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B.A. (Kwang Hua University, Shanghai) 1932 
M.A. (Yenchiug University, Pciping) 1934 

TUESDAY, MAY 26tli, 1942, AT 4.00 P.M. 


Professor M. A. Buchanan. Chairman 
Dean J. G. Althouse 
Dean G. S. Brett 
Professor F. H. Anderson 
Professor J. A. Long 
Professor C. E. Phillips 

Professor A. Macdonald 

Professor W. J. McCurdy 

Professor K. S. Bernhardt 

Professor T. W. Cook 

1912 — Bom, Canton, China. 

1932 — B.A., Kwang Hua University, Shanghai, China. 
1934 — M.A., Ycncliing University, Pciping, China. 
1934-36 — Teacher at Chung Yuen High School, Canton, China. 
1936-40 — Lecturer at Kuo Min University, Canton, China. 
1940-42 — School of Graduate Studies, University of Toronto. 

John Dczccy's Conccfl of Experience in its Relations to Education. ^ 


Dewey's concept of experience is an attempt to solve dualism and to assert 
tlie primacy of interaction between organism and environment. 

To Dewey, reason and sense, thought and fact, the mental and tlie physical, 
or the individual and the world are practically inseparable thougli logically 
distinguishable. He is inclined to think tliat this interdependence, or rather 
unity, is a natural event of life. Every day we act and are re-acted upon in 
our associations with other persons. The primary fact is act or experience, in 
which we and our environment are organically related, and in which the mean- 
ing of the environment and our idea of it are co-ordinated. When we are 
beset with a difficulty in the course of our active organic or social activities, 
we then begin to locate it. On such an occasion, the difficulty to wliich we pay 
attention is termed "stimulus", meaning tliat phase of activity which is in need 
of clarification. Or, it may be called sensation, meaning that the object enters 
into an organic relation with us. And tlie process of clarification, in which 
we make suggestions, form hypotheses, make use of physical apparatus and 
secure relevant data to get at the exact meaning of the situation, is the act of 
thinking or reasoning. The result of this clarification is the re-disposition of 
our antecedent situation in which the problem arose. In other words, we have 
made a change of the situation. We gain more meanings through the inquiry, 
while what is acted upon undergoes a symbolic or actual change. 

This ordinary course of life constitutes experience, in which thinking and 
sensations are in reciprocal adjustment. The knowing situation is not an abrupt 
spatial separation between the knower and the known ; it is a temporal dis- 
tinction between an unorganized, doubtful situation and an ordered, refined 
situation. The known is tlie result ; the given is the datum. .Both are related 
to the individual because of the dynamic interrelationship between him and the 
environment. To Dewey, the true meaning of an "individual" is not his 
physiological make-up, but is his associations with the social environment. And 
environment does not mean mere physical surroundings ; it means those things 
that enter into the activity of an individual as a sustaining or frustrating 

Tlu- iuinicdiate datmn in the study of mind is tlicn, to Dt-wey, not sensations 
or elemental stimuli, but is act or "sensori-motor co-ordinations" in relation to 
environment ; the immediate datum in the study of knowledge is not any inde- 
pendent real or subjective percept, but is what is experienced or real-in-relation- 
to-thc-individual ; and the immediate datum in the study of human relationships 
is neither the state nor the individual as such, but is free associations or inter- 
actions. Continuous reciprocal adjustments between the individual and the 
environment account for the development of individuality, the growth of 
scientific knowledge, and social progress. 

Mind, in Dewey's sense, is the quality of meaningful interactions with a 
view to attaining a purpose, social or individual. In fact, his concept of 
experience sometimes has the same meaning as that of mind. He thinks that 
experience is not merely a physical activity ; it involves the perception of 
relationship and the subsequent modification of one's conduct. In education, 
the directed course of experience is the growth of mind. Ability, cajiacity, 
intelligence, attitude, etc., are all interpreted in terms of those specific activities 
which refer the present to the future and which control the future in virtue of 
what is learned from the present. 

Consequent on the assumption that mind is emergent upon the social level 
in the course of evolution, Dewey regards conjoint activity as the necessary 
condition of the growth of mind or the reorganization of experience. He lays 
down a leariiing principle that "things gain meaning by being used in a shared 
experience or joint action." His intent is obvious ; shared activity is the medium 
in which is put into effect his theory of the interdependence of reason and sense, 
of thought and fact, and of the individual and society. But he has exaggerated 
the function of shared activity as exemplified in the activity program in the 
school. There are many occasions on which the use of a thing does not involve 
a social situation : and a social situation does not always involve a shared activity 
in Dewey's sense. 

Moreover, conjoint activity is not the necessary condition of the growth 
of mind. The understanding of principles and the application of these principles 
to particular occasions constitute the necessary condition of generalized dis- 
cipline. Shared activity vitalizes learning ; but mere group co-operation in 
realizing a project without understanding the principle underlying overt activity, 
is of no permanent educative eiTect. 

Dewey's conception of the growth of mind is inextricably involved with 
his conception of knowledge and learning. His assertion that knowledge is a 
human creation through action is opposed to the new realists' contention that 
knowledge is a revelation of the order of nature. The reasons for his theory are 
not far to seek. He is primarily concerned with the gradual reciprocal adjust- 
ment between man and environment in each phase of human development. So 
knowledge is, to him, an improvement of the present existing state through 
human effort. The second reason is that he is dead against dualism. He denies 
that the knowing situation is a presentation to the mind of some extra-mental 
knowledge relation. The relation between the individual and the world is 
primarily social or emotional or biological or aesthetical. Cognitive relation 
only occurs when a perplexity leads to an inquiry into the significance of the 
situation for the purpose of its clarification. The result of inquiry through 
analysis or abstraction is not different in its existential status from the original 
situation. It is its meaning, instrumental in controlling subsequent experience, 
that differentiates it from the original situation. The third reason is that Dewey 
puts a premium on the method of experimental science. The authority of truth 
is not traditional beliefs and customs but the individual's "originality of attitude" 
displayed in the testing of ideas. 

"Knowledge in action" is termed in education "learning by doing". Dewey's 
emphasis on the social aspect of experience leads him to adopt an exclusive 
integrated curriculum which has hardly a place for the systematic learning of 
fundamentals. His early wholesale condemnation of the conventional school 
blinded liini to the fact that it is the teacher's adequate method of guidance 
rather than conjoint activity that does away with the dualistic learning situation. 
Separate instruction of subjects is not necessarily a type of dualism. Dewey's 
early emphasis on overtness and lifelikencss was a reaction against traditional 
formalism rather than a suggestion of a criterion for the evaluation of the worth 
of the curriculum. 

However, the social function of conjoint activity is the primary concern 
of Dewey. His "joint activity" in education is a practical attempt at living 
up to his ideal of democracy rather than an exclusive method of generalized 
discipline. He has the ambition of harmonizing the alleged oppositions between 
"humanistic studies" and "vocational studies" and between individual freedom 
and social authority. 

On the whole, Dewey's concept of experience shows the influences of Locke. 
Kant, Hegel, and Darwin. He inherits the spirit of anti-apriorism from British 
Empiricism ; retains Kant's ideas of the composite nature of experience and of 
the creativity of mind ; makes use of Hegel's Dialectic metliod to synthesize 
opposed categories ; and reinforces his belief in the interdependence of the 
individual and the world by accepting Darwin's biological theory of adjustment. 
The method of experimental science has given him a formula of learning. 
Despite liis denunciation of faculty psychology and formal discipline, lie cannot 
shake off their influence. He has to admit the "power to grow" to account for 
the organization of experience ; and he has to emphasize the cultivation of the 
ability to tliink, the ability to meet changes, and the ability to co-operate with 
others in his activity program. Generalized discipline rather than specific 
training is his ideal of education. 


Major Subject: 

Philosophy of Education — Dean J. G. .'\lthouse. 

Minor Subjects: 

History of the Theories of Mind — Dean G. S. Brett. 
Modern Theories of Learning — Professor Peter Sandiford. 


ajT'^m T?s-^i3i-^JG 

4 Thesis subfittad in conformity with the rsquireiTsents 
for the degree of Doctor of Ihilosocl^ 
in the -Saiversity of Toronto 



^'^RA'F^^ ■ 

FEB 4 '1974 


^g/?siTY cnS;i 

T?UaLS OF LlLiiX::;^;!^ 


CTfA.;fTrS II 5nCPEEI!3'?C15 A3 SB\in.U<»TSSPORU CC-:TI!?JtfJ( 5 

1, Origin of ^uslisja and its '^aucationjl laplic .tioBS ^ 

2, Viistoric a Relations of .•v.vey^B Concept of 'Jxperiouce /3 

a. British ^pirlcisra 

b. ^nt*8 ''orjposite 'Tature of 7Tperienoa 

c. IlQ;-<3l«s Bialoctic .1 Interpretation of Thought and Fact 

d. Darwinian Theory of ^volition 

3« Arga'^nts for the Continuity of Jan ^vlth the .orld -i? 

a. :iothotiol07y of ^p<?ri.'nental J>cience 

b. Biological \rgument 

c. 'Il3t .rlcal .nratnent 

4. •rgu-ssnt for th© Continuity of Sensation and Keaacn 3 7 

a, Cocrdindticn of Activities 
S« Sipsrisnce as "nconp'issii;^ 'nivarso of Discour^ie *3 

a. Dcable-b.'.rr3ll9d «ardng of r.xperienae 

b. Intori-ction Xavolvimr Tempor^il Continuity 

c. im. ./ates^B ''3tr3aa of Consciousness" Cosjif^recl »lth 
■5ewey*s Concept 

d. Distinction Setaeon "xperlence and Ccmsolousness 


1. iJatura of llind i;6 

a. '^nH TilEipirieally neflnes 

1». Mlart T^iasrgcnt in tu3 "volution of Intsr-actin/i '>e;.ts 

e. 3.ri3totle»s Vlsw of Jiad Cofaparsi with na-.voy's 
a. The Relation (rf ;!in'3 w'ith Intalli.-j;ence, \bility, 

"ittitudes, ate. 

e. The -lace of "Idea-* in Teiyey's Tie^^ry of ind 

f, "mrea \spocts of Soul in delation to Dewey's nieory ctf .!lad 

2. Growth of 'and ' 93 

a. Identity of r^lrperionco lith 'rind 

b. The rlii-nificiace of the 'Jndorgoing \spoct of "Exjerieace 

(1) Correlation Between I'e^inin--? and ttitude 
e« Dewey's Insistence Upon ."ii'ared 'vctivity as t"-.o :'«ana of 
LTnlfyixig ijiowled -e and Char.ctar 
(1) His Difficulty 

d. Thin]te:in«; as 'athoc? 

(1) TTnlty c:f 'Jubjact- 'attor and "athod 

(2) Hasssons for Erci.haais Ui>on Thinking as an Cvort 
and Purposive l-rocess 

e. 4irQS of Grwfth 

(1) Grcfifth aa the Snd of "ducat ion 

(2) r-e-ocr-itic Livixg as the Tjjd of Education 

3. Daw«y*a Interprotntitn of Llental Dlscipllna i^' 

a, 7oTTiatlon and Enrichment of ''oncepts Through Joint ctlvlty 

(1) "on^itlona of Tr-jnafar of Learning ris ccountod 
by i'ltiona lists auA .sflc^i-itionists 

b. DeTelopiaont jf 'Cental Dlspositiona Tlirough Joint .ctivity 

(1) .ctlvs FMnrtioa of latalt 

e. Joint otlvlty as tho Basis of Irovl^irMg for Flexibility 

of r^blt and ^nriohnent of IJeynlng 
d. Dewey's Tnterpretatlcr. -lorioreil Vith Porrsil '^Qciplln© 
{!) uovival of "^^iculti-is" to Ixplijin Tr-wisfer of 

(2) The 'aanlns of "^ac^lty" 

(3) LockB»8 osltion in Kolation to ^jc^ilty isychologjr 

and FoTiisal Disci pll no 



1. Xacwled«e in Act loo '+* 

a. Continuity of "ature and T/att, Sens© and Heaaon, Ideal 
and Paul, ^:'A and 'eanc in Dewey* e Theory of Ijiafsrledge 

b. Dewey* a \rgu!sent against ^I'ew Realism 

c. Itewey's ■^.r.iph'isis on '?<ntlnuou3 2ecljrooal "jijuotrnent 
Between 'an and the ."orld 

d. Khc'^lodf^e arid t^uractar 

2. Le'iiming by Doing '" 

a. Dewey* s ' oc t'm Cld School :trictlce 

b. The lace .f r-Jcill- and J3ook- Learning in Dewey's 
"Lctitrity Prcs?pupi 

(1} The Chicago Ilxperirjentul Ichool 

c. Ihe Organization of jsubjcct-.'iitter in "Dewey's 'ro^raa 

(1) JUS Turly Cpti. -nisei and '.'xperlaant 

(2) IIl8 Sirly i^ioleaale Con'.e?nnati;.n of the (Id :^-chool 
and Cvor-D-iittasis Upon Life-lllce situations In ;cUocl 

(3) His Later 3mph;si3 on Systocrsatlzation of L'^uming 

(4) Herbert Ian Method Conipired with leeway's 

3. The Iroble-i of r^neralized Dlaclplina aca 3yr.te>.:wtic Ijaaming 
of Funda.'nentala in ^.lowey's Lctlvity rrc^ram Hi 

8. Conjclnt ".etivity the Basis of Tranofer cf Looming 

b. Understanding of Ideals or Forasation -f Flexible Mabits 
the B-!8l8 of TruiiSfor cf Learning 

c. Syateiftatic I^jumlag of Fundaaentals 

d. Dewey's Difficulty In Cver-I^aipliasizing rToblem-itic 
Conjoint ^^ctivity 

e. \ .iay Out of the Dii'flculty 

4* A GOiEEient on Breed's CriticisKi of Dewey's Conception of 

Knowledge and Theory of 'r^ucatltai ''f? 

1, )emocr'acy an Absolute Toint of Reforonc* In I3aw«y*s l^.il03ophy, 
Psychology, aii3 Bdiicatlon ^^^ 

a. Social Intercretatl on of rniloacpby 

b. Social IntoriTretotl on of Isychology 
e. Social Interprstatjtn of ^auoatioa 

(1) Dewey's Difficulty in Ajioptiag Eccaioaic Detorminisa 
to Interpret Dualless 

2, The ''S8«ntial Traits in Democracy Zih 

a. Dewey* 8 Crlt'^rlon in Eraluating a Society 

(1) Relation Botv?een the I'-dlvidual aad the ;5tat« 

b. \naly8is of ?'e;'?ey*e ")er3<»r-atic Ideal 

(1) l^Tee Int3ire!xan?.e of "^.xperlences -iccng Individuals 

(2) F^i.«l Cptsort^nity for ^ery Individual to "jsvelop 
his Capacities an~ to Contribute -^Tiat He is Oaj&ble 
of Contributing to the /elf are of "ocisty 

(3) Develop^eat of Scieatific Attitude 

(4) DevelojBjeat of Voril habits 

3, The Denocratic I .rt>rt -^f le?/oy*s "ConjciBt activity* 22'? 

a. 'Jiiity -:f Culture aad Utility 

b. IMlty of Freedom and authority 

ciriiTSR VI ca?ca.usicH ^^^ 

BiHLioa?.:jHr -Z^' 




!%« following peges have beon written in the conviction 
thet education is an "applied" phll sophy. ^bilosophie discuss! rna 
about the r^ations betwe^i tha i'ldividual and tbe world, thou^t 
and fact, raaaon and sfuiae, freedoiB ond authority, affect the way 
of bringing up c child. U0w«y*8 concept of experience deals 
prisiarily with these relations. Ihis philosophic- 1 concept, idien 
applied to the study of edttcatioB, is inatrunental in fozwilcting 
a philosophy of education for the settlencat of the educatioiud. 
points Gt issue. 

l^e educatioaal contzoTeraies •»— noaely, (1) develojnent 
of Bind tsoa witbin or foxstatlcn of it from without; (S) 
preparation for the fttture or enrichment of present experience; 
(S) growth na aeana or ^a ends; (4) knowing as apprebending the 
antecedent, ^cistecii realltir or ^a reorganizing the antecedent, 
phyaicrl situation in the li^^ht of its meanings; (5} subject- 
matter Qs reody-s^e logicol courses oabodying ttie cultural 
heritage or ss a teza denoting facts and idena tht^t are relevant 
to the solution of a planned problem; (6) interest and discipline 
Butually exclusive or interdependent; (7) Tocetionnl atudiea 
oppoaed and inferior to, or coutinuoua with, huBaniatic atudiea; 

(8) individuality antagonistic to, or allied with, authority; 
(9) school as the aedium of transmitting socicl heritage or as 
that of deiweloping » oilnd to BMst social chonges *— isay be, for 
the convKiiflnce of discussion, arranged in three groups. The 

fi»t tliree Smiqmi pmrtain to the paFoU.«B of ^rovth of thm Bind; 
%h» second thxvo Issues pertsin to the pToblcB of Isamlnf , which 
rtmit ligjit OQ the ontnre of sabjeot«<Battor and aethod; the thizd 
thros Issues pertain to ths peoblfln of relxitlouship betweoB jL3chool 
sod soeisty* la fact, aoB» of ^ese leflue^^ arm intricately 
interroleted; JJ««ey tries to eolve th«n in tiie light of his concept » 

mt the aatuxe of educstlcn is conditioned by the netire 
of flpes vithout ssyis^g. Bovever, it is net by asstatlng first 
a niad or a knovine self f^lileh gim bi'^'th to» and is posseeeed of, 
eoEperiSBce ttist Deessr stcrts to stidy its growth, its contact with 
fhe eorXdy &nd its relation with society. He finds Bind in 
expsgrleaoe; ho rieve Bind &8 em achieTement brou^rht about by the 
Iprtnrth of esperlonoe. It is this growth of Mcperisace *— > 
psrtloalexly, the knoviog jjcocess •— » that .'Jearey hes confined 
his Qttwitiun to, and m>t alod as such in antithesis to the world 
end to ssfnantiona that D«m»y following the troditiouiil duelistic 
tread tries to study. l%e eesenoe of experience is what is going 
oa in the eeonoalc, political, aesthetic, s!oz«l, as well es 
intellectual life. Life is a process of spatial interaction 
between the individual enci the world, and of temporal continuity 
of the paet, the present, and the future. Kaowing is ^t that 
]ih&se of life ezperistice sherein q difficulty arises rnd aeeds to 
be overeone; sug^Tssti ns, discussions, readings, observations, 
use of appliances ore InTclved. Coatlauous organisation into our 
disposition of new meaningful expsrienees for eaatn^l of the future 
la a Batter*of-'Ccin>se ex'ent even when we are unalndful of it all, 

Tbis naive viea cf Mrperience is the point of de{>nrtuie 


vliioh ; ewey takes in dealing vith the pereoitinl problea of the 
thsoxy of ]aiowlediD;e, namely hxm a oubJectiTe niod begets objective 
lDDmd.edee, or, bo« ve know the reality of the world rnd organize 
tba aanlfoklCt of sense Into a cc&ereat, unified systflra of truth. 
To hiB» mind and natter ore different factors of experience and 
do not eonatitato 8«p<^rcte prior eTclatents eport froni ezperienee. 
A Bind sufficient unto itself against outside chaotic sense ux- 
peri«nce8 or pltyeieel objects does not conatitnte e knowing 
•it nation miich is only artificially created by philosophers. 
Ibis factitious antithesis brings in its train the opposition 
between knowledge thst is derived frosi ordinary life concerns 
and knowledge that is evolved tsom reason. Oaimine knowinf is 
time Identified with the op^ rations of the loind which elicits 
principles, laws of the universe independent of ezparience* 
Qniversols either tuk«i as subalstiiig in world to be apprs^eoSed 
by the aind or vlswed es a priori laduoiples of the mind, are 
extC'llad as true rational knoid4>dge over against eBqpirieal, 
utilitarian skills and knowlodgs. The traditional «-!<luoational 
practice of dividing htosanistic and vocational studies, of 
tskinr. loamin,'^ either aa the acceptance of ready'-SBrie external 
truths contained in books or as the training of "faculties " of 
the Bind for the purpose of graspizur stem 1 truths, finds its 
support fToa this theory. 

To D«fw«v, this theory of knowledge which presupposes 
duaLia^?; betneon the asntal end the {dtysieul and entails dunlism 

between raticnel and empirical knowledge, has its origin in our 
clnss society. Hba distinction between the rich and the poor, the 

rtilcr aad the rulod, tb* prlvUegad and the oppreeaad, la • 
bcrrler to fi^ee shaping of life experleaoe. ?rhKt nettepe the 
poor la the ■nltttiMWce of thmir livelihood; akiUs aod 
kaoiaeage of eveiyda^- affetra am thus relegated to th«ai. vAiat 
eoaearaa the rich is the siode of enjoyiag leisure; pursuit of 
eultural atudiaat of ateniBl truths is their excluaive ri^t. 
Mftmal training to fore akllled habita beeonaa natumlly oppoaad 
to the tralaiag of intellect. The ana belmiga to the world of 
partioulara* Its choracteriatioa bein^ change and chaos; the other 
balonga to the vorld of nalTeraala, its characteristica being 
eternity end unity. ISiis alleged intrinsic connection at 
jmioaoidblcal dualian with claas aociety brings into relief 
Davay's riaapolat that his concept of ezperieace has ita 
denocrcstic inpoct. 

from ttie folleving pages we ab&ll notice that itavay'a 
c<neept of eatperionce is !)4Doeratlcally oriented, iiia aoidiasea 
on aociol corassimicatiQii in the developsoent of mind, on the 
originclilar of thinking in leami^is. and on cooperative living 
anoac individi;ala» reflect his damocratic temper. In education 
his over-eopbaais on cc^n joint activity tvds the rish ot tc^king 
it as the ajrelaaive aethod of i^narallsad training oxO. of 
acerlf Icing the syataBatlft laessing of fundaaeitala. 



Deve7*8 concept of ezDerience la an attempt to abake off 
the joke of dop.Uaai which places those, mho are auteiltted to It, In a 
difficult posltir^^n to rjcoount fear the interection of two oppoaed 
oet«eoarlea. He tries to give e monlatic, «npirieaX account of thou^t 
and fact, reaaon aad sansntion, the aantnl and the ph^icel, aubject 
and <rt)Ject, or the indlvldtt^l and the world, hy placing tham In the 
•ana ord©r of exiataace rad treating there vo two dynamic, interacting 
parts of one on-going whole. Ha relies, on the whole, t^pon a conaaoa- 
Mnw vi«v of aodatanee, yet Iw dirswe inopirotion firoe the peat 
Idiilooophic ayataaa of thoxi^t, aaaaly, the cBpirical riew of the 
orielQ of knowlodge held by Looke, Beiteley, and Htraa, the idea of 
the eoagpoeito aittaro of osvosiiiace deTaloped by g.ant, the dialectical 
view of the unity of thoii^t and fact aat in Hegel, end the 
•Toltttionazy theory of Darwin, In Edition, the aeUndol gy of 
aacpetlgwntal seiAoe haa rcidozed bin ouch asaiatance in the fcraulation 
of hia theoiy of knovladga, of logic, of Hetajfliyaica, end of 

Fnr conveolflDce of troataant, we shell take up first in 
this chapter the iraplieatlon involved in traditional dtiBlias eM its 
effeet ou education; then we shall de'l with the hletoriccl relations 
of D««r«y»a concept of ezperianee, end his ergaa»nt8 for the contiimi^ 
of ufin with the world, and of sensation with reason. Fron this exposition 

«• way eeaw to a better undemtandiog of his concept and of its 
edQoatinnr>l probleeM. 

n&e duallatlc theoary «Meli seta fflind a^tlnet nature aai 
•ease ha« both soelal vjiA. dlaleeticel aoto^eee. Aeo<»dia^ to Deeey, 
dtiallflan le a reflection of tb^e t«o bnalc quell ties of life, 
stability and uncertainty.^ In priinltlve life, the stabl* aopeet 

Defray, J., ■ aacperlenoe ivrvS. !-?;3t-3rQ. Saw Yoxic; w.W. !Sorton at Coiqpany, 
1929, chap. 2. a^e jJto&t f^r .ortalnty. Hw York: aintcn. Belch 
& Coi^^any, 19S9, ehep. 1. In theae ■■Jorka, Dewey a»koa explicit from 

the point of the develojiEiea t of culture, that philoso]^ h?.s Its 
ultlBQte origin la the preesricHiS life aen llYes in, DBBlifloi is 
a reflection of the tvo dcoixumt qaalitioa of life, stFibility and 
uncertainty (see y^ast for C'ertalnty. p. iSff, or atpMlerice and 
aatuie. pp. 4S-46) , ond is c mtlo'a 1 juatificstlon of tKe gurjer- 
aatural bein£>s vhich religion d«^Pi&e. But in hie earlier work, 
Reeonatrueti/a ia Hiiloaoyby. I^eoey does not appeal to the ccncept 
of preeorioua livlug for the eaqplanaticm of the origin of philosop^ . 
He .<r<entinna the iBiaglaatiTe legKids and atoriea first ^avinf/ oat 
of individual feneiea and 9MBc«i«e, and finally' ^Foving into social 
eults, beliefs, o» tooditions through their inatrjtrientol vnlue to 
the veal and unity of the group; but la ^is cmrlior writ! .^ ho does 
not explain their aoci 1 eeuse i^idi la oupiioeed to be tJe unstable 
and perilous couditlone of life, es ho latmr etteiqrta to do. The 
conflict between these socle- 1 beliefti and the coateB^oeratteotw 
kaevlod^ of observed facts and sequenees of nature g^nre rise to 
philosopher, the ^jnetlon of which was then to prasorve the !i»ral 
and sooi? 1 values thQt varo ADsbedded la tmditlon, by plaeinj; then 
under the mithority of reality inate-d of custom, {P., In P., p.l7«) 
flurt was in^redltion a relisious, supcrnstural world becoiaes in 
philosophy nhe world of hlj^est and ultimate reality; what wns a 
reli^oua s' notion of tfuttis and rulea of conduct turns out to be 
the authority of Bolng. ( Iblfl .. pp. 22-23. J "Ovor agcinst this 
absolute and nouoen-^l reality which could be apprehended only by the 

systetoatic discipline of philosophy itself stood the ordlrery 
eiq^lricr.l, relatively real, phenonwnel woHA of evezyday ezperlesce." 
( Ibid ., p.23.) Duall3in ha, thorofore, its root in aan*s er«tloiail 
inaeinationsa as man is fundeoMHitally "a creature of dealrss.*.. 
eetuated by hopes and fears, 1 ves and hates.*' { Ibid . , i,S,i Qie 
■oci 1 derivation of religion and i^losopby was not glvtti attention 
in this eorlier wozlc. Indeed, it seems that snotion is the producer 
of religi a; thus support la lent to the staterr«nt that "gode were 
born of fear." This leeway leter ottacke In his atperience and gature. 
as he ssya: "!s!an fears beeauoe ho ezista in a fearful, an awful world. 
The wcjrld is precarious and pezHoua." (£• and n., p.48.} Meati< n of 
the two earlier and lAter interpretations of dualism given by ^tSam 
■aster does not aoan that they are inot^^atible; but It laez^ly points 
out that the rveotc oeaee of dunlism is the precacFSoun unoertointy of 
life and thfit the insnedinto one is msm's «Boti*.ttal imagination. 

of life wbl<^h wes «aw«^lified In man's aklU In eontrolllag 
ractirrenfc, famtlier vrcnts W8« taken for grantoi. f!ie uneontroll- 
able vlf iaeltudee and troubl^e attending mm*« life eoneeqoent 
V^on tfee evep-cataglag, unoertain iJ i aoo men E of nature rosulted 
la the interpretation tJint these (Aeneos were t!»e operclJliM >f 
MOtt occult beings In control of the world. jcc<a?ainsly, aen 
triB;i to escape from l^e peril that aecompenled preenrlous 
•T«it0 by »eaa» of Tarlouo i»«y« of appeasing theee ooBlpoteBt 

poeere, euch as rituals, aacrlflees, magical cults, and othsar^ 
saodAs of eupplleatlon. 8e sought for the security of his life, 
for certainty caneeralng control of dxangin« orotita, for con- 
eiUatlcn of the attpr?!Kitur*l. With the paasa^ of tiae, this 
intrinsic tmit of life whl<?h f5pve rise t enixUm occasioned 
philosophic e]L«etilfitlon In search of truth, tmlvereel las, and 

ultlffiflite oet-i'js, -sjhlch are characteristic of security taA certainty, 

1 -^ 

So^ii8tlc9tl"D is eubstltntert for superstition. It often di^lss 

the stable end fixed to the disregard of the slgniftoance, or, 

to the denial of the erlatence, of pf>rticttlar, changing events. 

Particulars seen are governed by uaivereels onseea* Whet is 

certain Is real end true, while what is unccsrtala la uarsal and 

false. Ths reels of reals or s subsistent, ttltisiate principle thus 

is added to this worlfl of ssftse* Plato's dlTlsl n of the world 

of Ideas fr>-jSE thrt of socae evsnts, /jriatotle's retoeat to the 

ranks of reality in the ■atter»foi» process of d«?velorBient, 

giipf lonce and Itoture , •.. . 44 . 

&&t*a diatlnetlon of Hhe aoaBeaal end the liiTinwnot. mui the 
HKHBaeallf'n bifurcation of reality «ind appeerenee are note- 
worthy.^ Even the j^lloao^jlee, »«ch es those of HM-GClltua, 
Hegel , 3peno«r, BexseoB, etc., whlcii tsffim the earlsteiee of, 
«Bd eet atcere hy cShaage, ere no better off, when they "also 
indicate the Inteoeity of the craving for the sure fiad flxea," aittf 
deify "<a»Qnee by making it imiTersel, regular, awre."* la e 
vnrd, tlie theory eoneeirning: the two allayed, aif fortKit orears of 
eodstenee with ptirtioular prefMwice of the fixed, ultiaate, 
cmiTcreal end tmseen, to the chaaging, tronaiart, mrticular, 
aad naaopl finds its origin in tJie society of the prladtive 
peoples CEBd la the speottlatire Taorient of tl»ir anperstitioue 
belief in tfie exietccce of the sapeniBturnl as distiaet fro« the 

Hoerevev, the ther^ry rests r>n its own bests, viewed in 
the pesspcetiwe of eultoml history, it grows out of the pre- 
carioas onoertalnty of life and is kin to animistic religion. 
Tet, in tt^ Mat -dry of thou^t, the srguraente fnr it are not 
sheer soptiistxy in the Interest of anotional eongeniallty. 
ISie intricate relatlrm of min--. to iwtore or to sense can be 
felt in our ereiyd'^y ezperleBce. ?e take uncritioally on our 
lips aU abstract teme that cennot be sensed in the ]^Bie<9l 
•mrtroeaent. Bow ease thsee ^neric tense that are abstracted 
frosa particular evetite? ,lKit is tbe relation betweeo things 

^Ibid. . p." 56. 
''ibid., p.50. 

tbotij^^bt of end tblagt iNMMtA? Xn aBthcnatioe, thai^a is 
a ctirlouQ Qfrsflmmt bet««aai thttn^t aad fact* W* mtftk out 
watlMwrtical lean in accordeaee vitb our logical rvescoing 
end find tJbam fruitful iu the ps«dlctloa of iihyalcal erceita. la 

etttor vorae, tMngs ob«f/ tlaoac laws. ^ 1« » t£i«n Is tlie 
r^Uitiou betseen miad and tlxe v<nrld, tite aaatsl aad ish» pbysioal, 
or thott^t actd fact? ^'ore there a priori pr>ineipl«s» auch aa tho9« 
of cauaalltjr, dedu&tioa, inducti&ia, etc.? If there be, ore th«7 
raflectione of the n&tui« ox' the imiverae* ae are they 2ier*e norkingia 
of the iaind? l!o«i thaa do the vot^luga cf the mind refle^rt th« 
teppoQings of the ptqraioal vcrld? If tine derivati jb of ki^w ledge 
troa eeoae eoq^ieneiice preauppoae a priori priacipl^^ aad the 
latter Iw the ^neiice of edoid, mi^ , t^a, educatio:^ tK?uld be 
troinliifi; for the appreteasloa of t>h»a* priaoiples to the neglect 
of sobjeirt-aatter. rouXd set It^ic, »hi«h ia cocveiitloztall^' Sihe 
study of Ictvs of thought, beoose thea the aain oourae of atud;/ la 
tbe edueation of the jrosoBc? Ham do tiaese lava of thought take 
•hape la the gravth of aedad? At this point we sight hatre to 
aitelt the oreatlTitar o£ aivA, which, in rirtue af its a priori 
pvinclplos, eil&er discovera aad is ooincldent wi^ antecedently 
existent lass of fact, <xr creates the really of the world, a 
VQirld iriiidi is a product of its op^^atl- na« *ec^*tsF.ce of this 
ereetlTlty of aind vculd lend count enance to a p£y(&ol :*, «?hlch 

vonld he near c/f kin to faculty psycholog:,' , and theory of 
education, whlcb advocates nontai, if not foreaal, diselplins* 
Both of tliese poasibilltles are so ahhorrent to aiodomists in 
psydiolo^ tad edueation! Of course, the assupticm of 



a priori prisclples is only an H%tmp% to anavav the inroblan 
of the relation between thought and fact and to «xplaiii Hm 
nature of laind* 

If we foUew the Baritieh enidFielete la refttalag to 

adiait 8 priori prineiple6« we etiU have to face the pmblaa 
of the p87«hologicsl dusllsm of aensation aol reason. Lotiee 
refitted the esiatepce of Innete Ideoe and the ln&«pend«3t 
ezlatcBce of soul, yet ho retained the active operstione of 
idod. His '^redn ectlon", tis Brett stetea. Is *'a fuaetioti omad 
hf Bothln.'?''.^ TbRt kTW«le5|«!e la obtilned throueji both aonastlon 
aod thoa£4it ia ^ltho\!t doubt, fba fbraer la data; the latter 
plejB the role of orgmjlzer. ISia problesi would be l3ftai(^fieant 
if it did ntst ijiTDlre the preso^^sltionB th«t serasation la 
aizp«rieati'"l, wliile tlioaght la «BipR7>-«3?>ii>icnl; that eatpwrlenca 
la otocdc, orf>aalzad by a aynthetic faoulty; and that ae&aatif^n 
and thou^t, or perception and judgaeat are two di^tlaet, aaj^rate 
sta^s in the erolotion of knowledge. Tbeae would bring In th^r 
train a :Briori principl«a, and brli^ up again the p^nblMna Juat 

Tbe relstinn between the kzKmer tm.A the knamx, oad between 

jpeeaan scd sense baa eagaged the ^rdttit iadustry of i^losophars 
end p^c^ologists. SHMded^ la sheer subjertire retloolnstioa 
If th4 world that ^ Is aot Itxoini* viiat we perceive w>uld be vjr 


Brett, G» S.» A Hiatcary of Payctolt^ , vol. £, London: George 
Allen & Qnin Ltd., lOEl, p.S60. 


paoreept, when «e cannot pierce throuir<h, as it «ere» the v«ll 
of our senses. bat then r«illy Is mi&d? Bow does it 
Intoract vith bod? ot r»tter? These ore questions tbst bsve to 
be solred If ve cio not vidi to f r 11 into the pit of dualism in 

Tfblch interaction Is fsfreirer a a^stevy. i%b tmo possible 
solutions would bs: (1) to place tlie two realities, Bdad amd 
■Btter, in the se»e order of sxisterice, or (£) to aagate the 
exl8t«noe of the one or the othsr* Vtm latter ooaxee leads to 

spiritual IflR or fi9Bteri<»li8»» m the ea«« vm^ be. c<Haoeniine 
the p^(^olof<;ical relation, we hare to know «hotbar atcaalo 
aenseticns are really existeotiel ead ueed either a saperlor 
faculty to organize t5 em or intrinsic paydiolopical «? 
jAyslologie?! lews of oeaoelatlrfl toaceoimt fcr their synthesis. 
If not, are teey only ebstraotlona drswn in the cmirse of 
Itttgatrf enS ere they et firet eontlcaous with tho^i^t, foxfsfng 
an •aiperl«)ti''l or beharlouristic unityt' 

1!!^ t^-'^'lr>n of mtnd to the vorld and of mind to 
sess'^tinas itif therefore, ravf int3?l(^te. .J.thou.^ duslisB has 
an Ivrtitional origin, supporting crgosents for It are, nevRjp- 
tbeless, rsticisal. In the presence of pearticular evmxts, tbers 
ffiust be snaethiiDf: t^ich unifies ssid organizes* Definitions, 
cottsspts, pr loci pie 8, ideals are nsesssaiy in orjJer to llvs «a 
ordered and hsppy exlntence. '.sA here problsois oriso. -re 
tliese univereals ereeticna of the slid niiich ca-sts in its .-aold 
the aanlfold of sensations? Or, are they the structure of the 
world and disoovered by our raiod? i'argutaeits adTsneed bgr 
philosophers in Hie pr^t &re subtle but by no teeans tri^inl. 

fb» aducetloasl Impllcati'-'iks iGTolvaA Ix. tills 
discussion of tbe relstl^.n betwvan alnd and the vorXd or seasatlona 
er« too svldent to escepe our notice. In aduestloa tbere ari* 
th3r»; persnni^l problorru, ^ rt z. , '1) Bow <U> we gz^oir.' (£) jflov 
do «e learn? and (d) Tor whdt -jts we eaaented? I%« tjltinate 

alB of education has often he&n ia«xitifle€ frith ixmamion with 


tha itbaolute* Thm world is Tiered «8 both stlK&xlus and hisdrai^e 

to tbe Blnd*3 ai^rebeosiou of tiruth and r.tcQlsc'.eRt f.i the bl^ir.o. 
l?yutb, fca<mledf>',o, «p Ideal I3 gtvot! an existonti I stctiits mteeedent 
af eathorltatlve truths iKuideddoBii l*y trsdltton. as a nstural 
ct^nsoqcieaco of the eeperstloB of sense erpefirlesee tToto. thlBkiag 
by eiidoni'i^ the latter with e seif^auffielest pover of syctbesls* 
trftdltlocal belief in the fotssnl potency of the soul rlth Its 

■^■Plntc ns,v- be 8ai(3 to be the first ic the histo?:^ of educational 
thouglit setting forth tbe Tlew tbet the ultl'ute purposa In 
the ntirture -f loind lo to ettsln to tbe I'lvino, A]^i8totle 
tlu>aght that the life of coat«tiplstlon is the aspiration of 
■sa and t^e ultlniate altt of eduoatloiLL. J.thau.Th taking the 
biological outl k ea bia polat of departure, be Tiewad reality 
as a process paaslng from potaatlelity to sotw lity, famm the 
8iii^>l« to tbe eoniplear, yet tbere le, to hlia, a purpose l:::ic2ieot 
in these actofiUzatloiui, i.e.* tbe life of oont«Bplaticn vherein 
the soul attalixs to its utaiost pearfectiosa, or r«^o& aelil«rea 
Its conq^ete de7elopR3ent« TIte separation between inind and 
ztfiture wr.s accepteci iu the I^lddle iiges. ]iidttc&tloix et that 
ttms was controllftd b^r tlie dbnreh and «;» a trsiniiig for %h» 
h&ppiiises of future life. Coaenltts was definitely isflusncea 
by Platonic duQlisrn nfien ho ^Bphaaiasd the superior /vntus of 
•piritu, 1 life iu educatic^i. iiMitalozzi's hemonloas doTel^pae&t 
wiH particular osjphnsls on aorallty smcckea of ;hG same reilj^ous 
piety. Frttbel*s oystical ^bsolttte is the most striking instane« 
of the unity of the individual with the DlTine. 


oducatlooal counterpart, formrj. discipline, ezerts Its 
perrasire luHumco, jubjac%-matt«r lu Uxe achool la taken 
as tbe tool for the geaesal isproveBBaat of a taken-for-grE.ited 
^a«ral ability. IndlTldasl dlfforenoa and liit«a?e3t la 
xieglmiteil, beaidee iii&itt93f9ac9 to t2ie ccaterit of oubject- 

BaiJiaaia on the ereativlty of alnd, on the Intrlaaic 
relc tlofifliiip of the atlnd with the Ijofiziite, &u& o^ the true 
boi «g fii' universale, ao exaqplifled lu aoi^I lieola, la 
Intellectuttl and afnthdtle priuelpl^e, '^s distlAct frosa 
pukrticulars , shofim in Ib^ulalTe b«h8Viour, cUaGtlc asosationa, 
h&a tiiua inarkdd the content of retioa. 1 pcydiolrvgy rsnd 
idealistic i^iloaophy. ^heax tkis eiBidiasis la cpplitd to the 
direction of educatiorii.l pjreieLice, iiroT-loac crop up conteKiing 
authority h& f-gainst fr^»de«, forr.ol discipline &» ageinet 
subctantlel leGmi'£:, future life as ae-litot pi'oaent existaice, 
and liberal es agsiiist trccetlcaal studloa. 

To TGQtoTfe the balance, ve have to refozBiul£.te t)i» 
eoneopt of mind In it 8 relation to the wox'lc! an^-*. to sense 
Sfjcperieuces. T?iis is Dovey's asain endoa^cur. /jid here ^e rmsat 
sttestpt to see hov he bcscs his solution oa the suggestlouB 
of i^Bt philosophers. 


TBuire ore two probleeu* involved in dualisr , yjg- ., i&» 
the problcBi of setting miad o?er a^inst n&ture, and thet of 



Betting mind over against senae, Cne la philosophlca ; 
the other Is psyehologlcal. Eovarer, in pnst philosophical 
dlscusaloaa, tiic two wot© eoslblBed. They are so Inter- 
ralated that oixe cnxiaot oepajwte th«Bi In two deportaontal fields 
without feeling a swass of Incompletoneas. B«lnd in the 
p^diolo^cal amae as the unity- of perceptions Is eosily 
f^iaed with ndnd in the eplstenolf^cal end Bwtephysicel sense 
as a superior reality over against the phimaseaQl. Hiis 
comblaetlon In the dlsousslcn of the mental Tcreas the phyelcal 
is a result of philescphere* yearning for unity and coherence 
of thcu«ht. In Dewcgr «• can likewise find this eos^r^mxsiv* 
treatment; hia payeholofflr is a philosoohlcal treataent, lAfle 
his philosojdiy Is a p^chologlcal treateent. 

We amtlon this point, beeauae Dewey in his early jresrs 
Joined hsnds with British a^pirlelas, Tjertlcularly with Lock© 
and Wmm, who analysed ths psych olcgleal mech riisRi of mind with 
a view to proyln« ttist kao«led«e originates in experience and 
that Bind or soul 10 a spiritual entity is only g ccmfortinf? 
supposition to the heart's content of tiie philosopher,'' fhis 
oeaMnatioa of psychol ^y "Ith j^l isopby by aeans of the 
Msasaclon that reality laust be found or based in experience 
is Dewey's point of departure. 


Looks, J., An assay ^^oneeraing TItaRnn TTnilprgtai ding. Bk.S, chap.23, 
35. u3ncs3Slng Quae's stateoents on the reality ef alad, ••• 
WllliQB McDottgall, Body and Kind. L ndon: Ustteten Publishers. 
Iflll, p. 72. 



This sugmwtion Is, latMfti^ « wmfy pi«eioua tmHtBg* 
IMiSMd oa to ixwsy. It is th« Teirf teglnniog ef the tStfosd which 
ia la tear woven into th« systoasmtie etructure of his thou^t. It 
1« tli€» reoey wwn on «^ie4i h« twas to attack the dtjallsR vhicli 
British iispiridoB f»ilad to axmihilate. t, <<%»^s 8tat«aent 
in fciio op«!iias<: eliapter of iide .SaBsas,' CotKxarniiig Ruaai Unfl«rstaading 
tykoa hi» ^ncy, and no ieaa doni Buete*0 puxi^ose. ifcie is 
wijy iB hifi two early erfcldea, ntwrnly, "The i^eorAol-iglcel 
atendpolnt*' and "Peydioioey As Fhiloeophlc .Method",*' ho opwOj 

LoeJce says: "If by this iaquiry Into th^ nature of tlie 

otidexstssdltig, I cicn dlscoTar tl^ pcwsera tlie:?eof, how fsr 

they reach, to what things they are ii* aijy detsroe ppopoptlonat^, 

and whecre tb«!^r fail us, I eiijjuose it insy ha of use to proTOll 

with thG bua:' mind of rnsn to l>© sore coutious in swddlisg 

with things exeeedisi^; its conprehenaion; to stop when it is at 

th« utffioet exteut of its tethei'; aiu! to sit down ia a quiet 

tfftoTmace of thoso things whlch» uron exsRdr.^tion, arc* foiind 

to h« beyoKfi the reach of our C5pi;icltl©e# .e shoaH not th«i 

pe3±apa be ac focpvisrd, &ut of i;n affootetion of «n tmiyeroel 

ICKwladge, to rtlse iiUestic-ns, and perplox ourselves assfl 

©-"Jiera with disputes about thia^ to ^ich our uMerstPTKJlnfgs . 

ure not suited, atid of which we cannot fi^ai^a in .vra* minds any 

elenr or dlstiicl; perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhnpa 

too oft«a iisTponod) tse have not aay aotious &t aii. i-^: we 

cea flad out how fsr the xmc'crstfindirig cea extend its vies, 

hew far it h>.8 faculties to attain certainty, and in what 

esses It sen only Judge and guess, we asy Icam to ccr^tent 

oortsolves with Khct la attaineible hy no in this state*" 

Bk.l, ehE.p.1. 4. 

%«w«y*s aynipathetlc attitude toi«ard Uaara is shown in his 
Torewrd to tho Ir^dera T^lUr- ry Edition", inn inf?n T'-'.tijrs aaft 
Conftttct . 1929, rp.v-vii, 

^^ttnd, ol.ll, nos. ^;1&4£ {J«E, & -iprll, 18S6), pp. 1-19 
& pp. 153-173. 

». - . * . . .v.. 


d«elares t>iet phllosopltlcal euquliy should h& teiMd q« 
j?«jrel»logir; In othar worts, th« pxoblaa of Hindis rel?tto« 
tu nattrre is «o be oolvefl In the ppotolet of mind's relntlon 
to aease. '^m be any. tha^t psycfeolrgy i, the iwtbod of 
phlloso^y, he trlea to erolve a larltaiy or monistic thworjr ef 
aind and seoae by trestia« tbm la the sane or-Jer of exlstano*; 
that is to say, mind end s^ise wclst In am axe experlenee. 
He explicitly sfcatee tlxat psycholof^y is "the explicit 
find accurate detarmliiatlnn of the mtta^e of p«allty in Its 
wholaiess, as irell as th« detenaiaation of the yaloe and 
viiliaity of the vAPloua elenoots or fscfcore of thia alwle. It 
la the ultlaeta sclenoo of reality, because Ifc declares 
wh; t «xj»eiri«ac-e In its toteUty is; it fixes the worth end 
laeaalae of its various elmente l^ ehoelng thalr developaant 
a Id pla<M within this ^lole^ It Is, in short, tifaiioac-faie 
^^•^toi.^ '»?tothlag shall hs esstsBsa except just e Qsdoaa 
(uparlenoe itself, and that the nature of ell ahsll b« 
ascertelnsa fvm mA within this."^ 

To take expepieace ca an all-irseltislTe unlvsree «tf 
dla&ouree Is what Timnj caliod la 1886 "the paychologleal 
stsudpoirf, in 1905 -the postulate of t-raedi te «rapirioiaa-, 
and la 1925 •'the aeipirlc'l BBtfeod". The following ipiotatioaa 

"Jayetiolo^ no lillosophie Method", op. eit.. -•153. 
^IMd .. p.154. 


would show ua the eonsietency of his thought throu^out 

tlie^w three scores of ye^ra. 

"??« aro not to deteraiice the nstui*e of recllty or of 
atiy objeijt of philosophic';! lacjuirf by orEmining it os it 
is Iti Itself, but only as li ia ixix •loment lu avst knovlBdge, 
In oar «cp«i*lciace, only ra It io ral^tod to our al-id, or ia 
<;g *idi»a**..» :.r, in the ordinary ^.ay of putting it, the 
nn-iiire of e11 objootp cf nhllr:s(^hlc-l Inqulr,' i'^ to be 
fi%ed by findiag out »h?t oxperlezice sayo about thett-*** 
*«.»thiprR , .nnything, fli/ior^rthlne, in the oardlnriy or neih* 
tecbnic'-'l u»e of the teisi 'thing'— —ere whet thoy are 
experienced as •,•*? oonrc^ete rson detcmlnete earperle.ce, 
Tarylaa, wi^ea i* varlae, la apeelflo ra:^! oleaenta, so 
th: t WO hsve ;■< contmot:, not betve<ia a .^eullty, and 
verious approariaietiaae to, or pheaomaaal reyrasea.ationa 
of Haallty, but Isetween iliffsrcnt reels of <■ * Uvvo, 
hvA the re dor la b^^ed to '^ox la aiad ti. ^, vhia 

stnndpoint, when 'an exi>.ir5.«;ce» or •sctor eort of experience 
ia referred to. *a<xne thiag* or 'acoa aort of thiog* la 
alwaya raoant.*^ 

"Raferwico to the prinacy aat} ultlaeoy of the ■Bt«ri^il of 

or(!J'nar/ ezp-^rierice ji'otcot.r u , in thf- fii-st pl>»«re, froB 
oreatiag art if! ci 1 probleeus shlch deflect the energy and 
attention of phiiosopIierE frc>.r'. the rod problcaBc thet 
artae out of actual subject sietter. in the aec/bd plaee. 
It provide?: e. chewk ov K^^t toT the conf;lual':>n» of 
I^lXoao^ihic inquiry; it ia a csaata;.t rmdiid«£ tiiut wa 
aust rsplcco than, as- ae<:^Mary reflective products. In 
the azperiaftca out of liiich thay aroae, ao toat they say 
b» Crnflzaiod or .To^lfied >y the nw> order aid elmrity they 
Introduce Into it, aik! the n«^ algnlfioantly experienced 
objcM"<;3 for whi-r^h the-y rurnlsb a Ketho*.. In tho thirf. 
pines. In aeeiag how ^h«^ th^a function in further aaQwrlaneav 
the philoaophlcal reaulta tbaaseXvoa acquire edopli'lcj^l value; 
thay sre vhet thay contrlbttte to the oonsBon experien<>e of 
aaa, instead cf being curiosities to be dopooltod, with 
a.propriate labels, in ^ isetf:<^i}iyal&&l Kuaeua."^ 


•"T^e psycholoj4c«l standpoint", op. cit. , p,2, 

*"Tha .PoBtal.'»t,e of InsBedlate '^tplrlclaa" (origlnsUy in J « of 
-Till., ..syslioi., f;nd >ci. lU, \'^1,2,, Jul^ , iGOr.) in 
I nflnqgce of Parkin on '"hiloao^rtiy 'ivA other aaaaya. -^^a-v 
iaeTsi'. Hoary fiolt, lOlo, pp.2£7-£3e. 

^ acpariwiee and Hatnre, pp.lB-In. 

nit* aethod Is ^n etteapt to ^Te rcellty a 
"posrcSwloglnal" or ei^lric 1 Interppetatira, in othey 
words. It la to define or describe i %hing in terrag of 
axperience. Tba oRtn ^wtlve i^, like thf»t of Brlttsfe 
IkpirlcisB), to attack "aosse «urTo*:t belief or Irjftit^itlnn 
tl^t clot" el the snuctlon of inn^sbe l^oas or necaserujy ooaoeptlons , 
tee nn orl^n la an anthorttrjtlT© rwel^^ti vn of i-eesi'^n"! cM, 
In aaaitlon. It su-rceeas Is cloln,^ ^s!rt »*Pitl3h ■spl'rlfiisen 
fail9-i?. to 5o; It InttsppTats mliK! and nat'or In tiMs Ifelit of 
»h9t one estperieacos . 'I'elf , c";?:;»8cl^tts'»i'?an, or MaS ahntjld not 
be aaattRed ©s entity beSjiad erTwrt/^nce, btit s^'a^uLS be fieflnod 
with refereace to experience. Ln<» so with tha tbtIt<'T'9'3i; It la 
no uniTeree If It lo not realized In an loaiTlflvwl. j«>««?eir, 

Dewey's Tie* of wrperlenee beers some re see*!? nee to t\wi 
vt Loeke who took exneFlenoe or Ides ns flenotlas «rt«rcal 
objects and Internul Bwntal otoratlons. rhls «««? edmlte 
•hen be pots down Locke* a etateraente coaceRiLig the definition 
of ea "idea* aaad tlie aetara of adad.^ 

•^Beccnstractloc in iMlogcrVs;/-, p,C2. 

*'*'Paychol<"g:-' fm hlloocyhlc i'^taod", oi>» eit . 
"Tfta Parehologlcsl 3t8iadp<iiiit'', op. cit . iilic^ Jsaoa 

likaviea states th?t tbe a o', -b 1 .v-Ti r, xi'e i i^tl c;r' Oi 
esperlanca «ea alraaay is:yliclt la Lucke'e Bud ijexta»la7*a 
■•enlng of "^idf^". "![?» eitai'lng; vedge for this laora 
eoaexata vasr of azidarstar-ili r^ the dusllan wee fashioned b7 
Le^a ahen ha »ede the vord *id@r:* 8ta^4 IndlffaraiStlsr for 
thing teid thoa^^t, end by Bexicalejr vliaa he said thst vhet 
eeemcfD. amm^ aeane by r-eslltlee i;:> exactly, v.l- L v*>e 
phlloaopher amaaa by Ideas.*" "lioes 'wonsclouaoaas* Ixlat?" 
in J^eays In Rt.dlcal "^plrlolea. Sea feric: Lon^aenar creon, 
sod o., I9l£, p.lO. 

However, L cke»s notion of Ides or- experience ia etlll • 
loose one. There la no Intrinsic unity, but - ho<)£«-podce of 
aensatlnne, reflections of mental functions, ' nfl mamtal functloningi, 
The defect In Loeke»« point of ▼!«» la the etataie chareet«r of 
Ideas. Intrinsic unity of subject ond object sniat be smi^t ia 
another philosopher's notion of experience. I'or this we nsust 
turn to Kant» 

Kant thinks thst experience Is oonstltuted throu^ 
aodiflcatlcQ of the givm by the Forras of Intuition and the 
Categories of the alnd. It is by Itself a eomposlte of seosatloa 
and thought. This is to eay thet tte thln^ we pcreelve is not the 
thing that is, but the thing that has bees imbued with the colour 
of thought. Eant's formLLation ia to solve the problam of how 
knowledge is possible in rlew of tto two eortrosses represented 
by retionelles! and enplrlclam in the account of the origin of 
knowledge. Tb him, eeasotinn and thnujrht -sre both necenaety in ths 
for^tlon of knowledge, jid he is inellned to the retinnal school 
he gives to thought a distinct and supfsrlor etf tiis; the a 
rl foras and catogorlGs beecrie traa»-experlenti«il. 

Dewey hf;a analyzed the conception of Kant's a priori 
thev^t into two aeanings. Tliought is trwted "in a regalstive, 
dixisetlve, controlling sense, as eonaelously, intentionally, aakiag 
an experience different in a detenalnate 8«ise and aanaer." And 


Joad, c» s. U., Ctaide to Philosophy , l ndon: Tietor Oellonea 
Ltd., 1928, chep'TET 


It alao mtmm ^'aanethln^ vMch ie nlreody Irtficncnt la ogf 
experioBM* as eooqpamd with aaeh other » or vlth any past ud 
future form of lts«lf ."*■ D«re7 accepts tho fli'st neanins 
of thoui^t, tliousb^t la the fu&ctiansl awwe of reccnetn<etiiig ezperlenoe. 
Bst be rejects the seeond gtee&lQg boccuse of Its referring to aa 
tiiaiinnir , stetlc power whieh cceta iz> its cstegorlee erezy 
esQwarienee oni nalces the outer world not ss it is bat cs ita 
ezeluaive product. This letter Tiee lesds to a c<^eluaion that 
ezp^rienca is not real lund ttist expeorience itaelf la aot or^^alzed. 
It is thiB ecmelualoa that leeway, ellaslse ^^ 1=^ "^igrchologlcal 
standpoint^, e&anot aet his seal to* :ft> hia, the world that we 
ezp«rl«ice is the world thst Iq, ^a& in ita inter&etioa with us 
ita cxiatoace Ilea. Oxs^aiKQti a is aot aa exelualTe a^lity of 
l^boBi^t; la ttve world, or^uilzatioa la already exlat«it la the 
of hlologic&l ^metlons, such ae iaatlsctive acts, hsblts» 

sad in bhe foms of soelal institutloas, such as eustCHS, 
folStioaX eoastltutina , ocoaoaic pxocoas, stc. 

Despite refutatioB of Kaat*s aprlorisai, Dewey aeoepte 
his view of the creative ability of Hxe Bind, sad the unity of 
en act of perception. Biologleel fuaetioa of thou^t la 

**Brporlence aad Cbjeetlre IdeelUn" (oristaallj in rhil. !tey. . 
Vol. 1^1 190d} in Influeaoe of Dagsji^ on Philosophy sad othsr 
Basaya, pp. £06-^7. 

^Ibld., pp. SO9-S10*; see also Heconstructira in tMlosophy, 
pp, 91-92. 

^Aa eerly ee 1387, Dewey in his f.rtlcle, "kaooled^e aa Idealize tioa", 
put forth his view th- 1 tiie Ider hoa two capecte, viz., the 
aeaolsg aspect aod the eslatvice sapect, both of idiieh ava 
ecrrelQtive to ea<A ether, "ierceinog*.. is interpret lag". Be 
tbsu^t at tbat tl e that thla Tlew wae like Sant*a appereeptlTe 
uaity. **nie isttitioa of Eaat*8 asne au^geata th^t both hia 
atrangth and hie weakaeee lie in the llae Juat ceuti; ned. It 
la his atreagth that he reeogaizea tlvr.t oa appereeptlTe imlty 
Interpretia^ eeaeotloaa throu^ cetegoriee which eoastitute tha 
syathetic coat eat of sslf«>consolousaes8 is indiapeasabls to 
experience. It is his weokness that he conceives this content 
aa nurelv loorianl. nnd hane* as forsal." Mind. /ol. 12. no .47 


substituted for Its transeMlMftal ehapactw. Mind is 

emetiv* aot la virtu* of its inliereut fogma and categories, but 
b*e«tts« of the biological aecessity of readjuslanents to 
Btttnral eveuts tliat involve uncertninty. I^itperienee is a unity 
of alud end ib ttear, e imity in wbicJi vdiat la given hea ctlready 
e aeaning gtT«B to it «.al is oontinuous cith the past store 
of ezp«rteaoe. Ibis is iwoat's familiar phrase, "somtlietic 
unity of apperception", which explains ;.ho continuity and 
reeoaatruetioii of ezperiaice ao much emphasized bar i)«»ey. Th» 
tso a score have ao qflorrtl on the point thit proseat ezperieic« 
is influsnoed by ^d ortsaai&ed into the systecs of Ideea «r 
w ea ninco , vhich la turn adds nMsniag to fatore ex.peri<wt«, 
or on %hs point that eicpcrience has within Itself the synthetic 
^P5P«rceptlTe activity of thought. Their dlaaigrewseot is on the 
nature of this synthetie, apperoepttv© sctlrity. ^aat thinks thtit 
it is taxmfil end taqilies an underlying subetirEtuBi, an ?^;^ irtxile 
Dmmr thiaics thet it is a biological netivitgr of ca orgonlffl! in 
its Polatloa wife envlrooBent, Desfoy is dead egalnet the 
retiooaliste* 'soul" ettich forEss elUance with rellrloue doeniatiam 
and givM hlndz'&sce to the laroaotimi of eeientifio knoirladge, and, 
on the other hand, he is disstrtisfied with the aechanicel inter- 
pret ..'tion in seasetlonalisBi; it is to be expected the^t be tries to 
belaace the two eztrectes, actlvlstt and ns^hmian* and thus tt» 
nature of appereeptiou is explained as a naturel event In int^v 
actions betweea or^^isKi and enviroiswct. The spontenecus, creative 

^"lixperimee and Objeetive Idealism', op. cit ., pp. glO-£ll. 
Brett, 0. r... on. clt. . pp. 348-34S. 

•< *■ ■" 


activity of %b» orsRiiiam la talna as a ostter of course In 

la £ant «« earmot find the reX&tloashlp between the 
^mtal GSbJt the pUyeioel, tenoalecigo of t^ie letter beisg d«iied. 
Wtkf t «« know is the projection Into the glTen of our Blind's quelitlos, 
which have their oaa lad<^wudei:.t exlsteooe aad have no counterpart 
in the aen«u£il vorld. dcieixtlfic loee ere not lews characterlBtlc 
of the atructuro of the world, but are produced througjti coafonolty 
at experience to mind's categories* im we have eaid, Cetrey believes 
th»t reality is Icaowable and. t>?Ht the zaemtal &ad the piiysioal 
•hould be ccp^le of free iuteractlniie. I'het experience is a 
unity of thicm^t m& s^ise I3 not aufficleat* :jcpeiTteiace IteelT 
Bust be reollty; it ismst within itself hare pcinciplea of 
ovfgaai&atiosu 2>lth this belief in aisd, Dewey la hia early stage 

of thought tries to read his ova view into llagel'a :?ritin^« 


believed th.:^t the world, in its atruotui'e aaA 
historic:^ evolutiui;, is too isonifeetction of Reoson. The 
Dialectic process in isdlvidu'-.l thooi^t and fact isj tbe rexy 
•nsence and rerelation of -his reality. ..ccordlng to Hegel* a 
Dialectic, the universe is e. rationnl evolution of the absolute, 
which particularises itself Ib the proceae of ccnflicting 
and iqrsttMSlBiug events. There ia sothin^: ooiqplote in Itaelf , 
lndep«Eulaat of other thingja. Ineotapleteness presupposes self* 
contraditlca and oppositi .n. Conflletiag oppositee then deutaud 
Q^theaiat ttilch will soon be focmd to be also inocanplete and 

Joad, C. it. a*, OP. cit. « ch£ip. 18. 

preaupposesa s*lf-cc:itredlctloa. oufllot of op'-oeltas a^Oii 
Mura»8, and « xum syntheela to unify them tyrnc upt egdn in 
•ftlf-ooatradlctloQ, again In aaotber nam ajrathaeia, ad 
Inflnittaa * ^aracn&l argusaata, acts of kaovlfli;, the at-xta, 
hoBsaa history, davelopment of anlmeta end laaniiapttm ^in^a* oil 
•xprasa tbia ttnandins? conflict-ayntheala ppocaas. In Haeel»« 
tacaai, tkara ara ttarM nooentB: the theaia, th« eintithaala, sal 
tha ■amtheais, fcrmtng a triad. IWLa contlmioua firocaaa of 
triada aiAodlee fiaalit^r and raeli^aa It ip the more and wrve cc«splet« 
•tagae of arolntloQ. In othep vroxda, naallty la tha ?eiy bei"a«ln« 
proee'^a and can be inrsapad throof^ knovledg« of its threa- 
aonant pxoeaasas. 

Applytn?* thia Dialect ie to tJiou^it arsd f^et, wa flM that 
Bubjactlve and objaatlve are only rel^tiva tertna in axpz«3slng 
the 7^1, tSste true, and era antuaily ecsKplerBeutoz?, baln<? |»rtlal 
ezpresaiona of tha Inooaaat. Lon of thnu^t and lava of fact 
are tttn. neeeaaarily eoineldent beccuae of thalr aasie darivntioa 
tromt {Ltd expfreaalnna of, the bsolute. 

'Shia intrinelc relctionahip batvecan tiUHi^t and fact lurea 
Timw* Dlacardtng Hegel'a hlishly apeeulativ© Abaolute, be fijiOa 
iprotind in Begel to aapport fehe thaala that axp«rlanc« la orgarlxad 
and orderly; and he thlnka that itegel*s loelo la aore akin to the 
•e&aotiflo spirit ageinet vhloh are apriority and denlQl of the 
poasihlllty of kaoving reality. For aelesae aeana that °'our Ideas, 
our judjMBte May In aoma degree reflect nad report the fact 


it««If«»* Seteoitiflc men are trtM to tho liuitiaet of tte 
acicBtlfle eplrit In fight liog ahf of a flUitlM* a priori 
factor snppHed to f»ct frcan the mind*,* Wkea H»eel calls thought 
Ob joetlva he aioaus juat what ho says; that there le no apeclnl, 
apert faculty of thou^t belotoglns to end opei^.ted by a isiad 
exlatlng eepapate from tfee outer »OTld. -^hot Hesel meana by 
objective thci^lit Ifj the raeanl ;g, tiao eigtilflcraace of fact 
itself; end by siethods of thou^t he understerilB simply the prooeaw 
in which this aftoalng of fact Is evoXTod... Ttelatira of t^juj^t 
are» to Kegel, the typical fowja of aaaalng vhich the subject- 
■atter tekas In its yorloua progsfessl^s stages of helsg uaderstood. 
And this is »het a priori lasajifi frc«B a Haeslian atoadpoint. It 
is oot sone aXflBent in kBowledj^se; soma edditioc of thou^t to 
«rparie&ce. It la <arperieaca itseif la its skelatos, in the attla 
features of Its f raa a aut k.*^ 

This itttoxpretsticB of Bagpsl's view of thought and ffect 

la highly irrtportaat, becsusa it Is the esm of Dewey »s present 

belief that ttilaklng is asthod end that waanl-g is objective,* 

Be ellQ^ to ths belief ttet "thioJciri^?:. . .la oothio* bat tho fact 

ia its process of traa»lQtlc« frca toote larpre; si <a to locoat 

Dewey sdialts in y- letter to ; IUIor Jaaes thst his 
ctmceptlon of process as on-galne unity of thought oad fact is 

•^"The -reaMQt Position of Logleal Ihoory*', The Koniat , vol.e, 

ao. 1 (Oot., 1A9I), pp.^a-13, — 

miokitts as method aiid l^emiag as obJeetlTe viU be diseawad 
in the foUovinj; chapter. 

ibid., p.3. 

Tether Hefsellan. Ite ate««it 

"It lOEy be? the eoatlnued woTklnc- of the H9g«lia& baelllos 
of roeooeiXlatlon of eontradletorlae in tarn that oakas 
m» twl sa If th* eonecptloQ of pxoewm glv«a basis for 
unltlae the truths of plurelisiB end nonlan, nnd elso of 
seewsslty and spontciaeltT'****! eanaot help fselln^r that 
an adequate anislysia of aetlrlty ijould ei^ibit the worXd 
of fact anf! the world ct liens eg tTro corro8T>0Ttde"t 
ohJeetiTe sfcoterwnts of the actlre process itself — - 
correspondent hecause ©oen hes a wcjrfe to do, in the 
doing of idaiich It seeds to be helped out by the other."* 

This is to say that the unity of thn«t(^t and feet is to be toxisA 

In actioa^ It io only in overt aetlTlties thet thiokixtg is 


aanifest and th» relfstional aspect of objecta is i^oira* It is 

oxdy tram the interaetkin betvsen the subject and ths object 
thct '^objects of knovledgs" ore derived. It ia also in purposiTS 
activities thrt the antinony of tiie authority of the tenehsr and 
the freedeet of the eidld is eettled. Bssay^s three steps In ths 
process or gettixig louysledgo* vtz» » **tlM ratM^dwits cr condition* 
that eroke thwight**, 'th© datuB or Irroediate laaterlel presented 
to thought" , aa& **tha propar ofajeetive of thcu^t" are diatinctly 
s Hsffslien tri;:^.^ Lik«)rls«» tbs ii!qpulsiTe bshavioor of the child, 

ths obstructions set by the teeehar and other children, end the 
rsaultinf: cooperetiTe, regulativs ntles of conduct in eurricxiltoi 
activities BTe a tried,"* All other traditional opposed concepts 
or theories, su^ sa utility snd culture, laan and aatvore. 

A letter to '%. Jastes on March £7, ld<ffi is H. B. ivarvj^ TSm 

Thought and C^wreetwr of llllaa Jesaest Fol, 2. Boston: Little, Brenin, 

^and :ioa«iaoy, 10S5, pp. 5lJ'-523. 

"IQBmrledgs as Ideelizatlon", op« eit , 
Issays in :3n>orimental i^^^^c . (^ieai^: University of rhicago Press, 

JlSlft, p. 104. 
aacperienee and Muestion. Vkm Yc«k; ttacsiillan wocapany, 19^8, chap*6« 

individual and aooiety, the futtire and the pr*8«at, ideal and 
x«ial, theory end prootica, etc., are thus respectlYoly 
oynthesized, obe^lag the fUodaiMatal law that xiothing ia self- 
oontained and eaa-b e defined in isolation, but that everything 
is depw^eat for perfection on aosething oth^r than itself and 
to be realized in the on«>going cooflictointegrntion procese. 

Ibcpeiriance is desoriptive of end really constitutes this 
process* Desey's ^a^jpoandio^ of a aaturolistlc aaetai^iysics 
that experience has within itself the ofarracter of uncertainty 
end stability cannot but remind one of Hegel*s teachiQ<7. 'It is 
only natural that thinking;, ^llcaopl^, i>hilo80phy of educeti n 
ere, to De«e:v', playing the role of inediQtor betveen ecmflietlng 
opposites in the course of Hegelian triads. 

The "Hegelirn bacillus" has the function of bringing into 
interdependMiee the individual and the world, thou^t and fact, 
but it still needs eultivati n. Ilie subtle logic needs factual 
evidence. Asd this Dew^ finds in the biological theory of 
edJusttaflDt. .:je ve must guard against thinlcing that Devey*s 

"^t has be^i shown tqr Sanders thst in D«wey*s Peapcracy and 
xiaucatioin the devel^praeat of concepts follove Eegal*e 
Dialectic . see V • J. .acdem "The L gical Unity of Job i 
D«w^*s Mucational Jtliilosophy, .thics ( \n International 
Journal of socinl. Political, end Legal ihiloaophy) , 

Vbl, oOft ttO,4 (July, 1940). 


pirsssiit conception of continuity between mind end the world is a 

direct roavilt of his belief in tbe erolutlonr.l theory, ilie 

blologioal intereetion principle is only rainforceeasnt to his 

early psychologioal standpoint. His early gtateoant ecaceming 

the interdependflooe of conecloaer. : £ aid objects for the sake cX 

evoiding a "thlng-in-itaelf to account for the origin of 

eonaolousness is aoteeorthy: 

"1%e pirobl«B is to reeo&eile the uad^ubted relatlTlty 
of all existence ae kacnm, to eonsoioua&ess, and the 
nodoabted depezid«ice of chit own c<'>a8ciousness« ^Jid 
It ou^t to be evidant that the only way to reeoneile 
tlie apparent contradiction to give each its xlghte 
without denying the truth of the other, is to 
tiilnk then together. If this done, it ^ill be seen 
th t the solution is that t^e eonseioosnees to lAidi 
all exist eace is relative is not our cousoiousneas, 
«ttd that our coiuwiouaness is itself relative to 
esBseiottSBess in ^neral."^ 

Cooseioosnese was at thet tine eynonyaous vith 

ezperi«ice« !o«, with aceeptsraoe of the evolutioBsl theory, 

traditional ^lilosop^ie terns sre changed to biol^^gieal terns. 

Oxgsttlsm is substituted for subject; environasnt for object; 

organiflaD-in-rslQticn-to-enviroiffaent replaces the ontithesis 

bete^ the kiuiear and the kninm. 2Cant*8 synthetic, apperceptive 

activity of the mind beoomes a satural function of titie orgnnloe- 

in-relatiun-to*eQViroiB88Bt; power or ability beecaes wcys <^ 

response; perception ati& conception bec<Mse organic function; 

intelllg«ice beoosies n natural character in the adjustment to 

^"Hqrchological :.tQndpoint'', op. cit .. p. 10. 


emrironoent • -:xiMrl«ace 1b synonynous with Intoracti n* la 
8 vord« ttTery phlloaophle eo&ocpt Is interprsted In terns of 
biological events. The Heesllnn triad is turned into the triad 
of need-effort»aati6factlon, or tbot of unstable •quilibrlTa^ 
atrlTlne-reeoTery of equilibrium in the life situstion, aid into 
the triad of problan-hypotheais-eppllcation in the school or 
laboratory leoz&i&g situation. 

S« here jost seid that Levey toam allicnco with tirltlA 
.^laplriclsn in the e»ase of nssertlag the <Mq?lricsl origin of 
knoBledge. The Be<^aniaH of this «iq>iri<ml orlf^in is found by 
ie«e7 In the aethod of ejcperlaental selenee, whi<^ is* to his, 
an erideace of the intrinsic continuity betveen the niestal 
and the i^sical. Location of the problerr.^ su^estlon of 
l^pothesss, end their application in seimtific research give 
OsMy aqple ground to refute the traditioBP.1 assumption of 
oi^osition which is to him totally factitious. In ezperiasnts 
there is m>thlng standing in the way of the experiaenter in his 
taeklinr; of the subjset-aatter. Ttbo Interaction goes on beit«< 
Mm and the situeti-^n. In the course of hie observation of tte 
situation, his construction of working tools and other tbings 
x^evsnt to the aehleveraent of the purpose in riev, b* 
dlstlngalflhss his experiencing fr-a what he sacpearivBoee . rhis 

'Sevey, J., "The Itoed ftor a Bsoorery of Fbiloso^iy ", in Creative 
latelUgance. Mse York: VLmaj Bolt «al Oci^QBgr, 1917, I9.31-3S. 

dlatlnctlon is but an «xpeai«it for facllitatlB£ tho attainaant 
to ^otl&lli^* Itethods, 1(3 Aas, c^ {srloclplBS originate in 
«aqp«rieiie0 end ere not aacluslra pzoducts of any a^f-sufficiant 
thought; thalr affioaey^ dapaode on thatr baing taatad In 
•iparienca. The ooBtlnuous Ir^rovatomt of technologiorl end 
BCiexitiflc knovladea taotlfiae to the fact ihat th«pe are only 
|nDgyaaal78 etwees of enriching azperieztce In tdao course of 
controlllQg aotursl exeats. It is anything; but Irre lavent 
to tbluk tlwt the knovlne sltuetlou c nslsta of a subjective Bind m^ 
trrvs aeBlos^ ^^ objaetire vorld. ?o Bewe/, the ksoving 
situation is e ai^titl-temporal pxocasa beglmiinG wit* « crude 
phaaa of experienee and ending In a refined ^mae; it is by 
ao neana on c£>soIute apatir:! entlthesic between the knoirer sa& 
ttM knoan. The kaoisn la ^ilwaye the tetninua of aai inquiry, 
vhile the given is ita occaaion aa<1 datuo. the individusl la 
a kno«er irtven he la beaet vith s difficulty In g altuation. In 
other vojpda, the thing to be known la not re^Jy-cK"^©, for the 
vorXd is not a "bl-.elc-unlveree*', ooffliOjeted sad aaltlng to be 
apprahndad* Ita growth aa eTldenced in sciaeitific progress 
la In fact nan's creation. 'Jn the other hand, K^a*8 sartftl- 
idiyalci;:! groath Is conditicjned by and originates in envlronjnant, 
A phase of this eontlmiity of «iaa with the world is best ex* 
oapllfiod in the aaEperinontGl inraatigationa of acienca. Mind 
or thou^^t la 8 natural character in the intemcti -n between the 
ezperlziaitor and his laboratory aibuation. Mind is alarays laind 
in the natural or aoci 1 enTlroaswat . Blinking la alwaya thinking 
in the problcoBtlc aituatlcn. 


Of eoors*, this orguaant for t.he continuity of am 
wl&li the world froa the stand poiat of the methodolof^- of experi- 
aeatal soioiae atlll does not satisfy those who hold the belief 
that the real world ia s. aubsistinfr struetttre of m^thflmstiool 
fimendas. to thwn* the iosoving process is but one of discovery, 
and not of ereetion; Bind is e spectator in its arinrtthezkaloa of 
the re&l vrhieh la Indepeadeat both of the vorld «e live in and 
of the loBoving aind* r>evey*e answer is thpt the exponents of 
this Tievr, ss cft«st called new realists, have neglected the 
context of knowled^, i.e. its antecedent situetir^n and its 
resulteat ehonged ai tuition. iHio fonser is no less reel than 
ths litt«r. Its isoletloB fxon the crigiaal condition and the 
process of attack by beiiK called knorlodfce is only n isatter 
of co3venlen.c«, tft ttJCft tho new realists set up a dtKillstlc 
philn^sophy, similar to that of Pleto*s two realcBs, which is 
precisely i^at Dssay trios to a?oid« In edoeation this 
eonstltutea e pxoblani in euzrieul^e construction and lesmlng; 
we sheU.1 come to » full discussion of It again in the fourth 

The biological as^CBMBt for the continuity of mm with 
the wttPld was sugggssted in the last section. The mcin thesis 
Is thftt an organisra in Its svolukion fros simpler form Is • 
part of its wGorld, its structure end netirities being id»ped 
sad ds t W Hti ned by its sxnrlronn^ant. The hifrher the stsfss of 

Sssays in I'acperl- cental L ^ c. introductory ehaptser. 


evolution the aniwal ham reached, tha zaore oonplex Is its 
structure osiA function, and the greater Its povor of actively 
(diaoglag the envlroa^^iect. tboug^ there are qualitative eb?~3ges 
in the seole of eTolution. there la still >- ImapovnX eontlsulty 
beteeoB tte siiqile esoA the eotaplex orgonlc fonts* Uan im 
hij^lily ecoples is bis structure and exhibite sesy dlstinetlvtt 
trelte of beteviour. llMy are act prireite j/heoaam^ within the 
body, but ere qualities of imn^s belunrlour in his iaterectlott vith 
enviinmmsnt, aRtuml or social; ai^ they are eelleci nental or 
eonseioos. BSistence of these p^^s^ictilar qualities la en 
aeccKnpaniinent of the derelopBg&t of bebevioiir In its relation 
to enviroistie&t. consciousness is an adjective denoting a ^^oality 
of conduct; it Is not r. noun denoting a asperate Indepeadant 
exiptenee; tbere <>*■« no mKital entities set orer a^inst the world. 
?he lo&edifHre d>>tuir is experience; in biologicel terss, it is i&e»- 
in-relstl n-to-esvlrtHsaent-prccaos. t)nly In this interaction txn 
we distinguish distlnctlTs saodes of behaviour, such as heetrinfi, 
seeing, r«iBaiBl>erinf^ lasginlQe;, ^inklns* etc. 

Uiis treatment of 8»n*s place in nature in the li^t 
of biology Is iM>t coBWon to all holding a biol glcal interpretation 
of behaviour. Den^ey on ttke one hend^ sets rid of the postolatioai 
of ultimste categories of laental strftes it^ieh lends to a 
dUQlistic vi«r of asA agod tbm world, and, on the other, be evelda 

humtVt J*t "Conduct sad Experience" in Psychol ><i^es of 1830. 

roxcester: rhiri: llniverslty Fvmui, 1930. 

the iBBObaolct'l, atomic Interparetotlon of bunan beha^lourt vhleli 
Ittsda to denlel of «he ectittaulty of ezperiencA and learss 
unexplained the ereotlve role of the Individual. BehaviourlflB 
as led by cteon is beaed on the Qdjustsoent theoiy. But its 
postulBtlcn ttiat bdiavlour is e ooaposlte of independent, fixed 
stimuli ond responses cannot esplain the dynamic, purposive 
•djttsilaHnt cS cBSa to Ms envirooDisat. rhat ■» depends oa 
eaTizoament, or that response is conditioned Xtj stianlus is 
not the final stateBeJot* 1!he feouril phenoiaena of continuity of 
exptf^ieEice in nan's interaction prooeos must be accminted for* 
Tliis is the r^Mon i^ i)e«e7 caasot dispense with tte fact of 
nentel qoalities of be^trrlour. End yet does not li^ support 
to the old faculty peychol gy« 

And here 11«b 8 difficulty in explaining tte pi^oholoelccl 
, BSObaniaB of rawital-physic-?! b^KTlotar. Pro/^-ene is tnede i*en 
ee stress the ln;twdep«id«nee of ra«m mt natuiro from tlie stand- 
point of biology. 4 priori denenta seea to be dislodged frtaa 
tliieir abode in hisnen thou^dtt. still, soit^ element of truth in 
traditional z^tlonal p^chology, as often disparagingly called 
faculty piychology, persists. ri>e rie« that dlCforsit lantitsl 
acts are partial macilfestatioas of the potency of the soul is 
aofv (Gorged to tho rise that an act is not any local particular 
reaction of organs to stiooll, but a total effort pot forth by 
the vhole oz^alsa in the reciprocal adjustrnent betveen It 

tiM eariruBEMnt* I'he potency of the indlrlduol is lq?lled» 

In fact, the difference between the old stud the aev eoceeption 
ia only s «Rttor of degroe. Ihe fctrnwr is a belief in formal 
poteaev, nva the Intter In the opptfraejitlYe vjretaci of oarperleace* 
Dewef adnits the fact of nan's "ereatltre Intelllgeno** • 
and seta sueh et<^e by It aa e t^ceansT^ eondltion of huoaa 
frogre^* Its oxlstentlel reality, ho^erer, needs explanation* 
la rational psycholof^/. It le the intrlnalo fimeticn of the soul; 
It has been BosRetimea aETsgser^tod aa a faculty lyinp doscnnt in 
the child* The buainesa of education is to vsloe it «p, as It 
v«r», by tminin^? the c^ld vith aasieasd stibjeot-aatteir. Ibla 

•xaegerated theory haa beMX xelied apon oa t.he support of fonaol 

diseipline as {Kractieed in education; bfut It hiM aot eoiae to 

t«EP!8 with the iwsrilts of recent pistrcJsologle'l w t^egtaigpta* It 

etiU. r^lns that "tres^fer of Isj^ming* mast be preatzr-posed, 

if EOt oxaggereted, in oducatiea. In otiier trarde, the crectlvo 

ability of mea in eoplng idth (^bcIpr coDditiona by virtos of 

idiat he learsed la the peat uaSer different oorsdltloaa Bost T» 

admitted. Ibis sssibb to beg x^st is In question; hovever, it is 

• aatter of fact. T)0v«y thinks tb£t growth 1? the enri<dinient of 

relatiaaal oonteats of expsrieace eoaseqiEeat upon contlnu-l 

latfiorectioa between iJsdiTldu-tl and ©xvirwEaent, It ae^ras tlatt 

tbis esatlnasl enrlchawit of the ^stsa of experience or 

SMienisg is both a aeeesaary and attffieittit ccadltlon of adapting 

to ehanglng eaviroacteat and of ebanglng tbe adapted enrironcioat* 

^'i&eireyTj., l^etaoerecy and Sducatlon. Hew ioeki .V>fe«alHen ocsqany, 
iSlfl, p* iM6t p. 71ff . Bode,' B. H., Coaflictliu-, w^cholopiea 

of Learning. Hew York: S* C Heath and Coaatpeny, 1929, ohap.S. 


Bat irtio organlzea this •ysteeet of carperieace? Uo« shall ra 
account for Indlvldu 1 differences, paytiouJ i arly fog th » dlff w fao— , 
particularly for the al£f«renoe of iriterpret itlr.n of laeanitig* 
iohezwnt In peireeptual experiesoe? Xihm. two iiidlvlduale are la 
the mBsam aaTiroBBMBit right tvom their birth, their experiecce, 
i.e., their interaction nith eaviromaat^ diould then be the 
Ma»; in other vorfie, their ability nhould be the sane. Bon* 
e^car, idantlcsl environment does not gnarantee identical 
"Intelligenoe*** A controlled, good environrent is not a 
si!fficlent, even If s necessar?, condition to ^ve oceaslan to 
"creative intelligence". Iimate capacity here ccffiseo, to the 
fore. The belief in tlie foxi&cl potency of the soul is true 
in this reapect. Devegr, in his belief in orgBBi«t>ln-relatlon> 
to»«nrlr«QKant, does not give a setisfaetory account of the 
ereatlvi^ of the organiam. Strict adhereoce to int^roctionifln 
lead* to as exag>;rereted corollary thet linking Is an all<out, 
overt process, givlag rise to the difficulty of eaplainlng how 
an organized systen of Meaning can beccose po«er or creative 
Intslligenoe if there is no agent to organize. To this point 
«e ahnll cone agftln in the next chapter to show that etneevated 
interectionism cannot give us a better ground in explainir.^ sffiital 
discipline, or, in taodera pnyeholo^ct^l tezms, transfer of 
learning in education* 

ttsays in acperl-»at.l i. gie. p.l4 & p.31. 

Ito third (uvgMWit of lytrntgr for ths contintxitjr of msn 
with the world ie toimi. In toe iiietoriof-l or eooinl origin of 
tbe th«ory of ksowIeKige, i.e., the problem at th« poasibillty 

of knowing. Thla appears in his early apeooh on *"!%• Sigctifioene« 

of the JrTi^lem of KnowIeae«», the malu purpooe of whicsfc is to 

pzove that philcsopb? took its rise in the eonflictlRg lasu** 

of life qM, aooorfLiv^l/ f thBt the pzobles of knowledge was to 

back up the d«o»ad that an indiTidual ccn dlscorer anel verily 

truth ell by himself. 

In the aocratic p<°!riDd , philr sophy is to re^vnlamtm 

old beliefs caid to dlsccnrer a proper way of lirlng in order to 

eope with the ohangine and eonflietlng conditions of Athens 

eoaaeqpent upon the industrial, p(»litical, and intellectual 

detrelapaanta of tbe day. fbe discuseion for & guiding porincipl* 

of conduct soon o«ne to the hands of '*thinker8" wlio took tbe 

prDbleis as on end in itself, and uncotisciouslj sex^reted theory 

tmn practice. However, philosophy was, as Hvtmsr stotea, still 

a ^ide to life aetivities when ciareek phll>:>fioptiy exerted Ita 

influence upon the developEaent of hristi n theol gy end lusral 

thisary and upon the osi^^dzation of lioesan jurlsprudenee. These 

religious beliefs aid social organlziations resulted in plaoing 

r^itrlctions upon individu 1 frsedoa tmA power* bought in its 

purpose was to liberate and guide cruduct, but in tiie Middle 

Agiss it becsme an oppressor of iadividaelity. iiosre, «aey thinks 

A speech dsllTered in 1897, colle^rted in Tho Influence of Darwin 
on rhilosoi^iy and ther aaaya » pp. r;71-a04. 

ttet thla "Irony of history" is inevitable, dne to 80cl;>l turraoll 
Bud political disintegration dxirlng mid after tte laraalona of 
the northern berberlar^, v;ith the paeeage &*" tlnse, aa authorlt«tiT« 
iodoetrlnetlcu baa achieved Ite historic gdselon, the individual 
began in the Henaiosecce to aasert his power* He hecrjie the 
euthority of truth. ..nd the probl^i of tte possibility of 
getting at truth wlthcut depeadeice upon aztem 1 euthority took 
its rlae. Fhlloaophy thus aet itself upon thla tnak. So, to 
D«r«y, the proltl«& of ho* m know the world is not one ariaing 
frow a breach between n-an and the worl*!, but is, whwi viewed la 
Ita proper historiccl perspective, a aseans giving support to 
the Individufil's efTort to attain kriOwlefl?,e. 

The three hundred y* ora* dispute on thn probleoi of 
know ledge should note eoae to sn ead, for the rerl solution can 
only be sou^t in tl» fxtuol cppllcetion of loMwlfidge to action. 
The t\to cl&ssii^l schools, r^tionali^aii cn4 eoq^lrlclam, have their 
iBsrlts in setting' forth respectively the necessary coaditloaa of 
attaining kmnrledpe. But "nihfm the nature and aethod of know- 
led{^ are fairly understood, then interest siust transfer itself 
fTooi the possibilil^r of knowlodge to the possibility of its 
application to llfe."^ 

Vmnft therefore, charges the Kantl^^n fonoulatioit 
of knov2«ige as the unity of perception end conception with 
the neglect of actio a, the ^l^e q]t)U3 n^p of the unity anS, 
hoiee, of knowled^. ab this is In line with his preaeot 
conception of kaovledge iu action, it ie interesting to quot* 

^Ibid.. pTsM. 


his early stBtenent expresae' four decades ago, 

"Knowledge can define the i:*:^roept and el^bomte the 
concept, but their union can be found only In action* 
The dzperlisent 1 method of modem science, Ita 
exeetlon into the oltlnctbO mode of verlfloQtlon, is 
•imply this fnct obtnlnlng recognition. Only action 
can reconcile the old, the general , ond the pena^'^nent 
with the changing, tlie indlvidu"!, and the new. It 
is ootlon sa progress, as developraent, making over the 
we^xlth of the past Into capltol with which to do an 
ealsrglQg eud freer business, that alor.e e.^n find its 
way out of the cul-4e-4ae of the theory of kncnledge*" 

Th« KgfBmmit frcn the historical point of vieiw is to 
iSiow that the problem of opposing man to the world «es <»rlginally 
to give assurance to the individual's attempt to se^ knowledge. 
It is only wh«i philosophers tske s means aa an end that a 
factitious ontologic£tl gulf existing betrteen mind and natur* 
is ther^^ created, and the whole dispute becomes much ado 
about nothing. This ontological dualism hsTlng bean refuted. 
Dews/ still has to desl with the l^ne->standir^ p^jrchol-^gical 


In philosophy, the relation of z'eason to s«^e h s been 
treats as that of a super-^ipiriecl entity to oeapiricrJ. data. 
Seoantions ere atoisic, and their organiz'^tlon into percepts and 
concepts requires an agent to perforin the task. It was Plato 
who brought out this pxoblsm imd tried to give to mind a 
superior reality in tha apprehensi n of Ideas, aiid to the body 

Ibid.. pp.S99«>3S0. 

tm inferior st^-tus becauae of ita obstruction to the Bind*8 
activity. ^stotle thought tiiet sflBsations vtnvA to re&son ia 
the rolnticn of mstter to fomt. The function of reaenn as 
tmificQtion snd or^tr.ization of sensation is evident. Descartes 
took thinkinjT r-a the ess«iee of soul and originstor of knosledge 
to the tot 1 na^tnet of sense experiences. i>ocke took sansations 
BB the gntewcy to kncml«d£o» and resorted to sons active 
functions of the mind to account for their unification. Rme 
utterly denied the existence of this super-enpizleel Bdnd^ and 
retreated to the autoaatlc associations of is^rensicns es the 
eause of knov?ledge. Kant recouelliated the two •xtranss of the 
eopirieal and rational school, but still asserter! thst knovledeft 
is posaible bm^sBJse of isposition of the fozos and the categories 
upon the sease-ssinifoa^ld. Modesn j^ycholngiesv often o&iiha^as 
the etoodo elovats of aestal i^eaoaena or the atonic aspect of 
stiORilBS aad responses* 

"Qkis tz^itional takan-for^granted belief thst a knosing 
process involvea t«o sap-^rete existential, stages, sense-perception 
and thouj^-eoneeption, or the reception of sensory stimuli aad 
central connections In the brain, naturally leads sup ort to the 
beliefs th-^t thinking is an internal affair, th»t involves the 
woricinst of a priori principles on pi6ce-3»nl sensntii-fna; that 


UoTTlB, % v., si» PhSMiitoi^ 
Chicago iress, 1932, p«14. 


itel processes ha7e their Independent existence nr art fma 
eo&taet elth enr iroament ; th?t envlxoa-nent Is e aedley of 
pertlcular things Innoceitt of oi^a!ii2fltl<»i; thnt lenmin^ 
eonslsta of adeorptinn ot sep>'^rete» dlsjointe' subjeet-matter 
to be Qsslrailated later In the alnd, (thus wftklim ! recitation 
and the understartdlcg of its meenlni; ere two separate tesks); thtut 
bodily ^oOlJitiee ftLnetionlng ee messsngers of the Bind ere 
insignificant in getting kaeidfldge: and thnt knoeledoe is a 
■Msital product or a result of apprehension of eose prior existert 
reality trenseeidltig the perceived world. 

Dew^'s sttf ek on this psychological dualisni la not to 
refute the ecmtentian that there is no sensation or Inferssxee* 
Ee dalles that theire ere seae^^tions as such or Mlf-lnclosed 
though giren in crdinery ezperlsoee. In ordlnnry experience, 
there is only r^ series of eets in vhidi senseticas and reason 
?ire unified »id are not teleologleally discriminated. It Is 
only after analytic^?! research that we discrlnicpte those 
siisple oental el«sents and a distinctive taode of behaviour 
celled reasoning. Dewe/'a main purtxwe is to prove that 
tlfeoai^t is not Indepwtdert of euvlroiE!iaat, thus shutting the 
door to a priori knowledge; tbet etxperience la not, as tradi- 
ticmclly thought, a hodge-podge of sensations but is a continttota 
onr-going concern in *hich principles of connection ere itsplioit. 

*DeBey, j7, The Beflez Arc Concept in Isychology", Psychol gical 
Vol. 5, S0.4 (July, 1896}, pp.364-3e5. 

la other words, tbougbt is elways thlQklnr: scooething in a cours* 
of onrert actions with a purpose in Tiew; Bens^tion Is Rli?t>ya sen sing 
soaettiiag that stimal'-tes tbinlcins. Tliere is prioarily an act, 
an Qct i^ieh is eostinuous vith the p!«t and the future, and 
in which individusl and enviroir»est , thought end swiacti ns er« 
in reeiproesi ad^izstRent, There are no sepnrste fl«a»&tioas end 
thought existing apcrt frriS each ether and froai MOMtfaisg m m m t A 
and tbouf^t of. 

It is only vh«i there is oneertain^ arlslne out of 
the wiTiroiraent and a auitahle odjiistiaent is wanting that 
sensQtioa qtts s<nt8tition ea^»a to the fooua of attvaticn aad 
thinkl-ig invol7i".g firisl response is incited to moke a»er the 
situati:}a. Hne prirKxy fact la coordiaatl n of actlrities, 
the stiKultts or seasi^tloa h«ix:g thst phase of coordinatioa 
to be attended to, and th» reepoase heing the other phsee ot 
eoordiaation to coaplete the act. They do not exist by thwa- 
■elres, but are functi ne th&t s^re either to be defined or 
to give a-i^etl n in the face of disintegrating activitlee. ' 
So it is only in such a case thnt V0 can esy thnt eessetioa 
is a dfttum of th<«i^t; bnt still the foraer and the 1 tter 
are anlfied in erperienno, in act or in adoptive ceurse of actit n 
belareen organian and ^iriron eiit. 

To illustz^te, let us be^in with tho simple case, I 
mm « ll«^t. In (xrdicisxy ezperieuee. It is prloarily an aet 
of eeeing, iaToL?ir.g no antii^thesls between tti© subject, ^I", 

•'•Ibia. , p.370. 
^Tbid. . pp. 368-369. 

end the object, ''Ilcttt", or t a l wii k « blurred sensetloB aa 
■tiaMlua aad a lif^t Tlslf^n ae responee. Thia act le eontlnoous 
vith tba atreaa of acta in the li'SMMilete pest end aersaa into a 
esoeeeedlag cet* %>t until it ta interrupted do I tske notice 
of it. ^liam I eaiuiot determine whet it le In the conteort of ngr 
pIiysicel<*sBental sctiTities, euch aa in taking a vaUc^ olwearring 
the erenisg tky, htUng aslced hy eeraeone to look into the dlatanee, 
«r Hiet sot, the liftiht turne oat to be s eti ulue or sMis&tion, 
aod beoomee a datum of tboogbt, which srleee out of \meerteinty. 
It leads to the queeti' n of nai^t Is It?" or "ihat does that mean?" 
It is "tlk&t pkase of activity requiring to be defined in order that 
a eoesrdiuation uaj be eoaq^kleted.* Thinking then involves 
sugsestioaa of "things" to deteraiue the "thiog" in question* 
In the case in qoostion, t?ie use of, say, a telescope is iavolved; 
this ia also an aet larolTing sensori~BK>tor eoordinatinn, other 
setivitiea rro evoked relevant to lb.6 detecsdnstion of tte "ewi- 
•stlon". It is aa overt process, eontinuoos with the "saner tin" 
is questlr-n is this prTtienlar eontert of eTporience> i.e. tha 
aet of sael!ig 80iBethin«^th3t-*i79an8«scimethinr: csnidst the bif^er 
aet of taking a velk. It is in ccnstant reciprocal adjustment 
with sans'iti txs becaues of its suggestion of other "8<»S'>tions" 
sod their reai^oti^e checks upon its effectiveness. lias, when 
the li^t Is finally distinguished as z lii^ht, ths eoorSlnrjtioa 
la eoa^letsd; in other worda, the act is unified. Both thought 

•easatioa are therefore activities of the oripnlsnsi-in-ite-relationF- 

^Ibid. p.siss. 


to-^iivizHUSoent. both ay* ziot psychical nm such; both are aots 
in and of exrerisnc** 

To l.«Mey, psychlesl Bseerus s speeial ao(i« of phyaical 
oxist«no«»~ itiere Is no QBtlth«ais betvoeu ASBtal nn<3 physieal 
«bea soaw distl&ctlv* trelt^i appear iu »>a« aodes of aetlvitlos or 
iriMB « thiols eat«ra Into a new relstiuu »ith 'Anothor thing. ^ 
oall things tabl*, chair, paper, p«i, eto.« Je^pi&e tj^e faot that 
th^7 &r<i £iad« up of pr<4toaa axul elACtrons; and so wa eall scaae 
moaea of bohaTlour ausatal JUi 7irto« of thalr qualitatiy* traits, 
aueh as thinking, ssuaiug, raEBaaborin^., 8»ai::i,^, otc, despite the 
fact that thaor are but oaergy iii£<tribuiiluaa. likewise, whaa «e 
piircsiYe a tree, are stay oall it a percept* But, ao Dsmerj raaorks, 
^i;o cell 9 tree e percept la marely a saors say of saying a tree 
is porcsived. It tells as nothlag about Uu» tree but soewthiug 
s'ocut a &«s rslatlvm Into vliioh tho tree has euterod. Iitstead 
of cancelling or aslnerglzts the tree. It tells of on additire 
property isow taken on by the tree, as uiuuli so hs if we had said the 
loe* was votared by rain or fertilised* ..i^ tree, «hea it is 
pereeived, is exporlenoed is onm way; wiien retasabertid , irsflceted 
ttpoa, or adalred for its be&uty, it is sa(p«neu?e>i in other ways. 


Qy a certain figure of spsaeh^aoy call it as expericDOs, sseenliiK 
thiit it ie experieueed, but we eamiot by any figure of speech oall 
it an wrperianaiug.'^ 

nioug^it and seoi^tlon ars, therefore, psychic in th* mww 

■^^''Th* Need For c Recovery of i'hll sophy", op« cit «i PP«44-46. 
"Conduct and iiizperlenee", op. cit., p. 415. 

thet cfiCh of tbem Is !?■ distinctlrs mode of cct or expttrieae* 
to e cpttelflc end. /jb Just sold, they both ?re csctc Ir « 1»»1 
•oatext of experienoe aad ore tiMneelires «zpexl«Bee. '.'M.b eoa* 
M9tloB la i?iportant because Dcarey Is eonetently alert agninet ao^ 
SWTlral of the dOQllstle conception, eucb en t)mt of treetlng 
■antcl ixro cesses apnrt frrm enrizoa'^ent. Acta must be sets in 
soaettiine; ezpeaploielng waai be sorperlenclBf; la vtiet is experienced. 

In fine, D««ey*s soDoepticc of the oontlnulty of sMisstlon 
and reamon awens that thegr both nre in the sasMn order of existenee. 
fb«2r sre not eestitles es sisch* one beln^ Inferior in mlue to the 
other because of^lte fTn^ventar^ (^elity end beentsse it is eonfliMd 
to A materirl vorld. Buth ore acts in rel^tim to the enviroiawnt. 
In fact» eeo««tion and thrust ere elvays ftised toother in 
ordlnoiy ezperi«ice. :>en8!^tii>n Is net bore seosntion, bat s«n- 
WBtioa wsenlng eoasthiag. X see a red li^t. ' r^ed" ia the cbjeet 
«f i^ ect of saaslng, end at ones I'l^Ues the jud^scnt that the 
object is red. It is this T«rjr ftwi~n or eontlmiity that ecnstitutes 
tbe verr OQstei^e of experiosiee, ^» grorth of assnine* 


In the ^aresoing sections re here tuAm ecTf^lielt the i»olBt 
that Dewsgr tries to relste thriup^Jbt with fact, stibject with object, 
asaital with piiyaieal, reas^m with ssase. In his eerly ph£se of 
thoQ^t, he f^ves a psfdtologie'^l dMcription of reality by 
Identifyi a g exi>erience with reslity. U'iter, he takes the bio- 
logieol thsi^y of adjustsaeat as the sole sapport r;f his "p^- 
eholi-gieal standpoint", by asserting tho intrinsic dependwice of 


ovgociam upon enTlruomont. Hla ran In pxirpose la to unify tiM Mw 
Mtecpriss attking tham inteTdapendmit. Hovever, there is a all^t 
shift of flBpbasi? r«c?>rdluis tarn iai«xd«iMKi&«aec. Before acceptsnee 
of tbe evoltttioaal rieepoint, Devey aeoma to be sere idealiatlo 
in easuaing that 'all thac is, is lor eouacloQaneaa' , or "the 
BBture of all objacta of pixiloaopalcsl latjuiry la to be fixed by 
finding out what experieuce aaya about than." ^Iber ita aocdptance, 
lie is inelined to a mar« oaterlaliatio view tbet tbe individual 
ia indivi(iual'»in->rdlatioa»to-^a7iro&meiit, that aubjecti/ity is a 
ai^eeial laowe of objectivity, th(it thooe^t ia iriatrusental to 
adaptation and erolred fr-^x evolution, helative oi^saia oa. either 
aide does not chang« his negative attack on dudjilt^ aau his pcaitive 
fozBttilation of the tuiity betwe^ eubject end ob^ct. each is a 
pert of the whole, experience; each when tak«n Ytf itself is in- 
explicable and awaoingleas. 

Expeqrience is then hu enecjqpaaaing usivarae of diac ^^rae; 
every term is to be explained it It, To Dewey, terma auch sa 
"eeif, "aar* , "reol", "Ideel*, etc., ha/e tiieir exlat^ooe only 
in t^ie coure* of exp«rieaoe, and ahculd not be taLm for grunted 
aa a priori or defined by sheer diolectic. ior aeif-auffloieacy 

Impliea the introduction of occult caiiae which science icust fl^t 

irtqr of. croea refare&oe in the inquiry into the nature or the 

ling of teroM or thiuga is bt^ed on the very fact of intear* 
action, which glvea experience a double-burrelled laebBing, 

■^■"-a7cl;ol.>cical Jteeidpolaf, op. clt. . p.2 & pWB. 
^J'JBa'aya ia ::jtperla»ftntol Logic, pp. 70-71. 


^Cttyerlencej inolvAsa jrte| an do and suf for, yh gt 
tbtv strive for, Ioto, believe nnd «itdure, end aleo 'how 
■SB sot and are aeted upon, the eaya In which they do cud 
0affer, dealre asd enjoy, see, belieire, iaagfae — ^In 
short, procesoea of cyp^rleacinp: , • Experience* denotee 
the pisnted field, the sowed seeds, tbc reeped hBrveata, 
the ehesisea of night sn^. day, apzlrg snA sntUBsn, rvt and 
dry, heat tmi eold, that-- are observed, fe^tred, longed for; 
It eleo denotea the one who plants aid renps, who woxics 
end rejdieee, hopes, fenrs, pinna, lnrok«m sagic or 
chesdatiy to aid hl-i*, who is downccat or trltai^hant. It 
la *dccble->b&rrelled* in t^it it recognises In It a priaary 
integrity no divlalrn between act and a»terlel, subject 
end object, bnt coataina than both in &a unena3jr»ad 
tctnllty. •Thing* fm& *th u^t*,«»»«re alngle-b^rrelled ; 
they refer to producta dlsGriadn'-tad by reflectlou out 
of priaszjr errerlonce*"^ 

Szperleaee Bey be cospcred with "life" and "history" which Involve 

likawisa ap» tl-^^l-te-oporel activities between ufn cicd the world. 

•It la sl'?nlflcent thet ♦life* ffrsd •history* have the 
a«Eo nUJLneaa of lutdlvid^ iaeauin,'T. Life denotes q 
funetion, a eeBpr^^oaire activity, in which orgnniam 
a&d environnemt are iaoloded. tjnly upon rafleetive 
analjala does it break up into external esadltiojM--* 
Qir breathed, f c cd taien, gjwiind Kallosd upoai-— and 
Internal stmctures— -luaga reapirln??, atcsMteh 
digestiiig, lege «aikine» !&• aeope of 'hietory* is 
notorious: it la the deeda aaeeted, the trsgedlea 
undergcna; and it is the btsfoi eoBaeut, record, end 
interparetstl B thst inevltaibly follow, ''bjeetlvely, 
history t&>es in rlvera, aniaitalns, fields zad. foreata, 
law* and institutions; s«b3e«*tivel7 it InclwJea tlie purnoaes 
n«n{^ ryL-^jm, the deairea ami anotione, throug^i «hleh these 
thlnga ere c^dninis tared sai trenaferaed."^ 

To 'ewer, iKtersctirm involves taaporel continuity. 

Iliia fact ir evident aa whet and how we (11<3 ex^^rts inflneece npoa 

whet end how w* do, -^nd the reclproc 1 adjustawnt of the pest and 

the present influwieee wh^t and Itow we «hr;ll do. It la ais^ly a 

■etter of couraa which we Bc»roely In ordimiry eaqwjrlanco tek** 

'■:^>.o^xfeacfc ■»# Batttra. p*S. (Italics origin Ij 
Ibid, ip.8-0. 

b**d of. Habit ie this very fact or continuity. Itb foziaatiii 
eoziditiozu our outlook or sttltt:cJ» towfirdo later •xperl«pic« as 
««I1 as our Bschaalc3l siclll of doing tbiuga. Its ri((^dity osd 
autooHitlaBi ars often tbs cause of cc^a^leint b«o«use tbs lliait they 
set to intslli^iit sxpsriMios. Hor«srtbel»oa , h&bit reveals the 
Ictrlcsic quality of experience, its temporal aprnsd la flcaaing 
out of soaaethiac ^^ going iito scoistlilag else; particularly, it 
mbana the principles of conrecttoa and orgtijaiBntioa thft inhere 
iu this spvti l«t«spozal ocatifiuen* 

Here «e »&y t&kie the ordinary trlol-airi-error Bsthod to 
lUtistrste ;;ew^*a point of viv», TLls i^thod is oftea to^ea as 
evidsKce of eottaao^. cad di«coaiisoted aetioas ana is sell ezfloplified 
la 2lwiBdlk«»s eaperiaert of &o cat in « ea^m tryisg to escape. 
It JiiB bsen alleged that the cat*» w«y of leBTsda^ to get out Off 
the cage is typical rf crdiaoyy leeraiiiff awthod. rhe raadcia aa4 
coofuaed sets gradually and outfiastlcaily sort theaiselvss out, 
said the firril succe.'^sful act becosMi s rale of thtob aethod in 
guidiag: iubsequwit slrilor oxneriea«9. rhoradiks explains this 
eutoBstie snorting as chiefly the opeTQtiuii of the lav of effect, 
while ctLer IjohSTioarists, such es r^atsc^a Gsafl Cathrle , sxplein 

*^^at3. n la fn out mi out extrenlst. He sssorta th'^^t "the c r.ditloned 
reflex i ; th« unit, i-ut oi' which th« whole h**bit i» forMSd.^ (^-ae his 
Bahavioarlap . p.68.) He adnlts ^^loradike's lee of freq^eencyreeency, 
(;-,v.t« hir. eychc'l f^y ftr re thp tftuepnlrt of BehgyiorJBt. p«2S0.) bat 
refutes his Xiv of effect. He refpaias from explalnlo^ the nechanlsm 
of tlie selective uiia eliainatiire proems in e.-^y oiher vrey fch«n that 
of observation of ranica aoveasnts* A auecessful response is s result 
of vinT!^- trials, «U' In the Isat one Bfc<!o af-ier series <.r tri^-^ls. 
iTnliice V atson, i>«thrie dose sot teke behsTlour as a co^tosite of the eon- 
ditioQi.-ie of :i^ereotyi)od reflexes. Hose? or, ha tahee the eonditia&ing 
principle as a basic deseriptii^n of leiiming. (See his .be - ayohology of 
Leoraine, yp.26-27.} .;Xoept the ti « factor in oonditinnin.; which he relies 
ttpoa in sacplaiBing learning, the other factor, such as the principle of 
effect, io diareg- rded. To hiia, the key to the understanding of learning 
is the tlT^ relation between the aubstitnte stiTmlus and the response, both 




It r^e the ezolosiv* opeisti n of tb» lav of eoAdttloniiM;. f/km 
sctuni meehaaiflni of the org?.nizetl<m or aoAifleatlon of kaharlour 
l8 still s flai«ll«aglng T>nble3i to paycholr.isrlats. Hon^vor, If «• 
tak* this nodifleatlon of behavloor ne em (»-^lng lat«raetlQg 
process tuBtwoan an oi^anlaiB nn;? It a wtriroa^ent, snfl ^Mba^loor am 
aa Bfljustswnt t>iat InTOlTes "puarpose" or "lft?iding-to-an-»nd" ttrcots, 
1^, then, trl-^l and tars-^ae eaxnot be qa aggIaiie:mtion of svpartit* 
oleronts of stlmli aad reaponsea, Mat & aerial tabfirlocur In its 
jrooaas of raorganizstl-jn toward aa and, which la. In the o«ae of 
the aativltiea of the cet In quantion, the e<^CPp« fr<l& ths oagB* 
Ko itrtter hos wa «x?lftin the eavsa of the BodifleotlriQ, It la within 
wrparieniee psro par, and polnta to the Inherent qaalitj' of orfanlzstlon 
end eonaeetlon la cotperlenee. In othar wcrds there l8 alx«ady In 
expeirlanee s relation, i.e. cause ami effect, esK^ng Ita aXaneats 
Inextrleably voven tosathar* 

Ibia egain leads oa tn^ ev^*8 aerljr entmelatioti of 
■anaoplHBoto^ eoordl nation which we have briefly dlscuaaed In the 
l28t seetl^^. In the eaae of th« trlnl«-and--ermr leaminr of 
ThOTOdike*B e&tf we may apply thla eoneent to the argocent for the 
eoatln«lty inherent In trlal-ard-error acta. The eat in qoaatlon 
ie apparently aetlng In o nfuslon; i&e hltea the bare, aerf-tchea 
^lythlng thrt aha touehea, bvosipa her head agalnat the aurrotjztdlng 
tars« and does nany other aaiiwlngly irrelcract acta. "Rrii^ set, 
la fact, la a coordlnatl'n of bod^r, hoed, nnd ^« asovaoenta Ir. 
relation to the perpl^ring altuation, and stimiletea cr Icsds tc 
aaothaar act, i^ieh In tarn tranefonw the prerloue act; and t'ney 
unify into a lerger coordination. The apparently raudoa Bwveaiante 
have, to ttae Wllllani Jamee's anal £7, their "and", ''becsuae*..then''. 

"tbarttfor*" rslr^tions which ar* iMi|^t«et«<l whan the Lav of I-srslaoBsr 
is anforced to tbf.< letter. Inata d, Indapanda t alMMnta of atiraull 
and raapoiUMa aona to axlataaoa aa thcugh they vera ultl?iatea of 
batovlour axiating laAaiMadaiitly. Tollnaad in tha fnotatapa of HtOM** 
ivpraaaiona, axpccrianca aesi-tates an atomic oharaetar. The paat aaao- 
eiationista and tha {r«aant l^abaTiourista, including homdika, crar.ta 
their o«B prGblam, vte** hen ti.aBanta can be c isnaetad aooothly. But 
thaaa ^ould not be a aeirioua problaM. TUmb^ ao celled ultin^^ tea ara 
bat, oa tha port of the raaeerebar, xwnlta of their hair-aplitting 
aaaljais fr^r the aeka of ezporiinant, end ere, on tha pert of the 

^.cQcaniing this point, Brett *8 atPtertrnt ia penetiv^<tlng^. Ea aaya: "^<i«ice 
cannot atudy the univeraa; it nust cbatrsct "ind iaolsta and aaka artificiol 
in order to attain precision. It oaist aaatme pointa that have no langnituda, 
■oti n that involvea no friction; calla thst might axiat q1( uo In no en- 
tinooua tiaatw. . e know theaa things ^ra fietiona, but they nre the price 
that is paid far the kind of raaiilta aa aanti«»I& fact, if va go on 
pr blT4? nuch I- ngar, we way find tbet no aerl us paycholcgist ever really 
dwiied either a aalf or e Rind or ^^ at'ite of conaei uanaaa; all tha 
acaptica really aeant to aey w^a tl^t theaa things re true aithnut being 
uaeful, and though we can alaaya have tbaia aa caa rarely or aevar uae than. 
Hiat ia perbapa the root of the trcuble and it aaaaa the pr^rting of tha 
i»ya. Dae way will lead to a peyeliology which is aclentific but ortl- 
fieiel; the other will loed to a psycfeolcgy which is n- turd bat eeimot 
be aciffiitific, renaining to tho aod an art." Brett, ' • :;., "^aaoetatlonlaB 
and • -ct* Fayehology", ia iayeholofdea of 1950, pp,Sa»5i«i 
Thomdike has a aimilar atotaaeat. Ha aays: "Tht. xeaeon wizy I ba^e said 
■noh about frequency of c>'n&eetions, aetiafyingnosa of eoimacti ns, 
lAeottif lability of aitvfitiona, arallebility of raspoaaee and the like, 
and little ab ut the purpoaea or jsontal sets or total ninda which direct 
and organize them is not t^iat I belittle the latter. It is lather thot 
the general import nco of tiie Irttaar is obTioua, said that the rarlationa 
of individual Idioayaeraay do not aoesi apeciilly fruitful for atudy. so 
far, then, there ahould be no quarrel between an honest c nnectionist or 
asaoaiaticniat and an boneat purpoaiviat. Both equally believe that 
indiridual attitudes, adjuatsienta, dlapoaitiona, aets, Intereata, ond 
purpoeaa wox^ with the aitnationa of each aoaent to detaxBine mh t 
cormaetiona theae ahall moke. Phe qanrrel, if ai^, will be over the 
conneetioniat's aceou&t of l^o eonatitution end devalopnent of theae 
attitude.*?, aets, purpoaea, or aelvas." Thomdike, I. L., Bonan 
Laaifain^.. Hew Tork: (^ityory Company, 1931, p.121. 


individual in the real problaaetic situation, provocations, 
•tinuXetions for furtljor effeetlv* 8ctivitl«i. la tb« cas* of 
tb« cAt in qvestion, «• «a&BOt mtrnvmrn her Imovled^ of stlaOlKui aat 
vespoaBc; still, whot frustrates her effort becomes a stirnolus to 
her next effort. Tiiis is oontinuity in tisis in its activity, and 
ecvQtinuity in spaeet in 9ts reclproeriX edjustassts with its sarroaod- 
liies. In 3 word, its activity is primarily e nnected with its prior 
sad subsequent activities and with its ins^ediete euvironswit. 
BsaAvn Bovsnartts are in one scdss, fregr«&ter7 in view of their 
eluBSiaess and rspetitive oeture in attaining to the end, but, 
aevertheless, they are eontinxaoua «ad connected in view of the basic 
fact that they are serial toward an end. There is < idy a alffcreae* 
of degpree ^owsrd perfection e"neemia£ connections and or^anizsticm 
between earlier end later phases of activity; there is ao external 
cause outside experience to account for the or^oizntion and corm- 
ectlon of the alleged atonic sensations and responses. 

Trlsl-and^error is, therefore, a process which indicates 
eontianity as the character of experience. The eignificant fact 
is that of regul^tlcn and control in which an earlier experience 
is related to a later one. 1%ere are inferior ways of regulation 
and control due to trial and error, and there ere better Kays due 
to deliberate thinJcing* Connections are then, to L>«fwey, vital and 
existential in experience. Habit whca it is &. result of trial and 
error, gives to ezperieoice aaoethness of action, but, at ths saae 
ti e, rigidity; expcrifiuce is then in its te^porelospatial eon- 
tiuoity limited to ne specific direction. Bat wh«a habit is a 

result of lnt«lllgoit effort, euch am I; the foiaiBtlon of the 
habit of thinldBe, later cxperlenee vlll not be United but 
enriefaed an4 liwtriWMiitn to oore effective edjuetaerit to tbane^ 
inc eonditlooa. voonectlon ie, tbea, aore flexible aod rich in 

In Tlrtue of this intrinsic tenporsl c^ntiauity of 
•xperlenoe, tne ii^lTidual is grovir^. His past expert sc^ee 
•raditions his present. Msstal habits, such as attitodes, enotioaal 
antielpetioBS, seieBtlfie thiiJcloe* etc., and phjrsieel habits, such 
am MB8K&1 skills, eoostittrte his whole a^e-ap of pearsonslitx or / 

s^stflB of BeasinefQl sxperlence. .ind this pers- nalit/ or systSB 
in turn is iucorporated with fs-tore ezperieaee. Oa the other hnnd, 
tla ■nTtrniwant is ehangi..g either phjrsleallr or sTsbolleally. It 
is e)^«pe^"e ia>78icall7 idi«i it is eettelly transformed to the 
sdTastase of the individual or iadlTidosls eoaeezned. This is 
eridsTit when we take into account the enozBons and BarrellcMia 
slMncsB in our aeterinl miiliimswi I hrru^t about by our seitctists, 
■ueh as the construction of roads, bridges, trains, ears, aeroplanes, 
buildings, etc. .-'.d the enriromaent soy have a syidiolic change Ir. 
its asaninga. Bed colour stends for danger; li^t stands far hope; 
all otber particular thincs idiieh an iiidivldunl experiences have 
their p^irticular Keanings inhering t hero to . !:ieani-g is suggestica 
of otber things 8bs«it firoa the given experience, a^d acts, there> 
fore, ss a guide to eosdnet. Ths thing whsn ■oauing is .-.dded is 
knoidedge. It eoass out of intexectios end is its product. It 


la 8ubj«ctlT9 lu tha »«()•« thnt It has entered Into relatinn with 
the Indl^idura; aeverthele^a, it lo objective in the sense that 
It is oheruoterlstic of the hanging natural e7eota~~>the pzoceaa 
of groving out of something a&d aoTlng Into aoniethiag else. This 
t«iporal oontlnult? of eTperl«3cs la the catchword is Dewey's 
Yl«v of knowledge, leomin-g end eduoatlonol aim. 

D«(v«7*s ecneept of ezi«rieaee natnde ua of illi 
Janes *s "Stream of Conselousaesa"* It Is not aceurQte to say that 
the foTTaer'e eorcept is inflttoaesd by the latter. They have lived 
In Che same tints wherein IJeo-Hantlan thougjstt la in the EAceiidant; 
timy both ere in tbs saas eamp of anti-intellectu^liam in ths 
es»ss ()f which it la lively to eo^wct that th^sr have the scTie niain 
idea which is later deliber-'tely worlced into pra^^iatlaa. Bovever, 
Jaaes*a charaeterizetloa of the ttoo^t process as shanglog, 
e cntinuous, oogaltl7e, creative, eaic Ideeiticsl with the self^ 
ei^pec>.rs i^lor to Liewey*s dstelled discussl a of the quality of 

^fi. 3. ierr-/*a brief compsrls n of Jaraes and Dswsy le wortly of 
notice. He statea: "Joisies is not conelllatory and hospitabls 
to Idens, ..ewey more aystCBietic. ^"be Interest of Jaoes is 
strongly Ewta^yslcnl and reli^cos, thr:t of Dewey soelel and 
Ic-gleal. Both rnen feel the influ«Hiee of Darwin and of modem 
szperlsetatal eolenee, but while Jaaes sprlags from Britiab «&-> 
pirieiaa croeeed with the voltmt^rlsR c id fidetm of ^^Kurarier, 
Dewey has his roots in Plegel and in SEeo-Eantla^. James la Interoeted 
In cc>. t<sit, while Dewery*B preoecupatloa with method asKmits in 
effect to a naturalietlc paalogiiBSB, in vhich content is sethod. 
To James the ultl; • t© vlsl n Is intuitive, while to Dewey It 
la discursive ».» "]3ie Hy^ught and Character f llllo» Janes . 
Vol. 2, p,515. 

^aeos, ., JTlaclploa of ejehol gy. Vol. 1, New Yorit: Eanry 
Bolt and Coapemy, IB90, chap.O. 

Lenca wblch first appears In his 'rtlcle on "arpsrlsoes anfl 

Cbjecti7s IdeallsM"* publiflixsd In 1906, ns«ey*8 firsquaat syxpathstle 

BMotion of Jaiaes*8 vritlags snd quotetir)n8 of statemmita probably 

pxoTlda svldeiiee th-t he most have been rmeh Inspired by Jamca. 

Their aimilP-T attfck on raticnalian and flmplrieitra and fomulPtion 

of the unity of the mantal and tlie phyaieel in Boat anccinetly 

brought out in their reapeetlve stataroemts. J&znes states: 

"TRiare need never hare been a ;jcarr«l between aaanclationlam 
and its ri^uls if the foxnsr had adaitted the isdacoaposabla 
unity of every pvJLss of thnu^t, end the letter belac 
villlns to allow th^t •perlablne* pulae of thougjit Mi^t 
recollect end knoa,*^ 

And ao does r^vay struts: 

•TSia dirersi'ty of solatlona together with the dialectical 
oharaeter of each doctriae [aiaterlallam, interactionisB, 
pan-p^ohiara, elenTltel, etcO irtklch rf-n er it laproen-ble 
to CBpirie^il ott?.ok, M^^t that the trouble Ilea not so 
■tteh in the solutions, as in tbe faetors Hbich detezraina 
•tatasent of tl» prc^bltn. If this be ao, ths vay out 
of tbe snarl ia r, rsoonsideretirn of the eonespticaa 
in virtue of whict tbe probl«o exists, jad these eca- 
eeptlons have primarily nothing to do ^dth mlr.d-body; 
they have to do with m^carlyias astapfaysieal issues: 
-tiiie denial of gusli^ 1b f^erel to natural evaota ; 
the ignoriaf^ In piTticular of toa,jor .1 tualily and 
the dioffljg of the sup&rior i^e <lity of *ca'aa.a *«"^ 

ISmIt substitutica of ths vopa experieace for the word 
conscioosneas is liiceviae aiiailar. Jases*s earlier ass of the 
word ocnsciousnuaa is in g«Mral idaatieal in aeanlng si till 
exparlencs; his liter rsfutitiun of tlM szlstsnca of eousaiousnoss 
is a denial of iba exiatancs as entity, but the cdjeetlvcil sense 

4bid.. r.^71. 

atperience and Ifature. p.252, OUnderlining mine) 

of eonselcuwaoMi M tlM QU&llty of a thlsg tolas knom is still 
retained.^ Hie unity of thought end fact le definitely foxsiulated 
In experlencb. fo hits. In one context when It la In relation with 
the person, experience is thought; and In another context when it 

is In relation with other thln^. It la fact. It Is Q difference 

of relationship that oariBs off tbe one from the otter. 

D«»ey*8 "e.^tpcrlence", as Just zaoationed, la likewise double- 

barrelled. In hia early phese of thoa^t, consciousness end 

experience sre Identieul la Bsanlng. It Is likely that he Is so 

Impressed by I^gel*s conception of the world as the evolution of 

Reason of which thought and fact are the diverse otanifeatotlons 

that he treats c noclousnoss as hovi-^f^, tec cspects, viz., the 

Individual and the world. Ihese t«o instead of beiiig teken for 

granted, are to be determined in oonadousness , the origin of 

which is in Itself, and the natore of which aiay be gnsped 

eonsequeat upon tho inquiry into Its aspects. 

"The psychological standpoint as it has developed 
Itself is thlst ell thot Is, is for consciousness or 
knowLsd^. The basins ss cf tbe peyehologist ie to give 
a eenetlR eeeonnt of the varlcus eleBMnats within this 
eoB«eicucaess, and thereby fix their place, deteznine 
their validity, and at the same tl e show definitely 
whet the real and etemel nature of this eonsclcusness 
la. If we actually believe in experience, let us be 
in earnest with It, end believe also thnt If we only 
ask, insteod of assuaing at the outset, we eholl fiad 
what the infinite conte'nt is. liow experience beeaae 
we 3h' 11 never find out, for the reason thot experience 
is. ue she* 11 never account for It by referring It to 
■oiaethlng else, for *aoinethlng else* always is only 
for end in experience. '.Iiy It Is, we shell never 

■h)oe« •Conscioneness* Rxlat?", op. cit. . pp.3-4, 
^Ibld . . PI. .10-14. 


discover, for It Is a «hol«. Bot to* 11» >lw— 1« 
within the vhola beooflw w« ar-j find out, nnd thavtiby 
account for thesn by referring then to ©ach other and 
to the whole, end thereby also discover why they ore."^ 
"The Bothod of the true psychological standpoint shono 
htm subject and object arise vlthln eonseimw experleBcer 
nnd thereby develnpe the naturo of eonseiouttttss* It 
•hofvs It to be the unity of subject '■-nd object. It 
shows therefore that thers cannot be *two kinds* of 
oonsciousness, one subject, the other object, but 
thBt all oonselousnoss irtietner of *Mlnd'» or ot 
*llatter* Is, since eoaseicmaBsss, the unity of subject and 
object, vonscloosasss Bay, and undoabtadly does, bars 
two aspects— one oapect In which It appears ns en 
ladlTldu^tl, and another In which it appears as en external 
vofrld over against the IndlTldu 1. Bat tbmv are not two 
kinds of cnnselouansss, one of which moiy bo substracted 
fr^'^ the whole tand leave tho otter. They ars but c n- 
sdousness in one phase, aud ho^ It is that this division 
into the indlvidu. 1 end the ezsemcl world -^xlses from 
c !.sclousneeB«**that is precisely the business of 
: sycholof^ to det«RDine. 3ut it does not detemine 
it by assming ;t the outset thnt the subject is *ise*, 
aad the object is the world."^ 

Dewey later tel»»a ecnsclcumiess as a distinctive siode 
of experience,' inrolTlng Intemlttent ewereaess* ConaeiotisneRS 
Is eoosoioxis of something outside of Itself; it is an act 
Involving 1^' t is acted upon. irXperlsice, viewed fzom its here 
and now, 1b consei usness, such as seeing, remoBibering, fearing, 
lieplnr:, etc.; from Its teaporcl on->going process. It is a aoviz^ 
srstem of ■ssBings; '-nA troa. its spstlaL interaction it is 
reolproe I adjuetamt between indlTldunl and wiviroiuaeiit. 

"f eyehol^gieel 3tandpoint*', op. cit .. np,8-9. (It'sllc orlcln 1) 
fibld., pp.14-15. {Itsllc orlglaal) 

"•CtMaseiousness* and xperlence" in Influence of Dfiiwia on 
PhlXosoiJMr egtd .thbr ^s ys. ; also "Conduct and .xperlence", 
op« elt « 
*l«psgience and Hbture. p.;^3« 


thes* distlnotlva feotuves In Dmtff*m eoneapt of 
experisQc* ^re fundaisental to the uaderat> nding of his Hforj of 
•ducation, referonctt to which hns b««Q aade eaoofdly in tb« 
foregoing oectlonc. ^e following cti&ptrars will bo respective 
axunrers to the three perenni I probletsa in educati< n which were 
nentlcned in the first Becti< n, viz.. (1) Kotr do v>e growv 
(2) How do ve lesm" and {'6) For what are we educated? • shall 
aee how lew^ identifies mind with experience; how he identifies 
growth with derelopment of thinking; and how he tries to tide over 
the difficulty in his intertTetQtion of owital discipline which 
«e also touched upon in the third section. The leemiiif; problea 
Involres the contention of the nature of knowlnd^ thst it is 
a p3X>duct of reflective experienee. fte shall see that a 
difficulty underlies Dvrrey's sucgeetion of an activity curriculum, 
i.e., the q^uestion of systesetic growth. In the fifth chapter, 
we all 11 take up tho relation between flocperisBce and dflB»erocy 
and see bow Dewey*s concept of growth is in h-ZHony with his 
soeisl ideal, deooeraey. 


CHAPTa3^ 111 


In the preceding ohapt r, we have pointed out 

that Dewey tries to confirie all thinc-s — -events, objects, 
or qualities— —V7i thin experience. Thlniis grow out of 
experience and are explained with reference to it. This 
is to sej th«- t experience, to Dewey, is not only a con- 
tent denoting what we exncrience and how we experience, 
but a fnethod, ft-om which were evolved Dewey's "peycholog- 
ical standpoint ', enunciated in 1886 and his "'Postulate 
of Iiamedicte Empirioism", promulf^eted in 1905. It is 
now called the empirical method to be idflntified Tsith. 
that of experimentel scioic©.'^ 

"....the appeal to expei'lonce w&s coincident 
with the erencip-tion of science from occult 
essences ?3id causes and with t>« substitution 
of methods of observation, controlled by ex- 
perirr.entatlcaa and eaployin-' p^stheraBtleal eon- 
sideor fitions, for methods of ere diftlectlc 
definition end elessifio6tion..« Tt^ sia:nif- 
icsnee of experience was not tb? t sun (<nd 
i ^on, stick anci stone, rre or, e tares of the 
senses, hut tat en noulc not put their trust 
any lonrar in thin^ts which ere said, however , 
authoritatively, to exist, unless these thing;B 
a re oepable of entoiinfr into speoifioble 
connections with~laie orp;enisin eaict the orf>eniam 
with them . It t^^as an enphatic assertion timt 
until nen could see how thinieis e^ot into belief, 
and whot they did vfhen they got theare , intellect- 
ual acceptance would be witlteld. "2 

This method is significant in the fOTmulrtion of the 

l.:ee rire ceding? chap., 5 2. 

^EssaTTS In xperimental Lofyic , p. 62.{Tinderlinlnf^ mine) 


natur© and frrowth of mind. J/ind oannot be assumed without 
ascertaining it in exps^rlence. Its being is derived from 
and achieved In^ experience. 

the old substance theory in which an unchan^^lng 
substratun is supposed is thro¥?n overboard. For this suppos- 
ition reverses the picture by raking mind the centre from 
which experience proceeds, instead of admlttln??- that exper- 
ience is the matrix in which mind is developed. ?"lnd is set 
over a^inst the world. It is met cphy sic ally the principle 
of movement; epistesologically, the spectator of the world; 
psychologlcRlly, the principle of synthesis; and theologically, 
the variant of the Absolute. It becorraes something-I-know-not- 
«liat. Its nature cannot Ik explained, though its attributes 
are diet in/Jtul shed. Dewey discards this hidden erent^ as it 
cannot be sourht for in experience; but he admits the fact 
of conscious piienor5©na,nQriely, those of attention, reasoning, 
lmag;inetion, judj&^aeot , etc. They are not faculties as such, 
capable of r^^rformlnr* some stseciflc functions. They are use- 
ful nanK s to desi^-nate various raodes of ex5>erience character- 
istic of the activities of the organism in the environment. 
"To reaember is to do somethisT^, as much as to shoe a horse, 
to cherish a keepsake. To propose, to observe, to be kindly 
affectioned, are terms of value, of practice, of operation; 
Just as digestion, respiration, locomotion express functions, 
not observable 'ob jects* .-^2 ^^ primfiry fact is experl«ice, 

^"The Need for a Hecovery of hlloaophy' op. oit .. p. 30 
'•♦Co-jsciousness' and i-^xper ier«e", in Influence of D^-rwin 
In hilosophy and Other x.sseye , p. £51 


I.e., functiriis, sets. 

Keither doss Dewey endorse the assertion, of the 
aasoclatioRists that mind is a bundle of simple ideas, or 
a aiechenisT of brain physiolo^, or a network of S-R bonds. 
Their concerted effort in fight ingr a??ainst aprioriSi'w Is their 
Btren>-'^h . Their use of the product of analysis as the crip- 
inel datum, and their over-slrr.plified e^rplanatlon of oomplex 
conscious events by recortinf, to the ultisaste lew of contig- 
rUty, tffir5poral or spatial, are their tjeekfiesKes, E'^ny things 
arc left tinexplelned. If mind is t;o thing but ari ag^reffete of 
atomic ideas, it is irapossibie to explain how present oxper- 
lence recalls another past experience. Conti^lty pro^^ides 
8 oonr'ltion for onlv those eler^eTts of 3X?5erience that have 
a te^sporp.l sprsad or speti&l interrelateciness tn virtue of 
which lijalcage is possible. But atoiuisa presup^xises a d^- 
ationleas iastent which forbids ccntl/ruity to act as the 
sseans of connectirii; two experiences. Knowledge thus becoffies 
next to impossible, ioreover, tiassive receptivity of the 
mind cannot account for the feetuel pheno-ens of active 
choice on the part of the organism. Tliat tii© :aind lies open 
to a flooding in of sti-suli Is contrary to fact. Meed and pur- 
pose ar" left unexplained. Thirdly, fixed patterns of behav- 
iour krioOTi as conditioned reflexes resulting froa nere assoc- 
ietion and repetition can only adapt to a static environTieRt 
and can be of little avail in face of changing conditions. The 
lofty ambition of making intellisence or siind to order and tbe 
fond wish of making the asost of educe tl on, fail to be rsallzed 


beoause of ttie great premium put on eutometiam to the Ti«p:leqt 
of active powers inh rent in the orf!;enl8m, on the one hand, 
and of the very chanp-ing «orld, on the other. Fourthly, re- 
coisrse to 'ideas' le«ids often to s d^Jlal of the external world 
and creates the problem of how objective knowlediPe is possible^ 
Ideas become little psychic entities the validity of which Is 
based on consistency. Hven if it is admitted that consistency 
Is a criterion of truth, the act of ooaiparlson and dlBcrimin- 
ation is denied in assoolfttioniem. 

Te Dewey, the elasBlflcatlon of -cental states or the 
analysis of consciousness into specific conscious ele-nents is 
but met ho do logic si expediency for the purpose of understand- 
ing how experience arises,. how It affects its subsequent 
course, and ho'j? it saainteins continuity. The change froa 
the duallstic view of two realities, viz .. a psychic and a 
physical, to the sonistic view of experience raarks a definite 
departure from the substantive or the associational view of 
mind. As he says: '^fflth the change in standpoint from self- 
included existence to inoludinf;: process, from structural unit 
of composition to controlling! unity of function, from change- 
less form to !Bov«nent in growth, the whole schea^ of values 
is transformed. Faculties are definite directions of develop- 
ment; eleE»nts are products that are star ting-points for new 
processes; bare facts are indices of change; static conditions 
are modes of accomplished adjustment, lilot that the concrete 
erapirleel phenoiTienon loses In worth, niu<^ less that unverlf- 
iabie *3ietaphyslcal' entities are Impe^rtinently introduced; 


but that our sic! is the discovery of a psDoese of actions 
In Its adeptetions to cireumBtance," 

Indeed, ttie process of psychological ectiona in 
its a dart at ions to environraent reinains to be exnlo'-ed. 
¥lEd is this process of aetlona. As we said in the pre- 
ceding^ chapter, Dewey substitutes orpanism fbr a mind-body, 
organic ways of response for power or ability, environment 
for -^tter. viewing in tiie pers')ective of evolution, he 
takes ntlnd as an "eraergait" character appearing: on the 
third level of the interact ion of natural events, Her^ 
we hove to explain Dewey* s meaning of "natural events" 
befcare we try to interpret his notion of alnd. 

T^aturel events connote the checglng characteristic 
of things in the world, and denote individual structures, 
animate or inenimHte, and hap"/eninp;» In the ordinary sense 
of tile tenns, ''Kvery existence is an event," as it is in 
the process of ehanf-re. However, the speed of change is 
different ar^ong the existences. Sosie are at a slow pace, 
while others at a quick pace. Soase esthlblt an order of 
"causal se^^iuencc" in tlB course of their gradual chaniro. 

• ^Tbld. « p?. E59-260. 

^Kxvcr ien c e and ; v t ure , p. 271 

3lMd.,p. 71 


Some eachiblt a rapid eerles of changes. So the slower 
and the re^'juler rhythmic events mcy be called structure, 
end the more rapid and irre^ler ones prooess. To illus- 
trate, a t*5ble is 8 set of natural events which, viewed 
fron its ultlniate ^-ake-uD, is e system of electric charges 
which raintfiin a regular relationship among t*ie interactions 
of electrons-protons; viewed from its rete of change due 
to interaction with other events, it is slow in its chan/=re 
and exhibits a constsncy and yet gradually undergoes chon^e, 
passinff from the tisw to tte old ordar ; and viewed from Its 
arrangement among its interderjend^it parts, it is distinct 
from other set of netural events. This set of natural 
events, called table, is then jjossessed of the character 
of struot\ire or r-iatter. This i-s^y explain Dewey's defin- 
ition that '*'atter is that character of notur«9l events 
ulilch is so tied up with ohaiges that are sufficiently 
rapid to be perceptible as to give the latter c character- 
Istic rhythmic order, the causal sequence." It is "iprely 
a character of some natural events "whai they occur at a 
certain level of interaction."*' 

Appearing on a higher level of evolution, mind, as 
distinct from matter, is the ^nsaning of the interacting 
events. It denotes those Interactions of an organism 
with other livlnf* creatures. 

^Ibid . t). 71-72. 
2lbld. p. 73 

^Ibid. p. 262 


To illustrfite, when the child reacts to the thin^^ aa 
table, which he uses with other people and of which he 
knows the nes»e by following the sound uttered by others, 
this reaction is pofjsessed of the character or mind. This 
quality of behaviour cannot be teken as the result of the 
activity of a "mind". 

Now, as mind and setter are different qualities 
of natural events, they are different asrxjcts of nenifesta- 

tion ^.t the sarae thin^. In Dewey* e analogy, they are 'like 

the convex and the concave in a curve". 

The three distinct levels, ss Dewey points out, in 
the interact ioa-r)roce8S of natural events are those of matter, 
life, and siind. These levels ere not causal in ascending 
order, flatter is not the cause of life, nor are both of theai 
the cause of mind, Evolution is not teleolo/4cal; ffiiml is 
not the consusanatory ste^e in the evolution of the universe. 
To Dewey, they are respectively expressive of the distinctive 
quality of interacting events. "They are not 'explanatory* 
categories, as explanation is sometimes understood; they 
do not designate, that is, the operation of forces as •causes*. 
Thoy stick to ojapiricsl facts noting anl denoting character- 
istic cuellties and conseouences -eculi-r to various levels 
of interaction."^ In fact, ell ere the effects of natural 

^ 1 .id ., pr74 
2 ibid., p. 275 

^ Ibid., P. 2fi2 

The baaio fact on all levels Is the distribution 
of physico-chemical energies from a state of unstable 
equilibrium to tJiat of equilibrium. This repeted striv- 
ing process tonrerd equilibrium narks the activities or 
movements of animate and inanlmpite things. When there are 
external forces exerted upon the system or internal organic 
stimuli occurring in living orj^anisms, a oomnensatory 
change in the distribution of energies to adept to this 
disturbarase and to leed to a new equilibrium takes place. 
To Dewey, this basic event whieh is characteristic of the 
thr "« stf ges boeor® s on the psyoho-physicel level the 
activities of need, effort ana satisfaction. They are In 
no respects psychical, in the traditional .sense of the term; 
tS^y ere the ob.'leotive events of nature. '*By need is laeant 
a condition of tensionel distribution of eaergies such that 
the body is in a condition of uneasy or unstable equili- 
briu .. ;^y demand or effort is n®ent the fact that this 
state is naiifested in movemoits ^ieh modify environing 
bodies in ways ^ich react upon the body, so that its char- 
acteristic pattern of active equilibrium is restored. 3y 
satis fection is "^eant this recovery of equilibriam nattems 
conseQuemt upon the changes of environment due to interactions 
with the active demands of the organism." 

The difference between the llvin^r end non-living 
systems lies in the effect of the redistribution of physico- 
chOTilcRl ener^es. In the non-livlnp: systea, there is no 

1 Ibid., p. 253 


sign shoKfti of preserving? its own Identity throi-j(?;h the 
utilization of the result of the restored eouilibrium. 
Iron "shows no tendency in its Interaction with w? tor 
to modify the interaction so that consemiences will per- 
petuate the characteristics of pure iron." Plants are 
different. "The interactions of the various constituent 
parts of a plant teke pli^ce in such ways as to tend to 
continue e characteristically organized activity; they 
tend to utilize conserved consequences of p.** st ectivltlos 
so as to adapt subsequent chan^^es to ttie needs of the in- 
tegral system to which they belong.' 

Besides this distinctive quality of temporal con- 
tinuity of preceding end subseauent activities, there Is 
in the behaviour of the livinje: syst^a the quality of 
senBitivity. ''The root-tips of a plant interact with 
chemical properties of «ie soil in such "ays as to serve 
organised life activity; and in such 'isys as to exact 
from the rest of the organlsra their ovm share of re- 
quisite nutrition. This pervasive opera tiv© presence of 
the whole in the p/^rt end of the part in tte whole con- 
stitutes susceptibility — ths capacity of feeling— whether 

or no this potentiality be actualized in plant life." 

"hen we ccHse to that evolutionary st*^ge wherein eni<-sals 

have locomotive and dlstance-recer^tors, sensitivity is 

realized as feeling, a quality of Interaction in antici- 

paticm of consui'irastory results. Further steps mounting 

1 ibid ., p. -54 

2 Ibid., p. .356 


the scale of evolution lend ub on that stei»e wheroln the 
behaviour of the living organlsffls la c^iaracterlzed by 
lan^uxi«'5;e end social eaaanmicp.tion. Herein feelings which 
ere only "ve^e and massive imeosiness, cor-fott, vl^pv, 
and exhaustion" In the lower anliaals, {they do not know, 
however, that they hsve them) become dlscrirolnatlng senses . 
Discrimination and use of lan??uRge or symbol ere char- 
acteristic of the third level of Interacting events; 
mind ecierges from this etpga. 

To Dewey, "the distinction between physical, psycho- 
physical, and raental is thus one of lovels of Increasing 
complexity and Intimacy of Interaction araon^ natural events. 

J?hls" complexity and intimacy of interaction'* is best 
shown in the acts of remembering, reasoning, Isiaglnlng, 
speaking, obs<;rving, hopln?^, fearing, etc. All these are 
the qualities of interectlnj; events; or, to be concrete, thoy 
ere functions of the in . erections between organism aid en- 
vironaaent. In Dewey's sense, organism Is a systersi of nat- 
tiral events; in its sheer physic o-cheiaicrd interactions 
among its organic parts and between its whole systec) and 
the outer environment. It is possessed of ttie character of 
matt'^. Howev^ar, it has the qwellty of mind when its Inter- 
actions show that it responds to "eanlnp;s. And so vith the 
environment. Fnviron.Tient as such la a ajstem of natural 

1 Ibid., p. -dbQ 

2 Ibid., p. J&l 


events; but its essence lies In Its relations with the 
organism. In the course of reclr>rocal adjustment it has 
likewise the quality of :nlnd. Its sjrmbolic ohan^^e to 
suggested thinns throttpii the use of langu' j^e or ideas is 
tiT>lcal of the presence of mind, a thlnp perceived is 
called hat; abeam or ll£$it is imagined as hor)e; a sound 
suggests a ?raa. T aese environtrental things reveal then 
the cutility of adcd, aside from the feet that these very 
sots in the environtnent, su<^ as perception, i ma ^-^i net ion, 
su?r/restion, etc., are mind, or, to be more exact, bespeak 
the r'saning aspect of events or experience, which is mind. 

The purpose of vlewln«? mind as the quality of 
interacting?; events appearing or er.ierfTent oa a level char- 
acterized by language as well as striving for the satis- 
faction of needs, is, of course, to ele&r off the mystery 
of mind as sid) stance and to dislodf^e dualism from its long 
reif:nln(^ sov^^rei^ty over philosophical thinking. This 
viaw hes the advant«cte of f?ettinf? rid of any isolated 
mental states, ^The qualities (such as feelings, ideas, 
etc.) never were 'in' tlie organism; they always were qual- 
ities of interactions in which both extra-organic things 
end organieras partake."^ ; ind does not reside in tite body 
as classical philosophers thought it to do. There is no 
intent in Dewey to find any particul&r physiological cor- 
relate, such as brain, or the i?^ay rnatter in «ie cortex, 
to account for rnind. Once we assume that It is in the body, 

^ Ibid. tJ. ^59 


w© shal ' hr-ve to carry the burden of proof of how It inter- 
acts with the body and knows the external world. It seems 
to hla that mind Ib tYe netxxrBl result of tiie evolutlonKry 
process, and a natural characteristic in the functioning 
of leaninf^ful events, showi in language end eocial activ- 

This interpretation reminds us of Aristotles*s view 
of soul. Their similarities are ttet: (1) both take up the 
oatter from a developiTental jioint of view; (2) both think 
that soul Is ftinetlon; (3) both refuse to set raind efrainst 
body or "lattcx . To Aristotle, the ^orld is one of develop- 
m«it, passln^ from the simple to the complex, from the 
potential to the RCtuc«l, from patter to torn, ■.:atter is 
a potential substrBte, while forr. is nctiialized natter. 
The tTjo are not practically separable thoupjh logically dis- 
tinguishable. ' verythinp; as a phase of develop en t is 
matt«r-forffl. vhen it develops, its psst sta^e becomes the 
matt!.;r of the present stage, aM the present staf^e ^trowing 
out of the nast is the form, and in turn will become the 
matter of the future stai^e. Applying these conc^ts to 
the living organism, we find that it is a unity of soul and 
body, or of form and "alter. According to . ristotle, soul 

is only a characterization of T?'hPt is livlni^; so plants, 
animals as well as hujijsn beinii^s hove souls. This is v;ha1 


Ibidj^, pp. i3 1-292 

^ Brett, '^..>., History of s'-eholofy . voi I, London! 

Geor??e Allen & Oompeny; 191;-. Chnr.. 10 


DeiFey believes ^en he Interpretc life and ndnfl as qubI- 
Ities of Interactin events. Aristotle's nutritive soul 
of plants and sensitive soul of animals jnay be compered 
with Dewey's sensitivity to pre: servation exhibited in 
plants and feelinr.s exhibited in animals. GcKnlnf^ to tiie 

rational soul, wo find that Aristotle's familiar dictum 

that the soul is to the body what vision is to the eye, 

best Illustrates the unity of soul -body and the function- 
al r^le of the soul. -1th this Tie^ey does not disagree. 
*"3oul»," as he says, "when freed fr<HB ell traces of 
traditional '--attirialistlc animisM denotes the qualities of 
psycho-physical activities as tvx as these are organized 
into \mity."^ In terms of Aristotle's oortcept of potential- 
ity anfl actuality, mind and body are not opposed to eaeh 
other. Dewey says: "As lon-e; as the veristotelian metaphysical 
doctrine persisted that nature is an ordered series from 
lower to higher of potentialities aid actualizations, it 
was possible to conceive of the organic body as normally 
the highest term In a physical series and the lowest term 
in a psychical series. It occupies just that in> ertaedlate 
position v'here, in beln^ the actualization of the potential- 
ities of physical qualities, body was also potentiality for 
manifestation of their Idoel actualities." 

Of coiffse, the sinilleritle s of Dewey's view and 
Aristotle's do not overshadow their differences, as 4»s* 
said, Dewey docs not regard mind as soinethlng immaterial 

1 De iUii::!C. Bk. ii.e.l ^Dewey, ot). ctt .. p. 295 

* Ibid., pp. 2i60 


taking; its nbode In tli« body, nor does he find Its phys- 
iological counterpart. .<hll8 he Insiets that ttie asitis- 
factlon of needs is the purpose of ttie activities of organ- 
iscns, he does not poetulate any Im^ enent purpose os the 
ideal of develo; r'lent. 'Asides, he holds a social view of 
aina . 'iind appears only when there is lan^^^uare or social 

interaction. Prior to cor^rrainiCftion, there is no mind but 

psycho-physic eil life. Language and leaning presuppose the 

existence of socinl ectivities. v oaninprs do not core into 
beinp without lanfrruasre, and lenm^'K^ implies two selves 
involved in a Joint or ahei-ed under taking •" Mind is, there- 
fore, social. Thinking and kncminp- become a social event 
instead of subjective happaainrs in the brnin. ..rlstotle 
confron' ed toe problem of dualism when he could not locate 
the physiological counterpart of creative reason. Every 
particular sensation has its perticular sense-organ. The 
function, creetlve reason, \vithout its bodily structure 
led Aristotle to think that it alone is ser^rable fron tide 
body Old is immortal. 

iind, to i-ewey, is not Just a nuallty of eanin^yful 
interactions among social beini?:s or a quality shown in a 
symbolic environment. For it is not * ctivity alone thet he 
stresses; it is the satisfaction of needs, organic or social, 
that he makes much of. Needs offer proble-is and purposes. 


Xbia . . p. 282 Sc. p» 292 

^ Ibid., p. E99 

5 ^^cDougall, or), cit .. pp, iil-24. f>rett, ot?. clt .. chRp.13. 


Without these there will be no mind, anft so no thinking 
or intelll/-ence. The growth of mind, Uie reconstruction 
of the world, ^.e progre s of society are ell based on this 
point. To '-ive & arare complete definition of mind in 
Dewey's sense, we njay say thfst it is the quality of iieaning- 
ful interactions with a view to achieving? a purpose, eoelal 
or individual. As the int-ractione ore Instrur-jent si to the 

adjustment of the individual to his environment, mind Is 

llkewi i-e inst rument al . 

Essays in ETPerlmaatal I^3*^ic . pp. 19-JiO 

This statement agrees with loir Is' s wtien he says that 
Dewey's view of mind is ^doubly functional". "The 
functional theory of mind n^ay be said to take tvm eln 
direction s,^dex»endin^ UTx>n whether tfce term* function 
Is eant to^^POse or role. The two eirjphases ere 
lofrically se^orsble, even if not actually separated. 
one -ay, for~ instance, Insist that alnd is en instrument 
in the so vice of organic needs, that finishing such 
organic aid is the function of Rind, 'Without thereby 
subscribing to any specific theory as to the nature of 
rsind. ^iHiilsrly. one could aintaln thst^jnentallty is 
a characteristic of events in a cf^rtein role without 
holding tl-at this functioning; which constitutes siental- 
ity has as its purpose or l^inction the furthering of 
orp;anic behaviour. The essential characteristic of 
the pragmatic interpretati n is the t both of these uses 
of the term 'function' are employed— the thecary is doubly 
functional: miod, on the one hand, se -ves the P^^pps® 
of further ii^ organic action, v^ile, on the other hand, 
mind is rep/^rded as the functioning of events that ere 
not intrinsically ental.' Charles .. Morris, six Theories 
of ind. Chicago; University of ChicefW Prosa, 1932. p. ^75 

However, nlnd can-iot be ^rely ttie functioning of 
events directed to a purpose in view, oince functioning 
involves ths rble ployed by the individual, his intellif;enoe, 
ability, end attitu^ inuct be taken into account. Herein 
comes the traditional argussent for identifyir^ mind with 
thinking or reasoninf?:. The existence of 'lato's reason, 
Aristotle *s cre-tive r ason, Lescortes's thinkln- soul, 
Kant*s reason should invoke no dispute, so loi^ as they are 
understood in the functional sense thfit they are tl» intrin- 
sic fenture of human experience. Dispute srises only when 
they imply a metaphysic&l leelity which trenscends experience, 
Dewey links up mind with ability , capacity, intelligence, or 
attitude, which is instru ©n^el to chmfte the present con- 
dition in thelifrht of ths futiire oonseQuence. 

yind is "the Bbility to anticip?<te future consequenco^^ 
ani to resr^nd to them as stimuli to present behavior .1 
rird is "the capacity to refer present conditions 
to future results, ard future consequences to pres- 
ent conditions, ''2 
ind is "the attitude of participative response in 

social affairs, "3 
""liM »s a concrete thing is precisely the power to 
Snr^^rrtand thinp-s in t ms of the use J?de of ttem; 
a socialised mind is the poivnr to und-r stand them 
in tortns of taie use to v^hich the y ere turned in 
joint or shftred situntions, '4 

"..use of the P:iven or finished to antici^te the 
consequence of processes roing on is precisely what 
Is meant by •ideas', by * intelligence* .5 

^"Tl» Need fcr a Recovery of hilosophy", op. cit .. pp. 39-40 

2 Denocracy and ndueation , p- 120 

3 Ibid . . p. 570 

* Ibid .. pp.39-40.( Italic oriiTinal) 

5 "The Need for a Hecovry of Philosophy", p. 21 


"Intelligence is not somethinf; posser^sed once for 
all. It is in constant process of fort?jlng, and 
its retenticM require s constant alertness in ob- 
serving conseouerces, an open-ninded will to 
learn erd courage in re -adjustment ."1 

All thf^se terms ean the same thing. I.e. that specific 

t3rpe of activity which refers the present to the future 

and controls the future in virtue of whst is learned from 

the present. Of course, siind is a more comprehensive tern 

when eompf,red with the t:rcis. Intelligence, ability, etc. 

fee say scy that islnd is also double-barrelled in eaning. 

AB just said, envlronnientel thin"« as si^tiB evince ttie 

presence of nj.nd. accordins; to Dewey, environ'^^mt is not 

thlnp:s erely physically surrounding us; it is what we pre 

"cone me d V:lth'', "^whst enters into CourJ activity as a 

sustaining or frustrating condition", or whet "varies" 

with our activities. 

'*The words •environoent,* •taedium* denote some- 
thing more than suxrouniings which encompass an 
Indlvldufjl. They denote tiie specific continuity 
of the surromdlngs with his o\m active t^idencies. 
An inanlBBte being is, of course, continuous with 
Its surroundings; but the environing clrcumstences 
do not, etnphorically, constitute an envlr- 
oninent. For the inorganic being is not concerned 
in the Influeroes which a feet it. On the othor 
hand, so?ie things which are remote in spece and 
ti-* from a living crrstifff , esr)eclally a hximan 
creature , nry for^^i hit^ environment even more truly 
than so e of the thini:© clo :e to him. The things 
with which a ran varies are his genuine envlron- 
r»nt. Thus the ectivl ties of the astronomer vary 
with the strrs at whidh lie gazes or sbout which 
he calculates.... ^n brief, the environment consists 
of those conditions that promote or hlnd.^r, stim- 
ulcte or inhibit, the charact erist ic activities 
of a living being, venter is tiie environment of 
a fish bocaune it is necessary to the fish's actlv- 
Itles — to its life. 

■^ Heconstructicai in Ihllosophy, pp. 96-97 


...Juct because life si n if lee not bare passive 
oxiitence (supposinp; there Is such a thinn;),but 
a way of acting, environrient or mediun signifies 
what enters into this t-ctivlty as n sustaining 
or frustrating condition." 1 

Coiainr back to what has iuet been said, we may say that 

!Hind, in Dewey's sense, assuciea two asnects of - eaning. 

./hat is experienced symbolically is mind; and how it Is 

Qxperienced 1© also mind. The "whc t ' and the 'how", the 

subject-matter and the -ethod, are organically related. 

mtellirenwe, ability, etc., are the ways of response on 

the part of ttxe individual. The de^^ree of effectiveness 

in responding: to the given with a view to fulfilling; a 

pirpose testifies to the degree of intelll^moe one is 

possessed of. ossession does not oen here thr t intell- 

l^rence is kept inside of one's brain; it rath(tr e^:ns the 

total effect of past experience upon the organis- . 

In this connection, a <tuceti<Mi -Tsy arise as to the 

place of "ideas" and "meanings' In this functional view of 

mind. Apparently, we have ideas in our mind; ne matoe ideas 

out of «liat we h've perceived and out of xtiat we imagine. 

It is we who play r.t once the pt^ t of cam raman and raf^ician, 

so to speak. Starting from this point en endless debate has 

<:^one on concerninfr whether thare are f^nernl concepts besides 

psrtioul?^r ideas, or whether there is an agency which performs 

the knowledflie function besides the exister.ce of innate , mental 

functions. xtreios sensntioneli st, mild empiricism, "critical" 

retionalis'n, and extreme retionalism all took their rise in the 

^'.emocracy cnl :>ducctlon, vr>, 13-14. (IIdIIcs ori-iBal) 


debate. "Idea" In the sense of a rrental stuff independent 
of or dependent on exf-erience is the root fro irtiloh spring 
all these coriteadinf?; schools; the so'irce, tc;o, of the an- 
tithesis between tbe ental s^nd the physical, reason and 
sense, or thought and fr<ct. 

To be consistent with his theory of mind, Dewey must 
t6kB idea as a quality of interaction in fulfilling a purpose 
in view. And so he does. He says, ''meaninf^s, ideas, rre als:., 
when ttiey occur, chractors of a new interaction of events". 
They are to ^nen what sensitivity md frelln<y are to the lower 
living arganisris. They ere continuous with the latter qual- 
ities, end are properties of social as well ae biological 
behaviour, ''Kvery thou^t and meaning i'las its substratum In 
Bortm or^Gnic act of absorption or elixinrition of seeking, or 
turning?; away froT., of destroying, or cerinn; for, of signalin{^ 
or responding. It roots In soma definite act of biological 
behaviour ."2 To 11 lust rate, "'a burnt diild ay shrink from 
flane just as the dog cowers Ft the sight of e stick; "^ both 
acts exhibit the biological quality of "feeding" or "physiolo^ 
ical inference". However , the child consequent upon his 

^Experience and Nature , p. 290 

^Jbid .. p. S90 

^Ibld .. p. 290 

4Thl8 is ertrend Hus sell's phrase to design- te conditioned 
reflex, ths feature of which is ^at Dewey calls "fee ling "♦the 
expt>ctation of soraethli^ ui^eful or harmful in l-ter contact. 

{See B. Hussell, Ihilos ophy. New York: w.-.v. Norton r« ^ n-n 
p. 13.) • ev/ey den lt^tt U e BXi stenee of the rneaalng" 5%tiM^^ * 
of behaviour in the caee of that of lower anlniels. 


particlpfttlon In a languar© environTient , knovjs not only fleune^ 
thet-burns, but fla-^e-ths^t-cpn-be-'^ade-use-of-vjithout-doing- 
harm. In this Inrtanoe, "b olo^lcal eots jxTsist, but have 
sense, efjnin/f5, as well as f-«llnr, tone. bru^t withdrawal 
hftving only negative, protective seouencos ie turned into 
slfrnlf leant and fruit ftil explorction and iinipulF^ tlon.'^ To 
know means to hrve an Idea of a sttuaticxi in t^rms of its 
raeanin^s or consequences. To have an Idea la an obbrevinted 
toTTTi of sayinp: thct there is an intra-organlc recapituotion 
of fltoat has been experl^iced in a fbmer actual situ^^tion. 
When the child's finper ^t burned, end he Ic^irned from others 
the xmoB of the thinf^-tii at -burns, and the way of using it, 
he then has the ex'isrienoe which Involves inextricably the 
activity of his vocal and visual or^E^ans, his nustailftr with- 
dratring reaction, his glandulfor secretion, and other ori^anic 
reactiois. The parti eulnr intes;retion of the r actions of 
the intricate physiolof;ical •.echaaisn constitutes the neanlng 
of the sensori-motor act, and, to Dewey, this quality can 
revive in Ihe intra-oreenlc act without repetition of overt 
€'Ctivltiee. This is the r^cull?^r mA yet natural property 
of interacting events when coming to the language and social 
level. This quality, 1 ' oa or nefailnt, is instrunentol In 
avoiding hRrmful consequence and in effecting control of the 
environtaent. 'rny trking ideas end -^anings as emergent char- 
acters of interacting events in biological evolution, Dewey 
has the advantage of nipping dualism in the bud. Idea is 

^ :xT?erience t:nd 'C- ture . pp. a90-291. 


not then any mental stuff; It is but the quality of the 
"stuff" of organic interactions. 

The followln^^ cuotatlons are worthy of notice. 

"i'en combines r;eaningr,, like fire, u-arness, remoteness, 
wtXi'ith, coi3ifort, nice, nein, expansion, softening, so 
that fire enters into uew interactions and effects new 
consequences. By an intra-orgsnic re-en sctraent of 
partial eniiaal reactions to nritural events, and of 
accoBipenying reactions to and from others ecquired in 
intercourse end eorirauni cation, mean s-consooue nee s are 
tried out in advance without the ori^anisn^ getting irre- 
trievably involved in physical consequences. Thouf^ht, 
deliberation, objectively directed imaf;ination, in other 
words, is an added efficacious function of natural events 
and hence brin^TS into being new corisenuences. For images 
ape not n\ade of nsyehical stuff; they ere oualitles of 
partia l organic behaviours, which are their "stuff". 
rKey are partial because not fully i^eared to extero-oeptor 
fflQd ^usculs-r activities, and hence not complete and 
overt. ^1 

":raen I think such netmins-s as 'friend" and "enemy, I 
refer to external and eventual consequences. But this 
naming- does not involve mireculous 'action at a distance". 
There is sosiethiog t>rpsent in organic action which acts 
as a surrof^ot© for tbe remote things sip^iified. The words 
rake i(ti.iediate sense as ^ell as have signification. This 
so^^^ethin^ no^^j present is not juat the activity of the 
laryn,=^eai end vocal ap^>E^&tus. .hen short-circuitin{?; 
throus^h Ian ^ is carried as far as limitation to this 
aoT-firatus, ^ are nere counters automatically used, 

and languiige disappears. The ideas are qualities of 
events in all the parts of orfranic structure which have 
ever been i-aplicated in actual situations of concern 
with extra-organic friends and enemies: -presutnably in 
proprlo-receptors and or^an -receiptor s with all their 
connected glandular and muscultr :?eohanisni8. These qual- 
itie s give body end stuff to the activity of the lin,~uistlc 
apparatus. The inte^qration of the qualities of vocal 
apTjaratus allied through the nervous echanism ^aith the 
qualities of these other events, constitutes the irmnediete 
sense of friendliness said animosity. The more intimate 
the alliance of vocal activity' with the total org^aiio 
disposition toward friends end enesies, the greater is 
the iuuTsdiete sense of tiie words. The nervous system 
is in no sense the "seat" of the idea. It is the echan- 
ism of the connection or integration of acts.^'S 

^ Ibid., p. £91 (Italic oriiH;mal) 

2 Ibid ., p-. 29E-29B. (Italic ori^^jinal) 


Like mind, idea besides beins: a choracterlctic of 
interaotlcax on the part of the orgenisra is also objoctively 
existent in the for^ of en object a s surested « .hen tho 
f la « aufjpests that it burns, Vne aii^ ^^stion tends to con- 
trol the behaviour of the child. - , tie flame-that-bums 
is the HEoning-ospect or idea-aspect of the bare existence 
of the flame; to Dewey, this aspect exists not In the head 
or other place inside of the child, but in ttie natural world. 
The fjiven chsn{»es into a knowledpre ob.lect, ^'hile the organic 
reactions on the port of the child tre integrated concom- 
itantly so as to control his leter reactions to the flame. 
This change is just as r al and existential as any other 
physical object . Its sip-nificance lies in its controlling 
of subsequent exrerience; In ttie case of the child in question, 
he will not put his fingers to ttie flame, nor will he play 
with etches. ^hen he thinks t>^st the atches will bum, 
the eanimf; is, of course, not ^le sent, yet it determines 
his reactions as if it were prosmt. "Both the thing inean- 
Ing and the thing ".eent are elements in the sa^ie situation. 
Both are present, but botti are not present, in the same way. 
In fact, one is present as -not -present-in-the-sa'ne-way-in- 
which-the-other-is. It is pre sOTit as soxnethinR to be rendered 
present in the seme way through the inti^" vention of an oper- 
ation, e naiEt not balk eta purely verbal difficulty. It 
suggests a verbal inconsistency to srreak of a thinp; present- 
es-ebsent. But all Meal contents, all aims (that is, things 
aimed at) are present in the same fatdiion. Thinrjs can be 



presented as absent, Just as they cen be presented as hard 
or softy bleck or shite, six Inches or fifty rods awey from 
the body."-^ 

To take an idea or nieeiiing as objective is a natural 
consequence of Oewey's postulate that "things are what they 
are experienced as, "^ end his concept of experience as an on- 
going ccaitinuum. -le does not a ssus® any antecedent rfsality 
to be the criterion of truth. To hl->:^ sense data are not the 
standard to which ideas are to conform; neither is reason 
the source reveelln-: an absolute reality. Reelity Is exper- 
ience; it is chenpjln??; as err^erlence is en onptoinc. process. 
The criterion of truth is found in the fulfillment of the 
idea in action . The glveai suggests s thinjo; pre sent -as-pbsent- 
which we react to. This thing prescnt-as-absent is the Mea 
of tJi© given; its existence is just as real as the given. 
The process of sug-^estion is lilcewise physical, physical in 
the sense thet it is a natural event of inter&ction on the 
third evolutionary level. Oewey has remarked ''That suggestion 
occurs Is doubtless a mystery, but so is it a mystery that 
hydrogen &ad. oxygon trseke water. It is one of ttie hr/rd, brute 
facts that we h^ve to take account of. "3 "It ie as certain an 
empirical fnct that one thlnjj; sufjgests another as that fire 


alters the th ln^ burned. The s\srge sting thinir has to be there 

i"The Jxr^riwentel Theory of Khowidge", in The -influence r ^' 
Darwin on -hilosoohy ond Cither Ssaaya. pp .88-89 (Italic 
orip;inal) ~ 

23e« preceding chap. S II 

SEesays in 'Ixne riniantal Lo'-ic, p. 49, ('J-' ' j -p 


or given; somethng lias to be th re to do the 8ur^(ci;estinj^. 
The siggested things is obviously not *th€re* in the same 
way as that which sug-osts; if it were, it -^fould not have 
to be suggested* A suggestion tends, in the mtural an, 
to excite GCtion, to opertite as a sti^iulus. I nay respond 
ffloro really and ener^ie tic ally to a Ewggested fire than to 
the thin/; froci which the suggestion sprang: laiat is, the 
thin^^ by Itself may leeve -e cold, the thing as sufjgejting 
something else may sacrre e vigorously. The response If 
effected has all the Ibrce of a belief or conviction. It 
is as if we believed, on intellectual grounds, that the 
thing is, a fire. -«• 

The :yetsry of suggest ion ana the objectivity of 
Idea (thlng-as-Kiagested) raay be solved if we understand 
that Dewey stresses the in erdependenoe of aibject and 
object , thought and fact. To him, the Imr^edi te datum 
Is not nlnd; it is IntarectiCTi. 'Things ar© what they are 
experienced as" is the description of this process of 
Interaction; the state -ent that "a living organis.i ani 
Its life processes involve a world or neture temporally 
and ^>atially 'externel* to itself but •int-.Tnal* to its 
functlons"^is another sypreetlon of the process. His cen- 
tral thesis is tlBt every existence is an interacting event. 
Ttere is always a concomitant change between the thing 
experienced and the subject experiencing. It is a reclpro- 

^Ibid., p. 47 (Italics original) 
Experience and '-ture. p. 278 


cal chenrre rather than a one-way causal sequence. 3o 
when Dewey says t^.ot a thin?? sufy^esta another thing, he 
rneens a thing exTierienced is referred to mother thing 
erperienced or to be exTTerienced. 

The thing aaggested is lentel, in the comrion-sense 
point of view. However, ''mentel" is not interpreted as 
denoting a self-sufficient sphere antitiietical to a phys- 
ical one. ": entel" is a special mode of objectivity, for 
it is a quality of intaraoting events when lan^uaf--e is 
evolved, Another word for suggo&tioQ is infer erce. That 
is why Dew«y affirros its objective status, when he says, 
"^Hie existence of inference is a ftict, a fact as certriin 

and unouestioned as the existence of eyes or or the 

^owth of plants, or the circulf»tlon of the blood." To 

Dewey, a thin^ suggiests another thing nfeila there is an 

intra-orf^anlc event p^n^ on in the person in the form of 

inference. In the cotjrse of ttie 'rocess what is suggested 

is detached from the thinp* sugre sting and be<x>!nes a concept, 

exemplified in len{^af;e. Concept is not a rsental stuff. 

"A word, an elGrebraic si^, is just as riuch a concrete 

existence as is a horse, a fire-engine, or a flyfi^edc." 

It is inetruTiental in ,'Tuidinf action, in effecting the sol- 
ution of a problesTietic situp.tion. s.s a quality of an intra- 
orfjjanic event, which precedes overt act, it is an orf>;aiio 

^ KesasB in r.xpr^r imental Lof^lc , pp. 50-51 
^Ibid .. pp. 419-420 
®Ibld., p. 326 


"disT>ositlon" shown within ttw r«ohaal8m of related phys- 
iological funotlonlnre which heve been InTolved in a former 
elmll- r actual sltUBtlon. 

Viewed froia their Inatruinentollty, Ideas, eonoa is, 
or meanlnfrs nny be said to be plans of action. s Juct :ald, 
the criterion of truth rests on the effect of an Iden w!ien 
put Into practice. The trutl: of an Idon deT^rds on vor- 
Iflcotlon. A aotind s\j|fr^ec.ts a nian, or a r; t; the Idea is 
an hypothesis to be Terlfled In furthnr exrerlenoe. hen It 
is found to be the tapping of ti» shade r gainst the window 
due to the moveoent of ths wind, the idee cf the sound of 
a man or of a rat Is chanf':ed to the idea of the sound of the 
shade. The preceding and the succeeding Idoa arc no loss 
real, althou/^ the latter Is true, txue in the Bonse that ex- 
perience fTOws out of the pre coding md If. confirmed throuf^ 
overt obs Tvatlai of foots. In this observing process, the 
idea of a an sves as a p-uide. It Is "extra-orpianlo " as 
a aipgested object, "proaent-as-nbsent"; it is no leas intra- 
organic as diaposltion tendlnr townrd coraplotion of the whole 
obs'Tvatlon-oondust. Thot It direoto notion means th/t It 
is a plan or a method. Dewey's illuntrftion of a noD lort 
in thB woods illustrrtes a typical oasa of the place of Idea 

"Tha lostulate of InunsdirtB Haplrlclam", on . c i t . , p. i;30ff. 


in nan* 8 groving experience. 

"Supposlns; t « individual tends still and atteiants 
to conrrre his idea with the reality, with What 
rf^elity is he to com re it? Hot with the presented 
reality, far thBt r eality is the reality of hlrr^elf 
loet; not wi^ trie ooraj^lete reality, for at this stage 
or proceedings he h:is only thr: Idea to stand for the 
complete theory. 7hat kind of comrferison is possible 
or desirable ther^^save to trcit the «ntnl layout of 
he whole situation as a workinf^ hypothesis, as a 
plan of action, and proceed to act upon it , to use it 
as a director andcontrolTer of one*is dlvai^tlonB 
instead of stuablinr' blind3.y nround until one is either 
exhausted or accidentally ^ets out? fciow suppose one 
used taie idee-- that is to say, ttoe present facts r»ro- 
Jected Into n whole in the li.rht of absent £acts — as 
r^-uioe of T'Ction. suppose, by eans of Its speclf- 
icetiocxs, one works one*? way along imtil ona co-^es 
upon fanailier f^ound — finds one*i3 solf. Now, one 
laay say, ry Idea waa right, it »as in accord with facts; 
it Tifrroes with reality. Thot is, e-cted upon sincerely, 
it had Jed to the desired conclusion; it has, throup^h 
action , worked out tie state of ^ich ii con- 
templs ted or intended. The agreerent, correspondence, 
is between purpose, pien , esnd. its own execution, ful- 
fill-ient; between a rcjEp of a course constructed for 
the -aJce of fnildlnf; behcviour and the result attnined 
In acting upcai the indications of the raap,**! 

Idea and fact are, therefore, not antithetical. 
Fbct is always fact as exnerienced, as su/^f-ested . hen it 
points to aonething, it is an id ee ; it is chEsn-cred, hen 
the idea acts as a guide to further action and serves a 
purpose, the eventual fact, whet)»r it validstes or inval- 
idates the idea, is different from ttie receding in that it 
possesses a more enriched eanln^. In other words, the ex- 
trinsic ''leeninf- of a feet whoa it points to sa^icthing be- 
oooes the intrinsic neaninfr when it is its Iniriedi&te quality. 


?>s3aya in Kxperirraental Logric . pr) • 239-^40 . (JUf/es- er/y/»4/J 


This flndinr; of relationship is the source of the symbolic 

chani^e of environnient and of the concomitant chanpe in an 

individual's way of interacting. 

•^Doflnitenosa, depth, and variety of noGnlnc: sttsch to 
the objects of an ex orlence Jti t in the de^nree in 
which they hnve been previously thought cbcut, even 
when present in an eacrerlencc in rhich they do not 
evoke inferential r^rocedures st all. i;uch terms as 
•moaning', 'sif^nificence' , ♦value* hove a double ::ense. 
Sometimes they -^an c functitm: the office of one thing 
reT>r^ sent inp another, or pointing to It as Implied; the 
operation, in short, of scTvlrjr ps o aifrn. In the word 
♦symbol* this Banins; is rrBCtically exhaustive , But 
the terns also sornetinies ean an inherent ouality, a 
runiity Intrlnsieelly charRCtcrislns; the thlw: exper- 
ienced and raking it ??Drthwhile,.,,In tha situaticm 
which follows lapon reflection eaninge are intrinsic; 
they have no inctruraental or subservient office, — because 
they have no of ice at all. They sr? as taach auelitles 
of the objects in the eiturtlon as are red end black, 
herd and soft, square end round. "1 

This caaplementary ofe racter of idea and fact rests 
upon the main concept, experience, pexrticulprly in its Inter- 
action as')eot. In Dewey's earlier phase of thinking, he 
already Identified eeninf? as objective, as ideal ele-^nt of 
fact. Tacts change in relation to experience or intelligence. 
"Ihlnkinf'.. .is nothing but the feet in its process of trans- 
leticn frc«a brute lapr^'ssion to lucent-rnonning,'' At that 
tl!T» he St ill did not take up tJ© biological theory of adjust- 
laent to defend his psychological standpoint; he found that 
Hefrel^s lofdQ is p f»roi»id for 8 ssartine^ the vital connection 
of thought ai^ fpct. Thouf^t is but the expression of fact 
in Its pre dual coming in view of 1? tent neanlng; knowledge 

^Ibid ..pp.lC-17 

^Gee preceding? chap, ol^ 


is Idealization of fact in t t-is of Its meaning. 

"The ideallzQtlon is not a process of deiTir ture from 
the nipterir^l pr-^sented In -nercertlon, for this --oter- 
iel ie Itself Ideal, The lO ealirBtion of science is 
sirnply 8 furttis r develop ent of this ideal element. 
It is. In s:hort, only rend--ring erplicit and definite 
the reanlnf^, ttie idoa, Rlreody contained In porcer»tion.,.. 

"ffe hove to csk whet is the especial 5?round for ceiling 
the element vhlch rjekes knowled^?:© slgniflcait an ideal 
ele -ent? The ans^T in fTcnerol is thet this factor is 
ideal, because it is not present by way of i?n".edlr)te 
psyohical ccourrence, but as esnlng;. It is slrrnifj canoe ; 
am this is si :'nifloaTice . pret:cnce as synboliyed l It is 
convenient to h- ve a term xo denote wh- 1 is prese nt in 
the way of eeninf^ r: tbsr thon In ttie v^y of existence, 
and tiie •ideal* Ju?t ee * s the de^nand. It meets it neg- 
atively in swr-'Gstlnin; that this factor is not one of 
space- and time- existsnce and occurrence; it rreets it 
positively In s'j.r^-estinp' thnt it Is due to intelllf^ence.**! 

The phrase "due to Intel licence' probably neaas nt that phase 
of Dewey's thinking, the partioulrr aoAe of experiencing, 
and it realnds us of that strter^nt thr-t "the nature of all 
objects of philos> phical innuiry is to be fixed by finding 
out what experience says about theja,'*^ At present, "intell- 
igence" Is interpreted as that kind of behaviour which con- 
trols subsequent exT^e^ience in the lifjht of what is aug^sted 
in the present given sltutjtlon. The interdependence of idea 
and fact in experience Is efter all the most obvious in his 

Holding this point in view, we see th' t idea is only 
derived from .r«iii*s interaction with his environment; it is 
incorporated with CHie's whole psycholof^ioa 1 and physlolOfUcal 
laeke-up and becomes en organic disposition; it is instrumental 

1' cnowleds^e As Ideallzintion'', ot>. clt., pp. 390-391. (Underliniig 
2 iiee precedirei; chap. SII. f-^lne) 


in -aking over a problematic situntion, thus eventiiating 
in n more enriched experience. "To heve en idee of a thing 
is thus rot ju.'t to r?et certain sensations frora it. It is 
to be able to respond to th« thing in view of Its ploce in 
an Inclusive scheme of eotion; it is to fore^ the drift 
and pr6bd>le conseouence of the action of tiie thinp- upon us 
end of our action upon It."^ So sy^^bols, langue^, end other 
concerts have their existence only when they are used in a 
social experience. This theory of idee is in fact a phil- 
osophy of leamins; which explains the 'activl^ curriculum" 
Dewey first tried in the experinental school connected with 
the University of Chicago during thB nineties of the last 

So mwsh about tha mature of idea and n«anln^. Cur 
Tiurpose is to show, first, thnt idee is not a cental entity; 
secondly, that iden fl;roT3s out of ^;an*s interaction with his 
enviroment pointing both to an objective content and to a 
conconitant organic disposition; thirdly, that idea is an 
asr-ect of mind; fourthly, tuat iden and fact are mutually 
complementary; fifthly, that ideal and real are continuous; 
and lestly, that this rocinrocal adjuttment of idea and fact 
within experience constitutes the growth of mind or meaning. 
l>ewcy»s theory of mind may be comnrred with the time- 
honoured treatrsent of mind. The persistent nroblem of aind 
is its n- ture and its relet ions witti the world. Sonfie philos- 

emocracy m6 ducotion , p«36 


ophers tried to explain it in the ll;?;ht of a metaphysical 
or theolof^ical theory; some deliberately tried to explain 
it away in ord r to throw overboard dograetio beliefs couched 
^ a priori ter s. The latter group denied an undoubted 
fact, while the ftorr«r group exaggerated it. Dewey places 
it in the evolutionary perspective and explains it as but 
a necessary consequence of interoctln' events reaching the 
level of languBge end co sninication. The abode of 'nlnd 
often assuraed inside of the body is removed to the meaning- 
ful activities outside of the body. He does not 'regard * 
mind as any independent substance; instead, hs takes for 
inranted the active function that inheres in the organiaa. 

In the precedinp- chapt^T , we toucl«d upon the point 
that the -rrowing syste'^^ of experience presup-oaes some . 
innate yarinciple of activity. Now, we see thn^ Dewey has 

J^t dwell o^ 

to take into account tliis principle but does wmt dwell 
its neture as the past Ideelists did. He ^st takes it 
as a rnatter of course. This is the pertinf of the v/ays 
of Dewey and the idealists. The latter have to ask whet 
this principle of activity is, the expat iati on of Which 
often entails dtialisra. Dewey Juit takes it as a quality 
of organism's behaviour, a property inherent in the activ- 
ities of the living being, which upon final analysis are 
the display of tensional distribution of physico-chemical 


While Dewey odaaitB the innf te existence of Im- 
pulses or needs which In trsditlon rve t»k:eii as th» vol- 
itional end feeling aspects of the soul, he denies th« 
Innnte existence of thinking or intellect which in trcd- 
Ition is taken as the comitlonRl aspect of the soul. In 
other words, mind in tie narrow trriditionel sense as In- 
tellect is denied its Inmte existence. So lv> stetes, 
wlien he is reftii Ing the ttieoiy of "faculties": 

"There are, indeed, e ^reat number of original attlve 
tendencies, Instiietive modes of action, based on tiie 
orif'lnal connDCtions of neurones in th8 central nervous 
system. There re Impulsive tQ:idencle8 of toe eyes to 
follow and fixate llrht ; of the 'jeok nuiscles to turn 
toward lip-ht and sound; of U\@ hands to reach and ^,rasp; 
end turn and twist anr; thunp; of tlie vocal anoeratus 
to rBltb 80U;ids; of the raouth to spew out unpleasant 
substances; to s-a^ end to curl the lip, art so on In 
almost Ireiefinlte ntBft^er. But t e se tendencies (a)instead 
of beinp a snail number sharply ^^r ed off fron; one 
anothsr , tre of an indefinite vnrlety, interweaving with 
one another in all kinds of subtle ways, (b) Instead of 
being If tent Intellectual powers, reuuirlnfr only exer- 
cise for their perfeeting, thay ere tendencies to res- 
pond in cert'iin ways to chsn^es In the environrr»nt so 
as to bring about other changes. So-ethin/Jt in the throat 
jaskes one cough; the tendency is to e,"}ect the obnoxious 
pertlcle and thus nK>dify ttie aubseouent stln:ulus. The 
hend touches p. hot thing; it is impulsively, wholly un- 
Intellectually, snatched away. liut the withdrawal alters 
the stimuli ooerating, and tends to nake them more con- 
sonant with the needs of the orrranis™.. It Is by such 
sreelfic chanres of orRfltilc activities in response to 
ST>ecific chanp-es in the medium that thfit control of the 
environment of which we have spoken.. .is effected. Now 
all of oiff first seelnp-s and heorinps and touehlngs aid 
s-rellings and t©stin#!fs are of this kind. In any leg- 
Iti n- te sense of the words nentsl or Intellectual or 
cognitive, they rre Incklnr In these qualities, and no 
amount of repetitious exorcise coTild bestow any Intellect- 
ual nropeities of obsTv^tlon, judpraent , or intentional 
ect Ion (volition) upon them.'l 



Dewey's purpose is to keep away from the dlsppraiared 
"faculty" psycholof^. "^^ut tlie statement aeeras to defeat 
his purpose , He states catefrorically that there are no 
"latent intellectual powf^e reQulrini? only exercise for 
their p«rfcctin •"; t)vit the numerous interweaving liupul- 
sive tendencies have no "aentril or intellectual or cog- 
nitive" cuellties; th'it "repetitious exercise" of ttiese 
tendencies will not result in their having "any intell- 
ectual properties of obs<Tvation, jud/^nent , or intention- 
al action," 3ut he does not make cle- o st>^te ent 
that "they are tendencies to respond in c^rtftln trays to 
charges in the environnsnt so as to brinf^ about other 
chengea.'* It means, if we tire not mistaken, thit t)iese 
lapuls s tend to rcsi)ond to stiiiuli in certain vmys that 
brini; about chenf^es in the envlroa'^iental stimuli *5nd in 
the individual's subsequent ways of response. This bring- 
ing; -about procesB iney not be reflexive; the changee 
brouf^t about r^y not be due to ttm "tendency' but to some 
"intellecttial or comltive" elersent . The first example 
Dewey cites is a reflex aet. ";;omethinfr in the throat 
makes one coti/th; the tendency is to eject the obnoxious 
particle end thus to modify the subseouent stimulus". 
•'Ito nodify the subsequent stimulus" meaoB here that the 
tendency of the throat to eject the obnoxious particle 
would ease the thront of couprhlnp; and tJie subsequent ctlm- 
ulus is no loncrr obnoxious. The eecond is a reflex and 
yet intellip:ent act. It is reflex act when the hot thln^ 
is "impulsively, wholly unintellectual ly, snatched away". 

It Is •'Intel Lectual or cc^^nltive" " -^n "the withdrawal 
alters the stl^nuli operating and tends to maice them more 
consonant with the needs of the orgeniam". It eans that 
ti]e individual knows tlie hot-thingHsteans^pain-when-it-ls- 
in-coritaot. The chanf^e in the environment is symbolic and 
the <*inn;'e in the «iy Of response is a result of th9 recogni- 
tion of -^^eaninp;, Ro« Mttes this change? Dewey, in the stete- 
ment seens to attribute it to these rBtural tendencies. And 
in oonsonerfie with his theory of mind, he would say that 
this •neaninjs'fUl interaction of natural tendencies with en- 
vironment is mind or thinking. But how can the interaction 
of natural tendencies -ive - aanings, if there is no a priori 
potentiGlity or carecity to know or to learn? 

The source of the occurrence of eanini^ is, to Dewey, 
fysterious, as we h^ve quoted. In thst jmaaa^ , he goes 
on to say that,'*we oen investigate the conditions und r which 
the happening takes plaoe, we can trace the consequences 
which flow fror. ttoe happening. iy these wans we can so con- 
trol the hariTTeninf^ that it will take place in a more secure 
and fruitful manner, .iut all this derands upon the he':rty 
acceptance of the hapt;enini» as fect.''^ ''.e has no intention 
of havinp; recourse to a hidden pow r behind the cour5?e of 
events. e have Juj t said the t he rejects the notion that 
the seat of ^Ind is in the brain or in the nervous system; 
he adh res to his thesis thn t the seat of mind is the functicn' 
ing of events with a purporje in view. 

Issays in r x-^erimental Lo-^ic , VV» 49-50 


Does Dewey then really "jb e up any eoneral power 
inheient In the individual? e find thp.t Dewey surrenders 
the notion "faculty", but admits pow^r, ability, potential- 
ity to explein why a child learns or knows. He effinas 
the existence of the capacity to grow, when he treats of 

"It is noteworthy th? t the terms 'cai^aoity* and *nctential- 
Ity' have a double eanin^, one sense bein/; nccretlve.the 
other poaitiTe. Capacity -ay denote mere receptivity, 
llk» the ca'-'adty of a quart measure. ..e .ray c^ean by 
potentiality a orely dorsiant or quiescent state a cap- 
acity to beco-e something dlf fererit under external In- 
fluences, ^ut we also ean by capacity an ability, a 
pow r ; and by potentiality potency, force. low \s«ien we 
say that Icsnaturlty rieane t*e i>08sibility of growth, we 
are not referring to absence of powers which may exist 
fit a iKter tlrae; we express a force positively present— 
the ability to develop. "1 

And this "power to grow" has two aspects, dependence and 

plasticity. Dei?enderice denotes a ''social canaclty', while 

plasticity denotes 'the ability to learn from experience" 

or "the power to modify actions on the basis of the results 

of prior eaR?erlence8". 

"The thoroufT^^oinf? <d»racter of this helplessness su{Tgest8. 
sore conrpensating powfT . The relative ability of the young 

• • 

of brute anir-.als to adapt the-^selves fairly well to physical 
conditions frcm an e? rly period si^gests the fact that their 
life is not intlnately bound up with the lifte of those about 
them. They ere compelled, so to sreak, to hpve physical 
gifts because th* y are ladclng in social pifts. Human infants* 
on the othia" hand, can ret alonf with physical incapacity 
just becnur?? of their social ca-^aoity .... If it were said that 
children ore themselves racrvelously endowed with powe r to en- 
list the coopefrative attention of others, this wouI5~be 
thought to be a backhanded way of saying tluit oth' rs are 


Qe.iocracy end giducatlon . p. 49{ItGllc orifsiinal) 


aiervelouBly attentive to the needs of children. But 
observation shoves that chillren are gifted with an 
equipment of the first order for social interoo^u'i;e. 
Few grofsm-up ' ersons retain all of the flexible end 
sensitive ability of children to vibrote ^rmpBthetle- 
ally with the attitudes and doings of those about them.''l 
"The stsecific adaptability of an laanaturo oreature for 
growth constitutes his plasticity . This is something 
quite different ffom the pie. tic I ty of putty or wax. 
it is not a capacity to take on chanr^e of for^ In accord 
with external pressure. ..It is essentially the ability 
to learn from experience; the pow^r to retain from one 
exr^erienoe sonething which is of avail in coping with 
the difficulties of a later sltustlon. This eans pow- 
er to rodify actions on the basis of the results of 
prior experiences, ihe pow i* to develor dispositions , 
ijiithout it, the acquisition of he bits is ln5)ossible.''2 

Dewey* 8 "power to grow" Is In ^^eral not different from 
what the pet rsyohologlets called the faculty of intellect, 
an asect of soul. The latter also rTeens a potentiality to 
learn. The difference is that in the post, intellect o ten 
meant tte powrr to apprehend the true, the et rnal, and was 
thus theologically deified. Hovev^, aside from Its theolog- 
ical Implieetion and its rnetaphysieal Implication of knowledge 
ee antecedent reality, intellect, psychologically speaking, 
is etill a f^eneral powor to letirn. The ar.mment then turns 
out to be the question, viz.. Is there a r;enerQl power Involved 
in the furastloning of particular events? For instance, when 
we perform particular different tasks of emorlzetlon, we want 
to know whethar ell these particular r^er for-nances point to a 
sinfrle faculty or function. In Dewey* b, we have to ask 

•^Ibld ., p. 51 (Italic orip;lnal) 
^Ibia .. pp. 52-53. (Itrlics original) 


Whether In oir varlo^JS lasmirr's from experience there is 
the functioning of tlie same "power to develop dispositions". 
To be laore specific, we take Dewey* s definition of thinking 
88 an illuctr?jtion. Dewey defines thinking as the problem- 
solvinf? process, end hs nakes much of the cultivstion of 
thinking ability as the only ay to w et the changing con- 
diticaas of life . He refutes an a priori faculty of reason- 
inp, yet h© entertains the view that an ability to think 
can be achieved throuf^ problematic activities. Now amimg 
tbese nultitudious probleai-solvin • activities, is tltere 
involved a conprehenslve, ainple function of problem-solving? 
If the answer is negative, the cultivation of the ability of 
probleni-solvin^ is Irapossible. If the answer is affirmative, 
the lUnctlon of problem-solving is inherent In an individual. 
It is obvious tnot when no single Amotion of problem-solving 
is involved in these pertiouler processes, particular probloflB 
would involve particular thinkin- processes. There is no 
carrying over from the poyt to the vrcsent and to the future, 
and, nnturnlly, a f^enerol ability of problera-solvim?; to 
cope with ohan,<5inK situ.tions cnn hardly be developed. How- 
ever, Dewey does imply a problem- sol vlnr; faculty, when he 
admits the existence of "the po er to develop dispositions". 

He opposes himself to the exponents of faculty 
psyoholoffy, and y t in the last analysis of human n- ture he 
cannot shake entirely free from its influence, ^.ome thing 


that Is cofflprehenslvo end dormant, whether we cell It 
principle, category, capacity, functicaa, fsculty, or 
what not, must be assuiised at the start of human develop- 
nient. so long ee it rreens a general poesibllity to dev- 
elop, di ferent nemes ettached to it ere insi^^mlf leant. 
The real difference between Dewey and the rational psy- 
chologists concerning human nateir© lies in the method of 
developrent . Dewey lays stress on overt activities, soc- 
ial as well as individual, in the develop-^ent of flexible 
habits and thlnkiap: ability, while the rstional psychol- 
ogic t a cttreh less importRnce to environiaent and rely 
mostly on the -method of rigid drill. 

Coming back to what we hsve |ust said of the three 
aspects of soul, ^e shoalfl conclude that Dewey*s various 
original "tendencies' or "powers" con still be grouped to- 
gether and classified under these t^iree time-honoured 
types of cental activities. And the cuestion still reiaalna 
regarding a jcreneral faculty or function responsible for the 
transfer of learning. This we shall corne to in the third 
section of this chapter. 


From the forep-oing brief exposition of Dewey* © 
theory of mind, we can see, first , that 'nlnd appears only 
on that evolutionary level where there is social eorammication. 


As quoted, 8h>^red undertaking Is asde x>ossible throo^rh 
langoBge. "The heert of lancrar p^e Is not 'expression* of 
sonethinfT entecedent, aueh less expression of ectecedent 
thought. It Is covsunicttioQ; the estebllahasnt of eocr>er- 
ation In an aotlYlty in vhich there ere prrtners, anA in 
vhieh tlB activity of each is aodified end reiToleted by 
pertneraiiip.'' ir>eech involves -^aainsful actltitles which 
are the ^cond aspect of raind. The use of things as signs 
of other thin^^a is a cosuxmplsoe feet. .ords, concepts, 
anl other created syabols all Tx>int to sonething else, and 
are originally ' rivod froa a social setting. These meaning- 
ful ob.^ects ssrTe £'-ecific puzposes in the fvirthering of 
experience, urposive aotlTities are then the third aspect 
of mind. In Devey*s sense, these three aspects ere all 
interdependent; every aspect iHplies the others. To cite a 
fSailir'T instance, a child lesms the ne-^ of a thing 
throu^ tbe use of it Tith tbe Beoibers of his faslly. 3e 
sees thea use soae thing, say, a pen to write; he h eeoaa s 
Interested in it end holds it to write. The positicm of 
holding!; the pen is eorrected; the sound "pen" is heard and 
uttered in tlr- eoorse of his or their using it . This exper- 
ience, e conjoint, purposeful, and ?ieaninpful sctiTlty, is 
■ind. The growth of aind is, accordingly, ths growth of 

^ r.xrerience and '>-tiare. t) . 179 


To Identify ex3>erlence with mind is to all 
appearance risky, /s Just said, experience denotes not 
only content but method, list is mind is explained with 
reference to it. Howerer^ idlAt and how we exp<^ienee con- 
stitutes the very essence of mind, Mind, as Just defin^ 
in Dewey's sense, is "the quality of nieoningful interactions 
with a view to attaining a purpose, social or individual". 
This Instru Tentol value of interactions makes explicit the 
temporal continuity of experience, t»hile ^eaninpful activ- 
ities rfjfer definitely to experience os sn affair, a course 
of sction V7tier-eln we act u on a thine; and under^jo the con- 
sequence. The child puts a finp-or in the flaree and c<mi- 
sequently gets hurt; he then knows fla* -means -to-hurt. 
And should he he^.r of the name 'fla-ie" uttered by others 
in th' course of this experience, or see how people go 
jMar the fla-ne withoxlt ,f?:etting hurt, he then experiences 
^Bore about the metminp of fla^^e. This coairse of doln^ and 
suffering is what experience eans and whet -nind likewise 
laouis . whenever there is experience there is then mind. 
Experience becomes more refined when the -'ethod of doing 
and the way of suffering are distinflnaished within the whole 
non-reflective course of experience. rocess of distinction 
gives birth to concents det?fChed from the orlrinal context 
and is instrumentel to the fUrtherinfr of future exnerience. 
This Bf^ain is mind manifest In the reflective str^e of exper- 


In education, a directed course of exrerlence is 

the ,?:rowth of mind. The identity of the two «ords may be 

raede raore clear when we cor^ to Dewey*. _ inition of 


"fEducation^ is that reconetructifai or reorrsnizstion 
of experience 7/hich adds to tiie eanlnr of experience 
and which increases sbility to direct the cou; se of 
subsequent exoerience, (1) The incre-^snt of eanlne 
corresronds to the Increased -p^srcertion of ttie connections 
and continuities of the 6ctivities in which we ore encaped 
....(£} The other side of an educative eiPierience is an 
added poarr of subsequent direction or control. To say 
that one knows what he is obout, or can intend certain 
consequences, is to £?ay, of course, that he can better 
antioipL^te wftiet is froinp to harden; th^t he can, thfre- 
fore, :?-ct ready or Ta^ep«:'re in advence so as to secure 
beneficial consequerices HOd avart undesirable ones."^ 

If we clTan^c In this pessa'^e the word "experience" to "^Ind", 
despite an awkward presenti't Ion of form, ttie meaning of the 
growth of mlad is made clerT. 

Dewey pnrticulurly emphasizes the underf^oin/p; osrsect 
of experience in education. If experience is -"erely a phy- 
sical activity without any p^Tception of relationship an 
the part of the Individual anfl his subsequent ohsa^e of con- 
duct, it cannot be called experience. ThB flooding in of 
all kii^s of stimuli to our sen se-or fans with accompanying 
reflex-lilce responses sets up interactions of the "nsycho- 
physical" kind; novf^rtheless, the are not mind, nor can 
they be truly called experience. Every second we are sub- 
jected to the presence of hent, cold, to "Visual and acoustic 
sensations. These organic-environiental interactions do not 

3enocracy and r.duc; tion, pp. 89-90 


constitute experience. Kre? © child's playlnp- eotlvlty 

can h&rdly be called experience if the play is a sheer 

impulsive act without raeenlnr or puzpesa* Acts bcco^ne a 

zoaaningleea series in which connection between the preced- 

Inpr nnd the sucoeedlnr set is not perceived. 

"Mere activity does not constitute experience. It la 
dispersive, oentrifu«?al, dissipating, iixporience r8 
trying involves ohenpe, but chancre is raeanl iRicss 
tiensitlon unless it is consciously connected with 
the return save of consequences v/hlch flow from It. 
^hen an activity Is contimied into the under?^oin^ of 
conseouoncss, when the ch- n 'e made by action is re- 
flected bfic]. into B ch&nr^e :iede in us, the ere flux 
is loaded with significance. .e learn something. It 
is not exr>«rl8nce when a child r<erely sticks his finrer 
Into a f Ifl -e ; it is experience when the movement is 
aonnected with the pain whidi he und r7oes in consftquence. 
Henceforth the s tickings; of the fin,::cr into flame means 
o burn, i-einp; burned is a mere physical chan^, like 
the bjrnla<^ of a stick of r/ood, if it Is not p- rceived 
68 a consequence of 8<XBe other action. '1 

In conditioned response, there is an automatic uiider- 
going effect seemingly without the conscious perception of 
the relationship on the part of the individual. pvlov'a 
experimant cai the dog by conditioning Its saliva -response 
to the bell sound Is a typical case illustrating that change 
of conduct con be made in ficcorlance with the rule of tempor- 
al order of itlmuli . This apparently <iOes count r to Dewey's 
criterion of perception of meaning. It would invite con- 
troversy if we say that the dog perceives that the bell sound 
meana the cominr' of food. However, the "attention" of the 
dog must be secured before the conditioned response can be 
effected. That Is to say, the dop; must be in an al-- rt state 

^Ibid.. v., 163 (Italics ori^-'inal) 


without outside disturbaiKje, or?rcnic irritation or 
drowsiness, and It naitt be interested in the object of 

the act the food. This is the essential condition of 

the process. An ''alert" state is a step toward saying 
that 8 puriwse — food~do ruinates the reaction and tliat 
the perception of one stirralus sug»7estlng another is in- 
volved. Id the ease of ani~als, this chanj^a of conduct 
through external human Tnani:^ulotions is, of course, a 
kind of "experience", if tlie terai is used loosely. But 
lo Dewey's sense, experience is limited to the hunusn level. 
LanmiRce is the cause of the existence of nilnd. 

Even to the human bein^;, this ir^chaaicsl training 
of animals rvsj be applied. To L*ewey, this is the difference 
between training and education. Training emphasizes the 

chen.'re of overt action, while education leans more to the 

change of dispositions. The undergoing aspect of experience 

cieens not only physical change of behaviour, but thst of 

raental habits or attitucles. Ideas, Keanin^s, or concepts 

play the nain r61e of directing this whole reconstruction 

of experience. 'Tnderp;olng of oonseruence f^lves rise to the 

meaning of tte act; end the nenninfr pervades the whole orA:anlc 

structure of the individual and becomes the pert find percel 

of his moke-up. His later course of experience is thus 

affected. The physlolop;ical psychology of id<:.a end meaning 

^J. P. Pevlov, Conditioned Reflexes . Oxford University ■ ress, 

Detaoeracy end I^duontlon . p. 15 

19^7, ohap. 15 


suggested by i>ewey is significant, not because of its 
correspondence with the actiial physlolop^cal mechanism 
which is still a nystery, but because of its hint at the 
unity of t^at la leerned with the personal orp-anic -eke-up. 
k'eenings are not only suggested objects which effect a 
symbolic change of the ©nvlpomnent, but effect the attitudes 
as well ss the overt rction of the individual. Flan« not 
only .^eans to hurt, T*^ich at once chanirss the bare exis- 
tence of so'iethlni^ that is burning, but sinrultaneously 
alters the child* r sheer plryful attitude into, eay, a care- 
ful or a fearful disposition, and naturally determines his 
later riCtlvity with fire. 

To Dewey, unity of knowledge and discipline or that 
of deanim* and attitude can be effectively achieved only 
throurii shared activity. The purpose p Tsaoates the whole 
activity, determines the -^leans to its attalnrsent, 3.eada to 
the perception of the connection between the series of acts, 
and molds the attitudes and ideas of the one who partic- 
ipates in the activity. This is a point Dewey clinches in 
his philosophy of learning. He does not believe that there 
is a BEiore effective nethod thai that of conjoint activity 
in turninf^ to account the educative function of the under- 
going, aspect of experience, i.e., in directing effectively 
th« fsorowth of mind. It is cxily throuf^h Intimate personal 
participation in conjoint activity with a ptarticular pvir- 


oe preceding: section of this chapter. 


pose in view that kno^led^:© thus accuired is orf';anlzed into 

emotional find volitional dispositions, and hes a permanent 

effect UTX)n the .arrowing mind. Direct inculcation of cioral 

or intellectual ideas is definitely discounted by Dewey. To 

him, *'we never educete directly, \nt indirectly by means of 

tlj© environraent,"^ The educative role played by environment 

is cleerly .merked in the follo«lng passage. 

•*If we forniulale the principle.. .wo shall perceive 
that the social ediujs neither iaplante certain 
desires and ideas dir^^ctly, nor yet rrj- rely estab- 
lish«# certain purely ciuseulfr habits of action, 
like ♦instinctively* winkin^ or dodrin/? a blow, 
'iettinp: up conditions which stimulate certain vis- 
ible and tfjnfible wa^/s of aotln*; is the first step. 
^Taking the individual a sharer or partner in the 
assooifted activity so that he feela its succ see 
as his success, its failure as his failure, is the 
completing step, /^e soon as he is possessed by 
the emoticnsl attitude of the group, he wi I be 
alert to recognize the special ends r t x^hich it 
alHS and t>B rneans employed to secure success. Ills 
beliefs end ideas, in other words, will take a 
form similar to those of others in the croup. He 
ti'ill also achieve pretty lauch ttie same stock of 
knoT2^1edge since that Knowledge la an ingredient of 
his habitual pursuits. "2 

Dewey* ^ aBsortitai of indirect cultivation of char- 
acter in a social r*ediun has its source in his view of mind. 
It Is very obvious that direct inculCRticai is based on the 
theoretical ground that there exists a mind as such capable 
of receiving outside ideas or knowledf^e Just as a sense organ 
receives outside stimuli. I^t Dewey «iianges the notion of 
laind from an immaterial entity to the cuality of social, 
meaninf:<;ful, BnA purposeful intGErection. A mind can be achieved 
only in this kind of interaction. • ven an orf^anism cannot be 

^op.cit .,p.82. 
^Ibid. , PB. 16-17. 


taJron qc Just q atiniotui'o; " it is a cliorQetoriotio xm^ of 
Intoractlvity v/bicli io m>t oionltanoous, oil at onco tnit 
aerial. "1 Intornction ic the vory catctevor^l of Dot/cy's tlioory 
TliG intcrdcpondo!ico of an iatiiviauQl mid tbo eaQViK)naoat 
sho.ii on tliG iroTiGn level is social cort-tanicfstion, es ^;m 
liavo said in tiio prGCodinc; section* 

!!o'i"ovor, tlicrc arinos a dlffieulty v/li@n iievroy in- 
aistc that only in Llioi'od activity is tho odnoGtionol value 
of tho imQcrGoinG asnoct of esporionoe roalizod. Use of 
languGj^o r.B n. norms of {i^inlnc oooninG is oin obvious fpct. 
I^msguacc ic tlio laost cffoctivo instriciont is osrpandioG one's 
opatial-tonporal onviiTorsraont, IbrouGh reodinc txnd. personal 
ooanEmiCQtion, ovonts of roootc tlrio cmd place oorao -Tithin 
tlio focus of the hero cmd nor/, ^o-./oy believes in tho oociol 
oricin of lancixase; "Inngucco iiiplioG txio oolvoo involved 
in a conjoint or shared undortakinG.^S vHion a bahy borlns 
to loom the neaniajG Qi" coundc and tones, ho oboorvco others 
uslnc tho thing x^hlch the tono ii^iplioo, I^ldc that ;/Mch 
others civo hin, cries for it vfhen it is takon av/ay, and 
porforcio other activities \7h4ch aro connected ^Tith tho 
activities of other raoabcrs of his fcnily* Lupposo a child 
loams tho \7ord,"hnt"; its moanii^ goog with tho use nade of 
it in his activitioo t/lth tho Groim-ups. Tht^ put on their 
liats xjhon thoy go out v/ith hin; thcry put his hat on his hoad 
vThn^-x thay utt p the sound, "hat"; thc^ talre it off his head 
. ... . — - - ure, p.ii92. 


when they come horae tos^ether. In the course of this Joint 
activity of f»ing out, the child learns the meaning of the 
iwuxid, »hrt» . itot only does he know thet it si^^nlfies the 
thlaf^, but he knows Its me, and in time its different kinds, 
vben he puts on different hats on different occasions or In 
different seasons. The learning of l^nguaicre is througli 
this rrocess of Joint activity. However, there src occas- 
ions where the raeanings of things ore not learned through 
the xne rade of them, fords nsy be learned by beinp referred 
to a dictionary or to other persons, in such cesss, there 
is no actua l thing; entering? into the activity; nei13ier is 
the activity neeesserily a shared CMie. 

Dewey resorts to imagination to explain how one can 
8hi?ire :'«ntally with thoae who use the thinf;. He cites the 
vords, "Creek helraef, as an exaiaple. They "arouse a new 
aeanln^ by ineitinfc the one who riesrs or reads to rehearse 
Imagiaatively the activities in which the helmet has its 
u s e . For the time being, the one ^o understands the words 
•Greek helmet* becoj^s rrentally a partner with tho^ who 
used the helniet . He enf;ajye8, throu^ji hie i 'Trephination, in 
a shared 8 ctivity ';^ This explanation is not satisfactory. 
In order to know the neanlnsr of the word, we have to in»plne, 
of course. Its connection witt\ other things, .e hfve, in 
the case of "Greek hel?net'', to think of its shape. Its colour, 
the notorial, or even Its u&e by t2ie Greeks, /ccordlng to 


"^ Democracy and Nature , pp. 17-18. 

'^Ibid. , T'. 19(ilnderlininf: mine) 


Dmmey, the shape, the colour, the naterlal, and other qual- 
ities of a thing that we co'-e Into contact with in ordinary 
life, are known throu^ our use of it. 3ut in the case in 
question, to think of the use of the Greek helnet does not 
ueoes£>aril7 involve us in partnership with those people who 
used it. Of eomrse, if "shered experience or activity" is 
interpreted in the broad sense, learnine^ is elways the shar- 
ing of others' experiense, But, still, tte phrese has two 
distinct Txe^iin^s. Inr^^adlng a book, one slffires, in a sense, 
the experience of the author; one inherits, as it were, his 
experience; one is i>ossessai of his exnerience. The physical^ 
one-mrn siti^tioai is aentally a social eitasticKi in which tlM 
reader takes what the author gives. 'Shpre", in this sense, 
is in s one-way direction of taking something from sc»&e (xie. 
This kind of aharing experience is most evident in reading or 
in observation, Ima-ination plays an iaportant part in this 
shpjlng of other's experience, /xjiotner xeaninij of shared ex- 
perience is that it is an overt reoiprocel affair. One par- 
ticipates in en activity in n*,ich others take part; they all 
take interest in the comson concern which reacts upon their 
ways of acting and moulds, accordingly, their attitudes, their 
speaking ability, their under standinf- of the rneanings of the 
things that enter into the activity. In a word, they learn 
throuf'h this social -^edium. The baby learas the word, hat, 
through his activity associated Tsith that of tbe grown-up, say. 


the activity of fping out. 

Dewey is Inclined to think thst shsred experience 
is always reciprocal, no metter it is overt or imaginative. 
He tries to vitalise or vivify the learning process by in- 
sisting^ that the acquisition of ideas through len^^iage, such 
as that of books or Aia^re'ns, laust pass through tiie social 
process in v^hich lanmsge originates. This is an inevitable 
result of the application of hie concept of experience to 
the etudy of education. And this is why he concludes that,— 

"the use of iangua^ to convey and acquire ideas is 
en extftrsion end refinement of the principle that 
thin 'S j-ain jeanin by boint:; ueed in a shsred ex- 
perience or joint action; in no sense does it con- 
travene that principle, when words do not ent or 
es factors in a shared situation, either overtly 
or ime*3;inatlvely, they operete as pure physical 
stlntull, not es having? a tb anin^? or int eULectual 
value. They set activity running In a piven fjiroove, 
but there is no accompanyinf? conscious purpose of 
^eniiii^, l^us, for example, the plus slfti snay be 
8 stimiilus to perform the act of writinc' one number 
under snothei aid eddin^r the nunibers, but the person 
forming, the act will ot>ernte much as an automoton 
wcmld unless he realizes the eaning of what he does.J 

But to realize "the eanln^ of ^et he does " is not necessar- 
ily to be Involved in a joint activity, in Dewey's sense. 
Direct erplermtion by way of illustration by tho adults to 
the younc- still has its value in educeticm. This situation 
of explanation nay also be called shared in tSie one-way-dir- 
ection sense, i.e., the learner takes what the other gives. 

Besides the case of language le^'-min{? which does not 
necessarily involve conjoint activity, ive find that somctiraea 
the use of a thinj> does not necessarily involve a social 

^Ibid., p. 14 


situation, end the t e soci&l situation does not neeessarily 
involve reciprocal ftotlon. It is e patent feet that a child 
plays p.lone with an object and in the course of tlaw he knows 
how to '-.anipulfite It, Frequently he asks the help of his 
elders but does not allow then to not for him. He takes 
interest In his work the araeaning of which he gradually grasps; 
when he cannot solve e dllfleulty, he esks the help of his 
elders but they are still barred from joininr; in the child's 
ami work. The activity, on the rhoie, is an individual one; 
he takes soae advice from the elders, but this social sit- 
uation is not shared in Dewey* ^ sense. 

iJuppoee the child plays with a lock and a key. In 
the eofurse of his playing ^•le knoc s how to lock nnd hos to 
unlock, and ths relationship between the lock aid the key. 
Should he turn the key too hard la a wron^ direction and 
not be sble to it out , he would ask the advice of his 
elders. He takes the «dvlce, and wbsn it works, the r.eanlng 
of the relationship between ^e lock and the key beeoines 
clearer. ^H:^ situation, on the whole, is not 5oeiQl;nelthcr 
doss it involve any co.";:non interest. The advice Is taken 
but the activity and the interest Involved therein are mainly 
the child's. eny of the laboratory experlBients conducted 
by scientists are individual eotlvlti'^s but are no less mesn- 
in^rtil to then. Thus, thinitra raay f?aln neanlnfr even when they 
are not being used in a shared experience. And even in a 
shared experience, the shnrinp; is only e direct tekinf^ of 
scMBSthlng from the store of the elder's experience, so to 


Dewey's i n sis terse e on the infiireot aode of forming 
one's nental and eKotionel disposition as the raoet effective 
way of realizing tti e educational value of the undf^rfroing as- 
pect of experience. Is due to the fancy he takee to the un- 
eonscious influence of social cof^iwunication. His raferenco 
to the influence of primitive society In raouldin/? the character 
of the younj^-^is an illustrBti-n of hat he ^^ans by interact loa 
Kven in our present society, "the ^^(Hy our f^roup or class does 
thln/^s t.^ds to determine the proper objects of attention, and 
thus to prescribe the directions and limits of observation 
and eiaory. "het is stran^;;® or fooreign (thst is to say, out- 
sitJ© the activities of the ^oupsj tends to be aoraliy for- 
bidden and intellectually suspect. '^^ Our lan^uaj^e habits, 
our ways of behaving, and our aesthetic taste are primarily 
resilts of aociHl Influence, This infbrraal mode of education 
is, to Dewey, to be the method in school education. 

But the point we hr^ve Just made Is that the environ- 
ment the learner is la may not be a sodal environrrsent . Mind 
is, to Dewey, social. But when there is no ascial environisent, 
mind still appears in conduct, wjoaetl' es, Dewey's own illus- 
tration of the presence of ralnd as purposive action excludes 
the social context. The facilliar Illustration is that of 
the activities in writlnsr a theme with e typewriter. 

*Ibid. , chaps. 1 a H. 
^Ibid .. p. 20. 

^Ibid.. p. 21. 


**you ere enpia^-ed in a certain oocupetion, say v/ritlng 
with a typewriter. If you are an exT>ert, your fori«d 
habits take care of the physicsl moveaent e and leave 
yovLT thouf^hts free to consider your topic, Juppose, 
hosrever, you ere not skilled, or tlist, even if you 
are, the ua<iiinc does not work well. You then have 
to use Intellistenee. You do not wish to strike the 
keys tit rsndo.ti end let the consequences be what thsy 
may; you wish to record certain words in a givea order 
so as to amke sense. You attend to the keys, to what 
you hfive written, to your moveiaents, to the ribbon 
or tie si^achanlsm of the nadiine. Your attention is 
not distributed indifferently and miscellaneously to 
any end every detail. It Is centered upon whatever 
h«» a bearing upon the effective jiursuit of yotir 
oecupatlon. Your look la ahead, and you ere concernedl 
to note the existing fnets beoeuf-e and la so ftir as 
they are factor c In the achieveraent of the j-esult in- 
tended. You >uvc to find out whet your resources 
ere, what <»nditions are at oonannd, and what the 
difficulties and obstacles are. This foresif^ht and 
this siffvey with reference to what is foreseen con- 
stitute "ind. ctlon thet does not involve such a 
forecast of results and such an examination of means 
end hindrances is either a faatter of habit or ©Ise 
it is blind. In neither case is it irtelligent. To 
be va^e and uncertain as to what is intended and 
careless in observation of conditions of its roaliz- 
etion is to be, in that degree, stupid or nartially 
Intel 11 iB«nt . 

"If we recfff to the eer.e where mind is not concerned 
with tre physical r^nlpul'tlon of tl© instrurr^nts 
but with what one intends to write, the case is the 
saire . There is an activity in process; one is taken 
up with the developriient of a theme. Unless one 
writes as a phcHio^.raph tnlks, this -Bans intelligeno^ 
nai^iely, alertness in foreseeinf^ the various conclus- 
ions to which present date and consider fit ions are 
tendinft, tOfi;ether with continually renewed obsorvstloa 
and recollection to ^.et hold of the subject matter 
which bears unon the conclusions to be reached. The 
whole attitude is one of concern with whfit is to be, 
end with whst is so Tpt as t^e latter enters into 
the oovonent toiwirv^s the end. Leove out the directlm 
which depends upon fore slight of possible future re- 
sults, end there Is no intell licence in present behav- 


Ibid., ^P. 154-155 


Other illustrations vhleh Dewey eit'S, sueh as those of a 
men XolI In the vocds, of (ioubtful objects, the meaaings 
of which are beinf; sought for, to show mind as a purposive 
course of action, do not point to any soeiaL context. This 
imaas thet the growth of alnd or the reconstruction of ex- 
perience does not lie solely in ^>cial activities. Occas- 
ions in shieh ictivities ere iK>t social and not shared, 
would brealc dowi Dewey's funda-r.ental principle thnt 'things 
gain mean lag by being used ia a shared experience or Joint 
action. •* 

£Ten whan the Importance of Joint action in the growth 
of Blind is adnit ted, it is only on condition that thinking 
pleye an important role in the Joint action. It is valuable 
in so far as it is inetruraenta3. to ttie development of think- 
ing. ITow we turn to the topic of the nature of thinking. 

Dewey* £ trcat-ient of thinking as an overt, purposive 
process is to affir- the olos=e relationship between thought 
and fact, reason and sense, and to deny 'entel self-suffic- 
iency, e stated in the preceding! chapter that Dewey not only 
allies himself with traditional empiricism in upholding the 
empirical origin of knowledge, but ,^oes fxirther to identify 
the knowledf;e-p:ettin^ process with the experisiental method 
of science, thus avoiding the necessity of separating thou/'ht 
firon fact. His as sort ion that everything must be defined 
with reference to expr^rience is the first step tcw/ard relating 
thoufht to feet; his insistence tte t nfiind , intellir;ence. 

^ThRse lllustrotions abound in his Horr e Think end -ssaya 
in I;.xperi'"CTitnl ^o-io. 


ability are qualltlc s of experience thfit involve pros- 
pective inference end control is the second step; his 
asisertlon that mental events are but a hii*ior level of 
ob^ctive interacting, everts may be said to be the com- 
pleting step to validating the arip^inent far the unity of 
thought and fact. Cental and physical ev«its which have 
been pitted sixains t each other are no more antithetical. 
To cell a thinp rnental Is to say that it comes into re- 
lation with the organism which is pi^a-t of nature. A thing 
perceived, as r>ewey says, 'involves a relation to ort^anic 
activity, not to a knower, or mlnd*''^ 

To avoid taklsfl; reason or thinking as a faculty or 
en e^teluaive procese ooeratlrsi? in the orgaaiaa, and to es- 
cape from viewlnf^ knowledge as anything spun out of an in- 
dependent reason, or as antecedent reality waiting to be 
apprehended, Dewey regards thinking as an overt purposive 
proc e SB . 

"CthinklnrJ is not an event going on exclusively 
within the cortex or the cortex nod vocal organs. 
It involves the explor* tions by idiich relevant 
data are procured an<i the physical analyses by 
which t}« are refined and r» de precise; it com- 
prises the I'eadin. s by which infortnfition is i?;ot 
hold of, the words which nre experimented vdth, 
and the calculations by which the sl<?nlficance 
of enterteined conceptions or hypotheses is 
elaborated. Hands gad feet, sn-^aratia and 
appliances of all kinds as ranch a part of 
It as clianf^es in the brain. :ince these physica l 
opnrctions (including' the cerebral events)and 
equlpnents ere a x>art of thinking, tkinking^ is 
roentai. not because of a peculiar stuff v?hieh 
enters into it or of necullnr non- nr tural activ - 
ities yjhlch constitute It , but because of ^faat 
physical oets end epo licances do; the distinctive 
nor pose for T»hi'ch they fct ^ emploj^d nnci the dis- 
tinctive results wftiich they accomplish. '2 

l-'^lBaftva In '.TfDorlmentnl Tn'rln. t>. 25S footnote. 


'•Thoiiftht, intellif.-ence. Is.* ..Just a name for the 
eve.itE find acts whicdi ufike up the processes of 
anelytic inspection aid projected invention anS 
testing.., .These events, ther-e acts, are wholly 
nstoTol; they are •'rQalistic* ; they comprlEe ths 
sticks and ttones, the breed eni batter, the trees 
erjsd horses, the eyes end ears, the lovers and haters, 
the slfrjiH and delif^hts of ordinery experl«nce. 
Thinking is what Bome of the actual existences do. 
They are in no sense constituted hj thlnkinr?-.; on 
the contrr^ry , tiie probleiiis of thoukit ore set by 
the! r difficulties &a& its resources s re furnished 
^y ^^'^g^y © ficEOies; its ricts r re their doing's 
ndepted to a distinctive end.'l 

That thinking is instrumental in bringing out a re- 
fined, earlcJied, ordered experiertce from a problenrsatiQ, 
indeterminate phet>e of experience and that is €t 
physical event '-my be /aede more clepr in tiie fojlowii^ 

".. .thinkln/? is no dtffsrent in kind fron 1A\e use 
of nntarsl r«te; isis end ener^Kles, sey, fire and 
tool"?, to refine, re-ordev, mti shar^e other nat- 
ural raeteriels, sw * ore. In both cases, there 
ere letters -^hlch as they stand are unsatisfact- 
ory and tiiore are also adequate agencies for deal- 
ing with tben and connecting the-r, , At no point 
or place is there any Ju.-ip outside empirical, 
natural ob;}ects and their relations. Thot^ht and 
rtJQson sre not sr°eific powers, 'fhey consist of 
the procedures intentionally employed in t3» 
application to each othcir of the unsatisfactorily 
confused siid indeteriiinst a on one side and tJ» 
regular end stable on the other. Center clizing 
from such observations, empirical philosophy per- 
ceives thfet thinking?, is a continuous process of 
temporal reorc^anisaticn »ithin one and tiie same 
vorld of experienced things, not a jump from the 
latter world into one of objeots constituted once 
for all by thoijght."2 

^Ibid .. p« 21 (Italics ori.dnal) 
Sxpf^rience &nd ;-.-Httire , pp. 67-68. 


lliis treatraent of thinking; ie continuous ^th his 
conception of experience as the moving unity of subject- 
taattop and method. Tlie ordinnpy course of events in which 
w« do soriethlng end undergo the consequence constitutes 
experience. het we do and imder^o is usually not dis- 
criminated from how we do a thins: and und r^o the con- 
EOquence. The whs t anl the how, or ftio experienced and 
the experienc ing; ere intrinsically interwoven in our dolly 
life eetivlties. There la a vn/?ye dlsccrnsKsnt of the 
relet, icai ship betr?cen tlB oct and ttoe consequence, end 
ordinary heblte of b*fivlcur aro the results of this f^a^m 
reflection. To come back to our famllinr illustration, e 
a<^ the child who f?ot burned in his finder when h© put It 
In the fire, withdraws fiom the fire ttie next tline he coroeB 
near it. He sees the relBtlonship between yshat he did end 
whnt he undertfent; in other words, he Iaiow£ how he under- 
went the biarn. The fire meens to bum. This experience 
affects then his later exre^rience. However, if he invest- 
igates the fire, its occurrence, aM the dej^ree of neeirnesfi 
to it in relation to the degree of heat which be suffers, 
he is deliberately thinking. He Is then conscious that he 
is playlnf^ with the fire ; he finds more connections or mean- 
ings between the act nnd tbe consequence as 1» concentrntes 
his ottention on the how of his dolnis; and suffering. This 
distinction of object and subject, of subject-matter and 


.method Is a result of thinking that Is evoked in experience. 
It is, that is to say, a fuootlonal distinction of thought. 
The aiore one knows in the course of hie eaqjerleBice how on« 
acts im& is reached wpcn, i.e., tho laethod or T)?ay of exper- 
iencing, the laare is one able to control the future events. 
/ method is always a ruethod o;f some sub Ject-iffiitter just as 
an act is always a vsy of interaction between orf^snism and 
eavironrnent. Tim two sre not actually sei^erate or anti- 
thetioal. " ethod means that errangeiient of sub ject -.-Batter 
Khieh rkIcbs it leost effective in uae . Kevor is method some- 
thing outside of the r^iterial."^ 

Kow thinking is biA e different narae for «thod to 
designate the .'ieanlngful, purposive character of dealing 
«ith what is experienced. It is a distinctive mode cf ex- 
pe^lenc^n^t5. It is evoked In experience for the purpose of 
controlling: experience. 7o take a sysip^hetic und far standing 
of Dewey* t view of thinking ae method, we must bear in ilnd 
his basic thesis that experience Is a course of intoraotinR 
events in which the orf'ianism is s factor. lositlvely speak- 
ing, exptTlenoe is this Interacting? process; orfjanlsm is a 
shortened forai of saylnp; arganism-in-relation-to-environmant. 
Negatively speaklnfr, experience Is not a inedley of subject 
and object, thinkinc? and subject-matter, reasoB and sense. 
HecauBS of this intrinsic Interdetsendence of subject enA 
object, tho psychological acts of an individual are not is- 
olated from or independent of ttie envirtmment . They are not 

Democracy and ;<3liC8tlan, p. 19i 


consciously used by a inlnd to act upon eny incomiiif'?: stim- 
ulus; they sre rathsr the wea?B of experiencing; sOTje thing 
that ent^^rs Into exi-jerlonce. Outside stimulus is not some- 
thing tlBt has real existence hy Itself; it is called otltn- 
ultis in virtu© of its port pleyed in the course of experience. 

hen thst phase of experience is in dottot, we called it 
stimulus. rwironsent ie not outside of experience, but is 
that phase of our exirerlence itilch "pronotes or hinders, 

stiRHiletes or inhibits, the c haractGristio activities of a 

livln? heinfT."^ Thinklnp; is, therefoxe, ttet wey of exper- 

ienoinn: sorething whicii is doubtful; the w^ is ciieracterized 
by the flndlnr' of -reaning, suprgestlon of idee or pleo for 
solution. It is a process beginning with a problematic 
situation fsid endinp- in a clarified, deter foln-te situation, 
«e h^ve n^ntioned that Deiwy lon^ ago stnted in the inter- 
pretation of He;7el*s logic tl»t "thlnkini7,,,ls nothing? but 
the fact in its process of translation from brute impression 
to lucent eaning". He had the firm conviction that thinking 
is a way of exporlenoe. Now «*en he states thfit ''thinking 
is a directed movement of aib^ect-niatt x to a completing 
isstje,'^ reanlnp; that it is the developmart of experiaaoo 
from its problematic phase to a clarified end, he finds support 
in the evolutionary theory of Interactlca. 

^In the discussion of the nature of stimulus and response in. 
an fict of sensori-TJotor cooroiaation, '^ewey^s srticle "The 
Reflex Arc Goncept in j sychology " is saorchlng. see preceding 
chapter,.- 4. 

^De;Ttocracy and -d^x; r tion , p. 13 

SwCe procecilnf-;;; chap. ^1. 
*0p. cit ., p. 194 


:«»oy»E is CB ite oTert -t of thlntlag, 

8S seen la the fore x> lag o«u>tatiOBS is easily laderstood 
in the li^^t of th» Im^ traditioa oT eoat« ~~ ^iTe and 

. sphysioEl thiaiciag. He doee -. tte aapiro 

icists nor ?ltti tts r?:tioiiallsts re ilk* 

Bm^tmagf^s seadlK into to -^in' ^sses^s Ttom ootslde sod 
carrTlng th«a out fro si tbe sdJid. Thinking, la tlwir 
beeorres the fane tioni air of sisd inside ^e body sad Is 
dosed either with e -mysterious poser cr with a rriori cet- 
•fffrles to ac»ld incosilii-r aensetioas. ^^ditioaal as&ool 
prsetlee is besed uran this ttieory of aiad. Devey eai 
8t€« three evils resultia? from tts ttkeory. (1; odily 
setiTity is takes as tfee cause of leadia^ tte mlad 
tross. iatelie^oal pursuits, "^^e ?Mef soaree of tlie 
'problem of diseipliae* in schools is that tts teaelwa 
of tea to spend ttm Isr : of the ti-^e la suppressiac 

the bodily actirities which teke the alad avsy froa its 
■Bterial. i> prsalos is put oa physical pui^tode; oa slleaee, 
oa rifid uaifcrnity of posture aad aoveaeat; urea a sa^LlBe-> 
like slsnletlcB of the attitudes of iatelli Teat inttrest... 
Tte aagleetsd body, haviag no OK^gaaized fruitfxil ehaanels 
of ectlTity breeks forth, sithout kaovla- -ffhy or bow, iatO 
Beaniacless bolsterousaess* or settles inic lly eaaia^- 

less fooling both rery diifereat ffoe fee aoxaal play of 

children.-^ (2 odily acUTity Is devoid of nsMilai^: "seasas 


bid., p. 15 


and muscles are u;ed not as organic pfirticipant s In having 
an Instructive experience, but as external Inlets sad out- 
lets of ailnd,'*^ Reading, writing, end fi^^urlng someticies 
boco'tie In themselves a pure mechanical routine without ""ean- 
ing* (3) Uia^ Is endowed with two separate functions, vi z ., 
the fomation of l(?:?es about individual thlnp-s, and the 
passing of Jud,^''«nt on the connection of tie Ideas. Thla 
totally neglects tiie feet that perception always Involves 
interpi^tntlon or ^\iift:^ysnt, and t"at prceptlcn of relation- 
»hlp between two Ideas can only be effected In experience. 
I.e., in r=etu«»l tryin^-und^r^oing activity. Indifference 
to experience, accordingly, gives rise to what Dewey calls 

''the cielx:^e of half-observations, of verbal ideas, end un- 

asslrnilated * knowl dge» . 

Anothar reason for Dewey's view of thinking as an 
overt purposive r>rocess may be found in his firm belief In 
the efficacy of the exTsCT" Iment al iethod of science in 
getting -enuine knowl«d^e. His description of thlnkrln?^ is 
in t errsB of the general procedure of scientific reseerch. 
This is why he says tltet "physicel opa: etloiis (including 
the cerebral events) and equipments forma part of think- 
ing," end thj.t "thinking? Is what some of the actual exis- 
tences do." The funaamental traits of exporljr»ntal proced- 
ure whidi take Dewey's fancy are succinctly expressed 

Ibid .. p. 166 

;s early as 1887, ewey alieody assorted that ■'Perceiving is 
interT!retl«» ", mA tk* tJi© aeaninp: asr^ot of ioen is cocx- 

istent with^the existence aspect, oee ".jaowld e as Ideal- 
iKRtion', op . el t . 

Democracy and .-iducRtlon, p. 169 


as follows: 

"Ttie first Ir the obvious on« that all exper- 
irsntation involves ovtart doinfr,the akin/? of 
definite chssif/es ia the enTironnient or in our 
relation to it. The second isth.^t exryerir^nt 
is not a random iCtivity, hut is directed by 
ideas which have to meet th» conditions set by 
the need of the problem inducing the active in- 
ouiry. The third and concludin?^ featijre in 
which the otlier two receive their full treasure 
of meaning, is that the outcome of the directed 
activity is tl© construction of a new en^irical 
situation in which objects ^ve differently re- 
lated to one another, and such that the conoeq.- 
uenoes of dlreoted opeyatloos fGrm the ob^cts 
the t have ihe property of being loiotm."! 

These three features, viz., overt doin^, plan of 
solving problem, p.nd the final reconstructed experience, 
not only point to tJie function of thinking and tlie origin 
of knowledge but reveel the way of developinf^ ti^e ability 
to think and the method of lesming. Dewey seem to maka 
H formula for le^min*^ in the school out of the scientist's 
method of research in the laboratory. Unity of lethod and 
subject-matter, of thlnkittf'^ and bodily activities, of in- 
dividual and environrnent , is realised in this experinoental 
procedure. ' ind grows and the ability of thinking improves 
throufrh this overt, continuous process of problem-solving. 
The present-day project method, intesroted curriculum or 
activity prc^rara is based upon this experimental method of 

iio far we heve stated in this section in the light 

of Dewey's coricept of experience that the growth of mind is 
^he juest for Oertfiinty , pp. 86-87. (Italics orii?:inal) 


the continuous reconstruction of experience; thd growth 

hin^s (m the underljring aspect of experience; thfit the 

full educational value of this aspect is realized in shared 

activities; and tliat thinking is instruiasntal to discovering 

the connection between ttic doing and tiie undere:oing aspect of 

experience and can b© Invoked only i*ien there is difficulty 

or conflict in ttie coi2rse of experience. 3«t whither does 

the growth of mind tend? 'IMs is a problea c onceming the 

alms of education. 

There sre in Dewey* s formuleticai of educational alffis 

two points of view which seem to be mutually exclusive, and 

yet comple^nentary to each other* He asserts that growth is 

itself the end of education, while at the sarce time he holds 

that democracy is a criterion for evaluf^ting the growth of 

mind. The first positicsj is succinctly sot forth in the 

followlnsr stater:i©nt. 

"Since FT0v:1ix is the characteristic of life, educa- 
tion is all one with rrowinit»; it hf. s no end beyond itself. 
The criterion of the value of school educstion is the ex- 
tent in ??hich it cr etcs a desire for continued growth and 
supplies ■•^ans for -r^kin the desire effective in fact.'*i 

This is to say that sprowth Itself is an end when present 
experience is directed in tfae enrichment of its iosnediete 
meanin.^'t and is Instrun^entol to the effective control of 
future sitxiations. This continuous reorpianlzation of exper- 
ience effected through intelligent utilization of every 
immediate phase of activity is the ideal of education. In 

iJMiBoracy and £ductition , p. 62 

other vordB, when the habit of thlnklnf; Is derelc- -^ so 

that srrovth be«ofles a life process, : 

Is reelired. This Is s r<ethodolc estloB retter 

tlsji a sttfrg'^stioQ to dli^nsevith edueetioaid. alas. H« 

reveals the lack of interest, cariosity, or Intelll^eBt 

e<«eerQ cb the pert of the child r^sd the ri^rid adh^. 

to the pouriop-ln ~ethod on the p'^rt o. ■■-^ — , -'»-^- 

Echool adopts 8 fixed earriculuri 1 
:rith £«■• fixed ideal «hl^ does 3ot t^Jce ifito eo9sideTeti<a 
the child's experts aoe and capecities. ^~r '^- -ttein'orat, 
eTCT7 is justified; t g«jt is se^crifieed to the 

future; t be child is a ▼icti-' of t he edult'f lieel. i ecm^ 
plete ehsa^re cf point of rl€» i£ oeeessai order to re- 

fers this tradltiocel edacetioQal practice. r.c L-evej's 
•o&e^t of the costiitultv of er^^ience is aost aptmslta 
fcr the refors. dult -cent red education is tiieaged to ehild- 
eentred educetion; preparatloD for e st^ ic future i£ changed 
to the full utilizstioa of \Sm present resources of toe child; 
direct ^Tsonal iaculc^rticai is eh^^n^d lo indirect enrlroB- 
ent cultiTsticn. elianee opoB orsaalzed sebool subjects 
for the development of powers or abilities is rfianged to re- 
liance uron the child's ova eoeial eotlrltles. The applic- 
ation to edueeticB of the principle of eoatlnuity is elearlT 
shoen in the foUovin^ ststs'^nt. 

'*If education Is ^owth, it wjlsX pro4^r sslrelj real- 
ize preaamt possibilities, sod thus i^ke iodiTiduals 

better fitted to cor^e with Ister recuireattats. Ortmimf 
is not Bonethia- chleh is eoapleted in odd aiMants; 
it is a eoBtlBBOtts leadlos into the future. If tho 

envlronfjent in school and out, supplies conditions 
which utilize adequately the pr. sent cazscitiescf 
the Inmature, 1h© future which grows out of the 
present Is surely taken c?re of. The niistase is 
not in cttaching importance to nrenaretion for 
future need, but in makine; it the nainspring of 
present eflbrt. BecejA^;© the need of prer^aration 
for a continually developins; life is great, it is 
imperntive that every energy should be bent to 
inking the present experience as rich end siPinifi- 
csnt f s possible. Then as the present 'T^arr^es in- 
sensibly into the future, liie future is taken care 

Another point of view that seertis to contradict the 

argusent tt^it education lias no end beyond itself is set 

forth in the following staterient. 

'♦Since education is a social process, aid there pro 
tyanj kiiidfe of societies, a criterion for education- 
el eriticisra and constraetion implies e partieulqr 
social ideal.. .A society which ?nokos provision for 
participation in its ^ood of all its nerabers on 
equal terras and which secures flexible readjustnent 
of it 15 Institutions through interaction of the 
different forss of associated life is in so far 

democracy is then a criterion for evaluating the ^^rowth of 
mind. Apparently this is en external ideal appliod to ed- 
ucation; and is an end beyond education. 

In fact, Dewsy's notion of the ^i;rowth of experience 
has already implied the democratic ideal. To him, the 
development of caae*s capr cities is throufth a social process. 
The school is ref^/frcded as a for?n of ©omaunity life in which 
occupation in certain typical social aodes of activities 
acquires relevant and necessary skill and Infoirnation, and 
derelops intellectual freedo^i, moral and social habits of 

^Tbid ., p. 65 
^Ihid.. r. 115 


cooperation, tolerance, responsibility, helpfulness, f to. 
Social intcrection in terms of free participation in the 
common interests of the group, whet^t^r they be intellectual, 
aesthetic, or raat .-rial, is Dewey* s picture of school life, 
the ideal of which is to direct end organize the native 
tendencies of the child into intellii^ent and socielly des- 
irable hBbits and dispositions which in turn insure further 
growth out of school sral pronioto democrntic social progress. 
Democracy, in >ewey*s sense, is e moae of eoop-rntive living 
in which grrowth within a group and aaong groups is affected 
throuffh free participation in, and intolli</ent iraprovonent 
of, sociol interests. Realization of tlds social ideal 
depends on the children's early p^:rticip£tion in conjoint 
fiCtivities. Personal growth is a jnatter of social direction. 
This view Dewey exprei^sed ocrly lb 1897 when he stated that 
personal interests and capacities must be interpreted in 
their directed social f linetion .-^ Present living: implies 
preparation for future living, while the future ideal is 
progressively realized in the iiaproversetib of present living. 
Identity of end and process is Dewey's nethod of harmoaiizing 
the apparent contradiction of growth and democracy in their 
relation to the aim of education. 

^ y ]ed8^>rlc ::;roed . originally published 1897, collected 
In - due ration Today {Kdited by Joseph H^tner ) . New York: 

C.r. utnam* s 3ons, 1940, j)p, 4-6. 
2 i390 also chap. V, 



ye hnve tried to see from Dewey's standpoint the 
Intimate relationship between hie concept of ezoerienoe 
end his theory of the nature and prowtti of mind, .e have 
eoiraented on his insistence upon joint activity es the 
mediiLT! of fonain?? concepts, end pointed out his emphasis 
UTX>n the experimental n^ethod of science as the genuine 
way of lesming, and, particularly, of learning to think. 
The two points— joint activity and experirr.ental method 
of science— ere the basis of forminf- flexible habits and 
dynenic oonoe ts ^Ich, in Dewey's eense, account for aental 
discipline or transfer of learning. 

Joint ectivlty, as we hnve pointed out, is instrument- 
al in forming &ad enrlchlo^ concepts end in developing habits 
or dispositions. Concepts are the e an In^s of things which 
have been put to use. The more varied ttie activities, the 
®3re enriched are the eaiiniss j:^ot therefrora, and the more 
effective they are in cooin,*? ■sith changing life situations. 
Conversely, the more specific fire the activities, the more 
restricted ere the meanings and the less available the^ ere 
to chan^^JLng situations. 

Dewey points out the falsity of current '^philosophy 
of learning" which senaretes sense from thinking by :-alntaln- 
In^ that a concent is formed through the synthesis of etomic 
sense -pecept ions. As he remarks: 


•♦The philosophy of learning ismu hmn unduly dom- 
inated ^y 8 false psychology. It Is frequently 
stnted that a prson le. rns by ro-roly having the 
<5uslitiss of thlnr-s Impressed ution his nilnd through 
the gat-^way of the r-enses. Havin" received a store 
of sensory impressions, assoclrtion or some power 
of i?»ntal synthesis Is supposed to combine th«j 
into Ideas— -Into tilings with a irjeening. An object, 
stone, oramre, tree, (, is supposed to convey 
different impressions of color, shape, size, hard- 
ness, smell, tact©, etc., whidi aggregated to,^ether 
constitute th3 characteristic "ennioE of each thing. "^ 

This view of learning can h&rdly provide a fruitful condition 
for transfer of leernlng, and st the same time gives a dis- 
torted picture of the condition of transfer. 

The explanation of ttie condition of transfer branchea 
into two interpretations, according to the rationalists, 
active powers or faculties when properly trained by iieans of 
soOD particular sense r^terials will h«ve a f-'jeneral improve- 
v(ient. To Dewey, there are no TOarticulsr facultie s waiting 
to be trained; and when the loprnin^ sitxi-^^tion is confined 
to the absorption of certain particular subject-n^tth^r, the 
learning effect is of course not available to a different 
situation. To illustrate, spelling has been alleged as a 
rrieans of Improving: ttie power of memory and observation. The 
way of learnin/r srellinp; »8s restricted to reproducticai of 
foruis of words, jrill in reproduction was es^haslzed without 
any connection with other lines of activity, such as tiie 
learning at the same tiiae of tiie neaninst of the context of 
words, of their derivations, etc. It was limited to observ- 
ing and recalling verbal forms to the neglect of observing 

De:nocracy end iduc^tlon, pr>, S4-?5 



end recalling? other thingii. This acooimt of the condltlcai 
of transfer of lefimlng is, to ewey, fellecious. Cftie 
el©?ient in e situ&tlon constantly plven attention to cannot 
hnve any t^ystlcal carry-over to the learning of other differ- 
ent thlnp;s. Only -^hen x^arious elements in a situation are 
taken into account ^id enter into ttie activities of t3» learaar 
can the carry-ovnr effect be more fruitful in eubseouait 
social sittietlons. 

According to the assooiatlonlrts or behaviourists, 
transfer of learning takes place vjhen the ele^-^beait s in a later 
situation are identical with those in the previous learning 
situetlon. They explain learninipr in terms of isolated stiia- 
nlus and response, Ap-ainst this view Dewey has nede a pro- 
test in his paper, ''T^>e Reflex Arch Conceist in syeholo^^''. 
He has also hinted at the over-siinplificotion of the theory 
of conditioning? applied to learning. The pare sent -day 
association! st in the person of Iliomdike advocates the 
theory of identical eleiients whi<^ goes sf^reinst generalized 
discipline. His often-quoted ststeraent is pertinent to the 
understanding- of Dewey* f position. 

"One mental function or activity Improves another. 
In so far as and because they are in p^rt identical 
with it, because it contains elen.ents corrsnon to 
them. ...These identical elements :iay be in the 
stuff, the data ooncexniod in tive training, or in 
the attitude, the oethod taken «lth it. The former 
kind may be called i-:1 entities of substance and the 
letter , identities of piDcedure. "2 

^ Ibid ., y. 55 -k footnote, pp. 14-15. 

^ Thorndike, ^a..L., The ■ rinciples of Teach in/^ . New York: 
/..O. -eiler. 1906. pp. 1^43-^4 


ThorndllfB'E identity of objective elements is an emphasis 
oa direet training; transfer in such case is retsetitlon 
of BCt8. But his subjective elenent, attitude, Roes bo 
far as to admit sental diecipline whidi he tries to refute. 
When he says that beoausse the attitude is the seme in two 
different situetions, the response in the later new slt- 
uotion is therefore improved, this is to say that there Is 
8 transfer of the effects of Learning in one situation to 
another new situation* In otaier words, wheaa the leai'ner 
has ecquired in the course of his icaming, say, the attitude 
or ability or method of scientific thinking, hs is not only 
able to deal lelth his original lerrning sitti«tlons, but with 
later different situations, in the scientific manner. The 
aeeessary condition is tlien the developrr^nt of a rr'.ental 
attitude or a generalized ideal or method to facilitate 
traiTBfer of learning. 

It is obvious that Dewey agrees with Thomdike's 
identity of objective elenents. Rls view of a school as a 
winiature society wherein typicpJ. situations of life are 
presented is to provide an identical environment with later 
social situations so that the application of wh^it was 
learned is facilitated. However, he lays eraphssis on the 
meaning aspect of the situntlon. The gaining of ^«aning is 
not throu^ji mere percept ion-roe soninr; process but through 
use* His stetenient just ouoted continues as follows: 


"♦But as matter of fact, it is the eharacterlfstic 
use to which the thinir is put, because of its 
specific quelities, ^hlch supplies the eaniiie 
with which it is identified. A cheir is a 
thing ^ich ic put to one u^e; e. table, a thing 
nhich is employed for another purpose; an oran^-^e 
is a thing which coots so much, which is grown 
In warm cllinss, wftiich Is eaten, aid when eoten „ 
has an agreeable oflor and refreshing taste, etc. 1 

The enrichment of eanlngs through joint sctivlties is a 
factor In the transfer of learning. A iseelth of nlag- 
ful experience which one possesses endows one with nor© 
"poser" to teclde new situations. The efficacy of past ex- 
perience in controlling subseruaat cxpesrience depends on how 
tsidc the range of activities one was engaged In was. 

Concerning Thorndike's? subjective element, attitude 
or method, as a factor in the transfer of learninp, Dewey's 
position is no less similar. But le inslBts thot habit or 
method is to be formed In Joint activities. 

In the course of joint cctivlties wherein meanings 
are grained, tnental end motor habits are also forced. Habits 
are comrnonly regarded as jT^ohanicel skills adapted to the 
environ:;«nt for the purpose of f ecilltatlTO' vvork, and their 
efficiency as shown in accurete, fast, anci sraooth action is 
taken as a sif'n of effective control of one's action to con- 
form to a fixed environiaont . This passive sense of habit 
Dewey is not contented with. To him, habits have the active 
function of controllin? environment. It is not tnorely through 
he bit that we adapt ourselves to environment, but throufrh the 
ooordinotion of hnblta thet we adjust the environment to our- 

^on. clt ., p» S5 


selves. In other words, the function of habit is not ttto 

repetition of acts but the active coordination of orf^anic 

taeehanisms to c ntrol the situation. The more flexible 

heblts we hnve, the rsore cepeble we are of dealing with 

chan{?inf3 environment. This is obvious in our deily life, 

and in the growth of a baby. The baby gradually acquires 

more ho bits in the course of his experienee «nd adjusts 

the enviromient to himself as well os himself to the en- 

vironn»nt. The habit of sneaking, for instaiue, rende-s 

him more understandable to his family, and, in addition, 

.-aakes his family terve his needs, vmen he aoves a chair 

out of his way this is likewise an act which consists of 

the coordination if hsbits of walking and grepping. In 

our daily life, ^te more habits we hrve, the more we can 

coordinate thetn in controlling: our surroundinc-s. Habits 

of swakln,^, reeding, and writing contribute, of course, 

to our ease In s^eakln^, in reading, and in writing; but 

their coordination -Betes possible our effective dealing 

with environ^ient . e can undnrstsnd better tte changing 

world; we can have a bettor career; we can sufrgest ways 

of ainelioratinf? the environment; we can develop other 

rxental as well as bodily habits. All our daily acts are 

but various coordinations of hob its. '"Our character is 

the interpenetration of hnblts,'^ 

'♦A h£?blt means an ability to use natural conditions 
as ra ans to ends. It is an ootive control of the 

^liuiflen Ifcture end ;onduet . p. 38, 


enviroruaent tliroup;h control of the organs of action. 
e are perhar^s apt to emT)hPslze the control of the 
body St the expense of control of the environment, -e 
think of walkim', talking, playln - the piano, the spec- 
ialized Kkllls characteristic of tho etcher, the surp-eon, 
the brldp;e -builder, es if they were simply ease, deftness, 
and accuracy on the pnrt of the orf^anian. They are thst, 
of course; but the nessure of the value of these cuallties 
lies in the econoiaical snd effective control of the en- 
vironment whi<^ they secure. To be ^ble to v?alk is to 
have certain pronertles of nature at our disr)osal— and so 
v?ith all oth'^r habits, ..If vre think of s habit simply as 
a change vjroup^ht in the or??anisni, H9% rin^ ttie fact that 
this change consists in ability to efJteot subser'uait 
chfinres in the environment, we shall be led to think of 
*adjuv tiaent* ac o eonforailty to envlron-nent as wax conforms 
to the s >al which imoresKes It, The environment is thought 
of as something: fixed, providinrr in its fixity the end 
and standard of ohant»es taking place in the organism; 
iidjustment is ;Ju- 1 fitting oifffcelvee to this fixity of 
external condition.'*l 
**The more nuiiKsrous our habits the wider ths field of poss- 
ible obscsrvstion end foretellinf<:. The more flexible they 
are, the more refined is perception in its discrimination 
and the more delicate the presentation evoked by inaginatioa* 
The sailor is intellectually ot hOTi© on the f:'r;a, the hunter 
in the forest, the painter in hlr studio, the tm of r>cienaB 
in his ItboT'^tory. I'hese oounonp laces are universally re- 
cognized In the concrete; but their significance is ob- 
scured and their truth denied in tte oirrent fi!:eneral theory 
of mind. For they rean nothing? raore or less than that 
habit* fcapr:ed in procei;s of exercisinf^ biological aptitudes 
ere the sole £it<^ents of observation, recollection, foresi^t 
and Judgrnent : a mind or consciousness or soul in p;eneral 
which p«:rfor.'ns these opcrstions is a myth*'*8 

Shet we have ju t said has included two types of hebits • 
na lely, 1*i© sensorl-motor ai^ the mental, Dewey particularly 
points to ttie importance of the latter type. Attitudes, 
emotional dispositions, and the h^bit of thinkinc^ are indis- 
pensable f factors in accounting for the active fanction of habit 

^ Denocracy aid :^ducaticdi , pp. 54-55 
^Hunan 'loture and Conduct, pn, 175-176 


and the trensfpx of learning. Attitudes or disposltlon»» 
good or bad, shape the direction of an individual's conduct. 
f^ieeUanieal routines are et their corifRand. The attitude of 
friendliness, for instance, is a '^ntel habit. It has the 
power of selecting, and coordinating: the p» t ctore of habits. 
The ways of sT)eaklnf;, of ent^rtainin^^ and helping people are 
then det rmined, ipeakinc^ is, no doubt, a habit; but a 
friendly attitude dictates, as it were, the choice of words. 
The acts of entertfeininrr end helping are coordinetions of 
many sensor i-iao tor habits, to wit, liabits of walkinip-, seeing, 
speaking, jausele contraction, etc. These varied coordinations 
point to one purpose, namely, to be friendly to others. The 
habit of thinkin? likewise shapes the whole course of ^e*s 
life, f^lven to loose thinking*, a '^:an often .imtoes blunders 
and folio vss rules of thiimb. Cn the contrary the habit of 
exact thinklnc; furthers keen observation, acute foresight, 
and practicable rslans of action. Variation of overt be- 
haviour is conditioned by these otp.anio habits. 

Variation thus reveals both aspects of habit, viz., 
its grip upon us and our control over it. ven in its 
fixed holri uT5on us, it does not necessarily show identity 
of action in identicel situations, and it does not passive- 
ly reit for a p«rticul?5r stimulus to set it off In action. 
As Dewey well states: "A hebit does not wait, !;.icawber-like, 
for a stirnulus to turn up so that it ciay ."et busy; it 
actively seeks for occasions to pass Into full operation. 


If Its eicpresslon is unduly fclocSced, incllnetion shows 
itself in uneasiness jmS Intense craving." A 'an who 
is given to the habit of bad terap^ r«y eonimit a niurder 

flftien he is ol fended. This act, though it occurs only 

once in his life, i; etill a result of habit. 

This shows the potency of habit in its relation 

to growth. To Dewey, habit, when its active function is 

eraphasized, is essentially mentel disposition. 

'*The essence of habits is en acquired predis- 
position to ways or modes of response, not to 
pt^rticulPT acts except as, unrler special con- 
ditions, thffss express a way of behaving. Jiabit 
iaeans special sensitiveness or accessibility to 
certain classes of stioiuli, standing predilections 
end aversions, rather than bare recurrence of 
specific acts. It r-eais will.'*3 

Jdental disposition beooiaes ©ore sirgnificant when it is re- 
infer ced v^ith rich fund of eanings. Behaviour is intell- 
igent so fer as habit as well as inipulse is r?uided by 
thinking. Tlie habit of reflective thinklnf^, to Dewey, is 
shown in one's "straightforwardness", "opennindedness", 
'^integrity of purpose', rmd "responsibility of one's con- 
aequenoes."* Tltese intorreleted dispositions ore cultivated 
in the problem-suggv&tion-application process. 

Concepts and dispositions intfirpenetrate and co- 
ordinate with one snothear in conjoint activity. This is the 
point Dewey constantly reiterates. There aire involved In 

^ L e'^ocracy - nd -d^jcntlon , p. 57 

2 ilu"isn ! eture and Conduct , p. 42 

^ Ibid., p. 'Hi. To Devfey, will nseans the organic attitude of 
fores-»einp; possible conaecuerjoes of conduct. ;ill,;'!ental 
hfibit an«f disposition are Identical in :.oaning. 

* Democracy and j.due tion, pp. iJ03-210 


conjoint activity different corablnations and nodlflcetlons 
of habits and impulses. The more aried ere tl« situations 
s person is en(!?:f5/7ed in, the more meanin/;'' he /roins; the more 
flexible ere his habits, the move nimble Is his mind. Flex- 
ible coordination of habits forn^ed in wide ran^e of activ- 
ities is the condition for a generall?.ed training. 

...the wider the context— the t is to ssy, the 

ffior© varied the stimuli and iesp<mRes coordinated 

the more the ability ncquired is available for the 
effective jw^rfcr ance of other sets; not, strictly 
spewing, because there is any 'transfer*, but 
^ ' e tie wide rnnr^re of fee tore e moloyed in the 
i io act is eouivf lent to a brofid ranpe of 

activity, to a flexible, instead of to a narrow 
find rlfvidf coordinritlon,''! 
"...sof^e activities ere broad; they Involve a co- 
ordination of uiany factors. Their development de- 
mande continuous alteration and readjustment. As 
conditions chan^Re, certain factors ere subordin- 
ated, tmd others which y»d b^^^en of minor Import- 
ance come to the front. Tliere is constant redis- 
tribution of tt© fbous of tiie action, as is seen 
in the Illustration of a garat es over against 
pulling a fixed weipjit by a series of uai^orm 
riotions. Thus ttiere is practice in prompt making 
of new combinations with the foc»ffi of activity 
shifted to meet ohsr-^^e in subject tnatter. here- 
ever an activity is broad in s coT>e ( that la, 
involves the coordinating: of a lara-e variety of 
sub -activities) , and is constantly md unexpectedly 
obli(<ed to chftn^e direction in it& progressive 
develop ent, fwneral educetion is bound to result. 
For this is whrt 'peneral* tieans; broad and flex- 
ible. In practice, education ineets these conditions, 
and hence is gen^rl in the degree in whicdi it 
takes account of social relationships. "2 

In a word, Dewey's theory of generalized training 

emphasizes flexible 'nental dispositions attained in conjoint 

HCtivlty, But here the old nroblc:^ crops up again, viz. . 

^ibi«., p. 76 
^Ibid., p. 78 


Is tliere a general faculty or ftinctlon r0ST>onslble for 
the transfer of leomlnf?? We hf ve said that Dewey's 
"capacity to i^row" is similar to the alle,<red faculty of 
intellect. It is o ear^aoity prior to the formption of 
subsequent habits. Dewey defines it as "the pov^er to 
develop dispositions", and says, "V>ithout it, tiiefcquls- 
ition of habits is impossible." Obvlouely, selection 
and coordination of impulses end Ira bits are the function- 
in«r of this one single capacity. 

iiBother Tjolnt that evinces Dewey's entan,3;leinent 
in the traditional assumption of o single potentiality 
responsible for different manifestations of behaviour Is 
his nental dispositions, such as open-mindedne ss , inte/^irity 
of purpose, etc. Cf couree, these are but habits formed in 
problem- solving situations, Nevertheless, there are soiae 
imldlnp: comprehensive principles, ideals, or dispositions 
that determine one's dally various activities. The trad- 
itional Idea of s<MBe powers or faculties in determining 
one's course of action is in itself valid. The points at 
Issue nre (1) whethf^* there is a faculty or there are 

faculties inherent in liie individual; audi (2) whether there 

ere definite number s of faculties to be trained. 

Concerning the first point, Dewey does not throw 

overboard ell Inherent faculties; he still retains one, the 

^ Ibid ., p. 53 

^pearsian'i^ penetrating remark on currect criticisms of 
faculty psycholor-y is vsorthy of notice. :ie states: '♦■.hen 
the faculties were repr:;sented in terms that suggest agents 


capacity to grow. Concerning?; the second point, Denr^j 
denies the existence of inliorent faculties of memory, 
attention, speech, Judi^atent , reasoninj?, etc., but he 
tries to form other "fecultlea" (he calls them dispos- 
itions, abilities, habits) through interaction T^ith en- 
vironment. For generalized discipline is possible only 
when some funeral Rttitude, ideal, insight, <ar what not 
which Is cultivated in the course of one' Irsrning tfctlv- 
ities in the school, p:uldes one*;^^ subseouent life activ- 
ities. T!i© difference between Dewey and the rfitional psy- 
chologists is not that he has disproved the existence of 
faevilties, but that he hos cut down tiie number of faculties 
and replaced a number of dilferent "faculties" that are 
formed after ttie birth of a c^ild and i^overn his conduct. 

this i5fould seem to hs^ve really moant nothing more than "&« 
pr sonifiC't ion th^t constitutes one of the mort ordinary 
fi^^u es of speech. Is for the opposite ch^r^e of meaning- 
lessmss, this is no -ore true of * faculties' than it is 
of such universally accepted terr!B3 as 'dispositions*, 
•properties', t^nd 'functioas*. All these words indicate 
tlvat some single ^bidln;-'; caiK:e is needed to explain the 
many occasional ectual -anifeststions. Tho r^ind hes th« 
power of thought in the same sense th?t chlorine has the 
property of univalenoe, or oxy/ren that of nielting et -227 
def^<M38. In fact, the term 'property' v?a6 sometlm e act- 
ually used by the .:choolmen, and ef?aia by others subsequent- 
ly... (n the wholey...the comron sceusBtlons brought ogainst 
tho faculties thet they are superfluous mannikinE, or that 
they are devoid of leanin^r^, rould seera alike to lr;ve scant 
foundetion. Possibly they h- ve b ©n uttered by historians 
who wrote more than they rsad.^Speprman, C, sycholog y 
Down the 'rc^s . Vol. 1. London: MBcmillen fsid Co., 1937, 
pp. 188-189. 


The word, "faculty, when It -eans ''aptitude for 
any Exseclal kind of action", "power Inht^rent in the body 
or an or/^an', or a .lentsl power", as explained in the 
dictionery, is not e curse, isven when trensfer of learn- 
in;/ is explained in terms of faculties, there is no cause 
for complaint. Only when activities ere assigned to def- 
inite, inherent faculties whi^ stand in the way of further 
inquiry does debate arise. As regards faculty psycholo/^y. 
It is a neme f^-iven to the theory which maintrins that 
mental octivitios are the functioninf^ of some definite, in- 
herent principles of mind. There has been no professed 
school of faculty psychology in the pest; there? has been 
only a trend of thought which leaned upon the active function- 
ing of the mind. 

This evolution of thought is often traced back to the 

Greek p<*riod , ard Plato is re^»=rded as the exnonent of faculty 

psychology. He divided the soul into three parts. But 

i&ether these perts are really 'faculties" in Itie sense of 

independent entities capable of perforralnf^ definite functions 

has been a point in dispute. In his Republic . loto wrote: 

"imt the question is not ouite so easy when we proceed 
to ask whether these principles are thre or one; 
whether, that is to jsay, we learn with one part of 
oxa iiature, are ai^ry with another, and with a third 
part desire the sptisfaotion of our nfitural appetites; 
or whetlier the vjhole soul cones into play in each 
sort of action -to determine that is the diff iculty.'l 


Republic , (Jowetf s version) Bk. 4^ 4S6b. Here taken 
from upe&rman, c, op. clt .. p. 107 


He was inclined to think that the aoal exercises three 
functions; never the less, in his dielo^e, lir->aeus « the 
three functions become three distinct souls situated in 
th^^ee diff^irent parte of the body. The inoonei stency may 
be explained by his own confession of the difficulty. And 
in his discussion of l^e rational pert of ti\© soul, he dis- 
tinfruished four "faculties', viz.., reason, understanding, 

belief, and perception of the shadows; end these faculties 

were grouped into two divisions, viz., intellect md senses. 

^is rearran/rement of ''facultlss" was to group the Vfirious 
raental tetivitles into classes to con. espoad with the two 
kinds of knowl vd^e whieli they yield, viz. , sci^ice end opin- 
ion; or with the two r eelms of existence to i^ieh knowledge 
was referred, viz. , those ©f being and becoming. Intellect 
mey then be interpreted as ^\xri e distinctive functicoiing 
of tJie soul. 

slth the nasaa^e of time, isemory, imap;ination, 
attention, Isai^nge, concerstion, judf5;efflent , reasoning were 
siniPrled out as faculties. c:'vibdivisions of cental activities 
into faculties gradually had it s effect on educational praotios, 
Training' of faculties as independent erttities became fee vogue 
in educetion. vhetSaer the trouble lies in a mi sundfo* standing 
on the part of the educators of the natiare of faculties, or in 

^ epuiJlic, :ik. 6, ^ Slid. 
Z Ibid. , Dk. 7, 3 554. 

S Ibid . , ; k . 7 , S 554 

* apearman, op. cit ., chaps. 7-9; The abilities of sn ; London: 
Iv'aemilian end Jo., 19li7, chap. 3 


an ambi^ity of .sanlng for which the early psychologists 
were responsible is not easy to decide, "i^owever, a glance 
at the oriiP:inel Eieanlng of the word, faculty, rrusy help to 
clesr tip the «ii sunder standing, .coording to Spearsmn, the 
word "faculty is 1a renderlns; of the uitin faeultas , which 
was «n abbreviation of facilitas . and therefore sprang 
originally from the extre~»ly modest concer^t of bare fac- 
ility, Thrcup;hout its ordinary classical U8af>e, it still 
retained tdte sase m&ain^ at bottoci; it was usually trans- 
lated as the mere possibility of, or opportunity for, the 
event in question.'' 

It seens then that to ."nake a personified entity 
out of f^eneral potentiality of entel activities creates 
aore trouble than mi^t be expected. The most regrettable 
consequences ere the emphasis on the method of drill for 
the exercise of these personified faculties and tJie suppos- 
ition thQt cei*t8in school subjects li&ve t]ne value oT im- 
provinp; particular faculties. And this educational practice 
Dewey attaokii. 

But in his attack on faculty psycJiology, Dewey takes 
Locke as the exponent of the theory "in its classic form". 
Re states Lodke*s theory of mind and learning thus:- 

"On the one hand, th» outer world presents the 
mrterial or content of knowledere throu.^h passively 
reoftive** sensations. Cn the other hand, the c.ind 
has certain ready powers, attention, observation, 

'*• s;y'cholOjg'y Down the i.p:es. Vol. 1, pp. 188-189 


reteatlon, Qomryar iaon , flbstr^sction, compounding, 
3tc. KnowlecU^e results if the rrdnd discriminates 
and combines thin^pis es they are united and divided 
In n&ture itself. But the iciportant thin^ for 
ed^Kjatlon is the exercise or prnctio© of the facul- 
ties of the mind till they beeonie thorovaghly 
establi^ed habitudes.'^ 

This stete!«ent do s not do Lodce justice. Locke refused to 

enter tein any nietaphysicsl view of niind, and contented him- 

self with v?hat exr^erienoe tells of mind. His thesis was th* 

there are no inn©te prlitelples or ideas in one's nslnd, bat 

experiences that constitute ind. Exrierience comes from two 

sources, ns'-^ly, external objects and r»ntal functionlnge, 

or, in hlster alnolof^y , "otht a t i on s of the .alnd " , sue h as 

•^eroeption, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, 

Willi np-, and ell the different acting? of our own minds." 

And ideas are ex^^^ieriKices, i.e., experi«ice of sensations 
and experience of reflections of -aental functionings. .hen 
he said th^jt from experience mind is ultiaately derived it- 
self, he ieant that mind is nsde up of three aspects: 
sensations, reflections of cental functlonings, and cental 
functioning s, '-is postuletlon of the "op^ations of rind" 
and "reflection" does not differ from Dew«y»8 assertion 
of "the power to grow*'. The active functitaaing of the mind 
must be aciroltted. His phrase, "operations of the mind", 

^' e'nccracy rnd iudtacntion , p. 71 

^An Issay ;onc rnir^e., .rluman Undor stf^ndi n<7 , Dl::. 2 , chap. 1 

t; 2,5 . g 

^Ibid., 5k. 2, chap. 1, S 2 

^ibid . , Bk. 2, chap. 1, § 4 


appearia^ in his work pr tsslm . should not lead to the ads- 
understanding that he posited a metephyslcal rnlnd posaeaaing 
independent powers. He 5?as opposed to ttoe existence of innate 
ideas end the independent existence of soul. His opposition 
to faculties as real beings in ^SbB soul per fbrming definite 
functions ^wild not eseane Dewey's notice. All "powers" 
laeent by locke ere nodes of jnental &ctivities. 

Locke did uphold the exercise of ''posters' of t)T» mind. 
But he also upheld the rethod of developing Intellectual, 
esotlonal habits through proper selection sjA control of 
stimuli, or, to uue hie phrase, throufsrh the rlfiit "aseooiatioa 
of ideas". His anticipation of the present-day method of 
"eonditionlxig" end "unconditionln^' is worthy of our notice. 
Ahm. he discussed the weya of getting courage, he tiiought 
that toe children's fear of objects might be removed hy follow- 
ing two principles, viz. . (1} "to keep children from frif?>t8 
of all kinds, when they are young"; and (2) "by i°;entle degrees 
to accustom children to those things they ar© too ranch afraid 
of". He sa» : 

"Your child shrieks, md runs away at the aipht of 
a frcf?, Ifet snothor eatch it, arsd lay it dom et 
a good distance fri»n him: at first aociKitom him to 
look upon it; when \tb can do thct, then to come 
nearer to it, and see it leap without eraotion; 
then to touch it li^iitly, when it is held fast in 
another's hand; end so on, till he can come to 
handle It as confidently as a butterfly or a spar- 
row. L^y the same way, any other vain terrors -^^lay 
be res«>ved; if cere be trJcen, that ycu f^ not too 
fast , and nush not the chl Id on to a nt:w degree of 
assurance, till \)» be thoroughly confirmed in the 
former . "2 

f ibld ., tik, £, chap. 22, § 6,17,20 
^o.-ne Thoq;>ht Concerning; ducfstion , (edited by R.H. quick) 
Cambridge Univxalty xr ea, 190ii, p. 98 


Though Locke did not point out the necessity of another 
stimulus to engage the child's atteiitlon, such as food. 
It is int'^restiii^ to note that Locke'e: ima^lnetlon Is 
closely akin to Jones* r experinj«nt on the" unconditlonlng" 
of e child's feer of a rabbit. 

His sug'^estlon to "those vdio have chiMren, or the 

charge of their educrt Ion" of proTjer control of the connection 

of ideas, is slmilnr to istson's erperinient on ttie "condition- 
ing" of Q child*? fear responses to a white rat and fiirry 

objects. 'lis three instonces of ??ror.i? eonnaction of iSeae 

point to the ¥,ay of controillnv^ e'lvironiasnti^l factors. 

"The ideas of goblins and sprites teve really no 
nore to do with darkness than li^t; yet let but 
s foolish aid inculcate these often on the raind 
of a child, and raise them there together, poss- 
ibly he shell ?iever be ?.ble to serarate them 
8-^ala so long as he livee; but darkness shall 
ever afterwards bring with it those frightful 
ideas. Gild they ^ell be so .loined, th^t he can 
no more bear the one t'len tlie oth =r . 

"A i»n receives a sensible injury frotri another, 
thinks on the min end that action over and over; 
and. by ruiineting on theri strongly, or rnuch in his 
mind, so eenients those two ideas together, that 
he rakes them alntost one; never thinks on the r,jan, 
but the T>ain ai^ displeasure he sutf ered comes 
into his raind with It, so that he scarce distinguish- 
ec the ., but has as ?nuch an aversion for the one as 
the other. Thus hatreds are often begotten from 
slight and innocent occasions, and cuerrels pro- 
pagated and continued in the world. 

"A trssn lies suffered pain or sickness in any place; 
he saw his friend die In such a room; though these 
have in nature nothing to do one with anottier,yet 
when the idea of the place occurs to his mind, it 

^ rfory Cover Jonee "a r x. 

„ ^ laboratory 3tudy of Fear"; thB Case of 

Peter, " ed. :en. . Vol. 51, ig6;4, pp7508-315. 

^ An Sssey Joncprning Hieaa n llnd r standing, 3k, 2, chap. 53, § 8 

5 "~~~~~~~— ~~—~———— ~~~——~— --—----— —~--—-~-------~------ --—-■— - 

urchison, C, (£(!.)P sycholOr^ies of 19t^5 . .oroester, 
Clark University iTess, W2S. pp. Sl-54. 


brings (the iapression boin^ once n^de) that of 
the pain and displeasure with It; lie confounds them 
in his mind, and can as little beor the one as the 
other. •*! 

Our purpose h^r© is to sho« thst Locke is not aa 
avowed adherent of faculty psychology, as Dewey thinks that 
he was; and that besides advocating the theory of formal 
discipline, he suggested e very modern raethod of forming 
habits, which present-day psychologists and educators have 

Coming bacK: to the question of forrjel discipline, 
we find that the txedltionel practice of e-sifijiing certein 
sifl) .lect-inetter for the training of certain faculty is an 
over-siraplifled application of the notion, faculty. It is 
the eauee of r?ii sunder st ending tbs true eaning of foisnal 
discipline. Education is a process of transcending the 
Inynediate situation which a person Is engat^ed in, to the 
iseaning or ideal which It si^ifles, and thus it develops 
habits in the form of dispositions as well as of physical 
skills, ubject -matter, no matter whether by thot term is 
meant traditional re{?;inented courses of study or present- 
day irogressivists* planned courses of activities, is 
always a "©ans to an end. What is iep. rned is evaluated in 
its (Tienersllzed effect upon one's way of living. ? owey 
has the satae idea when he states that the essence of exper- 
ience lies in Its undergoing aspect and tlB t the habit of 
thlnkinf? is ttie aim of educetion. It is lii e ''form" rather 

Locke, op. oit., Bk 2, chap. 33 ^ 10-12. 


than the "matter" of exr>erlence tiiat counts most In ed- 
ucation. It is the generalized discipline ra^er than 
the speeific training that Is tt\e ideal of education. 
This is what formal discipline really saeaBB • Tiie roethc^ 
that the conventional school follc»is l>eoome« a hirdrance 
to the attainment of the lofty ideal of educ.':tlon« It 
has been alleged that formal disciplii^ is tiie twin of 
faculty psychology and thtit the unreality of "faculty" 
mast els© nean the luitenebility of forsial discipline. 
In fact, there is no neeessarv connection between the two 

What Dewey really attacks is the treditional isol- 
ation of septal factors fro® environoient and the fixed 
courses of study that lay claim to ^\e training of latent 
powers to the rjsglect of individual c??pacities arid exper- 
iesice, and of social <^ianges. t:e is dead against the dual- 
Ism which has lon^ existed in the corwantional learning sit- 
uation where there is ready-made sub lect -matter on t^ie one 
side^ and there are powers on Itie other. In his 
sense, developed powers ana organized subject-matter in the 
form of knowledp^e are tiie results of experience In fdilch the 
indlTldual interacts with his environment. The evolution 
from a problemfitio phase to the clarified phase of exper- 
ience is the organizing process of aibjeot-ciatter. On the 
other hand, the selection and coordination of the individual's 
Impulses and hfibits In the coarse of reflective experience 
is the w ay to fonalng "powers", "abilities", or "faculties". 


W>ien the pr<^sent clarified phase of experience is avail- 
able for the control of future experience, it neans that 
there is a ^cner elided discipline. 

Bewey*s Inslst^^ce on eoa.lolnt activity as the 
mediurr: of foriRlag dispositions or flexible heblts and of 
earichin'r concepts. Is consistent, h- ve tried to 

show^^lth his concer>t of experience. The growth of TilBd 
or thinkin><>- is a siat er of sociol interaction. In other 
wcsrds, learninw' cannot be eensrated fro^i the conjoint 
activity fro?^ ^rhlc*. knor-led^s Is dcrlyed. 




T5.19 continuity of ©n?! and Eearjis, Ideal aud r©al, -reason 
and asnse, oat ir© and aaa la siost distinctly revealed la Dewey's 
conception of fetiavlsdi^-:©. Kncwledse is u rssult of Ininlry arising 
fr<»i a pertlerity. Ob^arvatloa of tno total situation to locate 
the niiturs of tha proble?;: projection of I3«as or hypot-iea^s to 
direct the courts® of o-p^ratloi nni to -■.«t?i'5r a&v? flata; fleduotlons 
aad oalculatloas to Integrats tUo jaateriul gatbsred; oporiiious 
to daterniia^ tho vallditjr of the ideas enplcyyod aad th© existerice 
of a new ints^r-ited experler.ce with added sMsaning;-- all t -^sa 
steps overlap in the coui-se cf ir.q.ulry, aan result in a clarified 
situation. This fii^l situation and tho irdtial one are coati lU- 
eus in the soniie t nt the initial situation has he^iu in a procose 
of chaags ^ifhich is direotO'l by its oem possibility exilicitly 
projected as the end or ideal, an-i it finally Ber.;res in a clarified 
situation. The word * situation* is used here to l.aily interaction- 
lam. Sit ;ation denc/tes the eaviroasient wfiich the individual is 
in, \ doubtful situation is an obstruct ivo environ^- ent v^'-iieh the 
individual ?ms to grapple -sith; a clarified situation is a raoan- 
ingful situation broiu^ht about through the reflective way of 
reclrrocal adjustraent. In f is phase of raflectivo exrarlonce 
tSte environtreatal objs^ct becomes distinctly an "object of knoafle^i^s", 


while tho Indirid-ial ir, the "iCDO?/3r '*. "xjierier.oa, viewed froa the 
"Vhat" astect, io reconstr^jotedi in the fiease that the oavircaaaient 
is mor© orderly, systs^satised, asd signlficaat; viewed fron2 the 
•'how" aspect, it l8 life»wiao recoastructod in tiie sense t'lat th* 
Individual aets move jgetho^ically ana effe-^tiTaly. Growth of 
experience rasa-is on the one hand that the iadi visual im'sas i;yogreB8 
in his learning and, on the other, that his eavircsxseat is expan- 
ded aad refln©'I. This dynamic, j^-cgressive intsr-relitionahip 
between the individual and the world constitutes the ever-growing 
jrooBse of eTcpsrienoa. Kntxrledg'3, wher; viaweS ^artic\;l?irly IVosi 
th3 aspect of t'is eontinaity of Ksan with ths world, i-ieaaa thiit 
level of etrperience da which the icdivldijsal suceee^^s in Issproving 
the sltiation. Tt indicates a insult cf intsraction. 

To Dewey, ordlxsary ^'^roeiticn is not the b act of 
kno ledge. Pgreertion, of c-iirse, l-splies .ludg^aat. Things 
perceived in our (1:il7 life do have t!'9ir rneanlngs ch;e to the 
effect of previoas expsrtence. Jot they are not oognitively per- 
ceived; they are but socially, aesthetically, eiaotionally exjer- 
ianoed, .a he state-:, "anyone recognizes the difference h(3taoen 
an experience of q^ucneiing t'lirst where the perception of ^4 tar 
is a i^re incident, and an erssrience of vsater wiiere kno?jledgB of 
what water is, is t a controllliV interest; or bet*?e9n the ocjc^- 
Ksnt of social conv-rsrae aacKif^ friauds and a study delioBrutoly 
jaade of the e>:aracter of one of the participants; betweer: aeetetic 
appreciaticm of a picture and an eTanination of it b a ccmnoissaur 
to establish the urt'st, or y a dealer who hn a ocsl ercial inter- 
est In deter dnatiUij its probable selling value. The ilstinotion 


between the tare tyjiaa of experiestce is ervidant to acyona who will 

take the tr ublo to rsoall wiiat he Sees aoat of the ti;as whaa 


not ari,'?;aa;ed in Bieditatioc or inquiry,'* isost of our daily onreats 

belons to the n&n-refleetlv© type of expsriarxce. Until thare is 
a factor in experience that la doubtful, ex;9rienes reiatas a 
course of ordinary d(;in;':;-ei:fferiag. Thare is sasttiiing derived 
frojc what rouets upon the veraca; yet not until he discriisinates 
the relatioashij. or allows intcsllectual interest in distingaisning 
the hem froja the vhat , doeis tne naarvlng asvect do^alnats the whole 
context of experience, rtlien a factor in experience ia douotfiil, 
it beec -es the fceus of i»reeptiO!s against the background of the 
whole context of exrerience which RTteadsi out in acace and in tine. 
It sets a problem to be solved, aud jeeo^es s<^etainij to be icnoani. 
The reflaotlve stage of exierienee thsa aets in and the resulting; 
determination ot the <\- ■^r■■ f^-l factor tT&.T^£or^s it in reepoct to 
its meaning* So an a«>. ot, aa directly ^iven, la not a cognitive 
object, nor a standard to fcast knoerled^s, but is the v:>ccu3ion of 
knowledge. The thinking or oxi.eri cental way of seizing the iroblea 
Enlsȣ it the data of kaoarledge. 

The criterion of knowledge is in action, i.e., in ovort 
reflective ;rocess. "east/ry iualltl2>s are not the iaiediute crit- 
erion of knoaledge; neither is a synthetic principle iu;5ep«ndent 
of experience ita ottandtird. To Dewey, sensory lualities ordinarily 
mark the beginning of cognitive interest. They are the stl^xuluo 
to rofloctive expor'enee wnich results in the clarification of 
their significance. I hoar a noise and go to find oat the so-.jree 

E agaye in :.'rperl,ie;itnl LOj^c , p. 2. 


of the sounii. I t spx^ra that it c&aea frcBi a mm^s slippiBg fros th© 
stairsteps* It the Initial staj^d of experlasce, tiia aci^e la 
ju3t what I sxiarieno©; it laight be horrible, tiisplsaslsig, or even 
TSBlodious. But tli9 quality is net '^^oguisod*; it is Just QX2.«r- 
ienced as such. It bsco 9? tb.« v^tua of tocsring wiiarji it sets it» 
to fiad out what is the oausa. Tszm noiss is ''cogaizad*, and 
i»8eo(S88 the 'object of loiowlecl^* isiaen it is identifle'S with the 
rolliiig-<l<;«m-of-a-iriiia-frot&-t'n9-stairoas9. The sensory q.uality 
is changgcl frc-i the raeloiious or diaploa ia^ nuise to rolling- 
aoKn-of-a-saa-at-the-atalrcase solse. Ths forsier nfeen it is j ist 
eijsriencsd is iiot a ssed^ s«f kao»iag; tte latter afeea it is >;aoiga 
is not an «v1 usnce to rroTe that tha first experience Is jnreal. 
The sensory quality eTpsrlanced 1^ chanKsd. This siiiiplo lllusstisj- 
tloa iis to sho/ that what Deipey fnsans by kncsledg© iavolvss an 
actijal ov^rt reflective aetirr n'.th the reoulting alteration in 
the eiiviron':ient as «©11 a . the eisriohrjiBnt of aeanlaga on the ^^rt 
of the individual, .'^at le i7>Eried lately given is not "known'* but 
experienced; it i:s]lie3 so a ^eania^ or idea to be found out. This 
is what Dewey calls the cognitive ^haso of axparience to distinguish 
froic the cognized. ' /Hat ia _ ^c^n is the tersinus of tha overt in- 
veatisjation; aov sr is it a prod'jet of speculative tho^ ^'t. It 
is alwaya an actual or sysbolio change of wj-at i3 exrerieneed. 
Thinking is always thinking in overt action; it is in, and ia it- 
self, eTperienoe. ".s \sb said in the last chupter, thinking is the 
!»thod of intiuiiy for the control of eiperienee. ;»hat Darsey alvys 

'The Postulate of Irwiediute I^^aplricisa**, op, eit ., p. 233, 


koaps in "alnd Is tJie ©Tpsrl^aental Tsothcd of scieoed, wMoh has 

'sovkBi. afOfldera is the i.pausfci'i^atioa of the laatuTsl wesrld for the 

realization of -iia'a j.ractioal ideals, -shat he llsllkQiS is tae 

secludsd riotliou of speculation irhich iastaad of traaaforjtilag thm 

wcrld CG-jfojjts the self eithep in iPOjaeting a aous)«aal wopl.^ tcfc 

«sotional ooasolsitlcu or in idajitlfying tae outer sonae data with 

wbat is coac«ived as a 3taar}a3?d of truth. 3otii rationalis^u and 

«mp/Ticis,T; asgloct actios in relatlcn to knoi/ladge. To Jetmyg 

reason and ara instruaantal to tao attais^^at of kno^i-ladgej 

both are redij-rooally adjustad la the ctmirem of in^iuiry. 

"h color aouu at a parfcioular locaa iii a s|>sctral band 
Is, for exanpla, of isanwnss intellectuel iaportunce in 
oh©a.l3try nwi in a^tro- hy-jics. iiut ;.n»rgly as sean, 
a a bare soasury riuallty, it is the saie for tha clod- 
hopper and the scientist; in ©Ithor case, it is fan 
prod'-.ct of a dlroet sensory excitation; it is jijst and 
only aiiwthar cal'jr the ^ye has haprsnod upcai. To sup- 
pose that Its cognltlT© val^ie can be eked out op sup— 
pliad by as»-75l!atiag It with .rtsxar aansory qualities of 
the sar:« a«tur<» as it^olf, is like aupfcslai? that by 
pnttin;^ a plla if 8an4 in tba a^^ w© can get rid of the 
irritation ceu^ed by a alnc^lai grain. To supross, on 
tho ct^ser hani, tiiat -xet srust apjaal to a synthetic 
activity of an Indaj^ndont tbour>it to give the ciuality 
weaning in and for kno^/ladgo, is li-;9 supfosla;? that 
by tiilnking in our heads we can sonvsrt a jile of bricks 
into a b.iildin^. Thlnkini?, earriad on inalde the head, 
can jmlix sosae head«ay in forsiing the ^^lan of b builr2ing. 
But it takes actual oparaticns to wliieh th© plan, as 
the frviit of thoug!-.t, crives iristru'aental 3 ddaaes to 
riaking a buildin;?; c/ut of aerarate bricks, or to trans- 
fona an isoLated sensoi?y .-quality into a significant 
clew to ku(X7lad-?e of r^ture. 
" oonsoiy qualities experienced thi^uj^h vision have their 
cognitive stai^^s aisd office, not as senSfitional eapiri- 
clara holds in aai of themselves in isolatlojt, or as 
serely forced upon attention, but '.>scauae taey are t ie 
eonseiuences of definite and intentionally ^erfor-'-ed 
cperatioaa. Only in eonueetion with the intent, or 
idea, of thsse operations do they amctint to anything, 
either as disclosinrj any fact or girir^ tent and j.roof 
of any theory. 1'he rationalist school vms rignt in as 
far as it insisted that so~-.sory (i^tilltios are signifi- 
cant for knowledge only vnen coniiscted by moans of ifleas. 


Bat they m»r9 wroiu; in locatln/;^ the corinectirig i leas 
la Intellsct apart frcm cjxparience. Ccariectioxi. is in- 
stitited through operations waich cjsflne Ideas, and 
epnrations are as sjysh isattera of eTporioncea as ar© 
sansoiy qurjlities,**^ 

Thus fetifjwlsdgi? , afbea rieifea fro^a the asp-eet of ths con- 
tinuity of reason and sense » --nsans that larel of ext-arienee which 
is the raault cf tlae recipr-cal adjust;".8nt &«twoen thinking and 
09uaation displayed in th© csatimious eoordination of sti-ylus- acta, .'.easatlon or stlssulus is thist ,^8e of activity 
wMch invitss att-3r.tiQa b-->cau,s3 of scttie uncertainty within the 
activity; reaponaa is th« oth<5r liiass of activity which IstoIvob 
the eooraisuitioG of the functloniju's of ralated organs to deternin© 
ths uncertainty and ccsplte^ coordination," fhia reciprocal ad- 
justnsnt is often 111u3trat9<l by Dewoy in the case of the isrork of 
the carpenter. The carjeat-sr, as a builder, dcea not accept things 
aa thoy are, but vovks on t:'.Qt^. aa zs-aterle.'.! for eloange, 1% i^a- 
ipulutes the things, such as stones, iron, board, etc., to ®iit 
his purpose; he ehfanges the j>Ian w^-r^r. he cu as to unierstaBd the 
proper i^ay of controlllar than, llje objcts uniergo change- and 
are directed to an end; they are then the "object of laiowledge" to 
the carpenter. And so in his actual sforkin^ with his utensils. 
Sach sotor reejoroe is adjusted to the particular i^iase of working 
and deteraiaas the next stj':5ulis. This continuous, conaeeutive, 
thoui/h iTiinuts, adjuatxeat involves tlie coordination of thinldng 
and setisory etiuiulus. The final finished pro-iuct is an actael 
altoratlon of the antacoderit laaterial. It is called Imowledge 

The .ueet ?or Certainty , p. 112-113, 
"T!\M Reflex 'Ire aoncept in i^sychology'', cp. e.U », }-p. 368-389. 


whan this phase of exp-sriance ir; or^nl3©a ani tamn as a possible 
factor for the control of f ut irs problersatic sitfiations, 

/Incsthar isspli^atloa In ncsffey's vie?; of joia^leago is th« 
eontinuity of ths real an5 tha litoal* Tho sjeetatcr ooncsptlon 
Gf kBowleiJgs holis an aloof attit^ia© towara the isorlcl of affairs 
and puts a prwitsiu® upon oont<»s;latioa. Tha classic fons of this 
Tlesr Is repreasat'-S in "Sato's theory of Ideas. laaas are the 
I^ototypo3 after arh.icb. thicks ia the pheGO:a3nal -fforld ar© ra^lalied. 
His fa^Jiiliar alle^jory t -at our living In tha wcrld of 9«t-Bg is 
llks t'-^t ia 2 dark cf-vi* -/hero wa ^rs ehain©d to s»» tli© 8h>.do^s 
on the wall, and jxiss oui- lifs without seeing outsids th® ?av© 
the bright iregiOB «— - ths r^nlity, is to lllustrats hia aupposi- 
tion of a world of Idoas aat rer a ^ilnst a vrorld of sonso, Tr» 
aiiud's •ye Is to be dtrectad fresa the iaferior i^ealitiejs t at 
constitute thia ohaaglng .-/orld, to the eternal, superior Being 
through solitary apjrohoTisioa. Aside frcsi its support to theology, 
this conception talces tooe-ledge as oocaethiiig already axistitu; irior 
to hun«c inquiry. Xnov/lodg'3 i» discovered rat'ier than created. 
The chan^ea ttiat are emrtacterietie of the vvorld are taken as 
unreal and irrolevsnt to huaaa liappiiieae. D«wey*s adoption of 
the experlmerittil setho?! re^c^ards chance as a sine yja ooaa of gotting 
imcwledge. Tlie eciertiat Ic his l-oiu/ing process trlso to cliaags 
the condition. I^jB usets labomtoify apparatus to expori-ient cai 
thl8 aad that ecnd t!<-.r. so that scr-sethins; e-ergen. /hen he ia 
doing, ho ir, kn •r^isag. ;le does aot accept any girea as oo^5}Ct of 
knoTi ledge ; the sr.iveu projects iSeao --r cssibilitias that atinia- 
late the scientist to work at It, to set it uai^er different ori«r- 


Isantal oonaitloiis until ths idloa is realized. In thia experi- 
se^ital coacaption, real ".leasea to be sossethiag I'oaAy siada asd 
final; it -'}eca;:«s that whica hss *o be accepti?d as the isatftrlal 
of eiaanga, as the c^struetioxia and the .•aeass of certain specific 
desired ehajiigQS. Tba i^lsal and ratiooal also ceased to be a 
sejarataa rsady-rsaaa worlJ incapable of b dog ussd as a levsr to 
transform tha actual empirical world, a imre msylxm trcm eitapiiw 
ical dsflcisncies. Tiiey represent 1 atoll ifjeutly tliou^.t-Gut pos- 
sibilities of the existent world '^hich aay be ussd as stethods for 
raking over and laprovlaij it,** fSiowledss^ is then, frcsn this point 
of Tlcw, th© ''ideal" or "rational" realiz^sd through tno process 
of scientific inquiry and it coim>i yat of taa te^apcral eoatext 
of the ''real''. In other words, ia tba process of experience, the 
refined ph,^s--i i'.i the ''ideal" or kncwledga while tho crude i.robleis-» 
atic phes® 1" the "roBl". 

Coaneotsd with tbis c ntluuity of ^.an nith the world, 
reasun '^ith se.SQ, Ideal wit- i'eal, is t/yt of means with end» 
Inter lediato betwes' the aatycecent ocndltion of experience and 
the ultimate ft ergenee of tha "object ef isnozf ledge" ia the reflec- 
tive process, Ordljoar objects, as Dewey often reitez^tos, have 
a double status. They are, oa tb© one hand, individualized, or 
experienced as such, and, on t':e other, relative to aotjefning 
beyoiid them; tliat is to say, they p-oint to aorse rnoanlaga or ideas. 
Ab just said, the object experienced projects its possibilitiea 
which in turu sti-railate efforts for their ittainsient. T!ie end be- 
co;>e3 the ^.oaus wtten It lays the role of sotting a definite course 


.tecor-atr'jetion in ihiloaophy , 1 . 122. (Italic original) 


cf action. In faet» to Dewey, :. ..^aj. and »ads are all reflective 
sTj?0rience. k«euas i8 ths intelli?t®33tly conducted act tcx/KurS. aii 
anticipated end. Thinking and intelligent dciag are aynox^nous; 
the resultisf; object of knc0>lea|;« Is a joint product of th'S ir.ter- 
aetiou between data and neaniug. 

The nsj^tiva J?'g>l!"atlon of Dewey* e e-xperi -rental eon- 
ception of lai«.-ledi?e is tha siifre:vler cf the traditional Qatitaesia 
betaesn the kaower and the kacwn, qs -aaatianed in the fofregoing 
chapters. The kaoAing situation ia a tesjporal distiaetion betsaen 
an unorganized, doiibtf'il situation and an ordered and refined 
sit'oatiea; it is nut a spitial sej-iration of the knower frcss the 
teGwn. The kne^n is tha result; the j^iven is the datum. Both 
ere rsl'sted to the organla;^ bocauee of the dyaamic I nt a rrelat ion- 
ship between there. 

d'e taay take another sijsple example to ssske c].oar this 
tsTtsporal aspect of kaowladgs. I see a table. Our corm<ja arga^oent 
would be th.-it the msans and object of knowledge are both the given 
table. ?3ut, to Dewey, th-3 table perceived as such is lelTher Vw 
object of knowlsdi;^', nor the i^a-^jediate datna of knowledge. It is 
just what Is experionced as such, Cnly when I am not sure whef-ier 
it Is a tabla d^aa it baco-e the datum presented to thou;;5ht, la- 
fcrauce as to the Taeaaini- of t^ie given takes its rise, Uc«r, In 
Dsv/ey's 8e.:se, the given ie partly created by the Irrdivldual 
thouj^ it is St' 11 a n-.tural aveiit. In thfl^iase of t^e tablo, y/hat 
I see is not the whola, but a^-nB part of it witnin Its setting. 
This "sowe tart" is tha given, cbjoctivoly existing in the »e;.se 
that it is part of the total natural objoct, arid subject ivaly 1e« 
peiider.t in the aeuse that this ;art, as conditioned by a^ position 


in the rocsg, by ay visioa wM^h ia eoaditioned ny 11/^t, by 3^ 
ability of vlsiofi as nersal or (ief«otive,aad by .thor persoasl 
fast rs. Is likewise deterriliM^ by r«. This mj jaraj&rase Deswy^s 
state?3©nt tbat *?rfiat ia giv«B ia jartly constltutea by the ectlre 
ergpaisBt, the giTeimess invoivl/j.^ a rslatlOD to orgaaie activity, 
not te a ksower or Mnd*" 

1?his giT«fn su^ests th© other parts that I do not a«o, 
but thay ara none the loss real as it ie ^ue to 1^ past ©xperleac© 
with tables ana the further f-o8r»iol« oxperlsaee of tsuchiag and 
usiEg it. ihat is given ia a s^rabol of tfca eipeotsd; ^hmx the 
exTecte<5 comss to pasa, a flalshed product, as it were, is nsada 
out of the crude saterlal. I'^iis prc»duet is still subjectively 
desandent, though objectively ejdstfsg, I'h^ table as a tsble 
exists in this particular aettiS;?, but I do not actually see this 
Tsrhcla; I only "sake'* t^t - table cnit of the iart of it I sar ot 
still see. This "table" la the very product of tlie dynamic inter- 
relationa ip bet^aei the individtjal aM his focus of experience, 
Trcer: the be<?:ir)?»^n.!; to th? ©ad ia ti;® two phases of experiences 
I have been idtJiroct contact with reality. 

De'^ey's well-ka-Tan five steps of reflscttve thia'sliig 
b^ised upon the exjieri entai procedure stake clear the two phases 
of experience. The ,^ven ia the '♦felt" difficulty of the confronted 
situation, which has to be defined and locateti. It sur-^^ersts possible 
viays of solution which are deduced arid tested within tie waole 
contort of experler.ce. The solution of the difficulty transforss* 
the sltviattc'n into a asore significant reality, u remiltant of th« 


Zsaaya in acperimental Lorrjo , p. 256 footnote. 



l?8wey*3 coacaptiori of lojcs'v'ledse is orpcsed to tha as- 
sartiOE of t'aa new realists tliat kntwledgs is th« rolatioaal stpi- 
ucturs whlcb objectively esista prior to aa^ iaaepan-lent of hissaa 
iDi^uiry. .luit chan.-;9S la the emttae of loEicreiEg i» ia tb« knoyrer 
and act in tn^-- .•::• . .ri. L''e%-ey ha« C05?.psir©<2 his positicm with the 
realists*. H« finds tbnt "In baro outline, it is obvious that 
[both schools] a.sjrea ia r«garding thiaklag as lastrm»i9ntal, not 
as cojistltiitive. Jut this asroQieat t^iwis out to b» a forjaal 
rsattar in contrast aritii a di3a.?3?ee«»«Qt eoacspniBg that to which 
thinking is iastrurseatal. The ntm realiSK fiais that it is 
iiistrusental ai-.ply to iaovlaJgc wf oej-acts. Fr*;^ this it infers 
(with perfect ctirractness aad iBev*itabl«ii93s) that thiiifcing (ia- 
oludini^ all tno oparatlons of di^cavery and testings as they Piight 
'00 sat forth in. an induetlva lcs?lc) is a aei^ r^yshologlcal ive" 
llfsdaary, utterly irrslav^itnt to ajjy coaciusioas reg^irding the na- 
ture of objects kncsm, Tha th98is[of iastru-siautalis-Jis that 
tbiakiog la instruas-jatal to a control of tha eriVlronKeiit, a control 
effected thn>ugh acta which wouH aot be ursdertaken »lthor;t the 
prior reoolution of a cusiplex sitioation into assurad alerjants and 
an aecojapjoying pr Jection of possibilities -— withcitt, t>jBt Is 
to say, thfnJEing.* ■!« thlnlra that the a<sw realists neglect t'\a 
contort of knowledge, i.e. thi ;r!op proble-^tlo 3i tuition uad 

the reflective process, both of which aro the causa of the ea- 

ergence of knowledge. Isolation of the sub3eq.uer.t stage froai the 


Ibid., xji. 29-30. 

Ibid. ^, J p. 33. 


antecedent stage «oulc! rsndor tlia criterion of truth as sit*'^»?r that 

of ochereacs in th -ught within tha IMividual or that of corras- 

i-ondoace of ideas with tb« g^iven, llila ia contrary to tba oz:«r- 

J enti^l irocovises of ssttlagl^ifwlefis©. "There is ao laay to know," 

80 Dewey says, '*»hat are tha traits of asoisn objsets, as distinct 

frcK lasn?inary 'besots or objects of opinion, or objects of ua- 

artQlytic c.c^mon. sense, save by r^farrlriir to the operations of 

getting, usiRi^, aad tsstiaj^ eTidorc© — tlia processes of iaaowledi^e." 

This confusion of the d-'.ta and objects of knoviledfse is 

easily f'4--ad in the vrdiimry .orceptlon of tables and c^air3. The 

arg-a?:ent of the realists is that these thlnp'S are what they aro 

ao setter whsthsir they sr* i^eans or objects of kncf.7led.3e. C-jr 

preceding illustration of De..oy*3 tenj-oral aspect of knaAledge 

is still an opposite ne in this conagctlcai. Decay's answer to 

the charg" is also in t is direction. "le likens the status of the 

glT»n, such aa table, cbair, ^tc, to tliat of sensations, l:»-ajg3S, 

or ideas to convince t'lie realists ttot w^iat they thini of the latter 

as agencies of knowledge holds f the foraer. 

'*^'e have stated that.. .data (as the iyyadi-atg consider- 
ations from whjch controllafi iufsrcace proceeds) are 
not objects but ifsaans, instrumentalities, of knowledge: 
things by which se iciio..^ rathar t (i-; t!iijigs kno?m. It 
is by using tha color stain that we knos- a cellular 
structure; it is by risjrks on a ^a^je thiit we l^cm what 
sort© »aan brslievflts; it Is by the height of the barof?st©r 
that we ka'M the ^rob^ibility of rain... Just wliat the 
real! .'it asssrts about so-called -eatal ntates of sen- 
sationo, insi ":!>", an5 idsas, nasely, t'r^t thay srs not 
the 9ub/sct-T]att«9r of knowledg:^ but its agencies, holds 
of the chairs and tables to which he appeals in supiort 
of his dcctrla© of an iia-:edliJte cognitive .nressntation, 


Ibid., .65. 


apart fro:n any problem and aiqr rsf lection. And this 
is vary solid grosiad for instituting the oo-n^parisoa: tha 
sensations, ii^iges, ate, of the Ideulist are nothing 
but the chairs, tables, etc., of t;!© realist in t!ieir 
ultlsiate irraducibla qi^lltiea. Tho problo:i ia ifhloh 
the realiat arv^ala to tha imaediute upprel-iQuaioji of 
the table Is the eplsteraolcglcal problsa, arid he 
appetils to tha table sot isB an obj&ct of knavledge (as 
be thiiiics ha 3o83), tut as eviianca, ss a aoans of 
knowing his eosclualon — his real object of know- 
ledge* Ha has CBjly to esxanine his o»rn evidenee to sss 
that it is Qvider.cs, and hence a tsrs ia a rsflactlve 
ixviulry, while the nfiture of kna/lodgs is the object 
of his imav ledge." 

%?ath0Katlcs is ftan aaauced to b© built en a pri or! 
principles of thought; aad scientific principles ^-hieh, a result 
Tsainly of rathe-atloal ealculatloas, are applied effectively in 
the interpretation aad control of aatur©, point to a relationel 
structure aussiatant in a world. Tha worli besides being con- 
stituted of seasad particulars is a logical system In '^hich thesa 
partioilars are rslfitod. To Oerey, 'athesatieal raiutions of 
things, whic!T wo ©ODOeive of today, are th« result of agas of 
scientific work la Tali "iatinf^ and iatproria-? their hyrotheses, 
Sven in tha si:t;ple calculation of addition and sxjltipllcation trhleli 
we now take for rarted as p Mroly the mind* s functloaitig Indapan- 
dent of arrorJence, there was a pariod in which -saa couiital, Esanl- 
rulated and aaasurod physical thingg befcsra ha could build up tha 
relations of numbers. Tlie higher branches of jsathe-'^tics, such as 
calculus, are Indeed bfised on raaaoniag; naTel7t';eless, thay hava 
to be referred to experience for Tsrifioation before they can ba 
establis'.ed as learnizif5. Although it is not necessary to rofer 
avery step in Eathersatical reasonirii^ to erjarlzsantal rerlfioation. 

Ibid., -p. 43-44. 


y-3t thi fund of ^aathsimtical knccilgdge ^do use of In one's 
reaaoalnif Is T^rified exrerience and the result of thinking 
which one obtains siast br toatsd in exrerisnca before It is CC8&» 
pleta. Deway's ar?5UHsat is to iatertret th'3 present atatus of 
knOKrlsdse In t8r?<s of its historical growth; the purpose is to 
raaintain th« eontlnuity of thougjit and fact and to tie tip an 
crganizod intellsctual syste-s to the -sorld of ordinary exper- 

"ITae prssent-day ssKithesatical logician laay preaaat the struc- 
ture of satheaatios as if it had sprung all at cace froru the 
bra? a of a Tsus ^fhoese aaritcny i.- txiat of ;;ure logic, But, 
novorthelass, this very struc^ture is a prod-ict of lon,^: his- 
twr-;c grcartb, in shich all kinds cf exrariraents bavs bean 
triad, in r.'hich Bcrna len hava struck out in this direction 
and SGtse in that, aad in v;hich s«raf3 exercises and operations 
have resulted in coafusicm and others in triximpiBant clarifi- 
cations and fruitful -^c^ffths; u history in which :?5attsr and 
Tijethods have ba^n constant 1^- selooted and worked ovav on the 
basis of empirical sucoer<s and failure." 

-^mother of Dewey's eriticiSfas cf nos realises l3 that it 
poatulatee two worlds, 1.3., a ssrorld of I'acts aiid a v.'orl'l of rela- 
tions. '■Je denies that there is an extaraal world as euch or that 
t'-ere is a self set orsr against it, or that the knosln.'?: situatien 
is a presoctaticn to the tiiad of aoi^e extra- ental knowled..^ rola- 
ticsn. \5 are have s^id, he insists that the world is the cae w© 
experience and our own selves .oros- in relation to the envlron-nent 
we are in. The relation between the in;>iTidual and the ;vorl3 is 
prlraarily social or e.-^otloaal or aeathetioal or biolG?;ical. Cog- 
nitive relation is imly *a special cua^ of the a^^ent-iatlent, of 
the behaver-aajcyer-eufferar situation"", aavd it occurs when a 
perplexity leads to an Jnq'iiry into the aignificance of the situa- 


I j eeoaa truc tion in Ihi loao. h jr, p. 137. 

Assays in l^xjt^rimental Lo:ie, p, 278. 

i l^i> 

tion for the purpose of its clarifioati«Ki. 'Shn rosiilt of Inquiry 
through analysis or abstraction is not different in Its existential 
status frca the orl-^iui*! situation; it is its jEeaniti^ inetnfissntal 
in coatrolli-v? aubsgciuent expsrlomso tJsat differentiates it frcwi 
tii© orlgisal ait'oation. la Dewey's senste, the two real^na of exis- 
tence are the product cf the denial of the biolcdeel fact of Inter- 
action and contlBulty. That is vdiy he sayg, "Until the epistemolo- 
l^lcetl realists hare seriously coanidared the main proposition oC 
the prai^aatle realists, ylz ,, that knowing is sor^tMn^ that hapi:!ens 
to thia»T:3 in the natural cousrsis of their career, not the swMen 

introduction of a "unitvae* aon-aatural typa of relation fc =at 

to a sled or ecaxsciousnass — they are hardly in a position to 
discuss the seccn. and derived pru^aatic proposition thist, is this 
natuml continuity, things la beccniug Imcin usftorgo a sj/ecific and 
detectable a-alitative chanfja." 

The foregoing expoaitlon of HO'smy'j? arir.i>\Bnt is of course 
not the last word in settling the dispute. ;,hether kno^flscige In 
the foTw of scientific rrsathe^aatical principles, which are found 
fruitful in predictln?', the beha-'iour cf the physical world. Is but 
a dlselc'sure of an ordered iml verse, — is not the q,uestt<m t ^at 
"ewey pay^ heed to. "is poi n t of gaphasls Is not that our kno-y ledge 
l3 a disco?':;ry of the relational structure cf tho vforld, hut tl-at 
our kno»le<lj?e is an ir:prove.i!ent of cur ; reseat stinting, state in the 
oouirse of evclutiOTiary t?vent3« 'v/lawod frosa the liittar p sltion, 
knaivledgo is of course a result of human achieve.rLeiit in oxierienee, 
Hotrever, viewed from the fc.rswr position, kna*;ledge is cone the less 

Ibid., pp. 279-riJO. 


a dlseovery, of aa iaveBtiou, of the already fu^iOtioalng 
principles wMch are implicit In th» behaviour of natural events, 
"je^i-ey does not take as his object of iniuiry the sorli tmt Is all 
the tltrte physically functioning; ha takes as Ms objeet of laaulry 
©vsry stasre of experience or evfelution in arhlch sjan is a factor. 
A situstiOR is always a eitiiation which Involves the joy ana sorro®', 
prosperity and a<lvsreity, success ana failure of man, r^lstive to 
the atability and precarlousaesi? of the envirornneat, '^eh stage 
is bett-fir than the pireeedlns; one booause of aaa*s effort in irealiz- 
ing his isfeal tiat is set up to an-eliorate the eristias ecEfiltioa. 
This reault of i jprcvesjent la, of course, s hui2s,B creation snd is 
evolved frora the prior condition. .\nd kaOr/ledge is llk©;^se an 
approved result of inquiry, .iefinitsly ^ product of intelligence. 
De-.v©y*3 firs convictioa of ha'naa progress is based oa this bit-by- 
bit iTiproved u(iju3t;nsnt bet'veen san and Ms gxistin;? state of 
affairs. I'g is not disturbed by the eoatention that what we fiad 
only reveals the oilier of nature, no long as what s^a find coses 
out of our need and reflective thiiikin?:, He is concerned! with 
the eoadltlon that we eyj«rienc9 in3t3ad of the world at large. 
He is concerned with the ha^nraerin?- carried on by the blackaslth of 
the red hot ore, the hcialis/? don<5 by the doctor of the sick, or 
the laboratory x''*oe«^'ire performed by the scientist of taelding a 
problem, lie la act coacorr)e4 with the fact thait there ia already 
involved in these acts the functionln'^ of the rrinciple of cauiie- 
effect, of tho various physical and chemical laws ln--ieper.fient of 
and prior to our awareness, •» is concerned with tho particular 


phases of husan experiSECe la tiia coursa of evolution, aad with th« 
devolopaeiit of each pbisa leading oa to the suecseain.5 t^e. ?P0fa 
this aapeot, aa& saimot tJisrofore deny his asserticai of the changiug 
cliaracter of reality sad the creative roXs i^itelligaace plays in tha 
evolution of Imowledj^. 

Heallty, to Dewey, is not acesathiag all-iaclusive and 
coBjpleted prior to isiaa's action; it is "Bbat one experiences as" 
in each phass of one's ciavoloptnent. la tha queat for oeirtainty, 
tha quest is not axqr exclusive rsascniiit; la the haa^l, an-l certainty 
Ir? not for gorethinir elrsaoy la>li8it in. the natural errata. Cer- 
tainty has its Keania*; oiily w^n It is relatirs to 3o?;e uacartainty 
in the hsciac sitiatlon, ana the ciuest !s fruitful srhen it 3 3 aa 
active vvert action iir-sctnd tcwarxl the purpose in vie-^. 'Seeauae 
of his interest in each concrete piiase of experleaee as evolved 
cut of the precediQ:^, T^'S^«©y eoneelves of the external warld a ■ that 
phaae of the avolationary proceae with which «ian lnt':5racts. The 
aear realiata* position in talitag the external world as an object 
of cognitive interest dees not apjeal to his. His critir^ia;^ of 
idealiaiG still holds good wkea it is levelled sgaia^t ne>* re-alia.*,. 
Both schools holril in eo:-iraon the belief in a aabsisting world of 
relations, '^e states: 

''Ideal! ST. fails to take into account tha Si.«olf3ed or concrete 
chartictor of th-^ u-icertaln situation ia whicb tho-uTht occurs; 
it fails to note the ©jstlrically concrete witure of the ejbjeet- 
riatter, acts and tools by vrhlch determination and consistency are 
reached; it fails to note that the conclusiva eventual objects 
haviaj? the Ifitter properties are theseelvos as 5»ay as the situa- 
tions dealt with. T ha eonve raion of tha l&;;lc of reflection into 
an ontoloy of ra _ tIon?»l j-^aln:- j .-- t'iu" /uo to •irblti^iy c c-iv graior. 
of an -ventuul natural function of ualfi attcn into "i g.vjs:j1 
antooedent reality .'' 

KTperlenc9 and -"at are , p. 68. (U-iderlinln;; asine) 


So siueti we 'lavs m^iS. abo.'t tho coatlxiulty of aatura uBd 
aas, of reaeon and Bansa, of lioal and raal, vinci of ©nl and raaaas 
pra^ent tn the kno-jln-^ proc»;v?« there t.«^ anothos" point In. Tepsoy's 
conception c^ knm^lsd^a which 3?xgu1.. u^-.. -isoape oar notica, viz., 
the unity of Icaa?l8cls9 an'2 charactar In conjoint activities. It 
5..'? not only la virtus of the uTKlerataniliv^ of th9 nature of objeets 
or svonts, but In ?^irtue of tha davftlcp-.^Tat cf iw/^tfil ^^ispositioas, 
sueh as cpsn-mlsdodna'^.a, sincerity, honesty, r»»spoa'3l'oillty, 9te., 
that !ino?l9dg!9 provides adled eontirol of the anyipoa'^eitt* Jllnd la 
social as '^ell as ln*ell«« , ^o Tiavs ft«Kstf»at9'3 «i this f-oSnt 
t at istafl Is at t'laes not set.*!, D<»f«y is incline*! to thiiik tMt 
t*i» et^rj^nffe f ^'svltr.jr Is primarily tm the langufi^ aa4 
9 clal l«val and that :ts aa^i Ha© cf 5eT«lop!3ent Is bafseS im thia 
social aspect. An ln.1iTi<iual awes its b»ing to tho n^cji'^rccil 
Qdjustraent with tba 3:;«ial ©rtyixoaBSiont ho is in; hln grt:^th lies 
m Ms parti ei pat icaa In group actlTltleR. To use T)sw&j*3 omn words» 
"tho ori-^anlss Is act just a structure; it in a characteristic v/ay 
cf interactivity vrhlch is lack si ultauaous, all at oaca but sorlal. 
It 13 a way tspossible u-lthout stiruoturos foi* its r^eehanisat, biit it 
differs fror: strjcture as vKilkls?: illffsrs fros;. l©ga o* bx*9athiiig 
from lunga. Irior to coroiunlcation, tha c^ualltios of thio action 
are what w« iiava terpi©<3 psiychc-phy steal; thay «"?« not 'aoutal** 
Th9 cons»:iueaces of partakla^ ia ccctxraunloatioa acdify opinio ways 
of acting; the latter attain n«r^ Q.uallt'tss," Thla contiauoua mod- 
ification of organic ways of act in;? const itutea the vary eascnc* 
of til© grcwth of !sln<l or the raconstraction of erpsrieaee. -aid 

Ibid., p. 293. 


e ory pbuao of this sncdl float ion iir.plias tiwit sesse knc^lodgs thrcnitzh 

intaractioR is i^ined aad Is wren Into th® Tsty fabric of tits mind 

aa erridencad in a asodlfied soie of actla^, T&is Is why r«s»y ^loes 

not talce toaowladg® or t^s raiatieti of siaii with th© world as is©raly 

ec^itlve. Ths ability to think l9 iaterpretsd in tesras act merely 

of ths acquisition of sciautiflo technique in aolrina problSTjs ^ut 

also of tha for-yatioa 'jf intellectual and ®sotl€mal dispositions. 

Kncs/ledge is not Just th« acgaiaition of ideas. Ideas aust bo the 

coordinatioa of cr^nlc attitudes repreaei-itin-.- inclpiant, iatelli- 

5^nt activities which r9?5ult in perceptivis, ov<5Pt a>:^ts. The 

j-hysioloj^lcal asj-or-t of ileas or r-9anin.q;8 which De^'ey deals with 

is to roirtforeo his fir" co'viotion that iaacsledga and character are 

isutually co52pler»ntary in tlia course of adjustsjent and that the 

'-■»atal an-'3 ths rhyaical, the sind and ths scrld htb not antithetical, 

Tais ideal of unity, which is a fnodem way of sxjr^aslsg 

tho tire-honcurad diet'!?! that Imo^vladga ie virtue, i;?, to '^sey, 

tc a realised in jcizix acti"iti93, ^CTjladgo-gettln - is best 

carr'sd an in group cooi:sratioa. ?!« thinks, as said in the pra-' 

eedln?^ chapter, that fl-^Tlhility of habit, '^mralopnoat of ability 

to think, and enrich iioeat of kaoriladgej cr coucept depend on tha 

participation of tha indlrldial In shared eTperieriCe, 'Hs r^sthod 

of Esntal llsciplln^ is at bottom tha utilization of ohiired eT|i«r- 

lonce to mould &»«irable habita or dlspositioas. Ills iionl cf an 

educated Tw^n ' 'i a s-c'*lally iEtelli-^ent individual s^iutaining eo- 

op'TOtiva ralatlonship v?ith ot"n-*r3 and act!vs In iraprf.ving »oelal 

eoiiditiona, ;l!klll3 and iterss of In. or-atlon aarv© the purpose of 

achisvia-^; this end. 


3«e also pracedln? chap. 13. 



Applying, his ocncopt of kriC^ledgc to tha school situation, 
Dowey attempts the ovsrthro* of ths tra<i5tioaal practice ef ptissive 
l»araia^< an3 of tba rigid division of suojeet-raatter, 

r:«wsy*s attack en tha olci school practice bpuricuss oat 
ijito two ?irgusseEt3. (1) Sub j set-matter in the old sciiool, as tb« 
errgani'zed result of learning of the past, reprer^sats only the stand- 
point of the satured adult and aces act fit iBio the erparlQucQ of 
the ycang. "Tha subjact iKJtter of ths Isamsr is not.. •identical 
with th-3 fcsrraulated, ths? crystallized, aa3 syster'^ti^ad subject- 
^tatt^r of ths ed-!jlt; tlio material aa fi-jnd in bof:>\ie aad in. sorka 
of art, ate. Th-3 lattar re present a the possibllitias of ths for^ier; 
not its fiTlstinsr state, it 'snt'sra directly into the activities of 
the expert ana the educator, not into thut of the baginnsr, the 
learner." This typa of r3£idy--*aae e^terial is foreign to the ohild*3 
experience, and hence (4oes net eiall ^t his interest asd effort to 
learn. To Dearey, th«?re are taro kinds of subj ^ct-sai^tter relative to 
th- stage.- cf .-rrciffth of the raiad^ In the immature stn e, t-ilflga 
ar« organiT-ed aro-.ina one's cwn i-iaie^iate centre of jnt-fast. In 
the aature stage, tiiing!? m& orgaai-.ed with reference to the moan- 
laf;8 which they bear to one another. "To the one who is learned, 
6ubject-!5att9r is extensive, -ccorately defined, aai logically 
interrelated. To ths one sho is Isarainf;, it is fluid, partial, 
and connected through his personal occupations.**" These different 
etagfis of experience de.tand, therefore, a change of the eoriver.tioxiul 
division of course cf study into s<sAe dyurii-aic cou'se of doing vjhleh 

■jemocrficy and rvducatlon , p. 215. (Italic- original) 


Tbld., p. .?16. 


enters into the 8Tp«r1«nce of the young. Ot'^axxized facta 
-ire the tsr-rslnus of evert inquiry which involves 'oodily 
aetlTities, us© of apparatus, sugcjeations, etc, Thay repres- 
ent the predict of ages of tollsoa© work and liksv^iao the 
achi 5-. e^f^ent of an ad Alt* 8 intellactual oevolowsnt . To taice 
thSffi, therefore, as the object of study at the begirining ef 
a child's learning is to i'cjncre the psychological develop- 
raant of the child as lirell as tne psychological doveloprrteat of 

•♦Knowledge in aation" is ter led in education "lear- 
ning by doinis''. Dew«y*8 attantioji ia drawn to the dovelop- 
rasnt of solanoa rmioh has produced narrsllous results in the 
control of nature. To ccf;?bat tho trad'tional exaltation of 
knowledge In spgculation, the forsulation of a theory of 
itnowled*53 In aetioa la not effective until tho theory ia 
actually put I'ato pi^ctice. To tho 3ch>ol he turns for 
experi'ent. He realize- that tha slow but s .re way of 
changlB;: th9 funda iontal outlook of life and tho say of 
living ia thrcj.-^h education. 2^e payflholcn^ical ??rc»rth of 
r4nd pr:;vlde8 bin a?ipl« «?rouBd ia challenging the apeoulater 
theory of knovled^e. 

The first stage of ioicwiag, aa he argnes, is to 
kaoH how to do. The ability to do saraetaing effectively 
is the need of the yoanj and even of the alult. /» leam 
how to wqIk, haa to talK, how to 'sprite, h ^w to calculate, 
how to riae a bicycle, etc, b/ neana of aur handliu;- the 
ntiteriala a well as by .-noana of the control of thvt bodily 
or«/jns. /hat co.;.e ithlr the laamin^: situation Is the 


subject-siatter of the Jsamar, Ksthod and mibject-sjatter aro 
uniflaol In the imjs'.ediate iatopaat of the .isaraar. "o, to Dav/ey, 
orort activity in ths for- of problaa-solviiig sh old fot^n th« 
curriculum of the ycoa^. 

This argufls-snt of "leajming by doiag", based uj-ch th» 
psycholo-yical growth of aubjaot-riatter, is not conviacin,^ to the 
eonaerr^tlvo ed^jcatr. The orgaaized subject-matter ia, of eourso, 
e result of Isamiag on ths i^rt of tha aaturoS adult, ^ut, still, 
it can be slsnilified uod taken as the polat of departure of lear- 
niisf^ cr? the part of ths ycim^. It saves the unnocess 117/ -sfa/ider- 
Iji^a I'l bltiil alleys *5rhich chardctorirad hiisaa developaent in 
the past; it prcviries a eyste-fltic ^stery of the subject through 
flelibarate plaaniE/r by the teacher; it nay cultivate the habit 
of endurance, of solf-coiitrol thro«/3;h applyla;:; unaself to a hard 

(2) "■;-8'.>/ey» s ssc-ad argument, basied en the social function 
of the school is really a reply to thi^ oriticiswi. To I^-^ey, 
the 5Ch<x>l is not a place tc l«axTi lessons; it la a place to 
If^am ho?f to live ceop^erat^vely with others, v-ubject-ijjatter is 
not an end In it •■.elf, but is a sssans to promoting a bettrjr sccial 
Ilvinr?, This social t-^oal de'^'de a controlled eairlr«r::93t where 
children hava tholr -j^u ••o'm:nity Ufa and proble.-aa to solve. 
They learn how to live in their o?m genulue social s-ediua, in- 
stead of rreptsriiig hcjir to lire in a future adult society. 3ub- 
Ject-rsattor than oorapriaes '*fasta obserrad, recalled, read, talked 
about and the ideas 3ugc:o3ted in course of a develop-i»nt of a 
situation havinfj a purpose,"^ In short, anythias^ that ocsaes aa a 

Ibid., p. ^12. 


seans to achieving an 3dA in vi&a is Bubject-asattar. Tim learner 

through this probleBi-»i>iviag proe«ss identifies hi^.salf ;vith the 

setsrprise of th« group, tlma devoloplrij:; the spirit of ecsspaBlon- 

3bip; skills and inf'-.vm.tlosx are ac'iuired with a ke©:i coacem 

for thsir use, and indirectly liaxigs the laaraer'a attitudes 

t05sari3 society as well as tosjard niiture. 

"...any thin,-: which intellii^enc© stuaies repraseats thia^^s in 
the part which thsy play in tha earFyiu.^ forward of active 
lines of iaterest. Just as one * studies* his tyj.«vrr«itor as 
rart of the operation -f p<uttiac it tu U3a to effect i-esults, 
so with a35y fact or tr^ith. It l>9CO.-533 ao object of study •— 
that 18, of Inriuiry aM refle-tion — ■ when It figurss ae a 
f^^ctor to be rgckoaed ??!tU in the eoniylQtion of a e;^ur."e of 
eyojt t': jt! ^vrhi ch ■:<Q e ifi azi'-A'^-iia 3-.'l by r-'ioao oum is 
affected . ■'.rrr-oavB are aot ■-b.i-'Ctf; of study juut bocaaaa they 
are nuiib^rs already constituting a brasoh of laaTnaix!--! callsd 
<r>athe aties, but b cause they represent qualities ancl relations 
of ths sf rid is ««hlch ■ ur action g'-ss on, because ti-.ey aTe 
factors upon which the assCfapllahaaat of our purposea depajids, 
. . .Traaalated into installs. It /isass that the act of loaruiag 
or study' li,: is artificial and ineffective in the f3es;ree in 
which pupils are n'>P9ly jr^j.sentooE with a l-^jsaon te be learned. 
Study is effectual in the degree in which the pupil realizes 
ths place of the nu-mer-oal truth he is deaiin? with in carrj^ing 
te fruition act! vlti'-s <n which h*» is concerned."^ 

The conventional school aaaujaes the diacijlinary ef- 
fect of the ri,«5idly claselfied coui-so of study. It isolytes thia 
educational exjvircjriirtnt fro^i life outside the school, saintaisa 
the traditioa of separating cult ..ral studies frois practical 
studiea, ani resorts to the old sjethod of punlshaent and reward as 
the moans of motivating; loamini?:. It sees no necessity for 
studying the effect of the atuiies on the pupils. Honca t -eae 
problems — how fr«ely an individual avails hls-^self of »hat he 
haa laarno! to 30lve practical problo'S, how an individual ov- 
ganlzea th» new meanings which he haa learned fr^a the subject- 
rr-atter, h'-'vr an Individual Jerelops his varied Interests, hovt 


Tbld. , p. 158 (Underlinins; ^slne) 


Qa^.tional attitudes and id*3lB play their role in tba course of 
orie*s li.'e ■— - those do aot inrlte the att-^ntlon of the olS school. 
I^s traattion-jl scbcol see js to say to its pupils: "^You new have 
all the ©qulinant W9 can tve you. vjhero you av9 going anS 'flow 
you will uss that 3quip2,'?Et to arrivs th^ro is ycur own businoss.'* 

The old ed-jnatforial practice is, of eourBs, open to 
attack. Hosrerer, three problsns regain to be solired, Tiz. , 
(1) Ho? are skill and information iatroduced Irto joint activities? 
C^) "cw is learning aysteratised? and (3) ".."hat is the condition 
for a ganerallsed trainin<? In the new typo of educational jsroj^ra^i? 

Deway's suggestion for solTiag tha first problem is 
a new typa of curriouliiis t^hich he f or:;:erly used th? tsnn ''occupa- 
tion" to designate. For convenisaee* sake, wd zsay follcw the 
current trond of educational thou^cht and call it an activity pro- 
^s^a. 1^(? new prosram is '^ths ©ija^iisterit w^e of siajle occupa- 
tions which appf»al to the ptw»rs of y uth aad which typify gen- 
eral •^odea of 3'->«lal activity. Icills and iafor-atioo ubviit 
BHate:ial3, tools, arid Iwvs of oasr^^r 3t^ aciuired whll-r- activities 
are carried on for their o^n sake. The fact t'mt they are socially 

representative r^vss a quality to the skill and too^rledi^e ^ined 

which 'mke: the traasfora 'le to cirt-cf-school situatioiis.'' 

The criteria of seloctim? '^occupations"' ars then the intsrast ot 

the yoiaig and the general ae-ds of tha eossunity lifa. "kill and 

inforration Have th<.?ir value waen thay fit into tho activitisa 

which are carried on b. the young, an-i they can ba directly ap- 

"iBycholoy of uccupatl ons" , {Crizinally published in The ':iom- 
entary ";chool Stecord , 1900) 8olleetod ^ie School atvl the '^'■■ild 

^( ditQl by J. J. rir.ilay) Loi;don: IJlackie &-. .7oa Il.-.itod, 1007. pp. 81-88. 

^'Temoci'QCy and "Education , p. '^41, 


piled to si-rdlar out-of-sehool situations. Ea ralescatea akill and 
Byr^bolic iuforssation to n seeondar? position and ai-:? at th? for- 
mation of a social psrsomxlity thrcii,?n active part:icii«tio& in 
school projects that are relevant to ths probl-ssn of eo;33unity life. 

D85v'»y*s aetivHy jarogpaa Is a vary co'':pr6hejir;ive type 
of eurrleulu^s. H« has the a^ibiticri of unifying ^c^ilod-^e with 
character, laarnlng with doim^, ©ducatlcn ^ith life through th« 
fcundiag of a life-like situation. Skill and inforeation are oatuiv 
ally organised into tho growing exy«rleace of tha iric!ivi.iual throu^ 
lifs-liks activities, als ©ptiralse toward this new projfrasi is 
reflectsd in hie lecture on "The School and Social I^rc^resa", 
in ishich ha says: 

'"The introdaetion of active oecupeitions of nature study, of 
ela.^.sntary sclance, of art, of history; tha relo,iatiori of the 
-srsly symbolic avA f .tnal to a seccnvlary position; tha c'lan^ 
in tha -.oral school .-it -osph-ra, in the relation of pupils and 

toachars - of disciilina; the jntrfyiuctlcn of more active, 

oxpre?siv8, end sslf-dirfctln?-: factors — all thesa ara not 
•sro ac-o dents, they ^re n'^oe -sitiss of the larger social ar- 
olution. It rcnaius but to organise all those factors, to 
ar.pi-eelate than in th^ir fullness of meaning, and to pit the 
iioas and idaals invcl^red Into coraplate, uncosproaisin-? posaes- 
3lcn of tRjr school systora. To do this sisana to fsake ■saeh one 
of our sch-cls an e t;ryc.nic co munlty life, active with typ^s 
of occupations t it raflact th-a life of the la gsr societ:/, 
and par-eatei throvj-hout with the spirit of art, history, and 
science. .7hen th"? school Intr luces and trains fjach chili of 
S':<;lety into s« bership within such a littl'? conjEunity, sat- 
urate n,i him *ith the spirit of service, and providing hia with 
the inrtru ont 'f effect Ivs self-il recti on, we shall teve tbe 
deepest and host .^.'iraat|e of a larger ac;clety w>dch is worthy, 
lovely, nod harr.onioua." 

Dewoy'K foundinp; of a laboratory school contacted with 
the University of Chicago in 1096 was a tost or t'^is idea. In 
his report^ of the school, he states that t-.ere vrere four problems 

Ibid ., p. 464. 

;chool and Society . Chicago: University of Chicago Ireas, 
1900. pp. 4^44. 
^-.y^r,.. -„ara of ^•-« 'Ti-i-.r..r.^lty -lo-.entary -ohool". in _^o^l_^iUiL.^ietj 


la his alnd, to be answ red In tho conduct of the school, 

(1) ^..'hat can ba done, and how oan it b© done, to tiria^; ths school 

into close relation with the hcaae an& naig'nborhood life —— 
Instead of havin- the school a pluce where the cnil^ ocf-ies 
solsly to Isant certain le'3Sons?" 

(2) '^:'Ihst eaa be dcme In th© ssay of iBtrodaeiag 3ubject-r.attsr In 

history and seioncs an3 art that shall have a positive value 
and real significaiiCQ in the child's own life; tliat shall 
repr83«at, ?ven to th© yc\iiin:5St c!-ildraa, sojsathlJ?^ worthy 
of attainjtiBnt in skill or knoscled'js; as nich so to the littla 
pupil as are the stadias of tha hi .>ih-sehccl cr ccilo,<:9 3tu5e:it 

(3) "^tlow can iHStrueticn ia thsse f -rr^al, sysbclle hi-aticnsa •— - 

the aaster'nq o? th© ability to read, write, and use f1fi;iir8s 
intelligently -— be carrisd on wHh everyday experience and 
ocoupition !^s thrir Mckf^rotiad and in definite) relations to 
other studten c;f -tore inh-^ront content, and be carrlad on 
in aueh a way that the G^;ild shall feel their nocesaity thrwj^ 
thtsXr eonoBCtien with s'^bjeots whieh apieul to hirs «s their 
o?m accoviat?" 

(4) "Trid^Tidual atteation".^ 

In that expsriaentsil seho* 1, thsra v:@ve "t iree isain lines 
regularly pursued; (a) the ahoi>-work a-ith %'ocd and tools, (b) oooking 
work, and (c) »ork with textiles — sewliu? and waaving," De^.-ey 
fcmnd that "the child gets th;a^:c3t piirt of his actiuiGitloBS 
thro'sh his bodily actliritieB until he IsawiS to work syBtejaatlcally 
with th© liitellect." The forras of aotitritJ;s were planasd in such 
a miy as to lead "from one factor of skill to aaothor, fro« one in- 


tellectual difficulty to another." tlistorical, natural, scientific, 
knowledge all scrsw out of these jsjnual activities; raoral attitudes, 
habits, and iihynicjl 'sxspclae were rivon dafioite attention in the 
co;r3o of children's work.'' The purpose was, in fins, three-fold: 
to i-^rtr-n t-r V doin-; to int^acrate it:telloctual and Tscral loa--ning 
into a un'ty; and to rander tha aonool as a ftnc of co nunity life. 
Kaavledg'? tlirou;;h shared action was the sootto. 

As res<ird3 tha second proble^i, which we huvo Just roaad. 

^Ibid., pp. 116-119. 
^Ibld., p. 1^0 

-ThM.. :. V-l ^ibld.. pp. I^l-l^^. 


viz ., "lias is 'leeraine- by doing* systematized?'', Dewey at that tl^se 
alac attachad i'iporterice to the ct.ntinuity of erperieuce. !!o5¥ev9r, 
systsTiStizatlon of subject-sattar in ths new type of ourriculuas did 
not ecostituts so serious a proble-' to De^ey as did the rigid, ab- 
fstriict coQ"se - f study in tn;ii old school. Dewey fcjuded the ©xper- 
iaseiital school to ecuateract the old typa of education ratbter t an 
to set up a i'.odel of hos? thd series of activitiss that childra carry 
on should be ociinected so ae to result In an Intelleetijai ^r.^dniT^tlon. 
Probably his forrroilation of thinking as raetitod and hi^ sxpoaition of 
the significance cf the im:'.eri?cir!g aspect of experience isade Mra feel 
confident of succe.^s in syots -.atlaiug subjsct-ssittar in tU© course 
cf tackling the prbblenatic situations. It was in the 19'iO*s t .st 
be gave special attention to this problem. In 1938 in his Iseturea 
on "Sxperience and Ida^atlon'*, a special topic aas chossss ca tiie 
"•Ir-greasive Or-tanisstlon of Subject-'jattor"*. Could he have fore- 
? »ou tlio 111 coassqueacea or th-s aaa A,.isorioan educational jaovanor.t 
and given ^rt I volar attention to the cciaaected seq.uor:oe of subjeot- 
aattar, the feverish c" ild-circus.acribed education iaovossent sight 
not have Ci^ia into erratsrice. In h!s early BTrflri;nant, he plaaaed 
with the teachers of the elementary school the laading-on sequeaoe of 
problematic activities which Involved the acquisition of related still 
and iaforfRation. The meaning a3ti>set cf exr^rience rexerrin.? tv the 
past and pra ont was ^^iron auch attention. 'le trisd to ciiange the 
pmctitce of iaolatiiig the training of reason fros- a child's bodily 
activities 'JirectRd rrainly by hla needs and impulses"', by jtuiding 

"•Iiirlivi duality and ^perienoe". Journal of the ."atmes x'^ouiida- 
tion , Tol. 2 (Jan., 1926), pp. 1-6. 

"Hoa; Much Freedom in TTew Schools?", limi Jlepublic , ;bl. 63, 

no. 814 (July 9, 1920) 

Bea pr^cedlnir ehn-.ter on the evil.s of educational dualism in 

a • '"ito fro-! borllly uctivitias. 


the child's iaja^ivs activities tJirotigh tntelliaient atiggestions to 
bring hici to s«e the ?i9ania-s of tha activiti'^s and to realize 
his n«sda of !8a;"torlxu5 slclll, of getting rs levant inforisatloa 
instruaental to the SKecutioa of the activity. The child's preaont 
oTperian© is tHe starting point, but its s^awth is diractedi t?irough 
tha t^aohar *_8 plannlR.^ of activities. This jsode of guidance points 
to the differeace beteeea iatslli j^ent interest and isf-ulsive inter- 

As early as 1895 if hen Dm*ey dealt with "Intaraat ta 
relation to T»ai;i-'n)> of the Sill'*, the cbJe:-tiTe vapect of interest 
pointed tc the Iritallectual contiuulty of ©xi^rlence. He defines 
an interest as "prii^rily a forn of self-espre-slve activity — 
that is, of »?rovrth through acting upon nssf^siat ter.Aenoies.'' It 
has its objective as -sell as its subjective side. Objects enter 
into the activity of the child and eoae into eonseiSRis existe.ioe 
frot: ths standpoint of the child as aeans to the ac!\i'3ve;i«snt of an 
end. These ebjects at* the eubject-sKtter of the child and are 
instru'sental la xtendin.:^, the reng'j of his eTferience. 

T;5vory Interest... attache® Itself to an object. The artist is 
interesto'l in hia brushes, in his colours, in hi'^ technique... 
Canvas, br ishes, and jaiats interest the sjrt 1st. ..only because 
they help hint to find his erlstiar artistic cap^joity. I'hgre is 
u;thin.r? In the wheel an^ a piece of atrin;v to arouse a chill's 
activity save ss they sti ul-ta 8(mo instinct or impulse already 
active, and supply it Rrlth thd means of its execution. The 
nunber t'^elve 1?; uaintoreatln- when !t is a bare ertemal i'act; 
it has 1 nterest . . .TThen it preasi ts itself as an instilment of 
carryin;,? into effect so--;© dawning eriergy or iiealre— -iakiufj a 
b X, *.'?asurin": one'e height, &tc. And in its difference of 
deitjrse exactly the aarse prir^ciple holds of the raost technical 
Ite .8 of 3<?io::t:f e or hist ric ka«-.-ledge— whatever f-irt'iors one. 

In ccnsonanoe with his |->sychologioal standpoint that thtnge 
exist in exi,orience and faat the L- isediate datua is inter- 
act! cm azid not a ccj^ltive bject, Desrey denies fro.-^ the 
fJtandi'Oint of the experience of th-- ohlLI t.te conscious ex- 
latenoe of any object, axoejit that it enters into t:ie activity 
of the child. Tliis deiULal J 3 si sfiif Icatit in hie eduoatiojjial 


helpa !S3iital ntoTe^t^at, is of B^cessary and intrinsic Interest,'' 

Th« subjsetiva -v'de of interest ?a tha i>sr9onal satisfaction in the 

pursuit. I'hess two astecta ftsrs. ths basis or tha grawth of exp^riazice. 

Dsway then points out th^ rmj to develop, gonuina iaterest tnrotigli 

the solution of problesss tiiat uro aacountsred. 

"To reall zo an iatoroat means to do ao.iiethiaq, and in tha doing 
raslstance is r-et an;? T.u3t 3e f&cad. Only <iifftcultic3 are new 
intrinsic; they are significant; thair aeaning is appraeiatfj.5 be- 
cause they 21*6 felt In thsir ralation to tlie lapulse or habit to 
whcse out-worklng they aro rQl8vant.,.'ro appraciata a probla;^ aa 
such the child Kust fsel it as his 'jun clifficulty, which has arisen 
witlila ajafi out of his oam axpsriance, as an obstacle which ho has 
to over:: 0313, in order tc s^-scur^ his own ©nd, tha iate^^rity and ful- 
la-.^ss of his osa arperianee. Eut this siaaas thut pro5lei;3S siiall 
arise in and ^ow out of tho child's can iiapiilaes, ideas, habits, 

cut of his atte^.fijts to eT^raLi^^s and fulfil the®— out of his efforts 

to real'^o his Intsr^nts.'*'' 

Tha task of tha toacher is the^: not to indulsa but to utilize intar- 
est, i.e. "to mik& of it sc).T»thinj^ fvLller, ..'ider, soiiathing sore re- 
fined and under battsr cor.-rol'*, "Just hci?/ to use interest to saeure 

^rc^th in kna^ladgs and in tha efficiency Is what dafines the Ejaster 


th3-.ry as he oblacte to tha prasentatiori of organized subjsct 
Hstter to tha child and tha sxtemal devioas to jnotiTate tha 
c'^!Id*a "subject !Te'' -Int^re t. :is thocr:/ of Intorest aa self- 
e3Cpra»alve acti ity toward an and is a necessary corollary of 
hia view of pr .■•greas"'ve orgaaJr^tion of aubjeat-sat'-er. is 
atatas thus: "^vfa msy..«»a7 that the iatareist is in tha objact 
present to the senses, uut we aiiat be aware hcv we iriterjrat this 
saying. Tha object haa no conaeioua existe;ice, at tha tifss, aava 
in tha activity. The ball to tha child is nis gtine, lils game la 
his ball. 'iTio r-tusio has no existence save in the rapt hearir?;?; of 
the rasalc-— so long as the iatcrfjst is iriBiedtats or aaat etic. 
It is fraiuently said to be the otjer^t which attracts attention, 
which calls forth intsreat to Itaolf by its own Iviherant ^iualltlea. 
But this is a psycholo^?ical isipossibility. The bright colour, tho 
sweet aciind, t.hat }ntere«t the child are the-iaelves phases of his 
organio activity. To say the child attends to the colour does 
act maan that he -ives up to an axtemal object, but rather tliat 
he continues the activity which results in tha presence of the 
colour.' "Interest in delation to Trainivi:; of the ill", eo .llad 
-° Educational r.ssays (edited by J.J. Findlay), London: Slaclde and 
3oB United, 1910, pj^. 96-97. „ 

^Tbid., pp. 94-95. 'lMi-» PP- 128-129. Ibid., p. 137. 


Th« idea of direction of a child's doslras throur^ th« 
difficulties In the activities *as then exjari entod uj-oa, '.i3 has 
just be n said, ja th® Chicago Sxperlmsatal School, In his lecture 
on ^The School and thg Life of the Child", Dewey describes tfee 
actual goiBg-oji of the aohool. In the plaanln.-3 of cocfcia^ activity, 
for iastaace, the teachers planaad a series of actiTiti<?8 starting 
»lth the cooTcina of ve^itetaoles, then to tliat of eggs, and then to 
t \at of :.-:oat. Food -ale eats in th'^se kiads of food -A-er?? -"O'J ; 
eoaSltions of coiAin^: related with, the effect of the dej^re e of te?}- 
perature en tho thliv:^ evoked v^re iQametl, The -'^in purpose wa.i to 
(liree the pupils' Jntere^t to\v.i^ th-a understandlais or the facts 
of nature, as in this i.^irtie^tl^jr eaee, of the eheoiical eoastituents 
of food, the principles of eoc-kin.'-, etc. Kn^fledge is a result of 
this overt planned action aad leads on to the laiderstaadlag of other 

Tiowever, i^wey*s ?aairi tfjjo^et of attaok has betm the jpas- 
sivity of laaiTiiag, liis aet-;oiieal treat;neut of the philosophy of 
education in DefiOcr^cy ' cation is mora forceful in the exposi- 
tion of the iiiadeq,uacy of dualisti relleeted in school practice than 
in directing the readers* attentiun to tha ijuportanae of eysteaatlza- 
tlon In the propc^3ad ohangra of sehool curr'i culim. Saraatiaee hie 
stEite-eati? ,7j.^-e the reader the ispressioa that he advocates a fora 
of la i ss^g-falre ed' seat ion. In the case of the selection of proble^fis, 
his pri ary purp:;a9 waa to attack ths "teacher's role in the planniiig 
cf pupils* activities, simply bacause the old school rrti a the teaoKer 
absolute authority over the pupils. 

School ariil "jociety , pp. 55-8'7. 


^kB a consequones or th« absence of the svatarials and occui^utions 
which genorate real proble-ns, the p»upil*a probleris are not his; 
or, r.'t i9r, th«y are his only as a paril, not as a hui-^an being, 
rlence tha lan^entaiila wasta ia caciyln^f; .'jver such expertne^^s aa 
is aehisved in donling with tiiaa to the affairs of li e oeyoad 
the schoclroois, \ rsipil has a rroblera, but it is t'ls rroblGB of 
TjiegtiRr; the f'gculiar ra ul?re:tant:> set oy the teacher* -ia problem 
bgec-sas that of tindUiC. out wlat t'e taac'-er y/ants, yfrat wjll 
satisfy the teacher \n re cita t ion aad e zan lnati cn aag outwai-d 
dep'irt' !9nt . ''•^ 

But proijlsms IB a ooGtrolleji envlrraapaint can never be as genalaa anid 

n-jtural as those ariaiag In aa O5jt-of-school eitriro;iF:9at . The teacher 

naiat plan the course of activities in ad-ranee, antioljatta,'- definite 

jfTGblerr.a t -at prcbybly crop up, definite thinklsi? process i?hich in- 

vol-^es particular roadin.:;, fisaaiial v^ork and ase of physical lcnot?led=-e 

iaetruaental fn h^J stins to future problenatic sitvvations. And he 

?8ust exert his authority in th« interests of the j-rop^r growth of 

the child, to prevent hia from going astray in soatters of selecting 

problems ajvJ cf atinulatiriA.^ efforts as well as in matters of aoral 

discipline Inherent therein. 

Sc»?@ti:-jes Dewy* 5 over-eiapbasia on the educational iafluo- 

nfsm of anviron"-ent, particularly on that of the lifo-lika situ'ition, 

leads peopla to think that a life-liko situation is both a sufficient 

and necessary con'lition for t^owth, Dewey see?!i« to rsean that, rjivsa 

a ralniatui'9 cora-^unlty life, growth is a Tsattsr of course. 

"In place of a school sot apai^t fv-'n life as a place for learning 
lessons, we h^jve a rainliitur sf^cial group in which study and 
gr-wth are Incidents of present shared expeirlence. Plnygrounda, 
shops, wrrrkrooms, laboratories not only direct the natut^l active 
tendencies ot youti., but they in olve intercourse, ca^inaniosticn, ^ 
and cooperation, — all oxtendin;? the j-orception of eonnectione."" 

"There must be T:%iore 'jctual matarial, r^re stuff , mors appliances, 
an^ rsore opportuaitios for doirif; thius;3, before the .»ap[b9tv/8en 
school and life] can be orsrco-e. And v.hare children are eii^-i];od 
la dolnT; thint^a and in discussln-; what arises in t).-.e ooiiPse of 
their d in-, it is found, ..that children's in-iuirie are SfOntaa- 
© J3 and > iS, and the prop sals of solution a ivancod, varied, 
and iaa;enloua,"'' 

j^De:-;^<crj ey a-jd :-Mu<;'.'ti on, p. 183 (uriderllninT Mine) 


"Tfhere sohools are &q,nl^jxs6. with labcratorlss, shops, and gariena, 
where dra^tisatlom, plays ari3. ga-^-e;; are freely used, oj-por- 
tunitios erist for repr duein^ sitiatlcns of lir3,aaa for 
aeiuiriri- ani applying Inf r'natSon aad ilaas in tha earrylag 
forward cf pro^jrssslve dTperlsn.ees.'*^ 

The ai!3 of the sehcol la not so sRicb tc "rej^oiuee situations o£ 

life" as to promcte syHter-jatie -rc-wth through the utilisation of 

l.ife-llk> situations. 

OonsQiueiit upon the uprtslag tlda of critieiaii of the 

"Irogresaive Sduoation" aoveiaeat, ^'ewey coses to lay jxirtieular 

eaiphasia en the syatsjatiaatica of aubjact-isattnr. ils begias to 

iirect his attention to the errors of thjs nes odusatioii, rather 

thas to the old ©ducatioc. In his article, "Hoi* :^ch FreedcEi in 

Hew Schools?", he states: 

"To fail to a 3 sure gildanee a?id dtrectioa is aot taerely to per- 
Elt Qrapilsjto cpertite in a bliiod and spasaodic fashion, hut it 
pro otes the forratlcn of babHs of t ir^aturc, .mderolux.'ed, and 
egoistic activity. OuldiaiiO© and direction nsean that the im- 
jnili5<=t8 SivA desires take affect thrcu^b material that is 
i ■r^Tavaal and ohjeetivo. Aal fais subject ^natter csxs. D9 jro- 
Tided in a vfay ■srhl ch will obtain ordered and ccaGSCutive devel- 
cp-aat of er^r^eacQ only by ssans of the thoughtful solnction 
and orgsni^aticn cf n!>it=>rial 07 those Y&vin^ the broa'^est 
azx«rca«© »-- those who troat i tpulses and inchCRits deairea 
and plass as poteatlaliti s cf growth throu.'Tih iateroctioB and 
not as fiiv:Ll!tiss» 

"To be tnly self-centered is not to be centes'ed in oxm*»s feelings 
and de.'iires. Such a center seans dlsai patios, and tte ulti?aBte 
destr.iCticD of any cent'^r ■^t'atever. IJor does It .r:eaa to be 
egcistlcaliy bent on the fulfil. sent of ],ersoiifil wishes aad 
aribitlcns. It ir-sans rnth?r to have a rich field of soclftl aad 
natural relatioas, which are at first external to the aplf, but 
new ineorp rated into pere^ursl experience so that thay jive it 
welf^ht, balance, aad order,,.. in sorie progressive school. '3 the 
fear of adult ii-.poaiticn ha!S beoo-rie a veritable phobia. ..hen 
the fear is .i»rialy3ed, it neans si iply a preference for an 
i a-fiatura and undeveloped axpoz'ierce over a rii^ued aad thou^iht- 
ful cue; it erects into a standanJ ac.-aethiiig whic";, by its nature 
jrovides no steady moaaurT or tested criterion. ...Jut in fact 
rnauy of the currant intsrpi^tation:!! of the child-eentorod sc^iool. 

4bid., p. 190 


cf pupil Initiative and pupil xurpoeiag ana pla33iiln,T, suffer 
frop: Qxactly the sa-« fallaoy as the ai3ult-ln; position siethod 
of the tnscHtional school— cnli/ in an iaTsrt^td fcm. That 
i», thay are still obsessad by the r«rs mal factor; they ecn- 
celvs of no alternative to adult dletatioa save cnlld dictutioa. 
ir.'hiit is tainted i-:^ to tat axBy fro," every soda of jarsonal dic- 
tation and Fiarely i.>8r8onal c mtrol, Vhen the araphaais fall? uoa 
MtIrs; exp-erleaces thf-it ars odueatlcnally worth»hil9, tho santar 
cf gravity shifts fro^^ tlis p^arsonal factor and !s f und »lthin 
the developing: eiperiej^C'?* in which pupils and taaehers alike 
participate ...Tha fand&r^iental thing is to find the type -. of 
erperigpe e that are _ ^' rth hav l.:...-.t , not r-'je^-ely icr the ■no yssrit, but 
b ooauaa o f -wliat they laal to- — >the /iuastjcus they raisa, tho 
probl^L's they create, the deands for new iBforraatlon they sug- 
gest, the activities they hwho, the larger a^nd expanding 
fields into ?/hieh they ccntisu^uily open.''i 

ks the ailsuae of the concept, activity, which Dewey uses 
to co-uiiteract the passive learaicj? cf the old school, results in 
the indulgence of child's desires, ha, in his articls on "^Ictivity 
Tiov^Taont" appaaring ia the 53rd Yearbcok of the :^. _>, fj, ",, clianges 
his point of eaphasis frt^a the concentrated attack on tassive 
learning, as made in " and T'dueation to the constinictive 
criti class of the activity aoveraent ia the Jnited Itatss. He 
does this by pointing cat the I'xtportanoe of the undergoing; aspect 
cf each phase of aotiv'lty, and asks where it leads to, arhat con- 
nections it has with the p -nt erperLence, and what skill and in- 
formation It involves, "o lon^rer does he hi --salf soake much of the 
significance of the baire concept of activity. 

"The 'Mre cor.cept of activity in general no longer has- any def- 
inite educational value. It did have when It stood in tiarked 
contrast with quiescence and jasslve absoriJtion. But wo have 
now reached a point whore the problem is to st'vdy in a discrim- 
inating way fros a vurlaty of cints of view various modey of 
activity, and to observe their resiectjve consaqi. :nces when they 
are employed. Cther^^lse an activity progra-a will be in danger 

Hew I'ie^ublic , --ol. 63, no. 814 (July 9, 1930). (Underllnlnn; aine) 


of being a catchword used to j mtifj' all sorts of t'aings of 
groatly diverging voluos,-'^ 

•than De-wey eoRes to the topic of the organiEatioa o? lear- 
ning in his lectures on '*'r^«rienco and Education'' in 1936, his 
criticiarg on the "rrogrese-ir© Education" novemeiit is frank and ^rapa- 
thotic, r5B joints out its -realcsst point in the i^ttar of the oolec- 
tion and organisation of intellectual aubjeet-rjatter. 

"Tt is a ground for l9gitl''«t9 cr:t5cis-, hc./ever, when the on- 
goin -" '^iove-nsEt of prog;ressive ed;cation fails to reccc^nl^e that 
the i.rcble of 6eI«c;tiori and crganiTiatlon cf subject— scatter for 
study and learning ia fundamental. I.-iprcarieaticn t::=at takes ad- 
vantage of special cccaaions prsv^nt? t3a(;hir«» am! laariilai- fros 
be in? storaotypad and dead, "^t the basic .material of study 
cannot be picked up \n a eursoxy i^anor. Occasions which -are not 
and cannot bs foreseen are bcnnd tc arise, Tirharsver there is In- 
tell!9Ctusl frsed's. ^I^hsy should be utilised. But thsre la a 
dec ! d ad d i f fergnce bet~:-iQ n us is : them in t he daye lcpaen t of a 
continulu;^ jico of BCtlvjty and tirusting to tbe:T; to :;rovi.i3 the 
0hlef gsterial of learning . " 

The organization of facts axid ideas, though it should not be ready- 

aade, should be progressively shifted, as has just been said, fra». 

the individual centre of interest to the intellecta*! a9ai?silatlon 

and generall:natiou of what has bean observed, read, talked about, and 

diaocverea by exx:erlnient. In the course cf tackling a problea, the 

pu. il, guided by the teacher should be able to t^rasp the connection 

between past expertence and the present situation to see the slg- 

nifJcance of the present result, and tc revise his old cojiceptlon 

iu the light of the new -neanln/; he grins. Tiat is laarned is then 

orepanized on the ba!5is of observntlon, reading, discussion, rianual 

foanl puliation, instead of T9'''»in\n:T, in the familiar, routine level 

of personal denires. To ^iewey, the exjeri-ental Tetho'.i in the ^.pans 

^3 rd Tear'ook of the ?;. 3. o. g.^ ^ Bart II, the .etlYlty ::oveaent . 
gBTocRrdnjErton: mbllc /school I^ibllahin^ Coicpany, 1954. pp. 85-36. 
T?rrerieace and iMucation, pp. 95-96. (!Tndorllnin'3 nine) 


to organ! zati en, ^ Fcrasight oi' the sud of th© proole;iatic activity 
"DQCOses the a-saas of planninr, the course, which in turn rolisa upon 
obsoi-vatioa, infornatioa, and reflectlTO rovisw of one's ac>iuirad 
ajTStans of Ojrperlence. This iatelligsnt activity tako.7 Ite start in 
iapulsivo activity, correlates with the ezperieuee of tha laai^or 
and snds in organised ©xporieiic© op knowlotig©, aiioa th« end is at- 
tained, it becosss the startiru; polrt of farther ehallaaging probleris 
to b© L'et in the learner's activitiss, which are planuea by the teacher 
in ativaace. The function of knew? ledge as 3@wey constantly rep?;ats, 
"is to fsake one erp^irisnco fr?«ly svailjible in other experience"."' 
'rtlhat ia organised is act a 'f5re<i pc.^aaas'io-a b-it is an agency and 
instru-aentellty for opeaiu^- sew fields which isake new derands upon 
existing powers of observatJwn and of intelli>:-nt use of aerjcry,"*' 
Crgani-^atlon of snibj^ct-tatter Is always in the prcca s of ro rgan- 
isation conasq^uent upon ne«? learnings acquiral in the constant dif- 
flculty-suggastion-arpli'sa^ica prooeaa. Cross refer^^mce of the i^ast 
and the is the surast way of or^nizing present experience. 

"...the jsethod of intelligence -at-nifested in tha experiraentai 
aetho^ de, .ands keepin.;; ti'ack of ideas, activities, and observed 
ecnso-iuences. Keeiing track is a ratter of jre fleet ire revis// and 
su-v-sari^inij, In whic'^x there Is both diacrisiication and record of 
the significant festur-es of a devolopiag esj>erl9iice. To reflect 
is to look back . var what hiS hoe:', clone so as to extract the net 
fieanin-^s which are the eailtul stoclj for iutelligent dealing with 
further experiences. It is th© haart of intellectual organisation 
and of th-> disciplined aiud."* 

It raay cot bo cut of place here to co?f;pBi^ Dewey's exper- 
imental raetbod of learning vyith rierbJirt's nethod of teaching. The 
Herbert Ian ■tiethod h/as bean attacked on the grotind that it Tieglects 
the psychology of a child and lays too siueh stress on the teacher's 

jjlbl d . , chap. 7\ aa.'iccraoy ami Mucfitioa , chap. 25, 
''De ;- crti oy an 1 ''^uc'it'ori, p. 295. 
" ^^rpiv'.o uco and Jduc-itioa , p. 90. 
^Tbid., p. UO. 


authority. It ignorea the inditiaual's aptitudes and pc^ara, and 
easily re^ :;rt3 to a ne?^tiv« diaolpline, Dessray al?'' '••'U'l'ea this 
vtQW when he says that ■*;^rb3rtiiini3s is ,.. .a seiioo2j-;iaBt9r* s 
ps chology. It is the nataral STprassion of s nation layia.:: ijreat 
Ks^asis uj?on authorit?? and upr>n ths for Jitifc of In-JiYidu^il eliariiC- 
ter la diatirset and reeogjilzed subordination to th© etkioal dajaands 
flde i.i war and In civil ataird strati on i>j that authority. It is 
not the isychviloay of a natios which profeHSes to boli-^ve that every 
iudiTid\ial hcis withia hira the prlriciple of authority, aM tlMt order 
means cocjrdinatiraa, not subordliajtioa,''^ But the Herbartian isethod 
as a H»tbo3 sej^rata fro "arbart'a theory of "idea " jsay be rendered 
past as^ flexible as 'Imwy^s GTj«ri '^er-.tal rnethod. As Des^ey s?aya that 
■His vn-itho-i. is not the ''?5t«Qial tachalcjue of laboratory rssoarch", 
so is the erbiirti&a sethod not aacessarily lierl^rt's rsathor? relativs 
to his psychological th-sory of "ld«<i8'*, Tha steps of prejaration aad 
jresentatloa laay be lisenad t~ Dewey's suggestion of utilisation of 
child's iapulsive tendencies and axperianao for the acquisition of 
new experience. Co;.jarlson and ^n.9rall?ation are but the rariarits 
of Dewey's hypothosea and Gr;T3nl:?atloii of ideas. Both methods stress 
the application of ideas or knc-rfiedg© to actual sxpsriorMje, 

Dewey's isethod is by bo seaas fraa of the c^sarga of being 
a aohoolmaater's psycholc:^, althouifh it takes a child's exj^rlence 
as its point of departure. le adsiits that the teacher has to know 
the aoillty or aptitude of every pupil and to plan in udvance a ssrios 
of problosi'itic activitiss to a'riapa the courae of rlevslopiaent . "Sel- 
ection and arraiige.^aeQt " , as he says, "have to occur anyway unless 


"Exj'nrJence and Jducation, p. Ill, 

"In er-3t in t^elation to Trainin*?; of the .'/ill", op . clt ., p. 122. 


svarytMng Is carried on at Mpliazard acoordiiag to the ^j price op 
pres3iir« of tho aovas^nt. The problea is therefora to discovor within 
prosent experience those TSltjea that are akin tc th-sa which the con- 
wunlty prizes, and to caltlvate thoae tendencies that lead in the 
direction that ocial desiands will take. If oai^iasia is put upon 
these points >f eossamnity, not all clashes of personal ioGir© and 
social clal-;. will be avoided, bat in the f»aia there will be grosrth 
toward harrscoy."^ It is not, tbsi^forg, tteit the ilerbartian aethod 
is'^the natural expresaion of a ijation layiug great ensphasis uiion 
authority'', but irather that svary ©d-uoatiotial rr^thcfj jsist in atsra 
way or other roprssent the vlararpoint of the adult or eosnuiiity. ruven 
in a deirjocratic country where the salief is upheld tl^t "erary in- 
divid^ial has within him the priactple of authority", the schocliEister 
still htis to plan and direct a course for the realization of the 
princlile. The proble-a ccsicama aot so aaich the authority cf the 
teacher as the wuy of turning to sccoont the child's native teiid- 
•neies for tho devolop^stnt of a social ;;er3onality, ths eharticter 
of which is detsrained by the aocial Ideal. 

.hat pec;ple coK;aonly attack l3 in fact the Herbartian laethod 
as related to Herbart's psychclo^, tierbart denied the existence of 
faculties and substituted for thsa the ^nultitudinoua atomic ideas 
riginated in eTper'eriCs. The dynaaic as.ect of the soul hai to be 
•dmltted, and so he still postulated at bottai the existence of a 
8 ul. But h*3 did not actually resoirt to the eoul for explaining 
the aasociation of ideas. He gave life to these atoraie ideas as 
actively funetioniiu: entities, which are the JEanlfeetation of the 


33r(i Yearbook of the -!. :'. ',. ^:., '/ol. II , p. 84. 

Conceminf^ "jewey's view of tho relatior. of psychology with 

social order, see cmp, 5. 


activity of the underlying agent. Tnese Idea? are at once content 
and act in virtue of that unsxplainsd and assur-ied aotlvJty of the 
soul. Iliey are able to co»!pete with one another or unite togother 
in conseiousness. The imlty of slallar ideas are called the "'aj— 
r^rcejtion raaas", an'5 ths eoatinaous e^paadins of the sgisa by recruit* 
ing new Ideas Is culled the ajparceivin/? process. Dewey in his 
early years also ad-rdttei t Is fa'-t of a;p*irception as "the reaotioa 
of siind by "saana of its or;?anized structure upon the sensuotis mat- 
erial presented to it" to erplain part of the nature of ths knowing 
self." 4nd now his urnu'^iption of t'n-i "po^er to Xeam fruT?. exxi^rlecce"' 
is caily another new phrsae to describe an old psychological fact. 
But Dewey does not ad-^t tlMit kacv;ledge is the result cf the organ- 
ization of iflsus that are }rp.^9r^tf^c; to the senae-organa. To his, 
organisation oas only be saude through purjx>siT« activities; ideas 
arise caly in the course of grappling irtth ch«llenf?in;: s=ltuatlo>n8, 
and they hare to be tested in actlcsa bef(ire th-^y are eallad hTio-srledge, 
This conception of purposive shared activity v?hloh is based 
uj)on biolcj^ieal interaction'? 5 a« is the fundamental point oa which 
Hewey differs fron Herbart, ''^■eeause of the dynamic raaoe cf old 
ideas which control the asaireilation of new iu-coGsiag ideas, Her- 
bert rei^rded the syste-atization of subjeet-z^tter as a aatter at 
presentation and external -iotlvatiou of the learner* s int^ 
Interaction bee >--©s the intarsiction of new and the old jsaterial» in- 
stead of, in Oew^'a sense, interaction bet-«een the individual and 
the prcble.f^itic situation for th«» aol-ition cf which relevant subj^ct- 

^iirett, Cr. 3., op. elt ., ••ol. 3, p. 45. 

^ /•sycholo^-5'^ . New York: ':lar>-er 3r. ijrce. 1"90 (secoad edition). 
pp. 84-85. The other aspect of the knowing self is, to :^ewey, 
retention, i.e. "the reaetlou of the epperceived content upon 
the organized strjcture of the luind." 

?i*ao7 and ''due tiov., pp. 5>W6Z. 


setter enters as a factep. Besides, I-lerbart did not, as Dewey does, 

give atteatioa to tlie changing a ii'ect of aaviporateat, aad tiius tLo 

jTcspoetlvo fuactien of loKwledc^ waa neglected. Orjpinizatlon is 

an end of leaminsi, whila Its iastruiBQntality for future aajustment 

aa3 for attitude formation is talcen for grante'i. Dc.:'.\, .^-rticularly 

esphasises the Instibility of eaviroaoent; he regards organisation 

as a means to further eoatrol of the future. .\nd he IdeatifiaB in 

purposive shared actiritias the 'jsethcsi of or^niaatioa of subject- 

Hiatter, the <iietho<j of thinking, with tb.a grusrth of the iadlviaual. 

The fandaaisntal difference in theory accounts for Dewey* a 

vigorc'.is QPitioiSH of Fferfeirt's ?'athed. 

"llM conception that the siind consists of what hss been taught, 
and that tha iaportance of what has bean tau^cht consists in its 
availability for furtner taaehin't, reflects tho pedagogue's viaw 
of life. The .hilosojjh/ ie sloquant ab(jat the duty of fie teacher 
In Instr-iciting juplltj; it is aisost silsnt regarJis^g '-is priviloge 
of Isamiag. It e:iplra.«izes the influence of intellectual anvip- 
caa ent ajKai the rdnd; it slurs over the fact t at the environiaeut 
Jnyolves a per-i^cnal sharin.a- is c;>K'son experiences. It exag^-^xtites 
beyond reason tho p<''8s1 bilifci y of consciously for aula feed and 
used sasthods, and uni0rs3tl:;at?9S the role of vital, unconscious, 
attjtiidos. It insista upon the oil, tlxa past, and j.asnes ll^itly 
ever the operation of th genuinely novel aa-l unforaeeaale.'*'^ 

Hoi.37er, the 'lerbartian sathod, when teicen as independent of the 

psyehological theory of liierbart, is still valiiable. Its use is not 

restricted to the learning of fixed lessons. 'Sven apjlied to r»ei,-ey»8 

activity prograjt, it still holds good in its respect for t;ie i'^^st 

exjerience and native tenlencies of the child and in its scientific 

procedure of induction and deduction, eTceisiplified in the steps of 

presentation, coaiariaon, genera ligation and application. Instead 

of Biaking it a fixed mold in which instrxiction or learning is cast, 

a teacher's IntsUiss'it "*• ^'f i* woul^ not be unlike "lowey's five 

steps of reflective thinking. 

Ibid., pp. 83-84. 


The third problss lavolvadi ia t?ew©y»s aa?: currjouluia ae- 
tlvlties is: That is the contrition for a geMralize-l training us- 
3ur,ied ia Dewey's activity progras? In the preceding chapter, we sal(5 
thsit flsxlbls habits and dynamic concepts aoccsant for the tTOnafsr 
cf laamlag, an'l that joint activity and tha use of ths experiniental 
athod ire tha oonditloas for their dsvolopment . 

Conjoint activity is tha social aspect of interaction, and 
the basis of the roc on struct ion of erperlence. It is, to Dewey, 
a bisis of actiuirlng skill aia^ lafornatlon, of training thinking and 
jud^ont, and cf torrAru, 9>-lal habits. ?!ls emphasis on conjoint 
activity is, ,:ie sa'fl in the rro -ediag chapter, a n-itural consequence 
of his standp-iat that aind is social, purposive, anti maaalUfifiil. 
Tha process cf mental xisvelojjciant io essentially social. However, 
there I3 another I'suson to account for this eEiphasts. 'jowey is 
prlriarily concerned witp oeial reconstruction, aini he finds that 
the school can be or^niaed upon th® basis of tha social idoal uhlch 
lie strives after. Ccmjoint activity aerves the nlti~.ate purrose of 
developin^^ cooperative social ^jiecbers, ITie acquisition of skill and 
infoTi-atiaa is than a •seans of deTelopin.^ one's capacity for the 
l^urpose of oontributing to taa ^^rc^otioa of social Interests. Ula 
view of generalized training Is not, therefore, restricted to iaprcving 
on«»3 ability in observation, i«a/^inatlcn, reaaonin^, etc., in the 
coor.^ of proble.,--.8olvln:-:, »ut it includes the develojjsent of social 
insight, and other .xorol attributes that are instruaantal to demo- 
cratic living. 

ThB point In dispute is whether an Ideal or attitude, to ba 


aff^cacious in life situations, is foi^aed only in conjoint activity or 
doea the social situation or the understand iog of ths •neaiiia>- of 
what 13 l-^amecl account for the cui*ry-over effect of discipline? 
il\mt is the b.-.;1r faetor in loamlBg, tha> lif«-llk9 situation or the 
seaaing of what is doa©? Dew«y, of course, takes both as the neces- 
sary conditions of leamir.,-?. To Mas, conjoint activity is to b© 
carried on ^'n a niniattir* corrsiunity life, "e Is inoliriad tc taVjd 
lifelikener^s as a sore bisio factor ia loaminf;. In fact, life- 
llkenass serves only a twofcld purpose, to motivate learning; and to 
facilitate direct training. Learaing bocases -acre effective m.'sr 
the stli-Tsulatins condltioES of life in which the child participates, 
and its raault in 'natters of attitude, develomont and the acquisi- 
tion Oi skill !say '09 directly trade use of ia the direction of life 
actiritlss outside of the school, 

■iGsreTor, It is rather the imderstanding of rasanlngr? or 
principles nvolvad In a particular Isamiag situation than conjoint 
activity in a r<^al-lif9 sit -atlon tMt explains a ganoi^llEed train- 
ing. In other words, the disciplinary effect of the subjeet-aatter 
which asters into the activ?t7 of ths leamar depends on how well 
the learner la guided in understanding the general princixleo and 
Ideals to be aprlied to particular future situations. Devv-ey is 
ri,::ht when he says that "the act of leaiming or studying i'i artifi- 
cial and inof. active in the def^^oe in which pupils arc njei-ely pro- 
aented with a le^^^son tc be leamod. Study is effectual in the 
degree in which the pupil realises the place of sub j set-natter he 

is dealing with in carrying to fruition activities ia v/hich he is 

concerned." i3ut study la more effective when the pupils not only 

realize the connection of their study with the purpose of their 
r ■ ':': 

J ^3 

act4vity, but grasp the und©rl?;'lBg principles to apply thsm to 
particular cases. ZTory subject is capable of providing for tha 
:nlnd a general disciplitas «&en it ia well bundled by ths teacher. 
'SathQ^Jsattca, for insta-.ce, if it is not studied exclusively in its 
technlcul ppoceduraa, Ts&y have a sjensral efff5f;t on the ability of 

Dewey holds tc the ?iov? that typical social aodes of 
activity 7/ith a purpose in vie-.v will halp to a generalised disci- 

*rhe problem of Instru.'tJoa is thus tJiat of finding material -ishieh 
will engage a parson in specific activities having an aiss or 
purpose of aicraent or iutsr'^gt to hl^i, and dealing with thln.^ 
not 33 ■arrinafitlc appliance." but nn sondltloaa for the attainment 
of euds. The re^.e^y for the evils attendin^- the doctrine of 
fcrrial diseii-line irevi ucly spokon oC, is not to be foiui3 by 
aubatltutlng a dffctrln© of aj«clali3«d diooiplines, out by re- 
formla?! the notion of ^nd and Its training. Discovery of typical 
K;.-ies of activity, whether play or ussful occupations, in rhose 
ontoose they recv^nize they ha -e .?. .r;othi3i{t at staice, and ^"hich 
cannot be ca ried throii/»h TPithe-ut reflection and use of jud^jent 
to select laterial of observati n and recollection, is the rer^edy. 
In short, the root of the eiror Ion*; prevalent in the conception 
of training? of aind consists in Isavini? out o'J acccai: t r^^ovei.ents 
of thingr; to future results In whi-'h an individual shai-ss, and 
in the direction of vriiich obaervation, ir^gination, and ne.-sory 
are enlisted, "^ 

"OS/over, it is in insi-^ht into the oieneral princlxle of reflective 

thinking illustrated in perticulyr instance.^, that observation. 

Judgment, reasoning, etc. -yjy be laprcvsd. l^re interest in th« 

iJKwdlate tacklin^j of the problesiatie situation, typical of life 

thou^rh It -lay be, does not have any s^ena ralisei training. 

ISven In tha cnse of direct trainin.- through life-like 

situations, ii^orance of tho purpose of social habits that are for«rjed 

In these situations only provides opportunity for eonmlttin,- follies 

Judd, ;jadl9y, and Fox aire the chief jxjonenta of th' theory cf 
gen.'ralizfitlon n noernln . conditions for the transfer of learning. 


'!>e'30craey and ed ucation , pp. 155-lbG. 


whAn they are followed witxiut intellictent ecntrol In out-of-sehool 
life situati as. A parson honest In svory situation way un^ittliigly 
bacoiffls a fifth colusaxlst; our ccoporstion wlthcut roi^^irro say re- 
sult in our playing the jart of :iipp«t9 of other poople. direct 
training th<9 identity of th'j ne-M situation ■Hlth the old 
without Te^v<i to BCvel, uaexpsctod situations which call for 
thought. Desey In no sense -^Icas llttlo of the vrilue of meaning, 
as we have kncim, bat bocauaa of ais eaph^jsia on aot-^ial Interatftion, 
he sets high value on conjoint actl^'ity in life-like situations. 

Connected i?ith tha pi'oble n of generclised 1i=?clT:Ii~€ is 
the vnethoa of aequirin;^ skill aad infor-natlon. It is obTloua that 
the syErte-^jat-'c I'^amln'^ of infomational Icaowled^e and concentrated 
practice in essential skills are necessary to any tmnafar effect, 
Igncrance of, or Incompetency In, the technical procedures of 
tsckling probloES hampers not casly one's m^chaai-jal efficiency but 
the dovaloprnent of general attitudes and alilitiea. "'astery of the 
fundamental proco6«5 of arithnietical corn.putations, legibility in 
hanch?rltin>'i» control of commonly used words in spellln??, Infor-ation 
about the fundamental facts of history and j^ography» etc., not 
only help caie to cairy n the proble satic aetirity efficiently, b'lt 
pQve the way for understanding generel principles and devolopii:^ 
desirable liabita of thinkin,;: and of social living. To eq.uip pupils 
with necessary facts and skills is etost f>jndaaental In working for 
any generalized effect of discipline, social as well as intellectual, 
Vhen the educator presents the material for study with a Ion*' foi*- 
ward viev, guiding the pupils in rolatlns facts, in generalization. 
In providing ooncrote illustrations or denonstrations in conduct for 

realizing the iSeal csr pilncipl©, th» fundanentala are the necers- 
sary s^jans. 

Dew^ doo3 reeognise \ho Instrujasntal value of inforrtiation 
and skill, as vo have just said, and ho trios, to harscails© the ccufllct 
betwe^a this type of learning and th© acitirty j^rograa that air^s dir- 
ectly at the cultlratics of social habits, such as tolerant understan- 
ding, cooperaticn, fair play, assu:?<in§ respoasibility for one»s part 
in an undertakiag, honosty, truthfulness, etc., throm'h utilisation 
of jffiplls* exierlenee and ?iatlve tendencies. So he states: 

" Concerning the conflict batv^een activity directed at acquiring 
nkill iiu-1 acquirin--? def la: te bt>dl9s of forr-al ^oiosled^'^s , and ac- 
tivity ^i^OKintz out of and exprsasln-g the exiating otate of exrer- 
ience... there is no opposition in tfcaory. There carjaot bs ,::e-eral 
j^roafth unl-^ss skill and infor-iatlojc are acquired and retained, iiut 
practically, educational syste s differ as to whei'e the emphasis 
is x-lace<i« '.re skills and special riof.ies of knowledge is uie ths spec- 
ifl o ,-Tca l 3 of activ ity, ^t are f^oy trea ted as iseans f c-t c a rry jng 
gFi-?.^'^. anrlchi n,?. egg ^rjence as a goin;- ooacern? 'if the ilipil cat Ions 
of this <iu8stioE are bcme In a.ini wSien eatarainiui; actual or reecea- 
Tiended for-s af activity prc^ra-a, it ^111 be fotind, I think, that 
ar.ibigultlt>s are claar*»'^ up, snd special poirits will fall in place 
as i^esbers of an inclusive acher^."'-^ 

This Is in line with his viaif of subject-matter t ;.at it is ''an object 

of study.,,when it figures as a factor to bo reckoned 'a-it;i in the cos- 

jletlcn of 8 course of events tn which one is engafjed and by -a->os» 

outcoTiS one is affected."" 

But skin and inforination can hardly be learned systeraatically 

and thorou-^hly 'vhen they are broken into piece-3?al parts and learned 

only for the completion of a proble^iiatic activity at hand.^ 

CoTvnent on Activity Mov&iaent, op. elt ., p. 84. (Undarllaing nine) 

"Jeaocra cy and Hdueatlon , p. 3.58 


ITie followlno; staterient •Tade by Albert L. Ilartmaa is worthy of 
notice. "In our schools we have fDuiil that teachln-'-r throu.i^ 
activity units has u laflnltc© in the progru-; and that a 
variety of procedures in aacossary to "leet the needs of all 
pupils. ;e have reali.-;ed, however, tUut it is advii^ble to 
follcw such a cou 36 for only part of the school da;;^, since the 


Dewey has tha idaa of anifyixu? the learning of the fuadasjsntals sith 
the leamlnc- of bos' to liva with others, aad so h« erap&asisss these 
aodes of activity that hav« a soeial origin, ^hon he states that slcill 
and infcrssBtloa are '*m©aas for carryirj-s on and earichiiig sxperiaace 
as a going concern", the wos4 "Tcoeias'' conveys two i3i9aaia.;s and, ac- 
CG3?dingly, laplies two diffarsnt Tssthods of laaraing skill and infor- 
satloh. The first «59anln»; is tnat the leanlag of fundai^^ntals afforda 
opportunity for enrieliing the present ir'ssediate exr«riejice of the 
laarnar, and, in adrlitlcai, aldiag efficiency and dovelopirig general 
attitudes or ideals that earich future life eEperieace. This justi- 
fies ths systo^atic le'^ruirii^ of fvmdai^'Wntals that are uiirslated to 

aotivitias have aot proved satisfactory as the sola procedure. 
iMs real'lzatior. is tho result of our exporience witln the activity 
progra - for five y-sars. ?ive years ago we changed rather abruptly 
fro?! a modified sub iect— sattsr procedure to au activjty-exjierience 
t i-e of teachlsig. At the outsat the enphasis •sas laced on 
the activities and exjeriaaees of children rather than upc.-n 
skills in i^aditu::, writlarr, arith etic, and spelling. ve found, 
ha#9ver, t at after twc yoar^ of this type of vroric asmy cf our 
fourth-grade childre?; were very deficient in their ability to 
read, spell, and sfr^ta. Therefore it boca-'ie nscessary to 
evaluate the experience uBitD and to define their place in the 
scho 1 jrrigraa. le then uadartoc-t to teach otir r©«idlai5, spellia^,, 
writing, and aux-ber woric aec rding to the bast seleatific 
procedures In those fields. -lowevar, sre did not idve op our 
activity sartch-eat units, for we had f ; uud that they sarved 
a definite jiurpoae with children, est;«eially with those of sore 
tban avarage ability. Certain skills rsust be taught in haiwicny 
with the lawa of drill. In the activ-ity-ex;ariencft typ-e of 
j^roeedure rmny skills isrere not taught to the point where they 
becatso auto -a tie— —for ':',urlrs^: the two years of activit/ e"thu- 
slas's the childrei) v/are ajendias the laajcr iai-t of the school 
day in building, painting, and I'Odeling and ssere not spending 
sufficient tirae in -xilring the skilla autor:«itio." 55rd Ye^irbook 
of the ::. •>. -■>. Ti., lart 11, y. 110. 


problers-tlc conjoint activity. Anothar maaning is that this type 
of learning is pidsed up only in tha emorj^ency of aec rapliahlns the 
purpose of the ii'saefljate conjoint activity. It cioes euirieh tho iss- 
•rsdlate sxperience of the loarjser, wbo.l«arna sonethla?? instTrus^ntal 
to the solution cf a probls'- and kaows the eonneetion bet-ifeon this 
object of st.iiiy and the activity proper. ilcw*ver, tMs casual at- 
tention to fuada sentala doss not ©nricb experience viewed fro- its 
life-^pan in which t>i«ir aastciry is the backgrcnind for developing 
ischial insight. 

Adhering to his priRcijlo of interaction and the isoeial 
i<3eal of education, Dewey aoes not prsfer apeelal instpjctiou tn aso- 
cial subjects. Such as the 3;-i*s, history, ^se-raphy, etc. Tdrsct 
presentation of sybjoct-iiattsr without connaction -.flth conjoint ao- 
tivity would lend supr-ort to an educational dualism in which a 
salnd is assumed as self-sufficient, rsacjy to be brcug:' t to bear cm 
certain subject-matter; he would then jjiv© up his tenet that " e 
never educate directly, but indirectly by rvieana of the euvironnsent » " 

TJUl folloarSnf:: quotations are to shea? that Dewoy j^refers an 
exclusive integrated curriculjjs! in which aubject-isattor instead of 
being divided into seiJfirate subjects, enters into the unit of ^ork> 
which pupils carry on, to help the- fulfil their purpo;?©. 

(1) ■'The social environ :gnt consists of all the activities of 
fello«r-beln;'3 that are bound up in the carrying; on of tixe 
iactivitif>.-3 of any one of itr. r/^erKbers. It ie truly educative 
in its effect in the degree In »hich an in'liviclrial shar-s or 
participates in some coi joint activity. -3y doln^': hi 9 share 
in the a ssoci ated activity, the individual app rop riatea the 
pi' which ~i"ctudt3~: it,' bQ':?o as fa lliar ^ith its -.ethods 
an d suujoct :rmttflr9y a cjiiirea nooded skill, i s s at-iiMted 
with its eraotional t^i-irit. ""^ 

(3) "For when the scho -la depart f ro . thg educational conditlcna 
effective 'n V'^e ou:-of-achool environ ;.'nit, t'!»y nooes^arily 

^Tbid D ^2 . , p. 26. (Underlining mine) 


au--stitut9 a bookish, a pseudo-lntslleetual spirit for a social 
sjlrit. Children doubt l6s .;o to school to learn, but it Itaa 
yet to i)9 prcT'^r ? t hat l^amln.'; occura 'aost a'leyiatel;/ vt-iieu it 
is ;-'-a'i9 a ag^iarate eo:i.:fclc . •; h x lii0;^3 « .'hou tr-satin-.^ it «s a 
busiaeas ef this sort t nds to jrgcl'rie the social senoe -^^hlch 
oou.aa fro- sharing in an activity of cosroorA coneersi ijaa valua, 
the affoirt at iaolatsd in.ts>ll3ctual learning contr'd<Jiets ita 
own alsn. ./e -aay sacure a':/t or activity and soisory excitation 
by keeping an individual by hi ass If , bat W9 oaanot thereb,,- 
i;8t M;e tc undapstani th-j 'rieaain^a; arhich thi:'i:s mv3 in the 
life cf which he is a lart* fa iaay ascure tsd-mical Si^eial- 
ised ability in algtsbra, latin* or botany, aut not the kind 
i;f intelligence v.hich directs ability to useful ends. Cnly 
by erx^ging in a joint activity, v^ere oao jpersoa'a use of 
asaterial and tools is coriscicjsly referred to tho uso ether 
rers -ns ax^ siaiiirig of their cajacities and appliances, is a 
social diraetion of dlspositica attained,''-* 

(3) "A -erson siay beccTie expert in technical vhilosoiiy, xhilology, 

or mathematlaa or eagias^ring or fiaanelertflg, and bo iiiort 
and 111-advlred la his action and jud.^sent <Aitside cf his 
apociality. If, hosnjTer, HIb concerr\ '<?ith these technical 
9ubje:.rt ,r;!att3r3 has b-ea conxieota-l with hujsan. uctivitiea having 
social breadth, the ran^ cf active respoases called iiito 
play end flexibly integr^ited is rraish wider. IsolutioE of 
subject r.att^r fro-, a sceial o oatext is the eh iel' o bntntction 
i:: current pruct5-;e tc aecji.x'in^: a s0::eroil trai-i-iufc- of ';iud, 
Literat;re, art, rolli^on, v/hcti thus diaaociate-i, jjre just 
as aurrotsriiiic as the teoi'.nIeal thlMS :?hic}: the professional 
upholders cf garxoral education stroauotialy oppose.''* 

(4) 'Too fre:iueiitly aind is set .^ver the aorld of thlri-s ztA fuota 

to be 5asovm; it is i^;-;arded as so lethiric; exist vng in isolatioji, 
»lth mental states and apsrations that exist independently. 
Eno>rled«^ is tl en reg".rded as an external apjlicatioa of juroly 
'T'er'tal existeui--©s to the t}3lsgi: to ba laiovm, or els'? ar. a 
result of the ispressions which t-iis »itside subject .-sait-^r 
sjalce:- oa the -;ir!d, or as a co-;bination of tha two, 3ub j >ot 
satter is then regiirdod as soaethlns ec^plete in itself; it Is 
just soaiethiii ■, to be learned or loicsfn, either by the volun- 
tary application of ^iind to it or through the i-npre'siona it 
?sake3 on lind. Tha fa-,^t3 of interest show that th3:=e concep- 
tioaa are .'^thical, "lad appears in exj«>rience as ability to 
re5:-;on'! tc present stimuli ca tho basis cf antlcipaticn of 
future possible c ^sequences tluit are to take place. The 
th i :xg3 , the Si,!bjnct -ititter ^rnc;'/n^ ccnc'l:;t cf w'lato'/ar is recog- 
nized a"s having a bearing upon the aatlclrutel ccAirae of evants , 
•"h3t'^;3r aasiatin .r rfit r r^ft^^ It ."'^ 

(5) "The counterpart of tho inol^j 'tiori" "of vi la d fro, uctlvitia:.; 

deullas': vrith obi -ctg to --iccoi-pllsh en d s Is isolution or the 
subject :TQtter to oa learned. In the traditiosia," sbhai^ius of 

^ Ibid ., ip. 46-47. {Underlining ^ain«) 
^IbJd., 1. 78-79. (naderlinin,? aine) 

^Ibid., p;. J53-J 54-. (Underlining -nine) 


education, subject fnattsr means so rmeh aaterial to be studied. 
Various branches of st -diy reprpiasnt ao njaiiy independeat bran— 
Cher;, aach hr^Ting its parlnolples of arrange;Dent oomplote 
wlthlPt itsslf .. .I'invJn.^ a r^vady-r.-vide exlstoaori ou their cmn 
aocouat, thslr rslation to mind 13 arhausted in vi'bat th«y 
famish it to acq'jire. This idea correR--C!vii; to t'le eon-yea- 
tSonal v/paetice in whicli ths prcgraai of school work, for tiie 
day, Bonth, and saocesaive yaars, cotislstR of ♦studios* all 
aarkod off f ro -■ on© aaothor, and each suprossd to be co^iplete 
by itself— for sducationaT TjjsrroGSfJ at ley t.*^ 
(6) '^.iBraoas whose interests biva been eni-:srited and Intelligence 

trj'-ie-i \)y deallivq sflth tniri<vs snd facts 1n .*30ti-9 occu^j^tions 
aavin^j a purpose (v;U9tis>r in play or wcjrk) will bs those ?(iost 
llksly to j>scsipo th« altgrnatlves of an aoad» •.'.o and aloof 
kno^yladge aud a hard, napfcw, and :>8rely ♦ia::setical' j-i-uctice. 
T o c-Dga nl ^e eiueaticn so t'r! at n atural acti" ^e te n ionela-^ shall 
be fully enliataJ in doin? so-ieta-n:-- w'\il3 sea ri.;- to it t'lat 
tha doing; raq ui re n o b^o rvp t joii,^ _t ho ao :;■ i isi t i on of Inf o r at i_t-n , 
and th e uaa of a cc/n j_t riiCx; _ iY9 ijag l aatl c g^, is j/oat most neada 
to__&-3 _dons^ to^ i or wo sf>c;al cojid ltlonu . To oscillata bt3tv;89n 
drill 9-Karcis'e.= that str v* to attain afficiencr/ in cut^/ard 
doing witbdit the i*''.e of iritalli;?0nca, and an acctisiulatloT; of 
kBcarladge t;5at is auprosad to b<5 an ultimate end in itself, 
•j'ean's t^t edioatjon aceapta t"na present social Cfjj^j-litlona 
aa final, and tharaby takas upon itaelf tiia responsibility 
for pori-etuatlnia: t'aara. '-- reor^nlstition of adueatiou so that 
learning takes plaae in a nneotlon witij tli© iatelli^nt carry^ 
ing forward, of tPirposeful activitisf? is a sloi=? v/ork. It asm 
only be aeeogsjliatfeed pieces eal, a atap at a tir«. But this 
Is not a raesc© 'or nciinally accepting one ©dic-itlonal philo- 
sophy and acttofspiodating '^raaives in practice to another, it 
is a ehall?»ris-^ to Lindertska the task of raorsaaisatlori. cour- 
ageoasly and to keep at 5t psrsi atantly.**" 

These sir state v-aat -> , typical of .C-eT/ey'a inciii^tioji to an 

ail-co:ijrehen6Jve intogratad curriculum, point tc the'eithar-or"* 

standpoint to which he thinks that th?» Tro^rssei vista'* are coryjsittad.*^ 

He is disposed to think that either ??a iretair. the :3BthwJ of sejarate 

Inatruction whic^b has no dlaoipllTiary aiTact, cr ire adopt a aaw type 

of pro5s:rani in which Is pr^4uced a general discipliaa of the siad. IJe 

adalts of no alddle g^round. It see/na that he j^ys no head to the 

affaet of separate sttu'jies even a'hen they are iatsilif^utly han.ilod 

Ibid ., pp. 157-158. (Uaderliainij aiae) 
Ibia. , pp. lC0-16i. (Undarlinlng mine) 

v^e "'yjerieace a;id Ildncation 


by tho teacher. Dewey straanes most tbs enrleh-taont of ffl^ania^ or the 
l©ading-on of sxTsriance, but hs Is inolir-ed to believe t'lat the 
understandiin;; of general X'l'i^eiTlea for tho g .idaTice of comJuct and 
tha isprovesjent of intellectual ability oan only be affected thrcragh 
purpijsive, eoujolut activity, uliis obsesaiun ia pirtly "ue to his 
Qvotreion to eosTsntlonal ftifssalis^s, partly to his © -.rhaais apou social 
interacticn, and partly to hta fenr -ur for the social fdeal. *»9v?;r- 
thelese, thjsradicai view ?3ust be taken with a grain of salt, -e 
says that "it has yst to fee prored that learning: o curs scst ado- 
<iaately ahan it is nsado a ssyaratn conscious biasiaesn": hosovar, it 
bas yet to be proTsd tha' Idamin;? cccurs siost adeiiijately when it !.e 
!«ade an incident in like-like of^joint aetivitias, ^liethsr a tech- 
alciais or specialist la "!«ept and ill-advised in his action and 
lud^etBSiit outside of lils si>ecialty" depends on ho3; wide he reads, 
how eojnpreheasively ha iatsgratea the facts of different fields, and 
how dlligeatly he applies hl-isolf to the tusJc of fassiag jud^sents 
on social events throu^^h discussion, and to the utilization of what 
ha has loart^d. It ia not neeess.T;ry that he has to g© through evert, 
IMirposive, co-^jcdnt activity before be can secure a ge.ier»il training 
of "ilnd. It Is true that lo subject of study has in itself a specific 
function of ^tjoral trainia??, b^it no leas is it true that no life-like 
c nj int activity can olal an erclus ve riiglit of developina; ; ocial 
d \ spos i t i on . -t bottof-:^ th^ n athcA o f giiidance on t he inrt of the 
teacher det whether th era shall be any general t raining . 

Theoretically axeaiEing, Dewey h;is tc hold to the ■^eithar-or" 
standpoint. The noi^nt ho adopts th^> ■nethc-d of sepai'ato study, that 
moment he ylelle tc dunlism, which ha refutes. kiij. and inforiation 
are "intellect, .'al ni-idle'-an".-'- They are to be fitted into a pluiuied 

Jk > u.. ^^^ J 


saries of units of work. And when thoy are detactiOa fro.r. conjoint 
activity, and taken aa se^'aratd study for intensive drill, the 
learninj? situation returns to f at of a aind set over a -ainst sorae- 
thing to b<3 loitxvn. 

In a recent report c& tils ''©valuation of new practices in 
educaticm'' by an ''Inforj^l OOKaittee" appointed by the Irogrssoive 
Education -.^soclatlon, is noted that sjecial instruct io^i in the funda- 
•ftentals is still (jiven ai^rt froa ''aetivities" by jsany progressive 
aehools, an'^ tiat "the proportion of tlMO s^ent in this kind of spec- 
ial zed instruction is 25 par osnt, wMle for tha convs/itional schools 
the fSg'ire would be nearer ?0 percent." The purpose of special in- 
struction In 39!;;arat0 3u- jocts is "tc k^ep chllaren up tc or above 
tUc tandard in conventional achocla*'." TMs is to say that isaay of 
the IrogressLve schools have taken ths Interf.ediate ; s^sition, yisldia^ 
a bit to duallBn-. T>-ls, in f^nt ,flsTiate3 frcr". Dewey's suggestlcci of 
an activity pirc:^ra!S in wiiieli no cu'riproaiae is to be laade to dualism. 

How shall -nts ^t out of the "eit'oer-cr"' position? A way 
cf the difficulty is to plan a scale of ectivities st.srting witn the 
csrert and life-liks in the Icwar grades and proeeediuif to the implicit, 
intellectual actl-ities in the higher grades with the constant em- 
phasis upon the purpose of each vhise of activity, upon the continuity 
betv.eon the preceding and the auccsedin^j; phase, upon the intorrela- 
tionship among various types erf activity, and upon the developraent of 
aesirable rnsntal dispositions in tho course of activities. If the 

Irotjre.'.sive Sd-aoation Issoeiation, ::eiw .^^thsda vs. Old in -^yterican 
'Education (.\n Ajjalysia and Jliittaaery of ::ncont Ca!u«rative tudies). 
"ovf York: Bureau of Tubli cations. Teachers College, Coluiiibia 
university, 1941. pp. 6-7. 
Ibid., p. 7, 


purp se of learning particular items is kept in vlaw, the learning 
*it^lation of a ":iBd s©t over agairist certain subject ratter would 
cham^ t that of a p'irposlve act in which intellectual iaterast is 
enlisted and Into which the planned subjoot jaatter enters as an in- 
dlspejisable factor. If the subjaet ?natt':>r la to be planned jn the 
light of the develop/jont cf putils* e-xp^rlence, and with due raccg- 
nltiOG of the Tariability of interest and osipacity of each jtipil, 
the orjKini-zation of subject-natter would not be a rigid text-book 
fcr-r. but a prgreasivsly graded flexible plan. If suojoct;- are inte- 
grated aceordini^ to their nature, and ai^ .-'ell coordinated even when 
they are 'rade aeyavate, the whole ourpieulu;n is still a unity vithia 
different bj^nohe- of expsrlence. "Moh type of actl^-ity or ©aoh sub- 
ject is capable of engendsrlnc generalized habits or Ideals lirhen the 
pupils are lea to soe t)ieir ?/orth in social living- and are g-aided to 
put thos into practice ;n dally eetivltiris. If De^ey admits that 
the teacher* 3 better -^ethcd of guidance rather than conjoint activity 
is the ^.oj't 4>?*ectlve neans of escaping; a fall Into the rjt of dualissa, 
separate instruction in the upp^r grades would not bs neeea warily a 
type cf du-ilism. 

If the criterion of activity prograa is not b-fsed on overt- 
nees and llfellkeneso, syste-iat^e study of fundamentals and .^raaed 
reading would have a pronlnent ilQce in the curr^culuiB. In fact, 
l^ewey hi -self hints at this gjraded course of activities vrhen he 
says: - 

'',lth resi^ct to chronological gr?:«th, a scule or Sjiectrus exists. 
Speaklas ^ne rally, the youa^!;er the child, the greater the role 


of evert, a- distinct tro^ Ijsplicit, activity. Upon tlie whole 
the infant yf^mn awake Is dot a;- scrriisthlruj v;ith sense -Tgens and 
muscular equipasnt. ilth Increasing 'maturity, tho iratio of 
I'pliclt activity 'ncreasss. But ther^ are also gre'it irt'Sfvldaal 
differences. In adult life, ^m all coco^nize the diatiactton 
bet^'9e;T tho executive and t.i^ r-qairiti^ aa artistic tyves. Ver- 
Kous of the first sort think for the aake cf doiu>:; those of the 
aecond tyi« act (in the B»nse of dcir.g ar.d taking) chl-jfly for the 
sake of d^rectiDfi: asd erirlchlag ©sotional and intellectual atpeiv 
:ence. :^ffersnc©s 3hr>w the :eelvo?t early in life. :'-or^ cnillcea 
are distracted and confused b tue a;:;cunt of doirsg t at is a 
sti/»iulus to others, shJle th© latter are benii;;)'oa3 by eor^aitiais that 
ai^ aiited to tho for:»r»'*^ 

T^an in his r.'esiocracy aad Education, ixi w^hieh he places high value cai 

l>erceptibl9 physical ectlvity without giving particular attention to 

the systosatic davaloj.'aieat of intelleetxial activities, he polata out 

the thrae ;:5e;(eral ata.rsa in tho gr«»t.'': of suliject-Eatter in tliti sx- 

j>9ri9noe of tho learner, vl^.,"" (1) "kno;«led^ of acquair-.tanee" 

ciiapqe tori zed by ways of overt dolnf^; (2) "knc^i ledge about'' c'nar^ 

actorlzed oy iaforaation through r-sadli^ and forscnul oo;.wHinioation; 

and (3) "rationalized l:r.r,':7ledfl;e" characterized by log;ical orgaaiaation 

and rational In all sta.-'ss, 7/hat ia loiown is a iwarxS to 

define and solve future c>iaileaǤin3 situations; what is Issamed ia 

eval'jatod in its use. 

If the point of esiihasis on use aad probleiss-solving: does 

aot overshadow the sigaif ioanoe of information in learning, vicsricas 

experience would still have a pro-sineat plsice in the curriculuxa. As 

mm have repoatedly stated, Devmy* n thecry of kacs.'-ladge based >ii the 

experi;-'«ntal rjethxl of science ia prlrarily to repudiate traditional 

ind'jlgenoe in the independent activity of the isiind aad the belief in 

the existerico of any tnaascendental reals, -^s takes experience as a 

CoKiaent on 4cltivity :;?or«!5ent, ojs. elt ., p. 82. 

Deaocraoy and Sduofitlon, p. 215ff. 

.:'e here borrow Jane^i's two fa^nlliar phrases to 5er.cribQ sore 
fittingly iyv0vy*a idea. 


course of intaracttng ©vants, mind aa the ^luality of reflectit* 
action, thinking as the r-sothod of svolving a eettlsrl, asaured ^huBo 
of ©TCferlenoe , kncsledge as the terssimis oi' o^ort ija^uiiy— all thes* 
conceptions reflect his attack ea the past claosioal J.3lll030p^.i8s, 
In educ^stlon, ho substitutes probli^ns-solviag aetivitlss for fursal 
mibjeots and ideatifies fraedoa witb independent thinkin^j or iatel- 
iectual cricriaality. The relegation of skill and inforraaticai to a 
secondary place is iaerltable b -cause t'lelr acctijlsition Jias b5»«a re- 
garded ias the ain of ©ducat ioa. 1o»ever» to inake thee -iS faeans rather 
than an end is one thinj-t; to deny a, syste.^atie learalag of tbea is 
another tUin^. A aystesjatic stu?5y of skill and Infon-^tion, not only 
for the e-er^jeaoy of solving some :LT--»diate prublasiittie situation, 
but fop the preparation of solvin t future one?, juatifiss separate 
instruction, crobleia-ac/lvin-;- for the training of thiakin-g would 
Btill fa I t>i8 point uf e.u^iiaBls In fcVie siathod of teachisg and learning; 
hceevor, ii^robleviS are not neoes-surily life-like and iaaediate, .ar- 
tioularly in the uij^r firauei-'i, before they have a ger^erali sei ef- 
fect uron the apila. -s Uus oyen juat 'Quoted, ''selecticri arjid 
arrange.r,ent have to occur Qnya&y unlf?ss everything ia carried oo 
at haphassard according to the caprice or pressure of the moasent." 

1*18 suggestion of getting cut of the "either-: r" poeitloo 
is not opposed to Dewey* s general theory of loiewledge. '^i9 adhere to 

Dewey, op. clt . , ;. o'62. 


35rd Yearbook uf the N. 3. 3. S.> Part II. 


the view that pupils* imtivo teaddtvcles and experienca are tlia 
point of (Jeparturs of learaiag; we observe tha prlnelpla t'iat 
"ths functloa of knoiTledge is to tasks ous osperieitc® freely 
availiiblo in other OTCjerlaaees'*; a« Jraep up the ideal of cul- 
tlvatln.;- g aeral auGial a titufies and disposititaia; and ae hold 
to tho byword, viz., learning by dola.?, liut viewing fro;.-» the 
pulnt of yysts-Tatle grf^wth, t»9 de net stick to that typa of 
eonjoiat activity ^-hich la wort, life-liho; aad fro . the 
polut of laying a broad foundation for future adjust ent, w® 
pin cur fait . to lnfi:-r<iation and sicill wbsa this typ^^s cf lear- 
ning is sell gaided hy th© teaehsr, Sipliasis on the learning 
of inf oraatiOK dcao not f^iaan tbat infor?^tiori is kncsifled.;^ to 
the learner, .va treat it as a means to knowin,^, a beliotr© 
t>iat tho ziothoa of eTp>ri- rental sciocee is the only isay to 
genuine kucjsleige » i^ut nn eTperS^aeiital theory of katasledf^o 
does not orclude the aciuieltica of iafornatiCQ, •- seieritist, 
in his problesj-JgrpotheseB-testiau? experi.rients, his to fall back 
upon his o»a wealth af oJtperlence* 


To rainforce the reference which he hvivj-n to bear on the linEediate 
solution of the problem, hie past acquicition of ixxt'orsatlon and etill 
helps him in co sr«ll desrce. 

The effect upon preecmt control of ©aqjorience of ■sshat one has 
learned depcais upon the degree of thorou^Jiness in one's Icamiuc. In- 
stranontality docs not stand in the way of the iaeal — knowledge for 
the ea'ice of kno-sledgo. It is only through Intonnive and thorough study 
of the present subject natter which is oontixnious with t\e child's 
experience that it can be of instruzif^atal valta© to the future. Food 
ill-di£::cc!ted, either beceuse the food Is ill-eelscted or because the 
individual has been too hurried to chew it well, has ill effects upon 
t^e constitution, food has rtutrltivc -valuo only if it is well dif^ected, 
'Ilhis rnay he taken as analo'xais to leainiin.^, L< araia.g riat&rial, even 
when it is selected and arrmiged with reference to the papil's interest 
and ezporience, requires also concentrated, erurtsined^ icteUlsent effort. 
It Piuct be taken as the iajaediate end of studs'- before it can be an 
effective aeans of controlliUG the future. The fault of the conventional 
school is its mere esaphaeie up=on notlvating the learner's effort with- 
out regard to the sigiaificunce of his motor activities and e^^jerience. 
It calls for ^lie chewing of ^at is presented to the neglect of the 
nature of the food, the mental pabulxia, and of its effect up-on the 
individual, The leamiag result is like ill diGestion, However, 
the nere attention to the selection of good food that is agreeable to 
the child ^thout attention to his act of chewing will be liJccwlee un- 
wholesome to health. 


Dew^'»8 attack on the vi&g of education as preparation for 
life docs not gi-avitate toward the theory of laissez-fatre in the eer^se 
of indulging the desires of the pupil. His reiteration of the importance 
of full utilisation of the present capacities and experience of the 
child also teplles an all-out effort on the part of the child to master 
what he lesirns. If Dewey is not inclined to the vies? that only overt, 
life-like activity can provide opportunity for a sc-ne3rali2ed training, 
separate study of fundasontals, provided that it Is intsllicently 
handled hy the teacher, should still hold an important place In hie type 
of currieiiluia activity. 

The above justification of the separate study of fundEsnentals 

Kay bo more convincing if v/e appeal again to :'5ewe(i,-*e ou-n statenent. In 

his treatzsent of the relation of intrinsic and incttnnental valuer, he 

also sets forth the vies that studies are not racrely to be carried on 

for the sake of ttieir usefulnesD in life, but for their oisn sjake. They 

Hust be taken as on ev& in tliamsolvoB before they can be effectively 

turned to account, 

"It is as true of arithr.etlc aB it is of poetry that in sorae 
place and at sone time it ou-ht to be a good to bo appreciated 
on itc own account - just ac an enjoyable experience, in 
short. If it Ib iiot, then vrhen the tlr.e and place come for 
it to be used as a sieanB or instroraentality, it will be in 
just that rmch handicapped, lievor liavini* been realized or 
appreciated for itcelf , one will miss Eonething of its 
capacity as a resource for other ends. It equally follovrs 
that when we compare studies as to their valueG, that is, 
treat than as noans to sorcethlng beyond thenselvoe, tMt 
which coritrole their proper valuation Is found in the specific 
situation in ?/hich thoy are to be used. The ^ray to enable a 
student to arprehend the instruncntal value of arithmetic is 
not to lecture him uj^in the benefit it will be to hin in soiao 
resoote and uncertain future but to let him discover that 

success iii something he ic infeorscted in doing depends upon ability 
to use nunbor," 

Bnrlchnsiit of one's present experience ie interpreted in this statemont 
in temc of maxinun xsastery of what one learns. The laot two s-rmtences 
point out the iiaportance of the r.othod of guidance when special in- 
struction is given to pupils. 

To EUEi up, we find that Dewey*s experinental theory of knowledge 
does not, on the whole, go counter to the sepaiate study of fundanentels 
in the upper Grades. Bo's^ever, owing to his attack on conrontional 
fomalisR, and to his primary enphasis on social interaction, he is 
inclined to the view that overt life-like activity is fun^ianental to 
the understand inc of Taeonin^e, to the fomatlon of habits and dis- 
positions, social as well ar, Individual, and particularly to the dovclop- 
nent of the ability to think. In fact, his ozpcrineatal nothod serving 
the purpose of titiining thixskin;? and orsaaising v;hat the l^mcr has 
learned has no necoBsary connection with his conception of lifs^like 
activity. The latter servee only to notivate learning and facilitate 
direct transfer of ^7hat laas been learned to sinllar cut-of -school 
situations, Dut flexibility of habits and enrictecfnt of neanings which 
are two fui^anental factors in geneirilized trainin;^ rely rsorc on the 
aethod of the teacher than on lifcj-like situations. Separate study of 
fundanentals does not conmit ourselves to dualism or to the spectator 
theory of knov;ledse. Thorough and systematic study of then under 
Intelligent rjjidance is the surest laeans of better adjustment to 
future situations; v/hen it Is at the tin© of learning regarded as the 


L>ei nocracy and Education, p, SCI, 


Imediate end to be attained, it is to the learner Infomation, Hot 
until he appliec it Euccesefully to concrete situations, or changes 
his social outlook and intellectual dispositions consequent upon its 
acquiritlon, is it cedled knoi^ledee, Dewey*s assertion that "acquisition 
of knowledge depends upon response to t/hat is coEBnunicated" holds true. 


A recent criticlsa of T)^:ey*r> theory of hnov;le5ge and Ms 

activity progran is made tsy Breed," Lie accepts the stand]:elnt of the 

nes' realise, naintainiag that kno^Jledge is a relatlcsml structure wtich 
exists prior to and inaojrenaGnt of b--lns ioaosa. Kakinc^ use of this 
standpoint in the study of e<iacation, ho puts a preniun on conforaity 
as the neans of better ndjuot^.ont. Instead of stressiac the ahility 
to thinJc, he attaches isjportaace 1,c the fomation of habits and the 
acquisition of inforniatioa vrhicli has been established as facts. In- 
stead of stressing the interests of a child, he leans to'Kard author- 
itarian isnu Instead of supporting; the activity progran, ho sets high 
value on orgsinized subjoct-iaatter, 

Bb aecucos Dewey of subject ivisn, because the latter ignores 
the existence of a pro-existent world, exag^'orates the changing aspect 
of the \Borld, asserts knovfledge as a creation, instead of as a discovery, 


and flatters intelligence that it la creative. To hla, Dewey over- 

enphasizcs the problen-eolvinr:: procees for the purpose of iraprovini: the 

ability of thinking at the expense of transmitting social heritage. 

^roid ,, p, S21. 
2' ' ■ "" 
Dreed, Frederick S,, Education and the I^ov? Healisn, i:,Y, , Iiacnillan 

Co,, 1939, 
Ibid,, pp. rjS-39; pp. 117-llG, Chaps. Z &. 6 


Ibid . , Clxnps, 4 & 5 


Ind he thinks tihat Detvay in tua early pejirlod of hia tiiuu«<:Ut luid un> 

due e^nphudla on InJivldual fru<»dc«a and tUui Ue ucm aliii'ts hia (^<Auid 


to the argujiie»t for aociui conorol. 

A coKBiant oi* Biped's criticism ol' Dewey ua»y serve to bring 
out more dourly the luttei*'s yositioiv, and we ottn see in til's light 
of the ociiOopt of exfei'."u«(? viiufc ther^j tire poiuts in 'iroed'a 
criticism which are not Dewey's points of view. 

To say that Dewey commits hiroself to aubjoctivism should not 
mean that ho is a :.-!oden; -uno wijo aeniea the indepenjent existence of 
things iuidl 1^0 believes no cororaon world of sense, riotwithattinding 
that ''f^wey has t^ikeu a Ijsntian stand that the world is at ith 

the q.uftlitte8 of udnd or that exprrienoe is a ooinposite of sensation 

and thoup-Jit* he the r&ality of experianoe and its inherent 

organisation. .e liave tald that T)eway»s concept of experience is 

prisarfly an to refute the auppositlcas of a nouinsnal world 
SBid of the independent functioning of Reason. Ilia setting up of the 
bttimer of Antl-Intelleotu«iiaa is to follow in the footataj® of 
iiritish EznpiriciBBi. But he docs not inherit the analytic method of 
this school. He adopts llegsl*s Dialectic and fits it to the mi>thod 
of experiittental science. Mence the iBmedlate datum in the study of 
mlzid is not senaations or eleiaental stiuuli, but act or "sensori- 
motor coordination'; the innaedlate datum In the study of human rs- 
latlonshli>s is not tho Jtate or the Individual as auch, but ussoci- 
attons or interactions; and the Inmediate datum in the study of 


Ibid ., p. 67. 
^ee Chap. ^ Sec-fionl, 


knowledge is not any independent real, but experience or real-in- 
relation-to-the- individual, Ctontinuous reciprocal adjustnents betv/een 
the individual ana the xvorld account for the development of indi- 
viduality, the grovjth of scientific knowledge, and social progress. 
Dewey's practical mind prevents him from dvjelling upon the nature of 
things that are out of relation with man, though he admits that things 
exist before we experience theia. But things as such have no signifi- 
cance until they cok8 into contact with jnan; that is to say, they are 
significant v;hen they are made use of for the improvement of human 
relationships and the control of nature. In his appendix to "The 
Postulate of Inmediate aapiricism", he says,- 

".., There is nothing in the text that denies the existence 

of things temporally prior to human experiencing of them. 
Indeed, I should think it fairly obvious that we experience 
most things.,, as temporally prior to our experiencing of 
them. The import of the article is to the effect that V7e 
are not entitled to draw philosophic (as distinct from 
scientific) conclucions as to the cleaning of prior temporal 
existence till wc]^have ascertained what it is to experience 
a thing as past," 

And in his reply to V.oodbridge's "..'xperience and Dialectic", he says, - 

"I, too, conceive that things had in direct experience exist 
prior to beinfr; knovm. But I deny the identity of things had in 
direct experience with object of knowledge qua object of 
knov;ledge. Things that are had in experience exist prior to 
reflection and its eventuation in an object of knov/leage; 
but the latter, as such, is a deliberately effected re- 
arrangement or re-disposition, by means of overt-operations, 
of such antecedent existences. The difference betv;een 
Mr. Vioodbridge and Jiyself, as I see it, is not that he 
believes in the existence of things antece^Jent to kno-.7ledge 
and I do not; we differ in our beliefs as to what 

^Influence of ')arv"in on Philosophy and Other Zssays , p. 240, 


the character of the anteoedent exlstenoes with respect to 
knc/rfcledgo is, wTiilo 'Jx* Joodbrldge says »the object aTtista 
prior to Ita belnf? known,* T say that * the rhject* is the 
eventual product of reflection, the prior or antecedent 
existences beln- subject-matter for Icna^ledgo, not the 
objects of knowledfje at all,, ..The sciences of natural 
existence are not content to re'^ard anything as an object 
of knowledge — in its emphatic differential sense — except 
w- en the object in ijueat^on 's reached by experlraental 
methods. These exporlinental ithods involve overt operations -^ 
which re-dispose the exlstancea antecedently had In exi)erience.'* 

Breed's total mlsundersta ■lin - of ':ev,'ey*s point of view ia evident 

when his argument ae^ainst the denial of the independent existence of 

the world turns out to be logilcally an i^poratio eleachj , 

Dewey's "croationisi!" doos not mean to create something out 
of nothing or to make speculations that are iirrelevant to physical or 
social conditions. It toduns, on the one hand, that we do not accept 
anything as knowledge by hearsay or by relying upcm authority until 
we have actually tested It and found it true to Its original claim; 
and, on the other, that every exlstin,*:; phase of life can be improved 
throu.-^h hinDBn effort. Tn education, Dewey, therefore, lays emphasis 
on the developTOnt of reflective thinkino; to release the growing 
child fron the ^^rlp of trad'^^tion aa the standard of triith, la tries 
to relate the acquisition of infor-nation and skill with the on 'Olng 
axper'enee of the child so that what is learned, thou*h it ia a 
eonaJKmplace to the rriaiured adult, ie still, on the part of the c'^lld, 
a oreatloa as a result of his f^rappling with the probl^-iatle 
The child's oivn findln^ of the rolotionships of thin'^s ia a genuine 
onrlch-iont of his experience. 

'>8 we have said, Dewey is primarily coucemod with gradual and 

"In Reply to Some Criticisms", Journal of Philosophy , Vol. 27, 

No. 10, ('fey 8, 1930), p. 273 (Italics original) 

Breed, op. cit . , pp. 99-100. 


continuoua re'2<?JuntB9nt» of hiixan ralatlonshlpa. His laisoolvlni;, rather 
than aolviiic:, the persistent prcblejra cf philosophy is entirely One to 
hla practlcal-mSi>i3pdno98. His prospective etandpoint of unceaaingi; efforta 
to make h\xswn pro<prosB dooe not iier^niX him to ocntorm. with the ptiSt and 
to rer?iain satisfied with the gtatv^? ciuo ; neither dees It lead hln to a 
world view v;hlch raoognlKOS t'ns* ppir£?Iste!?t fimctioning of an or^^'or-^'l 
oosinos indepordent of be in.: ioiOATi. Dev^ey's world Is t!^at stif;o of 
hvuoan evolution which is ovolved frcmi a precedins^ stage and is aorging 
into a succeedlnf^ one through reclprooQl adjustment between .;- ,. ^^■.- da 
eavironinent . He does not have to yield to the conteatlon that knavledge 
is but Q disclosure of an ordered universe, so long as «rhat la knosnx 
improves the ccn''M-loa v^iich man is in. Ilenoe his dlstinctiOTi botv/een 
perceptual exporlenc© and object of knowled'?;®, and his eapiiaais on the 
oortlnuity of th-^ee t'^o phases of 9Xi:erienoe. Improveraent is brought 
about by exparlnsntal ^.^tl od. Tn Dewey ♦s sense, experimental method 
is intelllgenee or thinking. The latter la an opor-ative i'unctlon. 
There is no difference bet'veen his arialysia of reflective thought and 
the general prooedure of oTj.«rl';«ntal research. "Creative intellitijeaco'* 
is noK indepenient of the world; it ;jrlses from the needs or perplexities 
of the altuutlon an^ resjlts In an 1 nproved pliase of expai'l'snce . 

llie educational impliouticns of Oewey'a theory of knowledge 
ars by no means, aa Breed thinks, the indulgence of a child* a desires 
and the disregard of ov::X(nlzed iaio»ledge and akillful hiabits. Dewey's 

;«e ^eef/gn 1^ of this Chap* 

theory Inpllee that:- (1) Qcquinltion of lcrK)v;l a tenporal ja-oceoB 
which Involves the learner's actual rrappllnfr. v/l h the pcrplexln<5 
situation and which rosultc in onrichlnf: the loorncr's e:q>erlenoe; 
(2) infonnatlon and BklH nuot be learned relative to their infltruncntal 
vnluo la Incroaoinc the pm^or to direct life activities j (Z) kDowledge 
lo not CO rauch a form of orcanlzod ftubjoot-nattor as a po^.-or exhibited 
in the Intolllr'ent control of life activltiee; (4) the authority of 
truth ic not traditional beliefs and cuotons but the Individual's 
orinlnolity of attitude displayed In the tostinc of ideas. 

Indulgence of a child's dosiree is quite foreign to Dewey's 
point of view, v/hlch vt have nentloned In the foreGOlu;j section. Hie 
indifference to organized knorleugc aoos not mean that he prefers 
fragnentary leamincsj he Is indifferent to that tj^pe of orcanizod 
knowledge i«hlch docs not fit into the child's exi^jerienoe. lireed'e 
criticlsn of hlR recent shift of enpheeis from that of Individual 
freedom to that of social control le also not true of Uewey's ponition. 
He has been consistent in his enunciation of the coclal (-rcmth of nlnd. 
It is just because of his Insistence on conjoint activity, which alms 
at the cooperative llvln'^ of Inulvlduals, that the systenatic learning 
of fundanentalo boconos difficult. In the nejct chapter, we shall see 
tJiat his psj'cholory and philosophy are the support of his denocratic 
ideal, and tlmt his theory of education lo an attempt at roconcillne; 
the antinomy of freedom and authority, 

FSx)m o\ir point of view, Dewey's difficulty in devising a way 
for the syntenatlc lcBmln,~ of fundamentals In his activity procTon is 
not, as Dreed thinks, due to hie mibjectivicn v;hlch is exiiroGSive of 
hie theory of knovrlodee. It is rath. or, as we have said, due to his over- 


«B.phaDiD upon tlio oocial aepect of orporienoe, Llfo-like, conjoint 
activity, «rhen it lo held as tho only oLannel of achool loamiiust is 
liarcily compatible with cyoteoKitlo learning not to eay with a good 
H»thod of conerallzcd discipline. 



Vie now come to Dewey's concept of e:qperlence in its relation 

to the social ideal of education. In the form of a question, this 
topic is: For v:hat are v;e educated? V.'e made a remaiic in chapter 
three that Dewey's concept of growth implies the ideal of donocracy. 
When democracy means a node of associated living in v;hich the free 
sharing of one another's experience and the intelligent amelioration 
of common interests are the outstandinc features, it is only a vari- 
ant of growth. There is no incompatibility betvjoen his assertion 
that growth is itself an end of education nnd his conviction that the 
social ideal, democracy, ic the basis of evaluating education, 

Dev/ey's system of thought is democratically oriented, Democracy 
is an absolute point of reference upon wliich are baaed his philosophy, 
psychology, and education, lie maintains that a theory is conditioned 
by the contemporaneous social conditions, 

Dewey's presentation of a social interpretation of philosophy was 
first made in 1897 when he addressed the Philosophic Club of the 
University of Michigan on the topic, "The Significance of the Problem 
of Knowledge" . in this speech, he asserts that philosophy takes its 
rise in the social conflicts of the day and that its purijose is to 
guide conduct, Ee points out that the theory of knov/lodge became a 
dominant problem v.-hen after a long historic period of authoritative 
indoctrination in the Middle Ages, individuality came to the fore in 

^Influence of Dtrnvin on Philosophy and Other Essays , pp. 271- 
304. Gee also preceding chapter 2,aod§3, 


the matter of attaining truth. Instead of follov.'lng any external 
authority, the individuQl had the pretensions to be the master of 
hlnself in search of truth, Modem philosophy in its study of the 
possibility of hnowledge, is a moans of supporting the individual's 
claim. The real solution of the problem lies, however, in the 
application of Icnovrledge to life situations. The efficacy of the 
experimental method is obvious. It Is knowledge validated in action 
rather than Irnowledge Justified in ideas that is the criterion of 

Dewey in the course of defending the unity of theory and prac- 
tice, intellect and action sets forth the viev? that ttierc have been 
two groat, historical, rhythmic mover.ento exemplifying their unity, 
Tlie first moveiient began in the Gocratic period -^/herein the familiar 
dictum "Know t^lyBelf" was primarily to re-evaluate old beliefs, and 
to discover a new way of life in the face of the changing and con- 
flicting conditions of Athens. Freedom of intelligence v.-as predom- 
inant. But the movement began to ebb vhen thinkers became a class 
by themselves and when inquiry became an end In Itself, separate from 
the guidance of conduct. In the Middle Ages, the practical character 
of thought was most eminently manifest but the freedom of thought vms 
sacrified. Christian theology and its allied moral theory were the 
guiding spirit of individual conduct. The second movement began . ith 
the Renaissance when the conception of the individual as the source 
of riehts prevailed. Scientific research was on its march tavard new 
discoveries, v.hlle philosophy v/as in support of the social demand that 
the individual was able "to discover and verify truth for himself, to 
direct his own conduct and become a decisive factor In the organization 



of life itself". Freedom of Intellisonoo was regained but the in- 
terept in tho ponsibUlty of Icna-rledce vine ptirely theoretical nt the 
exponce of the practical aopoct of ]:na?lodc:o. Dewey thinkc that v:ith 
the grcrirth of e:rpert^ontal soionco the nature and method of Irnavlodge 
is cbviciis. It is now the end of the rcoond Tiorenent and the becln- 
ninG of tho third novenent, vhich ic 'Slnilar to that of the ."^ocratic 
period, Thinlclns Is inntrunental in effeotinn inproveinont of laiman re- 

This social intorprotatlon of philosophy marks the benlnninG, in 
the dovolopncnt of Demcy^B thou^^^ht, of relating philosophy v;lth rociol 
conditions, and of anticipating hie prenent emphasis on the application 
of acientiflc method to tho study and inprovement Of htjnan relationship, 
Frocdan of intolligenoe is efficaclou£5 only yhen It attempts to etraicht- 
en out pooial perplexities and ^*jhen society proreotoe free interchange 
of oxperionoes . 

The close reletlorohip between theory and oocial order ''^ae made nore 
evident when De^vey, in <another opeech on "Psycl-olony and Philosophic 
Method" J delivered in 109?, areerted that "?}very science in its final 

Standpoint and workinc^ir controllf>d by conditions l^'-ing outside 

itrclf — conditions thet FUbnict in the prectical life of tho tine". 

As to psychology, he nald: "/m autocratic, en oristocratic, a deno- 
crotic society propound cnich different cEtinatcs of the -orth and place 
of individuality; they procure for tho individual as an individual such 
different sorts of crporionce; they sIk at rousing such different im- 
pulses and at organislnc then according to such different purpoces. 

^Ibid ,. pp. 207-20G, 

''Reprinted as '"Consoloucnose* ani lixperience", op, clt . , p, 242. 


that the psyclology arielng in each nunt show a different tonper". lie 
pointed out that the asoixmptlon of pBychologlcal eTperlonce as irrelevant 
to the exiatenco of truth, v.lth its correlate that psycl.olocy io dictinct 
fron philocophy in that the former studios the tranoitory, temporal pro- 
coGG of psychic life in the apprehension of truths, v;hile the latter stu- 
dies the eternal truths independent of huwan experience, — has its origin 
in nan's inadequate Icnowledge of the nothod of controlling natxire. This 
dualism reflects that type of nocial and political orcanization in v;hich 
the individual rclieo upon the authority of the state and the church. To 
Dewoy, a new psycholocy, \vhen it attempts to show the dependability of 
experience and the intrinsic nocial aspect of the individual's psycholoci- 
cal dcvelojjncnt , is "a concept of democracy". Undcrctandlng of the nature 
of the individual in the profrressive adjustment of himself to the vrorld and 
of the world to himself provides a practical basis for the realization of 

"The doctrine of the accidental, futile, transitory nienificance 
of the Individual's OTpcrience as compared v:ith eternal realitiec; 
the notion that at best the individual is simply realizing for and 
in himself v;hat already has fixed completeness in itself is con- 
cruous only v;ith a certain intellectual and political scheme and 
must modify itself as that shifts. When such re-arrantjenont cones, 
our estimate of the nature and ira^iortanoe of psycholocy v;ill mirror 
the chance, 

"^:hen man's corimnnd of the methods that control action vras pro- 
carious and distvirbod; \;hen the tools that subject the v/orld of 
things and forces to use and operation v/ore rare and clumsy, it v«is 
unavoidable that the individual should submit his perception and 
purpose blankly to the blank reality beyond. Under ouch circumstances, 
external authority must roicn; the belief that human experience in 
itself is approximate, not intrinsic, is inevitable. Under such cir- 
cumstances, reference to the individiial, to the subject, is a resort 
only for oxplaiuine error, illusion, and uncertainty. The necessity 
of external control and external redemption of cjrperionce reports 
itself in n lov; valuation Of the self, and of all the factors and phases 
of experience that sprinc from the relf. That the psycholocy of me- 
dievalism should appoeir only ac a portion of its thoolocy of sin and 

^IBid., p. 243. 


salvation io as obvlouo rin that tho psychology of the Greeks 
should bo a chapter of oocnolocy, 

"As acQinst all this, the asoGirtion ic venturod tliat psychology, 
supplying us vdth knowledge of the behaviour of o::perience ful- 
fils itself in individuals, since it adninisters itself throuch 
their instruiientality, the account of the course and j-othod of this 
achievenent is a sicnificant and indispensable affair,"^ 

In this paper, Denoy desicnates his psychology as "social psycl .olocy " , 
which means that the essence of an individual is his social interactions 
vdth the croup and that native tendencies are highly flexible, dependent 
for their re-adjustncnt and re-organization upon their inpacte on social 
institutions. Tho social nature of the individual is a conception which 
suits and confims his ideal of donocracy, 

Dewey*s assertion that psychology in its fomulation of human nature 
is politically cot, as he states that "psychology is a political science"" 
ic later {^iven nore emphasis in hie I^cnan Nature and Conduct, in v;hich he 
reiterates tho point that tho psychological dualism of habit and thouglit, 
mind and action and the assumption of stereotyped instinctive poT;ors are 
the intellectual sUiport of tho laissez-faire economy and tho acconpaoy- 
Ing profit system, and of conservatism in its naintenonco of traditional 
beliefs and customs, .And recently. In his Freedom and Culture, ho again 
states that "ideas put :"orth about tho makeup of liuman nature, ideas 
supposed to be tho results of psychological inquiry, have been .... only 
reflection of practical measures that different groups, classes, factions 
wished to see continued in existence or nc-.'ly adopted, go that v;hat passed 
as psychology was a branch of political doctrine" , In this woi^j, he rovieivs 
historically the instrumentality of psychology in its Justification of 
political and economic movements, and suggests a "new" psycliology that gives 

1 Ibid ., :p. 265-CG7. 

2 Ibid . , p. 247. 

3 lYeedom and Culture. How York: G.P, Putman^s Gona, lOSO. p. 29, 



noral support to denooracy. 

With tills basic concept in nind of the relationship between thcoiy 
and Gocial conditionc, Dowey cones to relate dualion, no natter in v;hat- 
evcr forn it takes, to the traditional claee distinctions, and asserts that 
it is only in his ideal of democratic order that his theory of Icnavledce 
as identified v;iththc method of cxperincntal science can be realized, lie 
applies llarx's ocononic detominisn to the study of the orinin of dunlisn 
and educational practices. Ills Denooracy and I-ducotion abounds with 
statements v/hich testify to this interesting point of enphacia. A society 
which is divided into the rich and poor, the ruling and the roled, the 
oppressor and the oppressed inevitably narks off the life experience of 
those who are free to enjoy intellectual pursuits fron that of those who 
have to live by their hands. And this type of distinction leads to the 
separation of laicp/ing from doing, theory from practice, nlnd fron the 
world of praotieal affairs. A premium is put upon rational knowledge; the 
craving for ultimate truth tliat is independent of this uorld is engendered. 
In education, vocational studies are set over against huraanistic studios, 
manual activities are cet over ngalnst intellectual activities. There 
are two different types of schools v.-hich ore adapted for poor and rich 
pupils, Puthorriore , a class society bars the free interaction among in- 
dividuals of different economic standing; sets limits to the sliarlng of 
intellectual, material, and aesthetic Interc&ts that are the connon 
cultural legacy of ran; cultivates the double standard of morality and 
undesirable nontal dlGixJsitions and habits; and, on the v.'hole, makes 
impossible the unliomp rod development of each Individual in the social 

Ibid, , CJuip, 5, 


TliG follov.icg edoctcd (Quotations are typical of Dewey's belief 
in economic detoiminiEm: 

"A number of theoriec of laio'.ving..,,inply cortain bar-lc dirl- 
cione, ct-porationG, or antithesis, technically crdled duclisns. 
The origin of these divicions v.o iiavc found iu the hard and fact 
vialls which maik off social groups and classes v/ithln a croup: 
like those betv-een rich and poor, nen and v/onen, noble and base- 
boim, ruler and ruled. These barriers mean absence of fluent and 
free intercourse, Tliis aboenoc is enuivaloat to the setting up of 
different typos of life-o-q?cricnce, each v/itli isolated subject-matter, 
aim, and standard of values, jJvery such coclal condition mist be 
fonnulated in a dualistic philosophy, if philosopliy is to be a 
sincere accoimt of experience.,,. In the first place, there is the 
opposition of empirical and hiriier rational Icna/inc. . . . ''socially, the 
distinction corrosixjnds to that of the intellicence used by the 
workine classes and that used by learned class remote fron concern 
vrlth the neons of living. Philosophically, the difference turns 
about the distinction of the particular and universal. J'^xpcrienoe 
is an a(i.'];rocate of nor© or loss isolated particulars, acquaintance 
with each of T.hioh must be Gojnratoly made, Rear.on deals vrith 
univorcals, v.'ith c^'^cral principles, v.-lth laws, r;}iich lie above the 
welter of concrete details,.,. Another antithesis,,., is between knadcdce 
as something external, or, as it Id often called, objective, and knonv- 
ing ac something purely internal, subjective, psychical,,,. The 
Eex)aration,.,.betv;eon subject-matter and method is the educational 
equivalent of thin dualism, •-'Ocially the distinction hap to do r/ith 
the gavt of life v.-hich is dependent upon authority and that vhcre indivi- 
duals are free to advance. -Vnothor dualism is tliat of activity and 
passivity in Jaaov.'inG. , , , Tl.e distinction between sense training; and 
object lessons and laboratory exercises, and inire ideas contained in 
books, ond appropriated ,,,, by some niracvilous output of nontal energy, 
is a fair expression iu education of this distinction, Socially, it 
reflects a division betv;ecn those 'ho ore controlled by direct eoncorn 
with things and those who are free to cultivate thenselvos."! 

"....rince democracy stands in principle for free intorchonce, for 
social continuity, it iiust ucvelop a theory of Icnoi.-ledgc \.hich see in 
kna.'lodge the method by which one experience is made available in 
civing direction and meaning to another."*^ 

" the aim of education is to enable individuals to continue 

their education — or that the object and revrard of learning is con- 
tinued capacity for ^roi-'th, Ucm thin idea can .ot be applied to all 
tte nnmbers of a society except whore intercourse of nan with mem Is 
mutual, and except v.-here there is adequate provision for the recon- 
struction Ox cociel habits and institutions by noons of wide stiriu- 
latlon arising from equitably distributed interests. And this neons 
a democratic society,"^ 

^Democracy and Education, pp, 308-390, 
" ibid , . p, 401, 
^Ibid,, p. 117. 

This economic interpretation of dualism does not alvrays appear 
in Dewey's other vorks. In his Erperlence and Nature and The Quest 
for Certainty , he only states that dualism is a reflection of the two 
basic qualities of life, stability and uncertainty, and is a rational 
justification of the supernatural beings v:hich religion deifies. In 
his Reconstruction in Philosophy , he mentions in the first chapter the 
psychological cause of dualism, i.e, man's emotional imar-ination, and 
the social function of philosophy to readjust the conflicting conditions 
of the day. But in the third chapter of the -rork, he tries to relate 
social organization with ancient cosmology. He thinks that a causal 
relationship exists between a society, particularly the feudal system, 
which is marked by the rule of the privileged class over the mass, and 
philosophy, vrhich asserts a hierarchical order of being in which the 
higher beings are superior to and govern the lov;er beings, "The class 

theory of the constitution of the v;orld corresponds point by point to 

this ordering of classes in a scale of dignity and pc/.-er." In making this 

comparison, De^rey clearly has misgivings that the analogy may be far-fetched. 

The well-worn motto, viz ., to give a dog a bad name and hajig him, is 
expressive of the art of criticism. In order to justify one's argument, 
the most convenient v/ay is to relate the evil instances one can gather 
of the case one attacks. The end justifies the means. Dewey's method 
of criticizing classical philosophy is no exception. In his positive 
formulation he does not take dualism as a necessary consequence of 
feudalism. But in his negative attack on classical philosopliy, he takes 
advantage of Marx's economic determinism. The forcible point is that 
the alleged evil of classical philosophy vjould become real v;hen it is in- 
dicted as the spokesman, so to speak, of the profit system, the drawbacks 

^See CJhap. £, 6ar.fl. 

^ Reconstruction in Philosophy , p. 63 


of Vv'hloh are obvious to us oil. 

In the field of education, a posnlblo OTH^lnnatlon for Dowoy's 
econonlc Interpretation of iunllcn nay be advanced. The conventional 
double- track oyoten of Inotruction rooted In olaso distinct lone end the 
sharp contrast betv;oon the 3R*b ana the claGolc otudies can hardly escape 
one's notice, nor con the unbalanced development resultlnc therefrom. 
This separation of learning fron doing, or doing fron thinking is the 
exact opposite of Dev';ey*B unity of learning and doing, A sweeping 
generalization that a dualistic philosophy is a reflection of class distinc- 
tion is then made, disregarding the fact that dualitm is one vjord but in- 
cludes many types of antithesis v.'hich may have no connection one v:lth an- 
other. Tiio distinction of rich and poor laay have no necessary connection 
v/ith a dualistic philosophy; and this class division may likev'/ise have 
no necoBsory connection with the educational distinction betv;een nanual 
training and intellectual learning, ?niat is called connection nay be 
sheer coincidence. The trouble arises Trhen this coincidence is rocorded 
as the rule and is used to formulate a single all-enbracing principle, 

Dewey's v;eokness is his Indiscrininate associatins of all types of 
dualisn as orr;anically related, /\nd he conmits hlnGelf to the point of 
view that philosophers v.'ho advocate dualism are defenders of the statvis quo 
and spokesmen of the capitalists. However, vro inay hazard a guess that llarx's 
econonlc dotonainism appearing In his Dcnocracy and Kducation nifiht be a 
tactical support of his strategical thesis that all theories are in some 
way connected with the social conditions of the time. Social conditions 
include, besides econonlc and political structuros, scientific knowledge, 
fine arts, morals, and other competing Idealogies, Dewey hiiosclf also 
entertains the view that all cultural factors interact with one another 
and determine the existence of any theory or social institution. lie 


belloTes not that any one of these factors is the oscluclvo causal 
foroe In proiucing the '.-AiDle coclal structure. One of his critlclsns 


Of Marxlsn. is also based upon this point. 

To reinforce the connection of iiis theory of Imowledee, of human 
natvire, and of education with dcnocracy, he ties up duolisn to the type 
of social order that has the charactoristic of class distinctions. The 
effoct of this econonic interpretation of dualism oaoily lends support 
to the idea that tho school should play a leading role in brincing 
about a deriocratic collectivist cocioty,'' and that the school should 
inculcate the ideas of class oonsciousaees and class strucslo f*or tho 
achicvoRont of a new social order. 

TTreedom and C^ilturo. p. 6f. 

^Ibid. » Chap, 4, 

"^Gounts, 3.5,. Dare the School Build q Kew Social Order? Now York: 
John Day Gonpany, 1932, 

*Zalmon Slesincer, i:duc:ition and Glass Struggle — A Gyitical 
Examination of the Libcitil .uucatorc Pi-0{iran for the racial r^oaonstruction , 
ITov^ Yori-: J.J. Little &, Ives Co., 1957. 

■„ i? 



Vifhat then la Dowoy's Ideal of danocracy? Tliis qucstloa Ib in order, 
QC we have Just said that hlc sycten of thought is drmocratically 
oriented. In his Democracy and Educctlpn, he ou<jCGctB two points for 
the Gsaessneat of tho toi-th of a society, viz., (1) ocuqI oppoi-tunity for 
each individual to share the interests of society so that social control 
ie made possible through rcciprocp.l respect for Individuality and coop- 
erative ooncom with tho interoKts of the conr-unity; arid (C) rnaxli^Mia free 
intoi'action v;it}i other social groups so that social pro^r^'ess is nade 
possible throu'Th continuous readjustment to changia: cojoditions. In the 
fom of questions, these two points are! "How numerous and varied are the 

interests 'vhich are consciously shored? How full and free is tho Intor- 


plaj' ".Ith other forms of association? V.'e can readily seo lior.-.' Dewey's concept 

of Interaction and continuity of experience persists in his social ideal 
of dcraocracy. Continuous r^rotrth ie the very essence of hie ideal, 

Thour-h he "oos against Plato's Idea that society is tho individual v.-rit 
large (since it results in the re-rlnontation of individuals into three 
narked-ol'f classes in accordance with the tripartite division of the soul), 
nevertheless, the essence of llato's dictum that the individual and society 
are orsanlcally related is retained. Asocial ideal cannot bo set up in dis- 
regard of the nature of nind. It is true that a socifal ideal, as Dewey 
hinsolf orplicitli' states, must grow out of trie needs of the contemporaneous 
social conditions , llut it is no loss tmo that his social Idoal ie patterned 
after hlf? ideal of an individual, ''ind in not predetoTmined ntructure having 

Democracy and I-iducntion , p, 100, 


Ibid,, p. 96, 


any fired laental eleniente, such as Inctinctc and pos?era; neither is 
cociety a fized orgGmization having rigid class diBtlnctionc, Kind 
is the aeanlnGful interaction of the Individual ^Kith his cnvl3?onj:i ut ; 
end so cociety ic a process of associations in ^Mch intelloctual, 
aesthetic, find jaaterial interests are nade ccsaiaon and chared, Indi- 
vidxial gro-^h has no final perfected end, similarly cocioty teio no 
final static ideal. The end is an endlosE end ^?liich is unending 

When the individual is taken as giTen« he is only considered in 
the aopect of hie plays ioloeical make-up which is a necessary condition 
for the developnent of intelligence or mind. The rhyDlolocical structure 
is, of course. Isolated and plven, but indlvidxiality ic to be created 
throut^h active participation of the organien in shared activities. In 
the saiae way, when society is taken as a structure, it is considered 
only fron the aspect of political and oconoraic organizations which are 
instruncntal to the promotion of contacts in loatters of Eaterial, cul- 
tural, and aesthetic interosts. To Dewey, an Individual is not "ecaie- 
thing to be catered to, scmiethins ^Those pleasures are to be nagnified 
and pocsesslons nniltiplied"; social arraac^ients are not neans for the 
fulfllnent of the Individual's self-interest, Ito the other extr^ne 
theoi-y that the .State is an end in itself to v.'lilch every social nesriber 
is subordinated, iJo^roy llkevrlse does not subscribe, ISational suprenacy 
and ogotieapi xindcr the slocan of political independence to enlist indi- 
vidual synpatlgr and unconditional obedience to the dictator is Khat he nets 
himself against. The state is only a neans for (1) the protection of the 
individual's rieM to particiixite with equal opportunity in social concerns. 

^Reconstruction in Philosophy, p, 194. 

and (2) the widening of the area of social interests for freer inter- 
action anong Individuals, Accordins to Oowey, the function of the state 
should be interpreted as "tlmt of the conductor of an orchestra, v.-lio 
sokes no suslc hlnself but i.ho haraonlzss the activities of thoso who in 
producing It are doing the thing IntrlnElcally v^orth while. The state.... 
consists Fiore and sore la its po^er to foster and coordirsite the activities 
of voluntaiy grouping". 

It seess that De7:ey regards the individual as the ultiaate source of 
authority to v?hich social organization is puboriinated. In one sense he Is; 
that is to say, the individual is interpreted as a cociel being rhose de- 
velojncnt Is not an affair of :;Gttin£ or possessing soKOthlng for the satis- 
faction of an GsciTied selfish notivo, but is n ecurse of actine-to-and-re- 
acted-upon intorconnunication in Tr;hich he contributes, according to trhat 
he Is capable of eontrib-utiug, to the liberation and enrichaent of other 
individuals* lives with the concoaitant srocrth of his o^Tn experience. 
But when the individual is isolated from the social process, he can no sore 
claim authority than can any lorjer anlnol. The prinary function of society 
Is to provide a laaxlEsu opportuiiity for the developcsBnt of each social 
nenber, and for his aetlv© participation in the adjustaont of social re- 
lations. In no way does the respect for individuality nean that each Indi- 
vidual has a right to do as he pleases or that each individual can enjoy 
freedom of action even v?hen ho does not interfere with others* frecdon. 
The authority of an individual Is his freedom of intelligence in the direc- 
tion of cnlistins his efforts to the bettement of the social organization, 
which, in turn, facilitates the full developnont of personality, .\uthority 

^ Ibld. . pp. 20G-204. 

2"Bfeed for a Philosophy of Education" (Originally published in the IJew 
Era, i.'ov. , 1934), collected in Sducation Today , p. £97, 

S^Denocracy and r:ducntlonal Adninistration" (Originally an address before 
the lintional 2ducation ,\scociatlon, ?eb, 22,1937), collected in Hducation 
Todny . P. 341. 

and froedOR are not Gatithctical; they free reconciled, in Dowsy^o thcoiy, 

lE coopcrGtivo acsociations, Ilie pri^uxry fact is a procceo of cocial intor- 

QCtion fron which an IndiYidrml derives his being and in which a society 

takes its rise. The organiz relation of individual and society my be 

better appreciated in the follo^ag quotations 

"fjoeiety ie the proces s of arcociatins in Guch ways that 
cxperienoeo, idoac, emotions, values are trancnittod and made cc«:5noc. 
7o thin active process, both the individual and the institutionally 
organized nay truly be said to be nubordinate. The individual is 
subordinate because ozcopt ir. and through coiuimiicaticn of crperionce 
from and to others, he rqeains dtanb, iaerely Gcnticnt, a brute anL^al, 
Cnlj'' in ascooiation rith fello^e doco he becono a consciouB centre of 
erperience, Orsanlsation, which is ?/hat traditional theory has gcnei^al- 
li' nocmt by the tern Society or State, is alco subordinate bocuuae it 
becomec otatio, rigid, institutionalized trhonover it is not eaaployed ^ 
to facilitate and enrich the contecte of iiunan beings ^ith one another." 

To analyse Dewey 's concept of dejrjocracy which is, in reality, his 

social moanitis of experience or nlnd, tre Ksa* single out four traits in this 

type of social living. First, dejaocracy provides and lailtipliec the coci- 

Kon interests v^hich individuals aM groups chare. All the cultural 

factors, such as industry, ccrnncrce, politics, educaticm., oimscaents, etc., 

are tiiiat Dewey calls coEraon interests. To share freely these interests is 

to prevent individual or group iK)nopay at the expense of the aajority's 

privilege, dorason interests, in Oewey»s sense, also nean attitudes, ideals, 

plans, etc., shared by all social lacsmbcrs. For instance, the betterment 

of a social ccmccm, the plan of embarlciiig on a social enterprise, the 

appeal to sone of the native tendencies of the individual for social pur- 

pOBOS, nay be nado chared concerius or interests for the purpose of iia- 

provlng the ways of sroup living. Iliis upbuilding of corarion attitudes and 

Reconstruction in Philosopby, p. £07, (Italic original). 


and the Glaring in social activities are tb© effectiye raethod of pool- 
ing together the cooperative effort of nen, ancl of producing genuine 
social control. Participation in coranon pursuits mokes clear the 
corsnon end-in-view, and, accordingly, provides opportunity for each 
rattiajer to contribute to the pursuit his laaxiiawjB effort and opportunity, 
too, for the voluntary control of his own Impulsive acts. This l^pe 
of control is sntiroly effected by the cornnon interest which one chares 
and is totally different fron coercion exerted hy external sources. This 
ideal of social control is ^?ell illustrated in the playing of a ^uie, 

"Children at recess or after school play ([^anec, fron tag and 
one-old-cat to baseball and football. 'Kio rp^Q involven rules, and 
those rules order their conduct. The irartes do not go on hat^iazardly 
or by a succession of inprovisations. witlKmt rules there is no 
gane. If dis::Tutes srise, there in an umpire to a-pcal to, or dis- 
cussion and a kind of arbitration cirs r.cans to a decision; others- 
wise the t^aa© Is broken up and cones to an end. There are certain 
fairly obvious controllint; features of nuch situations.,,. The first 
is that the iTjles are a part of tho gane. They are not outside of it. 
Ho rules, then no gaae; different rules, then a different s^iae. As 
long as the ^sjasie r;oes on v;ith a reasonable smoothness , the playears 
do not feel tliat they are sutsTiittintT to extenaal inposition tait 
that t2ioy are playing the gajae. In the secoiKl place an individual 
Easy at tiiies feel that a decision isn't fair and he nay even get 
aaeiy. But lie la not objecting to a iiile but to what he clains is 
a violation of it, to sosae one-sided and unfair action. In the 
third place, the rules, and hence the conduct of the gaiae, are fair- 
ly standardised. Tliere ore roconnizod v/i:^c of counting out, of 
selection of nides, es well as for positions to be taken, laovenente 
to be made, e'. c. These rules have the sanation of tx^dition nd 
precedent, Tliose playing the gane have seen, perhaj^, professional 
matches and they want to Ksulato their rldei^. An element that is 
conventional is pretty strong. tJcuallj a group of youngsters char^^e 
the rules by -v-hich they play only when the adult group to v.hich th^ 
look for Eodels liave themselves nade a chanse in the rules, while 
the change rsade bj' the elders is at least supposed to conduce to making 
the ssffiJ® c50Te skilful or niore interesting to spectators. Lossr, the 
general conGluGion....iB tliat control of individual actions is 
effected by tho r;holo situation in vhich individuals fire involved, in 
which they share and of T-liich thoy arc cooperative or interacting 
parts. For even in a conpetltive ,3000 there is a certain l:ind of par- 
ticipation, of sharing In a ecsanon ej^erienoc."! 

Sxpcrionce and riducation. pp. 55-57. 


In larccr organisations, particularly in the rtate, this spon- 
taneous social stii(iGnce, Y/'hlcJx relies upon intelliGont underetandins of 
social values, is an ideal of denocratic livii^, Dewey's intent is to 
abolish clasE distinctions and other social evils resulting frraa unequal 
opportunity asong individuals in the rharins of social interests. 

As petards free interaction anonj- rocial troupe, such as fasnilies, 
clans, nations, races, etc., De?jey»e purpose is not Tinlike that in free 
interaction among individuals Tfho are different in social positions, 
econcmdc statue, age, sex, intelligencs. Interest, etc. His aira is to 
secure a contimious rocial progress through tho sharing of culttiral 
Inventions or discoveries, the understnndin-S of diffennt social insti- 
tutions, end the ooncorted effort at building up consnon ideals for the 
proiaotion of hvunan walfare. Gonjaand of natural forces through the use of 
scientific raebhod has broken do^m phyrical isolation of one social gJXfUp 
frOEi another, but we still see everywhere laoral, intellectual, ecOnonic, 
or political barriers to the free interchange of life-experience. This 
acccunts for nisunder^tandicg, hatred, egotism, conservatism, class 
strussle Eiii'i vjorld war, D6v:ey*s chief joint of emphasis hcjre is the free 
contact anons nations, and hie ideal is the prcsiotion of "trans-national 
interests" and the abolition of absolute national soverFignity, liis 
faith in cosnopolitanissi chines in 'vvith hie ideal of a state as "the organ- 
isation of the public effected tliroush officials for the protection of 
the interests shared by its riSjabers", 

"Associations of iTiatheraaticians, chcanists, astronoacrs; 
business corporations, labor orcnniz-ations, churches arc trans- 
national because the interests thoy repreoont are '^-orld-wide. 
In each v.'ays as these, intemationalisjn is not an aspiration but a 

The I'ubliG and Its Problens , IIc-v; Yoife: Kanry libit and Coiapany, 

1S27, p. 3C. 


fact, not a sontinontol Ideal but n force. Yet thoco interests 
arc cut acroas and thrown out of -ear by tlie traditional 
doctrine of ©rclusiYe national soveroicnty. It is the vocue 
of this doctrine, or dogm, that presents the stronaest barrier 
to the effective formation of an international nind \?hich alone 
agreee v?lth tho noring forces of prcccnt-day labor, conncrce, 
scienee, ert and religiott."^ 

The second feature of a denocratic woy of living ie the eqiial 

opportunity provided for every inonber of society to develop fully 

hie capacities and to contribute his share In tho determimtion end re- 

Hzation of the ideals and policies of the cOBminity, 

"Dc^oci^y har nary rieanln^, bat if It has - noral neaninc, 
it Ir found In resolving that the suprenc tost of all political 
institutions and industrial arrancesjents shnll be the contribution 
they Eiake to the all-ajround grosrth of every rceober of society. "■2' 

Tind out h<m all the constituents of our existing culture are 
operating and then see to it that 'Whenever and vrherever needed 
they isay be modified in order tMt thsir T7orkinr,s cay reloacc and 
fulfil the possibilities a£ husian nature. "3 

GcKipuleory education is only the first step to put into effect this 
principle of denocrecy. IJ:ilvcrsal school education nay be so handled by 
the social institutione that intelligence is hxrapored by narros7ine the 
educational effect of utilitarian subjects, twisting r,ocial events for 
propaganda, and adhering to the ideal of strict obedience as the si^ial 
virtue of youth. This is why 3eat^ says "One effect of literacy under 
©listine conditions tor been to create in a large msxber of persons an 
a]>petite for tho mcHiEntary »thrills* caused by isapaets that stimilate 
nerve endings but hose connections with cerebral functions aire broken."^ 
Public School education only "creates a i>roblen for a dcnocraoy instead 
of providing a final solution". *^ De^;ey»s euecestion for the realization 

Ibid. "";, 1G6, Rtconshucjien in M'/ost>f>fi)' , f>.^oi' , 

*?reedon and Culture, pp. 125-126. 
*IMiL, p. 44. 
^Ibid. . p. 42. 


of this see<»td principle is that the school should be in itself a node 
Of deiaocratic living; anfl that social institutions nust be go arranged that 
continued education In adult life is made possible, Tho traditional id«i 
that education la the preparation for the Independence of adult>X)od is 
jnoet vehemently attacked by Dewey. Preparation assijnes an unchanf^lng 
character of society. This is a cauce of failure to readjust cocial 
institutions to hunan needs. The independence of adulthood is only re- 
lative to the issnaturity of childhood. To Der^, tho difference between 
a child and anadult is not "the difference between groKth and no growth, 
but between the nodes of c^xiwth appropriate to different conditions, t-.ith 
respect to the dcvelopfr.ect of powers devotecl to coping with specific and 
econonic probleiss •f/e jncj' s>ay the child chould be groTJing into t2anhood. With 

respect to sympathetic curiosity, unbiased responciT^, and openness of raind, 

we r>ay say that the adult should be f:3TO5.;ing ii; chlldlilceneso" , 

The function of political, econoEiic and other social institutions is to 

contribute to the unhar.pered £:ro7wth of f?Teiy social nenber. The following 

questions are the test of the i«3rth of particular social institutions in 

their educative effect. 

"Just what response does this social arranj^eaent , political 
or economic, evoke, and ?;hat c.feet does it have upon the .iisposition 
of those v.'ho engage in it? Does it release capacity? If so, hoa 
widely? taong a fetv, \?ith a corresponding depression in others, 
or in an extensive and equitable way? Is the cap' city vliich is 
set free also directed in soiae coher'rt ^^y, ro that it beoQlacs 
a pacer, or Its nanifestation epasnodic and capricious?.,.. Are 
nen's senses rendered noro delicately sensitive nnd appreciative, 
or are they blimted and dulled by this and that fom of social 
organization? Are their Binds trained so that the hands are nore 
deft and cum;ing7 Is curiosity awakened or blunted? What is its 
(luallty: is It nere esthetic, d^tellinr: on the fortn .?jjd surface 

^3Grocracy and Mucation, p. 59, 


of things or is it alGO an 5.ntclleGtual pearchlag into tliolr 
Tjeanins:? Such ouestionc sr, theBO.... become the E:tartiiic points 
of inqulrlon about every instittttion of tbo coEranity r.tio:: it 
ie recjO;::nizcd that individuality la not originally civen but is 
croatci tir-dsr the iafl'oeiice or asaociated 11*©,"^ 

He^nilas the in^ividual'^s share In the shapias of the policies of 

society, 3swsy pins his faith to the efficacy of cooperative intelligence. 
The 4epcaacBCO oaa a few giftoa iiidividualc to rogulate social concoriLis, 
to hia, nost dangerous; they ten4 to nonopolize particularly the econonic 
ana political privilesois, and to deprive bhe laass of free intolligenco. 
Democratic 20"'ronsioat is only the instrojfieutality in liberating the in- 
telligence of every member of society and promoting his contribution to 
the bettcjrriciit of the cooperative vray of livlsog, Intellectuel inequality 
by nature doep not le^d to the denial of equitable opportunity to express 
one»s Judgment in the improv«aGnt of conman concerns, To Dewey, "The very 
fact of natural and psyd-tola-ical inequality is all the raore reason for 
establishment by law of equality of opportunity, ninse cther/'ise the fonacr 


becoaes a means of oppreooion of the less gifted". i^ie value of one's 
judijient is decided not by prior status of aisy kind Tfhatevor, such as trealth, 
race, social position, etc,, but by its actual effect in the shaping of the 
final cooperative result renardiag the sane isnue. Its value is then de- 
cided by this cooi>erative contribution. Desoy's reason, advanced for this 
masG determination of their osra fate, ic Glnple but none the less cogent. 
He saj^ "The individuals of the submerged isass Eey not be very v.iso, 
Biit there is one thing they are wiser about than axiybody else can be, snd 
that is whore the shoec pinches, the tx^ouble Tihcy suffer fron". 

^Recor-struetion in Philosopliy . ^p, 197-198, (Italic orisinal) . 
"Democracy and 'Siucatlonal Adninistration", op,^ cit,, p, 340, 
^Ibld., p, 339. 


Sojlal tiiurest and strife arise -Nhen tlie needs and capacities of the 
mass are igucred and the laettod of coercicn ie stibstitutfacL for that of 
dieouBsion, The anbitious and gifted clalisi thoir ultinat© right in tho 
dictation of social policies and plans, and iissredit the aathod of die- 
cxtssion as tho v»;ay to attain truth. A i^np of unlntsllisenfc poople can- 
not roach a wise decision ai:> raore than a child csn be entrastsd ^'ith the 
soIutiOB of a Docial probleia. In addition to this distrust of Biediocrity, 
another argument against the disc\iS£sioB laethod is tSie analogy of a social 
jxroblea arlth a siatheeaaticai problem. I^th cantiot be dseidod by balance 
Of Intorects thi-ough dieciission, De7iey»8 answer is that social truths are 
different fj^on laatheEiaticai truths; and &ven ^rhen both are alike, the 
aethod of dlGcussion is still better than that of coercion v^han the latter 
brings about liatred, celfishnesa, esotiaa, and srar. 

"iihen Carlisle could briag his sift of satire into ploy in ridi- 
c\iling the notion that nen by talkinc to and at each other in on 
eesenbly liali oaa settle ivhat la tiTjo iu uocizl aiTfiirc ^ini' nore than 
they can settle v:hat ie tine in the rmltlplication table, he failed to 
see that if r.en hau been uciEtJ clubs to rain and kill one f..nothcr to 
decide ths product of 7 tiaes 7, there ^ould have been sound reasons 
for appeclins to disoncsion and persuasion even la the latter case. 
The fundamental reply is that social truths are so unlilce xsatheKatical 
tnJit^lCj that unanlinlty of liXiXfopti belief is posciblo in rccpoct to the 
fomer only when a dictator has the poser to tell others I'shat they nust 
believe — or profess thoy believe. Hie aijustr.ont of ii.to3rosts dccionds 
that diverse interests have a chance to articulate thcnisolvos."^ 

The thiri trait in a democrat Ic mode of living Is the developaent of a 

scientific attitude or of a habit of scientific thinking in the study and ir*- 

provoment of l^uman relations, Devjey*s ^'-Idely used phrase, "creative intclli- 

genco" Is in fact a coraprohensive way of denoting scientific or experincntal 

attitude. Its forantion depends upon the cultural constituents which are so 

adjusted as not to Btand in the isray of its development. 

Freed on and Culture, p. 12G. Dewey's Goae-e, jaeaas osoentially orlr,laality In tliinklns. 
In his Denooney_ enrl ^lucatlon . be analyses it Into "intellectual Initia- 
tive, indepondence in obserratlon, judicious inr-ntion, foresight of con- 
eeciusnccs, and in^^-nuity or adaptation to th.Ti",^ In his .^X-oeio a and 
qulturc . Ii3 seta forth sinllar traits of caiantifie thinking, mich aa 
"wlllincncsc to hold beliof it) saapence, aljility to doubt tntil e-rtdonce is 
obtained; ':^'illin.3neso to go Trhere evidence points instead of putting first 
a personally preferred conclusion; ability to hold ideas in eolution snd use 

thes as hypotheses to be tested irst«5ad of s do.Tsas to be asserted; ami..., 


cnj<?yr:ont of nsii' fields for inquiry ead of netr probless". He is inclined 

to thitik taat the extent of the develo:?3cat of tLis attitude mrxjsg the mass 
Bseasures the success of denocracy. I^esdoss of action, puch as sjiosn in the 
freodoa of speech, of press, of belief, of assesbly for discussion, is fruit- 
ful In -Utie aalntonance of deEocracj' only -si^xGn people have foraed the habit 
of sciCT'.tiflc tMnking. Deliberate pro|3a{:snda an controlled nor/ by political 
peirtios and capitalists, and even Fianlpulated by totalitarian ctr^tos to rtake 
xise of this dGixjcretic dlctinctive trait, freodon of action, to uiidsrElno 

democracy, can only be offnet by the Gclentlfic attitude. "Frcedor. of action 


Without freed capacity of thxvichfc behind It is only cliaoG," This he uttered 

In 1905 Y,'hcn he defined democracy ac "freclTig intelli^noo for independent 
eff<3ctiveness" end tried to place on the fscliool the biu'dcn of rospoasibility 
for cultivating Bclentlfic attitiide, 

?.'e lK:ve said ovor and over that Dewey's theory of tooc-ing l3 pnttemod 
after the scientific nsotbod of inquiry, and that he regards reflective thinking 

ipemocracy and Education , p, ii^, 
' ^I'YoedOEi and Culture, p. 145. 

^Ibid . . pp. 140-149, 

*"Deinocroey in Education" (Originally published In _'Eh e 1-lcniontaiy Scho ol 
Teacher. Dec, 1903), collected In Education Today , p. 62. 


as an educational aim. The vjord, Erperimentalism, used to designate his 
system of thinking is most fitting v:hen it expresses at once his frrm 
belief in the efficacy of scientific attitude and his Tie\7 that thinking 
is in action and that the v;orld- process is controllable, Expcrimentalism 
lays emphasis on the use of science to improve human relations, instead 
of restricting it to the control of natural forces. To him, science is 
an instrumentality for ffood or for evil. Gunpov/der may be used either to 
blast rocks from the quarry for the purpose of building better place of 
human abode, or to blast human lives into oblivion. Airplanes may be used 

either to annihilate physical space for closer human understanding of each 

other, or to cany bombs to annihilate humsm beings, Scientific method 

nay be incorporated into our attitudes and dispositions, and determine 

the course of social changes. Physical changes can be plajaned; and so can 

v;e employ the scientific method to plan social changes, 

"Science is an instrumentality, a method, a body of technique, 
labile it is an end for those inquiries who are engaged in its 
pursuit, in the large human sense it is a means, a tool. For what 
ends shall it be used? Shall it be employed primarily for private 
aggrandizement, leaving its larger social results to chance? Shall 
the scientific attitude be used to create new mental and moral 
attitudes, or shall it continued to be subordinated to service 
of desires, purposes and institutions \vhich ^vere formed before 
science came into existence? Can the attitudes which control the 
use of science be themselves so influenced by scientific technique 
that they will harmonize vrith its spirit?"^ 

Besides the prevalence of the scientific attitude, other moral habits 
and dispositions, such as cooperation, tolerance, trustfulness, openmind- 
edness, responsibility, etc., characterize a democratic mode of living. 
Their development constitutes its fourth feature. Improvement of human, 
relations is at bottom an affair of fostering desirable attitudes, Ap- 
parently it sounds too simple -hen Devjey says that "democracy is expressed 

l"Scif.nce and Society", in Philosophy and Civilization . Nev; Yoii: 
G,P, Putmans Sons, 1931, p, 320. 

^Ibid. , p. 320. 


in the attitudes of huaon beings and is neasured by conseciuencea pro- 
duced in their lives". It is, nevertheless, true, Hunan habits and 
attitudes are the results of celoction and coordination of uattiral 
tendencies which are lu continuous interaction with social institu- 
tions. The value of the latter ic assessed by the effect thoy produce 
oa. the develoisaent of desizsble habits and dispositions. Universal 
education, nass production, representative govemraent, universal suf- 
frage, isatorial coKiforts throu^ scientific control of nature, etc, — 
these by themselves cannot be re^rded as deniocratic living. Social 
tumoil, political upheaval, class strugelo. national -STarfare arise from 
the aaladjustaGnt of hunan relations iiotirithstanding the existence of 
these institutions. Tliey acy tend to breed eelfichneos, hatred, ogotiFoa, 
clasc-^onscioasness, and other undesirable cental dispositions that go 
against social welfare. Eunan native tendencies are highly flexible 
and subject to the influence of all cultural constituents; and t-hcn they 
are shaped to definite habits of nicd, they, in turn, shape the course 
Oif social changes. Tcao criterion of deciocracy is not the political 
form, but the type of attitude or behaviour £?ho?.ii in daily life. 

rVeedoan and :>jlture, p. 125. 


We now corae to exaiaine tiosr the f oar Inter-relstod features of 
d<saocraoy are related to educational practice. 

Concemine; the first featiire trcnslated into educational teras, 
De?/^»E "active occupatioEs" caae a^ain to the fore, Tlie ideal of free 
interaction anone indlTiduals and aaong groups to feci 11 tat e vol\mtary 
social control and readjnstiaont to changing conditions iB put into 
effect in Bchool activities , School is regarded as a mode of deaocratlc 
living; learning takes place in joint and planned activities; subject- 
divided course of study is replaced ty conpi^encive pioblenv-solving 
projects in lAich relevtuit skills an4 infoiriatione are acquired.^ Dewey's 
learning principle is that "things sain neaain^ by being used in a shared 
experience or joint action". On this pilnciplo v:e have cax-ncnted for its 
neglect of learning sitt^tions that are not shared and for its tacit in- 
sistence on overt joint activity, v'Mch is not a necessary condition of 

generalized discipline, Iiop;ever, ^.i€mey id denocr^stically-rainded. Tils 

"joint activity in education is a prectlcal atter^t at living up to 

his ideal of doFiocracy rathei' than an ercluQive method of generalized 

discipline. Of course, Det?ey has tlie intent to laake it the cha'spion of 

all educational nethods. 

Democracy needs a nei- j^ychology end a new tiicory of Imor/ine* 3evj-ey»s 

Chicago laboratory school '.?as to try out his theory of 'knaslns','^ lait at the 

bottoa of his heart a democratic waj' of living is his prissaiy concern. i!he 

^Dee Chap, 3, Prrr.§2, and Chap. 4, pia3::;§2. 

%ee Chap. 3, ii8*.§3. 

'"The theory of the Chicago ";xpcrincnt" , in Katherinc Canp Mnyhew 
and Anna Canp "dwards. The Dewey School; Tlxc Laboratory School of the 
Untve rsitv of Chicago ^ ^896-1 903 . Iter Toit: D, Appleton-Jcntury aor.pany, 
1926. p. 464, 

nos psychology, vrhlch lays emphasis on flexible and variable native 
tendencies end on the intrinsic eocial nature of en individual, supports 
his social ideal of free- interchange of life-experionoe onons individ- 
uals and aiaonc groups. His faith in loiOE/ins -through-action li>:c<vlse bacfes 
up his denand for free intcUlgenr^G and cooperative livinc. There Is rx> 
store forceful evidonco than hie own statccicnt to ostablish our conviction 
that his psychology oM hie thc^xy of knowing are the adjuncts to his demo- 
cratic ideal, and that his "Joint activity" program is priiaarily to live 
up to his social ideal. The followins quotation is, indeed, a confession 
of Ma intent in the educational czpcrinent at the Unlvorsity of Chicaco: 

"The idea involved a radical departure fron the notion that 
the rchool is juct a place ir. vrhich to learn lesnons and acciuire 
certain forms of s'^cill. It Ecsinilated study and learnins with 
the school to tlia education v/liich Uil:ee place out of school vrhen 
living goes on in a rich and significant social laediuci. It in- 
fluenced iKJt only the nothods of leamir^ and sttidy, but also 
the oj^anisation of children ir j3Toups, an arrancencnt -7hich ttxils 
the place occupied by •Grading* • I* ^"'^'^ the subject-natter, not 
pupils, that was thought to need ^grading; the Inportant considera- 
tion for pupils Tsas that they should aesxiciate oi. the terms siost 
conducive to effective ca-inanication and raitual sharirs* liatural- 
ly, it also influenced the selection of tiubjact-siatter for t»tudy; the 
younger children on entering schcol ©n£aeed,for exejrarle, in p-Ctiv - 
ities that continued thi social life '.7ith v.'hich thiy --.'ere fasiliar 
in their hoaeo. As thn children matured, the ties that link fajaily 
life to the neif-hborhood and larger cornr-iuulty wjto Tollowed out. 
These ties lead baclrrard In tine as v^ell as outnard in the present; 
into history as vxell as the nost oonplex forss of existing social 

"Thus 12i8 aim was not to ♦adjust* Individtiale to social institu- 
tions if by Gdjustncnt is rseanl preparation to fit into present social 
arran^^esients ond conditions. The latter are neither stable encush 
not- rpo^ enough to justify such a procedure. The aim v«is to deepen 
and broaden the range of social contact and intercourse, of cooperative 
livine, so that the neiabers of the -chool v^ould be prepared to sake 
their future social relations wjrthy and fruitful. 

"It ^ill be noted that the social phase of education tfae put 
first. This fact Is contrary to an inpression about the school v.'hich 
has prevailed since it v^-as founded and -irhich laeny visitors carried 
av/ay'with theia at tho tins. It is thv idea vrhlch han played r. large 
part in prOc^rescive schools: nancly, that th^^y cziet in order to 
give coaplote liberty to individuals, and that they are and nust be 


child -c en trsd la a way :?lilcii isaoros, or at least nalcos little of, 
social rolationsMps and rosponsil)ilities. In Intent, chatover the 
failures in acocenplichr^-crit, tb-: scliool '..-as ♦coj-u'raiiity-coiit/rod*. It 
■aas held that tbo prpcos s of rrental developnent in eosentially a nociol 
procoGC, a :7rocsGs of participation; traditicml peychology was crit- 
icized on tlie -rouna that it treated the ■•rorrtb of r:iiid ic one ^"hich 
occurs in individuals in contact with a rncroly physical envirorjrwnt 
of thiago, ;\nd, gg hae been Just stated, the " 'ability of individ- 
uals tc live In cooperative Intogratioa witii c , '^ 

?ree interaction, which, to Dcwcy, bas the negative purpose of hrealcine 
down class barriers, doec a«ay v?ith the alleged antithesis between culture 
and utility. Tliepo should be no opposition between intellectual and voca- 
tional studies, unless there is in society a dmlistic division of classes 
each of vhich hac a differcmt l^pe of education, ^rhere is no subioot-mtter 
vhich is per se practical or cultural. On the contraiy, any subject-natter 
is both pr&ctical and cultural. The distinction is on2y a aatter of tmpha- 
sls,^ It is true that socte etudies, cuch as the 3a»s, liave direct bearing 
upon the oaintenance oi' one's liveli!«3<:»i; and that others, ruch as liter- 
ature, dravdng, lo^ic, etc., are psrc rmoto to the purpose of naterial 
earnins. But it is not true that one category of studies Is to be restrict- 
ed to nechanlcal drill at the o:Epease of :- (1) undorBtandli^ thRlr relations 
with society, (2) levelopine Intellectual and aesthetic inaicht, and (5) 
forning dseirablo attitudes and dispositions; and that another category of 
studies is to Give free vent artistic imagination, philosophic speculation, 
enot local aspiration for the coESunion v^ith the alleged Truth, Good, and 
Soauty, -dthout regard to their possible oocr-cction (depending upcai Uie 
teacher's social outlook anl nethod of teachins) ^^'Ith life reality, and 
with the cultivation of social insight and TsrtiolescsEO habits of nind. The 
criterion of the course of rtudy is: how does it contribute to the grovTth 
of experience which Insures as isuch the developaont of the ability to enjoy 

llbid. , pp. 466-467. (Italics orisinal), 
^Deciocaracy and Education, p. 292f, 

tlie leisurs tlse v-liicli one deserves for licviiig accepted liis share of 
social reGponsibillty, as the dtvelopEtent of the ability to EUiir.tair an 
indepeadcat end Intellit^eat livGliLood. Dcavey's social conception is 
that a lian is not bora equal in lutelliecnc© and interectc but he is bom 
with a rirht to hare Tree and e^iUitable cV.micie oi* cnjoyir^j the fruits 
or civiliiuitiioii ae well as of coutributing to the progrees of coclety. 
Ti;e free give-and-take that charactei'isoe d&nocracy nust be reflected 
in the school activities iu which "vocational" a«.i "intelloctuEl" studies 
are all essential to the gro^-th of aa individual iiTospective of his race, 
iutcllig&uce, social poeitioi;, wealth, etc., Sveiy individual should be 
the jaaster, Instead of bec«iiln3 the Gcrront, of vhat he hae iGamed. 
In other woiTds,he sliould uot bo traiiiod either as an autoiaaton in nechani- 
cal efficiency or as a aaanikiu, so to epcdt, for shov.y purpose when he takes 
up the study of "vocational" or "iatollectual" subjects. The deepening of 
erne 'a insirjit into hur.EB rclationsljip, the develc^jnant of the ability to 
Keet changes, the acceptance of resx-onsibility for cooperative living are 
Dewey's ideal; its realization depends froa the oducationel point of view 
up<bn the arrangGnant of cxirriculiHrv aetivitias. Iliat is wlsy he says, 
"Oemooratic society is peculiarly dependent for its maiatonance up<Ki the 
use in forffilnf, a course of ptudy of criteria which are broadly hunan, 
Dcaaocracy cannot flourish v/hore the chief influence in s^ibject-rsittor 
of instruction axe utilitarian ends narrOK^ly conceived for the laasses, and 
for tho higher education of the ^cm, the traditions of a siJecialized cul- 
tivated class". 

DesMy*s ar;,'Uitient for the unity of culture and utility is peychologicel 
as well an social. An individual develops oiily on condition th!=\t ho parti- 
cipates in his social environiaont. The enrichsMJat of the i!»anine of 


bid. , pp. £25-226. 


experience or tho rei'lncBaent of a niud ic ccocnticlly a ccclol process. 
Tbis pcycholorjical standpoint, as we have oald, is hicMy cit^iificcnt. 
Without its aupTX)rt, Dev/ey's social ideal of free interaction only 
provides an ethical baris for the conciliation of individual and society, 
of nataxal develojaient and social efficiency. The two still belooG to two 
opposed catGr:orlos, ]3ut vrhen Defwey affima, on poycholoclcal c:i"ounds, that 
native tondnncies are various and flexible, tliat their develqpncnt ie con- 
ditioned by the cultural Kilieu, and that an individual as an Individual 
is a gra'dnG system of habits, dicrsositicns, and native pov?erB coorlinatod 
through active adjuetnient to the asaociatei life, the age-long antinoigy 
between individual and society, natural develoiaaont and social efficiency 
is dissolved, i:iio "ou/jhtness" of free interaction as a way of conciliation 
finds its factual basis in De&ey's "social" psychology. The argument is 
then changed froR hose to bring about the hamony of the individual with 
the Bocial organizaticMi, to hos? to develop the intrinsic social tendencies of 
the individual for cooperative livine* 'vlien an individxial as such is 
ascujaed to be opposed to the alleged suproEBcy of the state or society, 
internal ref inencmt of riind and external service to *fe©- others are like- 
wise opposed conceptions springing into ezlstonce, Vihen Devjcy's "social" 
pcycliology brings out the priKacy of social interaction, any clain to 
internal sphere of actions can no longer hold c^ood. Social efficiency, 
in his interpretotion, becomes "cultivation of power to join freely and 
fully In shared or coirTion activities"; caid ctilturo Is defined as "the 
capacity for constantly crpanding the range and accuracy of one's per- 
oeption of meanings".'' 

^Ibid .. p. 144. 
^Ibid. , p. 145. 


Another cocisl function of Joint activity in the school is to 
dissolve the antinoEy between teacher's aut].crity omd child's frcedwa, 
Dew<^*e assert ion that "We never educate directly, Uxt indirectly by 
means of the envtronRent" ic to change the aethod of laoral discipline 
froia dircict, personal control to indirect social control, Tlie nost 
striking example of the conventional ssethod Is found in classrocra 
managcr^nt in which the teacher holds cway over the students. Order is 
kept by the teacher, and is xaeintained where there ie no violation of 
rules set up by the teacher. The authority of the teacher and the freo- 
doa of the pupils are then pitted against each other, Dewey's su^Gcstlon 
of indirect social control is, of course, based upon his doaooratic inter- 
actionism; but the change of the point of reference deserves our notiee, 
HikG conflict of social authority JQd individual frscdcnii is due to the 

urong interpretation of conduct in terras of its external aspect. Authori- 
ty near^ e:cterna l dictation of conduct, vfhilc freodca neans external un- 
restricted action, ro Dcrey, ~enuine aiithority ir, a Euitter of formation 
of iutelliso nt dis po sitlon r on the part of the pupils, aid gonuine free- 
dffin is a natter of development of intellectual o rifiicality . Thus inter- 
preted, authc^'itj and ^'r^ndo;^; have r.o irJiercnt Disposition. The real prob- 
IcKi is: ha? to set xx-p conditions that are suitable for the developcent of 
Intellectual originality aed cooperative habits ii; participatins in group 

"....the fundamental aeans of control is not personal but intcl- 
lectufil. It is not ♦moral* In the cGuse *,.bat a person is noved by 
direct personal appeal fron others, inportant as is this method 
at critical juncturos. It consists in the habits of unders ton i ir^ , 
?.hich are set up in usinti objects in correspondence vrith others, 
whether by t?ay of cooperation riud assistance or rivalry and ooch 
petition. I.ind as a concrete thing is precisely th^^ pofsver to under- 
stand thlnf^s in terns of the use nado of then; a socialized nind 
is the pov;er to understand bheas in terras of the use to which they 

See CJhap, 3 BbbuS2. 


are tumeu In joint or shared Bltuations. And aind in this sense 
is tha --.etliod of socIqI control ,"^ 

**.... genuine social control noans the formation of a certain 
aental disposition; a way of undcrrtandins objects, events, and 
acts which enable one to participate effectively In associated 
activities. "2 

The external aspect of conduct ic no raore the frarasof reference In 

evaluating autliority and freedom. ruplls» silonce in the classroom is not 

the trlunph of authority, nor arc unconstrained moreaents the ovidonce of 

freodCK3, Frcedoa of out-^ard novecxents Is only a means to freedon of in- 

tellisoncc.'^ Sarly In ISCKS, Desey pointed out v^ere genuine freedom lies, 

•^Mlsuiuierctandlns reoardlng the natxire of the frecdon that is 
desaandod for the child Is so coar.on that it nay be necosrarj' to 
eisj^acise the fact that it Is primarily intellectual froedon, free 
play of laental attitude, and operation v/hlch are sou£^t.... Rofona 
of education in the direction of ercater play for the individuality 
of the child Kcons the securing of conditions which will give out- 
let, and hence the direction, to a grovvins intelligence. It is true 
that this freed pa</er of ciind vdth its reference !;o its o\Ta further 
gro-v.'th cannot be obtained without a certain leGsrny, a certain 
flexibility, in the expression of even naiture feeling and fancies. 
But it is equally true that it is not a riotous looseninc of these 
traits v^=fcieh is needed, but Jiist that kind and degree of freedoa 
fax>n repression vrhich are found to bo necessary to nccuro the full 
operation of intollif-cnce.'^ 

Even on occasions on which the adult has to ezercise his authority directly 
over the pupils, he has to exercise it "as the representative and agent of 
the interests of the groups as a ^hole". Prlmrl3y in the shared purposive 
activity resides social control. 

The educational equivalent of the second characteristic of domcracy Is 
the teacher's responsibility for the finding of each pupil's aptitudes and 
capacitieo and the planning of v^uitable activities for their devolopcient. 
Dewey, as we have just said, has sanguine faith in collective intollisonce, 
"The best suarnntec of collective efficiency and pofrer is libOTOtlon and 

Ipewey. op. clt . , v:?. S9-^0. (Italics oricinal) . 
^Ibid . , p. 4S. (Italic original). 
• Experience and Education , p. 70, 
^"Dcnocracy in J:ducation", op. clt ., pp, 6£-69 

&ir<ii-<-L£>'r>'i rvnAo anA ■Rfltient Ion. n. 59. 


uce of ths diversity of Individual capacitioB in initiative, planning, 

foresl-sht, vigor and endurance," 

The cultivation of sclontlfic attitude, and the developnent of sen- 

tal dispositions such as eyiapathetic ixnderctandlns, cooperative spirit, 

etc., are the alns of De^-oy's problem-solving projects whlcli we have 

discus Ged in the preceding chapter. 

On th' vihole, the donocratic node cf living ic the realization of 
the social cleaning of experience. Its eosonce is free interaction anong 
persona to liberate the potentialities of every person and at the ease 
time to proEJOte social progress. The grosrth of the individual Is possible 
only through his contacts with other individuals and cultural factors, 
while the f.rovTth of society is possible only when individuals are free to 
cocasainicate with one another their experiences and to build up coranon 
Interests and alias, li^oedaia of intelligence not merely means tliat every 
indlvldaal is the source of authority in attaining truth, but neano that 
every Individual contributes according to hie capacity to the enriehnent 
of other people's life-experience, iYeed intelligence is collective 
intellieonce, Der.ey's pattern of intelligent behaviour is cooi)erative, open^ 
minded, pla:ined, purposive action. Social reconstruction rests upon the 
enployraent of the scientific method "s-tlch is a neans to a planned control 
of social forces. The school is a prepared cnvironnent in which the ycung 
and the teacher live a democratic life. Present raode and habits of liv- 
ing prepare naturally the future node and habits of living. The school 
becoEjes then a process of associations in which the developnent of each 
child's capacities is inextricably Involved in the collective effort to 
realize planned projects v,-hich are niniature interests. The exaggeration 

^Reconstruction in Ptilosophy, p, 209. 
^Seo Chap. 4, SafeiSS, 


of "deoocratlc .'^ra-ctli" ic the sciicx>l boccanea, of course, e. Courabling- 
block to any systeaatlc qdu thorougla ctiJKiy coT "ecccntiala" that arc 
ncans to an intelliGoat dcraocratlo living. Dewey's recent enjphanla 
upon Eysteaatic learning ic to laake up for his earlier attack upon 
traditional subject-divided courco of study. 


l-yca the procradini^ chapters, ?,'e see that D©?r^*s conc«F*ion8 of 
adnd, of kiicwled£:e, uni of stxiisty ^r^; b..33d ui,«n his e&ncejt of aiierior.ce. 

TTowth of Tsind, the stoqu' aitioai of tenowlsclice, and the progress of society 
all revolve on the bisjc 'issu'ription that the inli visual an'3 the luorW, the 
jri©ntal asii the physicsal, tliought and fact, re'isoii and sonso ure rrjctically 
inaepfiinjble tbow^h Icxjlcnlly distiagi-ilshable. llylng hmself »ith ccRjfficaw 
eense, "J-wey is incllnetl to t^4:lk that fnls intdr^epenaenee, or r^th->r uriity, 
is 8 natural event cf life. :'!ve^ 3ay wc act and are re-acted upon ia cair 
associations witli other persons, T'js pri.-aary fact ia act or fjxperienco, in 
which we and our enviroitfisnt are orguoically related, and in T/hlc'n thft •■sail- 
ing of the environroent and our i'3oa of It are cowdinuted. ..aeu in t;:3 cour-ie 
of our unceasing active organic or social activities we ore beset with a 
difficulty, ■^e fren begia to looite it. Cn such an occasion, t:.« difficulty 
to w^iich m pay attention is tersed "stinnilus", jnoaning tJwt £h%m of activity 
which is in need 'jS clarification. Or, it ;«iy be -ailed son^-stion, Tisanlng 
that the object enters into or-^^nic relation with UB. ' n^ t>e T^rceoss of 
cl-irificatiott, in whl^h wa alee suggestions, f^irrs hypoth-^sas, auika use of 
i^iysiosl oppiratus and sectire relevant -^ata to r^t at the exact naaning of the 
situation, is the act <.f thinking or reas -niiis. T!ie reault of this clarification 
la thft rodispositicn of o-ar antecedent situation in which the rrobls-r. arose. 
In other w(,rda, »e have mde a oh^anije of the oituation. '5« gain ^sore fseaning- 
ful eTt^rie-ice, while wh^^t is MCtod upon — tho eaviron^nent^il object — 
undergoes u csyttbollc or ^ictvjal ehan^. 

•Piia ordinary C'-^jrae ot life constitutes exierience. This inter- 


liopendance of the indivliuAl and the world, the aentul and tlie physical, 

tfecught and fact, reason an^ sense, is an undeniable fact. T)ie prograss of 

science is an illustration of the inatruBsentality of thinking and of the 

possibility of ixprcv3tt<? our ways of living. This is ;>3way*s point of 

c^eparturo la His sducati nal i^llosop^y, rie uses the »ord, experience, to 

lenote our i-sily activities ■which include our way of •jctim? iind the eoviroa- 

Ksnt we act ujoQ. In the histoiry of thought, the word, exxjerience, liis 

often been taken tc rieivete a rshase of ccnsci' usness. Tewey'a ecBsaraon-aense 

Tiew is well s -own in his arguraent witji his oppcoeats who insist that 

experience is subjectiTe. Tie refers to the Oxford Dictionary for the 

?3eanlag of the ter-n to prove thr.t It Is d .uble-barrelled In meaning and 

that it is obJQCtivs. 

"There are,.,:inticlp-:tiona of Hucse in I^cke. But to re'^iird 
Lockeian '^xparietice as asjuiv^lent to "lu^iin is to porvart hi tory, 
I,ocke, ns he was to himself and to the century succeoding him, 
was net a subj^etlviat, but in t'le ^rc-iin a coramon nenae Gbj^ctivi?=t. 
It was this that ^ve hi?a his historic influence. 30 cwii; lately 
h%s the 15irie-2Jant o-ntroversy 'J'jmin^ited recent thiukinfj th<5t it is 
constaatly pr^ji^ctod b closard. within a few weeks I Mve seen 
three irticles, all lasiating tryst the tarai experience imiat be 
subJ3ctivo, aad statirsg or implying that those who tal» the tera 
obJ-'Ctiyely T-ve 3-jbv«rt(?rs of established uf?age. But a c^isuii 
stuay of the dictl nary}! reveal th^t experience haa alvrays 
rseant " Vaat l3 exj-erienced", obaervaticn as a source of kno^-led?^, 
aa well as the act, fact, or icole of expsriencing. In the G-tford 
3ictl n-iry, the (obsolete) sense of "exporiiaental testiig'*, of 
actual "obsarTition of fwcts and events,** and *the fact of boiiig 
cor^cicuely ^ ffected hy an act" h=ive almost contdfsijoransous 
datings, viz., 1384, 1377, and 1382 i*ospectlY9ly. \ usa^^ aLtiost 
wore obJoctiYe than the beccnd, the }3?f!C<^nii*n uae, is "tfh^t has 
been experienced; the events that h;ive takes p:]^ice 'witiiin the 
knowlodsQ of an individual, a ccemuaity, mankind at l-irge, either 
during a partleular period or enerally,'* This dates back to 
1607. Let us have no ;aore captious :rltlcisas and plaints b<iSod 
on ignoitince of lingiaiatic usui:;©,'*^ 

This unleniuble fact of interdependence expressed in ordinaiy 

r'^^xporTonce and Objective Idealisa," op. eit ., pp. !204-205 footnote. 
(Ittilio orlj^iniil) 


activity or exj-srionce Is biolor.icully termed intor^ction, or j^llosophlcilly 
terrTiei temtoral-spatlal contlnuiua.l 

.Ve have 'mentioned thut Tewey's "experience" is expr»asiv« cf Hsi^el's 
Dialectic, is it iersotes tho liitaracting process in which the alleged uati- 
thesis between the i/hyaieal and the laantal is synthoaized. fUs reiterations 
of reccnstr !ct1.o a of experience conaeqaent upon conflicts in ons»s life 
situations, of sabjeetiYlty as a siistlnctivo sods of objectivity, of 
in3ivi duality ioveloped in a social aedlua, — savour of the nsgelian 
teripar which antedates his biological attitude. \M his af!her«nce to the 
bloloi^icsl theory cf tha contiauity of an with the le.vfsr foras of or^jnisa 
and ffith the okealco- physical processes, aod ef the reciprocal adjast"»nt 
beti-eon nan and Ms enviroa-iiant, S' clal as s^ell as natural, — is to put 
ile el's dialectic on a factual basis," 

This i^gellan concept of sxpertence (Jeterainos the whole outline 
of De'wey's theory of educaticai. This oatline, in t}e»©y*s own v/ords, is:- 

(1) "tlie biological ccntinalty cf .-•=:: ;n iiajuilses and instincts 

with nat-arsil energies} 
(3) "the dependence of the .^aath of raind upon participation in 

conjoint activities UovIq^ 3 coE^on j^irjcse; 

(3) "the influence of the riiysical environsKsnt thrcujth the uses 
Bsade of it in the social icsdiua; 

(4) '*the necessity • f utilisation of inflivilujl variations in 
desire &ii<\ thinkin;? for a progressively develo-lug society; 

(5) "the osssntial unity of aethol and subject satterj 

(6) "the intrinsic ccr.tinuity of an Is and .eans; 

(7) '*ths raco nitioa of ^Jnd as thin'icing which perceives and tests 
the rrflrssiag of behaviour. "3 

?Ii3 psychclo?5y, as said in chapter five, is d^nocratically orlsntsd; 

it is the "acr'-il'* sup!.<irt of his social ideal, nevertheless it shoi^rs sone 

fragrsent of H«gel»a thought. Huifsan nature is interpreted iss a flexible system 

of n'ltlvs tendencies which are selected and coordinated thrugh their inter- 

l.;ee chap. 3, § 5. 
pJoe chep.S, §2, 
' ^Degiocraey an d Educition , p.377. 



action with social conditions, and which ^re lahorontly social. His KRphasls 
ui»B social Intisracticn as tlie only means of achieving a social aintl, and of 
effecting social ohtins:© aad rr gross, is tyslcally an attoiapt to reacue lalsga»- 
falre iadlTidualiSTn cut of Ita esaggflrrations of self-iatereat aa4 of frosdoa 
of action* To hia. Individuality can only be achlsved thrt-ugh the i;diviiiual»a 
sharing of activities wMch erabody socially accepted - sonlngs and tuIuos, Tner* 
Is no Inborn luBtfct of self-lnterast . Any exclusively iselflsh. motive is a 
product of the interact lea of the pliablo native iaipulses with the existing 
social order -whlcb encoursj-^s au<Jh an individual atlrribute of bohavlcur. ;)ewey»8 
concept of social iateruction is Uagel's ilea than aa individual ., c^ r^.- L-.iti-nal 
only wlisn he la c!oveloped In the social Institntiona si-iilch erabody the objective 
Heasoa. But Dewey thlnlte that Hegel's obao3Sion in the .bsolute aalces isi-os- 
slble the in<iiyidual»6 active jiarfelcii:ation in sffectixig .socitil iTogveas, 
The chanf^ of the inatitutlcna bacorfees then "the work of the •world-sjdrlt* ." 
•Individuals, save the ^eat 'heroes* who are chosen org:ina of the world- 
spirit, have no sh-sre '.jt lot in it." raraoisl ievelopaont is tlie "obsdieiit 
as8JTnil*iition of the spirit of existinis? institutions."^ Ho<,:;el»s 'absolute 
is, af^ccrdlngly, not qeeeptsd by T<y»ey, but the Dialoctlc jaethod appeals 
to hia. The isspllcatiun tf the -iatnui, .s .lo have said, la th;it aothlsg 
is self -Sufficient and oaa be def in*Me in laolation; everything is la a 
jrocess vf devel ir-^ent, depondent for its rorfacticn up<ja scp.ethlng other 
tlian itself ,2 Developiaant is a eoatinuoua conflict-lntosrutica .roeeiss; 
1b :Oewey*s terms, it is «sb Interact ioji-reconstructl on process. Social 
institutions ire no lon<?er justified slnply because thsy are the incar- 
nations of lieison. Tiiey are, la llewey's interpretation, the instru^avallty 
for the liberati n of individual powers, and the llbsiwtlon of individual 

^Ibid., ppeS-TO. 
'^iiee chop. 3, |2. 


powors is possible ouiy wh«n the Indiviiuala take part in ■lirocti^.ig 

social interests. In education, ais activity program is the application 

of this Hegelian Diitloctio. 

Deaey's osan state. »ut spaalcs louder than our Interpretatica. 

In ackncwledging Jle.-^l's influence upon his thought, he writes:- 

'»t!agel»s idea of cultural institutions as an ♦ objective alnd» 
rxpan. which individuals ware depenleat in the formation of t :eir 
B»nt«l lire fell in «ith t-ie influence of Gcraite ani of Cca-iorcflt 
and Bacon. T*i« rr.etajfcysieal idea that an absolute mind Is Ewal- 
fested in social is-Jtitutions dropped out; the ilea, ui'on an 
empirical basis, of the posfsr exercised by cultural envl ron^ient 
in shaping the ideua, beliefs, and liitellectual attitudes of 
individuals rer.ainod. It was a factor in producing ny bellof that 
the not uncoffisix n ••i3Su;c;^ion in both psychology and philosophy of 
a roady-sade vAni over against a ihyslcal world as an object has 
no e-.yirical s pport. It ^s a factor in producing r^y belief 
that the only posaiols psycholosgr, as distinct from a biol<--ieal 
acco'ont cf behavi' ur, is a s 'Oial psycholo-T-. With respect to 
aicre tec^rit';ully phllo?50phle"»l i&itter, tas K^f^lissn o .rhfiSis 
;pon continuity nnd the functics of conflict peralstod on 
ei^pirical groanda al'ter ■sqr asrlier confidence in dialectic had 
glren way to soepttcisn. Thoro was a period extending into lay 
earlier yenrs at Chic;.g;o when, in coricecticn with n se!^iiniir in 
::egel»s Logic I tried reintsri^ratin^ his categorise in ter-ns of 
•readjunts^nt* and •recunstnction*. aradually I cawe to 
refJlise that wliat the .ris^^iplea actu-Oly stood for cixzlj be 
bett.5r anierstood and stated wben completely essancipated from 
Hegelian garb.*^ 

Although Dewey's method of ox];»rionco is Bagellan, his intent 

in the cc«icept of sxp'Orience ia Lockeian. 159 inherits t?ie tradition of 

British ■^.mpirlcisia, to attack "sosje current belief or institution fnat 

clai s the sanction of Inn-^te iieas or necess;iry conceptions, or an 

orij?in in an authoritative revelatl n of retison.''2 in education, he 

denounces the traditional resl^^nt*^ coarse of study and the theory of 

formal 'I1s<^ipllna ?ncre effectively than he emonclates the syste&itle 

or^ni7ati-n of subject-matter in. Tiaa liaiht of hia new suggestion — 

l'»Blo..:;rai:hy of John Dewey" ia The fbllosoyhy of John Dewey {edited by 

Jaul Arthur .chilpp), northwestern Jnlvaraity* 1939. pp.17-18. The 
statereat ori dnally appears in Dewey's "From .'-.bsolutiss to ■ocp-orlrGentalisiE'* 
in Conter^porary ^■•?oriean Thllosoiliy . vol.2. New York: The iSacsdllBn Cogiiany, 


^Kec^:;natr4etlon in Ihilosoihy, p.8S, 


the ut11l7^tlf'n of joint activities, '"is trancViant attack on the 

eonyenticnal school is ocn.ipl©a with his optimistic belief that the 

child's Interest in th"? study of fxmdanentals would apontiineoualy 

gr<w when the activity i ro :r.i~ is adopted. The following quotation is 

typIcGl of his early optlsdaau 

•^..sJinual traialng, properly coaceived, is an inevitable and 
inaispanmble introduction to the «tu'?ia8...of history and ^og- 
rajhy, "-s tha ijick'.'r jn": of sceial ©nfleavGjr. It projects. It 
raiifios, into these InRVitably. It caly ra-Tains far the tauc:or 
to bs alort to these conditions and to take advantage of then,,., 
T'!8 connoeti rn w th the, rlies cf^.bols -nnS. foriM of 
distinctive intollactual 'xxrance, la equally i-^^portant, aven if 
aore indirect... .Doubtless an intrenlous and wlde-aisake teacher 
wi:i find aut'iral connections also vifith the 5!satter of reading and 
writing, but ths e is no need of forcing ?3attor3 in this direction. 
■pon th<3 w.'Ole, the ccameetion here is indirect. But we raay be 
sure thtit the trEilnln^g jf the gienar-jl Intolligsnce w^ieh the child 
gets, hi3 sense of i^fility, ifflll arouse an intorest In those 
mttera. Be will feel their nscsssity, aven if he dcas not ali-/ay« 
hiive isir-iedigts motive fcr usias? theia eupiilled by the conatructiTe 
work. These tools of leamiag hax'e been sc integrally uasoclatod 
with productive work in tra whole jrogi?es3 of humsnlty tloat the 
moaentu:a which la secured frcn the pursuit of the lattnr will 
surely reflect itself, with inoreasod effect. In devotion to the 
other, "^l 

T5ie Ajserlcan "I'rcgressl're Mueatioo'* Ptove lent hss tints follot/ed 
Dewey's Loekeian intent as its iTlnciple of ot^saniziaf^ school actiTltiss, 
and hs3 no??l6Cted his HQ*j:©lias -iwth&d of continiious reorgini^ati oa of 
experience. The reaultln,? lai-.sez~falre type of education becoaes the 
target of critlcisra. Dewey's early wholesale ccn-leenati<as of the con- 
venti^nal curriculum gives place to his recent ackno»ledgr^.<Jnt of the 
value of ;?y3te!satic continuity in ths old currl cuius;. !To noro dc«s he 
entertain the optl -viatic ^^iew of the activity rrcgraa he held two score 
years a^-o when ho sujarvised the Chicago ^xperisiental School, — an 

l-^Bie "lace of jfeuual Training in t^e ^Isfwntary Ctjurse of Study** 
(Orl'^iually published la c/januta Tninintr IJa-azlne , July, 1001) , 
collected in ^flucatlan ?oday, pp.60-61. 


optitaistic view which perslf'ted for .: tirao ui ter that ©xparionco. In 

recent years he pays more attention to the pro/jraaslv© systeTSJtisation 

of subject-matter. 

''Develoii^ a eontlnuoua process, and continuity 
signifies ccnaecutiveaess of uctic-n, .'.ere wiS the strong point 
of the traditiciial edue.itlon at ita best. Tn© subjsct-SEitter of 
the classics and raatliovatics Involved of necessity, for those who 
?s:sstored it, a conaQn-jtivo and orderly developiceat along definite 
lines. Here lies perhaps tho ;3;r3at?st problem of the nevasr 
efforts in '5aucaticn,..Th© need for takinr? account of spontaneous 
and *inco9rced interest and activity is a genuine need; but without 
care and thought it results, all too roadJly, in a detached Tsulti- 
plif^ity of iRoLited short-tlFie activitioa or projecta, and the 
continuity necessary for :i*<sfth is lo;jt. Indeed, the now education 
ppocesaes re^juire npioh acre planning abftad on the part of teichers 
than did the old — > for there the planning was all '5oae in advauce 
by thft fixad currieuluR-,'*^ 

Dewey's idea of B\ina as the raorganiaati on of exi«rieace with 
a purpose in %imr pointa to his idealistic irKsliaatlca in ©ffipbasi-sing 
the ifflportant role of reason in initiating the change of the 'world. 
\a we knc», experience is relied upoo in aapirieiss to explaia aiad, 
wiiile irdnd is relied upon in rationaliSEi to iaxplsin exi«rience. Hewey, 
like the o'xpiricist, tafees oTisrienca to explain sind, but, lilts the 
rationaliat, admits the spontaneous and persistent 'activity of the 
organism. 'le tries to ,©t rid of a ].riori causes to axTilain the deri- 
vation of linowled^, and yot he relies on '•cre-^tive intalliTence" to 
account for the unity of behaviour. Like?;ise, he trios to bo nriturul- 
Istle, and yet he Icnoars theit rsjere autorsatic riasooiations of uental 
eler?«nts louve r.any things raiexplained. Kant*s ^rnthetlc apmrceptive 
unity of mind he accepts, but the oonstitutlvQ fcrss of Mnd he rejects. 
Kant's unity of perception -and conception in Isnowledge he endorses, but 

TnJeedTor a Ihllosojiiy of Education" (Criminally publlRhsd in 
The r?e»- X^m, t:ov,, 1934), collected in Iducation Toiay , p.295. 


h» ai5aa th« necessity of expari'riental action in .=;etting knowledg*. 
He r©;7'^rds "int^lli'renca not «s the original shapsr and final caass 
of thi3i:.;a, but as the T.ur;.oaeful ensr?:etic re-ahaper of those i-h-isea 
of nature and life tl'iat Gbstract s eial 'jjell-belng."* :ie ''e8tee?a3 the 
individual not as an exaggeratedly Kelf-sufficient 3^o which V 8ta» 
raagie creates the world, but as the agent wbo la responsible throu^ 
initiative, iavsntiveness end Intalllttently aireeted labor for recreiit- 
ing the world, transforming It into an instnuaant aaS posaesaion of 
Intelllsence."^ T!u3 is to say thtit rsality is what is experienced 
aa belBg; an3 kncsang is not to diacorer the nature of reality nor to 
create a reality out of rilnd's pos^^r, but it is to tr-tiasfors exiorieaco 
thpoagih purposive, Intellijjent Interactions with the envlronssent. 

The deveiOFrient of creatire Intelligejice is the chief aim of 
DwBwy'a theory of education. .s he expiaina it as an Inatriment not 
only in tr^nafom.lng the auturail world but in rw-^hapius^ social Inatl- 
tutiona, ani aa a quality of ahared porpoaivo activity, hla activity 
prcgr^ra affords the opportunity ef realising this aim. He admlta, as 
we h=^ve aoid, that hi^ vlow is idealistic,^ but it is nsturhllr^tic ;shen 
ho explains thinking or intelli.<ieaoe as "just a nase for the events and 
acts whlf'h -'ike up the proeesses of avialytlc inspection and projected 
Invention ani tsst^ng.''^ its iaatrxunontallty la likened to th?.t of fire 
and toola which 'rofine, re-order, and shape other natural ssiterials, 
say, 0;:^."* I^'.is n-^turaliatlc expLimtlc® is tc dissolve the ©iposition 
between slnd and body or tho v-orld. "As lndlvid-<jal is interpreted 

l^ecunstruistlon in ihiloaoihy , p. 51. 
S.Jeo chap. 4. 

^si^ys la T : :xprii3aDtal LOi:;ie , p. 41. 
4':}(p--jrlenc8 and Mature , p. 67. 


aa t^-3 in3lTidual-in-r9latlon-tG-Qnvlr'onni3iit, and lat<lllt|saaoe as t'le 
purpcsivG reorganisation of eXi:«rience in chared activity. 

3* hjjve scBaraentdd on Dewey's ©xaggeraticai of the functlca of 
shared activity in the school* Although shared activity is the -r?ediua 
ia which is put into offeet his theory of the imlty of the individual 
and society, of reason and sens®, it does not follow that 8harei^actl%-ity 
in the schvool is a goo; aethcd of geaaralized discipline, 'fe jaaintaln 
that the understandiiig of jsriR'-Uplse and the application of those 
prlnoiplss t particular oocaaions is the aeeessuiy coniltlori for 
ganspalized disclrllne.l Sh-srod activity vitalizes learning; but ser^ 
group eoop«r«tion in realising a project without uttierstandlng the 
princ!ple, say, the neaalng of cooperation under lyin ' overt activity, 
is cf no psrsauest educative effect. De^^ey's iusisterice t^xat ahare*/ 
activity is a universal sharactsristlc of ordinary learning situatioias 
is against fact. His Ipaming principle that "^things gain iseanlns by 
being used in a shared experience -r joi:it actioa'*^ is not trua vi ,11 
oceiSi ns. 7e pointed cut that soiaetirfes the use of a thing does not 
involve a social situation and that fa social sltuatica does not al?/ay» 
Involve a sh-.r^d activity in Te'vey's sense. Shared experieiice, in 
adiition to its msanlng of reolproeity of interests in a ec^cai concern, 
snay aaean the poasessicai \yj one indivilual of what another privea. Ca 
stjch occasians, as we said, things say gain n»aning even wUea they are 
not being used In a shared exx«ri@3ee. .'^^d even ia a ahiired axperiance, 
it s:.^ieti^e'5 T.eaas a itrect share taken from the stock of the elder's 
experience. That conjoint activity is 7iot a necessary oc^idition of 

ir.'ee ohep.*. 

t^Deaioc^raoy and Mucation, p. 14. 


m«!<ntal discipline Is r^iso ovidencM in Defwey's llluatratlons widoh yoint 
out the activity of slnd as purposive action without social context. The 
point of tteie crltieisas ia that the gpojrth of ainci doss not lie nalelj 
in conjoint activity.^ 

Tha function of conjoint =iGtivlty in the school is to avoid the 
duallstic situatiOB wherein the pupil learns willy-niliy the sabject-JOitter 
provi'led by the adtslt and A-heroln fre«doffi and authority ar© in direct 
opposition. y9W«y«s advocacy of an activity prcgram us the alternative of 
the dualistie rej^-nented course of st^idy evokes the probien of the rlaca 
of fundamentals in Dewey* a type of isaraing. Insistent pursuance of life- 
Ilka conjoint activity would sake th« leamins; of fundst'aeatals inei-iental 
and hinder the rprowth of the pucll. (S-cwth is nsaasured by tlic efficiency 
in bringins the past exp-jrience to t>ear upon the solutiun of lifs dif- 
ficulties and in enjcyine; the aestfeetie aspects of life. Triorovirh and 
systeraJtie laamlng is a desidsratua of pupils* growth; sp^seial in- 
atrictiOB in subject-aattsr is a iriietieul necessity. But this type of 
learnla? goes against "3ew«y»s 8»j^ stton q£ an exclusive iatefjrate'i 
carrlculna. A .^ay out of this difficulty is to give up overt, life- 
like conjoint activity as the casly way of avoiding dualistie educational 
jaraetlce, and to regard the teacher's method of guidajioe as the -letsr- 
Mnant of tbe contiBuaaee or diseontiamnce of conventlOBal practice. 

In the foregoing fourth ehspter, «« stated that to rret out of 
the difficulty we have "to plan a scale of activities starting with tb© 
overt and life-like in the lotser grades aad rroceedlng to the iaplicit» 
intellectual activities ia the higbsr jjrades with the ccnstaiit ef5pha3is 
upon the purpose of each jJiase at activity, upcm the ccastinuity botrfeen 

'"" 1 'oe chap.ii. 


the i;r©ce<liag una the auccosdlag i&aaa, upon the into^^-^ol;iticn8Mp 
among various types of activity, and upoa the dsvolopjRect of dosirubl© 
?»ntal dispositions in the course cf activitiss. If the purpose of 
learning partiouXur It^ais la ^ept in view, tha learning sitaatiwi of 
a Mind sot over a.-ainat certain subj.^ot-aattsr would chanige to that of 
a p«rpo3i\ra act in T^hleh intelleet.ial interest la ©allsted and into which 
th« planned subjact-iuattsr enters as an indiaf-ensable factor. If tlia 
subiwt-Taattsr la to bs planned la the light of the dev^lopmant of fuplls* 
eTperlenco and *ith due r9cog;itlon of virlability of Interest aad oapaoity 
of dach pupil* tfi® orgsmizati^a of suojaet-sutter ^Tcuin aot be a rigid 
tert-bcok forss, but « progressl vely-stradod , floxible plan. If subjects 
are integrated accordiag t > thalr nature. aoA z-sll cocrdi:iate<l ovea ahen 
tfeey are naae separate, thi v-'hole eurricaluie is still a uaity -^Itldn 
different brunclies of luinan arpsiriance. Sach type of activity or each 
subjoct Ifl capable of engendering the generalized habits or ideala s^ien 
tha pupils are led to see tUair worth is: social living aM are g^jldsd to 
jait them into practice In daily aotivitles."! 

-)gsoy*8 "conjoint activity" is, as has just bsss said, to 
dissolve the opposition between authority and froedcss, individual and 
society. It la a practical atteait at living up to his Ileal of 
etoROcraey rrithar than an exclusive rietUod of gaaerallzod disci pliite. 
This iffixiortant aission of joint activity la seen In the follcwlag 

state: «!it. 

"The tendency t: treat organisation as an end in Itaelf la 
responsible for -ill tho exa^igerated thscries in which individuals 
are subordinated to nc.TS institution to -srhish is given the noble 
natae of society. 3oclety is the process of associatins in such 

l::J«e chap.4, S3, 


ways th t exi«rlonces, ideas, Oi^ctions, Tallies, r^re truna'.iitto^ and 
?2ade c -i on. To this ^^ictlvc! -rocoss, btjth the indiviltjtil aiic the 
Institutionally or^anlzod nvay tn;ly be said to be subortil nate . The 
iniilvi-^ifil is a-abcrdlnato bsca :>e except in an'' thr ugh coiaraini'i-jticm 
cf ?»xperln.ace fT<.n «Tid tc othsrs, he re;nains duab, merely sentient^ 
a bruts aniiual. Only in gsaoelatioa with fellows does he beeo-ms a 
fionsoious centre of 9xi:^ri.ence. Crganizatio-n, whl'-h is whiit tradi- 
tional t'ie;ry hos t^snarally ?u6ant by the torja L.ociety or tate, is 
also subordinate because It becoaea static, rigid, Inatitutioc^lised, 
arhenever it is net Biriplcyed to facilitate and enrich the ccotacts 
cf hu'xm beings w'th ons another*''! 

ITils proceBS of sh-irlng cc!5-?.<»i int&rost is then transl'jted into eduoational 

activity as, activity j-To-p^ira, In tiewoy's Chicago axperinient, this idea 

was tried out. "It s?a8 thought that educaticai could prepare the youn;^ for 

future social life only w'an the sehool was itself a coopftrstlve society 

on a SmKjII scale. The integration of tha in-Iividuial and society is 

iiajpossibla except "^'len the individual lives in close asssoci'itioxi with 

others in the cacstfist and free give and taJ» of experiences and finds 

his happiness aad .Tottth in jproe»»sses of sharing with thos*'*^ 

Despite ')ewey*G denunc lotion of faculty psycholo,^ and formal 

disci *linf», he still has to simlt "the power to i^^rcmr'' to account for the 

OTifrmlsatlGn of axperionce. Of C':>>arse, t^^ia "power* is a distinctive 

charactsrlstlc of th^ behaviour of th9 living organism when the iiu^-^aii 

8ta?« is evolved in the course of biological evolution. But the tisse- 

honoured conception of ?nan*s Inherent cre?itive potentiality <>r intellect 

remains true. For-aal discipline, w-en it is interrreted as p-enerulised 

discipline as a^rainst sj.«elflc traiairtg, is a lofty ideal of education,^ 

'-ewey's eaphaeis cai the ability or Ijabit of thinking, on ths ability or 

habit to aceanKxinte oneself to cViange, is the reinstatoajent of formal 


In fine, Dewey* s concepts of aind, knosledge, and de-socracy 

l^^eccnstrtictlcn in Riilo80X'.hy, p. 207. (Italic ori'::injil) 
§"'11:10 J;.!»?orv of the Chic'u^' jJxperiBwnt " , op. cit., p. 466. 


are all intarrelated. The proper e:rcwrth of nindl d«f«n(ia oa th« arr- - , :it 
of sociiil Institutions tc faeilltj;te freo interacticna aecajg IndlYi'luuls 
and aacng sjroups, and also on the for-sitlcn of the experlmorital attitude 
in the control of nytural and social environ::»nt. '3«nuln0 knowing ia not 
aerely the applicatl n of scientific technique to :lir«ct natursil forces, 
but frBf» exr«rlr?«jntnl action in aSju^tiag huaian rolaticmahlps. Tolorance, 
free discusslo'n, coop-r'jtion, an-^ responsibility for cos's share in cea- 
tributing to the social -««elfaro are necessary for a ^jenulne democr :tio 
living. Ytt9 three concepts are the trtnltarlan asjscts of the mII- 
costprehensive concept of experience. Fsychologioally, the conceit aias 
at the unity of thoucrht and sense; episteinologically. It alas at the unity 
Of the knower and the knorm; nn<&<Hy, it aires at the unity of the 
indlTldual and the stcite. Joint -ctivlfcy ia the school m&ts this three- 
fold rurpose, "Rie gaidanos of the child's sporadic taj«laea Into intel- 
lif^nt activities and flexible hbits is to be achlered in sh-red un5er- 
tQlrinss; knowledge is a re;?ult of straif^hteclng out a perplexity t-Ji! is 
ors'unlzed into the child's disposition, thus ©aabllng hla tc deal acre 
effectively with later life sitTiations; the coordlnntlcn of in Ividual 
free'3oai -s^ith ooclsl authority resides ia cooperative activity, bxrt its 
Tuln'?rdble joints are its asausiptlcaa to be the exclusive aethol of 
fl^neralized discipline, and its practical difficulty in pliinnlng for 
aystSTitizatlon of loaming» 

I. Dswoy's ..'orks^ 

1. "The Tsychologlcal 3ta»id point," Mind, Vol.11, no,41 (Jan., 1886). 

2. "laycholc^^y as rhilosoxhJe riethod,'* rlinrl , Vol.11, No. 42 ( prll, 

1885) . , 

3. "Knowledge .8 Idealization." Lilnd , Vol.12, ao.47 (July, 1887). 

4. Isyghology {2na rcrlaed editioa), IJaw York: ■:iirp©rs & Brothera, 

1890. , ^ 

5. "Ti\e ireoeiit rosition of Logical Theory," TTie L-oaist , 7ol.2, no.l 

(Oct., 1891). 

6. "The Reflex Arc Conoept in Vsychology , *» Fsyohologi cal .voviQ^y, 

vol. 3, no,4 (July, 1896). 

7. Tiie "xshool and >ociety. Chicago: :Jniveroity of Chicsgo Irese, 


8. Tl-.Q .;choa -^nd f ae r/ijld ("dltsd by J .J. Findlay) . London: 

Blaekie <-"• 3oa, .Lt-i,, 1907. 

9. .ioral Jrineipl93 is rMucatioa. Bostou: Hougliton :'lfflin Company, 


10. Ti-.Q Tnfiuerxee of DatsTin on J^llosophy aad Other .3suys in 

?cmto^sr oimry Thcu ^:t. -le-tf York: ITenry :'olt and cospany, 1910. 

11. ^duTT ^tT^^HBl I'sWa (Mitad by J.J, gjadlay). Londoio: Blackie & 

3 on, Ltd.. 1310. 

12. Interest and IJffort in 7:ducatl<ai . Boston: rTcughton ., ifflin 

Conpeny, 1913. , ^ 

X3, Schools of TcncTTo^ {co-antbor, "velyn Dewey). Hew York: .P. 
>atton S-, Cor.pany, 1915. 

14. 've-}ccr;i cy -IducatJ ..a . ^sw York: ISie iac^nian Oorajpai^, 191o. 

15. Fssays "tn^ xi^ri mi.t.a Log! c . Chicago: Univsirnlty cf Cbicu.50 

Irer:3, 1916. 

16. '"Die reed For a Heocvery of Fhilcscpby," in Creative Intelligence 

(Dewey etal ) . TJetr York: rlenry Holt and 'Jomp^any, 1917. 

17. ueo^R3tr:jeti<n in Jhiloaophy. Lcin.1on: University of London 

rxess, 1921. 

18. -u-'!-in ^T«tur e and Ccnduet. Ne» York: Henry flolt and Gorapany, 193^:., 

19. "IndlVi h rojty and ^;ir;9rience,'^ Jcumal of the ^ivnaa Foundation, 

Vol.2, no.l (Jan., 1936). 

20. Tie nblLc aM Its ircbley>-.a . Uow York: ITenry Holt and Compiny, 

____ _-— — 

21. Qimv^ctBT and TJ^-cgts, 2 Vols. Se«r York: Henry Holt and company. 


22. Ziperienee r^d nature (revised edltlca). Hsw York: 3.3. Sorton 

'■ Co. 1929. 
03. The -ueat For Certainty . New York: Hinton, Balch k 0©., 1929. 
24. The Sour'ces^f a cience of I'ducatjon . r3ew York: Horace 

Hveright, 1929. 

iTJiese roferences are only the selections from '^owey's wc.rka. For a 

detailed bibliogra-hy, consult lilton '^alsey Thcnas, -- Blbll&v;r:^ of 
John Tewey , 1882-1939. 


25. "Ccmduct and .^jrperience," in rsycholOi^iss of 1930 (Edited by 

Carl lurchiaon). /oroestor: niark University Z-vesa, 1930. 

26. "Id Reply to ooms Gritieisas," Joum'.a of Thilogophy , Vol.27, 

no. 10 (iay 8, 19;^?0), 

27. '*IiOH -fuch Freedosi in U&^r .Sebf-OlsV," vsi^i i:epuulic, 'Ol,6o» 

no.SK (July 9, 1930). 
aa, Riiloso phy and Civilisation . New York: Mint on, ;ialch and 

Co?3jariy, 1951, 
39. Tha rjay L\rt; of Cducutloncq gt^nfusitai. anarldjise: Harvard 

University Iress, 19L>1. 

30. izthlca (rcevised edition. ccar<thor. J. Tufts), ^'aw York: sury 

•lolt and Cosiuiiiy, 1932, 

31. npg ;ie Think (Hsvised ?:dltion). Boston: D.G* Heath and Oa-spany, 

1953. , , . 

32. '♦Tre -^ocial-Nooaoffiic 5ituation and Musatl&n,' and "The L'n'.lerlying 

-hUoaophy of c:ducatloa," (»ith J.L. CMlds), in The irduea- 
tlonal yrcntler {^^'. Kilpatrlcic, editor). New York: ISio 
Century '::ofapa[?iy, ISi^. 

33. Catmint on Activity 'ovenent, in 33rd Yearbook of the !;.;^.o. - ., 

Pa rt II. Tl-e \ctivlty 'ovor^-ent. Blooniiuston: Tublic ::'«hool 
rub! i shins CojnjBny, 1934. 
3^ Ttf^'njp -w.Qory of tba ';hic:i,;o '"^^rifneat ," in ?1ig '^e^rey venool ; 
" Th^ i^bor-vtor^Jchool'o f the ^Tniver-jty cf _£!iJe-^f^o, 1896;^ 
1905 (by I-C. ..'ayhew 6na~ I.':, ^rdwords). '>^ '^'■' rh: D. 
pplfit^.n-CentvTy Corspi^.ny, 1936. 
35 ^TwrisrceaQif^^^'^ ?«'«» ^'°rk: The ••■aer-lllun Go-p.ny, 1938. 
36 ! rd^i-ii^^r^c^^JnJ^^vdQTn ^orld; John Do« ;ey «3 }-liilo3o ; 4^ 
(editVd by J .serFlStnsr). TJew York: Tiie -oaem Librsry, 


37. ?rs»df?T5 and Cult ure, riwff York: a.?, ftitnum's :5ons, 1939. 

38. ^^-'^rl^iice, m^a^dse sad Yaltie: \ liejoinder," in The Jhilgsoj^ 

of John Te-a>ex (edited by laul irthur Schllpp). Chicago: 
Korthvi'eetwrn. "niv^ralty Iross, 1939. 

39. nducaticn Tod-ay (editsa by Joseph Hatnor) Hes York: a.P. 

iutna-'s Jons^ 1940. 

II. General References 

1. Bagley, W.C, r:dtac-.-tloaal Values. New York: Ths ;^ciaiUuji 

Oorapany, 1911. 
g^ , •Education aa<! V.mrseiit :^a* ?iew York: Tbcsas 

rSelsoB '-r. Co,, 1937. 

3. , \B gs?entijli3t*3 Ilitfora for fne idv.ace^sat 
of .n-erican "'due t ion (reprint frora gducatic-gal --''-iis- 
tr-itloa and Juf^si^ioion, prll, 1938), 

4. Bode, B.H., C-onflictlng - sycrolaues of Loamir >g^ (ravised 

(atdlt.icn entitled Ic^ e Lsam , 1940). rew Tork: r).C. 
Msath and C<»ipiny, 1939. 

5. Breed, ?.3., 5duc:^ticn and the vTew Healiea . Tev^r York: Tbe 

ij^cxdllaa Goap'iny, 1939, 


5. Srett, G.3,, A ni«tcry of 78ycholO:-y, 3 Volo, Loridon: 
Oeor^ ;ilea ?~ 'Jusfin Ltd., 1912 ^-. 1921. 

7. , raychology, ..uclont and odora . Hew York: 
XiGngBBns, :'rreen and Co., 1928. 

8. , ** ^sociaticnisa snd ♦ ct» iaycholo.y, " in 
Faycholodas of 1930. Jorceater: Clark Uaivoralty 
-•"Taas, 1930. 

9. Ghlias, J.L. , I.Xivio'itif.n and the 'lilloaojhy of "xpori- 

mentalisa* Itow York: Tlie Ceut ..ry 'Zo., 1921. 

10. Counts, 3.S., pfar-e the 'ehool Bulll \ 'Tew ~ocial Oi'der? 

"ow York: John Day Co^eq-anyt 1933. 

11. Daatlashkevish, :'.J., Introdustion to the rhlloaophy of 

"di;c::;tioB. ITsy/ York: .-.^ricin Booir Cwnpany, 1935. 

12. Feldaan, I.T,, The 'hilosophy f rdtB "ievv'ey; Critical 

VnalyalB . Saltiieore: The Johns TTcp^ins Irsss, 1934. 

13. Fox, C, y-.e Ind and Its Body . London: K»?aii Paiil, lYench, 

Trubner & Co., 1933, 

14. , ''^dueatlcml Tsyehology (revised), l/mdosxi K«gan 
laul, Tr'enc:!, Trubner & Co., 1935. 

15. rJriffin, A.K., '.ristctle'a "sycholoTy of Cond'aet . L©a-don: 

villlasi and riorKate Ltd., 1931, 
15. GuthirlQ, S.R., Th ' ^ >3ycaolo ar of L garais^. ilas? YopjE: 
l-^rper aM Bret hers, 1935. 

17. liasacad, 7.4., •jri3totlg *s T-syebology \Tjg ^jjIwb and Isrva 

Haturalla ) . London: Soanenscriein, 1902, 

18. "look, 3., John De-voy . "ear York: Jobaa Day Co., 1939. 

19. J-ises, .;., I ri:i^lple?. of Isyeholo-T- , Vol. I. !:ew York: 

Renry Holt and Coripany, 1890. 

20. , "Doas *GoHsei .usasas* "xist?" in ^s-jaya in ::udieal 
^jnpirioissi . Hew York: LoTi2-:x;ins, Green, -:. Co., 1912, 

21. Joad, C". •., Guide to Ahllosophy , London: Victor Collinz, 

Ltd., 1338. 

22. Jones, :'..C., "i Laboratory 3tudy of Fsar; The Cass of :'otor,'* 

^8d. ^e.-?!., Yol. 30, 1924, pp,308-315. 

23. Judd, C,H,, . aycnology and Jecoadury gdi-tcitioB . Bosttm: 

Glnn S: Co., 1927. 

24. KilputriGk, ./.H., et al. , Edue«tl<aaal Frentlor . iTow Yoric: 

1*-\e Century CojiipiBy, 1933. 

25. Eilp-itirlcl:, ;,P.,, l Heoonstructed Treory of the ^'ducntire 

Irccess . ;Tsw York: Burotiu of rublicitioris, TQ-ohora 
College, Columbia University, 1935. 

26. , Renaklng the Curr ie^^liE::. V:ev York: 
Newsfm 5a Ccaapiny, 1936. 

27. Locke, J., an liaaay Concerning Ilusan "Jaderatanding (Bohn*a 

Library) . 
38. , Ccgaa 'Ei ought Concerning Sdueation ('Edited by P,H. 

l.uick), Ca-ibridjte Ijaivoraity .Press, 1902, 

29, lod.c:*, Ix.C, niiloaophy of r:ducation . -'ew York: -Tarpere & 

Brothers, 1937, 

30, 5Sayho» K.C. & Edwards, *i..C., T-ie Dewey Johool: ?is laboratory 

'xihcol of the T ':n iversity of Chirir^o, 1896»1 905. new York: 
D, •..ppl'-ton-'-ent.iry CcxTipuny, 1936. 




31, :;e!)ougall, :/•, Bc?dy ana ".-.ind. Lonclon: ;:ethu©n TubXlshers, 

33, "."orPlB, C.,:?., Six Theories of 'PinA . Chicago: University 

ctf Chicago Fro33, 1S33, 
33, 'Turpby, G. , fua 'listcric^Al Introduction to ''odera J'sycholog^ , 

Londraa: Eegfin rtil, Trencli, Tlnibner acd Jo., 1929, 
S4. lavlo^, J, P., C ond 1 1 1 onad vef lege 3 . Cxforcl Univoraity iregs, 


35. iorry, R.ii,, Preseftt ""hiloso^'hieal Tendencies * Mew Yori;: 

Lcaagrtiins, Greon ?'„ Co., 1910. 

36. , T^e r-:iOU|-:! :t ^ and Chc^ructar of .:illiuni Ja^ies^ Vol, 
Boston: Little, j-;r«>/jn, and CG:^yj.:y, 1935. 

37. Plato's Ko public (Jowett'e vex'sion). 

33. iTOgressive education -vsacoiation, :Tew Jef O'ls ys. L13 in 
'■jaerlcan " ^t iicutioa ( A.n Analyais an4 Juariy^ry of Aeccnt 
Co_.v^cit£Ve t ;dies') . "Tov; York; .Suroavi of 7ub'.llr:a't'i'oaa, 
TesCh"9rs Oollo =;e, Oolanibia 'Tnivorsity, 1941. 

39. Russell, B. , IhilosoiAy , r^e\f Ycrlc: .;,./, 'Tort on, 1937. 

4C. "•iindera, :,J., *"3ie Lo/^lcal •Jnlty of John Dewey's iducational 
Philosophy," ""thics { .-a Inteni^ticaal Journal of Sccii l, 
"olitieal, and lagal 'hilosorhy ?. Vol. SO, no.4, (Jxay, 1940). 

41. Saiidiforii, :•'., .'dur^titl on j1 fayc '.clo.-a^ , ■.•oar York: Ioa=:r^no, 
apeoa and Oo., 1928, 

4S, , gcimlatloas of rcl-jeational '^chQlo^ , :'s.: York: 

Longmans, Greea and Co., 1933. 

43. , \rtif.el9 en "Trtmsfop of Lsaming'* in l^ncycloyedia 
of '^duo'Htioaal Kegaarch (iJditkec! by ialtor S. Monroe), iTevs 
York: T:>e Jao-ulian" CanpaQy,^1940. 

44. Schllpp, ■. ,A, (ii^ditor), I^te i-hiloacphy of John '^'e'-'iey . Chi -sago: 

Northv?esterii -Jai varsity IrsiSs, 1939, 

45. ^ilaslngor, :',, I^ducation and Class struggle-—:. Crltieal TSgaa- 

iaatiop of the Ilber tl "TdueQtors I r o??r-; r:. f or^ t] i9 7 c clal 
Hra c onstiviet i on , :Ti?w York: J.J, Littla ■Sc'lves Co, 7* 1937, 

46. 3p3ar!nan, C., "pje ;\bilttt?s of :.^a . Lcndan: The TiesoaiUan Co., 


47. , raygholoiar Dor/n the -^s , 2 Vols. London: The 
ItacmillriE '^o., 1937. 

48. 55rd Yearbook of the H.S.S.H., Jart II, Tl'.e xtivlty ■overtent . 

BloQffiingtos: lublic Jchool I-ubllshiaj-; Iress, 1934. 

49. TnaiKiS, v.Ii., \ 3ibli0{^aphy of John Oewey,. 1S3S<-19^'9 . M»sf 

York: Colirabla Uxiivor:ity I-reso, 1939. 

50. Thoradike, '".L., Frinxifplns of Tss^ehing. How Yoric: -..G. 

3eiler, 1906. 

51. , Huran Laaralng . New Yorlc: The Century Co., 

52. Jatson, J.B., DehaYloriaa. "ew York: W.if. TTortcn t. Co., 1924. 

53. , l3yc-:oloj3r frca tiie standpoint ejf a liehavlorist. 
Keve York: J,3« Lippincott Oocsp.,riy, 1929. 

54. Vflndelbar.d, 3.» ". Sllstory of rhilosophy (tr. J.H. O^fts), 

i:ew York: The ii'caillan Co'jitany, 1921. 


»ll1ti/ll«WX v.»«-'«* ■ • 






P Toronto, University of 
Univ Thesis, Ph.D., 19A2. Oi 
T concept of experience