while in the
immediate front of the enemy if not in their presence" (Taylor to Wood,
Jan, 30, 1847, Taylor Letters, 84).
58 Tavlor to Scott, Feb. 7, 1847 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 1162).
480 JAMES K. POLK
enemies, in his oi^inion, believed that he would leave Mexico in
disgust and that they might use such action to his disadvantage,
"but in this I shall disappoint them.""®
The main Mexican army, commanded by Santa Anna, was
stationed at San Luis Potosi. Taylor's perversity in refusing to
take Scott 's advice about falling back to ]\Ionterey left his army
in danger of being annihilated by a greatly superior force. How-
ever, he took a gambler's chance and won the battle of Buena
Vista. He had planned originally to meet the enemy at Agua
Nueva, but, on Santa Anna's approach, he fell back to Buena
Vista, within seven miles of Saltillo. The battle opened on the
afternoon of February 22 and lasted until dark on the following
day, when Santa Anna retreated toward San Luis with his thor-
oughly demoralized army. According to his own report, Taylor's
force numbered 4500 men, while Santa Anna commanded 20,000.*'°
Taylor's first reward for defeating the enemy at Buena Vista
was the receipt of a reprimand from the President and the Secre-
tary of "War. Marcy's letter, dated Januarj^ 27, rebuked him for
having, in his letter to Gaines, criticized the administration and
exposed the plans of campaign. Ignoring his own indiscretion
which had called forth the rebuke, Taylor was now "satisfied,"
according to his own statement, that "Scott, Marcj^ & Co. have
been more anxious to break me down" than to defeat Santa
Anna. Marcy had supposed him to be powerless since his troops
had been taken away, and consequently afraid to defend himself ;
"but he will find himself somewhat mistaken, & I have no doubt
when he gets my reply to his abusive & contemptable letter, he
will regret the course he has pursued." Believing Marcy to be
"entirely incompetent," he thought that friends of soldiers who
had fallen at Buena Vista should hold meetings and memorialize
the President to remove him and to recall Scott to Washington.''^
■>^ Taylor to Wood, Feb. 9, 1847, Taylor Letters, 85, 87.
00 Taylor to Scott, March 1, 1847 (H. Ex. Doc. 60. 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
1168).
01 Taylor to Wood, March 20, 1847, Taylor Letters, 90-91.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 481
Two weeks later he received a letter from Marcy«- which ex-
pressed the President's "high appreciation" of his "distin-
guished services," but this did not in the least remove his dis-
trust of the administration. It will be seen, however, that the
distrust on both sides resulted for the most part from misunder-
standings due to the slow means of communication.
Although General Scott, as we have seen, arrived at New
Orleans on December 19, 1846, it took until the middle of Feb-
ruary to assemble troops and make other preparations for his
attack upon Vera Cruz. On February 15 he set out from the
Brazos de Santiago, and, after stopping at Tampico and Lobos
Island, his fleet of transports appeared off the coral island of
Vera Cruz harbor on the fifth of March. Not knowing that Santa
Anna had gone to attack Taylor, Scott expected that his landing
would be vigorously opposed; but instead, he was able to land
his troops on the sandy beach in front of the city without resist-
ance from the enemy. For about four days American land bat-
teries and' the warships of Commodore Conner kept up a con-
tinuous bombardment, and on March 29 the Mexican commander
offered to capitulate. Scott took possession of both the city of
Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Uhia.''^'
After the battle of Buena Vista, Santa Anna set out for
Mexico City, where he took the oath of office as President and
adjusted a revolt of the clerical party .«* Leaving the govern-
ment in charge of a substitute President, he left the city on April
2, 1847, and prepared to meet Scott at the pass of Cerro Gordo,
about twenty miles east of Jalapa. He occupied a position very
difficult to approach, but in the battle of Cerro Gordo, which
occurred on the seventeenth and eighteenth, the forces of General
Scott won a comparatively easy victory. Within a few days
Jalapa and Perote were occupied without resistance, and on the
62Marcy to Taylor. April 3, 1847 (H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
1133).
63 Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 216-230.
64. See Eives, United States and Mexico, II, 391 ff.
482 JAMES E. POLK
fifteenth Worth took possession of Piiebla. While Scott was at
Jalapa, Trist arrived on the scene bearing a commission to nego-
tiate a treaty, but a discussion of the controversy which followed
his arrival is reserved for another place.
Late in May Scott left Jalapa and established his headquarters
at Puebla. Here he remained for several weeks, impatiently
awaiting reinforcements. His time, however, was fully, if not
profitably, occupied in quarreling and making friends with Trist,
in bombarding the War Department with complaints and denun-
ciations, and in a futile attempt to procure a peace treaty by
bribing the Mexican officials.
During the same period Santa Anna was in Mexico City
making preparations to defend the capital. By an act passed
on April 20, two days after the battle of Cerro Gordo, the Mex-
ican congress had authorized him to ' ' adopt all necessary mea-
sures to carry on the war," but had deprived him of the power
of making peace except with the consent of the congress.*'^ While
engaged in his military preparations he received Polk's offer to
negotiate a treaty, which Trist had transmitted by the aid of the
British minister. The action taken by Santa Anna and his con-
gress will be discussed in the next chapter ; it may be said here,
however, that nothing resulted at this time from Trist 's attempt
to negotiate. After he had received for his own use ten thousand
dollars from Scott's secret service fund, the Mexican President
decided that the time for peace had not yet arrived.
While encamped at Puebla, Scott 's army had been augmented
by troops which had arrived during the summer. The health of
his soldiers was much improved, and they had been made efficient
by constant drill. By the seventh of August, nearly four months
after the battle of Cerro Gordo, all of the reinforcements had
arrived and the army began its march on the City of Mexico.
The first engagement occurred at Contreras, where on the nine-
teenth and twentieth of August Scott's army won a signal victory
65 Ibid., 434.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 483
over its adversaries.*"' On tlie following day the Mexicans were
again defeated, and this time thoroughly demoralized, in the
battle of Churubusco. It is quite probable that if Scott had
chosen to pursue the enemy he could have entered the capital and
ended the war.^'
Scott, however, did not follow up the advantage gained at
Churubusco. Instead, he agreed to an armistice in order to
afford an opportunity for Trist to enter into negotiations with
commissioners appointed by Santa Anna. In his report to the
Secretary of War he admitted that he might have occupied the
capital "with but little additional loss," but Trist and himself
had "been admonished by the best friends of peace — intelligent
neutrals and some American residents— against precipitation."
This admonition and the fear that by "driving away the govern-
ment" peace would be delayed were the reasons assigned for
consenting to an armistice.«« The "intelligent neutrals" were
members of the British legation, and their opinions seem to have
carried more weight than did the wishes of his own government.
As will appear in the next chapter, Santa Anna's commissioners
declined to accept the terms offered by Trist, and the armistice
resulted simply in giving the Mexican army a chance to re-
cuperate.
The commissioners held their last meeting on September 6,
and on the same day Scott addressed a note to Santa Anna. In
it he stated that the armistice had been violated and that it would
be terminated at noon on the following day, unless by that time
he should receive "complete satisfaction" for the offenses which
had been committed. Santa Anna's reply was anything but
satisfactory, for he not only contradicted Scott's assertions but,
66 In reporting this battle to the Secretary of War, Seott wrote: "I
doubt whether a more brilliant or decisive victory ... is to be toimd on
record" {Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 308).
67 Eipley, War with Mexico, II, 283. Ripley ser^^ed on General Pillow's
staff.
68 Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 314.
484 JAMES K. POLK
in turn, charged tlie American commander with violating the
principles of civilized warfare.®" Such an exchange of courtesies
meant, of course, that hostilities would be renewed.
Unofficial news of Scott's victories and subsequent armistice
reached Washington on the fourteenth of September. As the
President had recently decided to force a peace by ordering Scott
to prosecute the war relentlessly and to defray his expenses by
levying contributions, he was not well pleased when he learned
of the truce. He noted in his diary :
Judging at this tlistance, I would think he should have improved his
victories by pressing the Mexican Government to an immediate decision
upon the terms of peace which Mr. Trist was authorized to offer to them,
and if they refused these terms I think he should have taken immediate
possession of the City, and levied contributions upon it for the support of
his army. I fear the armistice was agreed to by the Mexican Commander
only to gain time to re-organize his defeated army for further resistance. "o
On October 4, although he had already heard of the capture
of Mexico City, the President decided to recall Trist. "Mexico,"
he wrote, "must now first sue for peace, & when she does we will
hear her propositions."'^ Apparently, he had little hope that
the fall of the capital would induce the enemy to make peace,
for two days later Marcy, under his instructions, sent to Scott
new orders for continuing the war. He was told that reenforee-
ments were on the way. It was hoped that they would enable
him to "carry on further aggressive operations; to achieve new
conquests ; to disperse the remaining army of the enemy in your
vicinity, and prevent the organization of another." It was ex-
pected that he would conduct operations in the most effective
way to "induce the rulers and people of Mexico to desire and
consent to such terms of peace as we have a right to ask and
expect." One means of effecting this result was the levying of
00 Scott to Santa Anna, Sept. 6; Santa Anna to Scott, Sept. 7, ISVi
{Sen. Ex. Doe. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 340-348).
70 Polk, nUiry, III, 156, 170-172.
71 i])id., 185-186.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE CITY OF MEXICO 485
military contributions.'- These instructions did not reach Mexico
City until the middle of November, and at that time Scott did
not feel disposed to follow them.
On September 8, the day following the termination of the
armistice, Scott ordered Worth to make an attack on the Molino
del Rey (king's mill), which was erroneously reported to be used
as a cannon foundry." Worth succeeded in capturing the mill,
but not without severe loss. A few days later General Pillow
made a "successful, but bloody" attack upon the fortifications at
Chapultepec.'* Scott's army now began its advance on the cap-
ital city. Santa Anna offered further resistance at Belen and
San Cosme, but, on the night of September 13, he evacuated the
capital and withdrew to Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Although defeated and driven from the capital, Santa Anna
was not ready to lay down his arms. Being no\v thoroughly dis-
credited, there was but one hope of maintaining his authority,
namely, by achieving some unexpected military victory. He
therefore determined to fall upon the small garrison which Scott
had left to hold possession of Puebla. Having issued a decree
in which he resigned the Presidency and assigned the duties of
this office to Pefia y Peiia and two associates, he set out for
Puebla, where he arrived on the twenty-first of September. His
attempt to overwhelm the garrison ended in failure, as did, also,
an attempt to capture a force under General Joseph Lane which
was on its way from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. While near
Huamantla, Santa Anna received an order from Queretaro, dated
October 7, Avhich directed him to turn over his command to a
subordinate and to appear before a court of inquiry. He com-
plied with tlie first part of the order, but not with the second.
72Marcy to Seott, Oct. (i, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
138-140).
73 Hitchcock, Fi/f 1/ Years in Camp and Field, 296.
74 "In later years," was Grant's comment, "if not at the time, the
battles of Molino del Eey and Chapultepec have seemed to me to have been
whollv unnecessary" (Grant, Memoirs, I, 152-154).
486 JAMES K. POLK
After keeping under cover in Mexico until the following spring,
he set out for Jamaica, there to await a favorable opportunity to
regain his lost power.
The order which came from Queretaro, and which deprived
Santa Anna of his command, was dictated by Peiia y Peiia, who
claimed the right to exercise the office of President, not by virtue
of Santa Anna's decree, but by the constitution and the laws of
the republic. We are not here interested in the validity of this
claim. For our present purpose we are interested simply in the
fact that Pena's action removed Santa Anna from control and
opened the way for a resumption of negotiations. These and
earlier negotiations will be discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER XX
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO
In January, 1847, as we have noted in the preceding chapter,
President Polk, in response to overtures made by Atoeha, invited
the Mexican government to send commissioners to Havana or to
Jalapa for the purpose of negotiating a treaty with diplomatic
representatives of the United States. In March, Atoeha, who
had carried the invitation to Mexico, returned to Washington with
the reply that Mexico would not consent to appoint commissioners
unless the raising of the blockade and the evacuation of Mexican
territory "shall be previously accepted as a preliminary con-
dition." Polk at once pronounced such terms to be "wholly
inadmissible" and decided to deal a crushing blow at Mexico City.
Before Atoeha had set out on his journey to Mexico, and while
the personnel of the proposed commission was under discussion,
Buchanan expressed a desire to be chosen as one of the number.
"I told him," wrote the President, "it struck me favourably,
but that if he went he must do so in his character of Secretary
of State, & go alone & without being associated with others."^
When the conditons demanded by Mexico became known there
was, of course, no immediate necessity for making an appoint-
ment.
The idea of creating a commission which might accompany
the army and take advantage of the first opportunity to negotiate
a peace appears to have originated in the fertile brain of Senator
Benton. He suggested such a commission in December, 1846,
i"I told him," Polk continued, "that would be due to his position, &
that the adniinistration, if he went alone, would be entitled to the whole
credit of the arrangement. It seemed to strike him favourably. Indeed
I had no doubt he was highly delighted with the idea" (Polk, Diary, H,
338).
488 JAMES K. POLK
Avhen the President had under consideration the appointment of
Benton to the position of lieutenant-general. His plan provided
for three commissioners who were to accompany the main army
and who were to be clothed with full diplomatic powers. Polk
approved the suggestion and mentioned Slidell as one of the
number. To this Benton interposed vigorous objections and, in
turn, proposed the names of John J. Crittenden, Silas Wright,
and himself. The President was willing to nominate any of the
men named, but he did not wish to slight Slidell, who had already
performed valuable services in Mexico. Benton would not yield
his objections to Slidell 's appointment, and the matter was
dropped.- The Senator's next attempt to procure a diplomatic
appointment was his request, during the following March, that
the President should make him commander-in-chief of the army
and invest him with power to negotiate a treaty.^
When, on March 20, 1847, Atocha returned to Washington
bearing an unsatisfactory reply to the American offer, the Presi-
dent announced to the cabinet his intention to "lay aside the
technical rules of war to be found in books ' ' and to crush Santa
Anna at all hazards.* His belligerent mood, however, did not
preclude a desire for peace at the earliest possible moment.
Nothing occurred which led the President to believe that
Mexico might of necessity be ready to accept his peace terms
until April 10, when news of the fall of Vera Cruz reached Wash-
ington. The effect of this news upon Polk's determination to
appoint an ambulatory commissioner and liis reasons for selecting
Nicholas P. Trist to fill the position are recorded in his own
memorandum of a cabinet meeting held on that day :
The subject of consideration today was the Mexican War. I had
several times mentioned to Mr. Buchanan the importance of having a
commissioner vested with Plenipotentiary powers, who should attend the
headquarters of the army ready to take advantage of circumstances as
they might arise to negotiate for peace. 1 stated to the Cabinet to-day
2 Ibid., 2fi2-270. ■'! Ibid.. 41 L\
* Ibid., 4.32. On tliis same day the mails brought the news of the battle
of Buena Vista.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 489
that such was my opinion, and that I thought it more imjtortant since the
news of the recent victories, and especially since the information received
this morning of the fall of Vera Cruz & the Castle of San juan D 'Ulloa.
All the members of the Cabinet present concurred in this ojjinion. The
embarrassment in carrying it out consisted in the selection of a suitable
commissioner or commissioners who would be satisfactory to the country.
This was a great difficulty. Such is the jealousy of the different factions
of the Democratic party in reference to the next Presidential Election
towards each other that it is impossible to appoint any prominent man or
men without giving extensive dissatisfaction to others, and thus jeopar-
dizing the ratification of any Treaty they might make. In this also the
Cabinet were agreed. I stated that I preferred that the Secretary of State
should be the sole commissioner to negotiate the Treaty, & that I wouhl
have no hesitation in deputing him on that special service if the Mexican
authorities had agreed to appoint commissioners on their part, but as they
had refused to do this he could not attend the head-quarters of the army
for an indefinite period of time and with no assurance whether the Mex-
ican authorities would agree to negotiate. Mr. Buchanan expressed his
entire concurrence in this view. He said he would be willing to go in
person if there was any assurance that negotiations would be speedily
opened, but under the circumstances & with our present information he
could not, of course, think of going. Mr. Buchanan then suggested that
Mr. N. P. Trist, the chief clerk of the Department of State, might be
deputed secretly with Plenipotentiary powers to the head-quarters of the
army, and that it might be made known that such a person was with the
army readj' to negotiate. Mr. Trist, he said, was an able man, perfectly
familiar with the Spanish character and language, & might go with special
as well as defined instructions. The suggestion struck me favourably.
After much conversation on the subject it was unanimously agreed by the
Cabinet that it would be proper to send Mr. Trist, and that he should take
with him a Treaty drawn up by the Secretary of State approved by the
Cabinet, which he should be authorized to tender to the Mexican Govern-
ment, and to conclude [a treaty] with them if they would accept it; but
that if they would not accept it, but would agree to appoint commis-
sioners to negotiate, that Mr. Trist should in that event report the fact to
his Government, when Mr. Buchanan could go out as the commissioner.
After the entire cabinet had approved such a mission, Trist was
sent for and the nature of the mission explained. He accepted
the appointment. He and all others cognizant of the President's
diplomatic venture were pledged to profound secrecy.^
^ Ibid., 46.5-468. Of the necessity for secrecy Polk A\Tote: "To give
publicity to such a movement before it was commenced, and to have the
federal papers giving their own version of it, and, as their habit is, to have
490 JAMES K. POLK
Although Trist, as we have just noted, was selected on the
recommendation of Buchanan, his past career and his qualifica-
tions were not entirely unknown to tlie President. He had studied
law under Jefferson, whose granddaughter he had married, and
after a brief term of service as clerk in the Treasury Department
President Jackson had made him his private secretary. In 1833
he was appointed consul at Havana by Jackson, and, after eight
years of service in that capacity, he was recalled by Tyler because
he had been charged by Great Britain with having aided the slave
trade in Cuba. Similar charges had been made during Van
Buren's administration, and even his brother-in-law, Thomas
Jefferson Randolph, advised Van Buren to remove him unless
they were disproved. "Mr. Trist is disinterested and honor-
able, ' ' said Randolph, ' ' his judgment I have never confided in ;
whatever his errors may have been they have been doubtless of
his judgment, but indiscretions may be carried too far."" This
characterization seems apposite to his entire career. Bad judg-
ment and inordinate conceit were his besetting sins.
Shortly after Polk's inauguration, Trist began to importune
the new President for office and to enlist the influence of the
Donelson family in his behalf.^ Unsuccessful at first, he was,
on August 28, 1845, given a commission as chief clerk in the
Department of State. ^
In appointing Trist to conduct the negotiations with Mexico
the President, as it turned out, made a most unfortunate selec-
tion; yet in passing judgment upon the President's act, the
them by every moans in their power thwarting the objects of tlie Govern-
ment by disc'ouraginfj the enemy to accede to the measure, would in all
Ijrobability bo to defeat it, hence the necessity of secrecy." Trist 's appoint-
ment was not, of course, ratified by the Senate.
c Eandolph to Van Buren, Dec. 16, 1839, Van Buren- Palmers.
" Trist to Polk, March 14 and April 2, Trist Papers. Polk 's name
does not appear on the latter, but it speaks of "your Inaugural." With
customary indiscretion lie lectured the President on the meaning of
sovereignty.
f' Buchanan to Trist on that date "hereby appointing" him to that
position {Trist Papeys).
TEEATT OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 491
special task which was assigned to the commissioner slionld be
taken into consideration. He was given a definite project of a
treaty for submission to the Mexican government, with but little
discretion to alter its terms. In case Mexico should prove un-
willing to accept the essential parts of the project, but never-
theless willing to negotiate, it was Polk's intention to appoint
Buchanan or some other qualified person, or persons, to conduct
the negotiations. A task so definitely limited did not require a
diplomat of the first rank.
Having decided to send Trist to Mexico, Polk directed P>u-
chanan to prepare a project of a treaty and, also, a reply to the
Mexican communication which had been brought back by Atocha.
Buchanan's draft of a treaty was submitted and fully dis-
cussed at a cabinet meeting held on the thirteenth of April. It
fixed the boundary of Texas at the Rio Grande, and provided that
New Mexico and both Upper and Lower California should be
ceded to the United States. Another article stipulated that the
United States should have the right of transit across the isthmus
of Tehuantepec. In addition to the assumption of the claims of
its citizens against Mexico, the United States was to pay the
sum of fifteen million dollars. In the President's opinion, the
sum named was too large, but, if necessary, he was willing to go
as high as thirty millions. The Secretary of State still opposed
increasing the amount. Walker attached greater importance to
the free passage across the isthmus than to the cession of both
New Mexico and the Californias. If this could be procured he
was willing to pay thirt}^ millions, otherwise not. H-e wished it
to be made a sine qua non. "To this," said Polk, "I objected
& stated that it constituted no part of the object for which we
had entered the War" — an indirect admission that he had en-
tered the war to acquire territory. Finally, all agreed to accept v
the President 's terms. Nothing was made a sine qua non except
the acquisition of Upper California and New Mexico — the Rio
492 JAMES K. FOLK
Grande boundary being considered as already settled.^ The pro-
ject in its final form provided for cession to the United States
of both Californias and New Mexico, while the United States
agreed to assume the claims and to pay fifteen million dollars ; but
Trist's instructions stipulated the modifications which he might
make.
The instructions covered the points agreed upon at the cabinet
meeting of April 13 (see note 9) and, in addition, authorized
Trist to incorporate, if necessary, an article guaranteeing rights
to the inhabitants similar to those stipulated in the treaty by
which Louisiana had been acquired. Should such an article be
included he was to insist upon a provision which would invali-
date all recent land grants. Should he fail to make a treaty, he
was authorized to arrange for a peace commission, provided that
"a reasonable prospect shall exist" that Mexican commissioners
would agree to the ultimata already specified by the United
States.
Under the same date (April 15) as the instructions to Trist,
Buchanan prepared a letter to the Mexican Minister of Foreign
Relations. It was a reply to the minister's note of February 22
which Atocha had brought back and in which Santa Anna had
declined to treat unless the blockade were raised and Mexican
territory evacuated. It also informed the Mexican government
of the purpose of Trist's mission. In this letter Buchanan said
that a demand such as Mexico had made was both unprecedented
and unreasonable — that "the war can never end whilst Mexico
refuses even to hear the proposals" which the United States has
always been ready to make. "The President," he continued,
0 Polk, Diary, II, 468, 471-475. The maximum amounts to be paid were
to be governed bv the cessions procured — $30,000,000 for all desired;
.$2.").000,000, without passage across the isthmus; .$20,000,000 if only Upper
California and New Mexico could be obtained. Trist was to reduce these
amounts, if possible. Polk 's vieAvs on territorial expansion are expressed
very clearly in his diary entry for January 5, 1847: "NeAV Mexico and
California is all that can ever probal)ly be acquired by Treaty, and indeed
all that I think it important to acquire" {ibid., 308).
TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 493
"will not again renew the offer to negotiate, at least until he
shall have reason to believe that it would be accepted by the
Mexican Government. ' '^°
On April 16, 1847, Trist set out for Mexico bearing his in-
structions and the project of a treaty and, also, Buchanan's letter
to the Mexican minister. Marcy instructed Scott to deliver the
last mentioned document to the Mexican commander with a
request that it should be laid before the government.^' The
secrecy with which the President tried to envelop the mission'-
was of short duration. On April 21 he was chagrined by dis-
covering in the New York Herald a letter which gave a very
accurate account of Trist 's mission and its purposes." William
S. Derrick, a Whig clerk in the State Department, who had as-
sisted in copying the documents, at once became the object of
suspicion, but the source of the leakage could not be ascertained.
Arriving at Vera Cruz on May 6, 1847, Trist hastened to tell
Buchanan "the results of his [my] reflections" since his depar-
ture from Washington as well as his opinions on affairs in Mex-
ico." With characteristic egotism he immediately assumed re-
sponsibilities which were never intended for him. A military
detachment, selected by himself, was sent on ahead as bearer to
General Scott of Buchanan's letter to the Mexican government,
10 Project and instructions, Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 81-89.
Buchanan to Min. of For. Eel., April 15, 1817 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong.,
1 sess., 38-40). All are printed in Buchanan, Works, VII, 267-279. Trist 's
commission and a copy of his authority from Walker to draw on the U. S.
treasury for $3,000,000 (both dated April 15) are among Trist 's papers.
11 Marcy to Scott, April 14, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
118-119).
12 On the day of Trist 's departure Polk wrote in his diarj': "Had his
mission and the object of it been proclaimed in advance at Washington
I have no doubt there are persons in Washington, and among them Editors
of the National Intelligencer, who would have been ready and willing to
have despatched a courrier to Mexico to discourage the Government of that
weak and distracted country from entering upon negotiations for peace"
(Diary, II, 479).
rs Ihid.. 482-483. "I have not been more vexed or excited," noted the
President, "since I have been President than at this occurrence."
14 Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 153-156.
494 JAMES K. POLE
the confidential instructions from Marcy, as well as a letter from
Trist himself. His failure to deliver these documents directly
was the main cause of the misunderstanding which followed.
Marcy 's letter to Scott^^ explained that Trist had been in-
vested with authority to arrange for a suspension of hostilities,
and
Should he make known to you, in writing, that the contingency has
occurred in consequence of which the President is willing that further
military operations should cease, you will regard such notice as a direction
from the President to suspend them until further orders from the depart-
ment, unless continued or recommended by the enemy.
In addition, Scott was informed that Trist bore a communication
from Buchanan to the Minister of Foreign Relations, and he w^as
instructed to "transmit that despatch to the commander of the
Mexican forces, with a request that it may be laid before his
government. ' '
The communication which Scott was thus ordered to trans-
mit to the Mexican general had been sealed, but Trist carried a
copy which the Washington officials expected him to show to
Scott at the time of delivering the original. As already noted,
however, Trist did not personally deliver the communication to
General Scott. He forwarded it from Vera Cruz, wnthout in-
closing a copy ; besides, his own letter, which accompanied it, did
not explain fully the nature of his mission.
When the documents reached Scott at Jalapa on May 7 other
things besides the absence of Trist 's copy of Buchanan's letter
tended to make the general both suspicious and irritable. Wliile
at New Orleans he had learned of the President's attempt to
make Benton a lieutenant-general, and, as a result, he regarded
Polk as "an enemy more to be dreaded than Santa Anna and all
his hosts. "^^ Although "very slightly" acquainted in Wash-
ington, Trist and Scott had, according to the general's account,
i-> Dated April 14 (ibid., 118-119).
i« Scott, Autobiography, II, 400, 403.
TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 495
developed "feelings of mutual dislike." Indeed, Scott foolishly-
thought that Trist's "well-known prejudice against him [me]
had had much weiglit in his appointment." Then, too, the gen-
eral had concluded from a conversation held in Washington that
Polk had originally intended to invest him with diplomatic
powers — a fact which made him all tlie more resent Trist's ap-
pearance in Mexico."
Nettled by w^hat he considered to be encroachments upon his
authority, and without waiting to learn all of the facts, Scott
entered into an indiscreet and insolent correspondence with both
Trist and Marcy. "I have just received your note of yester-
day," he wrote to Trist, "accompanied by communications to
me from the Secretary of War, and one (sealed!) from the De-
partment of State to the minister of foreign affairs of the re-
public of Mexico." After complaining that the army had been
weakened by sending the detachment to carry the dispatches from
Vera Cruz, and declining to "commit the honor" of his govern-
ment by having any direct agency in "forwarding the sealed
despatch you have sent me from the Secretary of State," the
general indignantly continued:
I see that the Secretary of War proposes to degrade me, by requiring
that I, the commander of this army, shall defer to you, the chief clerk of
the Department of State, the question of continuing or discontinuing
hostilities.
I beg to say to him and to you, that here, in the heart of a hostile
country, from which, after a few weeks, it would be impossible to with-
draw this army without a loss, probably, of half its numbers .... this
army must take military security for its own safety. Hence, the question
of an armistice or no armistice is, most peculiarly, a military question,
appertaining, of necessity, if not of universal right, in the absence of
direct instructions, to the commander of the invading forces; consequently,
i- Ibid., 576. There is no reason for believing that Polk ever intended
to give Scott such an appointment. The entries in his diary concerning
possible commissioners do not mention Scott's name, and from the first,
he had a vorv poor opinion of the General 's discretion and judgment. Scott 's
own account admits that Polk merely left him ' ' half at liberty to believe ' '
that lie might be associated A\-ith Wright or some other eminent statesman,
for "What could have been more natural ?"(! )
496 JAMES E. POLK
if you are not clothed with military rank over me, as well as with diplo-
matic functions, I shall demand, under the peculiar circumstances, that,
in your negotiations, if the enemy should entertain your overtures, you
refer that question to me, and all the securities belonging to it.i*
We need not wonder that Trist was provoked by tlie tone of
Scott's letter; still, there was no good reason why he should
commit the folly of following the example set by his adversary.
A little common sense on his part might, no doubt, have smoothed
the ruffled feathers of the irate general. Common sense, how-
ever, was a quality of which Trist seldom availed himself. In-
stead of awaiting a personal interview, at which he might have
shown his own instructions and a copy of Buchanan's "sealed"
letter, thereby removing the general 's misapprehensions, he chose
to answer Scott not only in writing but in language still more
abusive than that used bj' the general himself.
A man possessed of Trist 's peculiar characteristics very nat-
urally preferred written replies to oral explanations. Quite as
vain as Scott himself, proud of his rhetoric and insinuating in-
vective, he was so facile a writer that he could cover folio pages
more easily tlian most persons can write sentences. The fatigue
experienced by any one who peruses his tedious and rambling
discourses was equaled, apparently, by the pleasure which their
author had in penning them. It would have been unreasonable,
therefore, to expect him to forego the pleasure of writing, even
though a commonplace interview might more effectively have
answered the purpose for which he had been sent to Mexico.
While camped at San Juan del Rio, on May 9, he began his
reply, and installments were added whenever the army halted
on its march to Jalapa. It was finished after that place had been
reached and sent to Scott, along with another letter, on the
twenty-first of May.
18 Scott to Trist, May 7, 1847 (Sen. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 120-121).
A copy of this letter, accompanied by a very crisp note, was sent to Marcy
on the same day (ibid., 119).
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 497
Some of his remarks were sensible and to the point. When
he had sent his brief note from Vera Cruz, he told Scott, he did
not anticipate that a correspondence between them would arise,
"or that any communication whatever would be made on your
part until I should have the pleasure of congratulating you in
person upon the brilliant success which has attended your move-
ments." He pointed out, also, that his instructions, which he
had intended to show on his arrival, would have made clear to
the general that hostilities were to be suspended only after the
conclusion of a treaty, and not at the caprice of the chief clerk
of the State Department. He reminded Scott that the order to
transmit the diplomatic note to the Mexican counnander had come
directly from the President— an officer who surely had a right
to issue it. Commodore :^erry, he said, had not caviled at a
similar order sent to him— due perhaps to the want of "discern-
ment" or to "his not having equal reason for believing his own
personal consequence to be so excessive.
Having made clear to Scott that the purposes of the govern-
ment had been misapprehended, Trist might well have rested his
case. He chose, however, to show 'the general that these mis-
apprehensions had resulted from Scott's own density of intellect,
jealousy and self-esteem. After stating that there had been no
intention to interfere with the general's proper military func-
tions, he continued:
In a word, sir, the course determined upon by our government, respect-
ing the suspension of hostilities, is what any man of plain, unsophisticated
common sense would take for granted that it must be; and it is not what
your exuberant fancy and overcultivated imagination would make it.
Marcy's letter, however, was rather ambiguous on this point,i'»
whatever might have been taken for granted. In a sarcastic vein
Trist accused Scott of being piqued because the President had
not selected him to negotiate with Mexico. Admitting that
Polk might not have been "duly sensible" of Scott's superior
19 See above, p. 494.
498 JAMES K. POLK
qualifications for performing such a service, yet, he did not see
that the bhiiiie shouki rest upon tlie one who luid been selected
to perform it. In any ease, said he, it was the general's duty to
obey orders from Washington, whether documents were sealed
or unsealed.
This reply to the "tirade against our government," as Trist
called Scott's letter, was inclosed in another letter dated May
20, 1847. After informing the general that more important
business would "compel me to decline the honor of maintaining
a correspondence with you," he ordered Scott to transmit
Buchanan's note to its intended destination.-"^ Happy in the
belief that he had "finished" the "greatest imbecile" that he had
ever encountered, Trist thought, apparently, that his fulmina-
tions would be approved by the President.-^
On May 20 — the day before he had been finished by receiving
Trist 's letters — Scott wrote from Jalapa an insolent letter to
Secretary Marcy. He had, of course, received Marcy's somewhat
ambiguous instructions, but he had made no attempt to learn
from Trist the real intentions of his government. In it he said :
Mr. Trist arrived here on the 14th instant. He has not done me the
honor to call upon nie. Possibly he has thought the compliment of a
first visit was due to him! I learn that he is writing a reply to my
answer to him dated the 7th instant. ... Tt is not probable that I shall
find leisure to read his reply, much less to give a rejoinder.
20 SoK Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 159- KiS.
21 On May 15, while the letter to Scott was being prepared, he said in a
letter to Mrs. Trist: "There is a most extraordinary state of things here
between myself & General Scott — decidedly the greatest imbecile (and rend-
ered so by his utter selfishness & egregious vanity) that I ever had any thing
to do with. If I don 't finish him I will give any body leave to say that
all the time I have passed in study has been passed in vain. Show this to Mr.
B[uchanan] who can show it to the President." His egotism and his desire
for notoriety is still further exlvibited in a letter Avritten to Mrs. Trist on
May 21. She was instructed to tell Buchanan that he had made his letter
to Scott long "in order that he [Scott] should not have a hair's breadth of
ground left to support hiin. and because I knew that this correspondence
will make much noise & jiroduce such excitement that what is said in my
letter will be read by 100 persons to duc who would read the same thing
better said in editorials of the Union or any other paper. This is my
conviction, & this is wliat supports me tlirough the task. If I liave not
demolished liini. then 1 give uj)'' {Trist Papers).
TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO
499
It should be noted that when this was written Scott had received
no couiniunication from Trist except a brief announcement of
his arrival at Vera Cruz. The fact that Trist subsequently proved
himself to be quite as devoid of judgment as was Scott himself
can be no excuse for the general's attitude at this time. Besides,
no matter what Trist 's qualifications may have been, he was,
nevertheless, the diplomatic representative of the President, and
it was no part of Scott's proper military functions to abuse or
to ignore him. As superior in authority to both of them the
President had a right to command their services.
In another paragraph, Scott expressed resentment because
Polk had thought of investing both Benton and Taylor with diplo-
matic powers, while the same had been withheld from himself.
It was quite natural, perhaps, that he should have felt hurt
because of this discrimination, but surely he had no right to
claim functions not purely military.
His complaint regarding Marcy's instructions was based on
more valid grounds, although he had wholly misinterpreted the
wishes of the administration. "I understand your letter," he
told Marcy, "as not only taking from me ... . all voice or
advice in agreeing to a truce with the enemy, but as an attempt
to place me under the military command of Mr. Trist." After
quoting a passage from the Secretary 's letter, he added : ' ' That
is, I am required to respect the judgment of Mr. Trist here on
passing events, purely military, as the judgment of the President,
who is some two thousand miles off!" There was, he said, one
other instance like it in American history— when Bancroft ni
1845 instructed Taylor to obey the orders of Donelson— and "I
wrote to General Tavlor, with the permission of both Mr. Ban-
croft and yourself, to correct that blunder. ' ' He closed by statnig
that he would cheerfully obey direct orders of the President, but
not those of the "chief clerk of the State Department. "^^
22 Scott to Marcy, May 20, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
124^127).
500 JAMES K. FOLK
Scott was neither "finished" nor "demolished" b.y Trist's
rhetorical effusions, which were handed to him as he was about
to leave Jalapa. On May 29, having readied Puebla, he acknowl-
edged their receipt and informed their autlior that he had taken
the precaution to have them opened in the presence of staff
officers. Said he :
My first impulse was to return the farrago of insolence, conceit and
arrogance to the author; but on reflection, I have determined to preserve
the letters as a choice specimen of diplomatic literature and manners.
The Jacobin convention of France never sent to one of its armies in the
field a more amiable and accomplished instrument. If you were armed
with an ambulatory guillotine, you would be the personification of Danton,
Marat, and St. Just, all in one.
After expressing gratitude to the President for not having de-
graded him by associating him with Trist on a peace commission,
Scott asked the diplomat to make his future communications
purely official, for
If you dare to use the style of orders or instructions again, or to
indulge yourself in a single discourteous phrase, I shall throw back the
communication with the contempt and scorn which you merit at my
hands. -3
While the President was absent from Washington, attending
Commencement exercises at the University of North Carolina,
Marcy received and answered Scott's note of May 7, in which the
general's first letter to Trist (same date) had been inclosed.
In a statesman-like manner — and a style in i)leasing contrast
with the extravagant language employed by the general and the
diplomat — the Secretary of War pointed out that Scott's "dis-
tressing apprehensions of being degraded ' ' had resulted entirely
from his not having waited to ascertain the nature of Trist's
mission. He had no doubt that "more reflection and better
information" would remove the general's fears. Trist, said
Marcy, had been instructed to submit all documents to Scott for
23 Scott to Trist, May 29, 1847 {ihid., 172-173). Original in Trist Papers.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 501
examination ; and had the general, instead of declining to see
Trist, read the docnments, he would have seen that nothing
unusual had been asked of him.-*
Apparently, the Washington officials believed that the teapot
tempest raging at Jalapa would be quelled by the information
contained in Marcy's letter, for Polk made no mention of the
incident in his diary until the arrival, on June 12, of Scott's
insulting letter of May 20th. This, of course, was written before
Seott had received Marcy's letter; but it showed that the general
had made no effort to ascertain the facts, although Trist had
been at his camp for nearly a week. In another respect this com-
munication was more offensive than the note of May 7, which
had been received during the President's absence. That had
been addressed to Trist and simply inclosed in a brief note to the
Secretary of War ; the letter just received was addressed to Marcy
himself, and, as noted above, was both impudent and defiant.
Little wonder that Polk pronounced it "highly exceptionable in
character. ' ' He wrote in his diary :
It appears that Gen '1 Scott has taken offense because Mr. Trist was
sent to his Head Quarters as a Commissioner invested with Diplomatic
Powers & full authority to conclude a Treaty of peace. He desired to
be invested with this power himself, and although Mr. Trist had been
at his camp for six days at the date of his despatch, he states he had not
seen him. It is clear from his despatch, as well as one of previous date
enclosing a letter from Gen '1 Scott to Mr. Trist, that he would not co-
operate with Mr. Trist in accomplishing the object of his mission, the
conclusion of an honourable peace. His two last despatches are not only
insubordinate, but insulting to Mr. Trist and the Government. I gave
my views on the subject, in which the Cabinet unanimously concurred.
In accordance with them I directed the Secretary of War to prepare a
despatch to General Seott rebuking him for his insubordinate course, and
repeating the order in a peremptory manner to him to carry the despatch
borne to him by Mr. Trist addressed to the Mexican Government to that
Government, and requiring an immediate answer, to be returned by the
bearer of the despatch, whether he had obeyed or intended to obey the
former order of the Secretary of "War. He deserves for his conduct in
24 Marcy to Scott, May 31, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
121-124).
502 JAMES E. POLK
this matter to be reinovetl from the eommaiid. I t'oncluile[il], however, to
delay acting on his conduct until his answer to the communication which
I this day ordered to be addressed to him shall be received Gen'l
Scott arrogates to himself the right to be the only proper channel through
whom the U. S. Government can properly communicate with the Govern-
ment of Mexico on any subject; which is an assumption wholly unwar-
rantable & which I will not tolerate. The truth is that I have been com-
pelled from the beginning to conduct the war against Mexico through the
agency of two Gen 'Is highest in rank who have not only no sympathies
with the Government, but are hostile to my administration. Both of
them have assumed to control the Government. To this I will not submit
& will as certainly remove Gen '1 Scott from the chief command, as she
[he] shall refuse or delay to obey the order borne to him by Mr. Trist.
My doubt is whether I shall delay to remove him until I can hear further
from him. 25
A few days later the President declared that should Scott
persist in disobeying- orders he would have the general arrested
and tried by court-martial. But his caution was stronger than
his resentment. He took no step until he had consulted the
cabinet, and although fearful that Scott's "arrogance & inord-
inate vanity" might have jeopardized peace by causing delay,
he decided to await further news from Mexico. Marey and
Buchanan were instructed to inform the commander and the
diplomat that their conduct had been highly displeasing to the
President. Surely he had ample cause for being displeased, for
seldom, if ever, has an}' President had to cope with such folly
and such insolence on the part of his agents.
Elated by the thought that he had "finished'' General Scott,
won the approval of the President, and achieved fame by news-
paper commendation, Trist must have been shocked when in-
formed by Buchanan that his orders to Scott were botli super-
fluous and unwarranted. He was told that when he had placed
the communication to the Mexican government in the hands of
Scott his "whole duty respecting it was then perfoi-med"; and
if the general did not obey orders he was answerable neither to
the Department of State nor to the commissioner, but to the
2s Polk, Diarii, III, .jT-oO.
TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 503
military branch of the government. He was directed by the
President, said Buchanan, to avoid personal altercations, and to
submit to Scott his instructions and the project of a treaty.-"
Marcy's letter to Scott once more expressed surprise that the
general could have so misconceived his instructions. There had,
said the Seci-etary, been no intention to jiut him under the com-
mand of Trist in any particular. The President had ordered
him [Scott] to transmit a document to the Mexican connuander
and
ho [Polk] is ^vliolly unable to conceive how you can reconcile with duty and
subordination the making of it a topic of remark, I may say of incidental
reproof of your common superior, in an official communication to a sub-
ordinate officer in anotlier branch of the public service.27
While Marcy was writing the above letter another note from
Scott was on its way to Washington. Unlike its predecessor this
note did not breathe defiance, but with childlike petulance the
general asked to be recalled. He inclosed a copy of his rejoinder
to Trist 's last epistle which, with his usual facility at phrase
coining, he called a "flank battery" planted against him amidst
critical military operations. "Considering," said he, "the many
cruel disappointments and mortifications I have been made to
feel since I left Washington, or the total want of suppoi't and
sympathy on the part of the War Department which I have so
long experienced, I beg to be recalled."-^
The President was absent on a tour of the northeastern states
when Scott's letter reached Washington. After his return, this
letter as well as a communication from Trist, dated June 3, was
considered at a cabinet meeting held on the ninth of June. Polk
had good reason for thinking that these dispatches disclosed a
"wretched state of things" in Mexico. He writes:
20 Buchanan to Trist, June 14, 1847 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
112-113).
27 Marcy to Scott, June lo, 1847 {ibid., 127-129).
28 Scott to Marcy, June 4, 1847 {ihid., 130-131).
504 JAMES K. POLK
Gen'l Scott has written foolish & hitter letters to Mr. Trist & Mr.
Trist has written as foolish a letter to him. Between them the orders
of the Secretary of War & the Secretary of State have been disregarded;
the danger has become imminent that because of the personal controversy
between these self important personages, the golden moment for conclud-
ing a peace with Mexico may have passed. Gen'l Scott's last despatch
to the Secretary of War is full of passion & vanity & is highly insub-
ordinate. In view of the whole case & of the present critical condition
of affairs in Mexico, I submitted to the Cabinet for their advice whether
they should not both be recalled.
The cabinet agreed in condemning the conduct of both men, but
it was not deemed expedient to recall them. Consenting to await
further developments, the President directed Buchanan and
Marcy to command their respective subordinates to "cease their
correspondence and personal controversy and to act in harmony,
each in his respective sphere, in obeying the orders, and carrying
out the views of the government." He suggested sending some
one to act with Trist, and mentioned Pierre Soule in this con-
nection ; but no appointment was made.-**
On July 14 Colonel Wilson set out for Mexico, bearing the
new instructions which had been prepared by the two cabinet
officers and revised by the President. In his letter to Trist,
Buchanan once more emphasized the fact that so far as the com-
munication to the Mexican government was concerned Trist was
simply the bearer of the dispatch for delivery into the hands of
General Scott. In all other respects his functions were purely
diplomatic, and it was no part of his duty to discipline or super-
vise the commander-in-chief. Having repeated the President's
order to confine his activities to the diplomatic field, Buchanan
authorized Trist to make certain modifications in the boundary
which had been proposed in the original treaty project.^"
29 Polk, Diarii, III, 76-77.
30 Buchanan to Trist, July 13, 1847 (rec'd by Trist on Sept. 6) {Sen.
Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 scss., 113-117). Original in TrM Papers. In a
private letter written to Trist on the same date Buchanan said : "I most
deeply regret your quarrel with General Scott. It has been made the text
for much Whig abuse & misrepresentation. Still we must bear it as we
can. Ccvcrnor Marcy has written a powerful letter to General Scott by
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 505
Marcy's letter to Scott was a very clear-cut and admirable
document. With conuucndable patience he again pointed out that
in no way had the government given Scott cause for offense. He
assured the general that anything done by Trist, except the mere
delivery of the dispatch addressed to the Mexican government,
had been wholly unwarranted. In answer to Scott's request to
be recalled, Marcy, by the President's order, denied the request
and indignantly repelled the charges upon which it had been
based. ^^
The new instructions did not reach their destination until
September 6, and by that time there was no need of urging co-
operation on the part of the commissioner and the commander-
in-chief. They had become fast friends ; indeed, before the
instructions had been drafted they had already taken steps to
negotiate a treaty.
On April 20, 1847, soon after the battle of Cerro Gordo, the
]\Iexican congress had passed a law by which Santa Anna had
been deprived of the power to negotiate with the United States.
Nevertheless, within ten days, overtures were made to General
Scott, through the British minister, but nothing resulted from
the messenger which Avill bear you this. The President 's apprehensions
are great lest the misunderstandings may defeat or delay the conclusion of
a Treaty. Still he is well disposed to do you justice" (Trist Papers).
In a letter dated June 3, 1847, Trist had inclosed a communication from
an unnamed person regarding a boundary line. The main point of it Avas
that the line should be modified so as to include El Paso within tlie United
States. Trist recommended this alteration. See Doc- 52, 168-172.
31 "Of 'the many cruel disappointments and mortifications I (you)
have been made to feel since I (you) left Washington,' you have omitted to
specify a single one, and whether they are real or imaginary is left in great
uncertainty. The sending of Mr. Trist to Mexico as a commissioner of
peace, and the suspicion you cherished that you had been degraded by his
.being' clothed with military authority to interfere with your rightful com-
mand, are probably prominent among these 'cruel disappointments and
mortifications.' The exposition which has been made of that case, shows
the lamentable extent to which error may prevail in personal matters when
prejudice and suspicion pre-occupy the mind. Should your other undis-
closed 'cruel disappointments and mortifications' be of a like unsubstan-
tiated character, as it is presumed they are, you may well conclude tliat tliey
constitute:' no sufficient motive with the President to grant the indulgence
you ask" (Marcy to Scott, July 12, 18-47; Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, loc. cit.)^
506 JAMES K. POLK
them.^- Late in May Santa Anna abandoned Puebla and re-
paired to Mexico City where he resumed the Presidency and
prepai-ed to defend the capital. Scott reached Puebla on May
28 where he remained several weeks awaiting reenforcements.
Trist followed Scott to Puebla and established himself at the
headquarters of General Persifer F. Smith, but for some time
there was no intercourse between him and the connnander-in-chief .
Scott, as we have seen, had refused to deliver Buchanan's
dispatch to the Mexican government and, on June 6, Trist ad-
dressed a note to Charles Bankhead, the British minister at
Mexico City, asking if he would deliver Buchanan's note and
make known verbally to the Mexican government that Trist had
arrived at army headquarters."*'' Bankhead immediately sent
Edward Thornton, Secretary of Legation, to receive the dispatch
and to consult with both Scott and Trist. Thornton, who reached
Puebla on June 10, told Trist that Seiior Baranda, the Minister
of Foreign Relations, had frequently expressed a desire to dis-
cover some way of opening negotiations with the United States,
but tliat he lacked the courage to avow it openly and had re-
signed. The voting of three million dollars for diplomatic pur-
poses by the United States Congress had, said Thornton, made
a bad impression in Mexico, for many believed that the money
was to be used in bribing certain Mexican officials.^* Trist in-
closed copies of his notes to Bankhead in a letter to Buchanan,
dated June 13, in which he complained because Scott would give
him no information concerning affairs in Mexico.^^
As soon as Thornton had returned to the capital Bankhead
delivered Buchanan's dispatch (of April 15) to Domingo Ibarra
who had recently succeeded Baranda as Minister of Foreign
32 Rives, United States and Mexico, II, 432-435.
33 Trist to Bankhead, June 6, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 5^, 30 Cong., 1 scss..
181-183). Copy also in Trist Papers.
34 Thornton's report to Bankhead, quotod in Rives, United States and
Mexico, II, 440-441.
30 Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 178-181.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 507
Relations. In a brief note, dated June 22, .Ibarra informed
Buchanan that the "decision on tlie affair" would rest with the
Mexican congress.^*' Two days later Thornton arrived at Puebla
with Ibarra's note, and notified both Scott and Trist that Santa
Anna had called a special session of the congress so llial it might
consider the question of peace negotiations.
Since the Mexican government had thus taken a stej) in the
direction of arranging for peace, the question of meeting possible
overtures now presented itself to the American representatives.
They were not as yet on speaking terms, and since Trist was the
one who had been assigned the duty of conducting negotiations,
he was forced to make the first move. Consequently, on June 25,
the day after Thornton's return from Puebla, he addressed a
note to General Scott. In it he stated that since the information
given to himself and to Scott, by Thornton, seemed to indicate
that ]\Iexico was inclined to treat, he wished to notify the gen-
eral that he was ready to negotiate a treaty. He inclosed a copy
of his commission. ^^ Scott acknowledged the receipt of his note,
and "this," wrote Trist to Buchanan, "constituted the com-
mencement of our official intercourse with reference to the duties
with which I am charged."^* It was not, however, the beginning
of their friendship.
The next step in the ' ' official intercourse ' ' seems to have been
a note written to Trist by General Worth, which stated that Don
Emanuel Ibarra, a brother of the Minister of Foreign Relations,
lived near by. He was, said Worth, an intelligent man, and in
favor of peace. On the same day some one replied, stating that
Trist wished to thank Worth for the information, but was too ill
36 Ibarra to Buehaiiau, June 22, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
40-41).
37 Trist to Scott, June 25, 1847, Trist Papers. This seems to be the
only copy of the letter available. Eives (II, 442) says that no copy has
been preserved. Trist inclosed a copy of this, as well as one of Scott's
reply to it, in his dispatch No. 8, July 7, 1847, but neither the dispatch
nor the letters reached the Department of State (see H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30
Cong., 1 sess., 830, and note).
38 Trist to Buchanan, July 23, 1847 {H. Ex. Doc. 60, as cited above, 831).
508 JAMES E. POLE
to write."" At the same time, Scott sent to Trist a letter written
by Thornton which seems to contain the first suggestion about
bribing Mexican officials. On July 3, Trist wrote to Thornton
as follows :
Your note to Mr. Hargous, in which you refer to the impossibility that
I frankly told you existed to my adopting your suggestion upon a certain
point, has been sent to me for perusal by Gen '1 Scott, who moreover offers
at once to make every arrangement which may be necessary for imme-
diately carrying that suggestion into the fullest effect, which circumstances
may admit.
This being the present state of the case, I shall, of course, be thankful
for any information pertinent to the subject. If there be any person,
who, in your opinion, could be safely intrusted with the whole affair, I
should very gladly put it into his hands.*o
Evidently the following copy of a letter is the one referred to,
although the date appended is somewhat confusing :
(Copy)
My dear Sir:
Mr. Trist does not seem to think there is the smallest possibility of
making use of money in Mexico for what I mentioned to you; however
I told him how he might do it por si acaso. Should it be in your way,
pray use your influence with Gen '1 Scott to allow a reasonable time for
taking the note into consideration before advancing.
Yours very truly,
L. Hargous Esq.,
&c &c &c
Nemo the name of the ■\\Titer of the above letter is omitted out of
National delicacy. The writer was at the time on a vist to Mr. Trist, at
Puebla— about June 24, 1847.
Winfield Scott,
Puebla, July 19, 1847.'*i
39 Worth to Trist, July 2, 1847; copy of unsigned letter to Worth of
same date (Trist Papers).
40 Trist (the copy is unsigned, but is in Trist 's hand) to Thornton,
July 3, 1847, Triit Papers. A pencil note on the margin says that a copy
was "enclosed in my No. 8" to Buchanan. No. 8, as already noted,
did not reach its destination. Louis Hargous was an American merchant
in Mexico City.
41 On the side margin is written: "(the writer of this was Edw.
Thornton)." Since Trist mentioned what seems to be this note in his
letter of July .3 to Thornton, apparently a copy (the above) was made
for him on the date appended, i.e. on July 19. This is in the TriM Papers.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO nOD
Officially, both Scott and Trist had evinced a disposition to
cooperate ; but, as yet, there was no indication that a personal
reconciliation was near at hand. Nevertheless, a reconciliation
came within a few days, and the incident which seems to have
effected it was quite as trivial as was the cause of their bitter
feelings toward each other. Scott's sensitive nature frequently
led him to make dire threats, yet he was an extremely kind-
hearted man, even when dealing with his adversaries. The fol-
lowing brief note and the act of kindness mentioned in it, seems
to have won Trist 's heart completely, and to have been the first
step in the amicable adjustment of their differences:
My dear Sir:
Looking over my stores, I find a box of Guava marmalade which, perhaps,
the physician may not consider improper to make part of the diet of your
sick companion.
Yrs very truly
Winfield Scott,
Genl. P. F. Smith, July 6, 1847.42
&c &c &c
The marmalade seems to have had an immediate effect upon
Trist 's health and his disposition, for on the following day he
told Buchanan in a letter that his health had improved and
that
With Gen '1 Scott's reply to my letter, I received a message from him
evincing so much good feeling that it afforded me the sincerest pleasure
to meet it as I did, in a way which should at once preclude all constraint
& embarrassment between us.^s
Indeed, their mutual ''good feeling" and admiration soon became
so pronounced that they rated each other's judgment higher
than that of their respective chiefs, in the cabinet, or even the
judgment and the authority of the President of the United States.
42 The ' ' sick companion ' ' was Trist, who was staying at Smith 's
headquarters. On the back of the note Trist wrote: "Brought to my
bed side by Genl Smith, and left there with the box of guava, as I lay
ill at Puebla."
43 Trist to Buchanan, July 7, 1847, Tri^i Papers. This is a copy of
the dispatch ' ' No. 8 ' ' which never reached Washington.
510 JAMES K. POLK
The first fruit of the reconciliation between the two men was
the consideration of bribing the Mexican government to consent to
peace negotiations. It is evident from the above correspondence
that Thornton had discussed the subject with Trist, but whether
he or some one else named the definite amount of money asked
by the ]\Iexicans is not clear. Trist himself mentioned "specific
information obtained from various sources, ' ' and Hitchcock wrote
that English merchants in Mexico ' ' say a peace can be had for a
little money. ' ' In another place he said that ' ' our agents in this
business are Englishmen."^* It is probable that Thornton him-
self gave Trist the information, and that he had received the
demand for money from one close to the Mexican President.
On July 15 Trist and Scott held a conference, and on the
following day the former addressed a rambling letter to the
latter, fully committing himself to the plan of paying a bribe.
"We are both convinced," said he, "beyond a shadow of a doubt,
that the only way in ivhich the indefinite pratracti&n of this war
can possibly he prevented . . . . is hy the secret expenditure of
money at the city of Mexico." The amounts named as "neces-
sary & sufficient ' ' were ten thousand dollars in advance and one
million dollars on the ratification of a treaty. He admitted that
nothing of the kind had been contemplated by his government
and that he had no authority to take such action, but this fact he
deemed it his "duty to disregard." Concurring in Scott's view
that a part of the war fund might be used most advantageously
in buying peace — the real object of the war — he requested the
generaP-"' to join with him in giving the requisite pledge that the
money would be paid. Trist believed that such a pledge would
"entirely supersede the necessity for the occupation of the
capital.""
44 Hitchcock, Fifty Years in Camp and Field, 266, 268.
*'> Scott was, of course, more eaj!;er tliaii Trist to give the pledge. It
hail, however, been arranged beforehand that the request should come
from Trist, as commissioner. See Hitchcock, op. rit., 267.
41! Trist to Scott, July 16, 1847, Trist Papers, both the original draft
and a ' ' fair copy. ' '
TBEATY OF G UA DA LUPE HI DA LGO 511
Scott was already fully coinuiitted to the plan of purchasing
a treaty, but in a transaction so irregular he naturally desired
the approval of his generals, especially that of General Pillow
who was a close personal and political friend of the President.
On receipt of Trist 's note, therefore, he called together his chief
officers— including Pillow, Quitman, Twiggs, Shields, and Cad-
^valader— in order that he might "post them up" and win their
approval. According to Colonel Hitchcock, who was present at
the meeting, Pillow "fully and eloquently" supported the scheme
after Scott had explained that it was customary to use money
wJien dealing with such people as the Mexicans. Quitman ap-
proved the ' ' motives ' ' which had inspired the plan, but was not
in favor of paying bribe money. Twiggs "approved the whole
scheme." Shields had misgivings, but was willing to leave the
whole matter to Trist. Cadwalader expressed no opinion.*' As
a result of the conference Scott "very cheerfully" responded
to Trist 's letter on the following day. He said:
I fully concur with you, with several of the general officers of this
army & with many foreigners of high standing, here & at the capital, who
have volunteered their opinions, that the occupation by the U. States'
forces of twenty of the principal places in this Eepublic, in addition to
those in our hands, would not, probably, in a year or more, force the
Mexican authorities to sue for, or accept a peace on any terms honorable
or just to our country — without the administration, or pledge in advance,
of douoers to some of the principal authorities in this miserably governed
country. We have both learned, thro ' the most unquestionable channels, that
this is invited & expected as an indispensable condition precedent to any
negotiation. Indeed the minimums have been specifically indicated: — ten
thousand dollars, in hand, to one high functionary, & a million (to be
divided, probably among many) on the ratification of a definite treaty of
pestce.
He had, he said, already sent the ten thousand dollars, and he
agreed to unite with Trist, at the proper time, in giving a pledge
to pay the million dollars. This amount was to be paid by means
of a draft on the War Department under the head of "army
47 Hitchcock, Fifti/ Years in Camp and Field, 266-268. Some of the men
concerned later gave a very different version of their respective attitudes.
512 JAMES K. POLK
contingencies," and Trist was asked to send a note of explana-
tion to the Secretary of War. Concerning the ethics of the con-
templated action, he wrote :
In regard to the morality of the transaction in question, I have, like
yourself, not the slightest doubt. We have tempted the integrity of no one.
The overtures Ave propose to meet, if corrupt, come from parties previously
corrupted, & we only profit by that corruption to obtain an end (peace)
highly advantageous to both the U. States & Mexico. Such transactions
have always been considered allowable in war.-***
The Mexican congress, to which Santa Anna had referred
Buchanan's note of April 15, declined to take any part in diplo-
matic affairs. A committee of that body held that the Acta de
Reformas of May 18, 1847, had, by readopting the Constitution
of 1824, rendered inoperative the law of April 20 which had
deprived Santa Anna of his power to conduct negotiations.
Although the congress might easily have solved the difficulty and
prevented ambiguity by specifically repealing the law of April
20, it laid the matter on the table without deciding the question
of the President's authority."*"
It is probable that Santa Anna never intended to make peace,
and that he made overtures merely for the purpose of procuring
money from the American officials. But in view of the fact that
he had been promised a much larger sum, on the conclusion of
a treaty, it is more likely that his refusal to carry out his under-
standing with Trist and Scott was due to the attitude of his
congress. At any rate he gave this as an excuse. On July 24
a note from Thornton reached the camp at Puebla. It stated
that while Santa Anna was in favor of peace he could not induce
his congress to repeal the resolutions which had made it treason
for him to negotiate with the United States. The American
army must, said Thornton, advance on the capital, and it will be
met by a flag of truce before Penon has been reached. "So,"
wrote Hitchcock, who recorded in his diary the substance of
48 Scott to Trist, July 17, 1847, original, in Trist Papers.
•10 See Rives, United States and Mexico, II, 44:4-446.
TBEATT OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO
513
Thornton's letter, "the idea of peaee is all knocked into a coek«l
hat '■» As a result, doubtless, of Tliornton's adv.ee, Scot , ac-
cording to a letter written by Hitchcock some months later
prepared a men.oran.lum and sent a copy to Santa Anna. In it
the Mexican President was infortned that Seott was «bout to
advance upon the capital, an.l that he would «ther "defeat th
enemy in view of the city," should resistance be offered; o. he
.ould halt and give the government an "^VoMJ^^mo
oeace" As it turned out, the program outlined in this memo
Lidum was ouite eioseiy followed, but appareiitly the general
did not, at the time it was prepared, have much hope of a peace
'" TriitrScott .vere now fast friends, and each expressed to
his chief in the cabinet a desire that the acrimonious letters which
both had sent to Washington might be suppressed Tr.st now
b Led that the general's whole conduct had been elia-ten.ed
by the "purest public spirit," while Scott now found the_ com-
missioner to be "able, discreet, courteous, and a™'abl- iU
this time Scott had not received Marcy's most sev re c ticism
of his conduct, but he resented the rebuke -»;-- '" * ' ^f , ;
retary's letter of May 31st. Although he had this let e, in his
po^ssion for nearly three weeks, he told Marey «-t -e-i
^•I .10 not here *«antly ^^-^ ^^I^T o Te --
f Jlrrned^r fartrids tim^e had been occupied in
.^Sen. Ex. Doc. 65, 30 Cong., ^ ^'''l^^^'X.in his diarv of a dinner
52 Under date of July 30 Hitchcock speaks "^ ^^^ f/^^ , . Everything
given bv Pillow to the other generals '^^^^ J/^f ;, ?^'e\ar to the utmost
?ow shoVs that the fl-^<^^-l\^'^^i now S that our attempt to enter
^^^^^"^ S^r S'toi'^Mernrined opposition" (mteheock,
"'■:^i^i Buchanan. ^^^^^^^ ^^ SL^^sS [Ss^
Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 831, IJll iUi-^ ^ ^^^.^ j^^g ^^^n)
Scott said: '' You will perceive^ that ^^^ J^ ^^^^ ,^ ^ ^^zen
liZ Sl^S^a^, indVeirknTw^ie obligations imposed under all
514 JAMES K. POLK
trying to i)ur('liase a treaty from Santa Anna, and before the
news of that questionable transaction reached Washington many
interesting events had occurred.
The first division of the American army left Puebla on August
7, 1847, followed on the next day by Trist and Scott, one bearing
the olive branch, the other the sword.^* The latter was first to
be used, for, not until the battles of Contreras and Churubusco
had been fought was the Mexican President ready for the olive
branch. On the evening of August 20, after his defeat at Churu-
busco, he sought, through the British legation, to arrange for a
suspension of hostilities. A deputation from the legation — in-
cluding Thornton, the secretary, and Mackintosh, the consul-
general — met Scott at San Augustin, "ostensibly to ask for a
safe-guard for the English Minister and British subjects, but
really to prepare the way for peace. ' '^^
Near midnight of the same day Pacheco, the Mexican Minister
of Foreign Relations, called on Bankhead and asked him to use
his influence in inducing Scott to save the city from being sacked.
The British minister, according to his own account, would not
interfere further than to transmit a letter from Pacheco to Trist.
It was decided, however, that the letter should be addressed to
Buchanan (as a reply to his note of the previous April) instead of
Trist. Bankhead himself wrote to Trist, and expressed the hope
that peace might be concluded at an early date. Both letters
were sent to the commissioner.''^''
The note addressed to Buchanan stated that Santa Anna had
continued the fight until tlie American army had readied the
circumstances by an enlijjhtened patriotism." Due to negligence on the
part of the messenger, this letter did not reach Washington until Decem-
ber, 1848.
J54 From Ayotla Trist wrote: "It is, indeed, a nohic army, full of con-
fidence in itself, and full of confidence in its commander To
appreciate the man, to Jcnow him at all, one must see him in this sphere."
To Buchanan, Aug. 14, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 187).
ss Hitchcock, ¥ift\i Years in Camp and Field, 280.
56 Pacdieco to Buchanan, Aug. 20, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1
ses9., 189). Bankhead to Trist. same date, TriM Paper.t. For Bankhead 's
report to his government, see Kives, II, 496-497.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 515
gates of the capital, and that he had now resolved to hear the
proposals which the American commissioner had been instructed
to make. In doing so, said Pacheco, the President was acting
under the powers conferred upon liim by the constitution. This
meant, of course, that Santa Anna was ready to ignore the law
of April 20, which made it treason for him to negotiate with the
United States. This law may, indeed, have been rendered void
by the subsequent readoption of the constitution, but since the
law in question had not been specifically repealed, some doubt
remained as to the legality of any treaty he might make.
On the morning of August 21, while Scott and Trist were
on their way from San Angel to Tacubaya, they were met by a
''fine carriage" containing General Mara'y Villamil, bearer of
the letters written by Pacheco and Bankhead to the American
officials. Trist read the letters, and a conference was held.^' The
letter addressed to Trist did not expressly ask for an armistice,
but apparently Mara verbally made it known that such was the
wish of the Mexican President. With more magnanimity than
judgment Scott, instead of demanding that the request for a
cessation of hostilities should come from the defeated commander,
proposed an armistice in a note addressed to Santa Anna. The
proposal was accepted, and two days later an armistice was ar-
ranged.=« The agreement made at Puebla probably was Scott's
real reason for taking the initiative ; the reasons which he gave to
the Secretary of War were a desire to leave Mexico "somethnig
on which to rest her pride," and the fear that a more drastic
course would "scatter the elements of government" and make
the negotiation of a treaty impossible.^"
After some delay commissioners were appointed by Santa
Anna, and with them Trist held his first meeting on August 27,
57 Hitchcock, op. cit., 279.
58 The correspondence and armistice are printed in Sen-. Ex. Doc. 5.,
30 Cong., 1 sess., 308-312.
.0 Scott to Marcy, Aug. 28, 1847 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 314).
516 JAMES K. POLK
1847.*'° He soon discovered that the powers of the Mexicans
simply permitted them to receive his propositions for transmission
to Santa Anna. He told them that he had been authorized to
treat only with commissioners provided with full powers ; never-
theless, he delivered to them a statement of the propositions
which he was ready to make.''^
As soon as the American project had been received, Pacheco
drafted instructions to the commissioners and furnished them
with full powers, but the instructions required them to make such
extravagant demands that the commissioners immediately offered
their resignations. As a result, Santa Anna, through Pacheco,
authorized the commissioners to make such modifications as the
' ' circumstances of the country may exact. ' '"-
The Mexican diplomats met Trist on September 1, and for
two days the questions at issue were discussed. The terms of
settlement now suggested by the Mexicans were much like those
mentioned by Atocha in the preceding January. He had spoken
of the Rio Grande as a boundary, with a neutral strip on the
American side; they asked for the Nueces as a boundary, with
all territory between that river and the Rio Grande as neutral
00 The Mexican commissioners were ex-President Herrera, Bernardo
Couto, Ignacio Mara y Villamil, Miguel Atristain, and Jose Arroyo.
61 Trist to Buchanan, Aug. 27, 1847 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
191-192). On the morning of August 27 an attack made by a Mexican
mob on American supply wagons threatened to prevent negotiations, but
an apology temporarily smoothed over this difficultv. For details, see
Eives, II, 510-511.
62 For the instructions (in translation) and tlie correspondence relat-
ing to them, see Sen^. Ex. Doc. 52, as cited above, 330-335. By their
instructions the commissioners were to demand: Mexico would relinquish
Texas — not as a result of annexation, but of negotiation. Its boundary
must be the Nueces, and the United States must i)ay for the land one
half of the price fixed by Texas laws. AH debt claims against Mexico
must Vje cancelletl, as "an equivalent for entering into negotiation ''( !)
and ten leagues on either side of the boundary was to be neutral terri-
tory. Cession of New Mexico and California must be refused, but, as a
last resort, a factory port at San Francisco might be granted to the
United States. A passage over the Isthmus of Tehuantepec was to be
refused. Duties on American goods brought into Mexico must be paid.
The United States must restore Mexican forts to the condition in which
they were found. Lastly, tlie commissioners were to insist on indemnity
for all damages done by tlie American army.
TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 517
ground in which no settlement might be made by either party.
He had claimed no authority to discuss a cession of New Mexico ;
they said that their instructions forbade a cession of this terri-
tory. He had stated that Mexico was willing to cede Upper
California for a money consideration ; they were ready to cede
the upper part of this territory, but insisted that Mexico must
retain all of Lower California and a land connection with it.
They declined to grant a transit across the Isthmus of Tehuan-
tepec. Trist offered to withdraw the claim for Lower California
and the transit across the isthmus, if Mexico would cede Upper
California and New Mexico for a money payment. He agreed,
also, to submit the Nueces boundary question to his government
for consideration ; they, in turn, agreed to submit to their gov-
ernment the terms which he had proposed."^ Four days later,
and before Trist had taken steps to refer the matter to President
Polk, another meeting was held, and the Mexican commissioners
presented a counter-project and an explanatory note. The ces-
sion of New Mexico was refused, an offer to cede Upper Cali-
fornia north of 37° was made, and it was suggested that England
should be asked to guarantee the proposed treaty. Trist, of
course, declined to accept these terms and, for the time being,
negotiations w^ere abandoned. This in itself automatically abro-
gated the armistice, but General Scott chose to terminate it on
the ground that its terms had been violated by the interference
of Mexicans with American supply wagons.***
At the very moment, almost, when Santa Anna was rejecting
the project of a treaty offered by the United States, President
Polk was announcing his intention to demand additional terri-
tory from Mexico. On September 4 he told his cabinet that,
unless the next dispatch from Trist should announce that a treaty
had been signed, the commissioner ought to be instructed to
63 Trist to Buchanan, Sept. 4, 1847, and inelosures (Doc. 52, as cited
above, 195-201).
64 Commissioners to Trist, Sept. 6, 1847; Trist 's reply, Sept. 7; Scott
to Santa Anna, Sept. 6 {ihid., 375-380, 214-222, 346).
518 JAMES K. POLK
demand more territory. Three days later he expressed himself
as in favor of acquiring Tamaulipas. The question of modifying
Trist's instructions was discussed, but when, on the ninth, a
rumor reached Washington that the Mexican congress had been
called for the purpose of considering the American proposals,
Polk noted in liis diary: "I sincerely hope that a Treat}' of
peace may have been concluded and signed."**^
The mail of September 14 brought the President both en-
couragement and disappointment. By it he learned of the vic-
tories at Contreras and Churubusco, but, also, of the armistice
which followed them. The same mail contained Trist's brief
dispatch of August 29, in which the government was informed
that negotiations had begun. Polk was not pleased with the
armistice. He believed that Scott should have demanded an
immediate decision on the terms offered by the United States,
and in the event of their rejection by Mexico, he should have
entered the capital and levied a contribution for the support of
his army. "I fear," noted the President, "that the armistice
was agreed to by the Mexican Commander only to re-organize
his defeated army for further resistance I shall wait
very anxiously for further information from the army." He
waited until October 4, and, as no favorable news arrived, he
decided that Trist should be recalled and that Scott should be
directed to levy contributions on the enemy. ^'^
Letters embodying these views were prepared by Buchanan
and Marcy and forwarded to their respective representatives in
Mexico. The Mexican counter-project Buchanan pronounced
"a most extraordinary document," and the proposal of such
terms "a mere mockery." The commissioners must have known,
-^ 65Duirij, III, 161, 164, 167.
««"Mr. Trist is recalled," said he, "because his remaining longer
with the army could not, probably, accomplish the objects of his mission,
and because his remaining longer might, & probably would, impress the
Mexican Government with the belief that the U. S. were so anxious for
peace that they would ultimate[ly] conclude one upon the Mexican terms.
Mexico must now first sue for peace, & when she does we will hear lier
propositions" (ibid., 170-172, 185-186),
TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 519
he said, that the United States woukl never relinciuisli New
Mexico, Upper California, or the territory between the Nueces
and the Rio Grande. The assertion made by the Mexicans that
Trist had agreed to refer to his government the surrender of the
last mentioned territory was not believed in Washington. If, at
the time of receiving Buchanan's letter, a treaty had been signed,
Trist was to bring it home with him ; otherwise he was to suspend
all negotiations and return home "by the first safe opportunity."
The letter to Scott instructed him to support his army by
contributions levied on the enemy. Any proposals from Mexico
to reopen negotiations were to be forwarded by him to the
President."^
Polk has been criticized for ordering the employment of
measures which might destroy all organized government in
Mexico, and for demanding that future peace offers must come
from the enemy. His reason for adopting this policy, whether
valid or not, was his belief that Mexico would never come to
terms so long as she held the erroneous opinion that the govern-
ment at Washington was over-anxious for peace, or too weak to
continue hostilities."* In a private letter the Secretary of State
said that "the spirit of the Country is now thoroughly aroused
& the war will be prosecuted with the utmost vigor. This is the
character of the American people. They find that peace cannot
be made with Mexico upon honorable terms & they are deter-
mined to see it out.""^ Owing to the fact that there was, for some
time, no communication between Vera Cruz and the interior,
67 Marey to Scott, Oct. 6, 1847; Buchanan to Trist, same date {Sen.
Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 91-93, 138-140). The original of the latter,
as well as a duplicate and triplicate are in the Trist Papers. Some one
(undoubtedly Trist) has underlined in red the part which says that the
United States will never surrender Upper California or the land between
the rivers Nueces and Eio Grande. The dates of receipt are noted.
*^ 68 In the letter to Trist, just cited, Buchanan said: "They [the
Mexicans] must attribute our liberality to fear, or they must take
courage from our supposed political divisions. Some such cause is neces-
sary to account for their strange infatuation." For criticism of Polk's
change of policy, see Eives, II, 523-525.
69 Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 7, 1847, Trist Papers.
520 JAMES K. POLK
these letters did not reach Trist until November 16 and the same
mail contained another dispatch from Buchanan, dated October
25th. "When this dispatch was written the Secretary of State
had received the letter from Trist which submitted the Mexican
proposal regarding a neutral territory between the Nueces and
the Rio Grande. The Secretary liad, he said, been instructed by
the President to say that he "could not for a single moment
entertain the question of surrendering a portion of Texas."
Surprise and regret were expressed because the commissioner
had "gone so far beyond the carefully considered ultimatum"
as to refer it to his government. "The President," he added,
"has directed me to reiterate your recall." In a private note
Buchanan said that he was "extremely sorry" to be obliged to
write such a dispatch, but
to propose to consult the Gov't whether they would abandon that portion
of the country where Mexico attacked our forces & on our right to which the
Whigs have raised such an unfounded clamor, will be a fruitful cause of
assault against us in the next Congress. I hope, however, there may never
be a necessity for sending this dispatch to either House of Congress.'o
Notice of his recall and of the adoption of a more drastic
military policy were destined to have small influence upon Trist 's
diplomatic activities, for soon after the dispatches had arrived an
opportunity was presented for reopening negotiations. He and
General Scott were now boon companions,'^^ and while setting a
high value on their own combined judgment, each deemed an
order from the President and his cabinet to be a nuisance which,
in important cases, should be disi'cgarded. If, therefore, the
commissioner and tlie general believed that a treaty ought to be
made, why should the President interfere !
70 Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 25, 1847, Trist Papers. Eec'd Nov. 16.
The official dispatch is printed in Doc. 52, as cited above, 94-95.
71 On October 18 Trist wrote to his wife: "I am General Scott's friend
for life. I know him thoroughhi : he is the soul of honor & probity, and
full of the most sterling qualities of heart & head: affectionate, generous,
forgiving, and a lover of justice Tell all my intimate friends of
the entire revolution, from the conception I had formed of Gen S. in my
ignorance of his character, to what I now Icnow of him" {Trist Papers).
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 521
After the interruption of negotiations and the renewal of
hostilities Scott's army had won the battles of Molino del Rev
and Chapultepec and had captured Mexico City. On September
16 Santa Anna, then at Guadalupe, resigned the Presidency and
directed that the office should be held by Pefia y Pefia, president
of the supreme court, until the Mexican congress should other-
wise direct. He then set out on an unsuccessful expedition
against a small force of Americans stationed at Puebla. Peila
assumed the office, not however by virtue of the retiring Presi-
dent's decree, but in accordance with the constitutional provision
that the head of the supreme court should succeed to the Presi-
dency in the event of a vacancy. After removing Santa Anna
from his military command, the new President succeeded in estab-
lishing a government— one of doubtful legality in certain re-
spects—but one which prevented anarchy until the congress could
provide another. On November 11 that body selected General
Anaya to be President ad interim, and the new executive at once
made Peiia y Peiia his Minister of Foreign Relations.'-
Nearly a month before he had received notice of his recall
Trist had taken steps to renew peace negotiations. On October
20, during the brief administration of President Pena y Pena,
he sent a letter, through the British legation, to Luis de la Rosa,
the then Minister of Foreign Relations. This letter was dated
September 7, 1847, for the reason that it purported to be a reply
to the commissioners with whom he had negotiated before the
armistice had been terminated." Rosa notified Trist"* that
T2 Technically, Peua was not president of the court — that office being
vacant — but as senior member, he acted' as president. Hence his right
to assume the Presidency was somewhat doubtful. Trist to Buchanan,
Jan. 26, 1848 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Co;ig., 1 sess., 281). For other details,
see Rives, II, 584-589.
T3 Trist to Buchanan, Oct. 31, 1847 (copy in Trist Papers). Printed
in part in Sen. Ex. Doo. 52, as above cited, 212-213. The part omitted
tells of Thornton's endeavor to induce the Mexicans to negotiate. The
letter to the commissioners may be found in Doc. 52, 214 ff. In a letter
dated Oct. 25 Trist told Buchanan that there was a general desire on
the part of both Mexicans and foreigners for the annexation of all
of Mexico to the United States (copy in Tri^t Papers). This part is
omitted from the same letter printed in Doc. 52, 205-212.
74 Rosa to Trist, Oct. 31, 1847 (Doc. 52, as above cited, 227-228).
522 JAMES K. POLK
commissioners would be appointed, but this promise was not
fulfilled until after Anaj'a had become President.
On November 22 the new minister, Pefia, notified Trist that
President Anaya had appointed peace commissioners. Two of
the men selected, Bernardo Couto and Miguel Atristain, had
been members of the commission which had declined, in Septem-
ber, to accept the American project. The others were Manual
Rincon and Gonzago Cuevas. The former declined to serve and
his place was not filled. Peiia's note was transmitted to Thorn-
ton, who accompanied it by a letter of his own. In this, Thornton
stated that he had informed Peiia of Trist 's recall, and that the
minister was ''thunderstruck" and disappointed. Thornton ex-
pressed the hope that Trist might go on with the negotiations,
since the Mexican government had been induced to appoint com-
missioners by the prospect of a speedy peace. Peace could be
had now, he said, but delay might jeopardize the prospect of a
peaceful settlement."'' This argument seems eventually to have
appealed witli great force to Trist 's shallow intellect. He did
not, however, immediately follow the advice offered, for, two
days later, he formally notified Pefia of his recall and stated
that any communications regarding peace should be handed to
General Scott for transmission to Washington.'"
In thus declining, in the first instance, to proceed with the
negotiations after he had received notice of his recall, Trist was
not actuated by respect for superior authority ; he was influenced
solely by the belief tluit any other course would be futile. On
tlie same day that he formally notified Pena of his recall he told
Thornton in a letter tliat no dread of "the displeasure of those
entrusted willi liic power of dispensing office" would deter him
75 Pena to Trist, Nov. 22, 1847; Thornton to Trist (formal lotter of
same date) {Doc. 52, as above cited, 98-09, L':U). Thornton to Trist
(confidential), same date, Trist Papers. Thornton's confidential letter
was written at Pena's urjjent request. See Thornton to Pahnerston,
Nov. 29, 1847, quoted by Rives, II, 595.
70 Trist to Pefia, Nov. 24, 1847 (Doc. 52, as above cited, 99-100). Orig-
inal, recalled by Tri.st, in Trist Papers.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 523
from "disobeying positive & peremptory instructions,"" if the
President had not deprived him of "all shadow of authority to
do anything whatever." However, when Peila y Pefia argued
that the offer made prior to the receipt of his recall had com-
mitted Ills government, when the British dii)lomats urged prompt
action, and when General Scott "encouraged him, nevertheless,
to finish the good work he had begun ' ' and expressed the belief
that such action would be ' ' duly ratified at Washington, ' ' a man
of small mental caliber and excessive vanity, like Trist, could
hardly fail to be influenced.'*
Despite all this pressure he did not decide immediately to
disregard his instructions. On November 27 he drafted an-
other dispatch to Buchanan. In it he petulantly resented the
President's criticism of his course in offering to refer to Wash-
ington the question relating to the boundary of Texas. After
pointing out the futility of demanding that Mexican peace pro-
posals must be sent to Washington, he urged that a new com-
mission should be chosen to negotiate with the one already ap-
pointed by Mexico. He then expected to leave Mexico in about
twelve days.'" That he had at this time no intention of making
a treaty is made clear by a letter written to Mrs. Trist on the
following day. "I have," said he, "bid adieu for ever to official
life. This decision is irrevocable." She was asked to tell Bu-
chanan, with kindest regards, that Trist would not resume his
place in the State Department, for he [Buchanan] "will soon
77 But, he added, "not only am I divested entirely of the ofificial char-
acter which I lately held, and with it of all shadow of authority to do
anything whatever; but I deem it certain, that, in the actual state of
things at Washington, the cause of Peace could not fail to be seriously
prejudiced, were I to pursue any other course than that of the most
absolute & unqualified acquiescence in the Executive will, as announced
to me. ' ' He will go to Washington, he says, and do what he can for
peace: "In a word, the signing of a Treaty of Peace is reserved for
another hand than mine" (Trist to Thornton, Nov. 24, 1847 [copy],
Trist Papers).
-s Peiia to Couto, Nov. 24, 1847, quoted by Rives II, 596. Scott, Auto-
biography, II, 576.
-'■> Trist to Buchanan, Nov. 27, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
228-230). Complete copy in Trist Papers.
524 JAMES E. POLE
see the impossibility of this, or my having anything to do with
Mr. Polk." Apparently the last remark was induced by the
belief that the President had been unduly influenced by General
Pillow.^"
We are not left in doubt concerning the date of Trist's de-
cision to reopen negotiations, for, with characteristic egotism,
he announced with loud trumpet the very hour on which he de-
cided to play Caesar and cross the Rubicon. In a letter to his
wife, he said :
Procure the key to this cipher (...) and decipher the following, to be
read to him [Buchanan] most secretly. This determination, I came to,
this day, at 12 o'clock. It is altogether my own.
Enowing it to be the very last chance, and impressed with the dreadful
consequences to our country which cannot fail to attend the loss of that
chance. [Here follows cipher which was interpretd to mean] I will make
a treaty, if it can be done, on the basis of the Bravo, by 32°; giving 15
millions besides the 3 millions cash. si
In spite, however, of this precision as to the time of making
his decision, Trist seems to have told the Mexican commissioners
at least a day earlier that he probably would take the responsi-
bility of disobeying his instructions."- He had become obsessed
«o Say to Buchanan, lie wrote, "that a baser villain, and dirtier
scoundrel does not exist out of the Penitentiary, nor in it, than Genl
Pillow. This is, not an opinion, but a matter of fact, which will be proved
to the world." He told Mrs. Trist that he expected to leave for the
United States about December 6. Instead, he wrote his famous letter
on that date. In a letter written to John A. Dix (copy in Trist Papers)
on October 31 he had expressed his opinion of Polk's political generals.
In it he urged Dix to beware of precipitancy in the confirmation of gen-
erals, lest the Senate should become involved in "a deep, damning,
irretrievable disgrace — which no earthly power, nor all earthly powers
combined, can avert."
«i Trist to Mrs. Trist, Dec. 4, 1847, TriM Papers. In a similar strain
he told Edward Thornton that "this letter will occasion you great sur-
prise, but no greater than I should myself have experienced a few hours
ago, had a seer, in whose prophetic powers I put faith, foretold to me
that I was to write it" (Trist to Thornton, Dec. 4, 1847, TriM Papers).
This letter with blanks for Thornton 's name is printed in Doc. 52, as
cited above, 266-268. Thornton 's reply, dated Dec. 11, is in the Trist
Papcr.i. He commends Trist's jiroposcd action and feels certain that the
United States "will highly apj)laud your ilecision." He, too, expressed
the belief that peace could be had ' ' now or never. ' '
<< 82 Couto to Pefia, Dec. 3, 1847, quoted by Kives, II, 597.
TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 525
Avith the belief that "if the present opportunity be not seized
at once, all chance for making a treaty at all will be lost for an
indefinite period — probably forever" (letter to Thornton, just
cited) ; and a desire for fame doubtless helped to reenforce this
belief.
Having decided to make a treaty, if possible, Trist informed
Buchanan of the fact in a very extraordinary letter, the manu-
script of which covered sixty-five large pages. It is not only
prolix and extremely tiresome, but, in addition, is one of the most
gratuitously insulting documents in our diplomatic annals. He
assigned, as reasons for resuming negotiations in spite of his
recall, a conviction that his government still desired peace ; a
belief that a treaty could be made then, but not later ; certainty
that Mexico would not and could not consent to yield more than
his instructions had demanded ; and the belief that his recall had
been based on "a supposed state of things in this country entirely
the reverse of that which actually exists." Had he limited him-
self to these general statements the letter might not merit severe
criticism, whatever might be thought of his assumption of author-
ity. But Trist never knew when he had said enough ; his pen
rambled on where his brain declined to follow. Consequently,
each topic was amplified — but not illuminated — by a seemingly
endless profusion of words.
Under the first heading he gave a dissertation on the Presi-
dent's responsibilities, and then proceeded to philosophize upon
Polk's mental operations. Having reached the conclusion that
the President must still desire peace, he pointed out that the
executive indignation mentioned in Buchanan's recent letter was
entirely wasted on a weak power like Mexico. Despite his cer-
tainty that the President must still desire peace, he hinted very
pointedly that Polk wished to convert a defensive war into one
of conquest, and for such a wish he should be ashamed of himself.
Later in the letter he again recurred to the subject of annexing
all of Mexico. He believed ultimate absorption to be desirable ;
526 JAMES K. POLK
but a dissolution of the Uuiou would be preferable to the calamity
of immediate annexation.*^
As if disregarding his instructions and questioning Polk's
motives were not enough, Trist had the bad taste and the audacity
to volunteer opinions which could have no other effect than to
wound and to exasperate the President. Well knowing, of course,
that the Washington Union reflected the President's views, he
declared its criticism of Scott's armistice to be "balderdash,"
"stuff," and "nonsense," which no one outside of Washington,
"however low in understanding," would believe. Again, a tact-
ful subordinate would not have told the President that his close
friend, General Pillow, was an "intriguer" of "incomprehensible
baseness of character." Trist did this. He asserted, also, that
because the President had relied on ' ' supposition ' ' and ' ' private
representations" from this intriguer, "everything was seen up-
side down." Having referred to Pillow and Santa Anna as
"twin phenomena" in "moral obliquity," he did not hesitate to
speak of the former as "an individual who gives himself out as
the maker of the President (by having procured his nomination
at the Baltimore convention), and as the President's other self —
a pretension wliieh I have reason to believe but too well founded."
Even the "justice" done the President in charitably excusing
his shortcomings by attributing them to "a blind confidence"
in Pillow did not help matters very much. It could not have
given Polk extreme pleasure to read that "infallibility of judg-
ment .... is not among the attributes of the President of the
United States," or to be told that Scott's armistice, instead of
being a blunder, had rescued the administration and the Demo-
cratic party fi-om a "perilous position.'"** While reading his
S3 In this very letter Trist told Buchanan how easily annexation could
be accomplished; and, accordinjif to Lionel Davidson, agent of the Roth-
schilds in Mexico, he had, late in November, been in favor of permanent
occupation (Davidson to Thornton, Nov. 21^, 1847, Trist Paprrft). And
yet he condemned Polk for his supposed desire to acquire the republic.
84 Trist to Buchanan, Dec. 6, 1847 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 5S, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
231-26(5). Complete copy also in Trust Papers.
TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 527
tedious letters one is tempted, at times, to give Trist credit for
sincerity — to think that he really believed himself to be perform-
ing deeds of heroism ; albeit such charity for his motives must be
at the expense of his intelligence. On the other hand, certain
letters written to his wife show a want of sincerity, and brand
him as a man who craved notoriety.
The American diplomat 's decision to cut the Gordian knot in
order to save- both Mexico and his country from impending dis-
aster did not result in an immediate reopening of negotiations.
The Mexican officials who had been so anxious for him to remain
now pleaded want of authority, and interposed various pretexts
for delay. Since the impediments to formal discussions on the
part of the diplomats were not removed until the latter part of
December, we may turn our attention to Washington for the
purpose of ascertaining the views of the administration.
On Ocober 6, as we have seen, the President ordered Trist 's
recall, not on account of the commissioner's misconduct, but
because it was thought that he would be unable to make a treaty.
When, however, Polk learned that the commissioner had agreed
to consult his government regarding a neutral zone between the
two rivers, he remarked that "Mr. Trist has managed the nego-
tiation very bunglingly and with no ability."-"^ The recall was
repeated in still more emphatic terms.
Having no reason, of course, for believing that Trist would
disobey his instructions, Polk gave his attention to the war policy
which he purposed to recommend when Congress should have
assembled in December. It was necessary that his message should
be drafted with extreme care because the control of the House
had now passed to his opponents. At a cabinet meeting held
on November 9, Buchanan, whose Presidential aspirations had
revived, told Polk that his message must advise one of two courses
— ^to designate the part of Mexico which the United States would
hold as indemnity, or to occupy all of that country by a greatly
85 Polk, Diwij, III, 199.
528 JAMES K. POLK
increased miltiary force. He did not recommend either course,
but tlie President thought that he favored the latter. As Bu-
chanan had up to this time wished to confine the acquisition of
territory within very narrow limits, Polk believed that the change
was due to political considerations. Since there seemed to be some
uncertainty as to the policy of the administration, the President
read a paragraph which he intended to include in his message.
My views as thus reduced to writing [said he] were in substance that
we would continue the prosecution of the war with an increased force,
hold all the country we had conquered or might conquer, and levy contri-
butions upon the enemy to support the war, until a just peace was ob-
tained; that we must have indemnity in territory, and that as a part
indemnity the Californias & New Mexico should under no circumstances
be restored to Mexico; but that they should henceforth be considered a
part of the U. S., & permanent territorial Governments be established over
them; and that if Mexico protracted the war, additional territory must be
required as further indemnity.s''
During the next two weeks the President revised what he had
written, and, at his request, Buchanan drafted a paragraph
which embodied the Secretary's opinions on a proper Mexican
policy. Both drafts were presented for discussion at a cabinet
meeting held on the twenty-third of November. Avowing a wish
to take all of Mexico, Walker preferred Buchanan's draft, for
he believed that its construction would make such acquisition
possible. "I replied," wrote Polk, "that I was not prepared to
go to that extent; and furthermore that I did not desire that
anything I said in the message should be so obscure as to give
rise to doubt or discussions as to what my true meaning was. "'^"
This remark indicates that Trist's fears regarding the President's
change of i)olicy were wliolly unwarranted.
On December 7 Polk submitted to Congress his third annual
message. He told of Trist's mission and of his failure to conclude
a treaty. The commissioner had, he said, been instructed to de-
mand a cession of territory as indemnity, for in no other way
could Mexico satisfy the claims of the United States.
86 76id., 216-218. B7 ihid., 229.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 529
The doctrine of no territory is the doctrine of no indemnity, and if
sanctioned would be a public acknowledgment that our country was wrong
and that the war declared by Congress with extraordinary unanimity was
unjust and should be abandoned — -an admission unfounded in fact and
degrading to the national character.
He recited the substance of Trist's instructions and urged the
necessity of acquiring New Mexico and the Californias. The war
had abrogated the treaties regarding claims, making it necessary
for the United States to pay American claimants and to reim-
burse itself by taking territory. California, he said, should be
acquired in order to forestall the attempt by any other nation
to infringe upon the Monroe Doctrine. He disagreed with those
who advocated the policy of retiring to a fixed line and confining
the war to defensive operations. Instead, he recommended the
establishment of governments in New Mexico and California, and
a vigorous prosecution of the war. Having outlined his policy,
he added : "It has never been contemplated by me, as an object
of the war, to make a permanent conquest of the Republic of
Mexico or to annihilate her separate existence as an independent
nation," but a peace "must bring with it indemnity for the past
and securitv for the future."**^
"* 88 Eichardson Messages, IV, 533-546. Walker still favored the absorp-
tion of all of Mexico. A paragraph in the first draft of his financial
report to Congress practically advocated such a policy, but on the Presi-
dent's advice this paragraph was omitted (Polk, Diary, III, 241-242).
Among the TriM Papers is an interesting letter written by a young Mexi-
can to his father. It was written in Washington and bears neither date
nor signature, but an accompanying newspaper shows the writer to have
been Carlos Landa, and a comparison with events mentioned in Polk's
diary shows that the letter was written in December, 1847. Landa visited
the Secretary of the Treasury on December 13 and reported that "Walker
•is entirely in favour of the annexation of the whole of Mexico to the
United States; he told me so frankly & also spoke of the manner of
governing it during the first years by a suitable form of government
which should not be in opposition to the institutions of this country."
Regarding Walker as the most important member, he concluded that
Polk and the rest of the cabinet likewise desired annexation. He visited
Van Buren, Corcoran, Calhoun, and other prominent politicians. He says
that Walker was stricken with epilepsy on December 9; Polk in his
diary for that day notes that Walker "had been taken suddenly ill &
had fallen down in the Treasury building. ' '
530 JAMES K. POLK
The message was vehemently 'assailed in both houses of Con-
gress. As in the preceding session, the history of the outbreak
of the war was discussed in all its details. These recitals shed
no new light on the subject, for already nearly every argument
had been pressed into service to show that Polk had wantonly
usurped authority so that he might rob a sister republic of her
territory. On January 3, 1848, by a vote of eighty-five to eighty-
one, the House formally declared that the war had been "unneces-
sarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the
United States." Among the new Whig members who had the
pleasure of adding their votes to the denunciation of the Presi-
dent was Abraham Lincoln. With that consummate skill in
debate which was later to expose the sophistry of the "Little
Giant," he averred that Polk had falsified tlie history of our
difficulties with Mexico by telling a half truth. The statements
in the message reminded him of instances he had known of a
lawyer's "struggling for his client's neck in a desperate case,
employing every artifice to work round, befog, and cover up with
many words some point arising in the case which he dare not
admit and yet could not deny. "^"
Resolutions, too, there were in plenty. Dickinson presented
one on December 14 which asserted that the "true policy" of the
government required the annexation of contiguous territory. In
the Senate, on the following day, Calhoun offered a counter reso-
lution to the effect that a conquest of Mexico would be disastrous
to the United States, and that "no line of policy in further prose-
cution of the war should be adopted." On the twenty-second,
Lincoln made his debut as a legislator by calling upon the Presi-
dent to designate the exact ' ' spot ' ' on which the war had begun,
and for proof as to the ownership of that spot.""
»» Coufj. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 95, .155. The quotation is taken from
Lincoln, Works (Tandy ed.), 337-, which differs slightly from that reported
in the Globe.
«o Cong. Globe, loc. cit., 64.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 531
Three days after his message had been sent to Congress the
President received a letter from General Pillow which told of
the attempt made by Scott and Trist to procure a treaty by the
use of bribe money. At a meeting held on December 11 he told
the cabinet of the news he had received, and expressed "in the
strongest terms" his condemnation of their conduct. Scott s
immediate recall was discussed, but it was thought prudent to
seek further definite information from Generals Shields and Quit-
man, who were expected to arrive in Washington within a few
days.-'^ Although he must have known better,^- Shields, when
consulted, asserted that bribery had not been considered, and
that the discussion had related simply to paying part of the
•money for the territory in advance of the ratification of the
treaty. Polk did not accept this version of the matter, and re-
solved that those implicated in the scheme must be punished, even
though his friend Pillow might be one of the number. For the
present, however, he was obliged to await further information
concerning the "infamous transaction.'"'^
Before news of the bribery episode had reached Washington,
Polk and his cabinet had discussed the feasibility of promising
protection to the peace party in Mexico, if they would form a
government and agree to make a treaty. Incensed on account of
the bribery scandal and because Scott had arrested Pillow and
Worth, the President, against the advice of members of the cabi-
net, determined to recall both Scott and Trist. The question of
their successors had now to be considered. Marcy and Walker
felt that Taylor should be put in command of the army, but Polk
, fixed upon General W. 0. Butler. His intention to invest Butler
91 Polk, Diary, III, 245-246.
02 See HitcJicoek, Fifty Tears in camp and Field, 267-268.
93 Polk, Diary, III, 253, 262-3, 340, 383-4. In a letter to Marcy, Scott
stated that he had used secret service money simply "to purchase valu-
able information" {E. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 1085)— a statement
Avhich Polk pronounced "evasive, and leaves the irresistible inference
that such a transaction took place and that it will not bear the light"
{Diary, III, 346). Of course the transaction did take place. See above,
pp. 510-512.
532 JAMES K. POLK
with diplomatic powers was opposed by Buchanan, who insisted
that the commissioner should be a civilian. A choice was made
unnecessary by the arrival of news that Trist had already re-
opened negotiations.-'^ The President's belief that Taylor was
wlioUy out of sympathy with himself and his administration was
by no means erroneous. On one point only did the two men
agree — they both distrusted and detested General Scott. "Be-
tween ourselves," wrote Taylor to his son-in-law on hearing of
the victories near Mexico City,
Geu '1 Scott would stoop to anythiug however low & eontemptable as any
man in the nation, to obtain power or place, & be as arbitrary in using
it w'hen in possession; between him, Trist & the powers that be, old Harry
may take the hindmost, they are all of a piece.
When, about a month later, a false report of Polk 's death reached
camp, the hero of Buena Vista remarked : ' ' While I regret to
hear of the death of any one, I would as soon have heard of his
death if true, as tliat of any other individual in the whole
Union. "-'^ Perhaps his own brief term in the White House
caused him to realize more clearly the perplexities which con-
front the chief executive of the nation.
On January 4, 1848, Polk was much surprised to read in a
letter sent from Vera Cruz by Colonel Wilson that Trist was
negotiating with the Mexican commissioners.
Mr. Trist [was his commoiit] has acknowledged the receipt of his letter
of recal[lj, and he possesses no diplomatic powers. He is acting, no doubt,
upon Gen'l Scott's advice. He has become a perfect tool of Scott. He is,
[in] this measure, defying the authority of his Government. . . . He seems
to have entered into all Scott 's hatred of the administration, and to be
lending himself to all Scott's evil purposes. He may, I fear, greatly
embarrass the Government.
Next day Mrs. Trist showed to Buchanan the letter of December
4 in which her husband announced, in cipher, that he would
make a treaty in accordance with liis original instructions.""
04 Polk, Diary, III, 251, 266, 280-281.
05 Taylor to Wood, Sept. 27, Nov. 2, 1847, Taylor Letters, 136, 148.
00 Polk, Diary, III, 283, 286. For Trist 's cipher letter, see above, p. 524.
TEEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 533
Before the President had recovered from the amazement
caused by Trist's open defiance of authority, his vexation was
increased by a call from the House for a copy of Slidell's in-
structions and for information regarding the return of Santa
Anna and Paredes to Mexico. With the concurrence of the
cabinet Polk decided to furnish the House with Conner's in-
structions regarding- Santa Anna, but Slidell's instructions and
all relating to McKenzie's mission were withheld on the ground
that their publication would be prejudicial to public interest.'''^
Truly the new year had brought anything but pleasure to the
chief executive. One annoyance succeeded another in such rapid
succession that his patience was taxed to the utmost. Three days
after he had declined to give the House full information on dip-
lomatic affairs, the mail brought Trist's celebrated sixty-five page
letter (of December 6) in which the President was told that the
commissioner had decided to save the administration and the
party from a "perilous position," and the country from dis-
aster, by making a treaty with Mexico. No wonder that he pro-
nounced this epistle to be the "most extraordinary document"
he had ever read.
His despatch is arrogant, impudent, and very insulting to his Govern-
ment and even personally offensive to the President. He admits he is
acting without authority and in violation of the positive order recalling
him. It is manifest to me that he has become the tool of Gen '1 Scott and
his menial instrument, and that the paper was written at Scott's instance
and dictation. I have never in my life felt so indignant, and the whole
Cabinet expressed themselves as I felt. I told Mr. Buchanan that the
paper was so insulting and contemptably base that it require [d] no
lengthy answer, but that it did require a short, but stern and decided
rebuke, and directed him to prepare such a reply. I directed the Secre-
tary of War to write at once to Maj 'r Gen '1 Butler, directing him, if Mr.
Trist was still with the Head Quarters of the army, to order him off, and
to inform the authorities of Mexico that he had no authority to treat.
If there was any legal provision for his punishment he ought to be severely
handled. He has acted worse than any man in the public employ whom
07 Ibid., 287-291. Eichardson, Messages, IV, 565-567. For McKenzie's
mission, see p. 439.
534 JAMES K. POLK
I have ever known. His despatch proves that he is destitute of honour
or principle, and that he has proved himself to be a very base man. I
was deceived in him. I had little personal knowledge of him, but could
not have believed [it] possible that any man would have acted so basely
as he would liavo [has] doner's
Preparation of letters to Trist and Butler (who had super-
seded Scott) was delayed for several days while Polk and the
cabinet discussed the propriety of submitting Trist 's treaty to
the Senate, if it should turn out that he had already signed one.
Some of the members urged that unless the President had deter-
mined to reject such a treaty the suggested notice to the Mexican
government might prove embarrassing. Polk was now unwilling
to restrict his demands to those embodied in Trist 's instructions,
and .yet he declined to say that he would not accept a treaty made
in accordance with those instructions. Consequently General
Butler was told that if Trist had actually concluded a treaty he
was to send it to Washington, where it would be disposed of as
the President should deem best ; if none had been concluded, he
was to inform the Mexican government that the United States
would not recognize a treaty made by the former commissioner.""
Polk waited for additional information regarding his insub-
ordinate diplomat. The Mexican mail arrived on February 7,
but contained no dispatches from either Trist or Scott. It
brought, however,' a letter from the irrepressible Atocha, and as
usual he was ready to engage in underground diplomacy.
"Atocha is a great scoundrel," was the President's comment,
and liis letter contained the infamous suggestion tliat he should be fur-
nished with money to bribe the Mexican Congress to induce them to ratify
a Treaty of peace, though he does not state whether a Treaty had been
signed by Mr. Trist or not.
98 Polk, Diary, III, 300-301.
00 Ibid., 313-317. Marcy to Butler, Jan. 2l), 1848 {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52,
30 Cong., 1 sess., 146). On "February 2 the President, in response to a call,
sent to the Senate correspondence relating to Trist 's negotiations with the
Mexican commissioners at the time of Scott's armistice (Richardson, Mcs-
,<ia(/es, IV, 569).
TREATY OF GUABALUPK HIDALGO 535
He said that Trist claimed to possess a bribe fund, and Polk
thought it likely that the commissioner was base enough to nuike
such an assertion. Silence, in Polk's opinion, indicated a con-
spiracy on the part of Trist and Scott, antl he had little doubt
that a treaty would be made: "a few daj^s more will, I ti'ust,
develo]) what they have been doing. "^°'^
While he awaited developments, troubles nearer home fully
occupied the time and taxed the patience of the overworked ex-
ecutive. The hoards of office seekers multiplied. The Whigs,
not satisfied with aiding the enemy by "unpatriotic sentiments"
and annoying resolutions, were now, in the President's opinion,
"insidiously attempting to produce a panic in the money market
and thereby, if possible, to break down the Treasury, and thus
compel the inglorious withdrawal of our army from Mexico."
There were dissensions within the Democratic party among the
supporters of rival aspirants for the Presidency, and Polk sus-
pected Buchanan of using his position in the cabinet as a means
of injuring General Cass. Members of the party urged the Presi-
dent to cease reiterating his determination not to accept another
nomination, for they said that he might be nominated regardless
of his own wishes. "To all of them," says the Diary, "I have
given the same answer, & repeated my sincere desire to retire &
my fixed purpose to do so." At this same time he was called
upon to perform a duty which was personally disagreeable, and
one which would bring additional opposition to his administra-
tion. He approved the conviction of Colonel Fremont for dis-
obedience to the orders of General Kearny, and, although the
sentence of dismissal was remitted, he fully expected to incur the
powerful opposition of Senator Benton.^'" The suspense regard-
ing Trist 's activities was broken on February 19 by the arrival
of a messenger bearing the treaty of peace. Before discussing
100 Polk, Diani, III, 328-330.
T^oi Ibid., 319-322, 327. After the approval of the court's decision,
Benton, as noted elsewhere, ceased speaking to the President.
536 JAMES K. POLK
its reception, however, we may turn our attention to the negoti-
ations by which it had been concluded.
As noted above, negotiations did not begin as soon as Trist
had announced his intention to remain in Mexico. Pena y Peiia,
the Minister of Foreign Relations, said that the appointment of
commissioners must be confirmed by the senate and that the new
congress would not meet until January. Both Edward Thornton
and Percy W. Doyle, who had recently returned to his post as
secretary of the British legation, urged the Mexican goveriiment
to waive formalities, but, for a time, their arguments produced
no effect. Although Trist held informal interviews with the com-
missioners, not until late in December did Peiia consent to take
the responsibility of instructing the commissioners to treat with
the American diplomat. Even then, in true Mexican fashion,
he required them to ask for impossible concessions ; and before
an agreement had been reached. President Anaya's term of office
had expired. As a quorum of the congress had not yet assembled,
his successor could not be elected, therefore Pena, as head of the
supreme court, again assumed the office of President. Once
more, also, Luis de la Rosa was made Minister of Foreign Re-
lations.
Negotiations were resumed, but the new government at first
seemed less disposed than the old to make the necessary conces-
sions. The commissioners sat in Mexico City, while the seat of
government was at Queretaro, consequently much time was lost
in transmitting messages between the two places.
Before the change of government Trist had nuide it clear
that the Rio Grande boundary and the inclusion of San Diego
within Upper California would be insisted upon by the United
States. He said, also, that his government would not i)ay Mexico
more than fifteen million dollars. On assuming office Rosa ob-
jected to the boundary mentioned by Trist, and insisted tliat the
sum to be paid must be at least thirty millions. Doubtless he
would linve intorjiosed obstacles indefinitely liad it not been for
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 537
threatened uprisings in some of the Mexican states, and had
Scott not taken steps to renew military operations. When argu-
ments had failed, Trist threatened to break otf negotiations unless
a treaty could be signed by the first of February, while Doyle
urged both Rosa and the commissioners to avert the calamity of
a rencAval of hostilities. Such pressure could not be withstood.
On January 31 a messenger left Queretaro for Mexico City bear-
ing documents which authorized the commissioners to sign the
treaty as agreed upon wdth Trist. Not until the afternoon of
February 2 were all details arranged and copies in both languages
completed. In accordance with the wishes of the Mexican com-
missioners, the treaty was not signed in the capital where the
meetings had been held. For attixing the signatures they re-
paired to the near-by town of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and from that
place the treaty took its name.^°-
In the treaty the United States procured the things which
had been made ultimata in Trist 's instructions. The Rio Grande
was recognized as the boundary of Texas ; Upper California and
New Mexico, but not Lower California, were ceded to the United
States. In return, Mexico was to be paid fifteen million dollars ;
and in addition, the United States agreed to pay all liquidated
claims of American citizens against Mexico, and to assume un-
adjusted claims to the extent of three and a quarter million
dollars. Mexico was specifically relieved from the payment of
claims not covered by the treaty. The privilege of transit across
the Isthmus of Tehauntepec, desired by the American govern-
ment, was not granted. In a word, Trist contented himself with
the minimum which the administration had, in April, 1847,
authorized him to accept. As soon as the signatures had been
affixed the treaty was borne to Washington by James D. Freanor,
a war correspondent of the New Orleans Delta, better known
102 For further details concerning the last stage of negotiations, see
Eives, Uniiecl States and Mexico, II, 602-613. Some of the Mexican pro-
jects in the Trist Papers were, according to a note appended by Trist,
translated by Thornton and the copies are in his handwriting. Evidently
he was familiar with all of the proceedings.
538 JAMES K. POLK
by his pen name, "Mustang." Trist had already asked Scott to
disregard his positive orders and to "pledge his word" that he
would suspend liostilities.^"^
Freanor arrived in Washington on February 19, 1848, and
Buchanan placed the treaty in the President's hands at nine
0 'clock of the same evening. As Trist had announced his inten-
tion to resume negotiations, no suri)rise was expressed when the
document arrived. After a hasty reading of the treaty, Polk
confided to his diary :
Mr. Trist was recalled in October last, but chose to remain in Mexico
and continue the negotiations. The terms of the Treaty are Avithin his
instructions which he took out in April last,. upon the important question
of boundary and limits. There are many provisions in it which will re-
quire more careful examination than a single reading will afford. Mr.
Trist has acted very badly, as I have heretofore noted in this diary, but
notwithstanding this, if on further examination the Treaty is one that can
be accepted, it should not be rejected on account of his bad conduet.^o-*
To this sensible attitude of not permitting personal pique to
warp his judgment on matters of state the President steadily
adhci'cd. Although Trist 's arrogance and unwarranted insolence
had greatly exasperated him, the simi^le fact of negotiating with-
out instructions probably did not worry Polk very much. In
April, 1847, while Trist 's instructions were being prepared, Bu-
chanan received a letter from Moses Y. Beach, of the New York
Sun, whom the President had appointed as secret agent in Mexico,
and the agent intimated that he might make a treaty. He had
not, of course, been clothed with diplomatic powers, yet after
reading Beach 's letter Polk noted in his diary :
Jt is clearly to be inferred from his letter that he will make a Treaty
with them if he can. Should he do so, and it is a good one, I will waive
his authority to make it, and submit it to the Senate for ratification. It
will be a good joke if he should assume the authority and take the whole
country by surprise & make a Treaty.^""
103 Trist to Scott, Jan. 28, 1848, Trist Papers.
104 Polk, Diary, III, 345.
los I'olk, T^iarv, II, 477. Beach's commission is printed in Buchanan,
Works, VIJ, Hit."
TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 589
Probably Trist may have heard the President make similar re-
marks, and, if so, they ma.y have had some influence on his own
conduct in Mexico. However this may have been, Polk, in the
present instance, failed to see the humorous side of the trans-
action.
So important did the President regard an early disposal of
the treaty that he -waived his scruples against Sunday labor and
summoned the cabinet to a special meeting on the evening of the
twentieth of February. Of this meeting we have two accounts,
one in Polk's diary for the day, another by his nephew and
private secretary, J. Knox Walker. After a general discussion
Polk asked the opinion of each member concerning the advisa-
bility of submitting the document to the Senate for ratification.
All agreed that the tenth article relating to land grants in Texas
should be stricken out. On the question of accepting the treaty,
thus amended, the cabinet was divided — Buchanan and Walker
advised a rejection of the whole treaty, while Marcy, ]\Iason,
Johnson, and Clifford were in favor of accepting all but the tenth
article. After Buchanan's opposition to extensive annexation
his present attitude so nettled the President that he asked the
pointed question: "Will you take the responsibility of its re-
jection?" Buchanan's reply, that he would "take all the re-
sponsibility which properly pertains to me as Secy of State
giving such advice," led Polk to believe that the Secretary was
playing politics at the expense of his chief. He reminded Bu-
chanan that at the beginning of the war the Secretary had drafted
instructions to American ministers at foreign courts which as-
serted that the government had no intention of taking territory
from Mexico — an assertion which the President had required him
to omit. He reminded him, also, of his persistent opposition to
the acquisition of any land except Upper California and New
Mexico — now he objected to the treaty because it did not procure
a large enough area. Buchanan admitted this. He told the
President that he might go further and mention his (Buchanan's)
540 JAMES E. POLK
opposition to Scott 's march from Vera Cruz to Mexico City. But,
he added, his advice was not taken, and "I am not now willing
to acquire for indemnity what I would then have been very will-
ing to take. The line of the Sierra Madre will give us 'indemnity
for the past & security for the future.' " No agreement was
reached at this meeting.^"*
Another meeting was held on the following day, and the
President announced that he had decided to submit the treaty
to the Senate for ratification, with a recommendation that the
tenth article be stricken out. The reasons assigned for this de-
cision are recorded in his diary :
They were, briefly, that the treaty conformed on the main question of
limits & boundary to the instructions given to Mr. Trist in April last; and
that thougli, if the treaty was now to be made, I should demand more
territory, perhaps to make the Sierra Madra the line, yet it was doubtful
whether this could be ever obtained by the consent of Mexico. I looked,
too, to the consequences of its rejection. A majority of one branch of
Congress is opposed to my administration ; they have falsely charged that
the war was brought on and is continued by me with a view to the con-
quest of Mexico; and if I were now to reject a Treaty made upon my own
terms, as authorized in April last, with the unanimous approbation of the
Cabinet, the probability is that Congress would not grant either men or
money to prosecute the war. Should this be the result, the army now in
Mexico would be constantly wasting and diminishing in numbers, and I
might at last be compelled to withdraw them, and thus loose the two
Provinces of New Mexico & Upper California, which were ceded to the
U. S., by this Treaty. Should the opponents of my administration succeed
in carrying the next Presidential election, the great probability is that
the country would loose all the advantages secured bj-- this Treaty. I
adverted to the immense value of Upper California; and concluded by
saying that if I were now to reject my own terms, as offered in April last,
I did not see how it was possible for my administration to be sustained. io7
On the next day, February 22, he sent the treaty to the Senate,
accompanied by a message which recommended that all except
io« Polk, Dianj, III, 345-346. Walker's account is in the PoUc Papers.
In a note he says that he prepared it Fe})ruary 22, two days after the
meeting. He does not say whether he ha^l been })resent at the meeting,
but comment in Polk's Diary, III, 351, indicates that he had been.
107 Polk, Biarii, III, 347-348.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 541
tlu' tentli article should be ratified. With it he transmitted copies
of the instructions given to both Slidell and Trist, which np to
this time had been withhehl.^"*
Truly, the Pi-esident had been placed in an awkward position
by his officious diplomat. The war had been unpopular even
while IMexico had refused to treat, and Polk had good reasons
for believing that he could not hope for means with which to
continue it, if lie should reject his own terms. During his entire
career he had shown excellent judgment as to what was and what
was not attainable, and besides, the treaty gave him all that he
had set his heart upon. Tamaulipas or part of Sonora might be
desirable, if it could be obtained without difficulty; but Polk
was not the man to risk losing the objects which he had set out
to procure, when the prospect of better terms was by no means
certain. Despite all that his opponents might say it seems clear
that the President never welcomed a war, and he neglected no
opportunity which gave prospect of ending it. He was deter-
mined to have Upper California and New Mexico at any cost,
for these formed a part of his original program. His interest in
further acquisition was never very great. Buchanan's sudden
desire for more territory confirmed rather than altered Polk's
decision, for he believed that the Secretary was inspired by purely
selfish motives.
He wished [wrote the President] to throw the whole responsibility on
me of sending the Treaty to the Senate. If it was received well by the
country, being a member of my administration, he would not be injured
by it in his Presidential aspirations, for these govern all his opinions &
acts lately; but if, on the other hand, it should not be received well, he
could say, "I advised against it. "lo"
Doubtless Polk was justified in attributing to political motives
Buchanan's recent change of front on the territorial question.
At any rate he had lost faith in the Secretary's loyalty to the
108 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 573-574.
109 Polk, Diary, III, 350.
o42 JAMES K. POLE
administration. He had not concealed his resentment when dis-
cussing the treaty, and a few days later he had occasion to speak
still more pointedly. Buchanan told him that it was rumored in
the streets that he was to be removed from the cabinet because
a friend of his named Nugent, a correspondent for the New York
Herald, had criticized tlie administration. Polk told him that
the rumor was untrue, but that the vile effusions signed by
Nugent had been attributed to the Secretary of State. He re-
mai'ked " in a stern manner ' ' that Buchanan himself must judge
of the propriety of having a member of the cabinet holding fa-
miliar intercourse with an unprincipled person who "was in daily
habit of calumniating" the President. ' ' Their object, ' ' said Polk,
"seems to be to abuse Gen'l Cass, Mr. Woodbury, and myself,
and to praise Mr. Buchanan. The[y] falsely represent that I
am intriguing to obtain the nomination for a re-election to the
Presidency." He did not doubt that Buchanan had encouraged
these attacks, for his own purposes; but he did not wish to act
on suspicion alone. "If," said he, "I obtain any reliable proof
that Mr. Buchanan has given countenance to Galvienses [Nugent]
he shall not remain in the Cabinet. He denies that he has done
so, and I am bound to believe him." When informed by Clifford
that both Walker and Buchanan had spoken of resigning on
account of the controversy over the treaty, he declared that he
would follow his own course, regardless of consequences. Al-
though surprised to hear that Walker had made such remarks,
he was neither surprised nor perturbed by the hostility of the
Secretary of State. "I expressed to Mr. Clifford," says the
Diary, "an indifference as to the course which Mr. Buchanan
miglit think proper to pursue, but told him there Avas not the
sliglitest danger of his resigning. "^^•^
iio/J/iVZ., ;^>5.S-355, 359. Galvienses was Nuo;eiit's pen name. "Mr.
Buchanan's real trouble," was another comment in the Diary, "is that
he cannot use my administration and shape his [itsj course according
to his own ever varying whims, in order to promote his aspirations to
the Presidency. He cares not for the success or glory of my administra-
tion further tiian he can make it subservient to liis own political aspira-
tions.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 543
When he had received the treaty and submitted it to the
Senate the President no doubt believed that he had received the
last of Trist's abusive epistles. If so, he was greatly mistaken.
Indeed, Freanor had brought two more along with the treaty,
but by an oversight tliey had not been delivered to Polk until
two days after that document had been sent to the Senate. The
, first bore the date of December 29, and the main point developed
M'as that Polk's annual message had jeopardized peace negoti-
ations by aiding the puros, the party which desired to annex all
of Mexico to the United States. The particular part of the
message criticized was that which suggested that necessity might
force the United States to establish a government with which it
could make a treaty. By preventing the moderados, now in con-
trol, from making peace, the puros hoped, by continuing hostil-
ities, to force the United States to take all of Mexico, or at least
to establish some form of protectorate over it. The second letter,
of January 12, 1848, dealt with the difficulty of suspending hos-
tilities, and was still more offensive than the other. At the time
of Trist's recall, Polk had required the commander-in-chief to
transmit all peace proposals to Washington ; at the same time,
Scott was instructed to pursue the war with renewed vigor. Such
an arrangement, said Trist, prevented any suspension of hostil-
ities while peace proposals were under consideration — except by
disobedience of orders — and was "a wanton sporting with the
lives of men," a course which, if followed, would cause the
whole civilized world to "burst forth with one universal cry of
horror."^"
The arrogant character of these letters completely exhausted
the patience of the President, and their author was characterized
as "an impudent and unqualified scoundrel." Through Marcy,
Polk instructed General Butler to prevent Trist from exercising
any official authority in Mexico and to drive him away from the
army headquarters. When Marcy hesitated to issue so drastic
111 Trist to Buchanan {Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 274-280).
544 JAMES K. POLK
an order, the President not only dictated its terms but prepared
a note for the files of the War Department to show that Polk
himself had assumed the entire responsibility.^^-
Had Polk received at this time another long letter written
by Trist, he would, if possible, have been still more exasperated.
It bears a date earlier than Freanor's departure for Washington,
but apparently it was not sent until later. Besides giving a
detailed account of the negotiations, Trist made some really sen-
sible remarks concerning the obligation of the United States to
protect its adventurous citizens who had engaged in hazardous
enterprises in Mexico. As usual, however, he could not refrain
from saying disagreeable things. In his discussion of the boun-
dary he committed the unpardonable sin of asserting that the
land between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was as much a pari
of Tamaulipas (and not of Texas) as the counties of Accomac
and Northampton were a part of Virginia. ^'^ If so, the Presi-
dent was justly entitled to the sobriquet ' ' Polk the mendacious, ' '
for his war message had been premised on a falsehood and hos-
tilities had been wantonly provoked.
Private letters written at this time show that Trist derived
real pleasure from playing enfant ternhle. He had developed
an inveterate hatred for both Polk and Buchanan, and he seemed
to believe that he possessed information which, when disclosed,
would make the throne totter. He presumed that the arrival
of his treaty had caused a commotion, but it could have been
'^nothing to the uproar that is to come."
Until I shall be ready to speak, [he continued with a solemnity born
of conceit], let them remain in the doubt and the hoj>es, as to my future
course, inspired by the falseness & baseness of their own ignoble hearts.
Let them go on hoping that I am, or may be made, like themselves; capable
of being houf/ht, if not to active villany, at least to passive; to silence, if
to nothing else.
112 Polk, Diarii, 111. 357-358. Marcy to Butler, Feb. 25, 1848 (Sen.
Ex. Doc. 52, as aijove cited, 14S-150).
113 Trist to Buchanan, Jan. 25, 1848 (Sen. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess.,
290). . S> ,
TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 545
These remarks are interesting as coming from one of the two
men who alone had been guilty of huying others. The disclosures
which he expected to cause the *' uproar" were Polk's confiden-
tial correspondence with Pillow, whom Trist, in his letter, was
pleased to call a reptile.
As to whether he was entitled to payment for the extra time
put in since his recall, Trist 's mind was not quite clear; but he
would accept nothing which might depend upon even the ' ' official
decision" of the President.
His official mind is too corrupt or too imbecile. Nothing proceeding
from it — in the way of advantage, at least — shall touch me. I say the
same of every man capable of retaining a seat in his cabinet during the
last 3, 4 or 5 months.
The court of inquiry selected to investigate the charges made
against Pillow and other accused military officers was, in Trist 's
opinion, a "pitiable device of the pitiable being in the Presi-
dential chair." When notified by General Butler that he must
leave Mexico, Trist once more paid his compliments to the Presi-
dent and denied his authority to order a private citizen out of
a foreign countr3^ He w'as probably right in holding that
I deem it mj' duty to deny the lawfulness of any requirement from the
President of the United States, pretending to impose upon me the obli-
gation, either to leave the Eepublic of Mexico or to return to the United
States. I recognize no authority in that functionary competent to create
any such obligation. The pretension to create it, & the use of the armed
power confided to him, for the purpose of enforcing it, are, to my mind,
alike usurpations; usurpations differing but slightly in the shades of
enormity.ii*
The President, as we have seen, sent Trist 's treaty to the
Senate on February 22, but on account of the illness and death
of John Quincy Adams its consideration was delayed several days.
114 Trist to Mrs. Trist, March 2, 1848; Trist to Butler, March 17,
1848, Trust Papers, In a letter dated March 18 he told Butler that he
would not embarrass him by resisting the order. He had, on February 1,
written to his wife that he would go to West Chester and keep a board-
ing school. "For my own part, I will live on bread & water before I
ever again hold office of any kind." Also in Trist Papers.
546 JAMES K. POLK
Immediately, however, unofficial reports predicted that the treaty
would probably be rejected. Cave Johnson shared this belief,
and he told the President of a rumor that both Buchanan and
Walker had been exerting their influence against ratification.
Polk was still more perturbed by another "astounding" rumor —
also reported by Johnson — which charged Walker with giving
aid to the Presidential candidacy of General Taylor. "If I
ascertain this to be true, ' ' was the comment in his diary, ' ' it will
be inconsistent with the success of my measures for Mr. Walker
to remain in my Cabinet. I will require strong proof however
before I can believe it to be true.""'
The Whigs and a small group of Democrats who had been
devising means of compelling the President to end the war, now
that a treaty had been made, did their utmost to cause its re-
jection. The prospect for ratification was not encouraging. On
February 28 Senator Sevier, chairman of the Committee of For-
eign Affairs, reported to Polk that all of the committee except
himself had resolved to recommend that the treaty should be
rejected and that the President be advised to send to Mexico a
new commission, invested with power to make a new treaty. They
did not, said Sevier, object to the treaty itself but to the fact
tliat Trist had no authority to make it. The absurd suggestion
offered by the committee did not appeal to Polk's practical mind :
I told him I Sevier] I condemned the insubordination & insolent con-
duet of Mr. Trist, but that the Treaty itself was the subject for consider-
ation and not his conduct, and that if the provisions of the Treaty were
such as could be accepted, it would be worse than idle ceremony to sr-nd
out a grand commission to re-negotiate the same Treaty. I told him, also,
that if the Senate advised me to send out such a commission, I hoped they
would advise me also what they would accept. . . . Extremes sometimes
meet. . . . They have done so in this instance. Mr. Webster is for no
territory and Mr. Hannegan is for all Mexico, and for opposite reasons
both will oppose the Treaty. It is difficult, upon any rational principle,
to assign a satisfactory reason for anything Col. Benton may do, especially
in his present temper of mind, wholly engrossed as he seems to have been
for some months past with the case of his son-in law. Col. Fremont.
115 Polk, Diarif, III, 361.
TBEATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 547
His suspicion that Walker and Buchanan would use their in-
fluence against ratification seems to have been removed by their
volunteering to urge Senators to vote against the plan for cre-
ating a new eommission.^^'^
While the President was conversing with Sevier, the Senate
was passing resolutions which requested him to submit all corre-
spondence that had passed between Trist and the State Depart-
ment. Without consulting the cabinet, he decided to send it all,
despite its exceptionable character. On the next day he was told
that the fate of the treaty was extremely doubtful and that about
a dozen Democrats would vote against it because of their desire
for more territory. Not for this reason, but from personal mo-
tives, Polk feared most of all the opposition of Benton :
He has heretofore maintained that the true boundary of Texas was
the Nueces instead of the -Rio Grande, & he is apt to think that nothing
is done properly that he is not consulted about.n'
If some Democrats declined to uphold the administration by
supporting the treaty, so, also, were certain Whigs unwilling to
put ratification on a purely party basis. Polk was especially
pleased when on March 1 he was told by the banker, W. W.
Corcoran, that Joseph Gales, of the National Intelligencer, had re-
fused to prepare an article against ratification, when requested
to do so by Whig Senators. For several days after this the fate
of the treaty hung in the balance, its chief opponents being
Webster and Benton. Polk blamed the insurgent Democrats most
of all, for as he said, "if the Democratic party were united in
favour of the Treaty, I doubt whether a single Whig would vote
against it." Both parties, in his opinion, were interested pri-
marily in the approaching Presidential election, and he did not
believe that Whigs would care to incur the odium of casting a
strictly party vote."*
After much heated discussion and many calls upon the Presi-
dent for information (among other things for "information in
ii<i Ibid., 363-367. iiT/biJ.., 367. us ihid., 368-371.
548 JAMES K. POLK
regard to any disposition or overtures on the part of any consid-
erable portion of tlie Mexican people to be annexed to the U.
States"), the Senate, by a vote of thirty-eight to fourteen, ratified
the treaty on the tenth of March. The tenth article and the secret
article relating to an extension of time for ratification were elim-
inated as the President had recommended. Other modifications
made by tlie Senate, on its own account, caused Polk to fear that
Mexico might decline to ratify the treaty. He greatly appreci-
ated the assistance given by Senator Mangum, of the Committee
of Foreign Affrirs, who "though a Whig, is a gentleman" —
apparently a rare combination, in the President's opinion.^^^
As soon as there was any indication that the treaty would be
ratified, Polk began to oast about for a suitable commissioner
whom he might send to Mexico to urge its acceptance. He fixed
upon Louis McLane, of Maryland, and when he declined to serve,
Senator Sevier, of Arkansas, was appointed. Scarcely, however,
had Sevier's appointment been ratified by the Senate when he
was taken ill and, in order to save time, Attorney-General Clif-
ford was chosen to be his associate. Clifford set out for Mexico
at once, while Sevier's health was sufficiently improved within
the next few days to enable him to follow his colleague.
Ratification of the treaty by the Senate did not entirely relieve
Polk's anxiety, for he feared that his opponents might yet defeat
it by indirect methods. Evidence of a disposition to employ such
methods was seen in a motion, .offered in executive session on
March 14, to remove the injunction of secrecy from the Senate
proceedings. Its adoption would expose to the Mexicans the
iio/ftid., 369, .'{77, 381. When the records of the executive session
were finally made public on May 31 it was discovered that several rather
drastic resolutions had been offered. Webster, for example, moved that
all discussion of the treaty be posti)oned and that the President be
asked to appoint a new commission. Houston held that since Trist had
no authority to negotiate, his treaty was ''utterly void,'' and oujjht to
be rejected. Both Houston and Jefferson Davis wanted more territory,
while Baldwin, of Connecticut, tried to incorporate into the treaty a
provision for excludinff slavery from all territory to be acquired. The
proceedings are printed in Sen. Ex. Doc, 52, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 4 ff.
TEEATT OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 549
confidential instructions which had been given to Slidell and
Trist and, also, the division of opinion in the Senate. They
might as a result be induced to reject the modified treaty in the
hope of obtaining better terms. No action was taken on this
resolution until the last of May, but in the meantime the New
York Herald began to publish Polk's message which had accom-
panied Trist 's treaty to the Senate and, also, Slidell's instructions
and parts of the diplomatic correspondence. As Nugent, the
Washington correspondent for that paper, was known to be on
intimate terms with Buchanan, the Secretary of State at once
became the object of suspicion. Polk was loth to believe that
Buchanan could be guilty of such treachery; still, he advised
Senators to make a thorough investigation, and he was prepared
to dismiss the Secretary if it should be found that he had in any
way been connected with giving out the documents. When sum-
moned before a Senate committee, Nugent refused to disclose the
name of the person who had furnished him with copies of the
documents, but he stated in writing that it was not Buchanan.
Polk believed the Secretary of State to be both weak and self-
seeking, yet he was very much gratified to have Buchanan "re-
lieved from so injurious an imputation."^-"
Ratification of the treaty by the Senate did not terminate
discussion on military affairs. It was not certain, of course,
that Mexico would accept the alterations which had been made,
consequently the administration forces urged that the pending
ten-regiment bill should be enacted into law. Polk's whole war
policy was assailed and defended, as before, while opposition
members kept annoying the President with requests for addi-
tional information. Among other items called for by the Senate
was a copy of the letter which, in 1845, Gillespie had carried to
Thomas 0. Larkin, United States consul at Monterey, California.
Our chief interest in this resolution is that when commenting
upon it in his diary Polk distinctly implied that Fremont had
120 Polk, Diary, III, 396-409.
550 JAMES K. POLE
not been authorized to foment a revolution in California. He
transmitted a copy of the letter to the Senate in executive session,
so that if it were made public, and trouble should result, the
responsibility would rest upon the Senate and not upon himself.^-^
Clifford arrived in Mexico City with the modified treaty on
April 11, 1848, Sevier four days later. Under the President's
supervision Buchanan had prepared instructions which were to
g-uide them in their discussions with tlie jMexican officials. Among
other things they were to avoid diplomatic notes whenever pos-
sible and to hold personal conferences, which would be more
conducive to a speedy adjustment of differences of opinion. In
a letter to the Minister of Foreign Relations, written at the same
time, Buchanan explained in detail the changes which had been
made by the Senate. While his letter was very friendly in tone,
a pointed reference to the fact that ' ' four votes, taken from the
majority, and added to the minority, would have defeated the
treaty" was intended to impress upon the Mexican government
the futility of asking for better terms. ^--
During the period of more than two months betAveen the
signature of the treaty and the arrival of Clifford and Sevier in
Mexico the several factions in that country had had time to dis-
cuss the question of making peace with tlie United States, al-
tliough the details of the treaty were not known to the public.
The puros, or radicals, being anxious for annexation to the United
States, naturally were hostile to ratification. For an entirely
different reason the propertied class looked forward with dismay
to the withdrawal of the American army, because they feared
that adequate protection of their property would be gone. Ac-
coi'diiig to his own account, "certain leaders" desired Seott to
pi-o('laiiu himself dictator for six years, with the eventual purpose
of joining the United States. The general "ultimately declined"
121 Ihid., 395, 399. Eichardson, Messages, IV, 57&
122 Buchanan to Min. of For. Eel., March 18, 1848 (J3". Ex. Doc. 60,
30 Cong,. 1 sess., 67).
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 551
the invitation. One of his reasons was that lie had already sug-
gested annexation and "President Polk's Government carefully
withheld its wishes from him thereon."'-''
The work of the American commissioners was delayed by the
fact tliat the Mexican congress, which alone could ratify the
treaty, had not convened at the time of their arrival. Although
the members had been elected in March, not until the first week
in May did a quorum assemble in Queretaro. The apparent
reluctance of the Mexican government to meet the issue led Polk
to believe that ratification "may be regarded as doubtful."'-*
After meeting, however, the congress acted Avith unusual
promptitude. President Peila y Peiia in his message, although
regretting that the treaty had been modified, nevertheless ad-
vised its ratification. In addition, his ministers of war and
finance showed by verbal reports that Mexico was too weak to
continue hostilities if the treaty should be rejected. On May 19
the chamber of deputies gave its assent and the Minister of
Foreign Relations invited Clifi'ord and Sevier to visit Queretaro
and present their credentials to the President. They arrived on
May 25, just after the senate had ratified the treaty. Ratifica-
tions were exchanged on the thirtieth and the commissioners re-
turned to Mexico City and arranged for the fulfillment of the
financial obligations of the treaty.'^^
"At 6 o'clock this morning," wrote Clifford on June 12,
the flag of the United States was taken doAvn from the national palace in
this city and that of the Mexican republic was hoisted. The customary
honors were paid to both, and the ceremony passed off in perfect quiet,
although the great square was thronged. i^c
With this formality the two years' war with Mexico had been
brought to a successful termination. President Polk had not
123 Scott, Autobiography, II, 581-582. Doyle to Palmerston, Feb. 13,
1848, quoted by Rives, II, 643-644.
124 Polk, Diary, III, 447.
125 Sevier and Clifford to Buchanan, May 25 and 30, 1848 (H. Ex. Doc.
60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 72-73). See also Rives, II, 651-653.
126 H. Ex. Doc. 60, as cited above, 74.
552 JAMES E. POLE
onh' ' ' conquered a peace, ' ' but in all essential details he had
effected his program of national expansion. Determined from
the beginning to add California and New Mexico to our national
domain, he pursued this object with a dogged persistence which
neither opposition nor denunciation could weaken. Whatever
may be thought of his motives or his methods, to him is due the
credit (or censure, if you please) of extending to the Pacific the
boundaries of the United States.
The letter in which Sevier and Clifford had announced that
tlie treaty had been ratified by the Mexican congress reached the
President on the fifteenth of June. Comment in his diary is
limited to a statement that the letter had been received, for he
was ill at the time and his mind was occupied with the contem-
plated purchase of Cuba. His pleasure at being relieved from
the burdens of war may be judged by a remark made on the
second anniversary of its beginning: "It is two years ago this
day since War was declared by Congress against Mexico. They
have been two years of unceasing labour and anxiety with me. ' '^-'^
On July 4, just as the President had returned from the cere-
monies connected with laying the corner stone of the Washington
monument, a messenger arrived with the treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. He at once directed Buchanan to prepare a procla-
mation so that it might be signed on "the anniversary of Inde-
pendence. ' ' His private secretaries were set to work at copying
a message which had already been prepared, and two days later
this and the treaty were submitted to both houses of Congress.
Among the documents sent with the treaty was a copy of the
instructions given to Slidell in 1845. When the House had asked
for these instructions earlier in the session, their request had
been denied, but now, as the President noted, "the reasons for
witliholding them at that time no longer exist."
As a true expansionist the President fully appreciated the.
importance of his achievements. "The results of the Avar with
y-i-! Polk, Diani, III, 448, 492.
TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO 553
Mexico," said his message, "have given the United States a
national charat-ter whieli our country never before enjoyed."
New Mexico and California "constitute of tliemselves a country
large enough for a great empire, and their ac(iuisition is second
only in importance to that of Louisiana in 1803. ' ' He saw, on the
other hand, that evil as well as good might follow in the wake
of the war, and he took advantage of the occasion to warn Con-
gress against unwise legislation. In organizing governments for
the new territories, he invoked a spirit of concession and concil-
iation, so that sectional discords might be avoided and the Union
be preserved. The army should be reduced to its ante-bellum
footing, for "our standing army is to be found in the bosom of
society." A true disciple of Jefferson, he urged that
Upon the restoration of peace we should adopt the policy suited to a
state of peace. In doing this the earliest practicable payment of the
public debt should be a cardinal principle of action. Profiting by the ex-
periences of the past, we should avoid the errors into which the country
was betrayed shortly after the close of the war with Great Britain m
1815 In a few years after that period a broad and latitudmous con-
struction of the powers of the Federal Government unfortunately received
but too much countenance. Though the country was burdened with a
heavy public debt, large, and in some instances unnecessary and extrava-
gant, expenditures were authorized by Congress. The consequence was
that the payment of the debt was postponed for more than twenty years,
and even then it was onlv accomplished by the stern will and unbending
policy of President Jackson, who made its payment a leading measure of
his Administration. 12S
Some of Polk's friends, including Houston and Davis, of the
Senate Committee on Military Affairs, did not share his views
concerning a reduction of the army. Not satisfied with his recom-
mendation, the House, also, asked him for additional informa-
tion. On August 1 he submitted a report from the Secretary
of War, and along with it, a message saying that he had "seen
no reason to change the opinion" expressed in the preceding
i28Eichardson, Messages, IV, 587-593. The original ^^jf^^i^^^^
message contained a paragraph on the "misnamed & ^.^Pl^'^^l ,t^ „^,^
system,' but by the advice of the cabinet it was omitted (Polk, Diani,
III, 496).
554 JAMES K. POLK
July. He was "decidedly opposed" to an increase in the army,
and he attributed the anxiety for more adequate defense to self-
seeking military men and extravagant Whigs. Concerning the
latter he said in his diary :
Some Whig members of Congress favour the measure because it is in
harmony with their general policy. They favour, as a party, large ex-
penditures, high tariffs, & Banks, and in addition to this they would be
pleased to have a large increase of the standing army fastened on the
country, which they would for political effect charge to be a consequence
of the Mexican War.129
The forebodings of the President regarding the sectional bit-
terness which might result from attempts to establish govern-
ments for the new territories were not without foundation. The
Wilmot Proviso had not been forgotten, and already, indeed, the
debate on the Oregon bill foreshadowed the breakers ahead.
Renewed agitation of the slavery question resulted from the
Mexican war, but was not a part of it; its consideration as a
domestic question is reserved for another chapter.
i^'J Richardson, Messages, IV, 603. Polk, Diary, IV, 48.
CHAPTER XXI
OREGON
The treaty of peace which terminated the Revolution fixed the
boundary between the United States and Canada east of the
Mississippi River. By the purchase of Louisiana with its indefi-
nite boundaries, in 1803, the United States acquired whatever
claims France might have to territory lying west of the Missis-
sippi ; and by the Florida treaty of 1819 Spain ceded to the
United States all her claims to territory lying west of Louisiana
and north of the forty-second parallel of north latitude. In
general terms, all this was clear enough, but the difficult problem
was : What, precisely, are the proper limits of these claims ?
The British claim to the Pacific coast region was based mainly
on the explorations made by Captain Cook in 1776 ; the interior
of the Oregon region was claimed as a result of the discovery of
the Frazer River valley by Alexander MacKenzie in 1793. In
1789, however, the Spaniards, who laid claim to all of this region,
sent out from Mexico an exploring expedition. At Nootka Sound
they seized two British ships and nearly precipitated a war
between the two countries. The matter was adjusted by a con-
vention signed in 1790 which admitted the right of British sub-
jects to establish trading posts for the purpose of carrying on
commerce with the natives. The question which came to be dis-
puted later was whether, in this convention, Spain had trans-
ferred to England the ownership of thfe land, or sin>ply the tem-
porary use of it. .Russia, also, had laid claim to this region, but
by treaties — one with the United States in 1824, and another with
England in 1825 — had relinquished everything south of 54° 40'
north latitude.
556 JAMES K. POLK
111 addition to claims derived from Spain and France, the
United States based her title to Oregon upon discoveries and
settlements made by her own citizens. In 1792, Captain Robert
Gray, of Boston, had explored the Columbia River and named it
after his ship; and in 1811, John Jacob Astor had founded the
trading post of Astoria. This place had been taken by the British
during the War of 1812, but under the terms of the Treaty of
Ghent it was restored in 1818.
After 1825, when Russia limited her claims, the Oregon ques-
tion was reduced to this : Does either Great Britain or the United
States have a valid title to all of the territory west of the Rocky
Mountains and included between 42°, the northern boundary of
California, and 54° 40', the southern boundary of Alaska ; if not,
how should it be divided ? The United States claimed this region
by right of discovery — both direct and acquired ; on similar
grounds Great Britain claimed it, at least as far south as the
Columbia River.
Prior to Polk's administration several attempts had been
made to establish a definite boundary line between the United
States and Canada. In the treaty of 1818 the forty-ninth parallel
was agreed upon as the boundary from the Lake of the Woods
to the Rocky Mountains. The country west of the mountains
was left open to what was commonly called joint occupation ; that
is, each nation might make use of it Avithout prejudice to the
claims of the other. In 1827 "joint occupation" was continued
indefinitely, but either nation might terminate the agreement
by giving twelve months' notice to the other.
At an early date members of Congress began to take an inter-
est in Oregon. In December, 1820, the House appointed a com-
mittee and assigned it the duty of considering the propriety of
taking possession of the territory. A month later the committee's
report was submitted by P^'loyd, of Virginia. In substance it
recommended that the government should take steps to safe-
guard the interests of the United States on the Pacific coast.
OEEGON 557
No action resulted from this recommendation, but two years
later after England had (1821) extended her laws over the ter-
ritory, another committee was appointed to consider the sub-
ject. Their report was similar to that made in 1820, but again
no action resulted.
A bill to authorize the occupation of the Oregon River valley
was introduced in the House in December, 1828. Its most active
sponsor, Floyd, of Virginia, urged the necessity of extending
over this region the laws of the United States, and of constructing
military forts to insure the protection of Americans. Gurley,
of Louisiana, proposed an amendment under which lands might
be granted to colonists from the United States. Polk opposed
both the bill and the amendment on the ground that they would
violate the treaty of "joint occupation" with Great Britain. He
pointed out that those who participated in the debate had "con-
fined themselves to the expediency of the measure, and have had
no reference to the present state of our negotiations in refer-
ence to the preliminary question of title to the country." After
quoting the terms of the treaty of 1818, he remarked that "The
question is not now whether it was wise to make this treaty, but,
having made it, what is its spirit and meaning?" Until the
treaty has been abrogated, he said, it is the "supreme law of the
land," and it can not be abrogated until twelve months' notice
has been given. He moved that the Committee of the Whole
be discharged from further consideration of the bill and that the
subject be referred to the Committee on Territories. He moved
further that this committee be instructed to report in favor of
extending over the American citizens in that region the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of Michigan Territory, and of providing for
the exploration an(i purvey of the Northwest coast. Neither this
nor solutions offered by other members were accepted by the
House. On January 9, 1829, Polk voted with the majority in
rejecting the entire bill.^
^ Beg. of Deb., 20 Cong., 2 sess., 125-15.3. Also, Abridg. of Deb., X,
273-315.
558 JAMES E. POLE
In 1833 the Missionary Board of the Methodist church selected
a number of missionaries and sent them forth to found a settle-
ment in Willamette Valley.- Two years later President Jackson
sent William A. Slacum to investigate conditions in that region,
and in December, 1837, Slacum 's favorable report was laid
before Congress.'' On February 7, 1838, Linn, of Missouri, intro-
duced in the Senate a bill to organize Oregon as a territory
and to establish on the Columbia River both a port of entry and
a custom house.* As early as December 29, 1829, Linn had offered
a resolution which purposed to give the twelve months' notice
necessary for terminating the conventions of 1818 and 1827.^ In
both cases Congress declined to take any action, but interest in
Oregon continued to increase. Every year added to the num-
ber who exhorted Congress to do something for the protection of
American citizens in that country. Great Britain, it was lirged,
had extended her laws throughout Oregon as early as 1821 ; why
sliould the United States continue to disregard the rights of its
citizens?
The arrival in Washington of Lord Ashburton, in April, 1842,
gave rise to the hope that the whole vexed question of boundary
might be adjusted, for the northwest as well as the northeast
boundary was included in the scope of the British diplomat's
instructions.'' But, as Tyler informed Congress in his second
annual message, "it became manifest at an early hour in the
late negotiations" that any attempt to settle the Oregon ques-
tion "would lead to a protracted discussion, which might em-
brace in its failure other more pressing matters."^
Eager to succeed where otliers liad failed, Tyler proposed a
ti'ipartite treaty whereby he hoped to settle not only the Oregon
question, but, also, the diplomatic difficulties with Mexico which
2 Gray, History of Oregon, 106 ff. * Cong. Globe, 25 Cong., 2 sess., 168.
3 Sen. Doc. S4, 25 Cong., 2 sess. s Abridg. of Deb., XIV, 18.
"Aberdeen to H. S. Fox, Oct. 18, 1842 (Sen. Doc. 1, 29 Cong., 1 sess.,
139).
" Ric-hanlson, Messages, IV, 196.
OREGON 559
had resulted fi-om the revolt of Texas and the non-payment by
Mexico of American damage claims. He was willing to let Eng-
land have Oregon down to the Columbia Kiver if she in turn
would induce Mexico to recognize the independence of Texas
and to make territorial concessions to the United States. Eng-
land was to cancel certain claims against Mexico and to induce
her to cede to the United States that part of California lying
north of the thirty-sixth parallel, and as a compensation for this
service the United States was to relinquish her claim to that
part of Oregon lying north of the Columbia River. At the time
that he formulated this plan, Tyler apparently had little doubt
that England would readily agree, or that the combination w^hich
he had suggested would reconcile opposing interests in the United
States. ' ' Texas might not stand alone, ' ' he told Webster, ' ' nor
would the line proposed for Oregon. Texas would reconcile all
to the line, while California would reconcile or pacify all to
Oregon."® Despite this hopeful language, however, he en-
deavored, after he had retired from office, to represent this whole
matter as a passing fancy to which little importance should be
attached. ' ' I never dreamed, ' ' he wrote,
of ceding this country [between 49° and the Cohinibia] unless for the greater
equivalent of California which I fancied G. Britain might be able to obtain
for us through her influence in Mexico— and this was but a dream of policy
which was never embodied.^
Nothing, of course, came of Tyler's ingenious scheme for
killing so many birds with one stone. Ashburton expressed, un-
officially, the belief that Great Britain would not oppose a ces-
sion of territory by Mexico to the United States, but that she
could take no part in the transaction.^" While there was never
any prospect that Tyler's plan would succeed, had it been
8 Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, 260-261. See also Webster
to Everett, Jan. 29, 1843 (Curtis, Life of Webster, II, 175).
0 Tyler to his son, Dec. 11, 1845, MS in Library of Congress. Also
printed copy in Tyler, op. cit,. 447.
loSchafer, "British Attitude toward the Oregon Question," Am. Hist.
Rev., XVI, no. 2, p. 293.
560 JAMES K. POLE
accepted by the other governments concerned the Mexican war
might possibly have been averted. Webster soon left the cabinet
and the President turned his attention to the annexation of Texas.
The Oregon question remained unsettled and became one of the
leading issues of the campaign of 1844.
A bill introduced in the Senate on December 19, 1842, by
Linn, of Missouri, gave opportunity for debate on the Oregon
question and prepared the way for the approaching Presidential
campaign. Among other things the bill provided for the building
of forts along the route to Oregon and at the mouth of the
Columbia River, and for the granting of land to American
settlers. It can hardly be said that the discussion was sectional
in character, although westerners were more insistent than others
that the government should take some action. Webster attributed
the agitation entirely to politics,^ ^ but it is evident that many
were sincerely interested in westward expansion.
The chief opponents of Linn's bill were Senators Calhoun
and McDuffie, of South Carolina. The former declared that the
passage of the land-grant section would violate the treaty w^ith
Great Britain. Besides, he opposed the whole bill on the ground
that precipitate action might result in the loss of the entire
territory. England, he said, could transfer troops by sea in a
very short time, while it would take months for our army to
reach Oregon by overland routes. Consequently the sound policy
for the United States to pursue was that of ''wise and masterly
inactivity." McDuffie was averse to the bill, not because he
feared that its passage might result in the loss of Oregon, but
because he regarded the territory as an incubus which ought to
be discarded. He would not give "a pinch of snuff for the whole
territory," because it was totally unsuited as a home for civilized
beings.*- Benton and Linn made strong arguments in favor of the
bill, and refuted in detail the positions taken by the Senators from
11 Webster to Everett, Jan. 29, 1843, as cited above.
12 Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 3 sess., 198-200; idem, App., 138-141. Benton,
ThirUj Years' View, II, 471-472.
OBEGON 561
South Carolina. Sevier, of Arkansas, resisted an attempt to
strike out the section for granting hind to settlers, for he justly
regarded this provision to he "the very life and soul of the hill."'^
After i)assing the Senate by a vote of twenty-four to twenty-two,
the hill was sent to the House where it remained to the end of
the session without being voted upon.
The importance of the Linn bill can not be measured by its
failure to reach a vote in the House, for it elicited a debate in
Congress and an agitation in the press which focused the attention
of the people on Oregon and made it an important campaign
issue. Then, too, its introduction caused British statesmen to
give the subject more serious attention. Palmerston went so far
as to declare in the House of Commons that should the bill be
passed and put in operation "it would be a declaration of war."^*
Dissatisfied because Webster had not procured, in the Ash-
burton treaty, all that the United States had claimed on the
Maine border, and fearful that Everett, in London, might, under
Tyler's directions, compromise the Oregon question, opposition
members took steps to prevent such action on the part of the
executive. On December 28, 1843, Senator Allen, of Ohio, moved
a call upon the President for the instructions given to our minister
in London as well as the correspondence that had passed between
the two governments. On January 8, 1844, Semple, of Hlinois,
moved that the President be requested to give the notice neces-
sary for terminating the convention of 1827.^"' It was soon ascer-
tained that no negotiations were in progress in London and con-
sequently Semple 's resolution was defeated, but the debate
helped to agitate public opinion. Extremists objected to any
negotiation whatever on the ground that it would be an admission
that Great Britain might have some claim to the territory.
Negotiations were soon renewed, however, but in Washing-
ton instead of at the court of Saint James. The man selected
13 Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 3 sess., 153.
i-t Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, LXVII, 1217.
15 Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 1 sess., 77, 116.
562 JAMES K. POLK
by Lord Aberdeen for the American mission was Richard
Pakenham (later Sir Richard), and early in 1844 he arrived
in Washington. If his official instructions were to be followed
there was small prospect of an adjustment, for they required
him to insist upon the Columbia River as the southern boundary
of Oregon. It is evident, however, that Aberdeen himself did
not expect the United States to accept this proposal, and that
he was prepared to concede better terms if he could obtain the
sanction of Parliament and of public sentiment in England.
In a private letter dated March 4, 1844, Pakenham was in-
structed to
endeavor, without committing yourself or your gov't, to draw from the
American negotiator a proposal to make the 49th degiee of latitude the
boundary, with the proviso that the ports to the south of that parallel to
the Columbia inclusive, shall be free ports to Q. Britain. is
The tone of this letter augured well for the future.
Upshur's tragic death interrupted negotiations before they
had fairly begun, and the task of discussing the Oregon boundary
with Pakenham devolved upon John C. Calhoun to whom Tyler
now intrusted the State Department. According to statements
made later, Tyler and Calhoun were reluctant to resume nego-
tiations, consequently the Secretary of State decided that the
''true policy" was "to do nothing to excite attention, and leave
time to operate."^'' Nevertheless both Calhoun and Pakenham
presented and advocated the claims of their respective govern-
ments— including an offer from Great Britain to submit the whole
subject to arbitration — but as neither side would yield the essen-
tial points, the Oregon question remained unsettled at the close
of Tyler's administration.
" Reannexation of Texas" and "i-eoccupation of Oregon"
were twin planks in the platform adopted by the Democratic
16 Quoted by Schafer, "The British Attitude toward the Oregon Ques-
tion, 1815-184(5," Am. Hist. Bev., XVI, 296 (Jan., 1911).
1- Calhoun to Mason, May 30, 1845 (Ecport Am. Hist. Assn.. 1899, H,
660). Tyler to Calhoun, Oct. 7, 1845 (ibid., 1059).
OBEGON
563
convention of 1844. Although tlie former was the main topic of
discussion during the campaign, the party was nevertheless
committed to the claim that "all of Oregon" was the property of
the United States. The candidates accepted the platform without
reservation, while the rank and file voiced their approval by
lusty shouts of "54° 40' or fight." Did the platform and the
campaign cry mean what they said, or were they intended simply
to arouse enthusiasm and to win votes for the party ? In either
case the victorious candidate was placed in an awkward position ;
to accept less than "all of Oregon" would repudiate the party
pledge, while insistence upon the demand made in the platform
would almost certainly result in war with Great Britain.
In his inaugural address President Polk bluntly asserted that
"our title to the country of the Oregon is 'clear and unquestion-
able!' " He did not say "all of Oregon," but left it to be in-
ferred that this was what he meant. In addition, he recommended
that the laws of the United States should be extended over the
people who had established their homes in that distant region.
If the propriety of his recommendations may be questioned,^*
the fault lay with the party which had framed the platform
rather than with the President who was pledged to carry it out."
The new President's inaugural reached England late in
March and his remarks on the American title to Oregon were
by no means relished in London. In Parliament and in the press
they elicited expressions of surprise and denunciation. Opposi-
tion members were especially resentful. On the contrary, Lord
Aberdeen was disposed to treat the matter lightly and to regard
the address as a declamation rather than an official document.-"
18 See Benton, Thirfy Years' View, II, 649, and von Hoist, Hist, of the
U. S., Ill, 159.
19 It is interesting, however, to note that Polk reversed the position
which he had taken in 1828. See above, p. 557.
20 "I wish to observe that this speech is not an address made to Con-
gress—it is a speech made to the public, the Congress not being sitting
Undoubtedly, no speech of such a nature could be made by the President
of the United States without drawing towards it the most serious atten-
tion. Nevertheless, it .loos not possess the importance of an ofl&cial mes-
sage, forming a part of legislative proceedings."
56-4 JAMlfS K. POLK
He believed that a peaceful settlement was still possible ; if not,
he could only say that "we possess rights which, in our opinion,
are clear and unquestionable ; and, by the blessing of God, and
with your support, those rights we are fully prepared to main-
tain.'' In the House of Commons, Sir Robert Peel expressed a
desire for an amicable adjustment, but he severely criticized
President Polk for referring to "other contingencies than a
friendly termination" of pending negotiations.-^ The London
Times held that the interests of both countries would be served
best by a compromise adjustment like that which settled the dis-
pute over the northeast boundary ; nevertheless it thought that
Americans should be warned that their pretensions, if persisted
in, nuist surely result in war. The editor was not disposed to
aggravate "the very serious difficulties with which the indiscreet
language of Mr. Polk has already surrounded the Oregon ques-
tion," still, the extravagant claims of the President could never
be admitted.^^
During April and May the British newspapers discussed
the diplomatic situation in all its bearings, and speculated as.
to what ])oli('y Polk really meant to pursue. Only one, the
London Colonial Magazine, believed that a war with the United
States would be "productive of good"; the others cared little
about Oregon itself, but they resented the "blustering attitude"
of the American President and ])eople. For example, the Times,
on ^lay 9, said :
As long as Ave saw in these grotesque exhibitions of national vanity
nothing hut the expedients of presidential candidates, or the squibs of elec-
tioneering rivals, the foreign policj' of the United States had nothing very
serious or very formidable in its vacant thunders. But the election being
over, and the new president installed by the voices of the democratic party
for the next four years, foreign nations acquire something more than an
indirect interest in his character and position. If President Polk intends
to sustain the lieroic line in whidi he passed through his electioneering
l^robation and entered upon his liigli oflice, he may rely on having before
21 Hansard, Pari Deb., LXXIX, 121, 12S, 199.
22 London Times, April 5, 1845, quoted by Nilcs' Peg., LXVIII, 114-115.
OREGON 565
luni a career of uo ordinary toil, agitation, and peril. But if he purposes
to subside into a positive business-like president, more like the foreman of
a thriving business in the city than the champion of an empire, the sooner
ho descends from the high horse the better; and he Avould have done well
to throw aside the embroidered vestments of the candidate before he deliv-
ered the inaugural address of the president. Nobody supposes that in using
the very exaggerated and unbecoming language in which Mr. Polk spoke of
the American claims to Oregon, he intended deliberately to breathe defiance
to the Queen of Great Britain, or to threaten the rights of Her Majesty 's
subjects with instant violence. He intended simply to flatter a delusion
common in all democratic states, but especially amongst the democratic
party in the United States, which forces the statesman whom they have
chosen to govern their country to gratify their ovra popular vanity by
affecting a temerity and an overbearing recklessness towards foreign nations
which, as individuals, neither the president, nor any of his vociferous sup-
porters, can be supposed to feel.
Rulers of democracies, said the London Standard, on May 15,
are apt to be inclined to war for the purpose of increasing their
power and their patronage. To this fact it attributed the claims
set forth by President Polk, and therefore it did not believe that
the people would support him, except verbally. Americans
could not possibly gain anything by precipitating hostilities,
"therefore we hold a war to be extremely improbable, if not an
absolute impossibility, let Mr. Polk do all that he can." The
Examiner (April 25) considered Oregon "really valueless to
England and to America." It therefore congratulated Lord
Aberdeen on his conciliatory attitude, and advocated arbitration
or a partition of the territory.-^
The utterances of British statesmen greatly exasperated tlie
"old hero" of the Hermitage who, in characteristic style, urged
the President to combat British pretensions by a vigorous and
uncompromising policy :
Weak and debilitated as I am I could not resist endeavoring to wade
through the debate in the English parliament— comments on your inaugural
as it relates to oragou. This is the rattling of British drums to alarm us,
and to give life to their friends in the United States, such as the Hartford
convention men— the blue light federalists & abolitionists, and to prevent
23 Extracts from these papers quoted in NUes' Reg., LXVIII, 236-239.
566 JAMES K. POLE
if Britain can, the reannexation of Texas, by shadowing forth war &
rumors of war, to alarm the timid, & give strength to the traitors in our
country against our best interests & growing prosperity. This bold avowal
by peel & Russell of perfect claim to oragon must be met as boldly, by our
denial of their right, and confidence in our own — that we view it too plain
a case, of right, on our side to hesitate one moment upon the subject of
extending our laws over it & populating with our people — permit me to
remind you that during the canvass, I gave a thousand pledges for your
cour[a]ge & firmness, both in war & in peace, to carry on the administration
of our government. This subject is intended to try your energy — dash
from your lips the council of the times on this question, base your acts
upon the firm basis, of asking nothing but what is right & permitting
nothing that is wrong — war is a blessing compared with national degreda-
tion. The bold manner of peels & Eussells annunciation of the British
right to oragogon, the time & manner require a firm rebuke by you in
your annual message, and has opened a fair field to compare their claim
to oragon with their right to the Territory claimed by Britain on our north
East boundary, & which we were swindled out of, there being on file in
archives of England the maps on Avhieh was laid down our boundary agree-
able to the treaty of 1783, which Lord Browman said in eulogy of Lord
Ashburton shewed that England in her claim to that territory had not a
leg of right to stand upon — Just so with oragon, & peel & Russell both
well know it — stiU. now, a perfect right to oragon is claimed — make a note
of this, & in your annual message expose England's perfidy to the whole
civilized wor[l]d. To prevent war with England a bold & undaunted
front must be exposed. England wdth all her Boast dare not go to war.
You will pardon these my friendly suggestions. The Whiggs have held
you forth to England as feeble & inenergetic, & would shrink at the threat
of war — I am sure you will meet this with that energy «fc promptness that
is due to yourself, & our national charaeter.s*
As will be seen presently, Polk did not, in the first instance
at least, follow this fatherly advice. But ere the President had
decided to renew the compromise offer which his predecessors
had made, General Jackson had passed to a land where "peel &
Russell" no longer disturbed his repose. Even if he had lived
it is highly improbable that his views M-ould have influenced the
President's foreign policy. Polk was ever ready to pay homage
to Jackson on matters of no vital importance. But when the
occasion demanded independent action — as in the discarding of
-•» Jackson to Polk, May 2, 1845, Polk Papers.
OREGON 5G7
Blair and Lewis — he did not hesitate to follow his own judgment,
even at the risk of incurring the General's displeasure.
In the selection of a minister to represent the United States
at London Polk was hampered by political considerations. How-
ever, his embarrassment was somewhat lessened by the fact that
negotiations wore already pending in Washington and by the
slight probability that they would be transferred to London.
Since Calhoun had not been retained in the cabinet, many Demo-
crats thought that he should be given the British mission ; even
Jackson considered England to be the proper place for him,
"there to combat with my Lord Aberdeen the abolition ques-
tion."-^ But Calhoun made it known that he would not accept
the position ; so, also, did his friends, Pickens and Elmore, de-
cline the appointment.-'' Having failed in his overtures to the
Calhoun wing of the party, the President, through Bancroft,
sounded Van Buren on the subject. In reply Van Buren stated
his belief that an ex-President should not accept a foreign mis-
sion unless there was a crisis to meet. He did not believe a
crisis to exist, but if the President thought otherwise, he v^^ould,
of course, regard it as his duty to go.-' Levi Woodbury declined
the appointment for "domestic reasons," and Louis McLane, of
Baltimore, was finally chosen.-^
About the middle of May, while Bancroft was in correspond-
ence with Van Buren and before any official communications had
passed between Buchanan and Pakenham, the recently estab-
lished Washington Union announced what it believed to be Polk 's
Oregon policy:
Some say we want war — some that we ' ' cannot be kicked into war. ' '
Several predict that there will be war. Now, without undertaking to say
positively that there will he war, or that there will not be war, we venture
23 Jackson to Polk, Dec. 16, 1844, ibid.
20 After declining the mission himself Calhoun spoke favorably of
Elmore, but he thought General Hamilton to be best qualified for the
position (A. V. Brown (undated) to Polk, ibid.).
2" Van Buren to Bancroft, May 12, 1845, Kan Buren Papers.
28 Correspondence with Woodbury and McLane, Polk Papers.
568 JAMES E. POLE
to predict that it is not Mr. Polk 's Avish to plunge his country into war,
and still less to sacrifice her rights and her honor. He -will never abandon
either; and without meaning to bluster or to brave the British ministers,
we undertake to say that this is the general and enthusiastic seutiment
of the American nation. The President will carry out the wishes of the
people. It Avill not be his fault if our differences about Oregon should
terminate in hostilities; but it will be his fault, and a fault which we are sure
he would never encounter, to sacrifice our ' ' clear and unquestionable claims ' '
and our sacred honor to any visionary danger, or to any apprehensions of
danger." "Young Hickory," it added, will make good his title.29
Although this article purported to give merely the views of the
editor, Ritchie, no doubt it had the previous endorsement of the
President. Apparently its purpose was to prepare the people
for a compromise adjustment of the Oregon question, but, also,
to inform the British minister that the administration would not
be intimidated by the prospect of a war.
When the Tyler administration declined to accept the terms
offered by Great Britain, Pakenham, in a note dated September
12, 1844, asked Calhoun to specify what arrangement he was
"prepared to propose for an equitable adjustment of the ques-
tion." Calhoun did not see fit to comply with this request, and
four months after Polk 's inauguration no formal reply to Paken-
ham's note had been made. On July 12, 1845, however, in a
communication to the minister, Buchanan set forth the American
claims and offered to accept the forty-ninth parallel as a com-
promise boundary. Whatever Polk's private reasons for thus
suddenly reversing the policy announced in his inaugural may
have been, his official reasons were set forth in a letter which
Buchanan, on the same day, addressed to Louis IMcLane, the
American minister in London. In it he said :
The President, at a very early period of his administration, was called
upon to decide whether he would break off or continue this negotiation.
Placed in a responsible position, he first inquired whether the national
honor required that he should abruptly terminate it by demanding the
whole territory in dispute. War before dislionor is a maxim deeply engraven
upon the hearts of the American People ; and this maxim ever shall regulate
20 Union (semiweekly), May 12, 1845,
OREGON 569
liis romUu-r towards foreign nations. But it was inii)ossible for him to
conceive that there could be dishonor in pursuing the course whicli liad
been adopted by Mr. Monroe, his patriot Revolutionary predecessor, more
than a quarter of a century ago, and had been* cither expressly sanctioned
or acquiesced in by all succeeding administrations.so
In his note to Pakeiiham, Buchanan gave a comprehensive
statement of the American claims to Oregon — both direct and
indirect.''' ''The title of the United States," he said, "to that
portion of the Oregon territory between the valley of the
Columbia and the Russian line in 54° 40' North Latitude, is
recorded in the Florida Treaty, ' ' which transferred to the United
States all of the claims of Spain. He refuted the claims which
Great Britain based on the Nootka Sound convention, for, as he
said, no title to land had been acquired by this convention. The
valley of the Columbia, said he, belonged to the United States
by virtue of the discoveries of Captain Gray, the explorations of
Lewis and Clark, and the settlements made by Astor and other
American citizens.
"Such being the opinion of the President in regard to the
title of the United States," Buchanan told Pakenham, "he would
not have consented to yield any portion of the Oregon territory,
had he not found himself embarrassed, if not committed, by the
acts of his predecessors." But as they had uniformly proceeded
upon "the principle of compromise," Polk felt constrained to
do likewise. He had therefore instructed Buchanan again to
propose that the Oregon country be divided by the forty-ninth
parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, with
free ports for Great Britain on the portion of Vancouver's Island
lying south of that parallel.
30 Buchanan to McLane, July 12, 1845 (Buchanan, Worls, VI, 190).
He emphasized the fact that even General Jackson had been satisfied with
joint occupation. But he passed over the other important fact that none
'of Polk's predecessors ha<l barred themselves from compromise by em-
phatically claiming title to all of the territory.
31 In a letter written to John G. Palfrey, June 24, 1848, Buchanan said
that it was from Greenhow's Oregon and California "that my information
as to the facts in support of our claim was principally derived" (Works,
VIII, 106).
570 JAMES E. POLE
The line proposed will carry out the principle of continuity equally for
both parties, by extending the limits both of ancient Louisiana and Canada
to the Pacific along the same parallel of latitude Avhich di\'ide tliem east
• of the Rocky Mountains; and it will secure to each a sufficient number of
commodious harbors on the northwest coast of America.32
Pakenham replied on the twenty-ninth of July. He con-
troverted every argument which Buchanan had made, and in
addition, he endeavored to place the American Secretary of
State in a somewhat awkward position. If,- said he, Spain had
had exclusive title to Oregon down to the Florida treaty of 1819,
then Gray as well as Lewis and Clark had been interlopers on
Spanish territory and their discoveries could not give the United
States a valid title to the Columbia River valley. On what
grounds, he asked,
unless it be upon the principle which forms the foundation of the Nootka
convention, could the United States have acquired a title to any part of the
Oregon territory previously to the treaty of 1819, and independently of its
provisions?
The Nootka convention, he continued, was not the "main re-
liance" of Great Britain in this discussion, but it barred the
United States from acquiring "exclusive dominion" from Spain
by the Florida treaty. He argued at length to show that the
Nootka convention was still in force, and that none of the Amer-
ican explorations had given the United States exclusive title to
any part of Oregon. Although he had not referred Buchanan's
letter to his own government, Pakenham concluded his reply by
declining the offer made by the President, and by expressing
the hope that
the American plenipotentiary will be prepared to offer some further pro-
posal for the settlement of the Oregon question more consistent Avith fairness
and equity, and witli the reasonable expectations of the British goveriiment.33
The British minister's categorical rejection of Polk's offer
came as a shock to the administration and aroused the fighting
32 Buchanan to Pakenham, July 12, 1845 (Buchanan, Works, VT, 194 S.).
33 Pakenham to Buchanan, July 29, 1843 (ibid., 212-220).
OBEGON 571
blood of tlu' President. Regarding Pakenhain's note as insolent,
Polk decided to withdraw his offer of compromise and to reassert
claim to the whole territory. In the belief that the relations
with England had become critical in the extreme, he personally
dietated the main features of the reply to the British minister.
In order to prevent misunderstandings concerning his directions
to Buchanan, or discussions in cabinet, he began keeping a diary
in which the events of each day were recorded. This daily record
is of great historical importance, for it not only gives informa-
tion nowhere else available, but it displays the motives which
inspired the President's policies — at least the motives which he
desired posterity to accept as the key to his official acts.^*
The diary opens on August 26, 1845, and the day's record
is concerned principally with cabinet discussion of the Oregon
question. As early as August 7, after the Prussian minister
had informed Bancroft of a threatened invasion of Texas by
Mexico, Polk urged Buchanan, who was on a visit to his home,
to return to Washington as soon as possible. ' ' I must confess, ' '
he said, after explaining the Mexican situation, "that the de-
velopments which are taking place, as well as my daily reflec-
tions, make it, in my opinion, more and more important that we
should progress without delay in the Oregon negotiation."^^
By August 26, the date of the cabinet meeting just mentioned,
the President had become impatient because of Buchanan's delay
in drafting a reply to Pakenham's note of July 29. He asked
the Secretary when the reply would be ready for consideration
by the cabinet ; but, without waiting to learn what Buchanan
had prepared, he proceeded to tell the cabinet "the settled deci-
sion to which his mind had come." In his reply to Pakenham,
Buchanan w^as directed to "assert and enforce our right to the
whole of the Oregon territory from 42° to 54° 40' North Lati-
tude." He was to state that the President had offered to agree
34 For his own version of his reasons for keeping a diary, see Diary, H
100-101.
35 Polk to Buchanan, Aug. 7, 1845, Buchanan Papers.
572 JAMES K. POLK
upon the forty-ninth parallel solely in deference to his prede-
cessors and because of his desire to preserve peace between the
two nations. Since the British minister had, without referring
the matter to his government, rejected the compromise "in
language, to say the least of it, scarcely courteous or respectful"
the offer was now to be withdrawn. "Let the argument of our
title to the whole country be full," said the President, "let the
proposition to compromise at latitude 49° be withdrawn, and
then let the matter rest, unless the British Minister chose to
continue the negotiation."
Buchanan agreed with the President so far as the assertion
of title and the withdrawal of the compromise offer were con-
cerned, but he believed that a paragraph should be added to the
effect that Polk would consider any proposition which Pakenham
might submit. To such an implied invitation for further nego-
tiation the President objected. "Let our proposition be abso-
lutely withdrawn & then let the British Minister take his own
course." With his usual timidity, Buchanan urged that should
Polk's views be carried out, war would result, but the President
replied that "if we do have war it will not be our fault."
Buchanan expressed the opinion that the answer to Pakenham
ought to be postponed until it could be ascertained whether there
would be a war with Mexico, but Polk, after asserting that there
was no connection between the two questions, insisted upon an
immediate reply to Pakenham 's note. To his remark that the
United States would do its duty towards both nations and leave
the rest to God and the Country, Buchanan retorted that "God
would not have much to do in justifying us in a war for the
country North of 49°." Secretary Walker concurred in the
President's views, and the other members expressed no opinions.
L^ndeterred by the opposition of his Secretary of State, Polk
called a special cabinet meeting for the following day and directed
BiK'liaiian to have a draft of his answer to Pakcidiam ready for
considci'atioM. The draft ])i'('S('ii1c(l by Bucliaiian at the special
OBEGON 573
meeting was considered satisfactoiy — even admirable — so far as
the historical array of facts relating to the title was concerned,
but the President ordered changes to be made in the part relating
to tlie withdrawal of the compromise offer. Although the Secre-
tary of State argued that the answer ought to be postponed,
Polk ordered him to deliver it as soon as it could be copied. At
the close of the discussion the other members of the cabinet gave
their hearty support to the policy adopted by the President.
Having thus declined to make further overtures to John Bull,
Polk, on the following da}', directed that orders be sent to General
Taylor that in case Mexico should declare war or begin hostilities
he was to drive her army across the Rio Grande and invade
Mexico.^'"
The note to Pakenham, in its completed form, was an able
document. The historical part, prepared by Buchanan, presented
the claims of the United States to the whole territory with pre-
cision and clearness. The Nootka Sound convention, he asserted,
had not procured for Great Britain any territorial rights, and
all privileges acquired by that agreement had been cancelled by
a subsequent war with Spain. To Pakenham 's contention that
the admission of Spain's title to Oregon before 1819 would in-
validate all claims based by the United States on discovery,
Buchanan retorted that "this is a most ingenious method of
making two distinct and independent titles held by the same
nation worse than one — of arraying them against each other,
and thus destroying the validity of both." The United States,
said he, now possessed both its own and the Spanish titles ; either
was better than that of England, and certainly the two, com-
bined, could not be weaker than one.
The compromise offer was officially withdrawn, but Polk's
original intention of making no allusion to further negotiations
was not carried out. Presumably in deference to the wishes of
Buchanan, it was stated that ''the President still cherishes the
36 Polk, Diary, I, 1-9.
57i JAMES E. POLE
hope that this long-pending controversy may yet be finally ad-
justed in such manner as not to disturb the peace or interrupt the
harmony now so happily subsisting between the two nations.""
In taking such a firm stand the President may have been
influenced, to some extent at least, by the knowledge that Paken-
ham's prompt rejection of the compromise offer had not been
authorized by his government. On August 19, Polk had received
a private letter from McLane which stated that
The result of all I have learned is that this Government is earnestly desirous
of adjusting the Oregon question, & willing to do so upon liberal terms.
Their chief difficulty arises from the opposition 4' influence of the Hudson 's
Bay Company.
His information, he said, had not come directly from Lord Aber-
deen, but he felt certain that England would agree to the fort}'-
ninth parallel to the Straits of Fuca, leaving Vancouver's Island
to Great Britain. ^^ At the same time Robert Armstrong, the
American consul at Liverpool and an intimate friend of the
President, wrote that it was generally understood that England
held a mortgage on California. Great Britain, he urged, must
never possess California ; Oregon should be made the bone of
contention to prevent it.^^
Several weeks passed during which neither party attempted
to break the diplomatic deadlock. At a cabinet meeting held on
October 21, however, a dispatch sent by McLane on the third was
read and discussed. In an interview with McLane, Lord Aber-
deen had expressed regret because Pakenham had rejected the
American offer. After condemning Pakenham 's act, he intimated
37 Buchanan to Pakenham, Aug. .'50, 1845 (Buchanan, ll'orls, VI, 2.31-
254). On the same (la,y that Buchanan delivered his official note, Calhoun
wrote from his lionie in South Carolina deploring the possibility of a
rupture with England. "It is beyond the power of man," said he, "to
trace the consequences of a war between us and England on the subject
of Oregon. All that is certain is, that she can take it & hold it against
us, as long as she has the supremacy on the ocean & retains her Eastern
dominions. The rest is rapt in mystery" (Calhoun to Buchanan, Aug. 30,
1845, ibid., 230).
38 Copy of McLane to I'olk, Aug. 4, 1845, Buchanan Papers.
3» Armstrong to Polk, Aug. 4, 1845, Polk Papers.
OREGON 575
a willingness to agree iijion a modified proi)osition, and asked
whether President Polk would negotiate further on the subject.
Anticipating that Pakenham had received new instructions by
the same mail and w^ould make new overtures, Buchanan asked
the President what answer he should make. Polk promptly
replied that
all that could be said to him was, that if he had auy further proposition
to make on his part, it would be received and considered No intima-
tion sliould be given to him of what the views or intentions of the adminis-
tration were, & [but] leave him to take his own course.
He declared, also, that should Pakenham propose to agree upon
the adjustment recently offered by the United States he would
not accept the proposal. Sliould the minister make some other
oifer, this would either be rejected or submitted to the Senate
for its advice. To Buchanan's question whether he might inform
the British diplomat that a proposition made by him would be
submitted to the Senate, the President answered that such a
course "would be improper; the British Minister had no right
to know our councils or intentions." Although the Secretary
of State prophesied war, Polk was obdurate and refused to
modify his views. He told the cabinet that in his first message
to Congress he "would maintain all our rights, would reaffirm
Mr. Monroe's ground against permitting any European power
to plant or establish any new colony on the North American
Continent. ' '"
The conjecture that Pakenham had received new instructions
from Lord Aberdeen seems to have been well founded, for two
days after the cabinet meeting he called at the State Department
and expressed regret because the American offer had been with-
drawn. He suggested that negotiations might be reopened by
the signing of a protocol, but as he was not prepared to make a
definite offer of terms, Buchanan was not at liberty to accept the
proposal. When the conversation was reported to the President,
40 Polk, Diary, I, 62-65.
576 JAMES K. POLK
he insisted that "the British Government must move first," and
he doul)ted tliat an.y offer wouhl be made which the United States
could accept.*^
Up to this time there had been an estrangement between the
President and Senator Benton, as a result of the latter 's violent
criticism of tlie course pursued by the Baltimore convention.
Due, however, to a common interest in Oregon and, also, to the
influence of Buchanan, a reconciliation was effected. "With
Polk's consent, Buchanan showed Benton the correspondence
that had passed between himself and the British minister; he
intimated, also, that the Senator would be kindly received if he
should feel inclined to call upon the President. Benton approved
the action that had been taken and expressed a desire to con-
verse with the President, therefore a meeting was arranged for
the twenty-fourth of October. Polk was already preparing his
message to Congress, and it is evident that he was anxious to
win Benton 's support for the policy which he was about to recom-
mend. The Missourian's judgment was not always sound, but he
wielded an influence which could not be disregarded.
During the interview the two men agreed upon the following
points: that the twelve months' notice for abrogating the con-
vention of 1827 should be given ; that the laws of the United
States should be extended over Oregon in the same degree that
British laws had been extended in 1821; that forts should be
built on the route to Oregon ; and that the Indian policy of the
United States should be extended to the whole region. On some
phases, however, Benton w^as not prepared to go so far as the
President ; he thought that Great Britain possessed a good title
to the Frazer River valley, and he was willing to accept the forty-
ninth parallel as a sastisf actory boundary. To Polk 's suggestion
of reasserting the Monroe Doctrine against all colonization on the
North American continent, he rej)lie(l tliat while foreign nations
should be excluded from California and the Columbia River
■»' Ibid., 66-67.
OREGON 577
valley, the Frazer River valley was already occupied by the
British/- From the date of this interview until the court-martial
of Fremont the Senator gave his support to the administration.
And his support was of no small importance, although his arro-
gance and dictatorial manner often taxed the patience of the
President.
Three days after his conversation with Benton {i.e., October
27), the President received a call from T. W. Ward, Boston
agent for the Baring Brothers. After speaking of the absurdity
of a war between the two nations and of the unsettled business
conditions which had resulted from war rumors. Ward intimated
a desire to know whether Polk would persist in claiming title to
the whole of Oregon. His visit did not elicit the desired informa-
tion, for the President told him that "no one but myself & my
Cabinet could know what had occurred or what was likely to
occur." Two hours later Buchanan sent to the President a
diplomatic note which he had just received from the British
minister, and as it bore the date of October 25, Polk concluded
that it had been held back until Pakenham had learned the result
of Ward's interview with the President.^^
When presenting the note to Buchanan, Pakenham remarked
that he would regard it as official or unofficial as he might deem
best after he had ascertained the answer which it would receive.
A reply was prepared by Buchanan and carefully edited by the
President after its contents had been discussed at two cabinet
meetings. Against the wishes of the Secretary of State, who
desired to leave the way open for further negotiation, Polk
directed him not to submit his answer or to reveal its contents
unless Pakenham would decide, in advance, to regard his note
as official. He was unwilling, he said, to do anything "which
would have the appearance of inviting Great Brittain to make
another proposition." When told that no answer would be made
except to an official communication, Pakenham, after some
*2 Ibid., 55, 70-71. ^^ Ibid., 73-75.
578 JAMES K. POLK
anxious hesitation, witlidrew the note. During the conversation
he denied that he liad rejected the American offer, but had merely
refused to -accept it — a distinction which he held to be of great
importance. Copies of the note and the reply which had been
prepared were sent to McLane so that he might know precisely
what had transpired. ^^ The President, at this same time, was
holding conversations with Lieutenant Gillespie, preparing him
for liis mission to California with secret instructions for Larkin,
the consul at Monterey, and two weeks later Slidell was sent to
negotiate with Mexico.
During the latter half of November Polk was busily engaged
in drafting his first annual message to Congress. He discussed
the proposed recommendations with Ritchie and with several
members of Congress, and all parts of his original draft were
read and considered at cabinet meetings. In general -all mem-
bers of the cabinet, except Buchanan, concurred in the Presi-
dent's views; tlie Secretary of State dissented from his Oregon
policy and seriously considered leaving the cabinet to accept the
position of Justice of the Supreme Court. He made various
suggestions which were intended to soften the tone of the message,
and when they were not adopted the President noted that ''Mr.
Buchanan seemed to be depressed in spirits, and, as I thought,
greatly concerned lest the controversy about Oregon might lead
to War. "*^ When his own protests luid failed he tried to in-
fluence the President by saying that many members of Congress
were in favor of accepting parallel forty-nine as the boundary,
but Polk replied that he, too, had conversed with congressmen,
nine-tenths of whom were in favor of "going the whole length."
The diary states further that :
Mr. B. expressed the opinion with some earnestness that the country
would not justify a war for the country North of 49°, and that my greatest
danger would be that I would be attacked for holding a warlike tone. I
iilhid., 75-82. Buchanan to McLane, Oct. 28 and Nov. 5, 1845 (Bu-
chanan, WorJcs, VI, 285-286, 289).
*■' Polk, Bxnry, I, 102.
OEEGON 579
told him that my greatest danger was tliat I would be attacked for liaving
yielded to what had been done by my predecessors and in deference alone,
as he knew, to their acts and commitments, [and for having] agreed to offer
the compromise of 49°. I told htm that if that proposition had been ac-
cepted by the Brittish Minister my course would have met with great opposi-
tion, and in my opinion would have gone far to overthrow the administra-
tion ; that, had it been accepted, as we came in on Texas the probability
was we would have gone out on Oregon. I told him we had done our duty
by offering 49°, and that I did not regret that it had been rejected by the
Brittish Minister Tlie truth is Mr. Buchanan has from tlihe begin-
ning been, as I tliink, too timid and too fearful of War on the Oregon
question, and has been most anxious to settle the question by yielding and
making greater concessions than I am willing to ma.ke.46
The twenty-ninth Congress convened on the first of December,
and on the following day Polk submitted his first annual message.
"While he congratulated Congress on "the continued prosperity"
of the country, he nevertheless felt called upon to make many im-
portant recommendations. Foreign relations were given first
attention, and on the topics of Texas and Oregon the views ex-
pressed by the President were uncompromising, if not menacing,
in tone.
After giving a brief history of the attempts made by his pre-
decessors to settle the Oregon boundary question, the President
informed Congress of the offer which he had made and which
Great Britain had rejected. He had become convinced that
England would not agree to any adjustment which the United
States ought to accept, consequently "the proposition of com-
promise which had been made and rejected was by my direction
subsequently withdrawn and our title to the whole of Oregon
Territory asserted, and, as is believed, maintained by irrefragable
facts and arguments." Since England by her rejection of the
compromise offer had relieved the President from being further
influenced by the acts of his predecessors and had left him free
to assert the full rights of the United States, two things were
recommended : first, notice should be given that the convention
46/fe!V7., 107-108.
580 JAMES E. POLE
of "joint occupancy" made in 1827 will be terminated at the
end of twelve months; and second, "it will become proper for
Congress to determine what legislation they can in the meantime
adopt without violating this convention."'
While thus fully admitting the right of Congress to determine
the degree of protection which might be given to American
citizens in Oregon before the termination of joint occupancy,
Polk nevertheless freely suggested the laws which he considered
to be proper and necessary. "Beyond all question," said he,
"the protection of our laws and our jurisdiction, civil and crim-
inal, ought to be immediately extended over our citizens in
Oregon." They should be extended to the same extent that
England had extended her laws in 1821. Forts should be built
along the route to Oregon to facilitate emigration to that region.
He doubted that land grants could be made until the convention
had expired, but emigrants might rest assured that they would
be given land as soon as "joint occupancy" had ended.
So far as Great Britain was concerned, the most objectionable
part of the message was that which outlined the policy to be
followed by the United States after the convention of 1827 had
expired. "At the end of a year's notice," said the President,
should Congress tliink it proper to make provision for giving that notice,
Ave shall have reached a period when the national rights in Oregon must
either be abandoned or firmly maintained. That they can not be abandoned
without a sacrifice of both national honor and interest is too clear to admit
of doubt.
The claim of Great Britain to the Columbia as a boundary "can
never for a moment be entertained by the United States without
an abandonment of their just and clear territorial rights, their
own self-respect, and the national honor." Evidently with Cali-
fornia as well as Oregon in mind, he reasserted the Monroe
Doctrine against European colonization on the North American
continent.*^
•»T Richardson, Messages, IV, 392-399.
OREGON 581
According to the account recorded in Polk's diary, Demo-
crats generally — even many of Calhoun's friends — expressed en-
thusiastic approval of his message.-** Archer, a "Whig member
from Virginia, was especially pleased with the part relating to
Oregon, and remarked that ''he believed he was half a Polk-
man." "Well!" said Benton, "you have sent us the message,"
and "I think we can all go it as we understand it," to which
Polk replied (alluding to Jackson's famous remark) that the
Senator had very high authority for saying "as we understand
it." The real meaning of Benton's remark, as further conversa-
tion developed, was that England's title to the region drained by
Frazer's River was quite as good as that of the United States
to the valley of the Columbia.*''
The President was not moved to modify his uncompromising
policy by the opinions expressed by so influential a person
as Senator Benton; neither did the continued opposition of
Buchanan disturb his equanimity. At a cabinet meeting held on
December 9, the Secretary of State, after stating that he antici-
pated a call from Pakenham, asked the President what reply he
ought to make if the British minister should interrogate him on
the Oregon question. "Suppose," said he, "Mr. Pakenham in-
quires whether any further proposition which the British Gov-
ernment might make would be received, what shall I say to him ? ' '
Polk replied that Pakenham had no right to ask such a question.
The minister, he said, knew the contents of the annual message
and of the diplomatic correspondence he had received; let him
take his own course without any intimation as to how any future
offer would be received. "Mr. B. repeated his anxiety to settle
the question at 49° & avoid war. I told him that I did not desire
war, but that at all hazards we must maintain our just rights."
Pakenham called two days later, and, after expressing an earnest
desire for peace, desired to know what the United States proposed
48 Among those mentioned were Cass, McDuffie, Holmes, Seddon, Hunter,
and Wilmot.
49 Polk, Diary, I, 116-117.
582 JAMES K. POLE
to do at the end of the year's notice, but Buchanan was, of course,
unable to give him a satisfactory reply.^'' In spite of his "high
tone," Polk seems to have been rather uneasy because England
was reported to be engaged in "warlike preparations," and
McLane was instructed to ascertain whether they had been
induced by possible hostilities over Oregon."^
On December 23 "a grave discussion" took place in the
cabinet regarding the probabilities of a war with Great Britain.
Buchanan expressed himself as decidedly in favor of vigorous
preparations for defense, and in such a policy the President
heartily concurred. The Secretaries of War and Navy were
directed to communicate the views of the administration to the
military and naval committees of Congress and to aid them in
drafting suitable bills. Still in fear of war, Buchanan inquired
whether, in case Pakenham should offer to compromise on the
forty-ninth parallel, leaving Vancouver's Island to England,
Polk would submit the offer to the Senate for its advice. ' ' I told
him," wrote the President,
if an equivalent, by granting to the IT. S. free ports North of 49° on the
sea & the Straits of Fuca should also be offered, I would consult confiden-
tially three or four Senators from different parts of the Union, and might
submit it to the Senate for their previous advice.
As this was the first intimation, since the withdrawal of the
American offer, that Polk might modify his claims, in deference
to the Senate, Buchanan regarded the commitment so important
that he reduced to writing what the President had said.^-
Pakenham called at the State Department on December 27,
and, after an unsuccessful attempt to induce Buchanan to recall
his withdrawal of the American offer, proposed to refer "the
whole question of an equitable division of that territory [Oregon]
to the arbitration of some friendly sovereign or State." In
50 7buZ., 119-121.
51 Buchanan to McLane, Dec. 13, 1845 (Buchanan, Works, VI, 341-342).
52 He appended the memorandum: "I took dov^'u the foregoing from
the lips of the President in the presence of the Cabinet" (Polk, Diary, I.
133-136).
OREGON . 583
anticipation of such an ofifer Polk and his cabinet had, on that very
same day, decided to reject it, if it should be made. Buchanan
could not, of course, reject the offer without referring it to the
President, but he frankly told the British diplomat that he did
not believe it would be accepted. Pakenham regretted that there
seemed to be no way of reopening negotiations and intimated
that the American government did not desire an amicable settle-
ment. He said, on the other hand, that "the British government \
would be glad to get clear of the question on almost any terms ; j
that they did not care if the arbitrator should award the whole
territory to us."^^ This frank remark indicated that England
cared little about Oregon— except that she did not wish to be
coerced— and the prospects of an amicable adjustment seemed
very much brighter.^*
In his answer to Pakenham, which had been carefully edited
by the President, Buchanan explained why the offer of arbitra-
tion could not be accepted. The offer to refer to an arbitrator
the "equitable division" of Oregon, said he, "assumes the fact
that the title of Great Britain to a portion of the territory is
valid, and thus takes for granted the very question in dispute ' ' ;
the President could not admit such an implication, for he believed
that England had no claim to any part of the land. Pakenham
now asked if the United States would agree to submit to arbitra-
tion the question as to whether either nation possessed a valid
title to the whole territory, and his query was answered in the
negative, because the President did not "believe the territorial
rights of this nation to be a proper subject for arbitration. "^^
53 Pakenham to Buchanan, Dec. 27, 1845; memorandum of the interview
in Buchanan, Works, VI, 349-353.
54 Pakenham 's report of his government's attitude agrees with a
statement made bv Ashbell Smith: "In the conversation Lord Aberdeen
remarked that the British government did not care a pin, comparatively,
about Oregon and the Puget sound country; but that the universal con-
viction in England was that the country to the Columbia river belonged of
right to Great Britain and that the United States was attempting to bully
England out of it" (Smith, Reminiscences of the Texas RepuMic, 41). .
55 Buchanan to Pakenham, Jan. 3 and Feb. 4; Pakenham to Buchanan,
Jan. 16, 1846 (Buchanan, Works, VI, 355, 357, 370).
584 JAMES E. POLK
Polk's unyielding attitude did not necessarily mean that he
either expected or desired a rupture with England. Apparently,
he believed that he would yet be offered a proposition to which
he could agree. When, on January 4, Black, of South Carolina,
asked him to use his influence with Congress to induce that body
to postpone the date for abrogating the convention of 1827, he
declined with the remark that "the only way to treat John Bull
was to look him straight in the eye ; that he [I] considered a bold
& firm course on our part the pacific one."'^** Despite, therefore,
the blunt answers to Pakenham, McLane was authorized to let
Lord Aberdeen know, "cautiously and informally," that, while
the President himself would accept nothing less than the whole
of Oregon, he would, should Great Britain offer the forty-ninth
parallel as a boundary, refer the proposition to the Senate for
its advice. Anything less advantageous to the United States
would be rejected by the President without such a reference ;
"it is manifest, therefore, that the British Government should
at once present their ultimatum."" A few days before these
instructions had been sent Polk had suggested to his cabinet that
a settlement might possibly be made on the basis of a mutual
reduction of tariffs and the payment to England of a sum of
money for the surrender of her Oregon claims. This sum was
to enable her to indemnify the Hudson's Bay Company. The
subject was postponed for further discussion and seems never to
have been seriously eonsidered.^^
Before he had received the above-mentioned instructions Mc-
Lane, in a private letter to Buchanan, said that although the
Oregon question was becoming more critical every day, yet he
believed that tlie President had it in his power to adjust the
matter "upon a basis of a reasonable compromise," should he
feel inclined to do so. He believed, also, ''that it may he made
to appear in the end that his [Polk's] mode of conducting the
58 Polk, Diary, 1, 155.
•"'T Buchanan to McLano, Jan. 29, 1846 (Buchanan, Worlcs, VI. 366-368).
ss Polk, Diary, I, 191.
OREGON 585
negotiation had enabled Jiim to do what his predecessors had been
unable to accomplish."''" The latter suggestion was entirely su-
perfluous, for the President was already endeavoring to create
such an impression by his method of conducting the negotiations.
His judgment proved to be sounder than that of his critics. His
uncompromising attitude did not result in the war which they
so confidently predicted, but, eventually, in another and better
offer from the British government.
In the meantime Congress was engaged in a spirited debate
upon the President's message and the validity of the American
title to Oregon. In the Senate, on December 8, Benton presented
a memorial from the people of Oregon which stated that they
had set up a temporary government and asked its approval by
Congress. They requested Congress to create for them a terri-
torial government, or at least to give them civil and military
protection."" Next day Cass introduced resolutions which in-
structed the military and naval committees to inquire into the
defensive needs of the country.
When first presented, Cass's resolutions elicited no comments,
but when, on December 15, he came to urge their adoption the
character of his speech caused no little consternation. Negoti-
ations, he said, had failed to settle the dispute, and Great Britain
was assuming a menacing attitude ; adequate military prepar-
ation was the best means of avoiding war. The President, in his
opinion, could never recede from the position he had taken, and
it was better ' ' to fight for the first inch of national ten-itory than
for the last." Allen, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, agreed that the best method of averting war was to pre-
pare for it, "but the only, or rather the most effectual, preparation
which could be made in the United States for this state of things,
was the preparation of the hearts of the people." Webster,
Crittenden, and Niles deplored warlike talk, and thought that
59 McLane to Buchanan, Feb. 3, 1846, Buchanan Papers.
60 Unless otherwise stated, the opinions and remarks of congressmen
have been derived from the Congressional Globe under dates given.
586 JAMES K. POLE
Cass's remarks Avere most unfortunate. Webster did not believe
that Polk expected war, and, in his opinion, the message had been
intended as an ultimatum to induce England to make a better
offer. Sevier, on the other hand, would not accept this interpre-
tation. There would certainly be war, he said, for the United
States could not recede, and Great Britain would not; the only
recou7-se for the United States was to drive the British out of
the territory. There was little opposition to the resolutions them-
selves— the criticism was aimed at the remarks which they called
forth — and they passed near the close of the day (December 16)
by a unanimous vote.
The Senate having taken the first step in "preparing the
hearts of the people" for war, Allen, on the eighteenth, presented
a joint resolution which advised the President "to give, forth-
with," the necessary notice for terminating the convention of
1827 with Great Britain. On the same day Atchison, of Missouri,
moved to instruct the Committee on Territories to inquire into
the expediency of organizing a government for Oregon. During
the next two weeks Texas rather than Oregon claimed the at-
tention of the Senate, but on December 29 Hannegan, of Indiana,
offered a resolution which declared all of Oregon to be " part and
parcel" of the United States, and that "there exists no power
in this Government to transfer its soil, and the allegiance of its
citizens, to the dominion, authority, control, and subjugation of
any foreign prince, state, or sovereignty."
The Oregon question was introduced in the House on the
second day of the session when Ingersoll read a petition from the
citizens of that region asking for a territorial government. It
was read and laid on the table, but on December 15 Douglas
succeeded in having it referred to the Committee on Territories,
of which he was chairman. On the nineteenth, Douglas reported
from his committee a bill which provided for the protection of
the rights of American citizens until the termination of joint
occupation. It was read twice and referred to the Committee of
OREGON 587
the Whole, there to be made a special order for the first Tuesday
in January, and to continue such from day to day until it had
bepn adopted or rejected. Scarcely had the reference been made
when Winthrop, of Massachusetts, offered resolutions to the effect
that the differences with England were still open to negotiation
or arbitration, and that war would be highly discreditable to
both nations. Douglas responded immediately with resolutions
which asserted that the title to any part of the territory south of
54° 40' was not open to compromise or arbitration. From the
Committee on Military Affairs, Brinkerhoff, on December 31, re-
ported a bill for constructing forts along the route to Oregon ;
this, also, was referred to the Committee of the Whole.
While the House had been discussing the proposed govern-
ment for Oregon, its Committee on Foreign Affairs had been
trying to agree upon a joint resolution for giving notice to Eng-
land that the convention of 1827 would be terminated. As the
members were unable to agree, Ingersoll, the chairman, on Jan-
uary 5, reported a resolution for the majority of his committee.
It directed that the President "forthwith cause notice to be
given" that the convention would be abrogated twelve months
after the notice had been served. Garrett Davis, of Kentucky,
then reported that the minority of the committee — ^himself and
two colleagues — believed that the convention could be abrogated
by the treaty-making power only. The House, he said, had noth-
ing to do with it ; Congress neither made the convention nor could
unmake it, except by a declaration of war. The contention of
the minority was well founded, even though the objectors were
governed more by partisan feelings than by constitutional scru-
ples. Although the convention of 1827 did not specify by whom
the notice should be given, the natural inference was that it meant
the treaty-making power.
As soon as the reports had been read, the House proceeded
at once to consider the resolution. Giddings, who opened the
debate, stated that heretofore he had opposed expansion, but
588 JAMES K. POLK
since the South had succeeded in annexing Texas he now wanted
all of Oregon. The South, he said, was not interested in Oregon,
and he believed that Polk would surrender all north of the forty-
ninth parallel. Rhett repelled the charge that southern men who
opposed giving notice to England were governed by sectional
motives. His own reason for opposing the notice was that John
Quincy Adams favored it ; he would be ' ' blackballed ' ' in South
Carolina if he should vote on the same side as the member from
Massachusetts. Cobb, of Georgia (January 9), regretted that
southern men should question the title to all of Oregon ; if Con-
gress should fail to back up Polk's message, Great Britain would
be still less inclined to settle the question. In his opinion, it
would be very unfair for Congress to shirk the responsibility by
leaving the discretion to the President. The Washington Union
in urging abrogation of the convention pointed out that so long
as joint occupation continued England had no interest in the
settlement of the question, for ''she lias now all that sJic asks
for."'''
As the debate proceeded, many arguments — some of them
most unique — were offered in support of the notice and for the
claim to the whole territory. Levin, of Pennsylvania (January
9), based the claim to all of Oregon upon the "genius of Ameri-
can institutions" and the "laws of God"; Kenned}^ of Indiana,
upon the "American multiplication table," the operation of which
made it necessary for the people to have more room.*^- Brinker-
hoff, of 'Ohio, was captivated by the convincing logic of Bu-
chanan's defense of the American title as was "the Queen of
Sheba, when gazing on the architectural wonders of Jerusalem. ' '
61 Union, Jan. 12, 1846. "If we are to govern Oregon peaceably," said
the Union on January 16, "we must first get rid of 'joint occupation.'
If we are to govern any part of Oregon peaceably, we must first get rid
of 'joint Occupation' in that jiart. ''
"2 "Our people are spreading out with the aid of the American inulti-
])lication tal)le. Go to the West and see a young man with his 7iiate of
eighteen; after the lapse of thirty years, visit him again and instead of
two, you will find twenty-two. That is what J call the American multi-
plication table" (Cong. Globe, Jan. 10, 1846).
OBEGON 589
Sawtelle, of iMaine, praised Polk for his firm stand, for he wanted
no compromise like the Ashbnrton treaty; "we want no more
half-English half-American secretaries to barter away any other
portion of our territory." Douglas would not be satisfied so
long as Great Britain held an inch of territory on the northwest
coast, and he commended the President for reasserting the Mon-
roe Doctrine. He seems clearly to have believed that Polk would
not conclude a treaty of any kind with Great Britain. Had he
believed otherwise he would hardly have uttered the remark about
to be quoted, for his language would brand the President as
unworthy of confidence as soon as the treaty had been signed.
After citing the passage in Polk's message which stated that in
future no European colony might be planted in North America
with the consent of the United States, he asserted that the con-
clusion of any treaty with England— whether the line esablished
were 49° or 54° 40' — would be giving such consent. "But the
President," said he,
Has anuounced distinctly to the world, as our settled policy, that that
consent cannot be given. Sir, he who knows the character of the man —
he who knows the stern integrity of his political character— he who knows
the consistency of his whole political life — he who knows his fidelity to
his principles, must know that, during his four years, this "settled policy"
will not be unsettled by him. Sir, he is not the man to put the distinct
declaration forth to the world in the name of his Government of a settled
policy, and then to sneak back from it, to violate it, to disgrace himself
and his nation during that very presidential term in which he gave the
notice. Then, I say, that during these four years, it is a settled, irrevoc-
ably settled question, that no treaty fixing a boundary for the northern
part of Oregon can be made. Sir, the making of any treaty fixing a
boundary, would be a palpable violation of the very principle the President
has put fo/th in his message.«3
Great difference of opinion existed as to who possessed the
power and whose duty it was to notify England that the conven-
tion would be abrogated. Could the President alone do so, or
must he have the advice and consent of the Senate; could
•53 Jan. 27, 1846 {Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 259-260).
590 JAMES K. FOLK
Congress alone, or with the approval of the President, serve the
notice ; if Congress alone lacked power to give the notice, could
it direct, or simply advise, the President, to do so? The Whigs,
generally, favored leaving the question of serving the notice to
the discretion of the President so that he might bear the respon-
sibility, although many of them professed to be certain that notice
would be followed by war. On January 7, Hilliard, of Alabama,
moved an amendment which empowered the President to give
or to withhold notice ; Democrats opposed the amendment and
declared it to be both partisan and cowardly. ' ' But a few months
ago," said Thurman, of Ohio,
Many of them [the Whigs] professed to be unacquainted as to who Mr.
Polk was. But so rapid had been their progress, that they had not only
found out who he was, but they had ascertained that he was entitled to
such confidence that they proposed to confer upon him what they argued
was the war-making power. •'■*
Andrew Johnson condemned southern men who had accepted the
Baltimore platform and supported the candidate and who now
refused to sustain the President ; Strong, of New York, quoted
the London Examiner as proof that England hoped to profit by
a division in the Democratic party.
Had John Randolph been living at this time he would have
beheld another alliance quite as strange as that between "puritan
and blackleg,"*'^ for the "puritan," Adams, now sided with the
Oregon Democrats. He did not, he said, expect to add much to
the argument, for in no debate had the subject been "more thor-
oughly and completely exhausted." He wished to have the con-
vention of 1827 abrogated so that the United States might get
actual possession, for "that is the only thing we now want, to
have a perfect, clear, indisputable, and undoubted right to the
81 When Polk was nominated, said Cathcart, of Indiana, the Whigs
cried, "Who is James K. Polk?"; "and yet these immaculate apostles of
consistency are willing to vote this tremendous power [the war power]
into the hands of this very same James K. Polk! "
"5 On the alliance of Adams and Clay in 1824, see Schouler, lliai. of
the V. S., MI, .'.67.
OliEGON 591
territory of Oregon." The government should therefore give
notice to England, and occupy the territory. In his Memoirs,
Adams makes the interesting statement that neitlier Monroe nor
he, when President, really intended to divide the territory with
Great Britain : .
This offer was formerly made under the impression that it would not
be accepted, but that its effect would be to preserve the peace between the
two countries, and postpone the issue of the controversy until the time
should come when we should be able to maintain our claims by an appeal,
if necessary, to arms.'^o
His independence and his want of sympathy with the attitude
of his political associates is manifested in his remarks concerning
a conversation held with Representative Moseley, of New York:
He is a member of the Whig party, the policy of which among the
people appears to be concentrating itself upon a system of opposition to
the present Administration on the ground of its propensity to war with
Great Britain. Dangers of war, and a very contemptuous estimate of the
object for which they suppose the President is provoking it, are the only
theme upon which they dwell, without suf3ficiently considering that their
terrors and prognostics may furnish to Mr. Polk motives and pretexts for
yielding to the pretensions of our adversary, and sacrificing our own just
claims to the territory in dispute, of which I think there is much greater
danger than of a war for the maintenance of them.oT
The President's adversaries were unable to agree concerning
the most effective method of opposing his Oregon policy. In-
surgent Democrats, as a rule, argued against abrogating the
British convention because, as they said, war would result. Some
of the Whigs offered similar arguments ; others, as we have seen,
were willing to invest Polk with power to abrogate the conven-
tion, and to make him responsible for the consequences. Tooms,
of Georgia, Campbell, of New York, Ewing, of Tennessee, as well
as others, did not regard the American title to be "unquestion-
able" except to the Columbia River valley; they were ready,
6« Adams, Memoirs, XII, 221.
c- Ibid., 226.
592 JAMES E. POLE
therefore, to agree upon the forty-ninth parallel. King, of
Georgia, wished to settle the question by arbitration, while Davis,
of Mississippi, like Calhoun, advocated "masterly inactivity."
He thought that Polk was in need of being saved from his friends ;
if the title to Oregon was as ' ' perfect ' ' as the President claimed,
it was dishonorable for him and his predecessors to have offered
to compromise Avith Great Britain.
On February 9, 1846, the Committee of the Whole ceased
debating and prepared to vote on the bill as reported from the
Committee of Foreign Affairs. Numerous amendments were
offered,"^ but few modifications were permitted. After much
wrangling the House resolved by a vote of one hundred sixtj^-
three to fifty-four that the President ' ' cause notice to be given ' '
to Great Britain that the convention of 1827 would be abrogated
at the end of twelve months. A second paragraph explained that
such action was not intended to preclude further "negotiations
for an amicable settlement." In this form the resolution was
sent to the Senate for its approval.
The House resolution reached the Senate on the tenth but
instead of giving it immediate consideration, that body continued
to debate various joint resolutions which had been proposed by
its own members. Among these was one that had been offered
by Crittenden, on January 26, and this, with slight modifications,
was the one finally adopted as an amendment to the House reso-
lution. Before its adoption, however, the Senate indulged in a
prolonged and acrimonious debate.
The question of abrogating the convention of 1827 was dis-
cussed from every possible angle, and yet very little new light
was contributed by either the friends or the opponents of the
administration. Although not a political supporter of the Presi-
dent, Clayton, of Delaware, was willing to trust Polk's judgment
68 For example, as to whether Polk should be rocjuesteil, required, or
left to his discretion, with respect to giving notice to England. Some
wanted a long preamble, others, provision for further negotiation (Cong.
Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 345-350).
OBEGON 593
in the matter of giving notice. He expressed the belief that war
would not result from abrogation of the convention, and quoted
the Manchester Guardian to show that the British were in favor
of such action."^ Relying with the utmost confidence on Polk's
"honesty, integrity, and firmness," Colquitt, of Georgia, was
ready to follow the recommendations made in the President's
message, for
It has been very properly said that no message that ever emanated .
from a President of the United States has met with more general appro-
bation on the part of the people than the one to which I now allude. It
is able, dignified, and peaceful. All that he has said and all that he has
done, and all that he has offered to do, has met a favorable response from
the public.
Colquitt did not believe, however, that the American title w^as
so clear as to preclude further negotiation, and he was confident
that Polk would not reject a reasonable offer to settle the dispute.
In the course of his remarks Colquitt twitted Hannegan, of
Indiana, with having been indifferent to the acquisition of Texas.
"Both Texas and Oregon," replied Hannegan, "were united in
the Baltimore convention. But I dreaded— if Texas went first—
I dreaded Punic faith. Yes, Punic faith. "'« Others besides
Hannegan accused southern members with having declined, for
sectional reasons, to support the President's Oregon policy, but
for the most part these accusations seem to have been groundless.
One of the most exhaustive speeches in support of Polk's
policy was delivered by John A. Dix, of New York. He did not
66 "With respect to the notice for terminating the joint occupation of
Oregon," said the Guardian, "we are not sure that President Polk may
not receive it from the English Government before he can possthhj he m a
condition to give it himself. But whether givpu by the one side or the other,
we do not conceive that it will add materially, if at all, to the chance of a
hostile collision."
70 "Texas and Oregon," said Hannegan on December 30, 1845, "were
born the same instant, nursed and cradled in the same cradle— the Balti-
more convention— and thev were at the same instant adopted by the
democracv throughout the land. There was not a moment's hesitation,
until Tex'as was admitted; but the moment she was a.lmitted, the peculiar
friends of Texas turned, and were doing what they could to strangle
Oregon ! ' '
594 JAMES E. POLE
agree Avith Allen 's assertion that the time for discussing the title
"had gone by," nor with Clayton's contention that "it had not
yet arrived." His argument in support of the American claim
was so thorough and conclusive that Benton, who followed him,
declared that "He [Dix] has left nothing for me to say on the
point of title, familiar as I have been with that subject for thirty
years. ""^ The exhaustive character of Dix's speech may have
been sufficient reason for Benton's eschewing the subject of title
himself, but a better reason, perhaps, was his own real belief,
as he had already informed the President, that England held a
valid title to Frazer's River valley. Dix had relieved him from
the necessity of dwelling on this subject, and had left him free
to employ more general terms in his defense of the administra-
tion. Whatever his mental reservations may have been, he sup-
ported Polk 's Oregon policy with enthusiasm, the first fruit of the
recent reconciliation. "I concur with the President," said he,
"in what he has done — both in what he has offered — in what he
has rejected — and in what he has recommended to Congress to
do." In his opinion, the policy pursued had produced a good
effect both at home and abroad, had removed misapprehensions,
and created a feeling favorable to friendly negotiation. He had
no fear of war, for both governments were in good humor and
desirous of peace.
To Webster, Polk's Oregon policy was a riddle which baffled
solution. He desired to know what the President intended to do,
for he did not act like a man who expected a war :
There is nothing in his recommendations to the other House, nor to this,
indicative of such an expectation. There is nothing of preparation for
defense, indicating that the President expects war. Well, then, he can
71 "He has placed the American title to the Oolumbia," Benton con-
tinued, "and to the coast north of it, on ground from which it can never
be removed, and which must ])ut an end to the argument wherever that
speech is read. A sjieech more perfect in its proofs — better sustained by
history — more crowded witli material pertinent to the issue — more satis-
factory to all lovers of truth and justice — more judiciously conceived and
victoriously executed, I have never heard delivered. ' '
OEEGON 595
expect nothing but a continuance of this dispute, or its settlement by nego-
tiation. 1 am bound to suppose that he expects its settlement by negotia-
tion. What terms of negotiation? What basis of negotiation? What
grounds of negotiation? Everything that we hear from the Executive de-
partment is "the whole or none"; and yet negotiate! Sir, it is vain to
conceal from ourselves, from the country, or from the world, the gross incon-
sistency of this course of conduct. It is the spirit of that correspondence
[Buchanan's] to Avhich my honorable friend has alluded, that the whole of
Oregon is ours, and that nothing can be done which admits the existence of
a doubt as to our right to the whole, or the possibility of a right existing
in another; and yet Ave are to negotiate! Pray, Avhat is negotiation? Does
the Administration expect that, by negotiation, it can persuade the British
Government to surrender the whole territory to us? Is that its expecta-
tion? It may do that. I cannot say it will not. If that is the expectation
of our Government, why then, of course, it will try its hand at it. I wish
it success! That is to say, I wish the country could be rid of the dispute.
Take the whole of Oregon, if you can get it; but, at all events, settle the
question between the two countries fairly and reasonably. But I say I
do not understand the position in Avhich the Executive government has
placed itself ; in favor of negotiation all the time ; but all the time refus-
ing to take anything less than the whole! What consideration — what com-
promise— what basis — what grounds, therefore, for negotiation? If the
Government of the United States has made up its mind — I speak of the
Executive government — that, so far as it is concerned, it Avill not treat for
anything less than the whole of Oregon, then it should say so, and throw
itself on the two houses of Congress and on the country. It should say so.
He promised to support the administration in maintaining
the rights of the United States, but insisted upon knowing
whether the President intended to negotiate or to make war. In
his own opinion, the latter course would be very unwise — the
question should be adjusted by a compromise.'^-
"2 ' ' The speech of Mr. Webster, Mr. Calhoun, and others in the Senate
advocating peace and the Brittish title to a large portion of the country, ' '
wrote the President some weeks later, "have made the Brittish Govern-
ment & people more arrogant in their tone and more grasping in their
demands. If war should be the result, these peace gentlemen & advocates
of Brittish pretensions over those of their own country wdll have done
more to produce it than any others" (Polk, Diary, I, 345). Webster had
denounced the war spirit as early as November 7, 1845, in a speech in
Faneuil Hall: "The man who shall incautiously, or led on by false am-
bition or party pride, kindle those fires of war over the globe on this
[Oregon] question, must look out for it — must expect himself to be con-
sunaed in a burning conflagration of general reproach" (Curtis, Life of
Webster, II, 258).
596 JAMES K. POLK
Polk tokl Benton that he had endeavored to Avrite his message
"in plain English, & thought no part of it could be misunder-
stood.''" Nevertheless, members of Congress seemed to find it
ambiguous, and Webster's remarks caused another attempt to
fathom its meaning. Colquitt was certain that the President did
not mean to insist absolutely on procuring the whole of Oregon.
Allen was equally certain that Polk would accept nothing less,
since Great Britain had rejected the offer he had made. When
asked by Reverdy Johnson, however, whether his assertions had
been authorized by the President, Allen had to admit that he
possessed no information except that contained in the official
message. When making his declaration, Allen knowingly mis-
represented the President. In fact Allen himself had, on Decem-
ber 24, 1845, advised Polk, in case England should offer to com-
promise on the forty-ninth parallel, to submit the offer confiden-
tially to the Senate before acting upon it. Polk "agreed in the
propriety of the course he advised, ' ' but did not authorize Allen
to speak for him.^* Haywood, a Democrat from North Carolina,
although willing to accept 49°, wished to intrust the Avhole ques-
tion to Polk, for he would not
do the President so much wrong as to suppose that, if we passed the notice,
and thus put into his hand a great moral -weapon, that he could be guilty
of so miserable a trick as to use it to the dishonor of his country on the
one hand, or the reckless provocation of war on the other.^o
Reverdy Johnson thought that the President was bound to accept
the forty-ninth parallel, if offered by England. " 'Who is James
K. Polk?' was a question once asked. We all know now w4io he
is, though there are some who do not know what he is." He is
President of the United States, said Johnson, and if he had felt
bound by the offers made by his predecessors, certainly he could
not reject an offer once made by himself. Atchison, of Missouri,
73 Polk, Diary, I, 117.
-*Ibxd., 139.
~'' Like Allen, Haywood had not been autliorizod to speak for the
President {xhid., 262).
OBEGON 597
was unable to see how his colleagues could discern compromise
in the President's declarations. Polk had accepted the Baltimore
platform, and both his inauguaral and his message had claimed
all of the territory: ''The very moment he gave up any por-
tion of Oregon, every honest man would condemn it."'"
The debate in the Senate on the question of giving notice to
England continued until the middle of April. Many of the "Whigs
and a few of the Democrats opposed the joint resolution," but
Democrats, generally, rallied to its support. The advocates of
the resolution still differed in opinion as to the result of abro-
gating the convention ; some argued that such action would lead
76 W C. Eives, of Virginia, believed that Polk and his supporters in
Congress were simply playing polities: "Surely, such a spectacle was
never exhibited before in anv country as is now presented m ours, i^very
conciliatory advance of the British government unceremoniously repelled—
the most extreme claims urged on our side— a tone of menace & .'iisdain
freely indulged by the chosen champions of the administration m both
Houses— everything done which could apparently provoke a wor— and yet
I learn a settled purpose to accept any compromise that can be obtained
The minds of the whole nation kept in constant & painful anxiety & all
its business operations deranged, to enable a knot of small politicians to
play brag for the retention of public office, & to acquire credit, with a
people whom they hope thus to delude, for superior patriotism spirit &
valour' It is impossible to speak with patience, of such low & despicable
manoevering, even if it can be carried on without committing the peace
of the country. But the game is a most hazardous one, & Mr. Folk may
yet find he has not the skill to play it out" (Rives to McLean Feb 18
1846, McLean Papers). Tooms. of Georgia, likewise charged the Pi;esident
with insincerity: "I do not think a war in the least Probable. Mr. Folk
never dreamed of any other war than a war upon the Whigs. He is
playing a low grog-shop politician's trick, nothing more. He woubl be
as much surprised and astonished and frightened at getting into war with
England as if the Devil were to rise up before him at his bidding. .
His partv were alreadv committed to him to 54° 40', they would stand by
him, and he expected finally to be forced by the Bntish Whigs am
Southern Calhoun men to compromise; but he greatly hoped that he would
not be forced even to this alternative until he had ' all Oregon on every
Democratic banner in the Union for his 'second heat ' I have no. the
least doubt but that he fully calculated that the ' notice ' would be rejected
by a combination between the Whigs and Calhoun men of this Congress
and then he could have kept it open for a new pres.lential ^'amraign
(Tooms to G. W. Crawford, Feb. 6, 1846, in Bep. Am. Hist. Assn., 1911, II,
73-74). . .X, • .
77 ' ' Most of the Whigs in the Senate incline to remain rather quiet,
and to follow the lead of Mr. Calhoun. He is at the head of a party of
six or seven, and as he professes still to be an administration ma.i it is
be«t to leav^ the work in his hands, at least for the present " (Webster
to Sears, Jan. 17, 1846, in Webster, Private Corr., 11, 215).
598 JAMES K. POLK
to compromise and settlement, others, that the sequel would be
occupation of the entire territory. No agreement could be reached
as to wliat the President would do if the resolution should pass,
and nothing came from the ' ' Executive Mansion ' ' to aid in solv-
ing the mystery. ' ' Was there ever such a case known, ' ' exclaimed
Mangum, of North Carolina, "as an Executive without an organ
of his views and opinions in either House of Congress?" — the
Union had definitely stated that no one could speak for him ;
"that no man, beyond his Cabinet, knew his views." It had not
been so in Jackson's time, said Mangum, and it would not be so
now if Clay, Benton, or Calhoun were at the head of the govern-
ment. "The present Administration," he continued, was "re-
markable chiefly for one thing in the management of this ques-
tion, and that was, its secretiveness."'* In answer to Mangum,
Cass so far lifted the veil as to disclose that both Polk and
Buchanan had given their approval, in advance, to his [Cass's]
resolutions which called upon the army and navy departments for
information regarding the defensive strength of the country.
As to Polk's intentions for the future, however, Cass had nothing
to impart. In the opinion of the President himself the debate
had
taken a strange direction; that instead of examining and discussing my
views as communicated in these documents [message and correspondence],
Senators had been guessing and conjecturing what I might do hereafter,
and were approving or condemning what they supposed T might or
might not do."»
T8 A few days before, March 30, Barrow, of Louisiana, said: "There
never before had been a period when some one in the Senate was not
authorized to speak for the Executive, acquainted with his views, and
ready to put those right who misconstrued his language or his views."
79 Polk, Diary. I, 285-286. In a letter written a little later Crittenden
said: "Bitter dissensions are already manifested among our opponents;
they are about equally divided in the Senate. They quarrel about what
the President's sentiments and purposes are in relation to Oregon, — each
interprets the 'oracle' to suit himself, and eacdi jiretends to speak for liim,
while all are suspicious and jealous of him and of each other. They know
that one side or the other is cheated and to be cheated, but they can't yet
exactly tell which, in the mean time they curse Polk hypothetically. If
he don't settle and make peace at forty-nine or some other ]iarallel of
compromise, the one side curses him; and if he yields an inch or stops a
OREGON 599
After the Senate had discussed its own resolution for more
than two months, Allen who had originally reported it from his
committee moved, on April 16, that it be sent to the table and
that the Senate proceed to consider the resolution which had been
passed by the House on the ninth of February. The motion was
carried, and Reverdy Johfison at once offered an amendment to
the House resolution. It was almost an exact replica of the Crit-
tenden proposal which, along with other amendments to the Allen
resolution, had just been laid on the table. After some discus-
sion, and attempts to alter it, the Johnson amendment was passed
by a vote of 30 to 24. The resolution as passed by the House
had directed the President to notify England that the conven-
tion would be abrogated; as amended by the Senate, Polk was
"authorized, at his discretion" to give such notice. After the
amendment had been passed, but before the whole resolution, as
amended, had reached a vote, Allen bitterly assailed the modifica-
tion made by the Senate and announced his intention to vote
against the measure. The preamble, he said, advised negotiation,
while the main clause left the question of notice to the discretion
of the President: "they throw the whole subject back to the
President, to be managed in future according to his discretion,
after having condemned him for a want of discretion in his past
management." The measure was passed by a vote of 40 to 14.
The effect of attaching this amendment to the House resolution
may not, as Allen asserted, have been to array each house against
the other, and both against the President; but the affirmative
vote on the preamble must have made it clear to Polk that the
Senate would ratify a compromise treaty and that, in all prob-
ability, it would not cooperate with him in an aggressive Oregon
policy. Undoubtedly this action of the Senate had some influence
in modifying his diplomatic program.
hair's breadth short of fifty-four degrees forty miuntes, the other side
damns him without redemption. Was ever a gentleman in such a fix?
He might almost say like Satan, that 'hell was around him' " (Crittenden
to Letcher, March 9, 1846, in Coleman, Life of John J. Crittenden, 235).
600 JAMES K. POLK
On April 18 the House proceeded to consider the joint resohi-
tion as amended by the Senate. After adopting an amendment
offered by Owen, of Indiana, by wliich the President was "author-
ized and requested" to serve notice upon Great Britain, the
measure was passed by a vote of 144 to 40. Two days later the
House received notice that the Senate had rejected the Owen
amendment and had adhered to its own. A conference was then
arranged. Slight modifications were made in the Senate pre-
amble, but the main part of the resolution was left unchanged.
In the final form the President was "authorized, at his discre-
tion" to give the notice, and, by a vote of 142 to 46, the resolu-
tion was passed by the House on the twenty-third of April. ^°
The President regretted that action had been so long delayed
and that the preamble had been prefixed by the Senate ; but
"after all," he added philosophically, "Congress by authorizing
the notice, have sustained the first great measure of my adminis-
tration, though not in a form that is altogether satisfactory or
one that was preferred."*^ He decided at once to transmit the
notice directly to the British government instead of giving it to
Pakenham.
80 The Van Buren Democrats supported the administration by their
votes, although some of them did so reluctantly. Undoubtedly C. C.
Cambrolengr voiced the sentiments of many of them when he wrote:
"Heaven forgive me for having had any hand in laying the foundation of
this blundering administration. Tyler was bad enough but he had this
advantage- — there was no mock-mystery nor genuine duplicity in his con-
duct— if he betrayed his friends he was an honest knave, without any
hypocritical cant about the sabbath &c &c. But apart from that I am
utterly astonished at the little judgment and less integrity which has dis-
tinguished the course of this administration. First as it regards England —
when some three or four months ago she was making war like jirepar-
ations — McLane was instructed to inquire of Aberdeen whether these
preparations were intended for us — and now it appears that before that
enquiry was made, Bancroft was 'confidentially' recommending ten war
steamers — the Bureaus forty war steamers and Marcy fifty thousand vol-
unteers with the knowledge and approbation of the President! . . . How
nncandid and dishonorable must the conduct of the President and his
prime minister appear in the eyes of all honest men" (Cambreleng to
Van Buren, May 16, 1846, Van Buren Papers).
81 Polk, Diary, I, 348.
OHEGON GOl
While the resohition for giving notice to England was under
discussion attempts were made by both friends and opponents
of the measure to induce the President to alter or to supplement
the views expressed in his annual message. Opponents of the
resolution wished him to commit himself to compromise; its
friends, on the contrary, desii-ed additional pledges that he would
insist upon the whole of Oregon.
The first to approach him was James A. Black, a South Caro-
lina member of the House and a personal friend of Calhoun.
Calhoun was much opposed to the resolution, and his friends had
endeavored to effect a compromise with certain western Senators
who were its chief advocates. Black visited Polk on January 4,
1846, and told him that he had just held a conversation with
Senators Semple, of Illinois, and Atchison, of Missouri. He
thought they would agree not to press the notice resolution if the
South would unite with the .West in supporting the other meas-
ures recommended in Polk's message, including that for granting
lands to Oregon settlers. He therefore asked the President to
induce his western friends to postpone action on the resolution.
Polk declined to follow Black's suggestion, for, as he said, his
mind had not changed since he had recommended that notice
should be given. ' ' I remarked to him, ' ' he noted in his diary,
that the only, way to treat John Bull was to look him straight in the eye;
that I considered a bold & firm course on our part the pacific one; that
if Congress faultered or hesitated in their course, John Bull would imme-
diately become arrogant and more grasping in his demands.82
The advocates of notice and 54° 40' were quite as unsuccessful
in their efforts to commit the President to a definite future policy.
As representatives of a caucus of Senate Democrats, Hannegan
and Atchison interviewed Polk on the seventh of March and put
the direct question whether he would insist upon 54° 40', or, if
necessary, compromise on 49°. "I answered him [Hannegan],"
Polk recorded,
82 Ibid., 154-155.
602 JAMES K. POLK
that I would answer no man what I would do in the future; that for what
I might do I would be responsible to God and my country and if I should
hereafter do anything whieh should be disapproved by himself or others,
it would be time enough to condemn me I said, I am charged
with the Foreign relations of the country, and it was unheard of that
the President should declare in advance to any one out of his Cabinet
his intentions in reference to them.ss
Although the President declined, at all times, to commit him-
self as to his future course, he was careful, on the other hand, to
leave the way open for possible concessions. On several occasions
he informed both extremists and compromisers that if England
should offer the forty-ninth parallel as a boundary he might,
before acting, submit the question to the Senate. He was careful,
also, to let both factions know that no member of Congress had
been authorized to speak for him, and that the policy outlined
in his annual message would remain unchanged unless modified
by a future official communication.**
The want of harmony among Democrats in the Senate was
highly displeasing to the President, and the more so because he
attributed it to personal ambition rather than to honest difference
of opinion. "Tlie truth is," he wrote, on April 22, 1846,
that in all this Oregon discussion in the Senate, too many Democratic
Senators have been more concerned about the Presidential election in '48
than they have been about settling Oregon either at 49° or 54° 40'.
"Forty-eight" has been with them the Great question, and hence the
division in the Democratic party. I cannot but observe the fact, and for
the sake of the country I deplore it. I will however do my duty what-
ever may happen. I will rise above the interested factions in Congress,
and appeal confidently to the people for support.^-;
84 Ibid., 262-263 and passim.
»3lbid., 273.
85 Polk, Diary, I, 345. On March 9 he had observed: "This whole
excitement in the Senate has grown out of the aspirations of Senators and
their friends for the PresidencJ^ Mr. Allen has such aspirations himself.
Mr. Haywood probably prefers Gov. Wright of N. York. Gen '1 ('ass has
aspirations Init is more prudent tlian some others. Mr. Calhoun has aspi-
rations. My fear is that these factions looking to the election of my
successor in 1848, will so divide and weaken the Democratic party by their
feuils as to defeat my measures and render my administration unsuccessful
and useless. Each one of the factions doubtless desire [s] to use the
OREGON 603
Although the joint iTsoliition in its final form was not, as we
have seen, entirely satisfactory to the President, he accepted it
as preferable to no action at all.**" He had two reasons for desir-
ing some action on the part of Congress, even though details
might be unsatisfactory. He suspected that a majority in the
Senate would gladly see notice in any form defeated and would
therefore effect their purpose if the House would decline to yield.
He believed, also, that Great Britain would not make another
offer until Congress had taken final action, and evidently he was
confident that the serving of notice would induce such an offer.
Consequently when the fate of the joint resolution was hanging
in the balance, he and members of the cabinet sought interviews
with their friends in the House, and apparently it was due to
their influence that that body consented to accept the Senate
amendment.^^
While the question was still undecided, no one perused the
published correspondence with more care nor followed the debates
with more interest than the veteran diplomat, Albert Gallatin.
Having negotiated the conventions of "joint occupation," he
naturally took an interest in their abrogation, and he now pre-
pared a series of articles in which he considered both the validity
of the respective titles and the expediency of abrogating the con-
ventions. He was not in favor of giving immediate notice to
Great Britain, for, ' ' in the present state of excitement, an imme-
diate amicable arrangement is almost hopeless." In his opinion,
administration for their own advancement, and out of this circumstance has
grown the excitement & unfortunate collision in the Senate. They will
all be disappointed. I am not a candidate for re-election myself and will
lend myself to none of them. I will not be identified with any of them.
I will do my duty to the country & if my measures fail the responsibility
shall rest where it belongs. ' ' He also attributed Buchanan 's recent war-
like attitude to a desire to supplant Cass in the good graces of the ex-
tremists (ibid., 280, 297).
8'i While the Senate amendment was before the House, he told Cullom,
of Tennessee, that: "I would have preferred a naked notice; that next
to that I preferred the House Resolutions; but it being now ascertained
by repeated votes in the Senate that neither could be had, I decidedly
preferred the Senate form of notice to no notice at all" (Diary, I, 341).
87 Polk, Diary, I, 334-337.
604 JAMES E. POLK
the first and iudispensable step towards an amicable arrangement consists
in the investigation, not so much of the superiority of one claim over the
other, as of the question whether there be sufficient grounds to sustain the
exclusive pretensions of either Governmnet.
This was substantially the policy advocated by Lord Aberdeen.
Unlike J. Q. Adams, Gallatin did not believe that either nation
possessed an exclusive title to the Oregon territory ; therefore,
both might recede from their extreme pretensions "without im-
pairing national honor and dignity." Clear title for the United
States must, in his opinion, be based on the claims derived from
Spain, and he did not regard the Spanish title as unquestionably
complete. He did not, however, accept Pakenham's contention
that the claim which the United States based on the Spanish title
and that based on settlements made by American citizens were
mutually exclusive. Believing that the President, in view of the
policy outlined in his message, would be bound to assert title to
the whole of Oregon, should the convention be abrogated, he was
in favor of withholding the notice and of dividing the territory
by negotiation.^^
On April 13, when it seemed probable that the resolution for
giving notice to England would pass, the House, in Committee
of the Whole, gave its attention to the bill, which Douglas had
reported in December, for extending judicial and military pro-
tection to American citizens in Oregon. Among other things this
measure proposed to extend to Oregon the jurisdiction of the
Iowa supreme court, to build forts, to make grants of land to
settlers, and to establish a mail route between Saint Joseph,
Missouri, and the mouth of the Columbia River. Tlie debate was
not prolonged, and the aliginnent of advocates and opponents
was much the same as it had been wlien the resolution concerning
notice was under discussion. There was difference of opinion
among those who favored the bill as to whether jurisdiction
should be extended to the whole territory or to the southern
88 Gallatin, The Oregon Question, 1-33, passim.
OHEGON 605
part only. Adams once more championed the American title
to the wliole of Oregon and, in defense of his consistency, called
attention to the fact that he, in the Florida treaty, had procured
the Spanish claims to that region. When asked if the relinquish-
ment of Texas by the United States had not been ' ' a considera-
tion" in procuring these Spanish claims, he replied emphatically
that "it was no consideration at all"— that the two territories
had in no way been associated in the Florida negotiations.
Douglas, the chief spokesman for the bill, advocated extending
jurisdiction without designating boundary limits as the better
way of procuring the desired effect with the least annoyance to
Great Britain. He desired to have it understood, however, that
he was not in favor of yielding an inch of territory south of
54° 40', for any administration, present or future, which would
consent to relinquish any portion of Oregon would be guilty of
"perfidy." As already noted, such comments from Douglas
and other ardent supporters of the administration seem to indi-
cate that Polk's most intimate friends did not believe that he
would consent to a compromise. Surely they could not have
intended to brand him in advance as a man about to commit an
act of ' ' perfidy ' ' and ' ' treachery. ' '
After certain amendments had been added, one of which ex-
tended the jurisdiction of the Iowa courts to ''all that portion
of the territory of the United States which lies west of the Rocky
Mountains," without defining limits, the House, on April 18,
passed the bill and sent it to the Senate for its concurrence.
The Senate Committee on Territories disapproved the House
bill. On May 21 its chairman reported that, since a majority
deemed immediate legislation on the subject to be inexpedient
the committee desired to be discharged from further consideration
of the bill.
During the debate which followed the presentation of this
report Benton expressed his real views on the American title to
Oregon, a subject which he had avoided when discussing the
606 JAMES E. POLK
resolution for giving- notice to Great Britain. Oregon, he said,
included three main divisions: the islands, Frazer's River valley,
and the Columbia River valley. To the last only did the United
States possess a clear title. He therefore moved to recommit the
House bill to the committee and that it should be instructed to
offer the following amendments : ( 1 ) to extend the laws of the
United States over the territory to the same extent that England
had extended hers ; (2) the bill to become effective at the termina-
tion of the convention; (3) certain provisions for the administra-
tion of justice and for fortifications; (4) the boundaries to be
settled by trpaty, but until this had been done the line of 49°
should be rej^arded as the northern limit of American territory.
Cass assailed Benton's arguments and his proposed instructions,
and, on Crittenden's suggestion, the latter were withdrawn.
Within two weeks further action by Congress was made unneces-
sary by the conclusion of the Oregon treaty which divided the
tei'ritory between the two nations.
As the President had anticipated, the passage of the joint
resolution for abrogating the convention of 1827 was soon fol-
lowed by a new overture from the British government. A dis-
patch from McLane arrived on June 3, 1846, and gave the sub-
stance of a proposition which Lord Aberdeen had said would
soon be made to the United States by Pakenham. The proposi-
tion, as outlined by McLane, was so unsatisfactory that Polk
was "certain" that it must be rejected. ^"^ However, when the
subject was brought before the cabinet on the following day, all
members present were inclined to think that the project ought
to be submitted to the Senate for advice. The most objectionable
feature of the British proposal was a stipulation which guar-
anteed free navigation of the Columbia River to the Hudson's
Bay Company. Buchanan suggested that this privilege might
80 "If I reject it absolutely ami make no other proposition the ]>rol)al>le
result will be war. If I submit it to the Senate and they should advise
its acceptance I should be bound by their advice vet I should do so re-
luctantly" (Diary, I, 444-445).
OREGON C07
be limited to the duration of the company's existing charter,
which would expire in 1859.""
When the cabinet met again, on June 6, lUiclianan laid before
it the formal proposition of the British government, which had
arrived in the meantime and been delivered to him by Pakenham.
It proposed to divide Oregon by the forty-ninth parallel from
the Rocky ]\Iountains to the Straits of Fuca, thence through the
main channel to the sea. Two reservations were stipulated :
first, the Hudson's Bay Company and actual British occupants
M^ere to retain title to their lands lying south of 49°, but subject
10 the jurisdiction of the United States; second, free use of the
Columbia was retained for the Hudson's Bay Company and for
BriMsh subjects when trading with that company. The question
was raised as to whether, according to the proposal submitted,
the privilege of navigation to be accorded to the Hudson's Bay
Company would cease at the expiration of its existing charter in
1859. Without waiting to decide this question, the President
asked the cabinet whether he should submit the oifer, as received,
to the Senate with a request for its advice. Walker, Marcy, Ban-
croft, and Johnson advised him to submit the offer to the Senate.
Buchanan, who had recently assumed a belligerent attitude, said
that his opinion would depend upon the character of the message
which would accompany the document. "He said the 54° 40'
men were the true friends of the administration and he wished
no backing out on the subject." Although nettled by this
poniard-thrust about "backing out" the President suppressed his
feelings and even prevented Walker from openly resenting the
insinuation. He told the cabinet that in case he should decide
to submit the British offer to the Senate, he would reiterate the
views already expressed in his annual message. Should the
Senate advise its acceptance, with or without modifications, he
would follow the advice ; ' ' but if they declined to express an
opinion, or by the constitutional majority to give their advice, I
90 Polk, Biary, I, 447-448.
608 JAMES K. POLK
should reject the proposition. " After hearing this, Buchanan
advised that the proposal be submitted to the Senate, but he
declined to prepare a message embodying the President 's views.''^
The ill feeling caused by Buchanan's attitude continued for
several days. Other members of the cabinet freely criticized his
conduct and recalled that he had repeatedly advocated the
renewal of the compromise offer. After a conversation on the
subject with Marcy and Bancroft, the President wrote :
My impression is that Mr. Buchanan intends now to shun all responsi-
bility for the submission of the Brittish proposition to the Senate, but
still he may wish it to be done without his agency, so that if the 54° 40'
men complain, he may be able to say that my message submitting it i\id
not receive his sanction. I shall be disappointed if any message which
can be drawn will receive his assent. He will choose to dissent and if
it is condemned he will escape all responsibility. In his despatches to
Mr. McLane I have more than once, & in the presence of tho Cabinet,
caused paragraphs to be struck out yielding as I thought too much to
Great Brittain, and now it is most strange that he should take suddenly,
and without the assignment of any reason, the opposite extreme, and talk
as he did yesterday of "backing out from 54° 40'." His course is one
which I cannot approve. Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bancroft both condemned
it in decided terms.^^
Buchanan called on the following day and expressed doubts
concerning the wisdom of submitting to the Senate the correspond-
ence which passed between McLane and himself on the Oregon
question. Although he surmised that these doubts had been
prompted by the Secretary's fear that his inconsistency might
be exposed, Polk permitted him "to select what portions of the
correspondence, if any, should be sent." His indulgence was
rewarded by renewed insolence, for Buchanan not only refused
once more to draft a message for the President, but he had the
01 Ibid., 451-454. Polk attributed Buchanan 's change of front to a
desire to curry favor with the extremists. "It was not until within a
short time since that he gave indications of a change of position. The
first indication 1 had of it was a remark which fell from him incidentally
when speaking of the subject, to the purport that Gen '1 Cass had made
character by his course in the Senate on the suhiect. Gen'l C. was a
54° 40' man."
02 Ibid., 456.
OBEGON 609
audacity to rcniai-k that ''wlicu you have done your message I
will then prepare sucli a one as I think ought to be sent in." At
last thoroughly aroused by the insolence of his Secretary, the
President indignantly asked :
For wliat piirpose will you prepare a message? You have twice refused,
though it is a subject relating to your Department, to give me any aid in
prei)aring my message; do you wish, after I have done, to draw up a paper
of your own in order to make an issue with me"?
Buchanan at once resumed his normal state of timidity and
explained that his remark had been entirely misunderstood.
Nevertheless, when Polk submitted his message to the cabinet
for discussion, the Secretary of State raised so many objections
that some of the passages were eliminated.*''^
On June 10 the President transmitted the British proposal
to the Senate and, in an accompanying message, requested advice
as to whether it should be accepted. He made it clear that his
own opinions, as expressed in his annual message, remained un-
changed, and that he would reject the ofifer unless the Senate by
a "'constitutional majority" should recommend its acceptance.
After two days of deliberation the Senate, by a vote of 38 to 12,
advised him to accept the proposal, and on the fifteenth Buchanan
and Pakenham signed the treaty which terminated the long-
debated Oregon question.^* As shown by the vote, not many of
the extremists were ready to risk a war by rejecting the British
overture. Most uncompromising of all was Allen, chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs. On the day that the treaty
was signed, after a free expression of his feelings, he resigned
from the committee.
93 Ibid., 459-462.
04 Richardson, Messages, IV, 449-450. Polk, Diary, I, 467, 470. The
treaty may be found in Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I, 656. It fixed
the boundary at 49°, from the Rocky Mountains to the Straits of Fuca,
leaving all of Vancouver's Island to England; the Hudson's Bay Company
retained the use of the Columbia River on the same footing as citizens of
the United States; that company and British occupants retained title to
land already possessed south of 49°.
610 JAMES K. POLE
The adjustment of the Oregon question by an extension of the
existing boundary between the United States and Canada "was
eminently fair to both nations. Indeed it was the only sensible
solution of the long-standing dispute. The more one examines the
respective claims the more apparent it becomes that neither party
possessed a "clear and unquestionable" title to the entire terri-
tory. Was, therefore, President Polk justified in asserting claim
to ' ' all of Oregon, ' ' and if so, must be he condemned for accept-
ing less? Neither query can be answered by an unqualified yes
or no. Whether wise or unwise, whether designed or controlled-
by circumstances, Polk's Oregon policy was not so inconsistent
as his opponents represented it to be. He offered to divide the
territory, and when this offer was declined he steadfastly refused
to make another offer of any kind. While he continued to assert
that the American title to the whole territory was "clear and
unquestionable," at no time did he say that he would decline a
compromise, if offered by England. On the contrary, he told
both supporters and opponents in Congress that if England
should offer 49°, or anything approaching it, he would seek the
advice of the Senate before rejecting the proposal. As Webster
said in the Senate, Polk did not at any time act like a man who
expected war, and the President told Black that he "considered
a bold & firm course on our part the pacific one." He stated
repeatedly that he did not look for an offer from England until
Congress had passed the resolution terminating joint occupation,
and, although he did not specifically say so, he inferred that its
passage would undoubtedly be followed by an overture from that
government. This opinion was well founded — the "bold and
firm course" of abrogating tlie convention proved, indeed, to be
the pacific one, for Great Britain very soon afterward made the
offer to compromise."^ Without loss of time, Polk did what he
95 Commenting on tlie success of I'olk's policy, Eicliard Kush wrote:
"For one, I am unshaken in the belief, that it was the President's open-
ing message to the first congress he met on the second of December last,
that produced the settlement of the Oregon difficulty. It was like a great
OEEGON 6H
had long promised to do; he submitted the proposal to the Senate,
but with a warning that unU^ss that body shoukl advise its accept-
ance he would reject the oft'er and adhere to the party platform.
It would have been unfair to expect the President to stand alone
in demanding the full measure asked by that platform after the
debates in Congress and the press had made it plain that neither
Congress nor the people would approve his rejection of a reason-
able offer. It was not cowardly to ascertain the wishes of the
Senate on so important a question, and it would have been crim-
. inal to provoke a war for the sake of maintaining a campaign
cry, when it was evident that neither Congress nor the people
desired it to be maintained.
bomb-shell thrown into the British cabinet. It took them by surprise,
and first roused them to the unavoidable necessity of a settlement. I
thought when it appeared, that it would lead to war — so bold was it,
though every word was just; whereas it led to peace" (Eush to Trist,
Sept. 21, 1846, Trisl Papers).
CHAPTER XXII
SLAVERY AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENTS
Although a lawyer by profession, Polk owned slaves and
employed them in cultivating his plantation in Mississippi. As
a southern man he despised abolitionists, yet at no time during
his career does he seem to have taken a deep interest in the slavery
question — especially in the extension of the slaveholding area.
Like Jackson, he desired to extend the boundaries of the United
States and to increase its power and prestige, but neither man
was interested in promoting the spread of slavery. In support-
ing the annexation of Texas and in planning the acquisition of
other Mexican territory Polk acted as an expansionist, and not
as a slaveholder.
As early as 1826, while a proposed amendment to the Consti-
tution was being debated, remarks made in the House by mem-
bers from New England led Polk to express his views on the
slavery question :
1 have regretted exceedingly, sir, that scarcely any subject of general
concern can be agitated here, without having this unfortunate subject
of slavery, either collaterally, or incidentally, brought into view, and
made to mingle in our deliberations When this country became
free and independent, this species of population was found amongst us.
It had been entailed upon us by our ancestors, and was viewed as a com-
mon evil; not confined to the locality where it was, but affecting the
whole nation. Some of the States which then possessed it have since
gotten clear of it: thej' were a species of property that differed from all
other: they were rational; they were human beings.i
Fully admitting that the institution was an evil, he did not believe
tliat this fact should affect the solution of great national questions.
J Abridg. of Deb., IX, 16-17.
SLAVEBY AND TEEEITOEIAL GOFEENMENTS 613
As Speaker of the House, Polk was called upon to decide many-
points in which the slavery question was involved. His task was
simplified by the operation of the so-called gag rule under which
nearly all petitions and uiepaorials relating to the subject were
referred automatically to the "committee of oblivion." As a
party man, he rigorously enforced this rule, but in cases which
did not clearly fall within its scope he did not seem disposed to
support the extreme southern view. For example, when an
attempt was made, on February 6, 1837, to prevent John Quincy
Adams from presenting abolition petitions submitted by other
states than Massachusetts, Speaker Polk decided that "every
member had a right to present a petition, come from what quarter
it might."- This decision ran counter to the well-known southern
claim that while, under the Constitution, all citizens possessed
the right to petition for a redress of their own grievances, they
had no right to concern themselves about the grievances of others.
The Speaker 's decision in favor of Adams was not induced by
admiration for the ex-President or by approval of his conduct.
In a manuscript to be found among his papers'* Polk complained
that Adams, by his petitions, "has consumed so much of the
present session of Congress, to the delay of the public business,
to the annoyance of the whole House, and the degredation of his
own character." After asserting that it was necessary to have
a general rule, since the House could not take time to consider
each petition, he continued :
Mr. Adams was unwilling to submit to the decision of the majority.
On every petition day, he made constant attempts to wreck that decision,
to violate the rules, and defy the authority of the House. Upon the
plainest propositions he would take appeals from the Speaker's decisions,
and consume time in debating the appeal
Mr. Adams knew .... that it was the duty of the Speaker to observe
and execute the rules and orders adopted by the House for its govern-
ment
2 Cong. Globe, 24 Cong., 2 sess., 164.
3 "Notes on Mr. Adams' letter to the Quincy Patriot," undated, Polk
Papers.
614 JAMES K. POLK
The Speaker carries out and enforces the decisions of the majority &
therefore he represents in his letter that the ' ' Speaker and the majority
of the House" have undertaken to exercise "arbitrary authority." If
Mr. Adams is unwilling to submit to the decisions of the majority of the
House, he is unfit to be a member of th{it body. He seems to have an
utter aversion to decisions made by majorities. This principle lies at
the foundation of all our institutions. Majorities must govern, and it
cannot be helped if a few such refractory spirits as Mr. Adams are
unwilling to submit to that Government.
The manuscript is of considerable value, for, as Polk was the
presiding officer, his opinions on tliis important subject cannot
be found in official records.
On one occasion during his term as governor of Tennessee,
Polk was called upon to repel outside interference with the
"peculiar institution." In the summer of 1840 a "World's Con-
vention" met in London to consider ways and means of abolishing
slavery and the slave trade. Letters were addressed to officials
in the United States, and, among others, to Governor Polk. In
his last message to the legislature, October 7, 1841, the governor
stated that he had received two such letters.
Viewing these communications [said he], as an impertinent and mis-
chievous attempt on the part of foreigners to interfere with one of the
domestic institutions of this State, and having received the countenance
of a member of the Congress of the United States, under wdiose official
frank one of the packages containing them came to me, I declined enter-
ing into a correspondence with a foreign convention, but addressed to the
member of Congress alluded to the letter, a copy of wdiich is herewith
transinitted to you, accompanied by the communication.*
His answer asserted the right of a state to control its own affairs,
but it was a vindication of state rights rather than a defense of
slavery. In the words of a local editor, he
came boldly and manfully out before the country with a letter containing
the sound doctrine of the Constitution of our Union, and rebuked the
foreign interference with our State affairs in a spirit as becoming to the
patriot and the man as it was honorable to the State over whicdi he
presided as Chief Magistrate.^
* Term. Sen. Jour., 1841^2, 22-42.
!> Nashville Union, April 15, 1841.
SLAVEBT AND TEBEITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 615
Agitation in favor of annexing Texas to the United States
began as soon as that province had declared its independence in
1836. Althongh its principal snpporters were southern men there
is little evidence that they were moved by a desire to extend the
institution of slavery.'' When, however, Tyler turned his atten-
tion to the annexation of Texas, the question took on a more dis-
tinctly southern aspect ; and Calhoun, in his correspondence as
Secretary of State, brought slavery into prominence by distinctly
asserting that the United States desired to annex Texas in order
to protect that institution. When commenting on this correspond-
ence, early in 1845, the Democratic Review declared that Calhoun,
the apostle of state rights, had, in fact, nationalizecl the slavery
question :
What has become of this position [that the national government can not
interfere vAt\\ slavery in the District of Columbia] after a Southern Presi-
dent and a Southern Secretary of State — and that Secretary, John C. Cal-
houn, of all men living! — have so nationalized, so federalized, the question,
as we have lately seen done? When that has been not only acted upon, but
avowed, argued, vehemently urged — that, and that almost exclusivley — as
the ground for a large and momentous measure of national policy I^
In general, Calhoun's intimate friends were interested in Texas
because they were interested in slavery. For example, Dixon
H. Lewis deemed annexation to be "the greatest question of
the Age ' ' on account of the political power which it would bring
to the South. "It will," he wrote, "umte the hitherto divided
South, while it will make Abolition & Treason synonymous &
thus destroy it in the North.'"* This feeling, however, was not
shared by the Jackson Democrats.
When his views as a candidate for the Vice-Presidency were
solicited, Polk declared himself to be unequivocally in favor of
annexing Texas.** Neither his public utterances nor his private
6 For a discussion of this whole subject, see Justin H. Smith, Annex-
ation of Texas.
"^ Dem. Bev., January, 1845, article on Abolitionists. The whole article
is w-orth reading.
8 Lewis to Cralle, March 19, 1844, Cralle Papers.
9 Answer to S. P. Chase et ah, April 23, 1844, Polk Papers. Printed,
also, in various newspapers.
616 JAMES E. POLK
letters indicate any interest in extending slavery ; on the contrary,
the correspondence with his most intimate friends shows a desire
to avoid an affiliation with the southern wing of the party. It
has been noted elsewhere that Polk's bosom friend. Cave Johnson,
tried to induce A^an Buren to declare himself in favor of annex-
ation, and that Polk was anxious to cooperate with that wing
of the party which was indifferent or hostile to slavery. After
Polk's nomination, Johnson warned liim repeatedly that the
southern faction would try to claim and to control him. When
issuing invitations to the Nashville ratification meeting, great
care was taken to preclude any attempt to identify the candidate
with the South Carolina radicals.^'^
Throughout the campaign of 1844 neither Polk nor his asso-
ciates urged additional protection for the South, much less for
slavery ; nevertheless, both of these subjects, to a certain degree,
became party issues. Some excitement was created by the ap-
pearance of a pamphlet entitled ''The South in Danger." It was
prepared by Robert J. Walker, chairman of the Democratic na-
tional committee, and its object was to show that Whigs and
Abolitionists had united in the North and that all in the South
should join in defeating them. It was published without Polk's
knowledge and was deplored by his intimate friends." Despite
the fact that the candidate and his chief supporters were inter-
ested in territorial expansion rather than in slavery, his opponents
undoubtedly believed with John Quincy Adams who, on hearing
the result of the election, wrote : " It is the victory of the slavery
element in the constitution of the United States. "^-
Having received notice that the Mexican government had
agreed to renew diplomatic relations. President Polk, in August,
1846, asked Congress for an appropriation of two million dollars
I'J Johnson to Polk, June 21 and June 28, 1844, Folk Papers.
11 W. E. Cramer to Polk, Oct. 4, 1844; Armstrong to Polk, Nov. 5, 1844,
ibid. The Walker pam])hlet was published by the "Democratic Associ-
ation of Washington, 1). C. " and bore the date Sept. 25, 1844.
1- Adams, Memoirs, XII, 10;{.
SLAVE BY AND TEHFITOHIAL GOFEENMENTS 617
to be usi'il ill coiidueting negotiations. In making this request the
President unwittingly precipitated an "irrepressible conflict"
which ceased only with the end of the Civil War.
When he asked for this appropriation Polk had no thought
of slavery. He desired to buy Mexican territory and he wished
to be able to assure the Mexican government that he could pay
an installment of the purchase price as soon as a treaty had been
concluded. But when the subject came before the House the
slavery question emerged, for Wilmot introduced his w^ll-known
"proviso'' by which slavery would be excluded from all territory
to be acquired by the use of the appropriation. After adopting
what the President called Wilmot 's "mischievous & foolish
amendment," the House passed the bill by a vote of 87 to 64.
The amended bill came before the Senate on the last day of the
session, and, as Davis, of Massachusetts, obtained the floor and
refused to yield it, no vote could be taken. Polk was astonished
and chagrined by the unexpected turn of events. He blamed
Wilmot for having introduced an irrelevant topic, but he blamed
Davis still more for preventing the Senate from acting on the
measure. "What connection slavery had with making peace with
Mexico," is the remark in his diary, "it is difficult to conceive. "^^
While this comment undoubtedly expressed the real attitude of
the President, it has nevertheless been charged that his request
for the money was "caused by the burning desire to acquire
additional slave territory."^*
On August 5, 1846, the day after the request for the two
millions had been sent to the Senate, General Armstrong arrived
from London bearing the ratified Oregon treaty. On the same
day the President asked Congress to frame a territorial govern-
ment and to adopt regulations for making land grants to settlers
in that region. But the session was nearing its close, and Congress
adjourned without having taken action on the subject.
13 Polk, Diary, II, 75. He believed that, if permitted, the Senate would
have eliminated the proviso and that the House would liave acquiesced,
i-t Jay, Eeview of the Mexican War, 184.
618 JAMES K. POLK
When Congress reassembled in December, Polk renewed his
request for a two million dollar appropriation. He renewed,
also, liis recommendation that Oregon should be provided with a
territorial government. ^^
On December 23, in response to the latter recommendation,
Douglas reported from the Committee on Territories a bill to
establish a government in Oregon ; it was read twice and referred
to the Committee of the Whole. The twelfth section of this bill
extended to Oregon both the privileges and the restrictions of the
Ordinance of 1787, the most important restnction, of course,
being the prohibition of slavery.
On the evening of the same day Wilmot called by appointment
on the President, and the proviso which he had attached to the
appropriation bill at the last session was the topic of conversation.
Wilmot told the President that he would not again offer his pro-
viso, but that he w^ould have to vote for slavery restriction if it
should be proposed by another member. In his record of this
interview Polk thus stated his opinions on the slavery question :
I told him I did not desire to extend slavery, that I would be satisfied
to acquire by treaty from Mexico the Provinces of New Mexico & the Cali-
fornias, and that in these Provinces slavery could probably never exist, and
the great probability was that the question would never arise in the future
organization of territorial or State Governments in these territories. I
told him that slavery was purely a domestic question, and to restrict the
appropriation which had been asked for, so as to require the President to
insert it in a Treaty with a Foreign Power, was not only inappropriate
and out of place, but if such a Treaty were made it must be opposed by
every Senator from a slave-holding State, and as one third of the Senators
could reject a Treaty, it could not be ratified, though it might be satisfactory
in all other respects.
This argument, of course, overstated the effect of the Wilmot
proviso, for no one had asked that it should be incorporated into
the treaty. Wilmot answered that in any case he would be satis-
fied with a simple legislative declaration, and that he would not
again take the initiative in asking for this.^"
ir. Richardson, Messages, IV, 495, 504.
10 Polk, Diary, II, 288-290.
SLAVEBT AND TEEEITOBIAL GOVEENMENTS 619
In spite of Polk's effort to bury the slavery discussion by an
agreement with Wihnot, the question of excluding the institution
from territories was soon brought before the House. On January
4, 1847, Preston King, of New York, offered a bill to appropriate
two million dollars for diplomatic purposes the second section
of which was virtually a restatement of the Wilmot proviso.
King was not permitted to introduce this bill, and on February 1,
when another bill for granting the President three million dollars
came up for discussion in the House Wilmot, in spite of the
promise made to Polk, moved to amend the bill by adding his
anti-slavery proviso.'^ When informed of King's bill Polk noted
in his diarj' :
The sla^Tery question is assuming a fearful & most important aspect.
The movement of Mr. King to-day, if persevered in, will be attended with
terrible consequences to the country, and cannot fail to destroy the Demo-
cratic party, if it does not ultimately threaten the Union itself. [At the
close of a cabinet meeting held on the following day, he again reverted to
the subject.] Slavery has no possible connection Avith the Mexican War,
and with making peace with that country. Should any territory be acquired
by a Treaty with Mexico, Congress will have the full power to raise the
question of slavery in it upon the organization of a territorial Government
in it, or upon its admission as a state of the Union. Its introduction in con-
nection with the Mexican War is not only mischievous but wicked. It is,
moreover, practically an abstract question. There is no probability that any
territory will ever be acquired from Mexico in which slavery could ever
exist.
Buchanan expressed himself as willing to extend the Missouri
Compromise line to the Pacific, and in this view all other mem-
bers of the cabinet agreed. Polk declined to commit himself on
this method of dealing with the subject, although urged to do so
by both Buchanan and Walker. ' ' Though willing myself, ' ' said
he, "to assent to the proposition, I was not ready, until I saw
further developments, to recommend it to Congress as the policy
of the administration." On the same evening he presented the
17 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 105, 303.
620 JAMES K. POLE
proposition to Beutou in order to see if it would meet with his
approval, but the Senator declined to give an immediate answer.^ ^
While the President was not interested in the extension of
slavery, he was, on the other hand, unable to appreciate the fact
that there might be such a thing as honest opposition to the spread
of that institution. Except as it affected party interests he seemed
quite as indifferent toward the subject as Douglas was at a later
date when he declared that he did not care whether slavery was
''voted down or voted up." Polk attributed all agitation of the
subject to the same cause that he attributed everything which
thwarted his plans — a desire to promote the interests of candi-
dates for the Presidency. Politicians of both parties and both
sections were criticized for their unpatriotic conduct. Comment-
ing on the delay in enacting war measures, he wrote in his diary :
Even the question of slavery is thrown into Congress and agitated in
the midst of a Foreign War for political purposes. It is brought forAvard at
the North by a few ultra Northern members to advance the prospects of
their favourite. No sooner is it introduced than a few ultra Southern
members are manifestly well satisfied that it has been brought forward,
because by seizing upon it they hope to array a Southern party in favour
of their favourite candidate for the Presidency. There is no patriotism
on either side, it is a most wicked agitation that can end in no good and
must produce infinite mischief.is
On the day after this was written he told Crittenden that
I deprecated the agitation of the slavery question in Congress, and
though a South- Western man & from a slave-holding State as well as him-
self, I did not desire to acquire more Southern Territory than that which
I had indicated [California and New Mexico], because I did not desire by
doing so to give occasion for the agitation of a question which might sever
and endanger the Union. 20
King's appropriation bill, with the section prohibiting slavery
in all territory to be acquired, not only raised the issue with"
respect to anticipated cessions from Mexico, but it affected also
IS Polk, Diary, Tl, 304-,309. At a meeting held on January Hi the
cabinet agai!i uiKuiimonsly a(hised the extension of the l'>()° MO' line to the
Pacific.
19 Polk, Diart), II, 348. 20 /?,»;.. 350.
SLAVEBY AND TEERITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 621
the Oregon bill. It will be remembered that the twelfth seetion
of the measure proposed by Douglas extended to Oregon the
Ordinance of 1787. When the bill came up for discussion on
January 14, 1847, Burt, of South Carolina, moved to amend this
section by adding an explanatory statement to the effect that
the restrictions of the Ordinance were extended to Oregon ' ' inas-
much as the whole of the said territory lies north of 36° 30' north
latitude."" While willing, apparently, to let slavery be excluded
from Oregon, Burt nevertheless denied categorically the power
of Congress to prohibit slavery in any state or territory. He
argued at some length to prove that neither the Ordinance of
1787 nor the Missouri Compromise was a constitutional law.
This denial of the federal government's power to exclude slavery
from aiwj territory was soon echoed by other southern members;
consequently, an attempt was made to eliminate the prohibition
from the Douglas bill or else to defeat it altogether.
The President was embarrassed, and his opponents assisted,
by the hearty support given to his policy of territorial acqui-
sition by southern enthusiasts, both in Congress and in the press.
For example, the Charleston Patriot trusted "that our southern
Kepresentatives will remember that this is a southern war, ' ' and
the Charleston Conner asserted that the war w^ould widen the
field of southern enterprise and power.^^
In tlie House, Seddon, of Virginia, declared King's bill to be
grossly unconstitutional. "It more than violates a single specific
clause of that instrument. It outrages its whole scope and spirit,
and subverts the very basis of its being. ' ' Bedinger, of the same
21 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 178.
22 The f oniier is quoted in Jay, Bevieiv of the Mexican War, 1 82. See also
other excerpts from southern papers there given. The latter is thus quoted
by Eathbun of New York: ''Every battle fought in Mexico, and every
dollar spent there, but insures the acquisition of territory vi'hich must
widen the field of southern enterprise and power in the future. And the
first result will be to readjust the whole balance of power in the Confed-
eracy so as to give us control over the operations of the Government in all
time to come. If the South be but true to themselves, the day of our de-
pression and suffering is gone, and gone forever" (Cong. Globe, as cited
above, .364).
622 JAMES K. POLK
state, still loved the Union ; but he would cease to love his wife
(if he had one), "if, like the farfamed Mrs. Caudle, she were
forever taunting me with what she chose to regard as a great
deformity and annoyance."-^ Should the North persist in its
purpose to restrict slavery, he saw no remedy short of a disso-
lution of the Union. During the debate on the Oregon bill Rhett,
also, denied absolutely the power of Congress to exclude slavery
from territories, for they belonged to the states and not to the
United States.
For that [Oregon] territory [said he], we care but little, since it is
not probable that a single planter would ever desire to set his foot within
its limits. But the right is important, because it applies to future acqui-
sitions of territory; and by refusing to acknowledge the obligations of
the Missouri compromise, you force open the whole question of power.^i
The question of the control of Congress over slavery in ter-
ritories came before the Senate by a more indirect route. On
January 19, 1847, Sevier reported, from the Committee on For-
eign Relations, a bill for granting the President three million
dollars with which to conduct negotiations with Mexico. When
it came up for discussion on February 1, Berrien, of Georgia,
a southern Whig, gave notice of his intention to offer an amend-
ment. His amendment, among other things, declared that "the
war with Mexico ought not to be prosecuted by this Government
with any view to the dismemberment of that republic, or the
acquisition by conquest of any portion of her territory. ' ' A few
days later Cass offered a substitute which authorized the Presi-
dent to demand indemnity from Mexico. To those who desired
an extension of slavery Berrien's amendment was quite as of-
fensive, except in principle, as the Wilmot proviso itself; for
no acquisition of territory meant no extension of political power.
During the debate, Berrien warned southerners that slavery
23 ' ' These northern Mrs. Caudles, ' ' he continued, ' * will not let us rest
by night or by day. We get no sleej) for them! Their eternal din will
drive us to distraction. They interfere with our domestic matters; thoy
enter our very kitchens, and intrude ui)on our most sacred household
affairs! " {Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., App., 86). For Seddon 's renuirks,
see ibid., 76.
24 Ibid., 346.
SLAFEBY AND TEBBITOBIAL GOVEBNMENTS 623
Avould surel^y be excluded from all land acquired ; therefore both
the interest and the safety of the South * ' demands that we should
oppose ourselves to any and every acquisition of territory."
Berrien was not the only southern man who was averse to
territorial acquisition. Whigs would naturally oppose any policy
advocated by the administration, but there was a still more jrotent
reason why certain Democrats, as well as Whigs, did not favor
expansion. This reason was a conviction that slavery would be
excluded; and that while their section could not hope to gain
any advantage, further agitation of the subject might result in
a dissolution of the Union. Why, asked Morehead, of Kentucky,
should a policy (of expansion) be followed which would pre-
cipitate discord over slavery and probably destroy the institu-
tion ? In the House, Alexander H. Stephens vigorously opposed
the acquisition of territory and gave as one of his reasons his fear
of the results of slavery agitation. He had faith in the strength
of the Union, but he had "no disposition to test its strengh by
running against that rock upon which Mr. Jefferson predicted
we should be finally wrecked."
Calhoun joined the Whigs just mentioned in combating the
President's expansion policy. He saw even more clearly than
they did the approaching "irrepressible conflict." In a lugu-
brious speech made in the Senate on February 24 he declared that
Every Senator knows that I was opposed to the war; but none knows
but myself the depth of that opposition. With my conception of its
character and consequences, it was impossible for me to vote for it. . . .
On the passage of the act recognizing the war, I said to many of my
friends that a deed had been done from which the country would not be
able to recover for a long time, if ever; and added, it has dropped a
curtain between the present and the future, which to me is impenetrable;
and for the first time since I have been in public life, I am unable to see
the future. I also added, that it has closed the first volume of our political
history under the Constitution, and opened the second, and that no mortal
could tell what would be written in it. . . . Since then less than a year
has elapsed; but in that short period enough has already been developed
to make what was then said look like prophecy.25
25 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 sess., 500. Also, Calhoun, Works, IV, 371.
624 JAMES E. POLK
The thing which had developed, of course, was the inclination
of the North to resist the spread of slavery, and Calhoun fully
realized that that section possessed the power if the people should
decide to make use of it. His first remedy for the impending
disaster was to prevent, if possible, the acquisition of more ter-
ritory. Later, when he became convinced that this could not be
done, he felt constrained to deny that Congress possessed the
power to restrict the institution.
Already, indeed, Calhoun had been offered an opportunity
for asserting the latter doctrine. On February 15 Douglas had
attempted in the House to extend the Missouri Compromise line
through the territory to be acquired, as an alternative to ex-
eluding slavery from all of it. His amendment for this purpose
was rejected by a considerable majority. Four days after this
action had been taken, Calhoun announced in the Senate that he
was "against any compromise line." He had always, he said,
considered the Missouri Compromise to have been a great error,
although he had acquiesced in respecting it in order to preserve
peace. But since its rejection as a solution of the new territorial
question, he was now ready to insist upon the full rights of the
South in all territories. An enumeration of these rights he em-
bodied in a series of resolutions which Benton was unkind enough
to call a "string of abstractions." In substance the resolutions
declared territories to be the property of the several states, con-
sequently Congress did not possess the constitutional power to
prevent a citizen of a state from migrating with his slaves to any
of the territories.-"
The real reason why Calhoun and his sui)porters felt obliged
to abandon the historic method of compromise and to deny the
power of Congress over slavery in territories is obvious; they
were confronted by a condition of affairs which had never before
existed. In all land previously acquired slavery was already
established, therefore the institution might continue unless
20 Cong. Globe, loc. cit., 4.53-455. Calhoun. IVorls, IV, 339-349.
SLAFEBY AND TEBBITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 625
specifically prohibitL'd by Congress. In the proposed acquisition
slavery had been abolished by Mexican law, and, according to
international custom, this law would continue in force until sup-
planted by positive legislation on the subject by the United States.
Now Congress had never specifically authorized slavery anywhere,
and there could be no hope that it would do so in the present
instance. Consequently a new doctrine must be promulgated ;
it must deny the power of Congress to exclude slave property
from land which belonged to the several states. For the sake of
consistency the doctrine must apply to Oregon as well as to the
proposed Mexican cession.-' The issue was now squarely joined.
The advocates of the Wilmot proviso claimed full power to ex-
elude slavery from all territories, while Calhoun and his ad-
herents denied in toto the existence of such a power. After
Congress had adjourned, Benton told his constituents that at last
extremes had met — Calhoun and the abolitionists had joined
hands in subverting the Union.-^
Congress adjourned on March 3, 1847, without having pro-
vided a government for Oregon. A bill for this purpose had
passed the House on January 16, but on the last day of the session
it was laid on the table by the Senate. Under Polk's direction,
-' The Baltimore American, Feb. 17, 1847, pointed out very clearly why
southern members, after applauding the plan suggested by Cass, Buchanan,
and Dickinson for letting the people of the territories decide the question,
turned suddenly to oppose it. ' ' To leave to the territories themselves the
absolute decision of the existence of slavery upon their soil, might do very
well if slavery had been previously established there, as was the case when
Louisiana was purchased, when Florida was acquired, and when Texas was
annexed. But in the present case it would not do. The old formula must
be changed. The long and fondly cherished doctrine of state sovereignty,
so convenientlv inchoate in a territory as the germ of a state — even this
must be abandoned." Quoted in Niles' Beg., Feb. 19, 1848, LXXIII, 392.
28 The Calhoun resolutions, said he, "go the precise length of the
northern abolitionists, and with the same practical consequence, only in
a reversed form. The abolition creed is, that the admission of slavery in
any part of the Union is a violation of the constitution, and a dissolution
of the Union; the new resolutions declare that the prohibition of slavery
in any territory of the Union is a violation of the constitution and the
rights of the states, and a subversion of the Union! So true it is, that
extremes meet, and that all fanaticism, 'for or against any dogma, termi-
nates at the same point of intolerance and defiance" (speech at St. Louis
(no date given), quoted in Niles' Beg., June 5, 1847, 223).
626 JAMES E. POLE
Buchanan expressed to the people of Oregon the President's re-
gret because they had been left by Congress without a govern-
ment. Ignoring the real difficulty, Buchanan stated that the
failure of Congress to act had not resulted from indifference to
the interests of the territory, but to a pressure of business which
did not allow time to perfect the details of the bill \'° Just be-
fore adjourning, however. Congress passed the ''three million
bill" which enabled the President to use this sum in conducting
negotiations with Mexico. As we have seen, efforts were made
to attach to this bill either the Wilmot proviso or an extension
of the Missouri compromise line, but all such restrictions were
rejected.
During the session which had just closed Calhoun felt that
he had attained a commanding position. ' ' My friends, ' ' he wrote,
"think I never stood higher, or stronger than I now do"; and
he was "now certain that there will be no more Baltimore nomi-
nations, or if there should be, the nominee will be assuredly de-
feated. ' ' Through Benton, he said, the administration was trying
to build up the old Van Buren party, but tlieir efforts would end
in failure.^** After Congress had adjourned, he went home to
begin an active compaign for uniting the South in defense of
slavery. He desired, first of all, to prevent the reelection of
Polk, or the election of any of his adherents ; if Calhoun himself
could not be elected, he was ready to support General Taylor. ^^
It is interesting to note that while northern Whigs and "proviso"
Democrats were denouncing the President as a slavery extension-
ist, Calhoun and his supporters were identifying him with Van
Buren and other enemies of ' ' southern institutions. ' '
29 Buchanan, Works, VII, 258.
30 Calhoun to Thos. G. Clemsou, Jan. 'AO, LS47, in l^ep. Am. Hist. Assn.,
1899, II, 717.
31 ' ' The days of hunkcrism is numbered. Mr. Polk is the last of the
dynasty. It never can rise attain to power. ... As nuu-h as I am op-
posed to military chieftains for presidents, I shall, thus thinking, be
content to see him [Taylor] elected against Mr. Polk, or any one, who
contributed to make the war; and, let me add, against the nominee of a
convention, either democrat, or Whig" (Oallioiiii to Clemson, May 6, 1847,
ibid., 728).
SLAVEET AND TEEBITOBIAL GOVEENMENTS 627
Earl}' iu April the President was informed by his Secretary
of the Navy that Calhoun was soliciting signatures for an address
to the people on the subject of slavery. "I remarked to Mr.
Mason," says the Diary,
that Mr. Calhoun had become perfectly desperate in his aspirations to
the Presidency, and had seized upon this sectional question as the only
means of sustaining himself in his present fallen condition, and that such
an agitation of the slavery question was not only unpatriotic and mis-
chievous, but wicked.
He was as little pleased with a story told by Benton to the effect
that the supporters of Silas Wright "would be rejoiced at the
opportunity to take issue with Mr. Calhoun on such a question. ' '
The truth is, [he continued], there is no patriotism in either faction
of the party. Both desire to mount slavery as a hobby, and hope to secure
the election of their favourite upon it. They will both fail and ought to.
The people of the U. States, I hope, will cast off all such intrigues, and
make their own selection for the Presidency, and this if they are wise
they will do. I now entertain a worse opinion of Mr. Calhoun than I
have ever done before. He is wholly selfish, I am satisfied has no patriot-
ism. A few years ago he was the author of Nullification & threatened
to dissolve the Union on account of the tariff. During my administration
the reduction of duties which he desired has been obtained, and he can
no longer complain. No sooner is this done than he selects slavery upon
which to agitate the country, and blindly mounts that topic as a hobby.
Gov. Wright's friends in Congress as unjiatriotically have shown by their
course that they desire to mount the same hobby in the North and hope
to be successful by their opposition to slavery. They both forget that the
Constitution settles [those] questions which were the subjects of mutual
concession between the North and South. I am utterly disgusted at such
intriguing men in high place, & hope they will be rebuked by the people.32
32 Polk, Diary, II, 457-459. Although PoLk was wrong in attributing
the sectional discord wholly to President-making, it was true that the
slavery question was being used on both sides of Mason and Dixon's line
to break down party lines and to solidify public opinion either for or
against the "peculiar institution." A few months later Holmes, of S. C,
wrote: "I wish the Southern Representatives would consent to act to-
gether without regard to Whig or Democrat. The Wilmot Proviso is
paramount to all Party. We are in great danger. The North is resolved
to crush Slavery — are we equally in the South resolved at all hazards to
defend it?" (Holmes to Cobb, Aug. 21, 1847, in Bep. of Am. Hist. Assn.
1911, II, 88).
628 JAMES K. POLK
What the President desired most of all was to eliminate the
slavery question entirely and to have Congress confine its atten-
tion to the policies of his administration. However, since the
slavery question had emerged, he could not maintain simply a
negative attitude with respect to it. He was compelled, against
his will, to adopt some positive program for dealing with slavery
in the territories. As early as January 5, 1847, the cabinet sug-
gested an extension of the Missouri Compromise line, but at that
time Polk declined to commit himself. ^^
About a week after the cabinet had made this suggestion
Atocha appeared in Washington and the prospect of an early
acquisition of Mexican territory seemed brighter. Since Congress
persisted in discussing slavery, some positive plan on the part
of the administration seemed desirable. In his diary for January
16 Polk lamented that the session was nearly half over and that
Congress, instead of enacting necessary military measures, was
engaged in "a worse than useless discussion about slavery. ' ' He
and the cabinet deprecated this discussion, but "all feared it
W'Ould be impossible now to arrest it." Although every member
of the cabinet advised an extension of the 36° 30' line through
the territory to be acquired, Polk was not ready to commit him-
self to this solution.'^ In fact, the President does not seem to
have decided upon any definite policy during the session, although
he intimated to Crittenden that the Missouri Compromise line
would be extended f^ and as Congress voted the three million
dollars without attaching the Wilmot restriction, slavery for the
time being ceased to be a vital question.
In June, the President decided to made a tour of tlie nortli-
eastern states. Although we have no direct evidence that polit-
ical considerations induced him to make this decision, it is quite
33 See above, p. 619.
3-t Polk, Diary, II, 335.
35 He told Crittenden that the slavery question in California and New
Mexico would not l)e a practical one "because there would be but a
narrow ribbon of territorv South of the Missouri compromise line" (Diary,
Jan. 23, II, 350).
SLAVERY AND TEEEITOBIAL GOVERNMENTS 629
probable that he hoped, by making the journey, to retain the
support of northern Democrats and to prevent further defections
on account of slavery agitation. Among those who accompanied
him was Edmund Burke, commissioner of patents and his close
personal friend. No doubt Burke voiced the President's views
when, on the eve of the journey, he told Franklin Pierce that
the signs of the times portended a coalition of the South and
West against the North. He attributed this state of affairs to
the ' ' foolish course ' ' pursued by the ' ' proviso ' ' Democrats ; " it is
clear that the Northern and Southern Democracy are now divided,
a consummation which the federalists of the North have sought
for fifty years to accomplish. "^*^ Polk did not, during the sum-
mer, decide upon any definite policy with respect to slavery in
the territories, though his approval (somewhat reluctant, to be
sure) of Buchanan's open espousal of an extension of the 36° 30'
line indicated that he would not oppose this plan as a solution of
the question. ^^
When Congress convened in December, 1847, the President,
in his third annual message, informed that body of the failure
of Trist's mission. He recommended that California and New
Mexico should be retained permanently by the United States and
that Congress should at once provide each of these territories with
a civil government. In this connection he made no allusion to
slavery, but he concluded his message by quoting Washington's
admonition regarding the value of union and the calamity of
sectional controversies.
How unimportant [said Polk] are all our differences of opinion upon
minor questions of public policy compared with its preservation, and how
scrupulously should we avoid all agitating topics which may tend to dis-
tract and divide us into contending parties, separated by geographical
lines, whereby it may be weakened or endangered.
On December 8, two days after Congress had convened, the
Vice-President laid before the Senate a memorial from the Oregon
36 Burke to Pierce, June 21, 1847, Pierce Papers.
37 Polk, Diary, III, 142. Buchanan to Berks County Democrats (Bu-
chanan, Works, VII, 385).
630 JAMES K. POLK
"Legislative Assembly'' praying for the confirmation of their
land titles and for the adoption of measures to promote education.
This assembly had been created by the people of Oregon, without
authority from the United States government. The movement
to establish a temporary government began as early as 1843, and
one section of the "Organic Laws" prohibited slavery. ^'^
On December 14, before any consideration had been given to
this memorial, Dickinson, of New York, submitted resolutions
which attempted to define the policy of the government for both
acquiring and governing territories. They asserted that "true
policy" required the United States to strengthen its political and
commercial relations on the continent by the acquisition of con-
tiguous territory, and that in all such territories the people should
be left free to settle ' ' all questions concerning the domestic policy
therein," without any restrictions imposed by the federal govern-
ment. In other words, Dickinson advocated the "popular sover-
eignty" program which Douglas later mounted as a hobby in
1854. In his well-known "Nicholson letter" Cass made a bid
for the Presidential nomination by casting doubt on the power
of Congress over slavery in territories and by espousing the doc-
trine of "popular sovereignty."^"
The Dickinson resolutions were followed by others in wliich
individual Senators endeavored to commit the government to what
each deemed to be the ' ' true policy ' ' respecting territories. One
offered by Calhoun opposed holding Mexico as a province, or
incorporating it into the LTnion. As a substitute for the Dickin-
son plan, Yulee, of Florida, offered a resolution which declared
that territory owned or to be acquired by the United States "is
the common property of the Union," and that neither the fech'ral
nor the territorial government can prevent any citizen from enjoy-
ing full rights therein. Hale, of New Hampshire, offered another
substitute which purposed to exclude slavery entirely from lands
38 Gray, History of Oregon, chaps, xiii-xiv.
30 Cass to A. O. P. Nicholson, Dec. 24, 1847. Printed in Nilcs' Beg.,
Jan. 8, 1848, LXXIII, 293.
SLAVEEY AND TERKITORIAL GOVERNMENTS 631
that might be acquired. All of these proposals were defeated,
yet they afforded an opportunity for airing divergent views and
for illustrating the impossibility of arriving at any practical
settlement of the slavery question.
On January 10, 1848, Senator Douglas presented a bill for
establishing a territorial government in Oregon, and on February
9 Caleb Smith, of Indiana, reported from the House Committee
on Territories a bill for the same purpose. Both measures were
referred to committees, and for some time war legislation pre-
cluded their consideration.
The Douglas bill did not come before the Senate until May
31, and then Hale moved to amend by adding section twelve of
the Senate bill of the last session — the section which extended to
Oregon the Ordinance of 1787. Calhoun opposed the inclusion
of a slavery restriction, while others like Hannegan and Benton
thought such restriction to be unnecessary, since slaves would
never be taken to Oregon. Benton was unwilling to have neces-
sary legislation delayed by the introduction of this "pestiferous
question." He was especially anxious that military protection
should be extended immediately to the people of Oregon. But
Hale was obdurate, and insisted upon a positive prohibition of
slavery. ' ' If this Union, ' ' said he, ' ' with all its advantages, has
no other cement than the blood of human slavery, let it perish ! ' '
When the discussion was resumed on June 5, Foote moved to
amend by inserting in section twelve the words: "provided the
same [the slavery restriction] be compatible with the laws and
Constitution of the United States." In this way he undoubtedly
hoped to obtain a "Dred Scott decision" at that early date. After
Underwood, of Kentucky, had denied the authority of Congress
to interfere with local institutions and Baldwin, of Connecticut,
had declared that slaves were held solely by state laws and that
when a slave left the confines of a slave state— even if accompa-
nied by his master on a temporary sojourn— "his shackles fell
off," Badger, of North Carolina, offered, as a substitute for
632 JAMES K. POLE
Foote's proposal, a proviso which would exempt the people of
Oregon from the operation of the sixth article (the one prohibit-
ing slavery) of the Ordinance of 1787. Foote accepted the modi-
fication. After considerable discussion this amendment was with-
drawn by the mover on June 23, and Davis, of Mississippi, pre-
sented another which asserted that nothing in the bill should be
so construed as to prohibit slavery in Oregon while it remained a
territory.
After a long delay the House, on March 28, proceeded to
consider Caleb Smith's Oregon bill. In a most ingenious speech
Gayle, of Alabama, asserted that all laws by which Congress had
excluded slavery from territories had been based on precedent
merely and had not been authorized by the Constitution. He
held that territories were legally states before entering the
Union;*'' on the other hand, he denied that their government
thereby possessed the power to exclude slavery. In reply, Smart,
of Maine, declared that Congress not only had the power but was
bound by the will of the majority to prevent slavery from entering
all territories.
The President, as we have seen, was reluctant to announce a
definite policy regarding slavery in territories, even though the
Van Burenites believed this to be the issue nearest his heart."
3oth he and his cabinet opposed the Wilmot proviso,*- and, since
a negative policy could not be pursued indefinitely, Polk at
last decided to advocate an extension of the Missouri Compromise
line.
40 "Now, sir, how can a 'new State be admitted into the Union' mUess
it was a State before admission?"
■41 "The slavery question," wrote John M. Niles, "is evidently first
& foremost with the administration; it overrides the Mexican Avar & any
other question. The slave power rules as tyrannically here as it can in
Louisiana; that, is made the test & tie of fealty to the administration"
(Niles to Van Buren, Dec. 16, 1847, Van Buren Papers).
42 After Clifford had been sent to Mexico the President announced his
intention to select some northern man to fill his place. All members ex-
pressed an unwillinf-uess to be associated with a Wilmot proviso man
(Polk, Diary, III, 431).
SLAVEBY AND TEEIUTOBIAL GOVEBNMENTS 633
As already noted, the President desired most of all to elimi-
nate the subject of slavery, but forces beyond his control made
it apparent that this could not be done. Indeed, since the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo had been ratified by Mexico, the question
of governments for California and New Mexico had become more
urgent than ev€r. Congress persisted in discussing slavery and
there seemed to be no prospect of an agreemnt on the subject.
On May 26 a messenger arrived from Oregon and laid before
the President a memorial from the legislative assembly of that
territory, stating that the Indians were making war on the inhab-
itants. Polk transmitted the memorial to Congress along with
a message recommending the immediate creation of a government
for Oregon. He said nothing about slavery.*^ But on June 24,
in a conversation with Senator Hannegan concerning "the dis-
tracting subject of slavery, which is embarrassing the Bill to
establish a Territorial Government in Oregon," he advised the
Senator to ' ' bring forward & press the adoption of the Missouri
compromise line & extend it to the Pacific. ' ' Hannegan, as well
as the entire cabinet, agreed with Polk that ' ' the adoption of the
Missouri compromise was the only means of allaying the excite-
ment & settling the question." The President sent for other
members of Congress and urged them to support this policy in
order to checkmate the action of the Barnburners :
The necessity for settling the question is the greater since the con-
vention of Barnburners, held at Utica, New York, on the 22nd Instant,
have bolted from the regular Democratic nominations made at the Balti-
more convention in May last, and have nominated Martin Van Buren for
President and Henry Dodge of Wisconsin for Vice President distinctly
upon the ground of the Wilmot Proviso. This is a most dangerous attempt
to organize Geographical parties upon the slavery question. It is more
threatening to the Union, than anything which has occurred since the
meeting of the Hartford convention in 1814. Mr. Van Buren 's course is
selfish, unpatriotic, and wholly inexcusable. The effect of this movement of
the seceding and discontented Democrats of New York will be effectually
43 Polk, Diary, III, 463. Message dated May 29, 1849 (Richardson,
Messages, IV, 584).
634 JAMES K. POLK
co[u]nteracted if the slave question can be settled by adopting the Missouri
compromise line as applied to Oregon, New Mexico, & Upper California at
the Present Session of Congress. If the question can be thus settled haiinony
■will be restored to the Union and the danger of forming geographical parties
be avoided. For these reasons I am using my influence with members of
Congress to have it adopted.**
He was' quite indifferent regarding the extension of slavery,
but he was vitally concerned over preserving the Union and in-
suring the success of his party. He did not believe that sound
principles, or what he considered to be such, should be jeopar-
dized by a sudden change in the popular viewpoint. After the
Baltimore convention, Cass showed to Polk the first draft of his
letter of acceptance, one sentence of which declared that the
government should keep pace with public opinion. ' ' I suggested
to him," is the comment in the Diary, that the assertion
might be misconstrued to mean that constitutional principles might be
changed, in order to accommodate themselves to what might seem from
time to time to be public opinion, which I thought was an untenable &
dangerous doctrine. ■is
A few days after his conversation with Hannegan the Presi-
dent discussed the Oregon bill with Senators Bright, of Indiana,
and Foote, of Mississippi. He dictated an amendment which
would extend the 36° 30' line to the Pacific. When Bright intro-
duced the amendment in tlie Senate, Calhoun again asserted that
Congress could not, without violating tlie Constitution, prevent
a slaveholder from carrying his property to any territory.*"
During the first two weeks in July, Polk conversed with va-
rious southern members of both houses, nearly all of whom were
ready to accept an extension of the 36° 30' line. Judge Catron
wrote from Nashville that the position taken by those who denied
the power of Congress over slavery in acquired territory could
not be maintained. He was in favor of excluding the institution
*■* Polk, Diary, III, 501-503.
•15 Ibid., 471-472.
•*« Ibid., 504-505. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 875-876.
SLAVEBY AND TEBEITOEIAL GOVEBNMENTS 635
from Oregon and believed that it would be wise, politically, to
do so.*' The pleasure which Polk derived from the support of
so many southern men was offset by the acerbity of Alexander II.
Stephens. By a resolution introduced on July 10 Stephens called
upon the President for information concerning the governments
which had been set up in California and New Mexico. In a
violent speech he scathingly denounced the President and General
Pillow, and characterized the former as ' ' Polk the mendacious. ' '*^
In the Senate, on July 12. after Jetferson Davis had upheld
the right of a slaveowner to locate with his "property" in any
territory, Clayton, of Delaware, moved that the question of slav-
ery in territories be referred to a committee of eight to be selected
by ballot — four from the North and four from the South. Dur-
ing the discussion of this proposal Westcott, of Florida, asserted
that should the Wilmot proviso be attached to the bill, ' ' we have
a Chief Magistrate at the other end of the avenue who would
put his veto on it. ' ' However true this statement may have been,
it must have been based upon pure conjecture, for Polk would
hardly have given advance information to a man whom he de-
tested as he did Westcott. The Senate passed the resolution and
Clayton was made chairman of the select committee. ^'^
Calhoun was made a member of the Clayton committee and,
on July 14, Polk expressed to the Senator's friend, Elmore, a
hope that he might recede from his extreme position and accept
the 36° 30' line as a compromise. He could not with propriety,
47 "Were I in Congress, not a moment's hestiation would be felt in
voting for the exclusion of slavery from [in?] the Oregon bill; and if
this is done, with the sanction of the Democratic party — as it must be in
the Senate, the Barnburners may hang their harp on the willows, so far
as capital is sought from this slavery question; not that I think so much
will come of it as has been supposed, for Mr. V. Buren will have to carry
his abolition brethern, who will be very apt to absorb his party, & to
incorporate his good self, & Son John." Catron "w'd feel much gratified
to see this slavery question adjusted by a compromise on 36° 30' — the true
division as I think" (Catron to Polk, July 12, 1848, Poll- Papers).
■48 Polk, Diary, IV, 14. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 912.
40 Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 927-928, 932.
636 JAMES K. POLK
he said, ask Calhoim to call and discuss the subject,^" so Elmore,
two days later, brouglit the Senator to call upon him. After
Polk had expressed a "decided opinion" in favor of adjusting
the slavery question by an extension of the compromise line,
Calhoun said that the Clayton committee had as yet been unable
to agree upon a solution. He stated that a suggestion had been
made in committee which he was willing to accept : that the ex-
isting Oregon laws which prohibited slavery be allowed to operate
until changed by the territorial legislature ; and that the govern-
ments of California and New Mexico be prevented by Congress
from legislating on the subject of slavery, leaving the question,
should it arise, to be decided by the local judiciary. Polk was
willing to accept this adjustment, although he preferred an ex-
tension of the compromise line. Calhoun now produced the
loaded dice by which he hoped to win the game so far as the
Mexican cessions were concerned :
He said that much would depend on me, in appointments to be made
of Governor, Secretary, & Judges; that they might be Northern men in
Oregon, but that they ought to be Southern men in California & New
Mexico, who would maintain the southern views on the subject of slavery.
The tone of his conversation on this point seemed to be designed to elicit
a pledge from me to this effect. I at once felt the delicacy of my situa-
tion & promptly replied that that was a subject upon which I could not
speak, that if the laws passed in the fonn suggested I would do my duty,
and jocosely added that my friends, as Gen '1 Harrison's Cincinnati Com-
mittee in 1844 [1840?] said for him, must have a "generous confidence"
that I would do so.^'i
Calhoun returned on the following day and reported that the
committee had agreed upon the general terms above mentioned,
but that the northern members insisted upon a provision which
would allow appeals from the territorial courts to the Supreme
Court of the United States. He and two other members would
50 "I told him I could not invite Mr. Calhoun to call, 1st, because he
was an older man than myself, had been longer in public life, and 2nd,
because he niiglit su])po3e tliat I desired to exercise some official influence
over him. ' '
51 Polk, Diary, TV, 19-21.
SLAVE FY AND TEEEITORIAL GOVERNMENTS 637
not admit this pi'ovision, and he now suggested that the whole
subject might be postponed until the next session of Congress.
Since Polk urged immediate action, the Senator, after another
vain attempt to carry his point in committee, finally yielded on
the subject of appeal. "There is now some prospect," wrote the
President, ' ' that the question may be settled at the present session
of Congress, and I sincerely hope it may be." On July 18, Clay-
ton reported a bill which left undisturbed the prohibition in
Oregon. The status of slavery was left for the Supreme Court
to determine, and until this had been done, the territorial govern-
ments were not to legislate on the subject.^-
When the bill came up for discussion, on July 22, Niles, of
Connecticut, asked Clayton whether his bill answered the im-
portant question whether Congress had or had not the i:»ower to
interfere with slavery in territories. He replied that it ' ' neither
affirms nor denies the power, and herein consists the compro-
mise." Northern members were unable to discern a compromise
in a measure which left slave-owners free to enter California and
New Mexico without hindrance, except an improbable decision of
a pro-slavery court. The northern press was equally suspicious.
Said the New York Evening Post:
Talk as we may of the impartiality of our courts, a judge from the
Southern States, allied to the aristocracy of those States, would share
their prejudices and decide according to their views. This compromise is,
therefore, an ingenious method of giving Mr. Calhoun his own way in the
controversy.
And the New York Trihiine:
We protest against this juggle. We say it [slavery] has acquired no
right to a single foot of the new territory; the South avers the contrary.
We press Congress for a decision, and it is refused us. Instead of de-
ciding Congress undertakes to run the matter through so many different
crucibles, that slavery will finally be established and that inveterate old
rascal. Nobody, be alone responsible for it. . . .
A governor and three Judges arc to be the law makers and the law
expounders in each Territory — said governor and judges being appointed
52 Ibid., 21-24. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 950.
(538 JAMES K. POLK
by Polk, and of course chosen from among the most determined, wily and
unscrupulous champions of slavery extension. Nobody can pretend to
doubt how they will construe the constitution. '>3
The discussion in the Senate continued until the morning of July
27, when, after an all-night session during which numerous
amendments were rejected, the measure as submitted by the select
committee was passed. On the following day, after a brief debate,
the House laid the Senate bill on the table and proceeded to con-
sider its own Oregon government bill.
The President was sorely disappointed by this action on the
part of the House. He was especially mortified because the
defeat of the bill had been accomplished by the votes of New
York Barnburners and Democrats "who are timid & afriad to
risk their popularity at home." The result of leaving the slavery
question unsettled, to be agitated by "ambitious aspirants &
gamblers,'' would be to produce an organization of parties on
geographical lines and to endanger the Union. He did not doubt
that the bill would have passed if there had been no Presidential
election pending. The Whigs were desirous of preventing any
adjustment during the present session,
doubtless in the expectation that in the chapter of accidents growing out
of the excitement & agitation which must follow, that they may stand
some chance to elect a Whig President. I deplore as a national calamity
the want of patriotism which seems to actuate the conduct of the leaders
of the "Whig party in Congress; and I exceedingly regret that any portion
of the Northern Democrats from timidity or other causes have been in-
duced to act with them.'"'*
By the eighth of August he had become convinced that Con-
gress would not, at the present session, create governments for
New Mexico and California, yet he believed that the Oregon bill,
with its clause excluding slavery, might be passed. He asked
the cabinet whether, in case this bill should pass, he ought to
sign it. Each member responded that, since the whole territory
53 Both quoted in Nilcs ' Beg., LXXIV, 55-56.
51 1'olk, Diary, IV, 33-35.
SLAFEEY AND TERIUTOBIAL GOVERNMENTS G39
lay north of 36° 30', he ought to do so. He then asked whether
he ought to aceompany his approval with a message stating that
he had signed the bill because the territory lay north o£ the
Missouri Comjironiise line. Buchanan feared that such a state-
ment might injure the campaign of General Cass; the others
believed that it should be made, either in a message or in the
Washington Union. ^^
The House passed its own bill on August 2 and sent it to the
Senate for approval. The Senate attached certain amendments
which the House promptly rejected, and it looked for a time as
if no agreement could be reached. Polk was ready to approve
slavery resti'iction for Oregon, but he told the cabinet that he
did not wish it to be inferred that he would sanction a restriction
south of 36° 30'.^«
In taking his stand against the application of the Wilmot
proviso to all territory it is evident that the President was ani-
mated not by a wish to extend slavery but by a desire to preserve
the Union. He believed that the Union could be saved by an
extension of the compromise line — and, perhaps, in no other way.
He had set his heart on liaving the whole territorial question
settled by the adoption of such a policy. The elimination of
Oregon would make the adjustment more difficult, consequently
he preferred to have the matter setled by a measure that would
apply to all three territories. He believed that the South was
entitled to the privilege of occupying with its "property" the
southern part of the Mexican session; but, personally, he was
most interested in allaying sectional discord. He was equally
insistent — in defiance of southern pressure — upon prohibiting
slavery north of 36° 30', although he samewhat doubted the
55 Ibid., 61-62.
^fi"I expressed the opinion that if I approved and signed the Bill in
the usual form without assigning my reasons, my opinion in regard to
California & New Mexico would not be understood, and that it might be
inferred that I had yielded the question in regard to the Territory South
as well as North of the Missouri compromise line, which would not be
true" (ibid., 67-68).
640 JAMES K. POLE
constitutional power of Congress to apply such a restriction. In
this, too, he was moved not by any feeling against tlie institution,
but by the opinion that nothing else w^ould satisfy the North and
prevent further agitation. In a word, his attitude toward slavery
was one of indifference.
When, on the morning of August 13, Polk learned that the
Senate, at the close of all-night session, had passed the House
Oregon bill, with its prohibition of slavery, he realized that he
must decide the question of affixing or withholding his signature.
Although disappointed because the compromise line had not, at
the same time, been extended through the Mexican cession, he
nevertheless decided to approve the Oregon bill and, in a mes-
sage, to state his reasons for so doing. Buchanan did not wish
Polk to state in the message that he would veto any bill which
purposed to exclude slavery south of 36° 30' ; Mason, Marcy,
and Ritchie advised such an announcement. While the President
was drafting his message to the House, Senator Turney, of Ten-
nessee, called and urged him to veto the bill ; and Hannegan,
although he had voted for the bill, offered to sustain a veto.
Calhoun and Burt, of South Carolina, importuned him to veto
the measure, but he informed them that he would sign it, "al-
though I would do so reluctantly" ;
I told him [Calhoun] that if the question of imposing the restriction
was an original one arising for the first time, I would have serious doubts
of its constitutionality. I remarked that there might be questions arise
effecting [affecting] the very existence of the Union, upon which we ought
to yield individual opinions, in deference to what our predecessors had
done, and I considered this one of them.
He reminded Calhoun that the Clayton committee of which the
Senator was a member had been willing to exclude slavery from
Oregon, and that many southern Senators had voted for tlie
Clayton bill. He reminded him also that Burt, who was present,
had proposed the amendment in the House for prohibiting slavery
in Oregon, on the ground that the territory lay north of the
compromise line. Calhoun pleaded for a veto, but
SLAVERY AND TEBBITOBIAL GOFEENMENTS 641
I repeated that 1 would sign it, and told him that if I were to veto it
after all that had occurred, and in the present excited state of Congress
& of the public mind, I should do more to inflame that excitement & to
array the country into geographical parties and to rend the Union, than
any act which had ever been done by any President or any man in the
country. He left me fully understanding my opinions & what I would do.^T
Congress had agreed to adjourn on August 14, the day after
Polk had held the above-mentioned conversation with Calhoun.
The President rose early and carefully revised his message to
the House before the cabinet had assembled for the purpose of
accompanying him to the capital. To Buchanan's caustic remark
concerning Ritchie 's assistance in the preparation of the message
Polk retorted indignantly that none of the editor's suggestions
had been followed. The Secretary then reiterated his opposition
to sending the message.
Shortly after Polk had reached the Vice-President's room at
the capitol he was informed that both houses were engaged in
a debate against suspending the joint rule under which bills
could not be submitted to the President for his signature on the
last day of the session. Unless it were suspended not only the
Oregon bill but the army appropriation bill would fail. The
President communicated to several members his determination to
call an extra session on the following day if this session should
terminate without passing the appropriation bill. The joint rule
was suspended and both bills presented for his approval. As
he was about to affix his signature, Calhoun asked him not to
assign his reasons in a message, but the request was denied. Nomi-
nations to fill the offices created by the Oregon bill were made and
confirmed. When the hour for ending the sessoin had arrived
the House was so pressed for time that it adjourned in confusion
without having read the President 's message.'^^
In his message Polk told the House that he had signed the
territorial bill, even though New Mexico and California had been
57 Polk, Diary, IV, 70-74.
58 Ibid., 74-77.
642 JAMES K. POLK
left without governments, because Oregon urgently needed legal
organization and protection. Turning to the cause of sectional
discord, he thus stated the position of the slaveholder :
In the progress of all governments questions of such transcendent
importance occasionally arise as to cast in the shade those of a mere party
character. But one such question can now be agitated in. this country,
and this may endanger our glorious Union, the source of our greatness
and all our political blessings. This question is slavery. With the slave-
holding States this does not embrace merely the rights of property, how-
ever valuable, but it ascends far higher, and involves the domestic peace
and security of every family.
After commending the ' ' mutual concession ' ' shown by the f ram-
ers of the Constitution in dealing with the subject of slavery,
as well as the compromise adjustments of the Missouri and Texas
questions, he stated that he had not felt at liberty to withhold
his approval of the Oregon bill, because all of the territory lay
north of 36° 30'. "Had it embraced territories south of that
compromise, ' ' he continued, ' ' the question presented for my con-
sideration would have been of a far different character, and my
action upon it must have corresponded with my convictions."
Since the extension of the Missouri Compromise line would leave
but a small area in which the people might hold slaves, if they
saw fit, "is this a question to be pushed to such extremities by
excited partisans on the one side or the other, in regard to our
newly acquired distant possessions on the Pacific, as to endanger
the Union of thirty glorious States, which constitute our Con-
federacy?"^''
Nowhere in his political career did Polk speak so emphati-
cally as a southern man as he did in this message, and yet, as
we have just noted, Calhoun tried to dissuade him from sending
it to the House. It is unlikely, even at this time, that Polk was
desirous of spreading slavery, but he feared that unless some con-
cession were made to the South a dissolution of the Union would
59 Richardson, Messages, IV, 606-609.
SLAVERY AND TEBBITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 643
result. His desire for some immediate and permanent settlement
of the slavery controversy was intensified by the defection of the
Barnburners and the consequent weakening of the Democratic
party. If the vexed question could not be settled during his
administration there was, in his opinion, grave danger that no
adjustment could be made which the South would accept.
Chagrined because the Van Buren Democrats had cooperated
with the Whigs in defeating the California and New Mexico ter-
ritorial bills, he resolved, as soon as Congress had adjourned, to
punish leading Barnburners for inciting insurrection in Demo-
cratic ranks. His punitive measures must of necessity be con-
fined to persons actually holding offices, and of these the most
objectionable was Benjamin F. Butler, whom he had made United
States Attorney for the southern district of New York. At the
Barnburner convention, which had recently met at Buffalo to
nominate Van Buren, Butler had made a speech in which he had
denounced the administration and had practically defied the
President to remove him. Polk accepted the challenge and sum-
marily removed Butler from office. He would not have removed
the attorney ' ' for his mere opinions upon abstract questions, nor
for his free expression of them," but Butler's action in throwing
obstacles in the way of successful administration of the govern-
ment had forfeited his right to an office of honor and profit. In
Polk 's opinion, Butler was now ' ' one of the worst enemies of the
Democratic party and its principles in the Union," and his news-
paper organs in New York were more hostile to the administration
than any of the Whig papers :
Indeed the whole party of Barn-burners in New York, of which Mr.
Butler is a leading & controlling member, are not only abusive of me &
my administration, but they seem to challenge and defy me to remove
Mr. Butler, in the hope, no doubt, that they may enlist the public sym-
pathy over him as a martyr for opinion's sake. By his removal to-day I
have gratified [them], & they may make the most of it.^o
60 Polk, Diary, Sept. 1, 1848, IV, 114-115.
644 JAMES K. POLE
The harrowing question of slavery in the territories could not
be disposed of so easily as could obnoxious office holders. As
soon as Congress had adjourned, the redoubtable Missouri Sen-
ator gave the President new cause of annoyance by writing an
officious letter to the people of California. Benton informed the
Californians that since Congress had failed to legislate for them
they were without a lawful government."^ Therefore he exhorted
them to meet in convention and frame a government under which
they could take care of themselves until Congress should act.
He sketched the type of government which would suit their pur-
poses and suggested that a governor would be necessary to ad-
minister it. The Senate, he said, had voted seven million dollars
to pay the people of California for miltiary services, but the bill
for this purpose had been killed in the House committee by lies
against Colonel Fremont.
Polk Avas much perturbed by this letter and sought advice
from his cabinet as to the best means of counteracting its influ-
ence. Without admitting that the governments established in
the new territories had ''been void from the beginning" he was
aware that the military governments had "ceased to exist" and
that "the Executive had no authority to organize a civil Govern-
ment over them." Benton's "extraordinary letter," he told the
cabinet, had been sent to California
by Col. Fremont, the son-in-law of the writer, an<l the inference is plain
enough that he means they shall make Col. Fremont the Governor of the
Independent Government they shall form. Indeed 1 think it pretty (dear
that this was the main object.
He believed that the Secretary of State should infoi-m the Cali-
fornians, by letter, that the President would urge Congress to
61 "The edicts promulgated by your temporary Governors (Kearny
and Mason, each an ignoramous) so far as these edicts went to change the
laws of the lan<l, arc null and void, and were so from the beginning. . . .
"Having no lawful government, nor lawful ofiicers, you can have none
that can have authority over you except by your own consent. Its sanc-
tion must be in the will of the majority" (Benton to the People of Cali-
fornia, Aug. 27, 1848. Printed in Nile's' Beg., LXXIV, 244. Also in AJta
California, Jan. 11, 1849).
SLAFEEY AND TEBBITOBIAL GOVERNMENTS 645
frame a governmezit for them, and that they "need not be de-
ceived by the semi-official and officious proclamation of Senator
Benton. ' '"- A few days later the matter was again brought before
the cabinet, and the more the subject was discussed the greater
number of legal difficulties did it present. Polk thought it
probable that the military government in California was still
"a Government de facto," yet he was not certain that the Presi-
dent could enforce obedience to it. Touey, the Attorney General,
thought that "the sovereignty of the territory rested in the
people, and that they could, in the absence of the action of
Congress, govern themselves as they chose. ' ' Mason and Walker
believed that the sovereignty rested with the people of the United
States and that Toucy's view would permit even the establish-
ment of a monarchy. ' ' I stated, ' ' wrote Polk,
that it was a subject which from its novelty was surrounded with many
difficulties, but I thought instructions could be prepared which would avoid
the decision of any abstract, doubtful question.
He instructed Buchanan to tell the people that they had no
right, under the Constitution, to abrogate their de facto govern-
ment and form one of their own. These views were embodied
in a letter written by the Secretary of State and intrusted to
"William V. Voorhies, who was about to set out for California in
the capacity of postal agent for that territory."^
The election of a Whig President made Polk more anxious
than ever for an adjustment of the territorial question during
his own term of office. His fourth annual message contained
an urgent plea for the immediate establishment of civil govern-
ments in New Mexico and California. The reasons for the failure
to do this at the last session, he said, "are well known and deeply
to be regretted," and it would be irrational further to agitate a
domestic question which is coeval with the existence of the
government itself.
62 Polk, Diary, IV, 135-138.
63 Ihid., 140-143. Buchanan to Voorhies (Buchanan, Worls, VIII, 211-
215).
6i6 JAMES K. POLK
In the eyes of the worhl and of posterity how trivial and insignificant
will be all our internal divisions and struggles compared with the preserva-
tion of this Union of the States in all its vigor and with all its countless
blessings! No patriot would foment and excite geographical and sec-
tional divisions. No lover of his country would deliberately calculate
the value of the Union.
Although a staunch Union man, the President's conception of
the rights of a slaveholder in the territories was quite as south-
ern as that of Calhoun himself. The people of every state, he
told Congress, had helped to conduct the war, consequently "it
would not be just for any one section to exclude another from
all participation in tlie acquired territory." Whether slavery
would enter these territories, even if left to the slaveholding
states, was believed, he said, to be rather abstract than practical ;
but however that might me, "the quesion, involving, as it does
a principle of equality of rights of the separate and several
States as equal copartners in the Confederacy, should not be
disregarded. ' '
His views on the constitutional aspects of the question were
quite as southern as those on the political side. The Constitu-
tion, he pointed out, had imposed upon Congress no duty to
legislate on the subject of slavery in the territories, "while their
power to do so is not only seriously questioned, but denied by
many of the soundest expounders of that instrument."
Considering the several States and the citizens of the several States
as equals and entitled to equal rights under the Constitution, if this were
an original question it might well be insisted on that the principle of
non-interference is the true doctrine and that Congress could not, in the
absence of any express grant of power, interfere with their relative rights.
Since Congress, however, had, when dealing with previously ac-
quired territory, divided the area between slavery and freedom,
he was in favor of adjusting the present dispute in a similar
manner, but if
Congress shall now reverse the decision by which the Missouri compromise
was effected, and shall propose to extend the restriction over the whole
territory, south as well as north of the parallel 36° 30', it will cease to be
a compromise, and must be regarded as an original question.
SLAVERY AND TEKBITOlllAL GOFEENMENTS 647
After this implied threat to veto any bill for i)rohibitiiig slavery
south of 36° 30', he expresesd a willingness to accept an exten-
sion of the compromise line, the policy of letting the people decide
for themselves, or the submission of the whole subject to the
decision of the courts."*
If the President had entertained hopes that his message would
arouse Congress to take action, they seem to have vanished soon
after his recommendations had been submitted. In less than a
week he expressed to the cabinet a fear that Congress would do
nothing and that California would establish an independent
government and be lost to the Union. The rapid influx of popu-
lation would make the demand for civil government imperative,
and he believed that "the leading Federalists (alias Whigs)
would be glad to avail themselves of the opportunity to give up
the country for the purpose of relieving Gen'l Taylor of his
embarrassments upon the Wilmot Proviso." This party, he
said, had always opposed expansion, and had combated the pur-
chase of Louisiana with as much vigor as they had opposed the
present acquisition. Although the prospect seemed discouraging,
he urged the members of the cabinet to use their influence with
their friends in Congress. "It is, " said he, ' ' a question of rising
above ordinary considerations. We have a country to serve as
well as a party to obey. "•'^
Even though the President was ready to go nearly as far as
Calhoun in defending "southern rights," apparently his atti-
tude w^as not prompted by an interest in slavery per se. He was
willing — even anxious — to admit California immediately as a
state, although there was every probability that slavery would
be prohibited by its constitution. '''' On December 11, Douglas
64 Kiehardson, Messages, IV, 640-642.
65 Polk, Diary, IV, 231-233.
66 Indeed, if newspapers may be taken as an index of public opinion,
it was certain that slavery would be excluded, for the only two journals
in California were emphatic on this point. The California Star of March
2.5, 1848, asserted that ninety-nine hundredths of the population opposed
the imposition of "this blight" upon the territory, and the "simple recog-
nition of slavery here ' ' would be a greater misfortune than to remain in
648 JAMES K. POLK
had introduced in the Senate a bill for admitting both territories
as one state, but Polk believed the area to be too large and the
settlements too scattered for a single government. He summoned
Douglas and advised the admission of California as a state, and
the creation of a government for New Mexico by a separate bill.
Douglas approved this policy, but Calhoun, when consulted, re-
fused to commit himself. On that very day, however, the House
by a considerable majority voted its approval of the Wilmot
proviso, some of the Democrats reversing the votes which they
had east during the preceding session. Polk now saw no hope
of an adjustment except, possibly, the admission of the whole
territory as a state under the bill offered by Douglas."'"
Not content with approving the Wilmot proviso the House, on
December 21, instructed its committee to bring in a bill for
abolishing the slave trade in the District of Columbia. South-
ern members were much excited and took immediate steps to
arrange for a caucus. When informed of this fact, Polk declared
slavery agitation to be "a mere political question on Avhich
demagogues & ambitious politicians hope to promote their own
prospect for political promotion. ' ' About seventy members, both
Democrats and Whigs, attended the caucus, and, after appoint-
ing a committee to prepare an address to be sent to southern
states if the anti-slave-trade bill should be pressed, it adjourned
to meet at a later date.*'^
In another effort to procure some positive action, tlie President
sent for Senator Butler, of South Carolina, chairman of the
Judiciary Committee to which the Douglas bill had been referred.
He told Butler that no territorial bill which did not include the
Wilmot proviso could pass the House, and that if such a bill
the present state of disaster. The Calif ornian of October 11 was certain
that the people preferred to remain as they were rather than have * ' this
bliirhting curse" put upon them. On December 1.3 Benton presented in
the Senate a petition from a New Mexico convention which asked Consjress
to protect the people there from the introduction of slavery {Cong. Globe,
30 Cong., 2 sess., ,3.3).
07 Polk, Diary, IV, 232-235. es Jhid., 248-253.
SLAVERY AND TEBBITOBIAL GOVERNMENTS 649
should pass both houses he would be compelled to veto it. The
only way to save California was to admit her as a state ; he
therefore asked Butler's aid in bringing this about. Like Cal-
houn, Butler left the President in doubt as to what he would do.
Polk then sent for Douglas who, after considerable persuasion,
agreed to alter his bill so that California might be admitted
and a territorial government be provided for New Mexico.*"*
The adjourned meeting of the southern caucus was scheduled
for January 15, 1849, and on the fourtheenth Polk held a con-
sultation with several of the southern leaders. They told, him
that the address to southern states, which Calhoun had prepared,
was of such a nature that neither they nor their friends could
sign it. The President approved their decision, for he thought
that such an address would be mischievous. When nearly all
of the Whigs and many of the Democrats who attended the caucus
declined to sign Calhoun's address, it was returned to the com-
mittee for report at a future meeting. On the following day
Calhoun called on the President and said that the South could
no longer delay in resisting the aggressions of the North upon
its rights. Polk advised the admission of California and spoke
with approval of a plan suggested by Douglas for joining to
Texas all of the remaining territory south of 36° 30'. When
Calhoun opposed every suggestion and declined to offer a solu-
tion of his own Polk became convinced that the Senator did not
desire an amicable adjustment. "I was firm and decided," said
he, ''in my conversation with him, intending to let him under-
stand distinctly that I gave no countenance to any movement
which tended to violence or the disunion of the States."'"
The President had come to distrust Calhoun thoroughly and
to believe that he compassed a dissolution of the Union. This
opinion of the Senator is made very clear in the report of a
conversation held with Representative Stanton, of Tennessee,
who approved the address to southern states. After urging the
C9 Ibid.. 253-255, 257. to ibid., 284-288.
650 JAMES K. POLK
admission of California, Polk told Stanton that meetings and
addresses would weaken the South and add to the strength of
the northern abolitionists. A gathering of members from any
section quietly to discuss a political question was proper, but
I told him that I could not avoid the suspicion that there were two
or three individuals, perhaps not more than one (but I named no one
[Calhoun?]) who desired to have no set[t]lement of the question, but Avho
preferred a sectional excitement in the South & a dissolution. I set my
face against being involved in any such movement. I urged the necessity
and importance of going to work in earnest in Congress, and not in caucus,
to settle the question. I told him it was time enough to think of extreme
measures when they became inevitable, and that that period had not
come. I told him that the people everywhere were devoted to the Union,
and that it would be a heavy responsibility if Southern members of
Congress should prevent an adjustment of the slavery question by meet-
ing in caucus & publishing addresses, instead of meeting in Congress, where
their constituents had deputed them to act. He seemed surprised at
these views. I told him I was a Southern man, and as much attached
to Southern rights as any man in Congress, but I was in favor of vindi-
cating and maintaining these rights by constitutional means; and that
no such extreme case had arisen as would justify a resort to any other
means; that when such a case should arise (if ever) it would be time
enough to consider what should be done.'i'i
Hopes and fears alternated in the President's mind as daily
reports came to him of the debates in Congress on the admission
of California. At a cabinet meeting held on January 20 letters
received from Commodore Jones, Consul Larkin, and Paymaster
Rich were read and discussed. Each reported that, on account
of the gold rush, veritable anarchy prevailed and some form of
government should be established at once. Polk directed that
these letters be published in the Union in the hope that they
might influence Congress to pass the California bill. He feared,
however, that no bill could pass which did not include the Wilmot
proviso ; and he felt bound to veto any measure which prohibited
'■I Ibid., 289-291. Polk was not alone in believing that Calhoun wished
to disrupt the Union. "It is thought here," wrote Horace Mann, "by
many of the most intelligent men, that Mr. Calhoun is resolved on a dis-
solution of the Union" (Mann, Life of Horace Mann, 27.']).
SLAVEBY AND TEEBITOEIAL GOVERNMENTS 651
slavery south of 36° 30'. He desired the immediate admission of
California and thought that no southern man ought to object to
its admission, but he feared that southern extremists led by
Calhoun and northern extremists led by Hale and Giddings
would prevent an amicable settlement of the question. "I stated"
to the cabinet, was his comment, "that I put my face alike against
southern agitators and Northern fanatics, & should do every-
thing in my power to allay excitement by adjusting the question
of slavery & preserving the Union." Once more he exhorted
his cabinet advisors to use their influence -with members of Con-
gress. His efforts failed to prevent the caucus from adopting
Calhoun's address to the southern states, and he apprehended
further excitement as a result of this proceeding.'-
The southern Whigs were not ready for extreme measures.
This fact was shown by their support of an address presented
by Berrien at the southern caucus as a substitute for the one
drawn by Calhoun. On January 22 Tooms told Crittenden that
California could never be a "slave country" and that it ought to
be admitted as a state. "We have," he wrote, "only the point of
honor to serve, and this will serve it and rescue that country
from all danger of agitation."'^ Even some of the extreme ad-
vocates of the "peculiar institution" had little hope of install-
ing it in the new domain. For example, the IMobile Tribune said
that nothing could save the territories from becoming free states.
If necessary, it was prepared to defend by extreme measures
"our abstract right to a participation in them," yet it believed
that "the victory would be barren.""*
In order to facilitate matters and to avoid certain technical
difficulties, the Senate referred the California question to a
select committee of which Douglas was made chairman. On
January 29 he reported a bill by which California was to be
T2 Polk, Diary, IV, 296-299, 306.
"3 Coleman, Life of John J. Crittenden, I, 335.
74 Quoted in Niles' Reg., LXXV, 75.
652 JAMES K. POLK
admitted as a state and New Mexico given a territorial govern-
ment. In the evening he called to tell the President that he had
strong hopes of its passage. During the next few days Polk
conversed with various southern members and advised them to
support the bill, for, as he told them, this was the only way to
allay "geographical excitement" on the subject of slavery.'"
However, northern members attacked certain paragraphs in the
bill which purposed to extend laws of the United States to the
proposed state and territory. They charged that the committee
was attempting to introduce slavery into these communities by
a jugglery of words.
The end of the session was approaching and those who did
not approve the Douglas bill endeavored to prevent debate upon
it by urging the necessity of considering the general appropria-
tion bill. In this they were outgeneraled by "Walker, a "dough
face" from Wisconsin, who, after consultation with Foote, of
Mississippi, offered an amendment which joined the territorial
government bill, as a rider, to the appropriation bill. By this
amendment tlie Constitution of the United States and certain
specified laws were extended to the territories, and the President
was given wide discretion in selecting the laws and regulations
to be enforced.'^" The introduction of the "Walker amendment
gave rise to an animated debate on constitutional points, and
Webster and Calhoun took leading parts. It is unnecessary here
to follow this debate, yet it may be said that northern members
considered the amendment to be an instrument for smuggling
slaver}^ into the territories through executive action and judicial
interpretation. Their charges to this effect had more real founda-
tion than those of similar purport already brought against the
Douglas bill. There was a momentary excitement among Demo-
crats due to a rumor that Free Soilers and Whigs had planned
to attach the Wilmot proviso to the Walker amendment and
'-"Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 sess., 381. Polk, Diary, IV, 312-313, 316.
■!'■ Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 seas., 561.
SLAVEBY AND TEEEITOBIAL GOVEENMENTS 653
thereby to force the President either to accept the proviso or to
veto the entire appropriation bill. When informed of this rumor
by Venable, of North Carolina, Polk announced that he would
veto an application of the proviso to territory south of 36° 30',
no matter in what form it might be presented to him. In a
slightly altered form, the Walker amendment was passed by a
bare majority of the Senate on February 26; on the following
day, by a vote of 126 to 87, the House passed its own bill by
which slavery was excluded from the territories.
Only a few more days of the session remained and nothing
short of a miracle seemed likely to break the deadlock of the
two houses ; and unless some adjustment could be made the gov-
ernment would be left without funds. On March 2 the House
rejected the Walker amendment, and on the next day — the last
of the session — a conference committee of the two houses reported
its inability to agree upon any plan of settlement. The appro-
priation bill would now be lost unless the Senate should consent
to eliminate the Walker amendment. Officially, the session ex-
pired at twelve o'clock on March 3, but the Senate indulged in
a heated debate — even fist-fights" — until daybreak on March 4
without coming to an agreement. Hunter, of Virginia, was ready
to let the government go without funds rather than sacrifice
southern rights, while Douglas believed a government for Cali-
fornia to be more important than either.
Polk had come to the capitol armed with a message with
which he intended to veto the Wilmot proviso if it should be
attached to the Walker amendment. Late at night he was told
that the House had voted to amend the Walker amendment by
a provision which declared the laws of Mexico to be in force
until altered by Congress. The effect of this provision, as Polk
at once saw, would be to sanction the law by which Mexico had
abolished slavery. Buchanan, Walker, Marcy, and Toucy
advised him to sign the bill if it should be presented in this
77 Mann, Life of Horace Mann, 277.
654 JAMES K. POLK
form. "They drew a distinction, which I did not perceive,"
wrote the President, "between the amendment in this form and
the Wihnot Proviso." Mason, on the contrary, advised him to
veto the bill, while Johnson thought that he had no right to
take any action, since his term of office had expired. ]\Iembers
of Congress came to the President in excitement and asked him
to veto any bill containing the House provision. After telling
them that he had already decided to do so he began to alter his
veto message so as to meet the new situation. ' ' It was a moment
of high responsibility, ' ' says the Diary, ' ' perhaps the highest of
my official term. I felt the weight most sensibly, but resolved to
pursue the dictates of my own best judgement and to do my
duty." About four o'clock in the morning he retired to his hotel,
and two hours later he was aroused by a committee from the
two houses of Congress. Having reported that both the Walker
amendment and the House provision had been eliminated, the
committee presented for his signature a simple appropriation
bill and another for extending federal revenue laws over Cali-
fornia. He signed these, although he had some doubt that he
was still President of the United States; the appropriations
were saved, but California and New Mexico were still without
governments.'^^
As a believer in territorial expansion, if for no other reason,
Polk was sorely disappointed because Congress had not given
governments to these territories, for apparently he fully believed
that the Whigs would acquiesce in their separation from the
United States. He had some reason for this belief, although it
is evident that he attached too much importance to statenu-nts
made by certain members of this party. For example, wlicn lie
asked Senator Clarke, of Rhode Island, to save California to the
Union by supporting the bill for admitting her as a state, the
Senator replied with indifference : "Let her go." In the House,
Alexander H. Stephens tried to block tlie payments to Mexico for
'8 Polk, Diary, IV, 362-369. Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 sess., 682-698.
SLAVEEY AND TEllRITOBIAL GOVEBNMENTS 655
the territories, and when Buchanan remonstrated with him he
answered that he was opposed to retaining those lands. '^^ Polk
was disposed to accept these utterances as indicative of the Whig
policy because, as he said, the "Federalists" had always been
averse to expansion. As if to cap the climax, Taylor, as the
two men rode together in the inaugural procession, stated his
belief that Oregon and Califonia were too far distant to become
members of the Union and that it would be better for them to
form an independent government of their own. Doubtless Polk
was not surprised to hear these remarks from the Whig leader,
nevertheless he thought that they were "alarming opinions to
be entertained by the President of the U. S. " and he hoped that
they had not been well considered.
Gen'l Taylor is, I have no doubt, a well meaning old man. He is, however,
exceedingly ignorant of public affairs, and, I should judge, of very ordinary
capacity. He will be in the hands of others, and must rely wholly upon
his Cabinet to administer the Government. so
Such was his opinion of a successor whom he had never met until
a few days before this. He did not foresee that Taylor would
develop very decided views on the territorial question and that
he would, in effect, adopt Polk's own latest policy of having both
California and New Mexico admitted as states.
79 Polk, Diary, IV, 294, 300.
so Ibid., 37.5-376. Taylor's attitude toward California was not new.
He had opposed the acquisition of this counti-y while he was' fighting in
Mexico (Taylor to Wood, Aug. 23, 1846, Taylor Letters, 49).
CHAPTEE XXIII
TARIFF, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, AND THE
INDEPENDENT TREASURY
Throughout his political career Polk had been a consistent
opponent of protective tariff, and of internal improvements
undertaken by the federal government. He believed the so-called
"American Sj^stem" to be decidedly un-American — a breeder
of extravagance and a menace to the constitutional rights of the
states. Entering Congress at the same time that John Quincy
Adams became President, he took a vigorous stand against that
administration, particularly against its advocacy of internal im-
provements. His views on this subject, as well as on others,
accorded with those of General Jackson with whom he main-
tained an intimate correspondence.^
In his first annual message, Jackson stated his opinions con-
cerning both tariff and internal improvements. He regretted
that nations did not, by common consent, see fit to abolish all
trade restrictions ; as they did not, he was in favor of adjusting
the tariff in a "manner best calculated to avoid serious injury
and to harmonize the conflicting interests of our agriculture, our
commerce, and our manufactures." He urged that the public
debt be extinguished at the earliest possible date and that all
revenue not otherwise needed be applied to this purpose. As
there seemed likely to be a permanent surplus revenue after the
national debt had been paid he was in favor of distributing this
among the states, since internal improvements undertaken by
1 In a letter to Polk, Jackson, after expressing friendship for and
approval of Polk, stated that "1 am sure the general government has no
right to make internal inij)rovements within a state, without its consent
first had & obtained" (Jackson to Polk, Dec. 4, 1826, Polk Papers).
TABIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 657
the federal goverument were considered to be both inexpedient
and unconstitutional. All loyal adherents of the President ac-
cepted this announcement as the party program.
Polk's utterances in Congi'css at this time were in full accord
with Jackson's message. On December 30, when the House was
discussing the expediency of distributing among the states the
proceeds from the sale of public lands, he opposed such a dis-
tribution as premature, since the public debt had not yet been
paid. After it had been paid, he favored distributing the sur-
plus among the states rather than have Congress spend it on
public improvements.- When discussing the Maysville road bill,
which Jackson vetoed later, Polk expressed himself as ' ' opposed
altogether to this system of appropriations for sectional pur-
poses. " He " conceived these applications to be most pernicious
in their tendencies, and unconstitutional in principle." The
country, he said, "looked to the present Executive for the
adoption of a system of economy and retrenchment," a system
entirely out of harmony with the purposes of this bill. During
the same session a proposal to allow a draw^back on rum made
from imported molasses gave him a chance to assert that he Avas
"upon principle opposed to the whole system of the protecting
policy called tariff. ' '^
Always an advocate of strict economy, Polk, while a member
of congress, did not hesitate to apply this rule to small as well
as to large expenditures. At the risk of being considered "un-
gracious" he opposed, in 1831, a resolution for giving thirty
cords of wood to the suffering poor of Georgetown. The fact
that Congress was the legislature of the District of Columbia did
not, in his opinion, entitle it to give the national revenue to the
inhabitants. Should it adopt such a practice "the poor of the
other sections of the country had nothing to do but to come and
sit down here, in this District, and apply to Congress for relief."
The resolution was passed, but a year later he succeeded in
2 Ahridg. of Deb., X, 594. s ibid., 677-678, XI, 67.
658 JAMES E. POLK
defeating a semi-philanthropic project to pay forty thousand
dollars to certain persons for giving instruction in silk culture.
It was absurd, said he, to appropriate public money for such
purposes.*
In 1832 Polk was made chairman of the Committee of "Ways
and Means. In this position his most difficult task was the man-
agement of Jackson's war on the bank, but he had also to super-
vise all questions of finance. His attempts to enforce economy
very naturally led his opponents to charge him with arbitrary
conduct. In 1834 Adams accused him of attempting to force
the general appropriation bill through without adequate discus-
sion, while Lincoln, of Massachusetts, charged him wdth trying
to starve the opposition into submission.-^ Criticism did not
deter him ; he persisted in his opposition to unnecessary appro-
priations and in many cases was able to carry his point. For
example, he advocated, and successfully carried, a reduction in
the appropriation for the Cumberland road from $652,00 to
$300,000." This Avas a triumph for economy, and a damper on
internal improvements as well.
As early as 1832 Clay became interested in a scheme to dis-
tribute among the states the proceeds from the sale of public
lands. Successive bills to effect his purpose met with disaster —
one by the President's veto — and during the session of 1835-
1836 another distribution bill was introduced. It passed the
Senate and was brought up in the House on June 7, 1836. A
motion made to refer it to the Committee of the Whole for dis-
cussion received a vote of 97 to 96. Polk, who was then Speaker
of the House, added his vote to the minority and prevented a
4 Ibid., XI, 306-307, 691-693.
5 "The chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means," said Lincoln
on April 25, 1834, "came into this House when we had got only to the
45th line of this bill, with the declaration that he was determined to press
this bill through before the House adjourned. We were in consequence
kept here eight or nine hours without refreshment, and exhausted by the
fruitless efforts of the honorable chairman to accomplish his purpose."
0 Cong. Globe, 23 Cong., 1 sess., 340, 347, 461.
TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 659
reference to the committee.^ This particular measure was laid
ou the table. Another bill was introduced in the House which,
instead of giving the surplus to the states, proposed to "deposit"
it with them subject to recall. It passed both houses in this
form, and while everybody knew that in all probability the money
would never be recalled, the modification satisfied Jackson's
scruples sufficiently to enable him to affix his signature. The
money was to be deposited in four installments, beginning on
January 1, 1837.
The panic of 1837 which paralyzed all business activities
soon after Van Buren's inauguration transformed the surplus
into a deficit and created a demand for legislation to replenish
and to safeguard the national treasury. The Whigs very natu-
rally advocated a restoration of the Bank of the United States,
but the Democrats, quite as naturally, could not think of re-
habilitating the "monster" which they had so recently and so
thoroughly crushed. Neither could the latter party rely any
longer on "pet banks," for these too had gone down in the
general crash.
On May 15 Van Buren issued his proclamation, summoning
Congress to meet in extra session on the first Monday in Septem-
ber. It convened on the appointed day and, on the first ballot,
Polk was reelected Speaker over his Whig rival, John Bell. In
the message which was submitted on September 5 the President,
after calling attention to the financial distress of the nation,
recommended legislation designed to separate government finances
from all banks and to make the government the custodian of its
own funds. The plan which he proposed was known officially
as the "independent treasury," but it was more frequently
called the "sub-treasury." Despite the vociferation against the
continuance of the policy inaugurated by Jackson 's ' ' specie cir-
cular," the President boldly insisted that government finances
T This was a power of which a Speaker "rarely, if ever, avails him-
self," said the National Intelligencer, June 9, 1836, in criticizing his act.
660 JAMES K. POLE
sliould be conducted on a hard money basis. Nearly a month
before this message was submitted to Congress, General Jackson
learned of the recommendations which Van Buren intended to
make, and his approval is thus expresesd in a letter written to
Polk :
I have rec 'd lately some very pleasant information from the city — all
is harmony and the object of the Executive is, or will be, to separate the
Government from all Banks — collect & disburse the revenues by its own
agents, — receipts of all public dues in gold & silver coin, leaving the
Banks & the commercial community to manage their transactions in their
own way.s
Polk, like Jackson, approved the sub-treasury plan ; on the
other hand, it met with opposition even among Democrats in
Tennessee.^ Judge Catron believed that the government should
be the custodian of its own money, for, ' ' I care not what private
Banks you put it into, it will convert the keepers into Federalists
in principle & practice in a few years" ;^'' but his solution of the
financial depression was a large emission of paper money. In
the letter just quoted, he stated that a "Treasury circulation
must be adopted," and, after reading Van Buren 's message, he
pronounced the President's recommendations "sound in prin-
ciple, but hardly possible in practice." The people, said he,
are governed by habit and want paper money. They would not
be able to understand Van Buren 's plan, and the "party will go
down with it." A few weeks later he urged Polk to
8 Jackson to Polk, Aug. 6, 18.37, Poll- Papers.
9 In a letter, August 7, informing Polk of his overwhelming defeat in
his race for Congress, W. C. Dunlap stat«d that every candidate for the
state legislature favored some kind of a federal bank. James Walker in
a letter to Polk, August 27, stated that should the administration adopt
the sub-treasury plan it would find itself in a minority in Tennessee (both
letters in Polk Papers).
10 "The treasury," he continued, "dare not pass from the majority,
without power passing with it — the Treasury is the arm of power, as much
in this Gov't as in any on Earth; the placing it in private hands, is to
raise up a rival power in the place of the ))0])ular will — of numbers, whitdi
will govern in fact, in Congress, & out of it, by sops. ' '
TABIFF AND INTERNAL IMPBOVEMENTS 661
Strike boldly — it is your habit, & the iiieaus of your elevation; it is
expected of you. Go for 30 or 40 millions, to be circulated fast as may
be by the Govt — go for 20ties & over in gradations of tens. Strike out
the interest feature — boldly declare that the farmers will hoard the notes
bearing 5 per cent.n
Polk did not adopt Catron's advice to strike out boldly for paper
money. He agreed with Jackson and Van Buren in supporting
a hard money policy, although his position as Speaker prevented
him from taking an active part in the House debates. At its
session of 1837-38 the Tennessee legislature instructed her
United States Senators to vote against the sub-treasury bill ; and
Cave Johnson reported that although he was heartily in favor
of the measure, the people did not understand the new financial
plan and consequently were opposed to it.^^
At the extra session of Congress a bill to create an inde-
pendent treasury was introduced by Silas Wright, a close friend
of the President ; it passed that body by a small majority, despite
the vigorous opposition of both Webster and Clay. In the House
it was laid on the table by the combined votes of Whigs and con-
servatives. Nothing was done to relieve the financial situation
except to postpone payment of the fourth installment under the
distribution act and to authorize the emission of $10,000,000 in
treasury notes to meet the present emergency. Van Buren
renewed his recommendation, and at both regular sessions of
the twenty-fifth Congress an independent treasury bill was intro-
duced, but each time the plan was rejected. Not even a letter
from "Old Hickory" in which he admitted the iniquity of the
"pet banks" that he had selected as repositories and commended
Van Buren 's plan, had weight enough to influence the vote.^^
With this Congress Polk closed his career as a legislator. He
was fully in sympathy with the financial policy of the adminis-
tration although, as he said in his farewell address, "a sense of
11 Catron to Polk, Sept. 2, Sept. 10, Sept. 27, 1837, Poll: Papers.
12 James Walker to Polk, Jan. 25, 1838; Cave Johnson to Polk, March
25, 1838, PoR- Papers.
13 Jackson to Moses Dawson, Dec. 17, 1837 {Niles' Beg., LIII, 314-315).
662 JAMES K. POLK
propriety" had precluded him from taking part in the debates.
The fact that he had once supported Jackson's state bank policy
and now favored a divorce from all banks subjected him to
severe criticism from opposition members of the House. Williams,
of Tennessee, quoted a speech made by Polk during the session
of 1834—35 as the best argument that could be made in favor of
employing state banks and against such a fiscal agent as the
independent treasury. ^^ After Polk had left Congress to become
governor of Tennessee the independent treasury bill (but not
under that name) passed both houses of the twenty-sixth Con-
gress, only to be repealed by the victorious Whigs at the first
session of the Harrison-Tyler administration.
We have noted elsewhere that Polk's "Address to the People"
by which he opened his canvass for the governorship of Tennessee
dealt principally with national issues. It was an able state
paper^' and, among other things, expressed his views on the
"American System" and the independent treasury. One result
of protective tariif, he said,
was to take the property of one man and give it to another, without right
or consideration. It was to depreciate the value of the productive industry
of one section of the Union and transfer it to another — it was to make the
rich richer and the poor poorer.
Another result of protection was the accumulation of unneces-
sary funds in the national treasury, and means had to be devised
to get rid of the money without low^ering the tariff. ' ' This plan
was soon found in an unconstitutional and gigantic system of
internal improvements," and these were parceled out among
communities where the tariff politicians hoped to get votes.
14 "But all must now be abandoned," said Williams, "for the sub-
Treasury scheme, even at the expense of a political somerset. What, Mr.
Chairman, is this much-talked-of Sub-Treasury bill? It is sinijdy to sub-
stitute individuals in the place of banks as the fiscal agents of the Gov-
ernment. I propose to adopt as my own Mr. Polk's speech, delivered at
the session of 1834-5, against this change. It is an excellent argument;
I cannot better it; let it speak for itself" (Cong. Globe (Feb. 22, 1839),
25 Cong., 3 sess., App., 372).
1'' See page 143 and note.
TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 663
The assumption and exercise of the power, by Federal authority, to
construct works of internal improvement within the States, constituted
an essential branch of the system of which Mr. Clay was the reputed
father and head, and to which the popular but false name of the "Amer-
ican System ' ' was given. It was an essential branch of the falsely called
' ' American System, ' ' because it was the great absorbent, the sponge
which was to suck in and consume the excessive, unequal, unjust and
oppressive exactions upon the people, and especially upon the people of
the planting States, levied by a high protective tariff. High, unnecessary
and oppressive taxes, levied by a high protective tariff — lavish and
wasteful expenditures of the surplus money, by a gigantic system of
internal improvement, and high prices of public lands, that emigration
to the west might be checked — the laboring poor retained in the manu-
facturing districts, in a state of dependence on their richer neighbors
in whose employment they were, constituted Mr. Clay's far famed and
miscalled ' ' American System. ' '
The United States Bank, said he, was closely allied to the
American System. By use of it "Federalism" saw the means,
under another party name, to accomplish the "dangerous pur-
poses" of Alexander Hamilton — "extending the power and
patronage of the General Government, [and] corrupting the
sources of Legislation." Banks, both federal and state, had
"proved to be faithless fiscal agents," and therefore he now
advocated the adoption by law of the independent treasury
plan.^*'
With the bank controversy of the Tyler administration which
followed the repeal of the independent treasury act, Polk had
nothing to do. His friend Catron still retained his belief in the
virtue of paper money and thought that the Democratic party
could regain control if it would take a stand in favor of some
sort of a bank — something like the one proposed by Tyler, which
would issue paper currency. The party, said he, could not hope
to win by simply "offering nothing," and the sub-treasury had
always been ' ' an absurd shadow " ; in addition, ' ' the hard money
plan is a theory — & deemed a feeble & exploded theory, by the
people."^" Uninfluenced by Catron's arguments, Polk held
16 Copy in pamphlet form in Polk Papers.
17 Catron to Polk, Jan. 2, 1842, Polk Papers.
664 JAMES E. POLE
fast to his orthodox opinions. This fact is evidenced by his reply
to a series of questions propounded by a group of persons in
Memphis during his campaign for governor in 1843. He was in
favor, he told them, of a sub-treasury and of metal money,
although he did not object to a limited amount of paper cur-
rency if issued by state banks. He was in favor, also, of a
"moderate tariff," but for revenue purposes only.^^
The Democratic platform of 1844 said nothing about tariff,
except to reaffirm the very general plank in the platform of
1840 ; nevertheless this subject formed one of the issues of the
campaign. The compromise tariff arranged by Clay and Cal-
houn in 1833 as a settlement of the nullification trouble pro-
vided for biennial reductions until 1842, after which it was to
remain at a uniform rate of 20 per cent. In 1842, however, just
as this rate was about to go into operation, a new act was passed
which abandoned the Democratic revenue basis and fixed the
rates in accordance with the Whig policy of protection. In addi-
tion to protective tariff, the Whigs desired to enact Clay's pet
measure of distributing among the states the money derived
from the sale of public lands, but Tyler blocked this by insisting
upon retaining the so-called safety-valve proviso which had been
incorporated into the distribution law passed during the extra
session of 1841.^'' It was well known that a revival of the policy
of distribution and internal improvements would follow Whig
success in 1844, consequently the Democrats, in the Baltimore
platform, declared distribution to be both inexpedient and uncon-
stitutional and reaffirmed the declaration of 1840 against internal
improvements.
Absence of any new tariff plank in the Democratic ])latfonu
made it desirable for the candidate, Polk, to declare his views
on the subject, and such a declaration was made in the "Kane
letter" of June 19, 1844. As noted elsewhere, he expressed his
isEeply dated May 15, 1843. Printed in Nashville Union. June 2, 184:5.
m This'safety-valve provided that distribution should cease whenever
the rate sliould be raised above 20 per cent.
TAEIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 665
belief in revenue tariff, sufficient "to defray the expenses of
the Government economically administered." In adjusting it,
he believed in shaping the revenue laws so as to afford just pro-
tection to the interests of the whole Union, "embracing agri-
culture, manufactures, the mechanic arts, commerce and navi-
gation." In other M^ords, he adhered to the historic doctrines
of his party — tariff for revenue, with incidental protection. To
be sure, Cameron and others may have tortured this letter into a
promise of protective tariff in order to delude Pennsylvanians
and other tariff Democrats, but nothing in the Kane letter itself
warranted such a construction.
In his inaugural address President Polk reiterated his well-
known views on the tariff. After quoting from his ' ' Kane letter ' '
he stated that, when levying duties, revenue should be the object
and protection the incident :
To reverse this principle and make protection the object and revenue
the incident would be to inflict manifest injustice upon all other than
protected interests. In levying duties for revenue it is doubtless proper to
make such discriminations within the revenue principle as will afford
incidental protection to our home interests. Within the revenue limit
there is a discretion to discriminate; beyond that limit the rightful exercise
of the power is not conceded.
Soon after he had taken the oath of office, he announced to
George Bancroft "the four great measures" of his administra-
tion : first on the list came the reduction of the tariff ; and
second, the reestablishment of the independent treasury."" Since
Congress does not convene until December, his attention was
first of all directed to foreign affairs ; he did not, however, lose
interest in these party measures, even in the midst of foreign
complications.
As early as October the President began to draft the part
of his annual message relating to the tariff and the ' ' Constitu-
tional Treasury" as he preferred to designate what others called
the independent or sub-treasury. His draft when submitted to
20 See Schouler, History of the United States, IV, 498.
66Q JAMES K. POLK
the cabinet was approved by all except Buchanan. The Secre-
tary of State approved the recommendation to abolish the
"minimum principle" and, in general, that of substituting ad
valorem for specific duties, but thought that specific duties should
be retained on certain articles such as iron, coal, and sugar.-^
Polk agreed to consider Buchanan's suggestions, but eventually
he decided not to follow them.
As submitted to Congress on December 2, 1845, the message
invited the attention of that body to "the importance of making
suitable modifications and reductions" in the existing tariff
rates. All duties, he said, should be kept within a "revenue
standard," consequently it was necessary to understand dis-
tinctly what was meant by that term. By specific illustrations
he showed that revenue diminished or ceased after a certain rate
had been reached, and the point at which it began to diminish
was the maximum limit of the revenue standard. No rate should
go beyond this point, and all duties within the revenue standard
should be no higher than the expenses of the government should
make necessary. Rates need not be uniform, for discrimination
within the revenue standard was permissible, but such discrimin-
ation must be for the general welfare and not in favor of a
particular industry or section.
The tariff of 1842, he told Congress, violated the cardinal
principles which he had laid down, because its object had been
"protection merely" and not revenue. Its use of "minimums,
or assumed and false values" and the imposition of specific
duties had benefitted the rich and worked injustice to the poor.
Such abuses should be remedied, and
I recommend to Congress the abolition of the niininmm ]u-iucij>le, or
assumed, arbitrary, and false values, and of specific duties, and the
substitution in their place of ad valorem duties as the fairest and most
equitable indirect tax which can be imposed. By the ad valorem principle
all articles are taxed according to their cost or value, and those which
are of inferior quality or of small cost bear only the just proportion of the
21 Polk, Diary, I, 85.
TABIFF AND INTEBNAL IMPROVEMENTS, 667
tax with those which are of superior quality or greater cost. The articles
consumed by all are taxed at the same rate. A system of ad valorem
revenue duties, with proper discriminations and proper guards against
frauds in collecting them, it is not doubted will afford ample incidental
advantages to the manufacturers and enable them to derive as great
profits as can be derived from any other regular business. It is believed
that such a system strictly within the revenue standard will place the
manufacturing interests on a stable footing and inure to their permanent
advantage, while it will as nearly as may be practicable extend to all
the great interests of the country the incidental protection whic*h can
be afforded by our revenue laws. Such a system, when once firmly
established, would be permanent, and not be subject to the constant com-
plaints, agitations, and changes which must ever occur when duties are
not laid for revenue, but for the "protection merely" of a favored
interest.
Attention was next directed to safe-guarding the government
funds after they had been collected. Banks, both national and
state, had, in his opinion, proved to be unworthy custodians;
besides the framers of the Constitution never intended that the
funds of the nation should be turned over to private corporations
to be used by them for profit and speculation. Believing that
government moneys should be completely separated from bank-
ing institutions, he recommended that "provision be made by
law for such separation, and that a constitutional treasury be
created for the safe-keeping of the public money." The money
of the people should be kept in the treasury of the people in the
custody of agents directly responsible to the government :
To say that the people or their Government are incompetent or not
to be trusted with the custody of their own money in their own Treasury,
provided by themselves, but must rely on the presidents, cashiers, and
stockholders of banking corporations, not appointed by them nor responsi-
ble to them, would be to concede that they are incapable of self-government.22
These two recommendations — for a revenue tariff and for a
constitutional treasury-— formed the keynote of Polk's domestic
policy. He may have been less brilliant than his illustrious
opponent, but few will now deny that he held sounder views on
Richardson, Message!^, IV, 40G-408.
668 JAMES K. FOLK
the industrial and the financial needs of the country. His policy
was simple and economically sound ; and because, under it, the
business of the country was, so far as possible, to be left free to
seek its natural channels, little positive legislation was required.
Clay, on the other hand, like Hamilton, reveled in thauraaturgy
and legerdemain. His system of a government bank, protective
duties, and the collection of revenue to be distributed among
the states, was highly artificial ; and even if they were not uncon-
stitutional, surely Polk was right in saying that they had never
been contemplated by the framers of that document.
So far as his own party was concerned the message was well
received. Cass told the President that in the part relating to
tariff "You have struck out the true doctrine, you have cut the
Gordian Knot." His tariff policy was, of course, highly ac-
ceptable to southern Democrats, and many of them called to
express their approbation. "We Pennsylvanians, " Cameron
told him, "may scratch a little about the tariff but we will not
quarrel about it"; Wilmot, on the other hand, remarked that
"the doctrines on the tariff were the true doctrines & he would
support them."-^ It was rumored that Secretary Walker had
written the paragraphs relating to the tariff, but Polk asserted
indignantly that "the tariff part of the message and every other
part of it is my own."-*
Without waiting to see whether the Van Buren independent
treasury would prove to be a success or a failure the triumphant
Whigs abolished it in 1841, but, nuich to their discomfiture,
Tyler blocked the reestablishment of the United States bank.
After the election of 1844 the Democrats carried through the
House a bill to revive the independent treasury, but as it failed
in the Senate the whole financial question went over to the Polk
administration. The new President, as we have seen, made it
one of his leading measures and recommended the establishment
23 Polk, Diary, I, 109-110. Cameron, despite his remark, opposed the
tariff bill when it came before the Senate.
2-t Ihid., 124.
TARIFF AND INTEENAL IMPROVEMENTS 669
of a ''constitntional treasury" which was simply another name
for the independent treasury. In following his advice it can
not be said that Congress actually created anything ; all that was
asked and all that was done was to authorize the executive to
collect the government revenues in gold and silver, and to deposit
them in the treasury vaults until disbursed in the course of ordi-
nary business transactions. Congress simply made the govern-
ment the custodian of its own funds instead of having them
deposited in banks. -^ When, therefore, on March 30, 1846,
Dromgoole, of Virginia, presented the bill which had been pre-
pared by the Committee of Ways and Means, the title merely
authorized the building of fireproof vaults for the safekeeping
of public money, which vaults were formally declared to be the
' ' Treasury of the United States. ' '-'' The requirement that metal
money alone should be received by the government was added
later in the form of an amendment.
Caleb Smith, of Indiana, at once opened the attack upon the
bill and offered an amendment, the gist of which was to author-
ize the Secretary of the Treasury to deposit government funds
in "any bank or banks which he may deem expedient, and also
to receive the Government dues in the paper of specie-paying
banks." As this amendment would nullify the main purpose of
the proposed law there was, of course, no prospect that it would
be adopted. It served, however, to make the issue definite, to
align on the one side those who believed in a government treasury
and hard money, and on the other, the friends of banks and
bank currency.
25 The same may be said of the Van Buren independent treasury.
26 "5e it enacted ^-c., That the rooms prepared and provided in the new
treasury building at the seat of Government for the use of the Treasurer
of the United States . . . and also the fireproof vaults and safes erected
in said rooms for the keeping of the public moneys in the possession, and
under the immediate control of said Treasurer of the United States; and
the said Treasurer of the United States shall keep the public moneys which
shall come into his hands in the Treasury of the United States as hereby
constituted, until the same shall be drawn therefrom according to law"
(Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 574).
670 JAMES E. POLK
Smith's arguments in opposition to the independent treasury
were not very convincing. He stated, erroneously, that the Demo-
crats had not made the subject an issue in the recent election ;
that Polk and other Democrats had once favored state banks ;
and that the Van Buren measure was a "miserable humbug"
which had never really been carried into effect. On the other
hand, Grider, of Kentucky, asserted that the sole purpose of
introducing the bill was to redeem party pledges, for he was
certain that many Democrats did not approve of "reckless
financial experiments." J. R. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, saw
nothing in the measure ' ' to commend it to respect ' ' ; besides,
everything contained in the bill was already covered by the law
of 1789 which had created the Treasury Department. In gen-
eral the arguments against the bill were so lacking in force —
and frequently in pertinence — that Daniel, of North Carolina,
had good reason for concluding that the Whigs themselves had
"the internal conviction" that much good would result from its
passage.
The Democrats had small need for arguments, as they were
certain that they could command the requisite number of votes.
They maintained with justice that a fiscal agent was superfluous,
and that the government was most competent to protect and dis-
burse its own funds. They ridiculed the assertion that the meas-
ure was a device to draw all metal money into the coffers of the
government, leaving the people with nothing but "rag money."
Dromgoole, who made the principal argument for the bill, denied
the charge of discriminating against banks, for, as he said, they
had no legitimate claim to the use of public money. On April 2,
after Dromgoole had added an amendment which required pay-
ments to the government to be made in gold and silver, the bill
passed the House by an overwhelming majority.-'
On the following day the bill was received by the Senate and
referred to the Committee on Finance. Nothing more was
2T 122 to 66 {Cong. Globe, 29 Coug., 1 sess., 595).
TAIUFF AND INTEENAL IMPIIOVEMENTS 671
heard of it until the twenty-second of April. On that date Web-
ster asked the chairman, Dixon H. Lewis, when it was likely to
be reported to the Senate and whether the connnittee had settled
upon any amendments. In response to this inquiry Lewis stated
tliat it was the intention of the committee to give precedence to
bills relating to warehousing and mints. This apparent indiffer-
ence to immediate action on one of the "leading" administra-
tion measures did not escape the watchful eye of the President.
He sent for Lewis and urged him to give precedence to this and
the tariff bill, as postponement might endanger their passage.
I then told him [said he] that I had great anxiety for the passage
of the Constitutional Treasury Bill and the reduction of the Tariff, which
I had recommended in my annual message. I told him that I considered
them as administration measures and that I intended to urge them upon
Congress as such, and that I considered the public good, as well as my own
power and the glory of my administration, depended in a great degree upon
my success in carrying them through Congress.
Lewis was an ardent supporter of Calhoun, and the President
embraced the opportunity to read him a lecture on the way
southern men were jeopardizing important measures by petty
opposition to the confirmation of northern appointments. North-
ern Senators, he said, had ratified appointments of southern
men, and there was no good reason why southern Senators should
not reciprocate. To Lewis's complaint that Colhoun and his
friends had been turned out of office, Polk replied that he had
made his appointments without reference to any aspirant for
the Presidency. Being "the first President who had taken bold
ground and fully satisfied the South on the tariff," he thought
men from that section ought "to cease their opposition upon these
small matters in which no principle was involved, for the sake
of enabling me to carry out the great measure which involved
principle. ' '"^
-^ Polk, Diary, I, 367-371. Polk believed that northern men attached
more importance to appointments than southern men did. "I reminded
him that Mr. Jefferson's plan was to conciliate the North by the dispen-
sation of his patronage, and to rely on the South to support his principles
for the sake of these principles."
672 JAMES E. POLE
Despite the President's anxiety the bill was held by the com-
mittee until the eighth of June. Lewis then reported it to the
Senate with sundry amendments, the most important of which
postponed for six months the operation of the specie clause.
After another period of slumber the measure was brought up for
consideration, and, after three days of debate, it was passed by
a small majority on August 1, the day after the President had
signed the tariff bill. The House concurred in the Senate amend-
ments, and the constitutional treasury bill became the law of
the land.
As early as January 9, 1846, the erratic McConnell, of Ala-
bama, asked leave to introduce a "bill to repeal the tariff of
1842, with all its iniquities," but not until April 14 did McKay,
of North Carolina, chairman of the Committee of Ways and
Means, report a revenue bill based on recommendations made by
the President and the Secretary of the Treasury. Under it, all
duties were to be ad valorem. Commodities were grouped in
schedules; those in the first group were to pay 100 per cent,
others 75, 30, 25, etc., until the free list was reached. It was by
no means a free-trade measure, yet it was attacked as such by
the advocates of protection. They seemed to regard the tariff
of 1842 as something sacred, something which could not be altered
Avithout prostrating industry and ruining the country. "We are
in one breath told," exclaimed Biggs, of North Carolina, "that
if you do not protect the manufacturers they must be prostrated ;
and in the next you are informed that by your protection you
diminish their profits.-"
Opponents of the measure denounced the ad valorem prin-
ciple and charged that it was an invitation to commit fraud in
valuation. They ridiculed the claim of the administration that
a lower tariff would produce more revenue. "We are called on
now," said Senator Evans, of Maine,
2«Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., ]022. He quoted from Clay (1833)
to the efifect that "In general it may be taken as a rule, that the duty
upon an article forms a portion of its price. ' '
TAEIFF AND INTERNAL IMPEOVEMENTS 673
to rodiu'o the rates of duty, not bocause too imich revenue is raised, but
because there is too little, and because more can be obtained by a reduction
of the rates. Well, sir, I commend the prudence of those who take this
view of the subject. Whether they may be able to demonstrate it in a
satisfactory manner, is another matter.ao
Personal abuse of the President was not wanting. Gentry, from
his own state, denounced, in the House, what he termed "the
great, damnable, and infamous conspiracy" (Kane letter) by
which the people of Pennsylvania had been defrauded out of
their votes, and by which the men who had perpetrated it had
reached tlie positions they now occupy : these men were ' ' James
K. Polk and James Buchanan. ' '^^
Seaborn Jones, of Georgia, was selected as chief spokesman
for the House Committee of "Ways and Means, and indirectly,
for the administration. All sections of the Union, he contended,
would be benefited by a revenue tariff; for it was based on
justice and would insure stability for all lines of industry. ' ' Pro-
tection," on the other hand, "operates as a hotbed in bringing
forth exotics which the soil and climate would not naturally
produce ' ' ; and the fostering of special industries w^as not a
legitimate function of government.^- Of northern Democrats,
Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, was one of the most enthusiastic sup-
porters of Polk's tariff policy. He branded the tariff of 1842
as the " 'bill of abominations,' in violation of the genius of our
institutions, of the provisions of our Constitution, and fatally
subversive of the rights and liberties of the people." He favored
a "constitutional tariff" such as the one under consideration,
one "which would grant equal protection to all, exclusive
privileges to none. ' '^^
On July 3, after divers amendments had been rejected^* and
an attempt to lay the whole question on the table had been
30/btd., 1090. 31 Ibid., 1047. 32 7?,t(;.^ 990-991. 33 /bid., 1045.
34 While nearly all of the amendments related to adjustments in rates,
a few were grotesque. For example, Schenck, of Ohio, wished to insert
Polk 's Kane letter in the bill, and Stewart, of Pennsylvania, moved to
make the title read: "A bill to reduce the duties on the luxuries of the
674 JAMES E. POLK
defeated, the House passed the tariff bill and submitted it to the
Senate for approval. On learning the good news, Polk recorded
in his diary :
I Avas much gratified to hear the result, as this was one of the leading
and vital measures of my administration. It Avas in truth vastly the most
important domestic measure of my administration, and the vote of the
popular branch of Congress, Avhich had fully endorsed my opinions and
recommendations on the subject of the tariff, could not be otherwise than
highly gratifying.35
The House bill was taken up by the Senate on July 6, and
after two readings by title, Sevier, of Arkansas, moved that it be
made a special order. Evans, of Maine, endeavored to have it
referred for consideration to the Committee on Finance, but
many Democrats contended that such reference would cause
unnecessary delay. During the debate Clayton, of Delaware, in
an attempt to outmanoeuver the administration forces, moved
certain amendments and instructions which would, if followed,
compel the committee to consider the whole bill. He was not
successful, however, for Dixon H. Lewis, of Alabama, whose
"twenty score of flesh""*" was a host in itself, promptly re])orted
the measure back from the committee with a request to be excused
from its consideration.
As chairman of the Committee on Finance, it devolved upon
Lewis to lead the debate in favor of the bill. The belief so widely
held, said he, that ad valorem duties would fail to produce suffi-
cient revenue was "one of those axiomatic errors which, upon
examination, will be found to be wholly fallacious"; even under
the tariff of 1842 such duties had produced more than half of
the revenue. Hannegan, Bagby, and many other Senators sup-
ported the measure ; the main arguments urged in its favor were
the abolition of the minimum and specific duties, and the read-
justment of rates upon a revenue basis.
rich, and increase them on the necessaries of the poor; to bankrupt tlie
treasury; strike down American farmers, mechanics, and workingmen; to
make way for the products of foreign agriculture and foreign labor . . .
etc." ar, Polk, Diary, II, 11.
36 Adams, Memoirs, XII, 25. Lewis weighed 4'M) pounds.
TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 675
Opponents of the tariff bill consumed more time than did its
friends. In replying to Lewis, Webster attacked the policy of
relying upon ad valorem duties, and he hoped
to show to the Seuate and to the country that this bill, so novel, so danger-
ous, so vicious in its general principles; so ill considered, so rash, and I
must say so intemperate in many of its provisions, cannot but produce in
the country the most serious and permanent mischief if it should become
a law.37
"As a friend of the Administration," Niles, of Connecticut, pro-
foundly regretted the introduction of the bill, and "as a friend
of the Administration he would vote against it. ' '"* Of the Demo-
crats, Cameron, of Pennsylvania, was the most aggressive in com-
bating the measure; but his charge that Pennsylvanians had
been deceived by the Kane letter came with bad grace from his
lips, for if deception had been employed, Cameron himself had
been the chief offender. Benton did not approve all features of
the bill, yet he declared himself ready to vote for any measure
which would rid the country of the tariff of 1842.
The attitude of two members merits special notice, for the
Senate was so evenly divided that the fate of the tariff bill
rested in their hands. Like other Democrats, Haywood, of North
Carolina, wished the tariff to be reduced, but he maintained that
the House bill would effect too radical a change. After several
attempts to amend the bill had failed, he broke with his party
and resigned his seat in the Senate.^'' Although his act was
severely condemned by the party press, the President believed
him to be sincere and conscientious.***
37 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 1089. 38 iMd., 1117.
39 The reasons which he assigned for his resignation are given in his
"Address to the People of North Carolina" (Cong,. Globe, 29 Cong., 1
sess., App., 1178 ff.).
■to Polk, Diary, IT, 48. He thought that the Senator might be piqued
because he had not been given a part in framing the bill, yet "1 believe
him to be an honest and pure man, but a man of great vanity and possess-
ing a good deal of self esteem. ... I give not the slightest heed to the
painful insinuations which I learn this evening are made by illiberal
persons as to the motives & causes which have induced his course."
676 JAMES K. FOLK
After Haywood's resignation attention centered on Senator
Jarnagin, of Tennessee, for with him rested the power to pass
or to defeat the "great domestic measure." Jarnagin was not
only a Whig and a believer in protective tariff, but in his home
state he had been a bitter personal and political opponent of the
President. On the other hand, the legislature of Tennessee had
instructed him to vote for the administration tariff bill, and it
remained to be seen whether he .would follow his instructions.
On July 25 the President was much perturbed by a report that
Jarnagin had threatened to resign ; for ' ' should he do so, and
Mr. Haywood's successor reach here in time, the tariff bill will
be lost by one vote. ' ' Polk sent for Senator Turney, who prom-
ised to ascertain the intentions of his colleague. Jarnagin agreed
to remain in the Senate and to obey his instructions; but Polk
was not wholly relieved from anxiety, for Turney informed him
that manufacturing interests were attempting to win votes by
the use of bribe money and that even he (Turney) had been
offered a bribe."
Jarnagin 's position was a most unenviable one. Although
he thoroughly disapproved the administration bill, his instruc-
tions required him to support it. On July 27 he denounced the
measure but declared his intention to vote for it; he did not,
however, believe that his instructions precluded him from voting
for amendments which did not affect its main purpose — the abol-
ishment of the minimum and specific duties. When, therefore,
Clayton moved a reference to the Committee on Finance, with
instructions to amend, Jarnagin voted with his party. Polk took
this to mean that he would break both his pledges and his in-
structions. "Jarnegan," he observed in his diary, "holds tlie
fate of the Bill in his hands and tliere [is] no reliance to be
placed upon him," and he regretted the folly of Haywood in
resigning at such a critical moment.*- But the President was
mistaken, for Jarnagin yielded the "pound of flesh" even though
41 Ibid., 49-50. ^ lUd., 51.
TARIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 677
he succeeded in making the operation annoying to his opponents.
On July 28 he again announced his intention to vote for the
administration tariff, but
I shall, when the question conies on the engrossment of the bill, transfer
the whole responsibility, as far as I am concerned, to the keeping of the
representative of the whole people, and then we will know whether it be
a Democratic measure or not.
He meant of course that on incidental questions he would refrain
from voting and compel the Vice-President to save the measure
by his casting vote ; this done, he would obey his instructions and
help to pass the bill. He kept his promise,-*^ and the bill was
passed by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-seven after an amend-
ment proposed by Webster for guarding against under-valuation
had been adopted. Before the final vote was taken Webster pre-
dicted that the measure would be repealed at the next session,
for "it is as impossible that the sun should go backward and set
in the east, as that the people should suffer the principle con-
tained in this bill to prevail. ' '
Even after the Senate had passed the tariff bill the President
was pessimistic. He doubted that the House would concur in
the Senate amendment. A report that certain Democrats from
New York and Pennsylvania would join the Whigs in opposing
the amendment gave him "great uneasiness." They did vote
with the Whigs on incidental questions, but, due to fear so the
President thought, they joined with their own party on the final
vote. Polk's gratification found expression in his diary:
This great measure of reform has been thus successful. It has given
rise to an immense struggle between the two great political parties of the
country. The capitalists & monopolists have not surrendered the immense
advantages which they possessed, and the enormous profits which they
derived under the tariff of 1842, until after a fierce and mighty struggle.
43 Writing from his post at Naples to his brother, W. H. Polk said that
he had trembled when he read that the fate of the tariff bill depended on
"the doubtful honesty of Spencer Jarnagin." He had up to this time
believed that Jarnagin would sell out even if the price were labeled in
plain sight; "his rare honestv in this case, is to me wholly inexplicable! "
(W. H. Polk to J. K. Polk, Nov. 6, 1846, Polk Papers).
678 JAMES K. POLK
This City has swarmed with them for weeks. They have spared no effort
within their power to sway and control Congress, but all has proved to be
unavailing and they have been at length vanquished. Their effort will
probably now be to raise a panic (such as they have already- attempted)
by means of their combined wealth, so as to induce a repeal of the act.^^
The President had reason to be gratified with the passage of
this important party measure. It not only dealt a severe blow
to Clay's "American System," but it put in operation a tariff
policy which Polk had advocated ever since he had been in public
life. Much to the disappointment of his critics no industrial
calamities resulted from it, and the act was not repealed as
Webster had so confidently predicted. Despite the scoffing of
Evans, reduction of the tariff rates was followed by an increase
in the amount of revenue ; it became redundant in 1857 and was
still further reduced. While it would be absurd to attribute the
prosperity of this decade to the operation of the ' ' tariff of '46, ' '
no longer could it be said that an ad valorem revenue tariff would
block the wheels of industry.
The reestablishment of the independent treasury gave addi-
tional reason for gratification, and, like the tariff bill, it caused
none of the disasters which its opponents had prophesied. With
few modifications, the "constitutional treasury" has continued to
the present day, and it has done much to extricate national reve-
nue from the field of party politics. With the enactment of
these two measures and the settlement of the Oregon question
Polk had effected three of the four items of his administrative
program. There was no longer need of anxiety for the "glory"
of his administration, even though Davis had talked the diplo-
matic appropriation bill to death.
Having faitlifully complied with the recommendations con-
tained in the President's message, Congress believed, apparently,
that the law of compensation entitled it to a free hand in "pork
barrel" legislation. Despite the heavy drain on the treasury for
military purposes, items were recklessly added to the river and
4* Polk, Diary, II, 54-55.
TAEIFF AND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 679
harbor l)ill until it called for appropriations amounting to nearly
a million and a half dollars. Clay himself could scarcely have
asked for a more cordial endorsement of his internal improvement
policy, and especially from a Congress controlled by Democrats.
Polk promptly vetoed this bill, and his message to the House
is an able statement of the Jeffersonian doctrine of strict con-
struction. In his opinion, the measure under consideration was
both unconstitutional and inexpedient, and parts of it "a disrep-
utable scramble for the public money." "It is not questioned,"
said he,
that the Federal Government is one of limited powers. Its powers are
such, and such only, as are expressly granted in the Constitution or are
properly incidental to the expressly granted powers and necessary to their
execution.
After quoting Madison's rule for determining the scope of im-
plied power, Polk maintained that :
It is not enough that it may be regarded by Congress as convenient or
that its exercise would advance the public weal. It must be necessary and
proper to the execution of the principal expressed power to which it is an
incident, and without which such principal power can not be carried into
effect. The whole frame of the Federal Constitution proves that the
Government which it creates was intended to be one of limited and speci-
fied powers. A construction of the Constitution so broad as that by which
the power in question is defended tends imperceptibly to a consolidation
of power in a Government intended by the framers to be thus limited in
its authority.
National appropriations, in his opinion, should be confined to
national purposes, and Congress ought to refrain from exercising
doubtful powers. He censured in particular the present attempt
to include purely local items by a jugglery of words. ' ' To call
the mouth of a creek or a shallow inlet on our coast a harbor can
not confer the authority to expend the public money in its im-
provement. "''•^ Although he did not consult the cabinet on the
advisability of vetoing this bill, he believed that Buchanan,
Marcy, Bancroft, and perhaps Walker, would, if consulted, have
45 Richardson, Messages, IV, 460 flf.
680 JAMES E. POLK
advised him to sign it.**' He declined, also, to sign a bill for
making improvements in the territory of Wisconsin, but his veto
message was not submitted until the following December.'*'
In the interest of economy and as a check upon political job-
bery the President put his veto on a bill to grant five million
dollars in land scrip to persons who claimed damages for French
spoliations prior to 1800. In his message he pointed out that
this question had often been discussed, yet no former Congress
had seen fit to pay these claims, even when there had been a
surplus in the treasury. Since the United States had never re-
ceived anything from France for the injuries done he saw no
reason for the assumption that our government had become re-
sponsible to the claimants for aggressions committed by a foreign
power.*^
As frequently happens at the halfway point of an adminis-
tration, the autumn elections showed a decrease in Democratic
strength. Doubtless the main cause of defection was the unpop-
ularity of the Mexican War ; but the Whigs attributed much of
it to abhorrence of the "free trade" tariff, although that law
had not yet become operative. Among others. Governor Wright,
of New York, failed in his canvass for reelection, and adminis-
tration candidates were defeated in Pennsylvania. With his
usual delight in causing the President discomfort, Buchanan at-
tributed these defeats to the reduction of the tariff". Probably
he hoped to get some concessions for his friends in Pennsylvania,
but instead, Polk told him that he would, in his next message,
recommend that no change whatever be made in the law until
it had been given a fair trial. Wright's defeat had, in Polk's
opinion, been caused by the treachery of the "Old Hunkers"
who no longer deserved to be called Democrats ; ' ' this faction
shall hereafter receive no favours at my hands if I know it. ' '***
46 Polk, Diary, IT, 58. 4- Richardson, Messagea, IV, 610 ff.
48 Ihid., 466 flf.
40 Polk, Diary, II, 217-218. In a letter to Henry D. Foster, of Penn-
sylvania, Nov. 19, 1846, Buchanan said that he had always disapproved
TAEIFF AND INTERNAL IMPliOVEMENTS 681
When, early in November, the President began the prepar-
ation of his second annual message, the war estimates of Marcy
were so large that doubts were expressed in the cabinet as to the
ability of the government to meet its financial obligations. In
accordance with Democratic tradition, financial ills were readily
traced to "the money power," and the difficulty in floating a loan
was attributed to the machinations of bankers in Boston and
New York who were endeavoring to force a repeal of the inde-
pendent treasury law. The gloomy Secretary of State doubted
that the war could be conducted on a hard money basis; and
although he had advocated the independent treasury, he was now
satisfied that the government could not finance the war under its
operation.^"
In his message the President dealt with financial questions in
very general terms. It was too early, he said, to estimate the
revenue to be derived from the new tariff law ; but by the simul-
taneous abandonment of the protective policy by England and
the United States, commerce had received a "new impulse," while
labor and trade "have been released from the artificial trammels
which have so long fettered them." The present tariff law had
been framed in accordance with sound principles and conse-
quently ought not to be disturbed. In order to meet the extraor-
dinary expenses of the war a revenue duty might well be placed
on certain articles now on the free list, but it should be repealed
as soon as the needs of the treasury would permit. Walker, in
his report, recommended, for the war period, a special duty of
twenty-five per cent on tea and coffee, but like the President, he
was averse to making changes in the existing tariff law.^^
the tariff of 1846, and he hopeil that a modification "will be effected be-
fore the Manufacturers & Coal Dealers can be seriously injured" (Bu-
chanan, Works, VII, 117).
50 Polk, Diary, II, 221.
51 Richardson, Messages, IV, 498-502. Walker's Report (H. Ex. Doc. 7,
29 Cong., 2 sess.). "All experience," said Walker, "is against the pro-
tective policy. ... It is as unwise and unjust as it is repugnant to equal
rights and republican principles, to force, by legislation, any class of the
community to buy from or sell to another. ' '
682 JAMES K. POLK
The tariff of 1846 remained the source of revenue for the
remainder of the administration, for this Congress and its suc-
cessor steadfastly refused to vote additional war duties. Never-
theless, Walker was able to say in his annual report of December,
1847, even while renewing his request for duties on tea and coffee,
that
It is now jiroved that a tariff for revenue not only yields a larger
income than the protective system, but also advances more rapidly, in a
series of years, the prosperity of the manufacturers, by the augmentation
of their foreign and domestic market.
In like manner he could truthfully assert that, instead of
paralyzing industry as had been predicted, the independent treas-
ury and hard money had benefited those who had so vigorously
opposed them :
Domestic manufactures require for their permanent and successful oper-
ation the basis of specie, checking vibrations and inflations of the paper
system. ... If our manufacturers desire great advantages from the home
market, it must be abundantly and permanently supplied with a large
sjaeeie circulation, which alone can sustain that market for a number of
years, and prevent those calamities which follow an inflated paper cur-
rency. A home market for our manufacturers, when based upon specie
and low duties, is solid, permanent, and augmenting; but when founded
upon paper credits, it is inflated one year, only to be depressed the next,
or some succeeding year — thus depriving the manufacturer of any well-
assured and permanent domestic market. ^^
The Whig Congress was not disposed to aid the administration
by voting additional war revenue. On tlie contrary, the Presi-
dent was certain that attempts were being made to create a panic
and paralyze public credit.
The truth is [he observed] that the Whig party and leading presses,
having failed to defeat the Government in the jirosecution of the war by
the "aid & comfort," they have given to Mexico by their unpatriotic
sentiments, are now insidiously attempting to produce a panic in the
money market and thereby, if possible, to break down the Treasury, and
thus compel the inglorious withdrawal of our army from Mexico.53
52 H. Ex. Doc. G, 30 Cong., 1 sess. "When he saw the original draft of
this report Polk wrote that "though in the main sound in its doctrines.
1 thought some parts of it speculative, and perhaps too highly wrought"
(Diary, III, 229).
53 Polk, Diary, ]JI, 322.
TAEIFF AND INTERNAL IMPBOVEMENTii 683
While this may have been an exaggerated portrayal of Whig
machinations, the intemperate abuse of the President for having
"deliberately plotted the war" naturally led him to believe that
his opponents would resort to any means of crippling his admin-
istration.
If Congress could embarrass the President by declining to
follow his recommendations, he was equally determined to thwart
its attempt to force his hand on the question of internal improve-
ments. Late in July, 1848, the House passed a civil and diplo-
matic bill which contained, in the form of a rider, an item for
money to improve the Savannah River. Polk well knew that
the object was to compel him to abandon the principles of his
last veto message, or to incur the odium of defeating the entire
appropriation. The Senate later eliminated the obnoxious item,
but before this had been done Polk outlined in his diary the course
which he intended to pursue :
My mind is made up. I will veto the Bill, if it comes to me with this
item ill it, whatever may be the consequences. I will do so, if it comes
on the. last night of the session, and if I am over-ruled by two thirds, &
Congress should adjourn without passing the Civil Diplomatic [Bill], I
will issue my Proclamation conv[en]ing an extra session of Congress for
the next day.
He was much depressed by the "want of patriotism" displayed
by Whigs and bolting Democrats, both in the matter of appro-
priations and in their refusal to create governments for the ter-
ritories. "Whilst I deplore this state of things, all I can do
during the remainder of my term is to adhere undeviatingly to
my principles & to perform my whole duty. This I will do at any
hazard." The present Congress, in his opinion, was as reckless
and extravagant as any he had ever known ; the success of its
improvement schemes would bankrupt the treasury.^*
The adjournment of Congress did not relieve the President
from the schemes of improvement promoters, for the Secretary
of State now presented a project for external improvement. He
54 Polk, Diarij, IV, 35-36, 66.
684 JAMES K. POLK
called Polk's attention to the provision in the treaty recenlly
negotiated with New Granada whereby American citizens had
been given the right of passage across the Isthmus of Panama.
It was of great importance, he said, that a railroad or canal
should be constructed there, and he recommended that engineers
should be ordered to make a survey. Without consulting other
members of the cabinet the President promptly put a quietus
on Buchanan's project. If the government could make the sur-
vey, said he, it could also construct the works, and he believed
that it did not have the constitutional authority to do either. •'■'^'
Polk's aversion to internal improvements had become almost
an obsession, and during the month of October he spent his spare
moments in formulating a more thorough expose of the whole
"American System." Originally it was his intention to incor-
porate his expose in a veto message, for he fully expected that
Congress would pass another internal improvement bill.
Should another veto become necessary I desire to make it a strong
paper, so that if I should be over-ruled, as I may be, by a united Whig
vote and a part of the Democratic members, making a vote of two thirds,
I may leave my full views on record to be judged of by my countrymen
& by posterity. I can add to the strength of my veto message on the
same subject of the 15th of December last. If I should not have occasion
to use it, it will be left among my papers at my death. I am thoroughly
convinced that I am right upon this subject, and therefore I have de-
stowed much labour in preparing a paper which may contribute to con-
vince others that I am so.
His purpose, as he recorded in another place, was to show that
the "American System" consisted of several closely allied
branches: a federal bank, protective tariff, distribution of the
land fund, and internal improvements ; that the system liad been
overthrown in all branches except the last ; and if this should be
•'■--•"I told him furthermore that if any improvement Bill should during
my time be presented to mo, I should certainly veto it, and that if I were
to yield my sanction to his proposition it would be argued by my op-
ponents in Congress that while 1 denied the power to make internal im-
provements, 1 was exercising the power, and that too without an act of
Congress, to make foreign surveys with a. view to make foreign improve-
ments" (ibid., 139-140). How different from the attitude of a later
President, who could boast that "I took the canal! "
TABIFF AND INTERNAL IMPIWVEMENT8 685
permitted to survive, all the others would soon be revived.'"' One
may, or may not, agree with his views, yet there can be no doubt
of the President's own belief that, in demolishing this network
of special privilege which luid been woven by Hamilton and Clay,
he was performing a most patriotic service. Those who have
charged him — and justly charged him — with being a strong party
man have failed to appreciate his conscientious belief in the
principles of his party. No former President — not even Jeffer-
son himself — had succeeded so well in putting Jeffersonian the-
ories into actual operation. He was grieved by the thought of
retiring without having crushed the last remnant of the system
so elaborately constructed by Hamilton and Clay. He could no
longer hope for reward or distinction from his party, yet he was
quite as willing as he had been in 1834 to ply the oar of the
' ' galley-slave ' '^^ in promoting the principles of his party, because
he regarded them as most beneficial to his country. Even if
laborious effort to indite a document so convincing that posterity
must heed it is but an exhibition of personal conceit, still there
can be no doubt that he was impelled by patriotic motives and by
a desire to save his country from what he considered to be a real
and serious menace.
On the advice of his cabinet, Polk decided not to leave the
promulgation of so important a document to the chance passage
of an internal revenue bill. Yielding to their judgment, he made
it a part of his last annual message. The message is well written
and shows a firm grasp of the entire subject. It deserves careful
reading, for it is distinctly the most able indictment of the
''American System" to be found among our public documents.
Although the historical, and perhaps the best, part of the mes-
sage relating to this subject is too long to be quoted, a few
paragraphs will serve to indicate the conclusions which he had
reached :
.^•6 Polk, Diary, IV, 144, 1.57-158, 167-168.
57 ' ' Polk worked like a galley-slave to cram down his report ' ' (Adams,
Memoirs, IX, 83).
686 JAMES K. POLK
The several branches of this system were so intimately blended to-
gether that in their operation each sustained and strengthened the others.
Their joint operation was to add new burthens of taxation and to encour-
age a largely increased and wasteful expenditure of public money. It
was the interest of the bank that the revenue collected and the disburse-
ments made by the Government should be large, because, being the de-
pository of the public money, the larger the amount the greater would be
the bank profits by its use. It was the interest of the favored classes,
who were enriched by the protective tariff, to have the rates of that pro-
tection as high as possible, for the higher those rates the greater would be
their advantage. It was the interest of the people of all those sections and
localities who expected to be benefited by expenditures for internal im-
provements that the amount collected should be as large as possible, to the
end that the sum disbursed might also be the larger. The States, being
the beneficiaries in the distribution of the land money, had an interest in
having the rates of tax im])osed by the protective tariff large enough to
yield a sufficient revenue from that source to meet the wants of the Gov-
ernment without disturbing or taking from them the land fund; so that
each of the branches constituting the system had a common interest in
maintaining the public debt unpaid and increasing its amount, because
this would produce an annual increased drain upon the Treasury to the
amount of the interest and render augmented taxes necessary. The oper-
ation and necessary effect of the whole system were to encourage large
and extravagant expenditures, and thereby to increase the public patron-
age, and maintain a rich and splendid government at the expense of a
taxed and impoverished people.
*************
Under the pernicious workings of this combined system of measures
the country witnessed alternate seasons of temporary apparent prosperity,
of sudden and disastrous commercial revulsions, of unprecendented fluc-
tuations of prices and depression of the great interests of agriculture,
navigation, and commerce, of general pecuniary suffering, and of final
bankruptcy of thousands. After a severe struggle of more than a quarter
of a century, the system was overthrown.
The bank has been succeeded by a practical system of finance, con-
ducted and controlled by the Government. The constitutional currency
has been restored, the public credit maintained unimpaired even in a
period of a foreign war, and the whole country has become satisfied that
banks, national or State, are not necessary as fiscal agents of the Govern-
ment. Revenue duties have taken the place of the protective tariff. The
distribution of the money derived from the sale of the public lands has
been abandoned and the corrupting system of internal imjirovemcnts, it is
hoped, has been effectively checked.
TAIUFF zlND INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS 687
Jt is not (ioubtod tliat if this whole train of measures, designed to take
wealth from the many and bestow it upon the few, were to prevail the
effect would be to change the entire character of the Government. One
only danger remains. It is the seductions of tliat brancli of the system
which consists in internal improvements, holding out, as it does, induce-
ments to the people of particular sections and localities to embark the
Government in them without stopping to calculate the inevitable conse-
quences. This branch of the system is so intimately combined and linked
with the others that as surely as an effect is produced by an adequate
cause, if it be resuscitated and revived and firmly established it requires
no sagacity to foresee that it will necessarily and speedily draw after it
the reestablishment of a national bank, the revival of a protective tariff,
the distribution of the land money, and not only the postponement to the
distant future of the payment of the present national debt, but its annual
increase.
I entertain the solemn conviction that if the internal-improvement
branch of the "American System" be not firmly resisted at this time
the whole series of measures composing it will be speedily reestablished
and the country be thrown back from its present high state of prosperity,
which the existing policy has produced, and be destined to witness all the
evils, commercial revulsions, depression of prices, and pecuniary embar-
rassments through which we have passed during the last twenty-five years.ss
An early payment of the national debt was regarded by Polk to
be of snch transcending importance that he was loth to relinquish
the helm without having made a beginning. With a view to in-
fluencing his successor, he told his Secretary of the Treasury that
he desired, if possible, to purchase government stock, "however
small the sum might be " ; and as soon as the department esti-
mates had been submitted, he directed Walker to purchase half
a million dollars' worth. °^
Like the President's message, Walker's report was an ably
written document and a strong vindication of the financial policy
of the Polk administration. The predicted disasters had not
followed in the wake of the tariff of 1846 ; instead, Walker had
5s Richardson, Messages, IV, 657, 661.
S9"i informed him [Walker] that I desired to do this supposing it
might exert some influence over the policy of my successor. I deem the
speedy payment of the public debt of great national importance. If 1
commence its payment my successor may dislike to take the responsibility
of reversing my policy in this respect" (Polk, Diary, IV, 162, 195).
688 JAMES K. POLK
the satisfaction of informing Congress that even the manufac-
turers did not "desire the restoration of the tariff of 1842." He
came out boldly as an advocate of free trade, and although his
views were too radical for joractical purposes, it would be difficult
to find a better statement of the free trade theory. After an
elaborate argument to show that nations as a whole, as well as
all classes within them, were best served by unhampered trade,
he arrived at the following conclusions:
Whenever the laws of nature are beyond the reach of man, there is
perfect order under the direction of Almighty power; but whenever man
can disturb these laws, discord and injury are sure to ensue. . . . The
laws of political economy are fixed and certain. Let them alone is all that
is required of man; let all international exchanges of products move as
freely in their orbits as the heavenly bodies in their spheres, and their
order and harmony will be as perfect, and their results as beneficial, as
is every movement under the laws of nature, when undisturbed by the
errors and interference of m.an.60
Even though the President declared "Walker's report to be
' ' one of his ablest papers, ' ' his own remark concerning the Secre-
tary's report of 1847 was applicable to this, also — that it Avas
"in the main sound in its doctrines" but "some parts of it specu-
lative, and perhaps too highly wrought.""^ The two men were
in substantial agreement on the fundamentals of economic and
financial policy. Polk, however, always directed his attention to
the attainable, for he was too conservative by nature to indulge
in theoretical discussions.
The specter of improvements — both external and internal —
haunted the President to the closing hours of his official term.
In January, 1849, he expressed to his cabinet a determination to
veto a bill pending in Congress which proposed to pay Aspinwall
and others $250,000 annually for twenty years, to enable them
to construct a road across the Isthmus of Panama. He opposed
the measure first of all on constitutional grounds; in addition,
60 Walker, Annual EepoH, Dec, 1848 (77. Ex. Doe. 7, 30 Cong., 2 sess.).
';i Polk, Diary, III, 299, IV, 224.
TAKIFF AND INTERNAL IMPEOVEMENTS 689
he regarded it as "little better than a proposition to i)luiider the
Treasury."" On the very last night of his administration he
went to the eapitol armed with a veto which was to be applied to
any internal improvement bill. No bill of the kind was presented
for his signature, but he regarded the unused veto message as
' ' one of the ablest papers I have ever prepared. ' '"-
Among the bills signed on the last night of his official term
was the one Avhich established the Department of the Interior.
"I had serious objections," says the Diary, "but they were not
of a constitutional character and I signed it with reluctance."
He feared that such a department, in its practical operations,
would draw power from the states and extend, unduly, the juris-
diction of the national government. Had he been a member of
Congress, he would have voted against the measure.**^ "Walker,
therefore, and not Polk, deserves the credit for this important
achievement. It was the child of his fertile brain,''* and the
passage of the bill was due in no small degree to his personal
influence.
Those who have been most bitter in their condemnation of
Polk's foreign policy have found little to criticize in his internal
administration. "When he withdrew to private life all industries
were in a flourishing condition, and not even the victorious Whigs
cared to repeal the ' ' great measures ' ' of his administration. None
except Clay was fatuous enough to dream of reviving the obsolete
"American System."*'^
62 Polk, Diary, IV, 314, 364.
G-ilbid., 871-372.
64 Walker had, in his report, urged the creation of such a department,
and it was his hand that drafted the bill. See Vinton 's statement in
Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 2 sess., 514.
65 See comments on his Ullmann letter in Schurz, Henry Clay, II, 299.
CHAPTER XXIV
THE ''POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR DIPLOMATIC
QUESTIONS
In a commencement address delivered before the Yale law
school in 1903, Whitelaw Reid attached the name of ' ' Polk Doc-
trine" to President Polk's declarations concerning European in-
terference in American affairs. Although Reid himself con-
demned the doctrine, yet the very name given to it acknowledges
Polk's important contribution to the great American policy of
resisting European intermeddling with the affairs of the western
hemisphere. Moreover, despite Reid's criticisms and his state-
ment that it originated ' ' in an intrigue of the slave power, ' '^ the
Polk Doctrine has been approved and continued by the American
people ; and Presidents chosen by the party which overthrew
slavery, and of which Reid himself was a leading member, have
increased rather than diminished the scope of its application.
Polk's first public declaration on the subject appeared in his
first annual message of December 2, 1845, and referred to Ore-
gon ; but nearly three months before this he had applied the
doctrine to the Hawaiian Islands, and certainly not in the interest
of slavery. In September, 1845, Anthony Ten Eyck was sent as
agent to the islands, and his instructions prepared under the
President 's order contained the following significant paragraph :
Your mission, under existing cirounistanees, is one of great importance.
The United States have a deep stake in the continued independence of
the Hawaiian Islands. They present one of those commanding commercial
positions which Great Britain, judging from her past history, would be
anxious to annex to her dominions. To promote the prosperity and secure
the independence of these Islands, is therefore the clear policy as well as
1 Reid, Tlie Monroe Doctrine, ihe Polk. Doctrine a)i(l the Doctrine of
Anarchism, 7.
THE "POLK DOCTEINE" AND MINOE QUESTIONS 691
the duty of the Government of the United States. We could not view with
indifference their transfer to or their dependence upon any European
Power.-
This is a noteworthy addition the doctrine of Monroe : acquisition
of the islands by Great Britain coukl hardly be regarded as col-
onization, and the question of suppressing representative govern-
ment was, of course, not involved. The reason why the transfer
could not be viewed with indifference was that it would affect,
detrimentally, the commerce of the United States.
It was, however, the Oregon question, and his desire to obtain
California, that gave the President the best opportunity to de-
velop his policy of resistance to foreign influence in American
affairs. Pakenham's rejection of his offer to fix the Oregon
boundary at the forty-ninth parallel made it necessary for him to
make recommendations to Congress, and, on October 24, he dis-
cussed the subject with Senator Benton. He told Benton that
he was strongly inclined to reaffirm Monroe's declaration against
permitting foreign colonization, "at least so far as this Conti-
nent is concerned." "I remarked," said he,
that Great Britain had her eye on that country [California] and intended
to possess it if she could, but that the people of the U. S. would not will-
ingly permit California to pass into the possession of any foreign mon-
archy, and that in reasserting Mr. Monroe's doctrine, I had California &
the fine bay of San Francisco as much in view as Oregon.
The conversation then turned to Cuba and the two men agreed
that
as long as Cuba remained in possession of the present Government we
would not object, but if a powerful foreign power was about to possess it,
we would not permit it. On the same footing we would place California.s
There was of course nothing new in Polk's stand on the
Cuban question. From the beginning of our national existence
Cuba had been regarded as essential to our commercial prosperity,
and consequently within the sphere of American influence. His
2 Buchanan to Ten Eyck, Sept. 10, 1845 (Buchanan, Worlcs, VI, 255 ff.).
3 Polk, Diary, I, 71.
692 JAMES K. POLE
attitude was the same as Jefferson's,* that its possession by Spain
might be tolerated, but that it must not pass to a strong maritime
power. Although he later attempted to purchase Cuba, Polk was
not desirous of acquiring insular possessions, except as a safe-
guard to American interests. This fact is shown by his refusal,
a short time before his conversation with Benton, to purchase
from Sweden the island of Saint Bartholomew. In reply to the
offer made by the king of Sweden, the President directed
Buchanan to state that ' ' the acquisition of distant insular posses-
sions, for Colonial dependencies, has never been deemed desirable
or expedient by the United States."^ In a word, Polk was not an
imperialist, albeit he was a most ardent expansionist.
Kumors of British and French designs on California induced
Polk to take early steps to prevent their success. Six weeks be-
fore Congress had assembled he instructed Buchanan to notify
Thomas 0. Larkin, American consul at Monterey, that the Presi-
dent could not view with indifference the transfer of California to
Great Britain or any other European nation, for "the system of
colonization by foreign monarchies on the North American con-
tinent must and will be resisted by ^he United States. ' ' The
government, he said, did not intend to interfere between Mexico
and California, but ' ' it would vigorously interfere to prevent the
latter from becoming a British or French Colony."*^ In a com-
munication written during the following month Slidell, also, was
given a statement concerning the policy of his government. After
speaking of the beneficial results of the Monroe Doctrine,
Buchanan said that
The nations on the continent of America have interests peculiar to
themselves. Their free forms of Government are altogether different from
the monarchical institutions of Europe. The interests and independence
of these sister nations require that they should establish and maintain an
American system of policy for their own protection and security, entirely
4 See Henry Adams, History of tlie United States, IV, 342-343.
5 Buchanan to Ellsvi'orth, July 28, 1845 (Buchanan, Works, VI, 212).
« Buchanan to Larkin, Oct. 17, 1845 (Buchanan, JVorls, VI, 275-276).
The original is in the Larkin Papers, Bancroft Library.
THE "POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 693
distinct from that which has so long prevailed in Europe. To tolerate
any interference on the part of European sovereigns with controversies
in America; to permit them to apply the worn-out dogma of the balance
of power to the free States of this continent; and above all, to suffer them
to establish new Colonies of their own, intermingled wdth our free Re-
publics, would be to make, to some extent, a voluntary sacrifice of our
independence. These truths ought everywhere, throughout the continent
of America, to be impressed on the public mind Liberty here must
be allowed to work out its natural results; and these will, ere long,
astonish the world.'
So far, the expression of the President 's sentiments had been
confined to secret instructions, but his message of December 2,
1845, announced to Congress and to the world the policy which
he meant to pursue. He told Congress that certain European
nations, in order to check the territorial expansion of the United
States, were attempting to extend to America the "balance of
power" doctrine which had long been maintained in Europe.
But the United States, he said,
can not in silence permit any European interference on the North
American continent, and should any such interference be attempted will
be ready to resist it at any and all hazards.
.... Existing rights of every European nation should be respected, but
it is due alike to our safety and our interests that the efficient protection
of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that
it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that
no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted
or established on any part of the North American continent. s
In this pronouncement Polk professed to be reiterating the
Monroe Doctrine, but it differed in two particulars from the
declaration of Monroe. In the first place, Polk forbade any
European interference; and in the second, he spoke only of North
America. His statement that "we must maintain the principle
that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide
their own destiny" evidently applied only in cases where a peo-
ple desired to join the United States, for his views with respect
to Cuba and Hawaii would seem to preclude a transfer of
T Buchanan to Slidell, Nov. 10, 1845 (Buchanan, WorVs, VI, 295).
8 Eichardson, Messages, IV, 398-399.
694 JAMES K. POLK
possessions, even with the consent of the inhabitants. In each
case it was the commerce of the United States which he sought
to protect, and not the civil rights of the people of those islands.
Polk's declaration was, also, much more definite than that of
his predecessor; in fact it was a contingent declaration of war.
Some of the London papers were severe in their criticism of
the President's message. They perverted it into a declaration
of intention to absorb all of North America. "The President
advises Congress," said the Spectator,
to arm and. organize the militia that they may be prepared to receive all com-
munities already settled on the North American continent into the bosom of
the Union, and prevent the colonization of any part of the continent by
European nations.
Only a part of this statement was true. The Times professed to
see in the message not merely a bar to future colonization, but
"we must infer from the language of the President that exist-
ing rights and settlements are held by a questionable tenure."^
There was, of course, no occasion for this inference, for Polk had
stated explicitly that existing rights should be respected.
On January 14, 1846, Senator Allen, chairman of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, asked leave to introduce a joint
resolution relating to the subject of foreign interference in
American affairs. It followed closely the language of the Presi-
dent's declaration, and its object was to reenforce that declaration
by giving it the formal approval of Congress. Calhoun objected
even to the introduction of the resolution on the ground that a
discussion of the subject would stir up enmities and would lead
to no possible good. He resented, he said, such outrageous inter-
ference as that undertaken by France and England in the affairs
of Buenos Ayres, but
the great question presented by this resolution was, whetlier we should take
under our guardianship the whole family of American States, and pledge
ourselves to extend to them our protection against all foreign aggression. lo
« Quoted by Cass in Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 240.
10 Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 197.
THE "POLK BOCTBINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 695
Allen's motion for leave to present liis resolution was sent
to the table, but on January 24 the vote was reversed. The main
supporters of the resolution were Cass and Allen, the former
asserting that the President's declaration would be barren of
results "unless adopted by the national legislature." We could
not, he said, pernut the United States to be ' ' belted round by the
fleets, armies, and territories" of England; "Oregon and Cali-
fornia, if gained, and Mexico influenced, if not ruled, would
complete the circle" of British domination. In opposing the
resolution, Calhoun characterized it as "vaporing bravado." He
deplored the attempt to lay down general rules, and held that
each question should be settled on its merits. For example, the
machinations of Great Britain and France in Texas should, if
necessary, be resisted by war, for they ' ' would have as much right
to induce a member to go out of the Union as to prevent one
coming in."[!] The resolution was referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations, from which it never emerged ; Polk 's decla-
ration, like that of his predecessor, remained a mere dictum of
the executive.
Throughout the year 1846 there were persistent rumors of
European designs to establish a monarchy in Mexico. As early
as January 17 McLane wrote from London that
a favorite scheme of the leading powers of Europe is to compose the Mexican
troubles by giving her a settled monarchical form of Government, and sup-
plying the monarch from one of their o'wti families.
There were many protests, he added, against Polk's allusions to
the Monroe Doctrine. ^^ However groundless such rumors may
have been, their recurrence could hardly fail to cause apprehen-
sion on the part of the administration.
In March, Buchanan informed Slidell that ' ' we have received
information from different quarters, in eorroberation of your
statement^- that there may be a design on the part of several
11 McLane to Polk, Jan. 17, 1846, Polk Papers.
12 Slidell had written on February 6 that "for some time past, rumors
have been rife of the establishment of a monarchy in the person of a
foreign prince" {H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Cong., 1 sess., 58).
696 JAMES E. POLK
European Powers to establish a monarchy in Mexico." It is
supposed, said he, that tlie clergy would welcome such a change,
and that continued revolution may induce the people to accept
it as a means of security and protection. "Indeed, rumor has
already indicated the King, in the person of the Spanish Prince
Henry, the son of Francisco de Paula, and the rejected suitor of
Queen Isabella." While Buchanan believed these rumors to be
idle speculations, nevertheless Slidell was instructed to use the
utmost vigilance in ascertaining whether such a plot really
existed.
Should Great Britain and France attempt to place a Spanish or any
other European Prince upon the throne of Mexico, this would be resisted
by all the power of the United States. In opposition to such an attempt,
party distinctions in this country would vanish and the people would be
nearly unauimous.is
Apparently, the President did not believe that foreign nations
would actually attempt to set up a monarchy in Mexico, for his
diary is silent on this subject. Still, he was ever on the alert,
and determined, if necessary, to resist such an attempt. In
December, he denied Donelson's request for a leave of absence
from Berlin, because "a project has been suggested, of establish-
ing a monarchy in Mexico and placing a foreign Prince upon the
throne." Although Prussia, said he, had no special interest in
the matter, she probably would be committed, therefore Donel-
son should be in Berlin to meet the issue. Whatever the facts
might be,
Should such a project be attempted, it must be resisted by this Govern-
ment, at any hazard. This was shadowed forth in a mild manner in my
late message to Congress. !■*
Rumors of the Mexican monarchy proved to be, as Mark
Twainsaid of the report of his own death, "greatly exaggerated" ;
but in asserting that he would resist such a project, Polk can not
13 Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 1846 (Buchanan, Worlcs, VI, 404-405).
14 Polk to Donelson, Dec. 29, 1846, "Polk-Donelson Letters," Tenn.
Hist. Mag., Ill, No. 1, 72.
THE "POLK DOCTEINE" AND MINOE QUESTIONS 697
be charged with inventing a new doctrine, for this case at least
fell clearly within the declaration of Monroe against the activities
of the Holy Alliance. It is well known, of course, that at a later
date France was compelled by the United States to withdraw her
support from the Emperor Maximilian.
None of President Polk 's utterances against foreign influence
in America has met with so much criticism as his message relat-
ing to Yucatan. During the Mexican war this department main-
tained, as far as possible, a neutral position which necessarily
deprived it of the protection of Mexico. In March, 1848, Justo
Sierra, Yucatanese commissioner in Washington, applied to
Buchanan for military assistance, stating in his application that
the white inhabitants were threatened with extermination by the
Indians. Buchanan and Walker were in favor of sending them
arms and ammunition, and after some hesitation the President
consented to authorize Commodore Perry to supply the white
inhabitants with ammunition, if he could be assured that it
would not find its way to other parts of Mexico.^^
After several rather unsatisfactory conversations with both
Buchanan and Polk, Sierra, on April 25, presented a formal
communication from the governor of Yucatan. The governor
requested aid against the Indians and stated that the people of
the department "were ready to surrender their country & the
sovereignty over it to any Government which would protect &
save them from extermination." He stated, also, that a similar
offer had been made to Great Britain and Spain. Prospect of
foreign domination called for prompt action, and Polk informed
his cabinet that
we could never agree to see Yucatan pass into the hands of a foreign
monarch}' to be possessed and colonized by them, and that sooner than this
should take place the U. S. should afford the aid & protection asked, but
that this could only be done by the authority of Congress.i6
Without delay, the President began the preparation of a
message on the subject of Yucatan. The preliminary draft was
13 Polk, Diary, III, 374. ig Ibid., 433-434.
698 JAMES K. POLK
shown to the cabinet and to various members of Congress, all
of whom approved the sentiments which he had expressed. As
submitted to Congress on April 29, 1848, the message, after call-
ing attention to the deplorable conditions in Yucatan, stated
that the department had offered to transfer the "dominion and
sovereigny of the peninsula" to the United States, and that
similar offers had been made to both England and Spain.
Whilst it is not my purpose, [said he], to reeonimend the adoption of any
measure ^\'ith a view to the acquisition of the ' ' dominion and sovereignity ' '
over Yucatan, yet according to our established policy, we could not consent
to a transfer of this ' ' dominion and sovereignty ' ' either to Spain, Great
Britain, or any other European power, i^
While the president alleged that he was restating the ' ' established
policy" announced by Monroe, which "applies with great force
to the peninsula of Yucatan," it is obvious that the question
under consideration was not covered by either declaration of the
Monroe Doctrine. Monroe had spoken of colonization, and of
forcible interference with established governments ; Polk asserted
that we could not consent to a transfer of "dominion and
sovereignty," even at the solicitation of the inhabitants. But to
show that the Yucatan question did not fall within the purview
of the Monroe Doctrine does not prove that Polk should not have
announced his own much-criticized doctrine. Monroe dealt with
the threatened dangers of his own time ; was it presumptuous in
Polk to declare, in similar manner, his policy for dealing with
new phases of foreign domination ? Indirectly, there was a close
connection between the Polk Doctrine and that of Monroe. The
purpose of the anti-colonization declaration of Monroe was to
shut out, for the future, undesirable neighbors; this, also, was
the purpose of forbidding the transfer of Yucatan to any Euro-
pean nation. In neither case was any thought given to the wishes
of the actual oi' the prospective inhabitants ; the sole considera-
tion was the welfare of the United States. Moreover, Polk's
1" Richardson, Messages, IV, 581-582.
THE "POLK DOCTIUNE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 699
announcement regarding Yucatan was quite in line with tliat of
his predecessors with respect to Cuba, and the degree of im-
portance does not affect the principle involved. For example,
when Secretary Clay, by order of President Adams, notified
France and other powers that we could not consent to the occu-
pation of Cuba and Porto Rico "by any other European power
than Spain under any contingency whatever,"^* he was thinking
of the transfer per se and of the effect upon the United States,
and not of the wishes of the Cubans.
In his message. President Polk made no specific recommenda-
tions, but left it "to the wisdom of Congress to adopt such
measures as in their judgment may be expedient to prevent Yuca-
tan from becoming a colony of any European power. ' ' There was
no intimation that he desired to take permanent possession of
the territory or that he had any other object in view than to
prevent it from falling into the hands of a foreign nation ; still,
we know from his diary that he was ready to annex the depart-
ment rather than see it become a possession of Great Britain.^"
As soon as the message was read in the Senate, Calhoun
asserted that the ' ' broad and dangerous principle ' ' announced in
it could not possibly be deduced from the Monroe Doctrine. It
was, however, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
from which, on May 4, Hannegan reported an act to enable the
President to "take temporary military occupation of Yucatan."
The debate which followed elicited widely divergent opinions,
both as to the President's meaning and the expediency of occupy-
ing the territory. It is unnecessary to dwell on this discussion,
for before it had proceeded far dispatches arrived bearing the
news that a treaty had been concluded between Yucatan and the
Indians. Calhoun's remarks, however, are worthy of note, on
isaay to Brown, Oct. 25, 1825 (Am. State Pap., For. Eel., V, 856).
19 ' ' Mr. Walker was in favour of its ultimate annexation to the United
States, & Mr. Buchanan opposed it. I concurred with Mr. Walker rather
than see it fall into the hands of England" {Diary (May 6, 1848), III,
444-445).
700 JAMES K. FOLK
account of his peculiar interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.
It consisted, he said, of friendly declarations, with "not a word
in any one of them in reference to resistance." But Polk, he
continued, "seems to hold these declarations as imposing a
solemn duty on him as Chief Magistrate to resist on all occasions ;
and not only to resist, but to judge of the measure of that re-
sistance."-" As construed by Calhoun, the sole survivor of
Monroe's cabinet, the famous "doctrine" became a harmless
declamation — a simple statement of our desires, and not a warn-
ing to the European alliance. Hannegan, the chief supporter of
the bill, disclaimed any desire to annex Yucatan, although, like
the President, he was ready to do so if this should prove to be
the only means of saving it from British domination. That
country, in his opinion, would never neglect an opportunity to
strengthen her hold on the Gulf of Mexico : ' ' Cuba was said to
be the key, and with Yucatan she would have both lock and key,
and control the whole outlet of the vast Mississippi." It was
control of the Gulf region, and not the desire to possess additional
southern territory, that led the President and his supporters to
resist a possible extension of British domination over the depart-
ment of Yucatan. British activities in Texas had, justly or un-
justly, convinced Polk that England was ever ready to deal a
blow at the commercial prosperity of the United States.
Discussion of the Yucatan question, and of the alleged attempt
of Great Britain to make the Gulf of Mexico a "mare clausum,"
naturally revived interest in the destinies of Cuba. That island
had always been regarded as the key to the Gulf, and adminis-
trations of all parties had agreed that its control must never pass
to a strong maritime power. As noted above. Clay, under Adams'
instructions, had, in 1825, asserted that "we could not consent
to the occupation of those islands by any other European power
than Spain under any contingency whatever." In similar
20 Printed in full in Calhoun, H'orkfi, IV, 454 flf.
THE "POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 701
language "Webster, in 1843, informed the United States consul at
Havana that his government ' ' never would permit the occupation
of that island by British agents or forces upon any pretext what-
ever," and that the entire naval and military resources of the
United States would be employed to prevent it.-^
At the first session of Congress under the Polk administration
resolutions were offered in both houses for the purpose of author-
izing the President to purchase Cuba, provided the consent of the
inhabitants could be obtained. Nothing resulted from these reso-
lutions, for more pressing questions soon absorbed the attention
of both Congress and the executive. But when, in 1847, certain
British statesmen urged their government to seize Cuba as
security for the interest on Spanish bonds held in England, the
American press began to discuss the advisability of purchasing
the island. For example, the New York Sim came out strongly
in favor of annexation. It stated in an editorial that Spain
would sell Cuba for $100,000,000, and that the Cubans were so
eager to join the United States that they would raise the neces-
sary money if given a week's notice ( !)-- There is no evidence,
however, that the President gave serious thought to the subject
until tlie summer of the following year when the importance of
acquiring the island was urged upon him by John L. 0 'Sullivan,
editor of the Democratic Review and of the New York News.
In his diary for May 10, 1848, Polk mentioned a visit from
0 'Sullivan and Senator Douglas. They had come, apparently at
the instance of the former, for the purpose of exhorting the
President to take immediate steps to buy the island from Spain.
As usual, he declined to give them his own views on the subject,
although his decision had already been made. "Though I ex-
pressed no opinion to them," is the comment in his diary, "I
am decidedly in favour of purchasing Cuba & making it one of
-1 Webster to Campbell, Jan. 14, 1843 (Wharton, Int. Law Digest, I,
372).
22 Quoted in Niles' Reg., LXXII, 338 (July 31, 1847).
702 JAMES K. POLE
the States of [the] Union." A few weeks later he wrote that
it was 0 'Sullivan "who first suggested to me the idea of pur-
chasing Cuba."-^
Late in the month, when consulting his cabinet on the ad-
visability of making an offer to Spain, Polk emphasized the
danger of the island's falling into the hands of Great Britain.
Walker and Mason were in favor of making an offer, and were
willing to go as high as $100,000,000. Johnson objected to in-
corporating the territory into the Union, while Buchanan feared
that any agitation of the subject might injure the party in the
Presidential election.-* Two days later Buchanan received an
"important despatch" from the American consul at Havana
which said that on account of impending revolution the Creoles
were in favor of annexation. 0 'Sullivan told the President that
an agent of wealthy Cuban planters had informed him of a
scheme of his employers to overthrow Spanish authority for the
purpose of hastening annexation. 0 'Sullivan said, also, that a
distinguished American general,-' now in Mexico, had agreed to
resign his commission at the close of the war and to embark for
Cuba with discharged American troops. But Polk Avas too cir-
cumspect to indulge in filibustering schemes :
I at once said to Mr. O 'Sullivan that if Cuba was ever obtained by
the U. S., it must be by amicable purchase, and that as President of the
U. S. I could give no countenance to such a step, and could not wink at
such a movement. 26
When consulted on the subject, Cass expressed himself as
heartily in favor of purchasing Cuba, but Buchanan still main-
tained that the proposed acquisition was the "gravest & most
important" question that had ever been submitted to the cabinet.
At the next meeting he predicted that Mar with England and
23 Polk, Diary, TIT, 446, 498. The fact that O 'Sullivan was a "I^arn-
burner'' ami an enthusiastic supporter of Van Buron is evidence that the
project was not prompted by a desire to extend the shiveholding area.
2i Ibid., 468-469.
25 Probably Quitman. 20 Polk, J)iarii. Ill, 475-477.
THE "POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 703
France would follow an attempt to acquire the island ; but Polk
nevertheless decided that R. M. Saunders, our minister at Madrid,
should be instructed to buy it if he could. Buchanan i)etulantly
demanded specific instructions as to contents of the dispatch to
Saunders. Evidently he was preparing to disclaim responsibility
in ease the project should turn out to be politically unwise.
In order to forestall filibustering schemes. General Butler
was instructed to prevent our troops from taking part in a
Cuban expedition, and the American consul at Havana was told
that the United States would "preserve national faith with
Spain." On Walker's suggestion, it was decided that copies of
these instructions should be forwarded to Saunders at Madrid,
with directions to communicate them to the Spanish government.
Indeed, Saunders was to make it appear that the presentation of
this evidence of good will on the part of his government was the
main object of his interview with the Spanish minister ; he was
then to say that the United States would make an offer to pur-
chase the island, if such an offer would be agreeable to Spain.
Walker's happy thought caused Buchanan to withdraw his ob-
jections, and he announced to that he "would cheerfully prepare
the necessary instructions to Mr. Saunders. ' '-^
The dispatch to Saunders, in which Buchanan had incor-
porated the President's views, was formally approved at a cabinet
meeting held on June 17, 1848. He stated that the United States
had no reason to complain so long as Cuba should continue to
be a colony of Spain,
But we can never consent that this Island shall become a Colony of any
other European power. In the possession of Great Britain or any strong
naval power, it might prove ruinous both to our domestic and foreign com-
merce, and endanger the Union of the States. The highest and first duty
of every independent nation is to provide for its own safety; and acting
upon this principle we should be compelled to resist the acquisition of Cuba
by any maritime State with all the means which Providence has placed at
our command.
27 Ibid., 487.
704 JAMES E. POLK
Having thus definitely stated the policy of his government
and the determination to enforce it, the Secretary of State pro-
ceeded to show the necessity for such a policy and to give reasons
for believing that American interests were already menaced by
the designs of Great Britain. Incidentally, these reasons had an
important bearing on the President's recent message relating to
Yucatan. Cuba, said Buchanan, is situated between Florida and
Yucatan, and its possession would give England command of
both inlets to the Gulf. In time of war she could effectively
blockade the mouth of the Mississippi and sever the connection
between the Gulf states and those on the Atlantic.
As reasons for believing that England had ambitious designs,
Buchanan cited first
her uniform policy throughout her jiast history to seize upon every valu-
able commercial point throughout the world whenever circumstances have
placed this in her power.
Under the mask of protector of the Mosquito Indians, "she is
endeavoring to acquire permanent possession of the entire coast
of the Carribean Sea from Cape Honduras to Escuda de Ver-
agua" — and this, too, in violation of her treaty of 1786 with
Spain. By a similar violation, a simple permission to cut log-
wood and mahogany had led to the establishment of the British
colony at Belise. She had taken forcible possession of the har-
bor of San Juan de Nicaragua with the evident purpose of obtain-
ing control over all communication between the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans. Inability of Spain to pay the interest on securi-
ties held in England had given her a much more plausible pre-
text for seizing Cuba than she had for assuming the protectorate
of the Mosquito Indians, and the threatening utterances of Lords
Bentinck and Palmerston indicated a disposition to make use of
tliis pretext. Indeed, the recent dismissal of the British minister
at Madrid had made a rupture between the two nations almost
inevitable; should it come, "no doubt can be entertained that
Great Britain would immediately seize Cuba."
THE "FOLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 705
Saunders was then told that, in the opinion of the President,
a crisis had arrived which made it desirable for the United
States to purchase the island. He was, therefore, to conclude a
treaty, if possible, paying as a maximum the sum of $100,000,000.
He was instructed to make the offer orally, and not until he had
made it plain to the Spanish government that the United States
had been moved wholly by a desire to prevent Cuba from passing
to another power.-**
The hope-** of the President to crown his work of expansion
by annexing Cuba to the United States was doomed to disap-
pointment, for the traditional reluctance of Spain to part with
her West Indian possessions could not be overcome. After an
exasperating delay the Spanish foreign minister replied that it
was
more than any minister dare to entertain any such proposition; that he
believed such to be the feeling of the country, that sooner than see the
island transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk in the
ocean.
After all this statement amounted to a pledge that Spain would
retain Cuba ; and so long as the pledge could be maintained, it
effected the main purpose which Polk had in view. Fear of
British control of the Gulf had prompted his offer, and such
control could not be obtained so long as Spain retained possession
of the island.
A letter dealing with Central American affairs, similar to
the one sent to Saunders, had already been transmitted to Elijah
Hise, who had recently been made charge d' affaires at Guate-
mala. The dissolution of the Central American confederacy,
said Buchanan, had encouraged British encroachments on the
Mosquito coast, therefore Hise was to promote a revival of the
28 Buchanan to Saunders, June 17, 1848 (Buchanan, Works, VIII, 90-
102). Polk, Diari/, III, 493.
29 A person who represented himself to be a financial agent of the
Spanish queen told Dallas that he had been instructed to ascertain whether
the United States would be willing to buy the island. Apparently his
storv was pure fabrication. See Polk, Diary, IV, 4-5.
706 JAMES K. POLE
confederacy. The Secretary was not yet prepared to say what
course the United States would pursue with respect to tlie British
protectorate over the Mosquito Indians, but
To suffer any interference on tlie part of the European Governments
with the domestic concerns of the American Eepublies and to permit them
to establish new colonies upon this continent, would be to jeopard their
independence and to ruin their interests. These truths ought everywhere
throughout this continent to be impressed on the public mind.so
Hise concluded a general commercial treaty on the last day of
Polk's term of office, but nothing was accomplished in the way
of reuniting the Central American states. The Taylor adminis-
tration adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward England the
result of which was the conclusion of the well-known Clayton-
Bulwer treaty of 1850.
Early in the Polk administration an event, unimportant in
itself, very nearly caused a break in our diplomatic relations
with Brazil. On October 31, 1846, Lieutenant Alonzo B. Davis,
of the United States ship Saratoga, went on shore at Rio Janeiro
to apprehend deserters from his vessel. As Davis was about to
take them to his ship, the Brazilian police interfered and im-
prisoned both Davis and the sailors. Henry A. "Wise was then
minister to Brazil, and, to use his own expression, he played
"old Hickory on them" by demanding the immediate release of
the prisoners. He wanted, he said, "to make these Spanish &
Portugese Mongrells in S. America understand that the U.
States MUST he respected. "^'^ All except one of the prisoners
were set free, and the affair might have been dropped had not
Wise and Commodore Rousseau of the American squadron not
wounded the pride of the Brazilian court by further Jacksonian
contempt for diplomatic punctilio.
A fortnight after the prisoners had been released. Wise
ignored an invitation to the baptismal ceremonies of the Imperial
Infanta, and Commodore Rousseau neglected to fire the customary
30 Buchanan to Hise, June 3, 1848 (Buchanan, Worls; VIII, 78-84).
31 Wise to J. Y. Mason, Nov. 6, 1846, Polk Papers.
THE "POLK DOCTBINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 707
salute. A little later, when the Emperor's birthday was being
celebrated, Rousseau neither fired a salute nor hoisted the flag
on his ship, while Wise (not invited this time) made a speech
on shipboard which was anything but complimentary to the
Brazilians. Brazil now requested the recall of both men and
asked for an apology from the United States. The apology was
claimed on the ground of discourtesy to the Emperor and the
more serious charge that Davis had denied the sovereignty of the
empire by resisting the police — conduct which had been approved
and supported by Wise.
When the complaints were presented in Washington by
Lisboa, the Brazilian minister, Polk instructed Buchanan to say
that he would neither apologize nor recall Wise and Rousseau ;
recall of the minister would imply dissatisfaction with his con-
duct, whereas it was highly approved by the President. Buchanan
added, how^ever, that since Wise had, before the trouble had
arisen, alSked to be relieved, the President would grant his re-
quest ; Rousseau, also, would soon be sent to another port. With
this understanding, Buchanan and Lisboa agreed to let the matter
drop ; but the Brazilian government recalled Lisboa, demanded
an apology, and declared that a successor to Wise would not be
received until this had been made.
The new demand for an apology was presented by the charge
de affaires, Leal, in the summer of 1847. The only question of
importance was Lieutenant Davis's alleged resistance of the au-
thority of the police in Rio Janeiro, and everything hinged on
whether Davis or the police first had the sailors in custody. The
evidence seemed to show that Davis had apprehended them before
the police arrived on the scene. While it was admitted that the
jurisdiction of any nation is absolute within its own borders, cus-
tom permitted naval oificers to go on shore to arrest their own
sailors. As this was all that Davis had done, he had, in Polk's
opinion, committed no "infractions of police regulations," conse-
quently Wise was justified in demanding his release from prison.
708 JAMES E. POLE
The threat to reject a new minister was resented as "dictating
terms" to which Brazil "could not have expected submission";
but, said Buchanan, "the President will take no decisive steps"
until he shall have learned that Brazil has actually refused to
receive him.-*- This firm but reasonable declaration had the
desired effect, and the new minister, David Tod, was received
courteously by the Emperor. "Wise returned to the United States
filled with gratitude for the man whom he had once called a
"petty tyrant" and whom he had tried to goad into fighting a
duel. "I learn," wrote the President, after Wise had called to
pay his respects,
that he returns to the U. S. my friend, & his expressions of gratitude to
me to-day were as strong & decided as human language could make them,
so that I have lived to conquer the hostility of at least one of my political
opponents & persecutors. This I have done by performing my duty in a
magnanimous and liberal manner. ss
Zeal of naval officers to protect American rights nearly
involved the government in difficulties with another South
American state. In January, 1845, Buenos Ayres attempted to
invest Montevideo with an absolute blockade ; and because this
Avas forcibly violated by French vessels, a United States naval
officer, G. J. Pendergrast, demanded exemption for his own ves-
sels. The authorities at Washington, however, held that an
offense committed by one nation did not entitle another to dis-
regard belligerent rights, and the officers were instructed to
respect the blockade.
Before this question had been adjusted, British and French
naval officers announced a blackade of the whole coast of Buenos
Ayres and allowed other neutrals only forty-eight hours to with-
draw their vessels from the harbors. Pendergrast entered a
vigorous protest on the ground that neutrals-'^ have no right to
32 The most important letter (written to Leal on Aug. 30, 1847) is
printed in Buchanan, Worls, VII, 38S-404. Nearly all of the correspond-
ence relating to this affair may be found in Sen. Ex. Docs. 29, 35, 30 Cong.,
1 sess. .i.-i Polk, Bianj, III, 192.
34 England and France had not declared war on Buenos Ayres.
THE "POLK DOCTRINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 709
establish a blockade, and that even a belligerent has no right to
declare an entire coast to be blockaded. United States vessels
were given time to discharge their cargoes and withdraw from
the ports, and, since no seizures were made, nothing more serious
resulted than caloric speeches in Congress.'^'^
On December 12, 1846, Benjamin A. Bidlack, acting without
instructions,^" concluded a commercial treaty with New Granada,
one article of which provided for transit across and guaranteed
the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama. Doubtless Bidlack
was moved to take this unauthorized step by Buchanan's letter
of June 23, 1845, which instructed him to use his influence to
prevent New Granada from gi-anting transit concessions to
European powers, and which stated that "the United States
have strong motives for viewing with interest any project which
may be designed to facilitate the intercourse between the Atlantic
and the Pacific oceans. ' "' Nevertheless, the arrival of the treaty
in Washington took the President completely by surprise. At
first, Polk doubted that he could approve this "entangling
alliance. "^^
In general this document followed the usual form of com-
mercial treaties, and only the thirty-fifth article merits special
comment. Among other things, it stipulated that
The Government of New Granada guarantees to the Government of the
United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of
Panama upon any modes of communication that now exist, or may be here-
after constructed, shall be open and free to the Government and citizens
33 See correspondence, H. Ex. Doc. 212, 29 Cong., 1 sess.
36 While this treaty was on its v^^ay to Washington, Buchanan, on
January 2, 1847, authorized Bidlack to negotiate a commercial treaty.
See Buchanan, Works, VII, 183-186.
3T Buchanan, Works, VI, 180-181.
38 "As a commercial Treaty it was liberal & in all respects satisfactory,
but in addition to its commercial provisions it contained an article giving
the guaranty of the U. S. for the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama,
and "the sovereignty of New Granada over the territory. Serious doubts
were entertained whether this stipulation was consistent with our long-
settled policy to 'cultivate friendship with all nations, entangling alliances
with none' " (Polk, Diarti, II, 3G3).
710 JAMES K. POLK
of the United States, [and that] .... the United States guarantee, posi-
tively and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present stipulation the
neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with the view that the free
transit from the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or embarrassed
in any future time while this treaty exists; and, in consequence, the United
States also guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and
property which New Granada has and possesses over the territoiy.
The treaty was to remain in force for twenty years, and then
indefinitely, unless terminated by twelve months' notice from
either party.^^
A few days of deliberation overcame Polk 's scruples regard-
ing the entangling alliance and convinced him that the transit
agreement was too important to be rejected. On February 10
he submitted the treaty to the Senate with a message which stated
that "the importance of this concession to the commercial and
political interests of the United States can not easily be over-
rated." He advised ratification because
The treaty does not propose to guarantee a territory to a foreign nation
in which the United States will have no common interest with that nation.
On the contrary, we are more deeply and directly interested in the subject
of this guaranty that New Granada herself or any other country.
Besides, the purpose was commercial, not political, and it was
expected that England and France would join in the guaranty.
The guaranty of sovereignty was, in his opinoin, indispensable
to neutrality and to the protection of property rights ; and as-
surance of New Granada's permanent sovereignty would remove
cause for jealousy on the part of maritime powers. ^° Misgivings
respecting the thirty-fifth article and pressure of other business
caused a postponement of action until the next session of Con-
gress, but in June, 1848, the Senate finally gave its approval.
Although the extent of our obligation to insure the "neutrality"
and the "sovereignty" of New Granada has been subject to dif-
ferent interpretations, the subsequent history of this treaty is
39 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I, 302 ff.
40 Richardson, Messages, Jv, 511-513.
THE "POLK DOCTEINE" AND MINOR QUESTIONS 711
not within the purview of tlie present volume.'^ However, it may-
be said in passing that a forced construction of the thirty-fifth
article was utilized by President Roosevelt to prevent Colombia
from suppi-essing the Panaman insurrection and to facilitate the
process of "taking" the canal zone.
In the last year of his administration President Polk ap-
pointed the first diplomatic agent ever sent from the United
States to reside at the capital of Ecuador and diplomatic rela-
tions were opened wtih the republic of Bolivia/- In both cases
assurances were given that foreign interference v/ould be re-
sisted, and emphasis was laid on the identity of interests of the
American republics.
One of the last diplomatic events of Polk's official term was
the ratification of a postal convention with Great Britain. Suc-
cess in its negotiation was due to the untiring efforts of George
Bancroft, and its importance consisted in removing vexatious
discriminations against United States mails. Of it the President
said in his diary :
It places our own steamers and packets upon an equal footing with the
Brittish and relieves our merchants, naturalized citizens, and others from
a heavy discriminating charge of postage on letters and other mailable
matter conveyed in American vessels. This change has been effected by
the policy of the administration. Had it occurred under other circum-
stances & when so many other great events had not been crowded into a
single Presidential term, it would have attracted more public attention and
been regarded as an important achievement.43
It was, in deed, an important achievement, for it established
reciprocal privileges and deprived the Cunard steamers of a
virtual monopoly in carrying the mails.**
41 See Latane. Diplomatic EeJations of the United States and Spanish
America, 182-188.
42 Buchanan to Livingston, May 13, 1848; same to Appletoh, June 1,
1848 (Buchanan, Worlfs, VIII, 64, 74).
43 Polk, Diary, IV, 271-272.
44 See Buchanan to Bancroft, July 27, 1847, in which he speaks of the
"conduct of the British Post Office, in charging the same postage on
letters carried on our steamer, the Washington, to Southampton, at the
712 JAMES E. POLK
Polk's remark concerning the postal convention applies
equally well to a number of minor diplomatic achievements
which were overshadowed by the Mexican and Oregon questions ;
in a peaceful period they would have attracted more attention
and redounded more to the credit of the man who directed our
foreign policy. His vigilance in safeguarding American inter-
ests prevented foreign nations from gaining additonal influence
on this continent. While the original Monroe Doctrine has long
ceased to have any practical application, the "Polk Doctrine"
has been an active force in our history down to the present day.
It has not, indeed, been an unmixed blessing, for it has brought
us burdens as well as prestige. But whether we approve or con-
demn the doctrine, it was Polk who first declared that the United
States would not permit any interference, solicited or otherwise,
in American affairs, by European monarchies. In general, his
doctrine has been indorsed by the people of the United States.
expense of the United States, as though they had been carried there by a
British steamer, at the expense of the British Government" (Buchanan,
Works, VII, 375).
CHAPTER XXV
CLOSE OF CAREER
Despite the one-term pledge included in his letter accepting
the Presidential nomination, there were many who believed that
Polk would stand for a second term. Some of the Democratic
leaders feared that he might do so, while certain of his friends
hoped that he might be induced to accept another nomination.
Both fears and hopes were wholly unwarranted, for the Presi-
dent never swerved from his determination to retire at the end
of four years. Notwithstanding Claiborne 's disparaging remark
that ''no one but himself dreamed of his re-election,"^ nothing
in contemporary documents indicates that Polk indulged in such
dreams ; on the contrary, there is abundant evidence to show that
he longed to retire from public life.
As early as December, 8145, Senator Benton expressed the
belief that certain Tennessee politicians were planning to run
Polk for another term. When told of this the President noted in
his diary that there was not the slightest foundation for such a
belief : ' ' My mind has been made up from the time I accepted the
Baltimore nomination, and is still so, to serve but one term and
not be a candidate for re-election." In January, 1847, he re-
joiced "that with my own voluntary free will & consent I am
not to be again a candidate. This determination is irrevocable. ' '-
During the course of his administration political leaders fre-
quently suggested to the President that he ought to (sometimes
must) run again. On all occasions his answer was the same —
that under no circumstances would he again be a candidate.
1 Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, I, 235.
2 Polk, Diary, I, 142, II, 328.
714 JAMES K. POLE
In 1848, when commenting on Buchanan's scheming for the nomi-
nation, the President wrote in his diary :
The truth is, I have no doubt, though I cauuot prove it, that Mr.
Buchanan has become apprehensive that in the contest for the nomination
between Gen'l Cass, Mr. Woodbury, and himself the Democratic party
may ultimately be forced to look to me for re-election. He knows that I
have no such views & that I have constantly declared to all who have
introduced the subject to me that I would retire at the end of a single
term, but notmthstanding this he fears that a state of things might arise
in which the party might require me against my will to be placed before
the country for re-election.3
On May 13, 1848, the second anniversary of the declaration
of war against Mexico, the President read to Cave Johnson a
letter in which he formally declared that he would not stand for
reelection. It was addressed to Dr. J. M. G. Ramsey, a Tennessee
delegate to the Democratic national convention, and was "to be
by him presented to the convention if, as has been often sug-
gested to me it might be, my name should be brought before the
convention for nomination." Inasmuch as he was determined
to retire, he deemed it "proper to relieve the Convention of any
embarrassment which the presentation of his [my] name might
produce." Subsequently the letter was shown to several of the
delegates who had stopped in Washington on their way to Balti-
more, and to personal friends. All regretted liis determination to
retire. Rhett, of South Carolina, and Venable, of North Caro-
lina, went so far as to say that Polk could carry their respective
states, but that Cass would be unable to do so. While he could
not fail to be gratified with such expressions of approval, the
President adhered to his original purpose, and his letter to
Ramsey was read to the convention before the balloting liad
begun.*
Not only did the President decline anotlier nomination, but
from first to last he had refused to lend his influence to any
3 Ibid., Ill, 354-355.
4 Polk, Diary, IV, 448-463, imssim. The letter itself is printed in Jen-
kins, Life of James Knox Folic, 307.
CLOSE OF CAREER 715
aspirant of bis party. Not even in his diary does he express a
distinct preference, although there are indications that he prob-
ably preferred Cass. He made his appointments and shaped his
policies with a view to the success of his own administration.
To aspirants and to the public he made it clear that he would
affiliate with no faction of the party ; he would support the can-
didate chosen by the representatives of the people, whoever that
candidate might be. He even tolerated the Barnburners until
they had openly seceded from the party.
The Democratic national convention assembled at Baltimore
on May 22, 1848, and its greatest difficulty proved to be the
solution of a knotty problem presented by the delegates from
New York. Two sets of delegates from this state appeared, and
each claimed the right to seats in the convention. On the first
day the credentials committee decided tentatively to admit neither
faction unless it would agree to abide by the nomination. This
decision was regarded as a victory for the Hunkers and as advan-
tageous to Cass, and the Barnburners refused to submit to inter-
rogations. "When reporting this to Polk, J. Knox "Walker wrote
that ' ' Your true position before the Convention will be presented
immediately before any balloting. ' ' Two days later he reported
much bitterness and confusion, and that the convention probably
would admit both delegations.'^ This course was adopted event-
ually, as the convention did not care to assume the responsibility
of deciding between the two factions.
The Barnburners, who favored the Wilmot proviso, were dis-
satisfied and retired from the convention. They met at Utica in
June and nominated Van Buren for President. In August, at
a convention held in Buffalo, they joined with Whigs and Aboli-
tionists in nominating A^an Buren and Charles Francis Adams on
a "Free-soil" ticket.
The secession of the New York delegation from the Baltimore
convention and their subsequent affiliation with old-time enemies
5 Walker to Polk, May 22, 24, 1848, Folk Papers.
71(5 JAMES K. FOLK
were regarded by the President as little short of party treason.
He lost no time in removing from office B. F. Butler and other
active Barnburners. When news of the nominations made at
Buffalo reached Washington, he remarked that "Mr. Van Buren
is the most fallen man I have ever known. ' '"
Party schism and ill health overcame temporarily the iron
will of the President, and he yielded to despondency — almost to
despair. Schism mean the probable success of the Whigs and
the reversal of his cherished policies. Ill health portended an
early termination of his earthly career. On November 2, his
fifty-third birthday, he confided to his diary :
It will be 21 years on to-morrow since my father died. My mother is
still living; Upon each recurrence of my birthday I am solemnly im-
pressed with the vanity & emptiness of worldly honors and worldly enjoy-
ments and of [the wisdom of] preparing for a future estate. In four
months I shall retire from public life forever. I have lived three fourths
of the period ordinarily allotted to man on earth. I have been highly
honoured by my fellow-men and have filled the highest station on earth,
but I will soon go the way of all the earth. I pray God to prepare me to
meet the great event.
The news, a week later, that Taylor had probably been elected
President called forth another melancholy comment:
Should this be so, it is deeply to be regretted. "Without experience in
civil life, he is wholly unqualified for the station, and being elected by
the Federal party and the various factions of dissatisfied persons who
have from time to time broken off from the Democratic party, he must be
in their hands and under their absolute control. Having no opinions or
judgment of his own upon any one public subject, foreign or domestic, he
will be compelled to rely upon the designing men of the Federal party who
will cluster around him, and will be made to reverse, so far as the Execu-
tive can reverse, the whole policy of my administration, and substitute
the Federal policy in its stead. The country will be the loose [loser] by
his election, and on this account it is an event which I should deeply
regret."
The defection of the Barnburners, which augured Democratic
defeat in November, made the President all the more determined
0 Polk, Diary, IV, 36-37, 67. - Ibid., 177, 184-185.
CLOSE OF CAREER 717
to achieve new victories while his own party remained in power.
During the summer of 1848 he busied himself with what proved
to be a hopeless attempt to acquire Cuba, and with extending
the influence of the United States in South and Central America,
When Congress convened in December, Taylor had been
elected and there remained but one short session of Democratic
rule. Polk's four great policies^ had been carried through suc-
cessfully, but the problem of slavery in the Mexican cession still
remained to be solved. Defeat of his party at the polls did not
deter the President from urging once more his own solution —
the extension of the Missouri Compromise line. His persistency
led Collamer, of Vermont, to compare him with the lawyer who,
being reprimanded for contending against the opinion of the
judge, replied that he "was not rearguing the case, hut damning
the decision. "°
Judged by standards of the period which was just closing,
the solution offered by the President's message seemed both nat-
ural and reasonable. Even so shrewd a politician as Polk did
not seem to realize that the days of King Compromise were
numbered and that conscience and abstract principles had be-
come the dominating factors in the slavery question. Influential
leaders of both North and South were now more interested in
constitutional rights than in rquare miles of territory, and the
rank and file were rapidly falling into line. To be sure another
compromise law was recorded in the statute books in 1850, but
Clay's famous omnibus turned out to be Pandora's box in dis-
guise. During the debate on this bill, Calhoun gave warning that
disunion would surely result from further agitation against
slavery on the part of the North. In reply, Seward announced his
''higher law" doctrine which served as a battle-cry in renewed
onslaughts upon the "peculiar institution."
8 California, Oregon, Tariff, and the Independent Treasury.
9 Coleman, Life of John J. Crittenden, 328.
718 JAMES K. POLK
Naturally, Polk was chagrined because the slavery question
remained unsolved at the close of his administration, and, as we
have seen in a preceding chapter, he left "Washington harboring
the fear that California would become an independent state.^°
Still, he had little cause for discouragement on account of failure
in this particular. The most ambitious executive might well be
satisfied with the achievements of his administration.
During the course of his official term Polk renewed amicable
relations with nearly all of his political antagonists. Bailie Pey-
ton was the first to seek a reconciliation, and in September, 1845,
in response to an inquiry, the President said that he "would
receive him courteously & respectfully."^^ Peyton was subse-
quently given a miltiary appointment during the war with Mex-
ico. Wise, as we have seen, was completly won over by the loyal
support which the President gave him while he was minister to
Brazil. John Bell was the last to seek a renewal of friendly
relations, but in January, 1848, he, too, offered the pipe of peace.
As the two men had not spoken since the Speakership contest
in 1835, the first interview was somewhat embarrassing, especi-
ally so on the part of Bell. The President's "manner and con-
versation," however, "soon put him at his ease. "^^ "With Clay,
the President alwa^'s maintained cordial personal relations. Clay
was a dinner guest at the executive mansion on several occasions,
and, according to Foote, he tendered his services to the Presi-
dent in overcoming Whig opposition to the treaty with Mexico.^^
Polk left office harboring greater resentment for individual
Democrats than for members of the opposition party. Blair and
Benton had proved themselves to be "unprincipled," and the
10 See above, page 655. n Polk, Diary, I, 32.
12 "I said to him that I was glad to see him, and that so far as I was
concerned 1 was willing to let bye-gones be bye-gones, to let the past be
forgotten, and to renew with him our personal intercourse. He said that
was his desire, that we were to live neighl^ors when we retired from public
life, and that he desired to be on terms of friendship. I expressed similar
desires on my part" (Polk, Diary, III, 284-285).
13 Polk, Diary, passim. H. S. Foote, Casket of Beminiscences, 22.
CLOSE OF CAEEEE 719
"baseness" of Wilmot could not "be adequately described.'"
For the opposition party as a whole, his feelings had undergone
no change. As late as February 20, 1849, he recorded that
The Whigs & abolitionists in Congress pursue me with a malignity and a
bitterness which can only be accounted for because of their chagrin at
the success of Democratic measures during my administration. i^
Determined to uphold Democratic principles so long as the power
rested in his hands, he went to the capitol on the last evening of
his official term prepared to veto the Wilmot proviso and any
internal improvement bill that might be presented. As we have
seen in the preceding pages, he was not called upon to use the
veto power, although Congress would in all probability have
passed the obnoxious bills if the President's determination to veto
them had not become known.
The delight caused by the thought of retirement is recorded,
by the President on February 13, 1849, the fourth anniversary
of his arrival in Washington :
I am heartily rejoiced that my term is so near its close. I will soon
cease to be a servant and become a sovereign. As a private citizen I will
have no one but myself to serve, and will exercise a part of the sovereign
power of the country. I am sure I "will be happier in this condition than
in the exalted station I now hold.i^
General Taylor arrived in Washington on February 23, and
immediately an annoying question of etiquette presented itself.
Buchanan and other members of the cabinet were planning to
call upon the President-elect, and one of them consulted Polk
concerning the propriety of their doing so. Polk and Taylor had
never met ; but since their relations during the Mexican war had
been mutually distrustful, the President was not at all certain
that Taylor would call upon him to pay his respects. He told
the members, therefore, that "if my Cabinet called on Gen'l
Taylor before he called on me, I should feel that I had been
1* Polk, Diary, IV, 227, 343-344.
^^Ihid., 331-332.
720 JAMES K. POLK
deserted by my own political family." All except the Secretary
of State agreed with the President ; Buchanan threatened to dis-
regard Polk's wishes, but did not carry out his threat. Taylor
removed the cause for embarrassment by calling at the White
House on February 26, after which Polk gave a dinner in his
honor and treated him with the utmost cordiality.^*' As they
rode to the capitol on inauguration day, Polk found his successor
to be well meaning, but " exceedinglly ignorant of public affairs" ;
he added to the general's difficulties by ahsconding with the Ex-
ecutive Journal so that poor Taylor did not know what officers
he was expected to appoint !^^ When reporting to Polk this joke
of the season. Cave Johnson said that the new President knew
less about public affairs than even his opponents had believed.
On the evening of March 5^* Polk boarded the steamboat and
began his journey homeward. In response to invitations from
southern cities, he traveled via Richmond, Charleston, and New
Orleans, thence up the Mississijjpi river. During his whole Presi-
dential term he had suffered much from chronic diarrhoea, and
the fatigue of the journey caused its recurrence in an acute form.
Medical attention gave temporary relief, and the ex-President
reached Nashville much weakened yet apparently on the road to
recovery. After a brief rest he was able to visit his mother at
Columbia and Mrs. Polk's mother at Murfreesborough.
About a year before he left Washington he disposed of his
home in Columbia and purchased the Nashville residence of the
late Senator Grundy. It was renamed Polk Place, and under
the ijersonal supervision of Mrs. Polk the house was enlarged
and refurnished, and the grounds beautified. The President
16/ftid., 349-359.
i""Tlic old Genl himself says that by some accident or mistake you
had taken off the Executive Journal & therefore he had been dilitory in
presenting his nominations — he could not know what offices he had to fill
on that acct!" (Johnson to Polk, Washington, March 17, 1849, Folic
Papers). Johnson remained in the I'ost Office Department for a few days
after Taylor's inauguration.
18 As the 4th fell on Sunday, Taylor was not iiuiuguratcd until the 5th.
CLOSE OF CABEEB 721
longed for the day to arrive wlieu he might put aside the cares
of state and enjoy the quiet of a private citizen, although many
of his utterances indicate that he believed the end to be near.
For a time, after his arrival in Nashville, he was more cheer-
ful. The enthusiastic welcome accorded by his neighbors and
the interest which he took in supervising the improvements being
made at Polk Place restored temporarily his old-time vigor.
Whenever he undertook the performance of a task it was his
habit to expend his energies freely ; and in his present state of
health, his storehouse of energy was rapidly exhausted. The
labor of arranging the books in his library caused a recurrence
of the malady from which he had suffered on his homeward
journey, and it was soon apparent that he could not recover.
The Polk family as well as Mrs. Polk were Presbyterians, but
the ex-President was not a member of any church. He went
regularly with his wife to the church of her choice, although his
preference was for the Methodist denomination. '*' A few days
before his death his aged mother came from Columbia bringing
her own pastor in the hope that her son might accept baptism
and unite with the Presbyterian church. But the son recalled a
promise once given to Reverend McFerren, of the Methodist
church, that, when he was ready to join the church, McFerren
should baptize him.=° Having thus formally embraced Chris-
tianity, he felt prepared "to meet the great event.'"' He died
on June 15, 1849, in the fifty-fourth year of his age. He was
buried in the garden at. Polk Place. In 1893 his body, with that
of Mrs. Polk, was removed to the grounds of the state capitol.
On his tomb is the following epitaph, prepared by A. 0. P.
Nicholson :
10 "Mrs. Polk being a member of the Presbyterian Church I generally
attend that Church with her, though my opinions and predilections are in
favor of the Methodist Church" (Polk, Diary, I, 86).
20 Chase, History of the Polk Administration, 474-475.
21 See above, page 716.
722 JAMES K. POLK
By his public policy he defined, established, and extended the boun-
daries of his country. He planted the laws of the American union on the
shores of the Pacific. His influence and his counsels tended to organize
the national treasury on the principles of the Constitution, and to apply
the rule of freedom to navigation, trade, and industry.
This eulogium by no means exaggerates the national service
rendered by President Polk. Indeed, Nicholson might have added
that he had made the American continents ' ' safe for democracy ' '
by repelling with vigor all interference by Enropean powers.
Seldom in our history has such an ambitious and so varied a
program been carried into effect in the brief space of four years.
It was a program conceived, for the most part, by the President
himself, and his dogged persistence was an important factor in
procuring the legislation necessary for putting it in operation.
And yet, as Schouler has truthfully said, when commenting on
the ex-President 's death :
After this brief-spaced decent tribute Polk's name was seldom pub-
licly mentioned. Over the fruits, sweet and bitter, which his adminis-
tration had cast so abundantly into the lap of the people, there sprang
up very soon sectional quarrel and contention, but the gatherer of those
fruits was very soon forgotten. 22
And, in a great measure, he remained "forgotten" notwith-
standing the fact that his tariff policy led to prosperity ; that
his "constitutional treasury" proved to be successful; that his
"Polk Doctrine" has been approved and extended; and that his
expansion policy added over five hundred thousand square miles
of territory and gave the United States free access to the Pacific.
The acquisition of Louisiana, with its abundant resources and
its value as a home for America's surplus population, lias com-
monly been accredited to tlie stalcsinanship and farsightedness
of Thomas Jefferson. When the centennial of this event was
celebrated at St. Louis in 1904, Jefferson's part in the trans-
action was commemorated by medals struck in his honor. At a
22 Schouler, History of the United Slates, Y, 127.
CLOSE OF CAEEEE 723
similar exposition held in San Francisco in 1915 to celebrate the
opening of the Panama canal, one listened in vain for any men-
tion of the name of the man who had acquired the ground on
■which the exposition was being held, although days were dedi-
cated ofiEicially to many individuals who had contributed little
or nothing to the acquisition of the canal or to the prosperity
of the Pacific coast. Possibly, many who attended the exposition
could not have answered the campaign cry of 1844, "Who is
James K. Polk?" And yet, every one who is familair with our
history knows that Louisiana was purchased without Jefferson's
knowledge or consent, and that a vast empire (including Cali-
fornia) on the Pacific coast came into the possession of the United
States as the result of a policy conceived by President Polk and
consummated despite vigorous opposition, both at home and
abroad.
Why, then, has this man's name been enveloped in compar-
ative obscurity? Why has he not received full credit for his
achievements ? Undoubtedly one reason is that he possessed little
personal magnetism, while his uncompromising independence dis-
satisfied all factions ; and, consequently, he had no personal fol-
lowing to sound his praises and perpetuate his memory. The
excerpt from Schouler, above quoted, suggests incidentally a more
potent reason, although Schouler lays the chief emphasis on the
fact that Polk was "soon forgotten." As he says, "there sprang
up very soon sectional quarrel and contention," and unquestion-
ably this sectional discord had much to do with attaching odium
to the Polk administration and with consigning the President's
memory to oblivion.
The introduction of the Wilmot proviso precipitated a real
crisis in our history. The debate which it elicited presented new
phases of the slavery question and rendered the sectional conflict
truly "irrepressible." The determination of the anti-slavery
forces to exclude the institution from all territories called forth
a counter-determination on the part of the South that the
724 JAMES K. POLE
"rights" of the slaveholding states must be guaranteed and pro-
tected. Henceforth the slavery question overshadowed all others.
Little thought was given to the "sweet fruits" which Polk had
gathered. Debates on topics wholly unrelated to slavery inevit-
ably drifted into a discussion of this fatal subject, and all at-
tempts made to solve the problem increased rather than dimin-
ished sectional bitterness.
Since the conflict at first^^ concerned the territories acquired
from Mexico, Polk's expansion policy was represented to be a
conspiracy to extend slavery. But the President was not even
given the credit usually accorded to a successful conspirator, for
he was alleged to be the mere tool of more capable intriguers.
On the other hand, the protagonists of slavery had no gratitude
for the man who was charged with being their agent in the plot
to extend slavery. His unswerving independence, his refusal to
approve the extreme southern program, and his advocacy of an
extension of the Missouri Compromise line, made him, in their
eyes, a traitor to southern interests. As we have noted elsewhere,
Polk's policy of compromise was the policy of a period which
had just closed. Total exclusion of slavery from the territories
had become the watchword of one of the parties to the all-ab-
sorbing contest; unrestricted admission of "slave-property" was
demanded by the other. As the advocate of the traditional
method of adjusting the slavery question Polk satisfied neither
side, and he w^as charged by each with being weak and tempor-
izing. The achievements of his administration and his valuable
services as chief executive w'ere obscured by the focusing of public
attention on the slavery question in its new and more acute form.
Leaders of more extreme views won the approval of their respec-
tive sections. Conservatives like Polk were remembered only to
be condemned. In the earlier histories of the Mexican War the
Avriters have derived their information mainly from Whig sources
23 It was not until the introduction of the Nebraska bill in 1854 that
territories in the Louisiana Purchase were included in the discussion.
CLOSE OF CABEEE 725
and from distorted accounts written by dissatisfied Democrats like
Senator Benton.-* Very naturally, therefore, Polk has been cari-
catured as tlie pliable instrument of the slave power, and little
attention lias been given to the constructive policies of his admin-
istration. More recently, however, much valuable material has
been made available, and investigators have approached the sub-
ject with minds unprejudiced by the obsolete sectional contro-
versy. They have found — and it is believed that the preceding
pages have shown — that Polk was neither a conspirator nor a
weakling, but that he was a constructive statesman, an unsually
able executive, and a sound patriot. No other President took his
task more seriously nor spent his energies more freely for his
country ; and few, indeed, have done more to increase the power
and prestige of the nation.
2* Especially his Thirty Years ' View.
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728 JAMES K. POLE
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Lincoln, Abraham. Complete Works, compiled by Jolui G. Nicolay and
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' ' Polk-Donelson Letters, ' ' Tennessee Historical Magazine, III, No. 4. Let-
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Union. Semi weekly and triweekly.
Whig.
San Francisco
Alta California
Washington
Gazette.
Globe.
Madisonian.
National Intelligenoer.
Spectator.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 729
PEEIODICALS
American Historical Magazine. 9 vols. Nashville, 1896-1904. Contains
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AETICLES IN PERIODICALS
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SioussAT, St. George L. "Some Phases of Tennessee Politics in the Jack-
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BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS
Adams, Ephraiji Douglas. British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-
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Adams, Henry. History of the United States. New York, 1891-1898.
Ambler, Charles Henry. Thom<is Ritchie. Richmond, 1913.
Bancroft, Hubert Howe. History of California, Vol. 5. San Francisco,
1886.
Benton, Thomas H. Thirty Years' View. New York, 1862.
Birney, William. James G. Birney and His Times. New York, 1890.
Chase, Lucien B. History of the Polk Administration. New York, 1850.
Claiborne, J. F. H. Life and Carrespondence of John A. Quitman. 2 vols.
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Coleman, Ann Mary Butler. The Life of John J. Crittenden, with selec-
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Curtis, George Ticknor. Life of Daniel Webster. 2 vols. New York,
1870.
Curtis, George Ticknor. Life of James BucJianan. 2 vols. New York,
1883.
FooTE, Henry S. Casket of Rem,iniscences. Washington, 1874.
Fremont, John Charles. Memoirs of My Life. Chicago and New York,
1887.
730 JAMES E. POLK
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Grant, U. S. Personal Memoirs. 2 vols. New York, 1885-1886.
Gray, W. H. A History of Oregon, 1792-1849. Portland, 1870.
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W. A. Croffut. New York and London, 1909.
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States, translated by Alfred B. Mason and Paul Shorey. 8 vols.
Chicago, 1881-1892.
HoLST, Dr. H. VON. Verfassungsgeschichte der Vereinigten Stouten von
Ameril-a. -1 vols. Berlin, 1878-1884.
Howe, M. A. De Wolfe. The Life and Letters of George Bancroft. 2
vols. New York, 1908.
Jay, William. A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican
War. Pliiladelphia, 1849.
Jenkins, John S. The Life of James Knox Poll: Auburn, 1850.
Jones, Anson. Memoranda and official correspondence relating to the
Eepublic of Texas, its history arid annexation. Including a brief
autobiography of the author. New York, 1859.
Latane, John H. Diplomatic Eelations of the United States and Spanish
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Mann, Mary Tylek. Life of Horace Mann. Boston, 1865.
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2 vols. New York, 1913.
Meigs, William Montgomery. The Life of Thomas Hart Benton. Pliila-
delphia and London, 1904.
Nelson, Anson and Fanny. Memorials of Sarah Childress Polk. New
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Parton, James. Life of Andrew Jackson. 3 vols. Boston, 187().
Phelan, James. History of Tennessee. Boston, 1889.
Porter, Valentine Mott. General Stephen W. Kearny and tlu Coniiuest
of California. Los Angeles, 1911.
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BIBLIOGBAPRY 731
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1899.
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self. Usually cited as Autobiography. 2 vols. New York, 1864.
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Smith, Justin H. The Annexation of Texas. New York, 1911.
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Temple, Oliver P. Notable Men of Tennessee, from 1833 to 1875. Their
Times and Contemporaries. New York, 1912.
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1846.
Tyler, Lyon G. Letters and Times of the Tylers. 3 vols. Richmond,
1884-1896.
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States. 3 vols. Washington, 1887.
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Yoakum, H. History of Texas, 1685-1846. 2 vols. New York, 1856.
INDEX
Aberdeen, Lord, 417; and Oregon,
563, 574, 584.
Abolition vote, 279-280.
Adams, C. F., "Free-soil" nom-
inee (1848), 715.
Adams, J. Q., 46, 304; opposes
Polk, 44, 97, 122; slavery peti-
tions, 109, 126; opposes annex-
ation of Texas, 117, 126; de-
clines to attend Polk's inaugura-
tion, 319; supports Polk's diplo-
matic appropriation, 443 ; agrees
with Polk on "all Oregon," 443,
590; death, 545; and Cuba, 699.
"Alabama letters," 271.
Alexander, A. E., 208.
Allen, E., 357, 371.
Allen, William, 403, 561, 585; on
Oregon, 599; resigns, 609; de-
sires congressional ' ' Polk Doc-
trine," 694.
Almonte, J. N., 354, 445, 465.
"American System," Polk's opin-
ion of, 656 ff.; defeated, 678;
Polk's able message on, 686; ob-
solete, 689.
Ampudia, Pedro de, 411.
Anaya, P. M., President ad interim,
521 ; appoints peace commission-
ers, 522.
Anderson, Alex., Senator, 169, 271.
Archer, W. S., 313, 441, 581.
Arista, Mariano, 412.
Armstrong, Eobert, 152, 273, 286,
574; informs Polk of election,
283.
Ashburton, Lord, boundary mis-
sion, 558.
Aslimun, George, 467.
Astor, John J., 556,
Atchison, David R., 346, 586, 596.
Atherton, C. G., 126.
Atocha, A. J., advises Polk on
Mexican policy, 396-399, 465;
472, 487; suggests bribery, 534.
Aristain, Miguel, peace commis-
sioner, 522.
Badger, G. E., 631.
Bagby, A. P., 674.
' ' Balance of power, ' ' opposed by
Polk, 693.
Baldwin, R. S., 631.
Bancroft, George, works for Polk's
nomination, 237 ff., 272; Secre-
taiy of Navj', 298 ; instructions
to Taylor, 375; order relating to
Santa Anna, 439 ; his postal
treaty with Great Britain, 711.
Bank of the United States, asks
for recharter, 28; sale of stocks,
30.
"Bank war," importance of, 26;
Polk's part in, 26-46.
Bankhead, Cliarles, British minister
in Mexico, 506, 514.
Baranda, Manuel, desires peace
with United States, 506.
Barnburners, convention (1848),
633 ; removed by Polk, 643.
Bayly, T. H., 305.
Beach, Moses Y., would make treaty
without authority, 538.
"Bear flag" episode, 426.
[733]
INDEX
"Bedford letter," 84.
Bedinger, Henry, 621.
Bell, John, 57, 174 ; chosen speaker,
50 ; Murf reesborough speech, 53 ;
his "Cassedy letter," 58, 68,
84, 105; favors U. S. bank, 84-
85; charges Polk with partisan
bias, 98 ; denounces Jacksonism,
99, 130; northern tour, 123;
never a real Jackson man, 130 ff. ;
renews friendship with Polk,
718; supporter of White, 63, 68.
Benton, Thomas H., 28, 33, 164,
230, 236, 255, 262; "insane,"
257, 264^265; anti-Texas, 266;
opposes Tylorites, 288 : on Texas
bill, 314; advises Polk, 403, 436,
441, 466; urges expedition to
Mexico City, 453 ; declines mili-
tary appointment, 471; breaks
with Polk, 476 ; thirteen day de-
nunciation of Kearny, 477 ; sug-
gests ambulatory commissioner,
486 ; on Oregon question, 560,
576, 581, 594, 606, 631; Califor-
nia letter, 644; on tariff, 675;
"unprliieipled," 718.
Berrien, John M., on slavery, 622.
Biddle, Nicholas, 29, 32.
Bidlack, Benj. A., his treaty with
New Granada, 709-711.
Biggs, Asa, 672.
Birney, James G., nomination for
President, 263 ; prefers Polk to
Clay, 263; and free trade, 281.
Black, James A., 584, 601.
Black, John, 384.
Blackwell, J. W., 138.
Blair, F. P., hostile to Polk, 57,
164; instructed by Jackson, 265,
268, 315; sells Globe, 333; "un-
. principled," 718.
Blair, John, 286.
Bouck, W. C, 279.
Bowlin, J. B., 275.
Bradford, J. O., 114.
Brady, William, 56, 76.
Briggs, G. N., 95.
Bright, J. D., 634.
BrinkerhofP, Jacob, 587, 588.
Brown, Aaron V., 6, 64, 77, 174,
209, 259, 320 ; part in Texas pro-
gram, 220, 257; instructs Polk,
253.
Bro^vn, Jacob, killed, 429.
Brown, Milton, 205; Texas resolu-
tion, 311, 314.
Bro^vn, Thomas, 195.
Brownlow, "Parson" (W. G.),
124.
Buchanan, James, 164, 284; Secre-
tary of State, 294, 400 ; on acqui-
sition of territory, 416, 423, 437,
527; drafts project of treaty
with Mexico, 491; rejects Mexi-
can peace tenns, 518; would re-
ject Trist's treaty, 539; sus-
pected of treachery, 549 ; fears
war over Oregon, 572, 578, 581;
• no ' ' backing out, ' ' 607 ; on Ore-
gon bill, 640 ; on tariff, 666 ;
fears war over Cuba, 702 ; presi-
dential aspirations, 714.
Buena Vista, battle of, 480.
Burges, Tristam, 83.
Burke, Edmund, 629.
Burt, A., 621, 640.
Butler, A. P., 469, 648.
Butler, B. F., 234, 239; declines
war portfolio, 295 ; removed by
Polk, 643.
Butler, W. O., 471. 703; succeeds
Scott, 531.
Bynum, J. A.', 129.
Cadwalader, George, 511.
[734]
INDEX
Calhouu, John C, 7, 203, 231, 232,
270, 308; on Jackson's part in
abolition, 108 ; Secretary of
State, 218, 562; Texas ""con-
spiracy, ' ' 220, 241 ; suggested
for Polk's cabinet, 289- "na-
tionalizes" slavery and aboli-
tion, 311, 615; desires Califor-
nia, 403; declines to vote on
declaration of war, 415; opposes
lieutenant-general, 463; "most
mischievous man in the Senate, ' '
468; opposes war, 530, 623;
urges ' ' masterly inactivity, ' '
560; declines British mission,
567; "against any compromise
line," 624; presidential hopes,
626; seeks pledge from Polk on
southern governors for terri-
tories, 636; urges veto of Oregon
bill, 640; address on slavery,
649 ; opposes congressional ' ' Polk
Doctrine," 694; interpretation
of Monroe Doctrine, 700; dis-
union warning, 717.
California, one of Polk's "great
measures," 351; supposed de-
signs upon, 386 ; Mexican war
"waged for," 391; Kearny sent
to, 422; conquest of, 426; gov-
ernment, 644 ff., 651, 654; inde-
pendence of, 655.
Cambreleng, C. C, 292; Polk
"worse than Tyler," 416.
Cameron, Simon, on tariff, 278,
668, 675.
Campbell, R. B., 439.
Campbell, W. W., 591.
Cannon, Newton, assails Jackson
and Van Buren, 118; meets Polk
in debate, 145 ff . ; charges against
Jackson, 146; last message, 155.
Carroll, William, 42, 87, 122.
Carson, "Kit," 473.
Cass, Le-n-is, 209, 216, 441, 585,
598; Texas letter, 229; cam-
paigns for Polk, 258, 275; his
"Nicholson letter," 630; on
tariff, 668 ; desires congressional
"Polk Doctrine," 695.
"Cassedy letter," 58, 68, 105;
copy of, 84.
Castro, Jose, 424, 427.
Catholics, 279; as chaplains, 421.
Catron, John, 61, 252, 286, 302;
favors paper money, 115, 660;
on constitutionality of Texas
resolution, 314; asserts power of
Congress over slavery, 634.
Cerro Gordo, battle of, 481.
Chapultepec, battle of, 485.
Childress, John W., 53, 77.
Chilton, Thomas, 38.
Churubusco, battle of, 483.
Cilley, Jonathan, 121, 128.
Claiborne, J. P. H., 119, 326.
Clarke, John H., "Let her [Cali-
fornia] go, ' ' 654.
Clay, C. C, 47, 68, 275.
Clay, C. M., 277, 280.
Clay, Henry, 78, 144, 151, 169, 189,
205 ; and U. S. Bank, 29 ; distri-
bution bill, 102 ; certain of nom-
ination (1844), 212; hopes to
avert Texas issue, 223; anti-
Texas letter, 226, 262; defamed,
228, 273; nominated for Presi-
dent, 229; claim to greatness,
249; embodiment of party, 251;
vacillation, 263, 272, 277; not
defeated by Texas issue, 281 ;
God thanked for his defeat, 283;
like Hamilton, 668 ; and Cuba,
699.
Clayton, A. S., 28.
Clayton, John M., 67, 592 ; Clayton
committee, 635; Clayton bill,
637; and tariff, 674.
Clifford, Nathan, 539 ; Mexican
mission, 548, 550.
Cobb, Howell, on Oregon, 588.
Coe, Levin H., 166.
Collamer, Jacob, on Polk's persis-
tency, 717.
[735]
INDEX
Colquitt, W. T., and Oregon, 593,
596.
Contreras, battle of, 482.
Cook, D. P., 13.
Conner, David, 375; bombards
Vera Cruz, 481.
Corcoran, W. W., 547.
Couto, Bernardo, peace commis-
sioner, 522.
Cramer, W. E., 280.
Crary, I. E., opposes supreme
court, 135.
Crittenden, John J., 223, 488, 585 ;
Oregon resolution, 592.
Crockett, David, 24, 62, 81 ; opposes
Tennessee land bill, 21 ff., 23;
splits Jackson party, 22; and
Polk, 22, 76.
Cuba, and "Polk Doctrine," 691,
700; key to Gulf, 700; proposed
purchase of, 701-705.
Cuevas, Gonzago, peace commis-
sioner, 522.
Cullom, A., 403.
Cushing, Caleb, 127.
Dallas, G. M., nominated for Vice-
President, 239.
Daniel, J. R. J., 670.
Davis, Alonzo B., imprisoned in
Brazil, 706.
Davis, Garrett, on "President's
war, ' ' 415 ; Polk a usurper, 459 ;
on Oregon, 587.
Davis, Jefferson, opposes army re-
duction, 553 ; and Oi'ogon, 592,
632 ; on slavery, 635.
Davis, John, talks Polk's appro-
priation bill to deatli, 443.
Democratic convention (1844), con-
venes, 236; attitude toward Van
Buren, 236; two-thirds rule, 237;
platform, 239, 562.
Democratic convention (1848), 715.
Democratic groups, 259, 337.
Derrick, Wm. S., 493.
Dickinson, D. S., 470, 530; for
' ' popular sovereignty, ' ' 630.
Dimond, F. M., 384, 435.
"Disputed territory," 377, 381,
408-413, 415, 458, 517,
Dix, John A., 470; on Polk's Ore-
gon policy, 593.
Donelson, A. J., 35, 59, 88, 298,
355, 360; exposes Bell, 122;
favors Polk for Vice-President,
161; on Texas issue, 231; works
for Polk's nomination, 240;
charge in Texas, 308, 354; de-
sired as party editor, 332 ; views
on expansion, 465.
Douglas, Stephen A., 275 ; moves
to admit Texas as state, 371; de-
feuds Polk, 460; and Oregon,
586, 589, 631; and California,
648, 651, 653; and Cuba, 701.
Doyle, Percy W., urges Mexico to
make treaty, 536.
Dromgoole, G. C, 669-670.
Duane, Wm. J., 36.
Eaton, John H., 67.
Eaton, Mrs. John H., 25.
Election frauds (1844), 281.
Elliot, Capt. Charles, 359, 361.
Elmore, F. H., 239, 567.
Evans, George, on tariff, 672, 674.
Everett, Edward, unconstitutional
to amend Constitution, 16; on
military chieftain, 17; in Lon-
don, 561.
Ewing, E. H., 591.
Fairfield, John, 290.
l^isk, Theophilus, 218, 229.
Flagg, A. C, 291.
[736]
INDEX
Flores, J. M., 428; leads insurrec-
tion in California, 473-474.
Florida Purchase, 390, 402, 555,
570.
Floyd, John, report on Oregon,
556.
Foote, Henry S., and slavery, 631,
652.
Foster, E. H., 58, 153, 194, 199 ; re-
signs from Senate, 168; elected
Senator, 208.
Foster, R C, 176.
"Frankland," state of, 197.
Freanor, James D., bearer of
treaty, 537.
Frelinghuysen, Theodore, Whig
candidate, 229.
Fremont, John C, 423-426; acts
Avithout authority, 425, 549; his
court-martial, 476.
"Gag rule," 95, 107, 121.
Gaines, E. P., 430.
Gales, Joseph, refuses to oppose
peace treaty, 547.
Gallatin, Albert, on Oregon title,
603.
"Garland forgery," 278.
Gayle, John, on slavery, 632.
Gentry, M. P., calls Polk "petty
usurper, ' ' 462 ; denounces Polk
and Buchanan, 673.
Gerolt, Baron, 379.
Giddings, J. E., on expansion, 587.
GiUespie, A. H., 388, 424, 473.
Gillet, E. H., 101.
GUmer, T. W., 217.
Globe (Washington), unfavorable
to Polk, 57, 65.
Gholson, S. J., 119.
Graham, Daniel, 77.
Granger, F., 182.
Grant, U. S., 429.
Graves, W. S., 121.
Gray, Eobert, explores Columbia
Eiver, 556.
Greeley, Horace, 245.
Green, B. E., 392.
Green, Duff, 75, 222, 289.
Greene, C. G., 123-124.
Grier, Eobert C, 339.
Grider, Henry, 670.
Grundy, Felix, Polk's preceptor, 4;
48, 59, 67, 75, 85, 113, 118, 166-
169.
Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty of, first
project, 491 ; negotiation of,
536; signed, 537; ratification,
538 ff., 551; cabinet divided on,
539; proclaimed, 552.
Guild, Major, 87.
Gurley, H. H., 557.
"Gwin letter," 86.
Hale, John P., prefers disunion to
slavery, 631.
Hall, A. A., 55, 68, 124, 129, 141 ;
charges Harris with abolition-
ism, 149.
Hamilton, Alexander, 130.
Hamilton, James, 288.
Hammet, W. H., seeks Van Buren 's
views on Texas, 224.
Hammond, J. H., 94.
Hannegan, E. A., 229, 438, 601,
633, 640, 674, 700; Oregon reso-
lution, 586; on "Punic faith,"
593.
Hardin, John J., 260.
Hargous, Louis, 508.
[737]
INDEX
Harris, J. George, editor of Nash-
ville Vnion, 124, 27-i; his "buz-
zard," 141, 150; "abolitionist,"
149; shot by Foster, 176; de-
nounces Harrison, 179; retires
from Union, 201; 267, 302, 339.
Harrison, W. H., nominated, 173 ;
' ' Federalist ' ' and ' ' abolition-
ist," 174; carries Tennessee,
174; his "hospitality," 178;
"autocrat," 179.
Hawaii, and ' ' Polk Doctrine, ' '
690.
Hayes, A. C, 49, 56.
Hayivood, W. H., 313, 596; re-
signs from Senate, 675.
Heart, John, 247.
Heiss, John P., pre-nominatiou
' ' guesses ' ' (1844) , 234-235 ;
manager of ' ' Polk organ, ' ' 333 ;
excluded from Senate, 469.
Herrera, J. J. de, overthrown, 395.
Hickman, John, 237.
Hilliard, H. W., 590.
Hise, Elijah, in Guatemala, 705.
Hitchcock, E. A., 510.
Hoist, H. von, on Texas boundary,
364—366.
Hopping, E. D., 470.
Horn, Henry, 261.
Houston, Samuel, 271, 309, 355,
404, 437, 553; opposes annexa-
tion, 356.
Howard, T. A., 308.
Hubbard, Henry, 76, 161. 238.
Hunt, Memucan, 355.
Hunter, E. M. T., 138, 653.
Ibarra, D., 506.
"Immortal thirteen," 194, 200-
201, 204, 207.
Independent treasury, 659 ff., 668.
Ingersoll, C. J., 402, 587.
IngersoU, J. E., 670.
Interior, Department of the, cre-
ated, 689.
Irvin, James, 260.
Irving, Washington, 308.
Jackson, Andrew, born leader, 7-8;
vetoes bank bill, 29; 59, 74;
opposes White, 65, 67, 79, 81, 88,
106 ; breaks with Bell, 81 ; faith
in Tennessee, 83, 88, 104, 119;
' ' Gwin letter, " 86 ; dictates Ten-
nessee politics, 86-87 ; mortified
by loss of Tennessee, 106; per-
sonal triumph, ill; specie cir-
cular, 112; slandered, 113; re-
joices because Polk has redeemed
Tennessee, 152; at Polk's in-
auguration as governor, 156; on
Oregon question, 565 ; urges in-
structions for Senators, 177 ;
praises Governor Polk, 188;
favors Polk for Vice-President,
207; Texas letter, 220; discon-
certed by Van Buren's letter,
229, 232; suggests Polk for
President, 232, 243; drops Van
Buren, 233, 244; on Polk's abil-
ity, 246; on Benton's "in-
sanity," 257, 264; aids Polk in
campaign, 264-265; "let Tiler
alone, ' ' 268 ; induces Tyler to
witlidraw, 270; instructs Hous-
ton, 271; tries to save Blair,
303; prayers for Polk, 321; last
letter, 334 ff.; on tariff, 656; on
internal improvements, 656;
favors independent treasury, 660.
" Jacksoniana, " state of, 198.
Jacksonism, denounced, 130-134;
criticism of, becomes popular,
135 ; Polk 's pai't in, 135.
Jackson, Daniel, 129.
Jackson, Wm., 94.
Jarnagin, Spencer, 194, 208; his
vote decides tariff of 1846, 676-
677.
Jefferson, Thomas, 7, 350, 402, 441,
490, 553, 692.
[738]
INDEX
Jcsup, T. S., -13-1.
Johnson, Andrew, 177, 186, 192,
194, 236, 342; moves to create
' ' state of Fraukland, ' ' 197.
Johnson, Cave, 36, 47, 51, 59, 76,
114, 138, 174, 216, 230, 235, 259;
ojiposes political persecution,
153; Avarns Van Buren on Texas
issue, 225; distrusts Globe, 254;
fears disunion, 266, 275; in
Polk's campaign, 274, 276; Post-
master General, 298.
Johnson Henry, 314.
Johnson, Eeverdy, 437, 596, 599.
Johnson, E. M., 85, 159, 213, 238.
Jones, Anson, 355, 368.
Jones, James C, selected to defeat
Polk, 180; ridicules Polk, 182,
184, 185; defeats Polk, 187;
governor of Tennessee, 192.
Jones, J. B., 267, 302.
Jones, Seaborn, on tariff, 673.
Jones, Wm. Carey, 336, 475.
Kane, J. K., "Kane letter," 261,
664, 673.
Kearny, S. W., sent to California,
422; conquest of New Mexico,
4(=0; California expedition, 473-
475.
Kendall, Amos, "lying machine,"
127 7wte 33; 164, 230.
Kendall, George W., 454.
Kennedy, Andrew, on "American
multiplication table," 588.
Kennedy, John P., denounces Jaek-
sonism, 132-133.
King, Preston, three million bill,
619.
King, T. B., 592.
King,.Wm. E., 214, 301.
Lane, Joseph, 485.
Larkin, Thomas 0., 386, 424, 549,
692.
Laughlin, S. H., 56, 58, 81, 91, 104,
155, 162, 170, 192, 200, 208, 228,
274, 339; works for Polk's nom-
ination, 235 ff., 240.
Lea, Luke, 75.
Leal, F. J. P., Brazilian charge, 707.
Legare, H. S., 219.
Letcher, E. P., criticizes Polk, 246,
278 7iote 90, 286.
Levin, L. C, 588.
Lewis, Dixon H., 212, 222, 615, 671;
and tariff, 674.
Lewis, W. B., 48, 52, 129, 268; dis-
missed, 333.
Liberty Party, nominates Birncy,
263.
Lincoln, Abraham, 381; criticizes
Polk, 530.
Lincoln, Levi, 658.
Linn, Lewis F., Oregon resolu-
tion, 558; Oregon bill, 560.
Lisboa, Caspar J., complains of
Wise and Eousseau, 707.
Lloyd, Thomas, 331.
Louisiana Purchase, 403, 441, 555.
McConnell, F. G., 672.
McDuffie, George E., amendment
to Constitution, 13; bank bill,
27; 37, 39, 45, 441; Texas reso-
lution, 262, 311; Oregon worth-
less, 560.
McKav, J. J., appropriation bill,
442;" tariff bill, 672.
Mackenzie, Alex. S., mission to
Cuba, 439-440.
McKintry, John, 51.
McLane, Louis, 28, 36, 405, 548;
British mission, 567, 582, 584.
McLane, Eobert M., 451.
McLean, John, 63.
Maclin, Sackfield, 151.
[739]
INDEX
Maiiguiii, W. P., "Whig- but a
gentleman," 336, 548; on "ex-
ecutive organ, ' ' 598.
Manning, R. I., 95-96.
Marcy, W. L., 296; Secretary of
War, 298; instructions to Tay-
lor, 379-380; disciplines Scott,
420, 449, 470, 494, 518.
Marshall, John, 112, 130.
Marshall, Thomas F., 275.
Mason, John Y., 218, 285; Attor-
ney General, 298; and Cuba,
702.
Mason, E. B., sent to command
troops in California, 453 ; gov-
ernor of California, 475.
May, W. L., 76.
Meade, George G., difficulties of
warfare, 447.
Medary, Samuel, 238.
Mejia, F., 410.
Melville, G., 275, 281.
Mercer, C. F., 116.
Merritt, Ezekiel, 426.
Methodists, settle Willamette Val-
ley, 558.
Miller, J. L., 237.
Miller, S. F., 271.
Mississippi, contested election,
119 ff.
Missouri Compromise, on extend-
ing, 619; "unconstitutional,"
621.
Molino del Rey, battle of, 485.
Monroe Doctrine, 394, 575, 580,
691, 693, 699; as interpreted by
Calhoun, 700.
Monterey, battle of, 448.
Montgomery, John B., 426.
Morehead, J. T., 623.
Mormons, as soldiers, 422.
Moseley, W. A., 591.
' ' Mustang, ' ' see Freanor.
"Native Americans," 279-281.
New Granada, treaty with, 709-
711.
Nicholson, A. O. P., 113, 122, 174,
272, 283; appointed Senator by
Polk, 176; loyalty doubted, 199,
204.
"Nicholson letter," 630.
Niles, John M., 585, 675.
O'Connell, Daniel, 126.
Ol-egon, American title to, 555-556,
568, 579 ; British title to, 555 ;
joint oeeupatiou of, 556, ended,
fiOO; "54° 40' or fight," 563;
England cares little for, 583;
Douglas bill, 604; British offer,
606; treaty signed, 609; and
slavery, 625 ; government bills,
625, 632, 641.
O 'Sullivan, John L., suggests pur-
chase of .Cuba, 701-702.
Owen, Robert D., 600.
Pacheco, J. R., peace negotiations,
514, 516.
Pakenham, Richard, Oregon mis-
sion, 562, 568, 570, 577, 581;
signs Oregon treaty, 609.
Palo Alto, battle of, 429.
Paredes, Mariano, President of
Mexico, 395 ; proclaims ' ' defen-
sive war," 412.
Parrott, W. S., 383, 389.
Patterson, Robert, Tampico expe-
dition, 446; 449.
Patton, J. M., 93, 116, 121.
Peel, Sir Robert, on Oregon ques-
tion, 564.
Peiia y Peiia, 395; President of
Mexico. 486, 521, 536; advises
ratification of treaty, 551.
[740]
INDEX
I'eiidorgrast, G. J., trouble in
Buenos Ayres, 708.
Pew, T. J., 85.
Pevton, Bailie, 72-73, 97, 111, 113,
454, 718.
Pickens, F. W., 239, 567.
Pico, Andres, 473.
Pico, Pio, 427.
Pillow, Gideon, 233; works for
Polk's nomination, 235 ff., 240;
intrigue, 243, 289; 340, 446, 511;
criticizes Taylor, 455 ; at Cha-
pultepec, 485 ; denounced by
Trist, 526; arrested by Scott,
531 ; denounced by Stephens,
635.
Pinckney, H. L., 95.
Polk, Ezekiel, his "Toryism," 2,
273.
Polk, Jane Knox, 1, 721.
Polk, James K., ancestry and edu-
cation, 1-4; lawyer, 5; mar-
riage, 6; personal traits, 4, 7-9,
25, 69, 139, 283; republicanism,
10, 18; in state legislature, 5;
enters Congress, 6, 10, 12; and
majority rule, 14, 17; on state
rights, 18; and Jackson, 19, 21,
30, 39, 65, 81-82, 86-88, 91, 104,
134; opponent of Adams, 19, 20;
party man, 20 ; on Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 20 ; and six
militia men, 21; minority re-
port on U. S. Bank, 31 ff. ; chair-
man of Committee on Ways and
Means, 37, 38, 41-42; elected
Speaker, 90, 93; "unscrupulous
partisan, " 91 ; selected to re-
deem Tennessee, 123-125, 140;
and party press, 123, 274;
phrenological chart, 139 ; victim
of discord as Speaker, 92 ff. ;
"Jackson's creature," 92, 102;
committee appointments, 93, 101,
116, 127, 136; and slavery peti-
tions, 94, 107, 109, 121; de-
cisions attacked, 96 ff., 110, 122;
decisions praised, 103; 102, 115,
118; decides Mississippi election,
119 ff. ; " glorious infamy, ' ' 120 ;
last terra as Speaker, 125 ff. ;
scorns "affairs of honor," 129;
vote of thanks opposed, 136 ;
farewell to House, 137; "best
Speaker," 138; and White, 68
ff., 73, 76, 79, 88, 90; attitude
toward Van Buren, 164, 210, 213,
217, 221, 232, 241, 292. 297, 338,
633; and Bell, 50, 63 ff., 68, 70,
75, 85, 91, 96, 123, 659; attitude
toward slavery, 191, 464, 612,
614, 618-620, 627 ff., 633,' 640,
646; begins gubernatorial cam-
paign, 140 ; denounced by press,
141 ff., 148; "address to tlie
pec^ile" (1839), 142; denounces
Hamiltonism and defends Jeffer-
sonism, 143 ff. ; political consis-
tency, 145 ; elected governor,
150 ; inaugural address as gov-
ernor, 156 ; first message as gov-
ernor, 157; and banks of Ten-
nessee, 169; remedial legislation,
171; denounces Harrison, 183;
defeated by Jones, 187; doubts
Nicholson 's loyalty, 199 ; no
compromise with Bell, 199 ; runs
for governor (1843), 204; favors
pledging candidates, 206 ; de-
feated, 207 ; and Vice-Presidency,
161-164, 201, 207, 209, 213 ff.,
218, 233; opposed by old line
Democrats, 214; nominated for
Vice-President by Tennessee,
159, by Mississippi, 315; dis-
trusts Blair, 214, 266, 300; de-
clines place in Tyler 's cabinet,
217; Texas letter, 227; avail-
ability as candidate, 231 ; sug-
gested for President by Jackson,
232 ; nominated at Baltimore,
238-239 ; reasons for nomina-
tion, 240, 245 ff., 251 ; comments
on ability by Jackson, 246;
' ' Wlio is James K. Polk ?, " 248 ;
claim to greatness, 249-251 ; rep-
resents younger Democrats, 252,
257; party organ, 252, 266, 299,
331; letter of acceptance, 258;
[741]
INDEX
vicAvs on tariff, 260, 278, 662,
665 ff., 677; ''Kane letter," 261,
664, 673; "no pledges," 268,
284, 287, 300, 305; slandered,
237; electoral vote, 282; loses
Tennessee, 282; informed of
election, 283; determination to
be President in fact, 287, 321;
hamiony difficult, 288 ff., 311;
declines to retain Calhoun in
cabinet, 290; frugality, 293;
cabinet appointments, 298, 322;
"deception" on Texas resolu-
tion, 315 ff. ; inauguration, 319
ff. ; letter to cabinet appointees,
325; "political martinet," 326;
executive ability, 323 ff. ; devo-
tion to duty, 327 ff.; declines
presents, 33i; dismisses Major
Lewis, 333; bench breeds* Fed-
eralists, 336; on patronage, 18,
341-349; accepts House resolu-
tion, 353; announces annexation
of Texas, 371; does not antici-
pate war, 376; object of Slidell's
mission, 385; renews friendship
with Benton, 385, 576; desires
California, 351, 386, 390, 402,
418, 421, 427, 441, 552; first an-
nual message, 393; cites Monroe
Doctrine, 394, 575, 580; appro-
priation for Mexican territory,
402; seeks Benton's advice, 403,
404, 422, 441, 453, 466, 471;
aggressive policy, 405; war mes-
sage, 407, 414; on acquisition of
territory, 417, 423, 437, 439, 517,
528, 541, 552; opinion of Taylor,
430, 435, 448, 454, 463, 467;
plans discord in Mexico, 436;
permits Santa Anna to return to
Mexico, 439 ; on Mackenzie mis-
sion, 440; views on Wilmot Pro-
viso, 443 ; aversion for Scott,
455, 467, 471, 532; charges
Whigs with treason, 457; ample
grounds for Avar, 458; asks Con-
gress for lieutenant-general, 464 ;
deserted by Democrats, 464 ;
peace offer to Mexico, 466; de-
nounces generals and politicians,
468; criticizes Calhoun, 468,
627 ; worst day of his life, 469 ;
on hook warfare, 472; breaks
with Benton, 475-476, 535;
orders Scott to continue war,
484; decides to send commis-
sioner to Mexico, 486 ff. ; sends
Trist to Mexico, 488 ff.; views
on Scott and Trist, 501, 504, 527,
532 ff. ; army to live on country,
519; officially condemned by
House, 530; recalls Scott and
Trist, 531 ; urged to run again,
535 ; on unauthorized diplomats,
538; on submitting Trist 's
treaty to Senate, 538 ff. ; views
on Buchanan, 541-542; Trist a
"scoundrel," 543; fears Ben-
ton, 547; on army reduction,
553; on Oregon question, 557,
563, 567, 571 ff., 600, 602; mes-
sage on Oregon, 579; refuses to
arbitrate Oregon question, 583;
to "look John Bull in the eve,"
584, 601; "hell all around
him," 598 7wte 79; distrusts
Buchanan, 608 ; reason for Ore-
gon policy, 610; on extension of
Missouri Compromise line, 628,
632, 634, 636, 639, 642 ; on Union,
629, 640, 642, 646, 651; and
"Barnburners," 633, 643;
' ' Polk the mendacious, ' ' 635 ;
no pledge on territorial gover-
nors, 636; signs Oregon bill, 641;
on California government, 645 ;
Calhoun a disunionist, 650; fears
independence of California, 655;
on "American System," 656,
663, 678, 684, 686; and inde-
pendent treasury, 660, 671;
vetoes "pork barrel" laws, 679;
party ' ' galley-slave, ' ' 685 ; fears
Interior Department, 689; de-
clines to buy Saint Bartholomew,
692; not an imjierialist, 692;
would purchase Cuba, 701-705;
no apology to Brazil, 707 ; on
treaty with New Granada, 710;
on postal treaty with Great
Britain, 711; on reelection, 712
ff., 719; on vanity of life, 716;
renewed friendships, 718; death,
721 ; achievements unappreci-
ated, 722-725.
[742]
INDEX
"Polk Doetrini?, " named by Eoid,
690; applied to Hawaii, 690; ap-
plied to Oregon, 691 ; applied to
Cuba, 691, 703; applietl to Cali-
fornia, 692 ; differs from Monroe
Doctrine, 093 ; denied congres-
sional sanction, 695 ; and Mex-
ico, 695-698; and Central Amer-
ica, 706.
Polk, Samuel, 2.
Polk, Sarah Childress, personality,
6; Presbyterian, 721.
Polk, Col. William, 3.
Polk, W. H., 195, 215, 340.
Prentiss, S. S., defeated by Polk's
casting vote, 119 ff. ; calls Polk
tool of party, 136; Nashville
speech, 276; denounces Polk,
277.
Preston, W. C, 169.
Princeton disaster, 217, 357.
Quitman, John A., 511, 531.
Eamsey, J. M. G., Polk's letter to,
714.
Eandolph, T. J., opinion of Trist,
490.
Eead, John M., 336.
Eeid, Whitelaw, on "Polk Doc-
trine," 690.
Rejon, M. C, 445, 465.
Resaca de la Palma, battle of, 429.
Rhett, R. B., 121; favors weak
government, 135 ; on Oregon,
588, 622; on Polk's reelection,
714.
Rincou, Manuel, peace commis-
sioner, 522.
Ritchie, Thomas, 269, 302; edits
Polk "organ," 333; excluded
from Senate, 469.
Ritchie, W. F., 237.
Rives, W. C, 213, 597.
Roane, W. H., 239.
[743]
Robertson, John, 101.
"Roorback" canard, 273.
Roosevelt, Theodore, "takes"
canal zone, 711.
Rosa, Luis de la, 521, 536.
Rousseau, Commodore, trouble with
Brazil, 706.
Rucker, W. R., 54, 77.
Rush, Richard, 290.
Saint BartholomeAv, Polk declines
to purchase, 692.
Salas, J. M., 445.
San Juan de Uliia castle, cap-
tured by Scott, 481.
San Pascual, battle of, 473.
Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de,
397, 439; says Nueces boundary
of Texas, 440; dupes Polk, 444
ff.; indirect offer of peace, 465;
declines to make peace, 472;
assumes presidency, 481; re-
signs presidency, 485; deprived
of command, 486; proposes
armistice, 515.
Saunders, R. M., instructed to buy
Cuba, 703-705.
Sawtelle, Cullen, 589.
Sawyer, L., 122.
Schenck, R. C, 460.
Scott, Winfield, given command of
army, 416; indiscretion, 419-
420; sent to Mexico, 455; gives
military plans to newspapers,
467; captures Vera Cruz, 481;
defeats Santa Anna at Cerro
Gordo, 481; armistice, 483; inso-
lence to Polk and Marcy, 495,
513; quarrel with Trist, 495-
500, 513; peace with Trist, 507
ff.; bribery, 510 ff.; wishes Trist
to make treaty, 523; arrests Pil-
low and Worth, 531; declines
dictatorship, 550.
Seddon, James A., 621.
INDEX
Semple, James, 561, 601.
Sevier, A. H., 163, 546; Mexican
mission, 548, 550; on Oregon
question, 561, 586; and tariff,
674.
Seward, W. H., "higher law" doc-
trine, 717.
Shields, James, 446, 511, 531.
Shubrick, W. B., 475.
Sierra, Justo, seeks aid for Yuca-
tan, 697.
Slacum, Wm. A., report on Ore-
gon, 558.
Slade, W., 120; power of patron-
age, 133.
Slavery, Polk's attitude toward,
612-614, 618-620, 627, 633, 642;
new southern doctrine, 625, 630,
635.
Slidell, John, Mexican mission,
385; instructions, 390, 401; re-
jected by Mexico, 404; opposed
by Benton, 488.
Sloat, John D., 388, 426.
Smart, E. K., 632.
Smith, Ashbel, 370.
Smith, Caleb, 631, 669.
Smith, Justin H., 282.
Smith, J. M., 124.
Smith, Persifer F., 506.
Soule, Pierre, 504.
Standifer, James, 52.
Stanton, F. P., 649.
Stephens, Alex. H., opposes ex-
pansion, 623; calls Polk "men-
dacious, ' ' 635 ; on payments to
Mexico, 654.
Stevenson, Andrew, 47, 126.
Stevenson, J. D., 446.
Stockton, R. F., 389, 473; usurps
command in California, 474.
Story, Joseph, 6, 246.
Storrs, H. R., 14.
Supreme Court, "British," 135.
Swartwout, Samuel, 125. 127, 129.
Taney, R. B., 37, 111.
Tappan, Arthur, 174.
Tappan, B., 315.
Tariff, Polk's views on, 260, 278,
662, 665 ff.; "Kane letter,"
261; R. J. Walker on, 260, 688;
Polk's message on, 666; of 1846,
672-677, 682.
Taylor. Zachary, at Fort Jesup,
364; march to Rio Grande, 408
ff . ; defeats Mexicans, 429 ; pro-
moted, 430 ; distrusts Polk, 430,
450, 455 ; truce at Monterey,
448; letter to Gaines, 467; de-
cides to accept nomination, 479 ;
quarrel witli Scott, 479 ; wins at
Buena Vista, 480; reprimanded,
480 ; views on Scott and Trist,
532; would not mourn I'olk 's
death, 532 ; indifferent to inde-
pendence of California, 655.
Ten Evck, Authouv, in Hawaii,
690. ■
Tennessee, land question, 11-12,
21 ; election of Senators, 193 ff.
Texas, independence recognized,
112; annexed, 314; admitted as
state, 372 ; boundary, 373 ff.
Texas Question, origin of, 219 ;
Jackson's letter on (1843), 220;
Calhoun 's ' ' conspiracy, ' ' 220 ;
Van Buren and Clay oppose an-
nexation of, 224^226; Polk urges
"immediate re-annexation" of,
227 ; Cass favors annexation of,
229 ; ' ' enigma, ' ' 263 ; issue in
1844, 281.
Thompson, Jacob, 467.
Tliompson, Waddy, claims credit
for treaties with Mexico, 457
note 9.
[744]
INDEX
Tliornton, Edward, 50G, 512; aud
peace nofjotiations, 522, 53t5.
Thornton, Capt. S. B., 413.
"Tliree million" bill, 4(\9.
Tibbatts, J. W., 238.
Tod. David, in Brazil, 708.
Tod, John (!., 3(U).
Tooms, Eobert, 591, 397, 651.
Torrejon, A., attacks Thornton,
413'.
Toucey, Isaac, 045.
Trist, Nicholas P., peace commis-
sioner, 488; at Vera Cruz, 493
quarrel with Scott, 495-500
peace with Scott, 507 ff., 513
fj'uava marmalade, 509 ; bribery,
510 ff.; peace negotiations, 515-
517, 522 ff.; on Nueces bound-
ary, 517; decides to ig-nore in-
structions, 524; sixty-five page
letter, 525, 533; recalled, 518,
520, 527 ; ' ' impudent scoundrel, ' '
543; enfant terrible, 544.
Trist, Mrs. N. P., and peace nego-
tiations, 523-524.
Turney, H. L., 174, 189, 195; criti-
cizes Calhoun, 468; urges veto
of Oregon bill, 640.
Turney, Samuel, 188, 196.
Twiggs, D. E., 511.
Tyler, John, 217, 228; Texas
treaty, 262, 308; withdraws from
campaign, 270 ; last message,
309 ; selects House resolution,
317; tripartite treaty, 558.
Underwood, J. E., 129, 631.
Upshur, A. P., 217, 562.
Van Buren, Martin, versus White,
60; unpopular, 66, 78, 203, 208,
215, 241 ; nominated for Presi-
dent, 85; calls extra session, 116,
659; message (Dec, 1838), 125;
close of administration, 178;
visits Hermitage (1842), 202;
hostile to Polk, 209, 240, 245,
252, 262; nomination expected
(1844). 212; anti-Texas letter,
224r-225, 338; effect of his let-
ter, 229 ff.; nomination with-
drawn by Butler, 239; "be-
trayed," 243; offered British
mission, 567; nominated (1848),
633, 715; "fallen man," 716.
Van Buren, Smith, 295-296.
Van Ness, C. P., 398.
Venable, A. W., 653, 714.
Vera Cruz, captured by Scott, 481.
Verplanck, G. C, report on U. S.
Bank, 31.
Voorhies, Wm. V., 645.
Walker, I. P., amendment, 652.
Walker, James, 48, 52, 70, 71, 77.
Walker, J. Knox, 539.
Walker, Robert J., 163, 216, 242,
259, 285, 290; opposes Van
Buren, 226, 240; on tariff, 260,
688; on aid from Tyler, 267
"South in Danger," 277, 616
Secretary of Treasury, 298
amendment, 313 ; on Texa
boundary, 378 ; on acquisition
of territory, 423, 437, 465; de-
sires isthmus transit, 491 ; wants
all Mexico, 528; Avould reject
Trist 's treaty, 539; on Oregon,
572; "father" of Department
of the Interior, 689; and Cuba,
702.
Ward, T. J., 120.
Ward, T. W., and Oregon ques-
tion, 577.
Watkins, Tobias, 92.
Watmough, J. G., 42.
Watterson, H. M., 209.
Webster, Daniel, 130, 212, 585;
Oregon policy a riddle, 594; on
tariff of 1846, 675; on Cuba, 701.
[745]
INDEX
Welles, Gideon, 236; charges in-
trigue, 241; on Polk's cabinet,
324.
Westcott, James D., 459, 469, 635.
Weston, Nathan, 290.
Whig party, origin of, 84; cam-
paign in Tennessee (1840),
172 ff.; nominees and platform
(1844), 229; confidence in 1844,
248, 262; difficulties, 263; con-
vention at Nash\alle, 276; tries
to "produce panic," 535; op-
poses peace treaty, 546; on Ore-
gon, 590.
Wliite, Hugh, provokes Wilmot
Proviso, 442.
Wliite, Hugh L., 7, 21, 22, 60, 62
ff., 113, 150; nominated for
President, 89 ; " bank man, ' '
105; "carries" Tennessee, 106;
plans to remove him from Sen-
ate, 166; resigns, 168.
"White Whigs," 84, 86.
Whitney, Reuben M., and U. S.
Bank, 31, 100, 110.
Wiekliffe, C. A., 25, 361.
Wilde, R. H., 44.
Williams, C. H., quotes Polk in
favor of state banks, 662.
Williams, H. C, 168, 285.
Williams, J. L., 208.
Williams, Sherrod, 257.
Wilmot, David, "proviso," 442,
618; on tariff, 673; "baseness,"
719.
"Wilmot Proviso," 442, 469, 625;
approved by House, 648.
Winthrop, R. C, 587.
Wise, H. A., 94, 121, 126; opposes
Polk, 97, 117, 128; denounces
Kendall, 127; plays "Old Hick-
ory" in Brazil, 706 ff.; grati-
tude to Polk, 708, 718.
Woodbury, Levi, on importance of
Polk's election as governor, 156;
declines British mission, 567.
Wool, J. E., 451.
Worth, W. J., 411, 507; takes
Puebia, 482; arrested by Scott,
531.
Wright, H. B., 237.
Wright, Joseph A., 295.
Wright, Silas, 209, 224, 233 ; forces
White to resign, 168; declines
nomination, 239, 243; 279, 280;
offered cabinet position, 291 ;
488, 627; independent treasury
bill, 661.
Yell, Archibald, 55, 354, 357.
Yucatan, and "Polk Doctrine,"
697-698.
Yulee, D. L., 469, 630.
ZoUicoffer, F. K., 80.
[746]
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