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lOHANNIS WYCLIF
TRACTATUS
DE LOGICA.
NOW FIRST EDITED FROM THE VIENNA AND PRAGUE MSS.
(VIENNA 4352; UNIV. PRAG. V. E. 14.)
BY
MICHAEL HENRY DZIEWICKI.
VOL. II.
LONDON.
PUBLISHED FOR THE WYCLIF SOCIETY BY TRUBNER t"^ Co.
l'ATERNOSTEK HOUSE, CHARING CKOSS ROAD.
1896.
^
o o oo
\'iiidoboii;n:, Carolu.'- Froniinc, ivnoiir. C. ct R. Auliie.
INTRODUCTION.
All details concerning the manuscript (Univ. Prag'. V. K. 14) and
tlie authenticit\- and date of the work itself haviny; l^een discussed at
sufficient length in the Introduction to the first volume, we may at once
proceed to examine the second with regard to its contents alone. It
comprises the first eight chapters of the third treatisd of Lov;ica, or
more properly of Logicae Conliniiaiio. WycHf goes over the same ground
three times, it may be remembered: once in his Summary, or short
abstract of Logic; a second time, with much greater developments, in
the first and second treatises of Logicae Continuatio: and once again in
the work which forms the second and third volumes of the present
edition: in a most exhaustive manner this time, and treating of a variety
of questions which often seem quite irrelevant to the science of Logic.
It is true that in this third treatise Wyclif ostensibly deals with hypo-
thetical propositions alone, and that he leaves out, or expounds only
parenthetically, many questions alread}' quite threshed out in his first
volume. The difference, however, is to a great extent nominal. Botli
categorical and hypothetical propositions are for the most part as mere
headings of chapters, or as texts from which Wyclif preaches his system
with o-reater or less detail. In the third treatise, the matter is thus reallv
the same, but approached from a different standpoint, and expounded for
more advanced students. Perhaps some apology will be necessary for
the very detailed summary that is to foUow; if so, I may say that I
thought it would not be quite useless to go thoroughly through the first
work in which Wyclifs system is set forth as a whole, and of which
the other philosophical treatises are but modifications and developments,
Two volumes of metaphysics — De Compositioiie Ilouiiuis and /><■ Ente
Predicaiueulali — ha\(' indced been issued a]read\ ; bul thi- ^Mlitor has laid
VI INTRODUCTION.
much more stress upon their philological interest than upon their doctrinal
meaning. I have, therefore, thought that a full exposition of WycHfs ideas
as set forth in this work might prepare the way for a better understand-
inof of the other treatises.
It is perhaps superfluous to add — but in such cases I prefer
saying too much to saying too Httle — that I must here repeat the
thanks I gave to Mr. Matthew in the first volume of Logica. Even in so
special and technical a subject as this, his general knowledge of WycHf 's
views and style has been of much assistance in the understanding of the text.
Chapter I fpp. i — 2^). WycHf begins by a general discussion of
hypothetical propositions. They form seven species, according as tvvo
or more propositions are joined by the word and (copulatives), ur
(disjunctives), /y (conditionals), becattse (causals), more than (comparatives),
where (locals) or when (temporals). These, as Wyclif affirms, comprise
aU other species; for all, however complex, are reducible to these, and
they spring from the essential relations between God and the creature.
God is, and the creature is; either God is, or created being is not;
the creatures are because God is ; God exists more ihan the creature
exists; God creates beings if, wlien, and wliere He chooses. These pri-
mordial truths, seven and only seven in number, are the archetypes of
ah hypothetical propositions (pp. i — 2).
This classification is to some extent arbitrary, it is true, but
founded on the nature of things. It is not denied that these propositions
might be set in another order, or deduced from the primordial truths in
another way; but the order given here is the best, because it corres-
ponds best to the order of the universe (p, 3, 1. 35 to end; p. 4, 1. l — 5).
The words and, if, etc, are neither sufficient to estabHsh the order here
given, nor to classify the propositions (p. 4, 1. 5 — 12). If it be objected
that many hypothetical propositions are false, and that consequently
truth, and particularly primordial truth, has nothing to do with their
classification (p. 2, 1. 20 — 35), WycHf points out that every proposition
must be true at least in a transcendental sense. If it means something
false, it means a thing that is not, and therefore is true — negatively
(pp. 4, 5). His classification depends properly, not only on those signs
which render the propositions hypothetical, nor on the truth or falsity
of the latter, but upon the pecuHar sense given by those words to the
propositions wliich they unite into one whole (p. 6, I. 30 to end).
INTRODMCTION. VII
'riiey might indccd be classiiied accordino to the lirst priniiple of
abstract Being. For instance: Whatever is, is, and it is; //' anything is,
it is; it is whiht it is, and so on (p. 3, 1. i — 6; p. 7. 1. 5 — lO). Rut
God's existence is the tirst truth (^f all ; no other can l)c known per-
fecdy without it, and in that sense it is prior even to the |)rinciple of
contradiction, though both are equalh primitive hs regards thc truths
vvhich flow from them (pp. 7, 8).
Other words might de employed to form ne\v species of hypo-
thetical propositions (p. 3, 1. 13 — 30). But they may always be analyzed
into one of those ah-eady given. Neitlicr — uor, tor instance, means the
same as and with a negative (pp. 8, g). These propositions may be
combined with each other to the number of 120; but this does not
increase the number of primary species. For if I say, A is R if C is D,
becanse E is F, it is a causal proposition; but if we have, A is B, if
C is D because E is F, the proposition is condilional (pp. g, 10). Here
WycUf solves a number of sophisms at considerable length. It was no doubt
useful and even necessary for students of those times to know them; a
the present day, most of us would, for all these sophisms, endorse our
author's opinion concerning certain among them^ and say with him :
siint ntihi odibiles (p. 14, 1. 5). It is, however, worth while to note his
remark that a sentencCj however, long it may be, is a proposition, pro-
vided it imply one predominant act of the mind; where there are several
it is not one proposition, and can neither be aftirmed nor denied as
one. The aftlrmation or negation bears upon the hypothetical sign. God
exists, and yoii are an ass. is denied without any reference to its com-
ponent parts separately (p. 10).
But there seems to have been a personal argument, particularly
directed against Wyclifs theory of universals, which may be noticed
apart. We must remember that the universal "animal", in this theory, is
a real thing or entity^ identical both in men and in brutes. So we have:
'^'You are now whatever you wonld be, if you were an ass; in that case
you could bray; therefore you can now." This somewhat humorous
syllogism is gravely discussed, for it entails grave consequences. Wyclif
not only grants that the major premiss is true, but that the minor is
necessary (p. 10, 1. 35 — 41); but this is quite natural, if we refer to his
theory. He answers, howe\er, that though a man is identical with an
ass, the identity is only partial. What would be necessary to conclude
VIII INTRODUCTION.
that a man is an ass, is the identity of individuality, not. that of a uni-
versal attribute. But he adds: ''I knovv that this answer does not please
sophists" (p. i6, 1. II — 27).
The affirmative or negative nature of hypotheticals is then investi-
gated. Any proposition raight with truth be called both affirmative and
negative, since all affirm God's existence, and deny whatever is contrar}'
to their affirmation (pp. 16, 17). We must therefore consider how best
to classify them. Some say that in any proposition composed of two,
both propositions should be affirmative, or both negative, for the com-
pound to be one or the other; so that, where this requisite is wanting,
the resulting proposition is neither (pp. 18, 1. 31 — ^38). Others, that the
nexus aloiie, affirmed or denied, determines the quahty of these proposi-
tions (p. 18, 1. 39 to end; p. ig, 1. i — g). Others again, with whom
WycHf partly agrees, say that they follow the (juaHty of the tirst of their
parts (p. ig).
As for the quantity, i. e. the universaHty or particularity of such
propositions, the first three are said to have no quantity at aH; but the
last four (causals, comparatives, locals and temporals) foHow the quantity
of the first of their parts (p. 20). It may be objected (p. 21, 1. 25) that
these last are really categorical in meaning, since they may be expressed
in a categorical form. This, however, is a mere matter of taste and
preference. Some prefer the number three, others the number seven.
WycHf chooses not to eHminate the four last species, because every
point in the universe, is touched by six, and onh six otherpoints: thiis
making up the number seven. We need not here explain this reason
forther than to say that it is at the root of his cosmok)gical system, in
which the universe is built of mathematical points. In the next vokime,
we shall see the whole theory developed at great length.
Chapter II. After a i&v^ prehminary remarks about copulative pro-
positions, with which the chapter professes to deal (p[). it^ — 26), W\clif
launches boldly into the problem of the Universals. One is at first puzzled
to see how he manages to bring it in. It begins with the question (p. 26)
whether or no a pronoun stands merely for its antecedent, a particular
concrete being, or for its antecedent as affirmed b}- a preceding verb.
For instance: "Socrates is an animal, and it is an ass;" do we mean
by // an animal in general, or that aiiimal ivhicli is Socrates'.' Here we
notice that an) copulative pro})ositii)n in whicli one of the terms of the
INTRODUCTION. IX
latter lialf is thc same as one ot the tormer, inay have tlic kittcr term
replaced by a pronoun. As, A is B ciiui B is C, or A is B and A is (\
may be rendered: .4 is li and it (meaning either A or B) is C. This is
the shght link by which the controversy is connected with the subject
of the chapter; and here comes the tug" of war between Universahsts
and Nominalists. Wyclif urges that if we say, ''A certain man has stolen
something, and Jw is a thief," we may very well be ignorant of the
particular Jie who has committed the theft. He therefore does not stand,
as NominaHsts woukl liave it, for the individual himself, but for the
Universal ^'A certain man who has stolen this or that". Nominahsts say
they know this disjunctivel}': it is either A or B or C, &c. But this is
an idle quibble: to know thus disjunctivelv is not to know (p. 26, k 31
to end; p. 27, k i to 20).
Now all this looks to modern readers — and since they are modern,
they must of course be in the right — very much like mere loss of time
and trouble; useless expenditure of brain-work. To the Oxford wranglers
of those days, on the contrary, it must have been fuU of actuahty and
interest: for it was the very central point round which the battle raged,
and WycHfs unerring acumen, in thus coming to the point at once, is
greatly to be admired, if we can for an instant forget our superiority as
"moderns". The Nominahsts flatly denied the existence of anything biit
the concrete. For them, a universal name was in itself a mere "flatus
vocis", according to Ockam's famous expression; it had no meaning
except when applied to its singulars. They therefore could not possibly
admit that the pronoun Jic (or indeed any pronoun; wJin or ivJiicJi, for
instance) stood for a universal Thing, nor even merely for the words
which it replaced (which would still give universalit}- of a certain kind).
It had to stand for a singular object, an individual man or being. "'But
then," said the Universalists, ''if it stands for only one individual, you
must know who Jw is, when you say, He is a tJiief, as usual in such
sentences. If you do not know, and deny that it stands for somebody
in general, the sentence becomes a jumble of words, without any mean-
ing". We are not here concerned in the Nominalist's reply, which must
have been rather shuftUng and embarrassed, at least for those of the
extreme school of Ockam. But their attack upon W\ chf 's position, and
the staunch courage with which hc stands u[) to defend it, is ver\'
noteworthy.
X INTRODUCTION.
To put their attack into somewhat more modern language than
the crabbed form of the text: If you say, '\Socrates is an animal anfl
it is an ass," you mean that the universal "Animal" is replaced by //.
But suppose you substitute vertebrate for animal; the sense of it is at
once altered. Substitute mammal: the sense varies again. Thus \ve have
an endless series of different significations given to //, each of them more
concrete, yet none ever reaching the ultimate Hmit of individuality, This
would be the ruin of all science; for we could never draw any inference
from the universal to its singulars; and between each of these ifs there
could be found or imagined room for an infinite multitude of others. These
constantly changing significations would destroy the possibiHty of deduction,
^'A is an animal; it (not A, but the animal) is a vertebrate; it (the vertebrate)
is a mammal" — and so on. We can never conclude that A is this singular
individual man (p. 27, 1. 20 — 37). WycHf answers (pp. 28 — 30) that,
though less universal as a predicate than its antecedent, // has as a
subject the power of standing for the same, and consequently for all the
singulars which that antecedent represents. There is indeed an endless
descent, because there is an infinite distance between any universal and
its singulars. But, when we get to the lowest species of aH, we have
only accidents, that is, non-essential differences, by which the singulars
are distinguished; so that makes no difficult}-. If we say that one uni-
versal is infinitely beyond another, because it extends to more singulars,
this does not mean that it is infinite, any more than a surface, infinitely
greater than a Hne, would be infinite.
Beaten off on one side (as we may perhaps be aUowed to suppose)
the Nominalists return to the charge on another. ''You say that lie does
not stand for an individual. Let us then suppose that two men^ Socrates
and Plato, are running." The proposition, "Somebody runs," will be
true; but at the same time it will be true to add: "Socrates is not he.
and Plato is not /;<'." Now, what if no one else in the world is running
at the time? (p. 27, 1. 37 to end; p. 28, 1. i — 12). This however is met
(p. 30, 31) by denying that 7?^' has here the meaning of a universal
man. It is clearly a singular, meaning thc somebody who i-ttns in both
cases, and in one of the two it could not but be false.
The third argument is aimed more directly against universals. Eacli
of them stands for aU its singulars. But Jw. according to the su[)position,
is a universal. Wc may sa}- of A, He is a king; and of B, He is a thief.
INTROnUCTION. XI
The same //(• stands tor both, and is hoth. And it \ve knovv tlic uni-
versal 'Somebody', we also know — disjunctively of coursc; this is
a retort against WycHfs argument a few pages above — who has com-
mitted any action, however secret: it is sonwbody (p, 28, 1. 13 — 29).
W}'cHf answers (pp. 32 — 34) by enumerating various species of uni-
versals. Some exist before their singulars, and are God's eternal ideas;
some are mere passive potentiaHties; others are founded upon the in-
dividuals in which they exist; as, for instance, the idea of humanity. He
then proceeds to deny that, when we apply the universal to its singulars,
the supposition (appHcation, or manner of using a word in a proposition)
is other than j)ersonal. Now essential and personal suppositions are two
very different things. When we say: ''Humanity is animaHty together
with rationaHty,'" we have essential supposition; when we say that huma-
nity comprises the man A, the man B, &c. it is personal. In the first
case the subject stands for aU that is in the predicate ; in the second,
only for what is common to each of the singulars predicated. Thus, in
the case aforesaid, 7;e?' would not stand for aH the attributes of A and
of B; one might be a king, the other a thief; but he would have nothing
to do with the kingship or the dishonesty of its singulars.
Such is, so far as I can understand it, the position taken up by
WycHf; though he observes that there are many different answers to
this diftlculty, some of which, in his opinion, amount to the abandonment
of the ReaHstic doctrine (p. 34, 1. 30 — 35). He no doubt aHudes to the
system of Moderate Realism, which, as it was followed by the immense
majorit\- of Schoolmen, and had, as our author himself admits, the ad-
vantage of avoiding great difhculties, I may here venture to state in as
few words as possible.
When the same sign stands for a great many objects, and has
exactly the same signification when appHed to one as when appHed to
another, it is caHed a Universal. But ivhat is Universal? Pure NominaHsts
say it is the word, and the word onl}-; even the idea is different when
applied to different individuals. Thus we do not mean the same thing by
nian, when we say, 'A is a man,' as we do when we say, 'B is a man'.
Moderate Nominalists, or Conceptualists, admit that besides the universa-
lity of the word, we have also the universaHty of the idea; so that sub-
jectively we do mean the sanie thing in the above instance; that is, we
mean our idea of humanit)-. But nothing farther; there is nothing in any
XII INTRODUCTION.
ivay identical between the man A and the man B in their several natures.
Is there anv midcourse between this doctrine and that of such ReaHsts
as affu-m that there is in man a humanity corresponding to our idea,
and ycally identical in all its singulars? There is; it is the theory of
Moderate ReaHsts. To ascribe the universaHty of our ideas to a mere
groundless fiction of the mind would destroy the objective value of all
reasoning. To suppose that there exists a mysterious something, substan-
tiaUy identical in each and aH of the singular objects that come under a
general name, would land us in endless difficulties, with which we shaU
soon see WycHf attempting to grapple. They therefore draw a sharp
distinction between the Universal, as not seen by the mind, and as seen.
The Universal, as formaHy existing in many singulars, is nowhere but in
the mind. Everything that exists in nature is formaHy concrete, and sin-
gular in its essence. Thus the Universal, as known, is nothing but a
mere abstraction. But, as ahlc to be known. it is otherwise; it is real;
in each singular it exists as a basis from which our mind is able to
abstract the universal idea. Their defmition says of the Universal (as
known) that it exists formaliter in mente, fiindamentalitcr in re. The)-
avoid defending a position which they consider unsafe, and take up one
which it is very difhcult to attack with any chance of success. Asked by
NominaHsts if the redness of the rose, the geranium, and the cherry, is
a real universal, they reply: Its reahty is formally in the objects, funda-
mentally in the mind; its universality is formally in the mind; fundamen-
tally in the objects. Asked by those of Wyclifs school if there is nothing
idendcal in two shades of colour in which there is no difference, they
answer: Nothing but the aptitude they have for being grasped in one
idea; that aptitude, in objects similarly coloured, really exists; and when
our mind thus grasps them, it becomes actual — but only in the mind.
This may seem obscure, but I can find no words to state it more
clearly: and indeed this seems to me the true solution of the whole
problem. I do not see what the most determined Nominalist could find
m
to attack in this repl}-, if he understood it properly. It might perhaps
not satisty him; for it keeps up a strict relation between signs, ideas,
and things, between the subjective and the objective order, and maintains
the validity of human reason without restricdons, in whatever spliere il
niay ujork. But it avoids Avith the utmr)st care sfivinof a handle to this
most embarrasslng objection: How ran anything be real and yet not
INTROnUCTlON. XTIT
concicte? vSucJi caiition W \ clit thoiiylit excessivc; it novv rcmains tor us
to see liow he fought — most courageously and skilfully, it must bc
acknowledged — against this objection in its \arious forms.
Faithful to his accustomed method of showing a bold front to cliffi-
culties, and never shirking them, however weighty they may be, lie at
once proceeds to enquire, i*' How we can distinguish Universals from
tlieir singulars, and from each other; 2"'-^ How the transcendent entity,
Being, is common both to God and to His creatures; 3''^ Whether a Uni-
versal can receive accidental attributes, and 4''' Whether a Universal,
taken together with its singulars, makes up a number.
First. Ever\- Universal is all its singulars, and each of them. It
would seem that if so, it cannot be distinguished from them, nor from
any other Universal that might happen to be those singulars too (p. 34,
end). We are free to deny that the Universal is its singulars; it is in
them, but is not tlicy, having no personal supposition, as they have. But
it is preferable to admit that it is its singulars, and, thus considered,
receives a different personal supposition in each. This supposition, which
it lias in its singulars and not by itself, is amply sufticient to differentiate
it from them (p. 35). In some cases this difference may be merely logical
or notional, but still it suftices for a distinction; as that between tlie one
universal Phitnix and the one pho-nix existing in the physical world.
Each is identical with the other in all but the fact that the universal
Phcenix is (at least successively) communicable to many, whilst the cor-
poreal phoenix is not. Thus, as we see, even in this test case, there
alwa\s remains, between the Universal and its singular, one difference,
— communicability (p. 37).
Second. If God is Beiug, and the creature is a being, and Being
is a uni\ersal reality, the same in both : then we come to the Pantheistic
conclusion that there is something common to God and His creatures,
and really identical in both (pp, 37, 38). And in fact, as the Nomina-
listic position logically ends in Matcriahsm, so Realism ■ — unless it
carefully steers the middle course which has been mentioned — neces-
sarily tends towards (though not necessaril)- gocs to) the extremes ot
Pantheism. To answer tlie objection, we must note that transcendent
being is not in God and in the creature as a difference; — for instance,
in the wav that rationality exists in all men — but as a iiiode. This mode
is one in itself; but it exists in God otherwise than in tlie creature.
XIV INTRODUCTION.
It woukl Ije a false argument to sa) : ''Alanhutjd is a thing identical uith
Socrates and with Plato: therefore, Socrates is Plato." In Hke manner,
to say: ''Being is God and is Not-God; therefore God is Not-God" —
is false too (p. 38, 1. 10 — 34). We may say: ''^That which (meaning, or
as WycHf says, pointing to, demonsirans, Transcendental Being) is Not-
God is God;" but we cannot infer thence that the creature is God
(pp. 38, 39). But to admit even the former proposition seems perilously
near Pantheism: so we must not be surprised if WycHf reverts to this
point and supports his distinction with analogies drawn from the pro-
foundest mysteries of the Christian religion.
Third. To grant that the Universal Man is identical with each of
its singulars seems to imply its doing and being all that every individual
does and is. It is thus at the same time awake and asleep, white and
black, &c., together with countless other contradictory attributes (p. 39,
1. 38 to end; p. 40, 1. i — 14). This objection may be solved either nega-
tively or in the affirmative. Man is that which is white and that which
is black; but Man is not white and black. For, as a universal, this term
can receive nu predicates but such as are essential to human nature:
and it is evident that neither whiteness nor blackness are thus essential
(p. 40, 1. 15 to p. 42, 1. 6). But again, taking ideal humanity as the
exemplar and prototype uf each man, and consequently as the cause of
each, we may grant that it does every one of the actions of each. So
universals do receive accidents: not indeed in themselves, but in their
singulars, with which they are identical: and the countless different attri-
butes, which are or may be contradictory in their singulars, are not so
in them (p. 42, 1. 5 — 25). This explanation is similar to that of theolo-
gians, who deny that the Godhead suffered, although it was that which
suffered, i. e. the person of Christ (p. 42, 1. 28 to p. 44, 1. 25). Several
other objections are propounded and solved in the same way, by pointing
either to the mystery of the Incarnation or to that of the Trinity; in the
latter, the essence of the Deitj' is substantially the same in each of the
three persons; yet the Three are really distinct. The Father is not the Son,
although that ivhich is the Father is tJiat ivhich is the Son. "To every
sophism against Real Universals, you can tlnd a parallel one against the
Holy Trinity," sa}s WycHf (p. 46, 1. 18—22). Very true; and it there-
fore foUows that^ fur a Christian, the distinction is not meaningless,
meaningless as it may seem, But the foUowing vvould seem an obvious
INTROnilCTION. XV
rri)l\ : " Ihc 'rrinity is a ni\ ster_\- ; are Real Iniversals so? If lhe\- are,
faith and not reason should make us beHeve in them. It they are not,
they destroy the mysterious nature of the Trinit)- itself." It is perhaps
as an answer to this objection, never stated in so many words, that our
author in several passages of his works (and in particular a few pages
further, pp. 51, 52) takes care to note the differences between the
Universal and the Divine Essence. But he only points out other myste-
ries, and leaves the that ivhich distinction untouched, as parallel in both
cases. — The serious difficulty, viz., that universals must move about, as
they are wherever their singulars happen to be, is taken into earnest
consideration (p. 47). WycUf inclines to think that they move; at the
same time he denies that this implies localization of the Universal.
Foiirth. The most difticult point of all, where the writer seems to
be most uncertain, and which he probably developed and explained at
a later period, is, ''How the Universals can be said to make up a
number with their singulars". If the individual man A and the universal
man are identical, they are not two, but one; if, on the other hand, there
is a real distinction between them, they must be two realities, and be
counted as such (p. 48, 1. 3^ — 10). It seenis impossible to get a satis-
factory answer to this objection; at least that contained in the present
work seems to me rather lame, so far as I have succeeded in under-
standing it; and when I collated tlie chapter oi De Universalibus. ''Quo-
modo universalia ponunt in numero," I was too busy with the coUation
itself to pay much attention to the manner in which Wychf supplements
what seems wanting here. For a man of our author's skill and subtlety,
it would have been very easy to wrap up his answer in a string of
sentences impossible to understand, and signifying anything — or nothing;
such a mode of proceeding would have been not without great precedents
even in his time; and contemporary philosophers might perhaps tell us
whether it has been quite abandoned at the present day. But Wyclif, often
unintelligible when pursuing some of his favourite theories out of sight, is
never so ou purpose to embarrass an adversary. He may be lost in the
clouds; he does not hide himself in mists. His sturdy EngUsh nature prefers
momentary self-contradiction to wilful ambiguity, and remains in seeming
absurdit}- until such time as he can get a satisfactor\ reply to what per-
plexes him. This, I believe, will appear a litde further, I do not think
that it takes anvthin"' awav from the admiration due io his talent, and
XVI INTRODUGTION.
it niakes liim respected from anotlier point of view. Me begius b\'
enumerating different kinds of number (pp. 48 — 50), aud for some he
denies the possibilit}- of ascribing them to a universal taken with its
singular. If, however, number be taken to mean all that can be comited,
then he admits that the Universal and its singular can be counted toge-
ther, as the Godhead and the Three Persons of the Trinity. Such is
the sense, if I mistake not, of the words "tunc concedendum est . . .
quod quaeHbet unitas quae est essentia substantiae singularis est trinitas
suppositorum ejusdem substantiae .... et sic [ut] homo communis differt
ab homine singulari, ita essentia communis differt a personis non sic
communibus" (p. 50, I. 20 — 28). ^ Here the mystery of the Holy Trinit}-
stands WycHf in good stead. While he takes care to point out the diflference
between the Godhead, as communicable to the Persons, and the Uni-
versal, as appHcable to its singulars, he says: The numerical difficulty
whicli you propose to me applies ecjually to the Divine Essence, counted
with the Persons; qni nimis probat nihil probat^^. This would elude the
difficulty; but Wyclif is not satisfied with that. Reverting to the above-
mentioned case of the Ph(i:-nix, he affi1-ms that the universal and the
singular phcenix are not two, but one (p. 51, 1. 16); for there are neither
two universals, nor two singulars (1. 20 — 22). You cannot say they,
pointing to both at once (I. 30). The universal Phccnix is in no wise
other than (aliud vel alia quam, I. 27, 28) its singular, though they differ
notioually (secundum rationem 1. 29). This seems clear enough. Yet if
the universal Phojnix is so identical with its singular that there is a mere
logical distinction between them, and that we cannot even say 'between
themr properly, can we continue to affirm that it possesses a distinct
reaHty other than that of its singular? Wc can, answers Wyclif C^''. . . duo
distincta realiter," p. 54, I. 10). Every universal and its singular are two
things, really different iVom each other. This looks very like a contra-
diction in terms, unless (which is also possible) the text is corrupt. But
I do not think so, on account of W\clif's sudden conclusion of the
debate immediately after these words, his avowal that the difficulty is
very great (1. 11, 12) and his pointing out two other ways of answering
1 The text is slightly changed here iVom what it is in the treatise. I confess
I understood it less at the time. Even now it is not quite clear, and some words
are probabh wanting.
INTRODUCTION.
the clifficulty, whicli niight for a time be niurc satisfactur\' to some of
his pupils. They were free to grant that universals might be counted
apart from their singulars, though in reahty one with them; or to deny
it, because they are not different things. "But I," says WycHf, at the
close of the chapter, "stick to my first antwer" (I. 30). If the name of
Doctor EvangeHcus had not been given to him, he might have deserved,
as weH as if not better than Durandus, the title of Doctor Resolu-
tissimns.
Chapter III. Under cover of investigating the nature of disjunctive
propositions, WycHf continues the debate on Universals, and now pro-
ceeds to carry the war into the enemy's country in a very practical
way: viz., by asserting that the very idea of a promise demonstrates
the trutli of his theory. But we must tlrst of aH briefly note how he
gets to this subject. The proposition which contradicts a disjunctive is a
copulative of which both parts are contradictory to the former: as, A is B
or A is C: contr. A is not B and A is not C (p. 56, 1. 6, 7). Now
and A may be replaced by and it: so here, as in the foregoing chapter,
comes the question; for what do pronouns stand? In other words, ought
the ReaHst or the NominaHst view to prevail? Only here the field of
discussion is restricted and specified. I promise a penny. There is there-
fore a penny ivliich I promise. Does this which relate to a universal
penny, or to a singular one? WycHf at once and of course chooses the
first alternative. He says that, if anything singular is meant, not only
philosoph)', but political science and even all human untercourse must
go by the board. And not only the act of promising becomes impossible,
but purchase, sale, donations, acts of justice, rewards and punishments
are rendered null and void. When I promise a penny, a penny, according
to Nominalists, is a mere empty word, there being no universal penny,
but only singular ones; and so the promise becomes ineffective (p. 58).
One man owes another £ 20. According to Nominalists, even God's
Almighty power could not make him pay. There may be and are parti-
cular sums called £ 20 ; but such a general promise of what is but a
flatns vocis in itself can have no value. And so on with many other
cases, which all result in constructive absurdities; constructive of course,
for, righdy or wrongly, they were denied by the partisans of the opposite
system. Wyclif therefore declares (p. 59, I. 20) that we are obhged to
admit the ancient doctrine of Universals, and closes his case with
B
XVIII INTRODUCTION.
observations concerning the nature of promises and obligations (pp. 60,
61) with which he deals at some length. He then takes up a series of
objections, in which absurdities, very similar to those of which he accuses
his adversaries, are laid to his charge.
1. We are never obHged to give anything but what we have pro-
mised. If then the promise concerns only a universal penny, nothing
obHges us to give a singular one! Besides, as we may suppose that the
other party has a (universal) penny already, how can we give a man
what he possesses? So the ReaHst, not the NominaHst, standpoint is the
ruin of promises, obHgations, and in short of aU human intercourse
whatsoever (p. 61, 1. 26 — 37).
The answer is that we are indeed not obHged to give anything
but a universal penny, since no other is promised. But that we are
obHged to give; and since it cannot be given without the singular which
contains it, any one of its singulars must be handed over. As to the
man's already possessing a universal penny, that has nothing to do with
the matter : he must possess it in reason of the promise made, even though
he had it already, and independently thereof. He then will have it in one
more of its singulars, i. e. more plentifuHy (abundantius). WycHf adds, with
a touch of dry and possibly unconscious humour, that the multipHed pos-
session of a universal penny in its singulars is highly advantageous
(multum confert). Thus, if a promise concerns the Universal, its execu-
tion regards its singulars (p. 62, 1. 16 to p. 63, 1. 5). That the common
people know nothing of universals is quite false; they have a sort of
confused knowledge of them. Even those who deny their existence cannot
help contradicting themselves and agreeing with us in practice (p. 63, 1. 15
to p. 64, 1. 7).
2. "But," the adversary urges, "I for one deny the existence, even
the possibiHty of a real universal penny. So, at least when 1 promise
one, the promise must be that of a singular: I reaHy mean to give, and
I cannot mean what is in my opinion impossible, Thus universaHty is
not necessarily impHed by the words of the promise in my case; and if
not in my case, in none" (p. 61, 1. 37 to p. 62, 1. 5). ''Quite the con-
trary," repHes WycHf. "You may intend promising one particular penny
— the one, for instance, that you wiH happen to give — but you
cannot help impHcitly meaning the Universal which it contains. No doubt
it is promised vaguely in this case; stiU it is promised, That you have
IN rRODUCriON, XIX
it not in your mind, nay, that you positively exclude it trom your mind,
is an altogether irrelevant fact (p. 64)." If I may be allovvcd to clear up
the meaning of this by an example, we ma)' suppose that one man pro-
mises to give another a piece of land in which he is convinced that
there are no mineral riches whatever. Now it so happens that he is
mistaken: does the fact of his beHef render it untrue that, in promising
the land, he has promised all its mineral riches? When you say: I pro-
mise a penny — a singular one — you surely promise all that is con-
tained in that penny: now we say that a Universal is contained therein,
and that, wilHng or unwilHng, you promise it. — Here WycHf, in con-
nection with the indefmite universal term, a penny, makes some remarks
by the way about terms of the first and second intention and imposition
respectively. If a singular penny is spoken of, the sense, primarily uni-
versal, is contracted by the term singiilar. The promising verb indicates
universality, and that is promised in any case. For instance, I have two
pennies, and piomise you one of the two. That means neither in parti-
citlar; and it foUows that the object of any promise must be universal
(pp. 64, 67).
3. A third difficulty, made up of several put together, runs thus:
Transcendental Being is identical with everything, and at the same time
with anything in the world: if I promise something, it follows that every-
thing has been promised! And yet such a promise comes to nothing in
reality. I buy a man; if the meaning of this be 'Universal Man', then it
includes myself; yet I surely cannot buy my own person. And it might
be^'proved in the same way that what is promised is not promised
(p. 62, 1. 5—15)-
AII this is mere sophistry. The promise of Something is valid; but
the very smallest thing given fulfils it, and so it happens to be an idle
one, legally speaking; but that is not because its object is universal.
There are many such cases which judges would put out of court as fri-
volous. Notice, however, that when the singulars of any universal are of
equal value, any one of them will do; when their \ alues differ, we may
not choose at will any one of the worst, but may be compelled by law
to give one of average worth. (I suspect that WycHfs opponents might
have found means to cavil here. You promise a horse ; you give a hack
only fit to be slaughtered; but you have given the 'Universal horse' with
it just as well as if you had given a Derby favourite. Why should the
B*
XX INTRODUCTION.
judge enforce an average value, vvhen the value is totally irrelevant to
the thing 'principally given'? But this is by the vvay.) — Some promises
mav be legally binding, but impossible to fuhil, and not binding in con-
science. — We may go to market intending to buy something there;
now some of our ovvn goods being in the market, it foUovvs that vve
intend to buy our ovvn goods. There is nothing absurd in all this,
unless vve go vvith the expHcit intention to buy what we know to be
our ovvn (pp. 67 — 69). But vvhat absurdity, if a Universal be really
nothing, for a NominaHst to express himself grateful to a benefactor
who promises him a horse, a saddle, &c. (p. 6g, 1. 39 to p. 70, 1. 11).
As to the last quibble: ''I vvill give the (singular) penny which I
do not promise to give (since I promise the Universal)." Such a pro-
mise is a falsehood, for by its very tenour it flatly contradicts itself.
Or vve may understand the vvords to mean: that I do not promise to
give as a singulav; but then the sentence has no difticulty (p. 70, I. 12
to p. 71, I. 35).
The chapter closes with a fevv observations about obligatory acts,
mortal sins incurred by their omission, vvorks of supererogation, and
fasting.
Chapter IV. Here Wyclif discusses four difficulties raised, the first
separately, as one of the ordinary objections against Universals; the
other three together, as raising the question of the greatest number
of things possible. There are consequently two distinct parts in this
chapter.
I. Given fuur propositions, a, b, c and d (b contradicting a, and
c, d) vve find that a and c, and that b and d can cuexist respectively;
but that the couples a b, c d cannut. It follows that the four propositions,
if thought of as coexisting, are at the same time incompatible and com-
patible vvith one another. On the same Hnes vve may prove that all men
are equal and unequal, friends and enemies, &c. (p. 73, I. 15 to p. 75,
I. 7). But Wyclif easily points out that though such contradictory qua-
lities really exist, they exist relatively to different objects, not to the
same ; vvhich makes short of the vvhole objection. They are indeed all
contradictory and compatible; but not all vvith all; a, compatible with c
and d, is contradictory to h; and vice versd (pp. 75 — 78). And vve come
to the conclusion that opposite qualities, though they cannot be predi-
cated uf individuals, may be ascribed to universals, either essentially, or
INTRODUCTION. XXI
separately. Foiir is even; iour is three and one; three is odd: thereiorc
four may truly be said in two different senses to be both even and odd.
Christ is indivisible as God, and divisible, as man (p. 78, 1. 35 to
p. 79, 1. 22). All this is explained at what I cannot help thinking" need-
less length; but it is also quite admissible that a teacher may be trusted
to have known the requirements of his pupils and the exigencies of his
times somewhat better than those who read or edit his works five hundred
years after his death.
2. Then comes the second question: Whether God is able to
create the greatest possible number of creatures. The three difticulties
raised at the beginning of the chapter are answered thus; for if God
cannot create this greatest number, the conclusions given there are in-
evitable; whereas if (as Wyclif maintains) He can, then they are worth-
less (p. 79, 1. 22 — 2b). We are, however, not very well quaHfied to
decide whether this is a logical inference, and must take the assertion
for granted, most of these difficulties being' stated in a very unintelligible
form. Perhaps the third (p. 73, I. 10 — 12) alone is not totally obscure:
"Omnia quae Deus potuit facere possunt esse Deus, vel nihil potest
differre ab alio.'- This is itself not very clear; but if I can discern a
glimmer of meaning in it, it somewhat resembles the problem still in
A-ogue amongst Neo-Scholastics: "Whether the most perfect creature
possible /5 possible." If there is no limit to the number of creatures
which God can produce, there is either no limit to their perfection, and
one of the infinite multitude is infinitely perfect, though a creature; or
we must deny any difference of perfection between them. I give this,
however, merely as a hint, not being sure that it is the very same
question to which Wyclif alludes: "Omnia . . . possunt esse Deus,"
stands in the way.
The adversary is supposed to deny that any greatest number of
all is possible; for it would be infinite; and that is no less absurd than
a being of infinite size. To create it would exhaust the whole of God's
power, which is inexhaustible. At the Resurrection there would be no
room for an infinite number of men come to life again. Not one man
more could possibl} be created or perish. This, too, would lead to a
denial of Free-will. BesideSj if the term maii, for instance, is a Universal,
its signification cannot be exhausted, however, great the number of its
singulars ma)' be; it may always be supposed capable uf having as
XXII INTRODUCTION.
many more: which would not be true, if all possible men existed at any
time (p. 79, 1. 22 to p. 8i, 1. 6).
But this flatly contradicts Wyclifs principles. To answer the argu-
ments levelled against him, he makes a very remarkable and pecuHar
use of the term 'infmite'. He indeed affirms the existence of an infinite
number, but says that whatever exceeds our power of knowing distinctly,
is infinite to us. Thus, to give his own comparison — a striking one —
in a given line there is a definite and fixed number of points, known to
God, but absolutely beyond our powers of apprehension. As a fact, we
must admit the existence of continuous extension: now, how many parts
are there in any such extended being? The more we divide it, the
more of them we find, and we never can get to the end of our division.
Yet God, who created them, knows each in particular, and the sum
total of them all (p. 8i, 1. 6 — 33).
Would Wyclif have considered the multitude of stars in the sky,
or that of the sands on the sea-shore, to be infinite? I think not; for
the}- do not exceed our faculty of counting, but the time we have allotted
to us, or the instruments we are obliged to use; if we had time enough,
their aggregate would be represented by a number, finite even to us.
He takes an instance of quite a different nature; — we might go on
counting for all eternity the number of points in a hne, or of parts in
a given volume, however small. Yet he contends that as those points
are really therc (again a consequence of his doctrine; a NominaHst
would get out of the difficulty by saying that they were mere entia
rationis), it is impossible both that their number should not be known
to God, and that it should be infinite to Him. It is therefore definite.
To the length of each Hne corresponds a fixed number of points; a Hne
double that length will have twice as many; numbers beyond aU arith-
metical calculation, but numbers nevertheless. The idea is not wanting
in boldness and originaHty; but, Hke all speculations on these subjects,
it is liable to a good many formidable objections.
Wyclif strengthens his position by observing that certain proposi-
tions which are evidently true must be denied if we refuse to admit this
conception of the Infinite. A body certainly consists of all its parts; but,
were there no definite number, there would be no all : the very term
supposes them either counted or at least numerable. Again, in Genesis,
"God saw all the things that He had made," i. e. with all their details,
INTRODUCTION. XXIII
which to us are inflnite. A Vmc consists of points; the duration of a
sound, of instants ; tlu' whole is the suni of all its parts. All these imply
countless parts — countless, that is, in so far as our mind conceives
their mukitude. And yet the adversary is driven to deny all this. "I pro-
test before God," cries WycHf, indignantly "that of all fahacies ever
invented these seem to mc the most worthless!" (p. 82, L 6 — 28.) — If
our opponents admit that God knows each part of the said infmite
mukitudes, he must grant that all these parts exist. Granting this, but
refusing to admit that these parts are separately affirmable, he is at
once met by the fact that, as they exist, they must be beings, singuLar
beings, and as such affirmable separately. Suppose he takes refuge in
saying that, separately affirmable, taken together they are not so; he is
forced from that last refuge by the remark that in that case there must
be a limit to the number of beings which God is able to cognize col-
lectively; and, since a man could count up to any finite number, his
knowledge would be equal to that of God (p. 82, I. 29 to p. 83, I. 28).
It foUows therefore that there exists a maximum number of sin-
gular possible beings (men, for instance), to which nothing can be
added; and this is true both for simultaneously and successively possible
beings (p. 83, 1. 29 to p. 84, 1. 32). Peripateticians, admitting the eternity
of the world, affirm the successive possibility of an endless multitude of
men (p. 84, I. 33 to end). But Christians deny this; some (those of
Wyclifs opinion) asserting a fixed maximum number of every being, all
in ideal and necessary proportion, so that nothing in the world can be
increased or diminished (p. 85, I. il — 24). This does not limit God's
power, but affirms His infinite wisdom; how could more men be pro-
duced, when all those who are to exist, exist already ? Here, however,
two curious exceptions are made; one in regard to the number of in-
ferior animals (possibly because, not having immortal souls, they would
never simultaneously make up an infinite number), and the other con-
cerning that of human actions, which depend upon free-will and thus
cannot be fixed. Nol all fitture things take pJace by necessity (1. 37, 38).
This is an important sentence, for Wyclif, in his theological works, is
known to have maintained a doctrine which seems to contradict this
clear statement of his views. It may perhaps be interesting to some
future student of this subject to inquire when and how the change of
opinion took place, if it took place at all. It is (juite possible that when
XXIV INTRODUCTION.
Wyclif speaks of necessity, he may mean that, given the fact of free-
will and the actions resulting therefrom, things cannot be otherwise than
they are; this, however, is often set forth in language which must have
astonished the ordinary Catholic. In Buddensieg's edition of Wyclifs
Polemical Works there is a tract entitled De Pcrfectione Statuum, in
which (vol. II, p. 450, I. 5 — 18) a passage occurs that evidently sup-
poses free-will. Now this tract, according to Buddensieg, dates from 1383,
quite at the close of our author's life. But, on the other hand, this, as
directed against the Friars, may be explained away as an argument 'ad
hominem'. And in the Dialogus, when accused of fatahsm, he might
easily have destroyed the charge by the well-known distinction between
absolute and hypothetical necessity. Yet he gives none, and simply ad-
mits the necessity of all things that happen (Dial. pp. 45, 46). That
some change or other took place in Wyclifs doctrine is evident from
the following passage in De Ecclesia (p. 107, 1. 12 and seq.), in which
he expHcitl)- admits the fact: "Omnia fntnra de necessitate eveniunt ....
Quando autem variavi ab ista sententia, non cognovi, ut modo, quomodo
res habet multiplex esse, sed omne esse posui existentiam individuam rei
in suo genere." How he reconciles this doctrine with free-will is not
quite clear to me, as I have not been able to find a passage dealing
with free-will at any length, except a very orthodox one in De Ente
Praedicamentali (p. 247); but this treatise, according to Dr, Beer, could
not have been posterior to Logica by more than a few years. But we
must not rashly assume that he did not reconcile them. The Dominicans,
in their great controversy with the Jesuits, affirmed that God predeter-
mined all human acts, making all things act according to their nature;
so that, as the nature of will is to act freely, human acts were at once
predetermined and free! And this theory was not condemned by the
Church! — Having throvvn out these few hints which may possibly be
of use, I retuni to the summary of Wyclif s arguments.
The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic possibility has no
real foundation. A seemingly possible soul is in reality impossible, if
God has chosen never to create it. The number therefore of souls
extrinsically possible is that of all those which at any time will exist in
reality; it is consequently finite, though the abstract idea, 'SouP contains
an infinite multitude of singulars; for all those singulars to which their
cause (i. e. God's will) is wanting, implv self-contradiction. Wyclif con-
INTRODUCTION. XXV
siders as possible t)nly such as are so in reality, and at one timc or
other must exist: tliis does away with all the difficulties that can be
brought forward (pp. 86 — 88). The system in vogue at his time, refusing
to limit God's power of creating all that is possible in the abstract,
renders it necessary to deny that such a multitude is intinite. Wyclif,
limiting God's power by His will, calls the fixed number of possible
things that will be produced, infmite to iis (p. 88 to end of chapter).
Chapter V. brings us to a discussion of causal propositions, after
the writer's usual fashion, expounding his views on causes, accidents,
modes of being, the identity of God causing Man with Man caused by
God, and the origin of evil.
Of such propositions there are two kinds, the one affirmative, the
other negative, and each is reducible to a categorical having the same
sense. A conditional proposition does not imply causation, but only a
nexus between two propositions, neither does a copulative, which means
nothing beyond the coexistence of the two fpp. go, 91). Accidents are
caused b\" their subjects: because you are a man, you have such and
such qualities. This is a proof that accident and subject are distinct
entities, unless we deny the truth of causal propositions in general; but such
a denial would be subversive of all science (p. 91, I, 12—39). 'Cause'
cannot properly be defmed, any more than 'being% because their spheres
are equally universal. We can only state that the word signifies 'that
which produces an effect', that of which the entity precedes the thing
caused; whilst '^effect' is that other being produced, and of which the
entity flows from that cause. AII beings are causes and effects. Possibly
there is no last being, but there is a first one; which is, according to
Wyclif, not God, but Essence. This essence is tliat which is created
(unum creatum); but it is itself neither created nor caused. In short, it
seems identical with that Transcendent Being, of which we have already
heard a good deal, and which is common both to God and to the
creature; a conception so closely verging upon Pantheism that Wyclif
avoids that conclusion only by his surprising skill in argument, and the
constant employment of the highest mysteries of the Christian faith used
as points of comparison and instances to maintain the value ot his
subde distinctions (p. 91, 1. 39, 40; p. 92, 1. i — 18).
He then proceeds to enumerate the fourfold division of causes into
material, formal, efficient and fmal, each of which is a cause either per
XXVI INTRODUCTION.
se or per accidens, a true cause or a mere occasion. We may pass over
these details rapidly, only noting the conclusion: that the material exists
for the formal cause, this latter for the efficient, and the efficient for the
final cause. The ultimate End of all beings is that toward which all
beings tend, and for which they all exist, whilst it exists for itself alone.
Thus it can have no parts, but must be absolutely simple in its essence;
for if it had parts, every one would be caused, and would exist only
for the whole. Two beings may cause one another in different hnes of
causation, but not in the same (pp. 92 — 96).
Every causal proposition is redupHcative. For instance : You move,
since you walk, means Inasmuch as yoii walk, you move. Therefore,
though other propositions are also reduphcative (as: The more ahke
two things are, the less they differ), WycHf takes the present occasion
to investigate the nature of reduphcatives, and continues his investigation
in the following chapter. Whenever such a proposition is reducible to a
causal one, the predicate must be universal. If, for instance, Every man,
qua man, is rational, then it also follows that Every rational being is a
man. This is not always the case when the proposition cannot thus be
reduced (pp. 96 — 98 to 1. 6).
Here comes a difficulty. Suppose we say: A man, in so far as Jte
is white, does not build: is this true, and may we consider that 'white-
ness' is not a cause of his building? Some assert that we may not; for
the whole man builds, and whiteness is an attribute of the whole man.
WycHf, on the contrary, thinks that the proposition is true. The con-
nection between this apparently useless and meaningless subtlety and the
profound mysteries of the Scholastic doctrine concerning the 'hypostasis',
or essence of individuality, becomes clearer, when we ask, Did Christ,
qua God, suffer and die? Did He, qua man, create the world? The
answer given is in strict accordance with orthodoxy (p. 98, 1. 6 to
p. 99, 1. 4).
This leads us to examine what such modes of being as white-
ness, &c., added to the substance, are in themselves. Real they are no
doubt, according to the general drift of WycUfs opinions; but are they
reahties distinct from the substance to which they belong and which
they modify? If so, every substance would, in each of its modifications,
differ from itself. But the difference is merely modal, not substantial;
only the modes differ: to be thus or otherwise, and to be existing, are
INTRODUCTION. XXVII
not the same. Size gives a man magnitude; ciuality gives liiiu 'suchncss',
humanity alone gives him to be a man (p. 99, 1. 4 to p. 100, 1 6).
But if so, another difficult}' springs up. God, as creatiug man, has
what is called an accidental mode, which is not identical with His
essence, and therefore is posterior to Himself! And if we deny this; if
we say that this mode is identical with God's essence, we fall into
another snare: for the said mode (action and passion being admittedly
the same thing taken from contrary points of view) is also identical
with man as created by God (p. 100, 1. 6 to end). Thus God and man
would share in the same reality, or mode of existence; just as the
hammer qua striking the anvil, is identical with the anvil, qiia struck by
the hammer. It is curious to note how this old-world objection has been
reproduced and extended in modern times. Every student of Philosophy
will at once recognize the system which says: "I think of an object :
— therefore I am identical with the object, the Non-Ego. And the Non-
Ego, thought by me, becomes identical with my Ego." What was for-
merly an objection, refuted in a few pages, has become the starting
point and basis of man}- a volume of German metaphysical speculation,
which, having spent its force and lost its interest in its own countr}',
has lately found new life and men of talent to expound it in England.
And yet this fallacy (to speak of it in the language of the Schoolmen)
was well known even in Aristotle's time, Truly there is no new thing
under the sun! But let us see how Wyclif refutes it.
First, he points out that an accident may signify a mere happening
which does not in the least change the possessor's intrinsic nature: a
rich man may become poor without any loss to his physical attributes.
He then notes that not all relations are mutually real. A cause must be,
in its essence, prior to its effect, though it is only properly termed a
cause whilst the effect is being produced. This 'calHng', or denomination,
changes nothing in its being. So, the cause depends on the effect only
in so far as a verbal change is implied, whereas the effect depends on
the cause for its very being. A man, by means of his generative acti-
vity, produces a son : he is called a father as soon as his son exists.
But the man existed before and independently ; there is no real difference
between the father and the man. Wyclif therefore answers that the
likeness of me in God and the likeness of God in me, both produced
by creation, are not identical. F^or the likeness of me represents me as
XXVIII INTRODUCTION.
I am — i. e. — infiiiitely beneath God — and changes nothing in Him
(pp. lOl — 103, 1. 8).
And how would Wyclif, according- to these lines, have answered
the Hegelian puzzle of the Ego and the Non-Ego? With the utmost ease.
My thinking of an object does not change the object in itself; it only
makes it to be thought, The Non-Ego is the Ego — in my niind. Not
otherwise. My Ego, in thinking — i. e. mentally, is identical with the
Non-Ego; but only in so far. AII this is merely a verbal, or if you
prefer, a notional becoming. And the bubble is burst.
From this Wyclif concludes that no inherent accident has any
existence of its own, or adds anything to its substance, as a substance
(p. 103, I. 8 — 25); that every proposition of which the predicate essen-
tially belongs to the subject infers a causal proposition, but not vice
versu (for instance: Man is essentiaUy rational: iiian is rational because
he is man, but, I exist becaiise God wills my existence gives no inference;
p. 103, I. 25 to p. 104, I. 7); that a conclusion from a cause to the
cause of that cause is a true one (p. 104, I. 7 to end); and that, while
God's will causes my existence in the physical order, my existence causes
God's will to be what it is in the intellectual order, i. e., a cause. One
of the two gives the entity, but does not prove the existence of the
other; whilst the latter proves the existence of the former, but does not
give it entity (p. 105, I. l to p. 106, I. 9). It does not follow that either
is prior to the other, unless in two totally different orders: that of
being, and that of cognition (p. 106, 1. g — 25). Nor that God's will,
being a mere relation between the Creator and the Created, cannot
cause anything (1. 26 — 34). Nor that any creature, to be willed, must
first of all exist (1. 34 — 37; p. 107, I. i — 8).
But can we draw the following negative inference from a causal
proposition: "/ do good because God wills it ; therefore, if God does not
will it, I do not good because God does not will it? It is the very same
form of syllogism as the conclusive one which follows: The day exists
becausc the sun shines; therefore, if the sun does not shiue, the day does
not exist because the sun does not shiiie. Some deny this; others explain the
inference, noting that we may suppose the sun not to shine on the earth^
1 1 have here slightly developed what I believe to be Wyclifs meaning. In
other places, I have not scrupled to add a comparison or a line of explanation of
my own, to render the sense clearer.
INTRODUCTION. XXIX
because of cloutls ihat arise troni the earth itselt, In hke nianncr, God's
not willing" ine to do good (if He v/illed it, I should do g^ood without
fail) would proceed from an obstacle on m\- part — m\ non-reception of
His grace; just as in the case of the sun's ra)S. What is not received
cannot possibly be given. But I an responsible for not receiving it
through my fault (p. 107, I. 8 to p. 108, 1. 20),
So far, sin and its possibilit}- and origin is explained in the ortho-
dox way, and reconciled with God's First and absolute Causalit\-. But
Wyclif closes the chapter with one or two sentences which, even if
defensible, have a somewhat strange sound. God cannot but be the
First Cause of all; and therefore, though indirectly, of every act, in-
cluding sin: of the eternal truth that whatever is able to sin may sin at
some time or other; of the creation of such peccable beings; and also
of the ver}- happening (contingentiae, p. 108, 1. 33) of the act, which is
thus radically dependent upon God. We must, however, remark that there
is no attempt to fix the sinfulness of any act upon God. On the con-
trary, says Wychf, in so far as God is the author of sin, sin is good.
Whatever is true is good ; and the possibility of every sin depends
upon the everlasting truth already laid dovvn. Thus we have a logica
deduction as foUows:
A, B, C Z cire severally able lo sin.
We suppose the creation of A, B, C Z.
AIso that, in Wyclifs system, nfliat is able to sin means what (at
one time or other, or |in one subject or other) nill actually commit
sin; for able to does not signify mere abstract possibility, but the ne-
cessity of a future happening.
Then we necessarily have that either A, or B, or C or Z
will at sonie instant or other of all timc (either the instant a, or b, or
c . . . . ov z) actually commit sin.
Here we see, not only that there is no necessity for any of the
given singulars taken in particular A, B, C, &c. to sin at all, but also
that it is not necessary that the sin should take place at a given instant
of time. And as contingency is the opposite of necessity, we now see
what W} clit means when he says that sin is of the extremest contingency
(summa contingentia); for the truth would l)e veritied if only one of the
multitude A, B, C, &c. sinned but once.
XXX INTRODUCTION.
Chapter VI professes to deal with those reduplicative propositions
in which there is a comparison impHed; but it in reaHty discusses only
one of these propositions, viz.: In so far as two things are like each
other, in so far they differ. Which means that the greater anything is,
the smaller it is, for the magnitude of its smallness is so much greater;
and so on of all quahties which are comparable with each other. Man
of common sense would at the present day no doubt solve the question
with a shrug, and they would treat no more respectfully a problem
which I myself heard propounded by one of the Hghts of Philosophy:
What becomes of matter in the intervals of sensation? If all men and
beasts were sound asleep at the same time, where would the world be?
The problem discussed here at length by Wyclif is certainly not more
absurd. He gives three different answers which profess to solve the
difficulty, and proposes a fourth of his own. The arguments on either
side can hardly be of much interest, dealing with such flimsy sophisms
that we can hardly conceive their being seriously set forth by any man
in his senses; but we must remember that during the Middle Ages the
right understanding of the spirit of mathematical science was in its in-
fancy. Two points however deserve to be noticed here.
Why does Wyclif trouble himself so much about this question? Had
it been, as it seems, a mere exercise of ingenuity in verbal juggling, he
would probably have dismissed it with a few words of contempt, as he
dismisses others, by no means more puerile in themselves, calling them
Christmas jokes, "more joculantium in Natali" (p. 14, I. 10). But the
fact is that, absurd though it may be, it is directed against his system.
In Wyclifs theory, the universe consists of a multitude of real uni-
versals, shared by their singulars in varying degrees. Not only humanity,
amongst the rest, is thus shared, but also merit, demerit, size, and in
short everything intelligible almost; certainly every quality which allows
of comparison with another. The Universal Man, if I may be allowed a
simile, is thus, with regard to its singulars, like a straight Hne of a
certain length, containing a number of points, infmite so far as we
know, but fixed and known to God's omniscience alone. These points
represent the number of really possible men; and their position on the
line, the degree to which Universal Humanity is shared in by each in-
dividual man. And, to carry the supposition further, this line, produced
further, would represent Animality, which includes Humanity and all its
iNiROinicnoN. XXXI
singulars, Lifc, including Animality; Substance, including Life; and the
infinite line would stand for Transcendent Being", including all. The
following figure will sufficiently show my meaning:
X Transcendent Being X'
s
Substance
S'
L
Life
L'
A
Animahty
A'
X s L A H Humanity ^' ^' ^' ^' ^'
I I I I "'"^-^ I I I
j I I I I I
a b c d e f
Singulars of the Universal Man, or Humanity.
But it is quite clear that this objection goes to make WycHf con-
tradict himself. In so far as any man shares more perfectly in humanity,
in so far he shares in it less perfectly! Of course the arguments are
all grossly fallacious; but the subject itself is too important to let them
pass without careful refutation.
In the second place, we may notice the tendency of Scholastic
philosophy to apply the mathematical method to metaphysical reasoning.
We have seen cases somewhat similar to this in Logica before; but
nowhere does Wyclif mark it so strongly as here. He even goes the
length of supposing numbers set down to denote the entitative perfec-
tions of diverse species (pp. 119, 120) and points out the fallacy of
rcasoning upon such numbers, if the}- do not stand for homologous
things — I had almost said, quantities: for he evidently has in his
mind the intensity of essential perfection, when he numbers them thus.
This seems to have been a tendency more or less to be found in phi-
losophers of all ages, who could not help admiring the fruitful accuracy
of the mathematical method, and contrasting it with the barren vagueness
of their own speculations. Not to speak of the ancients, of the school
of Pythagoras, and of several curious passages in Plato and Aristotle,
we find a good many traces of this spirit in the works of modern phi-
losophers. Spinoza and Wolff attempted to reduce two very different
systems of philosophy to a series of theorems, deduced one from thc
other, like those of Euclid, At the present day, De Morgan, Boole nnd
XXXII INTRODUCTION.
Jevons have iii turn endeavoured to adapt Algebra to Logic or Logic to
Algebra; whilst Abbe Gratry, in France, has tried to prove God and the
Creation by the interpretation of certain mathematical formulae. And, to
restrict myself to Mediaeval Scholasticism, we by no means fmd Wyclif
alone in his way of looking at ideas — or rather at their universal
objects — as though they were measurable things. Here I must regret
not having taken note, in times gone by, of several passages of
St. Thomas, in which he distinctly speaks, for instance, of the distance
between the most perfect brute and man as greater than that between
the former and a plant. Here we see an explicit comparison between
two entitative differences. There are also in his works certain arguments
which, though referring to pure abstractions, might very well be repre-
sented by an algebraical equation, if we admitted the assumption alreadv
mentioned. I equally regret not being able now to fmd the passages I
refer to; but Ufe would be too short to look through the multitudinous
folios of the Angelic Doctor; I had to glance here and there, where I
thought I had most chance to tind them. One argument, I remember
well, struck me as being based on the implicit assumption that '"when
two variable quantities (or objects of ideas) are always equal to each
other as they approach the constants by which they are respectively
limited, those constants are also equal to each other". And we may
fairly believe that if, in the days of Schoolmen, mathematics had attained
the high degree of development at which thev stand now, there would
have been wrought a complete transformation of Metaphysics; not per-
haps to its disadvantage.
Setting aside the detailed examination of the debate, as useless
and uninteresting to us, we may however notice by the way what Wyclif,
in his ansvver to the fourth objection, remarks concerning goodness
(p. 122 to and of chapter). Utility has no intrinsic element of goodness;
it is good only extrinsically, and varies according to the demand for the
thing that is useful. But reversely, whatever possesses intrinsic goodness
possesses utility too; so does also that which is bad in itself; for even
sin has its use in the world. Intrinsical goodness is divided into two
species: that which is physically and that which is morally good. The
latter is always useful, at least to some extent; virtue never can be
badly employed; yet it may at times be less useful than what is mereh"
extrinsically good. The same division of evil must be made; it is either
INTRODUCTION. XXXIII
merely disadvantageons, or physically or morall\ liad. God is in no wise
evil; He is of use to all; even his punishments art- not injurious. Nor
can hc commit moral evil. Wyclif here (p. 124, 1. 34 to p. 125, 1. 15)
corrects or qualitles what h<; said at the close of die foregoiny chapter,
God cannot make a man to sin; but when He permits evil, He gives it
an element of goodness by the very fact. A man sins; therefore it is
true (and consequently good) that he sins: God makes the inference,
but does not posit the jjremiss. Good to all (p. -125, 1. 15 — 35), ^^ ^^
infinitely good in Himself, and finitely so to His creatures. Many things
that we call evil are in reahty good; as, for instance, punishments and
misfortunes (p. 126, 1. 15 — 20); and in many cases we mistake the value
of things, which varies accordiug to supply and demand (1. 22 — 25).
These never can be exactly regulated. Even should the variation in
price not spring from the wickedness of men, it is impossible to fix
prices exactly. We must leave that to nature; the real worth of any-
thing is its utility in the universe. — This is a clear and far-seeing con-
demnation of the many attempts to fix or keep up prices which
were so common during the Middle Ages, and are far from abandoned
even at the present day. In these few sentences we find Free Trade in
its germ.
'Hindrance' and 'obstacle- generally mean the reverse of utility;
but in a certain sense they may not be evils. If, for instance, God is
said to hinder any one from attaining eternal bliss, it is in order to
work out His plan of the world, in which predestination plays a prin-
cipal part. The natural tendency of all things is to sink to the centre;
but some must be impeded in their descent, or the order of the uni-
verse would perish. Wj-clif, however, speaks very guardedly here (forte . . .
difficultates plurimae, p. 128, 1. 34 — 36) and brings the chapter to a
close without going into any details on this subject.
Chapter VII. Here our author, availing himself of comparative
propositions, his nominal subject-matter, deals ex professo with the ques-
tion whether there is for every faculty, or active power, a maximum and
a minimum of intensity beyond which it caunot go either way. Of course
he asserts that there is, and in his answer to the objections, he dis-
cusses various and very diverse questions, including God's omnipotence,
the Hmits to human strength, size, and knowledge, the beatific vision,
and our natural faculty of sight.
G
XXXIV INTRODUCTION.
The problem is ushered in according to Wychfs usual fashion;
but it is not dragged in, as occurs in too many cases. Comparative
propositions easily lead to the question whether, wherever there is a
tnore and a Jess, there is not also a mosi and a least, not only existing' (which
is generally allowed) but even possible (p. 129; p. 130, L i — 15). As preU-
minaries to the solution, several principles are laid down concerning God's
power and His concourse in every act of His creatures. AU things proceed
from God, and every act of every creature requires an accompanying act of
the Creator, without which that act could not possibly take place.
There is also in Him a distinct and special power for every being,
which, when that being has perished, exists no longer; but this takes
away nothing from God's perfection, for it would imply absurdity that
He could act with that which does not exist (pp. 130 — 132, 1. 30).
This power of concourse is a relation in God, but a purely logical one
(p. 132, 1. 30 to p. 133, 1. 11). If there is no maximum intensity of an
act, God cannot eHcit it; and if there is, as we assert, such a maximum,
His power itself cannot go beyond it (p. 133, 1. 11 — 25). As God could
do, absolutely speaking, things which caniiot really be done, Wychf
objects to the theory which distinguishes His absolute from His ordinate
power; the former cannot be exercised alone, and therefore is inad-
missible. In any case, every being has power to act only so far as it
is possible for God to coact with it (p. 133, 1. 25 to p. 135, 1. lo).
Every fmite power or active faculty must have a maximum of
activity, beyond which it cannot go. Being finite, it is hmited, and the
very idea of hmit impUes a maximum (p. 135, 1. 21 to end). We may
suppose it to be variable, increasing uniformly during a certain time ; it
then will become successively twice, three times, &c., as great as it
was at first: that is, its limit of maximum performance Hes twice, &c.,
as far as before; so, even in this case, it still has its Hmit (p. 136,
1. 16 to end). The modern mathematical notion of a Hmit — • that which
a variable quantity may approach indefinitely, but never reach — finds
scant favour with WycHf. What cannot be done is not the Hmit of what
can. A given weight — say, a stone — that I am unable to carry is not
the Hmit of my strength; unless indeed it be the least weight that I cannot
carry, and that is an assumption impossible to prove (p. 138, 1. 7 — 23).
Objectioits. I . An army that can defeat a great power can defeat
any smaHer one; an army that can be defeated by a smaU power wiU
INTRODUCTION. XXXV
be clefeated by any yreater force. This is the difiference between acti\ e
and passive power. Now, in the sense pointed out, either of these
powers is without Hmit. — WycHf repHes that, in the sense given,
passive power is a inere imperfection. If understood to mean receptivity
of forms (as in the case of matter, primordial or other) without doubt
there is a Hmit to that receptivity. Sense-impressions have Hkewise their
Hmits, and produce a wrong judgment when thc senses are too strongly
stimulated in one particular way. Thence it is clear that our inteUect,
which perceives all things, cannot perceive them by means of any bodily
organ; and also that there is a maximum of receptivity for each of our
senses. Thus, whether active or passive, the power at work is in every
case a form; and this form cannot be indefmitely perfect (p. 138, 1. 23 — ^30;
p. 140, 1. 23 to p. 142, 1. 35).
2. God's power would be restricted by this theory; for then,
even by a miracle, He could not make any creature go beyond the
maximum of its power (p. 138, 1. 30 — 38). — Ansiver. It is one
thing to know that there are limits even to miraculous assistance, and
another to know what those limits are. God certainly could not, even
by a miracle, make a stone think. His assistance is necessary in every
act, and miraculous assistance only displaces the Hmit, but does not
destroy it (p. 142, 1. 36 to p. 143, I. ^,2). Is there such a thing
as the most rapid movement possible? Wyclif asserts that there is.
As time is made up of indivisible instants, so movement also consists
of indivisible degrees of velocity, and the most rapid movement
possible is that which increases at every instant by one such indivisible
degree. This is however, even from Wyclifs point of view, not
the most rapid, but the most rapidly increasing motion possible;
and surely we may suppose that at every instant the movement might
increase by livo degrees of velocity. That would certainly give us a
more rapid motion: but the passage is not very clear, and I am not
quite sure I have understood it rightly. — As for infmitely rapid
movement, WycHf at once sets it down either as impossible (as in the
hypothetical case given by Aristotle, of movement in vaciio ; for a
vacuum is an absurdity) or else as uot being properly a quantity. Here
our author probably alludes to the instautaneous nature of the movement
of Hght, a doctrine universally believed before the discovery of the telescope
had rendered possible the celebrated observations on the eclipses of Jupiter's
XXXVI INTRODUGTION.
satellites (potest . . . aliquid subito moveri et multiplicari per quotlibet
loca (p. 144, 1. 2 — 4).' We have to consider, not what assistance God
could absolutely give to His creatures, but what He gives them naturally
and according to His Divine plan. To this there must be a maximum
limit; it is that of the creature's abihty to act with such assistance (p. 145,
1. 13 to p. 146, 1. 12).
Can God create worlds indefinitely? If He could, then we are com-
pelled to posit an infinite and absurd vacuum beyond our world. These
worlds, however multiphed we may conceive them to be, would form a
body infinitely small in comparison with the enormous vacuum surroun-
ding it. We should then find one infinite magnitude to be greater than
another: which is a flat absurdity. This difficulty is absolutely unanswer-
able. An endless vacuum enlails quite as many absurdities as the hypo-
thesis of a body infinitely great. Yet God, though thus seemingly hmited
in power, remains Almighty, for His power is hmited only by Himself.
He eternall) produces an infinitely perfect act (the Word); and above
all, creatiou impHes omnipotence. Yet creation could not take place but
at a certain fixed point of duration; nor could the world be larger or
smaller than it is. Some, refusing to admit these hmitations, lay down
as a principle that God's omnipotence extends to ever}'thing that we
are able to maintain that He can do; and that He can thus grant an
indefinite amount of assistance to any created faculty. This, as Wychf
points out, is a grossly unfair method of reasoning. He does not however
deny that God conkl render such assistance, if He chose; but says that,
not choosing, He cannot (pp. 146 — 152).
3. Supposing that a given power A can sustain a weight B during
a certain time C, this being the maximum which it can bear, it could
evidently bear a heavier weight for a shorter time; again, during this
1 It is curious to note with what absolute certitude one of the greatest thinkers
of old sets aside the true explanation of what light is, while he gets to the right,
though vague, conclusion 'that it is not a body'. "Si lumen esset corpus, illuminatio
esset motus locaHs corporis. Nullus autem motus localis corporis potest esse in
instanti: quia omne quod movetur localiter, necesse est quod prius perveniat ad
medium magnitudinis quam ad extremum. Illuminatio autem fit in instanti; nec potest
dici quod fiat in tempore iniperceptibili. Quia in parvo spatio posset tempus latere,
in magno autem non posset. Statim enim cum sol est in puncto horizontis, illu-
minatur totum hemisphaerium usque ad punctum oppositum." (St. Thomas, Sum.
Th. la Pars, qu. I.XVII, art. 2.)
INTRODUGTION. XXXVII
shorter time (C) a smaller power, A', would be able to bear this same
weight B; this, in the opinion of the adversaries, would prove that no
power has a special maximum of its own (p. 138, 1. 38 to p. 139, 1. g).
WycHf answers here at great lcngth (pp. 152— 162), giving many diffe-
rent senses of the word "difficult)^'; but we need not go into them. The
gist of his reply (p. 159, I. 4 — 10) is that the notion of a maximum
must here be considered with regard to the time, and not apart. We
may, however, in this long and discursive reply, note several striking
sentences, some paradoxical, some quaint, and some proving a con-
siderable knowledge of mechanics, as then known. "Of all difficult
things — i, e. of those which deteriorale the agent that does them —
mortal sin is the most difficult (p. 155, 1. 26, 27)." "In the sense of
'something to be mastered', the universe is a difficulty to God Himself
(p. 156, 1. 20 — 25)." "Withont God's aid we should find it as difficult
to move a bean as to make a world (p. 157, 1. 29 — 31)." '^'In the act
of sustaining, much depends on the manner of appHcation of the weight,
An egv will not be crushed even by a considerable force; a sail will
bear up against a strong wind; and experiments with levers prove this
abundantly and in a marvellous way (multa . . . mirabilia facere, p. 160,
1. 25 — 34).'' ''The least weight a man cannot sustain is the greatest
that he can (p. 160, I. 34 — 37)." "Weight impHes distance from the
centre, or from the proper sphere of each element; water in its own
sphere has no weight, as divers teH us, and I suppose that it is the
same for the earth too (p. 161, 1. 14 — 16)."
4. The biggest or the smallest man possible is impossible. If the
former got a bump (tunsionem), he would then be too big to exist. If
the latter lost a hair (quamHbet ablationem partis supei"fluae), he would
be too small. — This humorous argument is answered on p. 167
(1. 34 & seq.) where it is pointed ont that, though the greatest possible
giant could not assimilate any more food, so long as his body remained
of that size, a swelling would not render his organism, as a living body,
any the larger. And a similar train of reasoning would apply to the
smallest dwarf. But before this reply, we come to a very interesting
digression (pp. 162 — 166). Wyclif, admitting a minimum of size for all
bodily substances, implicitly asserts the existence of atoms from the very
ontset (minima naturalia; p. 162, 1. ii); and a few pages later, he openly
gives them their right name (athomorum p. 166, 1. 32). It is too ge-
XXXVIII INTRODUCTION.
nerally believed that Schoolmen denied the existence of atoms. It would
be more correct to say that they passed them over. They of course
combated the systems of Democritus and Epicurus; and, fmding" that the
system of matter and form sufficed to explain in metaphysical terms all
that was then known of natural phenomena, they generally did not trouble
themselves to enquire if atoms were or were not true in any other sense.
St. Thomas, however, certainly says that there is and must be a Hmit
to the divisibihty of any corporeal substance; but he goes no farther.i
Wyclif, with his principle that a hmit not reached is not a hmit, cannot
help admitting atoms (p. 163, 1. 13 — 22). He grants, in answer to
objections made, that the combination or decomposition of two atoms is
instantaneous ; but this does not prevent the chemical change of the whole
from taking up a certain time (p. 163, 1. 23 — 31; p. 164, 1. 13—31). To the
well-known difficulty, urged even in our days by Ultra-Thomists against
such Neo-Scholastics as beheve in a 'minimum naturale', viz., that such
a theory would reduce compound bodies to mere aggregates, similar to
so many heaps of sand, he denies the conclusion in the case of organic
bodies, which have a supervening form that gives unity to the whole;
but whether homogeneous inanimate substances are mere aggregates is,
he says, a doubtful point (p. 163, 1. 31 — 41; p. 164, L 31 to p. 165.
1. ^y), Division is favourable to chemical change; and on that account
alchemists calcine metals, to give them the more perfect forms (v. g.
that of gold, or 'aureity'). But, as this calcination does not reduce the
metals to their ultimate parts, the successful result of their experiments
is ever a matter of chance. — We have thus: l^' , the elementary forms
in the atoms, and ^"'•^ those of the compound: simple in themselves,
these forms are to a certain degree extended in the bodies of the lower
animals, which accounts for their continuing to hve, although divided
into several parts, As for monsters with double organs, they are pro-
perly two animals joined in one, and possess two forms, or vital prin-
ciples (p. 165, 1. 37 to p. 167, 1. 34).
5. It is objected that, at least in the sphere of learning and know-
ledge, there can be no Hmit; for the more we know, the more able we
' "Quod etiam dicuni . . . quod corpus est in infinitum divisibile, vanum est.
Non enim corpus naturale in inhnitum dividitur, scd usque ad certum terminum."
(Sum. Thcol. 1:1 Pars, qu. 1. XVIII, art. 7.)
INTRODUGTION. XXXIX
become to increasc our knowledge. Nor can there be any limit to thc
raising- of a pile indefmitely high ([). 139, 1. 19 — 30). — All this is
absolutely denied. We knovv by faith that the Saints in Heaven do really
attain their maximum Hmit of possible knowledge by means of the
beatific vision of God. The question. /;ou/ this can be — a favourite one
both with Mediaeval and with modern Scholastics — is discussed at
some length. The blessed are not infmitely more perfect than we; for
their knowledge is an accidental privilege, not an essential attribute.
Wyclif inclines to think that they see all things in God; but, however
this may be, the essence of felicity consists in the sight of God Himself;
even were they ignorant of something, they would none the less be
perfectly happy (p. 168, 1. 10 to p. 174, I. 18). As to the raising of a
pile indefmitely high, of course the higher it went^ the more difficult it
would be to raise it any further; and there would come a point at
which it would exhaust all the powers of the whole human race to get
even one more stone to the summit. Thus, Nature imposes a limit to
men in all things; excessive increase of anything, for instance, of
Church cercinonics and possessions, is hurtful. This is a seed which at
a later period developed into an enormous tree (p. 174, I. 33 to
p. 175, I. 22).
6. A minimum of visibility is absurd. Seeing a surface, we see
the whole of it, and therefore we confusedly see all its parts, even to
the infinitely small. ■ — But Wyclif posits as an evident principle that
whatever is seen confusedly might, under other circumstances, be dis-
tinctly seen. This takes all the force out of the objection. A mathe-
matical point cannot be seen distinctly under miy circumstances; for the
smallest thing visible must be the base of a pyramid having its apex in
the eye. The chapter comes to a close with some details on the struc-
ture and organism of the eye, which may be curious as representing
the state of optical science in those days; but I am not in a position
to discuss them thoroughly; scarcely at all. As Wyclif avowedly takes
most of what he says from the works, not only of Alhazen, but also of the
famous Vitellio (Ciolek) of Cracow, one of the most celebrated opticians
in the Middle Ages, I should have liked to compare his anatomical
description with the summary given by our author. Unfortunately, the
work in question was not in the Jagellonian Library when I asked for
it, having been lent out at some distance from Cracow; but the English
XL INTRODUCTION.
student will no doubt find Vitellio's works in any great library. — One
of Wyclif s mistakes struck me. He denies that the visual rays cross
each other in the centre of the eye. If they did, he says, they wonld
fonn an inveiied iniage! This shows how little philosophers of that time
cared for experimeutal tests; for nothing would have been easier, even
then, than to examine the image formed and find out that it really was
inverted (p. 175, 1. 22 to end of ch. VII).
Chapter VIII. Of Conditional Propositions. Wyclif deals rather
more at length with them than with the others; but he soon turns away
to the problem of individuation, and thence to the question of the so-
called InsoJnbles.
Logicians generally hold that such a proposition as, If A is B, C
is D, does not posit the existence of anything, but merely affirms a
connection between two propositions (p. 186, 1. 14 — 16). Wyclif denies
this rule, though granting that it possesses an element of truth (1. 23 — 31).
Every proposition of this kind is either necessarv or impossible. If ne-
cessary, its truth implies God's existence, on whum all truth depends;
if impossible, it implicitly denies that He exists. Here occur some details
about necessary truth. A truth may be at different times both true and
false; and even at the time when it is false, its liaving heen true is an
eternal truth. The signification of the present may be extended to the
past and the futurc. A thing true in the abstract may be untrue at a
certain time and implj- fiilse inferences. If I move my hand, I produce
a truth, new as to its present actuality, false in the past and the
future^ and again everlastingly true in an abstract present (p 188, 189,
1. I — 16).
But, what individualizes such propositions as ^4 will be. n-as. can
bc, &c.? That is, what makes one among such propositions uttered in
various circumstances to be true, whilst another of exacdy the same
form is false? It is the difference of time, say some. What is eternal in
itself has a particular (not abstract, but individual) mode of being in
time; and it changes accordingl}- (p. 189, 1 16 to p. 19O, 1. 3). But if
so, this would infer a continual change in truth; nothing Avould remain
the same. For time is constantly changing; no one temporal truth could
hold good for more than one instant. And on the other hand, everv-
thing would be everlastingly true: before / ain born, and for ever, 1 ain
not-born; therefore it is everlastingly true that / ain. And the same
INTROnUCTION, XLI
conclusion might be drawn from every proposition (p. 190, 1. 4 — 30).
Wyclif s opinion is that individuation itself proceeds only from the cause
of each individual, and tinally from God; ])ut that we know the diffe-
rence between two individuals b}' their difference in time. Suppose, for
instance, that two sparks exactly ahke are struck from a flint succes-
sively, we know their difference because one was struck before the
other (p. igo, 1. 30 to p. 191, 1. 7). But even God Himself cannot
create the same thing twice over; nor, by the same reason, can any-
thing be annihilated (et per idem videtur nihil posse annihilari, p. 192,
1. 8, 9). Here is the tirst hesitating assertion of what was later to become
so firm a doctrine, resulting in a new theory of the Eucharist.
After this. WycHf comes to the grand question concerning certain
propositions called Insolnbles, on account of the great difficulty which
their solution offered to logicians. They may in general be put under
the form of a conditional, as follows: If the presciit proposition he true,
A is not A. This therefore is the best place to deal with them. Before
succinctly giving Wyclifs solution, it may be interesting to state
various forms of so-called insolubles, and the answer which I fancy
a modern logician would give, if he troubled himself to flnd any
solution at all.
If tlie present proposition be triie, A is not A. Grant that this is
exact: an absurdity follows. Deny it, and you have another: // is false
ihat, even if the present proposition bc truc, A is not A. We see that a
mere denial of the nexus lands us in a contradiction connected with the
antecedent; whereas its admission grants the contradiction which its
consequent contains. This dialectical puzzle, as is well known, dates
from very early times. In the days of the Greek sophists it took a form
somewhat like this: A certain philosopher said that all Cretans were
Hars; but he vvas a Cretan himself: did he lie, or did he not lie? If he
lied, he spoke the truth; and if he spoke the truth, he Hed. To say
that a liar may speak the truth sometimes does but elude the difficulty:
for he might have said: "AII Cretans always lie^'' and added the words
''myself included", to exclude the possibihty of an exception being made
in his favour.
This may be expressed much more briefJA'. Suppose a piece of
paper, with nothing written on it but: What is ivrifteti here is false.
This proposition, admitted as true, denies its o\vn meaning; denied as
XLII INTRODUCTION.
false, it proves itself to be true; and consequently false; and so on for
ever. Hovv shall w^e get out of this?
To make the case plainer, by contrasting it with one somewhat
similar, suppose it is said: No proposition is true. If granted, the pro-
position itself is not true; and being false, some propositions must be
true. Yes, but if denied, no difficulty follows. This is simply an absurdity
akin to the Sceptical position: It is inditbitable that every proposition is
doubtfitl. It is only on one side that such utterances resemble insolubles:
the essence of the latter consists in their being equally impossible to
deny or to affirm,
Does a man who swears that he is committing perjury forswear
himself or not? Not unless he speaks the truth; and if he is speaking
the truth, how can what he says be perjury? Can any one believe that
he is mistaken in that very belief of his mistake?
The puzzle seems still more intricate when a decision has, one
way or the other, to be taken in consequence. A certain Greek rheto-
rician taught his art to a young man. Half his fee was paid down in
advance; the other half was to be paid when, and only when, he gained
his first suit. Time went by, and the young sludent, having ended his
course of Rhetorie, and not appearing to plead, was called before the
judges by his teacher. "If," said the latter, "you win this suit, you
must pay me according to our contract; if you lose it, the sentence
itself compels you to pay me." The pupil retorted: "If I lose, our
agreement sets me free; if I win, I shall be free by the decision of
the Court."
Or the foUowing: A tyrant sets men at a bridge which is his pro-
perty, with the order to ask every passenger whether he will pass or
no, and allow only those to pass who answer truly. Ifhesays: ''I shall
pass over," he can either be allowed to pass, or be turned back, and
proved thus to have told an untruth; but what of the man who says:
"I shall not pass?" If they turn him back, he has spoken the truth, and
they fail in their duty; if they make him pass, they fail equally, for he
has uttered a falsehood.
One last instance. A man has tvvo slaves A and B. He decides to
free them both, under the following conditions: A is to be free, if the
first man he meets is a slave; B is to be free only if the first he meets
is a free man. Now it so happens that A and B meet each other before
INTRODUCTION. XLIII
anyhodv else. A, meeting B vvho is a slave, is free that very instant;
therefore l^ is also free, ineetini^- a frcc man; therefore A is also a slave.
And so on.
Debates on such questions have practically been dead for many
centuries; they are considered as mere uscless subtleties. And to speak
quite frankly on this matter, they really seem ridiculous enough, even to
a man pretty well versed in scholastic lore. But the greater the tempt-
ation for men of culture to endorse the svi^eeping judgments of that
proverbially narrow-minded individual — the man in the street — the
more they ought to strive against it. They well know that most of the
present philosophical debates, though not apparently now so ridiculous,
because fashionable, will appear so in the course of a few hundred
years. All that we can say of them with certitude is that they serve to
sharpen the wits by going as deep down into the principles of things
and the laws of thought as it is possible to go, If these old world dis-
cussions then served the same purpose, they are worth studying at least
from a historical point of view. And at any rate, the reader will per-
haps feel some interest in the solution to these puzzles, given from what
I should conceive to be the modern standpoint. I say, / should couccivc;
for I have been able to find nothing directly referring to them in any
modern work of Logic, not even in the Neo-Scholastic text books of
Liberatore and Tongiorgi, nor in that of the Thomist Goudin who, in
the 17"^ centur)', argued with overwhelming violence to prove the im-
mobility of the earth.
We should, I fancy, make but short work of all such propositions,
The main point of the difficulty is that every proposition must be either
true or false; the subject affirming of the predicate either the thing that
is or the thing that is not, Now, taking any one of these propositions,
we are compelled by overpowering evidence to admit that it is impos-
sible to call them either true or false, Well then, what follows? Why,
fhat they arc not propositions ! ^ They are mere strings of unmeaning
• A Scholastic friend to whom I showed this said to me: "What would you
answer to What is ivritlcn liere is a proposition? It could he admitted without
danger; and if you say that it is not, then by affirming its contrary, you admit that
it has meaning." This was subtle. I answered that it could be admitted without
danger, but tliat, helonging to the same class ol" sentences, it had logically to be
not denied, but set aside. It chances that bv thus ignoring, I apparently denied it;
XLIV INTRODUCTION.
words having the looks of propositions,. but not their nature. Thcv are
not absurd merely; an absurdity is not quite unmeaning; TJiis squarc
is rojtnd, clearly means an impossibihty, and its denial is evidently true.
Not incoherent: The number three is fragrant, does not even seem to
mean anything but the raving of a lunatic, which no one cares to deny. Not
mere gibberish: BJitri is BlatJtro may be equally well denied or affir-
med, nobody knowing what they are. The so-called propositions in
question are in realit}- a pecuh'ar class of pseudo-propositions: words
which appear to have a meaning, but which falsify both themselves and
their contradictories. And this, I think, would be quite enough to satisfy
modern students of logic.
The idea of so simple and easy a solution did not, it would seem,
strike any of Wyclifs contemporaries; and he himself, though coming
nearest to it in my opinion, does not quite hit the mark. Some of them
affirmed that such propositions were neither false nor true (p. 194,
L 24—37). Some, that they were both true and false (p. 194, 1. 38 to
p. 195, 1. 14). Others, that they were in reahty exceptive propositions,
as no proposition can include itself in its own meaning (p. 195, 1. 14 to
p. 196, 1. 20). Some said that the words impHed contradiction if under-
stood as they were, but they did not explain how they were to be un-
derstood otherwise (p. 196, 1. 20 to p. 197, 1. 20). And others again
denied that such words as proposition, true. faJse, &c,, could receive
universal extension (p. 197, 1. 20 to p. 199, 1. 9). Several other opinions
are enumerated besides (pp. 199 — 203). Wychf taking the material or
grammatical side of the defmition of a proposition, saw that both subject
and predicate had meaning apart, and that they were joined by a copula;
he naturally could not see his way to denying that in such cases there
was no proposition. But then, how could it be one, if it had no meaning,
if it neither affirmed nor denied anything? WycHfs answer (p. 203 to
end of work), comes to pretty nearly the same as the one I have given
above. It is not a proposition in the ordinary sense of the word, for, in
this ordinary sense, it has absolutely no meaning. But it exists. Whatever
exists, means its own existence. In that sense, every such proposition is
but I do not really. "What is written here is not a proposition" in my montJt does
not contradict "What is written here is a proposition" on tlic papcr, any more
than I ani a nian spoken by one person is contradicted by I am not a nian, spoken
by another. (See Wyclifs acute remarks on this subject, pp. 240 and 241 to 1. 11.)
INTRODUCTION. XLV
tnie: truc, hecnuse it is an existin^j thing. Wlicn wc inquire il it has
any truth bcyond this, wc are forced to repl\- in thc negative. A pro-
position reflected, so to speak, back upon itself, can mean nothing l)ut
itsclf; and in so far as it seems to mean something" else, it is false. Thus
evcry such proposition is both true and false, though in different ways
(p. 205, 1. 35, 36). Tn the case of the tyrant and his bridge, Wyclif
cuts the Gordian knot b) shortly stating that such a case would never
happen ; and that if it did, the man should be made to pass over (no
doubt because in either case the attendants would fail to do their duty,
and it inattered not what they did). As for the two slaves, mentioned
above, it is doubtful whether they have not fulfilled the conditions of
freedom imposed by their master; and as the law is in favour of liberty
(eo quod jura faveant libertati) they ought both to be set free (p. 208,
1. 8 to p. 2og, 1. 24).
A little further, Wyclif explains his theory more clearly still. Let
C stand for the proposition: The uieaning of C is triie. This is true in
the sense that C exists. True also, in that it means something, viz., itself.
But false, if it be taken to mean anything further (p. 216, 1. 14 to p. 219,
1. 5). Here it is clear that Wyclif, saying that such a proposition is
unmeaning in the third sense, says what amounts to affirming that it is no
proposition at all, as we understand the word nowadays. For him^ the word
has a far wider extension. Every tliing is a proposition (Log. vol. L p.
15, 1. 12—22), because it signifies itself, and makes itself known; he
cannot therefore refuse to call an 'insoluble' by that name, But what le
says, stripped of the numerous intricacies and subtleties which render
this part of his vvork ver\- difficult to understand, comes, I think, to
the same.
One word more before we conclude. It is easy to be seen, from
many different answers given to this question, that at Wyclif s time it was
considered to be a very important and difficult problem; arid also that
Wyclif, having laboured hard, and in the main successfully, to solve it,
is entided to the just praise which he felt that he deserved. His closing
words, both modest and dignified, may be quoted here.
"This matter has given me more trouble and occupied me for a
longer space of time than any other part of Logic. Nor do I doubt that
every one of the authors of the six above-mentioned theories has also
bestowed much care on the truths which thev have discovered relative
XLVI INTRODUCTION.
to this subject. Yet little praise shcjuld be given to such as fmd out
these truths; for it is certain that, both on account of the inteUigible
nature of truth (which manifests itself to whoever seeks it) and by the
motion of Him Who is the First Truth teaching us, every one fmds out
at last, by dint of scrutiny, certain truths of which he was formerly
ignorant. Therefore may full praise be given to the Lord of Truth!"
At this point the volume now edited comes to a close. It is, so far
as I have been able to calculate, abont the middle of the third treatise.
Of the seven sorts of hypothetical propositions, five have already been
dealt with; in the next volume, local and temporal propositions are alone
discussed, but at such great length that they might each be separately
considered as a treatise; and indeed, according to the indications given
by the catalogues, many of Wyclifs adherents seem to have considered them
as such. The question De Insoliibilibns was also copied out and studied
apart.
TRACTATUS TERCIUS.
CAPITULUM PRIMUM.
3 33" Sequitur de speciebus ypoteticarum, ut prius pro- Of
. ^ ^ • ^ » 1 T7^ hypothetical
miseram, in isto traclatu tercio pertractandum. Lt propositions;
primo supponatur VII esse species ypothetice, scilicet ^'l^y are seven
? tres cum notis coniunt^endi mere quodammodo sin- three witii'
, ■ • 1 ^. ^" 1- • ^- .. !• • syncatecorical
kategoricis: ut copulativam, disiunctivam, et condicio- -^ ^ians-.
nalem; et quatuor cum notis coniungendi quodammodo copuiatives,
' " -11 disjunctives,
kategoricis: ut causalem, comparativam, localem et and
, conditionals;
temporalem. and tour with
lo Et Dotest sufficiencia numeri istarum specierum sic . categorical
^. . . . ■ ■ 1 siS"s: causals,
convinci: diversitas specierum ypotheticarum capienda comparatives,
est secundum diversitatem modi significandi veritates tcmp^orais.
diversas sienificabiles per easdem. Sed VII sunt species There are so
•^ . ' . ' . manv, and no
huiusmodi ypotheticarum. Maior patet ex hoc, quia more;
, ■ I j- •/^ j 1 lor there are
1 5 species ypotheticarum vel sunt diversihcande solum ex o„|y seven
diversitate sienorum, vel solum ex diversitate signatorum, , "''°'i''^^°f ,
<3 '. . . . , .... hypotiietically
vel solum ex diversitate modi significandi, vel mixtim. expressing"
Duo prima non sunt danda: ergo, relinquitur alterum j|,e signs alone
posteriorum; sed non est possibile modum diversificari, i-V''^- "°*
r ' ....... ,. sutticient to
2o nisi presupposita diversitate significabilis. Ergo relin- diversify them,
, !-..•'"... 1 1 noi" the truths
quitur 4"^ membrum. Et mmor patet ex hoc quod signitied, nor
omne verum primarie significabile per ypotheticam est aio';,J"*^o'^-t
veritas 2"^ aliquam habitudinem ex veritatibus aggregata, must be the
, . , 1 ^ ^ iriT .- • .. !• modes taken
vel equivalenter; sed tantum VII sunt species taiium ^^ith those
25 habitudinum : ergo, tantuni VII sunt species ypotheticarum. p^l^J^ii^^^.
Minor patet ex hoc quod, posita prima veritate (que together arc
, . • ... , . seven in
est deiim esse) consequitur coniunccio vel copuiacio number;
prime veritatis causate (que est ens esse); et istis positis, '^'^^^^'^'^^^'.'^^f™"''
sequitur non solum quod deus est, vel ens est in the two
„ • , 1^1 • ^ 3- ■ ^ I primordial
3o communi, sed quod est dare veritates disiunctas vel truths: the
cxistenceof God
I. Cqp. deest MS. 2. hiitnil S in red ink MS. 20. dm''<' rig't B.
I
2 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. 1.
and ot caused ditferentes. Et 2'" talem coniunccionem vel disiunccionem
disjun^tivc, sunt copulativa et disiunctiva exemplate, significando
interred tiom yeritates sub habitudine copulandi vel disiuneendi. Ex
thcse bv tlieir . . ... . ^ . .
dittercncc; istis veritatibus inmediate sequitur quod, quia deus est,
^cjds^s^becausc" iJco ens in communi est; et quod prius naturaliter est 5
of God's deiim esse quam ens causatiim esse: et sic, habendo
existence; . . ^ . ' . '
Avhich, habitudinem causandi et comparandi, habemus duas
tc^ether.^impiy alias species ypothetice: scilicet, causalem et compara-
a co mparative / 1 i v a m .
AwAcQuditional, Q.uibus 4 habitis, manifestum est sequi, ^^»»2 posse 10
temporal, prodiicere causatum si wult, quando wult, et ubi -tvult;
because God gj. gj^ habemus tres alias habitudines: scilicet condicio-
lias powcr to .....
produce if, nalem, localem et temporalem. Nec est possibile invenire
ivlien -M^i. nUiere ,■ u u-.. i- ^i ...• ..• .. • •..
He chooscs. aliquam habitudinem ypothetice pertmentem quin sit
And ali other ajiqua istarum vel ad talem reducibilis. Ideo sequituri^
hypothetical ^ . . . " .
relations can quod sub septenario convenit ponere species ypothetice.
one^of these. Omnis autem ypothetica est copulativa, disiunctiva,
causalis, comparativa, condicionalis, localis, vel tem-
poralis. | B 33"
objections. Sed contra ista sic instatur: Multe sunt ypothetice 20
hvpotiictilal qi-^s significant falsitates: ergo, veritates non sunt cause
propositionsareypQj-{^gj-j^^j.^^.j specierum, scd solutn modi significandi;
lalse; truth has, -^ ^ . ' ' . . . . ^. '
therefore, et cum alium modum significandi in specie habet
"°with^their signum unius speciei, et alium, signum alterius speciei,
classitication, sequitur quod secundum naturam et speciem sicnorum 25
but torm alone. ^ / . r o
Tiie lirst trutii: sunt species ypotheticarum. Confirmatur per hoc quod
can be ' eadem veritas simplicissima est significabiiis quacunque
cxpressed byall 5pg(;jg ypothetice, ut patet hic: deus est et deus est;
the diflcrent r J i 7 i ^ ^ '
forms of deus cst vel deus est; quia deus est, est ila bonus sicut
propositions ; ,, .•x;'»...j .t -u -vtii ->
aiid hcre ciearlv ''•'>'/ deus est si est, ubi est, et dum est. m quibus VI 1 .-'o
only the torm exemplis patet quodlibet illorum precise primarie signifi-
makcs them . ^ " . . , .
dittcr. care illud quod signiticat hcc categorica, deus est.
Ex quo videtur relinqui quod, non a significatis suis,
sed a signis parcialibus, specificantur ypothetice.
2. And thc Item, quo ad veritates numerales, patet quod non 35
stated ordcr ol -^ , • ^ •,, ^ ■ ^
dependencv ^1*^ ordo inter illas, ut signatus est, quia eque primo
between them gg,- yeritas disiunctiva, condicionalis (et sic de ceteris
does not cxist ; . . . ' .
for thc principle indifferenter), sicut est veritas copulativa: ergo, non
of identity can ^ ,• ^ ,• ■ ^ . j ..
be exprcsscd propter ordinem talium ventatum est ordo et numerus
just as wcii specierum vpotheticarum. Assumptum patet per hoc^o
under any cther ^ - ^ t i- r t^
torm.
2 exte B. 10. mai"' B. 20. quia deus est ita B. 3o. ordinem
lalium tifice B. 32. circa causata (? ?) pro catcgorica. 40. a.'" pro
assumptum B.
CAP. 1. r.OGICA. 3
quod prima omnium veritatum causatarum est iiicliil
siimtl esse et non esse; et illa est necessario; vel veritas
disiunctiva, et eque primo cum illa sunt ille veritates:
si Liliqiiid est, aliquid est, aliquid est dum aliquid est, .Vicl in tiiese
0 quia deus est aliquid est, aliquid polest esse ubi t'%"/tV iiicic'a,'e iMiinit^c
potest esse, deus potest esse nielior creatura. Ymmo in ''^'".'^.* (''-l '" ,
•* . -T . , . . conditioiuil aiul
eadem specie ventatum est dare innnitas species eque causal
pritno, ut patet de veritatibus condicionalium et cau- ''"^vfiidriu"
salium. Ymmo, si ponatur aliqua prima veritas, ab illa eqiiaiiy
. . . . . pnmitive.
loprocederet veritas posterior per viam causacionis; et If any species
sic, arte imitante naturam, foret talis prima species wer^e^To^be^put
vpothetice. Ymmo disiunctiva precederet copulativam. fiist, it siiouid
. . be tlie causal
Item est dare multas alias species ad modum species; and
coniunccionum copulancium kathegoricas ad invicem, slwuW^m-ecede
i3 preter illas VII; erco, cum ab illis sorciuntur ypothetice the copulative.
. y , . , . -•>. Besides,
suas species, sequitur plures esse species ypotheticarum there are many
quam VII numeratas. Et idem videtur de ypotheticis .j^jQ^.ji^'^'^^^'^'!',^
negativis oppositis affirmativis, que videntur esse disparium conjunctions
1, , •,,• , . • , employed;
specieruiii valde ab illis, cum reguie que deserviunt ad negativc
2o cognoscendum veritates ypothetice affirmative non docent requi°int"'otl!cr
cognoscere veritatem negative. Et consimilis est diffi- /""'^•s t» P'ovc
, . . . ^ , . , . . ihem, cannot bc
cuitas in commixtione ypotheticarum ad invicem, ut, classed with
miscendo disiunctiva cum racionali vel aliter quomodo- attirmatives-
cunque. Non enim videtur racio quare talis proposicio ^"^
^ . ... . , ^,, . . ' \ . hvpothelicals
2D loret unius speciei quin per idem roret mixtim altenus " can be
speciei; quia prioritas vel posterioritas signi contingentis to"ctiier'^
non facit ad hoc, ut post probabitur. Et ex commixtionibus torminj; new
VII specierum foret secundaria species simplicis mixtionis, Thcir quality
B Sx" et duaram ad invicem. 1 Et conformis est difficultas "'■^' '^..^■^"^''y
^ I glvc I IsC to
3o de qualitate et quantitate ypotlieticarum. ■'■^'^ diiiicultio.
Ad istud dicitur quod non repuiinat alias species Gcncral
, . , . . . . * . answer:
ypothetice sub istas continen, cum iste non sunt species Thcse sevcn arc
specialissime; sed tales VII species ypothetice sunt "pcc^^ier^and"
ponende, ad quas omnes alie habent reduci; et hoc tlicreforc, thcy
r^ . . -, ■ r ""'^v contaiii
3o suincit pro intento. Mec moveret racio racta purum other idnds,
logicum ad inevitabiliter asserendum conclusionem; sed ^^'''^gj^y^jljig''^^
pocius diceret quod est ex voluntaria ordinacione, sine these.
1 . , , ,.., . , . Thc reason
causa uitenus querenda, quod sunt VI 1 species ypothetice. why there are
seven classes
23. voli pro vel B. 28. 2i pro sccundaria V,. 35. pur-J' pro
purum B.
2 3. Racionalis seems to mean two propositions united hy the
particle ergo; but Wyclif uses the word sometimes for causal,
sometimes for conditional propositions. See p. 8, 1. 38.
so
m
ar'
nia
JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I.
need not be Sed certum tamen est quod non est ordinatum ab
"^'^j^^'J^|y '""'^ homine, quod sil naturaliter exemplatum, et a racione
bitiarily by priori, ordinacione hominis, causatum; quia aliter non
uian, but tlicu- ^ . . . ...,,, , ,
order is based est ordmacio, sed deordmacio; nisi illud quod promulgat
°Vf\hirms".'^^ prius naturaliter esset naturale. 3
We deny tiie Ad primum argumentum negatur consequencia, quia
"^^the^fir^t °^ quamvis prima pars conclusionis sit particularis negativa
argument: i. c. yera, alia tamen est pars exceptiva falsa, cum modi
that the signs . .' ,- - j-u -i- ^ r
alone can serve signihcandi signorum audibihum sunt diversi m specie
„.^L^'fwf,','nc a modis significandi visibihurn, et visibiha diversa in lo
specie habent naturales modos significandi diversos in
specie; et totum hoc est inpertinens diversitati speciei
vpothetice.
I. \Ve must Sed pro ulteriori responsione sunt 3-' notanda, primo
'\'?ordV'/Al/'/!'"'4'-^0'^ isti termini, fiilsiun, et falsitas, sunt equivoce; i5
and/c7/i-e/;ooci( sicut veriini et veritas. Quandoque enim omnis entitas
sign^ifications. veritas dicitur, sicut et omne ens dicitur verum; et iste
JJspecdvely^nie ^^^"^i""^' f^l^itas, contradictorie significat convertibiliter
same as bemf;- cum illo termino. aliqua non cntitas. Et talem falsi-
and non-entity, , ' ■'..„. ■ -a
or more " tatem credo non posse signincan, cum omne signihcans 20
'^smnlfi/s trlm/ significat entitatem, et per consequens veritatem. Et sic
ncgativelv, Jste tcrminus, falsitas, significat omnem vcritatem nega-
having no . _.,,.. *^ .. "^ ^ ,
meaning by tive. Sed isti termini, verum, falsum, et ventas, supei-
Ti '"i^^',;,.,.,,,- addunt super ens nominahter inteUectum temporis
1 ne\ . nowLvci, i
add to ihis vcrbl; ut: dico vel credo veritatem, si dico: ens (quod 2.^
meaning a . . ^ . . „ , j- 1 1
relation wiih est proposicio) siginficat verum vel jal.mm; hoc est, ens
verb'emploUd'^<l"^'-' ^^'^ ^^^ ^"^ ^^^^^ "O" '^st. Et tunc dixi verum vel
/«4T/<.f//i(? /)■'«//;.• yeritatem; quia tunc dixi ens quod tunc fuit, et falsum
i. e. I said ,.., . . , ^ r-^T^..
somcttiiiii:: tliatlunc dixi vel concepi, quia ens quod tunc non luit. tt
thcn ivaa. j^.^ p^,.ii„i gt veritas sunt passiones entis, significando 3o
ens quod vere est, fuit, erit, vel potest esse. Sic autem
non ille terminus falsitas. Unde, si credo veritatem,
credo ens quod est; si credo falsum, credo ens quod
non est.
Again, falsc is Falsum quandoque sumitur tercio modaliter respectu 35
sometimes part jj^^j proposicionis quodammodo negative; ut "hominem
0 1 3. ITl O O (l I ^ ^ ■* ,
proposition ; as : t>.';,s-e asinum^^ est falsum, hoc est, illud non est. Et sic
// is talse , . .,, . j. , . •
tliat . . . . non utrobique ille terminus, falsum, convertitur cum
Sometimes it -n termino, falsitas. 2° capitur veritas per adequacionem
means tne ' J . . ^ ~ , .
detect ot' signi ad suum primarium significatum, et falsitas per^o
correspondence , . , . ,. , • t^.. , • „1;
between the defectum huiusmodi correspondencie. Et huiusmodi
sign and ihe
tiiing signified.
2, e.Ntti l^. 2\. tps 1^,. 35. fcio l!.
CAP. i. LOGICA. 5
veritas vel falsitas est in signo tantum, cum sit forma- in ihis sense,
liter dcnominans ipsum esse verum vel falsum. Et omnis '^^''^'[.^^'[^'"aJ^j®'^
talis falsitas vidctur michi csse veritas, et posse signi- ''''.^ meaiiing
hy itscu.
ficari. Sic crgo significare falsiun est significare ens
5 qu(Kl non est; ut ista: honw est asiniis, signilicat quod
homo cst asinus, et illud non est, et idco est
B 34'' falsum et impossibile | quia non potest essc; scd talis
proposicio: hoc est falsnni, et cetere simplices, signi- Some 01 these
ficant falsitatem, que est forma privativa qua signum smiie^^^ep^^S'/
10 denominatur esse formaliter sinc suo primarie significato. impossibility.
Et talium falsitatum alique sunt contingencie, alique
impossibilitates. Falsitatem vero, acceptam primo modo, limfalsiiy
claudit contradiccionem esse; quia tunc esset aliqua non ^irst" se"nse,^
entitas. Nec mirum, si talis terminus sienificat omne '^'Vi"ot P"^^'^"''.^'
r „ ■ T ■ • .,, ■ ^^ anvtliing.
iSens et non signihcat non entitatem, sicut ille terminus So a false
inteUigibile significat onme intelligihile et non significat sign^iiierLX/
inintelligibile. Omnis ergo proposicio falsa nrimarie '>^ false, \. q.
■ r-r, • , sometiiing tliat
signihcat talsum, quia ens quod non est, sed non talsi- is not; but not
tatem, nisi forte significando privacionem ; ut talis: hec cxcipfas
20 proposicio: ''dens e^/", est falsa. ^ privation.
Secundo, notandum quod omnes denominaciones po- 2. Signs liave
sitive signorum respectu suorum signatorum fuerunt '■""^""\h"'ir '^"'^'^
principaliter capte a suis significatis. Sed cominuniter, significations;
. , "- , . . ' often inexactlv.
aput communiter loquentes denominantur signa false
23 denominacionibus huiusmodi, dum defecerunt sua signi-
ficata propter similitudinem in modo significandi signo- A sign is
rum. Videtur |quod] signum vere denominatur universale, "" "TJndJ fof 7
quia cst signum primariutn universalis a parte rei: et "P'^^'"^''''' 'f '*^
i--,. -1 • • . , . ^ . sm^Hlar vvhen
dicitur singulare, quia est signum singulans. Est enim it signities what
3osignum genus, si primarie significat universale in ^"/^ it Is a "4ww," it
predicabile, demtis diflferentibus specie. Et voco pre- '^ ^-''P'"^sses the
,. , ., 111 • ,• . determinable
dicabile, quod habet aptitudinem ut predicetur. Nec essentiai part of
est ficticia quod universale predicatur, quia vere et " i-ieing;
realiter, predicari est inesse. Ut aninial copulative pre-
35 dicatur de quolibet suo in quid inferiori. Dicitur eciatn
signum species specialissima; quia primo significat um- a species, whQu
versale precise cornmunicabile singularibus in quid. Et whofe"issence'';
dicitur differencia, dutn priinarie significat universale .?.<^'^"<^'"''«^^> '
... ,. , ., . '^ , , . if it expresses
per se, et essenciahter predicabile in quale de specie the determining
part that
8. cetq B. 23, 24. gunt' pro commnniter B. 26. nio<" pro
modo significandi B. 27. Vi-- (Vl?) B; ib. quod deest B. ;-i2. prcdi-
catur B. 34. ra*- pri B.
6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I.
separates differentibus. Et sienum vocatur nroprium, quod primo
dirterent • ■r- , ■ " i . ^ ^ '. ^ ' . .
species: signihcat propnetatem vei passionem generis vel speciei,
a prorer/j, it it q^j^fjg pgj. gg ^" suo subiecio inest. Et signum dicitur
stands tor a ^ . ' .... .
quality ahvays accidens, dum primarie significat universale quod per
present in a •, ^ • ^ l- ^ t- ■ • i- -
genus or accidens et non per se inest subiecto suo. Et sic ludi- d
species; and an candum est de aliis denominacionibus. Si autem si^no
accident, it tor , . . _ i^
a quaiity tiiat defuerit tale significatum, vel non vere denominatur
only happens , . !• i t.. • at ^ i
to be present. nuiusmodi, vei aiiter equivoce. Aiique tamen denomina-
ciones plus capiuntur ex modo significandi, ut quiditates,
quantitates et qualitates proposicionis; iste tamen origi- lo
nantur aliquibus significatis.
3. The Tercio notandum quod prima et simplicissima veritas,
primordiai ^ . ■ ■ n ■ ■
truth — que est deum esse, sigi:iincatur nunc primarie, per ter-
God's existe}ice y^-^^-^^jj^ incomplexum, nunc per qualemcunque affirma-
— may be _ f^ ' . .
expressed in tive, katliegorice vel ypotiietliice soeciem. Sed non est i5
manv ditterent ,. .^ • ■n • '■;- j •' • ■ • i
ways, but ii is diversitas in liio signihcato, sed in signis et in modo
the same truth; jj^j-gj^jgjjjj Verumptamen coniunccio localis, causalis,
\ve may thus _ ... . .
knowit as temporalis equivoce significant in exemplis propositis,
simply; or i'n a supposita veritate eorum; et sic contingit cognoscere
complex way. eandem veritatem, ut deiim esse, incomplexe et non 20
complexe, ut deus cognoscit se; et contingit cognoscere
eandem veritatem complexe, 2"' quotlibet res et modos
We proceed by significandi. Nichil tamen complexe quicquam cognoscit,
combinine and - • , . ,,..,.,, ,
dividing; God nisi quod componit vei dividit. Ideo, quod nos non
knows ali in sufficimus quicquam distincte cosnoscere sine discursu, 2?
one inhnite act. ? . " ...
vel composicione vel divisione, cognoscit prima veritas
sine discursu vel actu distincto infinitum perfectius.
Nos tamen nichil cognoscimus nisi ad minimum novimus
illud esse.
Thus wc do Non ergo fuerunt species ypotheticarum exemplate ?<)
not takc the „,-„ •'' -r! ^ r 1 • ]• m ■ ■
division of ^ sua significata ralsa, nec mmediate 2"^ sua signi-
hypotheticais flcata simplicia, sed 2"'' sua significata, correspondenter 1 B 35"
irom tlieir false ' ' . . '^ . . ' . •' I
signiiications, copulata vel disiuncta, etc. si quis ipsa cognosceret.
trom their\rue Frequentcr enim contingit quod ordinans literas, ydio-
ones, but from niata, vcl alia signa habet communem influenciam et '}?
their joined, . .
disjoined, etc. veritates alias moventes; et ipse, ignorando ipsarum
accordi^n'" voces, putat quod ipse sit primaria causa huius ordina-
Jp *''^ ^^^^^- cionis. Unde instituens istas VII species moveliatur forte
We olten tind '
Ihat order is
unconsciouslv
3. ve pro per se B; ib. me pro inest i^. 8. c'"' pro equivocc 15.
9. mo'" ;7ro modo significandi B. 17. calis calis B. 18. Cfi';} pro
significant B. 22, 23. mo%^'' pro modos significandi B. 26. p^avl" jpro
prima veritas 15. 33 coe^ pro communem !5.
CAP. I. I.OGICA. 7
tali racionc. Talcs VII sunt ponende, et superfluit ponere inlluenced by
1- •n • 1 •,! tliat wliicli i"s
speciem quc non sit aliqua iUarum; ideo ille numcrus ordcred.
nec cst supertluus, nec diminutus. Ex istis ereo tribus riiese seven
' ' . . . . o _ classes are
notatis palct rcsponsio ad matenam primi argumenti. neither too
:; A 1 ., m ]• -^ 1 .. ^•f.. "^ 1 manv nor too
0 Ad 2'" dicitur quod non est magna utilitas ad pro- lew, and anv
positum numerum de ordinacione veritatum, quia certum ""'^''' '•^"iid t'e
^ . ' » . snpcrlliions.
est quod qualescunque cathegorice vel ypotheticc con- Answer to
■ ■ ■ ^ j ■ Oh/. 2.
tingit csse eque primo quo ad consequenciam cum jt matters litile
nrima veritate, co quod sunt quotlibet huiusmodi veri- y''?'' orJi-''' "i
' ... deduction \ve
lo tates quas claudit contradiccioncm non esse. Verumptamcn follow: all
^ , . -^ ^ T • trutlis tlow
necesse est deum esse primam ventatem. Ipse enim non equally from
est veritas universalis vcl singularis, presupponens aliam "^^ tust, which
inmcdiate, ex illa sequitiir ''eiis esse^- ; quia veritate But He is not
contradiccioncm claudit essc pnorem causatam vel nobis t,uth
iT noscibiliorem: illa enim vcritas est transcendens cui- ^''°'^ ^^''l"^'^ "^'-°
' . . conclusioii —
cunque noscenti. Primo omnium nota quo ad tempus, the existence of
, ^ 1 - • - ■ Beine — fiows.
quo ad naturam, quo ad instinctam noticiam, et quo bvmcansof
ad facilitatem noscendi. Et sub illa noticia confuse another that
comes betore it :
noscuntur que disccmus in posterius; et principalissime He is
, •,, • , T,, • • ^ transcendent
2osub illa cognoscimus deum esse. lllam enim ventatem Truth;firstin
primo omnium noscimus quo ad temnus. sed confuse tim«, nature,
' .... . iiituitive
quo ad causam; quia ipsa primarie movet ad eius knowiedge, and
• • ease of
noticiam. attainment.
Ymmo, non est possibile nobis quicquam aliud
^ ■ . ,. , . . And we can
20 cognoscere perrectissimo genere cognoscendi nobis possi- know no other
bili, nisi prius temporalitcr snecialiter cognoverimus ^'"!'"' peitectly
' ' ... . . . unless hv means
deum esse. Q^uodlibet enim aliud cst noscibile nobis of this one.
noticia p}'opter quid, que presupponit dei noticiam. Unde,
.^ / ^ ^ / . ^^ . , All cognition of
quamvis deuui esse analogice contineatur sub transcen- a thinT bv its
io dente, ipsum tamen non inercditur eius comnosicionem cause, must
'. '^. . suppose God s
quidditativam, nec presupponitur sibi, sed econtra. Nam, existence.
j ^ • ^ ^ Thus, thoush
dato pnmo, tunc esset genus, et per consequens pre- this truth Ts
dicaretur in guid, distingwendo subiectum ab aliis per analogically
. . . . . contained in
eius inexistenciam : quod est impossibile, cum nichil that of
„, ,• • , ,■ I , II transcendcnt
3d distingvvatur ab alio per hoc quod csteiis; sed per hoc being, the latter
certilicaraur de prima questione, si est, et non de 2'^ '^"'^* '^P^
' T ' . ' properly
quid est. Si autem detur 2'^'', tunc vcritate transcendente contain or
precede, but is
non esset veritas prior, cum tamcn essencia, communis implied bv it.
multis singularibus, est causata. Est ergo nrima veritas ^~'*.,''''.^ f^'""*'
^ ' ... Trutli is not
40 extra omne genus, cum nec sit universale nec singulare, inciuded in anv
j • ^ ,• ' ecnus, and is
sed omnia talia causat. ' neither
universal nor
singular.
5. v'» pro utilitas B. 19. p^nci™* B. 21^). n^' pro specialiter B.
8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. i.
So \ve havc Prius ergo videtur esse veritatem copulativam, que
copulativo sst: deiim esse et ens esse; quia est ens esse, quia deiis
fS'T°s*"""d ^'''^' ^° quod illam esse causatam presupponit illam esse.
Being is); then Et per idem, intelligendo deum esse vel ens esse tanquam
a disiunctive -.^ .^ j- • ^ ^ j -11 -^ ^
(God is or veritatem disiunctam, patens est quod iUa presupponit :>
Being is). But g,j^ ^g^g tanquam communissimum ; et per consequens
all these trutlis . ^ ...
aie egually presupponit deum esse et ens esse, cum nichil possit
primitive gua „m • • ^ ^ r\ •
conclusions, prcsupponere 2"" nisi presupponat utrumque. Omnuim
and their order j-gppgj^ istarum specierum veritates sunt eque prime quo
has besides _ 1 _ . " .. .
little to do with ad conscquenciam ; cum ergo disputacio ordinis istarum 10
the present • ._ . ^-^i-i 1 ■ • ^ r, t
dehates: veritatum non multum pertinet huic loco, | accipiatur, B :>d
tiieiefore let^it ^^|- ^[q^ suppositus numerus et ordo specierum ypothetice
supradictus,
We may add Et ulterius dicitur quod veritas primi principii est
that the truth of • .,,• • .,.,.., • i ^ ^ ^ -
the principlc of^egacio iUius impossibuis: idem simul est et non est,\o
contradiction, q^g negacio non est primo nota, cum impossibile sit
iiegation 01 the / " . f _ . . . '
impossible, is ipsam cognoscere, nisi per cognicionem illius aut com-
equivalent to • "^ ^ r^^ .,.• • • ..
intinite trutlis munis, ens est. Distmgwo enun inter esse et non esse,
in existence, antequam assencio huic neeacioni. Veritas ereo primi
but not in . ^. .. . i^ . . "^ .
causality. principii convertitur, quo ad subsistendi consequenciam, 20
cuin infinitis veritatibus, quia cum omnibus necessitatibus;
sed non quoad essendi predicacionem ; et sic sunt omnia
talia eque primo natura quo ad consequenciam. sed non
quo ad causalitatem.
Aiisifer to Ad 3"^ dicitur, ut prius, quod non obest plures 2.0
There"'mav be quam VII esse species ypotheticarum, dum tamen sint
more than seycn aj iUag reducibiles, Unde non cum quibuscunque ad-
species 01 .. , . ^ ^. .
hypotheticals, verbns nunt ypothetice, sed solum cum adverbiis loci
reducible to '^'^1 temporis, vel cum adverbiis comparandi, ut sunt
these. For this ^jjjig . j,^; du)n, donec, iisque, juaffis, etc. Nec cum ?o
reason the oniy . . . . •' ^
adverbs used quibuscunque coniunccionibus fiunt dispariter ypothetice
are those of i .. ^m j- ^- •
time, place, correspondenter 2"^ distmccionem grammaticorum ; quia
^"4 iste coniuncciones, uec, neque, sunt copulative neeative
comparison: . . . .
and only a few 2"^ logicos; et maior pars coniunccionum quas gram-
coniuncticns • ■ ^ ■, • ^111.. 1 • i "^ ^ -
can be matici ponunt expletivas, tales habent reduci ad copu- :>-^
employed — lativam ; et breviter omnes vere coniuncciones habent
copulative, ....
disiunctivc, reduci ad copulativam, disiunctivam, causalem vel racio-
causal and , ^ ..... .....
conditional. nalemj que et condicionalis potest dici. Alique tamen
Somc sunt coniuncciones adverbiales, et alie ad rethoricam
conjunctions arc '
closelv allied
I. co"^/ro copulativam B. 12. fufupp"" B. 17, 18. 0.'''^°" pro
Communis B. 22. pcom B. 3o. nig f/TO magis B. 3r. dispit B.
i -
3ii. rchoca pro rethoricam B.
CAP. I. LOGICA. 9
deservientes: et alique mixtim signilicant circumstancias witii adverbs;
. . "^ , ■ , somu arc iiscd
diversarum specierum; sicut patet advertenti exempia i„ oratoiy;
prioris modi. Hec ergo coniunccio, .seJ, superaddit ^1^1 '^"^J^^j|;^'"».'^'J>'^l''^
copulativam excessum, excepcionem vel aliam circum- hypoihetical
'^ . . , , 1-1 1 • T ciicumstances.
5stanciam; et sic habet reduci ad copulativam. Iste vero But is im
coniuncciones vel, et, ne, quandoque ponuntur in ora- 'tlf^ls"']!;;^"*
cionibus rethoricis et non proposicionibus, et quandoque Aii can bc
. , . . . . reduced to one
signincant circumstanciam esse; et ita omnes coniunc- oi- other of the
ciones incidunt in aliquos modos significandi coniunc- ^^*^^*^'^ species.
rocionaliter supradictos.
Triatamen sunt dicendapro materia argumenti. Primurn '^'"^'^^1,!''^.^ i^ °/
de mixionibus ypotheticis, si componant novas species; combinations ot"
.,' .-, ,„ , . ., iivpotiieticals;
2'" de quahtatibus earum, et 3'" de quantitatibus earum. n. of their
Quantum ad primum, patet calculanti, si non fallor, Ji^"^'/,!'^^,.'";^"*
i5 quod sunt i2o combinaciones distincte in septenario. l. There are
?, . T>. 1 •• ^ • • •!, 120 sorts ol
Nam luxta conceptum Porphyru, sunt ex coniungacionibus compound
quinque universalium 643821, sic illa speciebus ypo- p^o^p^oiuioi^s
thetice sunt 21-^ combinaciones binarie, comparando obtained
, . , Tr • •j cps !• • accordine lo
sexies copulativam ad VI species residuas; 5^^ disiunc- i>orphyry's
2otivam ad quinque residuas habentur 10; combinando "ombhfin"
eciam copulativam et disiunctivam ad quinque residuas universals.
et post 2'" alias combinaciones, trium habebunt 3 5 com-
binaciones; combinando eciam 4 ad invicem habe-
buntur 35; combinando autem quinque ad invicem,
25 2! habebuntur; et combinando 6 ad invicem habebuntur
septem ; que coniuncta septennario constituit 120.
B 36" Sed de istis | mixtionibus tria exempla satis est addu- ^''^{^^P].^^ °^
cere pro intento. Primo coniun^endo condicionalem et compounds:
, . .,.'..-,., . , \. If A is B,
copulativam cum racionali, ut sic: oz tii es asinus, tn AisCand
"^oes caper et tn es a.simts : eri;o, tu es caper. Illa magna „'4 " ^^'•,
■ ^ f^ ' ^ ^ It is much
employed by
2, 3. ex ps pro exempla prioris modi B. 11. ji m prn pro matcr B.
i(j. coniusacioncs B. 19. co"» prn copnlativam B. 21. adt pro ad-
invicem B. 26. a™ proseptem 15. 3o. cap'*' pro caper before et aiid
before II la.
26. Some of the numbers here seem to be \\rong; at least
I cannot account for the 10, nor for the expressions used. But
the total is right; thus: anv 7 objects, combined two and two,
give 21 combinations; three and three, they give 35; four and
four, 35; five and five, 21; six and six, 7; and there remains
oyie combination of all seven: these numbers, added together,
give 1 20. As for Porphyry's combinations of the five universals
— genus, species, difference, property, and accident — ■ with each
other, I quite fail to see how, on the same systeni (iuxta con-
ceptum I^orphyrii) they could amount to the number 643821,
though it is unmistakably plain in the MS., as the other numbers
are too.
lO JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I.
sophists to consequencia videtur tenere per illam regulam; argu-
prove an absurd ^ , j- • i- j
conclusion by mentando a conaicionali ad suum consequens cum
contoundmg constancia sui antecedentis, tenet consequencia. Et
tlie place ot tlie . . ' _ " _
comma: antecedens ilhus consequencie est necessarium cum
If A is B, ^ j • • I 3 • ^ • • • • ^
^wCand contradiccionem claudit te esse asiniim, nisi sis et caper ?
A is B: Q[ asiniis. Et illa arte utuntur sonhiste ad probandum
thcretore, . . _ _ r r _ _
A is C. quodlibet impossibile, capiendo unum quod includit
proposltion is contradiccionem, et inferendo ex illo copulativam, cuius
true, '^^■Jl^^^Y^ prima pars est proposicio quam intendunt probare,
2. A is B or st 2" pars est impossibilis primo sumpta. Secundum lo
C ts D and exemplum est copulando disiunctivam et copulativam
A is not B. ' _ _ '^ _ t
Here sophists cum racionali, ut sic argumentando: deus est, vel tii es
take a necessarv ■ . , ^ ^ ^ . -nt • ..
proposition, " asuius et uon deus est : ergo tu es asinus. Nam ista
A is B, an magna consequencia tenet a disiunctiva ad alteram eius
absurd one, "^ ^
C w D, and partem, cum opposito relique partis; et antecedens i3
chantjinc the j- • i .. i- ■ ^-
piaceotthe condicionale est una disiunctiva, cuius prima pars est
comma, say: necessaria. Et illa arte 2° utuntur sophiste ad proban-
A ts B or . . _ r i
C is D, and dum quicquid voluerunt^ capiendo primo unum neces-
theretore sarium, et disiungendo sibi unam copulativam cuius
C is D. prima pars est proposicio quam ipsi intendunt probare; 20
et 2^ pars erit oppositum necessarium primo sumpti.
Ymmo ista arte utuntur quidam volentes deducere quod-
Some cmploy libet ex impossibili. Seqvutur enim: tu es asinus; ergo,
this mctliod fo , • j r j , . • r ^ "^ ..
show that '" ^s asinus, vel baculus stat in ang;ulo et ex consequente
anvihing can be ^,, ev asinus vel baculus stat in amielo et tu non es 2?
deduced trom . . . f^
an impossible asinus. Ex quo sequitur vel tercius, quod baculus stat
proposition ; . ; i j • • , ■ 11
but wronglv, '" angulo. Ideo a primo, si tu es asinus, tunc baculus
for they change ^^^^ ,•„ anoulo. Quamvis autem conclusio quam inten-
the consequcnce . " . ^ .
in arguing. dunt sit vera, verumptamen a primo ad ultimum
modus argumenti inducit in errorem, cum consequencie ?o
intermediate sint variate, eo quod consequens medie
consequencie fiat disiunctive, et consequens ultime con-
sequencie fiat copulative; et sic contingit probare quod-
3. You are nnn> [ihet impossibile. Tercio miscetur condicionalis cum
ti'hat you ivotild ,■ , ■ ... . ... . „ -
i'? ?/"to;< );'f)(? causah copulativa et racionah : ut sic; quicquid esses si :>o
an ass; in tliai ggggg asinus, illud nunc es; sed rudibilis esses si esses
case you coutd . ...
t>ray : asinus: ergo, rudibilis nunc es. Tota magna consequencia
therefore. you . , ^ ' u - ^l ^^ • "" j ••
can now. videtur esse syllogismus ypotheticus m darii; et mmor
Here the minor gj;t- condicionalis necessaria. Et maior patet ex hoc
is necessarv, . . ^
the major too; quod nunc es et omne illud, et solum illud quo esses, 40
and the whole - . t- !•! i- 1 • • ^
looks likc a true si esses asinus. 1 alibus autem modis multis miscent
syllogism.
5. cap*' pro caper B. 33, ^4. quod lioc pro quodhbet B.
CAP. I. I.OGICA. I I
sophiste proposiciones ad prohandum honiiuevi esse Many otlicr
asniniu, vcl aliud impossibile; ut sic: si aico te esse compomid
auimal dico rerum: et, si dico te esse asiuum, dico verum: •''■«""i^Jii^ are
. ' ' . ' / uscd, IIOW Wltll
et cum solum dico hoc ut pono, sequitur quod /;/ sis onc lorni of
i-^ • • ^ 1 ^- 1- • !• li\ potlieticals,
? asiuus. ht sic miscent copulativam cuni condicionan, now with
causali et racionah" ; ut si /// es idcui asiuo ct lu es another.
auiuial, quia tu es homo; ergo, /;/ es asiuus.
Non enim valet diccre quod tales oraciones non sunt To reply to
,-, .,/-1, •• • Ti..^i- ^i ••!••! them, i"t is
B .->6' proposiciones, quia quelibet tahs est | oracio individua, uscicss to denv
loconerue verum vel falsum sitinificans; er^o proposicio. ti>at thesc are
. ^ . . ^ . . propositions,
AHter enim svUoeismus non csset proposicio, et ner lor ihev come
• ^ . ^ ^ ^ ' . ^ undeV that
consequens non necessarius aut verus; nec oppositum detinition; a
consequentis repugnaret generaliter antecedenti, eo quod ^^'''°''^ .*-'"°»'*"^
nullum signum est verum vel falsum, nisi proposicio; proposition,
.. . . . ... thoush
i^nec proposicio repugnat ahcui nisi proposicioni; nec compound; it
esset concedendum tale antecedens negandum, vel dubi- l'^ impossible
•^ . .' to dcnv tlicir
tandum, vel ponendum, curn tamen omnia illa conce- truth exccpt by
]■ , • •! • ..• c' .. • • their opposite, a
dimus de oracionibus mixtis. bunt ergo proposiciones, proposition;
sicut convertuntur cum proposicionibus, et habent sieni- ""d /ve couid
... . . . ^ neither deny,
2o rtcaciones congruas proposicionibus sine impedimento nor doubi, nor
ex parte multitudinis signorum vel aho signando. Ideo TheiV le'n"i\i
concedendum est quodlibet signum, quamtumlihet lon- ,..,"^'''''^* '1°
T . . ... diHerence here;
gum, univoce suhordinatum actui complexo principah whenever there
vero vel falso, esse proposicionem ; et, si fuerint quan- principaract
2.T tumlibet pauca signa, signancia ahcui complexe sine , sts"''''-"^,
' . . ' whethcr truc or
hahitudine ad unum actum principalem, non sunt pro- laise, there is a
posicio; et sic non intelhgit homo pro eodem instanti howevcMoiig;
distincte et principaliter nisi unum; et quothhet aha 'V^":^, ^^!"^'"'-' ^'''"
^ t. ... tails, howevcr
intellexerit, hoc erit sub hahitudine ad illud unum, et short, thc
no secundarie vel confuse. Sciencie autem multe in sunt ^proposition.
que sunt impertinentes ad invicem, nec sunt partes ''tl' '^^'^*^"'^l °V
T . . ... ... the one act ot
alicuius totalis sciencie. Ideo dicit Aristoteles ad hunc simultaneous
sensum quod plura scimus et tantum unum intelligimus. ^ thin<'*s'^
Possumus tamen successive elicere intellecciones super- ''itefdcpen-
dentlv.
3.^ tinentes ad invicem vel alicui tercio, dum tamen cre- "VVe haVe,
dimus. Sensus enim decipiuntur de simultate actuum knowiedae o^f
quo ad tempus. ."V'"-^' ",''"S,^
T . ' _ . independentlv
Ulterius notandum quod non propter tales mixtiones ot each other.
11,. • ..1 ..• !•! Note that these
habebuntur nove species ypotheticarum, cum quelibet compound
40 talis proposicio mixta sortitur speciem vpothetice, pi"opositions do
' ' . . ' . . ■''_ ' not torm new
2'^"' quod suhordinatur actui ypothetico principali; et species; lor the
sicut repugnat eundem habere de eadem proposicione the^princ^ipal"
verb is one of
28. distincta B; ib. quot est pro quotlibet. 42. proposiciones B.
12 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I.
the seven, and dispares actus principales, ita repugnat eandem proposi-
sDGcifics tlicni • • • X^ r
And if one man cionem mixtam esse copulativam, disiunctivam, etc.
understands thc eidem homini. Si autem diversi equivocaverunt de eodem
piincipsiciciin, ^ ^ ^■'
one way and signo, tunc vel erit oracio equivoca et non proposicio:
another in i iv ] ■i.-t • ■ • ■ , .
another, we 'v^^ aliter ue possibili ent uni proposicio vera et alteri 5
have no longer falsa; quod est michi probabilius. Ut intendendo talem
thus a proposicionem : tii es asinus vel deiis est vel aliquid est,
compound . . • • n- -n j • i i • i- \
.sentence may ^tat successive intelligere illud sme habitudine ad actum
''seve'rar principalem ; et sic intelligenti non est una proposicio,
propositions or sed forte multe; et stat post successivam et disiunctam lo
understood; inteleccionem parcium ad invicem intelligere totum
^"cith *r'"^' ^i"^"^- sub habitudine actus copulandi principalis. F,t
impossiblc or sic intelligenti foret copulativa impossibilis. Et stat con-
neccssarv, r i i • n • r ■ i ■ •
according as iLinaendo mteilecciones coniusas parcium ad invicem in-
they are joined j^glli„e,-£ totum actu principali disiuncendi. Et sic in- i S
in tne mina. ... ... .
teUigenti signum foret disiunctiva necessaria.
This answers Per hec patet responsio ad primam mixtionem, quod
the first . ' , • ,•
sophism. We niagna consequencia est concedenda tanquam racionalis,
admit the cum habeat unum sensum primarium verum : et minor
consequence as ...
a rationai, and est neganda. Nec credo quod racionalis est nova species 20
denv the minor. , ..,,..• • , • • ,• ,• • f- , '
A rational nypotnetica ; quia vel coincidit cum condicionah vel
(wi^th^Trslcn *^^"^2l' '" sentencia; | differt tamen in multis ponere B 3^
therefore) illam notam Si, et illam notam Er^o, ut est in con-
amounts eitlier •• , . . ,.,,.'" . ,,
to a conditional ^^^'•"^'^ciis vpotheticis exemplatis. Vocatur enim syllo-
°As'^tor"t1ie gis'^"'"^ ypotheticus, cuius premisse sunt ypothetice. Et 2?
antecedent, wc si queratur de toto antecedente prime mixtionis, utrum
tlien must dcnv •^ 1 , ,• • ,
it; tor it was' ^it concedendum, dicitur quod post concessionem magne
°"'y '^f'^\'!"'^'^ consequencie, est ipsum negandum, eo quod concessio
consequencc, veritatis primarie significate per magnam consequenciam
not scparateiv ; y •^ ^ , , \ ■
and as a pah "niitat antecedens ad sensum copulativum ; et propter 3o
con^seaucncc '^^'^'^ sensum limitandum communiter copulantur alie
it shouid bc cum illa nota sed. Proponendo ergo antecedens per se
copulated witli c ^ • , , , ,
hiit, not with lOfet ipsum concedendum, cum habeat unum sensum
It havhf<^ one '^^'^'-''cionalem verum; sed ex isto sensu non sequitur
scnsc truc, we conclusio. Unde multe tales proposiciones sunt extra ?3
should admit it , ,• • ,• -i •, , ,
in ihat sensc; obligacionem, cum aliquibus partibus concedende et
wou'ld ncflonUr '^"'^^ ^^''^ partibus forent negande, sine hoc quod fiat
give us the mutacio de suo primario significato; ut patet in proposito.
conclusion. ,- ,. ,■ "^ ■ ,,••
There arc, '-'01 sensus copulativus Iimitatur per addicionem con-
''^proposi'ti'onr'^ clusionis. In omni tamen bona responsione respondendum 40
that must bc
II. adi pro adinvicem B. 14. adi pro adinvicem B. 16. foret
signum B. 18. g<^pro consequencia. 2.S, 24. gug^ pro consequenciis B.
36. p"'''* pro partibus B. 3/. p'''^ pro partibus B.
CAP. I. LOGICA. i3
est principaliter ad esse signilicati, et per consequens dcnicd whcn
responJendum est homini ct ad eius signa. Sic ergo coiinlxton, as a
homo principaliter dicit et intelligit primarium signi- (ii^^^v^^iyuy 'J,^
licatuni signo et consequenter 2'""'^' illud signum. Sed srantcd, it
-■^ ille concessiones sunt equivoce, cum concedere vel jo answcr wdl,
negare significatum est concedere vel negare id esse; ^,^^^^^;jg*|!°^','^ 1^^
sed concedere vel negare signum est concedere vel the sensc"^of
, , , . . ^ . .^ -,. the qucstioncr;
negare quod habet primarium signihcatum. Minor ergo blit such
prime mixtionis est falsa; et sic totum antecedens anfb-^^uo^us
lo negabitur. et cessat efticacia argumenti.
Per hoc patet ad 2^"^ mixtionem quod magna con- As to the
, , . , • ^ second sophism
sequencia est concedenda et minor est neganda, sicut vve likcwise
et totum antecedens est negandum; et principaliter ^'^'""^ jhe^wholc
sensus secundum quem antecedens infert consequens. consequence
. ^ •,, , , • c aiid dcnv thc
i.TEt tamen illud antecedens, per se propositum, loret minor arid the
concedendum tanquam disiunctiva necessaria. Nec est ^,.,^'!!'?!^,. ,„
i _ ^ ^ ^ _ anteceucnt in
talis modus arguendi a primo ad ultimum laudabilis, the sense of thc
. "" . • • ,.T conclusion.
nisi stante univocacione sensuum proposicionum. Nec vct the lauer
est antecedens magne consequencie verum et consequens "aken''apai"t'^-'
2ofalsum; quia iuxta dicta, dum magna consequencia est but as soon as
^ . ,. . j j , we grant the
concessa, statmi hmitatur antecedens ad sensum copula- consequcnce,
tivum et impossibilem, et suum similem esset conce- ^^^^^'^'[(/'■the
dendum ad alium sensum. Et quia gloriantur sophiste sense that is
• • false
coram wulgo habere talem apparenciam, ideo debet ^nd to cut
23 1ogicus caute interimere altercaciones et conclusiones *v"th sop?i?sfs^
sophistarum: ut si querat utrum antecedens sit verum, who want to
,. . . ' , . r ■ , 1 ^ show otT their
dicitur satis vere quod ipsum, cum luit vocale prolatum, acutcness, we
non potest esse verum nec aliqua similis; alia tamen, thJ^Panteced^ent
talis qualis ipsa fuit, est vera, et aiia talis qualis ipsa is not true, bnt
., r • f 1 -i.?- • .. ^ _ • .. lliat anothcr
.^o fuit est falsa. Ymmo, scripta tota consequencia, est proposition in
antecedens impossibile: sed antecedens forte erit verum : ''?•: f^"""^ '°'?"
Ideo impossibile est concedendum; sed non significatinn yet another is
inipossibile est dignum concedi. Magne ergo et infructuose We, therefore,
fiunt altercaciones de veritatibus et concessionibus talium .g''^''^^,^)''^^^',^.
. impossiDie, Dut
?5signorum: ut stat, 4"'" bene respondencium sine obli- not as meaning
. ' , , . . j the impossibie.
gacione ad eamdem proposicionem, unum concedere jjut thcre are
B 37'' illam, alium negare, tercium | dubitare illam et 4''''' jy^pl^tcslrfd
dicere quod non cognoscit satis illam ut respondeat ad various ways of
. ■" answcrini? in
eandem. this matter.
2. homi B: ib. Sic 1!. 1 1. a* pro anteccdens li; ib. 0' pro con-
sequens B. 18. vno" pro univocacione B. 19. a^ pro antccedens B.
10, 20. qns" pro consequens B. 22. file^m z|t pro similcm esset B.
25. intr'ine' pro interinere B.
14 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I.
Aguiii, \vhi;n Et patet de illa proposita: hoc est Robertus; sed hoc
^^^ Uini<y" i"^ esset impossibile de significato; ideo equivocaret in
Robert;n is sensibus. Inter alias alteraciones sunt huiusmodi disnu-
impossible tliat . . . . . '
thc signitication taciones de signis ; et huiusmodi demonstraciones sin-
"^ s'hould'bc" gularium michi odibiles, quia indoctuales. Conformiter 5
Robcit. J do dicitur ad talem syllogismum: Tii es asiniis, vel uiamis
not approve ot , ,. , ,, , ,•
such uscless mea clauditiir: sea milla mamis mea clauaitur; eroo tu
V.'^g.' to^^s^ay: ^^ asiiius. Concedenda enim est consequencia, et ante-
You arc? fl« ,3M cedens est neeandum. Et si verificetur maior pro tempore
or my hand is ,..,,, . , .
closed. As the sue prolacionis, claudendo manum, more loculancium i"
atthe thne? Uiis ^^ Natali, et pro tempore prolacionis minoris verificetur
is granted. JHy aperiendo ambas manus, illud nec probat ante-
Tiien, opening / ^ - . .' ,,
both iiands, he cedens esse verum nec luisse vcrum ; quia pro nullo
ncMter ofmy instanti foret actus principalis tocius antecedentis verus:
luvids is dosed. n\iO(\i^ tamen requireretur. Unde non sequitur: utrague i^
Hei-e it is clear ^ .... , . . . , ■ ^, '
that there is no pars illius copulative juit vcra ; ergo, et copulativa. Nec
'"'d"r'awn°sin'ce''^ °P*^^''^^'^ ambas eius partes esse siniul instanter veras;
tiie principal quia de copulativis vocalibus est hoc impossibile. Nec
cict 01 thc -.,,. . .. ,
wliote est color ibi, si seorsum maior conceditur, dum manus
noTmie^^Iu^iiw clauditur, et alia vice minor conceditur, non clausa 20
timc. manu, concludere conclusionem pro tercio tempore.
Gi-ant the ., . , . ^
conscqucnce, Satis ergo est concedere consequenciam et negare ante-
antecedont tuid cedens, et interrurnpere intcndentes probare tanquam
stop tlic debate frustracione innitentes.
as usclcss. A 1 •
Ad terciutTi negatur magna consequencia, tanquam 25
,.v'a,i',n'i„ Vf,';',, non habens unum sensum verum, cum maior est uni-
c.\ampie ucny '
tlie whole as a versalis aflirmativa de condicionato subiecto et categorico
conscquence. ,. . . ,. . ,. .
We havc a predicato, et minor sit condicionahs necessana et con-
paraVo^fsm^fwo ^lusio categorica de inesse. Ideo patet quod non est
conditiouai syllogismus, sed monstruosus parallogismus decipiens lo
prcmises (mai. .^ ^ ' . ,• , ,• j , "
if you were an mcautos. Ergo opoitet in tali modo arguendi addere
%« are^nmv '^'^^^^ condicio sumpta sit possibilis ad concedendum
you then ij'o«/cY conclusionem de inesse. Ut sic argumentando: Qiiicquid
be) and a . . ... , . ., .,.
catcgoricai esses, si esses episcopus, illiid mmc es, existente possibili
conclusion. f^ ^^^q episcopum ; sed episcopus esses, etc, ergo quod 3b
potest esse episcopus nunc es. Vel capiendo in maiori
quod cuiusmodi tunc esses si esses episcopus nunc es,
The conclusion sequitur cum paribus quod nunc sis episcopus. Et ex
yoii^\f'en''an^ primo antecedente sequitur illa condicionalis, rudibilis
ass, you could
biay noiv. ^_ demracionib, jlvo demonstracionas B. 19. minor; ma\ov aboveB.
24. fruftco» jt;ro frustracione B. 27. t» to pro categorico B. 35. ergo
ctc. ergo B. 3~. t, = tenet pro tunc B.
II. Natali. Christmas games are alluded to here. See Eng-
lish ivorks of Wyclif, p. 206.
<:ai\ I I.OGICA. i5
)iii)U' es, si iiiDic es d.siiius. Sed pro condicionato brcviter Wo may notc
notanduin quod debet dan pcr negacionem prepositam oi" thc
toti: sic videlicet: Non est ita iit qiiicquid esses si e^.se^ ^"J^'^'^'?'^".' ''*'''-■"
- , by placiii},' a
cisiiius, illud uuiic es, quod est lalsum; hoc tamen est «o« bctorc tlic
5 verum, quod aliquid uon esses, si esses asinus quod tainen ^^ scnsrtalse"""
uunc es; quia, si esses asinus, tunc soluni esses quod "mpiv."'?,'
, ^ contradiction,
nunc es et noii soluin esses quod nunc es, cum ante- and in anotlici-
cedens infert contradiccionem. Ideo, propter ambiguitatem '"'^'
sensus multiplicis tollendam in talibus, proponenda est
lonegacio cum illo termino, est ita; et illa universalis,
15 SS' Quicquid esses, debet exponi per secundam exponentem
talem: j nicliil nunc es quod noii esses si esses: quod est
necessarium. Et tamen, intelligendo proposiciones con-
dicionaliter, necessarium est quod aliquid esses quod
i5nunc non es, si esses asinus. Nec contradicunt illa, cum
contradictorium talis affirmative condicionalis dandum
est per negacionem negantem actum categoricum, qui
est priori contradictorius et actus principalis eius; et
idem iudicium est de similibus quibuscumque. Thc tact is that
«r: ^ j- .-• .. 1 • 1- ■ ■ i^ thc antecedcnt
2o Alu autem distingwunt huiusmodi proposiciones ultra itsdf is
hoc quod oportet. Verumtamen tota equivocacio taliuni ambiguous:
. , , . . . . either
stat m hoc quod possunt sumi ypothetice condiciona- hypothetical, or
liter, vel cathegorice de condicionato extremo. Et in '^'^''foi' jitionai ^
aliquibus refert quo ad veritatem, in aliis autem non , l'^''"'-
, ,. . ^ . . . In thc latter
2T retert. In aliquibus est limitacio ad sensum kathegoricum, case the
et in aliquibus potest proposicio sumi ad libitum con- ^'°truc'but '^
cipientis; ut sic, dicendo quicquid esses si esses asinus, contingcnt;
id ininc es; intelligendo illam kathegorice, ita quod
ultimum eius verbum sit verbum principale, est pro-
3o posicio vera sed contingens, cum ponit te esse. Intelli-
gendo vero extorte illum sensum, si esses asinus, quic- '" the latter
.,, •II j • ■^ it is nccessarv.
qmd tunc esses illud ininc es, necessarius est sensus,
cum actus condicionalis sit actus principalis, et pro-
posicio nullum contingens ponit. Attendendum est ergo
35 principaliter ad actus principales proposicionum in
respondendo, in dando condicionalem vel convertibile
in tali materia. As tor the
jj, . 1 !• • • -1 .... other sophism
Uiterius, quo ad aliam mixtionem videtur michi, sicut (si dko te esse
omnis falsitas presupponit veritatem, ymmo omnis '"'""''^',„;"^^
4ofaIsitas est veritas, sic omnis diccio falsi presupponit it is a fact that,
,. . . . , ,. . every falsehood
aicere ventatis. Ideo non possum dicere te esse asinum bcin.g truth,
nisi dixerim verum. non solum quia necessario omnis "°^'""S f^ls*^
10. ca""" pro categoriciim. 25, 26. audicntis bejoie concipientis H.
i6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I.
can bc said res dicit se esse, et sic deum esse verum; quia notabi-
Deine^true* liter, sic proferendo dico et intendo ens esse in com-
everything muni, etsi non proferam illud verbum. Si autem
atiirms its own .' . '^ . . • ■,-
existencc with reslrmgitur dicere ad pnmanum signihcatum per pro-
And'1-ven for posicionem prolatam, adhuc, secundum volentes partes 5
the thing proposicionis prolate esse proposicionem veram, dicendo
primitivelv ^, . ,. , . j-n
signified, some quod tu es asiiius, dico verum : sed maior esset ad lUum
that °he°saying sensum falsa, quia potes tu non esse.
is true in ^t gic ad ultimam mixtionem dicitur quod magna
itself, but that . , ,, • ^ . ^ .
its object may consequencia non valet. Maior est vera, quia omnis lo
As^tbi-^thcfTa"!' homo esset idem asino, cum sit idem in genere ; et
(a man is sic omuis liomo est idem commune quod est asinus; sed
identicat with . -n , ■ , j ^ •
an ass) the nemo est asmus. Unde non sequitur: hoc quod est astnus
'^°fahe-"there'* ^^^ ^^onio ; ergo, asinus est homo. Sed si res singularis
is onlv partial incommunicabiiis sit tam homo quam asinus, tunc homo i5
identity. Thev . . ^ ^ ■ j *• .
are botli indeed est asinus; quod tamen non oportet, si ydempticetur
'^'^UiirdVthe'^ ^ ^^i'-"^ -^" communi utrique; sed sicut sunt idem tercio
universal (quia genere), sic sunt proporcionaliter idem inter se.
to a certain ' Et patet quod [sic], demonstrando per iUum termmum,
Sop^iists ^'^*^' communem. Etenim non sequitur: hoc est homo 20
howcvcr, are et hoc est asinus, erqo, homo est asinus, quia medium
displeased with ,. .*-, o-^ j i--^^
this answer, non est ultimum smgulare. Scio tamen quod sophistis
^dmijting^Uie ^^^ placet illa responsio, quamvis tam necessarium sit
which arc, universalia esse, quam necessarium est neminem esse
neccssao'. asinum. Sic ergo in communissimis formis sophismatis 25
lo'toucirth!f possunt introduci materie difficillime; | quia omnes B 38''
most difficuit veritates et opinabilia sunt connexa.
subjects, while „ 1 r,-. • 1 • 1 • s ■ ■ •
dealing with Quo ad 2"\ videtur michi quod omnis proposicio,
iV')l?-'r^'"f-f"^^' sive kathegorica sive vpothetica, tam affirmativa quam
Hypntlieticals. negativa racionabiliter dici potest; quelibet enim talis 3o
Aiiy proposition . ,. ■ r ^■^ 1 .. • c •.. r
might, I think, implicat satis tormaliter deum esse et inhnitas aiias
be called ne^aciones. Cum ergo hinc dicitur proposicio affirma-
afhrmative or ^ o _ i r
negatiye; each tiva, quia subordinatur actui afnrmandi, et negativa,
'e^xi^stciicl oT qi-iia subordinatur actui negandi; sequitur quamlibet
God, and taleni esse tam affirmativam quam negativam. Non35
denving inlinile ^ . <-'
other things. tamen dicitur proposicio ypothetica una, universalis,
'^are*'ca'ikd^'^^ particularis (et sic de aliis denominacionibus), propter
affirmativc or significacionem ^^'''''^"^ etsi fuerit affirmativa; quia affir-
negative ^ • ■ , rr- •
because of mare et negare sunt impertmencia ad esse affirmati et
negatlon^^they negati; et ad multitudinem vel proprietatem significantis.40
may receive
either name.
5. ppeta pro partes B. q. ul"'" pro ultimam B. 12. cone pro
commune B. 17. alicuius B. 19. sic deest B. 3i. alia B. 40. fig''<=
pro significantis B.
CAP. 1. I.OGICA. 17
Sed vcritas pronosicionis requirit t'.s\vc' sit^nificali ; et alie Yot a
,. • Inpotlieticiil
proprietates sequcntes rcquuunt certas condiciones pioposition is
sienorum esse, preter siqnificantes propter quos con- "?' ca\kd
o > f r< ^ 1 r n ^ univcrsal or
diciones sunt huiusmodi. Logicus tamen, distingwens particular, etc.
. ,-,>,• ^ 1- • "^ ^ bccausc its
5 actum athrrnandi et actum ncgandi cx opposito, et being depends
correspondenter ad proposicionem afhrmativam et pro- ™x'us"\nd noii
posicionem negativam, vocat actum afhrmandi actum on tiic
, ■" .... . -^ ,. secondarv
complexum, per quem principahter veritas arhrmandi signitlcation,
est. Talem autem philosophi vocant actum componcndi, '^,^''^" ^\'."-"
t t i_ _ ' atnrmativc.
10 et proposicionem ilU subordinatam vocant proposicioncm i.ogicians.
rn ■ t • ^ .. OppOSill" tllC
arhrmatnam. Actum vero negativum vocant actum aftirmative and
complexum per quem principaliter veritas est negata. "'^gative acts to
. .. .. . .. .. '^"'^ anotlier,
Et talis dicitur actus dividendi. Proposicionem vero ilH cali affirmation
, ,. . . . the wliole act
actui subordinatam vocant proposictonem negativam. L-,y which truth
i5Unde significata primaria talium proposicionum vocat afp,.nied*^'^bni
Aristoteles nominibus actuum, affirmaciones et nega- philosophcr.s
cal! thcse the
ciones. acts of
Sic ergo, loquendo de proposicionibus affirmativis et '^''"jj^'"!"'^^^"'^
negativis, sunt 3^ modi dicendi, quorum primus solum On this point,
20 attendit ad sii^na, 2^ solum ad sitrnificata, et 3"^ mix- tiiere are thrce
. . . . . opinions.
tim. Primi dicunt quod hec proposicio, hoiuo est, signi- One maintains
ficando primarie quod imlla chimera est, est affirmativa^ proposition is
et hec: nichil est, sienificando primarie deuui esse, est atfirmative
' o . ^ . . . ' accordni}; to
negativa. Ista tamen responsio est nimis vocalis, cum the form of
25nuIIum tale signum de se habeat quod sit affirmativum alone';^but ihe
et neeativum, sed a sienificato vel modo sisnificandi. form must
cy J :r> c _ depend on thc
Ideo dicit 2-^ quod ista: ita est qiiod uulla chimera signification.
est, est negativa, et hec est affirmativa, non est ita The second
jj .!--.• • • •••i2..'ii takes thc
quod deus non est. Prima enim primarie signihcat iliam meaning alonc,
3o neeacionem : nullam chimeram esse, et cum idem sit ""'■^ ^'if'^!''^ *'^y
c» _ .' _ _ that : It is truc
illaju ue^acionem esse ens, et iUa negacio. Et per idem that TVo c/;/mcT.7
].^,' ., ,'' , ; exists, is
diceret hanc esse negativam deus est nemo, vel non lioiuo, „egati\e, and
cum primarie sienificat neminem esse deuui, et sic pri- that Got/ /s mo/
. ' . . ^ . . ' . ^ 71011 e.xistent is
marie significat negacionem, et per idem quelibet ypo- affirmative. it
o- 1 • r ■ ^ rn ■ fy ^ ■ ■ a ,. WOUld folloW
00 thetica foret stc afhrmativa, curn quehbet signihcat d^at no
primarie veritatem. Et sic nulla esset negativa compo- liypothctical
». . ° . propositioii
sita. Cum enim ens et veritas convertuntur, et quelibet couid be
. . . . . .„ ^ negative, since
proposicio primane signihcat ens, et per consequcns thcy all
ens esse, quehbct proposicio primarie significat vcri- ^"{"^'51,^'t"^^^"
40 tatem esse.
3. fig'<=' firo significantes li. 2|. necessaria P>. 2?. qi' pro quod
sit B. 36, 37. qpoi pro composita 1).
1 8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. I.
The ihird Tercio autem dicitur quod maxime attendendum est
'^'"wlTich ^d modos significandi verborum principalium pro quali-
I adhere) asserts [g^jj^yg nroposicionum iudicandis, quamvis primarie
that the mode ^ •' . . . . ^,
ot signitving ot' ceperunt proposiciones tales denominaciones ab amr-
verbs^^miisTbe macionibus et negacionibus significatis. Sicut ergo actus 3
paiticiiiarly componendi, deum esse, 1 est complexus, et actus appre- B So"
aitended to. ' ' . .'.1 \ ^ , ^^ .
For the same hendendi essenciam divinam est incomplexus, quamvis
re^ndered^unde''r idem sit obiectum et eadem potencia, sic actus com-
ditterent torms, ponendi, detim esse, est affirmativus, et actus dividendi:
atrirmative or ' ' .
negative, nou esse ita qitod deus non est, est negativus, et tamen lo
^" diiTerence^i^n utrique actui eadem veritas correspondet; sed talibus
t'i^. equipollentibus, ubi est unicum verbum, ut non nullus
propositions. , ^ . ' ,.^ . . -„
So there may Iwmo cumt, dinerenter contingit actus arhrmativos
number^ot correspondere. Et contingit illis correspondere actus
hypotheticals, negativos geminatos; et sic de conformibus terminisi5
signitving the ^ . . , , . . , . ,
same "primarv contingit habere proposiciones cathegoncas vel ypo-
a'nv'^d'ifference'^ theticas ad placitum, sine distinccione obiecti princi-
paliter apprehensi. Ut in istis: sic est quod si tu es,
ns"AU\e^\s aliqii^d est, etc. si tu es aliquid est. Modicum enim
convertible with variantur termini, et utrobique idem est significatum 20
an attirmative . . . ^,. ,.
as to its pnmarium. Unde, sicut quelibet ypothetica est con-
^"meamn"^''' vertibilis cum cathegorica et econtra, sic quelibet
Thus: the nesativa est convertibilis cum affirmativa, quo ad
affirmative ^ ,. . , ■, , ,• ,
affirms truth — cssendi consequeticiam. Unde vere dictum est quod per
aftifmaiive°or ^^tum affirmandi veritas affirmatur, sive illa veritas sit 25
impossible; in negatio, sive affirmacio, sive non possit esse, Et per
lilie manner ^ . ' . ' . V . ^
every negative negativam veritas negatur, sive possit esse, sive non;
denies truth. yeritas enim est communis ad omne significatum pro-
There arc^threo pQg-j,jQj^jj. cathegorice vel vpothetice. Et affirmacio
regards the similiter, ut videtur; et isti vie ego innitor, 3o
diflerent quahty „ , ,. , . ^ ,.
ofhypotheticals. Q.UO ad quahtates ypotheticas, sunt tres modi
I. Tlie^y are jj^gj^jj^ Primi dicunt quod de qualibet specie ypothetice
when both " alia sit affirmativa et alia negativa. Affirmativa, quando
propositions . ■" . ,. ^,,
together with utrumque coniunctorum et nota coniungendi arfirraa-
"!c "'"■Y" '^'^'^ tur; et negativa, quando utrumque coniunctorum et'^-''
athrmatives: . . . " .
negaiive only nota coniungeiidi negatur. Et sic aliqua est ypothetica
wiien both, with ^ ., ^ . . ., ,.
the H(?.vzis are que neque est arhrmativa neque negativa. Ut tans: tu
denied. ^^j^ curris, et ego curro.
So somc would Sed 2" dicitur quamlibet vpotheticam cuius actus
be neither . ,. . .'..,. „,,
negative nor coniungendi, qui est actus eius pnncipalis, athrmatur. 4"
athrmative; as, gggg affirmativam, et solum talem ; ut sunt tales: tu es,
and C ix D
8- po B. 10. ncciQ B.
CAP. 1. LOGICA. IQ
et asiniis non est ; si iieiis non est, titnc ipse est ; tu non 2. The notioii
es vel deus non cs. Sed proposiciones ypotheticas istis ',','^,!laJj"^,^|;'°,',',°^
contradictorias, in quihus actus principalcs coniun^cnJi 'l"""i "'^' nexus
' . ' . ' ' :ilonc, denied or
negantur, vocant vpothcticas net^ativas, ut sunt talcs; aiiirmed; and
^ , ■. j ' , „ j • . • livpotiietical aiid
? ;?o» est itci quod tu es el quod asmus non est ; non, si caie"orical
/// cs asinus, tu non es honio. Et sic, ut dicunt, ypothetice P,'""P"sitioiis arc
,, ' . . tniis somewhat
sunt quodammodo cquiyoce atnrmative ct negative cum on the same
1.1 • • linc.
katheeoricis.
Sed 3'' via dicit quatnlibet copulativam, disiunctivam, 3. All follow
, ,. . , ^, ., . , , . . . thc qnahtv and
lovel condicionalem de partibus mdependencium signi- qnantity ot' the
ficancium esse et qualem et quantam, more kathe- parts- for in
eoricarum, secundum qualitates et quantitatcs primarum ♦""'■ ^ases thev
^ ^. ,. ,,^ . ' , arc merelv
parcium; ut hec est universahs athrmativa: omnis homo connected
currit ubi vel quando vel quia deus wult sic esse. Et '^amfTn^he'
i5sic de istis: oiimis homo est maior quam est milium, others the
,..,,., .,, relative member
omnis homo est substancia et illa non est asinus vel illa follows the
non est asinus. 4 enim note coniungendi sunt cathegorice; ^"tiie^otlier.^
et alie, propter dependenciam sensus relativi, sorciuntur
qualitates et quantitates primarum parcium ; sed non
20 condicionalis. Videtur tamen michi probabile quod solum Bnt I think that
. ■ j. ^ ^ 1 .^m on]\- the foiir
4 species ypotheticarum supradictarum sunt quales 2'" fli--st species
■qualitatem prime partis, ita quod talis ypothetica non '^for^we^find'
sit qualis, sic: Sor non est qui est albus. Nec est de propositions
, . , , . . - which cannot
racione ypothetice quod ambe partes sint per se signi- ^q cailed either
25 ficantes sine habitudine ad invicem, nec necatur uter- ainrmative or
c^ _ iiesative, unless
B 3q'' que actus in tali: Sor \ non est qui est albus, cum iste by changins the
sit eius intellectus: Sor non est et ille Sor qui non est, another less
est albus. Verumptamen hec est negativa, Sor non est ambiguous.
ille qui est albus. Hec autem est amphigorica, Sor non est
[U) qui est albus; ex hoc quod potest habere sensus prioris
proposicionis, vel relativum inmediate referri ad subiec-
tum. Et tunc convertitur cum copulativa impossibili.
Quo ad contradicciones ypotheticarum, notandum These four have
, . . . , , contradictories,
quod istis quatuor speciebus que sunt quales more and the other
35 katheeoricarum, sunt contradictoria, et cetcre signi- pi"operties of
^ _' _ '_ _ .9 categoricals ;
ficande proprietates, sicut kathegoricis; sed cuilibet but^hey are
copulative, disunctive vel condicionali contradicit cathe- \t categor^cai :
gorica negativa; ut isti : Si tu es homo, tu es animal ^^ I^JI"^ '"'^
contradicit ista non est ita quod, si tu es homo, tu es
4oanimal. Omnium enim contradictoriorum actus princi-
pales sunt contradictorii; et vocantur contradictorii,
II. nec . . . nec pro et . . . et B. i5. milm A. 25. adm A.
20 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. 1.
Many actus affirmandi et negandi primarie de eodem. Et
propositions are ^ . , ,. ^ ■ ■ . , ^
equivalent to patet quod multe proposiciones equivalent contra-
contradictories jictoriis que non contradicunt ; quia solum tales et
without bemg , "^ . P
so (ormally; omnes tales que liabent actus prmcipales contradiclorios
and the rules of ^ j- ^ r\- ■ ^- c ^ ■»• • -
contradictories contradicunt. Disiunctiva ergo racta oppositis parcmm -■>
based on the copulative, repugnat eidem quodammodo contradictorie,
contraposition r ■: i c _t »
oi being or equivalenter ad contradiccionem. Cum ergo omnium
non-beiitii' are ■^ , -^ z- ■ ^- ^ ^ ^ i i
the same tor ail. oppositorum eadem sit disiunctiva, patet quod regule
que deserviunt ad noscendum veritatem vel falsitatem
qualiscunque ypothetice, deserviunt directe vel in- lo
directe ad noscendum veritatem aut falsitatem sui
oppositi; et tanta de qualibet ypotheticarum.
in. Of Quo ad tercium, dicendum de quantitatibus ypotheti-
]'liese '" carum, videtui michi probabile quod nuUa trium
profositions. priorum vpotheticarum sit alicuius quantitatis, quam- i5
I thinlc that the ^. - ' . . . ^ . ^ .
three hrst Idnds vis qualiscumque quantitatis sit lcathegonca de tali
of livpotlieticals ^i ^- .^ r\ ^ .. r *" •
iiave properiy ypothetico extremo. (^uatuor autem aiie species possunt
110 quantity; jj^i quante a primis partibus, sicut prius dicte sunt
biit that tlie ^ . ^ -^ '
others 2'" partes illas esse quales. Nota tamen quod sophista
(coDwaratives, , . ...i ..• ...... i ...i
locais and concederet omnem ypotheticam, sicut et kathegoncam, 20
lemporals) \\A\Q Q^^Q ^^^^^ qualem quam quantam; ut lonsa ypothetica,
it bv reason ot . ^ ^ ^ ' . ~ ■' ^
tlieir tirst m hoc quod longa, est quanta. Et in hoc quod est
A soiMiiy^vouid '1^1'^'^ti'^^'^^ denominata, est qualis. Illud tamen dictum
say:Allthese pi-Qcedit ab equivoco, cum logicus non attendit ad
propositions ^ ... ....
when writien, quantum molis vel duracionis proposicionis logice, sed 23
have qitanfit}-, '^^' universalitatem, particulantatem, mdehnitatcm vel
and quantity is singularitatem. Unde indefinitam kathegoricam contingit
a qualtty. ° . . .'^ . . ^
luit logicians esse ypotheticam scnptam, et cathegoncam contmgit esse
'"as"concerns'"'' ypotheticam, tempore longiorem, et utramque pulcram,
imiversality, etc. acutam aut aliter qualitatam ; sed hoc est impertinens m)
1 he same . .... ^ . . ,. , '. .^
reason would mtencioni logice, restrmgentis qualitatem ad eius arhr-
pi-opo^shTon macionem vel negacionem superius expositas.
many qualities, ^^ hic communiter dubitatur quam longa oracio
that are qiiite . . . . • , • , ^ , •,
toreign to our possit esse proposicio; et videtur michi prohabile quod
(2a',"^a"oni; ^^t dare maximum tale: quod sic esse proponam. Sicut 33
speech be one totus mundus racionaliter potest dici proposicio, sic
proposition? •/- ■ , j r
Piobably there quantumlibet magnum artiftciale secundum tormam artis
'*ot poss'i'ble"^ dispositivam potest esse proposicio. Nec requiritur intelli-
length. The eere oiTines partes proposicionis simul, sicut patet de
whole world is '^ . . ,. -^. .
a proposition, proposicione vocali futura, sed successive, unam post 40
^"^artifidaf""^ reliquam. Superfluus tamen et in | debitus esset grandis B 40"
disposition of liber iste super quem non scriberetur nisi negativa
things, however ^ ^
considerable.
i3. dum pro dicendiim l;. '■!?'. fit pro sic B. ?8. possit B.
CAP. 1. I.OGICA. 2 1
DroDOsicio; sicut indehitc loqucrctur qui, intcndcndo lint as
K. , „ ., . 1 ■ • siiperfiuitv
dicere quou Sor scnbit, narraret totam geneoiogiam euis destroys tiiis
usque ad primum hominem. Est ergo in talibus dare ^i^a^maxi/,""^^
maximum 2'" mensuram debitam proporcionatum, quod of lensiii,
.,, ' , . beyoiid whicii
5 constitueret proposicionem artihcialem cum proporcio- no propositiou
nata concepcione. Nam contingit intelligere brevem ^^'Tjj," ^".'ichit
oracionem sine habitudine proporcionali; sicut cotii- is graspcd in
muniter mtendunt trurtantes cum pueris, proponendo correspondlng
illis claudendo manus talem disiunctivam : Tu es asiinis, A^vc^iy^^short
lorel mea maniis clauditur. qua concessa, utramque manum «roup may bc
.,, ^ . ,, deticicnt in tliis
aperiendo, proponunt illam negativam : milla mea mamis last quality;
clauditur; que eciam est concedenda; tunc concludit ^j |p^['Ji^!;f'^^Y
conclusionem. Sed tota oracio precedens non intelligitur ciosing the
,,,.,. . . . . . . . . ^ hand.
sub habitudme unius proposicionis; vel si sic, ipsa est
i5 neganda.
Aliatn autetn evasionem habent sophiste, concedcndo -Sophists say:
,. , . A wholii is its
quod totuin est sue partes; et sic dicunt copulativam parts: so a
esse universalem et particularem, affirmativam et nega- '^b.funivcrsri'"
tivam ; et tanicn nec est universalis nec affirmativa, particular,
, .,, r^ 1 -11 1 1 • 1 • atlirmative and
2o sed est ille partes. Sed illud non placet michi, tum ncsativc atoncc,
quia fundamentum est falsam, tum eciam quia quelibct ''''Vi^t^ tj',^'^^'
VPOtetica habet notam coniungcntem, que ncutrius principic is
■^. , j . •1, , talsc, and
categorice est pars. Ideo ypotetica non est ille kate- besidcs, the
gorice, sicut nec quique sunt 4. _ ciemenVwh.ch
20 Sed 3*^ obicitur evidencius quod quatuor specics, exists in neithcr
, ■ of the
que dicte sunt esse quales et quante, sunt categonce component
et non ypotetice. Aliter enim non esset hec categorica : ''^Anoth"'*'
A est, siiinificat siciit est, est maior Plalone, et sic de ohjectionrThesc
.,., ^ ^ , , -11 , • ] • T • 1 • ,, lour kinds said
smiilibus. Sed quo ad illud vidctur michi quod sicut to have
3oafifectus numero septenario reducit omnes species ypo- ''"''"|.'J>'|'jj^'''^ '"
thetice ad 'VII, sic afifectus numero ternario reducit categorical; if
•1, oc , 1-, o^ • ] - not, manv
omnes illas 3^ ad 3-'. Sicut ennn ad omnem punctum propositioiis
intrinsecum mundi circumstant solum 6 puncta ipsum "cTte"orfcar
tangencia secundum tres differencias posicionis (propter would be so no
, . ,. . . longer.
35 quod numerus septenarms dictus est numerus universi- But i think that
tatis), sic omnem veritatem kategoricam circumstant ^'^rcduces^all
6 veritates ypothetice, que cum illa constituunt veri- to 3, and he
, . _. . , ,., who likes 7
tatem copulativam. Sic enim completa est queiibet reduces ali
to 7. Every
i3. p^cc"' B. 14. fi<:B; il\ ipsum B. i5. negandnm B. 2'. 1" B.
23, 24. ka« B. 24. fnt B. 28. A enim (.-') pro A cst B- 32. 3^* ad
■3 B. 38. co^» B.
32. Ad omnem. "We shall tiiui a good deal more of this,
in Wyclifs theory of the Extended, later in the work.
22 JOHANNIS WYCr.IP^ CAV. I.
point iii the essencia, sive corporea, sive incorporea in nalura ab-
surround^cd soluta, que est communis tribus suppositis; et omnibus
by 6, and 7 is [\\[v, jnsunt proprietatcs, et communiter accidencia et
the uumber ot . . ^ ^ .
thc uuivcrse. opposiciones. Lt sicut non est dare realitatem que
reality^can^c "on ^i^ reducibilis ad aliquod trium suppositorum, 5
reduccd to ^[q jion est dare ypotlieticam quin sit reducibilis ad
three clcments, . ... , . .
all hypothcticals copulativam, disiunctivam vel condicionalem, cum
'^t''o thrce^^ tor omnis causalis, comparativa, localis, vel temporalis,
causals, directe reducitur aei copulativam : ut idem est te e.sse
coniparati\ es, ... , . ,
locals and ciiiinial qitia tu cs horno, et te esse aitnnalj et caiisain 10
''^'"iirectly''"^ t^n/.'> esse qiiia tii es Itomo. Et idem est A signi-
reduciblc to ficare sicud B sinnificat, et : A sisiiificare uiiuni ens
copulatives. -' . . -.P ,' ■ , ^- ^ -,,
Examples. ^^ ■" siguipcare illud ideni. Vcrumptamen ille terminus,
sicut, quandoque dicit similitudincm in modo signi-
ficandi et quandoque ydemptitatem significati; et idem i5
est dicere tu es ithi vel quando Sor est et dicere
quod tu es in aliquo loco \ vel tentpore et ibi vel tunc B 40''
Sor est. Et sic posset quamlibet talem dici esse copu-
Tiuis all belong lativam. Nec est possibile aliquam esse ypotheticam
to one of ihese qm^ ^^^j^ gj^ aliqua istarum trium specierum. Verum- 20
lIircG Cld.SScS J ' ^ -*■
but it comes to ptamen eadem est sentencia utrobique; quia reducendo
the same, for .,, , , . , , .
we then havc nlas 4 ad copulativam, habentur qumque species copu-
copul^ativtls l^itive. Nec sequitur, si sunt quales et quante, quod
And it does sint kateeorice. Et sic primum exemplorum proposi-
not foliow that ^ , . ^ , ^ • • ,
they arc torum est vpothetica, et secundum est proposicio kate- io
"^tiiaf^account"' 801"^^^- E^ tanta de ypotheticis sint dicta hic, quo ad
suas essencias et accidentales proprietates in genere.
5. suppf-f B. 14, i5. mo<"
CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.
Sequitur de copulativis pertractandum ; supponendo q, ^., ,„|.j,j^^^
primo, quod omnis ypothetica subordinata principaliter ^'^^ ''^si""'^ tii»'
actui ypothetico copulandi sit copulativa; et solum liypoiheti"i.al oi
5 talis. Ex quo patet quod ex quibuscunque kathegoricis ,sLib'oidiiiaic'io
contineit conulativam componi; et quelibet copulativa, ""^ mcniai aci
loquendo universaliter, tunc est vera, quando pnmane a copulativx-,
verum significat. Et specialiter discernitur ex hoc esse '^'i"%^^m.',',-^f^'
vera, quando ambe partes principales sunt vere. Nota signitics tiufti,
, - . . , . is ,so when both
lotamen quod proposicionem equivocam copulativam stat its parts arc
esse necessariam, et ambas eius partes impossibiles; ,,,,. :,'''"^'' ,.
ut patet te ista: uon est ita qtiod deiis est et tii es cqnivocaijy
„ . , .,,..,, . . , copulativc, may
asiinis. Potest enim hec mtelligi kathegonce, ita quod bc truc and
negacio cadat super actum principalem copulandi, et ^^°"\aisc'-^''^
i.T consequenter super utrumque actum partis; et sic est
kathegorica negativa et necessaria, contradictoria copu-
lative. Vel potest intelligi copulative, ita quod negacio unless the
cadat super primum actum solum; et talis sensus est iie^JI^t^on^f^iis
impossibilis : conceditur tamen propter sensum verum. on thc tirst
20 Nec ex hoc sequitur quod tu es asiniis, quia antecedens
non infert te esse asinum, nisi ad sensum copulativum.
Hic tamen dicitur communiter quod oportet addere To avoid
talem coniunccionem quod, ad hoc quod negacio neeet '','."^'?""-^'' ',' '/
J^ ' T o o^ iccommcndcd
utnimque actum; ut sic : non est ita quod, neeacio '« ''dd ^^'<'^- ;ts:
1 ,. ' \ V ■ ■ \ l It h- not Iruc
2D cadat super actum copulandi pnncipalem, et commvi- that A is b and
niter super utrumque actum partis; et sic est categorica This'"'^"''
negativa et necessarie, contradictoria copulative, quod tu es necessary
asinus et quod deus est ; tunc cnim cst limitatus sensus prop"ositio'n'.
kathegoricus, de copulato predicato. Ista enim : homo est, et signs and sense
3o deus hoc scit, si^nificando primarie [per /zocl auod chimera must
' " . i . '^'- J.^, . correspond, or
est, non est copulativa, sicut nec proposicio mixta ex tlie proposiiion
is not truly
1, 2. Cap. and Initial S desunt 15. 7. v'' pro univcrsalitcr B.
16. ne" B. 27. <j/"/cT copulativc B: vcl potcst intelligi copulative, -la iiuod
nefjacio cadat supcr primum actum solimi et talis cst inipossibilis, con-
ceditur tamen propter sensum verum, etc. 3o. per hoc dcest B.
24 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. 11.
copulativc, copulativa et alia ypothetica, cuius actus principalis
^nany^cTsesl" "^" ^^^ actus copulandi, nec proposicio simplex signi-
ficans primarie eandem veritatem quam copulativa
significat; quia ad esse copulative requiritur correspon-
dencia signorum et sensuum. 5
The negative Certum tamen est quod satis debite potest negacio
well^amM\'To neg^re utrumque verbum in talibus, quamvis propter
both verbs of evitaciones sophisticas excludendas, expressius sit ponere
the connected .,, . , ,
membeis; but dlum terminum, qiiod, respectu ambarum parcium; tunc
^idd //?"/,'as° '^o" ^^^ copulativa, sed kathegorica negativa de copu- lo
above. lato predicato. Nec obest proposicionem esse ypothe-
ticam, cum hoc quod 2^ pars dependenter significat
ad aliam, quia sic est de copulativis quarurn parciutn
posteriorum extrema refei-untur ad extrema | propo- B^i"
sicionum priorum; ut hic, Sor ciirrit et ille movetur. ^:'
As a rule, the Unde regulariter in taiibus refert relativum suum ante-
' a^mo^ijositi^on'' cedens sub habitudine ad totam significacionem prioris
refers to the proposicionis : ut idem est dicere: omnis homo est Sor,
whole preceding ' f • ,• •n c •
proposition. et idem est masciilus, ac si diceretur ille Sor qui est
omnis Iiomo est masculus; et sic de similibus quibus- 20
cunque. Nec dubium attendenti ad experienciam quin
tali proposicioni correspondat actus ypotheticus copu-
landi; sed isti oracioni, ita est quod Sor currit et mo-
vctur, correspondet actus categoricus, cum tota veritas
Someiimes, copulative intelligitur, ut una de qua componitur, quod 20
'^ot^'the^second"' il^^ ^st. Et si queratur cuius quantitatis sunt huiusmodi
member is cateeorice, dicitur quod sunt multe, cum ilie terminus,
mcluded m . "-^ , ' ^ . ., ...
that of the tirst, ??<7, demonstrat ventatetn communem convertibiliter
"is copuradve'^ '^"ri"' ^"'^'^- ^^^™- ^"1^ est dicere : Ita est quod ego non
onlvintbrm; sum, et dicere: ens est me non esse. 3o
as A is BC, and „ , •,, ■ . • • • •! 1 • •
A is B. Sed ille termmus, ita, m proposicionibus copulativis
^'^'aen'e'raliv^ '* ^'^^ipi^^^^' communiter demonstrative, ut: ita est sicut
uncierstood as ^20 dico, cuius unus intellectus est talis: illud ens est,
demonstrative ; '' , ,. ^ ,
but such quod ego dico. Tales enim oraciones sunt equivoce, et
c'nipk)y''it'uius ^^^^ respondcndo ad illas sufficit sensus primarii com- 35
arc cquivocai. prehensio. Et ita illa est concedenda, tu es, vel deus
it does not est, et tu non es, cum sensus disiunctus est verus. Nec
compouiKi prioritas vocem impedit, quin contingit illam intelligere
lypotheticals copulative; quia, ut prius dictum est, in mixtionibus
ivhich ot the . ^ . ' ^ .' ^ . '
hypothetical intelliguntur huiusmodi antecedencia copulative. Et in 40
signs comes ^ ,•. • ^^ -i 1 ..• .. j- • r „*„
tirst; talibus mixtionibus ex copulativa et condicionali, nota
25. inf B. 33. inti=« B.
\v
CAP. II. LOGICA. 25
contradiccionis communitcr facit ipsa esse condicionalia, v. g. whcn wc
ut hic: tu es homo et tu es asiiius si tu es cisiuus; et aiU^c is D if
sic est in racionalibus, ubi art^umentatur a tota copu- ^ ".,■!! 'n'i "*
lativa ad alteram eius partem communiter in syllo- considi^rccl as
... , . . ,.^„ ./ . a conditioiial.
D gismis ypotheticis, ubi possunt indiiierenter specilicari
a nota priori et a nota postcriori. Nec curo sive negata And it such a
,. ... . ., . proposition is
luerit talis proposicio, sive concessa m sensibus equi- cquivocal, it
vocis. Ego tamen elegi concedere illas, supposito uno .J^ii^^.Ji^,'^*- 'it"b .
sensu vero. Et, si argumentans probare voluerit sensum grantud or
,. ,. ^ . , , dcnicd : bul I
loalium, licet, et satis conveniam quod arguatur ao prutiir thc
sensum illam. tormcr.
Unde probabiliter potest ista dubitari : non est ita a negative
quod deus est vel rex sedet; cum, intelligendo illam J^'i°tradicthi<''
ypothetice disiunctive, est eque dubitabilis sicut 2" pars. a disjunctivf,
- r> , • 11- 1 -u 11 ■ • "lay ll"VC tWO
loSed intelligendo illam kathegonce negative, contra- diitcrcnt
diceret disiunctive ponenti principaliter veritatem disiunc- '" d\"nvfn''''thc^'
tivam. Et si queratur quare proposicio convertibilis cum propositions as
,. . ' , . * ' ^ ....... scparatc, or
contradictorio alterius non eque contradicit sibi sicut dcnying thcir
suum convertibile, dicitur quod in proposicionibus con- BuJ^|iow''i""it
■jo vertibilibus est dare gradus. Unde solum in converti- that cach of the
, .,., *- . ,. . disjuncts,
bilibus, quorum utrumque ponit explicite omnem convertibic with
veritatem quam ponit reliquum, intelligitur quod, si ^jjjjj|.g^ij^(gj. ^
nroposicio contradicit uni talium, contradicit utrique. the othcr, is not
L , , . . that
Lonstat autem quod multe sunt proposicioncs con- contradictory;-'
25 vertibiles, tam 2'" predicacionem quam 2'^^ consequen-
or
Bccausc
propositions
ciam, quarum una ponit explicite veritatem quam may bc
' ^ . . ' , . . , ... ., convcrtiblc
2" non sic ponit; ut patet de istis: honio est risibile; cithcr without
3 duplum est, duplique dimidium est, etc. Proposicio '"^ifxpHck"^
autem nichil significat explicite, nisi quod ipsa vel meaning on
^,. . ..„ .'. ,.. cithcr side, o
-■>o aliqua eius pars signihcat primarie; ut patet de istis, adding such
Sor est et Plato est, et ita est quod Sor est et Plato est. xhe^vcrTlunc
B41*' Sicut enim idem est homo 1 et humanitas et esse trutu may bc
, . . . .,, ' 1, ■ exprcssed in
hominem, quamvis signihcatur nunc collective, nunc dirtercnt
abstractive et nunc complexe: sic eadem veritas sisni- lu"'?"'^!:^-,^"';
i ' o tlicsc oitteient
35 ficatur, nunc kathegorice, nunc ypothetice; et nunc manncrs add a
complexe, nunc incomplexe. Et hinc videtur quod que- meaning.
libet proposicio, cum ponit veritatem qua.m primo signi- ti^^^^^o^si^s^-
ficat et asserit, quod sit affirmativa; sicut et videtur truth is that ot
,•,... , ^ ,. ^ affirming; we
quemiibet actum complexum esse actum componendi et do not conceive
40 copulandi. Diversitates enim talium actuum propter defec- ^ positivc
'^ r I proposition
under a negative
10. Iicet B. 27. uX^ pro ut patet B. 3o. nt^ pro nt patet B.
e
33. yttive z= completive? B. 3g. quelibet A.
2b JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II.
torm 111 the tum iiominum facilius possunt concipi quam explicari;
wheif its torm ut nuUus dubitat quin alium modum concipiendi habet
was positive. jg ^^n ji^ ^^f quod noH est ita quod deus est et chimera
let thev may ' ■' . ^
be both est, et alium de tali: non est ita quod deus est et
convertiblc wilh , ■ , t-.. ^ • -i^ ^ • •
the same cliimera est. Kt tamen signiticata primana convertuntur, ?
proposition. prima existente affirmativa et alia negativa; et tamen
utraque iilarum convertitur cum ista disiunctiva, deus
ncn est vel chiniera non est. Et tamen ilia non contra-
dicit copulative, quamvis equivalenter opponitur ; quia
This shows the contradiccio debet esse prima et maxima opposicio, lo
tiuth ot thc cLiivis non est medium. Ex istis patent retrule de modis
rulcs, argLung • . . .
V. g. from ihe argumentandi a tota copulativa ad alteram eius partem,
whole .. . • ■ c .. L- -^ ^•i •!• 1
copuiative to ^t non e contra, nisi rorte ruerit pars convertibilis vel
one of its antecedens ad reliqviam. Et sic de aliis regulis veri-
terms, and not ... °
conversely. tatum in illa materia. i5
We must now Istis premissis, restat videre materiam sophisticam
examine those ..• ^ • ^ • • ..• i ,.• t ^
sophisms which contingentem in termmis grammatice relatis, explicatam
concern communiter intra copulativas. Sunt erco talium rela-
pronouns. . . . f _ . . "^. .
Some e.xpress tivorum aliqui termini relativi vdemptitatis; ut ille,
identity, others ■ •• ^ .,■• .. _'. •• ],.■■]•
diiYerence, the ifsc, qui, is, etc. Aiii autem sunt termmi relativi diver- 20
lattcr connotingsjt^tjs. ^ aliter, alius et alter et cetera. Et diflFerunt
it in diHerent . . ' . . ' . .. . .
ways, and the isti termini 2"^ connotacionem ; ut alii connotant dispari-
former reterring ^ ^ ■ ^ i- j v ^ .. j- ■ .. ..
to universal or tatem essencie; ut alnid; alii connotant disparitatem
personal qualitatisl ut alter; et alii indifferenter cuiuscunque
identity. ^ . . ' . . . "
accidentis: ut aliter. Et relativa ydemptitatis quandoque 2?
referunt sua antecedencia simpliciter pro communi, et
quandoque referunt relacione personali; sicut aliqui
sunt termini interrogativi pro personis; ut quis? et
alii interrogant pro essenciis; \x\. quid? Et sic de multis
famosis apud grammaticos. 3o
Logicians do Est tamen una regula grammatice in qua dissenciunt
whet^ier^^or^^no logici; scilicet, quod omne relativum refert suum ante-
the pronoun cedeiis sub habitudine alicuius actus verbi sui ante-
stands ror its . . .....
antcccdent as cedentis; sic omne tale relativum Iimitacius se habet
afHrmed bya .., ..•, ..i- jcr,-
preccding verb. q'-^^"^^ suum antecedens; ut idem est dicere quod oor 3^
est animal et illud est asinus, ac si diceretur quod illud
Ifnot, \\c c()\x\A animal quod est Sor est asinus. Et patet ista significacio
not know that ,1 j^ivt ju^,.,.
a man had ^^ modo loquendi. Nam nemo dubitat quin sit possi-
committed a \^\\q unum abstulisse furtive bona, vel talem actum
thctt withoiit . . ' . . .
knowing who particularem fecisse, cum hoc quod ignoret quis fuit 40
that man was: -n t • ,. ■ ]• ,. 1 .,.• ..■,-
which is illc- Ipsi tamen qui dicunt omne relativum convertit
evidently false.
iS. (|it' co>"'8; intra deesi B. J4. scilicet pro se habet B.
CAP. II. LOGICA. 27
CLim suo antecedcnte, concedunt quod si sciunl quod
aliqua res fccit aliquem actum bonum vel malum, tunc
non ignorant que fuit iila; quia quamcunque rem sciurit
fuisse, sciunt fuisse illam, cum omnem talem sciunt
5 fuisse rem, nec ii^norant fuisse rem. Scd ista est satis And to say
patens pompa sopliistica, qua dicitur quod egn disiw^cte d^s/uncfivelrVa
scio aiiis fiiit ille qui commisit illud furtum, vel quod- a nicrc vcrbal
, , „ . , . ',. quibble.
cunque factum occultum. Et ideo ostensio talium A sophist
occultorum non est digna nisi premio sophistico. ^^"" ejth^g-'^.'!
loOuerendo ereo a tali sophista quis fuit ille qui fecit or another
. '-' , . ^ •' -^ . , ^ man;
talem turpitudmem, diceret quod ego et qmlibet homo pcrhaps
YS Yi" mundi est ille: | ideo, cum accusabit se de quocunque '"^houl/be
furto, dienilicabit se suspendi; vel promittendo sibi liangcd tor u;
^ ^ . ^ , , , or his reward
quantamcunque rem pro revelacione sua vel labore should be
i?quocunque, dando sibi quodcunque bonum vel malum, *■ ^'^Jtiicthing "
habet ipse contentari; quia promittebatur sibi aliquid, disjunctively;
et iliud datum est sibi. Omnia ergo ista sunt igno- anything —
rancium grammaticam sine fructu altercaciones bom- ^°° °' ^
barie.
20 Sed pro ista opinione arguitur. Si enim quelibet .Argumcuts pro.
intencio correspondens tali relativo fuerit inferior inten- 't'],^"^!'^",''^^,,^'-'^
cione sui antecedentis, tunc inter quascunque inten- i"-'»» univcrsal
. ,. . ^ . . . ^ . than its
ciones duas, ordinatas 2'" superius et inrenus, contm- anteccdent;
geret esse intencionem. Et sic communitas termini ^'^'*j',^;P||^^ '^"
2 5 consisteret vere in latitudine, et per consequens esset multitude of
. ,, . , , ' , pronouns
processus in innnitum, tam ascendendo quam descen- betwecn tiie
dendo in generibus et speciebus cuiuscunque predicati; "^"attei^^al/'^^
et per consequens periret omnis demonstracio vel varying in
. . 11 /- • • 1- • , universalitv.
sciencia, cum nulla roret species specialissima nec ordo and each 6f
3o universalium. Deduccio patet ex hoc quod, capto quo- antecedents of
cunque termino quantumcunque remisse communi, con- the loregoing
... 4. j 11.- • one; which
tmgit ipsum antecedere ad relativum mmus commune wouid be the
illo ; et sic inter terminos communes, secundum minimum i'uin ot all
. . , ' . science.
suorum significatorum esset dare terminos medios, ut
35 inter terminum communem ad 3 et terminum com-
munem ad 4.
Similiter, posito quod non sint homines currentes nisi o. it only two
isti duo, Sor et Plato; et dicat tercio utroque horum "i^"» ^ ^^!^ ^
. . ' _ . ~ wcre running,
audiente, c^uoA aliquis homo currit, et adiungat Sor: Sor each of them
40 «on est ille, et asserat Plato cum illis quod Plato non ^" was //e^'
supposing that
3. sunt pro fuit B. 6. dst=' pro disiuncte B. iS, ig. bo"<= B.
23. fri'g pro superius B. 32. coiie B.
28 JOHANNIS WYCLIF GAP. II.
both of tliem est ille ; tunc videtur quod si terminus relativus sit
a^ifd 'that'^L^was inferior ad suum antecedens (ut pono quod aliquis
less general homo currit et Sor non est ille, nec Plato est ille: quia
than its . . ... , .
antecedent, quilibet iUorum trium dicit verum; vel, si uterque
'''"S1V« r''^ currencium dicit falsum, quia dicit quod Sor non est i
for there can bc ///^ ^^1 currit vel Plato non est ille qui currit etc.)
assigned no / . , r • • i
reason for sequitur cum veris quod cnimera non est animat et tu
''tharthfy^^both '''^■^<?5 illud; aliquis liomo currit et Sor non est ille, et
lied, or tliat aliauis liouio currit, qui non est Sor: quod est contra
one was to be -' ' -^ . _, . .
beiieved rather grammaticam. Nec dicetur racio quare Sor dicit verum lo
than the other. -^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ Ciceronis dicto, quin per idera Plato
diceret verum cum eodem.
3. Arsument aJ Similiter iuxta sepe dicta, est dare universalia ex
lfthe're^'are parte rei, que sunt singula suorum inferiorum. Ex quo
universals e.v sequitur relativum converti simpliciter cum suo ante- i3
parte rei, every ^ , . r i r
pronoun would ccdente, et omnes conclusiones reputate ralse rorent
*'"Tor ifs^"'^ concedende; ut concedendum est quod aliquis homo est
antecedent. turvissimus et indignissimus latro, et rex esset ille;
The univcrsal f ^. . ....
he would be a quia homo communis est omnis homo. h.t sic aliquis
''^af the^^same""/''^'^ peccando maximam materiam in mundo, et deus 20
time, since it g^t ille. Et sic, si Quis fecit quantumcunque occultum
stands for the . . ,. 7 . ^ ^ . .,, - ,. -
universal, .Wa«. factum, tu scis disiuncte quis ruit ilie, quia disiuncte
fl^e^^un^verlaf, ^cis quod Sor vel quecunque alia persona fuit ille, in
Somebody, we sciendo quod fuit aliquis. Et sic non fieret sola vel
shoiild know , .^. . -'. ., ,-
disjunctivelv diflerencia inter ista; omms homo est animal quod est 20
^''^'tny^si^-T"^ ''^^ioii^^le, et omnis homo est animal et illud est racio-
action. nale. Et sic de multis scole communium incredibilibus
similibus.
Answers. i. We Ad illud dicitur, sicut prius, quod generaliter tenet
""any mentar' regula supra dicta, Et pro materia primi argumenti 3o
proposition gunt 3 dicenda. Primo, quod contingit proposicionem
means either its . . .... . , . n i>
signs or the anime componi ex m i tencionibus signorum vel inten- b 42
w\\"en'we^'know cionibus signatorum. Et communiter scientes ydiomata
a language we habent nronosiciones de intencionibus vdiomatum sub-
generallv mean ,. ' ' . . ., , . • '1 ^ i-i •>-
both; the ordmatas proposicionibus de intenciombus naturahbusoD
subordhia'te to signatorum. Et tercio, actus anime vocantur propo-
the latter; siciones eo quod illi inmediate ponuntur pro veri-
and tlie acts of . . \ . . . ,-. t^ u j- •*
the mind are tatibus signatis, etsi non signihcent. Per noc dicitur
propositfons, Quod quilibet terminus relativus proposicionis in anima
even when the primo modo est intencio sienificans ad placitum rem 40
objects tor '^
whichthey stand
have no
e.xistence. ^^ ^j^ ^^.^ ^j j^ ^ utrique B. 7. vei's B. 11. cic'onis B.
18. indigntiff''' B. 20. maxi™ ma™ B. 22. dp'« B. 32. am'e B.
37. me'= B.
CAP. II. LOGICA. 29
sianatam ner accidens, et omne si^nificatnm ner totam in mcaning
. . . . ^ ... cvcrv pronoun
proposicionem antecedentis: et sic contmgit ipsam con- is dcductively
verti quo ad consequenciam cum antecedente. Ut hic: '''':„^^j"^!j^,^t"^'^
ammal potest esse et illud est Sor; ista enim con- L^nt it '« as a
•" . ..... prcdicatc less
3 vertuntur quo ad consequenciam : ammal erit ammal univcrsai.
quod potest esse. Et contingit relativum esse inferius -j i''^" man^iJ'
subiecto quo ad predicacionem ; ut; Jiic hotno est albits, ^vhitc, and he
•Fr r- ivT I • 7r ■ c ■ l ^^ ^, /te stanos
et ille est Sor. Nam hominem esse album est mrerius ad ibr ihe man
hominem esse, quamvis plura significet; sicut commu- "iVkif islcsV
loniter facit relativum. Sed, loquendo de proposicione uuivcrsal than
. ^ . . man.
anmie 2' modi, tunc termmo relativo correspondent But in the
multe intenciones, quarum aliqua est forte illud ante- ^tc*^ n"av ^hav^e
cedens. Non enim sunt intenciones anime primo de many airtcrcnt
.... mcanniiis, and
eodem generate; sed per eandem mtencionem contingit onc ot"thcm
1 T frequenter tam vicissim quatn simultanee diversis acti- ame^ccdcnt
bus concipere illud idem: et sic contingit talem pro- Thus thc same
. . ^ . , ' . . ,- • •, mcntal
posicionem anmie 2"^ suhordmacionem diversis actibus proposition
esse kathegoricam et ypotheticam, affirmativam et "dj^fercnt^^^and"
negativam, veram et falsam, vmmo contradictoriam cven sclf-
., . . . ' , . . ,. contradictory ;
20 sibi ipsi. Sed secus est de proposicione vocah et de and as tor the
proposicione anime facta ex intencionibus signorum ; ^1^^,.^^^^]'^^^^ tl^
nec sunt actus tales nobis notissimi aliquales, sed sunt a'"e mcre
. , . , . . , . . accidcnts that
accidencia de genere accionis, nrmantes mtenciones et scrve to Hx the
generantes habitus per ipsorum frequentem eleccionem; ° '"nitn'd °"'
ofi de intencionibus ergo non habemus experienciam, sicud
de actibus.
Secundo notandum quod continqit terminurn esse Onp t^'i'm may
... ,. ^ . ^ , ,. bc callcd
mtenorem rehquo aut superiorem, vel quo ad predi- intcrior to
cacionem, vel quo ad significacionem. Unde patet ex p,"'d?ca\i'on"or
■>f, Jictis quod relativum communiter est inferius suo i" signitication
' ,^ . . . , and thc
antecedente quo ad predicacionem, et superius quo ad pronoun is
significacionem, sicut communiter sunt inferiora per '^',1^'^'°' '" ,^0^
accidens, per apposicionem atrregata ex sienis diversorum jn the sccond.
generum. Unde sic loquendo de mferiontate, videtur is, it scems, an
35 michi quod contingit in infinitum descendere, cum non'"^"'*!^^^^^^^.^"^'
contingit capere commune quin per aliam accidcntalem much we may
r . ^ . add to the
adieccionem potest intelhgi hmitacius. Ex hoc tamen antccedent, we
non sequitur quod non sit dare speciem specialissimam ; ^,-each'the'^
quia sub specie specialissima contingit habere quotlibet individuality
14.. geminanti B. i5. fTlan"? B. 22. a' 9« pro aliquales B. 35. in
fimum B.
32. Predicacionem — signijicacioiietn. We should say to-day:
extension — intension (or comprehension).
3o JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. 11.
Yet \ve can get intencioncs accidencium; et inter speciem et suum
specics, for genus proximum. Sed talia non erunt illius coordina-
after this point cjonis cum connotabunt encia diversorum predicamen-
is attained . . ^
there are torum; ens, cum est communissimum, quo claudit
accidents which ^ j- • • • -
may be added; contradiccionem esse communius, cum omne posse sit .i
but these do ^s^ie
iiot interfere. ^ ' ^ , , . . ,
The terms Sed 3° notandum quod logici habent pro eodem
inferior, prior, , . ... ,. "^ . . ,.
and more tenmnimi esse iiifenorem reliquo, vnorem, iimversaliorem
universal mcAw ^^ comniiiniorem : et unum dicunt reliquo communiorem
the samc . . „ . , , . . ,
among quo ad significacionem, 2'" quod plura signihcat. Et 10
any^^ter"!! h^a^s consequenter ponendum est unum vocatum infinitum,
. "1°'"'^. in quacunque proporcione 1 volueris reliquo maius. Sed B ^S"
signihcation, ^ ^ . *^ , . ' ■ -r- ■ ■
thcy call it termmus universalis propter suum significatum dicitur
Wemust"\"here- communior, quo suum primo significatum dicitur com-
fore, admit an j^yjjjj;3[5ilijjc;. q^ gjc communitas termini non consistiti5
vifinite, ......
signifying more in latitudine, sicut nec proporcio coinmunitatum se
But^a^^universai habet in aliqua proporcione numerali nobis cognita.
term is more gt communitas termini solum finita significantis nobis
common when . . . . ^ ....
it can be est alterius racionis quam commumtas termnn signi-
'^"^^more ° ficantis nobis infinita. Ideo non sequitur, etsi una sit 20
individuals; i-eliqua infinitum maior, quod sit infinitum magna;
and the relation . ^ ,. . , . . ' ^ „..,,. ",
of nniversality sicut dicitur dc maioritate superficiei ad hncam. Ista
unhxrTals Hutem dicta circumstant dubia cuicunque.
cannot be ^j oni Jicitur quod conclusio non sequitur, nec forct
known to us. . . . ' . . ■, ^ •! • ■ ■ r
if ono is illa oracio mixta proposicio, cum. dehceret sibi signi- s.s
nnVve\-sal'tliaii ^^'^^'^^o proposicionis, co quod nemo intelligit illam
another. it does proporcionaliter, cum cuilibet proposicioni oportet cor-
not follow that ^ ^ , ' ■ ■ ■,
it is infinite. rcspondere unum actum prmcipaiem preter actus cor-
^■„^.'.!n f^rJlvV^'" rcspondentes partibus. Pro materia tamcn illius sunt
nothing: the ^a notanda. Primo quod intelHgendo illum terminum, 3o
proposition, so . . ^
statcd, is ahqiiis homo, personaliter, habetur communiter cum
therrbei^i^^^no intencione speciei intcncio de aliquo singulari homine.
one act of tiic Et ideo dicit Aristotcles quod aliquis homo est singu-
mind by which , . ^ , . . , . .,.,..'
we may laris. Et logici ponunt quod signa particuiana nmitant
Note"ihat'xomc- ^'-^ supposicioncm personalem, cum aliter viderentur 35
man is more supcrfluerc si non supperadderent ad indefinitas. In
tlie^^i^ndefinite transccndcntibus tamen generibus et terminis 2*= inten-
man, and it cionis supponuiit termini cum signis particularibus pro
imphes personal _i ' . . . ?
supposition. communibus et singularibus indiff^erenter; ut substan-
Not, howevcr, . , . ,. . , , ^ -
in the hii^hest ciarum, vel umversalium encium, quoddam est univer- 40
genera ot ail, gale, quoddam singulare. Et universalium quoddam est
nor as regards ' ^ '^ . . . . ^
logical entities. genus, quoddam species. Sic ergo intelligendo aliquem
18. guitas B. 19. giiitas B. 23. cmcj pro cuicunque B.
CAP. II. LOGICA. 3 1
homiueiu, limitando ad ccrtum singulare, sicut com- Aud
• ^ ,1- 1 L • ^ "^ • V r ^ undeistandiiiff
muniter mteUit;unt plebei et negantes universalia, loret tiy some man
verum quod aliquis houw ciirrit et Sor uou est ille qiii . |}.'^?r'''"" .
T -^ _ . ^ individnal, il
ciirrit; sed tunc referret relativum suum antecedens mig!it bc irue
. . , . , . . , ,. , tliat some man
? smgulanter pro homme communi; quod conceditur ab ^.^,,.,. ^„^ ^ /^
aliquo currcnte dicerc. Quod si intellisatur antecedens ,,""' /"''' ''"'
^ ... . . "icn ne wouid
incontracte, tunc cum paribus foret talis proposicio mcan a certajn
,. , j L r ^ •;» t c ■ ^ -11 individual, not
lalsa; sed hoc toret verum: ille uou est Sor, sicut ille a common
houio qiii ciirrit uou est Sor, dum falsum est quod Sor A^d^i
lo uou est ille qili Clirrit. understood in
Et ex istis patet 2^^ quod sophismate componente ^pro^position
sic: aliqiiis houio ciirrit, et ille uou est Sor, et ille no?z ^•^^"''i^ .'-""^ *^'^'^'
^ , ' . , ' hut A ts not he,
est Plato, talse compointur; ymmo talse componeret true.
referendo ad eundem, sic componcndo: aliquis hniuo not^adniit t^iic
i5 currit, et ille uou est Sor, et illc unu est Plato: eeminando proposition
. . . . . snmc maii runs,
tamen proposicionem antecedentis, vel per unum intelli- aud hc w
1 ]• r ...... 1- 1 .,.- not A, and Iie
peret, vel per diversos. loret tahs copulativa vera, ^, „q; j^.
sicut et esset, intelli^endo illum terminum, ille, demon- f°'" '^^'^ caunot
. ^ . . . . ,,. rcter he to tlie
strative. Et sic Socrates ahter intelhgeret, inteUigendo same individual
2o totum simul, quam duo inteUigentes seorsum, geminando '"''"jp"!;\''i'"i'j'^,"''
primam proposicionem. Nec est inconveniens, vmmo proposition.
. . ....... And it is quite
communiter convenit, quod similhmis signis correspon- possible tor
dent diverse veritates primarie signilicate; et speciahter ^j|.,.,j|;,° ^it^ns to
intelHgendo terminos communes contractc ad aliqua mcAi\ diitercnt
. . _ . . singulars.
25 smgularia; ut communiter faciunt moderni, vocantes
singulare pro quo componunt predicatum. Et iUis foret
idem, aliqiiis homo ciirrit et Sor uou est ille, ut si com-
poneret quod aliquis houio ciirrit qiii uou est Sor; sed
ahter inteUigentibus non sic esset.
3o Tercio nota quod relativum quandoque refertur ad Thc prononn
. .,, ^ , , mav stand lor
terminum pro suo signihcato, et quandoque ad totam tlie term it
B43'' proposicionem pro suo significato ad terminum ; j i-it ^'^"|','^'^^,^:|.i'J!,y^,'"'"
in exempHs propositis ad pronosicionem, ul hic: proposition
, . * ^ ^ . , ■,-,,, ■ rclativelv to
cniiuera uou est amuial et tu vides illud; potest enim tbat lerm;
35 inteUigi quod tu vides illam veritatem qiie est " chimeram
uou esse animar-; vel aliter quod vides auimal ^znjcf :iud sucli senses
uou est chimera; et in multis differunt tales scnsus. dirterent;
Quandoque taincn oportct relacionem fieri ad totam ^'''"must'^'^ "^
proposicionem pro suo primario si^nificato; ut hic: necessarily
,^ . , , • , • T^ ^ • , • , • stand for a
40 Sor ciirnt et hoc placet michi. Potest enim placcrc michi whole
de non esse rei, et de eius suspensione, aut aUo eventu, toJ-T^mav^ilke
et si illa non placeat michi, Ideo patet quod iUc veri- v. g. certain
' ' qualities in an
5. fin'' B. II. fotle B. 22. filrnTs B.
32 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II.
individual, tates distingwuntur. Possum enim odire quod ille peccat,
^i'ndividua]'^ vel peccatum illius, quod idem est; et tamen non odire
himseif. ged amare ipsum. Et sic possum ignorare quod ille
est pater, vel paternitatem eius, quod idem est; et
tamen non ignorare ipsum esse, quod est eius essencia 5
et ipse. Videtur tamen quod ego non diligo liominem
esse in fovea, nisi quodammodo diligam eum dileccione
confusa naturali, vel aliter inordinata. Nec cognosco
Petrum nec aliquod accidens suhiecti, nisi cognoscam
ipsum subiectum, cum omne tale accidens sit suhiectiun lo
aliqualiter accidentaliter se habere. Sed de istis actenus
sufliciat.
3. We answer Ad 3"^ dicitur quod est dare universalia ex parte
^m^GrossTtcste" rei, et hoc secundum quinque gradus, ut docet Lincol-
there are fiye niensis primo posteriorum. Aliqua enim sunt viniversalia i5
specics ot i. r ...
universals: priora, singularihus corruptibilibus, non fundata m
be"bretheh- ipsis. Et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sint raciones fundate
singulars, and i^ Jeo sine alterius indigencia, vel in intellieenciis, vel
are nottounded . ,, . ., , •, ^ •
in them but in j" m constellacionihus celestibus. Omnes enim manieres
An°t4'is"or''in universalium vocantur ydee, vel forma exemplares, vel 20
the heavenly faciones, numeri, aut principia producendi aut cau-
constellations; ,. . -, •,• • • ,
and they bear sandi ista corrruptihuia. Et prime sunt idee eterne, et
'^The''first'™"" vocantur a Lincolniensi concreatrices rei, nec ponunt
thc eternal aliud nisi deum esse, et talia posse produci a deo
ideas, which / ' '^ .
assume only secundum ordinem debitum et mensuram, ut prouu- 2?
.^"d^Hirpclw " cibilitas hominis in deo esset, quamvis non esset alia
ot producing essencia preter deum, cum sit coeterna et correspondens
creaturcs. ,..,.. , ,.
producitati dei, sicut coeterna cum deo est taiis veritas:
They are in /,,.;^^ possunt ordinate produci. Nec potest illa veritas
God as an . -^ . . . , \ , ^ . • • r . o
extrinsjcal poni, nisi in deo qui est plenus veritate, nisi rorte .-10
''^Hfm to" equivoce sit in aliis, in quibus est deus. Et notum est
produce by ; quod illa racio est exemplar extrinsecum iuxta quod
deus producit, cum non possit producere illas^ nisi
they measure secundum suam producivitatem. Ideo sunt cause princi-
the beins oi . ^ , • .. o -
things, and piantes et numerantes, hoc est, mensurantes esse rei; c\. :>o
know'thm"s i^l^s oportet cognoscere cognoscendo res. Quis, rogo,
rightiy without coenosceret hominem debite, nisi precognoscendo quod
knowing them. *- , .,. , „, , , • , , • ,• , ,•
est causabdis a deo 2"^ debitam habitudinem ad alias
partes mundi? et illa causabilitas est ydea primi modi,
1
II. a^qua' accF B. 16. corupti'" B. 21. (pn^^ prn principia B.
23. r'rl pro rei B. 26. essc B. 28. produci'^ B. 34. ce" pro
cause B. 35. y'v' pro rei B.
(^AI'. II. LOGICA. 33
Causabilitas vero correspondens causativitati intelli- The second
gencie est universale 2' modi. Sed causabilitas cor- species'a*rc
respondens causativitati orbis celestis est universale 3'' passivc
j. -. , . ,. . . j- ,• • potentialities.
modi. Unde universalia prmii modi dicuntur nunc in The lirst
5 predicacione materiali esse deus, quia nullum alium ""IreTn'^
ponunt esse, nunc distinewi 2'" racionem ab invicem . °"s. ^ense
" . . .^ ,, ,. ,. , identical witii
et a deo, cum smt raciones rormaliter diverse, sed God, in anothcr
nec substancie nec accidencia; et nunc dicuntur esse Hi'm'anVfroni
homines, quia sunt potencie ex quibus homines fiunt. ^"'^''"other, bnt
. . . . neither
B 44^ Et ad istum sensum dicunt philosophi | quod quelibet snbstances nor
creatura fuit eternaliter in deo in sua racione. Tliere"ar'e^also
Sed preter illa tria est dare universales substancias universal
,,,..,., , . . substances
rundatas in smgularibus: ut esse nominem est verrtas, founded upon
ymmo necessitas communis cuilibet hominum: et illa ^\umanar\s^
i5veritas est species specialissima. Sed plebei et bruta, common to all
. . . . . men ■
cognoscendo hominem in suis accidentibus, ut per but the peopie
figuram, vocem et alias proprietates accidentales, etsi 1-^0". man^onlv
coenoscant confuse hominem seu speciem illam, tamen '^.^■.'"s external
? . , , ' . . activities, which
prrmo cognoscunt accrdens vel proprrum, posterrus l<nowledge
2ospecie; et illud vocat Lincolniensis universale 5^' modi. a Hftli kfnd of
Et de alirs speciebus unrversaliunf Porphyrii et suis universals.
distinccionibus dictum est superrus.
Nec dubito quin, concedendo veritates correspondere These
quibuscunque proposicionibus veris, concedendum est ""'^jj^g^.,'*!^"^"*'
25 communiter illa universalia esse; ut hec proposicio g'""nted; forthe
. necessitv of
necessaria, homo est, significat primarie veritaiem; et, man's e.xistence
cum sit necesse illam esse, patet quod oportet distin- dis^^^n^uished
swere tanquam priorem a quacunque tali veritate, illinn i'i'om the fact
7 . ^ i, ... ^ . ^ of this or that
Iwminem esse. Et rilam verrtatem suppono esse essen- man existing.
?ociam, naturam, vel speciem humanam. Et propter ^,f-^j^jj°'"^"g^^jgj
ignoranciam talium universalium lapsi sunt moderni the moderns
.*• , ,• • • • , i"to many
rn multos errores; ut alrqur negant termrnos unrversales, errors.
aliqui dicunt quod non est signare quid talis terminus Afo"^ev/^/s^has
communis significat: et sic nuUa talis proposrcio signi- no signification;
^ . F . ...... ' ^ , .,, ^ otliers that it
35 ncat prrmarre srcut est. Aliqur drcunt quod rlla pro- signifies a
posrcio, homo est, singulum hominem significat esse; J|"j|i"'^g,[?g^g"j'j
et sic quelibet proposicio sianificat primarie sicut non to mean as it
... . . is. Others
est. Alii dicunt quod est dare qualrter ex parte rer admit that it
primarre significat talis proposicio, sicut illud, qiialiter,™'^^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^'
40 non est ens. Sed ipsi peccant in noticia significacionis
1. cali'' pro causativitati H. 3. cativitati B. 5. mlij pro materiali H;
ib. nuliam aliam B. (i. po"' B. cj, po" B. 21. pon B.
n
:>
34 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. 11.
but say that as termini, cum ens sit commune ad omne ens predica-
'fn^vhich^thev' "^^^^; ^^ omne significatum proposicionis; ut patet 4°
are wrong. metaphisice 2°, et 5" metaphisice capitulo de ente; et
6" metaphisice c° 2°.
We. therefore, Suppositis ergo omnibus istis delineatis a logica, patet 5
first conciiiVicfns q^od tales veritates, hominern esse producibilem, hominem
of the last esse etc. sunt; et illas suppono denominari per talia
argument, , ', ., .,. , ^'. . . , . .
because the abstracta, prodiicwilitas hominis, essencta homims, etc.
fiiTantecedent ^t illa sunt universalia que ego pono, sicut et antiqui
is personal and concorditer nosuerunt. Et tunc ad 3^ primas con- 10
not essential. . . .
But we admit clusiones dicitur quod sunt negande, eo quod ante-
the last: there cedens relativi stat personaliter per limitacionem signi
is no dmerence ... i- • ,• i 1 i • r
in saying That particulans et predicati personalis. Ideo relativum refert
necessary ;^ov ipsura personaliter et non simpliciter. Sed ultima con-
It ts necessary ciusio est concedenda, cum eque contingit intelligere 1 5
tor man to be ; . ' r
for the termmum communem supponere contuse tantum a parte
*no7personaK subiecti sicut a parte predicati, precedente termino
but essential. confundente; sicut conceditur quod ho>ninem esse, est
necessarium; sic quod necessarium est hominem esse.
Et talis supposicio in sensu composito, ubi non est 20
signare singulare pro qvio proposicio verificatur, sed
propter primarium significatum termini, est una manieres
And iii this supposicionis simplicis. Sicut ergo predicacione speciei
men^arTon^ j7///r^.s homines sunt uuus hovwy quia communis homo,
and an animal gic animal est omne animal, sicut omne animal est 25
is every animal. . . ,
animal. Et sophismata que videntur sonare m oppositum
sunt in onus logico, inpediencia eum ad breviter et
faciliter loquendum, et intelligendum sapienciam anti-
quorum. ]
birterent Sed ulterius notandum quod diversimode inventi sunt B 44^'
answered tl^ese auctores respondere ad evidencias factas contra illam
objeciions posicionem. Et credo quod difficultas distingwendi
differently; ',,.,... . . . ^ .
and as some probabilius 111 ista materia, et apparencia inconsonancie
^ posidon "^ conclusionum sequencium quo ad wulgus, fecit multos
because of the dimittere illam posicionem. Unde recitabo communes 35
difhculty ot . ' . . . ,
answering, I raciones et responsiones in illa materia, ut veritas
usuaf"problems magis appareat. Videtur quod, si tale universale sit
and soiutions. quodlibet eius inferius, tunc non distingwuntur univer-
I. How can rve ^ . . ' . . ^
distinguish salia ad invicem vel a singularibus; cum omne singu-
"adfotlierand^^^^ sit species specialissima, genus intermedium et4"
from their
singulars'/
5. delnat^ B. 12. _p' /^ro personaliter H. 16. tm pro taiilum B.
27. in o"* pro in onus B; ib. eu, or»^" B.
I. See De Ente Predicamentali p. i, 1. 1, 2; p. 2, I. 27.
CAP. II. LOGICA. 35
genus gencralissiinum ; et per consequens eonvcrsini
e contra non est genus vel species, nisi singularis. la
illa materia est duplex responsio. Prima negat universale Some say that
esse singulare et speciem esse genus generalissimum, not^pro%riy
3 vel sic mixtim ; quia, cum termini tales 2*^ intenciones species and
... . ^ . . • ,• , •,,• genera, since
Iimitant aa supposicionem simplicem solum pro illis these cannot
que primo significant, patet quod, sicut raciones illorum '^supposk?o°n"*'
signiticant seu differunt, sic et illa; nec sunt illa universalia T^us these
"-.,., , . .,,. iiniversals are
a singulanbus separata, sed insunt illis; non tamen sunt in them, but
loilla. Et illa responsio satis tollit evidencias supradictas. ^"^ "o^ /Aey-.
Sed alia est responsio, concedens omne universale
esse quodcunque eius inferius, quia termini tales 2^ inten- Another
cionis possunt supponere supposicione simplici generali, *°he^'°"iyg,.g3^'
ut hic: animal predicatur, demptis speciebus; vel suppo- '^ ^'"^h of its
... . ,. , . . , ^ . particulars, but
i5sicione simplici speciali, ut hic: anunal est species with different
specialissima: supposicione personali; ut hic: animal ®"PP°s't'°ns.
est Sor. Nec impediunt termini 2^ intencionis tales
supposiciones, existentibus aliis extremis, proporcionatis
ad tales supposiciones. Et isto modo invenies auctores
2o sepe loquentes, ponentes universalia multiplicari nume- It is in this
rosius in suis singularibus. Et totum universale per hoc ^un^versa^l is*^
differt a toto integrali, quod ipsum est eius pars ^aid to be
... ^ ' .^ , ' . ^ . multiplied in
subiectiva, et non totum integrale est eius pars; quia its individuals.
aliter non vere predicaretur genus de sua specie, nec whoie^ira'
2 5 universale se haberet ad sua singularia sicut essencia subjective part
, , . . %^ . , . . of an integral
trina se habet ad sua supposita. Et sic, demptis evi- whoie, and not
denciis, quantum ad eleccionem responsionis in illa ^'jfo^lie^'
materia, non dubium quin intricacio non est in reipsa, difficulty is not
,.■..-, , ^, . ..... . '^ ' in the thmgs
sed in signis. Nec uubium quin iUe due responsiones themselves, but
3onon contradicunt; sed eadem est sentencia tenendi and^^t^houah
utriusque. Teneo ergo 2""'' responsionem, que est ^^oth answers
^.. ^, ,. ^ , ,.^ . come to the
communicacior; et cum hoc dico quod est dinerencia same, l prefer
universalium, ut prius dictum est. ^^^ mo7e'^ ^^
Unde, pro responsione notandum quod tripliciter convenient in
35 accipitur differencia: primo modo, pro quacumque acci- Ditference may
dentali proprietate, sive separabili, ut accidencia generum, ^ddental
sive inseparabili, ut passiones per se inexistentes. property,
Secundo modo accipitur pro speciali qualitate, que specific qiiality,
non est substancia, sed principium substancie, sicut a^^^ubs^tanM or
Aoracionalis. Sed 3''' modo accipitur pro relacione, que the relation of
1-/Y- ,• V. . ,.rr- • , non-identity
est^ unum dinerre a reliquo. Et sic differencie duorum between two
things.
33. 8'' (d"^ ?) pro dirtereiicia B. ^-. ij grun B.
35. See De Ente Precficamentali, p. 32, 1. 5.
3*
36 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II.
Agaiu two may priorum moduium affirmant ditferenciam 3" modi.
diHer totally, as ^o jiotandum quod tripliciter dicuntur aliqua differre
individuals, or ab invicem : vel totaliter 2"' essenciam, sicut duo indi-
two ditierent . . . . '
species; vidua vel due species incommunicantes, ut Sor et
''whoie^and^tr -P^^^o, homo et asinus; vel 2° parcialiter, ut | vel duo 3
P^'"t;, particulariter, ut sineularia que communicant in partibus R 45'
or merely f ' ... . .
logically, mtegralibus, et universalia que communicant m parti-
views^beLe ^'^^^ subiectivis : quomodo difFerunt corpus Sortis et
ditierent. medietas Sortis, et animal et homo. Sed tercio dicuntvir
aliqua difterre secundum racionem, quarido eadem est 10
essencia utriusque, sed raciones formales sunt diverse:
ut quantitas eiusdem subiecti, et figura, et superficies,
et eius concavitas. Sicut enim curvitas accidit linee,
sic concavitas superficiei. Et sic sunt isti tres modi
Some dittcr differendi specie specialissime difFerenciarum, cum ali- i5
f^-enei-ica^h", ^^^i differunt primo plus quam genere, ut deus et homo,
s°!^^, alia genere, ut homo et albedo ; aliqua specie, ut homo
genencally, r . . .
some " et asinus; aliqua numero, ut Sor et Plato. Aliqua eciam
specificallv, i-rr ...o,, 1- ^ ^-j ,-^
and som"c difterunt o" modo m genere et sunt idem subiecto
individually. sinsulari : ut fimira Sortis et eiiis ciuantitas: eadem tamen 20
And some, ° . -' " . . -' . .
though diftering est essencia utnusque, quia Sor. Essencia enmi famose
specificallv, mav . ,.• .. u-» i-^
be ideniical " vocatur substancia que potest per se subsistere, licet
with the same quandoque cuiuscunque predicamenti species vocetur
essencia, sicut et substancia, respectu sui accidentis.
Some difter Aliqua autem dififerunt et secundum racionem, dum 2d
only logicallv, .. • j ■ 1 ... • • ,. • •
while thev aie sunt idem smgulare; ut memoria anime, et racio ems-
the same Jem. Memoria enim, racio et voluntas, sunt una anima
singular being; . . ' . . '
as the mind is m numero et differunt inter se. Aliquando non differunt
memorv, „m • j -^ !_• ^ i^ •
reason and"will. 2™ racionem, dum unum sit subiectum altenus, sic
quod forma dicit idem subiectum et superaddit modum 3o
vel racionem ; sive forma sit accidens accidentaliter
inexistens, ut albedo, sive accidens per se inexistens,
ut passio, sive substancialis qualitas per se i*' inexistens;
I. Multipliciter aliqiui ditlerent in marg. B. 5, 6. Another hand-
writing from tlte words vel duo particii»' B. i3. sua pro eius corr. B.
14. ut= pro et sic B. 25. tn; a' above B. . 28, 2g. Aliquando — alterius
in marg. B.
5, 6. The second handwriting (from f. 45* to.f. 122*) is illegible
rather on account of its beiiig very close andmuch abbreviated
than from careless penmanship; while the third (f. 122* to 176)
is just the contrary. The tirst is fairly good. From f. 45* to 122*
there are many marginal notes, very fevv of any value. — Ut vel
duo particulariter is evidently a duplication, including a mistake.
I liave lcft it in the text because the page begins \\ith those words.
CAP. II. I.OGICA. 37
ut racionalitas inest homini; et quodlibet illorum dicit
eandem essenciam in numero.
Sed 4" dicuntur aliqua secundum racionem [differre,] Thore is yct
etsi dicant precise eandem essenciam et predicentur de diitereifce
5 se invicem, secundum equum ambitum. Sed raciones (called also a
. . ? . . , . distinclion
diverse insunt illis; ut existente unica fenice, tunc fenix without a
1- )'ii- .. -n 1 • -. j • difterence), as
universalis diriert a iUa, non subiecto sed racione, cum bctween the
illa sit incommunicabilis et fenix communis est com- ""ivcrsal and
. . . tne individual
municabilis et illa aput aliquos vocatur distmccio et phocnix; there
j-n' • r^^ • ^ ]■ -^ j j^rr ^ can beonjyone
lonon ditierencia. Et per ista dicitur quod genus dinert oi each, but
a sua specie secundum partem, cum sit reliqua species, ^'^'^ former is
^ . ... ^ . . . . ^ coinmunicable
que totaliter dividitur a priori specie; sicut homo to successive
,••:• 1 i-cc ^ c ..* singulars, and
communis per aliquid singulare dirtert a Sor, et tamen the other not.
est Sor; et econtra Sor difFert ab homine communi, ]^J^ ^y ''^p
' . . ' dinerence tliat
i5 non secundum suppositum, sed secundum racionem, cum the genus
1 ■,- .1 • . ■ • diftcrs trom its
sit communicabilis, et homo communis est incommuni- specics, and
cabilis; et sic homo communis dupliciter diflfert a Sorte, *'^^ umversal
' . ^ . ' trom the
quia et secundum suppositum et secundum racionem. individual man.
Et sj dicatur quod si Sor differt ab homine communi, .Vccordingtothe
20 tunc non est homo communis, iuxta exponentes dictas i^A 'differs'
tractatu proximo; dicitur quod ibidem exponitur diffe- fiom the
.... ^ . ^ ,.„ . universal man,
rencia primi modi et non complete ista dmerencia, he is not the
quia paulative oportet ascendere in tales subtiles ""b^^t Ythen"'
materias. Undc sicut prius dicitur rquodl oportet resol- purppsely
^ . ■*, , . ,. avoided going
2.-) vere primum termmum in exponendo huiusmodi pro- into all ihe
posiciones; ut ista: Sor differt a specie debet exponi '^/hes*e°
resolvendo hoc verbum differt, significans confuse ad differences, on
,.rr ■ ,• . ^ ,. ,.v. . accoiint ot the
dinerencias supradictas; ut si Sor aliqiia dijferencia ditficulty ot
differt a specie, ergo Sor differt a specie. Et antecedens But^it"is'dear
'io patet ex hoc quod Sor racione incommunicabilitatis }}]?^ A 'l'"*?
\.a- • T- • . . „ . . difTer, if he is
diriert a specie. Et tunc ista proposicio: Sor ista in- incommuni-
communicabilitate differt a specie, debet exponi, ut supe- u,]ivers"l no^
rius dictum est: Sor ista incommunicabilitate est, (?^ ^s may be set
. .... . torth bv
species est, et Sor ista nicommunicabilitate non est species. cxposition.
35 Igitur etc. Nec sequitur: ista incommunicabilitate vel
individuacione Sor est ille homo; ergo, secundum illani
est species; et conformiter dicitur ad omnia similia.
2° dubitatur si ens transcendens sit commune ad H- J\
. transcendenl
deum et ad omnia creata, ut supra dictum est. Et Beina common
both to God
and crealures?
2. ea pro eandcm B. 3. difterre deest B. 4, b. dc fe 1 = de se
s? B. 16. incommunicabilis B. 23. paulatic 1
ffe (= specie?; B.
21. See Logica, vol. I, p. 122, I. 4 — 16.
ipsis? B. 16. incommunicabilis B. 23. paulatic B. 24. quod deest \i
26. ffe (= specie?; B.
38 .lOHANNIS WYCLIF GAP. H.
if so, then videtur quod non, quia sic foret alia ydentitas quam
' "an i^dcntity ^ identitas generis, speciei vel numeri, et per consequens
bcyond that of summa diversitas vel diflferencia non excluderet idem-
genus, species . .....
or number, ptitatem, sicut summa magnitudo excludit parvitatem;
coSxisT wfth"the et sic de omnibus similibus infinitis denominacionibus 5
greatest positis. Videtur eciam quod deus sit causatum a deo, 1
possible ^ ^ . '
diyersity; quia ens transcendens est primum causatum a deo, et B ^S*
^be caused°by deus est iUud, cum ipse sit omne ens, sicut homo est
Himself, since omnis homo.
He caused all . . , , ,. .
being and Sed pro illo supponitur quod duphciter commune jo
'But on^the possit univoce participari suis inferioribus: vel secundum
other hand, the racionem differencie, sicut universalia participantur a
universal can ' . ^. ^ .
belong to its suis mdividuis; vel racione transcendencie, vit racione
''two "vays;" cssendi, sicut analoga participatur. Primo modo non
either as a es^ gi^g univocum, quia sic esset genus. Sed 2° modo i5
difference or as . . . . ■ ■ r- • -n
a transcendent satis univoce participatur, cum signincat omnia lUa sub
Thc^first nVusT codem signo naturaUter representata. Unde licet ens
be denied; but ji-anscendens sit omne ens, non tamen aliud a deo, vel
the second is . . .' . ,
univocal, sincc mferius deo, est deus. Sicut ergo non sequitur: homo
'same'bv^thr communis est Sor et ille homo communis est Plato: ergo, 20
same sign. ^^r est Plato; ita non sequitur: ens transcendens est deus
It does not ' ^ »• j j
follow that et ens transcendens est aliud a deo, ergo, aliud a deo
besides God is ^^^ deus. Nec est maior color in istis quam in suis
... 9°^'- t. ■ convertibilibus, sic areumentando: homo est Sor, et homo
that rvhich is . ' . . . , .
God is indeed est aliud a Sor : igitiir Sor est almd a Sor. Nec sequitur: 2 5
God'- but"this Hind quod est aliud a d/eo est deus : igitur aliud a deo
is a subject of ^gi ^ieus • xxt non scquitur: illud commune quod est aliud
transcendent ' ..... ^ . , .
bcing. a Sor est Sor; igitur aliud a Sor est Sor. Sicud enim
iinhersai inan homo communis est Sor, ita est aliud a Sor; sicud in
is that ivhtch s^q convertibili : Sor est homo, et aliud a Sor est homo :3o
is A, and that ' ■ .
whtch is other igitur Sor est aliud a Sor. Nec sequitur, hoc est deus
et hoc est aliud a deo; igitur, aliud a deo est deus;
sicut non sequitur: Ista natura communis est Sor et
illa est aliud a Sor: igitur Sor est aliud a Sor.
All deductions Nec est maior color in ista deduccione quam sic 35
aie mere^'^ argumentando : homo est Sor et homo est aliud a Sor,
paralogisms.
T
5. similihus underncath omni,bus B. 11. jiti'' B. 17. eo pro
eodcm B. 27. nec above ut B.
16. Univoce. In the great question of the Analogy of Bcing,
moderate Realists ahhor using the very term iinivoce; but their
analogia proportionis secundi generis, as Suarez calls it, does
not seem to differ very substantially from Wyclifs position. Yet
the slightest difterences are important here.
CAP. II. LOGICA. 3q
ersio Sor est aliud a Sor ; nec est talis deduccio svllo- "VV».v" /s Gorf,-
gismus expositonus, sed paralogismus syllogismo ex- tium "(Jod".
positorio oppositus, sic argumentando: hoc est deiis, et f,^]°ly"^^
hoc est aliiid a deo' ergo deiis est aliiid a deo, posito "ihis" has only
T> quod iste termmus, hoc, convertatur cum transcendente. the pointing to
Areumentatur enim affirmative a superiori ad suum ^°["'^"^'"8; "ow
o . . i' _ thcrc arc two
inferius. Pronomen enim non est demonstrativum in distinct
1 ^ • .. pointings here:
proposito, nec vere pronomen, sed termmus converti- or if it be not a
bilis cum ente. Et si intenditur eius sienificati demon- demonstrative,
. . . . it means
lostracio, tunc aliud demonstratur in maiori, aliud in transccndental
o- ^ o ^ •!; j j i n/ .. •* tieiiic, which is
mmori. Sicut ergo Sor est illiid qiiod est Flato, ita ,Jot Cod.
qiiodlibet est ens transcendens, qiiod est deiis ; sed "o» ,. J^or does it
" ..•'-' ' tollow that God
est deiis. Nec sequitur, si deiis est illud quod est crea- is caused:
tura vel creatiim, quod deiis sit creatura vel creatum. ^°by\he° '
i5Deus tamen necessario est supremum causatum, sicut ^"'^^™3tion, is
t ' reallv caused.
est creatura per naturam assumptam, ut narrant theo-
logi. Non est vis, sive ponatur illa conveniencia in
transcendente idemptitas, sive non; ideo consequens.
Philosophus tamen loquitur de idemptitate in genere
20 et non alia.
Ex istis patet quod illi qui dicunt nullum individuum To deny that
esse speciem ad iilum sensum quod nullum individuum '^" a^specie^s^,
potest communicari multis individuis separatis, et illi .because ot its
... . ... ,., singulanty, and
qui dicunt quodhbet mdividuum esse quodlibet suum to admit ihis in
25superius, et econtra, intelligendo per terminos 2*^ '^^^^^- beion^o^irv^ to a
cionis sua denominata confuse, non contradicunt; sicud species;, \s not
. ' •11 contradictory :
nec illi qui concedunt quod homo est species et nullus we grant that
homo est species. Prima enim significat quod esse ho- common^^and
ininem est communicabile cuicunque individuo hominis; .deny that the
.... . . . . mdividual is so.
3o et 2'^ significat quod nulli mdividuo hommis contingit Propositions
sic communicari. Nam communissime, cum terminis ""'ditTerent'^''^
significantibus per se idem significatum sed variatis in sigmfications,
. . ^ ... . . according to
supposicione vel modo significandi, proposiciones sunt the supposition
valde disparium sensuum, ut hic: homo est homines et^^^
ob homo est homo; A videt hominem, et hominem videt A;
homo coynmunis est omnis homo, et homo singularis est
omnis homo.
Sed 3° dubitatur si universale recipit accidentalem ui. Can a
predicacionem; ut conceditur quod homo communis '^'"J^Yive
40 comedit, dormit, et facit quidquid singularis homo '^f"^^'?'''{,
' ' 1 -1 o attnbules?
3. sic argumentando in marg. B. 9, 10. ut demra" B. i5. fpp =
supremum B. 32, _£«/.to per sc B. 38. du\' pro dubitatur D.
40 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II.
If so tlic facit, sicut derisorie arguunt illi quibus deficiunt ar-
iiniversal maii ^ ■ • ^ ^ • ^ t-^ • j .. j
eats drinks and gumenta in ista materia. Lt videtur quod non, quia
has many gjj, idem esset album et nigrum, sedens et non sedens:
opposite a 1 _ 7
quaiities at generaretur et corrumperetur; et esset maius et minus
' se ipso; et sic de multis inconvenientibus. Videtur 5
if not, tamen quod suscipit 1 predicaciones accidentales, quia B 46
universals are ,• n ^ • !• • • i- -j
of no use; aliter supernuerent universalia, nisi aliquid possent
besides, facere vel ad aliquid deservirent. Nec haberent uni-
universal . . . ^ . . . . ...
accidents would versalia accidencia subiecta illis proposita, nisi inessent
then have no , ^ •• ;„ ■ , • ^ u .. •
subjects. substancus 2'^, que ideo mmus sunt substancie quam fo
substancie prime secundum doctrinam Philosophi; quia
minus substant accidentibus quam substancie singu-
lares.
To answer Pro iUa materia notandum quod duplex est responsio,
A'"?'denv"that sicud in prima materia. Aliqui enim negant tales pre- i5
they receive dicaciones accidentales formales de substanciis univer-
such attributcs. . . . . .
salibus, distmgwendo pnmo de 4 generibus predica-
Predication is cionum. Alia enim est predicacio secundum essenciam,
(i) esscmiai quando predicatum inest subiecto, sed non per formalem
inexistenciam suo subiecto; ut liic : hoino est aiiiiual, 20
species est albiiin, ct generaliter quando predicatum
significatum est nomen substantivatuin per subiectum.
or (2) accidentai y^jijj £si- predicacio per inherenciam forme, ad quam
bv tnherence ot . . "^ ^- ... ^
a form ; contmgit esse motum, vel mexistenciam quam con-
"be^denied:'" sequitur per se mobilitas; ut quando predicantur verba 25
'i"'?a"ity i? ".°' adiectiva, vcl nomina adiectiva substantivata per sub-
irliite, but it is . ' . . ,.^ .
tliat which 7s stanciam; ut hic: liomo qiiantijicatur, qiialificatin; agit,
"'"''■ patitiir, locatur, durat, seciet vel ditatur. Et tales pre-
dicaciones negantur de universalibus et de terminis
ultimate abstraccionis : ut liinnanitas non cst alba, nec 3o
essencia generat. Et sic dc similibus predicatis perso-
nalibus, Humanitas tamen est album, et essencia est
generans, intelligendo in negativo genere substantivato.
Or (3) by 3"=^ modus predicandi est predicacio secundum causam,
'^""rScr"' "'^ hic: dies est lacio solis, motus c.st mobile, et sic de 35
or (4) as a merc aliis. 4" predicacio est secundum habiludinem; \i\. homo
'^relat'ionf intelligitur, similatur; et sic de aliis relacionibus difle-
rentibus. Et tales predicaciones recipiunt universalia.
Why these are Causa autem quare negantur predicata particularia
iTthe essence ^^ tcrminis abstractis, est ista. Termini abstracti ordi-40
received
3. a" jf ro album B. 17. )" pro primo B. 2(j. na"» pro nomina B.
28. sedet tn marg. B. 33. m^" pro in negativo B.
CAI>. II. LOC.ICA. 41
nantur ad signiticandum simplicilcr \critates abstractas accidental
■ ti ^ j IV ■,. c ■ attributes (siich
quas primo sii;nincant, eo quod alitcr sequitur contusio y. „ gs
locucionum distincucncium huiusmodi veritates; ut, curn ^i'litteness) ii
'^ . ' . would be
aliud sit esse hominem, et esse albiim eciam aliud (et esscntially
5 sic de ceteris), quomodo cognoscentibus haberentur ^^" ^' '^'
signa distingwencia huiusmodi veritates? quoniam, di-
cendo quod r' est qualitas et eciam albedo vel albacio,
modo, si isti termini supponercnt concretive, sicut
homo est album; tunc sicut homo est albiis, ita humanitas
10 esset albacio; nec esset distinccio accidencium a sub- and there
... • i\T ■^ 1 ■j. ± •11 1 .u would he no
stancia. Non ergo sequitur: humanitas est ille homo, et distinction
ille homo est albus; erso, humanitas est alba, quia hetween
^ \ . . ' ^ accident and
humanitas est cssencia hominis; que si esset alba, tunc substance.
esset albedo; talem enim sensum limitat subiectum,
1 5 supponendo abstracte.
Unde aptissimum medium inveniendi differenciam Aristot!e's rule
vel distinccionem aliquorum est regula Aristotelis: Si wiietlleTVwo
aliquod ens inest uni quod a reliquo removetur, tunc ^'"ngs dirtcr is
. ..„ . ^ , . ^ the possible
ista dirierunt; ut, quia esse hominem potest manere cum absence
hj K .. 11 ^ • • • • ^ ^-i of the one, tlie
oc quod esse album tollatur lam ipsis existentibus; other
ergo. quod est essc hominem et quod est esse albuni •'emaining;
..X- . .^ . . . . wlitteuess
dmerunt. Et illam differenciam nomino supradictis ditTers,theretore,
abstractis. Quando tunc unum est communius ad reli- "^"^ Himamty.
quum, tunc non sequitur simpliciter negacio superioris
25 de suo inferiori; ut non sequitur: ista potencia est in- A quality
comniunicabilis et illa essencia est comniunicabilis ; ergo ihc^^essencc
iHa potencia non est illa essencia; sed bene sequitur i^nt that which
.... . . . . . is the cssence
quod illa qtie sunt illa polcncia et ista essencia differunt. and that which
Nec esset possibile tollere illam regulam condicionalem, are ^dit?erentf
3o Infinitive tamen oraciones sunt concrete, nec conver-
tuntur cum abstractis, ut: hominem cecum esse est ho-
minem esse, et per consequens homo. Cecitas autem
non est homo; ideo non convertitur. Verumtamen in The univcrsals
C3USG thc
re cecum esse est esse cecum et per consequens cecitas; individual and
3b sed signa non convertuntur, ut dicit Aristoteles. Uni- theretore are of
.° . great use; thcy
versalia ergo causant individua, et per consequens sustain
multum deserviunt in universitate. Nec sequitur; uni- accl^dents^onlY
• versale facit illum cursuni; ergo currit : sicut non "°' particular
•^ " , . . . ones, and are
sequitur de deo. Homo communis ergo tacit quicquid therefore less of
substances than
their singulars.
3. lacu corfi pro locucionem B. 5. quo B. g. et pro est before
album B. 11— 13. est ille — est essencia iii marg. B. 22 no?o D.
25. po usually passio B. 27. po B. 28. po B. 29. ydi''=™ pro
condicionalcm B. 3i. ct pro cst B.
42 .lOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. II.
homo singularis facit, cum causat illud efficienter; et
tamen non loquitur, generat, comedit, et sic univer-
saliter substat accidentibus universalibus tantum ; sed
singulare substat tam singularibus quam universalibus
accidentibus, et ideo est magis substancia. 5
Secondly, we Alia vero responsio admittit terminos tales in suppo-
™fliev'^re"ceive' sicione personali, concedendo quod homo communis
accidents in currit, sicut et ille homo: et est eiusmodi cuius est
their .... .
particulars, aliquis singularis homo. Nec sequitur ex hoc quod sit
^"\^ifat ^h^eir'^ sapiencior | vel maior se ipso: sed bene sequitur quod B 32''
particulars are. sjj- sapiencior vel maior quam est in isto vel in isto
The Universal ^. . ^ . .
would not then supposito. Nec sequitur, si generatur et moritur vel
great^er^^fhin corrumpitur, quod non est, sed bene sequitur quod
itself, but incipit vel desinit non esse in isto vel in isto subiecto.
greater than in ^. . . . n •, tvt c
one or another Et sic ridet cum ridentibus et net cum nentibus. Nec i-J
By "this' nie^ans, sequitur quod sit monstrum, quamvis habeat infinita
. i' P" hj?^'^ capita et omnia organa hominis singularis, quia non
inhnite different . ^ . " . ^ , , .7, „ ,
attributes, in eodem supposito, sed in diversis habet illa. bed
negativel^oVa^^^^g^tive negantur, ut non sequitur: iste Jiomo non sedet,
least negaiive ^i /^^^ homo est hotuo communis: ercrn hono sitnpliciter 20
only in this or . ,^11 • j
that individual. vel homo commiims non sedet. Sed bene sequitur quod
non sedet in illo supposito. Sed alii concedunt quod
homo communis non sedet ; nec ex hoc sequitur simpli-
citer quod nemo sedet^ sicud nec ex affirmativa sequitur
quod oinnis homo sedet. 2d
I note thesc Istas responsiones recito, ut concipiantur auctores
becausTt^here is qui quandoque locuntur secundum unam et quandoque
often much secundum aliam. Nec contradicunt, sed equivocant in
coniusion, . ' *
authors supposicione. Ego autem elegi utrumque sensum et
^den^yiiig^the utramque scntenciam, sed utor verbis prioris respon- ?o
same thing in sionis, quia non dubiuiu quin Aristoteles negaret quod
diflferent senses; ' ^ ^ . .,, , ^ . ...
for my own essencia hommis albatur, etsi ille homo qui est illa
bmh are good, essencia albatur: ut theologus [non] habet concedere quod
but prefer the jivine essencia est mobilis, divisibilis, paciebatur etc.
wording of thc . '. .* „.
former, quamvis sit iUud quod paciebatur, moriebatur etc. sed io
'"^'^whi'"h ^° est passum, divisibile, creatura ; et sic de predicatis
theologians substantivis.
deny Ihat the . . • i ir
Godhead Nec debent taha recitan pro argumentis: hoc alba-
aithough'u was ^"'"^ ^t hoc est illa essencia: igitur illa essencia albatur;
a person who /j^c est Sor et hoc est Plato: igitur Sor est Plato.A^
sutiered. . . _, • ni
Examples of Omnis natiira imiversalis hominis est Sor ; omnis Plato
similar
8. cuq3 pro cuius est; est above B. 11. qxisto vel B. 17. arga^ jpro
organa B. 3i. ne"'' pro negaret B. 33. non deest B.
CAP. 11. I.OGICA. 43
est natiira IioDiinis iiniversalis hominis: igitiir, omnis objections, all
Plato est Sor. Nulhis Plato est Sor : omnis natura ho- '^samc way:''
minis svecifica est Plato: iffitur nulla natura /lom/»/.? ^" ^" ^'^"'^ ""i
c J .".... . supposition 01
specifica est Sor. Et sic de infinitis in vanum multi- the middle
,.. , •■ • ^ru » •■ 'cm varies
D plicatis. In omnibus enim talibus est vanacio suppo- fpom the majoi
sicionis alicuius termini terminorum principiativi syllo- '° ^^^ minor;
gismi,- ut in primo argumento quod sinistre vocatur
syllogismus expositorius, supponit ly 'hoc' in maiori pro
supposito vel persona compositi; et, sub racione qua
loillud suppositum [est,] sibi inest albedo vel albescietas;
et in minori supponit absolucius pro essencia, que, ut
illa essencia, non est albedo. Ideo idem est ac si ex '* ?^^
. . . . supposition is
istis premissis concluderetur quod illa essencia est kept the same
11 j r^ • ^ • 1 .. .. -^ • all throueh, tiie
albedo. Cum enim termmus abstractus supponit sim- conclusion is
1 5 pliciter pro esse hominem, et oppositum predicatur for- "i?^ against us.
maliter, dependenter substantivatum ad subiectum, ./irst cxampie,
.. .. • 1 ...... -11 •.. we admit that
oportet ipsam supponere abstracte, ut ule sit sensus: the essence is,
esse hominem est esse albimi. Sed si predicatum per se "°' white, but
/ 1 something
supponeret sine dependencia ad subiectum, tunc con- white,- which
.. • • .. 11- I-.. .. L- •;; distinction
20 tingeret ipsum intelligere personaiiter: ut hic: illa occurs in the
essencia est album; et illa conclusio sequitur bene ex "^y^^^ry .°f "i^
... . . ^ . . Tnnity.
illis premissis, sed alia non. Unde conformiter dicunt
theologi quod et persone sunt eterne et tam res quam
persone eterne, et tamennon sunt eterni; quia adiectivum
25 professionis per se supponens supponit similiter pro
essencia, ipso significante proprie illud quod est com-
mune tribus.
Quo ad 2™, patet argumentum quod non est color For the second
j , • j- -^ . . • we cannot
in deduccione, cum medium sit commune. Ac si sic argue, from the
3o argueretur: Sor est homo et Plato est homo; erso Sor tact that two
'-' . ^ . things agrec,
est Plato. Et eodem modo non sequitur: llla potencia, that they are
vel illa materia est illa essencia et illa forma vel 'V/e v. g. matter and
actus est eadem essencia: isritur, materia illa est forma form are each
" . . . . of them the
illa. Sed bene sequitur ex premissis quod materia sit compound
35 illud quod est illa forma; quod est verum, cum illa maueViniot
essencia sit communis ad materiam, formam et com- ,, *°^"'';,
' . Man is the
positum ex hiis. Unde, sicut theologi concedunt quod divine nature
B47" mobile et divisibile est inmobile et indivisibile, | cum " he is^not^^
homo sit natura divina, et tamen ille homo non est mcreate, and
. ' .... thus the
40 mdivisibilis, invisibilis, increatus, quamvis sit iUud quod communicable
universal is
I. hominis in marg. B. S. homo pro Iioc B. 10 est deest B.
i3. appo pro opposituni B. 21;. iiine pro conimuue B.
44 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. 11.
jiicoaimuni- est liuiusmodi ; sic communicabilis universalis, quia natura
siibjectsl^but^notcoi^i^i^^ui^i^^^t^ilis, est incommunicabilis, quia tam res
in iis natuie quam persona incommunicabilis; et tatnen iila natura
communicabilis non est tantum natura incommunicabilis.
And thus, gt conformitcr conceditur quod illud quod non potest 5
immovable in . . . ' ... ' .,,
itself and moveri est mobile, quia res mobilis; et tamen lila res.
sXjects/and* i^oiT ^st mobilis. Unde illa proposicio debet sic con-
whon wc say: yerti: natura mobilis est illa res ; et illa: natura exten-
that natiire ts , , .
extended, seen, ditur, ridetur, et cetera, debet sic converti: natura
'convertlrsof exteusa, visa etc. est illa natura. Et eodem modo de lo
tlie iiature tliat nesa.n\is. ut est illa: nulla natura communis est incom-
is extended. .,.,.., . . ,, . .
seen, &c., is mumcabilis, debet sic converti: nulla essencia incommimi-
^^lnd^th'e'^' cabilis est natura communis, quorum utrumque est verum.
adiective, Cum tamen illa natura est res incommunicabilis, quia
attnbuted thus . • , •,. • , ,- -
to tlie subject, persona mcommunicabilis, quia quandoque adiectivumi^
makes one verb. ^pp^gjj.^^j.j^ substantivatur per suppositum, tunc equivalet
ac si vcrbum adiectivum predicaretur in adiacens: ut,
si homo est quantus, albus, relatus, etc. tunc homo
quantificatur, albificatur, refertur, etc. Sed hoc non
oportet, quando predicatum substantivatur per se. Unde 20
peheles in absoluto dicit quod ex significato adiectivi
appositi et significato substantivi suppositi inplicatur
fieri una usia, sicut fit ex materia et forma, non sicut
quando predicatum non substantivatur per subiectum.
Et illud est cum diligencia inprimendum. 2.1
Vor xhathird: Quo ad 3'" argumentum, patet quod non sequitur;
it is quite true ^ . . . , ■ ' . • r>;
that of two sed ex ulis premissis bene sequitur quod omnts Ftato
'-A^InT§,bM\^ ^^>t idem Sorti vel illud quod est Sor, et hocestverum;
are that which ^q\ ^on sequitur, si Sor est illud quod est Plato; ergo
the other is; ^ . . •' . •;; j ■•
but not that Sor cst Plato, sicut non sequitur: materia est illua .•'O
no more than ^"o^ est forma: ergo materia est forma. Nec sequitur:
for matter and ///,,^f g^( omne quod est ille: i^nis est illa ioneitas: ers;o
form. -' ' -F ■ ■ -Tt ' .
The nature omne quod est ille ignis est illa igneitas. Nam essencia
bcYn|'n?ad1'up vel natura illius ignis est 3-' differencia inter se. Ideo
of tliree j^q„ tantum ille ignis est illa essencia, cum illud quod non 35
dirterent faclors, '-' . . \
we cannot est iste ignis est ista essencia, quia tam matena quam
edch ofihem^^forma. Undc, quamvis ille ignis sit alius quam sua
igneity;
4. tani B. li.ppro persona B. ii). fbstma'\p;-o substantivatur B.
20. fbstriia'^ B. 21. pehelie B. 25. "ip'.? B. 26. Qi?o pro Quo B.
2 1 . Peheles. I can find no meaning to this word. Peri Her-
vieneias seems too far-fetched, unless this is a conventioiial
abhreviation for an often recurring tide. ?2. I ani not quite
certain whether we ought not to read here ille; ille; or ille
ignis: ille ignis.
CAP. TI. I.OGICA. 45
materia, non tamen est aliud, Hcet hoc sit aliud (demon- and thougli fire
strando istum ignem). Nam ille terminus, aliitd, in tvom oni.''factor
neutro senere substantivatus dicit alietatern essencie '^Y; ^; ''f •
t' . . matter), it is
subiecte vel nature. Et aliter non oportet, quamvis not a diitcrent
^ aliqua dicta antiquorum sonant quod unus homo est "'
aliiis quain reliquus, sed non aliitd; quia tunc, ut
dicunt, non essencialiter eadem natura singularis vel
universalis. Probabile tamen videtur quod est dare
alietatem essenciarum singularium, que sunt eadem
loessencia universalis: ut eqo sitni aliitd aSor, quia alia lliere may be
natura singularis; et materia illiits ignis est alia ab illa amongst those
fonna, quia aliud suppositum: et tamen illa non est singular
•^ . ' ^ . ^. ' . . csscnces which
aliud, quia non est alia essencia. Unde illa exclusiva are idcntical
est falsa : Tantitm aliquod illoritni est essencia /^»/.v, nniversals: but
i5 demonstrando per ly ''illorum" omnes formas isnis, this otherness
^ , ^' , . D ' joes not make
habebit illam universalem aftirmativam convertibilem: them other
onine qitod est essencia ignis est aliqitod illoritni; quod Thus it^were
est falsum, cum tam materie quam composita sunt 'l''^? ^° *^yi.
. . ■ . . . . ^ . . Only one oj
essencie ignis. Et sic corruptibile est incorruptibile, ihese forms is
20 quia essencia et materia mcorruptibihs; et tamen iUe fire;
ignis non est incorruptibilis, cum possit naturaliter ,*"'", j"r" '^';
" . . . . should have to
corrumpi. Nec sunt illa opposita: res corruptibilis et exclude the
.•,•;• • ^ • ^ .•» •; ^ • matter, and thc
res incorritptibilis, sicut nec ista, corritptibile et incor- whole
ruptibile convertibiliter significantes. Quilibet enim homo conipounds.
. .... ... Alany
-^ est res incorruptibilis, quamvis non quodlibet sit incor- expressions
ritptibile. Unde, sicut non sequitur: Ego sitm natitra apparently
itniversalis, et illa est incorruptibilis ; erffo e^o suni in- contradictory,
. . '. . . ~ ' o f-i are not
■ corntptibilis; ita non sequitur: ista ignis est ista essen- really so.
cia, et ista essencia est incorruptibilis : ergo, iste ignis
3o est incorruptibilis. Nec sequitur ex isto quod homo sit And so none of
, ti • 1 j !• the abovc-
non homo, album, nigritm, vel quodcunque reliquum mentioned
inconveniens. Album enim est illud commune quod est . '^''u '^'"'^"'^* .'.?
" to be met with
nigrum, quia suppositum nigrum ; et tamen illa res in this theory.
communis nec est alba nec nigra.
35 duo ad exemplum 4^^^ dicitur quod non sequitur: As for the
sed bene sequitur ex illis premissis quod nulla natitra | inst^an^ce'; it
B 47'' specifica est Sorteitas vel individitacio Sortis; quod est J°''°^^'^ '''''^'".^J>'
•* -^ . . ' n that no specific
necessarium. Nec sequitur, nullits Plato est Sor, ergo essence that is
■ mtlliis Plato est illud quod est Sor ; sicut non sequitur: individualitv
40 nullum albitni est niisntn: ; erQO nullitm album est illitd °\ ^},
.'^ . '' as in the
qitod est nigntm. Si enim album esset nigrum, tunc res foregoing
"" ^" examples.
3. fbstatinati/ B. \. a.'- pro alitcr B. 3-'. Qme pro communc J!.
4G JOHANNIS WYCLIF Cap. II.
alba esset res nigra, sicut res corruptibilis esset res
incorruptibilis; sed hoc non potcst verificari pro re
singulari, quod res singularis alba esset res singularis
nigra; et cum nuUa res universalis sit alba vel nigra,
patet quod non verificaretur, qualitercunque extrema 5
If it is urged supponerent. Et si obiciatur quod natura specitica,
universal man puta anitual risibile ex hoc quod potest ridere, tamen
is 'able to gjj- nichil, dicitur quod illa natura non est risibilis,
lauglr and yet . ' , ^ , .'
cannot, we sicut nec potest ridcre^ sed esl omne nsibile et omms
dist^nguish: homo risibiUs. Nec sequitur: omnis homo est risibilis ; lo
abte to i^^gj' natiira specifica est homo: ergo, natura specijica est
!)i those beiiigs risibilis; sed bene sequitur quod illa sit risibile: quia
wiic i is. j^^ maiori medius terminus supponit personaliter, et in
All sophisms niinori simpliciter. Et eodem modo neeantur paralo-
against the ..„■■.. . i ^ •
Trinity find gismi 3" medii ; ut sic argumentando: Qiiicquid est ib
here^^am^^must ^^^^ essencia est immobile; iste jilius est aliquod quod
be answered ^^^ ///^ essencia; i^itur, iste filius est immobilis; sed
hkewise. . , ., . . ^ , ., r^ , .
bene sequitur quod ille sit immobile. Et breviter, non
est aliquis paralogismus negandus in materia de trini-
tate increata, quin proporcionalem contingit habere tam 20
in materia de universalibus quam in quacunque materia
de trinitate creata. Et ideo expedit cognoscere logicam
de universalibus.
All these Unde secundum antiquos, isti paralogismi reducuntur
unde^^^TheTe^ads ^d fallaciam figure diccionis, vel fallaciam accidentis. 25
o^jigures of {jnde, sicut hec est fallacia accidentis: Ouicquid heri
speecli, or ot ...,,, , , . - . .
the accidental. fuisti, tlliid nutic es; sedens heri fuisti: ergo, sedens
now what^you ««"^ es. Ista cum verbis de presenti est conformis
were yesterday; faiiacia: Omne quale est qualitas: omnis homo est quale :
yesterday you . -^ ■* •* ^
were sitting ; ergo omnis hotno est qualitas. Notum est consequens .•'O
are^^soto-day. ^sse falsum; et minor foret vera, et subiectum supponit
Comparison simpliciter sicut predicatum limitat. Et conformis fallacia
with a fallacy '^ . . ■ . . . .
on the persons est hic : omnis pater est relativus; omnis essencia increata
° There "is^a" ^•^' pi^ter; ergo omnis talis essencia increata est relativa;
mean \\\q tamen essencia nec per se nec per accidens est 35
between per se . ,. .
and^er pater, quia est dare medium inter per se et per
accidens, ut dictum est superius; et sic omnis sub-
stancia etc. significat quale quid ; ut quidditatem vel
aliam essencialem qualitatem; et quando variantur sup-
posiciones commutatur quid in quale, ut sic: om>n'5 40
19. a's B. 20. quirj above cum B; ib. (pporle B. 3o. negandum;
notu above B 37, 38. f " z B. 20. gumia' B.
accidens.
CAI\ 11. LOGICA. 47
honio movetur ; natura universalis est honio: ergo, natura
iiniversalis niovetur.
Dubitacio tamen est si universale potest moveri. Et Can iiic
videtur quod sic, quia potest esse ubi prius non fuit, moverit
3 et, motis subiectis, movcntur omnia que causaliter illis seems so, lor it
. , . ... ,. is wliere its
insunt. Cum ergo universale non est nisi ubi est ali- singulars are,
quod eius singulare, sequeretur quod universale fuerit ^ move 'so^
ubi prius non fuit, [ut] et singularia sunt ubi prius non ni"st it.
fuerunt aliqua huiusmodi singularia.
'o Pro isto supponatur omne universale esse ubique ubi Tlie principle
est aliquod eius singulare, et sic universalis substancia, j^ whcrever its
universale corpus (et sic de quotlibet accidentibus) sunt singulars are
ubique et semper. Alia autem sunt ubique ubi sunt sua granted; but
singularia; tunc videtur michi probabile quod sicud universa^s are
i^ universalia possunt esse ubi prius non fuerunt, sic wherever any
^ . , ,. . ^ . , , ' . of their
possunt moveri localiter, sed non augeri vel alterari. singulars are,
Unde modus localis predicatur secundum habitudinem ^^ "g^. ^!,^ "°^
aliter quam alii motus. Contingit ergo universale dupli- substance, or
citer acquirere locum: vel secundum sui individui Hut setting
2o generacionem, sicut deperdit locum ad sui individui "^^think h^' ^
corrupcionem : et isti motus vocantur multiplicaciones piobable that,
, , . . . ,. , .,. as the others
vel deminuciones universalium; quando scilicet nume- can be where
rosius vel paucius insunt suis singularibus. Sed 2" modo ''/hJy^carf also
contingit universalia acquirere vel deperdere loca per n^ove with their
... . , , „ sineulars;
2osuorum singulanum mocionem localem; ut, Sorte cur- which gives us
rente ad designatum locum, fit homo universalis ibi, speci^es^of
tam per cursum Sortis, quam formaliter per motum movement;
communem. Sed universalis punctus, linea universalis,
et cetera que necessario sunt ubique, non possunt pohufMnes
B^S'' moveri. 1 Nec sequitur: Sor non movetur, et ipse est and ail those
, ' . , . ^ things wiiich
homo commums: ergo homo commums non movetur; necessarily
quia repugnat quod moveatur et non moveatur, sicut Bu""ve cannot
repugnat quod sit album et non sit album. Moto autem conclude from
, . ,,., , . . the non-
subiecto, movetur quodlibet quod inest, racione motus movement of a
35 subiecti acquirentis novum locum. Nec oportet, si ^"^'^^'^.gYsar^
natura universalis est alicubi, quod illa sit ubicacio, does not move.
, , , . ,. . ,.' Yet this
cum sit proporcio secundum habitudinem in qua predi- movement does
catur transcendens connotando circumstanciam com- jocalization^of
munem universali et singulari; ut esse in loco, esse in the universal,
,, ' . », but a mere
40 tempore, esse mtellectum, animatum, etc. Natura ergo relation of
identity between
it and its
singular.
8. ut dee>:t B. y. fn'irtnt pro fuerunt B. \'i. eius above sua B.
25, 26. currere B. 33. igitur above autem B. 38. tnf"» pro Iranscen-
dens B. 40. ite" pro intellectum B.
48 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. 11.
universalis est iustus, grammaticus, et sic de ceteris
adiectivis professionis que per se supponunt.
IV. Do Sed 4° dubitatur de logica cum terminis numeralibus;
taken\vith tiieir'^^'^ dubitatur si universale ponitur in numerum cum suis
*/«^?//i7rs, Hw^e singularibus. llt, si dicatur quod siint v homines, non ?
up a number? .'-' ... ^ ., , r-.
V. g. arc there existente aliquo smgulari preter Sor vel Platonem. Et
'there"a^-e onh" 't'^? ^i alicubi est unus homo, ibi sunt duo homines;
two individuals, sic igitur sunt due res vel due substancie, quarum
-A. and B .•' '^ . . ,. ,
For where there utrumque est homo, cum veritas universahs detur a
the^rel^re^two singulari, et utraque illarum veritatum est homo. In lo
heings one Jsto communiter dicitur quod numerus stricte sumptus
universal, the . . ..... T ,
other singuiar, non est nisi multitudo singulanum, eo quod specince
is"a»w« ditferencia, non numero, sed specie dicuntur differre
The usuai reply ab invicem. Sed largius sumendo numerum, tunc quo-
is that as ^ . . . ' ^
7!umber is rumcunque numeratorum multitudo dicitur numerus;eti3
nniimude of ^^^^ modo quinarius est numerus specierum universalium,
singuiars, the senarius est numerus specierum politici regiminis; et
universal . , . . . ^ ;
cannot count; sic de ceteris numeris communium.
specihcaHv Tunc dicitur quod terminus numerahs, additus ter-
disiinct are not mino prime intencionis, limitalur ad significandum 20
said to ditter iii . , ,. ^ ^ , . *-
numher but iu numerum prmio modo dictum. Unde, sicut termmus
But number can ^-^^^^^'^*^^^^ limitat speciem specialissimam ad suppo-
he understood sicionem personalem, ita iile terminus numeralis limitat
in a wider ... . . ...
sense, for anv termmum prime mtencionis, et specialiter speciem spe-
'^v!^'l'ln'^^r.M^nt cialissimam ad supposicionem personalem, Cum ergo 25
Now when a homo communis sit quilibet hominum singularium, non
numher is . . .,,..,
added lo a ponit seorsum m numero cum liiis; ideo existente onDii
lirsthitelitlon homine, Sorte vel Platone, non superest 3"^ homo com-
it is understood munis ab illis, sed est uterque illorum, et non esset
in the tirst . on 1 • • i^ • 1
sense, and tercius, nec esset :>^ persona hommis. Lt per idem -">"
tli^e^sumlosition "^^" oportet, ubique ubi est unus homo, esse duos
must be homines. Nec sequitur Sortem esse tot substancias quot
personal. . ,. . • o 1
The universal, universaha sunt eius partes; quia Sor est lionio com-
'iJiVJi^oT munis, animal commune, corpus commune, substancia
pcrsoiidi ' '* ' ^
supposition commuuis, et ens commune: ideo singulare non est ^^
distinct from , , . .,.,,. ^
that of its multa sed unum m omnibus ilhs; e contra tamen uni-
'omnot^be' versale est multa, cum universale sit omnia eius singu-
counted thus. laria. Et sic duo sunt 4 et 5. Et sic de quocunque
So there are
not two men
where there is
4. ponit B. 7. sibi pro ibi B. 8. sicut pro sic B. 22. dist'"^
pro distribuens B. 24, 2?. ff^ fie»' ff'n»"i B. 33. p» pro partes B.
3. All this looks like another and aggravated form of the
difficultv stated thus by Biondello (Taming of the Shrew): A
horse and a man is more than one, and vet not many.
CAP. II. I.OGICA. 49
numcro finito vel inlinito assitinando. Ncc ex illa "'"-•. "'."'.',* ■^
. . . , ... aii individual
sequitur quaternarium esse quinarium, et sic de aliis plus a man,
speciebus numeri, formaliter dicti, quia talis numerus ''/,/^,,";/],'"^"^.'' '
non est ille res numerate, sed ipsarum accidens. Sicut f'"-' •'
'^ . substancc;
5 ennn quantitas contmua est coutinuum esse quantum,
sive sit corporeitas, que est substauciam esse coi-poream, similarly wiiii
sive superficietas aut superficies, que est substanciam ' 'lh,ds''o'i'"
essc superficialem, sive linealitas, que est .';t/&5/^7Jcn7;n ^l"'^'i'''.v as,v. p.
,. , . ,. , . number is tht;
esse liuealem, sive punctahtas vel punctus, qui est sub- multitudo ot
lo stanciam esse punctalem: sic nuiiierus vel numeracio est voiumc is tfic
substancias esse multas: quod dividitur ab illis et quolibet voluminousncss
... ..... . . ^ ot a snbstancc,
lUorum. Aliter tamen multiplicius accipitur numerus. ctc.
Sed sic loquendo inpossibile est unam speciem numeri now in ihis
esse aliam. Ymmo, sicut impossibile est aliquod moveri . sense it is
. ... ,. , . impossiblc tor
i.Tsnie motu, ita inpossibile est aliquas substancias esse onc sort of
multas sine tali numero, et sic necesse est tales nume- ""Ifnothcr.
ros esse: sic quod claudit contradiccionem numeros The uniiy by
' . . which cverv
ydearuni non esse. Unitas igitur a qua unaqueque sub- substance i"s
stancia una dicitur, est in qualibet substancia secundum ^^^^^]^ substance
2oindividuam veritatem, est simplicior et prior puncto, cum prior to the
... , ,.^ . . special poiiits
est m intersticns, et punctus superaddit posicionem. Sed which compose
species puncti, multiplicata secundum puncta indivisi- "j'j,fe's surta^ccsT
liilia, linealiter posita, principiat lineam tam secundum '"^ii^^ volumcs.
speciem quam secundum genvis; et species linee, multi- go that unitv Is
2.T plicata secundum lineas individuas superficialiter positas, "i^ principlc ot
... „ . , '^ . ' qnantitv;
prmcipiat superhciem tam secundum speciem quam plurality bcing
secundum individua; et sic de corporeitate quo ad desccnd'^t^o"thc
superficiem. Et sic omnis quantitatis principium est particular and
. . . . . . unity
unitas, sicut docet lincolniensis i° posteriorum 1 5". as we asccnd
B4S'' Sic ergo ascendendo | in universaliora invenietur pau- UiiTvcVs^al.
citas, et descendendo in inferiora, invenietur pluralitas;
ut, ornnes homines individui sunt unica species, et
omnes species animalium sunt unicum genus ; et sic Really laymcn,
i.-. 1 1 •! ■!•... j '^ 1 who studv tliis
omnis multitudo reducibihs est ad unum, non solum subjcct linow
3.T secundum communitatem sed ad unum separatum in '^''"''^' ^^f"^ "
' than tiicsc
genere causandi. Et vere layci miciati ni ista materia stammcrini;
ad pauca respicientes de levi pronunciant veritates quas 'si^nsl"
doctores signorum balbuciendo referunt sompniantes.
Nec sequitur quod liomo communis sit populus, ctsi ,. }} '^°^,*^ ""(
. . ^ . ^ . . . . . ^ '^ ' iollow^ that llie
4osit illi homincs divisim, qui collectim sunt populus. univcrsal jm.t.v
is a pcoplc ;
for lie is eacli
individual
separatcly, and
I. sifinando ii. 7. a' = aut! I>. 11. a\, vi' |!. 21. ini'^''* 1'..
2(). ff''"''l'>. 3o. vc B; /7'. inilli 1'.; //'. lo';' = layci .' H. :>S. fvff signisto
iii marg. B.
5o JOHANNIS WYCI,!F <:aI^ "•
the pcoplc is so Populus enim est multi homines civiliter connexi. Et
ATine'^ ihoiinh sic iUi homines per accidens sunt populus, sicut in-
made of points, jgi[jp^jjj. jpgj g^j concedunt quod totum est sue partes,
is not a species '^ . ^ . .
containing ut collectim componentes. Et sic negatur quod species
^^on" Vpedcs is puncti est linea, etsi sit illa puncta que componunt ?
man\ tiiinos, Hneam 1 quia non credo quod aliquod continuum sit
does not prove _ ' t _ _ t _n _ , ,•
that unity is eius pars. Nec sequitur, si una species sit multa diversa,
mu 1 u c. qyQj unitas sit multitudo, vel quecunque species numcri
Difterent soits ^ . ; t n i
ot unitv; reliqua. Pro quo nota quod sicut unum est transcen-
and"mmieniV dens, convertibile cum ente, sic unitas est convertibilis (o
As numeral, it cum entitate et cum veritate. Sed quandoque sumitur
is the principle • ... • . .. » ....
ot numher in a unitas pro pnncipio numeri, et tunc connotat per se
substance. substanciam esse unam : et sic striccius sia;nificat quam
which is one: . . - i j r
this is a stricter unitas transcendens. Sicut ergo lalsum est qiioa siih-
transcendeutal staiiciain esse iiuaui est siibstanciam esse quadruplicem, i:»
Being. Q[ j;ic Je aliis numeris; ita falsum est quod unitas est
quaternarius, vel quilibet alius numerus.
But it by Extendendo autem numerum ad quecunque numerata,
number we . . ... . .
mean anything sive sicut accidencia, sive partes quantitative substancie,
'countld '^ sive partes qualitative, tunc concedendum est ad sensum 20
we must grant equivocum quod quelibet unitas que est essencia sub-
tliat the unitv. ^. .^..^ .. . .,
essence of the stancie singularis est trinitas suppositorum eiusdem
"'trin'iiv'\)"f'hs"" ^ubstancie. Et hic multiplicantur multa argumenta aput
supposita. theologos in materia de trinitatc increata, ut aliqui
'^"^man'v '^'^ arguunt quod deus a deo differt, quia deus pater a25
difiiculties, all ^^(^ j^ij^, diftert: et sic homo communis diflcrt ab
ot tlicm . ... . . .. -^-
conccrning homine singulari. Ita essencia communis dmert a per-
Iriniiv a^s "well sonis non sic communibus. Et per idem trinitas in-
as the communicabilis non cst essencia communicabilis, nec
Universals. . . . 10
Tluis, God tlic persona. Et sic essent queque distincta, quorum quod- .^0
Fnther difters ijhct esset deus. Si enim omnis deus est pater, tunc
trom -God thc . , ., „^ ...
Son, i. c. God tantum est deus pater, et communicabile. Et illud quod
tVom God and ., • ^ •..•'.. • j- • » „»
tlic universal "cc spuMt ncc spiratur , ut esseucia annna, tantum
irom the esset spirans vel sniratum; quia tantum. cst aliqua
siugular man. ' . ' ' . ' .
And theii, illarum tnum pcrsonarum: et breviter nuUum csset -■'^'
thccoiiV[wison, ''^'■."umentutn in illa materia, quin contingit propor-
iiicrc wouid cionale facere in materia cuiuscunque trinitatis create.
be thrce ^
singulars of the
universal, God. ... 1. -> j 1,
r2. t uitas ]i. .^0. quandoqiie B.
22. Wvclif here alkides to his thcory, developed at greatest
length in De Materia et Fonna, tliat in all ihings the essence
corresponLls to tlie Godliead, the mattcr lo ihe Fathev, the form
to the Son, and the compound to ihc Holy (ilioxt. These ihree
hc calls ihe Created Trinitv. '.^3. Nec spirat nec spiratur:
allusion to thc words in Dccr. Grcg. Dist. I cap. i : Firmitcr.
CAP. II. r.OGICA. 5 1
Ouantum ad nrimum, videtur michi prohabilc uuod ''"'!J''_^
^ ' . ' ,. ^ . . woid Gnd
ille terminus, deus, nunquam supponit personahter nisi has a personni
per limitacionem appositi nocionalis; ut deus pater "o'nlv"\vheii'
differt a deo filio, deus iienuit deum, etc. Ncc sequitur: ^ippl"-'^ to ihc
. , . . persoiis ;
b gii^netis a genito differt. et iiterqiie est deiis: igitiir, thereiore ihc
deiis a deo dijfert, propter limitacionem suppositorum. ,;,i^)\v"7^',^j\!;oj
Pro secundo, notandum quod in parte est similitudo ^/"-"^ '^"' '^"'^'''
' ^ . '^ ... trom Ciod ;is
intcr universale et sua supposita, et essenciam divmam such.
et sua supposita; et in parte dissimiHtudo. Simihtudo, 2. The
10 in hoc quod ipsum est singulum suorum suppositorum ; between''"tl"c
et dissimilitudo in multis. Primo in hoc quod natura Univcrsal and
... , , ..,..,,. ? . the diviiic
lUa habet supposita sibi accidentalia, ut sic, mter se; Essence as to
nec illa participant communi denominacione secundum ohtains^onh''^'
maeis et minus; ut homo communis potest carere quo- .^°. '''^'' ^* '•''\<^''
'^ . • •,- - ^ 7S its siipposi/.T ;
ipcunque supposito corruptibili, et unum istorum potest but in the
esse sine reliquo; scd contradiccionem claudit essenciam °hese' are'^
divinam esse sine omnibus suis sur>positis, vel unum ^•^cidental to it
. , . and to each
illorum esse sine quolibet iUorum. 2", universalc maius, other; in the
melius, et quomodocunque dispariter accidentatum sup- absolu'telv
2opositum habet hic, et opposito modo accidentatum '^*/'^"""' : '" f'''^
. . . ,. . , . tormer case.
suppositum ahbi. Sed contradiccionem claudit unum they may be
suppositum increatum distare a reliquo, esse maius, p^i^l-t^^ct^^and
potencius, sapiencius, vel durabilius reliquo Primum PiodiKed in
' » t" ' T _^.. ditlerent, nav,
tamen est causa secundi, et ambo sunt una causa :)"; contrary '
2 5 et sic est quasi prioritas, non nature, cum sit eadem theTat^ter"^
B 4^" natura sineularis, sed prioritas 1 orisinis inter illa. Sed . f'''*^ .'^,
. r. .... ' . . . impossible.
longe simihor trmitati increate est trinitas cuiuscunque The priority
essencie create, cum in qualibet tali contingit habere "i,^.'^*;,,^ ''!,,', j of
proporcionalem proprietatem, cum contradiccionem thcse to thc
3oclaudit aliquam talem excedere vel deficere a tcrnario priority not ot
suppositorum parium quo ad omnia in quibus com- "^'odoin.' "
municat. P)Ut thc
Racione crgo illius diversitatis utendum est diversis be't'\v'een' thc
terminis et diversa lo^ica in materia de trinitatc et in increatc and
. . ^ . thc created
33 materia de universalibus; ut 3 personc hominum sunt Trinity is far
3 homines, sed non sic 3 persone divinc sunt 3 dii "h",'i^bei\veen
vel nature divine; nec deus est triplex, sedtrinus; nec the Uiiiversai
. . ' . , and ils
multiplex sed singulans, cum non habeat univcrsalc singulars.
supcrius. Ncc discrepancia vcl numerus est inter illa, ,,50 oYlier"
expressions in
dealing with Ihc
6. imitationcm IS. ao. h'- I!. 2]. ca' 15. 25. sint B. Trinity and ihe
' universals.
24. Causa. This word, applied to thc Uncausei.1 Bcing, is
generally disliked by Scholastics. They prefer ihe morc
gcneral term priucipiinii — id a quo aliquid fit vel est.
4*
52 ^ JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. JI.
Tljiee pcrsonb g^j ditferencia et pluralitas. Et sic de multis sinyni-
are three men; . . ' .. . '^
three persons ficacionibus et differencns terminorum, ad que labo-
' Gods, etc^^ riosum est pertingere. Sic ergo, propter excellenciam
And we say, idcmptitatis personarum in eadem essencia singulari,
not that the ^ i -11 • u r -n ^vr . -
Godhead negatur quod lila essencia ab aliqua lilarum ditiert, ?
1 ,^',^';'"*' sed est a quacunque illarum differens. Et lioc concludit
bnt that \\. is . ^ . . ^ . •' .
diHerent from communicabilitas conveniens essencie et non personis;
pcrsons.* ut, quia ista essencia est communicabilis, et ista per-
This difterencc j.Qj^^ non sic; ideo, quod est ista essencia non est ista
is the . ^. .
communi- persona. Et quia tnnitas est pluralitas et non sic 10
cabilitv of the •, ^,- n..--^ ^ 1
l)ivine"Nature. persona, ideo talis nulla tnnitas est persona, scd per-
iheTrinity gone: est tamen illud quod est quelibet illarum per-
is aiso an ' ^ ....
cssence, bnt a sonarum. Nota tamen quod coinmiinicabile accipitur pro
pluralitv: not • , .,-. ^ , ^ ■
a person, btit communicabilitate ad personas; ut essencia communi-
persons. catur; et accipitur pro communicabilitate ad naturas, i3
Commumcablc . ' r r _ 1
may be said sicut una persona est multe nature; scilicet, natura
either of an , ^ ^ ,• • .. • j ^
cssence, humana et natura divina; et sic de termmo opposito.
"r.of a person, ^^{j autem concedunt quod essencia differt secundum
in difterent ^
senses. racionem a persona, et tamen est illa persona; sicut
^""""^S""^ trinitas incommunicabilis est essencia communicabilis, 20
that the . . '
Godhead dirters sed non persona: ymmo, persone. Ulterius conceditur
Injiicallv from 1 ^ ^ ■ .... ^ 1 • ..
each person, quod tantum essencia que est pater, est deus, sicut
which it is omnis deus est pater; sed non tantum pater est deus,
ncvertheless ; . ' ' '. . '
and ihat only quia quod non est pater est deus. Ulterius conceditur
the (jodhead" , ^ ^ <:•,• ^ ... . ,
which is the quod pater et iiiius sunt unum pnncipium spu-ans2.i
Father is God, spjj-j^mii sanctum, et unus spirator, una causa spiritus
and vet not ^ . ' . . . ■'
only the Father sancti, sicut et est una spiracio activa. Unde eadem
that the Fathcr causa que causat omnes creaturas, causat filium et
and the Son spiritum sanctum: et illa causa est tam pater, quam
'spirate tlie ^ . . ^ ^ .
Holy Ghost filius, quam spiritus sanctus; et tamen causa spiritus 3o
principle the sancti non est ille, cum nichil inmediate et essencialiter
canse being causat se. Nec causa filii est filius: et sic tria sunt.
cquallv each ot
the persons, quorum quodlibet est causa; caiisa, et non multe cause;
vet not the ■ ■ ., j^- ^ ^ ,^
Hoiv Ghost quamvis sint muiti causantes et muita causancia;
as nothing can sed non cum predicatis substantivis. Unde omnis causa 3.^
cause itself. . . . '
And so each of Spiritus sancti est causa filii; et tamen aliquod suppo-
ihe threc are sJtum est causa spiritus sancti quod non est causa
one Cause; , .. . ' . ^ ^
yet there are iilii; sicut patet de filio. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod
causal a"ents. aliqtud vel aliqua sit causa spiritus sancti quod nod
Thc Cause of est causa filii. Filius enim, sicut non est aliud vcl 40
tharoT^heSoiT ^l'^"^ ^'^^ quam pater, sic non est alia causa quam pater.
yct ihc Son is j^Hn^ cnim, si non sit contractum pcr terminum per-
ihe Causc ot ' ' ^
the Spirit and
not of himsell. ^. ^
]-. delio li. 35. fblis B.
CAP. II. LOGICA. 5 3
sonalom, dicil divcrsilalcm csscncic; ul tilius cst alius
qiiam palcr, scd non aliud, cst ncc alia rcs. Ncc argumcn- lu iliis maucr
^ ,.,.., . , ,. \vc cati ncitlicr
tatur al) intcnon aJ suum su|icnus: liec cst alici persona: .^yn^^^ i,-„iii Uic
eriio, hcc est alia rcs ; sicut non scquitur: liec est '^/''^ ''''''''''■II.'','' ',"!,!'''
■^ persoiia: cr^o, alia esseucia. Scd ncc ccontra: hec non vicc vcrsa.
' ,. '^ . , ,. o 1 • Tliis disrcssjdii
cst alia essencia: er^o, non est alia persona. bcd in is cxcusablc bv
istis lapsus sum gratis, tum quia proporcionalitcr di- "[f^,(';°"^IJ|'''",|l'J"
ccndum cst in lo^ica dc aliis trinitatibus, tum cciam Incrcatc and ilic
^ .. r ..1 • • ► crcatcd Triiiitv.
quia matcne sunt connexe; superesset [utj juvenis, post-
loquam sapuerit materiam de universalibus regendam,
pretereat ad materiam de trinitate eiusdem essencie
subtilius cognoscendam.
Redeundo ergo ad propositum, concedi potest prin- {J.,':,\\'j'''gy[^J^'t'^
cipaliter quod quamvis aliud sit fenicem esse, et aliud Thcrc is indccd
i5illam fenicem esse, cum universalitas dilTcrt a singu- betwear^thc
laritate, tamen non sunt due fenices, quia tunc essent existence ot a
' 1 • j pnocnix
duo singularia. Nec sunt due res, due substancie, duo in gcneral and
corpora vel duo animalia quorum utrumque est fenix; particular'^
quia non sunt due sed una fenix singularis: quia vel phoenix.
1 • ^i- .u •K-t „1 But thev arc
2ooportet quod termmus talis supponatur simpliciter vel „ot two, but
nersonaliter; et secundum utrumque sensum, falsum ""^ to'" =>ii t'.i'''-
i > .... \V c must givc
esset quod sunt due fenices. Nec sequitur: A Jeni.v the tcrm a
B4()'' differt a B: ergo A et B siint dno supposita differencia, | eithci^°sscn'ti'ai
cum terminus numeralis limitat terminum prime inten- .orpersonal;
' . in either casc,
-^ cionis ad supposicionem personalem. Ideo non sequitur thcrc is but onc
quod aliquot ditferencia sunt illa, quamvis illa sunt -pii^" ^"'jferencc
differencia. Nec sequitur quod fenix universalis sit aliud, betwecn thcm
. . . . ^ 1 •II '® "^^' '^
vel alia, quam fenix singulans, etsi ditferat ab iUa dirtercnce of
secunduin racionem ; sed erit aliud singulare quam est ^^i^or^of ''
3o illa. Et per idem negandum est quod ille fenices sunt, otherness ot'
i ^ , ^ . , , esscnces: it is
demonstrando fenicem universalem et smgularem; sed a logical
distinction.
7. gt^. g. Srr3(.-'j 15; ib. ut decst B. w, 10. cum ; postquam in
e • at
marg. B; u possint iiimarg. B. 10. rega B. 11. pr (!) B. U. quod-
vis B.
II. Superesset. This scntencc prcscnts extraordinary difliculty,
as is scen by the readings, vvhich however are ohviously
insufficient. Mr. Matthew suggests that regendam being the tech-
nical word for certain obligatory lectures which the 'Magister'
has to give atter inception, the sentence may mean that he
should first be c^ualified to lecture on universals, before studying
the more ditficult matter of the Trinity. 29. Racionem. This
word seems to implv that Wvclif abandons his Realism in
presence of the difficulty; but a few lines below he savs that
thev are really distinct.
54 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. 11.
We must also ^m-,-, tXTmino indefinito facienda est divisio; ut sic:
deny anv ,. . ,. ,. • i • i ^
pliuaiiiy rerum alia cst universalis, alia particularis; substan-
''so™o?;J'y':' ciarum alia prima, alia sccunda; causarum alia uni-
Theije versalis, alia particularis. In quibus cxemplis Aristotelis
I1IOCHZX6S 7 r -i ^ ...
supponit terminus indefinitus mixtim, pro universali et 5
singulari. Et ita respondendum est ad quotlibet media
que inplicant universale. ut sic, ponere in numerum
cvim suo singulari.
Yet thcy arc Conceditur tamen quod omne universale substancie
"^''lYom^^cach''^ et eiusdem singulare sunt duo distincta realiter; quia 10
oihcr: torevcry Qj^-in^. suppositum est due nature. Sed propter difficul-
suppositum '^ '^ . .... , . . , ,•■
is of two tatem et apparenciam iUius conclusionis sunt duo alu
naturcs. ^iodi dicendi, quorum primus concedit universale ponerc
Thcrc are two . ' ^ ' . , . , ^
oUicr answers in numerum cum suo smgulari, eo quod utrumque
coJsidcrablc potest demonstrari, et universale causans singulare est i5
ditTicuity; onc gj^g causa et prius sineulari, et habet multa que non
consists m . , '^ ^ ". . • ,•, , • •
pranting that l:iabent singulare. Et sic in cuiuslibet hominis veste
''be countc?" sunt tria animalia: scilicet animal singulare, aiihual
and are many species specialissima, et auimal generale; et ita de aliis
in onc ' .' ^. .,. ,
individual, but sequentibus. Et ita unum singulanum est muita com- 20
onlVone munia, sicut unum commune est multa singularia.
with thcir Omnia tamen illa communia communtcant in parte
anoUier in subiectiva singulari. Secunda via dicit quod nullum
dcnying that universale differt a suo singulari, quia per idem argu-
ihc univcrsal . . ,. . . "^. ,-rr
dirters really mentum essencia in divinis foret rcs ditterens a persona 2?
singular. secundum racionem communicabilitatis; et sic loquendo
Lct which facile est videre quomodo universalc non ponit in
most^bcchosci^ni-imerum cum suo singulari. Eligat ergo logicus unam,
I clioosc ihc nuiji sentencia de universalibus est necessaria tam a
plebico quam a philosopho implicata; ego autem elegi 3o
primam responsionem. Et tanta de copulativis trans-
grediendo sint dicta.
6. quccunque; quotlibct abovc B; ib. mc'' LJ. 18 aliam pro ani-
malia B. 28. va B.
CAPITULUM TERCIUM.
Scquitur do disiunctivis tcrcio pcrtractandum : sup- <H" disjimciives.
ponendo primo omnem ypotheticam subordinatam pfin- ;,|,j^^sucli^onh!'
cipalitcr actui disiuneendi esse disiunctivam ; et solum , ''s.a""^;
•^ ... ... siibordiiiatc Iu
-"'talem. Proposicio enim de disiunctivo extremo, et pro- a pnncipai
posicio subordinata actui kathegorice quomodocunque jWtiie mhid'!^
composita noii est disiunctiva ; sicut nec katheeorica A catcg^ncal
... .., .. .. proposition
disiunctive signincans. Nec proposicio mixta cuius containing a
principalis actus est actus hypotheticus disiungendi; teim^^^orSiavin"
•"ad esse enim disiunctive requiritur proporcio signorum '^" ctqmvalcnt
. . ^ ... . . mcaninf;, docs
et signincacionis. Verumtamen de proposicionibus disiunc- not comc undcr
■ • "^ ■ • r .-• • .. • -u thc detniiition.
tivis in anima, ractis ex intencionibus rerum, non \yf. jq „ot
oportet illum ordinem observare, cum ibi non sit sp'^''''^ ''^i"^ of
. . . .... . . merclv mcntal
intencio de sinkategoricis distincta, contra nitencionem propositions,
, i • • -. r iri .. • j ..•u .. ■ 1 whicli do not
'-^signi. immo quothbet accidentibus, tam simul quam rcquire
successive, potest eadem intencio subici. De hiis ergo this similanty
^ ^ . . . . ot sign and ot
non directe tractat logicus, sed de proposicionibus sen- signification :
• L^i^i .. • • ■ 12 ^- thcv do not
sibihbus et suis signihcatis. belong to Lo^ic.
Patet ergo ex dictis quod a quacunque parte prin- 1^°"'^ Pi^j^.cip"'
. . ^ . . ^ ^ ^ . P<Ti"t ot the
2o cipah disiunctive ad ipsam, tenet consequencia, cum ad disjunctive is
•.. .. Ti^ •..•.. I.. • ..• c j » truc, thc wholc
eius veritatera suihcit veritas altenus partis. Sed econtra jg tp^g.
non tenet consequencia, nisi forte pars ad quam argu- t'''t the truth
T ' . ' . ^ '^ . ot the wholc
mentatur fuerit sequens ad rehquam ; ut sic: tii cii ?'ris docs not pvovc
I . • , • T^ r I t that ot" a part,
vel tii inovens; ergo, tu nioi^eris. I it es homo vcl tii es unless onc of
2basinus: ersio tu qs homo : et sic de aliis. Patet eciam . the parts is
'^ ' ... interrcd by the
quod quam vera est altera pars disiunctive, tam veraoiher; &%-. A h
I • ^ • .!••.• • j • BC or A is C:
vel venor est ipsamet disiunctiva; non quidcm venor thcrct'orc.4 « C.
quo ad adequacionem sit^ni ad suum sii^nificatum, cum '^^'"^ ""i"^'! °'"^
. . . ^. . ^ . P'T"t ot a
equacio non suscipit magis vel minus; sed verior pro- disjunctivc is,
3o prietate sui significati, sicut unum ens dicitur reliquo itsdf; i^ c. in
realius. Istud patet ex hoc quod falsitas partis sigmfication,
^ " ' not in dcgrcc.
i. Cap. deest. 2. blaiik space for initial S. g. noii est B.
14. de signatis; corr. in marg. B. 17, iS. rS"'- B. 27. ipamg B.
3o. quomodo; sicut above the line B.
56 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III.
Evcry desiunctive vere non facit ad Jisiunctive falsitatem | vel R 5o*
m^adc'or"two inconcedibilitatem eiusdem. Et universaliter hoc: que-
coniradicioiics ijbet disiunctiva facta ex contradictoriis contin^entibus
liiat arc . . ....... ^
continj^cnt is est necessana, sicut et quelibet disiunctiva lacta ex
arso^^^orY^morc consequente et opposito sui antecedentis, ut hec; tu es b
gencral coloratus, vel tn non es albiis. Cum enim cuiuslibet
proposition and ... ... . , ...
tlic opposite ofdisiunctive contradictorium equivalet copulative iacte
pardculTrTds: ^^ oppositis parcium, et e contra; patet quod cuilibet
^l is C, or A is ^^]\ disiunctive repuenat copulativa impossibilis.
not BC. , ^.
And ot all such Ex quo patet ulterius, cum tam vera est proposicio lo
^an mipossiwr quam falsum est eius contradictorium et econtra, quod
disjunctive. quelibet talis disiunctiva est necessaria, dum neutra
Tiuis tlie parts ^. ... „ .
arc less truc eius pars fuerit ita vera. Et si queratur a quo capit
'''''bcing ks^s°''^' talis disiunctiva suam necessitatem, dicitur quod a qua-
necessary. cunque eius causa, et a sua sisnificacione ac necessi- i5
Whence comes ^ . '. .^ ., ,
this nccessity? tate quam pnrno signihcat. Non tamen est dare partem
mc^inin^^^^oMhe prius necessariam, secundum quam ipsa est necessaria;
proposition; g^j jpg^ gst primo necessaria, sicut primo significat
tor it mcans _ ' . ^ - r o
morc than its illam necessitatem.
TliaV^arc Ex quo patet quod sicut necessitatum una est reliqua 20
thereforc, «om^ p^|-encior; ita impossibilitatum. Nec correspondent sibi
necessitics and f . ' ^ . ^ ,-, ^ . ,. .
impossibilities iste impossibihtates ex opposito. Quehbet enim disiunc-
"h°an ot^hersT ^^^^ facta ex oppositis signihcat veritatem facillimam
.4 is, or A is ^^ cosnoscendum de natura veritatis ; ut nullus sciollus
noi, can be . " .
atonceseen; ignorat quin hoc est vel hoc non est, quocunquc 2d
ivvLvji-^or A demonstrato. Sed necessitas disiunctive facte ex con-
is, does not sequente communiori et opposito sui antecedentis in-
appear so 1 . ^, ' ^ . ,. /- •,•
clcarly, and \vc ferioris est occulcior. Non enim est aliqua tacihtate
d"eceived. notum michi quod necessario Sor non sedet vel ipse
It wc take tlic ^^f Incauti autem decipimur admittendo in deposi- 3o
opposite . ., , . ,. ,. . ^ .
however: .1 is cionibus huiusmodi disiunctivas, et tamen m utraque
TL «or\ve^s'ee est par necessitas, quia quam impossibile est hoc esse
that A cannot ^^ ]-iq(- ,-iq,j esse, tam impossibile est quod Sor sedet
be sitting it hc . ' ,^ ^. . ^
is not. et tamen ipse non est. Prmia autcm istarum opponitur
^scc thc t^i/s^i^ty' P'^""'^'^ disiunctive noscibiliori, et 2=' opponitur 2*^ minus 35
of a proposition (^Qgnite. Frequcncius erco est falsitas date proposicionis
than the truth P, ^ p . . . -^ /
of its oppositc. evidens quam est veritas sui oppositi; et irequenter
ulid^down^wr contingit oppositum quod est ex habitudine naturali-
shall deal with scientis ad scibile.
tallacies .... ,., , ,. .
concerning Premissis istis generalibus dc disiunctivis, superest trac-40
espedallv ^^^^ materiam sophisticam cum terminis relativis factam,
relatives.
i3. ca B. 28. auima(.'jp/-ci aliquaB. io. cn\m : dnX.cm above Ihe line^.
33. non sedet B. 36. freqaenter B. 36, 3;. datc — vcritas i/i marg. B.
CA1>. III. LOGICA. 57
ut supcrficialilor tactum cst iii priori capitulo. Maior ergo .Most of ihcm
pars sophisticacionuni in ista matcria cxsurgit ex hoc 'the^^ract llua
uuod rclativum in cadcm proposicionc vcl in proposicione ^^''^" '''^' ,
1 '^ ^ ^ ^ pronomi .-;t;uids
disparata refert suum antecedcns stans confuse tantum, coniu.scdiy,
3 vcl sinkathcgorice disiunctum. Unde ncgantes universalia antcccdcnt.
statuerunt sibi, tanquam retrulam facicndi sophismata, sopl!ist.s makc
' ^ , . . , . . ; ' iip a copiilativo
quod quandocunque relativum idernptitatis retert suum out ot tliat
antecedens stans confuse, et indeterminate, facicnda est ;„/^^'y}^"fi'/J°"i[^
copulativa ex duabus proposicionibus consimilium ter- opposito:a.s:
. .... . J promisf a
lominorum ct contradictone quahtatis, Ut, promitteiido pcnny, this
dcnariinn, cum nulliusniodi singularis sit, ille promittitur ^,^!^^^^^^^^^^^^,?^^^.^^
dcniiriiis qiii non vromittitiir, sicut et ille non promitti- .^'^'^ havc:
■' ^ , j ■ , ■ ' promisc a
tiir ; et omnis homo est anunal qiiod illud non vidit', tl pcnny that l do
sic ditferencia non ponitur inter tales proposiciones {."^.^lnATdo
i3 ubi relativum in eadem kathegorica refert suum ante- "^' ^■''■'"""■<-' ''•
cedcns, et proposiciones in quibus relativum ponitur
in disparata proposicione a proposicione sui antecedentis.
Ut hic: omnis homo est animal quod cst racionale:^'^^ f'"^ • ■ ■ ''
. . . does not
apparet homo csse animal quod est hoc; et sic de simi- amount to thc
2olibus veriticatis in sensu composito, sicut patet per p^^j^mive '/L?/;''^.
exponentes earum. Sed ahter in sensu diviso de simi- \i- man n an
libus terminis sunt falsc; ut falsum est quod omnis homo rcasonable, o\-.
est animal et illud est racionale; sicut falsum est de animai^^and it
auricalco quod apparet hoc esse aurum, et illud aurum " reasonable.
23 est hoc.
Sed patet ex dictis superius quod maior pars sophis- Most of these
••.. .. ■ .. 1 ..j-^ ...•f-. subtletics are
matum ni ista matena est neganda, et disiunctive lacte to bc dcnicd
ex oppositis parcium sunt concedende. Ymmo, sicut aianting a
' * . ^ . . ' . dismnctivc
conceditur quod onmis homo est anunal quod est racio- instcad of thc
3u nale, quamvis illud non sit dandum, sic concedendum Ai°l"ve'sav:
csset de possibili quod promitto tibi denarium quem ^ promisc a
. . . ■* . . pcnny tlial 1
tibi promitto, quamvis ille non sit dandus. Promittere promise;
enim facit sensum compositum, cum potest tieri in caii''bc'm'ade'^
communi circa ahquid cum hoc quod nullum eius- '" g^^ncral
. . . . without
ib singulare terminent istam promissionem ; ut, promittendo spcciiving
sub istis verbis, dabo tibi denarium quem promitto.
2. in ex above the tine B. ^|. despcrata B. 8. t''« B. 11. n^i B.
i3. ille? B. 17. des^ata B. ib. a proposicionc before sui in marff. B.
21. alie B. 35. t'miet B.
4. Disparata. Hcre I have slightly changed the text; but
later we find the words proposicio desperata, meaning one that
entails great logical difhculties.
whicli.
58 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. III.
These sophists Patet ergo quod I maior pars sophismatum conces- b 5o*'
cannot dcal • • ..•i ^ .. i »•
^vitl, sorum a sic opmantibus rcputarentur apud antiquos
pliilosophcrs, inpossibiles. Nec communicaret sic sophisticans cum
pohticians, or '. . ...
any mcn pliilosophis, cum pohticis aut cum quocunque expri-
sp^ccch ^'"thcir mendo conceptum suum; ut patet de istis : promttto b
assumption ^/^/ aliquid quod non possuni tibi dare: vado Romani
would go to ^ ^ -'^ '
provc tiie ad videndum hominem quem scio non posse videri; ego
abiurdM.iii, n/i/e et provide emi vel vendidi equum quem scio et
scivi continue non posse emi vel vendi. Sor debet michi
viginti libros, et deus non potest facere ipsum satis- lo
facere pro debito quod sic debet. Sor racionabiliter obli-
gavit se ad faciendum penitenciam ad quam non potu-
erit obligari, cum non potuit illam perficere nec deus
illam e.xigere. Sor est dicior ex promissione Platonis
quam est Cicero, vel quam ipse prius fuit; sic quod sibi i5
est ius aquisitum valens 20; ct tamen si ex hoc in
aliqua proporcione esset dicior, ipse est in infinitum
and dcstroy Ihc ,- _^ . . . ]••]..••..■•
vcry idca of divcs. Promissio, emcio, vendicio, dotacio, lusticia,
promisinp. obliiracio, et cetera huiusmodi possunt esse cum hoc
buvms, scllmg, " . . . . •
gitt, justicc or quod non ad obiecta terminantur, nec sint dc materia 20
oblication, ., ^ • , n • • .. 1 ....ju
vel dc ente signando. Requiritur vel oportet ad hoc
quod homo equitet vel Jiabeat equum qui non potest por-
tare eum; sicut, ad hoc quod cattus moveat caudam
suam, requiritur ipsum caudam habere, que non difFc-
rat a duabus. Sor meretur amando hominem ct tamen deus 20
nec scit quod amat, nec scit sibi apparare premium quod
and all possiblc meretur ; posito quod Sor noscat in universali multos
merit, or action ^ , • .. r • .. .^ • i
worthy of concretos esse hommes, et raciat actum universalem
' rcward. volendi, vel amandi, quod concretus est talis, qui sit
omnis actus voluntatis Sortis; et mereatur ex nunc 3o
habere premium, sed nullum premium exinde mereatur
habere; sic enim operarii merentur mercedes, sed ntillas
ntercedes merentur.
Ali this is £(. t^nc patet conclusio iuxta principia illius opinionis,
impossiblc. ' . . ... ^ . . . '
Every que indubic est mpossibihs; quia pro omni merito 35
dT.-^i' r^ccdvcs ordinat deus premium quod scitur esse proporcionatum
its reward. merito. Nec Sor amat hominem, nisi ametur homo; ct
4. poli^ B. ^s. igtc H. 16. aq^" \i. 22. i.-q'l3 \',. 25. ^'^- !>.
2(3. ap"^' H. 27. noscatur B. 3o. exue B. ?i. e.xm B. 35. iducH.
5. We must remember that a penny, as promised, is a
universal; and Nominalists, denying these, denied that anything
was promised, unless in particular.
CAP. III. LOGICA. 59
tamcn actus vcrbi non coynoscitur nisi prccoi;noscatur l.ovc caiuiot
substancia actus. Patct quod si amatus vcl amatum cst '■^,',i' ^^xVsiin"
talc amaliilc, tunc illud amatur. sicut hiiiiiiitis essc ama- ."^'''^'^' •. '' ^y^
... ' , ... , lovc tlus: tluU
tur, ct illua cst homo; quia homincin csse vel natura a man h, wc
b huniana. Actus crt;o amandi Sortis terminatur spccialiter "o\. 1"','",';,"/'''
ct capit suas condiciones ab amato; et tamen solum "''^'i'"'-'-, ^^ ','*'"
. ' . . . . thc lovcd
a signo m anima; ymmo amare hominis est m amato onc iliat tlic
sicut honor est in honorato, quia aliter non differret ab '^KM-minaVcd.'*
amancia. Nec esset talis benevolencia hortata, nisi esset
loconformis benevolencie dei; ita quod deus amet illud .A.nd as ali
idem, vel saltem velit hominem amare quem amat. ^^'^ ]^^^ ^'''
Uterque enim wult et amat quod illa proposicio pri- ^'9'"';!:SR""^=^
. . . , ,,. , ^ ' * . * with God s lovc
mane signihcat: hiecits est boniis. Deus ergo scit distm- ofanypcrson,
gucre inter amatum a Sorte et inamatum ab illo; sicut wouW know
i5sciret cui proticeret oracio Sortis, si caritative oraret, \vho was the
, ob]ect ot lovc.
correspondenter ad amorem suum. Non ereo sophisti- ^ , .
. . „. . , . -^ .Sophists turn
candum est sic cum deo. Sicut ergo sic sophisticans ihe tahlcs on
dicit se mereri laudem ex illa subtilitate qua non thd"^subt1ety
meretur, ita premiabitur premio quod non senciet, mcrits, \yithout
f, . . . . mentuis,
20 Supponatur ergo antiqua sentencia de universalibus a rcward to
cum qua logicus potest communicare cum grammatica arc liiscnsYblc.
et logica laboriose inventa et cognita, cum loquentibus Lct us thcn
in qualibet facultate; et tunc patet quod omnes con- '' Voctrinc of
clusiones ille sunt inpossibiles. Sed pro facultate loquendi, universais;
^ . . '^ ^ ' we shall sec
2 5 notandum primo quod promissio est assercio aliquid that all thesc
dandi in futuro; et talis solum est subiective in racionali. '^""'^absmd! """
Sed obligacio est in quocunque; nec refert sive pro- Notc that a
. . ^ . . . '^^ promisc is aii
missio sit dotatum, sive pro equivalente exhibitum: assertion that
oportet tamen quod assignatur dari promissum pro '^°™*^ii ""j^ . ,^t '
3ofuturo; quia si daretur in presenti, tunc non esset pro- ^xists onlv iu
. ^ .... '^ reasonablc
missio, cum promissio dicitur quod pro omnibus 77n'55/o. bcings, and may
2° modo accipitur promissio pro signo promissionis | : oii°anotlic'r''
B5i''' ut carta, voce, vel alio signo promissionis primo modo pi"omisc, or
' ..^*^. '^ not: but it
dicte. Et 3° modo accipitur pro illo quod promittitur. must imply
35 Dividitur autem promissio in confusam et distinctam ;
in universalem et particularem. Confusa promissio est
[qua] promittitur omne singulare universalis primo, prin-
cipaliter, et distincte promissi.
Ex quo patet quod non oportet omne promissum dari
40 satisfaciendo pro promissione; sed sufficit quod detur
7. amarir B. y. aa^" B; ib. oz''» B. 10. anr, B. i3. Eiecq? B.
K\ u. dstiu'' B. 17. sic cum in marg.; ib. crgo sic above the lineK.
"i. q_poil missio B. 3j. qua dee.tt B.
i3. Eiecus. Probably thc name of an imaginary man.
the tuture.
6o JOHANiNIS M^YCIJF CAP. Iir.
It is not illud quod cst c.xplicitc vel implicite promissum ; ut,
necessary lo • ^ i j • • • • i -
j,ivc <?// thc promittendo unum denanum m communi, omnis dcnarius
csscnce promittitur, sed confuse: et sufticit dare quemcunque
promisca; onlv ^ ' . ' . ^ ^
wiiat is " legalem denanum, et quemcunque singularem homo
promiscd i j •... • u" i .. i • • f ■ -
c.xpiicitly or dederit michi, dat denarium communem qui exphcite ?
impiicitly. promissus [estl. Patet eciam quod hoc verbum promitto
It is enousli ^ ... ' . ■*
to givc oiic de presenti, mcludit verbum de futuro. Ut si pronitto
1rp^nnv"lias quidqiiid tibi, tunc asscro quod dabo tibi illud ; et idco
bccn promiscd ; i^Qj-i refcrt quibus istorum verborum promittens utatur:
tJHis I shalj . ' . . ^
hayethc^ ut, promitto tibi hoc, spondeo vel assero qnod dabo \o
pcnny^nlts ^ibi hoc, ebligo me ad dandnin tibi hoc. vei dabo tibi
smgular. i^qc, Verumtamen unum istorum potest quod non
Note also that . . ^. . ^
/ promise possunt reliqua. Possum enim dare tibi hoc, etsi non
'iii thc^futm-e promittam tibi hoc; possum eciam obligare me ad dan-
and may hc jQm hoc cx debito insurgente, ex mutui recepcione, i5
e.xpressed in . . . r 7
many ditlerent vel cx graciosa promissione.
of^\\ificlf^mply Obligacio tamen vel debitum famosius sumitur pro
.^^^^i^i^^H^"" obligacione racione beneiicii preaccepti. Utraque tamen
'Obhgation . 9 . . . ^
generaliy significacio est satis convenicns. Ex quo patet quod ?>^
sigiiilies to be ,. , ,• • • , , , •,• • ,-, •
obliged' for a "^st obhgacionis, vel debiti manieres. Prima est qua 20
bcneht; but Jebens vci obligatus ex sua gracia, sine superioris
there are thrcc ... .... '
natural Iimitacione vel sui indigencia, statuit dare bonum alteri.
signitications of ,-.^ .. , , ,• "^ • 1 j u •
the word : ^^ omnem talem obhgacionem vel debenciam concomi-
I. Whcn a tatur summa libertas in debente, cum solum deus potest
pcrson obliges ... . . ^
himself without sic obligari. Secundo modo obligatur quis quod ex 25
any necessity • • • -i- -^ • j "^u r • j i» •
but his own supenoris essencie limitacione ad beneraciendum alten
wiii; this sine debentis indigencia; et illo modo obligantur super-
bclongs to God .. ..'=' ' . . ..^
alone. celestia iTifenoribus* quamvis enim non recipiant ab
obiigaVion^'' inferioribus equivalens, recipiunt tamen a causa limi-
procccds trom tante ipsa ad hoc quicquid habent; ideo illam obliga- 3o
a supenor. . ^ ^ . ' ' . ^ "
3. When it cionem non concomitatur summa Iibertas. o^' modo
proceeds from 1 1 • ... ..... . . c ..■ • 1
necd of a obligatur quivis alciori, racione sue imperiectionis vel
supenor indigencie; ut creatum obligatur suo conservanti obli-
towards whom .'' ' . . . .... -
onc is obligcd : gacione essenciali; et ista obligacio uifert servitutem.
senlui^e!^^ Alie autem sunt obligaciones preternaturales inter 35
homincs, que sunt istis proportionales, ut dominus
graciose obligat se ad beneficium sui inferioris, et
sibi subserviens est obligatus benefacere inferiori suo
Thct-e are also ^(\ preceptum domini; et serviens vel mutuum accipicns
obligations ^ . . . . . ^ .
between man est obligatus dommo vel creditori. Omnes autem obli- 40
paralierto"the gaciones ille implicant indigenciam, cum dominus
three former;
6. est deest B. i5. debito insurgciitc et in marg. \j. n/. u^iis l>.
■i-]. fr^ce''» B.
CAP. III. r.OGICA. 61
indiget servo vel benefacto suo ad eius servicium vel violent
^ ■ ■ ■ ■ ^ ^ oblisation.s: bul
exercicium in virtute. these are not
Alie autem sunt oblieaciones coactive, non exemplate propcriy
^ ... c)bligali()iis;
in natura; sed pocius sunt non debite obligaciones, cum and logictti
- • ^ - 1 ^ .. ' oblii;atioiis.
.1 smX. violente contra naturam. Tiiesc aie
Alie vero sunt obli^ationes losicales, quc non sunt '"'^'"'^'.Yi''?''"'''"^
nisi posiciones casuum; ut ponitur quod tu tenearis maintaincd,
concedcre hoc et omne sequens ex illo; vel quod debcas „ jiropo.siti^on
ncqare hoc et omne antecedcns ad illud; ct sic de aliis, ,^,"'^ ''•' '''''^.,
. . . ... ... tollows troni U,
loquc logici obscrvant in posicionibus ct deposicionibus ; or dcnying
ubi [posicio] non est aliud nisi cognoscere quid sit possi- °'ai',te^c'cdents';''
bile, et omne tale admittere; et nost cuiuscunque talis ahyays
.' . . ' ' . ~ siipposing lliat
posicionem concedere ipsam et quodiibet ex concesso it be not selt-
,,•1 * t contradictory ;
scquens, et negare quodlibet bene concesso repugnans. ^nd answcrin"
i5Et ad inpertinens (lioc est, quod non sequitur nec «".v irreievant
' ^ ' ^ ^ . propositioii as
rcpugnat) respondendum est secundum suam qualitatem, it should be
sicut foret absque casu. In deposicione vero, negandum j'„' reaVity.
est depositum et omnc antecedens ad illud, vel ad bene ' '"^ attnmative
^ . . ' course is callea
negatum; et ad inpertinens respondendum est secundum yosition; lUt
20 sui qualitatem. Ista tamen bene cognita sufficiunt pro deposiiwi.
obligacionibus sophisticis; quia imposicio ipsa non est
nisi posicio significacionis signi, cui inposicioni est signi-
B 5i'' ficatum inpertinens. | Ideo, post inposicionem significa-
cionis proposicionis, respondendum est ad illam ut ad
2 5 inpertinens.
Sed dimisso isto, argumentatur tripliciter contra dicta. Three
Primo per hoc quod, si solum denarius communis pro- ,. 'if^Tpromise
mittitur tali communi promissione, et soluni ille est ^ uniyersal
,. , ., . . . . . , pennv, I am not
luste vendicabue ex promissione quod promittitur eidem: obliged to give
3osequitur quod solum commune est vendicabile in pla- .^""^il.^r^fi o,",',;.
citis casuum promissionum; consequens est falsum, tum but I cannot
quia communia habita sunt per ante, si possunt haberi, what he has
et solum dare vel promittere quod habetur non valet ; '^ "^;",,^-^:^,.'^^^ ■ ^
tum eciam, quia promissiones sunt practice, que solum penny; a
„ . ^ , . ^ ' . ,. promise is a
35 hunt per singularia, cum wulgus non cognoscit talia practicalmatter,
-^, ,-,,,-,,,,-,;., ^ to be tultilled
communia. ^ ^ (,,. si,igi,iars.
Similiter, esto quod proiTiittens promittat sub hiis 2. Suppose iiiat
... . I promise
verbis, dLibo tibi denarium singulare, vel alterum illorum somebody a
in altera maiiuum mearum; tunc non solutn commune ^■lI,!l,'\,V
40 promittitur, sed singulare, sicut patet ex verbo pro-
missionis: ct tamcn non potcst convinci quod cst illud
6. noi; pro vern. 11. posicio dr^est B. 3i. pmin'ionu B. 33. v,.
35. aliqua fro per B,
62 .TOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III.
neitlier I nor sic compromissum. Potest enim uterque compromittens
the other man , ^ n i • i- i , • ,
admitting the credere et velle quod non sit ahquod tale universale,
un\'e"sals°^ nec quod de tali fiat compromissio. Non ergo voluntarie
no universal compromittendo promittit illud universale.
'p^omised in^ Similiter, promittendo transcendenter aliquid, non :
3 lt""l M^omisc po^^^'^ ^s^^ amplior promissio, quia omne intelligibile
something. promitteretur ; et tamen illa promissio non esset efficax,
I promisc ^ ^ ] • ,•
everythinf; ; yet ^um non oporteat dare optimum nec medium promissor,
anxthiv^^^jiwcn j^j quidlibet dando foret satisfaccio, Non ergo homo
my promisc ; emit seipsum et omnem hominem, etsi emat hominem lo
it I buy a man, r^ ^ • • , ...
1 do not buy [^^i communi; et sic de venuicacione, accusacione, et
tliereforc not a '^onduccione, et tahbus que fiunt in universah circa
'universai man". hominem. Sic er^o necessario est ahquid quod non
And it I do, - , " . . ,. . ,^ . ^ ,
then I promise necessario est. Ita, promittitur aliquid in casu quod
vvhat I do not non promittitur. \b
promisc. ...
,4;;ji'er^. i. Wc Ad primum dicitur quod conclusio est concedenda, cum
srant the tirst , - . ....
conclusion: nemo placitans pro communi promissione denarii ven-
what is dicat iUum denarium vel illum, sed vendicat quod
demanded in ... . .
justicc is a debetur sibi denarius: quod fuit promissum. Sed quia
notWii^s o^r^^t^hat' tale commune non potest dari vel haberi nisi per sin- 20
^15ut'k''can°iot S^l^^^) i*^^o requiritur promittentem dare singulare; et
be given, uniess tunc sequitur ipsam, dando universalem, impleri pro-
bv mcans ofa • . ^ ,, .' , , • ,
particular one ; missionem. INon enim potest quandoque dari vel pro-
'^!^.;'-! "j^**.,'^''' mitti sin^uLare, nisi in sic faciendo involvatur universalc;
paiu uo\\n. ^ *■ '
The rcceivcr quia omnes tales predicaciones secundum habitudinem 2?
had, wc . . . , . . , ., -_ .
suppose, a suscipiunt universalc a suis singularibus. ht sic con-
betorc*''bift'^'noi '^^*^''^"'" qi-'od habeam communem denarium per ante
on account ot (si habcam aliquem denarium) non tamen ex illa pro-
Ihe promisc; • • . , i- •!, i • 1 • 1 • i
if he could havc niissione, ideo vendico lilud commune michi dan ab
\Ve'naniciih'r '^^° 1"^ ^**' promisit; quia, si possct michi dare illud 3"
one, it wouid sine denario sineulari, placct michi. Sed cum non
do . '
And it is a potest, ex dacione sua multiplicius habebo illud com-
great advantasc niune. Quotquot enim denarios quis habuerit, tottu-
10 nave ^ . . ^ ^ . .
univcrsal pennv pliciter habet communem denarium, ut si infinitos dc-
many limcs ■ 1 , •/-•,••,, , • -> -
repeatcd, narios habet, infinituphciter habet communem denarium ; -"^^
""'nTu/'from'^ sicut inlinitis vicibus dando denarium, infinicics daretur
another point dcnarius. Talia enim adverbia numeri si^nificant vicissi-
ot view. ,. ,. , , . ' . T-' •
tudines, et alia adverbia numerum suppositorum. ht sic
multum confert dare ct promittcrc, morc magnatum,
I. co abovc thc litic I!. 11. in dccsl B; /7'. acciifa"" B. 23. pt
qu B. ?7. habitiim I'.. 28. iiabitiim B. 35. liabct tunc B.
39. magtu B.
CAP. iii. [.OGICA. r.3
denaria in communi, etsi illa hahita sint pcr antc, quia
exinde multiplicius hahebuntur; ct in duplo plus valet
habere denarium communem duplicius. supposito quod
habitus ille non aliunde noccat.
3 Ulterius patct quod tam actus iusticie coniunctivc ^° '"^.'^ ^^
..... . . . luslicc,
quam actus lusticie disiunctive, sicut et actus lil^eralis, liiUM-niiiy cic.
B 32" magnitici et quomodolibet aliter virtuosi | fiunt circa univci-saN'.' but
univcrsalia. Execucio tamen actuum resnicit sincukiria: tii- ^'^^c-cuiion
' . ^ . ' ot such acls
sicut le\ est de universahbus et execucio legis de ictjaids
1" singularibus. Potest enim dominus promittere vel dare .v'im'd 'nKiv
michi dextrarium. etsi non habuerit tale, et dacio valet P'ojnisc mc a
^ . . . ... steed, Ihouyli lic
niiclii multum. Sed subserviens non dehberahit michi has nouc; inii
1 . • • • • 1 11-» ..• • I • l'is srooni will
dextrarium nisi sinpularem hahucnt, executive michi not dclivcr it
dando. ,'" nT-N i"ii"s
... ... - there is a stccd
' -"^ Ncc dubium quin pleliei naturahter confuse cogno- to dclivcr.
scunt universale; sicut patet de incantantibus et tam t^iic pcopiL-"'*
animatis quam inanimatis naturahter intellicentibus k'i"^^s noihin.^
. ' . '^' ot universals:
universaha. Unde bruta naturahter cognoscunt quod album, incaniaiions
dulce, vel tale sensibile est; ad hoc enim sufficit sensus eon^trarv. ' livcn
2ointerior. Et sic negantes universalia. isnoranter con- ^ruies know
. . . them 10 sonic
veniunt in sentencia cum ipsa ponentibus; ut nullus cxtcnt; evcn
negabit sensum talem, hominem esse est necessarinm. iucmWu mn
Et ad hoc quod homo sit, nullum sineulare hominis , dcny iIkii
. ,., . , . , . . liumanity is a
requu-itur; sed surhcit quod unum singulare sit posterius nccessary
2? aliquid et illud, quod sine ahquo homine potest esse; wit^hou"i"'nv
et cst tam necessaiium et pcrmanenter volitum a deo sin.i;nlar.s oV
et mtcntum a natura; salvatur in diversis succedcntibus; rcquircd t'o
..•.-.. • • .-•1 •! ■ ] niaiic it up.
ct sic est eternum, neccssarium, incorruptibilc quid, it is wiiicd bv
commune cuiHbct eius supposito et ubicunquc fuerit . ^od and
,. . , . . . ,.. , •, 1 • iiitcndcd bv
?o ahquid cius suppositum; et sic de ahis que philosophi Naturc; ctcrhal,
breviter locuti sunt de universaUbus. and^ preseiii '^in
Nec dicct ^raminaticus quod hec est incongrua: hoc cach ot its
. . " ^ ^ . . singulars.
est multiplicatimi, dcmonstrando per /j' 'hoc' primanum To say: 77(;,<r /s
significatum huiusmodi proposicionis, homo est ; nec "notT?ains'i^
33 dubium quin vcrbum sit narciale; et benc scquitur: ^ Si";"nm;ir, it
.... , , -,• this mcans the
hoc est multiphcatum; ergo, hoc est iioc. verufntamen beiufr of man.
pronomcn in proposito appellat communiter, cum de- ^„ot p,operi\"
monstrat universalitcr illud quod est multa; et sic non °- P'onoun.
propric est pronomcn. Et sic invcnimus dc omni sentcncia
4oquam ponunt philosophi de univcrsahlHis. quod omncs
2. pro indc. n), ro. vcl— univcrsalia //; iiiarg-. B. 28. quod li.
bb. pale B. 3o. inveniens.- B.
64 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAI'. III.
All men grant sciolli conveniunt in sentencia, sed errando discrepant
biit smnc^denv ^^ verbis. Sunt tamen multe subtiles consideraciones de
it in words; universalibus, quas plebei et clerici i^norant in parti-
and tnere are . .... . .
secret depths culari, que subtihbus logicis et metaphvsicis reservantur.
of tliis doctrine •,,, , • ^ ^ u .. -^ -x ■ ■ -
that acute Wulgus ergo, sicut ut brutum, cognoscit sibi conveniens .'i
logicians and jj-, specie et naturaHter afficitur sibi ex coneruencia
metapliysicians /, . . ''
aione can know. specihca, que non fundatur in signis.
2. Even when p^^^ ^™ dicendum quod promittens sub tali forma
a man promises . . ^ ^.
one particular vcrborum, promittit communia; quia sicut non potcst
p'romi^s'es'a ^s^'^ commune sine singulari, ncc econtra, sic ncc pro- lo
iiniversal j;;//// Verumtamcn secundum quothbet gradus potcst
[•'ccause tlie . . .
universalis here tam singularc quam communc promitti; ut confuse et
incliided in the , . ' -^^ 2 • 1 • . j- .• ^
sin^ular; oniv conrusius. iNam promittendo smgulare pnmo et distincte,
hc promiscs promittitur universale secundarie et confuse, et econtra.
it va.quclv. ^ . . . . ...
Sicut ergo sequitur: A significat homo, ergo significat i3
aniinal, ita sequitur: promitto tibi illum denariiim ; i(^itur,
promitto tibi denarium. Unde in casu Hmitato promitti-
tur denarius in universah contractius, et promissione
sic confusiori quam si promittitur cum paribus suis hiis
vcrbis, dabo tibi denarium. 20
ihurersal Nam isti tcrmini, universale et sin^ulare, sunt tcrmini
and svigulcir . . . ' . ~ . .
are terms ot 2*-' mtencionis, connotantes communicabihtatem et incom-
imemioii'. municabihtatem. Vocatur enim signum, terminus prime
A term is of intencionis qui sienificat suum sienificatum, non conno-
ihe iirst . " '^ . . . ^ . '. . ...
intcntion' when tando racionem universahtatis vel singularitatis: ut isti 2.^
connme^ck^lier tcrmini: homo, animal etc. Et vocatur terminus 2^^ in-
universality or tencionis qui connotat akerum istorum, ut isti tcrmini
the reverse in . ^ . . ' . .
the thing universale, smgulare, genus, species, substancia prima, ct
sianificd; oVthe , . • ' n
sccond when ix substancia 2^.
does. ge^ terminus prime imposicionis vocatur tcrminus 3o
A term is ot . . .„ . . . . ,
the 'first quicunquc, signmcans pnmarie signincatum quod non
whcif u^lias^not ^st signum artificialc, ut sunt isti termini: universale,
bccn artiticially /;o;,20 etc. Et tcrminus 2*^ imposicionis vocatur tcr-
created ; of tlie . . . „ . t .
second, when minus significans signum humanitus inventum, ut sunt
Thcse two sets taha: nomen, verbum, etc. Ex quo patet quod terminus 33
ot cxpressions 3^ intcncionis est terminus prime imposicionis: ct muhi
neithcr iiicliidc ... . ... . . . .
nor cxclude tcrmmi priinc imposicionis sunt termini prime mtcn-
Aiid^^t^hc tcrms '^ionis. Patct cciam quod isti termini: genus, species,
i^-ciiux, specie.t uuiversale, siniiulare, sunt analoga encia circum dccem
universal, ^ . '• . .
singuiar, arc gcncra, ct sunt superiora ad quemcunquc tcrmmum primc^o
analogousl}'
cniployed for"all
predicamental
beings, and arc ^ .., ,^^
above them all. i^- dr abovc thc liiic li. iS ivlis or neis B. 10. s' pro sic above
the liiie li. 2\. 'iqiii B. 3y. c'cu"c>/ B.
CAP. III. LOGICA. 65
intencionis per se in i^enere; cum omne singulare sit genus,
et species, et omnis species est gcnus, et econtra ; sed ra-
cione difFerunt, ut prius dictum est. Unde iste raciones |
H 32'' vocantur res 2'-' intencionis; et res signiiicate per ter-
3 minos prime intcncionis vocantur res prime intencionis.
Dicitur ergo quod cum verhis primo significatis
promittitur denarius universalis; sed iuxta prius Jicta, ,^^]^'-^^.j|,"-j'i"J^.]"'"j'j^'^_
ille tcrminus singularis z'^ intencionis contrahit ter- words, as iiie\
minum communem ad supponendum limitate pro de- pVomisL- a
lonario singulariter dando, sicut ct faciunt signa parti- p^JIJlJ^vJ^^^iMU
cularia. Ideo non est idem dicere: dabo tibi deuarium, they are
,,.,., . . , ••..]! contractcd In
et dabo tibi denanuui siupularein; quia mtendendo the 'second"
primam, teruntur intenciones univcrsaliter incontracte "\\^"'^°",'.j"'
in denarium; sed intendendo 2'"" feruntur intenciones ■f/w^«/ar, ctc.
i5 indifferenter in unum singulare; et illud principaliter meaniii« is
est promissum. Et sic contrahitur eciam illacio per diyferent
illum terminum: alteruui illoruni. Ideo ex ista pro- Herc, therctorc,
missione est dare denarium qui specialiter promittitur; p^lirticuhir'"
sed solius promittentis est discutere quis sit ille. Ideo ''ajve-n •^biu'^
2osufticit legi quod cogatur dare unum denarium, vel v.hich it wiii
, . -. ' . ... , . be must depend
aiteruni istorum. INam, luxta pnus dicta, cst darc in- on the giver,
finitos gradus contrahencium communium suis quacunque ^.^^"ji|^j*''J^p'^.i^^'j.^,
specie specialissima, ex limitacione accidentalis pro-'han force him
. ,. . . . ... to £;ive some
prietatis adiecte speciei; ut, vir est specialior quam pcnny or
23 Iwuio, et auglicus quam vir: et commune ad utrumquc There^^are
istorum est specialius quam anglicus. Ita tamen non iMiinite
sunt species substancie, quia ponunt formaliter acci- indivfduation ot
dencia substanciarum. " ''y"?^?"^^''''
I e 1 m .
Et faciliter patet quid promittitur quacumque tali
3o promissione primo et principaliter ; quia illud quod tlicretore'
primo et principaliter si^niticatur verbis promissionis; pmmised?
' , .,, • ■ , That which the
ut commune ad utrumque illorum promittitur, quando promisin'; verb
sic promittitur: dabo tibi alteruui istoruui. Ista tamen ^ir,l:'f':?'^^l"^p
signa partitiva: aliquod, alterum, siugulai-e, duo, ununi, 'hc univcrsal.
33 et quotquot similia, limitant ad intellectum pluralcm;
ct ita limitant verba predicata, ut: iutendo emere bovem,
conducere equum vcl apararium, etc. intenditur parti-
17. ex ista avd dare vcry illegiblc B. 22. om prn contrahcnciiim I'..
3/. apariu I?.
I 3. Primam. And. (1. 14.) 2^"". I do not know towhat femininc
substantive this reters, and therefore leave llie \\ori.is as tliey stand.
23. Cummiine. Wyclit' cvidently means ^combinatnm ex utris-
que\ i. e. vir anglicus; but 1 do not think ihe MS. is wrong.
37. Apararium, I believe, means ayparel liere.
3
66 JOHANNIS WYCFJF CAP. III.
culariter de illo quem non habeo, et de quo potest
esse racionabilis commutacio; quamvis logicus diceret
hoc non oportere.
'^ "ibat ;»a?f^"^ Et si argumentatur quod iste terminus, homo, sit
is an eqnivocal equivocus, cum sienificat homines sineulares et homi- 3
tcnn il it ^ ' *- . ,. ^, , ^
signitics at oiicc nem communem, qui ditterunt plus quam genere, cum
''^"^and^thT'^' unum sit corruptibile ct aliud incorruptibile; nec est
singular. [\[q^ \eva diffinicio, cum unum sit mortale et aliud
'iMan — . ,,..',. . ,
including a mmortale: dicitur quod iste termmus, hoiuo, est equi-
and^a^^Iivin" vocus, significando hominem et ymaginem hominis pictam, lo
one — is indeed gej nQjj sienificando universale et eius singulare; et
an equivocal . , ^ . . . ^
term:notso sic eundem termmum contingit nunc esse equivocum et
^"^" nunc univocum, secundutTi diversitatem intendendi per
sp^c^rs differ iUum. Nec esset possibile quod species differret speci-
specitically {\qq ^5 individuis suis, quia super ipsam speciem quod- i3
individiiais? libet illorum. Nec est dare speciem speciahssimam com-
^be^a^nothcr munem speciei, sibi et illis singularibus, nisi cavendum
species j-,e v,\\_ processus in infiniturn. Et cum species sit quod-
including .^ . ,. . . , '^ . , * .
both, and so hbet eius mdividuum, patet quod est oinue auimal racio-
on tor evei. ^^^^^ ^^ mortale, et per consequens communicat in diffi- 20
nicione cum eius indi\iduis.
I do not Credo tamen quod luortale non est propria diflferencia
»nr)">7i7/'^bel'on"s l^iominis, quia est accidens privativum; ymo, stat res
, ,t° ?'i'^ eiusdem speciei speciaHssime difterre corruptibilitate
defmition ot ^ ., ... ^ , , ., ^ , 1 „ =,
man; et non corruptibihtate: ut patet de celestibus et sublu- 2?
'^"'^"and'^''""^ naribus, et de accidentibus eorum; ut nutnerus, linea,
incorruptibility superficialitas, corporeitas, lumen, figura; et quotlibet
may bc /. • , • • , • •,'•,• • 1
dirterences taha accidencia m celo incorruptibilia sunt eiusdem
Ih^n^ 'l)t"thf speciei speciaHssitne cum accidentibus corruptibiHbus
same species sublunaribus. Et sic, quamvis corruptibile et non cor- ^o
TheCorruptible . ^ '
and the ruptibile difterunt plus quam genere, non tamcn omnia
''dirfe'r"ve'ry''^ huiusfnodi plus difterunt. Sed corruptibile et incor-
widely; yet not i.uptibile difterunt istis proprietatibus, et non solum
all things that ^ . ' ' '
are one' or thc genere logico, nec solum genere suorum subiectorum,
"so^^much^' "^c pluri difterencia quam difterencia generis. Non tamen ■^-''
oportet quod dift"erant plus quam aHqua quc genere
ditTerunt.
Asin^ularman. ^j^; er^o iste terminus, hoiuo .sin^ularis, dc I sua par- B 3-
denotcs . . ^. . , . . . , , ' . . .
incommuni- ticuhTri significacione signilicat naturam hominis in-
u>m^rlliV'mai!. communicabilem multis personis; et honio uuiversalisA^
thc re\erse; sienificat candcm naturam, ut communicabiHs est. Et
man denotes ^
neither.
i5. fripa t B. 35. pli B.
CAP. 111. r.OGICA. 67
iste terminus, homu, neutram islarum racionum conno-
tat. Frequenter tamen termini 2^^ intencionis sicnificant Hut thcse
T . .... adiectivcs are
similiter sine connotacione racionis huiusmodi ; ut patet noi aiways
in istis: Ego siim species, ego siiiii houio coniuuinis. E.t ^■,.,.^i'r^\\^P^y°^.j^
^ frequenter connotant tales raciones ; ut in istis: singiilare '"^« mean one
differt ab universali. Ideo, sicut supra dixi. in talibus otlier.
que videntur contradicere non est repugnancia sen-
tencie.
Et si obicitur quod contint^nt intelligere alterum Yo say that ^
10 istor-um, sicut el singularem, non contracte, intelligendo •'^"^"p^^',',,'"^,'^!^^^^
unum sinsulare pocius quam quodcunque, sicut ex- singular, is an
^ t. . ^,.^. ,,.^' , abuse ot
penencia docet; dicitur quod sic intelligentes abutuntur language;
significacione termini; et frequenter cogitat homo con- ^^y^^j^^ygj,,^]}!"!^
fuse de singulari, dum tamen ignoraverit; ut cogitando °* ?°"t-' ,
^ ' '^ ■ ^ particularwluch
i5quod rosa est pulcer jlos, et homo est elegans creatura, we do not
communiter intelligendo illas species sub conceptibus "^^^"l^ are^The^"
ymaginabilium que notacius in una specie sunt in vma- tiionghtsotmost
•^ . ^. ^ . - . . ^ , . • men, whose
ginativa mea. Et sic facit maior pars hominem, que intelligence is
non habet intellectum elevatum sufficientem ad intelii- ""^o"t\"^to""^
20 gendum universaliter illas abstractas essencias, sicut nndersiand
, ,-,••, ,1- . ...,.' abstract
docet Lmcolniensis. Intelligendo ergo sic similiter non essences.
repugnarent illa: Alter istorum denariorum promittitur, therefore^^no
et neuter istorum vromittitur; quia sicut hic non est real
■'^ . ^ . contradiclion
contradiccio, homo est species et nemo est species, betvyeen:
23propter supposicionis singularis mutacionem in V^^^^'^' and neitlfer!'%
lem; sic nec in proposito, cum eadem sit causa, ut promised;
. . . . .. , . . and the promise
dicitur. Sic ergo, etsi nohm quod sit universale, non eo will have a
minus erit, me invito: ymmo, sequitur me illud pro- objecV^even in
mittere communi promissione, etsi velim oppositum. „ spite ot me.
,. . , ,. . . , -'• rhe promise
3o Ad tercium dicitur quod tahs promissio non valet of something' is
ad lucrum illi cui promittitur; quia etsi esset dare in- '^^^^/a '^,s°'ig"s'^"
visibile, minime valens, cum tamen illud iion potest one; it could
' . , „ ' .... ... ^ ., not be
per se dari, dehceret execucio uiris in talibus casibus. judicialiy
Ideo iurista reputaret omnes tales casus frivolos, sicut '^"g^J^^iijj.l'^} '"^
tt et casum quo ponitur Sor mereri cum Platone per ho- thmgs cannot
. . . . . „ be given.
ram unitormiter gradu menti ut 4"', sed mereatur Sor as in the case
usque ad finem inclusive et non ultra, et Plato usquc °-nJrnhi"^a"
ad finem exclusive. Certum est quod nuUus iudex '"'iward. but onc
... . .,, . . . . during onl\ onc
mortalis sciret proporcionare illa premia suis mentis indivisiiiie
40 totalibus correspondenter; sicut nec testes possunt per ti',an "notha ;
expericnciam proporcionarc, vcl docerc quod dc facto unus "o '"a" could
' ' ' ' T settle the
17. V ff» B. 41. ppre B.
^8 JOHANNTS WYCLIF CAP. III.
ditierence sic alium excessit in merendo. Sic ergo quodlibet, pro-
hetween their ■ ^ ,• • • i ^ i • • ... !•
ineiits; nor missum tali promissione, valet; sed promissio talis non
coiiid the tact ggj- utilis pronter defectum execucionis de mere nobis
be proved. . .... . .
cognito possibili. Deus tamen scit si promittens teneatur
dare ex promissione tali quiddatn, et quomodo tenetur 5
dare.
When \vc Nota tamen quod, pro promisso de aliquo communi inter
oiv7a uni\ersal ^i^i^ individua non differencia in valore, satis est dare
of which the qj^iQj^;m-,que individuutn ; ut promittendo denariutn in
singulars are ot ^ .^ . '^
cquai valuc, communi. satis est solvere quemcunque denariutn ar- lo
singu?ars\vHl genteum non peccantem in pondere vel figura; sed non
do but none of ^gj- gatis dare denarium peccantem in aliquo istorum,
less value; . ' . ^
when the value ut plumbeum vel aliter equivoce bonum. Quod si
bound to^^^ive promittitur, cuius individua sunt gradatim bona, capien-
.nn averaoe onc jm-,-, ggf jg i^ig mediocriter bonum, secundum circum-i5
and tlie ludge s . . . ...
duty is to see stancias promittentis et persone cui promittitur; quod
that, as nearlv ,• ^■- ■ , -i • • ]• i tt..
as possiblc.' relinquo pohticis secundum epikeiam ludicandum. Ut,
fhis is donc. promittendo lignum vel bovem in specie, habet iudex
proporcionare valorem individui dandi ad circumstan-
cias [et| particularitates |. Fa in talibus satis est quod B 53'
iudex arbitretur, iuxta suum credere, arbitrio pro-
pinquo veritati, quia non tenemur, cum non sufficimus
AVhen a man arbitrari iustum simpliciter. Et taliter arbitrandum est
promises every ..:...
animal, or ali quando promtttitur aliquid in genere; utsisic: dabo tibi
thcXvodd.^ve """'" animal. Et, si queratur quantum debet dari, pro-25
may say that mittendo universaliter. distributo termino sicnificante
thc promise is . . . ^^
logically promissum: ut sic dicendo: dabo tibi omne aurinn miindi,
'" ■ ' dicitur quod multe promissiones huiusmodi sunt inanes.
Ideo sufficit logico dicere quod de veritate significacionis
esset solvendum. Sufficit ergo quod pro tempore con- 3o
gruo detur omne aurum quod fuerit in mundo pro tunc.
Et patet quante differt universaliter promittere aut confusc.
but cthicallv he {?(■ ^i ulterius queratur utrum illud quod non notest
would not be .... ^ '
obliged.bccause esse potest promitti, dicitur quod sic. Ideo dicerct logi-
promiscs k is ^us quod sic promittens: omne auriim mundi dabo tibi,35
undcrstood that am-ui-,-! q^od non potest esse promittit; quiaomnc aurum
the thmg ..,^ ' . ' ...
promised liiust significatum pcr terminum promittit et infinitum mag-
^SoT\x'rv^ num significatur pcr terminum. aurum. Sed politicus
impossiblc diceret quod, quando sub communi includuntur aliqua ad
promise or vow n ; n T
is null and void. que obligatus non potest tendcre rcgulariter, intclligenda 40
7. promissio B. S. non ost B. iS. honc B. 20. et deest B.
20. V™ pro univcrsum B.
CAP. TII. LOGICA. C9
est tacita condicio de i-^ossibilibus ,• ut in quocunque
voto \cl oWii^acionc alia intcUigilur: si illtid potest
fieii. Vana Cfi;o cst liuiusmodi promissio univcrsalis.
et alia quccunquc, quc non potcst implcri.
5 Ultcrius conccditur quod fatue emcndo hovcm in ■^". '"^- l^oijslit
communi incontractc, universalis bos distmctc cmitur, witliom any
ct quilibct singularis bos confuse. Et sic dc vendi- '"'(l^c' imhcrJar
cacione, accusacionc, conduccione, que sunt in uni- o^f-. '"".•'".>', ""^
. . . ... . of its siiigiilars.
vcrsali; nec est mconvenicns quod quis miprovidc vadat Is it ahsurd to
10 ad forum ad emcndum vel conduccndum res proprias ; niarUct"to 'buv
uuia intendit hoc, sed confuse; principaliter enim et anythtni:
. . ,. ,. . . . in ^enenil,
distmcte. si discrete mtendit tali commutacioni subi- pcrhaps
cibilia quibus indiget; et sic contraccius intenditur quam own''^'ood.s':-'
spcciem ; et sic non secuntur inconveniencia adducta. '".'}" ^'.'^*^ '"-"'■'■
' , , . , . ,., ot biivinj;, ctc,
i5Nota tamen quod tacientes sophismata cum tahbus thcrc is an idca
1- 1 •!•.... c L u _ ot' iiitciitioii aiid
verbis, negando universaha et actus coniusos, habent iiiteiii<-cncc^
cum quocunque gerundivo talia facere sophismata,
racioni verbi inclusi; ut: j'ado ad rideiiduiu, est sensus:
i'ado pro videre. In omnibus enim talibus gerundivis
20 intelligitur actus proponendi, vel actus intendendi. Et si
dicatur quod inconveniens est concedere quod homo 3V'.''"^""'Vr'^V
^ . .7 talsc to say Ihat
intendit vel proponit emere res proprias, dicetur quod going out to
, ]]•.-■ 1 •.,. c tuv in gciicral,
non. loquendo de intencione vel proposito conruso ^ve explicitly
inordinata; sicut non est inconveniens hominem scire , intcnd u^
' . . . . buv our own
25 illud quod nunc ignorat et cum difficultate adiscit. "things.
Et si communiter delectant restringere tales actus ad ^} ^'^'^y ?iio'^*'^
^ . . to rcstnct onr
distinctos, tantummodo respectu illorum ad que princi- actstoparticular
paliter terminantur, tunc concedendum esset quod homo miu^ "oiiig'to
bovem emit, sed nullum singularem; sed et vadit ad t^uy^;; ox,
' ^ . would go to
3oemendum alloc, sed nullum alloc vadit emere. Vel 2" buy uonc:
oportet dicere quod in omnibus commutacionibus sub- impiicitlv
auditur ''taliter commutabile". Vel 3" commutacio iHi- supposc ccrtam
conditions to
cita est irracionalis; ideo fatuitas sequitur ex illa. Mo- individualizc it;
, . ^ ^ • , , j- 1 or such buving
dcrni ergo, reputantes superiorem modum loquendi ab- wonld be mcrc
35 surdum, modicum attendunt quomodo absurdius esset .T-i°°''f^"';*^'
' T . . Thcy thiiiU our
dicere quod vadens ad forum ad emendum victualia poi^nt of view
. , . . , ^ absurd ; bnt
nescit quid emat; ymmo, emit pisces et cetera multa, et |,ow muchmorc
tamen nec deus nec ipse scit quid emit, quia nichil '^ theirs!
B 54'' emit. Ymmo, unus dcdit sibi equos, sellas, et multa j talia .jw-iv^wltV^*^]!
40 donaria, et tamen non debet sibi regraciari pro donatis, gratitnde for
gifts: iiothmi
12, ij). fbici''" h>. 18. crrautcs cst seiisus crrantcs li. 20. ppo''' li.
25. indifjinile : corr. in marg. B; ib. uon pro nnnc B. 26. commniic B;
ib. delcat B. 3o. alloc or alcoc befnre scd B. 3<). fcllas telas B.
70
JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. 111.
has been siven, cum alius nichil dcderit sibi: ymmo, utroque oblivis-
'"^ ^is^givcn.""''^ cente donacionis, vanum esset laborare rememiniscendo
vel refercndo quid donans vel magnificus dedit sibi,
^vmildT'ou's7 sicut vanum esset querere de specie, magnitudine, boni-
thc anger ot i^iq et ceteris accidentibus huiusmodi donacionis. Ta- 5
their . . , • • , • • • ^ • i-
benefactors. liter enim sophisticans ex sua sophistica incurreret inui-
gnacionem suorum benefactorum promulgando illam
Accusation logicam suam. Accusacio autem est de singularibus; et
singXr'iefcis Je querela in casu de universalibus, ut dicitur, pre-
alone. datus conquiritur de latronibus, et post evidentem lo
noticiam de personis predantibus, accusat eosdem.
Though a thing Sed pro ultimo dicto est notandum quod sicut ne-
"■■^y "oi^^e^"'-^ cessario aliquid est contingens, ita necessario aliquid
nccessary, it gg^ quod non necessario est. Sed non ex hoc sequitur
does not toHow ^ . .
that what is per locum a simili quod possibile sit hominem pro- lo
'''°p"omised:"°*mi':tere aliquid quod non promittitur; quia actus termini
because mobilis fertur super veritatem significatam per illam
)iecessanly . . .,• -j • j • •*
allLides to proposicionem : Aliquid ent qiiod non necessario ent.
proposiudn; Sic ergo, si similitudo esset ad propositum, signifi-
and we must candum esset illud quod promittitur. In omnibus ergo 20
also have . . , . ' ., '^ , , •
something — talibus veris sophismatibus est dare commune, vel sin-
smgular'- °i'iat gulare, super quod fertur talis actus: ut distincte scio
is promised. planetam esse quem non ut sic distincte scio esse;
I may know r _ , ,. '. . , , ^ ,
in general ihat posito quod distincte sciam quod planeta est, et quod
^ ^''wiuioui'*^*' omnem planetam ignorem esse, tunc scio planetam 23
knowing thc ggse quem non distincte scio esse: est unum com-
cxistence ot ^ , ,. . . , ,, • • 1
any one in mune quod distmcte scio, sed nullum eius singulare sic
'^A'ii'd"t'hi's scio; et cum commune non sit dandum nisi aliquod
knowicdgc, eius singulare sit dandum, patet quod si distincte
'"to particular!" quemlibet planetam cognovero esse planetam, tunc falsum 30
iiistanccs, is ^^^ quod distinctc scio planetam esse quem non sic
its principlc; gcio esse. Infinitas tamen partes celi non distincte scio
bul not distinct • 1 • . • j •
as to the facts esse; et tamen, quacunque michi ostensa, sic quod sim
it nuiy o"" ni-^iy certus illam esse partem celi, statim scio distincte illam
llULlIlC^lLlCILt ^ ^
esse. Unde planetam aliqualiter scio esse, qualiter nescio35
istum planetam esse; quia distincte scio hoc esse, de-
monstrando racionem; et tamen non distincte scio illum
planetam esse, cum ignoro utrum sit plantta sicut pono.
In proposito autem non est dare dcnarium quem non
2. bonum vanum at top of page tJ. 3. 1 above the line for vel
after donans B. 10. em'*"" B. 23. que = quem ? B; ib. sicut B.
25. scio B. 26. que — communem B.
CAP. III. LOGICA. 7 1
nromitto supef quum forlur talis promissio, cum omne I cannot Rive
. , ... . . , ,. ilic pcnnv tliat
singularc communis dcnarn promittitur contusc. hi i d„ „ot
autem promittam sub hiis verbis: dc^bu tibi denarium AV'.°'"'ifn '?,"".
qiiem tibi noii prumitto, adhuc communem denarium svich.
3 confusc promitto. Et sic falsum dico; nec excusor per f iviil^givenie
hoc ne tencar solvere denarium, quia in illo falso ^^'^'^- ^'noPvromiLft
plicatur quod dabo tibi deuarium; ad quod tenear, cum tell a talsehood,
'. -L ., and vet the
Slt pOSSlblle. obfect is
Unde in talibus oblitracionibus sunt tria: scilicet casus, /'"'^^P'*'' j"'^
'-' ^ ^ , 1 atn L?oiina i?v
loactus obliiiacionis, et verba obligandi. Quodlibet autem my promise."
. .... , ■ ^ • Three factors
illorum trium est possibile per se: sed primum est incom- i,^;,-^. t],^.
possibile cum duobus sequentibus: ut ponatur quo ^ '^f," obli^4tfoT'
eqo obIi£;em me sub hiis verbis sic sequentibus, et quod and the words:
/,,'". -^ ... the Hrst is
dabo denanum quem non promitto; quia, si sic non incompatible
i3obIi^em me, tunc omnem denarium promitto. Si autem ^vith the two
sub hiis verbis obligem me: dabo tibi denarium quem Uutiflsay;
... .^, ^ ^ , . , j • / will sivc thc
non distincte promitto: certum est quod in solvendo um- pg„„y f/,^i j ^g
versaliter promissum, generaliter veriticatur tale dictum. "°^,,f'f,'"fJ'!(. ,
"^4 Unde in tali casu: promitto tibi denarium quem ] nonis no difficulty,
-" distincte promitto, et ille est dandus, quia quilibet de- partictilar
narius singularis est talis; et tunc sophisma est simile Pn5"\ve murn'
priori, ut cum distincte scis aliquid esse quod non scis to the prcvious
^" _ , . ... -11 j ^ j j • • case (ot distinct
esse. Sed m omni tali casu illud est dandum, nisi knowiedj^e).
quia quid distincte promitto in tali casu, dicto quod Ai^so, '^^.l^^av^
ib denarium quem non distincte promitto; sed nec illum nec one of thcse
. ,. . • T- • Li- 1 • ^- tivo that I am
ilium sic distincte promitto. Et si obhgem me sub istis „01 obli{;cd to
signis: dabo tibi alterum istorum et quem non teneor ''^'''^bc^^t,')°'^(;d"i'o"'
dare, satis bene admittitur casus, quia tenear multa giveithcrcafter.
facere que nunc non teneor, cum succedente oportunitate
Sotemporis, vcl alia variacione circumstancie, insurgit nova
obligacio. Unde deperdicio, consumpcio, vel alienacio
unius promissionis obligat me ad dandum reliquum ex
debito. Multiplex tamen est obligacio tenenda, vel de-
bitum secundum variacionem modi obligandi.
33 Unde, secundum theologos, aliqua debeo facere sub ^°"hhf1uorv'^^
pena peccati mortalis, et aliqua sub pena parva amissio- under panf of
. . . . . . ^ ,. " mortal sin, and
nis antiqui meriti, cuiusmodi sunt opera super- others, of loss
of mcrit.
12. por puta b. m. qpllque B. 22. n{ aboi'e Ihc lineM. 3(3. va
or pa pro parva B.
37. Meriti. According to thc Catholic Church, merit can be
lost only bv mortal sin. Antiqui is very likely a mistake; per-
haps maioris (aris) would be the right word.
72 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. III.
erroeacionis. Unde non est nossibile non bene omnia
As we cannot . ^; i i •
always do whui hic taccre que debemus. Ideo continue peccamus, licet
ri^^lurwc^^sni '^°'^ mortaliter. Unde obligans se et hcrcdes suos ad
coiitLmially. dandum annuatim lo in pernetuum non debet infiniti-
\Vc ouglu not '',,,,.. ,
lo oblige pliciter; nec debet dare lo; sed debebit isto anno dare o
any*hh"in°tl!e '-^'^'^s™- ^^ ^'^ ^^^'^ patet quod non est possibile quod
tiitiue; racionabiliter sim oblicatus ad ieiunandum aliquo die huius
anci I am nnt . . y ... ? . , ,.
obhgcd to fast anni quo tenebor leiunare; quia, si bene leiunabo ali-
narticular^day; q^-i^ii^i-loj tenebor tunc ieiunare; nec potest esse racionale
lor it might beq^od oblicer sub pena mortalis peccati ieiunare illo lo
tliat my tastmg J. " '^ ' ...
would bc morc die, quo non tenebor sub pena mortalis peccati leiunare;
'''a^iirothcr?" quia tunc deventus ad ultimum dierorum limitatorum,
Thus I ought essem perplexus, et per idem ante illum diem. Multa
to do manv •,•/-, , ,
things which I ergo sunt racionaliter henda ad que deus non potest
absolutdy obligare me sub pena peccati mortalis: ut racionabile i5
compclled to q^^ quod faciam multa ad que non obliger sub tanta
do; and it I ^ . ^ ° . .
gave thcm up pena. Ymmo, si per annum cessavero a taccione
'shoul^^^sm talium, ego continue peccarem mortaliter.
continually. j^^n^ responsio est, concedens quod deus scit quod
Another answer . ^ . . ' ^ *
to thc singulare universalis tenear dare, cum non potest esse 20
diiricuft^csf I indifferencia quo ad deum. Sed ego ignoro illud ; et
am obhged to j^a est dare singulare quod debeo dare, quamvis indi-
Givc a f^ i ? i ^
particularthing; viduum humanum deficiat. Et ignorancia istius inducit
oiiiy^know^s^ omnes illas frivolas conclusiones supradictas. Negando
ergo formam casus ponentes in datoribus in talibus 25
commutacionibus.
AU this is but Ista autem iam dicta crunt occasionalis intro-
an introduction , • , • • , 1 .. ... i-cl^ ^^ ^ • • ..•
to ti,^, duccio ad inveniendum latentcs dithcultates in istis
diiiicultics ot materiis.
this subjcct.
2. gW- in marg. B. i^, 5. ililip' U. 8, 9. alw Li. 25. po'"^ 13;
ib. drob, B.
CAPITULUM QUARTUM.
Scquitur dc sonhismatibus ortis de relacionc rdativi ^""'"^".''f'^" "♦'
idemptitatis ad anteccdens pluralitatis, discrctum pro subjcct:
suppositis quorum non est dare totalem multitudincm. ^ophipms.
3 In talibus enim tiunt huiusmodi sophismata.
Primum : omnia compossibilia illorum 4 contradicto- ' xvritten
riorum sunt scripta. que vel sunt deus, vel illa non ^:"'"'"'^^'''!"^,'^^
possunt esse. 2'"". Omnes homines quos deus potest or impossiblc.
, , , .,,. ^ 1[. Impossibilitv
producere, possunt esse chymere, vel illi non possunt of thc
loesse producti ab aliquo si non a chymera. 3'" Omnia ^'""'f^tfv^God*
que deus potuit facere, possunt esse deus, vcl nichil lll. Aliis God,
,-rr .1- r ,n n I A 1- ^ 12 ■ ^ - or aii thiiii;s arc
8 55" potest differre ab aho. [4'^^] | Ahqua possunt hen; et si identicai.
ipsa, vel ahquod iUorum esset factum, deus differet ^'^'^jj^^'^.'^j.^.^^^'i^^"''^
a se. Et sic de quothbet similibus sophismatibus. Himsclf by
,^ • , ■ -n 1 ■ ^ ,. creation.
i5 Prmium autem probatur, signihcando ista 4 contra- i
dictoria : tii es, tii non es. Ego sum, ego non sum; ^^^^ ^'^"\1^'Iq[1^^1["c\\ ■
sunt a, b, c, d, scripta secundum ordinem ; et tunc .1 is B, A is
•',.'' . , tiot B ; C is 1),
patet quod prmia pars est vera, sicut et sue exponentes; c is uot D.
et secunda pars est vera, eo quod repugnat ahqua g^i^j^^^j^^,
^o esse omnia compossibilia iUorum. Si enim ahqua duo two couples
, . .,.,. »rj tliat can
dentur omnia compossibiha, supersunt aha duo com- coexist;
possibiha istorum : non ergo data sunt aha compos- '"^"'^''.j„j°|"'^''^^
sibiha istorum et 3'' istorum sunt omnia com- C and n cannot
possibiha istorum : tum quia quecunque istorum iam jims thc' lour:
2=identur, iUa sunt incompossibiha, tum eciam quia j^.' ^' .^./y'*^, ''
perinde aha 3-' essent compossibiha istorum. Nec 4'"" possible at the
.,.,.. ■ ,, . samc tinie.
sunt omnia compossibiha istorum, quia nulla 4 sunt
istorum, sed ista, et iUa 4 non sunt compossibiha.
„ . , , , , • • This reasonmc,
Et isto modo probatur quod omnes homines univer- extended,
3osales similes, equales, socii, vel adversarii, currunt, j^ yj^^P^.e^j-j^is
et nuUus iUorum movetur. Et omnes iUe conchisiones that mnst exist
at the same
1. CAp. deest,spacefor initiatS. .\ pli"» B. ij. chy« B. 10. cliy* B.
13. ab al.B; /i>. ^"'rfees/B. 24— 3(i.istorum — esseiit/nmar^, B. 26. pu, B,
irc
74 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. IV.
time: yet tlie probantur per hoc quod nulla talia possunt esse omnia
coexistcnce ot ^ ,- ,• • , . ^
somc oi them ^aiia qualui cxigerent conclusioncs. Contra iUas conclu-
timc''imNi^s ^'°"^*^s argumcntatur supponcndo duo : primo quod
coiitradiction. omnc relativum restringit suum antecedens ad kathe-
gorice supponendum. Aliter enim non plus posset csse 5
suum antecedens quam adverbium vel aliud synkathe-
goricum, Et hoc pretendit illa posicio, ponens vere
quod omne relativum idemptitatis retlectans signitica-
cionem super suum antecedens significat idem quod
suum antecedens ; ut si omnis homo est animal et ille lo
currit, tunc ille qui est omnis homo currit. Per hoc
enim probatur quod falsum est omnia compossibilia
istorum esse, et illa esse finita vel infinita, eo quod
tunc illa que sunt omnia compossibilia istorum sunt
huiusmodi et finita: illud fundat omnes conclusiones i5
huius materie.
Evcry object ot 2°; supponatur quod quecunque significanda sint,
tliougiit mav . /: • , • /^ ■ • •?•,• • • -, •,.
be indicatcd by sive finita vel infinita, sive possibilia sive impossibilia,
rionouV'fi7not'; ^"""^ demonstrabilia, ut illud patet expositorie ; quia
tiiese and tliose aliter esset dandum de aliquibus quod illa non sunt 20
are to be , , ... _ , •,, ,
exccptcd; whicli 'Jcmonstrabina. bed, negando quod illa possunt demon-
indic^ation" strari, vcl conccdendo quod illa uon possunt demonstrari,
satis implicatur per subiectum huius proposicionis
'demonstrari illa que data sunl non posse demonstrari.'
Ideo tam expositorie quam inductive patet supposicia. 23
cannoTcxist Similiter, aliqua que non possunt esse, possunt
may be thus demonstrari, cum possunt intellectui notari; et eadcm
mdicated, since . . ,, •
they can bc racione omnia que non possunt esse: ergo nulla impos-
''"° miild ""^ sibilitas cxistendi impcdit demonstrabilitatem. Et ex
These may be istis patet quod hoc vcrbum demonstrari, est summeSo
pointed out in .... . .
particular, and 3™piiativum, ita quod scquitur : onines /wintnes deinon-
For "thc number ■'^""'"'^"'% igitur onines homines qui possunt esse vel qui
of tlungs uon possuut esse demonstrantur. Et forte deus necessario
compossiblc is , ,• • • , , •,•
infinitc. dcmonstrat alicui omnia demonstrabilia, et per con-
scquens infinita que non possunt csse. Similiter, 33
sccundum precipuos philosophos, unus numerus infinitus
est reliquo maior, sicut tota univcrsitas causatorum
cst infinita. Sed nulle tales proposicioncs cssent
concedende, vel ncgande, nisi infinita possent demon-
strari illorum. Sive enim sit verum sive falsum quod^o
unus numerus infinitus cst reliquo maior, dande sunt
23. implicatur; ex above B. 27. uori B.
CAP. IV. LOGICA. 75
singularos tiiliuin, pcr i]uaruni subiccta bene intellccta
demonstrari habent intinita. Est cvj^o tirmissime
tenendum quod si aliqua possunt intcUigi, ipsa possunt
demonstrari, et per consequens, cum necessario in-
-'' tinita intclliguntur, ncccssario contingit demonstrari
intinita.
Q^uibus habitis, argumentatur tripliciter contra primam Vct it is not so.
■'"' conclusionem. Primo sic. Ista sunt | omnia compossibilia proposi^tmns
istorum; ereo, aliqua sunt omnia compossibilia istorum. -""^ *'" 'ii^'' •T';
^ o J ^ _ t compatiblo,
10 Et demonstro per /j', 'ista', omnia que sunt compos- uiidcrstaiiding
sibilia istorum, et solum illa que sunt compossibilia tliat can
istorum. Cum enim possum demonstrare quecumque cocxist, and
^ . . ^. ^ . onlv tliose; tor
voluero iuxta secundam supposicionem, et sine dubio I am tVcc to
libenter volo sic demonstrare, patet quod possum sic ^'nikc!^'
i5 dcmonstrare. Sicut ereo impossibile est racionale non A"J tiuis tlie
. . . . . . wholc aggrctiatc
posse intelligere quicquid voluent, sic impossibile est is compatitjlc.
racionale non posse demonstrare quidquid voluerit.
Possibile est ergo demonstrare hoc aggregatum, sive
pofsit esse, sive non. Et antecedens patet per hoc
20 quod omne demonstratum per ly 'ista' est istorum,
sive sit multitudo, sive unitas ; ut patet ex casu. Hec
crgo proposicio: ista siint omiiia compossibilia istorum,
primarie significat sicut est.
Similiter, ista sunt, cum quodlibet istorum est, co Again, these
. . , . . cMsi, for no
25 quod nichil dcmonstratur per ly Hsta' nisi quod est ; things can be
ct cum ista non sunt infinita, sequitur quod sunt u,iicss thcv
linita, ct omnia iinita de aliquo numero sunt quo ipsa f,''"^^' ""•''^'^''^
' . T . . tlicir niimbcr is
tbrmaliter numerantur. Ergo et ista sunt de tali linitc, and is
numcro. Et quicunque detur, potct quod istorum
lonumerus sic est istorum sicut ct ista habent illum
numerum. Sic enim cst idem numerus 10 canum et ly.i' ">"p'''^"" '*
distinct Irom
10 equorum ; nec forcnt ista formaliter multa, nisi its subjcct.
haberent numerum, sicut suppono, cum omnis species
quantitatis distinguitur a subiecto. Quod si loquamur
35 de numero pro rebus numeratis, patet idem, cum
singula illorum sunt de istis, et partes numerales
illorum ; nec habet alium sensum hec proposicio aput
bene intelligcntcs : Ista siint [omnia compossibiliaj istorum. Again, call
Similiter, ista 4 sunt A B G D; sed illi duo binarii proposi^^ons
40 sunt compossibilia : ereo ista 4'" solum sunt illa que A, B, C and D.
^ ' ^ A and 6, and
i3. fpponi B. 2ij. dcmonstratur dc'' B. 38. omnia compossibilia
deest B.
76 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV.
B ani D canhe sunt compossibilia, et per consequens, sicut sunt illa
'these*^cou'pl'e"'^ compossibilia, ita sunt aliqua compossibiiia. Sunt enim
alone. j^q paria compossibilia, ct illa duo paria com-
But these two ' . • • , , ■n
couples ure the possibiiium non sunt nisi duo ct duo, que sunt illa 4.
contLadictories, Alitcr cnim non cognoscerentur plura compossibilia 5
which are n[_\am A: et sic, posito quod ista 4 essent omnes
thcretore ' . . .^ . ' ^ ^ ,. -i t
compatiblc; proposiciones, et sic prime essent tot compossibilia
quot sunt binarii vel paria possibilium ; scimus tamcn
It is not iie. quod BD sunt alia compossibilia quam AC. Ideo Deus
'""^^'^each"' '^ conservans omnia compossibilia, conservat et cognoscit 10
proposition plura compossibilia quam A et C. Non enim oportet
should ' , . , ..... . .... . ,
possibly quod singulum compossibilium sit compossibiie singulo,
t*iuf ofhcr'or q"^^ ^''^ "°" contradicerent proposiciones, nec conver-
thcrc would terentur, nisi singula sic se haberent ad singula illorum ;
contradictorics. quod est contra dicta tractatu proximo. i5
I constdeiMhis Videtur ergo michi quod prima conclusio, sicut et
conclusion as quelibet consimilis, est impossibilis. Ymmo conceditur
impossible. ^ , . ...... ...
That each ot quod ista sunt 4 compossibilia istorum, quia smgulum
coexil^teVwith istorum est compossibile alteri; nec est inconveniens
the others, I quod ista sunt istorum et tamen sunt ista, sicut ista 20
admil; thcv ^ . ,.,,. , • • r, ^ ^ •
are those ti{at sunt ista et tamen difterunt ab istis. Potest enim que-
Yet^^ditleMrom libet talis proposicio dupliciter sumi ; in sensu com-
"those ihat they posito vel diviso, tam racione subiecti quam racione
The tour, and predicati. Ista 4 ergo suiit compossibilia, et non j
of°themf can"e "^'^'"'''" -^""^ oinnia compossibilia. Nec sequitur ex istis 2
coexistent. ^j/oc/ 4 contradictoria suut uuum istorum vel quod uuuni
4 suut pauciora quam 4. Et si obiciatur quod 4, inter
se contradictoria, sunt compossibilia, conceditur conclusio.
Just as weli as Unde pari evidencia qua conceditur ista 4 contra-
we can say that .. . ...... , , ^ , .,
these four are dicere inter se vel sibi ipsis, concedendum est quod jo
wTcanl'aT[i^at sLint compossibilia inter se vel sibi ipsis : Sicut enim
they are bjna et bina contradicunt, sic bina et bina sunt simul;
compatible; . , . ,. . . 11.. ..•_
they are et sic de ceteris que diversim. reciproce, vel alternatim.
and^^comp^a^tibie, inexistent, ^or vel quotlibet pluribus. .\ttendendum
two and t\yo. ' tamen est ad numerum subiectorum et ad condiciones 1^3
the'subie^cts'and predicatorum ; quia 4 proposiciones sunt convertibilia et
the^^suDjec^fare contradictoria ; sed duo non. Et duo homines amant se
ditlerent, but Jn casu, quia reciproce; et odiunt se, quia alternatim.
eilhe^^Mdentical Et si 2" obiciatur quod omnia compossibilia sunt
contradictory. ponibilia et admittibilia, et per consequens sic est de^o
We grant that jytis 4.^^' cum sunt compossibilia, conceditur conclusio.
all things
compatible
26. sunt contradictoria B. i\. p libci B, ■36. ptor^ B,
3
CAP. IV. I.OGICA. 77
'^'mmo, conceditur quod simul sunt possibilia, ct sic may be
admissihilia ; ct concedo quod stat in casu ita 4 benc iii.,, (|,g^^ ^,.^
admitti ab ipsa nonentibus sic nrimarie si^nificando ; togetlicr
' ' ' . . ^ possible ;
quia stat ununi par bene admitti ab uno et one couplc may
.■^ahud par hcne admitti pro eodem instanti a one per.son, '
B .^("1'' rcliquo. | ^'mmo stat eundem bene admittere ista duo aii<>'in-'i- bv
. ' ,..,.., anotlier at thc
pana pro cadem mensura a diversis liominibus. Non .same time.
tamen oportet quod si ista sunt compossibuia vel possibles tiiat
possunt simul esse vera. quia possibile sic et illa simul "''l'' be tnic,
' . , • •> •,• vel it is not
loesse vcra, quia 4 sunt duo paria possibilium que possit-i|e that
possimt simuJ esse vera ; sed non est possibile quod (J,''^^^,,^,.,'^"^,,^"'^!
simul sint vera. De duobus tamen non sic sophisticatur J^''^^esophisms
. . ' . can not be
sccundum sensum compositum et divisum. 4 enim sunt madewithone
compossibiiia, quia duo paria compossibilium ; et eadem ponr — \"e. two
I.T4 sunt duo paria incompossibilium. conples ot in-
.... . compatibilities,
Nec sunt aliqua incompossibuia. In 4 enim sunt and
6 coniugaciones binarii possibilis, iuxta dicta de duobus; _l°'",.g'\.'^,j„'',l^j_
ereo sequitur ista siint compossibilia ; ero-o possibile est ''^ '''2*e .*o"'"
^ . . •* "^ . propositions
qiiod siDiiil smt vera; sed de 4 non sequitur, propter wc lind six
20 combinaciones binariorum in 4 quales non sunt in com^pat^ibimies
duobus. Nec tantum dicuntur combinaciones compossi- which can
, ., . . .... , . .' , together bc
biles, quamvis sint possibiles pro eodem instanti, sed true; but it does
quia significata primaria illarum stat simul esse pro "gn °i,e7our'^^
eodem instanti. Multe autem sunt proposiciones com- piopositions
. . ., can be true
2D possibiles que, ut secum convertibilcs, possunt esse vere together.
pro aliquo instanti : ut patet de istis ; nuUa proposicio p,oposi'tIons
est, et hoc iiistans est, et multe possunt esse vere pro may be true
,. . . ' . , ' at a given
aliquo mstanti que non possunt simul esse vere ; ut instant, and
iste due possunt esse vere pro medio instanti crastine ^g"^,^'„ 'i',,"^.,',',', '^
.^0 diei : Eoo siiiu et es^o uoii suiii, quia utraque istarum "^■""'o' continue
'^ ,. . '^ ^ •,, • ■ t"""*^; ''s llie
in sensu diviso potest esse vera pro ulo instanti ; et fact of an
tamen neutra simul potest csse vera cum altera istarum, 'c'e'asesTo'be.'^
continue sic primarie signilicando sicut iam significat
primarie.
35 Et si 3" obiciatur quod iste 4 proposicioncs non is may be
sunt compossibilcs, nec possunt simul esse vcre, eo j^J-^hese four'
could be true at
3. bj^ ad i p mitti od b; placc of ivnrJs here very dnubtful. 4— 5. ab
uno — admilli inmarii-.; instanti a reliqno bnttom nf page B. 0. quod;
quia abnve H. 25. w^ prn nt P». 2(1. ut — iiistanli rn marp\ 1'..
32. cum altera istarum rn ivarf;. Jl. 33, 3,]. sicut — primaria tn mari:. 1'..
17. G. A is B; A is not B; A is C; .A is not C; and so
on. Of the.se pairs of propositions, six are coinpatible: A is B;
A is C, A is T), B is C, B is D and C is D. But the six
negatives [A is not B, etc ) are also compatible vvith each other.
78 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. IV.
one time tliey quod tunc omnes iste 4 essent compossibiles, et tales
compatiblc; sensus prctcndunt communiter loquentes in talibus
but it seems sophismatibus, Non enim videtur bene illa sonare quod
inconsistent to . '^ . '
say that at tlic ista 4 possibile est esse vera pro n mstanti, et non
TrewnnxuRMe ^st possibile ista 4 esse vera pro B instanti ; nec quod 3
'i"^V,, ista 4 sunt compossibilia et eadem 4 sunt incompossi-
incompatible. , ... ^ ^ ., ... j^. ^ .
bilia, et per consequens non compossibilia. Sic enmi
duo contradictoria et contraria incomplexa vere predi-
We repeat tliat carentur divisim de eodem. Ad ista dicitur concedendo
thev are . .
compatible two sicut pnus, quod omnes iste 4 proposiciones sunt 10
Tncompatil'ie compossibiles, quia divisim bine et bine; et omnino ille
liliewise. ^ contradicunt, quia divisim bine et bine: et sic
Tlius tour mcn ^ . ? ., . . ,,
may be friends 4 homines sunt smiiles, amici et tratres, et tamen sunt
''enemies'^aiid '^'-""i^ ^^^oc valde dissimiles, inimici et disparium
stranscrs, eacli nacionum. Unde si quilibet vir sit frater alicuius, i?
to each, but not . . . . .
each to every omnes vu-i sunt fratres : non smgulus smgulo, sed sm-
coaUeriia*te gulus alteri. Anguli enim sunt sese respicientes, coal-
angies. terne, aut contra se positi: etsi non quilibet sic se
contradictories habeat ad quemlibet. Et sic conceditur, tam de 4 quam
"a^^ix^^e^n^iimef ^^^ duobus contradictoriis, quod illa possibile est esse 20
but not two. y£j.jj pj-Q g instanti, et non est possibile illa essc vcra
pro B instanti ; sed 4 contradictoria possunt simul
esse vera pro B instanti, et duo non. Et sic, si duo
sunt contradictoria, tunc utrumque contradicit alteri,
iiec de duobus similibus vel quibuscunque connotanti- s.i
Thus two i^us relacionem equiparancie. Non tamen oportet, si
couples ot . . ^ ^ . . .,,
contradictories duo smt pana contradictorium, quod unum lilorum
necclsarih- pai"ii-im contradicat reliquo ; sed sufticit quod singulum
contradictory; iUorum contradicat alteri vel alicui illorum. E^t patet
it is enough tor , . , ... r ^ o
one membcr bc quod sequitur: hoc est par coutradictonorum et lioc est par .-,0
°^i^n"xhtlnhTr'^ ^ontradictoriorum; er^o, ista sunt contradictoria et paria
coiiple. contradictoriorinn ; et tamen non sequitur : hic est frater
et hic est frater : ergo isti sunt fratres: cuius diversitas
satis patet.
Opposites Ulterius, quantum ad predicacionem oppositoruiii 33
cannot be , , ^ . ,'. . , ., .,
predicated of de codem, patet ex prius dictis quod non est possibiie
b"t'ihcy^caii ^^e codem ultimo singulari duo opposita divcrsim per
of universals; gg formalitcr predicari, sed de codem communi pro
I. Essentially: divisis bene possunt. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo modo
twofold^and'yctP''edicacione per esscnciam ; ut hic : Hoc est divisibile ^o
indivisible: ^/ /,y^ ^gf indivisibile, dcmonstrando Cristum, qui est
10. sic B. 26. eq'pone B. 3o— 3i. ct — ergo iti mjrg. B. 40.
abope per 15.
CAP. IV. I.OGICA. 79
due nature. ?,'^ modo de codem ternario numerali pre- 2. Scparatelv,
,. , - j • ^ , 1 ■ ''^i'!' dillercnt
dicantur duo opposita ad sensus equivocos; ut, _/ iKniiiiws iueaiiings;
sunt siiuiles, et idein J. suiit JissiiiiHcs. Et 3" niodo ,[""'' "?*-'" ,^1"'^
' _ ^ like aiid unlike.
coniunctim, ut : istct 4'" •^»""' luiinerus par et niimerus 3. Togethcr:
r> i 1 ^ j- . • ■ j- four is at once
:< iiufcir. Sed duo contradictona inconnexa non predi--^ even, anJ
li 51")^ cantur per se divisim formaliter de eodem 1 ; ut, quamvis "'<^'"'^^"*;"' "^'^
' ... I ' ' T niimber.
illa 4 sint incompossibilia, non tamen sunt noii com-
possibilia ; quia tunc sunt illa que non sunt compossi-
bilia; et per consequens ad nullum sensutn sunt com- ,„
. . . ' ..... . " '^ "lav say:
10 possibilia. Sed termini privativi non sic negant. these tour are
r-. • , - ^ 1 ^ ^ ■ 1 ct2 ..• iiiconipatible,
Et si dicatur quod tenet consequencia ab arhrmativa lmu not 7iot
de predicato privativo ad ne^ativam de predicato in- compatible;
. ' . . ' . ^ ' . privative terms
liiiito, dicitur : est ut sic, et est ut non. Natn in ter- deny separatciy,
• • 1 , !• 1 • 1.- ^ ]• biitnot togetlicr,
minis de plurali, ubi multi sensus sunt negandi, non m^g ncations.
i3oportet predicatuni privativum inferre sic predicatum '^"^y ^e urged
. ^ . '^ .... that privations
infinitum quod plus negat. Nec valet subtiliacio iUorum implynegations.
qui dicunt quod si iniustum est, quod tunc non iustum ■sjf, ^vhen
est, et nullutn iustum est. Innutnerabilia erco con- r'"''a' 'erms
. . , . . . .^ . are attected bv
tingit heri sophismata secundum diversas combmaciones them.
..1 •• ..■•jir On this point
2osensuutn, et denominacionum cum termmis de plurah; therc are
sicul hic et in fine tractatus proximi est videre. ^ countlcss
_ ,„,. ,. ^ . , .... fallacies; see
Quo ad 3'' aha sophismata, restat videre si ahqut the end of the
possunt esse omnes homines, vel omnia que deus potest n-etuise.''
creare. Si non, tunc illa tria sophismata et quecunque "• Can God
. . . ,. creatc the
25simiha sunt vera. Et si sic, tunc omnia taha sunt grcatest possible
impossibiha. Argumentatur crgo i" de hominibus, quod ax^tiu-cs'.''
non est dare omnes homines qui possunt produci ; 't^"' ■"' '''fi^i^ts
. .,,. . ^ , . ., ., numbcr ot mcn
quia signihcatis ilhs, si possunt produci, tunc possibile could be
est quod illi sunt vel erunt. Posito ergo quod erunt, ^p°i "^^j^^'
^oquerendum est utrum pro quolibet instanti vcl tem- , together;
^ .,.., ,. but an intinitc
pore erunt infiniti vel non. Quomodocunque dicetur, number is
sequitur inconveniens; quia impossibile est quod sit ^'^"P^j^j',',^, '^i,\,fi^
magnitudo universitatis infinite vel multitudo encium
actu infinita. Et si continue, omnes tamen erunt simul God would
33 infiniti ; tunc deus continue creabit homines secundum poVer Vn thls
ultimum sue potencie et sic terminaretur sua potencia '"''''"e,. ,
. . ' multitudCjWlnch
ad valde parvum, quod foret maximum 111 quod posset ; is yet very little.
et tunc nemo possit producere suum simile, nisi qui de °bTable to
facto producet ; nec posset accelerari produccio ahcuius, ^''•'Set his like,
' ' ' unless he
actiialiv did so,
and with his
14. universaliter /'^•o ubil-' 15.
21. Vidcre. In Logice Contimiatio 2'id part, last cliapter.
22. This i.s a favourite question amongst Schoolmen, bristling
with difficulties, whichever answer be given.
8o JOHANNIS WVCr.IF CAP. IV.
ultimate eflbrt nisi forte deperdatur potencia producendi hominem pro
there would ^ /• . ■-> • • •!•! .. !• 11
be God's tempore tuturo. Primo sic quilihet applicaret se ad produ-
infinite powci- centem suum siinile tam eflicaciter sicut posset ; et
exeited to tlie . . _ ^v./oo..,. ,
utmost. preter hoc deus tantum multiplicaret creaciones hominum
Again, it a . ^ ^
ijeneral SlCUt posset. ■?
''^oss'bie*^'"ll'* Similiter, quicunque homines possunt esse, possibile
thcse inhnite est eos simul esse, cum resurreccio generalis sit possi-
mcii could 1 •r /^ • ..• ^^ •! -i
exist togeiher hiiis. Lum crgo omnes isti possunt esse, possibile est
and the worid ^qj. sij-nul esse : et tunc haberetur mundus intinitus ;
would be . , ' . , . '
inrmite, or God vel in potenciam dei ad faciendum quamlibet crca- 10
could not malvc .. • 1 1 r ,-- • ■
a more perfect turam maioreni ; quod de racto est. bequitur eciam
A '^^'^;''/"'"'^- ^ quod nullus istorum prodest producere suum simile, nec
And tlieii iiot ^ . . .
one man more deus novum hominem creare, vel aliquem istorum
could eitlier be .. • r
crcated or corrumpere ; et si aliquem istorum corrumperet, non
perish. posset novum loco illius producere, eo quod tunc noni.^
The posiiiiig oi ggggf^j- pnnio dati omnes homines qui possunt esse.
this greatest _ .... ...
possiblenumber Vmmo verisimiliter vel ex dubio sic ponenti quotquot ho-
would lead, bv • ^ j • • j . ^ • i
ihe same ' ii^ifiss possuut produci sic proauceului\ et per idem ex
i-easoning, to simiii dubio: omnia que evenirent inevitabiliter evenirent, et
the denial ot . . . ^ . .
trce wiii. nichil casualiter, nec aliquid posset mereri vel demereri 20
et tolleretur omnis contingencia ad utrumlibet et libertas.
Takc tlie word Similiter, certum est quod iste terminus, homo, sie-
man, and take . , . " . .^ . . j t>
that greatest nificat infinitos preter istos vel aliquem istorum ; sed
number ofmen ■ ^ ^ ■ • •.- 1
possible: it is quemcunque iste terminus signiticat, deus potest pro-
certain that ducere. Ergo infinitos preter istos potest dcus produ- 2.^
7nii>i iiiciiides . i^ ' t ' . .
iniiiiitely more; cere. Maior patet ex hoc quod non solum contingit
ymaginari vel intelligere quod infiniti alii ab istis
erunt, verum eciam contingit probabiliter credere quod
alii ab istis erunt. Et certum est quod sic intelligens
conciperet per talem terminum, homo, istos alios ab 3o
istis vel aliquo istorum ; igitur talis terminus, homo,
we cannot , • -a ..•..^ it •.. i^
exhaust tlie "on solum signihcaret istos vel aliquos istorum. ht
signihcation ot Jyxta illud vidctur sequi quod non cst dare omnia que
a general term ; . . ^ .^ . ., .
terminus comrnunis quicunque significat, Et minor
that «"(«'^mav argumcnti videtur, cx hoc quod caret omni racione35
. sjg'V].^' ^"'T''^ significare aliquem homincm quem impossibile esset
individuals that <^ ^ . .
God cannot dcum produccre ; cum quoslibet homines quos yma-
produce. ginor cssc infinitos, | deus potest produccre. Idco aliud B 57"
est dicerc quod deus non potcst produccrc talem
For what esscnciam, ct aliud cst dicere quod dcus non potest^o
reason coiild lie ,• • , • ,• -,-, , • , ^
iiot prodiice laccre ipsam csse huuismodi. I heologo crgo videtur
them .■'
(>. rr" i)Lial in marg. B.
CAI'. 1\'. I.OdlCA. '"^ I
essc difficile linyLTc racionem quare dcus non potest
produccre illum hominem; vel annichilatis istis omnibus,
producerc in toto novos, quia aliter, anichilatis omnibus
possibilibus preter deum, non csset possibile esse
3 aliquid preter ipsum.
Talia crgo argumcnta et multo potenciora contingit ,„.„,1"^'^?,',',^ ^^
facere ad probandum quod non sit possibile omnia que to prove th;it
possunt esse, fore in tempore eterno ; quia contradictone ^11 tliat can be,
veritates contingencium ad utrurnlibet possunt esse sivc ^^''" "°t '^'=;
lofore: etsi una erit reliqua non erit; ut sunt quotlibet and that olu-
tales : hoc fiilt fiitiirtnn, et hoc non fuit fittiiriim, demon- ^-{J"^),';.'^!','^^
strando filium meum. Caret ergo omni apparencia relativesis talsc.
probabilitatis quod nullus relativus vel eius significandum
posset causari ab homine, vel ab aliquo, nisi id quod
i5 de facto erit esset.
In oppositum argumentando, suppono prima aliqua T^o^'^"*y^'\' J^'^
esse infiiiital sed quia istud communiter negatur, probo that some "
... , 1 r. 1 • .. 1- things infinite
illud supponendo 1° quod, si sunt aliqua quorum "exist.
numerus non sit distincte a nobis noscibilis, tunc illa ,^i']\'i|„^'J.s
oosunt naturaliter infinita. IJt, si aliqua sunt omnia exceed our
.... ,. .. ^ ]•..■..• . powerofdistinct
puncta xUius hnee, non est nostrum distincte scire quot knowledge,
sunt, nec in qua proporcione se habent ad 4'"'"'" vel ad ?'"'; infmi^^-
^ 111 ^ ^ w G cflnnot \. ii.
quemcunque numerum nobis finitum. Q.uo supposito, know how
. ... ^ . ■ manv points
argumentatur intentum sic : ahqua est universitas rerum. tiig,.^- ^[.q ;„ ^
23sicut et aliquis est tnundus ; sed neutrum potest poni, .^g ^Tmust
nisi aggregatum ex numeraliter infinitis: ergo aliqua grant that thc
,. . ,, . _. ... ..• -^ ] ... world exists,
sunt tahter mhnita. Simihter contmgit demonstrare so wc must
quecunque infinita, ut patet ex predictis demonstratis ; ^'"f,",!,,';'^"'^*
ergo, omnibus partibus que componunt hoc continuum, for as aiready
^ , .,,. , ,. ., •,, ivT ^ • ,-shown, wemu
3o et solum ilhs vel ahquibus lUarum. Non est racio negandi assumc ihai
quod isti sunt, aut quod ista sunt ista, cum proposicio ^^^^^^^^[,11^^,1 ^
solum significat iUa esse que de facto sunt singulariter. are so;
,,. . 1 • /- -^ i^ ^ and that each
Ahter sequitur quod mhnitum muUa sunt corpora pa,.^ exists
que deus non cognoscat nec essenciaUter, et per con- T.*fPi""fJ^''!;-
33 sequens valde muUa sunt corpora que non sunt cognita drivcn to dcny
? , , • • that God causes
vel causata. Antecedens patet per opmionern conce- ti,es2 ^.^^8 or
dentem quod non tot corpora possunt esse. Cum ergo ^^'^t'J,e'^°^^'^
sequitur: infinititni niiilfa corpora siint: ergo aliqttot and yet they
, ^ .. •.. arc proved to
corpora siint: et cuni antecedente stat, ymmo sequitur, ^xlstl
st
6. SWbcfore talia zt' in mar^ B. i3. re"'* 15. 3:'. Sil"- = si-
militer B. 3<. al'' above: argumentatur 15. 35. cor'' — con"» in
marg. B. 40. a''= B.
3o. The general sensc is sufficiently clear, but somc words
are probabh' wanting in this placc.
6
82 JOHANNIS WYCr.lF CAP. IV.
quod deus non causat illa : ergo cum consequente stat
quod deus non causat iila. Nec alia, vel plura signi-
ficat antecedens unius relativi in una proposicione
quam in reliqua : ideo relacio ad diversa antecedencia
non facit diversitatem. 5
We also hayc Similiter, iuxta istam viam neganda est quecunque
to dcny all . ' . • i- 11
propositious affirmativa ni qua predicatum impiicat kathegonce
"^^ hlfimtl ^'''^ infinita, ut tales: hoc corpus componitur ex omnibus
among which ^^^ig partibus : deus coonoscit omnia que e^o cognosco ;
several arc ^ ' ~. . . ..^ . ^ ^
evidently true. deus videt cuncta que fecit; et sic mhnita conservaret, 10
quorum nullum potest conservare, cum nullum illorum
potest esse bonum vel non bonum. Ymmo, si ipse
conservaret omnia corpora que ego conservo, tunc esset
And in thecasc jj^^j^ii-m-,-, potencior quam est modo. Ymmo, quando
ot lincs, sounds ' . ^ . . ^
and such thingsinfinita successive concurrunt ad aliquid causandum, i-"^
"\vhTd/no°^ sic quod nullum illorum faciet totum, sed quodlibet
uUimate clemcnt g^^,^]^-j partem, sicut contingit de linearibus, de sonis,
malces up thc . ^ ' . ^ . . -n j
wholc, but only et alus tam permanenttbus quain successivis; tunc liiud
'deiiy^'that tliey* causatum non causabitur ab aliquo, nec ab aliquibus
have a causc. causacione univoca. Et sic ubi auctores ponunt totum 20
Thc whole is . , , • •n-
no ionger thc esse omnes eius partes, vel saltem causan ex ilhs,
^"for^theii''?t '*' ista via dicit quod si aliqua earum esset complete
would bc compositum ex omnibus eius partibus, ipsa esset in-
infinitely great. ' . ^ . ,. . .. , .
I protest, these finitum ; et tantum pompat de suis diviciis, quod deus
poorest orall non potest cognoscere omnia bona sua propter multi- 2 5
sophisms. plicitateni. Sed, deum contestor ! inter omnia sophis-
mata unquam inventa videtur michi quod ista minimum
valent.
Andtheanswers Nec valent responsiones devie que dantur | ad b .S7"
^'^^"v aTul°^ "° salvandum ista dicta ; ut aliqui concedunt quod in- 3o
Some say thar flnitum multe res sunt, et deus cognoscit eas in sensu
there is aii ' . " . .
infinite . diviso ; sed hoc est contra primam supposicionem, que
laiowil^^by^^God declarat quod ista inplicat quod deus cognoscat illas
separatcly; but -gg ^^^^ ^,,,,^ infinitum muhe ; et hoc bene concedit
then this ' ... . .1 -
infinite opinio. Alia via concedit quod ista sunt (demonstratis -^■'^
"'"'^'exfsts.'""- infinitis), sed ista non sunt ista: Sed certum est quod
Othcrs that g- • .^ , numerus est, tunc ista que sunt iste numerus
tliese (inhnitclv . •' .
numcrousparts) ,s-»»/; et per consequens aliqua sunt iste numerus; ct
'"be'scpa"tclTsic ista sunt ista. Sequitur enim: ista sunt ; ergo, encia
atfirmcd ; biit if , ^ /,s7j, per conversionem. Sed quc encia, si non 4"
they are, ihey ' i -1 ^
arc beings; aiid
theretore, these
singular beings,
6v notliing. ^ . ,, -, r \,
I. quanlc pro conscquente B. 8. componi L. u. «iljUo \>.
17. Imb(| \j. 22. aliquod 15.
CAW IV. I.OGICA. 83
ista? Si cnim solum dcmonsU-arcntur pcr ly "ista"
il!a qiie sunt, ct illa Jcmonstrarcntur pcr ly "'ista",
sequens cst quod ista sunt ista quc sunt. Tercia via Othcrs, iliat
,■ ■ , j ^ ^ ; cr- .. ,, .. cach scparate
dicit quod omne dcmonstrantur pcr ly ista est, partissinj^ularly
5 sed non omnia demonstrata pcr ly "ista" sunt. """'"^''t'!^' t^ft
Scd ista via, sicut et priores, ducit in devium : quia thi; piurai.
' . ^ . . o- But if cacii,
contra istam viam stant racioncs priores. Si unum thcn ail.
omnc dcmonstratum per ly "ista" est, tunc omnis
numerus vel multitudo demonstrata pcr ly '"ista" est.
lo Nec habet colorem quod omnia visa a me videntur Al-isurd
^ _ conscqucnccs ot
a te et tamen, si deus cognosceret quod nos videmus thc lattcr
•11 • -u^i ^ u c ^ j- u-^ iiypothesis.
illa, ipse annihuaret nos ambos ; Sor tamdiu numerabit
materias primas quo usquc deus non possit ipsas cogno-
scere ; et tamen quelibet quam numerabit est eterna ;
i5 quelibet res intellecta a Sor est: et tamen si aliquis
numerus esset omnium istarum, tunc ipse esset asinus,
quia inpossibile est quod sit aliqua multitudo que non
sit pars alterius multitudinis. Similiter sequetur quod
Sor promisit infinitos denarios et deus non potest satis-
2ofacere pro illo per se vel alium; sed Sortes satisfaciet
promissioni, solvendo quemlibet denarium quem promisit,
posito quod Sor in loculo habeat denarium cuius ali-
quam partem continget inferre residuo, cxistente
legali denario. Tunc patet quod Sor in illo infinitos
2 3 denarios communicantes habet; promittat ergo Platoni
omnes denarios qui sunt in loculo suo, et solvat
omnem partem illius.
Supposito ergo quod quecunque infinita sunt demon- As, ihcreiorc,
, ... "^ , ,. . cach individuai
strabilia, argumentatur quod ahqui possunt esse omnes in this iniinitc
'^ohomines. Nam isti homines possiinf esse (demonstrando "'^'".'^";'' ,'^'"\^'"-'
• " _ ^ - ^ pointcd out,
omnes homines qui possunt esse et solum illos). A^zf/// ' somc ccrtain
\ ^ . . , . f ■ . men are ali
non possunt esse, nisi omnes homines : ergo, aliqui possunt mcn.
esse omnes homines. Minor patet ex hoc quod omnes ''^^ each ot ihcm
r' _ _ T _ can cxist, so
homines demonstrati per ly "isti" possunt esse, sicut can the wholc
■ ,., .,, ^. multitudc: and
35 quinbet illorum potest esse. Sicut ergo omnes res as all things arc
collectim sunt omnis res, sic omnes homines collectim '^Jn'men"are*°
possunt esse omnis homo, cum ipsi non possunt esse every man.
... ^. ... . . .^ , ... , Wemustadmit
ahi. Simihter maxima signihcabilitas humane nature est a ma.vimum of
danda, cum data parte, dandum est suum totum. Sed ,f' 8"''i'^^!"^>' ^?,*^^
' . . . Ihetcrm man ;
40 illa non esset danda, nisi essct danda maxima if so,
, . , , . .. .... a maximum ot
multitudo hominum quious potest communicari: igitur etc. individuals to
which it can
apply:
2
(1. ducuiil r>. i'.\ mas Ij. 38. fica'»'* H.
6*
84 JOHANNIS WYCr.IF CAK IV.
or wc should Alitcr cnim non esset dare quam productivus csset
not know to , , • • • ^
wiiat cxtcnt deus hominum, cum non sit precise tam causativus
God can actuatc }^Qj-,-(ij-^my, gicut est conservativus hominum, nec tam
the possibilitv . ... . . . .
ot man. " conservativus mdividuorum ahcuius speciei quam voh-
tivus est conservare eadem; quod repugnat omni 3
potencie divine ; et per idem non cognosceret deus
And God gradum communicabihtatis iUius termini homo, cum
Himself, not ' .. ^ j ■ • -c » -nt
knowing the i^on cognosceret quot ad maximum signmcat. Nec
numher coenoscit in qua proporcione sit iste terminus, anhnaU
producible c>. '.'^'... .■
would not know eo ipso communior: et simihter, cum omne quod iste lo
nian^^perfectly. terminus homo significat potest esse, sequitur quod
. Every omnia que iste terminus, homo, significat possunt esse.
individual ^ > i ...
significd by thc Et certum est quod non plura nec altera, nisi iUa vel
possi^blT^or thc a^iqua iUorum significatorum possunt esse homines.
term would Ergo est dare 1 maximum numerum hominum qui Ji ^.S"
signitv what n ° . ' ^
does nm. possunt esse, sicut est dare totalem multitudinem quam
therefore*'a iste terminus, homo, significat.
maximum of Ymmo cum omnes homines qui successive possunt
men possible. . ^ . . '^
And if of men esse possunt simul a deo conservan, sicut est dare
''°'^men' quot homines possunt simul esse ad maximum, sic est 20
simultaneously Jaj-e quot homines possunt esse ad maximum. Si enim
possible. T . ' . . .
if not, the non est dare maxmium numerum hommum possibilem
number'would simul, tunc infinitum magnus posset esse mundus, et
imply a ^vorid «gj. consequens esset vacuum infinitum extra mundum
that miglit be r^ T
infinitely great, plus capax corporis quam ahquid esset causativum 25
and, tlierefore, . j 1 i-.. .. r •
aninfinite and corporis ; quod claudit contradiccionem, cum tunc
useless vacuum quihbet pars ilHus vacui superflueret, et per consequens
surrounding "i r 1 ? r n _
our world. esset causatum a deo et non causatum a deo. Et si-
militer, consimihbus mediis, contingit arguere quod
omnium specierum vel generum cst dare maximam '.^0
muhitudinem individuorum possibilem.
\'?'®'*/. Quoad istam difficukatem, patet quod longe
problem of far ^ . . ' . '. ^ . . .
more dcpth aUud quam istam sophisticam requirit declaracio iUius
preceding materie. Unde varie responsiones, secundum quod
sophisms.lt is jjg^gjj^-jQjg j,j(, opinantur materiam se habere. Peri- 3.^
answered: . . ^
By patetici autem ponunt generacionem rerum eternam
Peripateticians, ^ ^ . \ . _ •,,• .. i
granting an esse a parte utriusque extremi ; et ilh ponerent quou
infinite numbcr • -j^pQjjyj^^jl^ est omnes homines qui possunt esse, fore
ot men to exist ^ . . . .
in an infinite pro aUquo instanti. Verumtamen, ampliando verbum,
time and an , ^ . ^ ^ ...
eternal world: bene possunt esse m tempore eterno. Lnstiani vero 40
but not at the
same instant.
By Christians,
denying the
i._pductL() B. 2. calK) B. 8. qualiar /vo quot? B. 11. pt B.
;i3. i""" sop»' B.
CAP. IV. I.OGICA. o-"'
vere ponunt quod inpossibile est munJum esse eternum ';'.op'} j J .^^^^^^^
a parte ante, cum necessarium sit quod omnes partes coiitiiiuatioii of
mundi pro certo instanti inceperunt esse, et pro certo ^cenaininstum.
instanti cessabunt generaciones sublunarium, cum
5 mundus habebit ultiiiium eius complementum.
Et utraque pars opposicionis est bipartita. Nam °'Jj^Vposk''
primorum aliqui ponunt nulla posse esse, nisi que sunt absokue
'^. ^ . . ...... ^,. nccessity, aiid
vel erunt ; et sic omnia ponunt mevitabiiitate naturali others admit
evenire. Aliqui vero ponunt contingenciam ad utrum- '\,appg"[;fjl'_^
lolibet, vel racione materie, vel racione libertatis prime
^ • , ^, » 1- ■ / j Of the latter,
cause. Et sic de ^*^-^ secta. Aliqui ponunt quod deus some say that
terminat se ipsum maximo numero possibili n>-imero- ^^t^^^^j^^^^^^n^^^i^^^.^^
rum punctalium, ex quibus fit mundus, et sic corresponds
. , ., ^ . , ., ^ , . , wilh that ot the
nichil potest annichilare, nec mundum maiorare vei punctal atoms
i5minorare: sed animas usque ad certum nuii-ierum .^«^ [h^j^^o^i^^^j^j-g
creare et non ultra. Et sic terminat se ipsum, can be
, , . • j- • destroved,
secundum raciones ydeales maxmio numcro mdivi- increased or
duorum subtancie possibili. Et specialiter de partibus G^^^poxN^V
mundi eternis. Ouo ad illas enim ordinat numerum terminatins
,. . . , j j 1 1 .. itself with this
20 simpliciter congruum ; ita quod superaddendo excederet, maximum
et diminuendo deticeret a proporcione debita, sicut ^st ^^^^"J^^^^jjYi^i^g^
de maenitudine, tigura, etate, et numero mundi, cum arc in ideal and
^ ; o ' nccessary
SUIS partlbus. proportion, He
Nec est talis limitacio propter defectum potencie, sed ^o^^/j^l^g^n^the
23 propter infinitatem sciencie, mensurantis talia secundum world.
^, .'^ . ' ., .,. . . , This limitation
ultimum et optimum sue tactibilitatis; sicut deus non proceeds not
est impotens, quamvis non posset facere hominem esse p^t™^l»^^h'J't|:^^,
asinum, corrieere circulum vel aliud factum secundum infinite wisdom,
' ^ , . . „ . . . doins all that
ultimum sue complecionis. Et ita cessabit hommes jg best;
3oproducere, cum sciverit tot esse productos quot esset jJ^st^a^s^Go^^'^!^
conveniens produxisse ; nec plura posset superaddere, He clmfiot make
^ . , a a man to be an
quia non potest agere omnimode superHue, et omnes 355^ or a round
talespartes mundi servabit in eternum post datum tempus Nrm^oremen
i. e. post diem iudicii : bestie tamen et alie substancie can bc
., ., • , ., 1 • .. ]■ • produced, whcn
.1-1 corruptibiles cum accidentibus hommum possunt ctiversi- .^ that shonld
licari in numero, magnitudine, loco, et tempore, et ''j^\'^i;,,.u'jes^ejc.'!
aliis circumstanciis. Et sic non omnia futura inevita- and human
.,, , . , • actions, thcy arc
bihter evenient ; cum illa que subiacent humanis „ot subjcct to
actibus possunt impediri ex quotlibet causis fortuitis ^'^'^.''J-J^'^'"^'^
11. 'cc pro cause D; /7'. z^pro^^B. 21. po" 15. 35. acci '» horum
homimim tn marg. V>.
II. Aliqui poniint. This is Wyclifs opinion
86 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CaP. IV.
Tluis, not all ^el iuvari, nec est de imperfeccione hominum, cum
tuture things are ... .....
inevitable: fuermt sic incorruptiDiles, quia tunc non poterunt pro-
depend\%Vn\lie ducere sibi similia ; nec deus tunc continueret genera-
human wiii may (.jQj-igi-,;, rerurn secundum illum ordinem. Tunc enim
be prevented or ... , . , . ,,. .
not. erunt homines inmortales sicut celum et intelhgencie •, o
^^mmon^ni°^ P^i" consequens ad perfeccionem illorum carebunt
there wiil be imji^ej-jcia producendi sibi simiHa pro se salvandis vel
no generation ot ,? . ,. , . ^ . , . . . , - „.
men, tor the perhciendis, cum hoc non sit perfeccio | sic nisi secun- B ?«''
^ ^'^hars^tate. "^* ^""1 quid. ponens imperfeccionem evacuabilem.
Tf, therefore, Quq ad dicta hoiiiinum quibus est credendum, lo
God's power is .^ . ^ .
saidtotranscend dicitur quod, si ponunt quod deus potest in plus,
itis "e^pendently i"telligunt condicionaliter : si voluerit. In hoc enim stat
on His will; omnipotencia sua, quod, si iubet aliquid fieri, tunc
illud facit : quod impossibile est competere alteri ab
illo : et ista negat secundam conclusionem sicut eti5
that anytliing primam. Sed concedit alia duo sequencia ; quia contra-
can exist it is \. . , ,• , • ,
necessary to diccionem claudit quod omnia que ego vel quecunque
abirt^o^prodtfcc ^li^ ^"ss potest facere sunt vel erunt, cum a quocunque
it;andoftNvo ^aU yeritates possunt et fieri ; et si una illarum fieret,
seeminglv ,, ^ . ^ ^ , ... , . .^ ^
possible solils, rcuqua non herit. Ut patet de talibus: Ista aunna erit, et 20 .
wi\'rnot"existSs "'^^ ajiHHdf noH erit. Nam iste |sunt] due veritates que
impossibie, possunt csse, et tamen nec deus nec aliud a deo potest
because (lod ' . . ...
cannot will it creare ipsas, quia non possunt esse causate, nisi ab
^° ^^' aUquo quod non potest causare illas. Et sic : ista
And so of any possiint causari, demonstrando omnia creabilia ; sed non25
other creature. ■^ .,.,,. , ..,..,
est possibue quod ista creabuntur, nisi aiiquid potest
causare ista ; et sic ista ambo possunt esse, sicut
utrumque illorum potest essc, quia utrumque potest
It is impossible esse dc numero quo ista possunt numerari. Sed non
beings"c7re rn- ^^t possibilc quod ista sunt vel erunt ista; quia si 3o
will^^be //j(?.se unum erit, reliquum non crit ; ct ista deus potest
singuUirs: '. ^- . . . .
separately ihey causarc, quia utrumque divisim; sed non potest causarc
togetheri one '■'«'^'^- Et sic multa sunt cognoscibilia, sed deus non
exclLides the potest cognoscere illa, quamvis illa potest cognoscere;
ut patet de istis: Ego fui produclurus Jiliuin, et ego 2,1,
iu)n fui p?-oducturus fliuni.
Thus, without Non ergo negandum est aHqua esse infinita; nec
'^'^'Jnfimte''^ repugnat signare quecunque deus potest facere. Ymmo.
multitude of conceditur quod ista possunt esse ista divisim ; et
possibles, ^ ^
witnout denying
3. Qti'''' B. 10. una utre B. ?i. snnt deext B. 23—2?. ipsas —
causari ;;; mtin;'. li.
CAP. IV. r.OC.ICA. 87
quando ponitur quod istd sinit vel erimt, ncgandus est uiat ccitain jn
casus. Ncc videtur michi verum quod inlinita numcra- 'causaUvcly''^
liter sunt linita numcraliter. Sed infmitum multa sunt possiblc, and
cvcn that all
nnitum multa, ut patct per exponcntcs ; sed hoc non niay bc so, ii
5 antccedit ad priorcrn proposicioncm, cum illa sit in- an wiVi'' bc s'o.
finita cuius quodlibet sineulare est impossibile, nec cst ^',1 inmiitc
. ^ . .? ... ' . mLiltitndc is,
ahter particulariter venncabilis. Non enmi est darc tlicrctorc, linitc,
quanta sit, si non infinita ; nec quomodo disparitei iniinhe^^numbcr
signilicabit subiectum eius a subiecto multiplici de '* not.
'Osimilibus terminis.
Est ereo sienare aliqua infinita, quorum ahqua , ot this
" ^ . ^ '1 ^ multitudc somc
possunt esse et ahqua non possunt esse, cum numerus can, some
numerat aUqualiter que non possunt esse: non sic quod """° '-^'* ■
mcnsurat quot sunt, sed mensurat quot vere intuemur.
'-''Et illa solet antiquitus concedi inteliectualiter. Et si Thcsc things
.. ... .. can bc;
dicatur quod m ahis termmis taha convertuntur : Ista theretore, it is
possibile est esse et: possibile est ista esse ; Ista deiis these'thin"s
potest cognoscere et: deus potest cognoscere ista, vel t° '"^-
ista cognoscere, quod idem est; dicitur quod hoc est True, ifby^
20 gracie materie, quia multa verificantur de intinitis que thc^^absVraa
non competunt tinitis ; et aliquibus linitis multa possunt ^, objects ot
'^ . . ^ thought alone
competere que reUquis non possunt competere. arc meant; they
Quandocunque hoc verbum potest (vel equivalens) ji^^. piace''^'
precedit aflirmative oracionetii imperfectam, [a-i-pli- can or posstble
^ _ . . , ' . ' in a sentence,
25 catur potenciam posse in suum signiticatum ; ut, si deiis may in many
potest ista cognoscere, tunc est potcncia vel possibi- 'the^scnsc."
litas ad ista cognoscendum. Sed quando mediat, tunc
sufticit quod ad illa divisim est potencia cognoscendi.
Addit eciam illa posicio quod ille terminus, homo, la this thcory,
■ •n ^ • 1' -^ II Mi .. man docs not
.oo non signihcat mhnita, sed solum ula que possunt esse, signify an
sicut nec ahquid significat : inintelUiribile vel : melius ,?."^'.^*®, ^
. . . . . , ^ . multitudc, but
deo. Isti termini iuvant ad significandum homineyn, vel merely those
ahquid absolutum, aliqualiter se habere qualiter non pVissfblc ;' ^the
possunt se habere; ut iste terminus, //o;no, consignificat '"^st •"ipjy seit-
.' . ' . , . . contradiction.
35 in casu hominem esse iufinitum magnum, et ipsutn
csse omnes res, vel infinita supposita, et quotlibet
modis se habere, non per se, sed racione adiuncti.
Primo ereo et pcr se significat naturam illatn, et ^" l^ mcans
. o . . i ^ ... . 1" thc lirst
secundarie significat quotcunque individua, quibus placc, human
^ ^ ^ • • .. on • ]■ »■ • naturc; iii the
40 ipsa potcst communican; et 3", racione adiuncti, sig- second, all
nificat quecunque volueris, ut in ista : Tb^ po56/(;/; e55e '"^'^'^^■'jj'J^''J.'^i*'^[''^
natnre: and
4. 5. m'*^ B. 7. m"'' B 24. pom B. 27. f^ : sutlicit abovc B.
88 .lOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. IV.
thirdlv (with an homines qiiot vossunt esse animalia sienificat iste ter-
addition) • , ^ , • i- T •
anything minus, liomo, causatam multitudmem hominum quanta
whatever. potest esse animaliui:n ; ymmo illam naturam per se, et
homines qui possunt esse, primarie significat; sed
secundarie posse esse tot homines quot possunt esse 5
This last animalia. Sed talis sienificacio est inpertinens communi-
meaning is, . _ _ ^ i^
however,'quite tati termini, cum attenditur penes communica 1 bili- B 59*
irrelevant to the ^ ^ . . . . ,, . ....
univcrsality of tatem sui primo signihcati et non penes multitudmem,
the term. cum ymaginabile est ipsam communicari; quia ymagi-
nabile vel inteliigibile est hominem esse omnia que 10
possunt esse, vel ydemptificari cuilibet.
Thus God Ideo, ut superius dictum est, deus scit gradus
knows the ' . -t^ _ _ ' _ _ »
precise degree communitatum terminorum, sicut scit quot ille ter-
of extension ot • , • • ,■• • • i^ -i,
each term, and minus, iiomo, significat; nec signihcat uie termmus,
each"co'ntain"s'^ ■^'^^' '^"'"^'^os soles ; ncc iste terminus, iy ''chymera" i5
and I much multas chvmeras, cum talia multa possint esse, vel
preter this r ', • r- , ■
opinion. lorte ex adiuncto. Et tenendo istain viam, que est
michi valde opiniabilis, toUerentur faciliter instancie
supradicte.
^■s°i\ow more"^ ^^^^ autem est responsio famosior modernorum que 20
in vogue, whicli abhorret terminare divinam potenciam ad aliquod
refuses to iimit ,-. ■ , , ,, . . ,
God's power hnitum, sed ultra omne hnitum potest ; sic quod
*be1ow'the^ potencia sua terminetur ad bonum intellectivum, ad
infinite infinitum exclusive. Et pro isto defendendo inventa est
exclusively. •,, • ,,-,•,• ,- ■ , , ,, -
For this reason, iha inprobabilis logica, que dicit quod nedum nuila 2?
,^"l,;\"'Vl"u , sunt infinita, sed nulla infinita possunt demonstrari.
multituao has _ _ ' _ _ ....
been dcnied Dicit ergo quod signatis omnibus illis in que deus
not only to o n i^ _ . ^, . . ^ . ^. .
exist, but to bc potest, sequens est quod signerentur inhnicies inhnita
"afiirmablc' *^"^ "'-*'^ possunt. Nec esset possibile omne signare
as sucli. omnia que possunt lessel, nisi signarentur alique que 3o
Without this n t I J' _ »_ _ 1 _ n
denial, there "on possunt. Unde deus, quamvis mtelligat omnia iUa
inrnitvl)/ uiings 'I"^ possunt, ct omnia illa quc non possunt [esse], tamen
that God could nescit distincte discernere inter ista, nec demonstrare
not produce. .,, ...
So God cannot nla seorsum ab ahis. bic ergo, quantumcunque homo
whatHecai/and ^'^^^'^ intendere distincte possibilia per se, ignoraret et 33
what He cannoi non intenderet inpossibilia. Nec sequitur: cjnemiibet
do; though , . . ... , •'
He understands nominem qiiem ego intelligo deiis polest eausai-e : ergo,
These^thin^s *^"'"<^-''' qnos ego inteiiigo deus potesl causare ; quia
are possiblc, multos intelligo quorum nuUus potest esse, quamvis
though God .,.. ^ ^ .... 1 . ' ^^ ,.
cannot cause tamen quilibet quam ego intelligo possit esse. Et tahs4o
them ;
6-7. ()i<^' B. 7. pes B. X. pcs B. i3. om'" B. 20. moder-
oiiini /// nhin; . B. 23. bo'" B 3o. esse deest B. ?2. esse dc-esl B.
CAP. IV. I.OGICA. 89
copulativa conceditur : Omiics hoiiiiiies intellii^^nntur a we can know
.;,• . • ' ^ obiecls tliat are
vie et illi noii possnnt esse, quia non possunt esse impossibie;
omnes homines possibiles, cum opoi-tct, demonstrando .\- s- tiie
' . ' ' . cxistoncc ot all
omnes hommes qui possunt esse, condemonstran mcn.
? homines qui non possunt esse. Et sic deus non potest ''"' 9'"^ cannot,
^ ^ , , . ■ or thcy woiilJ
intelHgere omnes homines qui possunt esse; quia tunc bc possiblc by
• • ^ ^ i^ ^ ^ His knowlcdsc
isti possent esse ; aut saltem non potest cognoscere of uiem.
omnes causas cuiuscunque hominis, et tamen omnia
que ego nosco.
10 Cum tamen solet dici quod ad perfectam causati ^", ">'«'* f^l.^^i;
^ ' . to know a tliing
noticiam requiritur cognoscere omnes ems causas, et pertectly we '
quod deus docet hominem primo in cognoscendo "cimses^^and'^^
omnia que ipse cognoscit ; ideo non dubium quin iste , God's
, ? ^ . ^ ... ... ^ . . knowledgc is
conclusiones, sicut quothbet similes, repugnant isti the cause of
i3opinioni et veritati. Si enim aliquos significaret terminus, °""'"
qui non possunt esse, potissime foret de multitudine muultude ot^
infinita hominum, quod talis non est demonstranda, ut ..'"'^'l ^^''^''e ,
,• • . . -^ ' ^ . , , ., .,; attirmable, God
dicit opmio. Ymmo si esset demonstranda, adhuc illam could produce
posset deus successive producere, et potest anichilare, successive?v and
20 iuxta sic opinantes. Ymmo simul posset in totam multi- ''"injh''a,t^ ti'em.
,. \ .... . ^ , , In short,
tudmem, sicut et signabilem eius partem, vel saltem injinite men
deus posset illos indivisim producere, etsi non posset cei-t£dn"fixed
producere illas. Non ergo possum demonstrare homines ,1'^,'^ib'^''-,
' . 1- wincli is the
ahquanter se habere, quahter non possunt se habere ; iniinite, or
25 et tunc non significat iste terminus complexus, infinitos 'possi^ble"
homines ; sed finitos significat esse infinitos. Nec potest Let thc
intelligi /zo?»o, nisi aliquis illorum, deinonstrando homines ciioos°c^°vhic'h
qui erunt, et illos oportet necessario fore; sed non sic systc'" 's the
• . . ... bcsl.
omnia. Ehgat ergo philosophus sentenciain sibi plus
3o placentem.
8. 73 in marg. 15. 20. tom u'"" H. 21. Uni\\ D.
3. 'We must here notc the Scholastic ilistinction between
intrinsic possibilit}', or mere non-absurdit\-, and exlrinsic possi-
bility, or being causable. We can think ol' an intinite maltitude
ot' men as possible in the tirst manner and not in thc second.
But if God saw them as possible in the firsl manner, He would
also see Himself to be their cause, i. e. tliey would be possible
in the second too. Which would involve contradiction in the
case of those who will never exist.
CAPITULUM QUINTUM.
Of causal Sequitur de causalibus nertractandum. Ubi primo sup-
propositions : ^ ^. , i- • •
definiiion; ponatur omnem yppotheticam, subordinatam prmcipa-
relTted*b>°"be li^er actui yppothetico causandi, esse causalem ; utputa
idea of cause. quando due kathegorice coniunguntur ad invicem cum 5
nota cause.
Divisions, Sunt autem causalium talium quedam affirmativa et
in^whklf tHie quedam negativa. Affirmativa, quando significatum
proposition is primarium antecedentis significati prioris consequentis
allirmed to be ' . , . . . . -
tlie cause of asseritur esse causa; ut hic : qiiia tu citrns, tu movens.^^
aiiotlier; j^^^ enim asserit tuum currere causare tuum movere.
Et vocatur antecedens, proposicio inmediate subsequens
and nef:ative, notam causc ; et alia vocatur consequens. Vocatur
'"crusaHty*i's'^'' autem causalis negativa yppothetica | per quam negatur B 59''
dcnied; the nrincipaliter huiusmodi causacio. Ut hic: non ideo tu ib
negative or ^ .^ . . ,, , cn ■
aiiirmative form e5 aiumal, quia tu es asmus. Unde stat esse arhrmativam,
compolfent quamvis utraque eius pars fuerit negativa, ut hec ;
propositions paries non respirat, quia non habet pulmonem. Atten-
bcingirrelevant. •' -^ .-' ■',....,.
dendum est ad negacionem actus yppothetici prmcipahs.
So to cvery p-^ [^^[^ patet quod quelibet causalis convertitur cum 20
causal we can . ,. . ■ -n
substitute a kathegorica, m qua predicatur termmus signihcans
pi-opo°sidon veritatem consequentis, de termino significante veri-
vvith the verb tatem antecedentis, mediante verbo causandi. Ut idem
to airise. . ... , . ,.
cst dicere : tu es ammal, qma tu es honuj, ac si diceretur :
humanitas tua causat animalitatem tuam. Non quia tu 2?
times, tu curris ; et non timor tuus causat cursuni tuum,
thei^foil" diiiers et sic de aliis. Et sic de ceteris patet quod talis longe
i™m a dififcrt a condicionali et a copulativa. Causalis enim
conditional, . . ...,-,
because it ponit utriusque partis signilicatum inesse, sicut non
boih"oTiis ''acit condicionalis. Et quamvis in hoc conveniat cum Mi
parts; copulativa, superaddit tamen causacionem unius partis
and from a ^ ' '
copulative,
because it adds
the idea of
causation.
I. Cap. deest : b/aiik space for initial S !'•. 7. q B. 8. q H.
iS. pies B. 27. dc ccleris in marg. B. 29. polcst B.
CAP. V. LOGICA. 91
per reliquam. Unde mirabilitcr abutuntur tam gram- Somc absmdly
matica quam logica, qui concedunt quamlibet copula- diiicicncc''-^^
tivam converti cum causali. Ut si e<'o suiii, et baciiliis according to
stat iii aiigiilo, tunc ego simi, qitia baculiis stat m cocxistcnce
baugulo; et econtra. Nam sic ponentes ignorant gramma- jj"^. thc"same!
ticam, que ponit huiusmodi coniuncciones ideo esse Sucii an
\ ^ . asscition
causales quia sunt note causandi. Et ad talem sensum coniradicts
^ 1 • • ..1. ..• 1 • i-> • I • botli ijiammar
vocant logici yppotheticas causales. Per idem enim and io"ic.
dicerent quod amodo existens cum reliqua causat ipsum.
loGrave est ergo semper stare in significacionibus ter-
minorum, communicando cum ignorantibus.
Et ex isto patet 3°, noscentibus istam grammaticam This shows
et logicam, quod species et genus difFerunt sicut subiec- gp^e^dis and'
tum et eius predicacio. Ymmo quodcunque subiectum genera, subiect
. . . . . . ^ . ;'iid prcdicatc,
i5et eius accidens sequitur manifestissmie difierre ab in- diiler from onc
vicem; ut: quia tu es hoiiio tii es animal et risibile et ^" caiisally. "^'
quantum et coloratum. Ideo animalitas et humanitas
differunt; et per idem risibilitas et quantitas et colora-
cio, et [cetera] huiusmodi dififerunt ab humanitate a qua
20 causantur. Et ista puerilis consideracio de causaUbus ''JV^ chUdish
■^ . discussion,
est medium electutn ad probandum quecunque acciden- therefore, leads
cia esse, et distingui a subiecto. Quis enim negaret the^x^staKie^^or
quin aliqua causa sit quare substancia est quanta, qua- accidcnts
^. ^ .^ 1 . ^ distinct trom
hs, relata, agens, paciens, locata, temporalis, posita, et their subjecis.
25 habens? Nec dubium quin quicunque concedit aliquam
unum talem causalem, habet consequenter concedere
accidencia talia esse, et distingui a subiecto. Ut, si Sor Cansals ought
' . . ^ . ' eithcr to be
ex hoc sedet quia placet sibi, tunc placere sibi Sortis est denied, or the
T , 1 ^ ^ 1 1 1 doctrincs that
causa sesstoms sue. Ideo vel negent tales causales vel foiiow tVom
3<) concedant ; quod sequitur consequenter. Scd negatis cau-""^"' "^"'''^'"""
salibus, vanum est philosophari, cun:; ad hoc adiscimus But without the
... 1-. u^.. formcr all
ut sciamus causas rerum ; nec ahter arbitramur nos science would
quicquam cognoscerc. Vanum ereo esset qucrere rei pcnsh,
^ T ^ . . '^ ^ and nalurc
causatii, quare animalia habcnt membra secundum talem would no longer
35 anathomiam ordinata; et sic de omni ordinacione na- pnrpose: an
ture. Non enim ageret natura, nisi propter fincrn, cutn "tteriy talse
" ' J . i . .' doctrine.
non posset esse causa quare natura aliqualiter ordinarct.
Sed otnnia taha corrumpunt bonam doctrinam.
Supponendo ergo ista tria coroUaric ilkita, restat What is a
40 describere causam in communi. Sed forte noti potest
<). amo P. 14. pr'" P>. ki- cctera deeal B. 22. (,5." ?) B.
23, 24. quali^ B. ig. cor.i" B.
q2 JOHANNIS WYCLIF GAP. V.
si
a
nification is describi a priori vel nociore, cum sit analogum con-
bein^g, it'cannot veniencie cuilibet enti. Ideo oportet coUigere noticiam
i^^,r/ir/''ii'^,'^t cause a posteriori, sicut cognoscimus universale experi-
a postcviori mentale. Sicut ergo qualitas est accidens denominans
as that which r !■•. u ^ • • i i- i
causes its etiect, formaiiter substanciam accidentaliter qualem, sic causa -t
thar whlchTs ^^^ ^"^ causans suum causatum ; vel ens cuius esse
caused bv a antecedit ad aliud; et causatum e contra est ens cuius
esse sequitur ad aliud.
it tollows that Ex quo patet quod omne ens est causa; sicut omne
all beines are .. •!] i i ^ ,^ ■ ,
causes and ^ns cst liiuu quod est causatum. Primum patet, ex hoc lo
etlects. qyijj (j^,-q ultimo ente adhuc illud cognoscitur confuse
,.^l,."°^/o'p1l'.t 3 me et multis aliis. Et sic habet infinitas denomina-
Being; which ciones sibi accidentales quas omnes causat. Ex quo
is Essence. ■ , ^ ^ , , . . , .
videtur patere quod est dare primum ens si non ulti-
mum. Primum tamen ens est essencia que est 2° creata, i3
et per consequens est unum creatum, quamvis illa
essencia non causatur nec est creata.
^"causerf ^^ S\inl ergo 4 genera causarum, scilicet^ materialis, forma-
material, lis, efficiens et tinalis. Causa materialis est causa ex qua
formal, efficient „ , 1 , , •,• -
and final. est suum causatum. ht hec estjduplex, scilicet proporciona- B bo"
cIu^eTs^dthtV ^'^ ^*- propria. Proporcionalis, ut genus est causa ma-
analogous or terialis cuiuscunque sui per se inferioris. Si propria,
proper; if , ^ ^ ■ \- -^ 1 j ■ ■ ^ ^ .
proper, it is hoc est tnpliciter; vel quod sit pars rei ex qua et in
of'which^\hat ^^^ ^^^ ^^^ forma, sicut est materia prima elementi et
about which, or materia proxima elementi; vel quod sit materia de 2^
that of which , . ,, ,. .^
anything else qi-ia, sed non m qua tormauter sit torma illa; ut subiec-
'*• tum de quo est sciencia est eius materia; vel 3°, quod
sit materia de qua sed non ex qua fit parcialiter suum
causatum; ut subiectum accidentis causat ipsum ma-
terialiter. -^o
The formal /-./•,• ^ ,•
cause is either Causa lormahs est causa a qua formaliter est suum
extrinsicTeiuier ''^^^^^"™ ' ^^ ^^^- dupliciter: vel quod sit causa intrin-
that by which seca que est pars qualitativa rei; ut igneitas est forma
or that . . ^ .^ ^ .. . ^ - ,
according to ignis, vel aiiter, causa formalis extrmseca; ut formula
which the thnig £5|. ^ausa exemplaris formati; ut deus est causa exem- 33
plaris cuiuscunque essencie causate vel create. Differen-
cia eciam communis est causa formalis spcciei; et onme
universale dicitur forma.
cause^^is^vv^hat Causa efliciens vero, large loquendo, dicitur esse
makes anythingquodcunque causans; omne enim causans facit suum 40
in a wide sense causatum esse. Sed specialiter, restringendo terminum.
everv cause is
I). ptcru l;. 2), '-'5. et — clcmenti iu marf^. li. '3y. yms B.
<:ap. V. LOGICA. q3
solum agens vcl conservans active rem in e.v.vc dicitur cfiicioni ;
esse causa efficens; qualiter solum substancia a^^tiva ,.^.j,(,j",'^,j ,'* ,i,^,
potest eflicere: et illa vocatur causa unde motus. principic
Causa finalis est causa gracia cuius est suum causa- nidvomLMit.
5 tum, et hoc dupliciter: vel quod sit finis extrinsecus, ''^'■g |'i",ft' ,q]."*'^
sicut deus est finis omnium rerum causatarum; vel ^^•i''^'i anythins
^ . . . . r ,■ ■ ,- • • is: it is citlicr
hnis intnnsecus, sicut reiicitas est linis operacionum hu- cxtrinsic or
manorum. '■^''"'"^''^-
Ista ergo confuse dicta non docent ignorantem cog- When wc know
■■ . , '^ of anytiuii};
lonoscere causacionem; sed cognoscendo de quocunque tliat it is
ente quod ipsum est requisitum ad esse alterius, cog- ,o '/iic^existaicc
noscitur quod est causa eius. Ut video quod species "f anothcr,
... . } . \ve know it as
hgnorum et lapidum requiruntur ad esse domus, quia a causc,
ipsis pereuntibus perit domus et non e contra, exinde
i3cognosco quod sunt caiise domus. Et sic cognosco so- ciihcr by
1 1 1 1 I nr 1 SCnslhlc
lem causare iumen, et obstacuium, umbram. Multe cosnition, or
tamen sunt habitudines causandi quas non cognosco per oticiwibc.
sensum; ut causacionem qua unum universale causat
reliquum, et causacionem qua unum universale eternum
2o necessario causat reliquum; ut deus causat universitatem
encium ; pars materie causat suum totum, ut composi-
tum; et sic de multis causacionibus insensibilium.
Nec sufficit cognoscere quod unum sit reliquo prius Yct mcre
natura ad cognoscendum causacionem; quia, cum que- „..ftiirc" or^thc
2.^ libet pars materie prime sit eque primo natura sicut circamstancc ot
,. . .,, . , . being requircd.
alia non communicans cum illa, videtur quod sicut does not givc
materia ignis est ipso prius natura, sic quelibet materia i'dca ^of ^ca^lse"^;
prima esset prius illo igne in natura; et tamen non 't "]"f,f ''''^^ ''
'^ . ^ . . . . real infiuence on
quelibet est eius causa, quia non quehbet requiritur ad the being it
lio esse istius ignis, nec antecedit ad esse eius. Nec sequi- causes.
tur: deus necessario requirit quotlibet veritates pro
causacionibus inferiorum, ergo ille veritates requiruntur
ad esse dei; cum ly 'ad' consignificat circumstanciam
causandi. Infinita ergo sunt sine quibus ego non possum
33 esse, que non requiruntur ad mei esse^ quia non con-
ferunt ad hoc. Si ergo vis videre quid iuvat ad esse Wc must, to
alterius, |oportet] discurrere per 4 genera causandi supra anvthing is a
dicta cum suis membris, et videre ex criio vel de aito, causc, cnqm
' ■' -^ ' it it belongs
unde vel (7 qito est, secuudnm quid est vel quid est, one of thc
1 , ., ^ • 11 • ^ above-
40 gracia cunis vel propter quid est; et si nullum istorum mentioned
gencra ol
causes.
5. qp' pro qiiod sil 15. 23. non abovc iicc !?. 2(). a'() above \'>.
37. oporlct dccst B.
rc
to
94 lOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. V.
4 possis invenirc, nec causacionem quesiti invenics.
Et, si aliquod illorum inveneris^ illud genus causandi
invenisti. Sic igitur ad inveniendum istas raciones cau-
sandi deserviunt regule quas invenerunt philosophi.
ir!nu°e'cTn°be Nota tamen quod dupliciter aliquid dicitur nocius;5
imdei-siood iii vel prius natura; vel quia ipsum est principalius in-
in thc order ot tentum tanquam perfeccius in natura, sicut omne totum
in^^^theTrder^oi '^^'- P^"i^s ^^^ ^^ cognitum in natura quam est aliqua
cognition. eius pars; vel quia ipsum precedit in ordine cognos-
cendi, qualiter | omnis pars naturaliter precedit suum B 60''
totum ; et sic est ordo naturalis inter materias primas
omnium, cum prima quo ad primum modum, sit maxi-
ma materia ex quo mundus constat, et prima omnium
quo ad secundum modum, est materia punctualis; et sic
aliis quantis. i?
There are Sunt ergo istorum generum causandi multi modi; ut
m;iny divisions 0 o .
ot caiises; but aliqua est causa per se et alia est causa per accidens;
sa'kc \ve shaH alia est simplex et alia cornposita; alia in actu, alia
only taice the jj^ potencia; alia parcialis vel incompleta, et alia totalis
tirst: a cause -r ? ^ _ r '
per se or per et cotnpleta. Et de quolibet istorum modorum alia est 20
accidens. . ,. ,. • 1 • o j
causa universahs et aha est causa particularis. Sed pro-
pter brevitatem tantum loquendum est de primo inodo.
/Vv iv has three gj|,^^l- autem tribus rnodis ahquid dicitur per se ens,
meaninj;s hcre, _ _ _ ^ 1 '
as in the case sic tribus modis dicitur ahquid esse per se causa. Ma-
aVpiying'it gis tamen famosa accepcio est, vel large accipiendo -•''
cuises' o'- t^o'a P^"° quacunque causa requisita, vel striccius pro causa
principal cause, requisita cum qua non concurrit ex equo aha in eodem
genere causandi: ut tota materia ignis per se causat
\vhlch'^ca^usahtv ^P^*-^™' ^'^^ S^^quando causans sub racione ahcuiusmodi
is predicated" causat, utputa, quando sibi inesse causal per se 2" '^^
trom a certaiii , :. ,. ,.,, j^i^ .,
point ot view. modo predicandi per se; ut edincator per se edmcat,
medicus per se sanat, statuificaturus qui per se statui-
ficat: et sic de ahis. Nec refert sive iste terminus, pcr
se, precedat, sive subsequatur, dummodo terminus sup-
posuerit simphciter. Et iste modus loquendi est cre- 35
brior aput philosophos qui accipiunt verba significancia
tales actus, ut significant aptitudinem ad actus ; ut edi-
Jicare est e.sse edificativuw, et sic de ahis. Nec sequitur:
3. al. Ht abova sic igitur 15. (j. ordn= B. 12. om, Ij. i.S. 2"''
qiitis IS. 18. alii above Ihc line B. 23. quinque 2 bus above 15.
2^. quinque 2 biis above B. 26, 27. vel — requisita in inarg. B.
27. exeq" B. 20. '.W)^ B. 3o. causarc B 32. ('taliii ri) B.
CAP. V. . I.OGICA. 95
cditicator pcr sc cdilicat; omiiis cdilicator cst honio:
crgo, homo pcr sc edilicat. Tcrminis tamen supponcnti-
bus personalitcr, utrobiquc benc corresponderet dc
dicto.
3 3 bus eciam modis dicitur aliquid causa per acci- '''-•r .jcctdens
"1 ' . . Ikis also tlircc
dens alterius: prmio modo, ex hoc quod causanti acci- sifsniiicatious;
dit datum causatum causare, sicut deus accidentalitcr '"lij.cVdciual 'lor^
causat' mc. 2° modo, ex hoc quod causato accidit '' givcn causc
... ... to producc a
causari a dato causante; et illo modo individuum cor- sivcn cHcct; or
loruptibile causat speciem incorruptibilem, cum species causaikn'! 1s"
possit esse sine illo. Et 3^ modo dicitur aliquid pcr '»ccidcntal to
^ . ^ / tlic tlung
accidens causare causatum, quando ipsum non ut huius- caused;
modi causat causatum; ut musicus per accidens editicat, '" causcf'^^'^
sed non ut musicus. Et sic idem est per accidens musi- producjng ns
^ . , ctlcct, docs not
i5cum esse edificativum, et musicum per accidens edi- producc it di-
ficare, ut termini supponunt simpliciter. Nec sequitur
ad illum sensum: musicus per accidens edificat, et om-
nis musicus est edificator: ergo edificator per accidens
edificator.
20 Ex istis patent alique veritates. 1", quod stat eidem \Vc thcncc
querere racionem cuiuscunque generis causandi; ut deus j -j^i^Jj^i^^^J^nic
est finis omnium finitorum, forma exemplaris est, effi- ticing may be
. . ^ scvcral causcs
ciens vel conservans continuitatem eorumdem, et est in ditreicnt
materia vel subiectum sapiencie. Non tamen est possi- sa^me^^timc, b^ut
25 bile quod componat tamquam partes rei; sic enim ""t ^^'''^n t''"^^'^
7 ... ^ ^ , causes are
materia non coincidit cum forma, vel cum movente, tantamount to
vel cum fine illius materiali. 2" patet quod totum genus ''xvifok. '^
esse intrinsece materialis est propter formam, et totum 2. That thc
... r r matenal exists
genus esse formalis intrinsece est proptcr agens, et to- hut for thc
o ^ •. • ^ ^ a formal causc,
30 tum genus compositorum agencium est propter finem. this for thc
Ex quo patet quod impossibile est quicquam habere '^^1!'^!'^"^ =1"'-'' ''^'^
^ ..^ . ^ „ , ^ ^ . cthcient tor thc
causam, nisi habuent cavisam finalem que sit per se linal causc.
causa; nec est racio causandi materialiter vel formaliter
intrinsece perfeccionis simpliciter, sed racio causandi
35 efficienter vel extrinsece finaliter. Et 3" patet quod ''"„]'tj','^^ate']r„d'"
ultimus finis simpliciter non habet partes inteerales "' '^" t'""S* '^'^"
'^ . . . ^ " have no parts;
qualitativas, quidditativas, vel subiectivas. Et per conse- for if it had,
quens est omnino indivisibilis, unicus et eternus. Si enim /ol^-^hc^" hok%
haberet aliquas partes, tales causarentur, et per conse- ''"'■■' ''",'* would
40 quens haberet causam finalem, et sic non esset finis ultimate End
]..• r-... i i • ^ i .. 1^' of all : likcvvisc
ultimus. Et eodemmodo sequitur quod non sunt multi j^ jg (|„iqi,c and
ctcrnal.
, ■_-_.
3. torret B. 23. ijti'"; in mar^. cjli^ li. 27. mati B. 38. in-
divisibilc B. '
96 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF (^AP. V.
talcs iincs, ncc possunt tieri : quia sic haberct universalc
suam causam, et efficiens quod ipsas generat, ipsas
conservans continue. Q.uamvis enim necessarium sit ali-
qua causare se reciproce in generibus diversis causandi,
hoc tamen est impossibile in eodem genere causandi, 5
sicut et impossibile est idem causare se.
Causal Notatis istis preambulis, notandum quod conformes 1 B 6i =
propositions ... ... ... ,. '
toiiow the sunt divisiones proposicionis causalis, sicut dictum est
^as^^lic^causeT ^^ divisionibus eodem modo, cum de qualibet causa et
which they s^o causato contingit facere causalem veram; ut di- lo
signify; some , '-' .
being per se cenda est causahs per se et completa, cuius antecedens
'*"oth'e'rs^|'e/-''' infert suum consequens; ut quia deus wult me esse,
accidens and {^qq eeo sum. Et aliqua est causahs particularis et in-
incomplete. ctc. '^ ^ . .... .....
completa: ut, Sor currit, quia frigescit; et sic de ahis,
ubi antecedens est causa consequentis, sed per accidens, \b
And this ajso incompleta vel remota. Et sic proporcionahter dicen-
rcdupTixrative <-1um est de divisionibus causahum, ut dictum est de
propositions; Jiyisione causarum ; et cum omnis tahs causahs sit re-
duphcativa, et non econtra, patet quod conformis est
somc signifying jjyjgjQ reduphcativarum. Ahqua ergo reduphcativa re- 20 .
tlie same as '^ ^ ° . '^ . ..
causc, and somc duphcat gracia cause, et ahqua gracia proporcionahs
accoiiipaiiiment concomitancie. Gracia cause, ut hic: In qitantinn tn
of one fact by ^,^,.^./^. ;„ moveris; gracia proporcionalis concomitancie,
another. . , . , , 1
ut hic : proporc.onaliter vel in quantum vel cie quanto vel
prout aliqua magis conveniunt, minus differunt ; et econ- 2d
tra. Et ista est yppothetica comparativa et non cau-
sahs.
Wiien they Q.uando ergo sunt causales, tunc dicuntur habere 4
calfsality. exponentes, ut ista: Ex hoc quod tu es homo, tu es
ti'cy ai"e said to ^,;^,,^^/ dicitur debere sic exponi; tu es homo et tu es:<o
have four ' . .,•;•■. ;
cxponents: auimal et omnis homo est animal et si aliquia est nomo,
^C^^/rhX^l^' ipsum est animal. Sed revera ihud videtur michi super-
A is B, And fluutn et non sufficiens, quia sequitur: Tu es homo et
C is I), and . ' ^ • , 7- • ;
ery B is D, si aliquid est homo ipsum est animal: hrgo tu es animal
ev
^^h '^^lus^of ^^ omnis homo est animal. Ideo certum est quod due 33
i^utone^of^ iharum superfluerunt, quantum ad istam exposicionem
surely ^ Multe eciam sunt reduphcative in quibus insunt talcs
"^Tliese"'' 4 exponentes signande; ut patct de tahbus: In quantum
exponents ^gn^ Q^t, non idem sinnil est et non est ; in quantum deus
cannot ne .,,..-,.
appHed wult me esse, ego sum; et sic de ahis. Ymmo ista est^o
^Vroposilionr felsa, tcnta causahter: In quanlum tu es nichil tu es
that are not
causal.
7. ()foroes: conformcs belmr l'>. ir. teta ca'' P>.
CAP. V. rOGICA. 97
li(>)it(); et tamen exponentes siiiii \eie; nec exponunt
iste exponentes sensum reduplicandi gracia propoicionis
concomitancie.
Et ideo notandum quod terminus redunlicativus , 1,'."^ .
, ,. . . ,. . rcdiiplicativc
? quandoque tenetur reduphcative, quandoque snnpliciter, tcrm is
et quandoque comparative. Reduplicative, quando tenetur t^t°"md"rst^ood
sinkathegorice et mobihtat terminum connotando com- icduplicativcly,
'^ , . . . soniciiines
pletam causam, ut hic: Jti qiiaiitiim iiiimerus aliqiii.^i est simpiy, and
setiarius., est numerus perfectus : quod tantum valet ac si ^'^'ompara^ivc.''
lo diceretur quod esse seiiarium est per se et cumplete causa quia Rcduplicativcly,
^ T7 1 1 1 wheii as siicli,
ipseest numerus perfectus.\t\stc\ina\i.mvo\Qnx.Qs exponere iSc. point to a
sufhcit capere causalem et condicionalem, ut : quia Sor cmididon-*
est homo est aiiimal ; et si aliquid est homo ipse est
aninial, ergo Sor, in quantum est homo, est animal. Et
i5sic sequitur expositorie: qiiia deus est, nichil siinul est
et non est. Et, si deus est nichil siiiiul est et iion est:
ergo in quantum deiis est, nichil simiil est et iioii est.
Et racione note condicionis debet terminus redupU- and in tiiis
1 M* . • !• • casc. thc
cativus mobintare termmum super quem cadit : ut^ si prcdicate
2o iusticia est bonum, in quantum bonum ; tiinc iusticia est bccomcs
. •' . universal ; it A
omne bonuin; quia dato antecedente, tunc m quanturn as such is B,
aliquid est bonum, ipsum est iusticia; et per consequens i's'c\xi-y'^B
iusticia in commune est omne bonum. Vel si iste ter-
rninus, iusticia, supponat personaHter cum paribus in
25 hoc dicto, lusticia est boniim in quantutn boiiuiu. tunc
aliquain iusticiam implicat esse omne bonum.
Quando vero terminus reduplicativus terminatur Simpiy. whcn
simpliciter, tunc dicit confuse kathegorice quamcunque ilnpuVs^in
causam vel formam racione inherencie predicati ad s^ii^i'''' somc
. .... caiise that
Bosubiectum, ut hic : motus est actus, id est forina mobihs unitcs thc
. iZ-j »/•; i .. ^ .. siibjcct with thc
in quantuin actitaliter est mobile, quod tantum sonat ac m-cdicate:
si diceretur, motus est forma actualis mobilis secundum as : .A. is B /«
. '' . . so far as tt is C.
quam ipstim formaliter est in inotu. Et ita auctores de-
scribunt quascunque forrnas, dicendo quod forma talis
35 est actus secundum quem subiectum est sic for-
matum; et tunc isti termini in quantum, secundutit qiiod,
et sic de ceteris terminis usitatis in taHbus descrip-
cionibus significant circumstanciam cause formaHs. Et ^n ,s^i'^'i '^**^*
° the terms
patet generaliter quomodo forme quecunque sunt de- modificd by
B6t'' scribende, et quomodo descripciones ] auctorutii sunt "norbecomT*
univcrsal.
2. redu'» B. i8. d' B. 20. cst boniim cst B. 28. tc'' fip"' B.
3o. act"M.B. ih. act' B.
98 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V.
intelligende, et iuxta illum sensum no n mobilitat tcr-
minus reduplicativus terminum super quem cadit, cum
idem sit dicere: motiis est actiis mobilis iu quantum
movetur ac si diceretur, Motus est forma qua forma-
liter mobile movetur. 5
But as tor In negativis autem, ubi reduplicativi supponunt sim-
piopositions, pliciter, altercantur logici ; ut alii concedunt quod Sor
logicians do not /,; quantum albus non edificat, intelligentes proposicionem
Some admit, negative simpliciter, scilicet ad illum sensum, Sor per
vimt qua.a albaciouem non edificat : quod tantum valet ac si 10
n-hiteman, does ^{q^qyqIvw : Sor albacione non edificat, vel: non in
not biiild, J ^
undei-standing quantum albus edificat. Alii autem concedunt iUas
^''^ "afi^on" ^° ultimas proposiciones in quibus negacio precedit ter-
irhiteness. minum reduplicativam, et negant proposiciones in
Some admit ., } , '. . , .? . ^ .^ _
iliat simply: quibus negacio subsequitur. Aln eciam m airirmativis i?
/w^oes^iiild^ concedunt proposiciones reduplicativas, ponentes causam
considering remotam causare suum causatum ut hic; Cristus
whiteness as a ....
ri.mote cause. secundum quod homo passus est, monebatur et sitivit
"°his' woiiYd"^ eic, et tamen humanitas non fuit per se causa completa
e.xcept the talium. Alii autem negant omnes huiusmodi; sed con- 20
case ot Chnsfs , ^ • 1 , , r • i
actions qua cedunt quod Cristus secundum quod homo ruit ambu-
man. lativus, materialis etc, nec Cristus secundum quod deus
fuit inmortalis et inmobilis etc, quia non fuit inmortalis
inmobilis.
I prefer the Ego autem assencio priori modo loquendi, quia con- 23
'"^'xhe""" sonancior et antiquior et facilior. Nec sequitur: Sor in
reduplicative quantum albus non edificat, erffo, si est albus non edificat ;
term -' . . , -;. ' ^ . .,..■',
understood as quia terminus reduplicativus terminatur simpliciter ad
incomenience sensum expositum. Et sic conceditur quod Cristus est
toilows. corporeus, palpabilis, divisibiiis, etc, quia ut homo est 3o
The human .^ ,. '^ , .,...,?,.
actions of huiusmodi; et cum hoc est indivisibilis et inmortalis,
"trom^Ws^'" quia est due substancie vel due nature, quarum una
humanity; and ggt talis, et alia talis; et una est essencia divina, et alia
it also trom his . ' . : . . ...
Deity, it is in est mmor essencia divina. Quamvis ergo divinitas sit
'^"uo^e^he^i-^f causa ambulacionis Cristi, tamen non est causa eiusdem 35
so that they qeneris cum actu vel proprietate actus; homo tamen
cannot be "^ . .,. ^ . . , ,
ascribcd to tlic per se est gressibilis, etsi ncn poterit ambulare Gressi-
.\ndtluLa bilitas ergo est in specie humana tanquam eius passio,
man docs not quamvis species non sit subiectum eius primum. Et
build gua man, ^ , . ■ ...
but <?;(^ i7We ?o conformiter negatur quod aliquid, in quantum homo, 40
21, 22. albatiis; ambiihuiviis above deus; Cristus above B.
24. imo' B.
CAP. V. I.OGICA. '»()
eJiticativLini cst, scd in quantum habcns aitcm; ciuia /'«//./, wliich i>
*'■ ^ ''"' •ent
ings
esse edijicativiim non. est passio scd accidens separabile; ordcr onliincs.
et sic homo est alterius generis quam edificabilitas.
Dubium tamen est aput multos loeicos, si omnis ^ question:
' . •-' ' wlietlier cvery
5 substancia, secundum omnem racionem qua est, sit ali- substance is
quid. Et videtur quod sic; quia scquitur: secundinn /5- cvcr^v^^one^oF^Hs
tmn racionein Sor est: er<^o, seciindum istam racionem est "}°'^'^^°^ ^Y^^li^'
^ . . lor a mode is
ens et per consequens secundum istam est aliquid. \n someiliini;.
oppositum sic: Si homo est secundum omnem racionem iiand^^evcry'^
loqua est aliquid, tunc per omnern famulatum acciden- possible
^, . ^ ,. .,' , ., , , accident woiild
talem sui esset ahquid. Sed quid est per hoc quod est then make it
albus, pater, currens etc? Certum est quod ille nichil subTtandafiv
esset per ista, nisi homo; et per consequens quodlibet new; which is
^ ' , . ' • , T^- • »ot admissible.
illorum esset substancia et non accidens. Dicitur ergo These modes
irquod quelibet substancia infinitis modis racionum est, a subst^^ance^To
secundum quarum nullam est ipsa substancia vel ali- ^^ some thing,
. , , ,. ,■ , , ,• ■ ,• T~w but ot some
quid; sed aliquantum, ahquale, vel ahcuiusmodi. Pro «^e, qnaiiiy
quo nota quod ablativus in tali proposicione: Isto acci- The'"abhifiv'e
dente Sor est potest reei ex vi cause, et sic esset sensus case is
. , , . • , • • ambiguous,
2ofalsus; vel ex vi accidentis, et sic tunc esset sensus and may be
verus; ut: iste equus est albo colore ve] albi coloris vel sevcnf/°vavs"
secundum albedinem vel racionem albandi : que omn\a idem «on'"^ faise-
sonant. Et patet quod ista proposicio est equivoca: Iste
liomo est isto modo, ex hoc quod iste terrninus: iste homo
2? potest simul intelhgi ut subiectum, et ablativus regi de
ly 'est' ex vi accidentis ad illum sensum: Ille homo est
huiusmodi; vel aliter, quod pronomen sit subiectum, et
iste terminus, homo, sit appositum, regens alterum ex
vi cause formahs, ita quod sit sensus: iste homo isto
3o modo formaliter est homo. Notata ereo ista equivocacione, '^J^^ aiiswcr is
•^ . ... , . ^ . ^. ^ . ' theretore tliat
patet quod queiibet substancia secundum inhnitas ra- to be thus and
ciones formales vel modos accidentales est, quia est ^^"fn'^'''"^^^"^^^
illorum subiectum; et tamen non secundum aliquam the same; a
B 62' istarum est ens vel aliquid, | cum m tahbus regitur ter- something by
35 minus ab apposito ex vi cause; ut suppono ex gramma- i.,e"7Tbv''si'z'
tica. Homo ergo humanitate est homo vel substancia. ■"''^'' by
,. . , ' . ,. quahty, &c.
aliquid, et ens: et quantitate est quantus, et qualitate
est quahs, et aUis modis aliqualiter; sed nec substancia
nec aliquid Nec sequitur secundum istam
40 racionem Sor est similis alteri, ergo secundum istam est Tlie argumcnt
,. . , . . . . .,, , . ,. Irom what is
aliquid; quia circumstancie signihcate per huiusmodi accidcntallv
3, ediii'"^ B. 5, 6. a'd B. 8. a'd B. 10. fatm B. 35. a'
or o'" B. 39. afler aliquid, a space fnr Itirec words B.
I.oo JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. V.
morc particular abstrac.ta impediunt modum argumentandi a per acci-
unKi-rsaU 'does '^^"•^ inferiori ad suum superius; vel ad transcendens
not hold. superius. Sed in genere, argumentando a per se inferiori
ad superius. tenet consequencia ; ut, si ista albedine Sor
est albus, tunc ista albedine Sor est coloratiis. 5
Can the samc 2° dubitatur si eadem res secundum raciones acci-
throiigh tlVese dentales sit posterior quam est secundum racionem
accidental substancialem : et videtur quod sic, quia deus secundum
modes, . ^ • . , n •
posterior to inrinitas raciones est, secundum quarum nullam ipse est
essemial^being? deus; secundum racionem ergo qua ipse est causa mei lo
V. g. God, as j-,Qn est deus; et secundum illam racionem habet se in
cause ot my j- j /- , -u
being, is not aliquo ordine ad me Cum ergo secundum iUam racionem
and as such ^st prior me, vel posterior me, vel eque primo mecum,
He is in jiqjj potest dici quod secundum omnem racionem ipse
relation to me, . '. 7 . . . , .
and thus sit prior me; quia, ut sic, ipse est relatus michi, eti5
' my'beinT ^ relativa, ut huiusmodi, sunt simul natura; et per idem
sequitur quod non secundum illam racionem ipse est
posterior me, potissime cum, ut causa huiusmodi, est
On tlie other prior suo causato. Sed ad oppositum videtur esse hoc
i^'\dciitical medium: Si deus^ ut huiusmodi, sH eque prinio mecum, 20
wiih me in any ^yjjc ivse est eque primo rnecum. Et tunc per idem ipse
point ot view, ' . ^ ... . ■ n • ■
then He really est eque primo cuilibet rei, et mnnitum est posterior se
'^ "n'50 °a,^."^'" ipso. Sequitur enim: secundum illam racionem est deus
eque primo meciim ; ergo secundum aliqtfd et secundum
and God has veritatem est eque primo mecum. Nec aliter concederent 2?
cq^ual^^bx-Thc theologi quod deus ex humana concepcione est minora-
incarnation. jyg^ Sicut ergo deus, ut homo, est par nobis, sic, ut
Somc tnvolous . . '^ . ' '. '.,,..
adversaries causa iUius causati est eque pnmo cum illo. Et in isto
sii'cV^argmiients, est tediosum communicare cum trutanis qui nunquam
unlcss by respondent ad tales proposiciones, nisi addendo deter- "o
repeating the ' . . . '.
reduplicative minacionem reduplicativi. Ut, quando quentur utrum
term in the , . • cri- .. 1 .. •. * „»
conclusion. pater est pnor nh, dicunt quod pater, ut pater, est
eque primo cum filio; et aliter non respondent; et in
ista materia legiste et plebei sunt nutriti.
10. (8 pro racioncm I B. 12. vel pvo cum B. 16. h'' B. 20. me'" i'..
20. hua coe 15 2(). trutais 15.
16. Simul natura. This expression is one side of a double
distinction: together in time — together in nature. I have chosen
to render it bv the idea of identity; for the difhculty of Wyclif
is the very same as that concerning the identity of cause and
effcct, of subject and object.
CAP. V. I.OGICA. lOI
Dicitur er^o quod dupliciter dicitur accidens. l^rimo Accident has
modo quando ipsum in sui natura est substancia sed -j |,^_. ||,.st
secundum habitudineui alteri actualem habetur ab alio; impi>i:s one
. . Mipstaiico Ihat,
et illo modo divicie sunt accidencia diviti, et igneitas happeniufi to
5 est accidens essencie ignis, sicut et humanitas accidit anoUicr.ls
Verbo. Ubi ereo est unio talium naturarum in eodem callcd its
f . . . . accident ; as
supposito, bene sequitur illud suppositum, in quantum v. g. riches.
,^^ , • • ,• ■ , • • -^Now when two
homo vel ignis, est aliquid, cum natura in se unita sit such substances
substancia. Cum ergo tale suppositum sit more univer- '^^'^ umted in
o rt one peison,
losalium multe nature, concedendum est quod est maius this person is
et minus, prius et posterius eodem: et sic de aliis que '■'^*t^c. "according'
insunt illis naturis. Nec sequitur ex hoc quod idem sit '^* we speak oi
^ T . onesuDstance or
maius et minus se ipso, ut verbum est par patri et the other;
minus patre, quia natura minor patre et tamen illa ^or'lcss"t'ii^an'^'
i5natura est verbum. Nec sequitur: ista humanitas incipit ^^'^'^^^'^^1''^°'^^
... . <iny otner
esse et ipsa est deiis, isfititr deiis incipit esse. Nec sequi- contradiction
, % ... , .^ .^ ^ tollow thence,
tur, etsi verbum quod est illa humanitas sit natura
divina, quod illa humanitas sit natura divina. Nec sequi-
tur, si verbum assumpsit illam humanitatem, que est
2o ipsamet persona, quod verbum assumpsit parem vel se-
ipsum. Nec sequitur quod illa humanitas sit in infinitum
perfecta, etsi sit in intinitum perfectum. Nec sequitur,
si libere contradictorie assumpsit illam naturam, quod
poterit sumpsisse aliam, faciendo se alium hominem,
2 5 sicut homo facit libere se esse istum currentem, nec
possit esse aliud currens. Nec sequitur quod aliqua res
que est non idem deo possit fieri idem deo, cum illa
natura non posset manere dimissa, cum illa natura sit
Verbum esse hominem. Est ergo homo optimus possi- b^^^f/^p^^o/Mlie
3o bilis, et tam bonus homo quam bonum est ipsum esse natures, not on
1 • » 1 • 1 1 , • 1 1 • , • Ihat wliicli
hominem. Auud ergo cst homo et ahud deus, quia alia js 11,^.^^; „;,tii,,.s.
natura; sed non alius est iste homo quam deus, sed
est homo eiusdem speciei et univocus cum quolibet
altero homine, Cristus ergo, in quantum est homo, est
B (")2'' aliquid, quia substancia et creatura; j et in quantum
homo, est posterior essencia divina.
Sed 2" modo dicitur accidens quod claudit contra- The sccond,
... . , ... meaning ot
diccionem esse non inherens, ut accidencia 9 generum ; 'accideiit' is
et illa non possunt in se esse substancie. Ideo nichil "''''" ""'^^
■20 pm R. 2V (idi'^ \'. 21. ptrit 1'.. 2^^. manere di"fs dimissa:
in mari:. dimela B. 3c). piit B.
I02 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V.
cxseniially iii quantum sic accidentatum est aliquid, nec mutat
^anoilien '"^P^^ciern propter tale accidens; quia non est illud acci-
and such au j^ns concretive vel abstractive. Nec dicitur substancia
accident brings . . .,,,.. . .
no otherness prior aut posterior propter iUud accidens, quia sic
does'h'rendcr necessario deus esset posterior quam aliquid posset esse, 5
the siibstiince (^m-,-, esset postremum ens, et impossibile est dare post-
more or lcss ' . ' . ^
perfect. remum ens. Et sic conceditur quod deus, ut est causa
mei, est summe prior me, ymmo omnis causa, ut causa,
A cause is est prior natura suo causato; et tamen aliqua causa,
same^iime with ut causa, est simul natura cum causato suo; quia est lo
its ertect, and Jare duplicem simultaneitatem sicut duplicem prioritatem
pnor to it, '.,..,. ,
becanse tiiere is nature, scilicet sunultaneitatem quo ad causacionem et
rinniltaneTt'v simultaneitatem quo ad consequenciam. Et sic multe
botii of cause simultanee quo ad consequenciam sunt simul cum
causation and . . . ' . . . , -
of consequcnce. suis causatis; sicut omne subiectum est ems passio ; sed i-''
God isinfinitely non simultanee quo ad causacionetn. Sed in proposi-
""^^"vhiclThe^^^^^cionibus concessis tenentur termini reduplicativi simpli-
causes, citer; quia aliter essent sensus impossibiles. Deus ergo,
prcciselv in tlic ' ^ . .
order of causando me, facit se esse surnme pnorem me; nec ex
causation. ^^^ sequitur: omnis causa mei esse sumtne prior est me. 20
Patet ergo quo ordine prioritatis deus se habet ad me,
quia secundum causacionem qua causat me.
Aristotle, Et ad Aristotelem de simultaneitate nature relativorum
relathx-s^Tre dicitur quod ipse wult omnia correlata esse simul quo
simultancousiy ^j correlativa; et tamen non repugnat unum relativum 2 5
relatcd, is to be ' . . ^ ° ,
undcrstood to antecedere reliquum causacione secundum quam est
conscquen*ce°asi'clata, et simul alia simultaneitate. Alii vero intelligunt
tocausation,one pe^- reiativa, ageresata per accidens ex subiecto et re-
mav be pnor to ' ' ^'-' ^ '^ . .
the oilier. lacione; et illa possunt simul esse natura; et sic non
csl dare causatum, quin aggrcgatum ex deo et relacione -^"
ad illud sit eque primo cum illo causato; ct talia ag-
gregata intelliguntur communiter per substanciam ct pcr
This terminos reduplicativos. Et ex illis non sequitur: dens,
lio\vev!fr"^does '" '^^^ cama uiei, vel deus caiisans me est siinnl natnra
not identify mecnni: er<20 dens est sininl natnra mecntn. Et sic de 3-'^
God wiih us. ' n _ ... 1 -11 ■
stmilibus. Nec est ista sentencia ialsa ; sed cavillacio ver-
borum stat in eleccione.
I choose to Ego vero determinavi me ad priorem rcsponsioncm,
God^^^thoiitlh negando quod deus similis michi est simul natura me-
like to mc, is ^^yQ-) sgj similitudo dei ad mc est simul natura cum P
not identical ; ' . '
but that His simtlitudine mei ad deum; et deus equc primo natura
likeness with
me is idcntical
to mine with
1-1 im.
10. quod V>. m, 20. nec — mc ni mari;\ H. 2'i. Avf B.
CAP. V. i.(3G1(:a. io3
cst similis michi vcl causa mei, sicut cgo sum. klco God is like mc,
posterius natura est similis michi quam est, quia prius '"LiL-iii'"\itta- '
naturalitcr cst quam est similis michi. Nec sequitur: ,. Him, this
. . .... , ... Iiliciicss is alsij
deits isto i^radu pnontatis vel postenontatis est caiisa posicrior to
? uiei vel liuiusiuodi ; ergo isto i>-radu est, nisi cquivocando ""'
intelligatur quod est subiectum huiusgradus; et ita de
similibus est dicendum.
Ex istis dictis inferri potest evidenter quod nullum \Vc thus scc
accidens inherens potest esse aliquid per se existens, ut ^ ^''(^^."^^'("('can"'
lopartes substancie: quia tunc possibile esset quod sub- 'J^i^t.b.v itscir,
'^ . . •" ,. . , ^ ,. . , tor it it could,
stancia m quantum tahter accidentata esset aliquid; it would by
utputa in quantum alba vel similis vel quanta esset g^^gJl^^j. o'Jl,g'.'^
aliquid. Et per consequens proporcionaliter ut esset '•^"■^ whitencss,
. , . . . . V. g. increasmg
magis alba, esset magis illud ahquid, et per consequens indetinitely,
1 3 in infinitum posset aliquid unius speciei esse fcliquo ^^^q,." ot'"'yj^i,]rr
eiusdem speciei magis ens. Consequens est impossibile , ^'i<"; '^ ^\s*;
. ' ... . but there is no
de natuns. Ideo dicit philosophus signanter quod sub- morc or less in
stancia non suscipit maius et minus. Si ergo albedo """^^'
esset aliquid per se existens, aut natura potens per se
20 existere, tunc utique esset aliquid, et vinio illius ad sub-
iectum esset accidens quo subiectum foret accidentatum
inmediate formaliter, et non ilia albedo Omnis talis
unio esset vere qualitas et non albedo data; ut alias
declaravi.
21 Ex istis patent quedarn recule. Prima, omnis propo- ^Vhence several
' ^ . . . , . -^. ' rulcs tollow .
sicio de pe)' se predicacione infert causalem in eisdem 1. Evcry
• • .,. ^ ^ • I ^ ■ propositibn,
terminis, et non econtra; ut, si per se homo est ani- when the
mal vel risibile, tunc ex hoc quod aliquid est homo. pi'edicatc is
... ^ . ^ atlirmed pt;r se,
ipse est anitnal vel nsibile. Patet prima pars regule ex infers a causal
, - i^ ■ ■ 1- I 3 r ..• I 1 .- » j- proposition in
lHjV descripcione causalis vel reduplicative | complete et dic- tf,g 4me terms-
tls de universalibus, eo quod quelibet species est com- '^"f "°^ ^'''■'^ ^
. ' . ^ ^ , \ versa ; the tirst
pleta causa sui generis et sue passionis. Et 2'" pars part is evident,
1 .. ^ I ^ 1 i^ ^ -^ .. aiid the second
reguie patet ex hoc quod multe sunt ventates, quarum .,iso becausc
una est completa causa alterius, inter quarum extrema many true
^ . . ' ... causes cannot
33 non est per se predicacio, ut patet in istis: ex hoc bc prcdicates
quod paries non habet pulmonem, ipse non respirat : quia '"'
deus est, ego )ion sum asinus ; quia deus nnilt nie esse,
igitur eoo sum. Et patet quam deminute sunt 4 expo-
nentes supradicte, ymmo iuxta illas sequitur indifferenter
40 econtra quod in quantum sum risibilis vel gressibilis
sum homo vel animal, sicut econtra Et patet quante V-,1?^'^''^'* "•^'M"''^
' ' ^ ditlerence lu llie
sense if wc
2. filis B. 17. natis 15. 20. verc iibove utique B. 40. eov \i.
41. ci»v B.
104 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. V.
placethesubject retert preponere subiectum ante terminum reduplicative
thfredupHcli^^n'^ tentum, vel postponere ipsum, ut hoc est verum : Ali-
term. qnij jn quantum est substancia, ipsiim est Jwmo, quia
Sor ex hoc quod est substancia est homo et tamen non
in quantum aliquid est substancia, ipsum est homo; 5
quia tunc, si aliquid est substancia ipsum est homo.
II. Every causal 2" patet quod ex omni tali, cum minore capiente
wWctris'"idd°d causam sui antecedentis, sequitur sylogistice causalis
a w/«or stating cuius antecedens causatur, et consequens maioris con-
the cause ot tho . . ,
antecedent, cluditur; ut sic argumentando : quia tu es liomo \o
concltfsion, '" ^^ animal, sed quia tu es lapis tu es homo ; ergo, qiiia
t'i"s: . „ tu es lavis tu es animal: quia chimera non habet pul-
Because A ts B, ^ . ' ^- . t r ^ i
C is D; monem non respirat, sed quia non est non liabet pul-
^'''^/l"-$ fi"^' '"o;7e?7z; ergo, quia non est, non respirat. Tenet autem illa
Because E rs i-\ y^cT^^i^ pgj. hoc: quidquid est causa cause est causa i5
C is D
This reposes on sui causati ; et quidquid antecedit ad antecedens ante-
causTo^^acauseCedit ad suum consequens. Ut patet quod pulcre syllo-
is the cause of p-izatur ex causali tanquam minori et ex alia causali
its ettcct.
cuius antecedens est primum consequens ad 3^"'' cau-
salem cuius antecedens est antecedens primo sumptum, 20
et consequens est illud quod est consequens in minori;
ut sic argumentando: quia tu es homo, tu es animal,
qu'a tu es animal tu es corpus; ergo, quia tu es homo
tu es corpus. Et tenet ista regula per hoc quod quid-
quid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad suum ante- 2.1
cedens; utrumque tamen istorum dictorum intelligitur
quando non est variacio in genere vel in modo cau-
And we inust sandi. Ex hoc patet quod terminus super quein cadit
note that whcn , ,. . , ... ^ . j
a term is reduphcacio mobuitatur, ut sequitur: In quantum tu es
'^'■''heco^^mes' " homo, tu es animal ; tu es iste homo; ergo, in quantum ^o
iiniversal; 'qtia tu es iste homo, tu es aninial. Et si capiatur in minori
man' means in , . , . .... , . ^
so far as quod tste est homo, sequitur sirnpuciter quod iste
'^°^essen'ce "'^ ^'''^ animal. Sed tamen non tcnet descendendo ad
tiumaniiy. inferiora per accidens: ul non oportet quod, si ex
hoc qtiod tu es homo, tu es aniutal, et tii es iste homo 3:
albus ; ergo, ex hoc quod tn es iste homo, tti es animal.
Nam impossibile est quod iu sis homo e.v hoc quod tu
es iste albtis homo, pater, quantus, etc. ; sed ex hoc quod
tu es homo, tu es hoc album, quamvis non secundum
causani completam et per se sufficientem. 40
-.■>. le^tM n 2-1. consequencia ; regiihi abovc ii. 3". Non tnnien
iliud : coi r. above B.
c:ap. \'. r.or.iCA. io5
3" patet quod sicut cx nuUa causa necessaria per se IH. As a
, . . . 1-1 ^ • 1- ncccssaiv causo
sequitur logice contmgens, sic non quelibet parcialis jocs not intcr
causa et per accidens inferens causatum sequitur logice -„,,Yi''',\^'? ^
ex eadem. Verbi gracia, quamvis deum esse sit causa ncithcr docs it
. , , infcr a nartial
.T quare ego sum, non tamen si deus est, ego sum ; sed cau.sc. v. g.
oportet illi necessario adiungere causam contingentem, (5|usc'ot^mv
ut est volicio dei respectu mei esse, vel aliquid con- being;yct Go"d's
., ,, , , . , ,. cxistcncc docs
simile. Lx quo patet quod non est latitudo causandi „ot infcr minc.
a prinia causa usque ad contingens, quia totum genus ,. ^Y'^ '""■'^',' .„
^ _ _ T o j 1 _ r>^ thcrcforc, adniit
lo contingencium est creatum a causa necessaria, et inter that some
,. ... causcs causo
necessarium et contmgens est magna distancia. i mmo, each othcr;
dato opposito, sequitur quod, posita prima causa, po- (^^"['^"vifi^^i^.it
neretur omne possibile. Ex quo sequitur quod oportet I exist causcs
, . * ,. . , mc aiid is
dare causas reciproce se causantes, ut voiicio qua deus caused by mc
i?est formaliter et contingenter volens me esse bonum to be such.
est relacio ponens deum et me esse bonum ; et illa
causatur a me, sicut quodlibet extrinsecum volitum a
deo causat in ipso, sine eius mocione, unam volicionem
•vel complacenciam ; omnia tamen volibilia extrinseca Thcrcis besides
. ,. . . • an order in the
2o causantur ex eius volicione eterna, que est prmia essencia. volitions of
Est tamen ordo in volicionibus dei, cum una pi"ior ^<?^' °"^ ^';'"S
B 6V' causat aliam posteriorem: 1 ut volicio qua wult me esse and causing
,. ,. r ' , . . that othcr: thc
precedit wolicionem qua wult me esse vu-tuosum; et sic univcrsai v. g.
volicio qua wult omnem hominem esse precedit voli- '^,vl',-'^'i"ul'r'^
2D cionem qua wult me esse; nec indiget volubiii extrin-
seco ad eius volicionem, quia non indiget sic velle.
NuUa ergo accidencia sunt subiective in prima essencia
que implicant ipsam esse mobilem.
Exemplum 2*^ partis est: lumen ideo est, quia produ- Though ligiit
„ . , . . . j ^ is bccause
.->o citur a lummoso; et anmia est, quia creatur a deo: et produccd by a
tamcn lumen et anima possunt esse sine talibus produc- bod!""jt"can
cionibus. Tales autem producciones sunt cause parciales cxist without
. , , , that production :
et per accidens productorum, et per se causa produc- so also of ihe
cionum passivarum, sicut producciones successive per- [^^."nls^iis^^o
1^3 manencium non sunt cause illorum productorum, sed admit the
, . . _. , ■ cxistcnce ol
suarum produccionum passivarum. hic ergo producencia ccriain truths
mundi fuit causa per accidens mundi, sed mundus fuit ^^bich are
!r|. Sicut B.
2q, 3o, Produccionibus. I can only unJefstaiui this passage
by supposing Wyclif to mean by production and creatioii what
lakes place at the hrst instant of being; it is thcn true that
during the rest of their existence, both hght and the soul arc.
while the first act of . ausation is no longer.
lo6 JOHANNIS WYCrJF CAP. V-
neither the causa per se sue produccionis, cum sit subiectum iliius
causing nor thc . ' . . ^ . .
caused accidcntis, sicut deus fuit subiectum illius active pro-
substances; it' , ■ m r^ ^ -i -i i c ■
not, the world ducencie. Mec aliter esset possibue mundum tuisse pro-
could not have Juetum, nisi esset reciproca causacio, eo quod necesse
been produccd. ' ^ . .
est omne causatum habere causam, qua posita ponitur, 5
et qua non posita non ponitur; quod non esset possi-
bile nisi essent veritates preter substancias causantes,
et encia reciproce causata a se ipsis.
Threc Sed huic obicitur ; si A causat B, et econtra, tunc A est
objections pj-i^s natura quam B et econtra; et sic idem esset lo
severally ' . . ^ ...
answered. prius se ipso natura. Similiter complacencia dei, cum
sit relacio, non causat suum causatum ipsa prius natura.
Similiter subiectum pro instanti prioritatis naturalis
foret non volitum a deo, cum non prius sit volitum
quarn deus illud velit. i3
1. it A and 15 Ad primum dicitur quod consequencia ultima non
cause each , . . , ,. . . ^
other mutually, valet, quia est dare multos ordmes prioritatum natura-
orthem nrior ^i'-"''^ '■> iJeo, ad modum exponendi hoc verbum differt,
to the other. superius expositum, debet ista proposicio : ^ est natura
This, however, .„. ■ * ^ i- j- . ■ t->
does not i^llowi?''»'-^' -D, sic exponi : A est aliqiio ordine natiire priiis B ; 20
'^ d^ist^inction •'' ^'■' ^^'^^'^o omni ordine in quo utrumque est, capienda
pnoT qua est 2" exponens : talis B non est isto ordine eqiie prinio
causes, not iti- - i--i ^5-^
otherwise. cum A. \n diversis ergo ordmibus utrumque anteceuit
reliquum.
2. it is false that Ad 2™ dicitur quod relaciones faciunt multa bona;23
relations cannot . , ,,. , ... ,
be causes; but ut proporcio causat modum. Videtur tamen michi quod
°of God^"if is^^" '^^"■*> "'"/^ '"^ esse, ponit infinitas voliciones dei;
posited, at once et alia est causa esse mei, ut volicio qua wult ine esse,
posits intinite , , , . , . , , . ...
others, He voiendo omncm hommem esse (et sic de multis ahis);
'1i,"^*';'L^f,','t'^ et causa aeens in istis omnibus volicionibus est ipse qui l^o
the etncient o ^ i t
cause of all. est prima voluntas. Complacencia ergo presupponens me
esse, si sit causa conservans me, conservatur a me in
illo ordine causandi obiective.
3. A crcature Ad 3"^ dicitur quod conclusio est impossibihs. Et
must bc willed . ., . . . , . ^.
by God bctorc admiltantur quothbet mstancia nature esse smiul in .vt
";,!;f' 1l^,vl?,'i-i'' codem instanti temporis. cum illa instancia non sunt
not, it wouiu 1
not dcpend on nisi cradus prioritatum naturalium. Nec possct dcus
His volition. ^ ' '
12. ipso 1',. 23. Ad 2'" d'' undcitlncd 15. 'i\. Ad 3'" d' uiidcr-
liiicd I!. 35. «jp" pi'o inslantia B.
6. Before ihe ^voiid existed, God could not havc become
its caiisc, if there had not beeii somethiiig to make God that
causc; that .somediing is the tvuth that thc world is possible.
CAP. y. I.OGICA. 107
poiiere complacenciam suam in instanti naturc quo est l^iiit wc must
obiectum, quamvis utrumque sit quandocunque est al- botwccirtime
terum, altera. Pro illo ergo instanti nature nec ^st |,^^['^j|.'"'j'*^i^"||j,
obiectum volitum a Jeo, nec pro illo est non volitum, ln tlic samc
, .,, 1- I 1- • instaiu ot limc
•■' sed pro illo est volitum vel non volitum in sensu com- thcic may bc
posito. lllud patet de virtute scrmonis, ut alibi '-^xpo- "'''ot"^,aun-al'"'^
nitur. prioi-ity. Before
, . ri^ ■ • n^ • ■ lli'-' crcaturc
4'' patet quod si aihrmacio sit causa artirmacionis, e.xisis it is
et negacio est causa negacionis: et hinc solet regula- ^^'"^^'i]i°5 "°''
loriter antiquitus inferri ex qualibet completa causali con- iv. Attirmation
... .. • • CtlUSCS
dicionalis facta ex causah oppositarum parcium; ut, si afiirmation,
Sor est respirativiis quia habet pulmonem; ergo^ si non ,!'!'1?^h"'".
habet pitlmonem, ideo non est respirativiis vel igitiir non tiius evcry
. . . , , , _ , S causal
est respirativus quia non habet puimonem. bolercia tamen proposition
i3est, quando capitur oppositum consequentis et q>-^ando ^^^^''''JJ^^^JJ]^'^^!^'^!
oppositum antecedentis ; quando enim consequens est witii a
,. . , . , coiitradictorv
naturahter prius quoad consequenciam suo antecedente ; mcmbers. '
tunc antecedit condicionahter negacio consequentis ''^^- h^aiise ^ if c ■
gacionem antecedentis; ut: quia tu curris, tu moveris: tlierefore:
V . . . ' ^ . . ' . I I. 7/A w notC,
20 igitur, si non moveris tu non curris, quia non moveris. j a is not B
8(14* Sed si antecedens sit causa completa, convertibihter in- ^^^^^^^1'/°^.^'
ferens suum causatum, sicut est de subiecto et sua not B, A h
, . . ■ not C, because
passione, tunc negacio cause antecedentis sequitur mix- 4 is not B;
tim causahter et condicionahter ex negacione causati j.pnpioY|d'^j| ti,;,
25 consequentis; ut: Sor, quia est homo, est risibilis; t?ro-o, case of partial
^ . ' . , ' ^ . . .,.,.' ... ^ and 2. in tliat
si non est homo, laeo non est risibilis, quia laeo non est of compiete
homo: et non econtra; sed non oportet, si antecedens t^, . '^^"^'^*- , .
' i ' _ 1 liis, liowever,
sit causa convertibihs efficiens consequentis, quod nega- does not hoid,
, . . . . . accordine to
cio antecedentfs sit causa negacionis consequentis ; ut : somc, when the
So quia deus ivult me bene agere, igitur bene ago; si deus ^^^^^'^^fi^^ll^^^
non wult me bene agere. ideo non bene ago quia deus cause of thc
, , ^ ' . ' ] ,- consequent.
non nnilt me bene agere, non sequitur secundum ali- LMgression
quos; quia tunc deus csset causa quare non bene ago, ori"'in"ot"cv'ii'-'^
et cuiuscunque inordinacionis mundi. Ac si gratis sub- I do irell
„ . , , . . . , ^ because GoJ
3.1 traheret vohcionem suam, nccessitando me cessare 0. „./iig ^o ; ff' GoJ
bene agere, cum tamen cuiuscunque defcctus movaVis "''Jj^^ 'J'-^'^^^.^f^
radicahs est causa in deficiente et non in summo bono becausc God
. , . , , , . 1- • ;)'///*■ il.
conservantc; ideo, sicut repugnat solem debite applican it would sureiy
medio diaffano et non illuminare idem, nisi defectus ., f*^''°^'' .'''f.' ,
40 fuerit in medio, causans privacionem luminis, sic repug- i do good
, . , , j •! ■ Lieing removcd,
nat hominem esse non motum a deo ad agendum sioi 1 cannot do
good ;
/), .''. a deo — in sensu in marg. !'.. 18, H). abnvc ncgacioncm a)i
illegihle irord ; id .' \i. 38. ymmo; ideo abuve B.
io8 JOHANNIS WYCMF CAP. V.
but the defcct complaceiiter, iiisi defectus sit in homine. Sic quod deus
not"ui God,™s non causat istum defectum; quia defeclus posicione
thc opacity of inius solis, vcl defcctus applicacionis, vel invidia de bene
an objcct ... ^'^ ., . . r ^
prevents the esse alicuius non potest sibi inesse, cum tunc toret
paietrati^ng ; mobilis. Solum ergo antecedens quod est iniustum et 5
and God wouid gj. consequens naturaliter causans suum consequens
not t;ive His »" . ^ . . ^
grace", becausc est in bencplacitum deo; et consequens lustum bene-
^ receive i't.°^ placitum; ut peccatum causat penam, sicut et negacio
eius, aflirmacio est diminuta. Et tamen talis displiceret
It is thus deo. Sed consequens non sic, cum sit iustum. Ipse ergo lo
'(Tod^shollld^be est tam bonus et tam impotens deficere quod si non
the cause of all j^^ ideo non datur, quia accipiens non accipit. De
that is causi.d, '. . ' ^ . ^ . .
if \ve inchide nobis autem qui sumus avari communicatum trequenter
'^°'pHvations"^ contingit quod ideo non accipit accipiens, quia non damus.
underthathead. q^qJ g^ arguatur deum esse causam uniuscuiusque cau-i5
sati, dicitur quod est impossibile, cum negaciones et pri-
vaciones et earum futuriciones vel pretericiones eterne
sonantes in deordinacione non causantur ab illo, cum
nichil causat nisi complacendo de causancia et causato.
Wc grant Verumtamen conceditur quod omnia creata habent 20
howevcr, that , . ,. , • , • • j
all, dircctly or vel directe vel indirecte reduci ad primum: ut ideo
dej^^nds mi 'the pecco, quia sum peccabilis, et sum sic motus, cum
First cause : my j^^ pauca sufficiencia ad resistendum ; et non bonum
want ot ^ u-i- o-
resistance to est ut causatum a deo quod sum peccabilis. bicut et
in^my^^nZre, ista veritas eterna est bona: Omuis natiira peccabilis 2b
whi^ch, as g,./^ peccabilis: et ab isto bono processerunt contingenter
created by God, -t. . '^ . . . '
is good; my futunciones peccatorum, et de necessitate primo omnium
^'eterimMruur futuricio omissionis alicuius debiti deo. Et prima ob-
missio habuit disposicionem et inclinacionem in ob-
mittente, cum qua non tunc stetit oppositum illius 3o
but my act of omissionis ; et tamen inmediate ante instans omissionis
the"crtfc'me°st fuit declinacio omissionis possibilis, cum summa contin-
contingcncy, pgncia sit de talibus futuricionibus, cuius contingencie
Ihougll O . . ,. ,. r ■ ■ • T *
radically pnmaria et radicahs causa ruit pnma essencia. Ista
dcpendciit on ^^^^^^ generalia de causalibus notata haliucrunt introduc- 35
toria in pulcerrimas veritates.
2. po^ B. ■•>. fol B. i3. av'e above avari I?; /7'. omt'' ; iu marg.
giTicat? B. 23. mo or zuo 15. 24. cst et !?.
5. Anteccdens . . . iniustum. Wyclif mcans hcre, I lelievc,
that the fact 0!" sin, bccause of its injusticc, being the caiisc of
its punishment, plcases God. 34. rvimaria et radicalis causa.
h is well to note the boldness of Wyclifs speculations iii this
(apparenlly) his tirst work.
CAPITULUM SEXTUM.
Restat crgo dicere de terminis reduplicativis com- Rcduplicaiivc
parative tentis. Hoc autem non est commune omnibus coii^si^dcrcd
terminis reduplicativis, cum iste terminus, ex hoc, ex- comparativcly.
' ' . . Tlicy cannot
3 presse connotat causam et non comparacionem, sicut al! be so
isti termini, iti quautiim, de qiiauto, pro iit, secundum ^'^"^''V.v^zoi:.
quod etc. Quando- erso predicti termini tenentur com- Tiie exponcnts
. ... ... ., ol sucli
parative, proposiciones racione iliorum exponende de- propositions
bent exponi secundum exponentes positivi gradus, de ,^° compadsons*
loquibus dictum est tractatu proximo. Sunt ergo deno- ot equahty
j, /- 1, . . . . . r (asmitcn.as &c.)
■'* ^^4 mmaciones sibi mutuo correspondentes, ut bonitas | crea- alrcady dcaii
ture et eius obligacio deo, entitas rei et eius cognosci- ^^"^'
bilitas, et intellectivitas, et intelligibilitas; et sic de
omnibus denominacionibus, quarum unam gradatim
iSrepugnat correspondere alteri; sicut est de per se causis
et suis completis causatis. Ut entitas rei causat eius T^ere arc many
... . .... qualities that
cognoscibilitatem, sed non intelhgibilitatem, eo quod omne i^o beyond each
ens est necessario eternaliter intelligibile, quanto deus est "^'^'^'^g^^^oftl;'^^
illius intellectivus; ipse enim est tam intcllectivus quam ^ ^'1"* . ,
. .... . rcduplicativclv
2o volitivus. Quamvis multa intelligit que non wult, quia aftirmcd
non de omni intelligibili habet volicionem ; et per idem ^ent]t\%*
est tante causativus. ordinativus, ct productivus, sicut intelhgrbility,
est vohtivus. Multa tamen wult que non ordmat; et
volendo sc non causat se, quamvis causet illud quod
20 est ipse. Quelibet autem alia pcrsona volitiva est plus
volitiva quam causativa. Ipse eciam precise tam bonus
est quam iustus est; et sic de aliis que non sunt sibi
actualia. De istis autem rcspectu cuiuscunque subiecti But this
' . ^ question is
est maxima difficultas, cum tangat raciones vdeales full of
„ ... . *" ., . . ' ditficulties.
.-loquc sunt prmcipia rerum, sine quibus cognitis nemo touching as ii
est sapiens. "''^*^^'. ^'"^ 4-'"''"n
'^ principles ot all
things.
1. Cap. deest. 2. Spacc for iiiitial R. 15. l'(). crcaliva 1!; ib.
Ipsa 15. 28. accua )}.
i!0 .lOHANNIS WYCr.IF CAP. VI.
Tlic prcscm Istis autem primissis, tractandum cst de denominacioni-
'\vi'tli'posi'ti'vc '"-^s, latitudinibus positivis et latitudinibus privativis ex
f"*^ 'Y?'^''^'^- opposito sibi correspondentibus : ut si aliqiia in qiiantum
qualities. conveniunt, in tantum differunt, Quod si sit veruin, tunc
it" t\vo"thin"s^ aliquorum consequencia et eorum differencia sunt pares; 5
asree to a et per idem quelibet privacio suscipiens maeis et minus
ccrtain e.\tent, ' ^ ^ . . ^ . ... ° ,. . ...
tiicy disagree to roret panricabilis suo positivo; ut simihtudo disimili-
^exten™*^ tudini, magnitudo parvitati, intensio remissioni, rare-
If so, every faccio condensacioni, distancia propinquitati: et sic de
privation tliat ,-. „ , . ' ^ . .
admits ot ahis. Quo dato, secuntur multa mconveniencia; et con- lo
^ntensky i." sequencia prima patet ex hoc quod illa proposicio: in
cqual with thc quantum aliqua conveniunt, in tantum diiferunt, expresse
opposite ^ .^ ^ ' . -^. ' .'
quality. parihcat comparata secundum convenienciam et dirleren-
absiirdhiel ciam. Et quod ex illo secuntur inconveniencia, patet ex
lollow. iioc quod pari evidencia qua ahqua talia opposita sunti-''
For it some t ^ * . , ,, ,•
opposite equaha, et quehbet; et tunc sequitur quod nuUa tahs
thiis cqmiK^all denominacio suscipit magis et minus. Si ergo omne
otjhem are so. matrnum sit ita parvum sicut maenum, et econtra, tunc
Take a Ime; ^ ^ . ^ . ^ . „ .
an iniinitely omne magnum est inhnitum magnum et innnitum par-
k^belon^^^s to ^'-^™ j ^^ V^^ consequens, proporcionaliter ut est maius ^f>
thc line; so the esi; minus, et econtra; et per consequens non esset
line is what its . ' . . . ^ . , ,- • ,
■part is, infinitely possibile maiorari vel mmorari, vel aliter rnoveri sub-
'""mallness is* iectum aliquod, cum nichil possit fieri intensius vel re-
inhnitely ,,?r(?a/.- i-^-|issius. distancius vel propinquius. Prima consequencia
so it is both , , , -1. 1 ,•
at once. probatur, dando oppositum de A pedah: quantumcun- 25
lesseni^ng.^mid 4"^ parva est ahqua pars A, ita parvum vel magis
change, arc all parvum est A. Sed infinitum parvum est ahqua pars A;
mipossible ' . - . , . '
thenceforth. ergo mfinttum parvum est A; et omne parvum est ita
magnum sicut ipsummet est parvum. Per datum ergo in-
finitum magna est ahqua pars A, et per consequens A 3o
est infinitum magnum, et infinitum parvum. Argumen-
tatur ex hoc quod A est magis magnum quam ahqua
eius pars, et precise tam magnum est quidhbet, sicut
est parvum ; ergo A est magis parvum quam ahqua eius
pars. '^^
what is provcd Et idem argumentatur de qualibet magna vel quaUcun-
likewfse provcd qi-ie denominacione suscipiente maius et minus denominato ;
of all other ,^i^ gj infinitum sit aliquis numerus, tunc infinitum par-
qualities. An ' ... ^ . . • a •
infinitc numbcrvus est ; si infinitum remissum est ahquod, tunc infini-
small" becaii^sc tum intensum est; et sic de aliis, eo quod omne tale 4<'
its sniallness is gj.^ p,-ecise ita magtium sicut parvum; et per consequens,
infmitely small ; i o i > i i
&c.
lati''"' B. lii, 32. a'"'- B.
CAP. VT. I.OGICA. I i t
si est magis magnum, tunc cst magis parvum. i£\ quo
palam sequitur quod repugnat quicquam se habere pro-
B 63' porcione | maioris inequalitatis ad aliquid, eo quod ex-
cedcns aut cxccllens vcl plus denominaretur positivo quam
5 privativo.
Hic audivi multas fugas sophisticas. lUi enim qui Thcre arc
'^ '^ . .^ manv answcrs
ponunt omne cns absolutum, ponunt quod omnis priva- that attempt to
cio et suum oppositum comparantur sicut termini vel difficu/tv'?
conceptus aut subiecta taliter se habencia; cum omnis i>ome say tliat
... . . . , , . . a pnvation ot
lopnvacio vel sit terminus pnvativus vel subiectum pnva- size is ^o^m?/,
tivum ; et sic concedunt quod illa privacio est pedalis ^a Vi-^va^t^onTf'
vel tanta, sed non est tanta privacio. Alii dicunt quod ^ , ^izc.
. , . , . . Otliers ti)at
si parvitas augmentabitur ad suum duplum, tunc erit m smallness, to
duplo maior quando est subdupla quatn est modo. Et would^rcquire
i5alii dicunt quod talis privacio privative intellecta est to be halycd.
. . . ,, ^ ^ . , . . , Others that
tanta, et positive intellecta est tanta, ita quod ipsi ta- smallness and
ciunt ex sua consideracione ens extrinsecum esse tantum "both^equ^aHv^
vel tantum. Sed falsificant se ipsos, et dislinguunt ig- gi"eat. but onc
. . Vt- , ■ iinderstood
noranter niter esse positive et esse pnvative. 1 ales n- positiveiy, the
2o mas circumpalpitantes excogitabant, qui per ignoranciam °^ "^'^"'^^'"'^'^ ^'
distinccionis encium tenebantur.
Supponatur ergo quod loquimur de entibus ex parte But wc are
rei non causatis ex consideracione hominis; et tunc thin^Vas^thev
patet quod stat difficultas querens sub quo gradu est a'''^! ,"?f ^*
f ' . ' . . . created l">y our
23 ista parvitas; utrum secus sit tanta magnitudo sicut mind. What wc
parvitas vel non; aut, sub aliis verbis. utrum subiectum is'\"^ Ji^eatness
sit tantum sub racione qua magnum, sicut predicatum ^nd smallness
■^ *L ' . '^ are equal or
est sub racione qua parvum. Idem enim est querere not.
utrum tanta sit illa magnitudo, sicut est illa parvitas,
3o et querere utrum hoc sit tain magnum sicut ipsum est
parvum. Natn iuxta primam responsionem, non sequi- The lirst
... . answer says
tur A est tanta parvitas : igitur A cst tanta res ; quia that as
• ••• •• •*: pl ■'1 1 1 n p C C
parvitas proporcionaliter ut est maior parvitas est minor bccomes
res, ut dicunt. Multum er^o differunt magnitudo et par- greater, entiiy
, . ^ . . decreascs.
33 vitas, cum est dare maximam magnitudinem et non est There can be
dare maximam parvitatem ; et duplare parvitatem est ^^.,"i^^J[Jj"™ „\}
subduplare magnitudinem et nichil duplare. Ymmo fa- "o^ ot
^ . '^ . . „ ... smaliness;
cere parvitatem sic quod nat et mcipiat esse quantum- to double
li'bet magna parvitas, non cst facere sed destruere magni- ''""^i','aive* a^ '"
Aotudinem. Aliud erso est rem esse maenam, et aliud m«.""'tiid'2> «ind
^ \^ , • ,- iiot to doublc
rem esse parvam. (^.uod tantum sonat ac si diceretur: at ali.
Smallncss being
tluis distinct
i8. se ipsas B. 25. fg B. J(i. diiplae B.
4. A word is probably wanting after vel.
112 JOHANNIS WYCr.IF CAP. VI.
from maHiiitiidi; aliud est magnitudo et aliud parvitas. I.oquimur crgo
bcarVupon^tiic de tali privacione secundum racionem sue magnitudinis,
magnitudc //w/ q^a privatur, et ut distinguitur a magnitudine: et tunc
ts wantiiig; ^ ^ . ^ . ^ . ,.„ ,
and ncitiicr patet quod nec prima responsio nec 2^ tangit difncul-
2'"' answer tatem logicam illius matene. 5
touchcs the Totum ergo intentum logici est querere quomodo
dilhculty. .f . . & .7 , , • ■
The question magna est lua privacio; et non solicitatur de subiecti
that' pdvati^on magnitudine. Patet ergo quod claudit contradiccionem
hp^^j .,, in terminis aput quemcunque bene intellieentem dicere
masnitude? F . . ^
It is a tiat quod hoc ent in B instanti duplum ad hoc quod illa lo
sav^"hat''Jt 'thc ^st; et tunc erit in duplo minus quam illa est. Si enim
somc instant it loquimurde magnitudine privacionis, ut distinguitur con-
is doublc and ^ . .. ^ ... . . ^ . .
haU ot itseif. tra magnitudinem positivi, utamur terminis numen ad
pf ^^ ^^^^ a"n^^ denominandum maiorem gradum privacionis. Quando
will bc twice ereo dicunt quod parvitas A corporis iam est ut 4, eti5
as srcat when . ^ . . . ^ , ,' . , ' . , , ^'
A=:2, this is mnnite ent m duplo maior quando ent ut duo, vel men-
"^thhigs^^by"^ surant parvitatem secundum equalitatem subiecti, vel
contrary namcs. gji^-gj.^ gratis vocant maius, minus.
Thus the tliird £j patet ex eadem consideracione quod 3'' responsio
nnswer avoids . .,, , . . . .
thc difticulty fugit difncultatem, quia quentur utrum magnitudo posi- 20
ma""n'itiide, ^ive intellecta sit tanta magnitudo, sicut est parvitas,
positively or ^-q\ privacione intellecta. Et supponatur quod in qua-
iindcrstood', is cunque denominacione maius et minus sit signandum
magni u c. pj.QpQj-(;jQ,-,aii{£i- niaiori termino numerali, itt ipsum est
maius. Est ergo illa responsio, ponens quod omnia 2.^
privative opposita sub mediis gradibus correspondent,
et proporcionaliter ut gradus positivi supra medium
gradum sunt intensiores, sub gradus privacionis remis-
Less logicaliv siorcs; et econtra. 1 Ista autem responsio minus peccat H (o'
wronathan thc . , . .' .....
two former in logica quam priores, cum respondit rormaliter luxta 00
r,?l'r J^^rr^npJns veritatem sermonis; sed maqis peccat in sentencia, cum
than thcy are. per alias non devenitur ad aliquam diflicultatem propter
Every negativc proterviam. Improbatur autem ista posicio per hoc quod
qualitv for ^ , . ,. ^ . . ' . f j.
which no cum latitudmum pnvativarum non sit dare medium
can^^bc^assinue^ii^ gradum, eo ipso quelibet talis in infinitum procedit in 33
becomes quibus positivum infinitum procedit; ut patet de motu
infinite by the ^ . ^ ^, , ^ -c . . •
vcrv fact, likc et rantate. \mmo, secundum magnihcantes potenciain
'^'^"qiiaiuiesl'^*^ dei, omnis species denominacionis positive in infinitum
And if thc potest procederc. Et si gradus medius in actu alicuius
medium dcgrcc '...'. ^ . . . i • -u-
of a positive positivi sit semper par pnvacioni corresponuenti sibi,4o
ij utantur 1!. ig. patct qiiod B. 'S.\. latitudinii 15. 3t). in
aliqni'» 13; ib. zifz'" pro intiuitum B.
CAP. VI. I.OGICA. I 1 3
sequitur quoJ quemcunquc gradum positivum possibile qiialitv is equal
esset pariticari pi-i\acioni sihi correspondenti. Et cum conesponding
tales i^radus nunc equales non possent fieri inequales, "'-'ga"ve one,
^ ^ '^ ^ ' then tlie same
sequitur quod omnes tales gradus correspondentes sunt takcs piace in
3 equales. Sive ergo latitudo positiva ponitur procedere \Y^ye nof^ra
in infinitum, vel non, semper procederet altera in in- . quality
■ . ' . . . extending troni
finitum, cum cuilibet parti linite termmate ad non gra- o to .^ in
dum de una latitudinc correspondet latitudo infinita de '"corresponds °
suo opposito; ut maenitudini a sradu ut 4 usque ad .to 'ntmite
' r r> _ ^ ^ -T T intensity ot
loHon gradum correspondet in infinitum magna latitudo smallness; thu.s
• '' • r-.. • ■ • • !•• we shall always
parvitatis. Et sic mvenies m ahis. t^n^ the infinite
Similiter videtur quod repugnat certe calculacioni ut, ,'". ^^'^'i ^^•^";
. ^ . . ' It is impossible
posito quod A cahdum sub medio gradu ut 4 sit prc- to admit tiiat a
^ • ^ • ^ • bodv can be
cise ita intensum sicut ipsum est remissum ; tunc, ipso equally hot and
i.^ remisso ad suum subduplum uniformiter in hora, iiiten- , ^o'"^'' 'f
. ' iieat = 4, then
detur remissio unilormiter ad suum duplum, eo quod becoming half
proporcionaUter ut aliquid est magis intensum quam sub ^^becomes
medio eradu est ipsum minus remissum, et econtra. hi ^^"''''^.•betvveen
^ . ^. . . ...... . the two, we
medio ergo instanti erit intensio A cahdi ut tria, et re- have Heat = 3,
■ ■ ■ ^ .. • c -^ 1 • 'ind Cold=6:
20 missio erit ut sex; et per consequens innnitum velocius. coW having
Et non proporcionahter acquireretur remissio quam de- . .'ncreased
i^ ' . ^ ^ . iiHinitelv taster.
perderetur mtensio ; cum tamen quantumcunque velociter
fiet aliquid magis intensum, fiet ipsum minus remissum,
et econtra, cum illud sit motus utriusque. Vel aliter
2? oportet ponere processum in infinitum in motibus; non
enim gradum finitum motus infinitum velocem motum
consequi, et per consequens omnem motum velociter
in infinitum velociter moveri.
Ex isto videtur quod non sit possibile iJem esse precise It is, therefore,
3o [ita] intensum ut remissum; quia tunc, acquisita remis- '"qua[j"y ^an^ ^"
sione dupla, deperderetur precise intensio subdupla, et equaiiy intense
, , , • • • • •'"^'^ '3''; fo'" 't
cum tantum deperderetur de intensione sicut acquirere- Its laxity
tur de remissione, patet calculanti quod sequitur inten- °"aif^of it"''^
sionem fuisse duplam ad remissionem in principio. Non ^utensity would
,. , , ,1 "^ 'ost, and we
S.T enim stat aliquod ens crescere ad suum duplum propter should see that
tantam latitudinem acquisitam, quantum reliquum de- was frcfm^ t'lie
perdendo decrescit ad suum subduplum, nisi primum ^ beginnine
■;. ,,, , , , • double of the
ruerit subduplum ad secundum, eo quod oportet sic laxitv.
22. intensio above remissio B. J>o. it.i deest. 36. acquirendam ;
acquisitam above B.
5. Here Wyclif enters into mathematical calculations on a
subject which is perhaps not to be dealt with thus, and at a
time when mathematics were hardlv able to grapple with ques-
tions concerning the Infinite. . .
8
I 1 4 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI.
\Vliatincteases, aLiementum acquirere tantum quantum ipsum est: et
iiicreases by . '^. ' . .
iiie whole 6t diminutum non oportet deperdere nisi medietatem sue
its intensitv; i •.. j- ■ r> .. -n i ^-^ ]•
wliat " latitudinis. Kepugnat ergo illas latitudines esse pares.
diminislies,only ^a responsio negat omnem comparacionem privacionis
bv the halt. . '^ . '^ . ^ ^
. The third ad habitum: et istam opinionem tenent aliqui (de qui- 5
Vfmt^posiTi^ve^ '^^^s mirorj, qui ponunt omnem privacionem esse rem
and riegatne privatam. Ista autem responsio excedit, cum stat nriva-
intensities are ' . . ... . . ^
comparable. cionem comparan quo ad bonitatem vel maliciam posi-
talse.^since tivam ; et sic de causacione et multis aliis. Nam habitus
pnvations can facit plus boni, et per consequens est relisiosior data lo
be compared . ^ . ' ' ' _ "
with positive privacionc; sicut et una denominacio talis est reliqua
Tlidr 'good o'r durabilior, potencior, remocior, propinquior; | et sic de B hr»
evil results. quibuslibet denominacionibus extrinsecis, Ymmo, claudit
No two thiiigs T . . '
can bear the contradiccionem ahqua esse, quantumcunque disparia
same specitic c •..■•• . • • ^ -ii i
name unless luennt, nisi sit comparacio inter iUa secundum con-o
ihey are in .so yenienciam et differenciam in aliqua denominacione
lar comparable, . ,• , , ,, ,^ .
at leasi specinca generah vcl analoga. ht hoc invenitur m re-
analoeouslv: • ,• •^ ■ • , , •
which the vcrv sponsione, cum dicitur pnvacionem et habitum tantum
aiiswer implies, jj0-gj.j.^ quod neutrum est compossibile alteri. Omnis
by saying thal .... ^ .
positive and enim dirterencia vel est comparacio, vel ad cam secun- 20
qiiamies '^/7/t'>; '^ur infinite comparaciones.
tor to diiier Item, vidctur quod ille Ibrme sunt proprie comnara-
supposcs . . ^ . . ' ' '
comparison. inles, quia eadem est magnitudo utriusque, cum utrum-
be.sidespropcrlv que capit magnitudincm suam a subiecto preter eius
comparable, subiecti ma^nitudinem ; non est illis alia, quia aliter ad 2?
tor their "^ ' . . , . ' ^
niagnitude is ot omncm punctum, quam talis inlinitum magna esset
llic samc iKiIiire. .^ , • ■ . , ,
magnitudo parvitatis, et per idem ad omnem punctum
mundi infinitum magna intensio.
.\nd when we o" confirmatur ilkid ncr hoc quud ulramque sicni-
say that eacli ^ . . t o
has V. g. an ficatur vere haliere magnitudinem ut duo, et unam esse 30
intensitv equal . ^ . ,. .
to 2, \v"c mean causatam in gcnere suo, sicut reliqua est m suo; cum
"'iVMh'^'.'"'^ ergo omnia quorum magnitudines vere signiiicantur,
intensity. cum eodem termino materiali sunt equalia, sequitur
quod onmis privati\a dcnominacio sit cqualis denomi-
nacioni positive. 35
Ali doublcs ^n gj^ . pronorcio \ matrnitudinis ad eius medietatem
bemg equal. . ....
the magnitude est cqualis proporcioni B parvitatis ad eius medietatem,
A is to its halt . ^ ^ '^ . , , , ^ ., ,•
as the smallncss quia omnes proporciones dupie sunt equales. hrgo illa
,.'^>:^.?h'!f,ii.^.l''n 4 sunt proporcionalia ad invicem secundum G genera
regular proporcionum, de quibus in 5" elemcntarum pAicIidis. 40
proporlion.
10. rligi"' f). 12. diuliiriiinr ; corr. beluw B. i3. q,l3: and so very
oftfii llironf^hoiit tllc l/.S'. ^5. e Tll a» 1'.; //'. a'' I'.. 2(i. q, 1',.
CAF. VI. [,OGICA. I 1 5
Aliter enim non esset veruni quud inuporcionaliter ut
privacio est maior est eius oppositum minus, et econtrii.
4° sic; posito quod A et B in principio illius hore Again, it is
fuerint eque bona cum suis habitibus et quod habens ""i^' aTbad^to''
5 A sit frustratum ab illo, salvo B eque bono suo ha- '°?? ^ 8ood
, • , • • » , quality as it is
benti, patet quod tam mala est pnvacio A quam bonus good to havc
est habitus B, et per conscquens malicia privacionis ooodness'an"d
est par bonitati habitus. Et sic non solum malicia et ''adness are
• , . , , . , ^ equal here, and
bonitas, sed carencia et habitus sunt equales. Et per aisothe 'having'
loidem in quacunque proporcione maioris inequaHtatis pHvat'ion.
sunt cornparabiles. Et idem patet de privacione priva-
cionis; ut quam bonum est habere visum, tam bonum
est carere cecitate, quia tantum proficeret (eo quod
sunt proprie idem); sicut tantum nocet carencia rei,
i3sicut proficit hal)itus eiusdem ; et sic iuvamentum et
nocumentum, carcncia et habitus, erunt quomodolibet
proporcionalia.
Pro responsione ad istani difticultatem, suppono quod To .soive the
omnis privacio diftert ab habitu et econtra. 2" suppono niu'^!'^^',^^"^^^^^)^^^^^
2() quod aliqua sunt comparabilia inmcdiate per se, ut due ^issumptions.
, . . r • •,-, i.Thatprivation
suDstancie comparantur la perieccione essencian, due and posscssion
quantitates in equalitate et due qualitates in intensionc. ^. That^^^some
Quamvis enim talia formaliter comparantur relacionibus .'liings are
.... . ^ , , . , . immediately
distinclis a comparatis, noii tamen habent accidencia comparable
2.T absoluta subiectata in illis et per que fundamentaliter ^and othci°'hy '
comparantur; 2" comparantur aliqua per accidencia '"*^?"^,"'^''6"'
, , , . . absolute or
corum absoluta, ut Iiomo et asinus eque propne com- relative
parantur in quantitate et figura ct qualitate et aliis •'^^'"■^^"'s.
accidentibus, que univoce participant, sicut homo et
3o homo, quamvis substancie mai^is difterunt F.t 3" com-
parantur aliqua sccundum accidencia respectiva e.xtrin-
seca: ut due albedines sunt eque proprie michi, quia
subiecta quibus insunt sunt ita ]-)roprie michi. 3" sup- 3, ^hat some
ponatur quod aliqua comparantur in denominacionibus ''"Pgs are
. . . . ^. . iinivocally,
3o certi generis univoce particularis: ut, Sor est melior others
lapide. Aliqua autem in denominacionibus analogis ex- c^o^mpfrablc.
tra genus; ut dicitur: deus est sapiencior Sorte; A/Jir-
macio est melior qiiam privacio vel negacio. Tales enim
'denominaciones secundum quamdam analogiam insunt
40 vel circumeunt multa genera analogica. Et 4° supponitur 4- That there
quod aliqua sit comparacio vel proporcio proprie dicta, comparison
qualis cst proporcio numeralis quantorum eiusdem properly
' ' ' ' sn-called, as
■-'. b'' P.. .). i'' B. !m). Iht-dnii P.. ,|(). fciiin I'..
8-
ii6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI.
among speciei, sive sit racionalis, que | inmediate denominatur b G6''
qiiaiitities ot the i . i- » • -^ • • i- •
same species, ^D aliquo certo numero, sive sit irracionalis, sicut est
whether medietas duple, ut proporcio diametri ad costam qua-
ratioual or .... . "
irrational; drati. Alia autem est proporcio communiter dicta, que
''"sor"oV'^' "O" ^^^ numeralis; sed ad illam sufficit habitudo. 3
proportion, tiiai [^tis premissis, patet quod omne ens secundum pro-
mathiematicai porcionem communiter dictam est comparabile alteri
l" is"obvTo\?s cuicunque. Patet ex hoc quod quidlibet habet se ad
that all beings quidlibet aliud in quadam habitudine. Sic enim homo
are comparable ^ . . ...
according to sapiencior est, deo simihor, lapide perfeccior; et erit lo
Ihis universal rc • • r » . ^ •
proportion. ainrmacio negacione meiior; et tamen non oportet m
talibus dare proporcionem numeralem, quia similitudo,
perfeccio, bonitas, et magnitudo analogice ampliata ad
magnitudinem mohs et magnitudinem virtutis, circumeunt
omne genus. In omni enim genere contingit reperire i5
similitudinem, perfeccionem, bonitatem, unitatem, magni-
tudinem, prioritatem etc, que conveniunt transcendenti.
No negation 2" dico quod nuUa negacio vel privacio est nositive
is by itself and . ^ . . ^ ' ^
properly propric proporcionahter, vel per se vel per absolutum
wmi^lfpo^sithe accidens quod subiectat. Primum patet ex hoc quod 20
quality; not nullum genus est illis commune; ereo non per se sunt
even by means . . . . ^
bf an absoiute taua proprie proporcionaha vel comparabilia. Conse-
tiiev^ca^n^beThe <ius"'^i^ tenet ex illa supposicione; et 2^ pars patet ex
snbject of none ^oc quod privaciones el neeaciones non possunt sub-
such. . ^ ,. , . , , , ^ ,
lectare ahquod accidens absolutum, nec lorme ilhs 2?
opposite; patet ergo quod non sunt secundum se pro-
prie comparari, nec secundum quantitatem nec secundum
qualitatem quam subiectant.
But tiiey are g^ 3", dico quod tales forme opposite possunt tam
comparablc, '. ^ . n r
even properly, communi comparacione quam comparacione propne 3o
comparlson dicta fundata in accidente extrinseco ad invicem com-
is founded on parari; ut contingit dandas privaciones esse datis habi-
some extnnsic '^. . *- ^ . , . ,
relation. tibus, in quacunque proporcione volueris, plures aut
pauciores, diuturniores vel breviorcs; et sic de aliis que
insunt illis per accidencia suorum subiectorum vel alios 35
respectus. Et patet quid generaliter. sit dicendum de
comparacione privacionis ad habitum.
Some Sej pj.Q ulteriore declaracione notandum quod alique
pnvations, '. . . . . .
especialiy sunt privaciones que non suscipiunt magis et minus;
v,'orthv of thc
3, 4, 4" B. n. affma'"- B.
3. Irracionalis. Irrational quantities, or surds; as V^ (pi"o-
porcio diametri ad costam quadrati). But v.'hat Wyclif means
by (I. 4) medietas duple, unless it be Ihe square root of two
1 cannot imagine. Mr. Matthew suggests aut tor ut, on 1. 4.
CAP. VI. I.OGICA. 117
ut quies et cecitas, et breviter omnia que non comna- namc, do not
^ . , , . ,• ■ , ...... .. admit ot
rantur m eodem subiecto ahquid positivi sibi oppositi. increase or
Et ille proprie et simpliciter privaciones sunt. Omnes '^'JfJ'|'^^'^j'^" j^^^"'
tamen dicunt aptitudinem subiecti ad formam et nega- only tlie 'denial
. . , ,.^,.. ^. .-ota qualitv but
0 cionem habitus tahs forme. Sicut crgo omne pnvatum the aptitudc ot
visu est quod non habet visum, sic omnis cecitas est ^rgceiv^^iThat"
cuilibet aheri cecitati par: et sic de tahbus similibus. quality.
. ,.. ,. , , . . . Ali these are
Ahi autem dicunt quod tales privaciones sunt eo maiores equai to each
quo forme quas privant forent maiores; de quo ahbi. "f'"^^j.''j]jjj'^^^°"
loAHe autem sunt privaciones communiter dicte, et se- absolutencss.
, . , , . ,• • j 1 Others are not
cundum quid, que ponunt sua subiecta et aliquid de so absolutcly
forma, et ahcuius gradus forme carenciam, ut parvitas, tijePrPcon^i-a^v
remissio, etc. que ex opnosito correspondent suis posi- qualities, but
. . ' ^ ' ' . . . ^ • rather
tivis. Ista autem non propne pnvative opponuntur suis ,ciativeiy; it is
i3positivis; sed quodammodo relative, ut duphim et '■^'- ^^vc^havcTo^do'
midium; et de istis est nobis sermo. We dcny that
-^ . . ,. . , ,, 1- • • . anv ot these
De istis ergo dicitur quod nuUa talis pnvacio est suo priVations is
positivo maior vel minor, nec inequahs secundum essen- j.,f|a°]|g7than
ciam, vel equahs. Illud patet ex 2^ conclusione; quia, its positivc
,. ,. ,. . , . . i2 -^ qualitv, or
20 si ahqua tahs esset rehqua maior vel mmor, aut nnite equal or
aut infinite. Si finite, tunc contingeret aliqua taha pari- ,|^'JJj^^|1^\;.^°l^^
ficari. Per idem non est causa dicenda quare non om- be to admii
r • 1-- • /> • f 4. many
nia forent paria. Si mfinite, tunc omne magnum loret absurditics.
infinite magis magnum quam parvum, vei econtra; et
2? quecunque pars detur, sequitur inconveniens. Si enim
omne quantum foret infinite magis magnum quam par-
vum, tunc infinitum parvum foret in tanta proporcione
B 67" magis magnum quam parvum, sicut maximum in mundo;
et cum infinitum crescit parvitas ahcuius tahs super
3o parvitatem maximam, sequitur quod minus, in quantum
minus, foret maius. Et idem patet, dato quod quelibet
parvitas sit infinitum maior magnitudine.
Ultimo dicc quod omnes tales forme proporcionaliter But they
, ,. . j .. correspond one
et non secundum equahtatem ex opposito correspondent; with another
35 ut si magnitudo corporis fiat in duplo maior, parvitas ^-a^iTnot^^as^^'
eius fiet in duplo minor, et econtra; et sic de quacun- equals,-
. . , „ . , . so that, as one
que proporcione signanda. Ex quo sequitur quod si quaiiiyincreases
'una talis forma acquiratur uniformiter, reliqua deper- '^^'^^^j.^^g^^'^^^^^'^^'"
deretur dififormiter; et econtra. Et pro tempore quo una slower; as
, . . ,. ,. , . ^ one increases
4ovelocms acquireretur, reliqua tardius deperdetur et p^ore, the other
econtra. Ut, maiorato A uniformiter ad sui duplum in '^^tfut^^^ahvavs**'
in proportion.
•eet ^ llllllis
6. sp, pro est quod B; ih. hns above habet B. 12. prm^ (?) B.
3o. maxi B. 39. after ccontra three llnes crossed off B.
li8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI.
hora, tunc in prima mediale maiorabitur, ad sui sexqui-
• alterum et in 2^ mediate ad suum sesquitercium et
parvitas econtra in prima medietale diminuetur ad suum
subsesquitercium, et in 2<' ad suum subsesquialterum.
Et sic invenies omnia talia opposita in suis denomina- •''
cionibus et condicionibus valde dispariter se habere;
ut, si una illarum quantumcunque tarde remittatur ad
non gradum in situm, celeriter intenderetur reliqua,
quia semper infinitum magno de uno infinito parvum
correspondet de reliquo; et sic est de multis proprie- u>
tatibus, iuxta quas possent multiplicari quotlibet con-
clusiones Et patet responsio ad omnia argumenta,
preterquam ad ultimum cum suis confirmacionibus.
To the first Ad primum dicitur quod privacio non est molc
difficultv we ... • c -^ 1- •
reply that magna; quia si sic, tunc infinitum modica eius pars i^
privation has quantitativa foret quantumlibet infinitum maior suo
magnitude, nor toto. Infinitas tamen parvitates in quocunque continuo
'^^^ *■ est signare quantumlibet maiores parvitate tocius, qua-
rum quelibet presupponitur adesse parvitatis tocius; et
tamen non sunt eius partes, cum nulla talis privacio 20
Two shadows \^^\jqi partes. Unde, quamvis due urnbre causant per
may make one t- ^ . .
doubly intense: idem medium umbram magis intensam, neutra tamen
but they are . ... -^- ai- j
not the parts, est eius pars intensiva, sed causa suppositiva. Aliquando
'o"f tiiat rfew^ "°^ posui parvitatem habere duplices partes, sicut mo-
shadow. tum; utputa partes magnas mole et partes intensivas; 2.S
et sic proposui tales privaciones esse dupliciter magnas
proporcionaliter ad illas partes, ita quod pars infinitum
parva quo ad molem esset quantumlibet maior suo toto
quo ad intensionem; quia grave videtur quod talis pri-
vacio sit continue magna sine hoc quod habeat partes. 3o
Nec est explicabile qualiter parvitas partis principiaret
parvitatem tocius, nisi causacionc intrinseca, tanquam
If privations pars componens. Si enim cecitas habet partes secun-
shoufd^hev no'! '-^^™ extensionem subiecti, sicut et quies, et alie priva-
be extended ciones, quare ergo non extenderenter alie privaciones ^^
hke positive , ,-1 • , r j » ■
qnalities? que plus ponunt .•' Sed grave videtur lundare partes in-
tensivas parvitatis vel principiare illas secundum dis-
parem individuacionenx. ab individuacione aliarum par-
cium.
I. se.\ B. 4. ses B. 11, 12. oones B. 23. Above supp. p B;
ib. alii: alin above B. 2). possunt: posui above V>. .33. sjr (?) i;.
35. qr pro quare H.
CAP. VI. I.OGICA. 119
Quomodocunque ergo dc hoc sit, certum csl qiiod in posltivc
, 11-1 • • -1 I-- • oiiaiititics tlic
opposito modo est de taubus privaciorubus ct aliis posi- j,,eatcr implics
tivis; quia in quantis positivis maius minus presupponit ^'jlliji^^y^gy ',|'g
tanquam eius partem: sed in privativis minus presuppo- lcss supposcs
. ^ . * . . ' j , ' • thc grcatcr,
5 nit maius et mmmium est dandum; ut patet de parvi- and as tiie onc
tate mundi. In proporcionibus autem conservantur maior 'o[^[[^i?^n^\,!;t'^
proporcio maioris inequalitatis, et minor proporciona- diminish.
liter minoris inequalitatis; ita quod deperdita propor-
cione maioris inequalitatis usque ad equalitatem, infini-
lotum cresceret proporcio minoris inequalitatis; et
maiorata in infinitum proporcione maioris inequalitatis,
infinitum diminueretur proporcio minoris inequalitatis;
B 67'' sic quod intinitum | magnam proporcionem maioris in-
equalitatis, si detur, consequitur infinitum modica pro-
i5porcio minoris inequalitatis et econtra : minima tamen
proporcio, a qua alie procedunt, est proporcio equali-
tatis. Cum ergo magnitudo magnitudinis non sit, ri'si '^^^"J^^*j^°'^'-j^''
illa magnitudo, sicut magnitudo parvitatis est vel ipsa of magnitude,
, . . "^ . . . , . , so therc is no
parvitas vel eius passio, ne sit processus m mhnitum, vel magnitude of
2onugatorie replicetur eadem sentencia: patet quod falsum j^^^^l^iij^f^^^Yboiii
est quod eadem est magnitudo magnitudinis et parvi- have the samc
... . . , , . . magnitude is
tatis. Nec est mconveniens, extendendo nomina mten- false:
sionis et magnitudinis, concedere quod infinitum intensa [^gan '^notllin'''
magnitudo et intensio sunt ad quemlibet punctum by that term,
. , . . or clsc
25mundi; sicut theologi concedunt de potencia dei. Ista grcatness and
tamen anologa per se supposita communiter intelligun- *t™emseWes':'
tur de magnitudine molis et intensione qualitatis: which arc
, . . • j • evidentlv iiot
magnitudo tamen parvitatis non est magnitudo, sicut identical.
nec intensio remissionis est intensio, si non equivocetur.
lo Ad secundum dicitur quod minor est falsa. quia, Thc second
,. . . ' . . . argumeni is
racione certitudmis, in numens qui sunt prmie mensure met by
rerum, signantur exemplariter per eumdem numerum qui '^ft"the^sanie'
non possunt equari; ut perfeccio hominis vere designa- numbers arc
' ^ , ^ . . . . , empioved to
tur suo genere, gradu ut 8, et perreccio asmi gradu designafe things
ob ut 8, sicut magnitudo temporis, magnitudo corporis, et homolo^coTs^
velocitas motus signantur gradu ut 8. Et tamen dicere , they are
,.,, ,. .. theretore equal.
^quod illa sunt equalia est pure demencie. Et si argu- Though 8 may
mentatur sic : A est tantum in suo genere, sicut B in suo per^fectio°n of^^a
genere; ergo A est tantum sicut B, eo quod quantum- man in his
'^ !• 1 • species, ot an
4oCunque est aliquod ens m suo genere tantum est: ass in its
3. "mig pfupp' "maig B. 6. gnt se; above gfernr B. 10, u. et —
inequalitatis bottoni ofpageb. is. niia B. 23. itit^ B. 32. veris (?) B.
2
ib. fignanf ; f,'"' above B. 33, 34. designalur B.
120 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF GAP. VI.
species, of a dicitur quod argumentum non est verum de virtute
i^volSme/LraSermonis; sed A est ut 8 in suo genere et B est ut 8
movement, it [^ j^q eenere. Et sic in consimilibus proporcionibus se
were foUy to ^ '^ . . .
say that tiiese habent ad gradus suorum generum eisdem terminis
f hls^may numeralibus signatis. Cum enim non cognoscimus gra- 5
apply to all jjyg talium rnaenitudinum nisi ex supposicione, nec habe-
similar cases. ^ . , j • j
mus dispares numeros proporcionatos ad denominandum
And it does omnes dispares magnitudines. Nec mirum, si magnitu-
tha"t°two tWngs dines diversorum generum mensuremus eodem termino
beinggreat, and j^^jpj.jgj.ali. j^gj, sequitur: utnimcjue istorum est magnum lo
neither greater 5 t x o
than the other, ef neutrum reliquo mams: ergo, utrumque est equale al-
thcy are equal. ^^^_. ^ ^^^.^ oportet ad equalitatem esse convenienciam
specificam fundamenti.
The third Ad 3^'"'" conceditur quod argumentum est verum;
^valid^fbut'' sed quo ad illos sex modos argumentandi Euclidis, i3
Euclid dicitur uuod ipse inteiligit illas in quantitatibus eiusdem
understood . t ^. ,. . .,, , , , ^
quantities of generis (quamvis aliqui lUorum possunt habere locumj
Thesequantities eciam quantumcunque disparatis. Gonceditur ergo quod
may be proporciones aliquorum sunt proprie comparabiles et
proportional ^ t -i r r 1
with each proporcionata, nec sunt equalia nec inequaiia per se, 20
though^'neIth"er sicut patet de proporcione temporis ad tempus, et
equal nor spacii ad spacium, et similium discontinue proporciona-
unequal. '^ '^ . . ^ .
Thus the worldlium quibus proporcionantur proporcione communiter
greater^than dicta. Unde non sequitur: proporcionaliter ut magnitudo
a grain of g^f maior, parvitas est minor, et econtra; ergo, parvitas 20
less sniall than et magnitudo sunt equales vel inequales; sed sufticit quod
tbe same. proporciones excessuum sint equales, vel ex opposito
correspondentes. Ex istis enim probabiliter infertur quod
omne tinite denominatum aliqua tali denominacione
participat proporcionaliter suo opposito: ut mundus 3o
situ sic finite magnus, est eo minus parvus quam
mileum, quo est magis magnus.
if not, we could Aliter enim non esset dare ] minimum gradum quo B 68'
a"min?mum'nor aliquid est parvum, nec maximum quo nichil est par- ^
a maximum of vum. Ymmo nulla foret subdupla parvitatis ad parvitatem -^^
medietatis mundi; quia, dato quod sic, .mundus foret
in duplo minus parvus sicut est in duplo magis mag-
nus. Non enim est verisimile quod addicio unius puncti
ad istum mundum induceret parvitatem ad omnem
eius punctum, postquam per ante non fuit usquam eius 40
7. quando above cum B. 11. utr'' q, B. 17. piTt above comt' B.
18. desgate B. 23. cp por"'" cppor°^ B. 3r. fc» pro siia.; very
illegible B. 3/. mi'' underlined B. ..,..,
CAP. VI. LOGICA. 121
^liqua parvitas; ct ahlacio puncti toUeret parvitatem
a remancntc, cum unum talium oppositorum non possit
auferri, nisi per opposicionem reliqui. Sicut ergo est i''ut tiierc must
dare maximam magnitudinem, sic est darc minimam to magnitudc
f> parvitatem, quia aliter mundus inlinitum maioratus '""^ ^'"^""^^*-
successive non esset minor in aliquo instanti quam in
quolibct instanti; et per idem posset in tantum diminui
ad non quantum sine hoc quod minoraretur et non
minoraretur, nisi pro instanti foret parvus; et per con-
losequens, nisi fiierit ita qiiod est parvus.
Probabile ergo est dicere quod parvitas mundi est Wo may affii m
• • • . • -^ 1 ^ • ^ • that thc world
minima, sicut cius magnitudo est maxima; et sic gra- is at once the
dus parvitatis mundi est primum et minimum, quod est 8,''^'"5^^ ^",'? '^'^
* f ,. . . ^ . least small ot
metrum et mensura omnium ahorum iUius generis; ut possible hcings.
i5alia sunt eorum minora, que ab illo sunt plus distancia,
et gradus magnitudinurn mensurantur penes distanciam
a non quanto; et sic principium magnitudinis non
communicat in illa denominacione cum suis principiatis,
sicut principium parvitatis communicat in illa denooji-
2onacione cum suis participiatis: quia perfeccionis est
participare positivum et non communicare cum illo in
denominacione imperfeccionis. Primum ergo principium The first
. • 1- • •, -1 . . • ■ ^ ^ j principle ot all
est indivisibile et tamen inmensum virtute, sed non things is
mole; et ipsum principiat utramque denominacionem mtinite, but
j without
2? ultimate. Mundus ergo est parvus, non secundum com- dimensions,
1 •'^ • .. j .. j because
paracionem ad maius ymaginatum quod non est, sed indivisible: the
in comparacione ad maeis parvum; et alia sunt parva world is not
^ . r ... infinite since
in comparacione ad maius, Et proporcionaliter dicitur something
de remissione, propinquitate, et simihbus. Tales ergo t^ii^an Itfnot^n
3o denominaciones que non sunt simihter denoininaciones niagmtude bui
' . . ^ . . 111 smallness.
quo ad ahquid habent se positive, et quo ad ahud The like may
pnvative; ut densitas quo ad quantitatem privative se remissness,
habet, sed quo ad multitudinem materie positive ; et P'""!""'^"'^^ '^'^*^-
' ^ . . . t>ut some
econtra de raritate. Et sic est de sompno et vigiha, que quaiitles are
.■,- ••.. •._• j ■ \-^ ^ positive trom
oDsuscipiunt magis et minus, sed non proporcionahter ut one point of
ahe privaciones nunc citate. y).Q\\, and
. . . ..... pnvative from
Et si queritur quid est tahs privacio, dicitur quod another; as
est forma denominans subiectum formaliter huiusmodi ; ^"feep' and "^'
et sunt de eodem genere in quo sunt sua positiva oppo- ,}^^H'"§' ^^l- ,
'^ . " . *^ . ^^ It asked, what
40 sita, sed per reduccionem ; ut parvitas est in genere this privation
quantitatis, et cecitas in genere qualitatis. Non enim '*' A^fo"m ^'^"
5. minoratus above B. 6. maior above minor B. 27. £un B.
36. nc citate.
122 JOHANNIS WYCMF CAP. VI.
iiitrinsically oportet ponere privacionibus, negacionibus, faturicionibus,
\subject to pretericionibus et possibilibus, nova genera; quia de
receivc a racione generis est dicere iiositivam quidditatem sub-
certain name, . ° ... ^ . , . .
and beionginii stancie vel accidentis, que est veritas de presenti m
"enus^a^s^tlie substancia, fundata per formalem inherenciam. 5
positiye quahty ,Utrum autem iila que suscipiunt maeis et minus sunt
to whicn it is .. . ^ . ' . ,- •
opposed. privaciones vel non, est dissencio. Aliqui enim vocant
que^sdon'^ ipsas | quantitates vel qualitates, alii melius vocant illas B 68"
whetlier that passiones vel proprietates accidencium, non per se in
wliich incrcases ' .. . . . .
or diminishes genere. Et ahi vocant illas pnvaciones carencias et i^)
can bc called a .. •n i • • i .. i -r. *
privation or tunc ula verba privari vel carere etc, non mobiiitant
not; somc terminos. Sed idem esset hoc, carere quantitate tl qiian'
admit this; . . . . -' . ■' ,
some call titate carere. Unde al,iqua est privacio forme habite de
pnvation the i- , .. •.. i • j i •!•.. -i- _ • _•
propcrty of an predicato, ut cecitas, vel visus debilitas; ahqua pnvacio
accident and eg^ forme habende, ut privacio principians generacionem i5
some, a merc . . f '^ . . . •! •!•
want. compositi naturalis; aliqua est pnvacio forme possibilis,
"cith'ei"of "^ ut inpotencia infantis qui moritur in prima eius etate.
something ]7j aliqua est privacio vel carencia forme intellieibilis
alreadv ^ ^ . r i-
possessed^^or to que non potest esse, sed subiectum habet formam tahs
be possessed, • - ^ ^ ^ ^ • ..
or that minht speciei; ut omne quantum est parvum, et omne intensum 20
be so; or ot a gs^- remissum, ipso carente intinita quantitate et infinita
merely . . . ^ . ^ . .
intelligiblc intensione. Si ergo esset aliquod tale mfinitum magnum
caiVnot be ^'^1 intensum simpliciter, tunc esset non parvum et
possessed y. g. niinime remissum.
to be depnved . . . . . ,
of infinite Videtur autem michi quod parvitas est proprietas 23
size is lo be -^ • ^ ■ ^- • ■ n ■.. r^..
small. quantitatis et non carencia quantitatis mhnite. h.t sic
My opinion is ^^ ceteris que suscipiunt maeis et minus. Ad alias enim
that smallness ^ . ^ , .
is a property consequuntur carencie, sed non tormahter sunt carencie.
not a privation I" omni enim genere accidencium est dare genus et
ot infimte sizc. speciem, differenciam, proprium et accidens, quamvis 3o
Though not so ^ . ' . . . ^ . . ^
properly as in non ita proprie sicut in cathegoria substancie. Omne
subs^tanccs, tamen accidens accidentis est accidens substancie, sicut
accidents may omnis diflerencia vel proprium accidentis inheret sub-
have the nve . ...
predicables; but stancie per accidens cui per se inest; ut parvitas quanti-
ihe accident, ..^•^»'^ • ^ ..•'';
difference or tatis est siwiectum, sic quantum, esse parvum: et sic ^d
properiv of an \\\r^ parvitas potest separari a subiecto, sed non ab illa
accident bclongs '^ . ^ ' . .
to the quantitate. Non tamen est possibile quod accidens
As to t\ie fourth habeat sic per se, posterius illo quod ipsum accidens
argument, posset esse non inherens et subici tali posteriori.
the conclusion ^ . . . . ^ , .
may be granted. Ad 4"^ dicitur quod iii casu posito est conclusio pro- 40
Opposite forms
can bc properly babiliter concedenda, cum tales forme opposite compa-
compared,
thouiih not in
^''°"^''^'-^^':.. rantur in suis denominacionibus ab extrinseco causatis ,
4. qnod above que B. .^. fu"' R. 11 mo'»' B. 17. e"" e'» B.
CAP. VI. I.O(',lCA. 123
ct in talibus siint ipsc pi-oprie comparabilcs, iuxta 3'"" iiicinsclvcs.
usion.*m. CXuod autem talis rorma sit bona vel o,. badncss
mala, hoc est per comparacioncm ad utilitatem sub- pi"cceds tiom
' ' . ^ . . . . a companson
lecti et ad multa alia; ct ita dc mahcia est dicendum. with outside
5 Omne enim bonum est quodammodo bonum debile; ut ^vli^icli^^thcy^are
res quecunque cst precise tam bona alicui alteri quam "sctul or thc
T " ' , . ^ . contrary.
utilis est eidem ; et tam maia est res alteri quam in- Intrinsical and
utilis vel impediens est ab opposito alterius indebite. ""^oodness
Ex quo sequitur quod non proporcionalitcr cst res (""''^y^ "''*^ ""^
lobona alteri sicut est bona in sc, ut liabere centum so- iMoney may bc
lidos cst bonum virtuoso indigenti; et prodigo forsitan poo^"but liones*t
esset malum. Ymmo, cum diversis circumstanciis potest '^^''"'' j?"*^ ■'"
. ' . ' cvil tor a
vicissim esse magis l)onum vel mmus bonum liabere spcndthriit.
centum solidos, sicut patet de valore usibilium que sunt circ°mstances
i5eo alicui valenciora quo utiliora: ut panis valeret in t'"^ sani^^ tlimj;,
T . , ^ equally good
tempore necessitatis famelico quodhbet magnum aurum, in itselt,
ubi non valeret denarium sohdi pro loco et tempore e.xninsLar
quibus posset habere illutn pro obula. Et sic gladius ^''.'"^ '■,'•* ^'"^'''^
^ V . ^ . ^ . in a taminc;
valeret iniuste obsesso centurn guldenis; et tamen eidem or a sword in
c • ^ 1- 1 T 'u .. iM u- the hands ot a
2o rurioso esset ahas malus. In otnnibus ergo tahbus, ubi ^varrior or of a
aoitur de valore vel bono sub racione qua utile, atten- , niadman.
" ... 1- • -1 ^" t"est: thmgs
dendum est ad mdigenciam ahcuius cui est bonum, et demand is an
ad commodum quod cum paribus sibi inferret; quia '"tactoi-!"
valde relativa est racio talis boni. F^hysical
goodness
23 Bonum autem nature est co maius quo ens habens depends on thc
illud est naturaliter perfeccius, sicut fines perfecciores '^tliarbeing"'
sunt hiis que sunt ad finem. Homo enim, qui est finis which
, . . . . possesses it.
omnmm | ahorutn sublunanum, daret in casu luste pro The salvation
salvacione sua quotlibet talia bona. Ideo est quantum- wortli^more*
Solibet melior illis: sicut deus est sic optimum quod ^''^" the whole
" "9" potest esse, et quamvis omnis res naturahs absolute sit But natural
taliter bona, omnis tamen res naturalis est bona primo ^j^^^gvgpy^P^'/^*^^
modo, quia aliter talis. Ymmo probabiliter potest dici "sefulness to
^ . ... ...... some onc ;
quod quehbet pars mundi est cuihbet indigenti utilis;
35 et de facto prodest cuilibet homini ut quelibet pars
celi, causando celum, prodest michi, cum ipsum celum a'^j sin"have'
causatum conservat me secundum corpus. Et sic in- f^^"" "«cs.
venies de bonis accidentalibus quibuscunque. Vicia
autem et peccata sunt occasionaliter bona, cum prosunt
i8. s' B. iq. g^ pro guldenis B.
i8. Obtila, Cf. Lafontaine, Le Serpent ct la I.ime: "Seule-
ment le quart d'une obole."
T
124 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI.
Nothing can noii solum in exemplum aliis, sed et ipsis peccantibus
exist tliat is not , ^rij- -l-i
good in somc quod peccaverunt. Unde impossibue est esse ens, nisi
way. fuerit quodammodo bonum.
The third sort o m i. • 1 ^ -i
of good — J vero genus boni, honestum est utile; ut omni
'^*?'"^' 8°°'' ~ virtuoso prosunt virtutes et actus virtuosi; vmmo tanta
it its impossible est de illis virtutibus honestas quod nemo potest uti
to put virtue to , . ^ ^ i- • l • • !•
a bad use. male virtute morali, sicut potest abuti virtute naturali,
moral[v'eood ^^ forte intellectuali. Unde virtutes anime valent multa
are sometimes bona naturalia et extrinseca. Et quo ad racionem boni
equally so, , ^- ^ , , . .
sometimes nonesti, sunt quedam eque Dona, quamvis quo ad ra- 10
omedme^s bss- ''^^'^^'^ bona utilis quandoque plus prosunt et quando-
their utility aiso que minus; ymmo quandoque superantur a parvis bonis
varies so much »••/-> ^ ^ i- i- -^
that at times extrmsecis. Cum ergo tot modis dicitur unum opposi-
very shght torum. esse, sic et reliquum.
externai ' ^^
advantages Patet ergo quod 3^^ est racio mali. Divicie enim i5
"EviisTn^^hke quandoque actualiter sint male, eo quod alicui inutiles.
manner are Peccata nature et morum sunt mala nature: et actus
threefold : . . . . . '
unserviceable, viciosi sunt mala inhonesta. Ex quibus patet quod
immorah sicut nichil est bonum deo primo modo; sic ipse nuUi
Nothing is of est malus primo modo, sed cuilibet alteri nature est 20
use to CjOd; . ^ .
because he has ipse bonus prmio modo, sed nulh tam bonus quam
nee ^^"Pg ^'"^' bonus est in sui natura. Prima pars patet ex eo quod
unserviceable to Jeus non potest alio indieere. Cum ereo utile dicit in-
iione, since He ... "^ . ^
preserves all digenciam, nichil potest esse utile vel commodi-
"and' punishTs^' ^^'•1'^^ sibi. Et 2^ pars patet ex ,hoc quod ipse pre- 23
only tor the exigitur tanquam necessarius observator et dans omne
good of the '^ . .7^ . .
universe; so bonum cuuibet tah nature; et per consequens nulli tah
punishment He ^^'^ inutiUs ; quia si puniat aliquos, hoc est misericor-
infiicts is not diter, et ad universi honestatem, et ad eorum utihtatem.
an in|ury. , \ . _. .
Moral evii can Ideo non nocet vel impedit ahquos, etsi innigat illis ?o
"ommitte^d b)^ malum pene, quod est malum et nocens nature secun-
Th^''^^ d ^^^^ quid. Malum autem moris non potest principiari,
cannot make quamvis illud bonum non formaliter.
thou^^ii^^H^c' can Ergo deus potest facere hoc esse bonum quod Sor
make his sin to peccat, et tamen non potest facere Sor peccare. Et sic 35
be good, -^ '^ '^
4. honeste B. 16. acca' B. 28. qui sic above B. 33. ud bo°>
no for"^ B.
32. Mahim moris is here taken evidently in the sense of
sin; I think that pei^cata morum (I. 17) may mean' a bad habit.
Scholastics divided good into iitile, delectabile and honestiim.
evil into itiutile, molestum, inhonestum. On I. 1 5, 16, we have
inutile; on 1. 16 mclestum and on 1. 17 inhonestum. Now only
inhonestum corresponds to moral evil; and if we take peccata
moriim as sin, it would not necessarily be malum natare (i. e.
molestum).
CAF. VI. LOGIC.A. 12 5
ista [conclusio] esi bona: Sor peccat : ergo, honiim est vel Liecause tiie liist
verum est qiiod Sor peccat ; et deus facit consequens et lo^^the^^physicaf
non antecedens. Racio, quia antecedens non est in or- , °,'''^'^''-
^ . Whatever
dine nature, sicut consequens; quia Sor peccare est de exi.sts
3 ordine nature. Et primo conclusio probatur: Sor peccat; '"'''^' e goo.. .
ergo verum est quod Sor peccat; crgo ens est quod
Sor peccat; ergo bonum. Similiier: Sor peccat; ergo
iuste punitur; deus facit consequens et non facit ante-
cedens in sequela logicali. ut est hic. Et sic licet facit ^ ''"^ |'"-'
^ c • ■ ■ 1 1 • 1- 1- antccedenl,
loposterius, non tamen racit prius m sequela logicali; licet thonsh realiy
in sequela reali semper faciens posterius. facit prius. dum- Jqj a'!." ,ac\
modo illud prius non sit suppositum in ordine nature. '^ not logicaliy
■^ ' "^ , . . . ascribable to
Nec facit consequens et antecedens nontacit, quia ipse Him.
non est naturaliter prius, cum non sit in ordine nature.
B 69'' 3^ autem pars patet ex 2-' ; nec obest res eternasj habere God is good to
indigenciam alicuius quod semper habent et appetunt ci-eaturcs.
sed non indigent aliquo quo eternaliter carent vel sperant,
cum habent inainissibiliter quo indigent vel declinant.
Et quarta pars patet ex hoc quod tam bonus est deus lUit to nonc so
2ocuiquam quantum prodest illi, ut patet de virtute ser- '""'^qq^I 1^,"^ '*
monis; sed nulli tantum prodest quam bonus est in se; Himself; for
' . ,,.,,. . ' He is that
ergo, etc. Nec sequitur quod deus _mnnite concurnt ad intinitely, and
actum essencie create; quia necessario libere concurrit Hfs'creatmes'
ad omnem talem actum causate essencie. quante iuvat «"'y i'\so tar
.' as scrviceable
2.1 ad illum; ideo proporcionahter concurrit ad actum ut to them.
ipse est magnus; et hoc est melius quam esset, etsi in- ^to^^ji^/^^tror
tinite concurrerit ad quamtumlibet actum. Et hoc est h*'» creatures,
. . . ' . -111 smce it is free
inpossibile, quia tunc prmia mensura mimoderate habe- cannot be
ret, quia nuUum haberet motum ipse deus; quia ad ""•'"|,^;,j"be'""'''
3oasendum masis vel minus equaliter se haberet. Et si adapted to the
. => - . ^ 1 1 1 • intensitv ot
innnite concurreret lUi, non esset modus vel moderacio. each act.
Nec potest probari quod quante deus est, tante con-
currit, vel est alteri similis vel dissimilis. Minima enim
differencia possibili differt primum suppositum a 2".
35 Et si areuatur sequi: illo modo deits aoit similatiir vel Analysis ot an
o ^ c objection,
differt ab aliquo quare deus est sicut est causa: ergo illo showing it to
modo esl. dicitur quod non est color in argumento si ^equhocat^ion^,"
non equivocetur; quia tunc esset respectus accidentalis
causa, qualiter similatur vel dif!'ert ab aliquo; et cum
I. conclusio deest ; que B. ir. 12. dn" B. 14. za' B. 26. actus
sit underlined after ipse; est abovc the line B. 27. actum underlined;
q,l5 above B. 2S. mefa B. 3i. i' B. 36. qv quare. qualiter) ergo in
marg. B. 39. q? dens est sicnt est causa underlined before qr B.
126 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAH. VI.
taking thc causa fonrialis sit eadem forma que est causatum,
ablative case in • j ^ i- ^ .- .... ^ ,
different senses. sequitur quod talis respectus loret essencia divina. Quod
si equivocetur in relacione ablativi casus, intelligendo in
antecedente, "isto tnodo deus difFert a me" ablativum
regi ex vi cause formalis, et in consequente ^'isto modo 5
deus est" ipsum regi ex vi accidentis, lunc est iinper-
tinens sensui concludere, quia quante deiis est quod tante
differt a me. Non enim est subiectum tante quante est acci-
dens, sed plus. Nec est verum quod differencia qua deus
differt a me est par deo vel infinita, quia terminatur lo
ad duo extrema, et non convenit deo in magnitudine.
it tollows that Patet eciam ex dictis quod multa sunt bona que di-
many thinas • , i- i i • ,•
that we call cimus mala; et alia pJus valent quam cstimamus, alia
^Vor fnM*^"-^^ ' "^^""^ valent, cum omne tale imperfectum tantum valet
punishments quantum iuvat ad perfeccionem universitatis. Prima pars \b
misfmtunes. P^Ttet ex hoc quod penalitates et alia que dicimus in-
tortunia, sicut generaliter cuncta que nobis displicent,
dicimus mala, cum tamen iuste cx divina providencia
ad bonitatem universi evcniunt; et sic nobis placencia
dicimus bona^. etsi de facto sint mala; sicut patet de 20
ignorantibus et viciis corruptis.
Also, that our 3ed 2'' pars patct ex hoc quod venalia plus valent
eslimate ol . . . ' .... ^ '
vaiues is often m canstia quam in fertilitate valerent, eo quod equi-
mistaken. 1 j , ., • •, • -i
Dearth raises valens pius valet cum paucionbus quam, ceteris paribus,
pnces; we can cv\m pluribus. Cum ergo nullus h(jminum scit propor- 2.S
never . ' . . . . . ° . . . ^ }
exactly regulate cionare incomgibiliter usualia ad multitudinem utencium,
^demand"^ patet quod ignoramus valorem talium. Jn empcionibus
Sometimes autem et vendicionibus, accedit quandoque error nota-
man s . ' . . ' ^
wickedness bilis ex scclenbus hommium, et quandoque accidit
e!,timate to"^cn '"-'^'^'^"'^'^ *-'^ quadam estimacionc propinqua veritati; nun- :io
notably; quam tamen accidit valor ex sola ordinacione hominis,
sometimes it ^ , ,•
approaches vel ex hoc quod pro pluribus vendi potest, sed ex dis-
Nature a"iV ^nlit P^^''-^^'^'^ nature regentis sublunaria.
the estimate Et ultima pars patet ex hoc quod valere vel esse
that rcallv Hxes , ., .T . ,',.,. , .^, . ., ^
the ^vorth of boiiitm iitile dicit haoitudinem ad id cui est utile. Et 35
The mealure of '-'-"^^ universitas sit a deo cathereta participando quo-
worth of cunque tali bono, patet quod participacio utilitatis ab
anything is its . . ' ? . . ,^, ' ,
utility in the universitate est mensura valoris rei. Nec obest rem cuius
even^thou^n^h it '^°'^ ^''''^ usus actualis valere, quia ipsa iuvat quiescendo;
be not actually licet avarus 1 quandoque impediat rem iuvare. Summe B 70
3. re"" ['■>. iii. pena» B. iS. el e.\ fuma abovt' e\ divina I'..
12. venialia B. i'.|. \eniat ahove \alit H. 2ij. IVIibii I'.. [k>. iiisfia 1'..
3o. caihfra P..
CAP. VI. l.t)(-;iCA. I 27
ergo inter creaturas vak-t humanitas in Cristo. de qua Clirist's
non est nostrum scire quantum valet, sed relinquatur ,,t an^criaturos
consideracio illius subtilioribus theoloeis. "'''^ which has
^ . most wortli.
Redeundo ergo ad propositum, conceditiu- quod est Thus to have
D dare habitum rei tam bonum quam mala est altenus as/o })•««? is
rei privacio; ec sic boiiitas et malicia sunt denominacio- ^^'';
nibus extrinsecis pares. sicut sunt habitus et privacio:
sed hoc est impertinens ad concludendum magnitudinem but liiis does
• .. ■ ■ ^ i ■ • uot nrove that
et parvitatem esse pares; quia iste denominaciones ma"nitude and
losunt per se quante, et secundum se non possunt pari- smallness are
ficari, modo bonitas habitus rei et malicia privacione
rei capiunt suam magnitudinem ab extrinseco, sicut a
prodessencia vel utilitate universi quam ponunt vel
privant. Et ideo generaliter tam bona est res corrupti-
i3bilis quam mala esset, cum paribus, eius privacio. Et
isti termini tam et quantwn dicunt parvitatem proporcio- Tam and
num et non parvitatem illorum proporcionatorum ind'icate"ot
secundum sua intrinseca; ac si diceretur.- tante est P'""P°'"^.'°".' "^^'
..... . . intrinsic
magnitudo iluus muiorata quante est eius parvitas oquality.
2omaiorata; vel econtra. Et sic de similitudine et dissimili-
tudine et cunctis similibus. Et si aliquis inferret ex illo
exemplo quod magnitudo et parvitas parilicentur, negatur;
quia xWditanta qiianta dicunt paritatem proporcionem solum
et non paritatem magnitudinis et parvitatis ab intrinscco.
ib Nota tamcn quod dupliciter intelligitur inter aliqua SimiUuity and
esse similitudo vel conveniencia. et dissimilitudtj vel "" eitlieTln^'^
disconveniencia: vel quo ad sua accidentalia, vel quo accidcntal
. .. ^ ..... or esscntia!
ad sua essenciaha. Et utroque modo tnphciter, vel qualities; and
secundum speciem, et sic Sor et Plato sunt similes in ^"acneric'^'^or'^'
3o humanitatc et accidentahter similes in albedine; vel 2° anaiogous.
generaliter, et sic homcj et asiiius sunt similes in
animalitate et accidentalitcr similes in colore; et 3"
analogice, sicut motus et color sunt similes in o.ve, et
accidentaliter sunt similes in calefaciendo. ?^t corre-
y^ spondentcr de dissimilitudine.
Unde patet quod impossibile est quidquid produci nisi Nothing can be
... . .,. ^/ ^,,., . f, ^ .,., ^ , producedexcept
a sibi suiiili. Nam quodlibet est simile cuilibet, ut homo bv its like; but
melior est deo similior, proporcione communiter dicta, ''^^"^^"gjQQj j^J^
fundata in similitudine analogica. Stat ergo intinitum many ways,
,. . ., ,. . . ■-. , " . and is not
40 dissimilem alicui in uno accidente esse, quantumvis contrary to
sibi similem in alio. Ymmo stat illud quod non est
simile alteri in gencre vel in specie, sive substancialitcr
\i. a ,p descenden l-!.
ditTerence.
128 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. VI.
sive accidentaliter, esse quantumlibet sibi simile simili-
tudine analoga. Ex quo patet quod simile et dissimile
non sunt contrarie nec privative opposita. Nam duo
summe calida sunt in caliditate simillima; ita quod
sunt calida infinitum similiima, et tamen sunt finita 3
et ceteris accidentibus valde dissimilia. Similia ergo
possibilia sunt supposita increata.
We say of lielp Y)q iuvamento vero et impedimento dicitur corre-
and hindrance .... , ... . ... ,
what has been spondenter sicut dictvtm est de utili et inutili ; ut deus
us^eful and''uie summe iuvat, nec potest impedire vel nocere. Impedit lo
useless; God, tanien ne homo sit asinus, et ne mundus vel eius
hinderin? onc , ^ • , , • j- i •
species fiom partes deficiant; sed hoc non est impedire sed luvare.
'"'''does"not'''' Unde abutuntur terminis qui dicunt -quod quodlibet
hut helps. . . ' ^ 7 . . .
.Some say tluit ut sicut luvat ad hoc quod homo peccat, sic impediti.T
^^'^'^much^a'* ^"^ "^ peccet. Ipsi autem dicunt quod omne impeditum
hindrance as a est infinitum impeditum, et tantum adiutum, ut omne
help; hut this .... ,.,.,,. , . „ .
is an abuse of mohile impeditur ab intinito motu, ab mhnita magni-
terms. tudine, et sic de ceteris infinitis, et iuvatur ne idempti-
ficetur cuilibet; et sic de ceteris denominacionibus 20
infinitis, unde, iuxta sic loquentes, deus tantum vel
plus impediret hominem fieri quam potest iuvare, quia
quodlibet inpedit ne faciat infinita bona.
As the Dico ergo, sicut privacio privacionis non est privacio I
pri\ation 0I a . . ,. , . ,. , • n \.
privation is not sic mipedire rem a malo non est impedire sed luvare. B 70"
neftheMs°'/o ^^^- magnitudo parvitatis est magnitudo, sed pocius
hinde?- irom parvitas. Impedire tamen quandoque accipitur largius
evil properlv to , . , , ,
hinder, nov is quam obesse. et iiivare quam proaesse; ut omne habens
the magmtude naturalem inclinacionem ad finem et prohibitum ab
anything bui iHo fine vel execucione dicitur impeditum : et isto modo 3o
smallness. . ,. , , , o-
Hindrance gravc impeditur a descensu, ct leve ab ascensu. hic
mav, theretore, ^^^item loquendo de inipedire. quod sonat in bonum et
positively good; naturale, non est inconveniens deum impedire; et sic
and thus God ,. . ,. ,. ,.^ , ^•. ,•
may hindcr torte impediret aliquos eternaliter a sua beatitudine.
n>fo?n?L*rt°.?„.i Sed de limitibus huius impediti, et aliis huiusmodi 35
happiness. superficialiter solutis, sunt difficultatcs plurime; quas
transeo, tam propter impedimentum ignorancie quam
gracia brevitatis.
14. cle after quodlibet B. 35. deluibg B.
34 Beatitiidine. This looks like a foreshadowing of the doc-
trine of the 'Presciti', or foreknown. If God prevents any from
attaining eternal bliss, it is in order to further the accomplish-
ment of the Divine Plan of predestination.
CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM.
Consequens est ad dicta superaddere in capitulo de Of comparative
^- • ^ • , • ^ • • \T^ hvpothetical
comparativis sentenciam de maximo et minimo. Voco pi-opositions
autem proposicionem comnaracione vppothetica et nota 'i"'^ °f "^''.^'"i^''
^ ^. . f j rr ^ _ and minima.
5 comparandi denominatam, ut hec, Sor est ita sapiens
vel magis sapiens qiiam est Plato; et sic de comparativa
vera. Nam ista species yppothetice multum accedit, ut
dictum est, ad condiciones kathegoricarum; cum idem
sit dicere, Sor est melior Platone et Sor est melior qiiam They very
. rii ^ £■ ^ • ^ 11- -^ i^ • •_ much reseniblc
lo estPlato, nec pertecte mtelhgitur altera pars sine coin- cate-jodcals.
telleccione alterius partis. Ideo possunt dici tam quante
quam quales, ut kathegorice. De exposicione vero talium
racione termini comparativi gradus, dictum est supe-
rius, et quomodo refert dicere, Sor fiiit melior Platone The way ot
i?et Sor fuit melior quam fuit Plato vel quam Plato iam ^^hem^ancf
est. Si enim Sor fuit melior Platone tunc fuit ita quod pointing out
. . f ..... their ditierent
Sor est melior illo, et econtra. Sed si fuit melior quam meaninss, has
fuit Plato, tunc fuit melior quam unquam fuit Plato. '''''"sj',own.'^'^"
Nec requiritur quod simul fuerunt, sed requiritur quod
20 aliquando fuit ita quod Sor est meHor quam fuit Plato,
vel quod est mehor quam erit Plato, et ita [ad] dan-
dum instans.
Comparativa ergo, sicut quecunque aha proposicio, The truth of
tunc est vera quando est signum primarium veritatis, p,opos^Uons
25 et falsa quando deficit veritas quam primo si^nificat. depends on
. . , . '^ tlieir
Supponatur ergo ex ante dictis quod nichil vere com- comparisons
paratur alteri, nisi in aliquo communi univoco vel ana- Ccl^mparison
loeo, quod utrumque participat; et hoc sive sit essen- must be made
. , . : . , , ^ , . respectiniJ some
ciale comparatis sive accidentale. Patet quod omne sic other thing
common to
Socomparatum alteri vel comparatur sibi secundum magis '^bou"^*and
concerning
excess,
deficiencv or
vel secundum minus; aut ahter secundum equalitatem, concerning
excess,
2. Blank space for iniiuil C. 4. comparacionem yppotliclicam B.
20. alji B.21. zii'^ ; ad decst f'.. ■-'(). parte pro aute 15.
7, 8. Ut dictiim cst Sec Logica, Vol. I, p. 3o, 1. 27 — 3j.
I 3o JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
equality ot et sic equale vel inequale, que proprie competunt
wh\ch'is^ quantitati, transumuntur ad denominandum quemcun-
conimon. q^g excessum vel paritatem in quacunque denominacione
signanda.
Every power is p^j \^\y^^^ dicitur quod quelibet potencia terminatur 3
limited bv Ihe . ^. ^. ,.. . ,
utmost that is afnfmative vel negative maxnuo vel minimo in quod
and* uS'i's'^ i*s° not potest, nec solum restringitur potencia ad potenciam
only true of activam, que est accidens de 2^ specie qualitatis, sed
active power, ... , . .
but of every ampliatur ad omne posse logicum respectu cuiuscunque
potentLiliVv. denominacionis predicabilis, ymmo respectu cuiuscunque lo
entis possibilis, cuiusmodi sunt tales potencie cum suis
contentis: posse esse substanciam, posse esse quantum
discrete vel continue, posse esse quale, posse esse ad
aliquid, agens vel paciens; et sic de potenciis respectu
privacionum, potenciarum, pretericionum, futuricio-i5
All therc num, et neeacionum. Omnes ergo tales potencie pro-
proceed from . . .■" ,
the first active cedunt a prima potencia, que sic est actus purus quod
is°pureiy Act' ^ibi non inest potencia respectu sue denominacionis
and ihe-term absolute, nisi quam habet 1 necessario actualiter coeter- B 71"
ot Divine power ' . ' ' . j- u -n
is the limit of nam ; et ideo, cum omne posse causati procedit ab iUa 20
possiV"i'lity. potencia que est actus, potest dici quod quilibet ter-
minus alicuius potencie terminat potenciam activam.
Thus we must j?x isto patet quod omnis potencia logica vel natu-
in everv . ^ . ^ . . . ^. .
proposition i^alis presupponit potenciam primi actus. Si enim potest
""powrr^^onhf '^sse quod nichil sit ab alia potencia, potest sic esse. 20
First Entity. Aliter enim non quelibet affirmativa poneret significatum
Ihose who . ... 7, . .,,. . ,. , ,,
sustain ihat a sui verbi; sicut fantasiantur illi qui dicunt quod nuUa
prop^oiit^on negativa includit repugnanciam. Ipsi enim preponunt
cannot be pnsse loeicum posse dei; sed nesciunt exprimere quid-
absurd. put ^ ^ ^ .'. . ^ i--,
logicai ditatem ilhus potencie, sicut nec sciunt huius verbi .-^o
befm-TDivine pi^test significacionem declarare.
Power: at the Secundo patet quod absolute necessarium est deum
samc time thev ^ , . ,. ,. . ,
lose the " esse; eo quod, si aliqualiter potest esse, deus est; sed
'""""wo^rd^* ''^'' absolute necessario aliqualiter potest esse; igitur etc.
God's being is Maior patet ex nota proxima; minor patet per deducens 35
absolutelv ^ . . . ^ . , ,.
necessary. ad impossibile. Si enim potest esse quod non aliqua-
po^s.ibit,'Hc liter potest [essej tunc potest esse quod nichil potest
exists. esse ; et cum iuxta opinionem nichil potest esse
But God s ' ^
existence is
possible;
27. fantasiat"' B. 3;. esse decst B.
iQ. From the beginning of f. 71" there is another hand,
much more cramped than the former, up to f 82*^. After vvhich,
and until f. 122", there is ao^ain anotlier.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 1 3 I
impossibile, nisi claiulans formaliter contradiccionem, otliciwise
sequitur quod potest claudere contradiccionem quod bc self-
aliquid sit quod nichil simul est et non est; quod si contradictory.
homo est, animal est; et sic qualitercunque propo-
5 sicio nata est significare. Et cum nichil potest claudere
repugnanciam nisi quod claudit repugnanciam, sequitur
quod chiudit repugnanciam aliqualiter posse esse: quod
est impossibile.
Tercio patet quod omnia citra deum que dicuntur aii powcrs
loposse, dicuntur posse a potencia aliena. Sicut enim . telow God
1 " '^ ' , . . . imply anotlier
homo potest vinci a potencia aliena, sic qualitercun- power that
1 ^ 1 » k gives tliem
que potest esse ipsum ; vel suum antecedens potest movement
esse a potencia prima. Actus enim principians est sim- . tor act i.s
. . ^ . ^ . . . . simply pnor to
pliciter prior potencia, sicut esse est naturahter prius power, and aii
T-. ^ ... I ] powers havc
i? posse; cum omne posse sit esse. Fatet ergo quou aa (1^^,},. source
unam simplicem que est actus primus possibihs habet '" A'-''^
reduci quelibet aha potencia, cum quelibet talis sit
causata.
Sed hic obicitur. Videtur enim quod potencia dei '^^^^./'•'^//077. The
^ ^ . power or God
2oterminatur ad eundem terminum ad quem ten:nmatur goes no further
,., ^ ,. ^ • - I •!! .. • than anv other
quelibet alia potencia, quia usque ad illum terminum power"; thus
potest deus cum tali potencia, et non uhra. Et sic non ^bsolu/e and
^. . '^. ' . Qraiuale power
distingueretur posse dei absolutum a posse ordinato, sed are not distinct
^ .. ^ ^ ^ ^ .. ■ in Him : everv
omne potens tantum posset quantum posset cum con- power does ail
2 5 cursu prime potencie et sic quodlibet foret cuilibet 't '^'^" ^^'''i l^is
r r T _ _ concourse.
eque potens, quia vel ad eumdem termmum termina-
retur eius potencia usque ad quem deus posset cum illo
et non ultro, vel ahter non terminaretur.
Ad illud dicitur quod potencie sunt distincte respectu .\mwer. There
3o dei secundum formalem distinccionem ab invicem et p^wg^l^ j"^ q^j
ab eius essencia; et quehbet talis potencia terminatur as there are
. ^ . ' . things able to
ad deum ut ad eius subiectum. Et preter hoc est dari be caused; and
^ • ■ i ^ ^ ^ -ri .-t these powers
extnnsecum in quod potest et non in aliud, cum tot .^^.g fonnallv
posse sunt in deo quot res possunt causari ab eo; nec distmct irom
^ . . . , each othcr and
35 est tale posse alia essencia, sed ventas ponens deum tVom His
esse, et tantum causatum causari ab eo. Nec est in- wiieitM^thin?
conveniens deum deperdere quothbet tales potencias becomcs pasi,
^ . ' . .... God loses that
per lapsum rei in preteritum quam impossibile est power, it is
redire; sicut patet de motu, tempore, et mukis ahis. "make" no'''
40 Et in talem distinccionem dei incidunt qui verbaHter «^''""ge "" Him.
illud negant, dum ponunt quod aliqua deus potest a
y. cir dm B.
38. Qitam. Rem understood.
i32 .lOHANNIS WYCIJF CAP. VII.
potencia absoluta que non potest de potencia ordinata.
An eternal Nec est inconvcniens accidens eternum esse in deo,
accident mav , j ^ i • * • -nt *
exist in God" cum non dependat ab essencia extra ipsum. Nec est
it independent i^w^ potencia activa, quia ipsa potest quicquid aeere,
of all but Him. ^ . . ^ . t t. o '
Thus active sed quia ipsa denominat formaliter deum posse agere: 5
power merelv • ^ • ^ i- ■ • j^ ■.. .. i-.. .. .. ■
expresscs the sicut virtus oculi visiva dicitur, et qualitates potencie
tact that God active, quia per ipsas potest subiectum aeere. Tales
can nct thus > ^ f f f o _
and thus; jike ergo potencias potest deus deperdere sed non acquu-ere,
pow-er of the ^ed cum sint relaciones, habent possibilitates passivas
, ^y^- , ad quas dicuntur. Et, ut ego credo, prius est deum lo
And such ^ . ' , .
power can be posse in hoc, quam hoc posse fieri, non quoad con-
a^cqiiircd,'!" sequenciam, sed quoad perfeccionem. Nec repugnaf
^ j. *^°^- ^veritatem eternam que non est accidens obiective ter-
God s power ot . . ^ .
producing mmare accidens eternum in deo secundum racionem
anterfor to obiecti, esse quodammodo prius posse dei sibi relato. i5
"^.'^V' r Sic enim tam non potest facere deus me esse asinum
potentiahty ot ^
bcing produccd. quam non possum esse asmus, quam econtra.
Why shoujd jr^ gj queretur quare deum posse aeere est accidens
tliis power be ^ ^ . .
caiied an et non rem posse agi ab illo, dicitur quod ideo quia
gYc^ause it '-^^ racione accidentis est inherere subiecto quod pre- 20
inheres in a supponit et determinat modo. Non dubium, conciliante
subject and ,. . . .
quaiities it. alias veritates, quin deum posse producere B actu, sicut
Active power ^ • ■ ..■, ^, ■ ^ ■ ,-
docs so ^st veritas, sic est m deo^ et denommat ipsum tor-
formally; maliter id posse; et cum idem accidens potest desinere
esse per causacionem B actus, patet quod a divina 1?
passive power essencia quam presupponit. Sed B actum posse pro-
though itis duci, quamvis sit in deo ca«saliter, non tamen denominat
also in God as • r ,-. ,- j t i
in its cause. ipsum lormaliter, nec per consequens aliquod aliud
subiectum. Ideo non habet racionem accidentis. | B71'
It has been ^i §[ dicatur quod auctores neeant esse relaciones 'lo
denied that . ' ^ '^ ..."
there are in deo propter defectum tundamenti absoluti, dicitur
'^'God"on'" quod communiter ponunt auctores relaciones racionum
account of there esse in deo, et non dicere mobilitatem subiecti, nec
benig no . • , , , r , .
foundaiion of requirere accidens absolutum pro suo lundamento; et
suc 1 re ations. ^.^y^^ ponuiit in predicacione modali esse illam primam 35
essenciam, quia nullam aliam ponunt. Sed non est
But logical (not jubium quin tales distinguuntur formaliter a subiecto,
reali relations . . ' . '^ . .
are generally si ahqua distinguuntur. Et placet michi quod sint
hTvpIv^^onk 't'he^ '^'^1^'^i"'''^^ racionis. Modicam enim vel nullam reali-
cxistcnce of thc tatem ponunt alique relaciones preter realitatem sub- 40
First Essence: . ' .^ . '^ . . ^
and 1 am lectorum. Et, si dicatur quod multe tales positive
willing to grant
that they are
such.
ij, 14. t'ie H. 14. rone B. i8. qi' B. 21. coci" as B,
CAP. MI. f.OGICA. 1 33
superrtuunt, cum nunquam proccdunt in actum, dicitur lo say that a
1 •.. 1 • i.„ 1 1 ,. j 1 powcr tliat will
quod non sequitur; sed videamus quid valet quod dcus ncver be
notest hoc producere fdemonstrando unum quod nun- c.xcrcised is
' ' V - . ^ . superikious,
quam producetur). Ad hoc valet prima potencia; et docs not
3 sic facit multa bona, sicut privaciones ct negaciones, '"^ ^' ^'"^^'^'
cum omnc causare, extendendo terminvtm, sit facere;
nicliil tamen atiit proprie nisi essencia absoluta, cuius- '"'" "."^ !>'''
modi est substantia habens propnam mchnacionem cssence.
naturalem, a qua procedit accio extrinseca^ ut sepj
lodictum est, quod alienum est a quocunque accidentc.
Dicitur igitur quod nec potencia dei nec alicuius No power cau
alterius terminatur ad aliquod non existens. Ideo, si cxist^eiu for°iVs
maxima quantitas quam possum habere non est, tunc .''^'"i- in''src
. . , . „. •11 '* no ma.Nimum
nulla potencia terminatur ad ipsam. Si autem iUa ot quantity,
i5potest esse, tunc sicut ad illam possum maiorari, et pn)duM'it"
non ultra. Sic unum vosse dei usque ad illam potest '^ thcre is, it
, „ 1 -,, • ,,• •, can increase so
me maiorare et non ultra. Lt ad illum mtelligentibus tar and no
dicitur communiter huiusmodi potcncias ad tales ter- (^1,^'.^ pj.^,J'",. i^
minos terminari. Ad quam scnsum concedendum est iimit^-'4 by that
..,,.., . maximum.
2onullius potenciam terminan ad aliquid non msepara- Likewise,
biliter malum, quin potencia dei terminetur ad illud. Jxtends^U)^'
Talia enim mala non sunt in deo, sicut nec causantur every act,
, .,, . • •, • liowever evil, it
ab illo, sed sunt m racionibus eternis que causantur not inscparahlv
1 so, by meansof
. .... . t'ie eteriial
25 Ulterius per distinccionem potencie absolute a potencia '''^^s of things.
, .,, . . , Absoltite and
ordmata est notandum quod iUos termmos magistrales 0^^^/««/? power
et consimiles diversi diversimode concipiunt. Aliqui s^^an^^jt^^cat^ons'-
enim laree intelligunt, per potenciam absolutam, essen- some
. , • 1 1 understand bv
ciam rei sub racione qua absolute est potens, non the first ihe"
3o cohsiderando possibilitatem vel impossibilitatem ^er- i^^fj^j^^^^jj"!",'^^?,^
mini in quem potest per alicuius posterioris ipsa po- power, distinci
r.. ■, ■ T^-,- ,■ ■ 1 t'"om that on
tencia; et 2''' talem potenciam rilius dicitur producere which it has
alium Filium. infinitos modos, et ipsos infinicies anni- powei.
chilari. Ipse enim, ut prius dictum est, habet suffici-
35 entem potenciam ad omnia illa, si illa possent esse.
Et ad illum sensum dicunt auctores quod potencia ^" '''''t seus^; it
, , ^ ' , . is said that God
absoluta potest multa racere que non possunt heri: can do thinj^s
ut post lapsum operis mei, manente potencia eadem, "'^^don"°' '^'^
sum ita potens sicut fui in principio; ideo non est l'""'" instance
, ^ . . , , . , it is impossible
40 deiectus in potencia absoluta mei quod non possum to do tiie s^me
thing twice,
yet the powcr
to do is not
gone.
16. dei B. 26. mgrales B. 27. coci"' B. 3i, 32. ip po B.
32. fig dr B. 33. fi™ B.
iM JOHANNIS WYCr.IF CAP. VJl.
facere illud opus, sed impossibilitas cst cx partc facti-
bilis. Sicut non est defectus in visu meo quod non
possum videre remotissimam arenam in occcano, scd
ex impossibilitate proporcionate applicacionis; ideo
potencia absoluta est potencia, sed deficit potencia re- 5
spectiva que ponit, et agens posse facere productibile,
et illud posse esse; et illud vocatur potencia ordinata.
AM^Um^caif bc ^^^^ dicunt quod omne quod deus potest facere de
done by God's potcncia ordinata potest facere de potencia absoluta,
ulso be done by et ccontra, et solum que ordinavit fieri de potencia or- lo
Vowei-^and*^ dinata potest facere. Et ista via ponit omne quod fuit
vice versa. vel erit esse deo presens, et sic nullam potenciam
a deo deperdibile; ut dicetur capitulo ultimo.
But I follovv Hic tamen prosequor prius dicta quod rem pretcri-
this opinion : . • •, •, ^ r ■ ^ , ,
tiiat a past ^^^m impossibile est non ruisse, et quod multa erunti?
have^.\"s?e*d "^"^ "°" sunt ; et sic de aliis que sunt magis famosa.
and many ' Oportet enim gradatim ascendere in subtiliora. Ouam-
things future • ^ •,, i- ^- • j •^ ••, ^
do not e.xist. '^'is autem illa distinccio deservit pro auctonbus con-
'^betwee'"^tl'°" cordandis, videtur tamen michi quod nullum potens
two powers, potest in aliud, nisi possct in ipsum de potencia or- 20
praciicaily dinata. IUud patet ex hoc quod omnis potencia activa
j^^["'' ^^'°'^^'.'^. dicitur comparative ad potenciam causabilem ; ut, si
(dbsohtte) posset facere hoc, hoc posset fieri. Nec propter deper-
e.xercised unkss Jicionem potencie respective materie potencie absoluta
^^'/'ri'"^. n^'^'^ dicitur aliquid simpliciter minus potens, sicut nec Pater^S
And the loss of est potencior Filio, quamvis potest producere quod
such power -r^-,- ^ ^ , 3 • •
merely on ruius non potest producere; eandem enim potenciam
account of the absolutam habet uterque, cum illa sit essencia com-
wu.nL ot , ... ,
receptive power munis trinitati. Quamvis ergo tercium suppositum non
in the subject .. .. ^ .. , • , •
is no defect. potest tantum producere sicut alterum pnorum, est 3o
tamen id quod potest tantum producere.
cver^-^^beV^^an Ulterius conceditur consequenter quod omne agens
act in so far as tantum potest, et usque ad tantum, sicut potest 1 cum 157;
it is able with , • • . „ . .' '
ihc concourse concursu vel luvamine prime cause. Et sic, si deus
°''cause"^*^ potest facere me causare quodcunque opus ad quantum- 35
cunque intensivum gradum, et ego possum usque ad
In so far as •,, , • -,', , o "^- • •
God can give liium gradum in illud opus. Stnccius tamen sumitur
kls^possibfe q^-^snJoque potencia pro sufficiencia quam potens habet;
to act. sicut dicitur puerum non posse in actus viriles ante-
How far;' . . ^ . . ^ ,
I do not know; quam acquisiverit potenciam naturalem. Si vero quera- 40
''l"iows'' ^^^' ^ "^^ usque ad quantum potest talis potencia, deum
contestor ego ignoro de quacumque, sed bene credo
2.|. niut« B.
» -
nnuL
CAP. VH. LOGIGA. i^-T
quod est (.lare terminum quem deus si^tis iioscit. Ideo
damus nos per modum. peticionis vel supposicionis ter-
mini talis potencie, quis, queso, non ignorat gradum
niagnitudinis, intensionis, vel alterius singularis acciden-
5 tis subiecti? Nec est cura de talibus individuis corrupti-
bilibus, cum non sit sciencia habitualis de illis ut de
subiecto prime sciencie propter confusionem et recti-
tudinem. Ideo iubent populo quiescere a talibus ct
intendere utilibus.
lo Istis ergo premissis plus pro fundamento declaracionis Thc lorcg
materie quam pro fructu sciencie qui e.xinde P^tefecit '^"^['Jlj^t^^j ''^ve*^
pueris, videndum est quomodo regulariter ponendum , '-('rne to
^ . . . ^ .^ . , , . ,. thc main point,
est tales potencias terminari. Et quicquid moderni dixe- and afiiim iliat
rint, videtur michi probabile 2™ sentencias antiquorum, ^^n 'n^jtcd ^bv*^ a*^
i5quod respectu cuiuscunque potencie terminabilis est ma.viminn :
, . '^ ..,'... . . V. g. that thcrc
dare cuiuscunque speciei denominacionis maximum in \-\ists a
quod potest; ut est dare maximam quantitatem sub qua porsi^ble^for^^a^
homo potest esse, rnaximum gradum quantitatis et '"''"' ^-^'^c.
cuiuscunque alterius accidentis sibi possibilis; et pro-
20 porcionaliter de aliis potenciis.
Et suppono quod ille terminus lua.viiniuu dicat su- -p|,^. ^^.^^^.^
premum vel excellentissimum in quod potest talis mci.ximum
. T-. 1 1 1 1-1 1- • impivini; tlic
potencia. Probatur ex hoc regula : quelibet talis potencia higiicst strctch
dicitur esse maior, que cum similibus paribus in plus po- we aftirm'ihis
2T test; sed cuiuscunque talis potencie est dare maximum gra- because the
1 -i -1 • • \i, • 1 j ^i Tioi^s anything
dum possibilem ; igitur etc. Maior patet ex hoc quod quelibet is able to do,
talis potencia eo est magna quo in magnum potest; ergo p^owli^ls^^said ■
est eo magis magna quo in magis magnum potest. Aliter ^9 be; and
° ,. '^ ? ^ . ^ ^ . therc is a
enim non diceretur in qua proporcione est potencia que maximum ot
3oprecise in duplo plus potest quam A, maior quam A. "can''be^done'
Sed hic dicitur quod non est dare quantum precise it may bc
potest, et per idem non est dare precise duplicatam there is'iio
vel in quacunque proporcione racionali proporcionatam precise limit
,•,, ,-.,•,! ] -1 • , • • • • , -, , '" power, and
ad lilam. hed iliud videtur michi nimis mirabiie quod ihereforc our
33 data sit potencia finita et non sit dandus gradus mag- '^™P°[^,'°qJJ^""
nitudinis sue. Aliter enim foret mirabiliter magnum, si But if thc
. , ., . power is
nichil posset cognoscere quam magnum ipsum esset. finite it is
Ymmo, per exponentes sequitur quod hoc est precise the^Umit^^s'
tam maenum sicut ipsa est; et per idem sequitur quod precise.
<-" i. / j. i j. -pijj, ^,gj.y
meaning
7, 8. v^eti"» B. S. plo B. 21. t'"" B. 26. et maximum gra-
dum possibilem pro etc. B. 32. dupla™ B.
2. Ideo. To give this, sentence a reasonable sense, it would
be necessary to supplv too many words wanting. Perhaps non
is superfluous. At anv rate, ihe text is corrupt.
i36 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VJI.
ot the iila potencia potest equari alteri, quod possibile est
proves't'hat alteram et ipsarn precise esse equales, cum contra-
two things can Jiccionem includit equalia non esse precise equalia, eo
be precisely . ^ . .......
eqiial; if not, quod qualitas consistit omnino indivisibili. Et per idem,
^ 'no^^equali^iv,'^ ^i aliqua potest esse dupla vel subdupla, aut in qua- 3
and \i a power cunque alia proporcione ad iilam, tunc stat quod ali-
can bc doubied .^ . \ ^ , , , , ■,,
or haived, it is quid sit precise duplum vel subduplum ad illam; nec
exactlv halt ils • , , • i , ..
double and magis quam duplum, nec mmus quam duplum, est
double its hait. duplum. Ideo omne duplum ad aliud precise est duplum
ad idem. Et sic invenies de quacunque proporcione lo
racionali. Si enim millecuplum foret duplum ad suum
submillecuplum, et per idem esset sesquialterum, et
equale; et omne magnum esset sub quocunque gradu
parvum, quo alia esset pars, esset parva: quod non est
opinabile. i .^
Every power is Ouelibet ergo talis potencia est precise dupla ad eius
as great as tiie ^. '^ , ^, , . ^ f
sum of its medietatem et quadrupla ad eius 4""''; et sic de aliis
'^"' ^' proporcionibus. Et per idem sine dubio est precise
II can dinimisli t;anta quantam eius partes ipsam constituunt. Et con-
to zero and , ^ •" ' . ...
increase again. hmiatur ex hoc quod potencia, cum sit debihs, potest 20
remitti ad non gradum, et iterum crescere; vel saltem
if the power of subiectum potest intendi vel remitti in potencia. Pono
a given su-i)ec gj-gQ q^od subiectum intendatur quousque fuerit in 4'"
increases
2 ■)
nniformly from niaeis potens; et sit A totum temporis per quod erit
a givcn instant . '-^ ^ . t r 1
loanother until in duplo potencius quam est modo. Et sit B tantum
tirn*es*as'' temporis per quod erit minus quam in duplo quam est
great, then, modo. Talia enim teinpora sunt danda, cum iste pro-
when exactlv . . . . .^
half the time posiciones sint prnnarie signincantes; A est plus quam
''^^n^ust^be' ' ^^ duplo potencius quam fuit in F instanti, et A est
exactiy twice as minus quam in duplo potencius quam fuit in F instanti, 3o
great as at ^ . . . ., _.
lirst. manebunt vere m suis adequatis temponbus. Sit ergo
C medium instans inter | illa duo tempora, et patet B 72''
quod in C erit subiectum precise in duplo potencius
quam est modo; quia, si excederet, tunc non esset da-
tum tempus totum per quod subiectum erit plus quam 35
in duplo potencius. Et per idem si deficeret a poten-
cialitate dupla, non esset datum tempus totum per quod
erit minus quam in duplo potencius. Nec potest dici quod
illa tempora non erunt inmediata, quia tunc esset dare
medium inter contradictoria. Relinquitur ergo quod pro 40
C instanti erit precise in duplo potencius quam est modo.
29. ffup B. 3i. adcte tibo B.
CAP. VII. F.OGICA. i-''7
Dicitur quod fortc est darc quanta est quecunquc ir ii bc bbjcctcd
potencla. sed non cst darc quante potcst. Sed contra, powcr has
illud est primo illud quod superius taniiitur, quod po- "^ magniiudc,
tencia non dicitur magna quo ad molem, sed eo maior maximnm ot'
, * c>. • 1- -^ ^ ■ 1 possiblc cltect,
? potencia quo plus potcst. Sic enim dicit potencia rcJa- ^v^ rcmark tliat,
cioncm ad suum potenciale, iuxta dicta. Cum ergo po^^'^'-'^ liavui';
i^ . ' . . c> no dimcnsioiis.
potencia capit suam magnitudinem per comparacionem thcir magnitudc
ad potcncialc ct non nisi ad maximum, sequitur quod niaximum arc
tunc, data magnitudine respective potencie, dandum esset iJciuical.
lomaximum posse. Ymmo illud posse est illa potencia.
Similitcr, cum posse plus vel minus sit denominacio A.^ain, to be
, ■ j- ,.1 1 ,. • more or less
consistens m latitudine, cst dare gradus et proporcioncs ^\^\^.^ implies a
in illa latitudine. Et pcr consequens est dare unum certam breadth
' . ^ . . or powcr ; it so,
quod precise tantum potest sicut illa potcncia, unum there are
, • • j 1 1 ^ • j dccrees in that
i.Tqviod precise m duplo plus; ct sic de quacunque pro- breadth
porcione: et stant raciones superius facte. Ut ponatur ^"'^ '* ."^">, ^''^
' r f cxacllv ihc
quod A sit in quadruplo plus potens quam B et re- doublc&c. oi
•^^ ^ • ^ ^ •.-•.- r> .. •.- anothcr.
mittatur quousque precise tantum possit sicut B; ct sit jf _\^ jour timcs
C tempus maximum pcr quod poterit in duplo plus " ^ ^'^''loses'
20 quam B et D tempus per quod non poterit in duplo its power
1 r. ^ ^ 3 • 1- •...-•.. •!! uniformlv uiitil
plus quam B ; patet quod in medio instant inter liia boti, arc-equai,
precise in duplo plus poterit A quam B. Et patet iuxta ''.''^",]^.^'|'^'|V
superius arguta, cum non sit latitudinem dare subito the time is
. • 07 _ past A = ^" B
acquisitam vel dcperditam, quod in medio instanti pre-
25 cise poterit in duplo plus A quam B. Sed, iuxta opi-
nionem adversam, cst dare potencias indefcctibiles.
respectu quarum est dare maximum in quem possunt.
Et cum infinitum modica sunt, sit aliqua potencia talis: It is admiitcd
sequitur quod est dare potenciam defectibilem et poten- that^ccnain
3o ciam indefectibilem equales. Ergo sic ut est Jare *°',"'^" '^? ^"'!'"
T . ^ . . their iitmost
maximum in quod potest prima, sic et de reliqua. limit: but there
TVT • ^ •! •! 11 .- • are other forccs
INon enim est possibile quod. duarum potenciarum that are equal
equalium quo ad posse, una plus potest quam reliqua. '° them,^beins
Nec valet dicere illas potencias esse incomparabilcs genus, thouKh
35 propter differenciam corruptibilitatis et incorruptibilita- ditterilig^bv
tis, quia talia sunt propriissime comparabilia: ut patet "'"^°'''"P''^^'"-^-
. . . . . . r . present or
de qualitatibus et quantitatibus eiusdem speciei sic absent, which
differentibus, et patet de quantitate partis celi et quan- difference:
titate hominis, quc sunt eiusdem speciei, et tamen
40 differunt corruptibilitate ct incorruptibilitate. ]sjec ,"°'",'^°^/,.''''^
^ ' lencth of time
3. ca' B. 26. indebilis B. 28. tli? B. 29. dcbilcm B.
?o. indcbilcm 15. 3(3. ppiglTic.
l38 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
dLiring which capiuiit potencie suam magnitudinem a diuturnitate tem-
make^iieni^''' poi"um per que possunt esse, quia potencia non con-
to differ. sistit in sucessionc, quia tunc quelibet defectibilis foret
infinitum minor [in] defectibili, cum tamen aliud sit
posse ad diuturnitatem et aliud posse quo ad maiori- 5
tatem causabilem.
Nor can \vc Similiter, per deducens ad impossibile, patet quod
"mft "'^fimu'^ '^ori est dare terminum negativum, ut communiter signa-
properly; wiiat j-m-. quia si terminus temporis est, tunc non potest
cannot be done ' t _ J_ •,, •
is not the esse aJ terminandum potenciam, cum illa potencia non lo
'"^'can.^^ '" potest in illud quo non plus illud est iinis termini illius
A stone tliat quam quodlibet aliud. Ut, si non possum ferre A lapi-
is too heavy to ^ ^ .' ' . . '
be carried"by dem, que racio quare ille plus terminat potenciam
tiic hm'k of^my rn^^'"''' quam quodlibet reliquum quod non possum por-
strength than tarc? Non enim illud potest esse signum noscendiiS
any greater . '^ . '^
weight, unlcss magnitudinem potencie mee, quia nemo potest cognos-
'can^ lieveVbV cere quod illud sit minimum quod non possum, cum
known — tiic j^q,-, possum tantum nisi sicut possum. Exponentes enim
lcast weight I ^ . . ' .. . ' . .
cannot carry: talium negativarum sine putacns sunt mcompossibiles.
Tlie proposition .^ • j • i-... .. » • i
is therefore Sequitur ergo quod proporcionaliter ut potencie ad 20
proved. potencias, sic posse potenciarum habent seadinvicem;
illud patebit particularius in processu.
Objections: Sed contra iilud arguitur primo: Aut sequitur
woulTdVs^tmv quamlibet potenciam esse activam, cum passiva poten-
ali differcnce (^j^ diflfert ab activa in hoc, eo quod activa eo ipso2=^
between active ' . ^ . ^ .
and passivc quod potest 111 maius potest in minus, et potencia
"^^^*^'' passiva econtra eo ipso | quo potest in minus potest in b 73*
maius. Sed vix 2"'' illam viam est dare maximum in
quod quecunque potencia potest.
2. It wouid Similiter, quantumcunque potencia debilis propor- 30
"— evcn Sod^s' cionatur passo, potest melius proporcionari ab extrin-
omnipotence — ggj^Q. er2o nec est dare per maximam potenciam
to be limited ' d 1 _ r
by somc resistivam in quam potest, nec maximum gradum
'^'bounds!'^ accionis possibilis. Sic enim ex proporcione equalitatis
proveniret motus, vel accio; vel aliter unum excedit35
aliud per indivisibile, et deus terminaretur maximo
iuvamento quo posset iuvare agens.
3. It a given Similiter, cum facilius sit difficillimum facere parem
power can ' . ' .
carry a per minus tempus quam per maius tempus, sequitur
maximum of
weight for a
4. iii deest B. 5. a'"-, B. 19. pulac'.' B.
28. Maiiis. Therc is probably a .'^^cntence missing in this
paragraph, somewhere about this place.
CAP. All. I.OGICA. l39
quod si potencia dcbilis facit difticultalum pcr A tcm- ccitain timcs,
pus, pcr partem illius temporis posset facere maiorem. ' jouNc Uuii^
Ymmo nolencia minor sufHceret ferre tantam diflicul- ^^'^'^''f dnnns
' . . . . Iiall tliat tiiiic,
tatem per tempus minus, ct illud communiter tani^itur thc quadnipic
5 deportacione. Et per idem non est dare maximum tem- qiiartci^iS:^';';
poris per quod corruptibile sufficit durare: et sic s» tiicf'; '^ ii"
universaliter de omiii accione quam debile sufticit
ferre.
Similiter non est dare maximam quantitatem sub ';,,. smailcft''*
loqua potest esse homo, sicut nec maximam parvitatem man possiblc
^ ' ' I - , '■'^ impossiblc:
sub qua potest esse: ergo regula talsa. Antecedens ihc lirst could
patet ex hoc quod, signatis 2"^"* hominibus, quorum ^^^tlmv^nor
unus sit maximus possibilis, et alius minimus possibilis, c-ould thc
^ . ' . -^ . ' second losc
neuter sufficeret ferre aliquam lesionem, cum maior auv part of
i5propter quamlibet tunsionem, ab ictu vel punccione without^ccasin"
desineret esse; et minor propter quamlibet ablacionem '"^ ^"^ ^^ '^^'"'-
partis superflue corrumperetur; et sic esset dare ultimum
instans hominis et in infinitum debilem hominem.
Similiter non est dare maximam multitudinem 5. Thcrc is no
1,- ••1.....11 -o maximum v. c.
20 habituum quos quis smiul potest habere; quia Sor in icarning;
habens illos ipse, esset habilior ad ulterius discendum. the morc onc
. . . . . lcarns, thc
Ahter enim impediret plenitudo sciencie Sortem ad quid- morc
• 1 ,• 1 ^ • .^ 1 1 •... j • i:; • one bccomcs
quid discendum a sensu; et sic esset habitus de mhni- .,51^; to icarn.
tum facih mobilis. Et ideni argumentatur de cumulo
23 mixtorum que possunt per homines congregari, de gradu
et de multitudine caliditatis vel frigiditatis, quos potest
homo simul habere. Videtur enim quod, sicut non est
dare difficillimam penam quod potest toUerari, sic nec
in maximum gradum quantitatum nocivarum.
3o Similiter de potenciis passivis, videtur quod non sit 6. So also ot
dare minimum quod data virtus sufticit videre; tum ''^,*^n^j"„P°,u,^^"''
quia infinitum modicum sufficit cum alio confuse videre, visibic is
.... . absurd.
tum quia, visu vidente illud, possunt 8 circumstancie We sec
concurrentes ad visionem vel aliqua illarum meliorari, cven^Uic^
35 et per consequens videns sufriceret minus videre. Ymmo, "^'""^'^'y small.
cum non sit dare remississitnutn gradum visionis, nec
acutissimum pyramidem radialis, sequitur quod minus
visibile sufficeret videns confusius et sub apparencia
minoris quantitatis videre aliquod visibile. Tales quot-
40 libet evidencie se offerunt deducendas in quibus materie
difficiles possunt introduci.
1. ditHcl"" B. 4, 5. ta'' dcptacoc 15. ;5. tuo"B; ib. puccoc
140 .lOHANNlS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
.4««)'er;'Not -^^' ^^'"'^ dicitur sicLit piius, tcnendo generaliter par-
only is tlicie a tem affirmativam in talibus dimensionibus, ut est dare
most pertect ^ . . . ' .
substance of pertectissimam substanciam que potest esse, sicut et
substance^irL q^^^lil-^^et substantia est tain perfecta essencialiter sicut
perfect as it potest esse; et sic est dare maximam multitudinem 5
can be; ,.
there is a punctorum et punctualium que possunt esse, sicut patet
poTs"ble'numbcr '^^ punctis mundi et maximam quamlibet continuitatem
of pointsin any que potest esse; ut patet de corporeitate, de loco, et
continuous , , . t t^ • , , . .
body; de duracione mundi. Est eciam dare velocissimum mo-
UieVdocTty of ^^"^' accionem et passionem, que possunt esse; et sic lo
movemefit, generaliter de omnibus aliis, tam simpliciter quam re-
action and . . . / . ^ /•.
passion; spectu speciei. Lst enim dare maxmiam multitudinem
^Vt^oss^lc'^'^ hominum qui possunt, simul vel successive, esse; et sic
mcn, &c. de aliis speciebus; quia, signata minima multitudine
hominum possibilium que non potest esse, patet quod i5
auferendo unitatem ab illa multitudine foret residuus
numerus maximus sub quo homo posset esse. Et sic
gencralitcr, cum omne continuum sit compositum ex
non quantis, dato numero ncgativo, patet quod, auferendo
ab illo vel vel addendo ad illud unum indivisibile, foret 20
residuum maximum vel minimum respectu talis po-
tencie.
(if"o{ject/ons : ^^ primum dicitur quod impossibile est signare rem
i."Every powcr absolutam quin sit potencie active, nam posse faciliter
must be active, ... . ^ . .
in so far as vinci vel corrumpi non attestatur super magnitudine 2.S
dissolubimv is P^'-^"'^^^' ^'^'^ super impotencia minoris potencie; quia
impotcnce,"not aliter ad omnem punctum mundi infinitum maena foret
power in tlic . • /- • • • . .
form that potencia, et inhmtum minoris potencie cuiuscunque
disappcars. corruptibilis pars, quam ipsum totum; sicut communiter
argumentatur quod omne | corpus sit infinitum potens B 73''
racione materie sue prime, que videtur infinitum potens
passive; quia infinitum passivior quam forma vel com-
The positum. Potencia ergo " materie prime est potencia
potcntialitv of . . . . ^ . ' ^ -
primordi^al passiva denominacione extrinseca, et est nnita, cum
"extrinsica°lV^ ^^erminatur ad maximum in quod potest; quia capacitate 35
ssive; and as eius repleta, sive forma substanciali sive forma acciden-
it cannot ^ ,. ^ ' , , . . .,,.
receive one tali, non potest ulterius recipere rormam illius racionis,
it *li™another, ^tante illa, quia recipiens oportet denudari a natura
its power has rei recepte, Unde, si aliquod subiectum haberet secun-
a maxmium , , . ...
— themaximum dum ultimum sue capacitatis rormam mnatam, non^o
°that'^it*can' reciperet super illam formam eiusdem racionis.
pa
receivc.
3. fa"' = tiguram? B. 19. rnb» ne^° B. .34. infniita B.
CAP. VJI. I.OGICA. 141
Et hinc est quod intellectus non habet species inna- Digrcssion on
, . . . , . - ,, thc forms
tas eiusaem racionis cum speciebus quas recipit. INec rcceived by
materia prima formas substanciales, nec primum oi'8!i- scnle -^i^f either
num sensus recipit species ducenfes in distinctam noti- liad any
... ... , 'iniiate' torms,
.-> ciam quautatis sensus conrormis gradus cum gradu ii,cv would be
quantitatis sui organi ; sicut supposuerunt philosophi l"cc^^n"^°,L
tanquam per se notum. Sicut enim subiectum hahens others.
2'" ultimum sue capacitatis tbrmam quamcunque^ non
recipit super illa novam consimilis racionis; sic subiec- irn>?rpc«fnn=
lotum cognitum, i. e. animal secundum partem corpoream become
.*".,.. . . . • •!• contiised wiien
non gignit distinctam noticiam per recepcionem similitu- the organs are
dinis ab aliquo simillimo, sed confunditur noticia sensus ^:^^;,^'™"/-^
T - ^ ^ ^ impreshCu in
per notabilem fixionem speciei in suo primo organo one particnlar
. . , . wav.
extranei accidentis.
i5 Prima pars patet de racione, cum recipiens formam Both reason
, . 11-^ -. . • • .. .. and e.xperiment
ulteriorem non habuit capacitatem pnus saciatam; et teach us this.
2'^ pars patet experimento, quo scimus visum non 110- s^bfec^t'o\'
scere dyaphanum quale est in xpo elayde, que est pri- vision,
\f y S^ ^ ^ ^ . . ^ . hearing &c.
mum subiectum visus; nec auditu sonus percipitur in rnusj be quite
20 crystallo connaturalis aeris in miringa; nec olfactu, ^"^'^ ua^Jl^y^""
gustu, vel tactu qualitatis connaturalis primi sui subiecti: perceptible
^ ' ^ . . f. , bv those
ut tactu non percipitur distincte qualitas sub lilo gradu senses.
sub quo est organum sensus tactus. Sensus autem in-
teriores sunt multiplicate per organa spiritualia, quia
25 per sensus alentes, et tamen non illis distincte cogno-
scuntur quantitates sui organi. Et 3^ pars patet ex hoc .^* "°V ''"■''^
" . . .... sight, hearing,
quod intritus vel habens fortem impressionem visibihs, ' taste
confuse iudicat de aliis visibilibus; habens tinnitum auris, ^^^w ^j.^ ^p^
vel forte sonum extraneum, permixtim discernit de to judge
' ' . . wrongiv ot
3oaliis: et sic de habente fetorem narium, de ethico, de their
11 • ,- / ^ I- 1 • -^ ^ \ ] ..I • impressions.
habente gustum intectum (ut tebncitantes); de ethico "^
non percipiente propriam inanicionem propter calorem
occupantem diutine nervos tactus; et conformiter stupe-
scunt sensus propter fortem sensibiHs extranei impressio-
35 nem. Ymmo ymaginativa in sompnis movetur ad appre-
hendendum secundum impressionem humoris com-
plexionati; ut liielancolici sompniant de nigris; et sic de
aliis, sine hoc quod species primo recepte sint in sensu
10. al B. 12. Qfu'" B. iS. xo above xpo B. 24. fpuaiia B.
25. ales B. 27. itr'tiis B. yi. lanico B. 3('), 3~. coplexioti B.
iS. Xpo elayde. Of xpo I can make nothing; but elayde
seems to stand for hyaloide, the vitreous humour; which vvould
very well agree with the sense.
142 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. Vll.
This pioves particulari. Et per illam consideracionem probatur in-
that intellect, ^ u ^ • ru .. ..■ i-- ^
which tellectus cuiuslibet entis distincte perceptivus non esse
pei-ceives ali oreanicus, In quibus omnibus patet quod, data capaci-
beings ^ ^ . . ^ ^
distinctly, has tate, danda est maxima multitudo forme quoad partes
no organ; and ^-^ ^- ^ i j- • • • -
that whefevcr quantitativas et quoad diversas species; maxnna eciam ?
there is a intensio et maxima diuturnitas temporis per quod ma-
receptive . . . . .
faciilty there is teria prima potest taliter transmutari. Ideo materia est
a maximum ot •, ^ ■ n -^ c i u^ .. i
reception, omnimode potencie nnite. Sed non obest partem plus
both as to gggg passivam suo toto.
number and '^
intensity of the Redeundo ergo ad propositum, dicitur quod non bene lo
torms received. .... "^ .
Return to the distinguitur potencia activa a potencia passiva per
,'?'*'". ^"'''^?'- differenciam recitatam. Sed potencia activa est forma
the distinction . . .
between active qua substancia est formaliter activa. Et potencia passiva
and passive r i • ,- i- • t^ i-
powei- is at ^st rorma qua substancia est rormaliter passiva. Et taiis
tauit. Whether yQ^^,-^P habitudo ad agendum vel paciendum. Notai3
active or ... .
passive, the tainen quod in omni obiecto quo substancia est possi-
power is in , ... ^ , . , ^ _ i
any case a bilis, potest agere et econtra; ut lortis homo potest plus
form. pjjjj laborando quam datus debilior, et idem homo qui
The strongcr a ^ " . . ' . . . ? .
man is the potest oculo plus diaphano recipere speciem visibilis
more work hc ^ .^ , . . , . . , ir ^
can sutfer. potest plus active videre ipsum idem. Virtus enim visiva 20
Sight 15 active gg,- ^^^^^ activa quam passiva, sicut materia prima habet
and passive at . ^ ^ . ' . '
once. accionem manentem; raciones autem illarum potencia-
The essence ot . . • r r^ u .. ..•
thesc powers is rum, sicut et ipse potencie, lormaiiter et abstractive
identical, but intellecte, distincuuntur, quamvis essencia sit eadem :
the point ot . ^ .
view from multe ergo sunt potencie active que, si possunt in2.3
which thev . . . ^ • ■ j j- .. •
ansidefed minus possunt in maius, ut potencia videndi, potencia
are cor
is difterent. transmutandi ; et sic de multis similibus. Est enim dare
And as a ract,
the world is maximum quod quis potest videre, ut patet de mundo;
the maximum ^ . , , ^ ^ i^ 1 . r> »
of our sight, ^t maximum quod alteratum potest alterare | ut mun- B 74*
and aiso ot our j^j^-, yg| gj^g materiam 2'" partem. Est eciam dare poten- ?o
power ot . . ... . .
prodiicing ciam passivam que, si potest in maius, potest in minus;
cung'-- ut potencia portandi, potencia recipiendi, et sic de multis
aliis. Non ergo in hoc dicuntur potencie supra dicte.
There must bc Ad 2'" dicitur quod est dare optimam applicacionem
some iimit — •■•i- • • -i-ii ..•o-
ihough possibilium, et maximum luvamen possibiie ab extnn- 3.t
iiiii^nown seco, quod nobis vanum est venari sive supponere.
1(1 us — ' n ...
to the aid Utrum autem possibile sit porcos volare, muscas arare,
power of any ^t plumbum natare, cum iuvamine extrinseco, [estj al-
crcature. tcrius necocii. Talia enim creduntur deo valde possi-
\\ hetlier, v. g. , . '^ . . . '
pigs can Hy hilia 2'^^ acciones quas nostri vocant miracula. Non 40
miracLilouslV, ^ ^ ^ , i- t 1 • i • .. ir „ „1
is hiit a smaii tamcn potest |racerej lapidem posse intelligere vel
thing;
12. dm li. 16. ab'" \',. 27. trns'"' ]'>. 3- fyiiippoe P..
38. est Jeest B. m- facerc deest ]i.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 143
sentire: et sic de accionibus appropriatis speciebus. on ihc other
Suspendere tamen nisum gravis ad inferius vel levis ad couid not maUc
superius; vel iuvare nisum porci plumbati ad volandum ;> ^i'"ii^ 'iii"'>'
in aere, vel musce trahentis quodlibet trahihile videtur
3 deo satis facile. NuUum tamen istorum suflicit in ista Wc admit
de sui natura; sed si deus potest ista luvarc ad taha, but there musi
tunc est dare maximum trradum iuvaminis deo possi- ^^ '1 li'Y'i /^veii
. . . 'o tnat.
hilem et maximuip. gradum motus vel accionis cum tali In everv action.
, • ,., ■" ^ • j , botli tlie First
concursu dei. Nec est ymaginandum quod una pars cause and tiie
loaccionis tribuatur deo et alia pars intensiva vel exten- second causes
/ . work together.
siva agenti; sed tota accio tribuenda est utrique^ cum
nullum tale agens 2™ potest sine deo iuvante et agente
communiter totam accionem, quidquid agere.
Nec sequitur ex isto quodlibet esse tante potencie This does not
-.^,., ^. ■ , • ^^. prove that all
i^sicut ahud, etsi possit cum deo luvante tantum agere, things have
quia non habet in se tantam potenciam vel sufficienciam ^l"'"' "^'^^-^'.
~ . i^ . . power ; tor (jod,
ad sic agendum. sed hoc potest potencia activa. Essen- maldng one
• , • . . , . heins to do
ciahter tamen quantum potest quicquid cum luvante, more than it
tantum potest. Et si amplietur potencia ad posse logi- "^f". h°.
20 cum, tunc conceditur quod tantam potenciam habet givesitan
,,•■ ^ ^ , • .. r j j .. -^ augmentation
quodhbet tale agens sicut aliquod, sed non est ita of power.
sufticiens nec ita activum vel passivum, quia isti termini ^^ ^''^ "|^^" ^y
^ . ' ^ 'power mere
dicunt disposicionem actualem potentis. Unde deus con- absolute
, ^ ,. .. „n • f ]•.. -u- possibilitv, one
currens miraculose cum tali agente 2° inrundit sibi po- may have as
s.Ttenciam, quia aliter non aeeret totam accionem. Ideo much as
" T . . c> ... another; but
creditur non esse possibile deum sic insoliter agere, this is not the
nisi adaugeat potenciam cause cum qua concurrit. Non sigmfica^ti^on ot
enim potest concurrere ex equo ut unus homo iuvat . t'ie '^^ord.
^ . . " . And tlius, tor
alium sine augmentacione sue potencie; et credere or.e being,
?o Quod taHs potencie sit absolutum qviod per se esse po- another in act,
test, quamvis sit qualitas, non est sani capitis. !^* power must
' T . . . T ' ^ _ . be increased b.v
Uiterius dicitur quod stat unum excedere ahud mi- the heip ot "
nima proporcione maioris inequalitatis; et per consequens There is both
minus habet se ad maius in maxima proporcione mino- :' g'"eatest and
t r _ a least possih.e
35 ris inequaUtatis. Est ergo dare motum velocissimum inequality
., •, ^ ^ ^. , , • , betweeri
possibilem, ut motum equivocalem, vel cuiuscunque quod two things;
in quolibet linstanti] oppositi motus acquirit unum indivi- ^""^ .,
^ l ' tt' "1 consequentlv
sibile materie motus 2^^ eius indivisibile. Et quando suppo- the most rapid
r- -, ■ ,^ ■ 1 • • L^^i^ • movement
nitur motum [inj inhnitum velocitari ex subtihacione possible,
sudden or
18. quod quantum I'. 10. 20. lo": i^. 28. bonus B. 3r. q" B.
j6. eq'voc' B. 3j. instanti deest. 38. me B. 3o. in deest ;
ib. velo'' B.
144 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
infin^tely rapi^d cione medii, vel capitur hoc ex dicto, sicut fecit Aristo-
either not teles, vel supponitur impossibile, gracia argumenti. Po-
magnftude, or test enim aliquid subito moveri et multiplicari per
'.^ '."^P.?^/'^'^j quotlibet loca, sed nuUum tale subitum est maenum,
of movement sic nec aliquod indivisibile est quantum. Posito ergo 5
in vacuo, in . ........ , ... °
which there vacuo, per summum impossibile, smipliciter mobilietur
would be a successivo motu in illo motu naturalissimo 2™ ultimum
SUCCCSS1V6
change of place, sui appetitus, pro quolibet instanti acquirendo quolibet
but rapid in • .... ., -,. .^ .... ....
the highest ^ius mdivisibili situm indivisibilem.
''iTu^^belsked ^^ ^^ ponitur partes eius laterales non resistere toti lo
what cause (sicut tamen communiter ponitur, proper appetitus
could produce ^ ,. . . . ' \ ^ . ^^ .
such a earum per Imeam rectam Drevissimam) ; et si quentur
to°be"answered ^^ proporcione ex qua talis motus causaretur ; dicitur
that there quod proporcio ex qua talis motus causatur non est
would be • • , -^ ^ cn ■ ■ • 1 , -
present only "isi ydoneitas vel surhciencia moventis ad movendumir
the aptitude of i-nobile. Unde in motibus quodammodo violentis vocatur
the motive . ... . .
power. proporcio maioris inequalitatis, maior vdoneitas moven-
In movemenis ^- j ^ ..■.,.,
tliat are violent, tis ad motum quam est resistive ad impediendum.
^'"©'^onon^ol' U"^^^' quamvis minus potens agat in magis potens,
greater or less propter bonitatem applicacionis, propter iuvamentum oq
inequalitv ._ • , ,.„. ■ . . "
between the extrmsecum, vel propter dinormitatem passi^ potencia-
'^'otor'^and \he ^"^^^~^j '^^^^ aliam talem causam, non tamen ex proporcione
resistance of minoris inequalitatis 1 provenit motus, sed ex propor- r --V'
the thing . . ? . .\/ . ' . . -j^ . ^ . ° ^4
moved; cione maioris inequalitatis, que est maioris sufhciencie
and the greater nioventis ad movendum quam est resistencie ad resi- 23
the inequahty, "
the more " Stendum.
considerablc ai" ,. » ^ ^ i
the movement -^"1 autem sunt motus pure naturales, qui causantur
's- ex proporcione maioris inequalitatis, que est dominium
also natural moventis super motum, sine eiiis reclamacione vel pro-
movements, ini-,-. -ni-.. • ■ ^ i
which the thing "^ibicione. 1 aliter ennn proporcionatur motor celorum 3o
movcd does j^j quascunque partes eorum motas; et taliter propor-
not rcsist, but . ^ . '^ . . . . .
the infiuence cionatur anima corpori. Sed in multis proporcionibus
of the motor • ^- ^ , , • .
may be greater istis non est dare excedcns etexcessum: sicut in pro-
or less : as in ...
thc movemenl
porcionibus quantitatum. Nec sunt ille proporciones
ot the heavens. racionales ; ideo non abutitur terminis qui vocat 35
But it is often
impossible to
say by- how
much such an
I. ca'' B. i(|. motum B. 21, 22. pnz-f 1'. 28. dni" B.
34. quf" B.
1. Velocitari. Aristotle demonstrates as follows the non-
existence of a vacuum: If the resistance of the medium in
which a given body moves is halved, quartered, &c. thc velo-
city miist be doubled, quadruplcd, and so on: thus a vacuum
being absolutely unresisling, movement would be intinitely
rapid.
CAP. Vll. LOGICA. 145
proporcioncs (qua.s motus consequitur) ncc proporcioncs inilucitcc may
maioris inequalitatis nec proporcioncs minoris inequali- ]css'-^'ind so
tatis, Sed una proporcio est 2''' vel quomodolibet maona ^'"-"•^'r
. ' ' . ^ . '^ . propoi'tioiis
ad aliam, sme hoc quod ista proporcionata proprie miglit even bc
3 comparentur. Quis, queso, scit signare proporcionem ncithc" of
^iam maioris orbis ad eius partem, vel fundare illam S'c;'tcr nor of
... -, . lcss incqualitv.
proporcionem in fundamento debito .'* Unde est ordma- \Vc can indecd
tum quod intelligencia proporcionetur uni parti orbis „ot'^p^o'v, tbat
ad movendum illam certo gradu motus? quem ex suppo- /> g.icatcr oib
. . '.^ . ' ' ' lias inHiicncc on
10 sicione mensuramus termino numerali, ut 2 vel ut 4. thc movemcnt
Sed quod illa proporcio sit 2^^ vel alia numeralis, non "asa^toi!"'
est docibile. The prcscnt
1 ■ 1 • 111- question
Ulterius, pro ultimo verbo nota quod solum loquimur conccrns ihc
pro presenti de iuvamento quod deus potest naturaliter J\[.q^ naturailv
i3vel ordinate 2"^ possibilitatem cursus naturalis facere, et and ordinatcly
' r 1 • 1 to His creaturcs,
non de iUo quod deus potest facere de potencia absoluta. not that which
Sed revera illud verbum non solvit, cuni quicquid absol'utciv"givc.
deus potest facere cum agente 2°, potest facere dc Hut thcrc
communi cursu nature, et de naturalitate agentis 2'. real distinction
2oYmmo, iuxta dicta, deus nichil potest facere de po- ahsohitc
tencia absoluta, nisi quod potest de potencia ordinata: '''"'^ ordmaic
. power.
quia quotquot miracula deus potest facere, potest If God can
ipse ordinare potenciam ad illa faciendum. Ideo stul- ^^^miraclc^"
tissimum est verbum modernorum quo dicitur deum absolutely,
2? non posse de lege vel potencia ordinata talia lacare; can bc an
quia si intelligunt quod repugnat isti ordinacioni et for 'th^J^^niirrdc
leei qua deus voluit eternaliter universitatem ordinare, ^°J"^ wrought.
•!!• 1 • I j^ ■ • r 1 ] r 1 ^° ^^y *'iat
certum est illi legi vel ordmacioni [repugnarej quod [ne] such and such
quicquam boni fiat preter illud quod fit vel fiet, cum a^^ains^t^^God^s
3o eternaliter ordinavit quod solum ista vel aliqua illorum o''?'"^''^ P*^"'^'''
_ • • !!• 1 1 • !• -n cither meaiis
lient. Et si inteuigunt de parte legis ordtnate, illa esset that it is
explicanda, sicut repugnancia illius ad illud quod deus '^e°"J'„^,'|-'i.[° o',^
potest facere. Et non assignabitur repugnancia; quia what is and
talem contingit assignare inter aliam partem ordinacionis or that it
35 dei et potenciam cuiuscunque preter illud quod de facto to^somethhi"
erit. Dicendum ereo est de talibus, utrum potencia _,"i'^l God can
,. . . . , „. , . do: in thc hrst
eorum repugnat ordinacioni dei vel non. Si ergo loqui- case the act is
mur de potencia que potest esse ordinata, a qua talia ^^'^''se^^ond, no
possunt fieri, tunc certum est quod nichil potest facere such opposition
' . . ' . . ^ ^ can be proved.
40 nisi de potencia ordinata. So God can
■'do nothing but
by His ordinatc
power.
8. mf^'^ pporcoct"^ B. 17. rcna' B. 28. rcpugnarc deest ; ib.
ne deest 13.
10
146 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAl". VII.
Spcaldng, Supposito ergo quod loquamur de posse dei relativo,
' lauer'power,"^ ponente possibilitatem factibilis^ tunc videtur valde in-
ihcre rnust be consonum quod non sit dare quam causativus sit deus
limit to it. alicuius causabilis. Posita enim sua causabilitate, oportet
is^a^limirio ponere causabilitatem causabilis sibi parem; quibus 5
causahilitv, datis, oportet dare maximum in quacunque specie pro-
there must also . . t t 1 1
be a limit to duccionis quod deus potest producere; sicut patet ex
'^^nd"\he'reforc' ^"P^i'!'-'^ deductis. Nam causativitas est eo maior quo
there is a piyg potest; ergo, data maxima causativitate vel causa-
maxmium in ' . ^ ,
both cases. bilitate^ est dare quante ad maximum deus potest active 10
indefinkely able causare, et quante causabile potest passive causari.
to create, we Similiter, si cuiuslibet speciei effectus sit deus in-
should have to , . . '^ ,
adrnit an hnitum causativus, tunc necessario est vacuum undique
vacuum, infinitum; quia si versus aliquam differenciam termina-
because beyond i-etur, tunc extra eius terminum deus posset producere i3
Ihe Iimits of ' r 1
this world, God mundum, cum non posset producere mundum nisi in
'^""still. ^ vacuo. Sequitur: si vacuum potest esse, necessario est
Tliis '^;^'^"""'' vacuum undique infinitum. Et quod illud sit passive
would be . . ^ '
nccessary, and susceptivum corporis plus quam deus est productivus
rcceive^bo^dies caret omni apparencia. Si ergo ipsum potest suscipere 20
than God to tantum corpus sicut ipsum est, tunc deus potest pro-
produce them; ^ r 7 f t^
unless we ducere tantum corpus. Sed non dabitur quod ipsum est
^G^oTcoiiid' tante susceptivum quante est, nec quod [pars] suscipiens
creatc a world §^3 gjt pgi- totum tanta precise quantum est totum,
as large as this . . . ' . . . ^ '
vacuum; nisi ipsum possit suscipere precise tantum corpus quan- 25
it would aeain »„„..• » • •
be coeternal ^^^^ ^^t ipsum termmis.
with God, not Similiter, cum illud vacuum sit a deo, et tam utile
to be . . ' '
annihilated or sibi quod non posset producere mundura sine illo dato,
changed in anv ..,.],. • ... • ,1
way. " patet quod est necessano coeternum, sic quod deus
And God could non posset ipsum annichilare, vel unam partem eius So
not accelerate . '^ . . ^
to an infinite cum alia coextendere. Si enim posset, tunc non requi-
degree the -.. • • 1 ,. .
spced of the ritur vacuum recipiens rem corpoream, | ut dicitur, et B 73"
world ; because tunc sine dubio deus non infinitum velociter posset
all movement . . ''
supposcs a new movere mundum versus occidens, ut communiter conce-
accident (of ,•.. , • ^ • ■ r i- i-
position) ditur quod omnis motus successivus ponit formaliter ali-3D
.succcssively quod accidens aquisitum mobili, et aliquod deperditum:
gained and lost; ^ . . ^ ' n r '
but here there quia aliter non est fingenda causa quare mundus tam
succession at infinitum velociter movetur versus omnem differenciam,
all.
12. etfcus B. 23. pars deest B. 26. t'* B. 36. acci*'"* B.
38. dr<^ B.
19. riiif. qiiam. Bccati^c tlic vaciuim would be aclually In-
hnitc; aml ("lod, however abic lo crealc new workls, woiild
ncver fiH it up successively.
CAP. VII. I.OGICA. 147
co quod nuUum ens tbrct aquisitum mundo, si (.ic"
possibili sic moverctur, quia iam aquiritur; ct sic dc
dcperdito.
Ponendo ergo vacuum, ut nostri senciunt, oportet To posit a
■ £• ^ ^ vacumn is to
5 ponere ipsum esse ens positivum, specincans motum et pogit jt as a
eius accidencia. Si ertio vacuum sit tante permanencie '"^''' •'^'"S'
" . . ^ nay as a
et necessitatis, patet ex racione substancie quod esset suhstancc; and
, . ■ ..^ 1JC-] jL vct it is useless :
substancia, eciam ordinata valde. Sed quomodo noc, joi. „0 one part
si, infmitum multas et macnas partes eius aulerendo, "* '' '**
■ . : . ncccssarv.
10 residuum , sufficeret? ideo est servicium ad quod totum
deservit. Frustratorium ergo esset vacuum ad omne eius
punctum, et huic sine duhio non esset a deo bono con-
servatum.
Similiter, iuxta modernos ponentes potenciam terminavi Tiic modcrns
, ■ 1 • ^ -^ 1 .. 4. 1 i admit tliat God
u-iexclusive ad inhnitum quod non potest deus_, non tan- can do all
tum potest producere quantum potest, cum non potest tlimp, excepi
i r ~i t- ■> i create wliat i>
cognoscere quantum potest producere, et per consequens intinitc;
non potest cognoscere quam potens precise ad quid- jo 'mo'i\; thali
quam producendum sit, et per consequens est plus .Heisable;
^ f _ . . since He is not
20 causativus vacui quam substancie corporee, et sic non able to know
omnium specierum est eque causativus. Causat enim \q which^His'
vacuum, et contradiccionem claudit quod tante esset P°y^'" '^xtcnds;
' . . . ^ and at any rate
corpus, cum exclusive et non inclusive usque ad tan- He woiild
!->..• I „ conservc
tum potest causari corpus. Fotencia ergo qua deus vacuum in
25 causat vacuum per indivisibile excedit producibilitatem bemg, rather
^ . '^ than substance.
corporis. Vel aliter sequitur quod due sunt concausantes
eiusdem racionis, et una earum non potest tantum cau-
sare sicut reliqua, cum tamen ille potencie dicuntur And the
• ,|. • .. /-. _ maximum of
pares, quia lUis paria possunt causare. Corpus ergo God's crcation
■30 per indivisibile excessum a vacuo foret maximum in , ^\"'^''.'^ t^'^./'',
^ body inhmtely
quod deus posset. "small,
r,- .,. • ^ •,, I -^ ] • c •.. siirrounded by
Simihter, luxta lUud sequitur quod unum nihnitum ^^ inHnite
sit rehquo maius; quia rectificaret deus lineam girati- ^^^^'^■'"c^^:
T . ' T . , . . One infinite
vam (cum sit secundum se totam rectificabihs) et pre- wouldbegreater
„. j ■ ■ • 12 -^ • j t'i'in another.
3o tendat ipsam in inhnitum versus oriens, servando a Example to
puncto continue fixo Oxonie; quo facto, pono quod demonstratc
in qualibet parte proporcionah iliius hore deus protra-
hat A, totam Hneam, versus occidens, et devento ad
finem hore noto lineam terminatam ad situm Oxonie, If, one end A
, . ^ . , ■ ... . .,, . r. of an infinitc
4oubi finit A punctus in pnncipio, et signo illam per AB, nne AB being
sive fuerit finita ad rehquum extremum Hnee girative, "\v?s^to' make"^
sive non. Circumducat ergo deus AB lineam, fixo B the whole line
turn 011 B,
39. t''» I).
10*
148 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
we should have puncto, ct patet quod in vacuo causabitur circulus in-
^siirrounded^lV ^"1^"^, quo circumducto super polos, et axe quiescente,
a vacuum, the causabitur snera infinita: et per idem contincit in-
circle could '^. ' / , , , •
Rencrate an scribere vel circumscnbere quadratum et habebitur que-
'other^oi^umes' cunque figura supcrficialis vel corporea infinita in va- 5
couid hc c^Q. quod claudit contradiccionem in terminis. Patet
inscribed or ^ ,-,1, 1 • /- •
circumscribed; ergo quod [ad] nuUum tale est deus mfinitum [potens],
^im^possiVre"^ cum ipse cognoscit ubi sit quilibet eius punctus et
thuigs. quante pedale confert ad eius magnitudinem ; et sic per
consequens in qua proporcione se habet ad pedale, et 10
ad quamcunque eius partem proporcionalem: et per
idem deus scit ubi terminabatur A linea in principio
versus oriens; quia aliter, circumducendo A, stante ex-
tremo eius fixo et circumducendo B lineam infinitam
versus oriens excessam ab A per pedale, sic quod tam i .^
B quam A fiat infinita versus occidens, foret B maius
quam B per pedale sine alterius maioracione vel mino-
racione: et sic de infinitis quorum primum excedatur
a B per pedale, 2"^ per ^rupedale, et sic in infini-
tum. 20
Rctutation of Hic sunt responsiones inutiles. Prima dicit quod tale
certain weak ■ n -^ .. i_ u ^ ] •
answers to this quantum mhnitum magnam, partem habet, sed ipsum
difficulty. j^Qj^ gj;j maenum quia non est parvum. Sed hic non
1. Denies that c? ^ . . . „ . .
that the valet, tum quia est minus parte vacui infiniti, tum eciam
great', because quia ad esse quantum sequitur omne magnum sive 25
it is not small. j .jigj^gmj^ ut videtur de vacuo sive finite 1 magnum, B 7 5''
But in this case ... . i o ? /
it would really sicut est de linea girativa. Quid, queso, componerent
l-e smaller than •^ ,• • \ r • ■ -^ a- -j
a part of the magnitudines parcium A hnee, nisi magnitudmem .'' cum
infinite pars, ut huius[modi], requirit suum totum.
vacuum; r ' l _J' ^ _
besides, the Secunda responsio dicit quod quehbet pars propor- 3o
idea of quantitv ..... \ ^ -^ • .. \ o j .. •!! j
includes that' cionaus hnce A est ita magna sicut A. Sed contra iUud
of magnitude. gg^ descrincio nroporcionis multiplicis que non potest
2. Considers i ^ . ^ . ^ . .
eacli esse inter equaUa. A ergo habebit se ad eius medie-
proportional ^ Tmmm .. • • ■ n -^ • • -u
part of such a tatem, 4^"^, 8'^"^; et sic m mhnitum m proporcionibus
line as equal to niuUiplicibus correspondet. Aliter enim non fieret alia 35
the wholc; but ^ . . . ^ .
there can be pars finita ipsius ad eius quantitatem, nec per conse-
no proportion , • ^ . ^ ^ •.. • 4
betw-een quens ad eius esse. Cum enim tantum sit residuum
equals. sicut cst hoc totum, quomodo habet hoc totum esse
Thus an infinite _ . ^ . . . „ . .
line must havc sic magnum ab ista parte ? Ymmo, aggregatis mfinitis
quarterj an partibus in A et totidem in B, sic quod pnma m A 40
eighth, &c.
?. axeni quiescentem l^. 4. 4'" B. 7. ad deest; ib. potens deest.
26. imfu B. 29. modi deest. 32. mul»(/ B. 35. a" pro alia B.
38. ci B.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 149
sit dupla ad primam in B, 2'' sit dupla ad 2-'"", et sic Vet one of its
in intinitum; patet quod totum aggregatum ex primis ''away/k"
est duplum ad totum aggregatum ex 2'^, ut patet remains as
11" elementorum Euclidis, prima conclusione. Nec
5 refert sive illa fuerit finita sive inlinita. Et evidencia An iiifiniiL-ly
, ... , , ,,.,,. small added to
ad iUud est quod non quantum additum rinito quanto a finiie qiiaiitity
facit totum maius: ergo per idem, quodlibet linitum, whoic%eater-
pars intiniti, facit totum maius, Et ad illud valet quod . tjierefore a
... ,. ,., ,. . , linite added to
quelibet linea quantumlibet magnum est par alicui de an infiniie
logenere superficiei vel corporeitatis. Non ergo foret pars ^^^"''/j^ „*^gg"g^
linee per se causa sue magnitudinis, nisi, illa ablata, 'oo-
residuum foret minus.
Tercia responsio negat deum taliter posse movere 3. Denies that
vel causare substanciam vel accidens infinitum, ut in ^,'^,^''!'^ '°
i5 infinitum potest movere lineam, rare facere corpus, et s"bstance or an
^ ... , , .,, ■ r' accident that
sic de aliis; sed repugnat quod illa maneant in fine. isinfinite;a
Illud non valet isti vie, quia in vacuo intinito est linea expandecf''^
infinita, vel extremum simillimum linee, cum vacuum wouid cease to
, ^T , 1 • . . , exist.
sit quasi quantitas abstracta. Nec dubium qum, si deus Hut tor those
20 potest protrahere illam lineam vel rarefacere illud cor- ji^^Jj^Jj^jg^*^.^^'!! j*^
pus [inl infinitum usque ad finem illius horc, vel aliter t'"* answer is
. ,. , , , • • . ot no use.
contmuare recte lineas pedales ad mvicem, ipse potest if God can
omne tale finitum conservare in fine, eo quod non ^^^^,^iacuo"^^
corrumperetur nisi abeo; et ille libere contradictorie cor- so that it
. .,, , . , attains the
20 rumpit iUud, cum tamen non necessitaret se ad corrum- infinite in a
pendum illud, propter producciones precedentes, cum ^'^ c"n'also^^
sit tam conservativus rerum talium, sicut est producti- P>"eserve it from
.. , ., ■ 1 , , . ceasing to exist,
vus. Nec deest sibi locus ad conservandum^ quia est iieing as much
vacuum undique infinitum, cui deus non potest quid- 'j'^^ PJ^j^J^^"^^'^^'"^^!
3o quid addere vel quidquid auferre. Deus ergo, in infini- of everything;
- . , , , ,- .11. 1 norwould room
tum rarefaciendo mundum usque ad nnem illius hore be waming for
exclusive, repleret illud totum vacuum, quia cuiuslibet bod v ^ sufce^ the
partis illius repleret aliqua parte. Ideo replecio totalis, vacuum is also
sicut rarefaccio totalis, erit ita magnum sicut vacuum.
35 Et, ut breviter dicam, non est aliquod inconveniens tIuis the
deducibile ex admissione corporis infiniti, quin conforme 'j',^^',?^;','^^^.'^*^.",,^^
deducibile sit ex posicione vacui infiniti. Quelibet enim ent.iils as
., 11 • manv ditnculties
pars eius superHueret; et cum nuUum eius punctum as "that of an
foret sursum vel deorsum, ipsum non posse circum- '"'""boJy '^^
4oduci, nisi pro quolibet instanti transiret infinitum mag- Not one of its
. . . . ' poinls could be
num spacium, sicut patet ymagmando Imeas concur- moved up or
down, nor could
it revolve upon
itself, without
4. i(»ne B. 12. maius B. 16. maneat B. 18, x^rili™ B.
21. in deest B. 2'i. _ger B.
1 5o JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
supposing an rentes in centro, causando quantumcunque acutum an-
innnite space , ...... , .
traversed ; for gulum mrinitum. Namque magna basis termmaret
mall^^tf e^^^n '1 ^^i^uem angulum conatum in centro. Ideo infinicies
made by the infinitum spacium transiretur, antequam una parva linea
lines tliat meet , . , . . ,■ -^t , -
in the centre deveniret ad situm m quo est reliqua. Nec posset deus :>
stm thev^are'"^ ^^^^^^^'^, movere localiter, augmentare vel diminuere
last at an aliquam partem vacui, cum sit per se quantum et in-
infinite 1 . -, ^- j
distance. mutabile. immo tunc deus posset movere se, cum
dif^cufties quiescit in vacuo tenebroso, visibili per totum, ut tene-
bra videtur et infinitum taccio. Cum ergo quotlibet lo
talia inconveniencia sequuntur ex posicione vacui, et
necesse sit ponere vacuum ad hoc quod deus posset
talia mirabilia mobilia facere, videtur quod deus non
potest facere talia.
1 hat therc i'^ a Similiter per deducciones ad inconveniens videtur i5
limit to Ood s _ i_
powcr can also idem probari. Videtur enim quodlibet tantum posse
be proved bv . ,. . , , . , .,
arfiuments " sicut aliquid; sed nichil tantum quantum ipsum potest.
abM^irdfties Deus enim potest facere quodlibet secundum tantum
If there was no cBusare sicut aliquod ut formica, et quelibet pars mundi
limit He could ^ . , r-
malve one part potest esse tanta sicut totus mundus potest esse. Lt 20
as^^lar^^e^arlhe P^^" i^^"^ tantam difficultatem facere | ^ et cum difficul- B 76'
whole, togetiier tas attenditur penes gradum proprie potencie, sequitur
witli manv oiher ,,., , , "^ . . '
impossibllities. quodhbet habere tantam potenciam sicut deus, cum
quilibet habens tantam potenciam sicut deus, haberet
corpus infinitum magnum, quod foret deo par in poten- 20
cia. Et si dicatur quod omnis talis est potencia dei,
ct non potencia rei tante potentis, vere sic posset dici
nullam substanciam habere potenciam, inclinacionem
vel accionem; sed totum fit, aliis solum passive se
habentibus. Ymmo, non essent raciones inmobiles se- 3o
cundum quas partes mundi ordinantur, eo quod con-
tingentissime posset esse ita ordinatum quod terra loce-
tur in supremo mundi et sol in infimo, et quod minima
species corporum foret maxima species, et sic de
anathomia hominis et cuiuscunque partis mundi; ymmo 33
inclinaciones et proprie acciones rerum possent in toto
3. conatn B. 6. altar' B. 9, 10. teneb'^ vi"- B. 10. tctio B.
18. Pn4 B. 24. liabet ;7;o habens B. 3i, 32. gtm™» B. 35. antho» B.
16. Idem probari. This evideiitly makes the present para-
graph a mere sequel to the preceding one. I have not been
able to see the sequence, and not under.standing this paragraph
clearh' in any sense, have been very sparing of marginal notes.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 1 5 1
communicari. Omnes ille leges dependent ex voluntate
dei contingentissima, secundum quam posset facere
quamlibet partem mundi esse totum mundum, ut ho-
minem posset constituere ex terra vel parvis accidenti-
5 bus, cum anima, ita magnum sicut iam est mundus,
sine aliquo corpore alio preter eius partem. Et sic
periret substanciarum certitudines, raciones eterne et
incorruptibilitates rerum.
Posset ergo philosophus dicere quod deus in omnibus God's power.
i^talibus terminat se 2"^ raciones eternas maximo in quod f'""^ tcrminatcd
potest; quia alitcr esset imperfectus; nec est solum in- dittcrs in tlirec
/' ■ ^ • ] ^- ^ !• ^ ]• 1 ^ ■ !• wavs from that
nnite potencie durative, ut ahe partes mundi, sed tripli- ■ ot His
citer excedit alias potencias. Primo in hoc quod que- .^'^'^'''^"'"'^^'l,
. ^ . ^ . " 1 ' because He
hbet aha potencia habet finem extrinsecum finientem alone has only
r : „ ] • I •] ^ .. c ■ j T-^ 1-11 Himselt torend ;
oipsam; sed nichil potest hnire deum. Et ad illum sen-
sum demonstrat Aristoteles deum esse potencie infinite
ex hoc quod eternaliter movet celum, tanquam finis
ultirnus. 2° excedit potencias quascunque alias infinite, 2"<' bccause He
in hoc quod eternahter gignit actum vel intelleccionem ^a^if^Act^whfcii*
2osibi equalem, et nichil potest causare tam perfectum is mtinitely
causatum, nisi fuerit infinitum. Tercio, in hoc quod ipse and 3'-^ because
potest creare sine materia preiacente, et hoc claudit wit^iiout^^arrJ^
contradiccionem ahud facere. previousmatter.
Et ex istis sequuntur multe proprietates in modo Many other
25 causandi independenter et uhimate sumendi; et sic de no°v\Yom"t"e*se
ceteris, que solum sibi nossunt comnetere. Nec est P'"'"'-^'^'';^-^
,.. . . ., . ^ . . Though God
ahcuius potencie mtellective, nec proporcionahter suffi- cannot create
„;* r„ „ „ • ..1 .. .. tlie world now,
cit racere maius opus, nec est plus potens, nec est He is just as
modo minus potens quam quando produxit mundum, powerful as
^ . r T T i^ 7 when He
3o etsi nunc non possit mundum producere. Nec sequitur created it.
quod prius potuisset produxisse mundum, nec forte Nor could He
postenus, nec maiorem nec minorem, et stc hbere con- the world
tradictorie produxit mundum. Et conformiter est dicen- betore or atter
,.. . tiie hxed time,
dum de ahis factis 2'" ultimum sue factibihtatis. Nec nor hirger nor
35 probatur ex operibus que deus fecit, vel ex auctoritate ^"^He^^did!'"'
sufficienti quod ipse possit tahter facere. Nec valet ^° ^^^^h'''^ '^f';;^
^ . \ ^ can do as mucii
protervia qua dicitur, quod deus tante potest quante as Hc can be
„^„ » ..• • • o j ^ ^ r -y^ ^- maintained to
potest sustmeri ipsum posse. Sed potest tacihter susti- t,e abie to do,
meri quod ipse potest lini infinitum perficere et operari '* ''^''^"'^.^V"?^- "
^ . . . . . . It consists in
4ocum quocunque, igitur etc. Tahter enim arguunt ahqui, merely shiftini?
• 1 1 1 1 -^ ^" , j ] 12 -^ •!!• 'b'^ burden of
mduenao habitum responsalem, quando dehcit ilhs pioof upon
other shoulders
10. t'iat B. 23. a'" B. 'M. aucte B. 3o. in deesl.
i52 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. Vll.
I ^,'^ ^'^. H°' probacio. Non ergo infinite potest deus concurrere cum
that God, if He quolibet, sed mensurate cum agentibus secundum pro-
cliose, could • , ^ • T^ • ,,
render any porcionem ad eorum potencias. Posset tamen, si vellet,
■ i''!!"^. 1 i-it superius dictum est.
mdetinitely '
perfect. " Ad 3"^ dicitur quod est darc maximam difficultatem 3
III. It mu.st be , ^ • r,- ■ ,- , • ,•
admitted that quod quecunque potencia sutiicit tacere, et multitudniem
there is a hmit gj; rnasnitudinem, que communiter attenditur 2'" eius
to llie ditticultv . . . •'.
that can be " ultimum virtutis. Et sic locuntur (quamvis inconvenienter)
overcome bv •],• • .. • ■ • • • ,
any given" 1^^^ 'l'-^! negant potenciam termmari maxmio in quod potest.
To^^denTthis ^P^^ enim nec darent totalem potenciam, nec maximum lo
wouid be do nisum eius possibilem, nec maximam difficultatem eius
both the"t^otality possibilem fieri a data potencia; ita quod grave plus posset
a°nV"iie^limk "^''^' ^'^^^^^ omne divisibile per comparacionem suarum
attained by its parcium posset melius applicari 2"^ partes que propter
hichest act, and V , • • • ^, ^ . ^ . ^
the maximiim of distanciam ociantur, non tantum mtendentes sicut inten-i.T
ove^rcomc 'b ''it ^^"'^'-'^ propinquius posite. Sed quomodocunque sit de
It is quite hoc, claret michi quod quelibet essencia habet unum
certain tliat ■ ,-,-, , , . ,. ,
eye,.y suppositum, 2"^ quod producit aliud suppositum par
can'^"mduce P^io^^i? ^^ i^^^ ^st accio immanens perfectissima possi-
another equal bilis tali nature, 2"'' aliquod eius suppositum; ut per- 20
to itself, and r »• • ^ !-cli ■ti- • 1
this is the lectissima et duncilhma accio quam deus potest agere
alf '^slmitar to ^^^" produccio ad intra, et proporcionaliter de aliis
the begetting essenciis.
of the Word in t-' .. • 1 • r • ,
God's essence. c,st eciam dare acciones et facciones ad extra per-
certaTn^actions f^ctissimas et difficillimas possibiles | respectu talium B yt?
in which a agencium ; que acciones non sunt eo maiores quo per
maximum of • ^ ' , . . . , . . . ,
difficLilty is maius tempus durant; quia sic mfinitum modice dith-
"i^n^recTonin"' cultatis esset portare maximum lapidem per tempus,
this, we must cum portare ipsum per horam sit tantum finita diffi-
not say tliat 1» ^ • • • • r- • „
these actions cultas, et nisus minor esset portare ipsum per mfimtum 3o
are greater \n niinus tempus. Et sic in infinitum maena difficultas
proportiuii as ' _ f'
they last longer. esset portare quamlibet leve per tempus eternum, et
per consequens nuUi difficultati finite proportionalis.
'difficiiit 'ls ^^'^ attenduntur tales difficultates penes magnitudinem
in direct ratio eflectus extrinseci producti; quia tunc semper ad maio- 35
with the eftect ■ ^ . . . ,.-„ ,
produced; ritatem motus consequitur maioritas dithcultatis, et per
consequens quantamlibet magnum difficultatem sufficit
quantumcunque movens facere. Nec in aliquo con-
sequerentur se magnitudo potencie prime agentis diffi-
Ije^^oveVcome cultate.m et difficultas facta. Ymmo stat "facere diffi-40
witlioLit any cultatcm" univoce cum "producere et^ectum extrinsecum"
external eflect
being produced.
2. mif,ate B. 17. a^ (03?"! pro claret R. 3o. nisi B. 41. pro-
ducente 15.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. l53
solum conservando productum vel rcsistendo produccioni,
sicud patet de conservante lumen vel quemcunque
effectum alium, et de portante proporcionale vel pro-
hibente accionem agentis.
3 Videtur ergo quod hoc nomen, ''difticultas", sit nomen Diiiercnt
' ■ , ^ er 1-rr -1 55 ^ acceptions ot'
equivocum, sicut ct lioc concretum, ditlicile , et tiiu word
termini illis oppositi. Quandoque enim quecunque '^'M'"'i{y.'
. * . , " . . . . !■ I hc thinf,'
res dinicilis dicitur difficultas, sive sit accio, sive itsclf thut is
, . ■ , . ^ . ^ . ^ ditficiilt is cailcd
obiectum circa quod est accio; et ista accepcio est ;, diKiciiitj'.
■ ovalde extensa; ut sic loquendo: omne difficile est diffi-
cultas. 2" modo accipitur pro illo quo res tbrmaliter 2. 111111 by
denominatur difticilis, quod est accio vel passio circu- ditHcult;
iens multa eenera: ut res varie dicuntur difficile. Dicitur ic-quinng a
^_ _ _ certain power
enim aliquid difticile, quia est ens circa quod est either to be
r-i^ made or
'-"'agencia requirens certam potenctam. t.t cum omne ens preserved in
sit taliter intellieibile vel conservabile, qualiter a sola j®'"»' '."' •
o .... understood; in
potencia infinita potest conservari vel intelligi, patet this sense all
quod cuncte res sunt summe difficiles, inseparabiliter diti^icuk.''
quoad aliquem actum: ut puta actum intelligendi vel
20 causandi. Sed 3° modo dicitur res difficilis propter 3 The
eius perfeccionem ; penes hoc enim vuio modo mensuratur onV^thhilr^above
difficultas causancie. Et sic est maior difficilis pro- another,
. requinng a
ducencia qua deus producit animam quam producencia greater display
j -^ 1- r--^ r ^ .. jTii: 1.. ot power to
qua producit lignum, Lt lorte non est una dirhcultas produce it.
2? respiciens illas ambas, si non aggreeative. 4" modo , 4. Thc
. r . . ... . . . . . tendency to
dicitur aliquid difficile, quia infert fatigacionem vel tire or wcakcn
, , •,• • j- .. • • -11 j thc forcc that
debilitacionem exercendi potenciam circa illud. produces it.
Et ita tripliciter dicitur difficultas formalitcr. Pritna 0"ly the thrce
.... . . . Isst kinds
respicit perfeccionem potencie causantis subiectum express
3o difficulter. 2''' respicit perfeccionem causati. Sic enim properl^y^o
duobus modis dicitur causancia bona. 3-^ vero diffi- ^,, i-alii^d:
. ' as rcqiiinng
cultas respicit fatigacionem vel debilitacionem causantis a causc,
subiectum illius difficultatis. Ut summe difficile, tam " p,.pt^.|;tion m"^
primo modo quam secundo, est producere deum; et ,, , "i'-" '^ttect,
^ . ^ ' . '^ . . . ■" as implving
35 quoad primum modum eque difficile est intelligere that the cftcct
, • j ■ j 1? 1-^ /-\ ■ • makes the causc
vel causare quidquid hnaliter. Omnis autem causancia to dcterioratc.
pure naturalis excludit difficultatem 3*^ modo dictam,
cum omnis talis respicit penam vel debilitacionem
potencie. Nec video quod ille 3 dicuntur univoce diffi-
4ocultates; sed forte omnes fundantur in causanciis.
8. vi's diffis B. i3. gua B. 38. pcin B. 3y. 3 duiv''^^» B,
' 54 .lOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
The 3"! sort ot De tercia autem fiat nobis primo sermo. Et natet quod
difticultv is to • , , • I -1 ^ j 1 ,•• ,•
be tirst sic loquendo nichil est deo vel aliis pure naturaliter
Nothhi**f^'in ^ge^^tibus difficile, sed inobilibus physicis que continue
this sensc modo moventur, et sic sicut idem uni est bonum, et
diflicult to God 1.. ■ ^ • , ., ,-, • , • -
or to purely alteri est magis bonum, et 3" non sic bonum; sic d
natural agents, eadem accio uni est difticilis, et alteri est maeis diffi-
only to tnings , . . . .
tliat act by cilis, sed 3" facienti iilam est ipsa non difficilis; ut de
matcrial , ^, • ^ ■ ^. . ^ . . . . ^,
movements. deo et homuie et eius tactis, faciendo idem opus. Nec
i'"a'^ bcT:iore"or ^^^ oracio perfecta qua dicitur ditficultas sic magna,
less difiicuit to vel res sic difficilis, nisi explicetur illud respectu cuius lo
ditfercnt agents: ,■ ,• v ^ • ,- ^ i • j- ,
it follows that ultime dicitur; ut imperrecta est locucio dicere quod
therc is no aliquid est simile, nisi exnlicetur cui est simile. Sic
sense to the ' ' . '
word '-difticult" ergo, loquendo de difficultate, patet quod est eo maior
deternii^ne the ^^-^o maiorem penam vel maiorem fatigacionem vel
agent. debilitacionem infert, sive atrenti, sive pacienti, sive i3
It follows also . ' ri 7 i ■>
that the quolibet aliter accidentato; ut uni est tnagna difficultas
magnitude of , j- i^ • ^ i-t-,^ i , ,
the 5ifficulty is comburendi, alteri est magna dithcultas stare vel sedere,
in direct ratio ^,q\ q^^q {^ ^^Yi loco per tantum tempus etc. Nunquam
to the . . . . , . . ^
deterioration or tamen crescit tahs difficultas in infinitum, cum nichil B 77"
fatiaue caused :„•£;•» ■ ■ c ^- ■ 1 1 1 -i- • j
"by it in mhnitum puniri, tatigari, vel debihtari potest, sed 20
Aiso that it jn omnibus talibus est dare maximum terminum possi-
cannot incrcase -t
inhnitely. sincc bllem.
that WOUld TT J ^- ^ JTC 1^ ^^ ^ ^ /-1
totaliy destroy Unde querenti quante dithcultatis est portare rabam,
the agent that querendum est econtra difficultatem cui, qualiter, et
is to ^ . . . ^
overcome it. per quantum tempus; uni enim esset maior difficultas 25
I. It°'u be'asked ^^ alteri minor uno modo portandi; ut velociter movendo
how ditticult it esset maius difficultas, et alio niodo portandi minor:
is to carry a . ' . ' '
bean, we must, per maius tempus portare esset maior difficultas quam
to answer, first „ _c
know who contormiter portare per minus.
carrics it, liow jLx quo 2" patet quod velocitas vel tarditas motus ?o
long, and m . ^ . .. . ^
what way. est impertinens tah difficultati; et difficultas mstantanea,
slowncss"makcs ^'^^ ahter indivisibilis, est taliter comparabilis difficuhati
110 dittercnce; temporanee vel aliter divisibili, sicut instans est corn-
and thc carrying ' . . '
it for one ' parabile tempori ; vel contmuare res 2'" puncta tanturn
instant or for a _^ . • i- ■- • c -^ r •r ...• o-
longer period "*^" '^'^'^ sunpiiciter infinitum tacilius quam continuare :<:>
bears the same ipsas 2"^ Hneas vel superficies; sicut nec superficies
proportion as .^ , . • ,• • •
one instant to infinitum e.vcedit hneam, nec accio corporea, accionem
the samc^given superficialem vel linearem.
3. The length Patet eciam quod difficultas non est eo maior quo
01 time oniy . . . . ...
accidentally diutumior, quia magnitudo del)iHtacionis vel fatigacionis 40
fati^ue! and accidentaliter respicit diuturnitatem ; sicut nec motus
consequentlv thc
diHicultv"';
12. ahud 1'.. 20. iinliiiiiii B. 3^. oti'''^ B.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. i55
(ut aliquid habens macnitudinem maiorem a diuturnitate ■""^'-'ment is
vel longitudine) cst eo maius quo longius, ut patet de gieater in
, ,•• i^- T- ..I- proportion to
corrupcione et de aliis multis. 1 empus tamen et Iinea, iisiensthof
cum sibi similibus, sunt eo maiora quo longiora. Pena duration; e. g.
, , , , ^ . ~ . corruplion ;
5 ergo eterna non erit infinitum magna, sicut nec gaudium riius neither
... • 1^1, ,. damnation nor
etcrnum sibi oppositum; sed videndum est quantum ciernal bliss is
bonum ponit vel privat, et penes hoc mensuretur eius "itinite; both
1 1 ' 1 ^ _ are to be
magnitudo. Dampnatus tamcn sempcr fatigatur ct debi- considered
1- /i.. i- ^- ^ _ I 1 -i- .. • • according to the
litatur, semper ht ratigatus ct dcbilis, etsi non successive amount oT
lodeperdat potenciam. happiness lost
1 i . or gamed.
Patet 4" quod non penes proporcionalem deper- |. Ditiiculty is
... . ,. j^ri^ 1 • _ not to bc
dicioncm potencie attenditur dirhcuitas, quia tunc appreciated by
omne deperdens potenciam in agendo usque ad non ''''^ '"** "^
r i ^ o T _ power
gradum infinitam difficultatem faceret. Ex quo sequitur occasioned by
i5quod nuUa pars corporis maiorem difficultatem lacit man would'
quam suum totum ; et per consequens stat aliquid an^/nfii^uV
continue debilitari et fortificari 2"'' diversas partes sicut difficulty by
simul fit forte et debile. Non enim, si aliquid calefit, ^himself"
incipit esse calidum, sed satis est quod nova caliditate j^^a^^iii^^a^n^fs
2o vel intensione fiat calidum: et sic de impedimentis cxhausted in
denorainacionum que videntur contrarie. Unde patet hodv, and not
quod forte agens facit maiorem difficultatem, que '" ^'^^ ^!'\"'n' '^
i ... . . . . docs not lollow
tamen est sibi insensibilis, et debilius facit sepe minorem that that part
, , ... ., • •, •!• • T has overcome a
debilitatem, que tamen est sibi sensibilis, quia equahs rrreater diftlculty
23 ablacio a minori est sibi sensibilior quam a maiori. '''^" |'"^ whole;
. T _ . so also in the
Q_uinto, patet quod summa difficultas huius generis case of a strong
,. . . 1, \ and a weak
est peccare moraliter, quia patet sic: nuUo modo pro agent.
aliquo bono possibili servando vel acquirendo, et per ■• J'V','2'* f°'"^
T i .... 01 ditncultv,
consequens pro nuUo malo possibili evitando vel mortal sinis
1 1 n 1 • f 1 1 • j^ j fli>2 greatest of
3o evadenelo [homoj committeret aliquod huiusmodi, unde alirsince it
dcus offenderetur: quod non esset, nisi omne tale should not bc
T ' . . committed for
peccatum esset peius pene sensus; et sic de ceteris. thc sake of any
T-. . 1 , • 1- • 1 possible good.
Lt maior patet ex hoc quod, si commutarct aliquid xhe reason
huismodi pro obtentu alterius, offenderet contra summam ^^''^ mortai sm
... . . . is never licit,
35iusticiam, sicut patet explicato: sed quilibet debet non is that God is
^ ^ ' ^ thereby
offended; and
3. corpore / 17. lorti"'' B. 24.. difficultatem before debilitatem B.
cv
27. mo"" = inortaliter? B. 3o. homo deest M. ?2. c'^ pro et sic de
ceteris B. 33. omiftar^ B. 3|. altiiis B. 35. explicato (sic?) B.
3. Corruption, or decomposition, \vas counted by Ari-
stotle as a sort of inovement, meaning change. 2C). Diffi-
cultas. We must rcmember that Wychf speaks of that which,
if done, tends to make the agent deteriorate. Mortal sin is in
that sense a difhcult thing.
i56 .lOHANNlS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
as we should taliter commutare: igitur maior vera. Et minor patet
aiways choose g^ hoc quod semper de duobus malis minus malum
tli6 Icsscr 01
two evils, est eligendum, si oportet alterum habere: in malo
ThTgrcatesf vero moraliter non potest esse eleccio. Sicut ergo in
possibie; privativis est dare maximum eenus difficultatis, sic est 5
and what is \ ......
true lor sin in de CSSe et mdlVlduiS.
^brindiWdud Et quo ad difficuhatem primo modo vel 2" modo
sins. dictam, patet ex dictis quod sicut perfeccio difficilis,
llicrGistilso ,
a maximum vel potencia causantis ad accionem, sic difficuhas ad
the^ o^the/ two difficultatem ; et sic ahqua sunt univoce comparabiles, lo
senses of the gt ahque equivoce: ahqua proporcione proprie dicta, et
word ; ditficulty ,. ^ . ^ . '^ .. ^ .,,
may be greatei" aha proporcione communiter dicta. Umnes autem ille
°'" a"\'h^"*^ difficuhates sonant in bonitatem, sicut omnes priores
perfections of jn mahciam pene vel culpe. Nec distinguuntur iha
things, or the ,.,,.,. . ... ., i-cny -l c
powers of difficiha ex opposito, cum puniri sit tribus ditncuitatibus id
are^ato^^oriess. Jifficile, sed non peccare morahter. Hoc enim con-
These three sequitur penam maximam 2'" genus. Communitas autem
senses are not ' -^ . ■ ■ i a- cn \ ■ •
opposed. sophistarum non loquitur nisi de dirhcuuate accionis
on*if s^pe^aJrof ^^ extra. Certum est tamen quod tunc omne ens pre-
difficulty as to dicamentale est difficukas, 1 Nam difficuhas, positive B 77"
external . ,, . . ' . 1 -i- c 1
eftects ; but the mtellecta, sonat in magistenum et subtihtatem. Sed
smnJthil^ff^Tbe '^^^'^^ dubitat magnum esse magisterium servare mundum
masiered; and in quantitate, bonitate, proporcione, situ, tempore,
what is more .\ \ , ■ ' ' ^ . _
masterly than posicione, et habitu suarum parcium ."
prese^vatfon of 2° patet quod 2^ difficultas non consequitur nisum 25
the world? aut multitudinem potencie secundum se totalem agentis,
In the second . . . -^. • ,
sense, difficulty quia contmgit animam movere corpus proprium vei
imphany ahenum locahter et aheracione; et parem difficuhatem
particuiar effort contingit acens corporeum facere, et deum per se, sive
oftlieagent; . ,,.^ ." ^ ■ ■ n ■ 1-
God, a spirit, mtehigenciam cum communi mnuencia. Lt certum est 3o
a"materia'i' bodv ^uo^J ^^^1'^ "O" apponunt ccrtos nisus vel potencias.
can aii produce ijeo non oportet ad huiusmodi paritates difticuhatem
the same givcn J . . ,
movement rsrum productarum esse equahtatem nisuum vel po-
Iittem!ce'of tenciarum. Non enim includit difficuhas ista fatigacionem
effort; yel debihtacionem causantis, ita quod maior sit diffi-35
cuhas rem fieri a debihori quam a potenciori. Nec
I. commutari 1'.. 'i. a»-, P.. Hi. h^^ 1'.. 17. g'9 B. IQ. es B.
iQ, 20. ple Li. 31. mgrm 15. 22. ingrm B.
21. mgrm. This form occurs thrce times; magisterium does
not agrce wcU with the sense each time; but I can tind no
similar word that is on the whole preferable.
CAl'. VII. LOGICA. 1 57
includil ista 2'' ditlicultas generaliter paritatcm prinic i-^nt it does not
ditticultatis m gradu, sed communiter oppositum, cum ,|,^. dinicuitv is
omne ens primo modo sit summe difticile. !''^ samc, only
' . ,, . tliat it docs iiot
Tercio patet quod omnem ditticultatem concomitatur causc tiic agcnt
. 1-,-L- 1.. ■ • ] • j ,■ • j to deterioiatc.
-■' ditticultas summa; nam si quidquid ego lacio, deus Nor is tlic
conservative, ultimate, et omne onus meum facit: et "^i-^i^ssity of an
' . ' ■ cquallv pcrtcct
hoc non posset aliquid racere preter deum. Unde patet agcnt always
quod intinitis modis contingit facere opus. Cum modo '"Idea ot"an'^
facere illud est facilius, et alio modo facere illud est cqualiy pcrfcct
10 difficilius; ut cultellum facere opus artiricis, quam In every act,
hominem qui dirigit; quia ipse multas difticultates cmicourse of
coefticit quarum nullam cultellus potest facere; et ^'^'^■.^'''^•'jsii*^^!
, ,..,.,. . , . V. ... possiblc deprce
per idem longe dithcilior et artihcialior est taciencia of difticulty is
dei. Faccio autem passiva est eadem, eque difficilis, ^ tTin'^'^"!!!;^ l->c
ircausata ab omnibus. Aliquas autem faciencias reservat '^°"'2 •" ^■'"''fV,"^
. . . n t- • ^^■'i.ys. unequailv
sibi deus 2"^ totam speciem, ut creare, hnaliter gubernari, "difficult;
iustificare etc. Et alias communicat creaturis, ut patet "'is'ot eV'""^
de operibus nature que sunt communia deo et nature, difiiculty m all.
,. . ^ , ,. , , Creation,
et ahas operaciones nature malas morahter, ut [deus providential
20 potest hec] facere sed non approbare, quamvis approbet juft^ficaUonVc.
bonum consequens ex illis: ut patet de blasphemia, are acts that
, . r , .... , ^. ^ „ ,. ' God reserves;
mendacio, lurto, homicidio, luxuria, et cetera. 1 aha the rest He
enim dicitur deum velle esse permissive, approbando (q H?s"cr"at^ures:
sua convertibilia et non illa. Unde, sicut passio aliqua ^9 ^'^^,^ ^"t
' ... makes tlie sin
2.1 bene placet deo et agencia secum convertibilia non which a man
sic placent; ita econtra bene dco placet facere accioneiii '^°ithout'
moraliter malam, et non sic placet sibi illam accionem ^ippioving it,
^ . . . . , , . but onlv the
hen, quoniam si genus eius placet deo, sic et con- ^ood thafcomcs
vertibile sequens ex eo. Videtur ergo tantam difficultatem j,- ,hei-e/ore
3o esse movere fabam, quantumlibet tarde, sicut facere God wills sin,
. , . it ]s onlv
mundum; quia deum sic movere est summum ma- pcrmissivelv.
gisterium; sed distinccio solvit. pkascd whliHis
Quarto patet quod stat idem equivoce. et univoce own share in a
,.^ ^ . ., ^,., ... bad action,
respectu diversorum, esse sub quibuslibet gradibus esse though He is
35 difficile et per consequens facile; ut idem opus est "ni "i,'^^ Pj.^|'Q^'^^g[^g^
agenti facile et alteri difficile; et respectu unius asentis place.
" ,.-^ ., ', . ^ . ^' . And in onc
summe dithciie et respectu alterius minoris potencie sense (the
facilius secundum equivocacionem dictam. Unde non g^,'^;'^'^""'^"^ qq^^j^
oportet, si tante sit difficultatis quo ad potenciam there isas much
^ . . ...... ^ .._ \ . ^ difficultv in
40 requisitam, quod sit simpliciter tante dithcultatis. Et moving a' bean
ita dicitur de perfeccione denominacionis et multis '^* "V-ol-y'"^ ^
i3. fa^^'» B. i5. aboit^y li. i6. fina'' B. 10, 20. deus — licc tjfec*; H
3i, 32. mgrm B.
l58 JOHANNIS WVCI.IF CAI". VII.
It is clcar tliai similibus que augentur ex denominacionibus et con-
ditterein^senses, sequentibus; et acciones dei, relaciones, et multa alia
and in the saine similia positiva et privativa.
sense relativelv ^. .... 1^5
to a dirterent' Et per ista patet aliqualiter quod est dare maximam
''fhhf'^ m^av'*!^^^ '^iffi'^"^^^^^"'' quam agens sufficit agere vel causare;5
difficuit and sicut est dare maximum tempus per quod corruptibile
easv at the same -,, . , ... 1 n •n-
time, or more sufncit durare; cum sequitur: Usque ad hnem illius
difficul? temporis sufficit Sor durare; ergo per totum illud
There is thus a tempus sufficit durare. Sic enim durabit motus et alie
maximum to ^ 1 1 • j u ..
any difiicnlty res per tempora, ex hoc quod exclusive durabunt usque 10
overcome" there ^^ eorum terminos; quia aliter nullum successivum
is also a posset durare per tempus, et per consequens non esset
maximum of f , , ,. , ,
duration to ail longum vel breve, nec ahquam partem posset habere.
'''^'^"{'linRs.''''''^ Nec dubium quin pari evidencia qua ille motus per
totum tempus illud durabit (demonstrando illud quod i3
ponitur minimum tempus per quod sufficio durare) ita
ego per totum illud tempus possum vel sufficio durare,
quia continue a principio usque ad finem possvxm
durare, et sic precise tamdiu possum durare quamdiu
durabit ille motus; quia tamdiu, et quandocunque erit 20
aliquod instans intrinsecum motus huius qui erit per
tolum tempus.
Nec aliter posset aliquid deperdere potenciam durandi
successive, nec senescere; sicut nec aliquid posset in
proporcione racionali esse reliquo durabilius. Et sic 25
nichil haberet periodem naturalem ; ut si tempus centum
annorum sit minimum per quod non possum durare,
et nunc sit medium instans, ita quod precise medium
duracionis deperdi posset, patet quod adhuc sufficio
durare per dupla instancia. [ Aliter enim non esset B 78"
homo magis durabilis quam homo, et continue successive
decresceret, quousque fuerit minus durabilis; et cum
inde quam fuerit durabilis ut homo cum tamen dura-
ciones sunt eiusdem racionis; et tunc sine dubio deus
non posset scire in qua proporcione unum est dura- 35
bilius reliquo, nec aliquod tale posset tamdiu durare
sicut posset. Nec esset dare maximam durabilitatem
mei; et sic partes sine toto vel totis. Quamdiu ergo
erit ita quod ego sufficio vivere in instanti quod est
presens, certum est ergo quod cuiuslibet corruptibilis 40
I. dno'> 1;. i(). po' 15; ib. pcr qiiod noii I'. 21. intu""^" li.
■<^ a'd R. ji). poi B. '}o. 2U, pro dupla B. :\'. n, pro indc.
38. ps V,.
CAP. VII. J.OGICA. l5o
sive permanentis sive successivi quod natum cst durarc
per tempus est signare maximum tempus per quod
potest durare.
Et conformitcr est dare maximam difricultatcm quc We must al.so
3 possunt facere quo ad diuturnitatem temporis, quo ^id '' ,i™/j'],,i'J"|'[J"
intensionem diflicultatis per instans et quo ad minu- t''^' can be
. , . * . . ' . ovcrcome in a
cionem ditticultatis per minnnum tempus compositum given timc, and
e.\ 2*^"* instantibus. Et conformiter dicitur quod cst dare '"oggj^^ie^^n^^ount
maximum erave quod per totidem sufficit portare. ?f tinr^' which
, ■ is composcd ot
lo Pro quo est notandum quod portare est equivocum. two insiants;
Quandoque enim sumitur generaliter pro siistinere vel t|',|°.^^^jJ"J"^]'"(
conservare cuiuscunque effectus. Et taliter princeps ^an be borne in
.... . , r r ,|,3( time.
dicitur portare iUius onera regni et deus totum mun- Three senses of
dum. Q.uandoque capitur striccius pro prohibere grave '"^bear: ^°
\^ a descensu: et isto modo equus poi tat hominem succur- The i*'(very
, ,- . . ,. . , . wide) is to
sando pro declmo montis. quamvis aliquando sit alcior maintain
et aliquando bassior, sicut homo gradiens portat cifum. whatever',"evcn
Et sic loquendo aer sufficit portare quodcunque grave, mctaphoncally;
quia impedire ipsum a descensu. Sed Z^ modo sumitur prevcnt a heavy
20 portare pro impedire grave ne descendat; et hoc dupli- ^",1,^2 3^d'jg ^o '
citer. vel per se. vel cum alio ex equo concurrente, iimder a heavy
^ . . . . .' bodv Irom
quod nec est ipsum portans nec ahquid eius, Q.uamvis faliing- and this
enim ad portacionem hominis concurrat terra suppor- ^* a^Un*^ '^
tando, deus eciam gubernando partes hominis, et subdiyided,
; . . according as
s."^ aha iuvando; et tamen dicitur homo per se portare, ihe thing which
quando portat cum istis adiutoriis sine aliquo eius con- tivitself or by
currente ex equo; ut aere existente indifferenti, et quo- mcans ot
.,,.,.. another.
cunque aho comportante quod non est ilhus hominis
extrinsece causa portacionis sue. Unde impertinens est ^" ^'^'^^' '^*^'^*
.^ . . ^ . ^ not mcan to
3o portacioni sue quod portans moveat locahter vel allevet carry, nor to
pondus portatum. -^ ^
Ex quo patet quod abutuntur termino qui restringunt if we restrained
.1 f , c- • • * 'fs meaning to
portare ad per se rehere per tempus. Sic enmi^ luxta rnovement in
principium illorum non esset possibile quicquid portare f""'^;,^ column
^ . . ^ 1 -1 r would no longer
40 nec distinguuntur vehere et portare; et per consequens bear up a'
building.
6, 7. mi°> B. II gnalif B. ij. i'I pro illiiis B. 24. ct cctera
pro eciam B.
3. Durare. The whole of the preceding paragraph, cspecially
from Aliter to Certiim est is not easy to understand, for me at
least. I have a note on thc iranscript that it is not very ille-
gihle; so perhaps thc text is coriupl. But I cannot see why
WvcUf strives to prove at .siicli lcngth ihal all ihings have a
Hmit of duration, nor how his argumcnls prove il.
l6o JOHANNIS WYCIJF CAP. VII.
Thus a woaker columna et cetera quiescencia nichil portant, cum qui-
a^sUT. "eer one'; escant. Patet eciam quod stat in potencia portare
a plank or a potencius: ut liiinellum vel lapillus portat fortissimum
stonc mav bear f . ' ,, "^ . ' . . ,
a strongman; hommum. 1 mmo tenuis aer interceptus inter duos
a?r between nvol^pi^^^s planos in fundo castri, vel quantumlibet gravis 5
stones at the edificii, portat per se totum edificium suppositum; et
toundation of a . . * , , . ^„ . , , ,
castle. sic sme dubio suificit stuppa pluma vel lana, ymmo
omne corpus quod potest per se subici cuicunque gravi.
It does not Nec ex hoc sequitur quod omne portativum sit eque
follow, . . ,. ,. , , -„ .
however, that portativum; quia unum excedit ahud quo ad surhcien- lo
beaLnv^^wei^"!"! ^iam diuturne portacionis, quantum ad modum portandi,
nor that all can erecte vel decline, alcius vel bassius; et sic de multis
bear equallv ,. i- tvt • • r » n r/- •
weii; for some modis portandi. Non ergo sequitur; si [AJ surficit tan-
'^'lon'^cr**time ^ '■"'^^ portare sicut B; ergo A est tante potencie porta-
and ihus their tive sicut B; quia quamvis quoad illud sunt pares, i5
modeof bearinc _ t a • f i !•
is moreperfcct. tamen B excedit A in ahquo modo portandi, non ut
Bcsides, thc simpliciter portativus. Nota tamen quod applicacio
appHcation ot multum iuvat ad portandum; ut quantumlibet gracile
the weight uniformis continuitatis et grossiciei sufficeret portare
makes much , ^
diiference; a quomodocunque grave erecte, cum non roret racio quare 20
pcrpenmcular po^ius ad unum signum deficeret quam ad quodhbet;
rod can stand et ex indifferencia non potest fieri accio. Et idem con-
under any . . , . _ . ... ...
weight without tingit de tractu uniiormis continuitatis et grossiciei,
''beca^^s^e' dum sit par violencia ad quemhbet eius punctum. Et
there is no cum isto concordat experiencia de velo, ad modum 2?
reason for it to . . . „ . . . ,.„
bend on onc arcuacionis oneris hniti que propter indiiterenciam
side rather than yg| prope indifferenciam diu durant: sicut ovum inter
This is sccn duas manus 2"^ dyametrum longitudinalem quantumUbet
in the saiis of - . . ,- *" ^ • i-rr
ships, in fortiter constrictum non rrangetur propter indinerenciam
'^'^?en"'th\vise^^" deficiencie ad unum punctum pocius quam ad reh- 3o
and in quum. Et sic contingit elevari per elongacionem brachii
cxpcriments ,., ,., , ,. .,.,.,
with a balancc hbre quantumhbet grave, et multa aha mirabiha lacere,
The^leasTw^e^ight ^i 1"'^ cognosceret aptare instrumenta.
that a man Ymmo, sienato minimo ponderoso 1 quod non sufficit
cannot bear for ^ ^ o r 11 • , , .
a given timc is Sor portare per tempus, sed per instans, luxta ad- 33
'tlie"ereate'si!' versarium, ex hoc tam contingit eum levefieri, vel plus
weight ihat he contingit, quam Sor debihtatur ex eius portacione. Se-
the same time; quitur quod illud et non gravius sufficit Sor portare
so here again
we find a
i3. A deest B. 16. est p}-o ut B. 19. g^fficiei B. 21. fig-" B.
26. artiia"-'' B. 26. finitis B. 27. oim B. 29. fuget"^ B. 3o. et
deficiencie B. 3i. elc' B.
26. Arcuaciotiis. This sentencc, of which I can makc nothing,
is thc cxact rcading of the MS.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. l6l
per tcmpus. Et ita undique tenenda cst pars aflirma- maximum,
tiva, iuxta rcgulam Aristotelis. Et si argumcntatur quod o^ppmicms
est dare gravissimum portahile, cum spera terre non admit therc is
est portabilc ct non cst dare eius maximam partem wcipht that can
5 quantitativam. dicitur quod deus portat terram, primo oncTnluun.
modo loquendo, sicut ct mundum qui est maximum " " '^ *'"^ ''^'*'
" ' .. . ~ . "" one can bear
portahilc: sed aliis modis loqucndo non portatur, sicut ihe globe, and
' , j .. . • i- • that thore
nec celum, eo quod terra non potest esse mterius, nec i^^\j^„ ^^
cclum esse srave. Et portacio 2'^"* posterioribus modis ■"'''^'"y"" ,"' ^
^ . .^ ■'^ . part ot thc
lodicta includit violenciam tam ex parte portantis quam globc, there is
T- I • ^ • !• • r • 1 ] no maximiHii oi
cx parte portati. L'nde, sicut inclmacio terri ad aeorsum iij.a,-able\veiehi:
suspenditur per attracionem adatnantis, sic et naturalia, Y:,'^ .'"'^^'•'s'".''''^'
1 r _ ' _ _ :■ (jod bcars it iip
terra, et quelibet eius pars caret nisu ad inferius. in the tlrsi
,,. ^-^ ^ ^ ^ !• t sense of tiie
Sicut ergo aqua constituta cum spera totah non est \vord, and that
I ^ cravescens, sicut patet expertis subversis in aquis, ita "^ "'*^ "'!',':''
>^ ' \ ' .... senses, neitlier
credo esse de partibus spere terre, Et si obicitur quod the earth nor
• 1 ^ , ^ , ^ . the skv can be
partes spere terre violente cadunt ad puteos perpetua j,o,ne,"since the
violencia, et per consequens habent inclinacionem ad /"™^'" cannot
. '^ . " . tall lower than
csse inferius, et ita ad oinnem punctum elementi esset it is, and the
20 perpetuo violencia, cum cuiuslibet partis terre violenta- ^Vei^in.
tur aliqua pars: dicitur quod haberet in tali casu As divers teli
^ r "1 _ . - . iis, \vater lias
appetitum descendendi pro ordinando aere incluso in no wcight in
.,1 r; ] 1 » its own sphcre:
puteo supra terrain, sicut aque pro lUo nne descendunt ^Qjjjg j j^g]igv,;_
ad quantumlibet vmum locum, Existente autetn corpore witli the p:irts
^ . • . . . . i ot the eartli.
2? naturaliter locato in illo situ, non sic appeteret. Ideo
talia inanimata, pro universi ordine servando, mira-
biliter mutant appetitus suos ex regimine et inclinacionc
primc nature portantis omnes partes mundi in suis sitibus.
Est ergo dare maximum portabile, sive sit lapis, sive \Vc, therefore,
^i-L •! ..ij must admit a
3oterra, sive aggregatum ex talibus gravibus; et valde maximum of
modice potens sufticit illud portare cum iuvamine vir- '^^■'-''g'it, which
f . . . i . can be borne
tutis regitive universi, a qua orbis terre movetur, motus by a small
, ,•,. ^ - ^ 1 i- .. 1 r ,. M . power with the
localiter, etsi pars terre levehat vel auferatur. Nec est ai^of theDivine
verum quod spera terre moveatur circulariter vel recte influence, that
^ t- _ governs our
35propter partes exalatas a soie, et ipso facto conteratur: globe.
, • , • , ' The earth
quia vel circumdatur virtute regente et supplente per moves neither
aliquid intrinsecus ad opnositum, vel proporcionando '^''"'-'"'^.''^'",9'" '"
^ ' ' . . . a straight Iine ;
unum orbem terrc pure in medio mundi, cui tanquatn
fixo et inmobili innitatur, tota terra, sicut omne mo-
4otum, innititur llxo; et sic partcs circumferencialcs terre
12. alieracionem (.-) B. 14. Qfti*" B : //'. toli Ji. iq. e" B.
28. fitibo: ti very illegible B. 32. movct 13. 33. Qtc'a'' B. 3u. vel
quia B.
1 1
i62 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
its central parts stat tremere et alterari propter suam porositatem, non
The*^^cxt^erior'^ autem iUud purum. Nec est vis, sive idem numero sit
parts, which p^-ernum, sive idem in specie, corruptis individuis. Et
mav move and . . ,. ' . ,.
tremble, rest quamvis sit mobile naturalitate pnma, tamen naturali-
iv! E^verv^Xins tate ^'''repugnat legi eterne quod moveatur. 3
has a limit hoth \^\ ^m respondetur neeando assumptum, cum cuilihet
as to possible . .^ ^ "^ ' . .
niasiiitude and speciei corporum et qualitatum corporearum sit di-
iiitleness. stJncta magnitudo usque ad quam inclusive potest inte-
grum esse magnum, et parvitas usque ad quam potest
tale per se existens esse parvum; et illa vocantur apud lo
philosophos minima et maxima naturalia, non quod
continue sunt in tali specie, sed quod sic per se exi-
stencia in tali specie. Infinitum namque modicum homo-
geneum creditur esse inexistens parcialitcr suo toti in
i'rnoC: Naturc quantacunque specie corporeitatis porosi. Evidcncia i3
orde^i^n^alTher^^tem phisicorum est talis: natura ordinate procedit
works; this jn omni eius causacione; sed non sic procederet, nisi
implies a .,..,.,. • i-
detinite relation ordinaret individuis relaciones magnitudinum et parvi-
indivi^d^uarand tatum ; igitur etc. Maior patet ex hoc quod, si natura
its possiblc inonl ordinate procederet in causando, tunc deus non 20
size.
Not to admit esset deus: quod est summe impossibile. Idco maior
Tsfo denv^God^^s ^^t evidencia phisico, et una de nocioribus conclusioni-
existence, b^s sequentibus ex deuni esse, quod est primo notum
which is one , . . ^. ... ,. • 1 -i
of the first phisico in perfectissimo genere cognoscendi, cum nichil
'" ""rr/or/°* '^ aliud potest perfectissima noticia philosopho possibili 2?
cognition. cognosci (propter quid), nisi precognito deitm esse.
whoie world. Ideo noticia huius conclusionis est prima et principium
alMtTp^^^rts^ tocius noticie conclusionis propter quid, que cst per-
caiinot be made fectissima noticia nobis possibilis. Minor patet ex hoc
Sreater, so cacli , 1 , , • , , • !• • r^
of its parts quod oportet esse | debitam habitudinem inter partes R ■;
ddniiie^and maioris mundi, sicut inter partes minoris mundi; scd
certain size. eum mundus maior, constans ex tota matcria sua
possibili, non potest maiorari, patet quod ad dehitam
proporcionem suarum per se parcium ad invicem et ad
se ipsum, oportet ipsas proporcionari et difliniri in :-!3
Order must magnitudine et parvitate. Et per consequens sic oportet
prevail in tlie jg accidentibus corporeis ipsas consequentibus. Sicut
world as 111 . ' ^ , . .
the hiiman ergo incongruum esset quod oculus hominis esset in
talo, cor in capite, lingwa fracta ut manus, cerebrum
sicut venter, aut dentes tanti ut tybie: sic pcriret ar- 40
monia mundi, si sol esset in polo arctico, aut in
il t'-me' I'.. |. ii"a'« I'.. . 7, S. dt't'» R. 1?. 'ci prn qiiod B.
16. philosophorum (?) 13. i'o non deesl. 24. in in B. :;8. 9g'o^ B.
XI
bodv
CAl". VII. LOGICA. l63
centro, aut quadrangularis figure, protensus ab uno
polo ad alium, vel quotllibet astrum tantum sicut orbis,
vel totus mundus esset lucidus sicut astrum. Ideo non :ind it so, no
, , . . ,. ., . • doubt tliis oidL-r
dubium qum natura ordmat pro partibus maions cxicnds lo
5 mundi, quoad numcrum suarum parcium, q^-^oad ^^^^^^^y||^^]J^'K|',y^']^J
appetitus mundi vel pondera tcndendi ad certos fines, liie accidcnt ot
' ', . , . , . quanlilv, boili
ut locaciones et naturalcs acciones, et quoad instan- j,, ihinf;s
cias in quantitate, ligura, potencia, et cetcris accidcnti- .^"^'^"opriJlVta^^^^^
Inis, non solum pro sempiternalibus aut incorruptibili- inanimaic and
, ' ,., -1 ^ • animalcd.
H) bus, sed pro naturalibus, pro terre nascentibus ct suis
seminibus, pro animalibus, et breviter universis con-
scrvatis quoad singula corporum accidencia naturalia.
Nec valet dicere quod iste terminantur exclusive ad It is ridiculons
: , ., ... . to sav thal
suos tcrmmos, quia nichil potcst terminan aa terminum tiiese limits are
i.^quem non potest attingere. De terminis autem corporum ]J'^^,?^"^jj'"'^j^J;|j^4^
naturalium aliqui possunt sensu et experiencia con- ncver rcachcd is
. . ' . . not a limit.
vinci, ut termini corporum eterogeniorum et seminuin. i,i sonie cases
Sed aliorum parvitates excedunt sensus et experiencias, fact^^hjs^^umit"
ut parvitates lapidum, mineralium, elementorum, et is reached; in
,. .,.._, 1..3 others, as in
20 tahum simphcium. Certum tamen est quod est uare stones and
cuiuscunque tahs speciei simphciter minimum q^o^J the"smalfness oi-
potest pcr se existere. tiieir parts
„ , T-, • •... exceeds our
Contra hoc tamen argumentatur. Fnmo sequitur powers of
quod sit generacio subita, sicut et corrupcio subita ^r-rwnents to
25 minimi numerahs; et sic, tam subita gcneracio quam ihe contrary.
. . .".,., I. If there is a
subila corrupcio cuiuscunque genens acciaentis; quoa nilnimum of
est contra racionem proporcionis agentis ad passum. ^'a!j^^o^^^^'lj™"t"''
Racio satis patet ex hoc quod ignis, apphcatus passo instantancous
' , . . . ^ ■ , • • combinaiion
carente igne, subito inciperet inducere minimum na- nnd
?oturale. Et sic ex minori proporcione velocius ageret. '''^'^^vh,'c°ri'r"'
Simihter, tale minimum non esset ahcuius potencie impossible.
. • 2 Thcrc
active vel passive per se, cum quodhbet contrarium wo"uid be a
superdurans subito corrumperet ipsum, et per conse- j,ud"sta*bilitv'Yn
quens cum ipsum non possct pati, non possct natura- all bodies
,i i, r ■ • • ^ composed ot
3-1 hter agere. Cum tamen tam pcrfecta sint minora sicut s„ci, pi,ts,
maiova eiusdem speciei, ymmo perfcctissima sunt non 2verv"thin"
quante; quomodo ergo derogaret perfeccio proporcionum possessed of a
mundi ad eius partes? quia quantumhbet pertectum activity would
foret simplex aggregatum cum ahis, tamcn tantum confpou",^^^"!,'^,,^
40 figuratum constituerct, sicut contingit de arcna. the whole body
„..,. . ,, ... , would bea mcre
Simihter, capto igne duplo ad minimum naturale aggregate, like
per se existens, videtur quod contrarium subito ipsum =• ''^V?'if°two"'^'
bodies of
dilferent sorts
r ^ A- o /-"^1,0 ij „ cm D are mixed in
b. mudi B. 9. fcp*» 13. 40. fi™ B.
l64 .lOHANNIS WVCF.IF CAP. VH.
uneqLial corrumperet, quia non posset inducere de contrario
sreate'r quantiu- P^*" ^^j "'^' P'^^ minimo igni, ad cuius induccionem
will mcet vvith sequitur minimi ii^nis corrupcio. Et ultra, cum accio
no resistance ^ . ^ ^ ... ...
at all from the contrariabitur propter facihtatem, ex induccione talis
sma ei. minimi sequitur quod subito corrumperetur totus ignis:5
et per idem quantumlibet magnum simplex, cum con-
tinue post erit agens melius dispositum ad agendum,
ct subiectum ita capax sicut in principio fuit. Ymmo
tunc infinitum facile esset corrumpere totaliter tale
simplex, cum per divisioncm in minima naturalia subite lo
cederet in continuis, et per consequens motus in nuUo
consequitur proporcionem.
Aiatwers. i. Wc ^j pj-imum dicitur quod minimum naturale est
admit tlie , ^ , ^ . .
possibility of subito generabile et subito corruptibile, ut assumitur;
'combinati^orf ^t sic de accidentibus ipsum consequcntibus. Nec sunt i3
'"''^ ... talcs minores partes motus successivi; sed termini mo-
decomposition . ' .
in these cases;tuum successivorum. Non desunt illis motibus propor-
but it would ■ M ,• .. -i
take place cioncs ex quibus causantur; ahter agunt cum quibus-
according as j^j^-, circumstanciis et aUter cum ahis, propter motum
circumstances . ... , .
ailowed, just as et ordinem universitatis servandum: ut, plano existente 20
a fiill bottlo • 1- ., 1 ^ ■ -^ 1 • r
empties itseU mmediatc plano, natura non sinit unum elevari a reli-
onlv when q^Q^ ^\^[ ^^jj niodo quo corpus potest subingredi pro
peneirates. pleno servando. Sicut nec hquor exit fialas vel alia
vasa, orificiis eorum subversis, | nisi ahunde aer posset B79''
subingredi, supplendo locum hquidi exeuntis. Et sic de^.^
multis exemphs naturalibus in quibus certum est natu-
ram occuke facere taha, vel per se, vel supplendo
sufficienciam agentis sensibihs. Et aha est proporcio
cum tahbus paribus. Aha autem crit cum ahis paribus
proporcio. 3o
2._lt does nnt Ad 2"'' negandum, cum tale potest esse minimum per
se possibile in quantitate et non in virtute: quod si
follow tliat thc
minimuni iu
size is also a
2. cius B. II. oti" B. 32. v''" B.
ft
ig. Circuvistaiiciis. I can very doubtful as to Wyclifs mean-
ing, but it is perhaps this: Eacli movemcnt of combination
or of decomposition of two atoms (minimum naturale) must
be instantaneous, but as a vacuum is impossible (pro pleno ser-
vando) such movements can take place only when other atoms
are so situated as to fill up the vacant space which their move-
ment occasions, and thus the combination or decomposition of
the wliole must take place in time. Wyclif two pages later
(p. 166. 1. 32) distinctly uses the term atoms, which are pro-
babh- identical with his botiies tliat occupv oiilv two poiiitf^ iu
space, as wc shall scc towards thc end of Logica.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. i65
utraquo insit alicui corporis, tunc ipsum cst minimc niinimum in
potcncic per se pos.sibilis, ct talia minima iuxta potcn- buri*! ft^were
ciam, 2'" pronorcionem debitam constitueret maximum, ^°> iiie" ihcrc
» ^ . ...... would bc a
cuius forma superaduita servarct iUa mmima in tem- superaddcd
.'' pore ct operacione. Nec est verum quod inanimata /|°os" minima
omocenia minora sunt tam perfecta sicut maiora eius- loscther and
^ ^ ..... prcservc tiiem.
dem speciei; eo quod non solum perfeccio accidentalis, Every
sed essencialis perfeccio componitur ex suis partibus ,,, "^pg'^'!"^',,.,^
inteeralibus. Omne tamcn individuum alicuius speciei precisely the
<^ . . . . . . . minunum ot the
lohabct perteccionem dcbillimam speciei ad mmimum; perfectiou ot the
sed unum in perfeccione individua maiori, et aliud in ^couslderedi^
nerfeccione individua minori, 2'" quod contingit univer- individuaily
. ... . „ . ,. one is more or
sitati. Ideo, ex dacione perreccionis specihce, implicatur less periect
minimum naturale. Ncc obest quod perfectissima sunt 'Ti"is^'act'^of'
i3non quanta, quia illud quod est perfeccionis in uno liavin,q speciiic
. ...... , , pcrtection
foret imperteccionis in alio; ut habere magnos oculos implies a
est in equo bonum signum perfeccionis, in homine vero j, i^^quTteTmc
sicnum stolliditatis. Indivisibilitas ereo est simpliciter tii^t si^i; !«
,. . ., ... , ^ "^ quite wantmg
prestancior divisibilitate, sed non potest competere in the most
20 corporalibus; ideo non sequitur quod essent perfecciora [^^[^'^''jj^jqj,'^'"*^^'
vel eque nerfecta propioribus divisibilitati. Ymmo, cum lii^^i^^tore follow
7^, , •, ,•• Ili3t thc parts
deo sit quodammodo cura de omnibus, ut dicit commen- of a body arc
tator, non sineret tam modicum corpus per se esse ^'""'(^jjf^^li^Q^g .
quod ipsum non sufficeret in operacionem, nec servaret '^Xliat is
^ ' . ,,. ... -i- pertection m
2D per successionem debitam speciei. Utrum autem simpii- one being is
citer non quanta de corporibus homogeniis possunt "^^,pQ„fjf,?'°J|,j"^
inteerare mixtum, et sic per se esse sine inmediacione '"di^isibilitv is
'^ . . *^ , , . ^ , , 1 'I qnahtv that
corporum speciei sue, est dubium. hed de arena, de bodies cannot
partibus metalli calcinatis, de carnibus, et aliis mixtis wife^ther^there
3o ceteris, patet quod sunt quantitative divisibiles, cum i* or is uot in
' - • - T^ 1 • everv
aliter non servarent formam mixti. De elementis vero homogeneous
in mixtis est credibile quod multa non quanta sunt som°ething
coniuncta. Certum tamen est quod continuacio vel indivisibie that
' . . . gives it unitv,
adnascencia talium in mixtis est de perfeccione universi, 'is a doubtfui
35 co quod inordinacio esset, si omnia mixta essent cathe- '^"'""^ '"""
nata, eciam minima naturalia non adnata.
Ad 3'" dicitur quod non sequitur; sed posito igne :^. in tlie givcn
duplo ad minimum, tam quantitate quam virtute, ""appiicd^G'!!^
subducta sensibili conservacione, contingeret ipsum niinimnm of
. . . quantitv, thc
40 corrumpi subito. Ideo de elementis non sunt minima hrc itselfwould
go out.
4, ^. te?ce?oe? pro tempore B. 18. scolli'" B. ^i.jipioribg B
?4. aduafcM B 36. ec^ B.
i66 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. Vir.
And for tluit naturalia nec solum dupla ad minima, nisi in mixtis,
no*sach'minima "bi conservantur ex armonia commixtorum. Nec est
in tiie elements, jifficile nature, eracia mixti producendi, subito producere
but only in . . ^ r • j- . • ■ ^
ccmpounds. quotlibet mmima naturalia in medio contrario, sicut
^^^ That''^"^'^ contingit distanter infra terram et aquam et ignem 5
division is in q^ aerem a celestibus generari ad mixti constitucionem.
manv cases . ^^ ' u •^ !_•.. i
favourable to Nec sequitur quod continuabitur subita elementi pro-
diange!' duccio, quia deficiet proporcio recta, gracia cuius sic
Aichemists tieret. Conceditur tamen quod per divisionem contingit
''imperfect'' mixtum celerius consumi, sicut noverunt Alchimiste, lo
'"to'dispo°se'^^' calcinantes metalla imperfecta, et postmodum per
them for the niediantes, disponentes calcinata, purgata, et coagulata,
reception ot ■- . ...
more perfect ad formas perfecciores. Verumptamen sic dividere per
This^^ho^wever. igneni est laboriosum; nec scit artifex per sublimacionem
is great labour dividere talia omogenia in minima naturalia, cum excedunt i3
'"reduce the iudicium sensus. Ideo errant artifices in istis operibus;
smahest^pans': quod si perficiunt est prope casuale, cum execucio
for that reasoii, practica liuius sciencie deficit propter materie subti-
if they succeed. ;.
it is by chancc. Iltatem.
ThaTform"a ^^ ^l^^ patet quodsuntmulti gradus in continuacio- 20
continuous nibus corporum. et formarum quibus fiunt continua-
wholc varv . , . ,. . . . . ^ „ , .
both as to ciones; | et simplicia sunt tortissime continuata, et post B ho*
/f",l'"/;5,'Vh,. cradatim modis suis extenduntur forme mixte, secundum
forms that quod sunt propiora elementis. Nulla tamen forma
make them so ; » , ,• t i • ^ t •
first thc forms superaddita extenditur per subiectum par vel minus 2?
'^^ 'ufeiflhe^'^'*' subiectum quam sufficit corpus illius speciei per se
superaddcd esse; ut si ad esse lapidis requiritur adnascencia mille
forms ot the ,,'.■' .. ^ 1
compound, and non quantarum de elementis, tunc quotquot sunt tales
each°'forni"is millenarii debite proportionati, sive continuitates, sive
extendcd nQn continuitates, tot precise sunt forme lapidum et 3o
throufih a ,.,'„. . ,
niimber of its pcr consequens lapides. Et sic, notatis numero ct modo
siutici'ent*to athomorum requisitorum ad esse causans plante arboris
make up the yQ\ cuiuscunque alterius mixti, tot sunt forme et in-
whole; as e. g. ,. . , ' , . ,
if a stone dividua quot sunt talesnumen; et ad omnem punctum
'ckmcnt-uy° ^alis numeri est causa, forma indivisibilis, multiplicata. 33
parts, the forrn ijeo dififert extensio forme superaddite cuius pars
is dirtused ,. , • ,• • r 1
through all. indivisibilis est multiplicata, et cxtensio rorme elemen-
ph^its^and ^ix^^^s cuius pars indivisibilis est punctualiter situata.
animais, one jr^ j,-, pi-ima snecic sunt multi gradus; ut patet de
form of plant . . .' . f , , . '^ , . ' ^
or of animai mixtis inanimatis, de plantis, et anulosis, quorum torme^o
cxtcnduntur modis suis. Nec cst omne continuum
I. zpla H. 12. mcdia"' li. 20- coi:«'* yi'«' B. 3-2. cans B.
40. annlof, tJ.
CAP. \II. LOGICA. 167
(.iivisibilc in inliniuim, cum sil slatus aJ numcrum in- litc is
divisibilium. ut postea dicetur. Verumptamcn ultra hoc '"'ich'Vtom'."
quod nos sufticimus cot^noscere est quodlibet tale , ^'"■'''
}...,.,., . i"^ . clomciit.irv
divisibile; ideo ponitur tale mixtum omogeneum, cum toim occupics
3 nulla pars eius quantitativa sensibilis sit disparis speciei ''" -^ °"cif°"""
a toto. Manifcstum tamen est eteroacneum, cuius una «'ipcraddcd
. ^ . onc is dirtiiscd
pars quantitaliva est ignis, alia aeris. Unde non tiuough many.
intinilum est parvum tale mixtum. sed ad omnem bcii)"s^ stonis
eius punctum quelibet species elementi, sine earum pi:'"'^. and
. ,. . ,. ,. _ ainielhia, thc
loextensione vel continuacione, ut alias dicetur. Sed, si supeiaddcd
fuerit aliquod individuum per se quantumlibet magnum. toTomc^dc^^M-ec
et non habuerit multas partes non communicantes. », ^■'^''^"ded.
. , . ,, . . ^o continiious
quarum quehbet componitur ex athomis sutncientibus being is
2™ numerum et modum principiandi tale individuum, divisibic^ "hut
i5tunc forma illius est multiplicata per totum, sicut est ';ii" bcyond aii
. . .. . . wc can
de hominibus et bestus que requirunt membra simplicia, conccive.
ct componi in debita qualitate, quantitate et proporcione: men"and*o"/
ct ex nuUa tali forma cum parte sui corporis com- "i^i liislier
,. , 1- • - iuiimals rcquirc
ponitur adequate aliquod unum, vel qualitative; quia aii thcir organs
20 sic quilibet homo foret quodlibet eius pars, sicut ° dispo'scdT '"^
communiter tantritur de Sor. Anima tamen inest, '*"'^ '''^'^ ."'^*'^
." . . . ' torms bclong
continue actuabit illam, sed diversimode cum fuerit indccd to cacii
pars materie^ et cum fuerit completa materia ex qua partlv, and 'not
adequate liet totum animal, Si ergo tales due materie '" ^''"^ ^''"''^'^
^ . ^ wav as to
--■' non communicantes adunate, tunc sunt duo animalia, the^whoic
sicut patet de monstro habente duo corda et duo capita, a° tbV
cum aliis membris sensibilibus duplicatis, et cum toto '"o'isters with
. . . . doiible organs
residuo inferiorum membrorum ac si esset unici ani- ioined togcthcr,
1 • T 1 ,. ,. ,. j • I- thev are simplv
malis. 1 ale autem aggregatum esset dao animaiia com- twoanimais'
:^o municancia et non per se individuum alicuivis speciei ; ?",4 '.'"'^ 9"*^^
' . . . ^ individual of
sed esset unum, continuum, animatum, vivum etc. et any species,
1 ,. • • 1 ,. iiaving no one
tamen nec substancia nec accidens etc. common form.
Redeundo ergo ad propositum, conceditur quod ma- .7" rcturn to
^ . . .'■ ^ ' . " . . thc question:
ximus homo possibilis non posset augeri per assimi- thc biggcst of
33 lacionem alimenti, stante habita materia. Sed contin- nien cou*d not
geret ipsum tumelieri 2"^ partes, sine eius maioritate; become bigger
^ . '^ . . ' .' . . ' bv assimilating
quia magnitudo corporis attenditur penes multitudinem any food. so"
suarum speciticarum parcium non quantitivarum. Unde bodv"remained
non sequitur ipsum maiorari, si pars eius maioraretur; that maximum
40 nec haberet minimus homo possibilis partes supertiuas, part of his
A.T ,. • • j 1 ,. ] ... podv might
Nec est inconveniens, sed verum, quod est dare tam s\vcli up,
provided it was
not a spccilic
p.irt.
i'>. nib"^" B. i;i. coiv \>: it. ca'' li : ib. inc H.
l68 JOHANNIS WYC[,IF CAP. VII.
Tlierc is a tiibi primum quam ultimum instans esse hominis. Ncc forct
and a last ' . ^ • ,- • j , -c
instant oi talis homo innnitum debihs, cum posset tam agere
lie^'voull"not quam pati. Verumtamen anima potest sub remissiori
thcn he eradu disposicionis materie actuare materiam in quam
infinitcly wcak, '^ . , '^ . ■ , ■ i -k-, ■ , \ ■ n ^ h
ihongh his soiil est mducta, quam potest noviter mduci. | Nec ideo desi- i* '^f
his^bodv^less'^ neret homo incipiens esse proptcr indisposicionem in-
intcnscly. cepcionis sue materie. Nec foret materia incipiens in-
disposicionem in tali gradu disposicionis in quali
inmediate ante hoc fuit.
V. Thc ^\j 5;im obicccionem dicitur quod assumptum est lo
assnmption ot , , , . , , , , , • m , •
thc lifth talsum, cum beati habebunt habitus 2'" ultima suarum
"(■aUc^-^Uie* capacitatum. Et 2"^ Lincohiiensem, quilibet talis cog-
. bicsscd wiii noscet omnia, cum anima eius non fuerit mole corporis
cnjoy Hcaven ,. ',.,., ,
to the ntmost prcpcdita ncc auunde accidente extraneo occupata, sed
of tlicir
capacity.
primo lumine 2'" ultimum irradiata. Nec est hoc in- i-"^
G rossctc^stc crcdibiUus quarn quod unum punctuale lucis ditfundat
savs tliat tlicv . „ . ,. ,. ., , ,. .
will know all inhnitas hneas radiosas, manitestando distnlcte omnia
The'"ouf lias ^'•^'^ prius cont'ase videbantur in humine radioso. Anima
a natnral ergo habct in se naturalem disposicionem ad cogno-
io'\'no\v all scendum quamcunque veritatem sue noticie possibilem. -'J
""comp^lcx"^' Elt illam disposicionem, habilitatem, pronitatem, vel
relations or potenciam naturalem ad complexe comprehendendum,
simplc lacts. -^ , , • ... . .
vocant habitum aut scienciam mnatam; sicut pronitatem
naturalem ad incomplexe comprehendendum vocant
But ihe speciem innatam vel noticiam innatam. Sed ad actua- -^
intcllcctnal ,.' ,• • ,
habit, or actiiai hter ct distincte noscendum ventatem requiritur natu-
'^'''*^r,'''MUv'ic""* ralis exercitacio; et disposicio ab illa adquisita vocatur
rcquirccl, iii habitus intellectuahs, ut habitus, sciencia intelligibilis,
order to know. . 1 ^ ,• 1 ,. j
ars vel prudencia. Lt correspondenter dicendum est de
speciebus aquisitis, respectu apprehensionis incomplexe, -Jo
And ii actual Quod si quis, contemplando veritatem primam secun-
knowlcdge is ^- ^ . -^ ,. •. •
acquired bv dum omnes raciones suas causandi cognovent sme
'^°,V,l^Mt^'i'fhl!M'l proprio lahore singulas alias veritates, tunc vocatur illa
it is calicd noticia apud theologos noticia in verbo, noticia matu-
linon'led"e in . , . ,. ..,,.,. , . . . , .. -
thc Word, tina vel mendiana, noticia tacialis vei intuitiva clara. -^^
ihat^^t^he^^soiri Et iUa non est res absoluta, sed ponit animam non
tcnding towards extranee impeditam, tendendo in deum, incHnari ab
cnlightciicd bv ipso ad taUter clare noscendum huiusmodi veritates.
It^mav Utrum autem anima habeat tot liabitus correspon-
however, bc dentes, dubitatur a muhis. Et videtur quod non, tum 4"^'
denied that thc . • ,- • ,- • ,- •. 1 1 •„
sonl has a quia tunc mhnitum pernccretur per mlmitos habitus,
separatc
14. ppedita B ; ib. ut pro nec B.
3.T. Facialis. Facc to facc. "Now wc scc as in a glass, darkly.'
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 169
tum quia obiccium primum sufticit ad illam noticiam dispo^iiion lor
aciualcm, sine habitu nicJmante. Videtur tamen michi ccnition:
quod ox illis fortibus impressionibus causantur 2"^ ulti- 'ii^r^e t^emf;
T . ' . . . iiinnitc, tlic
muni vam species quam habitus, quorum primum in- dispositions
- r » ] I • • 1 .. „m ] would bc so
_-> chnat ad apprehensionem mcomplexam, et 2'" ad com- too.
nlexam ; sic quod anima per impossibile impedita ab l'ossibly iiic
) .... ^ "^ . powcrtiil
impressione fclici, adhuc posset recolere de actibus imprcssion ot
preteritis et per consequens de veritatibus obiectis illis causes both
actibus. Et pronitatem derelictam voco speciem vel .1'"^ ima^cs and
. ' . ... t"C dispositions
lohabitum; quia, cum anima nunquam ociabitur a talibus towards thcm,-
^■1 -j •_ -^ 1 • ^ ir .. so that it' thc
actibus, ideo communiter ponitur quod non mtelligeret ^aints conld bc
in habitu. Omnem ereo huiusmodi actualem apprehen- ^vithont the
.... ^^ . actual sii^ht
sionem consequitur vel precedit disposicio vel habitus of Gnd, thcy
inclinans ad talem actum, et per consequens species. e„j'oy ^l
i3Actas autem est prius causacione quam species vel i;^membrancc.
■^ . ^ ' This tcndcncv
habitus ab illo generatus; sed habitus est prius quo ad taken by itsdf,
consequenciam, et talis habitus intellectivus vocatur ^-ogni^ttvc imagc
apud theoIo£;os lumen glorie; et habitus voluntatis ",■! .'^'^P"^,'.^'""-
' . ~ '^ . . . It is thc light
vocatur cantas. Nec potest deus sine talibus beatificare of giory in ihc
1 ■ • .. ^ ^ ■ ., intclliscncc and
20 homincm, sicut nec potest sine actu. charitv in thc
Unde frivoli sunt casus, quibus ponitur deum supplere ^^''"! ^°^'^ ^'"'^
.. .. .. . ^. ncccssarv.
vicem speciei vel habitus sme posicione talium, quia It would bc"sclf-
claudit contradiccionem quod sic faciat. Sed magis ''°o'siip'posc^
frivolum est crcdere quod talia possunt per se esse, cascsinwhich
... ,. ..^ *. God dispcnscs
2?sicut aliqui arguunt de disposicione, causata in corpore with these
circumducto. Nec sequitur deum correspondenter quali- or 'tcffoncv" hat
ficari, quia non potest aswefaccione disponi. Nec sequi- ,^''^>', "^^'^ "'*'^
■ 1 . ' , ^ . " bv themsclvcs.
tur quod anima sit in infimtum pertecta accidentaliter "it does not
propter intinitatem talium accidencium, sicut nec subiec- the°souMs
B81" tum I est intinitum perfectum propter iniinitos modos et accidcntally
. r- ■ , • 11- • . ■ , • inhnite;
innnitas reiaciones, vel taha accidencia; nec est subiectum a substance
proporcionaliter perfeccius, ut plures tales qualitates '"'^bvln]in1t'c"^'
habet, sicut iniinite partes subiecti perticiunt ipsum . ,n''°''?^*.
^ . . ^ ^ . without beinf;
omnes equahter: et tamen ex illis resultat una perfeccio intinite on that
33 linita, sicut deus scit ex quot partibus tale componitur. jhe^.e^^^p" t^vo
Alia ergo est perfeccio essencialis quam claudit con- sorts of
... . .. .^. pcrtection: oiic
tradiccionem augeri vel minui, quia, si posset, esset csscntial, that
accidentalis et non essencialis subiecto; et alia est '^'^'ncrcase 0^"^
perfeccio accidentalis, sive ex substanciis sive ex acci- diminisli: fit;,
. . . . . othcraccidental,
40 dentibus resultans ; et sicut deus scit numerum princi- rcsulting from
paiicium talem, ita scit gradum perfeccionis et quante
unus numerus dictus a nobis infinitus excedit alium
42. datus above dictus B.
lyo JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
differcnt caiiscs, numerum finitum nobis vel infinitum. Et per consequens
°'kno'\\Vthe' scit quante beaius est accidentaliter perfeccior non
mimber, and bgato. Nichil enim est infinite perfectum, nisi forte in-
Ihe degree ot . ' • ,• ,
pertection they telligatur ille terminus perfectiim nominauter pro bono
No^befng is ^'^ "0'"i participialiter pro plene perfecto. Sic autem 3
int^nitely ^^,^18 dicitur infinite perfectus, hoc est, bonus. Et ex istis
perfected .\ ' ,. . ,
m the sense ot patet quod impossibue est aliquid esse in proporcione
^alotie is racionali perfeccius quam prius; quia vel oporteret
intinitely perfeccionem essencialem crescere, vel perfeccionem
rertect. ^ ■ r- ■ c ■ ■ ■ v
accidentalem parifican perfeccioni essenciali; quorum lo
utrumque est impossibile. Nec sequitur: Sor beatiis est
infinituin perfeccior accidentaliter qitam Plato est acci-
dentaliter: er^o, Sor, est infinitum accidentaliter perfectus.
Sicut non sequitur: virtus est infinitum melior dominio
Though coactivo: ergo, illa virtus est infinitum bona. Quando- i3
'Hca^vcrmav' ^unque ergo dicitur substanciam esse ita perfectam,
liavc inHnitciy intclliizitur de totali perfeccione aggregata ex substan-
more both ot' . ,. '^ . , ,. ' . , c ■ • i .. r
kiiowicdgc ciali et accidentali; et ita de perteccione accidentaii
hanptncss^^^^^thcv ^'^^ perfeccione generis accidentis, semper intelligitur de
are not " totali huiusmodi perfeccione. Et hinc non sequitur quod 20
intinitclv niore , . ,, ,. . ,, . . . , .
perfcct than \vc. ultimate telices suntinfinitum perrecciores nobis. quamvis
infinitum perfeccius cognoscunt et delectantur quam nos.
Two scnscs to Nota tamen quod aliud dicitur infinitum excedere
vtfinftdy1\n(i, ^^^^""^ quoad nos, aliquando cum aliqua deo rinita
as tiic humbcr parificarent unum alteri; ut patet de numero punctorum 25
ot points in ' ,, • • ,• r- ,•
a siirface and superficiei, et numero punctorum hnee. Et aiiqua non
infinite^ 'to ijs ^^^'^ "'^ comparando virtutes fortitudini, felicitatem dc-
but absokitely lectacioni sensuali, noticiarn intellectivam sensacioni; et
capable ot .,,..., , . < , • j j r •
cquaiity; thc sic de ahis. Linde non sequitur: .4 est in duplo perjeccius
"no^^cqualuT accidentaliter quam B: ergo est in duplo perfeccius B. 3o
possiblc." Nec sequitur: A est in duvlo verfeccius quo ad scien-
Thiis. though a . , ,• , -, • d \ ,
bcing is t\vice ciaiu, vel auud genus accidentis, quam h; ergo, A est
sd^i^ncMor 'a" v '"" duplo perfeccius quam B; quia iion est possibile sub-
accident) as " iectum esse tam perfectum accidentaliter quam per-
cannot ^ fectum est simpliciter, aut econtra. Nec sequitur: ille }>':<
'''"is't'\vy'ls " ^■^'"^ intellecciones perficiunt in duplo plus subiectum quam
pcriect simply. y;^^;-^^-^/ altera illarum per se: ergo, subiectum per illas
est in duplo perfeccius quam fuit, quando solum unam
habuit. Sed bene sequitur quod in duplo perfeccius in-
telligit et est in duplo perfeccius intelligens per illas^o
quam per alteram solam intellexit.
14. duio B. i'4. qyj 1). 38. q>^
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 171
Sunt autcm multa dubia contini^oncia hanc matcriam; Sci-cml minor
utputa si una sit pcrfeccio composita ex accidentali et /Therc
essenciali, aut una accidentalis perfeccio composita ex '^ '■''"^ Mnj;lc
■ . . purfcctioii
perfeccionibus diversorum gcnerum aut diversarum spe- consisting oi
T^ • ] ^ 1 ' • • ]•.. • LM -^ accidcnt and
3 cierum. ht videtur quod sic, quia ahter nichil possit substance, and
crescere in perfeccione. Vel aliter: substancia posset '^"^ iikewisc
. ' .... consisting ot
esse perfeccior quam prius fuit, sine hoc quod habeat tlie diitcrent
maiorem perfeccionem quam prius habuit. Ideo videtur a°Jidcnt.
esse una perfeccio unitate at^gregacionis vel vinitate
losubiecti; et illa crescit per adventum accidentalis per-
feccionis, salva perfeccione priori.
2°. Videtur quod omne accidens perficit subiectum, quia 2. Every
privaciones, ut peccatamorum et nature, faciunt substan- '^'"Yts^^sabj^Jct^'^
ciam iuste pati. Et in hoc, pulcrificant universum, et per i"ore pcrfcct;
• , . ,- . ^ • , • r^ • r tor evcry sin
i3 idem inperteccio perhcit subiectum ethcienteret non rorma- maivcs tlie
liter, cum solum perfeccio perficit subiectum formaliter. j '''""'ji,(['" '"''
B81'' 3". Videtur quod omne accidens subiecti facit ipsum rcndcring tlie
. ^. ,• • , • ,• ,-, universe more
tam periectum sicut ahquid; quia aliter esset quelibet perfcct;
substancia corporea infinitum modice perfecta et pei' '' '"^'^a rcal'''^^^
ooconsequens quelibet eius perfecta cuilibet. Nec aliud quidditative
" ^ ^ . ' . pcrtcction; it
posset esse minus pcrtectum quam est, et pcr idem not, bodics
omne quantum esset infinitum parvum vel remissum. ^\.°"^, ijjfie^
Sicut eriio musca contrahit navem, sic quantitas per- pcricction
. ,. . . . ^ , mdced.
ticit subiectum ad gradum totahs perteccionis. hed Quantity licips
23 precise tante perficit quam perfectum accidens ipsum p'°rTcc'ting
est, loquendo de perfeccione quam ipsum per se facit, substance, as a
^ ^ . • - • TT , ■ tlv liclps m
ct non de perfeccione quam ipsum conhcit. Unde non dragging a
scquitur; siib illo griidu accidens perjicit siibiectnm: t''"i,'t>, ^jJ^,5\j'^,,'J{\ij^'^ij^
sub illo ijradu subiectum verficitur, cuni aliud sit per- so far as it is
,• , , . i, -^ , . , ,. . pcrtcct itsclt.
:^o ficere et ahud perhci. Et ad antiquas reduphcativas
quibus solet concedi quod subiectum, ut quantum, est
sic perfectum, et, ut sciens, est perfeccius. dicendum
quod inteUigende sunt de quantitate et sciencia quod illc
sunt sic perfecte, et illa perfeccio attribuitur subiecto;
SSquia nullam aliam essenciam ponit tale accidens.
Nota tamen quod aHquod dicitur per se, excludendo Rcmark that
actualem inherenciam, et ahud, excludendo parcialem ^^!^ither-mclm
inexistenciam ; quomodo completa accidencia sunt per tiie ncgation ot
' ' . ' . . 'm another', or
se, cum non sunt partcs ahquorum sue speciei. Undc of -part of
anothcr'.
ic). aliquod li. 23. mulca IJ ; ib. nanc 1>.
3';, 38. Inherenciam . . . parcialem inexistenciam. The for-
mer word is used by Scliolastics to denote an accident as
distinguished from a suhstance; the latter to denote a part as
diflerent from its whole.
172 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
The whole of a nota quod dupliciter dicilur bonitas reliqua maior; vel
givcn accidenl .. r ^ \. \ ^ \. ■ ^ ^ -i-
is in the latter quia sic pcriectum per se habet bonitatem cui reliquum
scnas hy :tsei/. j-^qj^ habet ner se parem vel excedentem; et illo modo
Again, a thing . ... .
is cailed better quelibet substancia iniinitum excedet quodlibet accidens
than another • c • .^o j]--* .■•.•-
either because "^ perieccione; 2" modo dicitur unum participative o
it has a reliquo perfeccius; et illo modo virtutes, et felicitates,
superior degree ... .
of goodness by et niulta alia accidencia, nedum excederent substancias
beionging to inanimatas et vegetabilia et irracionabilia, sedhomines;
a subject. ^^ perfeccius et melius est hominem esse virtuosum
In the second ' . , . , . .
sense many vel felicem (quod est virtus vel felicitas) quam est lo
supcrior even habere quotlibet divicias; ymmo quam est hominem
to reasonable es^e absolute, cum preexieit esse hominem, et super-
substances. ■ r^ ■ r a . ' .
Quantity, addit nnem eius perfectum. Ista autem perfeccio vocatur
'"m^^a^cnal" participativa vel relativa, quia nichil valeret nisi, com-
accidcnts municando cum perfeccione substancie, supperadderet i5
cannot bc thus ^ . ^ j- r
supcrior. bonum modum, qui non potest per se esse, nec uniri
vel pariticari perfeccioni per se. Sed quantitas et alia
accidencia corporea non sunt sic perfecta, quia tunc
subicctum. ex hoc quod sic quantum vel accidentatum.
csset sic perfectum ; et per consequens omne sic acci- 20
dentatum est sic perfectum. Omnis ergo essencialis per-
feccio accidentis est per accidentalem perfeccionem sub-
stancie, vel pars talis perfeccionis.
Thus it may bc Lfnde videtur michi probabile quod aliquis ultimatc
maintaincd that . ,. , , ■ n -^ ^ .. ■ , j ■.. » -
a blesscd soul fchx habeat inhnitos actus^ terminatos ad ventates 20
'^^^rne Infinilc^'^ '^°S"i'^^^' 'l^' on^nes causantur et clarificantur a prima
acts, relatiye to luce, in qua felix clare videt omnia que ego uno actu
objects it transeunte confuse. Possibile enim est animam simul
knows all j^abere infinitos actus; ut patet ex intuicione visibilis;
cleai IV seen in " -t^ ^ . . .'
thc FiVst Sight. et quamvis nunc non sufficio in tot obiecta simul di- 3o
Evcn now the . ^ , ,- -i ■)!■ i • • j-
fact of sight stincte tendere, tacile tamen est illi luci prime dispo-
ir[°2^i^.,'!!ffinTt^ nere animam meam ut distincte in tot tendat. Et tunc
niT.vcaiiiiiniiHt- ^ _
multitude of Jn ipsa et per ipsam viderem omnia. et ab ipsa termi-
nm,^it is^^true, naretur omnis talis visio mea; sed non obiective ad
disthictlv- but ipsam, cum idem sit obiectum sic terminare visionem, 35
God can et illud obiectum esse illa visione visum. Ad visionem
strengthen ... . , , . •,, u^ »• ,,
our niental crgo felicem qua videtur deus terminans illam obiective
A^roUicr consequuntur omnes alie visiones quas et ipse terminat
visions mcrely aj obiecta visa. Visiones vero in proprio genere possunt
follow upon . , ,- !• • 1 1 • ■ • •.. » ■ I. u
the sight of excidere^ stante telicitate, | per desinicione ventatum in- H <S:
^°''* tuitarum, et non aliter, sic quod anima langueat desi-
derando videre ignotum; et per consequens non esset
38. terminant B.
CAP. Vir. I.OGICA. 173
plene felix. Ideo ponitur heatitudo essencialiter con- Thc biessed
sistere in visione et amore summe boni; cl alie visiones ,"" Jn^^ii^^oniv
vel alia bona contineencia ponuntur ipsam concomitari '" so far as'
. , ..^ ^ ' 1 . • j- "lat trutli itseU"
accidentaliter, que vocantur quandoque beatitudines ac- ccases to be.
5 cidentales, intensihiles et remissihiles. Quotquot ergo "\vouy'cfesire^
veritates heatus voluerit recolere. tot promptitates 't niid not be
, 1 I • , , , fiillv Iiappv.
vel habitus habet quot sunt ad prompte cognoscen- The 'cssence of
dum illas veritates; et, cum omnem veritatem potest '\.^"'||j"^j^ (|j'qj'^.'^
cognoscere, sicut et homo hic, verisimiliter omnem all tlio rest is
... . . , , , • accidental, and
loventatem distmcte cognoscit in actu vel hahitu; ut rnay be greater
cognoscendo deum clare sub racione qua creativus ThVcfe^ar
est A rei, co^nosco causabilitatem A rei, et A rem, cognition of
, *■ . . ... God in all His
tam in verbo quam in racione ydeali. Et sic, quotquot relations
cogniciones consecuntur cognicionem claram dei, quam ini'pii'i's''il >
i^non stat esse sine illis, nec illas sine illa, cum noticia distmct sight
, . ^ • . , . .... . . 0I all in Him.
dei et eius passionum de necessitate inducit in noticias
ydearum et exemplatorum.
Utrum autem oportet felices omnes sic habere tot Whether it be
actus, ego ignoro^ sed credo me scire quod omnes sic ^^i^no^y ^^^\'
20 felices necessario clare intuuntur deum, et tot alias but only that
... . , . . the blessed see
ventates quot desiderant videre, sive uno actu sive Cod, and in
distinctis actibus, et quot erunt gradus capacitatum th^v^^an^de^ske
animarum, sicut et claritatum noticiarum, quibus omnia 'o see.
, , ■ j j- , Knowledge ot
erunt cognita. Ideo non sequitur: A per/ecte et clare all would,
"^^ cognoscit 07nnia: ergo, ita perfecte sicut deiis. Nec sequi- "^"^^^^"^^^- "^■'"'''^
tur: ista sunt individua eiusdem speciei: ers^o eque capacia perfect as God.
„ , ... . ,. ^ . r ^ , f. God can
et eque activa. Sed ille qui limitavit animas ad diver- easiiy give
simode appetendum uniri corporibus, et ordinavit sub- de^^M-e^es^of
stancias individuales multiplicatas diversarum specierum capacity to
o^ , r .,. ,. . . , • • ,• diHerent souls.
-^ode lacili potest ordinare animas eiusdem speciei diver- Man can aiso
sarum capacitatum. Et forte homo, discendo et amando ;n),^^[,Il"??„--
deum, potest augere capacitatem suam, sed non obe- capacity np to
,- . , . ........ „ a certain
diencialem potenciam recipiendi felicitatem. Semper point; but that
tamen est dare maximum ad quod terminatur, sive '^n°i"ximum^
^^ universale sive singulare, in quacunque denominacione. The blessed
y, j ^, ,. ,. . . . , ., ,. . thus, if icnorant
Unue rehx taiiter sciens omnia nichii disceret, sicut of anvthing,
nec aliquid ignoraret, cum ad generacionem veritatis perfe^ctVhappv
desineret scire eius futuricionem, et inciperet scire eius
esse vel pretericionem; et ita semper, si homo incipiat
40 scire unum, desinit scire reliquum, et econtra; vel si
remisse, beatus multa ignorat que sunt impertinencia
ad sui beatitudinem, ut patet de conclusionibus doctri-
nalibus et peccaminosis operacionibus, tunc non desinat
9. visibiliter B. 16. paonu B. 43. pC^^ oponibQ B.
1 74 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VI[.
However, this illa cognoscere, et potest tantum discere quod vel igno-
secondarv ..i-i- • j r ■ r ^-
knowiedge irnay rct vel si. aliqua ignorando, fuit felix, tantum sciens
''from tliT' sicut potest; tunc huiusmodi aquirendo noticiam unius
sight of God, deperdit noticiam alterius. Potest tamen esse quod ad-
but from •»•11 ..•■ • 1 ji !!•
prcviousiy qLHrat illam noticiam sine hoc quod deperdat rehquam, .->
i"d%" h"mn- ^''-"'^ communiter sophisticantur in materia de fortitu-
also be the" dine solius mulieris derelicte de specie humana imprc-
knowledce .. o i- i- 1 1 • • 1 1
of the biessed. Snate. bemper ergo telix hahet noticiam claram de
deo; et replecio capacitatis sue impedit ipsum in casu
ad discendum; quod non est propric impedire. Non 10
tamen est possibile quicquid discere vel scire, nisi dis-
catur vel sciatur in verbo vel per verbum. Sed si no-
ticia fuerit imperfecta, et per mociones veritatum sci-
tarum ignorato verbo, tunc vocatur noticia vespertina
rerum in proprio genere. Et forte habitus tales ad-i3
quisitos habebunt ultimatc felices sicut et noticias ab
illis causatas.
Leavingthis Sed relinquendo illa theologis, 1 conceditur quod cst B 82''
point, we say , . '.,.'„.,,..,
tiiat there isa uare maximum cumulum possibilem heri ab hominibus;
siM^ofVpile ^"° dato, repugnat quod cumuletur ulterius, nisi ali- 20
that can be unde fiat diminucio. Nec est hoc incredibile filosopho,
made bv men, . ^ . ,. . i , , , -i-
and to "which quia antequam herit talis turris, valde debilitaretur
"° bt^^madV^" ^'^^^ multitudo hominum qui forent habiles ad agendum
without opus. Ita quod, vel propter inpotenciam illorum, vel
diminution on ^ . ,.,... . ' , .
another part. propter carenciam vel indisposicionem materie, vel 20
"^progressed',"^ proptcr vetacionem virtutis regitive universi non suffi-
the powers of ccrent ulterius, vmiTio data minima quantitate sub qua
the hiiman race " .' . '
would be non potest essc talis cumulus. luxta opmantes contranum
exhausted. ^^^^^ incredibile esset plebeo, postquam cumulus non
deficeret nisi per 4="^! pedis a tali quantitate, quod 3o
omnes homines mundi non sufficerent addere ille quan-
titati 4'""^ pedis.
Nature thus Certum ergo est quod est dare quantum regula na-
imposes a Imiit . . •- . . ' ,. ? . ... ^ ,. ^ ..
to men both turc sinit homines inordinate vagari in talibus edihcns
'i'n]'^nt re^nHs ^^'^ curiositatibus iustrumentoru 111, indumentorum, veK^.^
and as regards
curious
instruments,
('), 7. forti"'' B. 10. ad discendum 15. i3. mocoes I!. 22 iris B.
27. gu'" B.
G, 7. De fortitudine. This example occurs at more length
in other works. Mediaeval philosopliers, debating the question
whether, if the whole humau racc perished, except one woman
in a state of pregnancy, she couLi possiblv die or miscarrv,
decided it negativel}", because she wouid be necessar\" for the
exisience of the species.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 175
quorumcunque aliorum artiticiatorum. Immo quantum garmcnts,
sinerentur inorJinate procedcre in destruccionem poli- inisbandmen
cie, superhabundanter aueendo atri"icolas, vel bellatores, soidiL-rs,
' f , r> j? _ > artisans,
vel artilices. vel mercantes, vel qualescunque ritus ec- mercliants, or
1 ■ ,.• 4. • 1 1 • •! • 1 ^ <:>• .. ccclcsiastical
r clcsiasticos : et sic de bonis que sibi accumulant. Sicut ritcs and
enim e\ ordinacione politica nature nrime universum possessions.
' . . ' . (jovcrnment
est dispositum in numero, m qualitate et quantitate ouf^lit to
• • ■ ■ 11' • imitaic natnrc
ac posicione suarum parcium. ita non dubium quin j„ thcsc thiiiKs.
deberet esse in arte resendi policias imitante naturam ; And as mcn
. *^ ' . . arc pniiislicd
10 ct cum pars policie tantum hodie excedunt in multis proponionatcly
nominatorum, verisimile est quod aliqua pars policie ''wic'kcd,^i^
cito pacietur eclipsitn: vmmo, cum homo sit quodam- ''''-'''?^': ""-''"^ '^
'. '^.',.' " a hmit to llie
modo dominus et finis aliorum que sunt in mundo, greatest
iusticia exigit quod illa que homini subserviunt sint ^""^31'"'""
1 5 proporcionata suo fini et dominio, cum a fine impo-
nente necessitatem rebus, limitantur modi mediorum ad
finem. Et hinc credo homines proporcionabiliter puniri
ad sua vicia, Relinquendo ergo illa moralibus concedi-
tur quod est dare maximam penam vel indisposicionem
20 quam quis potest subire, tam quoad intensionem quam
quoad extensionem vel monstracionem.
Ad 6'^"^^ obieccionem conceditur quod est darc maxi- ^^- T''^'''^ '^ ^
. . T . . . maximum and
mum et minimum qviod quecunque data virtus visiva a mininuim
sufficit videre. Nota tamen quod duplex est visio, sci- faa,itv^caV*see;
25licet sensitiva et intellectiva; et utraque duplex, scilicet . t^iit botli
. . , . . ^ . ' ' . intellcclual and
distmcta et contusa. Distincta, qua excluditur a vidente bodiiy sighi are
ignorancia primo visi; ut cognoscendo per visum quod or'contnsed!
hoc sensibile est videro illud distincte. Sed visio con- Coniuscd sight
dOCS IlOt
tusa non excludit ignoranciam primo visi illa visione; exciude
3o ut, videndo a remotis silvam vel acervum, videro con- Tlicrc "^*^
re arc
fusc multa individua illius multitudinis, que tamen '"'^'.1''.'^ shades
' . T dividing lliese
B 83" ignoro; ita quod, quesito | a me utrum smt, dicerem two extrcmes;
quod nescirem, nisi forte in universali. Et in utroque thcm ''beiongs
membro visionis sunt quotlibet gradus; utrumque eciam ^",,'^''>''l'' ^'"
. . . ^ . . " refiected, or
35 membrum subdividitur m 3^; ut aliqua est visio recta, rctracted sight,
aliqua reflexa, ut visio ad specula, et 3'^'''^ est visio re- int^^iiecuiai'.
fracta, ut visio per media diversarum dyaphaneitatum.
De visione eciam intellectuali sunt proporcionabiles
distincciones.
2. indesrtniiccoji B. 4. agri col tices l'>. 21. mra"^ B. 23. visiva
5. Ecclesiasticos . . . accumulant. Note this.
lyf) JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
The minimum Compositum ergo cx duobus non quantis est mini-
^sighMs^^/he' mum quod potest intellectualiter videri. Est autem
union of two yidere in communi apprehendere visibile inmediate
mathematical . . . . ^^ , . . • •, -i
points. virtute visiva; et sic est dare mmimum visibile sensu
'^minimum^ot'* exteriori, ut superficiale circulare. Et probabiliter potest 3
bodily vision; jj^^j quod nichil videtur ahqua virtute confuse, nisi
lor nothing "i . ..^,,. ......
can be scen quod a virtute tahs speciei suthcit videri distincte; ct
'^con"d'^not be"^ •'^Jc visus corporalis non potest videre non quantum,
seen distincily: nec compositum adequate ex non quantis nobisfinitis;
tluis the ' ^ . . .
composition of sed minimum sic visibile videtur 2"'' pyramidem radia- lo
"^ mere^pSms"^ lem, cuius basis est in viso et conus in centro oculi.
could not be jr^ consequenter ponendum est quod est dare remississi-
seen ; for this ^ .' nt ■ ■ i •
minimum must mum gradum cuiuscunque 8'° cn-cumstanciarum ad vi-
'^Vpyramid" sionem concurrencium, et optimum gradum possibilcm.
whose apex is q^ ^q^. consequens remississimum s^radum confuse vcli5
m Ihe eve. ,. f . , ^,. . , , . , .,.
distmcte videncii, qui gradus est subito generabiiis: et
patet responsio ad 6^'" .
Some details Nota tamen quod nec organum nec scnsus videt, sed
ahout the eye. ^j^jj.,-,jjj organo et virtute, nisi forte videre sit equivocum
ad recipere speciem visibilis et ad apprehendere virtiite 20
visiva dandiim visibile. Sed quia visio corporaUs est
medium ad visionem ymaginativam et intellectualem,
necnon et subtiHor inter alias sensaciones ac propin-
quior intellectui, ideo perstringam aUquas paucas notas
in ista materia. 2.5
I. The eight Prirno dico quod ad visionem respondent octo cir-
iniluencfs: cumstancie, ^'■'^ quarum variacionem variantur gradus
lighi, distance yisionum et erroris in visione contingencium. Circum-
ot the ob|ect, . . , . . ^ . ...
its position, its stancie vcro sunt iste: lux, distancia, situs opposicionis,
de^nsUv' its magnitudo visibihs, densitas visibihs, figura visibilis, 3o
shape, the dvaphaneitas medii, tempus conveniens, et sanitas ocuH,
transparencv - ' . ' '^ '
of the medium Cuiushbet autcm istorum est dare gradum summe con-
sankarv suatc veniencie ad visionem, et gradum minime convcnieiicie
of the eye, j^j visionem, et 2"^ variacionem graduum in istis va-
are all . ' . . . /^
factors in the riantur gradus apparenciarum visibilium. -'<-"'
act o vision. ^q nota quod 20 sunt sensibiha communia; ut,
remocio, magnitudo^ situs, corporeitas, figura, conti-
guitas, separacio, numcrus, motus, quies, asperitas,
levitas, dyaphaneitas, densitas, umbra, obscuritas, pul-
critudo, deformitas, consimihtudo, ct diversitas. Omnium^o
2. intba' (?) B. 9. \]\f I'.. 11. cono li. i3. ccufuciarl' B.
23. subtilior' B. 26, 27. ccuftatie B. Sj, 38. qiitas B.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 177
autem istorum visiones presupponunt visionem lucis vel iiavc each a
, • ^ ,• • ^ ■ , ^-i- • ] ^ .1- limit favoLirabie
colons; et aliqua istorum subtihus videntur et aliqua ^^d
diflicilius; aliqua subito et aliqua successive, aliqua con- ""'"^9""''''^ '"
' T . ^ . . Iliis act.
B 83'' tuse et aliqua distincte. | Ad omnia tamen ista con- Thcic are
5 currit virtus distinctiva vel sensus communis^ eliciens "objecVs^oi"
diversos actus de istis, 2"^ modum presentandi speciei fen.sation
....... . perceivea bv
per se sensibilis sine specie iUorum acta per medium. sight,
.-r> • .. • • !• .. •! 1 _ • t)v means of
Tercio, nota composicionem oculi ex tribus humon- colour, its
bus; scilicet, ex humore crvstallino vel L;laciali, ex (''limary
' ' • . . object, some
10 humore vitreo, et ex humore albugmeo. Primus humor more, some
est sperula in medio oculi constituta, ad subiectandum but^^thelntcrior
virtutem visivam, habens in anteriori parte compressio- ^f"**:. '=*. "'^^'.'^'^'^
, • , ' ... , to distinguish
nem superncialem ad modum lenticule. 2^ humor est thcm.
• ^ • ^ , 11- ■ Anatomical
mter pnmum et cerebrum, subrubens in propinqua description of
i5 disposicione, ut ex illo tiat humor elacialis. Sed 3* hu- the ditterent
^ . - ... . . . parts of the
mor est quasi fex pnmi in antenon parte oculi, con- eye;
stituens cum vitreo quasi unam speram continuentem crystalline^lens
primum humorem. Duo ereo nervi exeunt a lateribus '^* the vitreous
^ . . . . . . and the
exterioris ventriculi cerebn directe ad ambos oculos, aqueous
^ • • 1 • • •..•u humours,
20 qui sunt pnmum par nervorum concavi pieni spintibus, q{ ([^^ gptj^
et statim canallisant se eversim, exeundo piam matrem, ., "erves,
' ^ ' that cross eacli
hoc est pelliculam tenuem involventem cerebrum con- other,
textam ex venis et arteriis deferentibus a corde vitani et pfci^miUer^
spiritum, et ab eppate nutrimentum. Et per illos nervos ''"4 ^iden
25 vocatos opticos deferentur species ad intra. Ex optico- retina which
1 ^ ■ ■.. ■ 1 ... 1 1 separates thc
rum ergo substancia oritur in oculo tela aranea vel crvstallinc
retina 2"^ unam eius partem, separans humorem i "^ a .trom thc
*^ ' r _ vitrcous and
2°, et 2"^ aliam centuram utrosque pnmos huiiaores, both from
dividendo illos a ^'^ . Deinde nervi predicti, antequam ^hu^mou""^
?o subintrant duram matrem, coniunguntur, constituentes
unum nervum concavum; deinde obviant dure matri et
accipientes ab ea pellem unani exeunt craneum. gx ^'.''^y l'''^'-' '''"'"
. . . . . ... thc pia inater
substancia ergo pie matris accipiunt nervi optici tenuem a thcir pciHcule
1,. , I •.. • 1 T » ■ which. in the
peliiculam ex qua producitur in ocuio 2'' tunica que evc, bccomes
35 vocatur uvea vel etina, circumdans tercium humorem, the iris,
sed cum nigra, viridi vel glauca, perforata rotunde ad
anterius, ut per pupillam species ingrediantur. Sed de "'1'^ irom thc
21. canalla"' [i. u^. c^tur^ 15. %. z'na B.
5. Sensus communis. This is thc sense which, according to
medieval philosophers, receives the impressions of tlie different
external senses, and also those feelings thaf arise within the body.
21. Canallisant. Perhaps a mistake for cancellant (see pag. 180,
I. 27) but I understand one word as little as the other; unless
cancellare means "to cross".
12
178 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
a memhrane substancia dure matris producitur in oculo tunica,
Ihat tliickens ^ • 1 »• ... ir
into tiie cornea. vocata cornea sive sclerotica^ que est alba, operiens
Tlie whole is foramen uvee ad anterius. De substancia autem panni-
covered wiih ... . . \
a membrane culi involventis craneum, cui per commissuras alligatur
conJLinctive. dura mater inmediate intra craneum procedit 4^ tunica, 5
All this is vocata coniunctiva vel consolidativa, que continuatur
wonderfully . . ' ^ .
contrived by cum cornea^ constituens orbem oculi; et ista est cornea
enahle us to interius alligata in concavitate ossis, vocati orbita oculi.
^^^- Complexiones autem, qualitates, quiditates, et posiciones
istarum parcium oculi sagacissime sunt ingeniate a 10
natura pro visione complenda.
l.ocaiion ot 4" nota | quod sensus communis viget in prima parte B 84"
sensiUve primi ventriculi cerebri, sicut ymaginativa in 2^, et
faculties in the correspondenter cstimativa et fantastica in medio ven-
brain : The . -f^ . . . .
interior sense triculo, et in postremo ventriculo meinorativa et virtus i3
'lirst^lobc of'^ 2""" locum motiva. Et sunt omnes recte virtutes multi-
the first plicate per sua organa, sicut visiva virtus multiplicatur
venlricle; Ihe ■ . " ...
imaginative in per crvstalloidem et locum coacursus opticorum. Visiva
estimaiive, ergo virtute ehcitur actus videndi, que non est mole
together with magnus, sicut taccio, sed obiective maenus, habens 20
tancy, is in the " . '. . ...
middle quotlibet partes 2"^ differenciam basium pvramidis ra-
ventricle ; the i- ,■ .^ .. . -ii .. : 1 •' .
memoraiive diaiis, et tactus ille est quodammodo niextensus m
and the motivc \\\q yisu, sicut et virtus visiva. Formaliter tamen et
tacultv is in . . '
the last (the subiective solum est actus vel virtus in vidente. Et hinc
um.j. pQsuerunt antiqui visionem fieri per extramissionem 2b
virtutis, et animam vel homincm esse quodammodo
cum illo cui afficitur. Et defectus noticie terminorum in
tali materia, et defectus admissionis modi loquendi, facit
multas dissensiones ab opinionibus antiquorum. Cer-
tum tamen est quod visio est de genere accionis, de- 3o
pendens essencialiter a viso et a parcialibus visionibus
dependentibus a suis obiectis ad que terminantur. Nec
terminarentur ad illa, ut ad suas causas, nisi aliqualiter
essent in illis. Ymmo, in medio est actus videndi, ubi
non est terminative; sicut patet quando, propter 35
8. of, 15. ij. g'" qp'<^' ii. v^. Tcxndi I'..
14, i5. Estimaliva meinorativa. Tliese must not be con-
founded with judgment and memorv; thc tbrmer belong to man in
common with the more perfect pnimals, and exciude any idea of
abstractive cognition. 16. If by postremo ventriculo, Wyclif
really means the cerebellum, then he is in singular agreement
with recent physiological experiments as regards the motive
facuUy. The cerebellum has certainly a good deal to do with
the motor apparatus.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 179
dislocacionem oculi vel aliam racionem, de iino continuo
apparet quod sint duo distancia localitcr. Vanum tamen
est credere quod actus tales possunt per se esse vel
conservari sine obiecto; et sic de multis que loquentes
5 nostre legis fabulantur.
Omnis ergo actus animc ponit formaliter animam Every act of
agere, et imprimit disposicionem vel habitum; et sic sup%"scs a
est in alteracione, et arguit animam mobilem. Ymmo, "9^^' *^"'^
... . . . . . . . ,, ' ot mcntal
habita prmia noticia pnmi ven 2'" mtellectum et plene movemcnt.
loamore 2"^ voluntatem et scienciam perpetuo sic ma- gct^is^an^^act of
nendi cum summa dotacione corporis et infrieibili sub- , P^^i^':}
... , ..^.-. ^ , knowledge
ordmacione completarum virium inreriorum ad supe- and love of
riores, resultat naturaliter felicitas, que est qualitas certitude of^
inseparabilis. Et iste disposiciones prime quandoque ".'^X'^'' '^''^"si"".
* , . ,. .^ , . ^ , ^ ^ it is a state ot
I.T vocantur partes beatitudinis; et beatitudo vocatur aggre- bliss, the
gacio omnium istorum bonorum. Quandoque vero disn^osi^tions to
materialiter loquendo, unum istorum vel multa vocan- ^^'^\^'^^^ ^'"'^ ,
, . , ^ . ' . . , . , eallcd parts ot
tur beatitudo particularis. Actus ergo denominat sub- bliss, or
iectum quale, sed non formaliter. 'xhc^^prcceding
20 Per istas 4"'' notas posset naturalis dare causas om- observations
^ . . ... cnablc the
nium erronearum appancionum in visione ; utputa natural
quare uritur nebula a longinquo et non de prope; '^ exp?ain^Uie'°
quare latent anguli et supereminencie visibiles a lon- cause of all
. . . ... errors m sif;ht:
gmquo; quare propter velocem giracionem ticionis thc red clouds
25 apparet candentem circulum in noctibus causari, et hiv!sibHk"v'of
quare de quiescentibus apparet quod moveantur, et angies and the
■" * . .... . . conspicuous-
econtra. Et sic de multis ahis. Dubia tamen copiose ness of hcights
D 84'' pulcerrima circumstant ista dicta: | utputa, quomodo '^ and 'vli\"a^'
distancia vel magnitudo visibiiis est pertinens visioni, brand whirled
. ^ . ^ . . round seems a
3o cum per media diversarum dyaphaneitatum contmgit circle;' also,
quantumcunque parvum ad quantamhbet magnam di- ''ti,fJ*^„s^°J°" \o^
stanciam apparere quantumhbet maenum distincta vi- move and
^ ^^ ^ . ^ . vice versa.
sione. T mmo, homo videt acervum et tenebram, sicut Some very
audit silencium intinitum, si esset: ubi non videtur quesu^ons^^al-e
35virtutem eeredi, cum non percipitur tahs privacionis c. g. in what
. . ° ' . '. ^ . wav distance
distancia. Ymmo, cum eadem visio non potest esse m ailccts thc
diversis locis, hic confusa et ibi distincta fet sic de how^we 'can
quotlibet gradibus) videtur quod visio sit extensa per ^ee darkness,
,. , , . ^ - . •* . whether sight
meduim habens m aere jiartcm confusam, sicut et m is not "
40 tenebra per quam videtur visibile, et in obiecto partes '^object^anj iV^
dispariter distinctas. Aliter enim esset quelibet anima "^® mtervening
air,
whether, as a
body at the
„ _^ grcatest
5. nr? ii. 8. ar' Ij. q. plcno B. 10. fcc^nt; B. 22. v'r'' B.
23. ani' B; ib. visi' B. 39. "a'e V>.
12*
i8o JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VII.
possiblc ubique, cum omnia intelligit. Videtur eciam quod re-
distancc would ■ r -^ i ..• • • •^ t> • •u-^- • a
appcar as a mocio racit ad noticiam; quia, posito B visibili m rme
pomt, tiie maxime distancie possibilis videri, cum aliis optimis
slislucst changc . ...... , ., . . .
tor tlic worse circumstanciis videndi, videtur quod ibi apparet mdi-
conditions visibile; et quantumcunque modica elongacio vel debili- 5
wonid rcnder tacio circumstancie perciperetur a visu, cum tamen non
it invisiblc; . . . . , '
whcther a a maxmie proporcionato propmquo perciperetur quod-
'''cinnot scl^ libet tale crementum vel decrementum. Et idem videtur
what a weak jg ^^jg visus penetrantis et non videntis medium
sight can; . .' . . .
whcthcr there quod visus debilior satis videt. Videtur eciam quod lo
huniati"nieri°; homo possit tantum mereri hic, quod non possit pro-
whether our mereri ulterius. Et sic terminaretur potencia dei re-
eyes . , . ' .
dcceive us as spectu cuiuscunque effectus ad maxmium m quod posset;
to the position , • i^- ■ ^ ,.• ...
of ob)ects. cum homo m ultimo mstanti sue promericionis non
posset ulterius convalescere merendo. Videtur eciam i5
quod continue erratur, videndo propter partcs oculi
diversarum dyaphaneitatum ad quas oportet radios
\'isibilis frangi.
Waiving all Sed diinissis illis, gracia brevitatis, dicitur quod per-
' we^may^^s^ay *' P^ndicularis, que est axis pyramidis radialis, penetrat 20
that the refracte usque ad centrum nervi communis; et alii
pcrpendiciilar .. . ^. - ,. .. , .
ray pcnetratcs radu obliqui franguntur declmantes a perpendiculari
to the centre of ^ , ... • .. ■ • j u „•
the nerve propter humorum vitreum, quia est maions dyaphanei-
common to tatis quam elacialis; et cum species visibilis in con-
botli cvcs ; ...' . .. 1-f
the others are cavitate sit quasi conformis dyaphaneitatis, multipIicat2D
rcFrnctcci i n • • ■ i
the same species 2"^ congruam posicionem, usque ad nervum
direction, so as communem. Aliter enim cancellarent se in centro, et
to coincide . . . . .
with thc eversim mtendentes, signarent posiciones eversas sensi-
'^'^''^rav';'^"'^'^ biles. Patet ergo quod sunt 4°'" pyramides per quas
if they did not, YJsio completur, quarum duo bassantur in visibili et 3o
they would ... ,• ,
cross each conantur m centris oculorum, et due alie bassantur in
ceini-c^of' the anteriori superficie vitrei et conantur in centro nervi
eyc, and lorm communis, racione cuius concursus apparet una res,
an inverted . . ..-,....,
image. non obstantibus ambobus oculis. Ibi enmi ht mdividuum
fo^ur^^pyramids 2'" posicionem et figuram duarum proximarum pyra- 35
ot rays; two midum. Et conformes sunt pyramides virtutes egredientis
based on thc . , .
obicct and with ab oculo, que vocantur pyramides visuales; et punctus^
\he ccnn-e"^ ^bi concurrunt in basi visibili, vocatur | punctus coniunc- g 8;
ot each eye; cionis et axis communis vocatur linea recta protracta
and two bascd . . . , .
on thc sLirfacc a centro communis iiervi, stans perpendiculanter, con- 40
huniouV 'w?th^ "'^ctens centra foraminum ; et quando punctus coniunc-
their apices cionis est in axe communi, tunc est optima opposicio
(j. acucie (sic!) B. ?i. cona'' B. 40, 41. conncctcntcin B.
CAP. VII. LOGICA. 1 8 1
possibilis. Et semper per axem pyramidis radialis lit joiiiinf; ;ii ihc
distmccior visio, et indistinccior ut, cum panbus, radius iiio pyr;imids
est ab illa axe remocior. Unde, ad iudicandum uni- ^^ ^''^ '!•''. f<""<^^
. . .... bcnif^ similiir to
formitatem rei, oportet punclum coniunccionis rotari liic tormc
if.
5 super superliciem visam; quia videtur quod axis pyra- oi-^^iilss^^diTthict
midis radialis, quantumcunque debilis, penetrans re- "ccordiiif,' ;is
. , ^ . .„ . . tlic ray is morc
fracte, sit lorcior ad certincandum quam radius obli- or lcss in ilic
quus, quantumlibet fortis. ^ ^ ^ tht''vTsua"a°xis.
Si autem delectat videre particulariter istam materiam,
lonotetur Alacen et liber tercius Vitulonis etc.
7. Alacen is Alhazen, aii Arab philosopher; Vitiilonis is
Viteliion (Ciolek), a Pole, who Fived in Cracow in the XIII"' ccn-
tury. His works were printed at Basle in 1572.
CAPITULUM OCTAVUM.
This chaptei- Sequitur de condicionalibus pertractandum.
conditional Et primo supponatur omnem ypotheticam subordi-
r e^^airsTch' ^^'^'1"'' 3ctu condicionato, esse condicionalem; ut est
hypothetical talis : Si tii es hojiio, tii es animal, et cetere que wul- 5
propositions as . . . „ . .
imply a gariter vocantur consequencie, quamvis 2"^ vim vocis
condition. habitudo veritatis posterioris ad priorem sit conse-
quencia qualis est in significato cuiuscunque condicio-
nalis vere, inter antecedens naturaliter prius et suum
Thc particle // naturaliter consequens. Et hinc patet quod differunt 10
oufc'i4 UiaT '^^^ note consequenciarum, si, ergo, igitur, et forte
suppose omnia svnkategorica que nos ponimus synomina. Nam
causation, in . ^ . .... . .
that it merely iste coniuncciones ergo, ideo, igitur, et si que consi-
'"\i^j!",„ miles, connotando causacionem, ponunt consequenciam
scquence. nec in materia nec in forma peccantem : Sed non sic 1 5
condicionalis: cum hoc sit necessarium, si tu es asinus,
tu es rudibilis. Et sic differunt note consequenciarum
om genera causandi.
//■ is somefimes Sed, relictis istis altercacionibus signorum gramma-
taken to mean ■ ■ , , . . .
because; ticis, notandum quod si quantocunque ponitur pro quia, 20
me7e^iin"o^' quandoque dicit simpliciter necessariam veritatem con-
sequence, dicionatam. Et hoc 2**^'' variatur; vel sic quod sit veritas
cither existing condicionis tenens ut nunc: ut hic: si ego sum Rome,
for tiie present, /■ i , ,,, • • ,
jalsum est verum. INam veritati eterne repugnat quod
nunc sim Rome, nisi quidlibet sequatur. Istam tamen 25
significacionem communiter abiciunt sophiste. Vel 2°
quod sit veritas condicionata tenens pro omni tempore
or eternallv, or eterno; ut: si deus est, ipse wult mundum esse. Vel
from all ' ^ ' .. , •
eternity tili pi"o tempore eterno a parte post; ut: si ego non siim,
it mavlmplv ""^^"' /'"^- Et talium per accidens consequenciarum 3o
that the aliqua ponit quod impossibile est veritatem condiclo-
consequence ,. ' ,.
must exist so naliter assumptam esse pro aliqua mensura tempons
'cond?tlo\i"^ P^° ^^^ ^^^ ^^*- veritas condicionaliter deducta. Ut: si
cxists ;
2. Blanls space for initial S B. 39. appg B.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. i83
deus wult tempus csse, tunc tcmpus cst. Aliqua autem or tiuit it cxists
solum ponit quod impossibile est veritatem condicio- p;irt ot tiie
naliler assumptam esse, nisi veritas condicionaliter de- ,. .'^•'^'si^^iice
'^ . ' . ol its condition.
ducta sit pro aliqua mensura. Ut, si deus nnilt me
5 esse, es^o sum; nam antecedens est eternum, et con-
sequens temporale. Semper tamen fuisset tale signum
verum; ego sum; quia sufticit ad veritatem talis signi
quod suum primarium signiticatum aliquando sit, ut
patebit capitulo ultimo. ^^ vero modo sumitur nota Again, it may
lo condicionalis de condicionato extremo, quandoque co- condition undcr
pulans imperativam: ut hic; si vis ritam ingredi, serva tiie impcrativc
mandata: quandoque coniunctivam, ut laic: domine, si °.'" ^''^.
' ^ T . ' ^ suD|Linctive
^Sb^ fuisses hic, frater meus non \ fuisset mortuus ; quandoque form;
copulat oraciones imperfectas in proposicionibus non
iDtentis condicionaliter; ut hic; tu es quicquid esses, 5/ o'" it may join
' ' . ... sentcnces that
esses asiints. Omnes tamen tales implicant condicionales. do not strictly
rij -1 •!• ]-^i ••^••j form, but
Unde videtur michi quod sicut hec oracio individua imply, a
non est proposicionaliter vera: fecistine hoc? ita racione conditional
^ . . ... propositioD.
coniunccionis est hec proposicio condicionaliter vera:
20 si Judas decessisset in gracia, fuisset salvatus. '
Ex istis patet quod 3'*^'" est condicionalis vera. Primo A conditional
,■ ■ ^11^ r, • 1 ^Tn^ proposition
simpliciter et absolute; 2° per accidens, et 3" ut nunc. mav be truc
Et omnis condicionalis vera convenit in hoc cum qua- simply and
absohtiely, or
libet, non solum quod primarie signiticat veritatem, sed accidentally,
25 quod impossibiie est veritatem condicionaliter assum- respect.
ptam esse, nisi sit veritas eius condicionaliter deducta; But m any
ir ' ... . case it is
et econtra. Et hoc est quod principaliter solet dici quod impossible for
^ . . , j • • tiie consequence
signanter tunc est consequencia bona quando impossi- to be true, if
bile est antecedens illius sic primarie sienihcantis esse tiie condition
i . i^ is talse.
Soverum, nisi suum consequens sit verum.
Et ita tripliciter dicitur impossibile et necessarium : Impossible and
.,...• !• •^ -j ,. m -j c- r necessary are
scilicet simpliciter, per accidens, et 2'" quid. Simpli- eitli/r
citer necessarium est quod de nulla potencia potest non absolutely so,
T . ^ . ^ . or accidentaliv,
esse. Necessariit})! per accidens est veritas quam ordi-
35 nacioni eterne repugnat pro aliqua parte dati temporis
eterni non esse. Et necessarium 2'" quid quidem solum or in one
temporaliter est, sed legi eterne repugnat ipsum non '^'■^P^'- ■
esse. Et correspondenter de impossibili per accidens
et 2'" quid. Unde, sicut omne necessarium per accidens
40 aut 2'" quid potest non esse, sic omne impossibile per
accidens aut 2™ quid potest esse.
28. signum (\) B.
l84 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
Rtiles: Ex istis patent quedam regule. Prima quod propor-
'conditi^onal' is cionaliter sicut condicionalis est vera, sic necessaria;
tnie, so it is q^ sicut ipsa est falsa, sic est impossibilis; et econtra.
necessary; as / , . . . . .
it is false, so Communitas tamen sophistarum non admittit condicio-
imposstblc. nalem esse bonam, nisi fuerit absolute necessaria. Ideo 5
Tliis is not i^Qj^ mirum si reeule eorum dissonant ab ampliantibus
'^cnerally
admitted now, necessciriiim et impossibile. Nam ex absoluto necessano
"absoL^e' sequitur necessarium per accidens: ut ex deiim esse
necessity and sequitur ivsinn velle mimdum esse, et per consequens
impossibilitv; , , • ,• ,
so it is no mundimi esse ; et breviter omne aliud verum, quantum- lo
^rukl^^preseni li''^et contingens. Ex quo sequitur quod omne futurum
some necessario eveniet, non quidem necessitate absoluta, sed
discrcpancy. . . . ^ . . '
From whatis necessitate ex supposicione. bequitur eciam quod con-
necessarv sequencia sit ponibilis et de impossibilibus, cum talis im-
may foiiow possibilis per accidens potest csse vera. 1 3
contingently; 2" patet ex falso, tam signo quam signato, sequi
that^liap"pens, verum; sed nunquam ex vero sequi falsum ex parte
happens ^.q\ pj-Q mensura pro qua est falsum. Pro omni enim
necessanlv; ; ' . ^ * - ,
though noi tali mensura, ipsum non est. Potest tamen talsum con-
^l^TruthVay tingens esse verum, et per consequens necessarium 20
follow from aliquo modo. Unde in talibus que sunt per accidens,
falsitv, but ^ ^ , , , . ^ . . ,
not vice versa. nedum ex falso het verum, sed necessarium erit talsum
contingent, et verum erit impossibile. Hoc enim potest esse ne-
however, what cessarium : Iste lapis occidit Sortem: et hoc potest esse
is talse mav . . ., -^ . 1 • i- r ,
become true, impossibile post corrupcionem lapidis. Idem ergo m re 20
necelsl^-y!*false ^st, fcilsiim fore veriim et illiid quod aliqnando non est
and what is aliquaudo fore: quia, si hoc nunc non est tunc hoc
impossi"blc, esse est falsum, et si illud est, tunc illnd esse est verum.
''^ "thlfe!"""^ Nec est color, si hoc tunc erit falsum vel impossibile | b Sfi"
but it does not quod litnc erit ; cum oppositum sequitur. ?(>
tollow that this ^ . . ,. ^ ' ,
will be/alse Unde aliqui dicunt quod verum converteretur in
'T/l/fri''" falsum et impossibile, et ipsum falsum habebit esse
Some say that possibile vel intellit;ibile. Alii autem dicunt quod verum
talsitv is truc ' ^ , . ' , ^ ,•
in sofar as it est falsum; quia quod pro uno tempore est, pro alio
thouglu^^-^olhe^rs non est. Unde non sequitur: hoc est falsum vel im- 3?
that what is possibile: erao, non est ; sed bene sequitur quod pro
true (at one ^ ' r> ' . ..
time) is falsc aliqua mensura repugnat necessario illud esse; non
^^AnTthus^' tamen simul et semel est verum et falsum; et sic ex
falsity follows yej-Q sequitur falsum ut ex denm velle diem iudicii esse,
trom trulh: It . ^ .,, , ,, /• 1 1 •
God wills that sequitur illum esse; quod adhuc est talsum, sed in 40
Jadgnicnt^be, tempore suo verum. Et illud reputo esse probabile.
it is: rt is,
false now, will _ _ -,
be truc at a i). poni' B. 21). al,y 15. 27. iVij B. 35. esse B.
given timc.
40. llliim, i. e. diem .
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. i85
Alii auteni dicunt quod si Iwc esse sit falsum, tunc Othcrs
,, ^ • 1- i-r .. .. maintain tiiat
pro nulla mensura est, quia aliter quelibet creatura ^viiat is tals.
esset impossibilis, cum in eternitate sit falsum et per ncvci- can be
' -^ . . . . . triie; tor tlien
consequens impossibile illam esse; et ita de veritate et the oxistence ot'
3 falsitate signi sunt opiniones. Ego autem voco signum Voind^be ^
verum, si suum significatum primarium est aliquando. false fr<)m all
..' . '^ '^ T eternity.
Alii autem dicunt quod non est verum pro mensura, Oihcrs think
nisi suum significatum sit pro eadem mensura. Et iuxta truc at anv'
primum modum dicendi foret illa copulativa nunc vera: '""'^ '^ '™'^
. . . ..... now.
lo Primiiin i}isti.ins niundi est, et dies iudicii est. Finally others
.,• •:•-.. ] • .. ■ .- r I affirmthat not
Alia via dicit quod, sicut signum non est ralsum^ to be
quamvis deficiat pro aliqua mensura temporis a veri- '^°'^P'^''^'.^' P"'^
. .„ : .i . does not
tate significata, sic nec ens ex parte reij est falsum, cxclude some
quia aliquando fuit falsum; quia esse falsuni est sim- quite faisc
i5 pliciter non esse; et ista tollit multas conclusiones con- ^^""id imply
^ ' . . . 7iot to be at
cessas que male videntur sonare. Tota' tamen ista diffi- «//,- and this
1^ .^. • • c- • ^ ••II T^i^ view avoids
cuitas stat in signincacione termini. Ideo eligat logicus manv ill-
viam plus placitam. Dimissis ergo istis usque ad ulti- souuding
t^ t _ ^ p _ 7 . . conclusions.
mum casum, fiat restnccio veritatis condicionahs ad
2o absolute necessariam.
Et tunc patet 3° quod quicquid sequitur ad tale 3. The
.^ j , ^ consequent of
consequens, sequitur ad suum antecedens; et per con- ^ consequent
sequens, quicquid antecedit ael antecedens antecedit ad '^ ^'^'^ , ^.
^ > 1 T. consequent ot
COnsequenS. its antecedcnt;
25 4» patet quod quidquid repugnat consequenti, re- conltradicYs the
pugnat antecedenti; et si quid steterit cum antecedente, consequent
f '-' » n ^ contradicts its
ipsum stat cum consequente. Sed non oportet in altero antecedent but
, ^ not vice versa.
quod econtra.
5^" patet quod ex opposito consequentis sequitur b. What
„ -^ ^ j • ,-... » .. contradicts thc
Sooppositum antecedentis, et non generaliter econtra; et conscquent, is
per consequens. quicquid antecedit ad oppositum, con- thc consequent
^ 1 T 1 fi to the oppositc
sequentis, antecedit ad oppositum antecedentis; sed of thc
quicquid sequitur ad oppositum antecedentis sequitur luit^not^y/cV
ad oppositum consequentis; sed in neutro oportet gene- versa.
35 raliter quod econtra.
6" patet quod ex omni simpliciter impossibiii sequi- *^-, F '"*','". ?"■-'
tur quodlibet concludendum^ sicut ex omni antecedente impossible
,,., , , • • j proposition
sequitur quodlibet absolute necessarium assignandum. ^^y conciusion
Si enim impossibiie est te esse asinum, non potest esse whatevcr may
^ . . . ... bc drawn; and
40 quod tu es asinus, nisi deus non sit; quia si posset esse any absolutely
cum hoc quod deus sit, tunc potest sic esse, et per p"opo*s1ti6n
may follow
from any
antecedeht
^ whatever.
f). al}i B. 18. placidam H
1 86 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
consequens non est impossibile sic esse: quod tamen
datum est. Et eodem modo probatur 2^ pars regule.
7. in the latter ^mo patet Quod omnis talis consequencia ponit for-
case God's ' ^ , ^
existence is maliter deiiin esse, et econtra; et per consequens ne-
^t^ie^^tbrmcr" cessitates sunt sic concathenate, quod posita una, im- 5
it is denied. possibile est quod reliqua destruatur; sicut, posito uno
Evcrv truc .
proposiiion impossibiii, forraaliter sequitur quidlibet concludendum.
exi°sU\ice^of Si enim quelibet talis ponit aliqualiter esse, utputa,
truth, and the veritatem sienificatam primarie per eandem, sequitur
latter the ^^ \ . ' . '
existence of quod quelibet talis ponit pnmam veritatem esse, ex 10
^°'all°"ruth°"^ 1"^ posita sequuntur due partes residue. Medium autem
depends. aj probandum istas regulas est descripcio consequencie
bone superius posita, et lex contradictoriarum. |
Objections. Sed contra illud argumentatur primo, per lioc quod, B 86''
I. The old . . ,'' n j- • r • j 'l -
rules of logic luxta antiquas regulas, nulla condicionalis quidquid lo
cMdidona? ponit; ergo non ex qualibet tali sequitur deum esse.
positsanything. 2° sic nunquam, nisi materialiter, sequitur impertinens
2. Accordint; to . •, -,. • . 1 11
this doctrine ex impossibili, sicut antique regule sumant; addentes,
"trut'h"coul"d^ quod nunquam sequitur necessarium nisi materialiter
flow from an ex impertinenti. [3°] multe necessitates possunt non 20
impossible ... .... , .
proposition, esse, quia aliter non esset ordo inter lilas; sed, posita
^^against Uie^ ""^ veritate, poneretur quelibet veritas possibilis.
oid rules. Ad primum dico quod assumptum non est regula,
Answers: , ,. .' ,,.
1. This, not cum obliquat a ventate. Verumptamen cum antiqua
tme^ c^annot^ sentencia communis non sit in toto falsa, intelligitur 25
be aVule. Yet isto modo: nulla condicionalis de contingentibus ex-
it is partiallv . . , .,, ^ . ,
true, if " tremis ponit alterum lUorum; ut non oportet si tu
"comin^Mt"^ ^^^ovearis te currente quod rel curras vel movearis;
conditionals. quodlibet tamen talis condicionalis ponit suum prima-
2. From the . . . „ . ^
absoiutely rium signmcatum et omnem eius causam. :>o
"im^poss^^fiblc' -^^ -™ dicitur quod nichil est impertinens simpli-
no irreievant citer necessario vel impossibili, cum omni tali impossi-
proposition , .,. ,,., . ,
can be deduced, bili repugnat quodlibet assignandum; et omne sic ne-
formeiMollows cessarium sequitur ad quidlibet. Et ex istis duobus
from any truth, modis dicitur proposicio pertinens alteri; vel quia, 35
and the latter ,. ,.,, , . ^•n- a- • a
contradicts ail antecedit ad illam, vel quia repugnat illi. bi enira A
Aud^a ^^^ pertinens B, quia sequitur ad B, per idem B est
proposition is pertinens A, quia antecedit ad A, cum pertinencia sit
another, either relacio equiparancie, eque fundabilis in antecedencia
fo^Uows^from ^^'-'""^ '" consequencia. Ulterius dicitur quod tam re- 40
or because it pugnat consequcnciam esse bonam et non de torma
coiitradicts it.
There can bo
no good
20. et sic(?) pro 3" B. 23. argumentum? B; ib. r'a=vera? B.
34.. ^bus B.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. 187
quam repugnat materiam esse informem. Nam ista est conscqncncc if
veritas ct forma cxemplaris per quam quelibct alia form, acconding
condicionalis tenct: si diiarum veritatum iinam impossi- 'P '.'*',*
.... . principlc:
bile est esse cum hoc quoa iion sit reliqua, tunc, si illa if A cannot
5 est, reliqua est. Verumptamen est dare aliquas formas, wiUwut B,
substanciales, syllotiisticas, entimematicas, et induc- then if A is
ciones; quia tenent alique consequencie que vocantur is so loo.
formales; sed non iste vocate materiales. Non tamen
est possibile quod aliqua consequencia teneat, nisi teneat
10 ad minimum per hanc formam. Suflicit ergo ad in-
vestigandum bonitatem formalem cuiuscunque conse-
quencie logice, quod sit consequencia; et demonstratis
primarie significatis per suum antecedens et suum con-
sequens, sit impossibile hoc esse, nisi hoc sit.
i5 Nec aliud intendit logicus per huismodi consequen- No
cias; ut quando dicitur: si e^o sum asimis, tunc baculus consequence
' . ^ . c». . ' can be good
stat in angulo, idem est ac si diceretur: non potest esse unless based
quod ego sim asinus nisi baculus stet in angulo. Quod principle.
patet ex hoc quod contradictoria istorum sunt conver- ^" *'^'^'^
'. . . 7 . . consequence
20 tibilia. Ista enim proposicio repugnat tanquam contra- means that
dictorie condicionali signate: potest esse quod ego sim \^ impossVble.
asinus, cum hoc qiiod nullus baciilus stet in angulo; ideo Kxample.
communiter, negata consequencia, ponit logicus com-
muniter quod oppositum stet: quod sibi tantum valeat
25 ac si dicatur: detur oppositum consequencie negate. Et //"likewo
hinc dicitur illam notam sic mobilitare terminum sub- fonowi^ntj term
sequentem, more negacionis. Unde sequitur: si homo "niversal.
" . .' . " . . ^ . . It 18 not even
currit, animal currit ; ergo, si iste vel quicunque alius nccessary
, ., ^ . ^, v M . . that the subject
homo currit, tunc animal currit. Nec oportet capere should be the
3o constanciam subiecti, sicut nec in nesativis; quia que- ^?'"'!?' J''° ^'^'^'^
. . o _ ' n T is tliat every
libet talis includit contradictoriam negacionem de pos- conditionai
11 o . -1 •!• .. -j .. j- I o- .. • ^ ■ I includes a
B 87' sibili: ut idem est dicere: | Si tu es asmus, tu es animal, negative:
ac si dicatur: Non potest esse quod tu sis asinus, nisi .,(^4 '•'■'''
•* -^ ' C is B means :
tu sis animal. No A can be B,
o- T-.. .... •!• j 1.. .- •••11 without C
3.-) Lt constat michi quod wulgate sentencie in iUa ma- bein"- D.
teria sunt infundabiles; utputa quod nulla negativa The common
' t- 1 ^ a opinion on this
includit repugnanciam, sed quod possibile est nullurn subject seems
ens esse, cum hoc quod non antecedit ad aflirmationem ; unfbunded^
ymmo quod possibile est quod si deus est, tunc, qua- viz. that no
4olitercunque potest non esse, est. Hoc enim iuxla inciudcs
r ^ ■ ^ .. •^•i • 1 i^^ impossibility.
sic rantasiantes est possibile, cum non mcludit repug- it icads to
nanciam. Sed procul a philosopho ista sentencia! Ad "lany absurd
'^ 1 r conscqucnccs,
and is to bc
rcjccted.
6. fpales ; inmarg. falcs B. 2.^, 2^. logicus communitcr /'« marg'. B.
l88 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
3. Necessary 3'" dicitur quod necessarium est quod sit ordo inter
coordiiiated^bv '^^*-^^^'^'^'^'^^' quarum nuUa potest esse sine reliqua;
the dependence u^- prius naturalitcr est niilliini liouiineni esse asinum
of one upon ' . . .
the other, quam est nie non esse asunini. Et prius naturaliter est
consequens esse, si antecedens est quam est aninial esse, 5
which their 5/ homo est. Et sic de iniinitis similibus. Ideo non est
connecTion does color concludendi quod non sit ordo prioritatis vel
not destroy. dependencie inter aliqua, si unum non potest esse sine
A truth mav \ . ^ . , ,
be necessar)', reiiquo. Nec est mconveniens quod iriulte necessitates
exi"st actual°v possunt non esse, que non possunt destrui, corrumpi, 10
vel desinere esse, ut tales: ego fiii quadragenarius, ego
predicavi etc. ; et multe veritates que iam non sunt
possunt esse, sed non possunt incipere esse; cum, si
sunt, eternaliter fuerunt, ut sepe dictum est de talibus:
it may also be ego fui predicaturus, Sor fuit episcopandus. Nec est in- i5
time conthi^ent conveni^ns, necessarium ex supposicione et impossibile
in the various pgj. accidens, esse secundarie contin^ens natum in
senses ot the ^ . . ...
word. maion vel minori vel semper.
We must Et ad cognoscendum dicta hominum in ista materia
the^sT^nification niultum confert cognoscere quomodo verba presentis 20
of the present temporis ampliantur ad quodlibet tempus, preteritum,
sense can be ■' ^ ^ , .
extended to presens vel futurum, ut postmodum docebitur. Ad-
'^futme.^" mittendo autem consequenciam ut nunc, conceditur
Froni a quod ex omni nunc falso sequitur quidlibet ut nunc,
proposition \ .^ , . .
that is false sicut omne nunc verum sequitur ad quidlibet ut nunc. 23
"d'raw\nv" Et ulterius patet ex dictis quod sicut movendo manum
conclusion that nieam facio ad omnem Dunctum mundi veritatem, sic
same time; and facio universalem condicionalem necessitatem. Unde,
'^°for'*true'^° propter ainpliacionem temporis verborum, oportet aliter
P/op^sifons. loqui quam in proximo tractatu locutum est: ut deter- 3o
Moviiin mv . ^ ^- . . ,.
hand, 1' minatum potest dici omne quod necesse est esse pro aliquo
'"t^ruth'^ and*^^^ tempore; et per consequens omnis veritas est alicui esse
consequently a determinata. Contineens vero ad utrumlibet potest dici
present . „ .... .
necessity, omnis effectus agentis libere, quod pro omni mensura
the°world! ^"'^ causat eundem eque potest ipsum non causare. Ex 35
On account ot guo patet quod omnis creatura est contingens ad
tlus extension ^ \., ^ . . ..^ ^ n i-f i-
of meaning, \ve utrumlibet quo ad deum. Ymmo [suntj quotlibet voii-
"^'oetem/nate'^ ciones dei eterne que possunt non esse, sed non in-
as that which cipere vel desinere. Unde libere contradictorie causare,
must c.xist at ii ^ .
ceriain titnc; est causare causatum voluntane pro omni mensura pro 40
^ad ut^-umlfM 'i^''^ ^'i^^ potest non causarc illud; ut est omnis volicio
as anything
caused ty an
agenl tliat is ,v cv ^
quitc frec not i. q,' pro qiiod sit 15. 12. piii B. i.''. ptiiro B; ib. epandus B.
tn cause il : 3;. sunt dcest B.
CAP. viii. I.OGICA. :89
dei ad extra. Contincens vero semper est effcclus habens thc Coniinffettt
catisaiu ex qiia scquitur; ct huiusmodi est omne con- g" ^||j.^t if^Yinc
tiniiens; ut voliciones dei ad extra sequuntur ex e55e ,/» '^.••"'se, and
. . ,. 7 . llowmg Irom it;
dei contingenter. Et omne aliud contingens sequitur
5 necessitate condicionali absoluta ex voluntatc dei. Con- '!i° Coniingent
, tn most cases
tingens in maion est effectus habens causam e.v qua | as cvi efect
naturaliter seqwtur. Contingit tamen casualiter causam /inivsjyom^^j
BH-i^ illam poni, et eftectum illam non sequi. Contineens in gn-c-n cause;
' . ' ' . ' ° thc Contmgent
minori cst effectus pretcrnaturahter sequens ex causa in feii' cases,
lo illud- non intendente. Ex quo patet quod dicta contin- ^/j^^^ ^"„,'^/'^,^^,„
cen.ter non opponuntur contrarie, sed relative. Nec '' A"n't'« canse.
'^ . ' ' . ... . . contraiy lo tlic
obest equivocantes in temponbus verborum sic varie usuai tendency
loqui, et cognoscere utrumque modum loquendi; ut, (;;|^„;,-,|t////"/„j
communicando cum iuvenibus, loquamur primo modo, necessary
^ ' ' are merely
i5et CUm provectlS, modo secundo. relative terms.
Dubium autem est si pretericio, futuricio, volicio, et Whether the
posse logicum (ut sunt iste veritates: A fuisse, /ore, '[{^^'dVpend^on
non esse, posse esse, etc.) individuantur a tempore. Et time tor their
^ . . . . ^ . . individual
videtur quod sjc: nam alia est futuricio Sortis, alia entity, diiTering
20 Platonis, quamvis utraque sit futuricio hominis; quia "^^awn^pro]^
aliud est unum illorum futurorum quam erit reliquum ; T^^° ^'"""]*. °/
. . . , . the same kind,
ergo, per idem, alia est iutuncio A cursus mei, alia cxisting both in
futuricio B cursus mei, quamvis utrumque istorum sit ^iJ^ p^ast"^&c."
veritas que est nie esse cursurum; et sic de pretericio- '•'"': ,"^'^''^'''l?^'''=ss
. . .... ' . dirterent trom
2rnibus. Nam pretencio cursus mei incipit esse, me desi- each other.
nente currere, etsi millesies prius desii currere; et per
consequens sunt tales quandalitates communes tam a sub-
iecto quam a tempore, continentes sub se alias infi-
nitas; itt per quot tempora ego durabo, tot sunt veri-
3o tates, quarum quelibet est nie esse duraturum. Videtur i iic ditterence
eciam quod necessario individuantur a tempore; ut, me °\-,'y".^5'([j^^f,^''^
non sedf^nte postquam sedi, est alia necessitacio sessio- ditfer;
nis quam fuit ista eterna que precessit esse mei; quia othcrwise the
aliter cadem veritas potest infinicies redire. Ymmo mHit^^exisWn
l'^^ videtur quod necessitacio potest incipere esse propter '"'"''.''^. '^"mber
. ^ ' . ' ,.■','. ot times.
incepcionem nove per se cause, etsi etcrnahter ruerit Besidcs, a
talis necessitacio^ ut, me incipiente esse, verum est 'js^^etcnial^ in^
quod non sum extra B situm qui de facto continet me; itseif, may
. ~ . ,. ' ... begin to exist
et hoc luit eternaliter verum. Cum ergo existencia mci in a new way
4" in B situ sit sufficiens causa ad facicndum me non csse '" ^"^^'^'
10, II. gtin' B. 26. mllefitis; ib. dcsiit B.
26. Mille^ius is probably a coniiption of millesies for millies.
Wyclif speaks of a series, A, R, etc. of runs.
1 90 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
extra illum situm, et illam potencia non impedita, vi-
detur quod facit unam talem negacionem preter illam
eternam.
Reasons contra. Sed contra, ista videtur esse opinio Eracliti, ponentis
It this were so, . . ' . . '^ .
all thinss omnia continue esse nova. Nam si ventates recitate 5
contTiTually he individuantur a tempore, tunc consistunt in successione,
new, sicut teinpus. Et per consequens tam necessitaciones
according '^ . . ' . .
to Heraclitiis, quam pretericiones et futunciones, habent partes suc-
individuVlkv cessivas, quod non est sane intelligibile. Ymmo, multo
of such trutiis maeis, omnia alia accidencia individuantur a tempore. lo
is caused by *-^ . ' ....
time, their Et sic, moto uno, omnia mobilia moverentur.
successfon^- Similiter, iuxta illud oportet ponere infinitas aut
and every communes synonimas, quod est summe nueatorium. Et
ncccssiirv , ,
truth is consequencia patet ex lioc quod tot modis ponitur
'^successive° unum oppositorum quot et reliquum; ergo, si infinite i5
P,"'"'s;. ,, sint tales necaciones, vie non esse extra B situm, infi-
so also ot all . , -„ .
accidents; and nite forent tales aihrmaciones, posita una, quarum que-
inconceivabie. libet esset nie esse extra B sitiini; et sic non esset dare
Again, if there ^ltiiiium sineulare; sed omnia essent communia, cum
can be an . ^ . . ,. . , , .
infuiite number accidens posterius subiecto mdividuat subiectum. 20
ne°"ations'undcr Similiter, cum nulla necessitacio potest incipere esse
the same form, gine desinicione sui oppositi vel econtra, videtur quod
there must be ... . ...
as many me generato in B sitii, racione cuius generacionis in-
and 't^his^^-ould cipit necessitacio, que est me non esse extra B, desi-
destroy neret ista affirmacio; esro sum extra B, et per con- 25
individuality. . .„ . ^ . .
Again, ail sequens, ista arhrmacio fuit ante esse mei; et tunc non
esset possibile aliquod ens incipere esse, sed omnia
things would
bo etcrnal.
Nothing essent eterna. Et tamen prius deductum est omnia esse
commences -^
without its nova.
'ceas'in'n^ Q.uantum ad istam materiam de individuacione rei 3o
Wfclifs on>n videtur michi 1 pro presenti quod omnis substancia B 88"
opinion. .,..,... .1 ^ ^ ,.,■".
Kvcry individua individuatur a qualibet sui per se causa, sicut
its^ind^i^NiduaHty ^st a qualibet tali. Deus autem, extra genus, et per
from its proper consequens carens individuacione, est principium indi-
cause ; . ... . . . . .
but God is the viduandi omne individuum. Accidencia eciam pnnci- 35
pdnciple^^of piancia substanciam sunt cause cognoscendi et regu-
indiyiduation lariter individuandi omne suum causatum, ut mensura
Accidents, such . . . .
as time, tempons in qua generatur res corruptibilis, motus,
'are^^prhidples' accio, potencia etc. que per accidens causant rem talem,
of cosnition, of Jndividuant ipsam; ut existente eadem materia et eodem 40
individuality, ' '
I. ia" B ; ib. po-^ (po'' ?) B. i3, i,|. a'coes jt'?-o aut communcs B.
ii), 17. jKite B. 17 a'coes actuaciones B.
CAl'. VIII. I.OGICA. 191
agente respectu B ignis quod sint respectu A ignis, and aie
alia tamen cst forma et pcr consequcns alius ignis: canscs.^^Hthe
quod cocnoscitur ex alietate temnoris in quo produ- '^'^"'"^, '■natter
" ^. . ' ^... and tlic same
citur, ex alietate producencie et multorum consimihum af,'ent produce
5 accidencium que concausant productum; quia aliter cascs'!^ tiie form
rediret idem icnis in numero, quociens eadem materia '^ diflcicnt;
^ . ' ^. . . . and tliis is
susciperet formam eiusdem speciei. Est autem aliqualis known by the
idemptitas in talibus circa ydemptitatem speciticam, ti'mc"&" i^n
que vocatur vdemptitas 2""* materiam. Et maior est V"''""
^ - ' 1 1- ■ production.
loydemptitas qua corpus laceratum vel divisum 2™ partes There is
aliunde continuatas, nulla penitus corrupta, maneret idem speck\,' called
corpus, quam prius; quia est idem 2™ materiam primam identity
r T y 1: 5_ -1 _ _ r _ according to
et 2™ partes quantitativas, que sunt materia propinqua. matter.
Unde sicLit unio materie cum forma in ista, continuacio
i5parcium materialium est de essencia ultimi singularis.
Rediret autem idem iioino quamcunque materiam anima
actuaverit, quia anima vere est persona hominis. Et
sic rediret quodammodo idem corpus.
Omne ergo accidens individuatur a suo subiecto, cum Thus every
20 sit ab illo, ut situs individuatur a mundo et eius quan- injhaduatcd
titate et figvira, et situs individuat motum, et modus in '-■'y "* subjcct.
communi individuat tempus, et tempus individuat om-
nem motum singuLirem, et omne ahud successivum;
cum ad uiiitatem motus, unitas mobihs, unitas tem-
23 poris, et unitas materie motus requiratur. Et corre- Things future
].. c .. ■ ■ .. ■ • .. 4. ■ and things past
spondenter, lutunciones, pretericiones, et potencie^ individuate
principiantur a suis causis a quibus individuantur taha tutunty and
r r _ _ T _ ^ prctention ;
a tempore: ut si aha eveniunt futura, ahe erunt tutu- things possible,
riciones, et si ahe fuerint res preterite, ahe sunt earum nossibiHty, &c.
3o pretericiones. Et sic alie possunt esse res producte, ahe The instant at
. . . ... wich any
sunt potencie ex quibus possunt produci. Nec indivi- successive
1 .. ^,- .. •• •.. •••J--J .. or permanent
duantur taha a tempore, nisi sui termini mdividuentur substance
a tempore. Et sic, eo ipso quod ahquid non per se commcnccs to
^ . ; i T ^ . ' . be, is the
substancia, successivum vel permanens, pro ahquo in- principle of
35 stanti 2™ se totum incipit esse, non solum pretericio individuation •
instantis iniciantis^ sed ipsum instans est principium sue
individuacionis: ut si sessio mea, actus anime, habitus,
et quecunque forma accidentaiis vel substanciahs mate-
riahs non potest fieri ante vel post idem instans in
40 quo fit; quia existente aha generacione, non foret iliud
ultimum singulare. Et forte sic cst de omni generali.
14. oii" co 15. 17. r' belwcen and abore auima and actuavcril.
3o. res rs' H. 3S. I:il 1',. )o. lit 15.
192 JOHANNIS WYCI.IF CAP. VIII.
Successiva tamen individuantur 2"'' suas partes con-
tinuas a novo tempore; sed permanencia a primo sui
instanti, et ab aliis quorum ipsum est principium. Ex
quo videtur quod impossibile est aliquod ultimum sin-
Rc-creation gulare fieri prius atque posterius quam sic. Successiva 5
contr^adictory ; a^-^tem non possunt corrumpi prius aut posterius quam
so is corrumpuntur, sed permanencia bene possunt et hoc.
anniliiiation. ^ , . ., -, i- 1 • , • 3 • i »
Sed impossibile est aliud recrean; et per idem videtur
nichil posse annichilari. |
It is absurd to jr,- patet impossibilitas casuum quibus ponitur quod B 88''
suppose tliat . , ' . . , ,, i ^ • i- 1
after idem ultimum smgulare torme substancialis vel acci-
same'fonn can dentalis absolute vel respective redeat post sui corrup-
return again; cionem ; et per consequens non redit eadem negacio in
or that negativc '. . ,, . . 1 j •
qualities are numero, potissmie cum nulla potest incipere vel desi-
'"'^'^tfme"^'^ '^^"^'"^- -^^ ^^^ videtur quod nulla negacio individuatur i5
These ^ temnore, tum quia non potest esse individua re-
consequently '^ ' . . ' . . . . .
liave no real spectu sue speciei, tum eciam quia omnis negacio vi-
existence. jgtui- ggse communis in linitis a tempore. Ergo videtur
nullam negacionem habere esse, cum quelibet sit eterna,
quamvis vicissim habeant diversas causas per accidens. 20
This Et patet responsio ad 2"\ superius suadens multitu-
solvcs tllC 1 i *■ ^ ^
second dinem talium negacionum. Unde, si sto postquam sedi,
as'to^h"e' "on est verum quod non sedeo, sed est eternaliter
infinite verum quod non nunc sedeo, quamvis habeant diversam
multitude „,. ■ n ^- ^ ■ •^,.-
ofnegatives; causam. Talia enim. fiunt contmue, et si non consistant 23
eternally u-ue ^'^ succcssione, sicut omnia creata sunt de quanto con-
tliat one servantur in esse; ut Sor facit Platonem fore episco-
neeation is true . , ,. . ~ ^ ^ r ■ ^ •
at ccrtain pum; sicut et multa alia prius fecerant et facient m
andht^that futurum. Unde deus simpliciter facit quamlibet partem
there is no mundi, non solum quia eternaliter wult illam esse ad :-!o
succession, as . ,.,,..,, , ^ , ^^^
in created mtra, sed quia facit illam esse ad extra, dum ex eteina
things. voluntate necessitat illam esse.
There is a Est tamen dare 3^'^ facienciam qua Deus subito facit
^"vhiclfGod ■*' opus, que faciencia desinit esse quando opus incipit
'''"tWn"'' ^ ^^^^- ^^ ^^^^^ faciencias est dare in causis 2'-% tam 35.
instantane"ously; respectu aftirmacionum quam negacionum. Unde miro
^^ aho lo 'be '" modo negacio eterna fit, nunc ab uno corruptibiii et
seco^nd^cairscs ^""'^ ^^ ^^^°' ^^'^"'^ contingit successivum fieri et quod-
libet corruptibile. Unde existencia mea in B loco facit
me non esse extra B; et tamen illud fuit factum eter- 40
naliter ab illo qui fecit me non esse.
8. si pio sed B. '.''b. niTs 13.
CAP. Vlll. [.OGICA. iy3
Et ex istis patet quid tenendum est, 2'" meum vi- Sncli i.s my
dere, in dubio, et quomodo respondendum est argu- tins"matter.
mentis. Non enim est inconveniens, sed verum, quod '" '•'' 1,"'^'= "'""'^
. . lliat the same
idem commune potest redire, mtendi, et remitti. Nam universal
5 quecunque veritas primo signilicata per oracionem in- icturn'a"ah]
finitivam est communis ad infinita: ut me currere, vel ^"'^ become
. ' moro or less
esse calidum est commune ad me currere isto cursu, intense in its
vel isto, vel isto; et sic de similibus; et me esse cali- '" '^' ^^^'
dum ista caliditate, vel ista; et sic de similibus. Est
lotamen dare singularia significata per abstracta; quibus
accipiunt infinita actu: que ornnia ponuntur de infini-
tiva oracione contracta.
Sed pro individuacione privacionum, notandum quod . -■^? f9'' ''."=
. . ^ . . : . . ^ individuation
individuantur a suis privativis, ut a subiecto et tempore, of privative
i5 et a quibuscunque suis principiis, saltem 2"^ esse in- its^pdncipk is
telligibile: ut alia est privacio A materie et alia pri- in that which
. _ . . . . they deprive —
vacio B materie, propter diversitatem subiectorum; et subject,
aliud est materiam carere B forma et aliud est ipsum in"d?ffeVent
carere C forma, quia B forma differt a C forma 2'^^ subjects, what
., ., ' . , .,..,• is calicd the
10 esse possibile; et per idem mdividuantur a tempore same privation
sicut sua positiva. Ex isto videtur quod quies habet dttierent-
partes successivas 2'^^ quas mensuratur tempore, sicut '"^^'^ '^^ '^^■'-'"
^ ^ ^ ' . as movement
motus. Nam unaqueque pars motus nata est opponi is measured by
sue proprie quieti; ut motus B tempore mensuratus Every
25 non potest opponi, nisi quieti pro eodem tempore. Unde n.iovement has
. . rr ' ? . ^ . . , I . Its opposite
B 89" opposicio vel repugnancia inter signihcata | non ponit rest; so
illa ambo simul existencia; sed unum ponit et aliud "^^eV^tain^thiie '^
destruit. Ex quo patct quod quies est longa 2™ longi- '^ opposed 10
^ . ^ . ,^ ^ r ". lest in that
tudinem tempons, habens partes successivas tempori same time.
3o correspondentes; et per consequens impossibile est quie- so^^called^^^must
tem esse sine tempore, si non equivoce sit quies. Sed ^^^'^ .P-^ce in
istis satis.
Contra predicta de bonitate consequencie arguitur. Objection to
Videtur enim sequi ex dictis, quod homo sit asinus, vel '^'^doc^dne'.""
35 quodhbet volitum, probari. Nam si ista consequencia est
35. This argument, as Wvclif himseU' says, serves to bring
in thc question De Iiisoluhilibus, one of the most difficult
points in logic at ihat time, and for which he proposes a spccial
solution. It may be slated thus: If the present proposition is true,
you are an ass; thc defendcr must either deny or grant it. If
he dcnies it, it follows that cvcn if the proposition is true, he
is not an ass; and thus he would at thc samc timc bc and not
bc that animal. If on llic contrary, hc grants il, Itc granls a
vcrv inconvcnient proposition indeed,
i3
1 94 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
If this bona, tunc tu es asimis (et demonstro per subiectum
^goo^.^yoTare eandem consequenciam quam facio); potest enim con-
a}i ass: sequencia dupliciter sicnificare vel pro habitudine qua
meaninp bv ^. ■'. ^ ^,. • j •
this, thc veritas postenor formaliter sequitur ad priorem, sive
"^The^jTesent"' inter signa, sive inter signata; vel pro illis veritatibus, 5
proposition and give sint siena sive sienata. Et sic dicunt sophiste quod
by consequence, y ^ . . , . .
either the power consequencia est proposicio antecedens et proposicio
°^rom'ofiL"^ consequens cum nota consequencie. Et illa est bona,
proposition to quando primarie significat necessitatem condicionalem.
another, or the " . ^ . .„ ^ ....
conciiision Et si suum significatum non fuerit tahs necessitas, tunc lo
'^^*^'*' dicitur talis consequencia non valere. Quibus modis
loquendi suppositis, patent argumenta ad utramque
partem ; quia^ si consequencia sit impossibilis et non
valens, tunc cum paribus est antecedens impossibile;
et sic, iuxta predicta, ipsum infert quodiibet consequens i5
concludendum. Si dicatur quod ista consequencia est
bona, tunc, cum veris, sequitur quod antecedens est
verum, et sic consequens. Et conformiter argumentatur
ad quodlibet volitum probare.
This introduces £^ i^[^ introducitur materia de insolubilibus, in qua 20
the grand . . . ... ,
question De sunt tot opiniones, quot sunt tuge invenibiles movende
xoly\nch'i\'ers i" eadem ; quod sine dubio attestatur super difficultatem
are very many materie,
answers, but , . . . • 1 .•
six principal Sunt ergo opiniones sex m ista matena plus tamose,
1. Thffirst quorum prima dicit quod nullum insolubile est verum 2?
denies that any ygj falsum. Sed ista tollitur, querendo de significato
such .,. . , \, .
proposition insolubilis, utrum sit vel non. Ut in communi casu :
'' "^'fa[se'"' "" 2'^'-'"" So?- dicit falsum vel non? et cum nemo dubi-
But can ii be ^g^j^ divisionem datam per contradictoria, patet quod
said to have . , , „. • , • ••.••.
no meaning^ stat dithcultas, etc. Si enim hec sit omnmo mdividua, .^o
"h^must \f' congrua, significans primarie sicut non est, tunc est
either true or f^lsa. Vel si negatur consequencia, supponatur illa
significacio termini, vel queratur utrum hec: Sor dicit
falsmu, sit signum tale vel non. Potest enim cuiuslibet
insolubilis materia trahi ad divisionem regulariter factam ib
per contradictoria.
II. The second 2'' via dicit quod omne insolubile est verum et falsum,
mainuins that f^igjficando se; sed illa tollitur, sicut prior, supponendo
propositions
are true, but
I. tunc in marg. B. 17. vi's B. n. mo^' B. 28, 29. negabit
in marg. B. 3o. Tdi"» B. 35. droj B.
28. Wyclif explains this further, pp. ihy, 199. Socrates (or
Sor) is siipposed to be the only man of that name, and to
utter this one proposition: Sor dicit falsum.
CAP. Vlll. I.OGICA. 195
existenciam vel non existenciam signilicati primarii talsiiy
sufticere. et exigi ad lioc quod sit vera aut falsa. 2" i!ut'a'«ahl^Tnve
supponatur experiencia certa quod insolubilia, sicut alie "'^'y ^nv
^ ' . . . ■ -^ • . incaning? n' so,
proposiones prn-nane, signihcant luxta extensionem ilK-y camiot be
5terminorum; et tunc patet contradiccionem sequi, ^"'\.JjjJ'.'^ ''"'■^
querendo si ex parte rei sit ita in communi casu quod -^"^- "^- g- a
J, , . . , „ , ^, maii miist
Sor decipitur vel non. hx. patet per communem deduc- eithcr bc
cionem quod, quecunque pars detur, sequitur opposi- '"''^not^." °'
sum: ut, si decipitur et solum credit quod ipse decipitur, . if he is
' . , ,^ . . ^ F ' mistaken and
10 ut pono, tunc non est ita quod decipitur; et si non thinks hc is,
decipitur et credit precise quod decipitur, tunc credit \^o'-*a'nd 'jf""*^!'
sicut non est: et omnis talis et solummodo talis sup- mistakcn and
.... . . . ... ^ thuiks he is,
ponitur decipi: et ita contingit argumentare in alns. hc is
Tercia opinio ponit nullam partem supponere pro 11 "^'xhe^^^hi i
()'' toto cuius est pars. Et sic 1 dicit quodlibet insolubile :ittirms that a
.,, "^ . ^ ' .^ ■" , . ^ , . part cannot
signincare exceptive: ut, posito quod ista solum sit stand for tiie
proposicio: Nitlla p?-oposicio est vera, sic primarie signi- tliat^ev'^-'- r
licando tunc dicit quod illa significat quod milla alia 'insolubic'
, . , , , ,...,.. . accordinelv
ab ista est vera; et correspondenter dicit in alus casi- has the
20 hus quibuscunque. Sed contra illud est veritas quod '"'^exce^ti"*-""
pars supponit pro continuo, et per consequens pro toto pioposition.
No
propositton
cuius est pars. immo in ista, 0}nne ens est, supponit rsiiue. i
must
subiectum pro omni quod potest esse, et per consequens '^^^^^"•' e-vcepi
tam pro se quam pro tota proposicione, Terminus uni- P'-oposjtion.
2b versalitatem supponens supponit pro omni quod significat, stands^tor'
ut alias declaravi. Cum ergo multe partes supponentes ^ iiniversai
. .^ ^ r r whole, and
significant naturaliter se ipsas et sua tota, quare non iin^refore it also
supponerentur pro illis? Sicut ergo hec proposicio itself.°'
scripta, hoc est falsiim, potest significare se esse falsum, „ '^''^.
r ^ ./ _ 7 _ r n ^ ? proposition :
3osicut nullus dubitat; ita potest subiectum specialiter ^''^''^'«^iw /.?, is
supponere pro ipsa proposicione, cum significat illam ; i^^ts^elt ^too.'
sicut quelibet pars significans significat suum totum. ^" ''^"^ wnttcn
^ . -^ . ... proposilion,
Nec dubium quin contingit in universali inteliigere rh's is fa/se,
suhiectum huius proposicionis, proposicio est falsa, sine the'propos^tVo'n
35 contracta connotacione. eque ipsa sola existente pro- . , l!^^"- ,
. ..^ . ^ . ' And the words,
posicione, sicut multis aliis existentibus cum illa. Ymmo propositio est
si sic significaverit : omnis proposicio alia ab ista est quiWa^'^
falsa, tunc subiectum significat et supponit pro ista ^'ni^i^ifa'
excepcione, cum proposicio excepit illam esse falsam.
40 Non enim consonat huic vie quod subiectum supponat
pro illis solummodo, pro quibus proposicio verificatur;
2. adhc B ; ib. ct I'.. 10. po B. :'u. vis 1!. lo. uaj H.
t3*
ig6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VKI.
and do not quia sic dicto, falsum est, supponeret subiectuni huius
^'^'evcry^'^^ proposicionis false in casu communi, non pro falso
proposition, but quod est, sed pro falso quod uo)i est; quod contradicit
Ihe present onc ^ .. . , . . ,^ • j • .^
is false. rudimentis de supposicione. \mmo, sic dicto, propo-
\ult th^^^subiect •^''^'^ ^^^ proposicio, predicatum non esset possibile esse 5
should stand svnonimum cum subiecto, quia pro una parte propo-
onlv for such ....■,-. i- ^ ^ • •c
individual casessicionis signihcat, pro qua reliqua non potest signiti-
Uie^^^^op^osid^c^n '^are. Et tamen potest significare pro se et vero, que
And in such a gunt illa proposicio pro qua negatur posse supponere.
would he"false, Nec dubium quin contingit terminum fieri proposicionis lo
^°'wouid"no''^^ partem prius apprehense per illarn, ignorante appre-
longer hc the hendente. Unde ergo non significaret sicut prius .'' Con-
same as A . . . . *: j r i „ „*
(predicate). tmgit eciam hommem componere quod talsum est,
^Jidte^po^ssible' ips^ ^^^^ existente ad intra, cum hoc quod creda
to affirm what nullam talem rern esse in anima, sicut wulgus et multi i5
falsity^beinfi^in clerici credunt. Sed quis dubitat quod sit contingens
and 'anlle^^same ^^t' sic concipiendo, appropriale apprehendit illam pro-
time to believe posicionem? non enim cogitat de hoc. Non ergo oportet
that no sucli ^ , . . i c u i u c
thing can exist multum msistere ad retellendum hanc tugam.
IV tY "fo^iuth 4° ^i^ ^^'-'^ quod repugnat insolubile significare 20
dcnies that in precise primarie sicut termini pretendunt. Ideo sequitur
fuch cases iherc 1 ., ., j • t u-i • -r: * •
is any in communibus casibus quod msolubile signihcat pn-
sjgnification j-^-^aj-jg alitcr quam pretendetur de famosa significacione,
wiih the terms; sed casus non certificat quomodo aliter. Unde concedit
^''"prim'ary^ ^ insolubilia, sed negat illa esse vera, quia quamvis signi- 10
sijnification f^cacio communis talium insolubilium sit vera, tamen
ditterent tiom _ . . .
what the words habent aliam significacionem falsam, sicut sequitur ex
im^j^ossibf^to casu. Ideo sunt concedenda esse falsa propter illam
be ivuown by jgnotam significacionem. Et tamen sunt concedenda
propter significacionem cognitam. 3o
This is a mere Sed ista via, inter alias, est pure fuga sophistica.
sophistical Gradus certe experiencie, qua scimus quod solum pri-
evasion; ^ '"^ ^ j j- 1
ihat aione is marie concipimus per talem, falsum est qiiod jalsmn
*'''*\alse,'^'^ '* est. Ymmo non esset possibile illam significare primarie
and if I do not j ].^j aliter, nisi innotescat michi quare sit aliter, cum 35
know it to be ' . ^ .
so, I cannot sis;nificare sit ''mo^ere ventatem apprehensivam ; et
1 1" H r m it is • • • •
such. ~ apprehensio hominis est sibi notissmia, cum actus anmie
sint per se noti, et potissime actus connotandi. | Qyxo- B 90''
modo, rogo, exponerem distincte copulative quod Sor
dicit falsum, et uno alio modo, cum hoc quod non 40
haberem experienciam de significacione alia? Oportet
i3. oplioiic" 15. 37. c prn cum B. 3(). ^0'"^ H.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. 197
enim sub quadam habitudine illud absconditum signi- \Ve mnst muke
r ^ ■ ■ ii ■ ..ti-^j I 1- ... "• >i copiilative
licatum .signincan; et habitudo copulandi est maxime pi-oposiiion ont
pertinens cum, propter illud sienilicatum, est insolubile ,. '!' ,'1",^
^ ' ^ ^ . . ^ . . '. . 'insoliiblc one,
falsum. Sed utrum possibile vel impossibilc, hoc nescit of which wc
5 sic opinans. Si enim disiunctive significaret, vel con- paJt aiid^deirv
dicionaliter, vel alio modo ypotetico, tunc non respon- 1'iesccond;
dendum csset regulariter, sicut docct hec posicio. impossihic to
r^ ^ • ^ ■ • 1 .. • • cxpouiid it thiis,
Caret eciam omni racione quod propter proposicio- jI ^vc do not
nem dcsinentem esse Rome, mc latente, ero coactus ad ^ino\\ the
sccond sense,
10 elicienduni novum actum apprehendendi distinctum, nor even
quem ego ignoro; ut opinio concedit, posito quod A possib'le'oi'-
sit ista proposicio: hoiiw est asiiiiis, Roine impossibilis, impossible.
et B: ista: in mente inea falsiiin est, sicut precise
significans ipsis solis existentibus; tunc, si cum paribus
i3 corrumpatur A proposicio Rome, manente solum B in
raente mea. naturaliter significante, significabit, me
invito, aliter quam prius. Unde, queso, principium
movens ipsam ad sic faciendum? Multi eciam sunt
casus insolubilium in quibus non satisfacit illa evasio.
20 5'^ via fingit diff"use quod nulli tali termino 2^^ im- V. Thc lifth
• • • /■ , • • .. • .. suvs that terms
posicionis, verum, talsum, proposicio, terminus etc. o"f the sccond
correspondere potest intencio universalis; sed compo- ,'".^P°*rH°"
nendo quod Sor dicit falsuui, oportet singulariter in- proposition,&c.)
telligere proposicionem falsam, que concipitur Sor nicaniiU, but
23dicere; ut sic: Sor dicit illaiii vroposicionein : hoino est in particular
' . . ... instances.
asinus, que significat priinarie aliter qiiain est.
Sed revera ista fuga non minus contradicit experien- But this
cie quam proxima, cum caret omni racione diversitatis cvasion
T r^ .... ... contradicts
ponere quod terminis prime imposicionis possunt cor- cxpcrience as
,.^. , ^ ^ • ■ ,^ ■ much as the
3o respondere intenciones reales, et non terminis 2^ im- former onc.
posicionis. Quis enim non credit quod multe sunt pro- Thcrc is no
. . . . . . . rcason to
posiciones in mundo quas ipse ignorat esse? iuxta illud deny a ^cneral
, , • , . ,. ^ . . meanins lo
wulgatum sophisma: tiiin scis aliquam proposicionem esse thcsc tcrms.
reraiii quain isnoras esse verain. Et certum est quod ^"'•' ''"■'"'^ "'"'^
^ . . . . . many
35 hoc non posset sustineri, nisi ponendo actus ac inten- propns/t/bits of
, , ,., . • „ which a man
ciones universales, correspondentcs talibus terminis 2 *■ may bc
imposicionis, Nemo eciam dubitat quin contin^it homi- ignorant;
^ ' _ ■^ _ so there
nem credere quod alterum iilorum contradictoriorum mnst be a
universal
signitication to
the word.
7. r'''''^*' B: ib. po B. 12. roiine B. 17. alit' alr' P.. 2S. duf-P B.
33. fo'-(or fo-'?) B.
8. Caret. The whole of this propositioii seems so unintel-
ligible that I fancy the text is corrupt, though the grammatical
con.struction does not appear verv faiilt^'.
198 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VUI.
And whcn we contingeiicium est verum: rex sedet vel niillus rex
comrad\ctoHes° sedet, quamvis nec sic credat illam, rex sedet, esse
one is /TOe,- we yei-am necreliquam. Nam, sciendo me sic habere illas
do not give a . ' ^ . .
precise signihcantes, puto me scire quod altera illarum est
meani'ii'!^"'to vera, et de neutra illarum sic scio quod illa est vera, 5
'one'. (;up[-) utramque illarum dubito, sicut dubito que illarum
est vera. Ubi patet sic componendo: altera illariitn est
vera, nec singuhariter compono pro prima' quod illa
sit vera, nec singulariter pro 2^'; quia tunc non assen-
tiret composicioni mee. 10
Aristotle and Similiter, auctores tradunt regulas universales de
<4°ieraf ilikl proposicionibus ; ut patet per Aristotelem et Boecium,
1°.'". describentes proposiciones : ubi nemo dubitat quod ipsi
propositinns ; . , , . , . . . ...
so the word non intendebant smgulariter proposiciones suas descnbere,
hasT°eneTal sicut nec sic opinans, ponens pro conclusione quod nulli , 3
meaning. proposicionum correspondet intencio simplex, nec simpli-
The verv . ^ -,1 ■ -n
eniinciatioii ot citer negat pro illa que est m mente sua, nec pro iUa
impiiert°i?s R^-^^ ^^^ '^^ mente mea; quia sic non esset conclusio
beiiet in a alicuius efficacie pro intento. Et si dicatur quod sic
general . . ^ ... . ^
meaning. componit, non illa proposicio: deiis est m meute inea, 20
habet intencionem simplicem sibi correspondentem, nec
aliqua proposicio sibi similis. Quero qualis intencio
correspondet ] subiecto secunde proposicionis; si uni- 600*
versalis, contradicit regule imposicionis; singularis, non
probatur nisi de illis 2*^"* quod non correspondet illis 20
intencio universalis. Et cum isti termini, nomen, ver-
bum, etc. sint termini 2"^ intencionis, repugnat quod
illis correspondeat talis universaiis intencio.
Again logicians Similiter est dissensio apud logicos quid requiritur
'^^wliat^a ° ^d esse proposicionis, cum unus ponit proposicionem 30
proposition )s, quam reliquLis non ponit esse proposicionem ; ut unus
some saymg ^ . • ,-, • ■ ,•
that every" ponit quidlibet esse proposicionem, alius quamlibet
sentence is one, • • ]• -j i r 1
another that it oracionem individuam veram vel lalsam ponit pro-
mnst signity posicionem ; et sic opinans ponit omne connexum in
sometnini; true ' . ' ' . .
or false. anima et solum tale esse proposicionem. Modo quod- 35
libet illorum clauderet contradiccionem, si non posset
in each case esse intencio communis de proposicione. Nam sic dicto,
lliere would be ji -i , • ■ ■ ■ -ji 1 j- 1
contradiciion quodlwet sii^iium ui aiiima, sigmjicans veruni vel jalsum,
it there were no g^f provosicio, elicitur iste sensus; quodlibet tale sipnum
sucli thing as . -'. ■'^ ' , , . -^ . '- ,
a proposition in 5/o"?n^c"i.i;7.s' deum esse vel hominetn esse asnuim est noc;^o
gcneid. quia iuxta istam viam sequitur: utrumque illorum est
proposicio; ergo, utrumque illorum est hoc.
^ .Xt -— ■
7. alta B. 8 fuv i^. 3i. net; np^ ni marg. B-
CAP. VIIF. LOGICA. 199
Unde lalia sunt incongrua vel impossibilia: On/n/.v There arc also
proposicio est, mitlte suiit proposiciones, ego credo quod aLisinJiiics.
tu habes proposicionem in mente tua ; et sic de similibus.
Sed ista haberent concederc in casu : omnis proposicio
5 est omnis proposicio, quamvis proposicio tua differt a pro-
posicione mea, ego liabeo otnnem proposicionem, et sic
de multis fVivolis, quarum deduccio esset stulcior quam
est posicio.
Nimis ergo profundaret se sic opinans pro funda- This opinion
, ^ . ■ 1 1 -i- ^ u-r- I • ] can, Iherefore,
10 mento solucionis msolubilium stabiliendo, quia negando trive no stable
intenciones universalium tluctuaret in respondendo in , toundation
^ to explain the
propria materia, sicut edificium constructum super 'insohibles',
„. ,. . . ..... because
aquas. Smgulana enim, propinqua divisioni, et incerta singulars have
sicut aqua, non fundant scienciam propriam obiective. ",°/"^o^if^eor'
i.^ Sexta via ponit in quolibet insolubili 3 concurrere, can be based
^ . ,, , , • on them.
primo, casum iacti; 2", antecedens vel causacionem: vi. Thc sixth
et 3° consequens ex 2°. Ut, posito quod unus Sor sit .distmsuishes
T _ . "1 every such
omnis Sor qui dicat solum quod ipse non est albus, proposition
, r ■ 1 i- -^ j the fact itself.
hoc totum est casus tacti; et quando adiungitur quod its antecedcnt
2oquicunque dixerit verum quod sit albus, hoc est ante- and its
T T " ' _ consequent.
cedens vel causacio ad esse album, quod est naturaliter Ex. gr.
consequens causacionem illam; tunc tenet ista posicio speaks thc
pro reeula eenerali quod omne naturale antecedens est ''""f'' " n^htte.
i ~ Y 2. A says ne ts
prius pro aliqua rnensura quam suum consequens; ut esse not whiie;
10 album, in casu posito, sequitur in fine prolacionis sicut autecedent;
talis motus ipsum consequitur. Et ita dicit insolubile ^^•^'y'^^'^/^!'^^'^.-^
esse verum post causacionem et falsum ante causa- is the
,., • 1 , •!• consequent.
cionem, et per ista tria mventa in quolibet insolubili Tliese
solvit generaliter insolubilia. Nam primo sunt falsa, vel '"!°.^g°j^[ge"®
3o neque vera neque falsa, et in fine erunt vera. Ideo or doubtful,
,.,. considered
oportet diligenter notare mensuram pro qua opponens before the
querit utrum insolubilia sunt vera vel falsa. ^ippH^ed^^^and
Contra illud sunt multe instancie. Primo enim videtur afierwards true.
quod mTpossibile sit hommem esse album propter cticere
35 talis proposicionis, sicut et impossihile est solam obviam
esse causam libertatis. Et sic generaliter in omnibus
i3. di'nni B. 3|. pp dice' R.
32. The Hrst conclusion is: A says lie {<; not wltite; if so,
he does not speak the trutli. Thc second conclusion is: If he
does not speak tlie truth, saying he is not white, tlien he is white.
The solution would consist in asking the opponent how hc
understands the propositionr As merely containing thc tirst con-
clusion, or as containing tlie .second too r
200 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. \ail.
I. This theory casibus insolubilium implicatur pro causa quod non
meie meaning potest esse causa; et per consequens omnes casus inso-
ot a proposition Jubilium neearentur tanquam impossibiles, cum tamen
to be tlje cause ° ^ . ,
of its objectivc nec vis videtur, nec argumentantes intendunt generaliter
^^wlikh^is"'^^' talem causacionem. Ut dicere istius proposicionis: 5or 5
impossible. ^/^/^ falsum, non implicatur per communem casum esse
causam quare illa sit vera; quia tunc esset vera sine
correspondencia veritatis significate. | B91'
2. The Similiter, iuxta responsionem, tale dicere successivum
antecedent n • ■ • ■ 1 -^ ^
successivelv P^^^ nullo mstanti temporis simui ent cum suo causato 10
enunciated, is consequente, eo quod nullum successivum potest esse
never together ^ ; -1 i _
with its in suo fine temporale, et per consequens non pro m-
consequent; g^^j^^j ^gjj determinato erit proposicio vera postquam
fuit falsa, vel econtra: et per consequens in fine non
so at the end ^rit causa quare proferens est albus. Non enim est i5
the cause of the possibile quod iliud quod non est quicquam causet.
consequent t- 1 ^ _ _ j _ ^
exists no Loquamur ergo de eodem mstanti temporis, mensurante
therftbre^can causam et eius causatum; et queratur si pro illo in-
cause nothiiig, stanti sit insolubile verum vel falsum, et stant tunc
and it \ve takc . . , _ . ,
an indivisible raciones communes insolute. Et ex isto patet quod 20
"^*^"^']!' ?he^ ^*'' distinccio quam ponit de dicere nichil facit. Ponit enim
'insoluble' is „x.\oA aliud est dicere successivum principale quali
then true or ^ . . ^ . '^
false, this vocaliter dicitur proposicio et aliud est dicere consecu-
^'^^no^replv,^'^'^ tivum quali in finem dicetur proposicio quando erit
for its vera. Nam 2™ illam viam nullum continuum componitur 2.=»
upholders do . . „ ..,,,.
not admit that ex non quantis in nne; ergo non erit illud successivum,
com'p"o"sea 'of qui» tunc erit dictum, factum, vel causatum. Ergo tunc
things without jjqj.^ gj.jt aliquod eius dicere vel aliqua eius causacio.
magnitude. . ^ . . -^
De vocali ergo proposicione, et non mentali, tunc primo
genita est nobis sermo, retorquendo omnes responsiones .^0
ad illud instans pro quo est talis proposicio sic quante
significans.
3. U this Ulterius dicit ista responsio in particulari quod pro-
'^Ju^^cJmin'"" posicio insolubilis pro tempore sue causacionis nec est
time neither ^Qy-^ ^ec falsa, et per consequens nec pro tunc con- 35
true nor talse, , , , , • ■ ■ r- y^
it must he cedenda vel neganda, quamvis pro tunc signihcat aliter
'^nor'^'de1i're'd*f'^ quam est. Ymmo, ut dicit, si tempus per ymaginacionem
and yet at this componeretur ex instantibus, et maneat per illud idem
time its ' . .... . . - ,
meaning tempus talis proposicio in anima, ego concipio jalsum
'^'^¥e'amV^'"' '^'"" ^'^^' negativa: "lioc non est verum"', foret continua4o
Supposetime ejus mutacio de veritate in falsitatem, et econtra; quia
composed 01
instants: we
can conceive a
case in which
the proposition, ^ ^
according to 4. vis B. G. ca"" 2| ca B. 3i. q'« f,"' R. 38. maeat B.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. 20 1
omnis talis negaliva in priori instanti foret vera et in iiie hypoihesis,
proximo instanti falsa; et omnis talis afiirmativa econtra continnaiu-
in priori instanti foret falsa et in proximo instanti chanijini,' tiom
* . . •' Irue lo lalso.
vera; sic quod continue per idem tempus alternatim
5 esset mutacio a veritate in falsitatem, et econtra.
Et addit responsio, quod si pro sienando instariti '^ Uuihcr
^ . .^ 10 position ot
ponitur talem proposicionem, ^4 iwn est reriiin, fore thosc who
verum, non sequitur e\ hoc A pro illo mstanti ihat if a c-ivcn
sienificare sicut est, sed pocius oppositum, cum ''sieni- proposition,
, ^ . ' ^ ' ^ ' '^ _ A is not true,
loficare sicut est"' est causa quarc A est verum. Et sic is supposed
.. • • • . .,- 1 . • . ,- •.. • true at a certain
est m proximo instanti precedenti; et conrormiter si moment it
pro hoc instanti sienificat aliter quam est, non ex hoc ,- .Y""'*^, "°^,
^ . "^. . ." . . (oliow tiiat A
est falsum pro illo instanti, sed mcipit esse falsum pro wouid signity
r .. accordina to
mstanti proxmie ruturo. reaiity at that
i5 Istud autem dictum est multum extraneum; primo, moment,
. ^ that would
m hoc quod ponit ordinem priontatis naturalis causare entail its talsity
successionem. Nam tota prioritas naturalis est simul succeedin^''
pro eodem instanti temporis, sicut prius et posterius AiPfif-"^"
in natura; aliter enim non esset possibile quod pro beside the
20 aliquo instanti temporis causatum simul sit cum sua impl'iesThat
causa. Et tunc vel pro hoc instanti deus et quelibet "''"^"'"^' P'"'°'''y
^ . . ^ causes
alia causa non esset, vel pro eodem mstanti nullum succcssion,- it
causatum esset. Sequitur eciam quod nulla successiva ex?st\vhhout
proposicio potest esse vera vel falsa; quia ''sienificare snccession at
^. ^ \ . . ^ . ^ all ; as in the
2.^ sicut est vel sicut non est" antecedit per mstans deno- casc ot cause'
minacionem esse rei; ut dicere et taliter significare '^"^ ^ '^^ '
concomitantur illam toto tempore sui esse.
Videtur eciam quod anima_, eadem proposicione per-
manente, omni motu subducto, caret successione; quia
3o prioritatem et posterioritatem temporis continue uni-
formiter componendo sic ex integro falsum; ubi non
est fingenda racio diversitatis instancium, nec racio
quare in uno illorum instancium foret talis proposicio
pocius vera vel falsa quam in quolibet illorum. Nam
35 proposicio, solum manendo per instans, foret vera vel
falsa cum "significare precise primarie sicut est vel
sicut non est" sit sufficiens causa talis denominacionis.
I. falsa prn vera B. 26. veri pro rei(?) B. 29. subducia B.
37. iTf"» B.
3i. The text as it stands has no sense. This, if owing to
missing words, is all the more regrettable because the words
would perhaps have given a clue to the rest of the paragraph,
^vliich 1 have failed to uncierstanJ.
202 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIIl.
Quomodo ergo explicaretur denominacio usque ad non
esse subiecti? Habita ergo continue tali causa non foret
difterenter nunc vera et nunc falsa. | Et ex eodem B 91"
videtur quod non stat eandem proposicionem manere
per tempus neque veram neque falsam, et tamen per 3
idem tempus primarie signiticare sicut est vel sicut non
est; specialiter cum instans temporis contineat tam
prius quam posterius in natura.
Tiiere are Preter istas vias audivi multas evasiones; ut prima
ot'^e[uding'ui'e Jicit quod non est possibile hominem esse Sortem vel 10
difficulty. Platonem. quamvis vocetur taliter. 2^ dicit quod non
I. By saying - ^ , . , . . ., . . ,
that a man is est possibile loqui vel moveri successive. :>'' dicit quod
'c^//ecY"socrat"e's non est possibilc movere aliquo motu, quamvis possibile
^- sit moveri sine motu, quia non est possibile successivum
successive esse: et multo magis non est possibile proposicionem i3
niotTon*is vocalem esse, cum tunc forent distincte voces que non
impossible. possunt pro eodem instanti proferri. Et ille sunt fuge
j. That, iherc ' , . . -^ . . . .1 ,• • .
being no sophistice mterrumpentes doctrmam. 4*^ dicit quod om-
^'iiotliTn""' nis proposicio significat seipsam. primarie et sic verum.
can mqvc, cta jicit quod non sunt responsiones vel denominaciones 20
though it is >J . . ^ , ^ , . , . ,
possible to proposicionum retorquendo ad idem mstans, cum noc
^ ''q-i'a°7vtry "O" ^it possibile. 6^ dicit quod quelibet negativa prin-
proposition as cipaliter et primarie signiiicat aftirmacionem, ut ista:
it pnmarily , ^ r ..*-.. . ,
significs itself, homo non est, pnmarie signiticat honunem esse, sed
^.'Vhat^^no negative, sicut ille terminus "inintelligibile" significata?
meaning of a intellisibile, sed privative: et per hoc evacuat insolu-
proposition can .,. ^ . ^. ,. . , ,., ,.
be reflected bilia negativa. Ymmo dicit quod quehbet tahs proposi-
"The^same^^ cio, hec non est vera, hec non habet primarium signi-
instant as it is ficatum, etc. primarie signiticat illam proposicionem, et
separately. per consequens primarie signiticat illam esse: 7™''' negat "o
^' i!e''"a\ive^'"^ omnes veritates negativas; nec est possibile quod pro-
signifies an nosicio precise primarie aliqualiter significet, nec quod
affirmative ^ .K '..,, ^ . ^ .. .. ^,
neptively; proposicio nunc signihcet uno modo et alias aiio mouo;
'"i^nsokfble" qui^ significacio proposicionis est eius forma. 8^-'' dicit
proposition altercando quod aliqua talis est vera, et aliqua talis est 33
is one ot tnem. ^ . ' , ,. . . ,.
7. That there talsa; et, posito quod una talis sit omnis talis, tunc
ail^nVe^g^a^^ivfs. vel dubitat quam opponens proponit, vel dicit quod
8. That somc repugnat casui aliquam talem esse propositam, vel 3"
and some are' distingwit infinite quamlibet talem.
taise. Tales innumeras responsiones potest quis audire, ^^o
quas oportet cum solercia excludere. inmutando casus
35. ahtado B 37. ut B: ib. ml B.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. 2o3
successionis in casus de permanentibus; ut, posito "^Sov
videat vel intelligat istaju, sic primarie significantem :
So?- videt vel i)!tellii^it /a/i»;n", et sic de similibus. Vel
aliter petatur concorditer, gracia noscendi veritatem,
.T talis modus loquendi; vel tcrcio directe vel oblique
destruatur fundamentum evasionis, utendo veris vcrbis ;
quod est in pluribus onerosum.
Relictis istis crgo viis volentibus per ipsas incedere, Wyc/ifs
suppono aliqua alibi declarata. Primo quod cuiuslibet ■''''''''''.""<?/■ ///?
u) proposicionis vere pro suo signihcato significatum pn- preiiminaries.
marium est veritas. Istud patet; quia alitcr non foret signmcrtion^^of
si^nificatum proposicionis ipsam esse veram. evcry true
^ „ , , i- • •. •,• Proposition is
2" suppono quod ad contradiccionem, convertibili- truth.
tatem, vel equipollenciam proposicionum, non sufficit proposiUons
i.Thabitudo si^norum, sed requiritur habitudo in modo cannot
,. ^^ ... 7 . . contradict each
significandi. Contradiccio enim non est nommis tantum, other in form
sed rei et nominis. Unde in multis talibus homo non '*'°",^^;;'t^l3^^"*^
intelligit, etsi voluerit, sensus equivocas sub eadem contradictory
. . . ... too.
habitudme; ut nemo simul intelligit illam : nnllum A
20 videt B, intelligendo distincte subiectum vel predicatum
tam in nominativo quarn in accusativo. Ideo non con-
tradicunt talia, equivoce intellecta: niillum A videt B, et
aliquod A videt B.
3", supponatur quod cuiuslibet proposicionis vere pro 3. The primary
23suo significato significatum primarium est veritas signi- ''"'"every' n°uc°'
ficata per suum verbum principale, in comparacione pioposition is
.. . . ^ . . ^ . the meaning of
ad eius suppositum : ut ista proposicio, Sor est, pn- the verb
B 92" marie | significat esse Sortem, quod est essencia Sortis, ^"ifs^^Vubject"'
et per consequens ipse Sor. Et hoc, Sor movetur, signi- ?n'^ every verb
, ^ . . . ^ , . , . . ^ . is a compound
3o hcat prmiane moveri Sor, quod est accidens priori ; quia of the verb
eius motus. Et sic de aliis verbis adiectivis, significanti- '" *"''
bus accidencia inexistencia subiectis significatis per verba
substantiva. Et ex istis patet quod omne verbum signi-
ficat substantivum copulacione, quia aliter aliquod esset
;->5verbum singulare, et per consequens eius participium
esset pronomen.
4", suppono quod omnis veritas a'"* mensuretur a 4. aii created
prima, que deus est, et in latitudine illarum veritatum some exteni
sunt tot gradus defectuum vel falsitatum quot sunt faise, because,
, Jr . . . . . . . compared with
40 gradus dehciencie a pnma ventate. Et sic omnis veritas the tirsi truih,
creata est vera, quia prime veritati conformis, et falsa, T/^^taUs^slKH-t'
it falls short
of it to a
certain extent.
14. 0'='» B. iq. n» B. 3 1 . s*" cone B. 35. vorbum singulare
very ilte^ible B; ib. pp'" = pauperum i!) prn participium B.
204 .lOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
1 here aie thtis quia ab illa defectiva. Sed restringendo sermonem ad
'thrtrufh^of a" signa notantur 3« gradus famosiores quibus contingit
proposition ; pi-oposicionem esse veram vel falsam. Primo modo
it is true, 1'", ' r
in the largissime est proposicio vera^ quia ens; nam ens et
''hfcTuseTis' verum 2'" philosophos convertuntur. Nec est dictum 5
what it is, i. e. j-ij-jg racionc : quia, si quicquam est, tunc ipsutii esse esl
a proposition, i i ' i i ^
and verum. Sed ideni est quodcunque ens esse et ipsum ens.
'^°beh?gTana ^ I^^ico non dubium quin, si quicquam est res vel ens,
thus true. ipsum est verum ens, vel vera res, et per consequens
And the falsest ipsum est verum. Ymmo, cum omne ens naturaliter lo
proposition is siiinilicat se esse, proposicio falsissima, cum sit ens,
antecedently to significat se esse naturaliter. Et non dubium quni prm-
its falsity. cipalius significat se esse quam significat illud falsum
quod ex ordinacione hominis significat; quamvis illud
quod principaliter intelligitur ex imposicione per pro- i.t
posicionem dicimus illa primarie significare: ut layco
significat proposicio principaliter seipsam, et literato
significat, preter significanciam naturalem, veritatem
quam imponitur significare: et tali primaria signifi-
The opposite cacione sunpono quod fiat locucio in presenti, Vero 20
of truth in this ^^ , , . . ^ , ,.
sense is autcm isto modo dicto opponitur talsum contradictorie.
mSc'negation, ut dictum est in principio tocius tractatus. Sic ergo
and every false loquendo de vero, omnis proposicio falsa est proposicio
proposition is ^ ....,.,,. r 1 • ^
true in this vera. Unde pentissimi philosophi posuerunt taisitatem
bdnrgi-oinJed signi esse eius privacionem. que non plus potest esse 2b
on truth. y-^[^[ \^ yevo quam malicia potest esse sine bono.
A second 2" modo, paulo contraccius dicitur proposicio vera,
t"utfn5°es propter veritatem quam primarie significat; sive ipsa
that the yeritas sit iosamet, vel ab ipsa dependens, sive ens
nroposition .... • , ^^1 10
must aeree omnino distinctum ; et isto modo sunt tales vere: hec ?>o
meaiSg gfven proposicio est, hec proposicio significat, hanc proposicio-
to it, whether „g,„ yi^^f Sor, deus est, et similia. Et isto modo de-
that be the . . . . •-•..,.. • •
proposition scripta est proposicio vera m principio tractatus primi.
"*upotf itT^or'" Prima autem istarum 4 proposicionum exemplancium
whoily simificat primarie ipsam proposicioncm, quia eius 3--'
independeiil. . „ . • ,- ... .,
essenciam; et 2^ significat primarie eius accidens, quia
suum si^nificare. 3'^ significat primarie visionem activam
Sortis causatam ex eius significacione; et 4^ significat
This principaliter essenciam divinam. Prima ergo istarum
proposittoti is, ' '
merely affirms
ih. layco(sic!) B. 17. Irnto B.
17. Layco. I have sometimes mct with the same word, evi-
dentlv signifving loyco (logico). This would agree vvith the sense
pretty well, if not for the lifevjto which follows. 22. See
I.ogica I, pag. 77.
CAP. Vlil. I.OGICA. 2o5
proposicionum solum in hoc superaddit quodlibet ens iliat it is
sit^nificandum, ut ipsa sit proposicio vera, et non quod- .inunct^iVom
libet reliquum quod ipsa ex ordinacione hominis siiini- ;iii.vtliing clsc.
. ?, ^ „ , . ... I lie oppositc
licat suum signihcatum. Sed ista causa est exihs, cum ot trutii in
5 ordinacio nature sit prestancior ordinacione hominis. (-afsilv^as 'r
Vero autem isto modo dicto opnonitur contrarie falsum, contrary, m
. . . .„ , wiuch liic
quod signiiicat complexe prnnane signihcatum quod signification
non est, ut sunt tales; hoino est asiniis, hec proposicio 'wron'"h^
non est, etc.
lo Sed 3° speciaHter dicitur proposicio vera, quando habet 3. A proposition
primarie significatum independens ab ipsa, ut sunt tales : t]',^,.j "^'^„1." ^^^^^^,
deiis est, sol movetur, etc. Et isto modo locutus est wlien it lias a
, . ,' . . . ,. . , pnmary
Anstoteles de proposicione, dicens: ni eo quod res signification
est vel non est, quam proposicio primarie signihcat, <;jep'2|,^°" ',^°|t
i5est ipsa vera vel falsa, et non propter mutationem
B 92'' factam | in proposicione. Et cum isto famoso modo
intelhgendi proposicionem concordat ethymologia, qua
proposicio dicitur a pro alio posicio. Unde intelhgentes in this sense.
proposicionem significative et proposicionaliter intelhgunt \'ro'V,osftioV'^
■ioipsam significare significatum quod nec est ipsa pro- s.fands for what
^ . . ^ , . ^ , , ^ . ,. ^ ^" is neither that
posicio nec ab ipsa dependens; quia ahter non esset proposition,
proposicione vera dicta relacio, que est adequacio signi- "°'i,pon'^i't ""
hcati primarii ad suum signum vel intellectum inteUi- The opposite
,.j ,. r ■ 1 r °* Xvinh is here
gentem. Nec aliter loret racio quare hoc roret propo- its contrary;
23sicio: hoc est (demonstrando se ipsam) quin per idem the absence^^of
quehbet res significans se ipsam esset proposicio. Et vero .^ny meaning
? ... . ' . , ,^ . independent of
isto modo dicto opponitur contrane talsum carens pri- tlie proposition
marie significato, quod non est ipsum significans nec This^^folsitv
ab iho dependens, sicut sunt taha: hec proposicio est, is tmth in thc
., . . „ • -■• • !• • • '^vo tormer
00 sif;nijicat, et movetiir, et simiha que matenahter signi- senses; and
ficant pro se ipsis Et ex istis patet quod falsum isto t],|J.^'*(^o'^' ^15^.3
modo est verum tam primo modo quam 2°. Patet eciam truth in the
. . ' o , second scnsc.
quod si quicquam est verum i^ modo, tunc est verum
2° modo; sed non econtra.
35 Istis premissis, dico quod omnia vocata communiter l say that
insolubiha sunt tam vera quam falsa. Claudit enim '^^is'^^bot'li' true
contradiccionem quod aliqua sit proposicio insolubihs; , 3",*^ ,t?'?c-
. . .,,,.'■ \ , ^ ^"^ ,. ,, .,. ., .,. 'Insolublc is a
sed sicut liiud cuius magnitudo est de dithciii noscibiiis contradiction
dicitur inhnitum. ut profunditas maris, ita quecunque '" 'ft'^'J^^e|.X''^**
40 proposicio de difficili solubilis, quam quis nescit solvere, signiHes 'very
... .... , .,. ■ ,' .... dithcult t(^
dicitur sibi insolubihs, et speciaiiter proposicio signi- solve\ or
ficans affirmative vel negative pro se ipsa, ex cuius sudi and suc'
h
porsons'.
23, 2.(. int^'ra intelli''-' \i.
2o6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. Vlll.
If we take veritate sequitur illam esse falsam, et econtra. N&c est
ti-an^cendental ^ic sophisma, Iwc siouuui est verinn et est signum reruni,
sense, then intelligendo istum terminum verum transcendentaliter
this sifii is .V ,., , . . . . , ,.
true.-. it is a quia m taliDus non est sophisma, nisi accidentanter
'""loleVr" conimigantur. _ _ / _ b
sophism. Per hoc patet solucio in particulari ad communia
Tlie general .,,.,. _\ . , „ . . ,^
Bolution is that insoluDiIia. Nam, posito quod unus Sor sit omnis Sor,
propostdons ^^ quod solutii istam proposicionem dicat vel eius
arc false in the partem : Sor dicit falsum, sic primarie sienificando, patet
third sense. and ^ , ^ ,• • r i 0., j • • •
true in thc quod Sor dicit falsum j^ modo, quia proposicionem 10
to*i-^'thcy7iave carentem significato primario independente ab illa; et
no meaning [^ tanto habet racionem falsi vel vacui carencia talis
whatevcr ihat . -^ . ,, -n /- i • ...
does not significati. Manente ergo lila ialsitate, gignit ipsa per
tiie^propoMt*ion suam significacionem quandam denominacionem que est
itsclf. vera 2" modo. Et correspondenter dicitur de illis: hoc ib
est falsum, seipso demonstrato; Ci^o cogito vel percipio
falsiim. Et [sic] de ypotheticis ex talibus compositis.
Aristotie Unde Aristoteles solvens talia 2™ quid et simpliciter
^maVwhV' ^^'^^'^ quod qui iurat se esse periurum bene iurat, iurans
swears that he hoc solurn, quia non dubium quin talia reflectant super 20
is commitline , , . . . r 1 •
pcrjury swears se quandam denominacionem esse ven, propter taisitatem
Vs^pVoduced^lsy presuppositam . Ideo dicuntur 2"^ quid vera et 2"^ quid
a reilex falsa: unde ex suis significacionibus verificant se.
inHuence, some ^ ,- • ,• • "" , • j^ • i-
thing of Coniormiter dicitur quod ista condicionalis est nn-
soThVthey^W P^^^i^ii'^' ^' "'^^ consequencia est bona, tu es asinus, 20
veritled in their quia antecedens est verum non solum primo modo, sed
significations. ^ . ^. ■, • • •< -1 /^ •
Again, tal<e the eciam 2*^ modo, et consequens est impossibile. Omnis
hvpothetic^ai ^nitn consequencia est bona, sicut et omnis res. Et sic
proposition ; tam hoc antecedens quam hoc consequens est bonum
the antecedent , , , ,
is true in the et verum, sed non est bonum vel verurn quod tu es s<>
's'ense"'^hurTs'^ ^^'''^-^^^ 5 1"^^ "°^^ potest esse. Q.uod si queris utrum
the consequent iHa conscquencia sit bona vel vera 3° modo, dicitur
is impossible, , . ,. . ., . ^
the whole quod non, sicut patet ex supradictis. Non enim est
''fahrinThe* ^^^'^ veritatem independentem ab illa quam ipsa pri-
third. marie sienificat. Et si isto modo formatur consequencia: :t3
If an attempt ,. ■ , n j . ■
be made to Ista consequencia est bona j" moao: ergo, tu es astnus,
"syHogistiTaTly'^' "^S^^^^^ consequencia, cum antecedens sit possibile et
Ave merely deny consequens impossibile. I Potest enim esse quod illa B
that the n 1 1
consequence is
good,
/]. acci'' 15. 17. sic deest H.
2. .Si^iiiDit voniin. Tliis is .\ristot]c"s class ot tallacics, dictuin
siinpliciter anvi dictuin xcciindum quid, as : Tliis sliocinal{cr is
good.-. Iie is a i^uud shoeniaker.
r:p°
CAP. Vlll. LOGICA. 207
consequencia materialis aliter significet tam pro ante-
cedente quam pro consequente. Ideo antecedens significat tiic antccLdciu
primarie de faclo qualiter non potest esse. Nec valet imposlibic
responsio que ponit signilicacionem signi csse eius sig"iticuiioii
5 formam, cum sit illa |tam] accidentalis signo quam
accidentale est michi quod sedeo. Non tamen est possi- or wc may
bile quod ista consequencia sic primarie significans sit consequencc,
vera 3° modo. Ideo bene sequitur: ista consequencia sic takcn ^vith this
, ^ . signitication,
prnnarie sigmjicans est vera y'' nioao: ergo, tu es asinus. but dcny thc
loSed antecedens est inprobabile. anteccdent.
Et conformiter respondetur, negando istam conse- Tlie answer tu
quenciam tanquam inpossibilem : Sor decipitur et Sor Can^^a^^maii^c
credit quod ipse deciviatur : erijo, noii est ita quod Sor deceived and
. . '^. . ^ ^ ' ^. . believe lliat lic
decipitiir ; quia sic credendo clauderet contradiccionem is dece/vedy
i5quod non deciperetur, intelligendo terminus ut logici '^ i'- &amc,
cornmuniter intelligunt tales. Sicut in simili non se- likcwise to thc
quitur: Sor periurat, et Sor iurat se periurare: ergo, ^^[^%\a^n' be'"
non est ita quod ipse periurat. Et excludantur eciam forsmjm by
, , . . \ •^ , . ^ ,. , ,. . sivcanng- that
dubietates m Sor, cum hic forte diceretur quod aliquis //e /s/ori-nww:-'
20 iurans verum. dum tamen dubitaret, illud male iuraret. '^case^f doubil^
Et advertc uenominacionem veri in hiis, super se re- ^'^^t would
, , . ... render
nexam ex talsitate presupposita, m eis tunc est leve the oatli a
[dicere quod] Sor decipitur. nisi ipse decipiatur; quia pei)ui>-
tunc claudit contradiccionem quod non deciperetur,
25 intelligendo terminos ut logici communiter concipiunt.
Unde, posito quod Sor precise primarie credat quod The fact of
aliquis homo decipitur, nullo alio homine aliqualiter beUe°vTnVthat
existente, et quod omnis homo prirnarie credens falsum /ome man is
. . ' . ^ deceived loscs
decipiatur, et solum talis; patet quod Sor decipitur, ail independcnt
Mj cum proposicio credita ab illo careat significato inde- if w"' su^ppoL
pendenti ab illa, cum illa sit causa quare Sor credit ^iiat ihere is
• 11 . ^ , . . ^, ,^ ,. '10 otlier man
illam, et sic quare Sor decipitur. Unde non conceditur but he,- and
ista consequencia de materia et forma, sed gracia ter- ' ^^'j-aise.'^ '^
minorum : iste honio credit quod aliquis homo decipitur, ^} '^ '* ®^''^
.... . . . '■ ^ . ^ ^ ,, iliac no one
35 ergo, aliquis homo decipttur. Et, si ponatur quod nullus who believes
homo decipiatur qui credit verum, dicitur quod hoc be^ deceiVed"
repugnat casui, cum magna decepcio est vagari in pro- ^e rcply that
. . ., ' ., ^. . , r . ^ . '^ to bc mislcd
posicionibus carentibus significatis independentibus ab by propositions
eisdem. Unde quomodocunque ponatur istum terminum, ^ ''^^scnse'^ "°
40 deceptus, significare, multos homines possibile est decipi independent of
^ -^ ' '^ ' * ^ themsclves is a
great dcccption.
3. 110 potcst B. 5. tam dcest B. i5— 16. intclligendo — intclligunt
functis deleta ; talis B. 22. ^c" B. 23. dicerc quod deest. 28. crc-
dentc vro cxistcntc B. 3o, 3i. idepn'-' B.
2o8 .lOHANNlS WYCLIF <^A1'. Mll.
It is quite et esse deceptos, cum hoc quod nichil actualiter credant:
'^"^decehx-d ^'^ "^ omnis male agens est deceptus, quia movetur assen-
witiioiit actualiy ciendo alicui tanquam bono quod non est sic bonum;
anything; et ista est magna decepcio. Nichil tamen decipitur nisi
necessary ^is a habeat disposicionern ad credendum falsum : ut incon- 5
disposition to tincns credit vel in actu vel in habitu quod expedit
believe wliat is .,,,., . . , ^ . . '^
talse. prosequi delectabile, cuqi omnis sic malus sit ignorans.
tvram^orderin" Et per ista patet responsio ad casus quibus ponitur
that those and condicionaliter quod, si qiiis dixerit verum, vertransibit
only those ,, ^ ' ^ , ^ , ' -^
who speak the pontem, et alifer non ; et quod Sor solimi dicat primarie lo
pass^over'a ^"oi ipse uon pe7~transibit pontem; talem enim deordi-
bridgc; what nacionem posset tvrannus possessor pontis constituere
is to be done .■' .•' .,f ..^ ..
to a man who et casuahter veniens sic dicere. Verumptamen condi-
"I shalVnot cionalis cst impossibilis^ sicut universalis ponens quod
pass it?" quicunque dixerit veritatem pertransibit pontem. Esti3
The case is ^ . .^ . . ^ . , ,• ,
impossible, enim impossibue quod omnis transiens hodie per hanc
contradknon! viam, et dicens proposicionem veram 3° modo, per-
transibit A ponte et solum talis, et quod Sor transiens
hodie per hanc viam dicat solum primarie quod ipse |
non pertransibit A pontem. Hoc enim tacite includit B qS'"
So, if God contradiccionem. Ideo, si deus ordinaverit universalem
should ordain . . .
the first part, primam partem casus, repugnat quod hor sic veniens
impossiDk^that i^a dicat. Ideo, vel est impossibile quod deus sic ordinet,
the second propter impossibilitatem et irracionabilitatem ordina-
should take ^. \ , ^ , , r -, • ,• •
place. cionis; vel 2° quod deus [non] sic ordinavit et potest 20
o?dinance"of <^sse quod deus sic ordinavit, vel 3° quod talis ordi-
the first part is nacio impediret Sor ad sic veniendum et dicendum.
jmpossible, or . -^ . . , , •,• 1:7.. •
merely not Sed prm:ium istorum est michi probabilius. t,t si que-
'To'^man"'\vi'ir'^ ''^'^"i" 4^"*^ procurator tyranni faceret cum Sor in casu
spcak the aboveguperius posito, dico quod exequendo vim vocis sive 3o
words. . - ' . c- 1-
As for the statuti faceret Sor pertransire pontem, cum bor dicat
'^th^e^d^ecree,^ verum. Et si gravetur casus quo usque fiat impossibilis,
the man should jico tunc quod utendum est epykeva.
simplv be made .,^ . \ , . -, .,' • ,
10 pass over Et ex istis patet quod impossibile est tyranmcum do-
'clse"o^t^a minum ordinare de Sor et Platone servis suis, quod si 35
master who primus cui ipse obviaverit fuerit servus, tunc Sor erit
decrees ^., ,. ^ , t^, • •
of his slaves, hber et aliter non: et econtra de Platone; si primus
A i^l^^Vbe^tVee cui ipse obviaverit fuerit liber, tunc Plato erit liber, et
if the first
pcrson he
mcets is a ^1' in \i. 2?. non decsl B. 26. noii sic B. 27. dd'" B.
slave ; B is to ' ^
be free if thc 3,|. lyc'^ B.
first person he
meets is free ; f^_ [.;f p^y j^i^^ '|l,is paragraph aiid ihc followinf; niay ihrow
soinc lii;ln on ihe alhisions in Z)e ^jt'0S^<3.s/<i (P''t^- -Ui h- 23 — 3i)
which 1 did nol ihcn undcrsland vcrv wcll.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. 209
aiiter non: et obvient isti sibi ipsis primo in B inslanti; and it happcns
• • o • ^ .• • ..• -u >::• r -^ ki t'iat A aiid \i
tunc, si in 1> instanti cum istis paribus Sor luent liber, n-^^.^.^ j;;,^.!, „,|,(;r
scquens est ex posito quod Plato pro illo instanti erit ''■"=^''
servus. Et sequitur ex opposito cum illo dato, quod
'? Plato tunc erit liber, cum tunc obviaverit primo libero.
Sed quamvis 2™ logicum non sit possibile quod talis iiic case is
sit ordinacio, sicut nec est possibile quod talis iniiio^ss^ible;
quis ex sola carta fiat liber vel servus: tamen difficultas ''"].}''" '^sai
T . , . . dilficulty
est quid fieret 2'" legem politicam, tyranno manu-
10 mittente illos servos sub illa condicione et residuo
contingente, ut positum est; dicitur quod logico non
est difficultas, quia condicionalis est impossibilis, vel
casus gravatus iiabebit partes incompossibiles, sicut
proximus. Secundum vero ius liumanum racionabile *''•'"''' "i": '""^'
. , . . ''y scttmi,'
i5videtur quod uterque fiat iiber, eo quod iura faveant trce botli
libertati et domino deficiet probacio ad detinendum beca^usc tiie
eos in servitute; cum, domino affirmante quod nro primo i^^^ '^ "1.
' , . . lavour ot
instanti obvie alter fuerit servus, redarguetur ex propria iiberty, and thc
confessione evidente quod ex iioc tunc uterque erit convincinT
20 iiber. Quecunque ergo pars probaverit partem suam '^'"°i', 'l'^^ ^
induceret oppositum. In tali ergo casu utendum est i<eep either of
1 ■ 1 ■•]• ^"^ •K^^ •11- thcm.
epykeya, quid racio ludicaret pro utilitate reipublice;
et illud est faciendum.
Patet eciam ex liiis dictis et tractatu proximo quod *-'''*'^ ot thrce
. ^ propositions
25 satis possibiie est te scire sciencia actuali solum istas actuaily known
• • j , 1 . ■ I r .7 at a t;i\en timc.
tres proposiciones, deus est, honio est, annual [estj. et
omnem proposicionem quam nunc scis per lioram post
lioc scies, istis sic primarie significantibus. Nam iuxta
prius dicta faisum scitur, sicut cognoscitur; sicut enim
?o scio liominem faisum, sic scio vei cognosco quod bioc
est signum faisum. Verumptamen eius significatum non
scio, quia non est ; et quod non est non scitur; et si
ponatur cum casu. Nullain proposicioueni sciri uisi cuius
significatum primariiim scitur, patet scientibus obiiga-
35 ciones quod post imposicionem stabit responsio sicut
prius, cum ad esse rei est respondendum. Ymmo
sopiiista diceret quod claudit contradiccionem sic scire
3am proposicionem, que sit C, sicud clauderet contra-
diccionem quod eius significatum maneat per tantura
4otempus. I
Q. tuo B. 22. epybeya? B. 26. tsl after amm^] deest B. 3o. ho B.
38. fi B.
14
2IO JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
Noti; tliat thcic Unde nota diligenter quod sunt multe manieres pro- H (14*
ot^pi-opoMi^ions, posicionum pro suis denominacionibus capescendis. Ali-
according to q^-j enitn est nroposicio que non notest esse vera pro
what thcv T .., . . ... ^
dcnote.' suo signilicato primario, sed sua convertibilis bene
Some cannot ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i ■ ^ • » ir
be true in their potest; ut patet de ista in mente mea: hgo non siim, ?
primary q^ ^q istai hec provosicio non est (seipsa demonstrata);
signihcation, . . . . '^ ..^' '
although et sic de similibus, quarum signincata non possunt esse,
^"thJ^same nisi ipsi non sint. Et econtra alique sunt proposiciones
mcaniiig may q,^,g ^q^ possunt sic significando esse false, sed sue
he triie. ^ . . ^ . .
Some cannot convertibiles bene possunt; ut patet de tah in mente 10
be talse, and ^ j .. y-v. 1 ^ 1 • -^ ^ 1
yet a mea, ego sum ; et de talibus, lioc est, vel signijicat, vel
corivertible ^gf veriim (ipsomet demonstrato). Et hinc bene dicitur
proposition . . \^ . . . -^
may be so. in materia insolubihum quod insolubile significans pro
in"soiuble se ipso non in toto convertitur cum alio consimih de
propositions terminis synonymis; ut hec proposicio, hoc est falsiim, ib
are not . r r ; j 7
absolutely est vera primo modo et 2°, et est falsa 3°, cum solum
convertible witli ••^2^ • i ^ c \ » ri
others, signihcat pro se ipsa, quod est ralsa, et vera alia de
tor This is similibus terminis, hoc est falsiim, foret vera simpliciter
false (meaning . . . . ' •' .' ^ .
this very pro priori, cum significaret veritatem que esset inde-
proposition) , i •n ^ ^ • ■ • • c ..
caiinot be true; pendens ab illa; et tamen primana signihcata propter 20
and 7 his is oposiciones non essent diversa, sed modi significandi.
false (meaning r _ ...''.
" the preceding Utraque enim esset vera et convertibihs cum rehqua;
proposition) , . ^ .- 1 !•... ■■, ,. r 1 -m
may be quite sed pnma esset talsa qualiter 2'' non esset ralsa. Nec
T-u • ^''^A-^' ■, est inconveniens, duorum simpliciter convertibihum,
Their diversity ... . .
proceeds trom unutn esse simphciter verum et ahud falsum, dum 25
their mode ot..^, . •....•j j...
sionification, signihcando pro se ipsa careat ventate independente
the second gj^ ipsa, rehqua significans primarie illud idem, habeat
referring to an ^ ....,' . .
object suum pritnarium significatum independens ab ipsa.
independent ot ,. ^ • ... j • •£■ j^
^tselt. Verumtamen non omnis vanacio in modo signihcandi
But 1 1 j s not cjtusat; diversitatem talem, sicut facit variacio in signi- 3o
every diflerence . . ' . . , . o -
as to the mode ficando materiahter, vel significative. Nam stat A esse
of signitication .. ^tu ^ u ■ -u .. ^ • ■
that causes this proposicionem que quothbet hominibus potest signi-
diversity; j^care, et tatnen esset falsa, significando cuicunque
a proposition ' . . . ... . .
may be true for sicut modo significat, si non michi tahter significaret;
mahv men, and ^..^j-'", •.. •j , / j „-
yet faise, if ut patet de ista scripta: ego video hoc (me demon- 3o
meant for me strando per subiectum). Quilibet enim ahus, intelhgens
and not . ^ ... . .
corresponding subiectum sub habitudine prime persone, intelligeret
meaningr^s: aliud per subiectum quatn ego intehigo. Et quilibet
I see this, inteUigens ipsam sub habitudine s^ persone habet alium
(written down) " . . 01
may be modutn intehigendi subiectum, eo quod pronomen ideo 40
understood in . ^ 1 ■ ^ ■ ^ ■ ■ c .. ■
the first person est prime persone quod singulariter signihcat ipsum
or in the third
by one who
reads it.
20. 2° B. 3i. f'"« B.
CAl'. vin. IX)GICA. 2 1 I
apprehendens sub habitudine qua ipsum apprehendit. Thus, tiiough
o •.. • ; c ^5 • "r .- • 1 ■.. .. thc lorm is Uic
bequitur enim: ly ego signilicat me singulariter et samc, tiic scnsc
est prime persone: eriro, ego apprehendo ipsum. Verbum chanf^cs,
' . ' n ; o r 1 r _ so tiiat / ani,
autem ideo est prime persone, quia subiectatur pro- becomes
• • • c» .. • .. !•! ] cqiiivaleiit to
? nomini prime persone. btat ergo in talibus mouum /■/;/, /^'^,,, /,.
loquendi variari, stante idemptitate sicniticati cum And / <7??i has
1 . . ^ " a dilterciit
convertente; ut patet de istis: ego siitii, et hoc est; et scnsc on thc
.... • ■ r j- ^ c • ..• lips of diltcrent
stat modum signihcandi manere conrormem, vanatis ^ un.„.
signiticatis et equivalencia. Et patet de istis duabus:
lo ego suni, ego simi ; quarum prima est michi prime
persone et 2'^ Sorti.
Aliqua autem est proposicio possibilis cui nec est Ceriain
alia secum convertibilis; potest esse vera pro dato tliat°cannot"bc
signiticato, ut patet de talibus: Nulla proposicio est, convertcd into
^,, . ,. . . .j, , . others may bc
i^iiullujii sigiiuvi alicui siguijicat, oniue apprehensivum truc in a
actualiter differt ab actualiter apprehendeute, nichil cogi- '^even'tho^u'^i'i'
tat per disposicionem sibi accidentalem; et sic de simi- that scnsc
... . . ^ -11 ■ dcstroys their
hbus, quarum signihcata posita tollunt ventatem pro- truth;
posicionis. Unde, si sophista velit cognoscere deurn etenfai^ict it
2o suum, capiat pro reeula quod solum illud quod omnem understood in
• j ivT ni , 1 that vvay.
veritatem potest cognoscere est deus. Nam 2'" theologos
potest esse verum quod nulla creatura sit, quod solum
deus est inteUigens, qui nichil intelligit nisi distincte,
sine actu distincto vel iuvamine alterius. Talia enim
B 94'' non potest aliud | a deo cognoscere propter repug-
nanciam.
Quocunque ergo nostrum significato, est dare quot- There is an
,., ^ .^ ^ b ' M indefinite
libet ventates quas non possumus cognoscere; ut ego multitude of
non possum distincte cognoscere quod oblitus sum we^cannot
'3o omnia que scivi, quod nichil scio, quod cesso ab omni l<now. as to
,,. ,- . , . .,.. T- I • , , ■ kiiow what
actu inteiligendi, et sic de simuiDus. Lt hoc sine dubio we tbrget, &c.
arguit imperfeccionem intellectus: quia nos indigemus imnerfection'''^!
tot ycraciis ad nostram noticiam, quod multas veritates our minds.
non possumus cognoscere, nisi destrueremus illas. Noti- iinowiedse in
35 cia vero dei ex parte sui solum ipsum ponit, et ideo Jjjj^ |",''"'''^.
omnia potest cognoscere. Unde multa eternaUter cogno- its objects,
... .. . comprises all.
scent omnem ventatem, que non omnem veritatem
possunt cognoscere, et 2"'' theologos aUquis homo A man may
■ ^ ' ■ ■ r ■ ■ know all trutli,
omnem ventatem potest scire, et tamen inhnite veri- and yet aii
4° tates non possunt sciri ab iUo homine, nisi fuerunt '"'^'^* cannoi
'^ ' bc Iviiown by
liini.
2. significans H. lo. m' pro miclii B. 12. que prn cui B. ih. n' B.
ij. d'm B. 33. yccV]s B. 35. noii boliim B.
14*
2 12 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
chymera nescia, quod verificatur de exemplo quod
ponunt: posse desinere esse hominem, etc.
And thoiigh Infinitas veritates deus non potest revelare vel
God teacnes . . ^
all truth there docere, quamvis necessano docet omnem veritatem ;
truths"that^He ^^^™ ips^ i^on potest revelare quod nichil revelat vel 3
cannot teach or jocet. sicut nec revelare michi quod non sum; quod
reveal to me; . . - . ^ . ' ^
for instance, nichii reveiatur michi, quod dampnabor, etc. sicut nec
"^^daniiied- ° possum sic cognoscerc quod privor omni distincta noti-
and there are cia. Est eciam dare veritates quas possum coenoscere.
truths that ,, - , , , . , ,
neither God Kt, si homo vei deus ipsas vel alteram earum cogno- lo
know^fo know '^^^■i'^' ^^^^ quidlibet annichilabitur; ut patet de talibus
them would he contradictoriis : incipio perpetuo oblivisci nie fuisse in
destruction of hoc iustanti, et, non sic incipio oblivisci. Contradiccionem
everythmg. enJn-i claudit alteram illarum fore, sicut repugnat pri-
Yet God can miam rememorari vel docere. Deus tamen omnem veri-i5
andrtiieretore,' tatem potest cognoscere, quamvis aliqui false dicant
it is talse to quod potest esse quod nichil sit. Hoc enim claudit con-
sav that ^ .. . . ^
absofute non- tradiccionem deum cognoscere, cum tamen equa passio
conceiv^aye. ^ntis sit cognoscibilitas. Ideo puto me scire quod clau-
it is equaliy dit contradiccionem "nullum ens esse", aut "tempus 20
absurd to - . , . . .....
suppose a luisse et nuilum ens mcipere esse , quia, si per im -
noUiing begi^ns possibile omnem creaturam deus annichilaret, adhuc
to exist, even infinite negaciones incipiunt esse de qualibet creatura,
in the absurd , , . . . , , , ,
hypothesis of vel saitem mcipit esse quod soium deus nunc est, quod
So"that"ti°me ^P^^ ^^^ ^^"^ ^' ^^"^ ^' ^^ ^'^^ ^^ ^^'^^ infinitis. Ex quo 25
and succession, videtur quod necessario sunt tempus et successio: quia
once posited, . . . .,.,... ^ .
must continue pro pnmo mstanti annichilacionis foret magna successio,
to exist. g^ illud semper maneret.
^are^^to be Aliqua autem est veritas quam nemo potest cogno-
known only at scere nisi pro instanti, 2™ restringentes verba; ut talis:3o
a given instant, , . ,. . .
if w^e do not noc mstans est, et taiis: omnem propostcionem quam nunc
^sense^ofTlfe^ •^^''^' P^'' ^^^ram post hoc sciani; quia aliter posset hoc
words; instans manere per tempus; et breviter ita est de
this happens , . . ., , „ , , 0«
particularly for denommacionibus quo ad esse verum 2° modo vel 0°
propodtions ™odo, sicut est de suis primarie significatis. Unde vere 35
in the second dicitur quod non possum coenoscere quod eratus sum
and third sense. , .. ^ . ^ . ,^. \. ^
Some truths, deo, nisi tuero in gracia vei caritate ; aiiquam ventatem
\°eqiure"t°o^be "°" possum cognoscere, nisi fuero cesus: et sic quot-
expericnced, cunque possibilia volueris de me vel quocunque alio
and are ■* ^
conditional, like
a bribe given
i5. docv' B.
0- Est eciam. This sentcnce is evidcntlv wrong, as appears
from the context.
CAP. VIII. I.OGICA. 213
enunciare. Unde aliqui eliciunt quod reliqui co^no- by a
scant veritates, ut prebendarius dat superiori magnam \^i^ supenor.
pecuniam ut sciat se esse beneiiciatum in tali pingui
beneficio: quod caret racione.
3 Redeundo ergo ad propositum : iuxta restriccionem I say that it is
,. ^ j. ■ 1 . .1 impossiblc for
predictam dicitur quod repugnat me cognoscere tales „4 ,„ i^now
vcritates, et cum hoc co^noscere quod omnem veritatem •'' '.'^'^ '"'"'■^ "'
' ^ ^ an iioiu- cvcrv
quam nunc cognosco, per horam post hoc cognoscam. trutii tliat T
Ymo, vocando omnem talem veritatem proposicionem, ''oniy"at''tliis'^
locum significet seipsam^ concedendum esset aliquam mstant;
proposicionem veram esse in me, quam impossibile est nt lca.st
me distincte cognoscere; sicut dictum est de talibus: ^' ^" • '
ego nichil apprehendo, omne qiiod niinc distincte cognosco \
B 95" per horam post hoc dictincte cognoscam, posito quod
i5solum cognoscam distincte A vel B, et quod continuem For tlic fact of
•11 ^-^- 1 .^ •11 r^ -^ .. • niv ivnovvins
ulas noticias per horam, tunc lUa L, ventas est in me, tlie trutiis A
etsi distincte cognoscerem C, tunc cum paribus cog- ""'^ ]^ ''^' }^^^
^ . ^ end of an liour
noscerem C per horam futuram, Ex quo sequitur quod is anotlier
omne qiiod distincte cognosco, cognoscam per horam; it Wnow C
20 et sic est verum quod distincte cognosco; ergo illud C ^'^'.'"'^R^ '^' ^''*^
. ~ L? o bei;inning as at
distmcte cognoscam per horam, et per consequens mane- tii^c end'of tiie
bit per horam. Et tunc sine tubio C eternaliter mane- ^ would'be an
bit, cum in instanti medio hore erit futura per horam. s''-'''"''''' "°' •'"
. . . .... . . . , . instantaneous
et in medio instanti istius hore; et sic in mnnitum, truth.
25 sicut communiter arguitur in ista materia.
Unde multe sunt responsiones in ista rnateria: ut ^^'"^'"^ •^'"'^ '"'1'?y
. . ' answers to tliis
iUa prima que negat partem supponere pro suo toto, difticuity, eithcr
_ .. • c ^ ■ T^ ■• 1-» r ]• •.. denvihff the
negat consequenciam tactam in Dani. Et aha dicit ^,o„s^.qy^'j',ce of
quod bene credo C proposicionem veram sine hesita- ^^'^ ari^ument,
'. ... or savins that
3o cione, sed repugnat me ahter scn-e illam. Hoc tamen I merely 'beiicve
videtur fflsum, eo quod cognosco quod C est verum, tniti/oTc at^
et cuiusmodi C verum est. Cui ergo repugnaret me ^'^5 beginnmg
^ ^ ^ " ot the hour;
scire C .'' nam, negato quod scio C, non stat auquod but the latter,
scitum a me, nisi A vel B; et cum utrumque istorum i^po^"]^j"„| pt q
35 cognoscam per horam futuram, sequitur quod omne , c"'itradicts
.^ . . ^ 5 M "1 thc hvpotliesis
distmcte scitum a me cognoscam per horam futuram.
Cum ergo sum certus de ista consequencia et de isto ^"'^ "i^
^ . . ' . consequence
antecedente, ut suppono, rehnquitur certitudo de con- as well as the
sequente. Argumentum enim est racio rei prius dubie true^^^o^^rs the
40 faciens fidem, hoc est, certitudinem. Nichil ergo impe- <^o'^seqnentalso.
dit hoc argumentum a produccione sui naturaliter cau-
sabilis. Ymmo de illa veritate quam scio stat difficultas.
I. e"""' = eximunt or eveniunt B. 3o. alig B.
214 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
If we keep to Relictis ergo istis novis invencionibus sophists, suis
^'Ift the^^wordf auctoribus, dicitur sicut prius, restringendo verba et
and admit a admittendo noticiam confusam quod omne ens cognosco
general ' . .,
knowiedge ot confuse, et per consequens, cum nichil possum cognos-
it is fmpfssibk cere, ignorando ens esse in communi, patet quod clau- 5
to know jj^ contradiccionem me vel aliud cognitum esse quod
anything tor ^ .....
niore than nunc cognosco per tempus cognoscere, saltem si nichil
buTf caif know sit extra presens instans. Possibile tamen est me esse,
what it is to quod distincte scio vel coanosco quod illud est per
cognize dunng t ^,, ,• • •/•i
time. tempus cognoscere. Sed hoc creditur esse impossibue lo
^di^tuic^ly°A de deo. Sic ergo posito quod distincte cognoscam solum
and B at the ^ ^.gj g Q^g gj^, pgj- horam cognoscam, coenosco con-
beginning, and ^ ^. ■- j
at the same fuse me esse cogniturum per horam omne quod nunc
con!SIed"y my distincte cognosco; et, si reflexero actum apprehendendi
knowledge of distinctum super illo, sicut oportet ad eius distinctamiS
A and B at the . ^ . . „ i • -u-i
end ; noticiam, inveniam m 2" actu renexo quod impossibiie
'''knowkdgr est me distincte cognoscere illam, sicud impossibile est
cannot be jgum qui solum distincte potest cognoscere continuare
distinct at the ^ . ^ . .
beginning. per tempus omnem eius noticiam.
if we give a Sed patet ampliantibus verba de presenti quod deus 20
to'thtMnsrot omne quod unquam novit vel noscet semper noscet,
the verb, ^^^^-^^ j^qj^ potest incipere vel desinere quicquam scire.
Et sic semper noscit omne instans esse pro mensura
sua, et hoc distinctive. Sed secus est de homine.
we can admit Verumptamen iuxta ampliacionem conceditur quod homo 2?
^'is%!^wili'be) potest distincte cognoscere C cum A et B, sicut iam
distinctly coenosco omne instans quod fuit vel erit esse tempore
known together ^ b . ^ . . ,• • • .
with A and B. suo. Et sic, posito quod simus m medio mstanti nore
Tio"t\oilow? sequentis instans demonstratum, concedunt in principio
1 know Cnon'; quod omne pro nunc scitum a me per horam, post hoc 30
.-. C is now ; ^ f , . . . ,
but: C is now sciam semper, demonstrando unirormiter; sed non sequi-
"'"^"J time" '" tur: mmc scio C; | er^o, minc est C. Et istam respon- B 95"
It is possible sionem approbo. Concedo quod est possibile me scire C;
tor me to '^ . . . , .
know c, but semper tamen, dum sum in via, ignoro muita in par-
'iw7can"be ticulari. Unde in omni noticia mea remanet aliquis 3.^
known only ^ctus meus confuse cognitus, quia aliler reflecterem
in general; my . ..'-„.
cognitive act is actus super priores in innnitum.
kno^vn^^o^^me. Unde infinite sunt veritates quas non possum nisi
There are thus ^Qj^j.Yjsg coanoscere, ut est confusa noticia; et multe
numberless '^ . . ^ . . , •
truths that I alie ignorancie mee: infinite enim sunt conclusiones 40
gencral": q^'as ignoro. Et si distincte cognovero quod ignoro illas,
if l'
distinctly knew
a
18. qtire B. 26. non pro iam.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. 215
tunc non ignorarem illas. Ignorare enim dicit, ultra that 1 did not
nescire, existenciam ignorati. Quando ergo sic arguitur s'|,ouid 'unow
omne qiiod distincte scio ver horavi post hoc sciam ; sed .., tliem.
•' .-^ ^ . ' \Vc mav tlms
C veritateni distincte scio; ergo etc: conceditur con- admit iliat we
':< clusio, sicut rninor in casu. Nam si ego distincte scio confusedly a
aiiod isnoro C, eroo distincte scio C esse veriim ante- J'sfi.nct act ot
^ o T o _ _ cognition ot C
cedens : patet ex hoc quod videtur michi deductum evi-
dencia infallibili quod ignoro C. Et consequencia facta
patet, ex hoc quod distincte scio illam consequenciam
loesse bonam : si ignoro C, C est veriim et distincte scio
antecedens, ergo et consequens. Sed constat repugnare it" i do not
aliquem distincte scire datum singulare quod ignoravit. ^""Tnith: l'*
Ideo, si in casu posito credo distincte absque formidine '^'«^'"ctiy know
. ... . . -^ • r^ ^"S antecedcnt
contrana quod scio distincte, scilicet C, tunc scio C: and, thereforc,
i5quod conceditur. Et patet ex dictisresponsio ad instan- y^^ig""^^'^,"^^!"
ciam superius positam; et illa est una evidencia inter 'i^aiiy proofs iu
j , , .1 • tavour ol
multas ad laxandum verba de presenti. extending the
Ulterius patet, cum viator, sciendo in universali veri- mme"than*one'
tatem aliquam, scit eius singularia confusa, quod i^no- '"^tant.
, ^ . ' . . ^ ^ . .... . . , '- To know
20 rat ab eo scitum; nisi rorte de illis sit aliunde scien- confuscdl\
cia specialis, excludens ignoranciam. Tenendum est '* tantamount
ly
lur
to ignorance.
eciam quod principaliter scitur vel cocnoscitur veritas , We know
,^ ^ ^. ^ ..... . hrstlv the truth
apprehensa, et 2'''"- signum. Unde multi laici sciunt and" thcn thc
multas veritates, et tamen ignorant signa esse; sic ut denotcs'it^n
2? versatur tamquam dubium inter doctos si sunt talia our mmd; tor
- .„ unlearned men
signa in anima. Kt hoc fortihcat quod oportet ponere may kuow
tales veritates, cum aliter foret sciencia sine propor- ™nd'^nothin"'
cionali scito fut tactum est tractatu de scire) : quoniam . atiout their
. . , . signs: and even
sciencia universalis et sciencia singularis non repugnant. 'the learned
3o Septimo restat videre quomodo in particulari sint ■vvheUicrMiev
solvendo insolubilia negativa. Ipsa enim videntur habere ^-^'st at al).
,.rr t ,• , • • T^'"^ ncgative
maiorem dirncuitatem, ut sunt talia : hec proposicio non insoiubic pro
est vera; Sor non dicit verum siciit est ; non est ita sicut^^'^l^l°^l^^^^^^.
efro cosito ; non est ita sicut cqo principaliter (.TecYo.- J''fic"lt, are to
'^ . ^ . .... . i^ r r he dealt with
3? et sic de similibus. Primam autem claudit repugnan- now separately.
ciam esse veram pro isto supposito, cum quelibet pro- pynpoJtton h
posicio est vera, eo ipso quod est, 2" eciam est falsa, noi irue"is
^ . ., ., . ^ . ^. , ,. • • ,• false in the
cum impossibile sit quicquid drcere, nisi dicatur neces- senss given.
sitas eterna, sequens ad omne dicibile. Quelibet s^g<^ xp^ak tke iniih
40 creatura dicit quotlibet veritates, Et sic dicitur ad f *'{.{•*"? '*
^ ^ also talse, for
the act of
speaking is true.
12. scire datum twice B. 3o. quo B. 3.'. maiorcm livice '"'t 's not as 1
34. pn""' B.
28. Cf. Logica, Vol. I, pag. lyq. "Securtdo patet'\ etc.
being
2l6 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII-
ihink", is also Sciam^ (^m^i nemo potest cogitare, nisi aliquando princi-
whatever°\ve paliter cogitet deum esse. Sed in 4'^ et similibus modi-
think we imply flcatis stat difficultas. Et ut brevius loquamur, restrin-
God s existence. , ^ , , r 1 j-
"it is not as 1 gatur verum vel falsiim ad verum et ialsum dictam
great^eTtrouble; 2" modo; et restringatur significare, dicere, et cogi-b
but \ye must f^,.Q g,-(; g^j tales primarios actus ex imposicione cau-
employ the . ^ , •11
words true and satos et cogitata, dicta, et sensata etc, ad illa que
s/cond ^"ense^^oi sunt 2 "^ primariam imposicionem huiusmodi. Quamvis
truth and enim illud sit in multis onerosum, tamen potest, gracia
talsehood. . . . ,. , . .
And then we argumenti, in multis amicaliter admitti, et responsio 10
tlicsrn^^egativL aptari ad proporciones, | ac si termini modificantes illos B 96"
are simply sensus essent expressi utrobique. Tunc dicitur quod
talia insolubilia negativa sunt falsa simpliciter.
A proposition Sed tripliciter variatur responsio; primo, capta illa
mav be . . ... .....
adduced, for proposicione : non est ita sicut hec proposicio pnmarie \^
d^lnv\ha't thei^ ^^ ^-^' imposicione significat. Dicitur quod non habet
is any sienificacionem ex imposicione, cum nichil ex imposi-
sicnification y ■ . r. • ,• • • j .. i- •
except what cione significat simpliciter seipsum, eo quod talis im-
beiml^s^tl/it. posicio superflueret, cum hoc habet quidlibet ex natura.
Nec est hoc nomen, proposicio, impositum ad signifi- 20
candum, nisi signa veritatum independencium ab eisdem.
Et sic talia communiter vocata insolubilia non habent
2""" omnes suos terminos significata primaria ex impo-
Or we may sicione resultancia. 2" responsio evadit insolubilia nega-
negati^ons^^have tiva per hoc quod nulla negacio potest esse ex parte 25
no reaUty. j.q[_ Sed pro 3^ responsione, consequente ad dicta de
Or we may . . . ^ , . - • -^ ,-,
note that, imposicione ac laxacione proposicionem ac veritatibus
si^^l°(fy' to be negativis, notandum diligenter quod licet hec 3=i con-
true, and to vertantur, liec vroposicio sii^nificat, hec proposicio est
sfn-nifv the ^ ~ . . .,
tliing tliat is, vera vel significat sicut est, hec proposicio est, et sic de 3o
sam"?yet Uicy quotlibet cum istis convertibilibus, in quibus proposicio
may'be very' principaliter sienificat pro seipsa; ista tamen converti-
ditierent if one * .,. ^^ ^ .' ^
is taken to bihtas est gracia termmorum, cum proposiciones con-
'mdeVende'nt'ot^ similes significantes pro significatis extra ipsas sunt
itself. valde dispares. Probatur per deducens ad impossibile. 33
Nam si ista non convertuntur, hec proposicio significat
et hec proposicio significat sicut est eadem inceptu deno-
minata. tunc esset possibile quod hoc significaret cum
hoc quod non significaret sicut est; quia certum est
quod reliqua coniugacio non est possibilis. Sed contra^^o
4. dcta" B. 18. fm'=-- B. 37—38. deta (= demonstrata?) B.
40. ()iugo B.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. 217
si C primarie significat sic. tunc C est verum, et tunc
signilicat sicut est: ergo, si C signilicat precisc se sig-
nificare, tunc est ipsum verum signiricans sicut est.
Et ex isto patet quod in qualibet tali idem est signi- And in aii such
. ^ . • •,- ■ -r- I • < •' • proposltions
-T ncacio et signmcatum : ut signincatum huius, A ."^'i?'"'- thc sii^niiication
Jicat, est ipsuvi A signijicare^ quod est eius signilicacio. ''"i"ni'(kd'arf
Et ita est dc istis: A sio^iificat sicttt est. Nam hec con- rjcnticai.
vertuntur : A Itabet signijicatiiui vel siguijicacioneni qiie est.
2*^' patet quod quelibet talis negativa, significans pro Anyproposition
loseipsa, hoc non signijicat sictit est, significat seipsam that denies its
non habere significacionem et per consequens falsificat signitication
^ . ,, . ^ . . . , ■ ■ ,^ talsities itselt.
sc, cum m significando lacit se ipsam habere signin-
cacionem.
Et ex istis patet 3" quod sicut proposicio significans As a
proposition
i-Tse esse verum est vera pro veritate extra ipsam, et sic aitirming its
significans primarie, idem est falsum 3" modo; sicut ^.^l",, Yi^^the^
B proposicio, significans primarie quod non est ita tit A third sensc, so
■ ■r: A . • A 1 c -i ^(-Aisfalse)
stgnijicat, est vera pro A, et ipsum A sub conrormibus may be true,
vocibus significans est simpliciter falsum. r-^A^fs^ fhise)
20 Ex quo patet quod B significat dispariter ab A, quia cannot be true.
A significat quasi manenter pro se vel suo actu, cum have dirterent
actus sienificandi sit absolutus, non transiens in extrin- significations,
•-' _ _ ' ^ _ _ tne latter Peing
secum, ut actus significandus. Et ista oportet diligenter independent,
TVT • 'l j-.. ] A ^ r 1 •.. and the former
notare. Nam sicut conceditur quod A est raisum, ita not.
25 conceditur quod non est ita sicut A significat; 'i'-"^'^ ^)[at^A"?sVa'?s"
non est ita quod A non habet significacionem, quod and that it
, , ,• . . ,, . , T 1 ip.eans that
valde est disparatum a signihcacione A. Ideo patet which is not,
quod talis consequencia non valet: A precise sigitijicat ^^^ ^'^^^ ^^^.^.^ l^
se non esse vertim et ipsiim non est venim: ergo, A The arguments
- . • ■ ■/: ^ • ^ r ■ ^ .. ^ ■ to the contrarv
ioprimarie sigmjicat sicut est ; sicut patet m suo conver- are not '
tibili. Nanj non sequitur: nott est ita qitod A non Itabet conckisive.
signijicacionem et A primarie signijicat quod A non habet
significacionent: ergo, A pritnarie sigttijicat veritatem qtte
est; sed directe sequitur oppositum.
35 Et si dicitur quod sequitur A significare modo quo Tlicre are two
,. , , . . mcanings to a.s' ,•
est, conceditur; sed ex hoc non sequitur A esse "^ Qvum, to siguijy as it
cum omne significans significat modo quo est; sed non /fh'."-^" ^Uie
significat, saltem precise, ens quod est, quod tamen way in which
, T T ] !• • . it is ov the
requintur ad esse verum. Unde patet ex dictis quod truth tliat A-.
B o^*" ista non | repugnant: ^4 siguificat sictit est (hoc est,
modo quo est) et tamen ipstim non siguificat sicut est
12. se in marg. B. i5. c prn se i(). precise above primarie B.
20. dispif B. 21. accidente /jro actu(^). 27. desparatum H.
2l8 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIII.
(hoc est, modum vel veritatem que est). Iste enim ter-
minus, siciit, potest intelligi equivoce sub habitudine
in some cases accusativi casus, vel sub habitudine ablativi casus, In
^'^'^mairc'"one!"'^ aliquibus autem, significantibus materialiter pro se ipsis,
non differunt isti sensus; quod sic declaro. Sit C ista 5
For instance: proposicio: ita est iit C si^nificat; tunc patet quod C
II is as C ^ ^ ~ -' . , ,
sig}iiyies confertitur cum quahbet tali: veritas vel eus est, quoa
nieanfnjs ^Tl^s. C significat ; C significat modo quo est vel modum qui
est vel veritatem que est vel habet significacionem vel
significacio C est. Omnia enim talia convertuntur gracia lo
C cannot here |.gj.j^-,jjjQj.m^-,_ Nam Cestverum: tunc suum sienificatum
be takcn as a . . ...
gcneral term est, et non potcst poni ens m communi, quia sic con-
Wh!i^t'(f mca"i^verteretur C cum tali necessario: ens est. Ideo non
is purely its supgrest Quid sit significatum ipsius C aut eius actus,
signitication, quod est sua signincacio; quia nec a subiecto nec ab o
obiecto vel fundamento distingwi potest significatum C
as we see by ab eius significaciont. Sicut ergo hec proposicio : A
pro™tfon'intn J"0)'e^//r, significat mocionem A, ita hec: C significat
thc iniinitivc. sicud est denotat C significacionem esse vel C habere
significacionem. Sicut enim idem est gaudere vel dolere, 20
et habere dolorem vel gaudium, sic idem est significare
vel habere significacionem, vel habere significacionem
que est, vel significare significacionem que est. Nec
dubito quin advertens diligenter satis inveniet illud
verum. 25
So if C Ex quo patet quod idern est C significare et C sig-
s\ll\£%oxh nificare ens quod est, vel veritatem que est, vel modo
the thing that „^q gg^ g^ sic ^q g\{\^ recitatis. Cum enim talibus con-
is and as it is. n _ ? ^ , , • -r
vertitur hoc: C habet signihcacionem.
Such 2« patet quod quelibet talis est vera 2^ modo et 30
are^^uueliTtlic falsa 3« modo. Et per consequens sua contradictoria
tirst, and gg^ ialso. 2" modo et ^" modo, et vera primo modo.
second and '-' . . ' , .....
false in the last Et patet 3° quod proposicio de similimis termmus
n'irplcUn'ti,at cum A, significando pro A, non converteretur cum A.
a proposition f^j^^-, p^ sienificando quod non est ita siciit A significat, 35
having thc . ^ ■,, , ■ ■/• 1 \
sametormasA, convertitur cum illo: A non sigmficare, propter noc
''mig'lu''n'm^b^ quod in suo contradictorio idem est significacio et sig-
conyertible nificatum. SeJ B, si^nificando pro A quod nou est ita
Wlth It. .^ • -114
It is not as A .sicut A sigmficat non convertitur cum ulo: A non sig-
nifi mcInYtt nificat, sed cum isto: .significatum a non est ; quorum 40
"o"^"'7;'-'f'.'«"- nrimum est falsum et 2'" verum. Ideo in A proposi-
but the thrng i^ . .^ • , , 1
signified by A cione est hoc verbum significat, quasi absolutum vel
is nol.
\\. acc^ pro actus B. iS. hnc pro liec B. 42. v pro verbLim B.
CAl'. VIll. LOGICA. 219
reciprocLim, cum comentitur cum illo non est ens qnod
est primario si^iiijicacio A. Sed B, signilicans immanenter
et transitive pro A, est verum significando quod eus
signijicatum per A non est.
3 Et si dicatur quod possibile est B precise converti- ObjecUon:
biliter significare cum A, et tunc stat racio: '-'icitur ^^^'jjj? "^'''y,,^^?,.^,
quod repuenat casui A et B sienificancia sic nrimarie absoiutely tiic
convertibiliter signihcare, sicut repugnat quod ista m niis is
mente mea: ego siim homo, primarie significet sicut ^IP*!',*^'^''^^ ^,^
loista in mente tua: eiro siim homo. Denominaciones au- say tiiat / <7m a
'^ . . . maii II) tlic
tem pronominum prime persone erunt diverse; sed mind of two
sicut oportet mutare personas pronominum ad conver- pcison"'
tibiliter significandum, ita oportet rnutare terminos B signiiies tlic
ad primane signincandum convertibiliter cum A; cuius Personal
i5racio est, quia A significat negative materialiter pro '^' o"der^to'"
sua sienificacione, et B sienificat significative pro A. conserve tlie
,, *". r^ ,. .. "^ . ,4 same sense,
Ideo, si B esset talis proposicio: non est ita quod A have to bc
habet significacionem primariam, tunc converteretur cum ^^^torni "
A; sed utrumque foret falsum.
20 Et si ultra dicatur quod eque possibile est A con- 2. A may be
trahi ad significandum convertibiliter cum B^ ^''^'-^'^ signify ti^ic^same
econtra, conceditur: verumptamen non est possibile A as B.
primarie significare ut ponitur, nisi significando quod
nullum ens est eius significacio: ymmo sic dicto: nullum
25 ens est extra A quod A significat, foret eius significare.
Sed B, significando quod nuUa est veritas extra A True; but then
quam A signihcat, foret talsum transitive, negans A become laise.
habere significatum extra se; cum tamen eternaliter |
B gy*" ante A esse fuit illa negacio: nulla est veritas extra A
3o quam significat. Et certum est quod perposicionem A
non extingwitur ista negacio; quia extingwendo illam
poneret illam. Ideo manet illa negacio sicut prius.
Scio tamen quod maior pars logicorum mirabitur de jMost logicians
; . .,,.,., . . „ . will be
signihcacione imposita insolubihbus negativis. Cuius snrprised at ttie
35 admiracionis causa est hoc quod intelligendo insolubilia, ^.ifvJ^io^^^hesJ
intelligitur per disparatas propositiones que inmateria- ncgatives.
. . . . , . . . . , . Tliey assimilatc
liter et transitive significant. Ideo videtur illa significacio such
esse contra experienciam qua experimur proposiciones '^o"dma'-y"o|iel°
nostras significare pro significatis extra se. Certum est which we
■". ../- ''• i,-i- • 1- l<no\v to iiave
40tamenquod ita signihcant insolubiua negativa, et alios a mcaning
indcpcndcnt of
themsclves;
but it is not
^ (V so of tlicse
i5. m"' mutabiliter(?) B. 16. f,"» B. 36—3-. T uilr'z B. 'insolublcs'.
3;. tul/o B. 40. aliter B.
2 20 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VIIl.
proposiciones quas proferimus ad eorum similitudinem.
\\ e must know j7j; ideo racionabiliter querit sophista certificacionem de
to whicli ot the . . t t
two proposicione ad quam responderet. Et per hoc patet
we ought to quomodo respondendum est ad talia: non est ita siciit
"Tt .\^^^y- j e^o primarie concipio. Nam riegative tales exemplate 3
primarily sunt concedende propter insolubilia negativa falsa. Unde
'■'Notliin'' faise hoc insolubile negativum significat primarie quod milliim
is my primary ^,^^ g^^ primaria concepcio mea: qiiod est falsiim. Ideo
concept ; ^ ^ . .
which we concedendum est quod 720» est ita sicut ego primarie
concipio; sed significatum primarium insolubilis negativi 10
Or it mav ^^^ ncgandum, cum sic significet non est ens qtiod est
mean: "There primaria concepcio mea. Et sic tale impossibile: eoo
is no being ^ ■' . . ^ ^ . . ^
that is my primarie credo sicut non est, significat primane quod
con^p^f" '^go credo credulitate que non est. Et sic decipior; et
which we deny. causa quare talia sic significant est ista, quia signifi-i5
'It is not as 1 ^ . . ^ . • , •
bLJieve' catum et res verbi affirmativorum est idem: ut idem
exphiined^ est credo sic sicut est et credo credulitate vel creduli-
likewise; tatem que est. Et suum oppositum repugnat esse verum
sic significando; tum, quia impossibile est me credere
credulitatem que non est, et per accidens est quod 20
talis significat me credere credulitatem que non est,
tum [quia] principalis significacio sua sit talis: ''me
credere ens quod non est;" sed cum actus credendi
non transit in distinctum, sed absolute terminatur in
se ipso, ideo idem est ac si poneretur "me credere 25
aiso all other credulitate etc." Et, ut puto, omne insolubile nega-
'ins^oluWifs'. tivum est 2'^ istam viam satis solubile.
We must note Ulterius notandum est quod multe sunt proposiciones
that many . , , ... .,,. . . ,
propositions que apparent msolubiJia ilhus racionis, sed non sunt.
appai°ent^v Ut puta, quando ponitur condicio per effectum con- 30
negatiye sequendo, et additur casus de scripto aUquo ad deno-
insolubles. .^ . ' '^ . . , ^
Examples. minacionem dependentem ex condicione vel enectu
futuro: ut patet de transicione pontis, de liberacione
servorum, et simiHbus 2"^ infinitas circumstancias valde
confusas variatas. Ubi nunc prodest ars obhgacionis 35
pro evasionibus, et nunc tantum gravantur casus, quod
sunt impossibiles.
A common case Unde communiter aryumentat sophista ad proban-
in thc cxercise . ^ ...
of obHgations: dum socium esse redargututn, vel cuiusmodi voluermt,
7/^7'/!^ /"'^' poii^n<-l'^ quod quicunque negaverit se esse redargutum, 40
refuted is so by ^^ solum talis, sit redargutus. Et illa est condicio. Tunc
tlie very Jact, ■ ^
is put and
granted.
(3. pp B. iq. tamen B. 22. cum B; ib. quia deest. 29. i"'' B.
3o-3i. gfe'!" B. 41. Qdi» B.
CAl'. Vlll. LOGICA. 22 1
post istam proponitur probandum : tu es redargutus; Tlien ; Iom cire
quod est ncgandum, quia falsum ct impcrtinens. Et cum ' anV Venk-d"'
non sit intencionis sonhiste probarc nisi manifestc falsum, i-astlv, a
^ ^ . ' svllogism
generaliter sunt talia 2" loco proposita falsa. Negato joininf,' these
3 ergo illo, arguitur: Qiiicunque negaverit se esse redar- concludln"
sutum est redars^utus; sed tu negas te esse redansutum : 'lom them, is
ers'o tu es redarirutus.
Hic est 3^ responsio. Prima negat antecedens tan- 'rhcre are three
quam falsa et impertinens, et concedit utramque eius '"''^^'^ ^-
lopartem. Sed in isto non est efficacia, cum ad hoc or- i. To deny ihc
dinatur posicio, ut sustineatur positum cum omni con ■ p, Jt",!','^^ ^vmiid
cesso, et sequentibus ex illis. Ideo consonancius esset '-""^ agamst the
' ^ . . . rules ot
negare totam copulativam tanquam impertmentem, et Obllgations:
B 97*' concedere primam partem tanquam positain, et | negare "iias\o'^\^c'^"
iT^am partem tanquam repuenantem bene concessis, vel i!,'^"'''"'^'^' .
^ T ' ^ . . ' 2. To denv the
oppositis bene negatorum. Nec est mconveniens negare whole of the
proprium actum vel eius pretericionem, quia commu- 't,,an\in°g or^'
niter, quando opponens proponit responsali proposicio- denymg its
nem de proprio actu^ non est ille actus; et per acci- case may be;
2o dens necessarium frequenter est negandum tanquam ^^^ bc denied
repuenans. Sed quia idem potest tolli mutando casus '" ^'^'^ .P''^^?"^'
. ^ ^ . T ... . . slnce it exists
sic: quicimque negaverit in ista liora in anima vel voce no longcr.
se esse A fit ipse A, tunc tercia responsione conceditur ditiicuity^mav
positum ; et post conceditur tamquam verum et inper- '•^'^ tormulated
_ r. . ., '. so as to rerider
25 tinens, quod tu sic negas te esse A; et 3° conceditur tlus impossible.
conclusio tanquam sequens, scilicet, quod tu es A. cveVvthint^.^nd
Probacio tamen conclusionis, subducto casu, nullius est ^'""y fiat the
. . . 'L conclusion
efficacie, cum non plus concedit nisi quod falsum nega- mcans no morc
tum extra casum est concedendum in casu post bonam iaisdiood' has
3o concessionem antecedencium ad ipsum. Ideo idem est 'l'^''? ^° ^*^
. . ^ . . admitted on
ac si mtendcns probare quod tu es episcopus, post eius account of the
negacionem ponat te esse episcopum. "^^^^ ^" '
Et ex istis patet quod negandum est tanquam im- Most of such
■1 •! 3 • •. • •. cases, besides,
possibile quod qmcimque negavent se esse asinum sit ^y^. ^^ i,g '
^b asinus. Ymmo, cum necessario quelibet res mundi negat .demed as
. ^ " mTpossible.
se esse quod non est, quasi omnes tales casus sunt
impossibiles. Variantur autem tales casus multipliciter ; They arc otten
.. •. 1 ■ -i j ; -^ •» I varied in manv
ut ponitur quod quicunque concesserit, dubitavent, vel wavs.
negaverit primum sibi proponendum sit talis et post
4oproponatur unum impertinens concedendum, dubi-
tandum, vel negandum, et 3", facto argumento ex
i8. riifali I!.
lo. See Logica, VoL L Introduction p. p. XXVlll, XXLX.
222 JOHANNIS WYCLIF CAP. VUl.
condicione et facto responsali, concluditur intentum. Et
eodem modo variatur casus, ponendo quod ''quicunque
aliter responderit ad istam : tu es A, quam respondet
Sor affirmative respondens ad illam, sit A, et solum
But these talis." Et sic de infinitis intricacionibus que plus indu- 5
subtleties only ^ ,,• •... j- c ^
givc truitless cunt sollicitudmes quam prorectus.
troubie. jj-i aliis. autem materiis sunt intricaciones plurime de
There are also . . ^
many subtleties obligacione legistarum; ut ponatur quod deus precipiat
cmiimyiVdment^s taliter sub pena peccati mortalis quod non doleas de
°^ 9°'J 7' ?■ '* peccato, nisi dolendo de peccato proprio: quod nun- lo
God had ' " . 1 i ' 1
commanded, quam ante hoc peccasti, sed quod solum doleas de
mor^al^^sTn" to peccato in communi, sicut faciunt illi qui dolent quod
have sorrow niulta peccata sunt in mundo, nec aliunde pro nunc
tor no sm bnt ' ,'.... '^
one's own, and pecces, Tunc videtur quod nunc mrrmgis preceptum;
ne\"er shVn"^ ^^^i^ si cum istis paribus peccas, non superest undei5
before, have peccares, nisi contraveniendo precepto. Et ex hoc
sorrovv tor sin '^ . . "^ . . ..
m gcneral: sequitur cum veris quod non peccas, cum in universah
'*s^in'^or not?'^ doles de peccato proprio et sic comples preceptum. Et
si dicatur primo quod non peccas, tunc oportet quod
doleas de peccato proprio^ et per consequens peccas. 20
It may be In isto vero diceret sophista quod stat te dolere
'"(inhat simpliciter de peccato possibili, etsi non actualiter sit;
sorrow for sin q^ si^ j^ casu posito tu doles de peccato proprio, non
in general . ' ^ . ^. . '^ / , ,
includes sorrow contraveniendo precepto. Contingit enim dolere de
^°'^sin"Vve°r" impossibili; multo magis ergo, de quolibet seu quo- 25
though it be cunque possibili. Et sic doles de quocunque peccato
onlv possiblc , , , , . . • ,
and not dolendo de peccato in communi; et sic de peccato
The^diTficuitv proprio, licet illud non sit. Sed quia videtur quod omnis
here is that jolor habet aliquod tristabile pro obiecto, ut preteri-
sorrow must . , . . ^ . , i- i-i
have somc cionem, tuturicionem, negacionem, vei aliam quamlibet 30
cause^^k^^^which veritatem ; non satisfacit ista responsio casum paululum.
mere possibility jjgQ dicit 2^ responsio quod solucio talium exigit
has not. . . ,. . . ..... ,.
Or (2) that such noticiam condicionis, quia ablativi casus, gerundiva,
'^^^'^absurd' ^" ista coniunccio, nisi, et similia, implicant condicionales,
condition; quarum maior pars est impossibilis : ut, deus non potest 35
ior God cannot ^ .^ , ^ . , , . . .
make it a sin obligare hominem quod, si dolet de peccato proximi
^ for 7hVs°in oT ^t non de peccato proprio, quod eo ipso peccet. Et
our neigbbours; sic de aliis condicionibus simpliciter et absolute intel-
and it it be . . ,..,,,.
said that they lectis. Si autem condicionales | non dicant causam com- B 98"
°mere"tacfof'''' pletam, sed teneantur specificative, tunc non superest 40
sin happening
concomitantly,
ar^umenMs '■ "''^'' "^- '->• m%v\\s B. 10. n' B. i3. aliil de _piK- jt?ro aliunde
destroyed. ^.^.^ imuc B. 22. fin"'' B. 22 fimp"'' iii mari^. B. 29. t'fta'<= B.
'ii. ncc B; ib. paululum (sic !; ij.
CAP. VUl. LOGICA. 223
argumentum ad probandum quod peccat, si dolet de
peccato proximi et non suo, cum stat oppositum. Et
ista responsio potenter encrvat casus huiusmodi. Unde
non est in potestate hominis vel dei statuere quod sim-
5 pliciter et absolute, si homo sic dolet, peccat, vel si
sic obviat, liberabitur; et ita de ceteris.
Sed quia admissa est condicionalis bona, ut nunc, Or (3) iliai at a
sicut et conditionalis necessaria ex supposicione vel ^'\vc'may bc
ordinacione divina, potest 3^ admitti casus, et concedi 7ha7,|.°''^'[,.|'|'|"
loquod pro dato instanti doles de peccato proprio quod commit in thc
haberes post modum, te adhuc manente innocente. Et acco'rdi'ns '"
sic cessat obieccio, scientibus ampliaciones verborum, f'i^ doctrinc
' . , '^ • ot ampliatioi) ol
quomodo omne preteritum vel tuturum est presens tem- the prcscnt.
pore suo. Si autem gravetur casus quod continue it it bc
i5maneas innocens, si non sic dolendo peccaveris, stante ''"0 miicr si'n^
residuo casus: certum est quod casus est impossibilis, wili be
. . . . . commiited, bnt
implicans mconvenienciam in ordmacione divina; ut that of beinj;
puta quod deus ordinet te perpetuo innocentetn et cum s^ns' of mhVr^s
hoc ordinet te elicere talem actutn ex quo cum obli- the case is
T j • j 1- -1 • palpably
■20 gacione sequitur te peccare. Ideo, si deus ordmat tibi absurd.
te habiturum perpetuam innocenciam, vel preservabit
te ne elicias talem actum, vel faciet quod non obliga-
beris sub fortna ex qua sequitur te perplecti.
Conformiter dicitur quod, deo precipiente michi ne- if God forbade
25 gative sub pena peccati mortalis, quod per istam horam Hi*:!!^ durin^^^^a
non dilieam eum, vel coeitem de eo actualiter. sed certain time, or
^ . , ,. ^ ,. , . to think ot
vacem praxi quod expedit, aliquando non esset possi- Him,
bile solvere illud rnandatum quo ad partem negativam,
cum non possit solvi quo ad illa, nisi faciendo affir- this could not
... ,.,. . be breaking
3o macionem negacioni oppositam que est diligere deum. His law;
Et certum est quod claudit contradiccionem, diligendo to sin throush
deum peccare. Et conformiter dicitur ad talia precepta '°^'^ °* '
negativa, iwn diligas deinn iiltra gradum iit 4'^''' non or tlirough too
incipias peccare non incipiendo per posicioneni de pre- "^'1,^^ °iVa°
3bsenti; et sic de similibus. Nam primutn mandatum non coutradiction in
. - . ...... , , , , terms.
possum inrringere, nisi dnigendo deum ultra gradum
ut 4°'". Et certum est quod non peccarem, sic faciendo.
Et quo ad 2"^ patet quod si infringerem illud pro hoc
instanti primo, ego inciperem peccare per posicionem
3. potnt^ B; ib. en'uat B. 6. fi» B.
6. Liberabitur. Allusion to the case of setling two slaves
free undcr ccrtain conditions. See above, pag. 20f).
224 JOHANNIS WYGLIF CAP. VIII.
If it be objected de presenti, et non ut sic solverem illud. Et incipiendo
woVrdS'hu"be solvere hoc mandatum, vel aliter, peccarem; per remo-
impeccable, cionem de presenti non solviter hoc mandatum. Ideo
shonld he iiave , ,. ...
no other patet quod taha mandata de virtute sermonis essent
\vt^aiifwer"that i"solubiha. Et si argumentatur quod deus, obUgans 5
this siipposition hominem solum ad illa, faceret eum impeccabilem,
too implies an , , ,. ,. . , . , '
absurdity. dicitur quod claudit contradiccionem hominem solum
remarl^^s^ obhgari ad taha, cum necessario, si homo est, obhgatur
togetlier with naturaUter muhis obUgacionibus inseparabihbus. Oui-
practice, are, . . " ^ r -i-
I thinlc cunque ergo ruent tahter obhgatus potest racihter pec- lo
soive'everv care ahunde. Ex istis crgo notatis credo quod exer-
diificulty of "the citatus cum dehberacione dicta habebit viam solvendi
sort. . . , , .,. ,
Comparison of quecunque taha msolubilia proponenda.
ophTion wkh Uhimo patet in quibus hec posicio convenit et dis-
the six former crepat a sinsrula de sex opinionibus supradictis. i5
ones. . . .
a) As regards Convenit enim cum prima in hoc quod ponit multa
It is^HkeTlie i=t i"solubiha nec simpliciter esse vera nec simpliciter esse
as it savs that' falsa.
no 'insoluble ... ^ • i j • ,
is simply true Convenit eciam cum 2'^ \n hoc quod ponit eandem
Like tife*'^-''"' proposicionem esse veram et falsam diversis modis. 20
affirming Et convenit cum 3''' in hoc quod ponit quodlibet tale
that the same . , , ., . . , . , , .,.
proposition is insolubile in quo pars suppomt pro toto suo msolubih
"^'and^false:"^ manere vacuum, et nullum debitum vel distinctum
Lilve the 3"', sensum cignens, nisi in quantum antecedit se ipsum
denvin*^ ,, . .._
all significaUon et ex sua significacione reflectit quamdam denominacio- 25
proposiUons "^^n pro illo insolubili vel causato suo. |
cKcept in so Convenit autem cum 4''' in hoc quod ponit repugnare BiiS''
far as they ,. , . , , ., . .7 . ^ , / r
signify aliquod msolubile signihcare pniTiane m toto conror-
/'ike^theT"' miter sicut significant proposiciones de similibus ter-
denying that niinis significantes immanenter et transitive illis insolu- 3o
Ihcv *ha.vG thc ....
same meaning bilibus ; ut patet de solucione insolubihum negativorum.
propo°s'itions Ymmo, omne insolubile, sive affirmativum, sive nega-
having exacily [ivum, est resolubile in tales terminos per quos non
the same form, ' . . . „ . . ,. ,,
and standing est expnmenda sua signihcacio, sed per alios disparatos
Li^ce 'tlie^S''' "^ credo qiiod decipior, credo qiiod credo prima7'ie sicutoo
admitting ,jo,, ^5/ et sic credo quod credo credulitate que non est:
that manv ,,..,.,
examples of et sic de smiuibus,
'{'mply''^"' Convenit autem cum quinta in hoc quod ponit mul-
absurdity; hqs casus positos in materia de insolubilibus esse im-
and hke the 0"', . ., ^ , ,. . .,
denying that possibiles; ut patet de condicionibus supenus notatis. 40
propositfon Et convenit cum sexta in hoc quod ponit nuUum
is really insolubile non posse solvi: sed veritatem esse de se
insoUible, ^
34. desperatos (sic I) B.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. 225
cognoscibilem, licet de difticili. Nec stat solucio in nega- bj .l.v rencuiis
... .... , . ., ditVerence.
cionibus casuum vel pnncipiorum logicorum, quibus n d',ifeis trom
innitantur responsiones priores; sed specialiter in noticia ys'g,^ti['' t",3t
denominacionis signorum quo ad esse veriim vel falsum^ attirmativc
... . . ■ •/- • • ... , insolubles arc
-"> et in distincta noticia signmcacionis proposicionis sol- „.ue ,„ two
] scnses and
^^""*- . . . . falsc in onc,
Discrepat autem hec posicio a prima in hoc quod and that
ponit insolubilia aflirmativa dupliciter esse vera, et i„solublcs arc
unice esse falsa; et insolubilia negativa 2'' esse falsa ^'^ .^/j^f^r^^ui^^^^on^.
lounice vera; et significatum primarium cuiuscunque in- it dirters from
.... thc """i in
solubilis concedit simphciter esse vel non esse. dcnying that
Discrepat autem a 2^ in hoc quod ponit nuUam ^^e same
r T i^ _ proposition is
proposicionem posse esse veram et falsam denominaci- true and falsc
., .. . ^ ■ ■ CL ■ ■ in the same
onibus contrariis; quia tunc signihcatum primanum scnsc.
i.T proposicionis esset et non esset.
Discrepat autem a 3=^ in hoc quod ponit partem u ditfcrs from
supponere pro suo toto; ut hic: hec proposicio est, ^denyTng"thaT
mundus est. Ymmo, sicut pars integralis significat com- a part can
stand for thc
muniter suum totum (ut patet de partibus superficialibus whole.
20 ostendentibus suum integrum) ita supponit partes. Nec
dubium quin contingit me ymaginari singulariter unam
talem proposicionem posse scribi : hoc scriptum est
proposicio, et me oblivisci illius ymaginati; contingit
illud interim scribi et obici michi, faciendo me re-
23 minisci de tota priori ymaginacione et ymaginato, et
ita significabit se ipsum. Et si obicitur quod prius Objection.
naturaliter intelligitur pars proposicionis antequam in- ''„^„51 be'^
tellieitur tota proposicio, et sic proposicio esset prior understood
• ,••,',,, ofor betore the
se ipsa: dicitur quod illud argumentum peccat 3'^"^. whole;which
3o Q.uis enim dubitat quin eque primo intelligitur per sub- '^sjgn^jfles ^hc^
iectum huius proposicionis, ens est, ipsa tota propo- whole.
' . , . . .^-. . Denied.
sicio, sicut et eius subiectum. cum, signincacione ex When we sav:
imposicione causata (de qua solum est nobis sermo), "''tTe'''sub1fct"'
omne singulare intelligibile eque primo significat? Nec includes the
^ . . ^ . . * ,.*^. ° -, athrmation ;
■.15 obest proposicionem prius intelhgi sua parte. Nec se- the part, thc
quitur, si ista pars prius naturaliter intelligatur a me, j^ js^^one thine
(juam intelligitur esse pars, vel quam intelligitur esse to know a part.
, .. ..'.' ^ ,. . ^ , and another to
hec proposicio noticia tah connexa et distincta, quod know it as a
exinde idem sit prius se ipso. Nam de eodem possum •^^'^*'
40 habere multas noticias. Nec obest proposicionem prius
intelligi sua parte.
12. cum(I) pro a B. 34. fui'' B.
13
226 .lOHANNlS WYCI.IF CAP. Vlll.
H dirti;i'«- rroui Discrepat autem a 4'' via in hoc quod certificat qua-
staihig^dcai-ly ^^^^^' insolubilia signiftcant, et non fingit sophistice, di-
what meaning cendo quod sequitur insolubile significare aliter, sed
the insoliibles . .^ ^ . .? r^ ■ ,
have and not impertinens est qualiter aliter signihcet. Et sic ponendo
^' 'questfol/'^ in eleccione arguentis quomodo aliterwult proposicionem 3
sophistically, signihcare, certum est quod illa responsio est similis
ikc a man who evasioni | hominis desperati de vera solucione, postquam B oo"
'^^^'thc*true " scrutatus est multas \ ias et nuUam in\enit ducentem
solution. ij^ noticiam veritatis.
It dirters iioni Discrepat eciam a 5'* in hoc quod ponit intenciones 10
the D"', in . ^ ... ? . ^ . . , .
admitiins that universales eque de signis sicut de suis signincatis. Nec
thi^ngs^silniVed. sequitur ex isto quod quelibet proposicio vel intencio
but also their viniversalis A ^igneret in anima aliam sibi similem,
signs, have <^ ^ ..... ,.
corresponding sicut non sequitur de specie singularis gignente aham
But"irdoet^not singularem vel universalem ; quia tale signum non est i5
toiiow that per se completa causa speciei genite. Ymmo, etsi esset,
cvery universal ' '^ . . . . , .
causes a cessaret e.\ capacitate anime gignere, sicut luminosum
universal idea ^ • 1
in the mind. cessat gignere lumen.
Objectioii: £^ gj obicitur 2° quod proposicio vera solum gigneret
2. A true or a . . . . , ^ ' ^ . . ^ °
false nitencionem signincantem proposicionem veram, et pro- 20
wou^id^^onlv posicio falsa solum gigneret intencionem significantem
cause an idea propositionem falsam : certum est quod nec illud dic-
signitving truth ^ r _ ^ , , ■•
or falsehood. tum nec eius tundamentum habet imearem umbram
Thi-i is denied coloris; quia stat quamcunque propositionem gignere
anv proposition intencionem universalem significantem omnem propo- 2.^
may produce sicionem veram vel falsam ; et stat quod nullam gignat,
anv idea, true ' . ^ . o o ;
or false, or sicut homo albus potest gignere intencionem univer-
nnne a a galem significantem nigrum hominem, et quomodocunque
accidentatum, sine hoc quod gignat intencionem in acci-
Truth or dentatis. Non enim per veritatem et falsitatem tan- 3o
talsehood, 1. e. • , 1 • , 1 1 ■
the meaning of quam formas substantiales vel accidentales producit pro-
''is^not°o"b"' posicio speciem talem ; sed est obiectum immediatum
likcned to a anime, faciens cum aliis animam elicere speciem talem:
subslantial . .... . . . • -r-
torm. sicut homo magis facit m anima mtencionem signih-
cantem oinnem hominem. Nec est aliquid falsius quam 3.''
[quod] significacio proposicionis sit eius forma substan-
Objection: cialio, sicut false fingit ista posicio. Et si 3" inferatur
^ toilovv" quod actus anime ageret in animam^ dicitur quod non
that the acts of sgqyj^-m-. gctus enim anime est accidens de genere
the mind act ^. . . . . ^ .
on the mind, accionis. Nec ex hoc sequitur processus in inhnitum 40
and so on
ad injinitum.
Denied.
4. a'r B. i3. agigne't B. 16. 0'» ca B. ^23. Iiare B.
27. intensionemd) B. 29— 3o. acc''' B. 36 c[\ioi deest. 3;. fingitur B ;
ib. inf.i' B.
CAP. VIII. LOGICA. 227
vel aliquiLi inconveniens. Et sic potest facere animam
produceie speciem, sicut per cogitaciones de diversis
individuis 2"^ suas conveniencias et differencias produ-
citur universalis species in anima.
3 Discrepat autem in hoc a 6'' via quod ponit multos And it dirters
casus nnpossibiles quos iUa admittit. Dicit eciam quod sctting down
tales oraciones consistunt in successione, ita quod est '"''">' '""'"'^
' ' cases as
dare primum instans in quo non sunt; et per conse- impossible;
quens non lunc sunt vera vel falsa. Dicit eciam quod propositions,
lotalis proposicio scripta, hoc est falsiim, continue uni- '< spoken.
r 1 _ _ r ' j 7 hcgin to be
formiter sic significans, non plus foret vera pro uno tiuc and talse
,., ,. at a eiven
instanti quam pro quohbet. ^ mmo pro quocunque morrient:
instanti temporis sienifical primarie veritatem que, but when
. r . '^ 1 . . ' . . . ' wntten, are
pro eodem instanti [quo fuit, pro illo instanti est vera. always equally
, • ^ ^ • j- • ^ r • i- ^^ ■ so, as soon as
1 -■> In ista auiem matena diucius et irequencius ratigavi thev exist.
me ipsum quam in aliqua reliqua materia loeicali. Nec ^ '^'"^''^ ''''.'^'^''
. ... . ..P . morc pains
dubito quin quilibet se\ predictorum opiniancium habuit about this
notabilem sollicitudinem pro veritatibus huius materie ^about anv"
quas invenit. Modica tamen laus tribui debet invento- "'''f P.'^'' "'
.... . Logic.
•..!o ribus huiusmodi veritatum; quia certum est quod ex Aud 1 do not
,• -u-i-^ ..-...• ,.• .1. ,. •!•! 4. • 1 doiibt but the
discibihtate ventatis (que satis presto est cuihbet inda- authors ot the
"antii, et ex mocione doctrinali prime veritatis, evenit other si.\
^ , ■' ... . opinions have
cuicunque quod scrutando invenit veritatem aliquam doue their
quam prius ignorans diucius fuerat perscrutatus. Ideo
li.T sit laus plena domino veritatis! 1
I). quo deext 15. k). ine' B. 23. c'c\ H.
10 ■
I N DE X.
Absohtte and oniinate power are nol lii-
stinct in God. i3i.
Abstract terms cannot receive particiilar
predicates, 40, 41.
AhsKrdity, the, ot intinilch small sniail
ness «ic, 110, 1 1 i .
Abuses ot' language caused bv imat^ina-
tion, 67.
AcciJent, iwo meanings ot", 101.
Accidoi/s are distinct from their subjects,
Mi ; aie indi\iduated by their subjecis,
lyi; lender their subjects more per-
tect, but to a small extent, 171.
Accusation concerns singular factsalone,
70.
Act is prior to power, i3i.
Actions, human, are not subject l'i ab-
solute necessity, 85, 86.
Actipe power qualities a subject, i32.
Acts of the mind that posit truth are
affirroative, 25; do not act and react
upon each other, 226, 227.
Addition, the, of an inhnitely small quan-
titv to a tinite one makes the whole
greater, 140.
Advantage, the, of having a universal
repeated several tinies, 62.
Affirmation logically causes atfirmation,
107.
Agreement and disagreement; are the\'
always equal between two thingsr 1 10.
Air, tlie, beneath the foundation of a
castle bears up the whole editice,
160.
Alcliemisls rightiy calcine melais to pio-
duce new forms in them, 176; why
their success is always doubtful, ib.
Alha:{en, an .■\rabian philosophei, 181
and note.
Ambiguity of the ablative case, 00.
Ampliaiion of the present tense to in-
clud« the past and the future, 214.
Analogical and nnivocal qualities of com-
parisons, i i 3.
Animals, irrational, know universals in
their accidents, '33, ')3.
Annelida, the, iti^.
Annihilation is impossible, 102.
Antecedent. the, of a proposition, when
ambiguous, changes its sense, 1 5.
Aqueous humour, the, in the eye, 177.
Arguments from a copulative to onc of
its paris are |icrmissible, 26.
Aristotle, his lule for knowing whether
iwo things difler, 41; says that rela-
tives are simultaneously related, 102;
his doctrine on certain points of Logic,
Mj8; on propositions, 2o5; on fallacies,
206,
Assimilation o( more food woidd be im-
possihle for the biggest possible man,
Atomic thcory, Wyclifs, lO? — 107.
Atfribiites, accidental, can a universal
receive? 3q — 48.
Augmentation of power, an, mav be
given by God to his creature^, 143.
Average value, an, niust be given when
the object promised has various va-
lues, 68.
Balance, the, experimenls witli, 160,
fiean, to move a, is as difficuli as to
make the world without God's help, 1 57.
lieatific \ision, the, 168—174.
lieatitude, ihe essence of, 173.
Blessed in Heaven, the, will probably
know all things, 168.
liodies, if made up of atoms, would be
mere aggregates, i63; denied, at least
for plants and aniinals, i65.
Boetius, general rules given by, 198.
fioldness, the notable, 6f Wyclifs ■ tirsi
speculations, 108 note.
230
INDEX.
Bribe, a. given by a prebendary to his
superior, 21 3.
Biirden, the, of proot'; our adversaries
try to shift it, i5i.
Buying, the, of one's own goods is not
impossible, unless exphcitly intended,
69.
Categorical propositions, some, are the
same in meaning as certain hvpothe-
ticals, it).
Caiisability, a hmit to, 146.
Causal propositions, Chap. V.
Cause, its signification is as widc as
Being, 92.
Causes are divided into ihose per se and
those per acciciens, g^.
Causes, two, can cause each other mu-
tually in different manners, 106.
Causing power, a hmit to, r^G.
Christ, as man, is created; as God, is
not created, /\3, 44.
Cfiristians, some, denying the eternit\-
of the world, admit a maximum
number of men, 85.
(Jiristmas Day, allusions to games on,
14 and note.
Cioiek, a Pohsh natural philosopher. 181
and note.
Circumstances, cight whicli infiuence
sight, 170.
Cumbination, instantaneous, objected
against Wychfs atomic theory, i63; his
answer, 164.
Combinations of hypotheticals, howmany,
9-
Combining and dividing is ilie same as
aftirmaiion and negation, 17.
Cumparable quahlies, 114.
Comparative propositions, Chap. Vil.
Comparison, a, between God's gracc antl
the sun's hght, 107, 108.
Comparison requires something common
to the objects compared, iio.
Compound, inatter and form, 43.
Cotnpound hypothetical propositions
() — 16; do not form a new species, n.
(^otnprehension, infinite, of God's know-
ledge, 211.
Comprehension, logical meaning of, 29
note.
Concourse, the, of God renders beings
capable to act, 1 84.
CoKc/zV/onij/ propositions, Chap VIII; ho^w
they differ from causals, qo.
Confusion, the, of coexistence with cau-
sation contradicts both grammar and
logic, 91.
Cunjunctive membrane, the, 178.
Constellations, the universalitv of their
influence, 32.
Consumptive persons not aware of their
weakness, why? 141.
Contingent, the, and the Determinate,
188, 190,
Continuous, tlie, must have a maximum
number of points for each body, 140;
is not indehnitely visible, 1G7.
Contradiction, in form only, not in
sense, is no contradiction, 2o3.
Contraction of the universal when con-
veyed in singular terms, 65.
Convertibility of negatives with affirma-
tives, 18.
Coe.ristence of incompatible objects, 74.
Cugnition of anything must presuppose
God's existence, 7.
Colour is the primary objecl of sight,
177.
Copulative propositions, Chap. II.
Copulative and causal propositions tlifler;
how, 90.
Corruptible, ihe, and the Incorruptible,
differ widely, 66.
Corruption is equivalenl to decompo-
sition, i53 note.
Created truth is ahvays false to some
extent, 2o3.
Creation a seconil time is impossible,
102.
Creatures, the greaiesi possible number
of, is it possible? 79 — 80.
Crystalline lens, the, 177.
Decrease and increase of power, i36.
Decretals, 5t).
Definitions of various causes, 92, i)3.
Demand and supply, i23, 126.
De materia et forma, 5o note.
Demon&tratiun, AristotIes's, that a va-
cuum is impossible, 1^4.
Demonstrative pronouns can stand for
any object of thought, 74.
Difference, various sorts of, 35 — 37.
Dijferent shades of meaning follow dif-
ferent modes of expression, 2 5.
Different ways of expressing God's exi-
stence, 6.
Difficulties concerning an infinitely large
body and a vacuum, 149, i5o.
INDEX.
231
Difficiilty, ihe, concerning ncgative re-
duplicatives, 98; touches Christ's na-
ture, human and divine, 98.
Difflculty may be overcome without an}'
external eftect produced, i52.
Difficulty is somcthing to be mastered,
i56; does not ahvays imply effbrt,
1 56, 1 5o.
Direct and indirect comparison of qua-
lities, the, 1 15.
Disjuitctive i<nowIedge is a verbalquibble,
-7-
Disjunctive proposilions Chap. III; which
they are, p. 55; rules concerning them,
35, 56.
Dissolubility, casc of, is impotence, not
power, 140.
Dissolution, aftcr, of a body, thc form
which it had cannot return again, 192.
Distinction of universals from each other,
34—37.
Divers tell us that water has no weight
in water; inferences, 161.
Division favours chemical change, 166.
Division of causal propositions, 90.
Doubling smallness is the same as hal-
ving magnitude, iii.
Duration, a maximum of, to all things
which change, 1 58.
Earth, absolute immobility of the cen-
tral parts of the, 161, 162.
Eating, is it an attribute of the univer-
sal man? 39, 40.
Efficient cause, the, q2.
Egg, a, cannot be easily broken, why?
160.
Ejecus, an imaginary man, 59 and note.
End, the Ultimate, of all things has no
parts, 95, 96.
English Works of Wyclif, 14 r.ote.
Equivocal sense of man when meaning
a painted and a living man, 66.
Errors in sight explained bv natural
philosophers, 179; enumeration of, ib.
Eternal and instantaneous truths, 2 1 3.
Eternity of universals, 63.
Etymology of the word proposition (pro
alio positio) 2o5.
Euclid's meaning as regards six kinds of
proportions explained, 120.
Evil, the origin of, 107, 108; divisions
Of, 124, 12 5.
Evils; so called, are often good, 126; of
two, the lesser should be chosen, 1 56.
Execution, the, of promises rcgards sin-
gulars, 61, 62, 63.
Exhaustion does not measure difticulty,
I 35.
Expansion, infinitc, would dcstroy a
body, 149.
Extension, the, of a universal term, is
not really indefinitc, being known by
(lod, 88; logical meaning of, 29, note.
Extrinsic and intrinsic possibility, 89,
note ; relations, 40.
Eye, the, anatomical details concerning,
176.
Eyes, largc, are a sign of stupidity in
men, 16:,
Fallacies of figures of speech and of
accidents, 46; oi th.Q, dictum simpliciter
and secundum quid, 206 and note.
Fabehood expresses truth in a transcen-
dental sense, 5.
Falsity follows from truth ; in what sense
184; may contain truth, unless abso-
lutely faise, iS^; is true in so far as
it exists and manifests itself, 204.
Four men may be brothers and friends,
strangers and enemies, each to each,
Fasting should be performed when most
acceptable to God, 72.
Father, God the, differs from God the
Son as the universal from the singular
man, 3o.
Final cause, the, 92.
Finitude, the, of an infinite multitude,
because some of its members cannot
exist, 87.
First principle, the, of all things, is in-
finite but without dimensions, 121.
Five degrees of univcrsals, 32.
Fly, a, helps in dragging a .ship for-
ward, 171.
Freedom is favoiired. ' by the law, 209.
Fiee-will used as an argument against
the greatest possible number of men,
80.
Forni, matter and corapound, 43.
Formal cause, the, 92.
Forms supperadded to those of the ele-
ments, plants and animals, 16 3.
Future and past things; what their exi^
stence is, 134.
General does not always imply particular
knowledge, 70.
232
INDEX.
Generic arnJ specific difterence, 36.
Oeyierality, increase of, implies morc in-
dividuals predicated, 3o.
Glubc, the, of thc earth borne up by
God, i6i.
God; is he caused by Himselfr 38; in
what manner, 5o, 3i and note; is not
an abstract. but a concrete truth, 7 ;
nothing difficult to, i?^; can in a sense
do things that cannot be done, i33;
can not make a round line straight, 83.
God's existence, the foundation of all
hypothetical propositions; how, 2.
God's power, how it differs from that
of His creatures, 1 5 1 ; would it be ex-
hausted by creating an intinite multi-
tude? 79.
Godhead, the, did not suffer when Christ
was crucified, 42; is communicable to
the three Persons, 52.
Good, the divisions of, i23, 124.
Government ought to impose limits to
ecclesiastical rites and possesions, 175.
Grain of millet, a, is as much smaller
than the world as the world is greater
than it, 1 20.
Gratitude destroyed by the Nominalistic
system, 69, 70.
Grosseteste (Lincolniensis) his doctrine
of universals quoted, 32; his opinion
on the beatific vision, 168.
Hand, the, if moved, produces a new
truth throughout the world, 188.
Handwriting, the, of the MS., 26, note;
1 3o note.
Happening, a, one meaning of accident,
lOI.
Happiness, the, of the Blessed, is infini-
tely greater than ours, 170.
Heraclitus' opinion tliat everything was
constantly changing, 190.
Hindrance and help, significations of, 128.
Human body, the, must have all its
parts in order, 162.
Humming in the ears, a, hinders the
perception of sounds, 141.
Ideas, the eternal, of God, are the causes
of things, 32.
Identity is not impHed by God"s being
like man, 102, io3.
Identity of a man with an ass, 16; of
God as creating with the things He
creates, denied 100 — 102.
If impHes merely necessary scquence,
unless when it signifies because, 182.
Igneity, 44.
Ignorance and confused knowledge are
the same, 2i5; may coexist with con-
fused sight, 173.
Immutability of universals, 63.
Impossibility of that which never will
be caused, 86; of the biggest or smal-
lest man possible, i3q; of a building
infinitely high, 174; of reaching a sin-
gular by contradicting a universal, 29;
of doing the same thing twice, i33;
of sinning out of love for God, 223.
Incantations prove universals, 63.
Incarnation, the, does not prove that
God is caused, 39; has rendered God
our equal, 100.
Iiicommunicjbility makes the difference
between the singular and its univer-
sal, 37.
Increase and decrease of power, i36.
Injluence, real, is required for the idea
of a cause, 93.
Influence of one orb on another may be
supposed, but not proved, 145.
Inlierent accidents cannot exist by them-
selves, io3.
Incorruptible parts of the world, the,
must have a definite size, i63; they
differ widely from those which are
corruptible, 66.
Individual, every, is (in the sense of
belonging to) a species, 39.
Individuality, the, of particular contin-
gent truth, 190.
Individuals and universals; do they make
up a number together? 48 and note.
Individuation of a universal term, infi-
nite degrees of, 63.
Infinite number, the, of things compos-
sible, 74.
Inflnite, a peculiar sense given to the
term, 81.
Innate forms are inadmissible for the
sense and the intellect, 141.
Insoluble, no proposition is really, 2o3.
Insolubles, the; propositions very diffi-
cult to explain, 193 — 127; six answers
and others given by various writers,
194 — 2o3; Wyclifs own opinion,
2o3 — 224; its simllarity with each of
the other answers, 224, 225; its points
of ditference from each of thcm
223-
27-
INDEX.
^33
Ittstantaneoux and etenial truths, 21 3.
Instantaneous conibinatiun objecteJ
against Wyclifs atomic theory, i63;
his answer, 164.
Insfantaneous action. ni^.
Instantaneoits movemcnt is not pro-
perly a movement, 144.
Integral wholes, 3p.
Intelligence, the, ol' most men, cannot
imderstand abstract essences, 67.
Intention, logical meaning ot'. 29 note.
Intrinsic and extrinsic possibility, 89 note.
Inverted image. an. is not formed on
the retina, 180.
/?•;.';, the, in the hiiman eye, 177.
Judici.d enforcement, the, of certain va-
lid promises is impossible, 67, 68.
Justice, acts of, concern universals, 63.
Knowledge a maximum of, impossible,
i3q; denied, 168 — 175.
Knowledge in the Word means that the
soul is enlightened by God, 168; fol-
lows upon the siglit of Him, 172.
I.anguage, abuses of, caused by imagi-
nation, 67.
Law, the, is in favour of liberty, 209.
I.aymen know more than Nominalistic
doctors, 49.
Lever, experiments with the, itjo.
Light of glor^-. tlie, possessed by the
Blessed, i6q.
Limit. a. both to magnitude and small-
ness, is necessary, 121; must be pre-
cise, i35, i36; if never reaclied is not
a limir, i63.
Limit, the lower, of what cannot be
done is not the upper limit of what
can. I 38.
I.imitatjvn, the, of God's power pro-
ceeds from his wisdom, 8?.
Lines consist of points, 49.
I.ogica, I. quoted, 37, 22 1.
I.ogical diflerence, 36); between the uni-
versal and singular Phoenix, .^3, and
note.
f.ogical obligations, the exercise of, 61.
Logical, does not ahvays imply ethical,
obligation, 68.
Love requires an existing object, 59.
Lass, the, of a good quality is as haJ
as its possession is good, ii3.
Loss, God's, of power to produce things,
when thev have once been produced,
l32.
Magnitude of a magnitude, there is no,
I 1 9.
.Magnitude and maximum are identical,
.37.
Man, taken alone, denotes neither com-
municability nor the reverse, 66.
Material, the, cause, 92.
Mathematical calculations and reasonings
on metaphysical objects, ii3 — 126.
Matter, primordical, the potentiality of
140.
Matter, form, and compound, 43.
Maximum, a, is necessary in all things,
21; implies the highest stretch ot,
possibility, 135.
Maximum, the, of possibility limits God's
power of action, i33.
Maxiynum, a. number of men must
exist, 83.
Meaning, the, rather than the form,
determines affirmation or negation, 17.
Melancholy people dream of black things,
141.
Merit, loss of, 71.
Meritorious deeds arealwaysrewarded,58.
Mmd, made up of memory, reason, and
will, 36.
Minimuni, the, of intellectual sight is
the union of two mathematical points,
176; of bodily sight, is the basis of a
p^ramid, ib.
Minimum visible, a, absuril, 139.
Miracle, a, if absolutely possible must
be ordinatel) so too, 143.
Modes of Being; do they substantially
change the thing modified? 99.
Money is good for some persons and
bad for others, 123.
.Monsters with double organs, 167.
Mortal does not belong to the definition
of man, 66.
Mortal sin degrades more than anything
else, i55.
Movement, every, has its opposite rest,
193.
Multitude, any, talls short ot the exten-
sion of the term man, 80.
Sature imposes a limit to things and
classes of men, 174 — 175.
Xatwe-instants and time-instants, great
difTerence between, 106. 107.
234
INDEX.
Necessity ot" a thing nol being neces-
sary, 70.
Negation logically causes negation,
107.
Negation, the, ot" the impossible is equi-
valent to infinife truths, but does not
cause them, 8.
Negations cannot be properly compared
with affirmative qualities, iiO.
Negative, a, may include impossibility in
conditional propositions, 187.
Nominalistic system, the, destroys all
gratitude, 67, 70.
Nominalists, diflerent doctrines of, 33, 84.
Number, the, of hypothetical proposi-
tion, I.
Niimber a multitude of substances, 4C).
Numbers, if employed to reprcsent qua-
lities which are not homologous, can-
not be compared. i ic),
Objects need not necessarily exist to
form mental propositions, 28; if im-
possible, can they be known by us but
not by God? 89.
Obligation, a iogical exercise; example
of, 220, 221.
Obligations, liitfeienl. senses of, 60, (u.
Optic nei'ves, tiic, cross cach othcr,
'77-
' >pposite torms can be compared b\' com-
paiison w ith othcr things, 122, i23.
Oprosites cannol bc predicaled of incii-
viduals, 78.
Order in naturc, a denial of, dcnics
God's existence, ii')2.
Order is influenccd bv that which is
ordcred, 7.
Ordinate and absolute power arc not
distinct in God, i3i.
Parts, all, of a body arc known to God
and therefore their exact number is
known, 81 ; if known, must exist se-
parately, 82, 83; and must exist
together, 83.
Past and future things; what their exi-
stence is, 134.
Peheles, an unintelligible word, 44 and
note.
Penny, a, universal, to be given must
be given in its singular, 60.
Pcople, thc common, know universals,
but confusedly, 33, 63.
Per accidens, ihree meanings of, 95.
Perfection, essential and accidental, iGli.
Peripateticians grant that the world
existed eternally, 84, 83.
Perjitry of a man who swears he is
committing perjury, 206.
Per se, three meanings of, t)4, g5.
Personal pronouns have not always the
same sense in different mouths, 219.
Phoenix, the uni\ersal and the particu-
lar, 37, 53.
Pia mater, the, 177.
Pigs might fly by miracle, 142.
Pile, a, the limit to, 174.
Pleasiire, the, of God in a bad action,
in so far as regardsHis share in it, 157.
Porphyrv (), and note; 33.
Position, the, of the hypothetical signs
in compound propositions is imma-
terial, 24, 2?.
Position and deposition 61.
Possessions, ecclesiastical, 175.
Possibilitr of deducing anything from an
impossible proposition, 10.
Possibility, the, of Gods Being implies
His existence, i3o.
Potentialilies, passivc, 33.
Potentiality, all, procceds from Gods
activc power, i3o.
Poiver, e\ery, is a tnrm, 142; springs
from act, i 3 1 .
Powers are limilcd by llic utmosl ihc}'
can do, I 3o.
Predestination, 1 28
Predicate, thc, ol rcdnplicaiisc propo-
sitions is somctimcs universal, qj.
Primordial niatter, ihe potentiality of,
140
Primordial irulhs, two in number,
existence of God and cxistence of
Being, i and 2.
Principle of identitv, tlie, miglit be used
to distinguish hypothetical propositi-
ons, 2.
Priority and simultancity of cause and
etfect, 102.
Privation has mo magnitude, 112.
Privations, some, do not admil of in-
crease or diminition, 116, 117.
Promises; is thcir object universal or
singular? 5j; they can be made
without specifying the singular, ib.; to
say the contrarv would destroy all
human intercourse and justice, ^8;
tliey must imply ihe future, 39.
(NDKX.
!35
JVonouns, ditTerent sorts ot'; how they
stand for their antecedent, 26; being
universal, can never stand tbr parti-
culars, 27.
1^-oportion does not exist between equals,
148.
Propositions, all, are bt)th attirmative
and negative, 16.
Propositions. many, niay at ihc same
time be contradictory and compalibic
with each other; how, 7? — 79.
Proposition, the same, may havc diflerent
meanings in diflerent moutlis, 210, 211.
Qiialities, specihc, make an essential dit-
terence 35; may be pertections in one
being and nf)t in another, iGS; somc
cannot be altirmed reduphcatively, loc).
Quality \n hvpotheticals, i() — 20.
Quantiiy in hypotheticals, 20 — 22.
Rational propositions, what is meant by,
1 and note.
Real and ideal possibiiit^', diflerence ot.
87.
Reducibilit)' ot all hypotheticals to seven
principal species, 8 — q.
Reduplicative propositions are divided
hke causals, Qtj; are expounded Hke
them only when the\' impl^- causa-
lity, 91"),
Reflection and refraction, 173.
Regulation, the, of prices depends on
nature, not on man, \2i').
Relations, extrinsical, 40; are generally
admitted lo exist in God, i32.
Relative and absolute infinitude, tlifte-
rence of, 3o.
Requisite, a. without whicli there is no
proposition, 11.
Resistance is not to bc found in the
movement of the Heavens, 144.
Rest, instantaneous, is no rest; it must
take place in time, igS.
Resiirrection, the, used as an argument
against the greatest possible number
of men, 80.
Rites, ecclesiastical. 175.
Rules as to the inference of reduplicative
propositions, io3 — 106.
Sail of a ship, the, can bear a great
pressure, 160.
Salvation, the, of one man is worth
more than the whole world, 12 3.
Science would perisli if causals were
denied, 91.
Second intention, terms of the, 64.
Sense and sign must correspond, or a
proposition is nol truly copulative,
23 — 24.
Sense impressions become impaired wiien
the organs are very strongly impres-
sed, 141.
Senses, diftereiu, uf tlie word difticuUy,
i33.
Sensitive facuUies; how located in the
brain, 1 78.
Seven, the number, atfected in all by
such as prefer it, 21.
Shadows, two. are the cause, not the
parts, of a doubI\' intensc shadow, i 18.
Sight, di\ ision of, into distinct and con-
fused, 17.3; is active and passive at
once, 142; proves that we have an
intinite multitude of acts, 172.
Siffht of God, the, is a powerful im-
pression of God's Being, Hu).
Signijicaiion, contracted, of the univer-
sal in singular terms, C)b.
Sighifications, diflerent, of absolute and
ordinate power, i33; of to bear, ibo,.
Signify, to, and to be true come to the
same, 216.
Signs alone, not sufficient lo distinguish
hypothetical propositions, i .
Signs, are universal, singular, gcnera.
species, diflferences, properties aiul acci-
dents; when, 5, ().
Similarit)' anii unhkeness, divisions of,
127.
Simtiltaneity and succession oi cause and
eftect, 102.
Subordination of causes, qb.
Subjeci, the, of Being is not identical
with it, 38.
Substantiality alone gives essentialBeing,
99-
Superadded torms are extended through
the whole, 166.
Superfluitr of a power that will never
be exercised, i33.
Superioriiy of some accidents to some
substances, 172.
Supply and demand, I23, 126.
Supposition, the, of universals is not
personal, 48, 40; its variation in a
svllogism destroys its value, 43.
Suppositum, every. can produce another
cqual to itseU", i52.
236
INDEX.
Symmetrical correspondence of certain
privations and qualities. 117, 118.
System, tlie, which refuses to limit God's
power, 88.
Sin, as punished, is pleasing to God,
'08; radically depends upon Him, ib.\
is not logically ascribable to God, 12 3.
Sin, mortal, incurred by certain omi>-
sions, 71.
Sin^idar, a. taken Avitli its univcrsal;
does it make up a numberr 48 — 54.
Sky, the, has no weight, i (3 f .
Slaves, case of two, set free under doubl-
ful conditions, 208, 2ot); tliey shouUi
both be set free, 200.
Sleep, is it an attribute of the universal
man? So, 40.
Sini^ulars, instable as watei\ cannot be
the basis uf scicnce, igg.
Sophistic zl, replies, a way to set aside,
202, 2o3.
Sorrow for sin; could it be a mortai sin,
even if God had forbii.iden itr 222, 22'3.
Soul, the, does not imdergo succession
while thinking of tlie same proposi-
tion, 201.
Soul<', difTereiit, have dilTerent degrees of
capacil)-, and each has a maximum, 17?.
Specief, can ihey differ specitically from
their individuals? 6(").
Specific and generic dilVerences, ?G.
Stones couid not think even bv miracle,
142.
Tliree, the number, is affected in ail b\-
such as prefer it, 21.
Time is the principle by which we know
the differences of individuals, iqo, i()i.
Time-instants and nature-instants, greal
ditference between tliem, loi), 107.
Transcendent being; is it common botli
to God and creatures? 37 — 3o.
Trinity, the mystery of, 43; in matters
concerning the. there is no argument
from tlie particular lo the general, nor
vice versa, 53.
'Irouble, exceeding. taken by Wyclif in
the question of thc Insolubles, 227.
Truth and God's existence arc posited
by every true proposition, 186.
Truth^i signitied bv hypothetical propo-
sitions, not sufficient to distinguish
their species, i.
Truths that ncilher God nor man can
know, 2 I 2.
Tyrant, case of a, giving an impossible
order, 208.
Uniiy is the principle of quantity, 4Q.
Universal, the, objected to be the same
in a thief and a king, 28; in what
sense it moves, 47.
Universals, as ideas, how identical with
and how distinct from God, 33; some
of them founded upon singulars, ib. ;
can have at the same time opposite
predicates, 78, 79.
Univocal signification of Being, the, ad-
mitted by Wyclif, 38 and note.
Use of universals, 40, 41.
Vacuum, a, if, posited, must be posited
as a being, 147; absurdities following
therefrom, 147, 148; is impossible,
.^4; must be admitted, if God is able
to create other worlds, 146.
Value, the extrinsical, of a tliing, changes
according to circumstances, i23.
\'arious significations of truth and false-
liood, 4.
]'elocity of movement must have a limit,
140; what that limit is. 143; cannot
possibiy be infinite, 144
Viulent movements, 144.
\'isual, the, power of the eye, compared,
to God's active power, i32; its act 175.
Vitel/ion, 181 and note.
Vitreous humour, the, 177.
Volition of God, a, could make any
being indehnitely perfect, i32; if po-
sited, it posits infinite others. lol).
\'olume, is the bigness of a substance, 4<.i.
Weight, the, that can be borne, a limit
to, i5c); the least that a man cannot
bear is the greatest that he can, 160.
Whole, the, is identical Avith all its parts,
2 I.
Wyclifs first speculations, the notable
boldness of, 108 note.
Woman, a, pregnant, if the only liuman
being; couid shc possibly die or mis-
carry ? 1 74.
Worlii, the, is a propositit)n, 20; can bc
changed in nothing, 85; could not
liave been created before or after the
fixed time, i3i; like the human body,
must have all its parts in order, 162,
i63; is the greatcst of all possible
beings, 121.
The Society's book for 1896 is now ready ; and the
works for 1897 and 1898 are in the binders' hands, and
can be sent next month to such Members as will pay
their Subscriptions for those years. The Subscription
for 1896 became due on Jan. 1, and should be paid at
once to the Hon. Sec, J. W. STANDERWICK, Esq.,
GENERAL POST OFFICE, LONDON, E.C. Cheques
to be crost, 'London and County Bank.'
Tenth RejJort of the Executive Coininitiee, for 1896.
(Aprii, 1896.)
The continued help that the Society gets from its printer,
Mr. Carl Georg Froinme of Vienna, combined with the
devotion of its editors, ]M. Dziewicki and Prof. Losertb, aided
by Mr. Mattbew, alone enables it to produce its books in
time, and in advance.
The volume for 1896, comprising the third and fourlb
parts of Wyclif 's Opus Evaugelieuin, edited by Prof. Losertb,
is bound and ready for issue.
Tbe volumes for 1897 and 1898, De Logica 11, edited by
M. H. Dziewicki, and Be Simonia, edited by Prof. Dr.
Herzberg-Frankel and M. H. Dziewicki, are in the binders'
bands, and can be issued next month to any Mernbers wbo
will pay tbe two years' subscription in advance.
Tbe Society is clear of debt to the end of 1895 ; but it
owes Mr. Fromme £850 for its three volumes of 1896-8,
and it lias about enough in band to pay its binders for
covering tbese volumes. Tbe Conimittee tberefore appeal
to Members for three years' advance subscriptions at once,
so tbat a fresh start may be made, free from all liabilitj^
at tbe future years' work, 1899-1912.
For 1899 and 1900-1, Be Logica III, edited by M. H.
Dziewicki, and Prof. IjOsertb's edition of De Civili Dominio
II, III, — wbose sbeets Dr. Peginald L. Poule and Mr. F. D.
Mattbew see, and Dr. R. L. Poole side-notes, — bave been
some time at press, and may be finisbed tbis year. For 1902
or 1903, M. Dziewicki has kindly undertakeu to edit tbe
Miscenaneous Tracts, Nos. 54-61 in Shirley's Catalogue,
which were copied by Dr. Buddensieg, and were in the
hands of Dr, Schnabel of Dresden, as editor, till his death
three years ago. Also, for 1902 or 1903, the De Potestate,
which has for many years been in the hands of M. Patera
of Prag, has just been sent to Professor J. Loserth, so
that it will probably go to press next year. For 1904,
the Pev. Dr. Buddensieg hopes to produce his edition of
De Veritate ; and then all Wyclifs great Siimma Theohgiae
will be in type, except the De Mandatis Dci and De Static
Innocentiae, which Mr. F, D. Matthew will take up as soon
as his help to other editors leaves him time for his own texts.
The other works of Wyclif remaining unprinted and not
likely to be included in the second volume of MiseeUanies §
now in charge of the Eev. J. P. Whitney, are, by Shirley's Nos, :
6. De Materia et Forma.*
7. De Materia (?).t
8. De Ente, Bk. I*, Bk. II.*
9. Replicatio de Universalibus.*
10. De Uuiversalibus.*
11. De Aninia.*
13. De Fide Catbolica.*
24. De Propbetia.*
Members have, then, to keep " pegging away " till the
work they have set themselves is done, and England's long-
due debt to Wyclifs memory paid, For that, money is
wanted, Who will give it?
In order to increase the Society's funds, the Executive
Committee have resolved that any Member may give the
right to any Library or person to buy the first fourteen
years of the Society's publications, 1882-95, at half-price
— 19 volumes at 8 guineas and a half— provided that
with this sum are paid the full Subscriptions for 1896,
1897, and 1898.
England, Europe, and the rest of the Christian world owe
so much to the memory of Wyclif, that support ought to be
forthcoming for the printing of his Works, the records of
his thoughts and life. Two-thirds of the Society's task will
be done by 1900. It is for our Merabers to see that the
other third is finished speedily, Editors are ready and
willing, Money alone is wanting.
* Copied. t Not copied,
§ Sbirley's Nos, 43, 44, 47, 48, 68, 77, 92, 94, 95,
26. De Imaginibiis.t
28. Peccatum Mortale et Veniale.t
32. Errare in Materia Fidei, &c.+
(45. Commentary on N. Test. ? not
Wyclifs.t)
64. De Paupertate Cbristi.t
(69. ? part of Dc Potestate Papae.)
70. De Clavibus Ecclesiae.*
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The Societfs Publications for 1S82 — 1898 {_£\ \s. each year) are : —
1882.* I. Wyclifs Latin Polemical Works, vol. i, edited by Dr. R. Buddensieg.
18S3.* 2. ,, „ ,, vol. 2,
1884. 3. Wyclifs De Civili Dominio, Lib. I, edited by Reginald Lane
Poole, M.A., Ph.D.
,, 4. Wyclif s De Composicione Hominis, edited by Dr. Rudolf Beer.
1885. 5. Wyclifs De Ecclesia, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
,, 6. Wyclif s Dialogus, sive Speculum Ecclesia Militantis, edited by A. W.
Pollard, M.A.
1886. 7. V^ycWVs De Benedicta Incarnacione, edited by the Rev. E. Harris,
D.D.
,, 8. WycUfs Sermones, Part I, edited by Prof. Loserth, Ph.D.
1887. 9. Wyclifs Sermones, Part I[, edited by Prof. Loserth, Ph.D.
,, 10. Wyclifs De Offido Regis, edited by A. W. Pollard, M.A., and C.
Sayle, B.A.
1888. II. Wyclifs Sermones, Part III, edited by Prof. Loserth, Ph.D.
,, 12. Wyclif s De Apostasia, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1889. 13. ^^ycWsSeniiones, Part IV and last, edited by Prof. Loserth, Ph.D.
1890. 14. WycWVs De Dominio Divino, edited by Reginald L. Poole, M.A.,
Ph.D.
1891. 15. Wyclifs Quaestiones and De Ente predicamentali, edited by Dr.
R. Beer.
1892. 16. Wyclifs De Eiicharistia, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1893. 17. \Nyc\\Vs De Blasphet>iia, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1S94. 18. Wyclif s De Logica, vol. i, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
1895. 19. Wyclifs Opus Evangelicum, vols. i, 2, ed. by Prof. J. Loserth.Ph.t).
1896. 20. Wyclifs C/wj-jS^z/tz//^^^//^^^^?, vols. 3, 4, ed. by Prof. J. Loserth,Ph. D.
1S97. 21. Wyclifs De Logica, vol. 2, edited by M. H. Dzievvicki.
1898. 22. Wyclifs De Simonia, edited by Prof. Herzberg-Frankel, Ph.D.,
and M. H. Dziewicki.
The Societys Future Publications ivill probably be : —
1899. WyclifsZ'^ Civili Dominio, Lib. II, edited by Prof J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1900. Wyclifs De Logica, vol. 3, edited by M. H. Dziewicki. (At press.)
1901. Wyclifs De Civili Dominio, Lib. III, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph.D.
1902. Wyclifs Miscellanies I, edited by M. H. Dziewicki (Nos. 54-61
in Shirley's Catalogue). (At press.)
1903. Wyclif s De Potestate Papae, edited by Prof. J. Loserth, Ph. D.
Wyclif s De Ente, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
Wyclif s De Mandatis Divinis, edited by F. D. Matthew.
Wyclif s De Statu Innocentiae, edited by F. D. Matthew.
Wyclifs De VeritateS. Scripturae, edited by the Rev. Dr. R. Buddensieg.
Wyclifs Miscellanies II, edited by the Rev. J. P. Whitney, M.A. (Nos.
43, 44, 47, 48, 68, 77, 92, 94, 95, in Shirley's Catalogue).
Wyclif s De Actibus Animae, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
Wyclif s Miscellaneous Philosophical Works, edited by M. H. Dziewicki.
And the rest of Wyclif 's Latin Works.
* The very heavy outlay for copying in these years (^^295) made the
issue of more volumes in them impossible.
Date Due
-VWf ■, \ ■ '
Ltbrary Bursau Cat. no. 11S7
WELLESLEY COLLEGE LIBRARY
3 5002 03208 2351
BR 75 . Wa 14:2
Wycliffe, John, d. 1384.
Johannis Wyclif Tractatus de
logica