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SURVIVAL
UNDER
ATOMIC ATTACK
THE OFFICIAL ĂĽ. S. GOVERNMENT BOOKLET
Executive Office of the President
National Security Resources Board
Civil Defense Office
NSRB Doc. 130
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1950
Fer talt bv th« Suptrintendent of Documentt, U. S. Government Printing Office
Wathington 25, D. C. Price 10 cent«
You
Dan
SURVIVE
You can live through an atom bomb raid
and you won't have to have a Geiger counter,
protective clothing, or special training
in Order to do it.
The secrets of survival are:
KNOW THE BOMB'S TRUE DANGERS.
KNOW THE STEPS YOU CAN TAKE
TO ESCAPE THEM.
Ă„TOM-SPLlTTING
IS JUST ANOTHER
WĂ„Y OF CĂ„ĂśSIN6
AN EXPLOSION.
U^ ^'^^^AP'i'
YO0R CHĂ„HC
I OFSURVIVINQ
ATOMIC ATTACK
i BETTER THAN
YOĂś MAY HAVE
THOUGHT.
CLOSETOTHE
XPIOSION, YOĂśR
.ANCES ARE ONLY
OMi oĂĽT OF ten:
To begin with, you must realize that atom-
splitting is just another way of causing an explo-
sion. While an atom bomb holds more death and
destruction than man has ever before wrapped in
a Single package, its total power is definitely
. limited. Not even hydrogen bombs could blow
the earth apart or kill us all by mysterious
radiation.
Because the power of all bombs is limited, your
chances of living through an atomic attack are
much better than you may have thought. In the
city of Hiroshima, slightly over half the people
who were a mile from the atomic explosion are
still alive. At Nagasaki, almost 70 percent of the
people a mile from the bomb lived to teil their
experiences. Today thousands of survivors of
these two atomic attacks live in new houses built
right where their old ones once stood. The war
may have changed their way of life, but they are
not riddled with cancer. Their children are
normal. Those who were temporarily unable to
have children because of the radiation now are
having children again.
WHAT ARE YOUR CHANCES?
If a modern A-bomb exploded without warning
in ihc air over your home town tonight, your
caiculatcd chances of living through the raid
would run somcthing likc this:
Should you liappcn to be one of the unlucky
people right under the bomb, there is practically
j MimIiih" .iioiiiic IxMiil), as usfd in this booklct, refers to the
^ 'nomm.»!" I.ninl) <lest liU-d in the '"Klleets of Atomic VVeapons,"
Miil.hhhr.l III |mie r^.SO hy the Aloiuie Kner^y Commission.
no hope of living through it. In fact, anywherc
within one-half mile of the center of explosion,
your chances of escaping are about i out of 10.
On the other band, and this is the important
point, from one-half to i mile away, you have a
50-50 chance.
From I to i/z miles out, the odds that you will
be killed are only 15 in 100.
And at points from 1/2 to 2 miles away, deaths
drop all the way down to only 2 or 3 out of each 100.
Beyond 2 miles, the explosion will cause prac-
tically no deaths at all.
Naturally, your chances of being injured are
f ar greater than your chances of being killed. But
even injury by radioactivity does not mean that you
will be left a cripple, or doomed to die an early
death. Your chances of making a complete re-
covery are much the same as for everyday acci-
dents. These estimates hold good for modern
atomic bombs exploded without warning.
WHAT ABOUT SUPER BOMBS?
Do not be misled by loose talk of imaginary
weapons a hundred or a thousand times as power-
ful. All cause destruction by exactly the same
means, yet one 20,000-ton bomb would not create
nearly as much damage as 10,000 two-ton bombs
dropped a little distance apart. This is because
the larger bombs "waste" too much power near
the center of the explosion. From the practical
point of view, it doesn't matter whether a build-
BEYOND A HALF
MILE. YOUR CHANI
OF SURVIVING
INCREASE RAPIDt
fNJĂĽRY BY
RADIOACTIVITY
DOES HOT
NECESSARILY ME,
YOĂś ARE DOOME
TO DIE OR BE
CRIPPIED.
DON't BE MISIE
BY WILD TALK 0,
"SĂśPER-SĂśPER
BOMBS."
' DOĂśBĂśNG A
OMB'S POWER
t OOESHT MEAN
DOĂśBLING THE
DAMAGE IT WILL
Ă–LĂ„ST Ă„ND HfeAT
ARE THE BIGGEST
DANGERS.
TO PROTECT
YOĂśRSELF FROM
BLAST, LIE DOWN
IN A SHiELDEO
SPOT.
ing near the center of the explosion is completely
vaporized or whether it is simply knocked into
a pile of rubble.
To be more specific, a modern atomic bomb can
do heavy damage to houses and buildings roughly
2 miles away. But doubling its power will extend
the ränge of damage to only about 2/2 miles. In
the same way, if there were a bomb 100 times as
powerful, it would reach out only a little more
than 454) not 100 times as far.
And remember: All these calculations of your
chances of survival assume that you have abso-
lutely no advance warning of the attack.
Just like fire bombs and ordinary high explo-
sives, atomic weapons cause most of their death
and damage by blast and heat. So first let's look
at a few things you can do to escape these two
dangers.
WHAT ABOUT BLAST?
Even if you have only a second's warning, there
is one important thing you can do to lessen your
chances of injury by blast: Fall flat on your face.
More than half of all wounds are the result of
being bodily tossed about or being Struck by fall-
ing and flying objects. If you lie down flat, you
are least likely to be thrown about. If you have
time to pick a good spot, there is less chance of your
being Struck by flying glass and other things.
If you are inside a building, the best place to
flatten out. is close against the cellar wall. If you
haven't time to get down there, lie down along an
inside wall, or duck under a bed or table. But
don't pick a spot right opposite the Windows or you
are almost sure to be pelted with shattered glass.
If caught out-of-doors, either drop down along-
side the base of a good substantial building — avoid
flimsy, wooden ones likely to be blown ovei on top
of you — or eise jump in any handy ditch or gutter.
When you fall flat to protect yourself from a
bombing, don't look up to see what is Coming.
Even during the daylight hours, the flash from a
bursting A-bomb can cause several moments of
blindness, if you're facing that way. To prevent it,
bury your face in your arms and hold it there for
10 or 12 seconds after the explosion. That will
also help to keeo flying glass and other things out
of your eyes.
WHAT ABOUT BURNS?
Flash burns from the A-bomb's light and heat
caused about 30 percent of the injuries at Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki. Near the center of the burst
the burns are often fatal. People may be seriously
burned more than a mile away, while the heat can
be feit on the bare face and hands at 4 or 5 miles.
To prevent flash burns, try to find a shelter where
there is a wall, a high bank or some other object
between you and the bursting bomb. You can
expect that the bomber will aim for the city's big-
gest collection of industrial buildings.
A little bit öf solid material will provide flash
IN YOUR HOĂśSE:
LIE DOWN AGAINST
A WALL ^
OĂśTDOORS: GET
NEXT TO A SOLID
BUILDING.
TO ESCAPE
TEMPORARY BLI
NESS, BURY YOĂś,
FACE IN YOUR ]
ARMS.
FLASH BURNS
ARE A SERIOUS ^
CAUSE OF INJUR
SHIELD YOURSEl
FROM THE FLASI
EVEN Ă„ LITTLE
! material 6ives
Protection erom
; flash burns, so
be sure to dress
properly.
RADIOACTIVITY
IS THE ONLY WAY
BESIDES SIZE IN
WHICH ATOMIC
BOMBS DIFFER
FROM ORDINĂ„RY
ONES.
WE KHOW MORE
ABOĂśT RADIO-
ACTIVITY THAN
WE DO ABOUT
COLDS.
protection even close to the explosion. Farther
out, the thinnest sort of thing — even cotton cloth—
will often do the trick.
If you work in the open, always wear full-length,
loose-fitting, light-colored clothes in time of emer-
gency. Never go around with your sleeves roUed
up. Always wear a hat — the brim may save you
a serious face burn.
WHAT ABOUT RADIOACTIVITY?
In all stories about atomic weapons, there is a
great deal about radioactivity.
Radioactivity is the only way — besides size —
in which the effects of A or H bombs are different
from ordinary bombs. But, with the exception of
underwater or ground explosions, the radioactivity
from atomic bursts is much less to be feared than
blast and heat.
Radioactivity is not new or mysterious. In the
form of cosmic rays from the sky, all of us have
been continually bombarded by radiation every
hour and day of our lives. We all have also
breathed and eaten very small amounts of radio-
active materials without even knowing it. For
over half a Century, doctors and scientists have cx-
perimented and worked with X-rays and other
penetrating forms of energy. Because of all this
experience, we actually know much more about
radioactivity and what it does to people than we
know about infantile paralysis, colds, or some other
common diseases.
8
It is easy to understand how radioactivity works
if we think of how sunlight behaves.
In the northern part of the world, winter's slant-
ing sun rays seldom cause sunburn, but the hotter
rays of the summer sun often do. Still, just a few
moments in the midsummer sun will not give you
a tan or sunburn. You have to stay in its hot rays
for some time before you get a burn. What's more,
bad sunburn on just the face and hands may hurt,
but it won't seriously härm you. On the other
band, if it Covers your whole body, it can make
you very sick, or sometimes even cause death.
In the same way, the härm that can come to you
from radioactivity will depend on the power of
the rays and particles that strike you, upon the
length of time you are exposed to them, and on
how much of your body is exposed.
ff
WHAT IS "INITIAL
RADIOACTIVITY?
Broadly speaking, atomic explosions produce
two different kinds of radioactivity. First— and
most important in an air burst— is an extremely
powerful invisible burst of rays and particles
thrown of! at the time of explosion. This kind is
called "initial" or explosive radioactivity. Its rays
and particles fly out quickly, then promptly die.
There is danger from them only for little more
than a minute. The second type of radioactivity—
lingering radioactivity— will be described later.
910413 O - 50 - 2 •
INJĂśRY FROM RADIi
ACTIVITY DEPENDS
ON THE POWER
OF THE RAYS Ă„ND
PARTICLES, HOW ]
LONG YOU WERE_
EXPOSED AND H
MUCH OF YOUR
BODY WAS HIT.
EXPLOSIVE
RADIOACTIVITY IS
THE MOST IMPOR'
TANT KIND, BUT
IT LASTS ONLY A
MOMENT. 1
THE BIG6EST
DANGER FROM
EXPLOSIVE RĂ„DfO-
Ă„CTIVITY LIES
WITHIN Ă„ MILE
OF THE EXPLOSION.
BUILDINGS WILL
PARTIALLY OR
COMPLETELY
SHIELD YOĂś.
!"
YOĂś ARE MORE
LIKELY TD BE
HURT BY BLAST
AND HEAT THAN
BY RADIATION.
The injury ränge of the explosive radioactivity
from a modern A-bomb is a little over i mile, if
the bomb is exploded about 2,000 feet in the air.
If it is exploded much higher, some of the radia-
tion may not reach the ground, so the ränge may
be less. If it is exploded much lower, the radiation
also may not reach out as far, because it would be
blocked by the ground or by buildings.
A litde more than a mile away, the principal
effects of the few dying rays that Struck you could
be Seen only as temporary blood changes in a
doctor's examination. You probably wouldn't even
realize you had been exposed.
A little less than a mile from the explosion cen-
ter, if you are unprotected, you are almost sure to
suffer illness. Less than two-thirds of a mile away,
those caught in the open are pretty sure to soak up
a fatal dose of radioactivity.
Still, the possibility of your being caught with-
out some protection is not very great. Even if you
are on the street, there is a good chance that a build-
ing, or many buildings, will be between you and
the burst, and they will partially or completely
shield you.
Atomic explosions high above ground cause the
most widespread damage. And, as happened in
Japan, when an A-bomb goes off in the air you are
far more likely to be hurt by the bomb's blast and
heat waves than by its radioactivity. At Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki slightly over one-half of all
deaths and injuries were caused by blast. Nearly
one-third of the casualties were from the heat flash.
10
Radioactivity ahne caused only about 75 percent of
all deaths and injuries
If the bomb were to go ofif close to the ground,
or slightly below its surface, the ränge of the
explosive radiation, as well as the ränge of the
blast and heat, would be reduced. This is due to
the fact that all three would be partially blocked
by the earth, by nearby buildings and by other
obstacles.
In an underwater burst, there would be much
less to fear from blast and nothing to fear from
heat. Practically all the explosive radioactivity
would be absorbed by the water. However, there
would be the second type of radioactivity to be
described later on.
WHAT ABOUT "INDUCED"
RADIOACTIVITY?
If an atomic bomb goes off in the air within two-
thirds of a mile or slightly more of your home,
there is no practical way of keeping explosive radio-
activity out of the above-ground part of your house.
It is possible that, at very short ränge, artificial, or
induced radioactivity could be set up in gold, silver,
and many other objects. However, this kind of
radioactivity will never ofler great danger, so don't
throw away bandages and other first aid materials
in the medicine cabinet. They will be perfectly
safe to use.
11
EXPLOSIVE
RADIOACTIVITY IS
LESS OF A
DANGER IN
GROUNDLEVEL
OR UNDERWATER
BURSTS.
EXPLOSIVE I
RADIOACTIVITY [
CAN'T BE KEPT ^
OUT OF THE UPPER
FLOORS OF YOUR
HOUSE, SO LEARN
WHAT TO EXPECT
FROM IT.
AND BOTTIED
FOODS MAY BE
IRRADIĂ„TED, BĂśT
IT WILL STILL BE
SAFE TO USE THEM.
I
DIARRHEA mi
THE FIRST SIGNS
*0F RADIATION
SICKNESS.
EVEN IF YOU
SHOULD GET
SEVERE RADIA-
TION SICKNESS,
YOĂś WOĂśLD HAVE
BETTER THAN AN
EVEN CHANCE OF
RECOVERY.
Naturally, the radioactivity that passes through
the walls of your house won't be stopped by tin or
glass. It can go right through canned and bottled
foods. However, this will not make them danger-
ous, and it will not cause them to spoil. Go ahead
and use them, provided the Containers are not
broken open.
WHAT ABOUT
RADIATION SICKNESS"?
ii
Should you be caught upstairs or in the open
at the time of a bombing, you might soak up a
serious dose of explosive radioactivity. Even so,
the first indication that you had been pierced by
the rays probably wouldn't show up for a couple of
hours. Then you most likely would get sick at
your stomach and begin to vomit. However, you
might be sick at your stomach for other reasons,
too, so vomiting won't always mean you have
radiation sickness. The time it would take you to
get sick would depend on how strong a dose you
got. The stronger the dose, the quicker you would
get sick. For a few days you might continue to
feel below par and about 2 weeks later most of
your hair might fall out. By the time you lost your
hair you would be good and sick. But in spite of it
all, you would still stand better than an even chance
of making a complete recovery, including having
your hair grow in again.
12
WHERE IS THE BEST PLACE
TOGO?
If your house is close to the explosion, there is
little you can do to protect it from the bomb's
blast, or pressure wave. Within one-half mile of
the surface point directly beneath the explosion,
the shock wave from an atomic bomb is sure to
flatten most houses. Out to a distance of about
I mile, Steel, brick, and wooden structures are
likely to be damaged beyond repair. Farther out,
therc is less destruction, but serious damage may
be expected to extend as far as 2 miles.
It is only wise to figure that the upper floors of
most buildings near the explosion will be pushed
in. This means the basement is probably the safest
place to be. If you have a basement and time to
get down to it, lie flat along the outer wall or near
the b..se of some heavy supporting column. You
would be even safer under a cellai work bench or
heavy table. Stay away from the middle of the
floor where falling beams and other objects are
most likely to strike you.
Naturally, you run a risk of being trapped in the
wreckage, but your over-all chances of escape from
the bomb in most cases are many times greater
than they would be upstairs. If your basement has
two cxits, you will be in less danger of being
trapped.
Besides protecting you from blast and heat, base-
ments also provide shielding from explosive radia-
ll
THERE IS LITTLr
YOĂś CAN DO TO
PROTECT YOUR
HOĂśSE FROM
BLAST.
IT IS BEST TO
FIGUBE Ă–N
€OLiiW>SE OF
THE UPPER
FLOORS AND TO
TAKE COVER IN
THE CELLAR.
BASEMENTS
GIVE SHEITER
AGĂ„INST BLAST
AND HEAT. AND
RADIOACTlViTY.
IE YOĂś HAVE NO
BASEMENT,
ICATE A SHELTER
YOĂś CAN REACH
QĂśICKLY.
CYCLONE CELLARS
ARE EXCELLENT.
'TIREPROOF
HOUSEKEEPING"
IS impor;i^nt.
tion. Because, the lower you get, the more bar-
riers against radiation there are likely to be between
you and the bursting bomb. Down in the cellar
you'll probably be shielded not only by other build-
ings, but also by earth and the cement foundations
of your own house. Earth, concrete and steel are
good radiation barriers.
If you have no basement, look around your im-
mediate neighborhood for a nearby shelter you
can get to quickly in an enacrgency. Such a shelter
might be a culvert, a deep guUy, or another building
within easy reach. If you live in roUing country,
there is probably a hill close to you. Even a high
bank v^ill offer some protection from most bursts
if it is between you and the explosion. In choosing
your shelter, assume that the enemy will aim for
the industrial buildings.
If you live in a State where there is danger from
sudden storms like cyclones or hurricanes, you may
have a "cyclone cellarV or something similar. If
so, you have a shelter that will give excellent pro-
tection against atomic bombs.
HOW SHOULD A HOUSE
BE PREPARED?
Starting right now you should go in for "fire-
proof housekeeping." Don't let trash pile up
around your house and always keep it in covered
Containers.
Continued on page ig.
14
ATOMIC WEAPONS WILL NOT DESTROY THE EARTH
Atomic bombs hold more death and destruction than man
ever before has wrapped up in a single package, but their
over-all power still has very definite limits. Not even
hydrogen bombs will blow the earth apart or kill us all
by radioactivity.
DOUBLING BOMB POWER DOES NOT DOUBLE DESTRUCTION
Modern A-bombs can cause heavy damage 2 miles away,
but doubling their power would extend that ränge only co
2/2 miles. To Stretch the damage ränge from 2 to 4 miles
would require a weapon more than 8 titnes the rated power
of present modeis.
RADIOACTIVITY IS NOT THE BOMB'S GREATEST THREAT
In most atom raids, blast and heat are by far the greatest
dangers that people must face. Radioactivity alone would
account for only a small percentage of all human deaths
and injuries, except in Underground or underwater explosions.
RADIATION SICKNESS IS NOT ALWAYS FATAL
In small amounts, radioactivity seldom is harmful. Even
when serious radiation sickness follows a heavy dosage, there
is still a good chance for recovery.
15
SllftVlVM^ scc
-^«.•^äSt^t^vV 4^>^<•o^ ^-d»»ift-v4. r*^^^ "-^^i'!, t'ä^iftirtiiiiifif ■A.i...il>i
ALWAYS PUT FIRST THINGS FIRST AND
1. TRY TO GET SHIELDED
If you have time, get down in a basement or
subway. Should you unexpectedly be caught
out-of-doors, seek shelter alongside a building,
or jump in any Handy ditch or gutter.
2. DROP FLAT ON GROUND OR FLOOR
To keep from being tossed about and to lessen
the chances of being Struck by falling and
flying objects, Hatten out at the base of a
wall, or at the botiom of a bank.
3. BURY YOUR FACE IN YOUR ARMS
When you drop flat, hide your eyes in the crook
of your elbow. That will protect your face
from flash burns, prevent temporary blindness
and keep flying objects out of your eyes.
I
»
I
» fc../.! 1 1-Si.jf.l.
NEYER LOSE YOUR HEAD AND
4. DON'T RUSH OUTSIDE RIGHT AFTER A BOMBING
After an air burst, wait a f ew minutes
then go help to fight fires. After other kinds
of bursts wait at least i hour to give lingering
radiation some chance to die down.
5. DON'T TAKE CtiANCES WITH FOOD OR WATER
IN OPEN CONTAINERS
To prevent radioactive poisoning or
disease, select your food and water with
care. When there is reason to believe
they may be contaminated, stick to canned
and bottled things if possible.
6. DON'T START RUMORS
In the confusion that follows a bombing, a
Single rumor might touch off a panic that
could cost your life.
Remove this sheet and keep it with you unttl you^ve memorized it.
II
17
" '^'^ ^ .■';*^'«?v^
1. STRIVE FOR "FIREPROOF HOUSEKEEPING"
Don't let trash pile up, and keep waste paper in covered
Containers. When an alert sounds, do all you can to
eliminate sparks by shutting off the oil burner and cover-
ing all open flames.
2. KNOW YOUR OWN HOME
Know which is the safest part of your cellar, learn how to
turn off your oil burner and what to do about Utilities.
3. HAVE EMERGENCY EQUiPMENT AND
SUPPLIES HANDY
Always have a good flashlight, a radio, first-aid equip-
ment and a supply of canned goods in the house.
4. CLOSE ALL WINDOWS AND DOORS AND
DRAW THE BLINDS
If you have time when an alert sounds, dose the house
up tight in Order to keep out fire sparks and radioactive
dusts and to lessen the chances of being cut by flying
glass. Keep the house closed until all danger is past.
5. USE THE TELEPHONE ONLY FOR TRUE EMERGENCIES
Do not use the phone unless absolutely necessary. Leave
the lines open for real emergency traffic.
18
If you know you have time when an alert
sounds, be sure to shut the doors and Windows and
pull down the shades. This will help keep out
fire sparks.
If you have shutters or venetian blinds, or heavy
drapes, they will also provide some protection
against härm from flying glass.
Several other household precautions should be
taken promptly. Atomic bombs set off high above
ground seldom cause breaks in Underground gas or
water mains. However, shaking and twisting of
the buildings by the blast wave sometimes snaps
off household inlets at the point where they enter
the basement. This may allow gas or oil to flow
into your cellar.
To lessen the danger of fires and explosions
that could result from this leakage, you should
throw the electric switch that shuts- off your oil
burner.
Your local Utility companies can give you de-
tailed instructions about your gas, pilot lights, and
so on.
If you have a coal-burning f urnace or wood stove,
be sure to close all its fuel and draft doors. In
other words, do all you can to prevent sparks and
to put out or Cover open flames.
Should attack come without warning, take these
same precautions right after the raid. Keep at
least one flashlight handy and don't strike a match
to light your way down into a darkened base-
ment. Gas or oil fumes may be present and an
cxplosion could result.
II
WHEN ALERTED,
CLOSE ALL WIN-
DOWS AND DOORS
AND GUARD
AGAINST INJĂśRY
BY FLYING
GLASS.
TO PREVENT
HOUSEHOLD
EXPLOSIONS,
SHUT OFF OIL
BURNERS.
LOCAL UTILITY
COMPANIES WILL
GIVE YOU DETAILED
INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT
GAS, ELECTRICITY
AND SO ON.
KEEP A FLASH.
LIGHT HANDY.
AIR BURSTS
. LEĂ„YENO
ms ĂśNGER*
ING RADIO*
ACTIVITY.
ĂśNGERING
RADIOACTIVITY
COMES FROM
BOMB "Ă„SHES"
OR ĂĽfiEXPLODED
Ă„TOMIC FĂśEL.
^ »» *- ^^
i ĂśNGERING
RADIOACTIVITY
ACTS LIKE
DUST AND IS
HARD TO GEI
RIDOF. AVOID
IT WHENEVER
YOĂś CAN.
WHAT ABOUT
ĂśNGERING RADIOACTIVITY?
Knowing how to protect yourself from blast,
heat, and explosive radioactivity, only one major
problem remains: That is how to avoid härm from
lingering radioactivity.
Explosive radioactivity bursts from the bomb
at the time of explosion and lasts for only little
more than a minute.
Lingering radioactivity remains for a longer
time, from a few minutes to weeks or months,
depending on the kind of radioactive material.
Lingering radioactivity may become a danger
when atomic bombs are exploded on the ground,
Underground, or in the v^ater. Air bursts leave
no dangerous lingering radioactivity.
Most lingering radioactivity comes from left-
over bomb wastes, or "ashes," technically called
fission products. They consist of countless bil-
lions of fragments, or pieces, of atoms split up
in the explosion. Smaller, and usually less dan-
gerous, amounts of lingering radioactivity may
be thrown off by scattered atoms of uranium or
plutonium that fail to split up when the bomb
goes off.
These totally invisible radioactive particles act
much the same as ordinary, everyday dust. When
present in any real quantity, they are scattered
about in patches and contaminate, or poUute,
everything they fall on, including people. While
•'
they can be removed easily from some surfaces,
they stick very tightly to others. It is practically
impossible to get absolutely all of them out of
household corners and cracks. Most of the time,
it is far easier to prevent poUution than it is to
remove it.
WHAT ABOUT
RADIOACTIVE CLOUDS?
In spite of the huge quantities of lingering
radioactivity loosed by atomic explosions, people
fortunately are not very likely to be exposed to
dangerous amounts of it in most atomic raids.
Since high-level bursts do the greatest damage,
that is the kind we can expect most often. When
atomic weapons are exploded in mid-air, the
violent, upward surge of super-hot gases and air
quickly sweeps practically all the radioactive ashes
and unexploded bits of bomb fuel high into the
sky. Most of them are carried harmlessly off in
the drifting bomb clouds. High-level explosions
definitely will not create "areas of doom", where
no man dares enter and no plant can grow. In
fact, they will leave very little radioactivity on the
ground, even near the point of explosion. Fire-
fighters and rescue teams can move promptly
toward the center of destruction with little danger
of facing harmful radiation.
And regardless of all you may have heard or
read concerning the dangers of radioactive clouds,
21
IN AIR BURSTS
RADIOACTIVE
DUSTS ARE
SPREAD SO
WIDELY THAT
THEY ARE UN-
LIKELY TO HAi^M
PEOPLE.
AIR BURSTS
WILL NOT
CREATE "AREAS
OF DOOM."
DONT WORRY
ABOUT HIGH-
LEVEL RADIOACTIY
CLOUDS.
IT WOĂśID TAKE
lANY THOUSANDS
OF Ă„BOMBS TO
I PROOĂśCE
- DĂ„NGEROĂśS
GROĂśND
CONTAMINATiON.
NONE OF THE JAP-
ANESE AT HIROSHIMA
)R NAGASAKI WERE
HARMED BY
UNGERING RADIO-
ACTIYITY.
kilitltfifHil;IU:iii
ĂśSUALIY LEAVE
A LIMITED AREA
RADIOACTIVE.
after the first minute and a half there is actually
little or nothing to fear from those produced by
high-level bursts. While most of the radioactive
materials swept up into the sky eventually fall back
to earth, they are so widely and so thinly spread
that they are very unlikely to offer any real dan-
gers to humans. Thousands of bombs would have
to be set off in the air before serious ground con-
tamination would be found over really large areas.
There was no ground-level pollution of any im-
portance foUowing either of the two Japanese
atomic bombings.
It was said earlier that 15 percent of the Japa-
nese A-bomb deaths or injuries were caused by
radioactivity. But not one of them was caused by
the lingering kind. Explosive radioactivity caused
them all.
WHAT ABOUT GROUND
AND WATER BURSTS?
Bursts on or near the ground usually will leave
a limited area of rather heavy and often dangerous
pollution near the explosion point. In such cases,
the possibility of härm from radioactivity falling
out of the clouds is greater than in high-level explo-
sions. But even so, a person could escape contami-
nation by simply taking refuge inside a house or
even by getting inside a car and roUing up the Win-
dows. And even if some of the wastes feil on him,
he would lessen his chances of injury if he
promptly shed his clothes and took a bath or
shower.
22
'
1
In underwater explosions, large portions of the
bomb's radioactive wastes will be "trapped" by
the water and then spread over the immediate
area. Under these conditions, serious ground pol-
lution is to be expected.
After a water or Underground burst a cloud of
very radioactive mist or dust might form and
spread, particularly down wind, injuring people
who weren't well sheltered.
If the explosion has been Underground, at
ground level, or in the water, stay in your shelter.
If caught in the open, get indoors right away.
Then stay indoors for at least an hour or until you
get instructions. It may be necessary to stay inside
for three or four hours. The reason for this is that
most lingering radioactivity loses its power very
fast. So staying undercover for a while will greatly
reduce the danger.
Any rain or mist that comes right after an atomic
explosion should be considered dangerous, even
though it may not always be radioactive. Keep
from getting wet if you possibly can.
And remember that an air burst will leave no
lingering radioactivity of importance, so after a
^ew minutes it will be safe to get. out and help
fight fires or to help people who may need it.
HOWIS
RADIOACTIVITY DETECTED?
While we cannot see, hear, feel, smell, or taste
radioactivity, its presence readily can be detected
23
UNDERWATER
A'BOMBS
FRODUCE
SERIOUS LINGER-
ING RADIATION.
STAY UNDER
COVER FOR AT
LEAST AN HOUR
AFTER GROUND
OR UNDERWATER
BURSTS.
AYOID GETTING
WET AFTER
UNDERWATER
BURSTS.
YOĂś WONT
j NEID AN
INSTRUMENT
^ TO DETECT
RĂ„DIOĂ„CTIVITY.
SPECIĂ„LISTS
WILL DO IT
FOR YOĂś.
THE RADIO-
ACTIVITYFROM
YOUR LUMiNOUS
WRISTWATCH
I DIALCAN BE
DETECTED EASILY.
COVER YOUR.
SELF TO AYOID
CONTAMINATION
WITH RĂ„OIO-
ACTIVE
MATERIALS.
with Geiger counters and other instruments.
However, you won't have to know how to use
one of these. Instead, you can rely on your
local radiological defense teams — a small, specially
trained corps of "meter readers" — to warn you of
the presence of lingering radioactivity. You also
can count on them to see to it that firefighters,
rescue workers, and other people who may have
to enter contaminated places do not remain there
long enough to be injured.
But always remember our sunlight comparison.
There is usually a whale of a difference between
detectahle and dangerous amounts of radioactivity.
The rays and particles from an ordinary, luminous-
dial wrist watch will cause a roar in the earphones
of a Geiger counter, as just one example. We
must not lose our heads just because radioactivity
is reported as present.
WHAT ABOUT
PROTECTING YOURSELF
FROM LINGERING RADIOACTIVITY?
While attempting to avoid exposure to the
bomb's blast, heat, and explosive radioactivity, also
do what you can to keep from being showered by
radioactive waste materials. Inside a shelter or
building there is little or nothing to fear from
this source. But if caught out-of-doors, try to
grab hold of something to cover yourself with
when you fall to the ground. A board or some
24
.1
sheets of newspaper might help, but a raincoat
would be better. The object is, of course, to keep
radioactive dust and raindrops off your body and
clothing. When it's safe to get up, throw away
your covering.
Always do what you can to help other people.
There is no chance of your being harmed by radio-
activity from the bodies of others, even if they have
radiation injuries. Don't leave injured people
where they may be burned. Direct rescue workers
to persons trapped in the wreckage. If necessary
to bandage open cuts and wounds and no Standard
first aid equipment is available, use parts of your
own or the victim's clothing. But tear them from
the under, not the outer garments. Underclothes
are far less likely to be contaminated by radio-
activity.
If you have walked through rubble from a
ground burst or water from an underwatcr burst,
be sure to change at least your outer garments and
shoes. Outer clothes will automatically serve as
a "trap" for most of the radioactivity you may ac-
cidentally pick up. By taking them off you will
remove most of the contamination. If the cloth-
ing is heavily contaminated, it is best to bury it.
You also should manage to take a bath or shower,
if you have been in an area of lingering radio-
activity. It is important that all radioactive ma-
terials be removed as soon as possible from your
body, and bathing is the only practical means of
getting rid of them. You won't necd special clean-
ing Compounds. Warm water and soap are ideal.
In washing, pay particular attention to your
25
DO ALL YOĂś
CAN TO HELP
OTHER
PEOPLE.
CHANCE ALL
OUTER GAR-
MENTS AFTER
LEAVIN6 A
CONTAMINATED
AREA.
TO REMOVE
RADIOACTIVE
WASTES, SCRUB
YOUR BODY
TH0R0Ăś6HLY.
i
YOU CAN
6ET RID OF
ALL THE
RADIOĂ„CTIVE
DIRT YOU'VE
PICKED ĂśP
IF YOU KEEP
SCRUBBING.
KEEP AU
WINDOWS AND
DOORS CLDSED
ĂśNTIL IT IS
OFFICIALLY
REPORTED
THAT THERE
iS NO POL-
LUTION IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD.
hair, for that is one place where the wastes are sure
to pile up. Also give your hands a good scrubbing
and get all dirt out from under your fingernails.
If there is a radiological defense man handy, have
him check you with his meter after you've finished
your clean-up. Should he find your body still ra-
dioactive, again scrub yourself from head to foot.
Then do it a third time if necessary. You can re-
move practically all of the radioactivity if you
keep at it.
Remember all this is necessary only for persons
who have come in contact with radioactive ma-
terials in heavily contaminated areas.
WHAT ABOUT RADIOACTIVITY
IN THE HOUSE?
A few simple Steps will go a long way toward
keeping your house from being contaminated by
lingering radioactive wastes scattered about in
some bombings. As a rule, it is far easier to pre-
vent radioactive pollution of a household than it
is to remove it.
Keep all windcws and doors closed for at least
several hours after an atomic bombing. In fact,
better leave them shut until civil defense authori-
ties pass the word that there is no lingering radio-
activity in your neighborhood. Should you get
an official report that there is serious contamina-
tion in the vicinity, better cover all broken Win-
dows with blankets or cardboard.
26
Whenever there is widespread neighborhood
pollution, it will be impossible lo keep your house
absolutely free of it. A little is bound to seep in
through cracks or eise down the chimney. (By
all means close the dampers in fireplace flues and
shut off air conditioners and ventilating fans not
equipped with special filters) . Unless you are care-
ful, some radioactivity is likely to be tracked in by
people or pets. Keep your cat or dog indoors.
And when you come in from outside, leave your
shoes at the door, for their soles are likely to be
covered with radioactive dusts. Better still, wear
rubbers, galoshes or other disposable foot cover-
ings over your shoes. Take these precautions, but
don't worry. There isn't much chance really
dangerous amounts will pile up in the house.
Should you help to clean up a contaminated
area, you might get some radioactive materials
on both your body and clothing. So don't go
home and sit around in your work clothes. Take
off your outer garments outdoors or in the base-
ment. Then wash, if you can, using warm water
and plenty of soap. Never fall to launder your
working clothes, but don't use the family washing
machine. Scrub all contaminated objects in
buckets or tubs used for that purpose only.
WHAT ABOUT FOOD AND WATER?
To prevent härm from accidentally eating or
drinking radioactivity, throw out all unpackagcd
foods that were lying around where dust from
27
CLOSE FIREPLACE
DAMPERS AND SHĂś'
OFF VENTILATING
FANS AND AIR j
CONDITIONERS. ^
BE CAREFUL
NOT TO TRACK
RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS
INTO THE
HOUSE.
LAUNDER
CONTAMINATED
OBJECTS IN
SPECIAL
BUCKETS
OR TUBS.
I
- WĂ„TCH OUT
FOR FOOD
eOHTĂ„MlNĂ„TION
ARÂŁR GROUND
- OR WATER
BĂśRSTS.
vlJii^iÄC
PIP^S OF YOĂśR
"OUSEĂ„T THE
Tl»€ OF EXPLO-
SION WILL NOT
IE RĂ„DIOĂ„CTIVE.
BOIL WĂ„TER
BEFORE
^ DRINKiNG
ILESS YOĂś'VE
EENOFnCIAUY
TOLD IT IS SAFE.
ground bursts or mist from underwater bursts
might have settled on them. And before opening
canned or bottled goods, wash the outside of the
Containers thoroughly. That will remove most
of the pollution that may have gotten on them.
Also be sure that all cooking Utensils and table-
ware are scrubbed clean in order to remove any
invisible, radioactive dusts. Food and Utensils
that were in closed drawers or tight cupboards
will be all right.
If it was an air burst, don't worry about the food
in the house. It will be safe to use.
Be careful of drinking water after atomic ex-
plosions. There is little or no chance that water
actually inside household pipes at the time of
attack will be made radioactive. If a little is
drawn off right after the burst and placed in
clean Containers with Covers, it should tide you
over the immediate post-raid period.
But even if the water continues running, don't
keep on using tap water for drinking purposes un-
less you have received official information that the
city System is safe, This is not only because of
radioactivity, but because of other dangers like
typhoid that can come from damaged water Sys-
tems. If you have to use city water before you get
official information, boil it. Boiling won't remove
radioactivity, but the chances that your water sup-
ply will be radioactive are pretty slim. Boiling will
kill most germs that may get into damaged water
mains.
28
WHAT ABOUT RADIOS
AND TELEPHONES?
Neither explosive nor lingering radioactivity has
any effect on the Operation of most mechanical or
electrical devices. Unless the wires are down or
there is a power failure, both your lights and tele-
phone should continue to work. But don't rush
to the phone just to find out how Aunt Susie may
have weathered the attack. Leave the lines open
for real emergency trafhc.
The bomb's radioactivity will not interfere with
the Operation of your radio. In the event of attack,
be sure to turn it on. It may be your main source
of emergency instructions. And don't forget:
Battery-operated portable sets, including those in-
stalled in automobiles, will continue to work even
if the city power goes off. Television reception,
like radio, won't be jammed by radioactivity.
WHAT ABOUT AUTOMOBILES?
One more household Suggestion: In times of
emergency don't park the family automobile on
the Street. Leave the way clear for emergency
traffic. Keep the Windows rolled up to prevent
possible contamination of the interior by under-
water or ground bursts and don't worry whether
or not it will run. Radioactivity won't interfere
with Operation of its fuel or ignition System.
.â– *ri
"1^'
YOĂśR TELE-
PHONE
CONTINUE 16
WORK, ĂśSE IT
ONLY FOR TRĂśE
EMERGENCIES.
KEEP THE
FAMILY CAR
OFF THE STREET.
RADIOACTIVITY
WILL NOT INTER.
FERE WITH ITS
OPERATION.
29
EVERYTHIN6 IN
THIS BOOKLET
Ă„PPĂśES TO ALL
MEMBERS OF THE
FAMILY.
slll^Vf^lIVI
ARE THE GREATEST
DANGERS YOU
FACE
WHAT ABOUT CHILDREN?
Everything in this booklet holds true for all
members of the family, including children, old
people, or shut-ins. It would be a good idea to
talk over the facts with all members of the family
to be sure each understands. People with school
children should discuss the booklet with teachers
and other parents at PTA meetings and similar
gatherings.
You may be sure that, in times of emergency,
all schools will be well organized for the protec-
tion of children.
Children old enough to understand can be
taught to do the right things. Younger children
simply will have to depend on their parents.
TO SUM UP
To sum up, always remember that blast and
heat are the two greatest dangers you face. The
things that you do to protect yourself from these
dangers usually will go a long way toward pro-
viding protection from the explosive radioactivity
loosed by atomic explosions.
While the lingering radioactivity that occa-
sionally follows some types of atomic bursts may
be dangerous, still it is no more to be feared than
typhoid fever or other diseases that sometimes
follow major disasters. The only difference is that
we can't now ward it off with a shot in the arm;
you must simply take the known Steps to avoid it.
30
If you follow the pointers in this little booklet,
you stand far better than an even chance of sur-
viving the bomb's blast, heat, and radioactivity.
What's more, you will make a definite contribu-
tion to civil defense in your Community, because
civil defense must Start with you. But if you lose
your head and blindly attempt to run from the
dangers, you may touch of! a panic that will cost
your life and put tremendous obstacles in the way
of your Civil Defense Corps.
KEEP YOUR
HEĂ„O. DONT
TOUCH OFF Ă„
PANIC THAT
MAY COST
YOUR LIFE.
31
PLEASE NOTE
With the release of this booklet, permission auto
matically is granted to any responsible Organiza-
tion, institution, individual or concern which
wishes to republish it for free distribution, legiti-
mate promotional purposes or for sale.
In reproducing this booklet, advertising, promo-
tional material, art work, and typographical styling
should conform to the tenor of the text.
No alteration should be made in the text nor
should reproduction be in extract or digest form,
except for review purposes.
The center insert (pages 15, 16, 17, and 18) may
be published separately.
Bulk copies of this booklet may be purchased
from the Superintendent of Documents, Washing-
ton 25, D. C, at a 25 percent discount for Orders in
excess of 100. Individual copies are for sale at 10
Cents each. Those reproducing this booklet for
sale should be guided by the prices quoted above in
establishing sale prices for their own editions.
The Civil Defense Office will be glad to cooper-
ate with those who wish to reproduce this booklet
by reviewing for accuracy any art or promotional
material which they may decide to use.
^ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : O — 1950
The
rrice
of
Liberty
Official Condensalion ../ the firs« «./.or/ I» ihe Congress by ihe
National Security Training Commission
December 1951
The Price
of
Liberty
A Condensed Version of the First
Report to the Congress by the
National Security Training
Commission
DECEMBER 1951
This is an official condensation of "UNIVERSAL
MILITARY TRAINING: Foundation of En-
during National Strength", the first report to
Congress by the National Security Training Com-
mission, which fĂĽll report is available from the
Superintendent of Documents, Government
Printing Qffice, Washington 25, D. C, price 35
Cents.
NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING COIVIMISSION
James W. Wadsworth, Chairman
William L. Clayton, Commissioner
Dr. Karl T. Compton, Commissioner
Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, USN, Commissioner
Lt. Gen. Raymond S. McLain, USA, Commissioner
PROFESSIONAL STAFF
Wm. Howard Gammon, Acting Executive Director
Edgar G. Shelton, Jr., Asst. to the Executive Director
■. «. GOVERNMEHT PRINTlNü OFFICE: I9SI
For sale by the Superintendent of Documonts, TT. S. Government l»rinting Office
Washington 25, D. C. - Price 15 cents
^^Eternal vigilance is the price of liherty'^ —
JOHN PHILPOT CURRAN
''God grants liherty only to those who love it, and are always ready to guard
and defend it.''"' —
DANIEL WEBSTER
(III)
Contents
Page
I. INTRODUCTION 1
The New Frontier 1
The Nation Acts 1
Need for a Long-Term Military Pohcy 2
Failures of the Fast 2
The Threat to Freedom 4
The Penalty for Unpreparedness 5
The Obhgation of Gitizenship 5
We Must Not Again Demobilize Into a Vacuum 6
Essentials of a Balanced Security Program 7
The First Step 8
When Can the Program Begin? 8
n. SUMMARYOFCOMMISSION'SRECOMMENDATIONS . 10
Training Plans of Military Departments 10
Physical and Mental Standards for Induction 11
Scheduling Inductions into the Corps 11
Protection of Weifare and Morals 12
Code of Conduct for the Corps 13
Permanent Supervisory Role of This Commission ..... 13
What Will the Program Cost? 14
Benefits of UMT Program 15
Need for Prompt Enactment of Legislation 16
The Frontier Response 16
(IV)
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Liberty is not a trinket to be cheaply purcliased at a bar^ain counter.
It is the most priceless of all possessions, purcliased at the price of
sacrifice— retained at the price of vigilance. For this reason, coura-
geous peoples striving for the ideals of freedom and human dignity
have always been willing to pay the price.
The price of liberty is dear, but default in payment would be tragic.
Americans have never defaulted.
THE NEW FRONTIER
In the early days of this Nation when the frontier lay just beyond
the doorstep, Citizens calmly accepted the necessity for military trani-
ing for the men of their communities. These early Americans learned
to expect savage and deadly attacks at any moment, and were found
prepared when danger Struck unexpectedly in the black of night or
through the dark woods at the edge of the Clearing.
The days are long since gone when the munitions of war consisted
of the family musket and a few rounds of sliot, and when all the men
in the family over the age of U were capable of using tliese weapons
to advantage.
Days of danger are still upon us.
The trend of liistory is beginning to run strikingly parallel to the
days of the frontier. Due to the increased deadliness of weapons and
speeded transportation, the United States and, indeed, the eiitire
World, lives in a frontier environment.
On this new frontier danger can strike swiftly and unexpectedly
from across the reaches of the world. The facts are clear. Tliey
cannot be ignored simply because they are unpleasant.
The retum to frontiei' conditions demands a frontier response.
THE NATION ACTS
Through the enactment of Public Law 51 in June of this year, the
Nation lias responded. Thus, uiider the crushing press of world
events, Congress has approved the principle of Universal Military
Training. That law, which amended the Selective Service Act of
1948 and which appropriately renamed it "The Universal Military
Training and Service Act," provided that during the inimediate crisis
the United States would continue its teniporary program of induction
for Service. The sanie Act created the National Security Training
Corps and a permanent body, the National Security Training Com-
mission, to which it gave two major tasks: (1) To develop the broad
outline and machinery of a specific UMT program for consideration
by the Congiess, and (2) to exercise general supervision over the
training of the National Security Training Corps, "which training
shall be basic military training."
NEED FOR A LONG-TERM MILITARY POLICY
The far-reaching action of Congress in the enactment of Public
Law 51 into law is deeply significant. It was taken at a time when
urgent need exists for the adoption of a military program which will
make its weight feit innnediately upon the scales of w^orlcl power.
It Avas taken at a time when contimiing need exists for a long-term
j)reparedness through an extended program of military training.
Tliis action reflects a realization, even in the heat and tension of
crisis, that the major problems we face in the world will be of long
duration. No tidy or decisive conclusion is to be expected soon.
Consequently, our basic and long-term military policies must pro-
vide for swift adjustment between periods of acute crisis and periods
of relative calm. The former demand large standing forces, the
latter smaller standing forces plus a large, trained, and ready reserve.
Approval of the principle of UMT reflects an undei^tanding that
in the past the Nation has not provided for intelligent, long-term mili-
tary policies. Instead, the Nation has marched up and down the hill
of preparedness, arining and disarming as the winds of international
piracy blew hot and cold.
Foreign policy in a bandit world must be based upon strength, the
only force which dictatore respect. Too often ours has been based
upon hope rather than might— has had for its f oundation the quicksand
of weakness rather than the concrete of military preparedness. This
has crippled and plagued the conduct of a consistent foreign policy
based upon the strength of free men.
One important lesson is apparent from this— deinocracy numt be
durable if it is to survive.
FAILURES OF THE PAST
The world has had repeated Instruction, with all the tyrants of his-
tory as its schoolmaster, in the lesson: "Unpreparedness invites
disaster." The bully always selects as his victims those who are weak.
A nation which prepares for nothing and hopes for the best is likely
to suffer the worst. A nation which is prepared for the worst is more
likely to avoid the cataclysm of war; is more likely to survive in a
jungle world where nations of prey wait hopefully for the weak
passerby.
History confirms this truth.
During the 1980's this Nation was unarmed.
Loud and feverish talk and Indignation were no match for the tanks
and cannons of the aggiessoi^s. We stood helpless, unable to stem
the onward rush of deadly events which burst upon the world ni all
their frightfulness in World War IL
Lives were lost ; homes were destroyed ; money was spent ; dreams
were demolished ; hearts were broken.
After enormous effort and heroic sacrifice, the Nation and its allies
triumphed over the aggressoi^.
Yet, by 1946 another even greater menace had arisen— Soviet com-
munism was on the march.
Once again we were unarmed.
Once again we had demobilized into a vacuum.
The recl flags of warning along this Nation's route of unpreparedness
are well known to all. The Berlin Blockade, the assault upon Czecho-
slovakia, the caref ully manufactured unrest in Western Europe, were
the warning flashes of lightning upon the horizon which preceded the
storm in Korea.
Whether it was due to the very brilliance of the warning flashes or
to our own inward blindness to reality, the Nation f ailed to respond m
time to avoid another tragecly.
Our past weaknesses of will and arms must be regarded as moral
failures, for they led to needless death and destruction. In the 1930's
our failure was a practical f actor in bringing on World War IL
By our studied inability to detect our true national interest, by our
deep reluctance to forge strong military power, by our failure to act m
time, we encouraged aggressoi-s and dismayed our f riends.
Approval of universal military training is a recognition of these
grave errors of our past, and a partial reassurance that they will not
occur agam.
The national decision to approve an enduring System of military
training reflects a more realistic view of the present conflict and the
march of history which produced the struggle between the East and
the West.
Now military training for all is to be integrated in the structure
of our national life. The duty of citizenship will be bestowed upon
all able bodied young men.
The Nation cannot but benefit.
THE THREAT TO FREEDOM
We live in a period of broad, swift, and far-reacliing cliange.
The past 35 years liave witnessed two global wars of treiiiendous
violence and brutality.
The Russian and Chinese Revolntions led to events which danger-
ously challenge freedom everywhere.
The war in Korea began. Its logical conclusion cannot be foreseen.
Five empires have collapsed.
The British and French imperial Systems have seriously declined.
The leading nations of AVestern Enrope have abdicated their world
leadership and passed that bĂĽrden and honor to the United States.
Since 1915 world power has gravitated to two centers— the United
States and the Soviet Union.
The fate of Western Civilization is now in our hands.
The piirposes of the two power centers— the United States and the
Soviet Union— are in basic conflict. Those who control the Soviet
Union and the international Comnuinist movement aim at a slave
World with the Kremlin as the master. The United States aims at the
preservation of the integrity and vitality of a free society founded
upon the dignity and worth of the individual. Because the leaders
of the Soviet Union seek to impose their tyranny over the rest of the
World, the United States and free men everywhere are engaged in a
mortal struggle with Soviet communism which will continu'e luitil the
conflict is resolved.
The challenge to the United States is total. It is condncted upon
every plane of existence. It is an attack upon all the religious, social
and ethical values of free society and upon the physical environment
in which these values have their life. Where efforts to confuse and
subvert have failed, the Soviet leaders have demonstrated that their
use of force is purely a matter of exj^ediency limited only by a concern
for their own interest and security.
Seen in this context of broad change and mortal conflict, Universal
Mihtary Training is an instrument ideally suited to our purpose. It
can maintain a workable balance of power or provide a basis for fĂĽll
and rapid mobilization of trained manpower in the event of total war
An effective Universal Military Training program can be a vital
factor m the long-term task of maintaining a power balance capable of
combatmg the hostile forces now at work in the world.
It would permit swift expansion of our standing forces for the pur-
pose of resolving a specific local crisis by a show of force.
It would enable us to meet force with force, as in Korea.
After a reasonable period of time. along with a vigorous reserve
program, UMT should permit reductions in the size of the standing
forces. Thus, the heavy financial burdens and social dangers which
large regulär military forces impose ui)on society could be eliminated.
THE PENALTY FOR UNPREPAREDNESS
UMT will also provide a fairer distribution of the military bĂĽrden
during the uncertain period ahead. The attack upon South Korea in
June 1950 cruelly revealed the heartbreaking price that nuist be paid
for military unpreparedness. During the immediate postwar period,
the United States relied unduly upon the unproved doctrine that the
advent of the atomic age had eliminated the need for large military
forces. At the same time we relied unjustly upon the reservoir of
seasoned veterans recently returned from Europe and the Pacific.
Although this reservoir of fit and available men was steadily diminish-
ing, its existence was used as an argument for reducing the regulär
Armed Forces to a dangerously low level.
When the attack came in Korea on June 25, the United States was
caught in a self-induced shortage of trained military manpower. The
regulär units were at half-strength. There was no class of young and
basically trained graduates of a UMT program ready to take their
place in the battleline. With few exceptions, the reservists and Na-
tional Guardsmen who had fought the Second World War were the
only source of men.
The Situation was desperate. Thousands of veteran-reservists were
called to fill the ranks. Many have died. Many more are suffering
a second disruption of their lives and careers.
While duty to country outweighs all other considerations in time of
danger, it should be clear that the large-scale recall of veteran-
reservists has been not only tragically unfair, but wasteful as well.
In the long-term crisis that confronts us, we must as a Nation be
capable of respondingto periodic military alai'ms, including total war,
in the manner least upsetting to our society. Many reservists sent to
Korea were husbands and f athers. Some were in business which ren-
dered important Services to their communities. Others were beginning
to make contributions in neglected and essential professions, such as
teaching. On the other band, some who had Jobs deemed essential
to the national interest were def erred to the detriment of their Reserve
or Guard units. Too often such occupational deferments deprived
those units of key officers and noncoms. The painf ul necessity of re-
calling veteran-reservists was bitter testimony to short-sighted policy
and pfanning. Through Universal Military Training and a workable
Reserve program, this tragic Situation may in time be remedied.
THE OBLIGATION OF CITIZENSHIP
The approval of UMT is significant for another supremely impor-
tant reason. It is tangible evidence that the ultimate Obligation of
973551°— 51-
citizenship— the bearing of arms in defense of the community— shall
now be made clear.
It has ahvavs been implied.
Tragic as it niay seenu every generation of Americans, withont
exception, has had to go to war. Yet in the past they have gone off
hirgely unprepared, psychologically or physically. Each generation,
fresh from its own sufferings on tlie battlefield, has wished fervently
that war could be abolished, and nearly all of them have allowed this
wish to blind them to the hard fact that armed conflict is a deadly
disease ever present and long rampant in the world.
This disregard of reality has resnlted in the needless death of many
thonsands. Young men, whose parents and commnnities have put
f orth great effort to prepare them f or the crises of life and work, have
consistently been denied the military training which would provide
them with a better-than-average chance to survive in battle.
Yet in time of war the Nation has always called them to the colors
and sent them into combat with hasty and sometimes inadequate
training.
Too often their early education has failed to impart to them a clear
awareness of their historic Obligation to bear arms, to pledge their
lives to duty and country. This denial to our sons of the hard facts
of the World in which they live has been short-sighted and unjust.
It has too often left them unprepared, in military skills and mental
outlook, to face the most basic of all human challenges — the challenge
of life and death upon the battlefield. Because of these successive
failures, many young Americans have lost their lives who might other-
wise have lived.
An effective VWT program would be a partial assurance against
the recurrence of such tragedy.
WE MUST NOT AGAIN DEMOBILIZE INTO A VACUUM
Dictators' hopes for world domination have always been rooted in
the belief that the democracies would eventually allow their defenses
to sag into nothingness — into a vacuum. So long as the military
power of the United States has been represented almost entirely by
its regulär Armed Forces, our enemies have believed that w^e would
allow our strength to slip away with the years. History proves that
we have an ingrained suspicion of standing Armed Forces and have
cut them back at every opportunity, with small regard for the real
dangers confronting us. Moreover, the economic and social dangers
of maintaining large standing forces indefinitely have alw ays been
real. Even an economy as dynamic as our own would be gravely
strained if it were long required to continue its present contribution
e
to the American Armed Forces, while at the same time lending eco- ^
nomic and military support to the balance of the free world.
Universal Military Training provides our country with msurance
against these two dangers. By transferring a large portion of the
responsibility for security to a continually vitalized Citizens' reserve,
it provides us with depth in trained military manpower. A large
reserve force is a basic need before there caii be any large reduction
in our standing forces. It provides a method for achieving reason-
able protection at a cost that can be borne over an extended period.
With an efticient Universal Military Training program operating m
combination with other elements vital to our security, we may hope
to remain strong enough over the years to discourage or repel any
military threat. This we can do without underminmg the mam-
stays of our greatness— industrial, scientific and educational suprem-
acy, freedom. and democratic institutions.
ESSENTIALS OF A BALANCED SECURITY PROGRAM
UMT is only one of several elements vital to our military security.
Failure to recognize this truth could be dangerous if UMT were, for
example, to become an excuse for a rapid and helter-skelter reduction
in the strength of our regulär Armed Forces. The same would apply
if reliance upon UMT were to lead us to withhold needed support
from our programs of scientific research and development, mdustrial
mobilization, the maintenance of a world-wide intelligence System,
and other vital security measures.
The success of a Universal Military Training program is also
closely related to the establishment and Operation of a vigorous re-
serve program that will sharpen and keep fresh the basic and tech-
nical training which young men will receive through UMT. All ot
the Commission's thinking about UMT is founded upon the vital
assumption that a sound reserve structure for the Armed Forces will
emercre from the current congressional deliberations on this siibject.
UMT has its limitations. It represents, in the period immediately
ahead, no alternative to the maintenance of substantial regulär armed
forces.
However, there are urgent social and economic reasons for beginning
to Scale down the number of men required on extended active duty in
the Armed Forces just as soon as enough trained reserves are available
to permit that to be done with saf ety.
If we are to maintain our free society over the long and critical
period ahead, we believe that the United States must resolve its
military manpower problem through the combination of UMT and
a revitalized reserve.
THE FIRST STEP
The first step toward an operating Universal Military Training
prograni lies in congressional approval of specific legislative recom-
mendations affecting tlie National Security Training Corps. In ac-
cordance with the mandate contained in tlie Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, our report contains such recommendations. If
Ihese should provide a basis for affirmative action by the Congress,
UMT niay get under way wlien the President or the Congress deem
it advisable to reduce or eliniinate the i)eriod of niilitary Service
now prescribed for young nien under 19 years of age.
WHEN CAN THE PROGRAM BEGIN?
The Universal Military Training and Service Act provides that
UMT may go into Operation only af ter the period of Service for young
men under the age of 19 is reduced f rom 24 months to some shorter
period of time. This action to reduce the period of Service for tliis
age gi-oup can be taken by the President, upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Defense, whenever it is found that such action
is justified by the strength of the Armed Forces in the light of inter-
national conditions. The Congress may also take such action by
concurrent resolut ion.
In the light of present world uncertainties the precise date of
commencement of a program of Universal Military Training is beyond
anyone's poAver to forecast accurately.
The decision rests with the President or the Congress; and the vital
question they must consider in this regard may be simply stated : When
will the general Situation permit a reduction in the required period
of Service for young men under 19?
At present, the Armed Forces are drawing on all physically fit men
in the age groups I8I/2 to 26 who are not exempt or permanently
deferred from mihtary Service. This means that maintenance of
the present niilitary forces of ap})roximately 3.6 million men is re-
quiring the extraction from the manpower pool each year of more
men than are entering this manpower pool as they reacli the age of
I814. Unless the present outlook materially changes, the prospect
is extended niilitary Service for all young men.
The Commission is nevertheless firm in its conviction that the pro-
gram should get under way at the earliest possible date. We believe
the Nation must soon find relief from the crushing burdens of a huge
Standing Army, Navy, and Air Force.
However, we de not underestimate the present dangers.
i
Indeed, it is because these dangers are likely to be of long dura-
tion that we believe the Nation must reorganize its defenses. We
must be able to support our defenses for a number of years without
endangering our produetive economy or impairing our democratic
Society.
As soon as a reasonable number of young men under 19 can be
spared from induction for service in the Armed Forces, they could be
inducted into a Universal Military Training program and after gradu-
atinfif from UMT be transferred into the reserve. Such an arrange-
ment, which would be consistent with the provisions of Public Law 51,
would permit the orderly installation of the program on a modest
Scale, and would constitute the first step in a gradual transition of most
of our trainable men from the regulär Armed Forces to UMT and the
reserves.
8
9
Chapter II
SUMMARY OF COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS
TRAINING PLANS OF MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
The military departments are moving f orward in their development
of specific UMT programs. Teiitative plaiis call for the Army to traiii
50 percent of tlie inen inducted into the National Secunty Tramnig
Corps, the Navy and the Marine Corps 28 percent, and the, Air Porce
22 percent. Each military department will carry out the trainmg
procrram as a function separate from its regulär functions. The m-
structors who will train our young men will be both military and
civilian, but all will be outside the regularly authorized strength ot
the Arnied Forces. If this Separation were not maintained, the UMT
pro<Tram would dilute the combat capabilities of our standmg forces
by denying to them the needed facilities and Services of officers and
enlisted men required to conduct the UMT program.
We recommend that young men should receive 6 continuous months
of training. During this (5 months, trainees would not be subject to
military service and could not be trained at shore installations outside
of the United States. Training would be both basic and technical.
Training plans are not based upon marching and other routme drills.
Training would be for twentieth Century warf are and would take fĂĽll
account of modern technical developments. All the programs should
be designed to send men into the reserve with a realistic knowledge of
military Organization and military life, coupled with enough technical
training to constitute a firm foundation upon which to build in later
reserve training.
Skill is not inborn in man. It takes tinie to develop. It can only
be acquired through tough and realistic training for survival. In time
of war nothing is more tragic than to see a courageous but unskilled
man die simply because he does not have the skill to survive on the field
of battle. The Nation owes to its sons the opportunity to survive in
the eventuality of war. In the past the reasons the Nation has given
for its failure to adequately train our young men have been wrong.
We have said, ''Do not train our young men to die on a battlefield."
We should have said, "Train our young men so that they have a chance
to survive on a battlefield." The untrained are those who die need-
lessly. A realistic training program is training for life— not for death.
10
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL STANDARDS FOR INDUCTION
The Universal Military Training and Service Act states clearly
that the UMT program is to be exclusively military in character.
This means that minimum Standards of mental and physical accept-
ability must be adopted. These would be too high to permit of
"Universal" application.
The military departments have already lowered their acceptance
Standards to a point where further reductions would produce serious
results. Even though a truly universal program would be highly
desirable, it would be better to exclude the physically and mentally
handicapped from a UMT program. They could be called up quickly
in time of fĂĽll mobilization and their civilian skills used effectively.
Six months of basic military training for this group would not in-
crease their potential military contribiition enough to justify the
extra expense and administrative load which their training would
impose upon the military departments. With the exception of these
vouths w^ho fall below minimum mental or physical Standards, all
young men should be subject to induction into the Corps, in a train-
ing program of this relatively short length there should be virtually
no deferments.
SCHEDULING INDUCTIONS INTO THE CORPS
Inductions should be scheduled on a basis that will minimize the
disruption to the lives of our young men. That plan must represent
a just compromise between the need for an efficient and economical
training program and a concern for the welfare of the individual.
It is our belief that the needs of the Nation and the individual will
be best served by monthly inductions through Selective Service.
Every young man would have the right to volunteer for induction at
a time of his choice, within the limits of established quotas. Such a
combination of mandatory and voluntary inductions, intelligently
administered, would prove sufficiently flexible to carry out the train-
ing program effectively. At the same time account could be taken
of^'the Wide differences in circumstances and personal preference
among the trainees. With the Cooperation of Colleges and high
schools, it should be possible for most young men who intend to con-
tinue their education to complete their 6 months of military training
without the loss of a fĂĽll academic year. It is believed that educators
are willing to make reasonable adjustments in their schedules if they
can receive some assurance that the new condition will be enduring
and not merely another in an endless series of disruptive changes.
11
PROTECTION OF WELFARE AND MORALS
It is anticipated by the Commission that the time will eventiially
come when most young men lipon reaching the age of 18 will be in-
diicted into the National Security Training Corps. By nndergoing
training, these young men will be fulfilling one of their obligations of
citizenship. At the same time the Government will assmne an equally
important Obligation. From the care of the home, young men will
be transferred to the care of the Armed Forces. The duties of these
agencies are no less than the duties of good parents. The training
agencies, under the watchful eye of this Commission, must provide
trainees with guidance and discipline, with recreation and healthful
living surroundings, with wholesome food, and with medical care.
The moral atmosphere must be on a high plane. Sources of tempta-
tion must be removed from the vicinity of training centers or declared
ofF-limits. FĂĽll facilities for religious worship must be provided for
those of all faiths. Officer and training personnel must be of the
highest moral type, for the trainees will look to these men for
example and leadership. This much the Commission will demand as
a minimum.'
The program should incorporate all the advantages to health,
education, character development and training for citizenship which
can be provided without surrendering the essential military objec-
tives. Unless the training contributes in a meaningf ul way to a youth's
readiness to defend himself and bis country, it cannot be justified. But
there is every reason for confidence that this military preparation can
be successfully combined with measures intended to make this a
period of mental, physical and moral growth for our young men.
Universal military training, involving as it does a sharing of the
responsibility for safeguarding our democracy, can and should repre-
sent a historic step forward in the ability of Americans to live and
work together for the common good.
We have recommended detailed legislative proposals to promote
the safety, health, welfare, and morals of the Corps. However, the
measures which can be spelled out in law are but a small part of the
total required. Laws prohibit or restrict, whei^as the greater need
is to inspire and lead, to establish high Standards of honorable conduct
within the program. Evidence of these would be observed in the
trainee's basic sense of responsibility. an understanding of his obli-
gations to his country. a sense of pride in his unit, a desire to achieve
excellence in military skills, moderation in his personal habits, and
tolerance toward his fellow man.
The achievement of Standards which would produce such qualities
constitutes one of our chief goals. Our optimism on this score is
bolstered by our review of the successful Fort Knox experiment. Its
12
lesson is clear : The key to moral and responsible conduct on the part
of trainees lies in the quality of their leaders. It is a matter of fiist
importance that all men involved in the training phase of the UMT
program be carefully selected and thoroughly indoctrinated in the
working philoso])hy of the program. They must accept responsibility
on a round-the-clock basis. That applies to every level of leadership
from top to bottom.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE CORPS
Trainees should have a carefully limited military status. They
would be a component of the Military Establishment but they would
not be in the regulär Armed Forces. The limited military status of
trainees is consistent with the congressional emphasis on the exclu-
sively military nature of the program, and with the assignment of the
military departments to carry out the training.
We believe the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be adopted
for the Corps, with a few significant modifications. These would
j^ermit a trainee accused of such major crimes as murder, rape, or
robbery to refuse trial by general court-martial and to accept trial
by the appropriate Federal court. Commanding officers, courts-mar-
tial, and reviewing authorities would also be directed to give fĂĽll
regard to the youth and inexperience of any trainee in awarding
punishment for any breach of the code. We are impressed by the
many improvements in military court procedures which are included
in the new code. Equally im])ortant is the readily undervStandable
and soundly constructed appellate system which it establishes. In
all events. the Commission will insist that justice in its highest sense
be maintained for all accused of offenses of any type.
PERMANENT SUPERVISORY ROLE OF THIS COMMISSION
Our report recommends a System of civilian inspectors and other
administrative safeguards intended to enable the Commission to carry
out faithfully its supervisory responsibilities assigned by law. Any
new program of this magnitude requires utmost vigilance in order that
its purposes may be achieved. This is particularly true of a progi*am
which involves our youth. The Commission's inspectors must have
fĂĽll and free access to all training records and facilities. They must
be independent in their observations and in their judgnients. With
the help of such a small but competent staff, the Conunission can be,
as Congress intended, a faithful watchdog of this program.
The Conunission 's inspections of the training stations will be fre-
quent, varied and thorough. All reports of injustice, low health Stand-
ards, bad moral environment, and slack morale will receive our prompt
attention.
13
The Commissioii lias permanent responsibility in this respect. Its
activities will not end with favorable congressional action on its legis-
lative reconnnendations. One of the basic benefits to be derived from
the continuing nature of its supervision over the entire program will
be the protection it provides against any possibility that UMT might
become a device for militarizing our youth. The Commission will
ahvays have a civilian chairman and a civilian majority.
We think the experience that American comnuinities have had with
millions of retnrning veterans in both World Wars indicates that the
danger of niilitarization is slight in any case. Men who have been
throngh the most grnelling experiences of war have coiiie home firmly
dedicated to the democratic process. The great majority of our mili-
tary leaders have themselves consistently demonstrated their devot ion
to the principles of civilian control and their hostility to any Usurpa-
tion by the military authority.
There is no basis for the fear that America would use its strength to
make war rather than use it to kee]) the peace.
It is not the Commission's task to act as grandstand quarterback m
criticizing the purely military aspects of the ])rogram. Only if
these military aspects unduly interfere with the basic welfare of the
trainee will the Commission intervene.
European Systems of conscription have often been criticized, and
rightly so, on the basis that they instill militarism into the young men
who are trained. At this point, the Commission feels that the dis-
tinction between these Systems and this program should be sharply
drawn. The European Systems, almost without exception, provided
for conscription for service— and the period of Service often ran into
years, not months. The Commissions' program calls for induclion
for training only, and this for a period of 0 short months. Almost
without exception European Systems were controlled by the military.
This American system provides for civilian control through this
civilian dominated Commission.
The possibilities of militarism diminish rapidly wdien such a System
provides for training only— they reach a vanishing point when such
a System is removed from military control and placed under predomi-
nantly civilian supervision. It is to be remembered that the Universal
Military Training and Service Act provides an ultimate in civilian
control and supervision. This Commisson must report directly to the
Congress twice each year upon the progress of this program. The
people, through their elected representatives, exercise the final check.
That is as it should be.
WHAT WILL THE PROGRAM COST
The cost of UMT cannot be estimated exactly until we know how
soon it call begin and what changes in price levels will occur in the
14
interim. However, it is possible to make some rough calculations nov-,
based on the assumption that cost levels will remain close to those
prevailing at the present time.
On this basis, the military departments have informed the Com-
mission that the first year's cost of UMT for a f ully implemented pro-
gram would be $4,187,983,600. This initial cost would include many
nonrecurring items. The annual cost in later years would drop to
$2,158,746,200. A total of 800,000 young men would receive training
each year under these estimates.
The Commission has further obtained from the military depart-
ments cost estimates for the beginning of I^MT on a limited scale.
These figures w ere based on the cost of training 60,000 young men per
year. For the first year, the military departments have estimated
the aggregate cost at $398,895,210. The recurring annual cost in later
years would be $179,291,680 for continuing to train 60,000 men each
year.
We believe it will be possible to reduce the cost of UMT below the
figures put forward by the military departments. We must record
our judgment that the indicated requirement of one overhead support
person to every two trainees seems much too high. The Commission
intends to make every effort to determine the validity of this ratio
and to work for minimum overhead costs in all respects.
BENEFITS OF UMT PROGRAM
The Commission believes that the UMT program it recommends
would have the following benefits :
1. It would give the Armed Services an existing training Or-
ganization capable of rapidly expanding the forces to meet a
general emergency.
2. It would vitalize the civilian components by producing a
continuing flow of basically trained young men into the Na-
tional Guard, the Organized Reserves, and the Air National
Guard.
3. It w ould f urnish trained replacements for the regulär Armed
Forces without the necessity of breaking up trained groups in
those Services.
4. It w ould free the regulär Armed Forces to seize and hold Stra-
tegie bases immediately at the beginning of a total mobiliza-
tion.
5. It would distribute equaUy among the people the Obligation
to defend our country.
g. It would benefit all of our young men, mentally and phys-
ically, and give them a greater appreciation of moral values
15
whicli would be manifest in the trainee's basic sense of responsi-
bility, an understanding of his obligations to his country, a
sense of pride in his unit, a desire to achieve excellence, mod-
erat ion in his personal habits, and tolerance toward those about
him.
NEED FOR PROMPT ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION
We are firmly convinced that the implementing legishition for the
program shoiild be enacted into hiw without delay. No final plans
for a rediiction in our standing forces can be made unless there is firm
assurance that there will be no break in the flow of trained men into
the reserves.
THE FRONTIER RESPONSE
The clear prospect is that the present generation must live in dan-
ger for niany years. An enemy can now strike directly against the
United States from the air or from the sea. The American people must
be prepared, like their forebears who pushed the frontier westward, to
meet a savage and deadly attack at any moment.
We must learn to live with danger and to do it calmly.
This is a time for steady nerves.
The return to frontier conditions demands a frontier response.
The greatest purpose that this program could possibly serve w^ould
be that it would prepare our young men for a war which would never
come — would give them training which they would never have to use.
This could be achieved through such a build-up of reserve strength
through UMT that aggressors w ould be discouragecl, once and for all,
from dreams of world conquest. On the other hand, if peace cannot
be had, this program wdll furnish the trained men to assure final
victory for freedom. It will at least assure that no young man will
ever die due to lack of adequate training.
Just as important, the program will result in more equality of Obliga-
tion. Most young Americans are well aware of the multitude of rights
they exercise as American Citizens. These rights are matched only by
the duties incumbent upon that privilege of citizenship. The rights
are well known, the duties sometimes more obscure. By doing their
duty to country, these men will come to a f uller realization and appre-
ciation of their rights and Privileges and the sacrifices which make
them possible.
We believe a UMT program will impart to our young men the arts
of survival and seif -defense which form the basis of confidence. The
program will reveal, by bringing together young men from all back-
grounds and geographica! sections of the country, the great wealth,
16
strength, and diversity of America's human resources. UMT will
seek in various w\ays to inform our youth of the meaning of their task.
That knowdedge will help them to measure the crisis, examine its
causes, and search for Solutions. Through a properly conducted pro-
gram the young men can be provided with a basic understanding
of the times in which they live, and with the skills necessary to face
w4th confidence even the worst possibilities of a catastrophic age.
If these things are achieved through UMT, as we believe they can be,
UMT will indeed become one of the foundations of enduring national
strength.
The price of liberty will be paid.
(Readers who desire the complete text of the Commission's First Report to the
Coii^ress, entitled "Universal Military Traininj;, Foundation of Emlurinj;
National Strength," niay purchase it from the Superintendent of Dociiments,
Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C, at the price of 35 cents
per copy.)
17
i
QUESTIONS AMD ANSWRS ON
NATIOI AL SEC'GkTII TRJlIWIMi
-.«-o 0 o
NATIONAL SECĂśHITI TRAINING COmiSSION
X^ASHINGTON, Do C,
JAICARY 19^2
i
QTIESTI0N5 Ăźm ArlSlERS OK NATIONAL SECURITI TRAINIIK
TABIL OF COIJTEi^S
1.
Wat ±3 the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 19^1?
2. Iffeat is the National Seciority Training CoiTimissiĂĽn?
3, VJhat is the National Seevrity Training Corps?
l:, Ttiat is Natio--^.! Secin-ity Training?
5. Hiat general tyi:e ex trariing xd.ll be given?
6. Miat did the Uni^-ersal Military Iraining and Service Act
require that the Gonirsiission ine lĂĽde in its legislative
recoFjraendations to Congress?
7. Has Congress approved universal 1-Iilitary Training?
8. Wiat raust the Congress do regarding the recoranendations of the
Coininission?
9. \Jha.t are the statutory requirenents lihlch must take place
bef ore this program of Universal Military Training can be
initiated?
10. >Jhat does the Commission recommend in regard to the date for
beginning the pro gram?
11. ^"flien can the program begin?
12. Will the program begin on a fĂĽll scale immediately upon its
implementatlon?
13. So far as the Commission itselL is concerned, x-rhen can the
program be^n?
lU. How universal is the program as recommended by the Commission?
15. Tteat are the Commission« s objectives for a LW program?
16. What general policies and Standards has the Commission recommended?
17. At -what age mll yomig men be inducted into the Corps?
18. "VJhat irethod of induction does the Commission recommend for the
Corps?
PAGE
1
1
2
2
3
3
3
5
7
7
8
9
9
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Page
19. Will trainöes and gradaates of the UM! program be siibject to draft
into the military Service? )
20o Miat xdll be the status of trainees after they f inish their
6 raonths training under UI^?
21e Miat are the Commission' s vie-wpoints concerning a Reserve
Program?
22« What sort of training program has the Air Force indicated that
it will have?
W/:.at sort of training program "will the Army have?
2Ue What sDrt of training program will the Navy have?
2$o What sort of training program will the Marine Corps have?
26. What is the cost of the proposed program?
*
27. Vftiat TOuld be the cost cf the Air Force program?
280 What K>uld be the cost of the Navy program?
29. Miat would be the cost of the Marine Corps program?
30« "What would be the cost of the Army pro gram?
31. Miat sort of code of justice has the Commission recommended
for trainees?
32« What sort of disability benef its has the Commission recommended
for trainees?
33. lf\lhat sort of death benef its does the Commission recommend?
3km Upon idiat monetary basis will a trainee * s disability and
death benef its be f igured?
35« Miat otber benef its will be aHowed trainees?
36. If a trainee is receiving income from another source raay he
continue to receive such income while he is in the Corps?
37. If a trainee loses any of his personal property due to bis
d\ity in the Corps, roay he be reimbursed?
38. Will trainees be allowed leave?
39. If a trainee has a coraplaint to register about the treatroent
he is receiving can he make a coraplaint to the Commission?
10
10
10
11
11
12
12
13
13
33
13
3il
35
16
17
17
17
3JB
18
18
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UO. Will r^e;vTiployTtĂźnt riglrbs be girren tc '--aii^Ăźes
0
hĂĽ. Will traiDses be proteoted against iixl-.o;id.cating liquors?
lj.2o Will traiiiees be protected against other moral haza:"d3?
l>3, ÂĄnat ars the e;xistj.ng Armed Bervices pi'ograms f or tirie moral
^.'jölfare of the trainees?
kk. Wliat does the Commn.ssion recoinmend in regai-d to special welfaire
protection?
U'
i o
1. ge:^.-=C,, â– â– :^^ax id.ll the Coiranission do in regard to inspection
Ol the Corps?
Ut o Hay yoixag men volunteer f or induetion into the Coi*ps?
May those yoTong men Trjho volimteer f or induction into tbs
Corps Yolurrbeer for a pajf-ticular branch of tbĂź Corps such
as the Nair^ or Air Force?
U8o What taIH be the pay of trainees?
U9« May trainees be tor-ained outside the United States?
50» Will yoTxng men "who are pin^suing a specialized course of study
essential to the national weif are be eligible for deferment?
51. What does the Coiranission recoinmend in regard to conscientious
objsctors to militaxy training?
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QUESTIOMS AND ANSVILRS ON NATIONAL SECTJBJTY TRAINING
1« IrJhat is the Universal Kilitary Training and Service Act of 1951?
This Act, also knowi as Public Law 5l> 82nd Congress, and Sd, ineaning
Senate Bill No* 1, was actually an amendment to the Selective Service Acte
The Act^ in generale continued Selective Service in effect f er the period
of the iinmediate crisis, and in order to meet the manpower shortage lowered
the age of induction from 1? to l8j and extended the period of Service from
21 to 2U months* At the same time, this Act approved the prijiciple of Uni-
versal Ă„litai'y Training, giving tc it the naine of National Security Training,
In approving this principle, the Act established the National Sec-uräty
Training Corps which will be t?ie Trainee-training gronp plus all personnel
necessary to carry out the training prograra, It also established the
National Security Training Comirdssion,
2.» ^at is the National Secirrity Training Gorjnission?
The National SeciĂĽcity Training Comirdssion is a commission established by the
Universal I4ilitar:,'' Training and Service Act of 195l f or the purpose of exer-
cising gener al supervision over the National Security Training Corps, The
Commission is composed. of five members* Three ai^e from civilian life and
not more than txjo of them can be a member of the same political party« The
remaining tuo member s are to be active or retired member s of the Armed Forces.
The chairman imist be a civilian« The Coirmiission is appointed by the President
by and vjith the consent of the Senate.
The Commission is charged with the responsibility of establishing policies
and Standards ^ath respect to training in the Corps and with making adequate
- j.
provisions for the moral and spi.ritual "welfare cf the Corps,
The fixst task of the Conlmi^3sion wa.? to suhmi.t to the Gongres-s not later
than October 29, 3,.95l, a ful]. report and legislati\'e recoramendations concorn-
ing a program of Natioral Sec-urity Trainingo lipon tlie adoption of this pro-
grain by the Congi-ess, the Coininission'o continuing famctions of supervision
will come into actlon.
»^
<
^
. Wi.at is the llatio.no.l SeciiritT TraLning Corps?
The Nat-ional Sec-urity Training Corps is the corps established by the Uni-
versal Military Training ajid Service Act of 19^1 irito which young men will
be placed for National Sec^JĂĽrity Training. It is not a corps within the
organizational otr-actnze of the Armed Forces« Traineos in the Corps will
not be ToomlyBTB cf the. Ainmad Force s«, They cannot be «ent overseas to land
installations for training«, They may not be inducted for ser^/ice while they
are members of the Corps« The establishinent of the Corp;^ is within the
constitational power of Congi*ess tc raise and support ai'mies, to provide and
maintain a navy^ and to provide .for the coimnon defense.
U. "^^hat is National Secm^ity Ti'ain.ing?
National Sec^jrity Training is syn.onomo-ĂĽ3 wlth Universal Military Trainings
Universal Militaiy Trainir3.g is a System ur^er viiich all young -flien capable
of performing military service will be required to train for a period of
six months. This six-month p3riod of training in either the Ariry, Na-vy,
Air Force or Ifc-lne Corps idll be followed by 7| years of service in the
Reserve So
2-
5« "What general type of training x^ill be given?
The type of training to be given as required by the Universal Military-
Training and Service Act of 19$1 is basic military training« The Secretary
of Defense and the varicus Military Departments have the task of deciding
the specific types of training to be given and have the responsibility of
carrying out the training pro gram in accordance with policies and Standards
laid doxm by the National Security Training Commissiono
6» Vihat did the Universal Militai^v Training and Servi'^.e Act require that the
Commission include in its legislative recommendations to Congress?
mm i'Mii iM I â– â– iiaiiii-rii
The Act required tliat the Commission submit legislative recoramendations
concerning;
(1) roeastires for the personal safsty, health, welfare and morals of the
traineesj
(2) a Code of conduct together mth penalties for violation of the codej
(3) measures necessary to implement the policies and Standards established
by the Commission^
ik) a program of disability and death benefitsj
(5) recoramendations re garding other benefitsj
(6) an outline of the obligations^ duties, liabilities and responsibilities
to be imposed upon members of the Corp
C5
?• Has Congress approved Universal Military Training!;
By the passage of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951^
the Congress overwhelmingly approved the principle of Universal Military
- 3 -
Traininge The Act pr 0*^0.(168 that all young men be liable f or training upon
reaching the age of 18 j provides that the period of training shall be six
months; sets up a inethod by -which the training program may be initiated;
establishes the Reserve Obligation which follows the training period^ pro-
vides for permissive and Statut ory deferments from the training program;
sets the rate of corapensation for trainees at $30 per month and their de-
pendency allowances at the rate alloTjed the lo"west paid enlisted men in
the regulär service; provides that trainees may not be sent overseas for
training; provides that the Slectiine Service shall handle the induction
process; provides that young men may volunteer for induction; and provides
for the protection against the use or sale of intoxicating liquors by or
to members of the Corps« The only remaining iratter to be solved was the
establishiaent of a concrete program by the Commissi on« This has now been
done and sent to the Congress for approval«
8. "What raust the Congress do re garding the recommendations of the Commission?
The Congress is naturally under no Obligation to enact the Commission' s
recommended legislation ĂĽti ich must become law bef ore training in the Corps
can begin« The Congr^essional Committees on Armed Services must<, hoi^ver,
report this legislation to their respective Houses within the first forty-
five days of continuous Session of the Congress which pass after the report
is submitted« "When these legislative recommendations are submitted to the
floor of each House they will have the status of a privileged bill^, i^e.,
a bin lÄiich may be called up for debate by any member at any time«
Airendments to this legislation may be freely made upon the floor of either
House o This tirae limit of forty-five days will begin to run when Congress
reconvenes January 8, 1952« This means that on approximately March 10 or
i^ I4. •»
shortly thereafter^ this legislation imst be reported to the Houses of
Congress by the respective Committees on Armed ServiceSe
9^ Miat are the Statut ory requirements which must take place before this pro-
gram of Universal Military Training can be initl.ated?
(1) Congress must act favorably upon the legislation which has been sub-
mitted by the Commissiono This does not mean that the legislation must
be enacted "witliout change« It merely means that some sort of bill must
evolve from these recommendationso
(2) The period of serviee required under the Universal Military Training
and Service Act for those young men between the ages of l8j and 19
must either be reduced from 2.k months or eliminated entirely« This
action to reduce or eliminate the period of Service for this particu-
lar age group may be taken either by the President or by the Congr^ess
by means of a concurrent re Solution©
10. Miat does the Commission recommend in regard to the date for beginning the
pro gram?
The Commission makes no recommendation regarding the date for beginning
the program since this matter is entirely the responsibility of the Presi-
dent and the Congress o All the Commission must de is to prepare itself
adequately so that it may begin to function imraediately upon the Initiation
of UMTo
11. Mien can the program beginf
Miile the Commission has no responsibility in determining ^en the program
can begin, the method of such determination is clearly stated in Public
- 5 -
Law 5l. That law provides that the President may reduce the period of
Service f or those under the age of 19 at such time as the Secretary of
defense recoiranends that such action is justified by the strength of the
Armed Forces in the light of international conditionso Mien that action
is taken the program can begin«
The program may sCLso begin at such time as the Congress by concurrent
resolution reduces the period of service for those under the age of 19«
At such time as the President or the Congress reduces the period of
active service in the Armed Forces for persons below this age, induction
into the Corps may be initiated« At that time all persons under the age
of 19 who are not then in the Arn^d Forces will become liable for induc--
tion into the Corps,
12 e Will the program begin on a fĂĽll scale jjmnediately upon its Implementation?
Not necessarily. If the program begins in the near future^ it may well be
»
initiated on a small scale due to the fact that most young men will be
needed for 2li months service in the Armed Forces and x-jill thus not be
available for U^ffo Also, it might be desirable to start the program on
a small scale building up gradually as the Commission and the Department
of Defense indoctrinate themselves in the Operation of the program« This
will enable all parties concerned to learn by experience the best methods
of operating UKT. The Department of Defense has indicated that initial Im-
plementation of UMT might well be on a scale with as few as 60,000 trainees
per year« The Commission takes no stand upon this except that, whether there
is partial Implementation or fĂĽll iraplementation, the CoiimD.ssion must stand
ready to exercise supervision over the program»
- 6 -
13» So far as the Coimnission itself is concerned^ \hen can the program begin?
The Coininissicn would be ready to begin its supervisory role upon a few weeks
notice. The Coinmission is ready at any tiine for the program to begin«
li;, How universal is the program as recommended by the Commission?
The Commission raade no legislative recommendation re garding the universality
of the programo This is already set forth in the Universal Military Training
and Service Act. That Act provides that all yoiing men shall be eligible
for training in the Corps but that the minimum Standards for physical
acceptability shall not be higher than those which prevailed for militai'y
Service in January 19U5« LikeT^^ise, the mental score is fixed at a minim\im
of 10 based on th? Armed Forces Classification test, The Commission did
recommend, however, that occupational and dependency defennents be reduced
to a minimum« With regard to educational deferments, the Commission recommended
that yo\3ng men be permitte d to remain in high school until graduation or the
attainment of their 20th birthday or until they fail satisfactorily to pursue
their course, T^ihichever occurs firsto A young man who is attending College
would be deferred until the end of his current College year or until he
failed satisfactorily to pursue his co\irse, whichever occurs first,
It is interesting to note in this regard that the Univei^sal Military Train-
ing and Service Act provides specifically that training in the Corps shall
be "basic military training" • Such "basic military training" by definition
involves strenuous wca?k which is designed to prepare men for combat rather
than "chair corps" duty« It is, therefore, necessary that the minimum
physical and ir^ntal Standards be set not lower than provided for in the
Universal Military Training and Service Act« If more universality is
^7-
desired^ it i^jould be neeessary to change the basic law so that training
of "all types" and not just "basic military training" would be authorized«
This would mean perhaps that seine yoimg men would be trained exclusively
to be clerical workers^ hospital attendants, .-vehicle Operators, laundry-
men, cooks^ or bakers. However^ this sort of specialized training for
limited service personnel is not now authorized by law.
l5o Miat are the CommissiQn's objectives for a UKT programf
The Comraission believes that a ĂĽl^ff program should be designed to achieve
the following basic objectives
1. To insure the existence of an active training establishinent which
could substantially reduce the necessity for drawing upon regulär
Units for training duty in time of mobilization.
2. To vitalize the National Guard and the Reserves by channeling into
these organizations a steady flow of basically-trained personnel in
tiras of peace^ thus reducing the time required for these components
to reach combat readiness in time of war.
3. To provide a pool of basically-^trained men ready for assignment with
a miniirrum of refresher training and physical conditioning.
lle To free the regulär forces more rapidly for combat missions in the
event of war.
5. To develop records of individual qualif ications in order to permit an
Order ly utilization of military personnel.
6. To impress upon the trainees their importance to the Nation in the
task of protecting American institutions and freedoms.
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l6, Miat other general policies and Standards has the Goimd-ssion recommended?
!• Every raeasure shoiild be adopted ^ich will make the civilian Community
an inte!rested, vital, and Controlling influence in the direction and
Operation of the UMT pro gram«
2. The program should be truly universal in its application to all
physically and mentally qualified men of the age of 18,
3, Training should be intensive, realistic, and tough« Little or no
leave should be granted to trainees during their period of training
other than emergency leave«
1;« Moral and ethical Standards for the Corps should be on the highest
possible level«
17, At what age will young men be inducted into the Corps
The Commission recommends young men should be inducted into the Corps as
soon as possible after attaining the age of 18«
18« What method of induction dDesthe Commission recommend for the Corps?
The Commission recomomends that the induction process be handled by the
Selective Service System and that iniuctions be on a monthly basis with
equal numbers of young men being inducted each month«
19. Will trainees and graduates of the TJMT prograjn be subject to draf t into
the military service?
No« They may be called into the military service only as reservists«
- 9 -
20. "What "Will be the status of trainees after they f inish their 6 luonths
training under UMT?
The Universal Military Service and Training Act provides that trainees
will remain in the reserves f or tJ years after corapleting their training
in um.
*
21« Miat are ths Coiamission' s vie-wpoints concerning a Reserve Prograni?
The Coininission believes that ths desired balance of technical skills in
thĂź Reserve can be achieved only if the UMT Program is closely related
to an effective Reserve Program« If ths technical proficiency required
for rapid mobilization and combat is to be achieved, the Reserve Program
must provide for the advancement of those skills which are imparted to the
trainee in elementary form diiring universal military training« The success
of UMT depends to a great ertent upon the establishment and Operation of
a vigorous and i^rkable Reserve Program«
22« IfJhat sort of training program has the Air Force indicated that it will
have?
The Air Force plan calls for a 26-week program which would be divided as
foHowsg Two weeks would be required for indoctrination and discharge^
ei^t weeks "WDuld be devoted to basic military trainingj and sixteen 1^Feeks
would be devoted to technical training« Sixty percent of all trainees
would be given formal courses in selected technical subjects« The other
forty percent would take part in on-the-job training tasks with regulär
Air Force units« Some of the technical courses would be full-length
- 10 -
versions of selected technical coiirses now tau^t in the Air Force such
as photography^ Communications^ Utilities and supply, Other technical
courses "WD-uld be the introductory or fundamental phase of longer and more
difficult technical courseSo Only the best qualified trainees WDuld be
enix)lled in these courses and it would be extreme ly Import ant that further
schooling in these fields be given in the Reserves. These more difficult
courses incliide weather^, radio and radar maintenance, aircraft and engine
maintenance^ arroamentD and wire maintenance« The Air Force would be
allotted 22 percenb of all trainees«
23, What sort of training program will the Army have?
*
The Army's training program would involve seventeen weeks of basic and
individual training far all trainees and would inölude the specialties
common to all branches of the Arrny« FoUowing this seventeen-week period,
six wcek« of basic unit and leadership training would be given« Certain
of the Army trainees â– would devote seven weeks of their time to specialist
school training« The emphasis in the Ariny^s program is upon the develop-
ment of leadership and the trained individual soldier» The Arri^ would
train about $0 percent of all trainees»
2Uo Maat sort of training program will the Navy have?
The Navy program wot:ĂĽ:d be divided into three major partso First^ a
twelve^week period of basic indoctrination| seeond^ a nine-week periöd
of eleinentarj basic instruction in such subjects as ordnance, electronics
and engineeringi and third^, a four-week period of on-the-job training
- 11 -
^ich in sonĂź instances will consist of duty aboard ship. The ^avy would
train 28 percent of all traineeso This would include the Marine Corps
sharSo
25o Iffliat sort of trainin^ program will the Marine Coirps have?
The Marine Corps program would last twenty-sijc weeks and would be divided
as foUowss ei^t weeks of Marine recruit training f or the purpose of
teaching the basic military skills | four weeks of advanced individual
training; eight weeks of specialist training in subjects such as artillery,
Communications^ supply and motor transportj and four weeks of unit train-
ing including basic amphibious training and tactics. The Marine Corps
would be allotted about l/6th of the Navy's share of trainees«
260 Miat is the cost of the proposed program?
*he Commission has arrived at tentative cost estimates for a program of
UOTj, based on preliminary cost studies prepared by the Arme d Forces.
/ i" .
Thp Comiwission emphasizes the extreme ly tentative nature of these studies,
however^ and disagrees strongly with the Armed Services proposed ratio of
one trainor to each two trainees as being extremely high«
The preliminary cost estimates were as followss
ao FĂĽll implementationc) 800^000 trainees per year.
First year«s cost^ |l;^l87^983p600 (including new facilities)
Annual recurring cost^ $2j)l58p7U6<,200«
bo Partial in^lementation^ ÖO^^OOO trainees per year«
First year's cost, 1398d895<,210 (including new facilities)«
Annual reciarring cost, $179^) 291^680«
12-
27. miat -WDiad be the cost of tfae Air Force program?
Tentative estimates made by the Air Force to the Commission indicate that
xuider partial implementation (13^200 trainees anmially) the first year^s
cost would be $358 ^5^9^ 210c, lÄiile the annual cost tiiereafter would drop
sharply to $32p99$s>^60. Under fĂĽll in5)leiiientation (186,000 trainees
annually) the first year«s cost would be $1,705, 197,600, a great deal
of this initial cost being f or the construction of new facilities^ the
annual cost thereafter would be $U59pl39^200«
28o \^hat TTOuld be the cost of the Navy program?
Under partial ij!5)leinentation (lli^OOO trainees annually) the Navy estninates
the first year's cost at $76^000pOOO| the annual cost thereafter would
drop to $141^750^000« Under füll iiii)lementation (183,000 trainees annually)
the first year«s cost would be $1,U12,U00^000<, of ^ich $73^,000,000 would
be for constructiono The annual cost thereafter would drop to $53U,U21,000<
29o Miat would be the cost of the Marine Corps prograjn?
Under partial inplementation (2,750 trainees annually) the Marine Corps
estimates the first year^s cost to be $28^1;39,OOOo The annual cost there-
after would be $8^830,000« Under füll implementation (37,000 trainees
annually) the first yBar^s cost would be $308 5,^275, 000^ and the annual
cost thereafter would be $102^676,000o
3O0 Iftlhat would be the cost of the Ai
)rogr
am.
Under partial implementation (30,000 trainees annually) the krmy estimatves
the first year^s cost at $135,907,000, i^ile the annual cost thereafter
would be $92,7l6,000o Under fĂĽll iniplementation (U00,000 trainees per year)
- 13 «
the fix st year's cost Fouid be |76l5,959;)000| the annual cost thereafter
woTild be $l;>062<,5lOpOOOo
31^ What sort of code of j-ustice has tbe Gommission recoimnended for trainees^
The Gommission has recoramended thatc, by and large«, the recently enacted
Uniform Code of Military Jtjstice should be applied to trainees. This
Code is a great improvement over the old Articles of War and Articles for
tbe Gov-ernuBnt of the Navy» It is uniform for all of the Armed Services
and^ in addition^, has a very intelligently planned appellate System« The
Code contains many provisions which are designed to assiire a fair trial to
any man accused and also designed to prevent imdue control of or interfer-
ence with the administration of justice. It sets up a Single Court of Mili-
tary Appeals over all the Serviceso This Court is made up entirely of
civilians* The Code pro-^rides that counsel shall be fiirnished to any man
who desires to appeal his case. A revolutionary st.ep was taken in the Pro-
vision which entitles an enlisted man to have another enlisted man among
tte court convened to try himo Commanding of ficers are forbidden to
censux^e a court-mai-tial or any member of a court^maxtialc Law officers
must be appoiitted for every general court-martial (a court which tries
tbe more serious Qffenses)^ and in this type of court-raartial both the de-
fense counsel and trial counsel must be la.i^yerSo There is a mandatory re-
view of e^/ery court-martial case by the convening authority and every gen-
eraJ, court-nm-tial case ytiich involves a discharge^ dismissal or sentence
of more than onie year must be reviewed by a Board of Review also made up of
civil justice So These Boards of Review not only reTiewthe law but also
review the factso This 5, of coursep is a great departure even from our
civ.il System of justice whicJti allows only the law to be
«» IJ4. «• I
revlewedo A safeguard is provided here, hoireverj in that the reviewing
authority^ upon the basis of new facts«, cannot lengthen the sentence of
the lower co-urto There is an automatic appeal to the Court of Military
Appsals T«Jherever a death sentence is involved* Self-incrimination is pro-
hibited as are pleas of guilty in all capital casese
The Coinmission has added a few significant modif ications to the Code as
it existSe For instance^ the Commission requires that commanding officers^,
Courts martial and reviewing authorities give fĂĽll regard to the youth
and inexperience of trainees in awarding punishmento Also, a trainee "^dio
is charged with a serious crime such as raurder^, rolJibery or rape may be
tried by general court-martial only if the trainee^ after consuLtation
with his parent or legal guardian, consent s in writing to being tried in
such a inannero If such consent is not forthcoming^ the officer involved
shall report the facts and circumstances concerning the offense to the
United States District Attorney f er the district in which the offense was
coinmitteda At the same time, Jurisdiction is vested in the District Cotrts
of the United States to try and punish trainees for these offenses«
32o Ifihat sprt of disability benefits has the Coimoission recommended for trainees?
The Commission has recomnended that trainees be given disability benefits
under the provisions cf the Federal Eraployees Compensation Act» This Act
applies to eii5)loyees of the Federal Government <, Due to the fact that
trainees will not be in service for an extended period of time^ will be
trained in the United States and will thus not be subject to the hazards
of warfare or overseas assignraent^ the Commission believes that veterans*
legislation regarding disability benefits should not apply to trainees»
-15-
The cost of these disability benefits londer the Federal Employees Compensa-
tion Act vTill probably be mach less in the long run than the cost would be
under the Veterans Administration« For example, the time will eventually
arrive liiien nearly all yoiing nien upon reaching the age of 18 will iindergo
training in the Corps« If veterans" laws were applied it woTild inean eventually
that anywhere from 80 to 90 percent of all young raen in the Nation wotild be
eligible to receive veterans' benefits for disabilities which mi^t be re-
motely traceable to the 6 months of duty served in the Corps years before«
Since veterans' benefits for disability are unifarmly higher than the bene-
fits allowed under the Federal En^loyees Corapensation Act, this could msan
a great drain on o\ir national resources«
»
Under the Comraission's recoimnendations, the training agency would make
all determinations as to whether or not the disability was incurred in
the line of daty* Miether or not a disability at a later date was proxi-
mately caused by prior service in the Corps wDuld be left to the determina-
tion of the Department of Labor ^ the agency T«hich administers the Federal
Employees Coii5)ensation Act»
3*^0 Miat aort of death benefits does the Commission recomrnend?
If a trainee dies while he is a member of the Corps or within 120 days
thereafter^ he shall have the benef it of free Government life insurance
in the amount of JlOpOOOo The training agency will pay the burial ex-
penses and the trainee ^s dependenbs will be paid any accrued compensation
or dependency allowances due to the trainee at the time of his death. If
a trainee dies before being accepted and enrolled as a trainee but after
16
reporting for induction to the local Selective Service Board, or he dies
subsequent to 120 days after his release from the Corps, death benefits
will be paid under the Federal Employees Con^jensation Act,
3U. Upon ^at monetäre basis will a trainee's disability and death benefits
rar the pvirpoees of the Operation of tbe Federal Employees Coinpensation
Aöt„ the trainee's compensation has been deemed by the Coramission to be
$150 per month. Although the trainees will be paid only 130 per month
cash in band, it is ostimated that the value of the food, clothing, shelter,
entertalnment and other Services flimished to them brings the total to the
realistic f igure of $1$0 per month.
^^^ What other benefits wiU be allo^d traiJiees
Trainees will be given all the custoraary maintenance benefits such as
transportationj quarters^ subsistence, clothing, equipment, hospitaliza-
tion, and medical, surgical bxA dental care. They will also be permtted
to rebain oerbain personal-issue clobhing after satisf actory coinplĂźtion
of training, While a trainee is in the Coipsj he will receive the pro-
tection of the Soldiers« and Sailors» Civil Relief Act of 19U0 vjhich
affords men in the Amed Services certain protection against eviction, de-
fault judgneritss forclosures of liens and mortgages and other matters fcr
tbeir period of service«
36 If a trainee is receiving income from another sourceo roay he continue
to receiiTB such income ^ile he is in the Corps?
les,
37. If a trainee loses any of his personal property due to his duty in the
CorpSg may he be reimbursed?
Yeso Trainees will be allowed to file Claims f or any such loss or damage
to their personal property»
38« Will traiiiees be allowed leave?
The Commissi on's viewpoint is that leave f or trainees should be held
to a minirauxno Certainly;, emergency leave could and would be grantede
After the initial phases of ths training are completed, it wuld be very
likely that trainees would be allowed to have weekend passes occasionally«
39. If a trainee has a complaint to regjjster about the treatroent he is re-
cer
can he make a complaint to the Commission?
Yeso Under tte legislation proposed by the Commission, it will be made
illegal far the training agency to deny a trainee direct access to the
Commission or its inspectorso Thus^, the Channel through which trainees
may make coir5)laints or suggestions is assiiredo
kOo Will reemployment rights be given to trainees?
The Commission has recoramended that trainees be entitled to limited
reemployrasnt ri^tSo Under this provision an employee would be granted
a leave of absence by his employer for the purpose of taking training in
the Corps« This period of leave would extend to 30 days af ter the trainee « s
release within which tijie he would be expected to apply for his old Job
if he desired it back»
- 18 -
Ixlo ÂĄ111 trainees be protected against into^dcating liquors?
Yes« The Universal Military Training and Service Act a\ibhorizes the
Secretapy of Defense to make regtOations concerning intoxicating beverages»
The Act further provides that any person, corporation, partnership or
association who yiolate these regulations shall be deemed guilty of a
misdeiosanor and punished by a f ine of not raore than 12 months or both.
The Goinmission has further recoinmended that the Commission be authorized
to approve all regulations which the Secretary of Defense makes on this
siibjecto Present regulations of the Arired Forces provide protection to
a large extent against consuraption of alcoholic beverages by minor So Since
i»arly all the trainees in this program will be legally minors, füll pro-
tection will be afforded thera under presenb regulationso
1;2<» Will trainees be protected against other moral hazards?
Tes. The Commission has recoramended that the present criminal code Pro-
vision which prohibits prostitution in the locality of Service installa-
tions be reenaeted into the Commission legislation and be vigorously en-
f orcedo In addition to this^ the Commission has also written into its
law a Provision which makes it unlawftd to permit trainees to enter houses
of Prostitution^ which the head of the training agency has declared to be
off~limits to trainees« A fine of not more than $1,000 or iinprisonment for
not more than one year^ or both^ is provided for any person, c orporatio^
partnership or association who violate this provisiono
The Commission also recommends that anyone having beenconvicted of a felony
prior to the tine of his induction into the Corps be banned from the Corps.
- 19
\
This «ill Protect traii^es to a large extent from imdesirable associates.
The Coinndssion also recoianends the establishment of an inspection System
luider tte control of the Comission, One of the duties of this System win
be to keep a ^tchfiol eye on moral conditions around all training installa-
tions.
U3. TOiat are the existing Ari.ed Services programs for the moral weif are of tte
trainees?
UU.
The Armed Services currently afford generous opportunity for religious
worship. They have severe restrictions upon the use of intoxicating
beverages, The Navy has a coraprehensive Character Guidance Program under
the dlrection of the C!hief of Chaplaias, ^UĂź the Amy has the Troop In-
formation and Education Program, the purpose of which is to inform the
Dien aC pertinent current events and to provide a variety of educational
opporttinit iĂź s o
What cbes the Commission recommend in retard to special welfare protection?
The Commission strongly recomnends the creation of local Citizen advisory
committees in the towns and cities which adjoUi UMT camps. The pi^pose
of these committees wo.uld be to f oster good relations and understanding
betvreen the Community and the mllitary autiiorittes, The Commission be-
lie^s that thsse committees would be insl^nune ntal in solving moral,
ethical<, and recreational problemSo The Commission recoromends that fĂĽll
use be made of the facilities of such national organizations as the Red
Gross« the USO^ and the. National Recreation Association«
20 -
hS. In generale i^at id. 11 the Commission do in regard to inspection of the Corps?
The Universal Military Training and Service Act requires that the Coiranission
siabmit to Congress twice each year a full report upon the training prograirio
In Order to do this, the Coiranission will establish a System of inspection.
Its inspectors will visit each Installation at least twice each year to in-
spect all matters of interest to the Commission. These inspectors mll be
given fĂĽll access to any and all information they need. They will be rnider
predominantly civilian control and their reports will f urnish the informa-
tion which will go into the biaimual reports to CongresSo
1^6^ May young men volunteer f or induction into the Corps?
leso The Coramission has recomnended that persons who are liable for in^
duction into the Corps raay volunteer within the limits of the quotas«
Volunteers may be as yomg as 17 provided they have parental consent«
)i7. May those young men ^o volnnteer for induction into the Corps volunteer
fn°r ^ p^rtinnlAT branch of the Corps such as the Navy or Air Force?
Yeso The Commission recominends that they be allowed this privilege withĂĽi
the limits of the quotaso
ll8e lAlhat will be the pay of trainees? ^
Under tte Universal Military Training and Service Act trainees must be
compensated at the rate of $30 per montho Those who have dependents
will be entitled to receive a dependency allowance equivalent to the sum
of tte basic allowance for quar^ters provided for persons in the lowest pay
grade in the Arraed Service s«
- 21«
^9. May trainees be tralned outside the United States?
No. The Universal Military Training and Service Act provides that no
person inducted into the Corps shall be assigned for training at an
Installation located on land outside the Continental United States«
50o Will yoting in9n -who are pursuing a specialized course of study essential
to the national welfare be eligible for deferinent?
The Coinmission inade r^o concrete recommendation in this regard but did
snggest that study be given to the possibility of training these young
inen for a period of 6 months after \Ă„iich they wuld be permitted to coro-
plĂźte thelr professional training idthout fear of Interruption. To
>
achieve this, tte Commission suggests that reserv© service for this
group of students be held in abeyance until such time as their Studie s
are coit?)letedc The remaining 7i years of reserve service would then
begin to run from 2 to 8 years after cowpletion of their training in UMT.
^« What does the Commission recommend in regard to conscientious objectors
to roĂĽitary training?
The Coimnission recommends that this group be treated as they are now
treated under Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service
Acte This neans that those f ound to be conscientiously opposed to train-
ing in the Corps would be inducted and assigned to noncombatant training
as prescribed by the Presidento Those ^o are f ound to be conscientiously
opposed even to noncombatant training^ would be assigned by their local
board to civilian werk contributing to the national health^ safety or
interest« The length of service in these capacities would be the same as
that required for trainees: 6 months©
- 22 -
b "
l^uX^. '^i, J^
/ "^
BOOK REVIEWS
Security without Militarism
By Elias Huzar, Cornell University
293
ClVIL-MiLITARY ReLATIONSHIPS IN AmERICAN
Life, edited by Jerome G. Kerwin. The
University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. v, 181.
$2.75.
I
IT HAS been a tradition of the American politi-
cal System that military power should be
subordinate to civilian authority. Constitu-
tional design and prevailing circumstances
have long favored that relationship; but recent
developments have threatened its maintenance
and have revived fears entertained by the
framers of the Constitution. They were con-
cerned lest the military and naval forces they
authorized be employed not only abroad
against foreign foes but also at home against
domestic freedoms. They were afraid that the
armed forces might be used not merely to
"provide for the common defence" but also
to undermine another purpose of the Union,
to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity."
What are the conditions that give rise to
militarism and how is civilian predominance
to be safeguarded? These are the questions
with which this volume deals. It provides some
answers and suggests clues to others. The book
is the result of eight lectures given on the
Charles R. Walgreen Foundation for the Study
of American Institutions at the University of
Chicago during 1946-47. Waldemar Kaempf-
fert, science editor of the New York Times,
writes on "Science, Technology, and War."
Dixon Wecter, chairman of research at the
Huntington Library, discusses the transition
'Trom Soldier to Citizen." Hanson W. Bald-
win, the New York Times' military editor, re-
views the problems involved in "The Recruit-
ment and Training of the New Armed Forces."
Paul H. Appleby analyzes the difficulties of
"Civilian Control of a Department of National
Defense." T. V. Smith, former director of Ital-
ian re-education for the Allied Control Com-
mission, deals with the "Government of Con-
quered and Dependent Areas." Quincy Wright,
professor of international law at the University
of Chicago, examines the role of "The Military
and Foreign Policy." Adlai Stevenson, alter-
nate member of the United States delegation
to the UN, Sketches the "Civil-Military Rela-
tions in the United Nations." Charles E. Mer-
riam recapitulates and rounds out the series in
an essay on "Security without Militarism: Pre-
serving Civilian Control in American Political
Institutions."
The study of American civil-military rela-
tions has not engaged the attention of scholars
nearly so much as the contemporary impor-
tance of the subject makes one wish it had, for
we are sorely in need of enlightenment. Little
of the insufficient analysis we have had has been
in terms of the political and administrative
practice in which the realities of civilian con-
trol must be sought. Some bibliographical
notes on prewar publications dealing with ad-
ministrative problems of civilian mobilization
were brought together under Pendieton Her-
ring's direction and published in 1940 by Pub-
lic Administration Service under the title
Civil-Military Relations. In 1942 Farrar and
Rinehart issued a useful syllabus on War and
National Policy, edited by Grayson Kirk and
Richard Poate Stebbins. Since then we have
seen the Start of a stream of publications about
World War II, particularly the administrative
histories and personal memoirs such as those
of Henry L. Stimson and Donald M. Nelson.
Still, there is nothing available for our own
armed forces comparable to Alfred Vagts' ad-
mirable book on The History of Militarism,
which is concerned chiefly with European ex-
perience. This is a result, partly, of the fact
that our own experience has not often posed
serious problems in civil-military relations of
the type we face today— an historical deficiency
in which we may rejoice, though we may regret
the absence of the sophistication which a
harsher history might have provided. Partly,
also, the gaps in our understanding have been
a result of an indisposition of academicians to
deal realistically with the role of force in social
relations. The present volume is a welcome ad-
dition, then, to a sparse, though growing, litera-
ture on what bids fair to remain a major prob-
lem in American political institutions.
^^'
294
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
4^ T
BOOK REVIEWS
295
Civil-military relationships in American life
is a field whose boundaries are ill-defined, the
more so the more "total" war has become. It is
also a subject that no one book could cover
adequately-at least, with our present inade-
quate knowledge about it. It is regrettable that
room could not be found in these essays for
more than brief references to our experience
and Problems in administration of scientific
research and development and to the difficulties
of mobilizing the national economy to supply
our military forces and Allies. With these ma-
jor exceptions, however, the eight writers man-
age to take up most, though they exhaust none,
of the significant aspects of civil-military re-
lations in the United States. Even though the
book does not pretend to be definitive, it is fĂĽll
of stimulating suggestions on a timely topic.
It raises more questions than it answers and
poses more problems than it solves. We may
share with Herbert Emmerich the hope that it
will lead others to regard national defense as
an Obligation of scholarship and to study, write,
publish, and teach about it.
II
WHAT is it that the writers of these essays
fear about the armed forces? The dangers
are twofold. First, there is the possibility that
the professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen
will become "bureaucrats" and will do a poor
Job in their several specialties. Second, there
is the possibility that they will become "mili-
tarists" and will exercise undue influence over
other than strictly military functions. The first
danger is one that has not infrequently plagued
our military institutions. The second is a
newer and more serious threat. Both difficulties
are commonly supposed to stem from certain
traits attributed to professional military men.
Merriam observes that "there are virtues
within the legitimate scope of military func-
tions; courage, sacrifice, tenacity, alertness, are
among these attributes encouraged in military
groups under the most favorable circumstances,
as over against cowardice, selfishness, indif-
ference, weak will." (p. 158) Wright catalogs
some of the chief characteristics frequently as-
sociated with "the military mind." One group
of traits is lack of inventiveness, traditionalism,
and incapacity to perceive the obsolescence of
methods or weapons. Kaempffert documents
this point in his brief discussion of the "culture
lag" in military organizations, though he dem-
onstrates clearly that the needs of the armed
forces have been a major Stimulus to the devel-
opment of modern science, atomic energy, for
example. Another group of characteristics con-
sists of patriotism and nationalism, advocacy
of preparedness in time of peace, and an irra-
tional conviction of the inevitability of war. A
third set of traits is overconfidence in the ap-
plicability of the military method to the Solu-
tion of problems in international relations.
Finally, there is an alleged tendency among
military men to favor discipline, order, plan-
ning, and even regimentation in economic and
social as well as in military life.
How widespread these mental patterns are
we do not know. In defending military men
against such charges, former Secretary of War
Robert P. Patterson has declared that "there is
no set type of military mind. ... I have never
Seen the signs of a military mind that could
be identified as a single type, any more than
there is a lawyer's mind, an engineer's mind or
a merchant's mind. Mental equipment and
outlook on life vary as much in the Army and
Navy as with other occupations or callings."^
Wright concedes that military men elected to
the Office of President have not displayed many
characteristics of "the military mind," though
he does not doubt that many military men suf-
fer from them. However, distortions of think-
ing such as those listed above are not unique
to military men. They are found in all profes-
sions, fostered by training, specialization, self-
interest, and so on— and, in the armed forces,
aggravated by the Separation from civilian ac-
tivities that accompanies service at isolated
military posts, on ships at sea, and in overseas
garrisons. Still, the fact that the difficulties may
be universal does not make them any less a
problem in the armed forces. It merely supplies
perspective and clues for solutions.
Wright suggests that civilians have certain
advantages over the military. They are readier
than the professional to accept and adapt
themselves to new developments in military
technology and policies. They have more con-
fidence that the world can be organized politi-
* War Department press release containing the text of
an address at a meeting of the Alumni Association of Co-
lumbia University, June 3, 1947.
cally for peace. They are more likely to appre-
ciate the facts that armed forces are only one
element in a nation's power; and that, even in
the conduct of wars, diplomacy, economics,
science, and propaganda may be more impor-
tant than strictly military power, essential
though that is. Finally, civilians are more dis-
posed to Support and to implement Subordina-
tion of the military to the politically respon-
sible civilian authorities.
A great deal of the superiority attributed to
the (whose and how typical?) "civilian mind"
is nothing more than the result of forces com-
parable to those which influence military men
and produce limitations in civilian minds simi-
lar to those for which the military are criticized.
Civilian minds may be as narrow and unadapt-
able as military minds— and this is a major
source of the difficulties of integrating govern-
ment programs for national security. In any
case, military men have much of value to con-
tribute to the process of government. Their
judgments must be considered if the govern-
ment is to balance ends and means, diplomatic
commitments and military power. The Presi-
dent and the Congress must balance Strategie
requirements, say for overseas bases or arma-
ments, against possible liabilities in interna-
tional and domestic politics. This is where such
decisions belong-not only because these po-
litically responsible officers are the instruments
through which our constitutional system works,
but also because military means are only one
of several, and not necessarily the best, methods
by which the ends of public policy are pursued.
Thus, for example, the policy for "Containment
of communism" is being implemented by the
Marshall Plan and the Voice of America pro-
gram as well as by our armed forces. Again,
Congress has recognized the relationship of
military policy to diplomatic and economic
policies in the provisions of the law for unifica-
tion of the armed service departments for a
National Security Council and a National Se-
curity Resources Board. In making decisions
on matters involving the national security,
then, the chief civilian officers of the govern-
ment should listen to our military leaders—
probably more than they often have in the
past, but perhaps less than they seem inclined
to do in some cases at present.
In spite of criticisms of "the military mind,"
there has been a growing tendency of late to
grant military men increasing influence in pub-
lic affairs. It is this development and its threat
to civilian supremacy, rather than "bureau-
cratic" weaknesses within the military estab-
lishment, that most disturbs those who are
critical of "militarism."
American military men have often been suc-
cessful candidates for political office, but for-
tunately they have not been disposed to use
military strength for that purpose as frequently
has been the case abroad. Wecter analyzes the
composition and attitudes of the sixteen mil-
lion veterans of World War II and concludes
that "this nation Stands in no danger from
masses of soldiers who refuse psychologically
to demobilize. ..." (p. 24) At the same time,
as a result of their own momentum and the
wooing of interested politicians, veterans con-
tinue to be a potent force in American politics.
How will their experience as military men af-
fect their activities as Citizens? Wecter suggests
that they are less likely than civilians to be
impressed by the mere fact that a candidate
has had a war record, and that many of them
have had enough of military controls. In what
direction will they throw the influence they
exercise through their various organizations?
Will they be preoccupied with special group
Privileges and benefits or will they act on the
assumption that the veterans' welfare is in-
separably related to that of the rest of the Com-
munity of which they are a part? What effect
will they have on foreign policies, miFitary
preparations, and domestic economic and so-
cial programs, particularly if the country falls
into hard times again? What will be their net
impact on civil liberties and the democratic
processes of government, especially if the coun-
try should be faced with domestic disturbances
and attempts are made to enforce order and to
preserve the Status quo by military means, or
if people succumb to the temptation to accept
authority in order to escape from the exercise
of their political responsibilities? These are
some of the questions raised, but far from fully
answered, by the essays under review.
It is not the military alone, however, who are
attracted to the expansion of military influence
in public affairs. Opinions differ on how much
the Penetration of "civilian" agencies by mili-
tary men is the result of a will to power on the
296
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
(
BOOK REVIEWS
297
part of the military and how much it is a con-
sequence of the attitudes and actions of civil-
ians. The military, like any other, bureaucracy
are subject to imperialistic impulses which im-
pel them not only to increase the armed forces
but also to reach out to control related activities
on which the success of military effort proper
may depend, for example, scientific research,
especially in atomic energy, and industrial mo-
bilization. It has been easy to rationalize such
expansionist tendencies in terms of national
security and many civilians go along with, and
even urge, growth of military influence over
other- than-military agencies and programs.
This is bad business when measured by
Standards of efficient, as well as of populär,
government. It dissipates the energies of mili-
tary administrators leaving less time for man-
agement of the armed forces whose Organiza-
tion, strategy, and tactics stand in need of
revision to bring them into line with contem-
porary technological and political develop-
ments. It threatens to lower the quality of
administration in the nonmilitary agencies by
placing their control in people less likely than
appropriate civilians to manage them effi-
ciently. It promotes the mistaken idea that
military defense is synonymous with national
security and thus leads to the neglect of other
aspects of that security. In other words, "civil-
ian supremacy" can be justified on grounds not
only of civilian self-interest and constitutional
doctrine but also of administrative effective-
ness.
Despite these considerations, however, the
recent tendency to staff government agencies
with military men and to subject public pro-
grams to their direction or influence contin-
ues— in diplomacy, research, education, indus-
try, and other areas. These developments have
been summarized by Hanson W. Baldwin in
an article entitled "The Military Move In,"
which appeared in Harpers for December,
1947. How shall we account for this tendency
in face of the tradition of civilian supremacy
and military Subordination?
A great deal of it stems from the fear that
there will be another war, a belief that we must
prepare for it now, and a feeling that military
men are best equipped to manage the prepara-
tions— which are conceived in more inclusive
terms today than they were before wars became
"total." Some of it is the result of the failures
of civilians who are insufficiently aware of our
constitutional theory of, and insufficiently sen-
sitive to the need for, a line of Separation be-
tween civil and military authority. Some of it
is an accident of personal acquaintance by ap-
pointing authorities who have been impressed
by the administrative records made by military
men in the armed Services. Some of it is due to
a conviction on the part of these authorities
that they will be able to control their military
appointees and to check any "militaristic"
tendencies they may display. Some of it is a
consequence of attacks on civilian bureaucrats,
at the same time that glamour, prestige, and
special dispensations enhance the Status of the
military profession. (Ironically, leaders of the
armed Services have complained in recent
months that attacks on the military have under-
mined and discredited their profession and
have hurt the military establishment by dis-
couraging competent men from joining, or re-
maining in, the armed forces.)
Some of it is the result of the government's
inability to secure the Services of capable civil-
ians because salaries and other conditions of
employment are unattractive; for example, the
President's attempt early in 1948 to secure spe-
cial legislation for appointment of General
Kuter to the GAB. Some of it results from a
desire to take agencies or programs "out of
politics"; for instance, the WPA after the 1938
elections. Some of it follows from the emphasis
on "security mindedness" characteristic of this
period of uncertainty and fear, as in proposals
to restore control of atomic energy to the mili-
tary. Some of it, finally, stems from an exag-
geration of the competence of military men
and inadequate discrimination between the
civilian Jobs for which their experience quali-
fies them and those in which it is not particu-
larly relevant. Perhaps the most remarkable
illustration of this attitude is the willingness
of assorted groups to take General Eisenhower
as a presidential candidate "sight unseen,"
without knowing his views on important pub-
lic questions.
III
How, in view of these developments, is civil-
ian supremacy over military authority to
be made effective? How can we implement the
political philosophy expressed by Viscount
Trenchard, Marshai of the RAF?
In a democracy, because it is a democracy, the
fighting man is the servant of the statesman and
strategy is profoundly affected by internal and inter-
national politics. The military chiefs are the advisers
on military policy and the executives through which
that policy, once decided, is put into effect. The re-
sponsibility is with the statesman who has to justify
his actions and maintain his position in a legally
constituted representative assembly, representative
of the people, whose knowledge of military matters
is nonexistent and whose judgment is frequently
wrong, based as it must be in war on a necessarily in-
complete possession of the facts.2
How are we to keep the military machine an
instrument, and prevent it from becoming a
master, of government policy?
One way out of the dilemma is disarmament.
It could be argued that the happiest Solution to
the problem of obtaining security without ac-
quiring militarism would be to reduce, or to
eliminate the need for, armed forces in interna-
tional, and domestic, politics. It seems more
realistic, however, to assume that military
power will continue to play a major role in
public affairs in the foreseeable future— that, as
Merriam says, force will continue to be "em-
ployed in self-defense to make possible the con-
ditions under which reason and co-operation
may live and advance to higher levels." (p. 159)
Thus, Smith notes that in countries conquered
by American forces in the late war we have
been subordinating our military to their civil-
ian authorities, that we are "determined to sub-
Ordinate the military even if we have to use the
military to do itl" (p. 98) Even the United
Nations Charter makes provision for interna-
tional application of armed force to maiiuain
or restore peace, a function whose administra-
tive and Substantive difficulties Stevenson out-
lines in his essay. But the UN's experience to
date has not been such that one may safely con-
clude there is no danger of resort to another
major test of arms among the great powers.
American military policy, like that of other
countries, still is based on the assumption that
nations must depend for their security on their
own, and their allies', forces rather than on
law and international armed forces. Our de-
* The New York Times, January 28, 1942, p. 8.
mobilization after 1945 was rapid, but the mili-
tary, naval, and air establishments that remain
exceed by far their counterparts in any previ-
ous period of "peace"; and the prospects seem
favorable to continuance of the armed forces at
high levels. A large military establishment,
however, poses a problem of unfamiliar dimen-
sions in American civilian control of the mili-
tary, for Standing armed forces, even if dis-
persed, are always a potential menace to that
control— though navies may constitute less a
threat of domestic oppression than do armies.
As Wright puts it, "the world is still an an-
archy, and states may feel compelled to become
tyrannies." (p. 133)
If disarmament is not the answer to security
without militarism, neither, in view of the na-
ture of modern warfare, is resort to civilian
components in lieu of professional armed Serv-
ices. Baldwin analyzes the nature of the mili-
tary danger to the United States in a future war
and outlines the strategy and forces required to
meet it effectively. He foresees the principal
threat not as one of large-scale physical inva-
sion but as that of massive assault by atomic
bombs and transoceanic rockets, planes, and
submarines. He believes that the offensive has
an ascendency over the defensive at a time when
our air and sea frontiers have become "live."
How, then, are we to protect the continental
United States, which is not only of tremcndous
importance as a supply base but also has be-
come the main operating base of our armed
forces? There can be no perfect protection
against surprise attack by guided missiles and
atomic explosives. On the home front, modern
war calls for defenses of a magnitude and a
complexity that this country has never had to
provide before, though initial steps were taken
in the last war. It calls not only for active meas-
ures such as air and missile interception but
also for passive measures such as anti-air-borne
work and disaster control. Against the enemy,
Baldwin writes, "there is . . . no defense ex-
cept a strong offense— the threat of retaliation
in kind, the threat of worse blows against the
enemy homeland than any the enemy can de-
liver against us." (p. 47) Such defense calls for
strong forces instantly ready for offensive ac-
tion; and such forces must be full-time profes-
sional since mastery of modern arms and readi-
ness to retaliate are beyond the capacities of
\
298
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
\ i
BOOK REVIEWS
299
part-time civilian components, though they
have a vital role in home front defense and as
reserves for the regulär forces. Baldwin argues
against universal military training; and he con-
tends that the necessary forces should be re-
cruited on the basis of voluntary, long-term en-
listments. He believes this is possible if service
is made sufficiently attractive and if military
personnel management is modernized— an esti-
mate which, for various reasons, has not mate-
rialized, so that selective service has recently
been reestablished.
If we must have a large Standing establish-
ment, how is it to be kept responsive to civilian
controls? The provisions of the Constitution
make clear that the Founding Fathers intended
that military forces should be instruments
rather than directors of public policy, and that
they should be controlled by the politically re-
sponsible agencies of the government, i.e., by
Congress and the President. Congress was
vested with authority to raise an Army, to
maintain a Navy, to make rules for government
of the armed forces, to vote appropriations for
their support— and thus to control their size,
and to declare war. The President was author-
ized to appoint officers and was made Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the
final authority for direction of the armed
forces. It seems to have been the framers' inten-
tion, as it has been the tradition in practice,
that most presidents, and more secretaries of
the armed service departments, should be civil-
ians. These and related constitutional provi-
sions point the direction and provide some of
the safeguards needed for civilian supremacy
over the country's armed forces— but they do
not insure that result. Civilian supremacy re-
quires a great deal more if it is to be made effec-
tive. As Appleby says, "Civilian control . . .
cannot be achieved by slogan or by fiat. It can-
not exist in an administrative vacuum." (p.
70) It requires not only submissiveness on the
part of the military but also confidence, intelli-
gence, and wisdom on the part of the top civil-
ians; and it needs appropriate Organization and
staffing in the Congress and the Administra-
tion. We have been, and we remain, defective
on all these counts.
It has been this country's good fortune that
our military leaders have regarded themselves
as servants of the people rather than their mas-
ters and have not been inclined to use their
military authority as a vehicle on which to ride
into public office or to maintain themselves in
positions they have won by populär election.
This happy result has been accidental more
than it has been a matter of deliberate design.
We need to know more about the circum-
stances that encourage such a frame of mind
on the part of the military and about the condi-
tions under which it breaks down, and to act
systematically on such insight. For example,
the pre-service background and the in-service
training of officers and enlisted men have much
to do with the respect they accord to orders of
their civilian superiors. And agencies other
than the top executive officers affect the respon-
siveness of the military establishment to civil-
ian Orders: the Congress, the courts, the people,
the press, and the armed forces themselves, for
the habit of obedience, to a great extent, is the
result of military training. Programs for re-
cruitment and for training of our armed forces
should be planned, among other things, to pro-
mote the tradition of civilian supremacy over
military authority, as well as to counteract "bu-
reaucratic" tendencies within the armed Serv-
ices.
We need more than Subordination of the
military, however. We need intelligent direc-
tion by civilians as well. If our military officers
need broader education in the conditions of the
Society in which they function, our civilian offi-
cials need a fuller understanding of the role of
force in that society's Operations and of the
methods for Controlling the armed Services. We
need civilians in the Congress and in the Ad-
ministration who have confidence in their ca-
pacity to direct the armed forces— and who have
the facilities, information, and judgment to
justify that confidence. Adherence to the for-
malities of civilian supremacy may conceal
Wide departures from that principle. Military
influence in public affairs will be as great as
civilians in Controlling positions are willing to
allow it to be. Certainly the views of military
men should have weight in public Councils;
but, for reasons already suggested, they should
not be accepted without question, even in
"military" matters. At the same time, the civil-
ians concerned have an Obligation to inform
themselves so that they will not act ignorantly
when they weigh military advice.
The central problem posed by claims for ad-
ditional military control over agencies and
programs concerned with national security is
not so much one of "militarism" as it is one of
domination by a part of the whole. The means
for pursuit of foreign and domestic policies are
multiple and interchangeable; but this basic
consideration often is obscured by Organization
that encourages separatism instead of Integra-
tion and by attitudes that confuse national se-
curity with national defense alone. National se-
curity requires over-all administrative and leg-
islative leadership which can see things whole
and relate them in thought and action, and
leaders of individual agencies and committees
who recognize that they are dealing with only
part of a total program to which their efforts
must be related.
^* The weaknesses of Congress in exercising its
\ controls over the armed forces have been essen-
tially the same as its shortcomings in directing
and supervising civilian agencieä^'X^egislative
committees, like administrative departments,
whose thinking they often reflect, tend to over-
emphasize the particular means for promoting
the national security with which they deal/And
legislative leaders, like the President, lack
many of the facilities needed to promote coor-
dinated action. These problems receive little
attention in the volume under review. How-
ever, Appleby observes that the decisions of the
armed service committees are pretty much ac-
cepted by Congress although these committees
are less civilian in character and attitude than
Congress as a whole. He also wams about the
dangers to civilian control that may result from
congressional curtailments of presidential and
secretarial authority over the military forces
out of jealousy for a rival institution. Congres-
sional weaknesses in passing on military recom-
mendations and in supervising the armed
forces have been remedied to some extent by
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946;
but a great deal remains to be done, especially
in oversight of military administration.
The difficulties of the President and of the
defense secretaries in Controlling the armed
forces are analyzed by Appleby in terms famil-
iär to those who have read his Big Democracy.
He wants to provide for such a balance in ad-
ministrative structure and power as will bring
up to the President the questions significant
for effective control of the armed forces— for
example, by strengthening the relevant func-
tions of the Department of State and keeping
administration of embryonic civilian war agen-
cies in civilian hands. Coupled with this need
is that for adequate staff assistance— civilian as
well as military, institutional as well as indi-
vidual—which will enable the Chief Executive
to act intelligently on the issues he undertakes
to settle. Appleby declares that "the strengthen-
ing of the whole executive office staff and its
better Organization to make for balance, inte-
gration, and control of the executive govern-
ment is the greatest single need in the field of
public administration in America." (p. 89)
Appleby 's comments about management of
the armed service departments are in the same
vein. Structure should be devised partly with
an eye to its function in raising issues so that
questions which require top level attention will
receive it, while others are kept at appropriate
lower levels; and the defense secretaries should
have not only a military but also a civilian staff.
He feels that intradepartmental civilian con-
trol has been too much a matter merely of po-
litical morality and too little one of adminis-
trative structure and facilities. Both, however,
are essential for the purposes of real civilian
control. Thus, Josephus Daniels, as Secretary
of the Navy, was wrong in opposing a general
staff for management of the naval establish-
ment but he was right in sensing the danger
that such a staff might also manage the Secre-
tary.
These essays do not include a discussion of
the unified defense department which Congress
established in 1947; but two comments may be
in Order here in light of the foregoing discus-
sion. One is that the legis iation has left ample
opportunity to the three armed forces— and
their spokesmen have been sufficiently moved
— to present their particular views to the Secre-
tary of Defense, the President, and the Con-
gress. The other is that the staffing of the de-
partment is deficient in two respects. First, the
principal instruments on which the Secretary
must rely for advice are Joint agencies made up
of representatives of the three armed Services
rather than truly departmental organs. Second,
the civilian staffing at the secretarial level for
programming, budgeting, personnel, research,
and other functions probably is inadequate for
30O
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW
\
effective civilian control of the military estab-
lishment.
Civilian control of the nation's armed forces
is only a special case of the management by po-
litically responsible officers of government
agencies with professional bureaucracies. Con-
trol of the military establishment may be a
more formidable task than management of
civilian agencies; but the lessons in the two
areas are interchangeable. We need not yet de-
spair in either case, though we have a long way
to go before we fully understand what it takes
to exercise that control and are able to make it
effective. The essays in the book under review
do not carry the analysis of the administrative
and political requirements of civilian control
of military authority very far; but they do open
up the way and raise enough questions to oc-
cupy for a long time those who can turn atten-
tion to civil-military relations. The necessary
research, thought, and action may be encour-
aged by awareness that the consequences of f ail-
ure in politically responsible direction and su-
pervision may be more serious in the war agen-
cies than in their civilian counterparts. In both
cases, however, it is well to recall Appleby's
warning that "civilian control is never finally
achieved but poses a continuing problem re-
quiring constant watchfulness. ..." (p. 9^)
Volunteers in Retail Price Control-A Postscript
By Charles Aikin, University of California
Volunteers in OPA, by Imogene H. Putnam,
General Publication No. 14 of the OPA His-
torical Reports on War Administration, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1947. Pp. ix,
166. $0.35.
I
THE OPA volunteer price control program
can be described either as one of the genu-
inely significant administrative developments
of the war period or as "the failure of a mis-
sion"; and both characterizations will be accu-
rate. The local war price and rationing board
price program never succeeded in attaining its
objectives nationally because of a lack of un-
derstanding of what it was and of what could
be accomplished through it, and also because
of confusing commands and no small blunder-
ing on the part of OPA planners at each level
of administrative authority. Yet, in exceptional
cases it succeeded beyond justifiable expecta-
tions, and through its successes one fjnds an
interesting and potentially useful device that
can be valuable in the conduct of large and
complex bureaucratic programs in the inevi-
table crises of the future.
Why was it that the heads of the national of-
fice of OPA and also those of most district Of-
fices rejected local board participation in price
work for a considerable time near the begin-
ning of the program? How can one account for
the fact that Washington executives-men who
planned so ably in establishing the basic form
of price control-did not contribute to the
price work of local boards? Conversely, how
was it administratively possible for a program
involving scores of thousands of volunteers and
devouring an ever increasing proportion of the
agency's budget to be forced on a reluctant na-
tional Office by field offices, and by a minority
of field Offices at that?
This program is a difficult one to appraise.
As it is an easy one to describe and appears to
be simple to understand, why was it so ex-
tremely hard to make it work? Just why was it
that some boards performed ably and others,
that wer6 almost identically staffed and
equipped, failed? Why was it that a good board
might, after months of excellent work, sud-
denly cease to function? Too, what was it that
happened to notoriously inept boards that— on
rare occasions— led them suddenly to mend
their ways?
Why were these war price and rationing
board price panels so hard to supervise? Was
there something peculiar about the problem of
field supervision when applied to local boards?
Experience indicated but did not explain why
^
f
An Appropriate Role for the Military in American
< Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note
by
BURTON SAPIN, RICHARD C. SNYDER AND H. W. BRĂśCK
\
Foreign Policy Analysis Project
Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 4
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR SECTION
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
July 1954
An Appropriate Role for the Military in American
Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note
hy
BURTON SAPIN, RICHARD C. SNYDER AND H. W. BRĂśCK
Foreign Policy Analysis Project
Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 4
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR SECTION
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
July 1954
.
Copyright, 1954
by
Burton Sapin, Richard C. Snyder and H. W. BrĂĽck
Princeton University
Printed in the United States of America
Preface
One of the challenges usually met by those engaged in conceptual
or theoretical work in the social sciences is whether their "apparatus"
is of any practical use. In other words, it may he logically neat
and have considerable esthetic appeal, but does it vork^ i.e., is
it applicable to empirical research problems and, equally important,
does it make any "difference" when applied to them?
We feel that this is a legitimate challenge when made in good
faith, and we have therefore given some attention to the preparation
and the enc o ura gerne nt of empirical studies using our decision-
making frame of reference, insofar as this did not interfere with
the major purposes of our Project. While the essay that follows does
not fall into the category of empirical studies, it is an attempt
to apply the decision-making scheme to the formulation of research
questions in an important area of public policy and concern.
Therefore, as we suggest in our Conclusion, its worth must stand
or fall on a considered judgment as to whether we have been able to
demonstrate that our conceptual scheme is applicable to this problem
and that it does make a difference to apply it.
We indicated our many intellectual debts in the Preface to
Publication No. 3 (Decision-making As An Approach to the Study of
International Politics). Since this essay is largely a by-product
of that paper, we will only reiterate here our thanks to all those
who have helped and encouraged us
B.S.
x\ • C • o .
H.W.B.
July 195^
III
An Appropriate Eole for the Military in American
Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note
Table of Contents
Preface
I. Introduction
Page
Increasing Scholarly Interest
The Utility of a Decision-making Approach
Analytical Focus of This Research Note
Some Underlying Assiimptions
Advantages of Conceptualization
3
5
6
8
10
II. Military Peirtlcipation in Foreign Policy Decision-
making: Some Organizational Concepts
13
1. The Larger Governmental Setting
2. Characteristics of Decision-making Systems
Type 8 of Decisional Systems
Suggested Categories for the Analysis
of Systems
3. Expert and Representational Roles
Commentary
13
15
16
18
20
21
III. The Motivation of Military Officers: The "Military
Mind
TT
2k
1. Introduction 25
2. Attitudes and Frames of Reference 26
3. Motivational Soiirces: Values and Intellectual
Skills 29
k. The Rapidly Changing Pole of the Professional
Military Officer 33
rv. Derived Research Problems and Questions
1. Introduction
2. Some Key Research Questions
(1) The gover-nmental setting
(2) Types of decision-making Systems
(3) Expert and representational roles
{k) The "military mind"
3h
3h
37
39
39
ko
k2
IV
Page
An Appropriate Role for the Military in American
Foreign Policy-making: A Research Note^
IV. (Continued)
(5)
Role Interpretation
Is There a Military Personality Type?
Military Thinking About Foreign Policy
Problems
^A^en has the military establishment view
predominated?
V. A Note on Researchability
VI. Conclusion
^3
52
55
Gk
I. Introduction
The greatly increased participatlon of the American military
establishment in the making and carrying out of United States
foreign policy represents one of the more important governmental
developments of the last fifteen years. This new role of the
military, and the political and social problems that have ac-
companied it, can be explained as a consequence of the major role
recently assumed by the United States in world politics, involving
among other things a substantial and cohtinuing external threat to
American military security. This threat is in turn sharpened by
the fact that the traditional importance of military tools and tech-
niques in international politics has been much increased ^j recent
revolutionaj-y advances in the technology of war. This Situation has,
of course, brought about a tremendous expansion in the size of the
American armed forces and the nature and ränge of their responsibil-
ities. The inevitable result is close interdependence and inter-
mixture of foreign policy and military policy, reflected in the
expanded military participatlon in American foreign policy-making."^
1. Since this Note is a by-product and application of our decision-
making frame of reference, it should be read in conjunction with
Snyder, BrĂĽck and Sapin, Publication No. 3, Decision-making As An
Approach to the Study of International Politics.
2. The background and general character of this new role of the
military in American foreign policy-making, as well as some of the
Problems raised by it, are discussed in much greater detail in a
recently published Short study by two of the authors of this Note.
See Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military
in American Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday & Company, 195^0-
While that volume and this Research Note are independent documents
that stand by themselves, they are to a considerable extent products
of a common body of though and research experience. In fact, some
of the concepts explicitly set forth and discussed in this Note
guided the analysis in the other study, though to some extent left
implicit in it.
-2-
-3-
The broad dilenuna posed for the toerican natloB by these
aevelop.ents .ay be thought of aa the aafeguarding of its essential
^ .-^a+^'+ntin-ns in the face of : (l) the major
democratic values and mstitutions in xn«
military threat from abroad; and (2) the consequencea tiiat this
threat has called forth within ĂĽ.e nation (including the conslderable
expansion in the size and impact of the armed forces).
Within the foreign policy-making proceas itself , the more specific
question arieee of making use of those military skills and resources
that seem necessary to the nation 's security while at the same time
maintaining a condition usually viewed as requisite to the continued
health and, even, the existence of American democracy, namely, civilian
supremacy or meaningful civil control over the military. IHus there
are two major problems or objectives: effective foreign policy-making
and better policies on the one hand, but formulation and successful
execution of policies vithin ö. prescribed constitutional and Insti-
tut ional framevork on the other. Clearly, there are a Cluster of
difficult Problems involved here . Some of these will be suggested
below.
As might be expected, there has been conslderable public con-
cern about these problems, indeed about the whole area of civil-
military relations. The debate and discussion occasioned by the
relief of General MacArthur in April 1951, the occasional warnings
by legislators and other public figures about "creeping militarism
and the rapid ly increasing influence of the military, the critical
comments by such distinguished Citizens as Dr. Vannevar Bush and
ex-Defense Secretary Eobert Lovett about the Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the lack of appropriate civilian control
over them, and the many governmental commissions and private study
groups that have examined the structure and Operations of the de-
fense establishment in recent years -- all of these indicate that
the role of the military has become a matter of conslderable con-
cern, and some confusion, to civilian officials, legislators, mil-
itary critics, interested Citizens and to military officers them-
selves.
Increasing Scholar ly Interest. However, while many speeohes have
been made and numerous articles written, there has until recently
been relatively little systematic analysis and research on these
developments . Within the last year or two, though, there has been
a noteworthy increase in attention to this area on the part of
academic and other research groups and, with the support of some
of the major research foundations, important projects have gotten
under way at a number of Colleges and universities.l
In the study cited above,^ two of the authors of this Note
1. Most of these are noted in William T.E. Fox, "Civil-Military^^
Relations Research: the SSRC Committee and Its Research Survey."
World Politics, 6: 278-288, ( January 195^). Some of them will be
commented on briefly in this paper. For a tentative formulation
of its research focus and some hypotheses by one group working in
this area, see Morris Janowitz, Working Paper on the Professional
Soldier and Political Power, mimeographed, Bureau of Government,
Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, July 1953-
Owing to Space limitations, a bibliography has not been included
in this paper. There are, however, extensive bibliographical and
footnote references relating to the military and American foreign
policy in Sapin and Snyder, op. cit . , pp. T8-8i+. Also, the Committee
on Civil-Military Relations Research of the Social Science Research
Council has recently published Civil-Military Relations: An Annotated
Bibliography, 19^0-19^2 (New York, Columbia University Press, 195^)-
2. See n. 2, p. 1.
1
-h-
have attempted to contribute to this developing academic interest
by a characterization and appraisal of the c ont empor ary role of
the military establishment in American foreign policy. An effort
was made to set forth and analyze the criteria in terms of vhich
the key question of an appropriate role for the military in foreign
policy-making could be answered, and then, in the light of what
seemed to be a generally accepted setof preferences on this matter
in the United States, the conditions conducive to the necessary,
effective and limited participation of the military in foreign
policy-making were specified.
In addition to attempting to clarify the value questions in-
volved in these issues of public policy, some attention was also
given to the separate problem of analyzing and researching the role
of the military in foreign policy. Considerable care was devoted
to the clear, operational definition of terms and problems, and
some analytic concepts that seemed to the authors useful were intro-
duced. Also, some key research questions in the area were indicated.
However, the study did not attempt any systematic presentation of
major factors that needed research, concepts and categories viewed
as fruitful for researching them, nor the more meaningful research
questions that might be suggested by such conceptualization. That
is precisely the task to which this essay is directed -- it is an
exercise ^ conceptualization and in the application of a conceptual
scheme to the description and analysis of an important social and
political Problem
-5-
The Utility of a Decision-making Approach. By way of further intro-
duction, it may be appropriate to indicate how the members of the
Foreign Policy Analysis Project happened to get involved in the
field of civil- military relations research. First of all, it
should be made perfectly clear that the civil-military field is
not a primary or even major concern of this Project. However,
a number of circumstances combined tg make the preparation of
this Note seem worthwhile. In the first place, the role of the
military in American foreign policy is and has been an important
personal interest, furthered by empirical research experience, of
two of the members of the Project.^ Furthermore, while the Foreign
Policy Analysis Project is concerned with assessing and evaluating
the literature of the field of international politics viewed essen-
tially as an academic and intellectual enterprise, its members have
at the same time been attempting to develop their own frame of re-
ference for defining the field. This frame of reference uses de-
cision-making as a focus for analysis. 2 Inevitably such an approach
1 In addition to the study by Sapin and Snyder already cited, Mr.
Sapin was, from 1951 t0.1953, a member of a research group of the ^
Center of International Studies, Princeton University, which exammed
the Japanese peace treaty as a case study in the formulation and Im-
plementation of American foreign policy. Mr. Sapin' s doctoral dis-
sertion dealt with the role of the military establishment in the
making of that Peace Treaty. See also Burtin Sapin, The Role of
the Military in Formulating the Japanese Peace Treaty, in Gordon
B. Turner (ed.), A History of Military Affairs in Western 5^^^^^^
Since the Eighteenth Century (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co.,195i^
pp. 751-762 (in reprint form, Publication No. 1 in this Seriesj.
2. The decision-making frame of reference is set forth in ^^^^^^^^^^^^
detail in Publication No. 3 of this series (see Snyder, BrĂĽck and Sapm,
op. cit. ) and will therefore not be discussed at any length m this
Note .
-6-
involves conĂźiderable interest in the processes of foreign policy-
making; and in the patterns of activity vhich characterize con-
temporary American foreign policy-making, the role of the military
establishment is both important and revealing.
Thus, we have found the decision -making approach and the con-
ceptualization flowing from it extremely useful and suggestive in
analyzing the military 's role in the formulation and execution of
U.S. foreign policy, and, at the same time, the latter prob lern has
provided interesting illustrative material for the application and
development of the decision-making frame of reference. In sum, by
a combination of personal interest and research experience, the im-
portance of the political and social problem presented by the role
of the American military in foreign policy and the apparent useful-
ness of the decision-making approach in dealing with it, this group
has been drawn into this area and devoted considerable time to it
in hopes of perhaps contributing some concepts and formulations of
key Problems that might lead to more fruitful research.
Analytical Focus of this Eesearch Note. Before proceeding to set
forth some of the underlying assumptions of this Note, the limits of
its concern should be made clear The field of civil-military re-
lations is a very broad one. It includes relationships within each
of the four departments of the military establishment and among them,
encompassing the many and complex problems faced in the Organization
and direction of the armed forces and their effective control by
politically responsible civilian authority. Another very important
-7-
area is represented by military relations with other parts of the
Federal Government, including Congress and its committees as well
as the other departments and agencies of the executive branch.
Civil-military relations can, again, be looked at in terms of the
impact of the activities of the armed forces on various aspects and
Segments of the society - on the American economy, on scientific
research and education, and on civil liberties. These are all
significant areas in need of systematic examination. However, the
xocus of this essay is narrower and its purposes more modest. It
is directed essentially to the problem of analyzing contemporary
military participation in the making of foreign policy decisions,
though much of what is said will also be relevant to military
activities with respect to policy Implementation and to the legiti-
mation of foreign policy decisions and programs.
In isolating our problem for purposes of analysis, we are ob-
viously not implying that it is in fact separable from these other
elements. While such a procedure raakes sense in terms of analytic
convenience, it is undeniable that those aspects of military par-
ticipation in foreign pDlicy-making with which this Note is concerned
would become much more und er stand ab le if , for example, systematic
studies of the characteristics of internal military establishment
Organization were available.
While the explicit ränge of concern of this essay is fairly
narrow, it is assumed that many of the concepts to be presented
would be quite useful in analyzing some of the other aspects of
civil-military relations just noted . The same comment would apDly
-8-
-9-
to historical reeearch in this area. Thie Note is oriented to re-
Ăźearch on contemporary aspects of the role of the military in
national policy-making, but it is feit that historical research on
this Problem or on military Organization and military policy in the
United States would benefit by the use of some of the decision-
making concepts. In this regard, there is no Intention to imply
that historical research in the civil-military relations field is
unnecessary. On the contrary, far too little is known about the
history of the armed forces, military policy and the relations of
the military to national policy-making in the United States. 1 In
sum^ while our primary focus of attention is present-day military
participation in the processes of American foreign policy formula-
tion and decision-making, it is suggested that the general ap-
proach and the particular concepts to be employed have a far wider
relevance and applicability.
Some Underlying Assumptions. It should be clear now that one of the
underlying assumptions of this Note is the usefulness of a decision-
making approach to the problem. Such an approach would seem to
become particularly appropriate in a Situation where no responsible
critic or observer is inclined to argue that military participation
in the processes of foreign policy-making is undesirable or unnecessary
1. A new program for encouraging research in this area has just gotten
under way. See Gordon A. Craig and Bryce Wood, "The History of American
Military Policy: A New Program of Grants for Research/' SSEC Items ,
8: 13-15 (June 195^). Furthermore, in the study of civil-military
relations that Harold Stein is directing for the Twentieth Century Fund,
one of the products will be a much-needed historical sketch of major
developments in the governmental role of the American military es-
tablishment during the last twenty years.
Once military participation per se is accepted as necessary to
more effective policy-making, it would then seem to become a
question of establishing appropriate limits and conditions for
it, in terms of those values or criteria that seem to have gen-
eral acceptance in the society. Avoiding or minimizing undesir-
able consequences and providing conditions favorable to the devel-
opment of desirable ones, in terms of both better policies and
decisions and the maintenance of meaningful civil control, would
seem to depend in turn on detailed and reliable knowledge about
the following: (l) the types of decision-making units in which the
military are involved and the roles they play in these units; (2)
the nature of the Communications networks linking military and
civilian agencies; and (3) the characteristics of military thinking
about foreign policy problems -- what values, attitudes and intellec-
tual skills military officers bring to bear on these problems and
with what results. These are some of the major factors emphasized
by the decision-making approach. It is difficult to see how the
role of the military in American foreign policy can be examined and
evaluated without attenUon to such factors and their consequences.
Another of our basic assumptions is that the most fruitful re-
•search on this or any other social science problem demands explicit,
systematic conceptualization. Briefly, this involves: first, ex-
plicit indication of the situations, relationships and other di-
mensions of the problem that seem fundamental and are to be studied;
and, second, establishing explicit categories or concepts in terms
of which xhese factors are to be investigated. Obviously these
-10-
categories must meet the tests of clarity and precision and must be
operational, that is, have identifiable empirical referents. This
is, of course, by no means revolutionary doctrine. It is or should
be Standard operating procedure for any research that labeis itself
social science. It is clearly not in itself a sufficient guarantor
of successful or worthwnile research. The researcher still needs
Imagination, experience, integrity and, if possible, enough acquaint-
ance with the literature of the behavioral sciences to choose his
concepts, his theoretical formulations and his hypotheses wisely.
This latter point should perhaps be underscored. Any one set of
concepts is not going to be as useful as any other. A conceptual
framework built on major research endeavors and significant theore-
tical contributions in the social sciences is likely to prove far
more fruitful than categories of the more intuitive, off-the-cuff
variety.
Advantages of Conceptualization. However, bearing these obvious and
inevitable limitations in mind, conceptualization, if well done,
should help produce a number of desirable results for research.
First of all, it should make possible the asking of more searching
and researchable questions. Secondly, it should provide the re-
searcher and the "consumers" of his research with explicit criteria
Of selection which specify the aspects of the problem to be studied
and the pertinent data. Such a "check-list" should help sensitize
the researcher to aspects of the problem or relevant data that he
raight otherwise miss. Finally, it should make for improved com-
parative analysis of a problem. Comparative analysis is obviously
possible when a series of studies using the same conceptual scheme
-11-
have been done. However, studies done in terms of differing interests
and orientations can also be linked and common properties or uni-
formities perhaps discovered if they are examined in the light of
an explicit conceptual scheme. There should be increasing number s
of such studies available as some of the research groups referred
to earlier begin to publish the results of their work. For example,
a series of case studies on civil-military relations in the foreign
affairs field is going to be prepared as one part of the Twentieth
Century Fund project noted above. Comparative analysis could also
be done on the handling of the role of the military in different
political Systems, in effect, comparative national experiences in
this area.
Clarity of purpose and focus, categories that are operational,
and questions that are researchable -- these are the theoretical
virtues of br inging to bear on research problems an explicit con-
ceptual scheme. For any particular conceptual framework, of course,
the. final test is in the researching, but the general advantages of
such an approach seem to us undeniable.
Our procedure in this paper will be to set forth first a series
of key concepts and then, in a separate section, present the kinds
of research questions suggested by these concepts. The various
decision-making Systems that characterize military participation
in foreign policy-making will be examined under two general
1. In the earlier series of public administration case studies
edited by Harold Stein, The Säle of the Tankers case has some very
suggestive material on the military establishment. See Harold
Stein (ed.), Public Administration and Policy Development (New Yjrk,
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1952), pp. 4^5-532.
-12-
-13-
headings, namely^ the organizatlonal and the motivational. The
section on Organization will be concerned with the larger gov-
ernmental setting, the characteristics of the decision-making Sys-
tems involved, and the possible organizatlonal roles that military
participants can play in the decision-making process. The discus-
sion under the second heading will focus on the individual decision-
maker, dealing with the character of military thinking about foreign
policy Problems in terms of motivational analysis.
II. Military Participation in Foreign Policy Decision-making:
Some Organizatlonal Concepts
As has been suggested^ military participation can be viewed in
organizatlonal terms : the responsibilities and jurisdictions of
the agencies involved; the complex Channels of communication by
which they are linked; the organizatlonal roles of the officials
involved; the Systems of activity in which they participate; and
the Statutes, Orders and regulations, and the precedents and con-
ventionalized procediires supplementing them, which provide the
rules of the game.l
1. The Larger Governmental Setting"^
We are principally concerned here with the Systems of deci-
sion-making activity that characterize military participation in
foreign policy-making. Our definition of the concept of decision-
making System and our notions of how these Systems should be in-
vestigated are set forth below. However, in order to study any
particular decision-making System, it is obviously necessary to
1. We have some serious reservations about the formal -Informal
dichotomy as applied to the analysis of administrative organizations
We prefer to view the written, prescribed rules and regulations and
the body of generally accepted but not usually explicit precedents
and usages which develop over time in any Organization as providing
the formal structure. We would label the latter, usually referred
to as the informal factors, as the conventionalized rules. This
leaves the term informal as a residual category to refer to more
temporary and fleeting behavior patterns which very often are not
relevant to decision-making. This is admittedly a rather cryptic
explanation of our reservations. For a more detailed discussion,
see the section on spheres of competence in Snyder, BrĂĽck and
Sapin, Publication No. 3, op. cit. , pp. 68ff.
2. Since we prefer to use the term Organization to refer to any
decision-making System, it seems desirable to label the totality of
the structural features and activities of the various legislative
bodies and executive branch departments and agencies within which
these decision-making Systems operate as the governmental or
institutional, rather than the organizatlonal, setting.
-14-
place it in the larger institutional framework or context of which
it is a part. Perhaps the general governmental setting in which
military participation in the formulation of policy and the making
of foreign policy decisions takes place can be conceived of in. the
following terms: first, the relevant aspects of the domestic
political setting^ including the political parties and public opinion
and pressure groups and, then, within the official governmental
structure itself, members of the House and Senate and the appropriate
Congressional committees and subcommittees, a large number of civ-
ilian officials and military officers at various hierarchial levels
in the State Department, the defense establishment and other exec-
utive agencies, all of these people with their particular organi-
zational roles and responsibilities, guided by a body of explicit
and conventionalized rules, having available to them a number of
Channels of coramunication to other officials and agencies, and in-
volved in a whole series of relationships with one another ranging
from interdepartmental committees established by Statute through
State or Defense Department briefing sessions for influential
Senators to informal communication over ths telephone or the
luncheon table. Included among these potential decision-mEtkers
are the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, their top
civilian aides, and Senators and Congressmen as well as generals,
colonels, Foreign Service officers, State Department desk officers
and members of Congressional committee staffs. They may be high-
ranking "policy-makers, " middle-level Office or section Chiefs,
members of staff units or "experts" of one kind or aiiother. They
-15-
are all members of executive agencies or legislative bodies,
committees, bureaus and other subgroups within them and perhaps
inter-agency groups with assigned tasks and responsibilities.
Looking at this governmental setting in somewhat metaphoric
terms, it might be said that each foreign policy problem or deci-
sion "activates" a part of this general, available pool of deci-
sion-makers. In other words, while we may talk of the State De-
partment or the military establishment doing this or that, ob-
viously for each decision or each series of decisions only a
small number of officials are actual decision-makers and their
relationships and Communications are but a small part of the total
ongoing activity. However, and this is the essential point, it is
important to remember that the small departmental or interdepart-
mental group, at whatever organizational level, with which the
researcher is likely to be concerned is not operating in a vacuum,
that this larger framework is there and that some of its di-
mensions may be highly relevant to the activities of the particular
decision-making Systems on which research attention is focussed.
2. Characteristics of Decision-making Systems
In analyzing the processes by which a decision or series of
decisions was reached, the researcher is usually, implicitly or
explicitly, abstracting from a great complexity of organizational
activity a number of actors (probably, though not necessarily,
from different departments, bureaus or Offices), who were, as he
sees it, principally concerned with the problem or Situation being
studied. He then attempts to reconstruct the activities -- con-
-16-
ferences, Communications and so on -- by which this group dealt
vith the matter under study. From the point of view of more system-
atic analysis and research, it seems to us useful to regard these
groups of officials as comprising^for the purposes of the problem
or Situation they are dealing with, a dlstinqt decision-maklng
System, with its own responsibilities, its own Channels of com-
munication, its own structure of authority and its own rules of
procedure.^ The analytic usefulness of this notion of a decision-
making System is of course much increased if the researcher has an
explicit set of categories in terms of which to study and characterize
one or more of these Systems.
Types of Decisional Systems. The discussion of military participation
in foreign policy-making that follows tends to be couched in terms
of decision-making units with per sonne 1 drawn from various depart-
ments and agencies within the executive branch. However^ as we im-
plied in the discussion of the governmental setting above, there is
no reason, from the analytic point of view, why Congressmen and
Congressional committees cannot form a part of the foreign policy
decision-making Systems with which we are concerned. In fact, this
would seem to be one of the advantages of this approach. In other
words, since the decision-making System is an analytic reconstruction
1. It should be pointed out that a decision-making System can also
be referred to as a decision-making unit if one wishes to emphasize
the concrete membership aspects which delimit it from other Systems.
The terms unit and System are then in a sense synonymous, ref erring
to the same kind of organizational group viewed from somewhat dif-
ferent points of view, and thus have been and will be used more or
less interchangeably in this paper. For more detailed discussion
of decision-making Systems, see Snyder, BrĂĽck and Sapin, Publication
No. 3, op. cit. , pp 58ff.
-17-
by the observer, it can cross the boundaries between the legis-
lative and executive branches as easily as it does the boundaries
between executive departments (though, admittedly, the problems
of analysis may thereby be complicated) . Thus, if the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
or key members thereof play an important part in the development of
a policy or the making of a major decision, they can quite defi-
nitely be incorporated in the decision-making System reconstructed
by the researcher.
One partlcular subcategory of decision-making System which is
typical of large-scale organizations like the executive depart-
ments of the U.S. Government is the committee or the working group
by means of which a great deal of intradepartmental and, most
certainly, interdepartmental decision-making and coordination is
carried out. Since such committees and working groups tend to be
important organizational devices for military establishment partici-
pation in foreign policy-making and execution, some of the categories
in the analysis that follows are specifically oriented toward such
groups, and will be so indicated. However, the list that follows
should also provide appropriate categories for the study of decision-
making Systems which do not fall under the heading of committees or
working groups.
It should be noted furthermore that the decision-making units
by means of which the military participate in the foreign policy-
m
aking process can be divided into two general groups: first, those
ii
-18-
-19-
units completely within the Defense Department (and staffed by
either military officers, civilian officials or both) dealing ex-
clusively or to a considerable extent with foreign pollcy problems;
and^ second^ those interdepartmental groups with representatives
of both civilian and military agencies. The categories which follow
(with one exception) and the later discussions of expert and re-
presentational roles and of the motivation of military personnel
would seem to apply to the former Systems as well as to the latter.
In fact, it would be most interesting to compare the Operations and
deliberations of those foreign policy units within the Pentagon with
their rough equivalents in such civilian agencies as the State
Department .
Suggested Categories for the Analysis of Systems. The list of eight
categories that follows is regarded as providing a useful set of
questions for the analysis of decision-making units in the field of
U.S. foreign policy. While it is possible that they could be broken
down somewhat more neatly and into a smaller number of major cate-
gories, they seem to us to point to all the important dimensions of
these Units. In some cases, elaboration of the category and some of
the questions it suggests have been included:
(^) the way the System or unit was activated (this might be
called the predecisional occasion for decision) -- planned? routine?
spontaneous? officially constituted or ad hoc? who took the in-
itative? what negotiations took place, if any?;
(^) the baais of military participation in the unit (this cat-
egory is, obviously, relevant only to Joint military agency-civilian
agency Systems) — how and by whom was military participation decid-
ed: (a) military request or claim to participate and civilian ac-
ceptance of such a claim; or (b) civilian invitation without mil-
itary Claim or request;
(3) personnel involved : (a) number; and (b) their organiza-
tional roles or positions (spheres of competence);
(k) structure -- how is the unit or System organized? does it
have a chairman or other chief , responsible official? what are his
powers? what is his ränge of discretion? and so on;
(5) objective -- what is the group's task? is it viewed as
policy-making? fact-f inding? advisory? what kind of decisions is
it empowered to make?;
(6) hierarchical level — at what organizational level is the
unit located -- Secretary, Assistant Secretary, desk officer, or is
there personnel from several levels?;
(7) duration of the unit -- temporary, ad hoc group? assigned
a limited duration problem? more or less "permanent"?;
(8) relation of the unit to other decision-making units and
other aspects of the governmental setting, and to aspects of the
domestic or international setting, if any -- in terms of Channels
of communication and Information, assigned responsibilities and
jurisdictions and so on.
These categories should enable the observer to analyze and
characterize the unit or System he is studying in what might be
called organizational or structural terms. They point to the cir-
cumstances of the System' s activation, the nature of its structure
-20-
and objective, and its relation to other units and to the setting.
Some concepts designed to probe the character of thinklng ab out
foreign policy problems which takes place in such Systems will be
suggested in a later section. However, there is one particular
aspect of the possible organizational roles (see Jb in the above
list) played by military participants in foreign policy-making that
calls for special attention, namely, the distinction between the
expert and the representational role.
3. Expert and Eepresentational Roles^
It seems to us that this distinction provides the Student of
military participation in foreign policy decision-making with a
useful analytic tool. The expert and representational roles can
be differentiated in terms of the following: the function performed
by the military; the Claims that can be made by them (or on them);
and the consequences of each role for the decisional System (as for
example, the civilian response to military Claims). In the expert
role, the military are presumably contributing to the process special
skills or knowledge not otherwise available. This may consist of
Information, analysis and Interpretation, or particular techniques.
As experts, their position is assumed to be advisory, and they bear
no formal responsibility for the decisions taken on the basis of
1. Most of the discussion of expert and representational roles
that follows is takien almost verbatim from Sapin and Snyder, op. cit.,
pp. 35-^0. See Ibid. for a presentation of some of the importänt
contemporary instances of military participation as experts and
as "representatives" in the making of U.S. foreign policy.
-21-
their advice. Equally, there is no basis on which they can demand
that they be invited to participate or demand that their views be
heeded. They are in the position of being consulted as to their
views and recommendations. The advice which they off er can be
judged on its merits, not on the basis of the power or influence
of those who off er it.
In the representational role, on the other hand, their essential
contribution to the process is not expert knowledge but, rather, re-
presentation of departmental interests and responsibilities. In
other words, the problem being dealt with is, presumably, so intim-
ately related to the interests and assigned responsibilities of the
Defense Department, or one of the armed Services, that they either
Claim or in any case are granted representation in the group dealing
with the problem and thus share responsibility for the decisions
reached. If the problem is a continuing one, there would seem to
be, in this case, almost a right to participate and, while par-
ticipating, a right to join in the decisions reached and, presum-
ably, to block the choice of disapproved alternatives. In other
words, when actlng as military establlshment representatives in
Joint civilian-military policy-making units, the military person-
nel are in effect members of a cooperative enterprise, in which
they have recognized and prescribed Claims, rather than expert ad-
visers to be consulted if the civilian agencies so desire.
Commentary. There are a number of comments to be made on this ex-
pert-representational distinction. First of all, these are ob-
-22-
-23-
viously idealized concepts and heuristic devices. The roles tend,
in practice, to shade off into one another. For example^ what starte
out as participation on an expert adviser basis may become so for-
malized that the expectatlon of Consulting and of being consulted
develops into an accepted and normal procedure. What results after
a while is a highly routinized relationship based on mutual expect-
ations. There is no thought, in a relationship of this klnd, of
excluding military representatives even if the prob lern at hand does
not seem to call for special military knowledge or expertise. As a
matter of fact^, it might be said that while the original rationale
for military participation in the making of foreign policy rested
essentially on the need for their special skills and knowledge in
certain areas^ in most present-day instances of Joint military-civ-
ilian activity in foreign policy-making the typical military role
tends to be closer to the representational than the expert. This
is not to say that military expertise is no longer being contributed
to the process but rather that it is probably more and more being
contributed in situations where the military have the rights and
responsibilities of representation rather than the more circum-
scribed role of offering expert advice and Information when called
upon.
Some commentators have noted that even in the case of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff , by statutory prescription, general agreement
and their own Statements top military advisers to the President, the
Secretary of Defense and tiie National Security Council, elements
of the representational have tended to slip into their role. That
I
is, there has apparently developed on their part some expectation
of being consulted regularly on a wide ränge of matters of greatly
varying importance and on the part of civilian leaders an accompany-
ing unwillingness to proceed without Consulting the Joint Chiefs.
One possible consequence of such participation by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in matters where they have no special expertness to con-
tribute may be to reduce the general quality and usefulness of
their contributions when they are highly relevant. Furthermore,
to the extent that they are viewed as having a responsible voice
in the decisions reached, they are likely more and more to be held
politically accountable for their views, particularly in a period
when foreign policy and national security issues are the dominant
ones for the nation.
These are merely examples of the possible consequences and im-
plications of expert and representational roles. They will be exam-
ine^ somewhat more systematically in Part IV of this Note. For the
moment, it should be pointed out that the distinction has a useful
ness and relevance beyond the particular problem area to which it
has been applied here. It is clearly pertinent to the relations
between civilian officials and military officers within the Penta-
gon. In fact, it would seem to be a useful distinction for the
whole field of civil -military relations. In broader terms, the
expert-representational dichotomy may be viewed as one way of deal-
ing with the more general problem of the role of the expert or
technician in a complex Organization or, even more to the point,
in a governmental agency in a democratic society.
-2k-
-25-
III. The Motivation of Military Offlcers:
^111
The "Military Mind"
Having flrst looked at mllltary particlpatlon In foreign pollcy-
making from the vlevpolnt of organlzatlonal etructure, the purpose
in thlB eection 1b to provlde aome conceptual toole for analysls
In terms of the Indlvlduals Involved and, more speclflcally. In
terms of the "qualltles of mind" they bring to bear on foreign
pollcy Problems and the nature of thelr Intellectual operatlone
wlth regard to them.
There hae been a good deal wrltten about the "mllltary mind,"
some Of It by responslble and knovledgeable observera and scholare.
Much Of thls literature has been characterlzed by certaln doubts
and fears about the nature and llmltatlons of mllltary thlnklng.l
However, vhUe these doubts and fears vlth regard to the "mllltary
mind" can by no means be casually dlsmlssed, It mnst be sald that
none of the wrlters vho have dealt vlth It have done very much to
clarlfy or develop the concept. The "mllltary mind" has been for
the most part an impresslonlstlc notlon rather than an analytlc
concept. it is also true, perhaps Inevltably, that there has been
little If any systematlc scientific Investlgatlon of the motlvatlon
Of career mllltary offlcers.
i.nS,f :.5i'LT.;s Sa'szs,-? sirpr«°.o-
i
I
If thlĂź iB regarded as a worthwhile area for social research
(and thls vould seem to be suggested by the character of public
dlscuBslon about the mllltary and by the literature referred to
above), then It Is obvlously necessary to move beyond these loose
f ormulatlons . It Is the purpose of the rather brlef and essentlally
suggestive dlscusslon that follows to present a number of concepts
In terms of vhlch the motlvatlon of mllltary offlcers can be In-
yestlgated, wlth a vlev to Indlcating how the "mllltary mind"
mlght be more meanlngfully researched.
1. Introductlon
Motivation can be thoughtof . In simple terms, as ref erring to
the why of human action — why people react in particular ways to
partlculeir sltuations, why one goal is pursuBd or one decision made
rather than another and so on. Stated somewhat differently, it re-
fers to a psychologlcal state in which energy is mobilized and
selectlvely directed toward various problems and sltuatlons. Moti-
vatlon, then Involves energy and tendencies. One can think of acts,
or sequences of behavlor, directed by a common motive or motlves.
The acts Include Performance, perception, thought and feellng; these
are integrated through the concept of motive. Obviously, having
sald these thlngs one has not said very much, nor made any progress
In the difflcult and complex problems of understanding and analyzing
â– I
1 A fuller and more detailed dlscusslon of motlvatlonal analysls
a; applied toorganlzatlonal declsion-making is to be found in
Snvder BrĂĽck and Sapin, Publlcatlon No. 3, op. clt^, pp. 92-11?.
TtiA Se prefentatlo; that follovs is based on thls dlscusslon.
-26-
human motivation. Nevertheless, it seems to us a useful, even
necessary, start to view the problem of the "military mind" as a
particular case or example of motivational amlyĂźis, the motivation
of military officers.
2. Attitudes and Frames of Reference
There is, unfortunately, no one generally accepted theory of
motivation or conceptual framework for the analysis of motivation.
However, there are a number of widely-employed concepts which are
of considerable usefulnesS; and some of these will be introduced
in the discussion that follows. Motivation can be analyzed in
terms of the attitudes (def ined as the read ine se to be motivated )
which are "triggered" or called forth by some particular event or
Situation and the frames of reference that are then brought to bear
on these events or situations. Included in the frame of reference
are perception and valuation. Perception refers to the way in which
the Situation is defined or slzed up by a porson. It ia a select-
ive process which Involves omlttlng and supplementlng details as
well as structurlng or organlzlng the Situation. Perception Is
influenced, obviously, by previous knowledge and by the information
poBsessed about the Situation. Yaluation is the assessment of the
Situation in terms of certain Standards or certaln objectives. It
may involve the Investment of the Situation with feeling — fear,
hostility, resignatlon, and so od.
Attitudes and frames of reference can be investigated In
terms of the following: (1) content; (2) behavloral consequences;
-27-
and (3) aources.l With regard to the last-named, slx major klnds
of motivational data for military officers will be noted below, but
at thlB polnt some further comments on attitudes and frames of refer-
ence are called for. First of all, it must be remembered ĂĽiat these
are analytic terms, they they do not refer to concrete objects, that
they are not directly perceived but rather Indirectly inferred from
behavior, Thus the dletinction between them is an analytic dlstinc-
tlon; they are not two easily seen and easlly separated concrete
entlties. Obviously, any one person'e attitudes and frames of ref-
erence are going to be closely related and have much In common slnce
they Stern from the same values, knowledge, personallty and so on.
However, In any particular Situation tiiey may easily differ or have
different behavloral consequences. For example, the receipt of a
memorandum from the State Department by a military offlcer may "trig-
ger" an attitude of annoyance with and dlsresject for Foreign Service
officers m general. Yet the frame of reference that the military
man bringe to beax on the State Department paper may also include,
in addltlon to thls feeling of annoyance, Information on the Im-
portance of the problem posed thereln and some perception of the
dllemmas faced by ĂĽxe State Department people. Thls may in turn
call forth an attitude of duty and devotlon to the safety of the
nation, but in any event result In an answerlng memorandum qulte
different from what mlght have been antlcipated by the original
reactlon.
" ^v» ^„r.+h«r underlYlng question with regard both to
1. Of course, *^%^H*^^ HgggiJ ^^g^oveFed and thelr sources
the attitudes and frames °f f ^^f^^^^^"^ ^^ ^^ common to military
officers. In effect, i^^f,^« ^ fundamental question is discussed
Mc...u-y conospti»! appmtu..
-28-
ThlB is obviously an oversimpllfied example, but it does
point up the fact that these are analytic dietinctlons, that the
phenomena to which they refer are closely related, act upon and
even modify one another but at the same time differ and may have
different behavioral consequences.
Examples of the kinds of attltudes of military officers about
vhich it would be extremely useful to have information are not diff-
Icult to find. What are their attitudes with regard to the actione
of particular countries? Is there a proneness, for example, to re-
spond to all Soviet actions as being aggressive or to all French
actions as reflecting weakness and decadence? Also of considerable
importance vould be military attitudes with regCLrd to various foreign
policy techniques or programs and also attitudes tovard clvilian
officials, Congressmen or, as suggested above, Foreign Service of-
ficers and State Department desk officers. Inoluded in the latter
category would be the kinds of expectations military officers have
about the behavior of these civilian officials and the kiiĂĽ of be-
havior they assume is expected from them by civilian officials
(leaving aside how they Interpret their own organizational roles and
those of their civilian colleagues, which is more a structural ques-
tion, relating to spheres of competence or role Interpretation,
rather than one of attitudes).
With regard to the frames of reference that military officers
bring to bear on foreign policy problems or situations, it would be
very useful to know how vaxious kinds of situations are perceived
or defified, which elements are given special attention or emphasie
-29-
and which are not noted or given only scant attention; furthermore,
how various elements axe judged and appraised, and in terms of what
goals or criteria. To use an oversimple example, do so-called ec-
onomic or public opinion factors tend to be ignored, or perhaps ex-
plicitly to be judged as of minor importance?
Obviously, the kinds of information in the pos Session of these
officers is of considerable significance. Certainly a great deal of
worthwhile research could be done on the nature of the information
relating to foreign policy problems (as well as the communication
networks through which it passes) that the military establishment
gathers or receives and then distributes to its personnel and, also,
the nature of the information and specialized knowledge that the
military themselves contribute to the foreign policy-making process.
3, Motivational Sources:
Values and Intellectual Skills
This discussion of the kinds of attitudes and frames of refer-
ence that might be important in the motivational analysis of military
officers leads inevitably to the question of their sources. In our
View the pertinent motivational data can be broken down into six ma-
jor categories: (l) the official plans and goals of the military
Organization; (2) the social and cultural values held by individual
officers; (3) the values of the Organization or of their subgroup
within the Organization (for example, the infantry as distinguished
from the paratroops or Strategie bombing as distinguished from tact-
ical air support); (k) the social values that they accept and act
upon because they view them as expressing the preferences of the
-30-
Bociety or perhaps an important segment of it; (5) their intel-
lectual skills and training; and (6) individual personality factors.l
A fundamental point to be emphasized in tiiis discusBion of the
"military mind" is lĂĽat the qualities of military thinking can only
be adequately understood and analyzed if they are viewed in the
light of their organizational setting rather than in vacuo. Clearly,
this is underscoring "the obvious since it is ihe organizational
structure and processes of the armed Services which in effect provide
the "military" in "military mind." Hovever, in addition to the impact
of organizational training and experience, it should be kept in mind
that organizational membership and goals may determine that certain
things have to be said and done by military officers no matter what
their personal views or preferences. Thus, the effort to protect
certain organizational objectives or interests may produce memoranda
and recommendations which the officers themselves knov to be "un-
realistic" or "unbalanced," but for which they will still argue.
Military values and value priorities represent another im-
portant area for research in this field, particularly with regard
to such crucial matters as the traditional democratic principles
and institutions of the society, and the various tools and tech-
niques of foreign policy. For example -- does there seem to be a
preference among military officers for the use or threat of use of
military force in foreign relations as against the processes of
diplomacy and negotiation?
1. For further discussion of these data, see Snyder, BrĂĽck and
Sapin, Publication No. 3, op. cit . , pp IO3-II6.
-31-
In Ăźtudying decision-making in complex organizations, in-
dividual Personality factors can be viewed more or less as "given,"
the asBumption being that these factors will not usually play an
important part in the decisions made and the actions taken.-*- On
the other band, the intellectual skills and training of military
officers and other decision-makers should be of considerable im-
portance in understanding their attitudes, frames of reference and,
in general, why they act as they do in particular situations. In
fact the notion of a military mind implies quite clearly that a
certain kind of organizational training and experience will produce
among men different in many other ways certain characteristic
values, attitudes, and modes of thought and problem analysis. For
thiB reason, the intellectual skills and training of military of-
ficers seem to us to deserve special attention and consideration.
It should f irst of all be noted that military officers as a
group are not specialists, technicians or Professionals in the same
sense as, for example, economists, psychiatrists, engineers or math-
ematicians. There are, of course, military officer specialists in
all of these and many other fields. The military supply or pro-
curement officer is likely to have training and experiences quite
different from those of the infantry or tank combat officer. Adding
the Navy and the Air Force to the discussion would undoubtedly com-
plicate matters even further. All of this suggests the possibility
of a considerable variety of "military minds."
1. See the discussion of personality in Snyder, BrĂĽck and Sapin,
Publication No. 3, ££• Sil' ' PP* IO8-II6.
-32-
On the other hand, It Is reasonable to ask whether there are
certain common characteristics of training and experience in a mil-
itary Organization or^ more specif ically, in the American military
establishment which tend to produce certain typical vays of think-
ing and acting, certain typical intellectual skills and qualities.
Is it possible that the kinds of work and responsibilities that
are typically assigned to the military, concrete, practical activ-
ities, building bases and manning them, police duty, maneuvers and,
of course, combat Operations, may produce some important common
characteristics -- attitudes, values, ways of looking at the world
and analyzing problems -- quite a bit different from those of the
diplomat, the civilian policy analyst or the academic specialist
in one field or another?! Certainly this is a hypothesis that,
more precisely formulated, might be well worth investigating.
In any event it is important, whether or .not typical patterns
emerge, to learn more about how military officers approach and an-
alyze policy problems and evaluate policy alternatives, and about
possible "blindspots" and biases in their analyses (that is, whether
any factors or data tend to be ruled out by definition as irrelevant,
or are perhaps ignored completely). Furthermore, what "theories" of
politics, international politics -- and human behavior generally -
do military officers have, and with what impact on their views and
recommendations? In other words, what explicit or implicit theories
or interpretive schemes do they have in terms of which they gather
or evaluate data and make recommendations regarding particular policy
p^. itlT" """'"'' '" this, Point in Sapin and Snyder, op. cit . ,
-33-
problems? It is difficult to see how the motivation of military
officers can be adequately understood without such knowledge about
their intellectual qualities and skills, and the organizational
training and experience from which these stem.
k. The Rapidly Changing Eole of the Pro-
fessional Military Officer.
A final factor to be noted (and one which may make contempor-
ary research on the "military mind" even more difficult) is that
the present Situation of the military officer is rapidly changing.
As was pointed out earlier, the role of the military establishment
in American life and in national policy-making has undergone a tre-
mendous expansion and development in just the last ten or fifteen
years. Inevitably, this must mean uncertainties and ambiguities
in the ways that the military def ine their own role in foreign and
domestic policy-making and, equally, how it is viewed by the civil-
ians with whom they work and cooperate in governmental decision-
making. Also important is the extent to which military officers
have begun to adapt; so to speak, to these new roles and activities,
whether through new types of training and education (si^ch as the
National War College) or through fairly lengthy experience with
some
of these new problems and situations. In any event, these
recent changes in the responsibilities and the roles of the military
Organization must be kept very much in mind in attempting to study
the qualities of contemporary military thinking, for the "military
i ^-^ t
mind" may well be in transition
-31^-
rv. Derived Research Problems and Questlops
1. Iptroductlon
It may be appropriate at this point to res täte one of our
essential, underlying assumptions. In our viev, the fruitfulness
of the kind of applied or policy-orlented research questions with
which we are concerned here is likely to be much enhanced if they
stem from more basic and general conceptualization, theorizlng and
research. As we have already emphasized, this paper rests on werk
carried on by this Project in the development of a decision-making
frame of reference for the study of international polltics.
The distinction should be clear, then, between this more basic
work and the research questions which follow. The latter are de-
signed to deal with a particular social and political problem now
facing the United States and are stated specifically in terms of
this Problem. Furthermore, their general orientation stems from
an explicit set of values which are regarded as representing the
preferences of the American nation in this matter. Thus, this
policy-oriented research has a more specific focus and is directed
to patterns and processes at a much lower level of generality than
our more basic work on decision-jnaking.
Turning to the problem in question, it may be useful as a
first Step to set forth some of the questions about it as they
are often asked. The following are typical:
IS there "undue military influence" on U.S. foreign policy?
How can we get the benefits of the "military view" without
getting this "undue influence"?
-35-
What should (or can) the militeiry contribute to the making of
foreign policy?
What are the dangers posed by the "military mind"?
Should (or can) the military be "kept out of politics"?
Are the militeury "moving in," threatening civil supremacy
vithin the American Government?
Hov can we keep the military "in their proper place"?
Are we threatened by "creeping mllitarism"?
How can the Joint Chiefs of Staff be made more political minded
and less military minded?
What is the basic relationship between power and policy?
How eure policy and force to be integrated effectively?
Sometimes, these and similar queries are simply stated as pro-
positions, as matters of fact, rather than as questions or hypothes-
es. In either case, it may be asked: what is wrong with them? The
answer is that, from the research viewpoint, they are inadequate
simply because they are not researchable. For one thing, the Pro-
blems are not stated or defined in terms that are operational, that
is, having clearly identifiable empirical referents. What this means
in a specific instance was pointed out in considerable detail with
regard to the widely-used phrase, the "military mind." The same sort
of analysis could also be applied to such phrases as "military in-
fluence" "militarism/' "the military in politics," and even civil
1. This question and the two that follow are taken, somewhat
paraphrased, from a recent book on the Organization of U.S. foreign
policy See W. Y. Elliott, United States Foreign Policy (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1952), PP. 107, 3ö and lOÖ respectively.
-36-
supremacy or civil control.
Another basic criticism that can be made of many if not most
of these propositions and questions is that the distinction between
fact and value Statements is not alvays made clear (and may not be
clear to the person making the Statement). There is no need to de-
fend the view that this distinction is a fundamental one, and cer-
tainly one that the social researcher muĂźt understand. It should,
for example, be clear that the Statement that there is undue mil-
itary influence on American foreign policy is a value Statement
rather than a factual Statement. As phrased, it is not researchable.
On the other hand, if one posits certain explicit values vith regard
to the American democratic System and then indicates the empirical
conditions within the United States Government which will be regarded
as furthering or protecting these values, then it should be possible
(though it may be difficult) tb establish a research project which
will attempt to discover whether the existing conditions approximate
the ones regarded as desirable and, if not, perhaps even what changes
or reforms are required to bring about the necessary improvement.
In other words, values can and do give direction to social research,
can suggest priorities in the kinds of problems to be dealt with, but
cannot themselves be researched (except, of course, as social data).
Clearly, the researcher is likely to have values and preferences
about the problem with wVn'nin v.^ •
-LciĂĽ wixn wnich he IS concerned, but he cannot research
these. He should rathor- hc^ o^t^
uia ratĂĽer be self-conscious about them and, to the
extent that they direct hnc, »^«
y airect his research, should make them clear and ex-
plicit so that when he doeR m^v^
ne does make value Statements, the preferences
-37-
or other criteria on which these are bassd are clear to all. Thus,
there is no reason why the question of an appropriate, or proper,
role for the military in American foreign policy cannot be a focus
for empirical research as long as the criteria of appropriateness --
whether they be certain democratic values, national security requis-
ites, Views on more "rational" decision-Jiaking or notions of econo-ny
-- are made explicit. Hypotheses can then be formulated and em-
pirical research undertaken with a view to discovering whether the
desired values are being fulfilled in the relevant empirical sit-
uations and, if not, why not and what can be done about it. As a
bare minimum, it is hoped that the questions which follow will meet
the operational test and that the value criteria on which they are
based will be perfectly clear.
2. Some Key Research Questions
The criteria used in this Note for evaluating the role of the
military in U.S. foreign policy and for indicating the important
research areas are set forth in detail in the study previously cited.^
Some of them have already been suggested above. In brief, the view
presented is that extensive military establi^nment participation in
the foreign policy-making process is necessary [i.e., to the making
of better policy decisions) because of the close interdependence of
military policy and foreign policy, but at the same time to be lim-
ited in terms of certain values assumed to express the general sen-
timents of the society in this matter. Ihe essential, underlying
1. See Sapin and Snyder, op. cit . , pp. 52-59
-38-
value is meaningful civil control or supremacy, expressed In terms
of certaln constltutlonal and instltutlonal requlrements, Includlng
the effectlvel as well as formal making of the major decisions by
politically responsible civilian leaders and, also a nonpartisan,
career servant role for the professional military officer. Less
crucial but still important as a criterion is the most economical
and effective use of military skills and resources in the foreign
policy-making process (admittedly difficult to define and to get
agreement about).
These are the values which point to the research problems dis-
cussed here: the nature of military officer motivation, the types
of decision-making Systems characterizing military participation in
foreign policy-making, and, as will be suggested below, the factors
making for and working against the predominance of military estab-
lishment views and recommendations, or for and against what some
might regard as an overemphasis more generally on military techniques
and desiderata in policy-making. Having accepted substantial mili-
tary participation in foreign policy decision-making as necessary,
it seems to us that the general task facing the researcher is to
examine its various consequences, to attempt to explain the develop-
ment of those consequences regarded as undesirable in terms of the
posited criteria, and, perhaps, to suggest remedies or at least
provide some prognosis for the future. Having already presented
the key research areas and the concepts viewed as essential (or at
1. It is not possible in this paper to indicate in appropriate
detail what our criteria for effectiveness are in this instance
See the discussion in Sapin and Snyder, op. cit pp 52 59
-39-
least quite useful) to their analysis, the next step is to in-
dicate the important kinds of questions suggested by this con-
ceptualization.
(1) The governmental setting. One very worthwhile contribution
here would be the collection and codification of all the written
materials -- legislative Statutes, organizational manuals, ad-
ministrative Orders and rulings and so on -- relating to the formal
structure of military participation in foreign policy-making. This
would include the laws and rules regarding those roles and responsi-
bilities of the military establishment which involve it in the foreign
policy-making process, and also all the Statutes and regulations re-
lating to the relevant organizational structures and processes. This
seems like an important and obvious enough task, but it is one that,
as far as we know, has not been done. To get a clear sense of the
various formal Communications Channels that link the Pentagon and
civilian foreign policy agencies, the procedural rules that govern
coordinating and cooperating activities among these agencies, and
the statutory and ad hoc committees and working groups that link
them would be in itself most helpful.
(2) Types of decision-making Systems. Obviously, it would be very
useful if a significant number of the decision-making Systems by
means of which the military establishment has participated in the
making of American foreign policy could be studied and then char-
acterized in terms of some of the categories set forth earlier:
the number and organizational roles of the personnel involved, the
objective, the structure and hierarchical level of the System, its
Ao-
duration, the basis of military participation, and so on. This
should include units completely withip the military establishment (in
any of tha three sf^rvice departments or the Defense Department) as
well as thoee involving military and civilian agencies. Just a
reasonable notion of the sheer number of such units and the ränge
of Problem: they have dealt with wojld be valuable.
Furthermore, ±t the kind of information mentioned above were
available, it should then be possible to determine what types of
systemt-, dealing v^ith vhat kinds of problems and situations, have
tended to predominate, if any, and with what kinds of consequences.
If such an analysis could be done for a sĂĽbstantial number of in-
stances in the period since th3 end of World War II, it might be
possible to see if any trends have developed in this less than ten
year period. As will be indicated in greater detail below, it would
also be of considerable interest to see whether any particular types
of Systems have been rather consistently linked with particular con-
sequences, for example, fairly clearcut predominance of the military
viewpoint.
(3) Expert and representational roles. Though the expert-representa-
tional distinction is really a subcategory of the previous heading, it
is regarded as important enough to merit separate treatment. As sug-
gested earlier, the obvious opening question is whether military
participation has characteristically tended in the direction of the
expert or the representational role. Assuming that the contribution
of special skills and information was the original rationale for
sĂĽbstantial military participation in the foreign policy-making
•kl-
process, it may be asked und er what conditions the military have
tended to move from an expert to a more or less representational,
or responsible, policy-making role in particular decision-making
Systems. This is a particular ly pertinent question if the impression
noted earlier, that present-day military participation tends in the
direction of the representational rather 'than the expert, is an
accurate one. Perhaps a part of the explanation is to be found in
the following Suggestion:
There seem to be two basic reasons why talented,
strong-minded civilian officials may feel helpless
in the face of military expertise, thus in effect
endowing the military with representational pre-
rogatives: first, the civilians rarely have re-
liable alternative sources of information about
military matters despite the fact that military
groups do not always agree; second, the civilians
lack the experience and knowledge of military
thinking which would enable them to challenge
successfully the interpretations of military
experts. Intelligent officials seldom like to
argue from positions of weakness, that is, from
positions not based on knowledge which is reliable
or accepted as reliable.-^
At the least, these are propositions worth investigating. The same
would be true for any correlations found between other characteris-
tics of these decision-making Systems and either the expert or re-
presentational role.
In those cases where the military role has either developed fror
the expert to the representational or has started as tiie latter, it
would be interesting to know how often the representational role has
been formally recognized and sanctioned by atatute, executlve order
or administrative ruling, and how often it has merely been conven-
tionalized through habit or precedent of eome sort. This suggests
1. Sapin and Snyder, oÂŁ. cit. , p. 3d-
-k2-
a further questlon -- how self-conscious have mllitary officere
aiid civillan officials seemed to be about the two kicds of military
rolee? Has the change from expert to representational usually been
recognized and understood for vhat it was? Have attempts been made
to justify or explain the change? How often has it been a result of
explicit mllitary clalm or, on the other band, eicplicit civillan
Invitation? Furthermore, in what instances have both roles been
played by different mllitary establishment members in the same de-
cieion-making System? By different mllitary officers in the same
System? And with what apparent consequences?
Finally, it would be Interesting to examine the available ev-
idence about these Systems in terms of the contributions of spec-
lalized skills and Information by the mllitary. What differences
would emerge between contributions made as experts as contrasted
to those made as responsible policy-makers? In general, it would
be interesting to know what special or expert contributions were
made by mllitary participants in these units no matter which role
they played. This suggests the further questlon of whether it would
be possible to establish meaningful crlteria in terms of which to
evaluate the need for either mllitary expertise or mllitary repre-
sentation in any particular decision-making System or with regard
to any particular policy problem.
W Ihe "mllitary mind." A questlon which links expert and repre-
sentational roles and other aspects of the organizational roles or
-43-
spheres of competence^ of mllitary officers with the individual-
orlented variables of the "mllitary mind" is: what kind of views
do mllitary officers have of their own roles and those of civillan
officials in the policy-meĂĽting process?
Eole Interpretation. For the various decision-making Systems
in which there is Joint military-civilian activity, the following
questions can be raised regarding role interpretations : how self-
conscious do the participants seem to be about their own roles and
those of their colleagues? how would they def ine the roles actually
being played in the particular case by the other members of the
System or unit (if they were at all self-conscious about this)?
what views do they have (if any) on what kind of roles their
colleagues should be playing? for example, do the civillan offic-
ials have any notions about what the role of mllitary officers
should be? to what extent do these civillan officials accept as
normal, or even desirable, the participation of the mllitary es-
tablishment and mllitary officers?
By way of illus'tration, it has become customary (there is no
statutory prescription) for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to Sit in on the meetings of the National Security Council
(whose members include, among other s, the President, the Vice-
President and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury) as
1. Throughout this paper, the terms organizational role and sphere
of competence have been used interchangeably. Actually we prefer
the latter, and it is the one used in cur Publication No. 3. How-
ever, a& a matter of convenience, we have tended to use the term
organizational role in this paper. In any event, they are synon-
yous in our usage.
-1^1^-
chief Military advieer. It would be moat intereating to knov how
the present chairman, Admiral Radford, views hie role in the de-
liberations of the Council, hov self-consciouB he la about being
+in^ o-Hh^-r hanri hoÂĄ his Tole Is viewed by the
an advieer, and, on the other nana, nuw
civilian leaders who sit on the Council. It would also be Inter-
esting to contrast the views of and regarding Admiral Radford
vith their equivalents in the case of his predecessor, General
Omar Bradley. There should be no need to point out the important
behavioral consequences that may flow from such role interpretations .
These role Interpretations, as noted earlier, should be viewed
as a part of the organizational structure, with consequences for the
s
tructure. On the other hand, how individuals Interpret their organ-
izational roles will obviously be influenced to some extent by their
Personalities and by their individual attitudes, expectations and so
on. In the latter category might be stereotypes relating to the
abilities of the other group, to their intellectual skills and "blind-
spots," or perhaps theories or assumptions about how one goes about
getting one 's way with Army colonels, or Foreign Service officers,
or economic analysts. The distinction beiween role interpretations
and attitudes, however, should be kept clear.
For example, it would be interesting to know whether a strong
emphasis on "strictly military" factors and a tough-mindedness or
rigidity of viewpoint on the part of military officers in dealing
with foreign policy problems is a consequence of certain attitudes
they have developed in the course of their military training and
experience or whether, on the other hand, it is a reeult of their
A5-
having defined their role in the policy -making process in this way.
That is, they may view their Job as in part to "keep "ĂĽie civilians
honest," to gain appropriate consideration for the "military view-
point" by overstating it. Such an orientation may be reinforced
by the traditional experience of having their requests or recommen-
dations turned down or pared down by civilian officials, either
within the executive branch or in Congress. In any event, whether
this orientation is a consbquence of the military 's role inter-
pretations or of their attitudes may make a considerable difference
if , for example, one is concerned with altering it.
If it is true that military officers are relatively more per-
manent in their particular assignments and more secure (in terms
of a long-term career within tiie military Organization) than are the
civilian officials with whom they deal, this suggests another kind
of relationship between organizational structure and attitudes.
IS such a difference in relative length and security of tenure
likely to encourage a military attitude of contempt or lack of
respect for civilian views and preferences?
TS there a Militarv Personality Type? Turnii^ now to the whole set
of concepts suggested earlier for more systematic study of the
"military mind" - attitudes, frames of reference, perception, values,
goals, intellectual skills, modes of thought and problem analysis and
so on - if sufficient data can be accumulated about the motivation
of military officers in these terms, it should then be possible to
say some more meaningful and reliable things about this impressionistic
will-o^-^the-wisp, the "military mind." These are some of the questions
that Should be answered if possible: Does a conf iguration of certain
characteristics emerge as more or less common among a large number of
-1+6-
military officers? (Putting the question in somewhat different
terms, it might be asked whether a certain personality type is
built up through the particular kind of common organizational ex-
perience and training involved in being a military officer?) If it
is common, exactly how widespread is it? Are thgre a number of such
type 8 rather than only one? Or isn't it possible to generalize at
all about the "military mind" (a possibility which should not be
ignored)? If it is, it may be asked whether any important variations
emerge at different levels and ranks in the military hierarchy? Or as
between the Services? If there is a conf iguration (or a niimber of
them), how does it compare with what is known about the "qualities
of mind" of the military officers of other nations, Germany, France,
Great Britain or Russia?
Assuming the existence of one or more conf igurations of char-
acteristics, the next step woĂĽld be to ask whether these tend to
dominate the actions of the officers involved, that is, granted
their existence, how important a role do they seem to play in mo-
tivating the actions of military officers? If there are such con-
figurations and the actions of military officers are dominated by
them, a vital question would be whether these characteristics dis-
covered to be "military" actually turn out to conf lict with widely-
shared values, attitudes and perspectives in the society. In other
words, if there turns out to be a phenomenon that can be meaningfully
labeled the "military mind," almost the first question that should
be posed is whether it seems in any way threatening or inappropri-
ate in terms of the military 's greatly expanded role in foreign
-IfT-
policy-making, and more generally, in the life and governing of
the nation. If it does, it may be asked with regard to which
^Q-l^QS 2ÂŁ. attitudes, how widely shared , in what kinds of cir-
cumstances, and with what consequences?
Most discussions of the "military mind" have tended to assume
the answer to the questions raised in the previous paragraph, namely,
that the "military mind" was in some ways antithetical to democaratic
values and institutions and therefore to be watched carefully and
kept under strict civilian control. Leaving this open as a question
suggests further queries. For example, if there is a conf iguration
of motivational characteristics typical of most or many military
officers, how does this conf iguration differ from other types about
which we might have, or could gather, information, for example, the
"State Department" or the "Foreign Service mind," the "bureaucratic
mind," the "business mind," the "American character," or even, if
you will, the "German military mind"?
The group informally associated with Professor Morris Janowitz^
hopes eventually to prepare a series of studies on the professional
soldlers of a number of modern industrialized Western nations in-
cluding possibly - in addition to the United States -- Britain,
France, GeniBny and the Soviet Union. These studies should provide
important comparative data on the characteristics of professional
military officers. Professor Janowitz himself is presently concerned
with the social characteristics, career patterns, motivation and
1. See the paper by Janowitz cited in N. 1., p.3.
A8.
self-conceptions, social status and prestige, and ideology and in-
doctrination of the top American professional off icers in the period
from 1900 to 1950, with particular attention to developing trends.
He is also interested in the consequences for the professional
military's "political power" of these recent changes in their social
and governmental role and in their social characterlstics, motivation,
ideology and so on.
If these and other investigations reveal the existence of one or
more American military personality types, another fundamental question
that should be answered if possible is why they develop. What is
there in the training, education and organizational experiences of
the military officer that produces such a type or types? Furthermore,
if some of these characteristics seem undesirable in light of the
Society 's values and the greatly increased influence of the military
establishment in national policy-making, does it seem possible to
make any adjustments in the organizational training and experiences
of the military officer which will help to change or modify these
undesirable qualities? Or do they seem to flow inevitably from the
nature of the structure, procedures and responsibilities of a mili-
tary Organization or, at least, of the modern American military
Organization?
Professors John Masland and Laurence Eadway, of Dartmouth, are
now working on a research project which should provide valuable In-
formation on a nimlber of the questions raised in these pages. They
are interested in: "(a) the utilization of career military officers
in positions involving participation in the formulation of American
national policy; (b) the skills and attitudes that
appear to be
-U9-
deslratle in officers holding these positions; and (c) the ed-
ucation, training and assignment of officers, as these processes
relate to the cultivation of these skills and attitudes."^ The
relatlon of this study to the discussions in this paper of the
nature and extent of military participation in foreign policy
formulation and the attitudes, values and skills of military
officers seems clear.
Military Thinking About Foreign Policy Problems. These general
questions about the nature and sources of the "military mind" are
necessary and important, but the specific focus of this Kote, the
military and foreign policy, should not be forgotten. If there are
typical characteristics of military thinking or typical conf igurations
of these, then it seems pertinent to inquire Into the results of
their application to the problems and decisions of American foreign
policy. Are there any characteristic "approaches" of the military
to foreign policy problems? Are there any lines of policy view and
recommendation or any modes of problem analysis and Interpretation
that seem typical of the military? For example, in their policy
recommeidations, do they tend as a rule to be self-conscious about
their assumptions and the lii^s of reasoning that presumably underlie
them? Are these assumptions usually made expliclt and systematically
set forth? DO they systematically analyze and evaluate alternatives
and consequences?
1. Quoted from the Statement describing their project by Professors
Masland and Radway.
.. Mong this line, Professor -^^/^lÂŁ^^J^;^^^^SZr.
^elSJf 'St ne tuarskiSand problem-solvi:« techniques of states-
men di^lomats, soldiers and industrial -bilizers" as related to
national security policy. See Fox, op.^it., p. 2Ă–4.
-50-
Ab a further point some observers have suggeeted that the
military's approach to foreign policy Problems tands to be some-
vhat legalistic and formallstlc in character?! If tlils is a
reasonable characterization what are some of its more specific
manifestations and dimensions? What kind of consequences does
thlB approach seem to have in cases where the military establlsh-
ment particlpates in the drafting or the negotlatlon of treaties
or other written agreements vith foreign nations?
Also, do the military in fact seem to overemphasize elements
of military force, strength and strategy at the expense of non-
m
ilitary factors? What do military officers seem to have in mind
when they refer to their presentations as "strictly military"
Views, judgments, analyses or recommendations? What do these
"strictly military" recommendations look like from the researcher*s
point of view? In the study already cited, it Is suggested that
the phrase "strictly military," whether by conscious design or not,
often accompanies recommendations whose underlying assumptions have
p
not been made explicit. There is certainly not enough evidence to
indicate whether these assumptions are understood by the military
but omitted for whatever reason or, on the other band, are omitted
because they are only vaguely or not at all understood. There is
some reason to think that the latter may at least sometimes be the
1. For a more extended discussion of this and other aspects of
military thinking about foreign policy problems, see Sapin and
Snyder, op. cit . , pp. 67-73.
2. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
-51-
case. After all, even an assumption that the larger context of the
Situation being dealt with, or perhaps its non-military aspects,
can be ignored is still an assumption'.
Another possible explanation for the widespread use of this
phrase by military officers is that it may sometimes be a personal
or organizational device for avoiding r^sponsibility for larger
policies or issues through an insistence that they only provided a
strictly military analysis or recommendation. The military
military officer may use this phrase to help him avoid having to
think about larger situations and complicating non-military factors.
The "political" military officer may use it as a means of self-
protection while in fact he does move into the larger politico-
diplomatic area. Still another possibility is that the phrase
may be regarded as providing a kind of certainty, a reassurance
about military expertise, to the civilian (and may actually perform
this function in some cases).
A good part of the apprehension expressed about the increasing
influence of the military establishment in ĂĽie United States seems
to be based on the assumption that so-called "military" values, ways
of thinking and patterns of behavior tend to be author: tarian, force-
oriented, impatient of dissent or disagreement and thus antithetlcal
to American democratic values and institutions. It might therefore
be Said that, to a considerable extent, it is these ways of thinking
and behaving that are viewed as suspect and undesirable rather than
the military officers themselves. If reliable evidence should in-
dicate that American military officers did not actually fit Ameri-
can stereotypes of them (and if the stereotypes were modified ac-
-52-
cordingly)^ there would probably be much less concern about the
military's increasing influenae on the contemporary scene, although
there would still be other good reasons, in terms of American values^
for keeping their role in national policy-making somewhat cir-
cumscribed. All of this is by way of suggesting that if it is
these "military" values, attitudes and behavior patterns that aro
viewed as threatening, then they would be equally -threatening if
they began to emerge with considerable strength among the civil-
ians of the society^ whether in the Government or outside of it.
Thus^ if one is concerned with the extent to which American foreign
policy has tended in recent years (or is likely to tend in the
f uture ) to be influenced by military values or desiderata, includ-
ing a willingness to use or threaten the use of military force and
a preference for military techniques in American relations with
other nations, there may be a good argument for. some study of the
"civilian mind , " of the extent to which "military" values and at-
titudes have been and are influential in the foreign policy thinking
of Foreign Service officers^ other State Departmsnt officials,
Congressmen, and the like.
(5) When has the military establishment view predominated? One of
the oft-mentioned concerns of many observers regarding the role of the
military in American foreign policy is what is usually referred to
as the fact or problem of "undue military influenae." This section
represents an attempt to indicate how this very important problem
can be defined^ and might be more fruitfully researched, in terms
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of the decision-making concepts and research questions previously
set forth. Perhaps the problem can be restated in the following
terms: in what types of decision-making Systems, with regard to
^^^"^ ^^^ds of decisions and policy issues, have the (l) Inform-
ation and intelligence, the (2) definitions of situations (i.e.,
describing and assessing situations to be dealt with and analyzing
alternative courses of policy action) and the (3) values and value
priorities of military officers and other military establishment
representatives tended to dominate, that is, to be_ accepted without
substantial challenge or critical scrutiny by civilian agencies and
civilian officials? Obviously, this is just one end of the contin-
uum; it would also be important to know under what conditions (that
is, in terms of the categories stated above) the military have seemed
to be on no more than an equal basis with their civilian colleagues
and their views subject to critical civilian scrutiny, and, further,
under what conditions military officers have played a rather circum-
scribed role, pretty much of the expert ad viser variety.
1
Clearly, an operational definition of critical scrutiny is
called for, but this would not seem to raise any insuperable dif-
ficulties. If the kind of data suggested above can be obtained,
it should then be possible to discover what significant correlations,
if any, exist between degrees of military establishment predominance
(as defined above) in Joint military-civilian decision-making
1. Needless to say, this kind of approach to the problem of "undue
military- influenae" is as relevant to _intra -military establishment
relations between military officers and civilian officials as to the
relations between military and civilian agencies.
-5^-
activities and such factors as the types of decision-maJ^ing Systems,
expert and representational roles, reciprocal role definitions and
expectations, the kinds of problems and decisions and analyses pro-
vided by the military.
For example, it would be interesting to know what relation
there is, if any, between the "compellingness" of the Situation
being dealt with or, even, the hierarchical level at which the unit
is located and the dominance of military establishment views. Also,
one would assume that the quality of the policy analyses of the
representatives of civilian agencies involved would be inversely
related to the extent of military dominance (that is, the better the
civilian analyses, the less likely military dominance). It would
certainly be important to know if this assumption is borne out by
the facts.
With such an approach it may be possible to make more meaning-
ful Statements about the extent of "undue military influence" (now
operationally defined) in American foreign policy-making and about
those conditions, organizational and intellectual (or, if you will,
psychological), that seem to be conducive to it.
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V. A Note on Eesearchability
Even if the concepts and research problems presented here are
viewed as meaningful and pertinent, there is at least one further
and major difficulty that must be faced up to, particularly in
researching the fields of foreign policy, military policy, and
the relation of the military establishment to foreign policy:
namely, that much of the data essential or useful in answering the
questions posed is simply not available or accessible to the
academic researcher. In other words, these may be crucial questions,
and they may have empirical referents in the world of foreign policy
decision-making, but it may just not be possible to get the kind
of documentation that would be necessary to answer them in any
substantial and satisfactory manner.
The basic problem, of course, is that many if not most of the
relevant Government documents and materials are classified and thus
not normally available to the outside scholar. Furthermore, even
when such materials are at times made available^ the conditions un-
der which they can be used are often not conducive to completely
free and wide -ranging inquiry nor to the public ation and wide
disĂźemination of the results of the research. And of course, the
more recent the problem one is interested in, the more difficult
these questions of classified Government data are likely to become.
The difficulty of gathering relevant materials in this area
would seem to make all the more clear the importance of the kind
of explicit and systematic conceptualization argued for and at-
tempted in this Note. If useful data is hard to come by, this
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would seem to be all the more reason for considerable self-con-
sciousness on the researcher's part regarding the problems he is
interested in, the concepts and methods necessaiy to help research
them, and the kinds of evidence and information they call for. In
this way, it should at least be possible to make the most fruitful
use of the data that is available.
For example, in the absence of access to the pertinent Govern-
ment dociunents, it may be necessary to engage in what might be called
"detective work" research, where the researcher depends to a consid-
erable extent on clues ard data pieced together from newspaper and
magazine stories and articles and from unclassified official docu-
ments, Speeches, releases and so on. This technique is often used
and is obviously necessary in the field of intelligence analysis,
but, skillfully and carefully done, it can also be a useful approach
for more academically-oriented work. Clearly, this kind of research
will be profitable almost exactly in proportion to the clarity and
precision of purpose and interest brought to his problem by the
researcher.
In sum, the role of the military in foreign policy, by its very
nature, provides some difficult problems for the researcher, but, on
the other band, there is no reason why much productive investigation
cannot be undertaken. FĂĽrth er grounds for a kind of restrained op-
timism are provided by the fact that there are some highly useful
and more or less easily available sources of relevant material on
this Problem. One obvious, and rieh, source are the published hear-
-57-
ings of certain House and Senate committees, both those dealing
with Substantive policy issues and those dealing with budgetary and
appropriations matters. The hearings of the armed Services and
foreign af faire committees of the two houses would, of course, be
partlcularly pertinent. There are any number of striking examples.
The hearings on the military Situation in the Far Fast held Jointly
by the Armed Services and Foreign Eelations Committees of the Senate
in the spring of I951 following the relief of General MacArthur are
certainly an important vein to be mined with regard to the military 's
role in foreign policy-making. The Senate hearings on such major
foreign policy steps as the North Atlantic Treaty, "troops to Europe"
and the Japanese peace treaty contain interesting and important
testimony by members of the military establishment. Of course,
the House and Senate appropriations subcommittee hearings each year
on the defense establishment budget are another basic source. Some-
times, the military are questioned rather critically and severely in
these hearings. Here again, there will be much in these hearings
that is not partlcularly important or interesting, but the observer
who is clear on what he is looking for will undoubtedly find grist
for his mill in these lengthy documents. Our assumption is that it
will require refined analytical tools to "tease out" the data
desired.
There are other unclassified U.S. Government documents which are
likely to prove useful. Certain basic information is to be found in
the relevant Statutes, in organizational Charts and manuals (there is,
for example, a great deal that is suggestive in the organizational
manual of the Department of State), and administrative rules and
-58-
notices. Furthermore, the military establishment has had its
share, probably more than its share^ of govermient connnissions,
private study groups and so on, investigating its Organization and
Operations. Most of these groups have, of course, issued their
analyses and recommendations in published reports that are available.
In the last year or two, there have been the reports of the groups
headed by General David Sarnoff and Nelson Rockefeiler, among others.
Shortly after the end of World War II, an important report was is-
sued by a committee headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt. Probably the
most influential and perhaps the most useful of the studies of the
military establishment has been that of the Hoover Commission. If
one thinks of the work of this Commission on the national security
Organization as represented by a pyramid with the final recommenda-
tions of the Commission itself as the apex of the pyramid, by moving
down from the apex toward the base one finds available increasingly
more detailed studies and analyses of the military establishment,
much of which should still be of interest. There is, of course,
the very interesting printed report of the Task Force. It is in
turn supplemented by a series of typescript appendices. These are in
turn supported by a substantial mass of reports, documents and other
raw materials now lying pretty much unused in the National Archives.
In any event, in the reports and analyses of the multitude of
study groups that have examined the workings of the defense establish-
ment since 19^5 should certainly be found much interesting and useful
data.
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Another obvious and important source of Information about the
military establishment 's role in national policy-making, and about
the "military mind," are the memoirs published in recent years by
many public figures, both civilian and military. Among the better-
known memoirs of American military officers are those of Eisenhower,
Bradley, Admiral King, Admiral Leahy, General Clay, Mark Clark (in
two books), General Truscott, W. Bedell Smith (his account of his
three years as Ambasseidor in Moscow), General Arnold, General Krueger,
Air Force General Kenney, and General Stilwell (actually, his collected
papers). Also available are a great many magazine articles and Speech-
es by these and other officers. For comparative purposes, there are
the memoirs of the officers of other Allied nations, such as those
of the British officers, General Frederick Morgan and Admiral Alan
Cunningham. A number of books by German officers have also been
published, among them the diaries of General Bommel and the memoirs
of Marshai Kesselring and General Guderian. This literature should
certainly have a wealth of suggestive material on the motivation of
military men.
Ihere is also much of interest to be found in the memoirs of
outstand ing civilian leaders, including some who were important fig-
ures in the defense establishment. Notable among the latter are
The Forrestal Diaries and the autobiography of Henry L. Stimson,
, — ■I
Secretary of War during all of World War II. Obviously, the six-
volume account of the Second World War by Winston Churchill will
have interesting illustrations and commentary on the role of the
military in wartime as will Sherwood's Eoosevelt and Hopkins and
the HĂĽll memoirs among many others.
-60'
In addition to the memoir llterature, another likely source of
infomBtion about military officers and the mllitary establlshment
are the official and semi-official hlstarles of the three armed Ser-
vices (including the Marine Corps) in World War II now being published
in considerable nuniber. These are further supplemented by the offic-
ial and unofficial historles of various Army divisions that have also
been appearing in recent years. For those particuleirly concerned
with the military and foreign policy from the point of view of liie
natiire of contemporary military thinking about foreign policy Prob-
lems, the major service public ations like the Combat Forces Journal,
the Naval Institute Proceedlngs and the Air Univers ity Quarter ly
should certainly prove useful.
If the researcher is clear about his purposes and problems and
is not mrerely on a "fishing axpedition, " there is no doubt that much
valuable information and insight regarding the role of the military in
contemporary American foreign policy-making can be gained from those
civilian officials and leaders and military officers^ recently ac-
tive in the high Councils of tĂśe Government, who are now temporar ily
or permanently retired from Government service. There seems no rea-
son why well-prepared intervlews with some of these figures could
not be quite productive, and without getting involved in the problem
of still-secret official information. Even a partial list of these
officials is quite impressive -- former Secretary of Defense Lovett,
General George C. Marshall, former Air Force Secretary Finletter,
ex-Army Secretary Frank Pace, John J. McCloy, Dean Eusk, Philip
Jessup, George Kennan, Charles M. Spofford, Avereil Harriman, Mr.
Acheson himself , and a considerable number of retired generals and
-61-
admirals -- Clark, Bradley, Van Fleet, Clay and a whole host of
others. Naturally, not all of these men would be equally agree-
able to this kind of interview, but even if only a small percent-
age could be persuaded to share some of their accumulated lore and
practical wisdom with the scholar, there is no doubt that much re-
liable and suggestive information could thereby be obtained.
The interview technique should also be an important aid in
researching the military-civilian decision-making Systems discussed
at length above. There is no reason why a great deal of useful
data cannot be gathered about these Systems (those at lower as well
as higher echelons) by Interviews with some of the military and
civilian personnel participating in them, witnout getting involved
in the problem of classified documents. How these Systems are viewed
by participants, their attitudes and expectations, the kinds of
organizational and intellectual problems and difficulties that arise
— it should be possible to learn a great deal about these and simi-
lar factors without becoming concerned with and discussing highly
confidential matters -of foreign policy substance.
Since the role of the military in foreign policy-making and in
political decision-making generally is merely a part of the larger
problem of the position of the military in American society, it may
be appropriate to point to a considerable number of studies of var-
ious aspects of the military establishment conducted primarily by
psychologists and sociologists. These studies would be most useful
1. Among the more important of these studies are the following:
Samuel A. Stouffer, et. al., The American Soldier (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 19^9 ) ,T^ vols . ; studies of naval leadership conducted
by the Personnel^Research Board, Ohio State University; Harold Guetz-
kow (ed.), Croups, Leadership and Men (Pittsburgh, Carnegie Press,
1951); Arthur K. Davis, "Bureaucratic Patterns in the Navy Officer
Corps'," Social Forces, 2?: 1^3-153 (l9i^8>, Charles H. Page,
"T^irrftftiinranv's Qther Face/' Social Forces, 25: 88-9^+, (19^6).
-62-
in detailing the kinds of attitudes prevalent in various parts of
the military establishment, the kiiris of leadership situations both
expected and actual, and the flexlbility or Inf lexibility of tue
military organizational structure. Another group of studies re-
lates to purely structural aspects of the military establishment.
The point to be made in connection with these studies is not that
they will provide immediately useful data on the military and for-
eign policy, but that they are suggestive both on questions of Or-
ganization and of motivation.
The kinds of questions^ on which these studies bear include the
following: What situations does the military officer find himself
in at various stages of his career? What are his expectations and
what is expected of him? What attitudes does he develop with re-
spect to the manipulability of his environment? What are his at-
titudes with respect to his civilian fellow Citizens?
It is probable that someone investigating a particular historical
instance of military participation in foreign policy-making will not
find these studies too relevant. However^ we do believe that those
whose interests go beyond the particular incident will find much that
is suggestive and informative in them.
Finally, another source of Information and insight about the
military establishment and military officers that should not be
ignored are the goodly number of first-rate novels dealing with
military life, particular ly diiring the Second World War, that have
appeared in recent years. Among those that come immediately to
mind are The Caine Mutiny, From Here to Eternity, The Naked and the
Dead, James Gould Cozzens' Guard of Honor, Meirquand's Melville
Goodwin, U.S.A. and Theodore Plievier's Stalingrad (dealing with
-63-
the German Army). Obviously, what is to be found in these books
is not systematic analysis tut rather the insights of very sensitive
and perceptive ob Servers.
These comments on data and materials that are relatively easily
available to scholars are by no means intended to be exhaustive.
They are meant only to suggest and support the notion that while
there are considerable difficulties in the way of doing worthwhile
research in this area, these difficulties are by no means insuperable
There is a lot of easily obtainable material which has so far been
rather inadequately, if at all, exploited. Furthermore^ as has
made clear, our assumption is that systematic and self-conscious
conceptualization of the research problem or problems at hand will
not only produce more useful, precise and easily comparable studies
but also will enable the Student to exploit to the fĂĽll the data
that is readily available to him.
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VI. Conclusion
It was ,stated at the start and has been emphasized throughout
that this essay was an exercise in the application of a conceptual
scheine to research on an important political and social problem.
Our attempt to apply the decision-making frame of reference which
we have been developing in connection with the major work of this
Project to the role of the military in American foreign policy-
making rested on two basic assumptions. First of all, we assumed
that the systematic conceptualization of any major research problem
was important and worthwhile, and, second, we assumed the usefulness
of our own decision-making frame of reference for dealing with this
particular problem. We feit that such an approach would enable us to
specify the relevant factors to be researched more clearly and pre-
cisely than would otherwise be possible, and also, to suggest con-
cepts and methods that would make for more economic, thorough and
inclusive research. Quite frankly, then, the worth of this essay
must stand or fall on a cons idered judgment as to whether its
substance Supports the validity of these assumptions or raises
serious doubts about them.
^:-
V
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y
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1
I
SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR III
A Non-Profit Educational Organization
BOARD OF DIRCTORS
MARK VAN DOREN
Honorary Chairman
REX STOUT
Vice President
DR. ALBERT SIMARD
Secretary
ISIDORE LIPSCHUTZ
Treasurer
REV. HENRY A. ATKINSON
THOMAS CRAVEN
FREDERICK W. FOERSTER
JULIUS L. GOLDSTEIN
WILLIAM HARLAN HALE
ERIC MANN
CHAT PATERSON
WLILLIAM I. SCHIEFFELIN
HARRY LOUIS SELDEN
JAMES H. SHELDON
WILLIAM L. SHIRER
MAJ. M. WHEELER-NICHOLSON
BELLE MAYER ZECK
ADVISORY COUNCIL
GEORGE BACKER
CONRAD BERCOVICI
REV. L. M. BIRKHEAD
REV. ROELIF H. BROOKS
STRUTHERS BURT
STUART CLOETE
MORRIS L. COOKE
RICHARD DE ROCHEMONT
BERNARD DE VOTO
WALTER D. EDMONDS
DOUGLAS S. FREEMAN
LIONEL GELBER
MARY B. GILSON
SHELDON GLUECK
ALBERT GUERARD
BEN HECHT
FREDERICK G. HOFFHERR
JOHN R. INMAN
FRANK E. KARELSEN, JH.
CHRISTOPHER LA FARGE
EMIL LENGYEL
MAJ. ERWIN LESSNER
MRS. DAVID ELLIS LIT
CLARENCE H. LOW
MRS. HAROLD V. MILLIGAN
HERBERT MOORE
LEWIS MUMFORD
ADELE NATHAN
ALLAN NEVINS
LOUIS NIZER
QUENTIN REYNOLDS
LISA SERGIO
CHARD POWERS SMITH
MRS. HJORDIS SWENSON
R. J. THOMAS
FRITZ VON UNRUH
FREDERICK WALLACH
CHICAGO
COURTENAY BARBER, JR.
MRS. ROBERT BIGGERT
J. J. ZMRHAL
LOS ANGELES
F. E. BROOKMAN
MAXWELL DUBIN
MAJ. JULIUS HOCHFELDER
SAN FRANCISCO
VERNON E. HENDERSHOT
ALBERT RAPPAPORT
SIDNEY ROGER
ST. LOUIS
J. LIONBERGER DAVIS
12Q
ALL OF THE ORIGINAL MATERIAL IN THIS BULLETIN MAY BE REPRINTED OR QUOTED
WITHOUT FURTHER PERMISSION UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED. CREDIT LINE TO
THE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR III IS DESIRED BUT NOT
NECESSARY. AS PART OF ITS EDUCATIONAL SERVICE. AND BECAUSE OF THE
PARTICULAR QUALIFICATIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PREVENT WORLD WAR III PRINTS
FROM TIME TO TIME THE PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS AND ADVISORY COUNCIL ON TOPICS OF CURRENT INTEREST.
1
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CONTENTS
WH ARE DETERMINliD TO CARRY ON 1
THE FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY 3
EDITORIALS:
"WE" 5
PRES. HEUSS SLIP OF THE TONGUE 6
HOW STUPID CAN WE BE? 8
OBSERVATIONS ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM
hy R. H. S. Crossnian 1 1
THE GIVEAWAY DEAL 13
A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT 16
JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON 17
DEMOCRACY FACES TEST IN GERMANY
hy Enjest S. Pisko IS
RECOMMENDED READISC:
THE SCOURGE OF THE SWASTIKA
/;} Lord Russell oj Liverpool 19
HERBERT HOOVER — WHEN WAS HE RIGHT> WHEN
WAS HE WRONG? 20
WHY GERMANS GO LAST
hy Paul Wohl 2 1
SHALL WE CHEER?
by Mdx Lerner 22
DACHAU 23
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?
by Jos/ĂĽb E. D//Bo/s. jr 24
HOW DEAD ARE THE GERMAN CARTELS? 26
OLD SIGHTS IN THE NEW GERMANY 29
THE "AGONIZING REAPPRAISAL" 30
ITEMS OF INTEREST 33
THE NEW GERMAN IMPERIALISM
hy T. H. Tete}is 3^^
HOW THE GERMANS ARE MISWRITING THEIR HISTORY
by Teretice Prittie 40
THE PAN-GERMAN PRINCE 43
INSIDE GERMANY 4^
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Published by the SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR Mi. Inc.
515 Madison Avtnuc. N«w York 22. N. Y. â–
Tel.: Plaza 3-4985
No. 45
Winter Issue. 1954-1955
lüSL ÜhSL OsJtsüiminsudi Jto ^äAAi/. Ö>l
AT the close of World War II the Society observed
ominous trends in international political rela-
tions which threatened the f uture of the peace. This
was particularly apparent with respect to the Situation
in Germany. Thus, we stated, ''So long as Germany
remains a potential asset to one or more of the allied
nations, she will he used for ulterior, selfish, political,
military and economic purposes, and so long will the
World remain insecure. So long as Germany is avail-
able for one of these marriages, she will he in a good
Position to recapture her military streng th, Only
when we have conclusive proof supported hy acts,
that the big powers will not establish any liaison with
Germany to use her as an eventual ally in any extra-
national activity, will there he a reasonahle chance of
destroying mutual suspicions and of establishing a
genuine world collahoration for peace^^ (Prevent
World War III, No. 14, April-May 1946).
It remained for the victors to provide "conclusive
proof supported by acts" that they were determined
to lay the foundation of a diirable peace in Europe.
Would they eliminate Gerinany's war potential and
encourage genuine peace-time industry?
Would they break up the predatory trust and
cartels?
Would they prevent Pan-Germans, militarists,
Nazis and war criminals from regaining positions of
power and influence in Germany's political and social
life? , ^
Would they provide Germany's victims with ade-
quate reparations derived from German industry
and external assets?
Would they encourage the decentralization of
German political institutions, thereby avoiding the
re-creation of a new Reich?
Would they develop a realistic educational pro-
sram to infuse the spirit of democracy among the
masses of the German people?
The Society fought persistently for this program
without compromise. On the other band, our poliey
makers were ensnared into the trap of wishful think-
ing under the influence of thpse having financial or
sentimental ties with Germany.
Through the realization of the above mentioned
objectives a peace-loving Germany could have been
constructed. Such a Germany would not have been
attractive to countries pursuing the dangerous game
of power politics, nor would such a Germany have
been in a posilion to play one side off against the
other in order to regain her dominant power.
However, the Western Allies, in their justified
eflfort to check Communist expansionism were "sold"
on the idea of a "German bulwark,'' just as they
were "sold" on the same fallacy after World War I,
with its tragic consequences. They deliberately re-
fused to admit that the Russians could also "make
friends" with the Germans as easily as they had
fought them. The upshot of this bidding and countei^
bidding for the band of the former enemy was the
scrapping of virtually every important measure de-
signed to render Germany harmless and to engender
democracy.
Thus, despite the superfi<ial signs of progress, the
evil forces which controlled Germany's destinies for
generations, are growing with renewed vigor. More
and more, they are assuming a decisive role in the
political and economic life of the country. The proof
of their power lies in the fact that even the so-called
democratic leaders cater to Pan-German and neo-
Nazi Slogans. The forces of Pan-Germanism are on
the march again. (See "German Realities 1954,"
Prevent World War III, No. 44.)
Having escaped the consequences of their aggres-
sions, there is no inner conviction of repentance
among the vast masses of the Germans. A people
who yeam for the glories of "Deutschland Ueber
Alles" cannot be won over to "our side" by heaping
concessions upon them. Indeed, every concession be-
comes a weapon in their hands against us, and the
granting of sovereignty and a new Wehrmacht fall
within that category.
"Rehabilitated" with billions of doUars (and
more to come), Germany will once again be-
come a menace to the security and welfare of
the U. S. and her allies.
In the name cÄ tlie ^'democralic process," the
German totalitarians will ride to power on a
new wave of mililarism and chaiivinism.
In the name of ''free enterprise," the German
cartelists will underniine the position of Ameri-
can and western businessmen in the world
markets. '
In the name of a "united Europe," the Germans
will stop at nothing to destroy the independence
and cultural heritage of her neighbors.
In the name of ''eo-existence," the Germans will
make common cause with the Käst to isolate the
u. s.
In the name of "world collaboration," the Ger-
mans will drive for world domination.
The American people liave been told that the Lon-
don and Paris Agreements will usher in a new
chapter in our relations with Germany. Whatever can
be Said about tliese Agreements, the fact remains that
the German problem is more acute than ever before.
(See the article "The Failure of Diplomacy," p. 3
in this issue). Thus, the Society's educational werk
takes on a more significant meaning in terms of
American security.
* * *
The Society may be a small voice in the wilder-
ness of confusion and illusion which goes under the
heading of policy. However, is it not the essence of
patriotism to speak the truth as it relates to the
welfare of our country, rather than to join the silence
of despair or the cheers of those who like to make
believe? Yes, we are determined to carry on as the
forsaken conscience of those who gloss over the
crimes of the devil and sup at bis table.
All the issues of "Prevent World War DP' are liv-
ing documents attesting to our painstaking eflforts to
enlighten the people and to maintain the vigilance
of our Government. With a deep sense of respon-
sibility to our members and the American people
we reaffirm our resolution to continue exposing the
conspiracies of those forces, inside and outside the
United States, who would subvert our security and
our international friendships in the cause of Ger-
niandom. We shall, as in the past, work for a realistic
Solution of the German problem as the key to
world peace.
^icy^h
JhsL J'aihvuL of. (Dlftbrnjaof,
Lei the peoples extend the hand of friendship and
forgiveness to each other " -sir wwsto,, cinuximt
The acid test of successfui diplomacy lies in its positive
contributions toward enhancing national security. On the other
hand, a diplomacy which alienates reliable friends, provides
potential enemies with greatcr opportunities for maneuvering,
and increases the chances of a new world holocaust, saps the
foundations of security. It is by these Standards that we must
judge the results of the London and Paris meetings.
We are cognizant of the fact that the decisions to remili-
tarize Germany and grant her sovereignty have been hailed
as historic triumphs. Following the meeting in London, Sec-
retary Dulles said that it was "one of the greatest Conferences
of all times."
With all due respect to his high office, we cannot share
Mr. Dulles' cxuberance. We are mindful of Mr. Dulles'
wealth of experience in international affairs. However, his
record in calling the shots accurately is by no means perfect.
Thus, his estimation of the intentions of the Rome-Berlin-
Tokyo Axis turned out to be wide of the mark. \n March,
1939, he told a meeting of the Economic Club in New York
"only hysteria entertains the idea that Germany, Italy or
Japan contemplates war upon us."
If it is unfair to rake up the past then we are prepared
to challenge Mr. Dulles' estimation of the London and Paris
meetings in the light of the Standards which, in our opinion,
definc the art of successfui diplomacy.
I
Ten years ago the political and moral prestige of the
United States in Europe was unrivaled. We were respected
and liked for our broad understanding of the problems be-
setting the nations ravaged by German militarism. In that
spirit we contributed generously toward the rehabilitation of
our distressed friends. Even our worst enemies cannot deny
this proud chapter in our post-war international relations.
Times have changed. One of our most respected experts
on foreign affairs, WiUiam Philip Simms (long-time foreign
editor of the Scripps-Howard newspapers) reported, 'The
United States is about as populär in Europe today as Hitler's
Germany was in 1938-1939." (New York World Telegram
and Sun, 8-23-54)
Mr. Simm's Observation may be challenged as an exaggera-
tion. Yet, it is a fact, like it or not, that we are no longer
regarded with the trust and friendly admiration — which had
made such a profound impression on that great American,
Wenden Willkie.
Undoubtedly, the Kremlin and its "busybees" in Europe
have helped to bring about this change. Yet, in the last anal-
ysis, this tragedy is of our own making. When we discarded
our original post-war policies for a program that treated the
German enemy as a long-lost friend, the die was cast. The
Communists merely capitalized on our monumental blunders.
Thus, scveral years following the end of hostilities, the
guiding Star of all our major diplomatic moves in Europe
' was Germany. The rebuilding of a powerful Germany began
to take priority over every other program which meant, in
effect, that all other projects would have to be neglected to a
smaller or larger degrec. Of course, this basic change in the
orientation of American diplomacy was justified in the name
of developing a mighty bulwark against the Communist men-
ace. But how did this drastic shift work out in practice? As
Germany's power multiplied, it brought about a dccline in
the relative strength of her western neighbors. As for the
Soviet bloc, the resurgencc of Germany has had no damaging
effects whatsoever to its military capabilities and economic
power. In short, the real suffercrs of the "Germany First"
policy were our Western Allies.
When the French buried EDC it appeared, at least for a
moment, that we were going to be savcd at the elevcnth hour
from the consequences of our own follies. Here was the great
opportunity for a genuine soul-searching re-examination of
our German policy — a policy which had been regarded as
sacred and untouchable ever since it was conceived. But no,
our policy makers would not have it that way. Thcy insisted
on agreement no matter what the price.
Pressure grew to unheard of proportions. The French Gov-
ernment was attacked and insulted in the press. Needless to
say, the Germans caught on quickly. Chancellor Adenauer
with an arrogance typical of the German diplomat, hurled
innuendoes at the French and their leaders. He went so far
as to State that unless Germany got her way, she would "lock"
to the Soviet Union (London Times, 9-4-54). Indeed, matters
reached such a pitch that one newspaper (New York Journal
American, 9-25-54) prominently displayed a Statement by the
German war criminal, Colonel General Alexander von Fal-
kenhausen, that France should be occupied until she was ready
to submit!
The pressures and the threats worked. An agreement was
reached. Europe will once again be confrontcd with a strong,
sovereign Germany, free to act as it sees fit. To believe that
the peoples of Europe will move closer to the U.S. when
they behold the rhythmic marching of a new Wehrmacht, is
to expect a miracle.
II
Restoring Germany's war power and uniting Western Eu-
rope simultaneously are irreconcileable concepts. The net re-
sult of combining these policies may be compared to. the
fruitless labors of Sisyphus. As this fundamental contradiction
deepens, the opportunities for Soviet machinations increase.
Witness, for example, the skill and effectivencss of Soviet
Propaganda as it exploits these incompatible policies. In West-
ern Europe this propaganda raises the ominous spccter of
German militarism, while in Germany it revives the spirit
of Tauroggen and Rapallo — Symbols of Russo-German col-
laboration.
Soviet diplomacy is also scoring. Thus, the series of notes
proposing a Conference on European ""security" and Germany
have achieved at least several objectives: (a) The U.S. has
been put on the defensive, (b) The confidence of the Western
European peoples has been shaken. (c) Flirtations between
the Germans and the Soviets are on the Upgrade.
The London and Paris agreements create more possibilities
for Soviet maneuvering. All of the Factors — ideological, eco-
nomical, political — which have drawn Germany and Russia
togcther in the past, have received a fresh impetus. Under
the guidance of the German General Staff, backed by an
assortment of totalitarian and reactionary groupings, the way
will be cleared for constructing the bridge to the Hast.
The role of these forces was noted in a State Department
booklet published in 1951 ("Confuse and Control"): "The
biisiness ivorld of W^estern Germany has several weak po'nits
of difjerent orig'in. One is the pretvar habit of Eastern trade
to balance mauufactured goods ivith food supplies. Another is
the fear of what might happen if the Comniuyiists should
come and the W^estern Powers should fail to stop them. Still
another is the remains of the old habit of authoritarian con-
trol, which has more affinity for Eastern than for Western
forms of government. . . .
"Those Germans who are still at heart in favor of Nazism,
of the orthodox militarist tradition, or of the extreme rightist
Position in big business, are a source of weakness, and are
pecidiarly susceptible to communist influence. . . .
"Hitler made much of Gertnany's position as the de-
fender of Europe against the bar bar i ans from the East. But
ever since Napoleon had conquered Germany and attacked
Russia, there had been much in common between the Upper
military and social classes in Germany and in Russia. The Tsar
was closely related to the Kaiser. Bismarck's policy was always
to cooperate with Russia. Now that Russia has a new ruling
class as dictatorial as the old aristocracy, some of the old feel-
ing of kinship is still to be found among extreme conserva-
tives in Germany, from the Junkers to the ex-Nazis. . . .
"There is wnie feeling among the aristocrats that they
might make tetms iiith the Soviet aristocracy and be cause of
their experience and ahility might become indispensable and
powerful members of the Soviet ruling class. . . ."
The State Department analysis concludes, "The tendency
for the extreme right to play with treason must be listed as a
definite weak point in the democratic cause."
Certainly vcry few Germans will accept this rather naive
description of the role of these forces in German life. These
powerful groupings are not alien to the German body politic.
On the contrary, German policy — past and present — is deeply
rooted in the Weltanschauung (world outlook) of these
forces.
The London and Paris agreements were intended, so we
are told, to "return" Germany to a western orientation — as
though Germany was at one time firmly attached to the West.
A study of modern German history shows that at no time
was Germany wedded permanently to the West or the East.
Indeed, for every olive branch to the West, the Germans
extended one to the East.
The real German position, unembroidered by the smooth
talk of some German politicians, was revealed in the sensa-
tional Madrid circular letter prepared by Germany's top geo-
politicians and published in "Germany Plots with the Krem-
lin" by T. H. Tetens (1953). "Our present policy must be
to overcome the consequences of our previous mistakes. An
emasculated Germany should never allow itself to be used as
a spearhead in an attack against the Russian colossus. This
would be an insane act {'Wahnsinns experiment') and would
spell our final doom, whereas Germany as the exponent of
European neutrality could gain far reaching concessions from
the Soviets. . . . We must not let ourselves become befogged
by Washington's stupid and meaningless slogans about the
'Struggle of Democracy versus Communism.' The so-called
American democracy does not deserve the sacrifice of the
bones of even a Single German soldier. . . . What Germany
needs in the future is not democracy but a System of State-
craft similar to that of the Soviet dictatorship which would
enable the political and military elite in Germany to organize
the industrial capacity of Europe and the military qualities
of the German people for the revival of the German race and
the re-establishment of Europe as the power center of the
World:'
A more recent expression of this position, although heavily
disguised, may be found in an open letter to President Eisen-
hower by the extreme rightist and Pan-German Organization
"The Steuben Society of America": "As far as Germany is
concerned — Adenauer or no Adenauer, BRUTO' or no
BRUTO — sooner or later she must be permitted to follow
her historic role of forming the bridge between west and
east — by way of neutralization or by having her own na-
tional forces. . . . Let us get out of the Fool's Paradise, in
which tve have lived all too long. . . ." (The Steuben News,
Nov. 1954)
In the light of German history, and given a sovereign and
rearmed Germany as contemplated under the London and
Paris agreements, the so-called Western orientation of Ger-
many is bound to be short lived.
III
At the Berlin Conference (2-2-54) Secretary DuUes stated:
"The Soviet Union proposes that Germany should be allowed
to have defensive strength on a national basis. But if Ger-
many had national forces streng enough to defend itself
from external attack, it would be so streng that it would
threaten all of Western Europe." However, a careful examina-
tion of the implications of the London and Paris agreements
show that what Mr. Dulles professed to object to will come
to pass. The revival of the German General Staff supported
by a national army of 500,000 men (with another 500,000
reservists) and equipped with the most modern weapons of
warfare, bears no resemblance to the usual idyllic description
of a German "defense" force.
Mr. Dulles' Statement is also significant in that it recog-
nizes that a rearmed Germany unlike one of our rearmed
Western Allies, is a very risky proposition. Moreover, it is
an admission that such a Germany would, in the first place,
constitute a threat to the security of the West.
One can speculate as to when and where German guns
will point, but there is no room for doubt as to the meaning
of German rearmament. It is a long step toward World
War III.
T* ^ V
Thus, on all three counts it is our considered judgment
that the London and Paris agreements do not enhance cur
security but, on the contrary, create new dangers.
^dJdĂźhicdiL.
\
The Germans have coined a word to describe the main
ingredient in their foreign policies— "Realpolitik." It is
a concept of conduct bereft of principle, honor or moral
consideration. Essentially, it demands total allegiance to
the cause of Pan-Germanism. The means are irrelevant
except insofar as they help to achieve the ultimate goal.
Unfortunately, the Western Democracies have been in-
clined to judge Germany by their own Standards of moral-
ity and conduct. The net result has been that the Allies
have been fooled time and again in evaluating Germany's
real intentions.
Today, for example, public opinion in the West has
been encouraged to believe that Germany has at last "re-
turned" to the Western Fold. But while the cheers grow
louder, Realpolitik continues to operate inexorably within
the f ramework of German policy.
German Realpolitik has always been active on the
American scene. In his book "Germany Plots With The
Kremlin" (1933) T. H. Tetens describes the influence
of Realpolitik among the most important sections of the
German language press in the USA. High on the list is the
"BĂĽrger Zeitung" of Chicago which has advocated a
Russo-German tie-up for some years. In 1949 this paper
featured on its front page an "Open Letter To Stalin
(See "Prevent World War III," No. 33) which proposed
a Russo-German alliance against the Anglo-Saxon bloc.
The author of the letter, Bruno Fricke, has had a check-
ered career including membership in the Nazi party. One
thing is certain: Regardless of how often he changed
colors, he is Pan-German to the bone.
Herr Fricke appealed to the late Soviet dictator to join
hands with the Germans. ''We are actually predestined,"
he wrote Stalin, "for an alliance with Moscow, all the
more so since mutual Cooperation with the integrated bloc
of the Soviet states has attracted millions of Germans edu-
cated under strict discipline. Who could resist us if both
our Reichs were united? What Napoleon did not succeed
in doing. Truman will not succeed in either: the subjuga-
tion of the earth!" (our Italics)
Perhaps some of our readers will say: "Well, what of
it? The "BĂĽrger Zeitung" is a small paper and therefore
unimportant." Unfortunately, this is not the case. The
BĂĽrger Zeitung boasts that it is the mouth piece for the
sentiments of 500 thousand German-Americans m the
Chicago area. Now, whether this is true or not, the fact
remains that the BĂĽrger Zeitung is an important publica-
tion for at least two reasons: (a) it is a reliable mdicator
of Pan-German thinking not only in the U.S.A. but m
Germany itself; (b) its editorial opinions have proved to
be of great influence among leading English language
newspapers in the Midwest.
Mr. Tetens points out that the "BĂĽrger Zeitung" "has
its place on the extreme right politically." It has been a
consistent supporter of our most fervent anti-Communist
crusaders. Yet, it was this paper which carried an open
appeal for a Russo-German alliance! This apparcnt con-
tradiction can only be explained by the decisive influence
of German Realpolitik which in the last analysis motivated
the Nazis to make common cause with the Communists in
1939.
Mr. Stalin is around no longer, but the BĂĽrger Zeitung
has not given up its campaign. The October 14, 1954,
issue carried a lengthy article which can be regarded as the
latest Version of the open letter to Stalin. This time the
message is directed to Mr. Molotov, one of Stalin's chief
lieutenants. The writer of this piece is a character who
goes under the pen name "Politicus." Ordinarily his col-
umns are dull. They read like an old broken record re-
peating the stale accusations of pro-Nazis and their
"The myth of Germany's superiority over
other European nations is alive. The remark-
able German economic recovery since 1948, the
political restoration of a truncated Germany in
the form of a federal republic, the assiduous
courtship of this republic by the United States
and many other powers — all stimulated the
myth.
"The reluctant West Germans took slovy/ly to
the idea of their indispensability to the de-
fense of our free world. But after two years of
exposure to this concept they came to believe at
the same time that in a nuclear war they would
be pulverized. The United States idea raised
their ego, which had been ground into the dust
in World War II.
"This doctrine of indispensability has en-
couraged the latent nationalists to try their
wings again, with the result that politicians
have emerged from their cocoons to recom-
mend negotiations with the Soviet Government
for a German settlement.
"The Western Allies' courtship of the Federal
Republic, the economic recovery and the doc-
trine of indispensability were the foundations
on which West German nationalists of various
hues reconstructed the theory, which they would
like to put into practice, of a reunited Germany
playing off the West against the East — as did
Bismarck and the Weimar Republic.
"The doctrine of indispensability is the hand-
maiden of the idea of a Germany powerful
enough to play the moderator in a balance-of-
power game in Europe."
(M. S. Handler, N.Y. Times, 8-28-54)
friends, tliat the Allies were the real war criminals and
that the Germans wcre the victims of an unholy con-
spiracy. However, his column of October l4th Struck a
differcnt note. It is hvely and more than that, it is a
rcvelation. By force of habit he intersperses the theme of
his articlc with vile attacks against the French. It is not
his snidc rcferences to the French which deserve comment,
but rather his unambiguous declaration that the latest
Molotov proposals for the "unification of Germany"
should be seriously considered by the Germans. He ex-
presses his doubts as to the efficacy of Chancellor Ade-
nauer's prescnt poHcy because it will not achieve the unity
of Germany which is "the greatest and most important
problem for Germany ..." How can Dr. Adenauer, Po-
liticus asks, achieve German unification "if we are the
Allies of a Western combine."
Before proceeding to a further examination of Politicus'
"letter" to Molotov the reader should note the word
"wc." This is not a slip of the tongue. The "we" is the
quintessence of the real meaning of Pan-Germanism for
no matter where and under what circumstances the Pan-
German lives and operates, it is always "we." The same
"we" is found in Bruno Fricke's letter to Stalin. Just
imagine the uproar if the Daily Worker ran a column by
a Communist leader employing the word "we" in speak-
ing of the Russians as Politicus uses the term with respect
to the Germans!
Returning to the remainder of the article, we note that
Politicus insists that "the only way to gel it (unification)
will he to deal with Russia in a jriendly way. Joining a
combine of potvers antagonistic to Russia is not the way."
But this is not all. Politicus seems fully confident that the
question of unity can be settled between the Russians and
the Germans while the Western Democracies sit at the
doorsteps awaiting the consummation of the deal. Politi-
cus is emphatic on this point. "The statesmen of Ger-
many," he declares, "should at least grip this hand and
try to get through conversations ..." with the Russians.
Ironically, he justifies his proposition on the basis of the
very policy whicli is now pursued by the United States
vis-ä-vis Germany. "America has shown the way" to
German-Russian negotiations when the U.S. "found out
that it made a mistake in fighting Germany," Politicus
refers to President Eisenhower's well known Statement
"let bygones be bygones." Therefore, according to Politi-
cus, "why cannot German statesmen at least follow such
an example to get on a good footing with Russia which
Germany attacked, not to forget." Thus Politicus shows
how American policy can turn into advantage for the
future of Russo-German relations. The United States is
hoisted, so to speak, by its own petard.
If past experience is an indicator of how our policy
makers will respond to this latest expression of German
Realpolitik, we predict that more billions will be turned
over to that "great bulwark" against Soviet Communism.
PRES. HEUSS' SLIP OF THE TONGUE
During the past dccade the moral climate surrounding
significant aspects of international affairs has undergone
a radical change. The transformation is particularly
marked with respect to the treatment of the former enemy
Germany. This was brought into sharp relief when the
four occupying powers freed one of the major war crim-
inals, Baron Konstantin von Neurath. It was done in spite
of the fact that he had only completed 8 years of his fĂĽll
sentence.
The background of this event was formed by the wide-
spread campaign in Germany to engender sympathy for all
of the war criminals. The Allies, prodded on by the Chan-
cellor himself, have sought reconsideration of the Status
of the major war criminals located in Spandau prison in
Berlin. In this connection the New York Times (4-6-54)
stated: "... The decision to reconsider the Status of these
men culminates a long series of actions by the Western
Powers to ameliorate the condition of German war crim-
inals. The moves have been made in response to German
pleas for clemency and to clear the way for West German
participation in the European Defense Community." Thus,
on the initiative of US policy makers who seldom refuse
the Chancellor a favor, the Russians were approached by
the three Western Allies. However, the Russians seemed
to show disinterest and, therefore, the question was
shelved temporarily.
Undoubtedly, some of our own experts thought that
the appeal had put the Russians on the spot and thus in-
creased the stand ing of the Western Allies in the eyes
of the Germans. They apparently forgot — or perhaps
never had learned — that when it comes to warming up to
German totalitarians regardless of color or breed, the
Russians will not be outdone. Hence, in their characteristic
fashion of "stealing the show," the Soviets suddenly
popped the proposition to free von Neurath. The New
York Herald TribĂĽne (11-4-54) reported that "the Rus-
sian move will probably make a considerable Impression
on the people of Germany." Needless to say, the Allies
found themselves on the short end. Nevertheless they
quickly consented to the Russian recommendation. (Ap-
parently, the only kind of agreement made these days
between the Russians and the Western Allies deals with
ways and means of making lif e more pleasant for German
war criminals.)
The public was told that von Neurath's release was due
to his age and ill health. We recall that when Field-
marshal von Kesselring was released from prison, the
papers announced that he was freed because he was suffer-
ing from canccr. Today this same von Kesselring, "victim
of Cancer," is among the top leaders of revived German
militarism and the chief of the military Organization
called "Stahlhelm." We will not make any predictions
with regard to von Neurath's future activities. However,
his past is a matter of record.
Von Neurath was condcmned by the International Mil-
itary Tribunal on all four counts for having been an
accomplice to the Nazis' crimes against peace and against
humanity. On March 18, 1939, the Baron was appointed
by Hitler as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia.
In that capacity he was responsible for the destruction of
democratic institutions and for the ruthless exploitation
of Czechoslovakian industry to further the Nazi war
effort. He was responsible for the widespread antisemitic
persecution that foUowed the enslavement of Czechoslo-
vakia. Von Neurath was one of the authors of the Ger-
manization program that was to be applied in Czecho-
slovakia. This goal was to be achieved through the liquid-
ation of the Czech intelligentsia and other groups who
might dare to resist Germanization. Under his rule a net-
work of concentration camps was set up and thousands
of Czech civilians perished. As Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs prior to von Ribbentrop's appointment, von Neurath
was one of the architects of Ăśie Nazi preparation for
aggression and conquest.
This is the man who is freed to the applause of the
German people. Chancellor Adenauer sent a wire of con-
gratulations declaring how "delighted" he was and ex-
tended to the Baron his "best wishes." The President of
the Bonn Republic, Theodor Heuss, summed up the feel-
ings of the Germans perhaps better than any other leader.
In a message to von Neurath he exclaimed:
"With pleased satisjaction, on returning from a short
journey, I read the report this morniug that the news of
the last feiv days has been followed by speedy fulfdment,
and the martyrdom of these years has come to an end
for you."
Here in a nutshell is the most reliable indicator of tlie
degree to which democracy has taken root in Germany. If
von Neurath suffered martyrdom, does it not follow that
his crimes were not crimes? To those who ignore the
significance of the Heuss message on the excuse that the
Germans— no matter what the cost— must be "on our
side" against the Communist menace, let them ponder the
words of the Bible, "for what shall it profit a man if he
shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul."
8
diĂźw Stiifdd, ^/WL ix)sL Ăźsbl
Among tlie Highlights of Chanccilor Adenauer's latest
Visit to the U.S. was his talk before the National Press
Club in Washington. It is quite apparent tliat the Chan-
cellor's Speech was carefully plannet! for his U.S. audi-
ence. For example, a good portion of his address was
devoted to a description of the anti-Communist attitude
of the Germans. Actually, this is an old story which goes
back to the days of Hitler's Third Reich. That the Chan-'
cellor should choose to reiterate this well known fact may,
in all probability, be ascribed to two reasons: (a) his
efforts to portray Germany as the great bulwark against
Communism (which has been paying off handsomely);
(b) to discredit France and Britain, where a substantial
portion of the electorate seems to accept the proposition
of "coexistence" with the Communist world.
Be it as it may, there is another aspect to Adenauer's
Speech which in our opinion is of even greater moment.
After describing the "Red Terror" and how the Germans
of all classes are fleeing from it in the tens of thousands,
he suddenly Switches his line. Let us, he pleads, "normal-
ize" relations with the "Red Terror." To achieve this
objective, the Chancellor proposes that the Communist
bloc be offered a non-aggression pact.
Here is a classical illustration of Realpolitik acrobatics.
Apparently only the Germans can perform this stunt and
get away with it. We recall how Winston Churchill and
General De Gaulle were smeared and abused by the Ger-
man propaganda machine when they dared to suggest
the "possibility" of "considering" the "practicability" of
top level negotiations with the Kremlin. More recently,
Premier Mendes-France has also come under the withering
fire of the Germans and their apologists for failing to
exclude the possibility of talks with the Russians. Even
the New York Times which, for unknown reasons, often
seems to bear a grudge against the French when it comes
to matters German, has also raised a cloud of suspicion
regarding Mendes-France's attitude toward Russia. (See,
for example, New York Times editorial 10-29-54)
Now, when Chancellor Adenauer comes up with the
bright idea of a pact with the Russians and says so pub-
licly in the Nation's capital, the newspapers bill his re-
marks as though he were the great sage at whose feet we
all sit waiting for his signal to act or not to act. It is even
possible that sooner or later our own diplomats will fall
over each other in praise of this great European for his
latest display of "vision and statesmanship." In this con-
nection the Washington Post ran an editorial (10-31-54)
which said that it was "a privilege to have the thinking
of this great European statesman, and the German- Amer-
ican treaty of friendship which he takes back with him is
testimony to the esteem in which his vision is held."
This is not to imply that the Chancellor has publicly
worked the Kremlin angle for the first time. We can cite
a number of instances during the last two years when the
Chancellor has declared his sympathy for the issue of
Coming to an undcrstanding with the "Red Terror." On July
7, 1953, he told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that
the German and Russian economies "once bejore com-
plemented each other in a magnificent way." He expressed
the hope that tiie future of Russo-German relations would
be as promising as they were in the good old days.
In the same month the Chancellor wrote Secretary
DuUes suggesting the development of an arrangement
with the Soviet Union. In September 1953, Adenauer
again raised the subjcct in a speech to the Bundestag and
in May 1954, the Chancellor again returned to this theme
at a press Conference in Hamburg.
The Chancellor has never been alone with respect to the
desire to "normalize" relations with the "Red Terror."
It is no exaggeration to State that the most important
sections of the German press as well as Germany's leading
politicians have at one time or another called for an
arrangement with Russia. (We shall be glad to supply
pertinent data on this subject if desired.)
Some years ago the Chancellor used to harp on the
theme that negotiations with the Russians was his supreme
"nightmare." In one sense the nightmare still haunts the
Chancellor. It is not negotiations with the Russians per se,
which makes the Chancellor tremble with fear. What he
dreads above all is a Conference of the Big Four to the
exclusion of the Germans. To prevent such a meeting at
all cost was the acid test of Chancellor Adenauer's states-
manship. His success in influencing American poĂĽcy to-
ward the realization of his objectives raised his stature
among the Germans. According to the Deutsche Zeitung
(9-19-53) a populär quip has been making the rounds
in Germany: "Who makes Washington' s European pol-
icy? — Konrad Adenauer in Bonn."
From the moment that Chancellor Adenauer's views
were given special consideration by our policy makers, the
subject of negotiations with the Russians became taboo in
the U.S. and remained so until the great medicine man of
the West lifted the spell. Now it becomes permissable to
talk about this forbidden subject, because Germany is no
longer a pariah among nations. On the contrary, it is now
being primed as the great def ender of Western civilization
against the Communist hordes. Its economic power has
begun to dominate Western Europe. Hence, the Germans
are no longer afraid of negotiations with the Russians.
Indeed, they will now insist upon it and we can be sure
that they who worship the very ground on which the
I
I
Chancellor walks, will do everything in their power to
revise American policy accordingly.
Already we note a certain fatalistic attitude concerning
the inevitability of negotiations with the Russians. This
was the sense of an article by Mr. Walter Lippmann in
his column of October 15, 1954. Another leading Journal-
ist, Joseph C. Harsh, speculating on the consequences of
the Paris accords, accepts the probability of talks with the
Russians but adds: "The emerging task for Western dip-
lomats will be to see to it that West Germany negotiates
as a partner of the West, not as an independent political
force."
The New Republic (11-1-54) dwells on the same sub-
just in an article cntitled "Germany as an Ally." "A sov-
ereign West German Government," the New Republic
observed, "is bound to enter into discussions with the
Kremlin.' A rigid doctrine that equates negotiation with
appeasement, can drive the discussions into a secret
iUegitimate frame. The safeguard for the United States
and NATO is to accept the inevitability of negotiation
and accommodation with Russia and thereby prevent the
negotiations from developing along bilateral and anti-
Western lines."
tt
'. . . With East and West bidding against
each other for the ioyalty of the Germans, the
outcome is unpredictable.
"There can be little doubt about who benefits
the most from this Situation. Nine years ago
the armies of the East and West entered Ger-
many as conquerors. It has taken the Germans
just nine years to become the most wooed peo-
ple of the world. In fact, if not in theory, they
can choose between the rival offers. For that
very reason the oflFers become steadily more
favorable to the Germans.
"The London contract was more favorable
for them than was EDC. What Moscow offers
today is more favorable to the Germans than
what Moscow offered last week.
"In retrospect, one can more easily sympa-
thize with the French statesmen who have done
their utmost to delay the events of the week,
for the settlement of one problem only leads to
the disciosure of a new problem just as dan-
gerous and just as difficult to solve. . . .*'
(Joseph C. Harsch, The Christian Science Monitor, 10-9-54)
* * *
II
*. . . As for the potential dangers in Ger-
man rearmament, it would be idie to suppose
that none exist. . . .
"That (German national) army will not be
free of international controls, it is true. But such
controls can really contro! a sovereign armed
State only so long as it chooses to be con-
trolled. We may hope and believe that the new
West Germany will stay with the West, but we
have not guaranteed it; we would be foolish
to forget that West Germany will be subject to
powerfui forces to Iure it elsewhere. . .
(The Wall Street Journal, 10-26-54)
Perhaps negotiations with the Russians are inevitable.
But some of the sophisticated commentators display a
naivete which is most perplexing. If they believe that the
Germans will only deal with the Russians as part of the
Western team, then these people have forgotten the les-
sons of history. Of course, the Germans have no such
intentions whatsoever! Their press has expressed confi-
dence that the Germans are well equipped to deal with
the Russians and need not be chaperoned by the Western
Allies. As early as October 3, 1953, Germany's leading
paper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, suggested in
an editorial "direct talks between the Bonn Republic and
the Soviets." "Orily Chancellor Adenauer," the editorial
declared, "can coniince the Kremlin of the honesty and
general usefulness of Germany s policy."
It was not the first time that this authoritative mouth-
piece of German foreign policy sounded off in that vein.
On April 1, 1950, this newspaper wrote: "Germany was
ahi'ays the bridge between the East and the West . . . The
Allies are not able to come to an accord with the Russians
. . . What js then more natural than for us to say, in vietv
of the present pressure: If until 7Wtv, within the frame-
work of world events, the others teere not able to make
HE'LL MAKE IT, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER
(Courtesy, The Washington Post)
10
an intelligent agreement, then it is otir duty finally to
arouse ourselves in order to obtain at least an economic
understanding . . .
"In doing so we will not turn to the little Bosses of the
Rastern Zone but directly to the big boss in Moscow.
Tbere is where decisions are beiyig made:'
In a recent articlc this same German newspaper made
the following significant commcnt: "Reunification must
bc the first goal of Germany's Eastern poHcy. It is in this
conncction that the question of restoring diplomatic rela-
tions with the Soviet Union must be seen. Diplomatic re-
lations have nothing to do with the evaluation of another
State. It is rather a question of the fact that Germany can
no longer be forbidden to do what other states do regu-
larly — that is, conduct conversations with the Eastern na-
tion." (New York Herald TribĂĽne 10-5-54)
Thomas Dehler, the Leader of the F. D. P. which is
part of Adenauer' s Coalition Government, has also ad-
vocated Russo-German talks and has proposed his willing-
ness to go himself to the Kremlin. He told the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung (10-5-54) that for years the
project of a journey to Moscow had stirred him more than
a trip to Washington "because what is going on, what is
planned and worked out in Moscow is more important
than what goes on in the Western world." Concluding his
remarks he declared his Opposition to any anti-Soviet poli-
tics. "Russia," he averred, "is a realistic political poiver, it
is necessary that we discuss and come together in a peace-
ful manner y A couple of weeks later Herr Dehler re-
turned to this theme with greater emphasis and clarity.
According to the New York Herald TribĂĽne (10-19-54)
Dehler said that it was "simply a matter of course that we
Germans will some day enter into conversations with the
Russians on unification." He added that experts (unidenti-
fied) in these matters believe that the Germans were
more able to conduct such conversations than the Ameri-
cans.
"Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's concern
abouf' the political and psychological loyalties
of the projected West German army emphasizes
the intangible problems and hidden dangers
that will confront Bonn and the West as the
Federal Republic takes up arms.
"There always have been dual problems and
dual dangers inherent in West German arma-
ment. . . .
"John W. Wheeler-Bennett in "The Nemesis
cf Power," says the German army 'dominated
the Weimar Republic from the moment of its
birth . . . first supported, and then condoned,
the overthrow of the Republic and . . . made a
major contribution to Hitler's Coming to power.'
"Dr. Adenauer's problem, and the world*s
Problem — to paraphrase Mirabeau — is whether
or not West Germany is to be a country that
has an army or an army that has a country."
(Hanson W. Baldwin, The N. Y. Times, 11-10-54)
No one, so far as we know, will denounce Dehler as a
crypto-Communist. On the contrary, when leading Ger-
man newspapers and top politicians propose negotiations
with the Russians, there is silence among our policy mak-
ers — a silence which becomes even more pronounced when
the Germans advocate negotiations with the Russians to
the exclusion of the Western powers.
The pattern of "excepting Germany" seems to be char-
acteristic of our dealings with the Communist danger since
the end of the war. It was the British and French who
were the targets of great Indignation because they had
traded in Strategie materials with the Communist bloc. In
the case of Germany not a peep was heard although it is
a matter of government record that the Germans have
shipped hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Strategie
materials to the Communist Fast.
The French have been regarded as unreliable because
Communists form a substantial block in parliament and
the French Government is supposed to be shot through
with Communist spies. But the Germans — hardly a word
of criticism of the fact that Adenauer's Government is
crawling with former Nazis. The defenders of our Ger-
man policy have never thought of asking Dr. Adenauer
why he prefers four former Hitler supporters in his cabi-
net to four anti-Nazis. Nor was the reliability and stability
of the Bonn Government questioned following the defec-
tion of Dr. John and Herr Schmidt- Wittmack who turned
up in the Eastern zone with important State secrets. And
now, when this same Germany speaking through its
Chancellor, calmly talks about a non-aggression pact with
Russia — of course, the West will be informed about the
progress — more silence.
The foregoing calls to mind a very pertinent question
which was the title of a critique of American foreign
policy written by James P. Warburg: "German Rearma-
ment— How Stupid Can We Be?"
". . . For sheer justice's sake, the Allies
acknowledge a pressing necessity to grant pro-
West German Chancellor Adenauer some *divi-
dends' for his consistent friendship the past five
years. So say Paris sources.
"The obvious 'dividend' is German sov-
ereignty. But there're some very sticky burrs
usually overlooked in such a deal, observe
attaches dealing with German afFairs.
"THE FIRST is: The German DID lose World
War II — and they must not be allowed to for-
get it.
"THE SECOND: Given the German record of
breaking pledges, how far can you trust Ger-
mans voluntarily to restrain their traditionol
military expansionism — once rearmed."
(John P. Leacacos, Cleveland Piain Dealer, 9-14-54)
11
t
OJbAsüwaJtionA on Jthß ^si/imjan pÄobkm
."The collapse of E.D.C.," we are
told, "is the greatest Russian victory since
1945." It certainly is. But how many of
the gloomy pundits go on to point out
that it is a victory for which the Krcm-
line can take none of the credit? That
is shared between Mr. Acheson and Mr.
Dulles, Mr. Morrison and Mr. Eden. It
is they who since September, 1950, have
disintegrated the Western alliance by try-
ing to strengthen it with twelve German
divisions. All the Kremlin has done is to
sit tight and profit by their folly.
No one, least of all an Englishman or
an American, has the right to blame the
French Assembly for delivering the death-
blow which finally disposed of E.D.C.
This was not a legislative murder, but
killing in sheer self-defense. For two
whole years an indecent attempt has been
made to force France into a monstrous
supra-national contraption, which neither
Britain nor America was prepared to en-
ter. At the last moment the French peo-
ple have rebelled against this Anglo-
American demand that they should com-
mit national suicide in order to suit our
convenience — and that of Dr. Konrad
Adenauer. M. Herriot was speaking for
the overwhelming majority of his coun-
trymen when he refused to put his coun-
try alongside Western Germany inside the
cage of E.D.C. Then he issued a solemn
warning that the final result of this policy
would be to leavc the Germans free to
walk out of the cage into the arms of the
Russians, leaving France lockcd inside. . . .
But what next? The European Defense
Community was perhaps the least dan-
gcrous method of rearming Germany,
since its cumbrous supra-national machin-
ery would have delayed, for a few years
at any rate, the emergence of a sovereign
German State. Any framework for Ger-
man rearmament which is hastily con-
trived to replace it will not only make
far greater demands on Britain (this time
Sir Winston will be unable to cheer the
French on from outside), but will con-
tain even fewer safeguards against the
by
R. H. S. CROSSMAN
emergence of a German national army.
Yet apparently it is the intention of Lon-
don and Washington to create this new
framework; and even M. Mendes-France
has apparently turned his face against the
alternative policy of neutralization. . . .
But now that the realists have made
such a mess of their policy, it is surely
time to ask ourselves whether neutraliza-
tion may not be at least as practicable
and at least advantageous to the West
as the present fcverish attempts to inte-
grate a rearmed Western Germany into
Nato.
Let US first clear our minds about the
definition of neutralization. It is not the
same as German neutrality, though of
course the neutrality of a reunified Ger-
many guaranteed by both Fast and West
would be one possible way of achieving
it. Neutralization mcans nothing more
than a plan to ensure that German mili-
tary strength is added neither to the East-
ern nor to the Western alliance; and it
is worth remembering that ncarly all
those who now dismiss this policy as
totally unrealistic strongly favored it as
late as 1948. In September, 1946, Mr.
HONI SOIT QUI MAL Y PENSE
(Evil be to him who evil thinks)
12
Byrnes, then Mr. Triiman's Sccretary of
State, made a Speech at Stuttgart offering
the Russians to neutralizc a unified Ger-
many for 25 years; and as far as we
know, this offcr remained official Ameri-
can policy at least iintil the Russian Block-
ade of Bcrh'n. In this Speech Mr. Byrnes
furthcr proposed that the cession of
Koenigsberg to Russia and of the Saar
to France should be confirmed, and that
the Oder-Neisse line should be ratified
in the Pcace Treaty. He went on to out-
line a plan for a central Gcrman ad-
ministration, supported by a National
Council composed of the Minister-Presi-
dents of the Provinces in all four Zones;
and he summed up bis plan in thcse
words :
"In proposing that the four major
Powers should jointly undertake to see
that Germany is kept disarmed and de-
militarized for a generation, the U.S.
was not unmindful of the responsibility
resting upon it and its allies to maintain
and enforce peace under law. Freedom
from mih'tarization will give the Ger-
man people the opportunity, if they will
but seize it, to apply thcir great energies
and abilities to the works of peace."
At that time, this American plan for
German neutralization was contemptuous-
ly dismissed by Stalin, who was still
playing for higher stakes. Now something
strangely similar is proposed by Mr. Mo-
lotov, and the West implacably turns it
down.
The reason for this complete reversal
of positions is clear. So long as the Soviet
Union was hoping to profit by American
isolationalism and to bring Western Ger-
many, and indeed all Western Europc,
within its orbit, neutralization was too
moderate a policy to satisfy its ambitions.
Since the formation of Nato — and, even
more, since America rcarmed and decided
to wage the Cold War — it is the West
which has conceived the ambition to win
the whole of Germany, and ultimately
the whole of Eastern Europe, to its side.
Driven on the defensive, the Russians
have correspondingly moderated their
aims — and now favor a neutral Germany
with a very small army of her own.
The real objection in Washington and
Bonn to neutralization, therefore, is not
that it would "favor Russia" but that it
would create a powerful obstacle to the
evcntual liberation of Eastern Europe, in-
cluding, of course, the lost German prov-
inces beyond the Oder-Neisse line. This
was made quite clear in the course of the
Berlin Conference, where the three West-
ern Powers made it clear that they would
consider no plan for German unification
which did not permit the new central
German government (i) to join Nato
and (ii) to demand a revision of the
Oder-Neisse line.
The first question we have to ask our-
selves, therefore, is w^hether the West has
been wise to discard the modest aims pro-
claimed in 1946 and to set itself the
grandiose goal of integrating Western
Germany into the Atlantic alliance, then
adding the Eastern Zone of Germany to
that alliance, and finally liberating East-
ern Europe. Would it really benefit
either the U.S. or France or Britain if
a Greater German Reich wcre once again
created ?
And furthermore, if we give the West
Germans sovereignty and encourage them
to revive their national ambitions, can we
be sure they will remain our faithful
partners when they realize, as some of
them are already realizing, that the Rus-
sians have far more to offer them than
we do? At the very least it must be ad-
mitted that the effort to add German
military strength to the Western alliance
is fraught with danger. By attempting it
since 1950, v/e have not only excluded
a peaceful settlement with the Russians
but imperilled Western unity as well.
Now, if E.D.C. Mark II is successful,
we shall re-create a Germany able once
again to exploit its balancing position be-
tween East and West.
These dangers would not be denied, at
least, by Mr. Eden and M. Mendes-
France. But they would probably say,
"How can we turn back now that we
have gone so far down this admittedly
dangerous road.^ The Bonn Government
cannot be put back where it was in 1949,
and if we tried to do so, we should throw
the Germans into the arms of the Rus-
sians." This assertion flies in the face of
every known fact about the State of pub-
lic opinion in Western Germany. It is
simply not true that the average German
is enthusiastic for E.D.C. and for re-
armament. On the contrary, every public
opinion poll has made it clear that en-
thusiam for E.D.C. is confined to rela-
tively small circles of Catholics and
European Federalists.
Both the Nationalists on the Right and
the Socialists on the Left desire to avoid
any irrevocable commitments to the West;
and even such sober observers as Dr. Hein-
rich BrĂĽning have recently shown them-
selves critical of any agreement with the
Atlantic Powers which could hamper later
negotiations with Russia. In fact, as Dr.
Adenauer knows only to well, German
opinion is becoming more neutralist with
every month that passes. If Britain and
America were now to agree to anothcr
Four-Power Conference and there pro-
pose the postponement of West German
rearmament in return for Russian conces-
sions on the issue of free elections, they
would certainly finish off Dr. Adenauer,
but they would also meet with overwhelm-
ing approval from German public opin-
ion. . . .
The beginning of sanity is to realize
that for four years (ever since the Ache-
son-Bevin-Schuman Conference of Septem-
ber, 1950) we have been marching down
a cul-de-sac. Now we must either let the
Germans break down the wall at the end
of the road, or retrace our steps and re-
sume the policy which we abruptly aban-
doned in the panic mood of the Korean
war. In France this decision would trans-
form pessimism and defeatism into jubi-
lant self-confidence overnight. In West-
ern Germany few tears would be shed
outside Dr. Adenauer's personal entour-
dge.
Mr. Churchill would do well to sit
down and re-read the Stuttgart speech in
the light of his own proposal for a
"Locarno arrangement" to guarantce Rus-
sia against aggression. Many of the de-
tails of the Byrnes plans have been out-
dated, but the main framework is as
sensible today as it was when he first
published it. It is for those who dismiss
neutralization today and explain exactly
what has happened between 1946 and
1954 to make them change their minds
just when Mr. Molotov seems to be Com-
ing round to their view and to be willing
to consider practical plans for peaceful
co-existence in Europe. . . .
If Britain and America continue their
effort to win Germany to their side in-
stead of neutralizing her military strength,
the disruption of Nato will continue; the
West will inflict on itself defeat after
defeat, and the Russians will sit on the
sideline enjoying the spectaclc.
{Condensed, Courtesy,
The New Statesman and Nation)
13
J/tĂź "Sivsiawa^ (Dsuxl
t
i
There are few success stories that can match the brilliance
of German achievements since the end of the war. Unques-
tionably, U.S. policy toward Germany has been of great
help. In our legitimate concern over the Communist danger
we have gone to unprecedented extremes "to keep the
Germans on our side." Naturally, the Germans have taken
fĂĽll advantage. In this connection Drew Pearson quotes an
American attorney familiär with the German frame of mind:
"The Germans seem to think they can get anything out oj
the United States just hecause we need them to oppose the
Russians." (8-11-54)
The German Lobby
However, there is another side to this unusual success story
which does not appear to be as obvious. We refer to the
outstanding work of the German lobby in the United States.
Since the end of the war the Germans have built up a power-
ful Organization operating on all levels of American life and
supported by what appears to be an inexhaustible "kitty."
This lobby has proven to be a very great asset to the Germans
and has netted them substantial gains. For example, it was
no mean feat to succeed in convincing our policy makers
that they should erase $2 billion of postwar debts owed by
Germany to the American taxpayers. This was one of Ger-
many's solid accomplishments since the end of the war thanks
to the smooth public relations Job performed by the German
lobby.
The Germans have had ample experience in this kind of
work going back to the days following the end of World
War I. Like today they sent their emissaries to the United
States "to lecture" and "to persuade." One of their best prop-
agandists was the fabulous German sea pirate Count Luckner
who later bragged how he had succeeded in squeezing "tears
from the ladies' eyes and dollars from the capitalists' pockets."
The "Deal"
The German lobby today is just as brazen and perhaps
even more effective. They have even dared to foist upon the
U.S. a deal which would discredit the moral leadership and
good faith of our country in the eyes of millions of our
friends abroad. We speak of their attempt to regain former
enemy assets valued at upwards of $500 millioD.
Following the end of World War II, the U. S. Government
accepted the responsibility of compensating tens of thousands
of American G.I. prisoners of war who had endured the
awful sufferings of enemy prisoner of war camps. Congress
passed legislation confiscating German assets in this country,
and the revenues therefrom were to be turned over to the
War Claims Commission to take care of these GIs or their
survivors.
German Plans
While the welfare of our American POWs was of im-
mediate concern, the official record shows that the U. S.
Government desired to prevent German assets in the U. S.
from being used for ulterior motives by the Germans or their
dummies.
Thus on March 30, 1945, the State Department publicly
announced that the German Government had devcloped "well
arranged postwar plans for the perpetuation of Nazi doctrines
and domination." The State Department went on to say:
"Nazi Party mtmbers, German industrialists and the German
military, realizing that victory can no longer he attained, are
now developing postwar commercial projects, are endeavoring
to renew and cement jriendships in foreign commercial circles
and are planning for renewals of prewar cartel agreements.
An appeal to the courts of various count ries will be made
early in the postwar period through dummies for UinlawfuV
seizure of industrial plant s and other proper ties taken over hy
Allied governments at the outbreak of war. In cases where this
method fails, German repurchase will be attempted through
'cloaks' who meet the necessary citizenship requirements. The
ohject in every instance will be to reestahlish German control
at the earliest possible date . . ."
In describing the German strategy, the State Department
Said: "Unless these plans are checked, they will prescnt a
constant menace to postwar peace and security."
That American public opinion in general supported a
realistic policy with respect to the disposition of German
assets is beyond question. Eider statesman Bernard Baruch
testifying before the U.S. Senate Committee on Military
Affairs in June, 1945, laid particular emphasis on the need
of confiscating German assets abroad. "German business
abroad," he warned, "has traditionally been an instrument of
economic and propagandistic war. These assets and organiza-
tions should be rooted out and taken over — everywhere. No
hokus pocus, no falling for 'dummy' contrivances . . . Enemy
assets in every country should be used to make restitiition to
nationals of that country for properties lost or damaged in
enemy countries."
To sum up, it can be said that our Government and the
Congress approved of the confiscation of enemy assets in the
United States for two basic reasons, (a) to strengthen Amer-
ican and Allied security; (b) to undo Germany's economic
penetration in the U. S. and to utilize the revenues of these
assets to compensate American victims of Nazism.
661
,99
'Bargaining'
For obvious reasons the Germans were silent on this ques-
tion during the first years following the end of hostilities.
However, when their "indispensability" began to hypnotize
our policy makers, they decided that the moment was oppor-
tune to turn loose their lobby and their public relations
salesmen.
During the negotiations on Germany's postwar debts to the
U.S. Germany's chief delegate Herman ]. Abs (one of
Hitler's paymasters) hinted that unless these former assets
were returned, Germany might not be able "to carry out her
bargain." Apparently even the $2 billion bargain which the
Germans received, did not satisfy the insatiable appetite of
Herr Abs.
Chancellor Adenauer put the matter in even biunter terms.
14
In the early part of 1954, the Chancellor publicly demanded
the return of the fornier German assets alleging that they
had belonged to Germans who "wcre always the traditional
Promoters of friendship betwcen the two nations. They should
be put into a position to resume that role." While the Chan-
cellor was talking about the nced for the return of these
properties to foster good will and as a token of appreciation
for Germany's brave role in the struggle against Communism,
West German direct exports to Red China were soaring to
record heights.
Traditional "Friends"
Dr. Adenauer was not specific as to whom he referred when
he spoke about those Germans who were the traditional
friends of the USA. It is not known whether he had in mind
the LG. Farben interests which had formerly owned the
General Aniline and Film Chemical Corporation located in
the USA. Nevertheless, I.G. Farben is working overtime to
regain General Aniline and Film the value of which has risen
from $25 million to over $100 million under American
management. The New York Times of February 7, 1954,
reported that "if all German assets blocked in the United
States were released, no conceivable justification would remain
for withholding General Aniline and Film Corporation stock
from Interhandel . . ." On March 28, 1954, the New York
Times correspondent writing from Switzerland, repeated the
same thought. Certain interests in Switzerland (unnamed),
according to the Times writer, prefer "to exert all their in-
fluence to approach the American Government directly, pro-
posing rapid settlement by compromise out of court." Their
efforts have been in vain because all of the authentic evidence
which is in the possession of the U.S. Government, proved
that GAF was a creature of I.G. Farben, even though this
relationship has been disguised by dummy corporations set up
in Switzerland.
Widows and Orphans
The German lobby in the United States has been a model
of discretion with respect to the role of the Farben interests.
They know that the name Farben is synonymous with the
concentration camps of Auschwitz and Buchenwald. They
are fully aware of the fact that without the criminal support
of I.G. Farben, Hitler could never have launche dhis wars
of aggression. Therefore, the public relations boys employed
by the German lobby, stay away from the odious name. In-
stead they dwell on "the little man" in Germany who is
allegedly injured by the confiscation of the former enemy
assets. The "widow and orphan" line is supposed to squeeze
dollars out of the American taxpayers' pockets just as Von
Luckner's sentimental Spiels in the 1920s brought on a rain
of American dollars to rebuild Germany's industrial war
potential.
Though they try to hide behind the "widows and orphans,"
they do make clumsy mistakes which are a revelation. For
example, the attorney for the Swiss dummy of I.G. Farben
is Ray Jenkins (not to be confused with Mr. Jenkins of the
Army-McCarthy hearings). One of the occupants of his office
is John W. Nairn who is counsel for the supposedly impartial
Senate Subcommittee investigating former enemy assets in the
United States. According to Drew Pearson (August 6, 1954)
lawyers Jenkins and Nairn "su^ap their secretary, Miss Anette
H. Day. EĂźcient Miss Day has been working for Jenkins,
attorney for the Swiss German comhine. Now she works for
the Senate Comnuttee investigating the possible return of the
C er man property."
Another Aspect
There is another aspect to the question of German external
assets which involves the U.S. relations with our western
allies. The United States was a party to important agreements
which sanctioned the confiscation of German assets abroad
and many of our war time allies are categorically opposed to
any plan that would scuttle those agreements and pledges.
Our allies have depended upon these former enemy assets to
help rehabilitate their war torn economies. The New York
Times, August 4, 1954, reported that the Dutch Government
would regard the return of former German assets as a "repu-
diation by the U. S. of an agreement it had made with its
allies."
The German lobby, however, is not concerned with the
sacredness of agreements (a characteristic of German diplo-
macy). These lobbyists harp on the principle of private prop-
erty rights— as though they have always defended that prin-
ciple. Of coursc, the whole world knows that the Germans
have been among the worst offenders of private property
rights whcn they lootcd Europe on a* scale unprecedented in
history. Yet, when a New York Times correspondent (4-5-54)
confronted West German officials with the fact that the Nazis
had looted 40 tons of gold from the Netherlands, these same
German ofiicials rctorted, "\Ve are allies today; how can you
Ilse the argument of a conqueror at this stageJ" So, when
they invokc the principle of private property rights, let us not
forget that even the devil can quote Scripture.
The bill sponsored by Senator Dirksen to abrogate the
present legislation is a monstrous insult to American tax-
payers. They would be obliged to underwrite "a $500 million
windfall payment of Treasury funds principally to German
industrialists who supported Hitler" (Francis C. Brown, head
of Schering Chemical Corporation). Were these the peoplt
Chancellor Adenauer had in mind when he spoke about
Germans who had always promoted friendship with the USA ?
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the Bonn Govern-
ment had ofiicially agreed to recognize the validity of the
confiscations. Article 3, Chapter 6 of the Convention with
Germany stipulates in effect that German external assets which
have not been created in the postwar years, do not legally
exist (Manchester Guardian 11-10-53). The reader should
judge for himself how easy it is for the Germans to go back
on their own signed agreements — a point which should be
borne in mind for future reference.
The Opposition
Fortunately, the Dirksen bill found rough siedding in
Congress in spite of the fact that the present Secretary of
State (an old band in representing German interests) argued
for it. The Attorney General's Ofiice opposed the bill; so did
many groups and individuals including the American Legion
and the Veterans of Foreign Wars.
The Washington Post, March 23, 1954, called the Dirksen
deal "a give away." In a leading editorial this newspaper
noted that "in the peace treaty which Secretary Dulles nego-
tiated with Japan, confiscation of Japanese private property in
the U. S. was recognized and accepted. There is no good
reason to deal with the Germans differently. ..."
t
The New York Post denounced the Dirksen deal in no
uncertain terms: "// German industrialists and their U.S.
lobbyists win this round, they will give Germany a weighty
club to extort similar concessions from small European na-
tions plundered by the Nazis." The New York Post's Observa-
tion had a prophetic quality for after the U.S. Congress
failed to consider the Dirksen bill, the New York Herald
TribĂĽne of August 11, 1954, reported: ". . . the West Ger-
mans will undoubtedly continue to bring the external asset
issue into trade negotiations with other smaller nations in the
future. They are expected to bring as much pressure on their
trading partners as the current power of West German in-
dustry will permit."
Within Congress itself, the Opposition grew as the facts of
the conspiracy were laid bare for all to see and to ponder.
Senator Hendricksen, Republican from New Jersey, refused
to agree to the Dirksen recommendations. He was joined by
Senator Kefauver, Democrat from Tennessee who quoted from
a report adopted by the American Bar Association (House of
Delegates, December 20, 1954): ''The United Nations are
now establishing a method of suppressing aggressor nations,
by use of sanction and threat of armed force. If the people
of a Potential aggressor nation, who have Investments abroad,
know that, if defeated, they will lose that property, the
knowledge will serve as a deĂźnite deterrent to aggression. On
the contrary, if they may plant property abroad on the assur-
ance that if their aggression fails, that property, carefully
preserved for them, will be returned to them by the nations
they have attacked, one check on aggressors is lost. Under
modern conditions international public int er est and peace will
be served if private property of the Citizens of any aggressor
nation is subject to application to that Nation s Obligation to
pay for the damage it inflicts on the people of the nations it
assails."
As a result of the Opposition, the Dirksen deal feil through
— at least temporarily. Needless to say, the Germans were
besides themselves. The LG. Chemie stock listed on the Swiss
stock exchange, dropped 13 per cent within several days
THE GERMAN "MIRACLE"
". . . Despite all the signs of progress and
activity, some reservatlons have to be made.
There is a very obvious undercurrent curiously
blended of self-pity and self-satisfaction; an
alr of complete detachment from the recent
past, which nobody ever mentions and nobody
seems to regret or repent. There is a certain
cynical and speculative streak in the firm be-
lief of most Germans that the Americans will
do anything for them, since they need them.
And, finally, there is a certain light-hearted
approach to business obligations and responsi-
bilities. Were it not for such things as these,
the German economic achievement of recent
years would be far more impressive and would
command far greater respect than it does. It all
looks a little bit too 'jerry-built'; a little too much
too soon and not quite genuine. . . ."
(George Soloveytchik, The Banker (London), November, 1954)
15
foUowing Dirksen's defeat. German reaction was immediate.
One promment German industrialist, unnamed, but claiming
to express the general feelings of most of his collcagues, said:
"If private property in the West is not inviolable, there is no
essential difference between the dcmocratic and authoritarian
principles. Consequently, we must look elsewhere" (N.Y.
Times, 8-16-53). Does this German industrialist imply that
the Germans play on democratic principles when it is profit-
able but will not hesitate to turn elsewhere whcn the payoff
is not forthcoming?
While the Dirksen deal has been temporarily chccked,
there is no doubt that the powerful German lobby will be
ringing doorbells during the next Session of Congress. The
money will flow and their paid mouthpicces will write ob-
jective newspaper columns on this subject. They will have all
kinds of allies ranging from neo-Nazi sympathizers to Amer-
ican cartelists. They will have their slick lawyers cooking
up new pseudo-legal arguments while their publicists flood
the country with tear jerking propaganda.
The October issue of the U.S.-German Chamber of Com-
merce Bulletin runs a plea from Gordon Michler (Standard
Oil) for funds to assure that the Dirksen deal is "given
prompt and adequate consideration when Congress meets."
AU checks, Mr. Michler advises, should be sent to the Treas-
urer of the "Committee for the Return of Former Enemy
Assets" located in Wall Street. In the face of this projected
assault by the German cartel interests and their counterpart
in the U.S., it would be well for the American people to
redouble their vigilance. The issues involved are moral as
well as fundamental to the security and good relations of this
country with her western allies. The Dirksen deal is in effect
a multimillion-doUar subsidy for Germany's aggressions which
would come out of the pockets of the American taxpayers.
On the other band, if the American people and their patriotic
organizations show the same determination as they did in the
Summer of 1954, it is certain that the German lobby will
again meet deserved defeat.
But what precaution do we take against his suddenly
vanishing?
16
Ăś ^MsĂĽi b) ihn fiJtMidsyd
On September 21, 1954, the Society for the Prevention of
World War III, Inc., wrote to President Eisenhower urging
a completc re-examination of the present policy toward Ger-
many beforc granting her fĂĽll sovereignty and the right to
remilitarize. The Society warned that the present policy toward
Germany inevitably deepens the disunity which already exists
in Western Europe and, therefore, plays into the hands of
Communist Russia. The President was told that a sovereign
and remilitarized Germany will be in the position to strike
a new bargain with Russia at the expense of Western security.
The letter further stated that the present German leadership
is surrounded by key advisers who are former Nazis and,
therefore, cannot be trusted.
Text of the letter signed by the Secretary of the Society,
Albert Simard, is furnished below:
September 21, 1954
The President of the United States
Divight D. Eisenhower
The White House Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
It is the Society s considered judgment that the steady de-
terioration of our position of leadership in Europe is primarily
due to our German policy. That policy has had the effect of
creating a resurgent Germany which is employing its power
to blackmail the West while laying the groundtvork for rap-
prochement with the Communist East. This ominous Situation
has created fear among our friends and allies, has provided
grist for the Communist Propaganda mills and has stimulated
disunity in Europe where such unity is essential for American
security.
The logic of that policy hrought ahout the fateful decision
of the Secretary of State to hypass France in his recent visit
to Europe. This unprecedented act of ignoring our historical
ally without whom there cannot be any sound and safe Solu-
tion of the German problem, will inevitably deepen the dis-
unity already existing in Western Europe.
An examination of German diplomacy since the end of the
first World tvar will clearly show that Germany tuas able to
revive her power for predatory purposes and to make deals
with Soviet Russia only after she had succeeded in Splitting
the West. If we grant the Germans fĂĽll sovereignty and en-
able her to regain fnilitary power, the conditions will he
created that will make it possible for Germany to strike a new
bargain with Russia at the expense of Western security.
According to the Christian Science Monitor (June 30,
1954), a large segment of influential German opinion believes
that "the Situation calls for German sovereignty without re-
strictions as well as the right to regulate for themselves their
relations with the East." The impact of fĂĽll sovereignty on
Germany s future decisions re gar ding whether or not she will
make a defense contribution to the West was described by
Felix von Eckardt, West Germany' s press chief (A.P.
9-2-54) : "We must have sovereignty first — and only then
can we consider {our emphasis) giving some of it up, to
international organizations."
Once West Germany obtains ftdl sovereignty, all prior com-
mitments made by West German politicians become subject to
abrogation. That Germany, if her interests so dictate, will
repudiatu the pledges of the present Chancellor, or that he
himself may do so, must be expected in the light of Germany s
notorious record on that score.
To unbiased Student s of German politics, the blind confi-
dence reposed in the present German leadership by our Gov-
ernment could place the United States in an untenable posi-
tion. Is it not shortsighted to pursue a policy the success of
which depends on the continued good health and popularity
of an aged German politician? Is it not danger ous to trust
Adenauer's leadership when among his chief advisers is Hans
Globke, head of the Chancellery and a former Nazi function-
ary who helped prepare the official Commentary on the Nu-
remberg race laivs?
The Globke case is not exceptional. The fact is that the
Chancellor is surrounded by other key advisers who are former
Nazis, including some jnembers of his cabinet. We cite as
examples :
(1) Theodor Oberlaender, Minister for Expellees, joined
the Nazi Party in 1933. He also became Reichs fuehr er of the
Federation of the German East. The Federation was later
classified by the Allies as a Nazi Organization.
(2) Waldemar Kraft, Minister without Portfolio in the
Adenauer Cabinet, is a former major of Hitler's SS. Kraft
tvorked closely tvith the Gestapo, the Nazi secret police.
(3) Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of Interior, joined the
Nazi Party in 1933.
(4) Victor Emanuel Preusker, Housing Minister, became a
Nazi Storm-Trooper in 1933 and joined the black shirted SS
which originated as Hitler's personal guard.
Does this not indicate the futility of our German policy
when Chancellor Adenauer apparently cannot find more re-
liable and less Nazi tainted elements for key positions in his
government?
It is our conviction that any firm and lasting defense against
possible aggression from the Communist East must frst and
foremost be based on a complete understanding and solidarity
among the three major democratic powers, i.e. England, France
and the United States. Our present German policy undermines
that solidarity and, therefore, contributes to the strengthening
of the Communist position in Europe. We, therefore, urge
that our Government re-examine the policy in its entirety
before taking any further action in the way of remilitarizing
Germany and granting her fĂĽll sovereignty.
Respectfully submitted,
Society for the Prevention of World War HI, Inc.
Albert Simard, Secretary.
Certainly, It would surprise no informed per-
son if Russia announced that East Germany
was going to build up an East German armed
force to counterbalance the military establish-
ment of the Bonn Government.
But, Hand in hand with that it is expected
that Moscow will quickly adjust itself to the
new Status of Bonn and, in all probability, em-
bark upon a caiculated policy designed to lead
to normal diplomatic and trade relations be-
tween Russia and West Germany.
(Harrison E. Salisbury, The N. Y. Times, 11-2-54)
17
The untimely death of Suprcme Court Justice Robert H.
Jackson at the age of 62 creates a great gap in the ranks of
democracy. The New York Times (10-11-54) describes Jus-
tice Jackson as one who will be remembercd, among other
things, "for the vigor, incisiveness and the clarity of his think-
ing as' a judge. . . ." The Times noted further, "w^hen basic
human rights were, as he saw it, at stake, he rose superbly
to the occasion." This is a fitting tribute to a great American
and outstanding Jurist.
The brilliance of Justice Jackson's career is not only due to
his distinguished work in the Suprcme Court. In has capacity
as the Chief American Prosecutor at the Nurembtrg War
Crime Trials, Justice Jackson also made a decisive contribution
toward the enrichment of international law and morality. In
this respect he helped to strengthen the fabric of Western
Culturc against the challenge of 20th Century barbarism.
From the days of Grotius, statesmen and lawyers have
talked about the necessity of creating a body of international
law that could help curb would-be aggressors. Yet, all of tht
talk and all of the efforts— no matter how worthwhile— did
not succeed in nailing down once and for all the principle
that international robbers and murderers are no more sacro-
sanct than the petty thief and assassin. Thanks to the vision
and courage of Justice Jackson, this principle was crystallized
at Nuremberg.
When Justice Jackson described in detail the diabolical
plot of the German leaders to destroy and enslave in the name
of "Lebensraum," he was providingt he basis for a great leap
forward in the sphere of international law^ Justice Jackson
was not oblivious to the criticisms from certain quarters which
deplored the prosecution of the German leaders for the crimes
they committed. With great eloquence and irrefutable logic
he replied to these critics in the very opening words of his
address before the International Military Tribunal: "The privi-
lege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the
peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs
which we seek to condemn and punish have been so caicu-
lated, so maliguant and so devastating. that civilization cannot
tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive then
heing repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory
andstung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and volun-
tarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law
is one of the most significant trihutes that Power ever has paid
to Reason."
In this samc address he met the charge that the War Crimes
Trials were "unfair" because the prosecutors and the Tri-
bunal itself represented the victors while the accused were
the vanquished: "Unfortunafely, the nature of these crimes
is such that both prosecution and judgment must be by victor
nations over vanquished foes. The worldwide scope of the
aggressions carried out by these men has left but few real
neutrals. Either the victors must judge the vancjuished or we
must Icave the defeated to judge themselves. After the First
W^orld War. we learned the futility of the latter course. The
former high Station of these defendants, the notoriety of their
acts, and the adaptability of their conduct to provoke retalia-
tion make it hard to distinguish betiieen the demand for
just and measured retribution, and the untbinking cry for ven-
geance which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task.
so far as humanly possible, to draw the line betueen the two.
W^e must never forget that the record on uhich we judge
these defendants today is the record on which history will
judge US tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned
chalice is to put it to our own Ups as well. We must summon
such detachment and intellectual integrity to our task that this
trial will commend itself to posterity as fulfilling humanity's
aspirations to do justice."
In his concluding remarks he set down in clarity the prin-
ciple upon which he rested the American case against the
German leaders: "Bi/t the ultimate step in avoiding periodic
wars, which are inevitable in a System of international law-
lessness, is to make statesmen responsable to law. And let me
make clear that while this law is first applied against German
aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful pur-
öose it must cotidemn aggression by any other nations, includ-
ing those which sit here now in judgment. We are able to do
away with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by
those in power against the rights of their own people only
when we make all men answerable to the law. This trial rep-
resents mankind's desperate effort to apply the discipline of
the law to statesmen who have used their powers of state to
attack the foundations of the uorld's peace and ^ to commit
aggressions against the rights of their neighbors."
In recent years a veritable torrent of abuse has been
heaped upon Justice Jackson, his associates at Nuremberg and
what they achieved. We can judge the significance of these
scurrilous attacks when it is noted that they come from the
very same elements who gave aid and comfort to the German
effort to conquer the world. These sinister forces are still
working overtime to turn history on its head. The war crimi-
nals become the martyrs and those who courageously bcat
back the aggressors are branded. The unpunished and the un-
repentant are frĂĽstrated and restless for they know that as long
as the principles of Nuremberg live on they dare not repeat
their devilish deeds without invoking the wrath and just retri-
bution of an outraged humanity. No matter how many dupes
they may find in the legal profession to apologize for their
crimes, the verdict of history will remain untarnished and in-
violabie. Freedom loving people will ever be grateful to
Justice Jackson for his historic role in working out enlightened
principles of justice for the defense of their dignity. libcrty
and peace.
"I cannot let pass the death of Associate
Justice Robert H. Jackson of the United States
Supreme Court without paying to him tribute
which he deserved on many counts.
". . . His Service to humanity and to inter-
national justice through his successfui prosecu-
tion of the Nazi crimlnals in the Nuremberg
trials alone will give him a place in both legal
and world history. To him we owe a large debt
in the establishement of the judicial determina-
tion of genocide. He sustained the idea of a
moral basis for international as well as na-
tional law of major historic importance. . . ."
(Jacob K. Jovlfs, N. Y. Attorney-General. 10-54)
18
(DamocÄaaf. JoaiL Jsi&L in. ^süimam^
ERNEST S. PISKO
To draw a Balance sheet of prevailing public opinion in
West Germany as of this moment is not difficult. But tb draw
a conclusion from it and forecast the eventual direction of
German thinking is virtually impossible.
Up to now, West Germany has been like a passenger in an
overcrowded rush-hour streetcar. It swayed somewhat when
the car bumped, but it was so hemmed in that it could neither
fall nor move. It was held upright by the pressures bearing
down on it from all directions.
But now the Situation is changing radically. With the oc-
cupation lifted, the streetcar grows emptier, and if the ride
does not gct smoother — which seems rather improbable —
German stability soon will be put to a grueling test.
Will it stand the test?
Democracy is threatened in West Germany from two
directions — the world political constellation and the Nazi
past. The political problcm cannot be solved by the Germans
alone; but the problem of their Nazi past can be solved only
by the Germans.
One may safely assume that there will be a West German
army soon and, some day, reunification of East and West
Germany. What remains to be seen is whether the new army
will be democratic in character and limited in size and arma-
mcnt; also whether any West German government can stay in
power that does not press for early reunification regardless
of the risks.
Regarding the Nazi past, the Germans have been reluctant
to repudiate it openly. The longer they wait, the more diffi-
cult will such a step become — and the more unlikely. At the
same time, pressure in the opposite direction will grow all
the strenger.
All those who have a personal stake in a rehabilitation of
naziism will try to persuade their fellow countrymen that the
Hitler years were a period of national glory, that Hitler's
political concepts were correct, and that talk about Nazi crimes
is slander.
A German Nazi foUower recently wrote in a letter to a
United States Senator that, if Hitler had not lived, Germany
would have experienced a tivil war in 1933, and the Soviets
would have occupied all of Europe, including Great Britain
and Ireland.
These are the same falsehoods for which the Germans feil
by the millions 20 years ago and may fall again. Too few
of them have realized that in 1933 the only threat of a civil
war came from the Nazis and that the Soviets would not
be in Central Europe today, had Hitler not first made a pact
with them and later engaged them in a war which he lost.
Next to these attempts to rewrite history are the efforts to
make the Nazis respectable.
The change in the populär attitude toward former Nazis
was reviewed critically in the independent Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, Sept. 13. In an article, written by August
Dresbach, it was pointed out that at the time of the denazifi-
cation procedure — between 1947 and 1950 — the defendants
were asked in court why they had joined the party. If they
Said they had not joined until after Hitler's seizure of power
and only under economic pressure, the court usually ex-
onerated them.
But now, the author said, it has become customary to ask
people "why they had not been in the party." Lack of mem-
bership is taken as evidence that the person was either "not
sufficiently Aryan" or married to someone racially suspect, or
that he was "too black" (Roman Catholic) or "too red."
Former party membership appears to have become almost
a prerequisite to obtaining one of the better Jobs. This ex-
plains the warning issued by the trade union leader Adolf
Kummernus, recently, that as to the number of former Nazis
holding official posts, "the Situation is already as bad now as
just before Hitler came to power."
And Heinrich Böll, one of West Germany's most talented
younger authors, wrote in the weekly magazine Aufwärts,
last August, that it now is fashionable to put the terms
"Nazi" and "war criminal" between quotation marks to in-
timate that they are used in a plainly ironical sense.
These are disturbing entries in the debit side of the ledger.
They are not meant, however, as evidence that democracy has
lost out in West Germany, but rather as a warning not to be-
lieve it has won or is sure to win in the near future. . . .
{^Condensed, Courtesy, The Christian Science Monitor)
"Any reaiistic survey of the German's atti-
tude to the economics of rearmament must be-
gin with their pians for iarge-scale tax reduc-
tions. This is odd, for what other country has
prepared for rearmament by cutting taxes? . . .
There is a widespread feeiing in Germany that
Americans must bear whatever extra costs may
be involved in rearmament. Some optimism on
this score is justified, for the first stage at least,
as the Americans will supply the heavy equip-
ment necessary for the initial German divisions,
though it has not been stated whether it will
be a gift. Certainly German hopes tend in that
direction. Similarly, industrialists take the view
that an American loan should be provided if
factories have to be re-converted to arms pro-
duction. . . .**
(London Economist, 11-6-54)
10
RECOMMENDED READING:
JPm ScDUhqA ofiJtsi Swailika
LORD RUSSELL OF LIVERPOOL
The author of this terrifying record was the former deputy
Judge Advocate General of the British army of the Rhine. The
dust Cover informs us that he resigned because the British gov-
ernment objected to the publication of this volume, presum-
ably because it would complicate relations with Germany.
Actually the Germans could not object to such a factual
record, though they must be ashamed, together with all of us,
that the inhumanities recorded in the Book should have oc-
curred. At one or two points the author allows himself specu-
lative judgment on how much or how little the German people
knew about the atrocities committed by the Nazis. These are
the only portions of the book which one might challenge, not
because they are not true but because the truth is not as well
established as the record of the atrocities.
The record will, of course, not be news to any reader who
followed the papers and the history of the war crime trials
from NĂĽrnberg on. But the record has a cumulative effect of
terrifying proportions. The Nazi crimes on the high seas, the
forced labor, the abuse of prisoners of war, the concentration
camps, the extermination of the Jews in the gas Chambers,
the atrocities against conquered peoples; medical experiments
upon prisoners; every part of the consistent inhumanity which
the Nazis achieved is included.
Naturally such a book does not make pleasant reading. The
question is whether it is worth reading. We had atrocity
stories after the first world war and then a reaction against
them because many of them were proved to be false. It is
". . . A few years ago, while the A-bomb
superiority of the West was a fact, there were
three possible ways by which Western Ger-
many could seek unity with the Eastern Prov-
inces; by a Nato victory in a third world war;
by the success of o roll-back policy achieved
through the threat of preventative war; and by
a bargain with the U.S.S.R. Now, with the H-
bomb equölity a fact, there is only the last way.
"It seems almost certain that this issue of
how to attain unity will dominate the political
scene in West Germany in the next few years.
So It seems inevitable that West Germany will
Start exploring all possible avenues to a bar-
gain with the U.S.S.R. and in so doing will be-
come an unreliable ally to the Nato Powers. I
cannot see cfearly how any change in Nato
Defense or foreign policy can prevent this Situ-
ation Coming about.
(P.M.S. Blocken, New Statesman Nation, Great Britain, 8-28-54)
rather ironic that the public was disposed to incredulity be-
cause of the surfeit of atrocity stories after the first world war
and then in the second the atrocities were so monstrous that
they caused an unjustified incredulity. That is why a report
from actual records is important for history.
Lord Russell's report establishes the implication of the
German generals in the atrocities, however much they have
tried to create the impression that they abhorred that part of
the Nazi program. It also gives a picture of unrelieved wicked-
ness including women nurses, etc.
The wickedness is, in fact, so unrelieved that it raises some
very interesting questions about human nature. Could it be
true that, when the general Standards of human decency are
outraged, men fall into a bottomless pit of evil? These Nazi
crimes, for instance, can only partly be prompted by the Nazi
creed, which recognizes no human rights superior to the
"survival" needs of the German nation. But the cruelties con-
sistently extend beyond the requirements of policy and de-
generate into pure sadism.
One could wish that the photos had been eliminiated, par-
ticularly those of corpses. They do not add anything to the
indictment and spoil the book.
(C<,ur,esy. The N. Y. Pos,) REINHOLD NIEBUHR
The Scourge of the Swastika. By Lord Russell of Liverpool.
Philosophical Library, 1954.
[Cartoon by Vicky)
20
disĂĽibsht diĂźovsĂĽi.
WHEN WAS IIE RIGHT? WHEN WAS HE WRONG?
During his many ycars of Service in public life ex-
President Herbert Hoover has displayed a marked interest
in German afFairs. He has been regarded by the Germans
as one of their tried and trusted friends. Indeed, wiien
he visited Germany recently he was hailed as their
"savior." Since the end of World War II, Mr. Hoover
has played a leading part in the formulation of U.S.
policy toward Germany. Of late, he has been quite defi-
nite in his vievvs with regard to the future role of Ger-
many. "I have always said that Western civilization can-
not survive without a unified Germany . . ." (New York
Times, 10-31-34). Mr. Hoover has stated that German
national ism is not a bad thing per se and that Germany
can be depended upon to act as the great defender of
democracy. "My prayer is that Germany may be given
the unity and fĂĽll freedom which will restore her to that
mission in the world" (N. Y. Herald TribĂĽne, 11-25-54).
Mr. Hoover did not always believe in Germany's mis-
sion to save Western civilization. In this connection we
cite two examples:
EXHIBIT "A"
/;/ 1918 a book was published efititled "The Iron C/rcle,
The Vutiire of Ger man bidustrial Exports, etc." hy S. Herzog.
Mr. Hoover sigued the hitroduction, excerpts of whkh we
pnblisb herewith'.
" 'If there is anything to be gained by being honest, let us
be honest; if it is necessary to deceive, let us deceive.' Thus
wrote Frederick the Great in the middle of the 18th Century
— the man who laid the foundation of Pan-Germanism.
which this world war was expected to achieve. Not content
with dominion by force of arms, we find Germany plotting
for commercial supremacy with that insolent disregard of the
rights of others and that resort to deception that has charac-
terized all her policies since Frederick the Great's reign. . . .
'Tor forty years the Germans have been plotting to realize
their dream of Pan-Germanism — eventual world conquest and
dominion. For two gencrations they have been thinking in
terms unknown or little understood by an innocent and un-
suspecting world. The Prussian philosophy that might makes
right, that the State is supreme, has completely possessed the
ruling and Upper classes of Germany, both military and com-
mercial, until deception and fraud form the background of
their most important international relations and undertakings.
They have made Germany an inherently dishonest nation. . . .
"German rule means the breaking-down of all order, the
exchange of personal liberty and national freedom for force,
of right for might, of justice for the mailed fist.
"The world should have been forewarned. Books were
written, maps constructed, by well-known German authorities
for the enlightenment of the German people, and these books
reached the outside world, but civilization, accustomed to the
pursuits of peace, turned a deaf car, and is now paying the
penalty for refusing to see and hear.
"Now another conception comes out of the heart of Ger-
many, that threatens the commercial interests of unsuspecting
nations — carefully thought out, with characteristic German
thoroughness, openly advocating the breaking down of all
business ethics, relying upon trickery and circumvention to
gam their end. This promises to stop at nothing, from na-
tional dumping of goods to crush competition to false labeis
and disguise of the origin and the breaking of contracts that
prove disadvantageous to the German.
"Let the manufacturing and banking interests and the
laboring and professional classes of all nations be warned in
time to devise antidotes and counter-attacks to the Machiavel-
lian devices of a class gone mad with lust for conquest, de-
liberately plotting to fatten itself upon the life blood of other
peoples even after the war. Let us consider in making peace
what protection we can give to the commercial existencc of
the frecd nations."
EXHIBIT '^B"
On the eve of the San Francisco Conference (1945) which
created the United Nations, Mr. Hoover wrote a special piece
for the North American Newspaper Alliance. Here are ex-
cerpts of this article:
"My fourth proposal for the San Francisco Conference is
that agreement upon continued and total disarmament of the
enemy nations must be entered into either as part of the
United Nations Charter or as a separate agreement. In any
event it will have to be enforced by the Security Council. And
it profoundly affects the whole question of peace.
"Three years ago Mr. Gibson [Hugh Gibson, American
diplomat] and I proposed that the enemy states must be com-
pletely disarmed for an entire generation. We pointed out one
of the great errors of the Treaty of Versailles in which
Germany was permitted to retain a professional army of
100,000 men, supposedly for the purposes of maintaining
internal order. She was permitted to have a navy limited only
in tonnage and type of ships. We stated that this leeway
perpetuated her professional armies and navies. It perpetu-
ated the warrior castc and all its traditions. It afforded a
skeleton army and navy of skilled men ready for quick ex-
pansion. It insured the continuity of the General Staff with
its military skill, brains, and ambitions. It perpetuated their
know-how to make war.
"Repeated experience with the warrior caste of these na-
tions in their intimidations, aggressions, blitzes, and attacks
without even declarations of war should be enough for the
world in this particular. We must make a better job of it this
time. . . . We should prohibit the manufacture of arms of
any kind [by these countries]."
21
(jJhif. ^afimtzTUu ^o £aätL
by
PAUL WOHL
IT he defection to the East of Dr. Otto fohtT, former sectmty chief in the Bonn Government, and Karl Schwidt-Wittmack,
member of the West German Parliament and prominent leader m Chancellor Adenauers Christian Democratic Party, created a Sen-
sation both here and abroad. There has been much speculation concerning their motnes. Perhaps the tnith will not be knoun
for a long time Certain factors which provide the background for these defections were analyzed by Paul W ohl, outstanding
expert on the So viel s for the Christian Science Monitor and a long time Student of German aĂź ans. We puhlish below a con-
densation of Mr. Wohls article which appeared in The New Leader.)
The flight to the Fast of Otto John,
former West German security chief, and
Karl Schmidt-Wittmack, a member of
the Bonn Parliament and leader of Chan-
cellor Adenauer' s Christian Democratic
party in Hamburg, has been a major
Propaganda victory for Moscow. Bonn
contends that the two men were emo-
tionally unstable or eise secret Commu-
nists or double agents who f eared that the
jig was up.
Propaganda-wise, this line of reasoning
was not very effective. John and Schmidt-
Wittmack are not only the West Ger-
mans who have sought to coUaborate with
the Fast. Among those who have done so
are men whose integrity is beyond ques-
tion. We may not agree with their way
of thinking, but today in Europe, and
especially in Germany, logical reasoning
frequently carries less weight than evi-
dencc of personal integrity and idealism.
Even if it could be established that
Schmidt-Wittmack' s trucking firm car-
ried unlicensed goods to the Fast (who
in the German business Community can
throw the first stone.^) or that Dr. John
was a double agent, this would not neces-
sarily discredit them in the eyes of their
countrymen . . . For most Germans, the
John and Schmidt-Wittmack affairs tran-
scend personal motivations. They have
become a signal for stock-taking. And
because this is understood by Soviet Prop-
aganda, while Western spokesmen try to
avoid the basic issue, the two cases have
acquired much greater political signifi-
cance than the defection of two British
diplomats in 19*31, of atomic scientist
Bruno Pontccorvo or of Hungary's cos-
mic-ray expert Janossy — all of whom,
like John and Schmidt-Wittmack, held
highly respected and well-paid positions
in the West ...
Politically, there is the idea of German
unity and power through neutrality be-
tween Fast and West. This has long been
advocated by a former Chancellor of the
Weimar Republic, Joseph Wirth, and
was recently endorsed by two other for-
mer Chancellors, Heinrich BrĂĽning and
Hans Luther. It is older and more deeply
entrenched than Konrad Adenauer' s idea
of a Western European Community. In
Prussian North Germany, it has always
come to the fore in times of stress. Ac-
cording to the late Walter G. Krivitsky,
conservative Prussian patriots were pre-
pared to arrest Hitler in 1937, provided
they could announce to the German peo-
ple that friendly relations with Russia
had been restored. It was Stalin who de-
cided against the plan. Stalin's successors,
far more than the late dictator in his last
years, have gone out of their way to honor
Fast German offtcials and to cultivate the
spokesmen for West German interests
who occasionally hold clandestine meet-
ings with Fastern representatives.
Paradoxically, German protagonists of
neutrality feel stronger today than in
1937 because (l) on-the-spot observa-
tions during and after the war have con-
vinced them of the general backwardness
of the USSR, which makes it unlikely that
the Kremlin will take the offensive in a
major war; (2) they sense that the Soviets
have lost momentum since Stalin's death
and believe that Moscow will agree to
creation of a neutral Germany; (3) West
Germany's spectacular industrial Come-
back, plus a certain amount of technical
progress in Fast Germany, have convinced
them that, in ten years at the latest, they
may be able to hold their own as a major
world power bctween Fast and West.
Some of West Germany's leading experts
on Russia go even farther. In private con-
versations, they predict a long period of
internal convulsion in the Soviet Union
which, undei certain circumstances, might
enable a Germany organized along state-
socialist (or state-capitalist) lines to be-
come the nerve center of an enormous
Eurasian empire extending from the
North Sea to the Gulf of Tonking.
This line of thought has gained ground
as a result of the difficulties encountered
by Western European unity efforts, and
the Communists have maneuvered skil-
fuUy to seil it to German right-wing
patriots ...
Ideologically, the Fast also has certain
attractions for West Germany. First of
all, there is the totalitarian resemblance to
the Nazi System. But there are other rea-
sons:
• The Fast appeals to the average Ger-
man's lovc of parades, of hero worship
and collective sclf-aggrandizement.
• The Fast's sweatshop methods appeal
to some German businessmen and mem-
bers of the old ofticialdom as reminiscent
of Prussias legcndary Spartan virtues.
• Some impoverished members of the
middle class lock with envy at West
Germany's prosperous new businessmen
and have fallen back into Nazism's anti-
capitalist mood or rediscover with Oswald
Spengler a close relationship between the
Prussian spirit and socialism.
• The European idea now appears petty
to these people. "A united Europe would
have been a great thing twenty or thirty
years ago, " wrote one of my correspond-
ents. "Adenauer's "Little Europe' is a po-
litical anachronism in the day of the
supcrsonic guided missile." Such views
are encouraged by Fast German invita-
tions to Visit China and by world youth
festivals.
• A few German intellcctuals have re-
22
turned disillusioned from America. One
university professor, who had toured this
country under Marshall Plan auspices and
later came back as an immigrant, was
forced to do unskilled work in a small
plant. Writing about his experiences, he
referred to the fine factories he had vis-
ited while an official guest as "the Ameri-
can Potemkin's villages" — a false front
comparable to those set up by Soviet
Propaganda.
Economically, too, East Germany does
not appear altogether dark and hopeless
to some West Germans. Certain rationed
foods are cheaper than in the West and
are smuggled into the Western Sector of
Berlin. Although market prices are still
very high, there have been eleven succes-
sive price reductions. Last August, more-
over, nominal wages were raised as much
as 20 per cent and taxes cut. For en-
giners, skilled workers, natural scientists
and the like, conditions are improving.
During the first six months of this year,
alone among the Soviet satellites, East
Germany maintained last year's tempo of
industrial expansion, which is far greater
than in the West. As in other Communist
countries, unemployment does not exist.
Several rows of impressive houses along
East Berlin's Stalin-Allee show that the
East Germans can build if given the op-
portunity to do so. East Germany has
also begun to gain a foothold in some
Western European and overseas markets,
and it is through East Berlin that most
commercial deals with China and other
Soviet-bloc countries are made.
Yet, economic opportunities are the
least important prospect that East Ger-
many has to offer. Its principal attraction
for West Germans at the present stage
seems to lie in the conviction that, without
a war, German unity can come only
through reconciliation with the East.
"Germans stay in East Germany or go
there," one old-timer recalled, "in the
same wa^ that Frenchmen after 1871
stayed in Alsace-Lorraine or returned
there despite Berlin's policy of cultural
oppression." All this may appear incon-
gruous to Americans, but it is well to
remember that Germans, and especially
German intellectuals, think politically in
a Strange, circuitous Teutonic way that is
very different from the most rational ap-
proach of the freedom-loving West.
{Condensed, Courtesy, The New Leader)
by
MAX LERNER
. . . We are told that it is the German arms treaty which is
DuUes' high historic achievement. As if to underscore this
claim Chancellor Adenauer has been brought here during the
week before election for high-level talks on arms and dip-
lomacy that will cement the new alliance.
I have nothing against Adenauer, who is probably a better
Chancellor than anyone Germany is likely to have as his
successor. He is a guest of our government and he deserves
courtesy at our hands.
But with the memory of the greatest mass-extermination in
history not wholly withered in our minds, is there real cause
for jubilation at the "victory" we have achieved in rearming
the nation responsible for the crematoria and the human fur-
naces? . . .
But it is one thing to say reluctantly that we had to do it,
and quite another thing to make it ground for jubilation.
What is there to be so happy about? The fact that there will
soon be a half million German soldiers under arms and an
equal number in the reserves?
The meaning of political events lies often less in the events
themselves than in the moral framework in which they are
placed. I have waited to hear from Dulles or President Eisen-
hower or any of the men around them a single word about
the pain this decision caused them, about the sorrow and
sadness that must mark it in the perspective of history.
They have said nothing. There has been only a barren, stony
silence.
The Conference at London and the signing of the treaty at
Paris had a double purpose. One was to bring Germany back
into the fellowship of nations, with rearming as a symboI of
its sovereignty. The other was to set up a System of controls
to make sure its armed power would not again east a shadow
over Europe.
The two purposes were necessarily intertwined. Without
the System of controls, the rearming would be at once cynical
and dangerous.
Yet the big fact about Dulles' role at London — like his role
in all the diplomatic maneuvers preceding London — was that
he concentrated on the rearming and allowed others to fight
for the controls.
The championing of controls — and the insistence on them —
was left to Mendes-France, although Eden helped. I think a
detailed analysis of the day-to-day maneuvers at London and
before London would show without question that Dulles
threw his weight toward the minimum of controls and toward
a dilution of the arms pool. Whenever there was a Showdown
on these crucial questions, Dulles always stood with Adenauer.
If this is why Eisenhower described Dulles' role in so glow-
ing terms, we ought to know whether he understands its fĂĽll
meaning. The best features of the London agreement — the
effort to control the rearming — came despite Dulles and not
because of him. It was the rearming itself on which he most
firmly set his will. If this is the returning hero we are sup-
posed to cheer, I stand mute while the parade goes by.
(Condensed, Courtesy, N. Y, Post)
23
OadfĂĽDUUL . . .
. They are weeding dandelions from the blood trench at
Dachau.
Roses and evergreens mark the graves of unknown thou-
sands. German gardeners neatly clip the grass in the trench
by the wall where elite guard officers once shot starving
prisoners in the back.
Dachau was the first of Adolf Hitler's great prison camps,
and the worst. Its record of murder and torture surpassed all
others, for 300,000 persons died there, many while serving as
unwilling guinea pigs for Gestapo Chief Heinrich Himmler's
"scientific" experiments.
There were typhus, typhoid, dysentery and starvation. There
was torture unparalleled, and an utter misery and breaking of
human spirit. Jews, Poles, Hungarians, Belgians, Russians,
Italians and Germans died there.
It is little more than a 15-minute drive north from Munich
to Dachau, where smoke used to curl from the crematorium
chimneys 24 hours a day. The elite guards did their grisly
work thoroughly — in one month alone, 6000 human beings
were stuffed into Dachau's long, brick ovens.
Under United States occupation, Dachau has become a me-
morial. The people who live there are refugees from the
Soviet East Zone.
Dachau is in the middle of a big piain, and many new
houses have Sprung up outside the camp since the war. In
1949, a grave containing the bones of 15,000 persons was
unearthed by a buU-dozer excavating for a basement. The
grave is now a memorial.
Just inside the gates of Dachau's extermination area is an
old pine tree, its trunk and first two limbs stripped of bark.
The tree Stands stark, with low-growing evergreens and a
small path around it. At the foot of the tree is a small marble
slab that says, in English, "hanging tree."
Nazis used to tie prisoners' hands behind them, then hang
them from a limb of the tree for hours at a time. After un-
endurable pain, a blessed unconsciousness would foUow.
Down the path a little way is the blood trench, about 22
inches deep and 15 feet long. It is markcd with another small
marble slab.
Farther along the path is a three-foot square of ground
marked off with roses. In the middle is a slab that says, "This
is the grave of unknown thousands."
It probably was there that 92 Russian officers, divided into
batches of 15, were stripped, forced to knecl and shot in the
back.
Still farther along the path is a three-foot square of ground
bordered by roses and evergreens. In the middle is another
slab that says "This is the grave of unknown thousands."
Continue along the path and there is another square, ex-
actly like the first, only much larger. This is another grave of
unknown thousands, discovered more than five years after the
war's end. • u •
Then you come to the crematoriums, two of them, with six
furnaces. The furnaces are made of brick, and are more than
long enough to accommodate an emaciated, tortured human
body.
Victims were stuffed into the fircs with long iron poles,
now worn smooth at the ends. Some were burned alive.
Rafters over the crematoriums in one low wooden building
are seorched black and burned partly through by the intense
heat.
Fingernail Scratches, made in desperation by doomed pris-
oners, still Cover the walls of the "undressing room" and the
gas Chamber. Mingled with the Scratches are other Scratches,
the marks of former Dachau prisoners who have revisited the
camp, and the names of tourists.
In the last days before the United States Seventh Army
arrived at Dachau, there were 112 to 135 deaths daily. Nazis
were dumping prisoners into ice water until unconscious in
alleged "scientific" experiments.
"Bone crusher," so-called by the prisoners, was Sgt. Kurt
Moeller, whose physical strength was so great he could break
arms and legs with his bare hands. Other Dachau guards used
prisoners for pistol practice.
Dachau's horror came to an end when American troops
arrived on April 30, 1945, but its misery did not. Advanced
starvation and diseases took the lives of 60 to 100 a day at
Dachau for weeks after the war ended.
Outside the camp, our troops found 50 boxcars loaded with
bodies of humans who had been starved to death, or shot to
death, bodies livid with bruises.
Two rooms in the crematorium were piled to the ceiling
with emaciated bodies. Even Dachau could not keep up with
the death pattern it had set.
{Courtesy, St. Louis Post-Dispatch)
"We have fought two wars in this Century to
prevent German hegemony in Europe, and it is
still our national interest to prevent such a de-
velopment at all costs. A dominant Germany,
once men like Adenauer are gone, could all too
easily revert to the policy of Bismarck, the
Weimar Republic and Hitler — a deal with Rus-
sia which would imperil the West.
The policy of basing a European policy on
Germany rather than France has a fatal ap-
peal for some British and American policymak-
ers. A pro-German Anglo-American foreign
policy, carried through in the Twenties and
early Thirties, made the Second World War al-
most inevitable. It could have the same result
again. A pro-German policy would turn the
Continent — including our faithfui friends in Po-
land, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania —
into disillusioned and depressed neutralists. It
would destroy the political appeal of the Euro-
pean idea, which would become not the dy-
namic rallying point of future hopes in Europe,
but an abiding threat of renewed occupation by
goose-stepping armies in field-gray.'*
(Eugene V. Rostow in The New Leader, 11-2-54)
24
25
(x)hat Kjojosl (x)sl ^tsuVinsuL?
by
JOSIAH E. DU BOIS, JR.
{The article publhhed belotv by Josiah E. Du Bois, jr., is a review of "Tyra)2ny On Trial" by Whitney R. Harns, published
b) SoNtheru Methodist Uuiiersity Press, Dallas. Mr. Du Bois was Chief Prosecutor of the LG. Farben case during the 1947-48
War Crime Iridis at Kuremberg. He has served in important posts in the Government. He was Assistant to the Secretary of the
Treasitry und er both Morgenthau and Vinson; General Counsel to the War Rtfugee Board; and Counsel and Financial Adiisor
to the Representative of the President on Japanese Reparations. He is the author of "The Devil's Cheniists, a definitive study of
the LG. Farben war criminals.)
World Icadcrs as well as legal scholars have differed
grcatly in their vicws concerning the wisdom of the Nurem-
berg trials and the effect of said trials in the field of inter-
national law.
According to Judge Samuel Rosenman, who represented
President Roosevelt in connection with the preparation for
the trials, the British offidals including Prime Minister
Churchill, "wanted to take the top Nazi criminals out and
shoot them without warning one morning and announce to
the World that they were dead."
Secretary HuU's memoirs recite "If I had my way, 1 would
take Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo and their arch-accom-
plices and bring them before a drumhead court-martial. And
at sunrise on the following day there would otcur an historic
incident."
In writing about "the power of the victor over the van-
t|uished," Chief Justice Stone said "It would not disturb me
grcatly if that power were openly and frankly used to punish
the German leaders for being a bad lot, but it disturbs me
some to have it dressed up in the habiliments of the common
law and the Constitutional safeguards to those charged with
crime.
On the other side, the late Justice Robert H. Jackson,
Chief Prosecutor at the major Nuremberg trial, states in his
introduction to TYRANNY ON TRIAL, "The only course.
in my view, was for the victors to behave as civilized victors
and take the responsibilities implicit in demanding and ac-
cepting capitulation of the whole German State and popula-
tion. Unless history was to lay the war guilt and the guilt
for organized programs of atrocities upon the whole German
people, some process must identify those individuals who
were in fact responsible and make an authentic record of their
deeds."
And Justice Jackson reports that: "President Roosevelt had
steadily and insistently favored a speedy but fair trial for
these men, fearful that if they were punished without public
proof of their crimes and opportunity to defend themselves
there would always remain a doubt of their guilt that might
raise a myth of martyrdom."
Despitc these divergent views concerning the trial and the
legal efficacy of the trials, no responsible person has attempted
to defend the morality of the almost unbelievable acts of
barbarism and cruelty committed by the Nazi leaders; and no
responsible person has been heard to say that the nature of
the punishment meted out to the arch criminals of the Nazi
era was unjust.
Perhaps the most important contribution of the Nuremberg
trials is the fact that they made an unchallengeable record
of the incredible events of one of the most blackest periodj«
in the history of mankind. The taking of Austria by tele-
phone; the rape of Czechoslovakia; the subjugation of Poland:
the conquest of Denmark and Norway in deliberate violation
of solemn covenants; the liquidation of the three little coun-
tries of Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg; the over-
running of Yugoslavia; the invasion of France; the attempt
to destroy the Soviet Union; the massacre of prisoners of
war; the enslavement of millions of human beings; the per-
secution and deliberate murder of the Jews and other minority
groups; the so-called "Germanization" of the Eastern coun
tries of Europe, including drastic restrictions upon the edu-
cation and cultural life of those unfit to be "Germanized"
and the sterilization of "inferior women"; the plunder of
the industries of every country of Europe invaded by the
Nazi armies; the looting of treasures of art; and such in-
comprehensible acts like the wicked experiments conducted
upon human beings for testing the effectiveness of poisoned
bullets, medical experiments to test untried drugs, the col
lection of skulls of human beings of "all races and peoples
at our disposal," the gassings of millions of human beings
and the burning of their bodies, the extraction of gold from
their teeth and the making of soap from their fat; these
events and many more were recorded for all time at the
Nuremberg trials.
". . . How are we to explain Germany's Un-
tergang from civilization — not to 'barbarism'
(an insult to all barbarians), but to nihilistic
crlminality on the part of its elite and to fren-
zied sadism and self-lmmolation on the part
of its people? 'Tyranny' or 'totalitarianism'
will scarcely serve as clues. ... In any case, it
is a fact . . . that the German Community of
our time somehow managed to atta'n Iower
depths of evil than any known to man in any
of his past or present experiments in social
(Frederick L. Schumann, The Nation, 9-18-54)
l
I
I
Yet, World power politics being what it is, history also
records the fact that as early as September 1944, while our
GIs were still being killed by the Nazi war machine, thcrc
was circulated within the United States government, at a
high level, a memorandum contending, in etfect, that as soon
as the war was over we should rebuild German power as
tjuickly as possible.
As a member of the American delegation to the Potsdam
Conference in July 1945, I saw this government formally
endorse a program designed to insure that Germany would
no longer be the dominant power in Europe. That was the
program the world heard. But there was secretly circulated
among the top leaders of the British and American delega-
tions a memorandum, prepared by certain top ofhcials in the
United States government, saying in elfect that this whole
approach was wrong and that our real interest lay in rebuild-
ing Germany as quickly as possible "as a bulwark against
Communism."
And, finally, we have recently heard the Prime Minister
of Great Britain announce at a party celebrating his 80th
birthday that "Even before the war ended, and while the
Germans were surrendering by hundreds and thousands, I
telegraphed Lord Montgomery directing him to be careful in
collecting German arms and to Stack them so that they could
easily be issued again to the German soldiers with whom we
should have to work if the Soviet advance into Western
Europe continued."
Many of the industrial, military and diplomatic leaders of
the Nazi era who were convicted at the Nuremberg trials
which followed the major trial are free today and back in
positions of great power in Germany.
Anyone who reads TYRANNY ON TRIAL and then pon
ders the State of the world today must ask himself "What
have we learned.'^"
"THE OTHER SIDE"
Speaking to the International Military Tri-
bunal at Nuremberg of Nazi atrocities in the
occupied territories, Sir Hartley Shawcross said:
". . . on the Iowest computation tweive million
men, women and children were done to death.
Not in battle, not in passion, but in the cold, cal-
culated, deliberate attempt to destroy nations
and races, to disintegrate the traditions, the in-
stitutions and the very existence of free and
ancient States. Twelve million mjrders! Mör-
ders conducted like some mass production in-
dustry. . . ."
This book, by Lord Russell of Liverpool who,
when Deputy Judge Advocate General, British
Army of the Rhine, was legal adviser to the
Commander-in-Chief in respect of all trials of
German War Criminals in the British Zone of
occupation, gives a factual account of the ap-
palling crimes committed and of the monstrous
Organization behind them. It is a formidable
indictment of German barbarity, which has
been fully comprehended by few people out-
side the occupied couutries. How many in Brit-
ain realize that, of the 3,000,000 Jews living
in Poland in September, 1939, not more than
50,000 could be traced in 1946 as a result of
the German policy of mass extermination? How
many know that 3,000,000 prisoners were killed
at the Auschwitz Camp alone; that at one time
10,000 people a day were put into its gas
Chambers? Since the war there have been
many books by German officers defending the
Nazi war machine. It is as well to read the
other side of the story.
(Publisher's Comment on "The Scourge of the Swastika"
By Lord Russell)
THB MANY FACES OF KONRAD ADENAUEH by Cummings
Through Mr. Oulltt's eyas • • • Through Mr. Eden's eyes . . •
Tlirough Mr. Francc's eyes . . .Through Mr. MoIotoVs eyes . .
(Daily Exprt'is)
25
27
The New York Times (10-24-54) pub-
lished a letter by Sidney H. Willner
dealing with the question of German car-
tels and monopolies. Mr. Willner's quali-
fications to speak on this subj ect cannot
be challenged in view of the fact that he
was formerly Chief of the Decartehza-
tion and Deconcentration Division of the
U.S. High Commission for Germany.
In his letter Mr. Willner questions the
accuracy of a Times report (10-12-54)
indicating that all the fundamental Al-
lied legislation concerned with the de-
concentration and decartelization "will be
discarded because there are no mcans of
enforcing that legislation after the liqui-
dation of the occupation regime." Ac-
cording to Mr. Willner, the Allied
deconcentration program has been in the
main accomplished and it is "inconceiv-
able that there is an intention to aban-
don what has already so largely been
achieved." In the case of Allied anti-
cartel laws Mr. Willner expresses the
hope that this legislation will not be dis-
carded. One can easily get the Impression
that this anti-cartel legislation has been
effectively enforced without fear or favor.
Mr. Willner declares rightly that the
scrapping of these vital Allied laws
could very well result in "regression to
economic feudalism" in Germany.
Judging from reports Coming out of
Germany over the past few years, regres-
sion to economic feudalism is no longer
a hypothetical question. On the contrary,
the resurgence of the trusts and cartels
has been proceeding in rapid pace. In-
deed, we will go further — the regression
which Mr. Willner fears has not merely
returned German industry to the Status
quo ante, but has increased the power
of the monopolies and cartels to unprece-
dented heights.
Unquestionably this is partially due to
the fact that the German cartelists have
left no stone unturned to hamper and
discredit the Allied decartelization and
deconcentration program. But that is not
the whole story. It is a fact, too, that Allied
officials responsible for the carrying out
of this policy, sabotaged it. This is one
of the major Undings of the Ferguson
Committee appointed by former Secre-
tary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, to
investigate the Situation in the early part
of 1949. The Committee took tcstimony
from the leading American oĂźicials as-
sociated with the decartelization and de-
concentration program. On the basis of
this testimony, the Ferguson Committee
reported that a perfectly practical pro-
gram for the elimination of the trusts
and cartels was emasculated and under-
mined by a clique of American officials
operating under General Clay.
These officials admitted that they were
unsympathetic with the policy which they
were pledged and obliged to carry out.
It was the program of the President of
the United States who had received his
mandate from the American people. Yet,
these officials, on their own authority,
succeeded in blocking the implementa-
tion of this program. They put forth the
view that the rehabilitation of Germany's
economic power was the sine qua non
for the economic welfare of Europe. Hav-
ing set up this specious proposition, they
feit themselves justified in crippling the
deconcentration and decartelization pro-
grams alleging that this was the only
way to preserve Germany's industrial
power. This stereotype rationale for de-
fending their Sabotage of the U. S. Gov-
ernment's policy was thoroughly refuted
by the Ferguson Committee's report.
The Ferguson Committee noted that
officials were trying to seil the idea that
the German economy could not be fully
productive unless it is one that is based
on excessive concentrations of industry.
In answer to this allegation the report
stated: "The experience in the United
States is just to the contrary. Nor is there
any justification for saying that Germany
could not afford the waste of competi-
tion that a rieh country like the U.S. can
afford. In those instances, since the oc-
cupation of Germany, in which there has
been deconcentration, namely, I.G. Far-
ben, the Banks and the Ruhr, there is
evidence that, rather than interfere with
German production or the recovery of
Germany, such deconcentration has in-
creased production and strengthened the
Germany economy.
"General Clay told your Committee
that the Operation of the I.G. Farben
plants as separate individual units re-
sulted in a vigorous come-back spurred
by competition and that some of the units
were producing in greater volume than
ever in their history in spite of the many
handicaps facing German recovery.
"The decentralization of the German
banks has, according to General Clay and
his Finance Adviser, aided in the eco-
nomic recovery of Germany."
The basic criticisms of the Ferguson
Committee report were never refuted nor
was remedial action taken. On the con-
trary, the report was filed away to gather
dust while Allied officials continued to
wink at the German cartelists.
In the Summer issue 1953 of Prevent
World War III we published an article
entitled "The Cartel Comeback — A U.S.
Failure." The article contained the latest
Information up to that time with respect
to the Status of the Allied anti-cartel pro-
gram. Detailed facts were presented show-
ing that the Situation had not improved
since the criticisms of the Ferguson Com-
mittee, but had worsened. We concluded
our analysis in these words: "It is clear
that when the Allies defaulted on their
own obligations to deconcentrate and de-
cartelize German industry, it became pos-
sible for the Germans to fully exploit
this failure by devising plans that not
only helped to 'reform' the trusts and
cartels but to give them respectability un-
der German law. ..."
As if to Support our charges, the New
York Times of November 8, 1953, quoted
Professor H. Schwenk, Chairman of the
Association of German Iron and Steel
Mills, to the effect that the U.S. Govern-
ment, through one of its agencies, was
working on plans for the restoration of '
the Ruhr iron and steel combines. . . ."
Several days following Herr Schwenk's
sensational disclosure, U.S. officials issued
a denial intimating that Schwenk's allega-
tions might be a refiection of the "wish-
ful thinking" of the Ruhr industrialists.
Was it only wishful thinking? Is it not
true that ten days following this denial,
the Allied authorities consented to main-
tain intact the steel trading combine of
the former Vereinigte Stahlwerke al-
though it was to be "broken up by Al-
lied anti-cartel legislation".^ (New York
Times 11-22-53) Some may regard this
as an exceptional case. In order to dispel
such illusions we shall cite the most up-
to-date information on the cartel prob-
lem derived from reliable sources, and iet
the reader judge for himself:
(1) On November 17, 1953, the Eng-
lish publication The Manchester Guard-
ian carried a report from its correspond-
ent in Germany under the caption "Re-
forming Industrial Trusts in West
Germany." The Guardian correspondent
described what he called "the growing
campaign to recreate the old German in-
dustrial trusts. . . ." In this connection
he noted that the tendency in the Federal
Republic was toward "the reversal of all
Allied legislation" prohibiting the car-
tels and trusts. He reported the view of
an American spokesman that the occupy-
ing power "cannot stop such regrouping."
(2) The December 10, 1953, issue of
the Manchester Guardian carried a more
detailed article on this problem by the
well known expert on Germany, Terence
Prittie, which was entitled "The Cartels
Return in Western Germany." Among
the facts cited by Mr. Prittie was that
"the big German banks have already be-
gun to frame a common policy which
expresses itself in identical reports." He
might have added that the very same per-
sons who were responsible for the loot-
ing perpetuated by the big three German
banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank,
Commerz Bank) were once again in the
same positions of power. Mr. Prittie's
conclusion is significant: "The Germans,
it is sure, want a discipiined and co-
hesive economy. They believe that cartels
will play their own part in that and that
Allied action in destroying the trusts was
no more 'final' than that of the child
who knocks down his bricks — only to
build them up again tomorrow."
(3) A report to the Christian Science
Monitor (12-31-53) noted that British
and American officials in contrast to the
French, were inclined to compromise rela-
tive to cartel and anti-trust legislation.
(4) The New Republic (1-11-54) dis-
closed that the German businessman was
"reconstructing his prewar cartel System
and, in the name of free enterprise, de-
manding that the Bonn Government band
over vast state-owned industries built up
over the decades." The New Republic
report confirmed the reports mentioned
above with regard to the resurgence of
the three major banks which had domi-
nated Hitler's Germany. It further men-
tioned that "the Ruhr and steel magnates
dream of transforming the Organization
(the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity) into the logical continuation of the
International Steel Cartel of 1926. " In
this connection it should be noted that
as early as September 21, 1953 the au-
thoritative financial weekly Barron's de-
clared, "The Coal-Steel Community now
functions as a massive steel and coal
cartel."
The tendency of the European Coal
and Steel Community to adopt cartel prac-
tices was noted by a number of countries
at the recent Conference of the "Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT)" at Geneva (New York Her-
ald TribĂĽne 11-12-54). (The record
shows that the old iron and steel cartel
was dominated by the Germans and
served as an effective instrument for the
building up of Germany's war poten-
tial.) The New Republic report also re-
ferred to the appearance of the "old
". . . To the Adenauer clique things looked
darkest, of course, when E.D.C. died. Once it
appeared there were to be no new German
divisions, the Krupps and Kesselrings declared
that all possibility of a Franco-German under-
standing was at an end. The scapegoat? The
French Premier, naturally. *Mendes-France must
go/ Said Adenauer, as if he were a French
Opposition deputy. In an interview with the
London Times he even threatened to fling the
Bonn republic into the arms of the Russians.
"But after the stormy summer came the sunny
autumn. Not the Mar^.jns but the Archangel
Michael, in the person of John Foster Dulles,
descended on London, Bonn, and Paris. E.D.C.
is dead, long live E.D.C! prociaimed the Lon-
don Conference. Amen! said the statesmen at
Paris. . . . The German industrialists and gen-
erals are smiling ... the twelve divisions and
prosperity are around the corner. The Bonn
government is already distributing arms con-
tracts, and German industrial Stocks are sky-
rocketing. . . ."
(Carolus, The Nation, 11-6-54)
« * ♦
"Meanwhile, what the American public
doesn't realize is that German businessmen are
descending on Latin America in increasing num-
bers, offering long-term credit and cheap prices.
Thus, while the USA spends money building
up Germany, Germany is indirectiy using that
money to unbuild American trade in Latin
America.*'
(Drew Pearson, 11-30-54)
pgr ^ -'^^^j^^fs^^i^'^ M
VJO'UL
Now fhaf we can agatn produce our best arguments,
weVe at last regained the freedom of speech/"
28
29
poNNcrful trade associations" and obscrved
that thc futLire airplanc industry in Gcr-
many was rapidly falling into thc clutchcs
of a tightly knit group.
(^) Business Wcek (3-13-^-t) ran a
fĂĽll Itngth artide entitied "German Car-
tels Try for a Comeback." "It is the vieti
of sofne AiHericau observers in Gertnany,"
Business Wcek reported, "that hy ou:
nieaus or another niost Gernian inät/stry
will emerge in a cartilized form u'ithin
u few yedfs M most." This magazine
summed up the effectiveness of Allied
anti-cartel Icgislation in the words of a
busincssnian: "Why do we med cartels
legcilized uhefi all we need is a tele p hone
to make oiir arrangements?"
(6) During March 1954 thc New
Vork Times carried scvcral reports from
Germany indicating that there was a
bright future for thc return of the Ger-
man trusts and cartels. One dispatch
(3-23-54) 4U0tcd the President of thc
German Fcdcration of Industry Fritz
Berg to the effect that thc U. S. could
never bring about the economic integra-
tion of Europe without industrial cartels.
(7) The Wall Street Journal (7-16-54)
carried a dctailed dispatch from Germany
entitlcd "Farben's Return." This refers,
of course, to the re-emergence of Ger-
many's chcmical trust. I.G. Farben which
was probably thc most important eco-
nomic prop for the Nazi regime. Here
is the way thc Wall Street Journal de-
scribes the return of Farben: "A ghosl
is stdlking thron gh sonie of Antericas big
\oreign cheniical markcts these days. Its
name is LG. Farben/' Thc Wall Street
Journals report notes that under Allied
Orders Farben has been built up into threc
individual firms which must remain in
that State until 1956 but also reports that
pressures are growing and the Farben
crowd is becoming "impatient." Whether
they will wait for 1956 is an open cjues-
tion. Indced, many of the prcliminaries
for the merging of the so-called inde-
pendent companies have been accom-
plished. By the time 1956 rolls around,
whatever needs to be done in that direc-
tion will be anti-climax. Thus, the New
York Times (7-26-54) states: "Decar
telizution restrictions iniposed by the AI-
lies expire in 1956. hnniediately after-
wards a new LG. Farben is expected to
enierge. . . ."
(8) The Manchester Guardian (8-26-
54 ) rcturned to the question of cartels in
Western Germany. Here is the way the
Guardian^ correspondent begins his re-
port: "The Allied High Covmiission is
unlikely to ofjer any objection to the re-
grouping of the German steel industry
which is reported to be fully u)ider way.
This regrouping ivill res/dt in an exact
rcversal of Allied policy in the Federal
Republic. which was based on the inten-
tion to break up ' undue concentration of
economic power'/' Interlocking director-
ites have become a common practice among
the major Ruhr steel concerns. Vertical
trusts are once again developing. Mer-
gers are reoccurring in such a way that
''the process of reconcentration may leave
few er than a dozen firms in a dominant
Position in the German steel industry." In
other words, thc reconcentration of heavy
industry is developing with such intensity
that by 1956 the world will probably
witness a cartelized, trustiticd Germany
on a Scale which could very well make
the monopolies of thc Hitler era seem
puny.
(9) The Wall Street Journal (10-5-
54) published an articlc from Bonn
which reported that, when West Ger-
many is granted fĂĽll sovercignty, "o)ie of
the casualties will be the American de-
cartelization Crusade." It noted that the
so-called Crusade "has beefi going badly
ahnost since it formal ly began. . , ." The
Wall Street correspondent predicts that
the retreat may well become a rout by
the time the Germans obtain their sov-
ercignty. He further states that the Ger-
mans "do not believe free competition
would work for Germany. , . !'
(10) The New York Herald TribĂĽne
(10-21-54) carried an articlc by its Bonn
correspondent revealing that the German
cartels have succeeded in perverting the
objectives of Allied anti-cartel legisla-
tion. For all practical purposes Germany's
industrial war lords will have a clear
field ahead because the Bonn Govern-
ment is cooperating. "The industrialists
of West Germany who backed Chancel-
lor Konrad Adenauer in the national elec-
tions a year ago. exercise a strong influ-
ence. . . ."
(11) A dispatch to thc New York
Herald TribĂĽne (10-31-54) announces
that West Germany's bankers "are ex-
pected to revive the big three banks of
prewar Germany" after thc Paris accords
are ratified. The TribĂĽne correspondent
writes that the German financial world
wclcomed thc deliberate dclction trom thc
new agreements of an earlier Allied-
German provision calling for the con-
tinued deconcentration of the German
banking System. "The nation's financial
press is already discussing the problem of
when and ivhere — not whether — the
great banking institutions of the past will
be re stör ed." How quickly it is forgotten
that the big three banks had originally
been split up precisely because they werc
the backbone of Hitler's aggressions rc-
sulting in thc ruthless looting of Ger-
man occupied Europe.
i(. ifi if.
Does this brief chronology of the Status
of the German trusts and cartels give
cause for optimism.'' Can we truthfully
talk as though they have not emerged as
yet.** What does this all mcan to the aver-
agc person, be he an American or a
European? They have heard of or ex-
perienced thc unspeakable crimes per-
petuated by thc Nazis. But do most of
them know that without the decisive help
of I.G. Farben, Krupp, Mannesmann, thc
big three banks, etc., there would have
been no concentration camps, no gas Cham-
bers and no World War II .> That is why
the subject of cartels and trusts is not
merely the concern of the historian or thc
economist. It is a matter of life and death
to every person who cherishes libcrty and
peace.
In 1945 the U.S. adopted a program
which had as one of its primary objec-
tives thc smashing of German cartels and
trusts "to prevent Germany from endan-
gering the safety of her neighbors and
again constituting a thrcat to international
peace" and to "destroy Germany's eco-
nomic potential to wage war. " The U.S.
program was prepared on the basis of
carcful investigations by hundreds of spe-
cialists who uncovered the influence of
these forces of war and economic ag-
gression. U.S. investigators had learned
that only a few years after the end of
World War I, Germany's industrial war
lords, yes, even under thc much adver-
tised democratic Weimar Republic, had
begun to seize the military power of
Europe. Coloncl William Taylor, thc
Paris agent for Dupont, wrote his Com-
pany in 1924: "Thc European monopoly
in military material (is) passing slowly
into German hands."
It is a fact that from the very lirst day
of peace after World War I to the mo-
mcnt of Hitler's accession to power, Ger-
many was being carcfuUy prepared for
World War II through the unmatchcd
resources and planning of a comparatively
small group of trusts, monopolies and
cartels with their principal location in thc
Ruhr. Their sinister activities had a defi-
nite impact on American security. Thc
U.S. Government agency, The Office of
Facts and Figurcs, in its first "Report to
the Nation," issued January 14, 1942,
stated: "{The enemy) has worked for
many years to weaken our military poten-
tial. Through patent controls and cartel
agreements he succeeded in liviitmg
American production and export of many
vital materials. He kept the prices of these
materials up and the output down. He
was wagin g war, and he did his icork
well, decoying important American com-
panies into agreements, the purpose of
which they did not sense. Our business-
men were peaceful traders. The enemy' s
husinessmen luere and are all over the
world agents of aggression.
"The list of materials afjected is long
— beryllium. optical Instruments, mag-
nesium, tungsten carbide, pharmaceuticals.
hormones, dyes. and many more. Whs:n
you match each product with its military
use. the significance of the attack becomes
clear. Beryllium is a vital element for
alloys that make shell Springs; magnesium
makes airplanes and incendiary bombs:
tungsten carbide is essential for precision
machine tools.
"Concealtd behind dumm) iorpora-
tions, the enemy went unchecked fo)
years, using our own legal machinery to
harn st ring us."
To be sure, thc Germans lost World
War II. But how mcaningful is that dc-
feat when the very instruments of her
aggression are preserved?
•
The dispatches were filed by different men in different
cities, writing at approximately the same moment:
BERLIN, Nov. 25 — Berlin's Jewish communal organiza-
tions and several other groups protested today against an
alleged revival of anti-Scmitism and ultranationalism at a
rally of the German party . . .
Several students were attacked and beatcn by thc crowd,
apparently when they failed to stand for the singing of
'Deutschland Ueber Alles." The foreign reporters were
abused and menaced when they did not sing . . .
Booted orderlies quickly movcd in on anyone who did not
sing. Two students, reportedly mistaken for Jews, were set
upon . . . At the meeting the loudest applause was for rep-
resentatives of an Organization of former members of thc
Waffen SS, the branch of Hitler's elite guard in the Army.—
From a dispatch by Walter Sullivan to The Times.
BONN, Nov. 25 — Two of the four government coalition
parties asked today for a gcneral amnesty for all German war
criminals before the Paris agreements are ratified . . . On the
basis of the record in parliament, even the Social Democratic
party is expected to support, at least partly, the two right-
wing parties' motion. Little doubt is feit that a large propor-
tion and possibly a majority of thc German people and mem-
bers of the Bundestag do not accept the doctrine of German
war guilt. — From a dispatch by Albion Ross to The Times.
Mf Hn HĂĽ
Thus the sickening echoes multiply as West Germany pre-
pares to be afifectionately wclcomed into the free Community.
Yet there is still no sign that the U.S. Congress will
seriously dcbatc our German policy. Many months ago it
becamc an axiom of American political life that the Germans
were the guardians of Western civilization, and that there
could be no serious argument on the point.
Nevertheless it becomes clearcr each day that something
has gone disastrously wrong with post-war Germany. Thc
Communists offer each cpisode as proof that "Western im-
perialism " is Sponsoring a revival of Nazism; in reality, of
course, the re-emergence of fallen Nazi hcrocs was othcialU
sponsored in Communist-ruled East Germany long before
manifestations of intolerancc became acute in the Western
zonc. There is little comfort for free men, however, in thc
rcmindcr that things are grim all over.
What is essentially being demonstratcd is thc failurc of
the Occupation. In the Eastern zone the totalitarians changed
brown shirts to red; but it was in the West that thc victorious
battle for democracy was presumably to bc waged. What
happened to the forces of freedom.'*
Possibly the simplest answer is that the cmphasis on Ger-
man rearmament — rather than on German re-education — be-
came the keynote of allied efforts long before the Germans
had absorbed any lessons.
There was a steady disintegration, too, in the calibre of
Occupation personnel, partly because of the irrational severi-
tics of the security program. Imaginative men who saw^ Ger-
many as a challenge to creative democratic planning were
replaced by brass-hats who saw Germany as a new military
bastion, and who could not teil a democrat from a storm
trooper.
No doubt there have been other factors: Germany is not a
simple Story, and there have been affirmative momcnts. In
the Eastern zone German workers staged their memorablc
uprising against despotism not long ago. In the West there
are decent men like Berlin's Mayor Schreiber who have
spoken out eloquently against the newest outrages. and thc
Bundestag itself has condemned the incidents.
But democracy in Germany remains on the defensive, los-
ing rather than gaining ground. As this is written ncithcr
President Eisenhower nor any other Western leader has taken
note of the latest demonstrations; Prime Minister Churchill
is busy trying to explain why he contcmplatcd arming cap-
tured Nazis in the closing days of World War II.
How much more must happen before free men rccognizc
and challenge the ominous Symptoms?
{Editorial, N. Y. Post)
30
31
Jhi ''d^ni^inq ^fistap^^
Last year Secretary Dulles warned oiir Western Allies that
unless Germany was returned to a Status of power and influ-
ence, the United States would undertake an "agonizing reap-
praisal" of its foreign policy. Offhand, it would seem that the
rccent Paris agreement restoring the sovereignty and military
might of Germany, would obviate such "drastic" action. Yet,
we had a hunch that the so-called reappraisal project is pro-
ceeding fĂĽll steam ahead. This is not to say that we can expect
a radical change in the direction and content of American
pohcy in Europe. On the contrary, we have the feehng that
the "new look" will turn out to be a more intensive pre-
occupation with the development of ways and means which
would enable Germany to dominate Europe.
Unveiliiig the Blueprints
An important clue, indicating where this "reappraisal"
is leading us, has been provided by an expert on Germany,
Professor James K. Pollock of the University of Michigan.
Prof. Pollock unveiled the blue prints in an address before
the Residential Seminar On World Politics at Bryn Mawr
(September 1954). In a sense it was most appropriate that
Prof. Pollock should choose the Bryn Mawr Conference to
expound the latest thinking on the German problem. After
all, the Conference was attended by influential educators from
all parts of the country and their favorable response to Prof.
Pollock's propositions could help condition American public
opinion.
Professor Pollock began his address with a moderate declara-
tion that his proposals were made on his own responsibility
"as a working scholar without the least official connection or
bcncdiction, and only with the hope that what I say will be
hclpful and at least stimulating." That Prof. Pollock should
make this dctour before going to the heart of his subject is
in itself a cause for suspicion. In any event, the humbleness
of his words need to be weighed in the light of the fact that
during the formative years of the American occupation of
Germany he was considered "the No. 2 political adviser in
the American Military Government of Germany" (AP, March
31, 1946). Any history of the development of U.S. policy
in Germany since the end of the war would be inadequate
if it did not take into consideration the great influence exer-
cised by Prof. Pollock in Military Government affairs. Indeed,
despite Prof. Pollock's self-effacing gesture, his address must
be regarded as one of the most significant pronouncements
with respect to the future course of American policy in Ger-
many.
Geriiiaiiy's Destiny ^
Professor Pollock's talk revolved around several main topics.
In the first part of his address he bemoans the fact that for
almost 10 years after the surrender of Germany "we are still
fumbling and talking about the German problem . . ." In this
connection he denounces "the mistakes of the past decade in
trying to work with what we thought were our friends. . . ."
Among cur false friends the French are especially con-
demned by Prof. Pollock.
Throughout the rest of his address the anti-French attitude
of Prof. Pollock is as obvious as is his pro-German bias. Since
the French cannot be trusted, according to the Professor, it is
necessary that all of our plans be based on the leadership of
Germany in Europe. This is what Prof. Pollock means when
he proposes that "we should strike out boldly and originally
along completely new lines in the development of a sound
and realistic policy toward Germany." Hitherto U.S. policy
has been ineffective because, in the words of our expert on
Germany, the U.S. has failed "to give sufficient weight to the
potentialities and dynamic power of Germany, as we are now
failing to utilize that other dynamic power in the Far Fast —
Japan." The United States must now make good its dismal
faiures. Let no one dare to stay in the way, the Professor
thunders, "the dead feet or hands or maybe souI of France
can no longer control the direction of our policy toward Ger-
many, nor should any other similar force in any other country
be permitted to prevent the formulation of a new American
policy toward Germany."
What Professor Pollock is suggesting is simply this: that
the country which brought untold ruin and misery to a world
in two wars, which desecrated every human value, which
made Europe into a vast cemetery — that nation must now be
placed on the pedestal of power. As for the rest of the world
— ^who cares!
After sounding off on behalf of Germany the Professor
turns to the business at hand. The first step in implementing
the "new" policy must be the remilitarization of Germany
togethet with the granting of fĂĽll sovereignty. These steps
are the least that can be taken at once in view of the fact
that Western Germany is "the only pro-American government
in Europe." As a follow-up the Professor demands that Ger-
many be admitted to NATO as a fĂĽll fledged member. If
the French or any other country expresses Opposition they
will, in due time, be forced to recognize "the position and
power of West Germany." (At this writing it appears that
the above mentioned demands of Prof. Pollock will be car-
ried out following the Paris agreements.) Once Germany
is able to regain her power and influence "to which it is
entitled," the United States must develop a vigorous support
for a United Europe under German leadership." Here Prof.
Pollock approaches the core of his plan.
Negotiations With Moscow
The concept of a United Europe under the domination of
Germany is linked up with Prof. Pollock's idea regarding
Russo-German relations. The Professor demands that the U.S.
underwrite "realistic German proposals for negotiations" with
the Kremlin. To make sure that this proposition is not mis-
understood, Prof. Pollock emphasizes that in all such moves
"the Germans should be given the initiative with the Rus-
sians" and the U.S. "should be content to advise and warn."
Amplifying this concept, Prof. Pollock avers, "there is no
sense in reconstituting a German force and initiative if we
do not intend to use it in the direction of an improvcment
i
•
in our relations with the Soviet Union." Therefore, the Ger-
mans must be given the go ahead signal to do business with
the Russians and "the bĂĽrden of planning and action should
rest with them." (Professor Pollock would have us believe
that the Germans are going to wait until we say, "go.")
Professor Pollock's views concerning Russo-German nego-
tiations are not without precedent. As a matter of fact, im-
portant sections of the German press have been spouting this
line for several years and many of Germany's leading poli-
ticians including Chancellor Adenauer have also dwelt on the
Coming of a Russo-German rapprochement. Thus, the second
part of Professor Pollock's address boils down to a plea for
a meeting of the minds between the Russians and the Ger-
mans.
The Pan-German Dreaiti
A Russo-German undefstanding, as advocated by Prof.
Pollock, would be a major prerequisite for the establishment
of Germany's paramountcy over Europe. He estimates that
"German power could conservatively be calculated to increase
steadily over the next 25 years." Under these circumstances
it will be necessary to encourage and develop Germany's tal-
ents and influence in "legitimate areas and activities." Ergo,
"Central and Eastern Europe is a natural area in which Ger-
man abilities may be utilized. . . ." Toward realizing this
grandiose objective Prof. Pollock proposes that the Germans
be given "the idea of a Central and Eastern European Treaty
Organization similar to NATO. . . ." The construction of
such a block of nations would "then provide a proper outlet
for German energy and ability."
". . . under the London Treaty, the Germans
will become the arbiters of Europe's destiny.
Once the Federal Republic is a sovereign State,
it can Veto any negotiations with the Russians
and with the Americans, continue to organize
the cadres for armed insurrection in the Eastern
Zone. Alternatively, it can use its sovereign
powers to come to an agreement with the Rus-
sians; and, In that case any agreements
reached with the West are no longer binding.
"We are well aware that even to express
such doubts about the London Conference will
be regarded in certain quarters as akin to trea-
son. The Western alliance, we are being told,
has been saved by British statesmanship, and
we should all be ready to pay the very high
price required in order to achieve that end. We
would not grudge any price if the result were
the creation of conditions for peacefui co-exist-
ence in Europe. Indeed, if similar guarantees
had been offered to France at any time before
1950, we should have welcomed the initiative.
What is ironical is that they are now being of-
fered not in order to counteract the German
menace but as a means of persuading France
to connive at Its revival."
(The New Statesman and Nation, Great Britain, 10-9-54)
Professor Pollock does not advocate anything which is
startling original. It is a matter of record that this program
has been at the heart of the Pan-German idea of a Greater
Reich. As early as 1810 Adam H. Müller in his "lieber König
Friedrich IT" declared, *'the great jederation of European
peoples IV h ich will come some day as sure as tve live, will also
bear German hues, for everything great, fundamental, and
eternal in all European institutions is certainly German."
MĂĽller's theme "engaged nearly every German writer and
thinker of prominence throughout the 19th Century — Fried-
rich List, Wagner, Nietzche, Treitschke, Ranke." One of the
most articulate proponents of a Pan-German Europe in recent
times was Friedrich Naumann who, incidentally, is considered
to be the intimate collaborator and teacher of the President of
the Bonn Republic Theodor Heuss. In his book "Middle
Europe," published in 1916, Naumann called for the Organ-
ization of a European power bloc dominated by Germany.
This bloc, as envisaged by Naumann, would comprise the old
Austria-Hungary, Turkey, the Balkans, and would Stretch
from the Baltic deep into Asia Minor. "The population,"
wrote Naumann, "of the German Empire and of Austria-
Hungary together amounts to about 116 million. Then there
is the German colonial population of pcrhaps 14 million. If
we count in with these 25 million of Asiatic Turks and about
20 million of other Europeans, with perhaps 25 million of
other non-Europeans, the population of the Middle-European
economic world group would be roughly reckoned at about
200 million."
In this world group Naumann wanted to have included
DON'T REACH TOO HIGH
{Courtesy, N. Y. Journal American)
32
33
some countries of Western Europe. He stated: "Wc shall not
say very mmli of thc Northern (Scandinavian) powers, the
Rumanian.s, Bul^arians, Serbians and Greeks, and also of
Holland and Switzcrland, for it would be a mistake to inciudc
thcsc smallcr statcs in our scheme from the outset as fixcd
c]iiantities, whilst actually thcy still have a breathing Space
before makin^ a decision."
The "breathin^f Space" was the First World War, whose
outcomc at the time Naumann published his scheme was still
undecided. Professor Pollock 's rhapsodic visions of a German
dominated Europe are merely a more up-to-date expression of
thc a^c-old Pan-German dream.
After outlining the central idea of his program, Prof.
Pollock concluded that if Germany's Europe is properly er-
ganized and encouraged "it can become next to the United
States a great constructive force for economic well-being and
freedom and peace in the world." Of course, Prof. Pollock
i. not insensitive to thc fact that the satellite countries in
Eastern Europe might not relish the idea of jumping from the
frying pan into the tire. However, he quickly dispels these
tcars by trying to assure his listeners that the Germans have
le..rned 'vvhat bitter mistakes they have made . . ."
Presumably, by "mistakes" the Professor refers to such
cpi ödes as the wholesale slaughter of peoples and thc ruthless
devastation of an entirc continent. Prof. Pollock appears to
bc confident that these "mistakes" will not be committed
again and that the peoples of Europe are just about ready to
grasp the blood stained hands of their tormentors. In any
cvent, he insists that "only Germany" can "rescue" Central
and Eastern Europe from Soviet domination. Ironically, Prof.
Pollock Claims that thc foregoing recommendations will go a
long way toward cu rbing the voracious appetite of German
nationalism!
The Professors Coiisistancy
Professor Pollock's singular devotion to Deutschtum is not
of recent vintage. Even before the end of World War II he
expressed views which neatly fit in with his latest plan.
Speaking at Carlton College in Minnesota on Fcbruary 14,
1944, the Professor said, "Personälly. I feel that we should
he ni no Lu/rry to deniohilize the German army. In fact, it
ivould he vmch uiser to continue to utilize th'is well-organhed
jorc:' for cii'ilian pitrposes . . . German armed jorces are
needed to assist in the rehahilitation of Europe . , ." He went
on to express his conviction that "it would be folly to attempt
a reshuffling of European industry solely in the interests of
prcventing the future possibility of German rearmament,"
adding that "such a move would bc caiculated to di:rupt the
whole European economy, not to mention the untold and
unnecessary suffering it would inflict upon millions of
Germans."
Elaborating on "Germany's importance" to Europe, he
stated that "a very brief consideration of Germany's capacitics
and resources and the nature of her popuIation and her posi-
tion in Europe should be sufficient to reject any plan which
looks towards the destruction of German industry." The
Professor then stated that Germany was a tirst class industrial
country possessing "a productive capacity which will be badly
needed in thc reconstruction of Europe." All this was said
while our GIs were struggling against the Nazi Wehrmacht
whose murderous power had been nourished by Germany's
"productive capacity."
Domination via Riisso-German Deal
And what about Professor Pollock's expert views on the
meaning of Hiderism? In Octobcr 1930, Prof. Pollock de-
livered an address before the American Association of Uni-
versity Women at the University of Michigan. His talk was
based on a recent trip to Germany. The Michigan Daily, the
University newspapcr, rcported his Speech in its issue of Oc-
tobcr 13, 1930: "Pollock concluded hy pointin g out that
Hitler' s party evihraces a doctrine of sympathy for the Prole-
tariat as well as the nationalistic atlitude for which it i.\
famou^: and that. if it came to power it would, in all proha-
hility, not resort to the strong-arm measures feared in some
quarters''
Only ten years ago our country together with its allies were
fighting desperately to turn back the Nazi tide which hoped
to conquer Europe in its bid for world domination. The Nazi
armies marched under thc banner of a "United Europe," but
they suffered ignominious defeat thanks to the courage and
determination of freedom loving peoples. The plan outlined
by Prof. Pollock would realize the Pan-German dream of a
United Europe as an appendage to the German eagle, blessed
and financed by the United States and achieved via a Russo-
German understanding.
QismA, Ăź(^ OnJtĂźAĂĽ&L
". . . Germans who command respect here at
home, such as former Chancellor Heinrich BrĂĽ-
ning, are beginning to criticize the Adenauer
government for its dose link with the United
States. They imply that the Federai Republic is
today in a Position to strike a bargain between
East and West. After all, they say, America
needs us and teils us so every day of the year.
Why should Germany not begin to take an in-
dependent position determined by its own
strength, its own needs and desires?
"Even American High Commissioner James B.
Conant, who has so earnestly adhered to the
policy of everything for Cooperation with Ger-
many, is said to have been afflicted of täte by
doubts. One hears in Bonn of a dispatch he
sent to the State Department two months ago
which he began by saying, 'I may seem to have
changed my mind, but . . .' He is reported to
have expressed reservations about the reliobil-
ity of Germany as a Western ally once the
process of rearmament with military equip-
ment supplied by America is completed. Co-
nant, it is hardly necessary to add, admits to
no such doubts. . . ."
(Marquis Childs, Washington Post and Times Herald, 7-6-54)
* n^ ^^
*'. . . Most Americans don't know whether
arming West Germany is wise. We are putting
guns into the hands of a nation with a bent
toward militarism — a country that caused two
world wars, a country that today crackles with
industrial vitality and that may again be tempt-
ed by rabid nationalism. . . .*'
(The New Republic, 11-1-54)
DEUTSCHLAND UEBER AFRICA
"An article published in ^Information says cm Or-
ganization known as the Tund in Support of Gennan
Interests in Africa' has been set up with five immediate
aims:
"1. Financing Operations of German corporations
and individuals in the African trade.
"2. The Organization of trips by the funds repre-
sentatives to Africa and the recruitment of local rep-
resentatives in Africa itself.
"3. The re-establishment of the 'Reichs-Kolonial-
schule' and other institutions which f ormerly interested
themselves in Germany's colonial Claims.
"4. Financial support of the *Germcm Overseas Serv-
ice' (Deutscher Ueberseedienst) which was created by
the federai Germcm govemment in 1952.
"5. The financing of a pro-German Propaganda pro-
gram in Africa."
(Wm. H. Stoneman, St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 8-17-54)
•
INSUFHCIENT EVIDENCE 1
"An attack on French Premier Pierre Mendes-France
as a lew was made today by Major H. Krueger, chair-
man of the neo-Nazi German Reich Party for the state
of North Rhine-Westphalia.
"Addressing a meeting at nearby Duisberg on the
question of a United States of Europe, Maj. Krueger
told his brownshirted audience that we do not want
to be ruled by the lew Mendes-France.' The audience
consisted of members of the 'Reich Youth' group,
whose brown shirts are adorned with belts, straps and
scarves like those of the Hitler Youth formations.
"The Borm Govemment recently dropped efforls to
ban the German Reich Party alleging there was insuf-
ficient evidence of the anti-democratic character of the
party 's members.
(L T. A., 11-2-54)
*
THE NEW ARRIVALS
"German technicicms are arriving here to take up
longterm engineering and contracting Jobs with the
Saudi Arabian Govemment.
"The Germans now rank in numbers second only to
the American oil colony members. The Germans began
to come here earher this year when two West German
compcmies got the biggest Govemment engineering
and contracting concession in the country.
"The German technicians include a number of men
who have adopted the Moslem reUgion and changed
their names. Europeans in touch with the group say
that some of these technicians are former Nazi officers
who were converted to Islam by Haj Amin al Hussein,
the former Mufti of lerusalem, on his visit to Germany
during the war."
(Reuters Dispatch, 7-10-54)
UBIQUITOUS KRUPP
"The Krupp interests of Essen, former leading Ger-
man armaments-makers, were learned to be exten-
sively investigating the possibilities of participation in
the expandlng economy of Conada.
"This is one of the latest developments in the remark-
able postwar rehahilitation of the Krupp concem,
which is operating on an international scale that has
placed it again among the world's leading industrial
organizations. ...
"Despite the Krupp family's extended difficuUies with
the Westem Allies in the first years after World War II,
their family wealth is still estimated at upwards of 90
million doUars. . . .
"This summer, a sign of further interest in Canada
came with the disclosure that a Krupp geologist was
examining the possibility of applying the Krupp-Renn
process in the treatment of low-grade iron ore in the
Ungava Bay region of the Labrador Peninsula in North-
ern Quebec.
"The geologist, Dr. Edwin Krzywicki, visited the
westem side of the bay to examine the huge iron ore
Claims of the Cyrus Eaton interests. . . .
"Alfred Krupp has been in the news in another con-
nection this week, as a result of his visit a few days
ago to Stockholm, where he was a guest of the Swedish
industrialist, Axel Wenner-Gren "
(Gaston Coblentz, The Washington Post, 10-27-54)
HERE WE GO AGAIN
"The German Domier Aircraft Manufacturing Com-
pany has side-stepped Allied curbs on aviation aclivi-
ties in Germany by setting up a subsidiary crmpany in
Spciin and building its first post-v/ar aircraft there. . . .
"The aulhoritativo British aviation annual (Jane's All
the V/orld's Aircraft) recalled that after World War I
the Dornier Company estabhshed a branch at Lake
Constance in Switzerland to avoid controls then exist-
ing over German aviation progress. In World War II
Dornier supplied fleets of combat planes for the Luft-
waffe. . . ."
(New York Times, 12-9-54)
HOW UN APPRECIATIVE 1
"Dr. Werner Naumann, former State Secretary in the
Nazi Propaganda Ministry, will claim damages from
the West German Supreme Court for the time he was
held under arrest on suspicion of plotting a Nazi Come-
back.
"The courl announced yesterday that it would drop
charges of subversive activity against Dr. I aumann
for lack of evidence. ..."
(Reuters, 12-4-54)
34
i
35
JAPANESE "BOY SCOUTS"
"A growing band of blue-shirted, black-booted
young Japcmese aim at the resettlement of Japon's mil-
lions throughout Asia and the Pacific as the Solution
to Japan's pressing population problem.
"*But do not think that we are aggressors/ said
Takashige Toyota. 27-year-old leader of the *Martyr
Youth Corps.'
" There are many areas in Asia and even America
in need of development.
" The Japanese people can help the people in these
areas to develop them. Our aim is the establishment
of a series of co-prosperity spheres/
"Toyota's corps is one of the biggest and most active
of more than 100 right-wing groups which the Japa-
nese press has labeled 'more dangerous than the Com-
munist Party.'
"Outlawed by the occupation authorities, right-wing
organizations which flourished in prewar Japan, are
Coming into the open again. Thousands of young, ag-
gressive nationalists are joining their ranks . . .
"Toyota said that the membership of the corps is
260,000. If these figures are accurate the blueshirts are
twice as strong numerically as Japan's army . . ."
(From Reuters, 7-28-54)
•
MISSION TO TOKYO
"Heinrich Georg Stahmer, who came here as Adolf
Hitler's secret envoy in 1940 to conclude the Rome-
Berlin-Tokyo axis pact, has retumed to seek a Japanese
market for Swiss-made guided Missiles and shooting
apparatus."
Stahmer became Nazi Germany's Ambassador to
Japan in 1943. Taken into AUied custody after the
Japanese surrender in 1945, he was held at Sugamo
prison from Jan. 1, 1946, to Feb. 21, 1947, when he was
released and placed under house arrest at Atami.
Later he was repatriated.
(AP Dispatch, 7-16-54)
DEFEATING THE REDS— GERMAN STYLE
"The Red China trade issue, which has caused bitter
American criticism of Great Britain, may also become
a source of friction between the United States and
West Germany . . .
"Until now, the fact that West Germany surpassed
Britain last year in direct exports to Communist China
(although not in shipments through Hong Kong) ap-
pears to have escaped general attention in the United
States . . .
"German industrialists and business men, almost
without exception, in the knowledge of this reporter,
are caustic in their criticism of American-imposed ob-
stacles to the China trade . . .
"The business lobby in West Germany has perfected
its argument to the extent of claiming that the Germans
want to help the world-wide fight against Communism
by building up Peking's industry. The United States, it
is said, is just hampering this laudable objective . . ."
(Gaston Coblentz, New York Herald TribĂĽne, 7-18-54)
RETURNING TO OLD STAMPING GROUNDS
"West Germany today is tuming Indonesia into its
principal base of Operations in Asia. From here, the
Germans seem eager to mount the recapture of their
prewar political and trade position in the Far East.
"Doctors in the interior of Bomeo are almost invari-
ably German, employed by the Indonesian Govern-
ment. In the Celebes and Sumatra, German geologists
and engineers have investigated the exploitation of
manganese ores and coal deposits. In central Java,
an Indo-German group has financed the opening of a
German radio assembly plant. In the waters aroimd
Indonesia, German ships operate on charter for embryo
Indonesian national shipping companies. . . .
"In the period before World War I, when Germany
was among the colonial powers, the Germans held the
eastem half of New Guinea, an area today under
Australian trusteeship. Consequently they are not im-
familiar with the region."
(Arnold C. Brackman, Christian Science Monitor, 8-3-54)
"COMMUNIST CAPITALISTS"
"Germany's top labor leader hinted today that the
Soviet Union might be buying into the coal and steel
industries of the Ruhr. . . .
" *We are told the buyers are Swedish,' Herr Freitag
said, 'but it is to be feared that quite different powers
lurk behind them. Let us hope that they are really
Swedes and not circles coimected with the Soviet
Union.' . . .
". . . no one hitherto has suggested that the Soviet
Union might be using the conventional weapons of the
finance capitalism it despises to acquire influence in
the heartland of German heavy industry. . . .
(New York Times, 10-6-54)
•
GERMAN INGENUITY
"America's war time Secretary of War, Henry L.
Stimson, who participated in the decision to drop the
A-bomb on Hiroshima, wamed in 1947 that *with its
(the A-bomb's) aid even a very powerful and un-
suspecting nation might be conquered within a very
few days by a much smaller one.' . . .
"And while no one expects either Israel or Sweden
even armed with a *super-super' to tackle the great
power Goliath, there is less security about a country
hke Germany.
" *If an ersatz H-bomb costing an insignificant sum
is ever built, the Germans will do it," one UN observer
declared fatalistically. , . ."
(Joseph Lash, N. Y. Post, 11-26-54)
•
ON ACCOUNT
"The Russians seem to mean business with their
campaign for more trade with West Germany. Moscow
has just opened an account (in Sterling) with Dussel-
dorf's Rhein-Ruhr Bank."
(Business Week, 9-25-54)
PERON'S PALS
"Otto Skorzeny, who was one of Adolf Hitler's most
spectacular commando officers, took part in recent
talks at Buenos Aires between Argentine President
Juan D. Peron and representatives of the Krupp inter-
ests of Essen . . .
"The ubiquitous Mr. Skorzeny 's home for the last six
years has been in Spain . . .
"The principal Krupp representative at the talks was
Eckhard von Maltzahn, an envoy of the Essen office.
The conversations are said to have covered a consid-
erable ränge of possible business which Krupp might
undertake in Argentina."
(Gaston Coblentz, N. Y. Herald TribĂĽne, 11-19-54)
•
"SPAIN WAS RIGHT"
" *Espa£ia tenia razon' — Spain was right — is a slogan
much in vogue at the moment. By *Spain' is meant
Franco, for, according to another much-stressed catch-
phrase, *Spain is Franco and Franco is Spain.' And
what people mean when they say that Spain was right
is that Franco was right in overthrowing the Republic
in 1936-39 and right in sending the Spanish Blue Divi-
sion to the Russian front in 1941 to help the Germans.
Conversely, the AUies were wrong, after defeating Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy, to penalize Franco Spain
by imposing an economic and pohtical boycott on the
country. . . .
"As if to prove the point, the Spanish Government on
October 25 presented the Grand Gross of Aeronautical
Merit to Professor Willy Messerschmitt, one of Hitler's
top designers of combat planes and today a resident
of Spain. The ceremony, fuUy reported in the Spanish
press, was the occasion for sentimental references to
Spanish-German coUaboration during the Civil War
and World War ĂĽ. Tour compatriots shed their blood
in the Spain of Franco, and the [Blue Division] volun-
teers of the great general Mufioz Grandes shed theirs
alongside the Germans,' Air Minister General Gonza-
les Gallarza told Messerschmitt as he made the presen-
tation. It was the Messerschmitt fighters, he added, that
bore the brunt of the air struggle *during the difficult
times experienced by the German people.' "
(Richard Mowrer in The New Leader, 11-22-54.)
THE $64 QUESTION
"Herr Theodor Blank, Dr. Adenauer's 'Defence Min-
ister,' this week posted the first of 140,000 application
forms to Germans who have already volunteered for
the new German army.
"He and his advisers have put down 36 questions
which would-be recruits have to answer. This is three
less than the number which millions of Germans had
to answer when the AUies took over after the coUapse
of Hitler.
"But Herr Blank leaves out the big query that
loomed on the form of those days. It was: *Were you a
Nazi Party member?' . . ."
(The Daily Star, 5-1^-54)
FRANCO'S FAST ONES
"Though a year has gone by since the U.S. -Spanish
deal for miUtary bases was signed. Dictator Franco
still lags on his end of the arrangements. In interna-
tional relations, however, he has been trying some fast
plays, at times with assists from that shadowy figure
of World intrigue, former Nazi Otto Skorzeny.
"It became known in July that Franco, while antici-
pating military weapons and equipment from the U. S.,
was selling mortars, shells and machine guns to Egypt.
to the tune of $3,500.000. In Madrid, Skorzeny carries
on unmolested, stirring up trouble for the European
democracies whenever he can. Now it comes to light
that it was he, acting through a dummy outfit in
Switzerland, who arranged the deal to supply Egyp-
tians with weapons described as *ideal for hit-and-run
attacks." Skorzeny's chief fame dates from his daring
exploit of September 12, 1943, when his airbome com-
mandos snatched the captive Mussolini from AUied
custody. . . ."
(Worldover Press, 11-1-54)
EYEING EGYPT
"The aimouncement of the eventual withdrawal of
British troops from Egypt has again revived sentiments
for closer German-Arab relations. As the Empire sun
sets. perhaps the German economic sun may rise. . . .
"No responsible German, however, believes that eco-
nomic measures alone are sufficient. Germany's road
to the Middle East is to be paved by political issues.
This means closer German-Arab Cooperation in inter-
national matters.
"This opinion is also shared by Arab spokesmen. An
official of the Arab League who broadcast a few days
ago over German radio stations insisted that the busi-
nessman is not the best Uaison between Germany and
the Arabs. He demanded that Germany send more
students to the Arab countries to acquaint themselves
more intimately with the pohtical issues of the Middle
East. He added that the peace of the world rests on
German-Arab Cooperation. . . ."
(Martin G. PhUlips, WPS, 8-6-54)
REUNION AT HEIDELBERG
"Fifteen thousand veterans of Germany's World War
n Afrika Korps held a reunion today. They were told a
new German Army must be based on the old military
principle: *bravery tili death.'
"The advice came from former Gen. Ludwig Crue-
weU, who succeeded Marshai Erwin Rommel as Com-
mander of the corps in 1943 . . .
"It is hoped that German soldiers wiU eventuaUy
be able to write Europe next to Germany on their
flags.'
"Taking part in the reunion were Marshai Rommel's
widow and former Field Marshai Albert Kesselring,
sentenced to death for war crimes but later freed."
(Report to The New York Times, 9-13-54)
I
i
•*«*^ -^^_z
36
JhsL Tlßw SsÄmarL QmpsüiJüDdiAm.
by
T. H. TETENS
Almost tii'o years ago, T. H. Tetens presetited in hh book "Germany Plots With The Kreml'in" startling documentation
to Support bis tbesis tbat US. policy in Europe tvas "leading toward a blind alley" and tbat tbe Bonn Republic "was secretly
nianeuvering jor a netv Russo-German collaboration."
In tbe ligbt of recent events Mr. Tetens book bas gained even greater sign/ficance. We have asked tbe atithor to give us bis
analysis of tbe present trend in Bonn's foreign policy.
Germany's struggle for the "Integra-
tion" and final domination of Europe
has not bcen interrupted or in any way
diminished since the French National
Assembly refused to ratify the treaty of
the European Defense Community. This
negative action reflccted the deep rooted
distrust of the French majority towards
a supernational device which doubtlessly
would have furthered Germany's time-
honored aspirations to dominate the Eu-
ropean continent.
Dr. Adeiiauer's
Disappoiiitiiient
The collapse of EDC had a deep psy-
chological and political impact on Ger-
man public opinion. It dashed the high
hopes which Dr. Adenauer had raised
with luring Statements since he became
Chancellor in 1949. He had repeatedly
told the Gcrmans that Western integra-
tion would mean the overcoming of the
defeat of 1945, that his policies would
revive the old European "Empire of
Chariemagne," and that unification of
Europe would result in a strong "Third
Power Bloc" independent from Fast and
West. No wonder that the French re-
fusal to ratify EDC was a crushing blow
to these dreams. German papers were
fĂĽll of recrimination and innuendoes.
There was strong criticism among Dr.
Adenauer's own following to the effect
that his policies were not flexible enough
and that he had put all his chips on
Washington 's support, and thereby had
totally neglected European realities.
To the Chancellor himself, the French
action came like a thunderbolt. When
his dreams and schemes were shattered,
he lost his posture. Unrestrained by the
customary ruies of conduct among friend-
ly nations, the Chancellor gave free reign
to his real feelings. His first angry out-
burst was, "Mcndes-France must go!"
(Frankfurter Allgemeine 9-23-54) In
an interview to the London Times and
in other Statements, he accused Mendes-
France of having sabotaged the European
idea. Adenauer's attack was the cue for
smears against the French Premier who
was accused of playing Moscow's game.
There even appeared reports that Dr.
Adenauer had placed his liaison men in
French political circles with the assign-
ment to mobilize influential French fac-
tions for an organized drive to oust
Mendes-France. (Der Spiegel, 9-15-54;
10-15-54.)
The New Ai3proach
The fit of anger was only of short
duration. By the middle of September
the Bonn policy shapers had decided on
a new approach. Indications are that they
adopted a plan of action which was
hatched by the industrialists within the
Adenauer coalition. It is obvious that the
managcrs of Rhine and Ruhr and their
geopolitical advisors who had worked
quietly for years to advance the scheme
for a greater "Lebensraum," were not
inclined to admit defeat. While Anthony
Eden toured the European capitals in
Order to find a political "Ersatz" for EDC,
intense negotiations were carried on be-
tween French and German industrial
leaders.
Suddenly, by the middle of September,
Secretary Dulles was urgently called to
Bonn. After lengthy Conferences on Sep-
tember 16 and 17, Adenauer and Dulles
agreed on a new strategy. The under-
lying idea was to make a fresh attempt
for European integration with the em-
phasis on Franco-German economic col-
laboration. Chancellor Adenauer pointed
to this new strategy in the Bundestag as
follows: "A United Europe," he said, "is
still the aim of our policy. If we cannot
reach it directly, we have to take a
dctour."
The "detour" calls for furthering by
all means the plans of the German in-
dustrial octopus, the tentacles of which
have already reached out all over Europe
and into other parts of the world. As
was done in the past with the Schuman
Plan and Pleven's Defense Plan, it was
decided that the new line should not
come from Dr. Adenauer or Secretary
Dulles. Thus, the gap between France
and Germany was bridged by Mendes-
France himself who announced a large
Scale program of economic collaboration
with the long ränge view that common
industrial projects in North Africa shall
tinally lead to European unification.
The African Enterprise
What caused the sudden switch in the
attitude of Dr. Adenauer and Dulles who
both had first deliberately snubbed the
French Premier af ter the defeat of EDC }
From a careful study of the German press
the following picture appears: When
leading statesmen were not on speaking
terms and the diplomatic machine was
stalled, the German industrialists carried
on high level negotiations with their
French counterparts. Dr. Fritz Berg, the
influential President of the Association
of German Manufacturers, as well as Dr.
Pohle, director of the great Mannesmann
concern, mobilized their friends in the
"Conseil National du Patronat Fran^ais"
who paved the way for an overall agree-
ment based on a close Franco-German
economic collaboration. A gigantic Eu-
ropean industrial cartel is in the making,
a trend that has been going on for the
last few years. These negotiations center
around several multi-billion dollar proj-
ects; among them is the development of
new basic Industries in Northern Africa,
of hydroelectric power production in
Africa as well as in the European Alps,
and also a great armament pool.
Europe, Africa and the Arab world
constitute a potential market of approxi-
mately 700 million people— four times
greater than the United States and thrice
as large as the Soviet Union. The neces-
37
sary capital for these great investments
are to be raised partly in Europe and
partly in the United States.
It was on the basis of these tremcn-
dous projects that the German industrial-
ists insisted that Dr. Adenauer should
make the necessary political "concessions"
to Mendes-France on the Saar issue.
Without these "concessions" no French
Premier could hope to gain the neces-
sary support from the National Assembly
for the far reaching treaties paving the
way for German sovereignty and rearma-
ment.
The German scheme for the industrial
exploitation of Africa is an old one. At
the beginning of the Century, the Mannes-
mann concern almost precipitated a
world war when imperial Germany tried
to put the French out of Morocco. During
the Weimar Republic, German indus-
trialists saw clearly the great possibilities
in Africa and played with the idea of a
Franco-German combine for the exploita-
tion of the Dark Continent. When Hitler
had conquered Europe, the plans for
many of these projects were ready for
implementation, but the Nazi industrial-
ists had to wait until the Adenauer-
Schuman-Monnet crew, supported by
Secretary Dulles, had prepared the poli-
tical stage for a German ized Europe with
Africa as Hinterland. Dr. Adenauer ac-
claimed the Schuman Plan as the begin-
ning of "a long ränge economic venture
in Africa" (Rheinischer Merkur, 5-20-
50). The details of the Adenauer-Dulles
scheme on Africa can be found In my
book "Germany Plots With The Krem-
lin." There, on the basis of conslderable
documentation, I pointed out that "the
Germans are today the most vigorous
and energetlc pushers of the great Afri-
can exploitation projects."
For many years, Germany's newspa-
pers and magazines have publlshed glow-
Ing articles about the great possibilities
in Africa. On June 25, 1952, the "Frank-
furter Allgemeine" pointed out In a sen-
sational editorial the gigantic projects
waiting for Franco-German collaboration
in Africa. The paper stated:
"What is shaping up is based on the
idea of creating a third great trading
area between the *Lebensraum* of the
Soviet Union and tbe United States. The
colonial quarr eis among individual s tat es
are a thing of tbe past. Today we must
hnild Continental blocs."
The man who Is pushing this big proj-
ect is Dr. Adenauer's African specialist,
the former Nazi Dr. Johannes Semmler,
a mcmber of the Bundestag and a dele-
gatc to the Consultive Assembly of the
Council of Europe. Bchind Adenauer
and Dr. Semmler are the industrial and
financial captains of Western Germany,
such as Dr. Robert Pferdmenges, Her-
mann Abs, Dr. Fritz Berg and scores of
others. These industrial lords are the
architects of the so-called "Strasbourg
Plan," of which the New York Times
said:
". . . Tbe 'Strasbourg Plafi' proposes
to create a past netv trading area emhrac-
ing tbe British Commomvealtb, Western
Europe and its overseas territories, and
matching either tbe Soviet bloc or the
U.S. in economic power . . .
". . . Herr Semmler said the territory
of the proposed economic development
pool made up more than one -third of
the inhabitahle parts of tbe glohe, cover-
in g a l arger area than tbe Soviet bloc and
Cowmunist China together." (Nov. 26,
1952)
This is the 'Lebensraum' that Hitler's
armies could not conquer, but which
could now be cconomically "integratcd"
by Adenauer, Dulles and Monnet, to
benefit the tycoons of the Franco-German
supranational cartel.
This great African venture is slated
to be carried out not through "political
unification" but via the detour of "eco-
nomic integration." This far-reaching
project and the German demand for the
immcdiate granting of sovereignty were
the main topics of the Dulles-Adenauer
talks in Bonn in the middle of Sep-
tember.
Fraiieo-Geritiaii
"CoUahoratioii"
The Frankfurter Allgemeine (10-21-
54) called the Mendes-France proposal
for Franco-German economic collabora-
tion "a Sensation." The next day the
same paper stated, ''all this alloiis only
one conclusion: the idea of a unified
Europe is shared by Mendes-France." The
Rheinischer Merkur, however, still mis-
trusts Mendes-France and puts its entire
hope on the initiative of Jean Monnet.
former chief of the Schuman Plan Au-
thority. In its issue of 11-19-54, this
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W CITY OPFKIAIS HOT TO SEIL • WM? TOYS' *=^
^Never mind^ soft, Daddyll be getiing his toys
baeh any day ftoii//'
38
Adenauer weekly praised Jean Monnet's
program for a United States of Europe
and undcrscored his demand for a "Eu-
ropean Parliament," "a common Euro-
pean Foreign policy" and "a thorough
political and economic integration."
The Rheinischer Merkur, together
with the neo-Nazi magazine, "Nation
Europa," appear as the most vigorous
advocates of this new Europe-Africa
scheme. The editorials in both papers
seem to be a repetition of those sinister
articles which Dr. Goebbels once wrote
in his paper, "Das Reich." The same
phrases about the "Balkanization of Eu-
rope," the "New Order," Germany's
"Right to have Europe," and the concept
of a "Third Power Bloc" are frequently
peddled by both the Rheinischer Merkur
and "Nation Europa."
In its issue of September, 1954, "Na-
tion Europa" propagates the idea of a
"European Union . . . which must hecome
so sfrong that it can independefitly exist
between the giants — the U.S.A. and the
Soviel Union." The same article recom-
mends European partnership in Africa
but demands specifically "the exclusion
of America."
In the August issue of 1954, "Na-
tion Europa" declares:
"Based on . . . (the tvealth of) Africa
and häcked by the multiple Franco-Ger-
man strength, we could doubtlessly force
the U.S.S.R. to withdraw their troops
from all non-Russian territory. Such a
Europe uould at the same time he able
to convince the Americans that it might
be wise for them to scurry on to their
ships and get out."
Of course, the Americans are expected
first to finance this attractive African
project to the tune of many billions of
dollars, just as they did during the
Twenties, when they were fleeced by
the same industrialists and the Strese-
mann "democratic" German Republic.
The new plan of Franco-German eco-
nomic Cooperation, officially proposed by
Mendes-France, and loudly hailed by
Adenauer and Dulles, is not a new be-
ginning in Europe, but an old scheme
skillfuUy revived by the Nazi industrial-
ists and their collaborating pals from the
Vichy days in France.
* * *
How will the new experiment in
Franco-German collaboration werk out?
Will the "Ersatz" give more substantial
protection to the West than the doubt-
ful EDC? Does Washington now feel
more assured that German divisions will
be forthcoming? To answer that ques-
tion, we must know what is in the back
of the mind of Adenauer and his old
Ribbentrop diplomatic brain-trust.
The Chancellor's Mission
On July 23, 1954, Dr. Adenauer's pa-
per, the Rheinischer Merkur stated edi-
torially that "EDC is only a means to
serve the great end of unification." In
another editorial (Feb. 19, 1954) it was
stressed, that through EDC the Bonn
Republic will become "an international
factor which will be attractive for the
West, but will become far more interest-
ing for the East." For those who remem-
ber the wealth of documentary evidence
presented in my book, "Germany Plots
with the Kremlin," it will be easy to
grasp the real meaning of the above
weasel-worded editorial.
One thing has to be made clear from
the beginning. Despite the flowery
Speeches he has made, Chancellor Ade-
nauer has never regarded it as his task to
become the defender of the West, but to
overcome Germany's defeat. In this he
has truly worked miracles. He has lulled
Americans into complacency on German
nationalism and he has milked billions
from the U.S. taxpayers. Today Germany
is the most powerful nation on the Eu-
ropean continent because Dr. Adenauer
has changed the defeat into victory.
Soon after Roosevelt's death, American
policy shapers, anticipating strained rela-
tions between the war-time Allies, em-
barked on a new course, first to fill the
power vacuum in Europe and Asia, and
later endeavoring to build situations of
strength in order to "contain" and "roll
back" the engulfing wave of Communism.
Very early Washington planners en-
visioned a resurrected Germany as the
"arsenal of the West" and Hitler's idle
Panzer and SS divisions as "the bul-
wark against Bolshevism." In the case of
Japan, a similar diplomatic formula was
applied. However, we are faiiing in both
objectives. During the almost ten years
since the collapse of the Axis, State De-
partment and Pentagon officials have con-
stantly lived, and live still today, in a
fool's paradise.
German leaders and industrialists have
expressed their reluctance to the present
booming export industries toward a new
armament economy. This is the reason
why they have suggested setting up a
new armament industry located in North
Africa, and financed with billions of
dollars by the U.S.A. Thus, there will
bc no arsenal for the West in Germany
proper.
''Rearmament"
As far as German divisions are con-
cerned, we have to face the same resist-
ance and doubtful performance.
American correspondents stated that
political conditions in Western Germany
have changed considerably in recent
months. It has been reported that the
German masses show a great apathy to-
ward the new Paris Treaty. German youth
is openly and militantly opposed to
Service in a new Wehrmacht, Dispatches
from Germany reported that the future
Minister of Defense, Herr Blank, was
shouted down in mass meetings and was
even personally attacked. Other reports
in the German press teil us of the great
manpower shortage in Germany which
will make it difficult to conscript hun-
dreds of thousands of young men. Ger-
man youth appear to be satisfied with
their civilian Jobs. According to the Ger-
man press, they are deeply suspicious of
the ultimate objectives of a rearmed
Germany. (Frankfurter Allgemeine, 11-
10-54)
The "Deutsche Soldaten Zeitung,"
often used as the mouthpiece of the
Blank Office, stated in a front page edi-
torial (11-15-54) that it will probably
take several years until German divi-
sions can be set up and organized. The
question is, where will the 200,000 men,
officers, non-coms and administrators
come from for the creation of the first
cadres?
War criminal Kesselring and other
Hitler generals have declared that the
former SS blackboots are "indispensable"
in the new Wehrmacht. Thus, the Blank
Office has to accept members of the for-
mer Waffen SS, the Nazi killers, the
efficient professional of Hitler's Panzer-
waffe of which the Pentagon planners
had dreamed as early as 1947 and Sir
Winston Churchill even in 1945.
The uneasy feeling regarding German
rearmament was recently aired by the
conservative London Economist (Oct. 26,
1954) with the reminder that the of-
ficers of the new German Army will be
recruited from the ex-colonels of the
Wehrmacht, by men who once served
"a criminal lunatic." As a point of con-
solation, the Economist has this to say:
"The most reassuring thing about the
future German army is that it is not
wanted by the public. It is being pressed
upon the Germans as a whole by the
Atlantic powers, by Dr. Adenauer, and
by the professional soldiers — in each case
with a different motive."
We must put the emphasis on "dif-
ferent motive." It has been reported from
Germany that the more cautious elements
among the German officers have gone in-
to civilian life and are not inclined to go
back into uniform, for the time being.
However, the rabble-rousing SS officers
are eager to Start all over again. But is
there anyone of sound mind to believe
that these butchers and criminals are
willing to die for the defense of the
West.^ These unreconstructed plotters
have a burning hatred for France, Brit-
ain and the United States. The Americans
have even the "honor" of being por-
trayed in the most contemptuous man-
ner by the German nationalistic press.
No wonder that the highly respected
"Frankfurter Hefte" (October 1954)
sounded the following alarm:
"German re-militarization amounts to
a catastrophe . . . An armed Germany
will increase the risk of war and provo-
cation considerably . . . Western Germany
rearmed will bring a revival of the evil
militaristic tradition and will lead to fĂĽll
(Nazi) restoration."
For Moscow's propaganda the German
remilitarization is a gift from heaven.
Moscow is able to rally the East Euro-
pean satellite peoples firmly behind its
leadership because the Nazi horror is
still fresh in their minds. The French
people is in deep fear that the German
remilitarization will lead to another catas-
trophe, as it did in 1939. The New York
Times correspondent Harold Callender
reported from Paris (10-31-54):
"The French hold it to be an axiom
that the Germans are dynamically un-
stable, always prone to break out of
bounds and upset something, as for ex-
ample the peace of the world.
"This is why the French want British
and American troops on German soil for-
ever if possible. This is why the French
are not in any hurry to see Germany uni-
fied in spite of official Western profes-
sions in favor of it. . . ."
The "Eastern Angle"
Contrary to the French, the Germans
are eager to get the American troops out
of Europe as soon as they are able to
make a bargain with the East. The docu-
mentary rccord shows that Dr. Adenauer
"foUows a tremendously bold plan: first
armament, foUowed later on by talks
with the Russians, in order to persuade
them to rcmove their armies behind the
Bug River." (Frankfurter Allgemeine,
April 3, 1952.)
Let US remember that Germany's lead-
ing geo-politician and foreign political
adviser of the Adenauer CDU, Dr. Klaus
Mehnert, stated bluntly as early as 1951:
"It would be necessary that we first
create a united, healthy and strong West-
ern Europe in whose name the following
off er to the Kremlin could then be made:
Continental Europe would break away
from the Atlantic Pact if the Soviets
agree to withdraw their forces behind the
Pripet-Marshes and release not only the
Eastern zone of Germany, but the whole
of Eastern Europe into the European
Union." (Christ und Welt, 12-27-51)
The Germans want no part in the
risky Dulles' policy of "liberation."
Their immediate aim is to regain fĂĽll
sovereignty in order to be free for un-
hampered negotiations with Moscow.
Leading German papers, such as the
"Frankfurter Allgemeine," the "Deutsche
Zeitung," "Deutsche Kommentare," as
well as the influential monthlies, "Aus-
senpolitik," and "Geopolitik" have sug-
gested in recent months that Adenauer
must keep "the wires to Moscow open"
and be prepared for a vigorous pro-
Eastern orientation. On September 29,
1954, the "Deutsche Zeitung" reminded
Dr. Adenauer to conduct his Western
policies always "with an eye towards the
East." The "Frankfurter Allgemeine (Sept.
21, 1954) suggested the mobilization of
American support for an effective Ger-
man "Ostpolitik" and stated:
"Reunification must remain the pri-
mary objective of German Ostpolitik. . . .
Germany must no longer he prevented
from what all other nations constantly
do, namely, negotiate with the countries
of the Eastern bloc."
The "Fortschritt," mouthpiece for the
Ruhr industrial interests, asks in a front-
page editorial (Oct. 14, 1954) for a
"keen German alternative in the great
game of world politics." America, says
the paper, is losing its influence rapidly
in the world, England and France are
flirting with the Soviets, and Germany is
in danger of becoming the loser. Thus,
the "choice of the alternative should not
be too difficult."
39
A leading pro-Adenauer diplomat,
Hans Georg von Studnitz recommends
in the "Aussenpolitik ' (Aug. 1954) a
German foreign policy which seeks to
gain the utmost from "all combinations"
in a "constantly changing world Situa-
tion." Taking advantage of U.S. for-
eign policy in Germany was the right
thing in the past, but to achieve reuni-
fication, Herr von Studnitz suggests "go-
ing together with the Soviet Union
against the United States."
In the "Geopolitik" (Oct. 1954) Wer-
ner von Hentig, until recently an active
diplomat in the Bonn Foreign Office,
asked "fĂĽll political independence from
West and East and the withdrawal of all
occupation troops from Europe." Ger-
many will even take "the risk of staying
unarmed" and will wait for future de-
velopments to find solutions for the ter-
ritorial questions of the Saar and the
Oder-Neisse-Line.
"Nation Europa" (August 1954) gives
the following advice:
"Germany must not sacrifice her bio-
logical substance in a 'holy tvar' against
Moscow. Is there a salvation against this
danger? Only if Germany frees her seif
from ties with the West, and adjusts
herseif in a new Rapallo policy. Our
limited freedom of action, available un-
der the occupation regime, must be ex-
ploited to the utmost in order to serve
the interests of a national 'sacro-egoismo.'
This without consideration of historic
sentiments or ideological complexities."
During the last year, four former
Chancellors of the Reich— Dr. Wirth,
Dr. Bruening, Franz von Papen and
Dr. Luther — have come out in favor of
a more active pro-Eastern orientation.
For several years the Bonn Government
has kept secret contacts with top Russian
diplomats. A few months ago it was re-
ported in German papers and in the
"Christian Science Monitor," (4-17-54)
that Bonn representatives had secret
meetings with high Russian officials in
1950 in Moscow and another one in
August, 1952, in Copenhagen. From
German press reports it is known that
Dr. Adenauer, in the beginning of 1954,
encouraged the rightist Bundestag mem-
ber, Dr. Pfeiderer, to travel to Moscow
and Peiping in order to negotiate secret-
ly on mutual Russo-German problems.
(Frankfurter Allgemeine, May 14, 15,
17, 1954)
The real issue for the Soviet Union is
{Continued on pa^e 49)
40
?(Ăźw JthsL 5ie>^/WĂ„^tA. thuL WJjkWhiiinq. Jhsd/L M&iohs^
Sir Lewis Namier picked on one of the
most significant fcaturcs of German think-
ing when he pointed out, in his book The
Nazi Era, that Germans themselves per-
sistently miswrite German history; and
what is bcing served up to the German
public today as genuine history are ab-
surdly unreHable memoirs and biogra-
phies. Such, for example, have been the
books of Von Papen, Schacht, Fritzsche,
Weizsäcker, von Dirksen. All these books
have been apologia for the authors, for
Germany, in places even for the nazi
regime.
The German people is in a receptive
mood for apologia of this kind, and these
muddled memoirs may well take the place
of real historical studies in their minds.
Sir Lewis Namier gives numerous illustra-
tions of their unreliability, and takes per-
haps the classic example from the mom-
oirs of Erich Kordt, a member of the
pre-war German Foreign Service. Kordt
printed the text of an imaginary letter
sent by Mussolini to Hitler on August 25,
1939. He left this letter out of the second
edition of his book presumably because
he had discovered that it had never been
written. But Hitler's former Interpreter,
Paul Schmidt, borrow^d the letter from
Kordt's first edition, and used it in his
memoirs. So did other so-called German
historians. "In short," Sir Lewis writes,
"it has become a fixture in German his-
torical literature."
The Germans, Sir Lewis thought, in-
vent, dream, and remember collectively.
This may be the reason for their approach
to history, which is to sort out convenient
facts in order to prove a favorable histori-
cal theory. One need only ask intelligent
Germans today about the last forty years
of their country's history in order to dis-
cover the effects of this method. They will
teil you, as they told me, that the first
World war was caused by the Entente
Cordhie: that Versailles was a deliberate
act of political vandalism; that the West-
ern Powers later sabotaged Stresemann
by
TERENCE PRITTIE
and the Weimar Republic; that the Brit-
ish twice thwarted the German resistance
by capitulating to Hitler, at Munich, and
by formulating the doctrine of uncondi-
tional surrender; finally, that the British
and Americans are responsible for the
present ills of the world because they
invitcd the Russians into Europe.
These are some of the fables which are
almost universally believed . . . But all
that the counter-arguments, about the
German invasions of neutral countries
and what happened therc, will produce
is the reaction of the German Journalist
who Said to me with a bright smile:
"Well, Ict's admit that we've all made
much the same mistakes; if wc admit that,
thcn we can gct on perfectly well to-
gether" . . . It may be that these strangely
mixed fcelings drive Germans to the re-
current rewriting of history in order to
satisfy their consciences.
Here, for instance, are a few examples
of how this rewriting is done in the
columns of the daily press. In May of this
year, the Refugee Press Service decided
to explain away the eighteenth-century
partitions of Poland. Prussia and Austria
only took part, the writer maintains, be-
cause otherwise Russia would have taken
more, or even the whole, of Poland.
Poland, moreover, had shown herseif in-
capable of resisting continuous Russian
intcrference. This was the secondary rea-
son for Prussian annexation of Polish
territory; and the writer points out with
vapid inconsequence that the difference
betwcen Poland then and Germany today
is that the latter is a vital factor in the
balance of world poHtics. Versailles, an-
other Refugee Press Service contributor
weites, created the Polish Corridor. The
Polish Corridor was the cause of the sec-
ond world war. Er^o, the Poles were
responsible for its outbreak. It would be
a waste of time to quote to such people
the words written in 1922 by General
Von Seeckt, creator of the post-1919
Wehrmacht. "Poland's existence," he
wrote in an official memorandum, "is in-
tolerable, and incompatible with the needs
of Germany. She must disappear." Von
Seeckt would hardly have held different
views had he lived in 1772.
"Not as Bad as All That"
Not long ago, one of the Joint editors
of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
Erich Dombrowski, produced a leading
article entitled: "It was not as bad as all
that." This paper is well produced and
generally reliable. These were some of its
editor's views. Louis Napoleon was pri-
marily responsible for the war of 1870
because he "launched a ruthless counter-
offensive to the Hohenzollern candidature
for the Spanish throne." The French were
largely responsible for the first world war.
Countries should therefore stop worrying
about their own histories, which are
bound to be prejudiced. "For what is
history," Dombrowski asks rhetorically,
"save a sequence of stories, a ripple on
the tides of eternity?" This is not an un-
fair description of the German approach
to their own history.
"Who ever assaulted France?" was the
heading chosen by the Celli sc Joe Zeitung,
which wcnt on to quote Dr. Adenauer as
saying that French policy in the Saar was
dictated by the "idea" that France was
attacked by Germany in 1940, anĂĽ occu-
pied for four years. The Cellische Zeit-
ung s "explanation" was that the German
Government did not expect the allies to
enter the war after the invasion of Po-
land. The Polish campaign, anyway,
lasted only eighteen days, and for the
rest of that winter Germany "tried every
possiblc means of preventing an extension
of the war." "The French campaign," this
paper gocs on, began a fĂĽll nine months
later, and because "France declared war
on US in the first place." The Celliscbe
Zeitung makes no mention of invasions of
neutral Scandinavia and the Low Coun-
tries, and concludes: "Any talk of an
assault on France is unjustified."
Part of the Job of these re-writers in
the populär press is to destroy the idea
that Prussia was ever militaristic. "Wc
should all keep on Prussia's side," wrote
Egmont Roth in the weekly Deutsche
Zukunft. And went on: "In ref erring to
Europe, the British invariably refer to the
Continent, with their feeling of aloofness
from the center of gravity of the old
world. This aloofness is the germ of the
British policy of the balance of power
after the Treaty of Utrecht" . . . Britain
is Roth 's Chief villain in European his-
tory, and his theory is supported by the
Refugee Press Service, which points out
that England waged ten wars between
1815 and 1914; Russia seven; France five.
Prussia waged only three; and these lasted
under a year in all.
The same writer goes on to demolish
that "gross lie," as he calls it, that the
Prussian and German General Staff was
the source of Europe's woes. Clausewitz,
he pointed out, laid down that military
strategy should be subject to political re-
quirements; and the allies flagrantly broke
this principle, and "are therefore respon-
sible for the present Situation in Europe."
The writer does not mention Clausewitz'
brilliant pupil, Schlieffen, who evolved
the plan of the right hook round the
unprotected French left flank. This hook
had to be delivered through neutral Bel-
gium, and its delivery brought England
into the first world war. Schlieffen's
plan, in fact, made German politics ex-
actly dependent on military strategy.
The German press often shows a curi-
ous disregard for contemporary history.
Richard Tuengel, writing in Die Zeit,
condemns the Western Powers for refus-
ing to employ ex-nazis of talent; for
appointing ex-communists to de-nazifica-
tion boards; and introducing stränge
Anglo-Saxon forms of democracy. The
Deutsche Zukunft maintained that British
junior oĂźicers manhandled Admiral Doe-
nitz and his staff, and "shot hundreds of
thousands of Germans into famine camps
which contained as little humanity as the
concentration camps." Suddenly, in an
article about eastern Germany, the DĂĽssel-
dorfer Nachrichten breaks into a tirade.
"Have we not," it writes, "the example
of the years 1945-48, when the victor
nations weakened us by hunger in order
41
to re-educate us."
When the British authorities in Man-
över gave permission for the re-burying
of the bodies of German war criminals,
executed at Hameln, in consecrated
ground, the entire press in Lower Saxony
launched an anti-British campaign. Writ-
ing of the ninety-one corpses, including
those of Josef Kramer of Belsen, the
Hanoversche Allgemeine stated: "Under
the conditions then prevailing, this leaves
open the question whether guilty and
innocent were not Struck down indis-
criminately. Out of this gruesome execu-
tion, it was not possible to give the exe-
cuted person even a worthy resting place."
... In reality, the British gave fĂĽll particu-
lars whenever enquiries were made; and
furnished a fĂĽll list of the executed, all of
whom had been given fair trial for their
shocking crimes. The worst of the busi-
ness is that millions of Germans were
deliberately misled and may believe this
tale ever afterwards.
It is natural that war crimes are a sore
subject for the Germans; but it would be
encouraging if at least a reasonable pro-
portion of the German people realized
EDITORIAL versus REPORT FROM BONN
â– t
Parliamentary
(German) leaders no
longer need look to
the generals to protect
the State from a series
of private armies, for
since the Second
World War no organi-
zations like the Stahl-
helm, the S.A. and
S.S., the Reichsbanner,
the Rotkämpfer have
arisen. Nor have the
German General Staff
and the officer corps
retained their continu-
ity; nor do dreams of
a glorious greater
Reich applal to Ger-
mans today quite as
they did twenty years
ago
Their (German
labor) leaders have
been appalied by the
activities of ex-Mar-
shal Kesselring, with
his bodyguard of uni-
formed members of
the Stahlhelm, and by
the return to the Ger-
man Community of
men like ex-SS. Gen-
eral Tanzer' Meyer, a
v^ar criminal, and of
ex-S.S. General Rem-
er. They have been
disturbed by the grow-
ing clamour of ex-
soldiers* associations
and by the certainty
that their members
will play a leading
part in rearment. . . .
DPkRUHö . \ REMEWeyt T«t WA^ >rt>ü USW) "^ WAIT. . . •
(Manchester Guardian Weekly, 10-14-54)
♦ * ♦
"When the former Commander of the SS dlvi-
sion "Hitlerjugend," SS major-general Kurt Meyer
who had been sentenced as war criminal was
röieased from the prison in Werl, thousands
gave him a reception. Even the church choir
and the fire brigade were present. A big firm in
Hagen announced they had a Job for him. . . ."
(Bulletin on German Questions, London, 10-1-54)
RETURN OF "ULLI MARLENE"
42
what their country had been responsible
for during thc nazi era. It is lamentably
truc that few Germans arc intercsted in
the subject. The Mayor of Bergen-Belsen
can assert that he knew nothing about
the camp one mile and a half from his
front door. A daily newspaper can write:
"But the first gas Chamber seen in Ger-
many was brought ^o Dachau by the con-
quering Americans in Order to fix blame
on the Germans."
Persisteiice of Anli-Seinitisni
Anti-semitism is a terrible thing to
think about after what has happened in
Germany. Yet it does still exist there, and
takes all sorts of bizarre forms. On April
8 this year, the chairman of the Jewish
Community in Mainz was asked by the
local Ministry of the Interior to inspect
Jewish cemcteries in the neighborhood.
In nine of them he found over sixty dese-
crated graves at a time when the Federal
Government was outlawing genocide. Lo-
cal authorities round Mainz were explain-
ing they were not responsible for repair-
ing graves which had been damaged by
"larking schoolchildren." Gravestones
which would have taken two grown men
to shift had been systematically ham-
mered to bits or thrown down thirty yards
off. But not a single person has so far
been successfully prosecuted for desecrat-
ing Jewish graves in Germany.
A few weeks ago poems were being
circulated in the Ruhr by a schoolmaster
called Strunk. One poem referred to the
pre-war Jewish Community in Germany as
"the 500,000 hyenas who tried to ruin our
Germany." They emptied all our shops,
and so we kickcd them out, the poem
goes on: "300,000 went to their Fourth
Reich in America and sold up New York
in no time. That left 200,000. Half of
them cleared out, and we haven't killed
off the rest yet. But we're glad to say that
Adolf liquidated a cool 6,000,000." The
schoolmaster's ode ends: "I want to spit
when I sce the Jewish memorials go up."
Strunk was fined the equivalent of ÂŁ25,
and will now no doubt be pardoned un-
der the terms of the gencral amnesty.
Racial lunaq' still lurks only just round
the corner, "Jew, go back to Israel," a
voice yellcd at a rccent Free Dcmocratic
Party mccting. "Our mcmbers of Parlia-
ment know how to waste cash," wrote
one local newspaper, "as, for instance,
the 3,500,000,000 mark present to Is-
rael." Leading Free Dcmocrats opposed
that same reparations agreemcnt because it
might adversely affect German-Egyptian
trade. In Nuremberg, ex-nazis formed an
"Association for Racial Questions," and
began to collect money for their anti-
semitic campaign.
B'nai B'rith, the society which recently
scnt its team to Germany, writes: "The
assurances which we have received in
somc quarters that anti-semitism no longer
cxists in Germany arc not borne out by
the evident facts. Most Germans, it is
true, are embarrassed by discussion of nazi
persecutions. They seek to avoid it and
block it out of their minds. . . . Opinion-
testing since the war has at no time re-
vealcd a real lessening of anti-semitism
in the group that lived through the nazi
period."
It is not surprising that Lord Russell of
Liverpool's book, The Scourge of the
Sivastika, has stirred up especial resent-
ment among Germans who just want to
forget. The editor of one DĂĽsseldorf
newspaper dcclaimed against the book,
which, typically, he has not even read, on
the grounds that "at least 100 books
about the concentration camps have al-
rcady been written." Have they.'* In re-
ality, just one major work, Eugen Kogon's
The S.S. State, has been published in
the German language about concentration
camps.
Thc classic historical study of them,
Reitlinger's V'nial Solution, is unlikely
ever to be translated in German. Only one
German newspaper had anything to say
about the English edition of the book.
The Deutsche Rundschau thought it
should not be discussed in Germany be-
cause it might disturb the peace of mind
of the German Citizen. The Deutsche
Rundschau was right: most Germans pre-
fer to remain blissfully ignorant.
The absence of honest study of the
recent past Icaves a vacuum, and the
German, tidy by instinct and preference,
does not like vacuums. All too many
foolish and dangerous myths are being
cvolvcd to plug the gaps in his conve-
nient memory. Therc is the myth of the
allied bombing of Dresden balancing out
with all the evils perpetrated by the nazis,
and this simple silly equation is often set
boldly down in print.
There is the myth of the Western
Powers inviting the Russians into Europe.
Does any German remember the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact, which gave Russia the
Baltic States, half of Poland, the Buko-
wina, and Bessarabia; in fact, all the vital
approaches into Europe? There is the
Story of the second "stab-in-the-back" by
the men of the German resistance who
undermined the German war effort in the
same way as the sailors in Kiel harbor
thirty-five years ago.
There is the special myth of the first
"European army," in the shape of the
WaĂźen S.S. This is what one soldiers'
newspaper, the Heifukehrer has to say on
the subject. "Thousands of Norwegians,
Danes, Dutch, Belgians, and Frenchmen
entered the war as Europeans to battle
alongside the W ehrmacht against bolshe-
vism. They did this as volunteers: they
were not even National Sociahsts. Their
crime was to ally themselves with an oc-
cupying power against Europe's common
danger." "What right," the Heimkehrer
continues, "have our conquerors to treat
as criminals tens of thousands of the first
Europeans to jettison their national re-
sentments .'*" As it happened, I was able,
carly in 1941, to watch one group of
Bclgian officers being systematically
schooled for enrollment in the Waffen
S.S. Thc bribe offered them was to return
home from their prisoner-of-war camp,
and Russia had not even come into the
war at that time. Those Belgian officers
were ordered to sing nazi songs, give the
nazi Salute, and study nazi literature. But
if some day the true story of the Waffen
S.S. is written, will many Germans trou-
ble to read it?
Today a society for the victims of anti-
nazi persecution has been formed to claim
compensation for "democratic misrule."
An ex-general has just been rehabilitated
who had a sixty-year-old captain of the
Reserve shot during the last days of the
war because he tried to stop an artillery
Unit from defending a hospital crammed
with wounded. Ex-Marshal Kesselring
personally commended the general.
These happenings are the stranger
when one remembers tliat victims of nazi
terror are still trying in vain to gtt com-
pensation, and that Kesselring, lately in
jail as a war criminal, has become the
head of the revived and uniformed Stahl-
helm. Such grotesque events will multiply
as long as Germans, with all their good
qualitics, still do not find out what hap-
pened in the immcdiate past. Nobody
should want to teach them anything; but
it is perhaps about time they started
learning for themselves about themselves.
{Condensed, courtesy, The Listener)
43
JhiL fian-^sĂĽimaifL fijdnoL
When Hitler seized power in 1933, the
numbcr of German intellectuals who went
into exile increascd considerably. Many
of them received the warm hospitality
and protection of the United States. In
thc eyes of most Americans they were
the Symbols of "the other Germany."
There is no doubt that some of thesc ex-
iles truly rcprcsented the best in the Ger-
man tradition. On the other band, there
were others who disguised their real char-
acter and intentions by outwardly pro-
fessing a democratic creed.
The late Professor John Brown of
Catholic University, Washington, D. C,
analyzed the activities of these individ-
uals in an article entitled, "Deutschtum
and America." He noted that they had
the facility of speaking through both sides
of their mouths. In one breath they would
proclaim their anti-Nazism and in the
ncxt moment qualify it with typical Pan-
German arguments.
Anti-Nazi Paii-Germaii
Among those "anti-Nazi Pan-Ger-
mans" discussed by Prof. Brown, is Prince
Hubertus zu Loewenstein, a self-adver-
tised foe of Nazism (at present a mem-
ber of the German Parliamcnt). The
Prince was a former German youth leadcr
and anti-Nazi. He Icft Germany, so the
story goes, because he could no longer
stomach Hitlerism. Arriving in this coun-
try in 1935, he confidently predicted that
Nazism and Hitlerism would not last more
than two years. In spite of the Prince's
"Opposition" to the Nazis, we find that
at the outbreak of World War II he pro-
tested the British blockade. Yet, even this
cpisodc did not detract from his popu-
larity among somc intcllectual circlcs in
the United States.
Indeed, the Prince was a most success-
ful lecturer in the United States. Wher-
ever he went hc was greeted by largo
audienccs who believed him to bc a gen-
uine anti-Nazi dcmocrat. Naturally, hc
put on his best front bcfore such groups
describinii in vivid terms the vast anti-
Nazi Underground allegedly operating in
Hitler Germany. He was even able to gct
away with this hoax among more ^ophis-
ticated and presumably better informed
persons in the academic vvorld. The
Prince was among a number of alleged
anti-Nazi democrats who were welcomed
in the lecture halls of American univer-
sities, where he was able to put across
his "line" to students and professors.
Commenting on a Ictter written by the
Prince to the New York Times on Au-
gust 22, 1943, Prof. Brown declarcd that
it is a significant "indication of how even
the sincere Christian anti-Nazi cannot es-
cape the strain of the Pan-German." Im-
plicit in Prince Hubertus' letter is an
attempt of the Prince to portray Nazism
as some sort of freakish phenomenon and
not as the logical out^rowth of the war-
like and predatory traditions rooted
deeply in the history of Germany.
661
'International Morality"
Professor Brown's characterization of
Prince zu Loewensteir« is supported by
the writings of the Prince during his stay
in the U.S.A. as an anti-Nazi exile.
One of his most definitive articles on the
German problem appcared in The New
Leadcr of April 15, 1944. This date
should be borne in mind because the Al-
lies were still at war and hundreds of
thousands of our troops were lockcd in
bloody battle with the Nazi Wehrmacht.
His article had a vcry imposing title,
"International Morality Versus Expedi-
ency."
What are some of the iniportant Cle-
ments comprising the Prince's views with
respect to international morality.^ Among
these Clements is a recommendation that
the Allies allow the German armies to re-
ihe German
Hall of Farne
is the
French
Chamber of
Horror.
Courtesy
Aujban
main on the Lastern Front mobilized un-
til the "independence" of the eastern
countries "has been fully established —
with functioning and democratically elect-
ed governments of their own. . . ," Thus,
while the free w^orld was fighting to de-
stroy the Nazi threat to democracy, the
Prince was advocating that Hitler's ar-
mies be relied upon to serve as the
guardians of the democratic process.
With regard to reparations he pru-
posed a Solution which in effect would
have made the Allies pay at least part of
the damages inflicted entirely by Ger-
many.
Another part of his morality was ex-
pressed in his attempt to cquatc tl e
armies of the French revolution wit'
Hitler's Nazi hordes. In this connection
thc Prince spoke of the "undying glory "
of the Western world's youth "on wha>
ever side they may now have to fight "
No distinction is made betwecn Hitler
youth ravaging Europe like a plague of
pests, and the young people in the Allied
countries fighting to liberate the enslaved
from Nazi tyranny.
In his Crusade on behalf of "Interna-
tional Morality" the Prince avoids the
question of punishing thc criminals who
brought thc world to the brink of ruin.
Writing in a liberal papcr like The
Mew Leadcr and making a generous use
of liberal phraseology, thc Prince ap-
peared to bc speaking as a dcmocrat. This
is the way he operated during his sojourn
in the United States. However, upon his
return to his beloved Fatherland, the lib-
eral banner began to fade and the martial
44
45
colors of Deutschland lieber Alles
emerged in all their glory. Rcporting on
an article which hc had si^ned for the
German langiiage weekly, Deutsche
Wochenschrift, The Overseas News
Agency concluded that the Prince had
now "come out for a form of Pan-Ger-
manism as extreme as the Nazis" (12-12-
46). The following are among his
choice Statements:
"The restoration of a German Reich
is the first and most urgent of all tasks
confronting the people in Germany and
all those of Geman descent everywhere
who are concerned with the survival of
the German language culture. On the
basis of natural justice, the future Reich
must include all the provinces which his-
torically belong to Germany. This means
the restoration of the 1914 borders. (The
territory in question involves Alsace-
Lorraine, the Belgian cities of Eupen and
Malmedy, Northern Schleswig, ceded to
Denmark, and that part of Western
Poland which belonged to Germany until
1918).
"The future Reich should also include
German Austria, together with the South
Tyrol. The Sudeten Germans, who have
been driven out by the Czechoslovakians,
must be permitted to return to their
homes in which they lived for a thou-
sand years and to decide by plebiscite
whether their territory is to form part of
the Reich. In general, plebiscites should
be held in all contested territories."
Propagandist Par Excellence
From 1946 onwards, Prince zu Loew-
enstein has frequently written in German
language newspapers and for some Eng-
lish language publications. An examina-
tion of his writings shows that he has
had two primary objectives, (a) to break
the western alliance and (b) to prevent
the implemcntation of those policies
which the United States had originally
devised for the postwar trcatment of Ger-
many. He alleged that the Germans were
starving; that their treatment at the hands
of the Allies was far worse than that ex-
perienced by the victims of Nazism; that
the English and French were looting Ger-
man resources and that the Americans
too were profiting at the expense of the
Germans !
It is difficult to determine the precise
influence of the Prince's propaganda but
if we note how American policy shifted
radically during the years 1946-47, then
it is safe to say that the Prince helped to
contribute to this change. His propaganda
may perhaps best be summed up in his
attempt to write a history of Germany.
The quality of this work was described
by the New York Times reviewer as fol-
lows: '7/ is five hutidred pages of his-
toric'ism, fnystifcation, scbolarly preten-
sion and propaganda, adding up — in so
far as it is coberent and comprehensible
— to a flatly controvertible fabrication. In
common with a number of recent books
of Gertnan apologetics, it is the tvork of
a German political exile enjoying asylum
in this country."
Besides his frequent blasts at the Al-
lied occupation through the medium of
the German language press in the United
States, Prince zu Loewenstein has taken
an active role in whipping up nationalistic
feelings among the Germans. Thus, in
1950 he took upon himself to become the
spokesman and leader of a German pro-
test movement against the British policy
to demolish the German naval base in
Helgoland. His melodramatic antics
helped fan the flames of German nation-
alism. He cast himself in the role of a
national hero dedicated to upholding the
honor and integrity of the Fatherland
against "perfidious Albion."
The Prince's hatred of the British and
the USA is only exceeded by his fanati-
cal diatribes against the French. The New
York Herald TribĂĽne (April 12, 1954)
reported the Prince as calling for the
isolation of France and for the establish-
ment of a German-US alliance. He
voiced the opinion that such an alliance
"would finally bring the F/ench Govern-
ment to its senses." His nationalistic rav-
ings against the French have been par-
ticularly virulent as regards the future of
the Saar. He has denounced the U.S.
for having accepted what he alleged to be
a "pro-French" Solution. In this connec-
tion he has tried to comfort the Germans
by stating that prominent politicians in-
cluding Senator McCarthy, were of the
opinion that the U.S. was under no
Obligation to support its original pledges
and policies. It is interesting to note that
this boast, made in the spring of 1954,
was part of an address delivered at the
Rhein-Ruhr Club, a favorite haunt of the
Ruhr barons.
Prince zu Loewenstein's anti-Commu-
nism should not confuse his position on
relations with Russia. In the very same
Speech before the Ruhr industrialists he
supported the efforts of the German poli-
tician Pfleiderer to renew diplomatic re-
lations with Moscow. He insisted that
"Before the resonant tones of diplomatic
jubilation on West German rearmament sub-
sided, an important sideshow scrop began.
"It concerns money; money for the Germans*
contribution to Western defense and to their
new army. Chancellor Adenauer's government
is not inclined to be extravagant with its highly
prized Deutsche marks and the Finance Minis-
ter, Dr. Schaffer, is a tough man with a mark. . . .
"He is thinking of his own home industries.
They are thinking about themselves, too, and
they can reach SchafFer's ear quite readily. At
the moment they are pretty annoyed that arms
control can loy bare all German industrial se-
crets to other competitors, namely British and
American. . . .*'
(Seymour Frddin, N. Y. Pott, 1 0-1 9-54)
". . . The Russians hold big assets for a deal
with the Germans: unification, withdrawal of
the army of occupation, rectification of the
frontiers, resettlement of the expelied refugees,
trade, and great political influence in the des-
tiny of Europe. This is no imaginary affair.
There is powerfui evidence that the pull to-
wards a Russian deal is gaining momentum not
only in the Opposition to Dr. Adenauer but
within his own coalition. Is it possible to prevent
such a deal by a treaty which is designed to tie
West Germany*s hands? . . ."
(Walter Lippmann, St. Louis Post Dispotch, 9-24-54)
the Berlin Treaty of 1926 with Russia
must be the aim of German foreign pol-
icy. This treaty, incidentally, served as
an effective counterweight to the pro-
fessed western orientation of Germany
following the Locarno Pact.
More recently the Prince, in his capac-
ity as "Fuehrer" of the so-called German
Action Movement, demanded the imme-
diate rearmament of Germany without
restriction or the holding of a Four
Power Conference. In any event, he ad-
vocated immediate reestablishment of
German diplomatic relations with the
Kremlin (Manchester Guardian 9-9-54).
It is interesting to note that in outlin-
ing the program of his German Action
Movement, he speaks of "German states
of special chaiacter" and writes: "Switz-
erland is a part of Germany, the connec-
tion of which with the Reich was severed
in 1648. However, the German speaking
Swiss people together with the Alsacians
and the Germans in South-Baden form
a unity in the sense of an Allemanic race.
The Swiss culture is determined by this
unity of race and through it, is spiritually
connected with the Reich. Only the cul-
tivation of this awareness makes the loss
of the external attachment bearable."
The voice of the Prince is not isolated.
Indeed, he expresses the views of the
most decisive element in Germany today.
It may be summed up in his own words:
"The restoration of a German Reich is
the first and most urgent of all tasks con-
fronting the people in Germany and all
those of German descent everywhere who
are concerned with the survival of the
German language and culture." It should
be obvious that this ambitious program
knows no limits for it not only includes
Europe but pertains to all other countries
and areas abroad, yes, even the United
States. It is Pan-Germanism pure and
simple.
A Story That Has a Lesson
The story of Prince zu Loewenstein —
his exile as an "anti-Nazi," the welcome
he received in the United States, his pos-
ture as a liberal intellectual, his ability
to dupe many well meaning Americans,
his return to the Fatherland on the very
first boat in order to unfurl the flag of
"Dcutscfiland Ueber Alles"— should help
US to be more discriminating when it
comes to judging real and alleged friends
and to increase our vigilance against
those who take advantage of our generos-
ity so as to distort the real issue.
It is noteworthy that the Prince is but
one of many exiles who posed as liberals
in the United States only to return to the
Fatherland to resume their deadly game
of attacking the Allies and paving the
way for a resurgent Germany.
Indirectly related to the Loewenstein
"saga" is the Exchange Program financed
by the U.S. Government, under which
German youth is given the opportunity to
visit our country, enjoy its hospitality and
learn about its institutions. We recall that
after World War I, democratic countries
such as Norway instituted physical re-
habilitation programs for German chil-
dren who stayed with Norwegian fami-
lies. As youngsters they came as guests,
but under Hitler they returned as con-
querors specifically chosen for the sub-
jugation of Norway because of their
knowledge of the Norwegian language.
The case of Prince zu Loewenstein
should remind us that those who are really
bent on our destruction may exploit our
hospitality to further their sinister ob-
jectives.
"From the news of the past few months I
guess it is safe to venture that the German
victory in the last war is now clear-cut, as was
the Japanese, and that if we play our cards
right the Germans and Japs soon will take us
into the family of nations. . . .
"The strutting that has been going on by the
backslid Nazis over the last year or so is almost
unbelievable — unless you've seen it. At home
in West Germany and abroad, the Deutschland
ueber Alles refrain is ringing again to the point
where the toe of an old Gl boot is apt to itch. . . .
"I consider the Germans a goose-step nation,
ever ready to follow the new messiah, and
head right back to supermanhood again. They
are overbearing conquerors and sniveling sup-
licants. When they're up they're arrogant and
when they are down they whine.
"I know nothing of foreign diplomacy, but
that ain't stränge, since the records shows that
the diplomats don't know much about it, either.
But I can smell things, like an animal smells,
and what I have seen of the German abroad
in the past year doesn't smell good. It smells
like 1933. . . ."
(Robert C. Ruark in N. Y. World-Telegram)
EUROPEAN DEFENSE PROBLEM
46
SnAJuisL ^sĂĽimam^
REWARDS
"The Bavarian State radio and the newspaper Sued-
deutsche Zeitung of Munich have disseminated charges
that officials are systematically withholding payments
to victims of Nazi persecution but rewarding former
Nazi officials and their heirs with Jobs and pensions. . . .
"The authors of the charges, Helmut Hammerschmidt
and Michael Mansfeld said only 136,000 of 500,000
Claims filed in the United States zone of Germany had
been satisfied as of April 30 this year
"Aside from the material difficulties in settling the
cases, the authors cited examples of officials who, for
spurious reasons and frequently for reason of discrimi-
nation, refused to accept claims.
"One case cited was that of a 76-year-old widow of
a man who was killed in the ghetto of Riga, Latvia.
Sho could not get damages because she could not pro-
ducs witnesses who had seen her husband murdered.
The authors said the officials had taken this line de-
spite documentary evidence that all 27,000 inmates of
the Riga ghetto had been liquidated by the Nazis.
"As opposed to this treatment of the Nazi victims, the
authors cited the foUowing cases of readiness to reward
former Nazi officials and their heirs: Rudolf Diels, first
head of the Gestapo, received a pension. The wife of a
war criminal held in the Landsberg prison also has re-
ceived a Pension."
(The New York Times. 11-21-54)
"LEGAL"
"The compulsory sterilizations and castrations or-
dered by the Nazi regime, often under 'eugenic' pre-
texts in the case of political opponents, were not ille-
gal, according to a decision handed down by the
Superior Court in the Westphalian city of Hamm.
(I. T. A., 11-8-54)
•
IN WHOM WE TRUST
"A former prodigy of the German general staff is
America's No. 1 spy abroad.
"Without Reinhold Gehlen's name ever being men-
tioned in an appropriation's debate in Congress, he
spends six million doUars a year from the United States
Treasury.
"Thousands of agents of diverse nationalities are on
his payroll, together v/ith the ehte of the old German
army's counter-intelligence corps . . .
"The Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon
appear to trust this retired German lieutenant general
more than they do any Allied statesman.
"On his secret reports, which evaluate the findings
of his costly anti-Soviet espionage Operations as far
beyond the Iron Curtain as Siberia, depends much of
American defense planning . . ."
(Daniel de Luce, Washington Post, 9-19-54)
ANSCHLUSS 1
"West Germany 's highest court ruled today that
75,000 Austrians living in Germany are still German
Citizens under laws passed in the days of Adolph
Hitler.
"The supreme court said this status will continue for
Austrians living here until a peace treaty or an agree-
ment between Austria and Germany settles the ques-
tion finally,"
(From a UP Dispatch, 10-30-54)
•
ONLY THE "GOOD" FEATURES
"Walther Langhammer, 35-year-old Hamburg vege-
table Store employee, is trying to form a political party
which will revive the "good features" of Nazism.
"Political sources said today that Langhammer calls
his Organization the 'National People's Party' and
Claims a membership of 4353, some of it in Communist
East Germany. Among its aims are a retum to Ger-
many's 1938 boundaries, and introduction of a German
welfare sjate.
"In Argentina this week Adolf Galland, ex-general
in the German air force denied reports that he had
connections with Langhammer. The latter recently de-
scribed Galland as his friend and a *hero of Ger-
many.' "
(Report to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 10-8-54)
DENAZIFICATION
"Two thousand former Nazi Party members have
called on the West German and state govemments to
annul all de-Nazification court convictions and pay
damages to Nazis intemed after the war.
"The resolution, adopted overwhelmingly at the
Aug. 22 meeting of the association of Former Intemees,
also demanded restoration of property which de-Nazi-
hcation courts had confiscated and public pensions for
dependents of Nazis who passed on in intemment."
(Dispatch to The Christian Science Monitor, 7-23-54)
*
THE EUROPEAN "HONG KONG"
"The North German port of Hamburg is making
progress toward recovering its pre-war business with
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This is encouraging
some Hamburg businessmen to visualize the city as
becommg a profitable European 'Hong Kong' in ad-
dition to Its other, larger trade as West Germany 's
most powerful port
"Moreover, the notion is making headway in Ham-
burg that it may be possible to provide the smaller
Red nations with major trading advantages— if they
plan to do business on the world market on a more
serious basis than heretofore."
(N. Y. Herald TribĂĽne, 11-30-54)
2:s!r
47
MEMO TO TAXPAYERS
The United States will be the main arsenal for the
rearmament of West Germany.
"More than $1,000,000,000 in American "heavy mili-
tary equipment" (tanks, planes, field artillery, naval
vessels) will be required for this purpose in the next
two years."
(Robert S. Allen, Cleveland Piain Dealer, 10-22-54)
IN AND OUT
"Former Nazi Gen. Otto Ernst Remer, a leader of the
first sizable neo-Nazi party in postwar Germany, sur-
rendered to German authorities after an 18-month-long
Police hunt.
'*Remer disappeared in March, 1953, shortly before
he was to start serving a three-month prison sentence
for defaming members of the anti-Nazi resistance.
Prosecution officials said he reported at Oldenburg jail
today to start his sentence, but was set free a few
hours later."
(AP Dispatch, 9-29-54.)
HEUSS HAILS KRAUSS
"One of West Germany 's highest decorations was
today awarded to Werner Krauss, a German actor
who is identified in the public mind with the most re-
pulsive manif estations of lew-baiting on the Nazi stage.
"Bonn President Prof. Theodor Heuss awarded the
Federal Grand Gross to Krauss on the occasion of the
actor's 70th birthday. The presentation was made to-
day in Berlin by Sen. H. Tibertius, head of the City 's
cultural and education department."
(ITA, 6-24-54)
"CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT"
(Exhibit 1)
"Nazi Field Marshai Erhard Milch, former inspector
general of Adolf Hitler's Luftwaffe, has been released
on parole from Landsberg war crimes prison.
"Milch, now 62 years old, was Hermarm Goering's
deputy. . . .
"Milch was sentenced to life imprisonment by the
Nuemberg war crimes tribunal in 1946 for his part in
exploiting slave labor. His sentence was reduced to
15 years in 1951." (UP, 7-3-54.)
(Exhibit n)
"Sgt. Robert D. Raynor, of Detroit, was ordered dis-
honorably dicharged today and sentended to serve ten
years in prison for thefts and frauds committed while
he was absent without leave in England." (UP, 7-20-54.)
*
TOASTING TO THE "GOOD OLD DAYS"
"Chancellor Konrad Adenauer last night toasted the
health of Emperor Hirohito at a dinner given in the
chancellery in honor of Japanese Premier Shigero Yo-
shida, who is visiting European capitals.
"In his toast, Adenauer said Germany and Japan,
wartime allies, had enjoyed happy relations for a Cen-
tury." (From an AP Dispatch, 10-14-54)
THE "NEW" GENERATION
"Students duels have been resumed on a mass scale.
Thousands are fought every year.
"This correspondent recently witnessed a dueling
Session. It was a deeply disturbing experience — a
glimpse into the mood of the Middle Ages. . . .
"New generations of students are starting their
careers with the facial scars that in former years be-
came a symbol of German militarism. . . ."
(Walter SulĂĽvan, 7-25-54, New York Times)
A BRITISH CARTOONIST LOOKS AT THE GERMAN QUESTION
"The new toy
{llltngu'orth in The London Daily Mail)
I
48
REPORT ON GERMANY
"In May I began my lectures at the University of
Munich. This once-famous institution has been partly
gutted by allied bombs. It is being rapidly repaired;
but the damage that Hitler wreaked upon education
will exist for many years to come.
"Too few of my graduate students knew the work
of Germany's great social scientists of the Weimar
era. . . .
"Like other Americans, we met with a heartening
welcome from the Muncheners. How could these peo-
ple, we wondered, be the same who cheered the mad
Speeches of Hitler. How could they have tolerated the
horrible Dachau concentration camp just a few miles
outside of the city? If one looks for war criminals, he is
apt to conclude that he is in the wrong country. . . .
". . . Two years ago, several German public opinion
institutes reported these results of a new poll: Ten per
Cent express unqualified enthusiasm for Hitler; ono^Ker
22 % gave their qualified approval. On the other band,
28% did condemn Hitler in unqualified terms, but an-
other 40% softened their condemnation by qualifica-
tions. . . .
". . . The worst apathy, as a recent study of 3/000
German youth shows, exists among the new genera-
tion. . . . The 3,000 German youth studied showed that
they feel a bitter sense of having been betrayed by
their eiders and by leaders who filled them with im-
possible values, Very dismaying is the fact that they
refuse to assume collective responsibility for a fresh
democratic Organization. ..."
(Harvey Wish, Cleveland Piain Dealer, 10-25-54)
THE PRICE OF IGNORANCE
"It is an old habit of American diplomacy to pĂĽt all
its eggs in one basket when dealing with foreign gov-
emments . . .
"American officials appear completely absorbed in
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. They are, of course,
obeying in this the signals from Washington . . .
"To an increasing degree, also, the Bonn Americans
are being isolated from the broad stream of German
life and politics by their own vast new housing project,
coUoquially called *The Golden Ghetto' . . .
"Finally, the American view has been restricted by
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy 's war on the State De-
partment and the Voice of America, in which Scott
McLeod, the McCarthy friend who is security officer in
the State Department, has enthusiastically participated.
There has been a real purge here, and the failure of
the High Commissioner, Dr. James B. Conant, to fight
it more vigorously has cost him some of the prestige
that was his as President of Harvard.
"The result is that there are many new people at
occupation headquarters. Some of them — perhaps all
— are experienced men. But, antiseptic though they
may be and dear to McLeod, they have one fatal flow.
They don't seem to know anything about Germony.
"This is the price of McCarthyism. Unless we are
very lucky, it will be a high price . . ."
(Doris Fleeson« St Louis Post-Dispatch, 9-9-54)
BOOM— BOOMl
"West Germany's economic boom has hit a record
high and shows signs of further expansion. Steel and
automobile production and foreign trade are smashing
all previous records. . . .
"Industrial production, which accounts for more than
50 per cent of the total Output of the economy, Stands
at 185 per cent of the 1936 level, or about 10 per cent
above a year ago. . . .
"Business leaders predict that the gross national
product this year will be at least 6 to 7 per cent above
1953.
"Germany's massive steel industry expects 1954 pro-
duction to reach 17,500,000 tons, compared with 15,-
419,000 last year....
"German automobile production in October ran 33
per cent above October, 1953. In October 48,100 ve-
hicles were tumed out, to push total production for the
first ten months of this year to 420,000. West Germany
ended 1953 as the third biggest manufacturer of cars
and trucks in Europe. The industry this year expects
to better last year's Output of 490,000 ..."
(The New York Times, 11-8-54)
•
PROMOTION
"Schleswig-Holstein's newly-elected Christian Demo-
cratic Premier, 41-year-old Kai-Uwe von Hassel, has
reappointed Hans Adolf Asbach, an importont official
of the wartime Nazi terror and murder regime in the
Ukraine, as Minister for Social Affairs, Labor and Ex-
pellees in his new Cabinet.
"Asbach starte d out to be a lawyer, but never pro-
gressed beyond the preparatory examination. Instead,
he joined the Nazi Party and by 1934, he had tumed
into a full-time Nazi Party functionary as Regional
Legal Supervisor and Social Policy Advisory of the
German Labor Front in all of Pomerania. IBs Nazi rec-
ord was so black that, after the war, the Bar Associa-
tion at Eutin in Schleswig-Holstein refused to admit him
to the practice of law. He qualified as a joumeyman
bricklayer, but soon abandoned it for a political coreer
in the ranks of the Nazi-infested BHE Refugee Party."
(ITA, 10-19-54)
•
JUST WAITl
"A Swiss correspondent said that he had been
threatened by a cabinet minister for having reported
a Speech by the German minister advocating the re-
covery of territories lost to Czechoslovakia and Poland.
"The threat, made to Dr. Eduard Geilinger, corre-
spondent of Die Neue Zuericher Zeitung, is being pub-
licized by the West German newspapers as proof that
the govemment carmot be trusted when it alleges it
has no intention to control the press through the newly
created coordinating committee.
"Dr. Geilinger said the minister who had threatened
him was Dr. Hans Christoph Seebohm, Mmister of
Transport. Dr. Seebohm, a former member of the Nazi
party, told Dr. Geilinger on the telephone *we'd take
care of you if we had our sovereignty.' . . ."
(The New York Times, 6-24-54)
49
FRANCO'S PROFITABLE ANTI-COMMUNISM
"Another aspect of Spain's international trade rela-
tions is a Moscow radio report of the existence of a
trade agreement between Spain and the Soviet Union.
. . . Following are extracts from the Spanish Economic
News Service, published in Madrid:
"March 30, 1954: *Last week Bonn mentioned a deal
of Spanish wine for Polish coaL'
"April 27: *E1 Economista affirms that a deal for 200,-
000 tons of coal for Renfe (Spanish State Railways) in
exchange for 300,000 tons of iron ore is in fĂĽll swing.
Licenses are said to have been granted . . . to ships are
about to leave with Menera and Setolazar ore destined
for Upper Silesia' (Poland). If samples are satisfactory
other important shipments will foUow . . .' "
(Richard Mower, Christian Science Monitor, 7-10-54)
A NEW HIGH
"West Germany's economy, certain to set post-war
records in both industrial production and foreign trade
this year, has a valuable asset in merchant shipping.
"While the nation's merchant fleet recently passed
the 20,000,000-ton mark, about 50 per cent of the pre-
war figure, tanker tonnage has reached a new high. . . .
(New York Times, 11-7-54)
". . . The common distrust of Germany which
unites Frenchmen is oimed at the so-calied
ruiing circles, the group that unseated the
Weimar Republic and which Frenchmen regard
as once again firmly seated in the Bonn and
Ruhr commond posts.
". . . 'We ore all for French-German recon-
ciliation/ one high French government official
told me. 'But you know as well as I do that the
Bonn administration employs thousonds of for-
mer Nazis and that Dr. Adenauer's foreign of-
fice is run by many of the some arrogant peo-
ple who served under a Ribbentrop. Do you
expect US to stoge a French-Nazi reconcilia-
tion?' The official then added:
" 'This is a fundamental matter. You Ameri-
cans are a moral people por excellence. You
apply the highest Standards of integrity in your
own Civil Service. How can you blind your-
selves to the real character of these men in
Bonn? Do you really believe you v</'\\\ find se-
curity by letting these men fill Europe's streets
with the clutter of German soldiers' boots
again?' "
(G. W. Herald, Gazette and Daily, York, Pa., 9-22-54)
4c ♦ *
"There is danger West Germany may be re-
armed without safeguards against revival of
German militarism and oggression.
"This — rather than the much publicized fear
that the French will prevent arming Germany
against Soviet oggression — is what worries the
American and British governments. . . .'
(Ludwell Denny, N. Y. World-Telegram and Sun, 7-2-54)
The New German Imperialism {Conti nueä jrom page 39)
not the twelve German divisions, but the
estabhshment of American bases in Eu-
rope and Asia. Russia's efforts are aimed
at forcing the American withdrawal from
their present European and Asiatic foot-
holds. In the hght of this basic prob-
lem, Dr. Adenauer's diplomatic maneu-
vering over the past five years — playing
the East against the West and vice-versa
— has been rewarded with fabulous suc-
cess. The German Chancellor believes
that he is in the driver's seat and that
he can extort more concessions from the
U.S.A. as well as from the Soviet, as
long as the present Situation continues.
This fact was emphasized and came
clearly to light when the "London Daily
Express" published the ill-famed memo-
randum of the Bonn official, Dr. Son-
nenhohl, who recommended agitating
continuation of the Cold War in Order to
cxact greater concessions from East and
West. The fact is that the Germans, at
(he present tinie, are fearful of war but
like to go on fishing expeditions in
troubled international waters.
"Blitzkrieg" Diplomacy
The German industrialists and Herr
Adenauer know that they do not have
available another $300 billion dollars for
a new super-modern Juggernaut to con-
quer "Lebensraum." So why should
they arm in the first place .^ It is for this
reason that they have concentrated all
their ingenuity, trickery and double-talk
into large scale diplomatic efforts in Or-
der to achieve the same results which in
former times were harvested only by
armed aggression.
If Dr. Adenauer can build an empire
by diplomatic "finesse," by Western
"economic Integration," by playing East
against West, and finally winding up
with a super-bargain with Moscow — why
should Germany resort to suicidal ex-
penditures for a super rearmament.^ The
"Old Fox" knows that it is much safer,
profitable and effective to apply "Blitz-
krieg diplomacy" than to get stuck in
"blitzkrieg warf are."
There is no doubt that a sovereign
Germany has to bargain with the Rus-
sians if it gocs ahead with building its
empire in Europe and Africa via the
detour of F'ranco-German "economic Co-
operation." Germany, says the "Aussen-
politik" (June 195-i) "must become at-
tractive as a partner for the Russians"
and that it has "to pay any price for
reunification."
The whole German history demon-
strates the striking fact that all dynamic
German moves were made either with
the tacit understanding of or in active col-
laboration with Russia against the West.
Dr. Adenauer is continuing the time-
honored tradition in German v\orld poli-
tics. The only difference is that in for-
mer times the Germans had to raise and
pay for huge armics in order to concjuer
their "Lebensraum." However, under
Dr. Adenauer, they have developed a rc-
fined procedure for imperiahstic aggran-
di Zement. Today, the mastcrs of Rh ine
and Ruhr are achieving their old Pan-
German obje^.ti\c^ through Dr. Adenaur's
skillful diplomacy — so highly admired by
Secretary of State John Foster DuUes.
1
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COMBAT FOKClĂĽlf
JANUARY1955
50i
In Position and ready for firing Orders from battery headquar-
ters, Skvsvveeper gun crew nioves fast when the word comes
The crew chief directs
the firing from his po-
sition behind the gun
SKYSWEEPER
Targets are checked on the position
indicator scope of the radar setup
A corporal technician adjusts sensitive
parts of the Skysweeper's radar set
Information received from Operations center is converted and plotted by battery technicians and sent to the crew
chief of the gun. These Signal Corps photographs, released in December 1954, were posed by the 53 Ist AA Battalion
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MADE BY MR. & MRS. AMERICA
As each C-119 and C-123 rolls off the assembly line at
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many of the vital components originale in towns and
cities all over the United States. Sub-contractors and sup-
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Fairchild is grateful to these co-workers for niaking pos-
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Fairchild
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HAGERSTOWN. MARYLAND
i,.-
Enlist tofly in the U. S. Air Force
Other Divisions
American Helicopter Division, Manhattan Bcdcn, Calif.
Engine Division, Farmingdale, N Y
Guided Missiles Division, Wyandanch, N. Y.
Kinetics Division, New York, N Y
Speed Control Division, St. Augustine, Fla.
Stratos Division, Bay Shore, N. Y.
H
I
I
ASSOCIATION OF
THE U. S. ARMY
U. S. ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION. 189M954
U. S. INFANTRY ASSOCIATION, 1893-1950
U. S. FIELD ARTILLERY ASSOCIATION, 1910-1950
PRESIDENT
Lt, Gen. George H, Decker, USA
VICE PRESIDENTS
Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA Maj. Gen. Robert N, Young, USA
SECRETARY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
CoL Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR Col. Robert F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS
ASSISTANT TREASURERS
N. J, Anthony Lt. Arthur S. Welch, CE-NGUS
KXECUTIVE COUNCIL
ARMOR
Maj. Gen. Wm. H, Abendroth,
NGUS
Maj. Gen. Arthur G. Trudeau, USA
CoL J. Paul Breden, USA
Capt. Sam W. Sacra, USAR
ARTILLERY
Lt. Gen. W. B. Palmer, USA
Maj. Gen. Wm. F. Marquat, USA
Maj. Gen. Bryan L. Milburn, USA
Maj. Gen. Harry McK. Roper, USA
Maj. Gen. Charles G. Sage, NGUS
Col. John Lemp, USAR
CoL Darwin D. Martin, USA
CoL John S. Mayer, USAR
CoL George V. Selwyn, NGUS
Lt. CoL Francis X. Bradley, USA
Lt. CoL John E. Connor, USA
Lt. CoL Otho A. Moomaw, USA
CORPS OF ENGINEERS
Maj. Gen, Kenner F. Hertford,
USA
Capt. John H. Bolton, Jr., NGUS
INFANTRY
Maj, Gen. James C, Fry, USA
Maj. Gen. James M, Gavin, USA
CoL Charles W, McCarthy, USA
Col, Alex J, Robinet, USAR
CoL Charles A. H, Thomson, USAR
Capt. Barney G. Schneckloth, USA
ORDNANCE CORPS
Maj. Gen. Earl S. Gruver, USA
SIGNAL CORPS
Maj. Gen. Victor A. Conrad, USA
TRANSPORTATION CORPS
CoL William B. Bunker, USA
"The Association of the U. S. Army shall be an Organization
wherein all who are in accord with its objectives may join in the
exchange of ideas and Information on military matters, and in
fostering, supporting, and advocating ihe legitimate and proper
role of the Army of the United States and of all its Clements,
branches, and components in providing for and assuring the
Nation' s military security.*'
Assodation's Journal
ON page 60 of this issue you'll find a list
of ten books which the staff of tais
magazine believe to be the most signific nt
contributions to military literature dui ĂĽg
the past year. The list includes title of
varying degrees of literary value that n-
dividually and coUectively have mad- a
considerable contribution to military I is-
tory and thinking.
We began these annual awards last y -ar
because we feit some public recogniiion
was due the authors who labor in ti\e
field of military writing to the advanta^e,
education and enjoyment of those of ĂĽs
who are interested in the military ficlĂĽ.
Soldier
Lieutenant General Raymond S. Mc-
Lain, USA-retired, was the second Pirs-
ident of the Association of the U. S.
Army, serving in 1951 and 1952. ile
was long an active advocate of a single
association and magazine representing
the Army and his many contributions
to the Association were especially valu-
able because of his business expericnce.
A citizen-soldier most of his life, Gen-
eral McLain continued to work actively
in the interests of national defense after
his retirement, particularly as a membcr
of the National Security Training Com-
mission which was a natural assignmcnt
in view of his long advocacy of universal
military training.
His death on 14 December 1954 was
a heavv loss to the whole nation.
The reaction to the announcement of
the awards last year was most encouraging
and convinced us that we were establish-
ing a useful custom. We were delighted
to find our selections approved in more
learned circles, too. One of our choicci,
Bruce Catton's A Stillness at AppomatiJX,
went on to win the National Book Award
and the Pulitzer Prize.
The ten selections this year represciu
not only long hours of careful reading but
rather extensive periods of free and frank
discussion among members of the staft anci
others who read widely in the field. In
all, about twenty books were considereci
serious contenders this year. The nnai
ten were reached by the democrati'
process of majority vote. As a result w-
have a list which doesn't completely satish
any one individual judge— and it is ur
doubtedly a better list because of this. vV
all agree, however, that every soldier will
benefit greatly by reading any or all O'
the tides selected— that's the only unani-
mous vote we could get.
The PuBLisHfcR
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
THE ARMY < ombvi ior< es JOURNAL
PUBLISHER
Col. Arthur Symons, Arty-USAR
EDITOR
John B. Spore
BUSINESS MANAGER
Col. Rober» F. Cocklin, Arty-NGUS
Associate Editors
Brig. Gen. Charles S. Harris, USA-Re».
Nornfian S. Poser
Contributing Editors
Brig. Gen. Donold Armstrong, USA-Ret.
Maj. OrvUle C. Shirey, Inf-USAR
Membership & Circulation
D. A. Mulioy
Assistants
N. J, Anthony
Esther E. Bennett
Doris Montgomery
Mary F. Grant
EDITORIAL POLICY
The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is a profes-
sionoi military mogozine devoted to the disseminotion
of Jnforitiofion «nd idees reiating to the miUtary ort
and science representing the interests of the entire
Army.
The ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL strives to —
Advance man'$ knowledge of warfare in the fields
of strategy, toctics, togistics, Operations, adminis-
tration, weapons ond weapons Systems.
Advance man's Icnowledge and understonding of
the soldier os on tndivtduol, as o member of o
troined unit, and as a member of the whole Army;
emphasizing (eodership, esprjt, toyalty, and a
high sense of duty.
Oisseminote Knowledge of military history, especiotly
artictes that have appiieation to current problems
or foster tradition and create esprit.
Explain the important and vital role of the United
States Army in the Notion's defense and show that
the Army is alert to the challenges of new weap-
ons, mochines, and methods.
Advance the »tatus of the soldier's profession.
t Adopted by fhe fxecwt/ve Covneil of the Asseciotion
of the U. S. Army, 2 t Jun« J9S4I
JANUARY 1955
Jonuory 1955
Vol. 5, No. 6
ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY
Announcement of the merger of the AU SA and the Antiaircraft
Association. Lt. Gen. G. H. Decker, Lt. Gen. L. L. Lemmtzer,
and Gen. Matthew B. Ridgxvay 4
Winning Seal 52
Ten Distinguished MiHtary Books of 1954 61
THE CURRENT SCENE
CTCography Is On Our Sidc Brig. Gen. Thmnas H. Phillips 1 1
Nike's Nest 16
The Gun That JMioht I lave Won 24
Red Parallel: The Tactics of Mo and Mao. . . Lt. Col. Rohcrt B. Rioo 28
Command Post of the Department of the Army 32
. . . trouble with cavalrv is Col. Shillelaoji 34
. . . It Will Take a Whole New Generation.
Brig. Gen. Theodore W. Parker 43
MEN AND METHODS
A Medal for Horatius Col. W. C. Hall 1 8
The Changing Face of War. . . Field Marshai X^iscount Montgoiuery 20
Ski School '. 37
New Incentive to Re-upr 42
48
Short Course for Military Managers.
TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
Skysweeper Cover 2
They Ride to Work Caft. Boyd T. Bashore 25
Extending the Range Capt. josiah A. Wallace 40
Bang! You'rc Dead Maj. Thoiuns S. Anns, ]r. 49
DEPARTMENTS
Association's Journal
The Month^s Mail .
Editorial
The Month's Films
2 The Month's Reading 46
8 Cerebrations 53
19 The Word from the Schools . 56
36 The Month's Books 58
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is published monthly by the Association
of the United States Army. Publication date: 25th of preceding month. Puhlication,
Editorial and Executive Offices: 1529 Eighteenth Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.
Copyright, 1954, by Association of the United States Army. Entered as Second Class
Matter at Washington, D. C, additional entry at Richmond, Va., under the Act of
March 3, 1879. Articles appearing in THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
de not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Department of the Army. the officers and
members of the Executive Council of the Association of the U. S. Army, or the editors.
RATES. One year $5.00; two years $9.00 when paid in advance; three years S 12.00
when paid in advance. Subscriptions for libraries, civilian groups or activities, and
others not eligible for membership in the Association of the U. S. Army S5.00 per year.
Foreign subscriptions $6.00 payable in advance. For other rates write Circulation IvLin-
ager, 1529 18th Street, N.W., Washington 6. D. C.
ADVERTISING information and rates available from the Business Manager or any
of our advertising representatives, who are:
New York office — 19 West 44th St., Murray Hill 2-5254
San Francisco office — Duncan A. Scott Co., Mills Bldg., Garfield 1-7950
Los Angeles office— 2978 Wiltshire Blvd., Dunkerque 8-4151
ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
My dear General Lemnltzer:
hand of fellowship of the members
I am proud and happy to extend the warm ^^^^ °^/^^e uf s! Antiaircraft
of the Association of the U. S. Army to the members of the u, ö- kh
Association.
The'f our and one-half years that ^ave passed sine the U S I^^^^^^^^^
Association and the U. S. Field Artillery Association ^oinedto^^ ^^
Association of the U. S. Army have ^l^^^^^'^J',^^^^ ^}^^^ as well as desir-
common association of all the arms of the U. S. .^^^f^^J^ ^^f ^^^ u. S.
able. We have made a good Start and now ^^^t the members oftneu^ stalwart
Antiaircraft Association have joined us, we shall go on to oecome
Champion and effective spokesman for the whole Army.
Sincerely yours.
UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
G. H, DECKER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
President
Lieutenant General L. L. Lemnitzer, President
United States Antiaircraft Association
THE U. S. ANTIAIRCRAFT ASSOCIATION
My dear General Decker:
Thank you for your kind letter of welcome to the members of the U. S.
Antiaircraft Association. ^ .4. n «o+
For sixty-three years the U. S. Antiaircraft Association and its Coast
Artillery predecessor served its members well. Now we are happy indeed to
join in the common effort of the other arms to create a Single, streng and
effective Association. , .
The overwhelming vote of cur members in favor of joining the Association
of the U. S. Army is convincing proof of our firm belief in the Ideals and
program of the Association of the U. S. Army and gives evidence that we shall do
all that is within our power to make the combined Association a powerful,
effective and resourceful spokesman for the United States Army.
In behalf of the Executive Council of the United States Antiaircraft
Association and our entire membership, I would like to express to you, your
Council and your membership, our appreciation and gratif ication at having so
harmoniously and successfully worked out all terms and details pertaining to the
Union of our Associations and respective Journals. I feel confident that this
merger will promote a better understanding among the members of all elements,
not only of our respective Associations, but of the entire Army as well, and
that it will serve to give us much greater unity and strength.
Sincerely,
Dear General Decker:
I am greatly encouraged to learn that the U. S. Antiaircraft
Artillery Association has joined the Association of the United
States Army. Both associations have my heartiest congratulations
on their decision to take this step.
The Army 's branches and components are bound together by
the traditions and purposes of the Army as a whole. The Associa-
tion of the United States Army can play a unique and important
role in strengthening the ties among us and thereby contribute
greatly to the Performance of duty by every soldier and ulti-
mately to the accomplishment of the Army 's missions,
«
I should like to say to every member of the larger and
stronger Association of the United States Army that you have my
wholehearted support in our common endeavor to make the United
States Army a Single Instrument of unsurpassed military effec-
tiveness, that it may at all times be ready to Shoulder any
responsibilities which may be placed upon it.
Sincerely,
L. L. LEMNITZER
Lieutenant General, U. S
President
Lieutenant General G. H. Decker, President
Association of the United States Army
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
M. B. RIDGWAY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Lieutenant General G. H. Decker
President, Association of the United States Army
JANUAR Y 1955
MESSAGE FOR MEMBERS
I
%
WOLIR Association of the U.S. Army has reached another milestone on the road to becom.ng
'an institution representing the entire United States Army. This is the first issue of the Jour
NAL to go to the former members of the United States Antiaircraft Association, who joinec^
vvith US officially on the first day of 1955.
We used the words ' pined with us'' because they best describe the spirit of our enlarged As-
sociation. The members of the Executive Council of the Antiaircraft Association take their
places as members of an enlarged Executive Council of the Association of the United States
Army. Antiaircraft's President becomes a Vice President of the new Association. The AnUaiv
craft jmirnal's Editor becomes a member of the staff of The Army Combat Forces Journal.
The AA jonnml's subscribers become members of the Association of the United States Army.
Your staff looks forward to the additional support from our augmented membership, and to
the new ideas and forward thinking that will come from the members of a branch that works with
the latest concepts of electronics, missile propulsion and guidance, and other new scientific de-
velopments.
The former members of Antiaircraft will receive this magazine (a monthly, as opposed to the
bi-monthly Antiaircraft Journal') for the period of their subscriptions. Thus they will receive
twice as many issues for the remaining membership period. Those members who belong to both
Associations will have their membership extended by the length of their unexpired AA member-
ships. And AA's life subscribers automatically become life members of the Association of the
United States Armv.
Your Publisher is particularly happy about this new development, since he was Associate Edi-
tor of the Coast Artillery Journal (the Antiaircraft Journals predecessor) from October, 1940 to
February, 1946. For him, it will be a case of welcoming old friends and associates. At the time
the United States Field Artillery Association joined with the United States Infantry Association
to form the Association of the United States Army, he feit that something important w^as miss-
ing from the new Organization. That missing ''something" is now very much present.
Your staff, both of the Journal and of the Association, welcomes the new members of the As-
sociation and looks forward with delighted anticipation to the opportunity to serve the wider
membership. We hope you will write us often, both with praise and criticism. The first improves
our morale; the second keeps us on our toes. For members in remote corners of the globe, we will
be happy to perform those little military Services that can best be done by a friend in Washing-
ton. Our Joseph I. Greene Memorial Library is small but useful, particularly to the historically
minded; all members are welcome to use it.
The Army Combat Forces Journal is our principal contact with the vast majority of our
members. Your Publisher, your Editor, and the other members of the staff are never satisned
with the magazine; we continue to try new things and to improve the old. We are guided to an
important extent by your wishes; if you don't teil us what you think we'll never know. We count
on the former AA members to offer us some new and refreshing viewpoints— and some publish-
able articles.
In manv fewer words— Welcome!
The Publisher
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
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JANUAR Y 1955
THE MONTH'S MAIL
"Faifhful to Our Trusf'
• The author of "Faithful to Our Trust"
[December issue] should raise his ehest
and look proud. Many oÂŁ us would have
liked to have said this. . . .
Like the author Im an intantry eom-
mander and will be one when a "brush
fire" Starts. I couldn't agree more with
the author's comments. All of the mal-
practices may not have existed in every
outfit in Korea but Im certain they were
there in some degree in some outfits ander
some Commanders.
When the Army stops worrying about
what the newspapers and "mamas" say
and Start building an army based on dis-
cipline we'll be on our way back to the
pre-Doolittle days when an officer's word
was sufficient, loyalty went both vvays and
a soldier was a soldier.
Lt. Col. Robert W. Garrett
Arlington, Va.
• I have read "Faithful to Our Trust"
three times and I infer the author subscribes
to the rewriting of our tactics books to
conform to his Korean experiences. As a
Veteran of the indignities of two wars'
annual physical examinations, I have this
brief but proven bit of sagaciousness to
ofFer: deviation from tested and proven
tactical principles results in disaster. This
applies to squad-sized and larger units
alike. Terrain may well be the principal
modifying Factor in applied tactics but
never an excuse for the abandonment of
tactical doctrine.
Maj. H. W. Richardson, Jr.
New Albany, Ind.
• The Editors have read the article more
than three times and cannot read tnto H
the meaning inferred hy Maj. Richardson.
On page 19 of the article the author asked:
"What of the even less experienced of-
ficers who know of no tactics hut Korean?"
The whole tenor of the article suggests that
deviation from sound principles often led
to near disaster.
Light Weight Otter
• "Front and Center" [November] gives
the capacity of the new DeHaviland Otter
as 500 pounds. That is about 2,000
pounds less than its rated ton-and-a-quar-
ter pay load.
Though we haven't received any Otters
yet we look forward to getting them early
in 1955.
Lt. John W. Granicher
30th Engr Grp
Fort Winfield Scott, Calif.
• Our faces are real red from emharrass-
ment and mystification over hoiv that ftgnre
ever appeared as "500 pounds." Some nat-
ural enemy of the Otter must have heen
on the loose in the print shop.
Equal Recognition
• I read with interest the questions of
Sergeant Bowles and the answers of Gen-
eral Weible [November 1954] regarding
the award of additional service ribbons to
our soldiers. The multitude of service rib-
bons that we now award have cheapened
our decorations to the point where Bill
Mauldin's garritroopers are even gaudier
than our bona fide heroes.
Civilians, unfamiliar with the meaning
of our various ribbons, are more imprcssed
by the blue badge of the combat infantry-
man than by any assortment of important
decorations. But what of the combat-tested
veterans of the other armsr The Yalu-
traveled artilleryman has the same collec-
tion of ribbons and stars as the Pusan clerk.
I'd be the last one to take a thing away
from a front-line infantr>'man— there's no
Job more rugged or deserving of recognition
—but how about some recognition for the
artillery FOs who were with him on Old
Baldy or the combat engineers who went
up on Baldy to dig out men trapped in
bunkers when the Chinese took over?
Members of regimental tank companies
were awarded the Combat Infantryman
Badge for performing the same mission as
divisional tank battalions who were ineligi-
ble. Infantry unit administrators won the
Combat Infantryman Badge at battalion
headquarters behind artillery batteries
whose men were ineligible. At one time, in
7th Division Artillery, there was no pro-
motion from second to first lieutenant un
less an officer had sixty days "hill time"
and at least one patrol. Some infantrymen
win recognition for one day of action.
Surely the Army hasn't so many genuine
combat veterans (men whoVe shot and
been shot at and spent a few miserable
weeks in a hole) that it can't afford them
suitable recognition.
Let's quit giving so many ribbons to
everyone and give something to those
people who do the dirty work.
Lt. Robert F. Ensslin, Jr.
58 Hamilton Road
Chapel Hill, N. C.
Service Stripes
• After reading "Here's Why, Sergeant
Bowles," [November] my buddies and I
believe that the service stripe and overseas
bars— the service stripe in particular— are
a mark that definitely should not be re-
moved from the uniform. To most of us
who prefer to stay in serxice and who more
or less feel we are professional soldiers,
Service stripes are a mark of pride.
Sfc Austin R. Keeth
Co L, 5th Cav
APO 201, San Francisco
Tac Air in Navy Blue
• The ideas presented in Colonel Rein
hardt's article, 'Tut Tac Air in Navy Blue"
[September issue] have often been discussed
among Navy aviators as well as infantry-
men, both Marine and Army alike. How-
ever, this is the first time, to my knowledge,
that these thoughts have appeared in a
widely read publication. It is encouraging to
see this done. Let's hope that the proposal
to place all tactical air commitments in
the hands of Navy and Marine Corps
aviation receives the most careful considera-
tion.
Although it seems to be a sound idea, I
cannot believe that it will be as easy as
Colonel Reinhardt seems to indicate. There
are certain obstacles to be surmounted be-
fore our military establishment could pos-
sibly operate under such an improved sys
tem. Some of these are briefly discussed
below.
First, we must be able to supply this
new force with pilots and aircraft (a tre-
mendous number compared with the pres-
ent naval air arm). This would possibly
suggest the transfer of Air Force men and
equipment to the Navy. But here we must
consider that there are differences between
Navy and Marine Corps aviators and those
of the Air Force Tactical Air Command,
differences which would most certainly pro-
hibit any switch, at least for some time.
For one thing, the naval aviator (and his
plane) must be able to operate from an air-
craft carrier. This is the principle of naval
aviation which gives it its mobility and flex
ibility and so must remain. Besides this.
it is also noteworthy that one of the fore
most missions of the Navy aviator has long
been close air support of ground troops.
which is untrue of his Air Force contempo-
rary. Extensive indoctrination and training
would be necessary.
It should be remembered that while the
Navy and Marine Corps provided excellent
support for the ground forces in Korea (par
ticularly in the Operations around the
Pusan perimeter and near Chosin Reser
voir, where they operated independently
under their own control system), this Sys-
tem is designed primarily for support ot
amphibious Operations. The Navy might
well be reluctant to send its air arm inland
on extensive overland campaigns out ot
reach of its seagoing forces.
The advantages of such a move secni
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
obvious to anyone who thoroughly under-
stands the two concepts of close air support
delivery. Tactical air would become a far
more capable infantry weapon, being availa-
ble to the unit Commander (down to and
including the battalion Commander) when
and where he needed it. The time lapse
between request and delivery of a close air
support mission would be reduced from
days— or, in some cases, hours— to minutes;
and that mission would be both flown and
controlied by pilots primarily trained in
ground support. The superiority of this
method is indispu table.
Colonel Reinhardt is to be congratulated
on a fine article which brings into the open
one of the vital problems facing our mili-
tary establishment today.
Lt. Thomas M. Martin
17SMC
Wing Schools, Ist MAW, FMF
FPO, San Francisco
Letter from Britain
• I have always read your magazine for
its fine articles and general contribution
to miHtary studies, but in the October 1954
number I find a passage most offensive
and untrue.
I refer to the last paragraph of the letter
by Mr. Frederic L. Wells on page 12.
This paragraph can only mean that Britain
has been stripped of her "prizes" because
she has lost her manhood, since she is no
longer hardy and self-denying. ... I trust
your readers have more intelligence than
to accept his complacent and completely
erroneous Statements.
As editor you should, in my opinion,
have excluded this letter. Great Britain
lost tremendously in the 1914-18 war—
infinitely more than the United States.
Even during the last war, with the U. S.
more than three times the size of Britain
we lost more men dead than you did.
If we lost our manhood it is because
they lie dead on battlefields for liberty all
over the world. . . .
T. H. McGuFFiE
40 Crosbie Road
Harborne, Birmingham 17, Eng.
• The Editors are aware of the immense
contrihutions and great sacrifices of the
British peoples to the cause of freedom
everywhere, and we hold them in highest
respect and deepest affection. The last
thing The Journal would do, wittingly
or unwittingly, is insult the peoples of
such a gallant ally and close friend of the
United States. We cannot helieve Mr.
Wells intended any insult to the British
peoples. We sent him a copy of Mr.
McGuffie's letter and he replied as follows:
• I regret that my remarks should have
made such an impression on any patriotic
Englishman. That Britain has suffered
grievously "we know, indeed"; but the
point was that these tragic events occurred
largely because certain things were not
done that incited men like Conan Doyle
JANUAR Y 1955
or Rudyard Kipling (note such verses as
"The Lesson," "The Islanders," "The
Dykes," and "Lord Roberts") warned ought
to be done.
I ofFered my two cents' worth that my
own country might learn from Britain's
experience; as it is surely to Britain's ad-
vantage that this country should so learn.
Frederic L. Wells
Newton Highlands, Mass.
Anniversary Issue (Cont'd.)
• I have read and re-read Colonel Dupuy's
article. It is simply magnificent, by far
the best article of its type that I have ever
been privileged to read. I do hope that it
can be published in some large civilian
magazine . . . where the civilian public
will have a chance to read it.
Lt. Gen. Hobart R. Gay
Hq. Fifth Army
Chicago, 111.
• I have just finished reading Colonel
Dupuy's "Pass in Review" and I am so
moved that I must write you at once. It
is the finest picture of Army life over the
years ... I have ever seen. [It] has great
historical merit but it teaches a real les-
son. . . . If all our new soldiers read this,
I am sure they would be better soldiers
and better Americans.
Col. Gilbert Baldwin Lame
Scarsdale, N. Y.
• I am a retired AUS Infantry officer
[and] have been a subscriber to your maga-
zine and Infantry Journal for way back
perhaps as far as 1914. .. .
I want to teil you what a great kick I
got out of "The Journal's First Half Cen-
tury." Maybe I'm wrong, but I sense
a certain tone of sadness, a certain wish
that some of the old customs of the service,
the old spirit that caused a man to be
proud of "the Dirty Third," the "Dandy
First," or "the Fighting Devils". . . .
I suppose you would call me an old fos-
sil; but old or young, fossil or otherwise, I
certainly do not approve of any lowering
of the Standards. Clothes may not make,
but "the apparel oft proclaims" the man.
An officer, I was taught, must always be
on parade. How disappointing the dress
of Army officers here in Philadelphia. . . .
Please don't misunderstand me. Maybe
it's not their fault. Maybe they must w^ear
the clothes they do. When I was in the
Army, an officer prided himself in being
well dressed at all times and he usually
was. . . .
And almost as bad, you see majors Walk-
ing on the left-hand side of captains, a
captain saying to a colonel, "Bill, that was
a good game we saw last night," and a lot
of other things that an old fogy like me
just can't stomach.
There is no Substitute for discipline.
Military bearing breeds discipline; disci-
pline begets unit spirit. When you have
(Continued on page 57)
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10
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
IN AIR DEFENSE
Geography Is On Our Side
BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS R. PHILLIPS
THE United States has a built-in geographica! ad-
vantage over the Soviet Union for defense against
air attack as well as for aerial Operations it might con-
duct against the Soviet heardand. The importance
of this advantage will increase as the two opposing
forces approach a stalemate in air-atomic weapons—
atomic and hydrogen bombs and the means to deliver
them.
When stalemate comes, the ability to foil the air-
atomic offensive will be the great deterrent to an
air-atomic blitz. When there is comparative equality
in air-atomic pow^er, defensive superiority will become
decisive. If the would-be first attacker knows that bis
Brigadier General Thomas R. Phillips,
U.S.A.-retired, has been a contributor to the
military press for many years. During the
pre-World War II years he wrote a number of
penetrating articles on the changing face of
war in both the Coast Artillery ]oiirnal and
Infantry Journal. Among these were "The New
Face of War" (1938), and "Traditionahsm
and Mihtary Defeat" (1941). He entered the
Army in 1917 and retired in 1950. Since then
he has been writing on military subjects for
The St. Louis Post-D/spatc/i— which means
that the good burghers of St. Louis are the
best informed people in the country on mili-
tary matters.
JANUARY 1955
11
■^mf»»» >"r-iwi ■■'•tTT*'
THE Ă–.S.S.R. UES OPEH TB AIR AnACK FROH AU DIRECTIOHS
attack will be heavily blunted by the other's defenses,
while bis own defenses are unable to do the same
against retaliatory bombers, an eflFective defense be-
comes the real deterrent. In effect it adds up to an
increase in offensive power.
Thus, as the Soviet air-atomic power increases to
the point where it effectively stalemates our air-atomic
combination, it w^ill become more and more impera-
tive for US to seize the advantage geography has be-
stowed on us and build an effective air and antiair-
craft defense.
THE superiority that geography gives the U.S. over
central Eurasia offers us two great offensive advan-
tages. First, our aircraft can enter the Soviet Union's
Eurasian heardand at any point on its 14,(X)0-mile per-
inieter. This perimeter is so vast that it is impossible to
set up either a complete defensive screen or a warning
screen at or near the rim. This requires the Soviets to
defend from regions inside the country. Thus they
lose the advantage of distant warning and successive
12
lines of defense. It has been reported that the Moscovv
region is surrounded by seventeen airdromes.
The second offensive advantage comes from the
much shorter distances the United States Air Force
has to fly from our peripheral bases to enter a central
Eurasian territorv. Moscow is only 1,100 miles from
Turkey, 1,600 miles from England, and 2,700 miles
from Thule. There is actually no target that is more
than 3,000 miles distant from some one of our pe-
ripheral bases. All can be reached by our medium
bombers and, with refueling, present bombers can
return to their bases.
The picture with reference to a Soviet attack on the
United States is just the opposite. With the ex-
ception of Uelen— across Bering Strait from Alaska
—all Soviet bases are more than 3,000 miles from
targets in the United States. It is doubtful that
Uelen would be usable as a base since any Operations
there would be picked up instandy by Alaskan radar
stations and the base could be taken out at once from
Fairbanks, only 675 miles away.
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
In addition, geography forces the Eurasian power to
make its flights over thousands of miles of territory
controlled by the U.S. or its allies. The approaches
are channelized over natural defensive and warning
areas unless long dog-legs are flown, which would
increase the already great distances.
Distance is an important factor in limiting offensive
capacity, simply as a function of time. A 10,000-mile
Bight would require from twenty-four to forty-eight
hours, depending upon the type of plane. Flights of
half or less than half that distance, such as from our
peripheral bases to Eurasia, could be made much more
often. The distance factor has the practical effect of
doubling the capacity of our air force or of halving
that of a Eurasian air force.
The geographical advantage to the U.S. in air de-
fense is equally pronounced. The direct routes from
eastern Siberia, North Cape (Mys Schmidt), and
Kamchatka pass over Alaska or the Aleutian Islands.
As previously indicated, the eastern tip of Siberia is
not usable as a base. 1 he direct line from Kamchatka
is more than 3,500 miles, while a long dog-leg to the
Pacific Northwest over the Pacific to avoid the Aleu-
tian Islands is about 4,300 miles. A long dog-leg from
North Cape to avoid Alaska and to come down through
central Canada to Chicago is about 4,500 miles.
OTHER North Pole approaches are no more favor-
able. It is about 4,000 miles from Franz Josef Land
to Chicago. And no one has suggested that the Soviets
might have air bases on Franz Josef Land.
The shortest air route to the United States from
the east is from Murmansk. The distances are about
4,000 miles to New York and 4,400 miles to Chicago.
The routes from Murmansk cross over Greenland,
Baffin Island, Labrador and Canada, and then for
several hundred miles over the United States. It
should be possible, from radar stations on Greenland
and on Baffin Island, Labrador, and Newfoundland,
to obtain warning of enemv approach 2,000 miles out
FRIENDLY LAND AREAS FUNK THE U. S. AT STRATEGIC POINTS
JANUAR Y 1955
13
of New York City. Substantial progress has been
made in establishing these stations.
Routes from eastern Europe which would cross
the Atlantic south of Greenland are longer. It is
about 4,500 miles from Lithuania or Czechoslovakia
to New York. The northern route would cross Sweden
and Xorwav and give warning, while a more southerly
one would cross Germany and Scotland. It is im-
possible to select a route in this area that will not
cross territory of our European allies, no matter how
far off the direct course the flight is made.
The chart on page 1 3 shows that the direct air routes
to the United States from either the east or west
Cover a width of only about 1,000 miles on the east
and about 800 miles on the west in the vicinity of
Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. This simplifies the
American defensive problem enormously. It means
that distant advanced warning can be provided against
direct routes of attack from the east and west by
covering a space of only 1,800 miles. This compares
with the Soviet problem of covering 14,000 miles to
gain warning.
To evade these distant warning installations a hos-
tile power could fly a dog-leg course. This would, of
course, greatlv increase the distances. This is the
justification for patrolling the Pacific between the
Hawaiian Islands and the Aleutians, for patrolling
off the Atlantic and Pacific coasts with airborne radar
planes. It also is the justification for radar patrols
between Greenland and Iceland, between Iceland and
the Faroe Islands, and between the Faroes and the
Shetlands.
For some reason the U.S. public has given more
attention to filling the gap in the warning System
from the North Pole down through Canada than in
getting effective warning and defense over the direct
routes. The North Pole routes to the United States
are the longest of all and the most difficult to navigate
because of the proximity of the route to the magnetic
North Pole.
A more reasonable program would be to build inter-
ccptor bases to back up the distant warning Systems
we have now toward the north west and northeast.
There is a widespread misconception that warning
is simple, easy, and dependable. The opposite is true.
Radar is perpetually giving ghost images that have to
be investigated by interceptors. A distant warning
line, with present radar equipment, across northern
Canada would send so many ghost images that the
entire air defense System would be in a State of con-
stant alert. Such a System is no better than none.
It is not feasible to build interceptor bases in the
far north of Canada. And they are terribly expensive.
Thulc air base, on Greenland, has cost us about $300
million so far. It is open to navigation about two
months a year and this has been extended to three
months by the use of ice-breakers. In northern Cana-
da the sea may be open for two weeks in one year
and not at all in another. The problem of building
an effective warning System there, with a minimum
14
of interceptors to back up the radar, is insuperable.
We can hope that new developments in radar may
improve performance to the point where a warning
line that is not backed by interceptors will have some
value.
Some U.S. scientists, supported by energetic news-
paper columnists, have insisted that the United States
should construct the distant warning line at once. In
the Department of Defense, where there was more
awareness of the logistical difficulties and also a better
understanding of the usefulness of such a line with
present equipment, it was feit that the defense should
be expanded north ward from the border.
ALONG the Canada-U.S. border is the Pine Tree
Line, reinforced to the north by Canadian regional
defense installations around the principal populated
areas. The farthest feasible advance to the north is
one which could be supplied by road and rail. This
is the so-called McGill fence which runs generally
from southern Alaska, north of the Canadian Nation-
al Railway and to Hudson's Bay north of Churchill.
Such a warning line can be supplied and can be
backed up with enough interceptors to investigate
radar images. At the present time it is the most im-
portant distant warning project, next to the Systems
covering the direct routes from the northeast and
north west.
The Soviet Union does not have an important
capability to attack the United States from the air at
the present time. The Soviet long-range air force
consists of about 700 copies of the U.S. B-29 with a
ränge of about 3,350 miles. A small number, from
10 to 20, of the Type 31 turbojet, similar in charac-
teristics to the U.S. B-36, have been built. This plane
is said to have a ränge of 6,500 miles and a top speed
of 460 miles an hour.
At the last show in Moscow the TU-37 and TU-
39 jet bombers were displayed in flight. These are a
heavy and a medium bomber with performance esti- •
mated to be near that of the U.S. B-52 and B-47.
These should be Coming into numbers in from three
to five years. When the Soviets do have a long-range
air force equipped with these aircraft, then the air-
defense problem of the United States will become
deadly seriou:.
The ränge of the Soviets B-29 type of bomber
alone is enough to indicate the impracticability of
attacking the United States with it. It obviously was
designed to reach all of Europe and the United States
peripheral bases.
Our own Air Force v/ould not dream of sending a
B-29 over Soviet territory, nor is there any reason to
believe the Russians would send one over the United
States. There has been a great deal of irrational talk
of one-way flights to the United States. Public im-
agination pictures a lone Soviet bomber with its
million- or five-million-dollar bomb reaching a billion-
dollar target here at the sacrifice of not returning.
This approaches fantasy. A lone bomber would not
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
stand one chance in a hundred of reaching its target.
When high Air Force officers talk about intercepting
only 40 per cent or only 70 per cent (it varies from
time to time) of the attacking bombers, they are
talking about what they call a serious, well-organized
attack, and not one lone bomber.
ATYPICAL bomber-attack plan would call for 15
aircraft to participate. One or two bombs might
be carried. Part of the aircraft would be loaded with
radar-deception equipment; others would go along
to divert enemy interceptors from the bombers with
lethal loads. The whole scheme of deception and
diversion would be most carefully worked out. When
an Air general says that 60 or 30 per cent of the at-
tacking bombers would get through, he means the
atomic carriers in this sort of attack.
It seems obvious that attac'ks against the United
Enormous problems of air defense loom on the
horizon. In a few years the Soviet Union will
possess a large fleet of high-speed intercon-
tinental bombers. We must be ready for that
day with improved radar detection and guided
missiles. While the Communist fastnesses can
be ottacked from relatively nearby bases around
the Perimeter of Eurasia, the Soviets must fly
long distances over unfriendly territory in order
to attack the U. S. This favor that geography has
given us, backed up by a sound defensive
System, may provide the deterrent to total war.
States by the B-29 type of bomber constitute no great
danger. There are too few of the Type 31 to be con-
sidered a serious threat, for the entire stock would
have to be used in a single attack. We appear to have,
therefore, from three to five years to perfect our
defenses before the Soviet Union will have a bombing
threat to match our own. And when that time comes,
as indicated earlier, the United States has a built-in
geographical advantage.
Air and antiaircraft defenses are wholly dependent
upon radar, and radar is going backward compared
with the advance of weapons. The radar guidance
and command Systems in ground-to-air, air-to-air and
air-to-ground rockets and pilotless aircraft can be in-
terfered with if the frequencies are determined and
the airborne equipment provided.
An antiaircraft rocket which explodes by command
radio could be exploded by the enemy radio if the
JANUARY 1955
enemy bombers had the proper equipment. On the
other band, radar bomb sights can also be jammed
and made ineffective. To top these complications, it is
perfectly possible to make a rocket with guidance
that will home on any radar transmitting equipment.
Equipment can be made that will detect radar as
quickly as the radar detects the equipment.
The struggle in the electronics laboratories to build
a jam-proof radar and to devise equipment to recog-
nize and jam radar is as critical and arduous as that
devoted to designing faster and faster aircraft and
better and better antiaircraft rockets.
This battle is being fought in secrecy in scientific
laboratories and at military testing grounds. Its out-
come will determine whether or not many miraculous
accomplishments in the guidance of rockets and pilot-
less aircraft will ultimately be effective in war.
AS aircraft speeds continue to increase, the problem
of interception becomes almost insoluble. Radar
warning does not reach out far enough to give suf-
ficient time for interception when combined speeds
of the two planes reach 1 ,500 to 2,000 miles an hour
—2,200 to about 3,000 feet a second, equal to the
speed of a rifle bullet. To expect two planes to meet
when the combined speeds reach such a figure would
be the same as expecting the bullets fired by two
duellers to hit each other.
Nevertheless the British are preparing to defend
their island entirely by antiaircraft rockets. This is a
more practicable Solution for Great Britain than for
the United States. The areas which must be defended
there are not numerous and are relatively small.
When speeds do become so great that interceptor
defense becomes impracticable, the United States will
face an exceedingly difficult defense problem. Con-
tinuing improvement in ränge of rockets and in radar
is of the utmost importance to meet the defense prob-
lem in the not distant future. And looking farther
ahead, it may become necessary to find a way to inter-
cept the ballistical missile.
At the present time, however, interceptor speeds
have advanced faster than bomber speeds, and the
use of air-to-air homing rockets has greatly increased
the power of the interceptor to kill. On the other
band, the bomber cannot use the air-to-air rocket for
defense. The bomber is attacked from the rear and
must fire backward. The initial speed of the rocket
is decreased by the forward speed of the bomber so
that it drops and loses its course.
Some time in the not distant future our survival
may depend upon solving defense problems which
do not yet press upon us but which do loom on the
dark horizon. If we can discern the problems today
we should strive now for the Solutions. The two most
critical ones in air defense are improvement of guided
missiles and radar. A few years hence, when the
offensive power of the air-atomic combination is
stalemated, an effective defense may become the
great deterrent to war.
is
From its launching site at Lorton, Va., a Nike batter)- guards Washington, D. C.
A Nike platform under construction.
The well holds the shaft that raises
the missile into firing position
NIKE'S NEST
Here's how bases for the Army's supersonic guided
missile are being built outside America's greatest cities
Nike is one of the chief elements of the fist that guards the nation
from air attack. Launching platforms for this potent guided missile
have been built near Washington, D. C, and are in the process of con
struction around other vital and heavily populated areas.
Nike's nest consists of two areas: the launching site itself and th(
control area. More than nintty-six tons of steel and a vastly greatoi
amount of concrete go into the building of one of these "platforms" f".
a battery of four Nikes. A mile or so away from the launching sit^
are the controls, where are lotated the three radar units that find the
enemy aircraft and "lock" the missile to it, so that their paths will in
evitably meet. Two officers and thirty-six men are regularly assignco
to the launching area, and five officers and forty-four men to the contn-l
area.
Used in conjunction with air interceptors and conventional antiair
craft artillery, Nike will preseiit enemy bombers with an impenetrabii
screen of fire. It has a ränge of approximately 50 miles and can reacb
altitudes of 60,000 feet. Its spted is approximately 1,500 miles an houi
Once the ground radar units have found the path of the approaching
bomber, automatic controls in the Nike take care of the rest and guidt'
the missile without fail to its target.
The plan of a Nike nest. When the radar "finds" an enemy bomber, a tracer beam
locks on it, and the paths of Nike and bomber have to cross (Courtesy "Steel ways")
An Army technician inspects a Nike missile before it is raised to the launching platform
. "V^
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The more things change the more they are the same
A Medal
for Horatius
COLONEL W. C. HALL
Rome
II Calcnds, April, CCCLX
Siibject: Recommendation for Senate Medal of Honor
To: Department of War, Rcpublic of Rome
I. Recommend Gaius I loratius, Captain of Foot, O-
MCMXIV, for the Senate Medal of Honor.
II. Captain I loratius has served XVI years, all honorably.
III. On the III day of March, during the attack on the
citv by Lars Porsena of Clusium and bis Tuscan armv of
CXM men, Captain Horatius voluntarily, vvith Sergeant
Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius, held the
entire Tuscan armv at the far end of the bridge, until the
structure could be destroyed, thereby saving the city.
IV. Captain Horatius did valiantly fight and kill one
Major Picus of Clusium in individual combat.
V. The exemplary courage and the outstanding leader-
ship of Captain Horatius are in the highest tradition of the
Roman Army.
Julius Lucullus
Commander, II Foot Legion
Ist Ind. AG. IV Calends, April, CCCLX
To: G-III
For comment.
G. C.
Ild Ind. G-III. IX Calends, May, CCCLX.
To: G-II.
L For comment and forwarding.
II. Change paragraph III, line VI, from "saving the city"
to "lessened the eflFectiveness of the enemy attack." The
Roman Army was well dispersed tactically; the reserve had
not been committed. The phrase as written might be con-
strued to cast aspersions on our fine army.
III. Change paragraph V, line I, from "outstanding lead-
CoLONEL W. C. Hall, Corps of Engineers, an occasional con-
tributor, is presently stationed at Fort George G. Meade, Md.
18
ership" to read 'commendable initiative". Captain Horatius'
command was II men-only I/IV of a squad.
J.C.
Illd. Ind. G-II. II Ides, June, CCCLX.
To: GL
I. Omit strength of Tuscan forces in paragraph III.
This information is classified.
IL A report evaluated as B-II states that the oflicer was
a Captain Pincus of Tifernum. Recommend change "Major
Picus of Clusium" to "an officer of the enemy forces".
T.J.
IVth Ind. GL IX Ides, January, CCCLXI
To: JAG
I. FĂĽll name is Gaius Caius Horatius.
IL Change service from XVI to XV years. One year in
Romulus Chaptcr, Cub Scouts, has been given credit for
militarv service in error.
E. J.
Vth Ind. JAG. Ild of February, CCCLXI.
To: AG
I. The Porsena raid was not during wartime; the tem-
ple of Janus was closed.
IL The action against the Porsena raid, ipso facto, was
a police action.
III. The Senate Medal of Honor cannot be awarded in
peacetime. (AR CVIII-XXV, paragraph XII, c.)
IV. Suggest consideration for Soldier's Medal.
P.E.
VIth Ind. AG, IV Calends, April CCCLXI
To: Gl
Concur in paragraph IV, Vth Ind.
L. J.
Vllth Ind. Gl, I day of May, CCCLXI
To: AG
I. Soldier's Medal is given for saving lives; suggest St.r
of Bronze as appropriate.
E. J.
Vlllth Ind. AG JII day of June, CCCLXI
To: JAG
For opinion.
G.G.
(Continued an page 47)
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
EDITORIALS
Remarkable Objectivity
lilE have been impressed in recent months by the firm
"objectivity displayed by those engaged in seeking the
best possible tactical Organization for the ground arms.
If anyone is engaged in honing a pet axe— er in goring
someone eise's pet ox— we would be very much sur-
prised. Everywhere we go we encounter a spirit of open
inquiry, best typified perhaps by an informal memoran-
dum written by a 03 Indian that came to our attention
quite by accident and in a totally different connection.
**No one yet knows," the memo said, "what the future
Organization will be and until we do, one cannot say
we are discarding anything."
f Y f
Queen of Battle
1 NOTHER officer wrote to us in a letter: "The prob-
" lems that face the infantry are tremendous but we'U
solve them if we get support and understanding." He
wrote that in a plea for this magazine to give every bit of
support it could to the infantrymen who are at work on
infantry's modern problems. We pledge all the support
we can muster. We reaffirm our belief that the infantry
is the arm that all the rest of the members of the Army
team labor and fight to advance. Infantry will change
— it has changed mightily in the lifetime of our senior
officers— but it is still the arm of decision, still the Queen
of Battle.
Y Y f
Army in Being
WE learned long ago that we don't have to smite our
readers with a broadside to make them get a point,
and so we are well content to simply label **The Oun
That Might Have Won," on page 24, as '*a lesson for
today." But we cannot resist the temptation to observe
that it is becoming more and more clear that a modern
army has to be an army in being on the day the em-
bassies burn their secret papers and not an M plus 30
or 60 or 180 day force. Viscount Montgomerv makes
this point, as you'U note when you read pages 20 to 23.
Incidentally, Colonel Oeorge B. Sloan hit hard at this
need for an army in being in an article in the June 1954
issue of this magazine. If you don't remember it, you
would be rewarded by digging up a copy of that June
issue to read what Colonel Sloan had to say about the
''Design for an Atomic Army."
f -f -f
Monty and SHAPE
YOLLLL not be surprised to find that Viscount Mont-
gomery's piece is pure Montyese: honest convictions
asserted boldly and without rancor. He is undeniably
a most remarkable man and an able soldier. He begins bis
JANUARY 1955
piece by saying he is an international soldier represent-
ing the NATO countrics, but is speaking his own per-
sonal views. We read that with considerable interest
because we have been avvare for some time that the
high command at SHAPE— General Gruenther, Field
Marshai Montgomerv, General Norstad and others—
have been deeply involved in the task of applying atomic
weapons to the defense of Western Europe. General
Gruenther himself has said that he believes atomic weap-
ons would be used if war broke out in western Europe.
Qualified and reliable newspapersmen who have visited
at SLIAPE have reported on the healthy attitude of in-
quiry and willingness to investigate new ideas that exist
there. For example, Dr. Vannevar Bush told a subcom-
mittee of the House of Representatives that he had
worked at SHAPE with Field Marshai Montgomerv "in
plann ing an important command post exercise [where]
there vvere scientific teams, the subject being modern
weapons." All this gives added interest to the 'per-
sonal views" of this international soldier who represents
14 NATO countries.
i i i
Tac "Strike Forces"
HERE'S somcthing that's really not so new but you can
muH over it profitablv nevertheless. The aviation in-
dustry press has reported that the Tactical Air Com-
mand wants to create somcthing called "strike forces."
This idea seems based partly on TAC's desire to share
in ''Strategie" missions with nuclear or thermonuclear
bombs and partly a way to carry the ball in small pe-
riphery wars. The latter concept would have a TAC
"strike force" of atomic light bombers and fighter-bomb-
ers that could strike a target— after ground forces had
maneuvered the enemy into profitable concentrations.
A further refinement is for the air forces of the smaller
allies to be confined to close support missions. For ex-
ample, the air arms of Turkey and Korea would be armed
with simple, hardv close-support aircraft such as the
Mighty Midget made by Martin.
i i i
Good Shooting
YOU can be proud that the LI. S. Army (with a mighty
assist by LI. S. science and industry) is the only mili-
tarv Service in the world to have conceiv^ed, developed
and produced workable, effective guided missiles and
rockets for both surface-to-air and surface-to-surface Op-
erations. We can't sav what the limitations of these
weapons are, but we understand their fĂĽll capabilities
have not vet been field-tested.
And we note that General Gavin recently said that
the Armv will have rockets with longer ränge and
carrying more explosive power tban the Honest John.
19
Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery
DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED FORCES, EUROPE
THE CHANGING
FACE OF WAR
Speaking hefore the Royal United Services In-
stitution in London some months ago Viscount
Montgomery disciissed the changing face of war
in the clearest and most forceful terms any
postwar soldier has used. We puhlish here a Con-
densed Version of that talk hecaiise we think
every soldier will find it stimulating and informa-
tive. We oiight to add that the Field Marshal
dtiring his recent American visit made almost
the same talk hefore a California audience.
ISPEAK as an international soldier who is the ser\'ant of
the fourteen governments of NATO. What I have to say
represents my own personal vievvs.
As we advance further along the road of development of
atomic and thermonuclear vveapons, guided missiles, and
hallistic rockets, it will become increasingly clear that a hot
war will be mutual suicide for the contestants. Therefore,
the great problem regarding the cold war now in progress is
hovv to win it without precipitating a hot war.
Local wars, e.g., Korea, Indochina, Malaya, Kenya, wĂĽl
no doubt continue to form part of the cold war, but there is
a vast difference between them and a hot war. Both are
global, the cold war and the hot war.
In trying to win the cold war one side or the other may
miscalculate and bring on a hot war, though neither side
wanted it.
I consider that the present State of world affairs, and the
prescnt tension, will continue for a long period. Therefore,
the true objective of all military thinking today must be how
to combine most economically the military measures needed
for success in the cold war, with the development of the
military strength needed to convince our enemies that a
World hot war would resuh in their own destruction: no
matter how great the surprise they achieved at the outset, nor
hovv ruthlessly they conducted the contest
The cold war calls for the use of conventional weapons;
success in the hot war calls for new weapons.
It is obvious that the use of atomic and thermonuclear
weapons will have a profound effect on the conduct of war,
on weapon Systems, on strategical and tactical conceptions,
and therefore on the Organization of forces.
In our reorganization, we may often find a clash occurring
between conventional weapons which we know about, ancl
new weapons which we do not know about. Whenever that
clash occurs, the Solution should be on the side of the long-
term new weapons. New weapons must be ''phased in"
20
gradually to our existing weapons Systems so as to reduce, or
eliminate progressively, equipment and weapons which will
become out of date as the years pass.
I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are
basing all our operational planning on using atomic and
thermonuclear weapons in our defense. With us it is no
longer: "They may possibly be used."
It is verv definitelv: "Thev will be used, if we are attacked! '
The reason for this action is that we cannot match the
strength that could be brought against us unless we use
nuclear weapons; and our political chiefs have never shown
anv great enthusiasm in giving us the numbers to be able to
do without using such weapons.
It all calls for a certain reorganization of our forces, and
in our strateg\\ A special group at SHAPE has had these
matters under verv close examination for the past year and
we have reached certain conclusions. We now need the
Cooperation of national authorities to get those conclusions
translated into practical action.
In fact, we have reached the point of no retum as regards
the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in a hot war.
If we visualize an atomic war, the importance of civil de-
fenses is apparent. TTiat subject is grosslv neglected today.
Indeed, there is no sound civil defense Organization in the
national territory of any NATO nation so far as I know.
Let us then consider the future.
If ever war should come again to this distracted world, which
God forbid, weapons of power unprecedented in the annals
of war are available for employment. There are some who
say that if war is joined, nuclear weapons will not be used.
I would disagree with that. My opinion is that the fear of
atomic and thermonuclear weapons is a powerful deterrent
to war; but once a world hot war has started hoth sides are
likely to use them. We would certainlv use them ourselves
if we are attacked, as I have said.
So far as we can see today we are not justified in depending
on air bombardment alone, even with nuclear weapons, to
bring a world war to a successful conclusion; still less a local
war or disturbance. Wars today can be won only by fighting,
and, in a hot world war, fighting will continue in the air, at
sea, and on land until one side loses the will to fight on. Wt
would be wise to accept these facts and to prepare ourselves
accordinglv.
On the other hmid, the skillfnl emplowient and acciirate
afylication of superior nuclear jĂźrepower in combination u^th
the Operations of streanilined land forces, can he a decisive
factor in the land/air hattle. The prohlem will he. how to
force the enemy to concentrate his armed forces siifficiently to
offer a worthwhile nnclear target, liHthont exposing our own
forces to destruction hy the enemy s nuclear attack.
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
In our forward thinking we must put the emphasis on
Organization, on tactical conceptions, and on the weapons
and equipment that are necessary to enable us to fight in
the way we want.
All our future depends on getting the right answ^ers to the
problems we now have to face.
If a hot war is precipitated by miscalculation, which is
always possible, there will not have been the build-up of
Eastern land and air forces, nor the strategical deployment
of submarines, which are generally taken for granted. In
such a case, we, the Western nations, might be temporarily
surprised.
But if we can react quickly, we would win such a war.
It would take a long time for the East to build up the
forces necessary to do us serious härm, and by that time our
air forces wĂĽl have done a great deal of damage to the East-
ern countries.
TTiis type of hot war, the war by miscalculation, may come
at any time. We must fight it with the weapons we have got,
and in the way our forces are trained when it begins. We must,
in fact, do the best we can with what we have got, and not be
tied to plans designed to meet an entirely different Situation.
Isuggest that such a war will have three phases.
First Phase: a world-wide struggle for mastery in the air
and of the oceans. It will be vital during this phase to pre-
vent enemy land forces overrunning and neutralizing Western
bases and territories.
Second Phase: the destruction of the remaining enemy
land forces.
Third Phase: the bargaining phase, when the enemy 's
homeland and all it contains is at the mercv of the Western
i.
MONTY MAKES THESE POINTS:
* Atomic and thermonuclear weapons will be
used if we are attacked.
* The dominant factor in future war will be
airpower.
* Air Support must be provided land forces,
using highly trained forces.
* To fight successfully on land we must have:
First-class peacetime forces in being
Well organized reserve forces
Sound logistic and movement Organization
Sound civil defense Organization
* Land Forces must emphasize strategical and
tactical mobility and simplicity of weapons
Systems.
* Suitable aircraft must be developed for mov-
ing divisions rapidly by air.
* Armies need a simple line of supply based
on an airlift.
* All Services must develop livelier and more
opportunistic battle leaders.
JANUARY 1955
airpower. We will then carry the air attack to the point where
the enemy accepts our terms.
The second and third phases may be concurrent.
Against the background of this over-all strategy, let us
consider the war under three headings: the war in the air;
the war at sea; and the war on land.
IT is clear from the strategy I have outlined that the dominant
factor in future war will be airpower. And that is my very
firm belief. But like so many things we do, we too often pay
only lip Service to this great truth.
The greatest asset of airjoower is its flexibility. The main
factors in determining the degree of flexibility are the methods
of command and control, the ränge of aircraft, and the mo-
bility of supporting equipment.
Flexibilitv and centralized control of all the air forces in a
theater of war, are vital to success.
But the West has sacrificed flexibilitv by basing the air
command Organization on the requirements of "direct Sup-
port" of the land forces, whereas it should be based on the
Organization necessary to gain the greatest measure of control
in the air.
Airpower is indivisible. If vou split it up into compartments
vou merelv pull it to pieces and destrov its greatest asset—
its flexibility.
If we lose the war in the air, we lose the war and lose it
quickly. The methods we adopted in the later stages of
World War II are not necessarily those we should adopt in
the next war. In World War II we had almost complete air
superiority from 1943 onwards; it will not be the same in
World War III, and we cannot afford to sacrifice flexibilitv
in our air command Organization.
We must be careful that we do not draw false lessons for
the future from the last two years of the late war; by which
time we had won the war in the air.
The land-hased air forces ninst always provide whatever
offensive air stipport is needed in the war on land, using
air forces that are highly trained in that particidar wörk.
But they must carry out this task without sacrificing their
own flexibility. On occasions the whole of the available air-
power may have to be used to help to savc the armies from
destruction, and the air Organization must provide for such
a contingency arising at short notice.
Now let us examine the war in the air.
If we can maintain the ability to Start a tremendous nuclear
bombardment of the East the moment we are attacked, they
cannot afford to do nothing about it.
It must aflFect the employment of their air forces.
It must force them to devote a considerable effort of their
long-range air forces and nuclear vveajx>ns to attempt to hit
our strategical air forces and the installations on which they
depend.
It must force them to expcnd effort on air defense, no easy
problem for them.
»GAINST this background, I suggest there are three suc-
cessive stages to consider in the war in the air.
In the first stage as I see it, both sides will rely principally
on piloted aircraft in both the strategical and tactical fields.
In this pericxl also we stand to gain from the balance in favor
of the offensive in the air if we can react immediately.
I see no sign, within this period, of either side being able
to create an air defense System which could greatly affect
the present balance in favor of the offensive in the air.
But we cannot afford to rely on air resources which depend
on mobilization. The air forces we need, together with all
21
ÂĄ
the means necessarv to keep them operational, must exist in
pcacctime. And we must restore to the air Forces the flexi-
bihty thcv have largely lost, by centraHzing Air Command
on the highcst possible level.
The second stage [is] the not too-far distant future, [vvhen]
the East mav create a surticient st(x:k of atomic weajx)ns, and
may develop the k)ng-range means of delivering them effec-
tixelv enoui^h For them to strike at the outbreak oF war a devas-
tating blovv at our means oF deHvering offensive aiqiower.
We would not then be able to applv our greater stock of
nuclear weapons, and we might thereFore lose the initiative
in the air war at the start.
At this stage, as Far as I can see, both sides will still be
relying principallv on piloted aircraFt.
BeFore this period arrives, it will be oF tremendous im-
portance that we should have developed, and have in being,
a highlv efFective global earlv warning System, together with
the best air defense that the scientists can give us.
The third stage: furthcr ahead in my opinion than five
years From now, the East may have developed means oF de-
livering their weapons with accuracy, both short-range and
long-range, which do not relv on piloted aircraFt. Our ability
to counter that threat bv both offensive and deFensive meas-
ures will be much reduced, because the targets will be Far less
vulnerable— whether they are launching sites, or the weajx)ns
themselves actuallyjn the air.
We must ask ourselves seriouslv what, at that stage, are
to be the targets oF our offensive airjx3wer.
Will it then be true that offensive Operations bv our aircraFt
or missiles will directlv affect the enemv's abilitv to deliver
his weapons against us?
1 do not see the airplane disappearing altogether.
In the tactical field I am sure that there will alwavs be tasks
For piloted aircraFt in support oF land and naval Forces. The
enemy's aircraFt used For these pur}X)ses, and their bases, will
remain an important target For our aircraFt and missiles.
What we must do now is to organize the command and
control oF our air Forces so as to retain the oreatest degree oF
flexibility, centraHzing command in the highest Commander
who can effectivelv exercise that command; so that he can
wield the available air Forces in a theater oF war as one
mighty weapon.
I.F we are attacked, we must set in motion an immediate air
offensive on the largest [x)ssible scale, directed at the enemv's
air Forces and at his homeland. ITie means oF delivering an
immediate air offensive must exist in peace. We must devel-
op an effective, and global, early warning System in order to
have some chance oF being able to take the offensive in the
air should we be attacked. And we must study air deFense
urgently; I will say something on this subject later on.
It is vital that our air Forces should be able to absorb nuclear
attack, and survive to strike back. The principle oF dispersion
must be explored From every angle. We must get awav From
the enormous concrete runwavs oF todav.
Naval Forces require air supjx)rt in the same wav as do land
Forces. It is vital, in the conditions oF today, that navies called
on to operate in the great oceans should have their own air
Forces.
The navies oF those nations whose work lies entirelv in
narrow seas such as the Mediterranean, or in European waters,
are in a different Situation; in mv view, such navies do not
need their own air Forces.
The question to be Faced, and decided, is, "In the Future
will the seas be controlled From the sea or From the air?"
When one considers the ränge and power oF aircraFt oF the
22
future, and the progress that is likely in radar and electronics,
1 am personally Forced to the conclusion that the time will
come when the major Factor in the control oF the seas will
be airjx)wer.
TO fight successFully on land we need the following four
essentials, as a minimum:
First: We must have first-class, 'active," peacetime Forces,
up to strength and ready at all times to act as our shield with-
out anv mobilization procedure. These Forces must be traincd
and equipped to the highest pitch: mobile, hard-hitting, oF-
Fensive troops oF magniftcent morale, very highly disciplined,
under young and active Commanders. These are the troops
and the Commanders who have got to stand firm in the Face
oF the horrors and terrors oF the opening clashes oF an atomic
war, and thev will stand firm only if they are highly traincd
and highly disciplined. These are the M-Day Forces.
Second: We need reserve Forces, well organized, capable
oF being mobilized in echelons, and each echelon receiving
sufficient training in peace to ensure it is fit to fight at the
time it is needed. These are the post M-Day forces.
Third: Our Forces, active and reserve, must be backed by
a sound logistic and movement [transportation] Organization,
which should exist in peace to the degree necessary to ensure
success in the opening weeks oF war.
Fourth: We must have a sound civil deFense Organization
in each national territorv.
The whole philosophv underlying these needs in land
Forces is that the active Forces "in being" in peace will make
it impossible For the East to launch an attack successFullv
without a preparatorv build-up oF their Forces, which we would
know about; it would be difficult For the enemy to surprise us.
Our active Forces will prevent the Eastern Forces From
reaching our vital areas, while we are assembling and moving
Forward our reserve Forces.
It is clear to me, and I hope to you, that adequate air
strength, multiplied by the ability to use nuclear weapons in
quantity, increases our chances oF successFullv dcFcnding the
West iF we are attacked.
A fiirther point is the great effect that the progress of science
nmy have on the time factor in war. There is a stronger re-
qtiirenient now than ever hefore for M-Day forces to he
ready. in place, and fiĂĽly effective against a surprise attack.
Reserve Forces must be organized with relation to the time
when they must be available For use. This will affect the
State oF readiness in which thev are maintained, and, to some
extent, their Organization and equipment.
IT seems to me that the early phases oF a third World War
will shape very^ rapidly the course oF such a war. It would
be wishFul thinking to say at this time that a decision would
be reached in a matter oF weeks or oF a Few months. But I
suggest to you that a policy oF the FĂĽllest exploitation oF nuclear
weapons early in a war, raises serious questions as to the
military worth in peace time oF contributions to the war effort
which will have a dclayed effect.
Let US have a last look at the war in the air, at sea, and
on land.
We have got to win the war in the air.
We will not win it unless the air Forces are allowed to
regain their flexibility and unity, and unless air command
is organized accordingly. It is vital that this matter be tackled
at once on the highest political level.
We must maintain in peace the ability to launch an imme-
diate offensive against anyone who attacks us.
The West is vulnerable to nuclear attack. Great offensive
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
power is wasted unless it is married to deFensive power and
can be launched From a secure base. As time passes and the
offensive capability between East and West levels out, the
advantage will go to that side which can protect itselF against
attack, and can survive to strike back.
There is at the present time no sure deFense against the
airplane or ballistic rocket. Indeed, so Far as we can see to-
day, trying to get a secure deFense against air attack is rather
like trying to keep the tide back on the sea shore with a
picket Fence. This Situation must not be allowed to continue.
The hest scientific hrains we possess shotdd he gathered
in to help in the task, working in dose Cooperation with air
forces. l say "air forces" hecause l hold the view that air de-
fense shotdd he organized and handled hy air forces, and that
antiaircraft commands shmĂĽd he handed over to that service.
IF the armies can hold the land flanks, they help to keep the
threat to proportions that will prove manageable.
Today, the navies must handle this war. They must be
given the minimum means to ensure control oF the seas and
oF the approaches to essential ports, and no more. It is essen-
tial that they should not dissipate those means on tasks which
do not affect the war at sea.
But we must not be hide-bound bv past traditions. I give
it as my opinion that the time will come when the seas will
be controlled From the air.
OF all the fighting Services the armies have the most difficult
task as regards Organization For the Future.
We must niake a serions study of the shape of future war
on Ja-yid. It is of little use to superimpose new weapons an
World War U organizations, and then to try and work out
the tactical changes involved; we have got to examine the
prohlem against a new hackground.
We must examine our armies, and their equipment, to see
what changes are needed in an atomic age. Ă„ complete re-
organization is needed of the reserve armies of all the West-
ern nations; the present Systems for prodiicing reserve armies
are mostly out-of-date.
In the Organization of land forces the emphasis must he
on strategical and tactical mohility, and on simplicity of weap-
ons Systems.
We need divisions that can he moved rapidly hy air; this
will necessitate suitahle aircraft for the purpose.
To gain fĂĽll advantage of the immense firepower that
nuclear weapons have provided, and to avoid destruction [^v
enemy nuclear attack, armies imist develop a more lively and
Opportunist type of hattle leader than exists at present, in
hoth junior and senior ranks. Such a leader must have the
iynagination, the daring, and the resources to seize fleeting
local opportunities; he must he trained to act independently
and immediately within the framework of a general plan,
rather than on precise and detailed orders or only after refer-
ence to a superior.
Land Forces must become less dependent on roads and more
capable oF cross-country movement.
The supply System oF land armies must be streamlined.
They must become much less dependent on fixed lines oF
supplv such as roads and railways.
Armies need a simple line oF supply based on an airliFt.
Todav, when supply lines are cut by enemy action, armies
cease to operate efficiently. The System oF the Future should
provide air supply to Forward maintenance areas From base
depots many miles to the rear, and well dispersed. Divisions
would draw their requirements From the Forward maintenance
areas with vehicles having a cross-country capacitv.
JANUARY 1955
The airliFt From base depots to forward maintenance areas
must be by some t\pe oF "vertical liFt" aircraFt, which can
take off and land xertically, and which fly at a fast specd
like an ordinary aircraft in level flight. The air supply must
be capable of b)eing maintained in all weathers, and by day
and night. Obviously the distance for this forward air supply
should be kept as short as possible; therefore base depots
should be moxed Forward From time to time.
I see base depots being replenished b\ large Freight-earrying
aircraft which can land and take oft' From PSP [pierced-steel
planking] airstrips.
THERE is clearly a tremendous future for "vertical lift" air-
craft, and it must be exploited for the benefit of land forces.
Whether this supplv Organization should be ownt^d and
operated by armies or b\' air forces is a matter for immediate
examination on the highest inter-service level.
Finance will affect the Solution.
No nation could attord to give the one service the amount
of airlitt that service would need at anv particular peak mo-
mcnt in war. In the Berlin Airlift, and in Korea, it was nec-
essary to draw on the air trans[X)rt resources of all the Services.
If the airlift Organization is to be an organic part of an
army, it will cost more than if it was under the air forces; and
the armv will nc\er have enousih.
In war time preat Hexibilitv will be needed, and the ability
to effect rapidK a large concentration of airlift within a
theater of war will be necessarv. Great skill will be needed
iF the liFt is to be maintained in all weathers. Air cover and
protection will be necc^ssarv. An airliFt Organization must be
dovetailed into air Operations.
A political decision will probably be necessarv as to who
will man, own, and operate the airliFt For land forces. That
decision should be gi\'en soon, and hefore an inter-service
argumcnt devclops which could lead to ill-Feeling. It is mv
opinion that this vast air Organization For the land armies will
be best handled bv the air Forces.
Such a supply Organization would do awav with the vast
array oF units and headtjuarters which todav constitute the
enormous "tail" oF a modern armv. It would be the first step
in restoring to armies the "Freedom oF the countryside," and
the tactical mobilitv that have so largely disappeared. Bv
simpliFying the tail we shall get more bite in the teeth.
The armies oF today have to a large extent lost their mo-
bilitv; they are bccomino; road-bound and are weighed down
by a gigantic administrative set-up in and around them. Staffs
are Far too big; the amount oF paper that is required to produce
even quite small action is terrific. We seem to have lost the
art oF command, other than by paper. No ordinarv man can
read halF the paper that is in circulation; I doubt iF the other
halF is worth reading.
IN the scientific age into which we are moving, which is
also an age oF ever-increasing costs, governments have got
to insure that their armed Forces and security measures are
built up within a Framework oF economic realities and against
a hackground oF sound inter-service resjx)nsibilities.
IF what I say has validitv, then the Future will call For:
Bigger air Forces.
Smallcr and more immediately ready regulär armies with
great strategical and tactical mobilitv. Better organized and
more efhcient reserve armies.
• Smaller navies.
• The Organization of the three fighting Services based on
more atomic and thermonuclear jwwer, and less manpovver.
23
A TALE FOk TODAY
The Gun That Might Have Won
THE Austro-Prussian War of 1866 was
the first (and no doubt only) war in
vvhich the soldiers of one side were
arined primarily vvith muzzle-Joaders and
those on the other vvith the compara-
tively new breech-loaders. Opinion is
practically unanimous that this Factor,
as much as any other, brought victory
to the Prussians.
In July 1866, vvhen the armies con-
verged at Königgrätz (or Sadowa),
vvhere the Elbe meets the Orlice in what
is now Czechoslovakia, the Austrians
lought with all their traditional bravery,
and at times with greater skill than usu-
al. The Forces were fairly even— about
200,000 to a side.
But the fire power was on the Prussian
side. Its troops had their breech-loaders,
the famous needle 2uns. Only a few
Austrian units were equipped with
breech-loaders, mainlv FrĂĽwirth puns.
The Austrian muzzle-loaders were good
weapons in one respect: they were
sighted to 1,000 yards as against 400
yards for the Prussian breech-loaders.
But the Prussian soldier could load from
the prone position; the Austrian could
not. This gave the Prussians a rate of
fire more than three times faster than
that of the Austrians.
After-battle studies revealed a most
significant fact, Austrian losses in their
muzzle-loader units were greater than
Prussian losses by about the same ratio
as the Prussian rate of fire was greater.
In the few Austrian units equipped
with breech-loaders, losses were about
equal to the enemy's.
WHY were the Austrians sent into bat-
tle with their outdated muzzle-load-
ers? Certainly not because the breech-
loader was a brand-new invention. Eight-
een years before, Prussia had completed
its re-equipment program to become the
first European power to have an army
of breech-loaders. The Austrian muzzle-
loader lingered on wholly for reasons of
national economy. Members of the Aus-
trian Diet, in their periodic attacks up-
on the already small military budgets,
habitually rationalized their parsimony
into bombast masquerading as military
policy. "Austria's military policy must be
24
a defensive one," a member said. "If we
are to choose between an Army of poor
striking power and a ruined economy,
let US be sure to choose the first." An-
other member exclaimed: "A sound
military policy may replace unnecessary
military strength." So spoke Austria's
policy makers, at a time when not far
away Prussia's armament program went
steadily forward.
ARMY leaders had for several years
been pressing for adoption of a more
modern infantry weapon. Several tvpes
of breech-loaders had been developed
in Austria, any of which might have
served the purpose if funds had been
granted for general production. Of these,
the FrĂĽwirth gun seems to have been
the best or at least enjoyed the highest
favor in military circles.
By 1862, at a time when the Prussian
Army had long been fully equipped with
their needle guns, Austrian Army leaders
managed only to equip several companies
with FrĂĽwirths. Early in 1866, as the
crisis mounted, Emperor Franz Josef
ordered the issuance of FrĂĽwirths to
the dragoons, hussars, and four infantry
battalions. Perhaps if time had allowed,
Austria might have caught up with the
^v
Bettmann Archive
Count Benedek, commander-in-chief of
the Austrian forces in 1866, paid with
his professional reputation for the blun-
ders of others.
changing times. Too late it learned that
wars do not wait for armies to get ready.
While the brief campaign was actually
being fought, the government appro-
priated 1,500,000 florins for 50,000
FrĂĽwirth guns. But florins could not stop
the needle guns.
In the peace arrangements Austria
lost its Italian province of Venezia and
was charged an indemnity of 30,000,000
florins to Prussia— a sum that would have
kept the army in breech-loaders for
many years. A fraction of that amount,
spent in time, might possibly have given
the Austrians victory instead of defeat.
ONE aftermath of Königgrätz was hard-
ly a unique event. The age-old, and
always unedifying, sport of scapegoat
hunting was indulged to the fĂĽll. The
Austrian commander-in-chief, Count
Benedek, was summoned to explain
things to the Emperor. "The troops of
Your Majesty fought valiantly," the gen-
eral began, "but the Prussian needle
gun ..." Here ended one of the shortest
royal audiences of record, when the Em-
peror turned his back on the distin-
guished national hero, veteran of eleven
campaigns and three battle wounds.
Shortly thereafter Benedek and three
of his chief lieutenants faced a court-
martial whose procedure was deftly
rigged to assure the foregone conclusion.
Since the defendants had for years been
publicly pleading for better weapons
and warning of the fate that Austria had
now suffered, the court thoughtfully
ruled out all testimony antedating the
war itself. Only the defendants' conduct
of the campaign could be discussed.
Some reference to the Prussian superi-
ority in weapons crept in, of course, but
the court did not encourage it. For rea-
sons that have been debated at great
length, the Emperor eventually ordered
the trial stopped. The results of this
action were largely academic; the mili-
tary careers of the principals could hard-
ly have suffered more by an official ver-
dict.
If there is in this tale some kind of
parable for our own times, it should not
be hard to detect it.
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
They Ride To Work
Armored infantry moves fasf on personnel caniers and Fights
hard — from the ground. Its tactical concepf and attitude
are more closely related to armor than conventional infantry
CAPTAIN BOYD T. BA5HORE
â– ^
Adedicated infantry lieutenant of my
acquaintance was assigned to an
armored division a few years ago. To
put it mildly, he regarded the assign-
ment with misgivings. It seemed to him
that his professional throat was about
to be cut. Why, he knew armor officers
who had never been assigned to an ar-
mored division! What would they do to
an eager young infantry lieutenant? His
only previous knowledge of armor was
eight hours' training in armored infan-
try techniques at The Infantry School.
As it turned out, the lieutenant learned
more about fire power, mobility, and
shock action than he had learned in
all his previous training.
When the lieutenant got his Orders he
decided he had better study the Organiza-
tion of the armored division. He dis-
covered that it contains plenty of infan-
try! Of the fifteen combat battalions,
four are armored infantry, four are tank,
five are artillery, one is combat engineer,
and one is reconnaissance.
As time went on our lieutenant learned
a lot more about armor.
The armored division has a flexibility
practically unknown in infantry units.
The armored infantry battalion seldom
fights as a tactical unit. Instead, it is
divided up into companies, and some-
times platoons, which are coupled with
tank, artillery, and engineer units to
form task forces. The mission at band
determines the proportions of tanks and
of infantry in the combat team. The
switching of units can be accomplished
vvithin minutes, merely by some terse
Orders given over the radio.
Our lieutenant liked the mobility of
Captain Boyd T. Bashore, Infantr>% en-
listed in 1943 and in 1946 entered the
Military Academy, from which he grad-
uated in 1950. His most recent assign-
ment was in Europe with the 42d Ar-
mored Infantry Battalion.
JANUARY 1955
armor when he became accustomed to
it. His tactics were formerly planned on
1 :25,000 maps, movement was made at
two and a half miles an hour, and organ-
ic supporting fires were not normally of
much help at ranges of over a thousand
yards.
But for the armored infantryman,
even 1 : 50,000 maps are sometimes too
small in scale because he can move at
speeds up to thirty miles an hour. The
90mm guns of the tanks can support
him at ranges of five thousand yards.
Enemy machine guns and indirect artil-
lery and mortar fire, while still held in
healthy respect, are no longer heavy fac-
tors in tactical planning for the infan-
tryman who rides to battle in an ar-
mored carrier. On the other band, the
infantryman's old friends— woods,
ditches, streams, marshy ground, and
bridges— become extremely menacing.
Enemy tanks and antitank mines are his
deadly foes. The armored infantry
officer must stress physical fitness in his
troops, because they live relatively plush
and gypsy-like lives, and are likely to
become unused to doing much Walking.
THE armored infantry rifle squad is
equipped, organized, and trained es-
sen tially the same as an infantry rifle
squad. It consists of a two-man auto-
matic-rifle team, five riflemen, a squad
leader, his assistant, and a driver. The
squad is transported in its own full-
tracked armored personnel carrier
(APC), which offers protection from
artillery and small-arms fire, goes forty
miles an hour, has a hundred-mile oper-
ating radius, and can cover the same ter-
rain as a tank.
In addition to usual infantry weapons,
the armored infantry squad has an organ-
ic caliber .30 A6 machine gun, and a
caliber .50 machine gun which is mount-
ed on the carrier. These weapons can
make the squad's fire power almost
equivalent to that of a Standard rifle
platoon. Whether the carrier is the M75
used in Korea or the new M59, it is a
mobile machine-gun pillbox which can
support the squad with devastating fire
from bull defilade.
An armored infantry platoon is com-
posed of three of these squads, plus a
machine-gun squad, which has two five-
man machine-gun sections, a driver, a
squad leader, and his assistant.
The armored infantry Company con-
sists of three of these platoons, plus a
mortar platoon, which has three 81mm
mortar squads, each transported by its
own APC. In addition to having the
normal supply, mess and administrative
sections, it has two large maintenance
sections— one for the company's vehicles
and one for its radios.
The vehicles include seventeen full-
tracked armored personnel carriers, two
2-^/i-ton trucks, one halftrack, four half-
ton trucks, and several trailers. The
mounted radios are fourteen VRC-7s,
fixe GRC-4s, and three GRC-3s; while
scxentccn PRC-6s and one PRC-8 are
uscd for dismounted work.
To the average infantry officer, the
armored infantry battalion is a Strange
unit. Tactically, it is composed of four
line armored infantry companies, a 4.2-
inch mortar platoon, and a reconnais-
sance platoon. Administratively, the bat-
talion is entirely separate. It has its own
personnel section, vehicular maintenance
section, medical detachment, and supply
platoon.
The armor headquarters on the regi-
mental level is the combat command— a
tactical headquarters which may be
changed from day to day. The battalion
is authorized its own insignia and its own
battalion colors, and it wTites its own unit
hi Story.
A
RMORED infantr\^ is generally used
in either of two ways: the infantry
15
Tanks and infantry move into an at-
tack during a training maneuver
Supports thc tanks, or the tanks support
the infantry.
Ihe tank, with its greater fire power,
heavier armor, and greater shock action,
obviously has the advantage over thin-
skinned armored infantry vehicles under
the right conditions of terrain. When
armor can be used in its primary role,
the armored infantry usually supports
the tanks.
But when the terrain is unfavorable
to tanks, armored infantry assumes the
primary role. Such conditions occur
when buildings, woods, or close terrain
render the tanks cannon virtuallv use-
less and make the tank vulnerable to
close-in antitank measures by enemy in-
fantry. Dismounted armored infantry is
used in the leading role when streams,
gullies, or minefields deny mobility to
the tanks. Then the tanks provide direct-
fire support and furnish antitank protec-
tion to the front, flanks, and rear of the
infantry, at ranges up to 5,000 yards.
Mobile defense is another new wrinkle
for the infantr^man suddenly exposed to
armor tactics. Armor defends an area by
maneuyer and counterattack, and de-
fense is seldom attempted on any level
below combat command. The defense is
oroanized into two echelons: a some-
what Standard line of strongpoints, and
a reserv^e. The reinforced infantr\^ units
are placed where they command the key
The latest armored personnel carrier, the M59, carries twelve infantrymen, weap-
ons and ammunition. The armor provides protection against small-arms fite and
shell fragments. Tactical use is still under development.
26
terrain features and block, or at least
control, the most likely avenues of ap-
proach. These strongpoints are meant
neither to stop the enemy completely nor
to disperse him. Their primary mission
is to canalize the advancing enemy into
corridors that lead to pre-chosen tank
country where armor can get in its dead-
ly licks. In this mobile defense, most of
the armored infantry is usually placed
in the strongpoints, while most of the
tanks are held in reserve.
The armored infantryman must neyer
become too attached to bis personnel
carrier. Unlike the tank, it is not a fight-
ing compartment. The armored infantry-
man is a member of a Standard but fast-
moving infantry squad, and he must be
prepared to fight band to band just like
his Walking cousin. The carrier is merely
transportation, a means of moying as
fast as the tank. The APC, like the air-
craft and parachute of the paratrooper,
merely gets him to the objectiye.
The M59, the latest APC, is lighter
than the M75. It has the added capabil-
ity of Crossing bodies of water. An ar-
mored infantry outfit in M59s can set
up a beachhcad in an attack, crossing a
riyer without stopping its adyance.
Armored infantry tactics are still be-
ing developed. Although almost eyery-
one pays lip seryice to the field manuals,
few agree exacdy how the new APCs
should be employed, primarily because
the one-inch armor on the M75 means
different things to different people.
There haye been armored infantry Com-
manders who stopped when they were
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
faced with machine-gun fire, and others
who attacked into recoilless 75mm and
105mm fire. No one has put out a firm
answer to the question: "Where should
the carriers be?"
There haye been Commanders who dis-
mounted three thousand yards away
from the objectiye, requiring their "ar-
mored" infantry to attack on foot across
a fire-swept hill, rather than endanger
the carriers. There haye been Command-
ers who belieyed that the APCs should
at all times foUow only ten or fifteen
yards behind the tanks, on the theory
that the tanks ' coyer" the carrier. But
most Commanders haye followed the
more acceptable tactics of haying the
APCs trail four or fiye hundred yards
behind until the tanks hit the objectiye,
and then close the gap at top speed, dis-
mounting riflemen right on the objec-
tiye, practically jumping down the fox-
holes of the enemy.
TO prepare himself adequately for an
armored infantry command, the infan-
try officer, in addition to his own branch
training, needs exactly the same back-
ground as an armor officer, with the
possible exception of tank gunnery. Un-
fortunately, he usually has not received
adequate armor training before he is
slapped into the race and told: "Do it!"
Some sound infantry officers may be
hurt professionally by their inexperience
when they are suddenly required to take
oyer an armored infantry command.
JANUARY 1955
Many armor officers don't fully appre-
ciate the infantr)'man's dilemma. This
sink-or-swim attitude is a serious defi-
ciency in our present methods.
There is a definite need for specialized
armored infantry training taught by an
armored infantry department at The In-
fantry School or The Armored School.
This training should haye somewhat
similar objectiyes, and perhaps be of
similar length, as jump school, and
should be conducted on an Army-wide
leyel for all infantr)^ officers and some
noncommissioned officers, before they
are assigned to an armored diyision.
Such a course could deyelop tactical
policies for the armored infantryman. As
it is now armored infantr)' doctrine is
two-headed; some comes from Benning
and some from Knox. This is not good.
This armored infantry indoctrination
course should emphasize practical class
participation, including armored infan-
try tactical problems with tanks. Equal
importance should be giyen to two weeks
of driyer and maintenance training for
eyery Student, including officers. This
should be combined with a somewhat
shorter course striying for the same goals
from the radio maintenance and Com-
munications Standpoint. The indoctrina-
tion course should end with a brief class
in the history and traditions of armor
in general, and armored infantry in par-
ticular.
Infantrymen should be encouraged to
volunteer for such schooling and subse-
quent assignment to an armored infantry
Unit, contingent upon graduation. And
also some distinguishing insignia should
be authorized for the armored infantry-
man, possibly a Shoulder are which says
"Armored," pattemed after "Ranger" and
"Airborne" tabs. At the yery least, official
recognition should be giyen to a blue-
braided high-peaked armor cap by award-
ing it free, the same as any qualification
badge, to the graduate of the school.
It has been agreed that eyer)^ regulär
infantry officer, if physically fit, should
be airbome qualified. The requirements
should go one step farther: eyery infan-
try officer ought to be armored infan-
try qualified too. Sometime during his
early infantry career, eyery infantr)' of-
ficer should rotate at least one cycle
through straight, airborne, and armored
infantry.
Only in that way will the infantr\'
officer realize that armor is not the pri-
yate monopoly of the yellow-scarv^ed of-
ficers and men who used to ride horses
and now ride tanks; but that it is rather
a State of mind, an aggressiye. flexible
manner of thinking by the officers and
men of any combat branch, who be-
licye in mobility, fire power, and shock
action.
27
RED PARALLEL
The Toctics of
Ho and Mao
Lieutenant Co/one/
Roberf B. Rigg
TI IL parallel bctuccn tactical patterns
and growth ol thc Vict Minh and ot
the Kcd Chinese in the Chinese civil
war is so precise that even the eircum-
stance of today s tiuee piediets tomor-
row s trouble.
Mao Tse-tung's ten military prineiples
Lieutenant Colonel Robert B, Rigg,
Armor, was a member of the Marshall
Mission to China in 1946. He was cap-
turcd by thc Communists at that time
and spent two nionths in a Red prison.
Out of that experienee and mueh study
he wrote Hed Chinas Fighting Hordes.
I le has also written a book on training
aids and expcdients, which will be pub-
lishcd this year. We count him as one
of our regulär contributors. He is pres-
ently assigned to C3 at the Pentagon.
have been consistently applied by Red
warlord 1 lo Chi-minh. The Viet Minh
began war on a guerrilla basis and has
emerged to its brigade- and division-level
period. Before long it will enter its army-
level era of Organization and oj^eration.
Viet Minh foot mobility has been of
the highest order, and on a parallel with
that of the Chinese Reds. It is the
Asiatic rebuttal to machine-age war. Ho
Chi-minh 's guerrillas have followed Mao
Tse-tung's axiom: "We march more
than we fight, but every march is for
the sake of a fight." This tactic multi-
plied Viet Minh numbers and confused
opposing intclligence officers and Com-
manders. A formal army, like that of
the French and the Chinese National-
ists, arrives at a point of justificd despera-
tion vvhen it cannot find, much less
oppose, the enemy opposite it. The mo-
bilitv and the elusiveness of the Viet
Minh greatly prolonged the Indochina
war. It was so designed by the Com-
munists for two purposes: to allow the
Viet Minh forces time to grow to fĂĽll
military stature, and to bring war weari-
ness to the people of Indochina. They
followed the Mao Tse-tung philosophy
of 'not fearing long wars" but wanting
decisiv^e campaigns within long wars.
It was the ninth of Mao Tse-tung's
Ten Military Prineiples that accelerated
bis rise to }X)wer from 1946 to 1949.
This principle said, in simple terms,
"capture from the enemy so as to arm
vourself." As the Chinese Reds gained
new weapons and material in the Chi-
The deadly parallel between
the tactics of the Red Chinese
and the Viet Minh is no-
where more precise than in
the adherence to Mao's dic-
tum to be cautious and pa-
28
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
nese civil war, the number of offensive
moves increased and they became more
aggressive. While the source of supply
was different for the Viet Minh, its
aggressiveness and concerted military ac-
tion was in direct ratio to the armament
it gained, and it gained the majority of
its arms from the Chinese Reds. Or-
ganizationally the Viet Minh grew larg-
er and more formal as Red China sup-
plied advisers, technicians, and weapons.
Red China's Ten Prineiples are sim-
ple rules designed for beginners in
warfare. They are tailored for the pa-
tient, and they fit the ultra-patient
Asiatic. Palace revolutionists or daring
revolutionists would be contemptuous of
their cautious and conservative advice.
But they are sure and certain rules for
men who have the patience and en-
durance to apply them. Ho Chi-minh
is such a man.
First among the ten prineiples of the
Chinese Reds is: ". . . strike at scattered
and isolated enemies, and later strike at
the . . . powerful enemies." Foremost in
consistency and chronology was the Viet
Minh's application of this axiom, which
might be called the tactics of digestion
without indigestion, a principle which
was proportionate to the means at band.
The Viet Minh attacked the outposts
(Strategie and tactical) of the French
Army in this succession, and scored some
verv important gains in 1950-51, espe-
cially in Tonkin. Over the years the
Viet Minh adhered well to the first
principle but did err now and then in
gauging the next degree of target to
attack. For example, the Red attack on
Na-Sam ( November -December 1952)
was apparently preceded by faulty in
telligence, or overconfidence, or a com-
bination of both. This bloody Viet
Minh attack had much of the character
of the 1947 attack the Chinese Com-
munists made on the Shantung city
(a formidably walled one) of Tsining
w^hich, like Na-Sam, was an attack
eventually abandoned after heavy Red
casualties. Neither place had any real
(local) Strategie importance, yet in both
instances there is now reason to bclieve
that the Reds attacked in the hope of
establishing military prestige.
VIET MINH adherence to the second
principle ("first take the small towns;
later the large") was leading to the
application of the third: "We take the
annihilation of the enemy's fighting
strength, and not the holding of cities
. . . as the major objective. . . ."
I lo's regulär forces always tried to
apply the fourth principle: "In every
battle, concentrate absolutely superior
forces. . . ." This they did at Dien
Bien Phu.
Consistently choosing its own condi-
tions of battle, the Viet Minh adhered
to the fifth principle: "Fight no un-
prepared engagements. Fight no en-
gagements in which there is no assurance
of victory. . . ."
Throughout all of their campaigns
with regulär and irregulär forces, Ho's
warriors were subjected to the sixth
principle, which is "fear no sacrifice,
fatigue," and train to fight successive
engagements within a short time.
Ambushing French columns with reg-
ularity, Viet Minh forces regularly ap-
tient in assaulting cities.
Mukden {a\ left) feil to the
Red Chinese in 1947 and
Viet Minh forces walked vic-
toriously into Hanoi in 1954.
plied the seventh principle successfully:
"Strive to destroy the enemy while he
is in movement. . . ."
Hanoi and 1 laiphong stood in 1954
as Mukden and the port city of Yingkow
did in 1947. The Chinese Reds even
tually took Yingkow, and Mukden be-
came an air-supjx)rted island that was
later submerged into the Communist
sca. Like the Chinese Reds, the Viet
Minh was patient and abided by the
eighth principle: "With rcgard to the
question of assaults on cities [take] . . .
those which are weakly defended. At
favorable opportunities wrest all of those
which are defended to medium degree.
Wait until conditions mature to wrest
[those] . . . strongly defended." As the
1954 negotiations in Geneva reached
their crisis the Viet Minh began mili-
tarilv to choke Hanoi and Ilaiphong.
Conditions had matured with the fall
of Dien Bien Phu. Obviouslv, Ho Chi-
minh had wanted these cities for a long
time, but he abided by the eighth axiom
that Mao had demonstrated to be so
successful. There is no doubt that Ho's
forces would have attacked and tried
to divide, so as later to devour, the delta
region, had the truce not been estab-
lished at Geneva. Another Viet Minh
aping of the Chinese Reds— and an old
Communist military-political combina-
tion— was their backing with military
victories of their representatives at the
diplomatic table. Asiatic Reds regard it
as axiomatic and necessarv to arrive at
the Conference table with victories cur-
rent enough to force favorable diplo-
matic arouments. The Chinese Reds set
their pattern when General George C.
JANUAR Y 1955
29
Marshall tried to settle the civil war,
and they applied it in Korea. It must
alvvays be expected that when a Red
regime is ready to negotiate it is also
readv vvith some soon-to-be-applied war
plans.
EXAMINE the tenth principle (which
the Viet iMinh used) and you find
yourself reading betvveen the lines or
paraphrasing its real lines:
"Be skilled at using the intervals be-
tween two campaigns for the resting,
regrouping and training of troops. (Do
not rest too long.) . . . Do not let the
enemy have breathing space." This prin-
ciple conccdes that the Communists at
this particular militarv stage of develop-
ment do not always have the logistical
capability of 'carrying through" and
that their drives will often spend them-
selves, vet thev must alwavs seek to
resumc their pressure on the enemy.
Logistically the Viet Minh was not up
to prolonged attacks as was demonstrated
in sevcral instances when they hit the
hard core of French defense^,
The French military problem over
the years was much like that of the
Chinese Nationalists. Unfortunately, the
French technique was parallel. Pillboxes,
islands of resistance, and bristling de-
fenses were created to ward off the Red
mosquito attacks, but as Communist ag-
gressiveness increased, the French came
to rely more on these fixed defenses. In
the fury of the tasks and troubles at
band the French were often blind to
the potential and power of mobility. In
the jungles aerial reconnaissance and
intelligence were useless. What was
most needed was more effective ground
intelligence or informaticn from natives
made ultra-friendly by political means.
British General Sir Gerald Templer
proved this point in Malaya. The French
wanted to engage the foe in open battle;
the Viet Minh forces avoided brutal
contcsts until they were ready, and the
French lacked timely enough informa-
tion u{X)n which to launch forces to
catch the Communists. Thus the French
were unable to concentrate on worth-
while Red concentrations.
IN the sober application of these ten
principles it must be conceded that
Red Chinese advisers to the Viet Minh
had their influence, and IIo Chi-minh
and bis officers can be credited with en-
durance and patience, but not with orig-
inality. The Chinese Reds spent many
war years perfecting these principles,
which will in the future provide the
30
basic guide to all other Red revolution-
arv moves in Asia.
Dien Bien Phu, the target of much
opportunity, was enveloped vertically,
just as Chanchun was in 1946 when
the Chinese Nationalists airlifted twelve
thousand troops into the Manchurian
capital, air supplied them, and lost them
to Red concentric envelopments on the
ground. Like the heroic def enders of
Dien Bien Phu, the soldiers of Chiang
Kai-shek fought at Changchun until
their perimeter was only a few hundred
vards in diameter— and even then re-
sisted until they were physically overrun
and captured at point-blank ränge.
After seeing this battle in Manchuria
I could only conclude that to survive at
all, such an airhead must move and
keep moving on the ground, so as to
force the enemv to realign bis forces
and prevent him from concentrating
them. To stand still (and Nationalist
heroism was equal to that demonstrated
at Dien Bien Phu, although the skill was
somewhat less) is to invite disaster.
Dien Bien Phu was a blocking effort
and an attempt to engage Viet Minh
forces in open battle so as to destrov
their numbers. But the key to Viet
Minh acceptance of battle here lay in
the Red consideration of the odds and
the "favorable conditions" which Red
China's great tactician and strategist,
General Lin Piao, summarizes several
times in bis written texts and in one
place says: "Calculated risk engagements
. . . should not be undertaken at ran-
dom . . . and only if there is a 70 per
Cent prospect of victory."
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu goes
deeper than the French decision to es-
tablish a blocking airhead there. Whose
initiative really caused the conflict? Ho
Chi-minh moved certain of bis troops
into Laos in a maneuver that was used
by Chinese generals. The "One-Eyed
Dragon," Chinese General Liu Po-cheng,
executed such a move in 1947 when he
moved bis army group from a long-
established battleground in Shantung
and "fled" hundreds of miles southwest
to the Taipeh Mountains, where he
could fight in a new area and force the
Nationalists to realign their strategy. In
short, Liu diverted the enemy and forced
him to fight in an area favorable to bis
own forces.
AT the time of the Laos invasion the
â– â– French were reported to have ex-
plained the disappearance of the Viet
Minh 316th Division by saying that it
had been ' wiped off the battlefield."
The Chinese civil war proved to U.S.
Army observers that one must beware
of the Red division that "disappears,"
because it always turns up again at a
very embarrassing place. The 316th Di-
vision did just that.
The Viet Minh Organization of divi-
sions on a regional rather than opera-
tional basis is taken from Mao Tse-
tung's concepts of consolidation in guer-
rilla war, which he wrote many years
ago. As Colonel Samuel B. Griffith,
USMC, translated it: "Without con-
solidation, one will have no strength for
further expansion. In guerrilla warfare,
if only one thinks about expansion but
forgets consolidation, he will not be able
to stand up against the enemy. . . . The
correct policy is to expand on ha^es of
consolidation." Logistically the regional
Organization provided the Viet Minh
with bases of food, manpower and in-
telligence because the Reds forced the
allegiance of the people within the par-
ticular countryside. PoHtically it allowed
them to dominate the people and in-
doctrinate them.
In viewing Red regional Organization
on a local or tactical basis, it is important
to look at the Viet Minh regional, or
base, Organization on a Strategie level.
Here we find the real logistical base of
the Viet Minh in South China just as
the Red Chinese base for their Opera-
tions in Korea was in Manchuria— or,
more realisticallv, in the Soviet Union.
Yet in both cases the bases were outside
the war zone and relatively safe because
to bomb or invade them was to invite
a bigger tbird power into the war.
The Viet Minh was a "twilight army"
whose strength at night could exceed
the numbers usually manifest in day-
light. This army, like that of the Chi-
nese Reds up until 1949, had two parts
-the guerrilla and the formal-which
acted in combination and coordination
with each other. In most cases either
portion could avoid battle by hiding its
arms and merging into the countryside
as peasants. This feature of momentary
obscurity in one's own land was in
direct contrast to the necessary formah-
ty of the French forces which had the
mission of preserving the government
and vital territories. However, the Viet
Nam force possessed, and still possesses,
the capability of operating portions of
its body on this basis.
I IKE the Chinese Reds until 1949, the
L Viet Minh force has lacked an air
force. Ho Chi-minh's forces have also,
like their Chinese predecessors, operated
.\ *N> ♦
AI .
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
with a fair minimum of motor transport,
and have utilized motor vehicles for
supply rather than for tactical mobility.
Oriental tactics of encirclement are
not those of the half-moon diagrams we
are prone to draw on maps. Instead,
they are more subtle, and often part of
the circle is a permanent guerrilla base
which only needs the regulär or more
formal army to close with it. The Viet
Minb's approach was often based upon
this concept, long ago projected by Mao
Tse-tung: ". . . if we analyze our various
[regulär army] bases and their inter-
relation, plus the relation of multiple
guerrilla bases to the regulär army's front
lines, then we are encircling portions
of the enemy. This is [a] second form
of encirclement."
Ho Chi-minh's forces must now be
measured in light of the progress of the
Red Army of China since 1949. The
''twilight army" of today will not re-
semble that army of the future. The
Viet Minh forces are going to take on
modern and formal aspect with Chinese
assistance, especially now that it is not
fighting.
In June 1946, a truce was superim-
posed on the Chinese civil war fighting
in Manchuria. At that time General
Lin Piao, the Communist Commander
in Manchuria, had an irregulär to half-
regular collection of well-disciplined,
hardened troops. He had failed, how-
ever, in the Battle of Ssupingkai (1946)
to stand up successfully against the
more formal and formidable fire power
of the Nationalist armies. The truce,
for all of its well intended purpose,
gave Lin Piao a period of many months.
He utilized this interval to recruit, re-
train, re-cadre, and reorganize bis motley
army. Logistically, he strengthened his
army and made many technical im-
provements. It was this army, rebuilt
during a truce period, that eventually
attacked the Nationalists and swung the
balance in favor of the Communists.
Lin Piao's army was the avalanche that
Started the Red sweep of China.
The truce in Indochina now offers
Ho Chi-minh the same opportunity and
period of grace. He can now rebuild
his army along more formal lines, cadre
new Units from among his veterans,
train without having to fight at the same
time, and strengthen his forces logis-
tically and technically. The Viet Minh
will not neglect to capitalize on the
truce period.
Should the war be renewed, it could
well be with an entirely new type of
Viet Minh army.
JANUARY 1955
-1^'.*.
â– ) >
m^
-mmuijs
■% ^*«
-»«»ii»**
^<w<-
%«a
i
?^ä
Red armies on the march. The Viet
Minh (above) were taught by the
Chinese Communists (heloiv) how
to travel Hght and move fast.
31
COMMAND POST OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ROBERT T. STEVENS
Secrefory o/ the Army
GEN. M. B. RIDOWAY
Chief of Sfoff
JOHN SLEZAK
linder Secrefory
GEN. CHARLES L. BOLTE
Vice Chief of Stoff
GENERAL «JTAFF
HUGH M. MILTON, 11
Assistant Secretary
Manpower and Reserve Forces
GEORGE H. RODERICK
Assistant Secretary
Civil-Military Affairs
FRANK H. HIGGINS
Assistant Secretary
Logistics & P & D
CHARLES C. FINUCANE
Assisfonf Secrefory
Financial Management
LT. GEN. L. L. LEMNITZER
Depf. C/S Plans & Research
LT. GEN. W. L. WEIBLE
Dep. C/S Opns & Adm
LT. GEN. W. B. PALMER
Dep. C/S Logistics
LT. GEN. GEORGE H. DECKER
Comptroller of the Army
MAJ. GEN. A. G. TRUDEAU
Assf. C/S G2, /nfe//igence
MAJ. GEN. J. M. GAVIN
.A$$f. C/S G3, Operofions
MAJ. GEN. R. N. YOUNG
Assf. C/S Gl, Personne/
r
^
MAJ. GEN. G.
Chief of /
C. MUDGETT MAJ. GEN. W
formofion Chief, CA-M
F. MARQUAT
litary Govf.
MAJ. GEN. E.
Chief, National
. ERICKSON MAJ. GEN. EUG
Cuard Bureau The Judge Ad
SPECkA'
NE M. CAFFEY MAJ. GEN. W. < :. ZIMMERMAN
\4ocafe General The /nspec or Genera/
L STA FF
MAJ. GEN. C. J. HAUCK, JR.
Chief, Legis/ofive Liaison
MAJ. GEN. A. C. SMITH
Chief, Military History
BRIG. GEN. P. F. LINDEMAN
Exec, Reserve & ROTC Affairs
BRIG. GEN. W. C. BULLOCK
Chief, Psycho/ogico/ Warfare
MAJ. GEN. G
The Sur
geon
ARMSTRONG
General
MAJ. GEN. P4UL F. YOUNT
Chief of Trt nsportation
TECHNICAL' ST
MAJ. GEN. S.
Chief of
. STURGIS, JR.
ngineers
MAJ. GEN. E. L. CUMMINGS
Chief of Ordnance
AND gcnviCES
r
MAJ. GEN. W. M. CREASY
Chief Chemical OfTicer
MAJ. GEN. G. I. BACK
Chief Signa/ Offfcer
MAJ. GEN. K. L HASTINGS
The Quartermaster General
ADMINISTRATIVE ST
ANS
MAJ. GEN. P. J. RYAN
Chief of Chop/o/ns
MAJ. GEN. W. H. MAGLIN
The Provosf Marshai General
MAJ. GEN. J. A. KLEIN
The Adjutant General
32
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
JANUARY 1955
MAJ. GEN. B. E. SAWYER
Chief of Finonce
33
IT always wants to do what it can do. Jeb Stuart had the
■only element of Lee's army which could ränge and raid
far from the main body— so he did. To possess a capabiHty of
damaging the enemy places on any military man or Force a
strong compulsion to do the damage. To possess great mo-
bihty imposes a strong compulsion to use that mobility. Stuart
understood the importance of his Screening mission too, but
he thought he could screen Lee, and ride hard and far, strew-
ing destruction under his hooves.
Lee understood the proper use of cavalry. He knew his
entire force depended on the information Stuart could col-
lect and deliver to Army headquarters. He knew also that
you cannot tie down good cavalry to the sole task of scouting
ahead of the infantry. There are times when this Screening
Job is of vital importance and there are times when such use
would be a waste of good cavalry. There are times when
the most vital mission is to serve the main body and other
times when the independent missions are appropriate. Stuart's
critical absence at Gettysburg was a matter of timing-timing
influenced by the compulsion to do what he could do.
THE air age introduced cavalry with greater mobility, greater
striking power and an inability to dismount and fight on
foot. As the ränge of aircraft increased, the preoccupation of
airmen with the independent mission also increased. This
new capability for inflicting damage deep behind the enemy
lines was much more fascinating than attacking enemy
. trouble with
cavalry is
COLONEL SHILULAGH
The cavalry General Walker was depending
upon on 26 November 1950
had long since departed the Army
CoLONEL Shillelagh, a regulär contributor to this magazine,
was recently detailed to an extremely important assignment,
and by the time you read this he may be wearing a star.
34
ground forces or even than jousting with other airplanes. It
opened up new possibilities. That compulsion to do what
men can do still existed-and always will. Other men, fearful
of it, worried about what would happen to the Army while
this new cavalry was off on its hard and far-ranging missions.
The compulsion to exercise the independent air capability
included the compulsion to justify it; so that a whole new
literature was created around the possibilities which lay in
exploiting this new power. This new literature pictured the
Army as a backward and reactionary service which could
not understand the potentialities of the new weapon and
which sought to limit its development. The efForts of serious
minds to arrive at a realistic balance of missions and equip-
ment were labeled reactionary by the exponents of victory
through air power. If the Army sought to develop its re-
quirements for close support and for reconnaissance, it got
a cool reception from air soldiers with visions of independent
air warfare.
^ORLD WAR II provided a good test of air weapons de-
tlveloped in the Thirties. The bombers developed by the
Army Air Corps compared very favorably with those of the
independent Royal Air Force in Britain. The comparison
does not support the charge that development of the inde-
pendent mission had been retarded by Army control of air
power in the United States. On the other band, the com-
parison with the Royal Air Force in the fighter category was
less favorable to the United States. It reflects the known
preoccupation of American airmen with bomber development
and their lesser concern with defensive warfare.
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
The real failure of the Army in this period was not in the
development of air power but in the failure to integrate this
power into the Army mission and structure. A contrasting
trend was followed in the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Whereas the Army leaders in large measure looked upon
the Air Corps as another branch to support the infantry, the
Navy and Marine leadership accepted aircraft as a primary
combat weapon which their ground combat leaders had to
learn to use as they used other weapons. The development
of air power was not the exclusive concern of an air corps in
the Navy and Marine Corps, but was a primary concern of
the top leadership.
Of course, the Army faced the more difficult problem. The
physical limitations of carriers effectively limited the Navy
to short-range planes which fitted into fleet missions. The
small size of the Marine Corps itself tended to limit aircraft
development to the ground support and reconnaissance mis-
sions. Only in the Army did the possibility of extended air-
craft ränge give a new lustre to the independent mission and
draw the airman's interest away from the ground battlefield.
The Air Corps was the logical inheritor of the cavalry tradi-
tion.
The Army did not produce a Lee who could understand
both the importance of service to the main body and the
importance of the independent mission, a man big enough
to stick to sound principles, while recognizing that human
error will sometimes spoil the best of plans. In consequence,
the Army structure was badly fractured, and the Army suf-
fered the total loss of the new cavalry potential. We may
well ask, as General Gavin has, "Where was Walker's cavalry
on November 26, 1950?" Was he depending upon a Stuart
who had long since departed the Army?
BEYOND these effects on the Army structure and jx)wer, the
campaign of the air power enthusiasts to justify doing what
they could do has had critical adverse effects on American
concepts of warfare. The "New Look" of recent history was
signilicant primarily in the official endorsement of a theory
of war which had long been advanced by air power en-
thusiasts and had been accepted as a practical basis for force
requirements before Korea, but had not received earlier public
endorsement by our military leadership. In a sense, the an-
nouncement of the New Look was the ultimate triumph of
the campaign to justify the independent air mission.
This air-power triumph is more astonishing in Coming so
soon after the Korean demonstration of the incapacity of air
power to control ground action. True, the Army criticism
of the Air Force claims has been muted by unification into
a sweet note which sometimes resembles harmony. And some-
times the Army's theory of modern war has only reiterated to
fearful mothers that their sons must still fight on the ground
in spite of planes and atoms. Unfortunately, we have pro-
duced no acceptable theory of war for our time.
All this seriously affects our military thinking in three ways:
(I) We have accepted civil destruction as an object of
war and a means of war where formerly it was an incident
of war. The question raised is not of humanity but of reahty
— whether we have forgotten that war is still a political in-
strument which must have political objectives and methods.
This delusion may prove to be the ultimate irrationality.
JANUARY 1955
(2) We have rejected the precept that indecisive brutality
and destruction which advantages neither side will be out-
lawed by mutual consent or forbearance. We expect war to
take the form of tremendous destruction on both sides, though
we find no purpose in it. We have surrendered to the idea
that a capability will be exercised merely because we possess it.
(3) We have lost sight of our objective of defeating the
enemy armed forces as a means to victory and have sub-
stituted for it the intangible will of the enemy to resist. This
is an objective which defies definition and invites untried
methods. TTiis error leads to the brutalization of war without
purpose, to a preoccupation with mass destruction, to the
neglect of the political realities.
COULD the Army have retained an Army Air Force which
would serve both close and distant missions? Or did the
new capability of long-range aircraft truly embrace a sphere
of action which was properly outside the scope of the Army
mission? Or finally, if the long-range mission warranted the
creation of a separate force, should this force have been en-
trusted with the missions of reconnaissance and close support
for the Army?
The Army readily conceded that the long-range mission
bore only an indirect and general relationship to the Opera-
tions of the Army Commander. It was not considered essential
that the Army control and direct these missions.
On the other band, tactical air was strictlv an auxiliar\' of
the Army. Splitting it from the Army could only jeopardize
the eflFectiveness of the air-ground team. Nevertheless, the
thesis that the air was a different medium and not properly
subject to Army command gained remarkable currency and
acceptance among Army officers whose training and experi-
ence had not stressed the requirement for command knowl-
edge of air warfare. An Army command which had classed
air support as something to be supplied by an Air Corps or
an Army Air Force was too ready to conclude that it could
accept this support from a separate Air Force. Unified control
of the air-ground team, representing the most critical coordi-
nation required in modern warfare, was sacrificed. The all-
important ground battle was split down the middle.
All the waste and inefficiency of Joint Operations was in-
troduced into the ground battlefield. There is no such split
of command on the naval battlefield nor on the air battlefield.
The true function of Joint command— coordination of the
three battlefields— was not recognized. The most serious
question of military Organization which confronts us today is
this: have we imposed on the ground battlefield a requirement
of coordination which men cannot meet? The corollarv
question is this: will our failure to integrate our capabilities
in the land battle lose that battle?
THE Army did not propose that the national interest would
have been better served by keeping the independent mis-
sion in the Army than by taking reconnaissance and close-
support missions out of the Army. For in truth, the Strategie
air force is still very much like the cavalry. It has the capa-
bility of striking far in the enemy rear; but it also has the
capability of striking the enemy army, with devastating and
possibly decisive effects on the ground battle. This mav yet
be the most important contribution of a Strategie air force to
35
THE MONTH'S FILMS
Each month in this space Captain Jack F. McAhon,
ivho is in charge of motion picture distrihution for the
Pictorial Brauch, Department of Defense OPl, reports
on the new films availahle to the Services.
Guided Missiles, MF 45-8354 (28 minutes), is
now ready for showings to the troops and for loan to
civilian organizations. This film, which gives an Over-
all view of our guided missile program, is an adapta-
tion of the "Big Picture" series, the only change being
the Substitution of a "Miscellaneous Film" leader for
the "Big Picture" leader.
i i i
The Concept of the Attack and the Triangulär
Infantry Organization, TF 7-1902 (21 minutes),
outlines the Army's fundamentals of offensive warfare
and shows how they are applied to the triangulär in-
fantry Organization. Every attack poses its own prob-
lems, but the basic concepts are the same— find 'em,
fix 'em, fight cm, and finish em.
i i i
Exercise Ski Jump, MF 31-8290 (27 minutes),
briefly Covers many of the problems that occur when
operating in extreme cold. The film Covers such things
as the selection of a camp site, pitching a hexagonal
tent, making a lean-to or snow house, handling the
injured, making a sied from materials at band, the
use of ski poles as tow lines, care and use of personal
weapons, and the need for proper personal health
habits.
^ t i
The driving hazards in Germany and other sections
of Europe are extremely different from those in this
country. Safe Driving Practices in Germany, SFS
20-209 (15 minutes) will prove to be a valuable film
for troops stationed or expecting to be stationed in
Europe.
/ f â– i
Tankers will be interested in the two-part film,
Fundamentais of Tank Turrets. Part I, Introduc-
tion and Controls, TF 17-1974 (17 minutes), opens
with a brief history of the tank and then explains the
various controls in American tanks, emphasizing that
though they may be located in different places and
have physical differences, they are basically the same.
The film outlines their Operation and their safety pro-
visions. Part II, Vision Devices — Direct Fire Sights,
Fire Control Equipment, TF 17-1975 (17 minutes),
explains the function, location, and capabilities of the
periscopes, telescope, direct-fire telescope, ränge finders,
elevation quadrant, gunner's quadrant, and azimuth
indicator.
i i i
Action of the Individual Tank, TF 17-1990 (20
minutes), Covers the responsibilities of tank crew
members and the areas of responsibility of the individ-
ual tank on the march, in the assembly position, dur-
ing the attack, and during reorganization. The theme
of the film is "teamwork means success," whether
among tank crewmen or among the tanks themselves.
36
victory; but the Separation of organizations and missions tends
to prevent its realization.
The argument for assigning reconnaissance and close-sup-
port missions to the separate Air Force is primarily economic.
There can be no doubt that these missions would be per-
formed with greater enthusiasm and success by an air dement
within the Army. However, the argument is made that the
planes required for the long-range mission will also perform
the Army support mission, and that economy is achieved by
pooling these weapons in a single force.
The P-51 of World War II was good for escort, for inter-
ception, and for ground support. Today, however, there is
no such plane. The high-performance interceptor will cost
five or six times as much as an attack aircraft and be much
less efhcient for the attack mission. It would be sheer waste
to plan to use the high-priced interceptors for the attack job.
So economy now requires special attack aircraft for the attack
mission. Equipment development and new tactics are making
clear distinctions between the air battlefield and the ground
battlefield which were less apparent ten ycars ago.
IN the perspective of this short reach of history, we can now
see what unification did to our defense Organization. It
took the air dement, our modern cavalry, out of the Army
to give emphasis to its long-range mission. It divorced the
long-range air weapons from the ground battle where they
have a major— perhaps a primary— role to play. It took the
tactical air force off the Army team and put it on the Stratair
team where coordination is difficult or impracticable. This
certainly has the appearance of creating a critical breach of
Organization in Order to correct a small point of friction.
The Army has indeed been grievously hurt in the unifica-
tion act. It has lost control of the ground battle, has become
dependent for vital support upon an independent cavalry
which is concerned primarily with its own separate objectives.
But most grievous of all has been the effect upon Army
thinking. The Army has come to accept the ground battle
as bounded by the use of its own weapons Systems. The tac-
tical air force Operations of reconnaissance and ground sup-
port, which are as integral to the fight as division artillery,
have been lost to Army thinking and Army planning.
The separate Air Force can be a tolerable arrangement only
if the Army maintains a capacity for vigorous and independent
thinking on the air power requirements of the ground battle.
The Army can best define these requirements. It must accept
the responsibility for doing so and must keep them in balance
with other planning for the ground battle. It must think of
the tactical air force as a part of the Army and must be pre-
pared, if necessary, to sacrifice divisions in order to maintain
a balance of tactical air force. It must define and establish
the Army requirements for support from the Strategie air
force. It must think and plan in terms of the whole land
battle. For these purposes, its leaders must be thoroughly
trained in the application of air power in the land batde.
These tasks may be extremely difficult under our present Or-
ganization, but they are absolutdy essential to the fĂĽll ex-
ploitation of our national defense potential.
It is not enough to reproach the cavalry of the air age for
wanting to go off and do what it can do. We must make cer-
tain that it is present and accounted for in the land battle.
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
Tough tactical exercises and winter sports are joined
at the Mountain Training Center deep in tlie Austrian Alps
-*»^
**
Skilied Austrian Skilehrers bring the students along fast; this first-week Student shows good downhill form
IN Austria when it's too cold to fish, you learn to ski. At
least that's what 600 U. S. officers and men did last winter
-thanks to the USFA's Mountain Training Center at Saal-
felden, deep in the Austrian Alps.
The MTC is in Operation the year around. But when
winter crawls down from the j^erpetually snow-covered peaks
and ice and snow cover the cliffs and ridges used for ' mili-
tary assault climbing" exercises during the summer months,
mountain climbing gear is stowed away and skis and snow-
shoes are broken out.
Students are officers and soldiers sdected for the training
by Unit Commanders of U.S. Forces in Austria. The courses
last five weeks and sdected students, earmarked as instructors,
oet three weeks of additional training. At the end of the five-
weck period students can perform such conventional maneu-
vers as the snow plow, stem turns, the stem christiania, the
herringbone climb and a few variations in cross country ski
running. ITie tvventy professional instructors are Austrian
JANUAR Y 1955
Skilehrers (ski teachers) and hilf skilehrers (assistant ski
teachers)— accredited bv the Austrian government, which pre-
scribes rigid Standards.
When a man reports at the school he is issued skis, ski
poles, ski boots, parka, sun glasses, snowshoes, two-man tent,
small cookstove, and a rucksack. From then on he leams
to live on and in the snow.
He spends most of bis time on the "slope' -alvvays on skis
and always carrying his rucksack. When he isn't on the slope
he is probably out on a 'cross country," which means toihng
uphill and trekking down either on skis or snowshoes.
It's hard work during the first couple of weeks but in-
cessant drilling and practice bring proficiency, and slopes that
were dizzy, impossible inclines when the Student first reported
become simple challenges to his skill.
And when it is all over and graduation day comes, the
Student skicr knows why the MTC is the most populär school
among officers and men on duty in Austria.
37
No comfortable chair lift as at Sun Valley, but a precarious handhold on a cold, frost-covered cable that some-
fimes slips out of the skier's mittened hand as he nears the top of the slope, sending him slitheringly downward
Soldiers from Alabama, Arizona and points north learn to bivouac for the night by scooping out a trench in
the snow and covering it with a shelter half held up by a pair of skis laid across the top of the trench
The parade ground is the "slope" where, except for cross-country jaunts, the soldier spends all his working hours
When the Student becomes reasonably proficient on skis he joins in small-unit tactics under a fĂĽll rucksack
38
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
JANUARY 1955
How guided missiles and rockets are giving surface-to-air
and surface-to-ground artilleries more punc/i, and more
range^ which nteans more mobility
EXTENDING THE
Captain Josiah A. Wallace, Jr.
THE nevv guided missiles and free
rockets now Coming into use are de-
signed to serve a multitude of combat
Functions. We have surface-to-surface,
surface-to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground
missile weapons in various stages of de-
velopment and refinement as well as
production. It seems probable that the
period of "atomic plenty" will also see
these new weapons become plentiful.
The new antiaircraft artillery weapon,
Nike, is presently in production. New
tactical units are being formed and
trained to use this surface-to-air w^eap-
on and a major share of the antiaircraft
defenses of our big citics will fall to
Nike outfits.
Field artiller)' is moving forward too.
New surface-to-surface weapons are be-
ing designed and tested to increase the
Potential of the field artillery arm. Now
in the process of testing and refinement
are such weapons as the Corporal, a
guided missile, and Honest John, a free-
flight rocket.
Employed as a field artillery weapon,
the surface-to-surface guided missiles and
free rockets provide the Armv with prac-
tical, dependable, all-weather w^eapons
suitable for use in—
• Extending materially the effective
ränge and warhead capabilities of
field artillery.
• Delivering tactical atomic explosives
accurately.
• Giving artillery much greater mo-
bilitv.
Captain Josiah A. Wallace, Jr., Artil-
lery, is on duty at the Antiaircraft Ar-
tillery and Guided Missile School at
Fort Bliss. His last appearance in these
columns was in the issue of May 1953.
40
• Reinforcing heavy fire support of
ground forces in conjunction with
tactical air elements er when such
Clements are unable to provide the
desired support.
• Attacking highly critical targets that
cannot be attacked by tactical air
elements.
These surface-to-surface missiles ap-
pear to bear up well in analysis against
an actual combat Situation. An example
from Korea illustrates this.
Near Kunu-ri in late November 1950
an aerial observer, operating deep be-
hind enemy lines, detected a growing
conccntration of Communist infantry in
what would appear to be an extension of
his division's sector. Continuing his sur-
veillance, he saw that the force, in its
movement south, was confined in a nar-
row Valley.
In answer to his request for artillery
fire, he was informed that the target
was beyond maximum ränge of all avail-
able battalions. Subsequently, tactical air
was called in but failed to locate and at-
tack the conccntration.
Early the following morning, the ob-
server, again airborne over enemv lines,
picked up his target once more and dis-
covered that the force, estimated now
at nearly ten thousand men, had moved
farther south during the night and had
dug countless foxholes in an area five
hundred yards wide and some three miles
deep. Eventually, he was able to get the
fire of a 155mm howitzer battalion on
the target, but despite excellent initial
effect on the conccntration, the battalion
soon was forced to displace to another
Position. Later the same day, this mas-
sive enemy force attacked southward
against our forces, forcing the withdraw-
al of two of our divisions.
Surface-to-surface missiles could have
been used in this Situation, and ef-
fectively. Guided missiles would have
been an ideal weapon against the con-
ccntration in the narrow Valley, and in
such an attack it seems certain that the
bulk of this force would have been kiUed
or wounded. Thus pressure on the UN
lines in this area would have been re-
duced materiallv.
This example shows how surface-to-
surface missiles can extend the ränge and
destructive capacity of conventional field
artillery weapons. Furthermore, had a
Single missile been fitted with an atomic
warhead it could have destroyed the
enemy force in the open.
It follow^s that surface-launched guided
missiles will provide the army in the
field with another means of delivery of
atomic weapons. No longer will we have
to rely entirely on air or 280mm-gun
delivery. Using both the 280mm gun
and guided missiles, senior Commanders
will have the capability of Bring atomic
weapons with great accuracy regardless
of weather conditions that might prevent
use of aircraft.
IN the Korean example, surface-to-sur-
I face missiles could have been used to
destroy the combat potential of the Com-
munist force even though that force was
dug in before its attack. Such an action
would have been in the nature of heavy
fire support for the American forces de-
fending near Kunu-ri. And if it had
been decided to launch an attack on this
force, the missile fire could have been
followed with conventional field artillery
and tactical air attack to pave the way
for the ground advance. If we assume,
for the purpose of discussion, that the
Communists had air superiority near
Kunu-ri, or at least behind their own
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
lines in that general area, tactical air
would have been exposed to considerable
risk in attacking such a conccntration.
It is of course questionable in such an
event if the aerial observer would have
scouted the force. Given the location of
the center of this conccntration, guided-
missile units could have pierced the
hostile air defense with ease and ac-
curacy.
This is but one example of how sur-
face-to-surface missiles could be used in
combat. Surely there are many others.
All would tend to prove that in modern
war the ability to strike ever deeper and
ever more effectively into the enemy's
rear is of great importance. All would
tend to show that the depth of a given
combat sector will, in the future, be
determined by the effective ränge of
weapons at the combat army's disposal.
FROM the point of view of wcight,
guided missiles offer considerable ad-
vantages over conventional artillery pro-
jectiles. These advantages stem from
their different design requirements.
The walls of a conventional projectile
must be strong enough to withstand the
tremendous external pressure exerted by
the propelling charge when the shell is
fired from the tube and boosted to maxi-
mum speed within a fraction of a second.
In flight, the projectile must be able to
bear up under the strong centrifugal
force resulting from its high rate of rota-
tion. The external portion of the projec-
tile must be designed to produce a mini-
mum of air friction so that it will move
along a stable, predictable trajectory.
Having designed a projectile that
meets these three requirements, the ord-
nance engineer can then, and only then,
compute the weight of the explosive
Charge to be carried by the shell. Frag-
mentation factors follow as a fifth and
minor consideration.
In designing surface-to-surface guided
missiles, the ordnance engineer can dis-
pense with most of these considerations
and design a missile to carry a prescribed
explosive charge.
Propelled by its own power, the mis-
sile is subjected to substantially less
shock of initial acceleration than an artil-
lery projectile. Since it is guided in the
air by airfoils of various shapes, there is
no need to consider centrifugal force.
Of prime importance, however, is the
aerodynamic design.
The outer skin of the missile must be
designed to attain maximum airspeed for
any given amount of power. The skin
and casing must be strong enough to
withstand extremely high speeds and
the resulting high outer-skin tempera-
tures. But these considerations do not
nccessarily require material increases in
the weight and thickness of the mis-
siles casing.
Liohter casing construction permits
heavier warhead charges and produces a
highly favorable charge-to-case weight
ratio that will probably allow an advance
determination of fragmentation effects.
SURFACE-to-surface and surface-to-air
guided missiles and rockets are not
intended to replace any of the weapons
now in use. They provide a logical Sup-
plement to these weapons, extending the
ränge and combat potential of the field
artillery. Because of their greater ex-
pcnse, these weapons may be used some-
what sparingly in any future conflict,
but they would be available as a potent
rapier with which the Army could thrust
telling blows swiftly and effectively be-
hind liostile lines. Guided missiles are
Coming of age.
^^ppORAL
41
JANĂśARY 1955
New /flcenf/Ve to Re-upt
9
ARTIUERY INTEGRAT/ON
Army pollsters bring to light some revealing
attitudes towards the new unit rotation plan
TI IIRTY-FIVE years ago the question
was, "I low vou gonna kecp 'cm down
on the Farm after thev've seen Parce?"
But toda\ it is, "I low you gonna keep
em in the Armv atter they have seen
all too mueh ot the world (except may-
be Paree)?"
Some hints were ohtained reeentlv hv
OCAFFs 1 luman Research Unit No.
2 which went into aetion with a ques-
tionnaire right alter the Army's unit
rotation j-)lan— Operation Gyroscope—
was announeed. IIRU No. 2 asked a
lot of cjuestions of 1,200 olTicers and men
of three different outfits in the U.S.
These were the ?>d Armored Cavalrv
Regiment, the lOth Intantrv Division,
and the 508th Airborne RCt-all schcd-
uled to go overseas.
Answers made to some questions bv
first-threc-graders of the Regulär Army
are of interest. The questions and the
results appear in the adjoining box.
Whv did fewer Regulär Army non-
eoms answer questions 2 and 3 aiTirma-
tiv^elv than answered question 1 allirma-
tivelv? The researchers say this was
beeause the men were told just before
being asked questions 2 and 3 that sign-
ing up in a unit rotation outfit would
mean 33 months of servicc overseas.
Many men probably figured that under
the old svstem their chanccs of staying
in the States w^ere better than reenlisting
in an outfit scheduled for shipment
overseas for 33 months.
But the big tipofiF seems to be in re-
sponses to question 6, and to a slightly
lesser extent, to questions 7 and 8. Availa-
bilitv of dependent housing seems to
Per Cent
who will reenlist
lOfh Inf
3d Armd
508lh Abn
Division
Cavalry
RCT
(1)
Will you reenlist >vhen
your present
tour of duty is over? (This question
was asked before the
unit rotation
plan was mentioned or explained.)
62
58
62
(2)
Would you reenlist for
a 3-year tour
with your present oufit under unit
rotation? (This question was asked
after all the facts about unit rotation
had been presented.)
50
52
53
(3)
Would you reenlist for
a 4-year tour
of duty wi?h your present outfit un-
der uni( rotation?
42
49
43
(4)
Would you reenlist in
tion outfit for 3 years.
a unit rota-
spending 33
months in Europe?
70
62
65
(5)
Would you reenlist in
tion outfit for 3 years,
a unit rota-
spending 33
months in the Far East?
45
47
55
(6)
Would you reenlist in
tion outfit for 3 years
a unit rota-
if dependent
housing were available overseas for
officers and first-three-
graders?
74
72
68
(7)
Would you reenlist in
tion oufit for 3 years
be spending most of 1
a unit rota-
if you would
[he time with
the same fellows?
71
75
66
(8)
Would you reenlist in
a unit rota-
tion outfit if it had o permanent home
base at which to train
and return to
after an overseas tour?
68
73
61
be the Controlling factor, followed by
"spending most of the tour with the
same fellows" and having a 'permanent
home base to return to."
Officers were favorably inclined to-
ward the plan. Of the officers inter-
viewed from the lOth Infantry Division,
94 per cent said they believed unit
rotation would be "some" or a '*big" im-
provement. In the 3d Armored Cavalry
Regiment, 100 per cent of the officers
tested were for the plan.
More than 60 per cent of the Regulär
Army first-three-graders said they ''would
be more proud to be a soldier" under
the unit rotation plan. They also ex-
pressed the belief that Gyroscope would
mean more adequate dependent hous-
ino both overseas and in the U.S., more
authority for noncoms, and more cer-
tainty for the future.
The report lists 37 res}X)nses of first-
three-graders to the question, "What is
your most important reason for not
wanting to reenlist in a unit rotation
outfit?" Of these, 19 said they just
didn't like the Armv or preferred civilian
life, and so wouldn't reenlist; 5 didn't
like the outfit they were then serving
in; 4 had family reasons (wife's health,
for instance); 3 said they had had too
mueh overseas service already; 2 simply
preferred Stateside dutv; 2 were so du-
bious about the merits of the plan they
didn't want to be inv^olved in it; 1 said
he didn't want to go to the Far East;
and another said, **I would not reenlist
in any unit without an increase in pay
1 "
Scale.
Pertinent and typical objections of
officers who planned to stay in the Serv-
ice were reflected in such comments
as these:
— "Opportunities for promotion in such
an outfit might be less.
— "Mv career mav follow too narrow
a field of experience which may reflect
on mv promotions later."
— "Possibilitv of getting stuck with a
dull oufit and job."
Officers emphasized the possibility of
improvement in combat readiness, high-
er morale and greater esprit even more
than they did stability or "family rea-
sons.
42
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
... I» Will Take
a Whole New Generation
BRIGADIER GENERAL THEODORE W. PARKER
TUE Integration of the field artillery
and antiaircraft artillery into one ar-
tillery, has led to the hottest controversy
in the combat arms since we debated
the merits and demerits of horseflesh
and the internal combustion engine. Like
the horse argument, which still persists,
the artillerv Integration argument is
likely to last for a considerable time.
The British Army has had an inte-
grated artillery arm for many years, in-
cluding the period of World War II.
I have often thought that perhaps their
Organization may have had a contribut-
ing influence on our decision to organize
similarly. It is interesting to relate, there-
fore, a chance conversation I had with
the artillery Commander of the British
Commonwealth Division on the occasion
of bis leaving Korea to return to Eng-
land. When I asked him of bis plans
he mentioned that he had first to attend
a meeting-a meeting of senior British
artillerymen to consider whether or not
their field and antiaircraft artillery
should be continued in one arm! llis
own opinion, he volunteered, was that
they should not be. So a Single arm of
both types of artillery is not a fixed
conclusion on the part of our British
artillerv comrades.
So far we have had only a four-year
test period of single branch artillery.
We can assume that the decision to
integrate was a result of considered, de-
tailed study, and with a long-term Solu-
tion in mind. Thorough, open discussion
of the problem should be welcomed, but
as we continue to argue the pros and
cons, we should base our arguments on
the future possibilities of Integration as
well as on the present degree of success-
ful Implementation of the change. The
Army Combat Forces Journal could
provide a very useful service, it would
seem, bv printing for the information
JANUAR Y 1955
of its readers the facts upon which the
official decision to integrate was based,
if such facts are available and releasable.
A distinguished antiaircraft artillery-
man, recendy retired, has said that it
will take a whole new generation of
artillervmen to make Integration com-
plete. Many an artillery officer of either
breed, field or antiaircraft, having spent
a significant portion of bis career devel-
oping the know-how of bis branch, may
understandably resent being placed in
a position where bis experience doesn't
fit him for the job at band and where
he must relv on the views and experi-
ence of others for the Solution of prob-
lems he feels he should comprehend by
virtue of bis training. Understandably,
he's against Integration. So we shall
probably have to write ofF all those who
were field or antiaircraft artillerymen,
and concentrate our efiforts on those who
have never been anything but just *'ar-
tillerymen." If integration is to succeed
over the long run, integrated schooling,
assignments in both fields, and a one-
branch loyal ty must be vigorously pur-
sued. The merger of our branch asso-
ciations and their professional Journals
is a Step in this direction. The young
artillery officers of today must grow up
with the conviction that integration is
here to stay, or that any future changes
will be effected in such a manner that
the skills they have mastered will not
become useless to them.
TUE most important basic difference
in the background and experience of
the two tvpes of artillerymen is that of
tactical concept. The field artilleryman
thinks, tactically, like the infantryman
or tanker he supports. He thinks in
terms of seeking and destroying the
enemv. He thinks in terms of move-
ment, mobility and offensive aetion. The
bidk of bis training is along these lines,
and properly so. The antiaircraft artil-
lervman, on the other band, thinks,
tacticallv, in terms of statie deployment,
with little or no tactical mobility, for
he must wait until the enemy comes
vvithin ränge of bis weapons before he
can engage. His training, and again
r
WHEN the question of artillery integration
came in for renewed discussion recendy, it
seemed only logical for the editors to ask
Brigadier General Theodore W. Parker
to set down his thoughts on the subject.
Having an intimacy with both kinds of ar-
tillery, General Parker is peculiarly suited to
know what he is talking about. After grad-
uating from the MiHtary Academy in 1935,
he served in several field artillery assignments
before and during Wodd War II. In Korea
he was Commander of X Corps Artillery and
last April he returned to the U.S. to take com-
mand of the 45th AAA Brigade at Fort Sher-
idan, IlHnois.
43
properly so, exclusivelv emphasizes de-
fensive action. Isn't it reasonable to
assume that it was similarity of mission
and tactics that led to the now obsolete
coast artillery branch taking over the
Functions of antiaircraft artillery as the
need for the latter arose? There is an
inherent, fundamental, and vitally im-
portant difference in the tactical training
and thinking of the two types of artil-
lerymen and in the employment of their
weapons.
From this point of view a better argu-
ment might be made for the integration
of field artillery with the infantrv or
with armor, or an integration of all
three, than for the integration of field
and antiaircraft artillery. Similar weap-
ons are found frequently throughout our
combat arms, often with identical or
closely related techniques of employ-
ment. It is not a difference in weapons,
or techniques, which basically requires
the existence of separate arms. It is far
more a question of difference in tactics. If
integration of the two artillery branches
should finally prove less effective than
their Separation, I am convinced that
such a conclusion will result from the
incompatibility of the tactics of the two.
The differences in the equipment of
the antiaircraft artillery and the field
artillery are not particularly important
as far as integration is concerned. Each
type of artillery has long included in
its armament a number of calibers:
light, medium, and heavv. Each has
had a variety of auxiliary equipment
and prime movers. An antiaircraft of-
ficer might be assigned to an automatic-
weapons unit (caliber .50 machine guns
and 40mm guns), then to a 120mm gun
unit. A field artillery officer might serve
with a 105mm howitzer unit, then a
240mm howitzer unit. Sound-and-flash
44
Units, Operations detachments, and
searchlight batteries were also possible
assignments for one or the other, and
now the field is broadened by guided
missiles, both surface-to-air and surface-
to-surface. The variety of assignments
is certainly expanded by integration, and
this expansion generates a need for in-
creased knowledge on the part of the
individual. In itself this is not a strong
argument against integration, for seldom
did any one officer serve with every
different type of equipment even when
the two artilleries were separate.
IT also seems apparent that the use of
antiaircraft weapons in a ground role
has little bearing on the question. Anti-
aircraft weapons, so used, have never
played a significant part in any cam-
paign, nor, to the best of my knowledge,
in any major battle. They have con-
tributed to successful actions on manv
occasions, and their use is definitely
warranted whenevcr they happen to be
on band and not more needed in their
normal role. Such use, however, has
nothing to do with artillery integration.
Since the two artillery branches were
integrated we have had only one peri-
od of hostilities, in which to observe
the results. The Korean action should
certainly not be taken as typical. On
the other band, the experience gained
in it should not be discarded. The con-
clusion I would draw, based on my own
observations, is that we did not practice
artillery integration in Korea. When
an artillery officer arrived in Korea
he was categorized as having an anti-
aircraft or a field artillery background.
As a first possibility, an antiaircraft
officer might be assigned to the AAA
brigade which was deployed in de-
fense of the fighter bases and ports
of Korea. A field artillery officer rarely,
if ever, received such an assignment.
There was certainly no integration there.
The majority of artillery officers were
assigned to divisions. Upon arrival at
division the antiaircraft officer was con-
sidered for assignment to the automatic
weapons battalion of the division artil-
lery. If there was a place for him there
(taking into account the relative offi-
cer shortages and specific MOS require-
ments of all the artillery battalions) the
antiaircraft officer would be assigned to
the automatic-weapons battalion. Rare-
ly, if ever, was a field artillery officer
assigned to an automatic-weapons bat-
talion. So there was no integration
there, either.
Percentage-wise, comparing officers as-
signed to those authorized in the tables
of Organization, there was always a
preponderance of antiaircraftmen over
field artillerymen. Consequently, a num-
ber of antiaircraft officers were assigned
to field artillery battalions, and in this
manner a degree of integration was
achieved. However, even when assigned
to a field artillery battalion, the antiair-
craft officer was a better-than-even bet
to fill an Sl or S4 position, or to wind
up in a headquarters or a Service battery,
rather than in an S2, S3, or liaison
officer }X)sition or in a howitzer battery.
Integration was thus partially achieved
in the division field artillery battalions,
but it was marginal.
Corps artillery, having no active, inte-
gral AAA Units, were assigned a much
smaller percentage of antiaircraftmen in
their artillery officer allocations. The
general pattern of the assignment of
antiaircraft officers to corps units was
similar to that of divisions. The corps
battalions, corps artillery headquarters
and the Eighth Army artillery section
all had antiaircraft officers assigned, but
seldom did these officers occupy }X)si-
tions requiring field artillery knowledge
and experience.
AS a part of the directed MOS System,
in which certain selected senior of-
ficers were ordered to specific assign-
ments, corps and division artillery Com-
manders and executives were often
officers of antiaircraft background. That
this System worked successfully was
partly because of the unusually high
ability of most of the officers so assigned,
and partly because, as a general rule,
the concurrent assignment of antiair-
craftmen as both Commanders and execu-
tives of any single division or corps ar-
tillery unit was avoided. The same rule
applied generally to field artillery battal-
ions and batteries: if either the com-
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
mander or executive was an antiaircraft
officer the other had to be a field artil-
leryman.
This description of artillery integra-
tion in Korea applies to the stabilized,
latter phase of the conflict. It indicates
that integration was only partial and
all one-way: antiaircraft officers in field
artillery assignments. The stabilized con-
dition in Korea probably made the
Operation of integration more successful
than would have been possible in a
mobile Situation, since there was more
time in stabilized combat conditions for
' on-the-job" training and since the new
knowledge required of the individual
was more limited. A general conclusion
is that integration of antiaircraft officers
into field artillery units worked satis-
factorily in the top and bottom grades
—general officers and colonels, and junior
lieutenants— but that it was not prac-
ticable in most instances in the middle
grades, where branch experience was
critically important in order to perform
satisfactorily in combat such duties as
battalion Commander, S3, liaison officer,
and howitzer battery Commander.
The advent of missiles, guided and
free, is hailed by some as a development
which makes the integration of the ar-
tillery more logical and desirable. It
may be so. Surely, if one missile or one
family of missiles should be developed
with equal capabilities against both air
and ground targets, the argument would
be strengthened. However such a uni-
versal missile has not yet been devel-
oped, just as a universal air-ground gun
was never developed by the.
United States Army. At any rate,
the same tactical differences ex-
ist as between use of surface-to-
air and surface-to-surface mis-
siles as exist between the antiair-
craft and field artiller\' weapons.
SO far I have said nothing
about the effect of artillery
integration on the officers of our
civilian components, although
they were certainly a majority
of the persons involved in the
description of Korean experi-
ence. If the artillery has now
become too all-encompassing for
a career officer to cope with,
certainly it will have to be
broken down into specialties or
assignment patterns for Nation-
al Guard and Army Reserve
officers who have much less
time to devote to its mastery.
The majority of our antiaircraft
artillery units are now commit-
ted to static defense roles for the
JANUARY 1955
protection of vital areas of the Con-
tinental United States. Both missile and
oun units are so employed. Future plan-
ning is taking into consideration the
fact that such static defense missions
are particularly appropriate ones for
civilian component units, utilizing a
small caretaker detachment on-site and
providing the emergency operating per-
sonnel from a unit recruited in the
neighborhood of the gun or missile posi-
tion. We shall probably hear more of
this development as time goes on, and
it may have its greatest impact on the
artillery arm, specifically on the antiair-
craft component.
There are a number of other factors
which affect the ultimate success of the
integration of the two artilleries. We
are always faced with a need for a large
number of officers for branch-immateri-
al duties such as service on high-level
staffs, military attaches, military mis-
sions, and branch immaterial service
school instructors. The time so spent is
lost to troop duty and experience with
artillery Organization, tactics, and equip-
ment. The average officer must spend
a considerable portion of bis career at
schools, both his branch and higher
schools. This requirement is increasing
with the increasing complexity of our
equipment. Again troop experience time
is lost. As an officer progresses through
his career, if he loses the opportunity
for troop experience he also loses his
confidence in troop leading in his arm,
and he tends to seek and settle into staff
or branch immaterial positions at every
level. An expanded artillery career field
would seem to aggravate this condition.
For the past several years we have had
the bulk of our field artillery overseas,
the bulk of our antiaircraft artillery in
the Continental United States. As long
as rotation of personnel is effected on
an individual basis the proper rotation
of artillery officers is certainly more easi-
Iv accomplished with an integrated ar-
tillery. Mark up a point for integration.
TM IS short review of integration, with
its limited number of cross assign-
ments, indicates that each of the two
arms has contributed certain of its char-
acteristics to the new offspring. Of these
I would name two as particularly bene-
ficial The field artilleryman has con-
tributed the sense of urgency and flexi-
bility of thinking that are characteristic
of a mobile arm and which are needed
to keep our static defenses out of the
doldrums; the antiaircraftman has con-
tributed an appreciation of the advan-
tages of mechanical Computing and auto-
matic transmission of firing data, charac-
teristic of his three-dimensional gunnery
problem, and of fundamental importance
in the development and improvement
of artillery technique in general, both
for aerial and terrestrial targets.
FOR the next fifteen to twenty years,
while all the once-upon-a-time field
artillerymen and antiaircraftmen serve
out their careers, generally alternating,
it is to be hoped, between assignments
in both fields, we should continue to
debate the issues of artillery in-
tegration with an open mind.
We should practice integration
to the hilt, departing from this
policv only when obvious dam-
age to Operations would result
(as I believe it would have re-
sulted in Korea). We should
rear a new generation of artil-
lerymen whose allegiance is
only to artillery, not to field
artillery or to antiaircraft artil-
lery. Then we should let this
new generation decide, in light
of their experience and the rc-
quirements of artillery at that
time, whether the artillery mis-
sion or missions at that time
can best be accomplished by
two arms or by a single one. Ar-
tillervmen have always prided
themselves on their versatility.
We can prove our claim to that
heritage by making integration
work now, while we continue
to analyze its strengths and
weaknesses.
45
THE MONTH'S READING
II
The Past Triumphant
PHILIP GUEDALLA
The Second Empire
Hodder and Stoughton, 1932
When Napoleon took the field [Napoleon III against
Austria in 1859], it would be as well for him to be Napo-
Iconic; and the Emperor, who had consulted the Oracles
of military orthodoxy in Paris, brought with him an authen-
tic plan by an old master. Almost past eighty, living in the
suburban peace of Passy was a Swiss soldier of the First
Empire named Jomini, who had ridden with Ney's staff at
Ulm and lena and left bis master as the clouds gathered
after Moscow. The old man had made a plan for his mas-
ter's nephew, and he made it in the fĂĽll tradition of Soult
and Berthier. The plan was palpable to connoisseurs as a
perfect Empire piece; one could almost see the gleam of the
brass gryphons on its dark rectangular joinery. It ignored
completely the unauthorised innovation of railways, and
it depended for its success upon the obliging courtesy of an
enemy who would keep reasonably still. But since it was
for use against the Austrians, it was entirely successful; and
the French enjoyed in 1859 the pleasing experience of de-
feating with the methods of 1809 an adversary whose military
thought was that of 1759. Jomini's plan, in the mode of
the First Empire, was victorious over generalship which had
advanced no further than the Seven Years' War; but if the
Austrians had been Prussians or if General von Moltke had
ridden to Pavia with the Feldzeugmeister Giulay, the French
would have been swept against the Alps.
The Meaning of Korea
THOMAS K. FINLETTER
Power and Po/icy
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954
The argument for extended bombing [of China] was not
military in nature. It was based on a fundamental political
objection to the course the US government was following
in the Korean War. The US government intended to limit
the war to Korea if it possibly could; it saw Korea as a war
to stop aggression and to restore the Status quo ante, as all
wars to enforce collective security are supposed to be. The
proponents of extended bombing wanted total victory over
the Chinese; they wanted to use the opportunity to roll
back the Communist power.
On the other band they wanted to make the rollback at
small cost and risk to the United States. The proposals for
a tough line with Red China promised an easy victory, with
little cost to the victors. Ihe idea of using United States
ground troops to support Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland
of China was repudiated by the most ardent supporters of
46
a tough policy in China. It was not even proposed that the
United States Air be used to support a landing by Chiang
on the mainland; and the Air is the favorite for those who
want a tough policy without much cost.
The argument for extending the Korean War beyond the
limits of Korea was that a limited war was inherently wrong
and that the purpose of the Korean War, like all wars,
should be victory, by which was meant a clear defeat of
China and, as a minimum, the rollback of Communist
power out of North Korea.
Two points about this are important. First, the idea that
we were after "victory" in Korea is incorrect, if by "victory"
we mean the total defeat of the Chinese and their uncon-
ditional surrender. We were in Korea to stop the aggression
where it started, at the 38th Parallel, which is what we did. . .
Next, all the suggestions that we should be tougher in
the Korean War, were, as we have said, based on the as-
sumption that the war could be extended and the Chinese
thoroughly defeated with litde additional effort by the
United States. The 1950 drive by the UN Forces over the
38th Parallel was on the assumption that the Chinese would
not intervene and that there would be no Opposition except
from the almost totally destroyed army of North Korea. The
later suggestions for "victory" over the Chinese assumed that
this victory could be had with only a very limited increase
in the military effort of the United States.
Too Powerful to Survive?
FRANK MUNK
Professor, Political Science, Reed College
The New Leoder
8 Nov. 1954
It would be difhcult enough to tarne the tiger of power
had we to cope with domestic and internal causes alone.
Yet it is evident that the real impetus in this country is due
to the shift from a primarily domestic to a predominantly
external State, from a State dedicated to due process of law
to a State dedicated to maximization of external power. In a
World of power politics, America must supplant arguments
with armaments. The question is to what extent.
In the present world Situation, a high degree of military
power would be required even had there been no changes
in the technology of war. Unfortunately, science— the power
over matter— has been brought in to increase man's power
over man. Science itself being blind, directionless and
directiveless, socialized science easily and inevitably becomes
an arm of government. Government and science together
are a formidable thing, formidable enough if one had to
contend with one such government alone. The fact, of
course, is that we are in the presence of a competitive
struggle— three governments have already exploded nuclear
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
weapons and more are on the way— and that no secretiveness
can prevent other nations from acquiring and developing
the total weapons now coming off the assembly line. Total
weapons create their own total states. How much power,
then, must the U.S. possess? Are there any built-in limita-
tions on national power? At what point does it become
self-destructive? There is no absolute level of military power
at which a country would be "secure." Too little power
may invite aggression, too much power invite overarmament,
militarization, the hybris of expansionism. The important
thing is not only the level of power, but the relative rate
of increase. In the long run, the most advantageous is that
level at which aggression is more risky than nonaggression.
But let US remember also that power tends to create
counter-power. Our chief worry in the months to come
will be not our potential enemies but our present friends.
Power attracts, but it also repels. You can become so power-
ful that everybody fears you-especially if you succumb to
the temptation of throwing your weight around.
The U.S. faces the problem of combining a government
of great external power with its traditional limitations at
home. Can there be a democracy permanently armed to
the teeth? Furthermore, does not impairment of the demo-
cratic process also reduce our military power? Ideology,
too, is part of a nation's strength. . . .
The ultimate question, therefore, is whether attempted
maximization of power truly leads to its Optimum, whether
the pursuit of more power may not in reality tend to reduce
it. The real challenge to America is to establish firm foun-
dations of national power in which the military, political,
economic and ideological components are so balanced as to
constitute a mixture blended for stability, maneuverabiUty
and Overall effectiveness. ...
Electronics and the Ă„rmy
GENERAL CHARLES L. BOLTE
Vice Chief of StafF, U.S. Army
Address before the Armed Forces Communicafions Associafion
December 1954
I would like to draw your attention to a recent action
which exemplifies the Army's deep interest in electronic
matters. Early this year the Army established the Electronic
Proving Ground at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. At this In-
stallation the Army Signal Corps will perform technical and
operational field-type tests on advanced Communications and
electronic Systems which help to determine experimentally
the requirements we must place on research and develop-
ment. Improved doctrine and techniques will be developed
at this post, and specialized individual and unit training will
be provided to the personnel who will operate our electronic
equipment.
For the first time, the Army will have facilities to lay out
in fĂĽll Scale the communication and electronic Operations of
an entire field army for study and evaluation. The Army
Electronic Proving Ground will serve as the crucible into
which we pour many operational problems, and through
which, by the application of experimental methods under
field conditions, we expect to crystallize procedures, organi-
zations, and Systems fulfilling the demands of the future
Army.
JANUAR Y 1955
A Medal for Horatius
(Continued from fage l^)
IXth Ind. JAG. II Calends, September, CCCLXI
To: AG
I. XVII months have elapsed since event dcscribed in
basic letter. Star of Bronze cannot be awarded after XV
months have elapsed.
II. Officer is eligible for Papyrus Scroll with Metal
Pendant.
P. B.
Xth Ind. AG. I Idc of October, CCCLXI
To: Gl
For draft of citation for Papyrus Scroll with Metal
Pendant.
G. C.
Xlth Ind. Gl. 111 Calends, October, CCCLXI
To: G-II
I. Do not concur.
II. Our currcntly fine relations with Tuscany would suf-
fer and current delicatc negotiations might be jeopardized
if Publicity were given to Captain Horatius' actions at the
present time.
T. ].
Xllth Ind. G-II. VI day of November, CCCLXI
To: Gl.
A report (rated D-IV), partially verified, states that
Lars Porsena is very sensitive about the Horatius affair.
E. T.
Xlllth Ind. GL X day of November, CCCLXI
To: AG
I. In view of information contained in preceding Xlth
and Xllth Indorsements, you will prepare immcdiate orders
for Captain G. C. Horatius to one of our overseas stations.
IL His attention will be directed to paragraph XII,
POM, which prohibits interviews or conversations with
newsmen prior to arrival at final destination.
LT.
Rome
II Calends, April I, CCCLXII
Subject: Survey, Report of DEPARTMENT OF WAR
To: Captain Gaius Caius Horatius, III Legion, V
Phalanx, APO XIX, c/o Postmaster, Rome
I. Your Statements concerning the loss of your shield
and sword in the Tiber River on III March, CCCLX, have
been carefully considered.
IL It is admitted that you were brieHy in action against
certain unfriendly elements on that day. However, Ser-
geant Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius were
in the same action and did not lose any government property.
III. The Finance Ofticer has been directed to reduce your
next pay by II I/II talents (I 111/ IV talents cost of one, each,
sword, officers; III/IV talent cost of one, each, shield, M-II).
IV. You are enjoincd and admonished to pay strict at-
tention to conservation of government funds and property.
The budget must be balanced next year.
H. Hocus Pocus
Lieutenant of Horse, Survey Officer
47
Short Course for Military Managers
OiNE ĂĽf a number of Steps being taken
to strengthen what might be called
the business side of the Army, the Com-
mand Alanagement School has been
opened at Fort BeK^oir, Virginia. Here
students get an intensive orientation in
the concepts and prineiples governing
the management oF major segments of
the Arrny. The school offers a three-
week short course to senior officers and
key civihan employees of the Army.
The opening of the school is evidence
that the Army recognizes that every in-
stallation Commander must, in effect,
be a businessman if the Army's business
is to be well managed. The job of the
school is to help the officer who attends
it become a good business manager.
The Chief of Staff, General Mat-
thew B. Ridgway made the formal wel-
coming speech that opened the School.
Later Assistant Secretary of the Army
Charles C. Finucane spoke at a lunch-
eon. Then the opening class, which
consisted of two major generals, a briga-
dier general, twenty-two colonels, eight
lieutenant colonels, and eight civilian
employees, got down to business.
THE school is an unusual one in many
ways. Take the physical plant. The
students sleep, eat and study in one
large brick building. Near the sleeping
quarters are five lounges, each accom-
modating about a dozen men, where in-
formal discussions and study sessions are
held. This is particularly convenient,
since the day's classes begin at 0830
and end at 2200.
Dogmatic teaching, as such, is held to
a minimum. The Army assumes that the
students have picked up a great deal of
management knowledge in their years
of Army experience. The program, as
well as the actual layout of the school
building, is designed to promote the free
interchange of ideas.
Classes are presented by the "case
method." Small groups of students, fac-
ulty members, and civilians discuss ac-
tual management situations that illus-
trate important problems. This teaching
48
Tlie new Army Management School aims to
help Commanders conduct the Army's business
method is used today by the leading
civilian schools of business management.
THE opening of the Command Man-
agement School marks an important
Step in the development of understand-
ing among both civilians and militar)^
men that the Army's nontactical methods
as well as its fighting equipment must
be kept up to date. Today's post Com-
mander is a business manager as well as
a military leader. He is being given in-
creasing authority to shift resources when
necessary; he has to make up many de-
tailed estimates and reports of bis Opera-
tions; he uses many highly trained civil
ians on the post; and the value of the
funds he manages runs into millions of
dollars.
With the increase in the size and com-
plexity of the Army there came the
realization that new techniques of man-
agement were needed. In 1948 the
Office of the Comptroller was estab-
lished to improve these techniques. Four
years later, one of the Assistant Secre-
taries of the Army, Karl Bendetsen,
directed that command management
classes be included in the Army's school
System. Since the results of adding this
instruction would be slow to be feit, and
since a cadre of senior officers who un-
derstood the fundamentals of manage-
ment techniques was needed, it was
decided to set up a short, concentrated
course in command management.
The Comptroller of the Armv re-
tained a management Consultant firm
to study the problem and submit recom-
mendations. By June 1953 it produced
a plan that won Pentagon approval.
The big task was to determine the
approach and scope of the school. Then
a faculty had to be recruited and a physi-
cal plant obtained.
MANY suggestions were worked into
the course of instruction. The pro-
gram, as it was finally drawn up, con-
sists of four phases.
General vianagement. This Covers the
relation between the installation and
higher commands; the skills and tools of
management; the military-civilian per-
sonnel management team; and the op-
portunities of building healthy Commu-
nity and public relations through good
management.
Planning and 'programming. Here the
students take up specific problems, with
the aim of reaching a better understand-
ing of the relationship between the Army
program system, the management of in-
stallations, the Army budget, and the
attendant missions and schedules relat-
ing to the allotments of funding.
Manfower management. Command-
ers are shown how manpower require-
ment policies and control techniques
affect their Operations.
Financial management. This concen-
trates on the concepts and objectives of
the Army's controls and accounting
techniques, and on ways in which con-
trol techniques can strengthen command.
THE staff of the school is especially well
suited for its assignment. The comman-
dant, Colonel Frank Kowalski, Jr., has
had much practical experience includ-
ing being chief of staff and CO of a large
installation. The deputy commandant
and director of instruction is Gilbert C.
Jacobus, a retired Air Force colonel, who
has taught graduate classes in manage-
ment at George Washington University.
He has also served in the Executive
Office of the President and as a member
of the Senior Staff of the National
Security Council. The other members
of the faculty have special training and
experience in management.
The Command Management School
promises to bring increased efficiency to
the handling of the Army's vast business,
and to help assure that every dollar
spent on defense buys a dollar's worth
of value. It will help develop field Com-
manders who will be familiär with the
conventional signs and Symbols of busi-
ness management as well as with the
signs and Symbols on military maps.
Bang! You're Dead
\>.. /
/
A realistic umpiring system
is needed for assessing
casualties and destruction
in atomic maneuvers.
Here's a suggested system
that neither gives away
any secrets, nor requires
you to be a physicist.
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
kJ^
V
.f
y
//-
MAJOR THO/MAS S. ARMS, JR.
WE'VE come a long way from the
broomstick and stoveripe maneuvers
of 1941. Modern exercises and maneu-
vers come complete with an "enemy" who
has bis own uniforms, equipment, and
doctrine, and who can usually be relied
upon to follow the tactical Situation and
refrain from engaging in fist fights for
possession of the objective. But in one
sense we're right back to broomsticks
and stovepipes. Our introduction of
atomic warfare to maneuvers has not
been a crushing success.
This is partly understandable. It is
true that we have made progress in
developing doctrine and staff procedures
for tactical employment of atomic weap-
ons. It is also true that the service schools
are teaching the doctrine and procedures.
But it is not safely possible to simulate
an atomic blast-even a small one— to the
extent necessary to impress troops with
the enormous destructive power of the
Major Thomas S. Arms, Jr. is a 1942
graduate of the Military Academy. He
completed the course at the Command &
General Staff College in 1950. He is
presently on duty at Fort George G.
Meade, Md.
weapon. Some devices that produce ex-
plosions and small, mushroom-shaped
clouds have been tried out, but there is
still plenty of room for ingenuity in the
physical Simulation of an A-blast.
There is also another— and more im-
portant—part of the same problem. Doc-
trine and instruction are fine, but neither
does the slightest good unless it is ap-
plied systematically. Our atomic doctrine
has not been applied systematically to
maneuvers, and it cannot be until a uni-
form System for umpiring is adopted and
umpires trained to use it intelligently.
Not until then will Commanders and
troops be able to get an accurate idea
of the destructive and disorganizing
capabilities of atomic weapons. Figures
on effects of atomic weapons are avail-
able to authorized personnel, but there
is a big difference between seeing these
figures on paper and trying to plug a
gap on the ground where a couple of
vour companies or battalions were a few
min Utes before.
WHAT are the requirements for an
umpiring svstemr First, it has to be
accurate witbout violating security.
49
JANUARY 1955
There is little j^oint to using atomic
weapons in exercises if Commanders and
troops are going to get either an exag-
gerated or reduced picture of casualties
and damage wrought by the blast.
Secondly, it has to be forcefuUy and
uniformly applied by umpires who,
having becn trained in tbe System, can
assess casualties and destruction with-
out a lot oF jawing back and forth witb
the Commanders whose units are being
chewed up.
Setting up a workable System with
these characteristics is a large order. The
planning has to begin at the top, at the
same time that the excrcise itself is laid
out. A senior officer who is a graduate
of a specialweapons course should sit
in on all of the planning for the exercise,
so that its atomic phases can be inte-
grated realistically. Then, when an um-
pire planning group is formed, a special-
weapons sub-section should be formed at
the same time.
This sub-section has several Jobs. First,
at least until Department of the Army
publishcs uniform instructions for um-
piring atomic maneuvers, it will have to
prepare a set of instructions, duplicate
them, and distribute them to unit um-
pires.
WHEN the directives and plans for the
exercise have becn written, the sub-
section will have to prepare in overlay
form a set of templates for each atomic
weapon or group of yields that will be
available for the exercise. (See Figure 1 .)
The sub-section will also have to pre-
pare yield tables for each weapon for a
ground-contaminating hurst and for as
many heights of burst as seem to have
anv point for the exercise.
These tables serve two purposes. First,
tised with the map template, they teil
the umpire the percentage of casualties
to assess against troops in different zones,
beginning with ground zero and working
outward (see Figiire 2), and they show
how much equipment in the dififerent
zones would be damaged and how badly
it would be damaged. (See Figure 3.)
SCALE: 1:25,000
Figure 1: Template
Secondly, they eliminate the Classifica-
tion bugaboo. The man who actually
prepares the templates and tables must
be a trained special-weapons officer who
is authorized to use classified material
for bis computations. Enough informa-
tion about the burst is omitted from the
table that unauthorized persons, even
slipstick specialists, cannot work back-
ward from the tables and come up with
information they shouldn't have. This
in no wav affects the realism for the
participating troops.
THREE more forms are also required.
One is a table for the umpire to use
for tagging casualties from residual radi-
ation, if it exists. (See Figure 4.) The
second is a table showing radiation
dosage, which the umpire can consult
if monitors with appropriate instruments
Figure 2: Casualties to troops (per cent)
ask him for the information. (See Figure
5.) The third is a report form which will
show the casualties and damage assessed
from a given burst in the umpire's unit,
location of the unit and ground zero of
the burst, what the unit was doing at the
time, and additional information the
maneuver directors may want. Of course,
there may be many variations of these
templates and tables, depending on how
much atomic play will be used in the
exercise.
When the special-weapons sub-section
finishes doing the preliminary paper-
work, the next step is to explain it to
the umpires who have to use it. This
instruction in the umpire school should
be given by special-weapons-trained offi-
cers who are qualified to answer the bliz-
zard of questions the Student umpires
will ask about such things as the effects
z
o
N
E
Troops in Open
Troops
Troops
Troops
Good
Visibility
Fair
Visibility
Poor
Visibility
in
Woods
in
Foxholes
in
Tanks
KIA
WIA
KIA
WIA
KIA
WIA
KIA
WIA
KIA
WIA
KIA
WIA
A
B
C
D
E
F
50
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
ZONE
Tanks
Dest.
B
Severe
Artillery
Dest.
E
Severe
Vehicies
Dest.
Severe
Signal
Aircraft
Dest.
Severe
Dest.
Severe
Figure 3: Damage to equipment (per cent)
of the burst, types of casualties it will
cause, damage to equipment, radiation
effect, and interpretation of the tables.
WITH all this done, the rest is fairly
simple unless the umpire Starts trying
to outgucss the tables. His main problem
will be to convince the irate Commander
of the 17th Balloon Regiment that he
and ninety per cent of his command
have just disappeared in a puff of smoke
because they were too close to ground
zero when Aggressor let fly with a
bomb.
The umpires of units likely to be clob-
bered will be told through umpire Chan-
nels the date and time of the burst, the
ground zero, and the map template and
weapons-effects tables they are supposed
to use.
The umpires then count the equip-
ment and personnel in the area and
check on the positions, actions, and lo-
cations of the troops. Just before the
time set for the burst, each umpire plots
his unit's location on his map, Orients
the proper template over ground zero,
and notes the zone his unit is occupying.
After the blast, he checks his tables to
see how many men and pieces of equip-
ment have been wiped out or damaged,
and tags the casualties and damaged or
destroyed equipment. Within four hours
after the burst he tags as radiation casual-
ties not more than ten per cent of all
wounded.
IF the burst leaves residual radiation,
the procedure is somewhat different.
If his unit is in the area at the time of
burst, the umpire takes the Steps that
have just been outlined. In addition, he
uses his table for residual radiation and
tags additional casualties at the end of
each hour the unit stays in the con-
taminated area. If the unit was out of
danger at the time of the blast but
moves into the area later, the umpire
must also be prepared to assess residual-
radiation casualties.
Whether this System is the "school
Solution" or not remains to be seen. It
was used in Exercise Flash Burn, and
it worked. More detailed reports on it
have been sent forward through Chan-
nels as a recommended appendix to FM
105-5 (Maneuver Control).
The important thing is not that this
svstcm or another be adopted in detail,
but that atomic play be included in every
tactical exercise where it is appropriate,
that its effects be accurately and uni-
formly calculated, and that umpires be
given a uniform System such as the one
outlined here-a System so authoritative
that unit Commanders will have no
choice but to accept the casualties they
are assessed. If this is done, and if
planning for atomic play becomes an
hitegral part of the exercise rather than
a hasty afterthought, Commanders and
troops Will get a realistic idea of the
effects of atomic weapons on every aspect
of planning and Operation in modern
warfare.
Figure 4: Casualties from residual nuclear radiation (per cent)
Times of Entry
(Hours After Burst)
Time of Stay (Hours)
Z
o
N
8
8
B
8
8
Ficure 5: Ground con.omino.ion from nuc.eor radio.ion. Dose ro.e .eve.s .Roentgens per hour).
JANUARY 1955
MAJOR W. M. CHAPMAN
SEAL DESIGNED BY INFANTRY COMBAT VETERAN CHOSEN
BY JUDGES IN ASSOCIATION OF U. S. ARMY'S CONTEST
Major William M. Chapman, IntantryUSAR, was awarded the $100 for the best
design of a seal for the Association of the U. S. Army. A total of 99 entries was re-
ceived. The judges were quite impressed with the general high quality of the sub-
missions and a final decision was not easy to make. The Association is deeplv
appreciative of the efforts of every person who entered the contest.
Major and Mrs. Chapman and a young son live at New Casde, Del, whence he
commutes to Wilmington where he is a professional advertising designer. He entered
the Army as an enlisted man in 1942 and served in the Southwest Pacific with the
Md Infantrv Division.
He returned to civilian life in 1946 but kept bis reserve commission and is presently
cnrolled in the USAR School of the Delaware Military District, Wilmington.
The final decision as to whether Major Chapman's design will become the Asso-
ciation's official seal rests with the Executive Council of the Association which had
not mct to consider it at the time this issue went to press.
THE JUDGES
Mr. H. STANLEY
THOMPSON
Vice President,
Rinehart & Company
Publishers
Brig. Gen.
DONALD ARMSTRONG
U. S. A.-Refirecf
L». Col.
WILLARD WEBB
Armor-USAR
Chief, Stack and Reader
Division
Library of Congress
^
^ Ir
()
52
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
Land Convoys
HUMEROUS recent articles in The
Army Combat Forces Journal and
elsewhere have discussed the tactical
Organization necessary for ground com-
bat in a time of atomic plenty. While
there have been numerous differences
of opinion on the details, one salient
fact Stands out: There will be and can
be no continuous, fully manned MLR
in the sense of either World Wars or
Korea. We are much more likely to
have a very fluid front with mobile and
semimobile strongpoints and task forces
of either reinforced-battalion or regi-
mental size. If we accept this our entire
tactical supply setup must be radically
revised.
Such a fluid front will provide many
opportunities for infiltrators and partisan
warriors on relatively unprotected sup-
ply facilities and columns. The day of
the regimental service Company and di-
\ision camps sitting alone only a few
miles to the rear of the front is over. So,
alas, is probably the day of the MASH
and other close-to-front evacuation faciU-
ties. Safety from ground attack will
onlv lie forward within the strongpoint
perimeters or way back in well policed
and protected areas.
Our air-mindcd friends will say the
ĂĽbvious answer is air transport and air
evacuation. They are right, but only
partly so. Roth will be needed for high-
prioritv cargo, support of our own m-
Bltrating groups, and evacuation of the
most seriously wounded. But they can-
not be cxpected to supply the front with
its tremendous dailv requirements of
food, ammunition, POL, and replace-
mcnts. These will continue to be sup-
plied overland as in the past-but with
a difference.
Supplies must be convoyed-in the
naval sense of the term-and the con-
\ovs must be prepared to fisht then*
way through and back again. Such sup-
plv columns would bring up the bulk
cargoes and the replacements. Indeed,
we should plan to put packets of replace-
ments on such columns for their added
fire and fighting power.
I am not advocating that armed truck
companies should fight tbeir way up
JANUAR Y 1955
- *
This department is designed to ac-
commodate the short, pithy and good
humored expression of ideas — radi-
cal and reactionary, new and old. .
We pay for all contributions pub- i
lished but you deserve to be put on
notice that the rate of payment de- i
pends upon the originality of the [
subject and the quality of writing
rather than length. This department
is hungry for contributions, so shoot
that good idea in . . . today.
*
alone. There are two possible Solutions.
One is to change the TC truck unit by
assigning to it platoons or sections of
armored cavalry, armored engineers, and
mobile AAA. this, I imagine, will prove
uneconomical, since truck units would
not often need that much protection.
The second, and to me preferable, Solu-
tion is to make up convoys as needed,
composed of TC truck units, armored
cavalr\s engineers, and mobile AAA.
Such convoys must be under the com
mand of a single Commander whose mis-
sion would be to get the cargo through
to its destination and bring them back.
While this calls to mind naval tactics,
it cannot be forgotten that it also was an
old and respected cavalry mission during
our Indian-fighting days.
On the route back, the convoy would
carrv salvage, prisoners, rotating person-
nel,' wounded, and-if we can still al-
ford that luxury-the dead. Roth en
route to and fro'm destination, the con-
voy Commander must have f^nal respon-
sibility for the destruction or attempted
salvage of damaged vehicles and their
cargoes. The Job will be neither an easy
nor a pleasant assignment, but it will be
a vital onc, requiring high skills and
fortitude.
MAJOR IRVIN M. KENT
dulum is swinging back to the theory
of spit, polish, discipline, and tradition.
Enlisted uniforms are becoming al-
most indistinguishable from ofiicers' garb.
If we're going to go back to the days
when there was a difference between
Os and EMs, there was, for many years,
one distinguishing mark of an officer—
the Sam Rrowne. Let's have it back.
I know many officers observed the
departure of Sam Rrowne without even
the suspicion of a tear. Rut who were
thev? They were the ones who let them-
selves get thick around the middle, so the
belt rode Hke a brassiere instead of cover-
ing the web belt, like it should. They
were the ones who couldn't find time
to give the belt the loving care that was
required to keep it looking its best. They
were the ones who bought a cheap belt
at Gus's Army and Navy Store and
w ondered why the belt never looked as
good as the ones the sharply dressed
officers wore so proudly.
A real officer, the hard, lean leader of
men, the man who couldn't understand
anything less than perfection, wore bis
Sam Rrowne proudly. This type of of-
(icer didn't gripe when the CO ordered
that all Sam Rrownes would match bis
,^vvn-he bought another like the CO's
or went into his trunk and brought out
another one that would fill the bill. He
feit that the CO had certain privileges
-and when he got to be a CO, as he
fullv cxpected, he could be as hard and
demanding, assured in his knowledge
that he had conformed when he was a
junior.
But now that the pendulum is swing-
ing back to making soldiering a way of
life-hurrah!-or a profession, instead of
an escape from Selective Service, let's
go all the way. Let's impress everyone
with the idea that officers are different,
and that there are no poor officers. The
Sam Rrowne can be the first blow in
the campaign.
MAJOR SHOOT'N SALUTE
Paging Sam
TI IE Nav\ has brought back the sword.
Oft'-post saluting is back. Tlicre are
moves afcK)t to make the NCO some-
thing more than a private with a fatter
pay envelope. It appears that the pen-
A Break for the Good Draftee
IN thcse davs of determined and some-
what desperate effort to improve the
reenlistment rate, it seems to me that we
are missing a bet in not being able to
53
make suiliciently delinite commitments
to a good man who is about to be dis-
charocd and who might reenlist if the
prospccts were a bit more attractive. 1
am thinking particularly of the draftee
nearing the end of bis first hitch.
I know a young man who illustrates
the point. He is a corporal, high school
graduate, basic training infantry, up-
right and intelHgent and a good physical
specimen. He is a miHtary chauffeur in
Europe. Very shortly he will go back to
a small Kansas town, to drive a laundry
tiuck.
II 1 were his combat-unit Commander
I would take this man tomorrow as a
tank gunner or assistant squad leader
and would be confident of a first-class
Performance of duty, in either capacity,
after a 30-day break-in period. In six
months I would accept him as a tank
Commander or squad leader, and be
happy to have him. But as things stand
I can't offer him a thing. He wants to
go back to the States, but if he should
reenlist there he mav be given no firm
promises of where he may be assigned,
nor any indication that he will be pro-
moted. He must build his reputation as
a worthy soldier all over again, at a
place he may not want to go, with a
Strange Company Commander. So he says
to hell with it.
My proposal, therefore, is this: that
the Army set up a system wherebv un-
usually good men of grade lower than
E5 may after a certain period of service
be put in a separate "especially desirable"
category and as members of that cate-
gory be given preferential treatment up-
on reenlistment.
I would expect no more than fifteen
to twenty per cent of all men to qualify.
The definition of what constitutes an
' especially desirable" man can easily be
drawn up. Based on these specifications,
original recommendation by a Company
Commander and approving action by a
battalion Commander would be cnough
to place a man in the select bracket. Of-
ficers recommending too many men not
especiallv desirable would be subject to
censure for poor judgment. In anv case,
the percentage could be kept at a proper
level through normal administrative ac-
tion.
Either the commandino ofFicer of a
soldier leaving a unit or a recruiting of-
ficer at a Separation point would be
privileged to commit the Army firmly as
to the man's assignment and promotion,
both within reasonable limits. He should
be given practically unlimited choice
as to geographic assignment, as mu.h
latitude as possible in choice of branch,
and a one-grade promotion on the spot.
54
I le should also be presented with a letter
to his new CO acquainting him with
the fact that he is the lucky recipient of
a good man.
VV^hy not? Such a System commits the
new Company Commander no more than
sending him any other NGO. The ad-
ministration of the System would not
be difficult. And the end result, I am
confident, would be a higher rate of re-
enlistment of the better men— desirable
for many reasons, including economic.
I don't think giving one man prefer-
ential treatment over the next has any
undcsirable aspects. The crying need of
the Armv is for good men, and the good
man wants a clear differentiation made
betvveen himself and the run-ĂĽf-the-mill.
BRIG. GEN. HAMILTON H. HOWZE
The Question of Status
COLON EL Dupuy's warm and absorb-
ing "Pass in Review" [October] hit
the buH's-eve in many places, especially
when it observed that "the sight of a
group of other officers, including colo-
nels of thirty years' service, bent low
under the bĂĽrden of their own bedding
roll and baggage, bobbing like a line
of weary stexedores past crowds of star-
ing, much amused enlisted men, was
helpfiil neither to the self-esteem of the
ojie nor the discipline of the other."
The spectacle of senior field-grade of-
ficers making like replacements with
twelve weeks' service may be in keeping
with the times, but I don't see it that
way. If it was part of the Army's effort
to appear democratic, it boomeranged,
for the Armv drew more brickbats than
its more autocratic sister service for being
iwdemocratic. Moreover, the Army's
penchant for treating its officers and
senior noncoms like recruits helped bring
on our current troubles.
My journey to the Korean front via
the replacement pipeline demonstrated
to me the Armv's knack for makino and
keeping bad habits. The sight of bird
coloncls draooing their own B-baas and
making their own cots in the Port of
Embarkation barracks was onlv the fore-
taste of a trip that seemed deliberatelv
designed to deflate the self-confidence
and prestige of officers on their way to
assume troop command. Contact with all
ranks at the various stops in the replace-
ment pipeline brought somc solace— we
discovered that we were all treated like
recruits. Only when most of us finally
arrived in a division did we feel that we
had a place in the Army. Later as a
battalion Commander I found it common-
place to have experienced noncoms come
to the outfit indiscriminately packaged
with the rawest reinforcements.
The Army has borrowed much from
business, but the way it treats its com-
missioned and noncommissioned soldiers
is consistent neither with good business
practice nor with military wisdom. No
Corporation would ever think of treating
its medium-level executives (Army field-
grade officers) or its factory foremen
(the Army noncoms) in a way that has
become all too customarv.
Before World War II an officer or a
first-three-grader was somebody— at least
in the Army. Inside the Army it is still
possible to restore the pride and Status
of those who serve. If we don't, we'll be-
come, to borrow a British phrase, an
army of generals, coloncls, and other
ranks.
LT. COL. HERD
Shooting Can Be Fun
KOREA taught US the value of accurate
marksmanship. Spraying the land-
scape with unaimcd fire did not stop the
enemy. All it did was cause our soldiers
to run out of ammunition. Increased at-
tention has been given to marksmanship
training in the last few years, and there
has been an improvement, but the Stand-
ard of shooting still leaves much to
be desired.
From hours spent on rifle ranges I
have determined that the most common
fault is the way young and inexperienced
officers and noncoms introduce men to
the rifle and shooting. It is considered
merely a chore which must be accom-
plished. No effort is exerted to make it
enjoyable or interesting. The unit Com-
mander should teil his men that they
are going to engage in a form of train-
ing that will be fun. He should teil
them that almost anyone can be a good
shot, and that many of them can become
experts. He should also teil them that a
noncommissioned officer should be able
to shoot well.
Expert riflemen should be paid for
their skill. Why not reduce the pay of
all recruits $20 a month, and then raise
the pay by that amount for those who
qualify as experts? In addition, the unit
Commander should award prizes to in-
dividuals who shoot well on the various
ranges. Rifle marksmanship must be
made a genuine sport and recreation if
we are to succced in raising it to the
Standards desired and instilling the sol-
dier with confidence in his weapon.
The next serious fault which has
crept into our rifle marksmanship train-
ing is the universal practice of rushing
the soldier throuoh his course of instruc-
tion. Eightv hours are allotted to rifle
marksmanship in our basic training pro-
grams. This should be ample for the
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
average intelligent soldier, but the results
would indicate otherwise.
To the average young training officer
today, accustomed to the eight-hour day,
eighty hours of training time represents
just ten days of rifle instruction. Conse-
quently, when he makes out his train-
ing schedules, he schedules ten consecu-
tive days of rifle marksmanship. If he
sees in the training program that sixteen
hours are allotted to preliminary firing
and eight hours to record practice, he
schedules three days of ränge firing. His
whole Company of 200 men must go out
and fire preliminary and record in three
days. Consequently, he hurries to the
ränge, he hurries to get each order on
linet and hurries to get them off. The
individual firer consumes only a small
fraction of the day in firing, and he is
hurried through that. Each man does not
get eighty hours, but only a portion of
it. He has little or no time to think about
his errors, much less correct them.
It is well known that if a subject is
spread over many days, instead of being
concentrated in a short period, the pupil
retains more of what he is taught. So
why not spread this instruction of eighty
hours over twenty days, with four hours
of training a day, or have a two-hour
period each day for forty days? There
might be difficulties in scheduling the
tra?ning and securing the ränge, but they
can be'overcome. If we spend five thou-
sand dollars to give a soldier basic train-
ing and he fails to stop the enemy be-
cause of poor marksmanship, we have
failed.
Another glaring mistake is the manner
in which firing positions are taught. The
soldier is told to take a prescribed posi-
tion as shown in the manual. Although
this is technically correct, it should be
•explained to the soldier that the best
positions are comfortable positions. Ex-
plain to him that the prescribed positions
have been found best for the majority
of men, but that he may require a slight
Variation. Any position may be used it
he can hit the target. Teil him that the
sling is useful to give him support, but
do not put him in too tight a sling. Let
the sling be loose at first, and let him
tighten it up as his muscles become ac-
customed to it.
Instructors who possess patience and
calmness are required for good ritle
marksmanship training. They must msist
that each Step in this trainmg be mas-
tered. The man must be taught how to
zero his rifle, even if it takes three times
as many rounds as the nine now pre-
scribed. Zeroing of the rifle with a sand-
l)ag rest is helpful to the new soldier. It
proves to him that his rifle fires accurate-
JANUARY 1955
ly, but it is up to him to hold, aim, and
squeeze in order to be a good shot.
A final point: Our rifle marksmanship
training manual is too long. Few soldiers
read it completely. Let's retum to our
Short manual of pre-World War II. More
people will read it, and some of it will
stick. Ten or fifteen pages would be the
ideal length, for this much could be ab-
sorbed, retained and used.
If these simple factors are applied to
our marksmanship training, it is feit that
the vast majority of our soldiers can be
made into good or superior rifle marks-
men. As many old soldiers know, these
techniques are not new; we have just
for sotten them.
COL ROBERT L. COOK
Driver Badges
A RECENT check at a large post re-
vealed that no unit on that post had
awarded badges to drivers or mechanics
in recent years. Few members of the
administrative staffs knew that the driv-
er badge was an item of issue. A quar-
termaster clerk had checked his stock
records and reported that he had the
badges in stock, but "nobody uses them
any'^more." What has happened to our
unit pride? Where is the soldier who
once proudly turned out for inspection
on Saturday morning with his badges
brightly shined and prominently dis-
played on his ehest? Are we too busy
today to recognize a job well done?
The driver and mechanic badges, de-
scribed in detail in AR 600-70, have been
Standard awards for many years and are
awarded in recognition of a soldier's spe-
cial qualification, just as marksmanship
badges are awarded.
Driver and mechanic badges should
form part of every unit's safety program.
They are a goal toward which all driv-
ers and mechanics can work; they are a
mark of distinction that any command-
ing officer of the grade of lieutenant
coTonel or higher can award to deserving
drivers. The timely awarding of driver
badges helps build unit pride which in
turn produces good safety records. It is
a means of setting the man apart and
oiving him individual attention.
^ Th'e manner of presenting awards has
much to do with the pride (or lack of
pride) with which they are worn. Unit
Commanders should remember that the
driver badge is a coveted honor to a
soldier onh if his officers consider and
treat it as'such. If the awarding cere-
monv is a haphazard toss across the first
sergeant's desk, the driver will probably
not wear the badge. But if the battalion
or rcgimental Commander personal ly pre-
sents the badge at a unit parade and
uivites the badge winner to take the
review alongside him, the badge's pres-
tige will be established.
We all know how costly vehicle acci-
dents are in money and lives. The driver
badge is another weapon we can use in
attacking this menace. Properly used,
these awards might save the reputation
of a unit Commander and his outfit as
as well as lives and money. Let's get
them out of the warehouse and onto
the chests of deserving soldiers.
COL. JAMES W. MILNER
Twin Firing Charts
ARTILLERYMEN can increase their
batteries' firing speed, accuracy, and
safety by using two firing charts instead
of one in the battery fire direction cen-
ter. Ignoring charges that it was not
practical, we tried this system, and
found that we liked it.
Here is the way it is done. When we
go into a new position, we have the
Computer set up a firing chart on a
normal grid sheet. We also have one of
the radro-telephone Operators set up a
duplicate chart on a battle map.
When a fire mission comes in, the
Computer acts as a horizontal control
Operator and determines the firing data
by the use of a Rizza Fan. The other
chart Operator acts as a vertical control
Operator. He computes the site and then
chccks to see if the firing data of the
horizontal control Operator are correct.
He sounds off, of course, if he catches a
mistake. The recorder relays commands
to the guns and does his recording in
the normal way.
The only extra equipment needed is
the two Rizza Fans. No additional men
are required. The Computer, recorder,
and two radio-telephone Operators that
are authorized are sufficient to make the
System work. For replacements there
are the two artillerv mechanics, a driver,
and the chief of the firing battery, just
to mcntion those in firing battery head-
quarters.
There are several advantages to this
System. First, vou get a double check
on firing data. ' It should give the Exec
such a sense of security that he can
more easilv get away from the FDC to
check on the rest of the firing battery.
In addition, the system makes it pos-
sible to engage two targets simultane-
ously. It enables two persons to receive
training in the plotting of live firing
dita. it can give a new chart Operator
training in determining real fire data-
puttino him under the gun, so to speak
-without taking a chance of having a
round land on the battalion Commander.
LT. JOHN H. VANSTON
55
THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL
Graphical Firing Table Fans
Production of one thousand plastic
commercial modeis of the GFT fan for
the 105mm and 155mm howitzers was
completed during November 1954.
These fans are being issued through
normal Ordnance supply Channels to all
active army 105mm and 155mm howitzer
battalions stationed in the United States.
Units of the U.S. Seventh Army will
also receive a limited number of these
fans.
These GFT fans are on sale at the
Book Department, TAS. They seil for
$16 prepaid. Orders for the GFT Fan
should specify the caliber of the weapon
with which the equipment is to be used.
THE ENGINEER SCHOOL
Signal Instruction
By installing six "vehicular mounted"
AN/GRC-9 radios in a room, TES's
Communications Section has been able
to overcome many of the problems rela-
tive to teaching signal Communications.
Power is supplied by regulär storage bat-
teries that are located outside the build-
ing. Power cords leading from the floor
boards connect the batteries to the PE
237 power supply units. A battery
charger housed in the building keeps the
lead-acid storage batteries on a con-
tinuous floating charge while the sets
are in Operation.
This arrangement has several advan-
tages: Instructional facilities are availa-
ble at all times; it is no longer necessary
to mount the equipment in a fleet of
vehicles; and there are fewer distractions
in a classroom than there would be in
the case of outdoor instruction.
For Bridge Builders
TES has recently made available to
qualified persons Special Text 5-261-1,
"Introduction to Nonstandard Fixed
Highway Bridges." It can be bought
from the Book Department for $.41 (in-
cluding mailing costs). The buyer must
State bis name, rank, and serial number,
and must present a certificate from his
Unit Commander stating that the text is
to be used in pursuit of military duties.
56
Special Fext 5-261-1 covers bridge
and vehicle Classification and design,
construction procedures, planning, and
Organization. It also contains data on
vehicle Classification and beam character
istics.
The following special texts are also
available at TES :
ST 5-7-1 Engineers in
Atomic Warf are $ .13
ST 5-32-2 Land Mines .39
ST 5-260- lA NonStandard
Military Fixed
Bridges 1.00
THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
Experimental Films
A number of experimental training
films, each containing one teaching
point, has been produced at TIS. They
are primarily designed to instruct newly
inducted soldiers in fundamentals, or
other personnel in "hard to teach" sub-
jects. The films ränge from five to ten
minutes in length.
Training films of this type are inex-
pensive and easy to produce and may
prove extremely valuable as a training
medium. The films are currently being
previewed and analyzed at TIS to deter-
mine their teaching effectiveness.
Subjects include: Driver's Mainte-
nance of Battery; Calibrating and Tun-
ing, Radio Set, AN/PRC 10; Reciprocal
Laying, 81 mm Mortar; Wearing Individ-
ual Parachute Equipment; Position and
Grip, Machine Gun M1916A6 on M2
Tripod; Bolt Locking Adjustment, Ma-
chine Gun M1919A1 and A6, and Ma-
chine Gun Clinometer M1917.
New Training Films
Dismounted Drill, TF 7-1947, 33 min-
utes. Drill fundamentals for the squad
and platoon, replacing an older film on
the subject.
Observation of Mortar Fire hy the
Combat Saldier , TF 7-1729, 41 minutes.
The first training film to be produced on
mortar Observation by the front-line sol-
dier.
Distribution of these films is antic-
ipated the earlv part of this year. For
the exact date, check vour local film
librarv.
Ranger Course Revamped
The Ranger Course (objective: the
development of small-unit combat lead-
ers) has undergone some changes.
Ranger training now consists of a
seven-week course which is divided into
three phases. The first, or Fort Benning
phase, is concerned with laying the aca-
demic and physical groundwork for the
rigorous practical training in the succeed-
ing phases. Emphasis is placed on map
reading and demolitions, as well as
physical development subjects such as
hand-to-hand combat, bayonet, and phys-
ical training.
The Ranger Camp in Florida is the
site of the second phase, which includes
swamp, jungle, and amphibious train-
ing. The final phase is conducted in the
mountains of North Georgia. At these
two camps the students are subjected to
the most realistic combat training pos-
sible. The patrol is the principal vehicle
of instruction and it is while acting as a
patrol leader that the student's leader-
ship abilities are tested.
Basic Infantry Officer and Officer
Candidate graduates may skip the Fort
Benning phase of instruction if they
graduated from those courses no more
than six weeks before the Start of a
Ranger class.
New Unit Designations
After four years of Service in Korea,
the 3rd Infantry Division returned to
Fort Benning on 3 December. The
Marne Division colors have replaced
those of the 47th Infantry Division,
which reverted to State control as a Na-
tional Guard Unit.
Men assigned to the 47th Division
at the time of transfer have been in-
tegrated into the 3rd Division. Major
General Haydon L. Boatner, who com-
manded the 47th Division at the time of
the change, now commands the 3rd Di-
vision.
In another "transfer" that involved
only the designation of units, not troops,
the 30th Infantrv Regiment became the
29th. This regiment is used as a dem-
onstration and experimental outfit for
TIS. The 29th Infantrv was stationed
at Fort Benning from 1919 to 1943.
MAJOR GENERAL PAUL W. RUTLEDGE
Commanding Genera/,
The AA Ă„ GM Center
Hinman Hall Dedicated
THE home of the Antiaircraft ArtiUery arm at Fort Bliss, Texas- Vhere
T,Ke tact.cs and techn.ques of the weapons of the future - bem^^^^^^
veloped todav'-a beautiful and useful new academic and administrative
buZg c^^^^^^ of handling more than 2,000 students was dedicated on
23 Nov'emb^r. General John E. Dahlquist, Chief of Army Field Forces,
was the principal Speaker.
The building. na.ed H:nn,an Hall in hono. ^^ l^^'^^/;^^^;;
General Dale Durkee Hinman, has 59 classrooms of 50-man capac.ty^
nf Wh ch can be converted into 100-man classrooms; a hbrary and
;:: „g i: r ~unications laboratCes; twelve basic elecUon.cs
;:Wories.. an auditodun.; snack ba. and administrat.ve offices^
The building was begun during the ti.e .hat Lt. Ger. Stanley R. M.ck-
elsen was ConTmandant. The present CommandanMs ^a)- Gen Paul W.
? r D • r.„ R R Hendrix is Assistant Commandant and Brig.
Rutedge. Eng. Gen. K. K. nenaux r .. a A », CM Center
Gen. Earl W. Heathcote is Deputy Commander of the AA & GM Center.
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
THE MONTH'S MAI
(Continued front page 9)
Unit spirit, you have a fighting group; and
fighting groups wm^wa^s.^^^ ^ ^^^^^^^
Philadelphia, Pa.
• Your October issue was süperb. Colonel
Dupuy writes a classic story. In connection
with his theme, it makes me wonder it the
Association could not convince the Army
that there is still time to rebuild an espr •
Whether we ever have a regimental espnt
based on British lines is immatenal, but
we do need more . . . ^^^^ ^^^^^^
2208 Ninth St.
Lubbock, Tex.
• Your Fiftieth Anniversary issue proväded
many of us here with an enjoyable and in-
formative period of reading.
Colonel Dupuy . • • places the Army m
its correct historical and social perspectne
JANUARY 1955
within the larger history of the United
States m the past fifty y^f^J^f^^^f^
simplicity and honesty of the Cloistered
Army 1904-16" was brilliantly recaptured,
and the confusions and triumphs ot the
"sLi-cloistered Army: 1920-40'' b^^^^^^^^^^
back many memories. Certainly, the mes
sage t^at the modern army needs to discover
and recapture the spirit of the past army,
hat spirft which provided the -tivaUon
and d ive for the successes of World War
II should be carried to the soldier and to
the civilian of today; an outstanding work
hke this of Colonel Dupuy's can well serve
that need. ^^ ^^^ ^^ ^ ^^^^^,
Hq. VII Corps
APO 107, New York, rs. i-
• 1 should like to oifer my very heartiest
congratulations on the anniversary issue
^ Colonel Dupuy's contribution was a
Inasterlv condensation of a fine record, and
an admirable piece of writing. The thing
that was particularly notable was the
,nanv points of contact between the ex-
perience of vour Army and our own, in
both a Service and a domesĂĽc sense.
1 am old enough to have done my hrst
soldiering back in the early days of the
centurv, when small ''native wars were
all we'had to worr>' about. And it is amaz-
inP how our little problems of those days
were paralleled by those with which your
Forces had to contend.
Colonialism is now out of date, it we
are to believe the ''humanists, but while
it existed it proved a wonderful school tor
soldiering!
Colonel Dupuv's illuminating story is
one I shall put by and often con over again.
Maj. Reginald Hargreaves
British Army, Retired
WĂĽtton St. Lawrence
Nr. Basingstocke, Hants,
England
57
THE MONTH'S BOOKS
The Past in Color
SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY: 1775-1954
Drawings by Fritz Kredel; T©xt by Frederick
P. Todd
Henry Regnery Company, 1954
144 Pages; $12.50
Reviewed hy
N. J. Anthony
Many Americans whose forebears saw
military sen'ice in "the old country" can
remember hours spent in admiring the color
drawings in the "soldier picture books"
those men treasured. But who can recall a
similar collection depicting American sol-
diers? Not until 1886 did one Army agency
get around to Publishing a Hmited edition
of such a work. This unhandy volume of
handsome drawings that traced the evolu-
tion of the Regular's uniform was supple-
mcnted by loose sheets in 1908.
Copies are extremely rare. There
were no books extant on the sub-
ject until Messrs. Kredel and
Todd published the first edition
of their work in 1940. That edi-
tion too is a rarity.
Now they come up with a new
work, having examined each plate
and made necessary alterations
and additions. The authors don't
pretend to record the evolution of
our military uniform. Each of
their thirty-two plates shows two
or more typical soldiers at selected
periods of our history. None is re-
peated from the old official vol-
umes, and none has been sketched
before. These soldiers look alive,
and Colonel Todd's commentary
leaves no detail of dress or equip-
ment unexplained.
Kredel and Todd concentrate
on the combat soldier. Except for
a plate on the WAC, one on
bands, and another on the USMA
cadet, we have representations of
doughboys, gunners, and troopers,
with some special-purpose people
mixed in. They come from regu-
lars, 'common" militia, organized
State forccs, Voluntecr units, and
the Confederacy. The Civil War
period provided the greatest varie-
ty in design, for colonels of Volun-
teer and State units vied with one
another in striving for originality,
a great many favoring the gaudy,
baggy-pants Zouave outfits which,
as Todd remarks, had by 1860
58
become a "widespread craze." But the de-
mands of field service soon forced con Ver-
sion to regulation blues. Adoption of the
current, more practical khaki for combat
came with the Spanish-American War.
Here are a few points of interest from
the great many detailed in drawings and
text. The only articles of uniform that have
been preserved are the grays, crossbelts
and tarbuckets (the uniform of the Reg-
ulär infantry of 1814) worn by cadets at
West Point and other military academies.
What appear to have been at one time
noncoms' inverted chevrons are not in-
signia of rank, but hash marks. The saber
as part of the uniform has passed on, as
well as epaulettes as insignia of rank. The
plate reproducing U.S. infantry of 1862
shows the first use of unit (patch) insignia,
The soldier with the solid sphere patch on
his hat, were his unit today "owned" by
I Corps, would wear the same insignia on.
his left sleeve, but its color would be black
instead of red. The use of omate costumes
dechned between the Civil War and 1898,
although a few local units still maintain a
traditional and stately dress for ceremonies.
Hirsute adornment seems to have gone out
of fashion after the adoption of khaki.
Let's hope that as times require there
will be succeeding editions. Messrs. Kredel
and Todd rate the thanks of all military
students for their sĂĽperb work.
The American Citizen soldier: common militia of 1830 at
drill. From Soldiers of the American Army: 1773-1914.
The Malayan Unpleasantness
THE COMMUNIS! MENAGE IN MALAYA
By Harry Miller
Frederick A. Praeger, 1954
248 Pages; Index; $3.50
Reviewed hy ;
Major Paul M. A. Linebarger
At last the recent story of
Malaya is told comprehensively
and well. The cruel, dishearten-
ing war in Malaya has gone on
for seven years without ever being
called officially "a war." The Brit-
ish public authorities have insisted
on terming the fighting "an emer-
gency," chiefly— I was told four
years ago in Kuala Lumpur— to
avoid the changes that would go
into effect in British* insurance
policies if the legal concept of
"war" were invoked.
Harry Miller presents an out-
standing accomplishment in book-
length journalism without digress-
ing, as do so many newspapermen
when tempted by hard Covers,
into pretentious history or sen-
tentious editorializing. The book
has a good index and a skimpy
glossary, but no other academic
machinery. There are no footnotes
and it is up to the reader to ac-
cept or to reject the book as a
whole, since it is impossible to
recheck his Statements one by one.
The book should be accepted.
Most of the sources cannot be
checked, anyhow, since they ob-
viously stem from first-hand con-
versations with participants or ob-
ser\'ers of the struggle for the
peninsula.
The author Starts his book with
the background of Malayan Com-
munism, including a description
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
of the role played by a sinister character
named Yuan Ai-Kuo in Mandarin Chinese,
Nouen Ai Quoc in Vietnamese. This man
helped form the Chinese-dominated Com-
munist movement of the South Seas in
1930. Today he plays a bigger role on the
World scene under the name of Ho Chi-
minh.
While the author's sympathies are Brit-
ish, they are not at all provincial or chau-
vinistic. He has a humane and civiHzed
respect for the Chinese who make up one
side of his story. It is a tribute to official
British secretiveness, which sometimes sur-
passes our own official talents for burying
mihtary and political Wunders, along with
other assorted dead cats deleterious to offi-
cial reputation, in the bottomless abysses
of classified files, that even Mr. Miller
could not get the true story of the Joint
British-and-Communist destruction of the
Malayan Kuomintang. First the Kuomin-
tang did not exist; then they were pro-
Japanese; then they were bandits; then they
did not exist. Mr. Miller follows Spencer
Chapman in writing of the KMT guerrillas
of wartime Malaya, and crediting only the
Communists for success.
The lesson to be learned from wartime
Malaya is that victory is not the justification
of any means whatever. While the Allies
in Europe were throwing away lives by
refusing anything but "unconditional sur-
render," the British (with respect to Ma-
laya) and the Americans (with respect to
Manchuria) purchased Communist help at
a fearful price. Miller points out the mili-
tarv rules which the Chinese Communists
in Malaya have adopted from China for
the good welfare of their infantrymen; he
does not point out that in tactics and
operational doctrine the Sino-Malayan
Communists have remained much more the
heirs of the British secret "Force 1 36" than
of the Chinese mainland "Eighth Route
Army." The enemy of Britain and of peace
-for Malaya— is Brirish-trained.
I visited Malaya in July and August of
1950, in September of 1951, and in Feb-
ruary and April of 1954. I interviewed
many of the persons whom Miller de-
scribes, all the way from that last of the
British proconsuls, Mr. Malcolm MacDon-
ald, over to the brilliant ex-Communist and
anti-Communist agitator, Lam Swee. I can
testify that the eulogy given Sir Henry
Gurnev, who was murdered by a Com-
A Selected Check List oÂŁ the Month's Books
This run-down of some of the books received for review during the month preceding our deadline
is to give our readers who like to follow current literature a monthly check list of the most tmpor-
tant, useful and potentially populär books. Füll reviews of some of these books tvtll appear tnthts
or subsequent issues. Any of these titles may be purchased through the Combat Forces Book Serv-
ice See page 64 for order coupon and a complete listing of Selected Books for Mtlttary Keaders.
AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION MANUAL,
revised edition. By C. H. Gibbs-Smith.
John de Graff, Inc., 1954. 239 Pages; II-
lustrated; Index; $2.50. A Standard work
in Britain brought up to date and now to
be distributed in this country through an
American pubHsher.
BENT'S FORT. By David Lavender. Dou-
bleday & Company, 1954. 450 Pages; In-
dex; $5.50. A well documented, readable
history to join the flood of historical ac-
counts of the Southwest which are Coming
off the presses in fairly great numbers.
THE COMMUNIST MENAGE IN MA-
LAYA. By Harry Miller. Frederick A.
Praeger, 1954. 248 Pages; Illustrated; In-
dex; $3.50. A Singapore-born newspaper-
man offers some superior reporting on the
little known (in America) but bloody and
destructive war that the Communists brought
to the Malay peninsula.
ESSENTIALS OF MILITARY TRAIN-
ING. The Military Service Publishing Co.,
1954. 905 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $5.00.
The sixth edition of what appears to be the
lineal descendant of the prewar ROTC man-
uals. Contains much basic information tor
the recruit or officer aspirant, but would
be of most value for use in dasses which
have a competent instructor.
FIRST COMMONWEALTH DIVISION.
By Brigadier C N. Barclay. Gale & Polden,
Ltd., 1954. 236 Pages; Illustrated; Index.
An unofficial history of the famous British
foimation that earned undying fame in
Korea. The author is the editor ot 1 te
Army Quarterly. Typically British in its
thoroughness and Understatement; a tair
assessment of a great division's contribu-
tion in Korea.
THE FLOATING WORLD: The Story of
Japanese Prints. By James A. Michener.
Random House, 1954. 403 Pages; Illus-
trated; Index; $8.75. This history and back-
JANUARY 1955
ground of Japanese prints by a perceptive
and sensitive writer should be of value to
military families who have become inter-
ested in or have collected this form of art.
Contains many illustrations, some in color.
GENERAL JO SHELBY: Undefeated Reb-
el. By Daniel O'Flaherty. University of
North Carolina Press, 1954. 437 Pages;
Index; $6.00. A biography of the Southern
cavalry general, highly respected by his
Union opponents.
KOREAN IN A HURRY. By Samuel E.
Martin. Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1954. 137
Pages; $1.50. "Hurry" is of course a rela-
tive term when dealing with a language as
much different from our own as Korean.
Well organized but written for those who
have a fair formal grounding in English.
A LONG LINE OF SHIPS: Mare Islands
Century of Naval Activity in California.
By Arnold S. Lott, Lt. Comdr., USN. U. S.
Naval Institute, 1954. 268 Pages; Illus-
trated; Appendix; $4.95. Mare Islands
hundred-year history. The photographs are
particularly attention-compelling, especially
those that'go back to Civil War days.
THE PROCESS AND EFFECTS OF
MASS COMMUNICATION. By Wilbur
Schramm. University of Illinois Press, 1954.
586 Pages; Index; $6.00. A text for those
interested in reaching great numbers of
people with a sales message, whether the
sale be one of products, political ideas,
psychological warfare, etc. Useful for those
whose fields of interest. lie in Propaganda,
psychological warfare, politics and adver-
tising.
REBEL PRIVATE FRONT AND REAR.
By William Andrew Fletcher; Edited by
Bell I Wiley University of Texas Press,
1954 162 Pages; Index; $3.75. The per-
sonal story of a Confederate enlisted man
in the Civil War. Honest, humorous and
readable.
THE RED CARPET. By Marshall Mc-
Dutlie. W. W. Norton & Company, Inc..
1955. 330 Pages; Illustrated; Index; $4.50.
A travelogue with photographs of Soviet
Russia, 1953. The writer, no lover of Com-
munism and no Communist, tries to be ob-
jective but that is rather difficult. He em-
phasizes the difference between the people
and their rulers.
SOLDIERS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY,
1775-1954. By Fritz Kredel and Frederick
P. Todd. Henry Regnery Company, 1954.
$12.50. The long-awaited pictorial history
of American uniforms, done in fĂĽll color.
An excellent gift volume for the soldier
(even for your favorite soldier, yourself).
THERE IS NO ASIA. By Dwight Cooke.
Doubleday & Company, 1954. 320 Pages;
$4.00. A former Time writer and editor
and present CBS commentator writes of
life in the territory which we are prone to
lump together as Asia.
THIS IS OKINAWA. By Willard J.
Howland and "Blackie" Bradford. Charles
E. Tuttle Co., 1954. 71 Pages; Illustrated;
$1.50. A picture book in Life style includ-
ing 180 photographs. A must for those
who contemplafe duty at that outpost.
TOKYO AND POINTS FAST. By Keyes
Beech. Doubleday & Company, 1954. 255
Pages; $3.50. A Pulitzer Prize winning
Far Eastern correspondent for the Chicago
Daily News and co-author of Uncomtnon
Valor offers some impressions of an over-
seas correspondent's life and thoughts while
covering several Far Eastern wars. The
book includes some stirring material from
the Korean war as well as personal remi-
niscences that never got into the newspapers.
THE NATION'S NATIONAL GUARD.
National Guard Association of the United
States, 1954. 119 Pages; Illustrated; $2.50.
A series of addresses by National Guard
leaders tracing the history and development
of the National Guard through the present
day.
munist ainbush on 7 October 1951, is (it
anythin^), not strong enough. The descrip-
tion of the ambush itself is an admirable
lesson in Communist tactics and military
c'thics; Miller gives the best report on that
to be Seen in print.
Miller concludes by demonstrating that
no antiguerrilla Operation can succeed with-
out an appropriate mixture of sustained
intimidation combined with reasonable
openings for reconciliation of the majority.
He gives due credit to Sir Gerald Templer
for the magnificent progress made in pacify-
ing Malaya and he brings the story down
to date by describing the British and Com-
munist sides right down to recent months.
ĂĽn the British side Sir Donald MacGil-
livray has taken over from Templer. The
country is now safe enough for vacationists
to go on motor tours; on the Communist
side there is real attrition.
This particular emcrgency is ending.
Miller concludes by waming that Malaya
is endemically ridden with problems. The
long future of the unhappy country is
still by no means settled. Malays and
Chinese must still coexist, with or without
Communism. They must, but can they?
Impressions and Memories
TOKYO AND POINTS EAST
By Keyes Beech
Doubleday & Company, 1954
255 Pages; $3.75
Heviewed hy
Major Orville C. Shirey
This is the kind of book a man with a
bad case of insomnia can often write in bis
mind between the hours of midnight and
0600— particularly if he has had an eventfiil
hfe.
Keyes Beech's life has been eventful.
He was a Marine Corps combat correspond-
ent and made the landings at Tarawa and
Iwo Jima, was a Far Iiast correspondent for
the Chicago Daily News when the Korean
conflict broke out, won a Pulitzer Prize
for bis coverage of it, came back to the
States and was invited to write a book. He
was, he says, flattered until "I discovered
that all editors want everyonc to write a
book on the thcorv that someonc mi^ht
write one that will seil."
Within a general cbronological framc-
work of bis coverage of the MacArthur
occupation of Japan and of the Korean
episode, Beech has vvrittcn some twenty
vaguely connected or vaguely disconnected
stories, impressions, memories and intro-
spective pieces. Most of them are about
the Korean conflict and its practitioners.
There are also some really fine stories
on MacArthur and the occupation. In a
very few pages, Beech manages to give a
better-balanced picture of the General and
what he accomplished than the reader is
likely to get from a good many recent
books on the subject. \\^hile viewing SCAP
and some of its activities with a notable
lack of enthusiasm, he concludes that Mac-
Arthur, though only mortal, is a great man.
60
It is, in fact, possible to sum up Beech on
MacArthur with a phrase by Max Ways,
Time editor, quoted in the book: "Never
underestimate a man just because he over-
estimates himself."
There is some hne material here from the
Korean fighting. Beech and two other cor-
respondents, for example, were on the Han
River bridge when it was blown in the
hrst evacuation of Seoul. His description of
the evacuation of the city, the blowing of
the bridge and their eventual escape on a
Korea n-powe red raft bring alive for the
reader the reports of the early days of the
war.
Beech was also with the 5th Marines
on their withdrawal from flagaru to the
sea, and his account of the dogged courage
and suffering of the men who fought their
way out is great reporting.
But most moving— and perhaps most
important for the future— is an essay titled
'T he Pavlov Technique," on the men who
"confessed" to bacteriological warfare. Most
of the Space is a transcript of the account
of Colonel Walker M. Mahurin, a great
fighter pilot with 22 World War II kills to
his credit, one of those who confessed.
Reading it, one can get the fĂĽll impact
of the tragedy of these peoplc. Men like
Mahurin are neither vveaklings nor cow-
ards. Many of them are skilled Professionals
whose Services we can ill afi^ord to lose. The
question is: how do we go about prepar-
ing others for the ordeal they may have to
undcrgo in any future conflictr Beech gives
no answer. We wonder, in fact, whethcr
there is an answer.
Taken all together, this is a thoroughly
fascinating book. Keyes Beech has spent a
good part of his professional career among
soldicrs, and they can profitably read what
he has to say.
War — The Dominant Factor
A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD:
From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto
By Maj. Gen. J. F. C. FĂĽller
Funk & Wognalls, 1954
$6.00; 602 Pages; Maps; Index
Reviewed hy
Rrig. Gen. Donald Armstrong
In 1940 the pubHcation of Major Gen-
eral J. F. C. Fuller's Decisive Battles pro-
x'ided a much needed corrective to the neg-
lect of war in histories written by Amer-
icans. In this country our historians were
inclined to crowd war off their pages and
to belitde our military past.
Today there is greater awareness of the
\ alue of military history and the need for
studying it. Few will quarrel with General
Fuller's comment in his preface that "we
live in a State of 'wardom'— a condition in
which war dominates all other human
activities. How long this tension will last,
whethcr there is a definite answer to it,
or whether it is destined blindly to work
out its own end, no man can say; yet one
tbing is certain, and it is that the more we
study the history of war, the more we shall
be able to understand war itself, and, sce-
ing that it is now the dominant factor, until
we do understand it, how can we hope to
regulate human affairs?" General FĂĽller is
a guide who writes with authority and un-
derstanding.
This is the first of a three-volume historv
which will be the most comprehensi\e
study in English of warfare in the Western
World. Judging from this volume, and from
the many earlier works on military affairs
written by General FĂĽller, this encyclopedic
study will be essential for even the most
meager military library. It is a scholarly
work, based on the best authorities extant,
and, as was to be expected, it is well written
and readable. Furthermore, it is an objec-
tive history, letting facts speak for them-
selves and not marshalling them to prove a
thesis. Unfortunately the outline maps that
were included in his 1940 book are omitted,
and this necessitates having at band a his-
torical atlas to understand the Strategie
situations. The tactical sketches are ordi-
narily adequate for the purpose.
In comparing this volume with the 1940
book, it is evident that General FĂĽller has
not merely revised Decisive Battles. This is
a carefully rewritten and greatly expandcd
study. For example, the present volume,
beginning with Megiddo in 1479 B.C. and
ending with the Battle of Lepanto in A.D.
1571, has 578 pages of text while the
earlier book has only 316 pages devotcd to
the same period.
Battles on land and sea that altered the
course of history are the points at which
General FĂĽller arrests his narrative to dc-
scribe in appropriate detail the how and
why of victory and defeat, and the strategv
and tactics involved. The important con-
tribution of this book, however, is the back-
ground of a succinct account of general
history, showing the political, social and
economic forces which created the environ-
ment and brought about the wars. There
is a welcome awareness of the interaction
of culture with the weapons, tactics and
Organization of military establishments.
Grand strategy is not neglected, and since
General FĂĽller clearly understands the in-
fluence on history of the Great Man, he has
much to say about the military leaders.
Undoubtedly one of the most useful by-
products of reading this book is a better
understanding of the psychology of military
Icadership. Brief biographical sketches and
character analyses of the masters of strategy
and tactics, too frequently overlooked in
military histories, add materially to the
value of General Fuller's study. There is
ample evidence, in consequence, of the
truth of Carlyle's belief that "history is the
essence of innumerable biographies."
General FĂĽller shows conclusively that
Single battles have frequently decided the
outcome of a war, but sometimes we are
in doubt whether luck or skill brought
about a victory. That being the case, the
lessons of this book support those opposed
to deterministic thinking— to historical laws
such as those defined by Spengler. Let us
hope that in our own country it will be a
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
Ten Distinguished Military Books of 1954
The Editors of The Army Combat Forces Journal cite these ten
books for their distinguished contribution to military literature
Givalry of the Sky
By Lyr^n Monfross
The story of the development of the helicopter, with emphasis on the con-
tribution of the U.S. Marine Corps.
Combat Actions in Korea ^Y '^«/o'^ '^"«e// A. Guge/er
An outhentic picture of men et war that shows courage and cowordice,
skill and error, with equal force and honesty.
Command Missions
By Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.
A memoir by a World War II Commander in North Africo and Europe, un-
usual for its vigor and frankness.
Communist GueriUa Warfare By Brigadier C. Aubrey Dixon and Otto Heilbrunn
A closely documented study of guerilla and anti-guerilla warfare in Russia
during World War II.
General Dean's Story ^s told to William L Worden by Major General William F. Dean
A moving account of the life of a man who fought for his country both on
the bottlefield and in o Communist prison.
A MiUtary ffistory of the Western World By Major General J. F. C. FĂĽller
A definitive work covering warfare from earliest times to the lote sixteenth
Century.
Nemesis of Power
Ăźy John W. Whee/er-Ăźenneff
The story of how the German General Stoff dobbled in politics between
1918 and 1945, told in vivid detail.
r> n Ăźy Burke Davis
They Called Hirn Stonewall
The first modern biogrophy of Thomas J. Jackson, the magnificent Con-
federate battle leader.
U S. Ann, i« World War II: L„««.« Su.por, of ,ke •^^''if ^J^^J^J^^,,,
An extremely valuoble study of logistics that candidly weighs both successes
and mistakes.
U. S. Army in World War II : The Supreme Command By Forrest C. Pogue
A thorough and coldly objective account of the command direction of the
largest and by for the most complex military Organization ever created.
JANUARY 1955
61
con\ iiicing argument for adequate military
tbrce and thc highest intellectual efFort on
the part of professional men as well as lay-
men to hclp solve the problems of war and
peace.
Anatomy of Espionage
WAR OF WITS
By Lodislas Farago
Funk & Wagnalls, 1954
388 Pages; Index; $5.00
l\evieived hv
CoLONEL C. A. H. Thomson
Ladislas Farago, in this short work, at-
tcmpts to give the general reader a complete
panorama of the subject of intelligence and
its allied activitics. Breczily and popularly
uritten, it is not intended to do more than
gi\c a tcmpting glimpse of the various Op-
erations which come within the field. The
bulk of attention is given to intelligence
and to espionage, and relatively cursor>'
treatment to Sabotage, counterespionage,
and Propaganda.
Intelligence is conceived on the broadest
possible Scale; so much so that the cold war
is defined as nothing more than an intel-
ligence Operation. There is a tendency in
much of the work to idealize the intelli-
gence Operator, and to praise his many
coups; this is offset in part by accounts of
incidents in which vital intelligence was
procured and sent to the proper authority,
but overlooked or deliberately ignored.
Stalin's disbelief of ChurchiH's reports—
and those of his own agents— that Hitler
would attack him in June 1941, is possibly
the most striking case in point.
Many topics are treated cavalierly, with
little indication of the controversy they
excite in theory and practice. The book is
replete with incidents, woven and inter-
woven into the exposition, but rarely if
ever told in satisfying detail. The author
has been satisfied with the most superficial
conclusions, and has allowed many con-
flicting interpretations and implications to
lic quietly side by side in his pages, with
the reader all unwamed.
Farago plumps for the small good stafF,
rathcr than the full-blown Organization,
largely on the basis of his own wartime ex-
perience. The question immediately arises
whether these paragons could be applied to
agencies with global responsibilities and a
füll ränge of functions.
The Army psywarrior will not discover
that G3 has anything to do with his spe-
cialty; the field of psywar is treated simply
as an outgrowth of intelligence, because it
uses intelligence in its Output. The defini-
tions of se\'eral key psywar functions are
bizarre, and not reflccted in the official
Army dictionary or in practice. It does not
appear, however, that the treatment of in-
telligence, espionage, or Sabotage is as ill-
adjusted to current doctrine and practice.
The most suggestive and challenging
Statements come in the concluding remarks,
where the author examines the possibility
that intelligence Operations can somehow
62
be substituted for violence in the modern
struggle between peoples and states. The
main point which remains uncovered is the
extent to which the threat of military
strength is indispensable to psychological
warfare or to diplomacy. So long as that
threat remains important, it is difficult to
foresee a Situation in which intelligence—
the war of minds— can wholly dispense
with the struggle of weapons.
The most valuable part of the book is
its bibliography. If the reader takes any
adxantage at all of the rieh fare there
listed, he can quickly discover for him-
self the füll ränge of controversy of belief
and practice which is hardly suggested by
thc author. And he can pursue further
the intriguing cases which the author has
sketched in tempting form.
Missionary's Story
FIFTY YEARS IN CHINA: The Memoirs of John
Leighton Stuart, Missionary and Ambassador
Random House, 1954
366 Pages; lllustrated; Index; $5.00
Reviewed hy
Maj. Gen. H. W. Blakeley
Dr. Stuart, born in China in 1876, has
written a book which Starts in the relaxed,
leisurely style of a Victorian biography
and gradually takes on a tenseness ch-
maxed by the author's imprisonment bv the
Japanese and by the various crises he
faced as American ambassador to China
during the period when the Communists
swept across the country.
From the purely military viewpoint,
the book has two main values: a consider-
able insight into the Chinese mind and
way of life; and commentaries on Amer-
ican military leaders.
China, with over 450,000,000 people-
a fourth of the world's population-and
with its central location in eastern Asia,
is certainly a country about which the
military man ought to know more than
he usually does. Dr. Stuart has not, of
course, written from this viewpoint, but in
the course of telling his life story he makes
many illuminating comments which are
probably not only applicable to the
Chinese people, but also to their armed
forces. As a young missionary, for ex-
ample, he was surprised to discover that
Chinese athletic teams would rather quit
a game than risk being defeated, and that
a boy who was elected captain of a team
had to cxpect that his defeated rival for
the Position would invariably try to ruin
the team's chances of victory.
Students in the universities of China,
even more than elsewhere in Dr. Stuart's
opinion, are excellent Barometers of pop-
ulär trends-"the most highly sensitized
Clement." The "age-long failings" of
Chinese officialdom, both civilian and
military, are profiteering from public
funds, primary concern over welfare of
family or friends or faction rather than
that of the country, the pressure to main-
tain appearances, bureaucratic red tape.
and incompetence. These deficiencies were
the basic reasons for the downfall of the
National government and armed forces.
"It would almost seem at times," says the
author sadly, "that the Chinese have no
abstract morality but are honest, truth-
ful, kindly, and so on, only as a duty to
the individuals concerned . . . their basic
virtue is perhaps that of personal loyalty."
The writer pays repeated tributes to
American military leaders, particularlv
Generals Marshall, Wedemeyer, and David
Barr. Of American military personnel in
general he says: "Even a layman could
recognize their professional attainments
and their high Standards of duty."
Last and Best
GENERAL JO SHELBY: UNDEFEATED REBEL
By Daniel O'Flaherty
University of North Carolina Press, 1954
437 Pages; Index; $6.00
Reviewed hy
CoLONEL R. Ernest Dupuy
Joseph Orville Shelby of Kentucky be-
longs among the folklore heroes of "the
dark and bloody ground." Self-taught lead-
er of light horse, Jo Shelby was born a
Southern aristocrat and a friend— but not
an associate, mark you-of outlaws. His
quixotic career ranged from partisan bick-
erings of the Kansas-Missouri borderland,
through the Civil War where he rose to
the rank of major general, CSA, across the
Rio Grande in one of the most fantastic of
gringo invasions, to end back in Missouri
as a fighting U. S. marshal.
It was an odd quirk of fate that Jo Shel-
by, who refused to surrender when the
Confederacy collapsed, should cap his
career upholding law and order in the
name of the Federal go\ernment and op-
posing States Rights.
Yet that is just what he did during the
great Pullman strike in 1894. Governor
Stone of Missouri protested Shelby's right
to use Federal deputies to protect trains
running through his State. "If the Gover-
nor," Said Shelby curdy, "had been through
what we have, he would have known that
the question he thinks is still open was
long ago setded in blood."
Shelby's war service was in a minor
theater— the backwash of the Confederacy,
the broad area of trans-Mississippi from
Missouri southward. No major decisions
were settled there, and, as it tumed out,
nothing that happened there after Nathan-
iel Lyon's initiative and iron hand had
saved Missouri for the Union in the spring
of 1861 could affect the fortunes of the
Confederacy one whit. There were battles,
raids, skirmishes, but all were side-shows.
So, although Jo Shelby was to make war
with fiery enthusiasm, he never rose to
comparison, for instance, with Stuart or
Forrest as a cavalry leader. His Operations
are buried in the musty files of the Official
Records. Shelby's one contemporary biog-
rapher was his adjutant, Major John New-
man Edwards, whose two hooks—Shelhy
THE ARMY COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL
and His Men and Expedition to Mexico—
are, according to the author of this book,
so fulsome and stilted as to cast an all too
rosy glow upon their hero.
Mr. O'Flaherty, with but this flimsy
background of source material on Shelby's
military activities, has nevertheless done a
monumental job of collation and docu-
mentation of material for his story. The
book would have been much improved,
however, had even one sketch map of Shel-
by's epic trail been added.
As a result, from a military viewpoint
the story is disappointing, for, as the author
remarks, he is "neither a military expert
nor a scholar"— we doubt the last— "and
has been content simply to trace the thread
of Shelby's Hfe through the kaleidoscopic
pattern of American history."
This book, then, is more a revelation of
the manners and ynores of individuals and
of a little-understood segment of our pop-
ulation during the monumental struggle of
the Civil War than a miHtary commentary.
To me the depiction of the anabasis of
Shelby's command cutting loose from the
Lost Cause to ride into Mexico is the best
part of the book.
Here was a body of light horse, a thou-
sand strong, well armed and mounted, vet-
erans all, plunging into Maximilian's war-
torn Mexico, prepared to take service as
mercenaries pure and simple— a nineteenth
Century White Company. Their sabers
were to be at the service either of Maxi-
milian and his allen government, or Juarez
and his revolucionarios: whoever should be
the higher bidder.
How they were tumed down by both
parties, their later adventures as colonists
in a short-lived Utopia, and the return of
the survivors to the United States, is a
lively narrative.
During the Civil War, Quantrill and his
bushwhackers, including Dick Yager, Cole
Younger, and the two James boys, rode
with Shelby's command from time to time.
Much later-in 1883-Shelby, loyal to one
of his old command, would be a character
witness for Frank James when he stood
trial for murder.
There is no evidence, however, that
Shelby himself ever countenanced Quan-
trill's red trail of arson, robbery and murder.
Jo Shelby had Standards of his own, and
they were high.
When, at the end of the Civil War
trail, Shelby and his men-marching for
the Mexican border, rode into Austin, Tex-
as, they found a mob about to loot the sub-
treasury, containing the last $300,000 of
gold and silver in the Confederacy. The
looters sabered down, Governor Murrah
suggested that the best disposition of the
fallen government's funds would be to di-
vide it among Shelby's men, who had not
touched a penny of pay for months past.
"I came into the war with clean hands,"
quoth Shelby. "With God's help I will go
out of it with clean hands . . . We shall
not take the money.
"We are the last of our race. Let us be
the best as well."
JANUARY 1955
In .
Review
In the August issue I mentioned how much I had enjoyed reading a biography
of Chinese Gordon. Now I find a new book, Gordon of Khartown ($5.00),
which in many respects surpasses the earlier one. This one is written by Lord
Elton and is a more thoroughly researched and more scholarly work than the
one by Lawrence and Elizabeth Hanson. Lord Elton's writing reminded me
a good deal of that of Cecil Woodham-Smith in The Reason Why.
Hundreds of escape stories have been written by American and British sol-
diers who were prisoners of war in World War II. Here, for a change, is a story
from the other side of the fence. Prisoners Bluff ($3.75) is the account of
a group of Germans who broke out of a British internee camp. Posing as British
ofhcers or Swiss business men as the occasion demanded, they made their way
some 1,500 miles in thirty days to reach the Japanese in Burma. For sheer ex-
citement, it's as interesting a tale as we've seen since The Wooden Horse.
Major General Ellard A. Wolsh, the fiery president of the National Oiard
Association, is well known to almost every National Guard and Reserve ofticer.
Since the end of World War II he has been a tireless worker and a staunch
defender of our National Guard System and has taken on all comers. It would
be safe to estimate that he has written and delivered in ringing rhetoric several
millions of words on his favorite subject to audiences large and small. There
are those who often disagree with him, but he is highly respected for his
intimate knowledge of his subject, and the tremendous amount of energy and
time which he has spent researching and developing his arguments. A fuU-scale
history of the National Guard has had a high priority on his list for a long
time, and we are told that the actual writing is now in the mill. In the interim,
the National Guard Association has published a handsome small edition of
selected addresses by General Walsh and one speech by Major General Edgar
C. Erickson, present Chief of the National Guard Bureau, which trace the
development of the Guard down through our history and its Status as of today.
The Nations National Guard ($2.50) is particularly worthwhile because it
provides material not otherwise readily available.
This seems to be Stonewall Jackson's year. We mentioned the fine new volume,
They Called Him Stonewall ($5.00) by Burke Davis sometime back, and novv
we have a newly edited version of John Esten Cooke's Stonewall ]ackson and
the Stonewall Brigade ($3.50). This is a faithful reprinting of the old edition
with only a few typographical errors corrected. John Esten Cooke, whom the
publisher cleverly describes as the Ernie Pyle of the Confederacy, certainly
captures the atmosphere of Civil War soldiering, and his book is highly enjoyable.
In the past eight years we've examined a goodly number of unusual books,
games globes and sundry other items intended to educate, entertain or amuse
our military forces. This month, for the first time in our recollection, we re-
ceived for review a road map! However, it's not as out of place as it sounds.
This happens to be a bilingual road map of Japan, and it looks like a damed
pood iob It lists for 50^ in the Far Fast, so I suppose anyone Stateside wanting
US to get one would have to spend 75^ or a dollar. I think TU put this one m
the old hope ehest, although it will surely be out of date before Fll get to use it.
The recent spate of books about General Douglas MacArthur has stiniulated
discussion about the war against Japan. Russia's entry into the Pacihc war
and the decision to use the atomic bomb will probably remain bot subjects tor
debate for years to come. There is, however, a new book published by Stanlord
University Press that adds considerably to our knowledge as to the necessity
of either of these controversial moves. ]apan's Decision to Surrender ($4.00)
is written by Robert J. C. Butow, presendy a faculty member in Princeton s
history department. Butow spent several years, starting in 1945, in both a
military and civilian capacity working as an intelligence officer in GH^ and
SCAP Since he was well versed in the Japanese language he devoted his time
exclusively to historical research. From the welter of material through which
he sifted Butow is convinced that neither the atomic bomb nor Russia s entry
into the war brought about Japan's decision to surrender-although they may
have hastened the culmination. His well documented history adds a material
PostScript to the military studies of that war.-R.F.C.
63
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V \LV^- ^ ^'^**'' *""* Published for thc Govcrniiint o£ the Commonwealth of Aüstralia by J. Ku».
Wo. 8.— F.Ö302.
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INTRODUCTOKY REMARKS.
I. In coinplijuice witli tlie irivitiitioii of the Commonwealth Government to
Visit and inspect the existin^ military forces and system in Australia, and su})se(iuently
to ^ive theni the benefit of my experience and advice rei^ardini^ the development of
tlicir latest scheme of defence, I reaclied Port Darwin on the 2 Ist Decemher, and
have since visited uiilitary camps in every State.
II. The Minister of Defence kindly arranged for the assemhly of troops in
these eamps on dates to meeit my convenience, and altliough the season was perhaps
exeeptionally trying and not the niost suitahle for both the men and their employers,
good nmsters were everywhere obtained.
III. My best thanks are due for the facilities afforded me on all occasions to
see the troops and tixed defences, as well as for the assistance given nie by General
Hoad and all the senior Australian officers in my study of the existing military
System and local conditions in this country.
IV. Having had considerable experience of Australians working in the field
during the South African war, I was not surprised to find what excelTent material
existed amongst the young raanhood of Australia from whom the defenders of their
country niust come. I notieed in the camps the great keenness displayed by all rauks
in rendering themselves proficient, and in applying the military knowledge they had
acquired to the practical conditions of work on the manoeuvre ground.
y. In these days, however, excellent fighting material and the greatest zeal,
though indispensable adjuncts, are not of themselves sufficient to enable a force to
take the field against thoroughly trained regulär troops witli any chance of success.
VI. I do not intend to criticise in any detail what I saw in the various camps
of exercise, but a great part of my suggestions for the training and Organization of
the Australian Citizen Forces, in Part I. of this Paper, have been devised to meet
the prmcipal defects I observed, and to enable these camps of exercise in the future
to be really mstructional, as well as a thorough test of the work done durinff the vear
in their home training. o ^
VII. Success in any technical career can only be achieved after a thorough
elementary grounding, and this is, perhaps, more marked in the military than in any
other profession. The A B C must be carefully studied and practised so as to
understand how to learn properly, as well as how to teach. It is only by correcting
niistakes on the spot, and clearly explaining their nature and results, as well as how
they should be avoided, that practical instruction can be given in camps both to
omcers and men.
^. VIII. The training I saw in the camps indicated that there was a distinct
tendency to go too fast, and to neglect essential preliminaries of training for more
advaneed studies which the troops engaged were not capable of carrying out
7 " , '^- 7^^^ conclusion I have come to is, shortly, that the present forces are
madequate in numbers, training, Organization, and munitions of war, to defend Aus-
tralia from the dangers that are due to the present conditions that prevail in the
country, as well as to its isolated position.
^ ^ X. The danger of want of population and consequent ineffective occupation
m raany parte of the country is, in inv opinion, a most serious existing condition in
Australia, as it may ^eatly imperil the stability of the present State of afl^airs in the
Commonwealth. I feel, however, that this is so well known and recognised that I
need not emphasize it further.
XI. I would also mention that railway construction has, while developing the
country, resulted in lines that would appear to be more favorable to an enemy
invading Australia than to the defence of the country. DifFerent ganges in most of
the States isolate each system, and the want of systematic interior connexion makes
the present lines running inland of little use for defence, though possiblv of con-
siderable value to an enemy who would have temporary command of the setu to?
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XU. ine new y provided unaei i^ « , National
organized and «r?Äh stiudard of efficiency can only ^^^^^l^JJ^ from the
"""^^Xra If Plans and «saential prepa^tions ha^e^ b«^n Jete^^ ^^ i„g
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r^'««n? t''!!;;'ii7entirelyab8orbtheenerKie8ofall engagw,
pfi:^:nrg;;cTba.l.en^f<^^^^^^^ I tave ^M,
> XV. I have divided my subject into—
Part I — Recoinmeudations.
as may be in my power;
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KITCHENER, F.M.
Melbourne, I2th February,
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PART I.— RECOMMENDATIONS.
STRATEGfCAL CONSIDKRATIONS.
1. It IS an axioin lield by the British Government that tlie Empire»s
existence depends primarily upon the maintenance of adequate and effieient naval
forces. As long as this condition is fiilfilled, and as long as British superiority
at sea is assured, then it is an accepted principle that no British dominion can
be successfully and permanently conquered hy an organized Invasion from oversea.
2. But in applying this principle to Australasia, considerations of tiine and
Space cannot be disregarded. The conduct of a great war depends upon the
calculated and proper combination of naval, military, and diplomatic forces ; and it
18 quite coneeivable that in the future, as in the past, national considerations
may require the concentration of British naval forces in one or other
theatre of Operations. It follows that, in seas reniote from such a concentration, tlie
British Naval Forces niay find themselves for the monient inferior in force
to an actual, or potential, enemy. In such a Situation, although our ultimate
superiority at sea might not be a matter of dou])t, some time might elapse
before our command of the sea was definitely assured in all waters. It, therefore,
becomes the duty of all self-governing Dominions to provide a military force adequate,
not only to deal promptly with any attempt at inyasion, but also to insnre local safety
and public confidence until our superiority at sea has been decisively and compre-
hensively asserted. For this rejison it has recently been agreed that the Home Forces
of the United Kingdom should be so organized as to compel an enemy conteniplating
an Invasion to make the attempt on such a scale as to be unable to evade our naval
forces. The same arguments apply to Australasia, and its land forces should be
calculated and organized on this basis.
" ^ ^ Strength Required.
. llt 8. In estimating the strength of the land forces necessary to meet this
requirement, three principal factors should be considered—
r^ PI ^; * (^) J^^® 8?*eat ocean distances which lie between Australia and the
S At H"^; 1 ,. territory of any possible enemies.
^,:' â– ':''/ '^:/- (&) The armed strength and power of traasportation over sea of any
^y " conceivably hostUe nation.
:f^B- (^) The rast exten^ and railway communication, of the Australian
r^^H ; Continent, which Covers an area of 2,948,366 Square miles, and
- ^1^^ >^ '}f' possesses a coast line of 12,210 miles; as contrasted with the
^ÂĄâ– '3 ^-, smallness ofits population, 4,275,000 souls, of whom 1,295,000 are
' males of a fiÄhtinflr aire.
*. Consideration^of these factors leads me to estimate the land forces required
at 80,000 fighting troops. Of these numbers, half would be required to secure the
larffer cities and defended ports from attack, and so to maintain the public confidence
and national credit, while the other half would be free to operate as a mobile striking
force any whei^in Australia.
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5. But the best defence is generally by taking the offensive, and there should
therefore be no difiPerence in the enrolment, Organization, and equipment of any unit.
11 i
*«-■''*'
1-. Organization op Force. ^ ^ -. , -
6. The De/ence Bill 1 909, which has just been passed by the Commonwealth
Parliament, gives eflPect to the principle that every Citizen should be trained to
defend his country, and I therefore propose to base the following advice as to the
manner in which the force of 80,000 fighting men should be enrolled, organized, and
trained on the principle embodied in that Act, which is designed to call into
existence a National Citizen Force. ^i. #\
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7. Inmyopimon,thetorce8 8nou „ fu-ttalions of infantry.
21 brigade« of 4 battahons each-84 battaüon^ _ ^ ^^ ^
28 regiments of light horse. ^ ;. '^f 4 ..f
49 four-gun field batteneB, and _^. ^g';!«!« totalling 224 gm«.
7 communication compames ana it f ^^ ^ ^^i^ ? w-!^^
Departmental troops to be provided in proportion. f: .afc ; ^ _
8 The peace and war establishments of u^its are given ^detad m Tables Y.
and Vl!bi?XrSk and file may be sumn.ar.^d as- ^„^g^if .-
r ' \' = ■,: ■:: -• ... 750 f«:.a,ooi
Battalion ... ••• ; •" w.v ; 850 U* ^70
Regiment of bght horse ^ ••• -,,^130 ^ 146
1903-1909 as the basi« of ray proposals, nav y „.^'«-^^
therein prescribed, because— „ j„„We o« a Dreparation, it cannot, in my
(«) While the cadet t«'»»"g.f J^^^^^ X^^^ "^""''^'^ preliminary
^ ' opinion, replace recruit training, J«}«" '! . j^j -^oldier. For
to' the production --^f^^X^J^ZVJX over and above
this reason I class the 18-\" ^^Ln „^7 hut liable to be put in
the peace establishment ot »0,000 men, but liaDie i« ^r^^
obedience to Orders. -^^^^" .j^^^^^^^^^ : ^;,' '\^^\^
■11. For this reason l advise that camp <^,«i'""g j^^ the
extemle" and I consider that, »^ j)« „fj^f, Svf Sf^^^^^^^^^
r^^^^X^^^^^-^'--^^ inclusive, in add.Uon to all
home training.
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this training will meet requirements up to the 25th yea
muster parade would suffice. _
,,. The .»ning ^»W >>, >-, o.er a»d .b.v. Lome »,™g, »o«W tb.„
' Forja,,io,»deM,12tol4jc«»-1201.ou»
20-21
21-22
22-23
23-24
24-25 j 1 i,r
25-26 years— Muster parade ouly.
ReSEBVES. ^^ x-u A^f
„. Afte. »biC, U», »m be, fe, .be peH^ »enUoned i„ eW CO „r .be Ae,
availabie as reservists.
► years— 6 days in camp.
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15. On this basis tlie yearly quotas enrolled in the Citizen Force would be-
Tablb I. — Yearly Quotas Enrolled in the Citizen Armt.
Tm».
Infantry.
UlhtHoiM.
Artlllerj.
TotoL
BngliiMn
Mkd
D«p«rftiMate.
18-19 . .
12,600
1,960
1,860
1,760
1,660
1,600
1,600
1,460
1,460
1,370
1,320
1,240
1,190
1,130
1,060
16,900
16,020
14,270
13,690
12,990
12,430
11,800
1,176
19-20 . .
20-21 . .
21-22 . .
22-23 . .
23-24 . .
24-26 . .
11,800
11,200
10,700
10,200
9,800
9,300
1,126
1,076
1,026
976
926
876
Total, 19-25..
26-26 . .
63,000
9,200
9,800
80,100
1,400
7,300
1,000
80,100
11,600
6,000
860
Note. — In the above table an annual wastage of 5 per cent. is allowed for
mortality, inedical unfitness, absence, and otber casualties.
»
Principles regarding Enrolment.
16. The first and imperative principle for the enrolment and maintenance of
these 80,000 men as an efficient Citizen Force is that the nation as a whole should
take a pride in its defenders, insist upon the Organization being real and designed
for war purposes only, and provide the means for properly educating, training, and
equipping their officers and men.
17. Unless these requirements bc met, no military System can be devised
which will be other than an illusion and a source of waste of public funds.
18. The second principle for a successful Citizen Force is a complement of the
first. The force must be an integral portion of the national life. The Citizen should
be brought up from boyhood to look for ward to the day when he will be enrolled as
fit to defend bis country ; and he should be accustomed to practise those habits of
self-denial, of devotion to and emulation in the execution of bis duty, of reticence,
and of prompt obedience to lawful authority, which are essential to the formation of
patriotic and efficient Citizen soldiers.
If). These considerations show how completely a Citizen Force should be kept
ouÂŁside party politics. Political feeling in an army is always a serious drawback
to efficiency, and may become a danger to the State.
20. Recruits should be drawn impartially from all portions of the country, and
from the whole of the Community ; and upon the manner in which the reciprocal
obligations of the nation to the force and of the Citizen soldier lo the nation are
brought home to the cities, towns, and shires will depend the value of the armed
strength of Australia. _
Reqistration and Exemptions.
21. The application of these principles entails a complete and thorough registra-
tion of the youths of the country, and the adoption of a System whereby those moving
from one part of the country to another will be traced and required to continue their
training. '
22. The question of exemptions will also arise, and in this there are, I think,
two broad guiding factors —
(o) That the welfare of the tamily should not be prejudiced.
(6) That the State should get the best men available.
Factor (a) points to the exemption ofthose who are the sole or main support of their
family, such as the only or elaest son of a widow, or of a man who is himself incapable
of eaming a livelihood for those dependent on him.
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Table II.~TRAiNiN(i Aiikas ani> Tkoops allottkd tiikukto— contmi*f(/.
â–˛tmNos.
191 to 193 ..
194 „ 196 ,r
197 „ 199 ..
200 „ 202 ..
Qroup XX.
203 to 205
206 „ 208
209 „ 211
212 „ 214
Group XXI.
Total
BattaUons.
84
Lil^t Hone
Bquadroos.
Field
ArtiUery
Batterien.
Engineer
Companles.
Army
Servloe
Corpe
CompäoieB.
Field
Ambulances.
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1
2
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1
1
1
1
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•- •
1
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• •
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1
1
j Details for forts
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3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
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1
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1
1
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• •
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2
1
1
1
112
56
21
21
21
Tue Permanent Instructional Officeu in ciiarge of tfie Area.
31. The duties of tlie officer in char^e of an area woiild iiiclude: —
(a) The inspection of the junior cadets training in the schools
(b) The Organization and training of the senior cadets.
(c) The enrohnent, equipment, and training of the adult froni eighteen to
nineteen years of age.
(d) The equipment, organizjition, and training of the trained soldier froni
nineteen to twenty-five years of age.
(e) The supervision of the registration of all male inhahitants under
clause 142 of the Act.
(/) Tiie maintenance of lists of males twenty-five to twenty-six years of
age wlio have just completed their training.
(ff) Connnunication to other areas of all changes of residence of men
under training, with pnrticulars of their milibiry proficiency.
(Ă„) Information regarding th 3 nnmhers, residence, and Classification of
the reserve men in the areas, and the Organization and maintenance
of rifle clubs.
(i) A thorough acquaintance with the inhabitimts of his area.
32. In all these matters, except registration and enrolnient, he would be
assisted by the officers of the Citizen Fon!es of the area.
33. Detailed Instructions for the guidancc of area officers should be drawn up,
and should, amongst other things, require a monthly statoment from eaeh area of the
progress made in registration, enrolment, Organization, equipment, and home training
of the Citizen Forces under liis charge.
34. The essential iniportance of these duties to the nation will make the area'
officer the keystone of the Citizen Force, wliost» Organization and fitness for war will
chiefly depend upon the education and training received in the " area."
35. Under this System, it is evident that the responsibilities of the area officer
will make it a national necessity that he should be a carefully-selected man
thoroughly grounded and trained in his profession, and scientifically edu(;ated. No
social considerations, no influence, nothing but efficiency should be allowed to affect
the selection and promotion of these officers. Their work should be judged by results
aione.
36. The selection and education of suitable men for these instructional duties
will thus be the foundation of a proficient Citizen Force. They should be taken
young, given a complete military education caiculated to make them good leaders
strict disciplmarians, and thoroughly competerit officers— brought up to realize that
their career depends upon their ability to do their daty and on that alone.
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87. In the United States of America theMmtaj7 College ofW^tPm^^^^^^
dt^g^tSir^Sce-for that will vary with national charactcmt.c8-to West
^°''*** 88 Hitherto it would have been difficult to find employment for the gradua^
«f «uch a nrimarV military educational estahlishment, but f have caretuUy e^«"™'"««
this noint anTfindThat now it has been decided to create a National Force, there will
tam^re^itoVfilledbythegraduatesofaMili^^^
«9 Tlie area officer should have reasonable prospeets of promotion, and there
that over every ten areas a supervising officer be appointed, wtio wouia, '""".'
,;t:ore"hestIff officer of th^ infantrv I^^J .«^-Si-^^^^^^^^^^^
^- S ÂŁS Ă„^-!2i Ă„ij^r:? X;SiS2'S^: U. permanent
troops. s ,j, „ /^
. i^^^ -^ FoKMATioN Ol A Staff Corps.
i' WMy recommendation is that a Staff Corpsbe ibrmed to provide tJ^^JJ
föf all these requiFements, areas, district and head-quarters statt», and permanent
its members should further be sent abroad to «t^d^. *"J. ^^staTctps Jöuld Äe
and forces of the British Empire, so that *""«««•; "«^^^^J amy in theworld.
equal, if not superior, in miUtary education to he officere of any ""'J /" ' ;>
15 The oroBosed Organization coutomplates the formation of 215 areas, wnicn
are reqlired fo pXe a fi|htin.force of 80,5oO men. 'r»^r^''':dlt''f2lro™
' SKi areas m^ay be of thi rj2 of captain or l-li^-^-^i^^^^f ,tffs Vl^^^^^^
will be required, one to supervise every ten areas. -te six d«trict stans reo
Xers, mLstly of field rank ; head-quarters w. 1 absorb 12 j ,^,e Mihtary College ,
and the permanent forces (on the present scale) 48. «^ sH;^^ „„™;„in„s on
43 To allow for officers being absent in other British l>o™«"«n«; °J
attachment toorstodying other annies,\t «taff coUege. on 1--;^ ^;, ^^^^^ ti
subalterns, captains, and majors should be »«^f f/ ./^'r. Jg^ ^y ranks and duties
Ä50 officers for the Staff^ Corps is reached, and their dwtributipn d^. lani«
is shown in Table III. betow :— -,, a -. . .?■;',
TaBL« III.-n.8TB.B«T.0N BV B*NK. AND DüT.K. OF StA>F COBPB 0>riO^
Dutv.
Lieutenants.
Area Officers for—
215 areas
In Charge of 10 areas
Permanent Forces ...
District StafiE for 6 distncts
Central Administration
Quarters
Military College ... •••
Spare for sick, on special course«,
attached to other arraies ...
at Head-
151
• • •
28
Captain«.
64
Major«.
Lt-Cols.
Totals
1
10
Coloneli.
Total
190
90
60
13
20
350
ZnTmen of the right stamp are to be attracted to the cor ps, the pay of eaeh
toassure^an adequate provision for maintenance on retirement.
Colonel
Lientena
Majors
CaptaiDl
Subalter
y^i^-vy-i;
.■'»Ar-
the St
will bet
groundj
the mt
elircinsj
branchj
ten pei
cadets
. «if^S;:/
followi
area o\
who vi
bead-q
tratioid
requirJ
deterni
Insped
for boj
a cad<
coUe»
CĂĽllegj
profiq
serviö
natior
durinj
at an^
men
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st Point sets
II Demokratie
>duce offieers
ideal s, if not
Lies — to West
tliegraduates
illy examined
•ce, tlierc will
Ion, and tliere
Ireadv advised
l, in war tinie,
In addition,
lie Couinion-
Ihe permanent
lle tlie oftieers
id permanent
College, and
to, the other
would be the
in the World.
areas, which
'har^^e ofeach
[on, 22 majors
\'h rcquire 25
•y College 8 ;
nuinions, on
per eent. of
iblishment of
iks and diities
ICKRS.
>Ionel8.
ToUL
20
350
e pay of each
the eircum-
in ("ommercial :f
i träte all tlieir
it not only fbr :'
retired.
in Table IV.,
iade, sufficient
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TaBLK iV.— l*ROP08BI> 1*AY i)¥ TUE StAFF C0RP8 OfFIOKRS.
Kstftbliahment.
Pay
per annum.
Ranks.
Nuinber.
Colonel ... ••• •••
Lieuteuant-Colonels
Majors
Captains ... ••• "...
Subftltepns
7
13
50
90
190
ÂŁ
800 to 900
700 to 800
550 to 650
376 to 450
260 to 350
The Military College.
46 I liave showii that 350 offieers are requircd for tlie Staff Corps, and I
shall now discuss the Organization of a Military College to maintam that corps.
47 Takino' 20 years as the average Service of an officer, it appears that after
the Staff Corps is^'up to e8tal)li8hment the yearly Output re(iuired from the colleee
will be about 18 cadets. The minimum leugth ot course required to efticiently
ground a cadet in his profession is three years.
48 As has already becn pointed out, strict selection should be enforced from
tte moment a boy becomes a cadet. To allow for the necessary process of
eHmiSn and also for those boys who may show profaceucy for some other
brSr o? the Public .ei-vice, I advise' that thirty .ade^ be the -"«^«07 ^add.ng
ten per cent. to this number for casualties, ano the fagure 33 x 3 - 99, say lOĂś,
cadets is reached as the establishment of the College.
49. The age of entry ahould be not less than 17 nor more than 19.
60. I consider that the irethod of entry into the College should be as
follows *
Candidates should be selected from Uie most capable of the senior cadets, each
area officer submitting the natne of his best cadet to the major in charge of ten are«,
S Sl then examiue tl.ese ten cadets and forward five naines through the district
Ä-quirrs, whö S State their recommendations, if any, to the central adrn.ms-
tratior The latter will then select from the uames received double the number
rSZk and will refer the ultimate selection from tl.ese la^tto an author.ty to be
Selined by Government. This authority mieht be a Board of Exammers, or the
Inspector-General, or the Commandant of the College.
51. A cadet liaving ioiued the coUege, his parents should pay ÂŁ80 per annuna
for board, lodging, books, clothing, equipn.ent, and instructiou ; except m the case of
a caTt obtaining a scholarshipf of which there should be twenty tor the whole
colle&rc • • •
-* 52. Until the Steff Corps is up to establishment, the fĂĽll output from the
colleee will l)e required ; once that stage is passed, or in the case of a Student showmg
pÄncy for a Leer other than a mllitary one. he m.ght be excused from müitary
Service on the foUowing condition : that he serves and is efhc.ent a^ an ofScer in the
national force for twelve years, and attends trainin^, as may be la.d down, and that
during these twelve years he wUl perform any special mihtary duty required of hnn
at any time by the Central Administration.
â– â– â– <^--'i&''Ki-'l)xmast the course, the cadet must be kept under strict discipline, and
taugilittokeep hYmself physically and menlally fit. Any cadet unlikelv to make
â– an efficient officer, or lacking in the personahty necessary to mfluence and command
men should ieremoved.
'V^iä"*?;',3r
:;-v"*
.-»■i"- ^
64. Ă–n the co'mplletion of his cotim at the coUege, the cadet should be given
his commission, and sent either to India for a winter training, t.«., October to Apnl
oi tS the ĂĽnited Kingdom for a summer trainiog, i.e., Apnl to October, as an attached
offi«i to a Britisb r^iment Oa return, he should do one year's duty under the best
''^!'i%
s â– /,
f
h .
*»'i«cj
*>%
t 1
•a:>^ -^'^^^
p^ q
,v
>il'
! ,'
14 •
instructional officcr available in an area, in order to learn liow best to conduct regis-
tration an<i to proniote hoine training in tlie area. He sliould theu be fuUy capaole
to take over cbarge of an area.
55. It will be evident that tlie Direetor of such a College itiust be a man of
exceptional (jualifications, well educated, and accustomed to do bis cluty fearlessl y and
thoroughly. He sliould be supplied with two aasistant directors and an adjutant of
similar qualifications tö hiniself, and a staff of professors to teacb the curriculuni
which sliould be based on that of West Point From the estinmtes at the eiid of this
part it will be seen that the establishment and cost of such a coUece wliPn in f..l]
working Order, will be ÂŁ15,050. 8 ; ^qen m tull
f.Ăź-.V^ political interference with the management of such Institution in
which disciplinary training forms an important part, and the efficiency of which is so
essential to the defcnce of Australia, should be strictly avoided. . j^^
Thk Citizen Officeb. â– â– ''.â– ., =<'â– "â– â– / â– \:o':%:;!'fr\
• f\ While. the StafF Corps will provide the trained inntructor, tJie ieadereliip of
units of the Citizen Force will depend on the Citizen officer, and it is therefore all
important that he should be of the most jironiising material available, chosen young
and selc(!ted solely for his capacity for leadership and military knowledee, and .
devotion to duty. Eyery opportunity must be taken to educate him in the spare
moments ot his civil business, and accordingly means of Instruction should be
available at or near bis bome.
58. Once selected, the welfare of the force requires that officers should serve
more continuously and for longer ])eriods than their men, and in this way repay the
nation for the trust reposed in them.
.59. A (•oiisideration of these requirements leads to the conclusion that—
((i) 1 he Citizen officer should be appointed as earlv as possible in his
military career, so that he may, at the most receptive time of his
life, study his duties as an officer, and develop his qualifications
*<jr ""P^i'ting instruction and leadership of men.
(ö) It should be understood that the acceptance of a commission entails /
a liability to serve as an. officer for at least twelve years, but such a
liability wouhl not interfere with free movement from place to place
m Australia; nor with resignation should the Governor-General
l)e pleased to accept it; nor, subject to the exigencies of the
Service, with the privilegc of leave 011 private afFairs to visit
countries outside Australia.
AppĂĽintment.
60 I agree with the principle laid down in the Defence Act, that in Citizen
Forces all promotions should be from the ranks; but, in order to get young officers,
1 advise that for tliis purpose Service in the ranks of senior cadets should count.
Ihe ordiiiary procedure to be followed in the ap|)ointment of an officer would then
generally be —
61.- The area officer would nominatc suitable senior cadets as sub-lieutenants
m the Ladet Corps ; such rank to carry no pay nor command outside the cadets.
Durmg the hrst year of their adult training these sub-lieutenants should be on pro-
bation as lieutenants in the Citizen Forces. When approve<l by the Battalion Com-
mander, and afterpassing the necessary tests, their names would be submitted
through the usual Channels, for commissions.
r i ^'t ^^ ]'^''^^^^^^ (^0» the commission would then be granted on the declaration
ot the officer that he is wdling to serve for twelve years. Under this System it is
estimated that an ofKcer would obtain his iirst commission between the a<res of 18 and
20, would leach the rank of captain about 2G, and of major about 30 or 32 i e
when his twelve years' service is about to expire. Above the rank of maioV no
Obligation to serve should be necessary ; zealous officers would remain in order to
command their battalions or regiments, and subsequently brigades.
63. A Citizen officer elected to any Parliament should be at once seconded.
Instruction.
64. The Instruction of a citizen offic-er will be in the Hrst instance aflPorded to
him at or near bis Lome by the instructional officer, who will take special care that
the
whic
subje
office
over,
mean
subjej
by ai
shoul
in Ii
set,
discui
the ci
subali
raii
bonusi
throu^
everyi
intellij
passinj
Much I
and de
is ^da\
soldi^i
the r
more
rates
prin
shoi^
citizj
couij
for 1
Fod
I* ^
^
15
regis-
[capable
man of
\ly aiid
itant of
pciihirn,
of tliis
in fĂĽll
:ion, in
Ui is so
[sliip of
>re all
young
, and
spare
ild be
servo
ly the
|in his
of bis
Kations
mtaik
mch a
place
leneral
)f the
Visit
atizen
icers,
^ount.
then
^nauts
idets.
pro-
com-
[itted,
ktion
it is
and
tbeofficers ofhis unit are tlioroughly tauglit in all the reginient^il work of the unit to
which tbey be ong. In addition to this instruction, special courses for technical
subjects should be arranged by the district sfiffs, and the proficiency attaiiK^d ]>y tlie
othcer goHig through any of theso courses be specially noted in his favour More-
over, as these officers will doul)tless liave their evcnings free for study, an excellent
nieans for bringing the wliole force together and of giving instruction in milibirv
subjects would be the free circulation of a niilitarv niagazine which should be edited
by and published under the direction of the Head-(2uarters Sfif!' The same a^ency
should undertake a systeni of correspondence whicii has proved to be of vilue
Hl India, whereby answers are given to (juestions on niilitary subjects, papers are
set, duly corrected and returned, strategical and tictical problems are explained
discussed, and corrected. * '
65. During the training ])eriod of his arm, U\ or 24 davs, as the case niay be
the Citizen officer should receive good emoluments, and 1 advise that the pay of a
subaltern for this period should be increased to ÂŁl per diem, the otlier ranks beine
raised in proportion. The rates for each rank would then be—
• • •
• • •
;d to
that
Subaltern
Captain
Major...
Lieutenant-Colonel
Colonel ... ... ... '.'.' 3 *o 0
66. No pay should be allowed for attendan(;e at sohools of instruction, but
bonuses sufficient to cover ex[)enses should be granted to those ofĂĽcers wlio i)ass
through the courses satisfactorily and attain the Standard of qualification.
The Citizen Soldier.
67. The Australian citizen soldier experiences much of niiliUiry value in the
every-day conditions of his civil bfe. He is generally a good rider, active, lithe, and
intelligent. As a cadet lie is taught to shoot, and h^arns the rudinients of drill, and
Dassing through bis recruit adult training, he joins the force as an efticient soldier.
Much Will undoubtedly depend on the amount of training that, through self-denial
and devotion to bis duty, the citizen soldier perfornis at or near his home, and, if this
18 done, in my opinion he will be able to subsequently maintain his efficiency as a
soldier under the training that has been proposed in this paper.
• j-^^i' '^^^^"g*^^^*^ t^»e period of Service, the citizen soldier must remeinber that
he IS dischargmg a duty to his country, and that the pay he receives is not a wage,
but an allowance to assist him in the discharge of his duty. I therefore think that Uie
rates of pay laid down in the Act are adequate, and, as under my proposals, training
will continue after the twentieth year, I consider that the pay of a soldier in all subse-
quent years should be at the rate laid down for the 19-20 year, nainely, 4s. per diem.
Citizen Non-commissioned Officers.
69. Wheu^ however, a Citizen soldier is selected for and is ready to assume
the responsibilities of a non-commissioned officer, tbe case is difFerent. He is doing
more than his country absolutely requires, and he should, therefore, receive higher
rates of pay — up to 8s. a day for a Sergeant.
70. The selection aud training of the non-commissioned officer will be
primarily the work of the citizen oftic^er. Promising non-commissioned officers
should be sent to schools for further technical training on the same conditions as the
Citizen officer ; they should be encouraged to extend their Services, aud are, of
course, eligible for commissions.
The Establishment and Organization of Units.
71. The establishments of the regulär army have hitherto been the Standard
for Australia, and this principle should be observed in the formation of the Citizen
Forces.
72. In its application, however, local conditions may/require slight variations.
For instance, bundsraen are not necessary for a Citizen Force, drummers and buglers
will SĂĽpply all that is necessary ; the details left at the base need not be so many.
! V
\
'W .#,
• 1
\ .
. i
jiblishinent of a
anks, or<^anized
iiiiiers
ihI
Kank aiid l<nie.
ler«.
• •
18
• •
15
f)
880
• •
18
6
9;h
001
tlie rapks will
curs.
eace and war ;
750
143
108
1,001
icters.
]Unk an<l File.
• •
\r,
• •
11
8
356
» •
4
8
386
-/
70
470
ure of tiie gun ;
.') officers and
146
ye., a total of
— tlu'
of tlu
• 1?
TltAlNlNG.
l.onu rant:;-,ll.icU will tak. ,,la.v all tlu- ,var n.un.l ... e v.c.m y
Ilui-inir tlu' next ywu- sliould l)e initiated a.i.l explaim-d.
"" 7<t This n.otl.od of tnih.i.i- ..atun.llv ..ec.-ssitaU.s a syst..|..ati/A..l an-a..-om,-..t
(luties of his Jirin.
80 Kor hattalion a.ul ret;i...«'"tal traini..-. tl..- asse.nl.ly of tl.o (piotas fro... two
In o.-di..ary year.s thcre w.U l.c ..<> ..ocess y to go ^'^y^^'^^^^^ „,- t^', f,,,,,
,.„nsult the conveniencc of eniploycis a..d ..t tl.e i.ien.
o.i the advicc of the Military Board.
8--> T,aini..i? sho.,Ul coosist of all that is essei.tial to good .najrhi..-, accu.ate
co..trolled shooti..j." a..d tl.e co...l«..atio.. of all ar...s ... attack a...l dofcee.
83 Throu-l.out, ti.c pri.icii.les c(.ntai..ed i.i tl.e nia..uals of the IJegular Ar.i.y
should ?,e follS. but'they'must'he applied with inteUisenco and w.tl. due .v.a.d to
t local coiiditions of personnet, groui.d, and .on.poH.t.on of tl.e ioice. Land w. i bc
uu,S to pr pcriy aud satisfac^torily earry out this work, andiu the selee ..... <.f «ts
r wo often conHictiug eonditions .nust he rceonciled-o,.c that .t shou d h. e se
tl ,.|tU.^ in Order that units and brii?ades will lose no t.mc on tl.e road, and tl.e otl.ci
alld whcTC possible might bc made availablo for tl.e broed.ng of art.llery horsc.
MOBIUZATION.
m'
84 Thorouehlv thought-out and practi.^al plaus for n.obili/.atio.. and con-
ccntration aTc 7^«^ bcfor! the Citizen krce can be c.o..sidered prepa.ed for war.
85. Preparation for mobili.ation in prin.arily the ««^^ of t'.e^^ Gc..<.al Sta^
who recom.nenli the lincs to be ♦""-- -^ ^ i;^,;; 1^^^^ ""(1. cen tl ... onl';
be 8atisfactor.ly eftected wl.en tue laiiway 7 .^^ ^,^.^^ .^
!i:„<äsr s:ÄTr sr?«;^«! »a^^^^^^
8taff as Secretary.
DiSTRiCT Staffs.
86. It only remains to consider the staff Organization suitahle to administer,
control, and inspect the Citizen Force.
F.93D2.
.'H
ti
it >
t^f
4- .-.a
.f--"«.
_i,,:.
'I*'^'
' >>-
■f „•»■:
3-^ifc
â– V'H.
â– ..-i
"m
Bö"
â– Ift;-
â– m
'«■':?■.-•
' ir^j
â– 'â– ' i ^â– -'i^., .
'« '•:*,
'kP
% !>â–
E?»^5iif"'
''•v-v
â– â– â– ;»■â–
.-m;
-,,.
*it;'-^,«-
V*
Colonel Wetzell.
•:. •V.",\
SOME REFLECTIONS
34U
â– ; /.'
decide how many they could and sHould allocate to
each. It is just like the claims each Government
Department presents to the Treasury for the Coming
financial year. The aggregate always exceeds what
the finances of the nation can afford. The Govern-
ment decide what to allow, what to reject, or how
much to cut down in claims which are in themselves
justifiable. This is a domain of strategy in which
the Government must be supreme. An extra 200,000
men at the front would not have converted the
Passchendaele fiasco into a triumph, but it might
have lost the War by disorganising the Services that
kept the nation from the hunger and penury that
destroyed Germany and Austria.
The psychological blunders perpetrated by Ger-
many afford many illustrations of the shortsightedness
of subordinating considerations of statesmanship to
immediate military exigencies. Strategy must take
cognisance of both. There is the occupation of
Belgium. It was not sound strategy because it was
a political blunder. It brought the British Empire
into the War. One of the ablest of the German
Generals told me recently that but for the force of
four highly trained British divisions placed on the
Belgian frontier the German Army would have
outflanked and Sedanised the whole of the French
Fifth Army and thus brought the War to a triumphant
end on the Western Front. Its presence in that
area was to them a disagreeable surprise. They
had anticipated meeting a British contingent sooner
or later. But they reckoned on its disembarking at
Calais or Boulogne, and their spies having informed
them that no troops had yet reached those ports,
they came to the conclusion that the British Army
had not arrived in France. The disembarkation at
-^
#
j
•■'>M
v^»^Wt&4t'#lüö^.^#;-.
-.^5
I
f
;:3
'• *'*^''.W0:'^'
(;>«■â–
,-y.*-i«WC^'^*-#*-^^*'"
:-'-"K-
'1^ ' «?•-
_ -if -> ., . _
J'is*..
i.':k
f..
^t.-'
â– 'if:';
'â– - *1
"';i.' ::"'':â– '* .
3412
WAR MEMOIRS
i^i^"#'' -â– '
Havre and thc specd with which thc Expcditionary
Force was scnt to France and mustered on the Belgian
fronticr upset the whole of their calculations and
frustrated their plans. The subtlety, efficiency and
celerity with which the British Expcditionary Force
was transported to the Belgian frontier without the
knowledge of the German StaflF was almost entirely
due to the genius of Lord Haidane. The way that
devoted but intelligent patriot was hounded out of
oiHcial life by insinuations of treason is one of the
most disreputable and stupid episodes in British
history. The invasion of Bilgium upset the whole
carefully elaborated scheme by which the Germans
relied on outflanking and capturing a whole French
Army. The provocation which brought America
into the War was another political blunder, for
which the soldiers were primarily responsible. The
insistence on taking too many men from food and
war production because they were needed at the
Gront was yet another. All these issues enter into
strategy and in determining them statesmen must
have their say as well as soldiers. In some of them
statesmanship is the more important dement and
statesmen ought to have the final decision — after
giving due weight to everything soldiers may have to
urge from their point of view. '
But there is a region where the soldier claims to
be paramount and where the interference of the
statesman seems to him to be an impertinence.
One is the question of whcther a great battle which
may involve enormous losses ought to be fought —
if so, where and at what time. The second question
is whether a prolonged attack on fortifications
(practically a siege) which is causing huge loss of
liife without producing any apparent result, ought to
SOME REFLECTIONS 3413
be called off. Should Governments intervene or
leave the decision entirely to the soldiers? The
British Government was doubtful of the wisdom of
the combined offensive of September, 19 15, in
Champagne and Artois. It was one of the costly
and fateful mistakes of the War, for whilst the Allies
were entangled in an attack doomed to failure on the
French Front, Germany was enabled to crush Serbia,
bring Bulgaria into the War, capture the Balkans,
open up her own road to Turkey, cut our Communica-
tions with Russia and drive us helter-skelter out of the
Dardanelles. Half the number of men we lost in
that ill-judged French offensive, if sent in time to the
Balkans, would have altered the whole aspect and
prospect of the War. The strategical as well as
tactical error of judgment then perpetrated by the
Army Commanders prolonged the War by two years.
Should the Asquith Coalition have exerted its over-
riding authority and vetoed that offensive? Their
Chief miUtary adviser, Kitchener, was definitely of the
opinion that it was a mistake and could not succeed.
They could, therefore, had they vetoed it, claim that
in doing so they were acting on the highest military
judgment at their disposal. It is true that Kitchener
subsequently recommended that it was not advisable
to quarrel with the French about it, as Joffre had
set his heart on this particular attack, had planned
it with great care and was convinced he would be
successful in breaking through. Ought the Govern-
ment to have risked a misunderstanding with France ?
They would have been well within their rights as
a Government and in doing so they would not have
been over-ruling the opinion of their own military
staffs as to the prospects of this particular offensive.
It is true that had they done so and gone to the aid of
ti
\.
rnx Ajk- -tt^-tlfT ^ii'ffcfc^^j^-^jj^ j ^ â–
ria-7&.r-_;' ■■- .«•>!#<»■■■•J-J»,*-«H**.'*» V X^'- l"^.'
^♦- ^ „^'l -i--*.» .^ *. **.^.
.. .^.'« .iv-Ütl ■!»—„. „J
- -..— i-*i'*.S?'— i"'
■•^
V.
l
k
7jMi,'»^^tr ' rifi
'm.:
.:,K-^Jt,
■*;■■- •:>.
â– :?â–
■v, J "■fi'if^'' ♦
(
:|
3418 WAR MEIIOIRS V
to the end of the War that a time would come
when his troopcrs would onc day chargc through
the gap made by his artillery and convert the German
defeat into a headlong scamper for the Rhine.
Needless to say, that chance never came. Generals
were in every essential particĂĽlar inadequately pre-
pared for the contingencies which confronted them
in this War. Had they been men of genius — which
they were not — they could have adapted themselves
more quickly and effectively to the new conditions
of war. They were not equipped with that superiority
in brains or experience over an amateur steeped in
the incidents and needs of the War which would
justify the atdtude they Struck and the note of assured
pastmastership they adopted towards all criticism or
Suggestion from outside or below. The Generals
themselves were at least four-fifths amateur, ham-
pered by the wrong training. They knew nothing
except by hearsay about the actual fighting of a
battle under modern conditions. Haig ordered many
bloody battles in this War. He only took part in
two, the retreat from Mons and the first Battle of
Ypres. And both batĂĽes were fought under the old
conditions of open warfare. He never even saw the
ground on which his greatest batties were fought, either
before or during the fight. Robertson never saw a
battie. The great Commanders of history, even
when they took no physical part in the battie, saw
with their own eyes aided or unaided with the tele-
scope the ground upon which it was to be fought and
watched the progress of the struggle between the
opposing forces. When you come to some of the great
essentials of training and preparation for modern war-
fare, then neither Haig nor Robertson nor anyof their
Staff had any previous experience that would give them
80ME REFLEGTIONS
3419
proficiency. And yet the strategy of the War depended
upon these two soldiers and their military advisers.
In the most crucial matters relating to their own
profession our leading soldiers had to be helped out by
the politician. I have already given in detail an
account of the way the Generals muddled the problem
of munitions. They did not possess the necessary
understanding of the probable character of the War
to foresee that it would be a war which would consume
a prodigious quantity of shot and shell. What they
ordered was of the wrong kind. They preferred
shrapnel to high explosive because the former was
more useful in the Boer War. What they provided
was on the assumption that the War would be con-
ducted in the open field. When it developed into
a war of deep digging they did not realise that in
Order to demolish those improvised ramparts it was
essential to equip an army with thousands of guns
of a calibre heavier than any yet trundled into the
battiefield. A fortress with its flanks on the North
Sea and the Swiss mountains, held by millions
of men and masses of cannon and machine-guns,
was a nightmare they never contemplated in their
most disturbed slumbers. It took them months
to adapt their strategy to this novel and unforeseen
portent. They did not realise that the machinc-gun
and the hand-grenade would practically take the
place of the rifle. Politicians were the first to seize
upon the real character of the problem in all these
respects and it was they who insisted on the necessary
measures being taken — and taken promptly — in order
adequately to cope with it. It was politicians who
initiated and organised these measures. In doing |
so, at each stage they had to overcome the rooted |
traditions, prejudices and practices of military staffs. I
^'^****«*iSifti^.
'"^Ik'ilJ.
•i-^-.^ AMP^t
.*t .:* <>*»
,'Ă„^
^Hk:
--iäfc-.-:; _.
>.;
■*».!..
â– M:^..
:-iit.
rm*'^
*- •■■■^ ' : . ' A ^'
u-'^ â– *.
!k *
X
;u,^'
1*
I -^
ti'
3420
WAR MEMOIRS
It was politicians who insistcd upon the importancc of
providing suffident and suitable transport fadlities
behind thc line on a grcat scalc in order not only to
bring up suppUes, but to incrcase the mobiUty of
thc Army along thc wholc fiont. It was dvilians
«Aosen by politidans, who reorganised and dcvdoped
thesc fadlities. It was pohtidans who foresaw that
any attcmpt to break through thc immense fortifica-
tions thrown up by the cnemy on the Western Front
woiJd mvolvc enormous camage and a Prolongation
of this destructive war. It was they who urged the
findmg of a way round on the most vulnerable fronts
It was poUtidans who urged the importancc of
makmg thc best usc of thc magnificent and almost
mcxhaustible fighting man-power in Russia and thc
Balkans by providing diem with thc necessary
eqmpment to play their part in attacking thc enemy
on has Eastcm and Southern Fronts. It was amateurs
who wcrc principally responsiblc for the tank, easily
the most formidablc of our weapons, and it was thcy
who invented and urged thc usc of onc of the most
serviccablc machincs of thc War, the Stokes mortar
It was a dvilian who invented die hydrophonc which
located die dcadly submarine and cnabled us to hunt
it down in the pathless depths of die sea.
Let anyone read the history of thc War with care
and thcn conjecture what would have happened if
the ignorant and cold-shouldercd civilian had not
insistcd on Coming to thc rcscuc of the military in the
dischargc of those functions which in pcace and war
constituted an csscntial part of the duties and rcspon-
sibilities of thc latter. I have not perused a history
written by or on behalf of thesc grcat Generals '
which recogniscs fairly and gcnerously thc con-
tribution rendered to thc achicvcment of victory
SOME REFLECTIONS
3421
by the unwdcomc Intervention of thc amateur
untraincd in military Colleges or on parade grounds.
. Lookmg back on this dcvastating War and sur-
vcying the part played in it by statesmen and soldicrs
respectivdy in its direction, I have come dcfinitdy
to die condusion that die former showcd too much
caution in cxcrting thdr auĂĽiority over die military
Icadcrs. They might have done so either by a
direct and imperative order from the Government
or by making representations foUowcd, if those were
not cfTectivc in answering die purpose, by a change
in thc military Icadership. Thc latter method of
procedure would no doubt have been the sounder
and \wer course to pursue had it been feasible.
1 he difficulty, however, all Govemments experienccd
was in discovering capable Commanders who could
have been relied upon not only to carry out their
policy but to do so cfficiendy and skilfully. The
long siege warfare did not provide opportunities for
resourceful men to come to the top by a display of
supenor skill. There was a rigidity and restrictive-
ness about the methods employed which allowed no
play for in.ĂĽative, Imagination and inventivcness.
1 he Orders issued to divisional and brigadicr Generals
and to Colonels from headquarters were precise and
could not be deviated from in any particular without
nsking a charge of insubordination. The men on
the heights offered no encouragement or chances to
genius down bdow. The distance between the
chateaux and dugouts was as great as that from the
fixed Stars to the caverns of earth. No telescope
was powerful enough to discern talent at that depth
even if a look-out were bcing kept. That is one
reason why no onc reached the highest ranks in thc
Bntish Army cxcept those who were there or
"s
VOL. VI
Vii
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3422
WAR MEMOIRS
SOME REFLECTIONS
.--4
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thcrcabout whcn thc War bcgan. No civilian rose
abovc thc rank of Brigadier, although there must have
bccn hundrcds of thousands who had ycars of ex-
pcricncc in thc fighting linc — many of them men of
cxccptional capacity. Thousands of thesc men had
passcd through our Secondary Schools, hundreds
through our Univcrsities, and not a few with dis-
tinction. It is incrcdiblc that amongst men of that
training and quality there should not have been
foimd one, fit for high promotion, after years of
greater cxpcrience of fighting under modern con-
ditions than any General in thc ficld had acquired.
Thc regulär Army before thc War numbcred some-
thing ovcr 250,000. During thc War four or five
million young men drawn from every class of the
Community passcd through its ranks. The wider
thc ränge of choice the better the chance of finding
thc right men for leadership. Besides, the Army
was never considered to be a career for the talents.
Rather the reversc. Boys who were endowed with
brains abovc their fellows sought other professions
whcre talent was more welcome and better requited.
Independcnt thinking is not encouraged in a pro-
fessional Army. It is a form of mutiny. Obedience
IS the supreme virtuc. Theirs not to reason why.
Orders are to be carried out and not canvassed.
Criticism is insubordination. The object of discipline
is to accustom men to respond to a command in-
stantly, by instant action, without thought of eflTect
or consequence. There were many intelligent officers
and men who knew that the Orders given them during
thc War were utterly stupid and must have been
given by StaflFs who had no understanding of the
conditions. But Orders were Orders. And with their
men they went to a doom they foresaw was inevitable.
3423
Such an instinctive obedience to the word of command
is csscntial to the eflSciency of a body of men who
have to face terror, death or mutilation in the dis-
charge of their terriblc duties./ But a long course
of mental subservience and suppression cramps the
development and suppleness of the intellect. It
makes " an officer and a gentleman " but it is not
conducive to the building up of an alert, adaptable
and resourceful leader of men. Haig's summary of
the qualities of the French oflScers he met is a con-
demnation of the rigidity of the System. The average
and commonplace men of distinguished form he
picked out as " gentlemanly " and " fine soldiers."
The one man of genius among them he gibed at as
a blatherer. In such a System promotion is a moving
staircase where the man who sticks on is sure of
promotion. Wheedling, pushing, intriguing enables
some to wriggle through the crowd in front of him —
but intellect is out of place and strength does not count.
In the grand Army that fought the World War the
ablest brains did not climb to the top of the stairs
and they did not reach a height where politicians
could even see them. Seniority and Society were
the dominant factors in Army promotion. Deport-
ment counted a good deal. Brains came a bad
fourth. Men of great intellectual powers are not
tempted to join a profession which offers so little
scope for the exercise of their powers and where the
awards have no particularreference to special capacity.
To be a good average is safer than to be gifted above
your fellows. The only exceptions were to be found
in the Dominion forces. General Currie, the Com-
mander of the Canadian Army, and General Monash,
the Commander of the Australian Army, were both
in civil life when the War broke out. Both proved
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3424 . WAR MEMOIRS
themselves to bc brilliant military leaders and went
right through to thc top. It means they had a
natural aptitude for soldicring and that the fact of
thcir being officcrs in unprofessional armies gave
fĂĽll play to thcir gifts. Monash was, according to
thc tcstimony of thosc who kncw well his genius
for war and what he accomplished by it, the most
rcsourccful General in the whole of the British
Army. But the tradition of the Dominions in
the occupations of peace and war is encouraging
f to frcsh talent. For this and other reasons the
British Government experienced a difficulty in secur-
ing for the Supreme Command the Services of the
ablest man which thcir great armies could have
provided. There was no conspicuous officer in the
Army who seemed to be better qualified for the
Highest Command than Haig. That is to say, there
was no outstanding General fit for so overwhelming
a Position as the command of a force five times as
great as the largest army ever commanded by
Napoleon, and many more times the size of any
army led by Alexander, Hannibal or Caesar. I have
no doubt these great men would have risen to the oc-
casion, but such highly gifted men as the British Army
possessed were consigned to the mud by Orders of men
superior in rank but inferior in capacity, who themselves
kept at a safe distance from the slime which they had
chosen as the terrain where thcir plans were to operate.
The solicitude with which most Generals in high
places (there were honourable exceptions) avoided
personal jeopardy is one of the debatable novelties
of modern warfare. ^Generals cannot any longer
be expected to lead thcir men over the topf^ with
pointing sword. But this departure from the
established methods of leadership by personal example
<*â–
SOME REFLECTIONS 3425
has gone too far. Admirals of a rank corresponding
to that held by the Army Commanders took exactly
the same hazards in action as the humblest sailor
in thcir fleet. Beatty was a man of dauntless intre-
pidity who sought danger. His flagship was hit
in the Dogger Bank fight and it was just as liable to
be blown up at Jutland as the Defence and the
Invincible. The Rear-Admirals commanding these
batde cruisers were killed when their ships were
sunk. Jellicoe was not altogcther free from personal
peril in the Judand mists. When a naval battle is
fought G.H.Ci. moves into the battle zone. Every
child knows the story of Zeebrugge, the one naval
exploit of the War that moved and still moves the
imagination of the nation. Sir Roger Keyes, the
Admiral who directed the attack, had the unmistak-
able Nelson touch and took just as great personal
risks as that redoub table sailor ever faced. When
High Admirals are not immune from the jeopardy
of war there is no reason why exalted Generals should
be sacrosanct. It is a new thing in war for generals
who never set eyes on a position to command their
soldiers to attack it without the slightest intention of
placing themselves in any peril by leading the attack
themselves, or even in viewing the ground before
action or coming near the battle whilst it is proceeding
to its deadly end. It is certainly a novelty in war that
military leaders swathed in comfort and security
should doom hundreds of thousands of their bravest
soldiers to lodge for weeks in slimy puddles with
Death as their fellow lodger, without even taking
the precaution of finding out for themselves what
the conditions are or are likely to become. In the
olden days when Commanders so directed a battle
that it eiided in a shambles for their own army, they
.-^*"
W _.. .*.. „ ,
--..^X
'^.^
Volume LX'Ă„
June 1955
Nutnber 2
POLITICAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL-MIUTARY
CONSULTATION IN THE UNITED STATES
IN the Cabinet room of the White House, every Thursday
morning, the National Security Council gathers around
a long, massive table. On the table are printed briefs
reviewing some problem of national policy. Prepared by the
Council staff, these briefs blend the views of many departments
and agencies, but in Council discussions the members and ad-
visers rehearse these views once again. The Secretary of State
and others suggest desirable Solutions to the policy problem,
while the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of StafiF describe the military risks entailed in each alterna-
tive course of action. The President then reaches his decision,
and the United States may acquire a new foreign policy or
perhaps a new shading for an old policy.
Nearly all Americans agree on the need for this National
Security Council. Everyone realizes that American policy
has outgrown the Cabinet, just as the atom has outgrown the
College laboratory. Where, fifty years ago, Secretary of State
Elihu Root could disregard reports of a crisis in the Middle
East, cabling the American envoy, "Continue quarreis with
missionaries as usual",^ a similar crisis today would call out
Instructions to diplomats all over the world, Orders to military
and naval Commanders, anxious discussions in Washington,
and an earnest Session of the National Security Council. Living
in a world as sensitive as a can of nitroglycerin, Americans
accept the need for exact weighing of political and military
factors before each policy decision.
^ PhĂĽlip C. Jessup, EUhu Root (New York, 1938), II, 109.
161
wir
Ernest R. May is an Instructor in Historv at Hn . „ •
From 1952 to 1954 he was, as a Naval Relv! ffi Un.versityf
Historical Scction, Joint Chiefs of Stiff '''^'"'' ^ """"^'^ °f 'he
162
PO LIT IC AL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
The nation has acknowledged this need, however, for only a
Short time. Not before the 1940's would the majority of Ameri-
cans have endorsed the rationale that underlies the National
Security Council. Yet this rationale now seems seif -evident :
military forces are the rooks and bishops behind the knights
and pawns of diplomacy; although the rooks and bishops move
less frequently, their röle in the game is no less decisive. Before
the executors of foreign policy can decide what the nation
ought to do, they must learn from political and military experts
what the nation is able to do. They must lay objectives
alongside capabilities, in the same way that business men
compare the blueprints of design engineers with the estimates
of cost accountants. In making foreign policy, in other words,
ends must be measured against means.
Although this rationale won acceptance only recently, it is
not new, even in the United States. Nowhere, in fact, is it
more vigorously summarized than in Number 23 of the Federalist
Paper s, written by Alexander Hamilton. But long years of
isolated safety smothered the idea of political-military collabora-
tion. It found no new spokesman until Captain Mahan began
to preach, late in the nineteenth Century. Even then, the idea
was not translated into action until after the conquest of the
Philippines, when a few Americans, looking across six thousand
miles of water at their new colony, began to believe that the
United States had grafted to itself an Achilles heel. They
perceived that the safety of this faraway member could not,
hke the safety of the homeland, be entrusted to Providence.
Realizing the need for hard, far-sighted planning, this handful
of Americans also realized their lack of any planning instruments.
The State Department, as Tyler Dennett characterizes it in
his life of John Hay, was an "antiquated, feeble Organization,
enslaved by precedents and routine inherited from another
Century, remote from the public gaze and indifferent to it. The
typewriter was viewed as a necessary evil and the telephone as an
instrument of last resort."^ Although the Army and Navy
had Professionals, while the State Department had none, the
armed Services were still no better outfitted for strategy-planning
than the State Department for policy-planning. Before the
2 John Hay (New York, 1934). p. 198.
i
No. 2] POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN U. S.
163
Army and Navy could produce coherent advice, they had to
nurture brains or general staff organizations, and such brains
developed slowly. The Army's General Staff, for instance,
was "only just growing to man's estate" fifteen years after its
founding, according to the 1918 report of its Chief of Staff.»
This General Staff and the Navy General Board faced, in addi-
tion, the problem of welding Army and Navy differences, so
that military advice on policy could be based on estimates of
the total military power of the United States. Until a Joint
Board of the Army and Navy and the State Department, too,
perfected their internal workings, the coördination of strategy
and policy could only be haphazard.
During the first two decades after the War with Spain, as a
result, consultation among the State, War, and Navy Depart-
ments took the antique form of correspondence among the three
secretaries. The Navy Secretary, advised by his General
Board, would write to the Secretary of State, proposing acquisi-
tion of a certain naval base on foreign soil. After referring the
proposal to such experts as he could collect, the Secretary of
State would return his judgment, either killing the idea or
pushing it up for final decision by the President.*
Like sophomore letters home, these begging Communications
from the Secretary of the Navy sometimes hinted casually at
subjects under study. The Navy revealed its concern with
Panama, for instance, by requesting bases across all the sea
approaches to the Isthmus — on the coast of Peru, off the Pacific
coast of Panama, on Fonseca Bay, and in Cuba.^ Never,
^ Annual Report of the War Department, 1918: Report of the Chief of Staff, p. 3.
^ See Seward W. Livermore, "American Strategy Diplomacy in the South
Pacific, 1890-1914", Pacific Historical Review, XII (March 1943). 33-51, and
"American Naval Base Policy in the Far East". ibid., XIII (June 1944), 113-135.
Livermore. "American Strategy Diplomacy in the South Pacific. 1890-1914";
Jessup, op. eil., I, 326. The following from Record Group 80, the General Records
of the Navy Department, in the National Archives (hereinafter cited as Navy
Dept. Arch., RG 80): C. Darling (Acting See. of Navy) to J. Hay, Mar. 5. 1903
(carbon), 8480-8; G. v. L. Meyer to P. C. Knox, Feb. 23, 1910 (carbon). 8480-9;
J. Daniels to R. Lansing, Feb. 28, 1920 (carbon), "Spindle File"— State Depart-
ment. The following from Record Group 45, Naval Records Collection of the
Office of Naval Records and Library (hereinafter cited as Navy Dept. Arch.,
RG 45): J. D. Long to McKinley, Dec. 13. 1901 (carbon), Confidential Corre-
spondence, vol. III,
164
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
before completion of the canal, did the Navy General Board
say that the Isthmus was of vital importance to the military
security of the United States. Alert eyes in the State Depart-
ment might have detected this thought in the Board's selections
of naval bases. And eyes even less alert might have perceived
the concept in two bolder letters, reminding the State Department
that no great Power should be allowed to perch on Ecuador's
Galapagos Islands or on Haiti's M61e St. Nicholas.« But the
Navy and Army rarely let fall such clues to their Strategie
thinking.
Neither did the State Department share its poHtical thinking
with the Services. In the archives of the McKinley, Roosevelt
and Taft Administrations, I have yet to find a letter from a
Secretary of State, asking for a military cost accounting before
some diplomatic stroke. Although Taft's Secretary of State
did occasionally ask the fleet to back up his diplomacy, he never
inquired ahead of time about the fleet's location and make-up.
Thus, in May 1912, when unrest was sweeping Cuba, the Secre-
tary asked for "a considerable naval force ... in the vicinity
of Havana." Only by chance, or as a result of naval clair-
voyance, did nine warships happen to be handy at Key West.'
Letter writing in the State, War, and Navy Departments
failed to bring about effective coördination of policies. As
a rule, in fact, diplomatic and mihtary recommendations reached
the White House separately, and the relationship between
poHtical aims and military capabilities had to be gauged, if
at all, by the President. Although this rule-of-thumb System
could work for a strategy-minded President like Theodore
Roosevelt, it displayed its failings even in his time.
In the Summer of 1907, for example, the budding American
high command, the Joint Board of the Army and the Navy,
^ Livermore, "American Strategy Diplomacy in the South Pacific. 1890-1914".
Rear Adm. H. C. Taylor to W. H. Moody, Nov. 10, 1902 (original), Confidential
Corr., vol. III, Navy Dept. Arch.. RG 45. Jessup. Elihu Root, I, 562-563; and
the following from the General Records of the Department of State, National
Archives (hereinafter cited as State Dept. Arch.): Daniels to Lansing, Jan. 2. 1920
(orig.), 822.014 0/287.
^Knox to Meyer. May 25, 1912 (orig.); B. Winthrop to Knox. May 25, 1912
(carbon)— both in 27868-4, Navy Dept. Arch., RG 80.
No. 2]
POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN U. S.
165
discussed the hostility growing between the United States and
Japan. Realizing that war, if it came, would find most of the
American fleet in the Atlantic, the Board proposed a precau-
tionary shift of battleships to the Pacific, then asked the Secre-
taries of War and the Navy to suggest such a shift to the Presi-
dent. The Secretaries did so, writing to Roosevelt at Oyster
Bay, and Roosevelt agreed, choosing, however, to disguise
the movement as a good will cruise. Although he seems to
have reached this decision without delay, Roosevelt waited
from late June until mid-July before notifying his Secretary
of State, who was still in Washington. For several weeks,
therefore, the Secretary of State duelled with Japanese diplomats,
wholly unaware, so far as the records show, of the Navy's
preparations for a warlike gesture !®
The first advances from haphazard coördination-by-letter to
coördination-by-conference were made, paradoxically, under
an administration that would never have endorsed the rationale
of political-military collaboration. President Woodrow Wilson
may even have denied the need for long-range mihtary planning.
At any rate, two generals swore after World War I that Wilson
had given verbal Orders forbidding the Army and Navy to
construct hypothetical war plans.^ During his Administration,
furthermore, a pacifist sat for two years as Secretary of State,
a near-pacifist ruled the Navy Department, and a Quaker
became Secretary of War.
Perhaps a prevaihng attitude of the Administration was
expressed on one occasion by this pacifist Secretary of State,
William Jennings Bryan. Renewed tension with Japan had
brought before the Cabinet another Joint Board recommenda-
tion for a fleet movement to anticipate the possibihty of war.
^Hermann Hagedorn. Leonard Wood: A Biography (New York, 1931), II,
79-81; Thomas A. Bailey. Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese- American Crises
(Stanford. 1934), pp. 211-227. Taft to Roosevelt, June 22, 1907, Private Papers
of Theodore Roosevelt, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Roosevelt to
H. C. Lodge, July 10, 1907, in Elting E. Morison et al. (eds.). The Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass., 1951-1954). V, 709-710; Roosevelt to Root, July 13,
1907, ibid., pp. 717-719.
^ Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker (New York, 1931). I, 40-41; Hagedorn,
Leonard Wood, II, 205.
166
PO LI TIC AL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
According to one member of the Cabinet, David F. Houston,
this recommendation angered Bryan, who "flared up . . . got
red in the face and was very emphatic. He thundered out
that army and navy officers could not be trusted to say what
we should or should not do, tili we actually got into war; that
we were discussing not how to wage war, but how not to get
into war."^°
Yet the Wilson Administration, with Bryan as Secretary
of State, saw uniformed ofl&cers and black-tied diplomats sit
down together to discuss questions of foreign policy. Tension
with Mexico, during the first year of the Administration, brought
Bryan himself to the White House for a Conference with the
War and Navy Secretaries, the Army Chief of Staff, and the
head of the Navy General Board. ^^ After war exploded over
Europe, Bryan and his subordinates found a recurring need
for special consultations with representatives of the Army
and Navy. The uncertain character of neutral rights and
duties brought into being a permanent Joint State and Navy
Neutrality Board, an advisory body on diplomacy and inter-
national law. The amount of correspondence among assistant
secretaries of the three departments increased three times over
the pre-war average. And Bryan's successor, Robert Lansing,
met almost daily, according to his desk diary, with officers from
the Navy General Board and the Army General Staff. ^^ Thus
Conferences, letters and committee meetings began to knit
the three departments together.
But American policy failed to benefit from this increasing
teamwork, for Wilson reached his decisions with little assistance
from any of the three departments. Lansing had come into
Office, in Colonel House's words, as a man "to do the details
intelligently,"^^ and his Department's share in policy-making
was never large. Meanwhile, the military planning agencies
lacked not only the Administration's trust but also the ability
to justify such trust if it were handed them. The Joint Board
*° Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet (Garden City, 1926), I, 66.
" Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1926-1937). IX, 328-329.
^' Private Papers of Robert Lansing, MS Div., Library of Congress.
^^ E. M. House to Wilson, June 16, 1915 (orig.). Private Papers of Woodrow
Wilson, MS Div., Library of Congress.
No. 2] POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN U. S.
167
of the Army and Navy had virtually disbanded, because one
of its recommendations had piqued the President. ^^ The Army
General Staff had slipped into torpor, while the Navy General
Board languishcd as a casualty of Josephus Daniels' per-
petual feud with his admirals. Collaboration among these
powcrless agencies could result, at best, in a coördination
of futilities.
The idea of political-military collaboration nevertheless
survived. Since the war had revcaled defects in the State
Department and in the Army and Navy, the post-war years
saw reforms in all three: the Rogers Act for the State Depart-
ment, reorganization of the Army General Staff, progressive
change in the new Office of Naval Operations, and creation of
a new and stronger Joint Board of the Army and Navy. To
some men in the War and Navy Departments experience had
also proved the need for regulär, official consultation with the
State Department. And these men put forward two successive
proposals for consultative organizations.
The first and most ambitious of these proposals came from
Franklin D. Roosevelt, then acting as Secretary of the Navy.
On May 1, 1919, Roosevelt wrote to the Secretary of State:
It is a fundamental principle that the foreign policy of our govern-
ment is in the hands of the State Department. It is also an accepted
fact that the foreign policy of a government depends for its accept-
ance by other nations upon the naval and military force that is
behind it. . . .
It is probable that certain policies are of such importance to our
national interests that they must be defended at all cost.
On the other hand certain policies are not, by the expense they
would entail, justified if they lead to war.
Hence it is submitted that in the framing of our policies, it is
necessary for the State Department to know how much they will
cost to maintain by force, in order to assign them their relative
importance.
Conversely, it is necessary for the Navy Department to know what
policies it may be called upon to uphold by force, in order to formu-
late plans and building programs.^^
^^ Diary of Josephus Daniels entry, for May 16 1913, Private Papers of Josephus
Daniels, MS Div., Library of Congress.
^^ (Orig.), 110.7/56, State Dept. Arch. The copy in the Franklin D. Roosevelt
168
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
Enclosed with this letter was a giant sheet of blueprint paper,
charting with boxes and arrows an Organization for planning
against all possible wars. Prepared by the Naval War College,
this neat chart outHned duties for a State Department planning
agency, for the Army General Staff, for a naval general staff,
and for a Joint Plan Making Body, composed of officers from
all three staffs. To this Joint Body was to go responsibility
for estimating national resources, both American and foreign,
and the key röle of defining American objectives for each possible
war and assessing the force needed for success.
Although this grandiose scheme was probably unworkable,
hard-headed discussion of the Navy's proposal might have
engineered some practical Organization for national defense.
No such discussion ever took place, and, in fact, Roosevelt's
letter was not even acknowledged. The letter and its enclosure
went, by mistake, to the State Department's Division of Latin
American Affairs. After some misspent months in that Division's
liHng cabinets, the document was interred in the general records,
never opened by the Secretary of State. ^^ Indeed, when I
found the original of Roosevelt's letter in the State Department
archives, the blueprint was stapled to it, closed, and, as far as
I could teil, the staple had never been removed, the blueprint
never unfolded. Such was the fate of the first proposal for a
National Security Council.
The second proposal came on December 7, 1921, this time
sponsored jointly by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary
of War. Considerably less pretentious than the original Navy
blueprint, this Joint proposal offered only the idea of collabora-
tion between the State Department and the Joint Board of
the Army and the Navy. But the reasoning in the Service
secretaries' letter closely resembled Roosevelt's.
They put forward three proposals. The State Department
should designate "a responsible oflftcial" to sit in with the Joint
Board when "questions involving national pohcy are under
library is described in Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal (Boston,
1954), pp. 19-20.
^^Memo, Division of Latin American AfTairs to Index Bureau, July 21, 1919,
110.7/56, State Dept. Arch.
No. 2]
POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN U. S.
169
consideration." For similar discussions, one or more State
Department people should sit in with the Joint Board's Planning
Committee. Finally, the State Department should "refer
to the Joint Board those national policies which may require
the Potential or dynamic support of the Army and Navy"
and find out "whether the Army and Navy as at that time
constituted and disposed are capable of supporting the policy
in question. . , .All such opinions and recommendations of
the Joint Board", the Secretaries added, "will be referred
to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy for approval."^^
This letter at least reached the desk of Secretary of State
Charles Evans Hughes, but Hughes brushed it into his "Out"
basket, noting: "This appears to me to be in substance a Sug-
gestion that at least provisionally matters of foreign policy
be submitted to the Joint Board. I question the advisability
of this." Taking their lead from Hughes, the undersecretary
and the assistant secretaries questioned its advisability even
more seriously. Consequently, Hughes suavely replied: "The
only officials of the State Department who can speak for it
with authority on questions of national policy are the Secretary
and Undersecretary of State, and it is impossible, in the existing
circumstances, for either of them to undertake this additional
duty."i8
Since War and Navy Department officials believed their
proposal to be of great importance, they refused to accept the
Secretary of State 's negative reply. They countered with a
new Suggestion : the Joint Board should inform the State Depart-
ment "whenever a subject comes before them for consideration
which in their opinion is interwoven with the international
policies of the United States." The Secretary of State or his
representative could then attend the Joint Board's meeting.
To this proposal the Secretary of State gave perfunctory agree-
ment, thus providing the Army and Navy with a valve for
^^ (Orig.) 110.7/123, State Dept. Arch.
^^ Hughes to Fletcher, Dec. 12, 1921 (orig.); F. M. Dearing to Fletcher, Dec. 13,
1921 (orig.); W. J. Carr to Fletcher, Dec. 22, 1921 (orig.); Dearing to Fletcher,
Jan. 4, 1922 (orig.), noted "(Mr. Fletcher concurs: JBS)"; Hughes to E. Denby
and J. W. Weeks. Jan. 17, 1922 (certified carbon)— all in 110.7/123, State Dept.
Arch.
170
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
startiiig a flow of military-political discussion.^^ But the
military leaders did not open tliis valve for over thirteen years.
Perhaps this long delay resulted from the series of slights
administered to the mihtary departments by the Secretary
of State diiring the Washington Conference on Naval Limita-
tion. Preparing for that Conference, Secretary Hughes "worked
closely with the Navy," his biographer says, and "was scrupulous
in exploring the Navy's point of view while insisting that civiHan
statesmanship rather than naval strategy should guide the
Conference."-^ The General Board, anxious to push the Navy's
ideas, presented Hughes with long, hard-thought essays on the
questions apt to come up for negotiation. The Board advised
that the United States fleet should equal the combined fleets
of Britain and Japan, cautioned against any let-up in the naval
building program, and portrayed the vital importance of fortify-
ing Oahu, Guam and Manila Bay. But Hughes rejected each
item of the Board's advice. In his opening speech to the Con-
ference, he not only proposed a 5:5:3 ratio among the three
naval Powers but also offered to scrap thirty American capital
ships. Later he proposed a general agreement not to fortify
islands in the Pacific." Undoubtedly, Hughes based these
Stands on careful reasoning and broad advice, but the Navy's
feehngs were badly hurt, and a sense of resentment over the
Washington Conference colored the writings of Navy and Army
officers for decades.
As a result, these officers became even more circumspect than
before in deahng with political questions. Furthermore, they
feil altogether from public favor, as, during the twenties, news-
papers and magazines drummed disillusionment, isolationism,
and new forms of pacifism and anti-militarism. Whereas to
Secretary Hughes a Suggestion for political-military coUaboration
had seemed only imprudent, to either of his successors a similar
Suggestion would havc seemed rash and startling. When
Hoover's Secretary of State was preparing for the new naval
19 Denby and Weeks to Hughes, Jan. 25, 1923 (orig.); Memo, Fletcher to Hughes,
Feb. 20, 1922 (orig.); Hughes to Weeks and Denby, Mar. 14, 1922 (certified carbon)
—all in 110.7/124, State Dept. Arch.
'° Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes (New York, 1950), II, 460.
2' Ibid., pp. 460. 462. 477.
No. 2] POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN U. S.
171
Conference of 1930, for instance, he rejected out of band sugges-
tions from the General Board and took with him to the Con-
ference only one uniformed ad viser, an admiral "carefully selected
. . . by the administration's civilian leaders," one who "took
a different position . . . from most of his colleagues."^^
During these years, nevertheless, the general stafi's were
improving their minds by cloistered study of possible wars,
and junior officers in the armed Services were building friendly
ties with their counterparts in the Foreign Service. They were
exchanging intelligence data, a practice started soon after
World War I, and they were meeting on various interdepart-
mental boards, like the Radio Advisory Committee and the
committee on Strategie raw materials. Early in the twenties,
too, Foreign Service officers began to attend the Army and Navy
War Colleges and to give lectures before War College classes.^^
Thus the future heads of divisions and branches within the
three departments laid a foundation for later Cooperation on
questions of policy.
Over this foundation a structure began to rise shortly after
Franklin D. Roosevelt became President. His Secretary of
State, Cordell HĂĽll, found himself deahng with a newly barbarous
Germany, an emboldened Italy, and a hostile Japan. As
HĂĽll stated to the Pearl Harbor investigators :
. . .soon after I came into the State Department, when I would
be talking with the representatives of the thugs at the head of
governments abroad. . .they would look at me in the face but I
soon discovered that they were looking over my Shoulder at our
Navy and our Army and that our diplomatic strength. . .goes
up or down with their estimate of what that amounts to.^^
^^ Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War
(New York, 1947), p. 168.
23 Memo, A. Dulles to "Mr. Merle-Smith", Sept. 21, 1920 (orig.), 110.72/8,
State Dept. Arch. J. C. Grew to E. Young, Oct. 18, 1924 (orig.); Davis (Asst.
See. of War) to Grew, Oct. 20, 1924 (orig.); Grew to Davis, Oct. 23, 1924 (certified
carbon)— all in 110.72/29, State Dept. Arch. J. M. Wainwright (Acting See. of
War) to Hughes, July 8, 1922 (orig.); W. Phillips to Weeks, Sept. 1, 1922 (certified
carbon)— both in 110.72/13, State Dept. Arch. Rear Adm. W. V. Pratt to Grew,
Feb. 25, 1926 (orig.); Grew to Pratt, Mar. 11, 1926 (carbon); T. Dennett to Grew,
Mar. 8, 1926 (orig.)- all in 110.75/20-21, State Dept. Arch.
Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Invesligation of the Pearl Harbor
Attack, 79 Gong., 1 sess. (hereinafter cited as Pearl Harbor Hearings), Pt. II, p. 455.
172
PO LIT IC AL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
Consequently, HuU took more interest than his predecessors
in military plans and opinions. Preparing for yet another
naval Conference, he asked the Navy to detail its wishes, and
he sent to London, not just a "carefully selected" admiral,
but the Chief of Naval Operations and a sizable band of naval
officers. In the same year, too, he named a high State Depart-
ment officer to sit in with the Joint Board's Planning Committee
for a reexamination of America's mihtary position in the Far
East.^^ Early in his term, thus, HĂĽll began to seat military
and political thinkers at the same tables.
As Europe's war drums beat more insistently. HĂĽll drew the
State, War, and Navy Departments closer together. After
suggesting special Conferences on Axis infiltration of Latin
America, he proposed a standing interdepartmental committee
to consider, among other things, "matters of national poHcy
affecting the three departments." He nominated Undersecre-
tary Sumner Welles to represent the State Department. The
President chose the Chief of Naval Operations and the Army
Chief of Staff to be the committee 's other members, and this
three-man group took the name, Standing Liaison Committee.
Thus was formed the first American agency for regulär political-
military consultation on foreign policy.^®
The Standing Liaison Committee lasted until 1943. Though
it handled chiefly questions of hemisphere defense and Good
Neighbor relations, it still gave the military chiefs an opportunity
to learn the trends of policy thinking in the State Department.
Later, too, it gave the State Department's second officer a
Chance to learn highly secret Army-Navy plans for possible
war, plans formerly withheld from State Department eyes.^^
Rarely, however, did questions of policy come up for the
Committee 's discussion, perhaps because the members had
little time for talk. The military chiefs were busy, fabricating
fleets, armies and air forces out of raw metal and rawer men,
^^ George H. Dern and Claude A. Swanson to Cordell HĂĽll, Nov. 26, 1935
(carbon) ; Hüll to Dern, Nov. 27, 1935 (orig.) — both in WPD 3887, General Records
of the War Department, National Archives.
^* Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington,
1950), pp. 89-92.
27 Ibid., p. 90.
No. 21
POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN U. S,
173
while the undersecretary and his department were swirling
through diplomatic crises that absorbed their time and powers.
So the Liaison Committee failed to march with the perilous
times.
In only one instance did the Liaison Committee handle an
important issue of policy, and then it patched together a com-
promise instead of building a Solution. The issue came before
the Committee in the summer of 1940, when Hitler was looking
acquisitively at the Vichy fleet. The Army and Navy, fearing
that Germany might seize control of the Mediterranean, pro-
posed a shift of the American battle fleet from the Pacific to
the Atlantic. But the State Department disagreed. More
fearful of a Japanese attack on Southeast Asia than of German
naval expansion and aware that Britain held the same fear,
the State Department believed the fleet more effective, stationed
at Pearl Harbor, where it might deter Japan from rash aggression.
Since the undersecretary and the military members all stood
fast behind their differing views, the Liaison Committee's
decision solved nothing. The fleet, they agreed, "should be
withdrawn from Hawaii only if the Germans actually secured
control of the French fleet." If that happened, of course, the
issue would still exist and would simply be more urgent. ^^
Other than this decision, the Liaison Committee accomplished
Httle that touched the great issues drawing the United States
toward double war. After November 1940, furthermore, its
functions shifted to other committee and Council tables. A new
Secretary of War started weekly Conferences with his State
and Navy counterparts.^^ The President began to deal directly
with his Chiefs of staff, by-passing not only the State Depart-
ment but also the civilian Secretaries of War and the Navy.
By the autumn of 1941, in the tempestuous twilight before
Pearl Harbor, the President was convening a War Council, made
up of his State, War, and Navy Secretaries, and his chiefs of
staff.30
2^ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-
1940 (New York. 1952), pp. 596-597.
2^ Ibid., p. 10; Watson, Chief of Staff , p. 91 ; Stimson in Pearl Harbor Hearings. Pt.
XXIX. p. 2065.
^0 Pearl Harbor Hearings, Pt. XXIX, p. 2066.
174
PO LIT IC AL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
I
No. 2] POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN U. S.
175
Despite the resemblance of this War Council to the present-
day National Security Council, it hardly served as a palette
for the mixing of military and political views. Rather, it
provided the President with a platform from which to announce
decisions already reached with the help of the chiefs of staff.
After November 5, 1941, the War Council spent its time devising
ways to carry out the Strategie concept long ago devised by the
Joint Board and now ratified by the President: "War between
the United States and Japan should be avoided while building
up the defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan
attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the
United States is of very great importance/'^i Then, when
war broke out, the President stopped inviting HĂĽll to the War
Council's meetings, and the Council, while it lasted, became
nothing more than a board of strategy.
The idea of coördinating strategy and policy seemed, indeed,
to die out with the onset of war. The President began to
consult only with his chiefs of stafif and with a few para-military
officials like Harry Hopkins. Not only was the Secretary of
State excluded from meetings of the War Council, but he was
left at home when the President went abroad to meet British
and Russian leaders and even left outside when Roosevelt
met with Churchill in Washington and Quebec.^^ During
most of the war, as a result, the State Department became
almost an auxiliary arm of the military Services.
Uniformed officers meanwhile filled the chairs left vacant by
diplomats. Eisenhower, Stilwell and Wedemeyer negotiated
with allied governments. The Service chieftains, reorganized
as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met face to face with their allied
counterparts and negotiated agreements that were, in eflFect,
mihtary treaties, requiring for ratification only the counter-
signature of the President. Although the Joint Chiefs con-
tinually disclaimed any authority in political affairs, their
decisions, in fact, directed American poHcy. When they con-
cluded, for example, that Russian aid was essential to victory
^^ Ibid., Vi. XIV, p. 1062; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The
Undeclared War, 1940-1941 (New York, 1953), p. 846, and chapters xxvi-xxviii.
32
The Memoirs of Cordeil HĂĽll (New York, 1948), II, 1109-1111.
in the Far East, they said, in effect, that American diplomacy
should subordinate other aims in order to bring about a Russian
declaration of war on Japan. Had professional diplomats
desired to challenge this ruling, they would have been unable
to do so. In 1944, as a matter of fact. when the State Depart-
ment wanted the Dumbarton Oaks conferees to begin discus-
sions of post-war boundaries, the Joint Chiefs checked any
such discussions.33 Quarreis among the Allies might result,
the Chiefs asserted, and Russia might find cause for delaying
her entry into the Pacific war. Thus, during World War II,
the strategists took command, and the military-State Depart-
ment relation was reversed. No longer were the military leaders
seeking parity with diplomats; on the contrar3^ the diplomats
were looking for space alongside the chiefs of staff.
Not until the last year of World War II did the State Depart-
ment begin to regain its lost Status. Then the need for mihtary
government directives and surrender terms caused the creation
of the State- War-Navy Coördinating Committee, the National
Security Council's immediate ancestor.'^
This Coördinating Committee, composed of assistant secre-
taries, prepared the plans for occupying Germany, Austria and
Japan, and pondered, in addition, many other questions of
post-war pohcy. Since most or all of these questions involved
fleets and forces in the theaters of war, the Coördinating Com-
mittee had to clear its decisions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and officers representing the Joint Chiefs sat in with the Co-
ördinating Committee's stajGF groups. Before the Committee's
recommendations went to the Secretary of State and the Presi-
dent, therefore, any differences with the Joint Chiefs had already
been discovered and explored.
^^See Department of State, Post-War Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945
(1949), pp. 276. 660-661.
^ Howard W. Moseley, Charles W. McCarthy, and Alvin F. Richardson, "The
State-War-Navy Coördinating Committee", Bulletin of the U. S. Department of
State. XIII (Nov. 11. 1945). 745-747. Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post:
The Operations Division (Washington. 1951). pp. 326-330. John Carter Vincent,
"The Post-War Period in the Far East", State Dept. Bulletin, XIII (Oct. 21. 1945).
644-648; "Germany and the Occupation", ibid., XIV (May 26. 1946), 910-914;
John H. Hilldring, Velma H. Cassidy, "American Policy in Occupied Areas",
ibid., XV (July 14, 1946), 47-48, (Aug. 18, 1946), 291-296.
176
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
Such a process brought forth, as an example, the Committee's
recommendations on post-war aid to China. Had these rec-
ommendations been compounded by the State Department
alone, Herbert Feis teils us in his recent book, The China Tangle,
they "would have subordinated the program of military aid
to the satisfaction of . . . political ideas"— democratic govern-
ment and political unity for China.'^ Recommendations drafted
by the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, on the other hand, would
have fixed on two different objectives — territorial unity for
China and military strength for the Chinese government. Thus,
while the State Department thought of aid for China as a means
of exerting pressure on the Kuomintang, to force a poHtical
strengthening of the NationaHst government, the armed forces
tended to think of this aid solely as a means for strengthening
the battle capabilities of the Nationalist forces.
Since the choice between these points of view depended
at all times upon detailed, expert information, the State Depart-
ment and the military had to reconcile, or at least define, their
differences before going to the White House with a program
for immediate post-war aid for China. The State- War-Navy
Coordinating Committee was an obvious arena where these
views might be tested against each other.
The State Department drew up a Statement of China policy,
emphasizing the poHtical objectives of unity and democratic
government. Although this Statement of poHcy has not been
printed, an earlier model of it is visible in the MacArthur hearings,
and the views of the State Department's chief Far Eastern
planner, John Carter Vincent, have been published at length
in the records of the McCarran committee.^« In the final
proposals of the State- War- Navy Coordinating Committee,
quoted in Feis's book, one can therefore detect phrases written
in with stubby blue pencils by the War and Navy Departments
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff :
36 Princeton, 1953. p. 374.
^^ Hearings before Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, U. S. Senate, 82 Cong., 1 sess., "Military Situation in the Far Fast". Pt. IV,
pp. 2929-2930. Hearings before Subcommittee on Internal Security, Committee on
Judiciary, U. S. Senate. 82 Cong., 1 sess.. "Institute of Pacific Relations".
No. 2]
POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN U. S.
177
The achievement of [American] objectives in China requires a
friendly, unified, independent nation with a stable government
resting, insojar as pradicable, on the freely expressed support of the
Chinese people. . . . The following should be established as
policies of the United States: ....
(b) To assist and advise China in the developme^it of modern armed
forces, ground, sea and air, for the . . .
(1) Maintenance of internal peace and security in China including
the liherated areas of Manchuria and Formosa. . . .^"^
One can see also the unaltered will of the State Department
in such a sentence as: "The extent to which political stability
is being achieved in China under a unified, fully representative
government is regarded by the U. S. as a basic consideration
which will at all times govern the furnishing of economic, mili-
tary, or other assistance to that nation. ..."
Thus were political and military views brought into line,
through the agency of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Com-
mittee. That line admittedly jogged and wavered. And
one can argue that events in the Far Hast would have followed
a diff'erent course had the opinions of one department or the
other prevailed. It remains true, nevertheless, that the State
Department and the military departments disagreed, and this
disagreement was due, not to a personal diff"erence between
John Carter Vincent and some general or admiral, but to a
real difference between political and military perspectives.
General Marshall, while Chief of Staff, opposed the State De-
partment's idea of using aid to promote reforms in the Chinese
government. Then, when he became Secretary of State, he
defended this very idea against challenges voiced by the new
Chiefs of staff.^^ Such real disagreements between the State
and military departments had to be reconciled in some place
like the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, or such a
committee had to define the points at issue for the President's
adjudication.
But the Committee had its limitations. It suffered, in the
^^ Feis, China Tangle, p. 375 (italics mine).
U. S. State Dept., United States Rotations with China with Special Reference to
the Period 1944-1949 (1949), pp. 251-252. 255-256. 269-273.
#
178
POLITJCAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
first place, from its inability to make policy. Although the
Committee was capable of rapid staff work, as evidenced in
its eight-day fabrication of a workable surrender instrument
for Japan, ^^ its mill of subcommittees hummed uselessly in
the spring of 1945 when Marshai Tito threatened to march
against Allied forces in Trieste. The question of American
action simply feil beyond the powers of the assistant secretaries
who made up the Coordinating Committee; and the Trieste
decision had to be made by the President and his Cabinet
Secretaries with httle or no preliminary staff study. â– *"
In the second place, the Committee went to work only when
a question was referred to it by one of the departments. As
a result, it failed to handle some questions well within its pur-
view. The four-Power arrangements for occupation of Berlin
were worked out hastily by soldiers and diplomats in the Euro-
pean Theater and approved by a nod from President Truman."*^
The Coordinating Committee never had a chance to examine
these arrangements, and no provision was made for guaranteeing
access to the city.
The nation needed the Coordinating Committee, but it also
needed a policy-making agency with the power to review all
questions. President Truman fuUy realized this need, and so
did his Cabinet Secretaries, particularly Secretary of the Navy
James Forrestal. Within two years after World War II, con-
sequently, Mr. Truman, Mr. Forrestal, and a staff of experts
had worked out a plan for a National Security Council. Bedded
in the unification act of 1947, this plan received the approval
of Congress, and the United States acquired a regulär, legally
established, cabinet-level agency for the coördination of political
and military views on foreign policy.
Fifty years of growth and experiment lay behind this Council,
and additional years of experiment lay ahead of it. The original
Council showed signs, some said, of being dominated by its
military members. As a result, Congress changed the member-
^^ Hearings. "Institute of Pacific Relations", passim (see index under "E. H.
Dooraan", "J. C. Vincent").
**> Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era (New York, 1952), II, 1474-1485.
" Speech by Mr. Truman, New York Times, Oct. 5, 1952, p. 82. Speech by
Mr. Eisenhower, ibid., Oct. 8, 1952, p. 23.
No. 2] POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSULTATION IN U, S.
179
ship in 1949, dropping out the Secretaries of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. And the composition of the Council has since
been altered several times, by executive order or simply by
invitation. Thus, for example, President Eisenhower has
invited his Secretary of the Treasury to sit with every session
of the Council, so that dollar costs may be reckoned with political
and military costs.
These alterations, of course, reflect a change in the Council's
functions. Still the patching and mending is all applied in one
place, on the National Security Council, and with one aim—
to perfect that Council. Instead of replacing one experiment
with another, in other words, we are striving now to improve
a working model.
Mechanically, of course, the National Security Council is
still in its scraps-of-wire and bits-of-chewing-gum stage. While
its general purposes are clear, its specific functions are not.
There seems real doubt, particularly, whether the Council
is meant to resolve differences of opinion or simply to bring them
into the open. Is it to copy the British Committee of Imperial
Defense, where variant ideas are exposed to endless debate,
or Japan 's pre-war Liaison Conference, where decision was the
goal, and difference often resulted in resignation? Which direc-
tion the National Security Council means to take is, at this
writing, far from sure.
A reflection of this uncertainty has been the tendency of the
Council and its predecessors to work like church Councils or
party platform committees, rather than action groups. Com-
promises have been forged, it seems, simply for an inner feeling
of righteousness and an outward appearance of unanimity.
In the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee paper on
China quoted earlier, for example, the State Department and
the military departments did not really reconcile differences.
They simply agreed on an ambiguous formula. With easier
consciences, thus, each department could do what it wanted
to do in the first place. Forrestal's notes on subsequent National
Security Council discussions, testimony at the MacArthur
hearings, and Chalmers Roberts' reports in the Washington
Post and Times Herald on the Indo-China and Quemoy mix-ups
of 1954 suggest that there have been later instances of meaning-
180
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
less compromise.'^^ Realization of the need for a coördinating
committee has, in other words, sometimes obscured the truth
that decision-making can become more realistic, but it cannot
become easier. Coördination is no Substitute for thought.
Neither has the problem of coördination itself been fully solved.
While executive departments may treat one another with
increasing frankness, the executive brauch and the Congress
retain the relationship of unfriendly sovereignties. Beside
the monumental problem of harmonizing executive and con-
gressional foreign policies, the relatively recent and minor
problem of harmonizing executive views shades into insignifi-
cance. Even the simplest questions of executive-congressional
coördination present absurd difiiculty. "If you teil Congress
nothing," as James Reston remarked, "they go fishing; if you
promise nothing, they go fishing; if you teil them all, they go
wild."^^ And, as Hanson Baldwin states the larger question:
"Are national poUcies ever really forged in secrecy and by a
small group? Do they not require the support and substantia-
tion of Congress and public opinion?"**
These unsettled questions of function and competence, rela-
tions with Congress, and relation to public opinion ought not
to cloud the progress that has been made. A committee that
effects some poHtical-military coördination has come into
existence. Fifty years ago such a committee could not openly
have existed in Washington. Had it existed in secret, it would
very Hkely have been ineffective. During World War I, when a
need for coördination was recognized, actual coördination was at
best haphazard, and the new crises attending World War II saw
one experiment tumble after another. The National Security
Council is thus the product of a long and painf ul history. What-
ever its present inadequacies and whatever the trials that lie
ahead, it is still an institution. It answers an enduring need, and
it is likely to be a permanent feature of American government.
Krnest R. May
Harvard University
^ Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), pp. 454, 517-518.
Roberts synthesized his newspaper articles in "The Day We Didn't Go to War".
The Reporter, XI (Sept. 14. 1954), and "Battle on 'The Rim of Hell': President vs.
War Hawks", ibid. (Dec. 16, 1954).
« Quoted in Millis, Forrestal Diaries. p. 444. ** Letter to the author.
I
COMMUNISM VS. PEASANTRY IN THE
SOVIET UNION
THE dramatic declaration by G. M. Malenkov, read at the
Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February
8, 1955, in which he asked to be released from the duties
of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, must again attract
attention to one of the most crucial problems still unresolved
in the USSR: the relation between the Communist Party and
the peasantry. In his Statement Malenkov explained his
desire to retire from the leadership of the Soviet government
by referring to the unsatisfactory State of affairs that had arisea
in agriculture — a State of affairs for which he was "guilty and
responsible".
The real reasons for Mr. Malenkov's resignation are unknown
here at the present time, and it is very possible that the real
causes which prompted his decision are of quite another nature.
Still it is evident that the State of affairs in agriculture would
never have been chosen as an explanation for his step if great
inefficiency in this field did not exist at all. Thus, his declaration
is significant as an acknowledgement of the lasting difficulties
on the agricultural front.
In the Resolution of the Central Committee of the USSR
Communist Party of March 2, 1954, taken on N. S. Khrush-
chev's report, it was disclosed that the growing needs of the
Population for grain production were not met in 1953. Despite
the fact that the total sowing area was increased by 6,800,000
hectares^ in 1953 over 1940, that sown to grain decreased by
3,800,000 hectares; to grain feed crops, by 6,800,000 hectares;
to groats crops, by 1,300,000 hectares; and to leguminous grain
by 800,000 hectares. It also was stated in the Resolution that
collective farms did not fulfill the 1953 plan for livestock breeding
and that an important decrease in the number of cows took
place in many regions of the Soviet Union in 1953.^
^ One hectare equals 2.471 acres.
2 Pravda, March 6, 1954.
181
182
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
[Vol. LXX
Strong measures have been taken to increase agricultural
production in the face of this failure of the peasantry to co-
operate with the established plans. The Party Central Commit-
tee and the USSR Council of Ministers decided to sow grain
over 28,000,000 to 30,000,000 hectares of virgin and idle land
in 1956. According to Khrushchev, more than 3,500,000
hectares of virgin land were sown in 1954 and more than 17,000-
000 plowed up for 1955.^
One hundred thousand Komsomol (Young Communist League)
members have been mobihzed for work on this land equipped
with 120,000 tractors and 10,000 combines.'» It is easy to
imagine under what strained conditions these young people
work and live in the desert. It is, however, very significant
that the Soviet government did not dare to repeat the experi-
ment of 1928-1932, the collectivization years, by forcible shifting
of peasants from other parts of the USSR to the virgin land.
For the herculean task in view, it had to take young people
inexperienced in agricultural work.
The tremendous extension of the sown area and the use of
non-peasants for the work on it are other indications that the
Soviet government is unable to force the collective farmers
to work more efficiently on the existing arable land, that it
cannot overcome the passive but permanent resistance of the
peasantry in spite of repressive measures taken to that effect.
One of the measures was the increase in number of compulsory
workdays to be spent by farmers on kolkhoz land.^ Indicative
of the tension is also the new law sharply increasing punishment
for the damaging of fields: every time the Soviet government
increases punishment for a criminal action it is a sign that such
actions have been perpetrated on a larger scale.
On the other hand, the Soviet government has tried to relax
the tension and improve relations with the peasantry. In
» Interview given by Khrushchev to Professor John Bernal on September 25,
1954 and published in Pravda on December 24, 1954.
* Khrushchev asserted that 150.000 city dwellers were sent out for this work
m 1954 and 165,000 will follow in 1955. New York Times, March 13. 1955. p. 1.
See N. Nazartsev in SeVskoye khozyaystvo (Agriculture), August 31. 1954.
A kolkhoz is a peasant collective farm.
EHPLOYES BACK
INJURY PĂ„YRISES
Associated Industries Stam
Also Covers Dewey's Plan
for Sickness Benefits
THE NEW YORK TIMEsj
of Mediocrity'
Ăźy WARREN WEAVER Jr.
Special to The New York Times.
ALB AN Y, Jan. 17— The state's
largest Organization of employers
threw its weight today behind
Govemor Dewey's plan for in-
creasing the maximum benefits
available to workers under the
Workmen's Compensation and
Sickness Disabihty programs.
Associated Industries of New
York State, Inc., which repre-
sents about 1,600 companies in
manufacturing and other forms
of business, announced support
of the Govemor's plan, although
the entire cost of the increases.i
about $20,000,000, will be borne
by employers.
Joseph R. Shaw, executive vice
President of the Organization,
Said that "we believe the pro-
posed increases are justifiable
for bona fide injured workers
who become disabled on the Job."
"We also feel increases are
justified for the non-occupational
Idisability maximum benefits," he
ladded.
Although Associated Industries
Inormally has been in the fore-
front of efforts to reduce the cost
[of Workmen's Compensation and
allied programs, its stand of to-
' day was not unexpected. Before
jpresenting his program to the
[Legislature last week, Governor
Dewey cleared it with officers of
the Organization.
Dewey Recommendations
In a special message Tuesday,
ithe Governor urged that the
laximum weekly Workmen's
Kompensation benefits be in-
k^reased to $36 from $32 and that
Ihe comparable Sickness Dis-
[bility benefits be increased to
J3 from $30.
He said that he hoped the in-
f-eased cost to employers would
)e absorbed and a net reduction
costs achieved " as a result of
le current Moieland Act inves-
ration into the cost of the
)rkmen's Compensation pro-
lam.
[r. Shaw made it clear today
>,t the stand of Associated In-
^tries for higher benefits did
mean that the Organization"
ild relax its efforts to improve
administration of the Work-
In's Compensation Law and re-
rce its Overall cost to em-
>yers.
^Employers have contended for
)me time that the cost of New
l^ork's program for reimbursing
Yorkers injured on the job was
luch higher than in other states,
lus penalizing business in the
State and making competition In-
;reasingly difficult.
Bills embodying the Govemor's
_)rogram were introduced in the
[Legislature last week. They are
lexpected to have smooth sailing,
disturbed only by probable Demo-
cratic attempts to make the ben-
efits even larger.
^onuft Urged
Blames Uninspired Leadership
'Present Low Morale' in the Navy
By HANSON W. BALDWIN
A letter from a junior naval
officer criticizing the "tides of
mediocrity and negativism" that
beset leadership in the Navy
epitomizes one of the funda-
mental causes for poor morale
in the armed Services.
I Poor or mediocre leadership is
one of the basic reasons for lack
of psychic incentive and positive
morale, as the Naval correspond-
ent emphasizes.
***** present low morale,"
he writes, "is due to a lack of
inspired leadership from above.
I have found httle of which to
be proud in my contact with the
more senior officers I have met.
Not that many of them are com-
pletely incompetent but just that
the real leaders are so few as to
stand out like isolated land-
marks.
"And these few seem to fight
an ever losing battle against the
tides of mediocrity and negativ-
ism. But the truly dishearten-
ing thing is that the mediocre
continues to flourish, seemingly
never detected by their own su-
periors, and thus giving the' im-
pression that the higher echelons
are also composed of mediocre
nonenities.
•Incompetents Are Promoted'
"•ym
Tfl panicuiaT*, the processes
of selection do not appear to be
weeding out the incompetent. It
is the impression of most of the
young regulär officers with
whom I have discussed this mat-
ter, Academy [United States Na-
val Academy] men for the most
part, that the good men are
being passed over while demon-
strated incompetents are being
promoted * * *.
"Another source of discontent
is the lack of responsibility in so
many junior billets. This is un-
doubtedly the result of the war-
time inflation in rank, and is
especially prevelant in the ED
[Engineering Duty] group. The
choice billets are monopolized by
officers one or two grades senior
to the billets, while many Juniors
are filling uaö«fteÄgarvsupernu-
limerary iobs * * ♦ . *
i| 'fliraligely enough, as an ED
officer I feel that the straight
line officer is now being discrim-
inated against much too strongly.
ED officers as a body care little
for the needs of the fleet, seldom
even giving lip service to the
maxim that the shore establish-
ment exists to serve operating
forces * ♦ ♦ .
"This sort of thing gripes me
as an ex-line officer. How much
more must it gall the career line
officer. I would gladly take the
Star off my own arm (and replace
it with special insignia for special
duty) as well as that of the rest
of the shore-based specialists and
women officers (Waves) if it
would thereby help to restore
some of the prestige and author-
ity of the line * * * ."
Pendulum Swung Too Far
This officer who, of course, sees
only one aspect of the Services'
morale problem, nevertheless is
sound in the points he makes —
though they are not inclusive and
one or two are too generalized.
The pendulum in the Navy —
like that in the Army — swung
too far after World War II, and
the authority and prestige of the
seagoing line officer has been too
much diminished. Keeping the
balance true between the shore
specialist and the men who run
the fleets is a perennial problem
of all navies; Nelson and his offi-
cers faced it.
Today, the staf f expert and the
specialist have too many preroga-
tives and too much authority at
the expense of those for whom
he exists — the seagoing branch.
There should be a clear dif f erenti-
ation in insignia between women
officers and shore specialists —
and the fighting, seagoing com-
mand or line branch.
The specialists and the sup-
port group exist for only one pur-
pose— the fighting fleets, and the
men who handle the ships in ac-
tion must have the authority ajid
the prestige.
The correspondent is correct,
too, in noting the mediocrity of
leadership and the inadequate re-
sults of selection for promotion in
junior ranks. The leadership
weaknesses are the most serious
but this Problem is part of a vi-
cious circle.
Good leaders are leaving the
Services because of the decreased
psychic and tangible incentives
to a Service career; the mediocre
who lack the ambition, the cour-
age and the intellectual qualifica-
tions to carve out a civilian ca-
reer remain in the Services and
thus create greater discontent
among the good officers under
them.
Selection failures have some —
but by no means the major— in-
fluence in this trend. There Is no
foolproof promotion System. The
Navy's system probably makes
its maximum errors in selecting
junior grade officers, for the
numbers to be considered are so
great that no selection board, no
matter how conscientious, can do
fĂĽll justice to each individual.
What is most lacking in all
Services is a sure and definite and
relatively rapid — though fair —
means of getting rid of the bor-
derline incompetent, as well as
the obvious incompetent, for the
greater good of the whole.
SUBWĂ„Y PLAN All
AT ENDING i SNA|
Continued From Page 1
local trains are served from
arate platforms at each side.
Direct connections to the
tion mezzanine would be bi|
from the new city Coliseum, W
is to be built at Columbus Cir
Additional traffic resulting fij
the redevelopment of the ai
and free transfer Privileges
tween the IND and I. R. T.:
Fifty-ninth Street will make^
express Station necessary, the
thority said.
The cost of the project fi
been estimated at $5,000,000.
Tlie next step in the West Sij
I. R. T. improvement would
the conversion of the presel
Seventy-second Street stati(
where extremely narrow plaj
forms are regarded as hazardoi
to a local stop. Entrance
the Station would be from tl
sidewalks instead of the presei
building in the center of tl
Street, where Broadway, Amstel
dam Avenue and Seventy-secoi
Street converge.
This project's cost has bee
estimated at $1,000,000.
At Ninety-sixth Street a crosi
over of southbound Broadwaj
and Lenox Avenue trains wou
be relocated to the south of tll
Station to eliminate congestion
and the Station platform woull
be lengthened — all at a cost oj
$5,170,000. The local Station aj
Ninety-first Street would b|
closed after the rebuilding a'
Ninety-sixth Street is completec
Problem of Power Plants
On the subject of the transĂĽ
power plants, the Transit Author]
ity told the Board of Estimat^
they either would have to be soll
or $176,500,000 would have to b]
spent to modernize them. 1
The plants are at West Fiftyl
ninth Street and East Seventyj
fourth Street, Manhattan, anc
Kent Avenue, Brooklyn. The proi
posal to seil them to Consolidated
Edison has been under consider]
ation since 1946.
"One accidental failure," th<
authority said, "may cripple ai
entire [subway] division for an
long as six months."
Should the plants be sold, th^
authority proposes to use thi
$176,500,000 rehabilitation func
thus released to build a previous
ly announced new subway line-
with a new tunnel under the Eaj
River at Seventy-sixth Street-
from Fifty-seventh Street ar_
Avenue of the Americas to Regl
Park, Queens. [
Tracks of the Long Island Rai
Road from Woodside to Regl
Park would be acquired as pari
of the project at a cost estil
mated at $13,700,000
oposak
Dr. Mayo Declines to Run
ROCHESTER. Minn., Jan. 17
(JF)— Dr. Charles W. Ma
clining to seek the UniJ
^s within seven
late of its sub-
IROPOSAL
Provision of a
international
conflicts with
shall not be of
Ict.
In international
than a ti^aty
jctive as intei-
United States
the Congress.
ROPOSAL
fter the ratifica-
Iment no treaty
heme law of the
je in pursuance
lion.
Provision of a
international
conflicts with
shall not be of
^t.
fo international
than a treaty
ictive as inter-
lited States ex-
Islation.
|.ny vote in the
istion of ratify-
be determined
nays.
only Congress.
Icould intervene.
lerged from the
jonsultation re-
[e had been "no
lying neverthe-
not reject any
|)0sal.
reported that
the week-end
lusive, too, but
jeek the Repub-
)ld adopt, how-
5ubstantially all
[oposal.
IS one of the
LS, for the first
|orgia colleague,
Russell, Sen-
)hnson of Texas,
Senate leader,
In on the Demo-
table.
lican side were
id, Homer Fer-
in, chairman of
mblican Pohcy
]ugene D, Milli-
Ichairman of the
)lican organiza-
mference.
)lain that Sena-
|d Russell, who,
control Demo-
[he Senate, were
^alter," aS the
lt.
ring notice that,
\s wanted a com-
)uld at once de-
and put "some-
In the way of an
|y would do well
Jorge text.
)ses Ground
J Situation tonight,
llways by the fact
lional amendment
)proval of two-
/^oting\in the Sen-
If ReplwjBntatives
[ESERYE NEGLECT '
LAID TO PENTAGON
Senate Unit Urges Hearings
to Learn What the Trouble
Is and How to Solve It
Islatur«
Itates,
alreaj
three-
Ithis :
;^arly
ld$ to
By HAROLD B. HINTOX
Special to The New York Times.
WASHINGTON, Jan. 29— Th«
Senate Preparedness subcommit-
tce charged the Defense Depart-
ment today with neglect of the
country's Reserve forces.
It proposed a series of piiblia
t.rarings to determine what ia
the trouble and, if possible, what
to do about it.
The subcommittee members ara
Senators Leverett Saltonstall of
Massachusetts and Styles Bridges
of New Hampshire, Republican.«:,
and Richard B. Russell, Democrat
of Georgia.
Mr. Saltonstall is chairman of
the Armed Services Committee,
to which the recommendation for
a public airing of the Reserve
Lutuation was addressed, which
Senators Bridges and Russell are
its ranking majority and min-
ority members, respectively.
Reser\e Vacuum Noted
Although the effective ranks of
the Reserves and National Guaid
had been depleted by the Korean
crisis in 1950, the subcommittee
found, the vacuum had not been
filled by the Defense Depart-
ment in the last two and a half
years. The group told the Admin-
istration that "if we reduce the
size of the regulär military es-
tablishment, we must have in re-
serve forces which will be able
to take up the slack caused by
this reduction."
The report rcferred directly to
the reduction in "force levels"
that President Eisenhower and
Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of
Defense, had decreed to curtail
defense expenditures. ,
The subcommittee declared that
"the problem of creating a streng
and available reserve can never
be effectively solved until a plan
for creating a continuous rotat-
ing reserve is fonnulated."
, It noted that this conclusion
Was not new, recalling that the
rmed Services Committee previ-
usly had reported favorably on
bill to provide a program of
♦universal military training. Such
fL program would supply men for
ä continuous rotating reserve.
The subcommittee reproached
the mihtary establishment for in-
cluding an "ivory tower" figure
in its budget estimates for re-
sei-ve recruiting. The budget, it
said, called for 599,000 Reserv-
ists by June 30, 1952, and 505,000
were enrolled on that date; 711,-
000 for June 30, 1953, with 535,-
000 actually enrolled, and 835,000
predicted for June 30, 1954.
"The committee feels the de-
fense effort as reflected by the
Reserve strength is no further
along today than it was in June
of 1952," the report said, adding
that the implied commitment of
the Defense Department to re-
cruit 300,000 Rescrvists by next
June 30 "is an ujirealisti
oposab|itESERVE NECLECT '
LAID TO PENTAGON
»s within seven
late of its sub-
IROPOSAL
Provision of a
international
conflicts with
shall not be of
Ict.
|n international
than a ti^aty
}ctive as inter-
United States
the Congress.
'ROPOSAL
t"ter the ratifica-
Iment no treaty
lerne law of the
je in pursuance
lion,
Provision of a
international
conflicts with
shall not be of
?t.
fo international
than a treaty
ictive as inter-
ĂĽted States ex-
kslation.
iny vote in the
istion of ratify-
be determined
Inays.
Senate Unit Urges Hearing»
to Learn What the Trouble
Is and How to Solve It
only Congress,
Icould intervene.
lerged from the
jonsultation re-
|e had been "no
lying neverthe-
not reject any
|)Osal.
reported that
k' the week-end
jusive. too, but
leek the Repub-
Jld adopt, how-
tiibstantially all
Joposal.
las one of the
Is, fĂĽr the first
jorgia colleague,
>. Russell. Sen-
)hnson of Texas,
Senate leader,
|n on the Demo-
table.
lican side were
id, Homer Fer-
in, chairman of
)ublican Policy
Eugene D. Milli-
Ichairman of the
)lican organiza-
mference.
)lain that Sena-
Id Russell, who.
control Demo-
[he Senate, were
kalter," as the
It
nng notice that.
jis wanted a com-
nĂĽd at once de-
and put "some-
^n the way of an
would do well
^rge text.
G round
By HAROLD B. HINTOX
Special to The New York Times.
WASHINGTON, Jan. 29— Th«
Sonate Preparedness subcommit-
tce charged the Defense Depart-
ivcnt today with neglect of tha
country's Reserve forces.
It proposed a series of publia
hrarings to determine what is
the trouble and, if possible, what
to do about lt.
The subcommittee members ar«
Senators Leverett Saltonstall of
Massachusetts and Stylcs Bridges
of New Hampshire, Republicans,
and Richard B. Russell, Democrat
of Georgia.
Mr. Saltonstall is chairman of
the Armed Services Committec,
to which the recommcndation for
a public airing of the Reserva
L<ituation was addressed, which
Senators Bridges and Russell ara
its ranking majority and min-
ority members, respectively. ^^
Reserve Vacuum Noted
Ration tonight,
^s by the fact
amendment
kal of two-
in the Sen-
ientatives
three-
Lthis:
clearly
Ids to
^qar-
^cäuse
'icker
Fer-
by no
^ana oZUftie situa-
their ultimate
George approach
j alternative to the
lere was no assur-
jeither, could pre-
Iou.se attitude to-
le George or Mc-
unknown,
Although the effective ranks of
the Reserves and National Guard
had been depleted by the Korean
crisis in 1950, the subcommittee
found, the vacuum had not been
filled by the Defense Depart-
ment in the last two and a half
years. The group told the Admin-
istration that "if we reduce the
size of the regulär military cs-
tablishment, we must have in re-
serve forces which will be able
to take up the slack caused by
this reduction."
The report referred directly to
the reduction in "force levels"
that President Eisenhower and
Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of
Defense, had decreed to curtail
defense expenditures.
The subcommittee declared that
"the Problem of creating a strongf
and available reserve can never
be effectively solved until a plan
for creating a continuous rotat-
ing reserve is formulated."
, It noted that this conclusion
Was not new, recalling that the
Armed Services Committee previ-
f usly had reported favorably on
m bill to piovide a program of
Hiniversal military training. Such
p. program would supply men for
ä continuous rotating reserve.
The subcommittee reproached
the military establishment for in-
cluding an "ivory tower" figura
in its budget estimates for re-
serve recruiting. The budget, it
said, called for 599,000 Reserv-
ists by June 30, 1952, and 505,000
were enrolled on that date; 711,-
000 for June 30, 1953, with 535,-
000 actually enrolled, and 835,000
predicted for June 30, 1954.
"The committee feels the de-
fense effort as reflected by the
Reserve strength is no further
along today than it was in June
of 1952," the report said, adding:
that the implied commitment of
the Defense Department to re- '
cruit 300,000 Reservists by next
June 30 "ig an unrealistic on«^^
e of ^being:
reafhed."
he subcommittee declared
that there was little enthusiasm
for servicö in the National Guard
or Reserve forces among youngf
men, their parents, their wives
or their employers. Much of the
unpopularity, it said, stems from
the recall, at the time of the
Korean outbreak, of veteraAs
who had not been drawing pay,
for Reserve drill, while individuals
and Units that had drawn such
pay were often left safely at
home.
^■■■■■HjfYweiii«^*' Page ^^ 1
free worids ^^'^ , checrs Soujn
Eisenhower stand cn ^^^^^^
Gorernment ^ de- bjL
™sident Eisen ^^^^ ,^ ^
Alfred that 1^« \ ^or um- OOC
°^ 7. m developmg a ne ^.^^
.wer Resources ÂŁor Na ^^ ^^^i. flebl
, .he Democr_aU ^_^., J
i \ , ,ble- reserve to
' \ \ „ ,he Democra^
,.............,,.,/lt/^
P06t Office. New York, N. Y. ' * / ' ^ h sTl ^
NEW Y(
Training Project in Abeyance
Till April 1—FlemmingAsks
2 New Manpower Pools i Thei
â– IIP
Bummary of report of Office nf
Defense Mobilisation , Pa.qe 64.
ArioriatPd Press
RESERVES:
iinins:, who
^ovver report.
'III Be Chosen
|lck Forecasts
Conference
BRACHER
|atic announce-
Wagfner, cm-
Lermination to
Lizens into his
a voluntary.
)ry basis, was
by Dr. Luther
^ity Adminis-
the Columbia
pnnial Confcr-
tis in Mod-
By CHARLES E. EGAX
Special tn The New York Times.
WASHINGTON, .Tan. 9_Presi-
dent Eisenhower today ordered
all Federal agencies concerned to
cooperate in developing: r new
military Reserve program by
April 1.
In the meantime. he said, he
will hold in abeyance any pro-
posals for putting into effect the
training provisions of the Univer-
sal Military Training and Service
'Act.
The President arted after i-e-
cejving a lengthy report from a
special Committee on Manpower
Resources for National Security.
It was submitted by Arthur S.
1 Flemming, Director of the Office
jof Defense Mobilization. Mr.
Flemming declared that speedy
action on a military Reserve pro-
gram was necessary lo meet
emergencies in this "age of
peril,"
General Eisenhower compli-
mented the committee on its find-
ings. In a letter to Mr. Flem-,
ming he said that "in general, J'
agree with the analysis contained
in your letter * * * of the press-
ing need to strengthen our Re-
serve forces and with your recom-
mendations as to the best way
in which to approach the
Problem."
SiipplementÄ Training Plan
The special committee was!
named last August by Mr. Flefti-j
over-
instrul
and pc
jin diai
jOf tw
ibuilt a1
Labor
Thisl
chrotr
1 focusin]
jdesign.
' to a vel
i light.
I into tail
|the mys
des elei
The n(
now, th(
mission
the strol
makes it
celerator
of prodigil
Its fĂĽll
by accelei
cores of h;
gies equivi
TITO AI
BYYlli
Split Seei
Admonisl
Let-Di
By
BELGR.
9— The n
Communisl
tonight 01
van Djila.«
jclosed the plan
Council during
[al vacation in
ick recalled that
[referred to it at
lis commissioners
[ads at City Hall
'eer, the Mayor's
"y, said yesterday
nl — to include busi-
Mional and civic
in "the process ofitary Situation
and that subcom
supplemented that of the Na-
tional Security Training Commis-
sion, which submitted a plan to
the President last month for the
training of 18-year-olds concur-
rently with the drafting of older
youths for active duty.
Today's report proposed cau-
tion, however, in starting such
a training project until the Gov-
ernment had canvassed its man-
power resources more closely and
had made sure it had the men
to handle anv conceivable mili-
Specifically, it appeared that
sions, a,t
having pj
ticles in
paper, tl
expressec
contrary]
other m(
[The
tacked
the pai
disciplii
reporte
The
Djilas
publica t|
pending'
to be named withinlt,,,^ separate laws would be mod-, ^^^""^^ ^|
mittee.
Borba
l.s referenre to
was
in from
ified and cootdinated if the re-
the p^,.^^^ were adopted — the Universal
iched off Military Training and Service! ^"""^- *^'
the floor ;^p(^ j^nd the Armed Forces Re-| ^•i^'^'^' ^
r^ad a long paper s^rve Art. ;
ons of thp Metro-j ,. „,
., ^ ,. ^ ,.^. I Mr. Flemmins:
jnitv to the Pohti- ,.4 . , •
^ ; committee s ronclusions
PS Ol a Jr ree '
i "new roncept for the organiza-
^ ^ ,â– , 'tion of a Reserve military force."
t>er. Dr. Giilick— _ . u * 1,
., , , ^, , Thp program, in substance, calls
esident 01 the In- , ,,. j- ^ , ,, ui •. 1
^ , . . ^ ^. ! tor an immediatelv callable and
lir Administration! ., , ^. , ,,* . , .. r^
a. selectively callable Reserve
force. The size of both Reserve
desnibed hiSj
as a!
[t historically "the
of party politics
Ities shows a vote-
lization dominated
l'his machine," he
)litics for Profit."
"ved earlier that
IS "tempered by
^lutions and up-
government' at
fenty to thirty
H. LaGuardia
Mayor in 1933;
fr Jr. in 1953.]
, Carl Feiss of
Home Finance
newspa p*
current
(New Th|
In his
Djilas Chi
high ranlj
were sniil
a top-raJ
ContiniH
military forces, along with their |:rr
composition, he said, will have! 1
to be determined by officials of /^Ăźl//"
the Department of Defense.
Those military Reserves sched- ^ QU)
uled for immediate call in an
emergency would consist of well-
trained men ready for instant
Service. The "selective" group
would be made up of those whosei /-'^^^^-'-^<
recall would be based on occupa- ; ^'^^"^^^ ^"
tional factois, equity and other ^^"^^-^^^ "^
considerations on an individual' ^^'^^P^'^ ^°1
basis. The mobilization director
|e 62, Column 1 | Continued on Page 64, Column 1
\rges April 1 Tax Drop
ing Is Cut by 5 Billion
Special to The Ntw Yof.k Time^.
lan. 9 — The, will expirc then iinlcss
floor hoteil
Detroit.
The witnl
33 years oh
four-hour gi
He was v\.i
and toproa
guards, who
ing to take
said.
Ritchif^ \y\
THE NEW YORK fTIMES, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1953.
31
2 DEMOCRATS FIGHT
FEDERALDISMISSAL
Teil President They Will Sue
to Resist G. 0. P. *Usurpers'
on War Claims Panel
By W. H. LAWRENCE
Special to The New York TiMr.s.
WASHINGTON, Dec. 14— Two
Democrats notified President Ei-
senhower today that they would
go to court to challenge his power
to remove them as members of the
LVar Claims Commission. They
irged that the Republicans he
named to succeed them were
Eiurpers and intruders."
[yron Wiener of New York and
h. Georgia L. Lusk of New Mex-
\>, who were removed by the
Resident effective last Friday,
jnt separate letters to the White
louse telling the President they
'd not agree that he had a legal
Sght to dismiss them.
The case may result in another
|mportant Supreme Court decision
iefining the power of a President
Lo remove officials from the Gov-
»rnment.
Early in the New Deal, Presi-
Ident Roosevelt was reversed by a
lunanimous Supreme Court ruling
after he had ousted a Republican,
the late William E. Humphrey, as
a member of the Federal Trade
Commission.
No charges were filed against
Mr. Wiener or Mrs. Lusk. Presi-
dent Eisenhower said simply that
he wanted personnel of his own
choosing as members of the Claims
commission.
3 Have Already Taken Office
Three Republicans, headed by
Whitney Gillilland of Iowa as
chairman, received recess appoint-
ments as commissioners last Fri-
day and already have taken Office.
The other appointees are Mrs.
Pearl Carter Face of Kentucky
and Raymond T. Armbruster of
New York.
There was one vacancy on the
commission when the President ap-
pointed the three Republicans.
Daniel F. Cleary of Chicago, who
was chairman, died recently.
Mrs. Lusk and Mr. Wiener con-
tend that the law as written by
Congress clearly contemplates that
commissioners shall serve for the
life of the commission. The White
House maintains that such offi-
cials serve only at the pleasure of
the President and are removable
at any time by him.
The act itself says "the terms of
Office of the members of the com-
mission shall expire at the time
fixed * * * for the winding up of
the affairs of the commission."
The commissioners receive $14,-
000 a year and are empowered to
adjudicate Claims of persons im-
prisoned, interned or held hostage
by the Japanese during World War
li. To date the panel has paid out
$133,000,000 to more than 250,000
persons and has approximately
$55,000,000 left to disburse.
'Certainty of Tenure* Upheld
At the time President Eisen-
hower ordered the removal of the
two officials, Mr. Weiner had said,
*'We are not policy makers,"
adding :
"We are not members of the
inside 'team.' We do not serve at
are creatures of the Legislaturc."
In his letter, Mr. Wiener said
that "the duty to adjudicate the
rights granted by law transcends
any sense of Obligation to the ap-
pointing authorities and requires
a dedicated adherence to the con-
stitutional oath of Office and the
principles of justice, which can
best exist in an atmosphere of
certainty of tenure of office."
Both Mrs. Lusk and Mr. Wiener
told the President that they still
regarded thcmselves as legal mem-
bers of the War Claims Commis-
sion. Both said they would hold
themselves In readincss "to per-
form the duties of that office."
Mr. Gillilland, the new chairman,
confirmcd that a stop order had
Text of an Address by Admjral Radford on the Defense Plans of the Nation
Special to Th« New York Times.
WASHINGTON, Dec. U—Fol-
lowing is the text of an address to
the National Press Club today by
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Mr. Koop, distinguished guests
and friends:
My span of military Service
Covers forty-one years. When
first I came into the service, the
armed forces developed their
plans and progranis without
much public attention.
Public Statements about the
military uaually stemmed from
hearings before Congressional
coir.mittees. Unless something
startling happened, nothing much
was said about what the military
were doing.
There have been many changes
in these forty-one years, changes
not only in weapons and tech-
niques of warfare, but changes in
Communications and public Infor-
mation media. Today, it is con-
sidered a Department of Defense
duty to help keep the public
informed.
That is why I am here today.
I will attempt to summarize
frankly for you— and through you,
for the American people— what
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
doing in the way of military
planning for the future.
In a sense, my two previous
talks this month have been two
chapters leading up to my discus-
sion here today. In the first at
West Point, N. Y., I spoke on
some of the problems and con-
ditions affecting world peace. I
stressed the concept of collective
security.
Describes the 'Interim Look*
In my second, one given before
the American Ordnance Associa-
tion of New York, I described
some of the factors affecting the
current planning for fiscal year
1955. I described this planning
as an Interim Look, in which no
material changes in force were
recommended for fiscal year 1955,
except for increases in Air Forces
and Continental Defense. I said
that changes were coming which
would affect the period after
fiscal year 1955.
Some news reports about my
talk on the Interim Look were
captioned: "Radford Against
Drastic Changes." This is cor-
lect; but, if considered out of
context with the whole of my two
Speeches, it could be misleading.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are
opposed to radical changes in a
huny because they are militarily
undesirable; and from the stand-
point of the security of this na-
tion, they are not practicable. By
"radical," I mean the dictionary
def inition— ' 'fundamental."
For example, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff do not believe that any
fundamental change could de-
velop so fast that one service
should be cut in half, and another
tripled, all in one brief period.
Changes in tactics and strategy
do not come that fast. That is
why I said that changes would
come as a process of evolution,
and with deliberate and pain-
staking planning. The signs of
the times do point unmistakably
to changes in the future.
That brings Us to what you
have called the "New Look."
Frrst, let me give you my descrip-
tion. A New Look is a reassess-
ment of our Strategie and logistic
capabilities in the light of fore-
seeable devalopments, certain
technological advances, the world
Situation today, and considerable
estimating of future trends and
developmentj
.^,Jew of this nation's military
requirements for security.
Note« President'« Directive«
The motif and the tempo for
the New Look stemmed from the
directive contained in the Presi-
denfs speech last April when he
said that henceforth, plannmg
would proceed on the basis of
preparations for the long-term
pull. Here is the real key to our
new planning.
With the President's policy as a
starting point, economically sound
military and mobilization plans,
for this nation and for our Allies,
should result.
The New Look really is not the
first such review of military re-
quirements. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff since their inception hi^ve
continiiously reviewed security
lirements.
"W
U. S. Navy
REPORTS ON DEFENSE:
Admiral Arthur W. Radford,
chairman of Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who said yesterday the
"new look" defense plan would
give the nation superior air
power and atomic weapons
while reducing armed forces.
costs for a particular period of
tension. That in itself makes a
great difference in militaiy plan-
ning.
When Secretary of Defense
Charles Wilson addressed you
about a month ago, he amplified
the President's statement when
he said:
"We hope to continue to build
up the nation's military strength,
particularly air power and air de-
fense while at the same time mak-
ing- progress in reducing expendi-
tures. This will be done through
developing new Strategie plans
and objectives, giving proper
weight to new weapons and equip-
ment, and by continuing to make
intelligent savings especially
through the better Organization
and utilization of manpower.
"The objective of the entire de-
fense Organization will be to de-
velop the maximum military
strength and security of our
country that can be obtained by
the intelligent expenditure of the
funds the people of our otountry
through the Congress are able
and willing to make available for
defense purposes."
Cites Need for Strength
This Statement by Mr. Wilson
indicates the objectives of our
planning. It sums up the fact
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
taking a long, hard look at our
national strategy and strength.
Certainly, it is not a matter
which could be completed in time
for the 1955 budget cycle. It has
to be approached in ä realistic,
deliberate, systematic manner. It
has to avoid the temptations of
day-to-day expediences, and pur-
sue instead, reasoned, intelligent,
long-term judgments.
The greatest announcement that
I could make to you here today—
and, from your point of view, one
of the greatest news stories—
would be that the United States
^^s^. ._^jres strong at-ftied
forces!*'^! can think of nothing
that could be more welcome to
all of US.
Unfortunately, 1 am unable to
make such an announcement. I
must State flatly, what must be
obvious to all of you, that a
strong military posture is not
only essential to our own secu-
rity, but is clearly necessary for
the Free World. There can be no
compromise with aggression any-
where in the world.
Last week President Eisenhower
made a magnificent address on
the atomic age in which he de-
scribed the tremendous destruc-
tive power of atomio weapons. He
said that today's stockpile "ex-
ceeds by many times the explosive
equivalent of the total of all
bombs and all Shells that came
from every plane and every gun
in every theatre of war through
bility. If mankindlTieasures up
to this responsiblity, atomic
power can be a fo»e for great
good, alleviating msmy of the ex-
isting deficiencies, all improving
the Standards of livlöig through-
out the world.
Says Threat Continues
On the other band, we could be-
come a world of nuclear giants
and ethical infants, in which we
know more about war than we
know about peace; more about
killing than we know about living.
Perhaps mankind is destined to
go through a period of indefinite
duration where man has the op-
portunity to forge his own des-
tiny, and where the threat of
atomic warfare is held suspended
over him like the proverbial
sword of Damocles. Man must
make up his mind as to his own
future.
In the meantime, there has
been no reduction in the vast
militant force of international
communism which continues to
threaten the free world.
In my speech at West Point, I
reported that the forces of the
United States truly are playing a
vital part in the far-flung collec-
tive defense System in which cir-
cumstances have placed this na-
tion. This deployment has helped
to strengthen the determination
and capabilities of the Free World
to resist communism, and to ar-
rest an attempted aggression.
Communism persists in contest-
ing the basic tenets of our way of
life. In practice today, it is using
its power, secretly and openly, to
undermine all efforts toward stä-
hle peace. We have convincing
reason to believe that communism
will desist from aggression only
when free nations are united in
arms, and only when they are
stoutly defended.
Recurring local situations— hot-
spots— are going to be with us
for a long time to come. Unless
we are in a Position to handle
them positively and quickly, these
hotspots will be serious and niay
be frequent.
If we maintain a strong armed
posture— a counter-off ensive capa-
bility along with mobile, comtat
forces in readiness— it shouild
convince the men in the Kremliin
that neither a global nor a local-
ized war will be to their advan-
tage. Then, they will be limited
to seeking their objectives through
political, economic, ideological
and subservice actions.
Thus, our military task is com-
plicated by the two requirements
imposed upon us. We must be
ready for tremendous, vast re-
taliatory and counter-offensive
blows in event of a global war,
and we must also be ready for
lesser military actions short of
all-out war.
Secretary Wilson and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have agreed that
we must fulfill these require-
ments with due regard for not
only military factors, but also a
wider ränge of political and eco-
nomic factors, as well as the
latest technological developments.
In this day and age, the military
must be realistically concerned
about keeping our national econ-
omy strong as an indispensable
bulwark of the Free World. It is
a most important facet of our
national security problems.
Says Aliied Aid Is Needed
We are further agreed that Con-
tinental defense programming is
an increasingly important part
of our national security planning.
We want to see continental de-
fense programming continue on
an orderly basis, with phased in-
creases in forces and facilities,
to improve our defenses against
bombing attack.
In addition, we are agreed that
our plans and programs cannot
be developed by the United States
for ourselves alone. They must
be worked out in Cooperation
with our allies, with fĂĽll recogni-
tion for their problems. They
must take into account the com-
mon danger and common respon-
sibility which belongs to the Free
World. Security is a cooperative
venture; it is not a competitive
race. 'To forewarn aggressors
and to construct effective mili-
tary might, we need partnership;
not partisanship.
Under these circumstances, the
concept of the New Look is the
development of an armed posture
which can be supported, year in
and year out, on a long-term
basis; not just one year— nor two
fMiMMMM»
MtkHMRMHWMWNNWM
years— but for ten years or even
twenty years if necessary.
As a Starter, the Joint Chiefs
of staff have picked a period
through fiscal year 1957. Last
week, we agreed to, and sub-
mitted a program for military
forces through this period which
will provide for the security of
the United States; forces which
will deter aggression in conson-
ance with the concept of collec-
tive security with our allies in
Europe and the Far East; and
forces which would provide the
basis for winning a war— an all-
out war or a limited war— if war
is forced upon us.
It is obviously impossible for the
United States to sustain forces
which will enable us to Station
combat-effective units of superior
strength every place where ag-
gression might occur. If we tried
to do this, we could insure eco-
nomic collapse. No, we cannot be
strong everywhere simultaneously.
Accordingly, we plan force
levels which provide us mobile,
versatile, combat forces in readi-
ness, and an adequate mobiliza-
tion base. These strength levels
will be of such magnitude that
our allies can recognize both our
determination to counter any ag-
gression, and determination to
Support our national and interna-
tional policies and commitments.
At the same time, these levels
will be those which are possible
of attainment over the long pull.
New Weapons Employed
Therefore, in 1956 and 1957, the
manpower allocated to our mili-
tary forces will be below that
planned in the Interim Look. Nor-
mal security and common pru-
dence preclude any public State-
ments of the detailed strength
levels at this time. I can teil you,
however, that in planning this re-
duction of manpower in our
armed forces, our specific inter-
est is in an orderly program based
over a period of years.
We want to reduce overhead.
We consider it imperative to im-
prove our ratios of combat man-
power to total manpower. We
want a very good realistic re-
serve program for all Services.
We want to make more effective
use of the manpower in uniform.
To accomplish these ends we are
improving greätly our combat ef-
fectiveness by the application of
new weapons and new techniques,
^nd hope ultimately to achieve
far greater flexibility than here-
tofore attainable.
From time to time I read of
criticism about the so-called tra-
ditional adherence to the concept
of balanced forces. It is quite true
that tho Joint Chiefs of Staff do
not subscribe to the concept of re-
lying solely on one service, or one
weapon, as a short cut to easy
victory. But a balanced force does
not mean to us an artificial one-
third, one-third, one-third, either
in manpower or dollars.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe
that our security and that of the
free world cannot at this time be
entrusted to an unbalanced— uni-
lateral or bilateral— concept of
forces. This is true in Western
Europe, Korea, and Indo-China
today. It would be true in any
other active theatre of Operations.
It is equally true, however, that
the balance in one Situation may
not be proper in another. The bal-
ance in one war will not be the
same as that in a later war.
Today's emphasis is actually
pointed toward the creation, the
maintenance, and the exploita-
tion of modern air power. "Today,
there is no argument among mili-
tary planners as to the import-
ance of air power.
Offensively, defensively, and in
Support of other forces, it is a
primary requirement. Its strength
continues to grow, both through
increases in combat air Units, and
through better equipment.
Yet now, and for an indetermin-
ate period in the future, under
most circumstances, air forces
must be complemented with other
forces. Land forces, amphibious
forces, anti-submarine warfare
forces, and other well-rounded
forces are necessary. Therefore,
we aim to build up also the eff ec-
tiveness of the Army, Navy and
Marines with better equipment,
new weapons, and a better plan-
ning of reserve components.
Services* Besponsibility Noted
Today, atomic weapons have
virtually achieved conventional
Status within our Armed Forces.
Each military service is capable
of putting this weapon Into mili-
tary use. Therefore, each service
has a tremendous responsibility
for living up to our expectations
for a still greater and more poww
erful degree of combat readiness,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff hava
no preconceived ideas as to what
our armed forces will look like
a decade from now. The views
and estimates we submitted last
week are based upon what we
see today as being in the best
interests of the United States and
the Free World.
None of us can be certain of
what will happen in the future.
Improved guided missiles, atomic-
powered ships and aircraft, an
enlarged family of weapons, and
new applications of electronics,
all will have their effects and
will be reflected in the evolution
of our combat units.
At this time of the fiftieth An-
niversary of Powered Flight, it
would seem appropriate for m«
to amplify what I mean by na-
tional air power. As I use tha
term, it includes the Air Force,
Naval Aviation, Marine Corps
Aviation, Army Aviation, and tha
tremendous aircraft industry and
civil air transportation Systems
of the United States.
You may not fuUy comprehend
the true magnitude of today's
United States national air power,
but I will State unequivocally that
it is superior to that of any other
nation.
Furthermore, the United States
has so developed certain segments '
of its airpower as to» achieve a i
Strategie Air Force and a Naval
carrier striking force which are
without peer in this world.
The President of the United
States, the Secretary of Defense,
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
of one mind on that matter: This
nation will maintain a national
air power superior to that of any
other nation in the world.
This supremacy in national air
power, when coupled with that
of our Allies, and with our col-
lective strength in other forces,
should lead the people of the
United States and the Free World
to reflect with pride on the prog-
ress and the achievements of tha
last half Century, and to look to
the future with confidence and
resolution.
3
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STYLE 4801 -Fint, gen-
uin« kidskin mute slip-
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STYLE 496-S«lected, heavy.
weight, genuine pigskins...
o favorite with most men.
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m^
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p
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Sizes 6 to 12 - $4.98.
Sizes 13, 14, 15-$5.9i.
JL.... 1 ^^■--^-»'" t.....Wi>...tiiiiMy
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IIHIWWUIWWW'WMWW^'"^^^^^
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STYLE 3497-Handsewrv
true moccasin slipper in
serviceable Ieather with
heovy-duty sole ond
.•.,heel, boseboll-vamp
>' seam. Good for outdoor
.service. Brown only.
Sizes 6 to 12-$3.9t.
Sizes 13. 14. 15-$4.9t.
If you don'f know hit fock-tlx« THfSf VHLUIU
The famoĂĽs new stretch-to-fit sock thot tokes its
size from the feet; ftts better, wears longer.
Assorted colors. 95^ pr. 3 prs. $2.7$
^w^•.•J•AAWl«•.^^^^^^â–
conimission when the President ap-
pomted the three Ilepublicans.
Daniel P. CJeary of Chicago, who
was chairnian, died recently.
Mis. Lusk and Mr. Wiener con-
tend that the law as written by
ConĂź:ress clearly contemplates that
commissioners shall serve for the
life of the comniission. The White
House maintains that such offi-
cials serve only at the pleasure of
the President and are removable
*t any time by him.
The act itself says "the tenns of
Office of the members of the com-
mission shall expire at the time
fixed * ♦ * for the winding up of
the affairs of the commission." ,
The commissioners receive $14,-'
000 a year and are empowered to
adjudicate Claims of persons im-
prisoned. interned or held hostage
by the Japanese diiring World War
II. To date the panel has paid out
$133.000,000 to more than 250,000
persons and has approximately
$55,000,000 left to disburse.
'Certainty of Tenure* Upheld
At the time President Eisen-
hower ordered the removal of the
two officials, Mr. Weiner had said,
"We are not policy makers,"
adding:
"We are not members of the
Inside 'tearn.' We do not serve at
are creatures of the Legislature."
In his letter, Mr. Wiener said
that "the duty to adjudicate the
rights granted by law transcends
any sense of Obligation to the ap-
pointing authorities and requires
a dedicated adherence to the con-
stitutional oath of office and the
principles of justice, which can
best exist in an atmosphere of
certainty of tenure of office."
Both Mrs. Lusk and Mr. Wiener
told the President that they still
regarded themselves as legal mem-
bers of the War Claims Commis-
sion. Both said they would hold
themselves in readiness "to per-
form the duties of that office."
Mr. Gillilland, the new chairman,
confirmed that a stop order had
been put on Claims approved by
the old commission, but said that
it was a purely precautionary and
temporary step. He added that the
new commission simply wanted to
investigate the processes under
which the old one had operated.
Mr. Wiener was unwilling to de-
Ăźcribe the precise fonn that his
legal attack upon the residential
powers would take. He said Mrs.
Lusk had made it clear that she
would not be a party to the suit
if the action hampered the rights
of persons awaiting adjudication of
their Claims.
1 ijook wt're
t-aptioned: 'Radford Against
Diastjc Changes." This is cor-
rect; but, if considered out of
context with the whole of my two
Speeches, it could be misleading.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are
opposed to radical changes in a
hurry because they are militarily
undesirable; and from the stand-
point of the security of this na-
tion, they are not practicable. By
"radical," I mean the dictionary
definition— "fundamental."
For example, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff do not believe that any
fundamental change could de-
velop so fast that one service
should be cut in half, and another
tripled, all in one brief period.
Changes in tactics and strategy
do not come that fast. That is
why I said that changes would
come as a process of evolution,
and with deliberate and pain-
staklng planning. The signs of
the times do point unmistakably
to changes in the future.
That brings us to what you
have called the "New Look."
FTTst, let me give you my descrip-
tion. A New Look is a reassess-
ment of our Strategie and logistlc
capabilities in the light of fore-
seeable developments, certain
technologlcal advances, the world
Situation today, and conslderable
estimating of future trends and
developm— '^- "" '
revlew^of this nation's military
requirements for security.
Notes President'» Directive«
The motif and the tempo for
the New Look stemmed from the
directive contained in the Presi-
dent's speech last April when he
said that henceforth, planning
would proceed on the basis of
preparations for the long-term
pull. Here is the real key to our
new planning.
With the President's policy as a
starting point, economically sound
military and mobilization plans,
for this nation and for our Allies,
should result.
The New Look really is not the
first such review of military re-
quirements. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff since their inception h^ve
continuously reviewed security
Problems and requirenients.
Actually, the New Look is new
in only two respects.
First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
who are making it, are newly
appointed.
Second, and more important,
our current review is based on a
guiding precept that is signifi-
cantly different.
Our "new look" prepares for
the long pull; not a year-of-crisis.
It is aimed at providing a sturdy
military posture which can be
maintained over an extended
period of uneasy peace, rather
than peaking forces at greater
ĂźTvTng proper
\\tiy:ht to new weapons and equip-
ment, and by continuing to make
intelligent savings especially
through the better Organization
and utilization of manpower.
"The objective of the entiie de-
fense Organization will be to de-
velop the maximum military
strength and security of our
country that can be obtained by
the intelligent expenditure of the
funds the people of our obuntry
through the Congress are able
and willing to make available for
defense purposes."
CIte» Need for Streng:th
This Statement by Mr. Wilson
indicates the objectives of our
planning. It sums up the fact
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
taking a long, hard look at our
national strategy and strength.
Certainly, it is not a matter
which could be completed in time
for the 1955 budget cycle. It has
to be approached in ä realistic,
deliberate, systematic manner. It
has to avoid the temptations of
day-to-day expediences, and pur-
sue instead, reasoned, intelligent,
long-term judgments.
The greatest announcement that
I could make to you here today—
and, from your point of view, one
of tho greatest news stories—
would be that the United S<^
es strtfng armed
forces. I can think of nothing
that could be more welcome to
all of US.
Unfortunately, 1 am unable to
make such an announcement. I
must State flatly, what must be
obvious to all of you, that a
streng military posture is not
only essential to our own secu-
rity, but is clearly necessary for
the Free World. There can be no
compromise with aggression any-
where in the world.
Last week President Eisenhower
made a magnificent address on
the atomic age in which he de-
scribed the tremendous destruc-
tive power of atomio weapons. He
said that today's stockpile "ex-
ceeds by many times the explosive
equivalent of the total of all
bombs and all Shells that came
from every plane and every gun
in every theatre of war through
all the years of World War II."
Yes, the destructive power,
presently and prospectively avail-
able to each branch of the armed
forces, dwarfs that ever expe-
rienced in the history of war-
fare. I am not being an alarmist
in this— I am simply stating cold
facts. These facts simply make
it all the more important that we
deter aggression and war before
they happen.
God in his great wisdom has
made available to mankind the
knowledge of atomic fission. With
this knowledge comes responsi-
in readiness— it should
convince the men in th« Kremin
3
RADFORD STRESSES
SUPREMACY IN AIR
Continued From Page 1
Broadcasting System's "Reporters'
Round-up" radio program, Dr.
Hannah said the suggested end
strength for the fiscal year 1957
was "within the ränge" of 2,800,000
or 2,900,000. The 1957 fiscal year
begins July 1, 1956.
Admiral Radford offered no de-
tails of the reductions in manpower
proposed for the next three years,
saying it would be inappropriate
to do so until the recommendations
of the Joint Chiefs were approved.
"The concept of the New Look,"
Admiral Radford said, "is the de-
velopment of an armed posture
which can be supported year in
and year out, on a long-term basis;
not just for one year, nor two
years, but for ten or twenty years
if necessary."
This long-term approach marked
a significant departure from the
planning of the old Joint Chiefs
toward a particular "year of cri-
sis," he declared. Admiral Radford
fiucceeded General of the Army
Omar N. Bradley as chairman last
August.
The proposed defense budget for
the 1955 fiscal year, beginning next
July 1, reflected an "Interim Look"
rather than a wholly new one, Ad-
miral Radford said. Looking ahead
to 1956 and 1957, however, the
Chiefs had recommended military
plans that could be maintained
"over an extended period of uneasy
peace, rather than peaking forces
at greater costs for a particular
period of tension," he added.
Through the years, he said, the
armed forces must be strong and
flexible enough to strike powerful
retaliatory blows in the event of
global war and to deal with recur-
rent "hot spots" round the world
in lesser military actions.
The Joint Chiefs agreed last
week with Charles E. Wilson, Sec-
retary of Defense, on a plan to
meet these requirements, Admiral
Radford said. He acknowledged
that their estimates were based
not only on military factors, but
on a "wider ränge of political and
economic factors, as well as the
latest technological developments."
Program's Provision»
In the general outline made by
Admiral Radford, the new pro-
gram provides:
^Step-by-step improvement of
the nation's continental defense.
QFuU recognition that the secu-
rity of the Free World demands
Cooperation rather than competi-
tion with our allies.
^More effective use of man-
power through new weapons and
reduced support forces.
Admiral Radford made clear tH^
conviction of the Joint Chiefs that
the United States must strive foi
air cupremacy, and that air power
should have top priority in spend-
ing.
"Today there is no argument
among military planners as to the
importance of air power," he said.
"Offensively, defensively and in
support of other forces, air power
is a primary requirement."
Land forces, amphibious forces
and those used in anti-submarine
warfare are complementary to air,
he added. He emphasized that by
the term air power he referred not
to the Air Force alone but to
Naval, Marine Corps and Army
aviation as well, in addition to the
country's aircraft industry and
civil air transport System.
The sum total of American air
power is superior to that of any
other nation, he said.
"The President of the'^ United
States, the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are
of one mind on that matter," Ad-
miral Radford declared. He added
that "this nation will maintain a
national air power superior to that
of any other nation in the world."
Any attempt to Station effective
combat forces around the world
wherever aggression might occur,
the Admiral said, can only lead
to economic collapse in the United
States.
He proposed that the country
should rely instead on mobile,
versatile forces in readiness, and
on an adequate mobilization base.
In response to a question, Admiral
Radford said that all he knew of
Mr. Wilson's plan to cut the armed
forces by 400,000 in the next eight-
een months was what he had read
in the newspapers.
In 1956 and 1957, however, the
manpfJ^er of the armed Services
will be further reduced, he said.
Endorsing Mr. Wilson's announced
objective of "more defense for less
money," the Admiral added:
"We want to reduce overhead.
We consider it imperative to im-
prove our ratios of combat man-
power to total manpower * * *.
We want to make more effective
use of the manpower in uniform."
As for atomic weapons, he said
they had "virtually achieved con-
ventional status" in the armed
forces of the United States.
"Each military service is capable
of putting this weapon into mili-
tary use," Admiral Radford added.
"Therefore each service has a tre-
mendous responsibility for living
up to our expectations for a still
greater and more powerful degree
of readiness."
He suggested that the future
guided missiles, atomic powered
ships and planes, an enlarged
"family of weapons" and new ap-
plications of electronic^ would have
their place in the steady evolution
of more effective combat forces.
. year out, on a long-term
basis; not just one year-n!r two
use ZiL^' niake rn^; :F;;ct 've
To «1 ® manpower in uniform.
To accomplish these ends we are
v.p,,. 1,' atomic weapons have
sH ni l^-UK^"^^'"^^^ conventional
tach mihtary service is capabU
, . - Pfide on the proar-
eas and the achievements of th»
aat half Century, and to look to
re/olXr "''' ^^'^"^^"^* -^
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ORDER BY MAIL TODAY
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Ploase send' me the following Itemsi
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SIZE
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I
S2
t"4^
^, rntx^cc TT'FSDAY, PECFAIBER 15, 1953.
THE NEW YORK TIMES, TL bM^ÂŁ^,^ , L^ :
CUR FiFTH AVENUE STORES ARE
OPEN TONIGHT UNTIL 9 P. M.
For his Christmas!
^^SWEATERS^
IMPORTED FROM SCOTLAND
SLEEVELESS REVERSIBLES
Two-Sweaters-in-one! Navy Blue on
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$
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1
Texts on Report ofTraining Commission
. — V.. - ... . .i xifi -.,^« »kSo 1a
L
.-««<*'
e>
M^
V
PURE GASHMERE PULLOVERS
Finest of the fine Yarns and Workman-
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Rogers Peet. Pullovers, as illustrated, in
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$32.50.
Also Sleeveless Slipovers, $22.50
and Cardigans, $38.50.
Sp«cial to THt Nr.w York Timw
WASHINGTON, Dec. U—Fol-
lowing are the texts of the intro
duction and the findings and rec-
ommcndationft of the report of the
National Security Training Com-
viission as sent to the President
today:
IntroducĂĽon
The twentieth Century has placed
America within striking distance
of cur enemie.«». Not sincp the
i War of 1812 has our soll been in-
vaded. Not since the disappear-
ancp of our frontier in the middle
of the last Century have our eil- |
izens lived in danger of swift
attack in the night.
Time ?nd technology have
ohanged thal. A plane can fly
from Europe to America and back
in less time than it took oui an-
cestors to take a long day's jour-
nev on horseback. Eighty years
ago the frontier \vas the woods at
the pdge of the Clearing. Today
it is the air above us and the seas
around us. The danger is the
«ame: only the weapons have
ohanged.
When our Citizens in the eaily
days of this nation were forced
to Hve with danger, they prepared
themselves for it. They learned
to use the weapons of the day;
thev were ready to join in the
common defense on a minute's
notice.
One of our earliest^ traditions
was the Minuteman. hi? powder
dry, his musket oiled. He helped
give US our nation and our her-
jtage. Today, cnce more. there ,
mav be no real security from at-
tack, but theie can be prepared-
ness. In our own time of danger.
we can do no less than our fore-
fathers We can train and have
leady our twentieth century
Minutemen.
We have lived with tension for
eight years without a world war,
lealizing more clearly as each
year pa.ssed that a new phenome-
non has intruded itself upon our
national traditions: the vicious
but slow-burning hatred of a pa-
tient and pov.erful foreign nation
bent upon the eventual domma-
tion of its subjugating doctnne
over the peoples of the world
Communii=m seems content for
the time being to harass. under-
niine skirmish. We learned m
Korea how willing Russia is to
let her satellites fight blood-let-
ting local wars. At every sensi-
tive spot in the world, the Com-
munists are patiently agitating^
boring inflaming. At any tmje
these local actions can erupt mto
large-scale fighting.
One of the factors which will
deter the Soviet Union from
faunching a w^r is the mihtary
Ăźtrength of the free. A nation s
military strength is nieasured by
the amount and quahty of mate-
ricl and men it has ready for de-
fense Of the two. men are the
most important. Without tramed
men with high morale, mateuel
is uselessB.
Earlv in 1950 we had too few of
the men and materials «eeaed for
defense. Monolithic Russia shoved
her Korean pawn upon us. Todaj .
1 after great sacrifice. great ex-
pense, great heartbreak. and ter-
ible unfairness to some of om
Citizens, we are still in a stage
of uncertain negotiations.
In the past we have miscon-
choice
m.^Inö^lBBIJ^iWipBRteful people
have chosen no defenses. This
irrer, if repeated, will gravely en-
danger the national security.
If there is another world war,
we will not be granted the two
years* grace vre had in 1914 and
1939. The Kremlin will not repeat
the error the Germans made twice
in too-recent history; we would
probably be attacked flVst. If we
do not train fighting men before-
hand, we certainly will not have
time to train them afterwaid.
•The Weak Are Attacked'
After each war in our history.
we have demobilized pell-mell. We
might have averted some of these
wars with sufficient preparedness.
The lesson of the fiist half of
this Century, the simple law of
lifo which we have learned the
haid way, is this: the weak are
attacked. - - — ~— - '
No\\ that fighting in Korea \n
nities. and themselves. yet we
have made them more liable toi
Service in limited emergencies
than nonveterans.
The law of the land today places
upon everv veteran of Korea an
over-all eight-year service and
Reserve Obligation, yet ihose who
have not been inducted for Serv-
ice have no Obligation whatso-
ever. The moral is clear: we need
enough trained nonveterans in re-
serve to meet the needs of partial
mobilization.
In peacetime we cannot possibly
maintain active forces large
enough to achieve victory if a j
world war conics. Citizen soldiers |
have done the bulk of the fight- j
ing in eveiy major American i
war. We had only about 300.000 \
Service mm in 19''n. yot the .<=erv- ,
ices numbeied over 12.000.000 at ,
the peak of the war pffort. and
over l.j/JOO.OOr» ^velP inducted or •
enlisted into the various services
while the war lastcd. Further-
more. relyins on lar'^e numbers of
men in uniform when there are
no active hostilities is a most ex-
pensive kind of defense.
A Reserve Forces Program
Recognizing the long-term na-
ture of the crisis, Congress in
Public Law 51. Eighty-second Con-
gress established the machinery
by which all qualified young men
not needed for service could be-
come liable fov induction for six
months of National Security
Training upon reaching the age
of 18. After the training period
these voung men were to become
membPis of the Reserve for seven
and a half years, available for re-
call in the event of emergency.
National Security Training is in
essence a Reserve forces training
piogram. Whether or not it is de-
! sirable depends upon the answers
I to three questions: Do we need a
Reserve? If so. do w «» want it to
â– be trained or untraincd? If we
,<\vant it trained, do we want it
I composed of veterans or nonvet-
I erans? .
We belle ve the answers are oD-
' vious. We need a Reserve and
' we want it to be trained. For the
.•^ake of fairness, we would prefer
that it be composed of those who
' have not yet served their country.
i Todav our Reserve is weak. Too
' few veteians will join its unitt
and activities; the few non-v«t-
erans we have are basically un-
traiTied. The only answer is to
train nonveterans not needed for
Service and then transfer them to
the Reserve.
National Security Training is
essential for a strong, tramed.
nonveteran, vitalized Reserve. It
would make a major contribution
to the capacity of our regulär
forces for quick expansion from
peace strength to war strength.
The program can begin at cnce
with at least 100,000 trainees, and
this level can be maintained or-
increased as manpower avail-
ability allows. Service is far fron^
universal today. Even if theg
forces are maintained at 3,360,000
through 1960, which is highly un-
likely, there will be over 2,000,000
fit young men who will not have
served through 1960 after all serv
ice requirements are met.
If the Services are even slightl
decreased to a strength of 3. 130
000 by 1955, about 3.000,000 f
young men will not have serve.
through the rcst of this decati
At a strength of 3,360,000, we
timate there will be about 1,'
mea Hi\^ĂĽ|b^f orN "
reduction iii the forces to
000. 1,500,000 or more youn,
will be available for trainin
The Selective Service S
can operate inductions for
ice and training simultan
as long as necessary. Whi
lecting some men for six m
training and others for two
Service by lot would not
absolute equality of duty, it
correct the present unfairne
veterans.
In event of emergency,
with six months' training w
be recalled ahead of the vete
and nonveterans as well as
erans would have a total eil
year military Obligation. As
inductions for service
taxpayers
have to st
have to st
pensivenes
would enc
cur prepai
never achi
ing forces
lions of dollars. We
streng, but we also
s61vent, The inex-
ĂĽf Reserve training
rage a steadiness in
:dness that we could
e bv relying on stand-
,lone.
It shouldijfinally be remembered
that the greatest savings may be
intangible. The prevention or j
even the shortening of war would
save the nation incalculable loss j
of life and effort. ;
W'e learned in Korea the dan-
gers and inequities of the unse-
Ipctive recall of veterans. When
National Security Training is ful-
Iv operative, almost every physi-
cally qualitied young man in the
civilian labor force will have a
Reserve Obligation.
Therefove. we propose that in
an emergency the Selective Serv-
ice System i^hould, in accordance
with the selective Standards ap-
plyin? to young men liable for
induction for service, recall Re-
servist» vho do not voluntarily
join organized Reserve unit? and
who do not have specific mobili-
zation assignments. At the same
time, T'e pronose that veterans
of two vears' service be trans-
fcrred, upon request, to Stand-by
Reserve as the national safety
permits, provided National Se-
curity^ Training is implemented.
The'- training itself would cause
a minimum of interference with
the edx'.ations, careers and pri-
vate lives of our young men. They
will take the training at the nat-
ural break between high school
and College or a career.
It is true that this country has
never had a long-term Reserve
forces training program, although
George Washington pioposed one
iTO^years ago. It is also true
that we have never maintained
large standing military forces in
neicetime Our security demands
Uilt we have one or the other;
oii- money and manpower limita-
ti
riflce for it. Whenever this is
not so, whenever some are re-
quired ' over and over again to
Protect the others; the spirit and
morale of the nation is weakened.
In a democracy as in no other
form of government. all Citizens
should watch the ramparts. All
should be vigilant against the
ever-present dangeis which can
strike out from half-way across
the world at any moment; all
should attempt to avoid dangev
by preparing for danger; all
sfiould share the duties, the dis-
comfort and the diity work. All
free men should be willing to
guard their liberties and each
free man should take his turn at
guard.
Summary of Findings
I and Recommendations
The Commission finds that:
IM
All should .share equally the Ob-
ligation to serve the nation.
Our present reserve system is
unfair,
a. About two and one-half mil
as
continue, a perfect fairness isj
possible, since selective standJ
for Service continue to be net
«ary.
TT^ndpr National Security Trli-
Ins will not let us have both.
he American tradition de-
nds a strong Citizen Reserve
pieference to a large profes-
nal force. We should have a
ugh-core active military estab-
hment, backed up by a large^
ained Citizen Reserve produced
a Reserve forces training pro-
ram.
Our enemies then will have to
ealize that we have an imme-
iately mobilizable Reserve to
•ipel attack. No human mind
Ican reason away reality. Com
munism cannot ignore our bombs.
our planes, our trained men.
We might reasonably hope that
the steady long-term leality of a
laree trained, continuously main-
ttnek Reserve would help to
mevent the death and waste of a
flUd world war. By thus adjust-
ng our defenses to the continuing
danger, we will ^ove closer to
peace. In the event of wai, ^ve
will be closer to victory.
Called Historie Compromls«
National Security Training thus
is an historic co"^P/°^^"^,„?lt
tween cur cherished trad tion
;«o* iflve-p active muitaiy
?fxxes in pea'cetime and our need
for habitual preparedness against
the implacable, continuing reality
I of the hostility of commumsm
" rnncress did not neglect the
i elem?nt of civilian control when
it established the National Secu-
rity Training Corps and Conimis-
Jli, a«_L95Ll ^-^ö- t*iis civilian-
ijiajority commis,
the duties of estabishing policies
and Standards for the conduct of
the six months' training, exercis-
\ug "general suRĂźrvision," and
submitting a comprehensive re-
port to the Congress every six
months on the Operation of the
Corps.
National Security Training can-
not be termed mllitaristic. To
seek to prevent a war; to build a
Reserve and reduce the size of
the active forces; to equalize
democratically the shaiing of the
Obligation to help protect the na-
tion; to supervise the training
program with a civilian agency—
all these things are compatible
with the best elements of our na-
tional heritage.
National Security Training will
be education for «urvival— the
survival of our young men. the
survivnl of the American herit-
age the survival of our basic
and the aieat human
lion of the three and one-half
million fit young men who be-
came 18 between World War II
and the start of the Korean emer-
gency saw no service before June,
1950.
b. Consequently. when Korea
came, more than 600,000 veterans
of World War II were involun-
tarilv recalled to duty for their
second war. They were put in
double jeopardy. with no consid-
eration for their family lives or
careers, while younger men went
entirely unobligated or were in-
ducted according to selective
Standards. Seiious morale Prob-
lems developed. [
c. If another local emergency j
like Korea erupts. it will be the j
older veterans. not the younger |
men who have not served. who |
will have to bear the first brunt j
of the conflict. Veterans might i
again have to be recalled un- j
selectively while young men in i
similar status would be deferred. 1
d. This unfair policy has been \
not onlv moially wrong, it has i
also been socially and finaricially
costlv.
e. We cannot with justice con-
tinue to place our veteran Reserv-
ists in double jeopardy while ex-
cusing our nonveterans from Serv-
ice or training.
[3]
Our present Reserve is inade-
quate.
a. About three-fourths of our
Reservists are veterans of Korea,
World War II, or both, and the
nonvfeteran reservists are rela-
tively untrained,
b. Only 32 per cent of our Re-
servists are participating in Re-
serve Units. Units are seriously
under strength.
c. The Ready Reserve is not a
unified Reserve. The title merely
describes the greater vulnerability
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Continued on Followlng: Paj?p
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)r Santa. Claus in your family trv to do too
skipping vacations^^mng uim».i y.^^^^v^ , ,_ wm
Then give him, for Christmas, the gift that will cnable him to take time our — lu u-
charge his vital energies regularly — right where he is, at home or office, when he needs
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$32.50.
Also Sleeveless Slipovers, $22.50
and Cardigans, $38.50.
LAMB'S WOOL CARDIGANS
Soft resilient Wool from the youngest
shearlings. Knitted in Scotland expressly
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in Natural, Grey or Navy Blue .... $18.
Also Sleeveless Slipovers, $10 ^
and Long-Sleeved Pullovers, $15.
Sires 38 to 46 in all Sweaters illustrated.
600 Fifth Avenue at 48th Street
479 Fifth Avenue al 4Ist Street
^^'al•ren Street at Broadway'
And in Boston: Tremont St. al Rromfieid St.
(he tuu^ being: lo haiass. unde
n ,ne .sk.rmi.h. W. lea.ned m
KoZ'ü how wiUin»: nussia i« to
l:r';:/.ateuitesri.htbi^^^^^^^^^^^^^
rnis^f-e patiently a^UatinR^
boiing. inflammg. At «"> V^^
these local actions can eiupi inio
laiKe-scale fighting.
-''TTf.'v ,° e gu' "measured by
l^^am^ounÄ Quamy cf mate-
fense Of \^^ .^"^^j^hoyt trained
most impoitant. ^^"i- mateiiel
men wilh high morale, maieuei
is uselessB. -
Failvinl950wehadtoo fewof
th^ men and materials needed for
ieense%lonolithicRu.siashox^d
her Koiean pawn upon us. Toda> .
«fter^ Kieat saciifice. gieat ex-
nense g.^at heartbieak, and ter-
rr^ru^fairness to some of ou
Citizens, xve aie stil in a atage
of uncertain negotiation».
In Ihe past we have miscon-
rnrin€WiHM9iFü"P^s^'eful people
Jiave chosen no defenses. This
«rior. if repeated, will gravely en-
danger the national security.
If there is another world war,
we will not be granted the two
years' grace w^e had in 1914 and
1939. The Kremlin will not repeat
the error the Germans made twice
in too-recent history; we would
probably be attacked fllst. If we
do not train fighting men before-
hand, we certainly will not have
time to train them afterward.
•The Weak Are Attacked'
After each war in our history,
we have demobilized pell-mell. We
might have averted some of these
wars with sufficient preparedness.
The lesson of the first half of
this Century, the simple law of
lifo which we have learned the
hard way, is this: the weak are
attacked.
Now that fighting in Korea is
suspended, how are we to adjust
our military defenses to the long-
term crisis that Stretches ahead?
We must be capable of lespond-
ing to periodic military alarms for
cither limited or total war. The
alarm might come in 1954, 1964—
or 1984. It might never come. Will
our men be trained and ready?
Our present policy is Selective
Service and a large standing mili-
tary force— massive and expensive
through the decades.
A large portion of our young
men are drafted for two years'
Service followed by a six-year Re-
serve Obligation. They are our
veterans. We cannot in good con-
science require them to serve in
the Ready Reserve units available
for recall to active duty as long
as hundreds of thousands of other
young men have received no train-
ing, Service or reserve Obligation.
A large, trained, non Veteran
Reserve, ready to mobolize on
a moment's notice. would be one
answer to the long-term danger,
Supplementing a small profes-
sional military nucleus, such a
Reserve would give us strength
with minimum cost and a max-
imum regard for the democratic
liberties we are defending.
One of the costs of our unpre-
paredness cannot be put in terms
of war and peace. After World
War II. we erred in thinking that
anothpi' war should be total if
anything. Instead. we became
involved in a limited conflict.
About 2,500.000 of the qualified
young men who reached military
age between 1946 and 1950 re-
ceived no military service. In
consequence. when the Korean
War broke out, we wcre forced
to throw more than 600,000 vet-
erans of World War II into the
battle lines,
For the second time in a decade,
these veterans suffered extended
interruptions of their civilian
lives and careers. They were
called away from their wives and
children and catapulted into the
front lines. sometimes within a
few weeks. Many had acquired
Status in Jobs and professions.
Down payments had been made
on homes, cars and furniture.
Businesses had to be closed.
Older Reservists in College were
pulled into service while younger
nonveteran students were de-
ferred. Farm and industrial
workers. scientists, teachers,
managers— all were recalled.
The selective principle was ap-
plied in inductjng nonveterans for
service but not to veterans ne-
called for their second tour of
duty. Veteran Reservists aie
older, more highly skilled, and
more essential to their families,
their professions, their commu-
Todav our
few veterans
and activities;
eran.s we have
trained. The
Too
is
trained.
haveno7yetse,vedtheirTöül
Reserve 18 weak.
will join it.s unlts
the few non-vii-
are basically un-
only answer Is to
train nonveterans ^^' J^^'^f^^J^i
sei vice and then transfer them to
the Reserve. .
National Security Training
essential for a strong.
nonveteran, vitalized Reserve It
would make a major contnbution
to the capacity of our reguUi
forces for quick e^pansion fiom
peace strength to war »tiength^
The program can begin at once
with at least 100.000 trainees and
this level can be maintained or-
increased as manpower a^vail-
ability allows. Service is far irom
universal today. E^«% ».^ oqa
forces are maintamed at 3.360,OW
through 1960, which is highly ""•;
likely, there will be over 2,0OO.OW_
fit young men who will not havp.|
served through 1960 after all serv
ice requirements are met.
If the Services are even slignu
decreased to a «^^^ngth of 3a3U
000 by 1955, about 3,000,ĂĽW
young men will not have servf
through the rest of thi« decac.
At a Strength of 3.360.000 we
timate there will be about l.UO-]
nv4A<«iiAvai]abl
Tnis decade; iriThe^BT^n'
reduction in the forces to 3
000, 1,500,000 or more young
will be available for training
The Selective Service Sy
can operate induetions for
ice and training simultane
as long as necessary. Whil
lecting some men for six mo
training and others for two yi
Service by lot would not
absolute equality of duty, it w
correct the present unfairnes
veterans.
In event of emergency,
with six months' training wtjiid
be recalled ahead of the veter
and nonveterans as well as
erans would have a total eiftt-
year military Obligation. As 1
as induetions for service n'
continue, a perfect fairness is
possible, since selective stand
for service continue to be ne
sary.
Under National Security Tr
ing every young man who is
needed for service would rec
six months' basic and specialst
training in the military fiels
jhnipnt, backed up ^V ** ^ , .
lained. Citizen Reserve P'«^^"';/;
a Reserve lorces training pio-
tram.
Oiir eneiiAie» then
vepd-^tlacK NO hun,a„ nnnd
ican leason away "^'",;' hnmbs
COS
e
will have to
Ihat we have an imme-
mobilizable Reserve
atiack No human
away reality.
,sm cannot ignore our
cur planes, our tiamed
U c might reasonably hope tha^
t,.e steady ^o^^-^^lTnu^s W main
Uv^e, trained, «onUnuously n ^^
p,event the death and^^^^ ^^.^^^_
third world ^^a^' "^^^ continuing
ing our defenses^ lo^the^co^^^^^^^ ^^
caiumt v..;i> lustire ron-
tinue to place ou. Veteran Reserv-
Ut^ in doub e jeopaidy -^niie e^
cv'sing nur nonveterans from Serv-
ice or liaining.
[31
Reserve ia inade-
Our present
T^About three-fourths of cHir
Reservists are veterans ofKo.ea
World War H, or both. and tne
reservists are
Mail or TeUpnonc Order
F,„ckUy Gijt art,fi<a,n Pnmt Pnsonal Choue
Clothcs ' Hau ' HaUrdashery • Shoes
Cent of our Re-
we will move
event of
danger
^'trbe closer to victory
war, we
In the
aer to vicvoi>.
Called Historie CompromlM.
National security Train^tM.
nonveteran rese— -- — ^'*^^'
tively untrained.
b. Only 32 per - „
servists are P^rt.l^iP^^^^^.JHoueW
serve units. Units are seiiously
""/^ThfÄ Reserve is not a
unifiTS^Reserve. The tUle mere ly
describes the greater vulnerabiUty
( ontlnued on Folloxvlng Page
ScwYork,FifthAvc.at4
6thSt.0.r.-.Chicagc,t9E.Jackson^^
Is an
tween
hiĂĽtonc
cur eher
large active
against large ^^^""^'j „^ir need
forces in P«^<^«t^^,%Sness against
for habitual pveparednes^^^^^^
the implacable ^onU^^^^g ^^
Congress d^^...^^^^" \"rol when
element cf ^j^J^^^^VaĂĽonal Secu-
it established '^^l^^%Tcomn.is
rity Training Co^s an ^ivlUan
joritj* <
1951
ly
n
3,
ttt-
remain
the Re4l.y
to
in
s
o
|e-
t-
He would spend bis
Reserve Obligation in
Reserve unless he elected
shorten bis Ready Reserve
bility by active participation
various Reserve programs.
After their training, the yo^g
men would leturn to their ho
and communities well equippe
survive and to assist in civil
fense in the event of sudden
tack.
Formula Is Endorsed
The Senate Committee
Armed Services proposed in 1
that the active forces should
decreased as graduates of a
serve training program were pro-'
duced. We endorse their formula.
If international conditions worsen
or there is a world war, the size
of the forces will have to be ad-
justed, but given any interna-
tional Situation except war, our
active forces can be smaller if we
have a large trained reserve than
they would have to be if we did
not.
By reducing the standing armed
forces and building up the Re-
serve, the program could save the
tie
le-.
Uiajority comnr
the duties of estabishing policies
and Standards for the conduct of
the six months' training, exercis-
ing "general sunĂźrvision," and
submitting a comprehensive re-
port to the Congress every six
months on the Operation of the
Corps.
National Security Training can-
not be termed militaristic. To
seek to prevent a war; to build a
Reserve and reduce the size of
the active forces; to equalize
jdemocratically the sharing of the
Obligation to help protect the na-
tion; to supervise the training
program with a civilian agency—
all these things are compatible
with the best Clements of our na-
tional heritage.
National Security Training will
be education for survival— the
survival of our young men, the
survival of the American herit-
age, the survival of our basic
liberties and the great human
values that flow from them. It
is the answer of democracy to
the challenge of dictatorship. At
the mid-century. as in 1775,
America will meet the test of
danger with its Citizen reserve,
skilled and ready— its twentieth
Century Minutemen.
We must have the materials of
defense; our men must be trained
and skilled in their use. Above
all, our men must have the mo-
rale which enables them to use
their skill and their materials
courageously. Skill is worthless
without morale— and morale can-
not be achieved through an un-
fair System.
When a democratic people are
called to defend their nation, they
know that they are defending
their own homes, their own land,
their own possessions, their own
government. All have an equal
interest in the common defense.
We proclaim equal rights, equal
benefits, and equal opportunity
for the pursuit of happiness. Con-
versely, we should all share
equally the Obligation to serve
the nation, to protect it and sac-
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Does YOUR Santa Claus
hard?
work too
,1, S.HO. CIro In y»"' l~* "' "
do too muc
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Then give him, for Christmas, the gift that will cnablc him to take tim^u^^c?
Charge his vital energies regularly — right where he is, at homc or office, ivhen he needs
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Av». of Amorfcas at 45tti St-,^ Now York 36, N, Y. • VA 6-2200
i
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f
THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESPAY, DfCEMBER 15, 1953.
Gommission Lists 'Specific Values' of Its Training Plan
.V
Continued From Preceding Page
of certian Reservists to recall in
the event of an emergency.
d. The only effective Reserve
we can possibly have under the
present System is a Veteran Re-
serve. Since many veterans are
understandably refusing to join
Units, this means our Reserve is
inadequat».
14]
At least one million men are
available for a National Security
Training program between now
and 1960.
a. Service is not required of all i
today. About 1,600,000 fit young 1
men of military age have not seen
Service as of now. and by 1960
this number will have increased
to about 2,200,000 if the armed
forces are maintained at 3,360,000 i
as now officially projeeted.
b. At least one million fit and
qualified men will be available for
National Security Training be-
tween now and 1960 after all
Service requirements are met. If
the forces are reduced to about
3,130,000 men in fiscal 1955 at
least 1,500,000 men would be
available for National Security
Training through 1960. When
allowance is made for the men
â– who would be added to the avail-
able pool by decreasing the age
of liability for training to 18, the
number of men available for
training increases to between one
and a quarter and two million
men between now and 1960.
These figures do not include the
over one million men now classi-
fied as exempt from service.
I«]
Inductions for training and
Service can and should operate
concurrently.
a. The Director of the Selective
Service System officially confirms
our belief that inductions for
training can and should be con-
ducted concurrently with induc-
tions for Service.
b. The impartial drawing of lots
to decide who will serve and who
will train would be much fairer
than the present selection of some
for Service and Reserve Obligation
of eight years, with no Obligation
whatsoever for those not needed
for Service. '
l Present rejection Standards for
! military service are not realistic
in light of the nature of twen-
tieth Century warfare.
[7]
Our defense posture must be
well adapted to the long-term So-
Viet danger.
a. The immediate crisis is pari
of the continuing crisis, and the
immediate crisis five years from
now will be only another chapter
in the same crisis we face today.
b. In all our past i^rars we have
jsent inadequately trained men
Hnto battle.
c. If there is another world war,
We will probably be attacked first
er early in the conflict, If we do
not have trained fighting men be-
forehand, we will not have time
to train them afterwards.
<tsr d. In peacetime we cannot pos-
8^t)ly maintain active forces large
— "- '- ^nsur^victory in war.
ye cannot lapse
Ten must
National Secunty Tramtog Comraission a report recommending that Universal MUtervTrain!
ing be operated simultaneously with Selective Service. Seated with the PresMent isMai r^
SL^"? fr'- T""'«'»» «halrman. Standing, left to right are AdSl Thomas c'
K.nka.d. L.eut. Gen. Raymond S. McLain. Warren H. Atherton and Dr. S T Comptou*
ferred out of the Ready Reserve
to Stand-by Status upon their re-
quest as the national security
permits.
[3]
The tralnees should become the
basis of a realistic nonveteran re-
serve.
a. Trainees should be allowed to
satisfy their Rea<iy Reserve lia
bility liy chosing between several
optionÄ insofar as the mobiliza-
tion base permits. Ready Reserve
liability should be shortened de-
pending upon the extent of par-
ticipation by the individual Re-
servist. â– -
b. In addition, inducements to
jotn Units should be offered to
trainees to encourage voluntary
Unit participation.
c. The troop basis of Resei*ve
forces should be fixed at an ap-
propriate level based on require-
ments of the World Situation;
unorganized Ready Reservists
should remain in a pool, subject
to recall. There should be no ef-
fort to move all graduate trainees,
either basic, specialists, or offi-
cers, into organized units abovo
the required troop basis.
d. Each trainee upon his en-
trance into the corps should be
I screened and classified as soon as
pgcticable ^»j^adetermine his apti-
perhaps radiation. uttt cen-
tury's Minutemen must be skilled
as well as brave.
Accordingly. the commission
recommenda that:
[1]
All fit young men of 18 should
enter the National Security Train-
ing pc>ol upon registering with the
Belective Service System.
m
The trained nonveterans should
«erve ahead of the veterans to
the extent practfcable if there is
another emergency.
a^ After six months of basic and
technical training, National Secu-
ritrtrainees should be transferred
to the Reserve for seven and a
half years and should be liable to
recall ahead of veterans.
b. As the implementation of Na-
tional Security Training proceeds.
veterans of the present emergency
Who have served two years or
inore and who are not volunta-
Mly praticipating in Ready Re-
serve activitles should be trans-
plans. and
V fr. — ■■;. «»PQ and its
„öEil^ ^f^^*«üW be trained as
™^F?^^rehae as possible. He
Should be encouraged to pursue
through existing reserve training
facilities specialist skills ac-
quired while in the corps.
e. Graduates of the program
should be classified distinctly as
members of d nonveteran Re-
serve, not intended to go on ac-
tive duty unless the alternative
is the recall of Veteran Reserv-
ists.
f. The Reserve Obligation of
young men who undertake cer-
tain professional and technical
traming should be held in abey-
ance until the completion of such
training if they so wish.
g. In an emergency the Selec-
tive Service System should recall
Reservists who are not partici-
pating in Reserve activities and
who do not have specific mobi-
lization assignments in accord-
ance with the selective Standards
applying to young men liable for
Service.
w
Young men sÄould draw lots
upon registering with Selective
ServJce to determine whether
they will be liable for training
or Service.
a. They should be notified of
the result immediately.
b. Young men who desire to en-
list in the corps should be re-
quired to draw lots to determine
whether they will be liable for
training or service.
c. Volunteering for the corps by
those under 18 should be restrict-
ed to young men who have grad-
uated from high school or who
have left school for good reasons
and have parental consent.
d. Young men should be al-
lowed to specify the month of the
year following their 18th birth-
days during which they prefer
to be inducted, with priority be-
ing given to College students,
farm workers, and industrial
workers.
e. Young men should be al-
lowed to specify the service of
their choice and should be ac-
commodated to the extent possi-
ble within the overall quotas.
f. National Security Training
should be prerequisite to the con-
tinuätion of exemptions of non-
veterans from induction for serv-
ice because of participation in
organized Reserve units, includ-
ing the National Guard.
g. Permissive deferments now
authorized by regulation for men
liable for induction for service
should be dlsallowed for ihdilC^
tion for training.
h. The induction of young men
in agnculture and industry should
be delayed for seasonal work, al-
though such delay should not con-
tmue for extended periods.
i. Young men in high school
should not be inducted for train-
ing until they graduate, cease to
pursue their studies satlsfactorily,
or reach their 20th birthday.
whichever occurs first.
j. The induction of young men
in College should be delayed until
the end of the current academic
year or until they cease pursuing
their studies satlsfactorily, which-
ever occurs first.
k. As an Interim measurse,
young men who, at the time of
registration. have signed R.O.T.C.
contracts committing theni to
liability fo/two years or more of
active duty if a commission is
tendered upon graduation should
be considered to have fulfilled
their Obligation for training.
Should they subsequently fall for
any reason to fulflll their contract
oommitments, they should be in-
ducted for training or service as
appropriate.
1. Present statutory deferments
should continue for divinity stu-
dents, conscientious objectors
sole surviving sons, and severe
dependency hardship cases, but
the number in these categories
at age 18 will be very neglible.
[«]
National Security Training
should begin on Jan. 1, 1955, or
earlier, with at least 100,000 train-
ees. This number should taper up-
ward as manpower availability
and the size of the armed forces
permit.
[6]
In the training program, train-
ees should receive not more than
six months and not less than
1,050 hours of actual training.
a. Existing training facilities
should be utilized for this pro-
gram to their fĂĽllest capacity. No
new major construction should
be authorized unless absolutely
necessary.
b. Support personnel should not
exceed the number authorized for
similar training in the regula
components.
c. The trainees' rights to speak
to dissent, to believe as the
choose, to equal justice under ;aw
and to econonWc protection an
good health should be maintaine
to the highest possiW« 1-evel..:^
d. Trainees should be reiristate
within their Jobs if they wist
within thirty days after their re
lease from the corps.
e. With two reservations
trainees should be subject to th(
^t'mt' °^ Military Justice
«,fi;/"?*^"u^°':^ ^" nonmilitar>
fhi^^r^^ i^°."^^ «*^^v« to present
the broadest and most generali^
«^^^ i?*^ Pnnciples of our society
and should encourage individual
discussions after formal lectures.
g. Instructors should have the
highest moral and ethlcal stand-
arcis.
h Local Citizen advisory com-
mittees should be formed to help
improve the off-duty environment
of the trainees.
i. The commission should be
consuited by the Department of
Defense about the budget esti-
^ri? K°i' ^^^ Operation of their
f^ .?. D^^°''^ ^^^y *^« submitted
nnir/^ /^^'"^^"^ *"^ «hould be re-
quired to submit cost studies on
the program to the Congress.
iiou ^"« «Kommission should estab-
I lish an inspectlon System to carry
out the superirisory and reporting
responsibilitiis imposed upon it
by the Congress.
[7]
"Basic miitary training" should
be redefined in the light of twen-
tieth Century warfare.
a. A carefttl, specialized study of
present phfrsical and mental re-
jection Standards should be made
by an independent, nonmilitary
group.
b. Basic literacy courses should
be offered to trainees who have
not learned to read and write
and every effort should be made
to utilize otherwise limited per-
sonnel in the Corps.
[8]
National Security Training
would add these specific values to
our defensive posture and ability
to survive:
a. The nation would not again
have to recall Veteran Reservists
ahead of nonveterans, removing
the present deplorable inequity
which has created a class of priv-
ileged deferees, while multiplying
the bĂĽrden on those who volun-
teer or are drafted to train and
serve and then are the only
trained reserve for any future
emergency.
b. The steadiness of ouc long-
term preparedness might help de-
ter war.
c. Our young men would be
trained to survive, so we might
expect fewer military casualties
in the event of»war.
d. The trainees could be of value
to civil defense, especially those
who joined their local civil de-
fense Units.
e. We would be better prepared
to contend with local aggression ;
to hold or seize vital surface
areajs; to protect our sea and air
basjfs; to aid our allies before
the|^ were overrun; to use or re-
fra/n from using power weapons
in 'accordance with moral and
practical considerations; to fol-
lov up aerial blows against an
enfcmy; and to contend with
fifth column activities in time of
wjfr.
. The military establishment
wMild be assured of the continu-
ir^ existence of a training plant,
nned and equipped, so that
regulär forces would not have to
broken up for training pur-
ses in an emergency.
Ig. The civilian Reserve compo-
'ents would be vitalized by a
';eady flow of trainees with
600 hours of training, or about
) per cent ready, instead of 600
ours, or less than 20 per cent
eady as at present. T^Jiis can be
ccomplished in no othir feasible
ay over the long run.
h. Regulär forces would be im-
icdiately avaialble for duty in ''
[the theatre of Operations, and
Reserves could complete field
training by the time shipping was
livailable for their transportation.
i. Machinery would be created
for Classification and aptitude
determination so that potential
pfficers, noncommissioned offi-
cers, and specialists could be en-
couraged to take further training
in their status.
j. The disadvantages of crisis
psychology would be replaced, to
some extent, by a calm sense of
strength.
k. The over-all Investment, less
itea-.aĂĽiL- Buildings which
are already available, woĂĽld be
less than $2,700 per trainee. Un-
der certain specified circum-
stances, National Security Train-
ing might save the nation's tax-
payers several billions of dollars.
1. Disruption of civilian life and
the civilian economy would be
reduced because the trainees
would take the training at the
natural break between high school
and College or a career.
m. To whatever extent our ac-
tive forces could be safely re-
duced because of the added se-
curity of a streng nonveteran
Reserve, more of our young men
"would have time for civilian pur-
suits, giving us a strenger na-
tional economy,
n. Present uncertainties about
military Status would be reduced.
o. National Security Training
woĂĽld be compatible with the
best Clements of our national
heritage. It would not yield mili-
tarism under the provisions of
law which require continuing
general subvision of the Operation
of the corps by this independent,
;ivilian-majority commission.
33
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Present rejection Standard« for
tnihtai-y service are not realistic
In light of the natura ot twen-
tieth Century warf are.
^ 17]
Our defeiwe posture must be
well adapted to the long-term So-
Viet danger,
a. The immediate criais is part
or the continuing crisis, and the
immediate crisis five years from
now will be only another chapter
In the same crisis we face today
b. In all cur past wars we have
,sent inadequately trained men
"into battle.
c. If there is another world war
we will probably be attacked first
er early in the confllct. If we do
not have trained fighting men be-
forehand, we will not have time
to train them afterwards,
d. In peacetime we cannot pos-
»ibly maintain active forces large
"'-•- ' inaure victorv in war.
Tinot lapp^
4ipt only
«o ägalnst
ry» bona
perhaps radiation .^ui^^en-
lury's Minutemen must be skilled
as well as brave.
Accordingly. the commission
recommends that:
[1]
All fit young men of 18 should
; enter the National Security Train-
ing pool upon registering with the
Selective Service System.
m
The trained nonveterans »hould
»erve ahead of the veterans to
the extent practicable if there is
another emergency.
a. After six months of basic and
technical training, National Secu-
rit5n;rainees should be transferred
to the Reserve for seven and a
half years and should be liable to
, recall ahead of veterans.
b. As the implementation of Na-
â– tional Security Training proceeds,
i .veterans of the present emergency
* V >vho have served two years or
r snore and who are not volunta-
* rily praticlpating in Ready Re-
serve activities should be trans-
id
'^ isis of a lealistic nonveteran
serve.
a. Trainees should be allowed to
J^Z-i^'^l^heir Rea(iy Reserve lia-
bility Jy chosing between several
Option« insofar as the mobiliza-
tJon base permits. Ready Reserve
liability should be shortened de-
pending upon the extent of par-
ticipation by the individual Re-
servist. -
b^ In addition. inducementa to
Jörn Units should be offered to
trainees to encourage voluntary
Unit participation.
c. The troop basia of Reserve
forces should be fixed at an ap-
propriate level based on require-
ments of the world Situation-
unorganized Ready Reservists
should remain in a pool, subject
to recall. There should be no ef-
fort to move all graduate trainees,
either basic, specialists, or offi-
cers, into organized units abovo
the required troop basis.
d. Each trainee upon his en-
trance into the corps should be
acreenedjtnd classified as soon as
ViV? ^1 jff.determinfl hls apti-
' york Plans, and
y to 'exiAMMLMWA and its
He s]3ji^rting Reserve fa-
^^_^^^^ uld be trained as
neal' iliy "fTbhie as possible. He
should be encouraged to pursue
through existing reserve training
facilities specialist skills ac-
quired while in the corps.
e. Graduates of the program
should be classified distinctly as
members of A nonveteran Re-
serve, not intended to go on. ac-
tive duty unless the alternative
Is the recall of vetc in Reserv-
ists.
f. The Reserve Obligation of
young men who undertake cer-
tain professional and technical
training should be held in abey-
ance until the completion of such
training if they so wish.
g. In an emergency the Selec-
tive Service vSystem should recall
Reservists who are not partici-
pating in Reserve activities and
who do not have specific mobi-
lization assignments in accord-
ance with the selective Standards
applying to young men liable for
Service.
[4]
Young men should draw lots
upon registering with Selective
ist in the coi ps should he i e-
quiied to draw lots to determine
whether they will be liable for
training or service.
c. Volunteering for the corps by
those under 18 should be restrict-
ed to young men who have grad-
uated from high school or who
have left school for good reasona
and have parental consent.
d. Young men should be al-
lowed to specify the month of the
year following their 18th birth-
days during which they prefer
to be inducted, with priority be-
ing given to College students,
lärm workers, and industrial
workers.
e. Young men should be al-
lowed to specify the service of
their choice and should be ac-
commodated to the extent possi-
ble within the overall quotas.
f. National Security Training
should be prerequisite to the con-
tinuation of exemptions of non-
veterans from Induction for serv-
ice because of participation in
organized Reserve units, includ-
ing the National Guard.
g. Permissive deferments now
authorized by regulation for men
liable for induction for service
should be disallowed for indtlö-
tion for training.
h. The induction of young men
in agriculture and industry should
be delayed for seasonal work, al-
though such delay should not con-
tinue for extended periods.
i. Young men in high school
should not be inducted for train-
ing until they graduate, cease to
pursue their studies satisfactorily,
or reach their 20th birthday,
whichever occurs first.
j. The induction of young men
in College should be delayed until
the end of the current academic
year or until they cease pursuing
their studies satisfactorily, which-
ever occurs first.
k. As an Interim measurse,
young men who, at the time of
registration, have signed R.O.T.C.
contracts oommitting them to
liability fo 7two years or more of
active duty if a commission is
tendered upon graduation should
be considered to have fulfilled
their Obligation for training.
Should they subsequently fall for
any reason to f ulfill their contract
oommitments, they should be in-
COIHHISSION URGES
NEW TRAINING PLAN
Continued From Page 1
the President on a Reserve Forces
Training Program."
President Eisenhower directed
the commission last July 23 to
make a fresh examination of in-
equities in the Reserve System and
to report on the feasibility of a
niilitary training program to sup-
ply nonveteran Reserves while
continuing the draft.
An earlier proposal to enact
Universal Military Training was
referred back to the House Armed
Services Committee last year for
further study. Although the Sen-
ate Armed Sei-vices Committee ap-
proved the bil] by unanimous vote,
it did not reach the Senate floor
The commission members said
:.V.T,^^.J^^^^^'^^ "° indication
whether the White House would
seek Congressional acticn on their
new recommendations.
.xrwl!^^ ^^ ^ "^^^ Conference!
Whether he believed the report'
would be enacted, General Adler
Bald the commission members "be-
Iieve it can" win Congressional
approval. It was not the comniis-
Bion s task to determine what Con-
gress might do, he added.
There was sufficient difference
between conditions now and in
March, 1952, when the earlier Uni-
versal Military Training bill failed'
of Congressional approval. to War-
rant hope of enactment this time
General Adler said.
He added that he assumed Presi-
dent Eisenhower v^rould not decide
whether to request Congressional
action until he received a compan-
ion report from the Office of De-
fense Mobilization on the question
whether men of draft age would
be available for National Security
Training.
In 1951 the commission held
that Universal Military Training
could not be started while the Ko-
rean war was draining off man-
power through selective service
With the armistice, that Situa-
tion has changed. Draft calls*since
last July have been running at 23 -
:000 a month, less than half the
^oie .sinviving son.s. and sevei^
) dependency hardship caaes, but
the number in these cate^oriea
at age 18 will be very neglible
I«J
National Security Traininc
should begin on Jan. 1, 1955 or
earlier, with at least 100.000 trkin-
ees. This number should taper up-
ward as manpower availability
and the size of the armed forces
permit.
I6J
In the training program, train-
ees should receive not more than
six months and not less than
l.OöO hours of actual training.
a. Existing training facilities
should be utilized for this pro-
gram to their fĂĽllest capacity No
new major construction should
be authorized unless abaolutely
necessary.
b. Support personnel should not
exceed the number authoriaed for
similar training in the regulari
components.
c. The trainees' rights to speak
to diasent, to belleve as the
I choose, to equaljuatice under ]av
and to econonWc protection an
good health should be maintain«
to the highest-poseible leweiv •.;-,
d. Trainees should be reinstate
within their jobs if they wis
within thirty days after their r
lease from the corp».
e. With two reservations,
trainees should be subject to th<
Uniform Code of Military Justice
of 1951.
f. Instructors in nonmilitar\
subjftcts should strive to present
the broadest and most generali^
accepted principles of cur society
and should encourage individual
discussions after formal lectures.l
g. Instructors should have the'
highest moral and ethical Stand-
ards.
h. Local Citizen advisory com-
mittees should be formed to help
improve the off-duty environmenf
of the trainees.
i. The commission should be
consulted by the Department o
Defense about the budget esti-
mates for the Operation of their
Corps before they are submitted
to the President and should be re-
quired to submit cost studies on
the program to the Congress.
j. The commission should estab-
lishan inspection system to carry
calls for an extended period dur-
ing the active fighting. Charles
E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense,
announced last Friday that the
February call would be further re-
duced to 18,000.
Mr. Wilson said then that the
draft or some equivalent would
have to be continued for the
"foreseeable future."
Campaign Stand Recalled
During the 1952 campaign Gen-
eral Eisenhower, 'who had been a
supporter of Universal Military
j Training earlier, appeared to op-
pose its enactment so long as the
Korean war made heavy demands
on selective service.
At Decatur, 111., on Oct. 2,
1952. he said: "We have the Selec-
tive Service. Let us not have any-
thing eise piled on top of that un-
til we solve this problem."
Dr. John A. Hannah, assistant
secretary of defense for man-
power and personnel, is on record
as contending that the available
manpower pool cannot support na-
tional training and the draft at
the same time.
An opposite conclusion was
reached by the commission and
supported by General Hershey. The
report held that any reduction of
the armed forces next year as
planned by Mr. Wilson would en-
hance the feasibiilty of National
Service Training by making more
young men available.
"The program can begin at once
with at least 100,000 trainees and
this level can be maintained or in-
creased," the commission reported.
"Even if the [armed] forces are
maintained at 3,360,000 through
1960, which is highly unlikely * * *
we estimate there will be about
1,000,000 men available for Na-
tional Security Training during the
rest of this decade.
In the event of a reduction in
the forces to 3,130,000, 1,500,000 or
more young men will be available
rör training."
The commission, which prepared
Its report before the "New Look"
m defense planning was outlinöd
by Admiral Arthur W. Radford,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
ötaff, actually underestimated the
P^^"ed reduction in active forces.
• •^^- "^""^^ disclosed this even-
mg that the manpower cutbacks
recommended to President Eisen-
hower and the National Security
Council would bring the armed
Services "substantially below the
3,000,000 figure."
In a broadcast interview tonight,
Dr. Hannah said the Defense De-
partment was going to "read the
report carefully and going to pass
judgment objectively on it."
He questioned, however, whether
six months' training was adequate
for reservists who might be called
to combat duty "almost without
notice."
The main conciusions of the
Training Commission are:
lAli young men should share
equally the Obligation of. national
Service.
^The present Keserve system is
unfair, because veterans of World
War II and Korea are in double
jeopardy while younger men who
have never seen active service are
free of Obligation. About 2,500,000
of the 3,500,000 men who reached
their 18th birthday between World
War II and the start of the Korean
emergency did not see service until
June. 1950. As a result more than
600,000 World War II veterans i
were recalled to duty. j
^The Reserve is seriously under
strength as a result, with only 32
per Cent of Reservists participat-
mg actively in the program. They
are reluctant to join because they
f eel this unequal treatment is mor-
ally wrong.
^Physical and mental Standards
of the armed Services are unreal-
istic. These should be readjusted
to make use of men who could
drive a truck or serve as Clerks
even if they were not fit for com-
bat duty.
^National Security Training
would remove the bĂĽrden of dou-
ble jeopardy from veterans and
build a trained Reserve of non-
veterans who should be called to
active duty first in the event of
war or emergency.
A program of national service
along^ these lices, the commission
said. would save billions of dollars
by making possible reductions in
the Standing military forces.
Details of the National Service
Training program recommended by
the commission were not much dif-
^n^«"^ from those proposed in the
1952 Universal Military Training
bill. The men would enter the corps
between the ageg of 18 and 10,
js.
uld be assured of the continu
: existence of a training plant
nned and equipped. so that
Jjgular forces would not have to
broken up for training pui-
ses in an emergency.
g. The civilian Reserve compo-
enta would be vitalized by a
J^l 'Jow of trainees with
,600 hours of training, or about
»« per Cent ready, instead of 600
»ours, or leaa than 20 per cent
'eady as at present. This can be
ccomplished in no oth<y feasible
i^ay over the long run.^
h. Regulär forces would be im-
lediately avaialble for duty in
he theatre of Operations, and
eserves could complete field
Taining by the time shipping was
â– vailable for their transportation.
i. Machinery would be created
ror Classification and aptitude
Determination so that potential
«iricers, noncommissioned offi-
cers. and specialists could be en-
«ouraged to take further training
m their statua. *
J. The disadvantages of crisis
psychology would be replaced, to
some extent. by a calm sense of
strength.
k. The over-all Investment, less
-caro-p sito, and huildin^s which
are already available, would be
less than $2,700 per trainee. Un-
der certain specified circum-
stances, National Security Train-
ing might save the nation's tax-
payers several billions of dollars.
1. Disruption of civilian life and
the civilian economy would be
reduced because the trainees
would take the training at the
natural break between high school
and College or a career.
m. To whatever extent our ac-
tive forces could be safely re-
duced because of the added se-
curity of a streng nonveteran
Reserve, more of our young men
would have time for civilian pur-
suits. giving us a strenger na-
tional economy.
n. Present uncertainties about
military status would be reduced.
o. National Security Training
would be compatible with the
best elements of our national
heritage. It would not yield mili-
tarism under the provisions of
law which require continuing
general subvision of the Operation
of the corps by this independent,
'Mvilian-majority commission.
CITY TRASH MEN WARNED
be assigned to camps nearest their
homes and receive $30 a month.
The commission urged thatrr^ij m-a * a * «
trainees be subject to thf Uniforrnr°'^,^;* *°J;^,^^P* "'.^y^"* '''
Code of MiUtary Justice, with' ^*'^'"^® ^^''^^ ^*'''''* '* 0"
these reservations:
^ Young men charged
with
Sanitation Commissioner An-
drew W. Mulrain cautioned city
murder, voluntary manslaughter,iarbage collectors yesterday not to
rape, robbery, maiming, arson or
aggrevated assaults would have
the Option of trial by a Federa!
civil court or general court-martial.
^Commandiijg officers, courts-
martial and review authorities
should give fĂĽll regard to the
youth and inexperience of trainees
m approving or affirming punish-
ment.
Speaking of the present system,
the comniission declared:
"America's first line of defense,
then, is older men with families,
special skills valuable in civilian
life, good Jobs, slight paunches,
and a bitterness too justified to
criticize. In an emergency the
younger ones who have not been
and are not being prepared to de-
tend themselves in battle again
would have to be called behind the
veterans, if at all, and given too-
! nasty. too-little, too-Iate training."
Trainees under the new plan, if
it were adopted, would have a big-
ger reserve Obligation than the
araftees, the commission said. The
trainees would have to serve seven
and a half years in the Ready Re-
serve, which means they could be
called the minute an emergency
occurred. The draftees, after their
two years of active military Serv-
ice would have a six-year Reserve
ob^i^ation, but this would be in the
stand-by Reserve which woiAd not
be called in until the Ready Re
serve was exhausted
ccept payment for emergencj
larbage .service during the strike
" private refuse collectors.
In a general teletype order to all
cations, he said requests for pay-
ent would be made at a later date
/ the City Controller's office. The
^^rge will be at the rate of $2 a
Jibic yard. An emergency commit-
Jje of the Health, Fire and Sanita-
^ÂĄ)u Departments is receiving ap-
Pjications for such service at 125
^orth Street or by telephone at
^Orth 2-6900. |
lAjiother attempt to mediate the'
afpute between Local 813, Interna-
li^ Brotherhood of Teamsters,
, • F. L., and private garbage col-
J^Jtors was unsuccessful yesterday.
^fiiiel Kornblum, director of the
cif/'s Division of Labor Kelations,
s^H the Session was adjourned
suf ject to call. The strike began
onlDec. 7.
CjiURT GUARDIAN SOUGHT
Pojlier Brooklyn Politician, 82,
Called Incompetcnt
Recept Bride Killed by Auto
Mrs. Irene Mannion, 26 years
old, a bride of less than a month,
was killed yesterday by an auto-
mobile that threw her in front of
another car on Jamaica Avenue at
201st Street, Hollis, Queens. Her
home address was 91-01 211th
Street, Queens Village. Mrs. Man-
nion was Crossing the avenue at
5:10 P. M. on her way home from
work. The two cars were travel-
'1 action to declare William J.
lernan, 82 years old, incom-
|it to handle his affairs will
'eard Friday in Brooklyn Su-
TT hi* Court by Justice Hen^y L.
ugn.tta. The octogenarian is a
T?il^F President of the Board of
hrJf •* ^^^^ ^^^ brought by a
Tor« F' former Representative
th^r '^- Heffernan. He asked
«^,oJ^*^"^ ^° appoint a special
5"^r|ia,n.
nZ?l younger Mr. Heffeman is
AcSiT^f^^^ leader of the Twelfth
rrf/Tibly District. He charged
r^rinT^ brothei>suffered lapses of
trau!T^ and inability to concen-
ter'divT P^^,!^"^i"ary hearing yes-
fhof ^1 -Justice Ughetta reported
mal ^he eider brother, long a
4^:
•V
ing m opposite directions. NolPower m the DemocrätYc Dartv in
Charge was made against either Brooky„ j^^.^^^^^f^c ^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^-_ _>____ w t ^^^^ Saturday in Edge-
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, THUkSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1952.
RESERVE OFFICERS
HONOR RED GROSS
Cite New York Regional Blood
Program for Distinguished
Services to Armed Forces
The U. M. T. Issue—I
2 Current Measures Held to Have Little
Relation to Military Reality in Atom Age
The Reserve Officerg Assocla-
tion's annual award for distin-
guished Services to the armed
forces was won yesterday by the
New York Regional Blood Program
of the American Red Gross.
At a ceremony in the Red Gross
Manhattan center, 70 West For-
tieth Street, Maj. Gen. Julius Ochs
Adler, Commander of the Seventy-
â– eventh Division and vice President
and general manager of The New
York Times, presented the scroll
to Golby M. Ghester. chairman of
the New York Red Gross Ghapter.
Lieut. Gol, Abraham Kaufman,
President of the Manhattan Ghap-
ter of the Reserve Officers Asso-
ciation accompanied General Adler,
who in turning the acroU over to
Mr. Ghester, said:
"We who know war know the
terrible price that has to be paid
In blood. The Red Gross, through
its Blood Donor Program, has
saved countless lives, and is ren-
dering a service of unusual type
and scope to the amied forces. As
Reserve Officers we are proud to
acknowledge this service by the
presentation of this scroll."
The Red Gross announced that it
had received 1,162 pints of blood
on Tuesday in its two centera and
aix bloodmobiles. The employes of
the Railway Express Agency, 219
East Forty-second Street, contrib-
uted the largest amount, 279 pints.
It also was reported that as of
Monday, the first eleven day» of
this month, the Red Gross received
9,255 pints, which Is 900 pints
more than it had gathered in a
similar period last month. The
February quota has been aet at
30,000 pints.
Appointmenta for blood contri-
butions can be made in Manhattan
at 70 West Fortieth Street, MUr-
ray Hill 9-1000, and ar the Brook-
lyn center, 57 Willoughby Street.
MAin 4-6001.
By HANSON W. BALDWIN
Military Training— Cromwellian Puritanism about him
and was persistent in his views;
he had differed sharply with this
writer in the past about the prin-
ciple of Universal Military Train-
ing. Hence a letter he sent this
writer pointing up the weak gpots
of U. M. T., as approved by Con-
gregs last year, came with all the
more force.
Under date of last June 4, Mr.
Patterson, commenting on an arti-
cle by this author, wrote that "for
a year now it has seemed piain to
me that the time had com« when
the armed forces should be
strengthened by universal service
of all young men at 18, to serve
two years, going directly to the
Army, Navy and Air Force."
"An undertaking of this kind,"
he added, "would supply the need
Universal
ione of the most controversial and
jleast understood measures in our
recent military history — was once
again the subject of discussion last
week by both House and Senate
Armed Sei*vices Gommlttees.
The House committee completed
its consideration of a bill intended
to initiate U. M. T. in the near
future, and the Senate committee
started hearings on the same
subject.
The bill, as reported out by the
House committee, and the measure
that is likely to be reported out by
the Senate committee have little
relation to military reality in the
atomic age.
The proposed legislation, on
which the House may vote this
month, has dangerous social and
political implications. But above
all, its miUtary features will in-
evitably complicate tremendously
the already muddled military man-
power Situation of the nation and
will be, if put into cffect soon, a
positive deterrent, rather than a
help, to military readiness.
The implementing legislation,
now under discussion, comes as a
sequel to Gongressional approval
last year of the principle of uni
Versal military training. But the
legislation that Gongress approved
last year was a far call, indeed,
from the universal military service
legislation that was recommended
to the Pentagon by the late Robert
P. Patterson, one-time Secretary
of War, and by others.
Pentagon Plan Altered
The Pentagon program as pre-
sented to Gongress was confusing
and inept but Gongress last year
further distorted and emasculated
it so that the law as passed was
a hybrid of very doubtful military
Utility.
The late Mr. Patterson, a man
of great integrity and tenacity of
purpose, saw this clearly and ex-
pressed his feeling about the baslc
U. M. T. law, which Gongress is
now trying to implement, in
strong terms last summer, more
than six months before his un-
tlmely death in an Elizabeth, N. J.,
plane crash.
Mr. Patterson had almost a
CanaiatoBĂĽiliV. S.Jett
For Use by British Fliers
By The Associated Prtir .
WASHINGTON, Feb. 13— Air
Force Secretary Thomas K. Fin-
letter announced a three-nation
agreement tonight under which
Ganada will bulld Sabre jet
ftghters equipped with United
States engines to be flov^Ti by
pilots of the British Royal Air
Force.
Mr. Finletter said the planes
would be used to strengthen the
North Atlantic Treaty forces
commanded by General of the
Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Canada and the United States
have been the only countries to
use the Sabre jet.
The announccment said Gan-
ada would build the F-6-E jets
at Ganada Air, Ltd. The United
States will supply the engines,
Instruments and other Govem-
ment-furnlshed equipment pro-
duced only in this country. The
number and production sched-
ules of the aircraft were not dis-
closed, but officials said the
figure would run into "some
hundred?."
ed power, would do away with the,
necessity of taklng men in the! war, raising raw regiments when
older age brackets who had al-jseaaoned regiments were falling to
ready found productive work and pleces and many others; but !t
had assumed family responsibjll- seems that we do not always leam
tiea and would avoid the harsh in- ( by experience."
ARMY WILL TRAIH
190,000 RESERVISTS
Continued From Pag« 1
military experience art expected
to serve a tour of duty averajrinf
thirty days with an actlvt Army
training division. Also, 15,000 of-
ficers of the so-calied Volunteer
Reserve are scheduled to receive
fifteen days of training in the ficld
or at schools.
The Army »uthorized the Or-
ganized Reserve Corps to call 10,-
450 officers and enlisted men from
Units of the troop program for an
additional four days to enable
them to prepare for the field train-
ing before the main body of Re-
servists arrlved at the campe.
The Army said that it dld not
yet know how many campe would
be involved in the expanded train-|
ing program. Last year, 151 were
used. Neither did the Army have
any word on plana for the summer
training of College membera of the
Reserve Officers Training Gorps.
The Army also said that it
planned jtraining for 2,677 officers
and 2,805 enlisted jnen who were
at Service schools (schools oper-
ated by branches of the Army,
such as infantry, artillery and
u
equalities and demoralizing condi-j Mr. Patterson's main point was j^^^f^^f", '"^55^77^ ĂśI3
tiona brought about by present the loglcal one that what ^^^f^^'^irl'Jlil^^^
procedures in Selective Ser^-ice. ineeded now was a compulsory re- \'^^t .1 L^J" Jl \*^'
"(But) the provisions of the bin.quirement that every youngst^r ^^^l^» ^^^^^^r^J^ *J«^^^
were watered down ♦ » * so that! serve two years-an>4here in tl-c if 'ii° ^l' ?P' "^^^^
the final product amounts to aI-|world-in the regulär Army, ^Byx^^^^I^^ ^"^"^P* ^^^*^' ^^^"* ^""^
most nothing. lor Air Force. He fully endorsed ^^^^''
"U. M. T. • • • Is of dubious the principle of Universal Militarv. _ .
value now. If put into Operation I Training for all boys (even in Dcfcnie Award for Skourat
it will not provide military strengthjpeacetime— and this is where the The first "merit flag" *'^- '*•
but will actually reduce it by rea
son of the assignment of a large
number of the professional military
to handle the training program.
The plan is also unfortunate in
that it will inevltably lead to cod-
dllng, the exact opposite of what
is needed.
"I had hoped that this country
had learned the folly of half-
hearted military policles, such as
Short cnlistments even in tlme of
The first "merit flag" for out-
writer disagreed with him), but ^^tanding contribution to civil de-
belleved that present world condi- t\*nse recruitlng here was presented
tlons made a requlrement for two yesterday to George P. Skouras,
years of service mandatory. president of the Skouras Theatres
Other authorities disagreed with
Mr. Patterson in his criticism of
the present basic U. M. T. legis-
lation, not because it was the legis-
lation they wanted and not be-
cause they feit it was ideal legia-
latlon, but solely on the basls that
half a loaf was better than none.
Corporation and the United Artists
Theatre Circuit, at a ceremony in
his Office at 233 West Forty-ninth
Street. Robert W. Dowllng, chalr-
niaji of the Manhattan recruitlng
Office, presented the flag as Arthur
W. Wallander, retiring City Direc-
inr- of Civil Defense, watched.
MEN!
Tahe advantage of aur
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16
L +
THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY. FEBRUARY 14, 1952.
I
AGGRESSORS LUNGE
INTO GOUVERNEUR
Forces in Mock War Maintaln
Bridgeheads Established
Along Highway 11
New Chatrman of GroĂĽp
To Aid Women Prisoners
By KALMAN SEIGEL
Specl»! to Th« New York Timei.
CAMP DRUM, N. Y., Fcb. IS-
Aggressor enemy forces continued
their powerful attacks, taking
Gouverneur in the early dawn, as
the Joint Army-Air Force cold-
weather maneuver, called Exercise
Snowfall. reached a crucial phase
today. .
The Aggressor forces scored
gains of four to six miles along
Highway 11 after sccuring bridge-
heads established earlier in the
ßight. ^, - «. u
A streng thrust south or High-
way 11 forced continued with-
drawal of Clements of the Third
Armored Cavalry of the United
States Def ender Forces. Reinforc-
ing elements from the Eleventhi
Airborne Division were used as a
covering force for this withdrawal.
This morning the covering force
was isolated by surrounding Ag-
gressor forces south of Sprague-
ville. It included elements of the
Seventy-first and Seventy-sixth
Tank Battalions of the Eleventh
Airborne.
Straf ed 'by low-flying enemy
fighters, the isolated units formed
a Perimeter defense or. high ter-
rain from which they successfully
repulsed enemy attempts to take
the hilltop.
The Stat« of the War
The over-all Situation was this:
United States Defender Forces
had been forced back to their main
line of resistance. This line runs
from Theresa, across Highway 26
to Antwerp. thence south of East
Antwerp through Alpina to the
right boundary of the maneuver
area.
They maintained an outpost line
for delaying purposes from High-
way 26 opposite Hyde Lake, run-
ning east across Highway 11 south
of Spragueville, running southeast
of Kellogg Corners to the right
maneuver boundary.
Aggressor forces had succeeded
In isolating a United States tank
battalion just south of Sprague-
ville.
The main attack was along the
axis of Highway 11. The second-
ary thrust was to the south in
westerly direction with the axis
thi^ough Sylvia Lake.
Tanker Gets Intense
Umpires, watching the battle,
tagged dead and wounded. Blank
cartridgc tank fire and heavy mor-
tar fire cchoed over the hill in
near-zero weather as the tankers
jockeyed for the best defensive po-
sitions. Simulated wounded were
taken to a f ield
and there await
EUROPEAN ARSENALS
EXPAND, TRUM AN SAYS
WASHINGTON, Feb, 13 (/P)—
Western Europe's arsenals, in
which the United States has in-
vested millions of dollars for
mutual defense, are about to quad-
ruple the value of their contribu-
tions, President Truman told
Congress today.
' For reasons of military security
the President did not give precise
figures in making his fourth semi-
annual report on the Mutual De-
jfense Assistance Program.
I But he stated that "it may be
,said that the estimated total value
'of Western European production
I of miUtary hard-goods during 1952
.will be approximately four times
1951 — these shipments totaled
$1.439,000,000.
Among the military items which
Mr Truman said are now being
produced in "significant quantity
by Allied countries in Europe are
military vehicles, machine guns,
mines, rockets and other ammuni-
tion He also mentioned such
heavy items as planes, tanks and
warships, . ,
Without giving the number of
effective combat divislons now
under the command of General of
the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower,
the report said that "it is not yet
adequate, to be sure, but Western
Europe is no longer the mihtary
vacuum it was in 1949."
Catholic Group to Seek $950,000
A quota of $950.000 in behalf of
Ihe 1952 appeal of the New York
AVAIANCHE TOLL 75;
MORE SNOW IN EUROPE
The New York Time»
Miss Henrietta Additon
Institutions for women and
girls should have women as
superintendents, according t* a
resolution the National Confer-
ence of Superintendents of Wo-
men's and Girls' Correctional
Institutions adopted yesterday in
closing its twenty-third annual
meeting, held at the Grovernor
Clinton Hotel. Forty-five women
from this country and Canada
attended.
Miss Henrietta Additon, Su-
perintendent of Westfield State
Farms, was elected chairman.
The resolution said that "it is
destructive to the werk of re-
habilitation for girls and women
in correctional institutions to de-
part from the policy of appoint-
ing women superintendents" and
that there was danger that this
policy was being ignored by ap-
pointing authorities in certain
areas.
Another resolution recom-
mended closer Cooperation be-
tween releasing and placing au-
thorities and the Institution
staff, to produce a continuing
method of treatment.
the 1949 value." The Mutual De-'Catholic Charities was announced
last night at an Organization meet-
ing of the special gifts committee
of the Cardinal's Committee of the
Laity. The meeting was held in the
Empire State Club, Empire State
Building. John J. Coleman, cxecu-
tive chairman, presided.
fense program has been in exist-
ence for two years.
Modern military weapons and
supplies are moving overseas in
an increasing stream, the Pres-
ident reported. For the period of
the report— April 1 to Oct. 9,
ZĂśRICH, Switzerland, Feb. 13
(UP)— New snow avalanches thun-
dered down Alpine mountainsides
in Switzerland and the Austrian
Tyroi today, boosting the winter's
accldent death toll to seventy-five.
Fresh snows throughout the area
threatened more avalanches.
Two more skiers were killed.
Germany is experiencing its
heaviest snowfall kl thirty years.
Roads throughout many areas of
westem Europe are impassable.
Mail deliveries have been delayed.
A second avalanche roared down
the Brienzerrothorm Mountain in
Austria, destroying all buildings
on the slope, including a number
of Chalets built in 1663, which
never previously had been dam-
aged by snowslides.
The death toll in the avalanche
which buried a tiny ski resort near
Melkoede Monday rose to twenty
today with the death of a German
Skier who waa injured in the
snowslide.
Snow feil for the tenth straight
day in the Alpine areas of Swit-
zerland, Austria, Germany, France
and Italy. In France, record snows
piled up in the Puy de Dome re-
gion, collapsing roofs and isolating
several villages.
Myers Is Re-elected a Regent
ALBANY, Feb. 13 CP)— The
Legislature today formally re-elec-
ted Chancellor John P. Myers of
Plattsburg to a thirteen-year term
on the Board of Regents, govern-
ing body of education in this state.
The unanimous action came at a
traditional Joint meeting of the
Senate and Assembly. Mr. Myers'
new term will start April 1. He
was elected a Regent in 1944, and
became vice chancellor three years
later. He was elected chancellor
by the board on Jan. 1. 1951.
Student, Staked at Brown,
StakesOthersto $1,275
Sp«cial to The New York Times.
PROVIDENCE, Feb. 13— Brown
University officials, harassed by
budget Problems, had something
to cheer about today.
An undergraduate walked into
the administration building and
offered to repay $1,275 he had
received in scholarship funds
over the last three years. Re-
cently the unexpected*^ heir of a
substantial amount of money, the
Student feit that the university's
past generosity should be repaid
with interest,
"I could not have come to
Brown without this help and now
that I do not need it any more
I want someone eise to have the
Chance," he said.
The money will become inime-
diately available for other schol-
arship grants. The undergradu-
ate, an honor Student prominent
in Campus activities, did not
want his name revealed.
you too can play the
HAMMOND
CHORD ORGAN
in 30 niinutes
Come in
today
and be
convinced.
Knabe
For 26 y*ar«, officiol pioi«*
of the Metropoüton 0p«r«.
5th Avenue Heodquarters for complel*
Hammond Orgon leUctiea
584 Fifth Av«., bet. 47th and
48»h Stf. • PLoza 7*1900
OPEN THURSDAY EVENtNGS UNTU 9 fM..
SATURDAYS UNTI16 P.M.
that are taking part in the maneu-
ver have been conditioned for
severe Winter warfare, Lieut. Gen.
Willis D. Crittenberger, Com-
manding General of the First
Army and Director of Exercise
Snowfall, said today.
In a progress report on the suc-
cess of the maneuver General Crit-
tenberger saij^he was satisfied
rformaafl^AÂŁi/er
Two Aggressor
or foolhardy, roll
die of the perĂĽn
f ender tanks roared down with
guns belching round after round of
ammunition. Both were knocked
out.
One tanker, standing tall in his
turret, seemed to be enjoying the
mock war around him. His driver,
leriously intent, yelled:
"Get the hell out of there before
you get US all killed!"
At midnight the isolated ele-
ments still held the perimeter de-
fense south of Spragueville. The
balance of the division was de-
fending on its organized Position
along the general line Theresa-
Antwerp-Indian Lake, with the
Third Armored Cavalry providing
flank security.
There is no doubt that the troops
I -
States Army,T!rrived at t^e camp
today to observe the maneuver.
Defense Coordinator Named
WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 (UP)—
The American Red Gross today an-
nounced the appointment of Clar-
ence F. Rowland of Cheverly,
Md., as civil defense coordinator,
to maintain liaison between the re-
lief agency and the Federal Civil
Defense Administration. With the
Red Gross since 1917, Mr. Rowland
has been Assistant National Direc-
tor of Disaster Services since 1946.
He formerly served with the Red
Gross in Siberia. South Russia,
Turkey and Armenia and in the
Midwcst and South.
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, F UDAY. FEBRUARY 15, 1952.
\
'ATOM SHELL' FIRED
AT TROOPS ĂśPSTATE
Fourth of RepjimentDestroyed,
Camp Drum Umpirt Ruies
in First Such Ficid Test
The U.M.T. Issue-II
Many Asser t That Implementing Program
in Present Form Would Impair Defense
By HANSON W. BALDWIN
By KALMAN SEIGEL
SpecUl to Th« Niw York Times.
CAMP DRUM, N. Y., Feb. 14—
The "aggressor" enemy brought
into play a new and lethal weapon
today — a simulated artillery shcll
with an atomic warhead — and in-
flicted heavy damagc on the 511th
Airborne Regiment of the "United
States forces" in maneuvers in the
field.
The simulated atomic artillery
Shell was fired just before noon in
the vicinity of Hall's Corners, four
miles West of Antwerp, in support
of an aggressor ground attack.
The use of the simulated weapon
was watched with high interest by
Lieut. Gen. Willis D. Critten-
berger, Commanding General of
the First Army and director of
Exercise Snowfall, the Joint Army-
Air Force cold-weather war games
now under way near here, and by
other high officials and unit Com-
manders.
The test gave the military an
indication of what might happen
if an atomic missile were fired into
the midst of a fighting regi-
ment. An early evaluation of the
casualties and equipment damage
indicated the destruction of about
one-fourth of the regiment.
On the basis of umpir« reports,
General Crittenberger announced
that **th« damage in this instance
is assessed to be sufficie]jt to cause
a serious modifitation of plans for
the employment of the troops in
this area."
Big Factor Wa« Surprls©
Early umpire reports indicated
. complete destruction of a battalion
headquarters, a Company and a
complete battery, and partial dam-
age to three other companies. One
factor that made for the heavy
*'casualties," the umpires reported,
was surprise.
The Simulation was achieved
by joining the effects of a flash
bomb dropped f rom a B-26 bomber,
a Charge of T. N. T. set off on the
ground and smoke Streaming from
three F-51 fighters. Air bursts of
atom charges normally leave little
residual radioactivity, and while
simulated attempts to measure
"radioactivity" were made, no esti
mates were disclosed.
The atomic "shell burst" had a
threefold effcct: its blast killed
men and damaged equipment; its
heat produced personnel casualties
or caused fires irr equipment; and
instantaneous radiation produced
rays of high and deadly intensity.
General Crittenberger pointed
oat thutvÄince this was the first
\ Uinß a «imuiated nuclear weapon
neuvers, the steps leadn&^^J ,^°
its «ae had been carefuUy and dc-
libcratcly foUowed. Here is how^
it was brought into play:
Just atfer midnight last night
an aggressor patrol captured a
United States soldier with a map«
of the defender's troop positions.
The map was carefuUy studied by
aggressor intelligence and passed
through the various levels to the
aggressor Commander, Brig. Gen.
William Emiis.
A "Lucrative Atomic Target"
He decided early in the morning
that the concentration of Umted
States troops in a spot four miles
west of Antwerp would make a
lucrative atomic target." He called
for aerial reconnaissance at day-
break and after studying the
Photos ordered viaual air recon-
naissance to confirm what the
Photos had shown. After the sec-
ond check he ordered the atomic
The proposed Universal Military
Training plan, now under discus-
sion in Congress, is believed by
many leaders to be a definite
handicap to national defense.
The View that the present law,
which Congress is now trying to
implement, is an entering wedge,
a Start from which a better law
may grow later, is one that is en-
dorsed officially by the Pentagon,
but there are some in high places
who do not agree with this view.
The basic U. M. T. legislation,
and the implementing measures
now being discussed by Congress,
provide for six months' training —
not for all, but for all 18-year-olds
reasonably physically fit — to be
Started when the President or
Congress decides.
The training, however, would be
in a separate "National Security
Training Corps," not a part of the
armed forces.
The training would be military
but would be supervised by a ci-
vilian commission and would be
ringed round with various limita-
tions and attempted safeguards,
which would make old-time top
sergeants turn over m their
graves, and which actually have
no valid place in any military
training for adults.
The National Security Training
Commission, for instance. reported
to Congress— undoubtedly as a in reserve components, thus build
to what it thinks is public ^^S up a large mass of semi
U. «1. T. 18 ENDORSED
BY HEAD OF LEGION
National Commander Teils
Senate Armed Services
Committee His Views
CONSIDERS U. S. BIDS
^
-.'•'S^s^s.s:*^;:?
ington but most of them, following
the "party line" of policy, will not
speak out publicly.
Maj. Gen. John S. Wood, U. S. A.,
retired, a distinguished tank Com-
mander in World War II, is one
exception however. He has in-
formed Congress that "from the
Standpoint of national security —
which should be the only basis of
consideration — U. M. T. as now
planned will cost enormous sums
of money without providing any
security whatever or in any way
deterring possible aggressors."
"On the other hand," he added,
"the continuation of the draft, or
a requirement of universal military
Service for eighteen months to two
years * * * seems inevitable for
a long period ahead."
"Luxury We Can't Afford'»
One mihtary official on a high
echelon told this writer recently
that "as long as we have limited
funds, U. M. T. is a luxury we can't
afford."
"You don't stockpile," he said,
"a guy you can teach on the pro-
duction Hne in thirty to 120 days."
The human "stockpiUng" he
mentioned referred to the Provi-
sion in the U. M. T. law that re-
quires all trainees after comple-
tion of six months of training to
serve for seven and one-half years
sop
opinion — that :
"We believe that no 3.2 beer
should be sold in a U. M. T. camp
or training area. We would expect
the PX's, ship stores and trainee
Clubs within the U. M. T. area to
provide adequate soft drinks, fruit
Juices, ice cream, and a wholesome
atmosphere."
Limitations in Program
The trainees in the corps would
have different pay and would be
subject to laws and regulations
separate from, but similar to, those
governing the regulär sei-vices, a
feature that would certainly en-
courage separatism and discourage
morale. Training would be limited
to this country; the youths would
not be liable for service overseas,
and our regulär forces would not
be strengthened but weakened, be-
cause of additional turnover and
the necessity of providing training
cadres for the trainees in the Na-
tional Security Training Corps.
There are many within the mili-
tary Service who have grave mis-
givings about the present legisla-
tion and are anxious to see any
attempt to implement it deferred,
at least for ^the duration of the
present emergency. Some of these
critics are men high in both ci-
viltan and military posts in Wash-
trained manpower. This authority
feit, as many others do, that such
a policy would do nothing to in-
crease our military "readiness,"
and might well impair it. The real
Problem of mobilization is not, and
never has been, the training of
large masses of military man-
power, but the manufacture of
arms and equipment and the Or-
ganization of Units.
The same man foresaw the emer-
gence of three major problems that
would greatly complicate the al-
ready enormous problems of the
armed forces if U. M. T. were
started during the present emer-
gency, to run concurrently — if even
on a small scale — with the draft.
These were the funding problem
(money); the deferm.ent problem
— how to pick some boys for six
months' training and others for
two years' service; and the person-
nel problem, i. e., the rapid ex-
haustion (which is a problem re-
gardless of whether onnot U. M. T.
is implemented) of presently avail-
able military manpower in the
18-to-26 age bracket.
All these objections are so
cogent and so serious that Con-
gress should give far more care
to its consideration of implement-
ing measures for U. M. T. than it
has yet given.
WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 (JP)—
The National Commander of the
American Legion endorsed Univer-
sal Military Training today, but
said the cost of the program as
outlined to Congress was "un-
reasonably excessive."
"One sure way of killing any
Universal Military Trainin-r pro-
gram is to make its cost so bur-
densome that the people and the
Congress will not support it," Don-
ald R. Wilson, the Legion head,
told the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
Mr. Wilson challenged official
Pentagon estimates that the first
year of U. M. T. training for 800-
000 18-year-olds might cost
$4,000,000,000, with the annual
cost running to $2,000,000,000
thereafter.
Strong Opposition to U. M. T.
came from spokesmen for the
American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion, the Presbyterian Church, the
Friends Committee on National
Legislation, and the Socialist
party.
Some argued that the program
would be an expensive experiment
in which the military training
would be wasted. Others urged
World disarmament as offering a
better chance for world peace.
Clarence Mitchell, Director of
the Washington Bureau of the Na-
tional Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People,
urged the committee to include in
any bill it recommends a ban on
racial segregation in U. M. T.
camps.
Mr. Mitchell told the Senators
that "at least two of the candi-
dates running apparently would
not carry out the program of the
present Administration on elimi-
nating segregation in the armed
Services, if we are to judge them
by their past records. * * *
"Senator Estes Kefauver of Ten-
nessee, who is seeking the Demo-
cratic nomination, actually voted
to support segregation when this
issue was before the United States
Senate on June 21, 1950."
Mr. Mitchell said that Mr.
Kefauver, during Senate consider-
ation of draft legislation, had voted
for a proposal to allow an inductee
to choose whether he wanted to
serve in a unit comprised of mem-
bers of his own race.
George Willison, a member of
Mr. Kefauver's Office staff, read
a reply. In it the Senator said that
"one of the Chief desires and aims
of my entire life has been to bet-
ter race relations."
SERVICES TO UHIFY
BUYIMG OF CLOTHES
House Inquiry Is Told Agency
Will Save Millions — Merger
of Catatogue Lists Pledged
WASHINGTON, Feb. 14 (UP)—
The Army, Navy and Air Force
different lumber items now pro-
curcd by the military eventually
would be reduced to the minimum
possible. He will be "disap-
pointed" if the cut does not mount
to 50 per cent.
Blankets and shoes also will he
standardized. with certain possible
exceptions, he added.
STATEHOOD BILLS URGED
more pleased over the testimony
of Admiral Fowler, who said he
knew he had the Job of setting
up a Single catalojnae for all mili-
tary items, that he had the power
to do it and would use the power.
"Like a fresh breeze into a
smoke-filled room," declared Mr.
Herbert, who earlier had accused
defense officials of "proclaiming
their virtue" while living "in the
sin of waste." * ^
"We haven't found the phantomjTruman Renewf Hi« Support for
of the Pentagon, but at least we Alaska and Hawaii
have a potential knight in shining
armor," he added. But he quickly
have agreed to buy their umforms,|^arned that unless Admiral Fow-
shoes, Sheets and other textiles her did what he had promised, the
and clothing through a Single buy- |subcommittee "will want no Part ^^^teh^i^^^to Vlaskä\°nd' Hawaii
ing agency in a move to save mil
Sp«cUl to Tot New Yokk Times.
WASHINGTON. Feb. 14— Pve-
newed support for the granting of
The New York Times
Sir Frank Whittlc
BRITISH JET PIONEER
CONFIRMS U. S. OFFER
lions of dollars of the taxpayers'
money.
At the same time an admiral
promised that he would standard-
ize all military buying and cut
down the thousands of different
listings of many items in another
action to reduce waste.
The officer, Rear Admiral J. W.
Fowler, was promptly termed a
"Potential knight in shining ar-
mor" by Representative F. Ed-
ward Hubert, Democrat of Louis-
chairman of a House subcom-
investigating military
of you. _
Admiral Fowler, who is retiredi was voiced today by President Tru-
attack.
'Had we been more experienced,"
Draif RĂĽle Drawn to Put
War Obiectors to Work
By The United PreM.
Maj. Gen. Lewis /B. Heräliey
Selective Service Director, has
drawn up regulations setting
forth the kind of werk about
8,000 conscientious objectors
must perform if they want to
stay out of the armed forces.
In a publication sent to local
draft boards, Selective Service
headquarters said that the men
would be limited to employment
by the Federal Government, by
a State agency or by a nonprofit
Organization engaged primarily
in nonprofit work benefiting the
public.
Under the draft law passed
last year, men opposed to mili-
tary Service are permitted to
perform twenty-four months of
work contributing to "the na-
tional health. safety or interest
in lieu of induction.
Thus far, no regulations have
been issued to carry out this
section of the law, and objectors
have not been required to do
any special type of work. But
JERUSALEM'S MAYOR
WILL VISIT THIS CITY
Spcdal to Ta» Njy Yomc Timm.
ELI AviV, IsRel, Feb. ^ 1* —
Mayor Shlomo Z. Shagai of Jeru-
salem will Visit New York ncxt
month and will receive a City Hall
reception on March 6. He »aid
today he had recelved a cable from
Mayor Impellitteri saying he
wished to reciprocate the hospi-
tality he had received from the
Jerusalem municipality during his
Visit to Israel last year. Mayor
Shragai said he would invite Jew-
ish organizations and communities
in the United States to participate
in the celebration of the 3,000th
anniversary of the f ounding of the
Kingdom of David in Jerusalem.
The ceiebrations will begin in
October and continuc a year. The
Jerusalem executive also said he
would take to New York plans for
development and Investment in
Jerusalem. ' _ ,
While in New York, Mayor
Shragai will attend a Conference
on March 13 marking the thirtieth
RUSSIANS AND CZECHS
BUYING TIBET AN WOOL
Special to Th« New To« Timm.
LONDON, Feb. 14— Sir Frank
Whiltle, who designed the first
British jet aircraft engine and flew
the first experimental plane nearly
eleven years ago, may take a Job
in the United States because he is
dissatisfied with the present trend
of jet development in Britain.
He confirmed today that he had
been approached by a large Amer-
ican Corporation with an invitation
to carry out research in the whole
iield of power production by gas
turbines.
Sir Frank, who Is at present
honorary adviser on jet develop-
ment to the British Overseas Air-
ways Corporation and a Consultant
at the Ministry of Supply, said he
would probably discuq^ the offer
on a Visit to the United States in
about a month. He declined to re-
veal the name of the Corporation.
His interest is in types of jet
work that he feels are being neg-
lected in Britain, notably the cen-
trifugal jet as distinguished from
the axial type.
It would be better to have work
done in the United States or in
the Commonwealth than neglected
altogether, he declared.
Sir Frank, only 44 years of age,
retired from the Royal Air Force
after World War II with the rank
of air commodore. While he was a
regulär pilot, Sir Frank's inventive
talent resulted in his being sent to
Cambridge and then assigned to
research work, for which he set up
his own Company.
He voluntarily gave all patents,
and eventually the Company itself,
to the Government, which, in turn,
gave him ÂŁ100,000, tax-free, in 1948.
AFRrCAN ASSEMBLY SET
ana,
mittee
waste.
The decision on clothing pur-
chases was announced today by
John D. Small, chairman of the
Munitions Board. It still must be
approved by Robert A. Lovett,
Sccretary of Defense, but this is
considered almost certain.
Mr. Small said only that the
Secretaries of the Army, Navy and
Air Force had agreed on a plan
for coordinated purchase of cloth-
ing. He called the action a "major
Step forward" in military efforts
to trim costs of these items and
sav' it "cannot help but save
money." He declined to estimate
how much. !
Cover» Nearly All Item» i
He also declined to give other
details pending Mr. Lovett's ap-
proval. But from other sources it
was learned that the plan calls for
a Single buying agency to
from the Navy and now is a San
Francisco Consulting engineer, is
head of the Munitions Board
cataloguing agency. His Job is to
boil down some fifteen military
purchasing catalogs into one and
to standardize items of equipment.
He refused to predict when his
Job would be finished, but prom-
ised that by July 1 the standard-
ization of spare parts for certain
internal combustion engines would
become mandatory. He said this
would reduce from 1,187 to sixty
the different types of spare items
that a destroyer must carry for her
man as the Senate continued con-
sideration of the Alaska statchood
measure.
Mr. Truman was asked at hi«
news Conference if he would sup-
port a bill granting the people of
Alaska the right to elect their own
Governor in the event the territory
was not admitted to the union.
He said that he would, if neces-
sary, but he still believed state-
hood would be voted for Alaska be-
cause that was what its people
ought to have. The same answer
auxiliary engine. ,^ ... jj j
He also promised that the 2.000 applied to Hawan, he added.
AMERICAN
Imported TRENCHCOATS
TS
er
all-purpo$€ coat for military
civilian wcar. Smart looking, exciusively
designed of finest imported fabrici. And
as tor value — just try to top it.
Egyptian Cotton Poplins and Gabardin^.s,
Selflined or Plaidlined. $50 end $55
In Wool Gabardines; also in water repel-
knt V/est of England Worsted in a va-
riety of Plaid end Check patlerns. $95
Detachable All-Wool Warmer witfi
sieeves. 19.50
known as "the Armed
be
Services
Special to Tot New York Times..
KALIMPONG, India, Feb. 14—
The joviet Union, and Czech
Blov&l«pptu^ entered'the
wool jiT^K following the recent]
decision of American importera'
not to accept any shipment ofl
Tibetan wool after Feb. 29.
TJhe Russians have come into the
field at a time when the Tibetan
wool trade was almost on the
verge of going "out of business"
because of a large accumulation
of Stocks in this border town with-
out buyers.
According to shipping circles
here, the United States Govern-
ment's policy of enforcing a rigid
economic blockade on China now
includes Tibet also, and conse
quently American buyers an
nounced last week that Feb
was the deadline for the shipment
of Tibetan wool from Indian ports.
This has left Kalimpong ship-
pers with nearly 4,000,000 pounds
of wool, which they declare will
be impossible to ship within suc|
a Short time. Furthermore, th^
prospect of the future absence
the American market that too
nearly 70 per cent of the 8,000,00
Delegatea tö Attend .Ohio
College Seision trv Jun«
Spcclul tv Tri Niw Yomc Timis.
COLUMBUS, Ohio, FehMi-^A
North American Assembljy on
African Affairs will be held June
16-25 at Wittenberg College,
Springfield, Ohio, Dr. Emory Ross
of New York announced tonight.
Dr. Ross, Executive Secretary of
the African Committee of the Di-
vision of Foreign Missions of the
National Council of Churches of
Christ in America, made his an-
nouncement before the Missionary
Education and directors sections
of the Foreign Missions Division.
I More than 300 delegates, repre-
29 senting forty Protestant denomi-
Textile, Clothing and Footwear
Procurement Committee."
The Congressional committee
was told yesterday that the plan
provided for all clothing pur-
chases to be made by a Single
Office, not for all the Services to
draw their clothing from a Single
pool. The aim is to prevent sit-
uations where the Army pays $24 j
for a pair of combat boots while I
the Marine Corps pays $16 for thcj
same thing. |
Military officials said the three i
Services had been collaborating on
some of their clothing and textile
buying since 1945 but that the
new agency would tie them to-
gether for nearly all purchases.
The new agency would not,
however, handle the buying of
"duck and webbing" material for
tents, tarpaulins, gun Covers, web
belts and similar items — which are
now bought for , all three Services
by the Army.
No Phantom, But a Knight
The House committee, gratified
by the plan for the Single clothing
agency, is still looking for what
Mr. H6bert has dubbed the "phan-
tom" of the Pentagon"— the per-
son or persons who held up the
plan from the time it was ap-
proved at the "field" level last
August until now.
But today the committee was
1ik&4i
\&7tca7i
RAINCOAT COMPANY, 200 FIFTH AVE., at 23nl Street
BROADWAY
nations will be present at the as-
sembly. They will represent
colonial powers in Europe, sclf-
governing Governments in Africa,
the United States, the United Na-
tions and United States industry,
Philanthropie groups and educa-
tion.
Dr. Harold Fey, managing editor
of The Christian Century, told
COCKTAIL mm.
Informal and InHmat«. Danclng from
5:30 P.M., dally txcept Monday.
No Cover chargt or mlnfmum chtck.
ALAN HOLMES
mtd hfl Ofclitclr«
Br
TIMIS SQUARI
IL K. Christtnberry, htld»HI
APOLOGY!
TO THOUSANDS OF CUSTOMERS WHO
iTORMED OUR STORE Ă„ND WHO COULD
Early umplre reports indicated
complete dcstruction of a battalion
headquarteis, a Company and a feature that would certainly en
separate from, but similar lo, those
governing thc regulär sei"vices, a
complete battery, and partial dam
age to three other companies. One
factor that made for the heavy
♦•casualties," the umpires reported,
was surprise.
The Simulation was achieved
by joining the effects of a flash
bomb dropped from a B-26 bomber,
& Charge of T. N. T. set off on the
ground and smoke Streaming from
three F-51 fighters. Air bursts of
atom charges normally leave little
residual radioactivity, and while
simulated attempts to measure
"radioactivity" were made, no esti-
mates were disclosed.
The atomic "shell burst" had a
threefold effect: its blast killed
men and damaged equipment; its
heat produced personnel casualties
or caused flres in« equipment; and
instantaneous radiation produced
rays of high and deadly intensity.
G«neral Crittcnberger pointed
oiA that, «ine« this wag the lirst
tiOM a 8imuiat«d nuclear weapon
tftiid lifitn TTinm mn
courage separatism and discourage
morale. Training would be limited
to this country; the youths would
not be liable for service overseas,
and our regulär forces would not
be strengthened but weakened, be-
cause of additional turnover and
the necessity of providing training
cadres for the trainees in the Na-
tional Security Training Corps.
There are many within thc mili-
tary service who have grave mis-
givings about the present legisla-
tion and are anxious to see any
attempt to implement it deferred,
at least for ^the duration of the
present emergency. Some of these
critics are men high in both ci-
viltan and military posts in Wash-
prreatly cömplicate the al-!
ready enormous problems of the
armed forces if U. M. T. were
started during the present emer-
gency, to run concurrently— if even
on a small scale — with the draft.
These were the funding problem
(money); the deferment problem
— how to pick some boys for six
months* training and others for
two years' service; and the person-
nel problem, i. e., the rapid ex-
haustion (which is a problem re-
gardless of whether or.not U. M. T.
is implemented) of presently avail-
able military manpower in the
18-to-26 age bracket.
All these objections are so
cogent and so serious that Con-
gress should give far more care
to its consideration of implement-
ing measures for U. M. T. than it
has yet given.
raiion in the armed
Services, if we are to judge them
by their past records. * * *
"Senator Estes Kefauver of Ten-
nessee, who is seeking the Demo-
cratic nomlnation, actually voted
to Support segregation when this
issue was before the United States
Senate on June 21, 1950."
Mr. Mitchell said that Mr.
Kefauver, during Senate consider-
ation of draft legislation, had voted
for a proposal to allow an inductee
to choose whether he wanted to
serve in a unit comprised of mem-
bers of his own race.
George Willison, a member of
Mr. Kefauver's Office staff, read
a reply. In it the Senator said that
"one of the chief desires and aims
of my entire life has been to bet-
ter race relations."
Dro^ Rule Drawn to PĂĽt
War Objectors to Work
ncuvers, the steps leadlng up to
it» use had been carefuUy and de-
liberately followed. Here is how
it was brought into play:
Just atfer midnight iast night
an aggressor patrol captured a
United States soldier with a map«
of the def ender' s troop positions.
The map was carefully studied by
aggressor intelligence and passed
through the various levels to the
aggressor Commander, Brig. Gen.
William Eimis.
A "Lucrative Atomic Target"
He decided early in the morning
that the concentration of United
States troops in a spot four miles
west of Antwerp would make ""
By Th« Unit
PrcM.
ÂŁeik
Sney
lucrative atomic target." He called
for aerial reconnaissance at day-
break and after studying the
photos ordered Visual air recon-
naissance to confirm what the
photos had shown. After the sec-
ond check he ordered the atomic
attack.
"Had we been more experienced,"
General Crittcnberger said, "we
would have been satisfied with
only the daybreak reconnaissance
and the artillery could have been
used earlier in the day. Because
this was the first time, we thought
it better to go through the extra
Steps."
One of the nation's top officials
responsible for recommending new
weapons and their uses acted as
an observer at today's experiment.
He is Lieut. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes,
head of the Weapons Systems
Evaluations Group of the Depart-
ment of Defense.
"You are pioneering with a
weapon so new and so costly,"
General Keyes commented, "that
you can't fire it as a pistol. We
have to go through the steps as
outhned by General Crittenberger.
Experience will shorten this up."
Despite the enemy's atomic at-
tack, the United States forces later
in the day mounted a powerful
counter-offensive along the main
battle line, scoring a breakthrough
on Highway 11 just north of
Antwerp.
Elsewhere defender forces were
also on the offensive after falling
back for four days, and a defender
column drove through a circular
aggressor line to relieve a trapped
tank battalion just south of
Spragueville.
DUTCH SIFT TARIFF ACTION
Maj. Gen. Lewis VB. Hersney,
Selective Service Director, has
drawn up regulation» setting
forth the kind of work about
8,000 conscientious objectors
must perform if they want to
stay out of the armed forces.
In a publication sent to local
draft boards, Selective Service
headquarters said that the men
would be limited to employment
by the Federal Government, by
a State agency or by a nonprof it
Organization engaged primarily
in nonprofit work benefiting the
public.
Under the draft law passed
last year, men opposed to mili-
tary service are permitted to
perform twenty-four months of
work contributing to "the na-
tional health, safety or interest"
in lieu of induction.
Thus far, no regulations have
been issued to carry out this
section of the law, and objectors
have not been required to do
any special type of work. But
Selective Service notified the
boards that the necessary regu-
lations "are in the final stages
of preparation and will probably
be released in the near future."
The proposed regulations
would let objectors receive
Standard wages paid for the
type of work they perform.
JERVSAlEM'S MAYOR
WILL VISIT THIS CITY
Spedtl to Tkb Niw Yomc Timm.
"TllL^Ă„VIV, IsRei; Feb. ^ 14 -^
Mayor Shlomo Z. Shagai of Jeru-
salem will Visit New York next
month and will receive a City Hall
reception on March 6. He said
today he had recelved a cable from
Mayor Impellitteri saying he
wished to reciprocate th« hospi-
tality he had received from the
Jerusalem municipality during his
Visit to Israel last year. Mayor
Shragai said he would invite Jew-
ish organizations and communities
in the United States to participate
in the celebration of the 3,000th'
anniversary of the founding of the
Kingdom of David in Jerusalem.
The celebrations will begin in
October and continue a year. The
Jerusalem executive also said he
would take to New York plans for
development and investment in
Jerusalem.
While in New York, Mayor
Shragai will attend a Conference
on March 13 marking the thirtieth
anniversary of the establishment
of Hapoel Hamizrahi (religious
workers) Organization in the
United States. The Jerusalem
mayor is a member of that party.
\VĂ–ĂśI
on a Visit to the United Stales m
about a month. He declined to re-
veal the name of the Corporation.
His interest is in types of jet
work that he feels are being neg-
lected in Britain, notably the cen-
trifugal jet as distinguished from
the axial type.
It would be better to have work
done in the United States or in
the Commonwealth than neglected
altogether, he declared.
Sir Frank, only 44 years of age,
retircd from the Royal Air Force
after World War II with the rank
of air commodore. While he was a
regulär pilot, Sir Frank's inventive
lalent resulted in his being sent to
Cambridge and then assigned to
re«earch work, for which he set up
his own Company.
i He voluntarily gave all patents,
iand eventually the Company itself,
j to the Government, which, in turn,
gave him ÂŁ100,000, tax-free, in 1948
AFrFgAN ASSEMBLY SET
Special to TuB New York Times.-
KAL4MP0NG, India. Feb. 14- [300 Dclegate» tö Attend Ohio
rvak|&e"eÄ/"t2-e gL'etalf- C.l.cg« 8e*..o« >.. Juri.
wool Ä*et follovnng the recentf spkui to th« niw york tim4
decision of American importers r-m ttmrtt«? Ohio F*»h '14— A
not to accept any shipment o^ Nor?h A^an AsfemWv on
Tibetan wool after Feb. 29. ' V? • ^^/^^*^*^ •„ k U^VJ t ^
The Russians have come into m tl'oi^'' t" w^."^' l ^^ ^*o if''''*
field at a time when the TibetanllĂźJĂ– at Wittenberg College
wool trade was almost on theSpringfield, Ohio, Dr. Emory Ross
RUSSIANS AND CZECHS
BUYING TIBETAN WOOL
verge of going "out of business"
because of a large accumulation
of Stocks in this border town with-
out buyers.
According to shipping circles
here, the United States Govern-
ment's policy of enforcing a rigid
economic blockade on China now
includes Tibet also, and conse-
quently American buyers an-
nounced last week that Feb. 29
of New York announced tonight.
Dr. Ross, Executive Secretary of
the African Committee of the Di-
vision of Foreign Missions of the
National Council of Churches of
Christ in America, made his an-
nouncement before the Missionary
Education and directors sections
of the Foreign Missions Division.
More than 300 delegates, repre-
senting forty Protestant denomi-
provai. But from oLher sources it
was learned that the plan calls for
a Single buying agency to be
known as "the Armed Services
Textile. Clothing and Footwear
Procurement Committee." |
The Congressional committee |
was told yesterday that the plan|
provided for all clothing pur-
chases to be made by a Single
Office, not for all the Services to
draw their clothing from a Single
pool. The aim is to prevent sit-
uations where the Army pays $24
for a pair of combat boots while
the Marine Corps pays $16 for the
same thing.
Military officials said the three
Services had been collaborating on
some of their clothing and textile
buying since 1945 but that the
new agency would tie them to-
gether for nearly all purchases.
The new agency would not,
however, handle the buying of
"duck and webbing" material for
tents, tarpaulins, gun Covers, web
belts and similar items — which are
now bought for all three Services
by the Army.
No Phantom, But a Knight
The House committee, gratified
by the plan for the Single clothing
agency, is still looking for what
Mr. Hubert has dubbed the "Phan-
tom" of the Pentagon"— the per-
son or persons who held up the
plan from the time it was ap-
proved at the "field" level last
August until now.
But today the committee was
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ALAN HOLMES
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W
TIMIS SQUARI
t. K. Oiristtnberry, PmIdtHt
was the deadline for the shipment l^ations will be present at the as-
of Tibetan wool from Indian ports. sembly. They will represent
colonial powers m Europe, self-
governing Governments in Africa,
This has left Kalimpong ship
pers with nearly 4,000,000 pounds
of wool, which they declare will' the United States, the United Na
be impossible to ship within such
a Short time. Furthermore, the
prospect of the future absence of
the American market that took
nearly 70 per cent of the 8,000,000
pounds of wool that came into
India from Tibet annually had pro-
duced an intense scare in local
tions and United States industry,
Philanthropie groups and educa-
tion.
Dr. Harold Fey, managing editor
of The Christian Century, told
Protestant pastors and missionary
education leaders the friendship of
G, I. and native Christians in Ko-
markets and wool was beginninglrea would be important in defeat-
to slump heavily. ' ing communism.
LIFE OF JINNAH DROPPED
Bolitho Abandons Biography of
Founder of Pakistan
special to The New York Times.
KARACHI, Pakistan, Feb. 14—
Hector Bolitho, New Zealand-born
biographer, has given up an
attempt to write a biography of
Mohammed Ali Jinnah.
Commissioned by the Govern-
ment to do a life of the founder
of Pakistan, Mr. Bolitho arrived
here early in January. It is under-
stood, however, that the material
necessary for his research has not
been made readily available to him.
Miss Fatima Jinnah, the states-
man's sister and heir and a former
dentist, has announced that she in-
tends to write a biography herseif.
Immediately before Mr. Bo-
litho's arrival a split of opinion on
the propriety of having the book
done by a foreigner developed
within the Government and in the
press.
iliiliiiiÄ
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May Abrogate Concessions to
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THE HAGUE, the Nethcrlands,
Feb. 14 — The Netherlands Govern-
ment is considering a proposal to
abrogate certain tarif f concessions
to the United States at the tariff
and trade Conferences to be held
next June, it was announced today
by Johannes R. M. van den Brink,
Minister of Economic Affairs.
The minister said it would first
be necessary to consult Belgium
and Luxembourg who are Joint sig-
natories with the NetheNands to
the General Tariff Agreement.
The Netherlands delegation was
already prepared at the Geneva
tariff Conference to propose the
withdrawal of concessions from
the United States in reprisal for
American restrictions on cheese
Imports but deferred action on the
State Department's promise to
«eek repeal of the import curb.
The retaliation move was revived
when the repeal action was lost in
the Unite4 States Senate recently.
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V
VO, ^^ i^f^(mUC^
l^^\ <JV
. U-oCz^cufciT'^ /v^A-/<.< c/^"-' *^ ^''--^'^^^ I 'i'-^Cf j â– / T >-- /^rv^
JOHN H. E. FRIED
89 EAST 86 STREET
NEW YORK. N. Y. 10028
«
TEUt 348-1408
March 24, J 976
Kack Wilder, M.D.
Associate Dean for Plannong and Operations
Albert Einstein College of Medicine
Bassine Bldg. 1300 Morris park Ave.
Bronx,NY. 10461
Holocaust Project
Dear Jack,
I have given quite a bit of thought to what we talked about the
other evening« Let me summarize my proposals, and add some observations,
as you suggested.
1.
Since, as I gathered, not very much time will be available to
the Symposium, it could be divided into two over-all topics :
A) LOOKING back (on the Catastrophe). What types of people were
the na::i decision-makers, the specialists who organized and directed the
enormous apparatus of oppression,persecution,and eventually systematic
million-fold annihilation? What were their motivations,their rationali-
*)
zations ?
B) LOOKING FORWARD ( beyond 1976). What conclusions for the
future — conclusions perhaps on the "nature of man?" — are to be drawn
from the still unfathomable occurrence of the Holocaust? (This topic
includes the question: What psychological impact has that experience had
on the 30-year period that has already elapsed since the end of Nazism? )
*)As"you"see , the entire,extremely complex topic of the psychology of the Jewish
victims would only be inferentrall^ treated^ To treat it fully,would require more
time. (Random example: The -^ewish Situation varied greatly at different periods and
in different parts of Germany and nazi-occupied Europe. This makes generalizations
very perilous.) Also, this is the most ÂŁainful_ and con^roversial aspect. Above all,
your project could make the biggest contribution by analyzing what is hardly ever dis-
cussed:the trauma, and that trauma's damaqe,the entire Hitler experience has caused
to the liost- Hitler period, and how that trauma could be overcome ? (See further on,in
this leUerT)
2.
I frankly believe T could make a useful contr^butlon by speaking
during the first, hlstorical, part of the Symposium, because of my exper-
iences at the 12 American trials at Nuremberg.
Let me say one word about those American trials. They followed
the previous international (ĂĽS-UK-France-USSR) Nuremberg trial,against
Goering and 20 other Nazi leaders. The Goering case surveyed the entire
panaroma of nazii criminality ,including of course the Holocaust, but concen-
trated on the biggest, or seminal crimes, the aggressions ("Crimes against
Peace" ) which made all subsequent War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
possible. - The subsequent 12 Aijierican trials at uremberg,in turn,covered
some 200 defendants, including industrialists (Krupp, IGFarben, etc. )s field-
marshals and generals; cabinet ministers and ambassadors; judges and pros-
ecutors who committed judicial murders; etc. But they covered also, in much
greater detail than the Goering Tribunal could, in trials each lasting for
can bej)c-" ^ '
many months, «hat^TTcalled the apparatus ofdestruction.
at youe Symposium
In Order to stay within manageable limits, I would focus/on three
of those American Nurembern cases ;
a) the case against the SS Fuehrers who ran Himmler *s "Main Office"
which was responsible for the establtshment, Organization, policies, and
supervision of all concentration and extermination camps in all Nazi-
/•
*) You may remember the S^gftcer Tracy/Marlene Dietrich fipictional-documentary film
about this case, "JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG." Tncidentally, I was Abby Mann*s advisor
on the Script, and we changed it considerably.
**) My ownf(position at Nuremberg was not with the Prosecution, but with the Judges.
As their Special Legal Consultant I would, at their request,prepare legal opinions;
;. analyze evidence; consult with the International Red Gross in Geneva, the U.N.War
Crimes Commission in London, etc.; and the like. I had ample opportunity to observe
the defendants in open Court, and by conducting ,as Commissioner on behalf of the
Tribunals, interrogations of defendants and others in the Nuremberg prison. In that
capacity, I interrogated Albert fpeer at Spandau, and also Hoess, the Commander of
Auschwitz, during his trial befoe the Polish People's Court at Warsaw,shortly before
he was hanged at Auschwitz in sight of the main gas ovens. —I attach a letter about
my work at ^^uremberg by one of the P-esiding Judges, written at the end of those trials.
dominated Europe. The Orders concerning everything related to those camps,
from food rations to punishment regulations to gassing equipment,came from
that central office at Oranienbugg near Berlin, and all reports from the
camps, including death statistics, had to go there« (Hence, the awesome
documentation that \Nas available at Nuremberg!) It was called "Wirtschafts-
Verwaltunqs-Hauptamt'* , translatable as "Central Office for the Management
of SS Business Enterprises" because the camps were conceived or camouflaged
as war production centers (where the inmates were often,as the official
term was, "worked to death") and asjcontributors to the German Treasury
(the victims* gold teeth and wedding rings were sent to the Reichsband.
This Nuremberg case (known as WHA case) furnishes the most complete
*)
and authentic inside Information about the Holocaust, insofar as the camps
were the main places for the execution of the "F5nal Solution."
b) However, there were also other methods used for the "Final
Solution." Two of these produced the largest number of victims, after the
Auschwitz method. One was, to herd Jews into nazi-created ghettos (which
one Nuremberg judgment calls vast prisons w6thout prison wardens serving
food) where the Jews were decimated by overwork, famine and sicknesses, until
the survivors were killed off. - The other method , used especially in the
Baltics,the Utoraine,the Crimea and elsewhere inthe USSR, was to organfeze syst-
ematic man-hunts but then not to transport the «rictims to concentratioon
camps but instead to kill them in mass executions ort the spot. Those tech-
iques were entrusted to special motorized SS formations of 500 - 800 men
each, called Einsatzgruppen — literally, Units for Special Assignments.
Twenty-odd c6mmanders and officers of such units were tried before
*) This WVHA Central Office was of course in close Cooperation with another of Himmler' s
Central Offices, GESTAPO-Jewish Section, where Eij;(chmann played a leading role.
one of the American Tribunals at Nuremberg to which I was assigned, as
Special Sgal Consultant. I think T should uover this Einsatzgruppen
case,too. Although the legal Situation seemedWsimple" ( pre-meditated
mass murder,uncontradictibly documented ), the undertaking was so ghastly
and the attempted justif ications and exculpations by defendants so devious,
that the Tribunal took months because ,as its Judgment says, the facts
"are so beyond the experience of normal man and
the ränge of man-made phenomena that only the most
complete gudicial inquiry, and the most exhaustive
traal, could verify and confirm them.,.The Charge.,
reaches such fantastic proportions and surpasses
such credible limits that believability must be bol-
stered with assurance a hundred times repeated."
With approx. one million men,women and children as victims (prevalently
JewSjbut also other nazi-proscribed categorieszcommunist functionaries;
doctors,teachers, agronomists and other members of the intelligentsia;
gyj>sies; etc.), this was the second-biggest murder trial in history —
the biggest having been the Watsaw trial against Auschwitz Commander Hoess.
The main difference between these Einsatzgruppen leaders and the
above-mentioned VMIA leaders(which,I think, is interesting for any analysis
of the Holocaust) is that the latter were "desk-murderers" who never touched
»■— •
a Jews but were conferring.and dictating Ifetters in comfortable Offices,
whereas the former gersnnail^ enacted and supervised the indescribable
and caused
scenes in the field, which required/some very different psychological reactions.
It is also noteworthy that the massacres were actively assisted by German
Army officers and units, and that among the 20-odd exterminatfeon leaders in
the Nuremberg dock, were eight lawyers, a university professor,a dentists,
an opera singer,an art expert, and a former priest.
/.
c) Thirdly, I suggest, especlally for your audience, to cover
the famous "Medical Gase/' where the list of the defendants reads like
a "Who is Who in German Medlcine'Vand which has become known through
Dr.Mitscherlich's book, Ă–octors of tnfamy.
The two main topics in this case weee: experiments on concent-
ration camp inmates,* and mass euthanasia killings of insane, feeble-minded,
deformed, etc. German "Aryans." ("useless eaters)
The number of ectual victims of the medical experiments ran "only"
into the thousands, but the envi.saged victims, specially of the sterili-
^ationand castration experiments, were to be millions«
The case illustrates especially two tYPes of mental ity:perverted
professional ambition, to foster (real — or,as the Judgment found,ofttn
merely pretended) medical progress through cruel and often lethal ex-
periments on humans; and abuse of medical researc^ in a "We*ll stop at
nothing" mentality , to foster the Obsession with mass extermination
(Or^hat could be called the self-escalation of SmSĂĽSfflr an increasingly
dehumanized fanaticism). Especially the Sterilisation and castration
experiments were designed 6b make the Holocaust program even more eff-
icient, by adding to the various killing techniques, the technique of
delayed extinction. As one defendant, a non-piiiysician,SS~Col. Brack in
Hitler's chancellery,put it in a memorandum to Himmler, Sterilisation and
«
castration would preserve the working capacity of the 2-3 million men and
women amon^ Ehrope*s 10 million Jews, but render them incapable of prop-
agating.
However, in addition, these experiments were designed to extentfl
the Holocaust program to non-Jews — perhaps sti^ing with "imperceptible
Sterilisation of the *hree million Russian prisoners of war the Germans
*)
had captured during the first months of the Russian campa^gn. Karl
Brandt, M.D. ,Hitler»s personal physician, Reich Commiss ioner for Health
and Sanitation, and head of the Office for Medical Science and Research
in the Reich Research Council, stated ön a Nureharg affidavitfwishing
to put the blame on Himmler, bgit with whom he constantly collaborated^
"Himmler was extremely interested in the development of a
cheap and rapid sterilization method which could be used
aqainst enemies of Germany, such as the Russians. Poles,
and ^ews. One (siel) hoped thereby not onlj to defeat the
enemy but to exterminate him. The capacity for work of the
c^ sterilized persons could be exploited by Germany, while
the danger of propagation would be eleminated« As this mass
sterilization was part of Himmler's racial Iheory, parti-
cularr/ly much_7 time and care weredevotedto these steril-
- ization experiments ." The aim was to find a method which
would be not "too slow and too expensive" and which made
the sterilization "not immediately noticeable." (^g doc.
NO-440).
3.
To summarize:Such Nuremberg-based presentation of the "Auscft-
witz"jtechnique,as well as of the other main techniques, could give the
factual background about the Holocaust, and the mentality of the per-
petrators. . As title for it, I suggest, simply
"The Final Solution of the Jewish Question."
(Ăźlusjperhaps, a sub-title to be agreed upon,)
4. Let me add that two core issues should be emphasized : The "Habituation
- Escalation Syndrome "; and "The Problem of Obedience to Criminal Orders."
*) /j am_/^^<^ ^y the ^^lea that the enemy must not only be conquered but destroyed., . .
If, on the basis of this ^edicinal sterilization/ research,it were j^ssible to
produce a drug which, after a relatively short time, effects an imperceptibrle
sterilization on human beings, we would have a new powerful weapon at our disposal*
©le thought alone that the 3 million Bd)6sheviks, at present German prisoners, could
be steilized so that they could be used as laboreo but be prevented from reproduction,
opens the most far-reaching perspectives." OLetter from defendanlJAdolf Pokorny ,M.D.,
^^i'^^^i^ J^®"®^^^^ Disease SpeTiTTTst/, ^^ Himmler,0ct.l941. Nbg Doc. N0-035) Pbbbrny
aavocated especially experiments with the plant caladium seauinum from Rra^n 7^x^f\
Himmler immediately^rdered research also along this ^t^J^/^^umum trom Brazil,and
/
A few words about them:
The Habltuation-Escalation Syndrome is baslc for the understanding
of the Holocaust. It is true that many Holocaust studies deal only wijh
the ultimate horror, what we can call the Auschwitz phases. That is a
major mistake,factually and analytically. I strongly urge that your
Symposium consider the Holocaust —the systematic exterminatlon —in
its perspective. It cannot be understood, unless it is seen as final
culmination. The "final" Solution of the Jewish Question was,indeed,
the final phase of a process, lasting for many years ( at least since
Jan. 1933), of indignities, discriminations, persecutions, atrocities,
interspersed with periods of fake "stabiiization" , until it culminated
in "Auschwitz." In fact, the Habituation - Escalation Syndrome played
a big role during , and is essential for the understanding of, the Ausch-
witz phase itself.
Similaxly crucial is a proper understanding of the problem of
Qbedience to criminal Orders. There is enormous confusion about it. To
c^rify it, would be an important result of the Symposium. Arguments like,
"They had to obey orders" ; "there must be discipline in the army" ; "in a
dictatorship, everybody who disobeyed would be killed", etc. have been
the despair of many decent people, but the glee of the nazis whp, of
course.know better.
Actually, the arguments get punctured if properly analyzed. I
cannot go into the mattei]here,but only mention: the arguments (even if
acceptedt) do,of course,never exculpate the givers of the criminal orders
hey,of course, causfid everything that followedix
The arguments completely overlook the conflux, the idenĂĽ ty of the attitudes
of the givers and the recipients of the orders; they ate regularly offered
nwAibhmatimsiTipinpTO^
I
8
without concrete proof that disobedience was as impossible or dangerous
as the arguments proclaim; above all, they forget the fateful point
. that the top nazis were not so stupid as to entrust arch-crimes to non^
congenial people S but they always found a big supply of congen/^ial
people — -from the chemists who produced the Auschvyitz poison gas, to
the General of the Wehrmacht who assigned ammunition and soldiers to
the murderous Einsatzgruppen who pulled the shrieking women out of their
huts -just as the AI Capone gang could become as efficient as they were,
by obtaining the Cooperation of judges,police,etc. Factually,analytically,
and psychologically, the basic problem of organized mass criminality is
prescie^ly. the Infection of non-gangsters by gangsterism, and that the
alleged difference between the givers and the recipients of criminal
Instructions is often non^xistent, as they so often both become co-
conspirators and collaborators.
To be sure, the "syperior order" complex does pose some difficult
probftems,but that^s why the above, and other ppoints, require airing.
The two matters of the Habituation/Escalation Syndrome, and the
Duty to Obey problem are so important that,depending on the structure
of the Symposium, and the time available, they could be presented as
separate point s or^the agenda^tnpiV..<; for separate lectures or round-tables).
In any case, if you invite me,I would emphasize these two matters.
«#
*) Smce the I had to obey Orders" argument was the principal d^se at Nuremberg and
all war crimes trials (e.q., Eichmann 1»rial in Jerusalem) it was at greatest length
discussed at all of those ttials. It regularly collapsed because the defendants could
hardly ever prove any actual examples where anything serious had happened to imp-
ortant people who did not want to become criminally involved, fhere is also the
big probjlem of ^oluntary relinquishment of positions,of requests for trai^ers,etc*etc
On all this,the Nuremberg material oontams a mass of information,and analysis.
5.
I come to the second over-all topic — the Impact of the
Holocaust on the future. It could be titled, "CAN WE OVERCWE THE TRAUMA
OF THE HITLER EXPERTENCE T
Only now, a generation later, do vie see the continuation and
consequences which those demoniac actions have caused to the post-Hltler
World, Hence, the question which,! submit, a project like yours should pose,
is: How will the world be able to free itself psychologically from that
incubus ? UnfathomaVly, those horrors have occurred; since then, Jews
and non-Jews must live with the knoMedge of AĂĽischwmtz. Calamities pre-
vlously never considered, have become the basis of the calculus. Must
this nightmare continue ? Hitierism^s greatest guilt has been to bequeath
a bacillus that has remained virulent: the world has become habituated
to think in super-Auschwitzes.
The continuing damage can be seen, i>a,, in the spread of
pseudo-Darwinistic views about the "aggressive nature of man"; 6ifi fatal-
istic Views about the " inevitability of wars" ; and of the concomitant notion
that the prohibition of war and of mass atrocities (all revulsion and
treaties and U.N.Charters notwithstanding) has been a pipe-dream.
After the war,at the time of Nuremberg, nazi criminality was
Seen as abhörrent aberration. It would been considered ludicrous to see
it as anything eise, and, I submit, this conviction is not a matter for
armchair philosophizing. Only the conviction that that dehumanization was
a unique aberration, and that jny repetition of Auschwitz in whatever form,
give
not only must but can be prevented, might/the world iWSĂ„ a Chance to sur-
vie in the nuclear age. So, let us not deceive ourselves; doctrines about
the basic badness of man and inevitability of wars with nothing barred,
10
in essence corrode the convlction that Hltlerism was an aberration,
and come near to lustlfyinq it— not morally, of course, butt)siiicholog-
ically or metaphysically, or anyway give a very pessimistic prognosis
for the future of mankind.
I am not a psychologist, but in my long preoccupation with
peace research and the phenomencr of world polities, I have often been
Struck by the crudeness and syperficiality of those pseudometaphysical
doctrlnes. Above all , I am convinced that, fortunatell:y,the very facts
revealed in the nazis* own records, contradict those doctrines. The
Hitler wars themselves, and the atrocities i^epetrated during them, were
not caused by something mysterious calfeed "man" and not "inevitably"
ordained by some fate— but were decided upon by handfuls of specific
persons sitting around specific tables at specific times, and who created
the psychological climate and enormous apparatus required to carry the[r( decisions
out. Contrariwise, if we succumb to those pessimistic doctrines, in
disregard of the historic record, Hitler is being posthumously revind-
icated. There is no middle way. Hitler's hybris would have set the world
on an irreversible downward course *
Considering the spread of fatalism and feeling of impending doom
— for example, among the present Student generation who was not exposed to
the Hitler trauma but is being much influenced by those pessimistic doctrines—
the need
to get rid of the virus becomes central.
In Short, the question must be squarely faced, whether,incredible
BS it Sounds, the Hitler trauma may have been so deep as to weaken the app-
arentjy axiomatic proposition that Hitlerism was an aberration, because that
11
undigested trauma hss infected the thlnklng of psychologists, "revieionist"
historiand, and pessimistic cultural sociologists who are molding the
intellectual climate. But even if this notion of a causal connection
between the Hitler trauma and present-day pessimism is rejected, that
pessimism itself shbuld logically be a main concern for a project such
as yours«
Hence my Suggestion to invite Erich Fromm« In his "Anatomy of
Human Destructiveness" he polemizes against presently infäiüiential neo-
Aagtinctive doctrines. ^e considers them to be based on a "the6ry that
assures us that violence stems from our animal nature, from an ungovernable
drive for aggression" and wams that "This theory of an innate aggressiveness
easily becomes an ideology," Furthermore, Fromm is a recogniz ed authority
on Nazism, . . .)
I am not so naive as to expect the Symposium to "prove" that homo
sapiens is peace-loving. There certainly will be controversy, and the pess-
*)Here,I can only allude to some indicators: take the influential British "revis-
ionist" specialist on the Third Reich, A.J.P, Taylor, whose books insist that
Hitler's policies/, except for the Holocaust were really merely good old power
politics (although the Final Solution was an intrinsic part of them !) ;
take tĂźe acquittals by West German
Courts of GESTAPO mass murderers on the g%Gnd that, as honest believers in the
nazi race doctrines, they were unaware of wrong-doing l
take the doctrine of "We are all guilty"
(somehow even the Jewish victims), to which Hannah Arendt comes perilously close in
her "banality of evil" argument in her book about the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem;
or the scurrilous view of John Lukacs*
book, "The Last European War", that Hitler's extermire tion/policy deprived the good
old antisemitism of Czarist Russia or Horthy Hungary of respectability, which would
otherwise have spread to America had Hitler simply exiled the Jews; and a respected
British historian»s comment in the N. Y.T.Book Review (3/21/76) that this book by an
"able exponent of the cultural pessimism that is widely fashionable today" is "cons-
istently interesting and provocative" ,with only a gentle murmur of disappoval, and
might have an impact comparable to that of Spengler« s Decline of the West ...
**)He also finds the presently prominent behaviorist school similarly "mono-explanatory"
and relying on "dogmatic preconceptions." -At the same time. Fromm wa%,s agaiĂźat un-
critical "optimism "("human nature is good"^as providing excuses for non-involvement
and indifference.
12
imists will make streng points.
To be frank, somebody like me should usefully partic^pate/in the
discpssion because politlcal science and international law are intertwined
with psychology : humans have murderous and predatory inclinations — and
that's precisely where the politicll institutions and the law co
me m.
They will never make a perfect world (murder has been prohibited for a long
time,and still occurs). But,after all, the sum-total of the history of
civilization consists in the efforts, by political institutions and the
law, to provide barriers against murder and war. And it is the responsibility
of psychology to be more aware of those efforts (and their relative effect-
iveness) and' to help in those efforts— which in the present era of disarray
dn the midst of superweapons , where an Ă„uschwitz-analogue could be produced
in minutesT-are more important than ever. (But forgive me:I promise, I
would not preach.)
6. A last Suggestion. You might also wish to fcnvite Dr. Leo Alexander,
the Boston psychiatrist. He was at my time in Nuremberg as court psy-
chiatrist and medical expert, and was particularly active in the Medical
case, which/might be of particular interest to your audience. As result of
his depth-interviews with the accused physicians, and others, and of his
study of the Nazi documentatlon, he developed his theory of "Thanatology,"
a psychology of morbid concentration on death. I could imagine that Alexander
would See a similar Syndrome in the present era»s search for ever more frighf
ful medns for mass extinction, which can never be used rationally but const-
Itute a cönstant titillation, and might still do us all in. Another legacy
of nazism ?
_ Of course, Professor Gustave M. Gilbert (stÄll at Long
13
Island University ?) would be a most valuable Speaker. He not only acted
as court psychiatrist at the Goering trial in Nuremberg, 1945/6 but also
as expert witness at the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem, 1961*
Three other possible Speakers come to my mind: Prof. Raul Hilberq
(Univ. of Vermont at Burlington), leading authority on the Holocaust ,author
of the definitive '*The Destruction of the European Jews*^ ; and if you wish
to invite a Ge rma n Speaker, either pr. Mitscherlich, or Dr. von Wei^saecSer
relative
( Max Planck Institute, I believe. He is the strictly anti-nazi hanrntoham of
the sinister von V/eizsaecker, State Secretary in Ribbentrop*s poreign Office,
who was convicted as war criminal by one of the American tribunals at Nuremberg
The present Weizsaecker is a member of the international study group on
"World Perspectives to the 1990»s" ,organized by the Institute for World
Order, 1140 Ave.of Arne ricafNYC., vifere he takes the position that a nuclear
conflagration seems hardly avoidable.)
«# t« w
A A M
Dear Jack, as you probably sense,. these remarks are not improv-
isations ^prompted by your project bgt some conclusions gradually reached
during my long work on my forthcoming book on Nuremberg, and its message
for the future. I confide them to you, in the hope they could be fertile
for the project. I truly believe that the Holocaust and the entire Hitler
experience are not a matter of the past but that their shadow and trauma
with very serious consequences.
continue to be wihh us,/lf this proposition were somehow indicated in the
title of the Symposium (something like, "THE HOLOCAUST, AND ITS CONTINUTNG
SHADCDW ') it could produce additional attention to the Symposium, To be
sure, the knowledgeable audience might reject the proposition. But the pro-
V.
14
Position itself would give the project an additional dimension, which
could add to the Sym^sium's signif icance.
Cordially,
.1.
JohiflH.'E. Fried
Professor ofVPolitical Science, Lehman
College, and Graduate Faculty , City Univ.of N.Y.
PS: As you suggested, I enclose
some biographical data/^, and
xerox showing my work at the 15 Nuremberg volumes.
Also, for good measure,letter by the Am.judge who
presided at the Medical Case,about my work in Nuremberg.
JOHN H. E. FRIED
55 EAST 86 STREET
NEW YORK. N. Y. 1002B
Pertinent Biographical Data:
TEUt 348-1498
Present posHion, Professor of Polltical Science, Lehman College, and Grad
uate Faculty, City University of New York
Dr.of Law, Vienna Univ.; - PH.O.(Public Law and Government ).Colun^ia Univ.NYC
Encl,
Until Hitler.s annexation of Austria, practlced law in Vienna. Game to USA.1938.
'''' '^i'r.ui:u\T:^^^^^^^^ (League of Nations),
from Europe aboi?1hr?;.rs?a:;'labor°pr:;r::! "' ^"^'^^^"^ documentatl^n
^udges Of tHose-TFiFn^iĂĽrt5S^1^;.:Sd^^^^^^^^^
"'"''tS^^'^S^^t^^'^^'—^ °"^". - Oept.of the Army
1949, Rapporteur, UNESCO Project and UNESCO Conference, Monaco, "Causes of War."
1950
1954
Encl.
BiblioqrpĂźh^ Books^and_chaeterJjjJ,^gk:
atithor, m^nU^LJmmmmAmU NY:Macmillan.l942, 426 pp.
w th fhrAl;iftanrf- ÄrfioT—" Pililosophy_and_HÜmaKrstrc S^fe
■^-^^^*^:pL:e^s?i-^Ttt-- °?v^^^^^^^^
creSit/encI.) '''" '' °° '^''- ^'^'^^^ ^^^-^ Vol.I.showing
of1nieinatto"naJ°La'w'Mrt T" Arn.Political,^enc^e_view, An.Journal
_^ĂĽiS.rnationaj^aw, etc.) & papers presented at Conferences fincl
STUOIES. III,1<)59) »'»•.-'"''»al«,publUhed In.yAD WASHB«
?
(Am
ux^^^«''^
^L/ /u^i-t«5^rCJt^
)
Z iM^
JO J t ^/4/iörAs-jrA
3/ tUi (JULmj^C^j^
^/ WlcXoo^ ^
< • I I
~ .- - t
> ♦
i
Start
Les deux aspets de Nbgt a)concernant le passe (l'epoque d'Hitlerisme]
b) concernant le futur,
--Nb--efehbiifeypas-8eHlemenfe-
Pour cela, Mfaigm ni cette epoque, ni Nbg doivent etre oublies
ou conslderes "vieille histoire". La guerre ne dolt pas etre oubliee
parce que
Nbg etablit pas seulement les orfeines de la grabde guerre,
at les delts causes par 1/Hitlerlsme, mais avant tout, l'esprlt,
kes attitdesjles notion que causaient ses guerres et delits. Les
conclusions tirees a Nbg en 19A6 appliquent,soi-disant,negativement
aus evenementsde 1' epoque pre-nbg,mais conctsituent des exhorttlons
solennelles pour le futur,Ce point est 8ssentiel,parceque lesbaeillcs-
les bacilles d'Hitlerisme ont montre^,depuis Nbg, dans des formes dive:
ses,une une virulence inattendue.
Cl^^
VERY START
tnemse of manifestation 1
Les Thetnes de la Manifstatlon
1)
Le thetne central, je soumls, decralt etre,la criminalite
de la geirre d'ag^resion,
**D*initier une guerre d'agression,n'est pas seulement un
crime; it is the supreme international crime."
(de-mystification)
isation de guerres . («ÄqrpriwMBmj
riitiamgaam iflihgKPIgttgmidiligtigrtaa^iupm
logique
3) La conclusion/de la de-mythologisation de guerres:
La de-mytholoigsation d'actes d'etats : lammMum les guerres
ne resultent pas de forces mysterieuses^j^ ^^^^ logiquement que
le declenchement d'une guerre itIMIH
j I
I III I .111
ne peut resulter
que de decisions concretes et specificques de d'indivAäus
identifiables .
ijt.(fiu /)(m^' -^^'^
l l
%(,. ic
^•i ^) f 1/ (MilM f
D
C^^)
i^C>4iH
Ă„
i
.â– ^Hi-'j-^'
'#->
>Y^
', '7^i/?^h^'
Dealh Train Man: Trial Folds
The West German trial of the man
who organised the special trains
which took Jewish victims to the
extermination camps was "suspend-
ed for an indefinite period" on
May 3rd.
Reason given for the Suspension of
the trial was that the accused, Al-
bert GanzenmĂĽller, former nazi
State Secretary aged 68, had had a
heart attack.
FĂĽll documentary evidence of Gan-
zenmĂĽller's personal implication in
the mass murder Programme has
been in the public domain since
1946, when his correspondence with
iGest'apo boss Heinrich Himmler on
Ithe subject of special trains to
iTreblinka Camp was produced in
levidence at the Nuremberg Trials.
(For details see GERMAN REPORT,
Fehruary 14th 1973).
Despite this easily-available and
incontrovertible evidence, the West
German authorities took no action
against GanzenmĂĽller who returned
to West Germany in 1954 from the
Argentine, where he had fled at the
end of the war. He worked for
14 years in a prominent position
with a big Ruhr steel firm, and
retired in 1968 on the very com-
fortable pension which the Bonn
government provides for State
secretaries in Hitler's government.
After extensive public urging, the
West German legal authorities final-
ly, in March 1970, filed charges
against him of "knowingly aiding
and abetting" the murder of mil-
lions of Jews.
Using one of their trusty delaying
tactics, the prosecuting authorities
prepared a monster indictment of
338 pages, and announced that
119 witnesses would have to be
called from all parts of the world.
Since then, the history of the Gan-
zenmĂĽller trial has been a record of
delay and obfuscation. In December
1970 a Dusseldorf court moved
that the proceedings be discontinued
because of "lack of evidence". In
June 1971 a higher Dusseldorf court
reversed this decision.
The lower court then reluctantly
set a trial date 15 months ahead, in
October 1972.
October 1972 came and went, but
the trial could not be held: the two
lawyers engaged by GanzenmĂĽller
were "busy on other cases".
The trial finally opened in March
1973; after a few weeks of desultory
hear'ings, GanzenmĂĽller had his
heart attack, which might even be
genuine.
\
-t
•X-) Nbg
ihich Go ulri be used against
Jews " altogether,*
theory."
sitaitmvnmit
Re'*hcCommi
Clunc^ 1 )
ndt was Hitler's per.physici
ssione- for Sanitation &Oub c "ealth,and emmebr of the Reich Resean
mOmahimpBrt, in ©pfier" t^ -e^te^ffl4R»te-4t^e-eReffly-
One hoped thereby not in1y to defeat the enemy
but to exte^minate h i m^wfflnwbmrTf'
fruastrati^n &
pessimism.
une seule Illustration .
sur la 30me anni versa ire de l'ONU,
Un editorial/dans un mensue^ interntional et d edie aux p)runcipes
de l'ONU, peut ecn'ere:
"..la troisisme gSe^re mondiale, peut -etre frolee un instant
et pe-idoiquement prophetisee, n'a pas eu lieu. Ppur la raison
sĂĽffisante sans doute que l'a-me absolue de po-^tee universelle
n'epargnamitm er-ait desormais personne, nulle part, laissant peu
de Chance aux fesponsables de s^en tire^ a l'abri d»un bunker.
Les fous apanti a part, la prudence commence a 1 • implication
personnen e." ( Robe-t Fenaux. L'ONU A TRENTE ANS.mriamffi
dans la revue, ASSOCTATTNS INTERNATTONALES,no.ll , 1975,
publ^'ee ;ar l'Unlon gr Assnsications Internationales, Bruxelles,
p.518.
\
TOPICS
facts 1
THE FACTS REVEALED AT nbg; AND THE LESSONS Tu BE DRAWN.
LESSON :
All powerful grpups and social ÂŁcrces ("elites*0. and nÂŁ
only holders of governmental and/or legislative power, are
co-responsible for iokm a country's international and dornest
en under^dlctatosrhip, d all the
mo
polQcies.
This holds true ev
so otherwsie: ' u ^
"Hitler could not make aggre war/ by himself .He had
hve the coope»topmn pf statesmen, military leader
diplomats. and businessmen. When they.with kjolwe
üfin: s/^//a ims . gäve h " im their Cooperation, they rr
tehmeslves parties to /his/ plan. They are not to
be deemed inoocent because Hitler made use of them.i
they knew what they were doing.«(JMT-l7226T)That gh
ere assignd to their tasks by a dictator does not ab^
solve them from responsivility for their acts...2^
(Repeated in many v^ays in other parts of the DAT 8
US Nbg judgments.)
^(r (. ^ i' ' d ^
J ]L { <^**>
-v )
ARE THE NBG PRINCIPLES ESSENTIAL FOR GLOBAL SURVIVAL ?
YES:esp. superior order doctine
1 1
\
mvite Mitscbef lieh.
I suggest tbat tbe nanif estation sbould also empbasize
as a prncipal message o Nbg, febafe-febe-feyiai- tbat non-govtivilians
--businessmen,intelLectuaIs, etc. also bave a respnsibility iev-the
tp-piFeveHt-febei^-eeHHtify-ls-- if tbeir coutry's govt. foLLos crimina,
policies. If tbis Suggestion is acepted, I would propose to invite as
a Speaker an outstanding West German pbysician, Dr. Alexander Mitscberlicb ,
wbp, at tbe American Nbg trial against Nazi doctors 'mhiimm criminal experi-j
ments (Tbe Medical Gase) was cbosen by tbe German side as tbe bead of
tbe German MedicalCommision wbicb was attacbd to tbe Am.tribunal during
famous
tbat 7- ontb trial. Dr.M.was imprisaed by tge nazis and tbereafter bad
toreport twice a day to tbe GESTALO. Be is tbe autbor o tbe famous
firsd ed.
book, Medizin obne Menscblicjkeit (1947) (tnglisb edition,f irst 19A9,
Doctors of Infamy:Tbe story of tbe Nazi medidal crimes. In 1965, be
publisbed with bis wife MHEMIHM DIE UNFĂ„HIGKEIT ZU TRAUERN wbicb anayloses
tbe reasons for tbe German post-Nbg psycboloical reactions ,or lack of
reactions (^ence tbe title, die Incapacity to Mourn (namely , tbe victims of
-k) (first ed.sold 100,000 copies)
Nazism) , ,vlpj.9b Tbe book bas been very influential in WGermany,and bas jus
been publisbed in NY, Tbe Inability to Momro . (NY Praeger, 1975, 308 pp._)
* j . . r- y- , . ^ * - of .feelings pf
and rejection ef -a-ieeli^Hg-ei-eelleeqie byE-feRe sbared respmsibilit'
Hcnacirr h. lchman colucoc
OCf>AffTMC»iT Or POUTICA4. •CICNCC
um
IT
•coroMo PA«« »DuuivAiie wcar
Joha Priad, April 5, 1976
T«ik|A(iv« OucllM for Frograa ^f
Ion of 30th AnolvrMtrr of tb« Judtßmnt of th« NütPOEiC
Inf CMtlOBUil TriWml (Octdb^r l»t, 1971)
>QltlililC SESSIOii (3 bours or 4 hourt)
NurMborg as Ulatorlc«! Aceountlag of \iQtld War II
1. Intro4i»cXloii by Jobn Prio4 (45-M «iftuttt«)
yiky vM tb« trUX hold? Vbo «oro tbo dofoadaat«, prooocutoro» jiidgooT
Ubot facto dU tbo trlol rovool? Whot voo tbo vordict? Wbot low did tbo
Trlbuaol opply? Wfeiot objoctlooo bovo boon ralood ogoiaot tbo f.klolT bo« dld tbo
JĂĽdgaottt onovor tbooo objoctiono? In vbot ooaoo voo tbo Trlol uoiqiiot lo vbot
ooaoo voo it not unlquo «t ollT Ktc*
2. SbiHl^ 3t tt :aoo pirt of Ui fl o, TRI;:, a:' llJUD^EftC.
(imIooo thio obould bo dono» for lov»oct, ot ond of Aftorttooa ooooloa?)
3. Spoocboo (or ftoundtobio) by aoabor« of dlfforont diolplinoo ot Lobaoa Collogo,
on topict ooloctod by thos. (ono pooolbillty: '^Hmt con tbo Uaoxplicoblo (Hitlorloa)
bo oxploinod?")froa «NIIT ongloo.;
lOMOto da bio ospotloacao*
4. Spooch by a foraor nati coocontratleo
5. Spoocb by i
Coraan war crli
Garaan opoakar (obtalnablo trom ioaa Coaaulata In VYCT)
10 trlalo («rhlcb aro atlll ftoing ont)
AfTEIliOON SESSIOii (3 houro or 4 bouro)
Tbo Contlnulag laportaaca of tba Muraabarg Prlaolplao
i. latroductioo by Joba Frlad (45-40 ainutoo)
Tboolox Tbay aro bocoaing ovar aoro cruciol, in viav af iacraaaing
daotructivaaaaa of war tacbnology.
Eapbaaia oa tba folloving Muroaborg Friaoiplaai
a) ProbibiCion of aggroooivo war ('VHa aupr
tba Nbg.JudgMtnt inoiott)
Intaraatiaaal criaa, aa
&
HCRBCRT H. LCHMAN COLLCOC
• r TMK otTY uMivcffaitv or m«w vom«
OCPAĂśTMCNT or POUrtCAL SCICNCC
ItiBl ••0-»ftl7
•COrOAO f*AlllC «OULCVAAD WEBf
•IIONX. NCW VOMK fCM«0
b) OMMtApbyxation of war: v«r« «r« not "la«vlt«bU" 4nd oot ordaln«d but
aecldftd upon by indlvidual d^cltlon-suiktr«, who th«refor« «r«
pcrtonaliy r«»pon»lbl« for th«a, as wall aa fpr atrocitlaa thay ord«r
or fall to pravanc, durlog tht war.
c) tha Sjgarior Ordar doctrlna. Ordara and lawa whlch vlolata tha
fundamaVtal rulaa of Intamatlonal law, «uat, in prlnclpla, not ba
carrlad out '*lf a »oral cholca la. In fact. poaalbla." (ahow that
thla doctrlna la not a Nurambarg Inventlon; and that in tha nuclaar
aga, eiay declda aurvlval.)
d) "International Obligation» take prlorlty over contrary dor.ieattc rulaa
and ordera.
7. Spaach by a former U.S. Proaacutor at Nuraabarg
on a flfth «urambarg principla, nanaly, that tha abova-^antlonad 4
Princlplaa apply not only to Governa^nt officlala includlng Haada of
Stata, and tUiltary laadar», but to daclalon-«akara In all walka of
lila, (Tha US triad and convlctad at Nuranbarg, a.ÂŁ., top G<^man
indtiatrifiliata —Krupp, i> Farban, atc, high Judga«, ph>aic^atta, a
war propragandlat, atc. (aftar tha Intarnatlonal Tribunal had convlctad
tha Chief Jaw-baltar, Straichar).
S.
Faculty on any topiea ralatlng to abov«»
Spaachaa by saabara of tha
aalactad by thaai.
My paraonal opinion ia. not to ahirk fro« diacusaing tha poat-Nuraabarg (!)
growth of nao-ĂĽarwlniatic and othar paaaiviatic doctrlaaa, varioualy poaiting
that "war la Inavitabla" or human »atura ia aggraaaiW* -vhich would contradlct
if not aaka utoplan, tha Nurambarg «laaaaga.
9. Conclualona froo Aftamoon apaachaa. (apaakar t or vary brlaf dabata?)
10. a) For Inpact, it aight ba prafarabla to ahow tha fll«^ TRIAL AT MUUMbCIC,
in whola or part, at and of Aftamoon aaaaion; OR
b) cloaa wlth a briaf (10 ainutaa) Hasortal Sarvica for tha ÂĄlctlMi of
World War II.
****
X
\
^
(MT
B R A N J)
JAMES T.
Associate Justice of the Supreme ''ourt
Salem, Oregon
April 1,19^9
To Whom it May Concern:
I wish by this letter to express my considered judgment
concerning the past accoraplishments , the ability and character
of Mr. John H.E. Fried.
Mr. Fried was appointed by the judges at Hurnberg as
Consultant in connection with the ^rial of the major war crim-
iö9i§ under the provisions of the ondon Charter and Control
^1 Law ^^o. 10. As Presiding DUdge of the tribunal which
tj?5§a the Nazi jurists, I was intimately acquainted with the
work which was done by %. Fried. Under pressure from half a
dozen different tribunals at the same time, he turned out an
immense amount of work of permanent value in the fieid of inter-
national law. His work was quietly perfomned , was of high
quality, astonishingly accurate and greatly he3.pful. I am per-
sonally indebted to him for tiis assistance in the legal problems
which arose in my case. His work dealt, not alone with questions
cf international law, but also to a great extent he was engaged
in the digesting of evidence. I consider Mr. Fried a great
Scholar with a splendid grasp of the issues/mmSammnfflmaaam which
were raised at NĂĽrnberg and of the evidence relevant to the issues.
He was also appointed as representative of the judges in the prep-
aration of Condensed records of the NĂĽrnberg trials. It is my
ardent hope that some ^oundation or Institution will appreciate
the significance of the -NĂĽrnberg trials in the development of
international law and relations, and will undertake a study of
the vast amount of historical material which was made available
for analysis through these proceedings. I know of no one who
could do^a better job along that line than Mr. John H.E. Fried.
It is my Intention by the foregoing to recommend him in
the highest terms and without any qualification.
Sincerely yours,
(signed:) James '^. Brand
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
Oregon and formerly presiding judge
of Triftunal III at NĂĽrnberg
COPY
LOUISlAim STATE UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
Baton Rouge, Louis iaoa
12 April 19^9
Office of the Dean
To Whom it May Concern:
During a period of a year from August of 19^7 to August of 19^ ,
I was closely associated with and had the opportunity to oteserve
the work of Mf . John H.E. Fried, Special Consultant to the nited
States Military Tribunals at NĂĽrnberg, Germany. In^.^is capacity as
confidential Consultant to the judges at NĂĽrnberg, r. Fried performed
Services of extraordianary value in relation to the twelve major
cases of trials of war criminals in the ^urnberg subsequent proceed-
ings. He possesses a broad background in the field of international
law and is particujarly well infonned on the more recent signif.icant
developments in international penal law,
Mr. Fried 's ability and his interest in the work which has
claimed his major attention for the past two years combine to make
him an ideal person to contrib/ute to significant literature pert-
aining to the urnberg trials. It would be unfortunate if r^r .Fried 's
exceptignal knowledge in the field of international penal law based
on the urnberg trials should not be utilized in the form of scholarly
publications making a wtttten record of the noted developments in
the field in which he has had such a prominent part.
Mr. Fried is recommended in the highest terms as to ability,
Personality and character. He has the capacity to conclude at a high
level of scholarship any work which he undertakes in this field. Any
interested Institution, group or organiza ion will make no mistake
in the sponsorship of his research and study as his work is certain
to refiect credit upon him and his Sponsors. He can be implicdlsLy
relied upon to make substantial contributions in the field of inter-
national law, augmenting the considerable record already to his
credit of publications of the highest merit. The undersigned will
be glad, ppon request, to fumich any additional Information con-
cerning Mr. Fried.
(signed:) Paul M. HEBERT
Judge, Military Tribunal No. 6, NĂĽrnberg,
Germany
(Dean, Louisiana State Univers ity Law School)
8oy 30 -A
M^
J M«^ f^<^^^ /^/vT'^ U; ,u K^J'^^ i^^^'^-1 AlLi^ SrT^i? Of^^"^^.
u^'^r'^ir^:. l'^fv- ''^t 7
,f
fii
THE GREAT NUREMBERG TRIAL
BY
JOHN H. E. FRIED
City University ofNew York
Reprinted from THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
Vol. LXX, No. 1 , March, 1976
Reprinted from THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
Vol. LXX, No. 1. March, 1976
The Great Nuremberg Trial*
John H. E. Fried
City Universily of New York
Professor Weinberg, an aulhority on World
War II and itsdocumentation, and the AMS Press
merit great credit for repubiishing this principal
source materiai on the trial of the 22 "major" Nazi
leaders by the International Military Tribunal
(IMT). Although during the two and one half years
after the case against Hermann Goering et al.,
twelve other trials against a total of some 200 de-
fendants — most of them also of high position and
vast power — were held in the same ornate court-
room by tribunals composed exclusively of Ameri-
can judges, it is the IMT case, as the most historic
of these altogether 13 trials, with which the name of
Nuremberg (previously identified with Hitler's
pomp-and-frenzy rallies) has been linked ever
since.
The original official 42-volume publication on
the IMT trial (known as "blue series" because
bound in blue) has long been out of print. Of poor
quality paper and binding, the sets that are still
available are falling apart. As Telford Taylor, the
U.S. Chief Prosecutor after Justice Robert H.
Jackson, recently said-, "Nuremberg" has become
a myth. The myth adds to the ominous confusion
concerning essentials of international behavior.
Because *'Nuremberg" remains relevant, and fac-
tual knowledge about it should be spread, the
publisher's Suggestion that libraries (even those
still holding an original set or what may be left of
it) acquire the new edition and that interested
parties acquire individual volumes while available,
is well taken.
The trial was, of course, unique in its sheer
magnitude.' The record is unique as the authentic
tale of history's worst war and of its antecedents;
unique as a battle of wits about trends, concepts
* The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945-
Oct. 1, 1946. With a new Introduction by Gerhard L.
Weinberg. Reproduction of the English Language Edition
pubhshed at Nuremberg, 1947-1949, 42 volumes, and 2
Supplements: The Indices of the German language edition
(Vol. 43, 637 pp.) and Report of Robert H. Jackson [on]
The International Conference on Military Trials. London,
1945 (Vol. 44, 441 pp.). New York (56 East 13 Street)—
London: AMS Press, 1971. $1,300.00 (buckram), $1,150.00
(Paperback). Single vols., $31.00 (buckram), $27.50
(Paperback).
' Statistical data about "this gigantic trial," given in
Justice Jackson's final report to President Truman, in-
clude: Over 100,000 captured German documents were
screened or examined; "about 4,000 were translated . . .
and used, in whole or in part, in the trial as exhibits."
Sections from "[mjillions of feet of captured moving pic-
ture films" and over 1,800 from over 25,000 captured still
and forces that were at work then, and have
largely remained determinative since; unique as
documentation of the degradation to which
ideological Obsession can lead; unique in showing
the psychology, personalities, and the unassailable
immutability of most (but eventual contrition of
some) of the protagonists. Even a reader who
merely scans this record will be impressed by the
vistas which "Nuremberg" opens.
Also those who do not wish to study the trial
more thoroughly, should become acquainted with
its flavor — the dimensions of the matters it dealt
with— as an antidote against the glibness with
which **Nuremberg" has been variously invoked
or criticzed. Because it was a major, many-
faceted event, "Nuremberg ' can legitimately be
viewed from various perspectives; and there is no
need to defend it in each and every aspect. Yet,
even a small degree of familiarity with its record
cannot but inspire an elemental feeling of awe in
the face of so much evil and tragedy — and heroism,
and render to specialists in pohtics, international
law, and related fields a heightened sense of their
responsibilities for the shaping of the future.
Since this series is a reproduction, and not a
revision, of the original edition, it contains the
shortcomings of the original. Those shortcomings,
the editof s very informative 20-page introduction
frankly admits. A fully satisfactory revision would
require a very large research project in order to
give, /.ĂĽf., completely adequate Indices and cross-
references, as well as explanatory annotations
(allusions to the period up to 1945 are becoming
decreasingly self-evident), and to provide informa-
tion on pertinent developments after the I.M.T.
trial. For example, in order to evaluate the testi-
mony of top-ranking defense witnesses, the reader
should be told where to find the record of (or still
better, be given quotations from) what they said
and what transpired when they themselves were
afterwards tried as suspected war criminals by
American, British, PoUsh, etc. tribunals. Until
such data will become easily available, the present
edition remains indispensable; and while seeming
photographs were used as exhibits. "The U.S. staff . . . ,
including lawyers, secretaries, interpreters, translators and
clerical help numbered at its peak 654 .. . British, Soviel
and French delegations aggregated approximately the
same number." ("Report to the President by Mr. Justice
Jackson, Oct. 7, 1946, in: Supplement Vol., Report of
Robert H. Jackson .... I.e., 432-440, at 434, 433.)
192
1976
The Great Nuremberg Trial
193
a little overwhelming at first sight, it has a good
logic of its own.
Structure of the Set
The set falls into four parts of unequal length:
{a) Volume 1 contains the basics of the IMT trial,
such as the composition of the Tribunal, the
Prosecution, and the Defense; the 4-power (U.S.-
U.K.-Soviet-French) Agreement and Charter for
the I.M.T."^; the 4-power Indictment; essential
procedural rules and initial decisionsr^ the Judg-
menf* (pp. 171-341); the Soviet Judge's dissent
from some of the Judgment's findings (pp. 342
364); the sentences and acquittals. (h) For anyone
wishing to delve more deeply, or concerned about
any of the enormous political, military, ideologi-
cai, legal, economic, and other issues debated at
the trial — which neither could nor needed to be
completely covered in the Judgment^ Volumes 2
through 22 give the fĂĽll official trauscripts, in
English, of the proceedings. (c) Two volumes (no.
23 and 24) contain some 1,600 pages of Indices.
{J) Eighteen volumes (no. 25 through 42) repro-
duce Nuremberg documentary evidence, mainly
in the original German.
- One of the two supplemental volumes in this series re-
produces Mr. Jackson's Report on the 4-Power London
Conference of July 1945 (originally published by the State
Department in 1949). It shows the evolution at that Con-
ference of the Nuremberg Charter which formed the basis
of the IMT and the other 12 Nuremberg triais, as well as of
the Tokyo international trial of the major Japanese War
Criminals, and of what became known as the Nuremberg
Principles. A careat must be expressed concerning this
printed version of the minutes of the London Conference.
They constitute transcriptions of the Stenographie notes
taken in English by Mr. Jackson's secretary, and hence in-
clude translations of the Statements by the Russian (Judge
L T. Nikitchenko, assisted, /.«., by Prof A. N. Trainin)
and French (Judge Robert Falco. assisted, /.«., by Prof
Andre Gros) delegations. As pointed out in the Foreword.
"The minutes [were] not submitted to the French, Soviet
or British Delegations for verification or editing [before
being printed in this volume]." (p. xiii; italics added).
^ Including severance of the case of old Herr Krupp von
Bohlen (too senile to stand trial) but not of Rudolf Hess
(able to stand trial). The respective medical reports are also
reproduced in vol. 1.
"* The reading of the Judgment in open court took the
last two days of the trial (Sept. 30, Oct. I. 1946). Its text
therefore also appears in the record ofthose days (vol. 22.
pp. 41 1 589), and shows how the four Judges alternated in
the reading. This has been of interest to analysts who be-
lieve (with certain internal justifications, but without
prooO that each Judge read the sections about the topics
primariiy assigned to him.
^ The arch-major criminals, Hitler and Himmler,
escaped the trial through suicide. Nevertheless, Nurem-
berg had to deal with them, especially insofar as their
Orders concerned the defendants. The supersecret docu-
ments emanating from them reveal their policies and inten-
tions in dimensions of enormity still largely not realized.
On the other hand, the Nuremberg materials also throw
light on various other aspects stressed by the Defense -
such as the support certain Nazi aims received from im-
portant non-Germans.
The Transcripts of the Court Proceedings
The transcripts (volumes 2-22) begin with the
Preliminary Hearings, the Opening Statement on
November 20, 1945 by the President of the Tri-
bunal, Lord Justice Lawrence (U.K.), and the
famous opening oration (vol. 2, pp. 98 115) by
the U.S. Chief Prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice
Robert M. Jackson ("'this trial represents man-
kind's desperate effort to apply the discipline of
law to statesmen who have used their power of
State to attack the foundations of the world's
peace . . . "). They go through to the TribunaFs
adjoumment on October 1, 1946.
In a total of some 215 sessions — a record for
concision — the four Prosecutions, by pre-arrange-
ment, and the Defense developed their cases on
the charges: aggressions, and conspiracy to com-
mit aggressions; the slave labor program; the
genocidal measures against Jews, Poles, other
Slavs, Gypsies;^ the starvation and exploitation
of occupied territories; the concentration and
extermination camps; the slave labor program;
etc. All ofthose policies, carried out on enormous
scales, involved complex arrangements between
governmental, party, police, and military agencies,
which also had to be unravelled in the trial and are
very instructive for the political scientist.
The Tribunal was able to base its findings on
contemporary documents, in the light of testimony
not only by the indicted protagonists themselves
but by other top-ranking decision makers.^ No
such evidence — laying bare the inner workings of
a regime whose impact on the future is still un-
predictable — had ever before been available to any
court anywhere.
The nine-day testimony of Goering Covers al-
most 400 pages (vol. 9, pp. 235 657, interrupted
on pp. 457 491 by testimony of his witness, the
Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus on Dahl-
erus* last-minute efforts in summer 1939 to bring
about a German-British understanding.) Less
lengthy but also of great historical importance are
the testimonies of the Chief of the High Command
of the Wehrmacht, Keitel (vol. 10, pp. 468 647;
vol. 11, pp. 1 28); KeitePs Chief of Staff, Jodl
(vol. 15, pp. 284 561); Foreign Minister von
Ribbentrop (vol. 10, pp. 223-444); Reichshank
President Hjalmar Schacht (vol. 12, pp. 417 602,
vol. 13, pp. 1-49); Arthur Seyss-Inquart, master
" The icnn "genocide" does not occur either as formal
Charge or in the Nuremberg Charter or Judgment. This
would have been retroactive, as the crime was technically
defined only in theGenocide Convention of 1948.
" "Defense Counsel are advised that the Tribunal will
not ordinarily regard as competent evidence, extracts
from books or articles expressing the opinions of par-
ticular authors on matters of ethics. history. or particular
events" (Ruling by the President, 22 March 1946, vol. 9,
p. 673).
1976
The Great Nuremberg Trial
195
pp. 402 41 3 and the Schmundt minules of the Con-
ference of May 23, 1 939, 079-L, Exh. USA-27, vol.
37, pp. 546 556); Hitler's Instructions to his
Supreme Wehrmacht Commander Fieldmarshal
Keitel of October 17, 1938 on the "future of
Poland" (a source of labor and a possible military
deployment area for Germany; what parts of
Poland to become Reich territory, to be cleansed
of '"Jews, Polacks and trash" — ("Juden, Polacken
und Gcsimier): etc. 864-PS, Exh. USA-609. vol.
26, pp. 377- 383); Hitler's instructions for the sub-
sequent invasions, starting with his directive of 20
Nov. 1939 for invasion of the Low Countries
(440-PS, Exh. GB-107, vol. 26, pp. 37 40), and
culminating in the Barbarossa directives for the
invasion of the USSR, such as the one of 18 Dec.
1940 (446-PS, Exh. USA-31, vol. 26, pp. 47 52);
minutes of secret Conferences involving. among
others. Goering, Keitel and Jodl, about the
lynching of downed American "terror pilots,'' and
Hitler's advice to Japanese Ambassador Oshima
at the Berghof on 27 May 1944 to "hang, not
shoot" them {"jeden amerikanischen TerrorĂźiecjer
aufJiaencjen, nicht erschiessen') (3780-PS. Exh.
GB [Great Britain]-293. vol. 33, pp. 74-80, at 79)
about which the British Prosecutor, Sir David
Maxwell-Fyffe, examined von Ribbentrop on 1
April 1946 (vol. 10, at384).
Numerous other documents show the still un-
fathomable, continent-wide program of the "final
Solution of the Jewish question" ; and the connec-
tion between the Nazi aims of annihilating Jewry
and annihilating communism ("Bolshevism is the
doctrine of Jewish Satanism^-^//V Lehre JĂĽdischer
Satanei,'' Robert Ley stated as early as at the 1936
Olympiade Party Rally, Nuremberg) (2283-PS.
Exh. USA-337, vol. 30, at p. 129). There are long
excerpts (370 printed pages) from the 38 volumes
of the diary of Hans Frank as Governor-General
of occupied Poland, 1939 1944 (2232-PS, vol. 29,
pp. 356-725); the complete transcript of the trial
before the notorious "People's Court"* of Field-
marshal von Witzleben, Count Yorck von Warten-
burg and six other conspirators in the unsuccessful
attempt to kill Hitler on 20 July 1944 (3881-PS,
Exhibit GB [Great Britain]-527, vol. 33, pp. 299
509; fĂĽll text of the "People Court's" judgment,
pp. 510-530); and SS General Stroop's report on
the final massacre, against heroic resistance, of the
survivors of the German-erected Warsaw Ghetto,
"The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More' of 16 May 1943
(1061-PS, Exh. USA-275, vol. 26, pp. 628-642).
The reproduction of these documents in their
original German puts them beyond the reach of
many American readers. However. the most telling
parts of the most significant documents were the
core of the trial; cited in court in all four oflficial
languages, they are to that extent recorded in
English in the Transcripts, part of the present
series (Vols. 2-22). For example, the British
Prosecutor Elwyn Jones, M.P.. in cross-examining
Dr. Wolfram Sievers, the manager of Himmler's
Race Research agency Ahnenerhe {\ncQs\vd\ Heri-
tage Society), about the most gruesome medical
experiments, read into the English record (vol. 20,
pp. 516 553) large sections of documents which
in the fĂĽll German texts appear in vol. 38.
It is also of some help that each German docu-
ment has been given an English title, and English
capsule description. Furthermore, some important
Nuremberg documents are in English in their
originaL and hence are reproduced in English in
Vols. 24-42. For example : Reports by the Duke of
Hamilton, on interviews with Hess after the
latter's landing in Scotland, 10 May 1941 (1 16-M
to 119-M, vol. 38, pp. 174^184); numerous affi-
davits, including those by two American diplo-
mats, George S. Messersmith and Raymond H.
Geis, about their experiences in Berlin (2385 &
2386-PS, Exh. USA-68, 750 in vol. 30, pp. 295-
311, 311-328); a Report by the Judge Advocate
Section, Third U.S. Army, on their investigation
of Flossenburg Concentration Camp (2309 PS,
vol. 30, pp. 158-164); Report of a special 12-
member bipartisan Congressional Committee
headed by Senate majority leader Alben W.
Barkley of 15 May 1945, about their personal in-
spection (requested by General Eisenhower) of
Buchenwald, Nordhausen and Dachau concen-
tration camps (159-L, Exh. USA-222, vol. 37, pp.
605-626); and the oflficial English text of the
'"Czechoslovakian Report on German Crimes
against Czechoslovakia" (998-PS, Exh. USA-91,
vol. 26, pp. 429-522). English defense documents
include, e.g., the written testimony by Fleet
Admiral ehester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy, on the
principles concerning the rescue of survivors of
sunk enemy ships that governed naval warfare in
the Pacific (Doc. Doenitz-100, vol. 40, pp. 108-
111). Some documents are in French. For ex-
ample: the ofiicial French government report on
the fate of French intellectuals, heads of political
parties and workers" organizations. Jews, and
other persecuted groups (274-F, Exhibit RF
[Republique Fran(;aise]-30 1 , vol. 37, pp. 1 1 6- 1 88);
list of 29,660 fusillaled French hostages (420-F,
Exh. RF-266, vol. 37, pp. 211-212); sworn State-
ments of French and Belgian concentration camp
survivors (vol. 36, pp. 261-387).
Indices. A publication of this complexity re-
quires some comments on its indices, and their
quality.
First, there is a large Suhject Index, consisting
of 660 pages in vol. 23. Regrettably. it was pre-
pared from the Transcripts of the court proceed-
ings alone. Hence, the Subject Index Covers only
194
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 70
of occupied Poland, and then of the occupied
Netherlands (vol. 15, pp. 610-668, vol. 16, pp.
1-113); Hitlefs Vice-Chancellor and ambassador
Franz von Papen (vol. 1 6, pp. 236-422), etc.
Among the defense witnesses were several sur-
viving German Fieldmarshals, some of whom were
themselves subsequently tried and convicted as
war criminals: von Brauchitsch (vol. 20, pp. 567-
594); von Manstein (vol. 20, pp. 594 646, vol. 21,
pp. 3-17); Milch (vol. 9, pp. 44^133); von Rund-
stedt (vol. 21, pp. 21-50); Kesselring (vol. 9, pp.
1 74-234). Fieldmarshal Paulus, the Commander in
the battle of Stalingrad, was a Prosecution witness
(vol. 7, pp. 253-304), as was Intelligence chief
Walter Schellenberg (vol. 4, pp. 374-385).
Other witnesses for the Defense— who, inciden-
tally, were more numerous than those for the Pros-
ecution—included the powerful Hans Heinrich
Lammers, Hilter's right-hand man as Chief of the
Reich Chancellery (vol. 11, pp. 28-154); Rudolf
Franz Hoess, Commandant at Auschwitz during
part of the war (vol. 1 1, pp. 396-422); the Acting
Minister of Justice, Franz Schlegelberger (vol. 20,
pp. 263-278); top Foreign Office men such as
State Secretaries Adolf Freiherr Steengracht von
Moyland (vol. 10, pp. 106-157) and Ernst von
Weiszaecker (vol. 1 4, pp. 277-297) ; and the former
high Gestapo officer Hans Bernd Gisevius who
had participated in the plot against Hitler's life of
20 July 1944 (vol. 12, pp. 167-305).
The panoroma of the trial was wide, covering as
it did the evolution of National Socialism; its
gradual undermining of Weimar Germany and
then the Versailles system; the nazification of
German political, constitutional, social, and eco-
nomic life, and the Organization of a warfare State;
relations with Germany's allies and their leaders,
especially Italy and Mussolini; the evolution and
implications of an ever more integral racism,
spreading over ever wider territories; the use of
foreign peoples as "colonials" and of foreign
countries as resettlement areas for ethinic Ger-
mans; the extent and excusatory weight, if any, of
collaboration by the Vichy regime in France or the
Quisling regime in Norway; the multiple horror,
especially in Yugoslavia, of triangulär war in-
volving two warring factions plus foreign invaders.
The transcript also gives a picture of the ränge
which the Tribunal granted to the Defense for the
presentation of their arguments, and thus allows
the reader to form his own opinion about the fair-
ness of the trial. Undeniably a high point of the
trial was the elaborate attack by Professor Her-
mann Jahrreiss (Defense Counsel for Fieldmarshal
Jodl) on behalf of all defendants against what he
termed the concept of " war as a function forbidden
by international law*' and on such other basic
issues as responsibility for crimes committed un-
der superior Orders (vol. 17, pp. 458-494).
For a variety of reasons, the doctrinal and fac-
tual presentations, as well as examinations by the
four Prosecutions, and especially the final State-
ments by Justice Jackson, Sir Hartley Shawcross,
M. Champetier de Ribes and General Rudenko
(vol. 19, pp. 397-618) are of great interest.
In Order to find his way among these 21 volumes
of transcripts, the reader has to consult vol. 23,
the first of two fat index volumes. In its 70-page
"Chronological Index of the Trial Proceedings"
Vol. 23 gives capsule information for each of the
IMT's sessions, such as names of witnesses heard,
topics discussed, rulings, etc.
Documents. Essential to the understanding of the
IMT trial is the fact that it was based on the
availability of a mass of contemporary German
documents, o( high {Geheim) and h'ighesi {Ge/ieime
ReichssĂĽche : Nur durch Offiziere: etc.) secrecy
ratings, which had fallen into Allied hands and
which often emanated from, were addressed to, or
referred to individual leaders in the dock. These
Conference minutes, letters, Orders, reports, official
files, etc. Cover every aspect of the trial.
Much of the second main part of this set,
namely, the 18 document volumes (no. 25 through
42) are given to the reproduction in fĂĽll or in part
of the most significant of those documents^ in
their German original. In precise, archival rendi-
tion, they show, for example, handwritten margi-
nal notations, abbreviations, "receipt" stamps,
and other indicators of their probative value —
essential also to professional research. Because of
Space limitations, only some of them can be
illustratively listed here : the minutes of the Confer-
ences at which Hitler revealed his initial war plans
(including the "Hossbach" Conference of No-
vember 5, 1937, 386-PS. Exh. USA-25, vol. 25,
^ Not ö// documents accepted in evidence at Nuremberg
(and certainly not, all that were available) are reprinted in
this set. Many more of them are contained in the U.S.
Government publication prepared at Justice Jackson's
initiative, "A^oz/ Conspiracy and Aggression" (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1946-1949; known as the "red series"). In
these bulky 10 volumes. all documents are given in English,
but the translations, done at Nuremberg under great
pressure, are not completely reliable. Finally, it should be
noted that the 15-volume "green series" edited by Drexel
R. Sprecher and myself, "Trials of War Criminals Before
the [U.S.] Nuremberg Military Tribunals'^ (Washington:
Govt. Printing Office, 1950-1953), covering the 12 subse-
quent trials of altogether almost 200 defendants (cases
against Krupp; I. G. Farben; Fieldmarshals and gen-
erals; Cabinet ministers and diplomats; the Acting
Minister of Justice and high judges; Luftwaffe and other
physicians involved in the "medical experiments," "eutha-
nasia," castration programs; leaders of the concentration
camp System, and of extermination units; etc.) contain
many documents (all in carefully checked English transla-
tions) that had been used by or were available to the I.M.T.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to provide the "green
series" with indices.
1976
The Great Nuremberg Trial
195
pp. 402-41 3 and the Schmundt minutes of the Con-
ference of May 23, 1939,079-L, Exh. USA-27. vol.
37, pp. 546 556); Hitler's Instructions to his
Supreme Wehrmacht Commander Fieldmarshal
Keitel of October 17, 1938 on the "future of
Poland" (a source of labor and a possible military
deployment area for Germany; what parts of
Poland to become Reich territory, to be cleansed
of "Jews, Polacks and trash"' — {^'Judetu Polacken
und Gesimier')\ etc. 864-PS, Exh. USA-609, vol.
26, pp. 377 383); Hitler's Instructions for the sub-
sequent invasions, starting with his directive of 20
Nov. 1939 for invasion of the Low Countries
(440-PS, Exh. GB-107, vol. 26, pp. 37-40), and
culminating in the Barbarossa directives for the
invasion of the USSR, such as the one of 18 Dec.
1940 (446-PS, Exh. USA-31, vol. 26, pp. 47 52);
minutes of secret Conferences involving. among
others, Goering, Keitel and Jodl, about the
lynching of downed American "terror pilots," and
Hitler's advice to Japanese Ambassador Oshima
at the Berghof on 27 May 1944 to "hang, not
shoot" them {'"Jeden amerikanisehen TerrorfHecjer
aujhaenyen. nicht ersehiessen') (3780-PS, Exh.
GB [Great Britain]-293, vol. 33, pp. 74-80, at 79)
about which the British Prosecutor, Sir David
Maxwell-Fyffe, examined von Ribbentrop on 1
April 1946 (vol. 10, at384).
Numerous other documents show the still un-
fathomable, continent-wide program of the "'final
Solution of the Jewish question"; and the connec-
tion between the Nazi aims of annihilating Jewry
and annihilating communism ("Bolshevism is the
doctrine of Jewish Satanism^//> Lehre JĂĽdischer
Saianei,'" Robert Ley stated as early as at the 1936
Olympiade Party Rally, Nuremberg) (2283-PS,
Exh. USA-337, vol. 30, at p. 129). There are long
excerpts (370 printed pages) from the 38 volumes
of the diary of Hans Frank as Governor-General
of occupied Poland, 1939 1944 (2232-PS, vol. 29,
pp. 356 725); the complete transcript of the trial
before the notorious "People's Court" of Field-
marshal von Witzleben, Count Yorck von Warten-
burg and six other conspirators in the unsuccessful
attempt to kill Hitler on 20 July 1944 (3881-PS,
Exhibit GB [Great Britain]-527, vol. 33, pp. 299
509; fĂĽll text of the "People Court's" judgment,
pp. 510-530); and SS General Stroop's report on
the final massacre, against heroic resistance, of the
survivors of the German-erected Warsaw Ghetto,
""The Warsem- Ghetto Is No More' of 16 May 1943
(1061-PS, Exh. USA-275, vol. 26, pp. 628-642).
The reproduction of these documents in their
original German puts them beyond the reach of
many American readers. However. the most telling
parts of the most significant documents were the
core of the trial; cited in court in all four official
languages, they are to that extent recorded in
English in the Transcripts, part of the present
series (Vols. 2-22). For example, the British
Prosecutor Elwyn Jones, M.P., in cross-examining
Dr. Wolfram Sievers, the manager of Himmler's
Race Research agency Ahnenerbe ( Ancestral Heri-
tage Society), about the most gruesome medical
experiments, read into the English record (vol. 20,
pp. 516-553) large sections of documents which
in the fĂĽll German texts appear in vol. 38.
It is also of some help that each German docu-
ment has been given an English title, and English
capsuledescription. Furthermore, some important
Nuremberg documents are in English in their
originaL and hence are reproduced in English in
Vols. 24^ 42. For example : Reports by the Duke of
Hamilton, on interviews with Hess after the
lattef s landing in Scotland, 10 May 1941 (1 16-M
to 119-M. vol. 38, pp. 174^184); numerous aflfi-
davits, including those by two American diplo-
mats, George S. Messersmith and Raymond H.
Geis, about their experiences in Berlin (2385 &
2386-PS, Exh. USA-68, 750 in vol. 30, pp. 295-
311, 311-328); a Report by the Judge Advocate
Section, Third U.S. Army, on their investigation
of Flossenburg Concentration Camp (2309 PS,
vol. 30, pp. 158-164); Report of a special 12-
member bipartisan Congressional Committee
headed by Senate majority leader Alben W.
Barkley of 15 May 1945, about their personal in-
spection (requested by General Eisenhower) of
Buchenwald, Nordhausen and Dachau concen-
tration camps (159-L, Exh. USA-222, vol. 37, pp.
605-626); and the official English text of the
"Czechoslovakian Report on German Crimes
against Czechoslovakia" (998-PS, Exh. USA-91,
vol. 26, pp. 429-522). English defense documents
include, e.g., the written testimony by Fleet
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. U.S. Navy, on the
principles concerning the rescue of survivors of
sunk enemy ships that governed naval warfare in
the Pacific (Doc. Doenitz-100, vol. 40, pp. 108-
111). Some documents are in French. For ex-
ample: the oflRcial French government report on
the fate of French intellectuals, heads of political
parties and workers" organizations. Jews, and
other persecuted groups (274-F, Exhibit RF
[RepubliqueFrangaise]-301,vol. 37, pp. 1 16-188);
list of 29,660 fusillaled French hostages (420-F,
Exh. RF-266, vol. 37, pp. 211-212); sworn State-
ments of French and Belgian concentration camp
survivors (vol. 36, pp. 261-387).
Indices. A publication of this complexity re-
quires some comments on its indices, and their
quality.
First, there is a large Suhject Index, consisting
of 660 pages in vol. 23. Regrettably. it was pre-
pared from the Transcripts of the court proceed-
ings ahne. Hence, the Subject Index Covers only
196
The American Political Science Review
Vol. 70
matters that were discussed in court and, as far as
the documents are concerned, therefore refers only
to the topic(s) on which a document, or some
passage from it, was quoted in court. Any other
topics contained in the document are not picked
up in the Subject Index, although they may be of
much greater significance for the researcher.
Even within this Hmitation, the Subject Index is
incomplete. For exampie, one of the trial's main
issues was the treatment of, and the law concern-
ing Partisans (or guerrillas, maquis, resistance
fighters). Yet. the subentry "International law
[concerning] partisan warfare" gives altogether
two citations: one on "German adherence^ (ital.
supplied) to that law, the other on "Violations
committed during'' partisan warfare. Both cita-
tions refer to altogether two pages in the court
transcript (vol. 21. pp. 293 and 292, respectively)
which reproduce a defense counsel's argumenta-
tion about the probative value of certain prosecu-
tion and defense evidence on partisan warfare, but
there is no reference to any of the documentation
showing German mass atrocities against partisans,
partisan suspects, partisans' families, villages hid-
ing Partisans, etc. Similarly, readers interested in
the TribunaKs handling of the French Maquis
question will find under "Maquis movement,
French" only: "see France; occupied territories;
Resistance"; and none ofthese entries has a sub-
entry for "Maquis."
The Subject Index pedantically records many
unimportant items, but omits matters which are
crucial for the understanding of Nazi war policies
and postwar plans. For exampie, the entry "Slavs"
omits references to one of Himmler's most horrify-
ing Speeches (Poznan, 4 Oct. 1943, 1919-PS, US
Exh. 170, vol. 29, pp. 110-173): the Russians are
not the "noble people" {''edles Volk'') described
in German soldiers' letters home (p. 117) but
"human rejects" {''menschliche Minderware'') (p.
118), "human animals" {"Menschentiere") (p.
1 23) ; " We need slaves for our culture . . . Whether
in the building of an antitank ditch 1 0,000 Russian
females ( Weiher) collapse from exhaustion {aus
Entkraeftuncf umfallen) interests me only insofar
as the ditch be finished. . . ." (p. 123).
Similarly, the Subject Index has no entry on the
future wars for which Himmler, in this and other
programmatic Statements, made far-reaching
plans: the ultimate Armageddon to be between a
biogenetically strengthened Germany reaching
beyond the Urals, in combination with a racially-
cleansed German-dominated Europe, against the
"1 to 1.6 billion hordes {Masse Mensch)" of Asia
(vol. 29, p. 172). If readers relying on the English
summary title locate the document, they will
hardly be able to guess Himmler's relentlessly
pursued visions from the tepid English summary,
"plans for the future" (vol. 29, p. 1 10).
The entry "Children" does not even contain a
subentry on the major Nuremberg topic of the
systematic kidnapping of foreign children of
"good blood" by a special Himmler Organization.
Himmler expected the policy (one of his obses-
sions) to yield eventually 30 million additional
Germans, and discussed it not only in his 1943
Poznan speech but elsewhere and much earlier
(for exampie. nine months before the Start of the
German attack on the U.S.S.R. in his "Otherwise
Germany will not be able to dominate the earth"
speech of 7 September 1940, 1918-PS, U.S. Ex-
hibit 304, vol. 29, pp. 98-1 10).
Of overriding significance is the Nuremberg evi-
dence about the Third Reiches "extermination of
Communism" policies, which the Subject Index
(vol. 23, p. 193) correctly spells out as extermina-
tion of Communists ("Communists, Extermina-
tion.") but for which it gives only six secondary
references. Actually, this war aim was fully dis-
cussed, as recorded, by Hitler, Fieldmarshals, the
SS and SD leadership, even prior to the start of the
attack on the USSR on June 21, 1941, and was
often linked with plans for depriving the USSR,
after conquest, of its main food supplies. (Exam-
pie: "Many tens of millions of people . . . will
[thus] die or have to emigrate to Siberia" — for
which migration no trains will be available. (Eco-
nomic Policy Directions for "Economic Organiza-
tion Fast,'" of 23 May 1941 Doc. 126-EC.) The
famous memorandum of 25 Oct. 1942 by a top
official in Rosenberg's Fast Ministry criticizing the
atrocity policies in the occupied Soviet areas as
adverse to the German war aims of "annihilation
{Vernichtung) of Bolshevism"^ and "obliteration
{Zertrümmerung)" or "dissolution {Aufiösung)"'
of the Soviet Union (294-PS, Exhibit USA- 185,
vol. 25, pp. 331-342, at 332) is only mentioned,
without capsule Contents, in the Name Index under
the memorandum's author, Minister Dr. Braeu-
tigam (vol. 24, p. 316) but is omitted, like many
other documents frankly discussing German war
aims, in the Subject Index short entry, "War Aims,
German" (vol. 23, p. 716).
The second Index volume (no. 24) opens with a
Document Index, which lists the documents ex-
hibited by the four Prosecutions and the Defense,
but only by numbers, and without thumbnail de-
scriptions. The bulk of the volume, almost 500
" Among various Statements to the same effect, see, for
exampie, Directives by the Economic Staff Hast ( Wirt-
schaftsfĂĽhrungsstab Ost) of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces (OKW) of September 1,1942: "Germany
must be the power that obliterates {zertrĂĽmmert) Bolshev-
ism, and the FĂĽhrer must be celebrated (gefeiert) by the
peoples of the Soviet Union as the liberator from the
bolshevist yoke." (347-EC, Exh. USA-320, vol. 36, pp.
331-355, at 346). There is no entry, "Bolshevism" in the
Subject Index.
1976
The Great Nuremberg Trial
197
pages, contains the Name Index. But like the
Subject Index, the Name Index is cuUed from the
transcripts only. It merely refers to the persons
appearing, or mentioned, in the pröceedings.
Again, within this restriction, the Name Index
is not complete. To illustrate: The inclusion of
Rudolf Hess (as Hitler's former Deputy, the
highest-ranking defendant) in the trial has been
criticized in view of his "amnesia." Strangely, his
sensational admission in court on 30 Nov. 1945, of
having simulated ammesia (recorded in vol. 3, p.
496: "Henceforth my niemory will again respond
to the outside world . . . The reasons for simulat-
ing loss of memory were of a tactical nature ... I
also simulated loss of memory [to] my ... de-
fense counsel. . .") is omitted in the Name Index,
under "Hess, Rudolf," subentries "Health" and
"Mental condition" (vol. 24, p. 424) and there is no
subentry for "Simulation" or for "amnesia."
(Incidentally, although his amnesia and Simula-
tion were carefuUy discussed subjects, there are no
such entries in the Subject Index, either.)
I must agree with Professor Weinberg, who says
in his Introduction (p. xxiii) that whereas the Index
volumes provide "fairly" good orientation for the
Pröceedings, "the indexing of the documents (ital.
supplied) is wholly inadequate." To remedy this
shortcoming, he added to this reprinted edition, as
a supplemental volume, the single combined Index
of the (1949) Germa/i-language edition of the
"Blue series." He finds it better organized, and
containing more document references, albeit by
document number only. Alas, this Supplement
volume indicates the (parallel but of course not
identical) pages and volumes of the German edi-
tion. If all this seems complicated, it at least gives
an inkling of some of the linguistic and logistic
difficulties of an international trial conducted in
four official languages.
All this, too, pales in the light of the significance
of the Principles, or message, of Nuremberg, —
that in order to prevent the disasters of govern-
mentally organized international mass criminality,
the individual policy makers are bound by the
fundamental rules of the world Community. This
record shows the reasons why, and the way in
which, the Tribunal unanimously — and, in the
end, with the consent of at least some of the de-
fendants and their counsel, — reached that conclu-
sion; as well as the precautio-ns it added so as to
make obedience to the Principle neither "un-
patriotic" nor demanding martyrdom. Also, for
example, in an era when organized terrorism has
become an increasingly dangerous threat, atten-
tion should be paid to the criteria by which the
Tribunal declared certain entire "organizations,"
for example, the Gestapo to have been "criminal
organizations" — so that voluntary membership
constitutes in itself a legal (but, as the Judgment
underscores, individually disprovable) presump-
tion of a punishable offense.
The series, then, has many uses. One, highly
desirable beyond academe in view of the wide-
spread confusion about the crucial meaning of the
trial, is to get acquainted with what the trial was
really about. The Nuremberg courtroom drama
gives a picture, unavailable elsewhere, of the
antecedents of World War II and of the Third
Reich's conduct and policies during it. In a
strictly chronological sense, those events lie now
more than a generation behind us. But their effects
and repercussions are still with us. And these
materials, by showing as they do the nature and
impact of Hitler's onslaught, also explain the
dfepth of the trauma which the cataclysm created
in the different nations involved (including the
Americans and the Germans).
That trauma^further intensified by the pro-
found political changes in Europe as result of the
war — has by no means been overcome; indeed it
explains much that has happened since and is still
leading the world on an increasingly ominous
course.
In other words, the Nuremberg materials allow
US not only to evaluate the factual findings, and the
law of Nuremberg, but beyond that to understand
the psychological and ideological aftereffects
which Hitler's onslaught continue to exercise on
world politics. Such understanding may be vital;
and this exploitation of the Nuremberg materials
has hardly begun â–
Those interested in spedfk subjects, on the
other hand, find here Information never meant to
be disclosed, on matters ranging from Propaganda
to higji finance, from military history to euthana-
sia, and learned debates about the criminality or
not of aggressive war, about the main defense ob-
jections ("retroactivity" ; "the victors tried the
vanquished"; "duty to obey even criminal Or-
ders"), to the skillful attempts to justify, or make
plausible, the Nazi policies mcluding the wars
themselves; and why the entire Nuremberg effort
consisted in denying such justifications, in memory
of the victims, and out of worry for our own future.
r UaĂĽ
Cvt. CLi>
^JarJ^ f-^
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
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unless first approved by the Section or its Council.
'.<
1
Starvation as a Method of Warf are —
Conditions for
Regulation by Convention
I. Alternatives
To what extent is starvation a permissible method of warfare? In the
context of international law, this question can be discussed on the basis of
one of five alternatives. The first two imply that starvation as a method of
warfare should be sanctioned eithergenerally (alt. I) or generally forbidden
(alt. 2). However, there would be some justification for calling an advo-
cative of alternative 1 a "hardboiled cynic" and an advocate of alternative
2 a "blue-eyed idealist."
A third Solution is indicated by the American, Mudgc (pp. 265-268). He
recommends a definition of the expression ''starvation as a means of
warfare" which the starvation of a civilian population would be permissible
by international law, only when it causes capitulation or is reasonably
calculated to do so (alt. 3).^ The main objection to this proposed definition
is that it is too flexible, leaving too much scope for arbitrary Implementa-
tion.
A fourth Solution would be to preserve the distinction drawn by in-
ternational law between combatants and the civilian population. Here we
have the principle of "military necessity" ("Kriegsraison"), sanctioning the
starvation of combatants, and the fundamental principles of international
humanitarian law prohibiting the starvation of a civilian population (alt. 4).
However, it has been observed by Miidge and other experts on in-
ternational law, especially Anglo-American lawyers, that in a modern war,
be it total {e.g., World War II) or predominantly characterized by guerrilla
warfare {e.g., the conflicts in Algeria and Indochina), it is extremely
diflficult in practice to maintain a distinction between combatants and civil-
M.A. (1944), LL.B. (1948), Univ. of Upsala. Mr. Rosenblad has been a Swedish
diplomat since 1948, and is head of section, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
iMudge notes (p. 236) that Wehster (3rd ed., Springtieid 1963) gives three different
senses of the active verb "to starve somebody": "to kill with hunger, to deprive of nour-
ishment, to cause to capitulate by or as if by depriving of nourishment."
252
International Lawxer, Vol. 7, No. 2
Zeiss v. Zeiss
251
/
politically inspired. TNhe facts were more fully exposed in Ihis case than in
any other case betweerKthe contending pärties.
American federal proc^ure, including liberal rules of discovery, gave
the parties a unique opportHnity to sift through opposing parties' files and
interrogate opposing parties' dfficerjy'and employees-an opportunity which
had not been available in any olfUbfe litigation pending in other parts of the
World. It was, thus, perhaps fittift that the American case, in which the
facts had been probed to the ^lest^^xtent, marked the final round in the
17-year worldwide court battl/ between^^ast and West.
\
Starvation as a Method of Warfare 253
ian Population. At all events, the boundary between the two is generally
indistinct.
The present article will begin with a brief summary of current in-
ternational law (section II). This will be followed by an analysis of alterna-
tives 3 and 4. Since both these alternatives are open to serious objections,^
a way out of the cid-de-sac will also be discussed (alt. 5). This final
alternative is based on the conviction that certain specific points of in-
ternational law are in need of revision (post, section III). The argument
leads on to a preliminary draft of Convention articles (sectionlV).
II. Is Starvation Sanctioned as a
Method of Warfare?
/. General
It is a tragic fact that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the United
Nations, states are still continually resorting to war as a means of resolving
disputes between them.^ In doing so, they are tempted to resort to star-
vation. On July 7, 1969, in other words at the time of the Nigerian conflict
(1967-70), British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart remarked in the
House of Commons: "We must accept that, in the whole history of war-
fare, any nation which has been in a Position to starve its enemy out has
done so" (Hansard vol. 786 No. 143 c. 953).
We must therefore consider, on the basis of current Conventions and of
the principles of humanity and military necessity, whether starvation as a
method of warfare is compatible with the laws of war (jus in hello). These
laws distinguish between combatants and the civilian population.
2. Combatants
Current international law sanctions the starving out of combatants with a
view to forcing them to capitulate. Experts are unanimous on this point
(the Finlander, Castren p. 197 and the American, Greenspan pp.
316-317).
^Alternatives 1 and 2 would not appear to require any closer consideration. Alt. 1 would
imply a retrograde development contrary to the fundamental rules of existing Conventions,
while alt. 2 would appear to be unrealistic.
^Contrary to the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed in Paris on August
27. 1928, and to Article 2:4 of the United Nations Charter: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations." Inadoctoral thesis (pp. 60-63) published in 1971, the Swedish political
scientist Goldmann notes that during the period 1945-67, 23 international wars took place
involving a total of 65 belligerents. Of these wars, nineteen were fought in Asia or North
Africa. Cf. Greenspan, pp. 20-22.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
254
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Starvation as a Method of Warfare 255
3. Civilian Population
The legitimacy of starving a civilian population to bring about capitula-
tion has been asserted not only by various statesmen, such as Bismarck
{vid. Garner 1920 Vol. II p. 337), but also by a series of Anglo- American
experts on international law, e.g., Garner {cf., supra), Lauterpacht
(B.Y.I.L. 1952 p. 374) and Nurick (A.J.I.L. 1945 p. 696). On many
occasions this has been the Position adopted by the maritime powers,
Great Britain and the United States of America.
The Soviet Union takes a contrary view. Similarly Mertens (pp.
192- 193), and certain Red Gross experts have contended that a blockade
aimed exclusively at the civilian population must be regarded as in-
compatible with the general rules of humanitarian law and human rights.
The deliberate starvation of an ethnic group is prohibited by the 1948
Genocide Convention, in which ''genocide" is taken to mean the in-
tentional annihilation, in whole or in part, of an ethnic group by means of
certain acts enumerated in Article II. One of these acts is defined in Article
II c as "Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part."'*
The legal position is apparently disputed. Unequivocal rules of in-
ternational law would therefore be welcomed.
III. Should Starvation be Prohibited as a
Method of Warfare?
y. Combatants
A Prohibition by Convention, of the starvation of combatants would not
appear to be an urgent necessity. Such a prohibition would hardly be
feasible. In a suitable context — ^.^., the preamble to additional protocols to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions — it might be possible to affirm that the only
legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war
is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. The aim is to win the war,
not to cause suffering which is unnecessary for its successful prosecution.
'*In a Bill (1951 No. 71, p. 5) for the Swedish ratification of the 1948 Paris Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the form of action quoted here
is Said to comprise "such actions as subjecting the group to a system of rationing concerning
essential foodstuffs making it impossible for the members of the group to subsist for any
considerable perio'^ of time" . . . C/. Mud^e p. 265. By December 1971, the Genocide
Convention had been ratified or subscribed to by 75 states, including Sweden, together with
the Great Powers France, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of
Germany. On the other hand it has not been ratified by the United States. The difficulties of
prosecuting infringements of this Convention, in the absence of an international criminal court
((./. art. V-IX), have been emphasized, e.g. by Schwarzenberger (The Year Book of
World Affairs 1968 pp. 197- 198).
J
pj
Ăś
it follows that the object of starving out combatants is to force a capitula-
tion and not to starve them to death.
Far more important and pressing is the need to protect the civilian
population from the use of starvation as a method of warfare. No doubt
most people of today, with the memory of various commercial blockades,
e.g., the German siege 1941-43 of Leningrad still fresh in their minds, will
feel that this is difficult to achieve. During the 900-day siege of Leningrad
more than a million Russians died of starvation ( Wykes p. 144). But the
civilian population does not always have to suffer. General Giap's siege of
the French troops in the Vietnamese mountain stronghold of Dien Bien
Phu during the spring of 1954 is said to have been exclusively directed
against combatants. Other instances of sieges mainly involving combatants
are provided by Blitzkrieg Operations, successfully carried out by Napo-
leon, Moltke and other war-lords.
"Dehydration" was also one of the methods of warfare employed by
Alexander the Great in his war against the great King of Persia, Darius
III, and the Persian fleet in the years 334-332 B.C. Arrianos (pp. 40,
50-51)5 writes that initially the quality and numbers of Darius' forces were
far superior to those of Alexander. His crossing of the Hellespont was for
that reason something of a gamble. Moreover, the Persians had made plans
to "burn the growing crops nor spare the cities. In this manner lack of food
would make it impossible for Alexander to remain in the country."
The strategy adopted by Alexander was unconventional to say the least.
After besieging Miletos he disposed of his own fleet, which was too small
in any case to defeat the Persians'. Instead, he occupied a river estuary
near Miletos, where the Persian ships were in the habit of taking on
drinking water. Before very long, Arrianos continues, lack of water and
food compelled the "barbarians" to sail away from Miletos without having
accomplished anything. During his subsequent campaigns, first in the east
and then-after his victory at Issus-in the south, against Egypt, Alexan-
der occupied one harbour after another. Gradually the once powerful
Persian fleet had to be disbanded and Alexander became master of the
eastern Mediterranean without having fought a Single naval battle.
The method of warfare employed by Alexander was predominantly a
question of tactics. Although eff'ective it was not unreasonably cruel, par-
ticularly if one compares it with many other techniques. Its aim was to
defeat the Opponent as simply as possible and the spearthrust was ex-
clusively directed against combatants.
*ln the Swedish translator's presentation of the Greek Arrianos' biography of Alexander
the Great, we are told that this work is one of our main sources on the career of this intrepid
Commander. Arrianos, who was born around 100 A.D., relies on documents from Alexander's
own time, written by such initiated observers as Ptolemy, one of Alexander's leading generals.
International Lawver, Vol. 7, No. 2
International Lawxer, Vol. 7, No. 2
256
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
2. Civil ian Population: Starvation Should Be
Sunctioned only When it Causes Capitulation or
Is Reasonably Calcidated to do so {alt. 3)
Mudge (pp. 266-268) recommends that starvation be defined as a lawful
means of warfare "only when it causes or is reasonably calculated to cause
capitulation." In other words, he wishes "to preclude deprivation of nour-
ishment or killing from hunger where there is no military effect, i.e., the
causation of capitulation, or no reasonable expectation that there will be
such a military effect." A definition of this kind, he says, would enable
international law "adequately (to) deal with starvation in the Biafran war
without rejecting traditional views."^
Mudge surmises that the definition thus proposed would have less effect
in Europe than in Africa. "Where human starvation is accepted as a fact of
life even in peace-time, it is even less reasonable to caiculate that star-
vation as a means of warfare will cause the government of the starved
Population to capitulate." This would appear to be a correct conclusion.
But is not the outcome also greatly influenced by many other factors, for
instance by general perseverance of a population and by the power of a
government over the population? Olsson (p. 252) has the following to say
concerning the siege of Leningrad:
One condition for the survival of the City was the placid calculation by its
ieaders that approximately one-third of the population must succumb:
so-calied "dependents" — nonemployable persons other than children — were
placed in a rationing class where they could hardly be expected to survive.
The actual definition is subject to serious objections. Like Article 23 of
the Civilian Convention, it allows far too much scope for the discretion of
the blockading power. Also it leaves the field open for uncertain assess-
ments. Thus, how could it be "reasonably calculated" that Leningrad
would not surrender, but that Biafra would?
There are obvious risks involved in a flexible definition of this kind.
Evidently it would sanction any starvation of the civilian population of a
State, which results in the surrender of that State. But if this result is not
^The essay by Mudge — entitied "Starvation as a Means of Warfare," published in
January 1970 in "The International Lawyer," and the only extensive study of its kind to have
appeared in recent years to the knowledge of the present writer— is a well-documented,
intcresting and wide-ranging analysis, thus constituting an excellent re-examination of the
subject "in light of the Biafran Situation" (p. 232). The article would appear to have been
written in 1969 and to have been influenced profoundly by the disastrous famine then afflicting
Biafra, which did not capitulate u-ntil January 12, 1970. This explains why Mudge has devoted
as many as 15 of the 40 pages of his essay to the Nigerian conflict. On the other hand, he does
not have a Single word to say concerning the armed conflict in Vietnam, which has been in
progress since 1960. This is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that cultivated land with
growing crops in Vietnam has been sprayed with herbicides {Bunn p. 409, Johnstone p. 714
and Meyrowitz 1967 pp. 189- 190).
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
Starvation as a Method of Warfare 257
achieved until after several years' commercial blockade of an entire nation
or, let US assume, an entire continent, then in view of the chronological
aspect one is justified in querying whether such a method of warfare
reflects a reasonable relation between the laws of war and military necessi-
ty.'^ Does this hypothetical example present acceptable proportions be-
tween means and ends? Would it not be more apt, in the light of existing
international law (which includes the United Nations Conventions on Hu-
man Rights), to characterize such a method of warfare as prohibited?
3. Civilian Population
All Starvation Should Be Prohihited (alt. 4)
Powerful humanitarian arguments can be put forward in favour of alt. 4,
which also presents a technical advantage.®
This alternative, however, presupposes that war is waged in a form
which is no longer self-evident, nainely, with the clear distinction asserted
around the turn of the Century between combatants and civilian population.
Following the advent of total war, this boundary-one of the foundations
of international humanitarian law -has become increasingly vague. Lau-
terpacht (B.Y.LL. 1952 p. 364) maintains that in most respects the dis-
tinction has become "a hollow phrase," while Schwarzenberger (1968 Vol.
2 pp. 157- 159) is still more resigned.
The same trend toward an elimination of the boundary between com-
batants and the civilian population distinguishes modern guerrilla warfare,
itself a challenge to the law of nations, "defi au droit de la guerre" {Mey-
rowitz 1971 p. 57). According to Mao Tse-tung (pp. 52, 70, 134, 158), a
guerrilla soldier must be able to move freely and unimpeded among the
''Downey (p. 254) suggests the following definition: "Military necessity is an urgent need,
admitting of no delay, for the taking by a Commander of measures, which are indispensable for
forcing as quickly as possihle (author's italics) the complete surrender of the enemy by means
of regulated violence, and which are not forbidden by the laws and customs of war." Cf. the
definition in the U.S. Army Field Manual 1956, sections 22-23. A number of older experts on
international law-f'.^. Spaight (pp. 133- 139) and Stowell (p. 785)-show a cynical tendency
to over-emphasize military necessity at the expense of humanitarian aspects. Both Castre'n
(pp. 65-66) and Downey (pp. 251-262) point out, however, that genuine or alleged military
necessity does not justify deviations from current international law. This was expressly
afl^rmed in a series of trials for war crimes after World War II, including the cases against
Wilhelm List, et al. (War Crime Reports vol. 8 p. 66) and Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. (War
Crime Reports vol. 12 pp. 93-94, 123).
Hi should be natural to apply and obey a ruie based on a clear demarcation. This
argument is usually put forward in defence of international frontiers along rivers, mountain
ranges, etc. Johnstone (p. 716) expresses the same idea when, referring to the 1925 Geneva
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, he says that "a line should be drawn at a clearly
definable point on the scale between no gas use and total gas use." By December 1971 the
1925 Geneva Protocol had been ratified by 34 states in all, Sweden included, but not by the
U.S.A., and had been subscribed to by a total of 52 states.
International Lawver, Vol. 7, No. 2
258
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
civilian population "like a fish in water." It is the civilian population which,
in every sense of the term, "sustains'' the guerrilla solcher.
Nurick (pp. 683, 696), who has made an exhaustive analysis of devel-
opments, refers to miUtary necessity and the practice of states: "the cus-
tomary practice of nations does constitute evidence of international law."
Again and again he points out the importance of new rules of international
law on the subject, taking into consideration the nature of war and the
practice of belligerents. He says that ''no purpose would be served if the
next Convention on the Rules of War adopts a set of rules which in
practice would be meaningless."
On the other band the International Committee of the Red Gross (docu-
ment 111, 1971, p. 13), referring among other things to military manuals,
contends that the distinction between combatants and civilians still remains
a reality of international law. The Obligation of respecting this distinction is
emphasized by the Secretary General of the United Nations (Report 1970
A/8052, p. 16). A similar point of view is adopted by Castren (p. 174) and
the American, Moore. The latter has made the following noteworthy State-
ment on p. XI of the foreword of one of his works (published in 1924 but
still relevant on matter of principle):
It is hard to beiieve that the world is prepared to concede that, in the next
war, first and legitimate measure of the beiligerent forces will be to bomb or
otherwise destroy producers of foodstuff and other contributory classes here-
tofore considered as non-combatant; and yet if the distinction between com-
batants and non-combatants has ceased to exist, such a measure would be
legally justified and strategically correct . . . No one contributes more to this
essential military gesture than the grower of grain . . . The most dangerous
fighter is the tiller of the soil. It is, however, gratifying to reflect upon the fact
that there is not a Single government today that is either accepting or support-
ing such a theory.
The discussion reviewed here would appear to Warrant two conclusions.
The first of these is that an express prohibition by Convention in line with
alt. 4 can hardly be termed altogether realistic. Can one reasonably expect
a beiligerent completely to avoid starving out the enemy civilian population
in connection with siege and blockade? And these means of warfare are
both sanctioned by existing international law.
The second conclusion is that the majority of nations nonetheless affirm
the fundamental Convention rules concerning respect for the distinction
between combatants and the civilian population.
Furthermore, we have every reason to bear in mind that "the wind of
change" to which Harold Macmillan once referred, has constantly swept
across the world. A case in point is the changed attitude toward the use of
torture, infliction of severe physical or mental pain with a view of ex-
I
â– !
1
I
Starvation as a Method of Warfare 259
tracting confessions or testimony. Well into modern times this remained a
lawful means of evidence, already sanctioned by Roman law. However, the
use of torture was prohibited by the majority of European nations under
the influence of the ideas of the Enlightenment.^ Today we regard torture
as both a degrading and inefficient method. Although it is still practised,
surely nobody would question the validity of the prohibition of torture
contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
"The wind of change" is still blowing, perhaps more violently than ever
in these days of the "birth pangs of the world Community." Also in view of
the UN Conventions on Human Rights, we should be open to second
thoughts on the issues regarding starvation of civilian populations. An
express prohibition may be a viable proposition. It should at least be
investigated. It would be well in line with the main principles of in-
ternational humanitarian law. Both the UN Secretary General (his report
1970 doc. A/8052 p. 18) and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(Basic Texts 1972 pp. 22, 42) recommend Convention provisions in this
direction.
4. Civilian Population —
Certain Rules Should Be Adopted (alt. 5)
This alternative is based on the conviction that the governments of
practically all states in the world are fully aware of the horrors of modern
war, and therefore desirous of rendering warfare as humane as possible.
The positive attitude was already evident in 1949, as witness the four Red
Cross Conventions then adopted in Geneva relative to the Protection of
the Victims of War. One difficulty is raised by the notorious anxiety of the
great powers to retain their freedom of action combined with differing
values and modes of thought in different corners of the world. One is
nonetheless disposed to beiieve in the possibility of widespread support for
certain Convention provisions.
a) PROHIBITION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF OBJECTS
INDISPENSABLE TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE
CIVILIAN POPULATION
The governments of most states should by now be prepared to forbid the
destruction in the course of an armed conflict of objects which are in-
dispensable to the survival of the civilian population. Proposais for reforms
^In Sweden torture was abolished by King Gustaf III by a Royal Patent of August 27,
1772. ordering the destruction of the "Rose Chamber" and other "Torture Chambers,"
together with all instruments of torture: "all such instruments as have no foundation in law but
are nonetheless inimical to liberty, humanity itself and all justice and which could be abused in
the exercise of violence and tyranny against free subjects . . ."
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
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260
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
to this effect have been put forward in many quarters: by the Institute of
International Law through its 1969 Edinburgh resolution and in 1971 both
by the International Committee of the Red Gross in connection with the
first Session of its Geneva Gonference of Government Experts on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Appli-
cable in Armed Gonflicts and, during this initial session, by government
experts from five states (the United Arab Republic, Mexico, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland and Sweden).
Gertain states can be expected to object to a prohibition of this kind on
the ground that it would be difficult to observe in practice and also that it
would impose limitations on the freedom of action of a belligerent. How-
ever, there are powerfui arguments of a generally preventive and humanita-
rian nature which can be put forward in favour of the prohibition. More-
over, it is contrary to all reason and, in this age of population explosion
with its attendant spectre of world starvation and environmental impover-
ishment, unpardonable to destroy any portion, no matter how small, of the
earth's limited resources of foodstuffs, cultivable land, etc.^^
b) PROHIBITION OF THE USEOF
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Another urgent requirement with a view to the survival of the civilian
population, concerns the general acceptance of existing bans on the use by
belligerents of weapons particularly endangering food production. These
bans refer, e.g., to the use of herbicides, and the dissemination of infectious
animal and plant diseases.
i^'Statistics quoted by Falk (pp. 514-515) and Palmstierna (pp. 13, 19) show that the
population of the world is doubling at an increasing rate. In round figures it was 0,5 billion in
1650, 1 billion in 1850. 2 billion in 1930 and 3.6 billion in 1970. It is now being doubled
approximately every thirty-five years. If this trend continues, then according to Statistical
predictions. the world population will increase as follows:
to 6 billion by 2000
"12 " " 2035
" 24 " " 2070
" 40 " " 2105
In 1969 it was estimated that 10,000 people die every day in the developing countries, from
diseases due to malnutrition. One should also note that it is in these very countries that
population is expected to rise most dramatically: from 2 billion in 1960 to over 3 billion in
1980, and upwards of 4,5 billion in 2000. Falk (p. 518) writes that "the continuation of these
reproductive habits for many more decades is almost certain to result in national, regional, and
possibly global catastrophe." Formerly. population growth was restrained by epidemics (c.g.
the Black Death during the mid-fourteenth Century), war and famine. In our own interests — if
mankind is to survive — we must now try to limit population increase and with it world
starvation by peacefui means. This can be done by means of birth control measures combined
with active environmental protection and a better utilization and more even distribution of the
limited resources of the globe.
'
>
Starvation as a Method of Warfare 26 1
c) REVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF CONTRABAND OF WAR
In a review of the concept of contraband of war, two Solutions may be
considered with regard to foodstuffs.
One of these Solutions — footstuffs may be treated as conditional con-
traband of war-is based on the unratified London Declaration of 1909
Concerning the Laws of Maritime War (Art. 24, 33-36), and accords with
the basic idea of many of the reforms that have now been proposed,
namely that during blockade and siege a belligerent shall be duty bound to
allow free passage for food consignments exclusively intended for the
civilian population.
The second Solution — whereby foodstuffs may not be declared con-
traband of war (c/., Lauterpacht 1952 Vol. 1 1 p. 805)-can be justified on
the following grounds. If one concedes, in accordance with the London
Declaration, that foodstuffs may be treated as conditional contraband of
war, experiences from both world wars testifies that one thereby paves the
way to increasingly severe restrictions of food supplies. The Solution
whereby foodstuffs may not be declared contraband of war at all is consid-
erably more far-reaching. A radical proposal of this kind would presumably
meet with vehement Opposition in certain quarters but would nonetheless
appear to be of greater practical worth than the first Solution. Also it is
clearly in line with the purpose of a regulation by Convention, which would
aim at limiting the use of starvation as a method of warfare.
This question is also a matter of obvious interest to neutral states, for
whom the task of arranging food supplies for their populations during an
international war is both vital and difficult. Every neutral State, negotiating
for safe conduct for Import deliveries, should therefore welcome a Con-
vention Provision aimed at unimpeded transport of foodstuffs.
d) FREE PASSAGE FOR CERTAIN RELIEF CONSIGNMENTS
Blockade, like siege, is a permissible method of warfare. As nations
become more and more dependent on the mutual exchange of commodities,
the effects of blockade oh the civilian population are tending to become
more and more disastrous. Here it will be sufficient to recall the starvation
that occurred during the two world wars and during the Nigerian conflict.
During these three conflicts it proved extremely difficult to obtain free
passage for international aid consignments.
The root cause of these difficulties lies in the problem of total war, but to
a certain extent they are also attributable to three distressing lacunae in
existing international law. Firstly, Art. 23 of the Civilian Convention
envisages relief supplies of foodstuffs, not to the entire civilian population
but only to the most "vulnerable" groups ("children under fifteen, ex-
International Lanver, Vol. 7, No. 2
International Lawxer, Vol. 7, No. 2
262 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
pectant mothers and maternity cases"). Secondly, the phrasing of Art. 23
allows far too much scope for the discretionary assessment of the block-
ading power. Thirdly, Art. 23 applies only to international armed conflicts
(and not, e.g., to civil wars).
An extension of the scope of Art. 23 is thus urgently needed. In other
words, we should work for the adoption of Convention articles assuring to
the entire civilian popuIation, relief consignments of essential foodstuffs
during blockade and siege in any kind of armed conflict.ii
The militarily justifiable demands of the blockading or besieging power
for guarantees against abuse-^'.^., through the relief consignments being
delivered to combatants on the opposite side-can be met by means of a
clause providing for strict control at all stages of the distribution process.
This control should in the first instance be entrusted to a Protecting Power,
"to a neutral Power, to the International Committee of the Red Gross or to
any other impartial humanitarian body" (Civilian Convention Art. 61).
This prescription of control is designed to dispel any misgivings that may
be entertained by such traditional maritime powers as Great Britain and
the United States. During the 1949 Diplomatie Conference in Geneva,
these States insisted on guarantees against the abuse of the right of free
Passage through a commercial blockade. Relief consignments were not to
result indirectiy in primary advantages to the enemy's war effort (''Final
Record of the Diplomatie Conference of Geneva of 1949" II A pp
635-637,763-764,819-820).
Here again one can emphasize the powerfui humanitarian considerations
in favour of all civilian populations being spared from starvation as far as
possible. It is therefore to be hoped that Great Britain and the United
States are in principle disposed to accede to this proposal for free passage
(c/. Lauterpacht B.Y.I.L. 1952 pp. 376, 379). In the years 1970-72 this
has been put forward by the Secretary General of the United Nations, and
by the International Committee of the Red Gross, and also by government
experts from a number of countries.
An attempt has been made to elucidate this alternative in a later section
(IV), containing a preliminary draft of Convention articles, based on the
^Mn an occupied territory it is the duty of the Occupying Power, to the best of its ability
to ensure the food and medical supplies of the popuIation (Civilian Convention Art 55) If the
Population of that occupied territory is inadequately supplied, "the Occupying Power shall
agree to relief schemes on behalf of said popuIation, and shall facilitate them by all the means
at its disposal. Such schemes, which may be undertaken either by States or by imoartial
humanitarian organizations such as the Iniernational Committee of the Red Cross shall
consist, in particular, of the provisions of consignments of foodstuffs, medical supplies and
cloth.ng.-AII Comracting Parties shall permit the free passage of these consignments and
shall guarantee their protection." (Art. 59)
I
<
4
«
ri
Starvation as a Method of Warfare 263
reforms proposed in recent years. This draft is to be regarded as a further
contribution to the discussion of the matter.
5. Is Alternative 5 Meaningful?
One plausible objection to alternative 5 is that it goes too far, that it is
"unrealistic." To this one can rejoin that the proposal has emerged from a
review of different means of warfare (siege, blockade etc.). Other objec-
tions which lie very near at hand can be expressed in questions of the
following kind: Can rules of international law which we know from exper-
ience are violated over and over again, honestly be said to serve any useful
purpose? And is it not pointless to regulate one method of warfare (star-
vation) so long as other, far more effective methods {e.g., aerial warfare)
are left unregulated?
This would seem to be a telling argument. It overlooks, however, the
fact that the laws and customs of war are predominantly based on humani-
tarian principles. With this in mind, the unflinching prevention of cruelty,
the saving of human lives and the preservation of human dignity must stand
forth as an urgent necessity. The nations concerned have established these
principles^2 because the prevention of unnecessary suffering is a matter of
mutual concern to them. Considerations of this kind, coupled with the
instinct of self-preservation and the fear of reprisals, also serve to explain
the "balance of terror." Moreover it will be recalled that poison gas was
not used during World War II in spite of the preparations made for doing
so {Bunn p. 386, n. 57), and that no nation has resorted to nuclear weapons
since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. The same
interests speak for the greatest possible protection of the civilian popu-
Iation—not least within the context of the articles proposed here.
Greenspan (p. 22) rightly observes that "a regulated war is a lesser evil
than an unregulated war." At the same time, more than one expert on
international law is profoundly pessimistic on this point. Schwarzenberger
CThe Year Book of World Affairs" 1968 p. 213) comes under this cate-
gory. He does not discount the possibility of the nuclear weapon powers, in
case of need, abandoning all restraint:
to forsake civilisation and accept the consequences of mechanised and deper-
sonalised warfare or, in other words, mid-twentieth Century barbarism in its
most destructive form. These are the real obstacles in the paths of would-be
reformers on the lines of Nuremberg and Geneva.
i2|n "Martens Clause" the High Contracting Parties refer to "the principles of the law of
nations, derived from usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and from the dictates of the public conscience." "Martens Clause" is the declaration in the
preamble to the 1907 Hague Conventions, named after Geheimrat de Martens, one of the
three Russian delegates at the 1907 Hague Conference.
International Lauyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
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264
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Stanation as a Method of Warfare 265
But passivity and sighs of resignation solve no problems.i^ in the words of
the Swedish poet Gustaf Fröding, it is our task "not like barbarians to
cower in fear and madness neath hard strokes of fate."
Any human being who is faced with a dangerous predicament will try to
save himself, as in the case of a pedestrian leaping out of the way of an
oncoming car. This cannot be called escapism. By the same token it is
meaningful to put forward proposals for rules of international law attuned
to contemporary requirements. Lauterpacht (B.Y.l.L. 1952 p. 379) has
indicated a "signpost" for the review of the laws of war. Revision, he
writes, should refer "not to existing law but to more compelling consid-
erations of humanity, of the survival of civilization, and of the sanctity of
the individual human being."
IV. Draft Convention Articies
(Applying to any armed conflict except where specified to the contrary.)
y. General
It is proposed that additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
be made to include provisions concerning the protection of the civilian
Population from starvation.
A preliminary draft of provisions to this effect is given below (items
2-5). It is assumed here that additional protocols will include:
a) a preamble stating the following: according to the St. Petersburg Declara-
tion of 1868, the only legitimate object of war is to weaken the military
forces of the enemy. Cf Basic Texts p. 5.
b) provisions regarding the purpose of the protocols, their applicability, inter-
pretation etc.
c) definitions of the terms "civilian population," "military objectives" and
"non-military objectives."!'» Should possibly a definition of the term "star-
vation" be found desirable, a suitable basis may be found in Art. II of the
1948 Genocide Convention together with the reform proposals mentioned
here {vid., sections II 3 and III 4).
2. Prohibition ofthe Destruction of Object s
Indispensable to the Survival ofthe
Civilian Population
{Vid., 1971 Geneva expert draft Aft. 13. Cf. Basic Texts p. 17 Art. 48.)
Objects which are indispensable to the survival of the civilian popu-
^^From this point of view it seems somewhat regrettable that the International Law
Commission has not been able to devote more attention to the question of respect for human
rights in armed conflicts {Castren p. 7, Greenspan p. 21, Lauterpacht B.Y.l.L. 1952 p. 360
and Schwarzenherger 'The Year Book of World Affairs" 1968 pp. 198-201). It is all the
more encouraging that so much attention has been paid to the subject by the International
Committee ofthe Red Gross and the Secretary General ofthe United Nations.
^'»Concerning these definitions, vid., 1971 Geneva expert draft Art. 5 and 11. Cf.,
ICRC's Basic Texts pp. 15- 16 Art. 41-44.
(
)
( i
ci
lation, such as foodstuffs and food producing areas, crops, cattle, water
resources and constructions designed for the regulation of such resources
must never be subjected to attacks directly launched against them, nor be
attacked by way of reprisals.^^
3. Prohibition ofthe Use ofBiotogical and Chemical Weapons
{Vid., 1925 Geneva Protocol. Basic Texts Art. 30 "Means of Combat"
should be amplified.)
The use in armed conflicts of any chemical or biological agents of
warfare against man, animals and plants is expressly prohibited.
4. Revision ofthe Concept of Contraband of War
{Cf, Basic Texts pp. 15-16. The section entitied "General Provisions.")
Three alternatives are put forward here for discussion:
a. Foodstuffs may be treated as contraband of war under the name of condi-
tional contraband.
b. Foodstuffs may not be declared contraband of war.
c. Additional protocols contain no provisions on this point.
5. Free Passage for Certain Relief Consignments
a. GENERAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING RELIEF ACTIONS
{Vid., 1971 Geneva expert draft Art 30. Cf, Basic Texts p. 22 Art. 64
and p. 42 Art. 30.)
Relief actions. The parties to a conflict shall exercise their authority in
such a way as to facilitate actions aiming at assistance and aid, including
medical supplies, essential foodstuff's and other material vital to the surviv-
al of the civilian population. The off'er of such assistance shall not be
regarded as an unfriendly act, especially when Coming from impartial
international organizations.
b. FREE PASSAGE
(Civilian Convention Art. 23)
International armed conflict. {Vid., Basic Texts p. 22 Art. 65. The final
words of the first paragraph "of another . . . its enemy" constitute one
rewording.)
»^There are advocates ofthe idea of a prohibition according to Art. 13 of the expert draft
also applying to a nation's own armed forces, i.e., covering scorched earth tactics. In this case
the final words "by way of reprisals" could be followed by "or destroyed by pre-emptive
action" {cf., Basic Texts p. 17 Art. 48:2). However, there are several objections to this idea.
Scorched earth tactics must be permissible on the part of the defending side. No state is
prepared to supply an invading enemy with foodstuffs, fuel, harbours, airfields. bridges, etc.
Subject to certain conditions, Swedish law sanctions the destruction, in time of war or when
war is imminent, of "property of such a nature that the enemy's possession thereof would
significantly enhance his war effort." Before deciding in favour of destruction, the authority
concerned must pay due regard to the conditions of its own civilian population.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
266 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The High Contracting Parties shall grant free passage to relief con-
signments destined exclusively to the civilian population of another High
Contracting Party, even if the latter is its enemy.
These Parties shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrange-
ments for the conveyance of relief. They may not, in any way whatsoever,
divert relief consignments from their proper destination, nor delay their
conveyance. They have the right to be reasonably satisfied, through the
Protecting Power, its Substitute, or an impartial humanitarian Organization,
that these consignments are used exclusively for the relief of the needy
civilian population.
Armcd conĂźict not heing of an international character. {Vid., Basic
Texts p. 42 Art. 31.)
In cases of blockade or siege, the Parties to the conflict, or any High
Contracting Party concerned, shall allow the free passage of all con-
signments of essential foodstuffs, clothing, medical and hospital stores and
shelter facilities, intended only for civilians.
The Parties to the conflict, or any High Contracting Party concerned,
shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which
the passage of relief supplies shall be allowed. They shall in no way
whatsoever divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are
intended or delay the forwarding of such consignments.
The Parties to the conflict, or any High Contracting Party concerned,
may make such permission conditional on the distribution only to the
persons benefited thereby being made under the supervision of an impartial
humanitarian body.
V. Summary
Starvation is an ancient method of warfare. Its aim may be to destroy
crops and other food resources nithin a State {e.g., by means of devastation
or herbicide spraying), or to cut off supplies of food from outside (e.g., by
blockade or siege).
Starvation as a method of warfare has been studied by the present writer
in the light of existing international law and practice in armed conflicts and
also in the context of certain proposals for reforms put forward in the years
1969-72. The result of the study is presented in this articie, which shows
that opinions are divided concerning the permissibility of starving civilian
populations. Unambiguous rules of international law would therefore be
welcome. Regulation by means of Convention should relate to concrete
situations. These can vary considerably in different parts of the world, and
in relation to the outward framework of the conflict (its nature and scope,
the resources of the belligerents, etc.).
\ International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
(
Starvation as a Method of Warfare 267
According to one alternative (referred to here as alt. 3) the starvation of
a civilian population would be permissible only when such an action causes
capitulation or is reasonably caiculated to do so. This alternative is rejected
here, above all because it aff^ords too much scope for discretionary deci-
sions and uncertain assessments.
Another alternative which has been studied is for all starvation of civil-
ian populations to be prohibited (alt. 4). A prohibition of this kind pre-
supposes that one can still speak in terms of a distinction between com-
batants and civilian population. The transition to total war and to guerrilla
warfare renders this distinction -one of the foundations of international
humanitarian law-increasingly vague. On the other hand there is a great
deal to suggest that distinction between combatants and civilian population
still remains a reality of international law. Thus an express prohibition of
starvation could nonetheless be a viable proposition.
The analysis leads, however, to the recommendation of a ''package"
containing certain rules {alt. 5). It is proposed that this comprise, firstly, a
prohibition of the destruction of objects indispensable to the survival of the
civilian population and, secondly, general acceptance of existing bans on
the use by belligerents of weapons particularly endangering food produc-
tion as implied in the prohibition of the use of biological and chemical
weapons. A revision of the concept of contraband of war is also recom-
mended. Finally, Convention articles are proposed which in any form of
armed conflict would guarantee the entire civilian population essential food
supplies during a blockade or siege.
Alternative 5 is elucidated by means of a preliminary draft of Convention
articles. This draft is based on a review of the reform proposals and is
intended as a contribution for discussion. The values at stake, which
constitute the fundamental motives of alternative 5, are ''compelling con-
siderations of humanity, of the survival of civilization, and of the sanctity
of the individual human being."
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268
INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
StarvĂĽ tU) n as a Method of Wa rfa re 269
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Mudge, George Alfred. "Starvation as a Means of Warfare." The Inter-
national Lawy er Vol. 4, No. 2. New Orleans- Chicago, 1970.
Nurick, Lester. "The Distinction between Combatant and Non-Combat-
ant in the Law of War."/i.y./.L. 39, 1945.
Olsson, Jan Olof. Leningrad. St. Petersburg. 2nd ed. Stockholm, 1970.
Palmstierna, Hans. Pillage, Starvation and Poisoning. Stockholm, 1967.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
Schwarzenberger, Georg. International Law as Applied hy International
Courts and Tribunals. Vol. 2 London, 1968.
"Neo-Barbarism and International Law." The Year Book of
'\
World Affairs. London, 1968.
Spaight, J. M. War Rights on Land. London, 1911.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Problem
of Chemical and Biological Warfare. (1971-1972). A series of six
volumes, of which vol. I, IV and V had been published by July, 1972.
Stowell, Ellery C. "The Laws of War and the Atomic Bomb. A.J.I.L. 39
1945.
Wykes, Alan. The Siege of Leningrad: Epic ofSurvival. London, 1969.
2. Red Gross Documents
Documents for participants in the 1971 Geneva Conference of Govern-
ment Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (selection)
III. Protection of the Civilian Population against Dangers of Hostilities
(Geneva, January 1971)
797/ Geneva expert c/ra/> = Outline of an Instrument on the Protection of
the Civilian Population against the Dangers of Hostilities. Working
paper submitted by the Experts of Mexico, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Arab Republic and Netherlands (CE/Com.III/44; 4 June,
1971).
Documents for participants in the 1972 Geneva Conference of Govern-
ment Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (selection)
I. Basic Texts. Documentary Material submitted by the International
Committee of the Red Gross (Geneva, January 1972).
IL Commentary part one, part two (Geneva, January 1972).
3. UN Documents
Reports by the Secretary General on "Respect for Human Rights in
Armed Conflicts" (UN Dec. 1969 A/7720, 1970 A/8052 and 1971
A/8370).
A Concise Summary of the World Population in 1970 (ST/SOA/Series
A/48; New York 1971).
International Lawxer, Vol. 7, No. 2
I
270 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
4. Cases
War Crime Reports. Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected
and prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commissions. His
Majesty's Stationery Office, London. Vol. 8 1949; eh. 12 1949.
See also, Schwarzenberger Vol. 2 1968.
Abbreviation
A.F.D.L Annuaire Fran^ais de Droit International (Paris)
A.J.LL. The American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.C.)
alt. alternative
Basic Texts. vid. Bibliography, ad Red Gross Documents
B.Y.I.L. The British Yearbook of International Law (London)
Civilian Convention. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. By 1971 the 1949 Geneva
Conventions (four in number) had been ratified or subscribed to by
127 States, including Sweden and the United States.
I.C.R.C. International Committee of the Red Cross
Land Warfare Regulations. The 1907 Hague Regulations Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land. By 197 1 the Hague Convention
(No. IV) Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land together
with its appurtenant Regulations had been ratified or subscribed to by
44 nations, including Sweden and the United States.
R.B.D.I. Revue Beige de Droit International. BrĂĽssels.
War Crime Reports, vid. Bibliography, ad Cases.
197 1 Geneva expert draft. vid. Bibliography, ad Red Cross Documents.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 2
y
UNITED N AT IONS
SECURITY
COUNCIL
Listr.
S/I31u2
13 ::arch 1979
ORIGlII/vL: H.'jLISH
Indonesia, iialcysia, FhilippJnco, Cin^cipore anC
Tnciiland: draft resolution
:;otinn vith :;rave concern that the Situation in the re^ion of South-r*ast Asi:.
aas oeriously deteriorated,
Concern2d that the mountins friction and grovinc tension in arid arcund the
re:ion ::ave r-33ulted in an escalation of arned activities and videnin- of the
conflict area,
Doer^v rerrettinf, the ar:..ed intervention in the internal affairs of Der.ocratic
.A k-
rlar.ipuci.ea and Lue arned attack a-ainst the Socialist Republic of Viet I.ani.
heiteratinr its firn cornritnent to the Cnarter of the United l.'ations and
to the accepted principles of international lav,
Ij^phasizin:: that all States shall refrain, in their international relations,
fron tlie tareat or use of force a^ainst the soverei^Tity , territorial intesrity
or ind'.^pendence of any Ctate,
:.?co:-T:izin,-. its pri-iar-y responsibility for tiie naintenance of international
peace find security in accorda^ice vith the Charter of the United IJations,
1. Ur;:entl;.' calls upon all parties to cease all hostilities forthvith-
2. Flirther calls u^on all r-arties to the conflicts to vithdrav; their fcrces
to tjieir ov.Ti countries;
.:>.
.Is to tiiOir. .'Lnd to rtritc" outside the re-ion to c::ercise t;:e utr.ost
•o
n ruiv acts vhicri n-- leal to a furth-r e-cal-tion
resl.raint :inc: to rcfr.'iin
:i::a vidi'nin^ of the conflicts;
^' I^eaffir:n:: that all Ctcttcz shr.ll scrupuloĂĽsly rccpect th-- soveroicnty,
torri'.ori'J. inte^ri^y cJic indi^jumdence oT other riates;
Ty-OSllJ
/...
4**
•j»4
1 r^ T T
-izecl of tne question.
i
NATIONS UN lES
CONSEIL
DE SECURITE
r •
l.
^ . • • w^ ^ .
>~ »——-•_;» ^.^
:-*^ „,-*;_:: â–
Dis^r .
GENERALE
S
<">
/I316;
13 mars 1979
FRAIICAIS
ORIGINAL : AI^^GLAIS
Indonesien Ilalalsie. PhilJDpines, Sin-^rour et Thailande :
projet de resolution
(
<
j
Le Conseil de securite,
Notant avec une profonde preoccupation que la Situation dans la reGion de
l'Asie du Sud-Est s'est gravement deterioree,
Preoccupe par le fait que la fricticn croiscante et la tension accrue dans
la reeion et aux alentours ont provoque une escalade des activites armees et un^
elargissement de la zone de conflit,
Rerrettant profondernent l'intervention arace dans les affaires interieures
du Kanpucnea democratique et l'attaque armce contre la Ecpunlique socialiste au
Vi et Kam,
Reiterant son ferme attachesent a la Charte des Nations Unies et aux
principes acceptes du droit international,
SouHrnant que tous les Etats doivent s'abstenir, dans leurs relations
internationales, de recourir ä la nenace ou ä l'en:ploi de la force contre la
souverainete, l'integrite territoriale ou l'independance de tout Etat,
Conscient de la responsabilite principale du caintien de la paix et de la
securite internationales qui lui incombe en vertu de la Charte des Kations Unies.
1. Demande insta.rr.ent ä toutes les parties de cesser imriediatement toutes
les hostilites;
2. Denande en outre ä toutes les parties aux conflits de ranener leurs
forces dans leur propre pays;
3. Fait annel atixdites r.-irtjes et aux Etats situes hors de la repon pour
cu'ils fass";;^in.7ru7e de la pIus cr.nde modrration et s'absticnnent de tous actos
qui pourraient conduire a une nouvelle escalade et a un nouvel elarG.ssei::ent des
conflits ;
U n.'affirne que tous los Etats devront respecter scrĂĽpuleusecent la
souverainete"".~rrnTeGrite territoriale et l'independance d'autres Etats;
/...
79-06419
Francaic
Face 2
5. Denande a toutes les parties aux conflits de rerler leurs differend:
par des no>ens pacifiques conformement a la Charte des IJations Unies;
6, Accueille avec satisfaction l'offre de "bons Offices du Secretaire
general dans la recherche d'une Solution pacifique;
7. Decide de rester saisi de la question.
N AT IONS UNI ES
ASSEMBLEE
GENERALE
CONSEIL
Distr .
GE^IERALE
A/ 3^4/116
DE SECURITE %^^^'\,,^
12 inars 197^
ORIGIimL : FRAFCAIS
ASSEHBLEE GEITEMLE
Trente-quatrieme Session
Point hG de la liste ĂĽreliminaire'-
APPLICATION DE LA DECLARATION GUR LE RENFORCEI TEITT
DE LA SECURITE INTERITATIO^mLE
CONSEIL DE S":CURITE
Trente-quatrieme annee
Lettre datee du 12 mars 1979; adressee au Secretaire Feneral
par 1'. Thiounn Prasith^ Ambassadeur extraordinaire et_pleni-
potentiaire du Kampuchea democratique
J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci- Joint, Dour votre Information, les dernieres
nouvelles de la guerre populaire de resistance contre 1' Invasion et l'occuDation
vietnamiennes du Kanpuchea dem.ocratiaue du 28 fevrier au 2 mars 1979.
Je vous prie de bien vouloir faire distribuer ces nouvelles comjne document
officiel de l'Assemblee generale, au titre du Point h6 de la liste prelirainaire,
et du Conseil de securite.
L' Ambassadeur extraordinaire et
plenipotentiaire du Kampuchea
(Sip-ne) TIlIOUmT PRASITH
'^- A/3U/50 =
79-O622U
/ 0 • •
A/3i+/ll6
S/13159
Franc als
Annexe
Page 1
Annexe
Re s uiiie des nouvelles de la ruerre Populaire_j^_^esistajice_contre_
l"MLnva"sion_et_V^occu2at_io^ du Kan-nuchea der.o cratigue
du 28 fevrier au 2 mars'~19T9 diffusees par le i;inistere de 1' Infor-
mation du Kampuchea deir.o cratigue
L'armee revolutionnaire du Kampuchea (APJO et les unites de [-uerilleros
continuent a lever haut le drapeau de lutte contre les envahisseurs vietnamiens .
Sur tous les fronts, les forces vives de 1 ' ennemi sont aneanties par pans entier
Affames dans leurs positions encerclees par 1^/VRK, les envahisseurs vietnamiens
tentent d'en sortir pour aller piller le riz de la population. -ais, a chaque
fois^ ils sont interceptes et aneantis par l'ARK et les unites de ^ruerilleros .
o •
1
DAKG LES ENVIRONS DE PKIIOF PEl^IK
Les 26, 27 et 28 fevrier et 1er rnars^ l'ARK a lance des attaques a Bat Doeng,
Chan Thnal, Kaach Poun, Phum Thmei et K^euk Porng. Soixante-seize soldats
vietnamiens ont ete tues et de nombreux autres blesses.
Le 28 fevrier, l'ARK a completernent balaye les envahisseurs vietnamiens de
Trapeang Lovea, Batt Xaun, Trapeang Veng et Vat Te Ok en leur infligeant de lourdes
pertes .
2o ZONE SUD-OUEST
Le 25 fevrier, l'ARK a completernent aneanti l'ennemi ä Trapeang Andoeurk,
district de Tram Kak, province de Takeo. Parml les i+5 ennemis tues sur le terrain,
il y avait trois conseillers militaires sovietiques, deux tanks, trois vehicules
militaires ont ete detruits. En plus des deux canons de 155itj:'1 et trois canons
de 105Tnm saisis (bilan deja diffuse dans le bulletin iJo 5). l'ARK a egalement saisi
trois camions Gl iC et un autre vehicule militaire.
Le 28 fevrier, toujours sur le front de Trapeang Andoeurk, l^ARK a aneanti
150 soldats vietnamiens, capture 10 et blesse un grand nombre d' autres. Elle a
saisi deux camions, dont l'ian Charge d'obus de 105riirii et^l'autre, de riz.
Soixante-treize armes diverses et 12 postes emetteurs-recepteurs 025 ont ete ega-
lement saisis.
Le 1er mars, les envahisseurs vietnamiens, refugies sur le mont Phnom Keek Tum
et affames, sont descendus pour piller le riz de la population. Ils ont ete inter-
ceptes par l'ARK, aui a tue 25 d'entre eux et blesse plusieurs autres. Le m.em.e Jour,
l'ARK a detruit un vehicule militaire sur la route nationale l^o 3 en direction de
Vat Chak et a tue 30 soldats vietnamiens.
/...
A/3^^/ll6
S/13159
FranQais
Annexe
Pa^re 2
Le 2 mars, l'ARK a intercepte les envahisseurs vietnamiens qui tentaient de
sortir de Paing Kasey et tue 15 d'entre eux.
Le 26 fevrier, l'ARK a lance des attaaues a Prey Sbat, Keek Tum, Batt Kaun,
Vat Chhouk et Phum Thmei. File a tue 58 soldats vietnamiens et detruit un vehicule
militaire.
Le 28 fevrier, 1*ARK a aneanti une unite entiere des envahisseurs vietnamiens
ä KeeL: Tum. Le m.eme jour, eile a intercepte l'ennemi qui tentait de sortir de
Ang Rolum Torng et Phum Hanr^ ainsi qu'au villa„';'e de Cham;oar Cher et Chrey Ho Phnaou.
Bilan : 91 soldats vietnamiens tues^ plusieurs hlesses et nom.breuses armes saisies.
3. ZONE DE KOII KCNG
Le 20 fevrier, l'ARK a totalement balaye les soldats vietnaidens dans l'ile
de Koh rinoaa, en face de Thmar Sar, Pa.r^.i les ^5 enner^is tues se trouvaient deux
conseillers militaires sovietiques. Les restants se sont tous jetes a la m.er. De
nom.breuses armes ont ete saisies ainsi qu'un poste em.etteur-recepteur C25.
Le 22 fevrier, l'ARK a coule un bateau de ruerre vietnanien qui traversait le
detroit de Pauy Yeam Sen, faisant plusieurs tues et blesses parmi les soldats
ennemis.
k.
ZONE NORD-OUEST
^Le 27 fevrier, l'ARK a attaque l'ennemi le long de la voie ferree, au sud de
la ville de Battambang, a tue 15 d'entre eux et en a blesse plusieurs autres.
Le 28 fevrier a Thmar Kol, 2? envahisseurs vietnamiens ont ete tues et de
nombreux autres blesses.
Le^28 fevrier et le 1er mars, des unites de guerilleros ont tue six soldats
vietnamiens et blesse plusieurs autres dans le centre de la ville de Battambang.
^Le 28 fevrier, a 0 Sralav et Vet Ta Min, 15 soldats vietnamiens ont ete tues.
plusieurs autres blesses- de nonbreuses armes et une quantite de medicaments et de
materiel medical ont ete saisies o
Les 1er et 2 r^ars, l'ARK et les unites de guerilleros ont intercepte les
envahisseurs vietnamiens qui tentaient de sortir de la ville de Battambanr r^our
aller p.Uer le riz de la Population. Elles ont tue hl soldats vietnamiens blesse
plusieurs autres et ont saisi 31 fusils AK. t^^naiiiens, D±esse
Le 1er mars, six camions militaires vietnam.iens transportant des troupes et
du materiel ont saute sur des mines ä la sortie de la ville de Pursat. Deux camions
ont ete detruits et un autre gravement endonmiage. Tous leurs occuDants ont ete tues.
A/3^/ll6
S/1315^
Franc ais
Annexe
Pa^e 3
Le 2 mars, les envahisseurs vietnam.iens encercles dans la ville de Pursat et
affames ont tente de sortir pour aller rjĂĽier le riz de la Population a la coope-
rative de Roleap. Dix d'entre eux ont ete tues et les rescapes se sont tous enfuis
vers la ville.
Du IT au 19 fevrier, l'ARK a tue 50 soldats vietnamiens et blesse de nombreux
autres autour de la ville de Kompong Chliaang.
Le 26 fevrier^ l'ARK a attaoue l'ennerd a Banteay Chey Krainfr Leau.
tue 15 soldats ennemis, blesse plusieurs autres et detruit deux canons.
ale a
Le 28 fevrier et le 1er miars, les unites de guerilleros ont elir^ine l8 soldats
vietnamiens autour de la ville de Kom.ponr Chhnang. Le 1er mars^ elles ont inter-
cepte les envahisseurs vietnamiens qui tentaient de sortir de la ville Pour aller
piller le riz de la Population et elles en ont tue huit et m.is en fuite les rescapes
5.
ZONE NORD-EST
Sur le front de I'.ratie, bilan Supplement aire du 21 au 2k fe^rrier : l'ARK et
les unites de guerilleros ont intercepte les envahisseurs vietnamiens Pres du
village Achar Khnaol, a l'ouest de Phnom Sruoch. au village Charrron.^, au village
Ekpheap et a Trapeang Skor, Elles ont tue 00 soldats vietnamiens, capturc deux et
blesse plusieurs autres: elles ont saisi de nombreuses armes dont 23AK, k BUo,
10 BUIj un poste 025 5 et detruit un vehicule militaire.
Du 25 au 28 fevrier, l'AR^^ et les unites de guerilleros ont attaque a plusieurs
reprises les envahisseurs vietnam.iens qui, affames, ont tente de sortir de la ville
de Kratie pour aller piller le riz de la Population. Elles ont tue Uk soldats
vietnamiens et blesse de nombreux autres.; elles ont coule vne barque tuant tous
ses occupants.
Sur le front de Rattanakiri, les 2^, 25 et 28 fevrier, les unites de guerilleros
au nord de Siempang, au Phum Sram.a (le lonp du fleuve Ge San) et a Voeunaai (au
barrage 0 Tag) ont tue 38 soldats vietnamiens, capture deu.x et blesse Plusieurs
autres notamment a.vec des chausse-trapes .
Les 1er et 2 m.ars^ les unites de '^"ueri Heros ont attaque les envahisseurs
vietnamiens dans Voeunsai, a l'ouest de Ean Lung et a 0 Dam Bau':» Bilan :
12 soldats vietnaniens tues et de nombreux autres blesses : deux amions militaires
detruits avec tous leurs occupants tues.
BILAN DU 28 FEVRIER AU 2 MAE3 197^ (avec des chiffres complementaires du
17 au 19 fevrier pour le front de Kompong Ohhnang et du 20 au 27 fevrier POur
d' autres front s) :
/...
//
A/3U/116
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Frangais
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Page h
■^ 1 »
Plus de 1 500 soldats vietnamiens tues, cinq conseillers sovietiques tues â–
- Quatorze soldats vietnarniens capturesj
- Deux tanks, un bateau de guerre, deux canons et 12 vehicules nilitaires
ennemis detruits •
Sept vehicules nilitaires, 1^+ postes emetteurs-recepteurs et une importante
quantite d'arLies et de munitions saisis.
/
NATIONSUNIES
ASSEMBLEE
GENERALE
CONSEIL
DE SECURITE
Distr.
GENEIALE
A/3U/IIT
S/13160
12 iriarc 1:"T9
ORIGINAL
t •'TP,
LAI.
ASSEI4BLEE GEIiERALE CONSEIL DE SFCURITE ^
Trente-quatrieme session ^ ^ Trente-e^iatrieme annee
Point U6 de la liste prelirrlnaire^
APPLICATION DE LA DECLARATION SUR LE R];NF0RCEMENT
DE LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALE
Lettre datee du 12 mars 19T9. adressee au Secretaire .p;eneral
par 14. Thiounn'Prasith, ambassadeur extraordinaire _et_
-plenipotentiaire du Kampuchea dt^mocratiaue
J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint, pour votre information, la
declaration en date du 3 mars 1979 du porte-parole du Ministere des affaires _
etranc-eres du Gouvernement du Kampuchea democratique concernant la mobilisation
generale decr^tee par 1' Administration vietnamienne en vue d ' mtensifier sa guerre
au Kampuchea.
Je vous prie de bien vouloir la faire distribuer comme document officiel de
l'Assemblee generale, au titre du point hG de la liste preliminaire, et du
Conseil de securite.
L 'Ambassadeur extraordinaire et
T^lenipotentiaire du Kampuchea
democratique 3
(Si/:>;ne) Thiounn PRASITH
X A/3U/5O.
79-06230
/..
'I
A/3^/llT
S/13160
Frangais
Annexe
Page 1
ANNEXE
'\ ^
Declaration, en date du B mars 19T9s du porte-parole du lunistere des affaires
etran^^eres du Gouvernement du Karg-ouchea dC'Fiocratique concernant la mobil! sation
p;enerale~d?3cretee~par 1 S\lministration vietnamienne en vue d' intensifier sa
p-uerre au Kampuchea
Le porte-parole du Ministere des affaires etran(jeres du Gouvernement du
Kampuchea dpmocratiaue a recu l'autorisation de faire la declaration suivante,
concernant la mo"bilisation generale decretee par 1 •"Aiministration vietnamienne en
vue d'intensifier sa guerre au Kampuchea :
1. La Clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong et ses maitres ^ sovietiques ont
mis en pratique leur ambition de dominer l'Indochine, l'Asie du Sud-Est ,
l'Asie et le Pacifique, en menant une agression armee des plus barbares
contre le Kampuchea.
En effet, depuis le 25 decembre 1978 jusqu'a l'heure actuelle , les
troupes d' agression de la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong , au nombre de
150 000 homraes^ appuyes par de tres nombreux tanks , canons, avions et
navires de ^uerre, ont envahi et occupe le Kampucuea.
2. Face a cette Invasion cruelle et barbare de la clique Le Duan -
Pham Van Dong, l'heroique peuple et l'heroique armee revolutionnaire du
Kampuchea, ayant des traditions de combattre et de vaincre les agressions
etrangeres a toutes les epoques, ont rassemble toutes les forces nationales,
tant a 1' Interieur au'ä l'exterieur du pays, en un large front patriotique
et democratique; sont en train de lever haut le drapeau de 1' independance,
de la paix, de la neutralite et du non-aligneraent et contre-attaquent , sous
toutes les'formes, les troupes vietnamiennes d' Invasion, ^aneantissant et
detruisant en tres r,rand nombre les forces vives et les equipements
militaires de l'ennemi. Les envahisseurs vietnamiens sont en train de
s'enliser profondement dans la guerre ĂĽopidaire au Kampuchea, sur tous les
fronts, grands et petits. Les forces vives de l'ennemi - 150 000 hommes -
et ses equipements militaires sont detruits et r^duits chaque jour par les
guerilleros, 1' armee revolutionnaire et le peuple du Kampuchea.
Les victoires quotidiennes de la guerre populaire sur tous les fronts^
ont caus6s un manque 6norme d'effectifs dans les rangs de l'ennemi vietnamien
pour la poursuite de son agression et de son occupation complete du Kampuchea
et pour l'application de la "khmerisation'^ de sa guerre au Kampuchea.
3. En raison, d^une part , de sa lourde defaite sur le front du
Kampuchea et, d'autre part , des difficult^s de plus en plus grandes a la
fois sur les plans politiaue, militaire et 6conomique qu'elle rencontre dans
propre pays , et du fait qu'elle est isol6e a l'extreme sur le plan
son
international, la cliaue Le Duan - Pham Van Dong poursuit son aventure en
/...
A/3^/llT
S/13160
Frangais
Annexe
Pap^e 2
proclamant la loi martiale qui decrete une mobilisation generale massive en vue
de l'utiliser essentiellement contre le Kampuchea et de preparer a tem-os la
"khmerisation" de sa guerre au Kampuchea. C'est dans cette Situation que le
Viet Nam intensifie sa guerre au Kampuchea de la fagon la plus sauvage avec
tous les risques que cela comporte.
La mobilisation generale massive et l'intensification de la guerre au
Kampuchea entreprises par la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong, d'une part ,
causent des pertes de plus en plus nombreuses parmi la jeunesse vietnamienne ^
separent les f amilies et aggravent la famine et la misere parmi le peuple
vietnamien. D'autre part, la Situation en Asie du Sud-Est ^ en Asie, dans le
Pacifique et dans le monde 5 Situation qui est doja tres tendue a cause de la
Clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong et de ses maitres sovietiques , devient et
deviendra de plus en plus tendue et pourra conduire a une guerre regionale et
meme a une guerre plus large.
Quelles que soient les difficultes qu'ils doivent affronter, le peuple
et l'armee revolutionnaire du Kampuchea, sous la direction du Gouvernement du
Kampuchea democratique, sont resolument determines a inf liger une defaite
totale a la politique et aux actes d' intensification de la guerre au Kampuchea
menes par la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong.
C'est la la seule voie qui peut sauvegarder et defendre le Kampuchea ^
son peuple et sa nation, assurer leur perennite et contribuer activement a
eliminer la tension et les menaces d'agression de la clique Le Duan -
Pham Van Dong et de ses maitres contre tous les pays et peuples d'Asie du
Sud-Est 5 d'Asie 5 du Pacifique et du monde .
Face a ces manoeuvres et activites perfides d'agression extremement
fasciste et barbare de la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong et de ses maitres,,
tous les pays et peuples epris d' independance , de paix et de justice dans le
monde et, en particulier, tous les pays et peuples du Sud-Est asiatique ont
leurs destinees etroitement liees et affrontent le meme danger venant d'un
ennemi commun, les expansionnistes regionaux vietnamiens et les expansionnistes
internationaux sovietiques.
C'est dans cet esprit et en se basant sur l'interet commun de tous les
pays epris d'independance, de paix^et de justice aue le Gouvernement du
Kampuchea democratique fait appel a la noble conscience de tous les peuples et
a tous les pays du monde et, en particulier a ceux du Sud-Est asiatique pour
que, etroitement unis, ils usent de toute leur influence et menent toutes les
actions possibles pour condamner et arreter les activites de la clique
Le Duan - Pham Van Dong visant a intensifier sa guerre au Kampuchea et pour
exiger que le Viet Nam retire du territoire du Kampuchea toutes ses troupes
et forces d'agression, cela afin d' eliminer la tension en Asie du Sud-Est, en
Asie, dans le Pacifique et dans le monde, et, en particulier, afin d' arreter
A/3^/llT
S/13160
Frangais
Annexe
Page 3
et d' eliminer le danger d'une guerre regionale qui pourrait embraser toute
l'Asie du Sud-Est en raison de l'intensification de la guerre au Kampuchea par
la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong.
Le Gouvernement du Kampuchea democratique saisit cette occasion pour
exprim.er ses profonds remerciements a tous les pays, les peuples, les organi-
sations de masse, les parties politiques ^ les diverses organisations inter-
nationales et les personnalites qui ont soutenu et soutiennent dans tous les
domaines la juste lutte du peuple et de l'armee revolutionnaire du Kampuchea
pour chasser les troupes vietnamiennes d' Invasion hors du Kampuchea, afin
que le peuple du Kampuchea soit maitre chez lui et decide lui-mieme de la
destinee de son propre pays sans aucune ingerence etrangere .
Le monde et l'humanite ont condamne et condamnent 1' Invasion du
Kampuchea par la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong. Ils enterreront profondem.ent
et a coup sur la clique Le Duan - Pham Van Dong dans les dechets de l'histoire.
La detente, la stabilite, la securite, la coexistence pacifique et la
prosperite naitront alors dans les regions de l'Asie du Sud-Est, de l'Asie et
du Pacifique.
f n » •
UNITED NATIONS
\
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
SECURITY
COUNCIL
Distr.
GENERAL
A/3U/123
S/131T9
19 March 1979
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH
»I
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Thirty-fourth Session
Item U6 of the preliminary list^
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE
STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
SECURITY COUNCIL
Thirty-fourth year
Letter dated 19 March 1979 from Mr. Thiounn Prasith
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Democratic Kampuchea, addressed to the Secretary-
General
I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your Information ,^ news of the
most recent developments in the people's war of resistance against the Vietnamese
Invasion and occupation of Democratic Kampuchea durinfi; the period from
3 to 8 March 1979.
I should be grateful if you would arrange for this communication to be
circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item kG of the
preliminary list, and of the Security Council.
(Si^ned) Thiounn PRASITH
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of
Democratic Kampuchea
•^ A/3i+/50
79-07018
/
A/3V123
S/131T9
rnp;lish
Annex
Pafe 1
ANNEX
^unr^ary of developments in the people's v^ar_ o_f resistance
arainst the Vietnaraese Invasion and occupatiö"n~f
Dei^ocratic Kampuchea durinr the r)oriorl 3 to 8 I%rch 1^79,
disseminated "by the ijinistry of Information_Qf_J>Focratic
Kampuc'iea
The revolutionary army of Kampuchea {ATIV) and the ;^uerrilla units are hotly
and dor!:p-edly pursuinr the Vietnaraese invaders on all fronts , inflictin.^' heavy
losses on thera daily. They have liberated increasin^ly larre areas of the
national territory and have successfully defended the Kopulation, the national
economy and all "bases of the people's war of national resistance apainst the
Vietnaraese Invasion and occupation.
1.
In the vicinity of Phnor Penh and at Phnora ^enh
(a) On 1 pTarch, the guerrillas assifned to the city of Phnora Penh killed
seven Vietnaraese soldiers at Vat Phnora (centre of the town) and wounded several
others .
(b) On 28 February and on 1 , 2, 3 and h March, the p;uerrillas and the ARK
attacked the eneray at Batt Kaun, Trapeanp: Venp;, Vat "Ta Ok , east of Oudonp, Vat
AnfTkrornp;, Chan Thnal , Dara.nak Sraach, Tainp- Kalat , Tbenp; Kpuos ^ Chhlak Vien and
Bat Doen^'^. Total casualties : 290 Vietnaraese soldiers killed, many others
wounded., one railitary vehicle and two 60 rara raortars destroyed , raany weapons and
raunitions seized^ as well as one telephone set.
2.
Southern area: River Bassac front
The y\RK completely controls the River Tonle Bassac from Prek I'esoeng
(frontier with Viet Nara) to Takhmao (8 Iciloraetres south of Phnora Penh) on
both the east and west banks , On the River Bassac front, the ARK" has wiped out
an entire eneray battalion and 152 other Vietnara.ese soldiers. It has also
seized a lar^^e nuraber of war materiel«
3.
South-eastern area
(a) On national highvmy 'J.o . 3 on 28 February, the eneray preceded by
four tanks and a.tteraptinfT to reach Prey Pchoek and Roleanp Kr eul , situated west
of national hi^hway I-To. 3j was intercepted by the ARK^ which killed 130 Vietnaraese
soldiers 3 wounded a cireat many others, destroyed one tank and seized nuraerous
weapons and raunitions.
On 1 3 2 and 3 March, at different Points alon^ hip;hway No
-)3
the ARK killed
65 Vietnaraese soldiers, ca"otured one other and destroyed one railitary vehicle.
/.
A/3^/123
S/13179
Enf^lish
Annex
Par.e 2
(b) On 3 f%rch on the Takeo-Kampot front, 30 Vietnamese soldiers were
killed and four radio transmitter-receivers were seized by the ARK.
On 6, 7 and 8 Harch the Vietnamese invaders were attacked at the foot of
Mount Phnom Danrei Romeal, on the road leadin^^ from Chamcar Sienp; to Thnal
Kpaub Run and on the road from Taken to Koh Sla , at Saan.e; and Sla, at Mount Phnom
Sramauch and at Sdok (scuth of Tram Kak). Total casualties : 109 Vietnamese
soldiers killed, one tank destroyed, num.erous weapons and munitions seized. The
ARK still controls Ta Ken and Koh Sla,
(c) At Kompong Som, during the night of 27 February, the ARK entered the
town for the purpose of attackinp; the enemy at the Rolok dam and killed
20 Vietnamese soldiers.
k.
Hestern area
On national highway No . U , on 27 and 28 February and 1 March , the ARK
launched attacks against the enemy at Cheung Chral , at the intersection vith the
road to Sre Ambel and on the road from Kompong Speu to Trapeang Kraloeng. Total
casualties: 87 Vietnamese soldiers killed, one military vehicle destroyed and
another two damaged, and two trucks - one carry ing rice and the other carry ing
munitions - seized.
5 . North-western area
(a) In the province of Battambang, the Vietnamese invaders repeatedly
attem.pted to steal rice from the population but , each time, they were intercepted
by Ăźuerrilla and ARK units. On 2 and 3 March , hk Vietnamese soldiers were
killed in the region of Me Chbar and a large number of others were injured and
some weapons and munitions were seized.
On h March, the ARK completely destroyed the enemy 's fortified position at
Chruy Sdao, inflicting heavy casualties on it.
On U, 6 and 7 March , guerrilla and ARK units attacked the Vietnamese enemy at
Phnom Sampeou, as it was leaving fbngkol Borei , at Samrong, in the village of
Daung Saranh, at Kout Sat and in the district of Thmar Puok. Total casualties:
205^Vietnamese soldiers killed, two captured and a large amount of enemy war
materiel destroyed, including one 105 mm gun and two 60 mm mortars at Thmar Puok,
one telegraph set and a large number of weapons and munitions seized.
On 8 Harch the enemy was intercepted by the ARK as it was leaving the town of
Battambang. Total casualties: 72 Vietnamese soldiers killed, several others
wounded, weapons, munitions and two radio transmitter-receivers seized.
(b) In the province of Pursat, a Vietnamese Company on its way from Svay to
Arel was intercepted on 27 February by a group of guerrillas, and 15 of its
members were killed.
/...
^/3^/l23
S/13179
English
Annex
Page 3
(c) In the province of Kompong Chnang, on 3 ^arch, guerrilla units
intercepted the enemy in the vicinity of Kompong Boeng, at the village of Trabek
and at Vat Ta Ngil, and killed 70 persons and wounded a number of others. During
the same day two boatloads of Vietnamese soldiers left the town of Kompong Chnang
and travelled along the River Tonle Sap for the purpose of stealing the people's
rice and were intercepted by the ARK. One boat was destroyed by the ARK and
the other was seriously damaged. Many Vietnamese soldiers v/ere killed.
(d) Along national highway Ho. 5, on 28 February and on 2 and 3 ^arch, the
ARK attacked the enemy in the region of Romeas and at Krakor. It wiped out
l^il Vietnamese soldiers and one Soviet, seized one military vehicle and nunerous
weapons and munitions .
(e) In the province of Kompong Thom, on 6 and 8 Ilarch, guerrilla units
killed 15 Vietnamese soldiers at Kompong Thmar and Phum Raung.
6.
North-eastern area
(a) In the province of Kratie, on 1 , U and 6 March, guerrillas attacked
the enemy in the village of Thmar Reay, at Dang Tung, in the village of Sre Praing
(west of the town of Kratie) and in the village of Srot Rotes, where the
Vietnamese invaders were trying to plunder the rice of the population. Total
casualties: 30 Vietnamese soldiers killed, many others wounded, and weapons
and munitions seized.
(b) In the province of Mondulkiri , on 22, 2^, 26 and 28 February and on
1 and 2 March, guerrilla units attacked the Vietnamese invaders west of Koh
Nhiek,, on the road leading from Koh Mayeul to Koh Nhiek, in the village of Sok
San, in the village of Royar and on the road from Koh Nhiek to Chi Meat . Total
casualties: 52 Vietnam^ese soldiers killed, many others wounded, and two military
vehicles destroyed with all their occupants.
•^
•^<
Total casualties during the period 3 to 8 March 1979 (with additional figures for
the last week in February and for 1 and 2 March on certain fronts):
(a) More than 1,800 Vietnamese soldiers killed, one Soviet killed, three
Vietnamese soldiers captured and many others wounded:
(b) Two tanks , one 105 mm gun, four 60 mm mortars, one radio transmitter-
receiver, one boat and four military vehicles destroyed:
(c) One boat .^ one 60 mm mortar and two military vehicles damaged;
(d) Three military vehicles, six radio transmitter-receivers, one
telephone set, one telegraph set and a large number of weapons and munitions
seized.
Jjs.Natio[is Unics, ainsi qiu; rcxpiilsion inuneJiate des
rcpi^:s- i't^uUs de Tchan^ K:iV-chek du siege qu'ils occu-
pcnt iT^igalernent ä rOrganlsatiod des Nations Unies
et dans *l*us les organisnies qui s*y rattachent.
1976' scance plentere,
25 octobre 1971.
2763 (XXVI). Rapport de rAgence internationale
de rener^ie atoinique
L'A ssenihlee generale,
Aycint re^it le rapport de l'Agence internationale de
l'encreie atoniique a l'Asseniblee generale pour Tannee
1970/1971 »,
Consciente qiie la declaration faite par le Directeur
general de l'Agence internationale de Tenergie atomi-
que le 8 novcrnbre 1971 ^^ met ä jour les principaux
faits survenus depuis la publication du rapport,
1. Prend acte du rapport de l'Agence internationale
de l'energie atoniique;
2. Apprecie le role constructif que joue l'Agence
internationale de l'energie atoniique en ce qui con-
ceme Tapplication paciĂĽque de l'energie nucleaire dans
l'interet des Etats Membres;
3. Felicite l'Agence internationale de l'energie ato-
mique des travaux qu'elle entreprend en vue de s'ac-
quitter de ses responsabilites en matiere de garanties;
4. Felicite en oiitre l'Agence internationale de
l'energie atomique d'avoir coopere avec l'Organisation
des Nations Unies ä la preparation de la quatrieme
Conference internationale sur l'utilisation de l'enerde
atomique ä des fins pacifiques, qui s'est tenue ä Geneve
du 6 au 16 septembre 1971 ^^;
5. Prie le Secretaire general de transmettre au Di-
recteur general de l'Agence internationale de l'energie
atomique les comptes rendus de la vingt-sixieme Ses-
sion de TAssemblee generale traitant des activites de
l'Agence;
6. Invite l'Agence internationale de l'energie ato-
mique a prendre ces comptes rendus en consideration
dans ses futurs travaux.
1979^ seance plentere ,
8 novembre 1971.
2782 (XXVI). Proclamation de la Journee des Nations
Unies comme jour ferie international
L'Assemblee generale,
Consciente de la necessite de souligner la valeur des
buts et principes de la Charte des Nations Unies,
Tenant compte du fait que, dans sa resolution 168
(II) du 31 octobre 1947, l'Assemblee generale a de-
» Agence internationale de l'energie atomique, Rapport
annuel, l^^ juillet 1970-30 juin 1971, Vienne, juillet 1971;
communique aux membres de l'Assemblee generale par une
note du Secretaire general (A/8384).
10 Voir Documents officiels de l'Assemhlee generale, vingt-
sixieme Session, Seances plenieres, 1979« seance, par. 15 ä 45.
11 Voir A/8487.
'ccu.rc que ic 14 octobre, jouriijc des ^sano^^
Unies, sera un jour ferie international et recofunumde
qu'il soit celebre coninic tel par tous les Etats Mem-
bres de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.
A^SV-e-o^^
2000' seance plentere,
6 decenihre 1971.
2793 (XXVI). Question examinee par le Conscil de
securite ä ses 1606«, 1607* et 1608^ seances,
les 4, 5 et 6 decenibre 1971
U A ssemh lee generale,
Prenant note des rapports du Secretaire general, en
date des 3 et 4 decenibre 1971 ^- et de la lettre du
President du Conseil de securite ^^ transmettant le
texte de la resolution 303 (1971) du Conseil, en date
du 6 decembre 1971,
Gravement preocciipee par les hostilites qui ont
eclate entre l'lnde et le Pakistan et qui constituent une
menace imnicdiate ä la paix et ä la securite interna-
tionales,
Reconnaissant la necessite de traiter de fa^on ade-
quate ä un Stade ulterieur, dans le cadre de la Charte
des Nations Unies, des questions qui ont donne lieu
aux hostilites,
Convaincue qu'une Solution politique rapide serait
necessaire pour le retablissement de conditions de nor-
malite dans la region du conflit et pour le retour des
refugies dans leurs foyers,
Ayant presentes ä l'esprit les dispositions de la
Charte, en particulier Celles qui sont enoncees au para-
graphe 4 de l'Article 2,
Rappelant la Declaration sur le renforcenient de la
securite internationale, notamment ses paragraphes 4,
5 et 6,
Reconnaissant en outre la necessite de prendre im-
mediatement des mesures pour amener une cessation
immediate des hostilites entre l'lnde et le Pakistan et
un retrait de leurs forces armees vers leur propre cöte
des frontieres indo-pakistanaises,
Ayant presents ä l'esprit les buts et principes de la
Charte et les responsabilites qui lui incombent en vertu
des dispositions pertinentes de la Charte et de sa reso-
lution 377 A (V) du 3 novembre 1950,
1. Demande aux Gouvernements Indien et pakis-
tanais de prendre sans delai toutes les mesures en vue
d'un cessez-le-feu immediat et du retrait de leurs
forces armees se trouvant sur le territoire de l'autre
pays vers leur propre cöte des frontieres indo-pakis-
tanaises;
2. Demande instamment que soient intensifies les
etTorts deployes en vue de creer rapidement et confor-
mement aux buts et principes de la Charte des Nations
( 'ff}
^- Documents officiels du Conseil de securite, vingt-sixieme
annee, Supplement d' octobre, novembre et decembre 1971,
documents S/10410 et Add.l et S/10412.
^^ Documents officiels de l'Assemhlee generale, vingt-sixieme
Session. Annexes, point 102 de l'ordre du jour, document
A/8555.
â– mm-r
.f^. 'â– ->-â– â– *---^^|-ĂĽ|-tit
Assemblee generale — Vingt-sixieme Session
Unies les condiiions necessaires au retour volontaire
des refugies du Pakistan oriental dans leurs foyers;
3. Demande ä tous les Etats de cooperer plcine-
nient avec le Secretaire general en vue de preter assis-
tance ä ces refugies et de soulager leur detresse;
4. Demande instamment qu'aucun effort ne soit
neglige en vue de proteger la vie et le bien-etre de la
population civile dans la region du conflit;
5. Prie le Secretaire general de tenir l'Assemblee
generale et le Conseil de securite rapidement et regu-
lierement informes de Tapplication de la presente reso-
lution;
6. Decide de suivre la question de pres et de se reu-
nir ä nouveau si la Situation l'exige;
7. Demande au Conseil de securite de prendre les
mesures voulues compte tenu de la presente resolution.
2003^ seance pleniere,
7 decembre 1971.
2794 (XXVI). Admission des Emirats arabes unis
ä rOrganisation des Nations Unies
L'Assemblee generale,
Ayant regu la communication du Conseil de secu-
rite, en date du 8 decembre 1971, recoinmandant l'ad-
mission des Emirats arabes unis ä l'Oreanisation des
Nations Unies ^^,
Ayant exanĂĽne la demande d'admission des Emirats
arabes unis ^^,
Decide d'admettre les Emirats arabes unis ä l'Orga-
nisation des Nations Unies,
2007^ seance pleniere,
9 decembre 1971.
2799 (XXVI). La Situation au Moyen-Orient
U Assemblee generale,
Projondement preoccupee par la persistance de la
grave Situation qui regne au Moyen-Orient, particu-
liercment depuis le conflit de juin 1967, et qui cons-
titue une menace serieuse ä la paix et ä la securite inter-
nationales,
Cofivaincue que la resolution 242 (1967) du Con-
seil de securite, en date du 22 novembre 1967, devrait
etre appliquee immediatement dans tous ses Clements
cn vue de parvcnir au Moyen-Orient ä une paix juste
et durable permcttant ä chaque Etat de la region de
vivre en securite,
Resolue ä ce que le territoire d'un Etat ne fasse pas
l'objet d'une occupation ou d'une acquisition par un
autre Etat resullant de la menace ou de l'emploi de
la force, ce qui est contraire ä la Charte des Nations
Unies et aux principes consacres dans la resolution 242
(1967) du Conseil de securite ainsi que dans la Dccla-
ralion sur le rcnforccmcnt de la securite internationale
adoptee par TAssemblec generale le 16 decembre
1970,
Se jelicitant des cflorts cntrcpris par la Commission
de chcfs d'Elat africains conformement ä la rcsolulion
adoptee le 23 juin 1971 par la Conference des chefs
d'Etat et de gouvernement de TOrganisation de
africaine lors de sa huitieme session ordinaire
Gravement preoccupee par le fait qu'Israel c *
d'occuper les territoires arabes depuis le 5 luirf^^
Ayant examine la question intitulee "La «lir»,.*
Moyen-Orient", ^iiuatio»
1. Reaffirme que l'acquisition de territoires ^\
force est inadmissible et que, en consequencc \c\T^
toires occupes de cette maniere doivent etrc'rc^
2. Reaffirme que Tinstauration d'une paix hai»'
durable au Moyen-Orient devrait comprendrc rS^
cation des deux principes suivants : ^**l
a) Retrait des forces armees israeliennes des
toires occupes lors du recent conflit;
b) Cessation de toutes assertions de belliccrancc
de tous etats de belligerance et respect et "reccüsäil
sance de la souvcrainete, de l'integrite terriioriile
de l'independance politique de chaque Etat de h nJtL
ainsi que de son droit de vivre en paix ä rint6ric«rl
frontieres sures et reconnues ä l'abri de menacrs i
d'actes de force:
3. Prie le Secretaire general de prendre les mcr«L
necessaires pour remettre en activite la missJ.-Ti i]
Representant special du Secretaire general au Motta
Orient en vue de favoriser un accord et de sccoö"
les efforts dcployes afin de parvenir ä un accord
paix, comme cela est envisage dans l'aide-memoirc .
Representant special, en date du 8 fevrier 1971 '*;
4. Exprime son plein appui ä tous les cfTorti ,5^
ployes par le Representant special en vue d'appli^ju
la resolution 242 (1967) du Conseil de s6curili;
5. Prend note avec satisjaction de la r6ponse peil-
tive donnee par l'Egypte ä Tinitiative prise par Ic R^
prescntant special pour instaurer une paix justc m
durable au Moyen-Orient;
6. Demande ä Israel de repondre favorablemcnl 41
l'initiative de paix du Representant special;
7. Invite en oiitre les parties au conflit du Mo)<a^
Orient ä accorder leur plcine Cooperation au Rr;^/i'
sentant special afin de mcttre au point des nicvurt«
pratiques cn vue de :
a) Garantir la liberte de navigation sur les n^-»|
d'eau internationales de la region;
b) Rcaliser un juste reglement du prohl^mc ^«r»
refugies;
c) Garantir l'inviolabilite territoriale et rirJc,-<^
dance politique de chaque Etat de la region;
8
Con
q
scn
resolution 242 (1967)
presente resolution;
9. Prie le Conseil de securite d'envisai'cr, rJ «-»l
oü cela serait nccessaire, de prendre des ^•;,P'^''^*J*'
aux termes des articles pertinents de la ^'•"^*^^^|
Nations Unies, conceinant Tapplication de !a f^^*^"
lution 242 (1967).
2016' seance r-^"-''/*
Resolution^ adopted withrmt reference to a Main Conimittce
I
ference on the Pcaccful Uses of Atomic Energy, held
at Geneva from 6 to 16 September 1971;^^
5. Requests the Secretary-Gencral to transmit to
the Director-General of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency the records of the twenty-sLxth session
of the General Assembly relating to the Agency's ac-
tivities;
6. Invites the International Atomic Energy Agency
to take these records into account in its future work.
1979th plenary meeting,
8 November 1971.
2782 (XXVI). Prociaiitalion of United Nalions
Day as an international holiday
The General Assembly,
Conscioiis of the need to enhance the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
M indf ul th^t in its resolution 168 (II) of 31 October
1947 the General Assembly declared 24 October, the
anniversary of the coming into force of the Charter,
as "United Nations Day",
Belleving that the anniversary of the United Nations
should be an occasion for Governments and peoples
to reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of
the Charter,
Declares that 24 October, United Nations Day, shall
be an international holiday and recommends that it
should be observed as a public holiday by all States
Members of the United Nations.
2000th plenary meeting,
6 December 1971.
2793 (XXVI). Queslion considered by the Se-
curily Council al its 1606tli, 1607th and
1608lh meelings on 4, 5 and 6 December
1971
The General Assembly,
Noting the reports of the Secretary-General of 3 and
4 December 1971^^ and the letter from the President
of the Security Council^^ transmitting the text of Coun-
cil resolution 303 (1971) of 6 December 1971,
Gravely concerned that hostilities have broken out
between India and Pakistan which constitute an im-
mediate threat to international peace and security,
Recognizing the need to deal appropriately at a
subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter
of the United Nations, with the issues which have given
rise to the hostilities,
Convinced that an early political Solution would be
necessary for the restoration of conditions of normalcy
in the area of conflict and for the return of the refugees
to their horaes,
Mindjul of the provisions of the Charter, in partic-
ular of Article 2, paragraph 4,
Recalling the Declaration on the Strengthening of
International Security, particularly paragraphs 4, 5
and 6,
11 See A/8487.
12 Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth
Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1971,
documems S/ 10410 and Add.l and S/ 10412.
^^ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth
Session, Annexes, agenda item 102, dĂĽcurncnt A/8555.
Recognizing jurther the need to take inimediate
measures to bring about an inimediate cessation of
hostilities between India and Pakistan and effect a
withdrawal of their armed forces to their ovvn side
of the India-Pakistan borders,
Mindjul of the purposes and principles of the Char-
ter and of the General Assembly's responsibilities under
the relevant provisions of the Charter and of Assembly
resolution 377 A (V) of 3 November 1950,
1. Calls lipon the Governments of India and Paki-
stan to take forthvvith all measures for an inimediate
cease-fire and withdrawal of their armed forces on the
territory of the other to their own side of the India-
Pakistan borders;
2. Urges that efforts be intensified in Order to bring
about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the
East Pakistan refugees to their homes;
3. Calls for the fĂĽll co-operation of all States with
the Secretary-General for rendering assistance to and
reheving the distress of those refugees;
4. Urges that every effort be made to safeguard the
lives and well-being of the civilian population in the
area of conflict;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Security Council promptly and
currently informed on the implementation of the pres-
ent resolution;
6. Decides to foUow the question closely and to
meet again should the Situation so demand;
7. Calls upon the Security Council to take ap-
propriate action in the light of the present resolution.
200 3 rd plenary meeting,
7 December 1971.
2794 (XXVI). Admission of the United Arab
Emirates to menibersliip in the United
Nations
The General Assembly,
Having received the recommendation of the Security
Council of 8 December 1971 that the United Arab
Emirates should be admitted to membership in the
United Nations,^*
Having considered the application for membership of
the United Arab Emirates,^'^
Decides to admit the United Arab Emirates to mem-
bership in the United Nations.
2007 th plenary meeting,
9 December 1971.
2799 (XXVI). The Situation in the Middle East
The General Assembly,
Deeply concerned at the continuation of the grave
Situation prevailing in the Middle East, particularly
since the conflict of June 1967, which constitutes a
serious threat to international peace and security,
»'-^
1* Ibid., agenda item 25, document A/856I.
15 A/8553. For the printed text of this document, see Official
Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year. Supple-
ment for October, November and December 1971, document
5/ 10420.
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BRITISH NATIONAL COMMITTEE
FOR THE HISTORY OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Chairman : Sir William Deakin, D.S.O.
Vice-Chairman : Noble Frankland, C.B.E., D.F.C.
Secretary : JJ. Chadwick.
Imperial War Museum
Lambeth Road
London SEI 6HZ
Tel : 01 - 735 8922
12 January 1979
Lj^A^ /Vir. fu\e^
The British Academy has sent on to me your letter of 3rd
January inquiring about the Conference on "Governments Exiled in
London during the Second World War" .
I do not recall there having been any reference to the
evolution of the plans for the treatment of German war
criminals during this Conference, but there may have been
some reference in the papers which I have not recollected.
The papers are not yet available, since I am in the process
of seeking to arrange for their publication, together with
other Conference proceedings of this Committee, on
microf iches . If I succeed in getting this project through
then the package should become available in American
University libraries. I will let you know what happens.
/viij:,--^u^cei
f(\AK^*^
John H.E. Fried, Esq.,
55 East 86 Street,
NEW YORK,
N.Y. 10028,
U.S.A.
/r-
'/
^
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NEERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directic: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
Strlctly confidential
AMSTERDAM, Februapy 19^9»
Herengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
A HISTORY OF GERMAN CONCfiNTRATIONCAMPS
Orjgin of the
!• This is a preliminary plan for a program of
international research and publication on the
subject of German concentrationcamps. It has been
drawn up by Drs Louis de Jong, executive director
of the Netherlands State Institute of War-Documen-
tation, Amsterdam, on the Suggestion of Prof.
Arnold J* Toynbee, director of research of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. .
2. Sofar rio international research has been carried
out as regards the development of the German
concentrationcamp-system. In several countries large
amounts of documentary material have been collect-
ed less for historical purposes than for those of
tracing missed perscns and prosecuting Germans and
oth^r nationals suspected of the committing of war
crimes in concentrationcamps» Several hiondreds of
books (1) have been published most of them dealing
(1) Sofar 338 books on concentrationcamps have been collected by
the Netherlands State Institute of War Documentation, 118 of
them In Dutch,
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL N^ERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-2-
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065^
with the personal experlf^nces of former Inmates of the
camps. Some of the books are of a more general character (2).
v/hatever their merits -and they are considerable- none of
them is adequate to the subject, nor was It possible to write
a fully adequate book at an earller date. The German con-
centrationcamps present a subject that needs some time to
"mature", The passions of war have to subside before an
objective study both of the gaolers and the gaoled becomes
possible. Moreover, some of the most important source-
material, whlch is in the possession of several governments,
would not have been available in the preceding years. Finally,
a program. of international research can only be carried out
after the completion of national programs -which have, indeed,
been instituted by several European governments.
«
3« The subject of German concentrationcamps can only be
adequately dealt with on an international basis. It would
be impossible for a French author to give an authoritative
description of the experiences of Polish prisoners. The
growth and decay of the System as a whole cannot be surveyed
(2) Dr. Eugen Kogon; Der SS-Staat, Munich, 19^6
David Rousset: L' Univers concentrationnaire^ Paris 19^6
Dr. Benedikt Kautsky: Teufel und Verdammten^ ZĂĽrich 19^7
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NJ^ERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-3-
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
but from an international level.
Moral Import anc^e k. The subject merlts further close study than has been devoted
to It sofar not only because of the extent and the Intenslty
of human suff erlng caused by it but primarily on account of
the fact that the German concentrationcamps present the most
•»
typical example of what one might call a ''pressurlzed**
Society. Similar societies though on a much smaller scale
and in a less inhiimane form have existed in the past. Never
bef ore have thirty milllon people been f orced to live behind
barbed wire; never bef ore have twenty million people been
done to death in a few years. Unless these incredlble events
are adequately described posterity may well disbelieve the
Story of Auschwitz and Belsen. An obiective historv of the
German concentrationcamp-system would form a most impressive
warning of what man can do to man> It would be a lesson in
democracy and decent government, It would be a yardstick to
measure comparable Systems in past^ present of future. It
would deepen social and psychological insight, It would
constantly appeal to and strenghten the conscience of Mankind
Political faetcrg, 5. There seem to be no insuperable politlcal objections against
the international research program as planned. It should not
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NJtERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-^-" AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
be undertaken in a spirit of vlndictiveness. Though conflned to
the development of the German system of concentrationcamps it
would, if properly carried out, not lead to an Indfctment of
the German people as such -It might rather show how this partl-
cular System came to lif e in a particular age and under a par-
ticular System of government. Closer study would reveal that
some of the evil characteristics of the German System have been
repeated in several of the internment-camps set up af ter the
end of World-War II by the government s of peoples, both in
Eastern and Western Europe, that suffered most from German
ruie and misrule. All observers agree that the ordinary Germans
do not Show any feelings of guilt in respect of the crimes
committed in their name* Most of them profess not to believe •
that gas-chambers and death-vans are not the product of Allied
and Russian Propaganda, but have, indeed, been in existence.
The results of an international program of research-in which,
of course, Germans would have to participate on an equal basis-
might, perhaps, open the eyes of some Germans, not the least
prominent ones»
Sponsoryhip 6. Though the program as planned could not be carried out
without the tacit approval and in some respects without the
active support of several governments, it would seem to be
impractical to suppose that an adequate general initiative
in this field will be taken on an official level, The suppo-
Directie:
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NEERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-5-
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
sltion Is rendered futlle by the present state of world
affairs. It is to be feared that a plan proposed by the
American Government would be per se Inacceptable to the
Government of the Sovlet Union - and vice versa If the
plan were to be f inaneed by the Governments of all peoples
concerned It is likely that most of the smaller European
Governments would feel themselves unable to make the
necessary contributions. Even under the most favourable
circumstances the initiation of such a program of inter-
national research if carried out on an entirely official
level would suffer interminable, perhaps even fatal delay.
The United Nations Educational and Scientific Organisation
would certainly have to be associated with the program,
howeyer it may be organised. The program might perhaps
even best be carried out under the auspices of Unesco,
• *' * . ■-
Its execution however, within the near future and on an
adeqi^ate basis would in the present writer's opinion only be
guaranteed if it could be sponsored by one or two Poundations
or Endowments with the necessary experience in the field of
, international research, If they were to undertake the
financing of the project -according to preliminary
calculations (see below par.ll- par.l^) a total sum of one
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NjfeERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-6-
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
milllon dollars would have to be made avallable -the
execution would be made possible at a reasonably early date,
Moreover a central^ driving f orce would be provided which
seöms essential to obtain a satisfactory result.
Resi4;t8
7. The program of research should aim at the publication of
several books on the subject of the German System of
concentrationcamps. Detalled proposals for the total number
-of volumes and for the compositlon of each volume can only
be drawn up by the editors. Tentatively the present wrlter
should llke to indlcate that the followlng subjects might ..
. well be investigated and described: ^ ' -
1* Nazi^ideology and the persecution of opponents
2. The development of the legal svstem of national-soclallst
Germany
3, Arrests - Persecutions - Transports to the camps
a, Before the outbreak of World-War II
b, During World-War II
c, The persecution of the Jews •
V, The SS *and its Organisation \
1. The State within the State
2. The Organisation öt the SS and the Wirtschaf tsverwal-
tTingshauptamt
5. The development of the svstem of concentrationcamps
1. Before the outbreak of World-War JI
2. During World-v/ar II (a. Germany b. Western Europe
c. Eastern Europe)
3. The breakdown
6. The development of the principal camps ^
1. The Dachau-coraplex
2. The Sachsenhausen-complex
3« The Buchenwald-complex
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL N^ERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
AMSTERDAM,
""7* Herengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
h. Mittelbau-Dora
?• The Neuengamme-complex
6, The FlossenbĂĽrg-complex
?• The Gross-Rosen-complex
8. The Auschwitz-complex
9. Jewish labourcamps in Poland and Uppersllesla
10. The Lublln-complex
11. The Pollsh exterminationcamps
12.Warsaw and Lwow
13.Stutthof, Riga, Balticum
iH-.The Mauthausen-complex
15» The Natzweiler-complex
16. The RavensbrĂĽck-complex
17«Jewish transportcamps and ghettoes
l8.Bergen-Belsen and Theresienstadt
7. Organisation and administration of the camps
8, Material conditions of life
9.Labour in the concentrationcamps
10 .Social and political life
11. Kultur e and religion in the camps
12. The psvchology of gaolers and gaoled
l^.Crimes â– > Punishments > Experiments
iH-.The concentrationcamps and the outside world
l^.Liberation and repatriation of prisoners
l6.Post-war justice and the concentrationcamps
17.Bibliographv
The present writer realises that this composition may be radlcally
altered. The eventual authors of the book should draw up the final
plan. The scheme as sugge^sted should merely be considered as an
Indication of the sort of subjects which an adequate history of the
System of concentrationcamps would have to cover.
Sources 8. The soiirce-material for a publication as described falls into different|
categories.
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL N^ERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directic: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-8.
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
a* A close study will have to be made of the most Important
collectlons of German official documents now in the possess:
of the Victors of vforld War II. They comprise:
1. The records of the Qerman "Auswärtige Amt'* and the "Reichs«
kanzlei"» ^
These records are now somewhere in Great Britain.- They
are the official property of the American and British Govern-
ments whose permission would have to be obtained to be given
access. Several millions of the most important dociments have
been microfilmed,
2. The records of the German ^Oberkommando der Wehrmacht" and
"Oberkommando des Heeres".
These records are in Washington. Permission to study them
would have to be obtained from the Secretary of the United
States Army.
3. The records of the German SS and Himmler* s personal files.
•The last known location of these records was Berlin
(7771 US Berlin Document Center). They may now have been
transferred to Western Germany.
k. The records .of the International Military TribuÄal and
of the United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg.
Directie :
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL N^ERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
•9-
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065:
These have been shlpped to Washington.
5. The records of the German "Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine"
and of the German "Oberkommando der Luftwaffe" -both collec-
tions are for the most part in London - do not seem to
contain much that would be of interest for the proposed study*
In several smaller European countries more or less important
collections of German doc\aments have been bullt up. In most
cases they are under the supervlslon either of the National
Archlves or of the National Library; in some, special Insti-
tutes have been set up to collect such documents (e.g. the
Netherlands State Institute of War-Docximentation, Amsterdam,
and the Pollsh National Memorial Institute, Warsaw). Special
collecting centres of documents on the persecution of the
Jews are known to exist in Warsaw, Lodz, Paris, London and
New- York.
There is no doubt that important collections of German docu-
ments have fallen in the hands of the Government of the Soviet
Union. Sofar this Government has not shown any willingness
to permit inspection of these documents by foreign nationals.
Even if the Soviet Government would be willing to fester the
purpose of the proposed program of international research, it
is doubtful whether this would include permission to make
a study of Russian-held German docxoments.
b. A picture of the development of the German legal system
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
. NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL N^ERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-10-
AMSTERDAM,
Hcrengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
should be bullt up from German na^tlonal^soclallst publications«
In the United States these may be found in the Library of Con-
gress and in the Hoover Library on War, Peace and Revolution;
in Great Britain the Royal Institute of International Affairs
and the V/iener Library on National-Socialism and the Perse-
cution of Jewry may be in the possession of the most represen-
tative collect ions. These may be supplemented by the collect ions
that have been built up in several formerly German-occupied
countries«
c. Post-war publications dealing with life in concentration-
camps or with the camp System as a whole may best be found in
the National Libraries of the different countries or in libraries
specialising on World War II, e.g. the "BibliothSque Interna-
tionale de Documentation Contemporaine'^ (Paris) and the llbrary
of the Imperial War Museum (London),
d, Very important Statistical material may be obtained from
the International Tracing Service (formerly Central Tracing
Bureau, Arolsen, Germany). Most European Governments have
organised national tracing Services, In some cases the tracing
of missed persons is performed or executed by the Red Gross
erganisations, The International Red Gross Organisation (Geneva)
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NEERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Dircctie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
^ -11- •
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
should dispose of valuable data as well as of much Informa-
tion on the war-tlme rellef of inmates of concentrationcampst
e. In several European countries large amoiints of legal evi-
dence have been collected in the form of written Statements
- of former prisoners which have been used in the trlals of
Germans or other nationals who have been held responsible for
conditions in speclfied camps, Similar statements have been
collected by national organisatlons of former political pri-
soners* These are e.g. in existence in Albanla, Belgiern,
Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Roumania,
the Soviet Union and Yougoslavia, The organisatlons are members
<
of the International Organisation of former political Prisoners.
("Federation Internationale des Anciens Prlsonnlers PolitiquesV
Paris). In several of them a dominant part is played by the
communists. The two most important German organisations
('•Opfer des Faschismus*', Berlin, and the "Komitee ehemaliger
politischer Gefangenen", Hamburg and Frankfurt) would seem to
be of special importance to collect sufficient data on the
history of the concentration-camps up to the outbreak of World
War II.
The written statements of former prisoners will be suppleraent-
ed by the data collected by Government departments specially
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NjfeERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Dircctic: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-12-
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, TeL 3006^
created to asslst returned prlsoners. In some countrles
^ (e.g, the Netherlands and the Scandlnavlan countrles) this
task was entrusted to the existing mlnlstries of social
affairs or social securlty; in others to speclallsed depart-
ments ('^Minlstfere des Vlctlmes de Guerre", Belglum,
••Minlstere des Anclens Combat tants et des Vlctlmes de Guerre*%
France),
Organisatlons 9, An Adequate history of the German concentrationcamps cannot
be wrltten In the form of a Symposium of national contributioB.
One cannot descrlbe a tree by merely describing Its branches.
The concentrationcamps formed one organic system, supervised
by the "SS-Wirtschaf ts-Verwaltungshauptamt»', Berlin. For
this reason its history will only be an adequate one if the
experlences and sufferlngs of members of nearly all European
nations are integrated into the basic picture of the general
development of the System, seen against the background of
the rise and fall of the natlonal-socialist regime, of the
course of World War II, and of the development of the German
war-economy*
The subject is too vast to be dealt with by one author.
It would seem preferable to set up a Board of three i^uthors,
e.g, consisting of an historian, a legal expert and an expert
Directie :
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL N^ERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-13-
AMSTERDAM,
Hcrengracht 479, Tel. 30065
in the field of social science* They will be the authors of
the publication, that is to say that in close co-operation
they will write the text of the final publication on the
basis of their own studies and on the basis of the reports
and evidence, passed on to them by scientifically qualified
research-associates. One special task will be assigned to
every research-associate« Some of them will make a st^dy of
the collections of German documents (see par»8, a) others
of the German national-socialist publications (see par.8,b).
Moreover, in each separate European coimtry the post-war
books dealing with concentratloncamps, the national collections
of German documents, and the Statistical or other evidence
collected by Government departments, Red Crosö Organisations
or organisations of former political prisoners will be studied
and slfted by one or two research-associates, Their work
is scientifically directed and co-ordinated by the Authors.
It may well be that in many cases "fresh" evidence will have
to be taken by the research-associates.
According to the data collected by the Netherlands State
Institute of War Documentation the number of research-associa-
tes pequlred and the time they would need to complete their
researches may be estimated as follows!
Number of research
associates
Years required
Germany
Poland
2
2
2
2
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL N^ERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
Sovlet Union
Baltlc republlcs
Czechoslovakla
Hungary
Roumanla
Bulgaria
YougoslQVla
Albanla,
Greece
Swltzerland
Italy
France
Belgium
Luxemburg
Netherlands
Denmark
Norway
Sweden
Great Britaln
United States
Israel
The total is forty man-years
10» The research-work should be completed in two years. The
entire program should be completed in three years*.
Budget 11. It is estlmated that per research-associate annually the
following budget may be necessary:
Research-associate
Secretary
Office
Travel
Unspecified
Total
S 5.000
$3.000
$ if.OOO
$ 2.000
$ 1.000
$15.000
Research would therefore. cost $ 600.000
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NlfeERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-15-
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 47 9 ^ Tel, 30065
12 • The Central Office (preferably to be located on the continent
of Europe) would be staffed by: one Director (who supervlses
the execution of the entire plan and who Is responsible for
Its progress); three Authors; one Llbrarlan; two Translators;
foiir Secretaries and Typists»
Annual budget:
Director
Authors
Llbrarlan
Translators
Secretaries
Office
Travel
ĂĽnspecified
Total
$ 8.000
$ 2if,000
$ ^.000
$ 8,000
$ 6.000
$ 10.000
$ 10.000
$ 5.000
$ 75.000
The Central Office would cost $ 225.000.
13. The eventual volumes should be slmultaneously published
in four languages, i.e. English, French, Russian and German.
If three volumes, each of approximately 800 pages, were to
be published -five thousand copies in every language- the
total cost of publication would be $ lOOĂ–OOO. Pictures, maps
and documents would have to be added to the text«
Ik. Total budget of the plan:
Research $ 600.000
Central Off ice$ 225.000
Publications $ 100.000
Ăśnspecified $ 75.000
Total $ 1000.000
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL NifeERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Directie: Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTHUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-16.
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 3006^
It is dlfficult to estimate the proceeds of the sale of
the books«
i^dvisorv Council
1 c
15» If the plan could be sponsored as described above (par#6)
and carrled out under the ausplces of Unesco It would seem
0
approprlate to set up an Advisory Council comprlsing re-
presentatlves of: .
the United Natlons Educational and Scientific Organisation
the United Natlons Social and Economic Council
the Government of the United States
the Government of the United Kingdom
the Government of France . '
the Government of the Sovlet Union
the Government of Poland
the Government of the Netherlands
the Government of the German Bimdesrepublik
the Council of Eastern Germany
the Government of Austria
the International Relief Organisation
the International Tracing Service
the Permanent Court of International Justice
the International Red Cross Organisation
the World Jewish Congresst
the International Federation of former polltical Prisoners
the German Commlttee of former polltical Prisoners
the Royal Institute of International Affairs
the Hoover Library on War, Peace and Revolution
The Advisory Council would be presided by the representative(s
of the organisation(s) financing the program.
One meeting of the Advisory Council mlght be suff iclent
to conclude essential bi^siness. At this meeting the final
program should be discussed and approved» Also, the Council
mlght be invited to decide to delegate their function to a
smaller commlttee composed of five of their members who
Directie :
RIJKSINSTITUUT VOOR OORLOGSDOCUMENTATIE
NETHERLANDS STATE INSTITUTE OF WAR-DOCUMENTATION
INSTITUT NATIONAL N^ERLANDAIS DE DOCUMENTATION DE GUERRE
Prof. Mr. N. W. POSTI-IUMUS
Prof. Mr. B. H. D. HERMESDORF
Prof. Dr. Z. W. SNELLER
-17-
AMSTERDAM,
Herengracht 479, Tel. 30065
would thereaf ter keep in close consultation with the
Central Office.
procedure i6« If this plan were to be adopted by a Sponsoring agency, thls
agency might invite' Unesco to issue the invitations to the
governments and organisations which ought to be represented
on the Advisory Covmcil. The preparations of the f irst session
of the Council may well take six months. The Council will have
to discuss a detailed plan. Its preparation will involve
thorough discussions with the prospective Authors as well as
with a number of other experts on the German system of con-
centration-camps and on the history of World War II in generale
The present writer should like to refrain from mentioning •
names of persons who in his opinion would be fully qualified
to form the Board of Authors, He is, however, convinced that
there is ample talent in Europe and elsewhere tq staff the
plan as described.
17. If in the autumn of 19^9 a beginning could be made with the
detailed preparation of the plan, the Advisory Council might
be convened in the spring of 1950. Research might start in the
summer of 1950. As stated, the publication would have to be
ready within three years.
Amsterdam, February 19^9«
Dr S.LOUIS DE JONG
WORLD WAR II IN THE WEST
historical methods - docunieiitatioii
5-9 September 1950
resecirch - historioyraphy
Amsterdam, Netherlands
a Conference under the auspices of the Netherlands State Institute for War-Documentation
ORGANIZING COMMITTEE.
Prof. Dr. Z. W. Sneller, Chairman
Prof. Dr. C. D. J. Brandt
Prof. Dr. P. Gcyl
Major-Gcncral D. A. van HĂĽten
Prof. Dr. T. H. Milo
Prof. Dr. A. J. C. RĂĽter
Vice-Admiral G. W. Stöve
L. de jong, Executive Sccretary
Amsterdam,
Herengracht 479
Tel.: 30065
April 15th
1950
Dr John K.'iL. Fried
635 Riverside Drive
I
'<T .»^
!r.T;
31
U • ü • ^ 1 •
Dear Dr Fried,
i^^i j
For a considerable tirie consultations have been neia
betv.reen official historians of the United States, the United
Kingdorij
France, BelgiLiri and the Fetherlards to ascertain
the posvsibility of orgai-^ising an international historical
Conference on ./orld :.'ar II. it hac novr been decidid that
this Conference v/ill take place and v/ill be held in .mistcr-
darn froni 3epter:iber 5-9, 1950 under the ausDices of the
Fethorlands vjtate Institute for ".."ar Docunentation,
plans for the Conference have not yet been dravTn up; \i
^''inal
are , ho'/evor^ serdinf; you a cony of the
prelinmary
prograruae uhich, v;e hope, vall give von a sufficiontly clear
idea of its ains and scone.
As
you vdMI see it is intended to orgsj-^iso a special
section covering the field of political ani diplonatic history.
::e should appreciate if during one of the sessions of this
section an introduction could be given on the value of the
Fureinberg trials for historical scierce* In our o-;inion the
International Nilitary Tribunal and the .imerican nilitary
tribunals have na de a contribution in these fields v:hich
although unknovm to tlie genoral public and even to niany
scientists, can hardly be overestimated. It is vielllznoim. to
US that you vrould have adrnirable qualifications for giving
this introduction having been Special Legal Consultant to
the ;.nerican military tribunals. In fact v/e do not think
that anyone eise would be better qualified to rdvc the
introduction on the proposed subject^ v/hich, in our vievr
might have some interest for various official
yoLir countr}'-.
agencies oi
\
n
Allovj US, doar Cr Fried, to express the hope on behalf
of the orr;anisin^ conmittee that you vall be able to accopt
thiG loriua?. invitation, ;;e are in no doubt that your
contribution v;ould be ar eosential olenei-^t in the oroceedin
Ol tliis Conference unich ii
:he first of its ]:ind to be held
V
lOcirs sincerei
1v
2. ^J'
z
ij
nellor
â– resident
<=?L
de Jong
Gecretary
T
\
historiLdl iiK-rhcxis^ - JocunuMUcirion
5-9 September 1950
resecircli HistorioLiniphy
Amsterdani, NetherLmds
a Conference under the auspices of the NethcrUnds State Institute for War-Documentati
on
September let, 1950
PROGRAMME
Final Versirn
TUESDkY, SEPTEI^'IBER 5TH
GENERkL SESSIOlMlnternaticnal Cultural Centre, Vcndelpark)
2'>p.n
3C p^m
5 p.m
Qpenin^ of the Conference
hääresses will be made by the Burgomaster of Hmstevii^m
Mr, Arnold J. d^Ailly^ and- by the Chairman of the
Organising Committee, Pr-f, Jhr Dr> P,J. van V/inter
Prof. ARNOLD J, TOYNBEE , London: Contenporary History a,
a scientific prcblem'^ (in ^ngiish)
Chairnan; Prof. Jhr Dr. P,J. van V/inter, Groningen
Interpreters: Miss Driesen, Miss Maneval
A group picture v/ill be taken of the participants
RECEPTION (Hunicipal Museum, Paulus Pctterstraat )
5.3C p.m, Recepticn of the participants of the c-.;nference by the
Burgcmaster and Town councillors rf Amsterdam.
I'^^DNESDaY^ SEPTET'iBER 6TH
COMIvIITTEE I: MILITaRY HISTORY (International Cultural Centre, Vondelpark)
9a30 a.m. Prcf. J.R.M. BUTLER, Cambridge: "Problems and development
of the British military histories of World V/ar 11'^ (in
English)
Chairman: Colonel C.P. Stacey, Ottav;a'.
Interpreter: Miss de Vos van Steenv/ijk
SUB.CGt#IITTEE- I (a): aRMY HISTORY (International Cultural Centre)
10.3; a.m. Lt. Ccl-nel ALLEN F. CLaRK, London: "The programme of the
hirtorical section of the American Army" (in English)
Chairman: C-lcnel J. Schi>:ftZ; Oslo
Interpreter: Miss de Vos van'Steenmjk
SUB^COrmTTEE I (c): NaVaL HISTORY ( International Cultural Centre)
10.30 a.m> Commander A, HAjffiL, Paris: "The activities of the Historical
section of the French Navy"- (in French)
Chairman: Rear-Admiral G.W, St':'ve
Interpreter: Miss Mayer
- 2 -
11 a . m .
C0^4^UT.TEE II: POLITICAL HISTORY (Netherlands State Institvte)
9.30 a«m. Prof. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, Lcndgn: "The Hi»t<^rical Programme
of the Ro3''al Institute of International Affairs" (in EnglishJ
Prof. M. BAUMONT, Paris: »'Problems of Publishing the records
â– of the German Foreign- Office" (in French)
Chairnan: Prof, Dr. B.H.D. Hermesdorf, Nijmegen
Interpreter: Miss Maneval
SUE-COMMITTEE IV (a) : HISTORY OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (Netherlands
State Institute)
9.30- a-.m. Mr. GEORGE DOURGIN, Paris: "Researoh in France^' (in Frenohl "
11 a.m. Lt. Colonel S.P, van »t HOF, The Hague: ^'Research m miHtary
resistance in the Netherlands" (in French)
Chairman: Gclcnel C. Joset, Sr., BrĂĽssels
Interpreter: Miss Driesen
SUB-GOffilTTEE IV (b): CONCENTRATION CAMPS aND DEPORTATIONS (Netherlands
State Institute for War Documentation)
9.30 a.m. Mr. L, POLIaKOFF, Paris: "The Centre of Jev/ish Contemporary
' • Documentation, Paris'^(in French)
10.30 a.m. Dr A, WIENER^ London: "The werk of the Wiener Library,
London'' (in i^nglish)
11.30 a.m. Mr. MICHEL M. BORWICZ, Paris: ."The activitios of the Gentre
of Pclish Jewish Contemporary Documentation, Paris" (in French)
Chairman: Prof. Dr J, Presser, Amsterdam
Interpreters: Miss De Bruijn and Mr. Krconenberg
GLNERkL SESSION- (International Cultural Centre, Vondelpark)
3 Pcm. Prof. EDMOND VERMEIL, Paris: "National Spcialism and öemaji
Civilizaticn" (in- French)
Chairman : Prof. Th. Abel, New York
Interpreters: Miss Maneval and Miss Driesen
THURSDĂĽY, SEPTEMBER 7TH
SĂśB-COMMITTEE I(a): kMY HISTORY (International Oultural Centre)
9 «30 a.m, Gclcnel R. TRUTüT, Paris: "Tbe activities of the Histcrioal
' • Section yf the French Army" (in French)
10.30 a,m. Colonel C.P. STaCEY, Ottawa: "The prograjnme of the Historical
' • Section of the Ganadian Army Staff" (in English)
11.30 a.m. Major-General D.A. van HILTEN, The Hague: "Army histcrioal
research in the smaller countries gf V/este'rn Europe,
especially in the Netherlands" (in English)
Chairman: Prof. J.R.M. Butler, London
Interpreter:^ Miss de Vos van Steenwijk
SUB^OOMMITTEE I (b):'AIR HISTORY (International Cultural Centre)
9.30 a.m. Colonel P. SäIMX-PEREUSE, Paris: "The aotivities of the
• ' Historioal' Section cf the French Air Forces" (in French)
10,30 a.m. Dr HENRY M. DATER, Washington: "Histcrioal research as to
• • the US Naval Air Forces in V/orld War II" (in English)
11 = 30 a:,m. Dr ALBERT F. SIMPSON, Maxwell Air Force Base, USa:
"Hiatorioal research as to the US Air Forces in World War II"
Ohairman: Rear-Admiral John B. Heffornan, Washington
Interpreter: Miss Mayer
- 3 -
^DIIMITTEE II: POLITICaL HISTOKY {Nethorlands State Institute)
9.30 G«n. Dr JOHN H.E. FRIED. Wpw Ynvir. htVw. m,,>...w,k,. — +.^^ ^i
9.30
11 e.m»
Dr JOHN H,E. FRIED, New York: "The Nuremberg trisls ?nd
hiotorical öcience'' (in English)
Mr. MAR3EL Bi.UDOT, Paris: '^Sources of the history of public
- -P^^i'^ in FrpncG from the amistice tili the Liberption^'
(m French)
Chairman: Prof. n; Bp.umont, Paris
Interpreter; Miss Maneval
COMIITTEE III: ECONOMIC AND SOCI..L HISTORY (Netherlands State Institute^)
9.30 a.m. Prof. V/.K. HnNCOCK, Lenden: 'Problems and developments of
the British Civil Histories cf World War 11^^ (in Enrlish)
Prcf. F. BaUDHUIN, Lcuvain: '^Research in the field of the
ec.-^nomic history -f German-cccupied Europe'^ (in French)
Chairman: Prcf.- Dr. C.D.J. Brandt
Interpreter: Mr. Schutte
11 a.m.
CĂśMMITTEE IV (a): HISTORY OF THE RESISTANCE MOVET-IENT (Netherlcmds-^t^ite
Institute) v ic.xu.ciiiu€r vK^ii,^--
9.30 a.m. Dr G. V/iCCiJlINO, Milan: "Research in Italy" (in French)
11 a.m, Commandant L. LEJEUNE, BrĂĽssels: "Research in Belrium" (in
French) . • • . t^ v
Chairman: Mr. J, Willequet, BrĂĽssels
Interpreter: Miss Dr lesen
3UB:.-,eOMMITTEE(iy((b): CĂĽNCENTRnTION GaMPS aND DEPORTkTIONS (Netherlands
State Institute) •
9*30 r.m.- Miss- G. TILLION^ Paris: "Research in France" (in French)
10,30 a^m. Prof. THEODORE nBEL, New York: "Research on the Sociology
• Qf c-ncentration cairips" (in English)
11.30 a.m. Dr PHILIP FRIEDMAN, Nev; York: "American Jewish research cn
the Jev/ish catastrophe of the years 1939-1945"
Chairman: Dr A. Wiener, Lv:ndon
Interpreters: Miss de Bruijn and Mr. Krconenberg
ENTERTAINMENT ' ,.
3 P*^'» Boattrip through the canals and harbours of Amsterdam (by
courtesy of the Burgomaster and To\m Ccuncillors of ĂĽmster-
. dara). The boats leave from the- State Institute fcr War
Dccumentation, Herengracht 479.'
7 p.m. Dinner at the International Cultural Centre (no evenine:
dress)
FRIDi'.Y, SEPTEMBER gTH
S-UB-.C0MI4ITTEE I (a): ARMY HISTORY ' (International Cultural Centre)
9.30 Colcnel JOH^iNNES SCHI0TZ, OsIp: "Army historic?! r^serreh
in Norway" (in English«)
Chairman: Colonel R. TRUTaT, Paris
Interpreter; Miss de Vc?5 van Steonmjk
QTTp pnmTi.^-EE j (c). NiiVi.L HISTORY (International Cultural Centre)
10.30 a.m. Pr.:f. Dr T.H. MILO, The Hague: "Naval Historical research
in the smaller c-untries of Western Europe, especiallv
• • in the Netherlands" (in English)
11.30 a.m. Rear-Admiral JOHN B. HEFFERNkN, V/ashington: "The history
cf the US Navy in World War 11^^ (in English)
Chairman: Commander Hamel, Paris
Interpreter :Miss Mayer
- 4 -
COM'IITTEE- II: POLITIC/.L HISTORY (Netherl?nds State Institute)
10,30 r.m. Miss ELIZiiBETH WISKEHivMn, London: ^^The vplue cf memoire
• • for tho hi-story -f V/c-rld \/ar 11^^ (in En^dish)
11.30 n.m. Dr FRITZ T. EFSTEIN, Prlo-Alto, USh: '^The rctivities of
the Ho.:vor Librpry and Institute r^n V/ar, Revolution pnd
Poace as far as World V/ar II is concerned^^ (in English)
Chairman: Mr^ F.H. Slinsgby, London
Interpreter: Miss Maneval
COMiLITTEE III: ECONOMIC aND SOCIiJu HISTORY (Netherlands State Institute)
.9.-30 a.m, Prof. Drc IL.ROLD ZINK, Frankfurt : ,^Hist:n- of tne Allied
• ' occupation of Germany'' (in Enf^lish)
10.30 a,m. Dr. M.W. MOUTON, The Hague: ''The Germans and the Hague
Convention an Land V/arfare'^ (in English)
Chairman; Prof. VJ.K. Hancock, London
Interpreter: Mr. Schutte
SUB-SSCTION IV (ri): HISTORY OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEI'-IENT (Netherlands
State Institute)-
11.30 a.n* Mr. !• de JONG, /tnsterdam: ^'Research on civil resistance in
the Nethe Irlands** -(in English)
Chairman; Dr G, Vaccarinc, Milan
Interpreter: Miss Driessn
SU3-SECTI0N IV (b): CONCENTRkTION CaMI^S aND DEPORTaTIONS (Netherlandg
State Institute) '
9o30 a,m, Dr I...L. SEELIGMaNN, Jerusalem: "Research in Israel" (in
' • English) /
10.30 a,m. Discussion cn certain* nr^^blems of concentration camp history
ChainrTan: Prof. Th^^ Abel, i.Nevx York •
Interpreters: Miss de Bruijn i^nd Mr. Kronenberg
^•30 p.m,
1-
GENERi^L SESSION (International Culturrl Center)
3 p«m. Mr. F« DEBYSER, Paris: "a plan for an international
biblirgraphy cf V/rrld War II*' (in French)
The following documentpr^r films will be shcvin:
1. THE GERM/vN INVASION OF HOLLAND - a Germrm newsreel dating
• fr-m May 1940
2, LIFE IN OCCUPIED HOLLnllD
3o THE JE\/ISH Dr.PORTi.TIONCAMP OF WE3TERB0RK - Frrgments
• from a film made by erder cf the Germans in 1943-4
4, HUNGER - Shots taken during the famine-v>d.nter
5'. Wi^LCHERE^j - Destruction and reconstruction of an Island
6. THE LaST SHOT -^ A British film on life in newly liberated
• Heiland - -
7« RECONSTRUCTION - a picture of the rebuilding of war-torn
Holland â– -. . -
SATURDaY, SEPTEMBER 9TH
GENSRaL SESSION (Internaticnal Cultural Centre)
10 a.m, Clcsing rf the Conference • •
ChairmanT Prof, Jhr Dr. P.J« van IJinter, Groningen
Interpreters: Miss Driesen and Miss Maneval
IlStoriv.ll !lK'th(Hl.S -
5-^) So[>ri-iiilHT IM50
MU.ition
so.irch hisf()ri(H)r<iphy
\instorcl<ini. NorlKTl.mds
a Conference under the auspices of the NetherUnds State Institute for War-Documentation
AMSTERDAM, September Ist 1950
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
ORGaHIZING COIMITTEE' '
Prof' nr"^?^n'' ^'■•n^'*^; ^^P ^''^"^^^' Groningen, Chairman
Prol. Dr. CD. J. Brandt, Utrecht
Prof. Dr P. Geyl,- Utrecht
rroi , ĂĽr i ,H-. Milo, Leyden
Prof. Dr A.J.C. ROter, Leyden
yice-Admiral G.'J. Stove, The Hague
L. de Jong, Executive Secretary'
STAFF
^ggrglariat and Infrrmation:
Mrf f' S^iJ^n^S^'^^Ll^ternational Cultural Centre)
ml's i' Jan^Honin^fnrr^^'^^^L^""^^^^^ ^^^ ^'^«^ Documentation)
Intergeterif (Office: State Institute for War Dccumentaiion)
MiS m" Dr^plfi' ie'^T"^ (General Sessions, Political History)
MISS M, Driesen, The Hague (General Sessions, History of the
Mii^ P Ă„^ ^^^ r^" Steenwijk, The Hague {Militaryl5Soryf '"''
MssL Mayer, Antwerp (Military History) nxsT;ory;
wf^o A ^'^"n^®.^.^^^?^'"^^ ^"^ Social History), Utrecht
â– Mr A V^^ ^""^K^"' Amsterdam (History of the 'concentration Camps)
LeJnick.lSiSSSf' " ^"'''°'' °' ''^ ConcentratiSn'Spi)
Kr', J',A« van Rhijn
Mr. Ho van Male
AUSTRALIA
""SJ^ef i„^w„;i5=Sif ?f ?£aji=l "^"O^i-n Of the Au,tr.Xi„
World War II, London
BELGIĂĽM
SJSJ^' P^r^'/^' - University of Louvain
aS V °^°"f^^- - "®^^ °^ ^he Historical Secti
Army General Staff , BrĂĽssels
on of the Belglan
^
- 2 -
HOSPEL, Mr, P, - Curator rf the War Archives, BrĂĽssels
JOSET, Culonel and }\rs. C. - President of the Maticnal Coiincil cf the
Resistance Movement, BrĂĽssels
KALKEN. Prof. F» van' - University of Brüssels
LEJEUNE, Commander L. Lejeune - Secretary of the Cv?mmission fcr the
Histcry of the Resistanx}e' Movement , BrĂĽssels
VERHAEGEN, Ma jcr-General G.M.G, Baron - Fcrmerly Head nf the Historical
Secticn of the Belgian Army General Staff , St Michel les Bruges
WILLEQUET, Mr. J. - Aesistant-Archivist Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
BrĂĽssels
CANADA •
HT."NTER, Major T JK '- Canadian Historical Liaison Officer, London
STACEY, Cclonel CP» - Director Historical Section, Army H^adquarters,
Ottav/a
FRANCE
AUBE, Mr, P, - Secretary General of the Consultative Commission on
War Dam-ag^' and Reparations, Paris
BAUDOT^ Mr. M. -'Public Records Office, Paris
BAUlvlONT, Prof, M, - Historical Adviser Department of Foreign Affairs,
Paris
B:.RWI6Z, Mr^ M'JI. - Study Centre for the History of Polish Jewry, Paris
BOURGIN, Mr« G. - Vice-President of the Historical Commission on the
Cccupation and Liberation of France, Paris
CHARTON-GUIREC. Mr. J» - Deputy Head of the Historical Department of
the French Army, Paris
CZERTOK, Mr, L'. '- Centre of Jewish Contemporary Documentation, Paris
DEBYSER, Mr. M,F. - International Library for Contemporary Document-
ation, Paris
GRANET, Mrs» M, - Historian, Paris
HAMEL, Ccmmander - Head of the Historical Department of the Frenoh
Navy, Paris
MICHEL j'Mr» H^ - Secretary-General of the CommittQe for the History v
of the War, Paris
POLIAKOFF, Mr. L. Centre' of Jevd.sh Contemporary Documentation, Paris
SkINT^PEREUSE, Cclonel P. de ~ Historical Department of the French
Air Force, Paris
TILLION. Misr, G, - Research Assistant at the National Scientific
Research Centre, Paris
TRUTAT, Golonel R. -- Head of the Historical Department of the .French
Army. Paris •
VERMEIL' Prof. E, - University cf the Sorbonne, Paris
INDIA
• •
MEHT/\ ^t M.Se - Ambassador of India in the Netherlands, Tho Hague
- 3 -
ISRAEL
SEELIGM/iNN, Dr I.L* - University of Jerusalem
ITALY
BRAG;J)IN, Commander M.A« - Historical Department of the Italian Navy>
Rome
GlAMMi.RINO, Colonel G. - Historical Section of the Department of
Dofence, Rome
PIERI, Prof. P. - University of Turin
V.iCC.J^INO, Dr G. - Direotor of the National Institute for the History
of tho Resistance Movement, Milan
LUXET-IBURG
MEIJERS, Mr J. - Historian of the Grandducal Institute, Xuxemburg
NORWi.Y
SCHIp/TZ, Colonel J. - Chief of the Historical Division of the General
Staff of the Norv/egian Army, Oslo
SV/ITZERL/iND
BAUER, Prof. E* - University of Neuchätol
SILBERSCHMIDT, Prof. dr M. - University of ZĂĽrich
UNITED KINGDOM
BuTTLER, Prof. J.R.M. - University of Cambridge, Editor British
Military Histories of World V^ar II, London
EBELING, Dr H. - Historian and Author, London
HiiNCOCK, Prof. W.K. - Institute of Commonwealth Relations, "*c.4-d^
Editor British Civil Histories of World V/ar II, London
I\I2LLAND, Lt. Colonel B. - Historical Section Cabinet Office (Gorman
records), London
SLINGSBY, Mr. and Mrs. F.H. - Public Records Office, London
TOYNBEE, Prof. and Mrs. A.J. - Royal Institute of International
Affairs, London
TYLER, Mr.J.E. - University of Sheffield
WIENER, Dr A. - Director of the Wiener Library, London
WISKEMANN, Miss E. - Historian and Author, London
YATES SMITH? Mr and Mrs. L.P. - Librarian of the Imperial War Museum,
London
.. If •
UNITED STATES OF M^^ICA
ABEL9 Prof, Th. - Department of Soclolo^y, Columbia ĂĽniverslty,
New York
BORN, Mr. Lester K* - Archlvist-Librarian, Library of Congress,
Washing"^^n
CLARK, Ltc Colonel and }Jbrs. A.F. - Assistant Military Attache, London
DATEH, Dr Henry M. - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval
Aviation History and "Research, Washington
EPSTEIN,, Dr F. - Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace,
Stanford Unlverslty, California
FRIED, Dr J.H.E. - Special Legal Consultant to the U.S. War Crlmes
Tribunals Nuremberg 19^7-19^9 > ^ew York
HSFFP]RNAN, Rear-Admlral J.B. - Read of the Division of Naval Records
and History, Washington
HUELE, Mr» H.A. - Consulate-General of the United States of America,
Amsterdam
HOMPHREY, Mr. Richard A. - Assistant Chief Division of historical
Policy Research, Washington
LEE, Dr and Mrs. O.A. - Historical Division, Office of the High
Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt
NEUMANN (?), Prof • FoL. - Columbia University, New York, Chairman
of the Commlttee on War Crlmes Research of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace
NICHOLS, Dr J.P. - University of Pennsylvania
STILLMAN, Mrs. M. - Consulate General of the United States of America,
Amsterdam
ZINKj Prof o Dr H. - Chief Historical Division, Office of the U.S,
High Commissioner for Germany, Frankfurt
NETHERLANDS
/J}AMA van SCHELTEMA^KLEEFSTRA, Mrs. A, - International Institute for
Social History, Amsterdam
B ASCHWITZ, Prof. Dr K, - University of Amsterdam, Director of the
Institute for Press Science, Amsterdam
BSIv![J/[EL, Mr. H.L. van - Netherlands State Institute for V/ar Documen-
tatlon (Assistant Archivist), Amsterdam
BENDER, Dr F. - Minis try of Educatlon, Arts and Sciences, The Hague
BEZE^/ER, Mr, K.W.L, - Formerly Chief of the Naval Information Ser-
vice, Naval Staff, The Hague
EOLKSSTEIN, Dr G. -Formerly Netherlands Minister of Educatlon, Arts
and Sciences (1939-19^5)» The Hague, Chairman of the Advlsory
Council of the Netherlands State Institute for War r^ocnmentatlon
B0LKE3TSIN-KRAFT, Mrs. J. - Board of the Netherlands People's Uni-
versity, Utrecht
EOOY^ Miss J.P. - Netherlands State Institute for War Docuraentation
(Department of Source Publicatlons) , Amsterdam
BS, Mr, P.A. - Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation
(Department for Source Publlcations) , Amsterdam
BRA^T)T, Prof. Dr C.D.J. - University of Utrecht
BROUWSR, Mr. H. - Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation
(Assistant Librarlan), Amsterdam
BRUGMANS, Prof. Dr I.J. - University of Amsterdam
BRUMEL, Dr L. - Librarlan Royal Library, The Hague
ĂźUCK, Dr H. de - Librarlan University of Groningen
SUvCET-KROES; Mrs. M.J.W. - Librarlan of the Netherlands State
Institute for War Documentation, Amsterdam
CALLffilJER, Lt. General M.R.H. - Assistant Chief of the General
Staff of the Netherlands Army, The Hague
To: Youth Ar^osy H ^^7 19!>0
Enclosure to my Travel iSerrice Ap^liBation :
Putpose of Trctvcl :
!♦ The purpose is twofold
\
! a) to particip te, anci to ispeak, VV'
at the Confcraice on lAiorla Irfar II,'
Amsterdam, HĂĽllcLno, 5-9 Septeuiber
19^0. - the oiiicial invitation l'roiĂĽ
this Öorifereace, I ^ficlo3ed(a3i:«ncl.# 1)
to aiy Ittter to Youth Ar^osy hea'iquarters
of 26 June 1950, ,
(Thie Organizers oI th's Amoteraa-n Coni'c:reace,un-ble to pay for :fy
trip,ap, roachea, through the iJ^et^^erL-nds lunbassy in W..snin^tcn,
the U.S. Uepartient of it-^te,- see Encl,,r 2 of ii\y letter of 26
June 1950. The 3tate Dept, declared not to te in position to lurnish
fiiiaiicdcil 'lelp^or tra.iöportation,because it is a bcffitntixlc, b^t not
a '-jo ermient-aponjored Conference. This infoi^atxon was ^iv^n to ĂĽie
over t: e telephone oy Hr. Freci^vrick D. Ih;iat,Dept.of interaitional
Conferences, Dept.of State, iAiaohin<.:tĂĽn,DC.,and conrirmed by lir.
rticiiara Humphrey,üiY.of Üistotical ^clicy Hesearch, State DeLt«,
Washington, DC.) â– vV
b) in corir ection with .,ork I am doin^ for
UNiL3C0,it is veru desirablu for ĂĽc. to
attend the Confsrence of liistorii^as,
Paris, 2o k\xg.'2 Sept. 19^. ĂśNiiioCO
agreed ith this ( see i^iGl.i?^ 3 of ĂĽ^
L-tter of 26 ^^une 1950;.
2. Since I vvrote you on 26 June 195 0, 1 receivtd ini*orjiation froa ĂśI^i-3C(D
( Kr. Robert Paktier, Secretary General, Conöeil interna tiünai do ia ^
la rhilosophie et des Sciences Humaines, UNl^^C0,19mave. Kleber, PoXis) ^
Uiat ĂśNjl::CO is wixiing to contribute $ 300,00 to th.:^ expenĂĽes of lijy
trip w
in View of thr fact that I h ve to pay the difference in Uie cost
of the air flignt, as well as the travelliiĂĽg expeases Luxeabovjr^-Pctris-
Amsterda -LiLxeinbonrg, and the hotel,rtG. expenscs 'i^iile staji^i^^ in i«arop^,
1 apply for the "-tudent" r te.
John H.h. Fried
/
/
/
Cople yovat M. FRIEI).
V
'%
ZOriAt dw 13. JuU 1$50 ^^SrSWffpf..
r~
in di«
2ÂŁbxiher KantonallMBik
â– f.'i
loh Vitt« Sift« «I folgvtnd» i\dros«« «in« Vergütung ala Kei»eent«tbMignm
für don XkMMOh ae» «"^^ Int«nmti€u«l« Hlatoriktarkanfr^asw ia V^gint
ricltt«a» unter BelastixDig auf unaorM Kontot
118 teil«» yX), gM
Xtar» J» K« BtXSD
IkmfaotiiMani lin«!
5S15 BroflARiQr
V« S« A#
äoehafliitOMV^Hl
COMITE INTERNATIONAL '
DES
SCIENCES HISTORIQUES
Le Tresorier ^ '^'^'^p'^'^*
Anton ffftfifinrtof
i
1 May 19^0
ProfeĂĽ^or Jarno l> T. Shobrcll
President, Carnegie ĂśKiowinent for IntejTi' tional Fe ce
hc6 «fest 117 ^trcet
lh\i Yorl: City
Dear Profoonor Shotv/ell :
Professor Franz iloiiin/'nn has aiviij &! rao tliat the Comrnittee
his suf *"crjtĂĽ â– 'n^ Yicjjoe to iindert-ike one of th<: proiecte.l studies, and
that the :.ipi>lication lor finrmcing the ntud;^'' is noi pendini-t. In the
meaAtirne, I v/ontlor v/hetrsor I ryiy as:- yon for your kiiid advi-e in the
f ol c tn.nr; i^^ ' '^ei'' •
?i-om ScpterJcr ^ - 9fl^^>r', ar. Int'rnrti« n?! lÜ; torical
Confcrenr^ on »*or± V/ar II ±a to bc hrld In Anrjtcrdari^under thr: auspiceo
of the llĂĽtherl nds 3t: te Inj'ltute for War Doc^aiaeiit.^.tion. The org nizerc
of tha Conicrkn.co havf. imdted me to ad<'roL-s the Conference on The V^ilue
of tho IJumber^ Tri-ils lor Hirtcrirrl ^cifTxce. Tlit^y iniorm nie that oho
ot'ier spe. kers v.l-l bc Prcfcr! or ?oyrmce of Brit.dn, Venneil of France,
and ^extcr Perkins of Rochc::^ter.
The Am< t<' rd'iT) Ini ti ate is not in a pv^niti n to pry f '>r the
expencsö of thu trip. Instoad, tliey .^'i'rt)aclTed,throiigh the I^etiuiL-^nds
^^il;aL y in W^usuin»;ion , ilr. Ifunt o:. tw^ Dixd'icn of Iiit:-rnation 1 ^onfcr-
er cer. •t t Ar State Departneüt. Mr, liunt advise.: thc.t th State Dep rtment
is sen'iin^ m unof icicl ob.nei'ver to the Genf rcnco (fron c^^ ĂĽabassy in
Loi''-ion) but cai^rjot defrry the expense^j of priv-tc pc^rtici ants.
Ify question iE »•het' er you bolicve that bhe Camcf^ie Endovn'>ent
\fOMh be^r thf- tr-ve linp expe. res| or, if not, uhetlv.ir you could ^ive
nie a imgf-esrtion os to ho:»' I could nm-nijc the matter* - I vjouL liicc to
rtdd th.'t, if I go to -^aro e at th^t timc of the jeat-, I Vi^uld like also
to attend the Pari C- nfcrence on the Dor^ar^entati )n of TSforLcl ii-r II vriijc h
is held juct a fev/ d'ys errlier and v;itli ./Vdch the Aracterd:iii Conference
is orf^anic-'lly connected.
I t.Jcr thrlib rty ol enclosint; the invitation I receivB'- fjoin
Amsterdam, and the progrrin.
V/ith best th:-n3<s and kind regards.
2 B^cl,
vevy faitlifully yoiirr,
Jolui II. ÂŁ. Fried
ALGEMEEN HANDELSBLAD VAN VRIJDAG 8 SEPTEMBER 1950
OVER
R V.S.
^ solang de str{}d in
^reenstemrning over tal
\imogelijk lijkt. De V.S.,
\nkrijk zouden er niet
movcr ataan, vooral
imher-verkiezingen in
jug zijn en er meer
Koreaanse kwtsiie,
\elat\ng van Peking,
mnje, toclating van
piakkelijker zouden
wpt, dat de V.S.
IS zullen U'orden
iitie van Truman
'rkt. Het is tch-
de Russen met
tse
[rs-
•Icteit
dan
ver-
,00g
?itle
knd,
id
'e
Schotse miinwerkers
in doodsgevaar
In een kolenmijn in het hart van
het steenkoolgebied van Ayrshire in
Schotland zitten 128 mijnwerkers op-
gesloten als gevolg van een instorting
aan de oppervlakte van de mijn.
De instorting Is het gevolg van de
hevige regens der laatste dagen; red-
dingsploegen zijn koortsachtlg aan het
werk om te vöorkomen dat nog meer
water m de mijnschacht zal .strömen.
Het reddingswerk wordt bemoeilijkt
door opstijgende gassen. De ploegen
moeten elkaar dientengevolge geregeld
aflossen. De gehele nacht is men bezig
geweest met het gooien van bomen,
hooi en hout in de geweidige krater om
de modderlawine tegen te houden, die de
mijnschachten dreigt te vullen en de in-
gesloten mijnwerkers te verstikken. .
Elke 15 minuten, stuurt de ploegbaas
van de ingeslotenmynwerkers telefonisch
een boodschap naar boven, die de wach,
tenden weer hoop geeft. Allen zijn nog in
leven.
Zeven man, die dicht aan de opper-
vlakte werkten, hebben kans gezien te
ontsnappen.
DEFENSIECOMMISSIE
UITGEBREID
Zij vergaderde gistermiddag
met minister Schokking
(Van onze parlementaire redactcur)
's-G ravenhage, 8 September
De Defensiecommissie is bij Konink-
lyk Besluit van 30 Augustus j.l. met
twee leden van de Eerste Kamer uitge-
breid, t.w. de hcrcn H. Algra (a.r.) en
mr W. C. Wendelaar (v.v.d.) Het werd
reeds enige tijd als een lacune gevoeld,
dat wel alle grote fracties uit de Twee-
de Kamer (behalve die der communis-
ten) hierin waren vertegenwo^^
maar dat geen enk^
van de a.r. en d
Kamer in dez
Itting had.
orzien
(Ingez. med.-advertei
Ptrxlsehi Tapfttn
Amsterdam, D\
Hilversum, Utrecht,
ELK STUK ZICHTBAAR
0\ĂĽhHWIJS
Prof. dr J. A. Hoi
overleden
In de ouderdom van zev«'
is te Wageningen prof. dr J. .
overleden, emeritus hooglerp
erfelijkheidsleer aan de Landtj
school aldaar.
Prof Honing was In 1920 hl
te Wageningen geworden, na
baan als onderwijzer te Amsl
leraar te Haarlem te zijn bego.t
universitaire studie heeft hij
Universiteit van Amsterdam
waar hij in 1909 is gepromovt^
dat jaar tot 1920 heeft hij aan
Proefstation te Medan eerst ai
kundige en later als directeur fe!
Tevens is hij buitengewoon ho«!
te Utrecht geweest; hij was oflj
de orde van Oranje Nassau, ei
zieh ook als bestuurslid van de 0
Organisatie voor Toegepast I]
wetenschappelijk Onderzoek verc;
lyk gemaakt.
De teraardebeetelling is op Za^
om 13.30 uur op de Algemene Bej
plaats te Wageningen bepaald.
EXPLOITATIEKOSTEN V/1
LAGER ONDERWIJS
Het Centraal Bureau voc;^
tiek heeft een overzich;*
van de door de geng
beschikbaar geste]
materiele exploj^
scholen in
o.m., da!j
hog-ere
ALGEMEEN HANDELSBLAD VAN VRIJDAG 8 SEPTEMBER 1950
ST EM DE
ip
\bleem van de
lossen
tsmaatschappöen hebben
)lgens een regeling met de
it Oost-Sumatra 86.000 ha
cklng gestelcj. Houdt men
]t de jioodzakelijke bosreser-
ift er nog heel wat grond
erenstand ovcr. Volgens de
Jn moeten er twee plannen
pijnd om tot de oplossJng van
ivraagstuk te komen: een
körte baan en een plan op
|aan. Het plan op körte ter-
|voorzien in een rationele en
[deling van de reeds door de
rs afgestane gronden en het
laken van die gronden voor
igslandbouw. Deze gronden
beschikking komen van de
^s een zelfstandige landbon-
Het plan op lange termrjn
de centrale regering te Dja-
rden uitgestippeld. Een spe-
imissic onder leiding van de
iul Hnkim heeft het gehele
_ in onderzoek.
ie v^erdcling van de reeds Alans
^ikking gestelde gronden komen
»rklng de „tanl's", die behoef^e
aan grond en die het bewijs
fiie 8Tond waard te ziin. Het ligt
Idoeling de grond eerst in bruik-
te geven, waarbij wordt ge-
naar een oppervlakte van ten
2 ha per tani, hoewel het moge-
dat men hier en daar voorlopig
moet beginnen. De tot dusver
le^opvatting, dat alleen de
)lking in aanmerking
Neurenberg diendc
wetgeving matig
Historlsch-wetenschappelijk gesproken
hebben de Neurenberger processen geen
antwoord kunnen geven op vele Pro-
blemen, bijv. op de vraag hoe het pheno-
meen van het Hitlerdom kan worden
verklaard, aldus dr John H. E. Fried
glsteren in een referaat op het inter-
nationale congres over de tweede wereld-»
oorlog.
De Processen te Neurenberg zijn ge-
vocrd om de individuele schuld of on-
schuld van de verdachten vast te
stellen, zodat de rechters zieh konden
beperken tot de behandeling van elk
individueel geval, gelicht uit het geheel,
Daarom heeft het Hof te Neurenberg
geen geschiedenia geschreven en Is het
in gebreke gebleven, een volledige be-
schrijving van de Hitler-periode te
geven. Evenmin hebben de processen de
volledige rol van bepaalde nazi-organi-
saties aan het licht gebracht. Tribu-
nalen kunnen recht spreken over men-
gen, niet over ideologieen. ..Neurenberg"
heeft de algemene wetgeving slechts in
zeer beperkte mate gediend. Met het oog
op de buitengewone practische Impor-
tantie. die de agressleve oorlog op de
ontwikkeling der dingen heeft, achtte
dr Fried een verder onderzoek hiemaar
als een der dringendste taken van hen,
die de sociale wetenschappen beoefenen.
MEVROUW PI
zou kunnen komen voor grond, achttr
de beer Sarimin niet steekhoudend. ,.In
de eenheidsf?taat kan geen onderscheid
worden gemaakt tussen de ene en de
andere StaatsbĂĽrger. Dit neemt echter
niet weg, dat natuurlijk niet getomd zal
worden aan oude elgendomsrechten e.d.".
De heer Sarimin beftloot met op de
noocLsakelijkheid te w\jzen, dat de onder-
nemers hun „goodunlV tonen door een
gedeelte van hun winaten ten behoeve
van de bevolking aan te wenden. Want,
aldus Sarimin, de bevolking moet besef-
ett, dat het grootlandbouwbedryf ook
. Het argumenta dat
t land CMin devie-
tot het Volk.
derneniers
door
Een leve
zondi
„De hinderen dj
(Van een onzer vers\
J^IETS houdt by het
gedachten zo levem
kracht zo ongehroken^
durend contact met
men, zoals mevroux
Siewertsz van Reesei
bezig houdt niet een
jaar, dan is het niet
in deze vrouw een
teit en levenskrac)
heid van de oudet
is directrice van
krachten volgens^
in Den Haag enj
haar inzichten
over op de jo'f
onder haar hoei
zij nog voortdi^
de gedra gingt
heeft een on^
kleine studi(
IJf Septemb^
dag viert, sj
verzamelej
vormd toi
ondcrivijs^
,,Ik benj
komen
System?
Philipp]
bijzonc
der st
myn
vadei
hygij
d*e
In.
nlf
H <\ H l ^
/U-
/^,6<5«^6S^ T>^/A^ ^-^U;
/> ^ ^
"^^ L-'X^
l'^
^^ " ^
iq^L- \^n «^ '^^°
*<'
•iw n f
'"*>"'**'**'*?>v«#^4
DOCUHENTS
SOCIALISTES
2
»" I
II
f
rv
N^4
COUR
DITIONS
8.B9POISSONN1ERE
PARIS 9!
.tu«!
N BLUM
^.
DEVANT
LA COUR DE RIOM
.»
X.
K
D
peVRIER-MARS 1942
I
^
PARIS
ÂŁDITI0NS de LA LIBERTfi
I
1945
^^h:
I
â– /
^'t:
t , '
«
1}]
LfiON BLUM DEVANT LA COUR DE RIOM
Au prlntemps de 1942, le Parti soclallste, alors
clandestin et illegal, a publik une 16g6re brochure
lntitul6e : « L6on Blum devant la Cour Suprßme
— Riom — F6vrier-Mars 1942 >.
Pour des raisons que comprennent aLs6ment
tous ceux qui ont 6t6 in616s ä l'activlt6 clandestine,
11 avait 6t6 impossible alors de reprodulre lnt6gra-
lement toutes les interventions de L6on Blum. Un
de nos camarades, fldöle militant du Parti, toujours
alerte, toujours jeune de corps et d'esprit malgrö
son äge, avait 6t6 charg6 de präsenter le texte et
de choislr les passages les plus importants. Nous ne
pouvons encore le nommer : 11 a pay6 de sa li-
bertö son Inlassable d6vouement ä notre cause et
son courage Indomptable ; 11 est aujourd'hul d6-
port6 en Allemagne. Au nom du Parti soclallste
tout entier, le Comit6 ex6cutif tlent ä lul exprimer
sa gratltude. Nous reprodulsons un peu plus loin
la brdve Introduction qu'll avait r6dlg6e pour l'^dl-
tion clandestine de 1942.
Qu'll nous soit permls de rendre hommage 6ga-
lement aux camarades de la F6d6ration du Nord
qui avaient assur6 l'impresslon, ä ceux aussl, che-
mlnots, camlonneurs, cyclistes, qui nous ont aidö
pour le transport et la diffusion de notre brochure;
ä ceux enfin qui avaient accept6 de garder d'im-
portants d6pöts ; certalns d'entre eux sont aujour-
d'hul dans les camps de concentratlon en Allema-
gne. #
,1
/
— 4 ~
Nous avons pens6 qu'en attendant le jour oĂĽ,
äprfes avoir rassembl6 tous les documents n6ces-
saires nous pourrons publier des ötude» plus com-
plötes et nous faire ä notre tour les accusateurs
de ceux qui avaient organls6 le proc6s et qul sont
les vrais responsables de la d6faite de 1940. il 6tait
urgent de faire connaitre ce qu'a dit L6on Blum
en face des juges de Riom.
On trouvera dans toutes ces Interventions r616-
vation morale, la largeur de vues. la clairvoyance,
en un mot, la grandeur que nous avons toujours
admir6es chez L6on Blum. La lecture de ces textes
nous donnera ces joies de l'esprit que nous n'avons
plus goĂĽt6es depuis que nos oppresseurs Tont em-
pfiehl d'exprimer librement sa pens6e.
Mais sa d6fense sera aussi un document d'une
valeur lnappr6ciable. C'est d'abord un magnifique
expos6 de toute la politique du premier gouverne-
ment'de Front populaire, en particuller de cette
politique sociale qui s'est heurt^e ä tant de pr6ju-
g6s mesquins et d'int6r6ts sordides. C'est aussi un
rfiquisitoire implacable contre les accusateurs; on
verra comment, par haine de la R6publique. par
halne des masses laborieuses, certains hommes. et|
on peut bien le dire, toute une classe ont 6t6 am€-|
n^s ä saboter une grande politique oü tout 6tait
6troitement et harmonieusement 116 : la d6fense|
de la libert6, le progrfes social, l'amfilioration de la<
production, la defense de la Patrie. Le gouverne-a
ment de 1936, le procfes de Riom, c'est de 1 histolre.
mais c'est encore plus de l'actualit6. Nous sortonp
ä Peine de la nuit oü nous avaient plong^s ceuj
qul voulaient d^truire nos libert6s et qui ont es
say6 d'an6antir la France. II nous faut maintenani
pour reconstruire notre pays et le r6tablir au ranj
des grandes puissances, pour renouer avec les no
bles traditions de la Revolution, voir clair dans lei
6v6nements qui se sont d6roul6s depuis dix anr
Le^pages qu'on va lire nous y aideront.
^i
i
"'''.'-
-y!!'
— 5 —
Ce n'est pas tout : qu'on se rappeile les clr-
constances politiques dans lesquelles s'est engagö
le proc6s de Riom. Quelques hommes seulement,
ob^issant ä ce qu'on peut appeler un r6flexe pa-
triotique, avaient entrepris de lutter contre l'en-
vahisseur et contre ceux qui le servaient au gou-
vernement de Vichy. Mais ce qui devait devenlr
plus tard < la Resistance > n'ätait pas organis6.
Surtout, on n'avait pas encore des vues claires sur
ce que devait 6tre la lib6ration de la France : lib6-
ration du territoire national d'abord et avant tout,
mais aussi libäratlon du peuple par l'anäantisse-
/ment des forces qui avaient conduit le pays ä la
d^faite et ä l'asservissement. Les paroles pronon-
c^es par L6on Blum devant ses juges, r6pandues
malgr6 la censure et l'oppression par les publica-
tlons clandestines du Parti socialiste, ont eu un
retentissement considörable. Ellas ont r6veill6 une
opinion publique encore stup6faite. Elles ont ra
nim6 la foi r^publicaine et elles ont enselgnä aux
Prangais que, comme au temps de la Grande Re-
volution, la liberte de la Patrie et la liberte des
cItoyens sont toujours unies et doivent etre d6-
fendues ou conquises par la mfime lutte.
\
i* -
k .4
•1
n
^
\
"«■•MBMikMifNiilkaM
INTRODUCTION A LA BROCHURE
CLANDESTINE DE JUILLET 1942
Le Comlt6 d'Action SociaUste (C. A. S.), cellule
g6n6ratrice du Parti socialiste de demain, a d6cid6
la publication en brochure de tout ce qu'll y a
d'esseatlel dans les d^claratlons et dans le plal-
doyer prononc6s devant la Cour Supr6me de Riom
par notre camarade L6on Blum.
Accus6 par les capitulards et les traltres de
Vichy d'avoir « manqu6 aux devoirs de sa Charge >
en dotant son pays d'une 16glslation du travail
unique au monde, L6on Blum a fait face ä la meute
de ses accusateurs et l'a r6duite au silence. N'osant
lui r^pondre, eile a brusquement mis fin ä un pro-
c6s dont eile allait sortir d6masqu6e ä Jamals.
Soyez sans crainte, vous. quilisez ces lignes :
ji-n jniiy. äüt n'est Pas tellement loin^jejgföcls^se^^
raZrfipris. T^utefoiirTg5;;;]ae€trs65"lie seront P^s jg^^
gifemes. ,,^^ ,
On retrouvera ci-aprös les hautes qualites m-
tellectuelles et la puissance de s6duction morale
de celul qui est depuis vingt ann6es, le guide in-
contest6 du Socialisme frangals. On l'oblige ä se
taire. Sa voix, gräce ä cette brochure, retentlra
ä travers les barreaux de sa prison et, pour les
grands devoirs qui nous attendent, eile sonnera
le ralliement.
Non le Socialisme n'est pas mort. II n a pas ab-
diqu6. Epur6 des traltres, des läches et des tifedes,
' 11 reprend le combat. II remplira, quoi qu'il ad-
vienne. toute sa mlsslon historique.
" Nous Prions nos amls. non seulement de llre
cette brochure, ce qui va de sol, mals de la faire
-8 —
lire autour d'eux. Chaque exemplalre. passant de
main en main, doit toucher au moins cent lec-
teurs.
Nous comptons sur vous tous et ä tous, nous
dlsons : < Courage et...ä bientöt !>. ^
INTERVENTION
DE M« ANDRE LE TROQUER *
Audience du 19 f€vner 1942
M* Le Troquer. — Comme en 6cho aux d^cla-
ratlons qui viennent d'Ăźtre faites par notre aml
L6on Blum et ä Celles de M. le gen^ral Gamelln
et des deux avocats qui Tassisteiit, je crois remplir
un devoir en communiquant ä la Cour un docu-
ment singulier qui 6claire les conditions dans les-
quelles nous venons devant vous.
€ Consignes g6n6rales d'orientation et de cen-
sure concernant la pr6sentation dans la presse des
audiences du procös de Riom. "~^
< 1. Ne pas oublier que l'objet du procfes est 11-
mit6 ä rimpr^paration de la guerre en France de
1936 ä 1940, pour des falsons qui ressortiront clai-
rement des d^bats ; 2. Orienter les esprits sur les
faits accablants que les audiences rev61eront dans
l'ordre des diverses imp6rities relatives ä l'orga-
nisation et ä l'öquipement des arm6es de terre et
de l'air, au d^veloppement de nos fortiflcations, ä
la pr6paration de la mobilisation Industrielle ; 3.
Faire ressortir que les accus^s sont responsables
d'avoir manqu6 aux devoirs de leur Charge dans
la Periode critique oĂĽ ils etaient au pouvoir ; 4.
Expliquer en toutes occasions que le v6ritable pro-
c6s, c'est celui de l'ötat de choses d'oü est sortie la
catastrophe, afln de permettre au peuple fran^ais.
0:
(»
-,9 —
Jet6 dans le malheur, de porter un jugement 6clalr6
sur des m^thodes de gouvernement dont 11 est de-
venu la victime ; 5. Montrer que ce proc6s ne sau-
rait fetre celui de l'armöe qui, troupes et chefs, a
du se battre sans disposer d'outils indispensables
dans une guerre moderne : 6. Developper chaque
Jour les arguments et les r^futations qui seront
fournls aux journaux par le service de presse au
für et ä mesure que le d6roulement des s6ances
l'exigera ; 7. Tenir compte de cette dernifere con-
signe de manifere particuliferement rigoureuse, s'il
s'agit un jour de la personne du Maröchal et de
sa politique ; 8. Revenir fr^quemment sur le fait
que la politique du Maröchal, dans tous les do-
malnes, a 6t6 et est Inspiröe par la n6cessit6 qui
döcoule de cette 6vidence : la France est condam-
n6e ä construire un regime nouveau ou k p6rir. >
Monsieur le President, vous disiez tout ä l'heure,
en ouvrant ces d6bats, que, pour vous, rien de ce
qui avait 6t6 fait ou dit n'existait. II apparalt ä
la lecture de ce document et apres les consignes
verbales qui Tont accompagn6 comme un com-
mentaire curieux que les debats pourront se d6-
rouler ici comme ils voudront. On pourra recevolr
des t6molgnages...
M. LE Präsident. — Ce serait donc une Cour de
Justice oĂĽ 11 n'y aurait pas de President.
M' Le Troquer. — Je suis sür du contraire, mon-
sieur le President. Mais je crois qu'il est de rint6r6t
de tous ici qu'on sache dans quelles conditions on a
l'intention de donner aux incidents qui pourront
avoir lieu dans cette enceinte, un 6cho d6form6. Les
accus6s sont habituös ä la deformation de la v6rit6,
ä la calomnie Les joumalistes regoivent des consi-
gnes, c'est leur consclence professlonnelle qui 6st en
cause. Mais la leur doit appr6cier dtns quelles con-
ditions eile supporteralt la deformation de la v6rit6.
#
■«A»«»<«MM)*
'^^
^A
— 10 —
ÂŁlle veut la v^rit^. Elle nous aura comme auxlllaires
pour la recherche. Mals si eile jalUlĂźsalt, si eile 6cla-
tait, eile serait n^anmoins d^form^e ä l'ext^rieur.
M. LE Präsident. — Puls- je vous demander com-
ment ce document est parvenu en votre possesslon ?
M" Le Troquer. — H circule dans toute la ville ;
11 est entre les malns de centalnes d€ journalis-
tes. Pour mol, rincident est clos, mals 11 devait
6tre soulev6 au d6but de mes explicatlons.
Je d6pose sur le bureau de la Cour les conclu-
slons sulvantes :
€ A Messieurs les President et Conseillers com-
^posänt la Cour Suprßme de Justice, pour M. L6ol
Blum, pr6venu. M* Andr6 Le Troquer et M« Spa-
nien, avocats ä la Cour de Paris, contre le minis-
töre public.
« Plaise ä la Cour. Attendu que la Cour Suprßme
de Justice a 6t6 Institute par un texte dit « acte
constitutionnel n° 5 >, que son Organisation, sa
comp6tence, sa proc^dure, ont 6t6 r^glöes par une
loi du 30 juillet 1940 ; attendu que le texte dit acte
constitutionnel n" 5 n'a aucune valeur 14gale ; qu'il
se r^före ä la loi du 10 juillet 1940 : attendu que
cette derniäre, adopt^e par l'Assemblöe nationale
de Vichy, promulguöe par le Pr6sident de la R6pu-
tolique et publi6e au Journal of fidel n" IW le 11
juillet 1940 s'exprime ainsi : l'Assemblöe nationale
a adopt6, le Präsident de la R6publique a promul-
guä la loi constitutionnelle dont la teneur suit :
€ Articie unique. — L'Assembl6e nationale don-
ne tous pouvoirs au gouvernement de la Räpubli-
que, sous Tautoritö et la signature du maröchal P^
tain, ä l'effet de promulguer par un ou plusieurs
actes, une nouvelle Constitution de l'Etat francals.
Cette Constitution devra garantir les droits du
travail, de la famille et de la Patrie. Elle sera ra-
tlfiäe par la Nation et appliquöe par les assembltei
.1 â–
I
— 11 —
qu'elle aura cr66es. La präsente loi constituUon-
nelle, d611b6r6e et adoptäe par l'Assembläe natio-
nale, s€ra ex6cut6e comme loi de l'Etat. Fait ä Vi-
chy, le 10 juillet 1940. Albert Lebrun. Par le Prä-
sident de la Räpublique, le Marächal de France,
Präsident du Conseil, Philippe Potain.
€ Attendu que le texte dit acte constitutionnel
n» 5 a däcrätä dans son articie premier, que les
articles de la loi du 24 fävrier 1875 et 12 de la loi
du 16 juillet 1875 ätaient abrogäs ; attendu que l'ar-
ticle 9 de la loi du 24 fevrier 1875 däcide : « Le
Sänat peut ätre constituä en Cour de Justice pour
Juger, soit le Präsident de la Räpublique, soit les
ministres et pour connaltre des attentats commis
contre la süretä de l'Etat » ; que l'article 12 de la
loi du 16 juillet 1875 däcide : « Le Präsident de la
Räpublique ne peut ätre mis en accusation que par
la Chambre des däputäs et ne peut ätre jugä que
par le Sänat ; les ministres peuvent ätre mis en
accusation par la Chambre des däputäs, pour les
crimes commis dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions ;
dans ce cas, ils seront jugäs par le Sänat. Le Sänat
peut ätre constituä en Cour de justice par un dä-
cret du Präsident de la Räpublique, rendu en con-
seil des ministres, pour juger toutes les personnes
prävenues d'attentats commis contre la süretä de
l'Etat > ; attendu que l'abrogation de ces articles
de lols constitutionnelles ätait Impossible, dans les
termes mämes de la loi du 10 juillet 1940 ; atten-
du que l'on doit marquer les conditions exception-
nelles dans lesquelles l'Assembläe de Vichy a ätä
convoquäe; qu'elle a siägä ä quelques quinzaines
de kilomätres des forces miUtaires ennemies, dans
des conditions matärielles anormales ; qu'elle a dä-
libärä sous la contrainte et la menace des mesures
de rigueur individuelles et coUectives ; que les
pressions de tous ordres exercäes sur eile ont af-
fectä et viciä la valeur du consentement donnä
par beaucoup de ses membres ; attendu que, mai-
â– t^
mmmmtmm
■"mamKßtmmmm»
l!
■,.» . iii«ii»iiiiiw«i>i
n<m<mm mim <â– > '
4
I
11
"i
-^12 —
gr^ les röserves les plus expresses ä faire de ce
Chef, la volont6 de rAssembl6e nationale reste Evi-
dente et le texte de la lol constltutionnelle du 10
juillet est pr6cls et sans ambiguUE, qu'll peut 6tre
.dinls, en se r6f6rant, non au texte lui-mfeme, mals
uux travaux pröparatolres et aux dfeclaratlons du
rapporteur Boivin-Champeaux devant TAssemblEe
nationale, que les pouvolrs ex6cutlfs et 16glslatlfs
ont 6t6 accord^s au gouvernement ;
« Mals attendu que celul-cl n'avalt pas le droit
d'abroger les articles 9 et 12 des lois constitutlon-
nelles des 24 f^vrler et 16 juillet 1875 ; attendu, en
effet, que le pouvolr de promulguer une nouvelle
Constitution en un ou plusieurs actes a blen 6tE ac-
cord6 au gouvernement de la R6publique, mals sous
la condltion suspensive de la ratificatlon par la
Nation et de l'applicatlon par les assemblEes nou-
velles ; attendu que cette double condltion n'a pas
6t6 remplie.
« Attendu, en cons6quence, que la Cour Suprßme
de Justice ne pouvait 6tre Institute par un texte
manquant de base legale.
< Par ces motifs.
t Donner acte au concluant et ä la defense de
leur protestatio!! solennelle contre la vlolatlon des
lols consitutionnellcs de la R6publlque. >
Messieurs, mon entreprise est audacleuse, eile
ne peut pas 6tre vaine. Bien que je con teste la lE-
galitE de la Constitution de la Cour Supröme de Jus-
tice, J'ai pour la qualit6 des membres qul la com-
posent, une d6f6rence que je tiens ä exprlmer
Mais nous sommes ä cette barre pour exprlmer ce
que notre conscience nous commande. c'est-ä-dlre
pour rempllr un devolr.
Peut-on s'adresser au pouvolr judicialre pour
lul demander d'appr6cler la constitutionnallt« des
lols Qul ront mls en action ? Aux Etats-Unis n
en«te UBÄ Oour Suprtoi« qul a cette qualit6 lol
•äH>i>^'4ii»MM«tiii
mmtmm
— is-
la questlon est controversfee, blen qu'en falt, on
trouve des analogies qul. pour 6tre modestes, n'en
sont pas molns certaines. En France, dlsent cer-
talns, seul le pouvolr 16gislatif est le souverain, in-
terprfete de la Constitution. Beaucoup de bons es-
prits ont exprim6 une opinlon contraire. Quol qu'll
en solt nous sommes devant une juridictlon ä la-
quelle on a donnö le tltre de Cour Supröme. Cela
lui donne des droits, cela lui cr6e des devoirs, les
dernlers sont encore plus lmp6rleux, permettez-
mol de le dire, que les premlers.
La lecture des textes Inclus dans les conclu-
slons d^pos^es est expressive ä souhait. La lol
constltutionnelle du 10 juillet est claire. On peut
promulguer des textes remplagant la Constitution
ant6rieure : lls ont une valeur virtuelle, une valeur
future. lls ne peuvent pas entrer en action, 6tre
mls en Jeu ; 11 leur faudra pour cela une double
sanctlon ; la ratification par la Nation et la mise
en appllcatlon par les assembl6es qul auront 6tE
cr66es. *
Et qu'on ne s'lmaglne pas qu'll s'aglt d'une for-
malit6. Impossible de soutenlr cette thfese. Le texte
adopt6 n'est pas m6me celui qul figurerait dans le
projet de lol du gouvernement. Celul-cl s'exprlmalt
alnsl ä propos de la future Constitution :
« Elle sera ratlfi^e par les assembl6es qu'elle
aura cr66es. >
Deux s6nateurs : MM. Taurlnes et Dormann,
au nom des groupes des anclens combattants s6-
nateurs, flrent adopter un texte d6cldant la ra-
tification par la Nation avant mfeme l'Electlon des
deux assembl6es.
Ce texte fut accept6 par le gouvernement et ne
permet donc aucune Equlvoque. II le permet d'au-
tant molns que le rapporteur, M. Bolvln-Cham-
peaux, avait dlt : c II est express6ment entendu
que le texte nouveau du gouvernement dolt Ă„tre
/
1.
— 14 —
lnterprÄt6 en ce sens que la ratiflcation de la Cons-
titution et r61ection des assembl^es devront faire
l'objet de deux votes distincts >.
Et plus encore, Messieurs de la Cour, devant la
commlssion de l'Assembl6e nationale, le vlce-pr6si-
dent du Conseil de l'epoque, d^l6gu6 speclalement
par M. le Inar6chal P6tain pour soutenir le pro j et
du gouvemement — j'ai indiqu6 M. Pierre Laval —
s'6tait exprimö de la fagon suivante : « Le gouver-
nement, se ralliant ä la thäse des anciens combat-
tants, accepte que la ratiflcation soit demand6e
& la Nation >. t Cela signifie, dit toujours M. Pier-
re Laval, que la ratiflcation devra pr6o6der le fonc-
tionnement effectif des institutions nouvelles >.
Sur le plan juridique, sur le plan 16gal, Je le dis
maintenant, la cause est entendue.
Alnsi, Messieurs, le gouvemement n'a pas res-
pect6 la 16galit6 acceptöe, propos^e par lui. II a
crÄ6, mis en action des textes qui ne pouvaient 6tre
que des projets virtuels, ne valaient que pour l'ave-
nir, certaines conditions 6tant alors remplies. Le
gouvemement, sans doute, a 6t6 emport6 par l'en-
vie de copier, d'lmiter. II a du chercher dans les
s6natus-consultes et la Constitution pr6biscitalre
du second Empire avec lequel il a la tendance de
s'identlfier. II n'a rien trouv6. Mais 11 auralt pu
il aurait du faire une Constitution. D y a des proc6s
qu'on n'engage pas n'importe quand, n'importe oĂĽ,
n'lmporte comment. Le territoire national doit 6tre
liWrö de l'occupation 6trangfere pour d6battre en-
tre Francais de ce qul regarde les Francais.
Aprfes 1870, on a poursuivl le mar^chal Bazaine
quand le territoire a 6t6 Iib6r6. Et encore. l'a-t-on
fait parce qu'il existait dans le code de Justice ml-
Utaire. un texte sur les places tortes, mais on n'a
pas poursuivl les minlstres qui s'appelalent Emile
OlMer. le due de Granunont, le mar6chal Le&ĂĽ!
I %
— 16 —
Sous le regime lmp6rlal qu'on paralt rcgretter. la
responsabilltfe d'un homme 6cartait toutes les au-
tres.
En 1871, 11 n'y avalt donc pas de texte. C'6tait
de la -Constitution imperiale qu'^talt Issue llrres-
ponsabillt6 des mlnlstres de l'fepoque et ccat. au
contraire, dans la Constitution nouvelle celle de
1875, qu'a 6t« inscrite la responsabUitfe des mlnls-
tres de la R6publlque.
C'est la r^ponse aux afflrmations quelquefols
omclelles. toujours solennelles, mals fo^tralres ä
la r6alit6 qui ont 6t6 produltes depuis des mols.
L'Emplre ne fut pas le regime de la responsablUt^.
C'est la R6publique. au contraire, qui a repris la
tradltlon pass6e. C'est Qu'en 1875. on avalt le sou- .
venlr- des 6v6nements qui avalent Pr^c^^^^^f^f:
riaration de guerre. 01iylieri.jCü?«»münt^^ i^D^^
aSt de l^kr-FiiSdiiibmt6^^
tromp6 les Chambres. Us avalent f«"»»* '^ P»y»;
On avalt dlt que monneur «alt engagö. Wen flue
Mtlsf action eĂĽt 6te obteirae ; on i^avalt pas com-
munlQU« au Parlement. non plus qu ä 1 optalon
des dfepeches rtv«latrlces ; on avalt lalss« crolre
quV>n «alt en llalson diplomatique ajec l'Autrlche
et l'Italle.
on avalt encore dans l'esprlt 1" .a"}''«„^"°';»
11» Lehffiuf sur la pr6paratlon mUltalre ; tout le
monde^vIltJresprit rhlstolre du «n „^^ ^«^
tre. on a m6me mls ensulte en cause les quanUMs
de matSrlel et Von PO«"alt apporter i cette barre
des documents suggestlls. On » *cart« /«/« J^»
tautes du commandement. ln«|.V''^"JÄn^S^
' pens6es par Vhfirolsme et le sacriflce des hommes.
Dans tout cela. 11 y avalt des motlfs pour un
proc&Tde haute trahlson. mals 11 n'y avalt paa d«
luses
La Constitution de 1875 y a f""^ **';'"* Jl!Sl
ganlsme Juridique qu'eUe a pr6vu aul. seul. avalt
^â– ^mmmmmmmtm
•s^n'm:^:
'§
— 16 —
qualitö pour Juger les hommes qul sont Icl.. ou
d'autres.
La Haute Cour de justice est une Juridiction de
caractfere politique, et un auteur que nous estl-
mons, que nous appr6cions, a pu dire que les hau-
tes cours appartenalent au droit commun constl-
tutlonnel.
On a le droit de dire, d'allleurs, que c'est rendre
Service aux magistrats de l'ordre public, que de
poUMqie'' "'''^' ^""^^^^ ^'''' "^^^^^ ^^ caractfere
Seulement, pour convoquer la Haute Cour 11
auralt fallu convoquer la Chambre des döputös
t^^LZ^''\''^r''' ^^ ^^^^ ^^ accusatlon Mais
les d6butants dictateurs ont eu peur que l'ettet dl
surprlse du 10 julllet 1940 ne se renouvelle pas^ Ib
vfolantT'Jni ""k "^^''- ^'' °^^ ^^" '''' ^^b^les en
vlolant la loi. Nous en prenons acte pour ce proc6s
pour demaln, pour l'histoire. '
qu 11 y a eu dans la bousculade de la d^f alte dans
pou^oT '''' ^''^'''^^ ^^e v^ritable invlLlon ?u
im?!f ^o^mes inattendus y sont venus. Quelques-
uns^^^taient des chevronn^s. des sortes de r'cim-
D'autres ont 6t6 capables pour m6naeer 1a tr^r^
sltion ; d'autres. qul n'y seraient Sf ven^^^^^
sont pr^cipitös dans une sorte de bousculaSe et
quelqu'un qul s'y connalt Wen a quaUfircela dl
€ divine surprlse >. MUduiie ceia ae
Les uns et les autres ont assum6 de lourdea
parfois de traglques responsabilit^s '
to„^i''ri?'^"'^^i '°"^^ - ^Is l'ont encore montr6 '
tout ä l'heure dans la note de la censure ~ 6tSt
mTT'. ^ «^P^bllque. jusqu'ä l'asphyxle ''
seront inuti^P,'^^,^?"'"'" ^' ^" P^^^' 1^"^« efforts
seront Inutlles et leurs espolrs ne se röaliseront
t^
— 17 —
Toutefols, J'al le droit de dire encore qu'ils ont
trahl le mandat formel qui leur avait 6t6 donn6.
C'est du gouvernement de la R6publique qu'ils
avalent regu le pouvolr.
L'Assembl6e nationale de Vichy ne pouvait pas
agir autrement : un contrat, un trait^ a mĂźme 6t6
pass6 entre le gouvernement et l'assembl6e.
L'expos6 des motifs du pro j et d6pos6 par le
gouvernement le dit express6ment : < C'est dans
cet csprit que le gouvernement s'est tourn6 vers
les Chambres en leur demandant de rendre possi-
ble. par un acte solennel, dans l'ordre de la 16galit6
r^publlcalne, cet immense effort >.
Et le 9 julllet 1940, dans son rapport au nom de
la commlssion du suffrage universel, devant la
Chambre des döput^s, M. Mistler disait : « Aujour-
d'hul, en permettant comme le gouvernement le
lui demande, l'immense effort de reconstruction
du pays dans l'ordre et la l^galit^ röpublicaine, le
Parlement donne un exemple >. Et le rapporteur
d6plorait que la garantie essentielle de la R6pu-
blique — la souverainet6 du Parlement — n'ait pas
6t6 plus effectlve.
M. Boivln-Champeaux, rapporteur devant le S6-
nat et l'Assembl6e nationale, avait rappelt que la
Constitution de 1875 avait fait de la France « un
pays libre oü l'on respirait ä l'aise >.
Le pacte conclu formellement, express^ment,
n'a pas 6t6 respect6 ä la faveur d'un armistice im-
pr^voyant, bäcl6 dans la peur, dont la dur6e a d6-
pass6 les pr6visions les plus pessimistes et dune
occupation prolong6e des deux tiers du territoire.
On s'est lnstall6 au pouvolr. on s'en est servi,
on en a abus6, on a critiqu6 ce qu'on appelle d6jä
— ä tort — l'ancien r6gime. L'instabilit6 des mi-
niĂźtferes ? Qui donc, aujourd'hui, ne sourirait pas
devant cette sorte de kal6idoscope qui fait döfiier
\r 'jZ:-
^1 I lim i>-. â– <â–
I
^p
.
. — 16 —
qualit6 pour Juger les hommes qul sont Ici... ou
d'autres.
La Haute Cour de justice est une Juridiction de
caractöre politique. et un auteur que nous esti-
mons, que nous appr6cions, a pu dire que les hau-
tes cours appartenaient au droit commun consti-
tutionnel.
On a le droit de dire, d'ailleurs, que c'est rendre
Service aux magistrats de l'ordre public, que de
les mfeler le moins possible aux d6bats de caractfere
politique.
Seulement, pour convoquer la Haute Cour il
aurait fallu convoquer la Chambre des d6put6s
seule qualifi^e pour la mise en accusation. Mais
les debutants dictateurs ont eu peur que l'effet de
• surprise du 10 juillet 1940 ne se renouvelle pas Es
ont manqu6 d'audace. Ils ont cru etre habiles' en
vlolant la loi. Nous en prenons acte pour ce proc6s
pour demain, pour l'histoire.
jMais comment a-t-on pu en arrlver lä ? C'est
qu 11 y a eu dans la bousculade de la d«f alte, dans
ouv ĂĽ?"^^ du dfesastre, une v^ritable Invasion iu
Des hommes inattendus y sont venus. Quelques-
uns 6taient des chevronn^s. des sortes de r6cidi-
vLstes.
.^J^'^^^lJ^ ?°' *** capables pour minager la tran-
^inf Ärff",'//"'.""' °'y ''^'■*'«"* Janial« venus. se
sont prtclpltfes dans une sorte de bousculade et
que iqu'un qul s'y connalt blen a qualU «ceia de
€ divine surprise >. ^
Les uns et les autres ont assum6 de lourdes
parfois de tragiques responsabilit^s
ir..}fTvl^^^^^l ^°"^^ - "^ ^'°^^ encore montr6
danesth6sier la R6publique. Jusqu'ä l'asphyxie.
seront inutiles et leurs espoirs ne se r6aliseront
0
— 17 —
Toutefols, J'al le droit de dire encore qu'ils ont
trahl le mandat formel qui leur avait 6t^ donn6.
C'est du gouvemement de la R^publique qu'ils
avaient regu le pouvoir.
L'Assembl6e nationale de Vlchy ne pouvait pas
agir autrement : un contrat, un trait6 a m6me 6t6
pass6 entre le gouvemement et l'assembl6e.
L'expos6 des motifs du projet d^pos6 par le
gouvemement le dit express6ment : < C'est dans
cet esprit que le gouvemement s'est tourn6 vers
les Chambres en leur demandant de rendre possi-
ble, par un acte solennel, dans l'ordre de la 16galit6
r^publlcaine, cet immense effort >.
Et le 9 juillet 1940. dans son rapport au nom de
la commisslon du suflrage universel, devant la
Chambre des d6put6s, M. Mistler disait : « Aujour-
d'hui en permettant comme le gouvemement le
lul demande, l'lmmense effort de reconstruction
du pays dans l'ordre et la l^gallt6 r6publicaine le
Parlement donne un exemple >. Et le rapporteur
d6plorait que la garantie essentielle de la R6pu-
blique — la souverainet6 du Parlement — n alt pas
6t6 plus effective.
M. Boivin-Champeaux, rapporteur devarit le S6-
nat et l'Assembl6e nationale, avait rappel6 que la
Constitution de 1875 avait fait de la France « un
pays libre oü l'on respiralt ä l'aise >.
Le pacte conclu lormellement, express^ment,
n'a pas 6t6 respect6 ä la faveur d'un armistice irn-
pr^voyant. b&cl6 dans la peur, dont a dur6e a d6-
pass6 les prÄvisions les plus pessimistes et d une
occupation prolong6e des deux tlers du territoire.
On s'est instant au pouvoir, on s'en est servi
on en a abus6. on a critiqu6 ce Q^'^n ,^ppelle d6^&
_ ä tort - l'ancien r6gime. L'lnstabilit6 des mi-
nistferes ? Qul donc, aujourd'hui, ne sour^rait pas
devant cette sorte de kal6idoscope qui fait d6fuer
#1
- 18 - •
sous les yeux du public des hommes qul, successl-
vement, passent et dlsparaissent ? Quelle besogne
a 6t6 accomplie ? L'existence des as&einbl6es le-
gislatives a 6t6 affirm^e par un acte constitutionnel
n* 10, Sans qu'on ait qualit^ pour cela, sans qu'elles
en aient besoin pour exister. Mais les garanties
constitutionnelles ont 6t6 supprim6es, les 61us, les
mandataires ont 6t6, de toute facon, atte^its ä
la fols dans leur dignit6 et leur possibilit6 d'exis-
tence. On espfere d6truire par l'usure, par une sorte
d'effritement, des Institutions qui pourraient Ăźtre
demain un suprĂźme recours. On a entrepris et on
poursuit la d^sorganisation de la vie regionale et
locale ; on r^voque les maires, on d^missionne d'of-
fice des conseillers g6n6raux, on dissout les con-
seils municipaux.
M. LE PRj6sn)EifT. — Nous sommes bien loln de
notre procös. Revenons-y.
M* Le Troqüer. — Je vais terminer, mais je suis
bien dans^le cadre du procäs, cadre que Je me suis
impos^ : celui de la responsabilit^ de la guerre.
M. LE Fr6sweht. — Diminuez le cadie.
M* Le Troqüer. — J'ai d^montr^ rillögalltö de
ce qui a €t€ fait. Je reste bien dans le procäs.
Les assembl^es locales contrOlaient Tadminis-
tration. On a renvers^ les röles, les fonetionnaires
nomm6s par le pouvoir central choisissent ceux
qui devraient les contröler et les mettent au pas.
parfois au garde ä vous ; on en a m^me tu & Paris
qui ont ^te soumis ft l'appel nominal.
On dönonce le capitalisme sordide dont le Chef
de l'Etat lui-m6me a proclam6 la malfalsance dans
plusieurs de ses messages ; mais la libert6, les 11-
bert«s sont supprlm^es. II est dangereux d'expri-
mer une oplnlon, de formuler une critique qul ne
soU pas au goĂĽt des maltres de l'heurc. Des hom-
— 19 —
mes, des femmes, par milliers, par dizaines de mil-
liers sont en prison, dans des camps de concen-
tration en vertu de lettres de cachet, trop souvent
aussl parce que leur origine, leur religion sont
honnies, des d6ch6ances civiques, professlonnel-
les sont ordonn6es pour la mäme raison ; on as-
siste ä des drames effroyables. A des hommes, on
interdit d'exercer leur mandat, leur profession
qu'ils honoraient, de l'aveu de leurs pairs les plus
exigeants. La France, ce n'6tait pas cela, ce n'est
pas cela, ce ne sera pas cela..
Elle a 6t6 grande par le rayonnement des idfees
qu'elle incamait, qu'elle repr^sentait ; nous ne nous
r^signerons pas aux abaissements qu'on lui fait
subir, aux d6ch6ances qu'on lui pr6pare. Les hom-
mes qui sont au pouvoir devraient relire et m«-
diter cet article 35 de la d6claration montagnarde
du 24 juin 1793 : < Quand le gouvernement viole
les droits du peuple, l'insurrection est pour le peu-
ple le plus sacr6 des droits et le plus indispensa-
ble des devoirs >.
Partout, dans les campagnes comme dans les
vllles, on souffre du froid ; la faim est liiapais6e,
mais on .se raidit et le moral tient ; les anciens
^comme les jeunes sont rassembl6s, les clolsons de
partis se sont effondr^es, les rivalit6s religieuses
et philosophiques se sont tues ; les Fran^ais de tou-
tes quaUt6s, de toutes classes sont au coude ä coude.
S'il est vrai qu'une partie infime de la bourgeoi-
sie s'est d6rob6e ä l'honneur pour sacrifier & l'ln-
t6r6t, il n'en reste pas moins que le peuple, les
classes moyennes, que ce soit d'un cöt6 ou de 1 au-
tre de la Ugne de d^marcation, savent montrer par-
tout ce que c'est qu'une nation fiöre, qui ne doute
pas de son destin. Uni dans une attente Impatiente.
mais avec une dignit6 crisp^e et fr6mlssante. le
peuple de France montre son esp^rance. sa volont^
d« faire- revivre souveraines la Patrie et la Uöen».
i.
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— 20 —
INTERVENTIONS DE M« SPANIEN
20 Uvrier 1942
PREMIERE INTERVENTION
Les c^nsells de M. Li6on Blum s'assoclent sans
r6serve aux conclusions que vient de d^velopper
M' Rlbet.
Avec une logique, ä nos yeux lmp6rleuse, elles
posent un problfeme d'une redoutable gravit6. Elles
montrent d'une laQon Invlncible que le proc6s de
l'impr6paration que vous voulez faire n'entre pas
dans le cadre de la lol qui vous a Instituts. Elles
fönt ressortlr que ce procäs de l'impr^paratlon qui
se trouve Substitut ä celui que vous aviez mlssion
de poursuivre, c'est-?i-dlre celui de la responsabilitö
de la guerre et de son prolongement, que ce procfes
suppose rintroduction dans le d6bat de la substance
m6me que votre arr6t de renvoi pr6tend en 6car-
ter. Cette substance, c'est la conduite des Opera-
tions militalres, c'est la recherche des responsabl-
Ut6s ant6rieures ä juin 1936: Voilä la matifere, la
substance que vous voulez 6carter ou que, acces-
soirement, vous pr6tendez vouer, dfes votre arrfet'
de renvoi, ä l'ombre et au mystfere des huis-clos.
D'avance, Messieurs, vous nous avez fourni la
double preuve de la v6rit6 de la thfese qu'a soute-
nue ici M« Ribet. Cette preuve tient dans l'ln-
terpr6tatlon que le r6quisitoire lui-meme a donn^
page 63 au moc < ult^rieurement >. Elle tient
aussi dans l'omission par votre arrfet de renvoi de
ce möme mot t ult6rieurement », Omission pure et
simple, et par les magistrats instructeurs, et par
les r6dacteurs de l'arrfet de mise en jugement.
Les observatlons de M« Rlbet s'appllquent 6trol-
tement ä notre cas pulsque au seuU m6me de rin-
culpatloii qui nous a 6t6 notlfi^ par le conseUler
— 21 —
Instructeur, la mĂźme Omission syst6matique s'est
manlfest6e. Cr, une chose est sĂĽre : c'est que nous
sommes Icl. dans la plus haute matiöre pönale qui
seit. -Dans le domaine p6nal, sl humble soit-ll, 11
n'y a pas de place nl pour l'approxlmatlon, nl pour
la conjecture. L'lnvocatlon d'un texte p^nal, base
d'une poursuite quelconque, exclut la cltatlon In-
exacte, le r6sum6, l'extralt ou l'analyse. Et cepen-
dant, dfes le seull des r^quisitlons, c'est un texte
Incomplet qui se trouve clt6, pulsque dlsparalt du
champ des r6qulsltlons, sur la fol du rappel de la
lol qui pr^lude aux poursultes, la mention des co-
auteurs et compllces.
Vollä le falt, il est consld6rable. A nos yeux, 11
est sans pr6c6dent. II vlent de vous et nous pou-
vons dlre respectueusement qu'll nous appartlent.
M" Rlbet vous l'a montr6 ; ses conclusions, aux-
quelles nous nous assoclons, vous demandent de le
reconnaitre. Et je crols que vous ne pouvez faire
autrement, en proclamant la nullit^ de votre Ins-
truction et subsldlairement en r6parant ce qui a 6t6
falt, en ordonnant le suppl6ment d'lnstructlon qui
vous est demand^.
Sl nous nous jolgnons aux conclusions de
NT Rlbet. c'est que le ralsonnement qu'll a d6ve-
lopp6 ä votre barre s'applique. ä plus forte raison,
au cas de M. Blum.
M Blum ne revötait aucune Charge publique a
la date du 4 septembre 1939. Or, pour avolr con-
couru au passage ä l'6tat de guerre, 11 fallalt au
molns etre mlnlstre oti le subordonn6 Immödlat
d'un mlnlstre ä cette date capltale.
M Blum n'a revfetu aucune Charge publique
aprös le 4 septembre 1939. Comment, d6s lors, au-
ralt-11 pu commettre un acte r^pr^henslble aprös
cette date, dans le cadre de la loi qui vous a ins-
tltu^s? , ,
Parml les actes que vous avez retenus, et cesi
pour nous une seconde raison de venir appuyer
TiimnifM mi
^'', — 1 Ji'Z-'V ' '■T^'Vit^iww »" > r;*^-j|
•
— 22 —
l'argumentation de M« Ribet, 11 y en a un seul, ä
nos yeux, qul a concouru au passage de l'^tat de
palx ä r^tat de guerre : c'est la r6union du 23 aoüt
1939. M. Blum n'y 6tait pas. II ne pouvalt tras y
6tre. Ce fait, ^videmment, devralt sufflre pour
soustraire M. Blum ä vos debats.
M. Blum, cependant, vous a dit hier pourquol
11 entendalt malgr6 tout y demeurer. II n'y a pas
lä de contradiction, comme le soutenalt hier M. le
procureur g6neral.
Nous avons le devolr de vous demontier que ce
procös est mal constrult, entach^ de vlces, contralre
aux principes dij droit et qu'il ne correspond pas ä
la loi qui est ä la base m6me de votre poursuite.
Nous avons le devolr de vous d^montrer que le pr6-
jug6 le domine et nous domlne du m6me coup.
Nos Clients ont, eux, autre chose ä faire et
ä dlre. Ils ont Tambitlon de döfendre leur honneur,
non seulement devant vous, mais devant le pays
tout entler. C'est pourquol les deux täches se re-
Joignent et concourent, chacune en se plagant sur
son plan autonome. II tfy a lä aucune sorte de con-
tradiction.
Un fait dem eure et c'est pourquol j'lnslste au-
pr6s de vous, Messieurs, avec gravlt^, un fait de-
meure : si vous r^tablissez le mot « uit6rieure-
ment >'ou si vous lui donnez, ä notre requßte, son
sens v^ritable, M. Blum ne peut matöriellement
fitre retenu dans les liens de la Prävention.
Je vals vous faire une confidence. Je me suis
demand6 comment vous en 6tiez arriv6s au point
oĂĽ vous etes et voici la r^ponse que je me suis
falte.
. Vous etes n^s dans des jours sombres, Messieurs
dans les jours les plus sombres qu'ait travers6s
notre patrie. Le d6cret du l" aoĂĽt 1940 vous a
convoqu^s pour une double täche pf^cise et (Jrama-
tique ä la f ols. II vous a donn6 la misslon de
— 23— V
rechercher les responsabilit6s de la guerre, alnsl
que les responsabilit6s de ceux qul lavaient
prolong6e Inutilement.
Sans doute le texte est clalr. H n'y a polnt de
travaux pr6paratoires qui puissent l'^clairer ma^
11 existe cependant quelque chose d'autre QUl Peut
nous mstrulre ; c'est l'ambiance dans laquelle U a
6t^ promulgu6. *
un joumallste. que vous connalssez. rappe^lt
dans son llvre sur les provocateurs de la guerre^
l la page 2 de la pr^face. ce ^^\^f^'^'f^.
diffusion officielle du gouvemement f ranga s le 1
onĂĽf 1940 le iour mĂźme oĂĽ le texte qui nous
intöresse paLlssalt Tu Journal officiel Apräs avoir
Inuml I les diffärentes cat^gories de resP^nsables
qui allalent fttre d6f6r6s ä la ^our^^, ^^Xetenu
ainiitait • € ceux qui ont provoqu6 et entretenu
risprit de guerre en^'opposant par tous les moyens
aux tentatlves de conciliatlon et aux tentatlves
""" VoTä 'comment une volx officielle, ^^^f^terpr^^^^^^
le d^cret qul venait d'6tre pris en vue de votre
LvtcatU Mais ĂĽ y a autre c^o-^^^^^^^^ M.
rrmS Cu" \l Ă„euV^gTnlr^ T'^r^^^^
mlnce. mals enfln U exisLaii. ^c &^^ Ai«bprt
^alt 'transmls. -us la Signatur, de M^ ^^bert.
une lettre qul est ä ^o*^® ^^^f^^^J'r^ lettre '> J'en
. documents qui ^talent jolnts ä cette lettre . Jen
ai nrls note sur le texte lul-möme.
ci d-Lrd le P-^--^^f,i?iit^;°alt?.
Z'^: acTesTui ^rvVenTToir— ™ -
un des ^cies q" ^ ^ ^^ guerre. n y
passage de 16tat de P^^*^ »* ^^ . ^g i'Assem-
avalt aussl le compte ^«^.^^^f^^^i^H ,u^^^^^
bl^e des d^put^s tenue ä Vichy \e «J^^^^^^^^^^^ ^ '
sous la Pr^s^dence de M. Cayrel 1 im ^^ ^^^^
M. Georges Bonnet, et M. ueorsc» »
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-24-
cette Intervention qu'll a communlqu6e ä l'appul
des r6quisitions ä prendre, s'est donn6 la täche
de justifler sa politique. EnĂĽn la cople de la
relation sommalre de la Situation vue de Londres
du 17 juln au 20 Juillet 1940. r6dig6e par M. Paul
Morand et dat6e de Liverpool le 20 juillet 1940.
Vollä le bagage que vous aviez au d6part
monsleur le procureur g^nöral. Je reconnais qu'll
s'est enrichl. qu'll est devenu plus lourd et plus pe-
sant. Mais c'est le bagage orlginel qul. sl mlnce solt-
11, Imprlme sa marque ä votre proc^dure et indique
d'une faQon trös nette ce qu'on attendait de la mls-
slon ä vous confl6e.
Vous ne vous y ötes pas mCpris. Ce procfes qu'on
vous donnalt mlsslon de faire, vous n'avez pas
voulu le poursulvre, et ä mes yeux c'est votre
honneur. Vous avez pens6, comme nous tous, qu'll
n'est pas vral que la France, par aucun de ses
hommes d'Etat, quel qu'll solt, ä quelque endrolt
ou dans quelque moment qu'll alt rempli sa täche, '
alt voulu la guerre. Vous n'avez pas voulu susclter
un pr6jug6 qul seralt n6 de votre arröt et qul se
seralt Substitut au jugement de l'hlstoire.
II y a autre chose encore que vous n'avez pas
voulu dlre pour votre glolre. Vous n'avez pas voulu
instrulre le procfes du prolongement de la guerre.
Car vous vous fetes dlt, comme nous tous, qu'un
tel proc6s suppose au molns la guerre termln^e.
que la coalltlon dont nous falslons partle, n'a pas
abandonn6 la lutte, n'a pas d6pos6 les armes. Tant
que par le monde des hommes luttent et meurent
sous les Couleurs de la llbert6, la questlon du
prolongement de la guerre ne sera pas r6solue.
C'est pourquol vous n'avez pas voulu essayer de
la rösoudre. Jamals d'allleurs, une teile questlon
ne pourra 6tre r^solue sur la simple constatatlon
d'un rapport de forces. Car c'est la lol morale et
non pas l'arlthm^tlque qul rfegle les problömes de
la consclence.
:
t
- ^•>- -^ -^ rr- * ^«
— 25 —
Vollä ce que nos pferes nous ont appris. Sl vous
avlez d6mentl, en falsant le procfes qu'on vous de-
mandalt de faire, l'enseignement de ceux qul nous
ont donn6 notre structure morale. de ceux qul nous
ont appris ä r6v6rer depuls L6onldas Jusqu'ä Albert
de Belglque, 11 auralt fallu 6telndre la flamme 6ter-
nelle que nous avons allum^e sous l'Arc de
Trlomphe pour honorer le souvenlr de nos h6ros.
C'est alnsl que je me suis expliqu^ ä mol-m6me
l'attltude que vous avlez prise.
Mals alors — je vous le dls avec tout le respect
dont je suis capable — de cette attltude 11 fallalt
tlrer les cons6quences.
II fallalt d'abord rendre le non-Ueu qul
s'lmposalt.
II n'y a pas de justice sans courage et sans
risque Je sals que vous vouUez d^pToyer ce courage
et que vous vouliez affronter ce risque. Mals vous
savez aussl qu'll n'y a pas de justice sans llbert6.
Vous avez comprls. vous avez pens6 que le procös
que l'on vous demandait de faire 6talt ^itmie
sinon imposslble alors que les g6n6raux^ Blllotte _
et Huntzlger smit morts, alors que les S^nöraux
. Cond6 "Bourret et Giraud, qul ont command6 des
arnr6"es devant l'enneml sont encore aux mains de
l'enneml. alors que le g6n6ral Colson n'a pu obtenlr
dFläissez-passer, pour r^pondre ä votre convoca-
tion. La Ugne de dtoarcatlon d6chlre encore le
terrltolre et vous avez sentl qu'll 6talt dlfflclle et
dangereux de superposer ä cette Ugne de d6mar-
cation matärlelle, une Ugne de d6marcation morale
qul rulneralt l'unlt6 du pays. Tout cela vous 1 avez
sentl et permettez-moi modestement de vo^s ^^
rendre hommage. Et cependant vous avez Substitut
au procfes que vous ne pouvlez et que jous ne
vouliez pas faire, un autre procfes que M Rlbet
d^finlssaU tout ä l'heure. La P^o^^^ure qul aalt ]
merte entr^vosmalns, vous avez t^^
rs^M^en nin-^onnajot^
^1
tämmi
SES
— 26 —
Comment s'6tonner, dans ces condltlons, que le
cadre qui servait ä vos travaux ait 6clat6 ?
Voilä qui donne toute sa valeur ä notre ralson-
nement sur le mot « ult6rieurement >.
Ce mot, en effet, que vous avez omls, se trouvalt
sur votre passage comme im obstacle, et c'est cela
qui donne ä cette Omission un caractöre sl redou-
table et sl grave.
Voilä oü vous en ^iez lorsque, comme un coup
de foudre dans un clel Incertain, le message du
mols d'aoüt a retentl. La possibilit4 en 6talt d63ä
contenue dans l'acte n' 7 et la menace s'est
r6alis6e. En effet, aprös le message, ce Tut la
sentence.
Que dlt-elle ?
Je condamne avant vous, Messieurs de la Cour,
les hommes que vous devez juger. Je mets fin ä
vos lenteurs et ä vos lnqui6tudes. Vous pouvez
condamner ces hommes avec tranquillitö : 11s sont
coupables moins par ce qu'ils sont, que par ce
qu'lls Incament, leur procös, c'est le procös du
r6gime, le procäs des moeurs et des m6thodes.
Voilä ce que vous allez Juger. Un procfes diff6r4
eĂĽt 6t6, ajoutait le Mar^chal de France, chef de
l'Etat, un procös manqu6. C'est vral. Mals alors
11 fallait ou le faire, ou se rendre compte que sl
on le diff6rait jusqu'ä la restauration des libert^s
pubUques, jusqu'ä, la lib6ratlon du territolre, 11
valait mleux y renoncer pulsque, sous les Premiers
Souffles des libert^s reconquises, le proc^s, tel qu'il
«talt pr6vu, se seralt 6vanouL
La Cour, je le congols, lorsqu'elle a entendu
retentir ce message, s'est alarm6e pour sa propre
Ind^pendance. Elle s'est l^gitimement souci^e de
l'affirmer en v6rifiant sa comp6tence. Pouvait-elle
accepter d'enregistrer une condamnation d6jä
prononc6e ? C'est pour vous S^gager de cette
Obligation qui pouvait apparamment peser sur
— 21 —
l'arret que vous alUez rendre, que vous avez d^battu
et rendu votre arr6t de renvoi. Nous avons salu6
votre pffort. Je le salue encore aujourd'hui mais,
excusez-moi, messieurs, il ne nous a pas convaincus.
Ce sont bien les mĂźmes faits qui servent de
ßupport aux deux condamnations ä Quelques
diff^rences prfes. Cela. vous le conc6dez au d^but
de votre arrät de mise en jugement. Pu^^.\o^s
ajoutez que ce que le Mar6chal a voulu 6dicter,
c'est une sanction politique alors que la sanct on
que vous avez mission de prononcer, cest une
sanction judiciair e.
II n'en est rien Messieurs ! Contre M. Blum,
en effet M. le Procureur g6n6ral, n'a pas retenu
raccusation d'imp6ritie. II a retenu seulementce
qu'il appelle, la soumission ä la politique. Laffaire
est donc politique dans les deux cas : qu eile se
situe sur le plan oĂĽ s'est plac6 le Mar^chal ou
qu'elle se d6roule sur le plan oĂĽ le r^quisitoire 1 a
nlac^e«
Nous verrons un jour ce qu'il faut entendre par
la soumission ä la politique. Nous ditons ce jour-lä
que la plus grande plaie de notre 6poque. c est le
septicisme universel ä l'^gard de ^^J^^^^^^^.
politique. Nous viderons un jour le d6bat qui
s'Uist?tue, comme on l'a dit. entre Catherine de
Sienne et Machiavel. Entre Catherine de Sienne
d'aprfes laquelle la justice et la fid61it6 sont le fon-
dement de la conservation de la cit6 et Machiavel
avec son « 6vangile d'injustices Intelligentes >.
Nous verrons donc ce que recouvre votre
accusatlon de soumission ä la Ppli^ique Nous
verrons si ce n'est pas au contraire la Ăśd61it6
politique que vous avez voulu d6noncer.
Mais le moment n'est pas venu de d^battre
ce sujet si grave. Ce que je veux examiner cest
la question de savoir si votre arrfet de fenvol vous
a Ilb6r6s comme vous aperceviez le besoin de i etre.
-c^Z
il<»i II '<liri
.'/JtiJmiiĂźmmmfimmm
!l
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— 28 —
Ce n'est pas la meme forfalture, dltes-vous plus
loin. La forfaiture ou la trahison des devoirs de
la Charge, celle que condamne le Mar^chal, c'est
la forfaiture issue de la violation du serment de
fid^lite qu'on lui a pr6t6. La nötre, c'est une forfai-
ture strictement 6troite, celle qui suppose ä sa
base un lien de concours au passage de l'^tat de
paix ä r^tat de güerrg. qui suppose r6tablissement
d'unMien causal entre des faits d6termln6s et la
Prolongation de cet 6tat de guerre.
Messieurs nous n'avons pas pr6t6 serment. Ce
serment qui en oblige d'autres, ne nous oblige pas.
Alors comment ne voit-on pas que la sentence du
Mar6chal qui recouvre la vötre et sur laquelle le
Mar6chal s'est expliqu6, s'6tend sur un domaine
qui d6borde le cadre 6troit dont vous vouliez fixer
les limites. C'est la forfaiture en gen6ral qu'il veut
atteindre, y compris cette vari6t6 de forfaiture
6trlq-a6e et reduite que vous pr6tendez pouvoir
nous imputer
Pour fetre complet, je diral un mot de cette
analogie qu'6tablit Tarret de renvoi, entre notre
Situation et celle qui r^sulte des sanctions
disciplinaires.
La encore, nous ne sommes pas soumis, et nous
ne pouvions pas l'ßtre — il serait cruel d'insister —
ä aucune discipline du Mar^chal.
De mfime, dites-vous, qu'une sanction discipU-
naire ne s'oppose pas ä une poursuite de droit
commun, de m6me la sanction disciplinaire
pronono6e par le Mar6chal ne s'oppose pas ä ce
que vous vous saisissiez de l'affaire.
Cet argument, Messieurs, ne nous convalnct pas.
Lorsque le mĂźme support de fait 6tablit la mat^-
rialit6 d'un acte qui constitue une infraction
disciplinaire et qui se präsente aussi sous les
esp6ces d'un crime de droit commun, c'est un
principe constant que le criminel tient le discipli-
K\
— 29 —
En reante. mcö ^lacez la condamnation
Ă„^ iTralfAeTcefursur leaue, vou3 vous
mouvez si vous la placez ^"/^^^«,?"„; '^'ou^ ne
vous sont maccessibles, qui ne '°" .''"/„ ""j"!."*
„.,! ^r, nhArP7 Das ' Pour nous en Uberer, u nous
JaüdraU Ar tious d«endre contre la sentence
'r MaÄl et nous en ^Mendre devant vou -
Mals cela vous ne pouvez pas ladinettre car s^
vous 6tes une cour souveralne vous nfetes Pas un
trlbunal d'appel ; vous vous refusez i Utre.
nans ces condltlons. nous avlons raison de
con° ure qu'U y a chose Jug.e contre vous. comme
de votre arrĂźt de Renvoi par las pp dernifere
c ult6rleurement >. ^ujourdhul pour la
f'I
M
i5' »
a
\\
. 1
1 1
! (
!(1
— 30 —
entendu, car la contradlctlon. sachez-le, c'est tout
de möme autre chose que la communlcation cour-
toise de diverses plfeces.
La contradiction, c'est la confrontatlon avec les
t6molns qui accusent ; c'est la confrontatlon des
t6moins entre eux, lorsqu'ils se d6mentent mutuel-
lement. Vos arrĂźts ont 6t6 rendus sans cette contra-
dlctlon. Cette contradiction se prodult pour la pre-
mläre fois aujourd'hui, & votre barre. Et votre
arrĂźt ne peut avoir 6t6 rendu que sous r6serve de
cette contradiction. de cette lumlfere, que nous
pourrions un jour vous apporter et que nous vous
apportons dfes aujourd'hui.
C'est un argument de texte que celui que nous
vous proposons. Mals vous avez montr6 votre soucl
des textes dans votre arrfit de renvoi lorsque vous
avez 6cart6 les Operations mllltalres. C'est en vous
appuyant sur le texte que vous avez 6cart6 tous
ceux qui ne sont pas subordonn6s imm^diats des
minlstres et anclens ministres, tout en oubllant
que, par le moyen du paragraphe 3 qui pr&volt la
poursuite des co-auteurs et complices, vous aviez
la possibilit6 de r6introdulre dans le circuit de votre
poursuite ceux que vous pr^tendez en 6tre automa-
tiquement 6cart6s. Vous cumulez toutes les instan-
ces, ne l'oubliez pas. Consid^rez votre proc^dure.
II n'y a aucune espfece de difförenciatlon entre les
diverses Instances qui sont d'ordinaire distln-
gu6es pour le bien de la justice et du justlciable.
Vous avez 6t6 ä la fois la juridictlon d'instruction,
la juridictlon d'accusation. Vous fttes aujourd'hui
la juridictlon de jugement. Si l'arrĂźt que vous avez
rendu n'6tait pas susceptible de ce recours que
nous introduisons aujourd'hui contre lul devant
vous, comme 11 ^mane de vous, 11 serait du mĂźme
coup r6put6 Intanglble. Mais , comme 11 6mane de
vous, notre condamnatlon y seralt ä l'avance pr^fl-
gur6e. Et n'apercevez-vous pas que, du coup, toute
notre d6fense seralt valne ?
— 31 —
C'est pourquoi, Je vous convie, aprfes M' Ribet
ji restituer au mot c ult6rleurement > sa place et sa
slgnlfication. Je vous adresse cet appel de toutes mes
forces et je vous dis : prenez garde ! Dans l'arrfet
que vous allez rendre, l'histoire, un Jour, recherchera
la preuve de votre libert^.
DEUXIEME INTERVENTION
J'ai ITionneur de donner lecture des conclusions
suivantes :
€ Plaise ä la Cour.
€ Attendu qu'avant l'ouverture des d6bats 11 a
6te port6 ä la connai^sance de M. L6on Blum que,
sur r6quisitions de M. le Procureur g^nöral en date
du 5 mal 1941, visant express^ment la loi du 30
Juillet et le d^cret du 1«' aoüt 1940, la cour procäde
actuellement ä une Instruction contre X par
l'organe de M. le conseiller Wateau.
€ Attendu que cette Instruction pr6sente une
«troite connexit6 avec la poursuite qui fait l'objet
des döbats.
€ Attendu que, quelques jours avant l'ouverture
des d6bats, la cour döcidait d'extraire de cette
prooÄdure, un certaln nombre de t6moignages en
vue de les communiquer aux accus^s.
€ Attendu que M. L6on Blum s'est refus6 ä pren-
dre connaisance de ces piöces avant d'etre flx6 sur
le polnt de savoir si cette communlcation 6tait
partielle ou lnt6grale et si la proc6dure en cours
6talt jolnte ä l'affaire prlncipale.
€ Attendu qu'il est constant que la Cour n'a
vers6 au d6bat qu'une partie des piäces, apr§s avoir
elle-m6me proc6d6 ä un tri, oü, ni les accus6s. ni
la defense n'ont partlclp6.
€ Qu'll en r6sulte que les maglstrats qui forment
ä la fols la juridictlon d'instruction et la juridictlon
V
T
\\ I
— 32 —
I de jugement ont donc. ä ITieure actuelle, connals-
sance des pifeces d'une proc6dure en cours dont la
communication n'a 6t6 Offerte aux accus6s Que -
pour Partie seulement.
€ Qu*en outre, si la proc6dure en cours ne falsalt
pas l'objet d'une Jonction, il en r6sulterait que
des documents nouveaux pourralent 6tre solt
gard6s secrets, solt trl6s ä nouveau par la cour en
vue de nouvelles Communications.
€ Qu'ainsl dans une Instruction dont la connexit^
avec la poursuite actuelle r6sulte des actes m^mes
de la Cour, certaines pifeces ont 6t6 et seront port6es
ä la connaissance des Juges et qu'elles demeureront
secrätes pour les accus6s et la defense.
« Qu'il y a lä vlolation substantielle des droits de
la defense.
« Par ces motifs,
« Donner acte au concluant de ses solennelles
protestations ä toutes Ans utiles.
€ Dire et ordonner que toutes les plfeces sans
exception d6pendant de l'instruction poursuivle
contre X par M. le conseiller Wateau seront int6-
gralement communiqu6es au concluant.
€ Ordonner la jonction de la proc6dure en cours
au procfes. Le tout pour 6tre, sur communication et
jonction de ladite proc^dure conclu par M. L6on .
Blum et sa defense, ainsi qu'il appartiendra. >
Voilä mes conclusions. Ne redoutez pas de mol
que j'affaiblisse ou que j'obscurcisse par un
commentaire prolong6 ce fait 6clatant et brutal.
Actuellement, ĂĽ y a certaines pidces qui demeu-
rent secrdtes pour la defense et que la Cour connaiL
Dans une certaine mesure c'^tait fatal, je peux le
dire car vous avez 6cart6 la defense de vos travaux.
Je l'avais 6crit un jour avec mon confrfere Le Tro-
quer au d6but de votre Instruction : t la defense,
c'est la garantle du justiciable, mais c'est aussi le
— 33 —
gage apparent de la s^r^nit^ du juge >. Cependant
malgr6 nous vous avez commenc6, dans une souve-
rainet6 qu'une fois pcur toutes nous avons admise,
par ne proc^der ä aucune confrontation.
Et cette proc6dure nouvelle aujourd'huls'achfeve
par le fait que certaines pifeces qui vous sont con-
nues ä vous, Messieurs, restent ignor6es de nous.
Votre proc6dure, j'ai le droit de le dire, quelle
pr6somption d6jä pour les accus6s aux yeux du
monde !
Qui peut dire d'avance quel sera le jugement de
mistoire sur les choses et les hommes ? Mais ce
qu'on peut dire d'avance, c'est que si votre proc4-
dure devait demeurer secräte pour partie, si vous
n'apportiez pas ä notre requßte le remfede que nous
vous proposons, votre proc^dure, eile, serait d6jä
jug^e.
C'est fortuitement que nous avons appris, 11 y a
peu de temps, l'existence de cette proc6dure et du
r6quisitoire. vieux de neuf mois exactement, au
hasard d'une communication sollicit^e par M. L6on
Blum, peu de temps avant le d6bat.
Cette proc^dure ouverte contre X est 6troitement
connexe ä la nötre. Je pense que je n'aurai pas de
Peine ä en convaincre la Cour, maintenant qu'elle
a elle-m6me reconnu le fait, en versant certaines
pifeces 6manant de cette proc^dure ä la proc6dure
qu'elle poursuit contre nous.
Si vous voulez que je pr6clse, Messieurs, je me
bornerai ä une brfeve lecture du r6quisitoire lui-
mäme. Nous en avons parl6 avec M. le Procureur
g6n6ral. d6s que l'incident nous a 6t6 connu. J ai
lu, avec vous, vous vous en souvenez, dans votre
cabinet. le r^quisitoire auquel je faisais allusion.
Et je pense que si mes conclusions peuvent appa-
raltre tardives, vous ne leur ferez pas le reproche
d'6tre demeur^es secr6tes.
Volcl en tout cas votre r6quisitoire, tel que je
vous le relisais dans votre cabinet :
j
IgHhiiflMlMMMWBvl
— 34 — -
€ Nous, Procureur g^6ral prfes la Cour Suprfime
de Justice et vu la proc6dure Instruite contre les
accus6s des chefs d'infraction aux articles 75 et
ßuivants, etc.. » ce sont les textes mömes vls6s
dans les r6quisitoires introductifs, aucune discussion
lä-dessus. « La loi du 30 juillet 1940 et le d^cret du
!••■aoüt 1940... >, lä-dessus, non plus aucune discus-
sion et nous ferons l'^conomie d'un d6bat Inutile,
ces textes que vous visez dans votre r6quisitolre sont
ceux-lä m6me qui commandent la poursuite actuelle
et la reunion de la Cour. Je n'inslste pas, ce serait
inutile. Les textes sont clairs et dans l'esprit de
chacun de nous.
€ Attendu — poursulviez-vous — qu'll paralt
opportun de rechercher si entre les cinq inculp6s
susnommes et en dehors de toute coaction ou com-
plicit6 avec eux > — cela c'est une pr6caution Juri-
dique que vous avez prise ä desseln — t d'autres
justiciables de la Cour suprĂźme ne se seraient pas
rendus coupables de faits de m6me nature.
€ Vu les textes pr6cit6s :
€ Requ6rons qu'il plaise ä la Cour suprßme
ordonner qu'il sera proc6d6 ä cet effet ä toutes
investigations utiles et notamment sur le point de
savolr si des agissements du particoinmuni§tß^ui
tendaient, soit^^dirpr^^^ ^n tx__golt T" f1 1 r^^^^^p^^^^t, ä
restrejndre i'activit^ de5_.,QUvriets_, et des usines
ttavaillanTpöur la dllense^ najjonaie ,.n'ont pas 6t6
tol6r6s ou facilit6s.
€ Riom, le 5 mai 1941 >, 11 y a d6jä prfts d'un an,
« sign6 « Cassagneau >.
Messieurs, la connexit6 est 6clatante. Je vous
Tal dit tout ä l'heure, les m6mes textes comman-
dent les deux poursuites.
Le d6cret du 1*' aoĂĽt 1940, vous l'avez admis de
faQon claire et lumineuse dans votre arröt de renvoi,
fait k la Cour un devoir de v^rifier si les actes que
i
— 35 —
lui sont d6f6r6s ont concouru au passage de l'^tat
de paix k l'^tat de guerre ou ult^rieurement aggrav6
la Situation ainsi cr66e.
Comme en exergue ä votre r^quisitoire du 5 mal
1941 VOUS visez les textes mfemes dont la Cour a
d6fini la port^e dans son arr6t de renvoi. Nul doute,
que, dös l'origine, 11 y ait \ä une preuve formelle de
connexit^.
Voulez-vous que nous examinions alors de fagon
plus pr6cise le texte mäme des r6quisitions ? A qui
fera-t-on croire que ce texte ne s'apparente pas
^troitement dans ses consequences et ses incidences
ainsi que dans son objet avec la döfinition aue vjus
avez vous-meme formulöe dans votre r6quisltoire
d6finitif ?
On Salt parfaitement que ce que vous avez retenu
ä l'encontre de M. L^on Blum, c'est excluslvement la
soumlssion ä une certaine politique nettement visee
dans le dispositif de vos röquisitions. Vous ne pouvez
pas s6rieusement prötendre le contraire. J'ajoute
m6me, bien que je n'ai aucun mandat lä-dessus. que
en ce qui concerne par exemple M. le contröleur
g6n6ral Jacomet, ou M. Edouard Daladier, ils doivent
se sentir dans les termes de vos röquisitions, -'is^s
au mĂźme degr^ que nous par la nouvelle Informa-
tion. Vous y reprenez sur nouveaux faits les accu-
sations que nous croyions closes par Tarröt de ren-
voi et deformes dans un ^tat d6finitif ä la juridiction
devant laquelle nous comparafssons aujourd'hui.
Je sais bien que vous avez pris cette pr^caution
dont je parlais tout ä l'heure : « en dehors de toute
coaction ou complicit6 avec eux ». Messieurs, tout
d'abord, si une coaction ou une complicit6 se
r6v61alent, je ne crois pas que vous seriez empSch^s
de l'ötablir parce que vous auriez soigneusement
d61imit6 votre texte.
Je ne le crois pas, pärce que ce n'est pas loglque
de le croire, mais surtout parce que, l'6v6nement le
— 36 —
d6montre, la mfeme pr^caution jurldique. congue
dans les meines termes, n'a pas einp6ch6 la jonctjon
de la procedura Intentee contre M. le contröleur
gen^ral Jacomet ä la poursuite teile qu'elle ^*.ait
alors d61imit6e et poursuivie contre nous. Je vais
vous en donner une preuve extrömement facile, eile
consistera pour moi ä vous lire le r^quisitoire contre
personne d^nomm^e, aui a pr61ud6 ä rinculpation
de M. Jacomet en date du 21 avrll. Je väis vous le
lire et vous verrez qu'il est congu dans les memes
termes que celui du 5 mal.
« Attendu — 6crivez-vous — qu'll apparalt oppor-
tun de rechercher si entre les cinq inculp^s
susnomm6s. et en dehors de toute coaction ou
complicitö avec eux, d'autres justiciables de la Cour
supr^me ne se seraient pas rendus coupables de
faits de m ferne nature.
« Vu les textes susvis^s, requ6rons qn'il plalse
ä la Cour ordonner qu'il soit proc6d6 ä cet effet ä
toutes investigations utiles et notamment sur
ractivit6 de M. Jacomet, ancien secr6taire g6n6ral
du minist^re de la Guerre, etc.. >
Je constate — cette constatatlon se suffit ä
elle-mfeme — que la mfenie pr6caution juridique
€ en dehors de toute coaction et complicit6 > n'a
pas pr6serv6 le contröleur g^n^ral Jacomet de votre
poursuite intent6e contre lui et jointe ä la nötre.
Elle ne nous a pas garanti contre la jonction qul
s'est produite de l'affaire Jacomet ä la nötre.
Je disais au d6but de mes explication que la
connexit6 6talt 6trolte, que la pr6caution qui a 6t6
prise n'offrait pour nous aucune garantie. Je crois
pouvoir äff irmer maintenani, apr6s ce bref d^velop-
pement, que j'ai rempli mon propos et que j'al
d6montr6 ce que j'avais entrepris de faire.
Donc la Cour a fait un tri. Ce qul nous a 6t*
Offert, c'est un lot de dix-huit t^moignages extraits
par la Cour, en dehors de nöus, du dossier qu'elle
(
— 37 —
avalt sous les yeux. Ce tri auquel la Cour a proc6d6
a eu comme cons6quence Indiscutable et materielle
que ce qui 6tait jusque-lÄ — th6oriquement du
moins — ä la connaissance d'un seul juge. du seul
maglstrat instructeur est maintenant ä la connais-
sance de tous les juges composant la Cour suprfeme.
Vous vous fetes r6unis, Messieurs, puisque vous
avez rendu un arröt pour proc^der ä ce tri de pi6-
ces, pour faire le depart entre les pifeces que vous
nous donniez et Celles que vous gardiez pour votre
propre Information. II a bien fallu que vous preniez,
Que vous gardiez, la connaissance de tous les do-
cuments qui vous avaient 6t6 soumis.
Vous ne nous avez livr6 que des morceaux choisis
d'une proc6dure dont vous seuls connaissez l'int*-
gralite.
Voilä en toute r6v6rence, la Situation teile qu'elle
se präsente.
Nous avons relus6 et nous nous refusons ä votre
barre, ä prendre connaissance de cette anthologie de
t^moignages. Nous sommes ä bon droit exigeants.
Nous voulons tout ou rien. Et mfeme si vous nous
communiquiez maintenant toute la proc^dure, le
droit de la defense, au moins pour un temps, n'en
aurait pas 6t6 moins compromis.
Messieurs, une autre question qul nous Interesse.
qu'U faut que je traite brifevement. Si nous expri-
mons ici le voeu que cette communication int6grale
soit aujourd'hui ordonn6e par vous — pour ma part,
je ne doute pas un instant que ce soit le partl au-
quel la Cour finisse par se r^soudre -- c est parce
que le sort de cette proc6dure laterale ä la nötre fall
maintenant l'objet de nos legitimes pr6occupations.
Comment se terminera-t-elle, cette Procfedure
sl connexe ä celle qul vous est döfer^e ? Sera-ce
un non lieu ? Seront-ce des inculpations nou-
Teiles, de nouveaux Justiciables de la Coiu
Supreme ? Ces nouveUes inculpations modine-
.mmimmatm
mĂź
— 38 —
ront-elles, att6nueront-elles, aggraveront-elles les
responsabillt6s et les charges Que vous avez d6ĂĽ-
nies et retenues contre nous ? C'est cela que nous
voulons savolr.
Sl d'aventure. un non-lieu Intervenalt, quel 61^-
ment pr6cipux de dlscussion pour nous, quel 616inent
capital de justlficatlon pour nous. II serait donc
av6r6. qu'en dehors de ce que vous avez retenu, ä
votre r6qulsitolre — et cela ne nous effraye pas,
Messieurs — 11 n'y a rien, rien d'autre, aucun acte
qui pulsse 6tre r^put^ avolr tol6r6, avoir constituö
Selon votre expresslon une propagande subversive ou
des men^es r6volutlonnaires.
Quelle pr6cieuse Information pour nous. Et du
point de vue des droits de la d6fense, comment
pourrions-nous en fetre amput^s si Ton veut que
ce d6bat soit loyal et complet, comme on nous Ta
promls ?
Et si ce sont des inculpations nouvelles, com-
ment ne serions-nous pas admis au cours de notre
discussion ä 6valuer, ä mesurer les Incidences, les
r^percussions de toutes sortes de ces r6quisitions,
de ces inculpations nouvelles dans le champ de la
proc6dure que vous jugez aujourd'hui contre nous ?
Tel est, Messieurs, le sens des conclusions que
nous avons eu l'honneur de porter ä votre barre.
Ne vous y trompez pas et prenez garde : Nous
sommes devant vous condamnis d6jä par le ma-
r6chal P6taln, chef de l'Etat. M. le procureur
g6n6ral ne cache pas son dessein de requ^rir contre
nous avec s^v6rit6. II nous l'a dit. Sl vous ne Joi-
gnez pas aujourd'hui la proc^dure qui reste suspen-
due sur nos tfetes, dont je vous ai montr6 qu'elle
avait avec nos d^bats un lien Infiniment 6troit. nons
pourrlons courir le rlsque d'ötre condamn^s, non pas
une fois, non pas deux fois. mais möme trois fols.
C'est trop. A cette Situation sans exemple, Je
demande ä la Cour de pourvolr et de remfedier.
39
UNE LETTRE DE LEON BLUM
A LA COUR DE RIOM
Bourrassol, le 20 octobre 1941.
Messieurs,
Vous m'avez impos6 un d^lal de cinq jours
pour präsenter mes d6fenses au r^quisitoire signd
par le procureur g6n6ral pr6s de la Cour.
J'ai regu communication de ce r6quisitoire, le
Jeudi 15 courant, ä 18 h. 45, quelques minutes
avant qu'ä la radio, M. le mar^chal Potain rendit
publique la condamnation d^jä prononc^e par
lui contre moi. Le vendredi 17, au matin, les mo-
tifs de cette sentence 6taient 6galement rendus
publics, par la voix de la presse, sous la forme de
propositions 6mises par le Consell de justice poli-
tique : le Conseil declare, et M. le maröchal Potain
a sanctionn6 cette d^claration par Tapplication
d'une peine, que j'ai trahi les devoirs de ma Charge.
C'est donc un homme d6jä condamn6, et con-
damn6 exactement sous la mßme qualification pö-
nale que vous invitez ä r6pondre au r6quisitoire
de votre parquet. N'est-ce plus autre chose qu'une
cruelle d6rision ? Que pourra signiĂĽer ma
r6ponse ? Est-ce que la cause n'est pas d6jä trän-
ch6e devant tous ? On a parlö de la Separation
des pouvoirs, c'est-ä-dire de la sp6cialit6 de l'au-
torit6 judiciaire et de son ind6pendance au regard
du pouvoir ex6cutif. On a m6me jug6 convenable
de rendre hommage ä ce beau principe. Mais, au
fait, vous fetes dessaisis : 11 y a chose jug6e contre
vous comme contre moi. Statuant sur les mĂźmes
falts, en vertu d'une inculpation identique, restez-
vous T'öellement libres d'inflrmer par votre futur
arrfet le dispositif ou les motifs de la sentence
döjä rendue par l'autorltö «uprßme de l'Etat ?..
r«p«>WNiipMiWM
— 40 —
J'aurals honte d'insister davantage auprös de ma-
gistrats francals.
Ma r6ponse *se Umitera donc ä trols observa-
tions ou plus exactement ä trols prlses d'acte.
Volci la premläre :
J'lgnore dans quelle mesure le Consell de Jus-
tice politlque a eu connalssance de votre Instruc-
tion. Mals je rappelle l'attltude que j'al conserv^e
constamment et de propos d611b6r6, tout au long
d'une proc6dure condulte selon ces pratlques
secrfetes que la loi frangaise avalt condamn^es.
Pendant mes trols Interrogatolres par M. le ma-
glstrat iilstructeur — je ne compte pas le premler
Interrogatolre d'ldentlt6 — je m'en suis tenu sys-
t^matlquement aux explications les plus g^nferales.
Je n'ai pas appel6 un seul t^moln ou prodult un
seul document. Je n'al dlscut6 aucun des t6mol-
gnages ou des documents recueilUs par l'accusa-
tlon. Je n'al falt ressortlr. comme 11 m'eüt «t6
facile, nl les erreurs partiales, nl les contradic-
tlons qul affectent un grand nombre d'entre eux.
ExpUcltement et formellement j'al r6serv6 cette
dlscussion, comme tous mes autres moyens de de-
fense, pour le jour qul vlendrait enfln, le jour des
d^bats publics. Je d6nle dofic, d'une fagon absolue,
le caractfere contradlctolre de l'lnstructlon condult«
- contre mol. Le Consell de justice politlque, m6me
dans l'hypothfese peu vralsemblable oĂĽ 11 auralt
eu connalssance de votre dossler, s'est donc pro-
nonc6, sur mon compte, sans que les droits de
la döfense eussent 6t6 exerc6s, pour mol, ou par
mol, sous une forme ou ä uA degr6 quelconque.
H^mmp Ji^llc. accns^ puMlOuement d'avolr
cQi^romls parniQii actlon^gQayemementale les
lnt^r^ts~]er"SrsgcurE6- de^mon, pays. i'avals droit
ä une jusOTcäflbn et ä une röparatlon publlques.
Je le ^^6p]^-ir-Tegr€ft, je ne i?u1ä ftlus_esp6rer la
r6paratiQnrMl75l^ Justice. Mals^Xe cpnserve et
je revendlque Ic droit de me justlfler devant le^
i
— 41 —
pays, devant l'oplnlon Internationale, et, j'ose
dlre. devant l'Hlstolre.
Volcl la seconde :
Mes consells, Maltres Le Troquer et Spanien,
ont salsl la Cour d'une note qul lul a 6t6 remlse
le 18 j an vier. D6s ce moment, et ä travers les Pre-
miers 616ments rassembWs par l'lnstructlon, 11
apparalssalt que la d6falte des arm6es frangalses
ne pouvait plus trouver de raison sĂĽffisante dans
rinf6rlorlt6 num^rlque des engins mls ä leur dis-
posltlon. Nous demandlons, par consöquent, ä la
Cour d'6tendre ses Investlgatlons ä la condulte
des Operations mllltalres. Nous falslons ressortlr
Qu'une enquĂźte portant sur les 6v6nements tels que
rentr6e en Belglque, la rupture du front de la
Meuse, le d6faut de contre-offenslve ä compter de
cette rupture, pr6sentalt pour la Cour un carac-
t6re obligatoire et möme ä nos yeux. un caractfere
pr^Judlclel. Depuls le mols de janvler demier, et
& mesure que l'lnstructlon se prolongeait, l'lmprea-
slon qul avalt dlct6 la note de mes consells a prls
la valeur d'une certltude. II est aujourd'hul 6tabll
que le Programme d'ensemble pour l'armement des
forces terrestres, mls en oeuvre — pour la premlfere
fois _ par le gouvemement que Je pr6sldals, 6talt,
au moment de l'entr^e en guerre, en avance sur
les d^lals pr6vus d'ex^cution.
II est stabil, pour la plupart des engins qul
ont Jou6 un röle d^terminant dans la balalUe, qu'll
n'exlstalt pas de dlsproportion num6rlque sensible
avec l'ennemi. Molns encore qu'en janvler demier,
les problfemes qul concernalent le mode d'emplol
de ces armes et la condulte strat6glque des Opera-
tions ne pouvalent 6tre 6cart6s de vos recherches.
La Cour n'a cependant pas tenu compte de la note
de mes consells. II en r6sulte que l'lnstructlon a
pu S€ clore sans avolr ete dlrlg6e sur aucun des
deux ordres de falts que d6slgnalt Irr^slstlblement,
au lendemaln de la d6falte, ime oplnlon unanlme,
— 42 —
roplnlon des soldats comme des citoyens : d'une
part, les fautes du commandement ; d'autre part,
cette combinaison suspecte de complicit6s, cons-
clentes ou inconscientes, qul ont alt6r6 la force
frangaise en face de Tennemi et qui sont cou-
ramment englob6es sous les vocables de < cin-
qulfeme colonne » et de « trahison >. J'entends
non pas la « trahison » des devoirs de sa Charge,
mais la trahison tout court.
Voici maintenant la troislfeme :
II r^sulte tout ä la fois du r^quisitolre et de
l'avis du Conseil de justice politique que les char-
ges relev6es contre moi visent, uniquement, les lols
vot6es et appliqu6es ainsi que la politique sociale
pratiqu6e sous le gouvernement que je pr6sidais,
ä l'exclusion de tout acte posltif rattachable ä ma
personne. Je renouvelle donc ici, avec plus de force,
la d6claration que j'avais d6jä fait consigner dans
mon Interrogatoire d^finitif. « Dans la Constitution
r^publicaine de 1875. la souverainet6 appartlent au
peuple frangais. Elle s'exprime par le suffrage uni-
versel. Elle est del6gu6e au Parlament. Quand on
Impute une responsabilitj6 p6nale ä un homme, ä
un Chef de gouvernement, sans 6tablir et mĂźme
sans all^guer rien qul touche ä sa personne, sans
articuler un seul fait contraire ä la probit^, ä
rhonneur, au devoir professionnel d'appllcation,
dje labeur et de conscience ; quand on lul fait
crime exclusivement d'avoir pratiqu6 la politique
command6e par le suffrage universel souveraln,
contröl^e et approuvöe par le Parlement d616ga-
taire de la souverainet6. alors on dresse le procfes,
non plus de cet homme. non plus de ce chef de
gouvernement, mafs du regime r^publicain et du
principe röpublicain lui-m6me. Ce procfes. je suis
fler de le soutenlr au nom des convictions de toute
ma vie... >
Je vous prie d'agr^er, Messieurs, l'assurance de
mes sentiments de parfaite consld6ratlon.
— 43 —
PREMIERE DECLARATION
DE LEON BLUM
19 fivrier 1942
La d6cision de M. le g6n6ral Gamelln n'appar-
tient qu'ä lui, mais le sens qu'elle prend et les
cons6quences qu'elle entraine nous appartiennent
ä tous. Je demande ä la Cour la permission de
formuler les r^flexions qu'elle m'inspire.
Je ne feindrai pas la surprise. L'attitude que
vient de prendre M. le g^n6ral Gamelin 6tait con-
nue. Elle 6tait attendue depuis longtemps. Au mo-
ment oĂĽ le geste s'accomplit comme il vient de
s'accomplir devant nous, on ne peut se d6fendre
d'une Emotion assez cruelle.
M. le g^n6ral Gamelin. somme toute, s'iden-
tifie avec notre arm6e malheureuse. et l'on ne peut
que s'incliner avec gravit^ et douleur. Mais pr6cis^-
•ment, et c'est une premifere cons^quence qui ne peut
manquer de vous frapper comme eile me frappe
moi-m6me, avant mĂźme que ce proc6s commence,
c'est un ablme b^ant qui vient de s'ouvrir devant
nous.
Messieurs, votre mlssion est d'6tablir et de sanc-
tlonner des resDonsabillt^s. Lesquelles ? Cell^
(Tun^ dfeiaitfi militair£^Or. par votre arröt de reiT
vor, vous avez "6cart6 du d6bat tout ce qul concerne
les'op6rations militaires.
Vous etes all6s plus loin. Pour plus de sĂĽreW.
vous avez condamn6 ä l'ombre et au silence du huis-
clos, toutes les d6positlons. toutes les confronta-
tlons. toutes les r^quisitions. qui mfeme accessol-
rement auraient pu fixer cette cat^gorie du Pro-
bleme.
Mais 11 resteralt dans le d^bat la r>eTsorme
meme de M. le g6n6ral Gamelin. Präsent au d6bat,
IWiBMI»
i
— 44 —
11 auralt attlr6 InvĂĽiciblement cette partle <lii
problfeme que votre arrĂźt de renvoi a entendu
exclure. Sa pr6sence ä la barre, son Intervention
dans le döbat, son choc avec les tÄmolns de tout
ordre qul ont 6t6 clt^s, et qul sont des ex6cutants
de tous grades, auralent par la force mĂźme des
choses, fait jallllr Icl des 6tlnceUes de v6rit6.
M. le g^n^ral Gamelln ne sera plus pr6sent aux
d^bats, car ce n'est pas y 6tre pr6sent que d'y
asslster en spectateur muet, mĂźme sl ce mutlsme
est stoKque. Vous aurez retlr^ du d6bat la matifere
et maintenant M. le g6n6ral Gamelln en retire la
personne.
Nous arrivons alnsl ä cette consöquence, sur
laquelle j'appule fortement devant la Cour, que
dans ce d^bat sur les responsabllit^s de la döfalte,
la guerre sera exclue.
H est vraiment malals^ de concevolr un para-
doxe plus choquant, plus r6voltant pour l'esprlt.
Pourquol votre Juridiction a-t-elle 6t6 Institute ?
Pourquoi votre Session a-t-elle 6t6 convoqu6e ?
Parce que l'arm^e frangalse avait succomb6 dans
une campagne malheureuse, parce que le peuple
francais avalt voulu savoir pourquol son arm6e
avait 6t6 vaincue dans cette campagne. Personne
ne peut m^connaltre, en effet, que cette d^faite
militaire, rinstinct du peuple lul d6signe des causes
militaires.
Et vous, Messieurs, charg6s de la recherche de
ces causes, vous qul avez falt entrer tant d'autres
choses dans ce procfes, voicl maintenant que vous
en aurez expulsö la guerre.
Car c'est bien vous, Messieurs, qul aurez r^dult
au sllence M. le g6n6ral Gamelin. H vous a dlt
ses raisons au cours de sa d^claration. II ne veut
nl s'^lever contre la sentence d6jä prononc6e contre
lul, par la plus haute autorit^ de l'Etat, ni se faire
Ici ä cette barre l'accusateur de ses subordonn6s.
— 45 —
Son sllence lul est donc dictö d'une part par la
d6cision de M. le mar6chal Potain, mais aussl
d'autre part, par votre arrfet de renvoi.
M. le g6n6ral Gamelin, unique accusÄ militaire,
porte sur lul, jusqu'ä plus ample inform6, la res-
ponsabilit^ globale, toute la responsabilit6 ano-
nyme de la d6faite. II ne peut donc s'en laver qu'en
la rejetant sur d'autres. II ne peut l'att6nuer qu'en
la reportant toute, ou en partie, sur d'autres.
Gr. cette d6termination des responsabilit6s r6ci- •
proques, et le cas 6ch6ant, cette Ventilation, ce tri.
c'^tait la mission de la Cour, c'^tait aussl son devolr;
vous n'avez pas rempli cet offlce, et maintenant
M. le g^n6ral Gamelin se refuse ä le remplir ä
votre place.
En d6clinant une mission qul 6tait la vötre,
vous l'avez contraint necessairement, invincible-
ment, solt ä se talre, soit ä se faire ici l'accusateur
public d'hommes qul, pour vous 6taient des justi-
clables et qul, pour lul, sont rest6s des compagnons
d'armes.
II a cholsi de se talre. Ce sllence attire le res-
pect. Mais ce sllence et ce respect sont en realite
une condamnatlon port^e contre l'arröt de renvoi
prls par vous.
Pour ma part. je dls ä la Cour que je partage
son respect, mals je me permets d ajouter que
nous ne partageons pas son sllence. Quand je dls
€ nous >, je parle au nom des amls qul m asslstent
et en mon nom personnel.
Ce n'est pas que je me sente moins atteint que
M le g^n^ral Gamelin, solt par la sentence de
M.* le mar^chal Potain, solt par l'arrfet de renvoi.
J'al entendu les paroles qu'ä prononc6es M. le Pre-
sident Caous au d6but de cette audi^ence mais
quand M. le g6n6ral Gamelin 6nonce cette v^m6
si simple qu'il est condamn6 avant mĂźme de com-
paraltre devant ses juges. 11 a raison, et 11 nest
r
MĂźjm
Ă„SS
ip
— 46 —
pas le seul ä se trouver dans cette Situation vral-
ment sans exemple.
Messieurs, quol qu'on fasse, 11 y a une Inlqultö
fondamentale, 11 y a une tare originelle qul pöse
sur ce procfes.
Des hommes que votTe devolr de Juge, alnsl que
M. le President le disalt tout ä l'heure, est de con-
sid6rer comme innocents, jusqu'ä l'heure m6me de
votre verdict, se pr^sentent devant vous, condam-
n6s et cela par la plus haute autoritö de l'Etat,
par une autorit6 ä laquelle vous avez pr6t6 un
serment de fidölit^ personnelle.
Messieurs, cette v6rit6 sl banale est 6trange-
ment confirm6e par les r^sultats de votre Instruc-
tion, car en v6rit6, c'est avec stupeur que la France
et le monde apprendront quels 6taient les rap-
ports numeriques exacts du mat^riel fran^ais et
du matöriel enneml, solt au moment de l'entr6e en
guerre. seit au moment de l'attaque allemande.
C'est pourquoi, dös le d6but de l'lnstruction, 11 y a
maintenant plus d'un an, nous vous avlons de-
mand6 de faire porter votre enquöte sur cette
question essentielle, pr6judlcielle de savoir si des
erreurs du commandement n'avalent pas ^t^ la
cause döterminente de la döfalte.
C'est dans ce sens que, pour rempllr entlfere-
ment votre mission, vous deviez pousser votre Ins-
truction. Or, non seulement vous n'avez pas falt
droit aux conclusions dont nous vous salslssions,
mais par votre arrĂźt de renvoi, vous avez rejet6
du d6bat les questions que nous poslons et vous
nous interdlsez aujourd'hul de les porter ä la
barre.
Je pourrais donc vous dire ä mon tour, Mes-
sieurs, vous avez mutil6 ma defense d'avance, au
polnt de la rendre impossible. Jugez-moi, condam-
nez-moi pour la seconde fols, Je me talral, Mes-
sieurs. Nous parlerons cependant, nous ne nous
bornerons pas ä tlrer les cons6quenc€s logiques de
>
\
\
\
-^ 47 —
la Situation dans laquelle vous nous avez enferm^s.
D6s le d6but möme du debat, nous allons nous
assocler ä l'effort loyal, ä l'effort pers6verant qul
sera tent6 pour modifler ou plutöt pour rompre
cette Situation que vous avez impos6e.
Je sals blen qu'll y a quelque chose ä quol nous
ne pourrons rlen changer. ä quoi vous ne pourrez
plus rlen changer vous-möme quoi que vous pen-
siez, quoi que vous d6clariez ; c'est la sentence
d6jä prononc^e contre nous. Au moment oü eile
a 6t6 rendue, la Cour a sentl peser sur eile la
menace, eile a sentl peser sur eile l'entrave. Vous
avez essay6 de vous d6gager dans votre arrĂźt de
renvoi, vous avez essay6 de lib6rer votre ind^pen-
dance de juges. Mais Messieurs, vous sentez aussl
fortement, peut-6tre plus fortement que moi, que
vous n'y 6tes pas parvenus. Vous croyez-vous vral-
ment libres de renvoyer d'ici par un verdict d'ac-
quittement, les hommes d^jä d6clar6s coupables,
sous la mßme Inculpation pönale, en raison des
mĂźmes falts, par la plus haute autorit^ de l'Etat ?
Vous savez bien qu'elle ne vous a laiss6 d'autre
choix que de nous appliquer une peine plus forte
que Celle qu'elle a prononc6e elle-mĂźme. Non, Mes-
sieurs, ä cet 6gard, vous 6tes bien r6ellement des-
saisis. II y a chose jug6e contre vous comme contre
nous. Votre futur verdict ! on a imprim6 d'avance
sur lui une marque ind616bile Mais si nous ne pou-
vons rien tenter d'efflcace en ce qui concerne la
sentence d6jä prononc6e contre nous, il n'en est
pas de m6me en ce qul concerne notre arröt de
renvoi. Sur ce terrain, nous pouvons et nous de-
vons engager la lutte. Nous pouvons et nous de-
vons vous demander de r6tablir le d6bat dans sa
libert^, dans sa 16galit6, dans son int^grit^, dans sa
loyaut^ et c'est ce que nous allons faire, avec
l'ardente volontö de tirer d'un d6bat 61argl et
affranchl, tout le contenu, tout le r^sldu posslble de
v6rit6.
'-\
\
'~mt^y-ha!lt0K:^,
V
— 48 ~
I
Nous le ferons, moins pour nous, Messieurs,
d^jä condamn^s, que pour le pays, que pour l'opl-
nion universelle et Je ne crains pas de le dire, pour
l'Histolre.
Nous ne d6sesp6rons pas de cet effort, avant
de l'entreprendre. Dans son message, M. le mar6-
chal Potain avait dit, tout en vous plagant
devant le fait accompli de son jugement, « ce
proc6s doit avoir lieu en pleine lumiöre. J'al pes6 les
avantages et les inconv^nients >.
Nous nous armons, Messieurs, de ces paroles,
nous voulons les Interpreter comme ayant r6elle-
ment entendu laisser ä votre conscience de juges,
une certaine libert6.
Messieurs, j'ai 6t6 maglstrat comme la plupart
d'entre vous, je Tai 6t6 pendant prös d'un quart
de<?si6cle. Ma carrifere de magistrat 6tait ä peu
prös remplie lorsque j'ai 6t6 jet6, un peu malgr^
moi, dans la vie publique. J'ai toujours appartenu
& des instances suprĂźmes, le Conseil d'Etat, le tri-
bunal des conflits. Je crois savoir ce que c'est qu'une
conscience de magistrat et je crois aussi savoir
ce qu'est l'^tat de conscience d'une Cour souve-
raine. La souverainet6, pour un juge et pour une
Cour, n'est pas une aisance, une facilit6, eile est
une aggravation de la Charge. Le fait de ne sentlr
au-dessus de soi, ni une instance d'appel, ni un
pouvoir de Cassation, rend plus lourd encore, plus
exigeant le devoir, parce que toute d^clsion est
definitive et definitive veut dire : irreparable pour
le justiciable, irreparable aussi pour le juge.
Nous ferons appel ä ce sentiment chez vous,
Messieurs, et en möme temps qu'ä cette conscience
professionnelle, nous en appellerons aussi ä ce
sens des interets du pays dont vous avez de ja
donne la preuve dans ce procfes mfime.
Tel qu'il avait ete engage ce procfes etait celul
des responsabilites de la France dans la guerre,
c'est-ä-dire^le' procfes des responsabilites de 1ä
1i
%
i
*i
l
— 49 —
France. Ce procfes, vous vous etes refus6 ä le dres-
ser. Le signe tangible, evident de" 70tre refus, c'est
rabsence sur ces bancs de M. Paul Reynaud et
de M. Georges Mendel, eiements necessaires d'un
procfes en responsabilites de la guerre, vis6s direc-
tement par une des parties du texte qui vous a
constitues — bien que, cependant l'instruction
n'alt, je crois, pas meme commence — et qui, en
tous cas, au lieu de s'asseoir ici ä cöt6 de nous.
lont encore dans leur casemate du Portalet.
Messieurs, vous avez fait cet effort. Seulement,
je vous demande de prendre garde. Le proces
actuel n'est plus le proces de la France, mais il
reste qu'il est, 11 sera fatalement — on vous en
a de ja averti ä la barre — le proces de la Repu-
bllque Un debat sur les responsabilites de la de-
faite, d'oĂĽ toutes les responsabilites militaires ont
ete exclues d'avance et de parti pris, c'est n6ces-
sairement, volontairement, en meme temps qu'un
attentat ä la verite. une prise ä partie du regime
republlcain.
Nous avons bien cV.« raisons de craindre que
teile ait ete l'intentlon des hautes autorltes.
Mais croyez-vous, Messieurs, que ce soit lä l'inte-
ret du pays ? Croyez-vous que ce soit repondre ä
l'interet du pays, du pays qui attend la v6rite, qui
appeUe la v6rite, et qui ne renie pas la Republique.
Messieurs, j'acheve ces observatlons dont je ne
m'excuse pas aupr6s de la Cour. Nous essaierons
donc — le mot « nous > dans ma bouche a tou-
jours le meme sens — nous essaierons donc ä la
barre de substituer ä cette prise ä partie Parti-
sane, contre un regime, des m6thodes, des mceurs.
la recherche ä la fois sereine et courageuse de la
verite. Nous vous en proposerons les moyens, nous
essaierons d'y parvenir gräce ä vous, de votre
aveu. Mais, si nous etions prives de votre concours,
nous ne decouragerions pas. Nous nous obstine-
rions au contraire. nous lutterions encore. Notre
^^
•^
•Ij,;
k
'^'1
?J
r
ammm^jaKJil-
/
50 ~
devolr, vls-ä-vis du pays qu'ici encore nous enten-
dons servlr, demeurerait le mĂźrne. II n'aurait pas
6t6 modifi6 par votre refus, U n'en serait devenu
que plus 6vident et que plus pressant, car ce refus
signiflerait clairement et n^cessairement q>ue le
d^bat est maintenu par vous, en pleine connais-
sance de cause, dans les limltes et dans le carac-
t6re qul sont actuellement les siens. Procfes de la
R6publique, qui est pourtant aujourd'hul encore
le regime 16gal du pays, proc6s du r6gime, des
moeurs, des m^thodes d6mocratiques ; proc6s de
la politlque de justice et de conciliation sociale
qu'avalt pratiqu^e le gouvemement que je dirigeais.
Et alors, Messieurs, 11 nous incombera de mon-
trer, de prouver ä la France, qu'elle n'est pas le
peuple, qul, pour avoir cru ä son id6al, pour avolr
cru au progrös et ä la justice, doit expier sa con-
flance et se courber sous son chätiment. Si la
R6publique doit rester ici l'accus^e, nous resterons
ä notre poste de combat comme ses tömoins et
comme ses döfenseurs.
4'
\
(^
DEUXIEME DECLARATION
DE LEON BLUM
20 fivrier 1942
Je d6slre appuyer par quelques remarques d'un
ordre un peu diff6rent les observatlons d6cisives
d6jä soumises ä la Cour.
Le texte de l'article T', paragraphe 1, du d^cret
i * "* du l«*" aoüt 1940 est d'une r^daction sl Umpide qu'il
semblait devoir 6chapper ä toute controverse.
II flxe un rep^re dans le temps : le 4 septem-
bre 1939.
n vise deux cat6gorles d'actes relativement k
ce repöre fixe.
4
^
— 51 —
D'une part, des actes anUrieurs : ceux qui ont
concouru au passage de l'^tat de paix ä r^tat de
guerre.
D'autre part, des actes postörieurs ou ulU-
rieurs : ceux qui ont aggrav^ la Situation ainsi
cr^6e.
Pour la premiöre cat6gorie d'actes, le texte fixe
le 4 septembre comme terme. Pour la seconde cat6-
gorie comme point de dipart.
Cela pos6, quel devait 6tre le polnt de d6part de
l'information pour les actes de la premiöre cat6-
gorie ?
Le texte ne le dlt pas expllcitement, mais 11
rindique.
Ces actes de la premlfere cat6gorle sont ceux qul
ont concouru au passage de r6tat de paix ä l'^tat
(Je guerre. Les infractions~que le texte vise sont
donc n6cessairement postörieures ä r6tat de paix
tel qu'il a 6t6 constat6 pour la dernifere fois avec
certitude. La paix existant ä un instant donn6 du
temps, dans des conditions incontestables, la ques-
tion est de savoir comment, et par le concours de
quels actes, la France est pas&6e de cet 6tat de
paix ä la guerre. Dös lors si vous aviez poursulvi
votre Information dans ce sens, jusqu'ä quelle date
aurlez-vous du la faire remonter ? Qu and un 6tat
de paix incontestable a-t-il exist6 pour la dernifere
fois entre la France et l'Allemagne ? Je ne crois
pas qu'une h6sitation puisse s'61ever ä cet 6gard.
La date lndiqu6e par le texte 6tait celle des accords
de Munich... Munich n'a pas 6t4 seulement un ar-
rangement special ä une difflcult6 donn^e. mals
un engagement de paix g6n6ral et solennel con-
tractu pour une longue suite d'annöes, avec l'obllga-
tion bilaterale de consultations et de recherches
amiables sur toutes les difficult6s europ^ennes qul
pourraient survenir ultörieurement. Les textes sont
formeis, les commentaires du chanceller Hitler
cjolncldent avec ceux de M. Chamberlain et
iM
V
mmtmm
,. .* *
•*-^'
1"
11
4t
V
— 52 —
d'EdoHard Daladier. Ce rappel peut sembler au-
Jourd'hul... Strange. Mais le falt est lä. II avait 6t6
affirm6, promis ä Munich que l'accord 6tait la paix.
Votre recherche sur le passage de l'ötat de paix
ä la guerre n'aurait pas du remonter plus haut.
Voilä le point de d6part 6ventuel flx6 pour
les actes de la premiöre cat6gorie (si vous les aviez
recherch6s) ; pour les actes de la seconde, il n'y
a pas, il ne devrait pas y avoir de discussion pos-
sible puisqu'il est tix^ explicitement par le texte
lui-m6me. Je ne reviens pas sur la d6monstration
Sans r6plique qui vous a 6t6 administr6e. Pour faire
entrer dans votre Information des faits cönsid6r6s
par vous comme des actes d'aggravation mais pos-
t6rieurs en date au 4 septembre 1939, il a fallu :
que le requisitoire supprimät de son Interpreta-
tion le mot essentiel : le mot ulUrieurement (car
11 interprfete...)
et que vous le biffiez du texte mftme.
C'est l'alt^ration du texte, et eile seule qui vous
a permis de remonter dans le temps en degä du
4 septembre. Mais le point de d^part 16gal 6tant
ainsi ^cartö, 61imin6 par vous, lequel alors alliez-
vous cholsir ?
Un seul 6tait admissible. Un seul entrait dans
la logique de votre erreur... A d^fai^t de la date
explicitement fix6e par le texte, ä d6faut d'une
Indication impliclte que, blen entendu on cherche-
rait en vain, il n'y avait plus cette fois qu'un point
de d^part possible, celui qui correspond au d^lai
de la prescription. Or le r6quisitoire, en termes
exprös, et la Cour, ainsi qu'il appert de son Ins-
truction m6me, ont choisi arbitrairement le d&but
de la ligislature de 1936.
Pourquol ? Je me permets de le demander, mft-
me aprös M« Ribet. Est-ce que le r6armement
de la France ne s'est impos6, comme un devoir de
la Charge ministerielle, qu'ä partir de juln 1936 ?
â– I
I
53
Ou blen est-ce que ce devoir avait 6t6 exactement
rempli jusqu'en Juln 36 ?
J'indique ä mon tour quelques r6f6rences.
Le partl nazl prend le pouvoir en mars 1933.
Le Troisiäme Reich quitte la S. D. N. ä la fin
de 33 et dfes cette 6poque il arme ouvertement.
Le 16 mars 1935, le Service obligatoire est r^tabll
en Allemagne.
Je sals bien que l'annöe 33 marque en France
un effort certain en vue de la < coexistence pai-
sible » avec les dictateurs totalitaires. C'est rannte
du Pacte ä Quatre. Mais dös le d6but de 34, une
offre de limitation quantitative des armements
est öcart^e par le gouvemement franQais. La fa-
meuse note du 19 avril 1934 est exp6di6e (contre
l'avls de M. Barthou, ministre des affaires 6tran-
göres). « La France ne s'en remettra qu'ä elle-
m§me du soin de sa propre s6curit6 5>, ce qui signi-
fle que la Conference de d^sarmement est prati-
quement close, et que le chancelier Hitler reven-
dique sa pleine llbert6. Dös ce moment, 11 faudrait
röarmer, si Ton voulait maintenir la « marge de
sup6riorit6 » ä laquelle on n'avait pas voulu re-
noncer. II y avait alors un gouvemement fort qui
disposait de pleins pouvoirs.
Gaston Doumergue 6tait pr6sident du Conseil.
M. Andre Tardieu 6tait ministre d'Etat, M. le Ma-
röchal Potain ötait ministre de la guerre. II n'exls-
tait pas alors, en service dans nos unitös, la pre^
mifere trace d'un matöriel moderne. Qu'a-t-on fait
cependant ? Quelle a 6t6 l'importance des crödits ?
Quel a ete le volume des commandes effectlves ?
Quels travaux ont 6t6 engagös ? Seul, le gönöral
Denaln, ministre de l'air, a entamö sans d6sem-
parer Texöcution immödiate d'un vaste Programme,
mais le dossier montre avec quelle pröcipitation et
quelle Incohörence. Les devoirs de la Charge minis-
terielle etalent evidents, imperieux ; les a-t-on rem-
plls ?
♦ '
mmmtmutttKi
l'J
t-
— 54 —
Pour en Juger, 11 sufflt de se reporter ä l'affalre
du 7 mars 1936, deux ans plus tard. Evoquez, mes-
sleurs, V03 Souvenirs ! Rappelez-vous l'accent des
premlöres paroles, prononcäes publiquement par
las repr6sentants du gouvernement, puls Taffals-
sement de la Position frangaise. Une Information
complfete vous aurait appris quel compte avait 6t6
rendu alors par les ministres technlques de l'ötat
de nos forces militaires et de quel poids leur rap-
port avalt pes6 sur la d6cision — ou l'absence de
d6clsion — gouvernementale. Cet incident, dont
les suites ont 6t6 si graves, suffit ä montrer dans
quel 6tat de priparation materielle le ministfere de
Juin 36 a trouv6 rarm6e. Votre Instruction aurait
du dresser ce bilan. On s'en chargera sans doute
ä votre. place. Mais depuis trois ans passes, qu'a-
vait-on fait ? Ce qu'on a fait kait-Il ä Töchelle
des besoins, ä l'öchelle des dangers ?
Le mode d'emploi d'un mat^riel präsente encore
plus d'importance que sa quantifc6. Pendant la
campagne, la caducit6, TinadSquation des doctrines
de guerre, des conceptions tactiques, ont apparu
avec une tragique 6vidence. Mais ces doctrines et
ces conceptions ne sont pas venues au monde avec
la 16gislation du Front Populaire. D6s avant juin 38.
— et en r6alit6 depuis l'autre guerre — on profes-
sait, on inculqualt, on pratiquait d6jä la doctrine
des fronts invulnörables, la foi absolue dans la for-
tiflcation et dans la defensive, la m6fiance vis-ä-vls
des engins blind6s — et surtout vis-ä-vis de Tem-
ploi ind^pendant des grandes unit6s blind^es —
le scepticisme vis-ä-vls du röle de l'avlation dans
le combat. Les documents foisonnent, et sous quel-
les signatures l
Alors pourquol Tinstruction n'est-elle pas remon-
t6e plus haut ? Votre arrfet de renvoi est muet lä-
dessus. Le r^quisitoire s'en tient ä quelques expli-
cations 6trangement embarrass6es. Elles pour-
raient se r^sumer ä ceci : « A supposer que les
\
i
•4
— 55 —
pr6d6cess€urs des inculp6s fussent coupables, cela
ne les d6chargeralt pas de leur responsabilit6... >
Quelle suprenante conception de r6gallt6 de la
justice ! Alnsi, parmi les coupables du m6me crime,
on frapperait les uns, on 6pargnerait syst6matique-
ment les autres. Sur quoi fonder cette discrimina-
tion, sinon sur des crit6res d'ordre politique ?...
N'est-il pas Evident, tout au contraire, que si nos
pr6d6cesseurs 6taient reconnus coupables, notre
faute serait tout au moins att6nu6e, car nous au-
rions port^ le poids de la Situation qu'ils nous au-
raient transmise... Mais le dossier 6tabllt que pr6cl-
&6ment ä partir de juin 36, nous avons fait ce qu'on
n'avait pas fait avant nous. Le gouvernement que je
pr6sidals a mis en train un Programme d'ensemble,
sans commune mesure par l'ampleur et l'lmpor-
tanc6 avec tous ceux qul avalent pu le pr6c6der,
ce Programme n'^talt pas un Programme sur le
papier, 11 a 6t^ ex^cut^. Jamals les cr6dits ne lul
ont manqu6, au moment de l'entrie en guerre il
etait en avance sur les dilais pr^vus d'exicution.
S'il n'a pas et^ achev^ ä cette ^poque, s'il n'a pas
6t6 entreprls sur un plan industrlel plus m6thodi-
que, en partant des bases de la productlon. c'est
qu'il avalt 6t6 mls en tialn trop tard et ce d6mar-
rage tardlf est pr6cls6ment ce qui engage les res-
ponsabilit^s ant^rleures ä juin 36.
Qu'on n'all^gue pas que cette date de juin 36,
cette date fatidlque correspond ä une Periode dan-
gereuse des relatlons franco-allemandes. Je n'entre-
rai dans aucun detail sur ce polnt. fĂĽt-ce par vole
d'allusion, mals la preuve me seralt, me sera faclle*
Alors que repr6sente-t-elle ? Cette date ne repr6-
sente et ne peut repr6senter autre chose que l'arrlvöe
au pouvolr, aprfes des 61ectlons g6n6rales qul ont ren-
vers6 la majorlt6. du gouvernement connu sous le
nom de gouvernement de Front Populaire. Et faire
partir rinstruction de juin 36, ä d6faut de toute
autre raison concevable et Intelllgible. c'est recon-
— M —
naltre qu'une Prävention poUtlque — peut-6tre une
repr6saille politique — a dict6 le choix. L'intention
^clate. On cherche ä faire rejaillir sur le Front
Populaire, sur la politique ouvriäre et sociale qu'il
a pratiqu6e, et, ä travers lui, sur les institutions
d^mocratiques, la responsabilitö de la d6faite ml-
litaire
Seulement, messieurs, je vous demande d'y r6-
fl6chir : un ph6nom6ne politique comme le Front
Populaire ne nait pas comme un Champignon d'un
ou deux dimanches de scrutin. II est 116 ä ce qui
pr6c6de, et, dans une large mesure, 11 en est issu.
II n'est pas un commencement absolu et on ne
peut pas l'isoler ä sa guise. Je r6tablirai, quand
11 le faudra, la v6rit6 m^connue et calomni6e en
ce qui touche le gouvernement de Front Populaire.
Je montrerai ce qu'ä 6t6 son oeuvre" dan's Tordre
de la paix Interieure, dans l'ordre de la palx inter-
nationale, dans l'ordre de la pf^paration materielle,
morale, politique de la defense dU pays. Mals sl
vous estimez que son oeuvre a 6t6 n6faste, si vous
estimez cela, alors 11 fallait 6tendre votre Instruc-
tion ä ceux qui l'ont determin6e soit par actlon
directe. soit par r6action in^vitable. Recherchons
les auteurs principaux dont nous n'aurions 6t6 que
des compllces.
Car le Front Populaire n'a pas 6t^ autre chose
qu'un reflexe de defense instinctive :
d'une part, contre les p^rils qui menacaient la
R6publlque et dont l'agitation des ligues para-mi-
litaires et l'6meute du 6 f^vrier avaient 6t6 le signe
frappant ;
d'autre part, contre la Prolongation de la crise
6conomIque qui accablait les masses ouvriferes, les
populations paysannes, la classe moyenne du pays,
et qui se traduisait par le marasme des affaires',
par la baisse continue des prix agricoles et des
salaires, par le chömage, par la mis6re.
Les promoteurs du Front Populaire en tant que
T
7
'
♦ — B7 —
moTivement politique, ses parrains — vous serez
peut-fetre surpris de l'apprendre — ont 6t6 M.
Doriot et M. Gaston Bergery. Mais ses v^ritables
auteurs sont ceux qui ont tent6 le renversement
les institutions r6publicaines, ceux qui, par leurs
remfedes ä contresens avaient prolong6 et aggravö
en France la crise universelle.
Comprenez donc dans votre Information les
conjur6s du 6 f6vrier et de la Cagoule, les hommes
qui ont ferm6 les yeux sur leurs attentats ou qui
les ont couverts d'une complicit6 secrfete. Ce sont
eux qui ont provoqu6 la coalition spontan6e des
masses populaires, toujours passionn^ment atta-
ch^es ä la libert6. La r6percussion directe sur la
d6f alte est ici sensible, car ces men6es factieuses ont
aggrav6 les divisions du pays, alt6r6 sa confiance
en lui-m6me, dans ses institutions, dans son id^al,
et, par lä mßme, compromis sa capacit^ de r^sis-
tance dans le danger.
Adressez-vous d'autre part aux Champions de
la parit6-or ä tout prix et de la d6flation ä ou-
trance. Ce sont les coupables de cette mis6re, de
cette souffrance, de cette rövolte des classes labo-
rieuses dont les 61ections de mai 36 ont 6t6 l'ex-
pression, l'expansion. Ici encore, r^percussion di-
recte du pays au moment oĂĽ le r^armement mas-
sif s'imposait. Ici est la cause d'une grande partie
des difficult6s techniques qu'on a eu tant de peine
ä apaiser. Dressez le bilan. Faites le compte des
usines ferm^es ou 6teintes, des outillages non en-
tretenus ou non renouvel^s, parce que les marges
b6n6ficiaires ne permettaient plus ni amortisse-
ment, ni investissement, des sp^cialistes disperses
ou us6s par le chömage.
Eux pouvaient choisir et ont choisl librement
leur politique. La nötre nous 6tait dict6e par la
leur. Ou plutöt nous ne pouvions plus choisir nous
qu'entre la politique que nous avons pratiqu6e... et
la guerre civile, qui n'6talt assur6ment pas le plus
~ 58 ^
— 59 -
"»'
i:
i*
!..
II
sür moyen d'acc616rer les fabrlcatlons et qul n'ötalt
probablement pas non plus le meilleur moyen
d'6viter la guerre 6trang6re.
Notre devoir — le devoir de notre Charge —
6tait de prävenir ce fl6au... II 6tait de ranimer la
confiance du pays dans les institutlons libres —
et par cons6quent de nous montrer ' scrupuleuse-
ment fidfeles au Programme qu'avalt fall pr6valolr
la volonte du suffrage universel. II 6tait de ranimer
une 6conomie ^puis6e et 6tiol6e, par des möthodes
contraires ä Celles dont l'^chec avait jet6 le pays
dans une condition si reaoutable. Ce devoir, nous
Tavons rempli. Si vous estimez, comme M. le pro-
cureur g6n6ral, que son accomplissement 6tait
nuisible aux int6r6ts du pays, commencez par re-
chercher ceux qui nous l'avaient fait peser sur
les 6paules.
En remontant dans l'histoire des dlx demiferes
ann6es, vous n'avez donc pas le droit de vous ar-
rßter ä l'ötape que vous avez choisie. Le d61ai jurl-
dique de prescription peut seul vous fournir un
point de d6part. Vous auriez de la peine ä en trou-
ver un autre que justifiassent des raisons d'ordre
historique. En tout 6tat de cause, votre point de
d6part ä vous ne se justifie par rien, ä aucun point
de vue, ni historique, ni juridique. Ma d^monstra-
tion lä-dessus est p6remptoire, ce me semble, et je
crols que je puis mettre au d6fi l'accusation —
quelle que soit ragilit6 de sa dialectique — de
m'apporter lä-dessus une contradiction supporta-
ble. II ne peut s'expliquer que par une seule et
unique raison, que je ne veux pas r6p6ter et dont
vous voudrez assur6ment vous d6fendre. Si vous
pers6v6rez dans le systäme de l'lnstniction du
r^quisitoire et de l'arr^t de renvol, vous proclame-
riez par lä meme que ce proc6s est une entreprise
politique, que vous fetes des juges politiques et
nous n'aurions plus qu'ä en enregistrer tristement
l'aveu.
\i
DEFENSE DE LEON BLUM
Audience du mardi 10 mars 1942
M. LE PR^roENT. — L'audience est ouverte.
M. Ltov Blum. — Tout d'abord, 11 y a un point
que je voudrais fixer devant La Cour et qui la
surprendra peut-6tre un peu : je voudrais dire un
mot de la dur6e exacte de mon existence ministe-
rielle. II semble que ce soit un point qui ne devrait
präter ä aucune contestation. /
M. LE President. — Du 4 juin 1936 au 23 juln
1937 vous avez 6t6 pr6sident du Conseil. Vous avez
6t6 6galement vice-pr6sident du Conseil du 23 juin
1937 au 18 j an vier 1938. Vous 6tes revenu pr6sident
du Conseil du 23 mars 1938 au 7 avril 1938.
M. LfioN Blum. — C'est exact, M. le Präsident.
Mais au cours de l'lnstructlon, il y a eu une
tendance assez curieuse ä rallonger tout ä la fois
et ä raccourcir mon existence ministerielle. Voici
ce que j'entends par lä.
J'ai pris le pouvoir en effet le 4 juin au soir. Les
61ections g6n6rales avalent eu Heu le 26 avril et
le 3 mal. Entre cette date du 3 mal et le 4 juin.
11 y a un Intervalle, un inter-rägne d'un mois ä
peu pr6s. Or, 11 y a eu tr6s certainement. si j'en
juge par les conversations avec le magistrat ins-
tructeur, certaine tendance ä anticiper quelque peu
sur mon arriv6e reelle au pouvoir et ä comprendre
d'avance dans mon gouvernement tout le mois
qui s'est 6coul6 depuis le r6sultat d6finitif des
eiections g6n6rales. Je ne m'en 6tonne pas autre-
ment. pulsque ce mois de l'inter-r6gne a 6t6 6ga-
lement le mois pendant lequel a commenc6 et s'est
d^veloppe le mouvement des occupations d'usines.
•: i
\l
60
â–
,
0
Je tlens ä pr6ciser trfes exactement que pendant
ce mois, je n'6tais pas le chef du gouvernement.
Je sals qu'on a lnsist6 aupräs de < mon aml >
Albert Sarraut pour qu'il ^onnät sa d6mlssion dfes
que le r6sultat des ^lections fut connu. On a, d'au-
tre part, insist^ auprös de moi pour que je fasse
pression sur lui et que je m'empare imm6diatement
du pouvoir pour lequel je me trouvais d6sign6 par
le r^sultat des 61ections. Ni M. Sarraut ni moi ne
l'avons voulu. M. Sarraut, parce qu'il n'6tait pas,
comme c'^tait arriv6 dans des circonstances an-
t^rieures, un vaincu de la bataille 61ectorale. II
appartenait ä un parti, le parti radical, qul avait
6t6 un des partis int6gr6s dans la coalition du
Front Populaire. D'autre part, il n'6tait pas dans
la nature d'Albert Sarraut, qui est un hemme cou-
rageux et d'un courage chevaleresque, de se d6-
rober devant une Situation difficile. Quant ä moi, •
je me suis refus6 ä toute Intervention et ä toute
pression de ce genre, pour des motifs que j'al,
d'ailleurs, expos6s publiquement, parce que je te-
nais, en raison mfeme des circonstances, ä ce que
la transmission du pouvoir s'op6rät dans des con-
ditions irr6prochables de 16galit6 r6publicaine «t
de correction constitutionnelle.
On m'a beaucoup interrogö sur les contacts que
J'avais eus avec M. Albert Sarraut pendant ce mois,
comme si — vous savez que c'6tait ma r^putation
— j'avais jou6 pendant ce mois mon röle habituel
d'6minence grise, protecteur et tyran des gouver-
nements ! Pendant ce mois, j'ai vu M. Albert Sar-
raut deux fois. II est venu me voir un jour dans
mon appartement du quai Bourbon avec M. Paul-
Boncour, ministre d'Etat, charg6 de l'int^rim du
ministdre des affaires 6trangöres, pendant une In-
disposition de M. Flandin qui en 6tait titulaire.
Je ne ferais pas allusion ä cet incident, si M. Flan-
din lui-m6me, ä la Chambre, ne l'avait rendu pu-
blic... M. Flandin essayait ä ce moment de renouer
_- 61 —
avec ritalie des relations plus cordiales et il avait
con?u rid6e non pas d'une dömarche directe ä
Rome, mais d'un sondage pr6alable ä Londres. MM.
Albert Sarraut et Paul-Boncour sont venus m'en
entretenir. Je leur ai r6pondu que je n'acceptais
pas d'fetre une espfece de m6decin Consultant dans
les affaires dont je ne connaissais pas le detail.
Ils ont insist6 et m'ont demand6 un conseil d'aml
que je ne leur ai plus refus6 et dans l'espöce, sans
entrer dans des details plus approfondis, les cir-
constances ont, je crois, montr6 que ce conseil
6tait bon.
J'ai revu une seconde fols M. Albert Sarraut qui
m'a demand6 de passer au ministäre de l'intörieur
un jour que, en feuilletant une collection de jour-
naux, je pourrais pr6ciser ; je crois que c'^tait le
samedi 30 mal. Le mouvement des occupations
6tait, das ce moment-lä, devenu extrßmement alar-
mant. M. Albert Sarraut m'a demand6 de joindre
mes efforts aux siens dans une d6marche qu'il
ex6cutait auprös de la Conf6d6ration G6n6rale du
Travail. D m'a pri6 de la faire. Je l'ai faite.
Voilä toute mon immixtion dahs le gouverne-
ment de la R^publique pendant le mois oĂĽ j'6tais,
suivant une expression de M. Paul Reynaud, une
Sorte de < dauphin couronn6 >.
«>
y
l
ET M. CAMILLE CHAUTEMPS ?
Cette extenslon' de mon gouvernement, en antl-
cipa'nt sur sa naissance, j'ai eu le sentiment qu'on
l'essayait aussi en le prolongeant au delä de son
terme. Vous venez de lire vous-mäme, M. le Pre-
sident, une pi6ce dans laquelle je suis qualifi6 d'an-
cien President et d'ancien vice-pr6sident du Conseil ;
J'al, en effet, 6te vice-pr6sident du cabinet Camille
Chautemps. J'al 6t6 renvers^ par le S6nat.
L !
f
t
1
— 62
63
Le S6nat avalt rejet6 un pro j et vot6 par la Cham-
bre des d6put6s et sur lequel j'avais pos6 devant
lui la question de confiance. Les condltions de ma
chute risquaient ainsi de cr^er un confUt entre
les deux assembl6es. Car, 11 n'y a aucun doute que
la Chambre des d6put6s, si je le lui avais demand6,
aurait pers6v6r6 dans son vote, et ce conflit entre
les deux Chambres, 6tant donn^ les condltions g6-
nörales de la vle publique en France ä cette 6po-
que, 6tait de nature ä d6terminer une crise politl-
que assez redoutable.
J'ai eu le soucl, ä ce moment, d'assurer, dans
toute la mesure possible, la transmisslon r6guli6re,
la transmisslon paisible du pouvoir. C'est la raison
prlncipale pour laquelle j'ai accept6 d'entrer dans
le cabinet de M. Camille Chautemps qui d'ailleurs,
je dois le dire, pendant toui le cours de notre col-
laboration d'un an et m6me d'un peu davantage,
avait 6t6 pour mol le collaborateur le plus affec-
tueux et le plus empress6. J'ai donc accept6. Mals
je n'6tais pas plus le chef du gouvernement, apr^s
le 13 juin 1937, que je n'6tals chef du gouverne-
ment avant le 4 juin 1936.
Le magistrat Instructeur, dans une des visltes
qu'il m'a faltes ä Chazeron, m'a dlt, avec une dou-
ceur flatteuse assur6ment, mals redoutable :
€ Comment, quand un homme comme vous est dans
le gouvernement. tout le monde sait blen qu'il en
est le v6ritable chef ! » II n'en 6tait rien.
M. Chautemps 6talt bien le chef du gouverne-
ment qu'il pr6sldait, et pen(|ant toute cette
Periode je me suis efforc6, au contraire, parce
que c'6tait entre lui et mol une question de
d^licatesse 616mentaire, de m'effacer et de r6server
mon attitude autant qu'il m'a 6t6 possible. M.
Chautemps et M. Georges Bonnet. qui 6tait ministre
des finances, ont entrepris aussltöt une politique
6conomique et financiöre entlferement contraire ä
Celle que j'avais pratiqu6e et qui n'6tait pas sans
(
m'alarmer. J'avais mol möme, ä un moment donn6,
en mars, proclam^ la n^cessitö d'une pause. Mais
une pause n'est pas un rebroussement et je redou-
tais, je l'avoue, d'une faQon tr6s sensible, les effets
d'un retour ä la politique d'6quilibre budg^talre
comptable et de superfiscalit6. Pourtant j'ai loya-
lement couvert, devant mon parti, et m6me devant
xles assembl6es populaires, cette politique que je
n'approuvais pas.
Pendant^ toute cette p6rlode d'ailleurs oĂĽ des
soucis personnels m'ont beaucoup s6par6 de la via
publique, je crois ne m'fitre occup^ d'aucune affalre
importante, si ce n'est de la nationallsation des
chemins de fer avec M. Queuille, affalre oĂĽ j'ai
pu obtenir des rösultats Importants, bien qu'insuf-
flsants ä mon gr6. Par cons6quent — j'en suis
fächi6 — je ne peux accepter cette maniäre de voir
qui s'est d'ailleurs att6nu6e, car je ne crois pas
avoir 6t6 qualifi^ d'ancien vice-pr6sldent du Conseil
dans tous les derniers actes de la Cour. Ce serait
d'ailleurs quelque chose d'assez 6trange, vous en
conviendrez, que je sols Icl retenu comme vice-pr6-
sldent du conseil d'un gouvernement dont le pr6-
sident est, en ce moment. nanti d'une misslon offl-
cielle dans un pays 6tranger, solt par le gouverne-
ment, solt par le Chef de l'Etat. Et je ne peux
m'empfecher de faire ä ce sujet une Observation qui,
ä mon avis, marque dans quelle Intention pro-
fonde ce proc6s a 6t6 entrepris.
Car enfin, M. le President, vous reveniez tout ä
l'heure sur cette afflrmation que vous ne perdez
aucune occaslon de r6it6rer, peut-6tre pour mleux
vous convaincre vous-mfime...
M. LE Prästoent. — Parce que c'est l'^vldence,
parce que les faits parlent d'eux-mĂźmes 1
M. LÄON Blum. — Nous entrerons dans ce d6bat
sur le fond quand vous voudrez. sur la question
de savoir si la Periode de juin 1936 ä juin 1937 cor-
I
â– â– *
k
— 64 —
resoond en effet äi une Periode partlcuUferement
crlCe des relatlons tranco-allemandes, et Je me
?Ils fort de vous persuader du contralre. Mai» en-
ta en tout ca., le gouvernement Chautemps se
tföuve Placfe Pendant cette p6rlode suspecte La
nhases • 11 y a tout d'abord une Phase Blum — je
su^blen obUge de me nommer le premler c'est,
lä Chronologie qul l'exlge - et 11 y a ensulte une
Phase Chautemps...
M. Daladier. — Oul !
M L60N BLUM. - ...qul dure prfes d'un an ; 11 7
a ensulte une phase Daladier. M. Daladier est lä.
Je sms lä ! Et' l'homme qul se place entre nous
deux je le r^pöte. est en ce moment nantl dune
mlssion offlclelle du gouvernement ou du Chef
de l'Etat.
M LE PRESIDENT. - H Importc peu ! Je veux pr6-
clser slmplement la Situation ; 11 n'est pas questlon
de vous reprocher ä aucun moment l^s actes de
M. Chautemps.
M LĂ„ON BLUM. - Non, M. le Pr6sident. Cepen-
dant je le r6pfete. dans les Premiers actes de la
Sdure je suis quallfi6 d'anclen vlce-pr6sident
fu conse'l. en mĂźme temps que d'anclen pr^^dent
du Consell H est trfes Important de soullgner ce
1 alt M Chautemps se place bien dans la p6rlode
suspecte Les dangers dont vous parlez 6talent-lls
moTndres pendant les deux ^^^l^\''f''''^\^^^^^^
mestre 1937 et au commencement de 1 ann^e 1938 /
?e peux rn^^e vous dlre que c'est pendant cette
plrlode par exemple, que les Insufflsances quall-
?atives de notre mat^riel d'avlation sont apparues
pour la premiäre f ols d'une f agon tout ä falt frap-
pante. Car pendant le premler semestre de 1937
notre mat^rlel d'avlatlon, dans cette espfece de hanc
d'6preuve qu'6talt la guerre clvile d'Espa^e 6talt
encore consld6r6 comme le meUleur mat6riel en
-^ 65 —
Ugne C'est vers la fln de 1937 que la rövolutlon
technlque, dont parle un des t6molns, a commencö
ä se tradulre sur les fabrlcatlons en s6rle.
J'ai donc le droit de dlre que l'intentlon du
procös apparalt Icl d'une fa^on tout ä falt partl-
cuUäre. Je ne parle pas sp6clalement pour la Cour.
Je ne demande pas que M. Chautemps vienne.
pendant que nous nous serrerlons un peu, prendre
place Icl ä un des bancs oü nous sommes assis
nous-memes, blen que j'aie ^t6 assez son aml pour
regretter qu'il ne soit pas ä notre place plutöt qu ä
la slenne. Mals cependant, le falt d'avolr projet^
hors du d6bat les affaires mllitaires d'une part.
le falt d'extralre artlflciellement dans cette Pe-
riode de 1936 ä 1939, un des gouvemements qul
ont rempU cet Intervalle, d'autre part, ne mon-
trent-lls pas — et avec une 6vldence tanglble, con-
cräte. salsissante — une Intention poUtique contre
certalns hommes consld^r^s comme Incamant par-
ticuliferement une certaine conception politique.
Intention qul est ä l'origlne de ce procös.
POUR L'UNITE ET L'ARMEMENT
DE LA FRANCE
Cette Observation de ma part est 16gitlme Je
voudrals en faire une autre. On a plus ou molns
prolong6 mon premler gouvernement ; on lui a
ajout^ une espfece d'exJstence avant terme et en-
sulte une espfece d'exlstence posthume. Mals j al 6t6,
comme vous l'avez dlt, deux fols chef de gouver-
nement. J'avoue que je suis 6tonn6 du peu de
place que mon second gouvernement a teiiu dans
['Instruction, n semble que personne ne sen solt
pr6occup6, qu'il n'alt 6velll6 aucune espöce de
curlosltÄ. II n'a pas M long : 11 n'a mßme pas
— 66 —
dur6 un mois. Tout le monde savait qu'il serait
court quand il a commenc6 et, je vous l'assure.
je le savais aussi bien que personne. Cependant il
a .6t6 marquö par des 6v6nements que vous n'avez
pas le droit d'omettre si vous voulez approfondir
ce que j'ap0ellerai la moralitö politique de ce
proc^s.
M. LE President. — Vous parlez des 6v6nements
ext^rleurs du 15 mars 1938 ?
M. Leon Blum. — Je vais pr^ciser, M. le Presi-
dent. Les ev^nements dont vous parlez 6taient ac-
complis quand je suis arriv6 au pouvoir. Mon gou-
vernement est du 13 mars et l'Anschluss est du 11
A la Premiere nouvelle des 6v6nements ext6rieurs
dont vous parlez. j'ai obtenu l'adh^sion de mon
Parti ä ce que j'appelais l'unit^ franQaise. Ce
n'^tait pas la premifere fois que j'essayais de la
röaliser. A la fin de janvier. entre les deux minis-
t^res de M. Chautemps, le President de la R6pu-
blique m'avait appel^. D^s ce moment, je lui avais
indiqu6 que je croyais n^cessaire de provoquer ce
que j'appelais dans une interview donnee ä ce mo-
ment-lä ä des journalistes : « Un accord Matignon
politique ». M. Lebrun m'a demand^ : « Croyez-
vous 6tre l'homme le plus indiquö pour tenter un
groupement unanime de ce genre ^ :> Je lui al
r^pondu : « Non ! Je ne crois pas ätre l'homme
indiqu6. » — Qul pensez-vous qui puisse le r6a-
liser mieux que vous ? » J'ai prononc6 le nom de
M. Edouard Herriot. M. Lebrun m'a pri6 d'aller le
lui proposer, ce que j'ai fait. Je suis all6 trouver
M. Herriot : je lui ai fait cette proposition de la
part du Präsident de la Räpublique : eile n'a
pas abouti.
Mais en mars, chargä cette fois d'une facon
pressante. Instante, de constituer un gouverne-
ment, c'est ce que j'ai essayö. Peut-6tre. mainte-
nant que j 'Oriente rotre memoire vers ces souve-
V
y
— 67 —
nirs. reviennent-ils ä votre esprit ? J'ai convoque
tout d'abord chez moi les diff6rents Präsident des
groupes, y compris les groupes de la droite de la
Chambre, en leur demandant si, sous l'appel des
circonstances extärieures, ils consentiralent ä en-
trer dans un gouvemement d'unitä frangaise. Je
leur ai dit et r6pät6 que s'ils pensaient que ce grou-
pement fĂĽt plus facile autour d'un autre homme
que moi, j'etais pret ä m'effacer. Presque tous les
präsidents des groupes se sont däclaräs d'accord,
mais ils ont trouvä de la resistance quand ils ont
consultö leurs groupes respectifs. Qu'ai-je fait
alors ? C'est un äv6nement parlementaire assez
original. En pleine crise, j'ai reuni ä la Chambre,
dans la plus spacieuse des salles de la Chambre
qu'on appelle la salle Colbert, tous les deputes de
l'cpposition. Je leur ai adresse un appel direct, ins-
tant, et je crois. ä certains moments. assez pathä-
tique pour qu'oubliant toutes nos divisions, toutes
nos controverses, nous essayions de tomber d'ac-
cord pour un gouvernement commun. Je leur al
räp6t6 ce que j 'avais dit ä leurs repräsentants quel-
ques heures auparavant : « Si vous pensez qu'un
autre homme puisse plus aisement que moi obtenir
ce qu'en ce moment je vous demande, dites-le et je
me retire aussitöt ». Je crois que quand j'ai quittä
la salle Colbert, il y avait eu en moi assez de con-
viction et d'6motion pour que j'aie gagn6 l'adhä-
sion ä peu präs unanime. Quand je me suis retir^,
je ne voudrais pas nommer les hommes qui sont
venus me serrer les mains en exprimant le regret
d'avoir peut-6tre port6 sur moi, ä d'autres moments,
des jugements peu äquitables. Mais apräs mon dä-
part d'autres orateurs sont venus. L'effet que
j 'avais produit a etä effacä par d'autres discours
et je n'ai pas obtenu ce que Je däsirats.
J'ai alors form6 un gouvernement. Relisez ä
VOfficiel la s6ance de ma Präsentation devant la
Chambre. A la tribune, j'ai räpätä ä l'opposition :
— 68 —
< Les circonstances exlgeralent en ce moment
l'unlon de ious le« Frangals : Je l'al offert Je l'offre
encore Dltes un mot, faltes un gaste et Je descends
de cette tribune pour aller porter ma d6mission
au President de la R6publique, et lui d^signer
rhomme qui pourrait le mieux r6ussir dans l'en-
treprise que J'ai tent6e vainement >. Les m6mes
hommes qui avaient provoqu^ ce revirement dans
la r^union de la salle Colbert m'ont alors r^pondu
par un refus et c'est ainsi qu'a commenc6 mon
second gouvernement.
Ne croyez-vous pas, que du point de vue de la
moralit6 politique de ce procäs, cela pr^sentait une
certaine importance ?
M. LE President. — La moralit6 politique de ce
proc6s est une question purement subjectlve que
chacun appr^cie ä sa faQon. Pour la Cour, le pro-
cös n'est pas et ne sera Jamals un procfes politique.
M. Leon Blum. — II l'est et le sera malgr^ vous.
M. LE President. — Pas pour la Cour, Je vous
l'assure.
M. L60N Blum. — II Fest par sa matiöre m6me.
Ne cherchez pas, dans mes paroles, Monsieur le
President, un sens qui n'y est pas. Cela ne d6pend
pas de la Cour. Mais en ce qui me concerne, Je ne
peux pas ne pas consid6rer que la matifere de
l'accusation est purement politique. Ce qu'on in-
crimine en soi, c'est ce qu'on a appel6 « un climat
social », cette expression a d6Jä fait fortune. Vous
parlez d'impression subjective : une impressiot)
subjectlve se nourrit d'un certain nombre d'öle-
ments. Je ne crois pas que ceux que J'ai fournis ä
la Cour soient lndiff6rents, et Je ne crois pas que
Je sois en dehors da cette psychose du procäs.
comme vous le disiez.
II y a eu autre chose durant ce court gouver-
nement. J'ai fait autre chose. J'ai d4pos6 un grand
__ 69 —
proJet fiscal, frlf le's6naTt'auird.te'rminl
ma <=1^"*«- ",f"^u dossler Oh 1 11 n'est pas facUe
ce projet. II est au aossier yj ^^^
de l'y trouver, mals 11 ^ ^!^„Vous a volturtes ü
des «normes «'^nttaes QU on nous a ^^^ ^^^^^^^
Bourrassol ; 11 ^S'^P^™""!, „,„„,„„ des flnances
des procfes-verbaux de ^%.^°'^f^^%r'ousietiez
de la Chambre. Mals enJm 11 y e^t. Si vou ^^^^^^
les yeux sur ce projet e^^^^^™^ ..^ige par
et *<=°nr^h.r.le U se place s„r le plan d'une
rfeconomle liberale , u se P'" ^j ^ changes,
6conomle de guerre. II v se le com^^ Interieurs,
la crfeatlon <i«%«°75''„„.tr „ermeTd'af f ecter pr6-
un contröle des devises «"i^ .P^!^*' remläres, des
cistoent ä l'achat des matiferes prem .^^^^^^_^
machlnes-outil. et ^es^ P^odmts finls ^^^^^ ^^^^
au riarmement. II ferme le circu
de ne pas compter ave«: les cr^dlts. de^e P^^^^^^ ^^
ter avec les f! f/ll'orrde rfa^ement. II POse
^L .es ----- ^,3 „ vous
Pendant ce ^^^^^^^^^l^^^l^. remnli s'est placee
le voyez assez ^°-;;^^^^^^^ a parle ä
aussi cette crise ouvrläie a^t contrats
propos de la r^union ^u 15 mars ly^^
?ollectifs conclus pour^^^^^^^^^ ^^ ,,
1936 avaient 6t6 r^conduii^ ^^ ^^^^^
au mois de Juin 1937. J^^^^^^^^^^^^ pure
nat n'acceptaU p^s un no^v lle^^^^^^^^^ ^^^
et simple ; et c est ^e aeoa Qu'ai-Je
collectifs qui ^tait ä lorlgme ae i»
. ii
■■»«#•««••'
_ 70 —
fait, apräs la r6union du 15 mars ? J'ai aussitöt
entrepris une nögoclation, qui essayait de fondre
la r^vision des contrats collectifs et la r^vision des
salaires — sur laquelle un arbitrage aurait incon-
testablement accord6 satisfaction aux ouvriers —
avec la question des heures suppl6mentaires. J'ai
fait accepter par les ouvriers le principe de cinq
heures suppl^mentaires ou plutöt la principe de
la semaine de 45 heures consid6r6e comme nor-
male, non seulement dans les Etablissements de
l'aviation, mais aussi de la guerre, et dans les Eta-
blissements travaillant indirectement pour la d6-
fense nationale. Cela, qui a 6tE ä l'origine des sen-
tences Jacomet et Giraud. mEritait aussi de ne pas
Etre EcartE du d6bat
Cette question de dates de mes gouvernements.
comme vous le voyez, n'Etait pas si simple nl sl
Elementaire. Au fond, personne n'incrimine mon
second gouvemement ; je ne vois rien qui s'y
rapporte dans le rEquisitoire. J'ai fixe les limites
exactes de mon premier gouvernement. II est donc
entendu que c'est de ce qui s'est passE entre le
4 juin 1936 au soir et le jour de ma chute, le 17
juin 1937, que j'ai ä r6pondre devant la Cour.
A
Je voudrais encore aj outer quelques mots qui
röpondent d'ailleurs ä une Observation que vous
avez falte de vous-mEme, Monsieur le President :
cette Observation est Evidente : par cela mEme eile
apparait superflue, mais je tiens pourtant ä la
formuler
II n'appartient evidemment pas ä la Cour
SuprEme de juger ma politique. Je dis « ma » et
je serai träs souvent au cours de mes explications,
amene ä dire : « ma » bien qu'il s'agisse d'une poli-
L,t - — »«
— 71 —
tique qui a Et6 mienne en ce sens que j'Etais chef
du gouvernement, mais enfln, qui a 6t6 celle d'un
gouvernement uni...
M. LE PR^sn)ENT. — Gouvemement dont vous
Etiez l'animateur.
M. Leon Blum. — J'espEre en avoir EtE l'anima-
teur. Je disais donc que vous n'aviez pas ä juger
cette politique en soi, ni mEme ä la juger par un
rapport ä l'ensemble de la conjoncture politique.
Vous n'Etes nl une acadEmie, ni une assemblEe
dElibErante : vous etes des juges. Ma respon-
sabilitE politique, c'est devant les assemblEes qu'elle
Etait en jeu, eile a constamment EtE couverte en
toute matiEre par de fortes maioritEs, quand ce
n'Etait pas des votes unanimes. Pour vous. la ques-
tion n'est pas lä. Vous disiez au cours d'une de
ces demiEres audiences, qu'en ce qui concerne les
opErations militaires, ce sont les Clausewitz et les
Jomini de l'av^nir qui les apprEcieront aprEs de
longues annEes de recherches d'archives. Vous me
permettrez de ne pas partager votre opinion sur
ce point. Je crois qu'il s'agit lä de choses claires,
Evidentes, dont beaucoup Echappent ä toute con-
troverse, et laissez-moi vous le dire. quand vous
prononciez cette parole, eile contenait un juge-
ment bien sEvEre sur le debat mEme auquel vous
prEsidez. Car s'il est vraiment impossible aujour-
d'hui d'Emettre une apprEciatlon sur des doctrines
militaires, des conceptions militaires ou des Opera-
tions militaires qui, de toute Evidence, ont EtE la
cause dEterminante du dEsastre militaire, que veut-
on dire par lä si ce n'est que ce procEs ne pouvalt
pas Etre jugE ä l'heure prEsente...
M. LE President. — J'ai dit qu'il n'appartenait
pas ä la Cour d'en juger, c'est tout ce que j'ai
dit. Car enfln, c'est tellement Evident, qu'on dls-
cute encore sur les fautes que NapolEon a pu com-
mettre ä la bataille de Waterloo.
Y
-72-
M UoN BLĂśM. - Oul. mals U y a d'autres lautes
certalnes, m6me quand 11 s'aglt de NaPol^on et U y
a des eomparalsons qul rlsqueralent d etre bles-
santes pour ceux qul en sont l'objet.
Ce aue vous avez dlt des Operations mlUtalres
dev^ent au contralre trts vrai d'une PoUtlQue qu
o It^ pomolexe qul a 6t6 controvers6e, qul avalt
^ef^^rS^^nsV pass.. «ui aura des retentlsse-
ments dans Vavenlr, qul a m6me son retentlsse-
SeSt icl, ä l'heure präsente Et alors oul^es
vral en ce qul concerne cette politlque, peut-etre
In effet faudra-t-U attendre les TocquevlUe. les
Taine de Vavenlr pour la juger apr6s de longues
Inn/es de travaux Mals cette recherche en tout
cas ce n'est pas ä vous qu'elle appartlent. Vous
n^Vez pas ä apprfecler ma poUtlque en soi ; vous
n'avez pas ä rappr^cler dans ses rapports avec la
conToncture poUtlque generale : vous avez unl-
quement Tl'apprecler dans la catfegorle de ses
S posslbles. A-t-elle eu. oul ou non PO"r rfcul_
tat de concourlr au passage de l'fetat de palx a
mat de gucrre ? a-t-elle eu, oul on non. pour
risultat d'aggraver la Situation alnsl cr66e ? Je
cro?s qu'lln'y a pas de dlscusslon posslble sur ce
nolnt Sl je transpose ces formules sur le plan de
fa poUtlque concrfete. ä quol aboutlssent-e les ?
Cela revlent ä dlre : mes lols sociales et la fa?on
dont je les al appUqufees ont-elles, oul ou non,
provoque des entraves ou des retards dans la con-
ceotlon des programmes d'armement, qul 6talt
d'alUeurs, eux aussl. l'ceuvre de mon gouverne-
ment « mon » fetant prls dans le sens que je vlens
d'lnd quer et sans que je pense un Instant ä
rtdulre la part et le mferlte d'lnltlatlves qul appar-
tlennent ä Edouard Daladler.
Que sult-11 de lä ? n suit de lä que Vaccusa-
tion dlrlgSe contre mol a un caractfere, comment
dlre ? un caracttre Indlrect, un caractfere secon-
dalre peut-6tre. plus exactement : un caractftre
imi«%tm<tm -yrnttt
»•**•
►•V^c^^
.jU
_ 78 —
condltionnel. Car. enfln, l'*^<="f ""V* f^e^'mon
les retards et entraves que la Po""Ti' »on du
gouvemement auralt apportfes ä 1 "^f =";Xg^':
?raves n'exlstalent pas, comment ma PO""^"/^
powrralt-elle 6tre lncrlmta6e, ^<:°««l«^„^;;'^j« J^:
?aii<^p<5 d'un falt qul n'exlste pas ? 11 laudraii coro
L'e'ncIrVarchercler cette preuve. et Je - P«me
^aÄe' marqu^^rÄvf c^Sr e^ d.^
l^ur e^n^ral Jaconiet. EUe s'est d6gag6e de toute
l iSe OTfeente que le Programme d-armemem a
et sulflsants besolns de Varmie, tels qu lls «aieni
e&tlmes par le commandement...
M I.E Piii;sn)KNT. - Attendez que nous ayons
eco!fte fĂĽr cfpXt les d^positlons des t^moins.
M i*.oH BLUM — Je prends acte en ce moment
des*^.^?s qul^e sont ü^-ul^ J-qjrä Theureju
^^^ttlsTlÄTmur\'cS?r:""ul rert?t dS
TĂ„m"m tfen Ixtraordlnalre ^PO- - P-
g?amrae d'armement Iransais, mais ĂĽ a 6t6 ex6cut.
en avance.
M. i^ PRocüREUR GtN^RAL. - Nous sommes tout ä
f alt en d^saccord.
x;r TvHK BLUM — Mals VOUS ßtcs en d6saccord
«vP^'toTce qu^a MHMi ä rinstruction 6crlte
pt Sit Tusau^ pr4nt dans ce d^bat. En tout cas
et dlt jusQua Pres>eiiu commencez par
j'aurais le droit de vous aire .
aMBia
I
— 74 -
m'apporter cette preuve; vous ne pouvez vous adres-
ser ä moi, qu'apräs que vous l'aurez etablie. Je ne
peux intervenir qu'ensuite. Encore une fois il n'y
a pas eu retard et entrave, et 6tant entendu que
vous ne pouvez rechercher ma politique que dans
la mesure oĂĽ eile les aurait provoqu6s, que signifie-
rait Taccusation dirig^e contre moi
Je ne peux pas ne pas dire cela, parce que, du
point de vue de ma defense, c'est un r^duit inexpu-
gnable; mais j'ajoute tout de suite que je n'ai au-
cune Intention de m'y enfermer. Je vais repondre ä
toutes vos questions, pour ^clairer la Cour. Et j'y
repondrai car je n'y r^ponds pas seulement pour
la Cour.
M. LE President. — Voulez-vous cependant r6pon-
dre ä la question que je vous ai posee au d^but de
l'audience ? Comment se fait-il que les modalit^s
d'application de la loi du 21 juin 36, dite « loi de
40 heures » n'aient 6t6 organis6es qu'ä la fin
de 1937 et en 1938, alors que cependant, en ce qui
concernait les Etablissements travaillant pour la
Defense nationale, rapplication de cette loi 6talt
organisee dös le 29 juin 1936 sans aucune d6ro-
gation ?.
M. L^ON Blum. — Je n'ai pas connu ces clrcu-
laires. Mais je n'en d6cline pas plus la responsa-
bilitö que de tout ce qui a pu se passer pendant
mon gouvernement et je montrerai avec Evidence
que leur effet sur le rendement de la production a
tt^ probablement nul ; car il n'est stabil nulle part
que pendant la Periode de mise en train du Pro-
gramme, les heures suppl^mentaires aient 6t6 n^ces-
saires.
Jusqu'ä pr6sent. on m'a toujours fait le reproche
contraire d'avoir hätE la mise en application de la
loi, et puisque vous tenez ä donner un caractöre
plus discursif ä des explications que j'essaie pour
— 75 —
ma part d'ordonner, je veux vous dire tout de suite
quelque chose que j'aurais €t6 amen6 ä vous dire
par la suite.
J'ai 6t6 au contraire presse de toutes parts d'a-
journer la Promulgation des räglements d'adminis-
tration publique d'oĂĽ d^pendait l'application de la
loi pour les particuliers. Que l'Etat ait donne l'exem-
ple et qu'il ait d'abord appliquE ies lois dans ses
propres Etablissements, c'est naturel. Mais pour l'in-
dustrie privee, la loi n'etait applicable qu'apräs la
publication des röglements d'admlnistration publi-
que qu'elle avait prEvus. La loi donnait d'ailleurs,
comme toutes Celles que j'ai fait voter ä cette 6po-
que. une trfes large dElEgation. C'est un procedE que
j'ai toujours appliquE, parce que je n'ai Jamals
voulu faire de dEcrets-lois et que je ne voulais pas
cependant que les lois que je prEsentais se perdis-
sent dans des discussions de dEtails sur des textes
trop minutieux. J'ai essave de parer ä cette diffl-
cultE en faisant toujours voter par les Chambres
des textes träs courts, posant d'une fagon precise
les principes memes de la loi, mais remettant aux
räglern'^nts d'admlnistration publique tous les de-
tails d'application; et je crois que cette m6thode est
bonne. II en a 6t6 ainsi pour la loi des 40 heures.
Mais eile prEvoyait notamment la consultation des
organisations syndicales et patronales. dont on de-
vait provoquer l'avis Ecrit. Elle supposait ensuite —
je ne crois pas me tromper blen que je n'ale pas
revu le texte depuis longtemps - l'avis du Conseu
national Economlque. Toute cette procEdure pre-
nait naturellement un certain temps. Je ne crois
pas qu'il ait Et6 possible daller plus vite Le rfegle-
ment d'admlnistration publique pour la mEtallurgie
est de septembre ou d'octobre...
M. LE PROCUREUr" GENERAL. — 11 CSt dU 27 OCtO-
bre 1936.
i.
*^* w,^
r
— 76 —
M LĂ„ON BLUM. -. II n'est doiic pas de d^cembre
1937 'mals d'octobre 1936. J'6tals 6tonn6. monsieur
le President, en vous entendant 6noncer votre date.
De juln ä octobre. c'est un d61ai minimum. et Ion
m'a demandö. ä ce moment-lä. de prolonger blen
autrement le d^lai. gavez-vous ce Qul s 6tait pass4
Dour la loi de 8 heures ? Elle n'6tait applicable, en
effet qu'au für et ä mesure Qu'elle 6tait appUqu^e
ä teile ou teile cat^gorie par un r^^ement d'admi-
nistration publique. Certalns de ces räglements n6-
talent pas encore pris aprös prös de 20 ans, quand
nous avons fait voter les 40 heures. Ce que Ion
m'a reproch^ ä V^poque, c'est d'ötre all6 trop vite.
On m'a reproch6 d'avoir appliqu^ la loi trop tot, de
l'avoir appliqu6e massivement, globalement. au lieu
de l'appliquer seulement pour certaines corpora-
tions. On m'a reproch^ de l'avoir appliqu^e d'un
coup au lieu de l'appliquer par partie.
Savez-vous pourquoi je l'ai fait ? Je vals vous le
dire tout de suite. Nos premiferes mesures avaient
incontestablement provoqu^ une reprise ^conomique.
II n'y a aucune esn^ce de doute. au'en septembre et
octobre 1936. dans l'industrie fran?aise, la demande
6tait suü^rieure ä l'offre. n n'existait plus de Stocks ;
le commerce se ranimait, et le fait que la demande
6tait sup^rieure ä l'offre provoquait d^jä une hausse,
avant mfeme que le r^sultat des lois sociales ait pu
s'incorporer dans les prix de revient. J'ai d^lib6r6
longuement ä Matignon avec un certain nombre
d'hommes parmi lesquels se trouvait Ren6 Belln,
que vous pourrez interroger lä-dessus, car j'ai l'ln-
tention de le citer comme t^moin. Nous avons dis-
cut6 la question de savoir s*il f allait faire une appli-
cation progressive, par cat^gories ou par paliers et
savez-vous ce qul nous a d6termin6s ? C'est qu'ä
cette ^poque nous nous sommes rendus compte que
le .patronat justifiait d^jä des. prix de gros tr6s 61e-
v6s en y incorporant d'avance le coĂĽt pr6sum6 de
la loi de 40 heures. Nous nous sommes dit : si nous
— 77 —
proo^dons pax paUers ou par cat^Borle.. noj^ aur«.s
deux hausses ^uccesslves et cumul6es ceue q
am r6alls6e. mn ^^^^'^'^^l '"et une seconde
t^rSa?e.^VĂ„m nouj a d.enn.. .
appliouer si vite la loi des 40 heures.
iur\ir P«isn)ENT - J'ai mal cit6 tout ä l'heure
M, LE PREsroEMT.. « ^Afonnrffie Je vais don-
la date de ce Gieret surlamitaUur^e.^eva
ner lecture de ^'^^}''\l*}±Te%Xneie au delä
Ä.?SirriSÄr.Ä de .a d«e.e
nationale ou d'un ««^^^ ^"^^„1^ .^^ ^ttendu 1938
Comment alors se falt-U «u on aii a
^"^ ^'''' ,rr4iU'r« de r^fensf nauonale?
Qu'il donnalt ö*«^ l^"^^"f-it s'est pass6 en 1938
rua"nVv°ouVSVaf PrÄt^u ''conseU. «als
je revlens sur ma question.
« . rkr. TIP neut pas isoler cette
M. UON BLUM. - ^",,iJ?^Ses de la question
vot6e. , .,. ^A
M. X. PHisn.^. r„YÄ mmÄ Itt ne
rr.riucur=vrifnt"f ce .ue vous y
r^pondiez par avance.
. « -^, tp np veux aucunement eluaer
vos^^t^ontrvoĂĽs's^e "auXueurs tacUe de .'In-
terrompre.
M. « PRESIDENT. - ce n'est pas de nature & vous
g^ner, j'en suis sĂĽr.
• I
i
— 78 —
M. Leon Blum. — Cela ne m'inquiäte en rlen, cn
effet.
M. LE President. — L'essentiel est que j'obtienne
les r^ponses qu'il vous conviendra de faire ä mes
questions. Si vous n'y r^pondez pas au cours de vos
explications, je les reprendrai par la suite.
M. Leon Blum. — n y a lä quelque chose que je
suis oblige d'^noncer tout d'abord ä la Cour, bien
que ce grief ne seit pas retenu par l'arr^t de renvoi,
mais enfin il a 6t6 formul^ par le Conseil de Jus-
tice politique...
M. LE President. — N'en parlons pas.
M. Leon Blum. — Ce qul s'est pass6 avant que
vous vous sovez r^unis n'existe pas pour vous.
avez-vous dit, mais il existe pour nous. Cela a pour
nous une existence sensible se traduisant par des
donn^es materielles concrfetes. Cela a eu aussi un
retentissement dans l'opinion et je suis d'autant
plus fond6 ä y r6pondre'aue ie trouve malgr6 tout
les traces de cette Charge dans le r^quisitoire.
LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
ET LES CREDITS MILITAIRES
La premiöre des charges relev6es contre moi par
le Conseil de Justice politique 6tait de n'avoir pas
donne ä la France les armes que sa securit6 exi-
geait. Je crois que je cite ä peu präs textuellement.
Je suis tout de möme Obligo, parce que cela tient
au Premier clief ä la moralit^ tout court ou la mo-
ralit6 politique de ce procfes, de dire ä la Cour ce
que j'ai fait au contraire pour donner ä la France
les armes que sa s^curit^ exigeait. Nous verrons
ensuite si. comme le sou tient Taccusation, j'ai repris
d'une main ce que j'avais donn6 de l'autre. Car. au
\
— 79
fond, c'est bien cette expression un peu vulgaire qui
fait le fond de l'accusation. Mais avant de savoir
ce que j'ai, parait-il, repris, il est peut-etre interes-
sant de savoir ce que j'ai donne.
Quand j'ai constitue mon gouvernement, j'avais
sur sa forme mäme un certain nombre d'id^es que
javais enoncees dans des articles de revues, puis
dans un livre qui a d'abord paru sans nom d'au-
teur et qui a ete ensuite reimprime sous mon nom.
J'avais explique comment, selon moi. devait 6tre
organisee la direction du gouvernement, avec un
President du Conseil sans portefeuille, avec un se-
cretariat göneral autour de ce pr6sident du Conseil.
J'avais explique que. selon moi, l'oeuvre de direction
et de coordination d'un chef de gouvernement ne
pouvait se concevoir que par le travail direct et
continu d'un President du Conseil avec chacun de
ses ministres. Ce travail direct est difficile avec un
nombre de ministres aussi eieve que le comportent
les cabinets... pas aujourd'hui... que le comportaient
hier les cabinets frangais. J'avais donc ete conduit
ä la conception d'un gouvernement constitue en un
certain nombre de groupes. Et, c'est peut-etre en-
core une de mes promesses que l'on tient, j'avais
dejä ä cette epoque pense ä une distinction entre
les ministres et les autres gerants de departements
ministeriels du meme groupe. ceux-ci n'etant que
des secretaires d'Etat. Je n'ai pas pu realiser compie-
tement cette conception, pour toutes sortes de rai-
sons. Cependant, il y a au moins un de ces groupes
qui a fonctionne d'une faQon serieuse; c'est juste-
ment le groupe de la Defense nationale. Quand le
gouvernement s'est constitue et que M. Daladier a
accepte d'etre mon collaborateur, il a tout de suite
ete entendu, sur sa demande d'aUleurs, qu'il ne
serait pas ministre de la guerre, mais ministre de la
Defense -nationale et de la Guerre. Les autres mi-
nistres^ charges de departements militalres, nous les
avons choisis ensemble. J'ai voulu qu'lls fussent ä
/
— 80 —
Aon nrÄ et i'ai d6slr6 qu'lls en lu&sent Inform^s de
mim comme une nuance de »^^^^Ination. Cest
ainsi Qu'a 6t6 choisl le ministre de la Marine. M.
G^nrDuparc. Qui. ä toutes ses ^^^^^^l^%'^^\
nelles en jolgnalt une dui. pour nous. avait beau-
S)UDkeprix. Celle d'ötre. ä cette ^poque. l'un des
X intXs amis de M. l'amiral I>arlan- C'est ai^^^^
que fut cholsi M. Pierre Cot, qul ne d^sira it pas du
tout 6tre ministre de l'Air. qui. au contraire insls-
tait pour qu'on lui donnät un autre d6partement
minis^riel et qui. je peux le dlre. sur mon pre-
mier projet de liste ministerielle, tigurait en effet
avec une autre afEectation.
Dfes la premiäre reunion du Conseil des minis-
trps le 6 iuin, Edouard Daladier a fait signer par
le President de la R6publique un d^cret qu'on a pu
completer ensulte en faisant ^^^^^^^'^J^^f^jt'
forme de Vexpörience acquise. mais qui 6tait le Pre-
mier texte connu qui organisät une coordination
permanente, sous la direction du ministre de la
mfense nationale, entre tous les d^artements ml-
Utaires. Et je me souviens que. quand nous avons
aultte ensemble VElys^e. Edouard Daladier m'a dit •
« Vous venez peut-6tre. par ce simple d6cret, de ren-
dre plus de Services ä la Defense nationale que beau-
coup de vos pr6decesseurs pendant de longs mois. »
En septembre. Edouard Daladier est venu me
trouver il m'a tenu un langage que vous connais-
sez d'avance. car celui-cl que je vais relater cor
respond exactement au compte rendu qu'il vous a
donne de ses conversations avec le g6n6ral Game-
Un • « Le Service de deux ans vlent d'ötre retabli
en Allemagne. II faut r6pondre. On peut r^pondre
de deux fagons, ou par une Prolongation de la
dur6e du servlce miUtaire. ou par un Programme
darmement >. Pour des raisons qui sont Celles
GU'll vous a de ja donn^es lul-mfeme, et dont la plus
forte 6tait que sur le terraln de la dur^e du ser-
R
f
— 81 —
Ă„Ă„ =rr Ar f ÂŁ. P-
exlstalt d6jä dans une cenaine mesure ^^
•^T. nn'ciir>^i :-p Urogramme etait consiaeit; wii"
Su def erMitrn.ires pour la mfense na-
"TaHe r.pondu ^^^^^^-^T^^'-I^
me tenlr ce langage? «"^^^ ^J^^ton de VAm^e du
s'est pr^sent^ ^Tet au onZ a d^and^ : < Etes-
S^nat en mars l^^* ^t au on ™ ^^ , ,
vous d'avls de retaWir le service a
dont 11 aalt probabement Partisan ^ « /^^y.
11 ar^pondu : *0«'/„t »Quand M. Fabry, en
que ne le Pe«n«"rait pas »^ "«f^ a dlt : « de
1935, est alle "!«^^,^,^,„^*n^ e^lres pour la Vf-
trfes larges «f '^''^ J^^^'^l lul a rfepondu : « Peut-
fense nationale », M- ^'f' 'J!\.e ne le permet pas;
6tre, mals la s"«*'^°" '""^'f^'avant mt ä la d6-
11 laut en ce «0»«"*^ '°"F/I,iiibre budgetaire. »
lense de la monna e ^t - »^^^ ,,^,,, q„e
J'aurals peut-6tre pu temr le langage
M. le «"^<^^t S"/urorV^nt de ma part aue
auralt m&me M ^°^^;.„\:..^,. au gouvernement
0 I
— 82 —
vote etait necessaire pour les faire passer — comme
ce fut le cas en 1929, pendant le ministere Herriot
qui, en tout cas, avait toujours propension ä deman-
der la reduction des credits militaires. J'avais dans
mon propre parti une minorite bruyante qui r6cla-
mait chaque jour le retour au Service d'un an. J'au-
riis pu dire aussi : « Non ! impossible. Je ne le peux
pas. II y a des ralsons politiques, des raisons de
parti qui m'en empechent ». Si j'avais r^pondu cela
j'aurais peut-6tre trahi les devoirs de ma Charge.
Si j'avais parl6 comme M. Pierre Laval, j'aurais
aussi des excuses fortes. Au d6but de notre minis-
tere, nous n'avons pas fait la d^valuation qui 6tait
pourtant, comme tout ie monde l'a dit, inscrite dans
ia n^essit^ des choses. Si nous l'avions faite au
d^but, nous aurions agi selon notre int^ret de gou-
vernement, car 11 aurait 6t6 sensible qu'elle 6tait
bien un legs, un h6ritage inevitable de la politique
de nos predecesseurs et de l'etat ^conomique du
pays tel qu'il nous 6tait transmis. Sans nous m6-
prendre aucunement sur cet inconv6nient politique,
nous l'avons cependant differee. Nous avons fait
une tentative, un essai d^sesp^r^, pour voir si les
Premiers r^sultats de la Stimulation 6conomique que
nous voulions injecter au pays ne rendralent pas
pr^cis^ment inutile une devaluation qui, pour tous
les salari^s, tous les rentiers, tous les d6tenteurs de
revenus fixes, quelques pr6cautions qu'on y prenne,
entralne des cons6quences cruelles. J'aurais pu dire:
« Y pensez-vous ? 14 milliards ! Nous allons annon-
cer 14 milliards de credits ! Mais alors que va deve-
nir notre monnaie ? Nous allons etre accul^s ä la
d6valuation ? » Et j'aurais 6t6 d'autant plus fond4 de
le dire que c'est ce qui s'est passe, que l'annonce
de ces cr6dits massifs a eu sur le march6 des chan-
ges une influence teile que nous avons et6 Obligos
d^s la seconde quinzaine de septembre de n^gocier
les accords tripartites avec l'Amerique et avec l'An-
gleterre et que nous avons convoqu^ le Parlement
â–
— 83 —
a la fin de septembre pour lul faire voter la deva-
luation. J'aurais pu dire cela. Si je l'avals fait.
j'aurais peut-ätre trahi les devoirs de ma Charge.
Dans l'une ou l'autre hypothfese. j'aurais fait
passer des pr6occupations politiques, des interĂźts
politiques, si haut«, si importants fussent-ils, avant
les interets de la Defense nationale. Est-ce que j'ai
dit un mot de cela ä Daladier ? Je vois encore notre
conversation ä Matignon. Je l'ai 6coute, je lui ai
serre la main et lui ai dit : « Vous pouvez compter
sur moi. C'est entendu. Je ferai tout le n6cessaire ».
Nous avons porte ensemble ce pro j et au Conseil des
ministres et il a 6te vot6 sans l'ombre d'une diffi-
culte. unanimement, ce qui est un fait sans exem-
ple dans l'histoire parlementaire de la R6publique
Est-ce que nous nous sommes bornes ä cela?
Car il y a le Programme de la guerre, mais en
mdme temps nous avons adopt6 pour l'aviation
le plan quinquennal, le plan des 1.500. Nous avons
consacre ä ce moment ä l'aviation de nouveaux
cr6dits considerables. Ce plan, un an apräs, c'est
entendu, n'etait pas encore execute. Cependant.
c'est dans le plan quinquennal que se trouyent
^es premiferes commandes de Moräne et de Bloch
isi qui sont entr^s ensuite dans le plan V. C'est
dans le plan des 1.500 que se trouvent les premife-
res commandes de Potez 63 qui y sont entr^s aussi.
Ces modales d'avions ont ete ensuite multl-
plies par la diligence de Guy La Chambre et ont
ete reiement principal de notre flotte de combat
au moment des hostilites. Pour la marine, nous
avons d6cid6 de mettre en train une nouvelle tran-
che du Programme naval sans attendre que la
tranche en cours fut achev^e. Le plan de la guerre
le plan de l'aeronautique. la decision prise pour
la marine, que M. l'amiral Darlan etait venu me
demander ä moi personnellement pour mieux me
convaincre — 11 n'y a pas eu de peine — j'ai Chif-
fre pour tout cela la depense, dans un debat de
/
i
I
I
— 84 —
vant le Sönat. en fin septembre, ä 20 mlUlards, et
encore je crols Dien que Je ne comprenals pas
dans cette estimation la tranche suppl6mentalre
du Programme naval, ce qul pourrait porter cette
döpense ä 22 ou 23 mllliards. II s'agit lä de la
premiäre estimation qui a 6t6 d6mesur6ment d6-
pass6e au cours de l'ex6cution, comme vous l'a dit
M. Daladier.
Ce que j'ai falt lä est malgr6 tout quelque chose
qul compte. Les magistrats qui r6digent un r6qui-
sitoire ne sont Jamals embarrass6s, bien entendu,
jnais enfln, peut-^tre malgr^ tout cette pens^e
s'est-elle « interf6r6e » entre eux et le papler sur
lequel ils ^crivaient. De ce que J'ai falt. de ce que
mon gouvernement a falt, encore une fois, pas un
Instant, Je ne veux usurper tout le mörite, mals
enfln, J'6tals le chef du gouvernement. On me
reproche d'avoir lalss6 faire la nationalisatlon
d'une certaine faQon. J'ai bien le droit de me tar-
guer d'avoir non seulement laiss6 faire, mals ald6
ä faire le r6armement masslf de la France dans
la mesure que l'^tat-major Jugeait n^cessalre ä
cette ^poque. On a dit : « Oüi ! Oui ! Naturelle-
ment vous avez falt ce Programme, seulement
nous savons bien avec quelle arriöre-pens6e. En
r6alit6, vous ne pensiez pas ä la Defense natio-
nale, mals au chömage ! » Je ne sais pas du tout oü
le Parquet a prls cette id6e.
M. i-E Procureur GÄNiRAL. — C'cst dans tous les
textes qui ont 6t6 publi^s. On y falt toujours allu-
sion au chömage, notamment lorsque vous sollici-
tez l'appui des organisations ouvrlferes.
M. LÄON Blum. — Je n'ai falt aucune demande
d'appui aux organisations ouvriferes. Je vous d6nie
le droit de suspecter ma bonne volont6. Pas une
fois, dans un texte venant de moi, vous ne trou-
verez cette id6e que les cr6dits sont destinös ä r6-
sorber le chömage. J'avais fait voter depuis plus
*
I'
— 88 —
de trols mols les mesures contre le chömage c'est-
ä^üre le Programme des grands travaux, la lol de
40 heures et aussl en septembre la ^^-^l^ «es pr6te
et des avances ä la moyenne et ä l^Petit Indus
irie. Mais l'aurals-je fait. seralt-ce bien orle'nal •
Si ravals dit aux organisations ouvrlferes • « » t^ut
rtaimer II le laut. Nous demandons dtoormes
Ss mals ces crMlts vont mettre en "aln des
labrcations consldferables qul auront auss pour
rSat et pour effet bientalsant de rödulre le cho-
S» : en auoi seralt-11 ^on^^^^r^^ ^.^^J^l'H
fol d'homme politlque ayant f«"" .^^ "^^^?f' „on
r^armer ? En rien. Mais j'ai falt llnverse. «on
seu™t Je n-al pas d6rlv6 versle chömage les
cr6dlts votös pour la Defense nationale «als Ja
dferlvö vers la Defense nationale des creaits qui
avalentltl accord^s par le Parlement pour la ri-
Äon du Chömage. Carpourle Programme des
erands travaux qui avalt «t6 vot6 par la Chamore
fvant sa Separation fln i^^''\Z.mTZwC
^•or^rt^ ^+ mii hii avait pour objectif la resorpuuii
Tc^l^imlgf Jand ll s4 agl entre d.paf-^^^^^^^^^
minlsterlels. de distrlbuer les 4 «l"i"f/^/\ "X
que comportait, je crois. cette _Pre«»i^« »rancne
Sous avons dit aux mlnlstferes de la D«ense na
tinnale • < Demandez-nous ä ce tltre tout ce que
vouf voĂĽdrez Tet 11 n'y a pas une demande fate
par ces mlnlstferes qul n'ait "^ accueilUe. Sur les
i n,iin,rrtc rtfi erands travaux destln^s a resoroer
t S^^mlte 11 y a eu prts d'un mllUard flnalement
le "Chömage, u y a cu y^-^^ ^«„4. Tr>nitflirps Par
nale.
I
*â– :-
86
f
\\
DEVOIR REPUBLICAIN
ET DEVOIR NATIONAL
J'en reviens maintenant aux circonstances dans
lesquelles ont 6t6 vot6es, non seulement la loi de
40 heures, mais ies autres lois sociales. Je l'ai dit ä
la Cour : cette loi de 40 heures fait partie int6-
grante d'un ensemble politique. Cette politique. je
n'ai pas eu ä la choisir, eile m'a 6t6 imposöe. dans
Ies circonstances oĂĽ j'ai pris le gouvemement, par
une n^cessit^ de droit, et par une n6cessit6 de fait,
avant v^ritablement le caractäre d'un cas de force
majeure. Comprenez-moi blen. Je ne dis pas cela
pour m'en excuser, pour la d^savouer. Je ne m'en
excuse en rien, et Je ne la dösavoue en rien. Je
la revendique tout entiäre. Mais U est impossible
de l'apprecier ^quitablement si Ton ne se remömore
pas aujourd'hui Ies circonstances au cours des-
quelles eile a et^ instaur^e dans notre pays.
Qu'est-ce que j'entends par Obligation de droit ?
Nous ^tlons en juin 1936, au lendemain des 61ec-
tions g6n6rales. Ces 61ections s'^taient present6es
sous un aspect et dans des conditions assez neufs.
assez originaux. Ce n'etait pas la premiöre fois,
en France, qu'une coalition de partis se pr^sentait
ensemble collectivement, devant Ies 6!ecteurs —
c'6tait arriv6 en 1919, au moment de la coalition
de partis, car si la Conf^d6ration g6n6rale du tra-
vail, la Ligue des Droits de l'Homme faisaient
Partie du Front populaire, la Ligue des int^rĂźts
4conomiques de M. Billiet faisait partie du Bloc na-
tional en 1919, et y a möme jou6 un röle d6ter-
minant. Mais qu'est-ce qui 6tait neuf, original ?
C'^tait la premiöre et la seule fois qu'une coali-
tion de partis se pr6sentait devant Ies 61ecteurs
avec un Programme commun. qui avait 6t6 au pröa-
lable d6battu, delib6re entre tous ces partis, adopt^
^ 87 —
i
par eux, avec un Programme qu'on soumettait aux
61ecteurs, sur lequel on demandait aux ^lecteurs de
se prononcer. Cette coalition prenait en revanche
l'engagement solennel d'executer ce Programme si
ies 61ecteurs lui donnaient la majorit^ et si le verdict
des 61ecteurs portait ses repr^sentants au pouvoir.
Jamals Ies 61ections ne se sont d6roul6es en France
d'une faQon plus franche, plus loyale. Chaque 61ec-
teur pouvait se prononcer ä son gr6, mais il savait
sur quol se prononcer. Un Programme pr^cis lui
6tait soumis et c'est ce Programme que la majorit^
s'engageait ä ex6cuter, une fois au pouvoir. II y
avait ainsi. entre l'electeur et l'elu, entre le suffrage
universel, la future majorit^ et le futur gouveme-
ment, une Sorte de contrat. Les lois sociales figu-
raient au Programme. La nationalisation de l'in-
dustrie et du commerce priv6s des armes flgurait
au Programme. Je ne m'arrĂźte pas ici pour l'instant
ä la distinction que vous avez intfoduite, Monsieur
le President, si j'ai bien compris, entre le vote des
lois elles-mömes et ce que vous appelez leur ap-
plication. Car, de m6me que les lois, le mode d'ap-
plication 6tait dans le Programme ; il 6tait dans
l'esprit du Programme du Front populaire. Le fait
d'executer les lois sociales en complet accord, en
compläte collaboration avec les organisations ou-
vriferes 6tait incontestablement dans l'esprit du
Programme du Front populaire. Cela est si vrai que
la Conf6d6ration g6n6rale du travail faisait partie
int^grante du Front populaire. Par cons6quent.
qu'il s'aglt de la confection, de l'adoption ou i.u
mode d'application du Programme de r^p^^s sur
lequel le corps 61ectoral s'^tait prononc6, c 6tait ä
cet 6gard tout un. Tout cela 6tait compris dans le
verdict ^lectoral, dans l'expression de la volonte
du suffrage universel.
Cr je l'ai dit d^jä dans mon mterrogatoire et
dans une lettre que j'ai adress6e ä la Cour : en
France, au temps de la R6publique. la souveralnet6
l ,1:.
.lil
'â– )
— 88 —
appartenait au suffrage universel. Cette souveral-
net6 6tait fix6e par la majorit^ des 61ecteurs. Elle
6tait d61^gu6e au Parlement. En ex6cutant la vo-
lonte du suffrage universel souveraln, sous le con-
tröle du Parlement et avec l'approbation constante
du Parlement d616gataire de cette souverainet6, je
remplissais donc le premier devolr de la Charge d'un
ministre r6publicain. C'est en manquant ä ce de-
volr Que j'aurais trahi ma Charge. Je ne crois pas
que vous puissiez aujourd'hui me reprocher de ne
pas l'avoir trahi par une fid61it6 anticip6e ä un
autre regime politique d6jä pr6form6 dans les des-
s€ins de la Providence. Nous 6tions en R6publique :
j'^tais un ministre r6publicain. J'ai observ6 scrupu-
leusement ce qui est le principe de la doctrine de
la R6publique et j'ai rempli les devoirs de ma Char-
ge de ministre r^publicain.
J'ajoute tout de suite qu'ä cette 6Doque et ä la
suite d'6v6nements qui sont aussi dans vos m6-
moires, il r^gnait dans des cercles trfes 6tendus de
Vopinion publique une Prävention ind6niable contre
le regime parlementaire. Je ne pense pas que vous
jugiez utile que je vous expose quelles sont mes
vues sur le regime parlementaire et sur les rapports
du regime parlementaire et de la d^mocratie. Je ne
crois pas que le regime parlementaire soit la
forme , l'unique forme possible de la d6mo-
cratie. Mals ce qui est sür, et lä-dessus rexp6-
rience de l'histoire est probante, p6remptoire : c'est
qu'en France tout mouvement antiparlementaire
a et6 le Prodrome, Pinstrument d'entreprise de
caractäre c^sarien. J'al donc jug6 n^cessaire de pr6-
server les institutions parlementaires pour d6fen-
dre les principes mömes de la R^publique. Qu'avalt*
on reproch6 au regime parlementaire ? Pr6cis6ment
de n'avoir pas tenu, par la r6alit6 de Tex^cution.
les promesses faites devant le corps 61ectoral. On
disalt, on r^p6tait : « Qu'est-ce que c'est que cette
Parodie, cette com6die ? L'^lecteur est souverain
— 89 —
Pendant unlou.1.«--^^-^^^^^^^^^^^
ralneW nationale 1*^" "^.f°^ents de la campagne
ments QU'Ü a prls »•,,^? **;.Sment - on pou-
antlparlementalre. ^'f ^^f ^'^ ™ certaln nombre
valt mustrer <=«"%X«ordes engagements con-
d'exemples - i™fl?ectoral et Vespfece d'lnca-
tract^s devant le ^f Pf„f-.d la majorlt« n'6talt pas
pacltfe du Parlement, ^«f "° 'J.^ement insufflsam-
sufflsamment unle ou le «°7X^er Eh Wen ! U
ment 6nerglaue, <i^''°'^"'^',/^ J* Tcette «POQue de
«alt p:us n^cessalre «"! 'Xteratent tenus. que les
montrer que les «"«f ^«^!f ^^.f ne sals sl c'^alent
promesses seralent »«"irnt lefnötres. Nous les
Celles des autres, <;"^'^"J ^„n contrat. II «alt
avlons faites, nous »v ons slgne u ^^^^^„g^e^
plus nScessalre que i^ma^ que ^^ ^ „ ^tait
donnät l'exemple de ^f "^„-11 monträt. par la
plus nfecessalre que amak qu u m ^^^^^ent
rapldltö dans la r^^Usatlon que .e 6
paUentalre est ..pable ^J^^^ ^,^^,,^
M. LE PRESIDENT. - ^^ J««« ^" Jt ^l'une r6-
d-ld^es ?... Je voudrals !°^%f t'^rtfonnalre, Je ne
flexlon. Mals Je ne suis pas un w
voudrals pas vous fatiguer...
M. L.OK Bx.^. -Vn tortlon^alre, vous ne l^tes
d'aucune fa?on. Enfln... on verra.
M. LE PRi:sn>Eirr. - On 1^ verra ^^^^^
vous dlslez tout i \'*\««/*fX qu^dans resprlt
cation des lols «? Peut 6tre faue qu ^^^ ^^^^^^
oĂĽ les lols ont 6t6 vofes et que vo ^^^ ^^^^^^^^
obUgfe de sulvre l'ef ^t qui ava» gu jp^^ q^e
jusque dans VaPPWcaUon mtoe d ^^p^^^ ^^
les «ecteurs vous a'*'ent cona ^^^^ ^,^^^^^_
Ne croyez-vous pas f Pf'if "„e les clrconstances
cation des lols, 11 Pf"* ^^'^'[jrtout les guides des
imposent ä ceux qui sont «als^y"" ^e coneevolr
«ecteurs pulsqu'lls sont les che s^ ^^^ g,ec.
cette appUcatlon d'une facon auire
VI
^ rf -
— 90 —
teurs qul sont mal 6clair6s des Incidents qui peu-
vent surgir et des n6cessit6s de la Situation ? Ne
croyez-vous pas que le röle d'un guide est de con-
duire et non pas de suivre ? Qu'en pensez-vous ?
M. IJEON Blum. — - Je suis tout ä fait d'accord
avec vous, Monsieur le pr6sident, et je crois que
j'ai 6t6 ^galement d'accord avec vous dans ma con-
duite. Je pense tout au moins que j'arriverai ä vous
le d6montrer. Chaque fois que j'ai pris la parole
devant un auditoire populaire, j'ai tenu le langage
suivant : « J'ai une cat^gorie de devoirs envers vous
en ce sens que c'est votre conflance, votre affection
qui m'ont port6 au pouvoir et que je dois y rester
ndäle. Mais j'ai d'autres devoirs que j'ai contractäs
personnellement vis-ä-vls de la collectivit6 natio-
nale, ä partir du jour oü vous m'avez port6 au Gou-
vernement. Ces devoirs, je les ai personnellement.
vous l€s avez collectivement vous aussi. Un parti
comme le parti socialiste ou une Organisation com-
me la C.G.T. qui vit au sein de la communaut^ fran-
Qaise ont des devoirs vis-ä-vis de cette communaut^.
J'esp6re qu'il n'y aura jamais de discordance entre
ces deux catögories de devoirs. (Je vous dämontreral
le moment venu que j'ai 6t^ presque toujours assez
heureux pour provoquer cette conciliation). Mals
le jour oĂĽ je ne pourrals plus compter sur vous, le
Jour oü je ne vous aurais psus persuadös des devoirs
qui m'incombent comme chef d'un Gouvernement
responsable vis-ä-vis de la communaut^ nationale,
ce jour-lä je ne resterai pas un instant de plus au
pouvoir >.
Voilä ce que j'ai dit constamment. Vous ne trou-
verez pas dans ma bouche d'autre langage.
J'ai relu ä Bourrassol, il y a deux ou trois jours,
un recueil des discours que j'ai prononc6s pendant
la premidre partie de mon Gouvernement. J'aurais
fait volontiers l'hommage de ce volume ä chacun
des membres de la Cour, mais il est frapp6 d'in-
terdit et pour vous le procurer il faudra vous adres-
vV*'"^:.*-" -
-^...-:.
91 —
ser ä d'autres qu'ä moi. Quand on lit ces discours.
on ne manque pas d'6tre saisi de cette esp^ce de
permanence, de constance dans la nature des thfe-
mes et dans le ton de l'appel. Quel que soit le pu-
blic auquel je m'adresse — c'6tait quelquefois, com-
me par exemple au temps de la guerre d'Espagne,
un public pa^sionn^ment soulev6 contre moi —
vous retrouverez les formules que je viens de rap-
peler sur la n6cessit6 de remplir mon devoir de
Chef du Gouvernement vis-ä-vis de la communaut^
nationale. Vous les retrouverez en particulier dans
mon discours de Luna-Park en septembre 1936, oĂĽ
j'affrontals une foule ouvrifere dont la tr^s grande
majorit^ m'6tait plutöt hostile. C'est le langage que
j'ai toujours tenu ä la tribune du Parlement, dans
les r^unions politiques, c'est un thfeme constant
c'est un mode constant. Par cons^quent, Monsieur
le President, je suis parfaitement d'accord avec
vous. J'avais un devoir de fld61it6 ä l'^gard des hom-
mes qui m'avaient confl6 un mandat. Ce devoir ae
fid^lite. je ne Taurais pas trahi. Mais avais un
devoir comme chef du Gouvernement vis-ä-yis de
l'int^rĂźt national dont j'avais la Charge. Si ] avais
du manquer en quoi que ce soit ä l'un de ces in-
t^rets pour rester d'accord avec mon P^^rtl Je n au^
rais pas Pu rester au Gouvernement et e ny serais
pas rest6. Mais j'ai obtenu cette conciliation dans
toutes les questions qui Interessent la Defense na-
tionale, puisque j'ai obtenu le vote ^nanime, sans
r6serve, de mon parti en faveur des cr6dits de la
Defense nationale, puisque, dans ces ^toes rögie-
ments d'administration publique auxquels vous fai-
siez allusion tout ä l'heure, alors que pour tous les
autres cas les d6rogations sont limit^es. mesur^es
chichement. avec une certaine m6flance, Quand il
s'agit de travaux interessant la Defense nationale
les dörogations sont sans limite, sans mesure et
elles ne d6pendent plus que de l'accord du ministre
Interesse et du ministre du TravalL
— 92 —
M. LE Präsident. — Et on n'en a pas profltö !
M. UoN Blum. — C'est une erreur, Monsieur le
President. Vous verrez qu'on en a proflt6.
(L'audience. suspendue ä qulnze heures quinze
minutes. est reprise ä quinze heures quarante-clnq
minutes.)
ill
I
LES OUVRIERS ONT CONFIANCE EN VOUS
M. LE PRisn)ENT. — L'audience est reprise.
Voulez-vous, Monsieur Blum, contlnuer vos ex-
plicatlons.
M. LÄON Blum. — Oul, Monsieur le President.
J'ai indiqu6 ä la Cour ce que j'ai appel6 los
Obligations de droit au regard des princlpes r6pu-
blicains. J'en viens maintenant ä ce que j'ai appel^
l'obligation de fait, celle qui est tir6e des circons-
tances.
Je voudrai:j demander ä chacun des membres
de la Cour de faire encore une fols un effort de
memoire et de se reporter par la pens6e ä ce qu'6tait
la Situation quand j'ai pr6sent6 mes collaborateurs
ä M Albert Lebrun, le jeudi 4 juin. II y a dans cer-
talns documents de l'instruction une tendance vi-
sible ä r6dulre, ä att6nuer apräs coup la gravit6
de la Situation, teile qu'elle se pr^sentait ä ce mo-
ment. Je vous demande, Messieurs, de vous Sou-
venir Rappelez-vous que les 4 et 5 juin, il y avait
un mllllon de gr^vistes. Rappelez-vous que toutes
les usines de la r6glon parlsienne 6taient occup6es.
Rappelez-vous que le mouvement gagnalt d'heure en
heure et de proche en proche dans la France en-
tifere.
Des t^moins oculalres vous Tont dlt. M. Albert
Sarraut l'a dlt. M. Frossard l'a dlt. La panlque,
— 93 —
ports mol-meme avec j" /^P'*' g^^talt leur «at
patronat et Je me souvlens de ^e QU «a
d-esprit t cette 6poQue. J« J"« f ^"J^^is eommun.
me dlsait ou me f ai alt dlre par a ^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^
Qu^^e'^Son va'nou^s prendre 9 Qu'est-ce cu-on
^^ L?o= oc-c^paient - us^es^ - -ut^tre
ce qui contribuait e Plu3 ä la t«reur c^e ^^^ ^^^
espfece de tranqml 1^. cette espfe^^j^^ ^„,„„ des
me avec laquelle ils s f ^le"^ ' entretenant, sans
machines, les surveUlant les entre ^^^
sortlr au dehors. sans aucune espfece ae sis
lence extSrleure collaborateurs
Je suis arrlvfe ^ If y«^^ f ^^^^^^^^ ^u prfesi-
vers 7 heures du soir. Je '« ^i i^ alllons
dent de la Rfepublique Au moment oĂĽ nous ^ ^,^
nous retlrer. M. Albert Lebrun nous a ^^ ^
une demande ä vous transmettre de la y
sarraut P/t^-^,,fVTFVolrrministre du
rleur et de la part ae "J- ; comme sl grave
Travall. Ils consldferent la Situation coram
qu'ils vous demandent ^«"e pas 76" ^^^
oemaln matln pour ^ transm™ j,^„
Ils vous prlent av^c instance de vo ^^^^^^
et rautre au «nlnl«*^" ^f/g teures po^^ n'^
tfere du Travail dfes ce f ''â– , ^^heXr^uptlon dans le
alt pas un Instant de dSlal <> "J^erirup ^^^^^^
Passage des Services. Ils «f J^l'^^J jans les cir-
temps demeurer chargfes d un Interim u
constances actuelles. > „iT,i»trp du Tra-
II a m entendu aue M Lebas r^^^^l^^^, _
vall - qui est toujourspr sonnler «1 ^^^ ^^^
et que M. Salengro minlstre de 1 ^^^^_
mort dans les ci'-con^*^"^",' nsmlsslon „voirs
dralent ä cet appel, et la transmib mciaent.
a eu Ueu s^ance tenante^Mal^ aprfes ce ^^
M. Albert Lebrun m'a demande ae re
r
1
I I
(1
n
. I
— 94 —
lui et m'a dit ceci : « La Situation est terrible, quand
comptez-vous vous presenter devant las Cham-
bres ? » Je lui ai repondu : « Apr^s-demain, samedi,
je ne vols pas le moyen d'aller plus vite. » II me dit
alors : « Vous allez attendre jusqu'ä samedi ? Vous
ne voyez pas ce qui se passe ? » « Comment vou-
lez-vous que j'aille plus vite ? ai-je repris. II faut
malgr6 tout que je redige la d^claration ministe-
rielle, que je convoque un conseil de cabinet et un
conseil des ministres. D'ailieurs mat^riellement,
convoquer les Chambres pour demain serait impos-
sible. »
M-. Lebrun me räpondit alors : « Les ouvriers
ont conflance en vous. Puisque vous ne pouvez
convoquer les Chambres avant samedi et que cer-
tainement dans votre d6claration ministerielle vous
allez leur promettre le vote immediat des lois qu'ils
r^clament, alors je vous en prie, das demain adres-
sez-vous ä eux par la voix de la radio. Dites-leur
que le Parlement va se r^unir, que d6s qu'il sera
r^uni vous allez lui demander le vote rapide et
sans deiai des lois dont le vote figure sur leurs
cahiers de revendications en meme temps que le
reievement des salaires. Ils vous croiront, 11s au-
ront conflance en vous, et alors peut-etre ce mou-
vement s'arretera-t-il ? »
J'al fait ce que me demandait Monsieur le Pre-
sident de la Räpublique, et qui, au point de vue
correction parlementaire etait assez critiquable, car
du point de vue de la stricte correction parlemen-
taire et r6publicaine, je n'avais pas d'existence
avant de m'Ăźtre presente devant les Chambres et
d'avoir recueilli un vote de conflance. J'ai donc pris
la parole ä la radio le lendemain et j'ai dit aux ou-
vriers ce que m'avait dit ä moi Monsieur le Pre-
sident de la Republique. Je leur ai declare : « Par-
mi les revendications que vous presentez dans tou-
tes les usines, il y en a qui sont du domaine du le-
gislateur. Des que le Parlement sera r6uni, nous
— 95 —
lui demanderons de voter, et cela dans le deiai le
plus bref possible les lois que vous attendez. Je
m'en porte garant pres de vous... »
Je me suis alors presente devant les Chambres
le samedi avec cette declaration ministerielle qui a,
eile aussi, un caractere assez particulier et assez
original. Le «Gouvernement s'est, en effet, presente
devant les Chambres en leur disant : « Je suis ici
l'expression d'une volonte populaire qui s'est mani-
festee par un Programme, je n'ai pas d'autre Pro-
gramme que celui sur lequel cette volonte du suf-
frage universel s'est prononcee et que nous avons
pris tous l'engagement de realiser. » Et en me pre-
sentant ainsi devant les Chambres, je leur ai de-
mande de placer ä leur ordre du jour de la semaine
suivante une premiäre serie de lois parmi lesquelles
figuralent la loi de quarante heures, la loi sur les
conges payes et celle sur les contrats collectifs.
Ce qui etait l'etat d'esprit du chef de l'Etat
etait aussi l'etat d'esprit du grand patronat. La con-
versation avec M. Albert Lebrun est du jeudi soir.
Des le vendredi matin M. Lambert-Ribot, qui avait
ete mon camarade pendant de longues annees au
Conseil d'Etat avant d'entrer, comme un trop grand
nombre de membres des grandes administrations
publiques ou de l'universite, au service d'organis-
mes patronaux. M. Lambert-Ribot, avec qui j'avais
toujours entretenu des relations amicales, m'a fait
toucher par deux amis communs, par deux inter-
mediaires differents afin que, le plus tot possible,
sans perdre une minute, je m'efforce d'etablir un
contact entre les oreanisations patronales supremes,
comme le Comite des forges et la Confederation
generale de la production, et d'autre part la
Confederation generale du travail. Sans nul
doute, j'aurais tente moi-meme ce qu'on a appeie
l'accord de Matignon. Mais je dois ä la verite de
dire que Tinitiative premläre est venue du grand
patronat.
< •
11
i
— 94 —
lui et m'a dit ceci : « La Situation est terrible, quand
comptez-vous vous presenter devant las Cham-
bres ? 2> Je lui ai repondu : « Apräs-demain, samedi,
je ne vois pas le moyen d'aller plus vite. » II me dit
alors : « Vous allez attendre jusqu'ä samedi ? Vous
ne voyez pas ce qui se passe ? » « Comment vou-
lez-vous que j'aille plus vite ? ai-je repris. II faut
malgr6 tout que je r^dige la d^claration ministe-
rielle, que je convoque un conseil de cabinet et un
conseil des ministres. D'ailleurs mat^riellement,
convoquer les Chambres pour demain serait impos-
sible. »
" M. Lebrun me röpondit alors : « Les ouvriers
ont conflance en vous. Puisque vous ne pouvez
convoquer les Chambres avant samedi et que cer-
tainement dans votre däclaration ministerielle vous
allez leur promettre le vote immediat des lois qu'ils
r^clament, alors je vous en prie, dös demain adres-
sez-vous ä eux par la voix de la radio. Dites-leur
que le Parlement va se r^unir, que das qu'il sera
r^uni vous allez lui demander le vote rapide et
Sans deiai des lois dont le vote ĂĽgure sur leurs
cahiers de revendications en möme temps que le
relfevement des salaires. Ils vous croiront, 11s au-
ront conflance en vous, et alors peut-etre ce mou-
vement s'arretera-t-il ? »
J'al fait ce que me demandait Monsieur le Pre-
sident de la Räpublique, et qui, au point de vue
correction parlementaire etait assez critiquable, car
du point de vue de la stricte correction parlemen-
taire et republicaine, je n'avais pas d'existence
avant de m'ätre presente devant les Chambres et
d'avoir recueilli un vote de conflance. J'ai donc pris
la parole ä la radio le lendemain et j'ai dit aux ou-
vriers ce que m'avait dit ä moi Monsieur le Pre-
sident de la Republique. Je leur ai declare : « Par-
mi les revendications que vous pr6sentez dans tou-
tes les usines, il y en a qui sont du domaine du 16-
gislateur. Des que le Parlement sera reuni, nous
.<»
— 95 —
lui demanderons de voter, et cela dans le deiai le
plus bref possible les lois que vous attendez. Je
m'en porte garant pres de vous... »
Je me suis alors presente devant les Chambres
le samedi avec cette declaration ministerielle qui a,
eile aussi, un caractere assez particulier et assez
original. Le «Gouvernement s'est, en effet, present6
devant les Chambres en leur disant : « Je suis ici
l'expression d'une volonte populaire qui s'est mani-
festee par un Programme, je n'ai pas d'autre Pro-
gramme que celui sur lequel cette volonte du suf-
frage universel s'est prononcee et que nous avons
pris tous l'engagement de realiser. » Et en me pre-
sentant ainsi devant les Chambres, je leur ai de-
mande de placer ä leur ordre du jour de la semaine
suivante une premiere serie de lois parmi lesquelles
figuralent la loi de quarante heures, la loi sur les
conges payes et celle sur les contrats collectifs.
Ce qui etalt l'etat d'esprit du chef de l'Etat
etait aussi l'etat d'esprit du grand patronat. La con-
versation avec M. Albert Lebrun est du jeudi soir.
Des le vendredi matin M. Lambert-Ribot, qui avait
ete mon camarade pendant de longues annees au
Conseil d'Etat avant d'entrer, com.me un trop grand
nombre de membres des grandes administrations
publiques ou de l'universite, au service d'organis-
mes patronaux. M. Lambert-Ribot, avec qui j'avais
toujours entretenu des relations amicales, m'a fait
toucher par deux amis communs, par deux inter-
mediaires differents afin que, le plus tot possible,
Sans perdre une minute, je m'efforce d'etablir un
contact entre les organisations patronales supremes,
comme le Comite des forges et la Confederation
generale de la production, et d'autre part la
Confederation generale du travail. Sans nul
doute, j'aurais tente moi-meme ce qu'on a appeie
l'accord de Matignon. Mais je dois ä la verite de
dire que l'initiative premiere est venue du grand
patronat.
|!
^z^
~ 96 —
Donc, Je vous le röpdte, dös 1^ vendredi matln,
par deux amis communs — il y en a un que je peux
nommer. c'6tait M. Gninebaum-Ballin. President de
section honoraire du Conseil d'Etat — M. Lam-
bert-Ribot me faisait toucner pour me demander
de provoquer au plus vite le contact sur la base
de relövement g6n6ral des salaires avec l'^vacuation
des usines en contre-partie. D6s le vendredi solr —
M. Duchemin l'a relat6 dans un röclt trös sobre.
trfes simple, mais d'un ton trös ^mu. qui a paru dan»«
la Revue de Paris — MM. Lambert-Ribot, Duche-
min, Dalbouze, anclen President de la chambre de
Commerce de Paris, 6taient chez moi et nous r6-
glions ensemble une conversatlon avec la C.G.T.
dejä acquise du cöt^ patronal. Dans la journ^e du
lendemain, samedi, Roger Salengro est all6 n^go-
cier, rue Lafayette, avec les repr^sentants de la
C.G.T. dont il a obtenu l'assentiment. Voilä d'oü est
venu l'accord Matlgnon,
A ce moment, mes engagements vis-ä-vls de la
classe ouvriöre 6taient d^jä pris. J'avais parl6 ä la
radio. Tout le monde savait que j'allais faire voter
par la Chambre la lol de quarante heures. Personne
n'y faisaient objection ni rösistance. Tout le monde
consid6rait cela comme une chose naturelle, n^-
cessaire. in.6vitable dans les circonstances oĂĽ Ton
se trouvalt. On ne demandait qu'une chose aux
Chambres : aller vite, voter vite, afin de liquider
cette Situation redoutable, cette Situation que j'al
qualifi6e, non pas de rövolutionnaire, mais de quasi-
r6volutionnaire, et qui r6tait, en effet.
Les usines 6taient occup^es. Est-ce qu'on avalt
demande ä mon pr6d6cesseur, est-ce qu'on me de-
mandait ä moi de les faire 6vacuer par la force ?
Je vous le r6pfete. on m'a demand6 ä moi de pro-
voquer une reprise de contact — car il y avait d6jä
eu un essai sous le Gouvernement pr6c6dent — avec
les organisations corporatives, les organlsations cen-
trales et la classe ouvriöre pour arriver ö, un accord.
— 97 —
On n'a mSme pas, comme on l'a falt plus tard, ä
partir d'octobre et novembre, pos6 comme condi-
tlon sine qua non ä l'ouverture des conversations
entre ouvriers et patrons l'övacuation pr^alable des
usines.
Dans les conversations de Matlgnon, 11 est clalr
qu'il n'appartenait pas aux patrons et ouvriers r6-
unis de voter sous mon arbitrage la lol de quarante
heures. C*6tait l'affaire du Parlement. Mais il n'y
a pas le moindre doute qu'au cours de ces conversa-
tions, le vote de la lol de quarante heures alt 6t6
escomptö. Le sujet de ces conversations 6tait blen
simple. Parmi les revendications ouvriäres, il y en
avait qui d^pendaient du Parlement et les patrons
s'y soumettaient d'avance loyalement. II y en avait
d'autres qui regardaient les patrons seuls, ä sa-
voir les revendications qui touchaient le taux des
salaires.
Je vous assure qu*ä ce moment-lä, tl n'^tait
pas question de diminuer l'importance du mouve-
ment. Si vous avlez vu le visage des hommes avec
qui Je discutais ce soir-lä, vous ne penseriez pas
sur la fol de certains t6moins que ce mouvement
n'6tait rien et qu'il aurait suffi d'un peu d'^nergie,
d*autorit6 ou de poigne pour faire rentrer toute
cette « racaille » dans l'ordre ! Non ! Ce n'est pas
ainsl que les choses se sont passöes et personne
n'a Jamals demande qu'on ĂĽt usage de la force. Les
patrons — M. Sarraut a rappel6 leur langage — non
seulement ne lui ont pas demand^ d'en faire usa-
ge, mais 11s l'ont adjur^ de n'en pas faire usage.
Ils lui ont dit : c Dans l'6tat pr6sent des choses,
cela ne pourrait aboutir qu'ä un conflit sanglant.
Cr, nous ne voulons pas reprendre le travail dans
des usines ensanglant6es, avec des ouvriers dress6s
contre nous. Nous ne voulons pas non plus courir
le risque de la destruction d'un outillage n^cessaire
ä la production nationale. » Je me rappelle tous les
>l
— 98 —
incldents de cette'soir^e et de cette nult du 7 Juln.
J'entends encore Benoit Frachon, secr^taire g6n6ral
adjoint de la C.G.T., quand on discutait les augmen-
tations de salaires, M. Lambert-Ribot disalt : « Com-
ment, vous ne vous contentez pas de tel taux, mals
quand donc les ouvriers en France ont-ils Jamals
eu une augmentation g^n^rale des salaires de cette
importance ? » Et Benoit Frachon lui r^pondlt :
€ Et quand donc en France avez-vous vu un mouve-
ment ouvrler de cette ampleur et de cette impor-
tance ? » A propos du relövement des salaires anor-
malement bas, j'ai entendu M. Duchemin dlre ä M.
Richemont, tandis qu'on lul mettait sous les yeux
le taux de certalns salaires, de salaires effroyables
par leur modicit^ : c Comment est-ce posslble ?
Comment avons-nous pu lalsser faire cela ? Nous
avons manqu6 ä notre devoir en laissant les choses
aller ainsi. > Et cela, M. Duchemin l'a rappel6 en
termes voil6s, mais nets tout de m§me. dans cet
article auquel j'ai fait allusion tout ä l'heure.
La contre-partie, c'6tait r6vacuation des usines.
D6s ce jour-lä les repr6sentants de la C.G.T. ont dit
aux repr6sentants du grand patronat, qui 6taient
ä. Matignon, MM. Duchemin, Lambert-Ribot, Dal-
bouze, Richemont, President du syndicat de la m^-
tallurgie de la r^gion parisienne : « Nous nous
engageons ä faire tout ce que nous pourrons, et
nous le ferons. Mais nous vous en avertissons tout
de suite. Nous ne sommes pas sĂĽrs d'aboutir. Quand
on a affaire ä un mouvement comme celui-lä, ä
une mar^e comme celle-lä, il faut lui lalsser le
temps de s'6taler. Et puls, c'est maintenant que vous
allez peut-6tre regretter d'avoir syst6matiquement
profit6 des ann6es de d6flation et de chömage pour
exclure de vos usines tous les militants syndica-
listes. II n'y sont plus. Ils ne sont plus lä pour
exercer sur leurs camarades l'autorit^ qui serait
n^cessaire pour faire ex6cuter nos ordres. » Et je
— 99 —
vois encore M. Richemont, qui 6tait assis ä ma
gauche, baisser la töte en disant : « C'est vrai, nous
avons eu tort ».
Voilä quel 6tait l'6tat d'esprit de la r6unlon de
Matignon en ce qui concerne Paris et la banlieue pa-
risienne, au moment oĂĽ j'ai pris le pouvoir. Qu'est-
ce que je devais faire ?
M. LE President. — Un mot, je vous prie, Mon-
sieur Blum. Vous savez cependant que Tindication
que vous donniez tout ä l'heure ä savoir que les
Patrons ne demandaient pas l'^vacuation par la
force des usines est contredite par un certain nom-
bre de t6moins que nous entendrons.
M. L^ON Blum. — Vous entendrez un certain
nombre de t6moins isolös qui ont pu envoyer une
lettre au commissaire de police de leur quartier au
moment de l'occupation de leur usine. Mais en ce
qui concerne les organisations patronales, il n'y a
pas l'ombre d'une discordance. Le langage des Pa-
trons a d'ailleurs 6tö relat6... J'aurais voulu vous
öpargner des lectures qui sont ennuyeuses. Cepen-
dant, voulez-vous que je vous relise la d6claration
de M. Albert Sarraut au Sönat, teile qu'elle est rap-
port6e dans la döposition de M. Langeron.
M. LE PR]&Sn)ENT.
tres döpositions.
Vous lirez quand je lirai d'au-
M. L^ON Blum. — Des tömoins viennent dire :
€ Non ! ce n'ötait rien, avec un petit peu de poigne
on en serait venu ä bout ». Mais ce langage, je l'af-
flrme, personne ne me l'a tenu le 6 juin, personne
n'est venu me dire : 11 faut user de la force A la
Chambre, le 6 juin, lors de la discussion des inter-
pellations, j'ai dit ä propos des occupations d'usines
comment je comptais agir. J'ai montrö que je ne
croyais pas possible d'user de la force. J'ai dit que
sl Ton voulait me demander de faire cesser les oc-
cupations coĂĽte que coĂĽte et par n Importe quel
'
— 100 —
moyen rttalt un engagement que Je ne prendrals
^nTj'al parle avec franchise, car je n'al Jamals
manquf de ranchlse. La Chambre m'a r«pondu
SS un vote 6crasant. Personne n'a os6 monter ä
L tr^bune pour dlre : « Que devlent le droit de
nroDri^r' II faut avant tout Que force reste & la
foTet au droit de proprl6te ». Personne n'a tenu ce
aligage" Qu°and Je'me suis pr.sen« devant le S6-
nat en septembre. ä propos de la loi de aeva
Tuation ropposition s6natoriale. latente depu s le
dTbu? commencait ä prendre ^onsc ence d'elle-
mtoe Elle avait trouv6, ä ce moment-lä, une oc-
ras^on favorable. A propos de la d^valuatlon on
m'a attaqu^ sur la question des occupations dusi-
nes. J'ai rappel6 ce qui s'6tait pass6 en juln et j al
mis les membres de rassembl^e au d6ĂĽ de me citer
un seul cas, un seul fait prouvant que personne
m'eüt demandÄ d'user de la force. Personne dans
l'Assembl^e ne s'est .lev6 pour me contredlre.
Cela a peut-6tre l'air singulier de parier ainsi au-
jourd'hui de la place oĂĽ je suis et dans une Situa-
tion comme ceile-lä. Mais je dois ^ous dlre qua ce
moment, dans la bourgeoisie et en Partlculler dans
le monde patronal, on me consid^ralt, on ^ atten
dait. on m'esp6rait comme un sauveur Les cinjons-
tances ^taient si angoissantes. on 6tait sl pres ae
quelque chose qui ressemblait ä la guerre civile,
qu'on n'esp6rait plus que dans une sorte d Interven-
tion providentielle : je veux dire l'arriv^e au pou-
voir d'un homme auquel on attribuait sur la classe
ouvri^re un pouvoir sĂĽffisant de persuasion. un
ascendant sufĂĽsant pour qu'il lui fit entendre rai-
son et qu'il la d6cidät ä ne pas user, ä ne Pas aöu-
ser de sa force. II n'y a aucun doute possible .
personne ne m'a Jamals demand6 d'user de la force
& ce moment-lä. Et si je l'avais fait, si j'avais jet6
alors la France dans une guerre civile. est-ce que ce
n'est pas ä ce moment que j'eusse traHi les devoirs
de ma Charge ?
— 101 —
Ma poUtlque, vous Tenvlsagez — vous l'avez dlt
et je dois le rappeler — sous un angle nettement
d6termin6, ä savoir sa r6percussion possible sur
l'armement de la France. Mais, qu'est-ce que cela
donnait pour l'armement de la France, la guerre
civile ? Et mfeme les bagarres ouvriöres sanglan-
tes, se prolongeant durant des semaines et en-
tralnant des incendies, des bris de machines,
qu'est-ce que cela doimait pour l'ex^cutlon des
programmes d'armement ? Et si vous vous pla-
cez au point de vue « des faits qui ont concouru
au passage de l'^tat de paix ä l'^tat de guerre >,
la guerre civile en France, n'6tait-ce pas la plus
redoutable des circonstances qui pussent amener
une 6ventualit6, un danger de guerre 6trangöre ?
Alors, qu'est-ce que je devais faire pour apaiser
les ouvriers ? Leur faire des promesses et, ensuite,
ne pas les tenir ? C'^tait sur la foi de ma parole,
sur la foi des engagements pris vis-ä-vis d'eux et
du Parlement r^publicain que petit ä petit le mou-
vement s'est apais6. II n'y a aucun doute, en effet,
qu'ä partir de Matignon, la d6crudescence alt com-
menc6. H y avait 1 million de gr^vLstes ä ce mo-
ment-lä et trois semaines aprfes, 100.000. A la fln
de juillet, on pouvait consid^rer que le mouve-
ment 6tait terminö. Alors, que devals-je faire ?
Des promesses pour d^cider les ouvriers ä quitter
les usines, quitte ensuite ä biaiser, diff^rer, lan-
terner, mentir ?... C'6tait donc lä mon devoir de
ministre r^publicain ?... Et si j'avais agi ainsi,
aurais-je rempli les devoirs de ma Charge, ou les
aurais-je trahis ?
Messieurs, je vous demande pardon... Je parle
de moi, mais de quo! voulez-vous que je parle ?
C'est bien de moi qu'il s'agit. Je suis entr6, vous
le savez, dans la vie politique assez tard, alors que
ma vie personnelle, ä d'autres 6gards 6tait d6jä
formte et flx6e. J'y suis entr6, je peux le dire,
dans des condltions un peu insolites, en ce sens
.1
— 102 —
Que Je ne suis pas un homme politique Qul s'est
mis ä faire un beau jour du soclallsme, Je suis un
socialiste ayant depuls longtemps, depuls qu'll a
rage d'homme, une conviction socialiste et que les
circonstances ont Jet6 dans la vle publique, que
son partl a charg^ de faire de la politique. Vollä
ce que Je suis. Quand Je suis entr6 au Parlement,
quand J'al eu la Chance de d6buter avec quelque
succfes, das ce moment s'est organls6 autour de
moi, des ann6es durant, une espöce de longue entre-
prise de s^ductlon et de corruption. On me dlsalt
volontlers : « Ce n'est pas s6rleux, ce n'est pas possl-
ble, un homme comme vous, un homme qul a rempU
les fonctlons que vous avez rempUes, un homme de
votre valeur, un homme de votre m6rite »... on ajou-
tait mßme quelquefols «un homme de votre ri-
^chesse », car la 16gende n'est pas d'hler, celle qul
repr^sente comme un dilettante f astueux un homme
qul a travalll6 toute sa vle et qul, depuls de lon-
gues ann6es, ne vlt plus que du prodult de son
travall. On m'a dlt cela sur tous les tons : « Ce
n'est pas posslble, ce n'est pas s^rleux »... On a
esp6r6 de mol une de ces ^volutlons dont l'hlstoire
parlementalre de la France offre un certain nom-
bre d'exemples g^n^ralement heureux pour ceux
qul en opt 6t6 les auteurs. J'al tr6s blen sentl, plus
- d'une fols, que pour gagner la sorte de consid6ra-
tlon qul me manqualt, pour devenlr un « v^rltable
homme d'Etat », pour recevolr mfeme la cons6-
cratlon suprĂźme d'une acad^mle, 11 m'auralt suffl
de peu de temps. II m'auralt suffl de quelques
mlnutes, le temps d'une trahison envers ceux qul
m'avalent toujours falt conflance ; 11 n'auralt pas
fallu d'effort long.
On a peut-etre attendu cela de mol dans les
d6buts de juln. Songez donc : quelle aubalne !
une salgn6e ! une salgn6e pratlqu6e par un repr6-
sentant du partl socialiste au pouvoir ! Ou blen
une duperle, une duperle cruelle vis-ä-vls de la
— 103 —
classe ouvrl6re pratlqu6e par l'homme en qul eile
avait mis sa conflance, l'homme qu'elle avait voulu
au gouvemement ! Je n'al rien falt de tout cela,
J'ai rempli le premier devoir de ma Charge qul
6talt de maintenir ce que j'ai appel6 l'ordre civi-
que, l'ordre r^publicain, d'6viter l'effusion de sang,
d'6vlter la guerre clvile et puls de tenir loyalement,
publlquement la promesse que J'avaLs donn^e.
Vollä, Messieurs, dans quelles condltions ont 6t6
vot^es les lols sociales dont l'accusation extralt
la loi de 40 heures.
LES QUARANTE HEURES
Maintenant, Messieurs, J'en vlens ä cette
fameuse loi et icl, Je suis oblig6 de r6pondre d'un
mot ä une phrase du r^quisitoire que, vralment.
Je le dis ä la Cour, 11 m'est impossible d'accepter. ,
Le r^quisitoire afflrme que, selon moi, la loi de
40 heures n'auralt pas dimlnu6 le rendement de
la production frangais^ et 11 ajoute que Je ne peux
pas avoir prononc6 une pareille afflrmation de
bonne foi... C'est blen cela l'expression.
M. Le Troqxter. — Avec sinc6rit6.
M. L6oN Blum. — Je n'admets pas ce Jugement.
J'ai eu, dans ma vle politique, beaucoup d'adver-
saires, des adversalres trfes äpres, trös acham^s.
Je ne crols pas que ma slnc6rit6, que ma probit6
d'esprit, que ma probit6 tout court aient 6t6 mises
en doute ou en cause. Je dois le dire, ce qul
m'6tonne, c'est l'^tonnement du mlnistfere public,
et vralment, 11 traduit en matifere industrielle —
Je ne me permettrai pas de dire une ignorance —
mals une innocence dont Je reste vralment stu-
p6fait. A preml6re vue, cela a l'air d'une contra-
diction de dire qu'on dimlnue le temps de travaU
.1
/^
\
â– i.
— 104 —
et que cependant le rendement tadustrlel ne dtol-
nue Das C'est pourtant toute l'hlstolre de 1 Indus
me en France en Europe et dans le monde entler.
Denuls plus d'un slfecle. toute l'hlstolre de l'ln-
rtnstrle c'est la dlmlnutlon continue du temps de
taviu ^soclie l r«6vatlon constante de la pro-
I!:1hL ^rme-ne que la dlmlnutlon continue des
nr^ de' revl^nt assocL\ l'61*vatlon continue des
•^ , . 1 rllrnput sembler un double paradoxe i
Are vte. ETcÄnt. depuls qu'll y a une
gJande Industrie dans le monde, ces deux pWno-
mfenes contradlctolres en apparence et qul ont
^ouvert Te mlnlstfere public de stupMactlon se sont
prödul s slmultan^ment, parallfelement et peut^
etre mon Dleu ! en y r^nschlssant. sont-lls mfeme
lonctlon l'un de l'autre.
11 V a eu une 6poque, au temps de l'enquete
Vmer^e au temps des preml6res loU ^d»smell^.
lr^ AnffiPterre oĂĽ des enfants de 10 ans travau
ff^p^t 12 heures dar^ les mlnes et les fllatures.
* Tcf momeTauand on a voulu appliQuer les pre-
ml6?eriols de protection 16gale du travail. qu
Snt un ma^mum 16gal des heures de trava
?ce QUi 6tait, paralt-il, attentatoire ä la llbert^ du
fjol et meme. par un comWe ^^^^^^ ^^^J^
iibert6 de rouvrler QUi ^tait. dlsait-on, Wen lltore
rtrivailler davantage si cela lul convenait) .^onc
auand on a pr6sent6 ces premiferes lois en Ang e
?erre les Patrons, et pas seulement les co^serva-
teurs ont tenu le langage du Ministfere puj) Uc. Ils
ont dit : « Faltes attention, si vous ^^^uisez^^^^^
vall des enfants dans les mines et les ĂĽlatures la
^rLction" nationale va <ii-in-er >• m ee^endant.
on a vot6 ces lois, on en a vot6 d a^^f ^^ Umitant le
travaU des femmes. des adultes on l'a fj^^/^^
Uux de plus en plus bas et durant ce temps, le
rendement Industriel n'a cess6 d'augmenter.
KeSence a 6t6 laite ^galement en France au
moS Tvote. en 1919, de la lol de 8 heures. dont
— 105 —
l'appUcation n'a nullement r6duit la productlon In-
dustrielle dans notre pays.
Par cons^quent, j'6tais trfes s6rieux. trfes sin-
cöre, quand je disais cela. Noubliez pas, d'autre
part, que la loi de 40 heures s'int^grait dans un
ensemble de mesures dont l'objet 6tait de relever
la masse des salaires et aussi le taux des denr6es
agricoles, tellement d6prim6s pendant la Periode de
deflation, d'instituer des avances ä la moyenne et
ä la petite Industrie, bref d'augmenter ce qu'on a
appel6 et qu'on appelle encore le pouvoir d'achat.
En stimulant, en augmentant le pouvoir d'achat, en
stimulant la consoihmation, en stimulant la de-
mande, il 6tait 16gitime d'esp^rer que cet ensemble
de lois dans lequel s'incorporait la loi de 40 heures
d6terminerait une augmentation de la productlon.
C'est ce qui est arriv6, en effet. L'accusation, blen
entendu, a demand6 un rapport ä son expert uni-
versel, et l'expert universel ayant constat6 qu'en
effet, il y avait eu un relövement de la productlon.
a d^'sign^ un surexpert, lequel a d6clar6 que le fait
6tait exact, inais que ce n'6tait pas attribuable ä
ma politique. On interprötera les causes comme on
voudra, toutes les statistlques sont interpr^tables
au gr6 de celui qui les manie, mais en fait, la sta-
tistique est lä. Pendant que j '6t als au gouvernement.
la productlon a augment^, non seulement pendant
mon gouvernement, mais pendant les deux ann6es
qul ont suivi le 6 juin 1936, relativement aux deux
ann6es qui Tont pr6c6d6. Ce n'est pas douteux.
M LE PRfisroENT. — Comment expliquez-vous, sl
vous croyez que la loi de 40 heures n'a pas eu
d'effet sur la productlon, que le Comit6 d'enquöte
sur la productlon Institut, si je ne me trompe,
sous le ministfere Chautemps, dont vous avez parl6
tout ä l'heure, alt formul6, en ce qui conceme les
r^sultats des lois sociales, la lol de 40 heures en
particulier, au point de vue de la defense natio-
nale, les conclusions que voicl ;
••
r*
,r
— 106 —
€ La dur6e du travall, les diff^rentes modalit^s,
pr^vues par les textes r^glementaires pour donner
ä la loi de 40 heures toute la souplesse d6sirable, se
sont heurt^es, en pratique, ä des difficult^s d'appll-
cation. Le comit6 insiste pour que les posslbilit6s Of-
fertes par les modalit^s existantes soient utilis^es
dans toute la mesure n^cessitee par les besoins de la
production industrielle, et au premier chef, de la
d6fense nationale >.
Si le Comit6 a 6prouv6 le besoin d'insister.
c'est qu'il avait pour cela des raisons.
M. Ii:oN Blum. — Ma memoire me trompe peut-
ötre, je ne le crois pas, mais si, dans cette enquöte
sur la production, apr6s avoir lu les considärants,
vous lisez le dispositif, vous allez voir ce que les
organisations patronales qui formulaient ces criti-
ques, r6clamaient. Le savez-vous ? Elles r^cla-
maient rannte de 2.000 heures au lieu de la semaine
de 40 heures, 40x50 = 2.000 et ce qu'elles enten-
daient par plus de souplesse dans Tapplication de
la loi, c'6tait une possibilit^ de r6partition dif!6rente
du credit total des heures de travall r^sultant de
la loi de 40 heures. Voilä ce qu'elles demandaient.
Ceci peut avoir son importance pour une Industrie
saisonnifere, pour une Industrie qui travaille par
ä-coups, pour une Industrie qui a tantöt un coup
de feu — un coup de chien — et ensuite une Pe-
riode de Stagnation et de demi-chömage. Mais quelle
diff6rence y a-t-il entre la semaine de 40 heures
et rannte de 2.000 heures pour des usines dont le
travall est continu, comme les usines travaillant
pour la defense nationale et. ä plus forte raison,
pour les Etablissements de l'Etat ?
Dans les conclusions de l'enquöte sur la pro-
duction, on ne peut rien tirer contre ce que
J'avance et c'est mol, plutöt, qui serais en droit de
rinvoquer. Peut-6tre l'aurals-Je fait de moi-m6me
pour montier qu'ä la fln de 1937, personne ne con-
— 107 —
sid^rait la semaine de 40 heures comme constltuant
une dur6e de travail Insufflsante et que c'6talt plu-
töt des modalit^s plus souples d'application que,
möme dans les milieux patronaux, on poursuivalt d.
cette date, car si je ne me trompe, ce rapport est
dat6 de d^cembre 1937...
M. LE President. — Je n'ai pas la date.
M. L6oN Blum. — Je crois pouvoir affirmer qu'il
est bien de d6cembre 1937. Mais tout cela 6tait en-
core inflniment plus exact au moment oĂĽ l'on a
commenc6 ä mettre en ex6cution le Programme de
septembre 1936, car enfln, est-ce que vous vous
imaginez que la loi de 40 heures, au moment oĂĽ eile
a 6t6 vot^e, alt r^duit la dur^e du travail effectif
en France ä cette 6poque ? Vous imaglnez-vous
qu'on travaillait 40 heures en juin 1936 ? On ne
travaillait pas 40 heures. II y a quelques lacunes
dans Instruction ä cet 6gard.
II exlste deux statistiques officielles de chömage.
D'abord, une statistique du chömage complet qui
est, en r6alit6, la statistique du chömage secouru
et qui est fournie par les relevEs des caisses munici-
pales de chömage. Edouard Daladler vous a expliqu6
tr6s bien, l'autre jour, pourquoi ces chiffres sont
gEn6ralement incomplets ; parce que beaucoup
d'ouvriers ne se d6cidaient qu'ä la dernlfere extrö-
mitE ä se faire inscrire ä la caisse d'assistance-
chömage, et aussi pour une autre raison : c'est
qu'il n'y a pas de caisses de chömage dans toutes
les communes. Par cons6quent, cette statistique du
chömage n'a qu'une valeur relative, eile permet de
suivre les mouvements dont eile dessine la courbe
avec une certaine exactitude, mais eile ne pennet
pas une certitude quant ä la quantitE exacte des
chömeurs.
II y a une seconde statistique, plus pr6cise. plus
exacte : celle du chömage partlel, statistique men-
sueUe <iress4e par le servlce des mines, car dans
108
notre l^glslation, c'est le servlce des mines qul
contröle les appareils ä vapeur. Le service des mlnes
dresse tous les mois une statistique portant sur les
Etablissements ä feu — c'est, je crois, le terme du
rfeglement — ayant plus de cent ouvriers, et chaque
mois il donne la statistique du nombre moyen
d'heures pendant lesquelles les ouvriers ont tra-
vaillE dans les Etablissements qu'il contröle.
Demandez ces statistiques ä M. Belin — statis-
tlques du chömage partiel, caisses de secours mu-
nicipales, relevE mensuel du service des mlnes —
vous verrez ce que c'Etait que le chömage partiel
avant que nous venions au pouvoir. On me citalt
rEcemment le mot de M. Louis Renault : « la lol
de 40 heures !. Ah ! si je pouvais seulement 6tre
sür de donner 30 heures de travail par semaine ä
mes ouvriers ! >
Messieurs, vous ne vous souvenez donc pas de
r6tat des Industries ä cette 6poque, de leur Etat de
dEpression, de marasme, de pEnurie dans lequel la
dEflation ä outrance les avait plongEes. Je ne veux
pas insister, mais tout cela est incontestable ; au
moment oĂĽ nous avons f ait voter la loi de
40 heures il n'y avait pour ainsi dire pas d'Eta-
blissement industriel en France, oü Ton travaillät
40 heures par semaine, ou bien alors, c'Etait une
exception, un privilEge dans un Etablissement fran-
Qais.
M. LE PR]ßsn)ENT. — II y a un document sur la
question : ce n'est pas un document frangais. II
Emane du Bureau International du Travail. Vous
le connaissez.
M. LfioN Blum. — Non, Monsieur le prEsident.
M. LE Präsident. — II est extrait de VAnnie so-
ciale, Journal ou revue EditE par le B.I.T. ä Ge-
nEve, pour l'annEe 1938-1939.
M. L£oN Blum. — 1938-1939 ?
_ 109 —
M. LE PRÄsroENT. — Je vous donne le renselgne-
ment, vous en tirerez peut-ötre les arguments que
vous croirez devoir en tirer : chapitre IV — cela
Emane, je le rEpEte, du B.I.T. ä GenEve — Condi
tions de travail, durEe de travail et questiona
annexes — France — En ce qui concerne la durEe
effective du travail dans les Etablissements occu-
pant plus de 100 ouvriers, les statistiques montrent
que le nombre moyen d'heures totales par semaine,
qui Etait de 44,6 en 1934, 44,5 en 1935 et 44,5 en
1936, est descendu ä 40,04 en 1937, ä la suite de
l'application de la loi sur la semaine de quarante
heures, et 39,0 en 1938. » Je vous donne le texte.
M. L6oN Blum. — Ce sont des chifEres tout ä lait
Inconcevables en ce qui concerne le chömage par-
tiel. Chacun a encore dans le Souvenir ceux du
chömage partiel ou du chömage total au moment
de juin 1936. C'est un fait de notoriEtE publique, et
je suis surpris de ces chiffres ; j'aimerais avoir
le document et l'Etat complet, Etant donnE les sta-
tistiques du Service des mines dont je vous ai moi-
mEme signalE l'existence.
Ce dont je suis sür, et je tiens ä le dire, c'est
qu'au moment oĂĽ on a discutE la loi de 40 heures,
on a fait beaucup d'objections, de critiques ; on
a manifestE beaucoup d'apprEhension, mais jamais
celle-lä. On a parlE de concurrence ä l'exportation,
de rEpercussions et d'incidences monEtaires, de
difficultEs pour des Industries purement saison-
niEres ou d'un caractEre particulier, comme la ma-
rine marchande, ä s'adapter ä un rEgime trop
rigide. Mais personne n'a prEsentE d'objection de
cette nature, et cela non seulement au moment
du vote de la lol, mais quand j'ai EtE interpellE
au SEnat, en 1937 quelque temps avant la chute du
mlnlstEre, sur la loi de 40 heures. L'interpellation
Etait pourtant mordante, agressive, mais pas un
instant des faits de ce genre n'ont EtE apportEs
dans le dEbat. Je crois doHc qu'on peut tenir pour
/
— 110 —
acquis, pour assur6, qu'au moment oĂĽ le Programme
d'armement a 6t6 r6dig6, personne ne pouvait
s'imaginer en France que la lol de 40 heures seralt
un obstacle ä son ex6cution.
Toutefois je voudrais, si vous le permettez, ser-
rer d'un peu plus prös cette analyse des r6percus-
sions de la loi de 40 heures sur le rendement de
la production. C'est un ph6nom6ne beaucoup plus
complexe que l'accusation ne paralt rimaginer.
Dans uhe production moderne, on peut distin-
guer raisonnablement trois 616ments : le premier,
c'est la nature, la qualitö, le perfectionnement de
l'outillage ; c'est r616ment machine, pour tout
englober dans une seule expression. Le second,
c'est la dur6e de rotation de cette machine ; non
pas la dur6e de travail de l'ouvrier. Pour le troi-
sifeme 616ment, c'est le rendement horaire de cette
machine que l'ouvrier doit mettre en actlon.
Voulez-vous maintenant que nous examinions la
r^percussion de la dur6e legale du travail sur ces
trois 616ments ? •
En ce qui concerne le premier — la qualitö de
l'outillage — eile est certainement nulle. La qualitö
de l'outillage dopend de la qualit6 du patron, de son
esprit inventif, de sa decision plus ou moins rapide
ä renouveler cet outillage et aussl de l'^tat de sa trö-
sorerie, car nous nous sommes trouv6s en pr6sence
d'une Industrie oĂĽ la suppression des marges b6n6-
nciaires et des amortissements avait arrßt^ complö-
tement le renouvellement des outiUages.
Le second 616ment nous met au ccEur du Pro-
bleme : c'est la dur6e de rotation de la machlne.
Car il ne s'agit pas de savoir combien d'heures
l'ouvrier trav^ille, mais combien d'heures la machlne
toume.
Ne croyez pas qu'entre la dur^e du travail de
rouvrler et la dur§e de rotation de la mÄChln^, ü
— 111 —
y alt un rapport aussi simple et aussi nöcessaire
qu'on l'imagine : il n'en est rien. La dur6e de rota-
tion des machines et la dur6e de travail de l'ouvrier
ne sont pas li6es n^cessairement et dependantes
l'une de l'autre, et vous allez en avoir tout de suite
la preuve.
Quel est le maximum possible pour un ouvrier ?
Mettons que ce soit 10 heures, 11 heures. Ce sont
des maxima qu'il est pratiquement impossible de
d6passer, qu'il est träs difflcile d'atteindre. Quel est,
au contraire, le regime avec lequel un outillage
donne le maximum de rendement ? Serait-ce par
hasard le r6gime de la loi de maximum de rende-
ment ? Serait-ce par hasard le regime de la lol de
10 heures ou de la loi de 11 heures pour l'ouvrier ?
Pas du tout : le rendement maximum de l'outillage
c'est routillage qui toume sans arrĂźt pendant 24
heures par jour. Pour que l'outillage toume pendant
24 heures par jour, vous ne pouvez pas n'avolr
qu'une 6quipe. Une 6quipe ne travaille pas jour et
nult. Vous ne pouvez m6me pas avoir seulement
deux 6qulpes. II est ä peu pr6s impossible, dans les
conditions de travail moderne, d'avolr une Equipe
travaillant 12 heures- par jour, c'est-ä-dire ä la
semalne 72 heures. Personne, je crois, n'a Jamals
parl6 de cela. Alors. le regime maximum est de 3
6quipes, et c'est celui que l'on pratlque lä oü le
travail est continu. Ce que vous ne pouvez tout de
m6me pas faire, c'est que la journ6e alt plus de 24
heures. La dur^e de travail de l'ouvrier, qui corres-
pond au rendement maximum de l'outillage n'est
nl dix, nl onze, c'est 24 divis6 par trois, c'est-ä-dire
8, de teile sorte que le regime l^gal du travail
correspond ä la rotation maxima de l'outillage,
c'est la semaine de quarante heures, si c'est 5 jours
par semaine, et au maximum, la semaine de 48
heures si on travaille 6 jours. Car 11 est impossible,
au molns pendant plus de quelques semalnes, de
supprimer le repos hebdomadalre.
l
mm
f
>'•'
\
I
ĂĽ
H'
»
— 112 —
Vous saislssez tout de sulte comblen les deux
donn^es varient d'une fagon ind6pendante l'une de
l'autre. On a r6p6t6 partout — M. le Procureur
g^nöral l'a dit l'autre jour — que pendant ce
temps lä, en Allemagne, on travaillait 60 heures.
Qu'en savez-vous ? Vous le r6p6tez parce que le
chancelier Hitler l'a dit dans un discours au
Sportpalatz. Voilä, ä ma connaissance, l'unlque
t^moignage que l'on possäde. En r6alit6, nous
n'avons Jamals su ce qui se passait dans les pays
totaUtaires, pas plus qu'un pays totalitaire n'a su,
comme les 6v6nements l'ont prouv6, ce qui se passait
dans un autre pays totalitaire. Peut-6tre travaillait-
on 60 heures par semaine en Allemagne, pour les
autostrades, pour la construction de la llgne
Siegfried, oĂĽ pour d'autres travaux de terrassement
de cette nature, oĂĽ seul le travail humain compte.
Mals moi, Sans le savoir, je vous afflrme que. dans
les usines de mat^riel de guerre, on ne travaillait
pas 60 heures parce que le travail 6tait contlnu
parce que les machines tournaient jour et nult et
que sl les machines toument jour et nult, on se
trouve tout de mfime en pr6sence de cette v6rit4
plus forte que toutes les autres. c'est qufe la joum^e
n a que 24 heures. pas davantage. pas 30, pas 33.
Par cons6quent. dans les usines de guerre en Alle-
magne, vous pouvez etre assuräs que l'on travaillait
I A51"?„r°'' f availle encore ä 3 4quipes par Jour,
3 4quipes qui sont n6cessalrement de 8 heures et
par cons^quent 48 heures par semaine et non 60.
r^An?^^! ^^""^f ^-^^^ ^^"^^® ^ela. Imprudemment,
n^gligemment. on ne se doute pas du mal que cela
peut faire, on ne se doute pas des attelntes que cela
peut causer en roulant, quand on l'a n6gligemment
nn^J^ r^flfchit, je crois que l'on est aussitöt
convaincu, je ne dis pas de la v6rit6. car je n'en
sais rien, mals de l'^vidence de ce que j'afflrme
Voulez-vous un autre exemple pris dans rindustrie
— 113 —
frangalse ? H y a une usine de moteurs qui s'appelle
Gnome et Rhone. On y travaillait ä trois äquipes.
Intervint une mesure d'ordre g6n6ral, un d6cret-loi,
je crois, qui d'ailleurs pour des raisons d'ordre
psychologique, et peut-6tre autant que pour des
raisons materielles, posa en principe le systfeme de
la joum6e de 10 heures dans les Industries tra-
vaillant pour la d6fense nationale. Onome et Rhone
dit : « Ecoutez : vous n'allez tout de m6me pas
m'appllAuer cette loi. Chez moi eile va faire tomber
le temps de rotation des machines de 24 heures ä
20 heures, ou au maximum 21 », car je crois qu'on
est arrive flnalement ä un regime oü l'öquipe de
jour faisait 11 heures et l'äquipe de nult 10 heures.
On lui a r^pondu : « C'est fächeux. mais 11 faut
vous conformer ä la rägle präsente. sul\re l'exem-
ple. » Une augmentation de la dur^e 16gale du
travail dans une usine d6termin6e s'est ainsl
traduite par une r^duction de la dur6e de rotation
des machines. Vous voyez que ce n'est pas si simple,
si 616mentaire, que cela n'est pas une espfece de
rfegle de trois d'6cole primaire !
M. LE Procureur gäniSral. — Cependant, voulez-
vous me permettre de vous opposer un texte, c'est
M. Daladier qui l'a donn6 et je Ten f^llcite. C'est
le d6cret-lol du 20 mars 1939.
M. L£oN Blum. — Je viens d'y faire alluslon !
M. LE Procureur gänäral. — Ce texte qui a 6t6
fait en raison des n^cessit^s de la d6fense natio-
nale pr6voit qu'il est urgent d'avoir recours aux 60
heures.
M. LÄON Blum. — Oul, M. le Procureur g6n6ral.
C'est ä ce d6cret mßme que je viens de faire allu-
slon quand j'al parl6 de Gnome et Rhone. C'est par
appllcation de ce d^cret-loi qu'on est arriv6 aux
r^sultats que je vous dis. Je vous montre par cet
exemple que Ton ne peut pas faire des ralsonne-
"■— '.:^'- ::s ,L» LajuM
%
— 112 —
Vous saisissez tout de sulte combien les deux
dorniges varient d'une fa?on Ind^pendante l'une de
l'autre. On a r6p^t6 partout — M. le Procureur
g6n6ral l'a dit l'autre jour -— que pendant ce
temps lä, en Allemagne, on travalUait 60 heures.
Qu'en savez-vous ? Vous le r6p6tez parce que le
chanceller Hitler l'a dit dans un discours au
Sportpalatz. Voilä, ä ma connaissance, l'unique
t^moignage que l'on poss6de. En r6alit6, nous
n'avons jamais su ce qul se passait dans les pays
totalitaires, pas plus qu'un pays totalitaire n'a su,
comme les 6v6nements l'ont prouv6, ce qui se passait
dans un autre pays totalitaire. Peut-6tre travaillait-
on 60 heures par semaine en Allemagne, pour les
autostrades, pour la construction de la Ugne
Siegfried, oĂĽ pour d'autres travaux de terrassement
de cette nature, oĂĽ seul le travail humain compte.
Mals moi, sans le savoir, je vous afĂĽrme que, dans
les usines de mat^riel de guerre, on ne travaillait
pas 60 heures parce que le travail 6tait continu,
parce que les machines tournaient jour et nult. et
que si les machines toument jour et nult, on se
trouve tout de mfime en pr6sence de cette v6rit^
plus forte que toutes les autres, c'est qire la joumöe
na que 24 heures, pas davantage, pas 30, pas 33.
Par cons6quent, dans les usines de guerre, en Alle-
magne, vous pouvez etre assur6s que l'on travaillait
et que l'on travaille encore ä 3 6quipes par jour,
3 4quipes qui sont n6cessairement de 8 heures, et
par cons^quent 48 heures par semaine et non 60.
Une Phrase jet6e comme cela, Imprudemment,
n^gligemment, on ne se doute pas du mal que cela
peut faire, on ne se doute pas des attelntes que cela
peut causer en roulant, quand on l'a nägligemment
Jet6e comme un disque. Personne n'en sait rlen. Sl
Ion y r6fi6chlt, je crois que l'on est aussitöt
convaincu, je ne dis pas de la v6rit6. car je n'en
sals rlen, mais de l'^vidence de ce que j'afĂĽrme.
Voulez-vous un autre exemple pris dans l'lndustrle
y*
— 113 —
frangaise ? H y a une uslne de moteurs qui s'appelle
Gnome et Rhone. On y travaillait ä trois 6quipes.
Intervint une mesure d'ordre g6n6ral, un d6cret-loi,
je crois, qui d'ailleurs pour des raisons d'ordre
psychologique, et peut-fetre autant que pour des
raisons materielles, posa en principe le systäme de
la joum6e de 10 heures dans les Industries tra-
vaillant pour la defense nationale. «Gnome et Rhone
dit : « Ecoutez : vous n'allez tout de m6me pas
m'appliquer cette loi. Chez moi eile va faire tomber
le temps de rotation des machines de 24 heures ä
20 heures, ou au maximum 21 », car je crois qu'on
est arrive flnalement ä un regime oü l'öquipe de
jour faisait 11 heures et l'6quipe de nult 10 heures.
On lui a r6pondu : « C'est fächeux, mais il faut
vous conformer ä la rägle präsente, sui\re l'exem-
ple. » Une augmentation de la dur^e 16gale du
travail dans une usine d6termin6e s'est alnsi
traduite par une r6ductlon de la dur6e de rotation
des machines. Vous voyez que ce n'est pas si simple,
si 616mentaire, que cela n'est pas une espöce de
rfegle de trols d'6cole primalre !
M. LE Procureur g6n:6ral. — Cependant, voulez-
vous me permettre de vous opposer un texte, c'est
M. Daladier qui l'a donn6 et je Ten f^liclte. C'est
le d6cret-lol du 20 mars 1939.
M. Lf ON Blum. — Je viens d'y faire allusion !
M. LE Procureur gänäral. — Ce texte qui a 6t6
fait en raison des n^cessit^s de la d6fense natio-
nale pr6voit qu'il est urgent d'avoir recours aux 60
heures.
M. LÄON Blum. — Oul, M. le Procureur g6n6ral.
C'est ä ce d6cret m6me que je viens de faire allu-
sion quand j'ai parl6 de Gnome et Rhone. C'est par
appllcation de ce d6cret-loi qu'on est arriv6 aux
r^sultats que je vous dis. Je vous montre par cet
exemple que l'on ne peut pas faire des ralsonne-
^ t
\
t
*<.
— 114 —
ments aussi simples, aussl uniformes aue cela, et
que, en Imposant une applicatlon uniforme du
d6cret-loi de mars, on est arriv6 pour une Industrie
donn6e ä augmenter sans doute la dur6e du travall
des 6quipes, mais ä diminuer ce qui est une chose
essentielle, la dur6e de rotatlon de l'outillage
Industriel.
J'en revlens malntenant au troisi6me 616ment :
le rendement horaire de la machlne. Car la mĂźme
. machlne tournant un m6me nombre d'heures, tel
ouvrier en tlrera dans le m6me temps plus de
pl6ces qu'un autre. Une des conditions de la produc-
tion c'est de porter au maxlmum ce rendement
horaire de la machlne. Ici, vous vous trouvez en
pr6sence de faits comme le freinage dont 11 a d6jä
6t6 question ä tant de reprises. Je veux vous dlre
ä mon tour que ce serait une grande erreur de
consid6rer le freinage comme une espfece de Sabotage
ou de gröve perl6e. Le freinage a 6t6 un sentiment
contre lequel 11 fallait lutter. C'6talt cependant un
sentiment d'essence noble. II pouvait avoir certaines
racines 6goistes quand 11 6tait entretenu chez l'ou-
vrier par la crainte de son propre chömage ; mals
11 devenait un sentiment noble quand 11 6talt
entretenu chez l'ouvrier par la consid^ration du
chömage de ses camarades, par le d6sir de procurer
du travall ä un plus grand nombre d'entre eux, ä
son propre d6triment, car le salaire comportant
partout au-dessus d'un taux flx6 de base. des tarlfs
aux piäces, si l'ouvrier avait travalll6 davantage, 11
aurait gagn^ davantage. n aimait mieux gagner
molns et procurer de l'ouvrage ä un certain nombre
de ses camarades.
Le rendement horaire, de quol est-il fonction ?
D abord d'un certain nombre de dispositions mate-
rielles : rorganlsation Interieure de l'usine, r^clal-
rage, ra^ration, la disposition des machines, le plus
ou molns de facllite ä circuler ^ntre elles, le plus
ou molns de methode et de raplditö dans les tranÄ-
— 115 —
Ports Intfirieurs, tandis que l'objet de la fabrlcatlon
passe d'un 6tat ä un autre. II dopend de la bonne
coordlnation et de la bonne adaptation des mouve-
ments de l'ouvrier ä sa machlne ; 11 dopend aussl
de la condition morale et physique de l'ouvrier. H
y a toute une 6cole en Am6rique, l'öcole Taylor,
r6cole de ces Ingenieurs Bedeau, que vous voyez se
promener dans des Inspections, qui ont pouss6 tr6s
loin retude des m6thodes d'organisation materielle
conduisant au maximum de rendement horaire de
la machlne, ce qui est pr6clsement leur objectif.
Mais 11 y a aussi recole de Gilbreth qui a etudie et
recherch6 les donnees les plus favorables dans les
conditions physiques de l'ouvrier pour que ce ren-
dement soit obtenu. La donn6e essentielle c'est que
la fatigue physique de l'ouvrier soit Umitee. II y a
un exemple classlque : dans un atelier de femmes
on a obtenu un rendement double simplement en
alternant. pour les femmes la Position debout et
la Position assise.
Ne croyez-vous pas que cette condition morale et
physique de l'ouvrier, toute notre legislation sociale
etait de nature ä l'ameiiorer : la joumee plus
courte, les loislrs, les cong6s payes, le sentiment
d'une dignitö, d'une 6galite conquise, tout cela etalt,
devait etre, un des eiements qui peuvent porter au
maxlmum le rendement horaire tire dQ la machlne
par l'ouvrier. ^ -•
Messieurs, sl vous reprenez ces tjrols ei6ments,
vous verrez que nos lols sociales ne pouvalent agir
que favorablement sur le troisieme. Notre politique
ne pouvait agir que favorablement sur le premler :
renöuvellement et modemisation de ToutlUage,
puisque nous institulons par tous les moyens une
Stimulation de la vie 6conomique, une clrculatlon
plus active de capitaux. D'ailleurs, nous avons aide
la petite et la moyenne Industrie de ce pays pour
lul permettre ce renöuvellement ; independamment
des •Xlortß faits uar des moyens spödaux, nous lui
/
if
ii
u*
M'
(•,'
— 118 —
avons falt des pröts dont d'ailleurs, je le dis en
passant, quelques-unes des plus importantes firmes
Industrielles de ce pays ont Profite.
Quant au deuxiäme 6iement, je crols blen avoir
d6montr6 d'une fa?on, je ne dis pas persuasive.
mais en tout cas claire, que l'essentiel n'est pas
d'augmenter la dur6e du travail, mais d'augmenter
la dur^e de rotation des machines. Quand vous
passez de la semaine de 40 heures ä la journ6e de
8 heures, c'est-ä-dire ä la semaine de 48, vous
augmentez la dur6e de rotation de 25 %. Quand
vous f altes deux ^quipes, vous l'augmentez de
100 %, avec 3 6quipes, vous l'augmentez de 200 %.
Tout le Probleme essentiel 6tait donc la d6multi-
plication des 6quipes. Je sais bien, Monsieur le
President, qu'icl se pose cette question des
sp6cialistes, qui est trfes importante et au-devant
de laquelle je veux venir.
M. LE Präsident. — C'est une question essentielle.
M. D6oN Blum. — On a dlt et repete que ce qul
avalt empSche la d6multiplication des 6quipes,
c'6tait le manque de sp6cialistes. Je crois que cela
a ete surtout la mauvaise volonte ä sortir des habi-
tudes prises et des routlnes acqulses. Aujourd'hui,
le specialiste dans l'ĂĽidustrie moderne n'est pas le
fiursitaire de la guerre 1914-1918, ce n'est pas le
tourneur ou le fraiseur travaillant sur sa fraise ä
main, ce n'est plus cela. Les machines de l'industrie
moderne sont en grande partie automatiques, en
ce sens que dans bien des cas un ouvrier peut en
conduire plusieurs, et que dans d'autres cas, un
ouvrier qui n'est pas un specialiste proprement dlt,
mais un manceuvre sp6cialise, peut les conduire.
Vous trouverez dans le dossier la preuve de ce que
J'avance. Par exemple, ä un moment donne, la
direction du Creusot demande un Programme plus
6tendu, ä plus longue portee pour la fabrication des
aclers mouies dcstines au cuirassement, au blln-
117
dage. Elle dlt : si je suis en presence d'un Pro-
gramme suffisamment important, je pourrai ache-
ter et installer des machines qui me permettront de
faire reconomie d'un certain nombre de specialistes.
De mSme, il y a au dossier un rapport tres interes-
sant fait en 1936 par le contröleur g6neral Bois, oü
il examine l'etat de l'usine Hotchkiss. II constate
ce que tout le monde a dit d'ailleurs, que cette usine
en 1936 fonctionne d'une fagon absolument artisa-
nale et qu'en raison du manque de perfectionnement
de son outillage, eile fait une consommation de
specialistes absolument demesuree. De teile sorte
qu'on aurait pu chez Hotchkiss, en renouvelant
Toutillage, liberer un certain nombre de specialistes
de möme qu'on aurait pu le faire au Creusot en
montant des machines nouvelles.
D'innombrables temoignages qui sont au dossier,
ceux de MM. Guy La Chambre, Dautry, Mahieux,
montrent comment cette difficulte des specialistes
a ete resolue pendant la guerre. Pendant la guerre
on a forme des specialistes ; on a fait marcher les
machines, on les a fait meme diriger par des fem-
mes. Je me rappeile cette phrase restee dans ma
memoire ; eile provient d'une note de M. Guy La
Chambre : « On ne se doute pas, dlt-il, de la quan-
tlte de femmes qui etaient la veille couturiäres, qul
n'avaient Jamals fait marcher que des machines ä
coudre, qui sont devenues des fraiseuses et des
decoleteuses. Si on avait voulu, on aurait une quan-
tite sĂĽffisante de specialistes. >
Je sais bien qu'il y a lä un vice du patronat I
On a neglige l'apprentlssage pendant les annees
de deflation. On ne s'est pas assez soucie de la
Promotion ouvriere. Quand on a essaye de mettre
en jeu toutes ces institutions patronales ä partir
de 1937-1938, on s'est heurte ä beaucoup d'incom-
prehension, ä la crainte d'engager de nouvelles
depenses. C'est pour mol certain. Ce que je vals
vous dire va vous paraltre peut-etre un peu ötrange,
1
r.\
\ .
:t
^!
1
!
'i
-<â–
t
i
- 118 -
mals Je vous assure que blen des fols, Je me suis
surpris 6tudiant ce dossier, non pas comme un
accus6, mais si vous voulez blen, comme un avocat
Qul examlnerait le dossier d'un autre, plus slmple-
ment, comme un Frangals, qui, ä l'alde des 616ments
qu'un hasard mettalt entre ses mains — je n'ose
pas dlre un prlvUfege — essayalt de volr clalrement
toute la v6rit6. Je suis arriv6 pour ma part ä la
convlction que la d^multlpUcatlon des 6qulpes 6talt
posslble. en tout cas Inflnlment plus que le patronat
n'a voulu en convenlr. Vous trouverez l'^cho de
cela dans des documents mesur6s, nuanc6s, comme
l€s rapports du contröleur Jugnet ou de M. Valette
qul constatent que ce renouvellement complet de
rorganlsatlon de l'uslne, que cette Introductlon
d'6quipes multiples donnaient vralment un Supple-
ment de pelne, d'ouvrage au patronat, et qu'll
almait mieux s'en tenlr ä rorganlsatlon traditlon-
nelle de son uslne. II n'6talt pas sĂĽr qu'un
suppl6ment de proflt vlnt r^pondre ä ce Supplement
d'efiforts et peut-6tre ä ce suppl6ment de rlsque.
Qulconque 6tudle ce dossier avec cette espfece de
besoin impartial de trouver et de connaltre la v^rlte
qul vous etonnera peut-ätre chez un accuse, mals
qul Je vous assure me possöde encore, arrive ä cette
convlction que la Solution v6rltable 6tait dans le
doublement, dans le trlplement des 6qulpes.
Du cöt* de la classe ouvrifere, on percevalt les
choses trfes clalrement. II y a une toute petite
anecdote que Je trouve absolument salslssante. En
1938, on enreglstre des retards dans la fabrlcatlon
des culrasses de chars parce que les aclers man-
quent. L'lng^nleur g^n^ral Happlch 6crlt ä M.
Lambert-Ribot. II 6talt en correspondance avec lul,
ce qul est tout ä falt naturel et louable. II lul
Signale les cas Utlgleux en vue d'lnterventlons du
Comlte des Forges qu'll suppose plus importantes
et mieux accueillies que Celles de l'Etat. M. Lambert-
Ribot Intervl^iit donc aupr^ des Industries Int^
\!
— 119 —
ress6es pour ces aclers dont la llvraison falt d6faut.
II y en a qul sont fournis par une maison de Saint-
Etienne dont le nom est connu dans la politique
et dans l'industrie, la maLson Neyret. M. Neyret
r6unit ses ouvriers et leur dit : « Voici ce que nous
allons faire : au lieu de fabriquer tous nos aclers
avec les mömes equipes, nous allons former des
6quipes speciales pour des aclers destln6s ä la
Defense nationale. Et lä, nous travalUerons donc ä
trois equipes. > Les ouvriers repondent : t Sl Ton
fait cela nous consentons ä travaiUer le samedl. >
C'est-ä-dire que lä oü eile sent de la part du patro-
nat un effort novateur, energique, et en mĂźme temps
un signe de bonne volonte, la populatlon ouvriere
de Saint-Etienne, qul n'a pas la r6putation d'Ăźtre
une des plus commodes, y r6pondait aussitöt par le
geste que Je vlens de dlre.
M. LE Prästoent. — Vous evoqulez tout ä l'heure
le temoignage de M. Dautry au sujet des sp6cla-
Ustes. Voici ce qu'll a d6clare dans une deposltlon
le 9 oetobre 1940. II venalt de parier de recruter,
car la lol de 40 heures dans les chemins de fer
avalt eu pour resultat l'embauchement de 97.000
manceuvres, ^ui, dlsalt-il, au taux moyen de 16.000
francs par an coütaient ä l'Etat une d6pense sup-
piementaire de un mllliard et demi. Mals ce n'est
pas l'essentlel. II parle des speclallstes. c Quant ä
nouveau ä l'automne demier, en 1939, J'al voulu
faire placer des chömeurs, dlsalt-11, des uslnes
Renault, on a constate un effroyable dechet physi-
que. Chez nous, le bon ouvrier a toujours manqu6
et au plus fort de la crlse de chömage, on n'avalt
pas suffisamment de speclallstes. La perte du slxife-
me de ces speclallstes etait une v6ritable catastro-
phe pour la lol de 40 heures, car ce slxieme se trou-
vait irremplagable avant de trfes longs mois et möme
des ann6es de preparatlon.
M. LtoN Blum. — Je suis d'accord avec M. Dautry
sur un polnt d'allleurs Important et cependant
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— 120 —
accessolre : c'est qu'en effet 11 6tait presque impos
sible, malgr6 les afflrmations des ouvrlers de trouver
des sp6cialistes dans Teffectif des chömeurs. Le
chömage est pour les ouvrlers une cause terrible
d'usure physique et d'usure morale. II prodult chez
l'ouvrler une esp^ce de vlellUssement pr6matur6.
Qu and on donnait aux admlnlstratlons publlques
ou aux Offices d^partementaux du travall des Ustes
de chömeurs portant leurs anclennes professlons,
qul 6talent blen des professlons de sp6clalist€s, et
quand ensulte on imposalt ä ces chömeurs des essais
(qul ont, je crols, 6t6 trop s6v6res), 11 y avait un
dachet terrible : seule une Proportion Inflme de ces
chömeurs pouvalt remplir le röle de sp^clalistes.
Je suis d'accord lä-dessus. Mals la cltatlon de M.
Dautry ne prouve rlen contre ce que je vlens de
dlre. II s'aglt de la facillt6 de former des sp6ciallstes
en un temps relativem ent court. Vous trouverez
dans le dossler un document du mlnlstfere de
l'Armement : c'est un grand rapport stabil sur la
demande de M. Mlrault, dans lequel on r6sume
l'ensemble des efiforts falts pendant la guerre. Vous
verrez comblen pendant la guerre on a pu Impro-
viser de sp6clalistes, mĂźme parml les* femmes.
En r6alit6, ce mot de sp^ciallste est 6qulvoque.
Dans rindus'trle moderne, le vral sp6clallste, c'est
Toutllleur, c'est-ä-dlre celul qul affüte, solgne, met
au polnt l'outil de la machine ; car la machine-outil
est une machlne qul manie l'outil semblable ä un
outil d'homme. C'est le rfegleur, celul qul survelUe
et v^rifle le rythme des mouvements de la machlne.
C'est le v6riflcateur qul contröle les pifeces avant
qu'elles passent d'un 6tat de la fabrlcatlon ä un
autre. C'est le suiveur qul sult la plfece d'une ma-
chlne ä la machlne suivante dans le rythme de la
chalne. Ce sont lä des hommes qul ne peuvent 6tre
formös que par un long apprentlssage. H y a lä une
61ite ouvrifere qul correspond ä une v6rltable
maltrlse. Mals de ces ouvrlers qul en eflfet ne peuvent
t
— 121 —
pas etre remplac6s par des manceuvres sp6cialis6s
ordlnaires ou par des femmes dans une grande
usine, ll,n'y avait qu'une Proportion Infime. Quand
11 s'agit de main-d'oeuvre sp6clalis6e ou de femmes
se bomant ä conduire les machines modernes,
comment a-t-on fait pendant la guerre ? Comment
avalt-on fait pendant l'autre guerre et surtout
pendant celle-ci ? Vous avez le t6molgnage du
minlstre de la Defense nationale, la d6claratlon de
M. Mahieux ä la commisslon des Finances du S^nat
qul est saisissante ; vous avez ce rapport adressö
ä M. Mirault auquel je fais allusion. Vous verrez
partout les traces du mSme fait. C'est qu'on a pu,
somme toute, improviser des sp6cialistes hommes et
femmes.
LES HEURES SUPPLEMENTAIRES
M. LE Präsident. — Avez-vous autre chose ä dlre
sur l'appUcatlon de la loi de 40 heures ?
M. LÄON Blum. — J'en viens maintenant ä la
questlon des heures suppl6mentaires que je n'ai pas
abordne et que je n'entends pas du tout 61uder.
J'ai essay6 tout ä l'heure de vous montrer quel
6talt le regime Optimum de travall dans une Indus-
trie moderne et je crois vous avolr montr6 claire-
ment que ce regime 6tait celul des trois 6quipes de
hult heures.
Quel est, dans une chalne de fabrlcatlon mo-
derne, le röle des heures suppl6mentaires ? Eh bien!
si l'organisation optima de travall n'a pas 6t6 r6a-
lis^e, s'il n'y a qu'une 6quipe, par exemple, 11 est
6vldent que les heures suppl^mentaires augmente-
ront le rendement de cette 6quipe. D'autre part
meme dans l'organisation optima, on peut avoir
besoln d'heures suppl6mentalres parce que tous les
616ments du travaU ne s'ex^cutent pas avec un
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— 122 —
synchronl&me absolu, qu'll peut toujours se produlre
un certain d6calage d'une partie de la fabrication
par rapport ä une autre et aue pour ^viter un
engorgement g6n6ral, ĂĽ faut alors que l'heure sup-
pl6inentaire Intervienne pour apporter une correc-
tion, une compensation.
Notez que pendant toute la Periode qul m'intö-
resse, vous pouvez le voir dans les rapports de M
Jugnet meme dans le rapport de M. Jugnet sur'
1937. on n'envisage Jamals les heures suppl6men-
taires que de ce point de vue. On ne paralt pas
Ăźouhaiter un regime g6n6ral du travail d^passant
les 40 heures et on regarde toutes les difficult6s que
Ion rencontre pour les heures suppl^mentaires de
ce Point de vue : compensation. correction, 6quili-
bre harmonie. D s'agit d'assurer. malgr6 les petits
accidents In^vitables. l'ensemble de la fabrication.
Cela dit. et le röle des heures suppl6mentaires
6tant ainsi d6termin6 dans une fabrication. auel
a 6t6 mon röle ä mol ? . ^ ^x
^co^H ''I^'i' *^^'"'' *^°'°^'' ^ ^^* ^"« J'avais pris. ä cet
egard, ä la Commission des Finances du S6nat des
engagem^nts que je n'ai pas tenus. Vous pouvez
vous reporter ä la discussion. je me suis opposi
avec une obstlnation invincible ä tous les amende-
ments qui voulaient me prescrire des d^rogations
d'une cat^gorie dötermin^e. J'ai dit : non je n'ac-
cepterai Jamals cela. jamais je n^acceptira^de
donner ä une autorit6 administrative unique un
pouvoir en matidre de d^rogation.
Je parlais ainsi. parce que pendant la premifere
tage de la loi sur le repos hebdomadaire. par le
systtoe des d6rogations pr^fectorales. Je savais
aussi quelles avaient 6t^ les lenteurs d'application
fJ^ll .1 ^'"^^^'/t Je ne voulais pas retomber
dans de tels errements. Non seulement je n'ai pas *
?Iif,cf ^K^H^^'^'^'i "'^^'' J' ^e r^pfete, je me suis
refus^ obstin^ment ä laisser introduire dans le texte
■«•«NIHMMMMBaMMM
— 123 —
rien qui pĂĽt limiter ma libert6 en ce qui allait
concerner la r^daction des räglements d'adminls-
tration publique. Les r^glements d'administration
publique oni 6t6 6tudi6s avec la proc^dure que je
vous ai rappel6e tout ä l'heure ; ils ont 6t6 pr^par6s
par mon ami Lebas ; c'est un travail que j'ai vu
de prfes et dont, bien entendu, je suis et 6tais
entiörement responsable.
Or, qu'est-ce qulls disent les rfeglements ? Les
räglements visent un certain nombre de d^roga-
tions possibles : un accident dans l'usine, un
changement de fabrication. une influence saison-
niöre, etc. mais. dans tous ces cas, ils limitent de
la fa?on la plus rigoureuse le conilngent, le credit
annuel accord^ ä l'industriel. Tandis que quand il
s'agit de travaux qui Interessent la defense natio-
nale, alors la facult6 de d^rogation devient
illimit^e. Le gouvernement d^cide. apräs entente
entre le ministre de qui le travail d6pend et le
ministre du Travail.
Voilä mon röle. C'^tait de prendre les räglements.
Mon röle, c'^tait aussi. en vertu des r^glements. si
un conflit s'^levait entre le ministre du Travail et
le mmistre particuller de la Defense Nationale —
si. par exemple. Edouard Daladier 6tait all6 deman-
der ä Jean Lebas des heures suppl6mentaires pour
uelle ou teile usine. et que Jean Lebas n'y eĂĽt pas
consent! — mon röle, dis-je. c'6tait comme chef du
gouvernement. d'arbitrer ce conflit.
Sur le plan gouvememental, il n'y avait pas
d'autre röle pour moi : faire le räglement (vous le
voyez, Messieurs, je Tai fait) et, le cas 6ch6ant.
appliquer la disposition du röglement qui me conf6-
rait ä moi, vis-ä-vis de deux de mes ministres. un
pouvoir 6ventuel d'arbltrage.
Eh bien ! je dis cela tr6s clairement, mals tröi
.'ermement. Je demande — et c'est un d6fi que je
Porte — qu'on me cite un seul cas oü j'ai 6t6 saisl
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— 124 -^
par les minlstres du Travail et de la Defense
nationale d'un litlge portant sur Tapplication de
la loi de 40 heures...
M. LE Procureur GfiNÄRAL. — Ils n'ont Jamals
rlen demand6. Nous verrons pourquoi, d'alUeurs, et
vous en convenez. Ils voulaient qu'on ne fasse que
40 heures.
M. L6oN Blum. — Jamals je n'ai 6t6 saisi d'un
cas quelconque. Je demande qu'on cite mĂźme un
seul cas oĂĽ j'aie 6te saisi par une Organisation
patronale ou par des patrons d6termin6s d'un litige
de ce genre.
Messieurs, on m'a reproch6, pendant mon gou-
Temement, d'avoir beaucoup regu d'ouvriers. J'ai
beaucoup re?u d'ouvriers, j'ai aussi regu beaucoup
de patrons. II y a des hommes comme M. Lambert-
Ribot ou comme M. Petiet ä qui ma porte 6tait
constamment ouverte. Pas une seule fois, pendant
mon gouvernement, on n'est venu me saisir d'un
.cas portant sur une difflcult6 relative aux heures
suppiementaires et que j'eusse ä trancher comme
Chef du gouvernement. Jamals je n'ai 6t6 saisi
d'un cas de ce genre.
M. LE Procureur göjäral. — Mais je pense que
vous 6tiez d'accord avec votre mhiistre de la Guerre.
M. L6oN Blum. — Je suis toujours d'accord avec
mon ministre de la Guerre, quand 11 s'agit de vous
r^pondre, Monsieur le Procureur g6n6ral.
M. LE Procureur gänäral. — Le ministre de la
Guerre avait fait une circulaire le 29 juillet 1936
et vous savez dans quels termes eile est r^dig^e :
€ Aucune heure suppl6mentalre ne sera effectuee. >
M. L^ON Blum. — Je connais cette circulaire.
Pourquoi ne vous souvenez-vous pas qu'elle a 6t^
rapportee imm6diatement apräs mon d6cret et par
application de mon döcret.
ii
— 125 —
M. Daladier. — Je vous demande pardon. Je me
suis d6jä expliqu6 longuement sur ce point et sur
l'origine de cette circulaire et de sa dur6e. Cette
circulaire a ^t6 prise — je Tai expliqu6 ici dans
une des preml6res audiences — sur la proposition
de M. Guinand. C'est la circulaire dont vous citez
toujours le texte. Elle a 6t6 prise dans ce but pr^cis
de contribuer de la manifere la plus ferme ä la
r^sorption du chömage. En vertu de cette circulaire,
M. Guinand, dont nous ferons le compte quand
viendront les tömoins, notamment les directeurs
des arsenaux, un grand nombre d'ouvriers, plu-
sieurs milliers, ont 6t6 embauch6s. Voilä quel a 6t6
le but de la circulaire Guinand.
M. L^ON Blum. — Je voudrais aj outer un mot.
Cette question des heures suppl6mentaires, c'est la
grande trouvaille de l'accusation. Je voudrais bien
savoir ce que l'accusation contre moi serait devenue
si on n'avait pas fait cette d6couverte.
Seulement, il faut que la Cour se rende bien
compte d'une chose : dans des matiferes comme
Celles des demandes d'heures suppl^mentaires,
l'immense majorit^, la g6neralit6 des cas — ceux
oĂĽ les heures suppl6mentaires sont demand6es et
accord^es sans difficult6 — ne laissent aucune trace;
les cas comme ceux-lä, il y en a des dizaines de
milliers. Ce qui laisse des traces, surtout quand on
les recherche avec tant de soin, ce sont les cas
litigieux. Mais le cas normal, celui-lä ne retentit
pas dans l'instruction. Si vous cherchez d'oĂĽ sont
venues les difficultes, vous vous apercevrez que,
presque Jamals, elles ne se sont 61ev6es jusqu au
plan gouvernemental. M. Guy La Chambre vous a
dit que, pas une fois, il n'avait eu des difflcultes
avec le ministre du Travail pour faire regier des
questions de ce genre. Le plus souvent, ces ques-
tions sont rest6es sur le plan de Tadministration
locale.
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— 126 —
II est parfaitement possible qu'ä l'inspection du
Travail 11 y alt des fonctionnalres qul se solent
montr6s partlcullferement polntlUeux ou r6fractalres
dans les questions d'heures suppl6mentalres, en
s'lmaginant peut-ßtre par lä qu'lls faisaient leur
cour au gouvemement du Front populalre. Ăźou^
tous les gouvernements 11 y a des exc6s de z61e et,
vous savez, ce sont g^n^ralement les m6mes fonc-
tionnalres qul commettent les mßmes excfes de zöle
sous des gouvernements successifs et contradlc-
tolres. Les inspecteurs du travail qul h6sltalent
devant les demandes du patronat, que font-lls
aujourd'hui ? Je n'en sals rien. En principe, 11 y a •
une flctlon du gouvemement repr6sentatlf qul veut
qu'un mlnistre solt responsable des actes de tous
les fonctionnalres plac6s sous ses ordres. II est
cens6 ne pas ignorer ; il les couvre de sa responsa-
billt6 ministerielle. Du polnt de vue de cette respon-
sablllt6 ministerielle c'est d6jä aller un peu loln,
mais s'il s'agit de responsabllit6 pönale ou de res-
ponsabilite criminelle, vous avouerez que cela passe
un peu la mesure. Dire que nous sommes des criml-
nels et des traltres parce que, sans que nous en
ayons la moindre notion, tel inspecteur du travail,
dans tel d6partement, par excös de z61e et, je le
r6p6te, par flatterie vis-ä-vis de notre 6tat d'esprlt
prösume, avait fait une difflculte ä une demande
d'heures suppl^mentaires 16gitimement formte par
un patron de sa circonscription, non tout de mĂźme !
La notion de crime et la notion de trahison ne
peuvent pas s'6tendre jusqu'ä une parelUe clrcon-
f6rence.
Vous ne connalssez que les cas litigieux, mals
quand on d6pouille le dossier, oh ! naturellement,
on admire avec quel soin ils ont 6te recueillis.
montes, sertis. II y a lä un travail d'art qui fait le
plus grand honneur aux joailliers qul s'en sont
charg6s. Mais sl Ton prend une plume et un mor-
— 127 —
ceau de pajpier et que Ton fasse l'addltlon des cas
concrets qui sont citös dans le dossier, 11 y a quelque
chose dont on est confondu. c'est de leur petlt
nombre. Sur des miUlers, sur des dizaines de mll-
llers de marchös qui se sont conclus pour rex6cutlon
du Programme de 1936. combien de cas clt6s par
M Lambert-Ribot qul, pourtant, a du racler tous
les tiroirs du Comit6 des Forges pour nourrir sa
nomenclature ? Combien en cite 1'lngenleur g6n6ral
Mellon ?
J'en parle d^une fagon d6sint6ress6e, car Je ne
sais pas sl un seul des cas qu'on cite s'est prodult
Pendant mon gouvemement. Peut-€tre un, et
encore, je n'en suis pas sĂĽr. Mais peu importe l
Les reflexlons que je fais ont leur valeur g6n6rale
objective. Je r^pöte que les cas sont i^nim«nt peu
nombreux. En tout cas, - et cecl je le redls dune
facon solennelle -^ comme chef du gouvemement
je n'al Jamals eu ä en trancher aucun. On n en a pas
port6 un seul ä ma connalssance. Dans 1 affaire des
heures suppl6mentaires, je n'al pas eu d autre röle
que de particlper ä la rödäbtion des räglenients
d'administratlon publique de la loi des 40 heures
et personne, je crois, n'a pu 61ever la mointo
crltique sur la f agon dont ce röglement 6talt r6dlg6.
En 1938, c'est autre chose. Je suis Intervenu dans
les questions d'heures suppiementairesaprfes cette
reunion du 15 mars, dont M. Guy La Chambre vous
a dTjä parle. A ce moment, j'ai n6gocl6 avec les
organisatlons ouvriäres, mais dans quel sens ? Dans
ie sens de la formule que j'avais introduite dans
}: dlscours que je pronongals ä cette ^^rnej^^^^^
devant la Chambre ä l'heure präsente . « Ce sont les
belolns, c'est la rotation necessaire des machlnes q^
sont la donnee fixe et le travail des hommes doit fetre
rdo^ee mobile >. Et j'ai donc ^^te«V"''nonrd?t
organisatlons ouvriferes pour une sorte de concordat
qufsTt ensuite exprlme dans l'arbltrage Jacomet
il
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128 —
n.
i^ĂĽ'
et dans l'arbitrage Giraud et Qul portait ä 45
heures.'par addition de 5 heures suppl6mentaires.
mais par addition si je puis dire, organique, r6gu-
li6re, le temps normal de la dur^e du travail dans
tous les Etablissements travaillant directement ou
Indirectement pour la D6fense nationale.
Mais quand j'ai n6goci6 cela, qui n'a abouti
qu'aprös moi entre les mains d'Edouard Daladier,
de Guy La Chambre et du contröleur g6n6ral Jaco-
met, qu'ont dit. quel langage m'ont tenu les organi-
sations patronales ? J'ai convoqu6 dans mon cabinet
M. de l'EscaillE, pr6sident de l'Union des soci6t6s na-
tionalisees de Ta^ronautique. et M. Pierre Forgeot,
President de la Chambre syndicale des moteurs. Je
connaissais peu M. de rEscaillE ; au contraire, M.
Pierre Forgeot Etait et est pour moi un ami träs
ancien et trfes intimie. Je me suis adress6 ä eux avec
toute la force de persuasion dont je puis 6tre capable
pour les convaincre de la n6cessit6 de signer cet
accord qui, dans toute l'a^ronautique, aurait portE
la dur6e normale de travail de 40 ä 45 heures. Je
me suis heurt^ ä leur refus absolu et, je le r^pfete
je n'ai pu vaincre cette r^sistance, mĂźme auprfes
d'un ami personnel, trös intime et tr^s eher. Ils
m'ont dit — je suis heureux qu'on alt pu les faire
cEder quelques jours aprös — « impossible ! nous ne
savons que faire de vos 45 heures dans l'a^ronau-
tique ; nous n'arrfvons mßme pas ä faire travailler
nos ouvriers pendant 40 heures».
Je n'ai rien pu obtenir et, au fond, cela n'a
absolument rien d'extraordinaire car. en r6alit4,
dans toute production industrielle, il y a deux
phases : la phase pr6paratoire, qui est celle de la
d^termination des modales, de la passation des
march^s, de la Constitution des approvisionne-
ments, de la commande des outillages, de la con-
clusion des sous-march6s, etc., et il y a celle de
la production industrielle proprement dite. Les
45 heures, on ne pouvait en avoir besoin que dans la
— 129
seconde phase. Pour la premiäre — la pr6para- <
tion — on a surtout besoin de dessinateurs et
d'employ^s de bureau et l'objection pour les sp6cia-
listes ne vaut pas ici, car parmi les dessinateurs il y
avait un chömage intensif et quelques-unes des dif-
ficult^s ouvriöres les plus laborieuses que nous avons
eues ä regier ont m6me eu pour cause des licencie-
ments massifs de dessinateurs dans un certain nom-
bre de grands Etablissements. J'en cite un qul me
revient ä l'esprit : la Marine d'HomEcourt. Cr, pour
le plan V de l'aviation dont il s'agissait ä ce mo-
ment, on en 6tait qu'ä la premiäre phase.
Mais pendant mon premier gouvernement, quelles
sont les fabrications pour lesquelles on avait
d6pass6 la premiäre phase avant juin 1936 ?
Qu'est-ce qu'il y avait en fabrication au moment
oĂĽ nous avons fait voter la loi et oĂĽ nous avons
pris les rfeglements de la loi des 40 heures ? II y
avait un Programme de 2.000 piEces de 25 anti-
chars chez Hotchkiss ; 1.400 commandEes par le
Colon el Fabry ; le reste commandE par le g6n6ral
Maurin. Ce Programme a et6 exEcutE fin 1936, sans
retard. II y avait des chars en commande chez
Renault. Croyez-vous que chez Renault les retards
pour les chars aient eu pour cause des heures sup-
plEmentaires, alors que, dans une pareille usine, ce
n'Etait qu'un jeu de dEdoubler ou de dEtripler les
Equipes sp6cialement consacr6es ä ce genre de tra-
vaU 2
A ce moment, aucun autre des matEriels mo-
dernes n'est encore en fabrication. Les pi6ces
contre avions, la mitrailleuse Hotchkiss de 25, le
90, n'ont EtE command6es qu'en 1938. Le 47, il n'y
en a pas eu et il ne pouvait pas y en avoir de
commandE en 1936. La premiEre commande nomi-
nale est de 193'/ et le dEbut de la fabrication efifec-
tlve est de 1938. Par cons6quent, pendant toute
m
X
4
— 130 —
cette Periode oĂĽ je n'al vu personne qul vint me
parier de difflcult6s venant des heures suppl6men-
taires, on n'en avait en r6alit6 pas besoln, vollä
la trfes simple v6rit6.
Les besoins sont venus ensuite avec la produc-
tion industrielle en grande s6rie, soit pour d6ve-
lopper la production dans les usines oĂĽ l'on tra-
vaillait ä 6quipes uniques, soit pour obtenir cet
effet de correction ou de compensation, dont je
parlais dans les usines mieux outill6es et mieux
organis6es, oĂĽ les ^quipes avaient 6t6 d6multi-
pll^es. Edouard Daladier a fait allusion aux
irictions qui se sont produites, ä ce sujet, en 1938.
Le document essentiel est le rapport de l'ing^nieur
g6n6ral Mallen dont il vous a parlö d^jä. Dans
ce rapport. comme dans le rapport Lambert-
Ribot, il s'agit d'un trfes petit nombre de cas, Inte-
ressant d'ailleurs surtout la marine et ne portant
pas sur des fournitures d'une trfes grande am-
pleur. Ces incidents ont eu des cons6quences poli-
tiques träs importantes parce que Edouard Dala-
dier a eu le sentiment de se heurter lä ä une
mauvaise volonte de la Föderation ouvriäre des
m6taux, mauvaise volonte d'autant plus irritante,
je le congois, qu'elle prenait un caractere dilatoire.
En somme, la Föderation des metaux repondait
evasivement, demandait un deial, bref, prenait
des attitudes qui evidemment quand 11 s'agit
d'interets aussi importants peuvent, ä un moment
donne, epuiser ce qu'on possfede de calme. Je ne
nie pas du tout que, de la part des dirigeants de
la Federation des metaux il y ait eu ä cette
epoque, des arrifere-pensees polltiques ; c'est par-
faitement possible. Je n'ai pas ä le rechercher pour
ma part. Cependant, il y a quelque chose que je
veux vous dire parce que, en tout, 11 laut Ăźtre juste
et dire ce que Ton croit la verite.
Je crois qu'll y a eu ces arrifere-pensees poUtl-
— 131 —
ques de la part des dirigeants de la Federation des
Metaux, mais je crois qu'il est indispensable aussi
de se rendre compte que, dans la masse ouvriöre,
cette mauvaise volonte s'allmentait d'un etat d'es-
prit general de mefiance, explicable ä bien des
egards, je veux dire mefiance vis-ä-vis du patronat.
Dans cette reunion du 15 mars dont M. Guy La
Chambre a fait le recit, Coste etalt lä, ainsi que
Croizat et d'autres encore. II n'est pas possible qu'il
ait oublie combien un certain nombre de faits
produits par Coste avaient produit de Sensa-
tion sur nous. Coste nous montrait, par des de-
tails precis, certains, comment, par exemple, dans
teile ou teile usine on demandait des heures sup-
piementaires dans un atelier pendant qu'on faisait
chömage partiel, ou meme qu'on licenciait Tate-
lier voisin. II nous montrait comment, dans ia
meme equipe, il y avait demande d'heures suppie-
mentaires certaine semaine et, au contraire, des-
cente en dessous de la duree legale du travail une
autre semaine. II nous montrait comment des hom-
mes, ä qui on avait demande des heures suppie-
mentaires ou auxquels on se preparait ä en de-
mander auraient ete arretes pendant des jours et
des jours par des defauts d'organisations internes
ou par des manques d'approvisionnement. Tout cela,
11 n'etait pas possible que des ouvriers qui vivent
de la vie de l'usine, ne le sentissent pas dans une
large mesure, qu'lls ne sentissent pas la repugnance
des Patrons ä faire l'effort ou les sacriflces necessai-
res pour dedoubler ou detripler les equlpes. Quand
lis constataient cet effort, ils y repondaient, comme
le faisaient les ouvriers de l'acierie Neyret de Saint-
Etienne.
n y avait quelque chose de plus grave : c'est
Que les ouvriers s'apercevaient que depuls le temps
des accords Matignon, la Position generale du pa-
tronat avait singuuerement chang6. A Matignon —
•3
'I
*â– '
II
— 132 —
Je vous l'al dit — on demandait mon arbltrage; on
s'y r6f6rait, on s'inclinait d'avance devant lul. Mais
si moi, je n'al pas voulu, une fols la crise apais6e,
reprendre aux ouvriers ce que je leur avals consent!
ou falt obtenir au moment du p6ril, dans des cer-
cles entiers du patronat on a fait un ralsonnement
diff^rent et on a pris une attltude contraire. Par
exemple, en septembre, j'ai r6uni de nouveau,
comme ä Matignon, les~repr6sentants de la C. G. T.
et de la C. G. P. F. J'ai essay6 d'obtenir d'eux quelr
que chose qui, vous n'en disconviendrez pas, est
conforme ä l'int^rfet public, et que j'ai du, ensuite,
r^aUser par la loi. Je leur ai demand6 de conclure,
par accord amiable, comme je l'avais fait ä Mati-
gnon, une entente sur un Systeme de conciliation et
d'arbitrage permettant d'exclure et la gxfeve et le
lock-out. Les ouvriers y consentent. Au bout de
quelques s^ances, le patronat rompt la conversation.
Dans les discussions pr^alables ä la publication du
rfeglement d'administration publique de la loi de
40 heures, les organisations patronales ont eu ä
prendre Position. II y a au dossier la preuve
6crite — je me demande par quelle imprudence on
l'a laiss6e s'y 6garer — de ce qu'^tait, ä ce moment,
l'attitude du Comit6 des Forges vis-ä-vis d'une loi
qui 6tait pourtant la loi de l'Etat, une loi que ses
repr^sentants s'^taient engag^s tout sp^cialement
ä respecter lors des conversations de Matlgnon.
Vous verrez quelles Instructions 6taient donn6es aux
repr^sentants du Comit^ des Forges au cours des
Conferences paritaires, et vous verrez ce qu'^tait
l'intention prof onde du Comit6 des Forges vls-ä-vls
de la loi.
A la fin de decembre 1936, il y eut une r6volu-
tion de palais dans les organisations patronales.
Tous les hommes qui avaient particip6 ä Matlgnon
ont 6t6 remplac^s. M. Duchemin 6tait remplac6 ä
la Conf 6d6ration Generale de la production par l'un
de ces hommes qui sont 6trangers au patronat, qui
(
— 133 —
sont etrangers ä l'industrie et qui, soit par pr6ven-
tion de parti, soit par fanatisme doctrinal, appor-
tent parfois ä la defense des int^rfits patronaux plus
d'äprete que les Patrons eux-mämes. M. Dalbouze
quittait la Chambre de Commerce de Paris; il mou-
rait aussitöt aprös. M. Richemont a quitt6 la Pr6-
sidence de l'Union des syndicats patronaux de la
Seine oĂĽ il 6tait remplac6 par un patron de com-
bat. Seul, M. Lambert-Ribot, qui n'est pas un patron,
est rest^ ä la t^te des Services du Comit6 des For-
ges.
Les ouvriers savaient tout cela et il n'6tait pas
possible que ne naqult pas chez eux cette pens6e,
peut-etre propag^e, mais trouvant son origine dans
des faits qu'ils savaient et dont ils 6taient t^moins,
c'est-ä-dire que le patronat voulait revenir sur les
avantages accord6s ä la classe ouvriöre, que la loi de
40 heures 6tait son objectif principal, qu'il usait,
qu'il abusait de toutes les difficult6s que le soucl
de la defense nationale pouvait susciter, pour les
dramatiser, pour reprendre au personnel ses avanta-
ges, pour d6trulre le progr^s acquis. Ce soupQon exis-
tait dans la classe ouvriöre et sans que je veuille
ici plaider pour personne, ou apporter des excuses
pour personne, je dois apporter ä la Cour qui juge
ces aspects de la v6rit6.
A cette 6poque, plus tard encore, j'ai fait ce que
J'ai pu pour pr6server le principe de la loi de
40 heures. Tout en ayant dit ce que j'ai dit dans
mon discours de 1938, tout en ayant tenu devant
la Föderation des travailleurs de l'Etat un langage
oü je les incitais ä atcorder toutes les heures sup-
piementaires qu'on leur demandait, tout en ayant
pris l'initiative des conversations de mars 1938 avec
les chambres syndicales patronales, je voulais pr6-
server ce principe. M. Belin l'a r6p6t6, d'ailleurs, il
y a quelques mois, ä Toulouse, la loi de 40 heures
est encore une loi de l'Etat.
4
V
ir
h
il
<:(
Y^l
H I
|t:
- 134 -
Je vais vous dlre pourquol J*y al tenu. Dans
ma pens^e, la loi de 40 heures devait servir
ä resorber le chömage au mfime titre que d'autres
mesures. Mais, ä mes yeux, eile avait im autre sens ;
eile avait une portee beaucoup plus profonde. Nous
sortions d'une crise universelle que tout le monde a
qualifiäe de crlse de surproduction. Surproduire ?
Produire trop ? Trop relativement ä quoi ? Certai-
nement pas relativement aux besoins de Thumanitö,
mais trop par rapport ä la possibilit^ de consom-
mation, c'est-ä-dire ä la facult6 d'achat. Et nous
sommes arrives, en effet, ä un point, ä un 6tat de^
l'histoire du monde oü, par suite du progräs continu
de rindustrie et de la technique, par suite aussi d'un
mauvals systfeme de r^partition des richesses, l'appa-
reil universel de production cr6e plus de richesses
qu'il n'est capable d'en repartir et que la masse des
consommateurs n'est capable d'en absorber. De lä
ces ph^nomönes, en apparence Incompröhensibles,
ces destructions de richesses pour lesquelles 11 existe
des besoins. Quand on brĂĽle des sacs de caf6 ou de
bl6, ce ne sont pas les besoins qui manquent, mals
bien la facult6 d'achat qui fait d6faut. Le progräs de
la civilisation, de la technique, c'est bien pourtant
une propri6t6 collective de l'humanit^ ; c'est l'h^ri-
tage de tout ce que la civilisation nous a 16gu6
depuis les Premiers tätonnements de la race hu-
maine. Et nous vivons dans un r6gime tel que ce qui
devrait 6tre le bien commun de l'humanit^, ce qui,
par cons^quent, devrait se repartir, s'^taler en bien-
faits, en Profits sur tous les hommes se traduit, au
contraire, par des profits d6mesur6s pour certalns,
et pour la masse des autres par le chömage, la sous-
consommation, la baisse des salaires, la misfere. Je
crols qu'un ^tat de choses comme celui-lä cessera.
Cette espäce de divorce impie entre la sclence et la
soci6t6, entre la nature et la vie, ne durera pas 6ter-
r
— 135 —
nellement. Toute la question est de savoir comment,
par quels proc^d^s, par quels moyens il changera.
Mais, Sans nul doute, un 6tat viendra oĂĽ ce qui est
l'höritage de tous les hommes deviendra le b^n6-
flce, le Profit de chaque homme, oĂĽ chacun touchera
sa quote-part, son petit dividende, soit sous la forme
d'un sui>pl6ment de bien-6tre, pour un m§me tra-
vail, soit sous la forme d'un Supplement de loisirs
pour un möme salaire.
Eh bien ! la loi de 40 heures avait, et eile a
encore ä mes yeux cette importance toute puissante
qu'elle repr^sentait dans le progrfes de la civilisa-
tion, cette attribution aux travailleurs du dividende.
Elle repr^sentait des arrhes, un premier profit que
les travailleurs pouvaient toucher, qu'ils pouvaient
percevoir comme leur part legitime dans un mouve-
ment de la civilisation 6t du progräs qui appartient
ä tous les hommes. Voilä le sens profond de la loi de
40 heures, ou plutöt le sens profond de mon atta-
chement pour eile.
DEFENSE DE LEON BLUM
(Suite et fin)
Audience du mercredi 11 mars 1942
M. Le Präsident.
13 heures trente.
— L'audience est ouverte ä
M. L6oN Blum. — Je voudrais d'abord rappeler
ä la Cour ce que je lui ai d6jä dit, c'est-ä-dire que
les difförentes lois sociales que j'ai fait voter com-
posent un groupe homogene, un syst6me, qu'elles
sont il^es 6troitement les unes aux autres. Avant
d'aborder les nationalisations, qui viennent malnte-
il
— 136 —
nant ä leur tour mals qui sont en r6allt6 une ma-
tiäre un peu 6trang6re ä ce systfeme, je voudrais
dire un mot des autres lols qui composalent le
groupe et que Taccusation ou bien n'lncrimine pas
ou bien n'lncrimine plus.
Ati cours de l'instruction, aucune question ne
m*a 6t6 pos^e sur des lois comme la loi sur l'arbi-
trage obligatoire ou celle sur les contrats coUectlfa
M. LE PRfisroENT. — Rendez-vous compte que vrai-
ment cela n'int6resse pas le procös.
M L60N Blum. — Aussi n'en dirai-je rien. Bien que
cela fasse partie du systöme, l'accusation ne les a
pas retenues. Ce sont pourtant des lois importantes
et je suis convaincu que la Cour lirait avec int^rfet.
par exemple, ne serait-ce que pour marquer le ca-
ractöre g6n6ral de l'action que j'ai exerc6e, le d^bat
de la loi sur l'arbitrage obligatoire devant le S6nat.
La loi sur les contrats coUectifs, j'aurai ä en parier
ä propos d'un des reproches pr6cis qu'on m'a faits,
celui d'avoir ruin6 l'autorit^ patronale. Elle präsente
aussi une importance particuliäre. Mais je pense que
si on ne les a pas incrimin6es, bien qu'elles entras-
sent dans le systfeme, c'est sans doute parce que.
dans le regime actuel, tout en transformant l'esprit
de ces lois et en y substituant des m^thodes d'&uto-
rit^ ä une m6thode de llbert6, on a cependant
retenu un assez grand nombre de dispositions posi-
tives. Par exemple, cette fameuse Institution des
d616gu6s ouvriers dont on a tant parl^, m6me dans
rinstruetion, est rappel6e d'assez präs par une Ins-
titution comme celle des comit6s sociaux d'entre-
prises, avec cette difference que les d616gu6s
ouvriers pr6vus par les contrats coUectifs 6taient
61us, tandis que les comit6s sociaux d'entreprises
sont compos6s de d^l6gu6s gouvernementaux.
— 137
LES LOISIRS
Mais il y a une loi sur laquelle je suis oblig6 d'in-
sister parce que, sur celle-ci, j'ai 6t6 interroge et
qu'elle ĂĽgure encore, si je ne me trompe, dans
l'6nonc6 des charges tel qu'il est articul6 ä mon
inteorrogatoire d6flnitif. C'est la loi sur les cong6s
pay6s. Cette loi, combin6e avec la cr6ation d'un
sous-secr6tariat d'Etat aux loisirs et aux sports, 6tait
la base d'une des charges imagin6es contre moi. On
me reprochait d'avoir fait perdre le goĂĽt du travail
aux ouvriars frangais et d'avoir encourag6 chez eux
ce que des personnages offlciels ont appel6 l'esprit
de jouissance et de facilit^. Cette Charge ne se
retrouve plus dans l'arrĂźt de renvoi, mais vous ne
pouvez pas contester qu'elle subsiste dans l'atmos-
ph6re de l'accusation. A-t-on renonc6 ä la retenir
explicitement quand on a appris la mort et qu'on a
lu la citation posthume de l'homme qui avait 6t6
mon coUaborateur direct pour ce travail, qui avait
occup6 la Charge de sous-secr6taire d'Etat aux loi-
sirs et aux sports, de mon ami L60 Lagrange ? Vous
savez que...
M. LE Präsident. — Je savais tout cela. C'est une
des raisons pour lesquelles je ne vous en aurais
Jamals par 16.
M. L60N Blum. — Oui, Monsieur le President,
mais je peux tout de möme dire que l'exemple donn6
par cet homme dont vous savez la valeur h^roique,
que vous avez connu, et qui d6bordait de jeunesse,
d'enthousiasme, prouve que l'on a pu donner pen-
dant de longs mois toute sa foi et toute son Energie
ä une ceuvre comme celle de l'organisation des loi-
sirs et des sports et avoir tout de mäme conserv6
en soi quelques vertus höroiiques. Mais je pense que,
outre cette raison que je suis 6mu. Monsieur le
President, de vous entendre rappeler comme vous
l'avez fait, on s'est rendu compte qu'il y avait dans
tout cela une confusion qu'il n'^tait dans l'int^rĂźt de
\
1 tr
li
w
m
1 • j,
^
— 138 —
personne de prolonger longtemps. On s'est rendu
compte que le lolsir n'^tait pas la paresse, Que le
loisir est le repos aprös le travail, que le lolsir et
le sport sont pour l'ouvrler la sant6, et aussl comme
une r6conciliation avec une vie naturelle dont 11 est
txop souvent s6par^ et fruströ. Je ne veux pas Insis-
ter, encore une fols, puisque le grief ne se trouve
plus dans le r^quisitolre d6flnitif ni dans Tarröt de
renvoi de la Cour. Mais, quand je pense ä l'ensem-
ble de cette oeuvre ä laquelle on a imput6 tant de
malefices, j'y pense, moi, avec beaucoup d'6motion.
Je ne suis pas sorti souvent de mon cabinet minis-
t^riel pendant la dur6e de mon ministfere, mais
chaque fois que j'en suis sorti, que j'ai travers6 la
grande bänlieue parisienne et que j'ai vu les routes
couvertes de th6ories de « tacots >, de motos, de
tandems, avec ces couples d'ouvriers vfetus de
pull-overs assortis et qui montraient que l'id^e du
loisir r6veillait chez eux une espöce de coquetterie
naturelle et simple, j'avais le sentiment d'avoir,
malgr6 tout, apporte une embellie, une 6claircie dans
des vies difficiles, obscures. On ne les avait pas seu-
lement arrach6s au cabaret, on ne leur avait pas
seulement donn^ plus de faciUt6 pour la vie de fa-
mille, mais on leur avait ouvert une perspective
d'avenir, on avait cr66 chez eux un espoir. Et je
me rappelais avec un certain orgueil les paroles
qu'a prononc6es, dans la dernifere occasion parle-
mentaire de sa carriöre, un homme d'Etat anglais
quand, aprös avoir fait abroger les droits sur les
bl6s et jet^ ä bas du pouvoir aprfes cette victoire, Ü
diTait : « Je laisserai un nom qui sera prononc6 avec
haine ou avec coläre par les monopoleurs et les sp6-
culateurs, mais qui sera peut-6tre prononc^ avec un
sentiment de reconnaissance dans la demeure de
ceux dont le lot, dans ce monde, est le travail. » J'ai
6prouv6, pour ma part, une Emotion, une flert6 de
ce genre et je crois avoir le droit de l'exprimer Icl
devant mes juges.
— 139 —
LES NATIONALISATIONS
J'en viens maintenant aux nationalisations.
Ce mot de nationalisation semble avoir, par mo-
ments, une vertu horriflque. Dans beaucoup d'es-
prits, la nationalisation se confond avec la socia-
lisation, avec la collectivisation et, par cons6quent,
avec la spoliation ! Je voudrais d'abord vous dire
que rid6e de nationalisation n'est pas une id6e
socialiste. L'origine des nationalisations est dans les
doctrines du socialisme r^formiste qu'incamait un
homme comme M. Millerand, au temps du Pro-
gramme de Saint-Mand6. Elle est surtout dans les
anciens programmes du parti radicai, ä l'6poque de
Camille Pelletan. Des nationalisations, on en a fait ä
propos de beaucoup d'objets, pour des raisons pure- •
ment flscales. Le tabac est une nationalisation. On
aurait du en faire pour capter ä son origlne, ä la
source, une categorie de richesse qui commenQait ä
se cr6er, qui aurait pu 6tre capt^e au proflt de la
collectivit6 au lieu de devenir une source de b6n6-
flces et de profits particuliers. Si on avait nationa-
lis^, ä son origine. par exemple, l'industrie 61ectri-
que, cela aurait 6t6 sans aucun doute un bienfait
pour le pays. On nationalise lorsqu'on se trouve en
pr6sence d'un monopole de fait comme pour la raf-
flnerie de sucre ou de p^trole, ou bien quand on est
devant une industrie-clef dont toutes les autres d6-
pendent. comme le credit. Mais pour les f abrications
de guerre, on ne se trouve en pr6sence de rien de
pareil. L'industrie de guerre a 6t6 de toute 6ternit6
une Industrie secrfete. On commence ä voir appa-
raltre la fabrication priv6e d'armes au moment oĂĽ
on fabrique des canons en acier. C'est ä ce moment
que des industriels comme Krupp en Allemagne et
Schneider en France, du fait qu'ils possMent seuls
les moyens techniques pour traiter de grandes mas-
ses d'acier, se mettent ä fabriquer des canons.
Quels sont les mobiles qui ont fait inscrire la
m
. t:
— 140 —
*
natlonalisation des Industries de guerre dans le Pro-
gramme du front populaire et ensuite dans le Pro-
gramme minlst^rlel ? Le mouvement s'est form6 en
France pendant la guerre de 1914 ä 1918 et 11 est
imposslble que vous n'en ayez pas gard6 le Souve-
nir. Un mouvement public irr6slstlble contre rid6e
du Profit priv6, du b^n^fice prlv6 s'est constltu6 pen-
dant la guerre. Cette id^e de profits priv^s parfols
d6mesur6s au mlUeu de la misäre universelle et
alors que toutes les natlons, mfeme les victorieuses,
6talent ruin^es, a soulev6 une sorte de r^probatlon,
d'lndlgnation universelle. J'^tais ä Bordeaux, en
1914, lorsqu'on a comprls la premlfere fois la n6ces-
sit6 de constltuer une nouvelle Industrie priv^e des
armes. J'ai vu arriver ä Bordeaux le lieutenant
Renault, le lieutenant Citroen et le lieutenant Lou-
cheur. J'6tals alors le coUaborateur d'un mlnlstre
et l'aml personnel de quelques autres. On s'est de-
mand^ alors si on ne procöderait pas par voie de
natlonalisation totale. M. Loucheur arrivait ä Bor-
deaux et on lul demandait d'improviser une grande
uslne pour fabriquer des obus. On allait lul donner
des locaux, on allait lui donner la main-d'oeuvre, on
allait lul donner les mati^res premiäres, car c'6tait
l'Etat seul qui importait les aciers des Etats-Unis.
Tout 6tait ä l'Etat, dans cette Industrie qu'on allalt
cr6er. On s'est donc demand^ s'il n'^tait pas natu-
rel, avec cette main-d'oeuvre militaire, avec ces
moyens d'Etat, avec ces chefs d'industrie qui reve-
naient du front, et qu'on mettait hors cadres, on
s'est demand^ s'il n'6tait pas legitime, sens6, de
cr6er une Industrie purement nationale. Si on l'avait
fait, je crois qu'on aurait 6vit6 de grosses difflcult^s.
On aurait 6vit^ le scandale des gros profits et aussi
cette esp^ce de division publique, pendant la guerre
et aussitöt aprfes, entre ouvriers et paysans, le pay-
san restant au front et l'ouvrier, rappelt ä l'atelier
avec de gros salalres. Tout cela a 6t6 apergu ä cette
6poque. On a pr6f6r6 le syst^me de l'industrie priv6e
•
— 141 —
en pensant que, pour les patrons l'appat du proflt,
et pour les ouvriers la perspective de hauts salalres,
amöneraient une production plus intense. Mais pen-
dant la guerre la protestatlon s'est 61ev6e ä maintes
reprises. Des projets de loi tendant ä la r^qulsition
g^n^rale des Industries de guerre, ont obtenu ä la
Chambre des mlnorit^s sans cesse croissantes et peu
ä peu ce sentiment de göne vis-ä-vis d'un profit d6-
mesur6 et illicite, si l'on se place sur un plan de
haute moralit^ nationale, a inspir6 la loi sur les
b^n^fices de guerre. Puls, le scandale des profiteurs
de guerre et des nouveaux rlches aldant, 11 a prls la
forme d'un sentiment public irr^sistible.
Ces Profits, dans une Periode de surarmement,
pr^sentent le möme caractfere que pendant une Pe-
riode de guerre. Je prends deux exemples et je les
tire d'^tablissements dont vous avez d6jä entendu
les noms ä maintes reprises et dont vous entendrez
encore prononcer los noms. Hotchkiss ! L'action
Hotchkiss, pendant la guerre de 1914 ä 1918, a 6t6
d6doubl6e trois fois. Le titre primitif, qui 6tait, je
crois bien, de 250 francs — je ne suis pas sür qu'U
n'^tait pas de 100 francs — repr^sentait donc huit
titres ä la fin de la guerre dont chacun valait plus
de 1.000 francs. Le capital avait 6t6 revaloris6 dans
une Proportion de 3.000 pour cent. Ce möme titre
vaut aujourd'hui 4.000 francs. Dans le dossier m&me
vous trouverez un rapport du contröleur Millot au
sujet des affaires Brandt. On y explique que les
affaires d'exportation de mat6riel Brandt, men6es
de compte ä demi entre l'Etat et la malson Brandt,
ont donn^ un superb6n6fice — je ne sais pas exac-
tement ce que cela veut dire — de 30 %. On y expli-
que que M. Brandt et son gendre, M. Renault, tou-
chaient chaque ann^e un dividende 6gal ä 30 % du
capital; sans compter leurs appointements, leurs
frais de repr^sentation et surtout sans compter leurs
droits de licence, pulsqu'ils poss^daient les breyets
explolt^s par la socl6t6. Comment est-U posslble
— 142 —
\t I
»■;
M\
qu'en pr^sence de faits de ce genre, un mouvement
puissant ne se forme pas pour attrlbuer ä l'Etat
le monopole de la fabrlcation des armes ?
H fut un moment oĂĽ Ton a voulu faire de ce
procfes le procfes du toelUcisme. Mals, Tindustrle prl-
v6e et le commerce prlv6 des armes sont des Indus-
tries belUclstes par excellence. Rappelez-vous l'en-
qu6te de Nye aux Etats-Unls. Rappelez-vous le mot
de Brland ä C>en6ve : € C'est dans le mftme acier
que sont talU^s les canons et les plumes de ceux
qul essalent de d6clencher la guerre en Europe et
dans le monde. > Les cons6quences du commerce
priv6 des armes n6cessairement 116 ä l'lndustrie pri-
v6e des armes, on les avalt d6jä aperQues pendant
la guerre de 1914. La Bulgarie 6tait notre ennemle.
Les canons bulgares 6taient, si je ne m'abuse pas,
des canons frangals. Nous avons vendu ä l'Italie,
avant cette guerre, du mat^rlel, notamment du ma-
t6riel Brandt. L'ld6e que des soldats frangals puls-
sent 6tre atteints par un mat^riel de guerre fabriquö
en France et dont nos ennemis usent contre eux
est une ld6e qul a une r^sonnance profonde dans
le pays. Souvent — ce n'^tait pas le cas de l'Italie
mais de la Bulgarie — ces armes foumles par des
industrlels fran?als 6taient pay6es sur le produit
d'emprunts 6mis et plac6s en France. Comment tout
cela n'aurait-il pas cr66 un mouvement en faveur
de rid^e de la natlonalls^tjpn de Tlndustrle et du
commerce prlv6 des armes ?"
Vollä iKDurquol la natlonallsatlon, avant les 61ec-
tions de 1936 et du falt m6me du r^armement, avalt
provoque un mouvement d'oplnion sl Intense. Ce
n'est pas une questlon dont je me sois beaucoup oc-
cup6. Je n'6tais pas le sp^cialiste de cette questlon
dans le partl soclallste. C'6talt un de mes camarades
de partl — Edouard Daladler, l'autre jour, l'a d6sl-
gn6 en termes assez clairs, mals 11 n'y a aucune rai-
son pour ne pas le nommer — c'^talt mon cama-
rade Paul Faure. J'al d'allleurs toujours pens6 que
— 143 —
dans des programmes de coalltion entre le partl
soclallste et d'autres partis 11 fallait Introdulre des
nationalisatlons. mals je pensais ä des nationalisa-
tlons d'un autre genre, surtout ä la natlonallsatlon
des chemlns de fer, d'une part. et des assurances,
d'autre part. c'est-ä-dire de deux monopoles priv6s.
Mals, enfin, c'est dans ces condltlons que la natlo-
nallsatlon a 6t6 inscrite au Programme du front po-
pulaire Pour le mlnlstre de la Defense nationale
cela repr6sentalt un Int6r6t d'un autre ordre et ĂĽ
vous a dit lequel : l'lnt^rĂźt de facillter l'armement
de la nation. C'est cette Id^e qul se trouve en pre-
mifere Ugne dans rexpos6 des motifs. Mais je vous
rends compte. mol, des raisons pour lesqueles cette
r^forme a flgur6 dans le Programme Iniuai.
Croyez-vous qu'll y alt lä l'eflfet d'une presslon
communlste? Les communistes ^^alent tout ä falt
indlfl^rents aux questibns de natlonalisatio^^^^
r^talent ä tel point que. quand on a d^battu entre
oartls le Programme du front populalre, les com-
Sstis Llent hostlles aux nationalisatlons Vo^
pourriez trouver, dans le Journal que ^^ dirigeals,
S^e pol^mlque sur ce sujet avec un ;J,^P^^^ .^^"^^^^
niste, Jacques Duclos. Croyez-vous qu 1^ s intöres-
salent partlculiörement ä la natlonallsatlon des In-
dustrie^ de guerre ? Vous 6tlez träs ^^e^' ^^^^^^^
sleurle President, <ies influences I^U»
avalent entour^ le d6pöt du ProJet de la lol, et vous
avez mterrog^ ä ce sujet M Daladler Je va^ vous
foumlr un petlt 61toent d'lnformatlon qul vous
surprendra peut-6tre.
Au commencement de 1937. un adtniiĂĽstrateur du
Creusot. qul est Je crois un membre de la tamme
Schneider. M. de Salnt-Sauveur f* «^^"^^^
avant la guerre de W"- so<=="P!" *°"^,ÄSer
de« intirfets consid6rables que la malson scnneioer
Sss^dalt daiS^de Blandes mdustrles russes notam-
ment dan. les uslnes P°?t"°«- ff '^ Tpc^
rambassadeur de ITJnlon Sovi^tlque ä Paris, m. ro-
1 11 wiiüiii.HlWr»— — "
ftr >!<■■»*
itm
Uti
\
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fi
i
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1^ ^
— 144 —
tiemklne. II y avalt ä ee moment, entre le Creusot
et runion Sovi6tique de petites frictions. Les Sovlets
avaient demand6 au Creusot de grosses pl6ces de
marine. On s'occupait l>eaucoup, ä ce moment-lÄ, de
la Constitution d'une marine sovi^tique. Ces piäces
n'6taient pas livr^es par le Creusot et le gouveme-
ment sovi^tique croyait sentir de la part du foumis-
seur une certaine mauvaise volonte. A plusieurs re-
prlses. le eouvernement sovi^tique s'en 6tait plaint
et ses Dlalntes avaient 'Stö transmlses ä Tadminls-
tration de la jnierre. M. de Saint-Sauveur a donc dit
ä M. Potiemkine : « C'est vrai ! nous avons mis
beaucouü de mauvaise volonte ä vous livrer ces pi6-
ces. mais .iouons cartes sur table. Si vous le vo^dez,
non seulement nous vous livrerons ce mat^riel trös
vite, mais nous ex^cuterons pour vous tous les au-
tres mat^riels oue vous nous demanderez et nous
travaillerons pour vous comme nous le faisions pour
la Russie tzarite. Mais, en behänge, il faut que
vous nous rendiez un petit Service. La loi de natio-
nallsation est vot^e. mais eile n'est pas encore
appliau^e. On discute encore au ministdre de la
guerre sur les 6tablissements qui y seront comprls.
Nous pourrions probaiblement nous arranger pour
que. dans les Services techniques du ministfere de
la guerre. on n'insistät nas pour la nationalisation
du Creusot. Seulement. 11 s'agit de neutraliser les
Influences socialistes. Le Creusot ^cbappera ä la
nationalisation pour peu que vous vouliez bien dire
un mot ä ce suJet ä M. Blum. > Une influence pollti-
que s'est ainsi ex.erc6e pour que le Creusot 6chap-
pät ä la nationalisation et cette influence politique
6tait une d^marche d'un des administrateurs du
Creusot auprfes de l'ambassade des Soviets ä Paris.
M. LE PRfisroENT. ~ ...qui a continu6 la d^marche
aupr^ de vous.
M. L6oN Blum. — M. Potiemkine a 6cout6 sans
mot dire. puls 11 a r6pondu que la seule chose qu'Ăś
put faire 6talt de me transmettre purement et sim-
\
l
\
145
plement cette conversation. Mais je ne peux pas
croire qu'il l'aurait fait si le parti communiste en
France, qui n'6tait pas sans liaison avec l'ambassade
sovi^tiaue, avait eu vis-ä-vls de la nationalisation
des Industries de guerre une position bien ardente.
Je ne me serais pas permis de raconter cette
anecdote. bien qu'elle sott, je crois, assez interes-
sante, si eile n'avait laiss6 une trace dans le dos-
sler. Edouard Daladier. interrog^ un jour ä la sous-
commission des armements de la Chambre par
M. Georges Mandel qui lui demandait si des influen-
ces 6tranĂź6res ne s'^taient pas exerc6es contre la
nationalisation, a cru qu'il faisait allusion ä cette
Visite de M. Potiemkine. dont naturellement je lui
avais fait part. tout comme M. Potiemkine m'en
avait parl6. un peu comme un enregistreur phono-
graphiaue. Cependant. M. Mandel faisait allusion ä
autre chose, car, par hasard, il ignorait cet incident.
La Cour le volt : quand il s'agit des influences poli-
tiques qui s'exercent pour ou contre certains actes
gouvemementaux. la recherche, si on la poursuit
avec un neu d'insistance. möne quelquefois ä des
r6sultats assez diff^rents de ceux qu'on supposait.
Dans cette nationalisation qu'Edouard Daladier
a fait voter conform^ment ä l'engagement que nous
avions oris dans notre d6claration ministerielle, quel
a 6t6 mon röle personnel ? II v a un article de la loi
qui avait et6 rMig6 de ma main. avec beaucoup
d'appllcation. C'est c^ul oui est relatif ä la flxation
des indemnit6s. Dans la premifere phase de mon
existence. j 'avais fait par moi-m6me l'experience
des litiges de toutes espfeces que produlsent les ra-
chats de concessions. et je voulais les eviter. D'au-
tre part. j'6tais trfes soucieux de ne pas grever la
tr^sorerie par le paiement des indemnites. J'avais
donc r6die:6 un article de loi qui 6tait fonde sur
deux ld6es. La premifere etalt rextinction de la
societe expropriee en tant que personne morale, par
le rachat des actlons. ce qui supprimait tout litige
~'^7TrnffS''''*iffBirnff'iM jii'f im
\
146
posjsible puisQue la oartie disparaissait. tandls que
je crols aue les litiges ne sont pas encore r6gl6s en
ce moment entre l'Etat et les 6tabllssements expro-
pri6s. Ma seconde ld6e 6talt la facult6 pour l'Etat
de se liWrer vls-ä-vis des d6tenteurs de titres par
la d^livrance de rentes. C'est le mfeme syst6me que
J'ai essay6 de faire or^valoir Dour la nationalisation
des chemins de fer. Mais la commlssion des flnan-
ces du S6nat a opdos6 ä mon texte une r^slstance
Insurmöntable et je le d6ülore encore aujourd'hui,
car, d'une part, tous les litiges dont je parle n'au-
raient iamais exist^ et ehsuite la nationalisation
se fut ex6cut6e. surtout pour l'aviation, dans des
conditions inflniment plus ais6es. car les cr6dits, au
lieu d'6tre absorb^s par des versements d'indemni-
t6s, auraient pu alimenter plus largement la treso-
rerie des entreprises. Je ne suis pas partlsan des
soci6t6s mixtes. je les considöre comme une formule
bätarde aui cr6e ä l'Etat beaucoup de responsatoi-
lit^s sans lui donner un pouvoir de gestion r6el. En
tout cas, teile est la part que j'ai prlse dans la lol
de nationalisation.
J'ai vu dans la d6position d'un t6moin qu'ä pro-
pos de la nationalisation, j'aurais prls certalns en-
gagements devant le Senat. Je n'y suis m6me pas
all6. Vous ne trouverez pas. dans la discussion de la
loi devant le S6nat. un seul mot de moi. Je n'6tais
pas ä mon banc. La discussion a 6t6 conduite par le
vice-pr6sident du Conseil. ministre de la Defense
nationale et de la Guerre. II y sufflsait fort bien,
je vous orie de le croire. Je n'ai prls aucune part ä
cette discussion devant aucune des deux assembl^es.
Maintenant. il s'agit de savoir les cons^quences,
les repercussions de cette loi.
M. LE Präsident. — Ce aue Tarrfet de mlse en Juge-
ment incrimine. ce n'est oas la loi sur la nationali-
sation. pas plus Que l'arret n'incrimine en rien la lol
de 40 heures dont nous parlions hier, c'est l'applica-
tion Qul a €X/ä falte de ces lois dans les matidres iB-
\
— 147 —
t^ressant la defense nationale. Nous sommes bien
d'accord ?
M. liiON Blum. — Parfaltement. monsieur le
President,
En ce Qui conceme les Industries d^pendant du
minist6re de la Guerre. on peut tenir pour 6tabli par
l'instruction 6crite aussi bien que par les d6bats tels
qu'ils se sont d6roul6s jusau'ä ce Jour aue la natio-
nalisation a augment6 le rendement de ces Indus-
tries. Je dois mßme dire que l'hypothöse contraire
pr6sente ä l'esprit auelaue chose d'inconcevable.
Comment, en effet. imaginer aue. prenant des In-
dustries, y d6pensant les mlllions par centaines pour
d^velopper leurs installations et oour am^liorer leur
outillage. alimentant leur tr6sorerie. leur donnant
des facultas de credit et leur assurant une conti-
nuit6 de commandes au'elles n'avaient Jamals con-
nues, comment imaginer que par une espöce de mi-
racle arorfes tous ces efforts on alt pu arriver ä une
production r^duite ? C'est lä un mystäre qui parait
ind^chiffrable. Les r6sultats sont lä. Pour chaque
usine Ăśs ont 6t6 6tablis et 6nonc6s par M. Daladier.
Tis seront encore affirm^s ici ä la barre par les
t^moinA.
Mals 11 y a un point sur lequel je veux personnel-
lement Inslster d'un mot, c'est celui de la nationali-
sation dans l'aviation. On a beaucoup parl6 de l'6tat
dans lequel M. Guy La Chambre avait trouv6 l'avia-
tion auand il est arrlv6 au mlnlstfere. Mais 11 y a
dans le dossier un certain nombre de jugements tr6s
importants sur l'6tat dans leauel M. Pierre Cot
avalt. lul aussl. trouv6 l'aviation. quand 11 a prls
possession de ce mftme ministöre. Vous n'avez qu'ä
vous reporter aux auditions de la commlssion des
Flnances du S^nat devant laauelle ont comparu le
g6n6ral Denain et surtout M. Marcel D6at. C'est M.
Caillaux qui disait ä M. D6at, en d6plorant l'Etat
dans leauel 6tait l'industrie a6ronautiaue : f mals
alors ĂĽ faudra bien finir oar nationallser tout
m\
1;
— 148 —
cela >. On se trouvait en ĂĽr6sence d'une Industrie
dont le r^auisltolre lui-mĂźme reconnalt l'^tat mise-
rable : Industrie artisanale — le mot revlent dans
toutes les d^positlons — Industrie dont la pulssance
de productlon est mesur6e par le Chiffre m§me au-
auel des exnerts assez bienveillants ont estim^ le
mat6riel au'on rachetait.
II y avait. je crois. 40 usines d'avlation qu*on en-
tretenait avant le K6n6ral Denain par le Systeme des
prototypes, ensuite par le Systeme des commandes.
Cette multiplicit6 des usines, qu'un homme comme
M. Marcel R^gnier, rapporteur general de la com-
mission des Finances du Senat, deplorait, a abouti ä
une cons6auence träs ffrave : la multiplicit6 des
types. Pour faire vivre des usines. an ne r^nartissait
pas entre elles les commandes d'un mĂźme appareil
comme on l'a falt plus tard. on leur commandait ä
chacune im aPPareil de sa cr6ation. C'est ainsi qu'on
est arriv6 dans l'aviation francaise. au lieu de se
concentrer comme l'aviation alleraande sur un petit
nombre de types constamment nerfectionn^s. ä une
multiplicite de types difförents pour lesquels 11 fal-
lait ä chaaue instant mettre sur oied des modes de
fabrication entiärement nouveaux.
Je veux encore vous montrer ä quel point cette
nationalisation aui a permis la concentration — pas
autant aue M. Pierre Cot Teüt voulu et lä aussi il
s'est heurt6 ä beaucoun de r^sistance — je veux
vous montrer ä quel point eile 6tait n^cessaire par
un exemple que je tire du dossier. C'est l'honneur et
le m^rite de M. Guy La Chambre d'^tre parvenu ä
obtenir la fabrication en erande s6rie des avions de
chasse comme le Moräne. Mab? k nartir de quel
moment cette fabrication en srrande s6rie a-t-elle
vraiment march^ ? A nartir — le dossier l'indlque —
d'octobre 1938. Pourauoi et comment ? Parce que,
d'accord avec son ministre qui l'a couvert, un
homme t6m6raire et aventureux. mais aussi avec des
Id^es vraiment geniales, M. Caquot. a renouveW
CjitmmAidJämmmtkmmJimmu^,
— 149 —
de fond en comble les m6thodes de fabrication. Au
lieu de Commander ä chaaue usine des Moräne com-
plets. il a eu l'audace et le courage de diviser le tra-
vail entre les diverses usines. II a dit ä une usine :
€ Vous fabriquerez teile pi^ce de Moräne » et ä une
autre : « Vous fabriquerez teile autre pifece ». Puls il
a cr^e une usine centrale aui taisait le montage des
avions comnlets.
Cette maniöre de faire a d'abord provoqu6 des
retards narce aue d'une usine ä l'autre. 11 a fallu
proc^der ä des transports de mat^riel, concentrer
dans chaaue usine. en l'emnruntant aux autres, tou-
tes les machlnes corresoondant ä la cat^gorie de
pifeces que cette usine 6tait charg^e de fabriquer.
Mais, ensuite, quand tout a 6t6 organis6, on a ob-
tenu de grands rendements.
Tout ce que je dis lä est rigoureusement exact.
Mals une concentration comme celle-lä qui falt en
r6alit6 de toutes les usines nationalis6es les Instru-
ments d'une mĂźme nens^e et d'une m6me volonte,
qui divise et qui partage entre elles imp^ratlvement
le travail, croyez-vous qu'elle eĂĽt 6t6 posslble sans
la nationalisation pröalable, avec des socl6t6s pure-
ment priv6es, alors mSme que chacune m^me eĂĽt
d^endu rigoureusement de l'Etat nar ses comman-
des ? Vous voyez blen aue par des exemples com-
me celui-ci ä quel point, du point de vue de l'int6-
rĂźt de la defense nationale, la nationalisation ^tait
n6cessaire, au möme degr6 que pour un certain
nombre de fabrication de guerre. Prenez un exem-
ple, une usine Hotchkiss qui fabriquait du mat6riel
de premifere n^cessit6. Les rapports contemporains
qui sont au dossier d6crivent dans quel 6tat eile se
trouvait. avec une surabondance de sp^cialistes et
un outillage dont la pauvret^ 6tait lamentable.
M. LE Präsident. — L'argument tel que vous l'ex-
posez se comprendrait sl l'on avait nationalis6 l'en-
semble des Industries travaiUant pour l'a^ronautl-
que. mais vous n'en avez nationalis^ qu'un tout petit
r
A
I ■•
â– MiliJB?
i
%
ĂĽ
1
1
m
11 ;
llt
K
i
150
nombre. Darce au'il y avait lleu 6videininent de n'en
nationallser au'un oetlt nombre.
M. L6oN Blum. — On a natlonalls^ ä rnie ou deux
exceptions Dr6s toutes las fabrlaues de cellules.
M. LE Präsident. — Le fait est que votre argu-
ment ne porte pas.
M. L6oN Blum. — Comment 11 ne porte pas ?
M. LE Präsident. — na une port^e trop g6n6rale.
Pour au'll fĂĽt vraiment solide. 11 eĂĽt Impllqu^ que
la natlonallsatlon elle-mfeme eĂĽt 6te g6n6rale.
M. LÄON Blum. — La natlonallsatlon a 6t4, en ce
qul concerne l'lndustrle des cellules, absolument g6-
n6rale. Je crols qu'll y a eu seulement une ou deux
entrenrlses dont l'^tat flnancler 6talt si mauvals
qu'on a jug6 ä peu pr6s imoosslble de les remettre
sur pled. Presoue toutes d'allleurs 6talent dans une
Situation flnancl^re mls6rable : ou blen elles 6talent
ä la vellle de la Uauldation. ou blen elles 6talent ä
la mercl des banaues aul leur falsaient des avances
de cr6dit.
II eĂĽt 6t6. certes. pr6f6rable de nationallser 6ga-
lement les uslnes de moteurs et aussl certalnes usi-
nes d'accessolres. Mals de ce qu'on auralt pu faire
encore mieux, s'ensuit-11 qu'on a pas falt blen ?
D'allleurs Texemnle oue le vous donne et qul est sal-
slssant. celul de la fabrlcation des Moräne, est tlr6
de ce aul touche les cellules. Notez que pour les usl-
nes de moteurs. s'll n'y avalt pas concentratlon
d'Etat. 11 y avalt concentratlon de falt. car, ä part
une seule uslne au'on a natlonalls^e et qul ne pro-
dulsait pas grand chose, la malson Lorraine, tous
les moteurs d'avlons en France 6talent foumls ex-
cluslvement par deux malsons : Gnome et Rhone et
Hlspano. Pour les accessolres comme les höllces, les
tralns d'atterrissage 11 y avalt ösralement une con-
centratlon trfes reelle. Au contraire, pour les cellules,
11 y avalt cette dlsperslon qul est d6crlte en termes
salsissants par M. Marcel R^gnler.
— 151 —
DESARMEMENT
ET SECURITE COLLECTIVE
H y a un point aue le suis oblleö d'aborder maln-
tenant. Je dois r^oondre ä l'accusatlon que Ton a
tlr6e d'une Phrase extralte de l'expos6 des motifs
du projet de lol.
Je ne sais aul a fait cette d6couverte. C'est, je
crols. un des nremiers t^moins entendus par M. I5
conselUer Instructeur : ie ne sals sl c'est M. Brandt
ou un homme politique qul lul a mls sous les yeux
cette Phrase decoup^e dans un expos6 des motifs oĂĽ,
ä l'appui de la natlonalisation, on formulalt blen
d'autres arguments et d'une blen autre nature.
M. le President. — Voulez-vous que je vous rellse
ce passage de l'expos^ des motifs ?
< Les n6ffoclatlons ooürsulvles ä Genfeve n'auront
pas 6t^ steriles. Elles ont oermls ä la fln des tra-
vaux de la Conference du d6sarmement de formuler
quelques prlncloes g6n6raux dont l'lmportance ne
saurait 6tre assez fortement soulign6e car c'est dans
ces prlnclpes que le präsent pro j et a puls6 son Ins^
plratlon ».
Un peu plus loln :
«"La France vlent de manifester avec 6clat son
attachemnt ä l'oreranlsation Internationale de la
• palx oar la s6curit6 collectlve et le d6sarmement
progresslf. Elle oeut donner lmm6dlatement une
forme concrfete aux asolrations de la consclence
publlaue en natlonalisant dans une ^rfes large me-
sure des Industries de Ăźuerre. Ce geste r6confortera
les tendances paclflaues aui tron tlmidement s ac-
cusent dans le monde. L'exemule oue donnera la
France entralnera l'oplnlon Internationale >.
J'avals soullgn6 ce passage de l'expos6 des motifs
f'"'*
h {
%
— 152 —
lors d*une pr6c6dente audlence en le rapprochant
de la Situation Internationale ä l'^poque oü cet
expos^ a ^tÄ r6dig6.
M. L60N Blum. — Je me rappelle trfes blen le Jour
oĂĽ M. le conseiller instructeur m'a mis ce texte sous
les yeux en me demandant sl je le connalssals.
Je ne le connalssals pas. Je ne l'avais Jamals lu.
Je vous al dlt quelle part Tavals nrise ä la r^daction
du projet de lol sur la natlonalisatlon : c'est exclu-
sivement la r^daction de Tartlcle sur la flxation et
la liquidation des indemnlt^s.
Seulement, j'al compris que cet expos6 me met-
talt dans un cas trfes grave. Pensez donc : M. Blum
d^pose des demandes de cr6dits pour armer la
France et, en mfeme temps, il r^dige ou en tout cas
11 slgne une Phrase comme celle-lä, N'est-ce pas la
preuve de sa profonde duplicit6 ? Ne voit-on pas
dans cette Phrase oercer le bout de Toreille ? M.
Blum est l'homme du d6sarmement. il a 6crit sur le
d^sarmement des centalnes d'artJcles. 11 a m6me pu-
blic un livre. Eh bien ! au moment mfeme oĂĽ 11 se
vante d'armer la France, au moment oĂĽ les circons-
tances exigent en effet aue cet effort d'armement
trop longtemps aJoum^ solt enfin accompli. ä quoi
pense-t-11 ? H ne pense en r6alit6 au'ä la dösarmer.
Tout le reste de l'exposö des motlls disparalt, tou-
tes les autres ralsons donn^s s'6vanouissent, tout
ce qui a 6t6 dit au cours des discussions parlemen-
taires s'envole en fum6e et il ne reste plus que cette
Phrase accusatrice qui est devenue un slgne d'aveu
de ma dupllcit6 et de ma trahison !
M. LE PRÄsroEMT. — Je me permets de vous rap-
peler dans le möme ordre d'ld6es une autre phrase,
que Je n'avais pas cit6e Jusqu'ici, mais que je vals
vous rellre puisque vous abordez ce sujet, phrase
que d'allleurs l'accusatlon vous reprochera peut-
etre en cherchant ä connaltre votre nensöe intime.
t
— 153 —
II s'agit d'une ohrase extralte de votre nrofesslon
de foi lors des ölections de 1936 :
c La paix ne sera Jamals solide dans un monde
livr6 ä la concurrence des armements et des mar-
chands de canons. II n'y a de vrale paix que la palx
d^sarm^e >
M. L60N Blum. — Oul.
M. le President. — Cette phrase est dans le mßme
ordre d'ldöes que la pr6c6dente. Vollä pourquoi Je
les raporoche l'une de l'autre pour vous donner
Toccasion d'expliquer votre pens6e.
M. L60N Blum. — Je ne sais pas sl J'al r6dig6 en
1936 une profession de fol. C'est possible, Je ne le
crois p9^.
M. le PR^sroENT. — C'est probable.
M. LÄON Blum. — Mals vous trouverez cette mfeme
formule de la naix dösarmöe dans 150 articles ou
discours de mol. Par cöhsöauent. 11 ne peut y avoir
aucune esp^ce de dlscusslon sur ce Point entre nous.
Je vals dire d'abord ä auoi corresroondait lln-
sertion de cette phrase dans l'exDosĂź des motifs du
projet de loi sur la natlonalisatlon, ä cöt6. Je le re-
p6te. ou Dlutöt aprös les motifs d'une toute autfe
nature visant la nöcessitö de la natlonallsation
d'une part et d'autre part du contröle qu'on oublle
toujours. pour le rendement des fabrications de
guerre.
Mais examinons maintenant. ä cöt6 du courant
d'idöes oul avait d6termin6 l'lnscriptlon de la naUo-
nallsatlon dans le Programme du front populalre, le
courant d'idöes qui avait provoquö l'lnsertion, dans
l'expos6 des motifs. d'une Phrase comme celle-lä.
n y avait eu une conf6rence du d^sarmement Ă„
Genfeve. Elle s'ötalt röunle en 1931. L'Allemagne
l'avalt qultt^e en 1933. La conf6rence avait nÄan-
"srr^smsgrp'
'I
i^i
[|)
I
•
i:
t
j'
;
iff>
>
r *
— 154 —
molns Continus ses travaux. Elle ne sl6gealt plus en
s6ance pl6nl6re, mais elte avait laiss6 aprös eile une
commlssion permanente qui. eile, n'avait cess6 de
poursuivre sa tAche.
Elle 6tait arriv^e ä un certaln nombre de don-
n6es fermes. Elle ^talt arriv6e ä cette donn^e qu'une
limitation des annements doit 6tre g6n6rale et
aussi au'elle doit 6tre contröl^e. Pour les fabrica-
tions d'Etat. les movens de contröle sont relative-
ment faciles ä trouver. On les avait 6tudi6s ä fond,
notamment les moyens de contröle budg^taire, car
la gestion d'un etablissement d'Etat transparalt ä
travers les documents bude:6taires. surtout s'il y a
une Convention aui imnose ä l'avance une forme
d^termin^e et commune. Mais, pour les fabrications
priv^es. quels peuvent 6tre les moyens de contröle
International s'il n'existe pas au pr6alable un con-
tröle national ? C'est le contröle de la Soci6t6 des
Nations sur les nations. C'est alnsi que par une au-
tre voie on 6tait arriv6 ä cette notion : ou bien la
suporession. c'est-ä-dire la nationalisation, ou bien
le contröle de l'industrie et du commerce priv^s des
armes.
Quand le d^pöt du prolet de loi a 6t6 d6cid6, la
r^daction de l'expos^ des motifs a 6t6 confi6e ä une
petite commlssion comoos^e d'un trfes petit nombre
de membres. Je crois qu'elle comprenait M. Oudinot,
le contröleur g6n6ral Guinand, M. Louis Aubert.
M.
moL
Jacomet. — L'ing6nieur gön^ral Happich et
M. L60N Blum. — Dans l'expos^ des motifs, on a
mis en t6te les motifs que l'on jugeait les princi-
paux. Puls, k la fin. on a ins6r6 une phrase qui r6-
pondalt au stade terminal des travaux de la com-
mlssion oermanente de d6sarmement. De ces tra-
vaux, vous pouvez penser qu'ils 6taient sans aucune
actualit6. Je le pense aussi r6trospectlvement. Mais
lls n'en pr^sentaient pas moins un trfes grand int6röt
)
— 155 —
a cette 6poque, notamment dans les pays anglo-
saxons comme les Etats-Unis. Tout r6cemment en-
core le President Boosevelt au cours d'une manifes-
tation DubliQue. avait montr^ rint6r6l que TAm^rl-
que attachait aux travaux de la Conference du
d^sarmement oĂĽ eile 6tait representee. alors qu'elle
ne faisait pas Partie de la Society des nations. A
cette 6poque,. la Conference du dösarmement et le
Bureau international du travail 6taient les seuls
liens aui rattachaient les Etats-Unis ä l'organlsation
internationale de Genöve.
Ainsi donc, apr^s avoir 6nonc6 dans l'expos^ des
motifs le« raisons d'ordre national, on a 6nonce les
motifs d'ordre internatfonal. et on l'a fait dans des
termes aui correspondaient ä la thöse qui avait tou-
Jours ete soutenue ä Genfeve au nom de la France,
que le contröleur g^n^ral Jacomet qui repr^sentait
la France ä cette Commlssion permanente y avait
d^velopĂĽ^e au nom de M. Tardieu et au nom du
colonel Fabry.
M. Jacomet. — Et au nom de l'6tat-major.
\
M. L60N Blum. — J'allais l'ajouter. Thäse qui etait
6galement et aui a toujours 6te celle de l'6tat-major
de l'armee, th6se qui est la th6se constante, perma-
nente du Ăźouvemement francals et de la politique
francaise. Cette Phrase sienifiait : le vote et la loi
ne ferait aue confirmer et consolider une Position
du commandement francais et de tous les gouver-
nements francals successifs.
Voilä ä auoi se r6duit cette terrible affalre de
rexpos6 des motifs.
Seulement sur ce point. vous me permettrez de
pousser oersonnellement l'analyse un petit plus
profond^ment.
Vous 6tes peut-€tre surpris ä üremifere vue, c'est
une de ces contradictions apparentes. superficielles
comme celles aue Je signalais hier en d'autres ma-
o\
Lt 7
— 156 —
tldres, qu'un gouvemement, tout en armant de son
mieux le pays. tout en d^ployant l'effort le plus
actif. le plus 6nergique pour rattraper le retard
funefite dont le pays souffre, vous 6tes peut-6tre
surpris qu'il continue ä parier du d^sarmement et
persiste ä agir en vue du desarmement ? Cela vous
paralt sans deute incompatible, contradictoire.
Ce sont lä des problämes auxquels j'ai r6fl6cnl
Pendant des ann^es. II n'y en a pas dans ma vie
publique qui m'ait occup^ et possed6 au mäme degr6.
Je vous d6clare que cette contradiction est toute su-
perficielle. Dans la r6alit6 des choses l'effort d'ar-
mement et reffort de desarmement international, ou
si vous voulez serrer de plus prös ma pens6e, l'effort
pour armer d'une part. et d'autre part l'effort pour
entretenir l'espoir d'un desarmement posslble, ce ne
sont pas lä du tout des notions contradictoires. Ce
sont au contraire des notions coh^rentes, solidaires,
rigoureusement compl6mentaires.
J'ai expos6 toute ma pens6e sur ce point dans un
discours Que j'ai prononce ä Genfeve das les Pre-
miers jours de mon gouvemement et qui a eu la
bonne fortune assez exceotlonnelle d'avoir ralM
l'unanimite absolue de toute l'opinion frangaise
teile qu'elle pouvait s'exprimer par la presse et au
Parlement. La thöse que J'y avais expos^e, et qui
paralt vous surprendre, avait vraiment ralli6
i'adh6sion entifere du sentiment public.
Qu'est-ce que j'ai dit dans ce discours et qu'est-ce
que je voulais dire dans les textes que vous pour-
riez retrouver. sinon dans ma profession de foi ^ je
ne suis Das sür d'en avoir fait une — mais en tout
cas dans le discours radiodiffus6 que j'ai prononc^
ä Narbonne, quelques iours avant les eiectlons de
1936. et oĂĽ je d^veloppais le Programme de mon
parti pour les eiections generales ? Voicl la subs-
tance de ma oens^e.
Dans retat pr6sent du monde — depuis 1933 sl
vous le voulez bien — la paix ne peut etre assur^e
â– "\
— 157 —
en Europe que par la s^curite coUective et l'assls-
tance mutuelle... II existe des desseins de revanche
et aussi des desseins d'li6g6monie aui ne seront arrö-
t6s oue oar la certitude de bloauer contre eux la
totallte des nations group^es par le pacte dans la
communaute internationale. Cette certitude ne sera
acquise aue si chacune des nations associees est
r^solue ä tenir pleinement ses engagements vis-ä-
vis des autres. ä honorer pleinement, coüte que coü-
te, la sißnature au'elle a donnäe. La paix ne saurait
donc 6tre preserv6e que si chaaue nation assume
courageusement le risque de la guerre et si eile se
pr6pare ä soutenir ce risque. De lä decoule la n^ces-
sit6 d'armer. Armer pour resister ä l'agression, si on
est soi-meme attaqu6, armer pour remplir les enga-
gements de l'assistance mutuelle si une autre na-
tion solidaire est attaquee. Armer pour couvrir la
s^curite des nations oue protfegent notre signature
et notre honneur.
Mais, comme je Tai d6clar6 dans un discours de
decembre 1936 ä la Chambre, si. dans l'etat präsent
du monde armer est un devoir ou plus exactement
une necessite imm^diate, si l'assistance mutuelle
ainsi concue peut 6tre efficace dans la g6n6ralit6
des cas et peut sans doute pr^venir l'immense ma-
jori te des conflits possibles, eile pourra aussi trans-
former ce qui n'aurait 6te qu'un conflit local, en
une guerre generale. Je n'ai pas besoin d'insister sur
cette cons6ouence.,. Ce risque est d'autant plus fäl-
ble qu'il est plus g^n^ralement accepte et plus cou-
rageusement accepte par les nations. Mais 11 existe.
II n'est pas eiiminable dans l'etat präsent des cho-
ses : la France en a fait rexpörience. Et alors, com-
ment pourrait-il fetre 61imln6 ? De deux f acons seu-
lement. II faudrait ou bien que la communaut6 in-
ternationale fut suffisamment arm6e, ou bien que
chaoue nation fut suffisamment desarm^e. Dans la
premifere hypothäse, la communaute internationale
poss6derait en propre une force milltaire assez puls-
et
:i.
— 158 —
I.
it •
h â–
saute pour s'oüüoser souverainement ä toute tenta-
tive d*agression, d'infraction ä ses rägles, de r6bel-
lion contre ses sentences. La Dolice Internationale
devrait disposer vis-ä-vis de chaaue Etat nris isol6-
ment de la certitude de suD^riorit6 dont la police
centrale de l'Etat disnose vis-ä-vis des Indlvidus.
C'est dans cet ordre d'id^es au'on avait suerg^r^, par
exemple, de r^server ä la Soci6t6 des Nations le
monopole de Taviation militaire. Mais, ä 4^faut de
cette premiöre hypothöse, assez difficile ä r6aliser,
on est n6cessairement re.iet6 vers la seconde : Celle
oĂĽ aucun des Etats particuliers ne poss^derait plus
en propre une force militaire assez puissante pour
tenter l'aventure. pour braver la communaut6 inter-
nationale, pour la placer devant le fait accompli,
pour paralyser par l'effroi et la terreur le jeu de la
s^curite collective. Vis-ä-vis des nations suffisam-
ment d6sarm6es la sentence internationale s'impo-
serait sans possibilit^ de r^bellion et de d^fi : ä tout
le moins l'effet de sanctions purement pacifiques
resterait efficace. Voilä le sens profond du desarme-
ment. de la limitation des armements. C'est seule-
ment par le d6sarmement aue la s6curit6 collective
fond^e aujourd'hui sur la force des armes, peut fetre
vid6e peu ä peu de son contenu vlrtuel de guerre.
Seul, il permettrait le leu pleinement pacifique de
l'arbitraKe et de l'assistance mutuelle.
Dans un systdme comme celul-lä. aue 1'ai cons-
tamment soutenu. au polnt d'affirmer au'on avait le
droit d'user de la force pour oblieer une nation ä y
participer. vous voudrez bien reconnaltre qu'il n'y a
rien d'incompatible. au contraire. entre l'effort
d'armement et l'effort men6. en vue 'du d^sarme-
ment. mais au'U s'asrit. au contraire. des 616ments
ins^parables d'un möme ensemble.
Quel est le dans:er. d'allleurs le daiiRer positlf,
direct d'une teile politloue ? Si eile r^ussit. on arrive
ä limiter et ä contröler d'une faQon g6n6rale les ar-
mements. ä dösarmer suffisamment les nations, par
— 159 —
une Convention imanime et lovalement accept^e,
pour aue l'autoritö de la communaut6 internationale
suffise ä or^valoir sur la r6slstance possible de cha-
cune d'elles et a assurer le rfeKlement pacifique de
tous les litiges. Dans ce oas. la paix. la paix v6rita-
ble. la paix d^sarm^e est assur^e. Voilä ce que paix
d^sarm^e signifie. Et certes je souhaitais qu'il fĂĽt
possible d'arriver ä. un 6tat pareil : certes je consi-
d6rais ce sy&töme comme un id^al pour les hommes
qui gouvement au nom de la France.
Mais si cela ne r^ussit pas. la Position de la
France n'est nuUement compromlse. eile est conso-
lid^e. Elle est consolid^e sur le Plan international
parce qu'on a donn^ ä l'opinion universelle la preuve
de sa volont6 profonde de paix : on ne s'est pas d6-
sarm6 pour cela. puisqu'il n'a Jamals 6t6 auestion de
d^sarmer avant que de pareilles Solutions soient d6-
finitivement acquises et cela a 6te dit en propres
termes. Sur le plan ext^rieur. le plan international,
la Situation politiaue et morale est donc fortifi^e,
consolid6e, et eile Test 6galement sur le Plan natio-
nal, n est d'autant plus als6. et surtout il est d'au-
tant plus legitime d'inciter le navs aux suprömes
sacrifices pour assurer sa defense arm^e, qu'on a
plus ardemment et plus sincferement tent6 de barrer
la route ä la guerre. de construire une Europe d'oü
le danger de la guerre serait exclu.
Messieurs, voilä auel a 6t6 le sens de notre expos^
des motifs de 1936. voilä le sens de notre attitude au
gouvememen^
Je pourrais vous en donner la preuve la plus Evi-
dente. H s'est tenu le 19 mai 1937. une s^ance du
Comit6 permanent de la defense nationale dont
vous avez. bicn entendu. le proc6s-verbal au dossier.
A cette s6ance assistaient le ministre des Affaires
6trang6res. M. Yvon Delbos, et moi. L'objet de la
r^union Etait de d6finir les Instructions aui seraient
donn^es aux d616gu6s francais ä la commission per-
manente du d^sarmement. Je n'ai pas copi6 le texte
'\
IM
B
\
— 160 —
Integral de ce Drocfes- verbal, mais J'ai uris en llsant,
quand on me l'a commĂĽniau^. auelaues extraits qu'il
est f aclle de v^rlfier.
< Cette s^ance. dit le orocfes-verbal. a pour objet
la mise au point de la Position fran^aise ä l'^gard
des questions susceptlbles d'Ăźtre 6voqu6es prochai-
nement devant le bureau de la commission perma-
nente du d^sarmement
M. Delbos fait un expos6 de la question. M. Da-
ladier declare : « Nous ne voyons — c'ätait rid6e
constante de l'^tat-major — que des avantages ä ce
que tout le monde suive l'exemple donn6 par notre
loi d'aoĂĽt 1936 >.
€ M. Delbos inlervient et l'intervlens ä mon
tour : « M. L6on Blum declare nu'aussi bien en ce
qui conceme l'Angleterre au'en ce aui concerne la
France, sa convlction est tout ä fait contraire ä
Celle aui vient d'Ăźtre exprim^e >. II s'agissait de la
r^sistance dans certains cercles de Topinion anglai-
se ä l'id^e de la reorise des travaux de la commis-
sion permanente. « A son avls. il est d'autant plus
facile d'entralner une large Partie de l'opinlon au
r6armement au'on peut lui montrer le d^sarmement
plus proche ou au'on peut attester devant eile d'un
effort loyal pour le d^sarmement. Sur une remar-
que de M. le maröchal Petain, M. L6on Blum pose
la, question suivante : t Ou'adviendra-t-il si TAlle-
magne et l'Italie n'acceptent pas de participer aux
travaux ? » II y repond en indiquant que, dans ce
cas, notre int^rĂźt est de Dousser les travaux le plus
possible. Sans toutefols nasser k aucune mesure
d'ex6cution, tant que l'adh^sion de ces puissances
ne sera pas obtenue >.
Au cours de cette discussion, j'ai constat6 l'accord
absolu de pens^e sur la Position que J'ai d^finie :
pousser les travaux de la commission du d^sarme-
ment. continuer. m6me en l'absence de l'Allemagne
et de ritalie de fagon ä en tirer davantage vis-ä-vis
-. 161 —
de ropinV)n universelle, et. bien entendu. ne passer
ä auctine mesure d'ex6cution dans notre pays. tant
qu'on ne serait pas arriv6 ä obtenir une Convention
g^nörale. J'insiste encore dans la suite de la discus-
sion sur l'int^ret puissant d'une attitude de ce genre
au DOint de vue de l'opinion int^ernationale. et je
trouve ceci dans mon analvse : « Le mar^chal Po-
tain pense aue Ton ne devrait aborder la question
de la limltation des armements aue lorsque l'Angle-
terre et nous aurions atteint notre maximum.
M. L6on Blum d6clare aue c'est une condltion sine
^a non : ä la base de toute limitation il faut placer
I'achdvement des programmes en cours >.
La s^ance s'est termin6e sur un accord unanime.
C'est ,ft l'unanlmit6 au'on a d6fini les instruction«'
des repr^entants francals ä la commission perma-
nente du d^sarmement. Et. ie le r^nfete. ä cet accord,
ont participS. non seulement l'6tat-maior. car c'6tait
lui qui, comme toujours, avait fait la pr^paration
technlque de la discussion. mais aussi le mar6chal
Potain, qui. explicitement. au cours de cette s^ance,
s'est d6clar6 en complet accord avec les id^es que je
venais d'exprimer. ^^
M. LE Präsident. — Encore deux mots. si vous
voulez bien. sur l'expos6 des motifs de la loi de na-
tionallsation des Industries d'armement. Pour d6f en-
dre ce projet vous vous placez sur le plan national,
Mais sur le Plan International ? L'accusation, sur le
plan international, vous fera peut-Ăźtre remarquer
que voUre th^se impliquerait. pour avoir une autorit6
v6ritable. que les natlons. toutes les nations int6res-
s^s participassent aux travaux de la Conference du
d^sarmement. Or. deux tout au%ioins ne partici-
paient peut-6tre plus aux travaux de la Conference
du desarmement. ou plutöt leur avis n'ayant pas ete
ais6ment acquis. cela enlevait sans doute quelque
autorite ä la thfese et ä la Position aue vous preniez
alnM.
M. BLUM. — Cela nous inspirait, & coup sür, le
i;
^i
— 162 —
sentiment aue notre Position avalt peu de Chance
d'aboutir ä un r6sultat positif. mais cela ne d^trui-
sait pas les faits. cela ne supprimalt pas les avan-
tages de notre Position, ni du noint de vue inter-
national, ni du Point de vue national. Au polnt de
vue international, cette espäce de mise en demeure
adress^e ä rAllemaerne et ä l'Italie. devant la cons-
cience universelle — car eile existe, eile poss6de une
puissance et une force reelles, nous l'avons bien vu
Pendant la ßuerre de 1914 — cette espöce de mise
en demeure pour les sommer de se prononcer comme
nous-m6mes pour l'effort de la limitation et de con-
tröle des armements, cela compte. Car personne,
en somme, n'ose dire, en s'adressant ä l'opinion uni-
verselle ou ä son propre peuple. au'il ne veut pas
la paix sur terre. La paix. tout le monde en parle
touiours. Seulement. voici l'^preuve : .U faut main-
tenant orononcer. dire öui ou non. Allez-vous ^ccep-
ter ? Si oui, il y a une possibilit6 de paix dans le
monde, sinon, la conscience universelle saura d'a-
vance. sans au'il soit besoin de cr6er nour cela des
Cours suprĂźmes, oĂĽ se trouve la responsabili6 de
la guerre. Elle saura avec certitude aui a 6t6 l'agres-
seur. Et auant ä la oosition nationale, je r6pfete ce
Que j'ai dit: c'est aue vis-ä-vis d'un pays ä qui Ton
administre la preuve taneible au'on a tout fait pour
6viter la Kuerre. au'on est all6 iusqu'ä I'extr6mit6
de l'effort possible. m§me si dans son for Interieur
on ne crovait oas au succfes possible, quand oil a
ainsi pouss6 les tentatives jusqu'au bout, alors on est
singuliferement dIus fort Dour demander ä un peu-
ple de s'imposer le sacrifice suprĂźme avec abn6gar
tion et avec cours^e.
M. LE PR6sn)ENT. — Sur le plan national, peut-
etre Taccusation pourrait-elle vous faire observer ceci
qui se rattache ä l'id6e aue vous venez d'exposer :
c'est que vous. chef de narti. chef de eouvemement
et qui jouissiez d'une autorlt^ consid6rable...
M. Blum. — Pendant un certain temps.
I
— 163 —
M. LE President. — ...dont toute id6e 6mise par
vous ä V^Kard de ceux aui vous suivaient pouvait
apparaStre peut-^tre comme une id6e-force, n'avez-
vous sans doute pas 6t6 d'une imprudence extrfeme
dans la r6daction des 6crits que vous avez 6te ap-
pel6 ä signer. N'y a-t-il pas eu de votre part une
certaine imprudence. alors qu'll anparait aue la
Situation commande de concentrer tous ses efforts
en vue de la defense nationale, de la defense de la
patrie, de la pr^parer ä tous les dangers possibles ?
N'apparalt-U nas au'un des ^6ments au'un chef de
gouvernement peut k ce moment envisager le plus
directement c'est la pr^oaration morale du pays
aux dangers possibles ? Et croyez-vous que ce soit
pr6parer activement. intens6ment le moral du pays
ä rid6e de certains danerers. de certaines n6cessit6s
qui pourront lui advenir aue de lui parier, mäme
ä l'occasion des Industries d'armement et de la na-
tionalisation. de certains — comment dirals-je... —
de certains rĂźves comme ia s6curit6 coUective...
M. Blum. — RAves !
M LE Pr^sid^nt. — ...et le d^sarmement progres-
sif? cela contribue-t-U ä faire entrer dans l'id^e
du peuple cette notion au'un chef doit conduire
Selon les n6cessit6s. avec la force aui s'impose ä lui:
rintensit6 de son effort touiours ĂĽlus grand... Qu'en
pensez-vous ?
M. Blum. — Nous sommes lä dans un d^))at po-
litique !
M. LE President. — C'est vous aui l'avez com-
menc6.
M. Blum. — Je r6pondrai bien volontiers. d'abord
qu'il V a une^ mesure en toutes choses et qu'll ne
faut tout de mfeme pas exag^rer le retentissement
international possible d'une nhrase d'expos4 des
motifs, que ie ne sals pas sl un lournal quelconque
a reproduit. aui n'a 6te certainement conuu nulle
part et n'a pas 6t^ 6pluch^ avec toute la minutie
11
)^ ■•-,., :v^
Il '^
i
ni«
— 164 —
Qu'ont pu y aDDorter certains t^molns de l'accusa-
tion — ou l'accusation elle-möme.
Mais prenons les textes qul, ä ce moment, expo-
saient la oens^e du eouvernement. Lisez mon dls-
cours de Gen^ve ä l'assembl6e de la Soci6t6 des Na-
tions. au mols de juillet, dlscours approuv^ par
l'unanimit6 de l'oDinion. lisez mon discours sur la
politiaue 6tranKöre ä la Chambre en d^cembre, ap-
prouv6 ä runanimit^ oar l'Assembl^e. Reportez-vous
si vous voulez au discours de Lyon, au mois de jan-
vier. aui a eu aussi un Krand retentissement, et oĂĽ
j'ai trait6 sp^clalement des questions de d^sarme-
ment et des relations entre l'AUemagne et nous. Je
vous le r^D^te. sur la auestion m6me que vcus
m'avez pos6e. ie ne suis oas d'accord avec vous. Je
ne crols oas oue ce soit affaibllr le moral d'un
peuple. que ce soit le d^biliter que de lui montrer,
en mfeme temps qu'on arme autant aue Ton peut
parce aue les n^cesslt^s de la Situation l'exigent,
qu'on ne laisse pas cenendant se orescrire l'espolr
— c'est le vrai mot. ce n'est pas un rßve. c'est un
espoir — d'un arraneement international, d'un r6-
glement international d'une Organisation pacifique
de l'Euron**
U n'y a pas un peunle en ce moment. mfeme
parmi ceux des r6gimes totalitaires. qu'on puisse
entralner ou maintenir dans la euerre si on ne lui
donne oas tout d'abord l'assurance au'on a tout
fait oour pr6server la naix. MAme les dictateurs
s'adressant ä leurs peuples sont Obligos de tenir ce
langage et de dire : t nous n'avons pas voulu cela,
la guerre nous a 6t6 impos^e, nous avons fait tout
au monde oour la pr6venir >. Et nous. gouveme-
ment r6publicain. nous ministres r^publicains dans
un pays d'opinion alors libre et de suffrage univer-
sel. nous y 6tions tenus encore davantaare. Nous
avons ainsi ralli6 toute l'opinion frangaise et tout
le Parlement autour des demandes de cr6dits mas-
slfs qui se sont succ6d6 entre 1936 et la guerre.
— 165 —
et qul n'ont Jamals rencontr6 l'ombre d'une diftl
cult6 dans l'opinion et dans les Chambres. L'une des
raisons de cette unanimit^ c'est pr6cis6ment qu on
savait que nous avions tout fait oour maintenir la
paix en Europe et que oar de semblables projets
nous faisions une fois de olus tous nos efforts pour
la rendre possible. Non. non. monsieur le President,
ce sont 1^1 des questions eraves. non pas au point
de vue de ce orocfes. mais oour chacun de nous vis-
ä-vis de sa conscience d'homme et de citoyen.
Croyez-mol. c'est mol qui ai raison dans ce d6bat.
n y avait pour moi deux täches ä r6aliser. Armer
le pays. et ne pas renoncer ä l'armer tant que la
s6curit6 ne serait pas un fait certain, tangible. Mais
aussi prouver au oeuple au'on ne renonce ä aucune
exp6rience, ä aucune tentative qui aient la moindre
Chance d'fetre r6alis6es. C'est la politique n6cessaire
qu'll convient de suivre pour gagner et vlrĂĽiser
l'esprit public.
Je suis un homme dont la plus grande oartie de
la vie publique s'est oass6e ä studier ces Drobl6mes
Je suis, paralt-il. auiourd'hui un belliciste: J ai 6t6
autrefois un paclfiste en ce sens aue l'al consacr6
des ann^es d'efforts et d'6tudes ä rechercher le
moyen de pr^venir la jnierre et d'organiser en Eu-
rope la s6curit6 collective. Mals la oaix teile que
nous la voulions et teile aue nous esp^rions l orga-
Aiser. c'6tait une oaix indivislble. s'aendant ä
l'Europe entiöre. comportant un räglement gßnerai
et 6auitable de tous les iitiges: c'^tait une paix
reposant sur la llbert^ des peuples. le respect des
contrats. sur la or6valence de toutes les notions
morales qui rfegnent entre les naUons comme entre
les hommes. Et le iour oĂĽ 11s ont vu l'lnd6pendance
des natlons menac6e. les contrats viol6s. le monde
livr6 ä des desseins de conau6te et d'h6ßemonie,
alors, ces hommes que l'on qualifialt injurleusement
de paclflstes bölants se sont rendus comote que sl
la paix reposait toujours sur la s6curit6 collective.
\
s ■-rä^^^
-XlU.
--^Vv â–
'/)
/
— 168 —
la s6ciirlt6 collectlve. eile, ne Douvalt Dlus reposer
aue sur la force des annes. Les oaclflstes sont deve-
nus de sol-dlsant belUclstes sans avoii chang6. C'est
pour cela que. comme chef de eouvernement, J'al
fall ce que J'al fait. Mais. Jamals 1e n'al renonc6
a l'espolr du d^&armement. Jamals 1e ne Tal lalss6
se prescrlre. Et sl. en seDtembrp 1936. 1e me suis
engaK6 dans une n6g:ociatlon directe et oersonnelle
avec un reĂĽr6sentant du chanceller Hitler, c'est
parce qu'un des articles essentlels de la conversa-
tlon qul s'engagealt entre nous. <^talt raccession de
TAllemagne ä ime n^Kociatlon sur la Umltatlon g6-
n6rale et le contröle des armements.
Le reprösentant du chanceller Hitler 6talt le Dr
Schacht. II est venu me volr ä Matlgnon, pour une
conversation directe. en Passant nar-dessus les In-
term6diaires officlels au nom du Chef du Reich.
J'aurals peut-fetre pu dlre. sl l'avals 6t6 l'hamme
qu'on d^peint : « Je suis marxiste. le suis Julf, Je
n'entre pas en conversation avec un Etat oĂĽ Ton a
extirp6 toutes les organlsations soclallstes. oĂĽ Ton
pers6cute les lulfs >. Sl l'avals dlt cela. I'aurais trahl
les devoirs de ma Charge. Mais je lui ai dlt : < Je
suis marxiste, je suis juif, et c'est pour cela que j'al
le d^slr le plus vif encore de volr aboutlr la conversa-
tion qul s'engage maintenant entre nous >. II m'a
r6pondu : « Monsieur, cela ne vous fait que plus
d'honneur >. Je ne lui demandais pas ce t6mol-
gnage. mais j'en tlre avantase nour montrer que,
lorsqu'il s'est agi de auestlons de d6sarmement, que
ce füt ä Genfeve. k Paris ou allleurs. le n*al eu en
vue aue les intörfits de notre pavs. En m6me temps,
je r6alisais des Plans d'armeroent masslfs ä un
point tel aue personne ne l'avalt- fait encore. Dans
un cas comme dans l'autre. i'al remnli les devoirs
de ma Charge, mon devolr de chef de eouverne-
ment. J'al rempll mon devolr de Prancals.
(L'audience, suspendue ä quinze heures, est re-
prise ä quinze heures trente minutes.)
-^ 167 —
LES OCCUPATIONS D^USINES
M. LE PRfisiDENT. — Le trolslfemc 616ment relev6
contre vous par l'acte d'accusation, c'est d'avoir, par
votre faiblesse devant l'agltatlon r6vo)utionnaire,
sp^clalement en tol6rant des occupatiotis et des
neutrallsations d'usines. amen6 une diminutlon con-
sid6rable de la production: le tout 6videmment en
ce qul concerne les prodults utlles ä la defense
nationale.
M L6oN Blum. — Les expUcatlons aue j'al ä don-
ner ä la Cour se trouveront tr6s abr^g^es par Celles
que je lui al d^jä fournies hier sur les mouvements
de mal et luln 1936. La Cour sait dans quelles con-
dltlons. sous Quelle forme, avec Quelle g^n6rallt6
s'est produit le mouvement d'occupation d'usines, ce
que M Luden Romler. dans un article du Figaro
de cette 6poque aopelalt l'exploslon sociale qul est
venue frapper le minist6re Blum au moment mfeme
de sa formatlon. Ce mouvement a commenc6 ä d6-
croltre ä comnter de l'accord Matlgnon. La C. G. T.
au cours des conversatlons de Matlgnon. s6talt
engag^e ä y mettre fin dans toute la mesure du
posslble. Elle s'y est efforc^e. Un annel a 6t^ lanc6
aux ouvrlers le solr mĂźme par M. L6on Jouhaux.
II a 6t6 renouvel6. J'al lndlau6 allleurs une partle
des raisons qul ont rendu plus lente la d^crudes-
cence de cette Enorme mar6e humalne; mals en
fait. dfes le mols de JulUet. on nouvalt consld^rer
que le mouvement n'avalt plus au'un caractfere locaL
II y a eu en septembre une netlte rechute qul a
6t6 de courte dur6e. Ensulte. on ne s'est plus trouv6
qu'en pr6sence de cas d'espfece tout ä fait parti-
cullers sur lesquels j'aural, dans un Instant, ä reve-
nlr succlntement.
Ce mot d'occupation n'fetalt pas rlgoureusement
exact. blen aue malatenant 11 solt pass6 dans la
* 1
— 168
^;;f
1 !
lansrue courante. Jamals une uslne n'a 6t6 occup^e
du dehors: Jamals les ouvrlers venus de leur malson
ne sont all6s occuĂĽer l'uslne. Ce aul se passait, c'est
qu'ä l'heure du d6brayage, quand les sirfenes slf-
flaient le repos et le d6part oour l'^ciulpe, les
ouvrlers. au lleu de s'en aller, restalent. L'expres-
sion populalre aul a 6te emplov^e dans la röRlon du
Nord, oĂĽ cette forme de erfeve avalt prls naissance,
11 y a de lonprues aun6es. est beaucoup plus Juste.
En langftKe ouvrler, on aopelle cela la grfeve sur
le tas. C'est une expression tr6s raract6rlstlaue, sai-
slssante et qui rend mieux compte de la r6alit6.
. II faut noter au'au polnt de vue de l'ordre public,
cette forme de eräve a d'incontestables avantages.
Les ouvrlers occupent l'uslne. mals 11 est vral que
l'uslne occupalt les ouvrlers. Les ouvrlers 6talent \ä
et Pas allleurs. Tis n'6talent pas dans la rue. Au
moment oĂĽ ils 6talent tous eroun^s dans l'usine, Us
ne formalent pas ces cortfeees avec des chants, des
drapeaux rouKes. aul viennent se heurter aux bar-
rages de Police, ce aui oroduit les incidents vlo-
lents et quelquefois sangrlants de toutes les grfeves
connues. Pas de contact dlrect sur la voie publique,
avec la force publique. II v avalt vlolation du droit
de propriet6. cela ne fait aucun doute. Je n'al Ja-
mals fait difflcult^ de le reconnaltre. Je l'ai d6Jä
dlt ä la Chambre le 6 luln. Je Tai r6p6t6 toujours
avec la möme franchlse dans les trfes nombreuses
dlscusslons auxauelles. dans les deux Chambre, les
Incidents de cette nature ont donn6 Heu. H v a vlo-
lation du droit de la proprl^t^. d'un droit de pro-
pri6t^ — remarauons-le — abstralt. th6orique puls-
aue la STfeve est l^sale et au'en r6alit6 le propri^talre
de Tuslne n'ötait prlv6 d'aucun droit utile. Mals
enfin, 11 y avalt, sans nul doute, violatlon d'un
droit. C'est le nremler devoir du srouvemement de
faire respecter ce droit, comme les autres; c'est
le devoir du Ăźrouvemement de faire ex^uter les
d^clsions de Justice au'un certain nombre de- pa-
— -•^•
^'"
— 169 —
trons ont provoqu^es en Introduisant par exemple
des r6f6r6s. Aucune espfece de doute et de restriction
lä-dessus.
Seulement voilä — nous allons encore parier
politique. je m'en excuse — un eouvernement n'a
pas au'un devoir ä la fois. II n'en est pas des gou-
vernements autrement aue des individus. n y a pour
les gouvernements comme oour les individus des
contradictlons et auelaue fois des incompatibilit^s
entre les devoirs diff^rents. II v a pour le chef du
gouvernement des situations aui ressemblent ä ce
que l'on appelle dans la vle priv^e des cas de cons-
cience. On est pris entre des devoirs dlff6rents et,
en apparence ou en r6alit6, oppos6s, et on est
Obligo, Chef du gouvernement ou homme priv6, d*6-
tablir une certaine hi6rarchie entre des devoirs tcus
certains. comme de faire resĂĽecter le droit de pro-
pri6t6 et comme d'autre oart de pr6server la paix
publiaue. C'est sous sa responsabllit^ politique dont
les assembl^es sont iuKes au'un chef de gouverne-
ment choisit.
Je suis p6n6tr6 encore aujourd'hui. et plus que
Jamals, de cette conviction au'ä cette heure. dans
la hi^rarchie des devoirs, celui qui primalt les au-
tres. qui devait s'lmposer avant t^ut autre & moi,
c'6tait de pr6server l'ordre civlaue. c'^tait de pr6-
server ce que J'appelals ä la tribune du Parlement
la paix civile. Je vous ai rappelt, et je d^fie encore
sur ce Point toute contradiction. aue personne ne
m'a Jamals demand6 autre chose, que, ä ce moment,
auand on 6talt devant la r6alit6 et non pas ä six
ans de distance, personne ne m'a propos6 d'agir au-
trement aue je ne l'ai fait. D'aiUeurs. messieurs,
ypus pourrez appr^cier. d'aprfes Tensemble des docu-
ments du dossier. par exemple d'anrfes le texte que
Je citais hier : la d^claration de M.« Sarraut au
S6nat, reprodulsant le langase oue lul tenaient les
Patrons eux-mĂźmes auand ils parlaient c d'un poten-
tlel de force et de passlon aul animait en ce moment
\
-^ 170 —
la multitude ouvrldre > et aul anralt donn^ un ca-
ract6re de lĂĽttes violentes ou de sruerre sanglantc &
tout effort f ait oour chasser les ouvriers oar la force
des usines. Vous n'avez au'ä, vous reporter ä des
documents comme celul-lä Dour vous demander si
vraiment, en consclence, tel n'6talt pas le premier
devolr de la charee
Mals examinons le problfeme du point de vue qul
est le vötre. celui de l'lncidence sur les rendements
eu sur les fabricatlons. L'autre jour, monsleur le
Procureur K6n6ral a Jet6 dans la dlscusslon un Chif-
fre qul a naturellement prodult un prrand effet par
son volume aPDarent. II a dlt aue d'aorte des sta-
tlstlQues dress^es par le mlnlstfere du Travall la
crlse avalt entraln^ une perte de 19 mllllons dlieures
de travall. Je ne crois pas avolr mal entendu.
M. LE President. — J'aloute 19.190.196 heures.
M. LÄON Blum. — Les statlstlclens sont vraiment
des Kens admlrables. C'est un chlffre aul falt grand
effet. Mals le vals vous dire au '11 m'^tonne peut-
6tre dans un aĂĽtre sens aue M. le Procureur g6n6-
ral l'a annonc6. 19 mllllons d'heures. mettons 20
mllllons en nombre rond. cela reur^sente 2 mlllions
et deml de journ^es de travall de 8 heures.
M. LE PRÄsroEHT. — Dans la r6glon parislenne.
M. L6oN Blum. — Oul. dans l'aeKlom^ratlon pari-
slenne. Nous avons »rfes d'un mllUon de chömeurs,
cela repr^sente deux lours et deml.
M. LE President. — Seulement dana les usines
travalllant pour la defense natloriaift.
M. L6oN Blum. — 19 mlllions dTieures. ce nom-
bre astronomlaue correspond exactement & 2 mll-
llons et deml de lourn^es de travall. Pour une
Population de 500.000 ouvriers, cela repr^sente 5
Jours. Sl vous appllauez ce nombre ä une popula-
tlon plus 6tendue. c*est & Pen Drfes l'^ulvalent d*un
jour-
^ 171 —
M le Procureur gänäral. — On auralt pu faire
des avions et des chars oendant ce temps.
M L40N BLUM. ~ On auralt nu faire des avions
et des chars ? Je vals vous r^pondre tout de sulte^
On auralt pu faire des avions ? En admettant mtoe
aue la d^perdltlon alt 6t^ beaucoup plus grande, en
admettant. comme le falt le contröleur g6n6ral Bo^
dans un rapport auauel fal d61ä falt aUuslon que
toutes les causes cumul6es. gräves. occunatlons d usi-
nes. gräves cons6cutlves. congös nav^s au'on a quasi
bliiu^s, alent prodult un retard de deux rno^.
flu'est-ce aue cela auralt repr6sent6 Dour lavla-
tlon ? Cela repr^sentalt deux ou tjols douzalnes des •
apparells aue l'on fabrlaualt dans ce temps-lä. On
fS^rlaualt alors des Bloch 210. des Po ez 54 le vlell
Amlot le vleux Farman. Cela aurait-ll eu une
Ă„e importance Pour la defense nationale aio^^^
Ze rannte surabondalt de ces ^7^^^^«^^^. ^^3^9^^
aue l'on n'auralt pas emplov6s sur le front de 1939-
?940^ II y auralt eu deux ou trols douzalnes de ces
a^areUs en plus. Cela auralt-U eu une influence
sur le sort de la guerre ?
R6fl6chissez un neu. sans Prävention et sanspartl
prls. Quels 6talent les mat^rlels en ^abrlcatlon ä ce
moment-lä ? Nous sommes avant ^fX.'Irs^^^^^.
RPĂĽtembre 1936. Pour les canons antlchars. avanj
Le Programme Fabry-Maurln ''«'"f «""^* f°^" f l
ces en tout. Ces 2.000 olices sont ortvues pou^ U
fto de rannte 1936 et sont l'^*''^,,^,}* "?JuvV|es
n*A n V en avalt 2.000 & auelaues unlt«s nres iivrees
Tu^ fanvler' 1^37. Tous les «»--»f.^.f^^f ^s
Sans controverse nosslble <^oncordent ^^-^«y"^J°"^
avez falt une Observation, monsleur le President a
prooos des chars Renault. ^^/^^L aie lel^eM
au'en effet toutes les causes totalls6es aue je viena
Sauer peuvent avolr orodut deux ou troU mo^^
de retard sur les chars Renault en 1936. Les com
. (
MM
^mrt^^'^m
/
\
.\U
— 172 —
mandes de chars Renault avant notxe profn'amme
portaient sur quelle auantitö ? Je crols au'U y en
avait 300 en commande ä ce moment-lä. Le contrö-
leur g6n6ral Bols. dans son ranĂĽort. aloute qu'll est
difficile de rattraner ce retard chez Renault. Je ne
vois Das bien Dourauoi. Mais 11 ajoute QU'il ötait
facile de le rattraner si on voulalt blen donner des
commandes ä Hotchklss. HotchkLss avalt des sp6-
clalistes en surabondance et inslstalt oour qu'on les
fit travailler
H-i
C'est peut-etre une TUeresslon. mals Tal Tocca-
sion de le dire Ici et je le dls: Je ne sals Das sl dans
certains mllleux techniques 11 n'y avait pas le sen-
timent que le char 6tait une espfece de propri6t6
de la firme Renault. Pour le char B. la preuve en
est dans le dossler. Du fait que c'6tait un consortium
compos6 de Renault, Schneider, Delaunay-Belleville
et Je crois les Forges et Chantiers de la M6diter-
ran6e qui avait financ6 les Premiers travaux d'6tu-
des sur la demande du e6n6ral Estienne. on a ad-
mis qu'il existalt un monoDole de fabrication pour
le consortium de ces quatre maisons. II n'y a Jamals
eu de commandes de carcasses de chars B en dehors
de ces quatre maisons. Mfeme nour le char 16ger,
vous verrez dans la sulte de Tlnstruction combien
malgrr^ leur qualit^ excellente. la commande de
chars Hotchklss avait suscitÄ de difflcult6s. Je sals
que dfes ou'on a command6 des chars ä Hotchklss
cela a amen^ une balsse de Drix slneuUftrement sen-
sible sur les chars Renault. Alors ne narlons pas
trop du retard des chars. Pour les avlons le vous
le dis vraiment. le rösultat est n^ellsreable. Je r6-
pfete : est-ce que cela compte auand vous faites
le bllan des forces relatives de la France et de
TAUemagne au moment de l'entröe en guerre de
supposer qu'll y auralt quelques unit^s de plus du
vieux Programme Denain & caser dans nos esca-
drilles. S'il en avait fallu quelques douzaines de
plus, on les auralt trouv6es sans pelne. Pour les antl-
I
— 173 —
rnars en ce qui concerne la fabrication du pro-
rSlrd de de« ou trols mols. oul d'allleurs, avalt
r^itmp pntre la llvraison des carcasses. la livraison
nisme, entre la ^^;^* „ ^^ „ ^ d'aiUeurs deux
des culrasses et des toureiies. ii > «* .
documents contemporalns qui sont tout ä ^ait con
causes du retard des -^ha". dauWe Dar
la correspondance entre M. H*°^ fi^" ^is hier Or
Blbot daiis des condltlons aue 1»™'^ ^^^^^„it,
M. Lambert-Rlbot au nom de '^ ^/^;°^.,f .„^e
r ^a'uu^s - "ir- rv.r d-lndlouer.
nmportance f '°"™,„ ee oue cela reorfesente,
Quand on veut Wen anal'ser ce „and'chose.
on constate ««« <=«)? "^„'"^«Te retentlssement et
ria^T.VaVel'-ielJolfoX-en -te nlus rlen du
tout.
dedapa.
M. WOK BLTTM. - Pas du tout. mals vous allez
me le dira.
täte des «ectlons de 1936 ont M connus. 1 al eu a
^ l
* ^.^4*-.
i
fI
l
)
— 174 —
sublr l'occupation d'usines ä Issy-les-Moullneaux
d'environ 500 ouvriers de la socJ6t6 Loire-Nieuport.
Je me suis rendu Immödlatement au ministöre de
l'Int6rieur Dour demander des Instructions sur la
conduite ä tenir. J'ai ^te recu Dar M. Sarraut —
c'6tait donc avant votre ministöre. II m'a döclar^
Qu'il exercait en fait l'intörim et se trouvait dans
une Situation difficile, mais au'en tout cas 11 ne
pouvait mettre ä sa disüosition aucun agent de la
force Dubliaue. Par la suite. j'ai eu ä connaltre
d'autres occunations d'usines comme President de
runion syndicale: mais en ce moment les faits de
cette nature n'etaient plus une nouveautö. C'est
par l'intermödiaire de M. Lambert-Ribot. de l'Union
mötallurp:iQue. aue toutes 3es dömarches furent fal-
tes auprös du gouvernement de M. Blum >.
M. ij&ON Blum. — Savez-vous ce qu'elles ont 4t^ ?
M. LE Procureur GÄirtiRAL. — Nous n'avops obterni
de ces entrevues aucun rösultat oratiQue, en ce qul
concerne la protection des usines.
En ce Qui concerne le rösultat de ces occupa-
tions. ie reviens alors ä la que«tion que tout ä
l'heure je oosais d'abord au point de vue des ca-
dres qui ont önrouvö la nerte de leur autoritö. II en
est rösultö une diminution de rendement trös va-
riable suivant le cas d'esnöce On peut l'estlmer ä
30 %. U döpasse m6me ce chlffre' dans certains cas.
Ces occupations — je termine la citation — ont
d'ailleurs 6t6 suivies par toute une nöriode de trou-
bles occasionnös par les reprösailles des ouvriers-
contre ceux de leurs camarades dont ils n'avaient
pas apĂĽrouv6 l'attitude au cours des occupations.
II y a eu de nombreux cas oĂĽ les ouvriers ont du
abandonner l'usine dans laauelle 11s travaillaient.
Je suis amenö ä poser cette ouestion : au point
de vue du mat^riel vous verrez les döficiences que
ces occupations d'usines ont provoauöes et au point
de vue moral. vous voyez les graves inconvönients
— 175 —
qui pmdant plusieurs annöes se sont prolongös ä la
suite de la carence du gouvernement.
. M UoN BLUM. - Carence du gouvernement ?
Merci. monsieur le Procureur genöral. E« ce qui
concerne les rösultats matöriels, .le «^aintien^ rigou-
reusement ce oue J'ai dit. Vous avez au Dossier pour
chaoue usine le tableau chronologique des occupa
tions e.t vous avez ainsi le nombre exact des jour-
nöes de travail oerdues. Je voudrais bien savcnr ce
nue ruslne- Lolre-Nleuoort fabrlauait le 6 juin. Je
?uppise que c'ötait des aopareils Nieuport 3e n'en
sais rien Ce dont ie suis sĂĽr. c'est aue c'est un aP-
pareiloui au moment de l'entröe en .uerre n;avait
Plus aucune valeur militaire. Quelques unites de
Plus ou de moins. cela n'a aucune valeur quand
vous avez auiourd'hui ä rechercher les responsabl-
Ut6s dl'a döfalte militaire. Quelles consöquences
morales cela a-t-il produit ?- Mol je vais vous de-
Sander auenes auraient etö les consöquences mo-
X de ?a oolitlque contraire. Voüä la question ^^^^^^
je voudrais poser. C'est en effet le choix qui se
Dosait devant un chef de gouvernement. Je vois
wen d'un cötö un certain nombre ^'l^eures perdue
dont i'ai essavö de mesurer l'effet «f .^/f /^^f.^' 5!
rautre. si dans des circonstances nareil es aussi pö^
• rllleuses. aussi dramatiaues i'^vais oris ou si M
Sarraut. mon orödöcesseur - puisque j ai trouve
cette DOlitique d6jä entiörement engagöe -- huit
ou^s ^uSant/avan pris ^f ^^^«-^^^^^
nous serions all6s au plus grave ^^^ c^^^/^^^,^^^^
et je le rönöte. comme consöquence fatal e_äl^
^erre civile. C'ötait plus grave que ce QU annonce
Sl de LescaiUö comme cons^quences au point de
vue du rendement. Le ressentiment Q^^f^^J^^./f^^
dans la classe ouvrlöre m6me valncue ^f^^ iwlitiqu^^^
de sanctions impitovables et de röpression n aurait
pas 6t6 moins grave. Je suppose. _
n ne suflit pas de dlre ä un ^o«^^^«^^' 7^^^. ^^^^
trahl les devoirs de votre Charge; U faut lui dire
.iLäsdj^
>
<i \
— 176 —
â– /
/ â–
•
Quels 6taient ces devoirs. J'espfere qu'on me lea dira.
J'esD^re au'il existe dans l'esprlt de la Cour ou du
Parquet une sorte de code des devoirs d'un homme
politique. Quand vous jugez un meurtrier, c'est tout
simple, vous avez l'article du code. II a tu6. Le code
dit : on ne doit oas tuer. n n'y a pas de code 6crit
pour les hommes oolitiaues. les minlstres. les an-
ciens ministres. II faut aue vous en 6tablissiez un
dans votre esprit avant de Tappliquer. II ne suffit
pas de me dire ä mol ou ä l'un de ceux qui sont sur
ces bancs : Vous avez trahi les devoirs de votare
Charge. II faudra me dire auquel de ces devoirs j'ai
manau6. II faudra d^finir mon devoir. II faudra
Que vous m'affirmiez qu'ä cette heure-lä, dans une
Situation ä laauelle je ne peux encore aujourd'hui
penser sans angoisse. mon devoir 6tait de jeter la
France dans de tels risoues. dans de tels pörlls, cai;
je n'exag^re pas, je ne grossis pas. Je ne croLs pas
vous donner l'impression d'un homme qui travestit
la v^rit^ Dour sa defense personnelle. Si je m'ötais
tromp^. qui m'empöcherait de le dire ? De quoi au-
rais-je peur ? Personne ne me suppose de mobile
bas. int6ress6. Si je m'^tais tromp6. ce serait par
exc^s de confiance. d'id^alisme. d'ättachement ä la
classe ouvrifere. II n'v a dans tout cela rien de d6sho-
norant pour un homme. Si je m'^tais tromp6, qui
m'empfecherait. je vous en prie. de vous en faire
aveu ? J'ai eu le temps de r6fl6chir depuls, je vous
l'assure. Non, je ne me suis pas tromp6. Mon devoir
6tait clair. imp^rieux. n 6tait d'^pargner ä la
France, ä la suit« de la guerre civile, la guerre
6trang6re, de ne pas provoquer entre patrons et
ouvriers ce aue les patrons redoutaient alors le
plus, cette esD^ce de division morahe qui est plus
grave et plus pemicieuse que tout. dans un pays
et dans une d^mocratie. Mon devoir 6talt de ne
pas provoQuer de semblables convulsions civiles. En
tout cas. aue i'aie eu tort ou raison, mon parti ötait
pris : je n'aurais pas, mol, employ6 la force > Je
J
— 177 —
n'auraU oas falt marcher d'abord la garde mobUe
et ensuite l'armie. dont ce n'6talt pas la mlsslon.
Je n'aurals Das falt cela. SI Je n'avais pas pu par
la persuaslon et la conclUatlon entre ouvriers et
Patrons ramener ce aue J'ai appel6 Vordre clvlque
l'ordre r6oubllcaln. l'aurals renonc6 ä mon mandat
et peut-6tre i ma vle d'homine ooUtlaue.
Un Souvenir est rest« pour mol Pl"! cruel aue
tous les autres : c'est celul du solr de CUchy. II y
a eu ce lour-li une 6chauffour6e sanglante. Dleu
Llt aue le n'y 6tals oour rien. aue i'avals falt tout
mon Dosslble. SI vous voulez vous renseigner sur
les causes les Plus probables de cet accldent tragl-
aue vous consulterez lä-dessus un homme aul a tra-
v^lfe auprfes de vous. M. le ConselUer KteiUe. Bien
aue ceüe loum6e eftt 6« celle d'un g^and succte
pour le Kouvernement. le succfes trlomphal de 1 em-
prunt aue nous avlons lanc6. Je sals auel senttoent
d'angolsse et de douleur. encore vlvant. encore prä-
sent en mol. J'ai «orouv« ce solr-l&.
Non, non. d'aucune fa?on ieiie l'aurals falt. Quel
aues mols aprte. la Situation 6talt dl"*^««*^,,,;»"?
me oarllez hier, monsleur le President, des patrons
S^l. de leur cabinet. venalent täfephoner au com-
mlMalre de poUce pour demander au'on les prot*ge
Ceux-uT ne vovalent la Situation aue de leur polnt
de vue personnel local. Les organlsatlons PatronaJes.
qui eUe^ voyalent la Situation da^^ «>" «'l^!""^^
qui MLvalent ce qui exlstalt un peu partout et 6. quel
degr6. n'ont rien demand« de parell.
Plus tard la Situation n'a plus eu aue ce carac-
tJ loca" personnel. Onpouvalt faire respecter
la lol sans courlr de parells rlsques. I^ ^IferarcWe
des devoirs h partir de ce ««'««»Vnt/.^ft "et
Nous n'avons pas h6slt6 : :^°''\^^Zl ^u dm-
pecter le droit de proprWtfe. Par e'cemp e au com
mencement d'octobre. une gr*ve de restaurateurs
et d'hOtellers a «clatfe Juste au moment du Salon
d'automobne. Nous avons falt «vacuer les restau-
— 178 —
'' '!
n
ii I-
rants par la police. J'al trouv6 tout ä falt par
hasard. une note & ce suJet, ces jours dernlers
Le solr du jour de cette Operation, qul s'est falte
avec un pleln succ6s, le Journal Le Temps me re-
prochalt d'avolr falt proc6der ä cette 6vacuatlon
trop doucement. Le r^sultat avalt 6t6 obtenu ;
les gr6vlstes avalent 6t6 mls hors des locaux qu'Us
occupalent : le droit de proprl6t6 6talt respect6.
Seulement, voilä le grand malheur ! Grand signe
de la falblesse du gouvernement ! de sa faiblesse
criminelle ! 11 n'y avait pas eu de bagarres, 11 n'y
avait pas eu de vlolence. 11 n'y avalt pas eu de
rlxe entre les gr6vlstes et les forces de police.
C'est un grand malheur, n'est-ce pas. c'est un
cruel et dur reproche ä faire ä un chef de gou
vemement.
Nous avons fait la m6me op^ratioh le mols
sulvant, en novembre, dans les grfeves de la cho-
colaterle, grfeves qul ont eu ä leur orlglne des ma-
nceuvres blen suspectes, sl je songe ä l'homme qul
les a provoqu6es et au röle qu'U joue aujourd'hui.
Nous avons recommenc6 dans le Nord ä propos
des n*utrallsatlons. Une fols le principe de l'ar-
bltrage accept^. par les patrons. nous avons fait
6vacuer les usines. EUes ont 6t6 6vacu^es — c'est
ce que Dormoy r6pondait ä la tribune du S6nat ä
M. le s6nateur Fourcade — sans attendre que la
proc6dure d'arbitrage fut commenc6e, sur la seule
acceptation du principe de l'arbitrage. Monsieur
le President, je crols que sur le sujet des occu-
pations j'al 6puls6 ce que j'avals ä dire ä la Cour.
J'en vlendrai ensuite aux neutralisations.
M. LE Präsident. — Vous dlslez que vous avlez
eu ä cholsir entre une hl6rarchie de devoirs.
M. LÄON Blum. — Oui.
M. LE PufesroENT. — ...et que vous avlez choisl
ceux qul paraissaient les plus impörieux et les
plus nöcessalres ä rempllr.
— 179 —
M. LÄON BLUM. — Cela me le paralt encore.
M LE Präsident. — Vous avez choisi par ordre
de grandeur. On vous fera remarquer que peut-
ötre la Situation n'6tait pas si grave au point
de vue des occupations d'usines quand vous aviez
oris le pouvoir le 4 juin 1936, par exemple. si nous
en croyons une d^position regue ä l'instruction. celle
de M Albert Sarraut votre pr6d6cesseur.
M Albert Sarraut nous donne des chiffres. On
lui demandalt quel a 6t6 le volume des occupa-
tions : t Dans la p6riode qui me conceme, d t-11.
ayant pr6cis6 que les occupations d'usines avaient
commenc6 le 26 mal. il a falt l'int6rim jusqu'au
4 Juin dans la Periode qui me conceme, dit
M Albert Sarraut, le volume des occupations n a
pas d^pass^ 70 ä 80.000 gr^vistes qui. le 2 Juin,
6taient descendus ä une dizalne de mll le Hier
vous nous avez donn6 le chiffre des gr6vistes tel
qu'U F'est trouv6 au moment oĂĽ vous avez exerc6
le pouvoir. ä une date que Je ne peux pas pr6cl-
ser. Vous avez dit : un miUion.
M. L6oN Blum. — Oui.
M. LE PRÄSIDENT. - J'avais trouv6 dans des dö-
clarations de M. Langeron, le chiffre de 800.000.
peu Importe. ., .
M. LtoN Blum. — C'est cela.
M LE PRfoiDENT. - Je donne les chlflres de
M. Albert Sarraut. Mals sl vous avez prls le pou-
voir avec 10.000 grövlstes. n-eüMl pas «t^ posslb e
ä ce moment-lä. rnftme en respectant la h™We
de.1 devoirs d'arrlver ä malntenlr la s6curlt6 com-
pllte teUe' quW r^sultalt de l'^at social fran-
eals. meme la Ubertö du droit de proprio«.
»M. UON BLTTM. - Sl Je n'avals eu affalre qu'ä
■10.000 gr^vlstes. la Situation eüt fit« "e« sünt^m^
Mals vous avez le sentlment. je «f • «"^
chlflre comme celul-lä ne Concorde pas avec les
clrconstonces. Noua le verrons avec M. Sarraut. ii
!'(
— 180 —
vi
V
11
l
}
lit
W
II?
^'
arrlve quelque fois que les d6posltlons ne solent
pas enregistr^es d'une facon qui rende tout ä falt
rigoureusement la pens6e du d6posant.
M. LE Präsident. — Les chiffres sont bien pr6cls.
M. Ltov Blum. — Je vais vous Ure l'extralt du
dlscours de M. Albert Sarraut au S6nat. M. Sarraut
a expos6 dans la s^ance susvls6e — Je prends ce
texte dans la döposition de M. Langeron de dls-
cours est de julllet) — la r^ponse que lul flrent les
Patrons. Ceux-ci lul demandörent formellement de
ne pas faire usage de la force. < Ils souUgn^rent
qu'aucune vlolence n'avalt 6t6 commlse dans les
usines, qu'6tant donn6 le potentlel de vlgueur, de
nombre, de r6sistance qu'opposeralt la masse ou-
vrifere, on Irait ä coup sür ä un confllt sanglant
dont Ils seraient eux-mfimes rendus responsables
lorsque le travail reprendralt, que Ton risqueralt
6galement le ravage et la destructlon d'usines,
dont la conservation Importait au pays, qu'enfln
— car le patronat n'avalt pas la consclence par-
faltement claire et nette — qu'enfln certalnes
revendications 6tant justifl^es. Ils faisalent appel
au gouvemement pour les alder ä n^gocler. >
II me semble. en effet, dans certalnes plfeces de
l'instruction, trouver les traces de cette espfece de
roman. Le mouvement d'occupatlons aurait 6t6
flni quand J'arrival au pouvoir et 11 auralt recom-
mencÄ avec une lntensit6 bien plus grande lorsque
Je m'y suis Installö.
J'al 6t^ appel6 ä l'Elys^e le Jeudl 4. Je me suis
pr6sent6 devant la Chambre le 6. Matlgnon est
du 7. II ne s*est pas 6coul6 beaucoup de Jours entre
ma prise de pouvoir, le Jeudl solr et la röunlon
de Matignon, le dimanche matln. Tous les faits
qui se sont produits entre le Jeudl solr et le samedl
matln : le langage de M. Albert Lebrun, les d6-
marches des patrons auprös de mol, mon appel
radiodiffusö, vous ne pouvez pas ne pas les avoir
— 181 —
nr^sents ä l'esprit. Des 6v6nements comme ceux
des Premiers Jours de iuln lalssent une trace dans
les m6molres. Cela ne s'oublie pas sl vlte. Ne vous
rappelez-vous pas ce qu'6tait la r^alit^ de ces mou^
vements ? II faudrait pr6ciser ä quelle date on
6tait tomb6 ä 10.000 gr6vlstes.
M. LE PRi:sn)ENT. - Le 2 Juln, dlt M. Albert
Sarraut.
M LĂ„ON BLUM. _ II y a eu des conversatlons
engag^es par Frossard ä un moment donn6 qui
n'ont pas abouti et c'est peut-etre apräs l'^chec
de ces conversatlons que le mouvement s est am-
nMfl6 ä nouveau. Mals 11 fallait qu'll y eut quelque
chose de plus grave que 10.000 ^^^vistes pour
qu'Albert Sarraut et Frossard flssent demander
par la pr6sldence de la R^publique d'occuper les
mlnistferes du Travail et de ^'I^törleur. sans perdre
une heure, sans attendre Jusqu'au lendemaln ma
tin pour la transmisslon des pouvolrs^ „^^bn»
Du reste, 11 y a au dossier un certaln nombre
de documents concernant des occupations. On m-
dique ä quel moment I'ocrupation a com"ienc6^
Vous verrez sl dans la plupart des documents cette
date n'est pas ant6r1eure au 5 juln. date de ma
prlse de possession effectlve du pouvoir.
M. LE PRĂ„SIDENT - Autre chose. l^^lll^"^^
dans le mtoe ordre d'idöes. II y a au J^^f^«^^^^^^^
d^posltlons interessantes : celle de M- Gulchard et
Celle de M. Marchand, qui ont 4t6 tous les deux chefs
de la Police de Paris. M. Marchand d^PosHion du
10 julilet 1941 d6clare : « J'al 1 Impression trfes
nette qu'll aurait 6t6 faclle de «'^PPff ^ .^^/^^
occupations en employant les forces ^e P°Uce et
la Police armöe. La chose auralt 6t6 dautantpius
faclle qu'on aurait employ6 plus tot les moyens de
coerclslon. >
M. Uo» BL^. - Oul. Monsieur le Pr«fWent.
Lorsque des Chefs d-ustae ou d'entreprlse W16pho-
>
4l
y
\ \
VS
< .
— 182 ^
nalent ä la poUce munlcipale pour demander
qu'on fit 6vacuer leur uslne, les Services leur r6pon-
dalent qu'ils allaient en r6f6rer aux autorit^s com-
p^tentes' et finalement aucun ordre n*6talt donnö
pour employer la force arm6e aux fins d'expulslon.
M. LE PidisiDENT. — Autre chose : vous avez dlt
que' les patrons n'ont pas demand6 l'expulsion des
gr^vlstes occupant les usines. Volci ce que dit sur
ce point M. Gulchard.
M. LÄON Blum. — Je ne dis pas que des patrons
lsol6s n'alent pas t616phon6.
M. LE Präsident. — D6jä des chefs locaux
avalent pris, dit M. Gulchard, l'inltlatlve de rete-
nlr des effectifs et de demander des renforts pour
appuyer l'intervention qu'ils jugeaient n6cessalre.
C'est alors, dit M. Guichard, que je regus du cabi-
net du prĂĽfet des Instructions trfes nettes pour
dlff^rer toute actlon de cette nature. Je dus faire
rentrer ä leur cantonnement les renforts des gar-
des mobiles d^jä envoy6s dans deux banlieues pour
participer ä des 6vacuatlons projet^es. Auparavant,
je t616phonai au prĂĽfet qui confirma l'lnstruction
transmise par son cabinet vers le 26 mal 1936.
M. LÄON Blum. — 26 mal, c'est cela.
M. LE PRiisiDENT. — Oul. Et un pcu plus loln :
« Sur les demandes des patrons, sur la recomman-
datlon du prĂĽfet, j'avais pri6 la Chambre syndl-
cale patronale la plus Int6ress6e par les occupa-
tlons d'usines, celle de la rue Lauriston, de ne pas
requ6rir notre Intervention au für et ä mesure
qu'une nouvelle usine 6tait occup6e et de nous
lalsser notre llbert6 d'actlon, ce que M. Rlchemond.
President de cette Chambre syndicale, dut conflr-
mer par lettre. > II est donc difflcile de dire avee
autorltö que les patrons n'ont pas demand^
l'expulsion des ouvriers occupant les usines. S'ils
ne Tont pas demandö, c'est ä la demande du pr^f^t
de poUce lul-mftme.
<*-
^ 183 —
M UoN BLUM. - Mais sur la d6positlon de Vi.
Guichard, je tiens ä dire un mot. M. Gulchard est
un servlteur cong6di6 qui a du quitter son service
ä la prMecture de police dfes les premiers jours
de juln 1936.
M LE PRĂ„sroENT. - II dit meme pourquol :
parce qu'il avalt voulu enlever le drapeau rouge
sur certains Etablissements. C'est cela qu 11 dit.
M L60N BLUM. - Oul. c'est cela ^"'"^dlt- "Jf^f
ce n'est pas pour cela qu'H a /t^ congMl6^ C est
ä cause du röle qu'il avait JouE ^^^'J ^""""I'fu
6 f^vrier A ce moment. M Guichard ne pensait
prS^ment pas qu'on pĂĽt emp'oyer les force
de Dollce pour röprlmer une insurrection arm6e et
fui Chef de la poUce munlcipale. n'6tait pas ä son
poste l n'6tait pas ä la töte de ses troupes. Vo ä
fa raison Vous pourrez entendre lä-dessus, pulsqu U
est convoquE comme t^moln, le rapporteur g6n6ral
de la com'mission parlementaire d'enqu.te M Ru^
cart. commission pr6sid6e par un homme dont le
nom. je crois, attire un respect universel. M. Bon-
nevfty
La'd^posltlon Gulchard est en rSallM ««ef Po-
sition dlrlgfee toute entlfere contre M. ^an«"""-
Qu'Us s'expUquent ensemble. Vous les <:on ronter«.
S^uVuan? ä M. Guichard. Je le r*p te aujourd h„,
11 a du aultter la prifecture de PO"", Vv " r oĂĽ
srrs- asr .-nHc Ă„Ă„
qu'U peut entrer de partlaine P0"""< „ontiaue
d6bat d'oĂĽ vous praendez bannlr te polltlque.
^1
1
• I
ir
— 184 —
t,Fi *°".' ''"^' ^® '« "^P***- cette d«posltlon Oul
chard qul, d'allleurs, 11 i'a dit d'une (aTon expU-
clte. vlse surtout la premlfere phase de l'occuDaUon
eele Pendant laquelle 11 auralt «tVpossTble /eion
est d-uf hnnf^^f. '"°^^"'' "' P°"« ordlna!« die
est dun bout ä l'autre une dtaonclatlon calculäe
contre son anclen chef M. Langeron et c'est en re
M Langeron et M. Gulchard gue vous pourrez tous
meme instituer le döbat, lors de leur venue.
canlZln,''^ """""^ '°"' * ^'^^"'^ ««'en ce qul
^S in rf °*='="P^"0'^s d-uslnes. 11 y avalt confut
Possible entre le droit de proprl6t6 d'une nart »t
• mlT. ?"^' "" "«^"'^ suÄrleur du go^v"me
ment : le devolr d'assurer la paix clvUe
U i^nflff ""' conceme les neutrallsatlons d'uslne&
Dart?cu^ier "<??* *°"* '^*"' catögorles de drofta
S^rin l/'Jnu ü"^ ""* '« "^«^ '»e proprl6t6 du
»n H^' l'"" *^" P^""»« de recruter des ouvrlers
Ippart^ent tl *"*''''"'. '* ^'°'' ^' ''«vaiuer q"
»m?h, i ■^?i' *'"' ouvrlers de l'uslne qul n'ont Das
c«n^ m,"J ," '*""'** Pour remplacer les gr6vlstes
ceux qu en langage ouvrler on appelle InjurleuM
mem les « Jaunes , et d'autre partrie droit de S
comDrenn.n?'"l"'°"^ n^cessalres. naturelles qul
comprennent entre autres, ce qu'on appelle en An-
Heterre et aux Etats-Unls. le plcketlng c'est ä-dh^
le drglt pour les ouvrlers gr6vistes. par des moyens
t Ära,ner°äv'^' des moyens d'appel senTS
„tL^ ?"*"'"fr avec eux dans la masse ouvrlfere en
tTes t rdSo°n"Ä ""* "^'^'^' '^^^^^ '«' "
Ces deux cat^gorles de droits sont dans la lol
11 n'v o ^äII ^ ^^^^ ^® gouvernement possible
sez iusquau bout ces deux droits, ceux qul apw-
. — 185 --
tlennent d'une part aux patrons et aux ouvrlers non
gr^vistes, d'autre part, ä la masse d'ouvrlers en
gr6ve, vous aboutissez ä la bataille dans la nie,
vous aboutissez aux rlxes et aux bagarres entre les
piquets de gräve et les ouvrlers non gr6vlstes ou les
nouveaux engagös. Et sl vous, gouvernement. vous
Intervenez avec une certalne rudesse pour rendre
libre l'entr^e des uslnes, vous Intervenez en f alt dans
la gr6ve, en faveur du Patron ; vous ne tenez pas
la balance 6gale entre les deux droits aue vous
devez 6galement faire respecter.
Alors, quelle est la solutljn ? La Solution on I'a
cherch^e blen souvent ; M. Waldeck-Rousseau et
M. Miilerand avalent cru la trouver. Ils ont d6pos6
& l'6poque oĂĽ M. Waldeck-Rousseau 6tait pr6sldent
du consell et M. Miilerand. mlnlstre du Commerce,
une lol sur l'organlsatlon du droit de grfeve. Lors-
qu'un certaln nombre d'ouvrlers d6slralt la grfeve,
un scrutln s'lnstltualt dans l'uslne, avec des garan-
tles s^vferes de slnc^rit^, et une fols que la majorit«
s'6talt prononc6e, sa d6clsion pr6valalt en cettp
matifere comme en matl6re polltlque. C'est-ä-dlr^
que la grfeve devenalt 16gale, que l'arrĂźt du travaU
devenalt obllgatolre pour le patron. et que. par
cons^quent, l^islne 6talt « neutralls6e >.
Au S6nat, devant M. Miilerand lul-mfime, qul n'a
pas Proteste, car 11 ne pouvalt pas protester. je Tai
dlt : t La cons6quence pratique de la lol que vous
avlez conQue avec M. Waldeck-Rousseau, c'6talt en
falt la neutrallsatlon de l'uslne. >
Qu'est-ce que nous avons falt ? Nous n'avlons pas
le temps de faire voter la lol de Waldeck-Rousseau
et de Miilerand. et d'allleurs nous penslons ä une
autre lol qul a 6t6 vot^e quelques jours plus tarn,
la lol sur l'arbltrage. Mals nous avons dlt slmple-
ment : « L'uslne est peut-6tre ä vous. patron ; e
droit de gr6ve est peut-6tre ä vous. ouvrler, mais
la rue est ä nous, gouvernement. C'est nous QUi
occuperons la rue, c'est nous qul malntlendrons
r
ii
^1
fix
1!^
X
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^ 188 ^
rordre contre les uns ou contre les autres. Et au
S^nat, röpondant toujours ä M. Fourcade. mon pau-
vre ami Dormoy. mort assassin6, vous le savez —
on l'a trouv6 un matin, la töte d6chiquet6e par une
bombe dans la ville oĂĽ 6tait flx6e sa r6sidence
surveill6e, assez mal surveill6e, comme vous voyez ;
les auteurs directs du crime sont connus. mais je ne
Sache pas que ses inspirateurs aient 6t6 recherch^s
— au S6nat donc mon ami Dormoy röpondait ä M
Fourcade : < Je n'ai Jamals employö le mot de
neutralisation et les gardes mobiles dans le Nord,
-- car cela se passait dans la r^gion lilloise et dans
les n^^tallurgies de la Sambre — les gardes mobiles
n'ont pas d'autre Instruction que d'assurer l'ordre
dans la nie contre toutes les 6ventualit6s >.
II y avait ä ce moment des gr6ves dans le textile
et des grfeves mötallurgiques dans la r6gion de la
Sambre et la r6glon lilloise. Les populatlons du
Nord sont des populatlons courageuses et profon-
d^ment patriotes. Ce sont aussi des populatlons
vlolentes oĂĽ les r6flexes ouvriers pr^sentent quel-
Quefols un certain caract6re de rudesse. D'autre
part rinstruction aurait pu, je crois. sans grande
peine, se rendre compte de ce qu'6tait ä ce moment
pr6cis r6tat d'esprit particulier des ouvriers dans
la r^glon du Nord. Les incidents de neutralisation
d'usines se sont produits ä la fln de novembre et
en d6cembre. Or, en novembre, le ministre de l'In-
t6rieur, qul 6tait 6galement le d6put4 et le malre
de Lille, Roger Salengro, avait 6t^ assassin^, lul
aussi. II avait 6t6 assassin6 par une calomnie atroce,
dont un vote un^nime de la Chambre l'avait justifi6,
mais trop tard pour que les effets meurtrlers
n'eussent pas agi en lui et ne l'eussent pas conduit
jusqu'ä une Issue fatale.
Mais le prĂĽfet du Nord, qul est toujours le mĂźme
qui est toujours ä son poste, qul a vu les Premiers
effets des neutralisations d'usines, pourra vous dire
ce qu'6tait l'^tat d'esprit de la classe ouvriöre dans
— 187 *-
cette r6gion d6termin6e ä ce moment-lä. L'anclen
maire de Lille, qui en est encore le d6put6. pourra
vous le dire. Nous avions tout Heu ä ce moment-lä,
bien que dans le reste de la France 11 y eĂĽt un
apaisement certain pour la raison pr6cise que je
vous Indique, de redouter que les confllts ä la porte
des usines ne prissent un caractfere violent.
On a entendu quelques-uns des patrons du Nord
ns viendront peut-6tre d^poser ä la barre ; ce sont
des Patrons parfois trfes durs. Je me rappelle des
pourparlers d'arbitrage auxquels nous proc6dions
M. Camille Chautemps et moi. M. Chautemps est
d'une tr6s grande affabillt6 naturelle. II 6tait entrft
dans cette n6gociation avec un pr6jug6 favorable ä
leur 6gard. Je me rappelle leur duret6 et tout ce
que cette duret6 recouvrait d'äpret6 autoritaire, de
vieil esprit de patronat de droit divln. En les enten-
dant, M. Chautemps fut soulev6 d'une colfere vral-
ment furleuse. Voilä vis-ä-vis de quel? hommes nous
avons d6cid6 les neutralisations d'usines.
Mais que faisions-nous en m6me temps. Nous
Dr6parions l'arbitrage. Nous faisions 6vacuer les
usines, d6s que le principe de l'arbitrage 6talt
accept6 et c'est ainsi que les grfeves se sont terml-
n6es. Je ne sals plus si c'est M. Chautemps et moi
qui avons arbitr^ — j'en ai arbitr6 tant — le conflit
lillois ou si nous nous 6tions seulement charg6s de
la n6goclatlon pröalable qui aboutit ä l'acceptatlon
de l'arbitrage par un patronat longtemps r6cal-
citrax^t.
Dans la Sambre, j'al eu la bonne fortune de
trouver l'aide — car c'est bien, j'en suis & peu prfes
sür. dans ce confllt-lä qu'll a offert un si pr^cieux
concours — d'un homme qul 6tait mon ami, que
quelques-uns d'entre vous ont connu et que tous
ceux qui Tont connu ont respect6. Le premier Pre-
sident Paul Matter. C'est lui qui a arbitr6 ce conflit
II m'a prfet^ le concours de son amlti6 dans cette
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— 188 —
clrconstance. sans se lalsser offusquer par le scan-
dale des mesures de neutralisatlon.
La neutralisatlon ätalt une sorte de mlse sous
söquestre provlsolre, de mise sous scell6s durant
laquelle tous les droits de part et d'autre ötaient
r6serv6s. Pendant ce temps nous maintenlons
l'ordre dans la rue. Nous arrlvions pratiquement au
.möme resultat que celul qu'envlsagealent M. Wal-
deck-Rousseau et M. MlUerand par leur lol sur
l'organloatlon de la grfeve. Nous amenlons les par-
tles ä l'arbitrage. Si une des parties se refusalt ä
l'arbltrage, c'est contre eile que nous usions de la
presslon dont un gouvernement peut dlsposer. C'est
alnsl que nous sommes parvenus ä r^soudre ces
conflits. Ils 6talent encore en cours — car 11 a fallu
une dlsposltion transitoire de la lol pour les regier
— quand nous faisions voter par les Chambres un
texte sur la conclliation et sur l'arbltrage' obligatoire
qul Interdlsait la grfeve aussl blen que le lock-out,
avant que des tentatives de conclliation et d'arbi-
trage eussent suivi leurs cours. Je constitual en
mĂźme temps cette cour d'arbitrage dont un autre
de mes amis d'autrefois, mon camarade Georges
Pichat avait blen voulu accepter la prfesldence.
Aussitöt cette cour fonctionnait et une Jurispru-
dence de l'arbitrage s'lntroduisalt petit ä petit dans
les moBurs.
Voilä comment, selon l'expresslon du consell de
justice politlque, je transformals des r^formes
sociales en Instrument de dlvision entre patrons et
ouvrlers. C'est par la conclliation. c'est par l'aoeord,
c'est par l'entente que j'ai essayö de regier toutes
les dlfflcult6s de cette « exploslon sociale » qul 6tait
venue frapper au visage mon gouvernement, d6s
mon arrlv^e. Et en cela. du terrain sur lequel la
Cour se place, je pense tue j'al adopt6 la politlque
qul pouvalt le molns nulre ä la France et qui pou-
valt le mleux proftter ä la production et au rende
aient du matöriel.
i>
~ 189 —
Vous m'avlez clt6 des t^molgnages. Vous m'en
citerez d'autres. II ne sera pas difflcile de faire
d6üler ici. comme on l'a fait ä l'instruction. 50. 100,
150 patrons qul vlendront vous dire : ♦ H est arrive
ceci dans mon usine ; j'al eu tel ennui. teile diffl-
cult6 >. Qu'est-ce que cela prouvera ? Cela prouvera
qu'll y a eu des difflcult^s pendant cette Periode.
Qul le nie ? Tout le monde le sait. Croyez-vous que
Je dlscute sur la matörlalit^ de ces dlfücultös
ouvriöres ? II y a eu ä ce moment-lA ; U y en a
toujours en France, avec une grav!t6 variable. La
question n'est pas lä. La questlon v>st de savoir sl
ces difflcult^s, c'est moi qui les al cr66es. ou sl au
contraire. c'est moi qui les al apaiss6es. Voilä le
vrai Probleme. Et puls, c'est aussl de savoir si,
apals6es par moi, elles ont eu cependant un reten-
tissement sur le problöme que vous avez sp^ciale-
ment ä 6tudier et ä r6gler. Mals en quol est-ce un
grlef contre moi de venir me dire : teile usine a
6t6 occup6e de tel Jour ä tel jour. Et puls apräs ?
Je le sais, je vous assure. ces dlfflcult6s-lä personne
ne les a v^cues d'aussi pr6s que moi. aussl p^nibie-
ment que moi. Mais quel a 6t6 mon röle ? Ai-je eu
un röle d'excltateur, d'aggravateur ? J'ai eu un röle
de conciliateur. Je Tai eu obstin6ment. Je n'ai pas
essay6 autre chose, et j'y al r6ussi, peut-ötre mieux
qu'un autre n'aurait pu le faire ä ma place. C est
tout le probläme.
LE PARTI COMMUNISTE
J'ai encore quelques mots ä aj outer. Je ne crols
pas avoir 61ud6 en rien l'accusation. Mais je vou
drais faire un dernler effort pour la toucher dans
ce que Je sens bien 6tre son röduit Intime, dans ce
que je sens bien 6tre son Intention, son insplratior
profonde.
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— 190 —
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Pour mon usage personnei, quand je prends des
notes pour mon travail, c'est ce que j'appelle
« rargument du venin >. L'accusation semble
convaincue — et c'est ce dont eile voudrait convain.
cre l'opinion — que ma politique a inject^ dans la
soci6t6 franQaise, et specialement dans la classe
ouvri6re, un venin, un poison, un 616ment toxique,
tellement toxique que ses effets d616t6res se sont
. )ursuivis Ind^flniment et durent peut-6tre encore
sjjourd'hul.
Je crols que c'est bien cela le fond de Taccusa-
tlon, je crois que c'est bien le fond de ce qu'on
retrouve sous les divers griefs, sous les divers chefs
(* accusatlon, sous les questions de tout ordre qul
ni'ont 6t6 pos^es au cours de l'lnstruction. Je ne
\ ^ux pas dire que cela soit articul6 d'une f agon
L'en pr6cise nulle' part, mals je ne crois pas me
t omper en affirmant qu'on sent partout cette id6e
latente et präsente. J'ai empoisonn^ le pays et je
l'al intoxiqu^ par ce qu'on appelle ma faiblesse. ma
complaisance. Ma faiblesse et ma complaisance
vls-ä-vis des men^es subversives et, premiferement
j'imagine, vis-ä-vis du parti communiste.
En quelques mots, sans embarras, je voudrais
m'expliquer sur mes rapports avec le parti commu-
niste. C'est entendu, le parti communiste 6talt
entr6 dans la coalition de front populalre. C'est
entendu aussi, l'annöe pr6c6dente, ä la fin de 1935.
un pacte dit « d'unit6 d'action » avait 6t6 conclu
entre le parti communiste et celui auquel j'appar-
tenals moi-m6me, le parti socialiste. La raison d'fetre
de ce pacte d'unit6 d'action comme la raison d'Ăźtre
de la coalition de front populaire, je vous l'ai d6jä
indiqu6e : c'6tait un r6flexe de defense dont 6taient
menac6es en France, les institutions r^publicaines
et la Ubert6 elle-mßme. Mais le pacte d'unitö d'action
et la coalition de front populaire n'ont 6t6 conclus
qu'aprös une certalne date, aprfes la date oü M
Laval, ministre des Affaires 6trang6res du cabinet
rrräör-Zrlrtrrt!iLrat«w»f<f-aK»-«^'-i *».- , ._ »t-m .
— 191 —
Flandin 6talt parti pour la Russie, avait sign6 un
pacte avec M. Staline et oĂĽ M. Stallne. par une
manifestation publique et retentissante. avait
approuv6, avalis^, les efforts qui 6taient faits en
France pour augmenter la puissance defensive du
pays Ce n'est qu'apräs cette d6claration, apräs que
les communistes, conform6ment ä la d6claration
de Staline, eurent abandonn6. en matiäre de defense
nationale, la Position dite de d6faitisme r6volution-
naire que Thorez afflrmait encore contre mol ä la
tribune dans le d6bat du 15 mars 1935. ce n'est
qu'aprfes qu'ils eurent renonc6 explicitement ä leur
campagne autonomiste en Alsace-Lorraine, cest
seulement aprös cela, qu'ont pu 6tre conclus et
au'ont 6t6 conclus d'une part le pacte dunltö
d'action et. d'autre part la coalition de front
populaire.
Je ne crois pas que les dlrlgeants du parti
communiste eussent pour moi des sentiments de
nr^dilection particuliäre. J'avais 6t6, dans le parti
socialiste, l'homme qui, au moment de notre scls-
sion, avait le plus efflcacement r6sist6 ä une adh6-
slon globale du parti socialiste frangais ä la m
Internationale, au Komintern. J'6tais l'homme qul.
contre le parti communiste, avait marqu6 le plus
fortement la distinction ou m6me la contradiction
des deüx doctrines. Malgr« tout. j'al 6t6 partisan
de l'unit6 d'action, et de l'entr6e des communistes
dans le front populaire, ä partir du moment oü ces
obstacles ont 6t6 lev6s : question de d6fense na-
tionale et question d'Alsace-Lorraine.
Je suis devenu chef du gouvernement. Je ne crois
nas que dan§ une seule occasion. dans une seule
circonstance. je leur ai c6d6 ; je ne crois pas que
Jamals sous leur pression. j'ai abdlqu6 un seul
des devoirs que me dictait ma mission de chef de
gouvernement. Dans une circonstance ä laquelle
ral fait allusion tout ä l'heure. ä propos de cette
entrevue dont j'ai fait revivre certains aspects
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_ 192 —
devant la Cour, le parti communlste s'6talt pro-
Tionc6 d'avance contre moi, de la facon la plus
menacante ; mon attitude. n'en a pas 6t6 modifl^e.
Dans la polltique dite de non-immlxtion en Espagne.
j'ai rencontr6 son Opposition d6clar6e ; Je n'en a!
pas molns persist6 dans ce que, toutes les donn6es
du Probleme 6tant pos6es, je consld6rais com-
me rintörfet de la France. A aucun moment Je
n'al c6d6. II est possible qu'll n'ait pas d6slr6 que
mon gouvernement se prolongeät, qu'll ne m'alt pas
toujours servl, si je puls dlre, sans arrl6re-pens6e,
mals j'6tals convalncu et je suis encore convalncu
qu'll est Impossible de d^fendre en France les
libert6s r6publicaines en excluant de cet effort les
masses ouvrlferes et la fraction de l'61lte ouvrlfere
encore group6es autour de la conceptlon commu-
nlste. Et je pensals surtout que c'^talt un Immense
rösultat et un Immense servlce rendu que d'avoir
ramenö ces masses et cette 61lte ä l'amour et au
sentlment du devolr envers la patrle.
Cela dlt, qu'll y alt eu entre eux et mol telles ou
telles dlfflcult^s cela n'a plus d'importance et, pour
ma part, je les efface entlferement de ma pens6e.
Je n'oublie pas qu'ä l'heure oü Je parle l'Union
sovl^tlque est engag6e dans la guerre, dans- la mĂźme
guerre que nous. 11 y a deux ai^. contre les mftmes
adversaires. Je n'oublie pas que, dans la zone
occup^e, le . parti communlste foumlt sa large, sa
trfes large part d'otages et de vlctlmes. J'al lu
l'autre jour, dans une liste d'otages donn6e par un
Journal, le nom du petlt Tlmbaud. J'al tr6s blen
connu le petlt Tlmbaud : c'6talt un secr^talre de
rUnlon des syndlcats m6tallurgistes de la r6glon
parlslenne. II 6talt ä la conversatlon du 15 mars.
Je l'al vu souvent, J'al 6t6 blen souvent en bataiUe
avec lul. Seulement 11 a 6t6 fuslll6 et 11 est mort
en chantant la Marseillaise, cette Marseillaise que,
malgrÄ tout. nous avlons r^apprls aux ouvrlers ä
chanter, peut-etre pas la Marseillaise offlclelle,
— 193 —
peut-etre pas la MarseĂĽlaise des cortfeges ofĂĽclels et
des quals de gare, mals la Marseillaise de Rouget
de l'Isle et des volontaires de l'An n, la Marseillaise
du groupe de RĂĽde, la Marseillaise de Hugo c all6e
et Volant dans les balles >. C'est comme cela qu'est
mort le petlt Tlmbaud et que sont morts beaucoup
d'autres. Par cons6quent, pour ma part, en ce qul
concerne le parti communlste, Je n'ajouterai rien.
LA LIBERTE ET LA JUSTICE
ENGENDPENT SEULES
LES GRANDES VERTĂśS VIRILES
Est-c^ que J'al 6t6 plus complalsant envers mon
propre parti, envers le parti auquel j'appartenals et
que Je repr^sentals au gouvernement ? Je suis tou-
jours demeur^ avec lul dans le contact le plus
6trolt, mals je vous al dlt hier, ä une autre occasion,
quelle avalt 6t6 mon attitude. J'al jou6 un röle un
peu slnguUer, un peu original dans la vle publique,
en ce sens que je n'al Jamals recherch^ le pouvolr,
que J'al mfeme mls ä m'en 6carter autant d'appli
catlon et de soln que d'autres pouvalent mettre ä
s'en rapprocher et que j'en al d6tourn6 mon parti
aussl longtemps que cela m'a paru possible. Mais
ä partir du Jour oü les circonstances le lui ont
impos6 et me l'ont impos6. Je n'al Jamals agl que
comme chef responsable du gouvernement r6pu-
bllcaln Si Je m'6tais trouv6 en d^saccord avec mon
parti. je vous al dlt hier ce que J'aurals falt. Mais
*j'al eu cette bonne fortune, tout au contralre. de Je
ralUer ä mol dans toutes les conjonctures dlfflclles
de mon gouvernement, blen que ses premläres Ins-
plratlons, ses Premiers mouvements fussent peut-
Ctre contralres. II en a 6t6 alnsl dans l'alfalre de
la guerre d'Espagne, U en a 6t« alnsl dans lal-
1 _
•<^immmmm»imm>^mif_ -i«**!!«»**»«*«»'""»- *"" ' """mm-
*«-<r^ "■■•• 'â– â– ^ â–
— 194 —
faire de la c Pause >. 11 en a 6t6 alnsl lorsqu'll s'est
agl, en 1938, de former un gouvernement d'unltö
frariQalse. Toujours, j'al eu cette Chance de pouvolr
ralller autour de moi la masse de mes amls. Ce
n'est pas mol qui me suis pll6 devant une volonte
de parti. c'est mol qui al gagn6 le partl auquei
J'appartenals ä la conceptlon polltlque qua je
jugeais n6cessaire en fonction des Intöröts donl
j'avais la Charge. Je ne suis pas soumis ä un oartl.
j'al persuad^ le parti de se soumettre ä ce que Je
croyais 6tre rintfirfet collectif, rmt^rfit de la Na-
tion. Vous pouvez, je le r6pfete, lire tous les dlscours
que j'al prononc6s dans toute cette p6rlode : tou-
jours la möme notion du < bien public >, toujours
l'appel aux mfemes sentlments : l'entente. la con-
ciliation, la Concorde. Le dlscours de Luna-Park,
dont je parlais hier, s'arhfeve par un rappel de la
d6finltlon sublime que Hugo a donn6e ä la Patrie :
€ O Patrie ! O concorde entre les citoyens ! >
Par cons^quent. je ne trouve rlen dans tout cela
qui peu\ justifler cette accusatlon latente et cons-
tante. Je vois, excusez-mol, le bien que j'al pu
faire, je vois que j'a! apaise de grands conflU^
soclaux. je vois que. pnur la premlfere fols. J'al
group6 1 unanlml^ autour des cr6dits d'armement ;
je vois que j'al pr^par^ les esprits en France ä cette
conceptlon de l'unit^ francaise qui aurait pu, qui
aural, dö etre aussl belle qu'elle l'a 6t6 dans les
Premiers mols de la guerre de 1914. car c'est un
spectacje qui l?lsse ä tous ceux qui Tont connu un
Souvenir Inoubliable Je vois ce que j'al fait. je vois
!e bien quo j'al pu faire, que j'al ^t^ assez heureux
pour faire. Quel est le mal que. mĂźme Involontaire-
ment. meme malgr^ une bonne volonte et un d6slr
de bien dont personne: je crois. ne doute. quel est
le mal que j'aurais commis ? Est-ce que mon crime
d empoisonneur et de traltre, c'est d'avolr — on l'a
ölt ruine l'autorite patronale, detrult les cadres
fW
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— 195 —
de la dlscipline ? Je ne le crois pas, car s'il en 6tait
ainsi on aurait incrlmin6 ma loi sur les contrats
collectifs. Cette loi sur les contrats coUectifs c'est
eile qui a introduit la d6mocratie dans l'usine, c'est
eile qui frustre le patron de son droit, peut-etre
essentiel, 116 dans une certaine mesure ä son droit
de proprio t6 : le droit de discuter en tfete ä tete
avec chacun de ses employes ou ouvrlers. les con-
ditions du travail. C'est eile qui fait du contrat de
travflll collectif la matifere d'une discussion 6gal8,
paritair? entre ouvrlers et patrons, entre collectl-
vit6 ouvrifere et collectivit6 patronale.
S'll y a une loi qui alt modlfi6 le principe de
rautorlt6 patronale, c'est bien celle-lä. Pourtant,
eile est en dehors du d6bat. Je ne suis pas de ceĂĽx
aul alent Jamals essay6 de rulner l'autorite du chef
d'industrle. Trop souvent, h61as ! les patrons sen
sont charg6s eux-m6mes. Je ciols que. dans une
d^^mocratle ouvriere comme dans une dämocratie
polltlque, l'autorite est n6cessalre et 1 autor t6, un
Chef la conqulert, quand 11 donne ä la f ols 1 exem-
Dle de la comp6tence, du labeur, de la justice et de
la bonte. Mals en revanche, je crois qu'll y a une
forme d3 l'autorite patronale, qui a dl^paru et
qu'on ne reverra plus ; celle dont, heias ! Pendant
cette penode dlfflclle, certalns patrons semblalent
entretenlr la remlnlsfcence un peu douloureuse. Le
ĂĽXnTt de droit divln est mort. L'autorite patro-
nale analogue au commandement hierarchiqu^ ana-
logue au commandement totalltalre, c'est flni, c est
mort on ne reverra plus cela. On ne donnera plus ä
des masses ouvrieres le sentlment qu'elles sont as-
servles au travail par le llen d'une hl6rarchle qu'e les
n'ont pas eu le droit de discuter et auquei elles
n'ont pas volontairement consentl.
Tout cela est d'un autre temps. Sous quelque
forme qu'on la cori<?olve, mĂźme quand on la congolt
comme on le fait aujourd'hul, rorganisation du tra-
yail ne sera plus et ne peut plus etre qu'un Systeme
•
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— 196 —
plus ou moins complexe de Cooperation, embras-
sant tous les personnels de l'entreprise, depuis l«
patron jusqu'au dernier manoeuvre. On ne mönera
plus la niultitude ouvrifere par la contrainte, m
n'asservira plus les masses ouvriöres au travall.
Je cherche donc quel peut etre le contenu tan-
gible, concret de cette accusation dont personre ne
pourralt d're qu'elle n'est pas präsente sous toutes.
le? charges dirig^es contre moi. Et quand je cher-
che, quani j'examine ä quo! r6pondent ces griufs
de f aiblesse et de complaisance par quo! Täme de
ce pays aurait 6t^ alt6r6e, j'en reviens toujours en
dcrnifere analyse öi cette 6ternelle occupatlon des
usines dont je vous al tant parl6.
Messieurs, je ne reviens pas sur tout ce que j'al
dlt. II n'y a pas, je crois, d'argument que je n'ale
fourni. Je vous al dlt pourquol la r6pression. telli
qu'on semble la regretter dans certaines d6posl-
tions, me semblait impossible, puisque, si eile avalt
et6 possible, eile aurait ^t6 la pire des fautes, le
plre des crimes contre la Patrle.
Mai^ supposons que j'aie fait ce qu'on paralt me
demander, ce que certains t^moins, tout au moins.
paraissent me demander, ce qu'on paralt regfettor
que je n'aie pas fait. Supposons que j'aie ex6cut6 la
salgn6e ouvriäre, que j'aie provoqu6 de nouvelles
journ6es de juin, car c'est ä peu pr6s lä historique-
ment que l'on peut trouver l'analogie la plus vral-
semblable C'est entendu, j'aurals r6tabll l'ordre,
l'ordre mat6riel. Est-ce que vous croyez que je l'au-
rais rätabli pour longtemps ? Ne savez-vous donc
pas qu'il y a dans ce pays un fond de g6n6roslt^
auquel l'usage et l'abus de la force r^pugnent ? Ne
.«avez-vous pas qu'au bout d'un certaln temps, dan%
tout mouvement de ce genre sl condamnable qu'll
alt paru finalement, c'est toujours aux vlctim*»«
que la Sympathie publique s'attache ? J'al remr^u
un röle auquel j'oserais dire presque que j'^tais des-
I.
-^ 197 —
tin6, un röle de conclliateur. Si j'avais fait autre
chose. sl j'avais 6t6 le bras qui frappe, le bras qul
venge tant de peur, si j'avais us6 de la force. l'or-
dre que j'aurals 6tabli n'a uralt 6t^ qu'un ordre fra-
gile et pr6caire, parce que j'aurals heurt6 ce qu'il
y a de plus profond. de plus sensible, de plus g^-
n^reux dans l'äme de ce pays. Briand, ä la Cham-
bre, dans un mouvement admirable, disait :
♦ Voyez mes mains, pas une goutte de sang ! » II
r^pondalt ä ce profond sentlment populaire. H'er
soir, dans ma cellule, je lisais la « Revolution Fran-
gaise > de Michelet, et, comme par hasard comme
quand on ouvre la Bible en cherchant un texte, le
suis tombe sur cette phrase : « le cceur me salgne
de volr couler le sang francais >. La phrase entre
guillemeti. Qui a dit cela ? c'6talt Jeanne d'Arc !
Voulez-vous que je vous donne un t6moignage
d€ cette sensibilite francaise ? Je n'al pas ä eher-
eher blen loin. Le 6 f6vrier. le gouvemement avait
emp6ch6 l'6meute de renverser ä main arm^e 1"S
Institutions r6publicaines. II avait accompU son
devolr strict, je ne crols pas que nul en puls.^e
disconvenir : ei tout cas. je n'en disconviens pas.
II avait accompll son devolr en repoussant de vlve
force l'assaut au pouvoir donne. je le r6pete. par
des troupes armöes. E n'a pourtant pas surv^cu ä
l'emplol de sa force. Et. par un extraordinaire para-
doxe, les hommes qul ont e^lolt^ avec f^rocitö
contre le gouvemement de ce temps le malaise
profond de l'opinlon, cette horreur du sang r6pandu
qul est au fond. je le r6pfete, de la s^nsibllit^ fran-
Qalse. ces mĂźmes hommes 6taient pr*cis6ment
ceux qul avaient pr6par6 l'6meute par leurs provo-
cations. Et ce sont encore ceux qul me reprochent
le plus ftprement aujourd'hul d'avoir, par faiblesse
et par complaisance coupables. m6nag6 le sang des
ouvriers le sang du peuple. Comme s'il y avait deux
espfeces de sang en France. Le sang bourgeois et
quand, par malheur, on le r^pand, on est un crl-
â– â– â–
I' il
i
— 198 —
mlnel, on est un c fusUleur >, on est iin c galopin
sanglant > et le sang ouvrler, celui-lä, quand on
r^pargne, on est un politiclen debile, mis6rable,
Qul pervertit le pays par sa faiblesse et qul a trahl
son devoir.
Pour la sauvegarde des InstltuVons Ubres. c*6talt
un crime d'user de la force. mals Dour la protection
de certains modes de la DroDri6t6 ou de cenaines
formes de l'autoritö patronale, c'^tait un crime de
ne pas user de la force. Mais alors, quelles sont
donc la nature, la mesure. la limite de ce droit de
legitime defense qui appartient ä tous les souver-
nements et qul est le coroUaire, le compl^ment
n6cessaire de son devoir d*assurer l'ordre ? Ce
droit de legitime d6fense a des limites pour le gou-
vernement comme 11 en a pour les particuUers.
Votre jurisprudence de la Cour de Cassation en a
laborieusement d^lini les limites pour le particu-
lier. II y en a aussi pour un gouvemement. Le
gouverne'ment peut user de la force lorsque l'essen'^e
du regime est mise en cause, lorsqu'un int6r6t
vital de la Patrie est menac6. mais alors seule-
ment. Dans les troubles auxquels on pense (t oĂś
l'on m'accuse d'avoir 6t6 si criminellement debile,
nl ressence du r6gime, ni rint6r6t vital du pays
n'6taient menac^s. Son int^rfet aurait bien autre-
ment souffert d'une conduite contraire. Ce qui 6tait
menac6, je le r^pfete, c'ötaient certaines fomtes du
lespect du ä la propri6t6 et ä l'autorit^ patronale.
' Messieurs, je vous assure que je suis bien lä au
cceur de la qĂĽestion ; j'y ai bien r^fl6chi. Le fond
de la qüestion est bien lä, car si l'on recherche les
carses profon'les de cette Emotion, de cette « gran-
de peur > de juin 1936. on se rend compte que ce
qul effrayait le plus peut-6tre les repr6sentants
intelligents et pr6voyants de la bourgeoLsie. c'^tait
la modöration mßme de ce mouvement, c'^tait le
respect mĂźme de l'ordre physique, de Vordre ma-
\
{
I
— 199 — '
t6riel ft l'int^rieur des usines. Je vous l'ai dit :
les ouvriers 6taient install6s autour des machines.
tranquilles, disciplin^s, montant la garde, entrete-
nant le mat6riel, d6signant les corv6es pour cet
entretlen. Ils 6talent lä comme des gardiens. c'est-
ä-dlre comme des surveillants. et aussi, dans in
certain sens, comme des copropri6taires. Le sens
de leur attitude, et on le sentait bien quand on
r6fl6chissalt du cöt6 patronal, c'est que, dans leur
conviction, quelque chose de leur travail s'^tait
incorpor6 ä cos machines qu'ils avaient si loug-
temps mani^es. Appelez cela comme vous voudrez :
droit de regard, droit de protection, droit de co-
propri6t6 du travail industriel sur l'appareil pro-
Quctif du pays, conscience de ce qu'il y a d'indls-
soluble dans le regime moderne de la productlon,
entre l'instrument mat6riel et le travail de l'homme, ,
cn fentait tout cela, mais les ouvriers le sentaient"
aussi. Et cette ld€e, il ne faut pas vous imaginer
qu'elle 6tait toxique, qu'elle faisait parcourir dans
les veines de la classe ouvrifere ce poison mortel
dont les effets se feraient encore sentir aprös tant
. d'ann6es. Si vous envisagez des sentiments de ce
genre avec gravit6 et sans Prävention, vous vous
rendez compte, au contraire, qu'ils ne peuvent que
coop^rer ä un sentlment d'unit^ entre les difI6rentes
classes qui composent la. natlon. Et, du point de
vue special qui vous oceupe, constater une commu-
naut6 de droits et de devoirs vls-ä-vis du patrimoine
national, est-ce que cela ne conduit pas ä en assurer
et ä en pr^parer la d6fense commune, la defense
unanime ? La prise de conscience de ces idöes
nouvelles, croyez-vous qu'elle n'a pas 6t6 pour quel-
que chose. bien loin de conduire le pays & son
d^sarmement moral et ä son abandon, dans cet 61an
unanime qui l'a, au contraire entraln6 pour sa
defense, au moins tant que des forces purement
int6rieures ont jou6 en France ?
Karl Marx a dit que le prol6taire n'a pas de
ij'
-^ämaiii
mm
N
ll
I«
i
_ 200 —
patrte et en cela 11 6talt d'accord avec toutes les
16gislations anclennes, car en Gröce oü ä Rome,
le proietaire n'etait pas soldat, pour la raison qu'il
n'avalt pas de biens ä defendre. Mals Jauräs a dlt
que sl le proietaire n'avait pas de patrle, le progr6s
r^publlcaln, peu ä peu, lui en fal&alt une et c'est ä
mesure qu'on cr6e peu ä peu pour les ouvrlers une
coproprl6te de la patrle, qu'on leur enseigne ä
defendre cette patrle.
Cet espece d'accord unanlme qu'on a trouv6 en
France au moment de la mobillsatlon 6talt un peu
la cons6quence de tout cela ; et par cons6quent
6tait un peu notre oeuvre. Rappelez-vous les Incl-
dents qui ont preced6 la guerre de 1914, cette guerre
que la R6publlque, ce regime r6publicaln tant honni,
tant d6cri6, a pourtant gagn6e. Rappelez-vous le
syndicalisme revolutlonnalre ; rappelez-vous l'her-
• v6isme ; rappelez-vous les mutineries de 1913 ;
rappelez-vous Tavant-vellle de la mobillsatlon,
l'assassinat de Jaurfes; rappelez-vous quelle angoisse
ori pouvait 6prouver alors sur ce que seralt l'attitude
de la masse des ouvriers vis-ä-vis d'un ordre de la
mobilisation. Vous n'avez rien vu de pareil. tant
que ce sont des influences purement nationales qul
ont 1ou6. vous n'avez trouv6 aucune exception de
cette unanimifc6. Cela est constat6 par de nombreuses
pl6ces au dossier et je crols que cela a 6t6 constat*
dans un de ses memoires Dar le genöral Oamelin
lui-mfeme.
Dans cette espfece de r^solution sllencleuse et
grave qui a amene nos Als. le mien comme les au-
tres. vers leur rfegiment. je crois que quelque chose
venait de nous et que quelque chose tenalt ainsi ä
notre oeuvre...
Messieurs, J'al achev6. Vous pourrez naturelle-
ment nous condamner. Je crois que. mfeme par votre
arrfet, vous ne pourrez pas eflacer notre oeuvre. Je
crols que vous ne pourrez pas — le mot vous paral-
tra peut-ßtre orguellleux — nous chasser de
— 201 —
l'hlstoire de ce pays. Nous n'y mettons pas de
präsomptlon, mais nous y apportons une certaine
flerte : nous avons dans un temps bien perilleux,
personnlfl6 et vivine la tradition authentique de
notre pays, qui est la tradition democratique et
r^publlcalne. De cette tradition, ä tra vers l'hlstoire,
nous aurons malgre tout 6t6 un moment. Nous ne
sommes pas je ne sais quelle excroissance mons-
trueuse dans l'hlstoire de ce pays. parce que nous
avons 6t6 un gouvernement populaire ; nous som-
mes dans La tradition de ce pays depuis la Revolu-
tion franQaise. Nous n'avons pas Interrompu la
chalne, nous ne l'avons pas brisee, nous l'avons
renou6e et nous l'avons resserree.
Naturellement, 11 est facile quand on dispose de
tous les moyer qui agissent sur l'opinion de d6fi-
gurer notre oeuvre, comme on peut d6flgurer notre
personne, notre vlsage. Mais la realitö est lä et
eile se fera jour. La dur6e de l'effort humain ne
commande pas le rendement d'un appareil Indus-
trlel, le loisir n'est pas la paresse ; la liberte et la
justice n'ont pas fait de la patrie une proie desar-
m^e ; avec les ilotes on ne fait pas plus des ouvriers
que des soldats. Qu'il s'agisse de manier Toutil ou
de manier l'arme, ce sont la Uberte et la justice
qui engendrent les grandes vertus viriles, la
conflance, l'enthousiasme et le courage. Quand on
nous dit : c Vous avez eu tort, 11 fallait agir autre-
ment i on nous dit n6cessairement, forc6ment, « 11
fallait trahir et briser la volonte exprimöe par le
peuple >. Nous ne l'avons ni trahie, nl briste par la
force, nous y avons ete fldöles.
Et Messieurs, par une Ironie blen cruelle, c'est
cette fldeilt^ qui est devenue une trahison. Pourtant
cette fld61it6 n'est pas 6puis6e, eile dure encore et
la France en recueillera le bienfait dans l'avenir oĂĽ
nous placons notre esp6rance et que ce procös
möme, ce procäs dirig^ contre la Republique.
contribuera ä pr^parer.
ifi » '■ii)w—i m iJii'W'
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Imprimerie speciale du Populaire
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21 octobre 1968
\
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2.^ instance dans le cas Ro.chlino
dernieres än,a"„":sTEn^u".rd:r;:ii"^°"^*"*""^ P«n<^-t c.s
•t pillageaient mon bur.au^d.tJJi.ait k ^•"•trai.nt mon apartement
y inclue ma correspondanc.'aJJc I^j;;! ''""""P ^« °»^ dossiers?
, Si je me souvianfi Ki*« *
jugement du proc.s contr. 1. üaCl.ft.rr *''''°^'' *^« Photo-copies d'un
«sait fn C Jrf.r "f^^'^iation d, LlfaiL;^'' P"^«"tion charg.ait
"ntre la conctption de "conspirac/*. P^ofesseur Donnedieu
•t Lafarge7l?65)*"c'«rün^fr. ^' Bibliographie Mondiale des MM r. . .
pouh/ laquelie t^rff ^^'^-F^ben, Krupp.wilhelmsJri«. "."^ Washington,
Franchem2nt n^y'a"J!fP°"«ibl« con»e i. reJi^.Jta^f'Z*?''"^' «tcetc.')
(«t autres Ltt) J, ^^ "" """««> d'erreur tvoon„^K, "^ ^"^«^ aoiericains.
les Plus si'nclZr''' '''"'•'^' =^« '^-i.ur .t Collegue. ,«,s salutations
Ln?/'^^*"*"^ G.I..vasseur
faculte de Droit et doe c-<
Universite de Parf! Sciences Economiques
Paris \
John Fried
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' Deiwcl^nie Ann^e \ No 64
fOITlON SPfc'IAM' TR ANCO-POIONAIS
V
->
^^. .
1 ^. «
JOURNAL OFFICIEL
Ăś\J CO/^MANDESAENl FN CHEr FRANC^AIS EN ALLEMa\GNE
GOUVERNEMENT MILITAIRE DE LA ZONE FRANgAISE D Ă–CCUPATION
Arntshlott dos französisdwn Ol-^crkcmvuaruios in Dciilschinnd
Ordonnance*. ArT^t<is Pt R^qlements, l>^ris«on«» r«^ql<»ment»iro^
D^cisions. Circulaire», Avis, Commnnicatlons, Information*.
Annonres l«^qale*
\ piordnungrn VPihjgunqpn. «r.srh/j;.<;sfi, Austiihrijnq^hi^stimmuncrn
AnnroDimoen. Rundet Insse Benorhnchtiij.jnor . ^liSip.'i.naef.
Ar^ii VfTöiiennifhiinqcn. Oticnli /usle iun<:,
L e t o X t e f r a n c cJ i s s p n 1 f a i t f o i, \ a t r a vi n r n .m^ n a v ^ »"> l q u ii n r a i a r t o r c ii . n i v^ 3 ... a t . v> .i
Allein der französisrlie Text isl amiluh .Ik^ ci(^;its» hr r'ibrrsrlvarg gilt nu? als lnfl^lm/^:K^ri
I
Direction. R«^i1arfion. Admini<;tTa ion
Iritunq, Rod.^k!,.%n \>iwn;?T-,no
loiiTn.'^l Ofrioiol 7 Rädr ctirt^r» R.M'on-R.idon.
Ahonrement : 2S n»*m< o«.. 10 M=4iks
AnnoiKos lecjalps : 70 ptp 1^: hau«»
Ahonnemenl 25 Bl.'^ttf»; U' M
Ă–t!rrl}i,-bp ?i>s!rlhir}a d>p ?piic 7C- Pfa
Tour toufe r^rlamafion ioindre la derniere bände repue
r •l:.i^ â–
Jeder Reklamation ist das letzte Streiiband beizutiraer
TRIBUNAL GmUl DE GOUVri^NFMEKT MSL1TĂ„IR(
DE LA ZONE FRANCAfSE n'OtCURATfON A RASTAfT
l^roccs di^s Camps de Conccntratit^n Nazis
lie
NATZWEILER
CAMPS PI SaU7MBrR(, S( Ht^K7r\v;r\
SPAU MIXGEN . rR7T\GE\ DAT TMl )?<,rN
NaiM > /.s;\ ]r\t>iir.al Ho.sKovw Tr^iuni^^kic
s*^trv*f\ C^kiip.K \ rncj Nicniirc h Rastatt
Pi i>v CS hitlcrv v\>Kiih i^!>o70>^ koiucntracyjnydi
Ntit/Hcilcr
obrv';> ^4 Sih^in^ork: S^^J^t T'inct^n Spa;«'hinjjen,
Et j.irijcou, OariJ merkten.
Jl^GIMIM
Te f lihvinal Cien^'al de Gonvprn.-»rnen't Militai^e do M /«'mip Frnn-
«lamrp dr M^rsioiu \rssrT lo^n, Pr^s'dr->nt dp Chamhrp h ]a (^niir
O \pnr>l rjr» f .\ R f S
« TPT.nu le loi Fevrici 1*^J7, Ic Tticonnenl ci aprös.
Au ""»T" d<- <".-»m .-andprripnt rn T hef F, ancci's pp AliomftCfnp,
Vn ifi N->i Nn !0 on rintr di ?n Oe.-embro 194.'5 dn Consfi! d<^
{'•^ntr'^'r fntPra'hf' dp [-irRI.lN, rp'ali>-p au chAtimonl d.-'v ppiv.jpnos
ccnpabiPs dp (li^nos de «lu^'rrc;, ae rrimrs contrp la Paiv ol roilrp
r!^tm?<nitp. pul.lipr !o 11 Jarvipr i'>4«^ au Journal Oltinel du ("f>rn-
r'flr!<iorrpnt rn ^bpf Ficjn.'ai' or Mlpntncfnf»,
vti r(^rdonn^ncr No 3ö on »jate du ?5 Fevrici 194i'>. du Com-
mandompnt cn Chpf Frar(,7iis (»n Allomaqne, relalivc a 1a roprpss'.->r
• Ip- rrinrip«; dr> rnorro, vonIrr )« Paiv pi rHiirrianlt^, poMu^e )f'
8 M^rs i''>4f, .SU Jouinal C»fficio^ du C''•m^landeI^.^•n^ pu Che! Fiapv'dv
en Ademagno,
? t\ni^ ri. : I 1 ? :047 I.
<^pirv;.|^; sif. 5,;. (♦pk!Pi!.: Mir»,u-«v.. I rxc.d\ Konin^Ii w Bcdn
^v . ir> 7 dn. 20 cuiidnia 1'"'4.S i o -.tlsycHnin osnh w inn\ch 7hi.>r! .
''A oTPnp\'f:h, vbiodni w.)b:^v t\'K.'iii \ vohp»" Lud7k.v.'i ool>~"""oiiv :â–
dn M sl^'r?rirt l<^4!>r. v Oyirr.i^ku l'- ^ Vprrr^lnpT. n>^w>,!-'^
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opipvf.j;,,- ^i(^ „3 za ; rafi'- rt; u \ /»{> , dn 2.'> liiloc)o h»'ib:. N<t 7* ,
nooo i,\;r*'odv!\va T'iai'riiskiooo v\ \'.iitc7PCh o rwn'f.ran ii rlv^h'
vnjpnn\Th, rhr.^dni nv/pr'v Pokoi.iwi i 1 ud"ko«ri, ocfl ^'^ro^•\'m .In
iOrirre ;<"MnT V r.ripnnilvii IMnv. Vrir'/nliuuio ''>.»v'.»d7! wa rj-apti.sk'Pcir
V Vionn. /prh,
vwavK >. *;7\ yf V tnvsl 1y^^ pi/rnisov< Trvbimnlv X'^ iadry Oktt-
r»f«, \ irr Sirrly FrnTtrusk'n »,a v1a*;t-iwr d.^ sf^drpn'a vs7\tku>) v.'».'»h
nir hodrt. vrh obvvatplnmi frarii-nsk iini vinrv»! vV.rodiv wojpnnych
luh ib'odni pizoiivko Lud7.ls.uS''i
/
654=^
ionrnal Officicl du Comman<i( mrnt rn C\\cf Franc«ls . — ^^.^r.z^r-:n=irr:
Atti-ndu qu'aux termes de res fextes, U's Tribunaiix de CJouvetne
ment Militaire de Id Zone Fr.incaise d'Occupation sont competents
pour luger toutes personnes aiilres quo les ressortissants FroiKais
qui se sont rendus coupables de < rimcs dj Cjucn;e ou de ciimes
contre rHumanite, |
Attendu que, dans le courunt de l'annee 1944, des camps de cu.i-
ccntration dependant du comp de NATZWElLltR-STRUTHOr et
connus sous la denomination dt ' Sous-camps de NATZWEILLCR
furent creos sur l'orure direct d'HIMMLER pour executer un plan
de production appele „PLAN GAILEMBERG" dans la Zone acUiellc
d'Occupation Fiancaise. en vut d'exploiter, d'une facon intensive et
dans dos conditions paiticuliercment penibles et malsaines, les (jise-
ments de schistes petrulifere!^ de la region et d'effcctuer, dans los
memes conditions, des travaux importants d'ordre militaire.
Quo les arrestations massives eflecluees dans divers pays occupeb
par l'Allemagne et notamment en Belgique, en France, en Luxein-
bourg et en Pologne, permirent aux AUemands d'utiliser ä rextremc
les individus ainsi deportes, dans des conditions telles qu'elles-
tendaient d'une part a augmenter. par cette main d'oeuvre forcee
le potentiel de guerre de rAllemagne et, d'autre part, ä eliminer et
meme ä exterminer systemaliquenient 'es Clements qui ne pouva^en^
pas s'assimiler
Attendu qae des miliiers de ces deporles, en provenance de
divers camps de roncentration et notamment de NATZWEILER. de
DACHAU, de DANTZIG-STRUTHOF et d'AUSCHWITZ lurent inter-
nes particuliercment dans les camps de SCHĂ–MBERG, d ERZINGEN,
de SCHĂśRZINGEN, de DAUTMERGEN et de SPAICHINGEN.
Attendu que 47 parmi ies antiens rhefs de ces cinq dernieis
camps. chefs de blocs, gardiens SS et „kapos" jusquici retrouves
comparaissont devant le TribunrJ. General pour y etre jug^s.
Que 3 anciens Olflciers SS du camp de NATZW EILLER-STRL'7-
IIOF dont dependaicnt cos cinq „Sous-camps", comparaissent egale-
ment devant le Tj.bunal General pour y repondre de leurs crimes
mais uniquement en tant que dirigeants ou contioieurs des „sous-
camps' de SCHĂ–MBERG, d'ERZINGEN, de SCHORZINGEN, de
DAUTMCRGEN et uu SPAICHINGEN,
Attendu que si ces cinq ,,s«.'..s-camps " dependaicnt du tamp uo
NATZVVEILER-STRLTIIOF. d oĂĽ les Oflicurs SS donnaient les con-
signes et venaient effectuer des inspections, — les chefs de camp,
duisi que les chefs de blocs, les qardiens SS et les .kapos" avaient
une initiative et une autorite certaincs pour fixer le regime special
du camp et les methodes de trävail : que Ion peut difc qu'en faii
ils Y regnaient en maitres.
Attendu qu'il resulte de nombreusts depositions concordantes et
accablantes emanant de temoins de toutes nationalites et mtme
oĂĽcmands
Qu un travaii loice. cxienu<.nl et epuisant. etait impose par les
nires brutalites. delibcrement (.oiimises. avec un rafhriement d'nor-
:' ur et de cruaiiW , souvent ä }.eine imaginables,
*.)ue la nournture, Ic legemrnt et Ihabillement etaienl nettement
insiithsants
I
Attendu que ee regime, contraire aux principes les plus ^le
mentdires d'huni.uiite, eiilrainait necessairement l'affaiblissemeiit
f»iiysique, i'agonie inoiftle tt conduisdit a la mort lente et ä l'exter-
mination systematH^iie dun tres grand nombre d'internes.
Ailendu que Ion dwif cen^iater. au vu des temoignages recueillis
eutn raison de lt<irs conditions d'existence, les internes vivaient
''.uv.s res Ccunps ; Minme «lans ur. veritable enfer.
Attendu qu'en dehors des brutalites, des cruautes sans nombre,
du manque complct d hygiene, les deportes se trouvaient dans un
etat de dotresse et meme de torture morale permanent, vivant sans
ces^e de jour comme de nuit. sous la lerreur de leurs gardiens i
que cet etat de choses ne pouvalt encorc qu'augmenter leur raisere,
■/\\az\wszy. /c na bt/posredn» rozVa? Himmlera w ;<>44r n«
teienie (»be( nej strefy f-kupacyine] »rancuskiei yostuly ralozonc
<>bozy kon« cntracyjne podlegajare obozowi \'ot;weik r-Struthdf ;]
noszace nazv^e ,,podob< /ow Natzweiler" i z» obe/y !e byiy utworzenc'
w (elu /-lealizowaniu planu pr/en»\slovve<jo. /waut »a ..planen»
r.eilenbeiga' . zmie r/ajacego do inUusy v> uej «Ksplouiac li w waTunkacl
\\>jatk()U'o fiezkich 1 niezdiowych, znajdu iacy( h >>;(• vv '••j ».kcilifv
/loz naflowych i w tychze samych wa*r«irik«icb f. zrorov^ adzenj«.
baidzo Wciznych prac o charukteize wojskowym;
ze masowe aresztowania doknnx wciru w loyuMl »•:<i|o«l'; iK»
pt^wanych przez Niemcy, a nuanowic. w P» leii. *"'«»*( |i, l .V'^(m
burgu, i w Polsce, pozwolily Niemcom na wy Kor/ystai; t do ri-Uiiecz-
!;osci ludzi w ten sposob depc>rtowanych w vvai'Jhkath /mieii ai«!- '^ \.J
z jednej strony do powiekszenia pizez te niewdnicyu -i e nti^afZa
H'oicnnego potencjalu Niemiec, z drugiej zas strony ĂĽo wyelimu.e- a
nia a nawet syslemalycznego wytepienie elomeniow K'ere m« df;ly
sie zasymilowac;
zwd/y\\b,zy, ze lysiace tych uepulto.^ unyc)! pizybyjy«.' z jozn^v;.
ubozow koncentracyjnych, a mianowicie z NatzweiU r v Daf hou. >
Stuttjjofu i z Oswiecimia, zustalo inlernowany ch |.i>ewa/r.t v.
obozach Schoniberg. Lrzingen, Sciiörzingen, DaiMnifcr«.« t. ; Spu*
tb. Ingen,,
zwazywszy. ze 47 z posrod bylych komendaniow ustatnio
wymienionx eh obozow: blokowwh, ^traznikovv^ S^ i ..capo"'
uotychczas ujelych staje przed T^y^Jnalem Wojskowyn., ic trzcj
byli oficcrowio SS nbozu Natzweiler-Struthof. ktoierini podiegale
tych 5 podobozow >taja rowniez przed Tryl)'.!na]em V\ojskĂĽvvyi/i.
aby odpowladac tylko za te zbrodnie ktore popeinih jako kierownicy
i konti(derz\ .3 -Ci>i ,,po(iobozow ' Scbönibtic; Eizinyer. Sehorvinger
l.^aulmergen i Spaichingen-,
zwazyvvs/v, ze jakkolvwiek te 5 ,,p(>(U)b«»zow ' zajeja'e od oboz-.)
\<j!/\veiler-Stuthol vkud ohcerovie SS p:z\ieicizah na .n^pl.k^je i
dowali zlecenia, to j( (inak kierowniey ,,pouobc)Zow jaV blokovvj
oraz straznicy SS i ,,rapo' mieli Avlasna iruf jatywe i wpiyw na
ubtalenie porzadku vv (»bozacli oraz ustalenie metod prccv tak ze
inozna przyjac. iz b\lj tarn t<.kt\c/nvnn wladcanu;
zwazyv\ sz^ , ze 7 iicznyci. ze/uaii vocdnu obciazajacycn 7'u~'ion\(..,
ptzez swiadkow w^zystkirh nareöovsci. j;a\ve* i narot.ovi-f.£.ci nie-
mieckiej, wynika, iz piata przynuisowa wvizerpujacä by la narzucana
I'izy po)nocv jaskrawej brutahiosci. stoscuanej z wyial r.'-wanym
ijkrucienstwtm. trudnyui ilo w yi'brazenia, /e odi-wienit, warunk-
:nieszkaniowe i ubranie bvly zder\ lirv/anie uiew ystar'^^aui» e;
zwazywszy, ze waruuki te ^prztczne z ncjekn.enturni' .»zn mi
/tisadami ludzkosci. sila rzctzy spowod. wuh wy cienezerie hzyezne
1 Ouchowe i doprowadzaty do nouolnej sn.u ;ci > rio »-vs'em.itN cznf i
eksterminac ji wielkiej liczby depoi tovianvcli;
zwazywszy, ze jak wyn'ka z zeznan swnu'.kow naU.-y libsuiit >2
•.^ebec tych waiunkow egzystrn« ji u^t^^no^^uMi 7\ li n v% \ inuj.iony < 1)
ebozdch jak w piekle;
zwa/ywszy, ze poza brutair.o>cia. nit daicu -. rn Mt zĂĽuerzyc
okrucienstwem. zupelnyin braki'.m 'igienv u« poitowani znajdowah
bie w slanie depresji i iidieki moialnei. zyjac btzu»Uini>ie luk w
dzien jak i w nocy pod lerort m swoieli nadzc-cow, zt 'aki stan
rzeezy mogl jedynie powiekszyc ul» ned/e;
zwazywszy, ze straznicy dopus/czah su kiadz.«7\ .xwnosci
p»zc2naezonej d)a iiifernowauych. /mnu i>zaj.i. \^ .m\ sposot znacznic
I
I
Journal OfÖciol du Commandemoiit vu Chef Francais =:—-==
655 =
aux internes
notdblonKMU
au travdil
j Altendu que des detournenients de vivres deslii\es
ietaient comuiis par K»urs gardiens, — diininuant ainsi
lies rations alimentaires deja insuftisantes pai rappor
>extenuani qui leur etait impose,
i Attendu que dans lous cos rainps, le LOGEMCN l necj^^ssaiio pour
fies internes navait pas ele pr»?vu ni orcjanis!« par la suite, de sorte
Jqu'ils etaienl parqu.'s, dans des conditions inlmmaines, dans des
baraquements surpeuples oĂĽ ils devaient vivre dans la vermine et
couverts de poux, sins aucune Hygiene, le plus souvent sans eau et
dans limpossibilite de changet de linge.
Que. pour toul vötenieut, los internes n'avaienl. la plupart du
lemps, qu'une chemise. une vestö et un pantalon rayes en fibrane,
et, tres exceptionnell-^ment, \m manteau en hiver ; que certains de
ces maiheureux, poui se preser.er du froid et des intemperies,
portdient, en guise de sous-vetements et au risque des plus cruelles
sanctions. des sacs a ciment en papier ramasses en fraude sur les
Chantiers ; quils etaient tres mal chausses et portdient le plus
souvent aux pieds des loques ou du papier ; que souvent ils devaient
marcher pieds-nus. meme dans la neige,
Que tous etaient astreints, — sous une discipline de 1er, sans
§gard ä leur aptitude et leurs possibililes, — ä un TRAVAIL tres
dur et dauiant plus penible qu il etait exige dhommes malades,
atlaiblis et nettement sous-aiimentes.
Quils etaient notamment employes a rexploitation des gisements
de scbistes et a la construction dusines,
Quils etaient en butte, non seulemenl dans le camp, mais encore
sur le lieu du travaii et en cours de route, aux MAUVAIS TRAITE-
MENTS. aux sevices injustes oi a U brutalite des gardiens et des
„kapos" souvent condamnis de droit commun ; que tous ceux-ci,
non seulement appiiquaient avec une extreme rigueur les consignes
recue*, mais encore prenaient l'initiative de frapper ä coups de pied,
de poinq, de matraque pour les motits les plus futiles ou meme sans
aucun motif, .
Que cenams gardien* dune cruauie feroce matraquaient jusqu'ä
evanuuissement et pietinaient a mort leurs malheureuses victimes ;
que des temoins ort meme revele quo, dans certains camps, notam-
ment d DAUTMERGEN, i un des plus durs d'Allemagne, des internes,
arnvos au dernier degre depuisement, n'avaient la ressource que de
se cacher au miheu des morts pour tenter de se soustraiic ä un
tiavail quils savaient devou leur etre fatal,
Que. si un baraquement etait reserve en principe, a IINTIR-
MERIE du camp, il ny existait. en pratique, aucun mödicament ;
quil a / etait doane que des soins insuitisants meine aux malades
los plus gravemen» alteints ; que les medecins designes paimi les
Inier-.vjs etaient solvent frappes ; quils ne pouvaient excercer leur
art qu^ sou.^ Id dependance dos gardiens et des kapos qui limitaicut
ie noiubie des maiades hospitalises ou exemptes de ttavail, tenant
compte rv)U dei imperieuses consideratious medicales, mais bien de
leur voior.te dutil.set au maxlinum la main d'oeuvre.
Que, aotaiunient au camp de SP.MCHINCiEN, une inhimiore alle-
in ^iidc? avait in^euiicäon tormelle de soigner d'autres cas que les
acciden'.ä de travaii. et qu'elle fut meme menacee parce qu'elle
GTAIT TROP Hl'M AIN'E a .l'eqard d'inlernes de camps de cour
entraaoi»
Q .j des cadavfes aus restaient plusieurs jours exposes derriere
les baraquements; qu'ii, etaient ensuite entasses dans des caisses
:'i piötmes. ou tires ä monie le sol jusqu'au charnier ; et qi;e los
ĂĽ-n's en ot e'aient systematiquemont arrachees et recupereos,
Que meme en tenant comptc ĂĽe la Situation generale en Alle-
maqiio, la nourriture, dans tous les camps, etait toujours tres mau-
vdiso et nettement InsufMsante < qu'elle se composait habituellemont
et piesquuniquement dun litre d eau dans lequel on avait fait cuire
des chĂĽux, des ruiabagas, des pissenlits ou meme des orlies ramas-
sees dans les champs apres le travaii,
ara
lat jO zy wnosciowe, ktore i tak nie byly wspolmiorne z wyczoipiij
praca. jakiej od nich wymagano;
'/.wazyws/y, ze w zadnym z tych obozow nie pi/yfiotowano 7 gory
ani potym lue uizadzono niezbednych pomieszczen dla intoinowdtiyc h,
tak /e zostali oni skupieni w warunkach niolud/kich w bar ikdcli
przoludnionych, gdzie zyli wsrod lobactwa, pi>kryci wszumi. p')Z-
bawioni wszelkiej higieny, najc/.escie) b»;z wody i boz inozlivvcjsci
zniiany bielizny, ze za cale ubranie internowani nuoii ucMczosi ioj
tylko jedna koszule, jedna marviiarke, ledna par-- spudni v pusv
z ftbrany i tylko w wyjatkowycb wypadkacb -}jdlt<) na zum* /.o
niektorzy z tych nieszczesliwycli, aby sio uchr<»ni< przod zininem
nosili pod ubraniem, narazajac sio przez to na okrutno kary.
papierowe worki znalezione na miojscu pracy /o 'oyli baiii/.<; /le
obuci i ze przewaznie nosili na nogath sziudiy l'.b pd;)iv'i, ze r/i st<»
musieli chodzic boso, nawet po sniegu;
ze wszyscy byli zmuszeni pod zelazna dys^ypliiia, be? wz'jlclu
na ich zdolnosci i mozliwosci do prary bardzo nozkioj, tyit: cio/szo).
ze narzuconej ludziom chorym, oslabionym 1 ^docydowanio moflo/v-
wionym, ze byli mianowicie uzyci do ek -ipJoatacji kopaln i t)iul()wy
fabryk,
ze byli mallretowani nietylko w obozio, ak- takzo pr/y pracy i
na drodze do pracy, musieli znosic niezasluzone bii ie i brutalnosc
dozorcovv' i ,.capo" przewaznie przesteprow kiyminalnych, zo wv-
mienieni nietylko dokladnie wykonywali otrzymane poleronia, alo
takzo z wldsnej incjatywy kopali, biU piescia, palka gumovva z
najbarJzioj blahego powodu i nawet be;! powodu,
ze niektorzv straznicy o dzikies brutaluosci bili palka a? do
omdlenia i kopali swoje ofiary powodujac ich smierc, zo swiadkowie
stwierdzili, iz w niektorych obozach, jak Dautmorgen, ktory byl
jednym z Udjciozszych obozow w Niemczech, inti-rnowani dochodzili
do takiogo stopnia wyczorpania, ze jhowali sin pud trupv, usilujac
uniknac pojscia do pracy, ktora w ym siaiuo wyczerpania byia dla
nich zabojczd,
ze jakkolwiok w zasadzie jeden barak byl przeznaczony ua izbe
chorych obozu. to w praktyce nie bylo zadnych lekarsLW.zoudzielano
tarn pomocy niedostatecznej nawet najciozoi chorym, ze lekarze
wyzuaczeni sposrod internowanych byli c/est<» biti, zo mogli oni
wykonywac swoj zawod jedynio w zaleznosci od straznikow 1
„capo", ktorzy ogianiczali liczbe chorych lub zwolnionych przez
lekarzd od pracy niebiorac pod uwaqo sian;. zdrowi« inlomoA^anvch.
loc7 chec jak naiwiokszogo wykorzvs; tria >ak roi)«Kzych,
zo np. w obozio Spaichingen piolegniaika memiecka miaia prawo
leczyc ledyaie skaleczonia doznano pr/v pracv i ^'o giozono jej, ydyz
odnosila sie po lud/ku do intornov/anvch ohozu koncoutra. yjnego.
zo nagie trupy lozaly pr/ez kilka dm za .cianann barakow. zo je
00' -.n pakowano do skrzyn i ubiian . nogaini. albo to.^ nawet
wjoczono po ziomi az do cmentarzyska \ ze zloto zobv byh sv:,!e-
matycznio wvivwane i zabiorano,
70 nawot wziawszy pod uWacio svtuacio ogolna w Niemczech
wy/vwi.MUo wo wszvstkich obozacn bylo zawsz.' bardzo zlo i nie-
dostate- /ne. zo »kadalo si- zazwyozai z jodnogo litia wody, w
kloroj gotowano kapuste albo brukiov; lub lez ziola vs/glodnie
p >krz\ wy. zobiano na polu })o prao»,
/.. kuchaizo blokowi i st.aznicy kradli od/.on.o, zmnuMszajac w
t.-n sp.,sob bardzo znarznio d/ieun- la. p« zywm.soiowe 1 tak ]UZ
niewvstarczajaco. zo w tych waruokach snuertelnosc spowodowaua
r
656--=^
= Joiirpal Offiriel du Ci)mm<mf1oni(>nt rn Chef Francafs =^-^
Que les cuisinicrs, Ics chefs de blocs et les qaidions c()minctt<iiont
de nĂĽinhieux detournenionls de vivres, diminuant ainsi d'iino favon
notable los rations qiiolidimucs dojä tres insuifis< ntes,
Que ddJis CCS coiidiüuns, ia MORTALlTf:, dVie ä la sous-uli-
menlĂĽtion et aux biiitalites, causes de la dysenteAe et de la lul)er-
culüse, etciit frts ()iiinde ; — que si, dans certains Ciiinps, eile paiait
avoir ete tle ninindre impoilance, ce fut parte que les inleines trop
malades, tiop atlaiblis pour ctre capables de travailhr, etaient
evacues sur daulrcs camps et qu'ils etaient aussitöt remplacts par
d'autres internes devant subir le ineme sort,
Attendu que Ion doit constater, au vu des depositions de tous
les temoins entendus, que ces camps etaient redoutables -, que meme
cerlains, comme celui de DAUTMERCCN, doivent etre consideres
comme de veiitablos camps d'extermination,
Attendu que, s'il peut appaiaitre que l'existence au Ccuup de
concentration d'ERZINGCN, oĂĽ les internes en majorite^N. N. turent
moins nombreux, ail ete moins penible que dans d'autres camps, il
n'en est pas moins viai que le locjtmcnt et la nourriture y etaient
tont aiissi insi.. .isanls et que le travail y etait tout aussi penible,
I'CiS que dans ce camp, qui parait avoir presente un caractere
toui ditförent, les internes, en raison de leur nombre plus reduit,
ont pu fdiie picuve d'un esprit plus (jiand de solidaiite contre les
(jaidirns SS, gräce encore au devouement et ä l'esprit d'initiative
du medecin Francais du camp, egalement inlerne, les malades ont
pu recevoir les soins les plus indispensables,
Que neanmoins, certains gardiens y furent d'une brutalite extreme.
<>.
\^-^
,^
Attendu que SCHVVARTZ, HARTJENSTEIN et SCHMIDETSKI
compataissent en leur qualite de dirigeants des ,,sous-camps" faisant
Tobjct du present proces, et se trouvent places sous leur autorite
ot sous ieur contröle,
Qu rn dohois des Instructions quils pouvaient recevoir de
l'autorite superioure, rentraient directement dans leurs attributions,
la survrillance de la Situation materielle et de l'etat nhysique et
moral d»-s internes,
(./Ulis avaicnt nolammtMit ä s'assurer, au cours de leurs inspec-
tions de lobservation des consignes generales qu'ils avaient don-
nees ; qu'ils devaient plus particulierement veiller ä ce quo soient
dislribuecs les rations reglemenlaires et faire respecler l'interdiction
de frapper,
Que c'est en vain que ces dirigeants pretendent avoir safislait ä
leurs oblige.tions ; qu'en effet, se rendant dans les camps ä des
heures oĂĽ les internes se trouvaient dans les commandos, ils
n'etaient pas ä meme de se rendre compte de leur etat, de recevoir
leurs d(deances,
Quau surplus. ils ont omis de se faire remettre l'etat numeiique
(Ks murts qui leur aurait permis de rechercher les causes des in-
nornbrables deces,
Qu'en agissdiU ainsi, ils ont rendu possible et facilite l'exerution
dos crimrs reproches ä leurs co-accuses,
Attendu que c'est en vain que ces trois accuses soutiennent que
ks entreprises inchistricUes ainsi que l'organisation TODT, ä la
disp(;.siti(;n de qui les internes etaient mis, n'auraient pas rempli leurs
obligations, nolamment au point de-vue ravitaillemcnl ; qu'en elfet,
il l;ur incombail dunposer ä ces oiganisations la stricte Observation
(!( l'-iirs (;bligati(ms.
Atttndi! que lu plupait des autrcs accuses se bornent a opposei
de simples denöyations,
Que si certains d'entK; eux reconnaisstMil paitiellenicnt les iaits
qii leur sont repioches, ils tenlent vaineuKMil den dinunuer la fre-
quente et la gravite.
bmlalnyin traktowani(-m i niedc./ywieninn podarj.iiaf >»» ''•' «>•
buM!unk(^ i nru7lic(>, bylu bard/', du/a. z» je/.l, u j.. u„n,|, ,,|.,,/.
ux.l.iie MO ona mniejs/a. lo j.dvtue dl.itrqo, ze inl< niow.u.i /
clioi/v ) o,-.lal>ieni, aby byr /dolnMiii ,],, pj,. y \.)\i v^v.vl
do iniiycb ohczow, a miejsce ich zajmow.ili iutu inti r n-w<.u!, ktoi\
czekal ten sdm los;
zwazyw.>/y, ze na podstawie '/r-/nan v\ ^/ystki' I. j.rzoshu li.un
swiudkow, ubozy te nale/.y u/nac /d w/bifd/aj.if e yi(j/e, ze iiuv
niektojc, jdk Dautmergen, mo()a l>yc u/udne /a pr-.wd/iwv (d
ekbterminacyjny,
zwazywszy, ze moze sie wydawac. ze warunki w obo/ie k-
centracyjnym Er/ingen, gdzie internowani pizewaznie „N. N. ' i|
lityczni) nie byli tak liczni, byly znosnie.jsze niz w innvf h oh',/d.
to jednak jest laktem, ze pomieszczenie i wy/.^ v\ie;iit byly laiu t.
samo niedostateczne, a praca tak sanio r ie/La; ale ze w obozie tyi
ktory prawdopodobnie niial miec zupelnie inny (haraKtei. nielicz
internowani mogli wykazac wiecej S(-.li(iarnosci w pizezwyciezari
metod slraznikow SS, a lakze dzie.ki poswieceniu i inicjatyu
francuskiego lekarza oboztnvego, takze internowanego* chorzv mog
ofrzymac przynajmTiiej i lementarna opieke lekarska, ze jcdna
niektorzy ze straznikow odznaczali sie wielka bnitalnosc id;
zwazywszy, ze Schwarz, Hartienstein i Schmidetzki odpowiadaj
teraz z tytulu swojego sfanowiska kierownikow tych ,,podi>bozow
bedacyclt przednnotc^m obecnego piocesu. i /najdujacych sie pnd ic
wladza i kontiula,
ze niezakznit^ od instr-iKc ji, ktoie mogli •»♦rz\nuwdr <id wlad
wyzszyrh, do nich nalczal nadzor nad poluzeiiieni mute'id'nyn
stanem hzycznym i psychiLznym intemowdnycli.
ze podczas swoich inspeki ji niieli oni za obo^\ iazck upcwnir sit
przybywdjuc do obozow w (jwdzinach. w ktoiych internowani byl
zwlaszcza czuwac nad rozdzieUiniem przepisanych racji z^wanoscio
wych, sprdwdzac czy zakaz lnria jest przestrzegany,
ze nie jest uzasddniune twieidzenie w\micnionych kierownikow
obozow lakoby wywiazywali sie ze swouli obowiazkow, ze w istocit
przybywajac do obozow w fjoci/inach, w ktoivcli internowdni byl;
pizy priicy, nie mn^li moznosci zdania sobie spiawy ze stanu
internowanych, ani przy jmowania od nich za/alcn.
ze ponadto zaniechali ^prawd/nnia przedkladanecic» scbie liizbo-
W(go stanu sniiertelnosci, (o nie ze/wolilo na poszukiwarie jcj
przyczyn, ze postepujac w trn -^pesob innozĂĽwili (Uii i ulatwili
dokonanie zbrodni zarzucanydi ich wspoloskarzonym;
zwazywszy, ze ci trzej oskarzeni nieshis/nie Iwierdza, iz
przedsiehiorstwa przemyslowe i orcj.'iiizacjie Ttult, äo ktorych
(hspozycji internowani po/osldv\d!i vv olo/ii h, nie \\\(H'!nilv -swoich
zubowiazan, zwlaszcza jezi li (iiodzi e w \ . \ w ieTt:'\ giiy.'. w i/eczy-
wistos( i do nich nalezalo znuis/enie tsiii oiganiziuji dt) scislego
r»rzestrzigauia wzielych na siebit^ 7ib^>wid7an;
zwti/ywszy, ze wieks/o.->t })o/i»sldl\ <"ii oskdi/uiiyth ogranieza sie
(!'» niepizyznawania sie do winy. ze )e/eli luektoizy z iiim przxznaja
( â– -'( s( idwo zaizu(dne im C7\i\\\ lo stiiidjd sie zmni(\is/ye iih skutki
i U 11 ''• /be:
r
*
Jouipdl Olliciol (In ('"m-ii i"l( tu m1 cn Chef Pidncais
^ -=- 0^7
Mdis, allendu que le nombro et la cuiuoidĂĽncL; des lemoiyn.Kj. -=
recueilĂĽs sous Id foi du seiinrnt siillisfiil idiis a (jiuii(]>' m<.'.;iii.'
des cds, d etablir Id rödlilö des fdits ropieu liös c ui onl (niuijniu a
entrdiner non seukmonl la misöro [»hysiqiic et moidle de ii.Mubmix
internes, mais encore Id mort de plusieiirs milliere d'eniro eiix,
Attendu que cerlains dccuses se rotranchont derriere des ( oiisicjnes
recucs eil ce qui con^eine les viilences qu'ils onl exeKcos,
Mais altendu (juil est acquis dux debats que tout le |)orsonnel
des camps avait l'ordre de ne poinl exercei de violences sui les
internes,
Que certains accuses soutiennont qu'ils ont ete amenes a trapper
pour mainlenir Toidre ; que cependant, cerlains chefs de camp ont
reconnu que ces brutaliles etaient inuliles,
Qu'en oiilre, le Tribunal General constate, que les coups donnes
etaient hors de proportion avec les pretendues necessites de la
discipline,
Attendu qu'il Importe enfin de souligner que si cerlaines violences
ne poitaient pas directcment atteinte ä l'integrite physique des
internes, dies constituaient neanmoins, par leur^natuie, une atteinte
ä Id dijnite humame.
Attendu que, en ce qui concerne les responsabilites individuelles
des accuses, qu il est etabli par les depositions des nombreux temoins
entendus au cours des debats et par les derlaralions des accuses,
QUAL CAMP OE SCHĂ–MBERG :
Le Chef de block, UnterscharfĂĽhrer-SS GLEICH Ludwiq, dit
..LUCKl", de nationalite Allemande, alcoolique d'une qrande brutalile,
a frappe avec un baton ä tort et ä trdvers pendant les appels, pour
les nirjtifs les plus futiles, — qu'il a meme baftu jusqM'ä evanouisr.e-
ment notamnient im interne Francais et un interne Italien qui duront
etre transportes ä l'Inlirmerie oü ils sont morls peu de temps apies,
qu'il a frappe et fail frapper le soir, au retour du travail, des inter-
nes qui lui avdient ete signales par le „Contröleur" du camp SLlTll
qui estimait qu'ils n'avaient pas suffisamment Iravailiö, qu'il a
pousse enfin ä un travail extenuant des internes qu'ils savaient epuises.
Que le R;ipportfĂĽhrer-Hauptscharfu]\rer-SS SEITH Willy, de
nationalite allemande, ,,Contr61eur du Travail", semait la tcrreur
dans le camp ; qu'il relevait notamment sur les chantiers les numeros
des internes qui ne travaillaieut pas suffisamment ä son gre, afin
qu'ils soient, le soir, au retour au camp, frappcs de 15 d 23 coups
de bälon ; qu'il d fiapiJe lui dussi avec les poings on avec im bätt^i
des internes dont il connaissait l'elat d'aifaiblissemcnt extreme ;
que cus brutalites ont, contrairement a ses denegations, contribue ä
entrdiner la mort de nombreux internes,
Que le Chef de cuisine, OberscharfĂĽhrer-SS BUSCH Nikolaus,
i" nationalite all-?>manfle, qui exercait en meme temps, par inter-
riitlimce, les tonctions de suus-chef de camp, na jamais eu le
luoindre yeste d'humanite ; qu'il est etabli, maigie ses denegations,
(1 i'il frdppe souvent, sauvagement, sans motif, ä coups de poincj ;
que p(»ur punir des internes Russes qui avaient derob^ un peu de
noiirri^ure, il les a forces a manger des chovix crus de plusieurs
kilos, quo ce supplice a piovoque la dysenteiie, et, parlois meine,
la morf des viciimes,
Attendu qu^ BUSCH a delourne une grande quantite de vivies,
dinsi (jiie partio du contenu des colis de la Croix-Rouye,
Qu il savail qu'en diminudnt les vivres dcstines aux internes, il
alteiaidit considt i ablement leur resistance physique ef piecipitait
leur moit,
Que le Sturmmdnn-SS J E T Z L L S B L R C L R Joset et le I^otte.-i-
fuhrer-SS V O L L R 1 N G Wdller, tous deux de natiunalite aliemaude,
1. rz /'vv.i/ywszy, ze lirzbj i / pyilinj^c zlozonyli p<>ii |,,/y
/.i/.i,..n swi.idkow wy;,tdu/d w piziv^azufj c/«s( i wvpäiAow
iisl-dcnia (/,\ now Zuizik <iii\ c li, Kiore S|,.)W(Klowd!v ni^'lyiko i
h/\i-''ia 1 ua<h(jwa wielu uih i tiowaiiych, aU- la'./ • spowulci
siuuMi wielu tysifcy z posiod mch;
zwa/yws/\', ze niektorzy oskar/cid, u z"Ii ( 'i-ul/j (, dw.dt / i.
iiiteiMowaiiym, tlomac/d sie ()(tz\ iiiuiu m k./' i/m ,,|,. zwu/.v
ze ust.dono w c/asie procesu, iz cäl\ persoU'"! ol) /i; mi d 7
â– /adawania (jwaltu intiTUMWan^ m, /.<' iulI; toi/y os'. .i/,rd Iwi-;
i/ miisieli bic dia utizviudrua porzadku, /.c jcdn.ik nu-kt
kumendanci obozow przvznali, z'» brutaluosc ta in- bv;i poir/.
/e ponadto Trybunal stwieidza, 1/ lazy Zddavv.,iii> i^i,: l.y!, w
mieine z rzekonia koniecznu:5Cia uti'.ymania (i> m v ,>litiv, u •
lego, ze nalezy w koncu pcjdk'csiir, iz u ĂĽv pcv.iic i)i/.'jauy
Idlnosci nie powüd»jwaly bezposrednio uszk(jd/',Miia '. it h -neg(> ui
nuwanych, jednak powodowaly one ^ ym niciu-ii'-j '/iiia/v (jomĂĽ
ludzkiej;
zwazywszy, ze jezeli chodzi o ĂĽd;rjwied7ialno^r indywuli;,
oskar/onych, to /ostalo uslalone na niocy zeznan ĂĽcznych s\v;ad.'.
przesluchdnych podczas rozpiawy i wyjaauien uskai/nnych.
ze w ohozie Schömberq:
blok(nvv Unlerscfiarfiihrer-SS Gleich iLudvviki zw.iny ,,Lu.
narodowosci uiemieckiej ctlkoholik, o wielki'>j biuldin"sci, bil iid
podczds apelow kazdego kto mu sie nawinal pod leke, bez zadne
powodu 7" iiauct l)il az df) >>mdlenia, a mi^inow i'ie inte^nov^^lnf•
Erancuzd i \Vb)cha, kloT/., prz Miit-si'-ni na izl)e cliiiych zma
wkrotce polein, /e l)il i ka/al bic ix) li^iwrocie z pracy lych int'
nowanych, ktorv(h wskazvwal mu ..kontroler pracy" Seith, a ktor
zdaniein jegu \)\v dosr piafowaii, '/<? zmusza! do v\•^•r■z'-«rouiac
pra-'v tyi h i'itei nowanych, kiorzy bvli wyczerpani;
ze l<ap[)(jrtiuhrei . Hauptschai!uh:'^r-SS Seith iWillv). naiDdowo-
ni'Miiiecki'd, ,,k'>:il lolor [)'ac\'", t)\l postraclr.^!!! w obocie,
/.dpi-,\\vai p!zy prarv nazwiska tvv.',, kloi/\ w -'ĂĽng nivHio 1
pracowdli dos'atecznir, crleni ukaratiia i' !i po po'AMcie do oho/r.
do 23 kijami, •'.e sain l)i! ()iebcia lub ki]eni tyili :!itv.'ruo\vui.". c
ktorzv bvli \v stanie os!al'M/neqo wvczer[}ania ve i):utalnosc l^'u
mini'j jeno zaprzoczen, spMWfvJDwala «^iriorc wielii intoi now in\(
ze kierownik kuchni, Qht.i.scliai t'jhrer-SS r)ustli (Nicolau
na:odo\vosci nit miecki»^!, kiorv jediioczrsnie wxkonvwal funck
za-'tepcy komendania ohrv/u, nie \v\kazil nigdy zadnego odiucl
ludzkioqo zn uslahMio Piii^io jeuo zapr/etzen, /o I'vil czesto pu'sc
w sposĂĽb d/iki, bez pow^tlu, ze uia ukaiania ial*.i nov\ anych Rosja
ktorzv dopuscili sie kradziezy trorlu' zywnosci, zmusil ich c
zjedzenia kilku kilo surowe) kapiistv /■> !•> zneranie '^ie spowodowa'
k:\v--;wa bi-'gi.nke i n;ekird\- fak/e i Muleri. z\vj/\\vsz\, 7e Hesc
kradi zvwnosc w widkicii ilo-^wath, jak rv)\\i'.u-z tzi-.->L zawaitosc
i)ac/i>k C'ZvTwoiiego Ki/v/.a, /.â– \\iv-dzial. iz zmnieiszaidc ilosc jedzeni
przi /narzon'."i<) dla inlei nou aiu . ii, /.innic is.a /Uvu/iii»^ ich odpenos
hzyczna i pi/ys[)ieszd nh snueic;
/(i Sturmmarai-SS J(izel!>eH|-r (.loset) i Ro'!eu!iihrer-SS VVolfrin
{Walt(M) obai narodowsri uie;ui.-c kiej, slia.'.nicy obozu. wvpelnial
swi/ie lun'.cje w spo^ob i)iuialuv, .de nii' nia dostate^ znych dowodo^
na !o, ze i.izy kloie zadvuv ili <,M)v\\uioVvaly powdzn:^ nastepslwd;
!•
^658=
sentinelles du camp, ont exercö leurs fonctions ajec brutaliU'-. jnais
qu'il n'est pas sulfisamment Stabil quo les cokn^)s portes aiint
entraine des consequt'ntes qruves,
Que le Staimdnn SS. DITTMAR Karl, de nati )nalite <ill(>mande.
sentinclle au camp, a souveat frappe les inlcAies a coiips d<'
pied, nolamment lors des appe-Is ( t h coups de croUc lors de Tön a-
cuation du camp,
Mais qu'il appaiait que cette sentinclle est un «.imple d'esprit
dcHit la respt)nsaliilite est altenuöe,
Qu' enfin le contremaitre civd STĂśRZ Gregor, de nationalite
dllemande, ampute de fjucrre du bras gauche a, de toutes ses forcos,
Irappe les internes avec une matraque et avec le poinq ; qu'il les
poussait au travail mnlgre leur affaiblissement, choisissanl les tra-
vaux les plus penibles pour los rontier aux moins resistants,
Qu'il a reconnu p.irtiellement les faits. pretendant toulefois
qu'il souffrait frequemmont de sa blessure de guerre, ce qui le ren-
dait nerveux,
Mais attendu que ces cirtonstauces ne sauraient altenuer la
responsabilite qu'il a encouruc, en exercant des violences graves
alois qu'il ne pouvait ignorer qu'elles etaient de nature a entrainer
la mort ä plus ou moins longue echeanre de ceux qui en elaient les
victimes.
=^-= Journal Officiel du Comm«ndemrnt en Chef Francais
AUendĂĽ qu il resulte de nombreux terao)gnaqes recueillis au cours
deb debats :
QuAU CAMP de SCHĂ–RZINGEN :
Le Chef de couip. RottenfĂĽhrer SS O EHLER Herbert, et le
lapo TELSCHO vV Walter-GĂĽnther, condamne de droit rommtrn.
tous deux de natio-ialite allernande, se sont conduits commc de
\eritables tyrans. ni.irtyrisant les internes et semant la terreur parmi
eux ; qu'ils sont resbonsables de ia mort de ccntaines de deportes ;
qu'iis les ont continueĂĽement ^rappes et matraques jusqii'a l eva-
noüissement et jusqu ä la mor» sous les pretexfes les plus futiles et
memo sans aucun motif,
Qje notamment TELSCHOW a frappe d un coup de poing un
interne avec une teile viokncc que celui-ci en tomba evanoui ;
qu jJ a happe e: pietine un interne Rut>se qui en mourut quelques
jours plus tard.
Qae ces deux accuses ont oblige non sculemeni ies in! eines,
raais encore les malades et Irs mourants ä assister tlr^ns la neige,
et exposes ä toutes les intemperies. ä des appels qui duraient plu-
sieurs heures ; qu'ils les ont matraques et fait matraqacr. sous leui
.virveillance, de 25, parfois meine de 150 coups de balon sur les
r-iiis : qu'ils ont luil levtr e: Loucher, plusieurs fois par nuit, les
.nlt rnes ä coups de bitton, qoi'ils ont commis et fait commettre des
..^tes <ie cruaute Sans iiombrt, uf tamment sur des internes hongrois
q 1. iiv..ient tente de s'enfuir et qui avaient ete ramenes au camp, et
I'l.is paiticuliercrnent en j» ur mettant pendant plusieurs jours et
pliJsicuis nuits anx mains d ,.ux pieds, des menottes specialement
r-nstr-uifes ^t qui cntraieni uuas ies chairs ; qu'ils ont enfin delourne
<!• s vivres de la caiisine ainsi que ie contenu des colis de la Croix-
K- jg« et qu'ils se sont appr^pries des objets precieux appartenant
« »1« s internes arnv.int öu -amp, ainsi que des dents en or qu'ils
t.';sa;ent arracher opres leur mort aux internes reper^s des leur
cjrivt. uu camp et voues pour ce motif, a une mort violente dans
les «lelais les plus rtipide^
Afid.du que pour et happer h de telles horreurs et a de telles
friwijtes, (ertaius internus p:efererent t herther dans la mort la fin
uc If ur Uiartyre,
Que le gaidien UnieraCiiäitührer SS W I N TE R B A U E R Oskar,
de n<itionaIite all.m.ii.de, u et6 aignale par de nombreux temoins
comme ayant. 6le aassi ĂĽn matruqueur ayant frnppe les internes i
ccups de bottes et de läton : qu'il a interdit aij medccin du camp
/e Sturmn,ann-SS Ditm.i- (Karl! na'ofl«,u«.m ; rnernuckiei s!r,5?n
ol.o/ii, kopal <7esto intf rnowanyth pod(.2...s .ipeln », pour/a«- t \a
Uiacjj ..bo7.r. Uli ich ! olba. ale 7a. lu-uvi i». ..v^ dcpodcl.:. i.mw...
^iia/nils fcn jest nicii,.ro7winuty nrnwiov«,. Vvf.fr. wm. .Upowi
d/.uilni)st jego jcst /nniiej.-,zona;
vo majhter cywjlny Stoiz (Ciecu.n ,.,--o,i. v. ,.s. uicu.n^uy ,
walida wojenny. jednoreki. bil Intern, wany* h y t./iwt; m! | ies(
i [>alka gumowa. ze zmuszal u n do prc< v m:i;„. k t, oslai)ien.
wys/nkiwal najciezsza prace d!a nojn.nicj occo-nvi i.. ;.c > n s< \uv
przyznal sie do winy, utrz.vmujac ircmäkze. y«- . i. rp)ei;jr na v) uP
lany wprawialo go czesto w Man poii.-i.<-v^..v.,.n,„ jw.i/vws.
jednak. ze te okolicznosci. ktore r,ie /rr.nir i«>7.iiü *M.p. w;. r.^.als.oM i
biutalne czyny, o ktorych wiedzjai, ze iroqu spinoo. A.r ( vs.. i.a;
•üb powolna smierc ofiar.
zwa/ywszy, ze w obozie Schör eiligen:
komendant obozu Rottf nlührt r-SS OeMf.r ::-äi»,. jt. , („r,
Tel^chow (Waller. Günther) przesiepco i^r\miuiAn\. <^V-.'«:wä, r.ui.xic
wosci niemieckiej, zachowywali sie lak psawozivv/, iwur.. .iirczn
internowanych i szcrzac wsrod nich iei«)r. iC s. on. «.dp. »* .«fJzialr.
7,a smioic setek deportowanych. zt bili ich ciogie, a^, «ic omUicni<
I az do sniierci pod naibaidziej biohvm} pretcksJami. b Or.wet bt;
ĂĽadnego powodu,
7e Telsrhow pevinego dnia «uierzyl tak uvtßltownje pieFci<
pewneg.. inicrnowanego, 7e ten padl zemc/ionv: ze innego inter
nowanego Rosjanma tak pouil i potiötowai nocami. 2* ter. ; marl p«
kilkii dniath;
ze ob\(lwaj oskarzeni zmuszo'i v^zysikich interno\vĂĽn\ch. nie
wvlaczajac ( hurych i umierajacyct-i. by !^t«wnh de kilkuu.-dzmnych
apeluv/ na sniegu 1 pizv niepogodzie. ze bili 1 käzali bic inter-
nowanvch pod swym nadzoyem. wyniierzuiac im po 25 ö niekiedy
nawet 150 uderzen kijem, po plecacii. ze wifu-krotme uOcrzeniam:
kija w citupi nocy budzili inte rruvvanycV. ze popelmii iiit^ spo-
wodovk all popelnieuie niezl:..zonych 'losci okri:cienstw d miönowicie
na internowanycli Wegraci». ktcrzy ..siiouah uciec : ktC'-ry zosia;:
^prowadzeni do ohozu, w szczegolnosM zaklodöiac in", p^zez kilk6
ein! na rece i na nogi kajdanki sptLioinie r rzyrzadzt-ne. ktort vpii^ly
.-ie w cialo; i ze kradli /vwnosi i t-uchrii ak rownie? rawa'^tosc
paczek Czcrwonego Krz^Zu » .t ifzv v IciiZcta ;: soMf pM^-dir.iotv
wartosciowe przyb^ lych d. obozu internowuP.N t r juK uwnifz ziott
?eby, ktore kazali wvivwac zmi.ih'ir. ir.:« r'^-. '.^ an\m juz z tego
{^owudu przeznaczony m 7a;az po if..\<;,ycui do cbozu ra eviäiiowuo
smierc,
zwazNW'szy, ze niektorzx inten. o'\*-är.' Vv uuiknac takuh p<..*vvoi-
iiosci i takicli okrucienstw. v.olcli przcz t-rnit n pok>iy. k;fs svtyiĂź
c*(>rpieniom}
zwazywszv, ze straznik L'nterj.char'iii.yer-S'^ WinurVauer Oskar)
na r(HU> vvosfi niemieckiej. zost*-.l * skĂĽi/ciAy y^ze?. whIu j-viadkow,
Iz kopal iufernowanvch l bil ^tale >\ji-m. *-<• Zr.bronil «bozowtmu
lekarzoMi ud/ielac pomocy clicMin it lu.towa; in't r...wt.nych
)7uconych d.> snicgu, ze procj hr.o Vu?Ci\ 7«.i opcc jcdnKio inter-
nowanego, klory dawal jeszce :'t:ok. zycjä ze zwiocil uwaoe ..rapo"
Tflschowa ua pr/ybylego do obov.. zydts pot*-kirgo, Kteiy miul j'.ott
U7cbienie i klory w kilkji tini poinie, z."-'ai tak biuta>nit. zbi'.y. ze
zmarl. po./\ni zcbv j« go 7<'.->l«i'^ m y v» «»nt: i fKrudiii-rit,
i .
.lourn*! Officio! <in Commandcrnrnt rn Chef Francais =^=
CiQ
de sowjner les mdladi s qu il a pietint- (le«, internes, dani Id nrijjo ;
Qudu suiplus. il a ld\\ entorier im interne «ilors qu'il ctait cmoro
I vivdnt ; qu il a siqnale au Kapo Tr.LbCIlOVV un inteint Jail Polo-
; nais, des son arnvee au camp paice quil avait des denls en or et
; que quelques jours i)las lurd, ci-t interna Int tellement haUn qu'il en
mourut el que s« s dents lurent airctf Jt^ct, <-♦ volees, '
I Attcndu que l'aecuse W IN rLKBAJ'ER 0 rrconnu poitiellement
1 les fäits et notammeiit ovoir frappe a <oups de poinq e! q lelqu'fois
avec ün bäton et dv«sr vole des baques el oltjets prec ieux ainsi que
partie tiu contenu des colis i]€ 1a Cr<«i>.-Rt>aqe destin^s aux dcjjo'tns
Attendu que Ic kapo STAC Fi Loienlz, condunme de droit com-
man. de naliKnaiite aliemanäe, !a:scjnt ti;iii'tiüns de Chef de cuisin'-'
du tamp, a trappe des internes ^ c»»ups de biiton et a coups de
poing ; d procede ä des fouillo tt «i vele cts oImpIf prerieux « dt.'fi
inteiVes, et s'est livre enfin ä un tra!:c de deniees ai) prejudite iles
internes
Qu'il a rcronnu partielU-ment les fails. n.ui* oiie >e!= ä^is^einf-nts
ne revetent pas une particuliere qrrtvifc.
AUendu que le Sturmmann SS DORN AI LR .{«-hann de natio-
nalite allemdndc. a ete un chel de bloc bruicil. frappant chaque jour
les internes d coups de matraque ; qu'un joui, il o casse, ^ coups
de Crosse, les den's dun interne; qu'il e>. iqe^iil un travail epuisant
€t ineme des travaux i,upplemeritaires, saihürt qu'il devait entrainer
po'ir »es plus affaiblis une mort certaine,
Attendu que rHauptscharfĂĽhrer SS. K E R M A N N Jakob, Chef
de la compafjnie des qardes. de nationaht^ allemande a connu et
constate les brutalites exercees par ses sentinelles ; gue, cependcnt.
oiuUjr^ 1 autorite dont li jouissait, ii a t&lere ces äqissements crimi-
neis , qu'il a egaleraent detoume des vivres po-ur lui-meme, pour sa
famille et pour des civils allemands : qu'an cours de 1 evacuation. il
seit fait trainer avec sa famille et i^es baoc.ges dans une charrelte
attclee de deportes,
Attendu que les sentinelles SS PFEFFERKORN Rolf,
LINK JdcoD. DAN NECK Wolfgang, Uius trois de nationalite
elhm^inde, ont egaiement, de leur propre initiative, fiuppe avec
brutaĂĽte des internes sans motil uicusitile ; qu'en outre, lors de
l'eväcudtion du camp, alors qu iis ne pouvciient Ignorer i'arjivee pro-
chĂĽine des arraees alliees, ils n'ont modifie en aucune fa<;cn leur
att.tude, coRtinuant ä frapper et ä iriatri^quer, que toutefois, il n'est
pdb demon're que ces coups et vioiences aierit entraint I0 moit
d :ntt rnes,
Av.endu enlm, que ie thef de cridntier ue Ztplenhahn <0. T.)
P A T O L L A Josef, de nationalite allemande, a brutalis^ des intei-
r.c< cjont il cstimait le travail insuffisant -. qu'il reconnait d'ciiler.rs
..vl r 'rappe Lvec les mains et qnelquefoit avec uti bf^ton,
O: aLtendu qu il se rendäit i ompte de Vcimaigiissemcnt et de
. .li'aibiissement des internes tt c;u'il saveit les consequen. es gra-
v(rs ^â– '. me'ne mortel^es que ces coupf pc-r.vflieTit avoir.
t
Attendu qu AU CAMP de SPAICHINGEN
le kĂĽpo E U R T L L August, de r.etioiic.hte allemande, tcndtinme
<-• droit coinr.ii.n, <.' ete reconnu forTjC-llernent oar tons les lemo;ns
«;ijf lEdlgre ses denegations, *] est etabli cju'il a agi comme un sadi-
<;ar , df.r.RĂĽnt des co .ips et rriĂĽ'ruquant par piaisii ; qu'il a trappe sav.s
«.!).- in motif i'.squ'ci '.'evanouisscrrient et rneme jusqu'ä ia rriort,
'orut.ii.se les Mternes pendant qu'ils mungeaient alln de les en
fmpöcher, frapoe un interne a^ point de lui CLSser le b^as tt to:«:e
« .i ;!..v,iil iijcme les malades i i^qu'i. rcrr.p'ict evcir-ruissernent,
Que 1^ kapo ECK PnilJp, de natiOr.aJite alicmände, cor.du:ni.e (le
droit commun, s'e-et toujours cond.iil dans :e camp cornrn^- un 'ndi-
Vidu tres brutal ; (}u il c, p^ur ies rnotifs les plus fvitiles. !roppe
t-v« i;n baton des internus dor.t certöins reit« rent etttjntc 'linür-
m.Us pcrmaneri'.es,
vWazywszY. /e oskarzony Winleibauer przy/nal sie e/»s( i..w.. do
•\t!. i/\n( w a rnianowicie do biria pii seid, a rzasand ki|»,ii , do
h:a(l/i<,<-^ pii rscionkow i przedmit.tow wärtosi u.vvy i h. ),jk »..vfiez
i /( si 1 i'dwuitt'Mi paczek Czerwonego Krz.vza |)r/<-/ria( /..i.y. n dia
li t« irnu .;!iy( h,
/wavywb/\' jv ..f apo Stacii (L<nentz) pfy«M«p(o i 1 y ntinalny,
naiodou<)S(i niemieckiej, pelnif.cY funkcje kinovs ml.a I- u. hui w
«u.uzie, I.il mit riiowanych kijem lub plestid. [>rz<'sziiK iwal i-iWr-
litiwauych i kiadi irn izeczy wartosciowc- i wreszr,« z« i kr/\w(iä
diu inteinowdiiych zajmowal sie handhMn ro/nv*« ..tUk-ilow
2\ wn(;scH)wyf h ze przyznal sie czesciowo do tyeh (/vr.<\v ,.U- /e«
i( gu postepowdnie nie miaio ciezszych nastep'-tw,
zv^üzywszy, ze Strummann-SS Dornauer (j(»h<.nrif n..r'/d(i\M>^( i
nitniiecKiej byl blokovvym brulalnym, ktory bu (iugle intr r:i(..wun ych
«ii-:i ovva pä^kä i ze raz wybil jedncmti Internowanemu zrhy :,di r/t -
Hit in Koloü, ze zadal piacy wyczerpujacej. ä nawet pröc oodatko-
V ; ^ li, wi« dzac ze p-izez tc moze fcpowodfw.u smiere najb.Mdzifj
i'slabionyLh;
/wdzyvszy. ze HauptscharfĂĽhrer-SS Hermann iJai'ob). szef k<>m-
pĂĽnii stidznikow. natodowosci niemiecKiej wiedzial 1 sanr* slwic ;dzil
brutalne zachowanie sie podleglych mu wartuwnikow, ze n^.un* lego,
wi :ew auToiytetowi jakim sie cit-szyl, tolerowal te vĂĽroinicze
p\.>stepowania. ze v.rcidl rouniez zywnosc dia siel)if dla sv/ej rod/iny
i dla (ywiinej ludnosci niemieciviej, ze w ezasie ewakuacji kazal
siebie swoj«! rodziae i swe tagaze ciagnaf w wozie do kturego
zaprzaoi ir.fetne wänych;
zwdzywszy ze straznicy SS Pletierkoin iRolf), Link (Jakub) i
Dannek (Woifgur.g), -wszyscy tizej narodowcjsci niemieckiej, takze z
wiäsnej inicjatywy bili brutainie intcrnowanycn bez uzasadnionej
»♦^zv'^yi^y ze piocz lego podczas evkakuacji ob<^zu. kicdy napewno
viedzieli <> olisKim nädejsciu wojsk sp!z^'rnler?onych nie zmienili
zupelnie iwcgo postepowania. kontynuujac bicie â– . maltretovtinie, ze
â– jednak nie i< st uov iediLione. 20 te udeizenio --nownduwdiy smierc
internowänych,
zwäzywszy ze kierownik «»ddziaiu p'äiy Zeplenhöuen z »rga-
nizacji Ted! (O T.t Faudla (Joseti narodi.wofci niemieckiei bru-
tnlizowd t\rh internowanvch, ktorych :oL>ote :iwazä! za n>e-
wysterczcidCft ze jizymal z^esztf. iz bii reka. a (Zcisami 1 kijem;
otuz wzmwsz.y pod u-ivage, ze ^ĂĽa^^ai s./uie sj rawi z v yclv.idniccia
i osiobicnio Int^rnovanvch i ze v.iedzial jijk pfwazne. a r.t-wel
•«rnierteine nogu hyi nästep<tvso ;ycri udevzeni
/HrtzvHSzy, it V obozie Spaichingen:
, rapo' Puitel (Aiigiist) narooi wc^ci s^iemutrui p'i<-upw. niv-
n.,ii<.)r«y vostal s'anowczo rozptiZr.any p'20-z v^zystkich sw.^ttlKOW,
zo jest iistdlont wbrew j<.qc zaprzeczeniom. rz postepowd! .ak
^.>(-VM<., 1: riaiunvhl przyjeinno^c v i-xn; vt bil l « z /«dne()0
P' wod.i. ..z or, 1 !ndien;d, i uuwet az do sniiem ofii^r. ze b: vitalizowal
inteir.f -.vanych. by im pr^esZK« dzi^ w !e(i/eniü. ze to'' kuic^rzyl
;»f''^tr;c) :^ri*e:novs aneoo iz ir.t. z^c.n.ai i'k« /i zPi.MZdt do pracv
ntsAvel ^.liOf.»)-. uZ o< z 4 «. int oc A^ \ v z. ■».•. io,
7A.;Z'v\vt2y, ze .copo L(k iP;ilippf i.is;uĂĽovi( SCI niwmuTkiej,
jrr-steifa krvniintilny, p(sUp(\^«il "»«" o»M' k Zuwszf i'ordzo brutai-
nie, re 7 ;'c|i.. ;d/ie.; blol.v. h p<M.i-(liw lut ii.tt ;r< u ar.M ! kt'cm »ak.
:< ni( i.te*2y i uich zOoJali kuiemm ,
.=.^== . 660
Journal Offiricl du CoiiunfiiuU'mont imi Ch('f Pr-Tucdis ---=:_=. =.^=:j
Quo le gdrdien SS. OTT Pdul, do nittioiialile dlluiud
I frappunl tiequeiimKUt les inlcriies a coups du crosse,
^ mteii.e poloiiius jiK|ö p.ir lui iiuil alujnö lors d-n ap
intcMiö mourut lo loiidomain,
|ide, lies dui,
a piclinö uu
jol ; qui' cd
1
C^ae io '-â– .larniann SS. D .\ H L M A N N l-rilz, de naUondlitc alle-
nuüulo, qu! pietond n\ivoii doiiiiö que quelques gillles a exeice los
toncfions de gardion de la tacon la plus inhuniaine, et avec uno
brutdlito teile qu'il a möme unc luis brise son arme sur un iiiloiiie ;
qu il a Iruppe un It.ilioa au poiut (pio celui-ci düt ctrc transporle ä
1 In^rmeric oü il döcödait quelques hcures apres ; qu'il a tire, lors de
levacuation du canij), sur des internes epuises et qui ne pouvaient
plus suivre la colonue,
(^ue le gardien SS. L O R E N T Z Hermann, de nationalite alle-
maiule, a parfois p'^rmis aux internes de recevoir le morceau de pain
qu: leur clait otfort par des personnes compaLissantes ä Icur mise-
rable SĂĽll; mais qu il s'est toujours comporte comme un gardion
trös brutal, specialistc des coups de poing et de pied, de matraque ;
Qu ,! emp'Jchait ses victimes de panser les blessures qu'il avait occa-
sionnees ; qu'il a pieline un interne ; qu'il a retire les cuillers de
certd.ns dcportes les lorcant ä manger avec lours mains ; qu'enfin,
il a men.ice linürmiöre allemande de lusine, lui reprochant d'ETRE
lilO? IIUMAINU pour un camp d'intemes,
Que lo cuisinier civil LEI DING Heinrich, de nationalite alle-
niande, a souvent detourne des vivres au prejudice des internes,
diminuant ainsi la capaciie de resistance pny&iqae de cos derniers,
Attendu qu'au CAMP d'ERZINGEN,
M A R E K. Paul dit ,,Croquignule", de nationalite a.llemande, a
elö un contremaitre civil particuiieromerl t ruol et brutal, n ayant
jamais tenu compte des 'irmcipes les plus elemcntairos d'liumanite ;
qu'il a brutaliso avec un manche de pioche un malade qui n'avait
p IS ou la force de relever un wagonnet, et trappe jusqu'au sang
d'autres internes ä coups de poing, parfois menie avec une barre ä
m;nes, s en prenant souvent aux faiblos,
Qui] a oni.is de prendre les mesures de precaution indispensab'es
pour e\ i'.cr tout accideut mortel dans lexecution des travaux qu'il
(iiricjoait.
(iue le Chef de camp, Haupts hariiihrer SS. RIEFFLIN Karl,
de nationalite allemando, s'est comporte au camp, comme un tor-
lionnaire, semant la terreur dös qu'il apparaissait sui les ci' intieis,
surqis.iant en tous moments, frappant brutalemont ä coups de pied
et ile bäton sous les prelextes les plus futiles et exigeant toujours
un travail exccssif,
Quo le chef de eamp OberscharfĂĽhrer OLESCH Paul, de natio-
n.il ie alkruande, d'humeur inegale, impulsif, a exerce parlois des
violcnces en portanl des coups de pied et de baton,
'•lais att'Midu que cos violences ne presentairnt pas le caractere
de ouitdlilc ou de cruaule, qu'il a en outre ait preuve en maintes
ci.'constances, de certains scntimeuts d'humanite, laissant au medccin
du camp interne Frnngais, la possibilite d'exercer son art, et donnaiil
j)a!lois uno soupe supplementaire aux internes les plus alLublis,
Qu'enfin, lors de I'evacuation du camp, il a pris des mesures
P'>ĂĽr su'ive -.irder la vio des internes.
Que le n »rdien SS. GEISEL Anton dit ,,Gants ßlancs", de nalio-
rifilitö ü!leir.an<.le, repule severe, a lait son melier de senlinollo non
seulement ^mus aucun geste d'humanite, mais blon avec brutal ile,
vociferant -^ans resse, exigeant le maximum de travail, frappjn' a
coups de piod et de crosse,
Qu ii a noi.iininont poile des coups e' fait dos blessures qiavo-: a
uu interne qui n'avait plus la toico de travailler,
/A) Mia/a)jk SS Oll (Paul) ndrod()Vvo.->ei nii'imei kuj, baid/o suiuwv,
bil c/eslo koll)a inlornowdnycii, ze ski)pal uji-unow aii.(ii) Pol.jk.i,
uwii/jj.ic, 7,e ten nie sfoi dobr/o w szetoqu poir/as apcin i 7" t<ui
inlernowany znuiil ua/.ajutiz;
ze Sluiiiuuann-SS Dahlmann ([mII/) narodowosc i niemi." ki. i ktoiy
twieid/i, iz lylko kilkakrotnie udorzyl w U.arz, p< uil turnk;«»
s»ra/nika w sposob najbardzioj niolud/.ki i z laka bi il jlnost ui ze
raz navk^ot zlamal swa kolbo bijac jodnogo inter nnwancio i z«»
pobil jcvlnefio Wlocha tak mocno, iz ton musial ])yc /an'. >>i.»ii\ d-»
izby rhorych i tam zmarl w kilka godzin poznio), ze pod. / is
owakuarji obozu sirzelal do intornowanych, ktr)izy byli wyrionc/em
i nie mogli nadazyc za k(jlumna;
ze straznik SS Lorentz (Iloimann) narodowosci niomiockioj.
pozvvalal czasami inlcrnowanym wziac kavvalok cid. ')a Zii .iiarr)\v;«'iy
im przez osoby wspolczujace ich ncdznemu losowi, ale ze zaciiou v-
wal sie zawsze jako dozoica bard/o brulaliiio, siiocjalme udei/ijac
piescia, noga i palka gumowa, ze nie pozvvalal swym otiarom wpatt/ c
zadanych przez siebie ran, ze poliatowal noganji jednt (jo inler-
nowanogo, ze odbicial niektorym internowanym lyzki, /.mii-zaja' ich
do jedzenia rekami, ze wroszcie zaqrozil piekgniarce nieuiieckioj
z fabryki, zaizucajac joj, ze jest zbyl lud/ka dld internuw jn\ c ti;
ze RoltenfĂĽhrer Opitz (Clunlliei) narodowosci nienĂĽeckiej, ')ez
powodu bil niektorych intornowanych pod . blahym prelekMem
nieprzestrzegania otrzymanych rozkazow, ze jesli nie jest dowiedzjone
iz to zadane razy mialy smiertelue nastepstwa, to niemniej, jest
pewne, iz przyczyniiy sie do zniszczenia zdrowia interiu)\, anych i
poglebily ich nedzo tizyczna i duchowa;
ze kucharz cywilny Leulimi (lleniricli) narodowosci niemiockiej
czesto kradl zywnosc ze szkoda dla inlernowany ch, zmniejszajac w
ton sposob ich odi)ornosc fizyczna;
zwazyws/y, ze w obozie Erzinyoii:
Marek (Paul) zwany ..Croquignol" narodowosci niemieckiej, byl
majslrcm cywilnym i wyjalkowo okrufnym i brutalnvm, nie biorac\ ai
nigdy pod uv/ago ndjbardzioj elementai nych zasad ludzkosci, ze
pobil molyka jednogo chorego, klory nie mial sily podniesc wagonu
kolejki i ze pobil do krwi hup eli internowanvch czy !o uderzeniem
pioci, czy nawel czasem drdi|iem zelaznym, mszczdc sie szczegolnie
na slabych, ze nie przedsiewzial srodkow oslroznosci niezbcdnych
dla unikniecia wypadkow smierlelnych przy pracy. ktora kierowal;
ze komendant obo/.ii Ilaujitsc luirfĂĽlner-SS Rudtliu (Kail) naiodo-
wosci niemieckiej, zacliowywal sie w ol)ozie jak op' iwea, sK\iac
postrach jak tylko sie uka7al na miejscu pracy, bijac l)rulalnie
nogami lub kiiem pod b^ le jaknu piefokslem i domagdjac sie zawsze
nadniiornoj pracv;
ze koni-ndanl obozu Obersrliaifuhrer O'.esch (Paul) narodowosci
niomiecklei, zmienncgo us}i(.soi)itMi!a, ui.puU\wny, wymior/al nie-
kiedv iider/enia czy lo noga, c/y to palka; ale biorac pod uwage,
ze te uderzenia nie nosily eiiaiakieru I»i utalno^^ci, ani nkiucionstwa,
z.> po/ateni v wielu t)k.)licznos. iaeli dal eii d «wed uc/uc ludzkich,
po/walajac lekarzowi obo/owomu, uUe: nowanomu l-iancuzowi wv-
konywac sw^.j zawod, d-ijac rzasuM naibard/ioj o.labionym intor-
iu)wanvin d'Hlatkowa p(>;eje /upv i vMH>v/.cie. ze uoilc-a^ ewakuar-i
ubo/.u pi^edsiewzidl bunk^i, by ucliiou.i. /icie luloiiiov, au^ eh;
Journal Offiriel du Commandrmont en Chof Franrais
6()1
Que le qardien SS. KELLINCER Simon, dit „Mitraillrtlc". Ne
roumdin et enrole dans Idimee dllemande, repiite dui,
pcur, Li n'iiydnt jamdis t?u Ir nuiiadru goiite dliunidii
nctammcnt, ä coups do crosso, un jeune deporte nti
rdnjdsse un fruit, )
(^ue cet dccusc d rcconnu du roste avoir parlojs liappe pour des
motils iuliles.
, hrulal par
tö, a lidppe
lö qui avait
Attendu qu'aii CAMP de DAUTMERGEN,
Los quatre chefb de block SS. BECKER Hans, BRAUN-
WA R T H Andreas, THEIS Alt^ert et BILLOTIN Leo, tous de
nationalite allemandc, ont ele des chefs de block terribles ; qu'ils
ont vioiemment frappe les internes lors des appels interminables
dans la boue "et malcjre toufcs les intemperies ; qu'ils ont matraque
et fait matraquer chaque dimanche les internes punis au cours de la
srmaine.
Que notamment, BECKER avait sans cesse un bäten en main
d')nt il s'est servi pour trapper jusqu'ä la mort les internes qu'il
pietinait ensuite.
Que BRAU NW ART, ayant rempli les fonclions de chef de
maqasin d'habillement ne s'est pas contente de frapper ä coups de
bätou quand on lui demandait des ettets d'hiabillement, mais encore
qu'il a retire aux nouveaux arrives leurs effcts chauds et leurs
chaussures, refusant au surplus de donner aux internes des effets
d habillement, bien qu il en ait eu en quantite sĂĽffisante dans son
magasin,
Que lors de rexecution d'Avril 1945, il a acheve un interne qui
avait ete pendu et dont la corde s'etait cassee et qui avait ete amene
ä ''infirmerie,
Que THEIS et BILLOTIN ont frappe vioiemment les in-
terne avec un bälon et notamment les malades, lors des appels in-
terminables dans la boue ; qu'ils ont donne l'ordre de frapper les
internes punis de nombreux coups de baton le dimanche ; qu'ils ont
cnfiii pietine et frappe a mort un interna malade que transportait un
de SOS camarades,
Attendu que le ciiet de kommando DEUTSCH Josof, do natio-
nalite autrichionne, a frappe cruelloment jusqu'ä evanouissoment, que
notamment i' a tire sans sommation sur un Russe qui avait tente
de s'onfuir et l'a tue, ainsi qu'un autre interne qui avait ramasse
un fruit
Attendu que le kapo MARKUS Maurice, israelite, de natio-
nal.('"> polonaise, a etG chef de block des Juifs au carnj) ; qu'il a
iiappe ä coups de matraque avec une violence teile que scs nom-
brouses victimes ont du ötre transportees ä rinfirmcrie,
Attendu que cet interne soutient qu'il n'a frappe que pour main-
tenir l'ordre dans le camp,
Mais attendu que les temoicjnages recueillis demonlrcnl au con-
tr^iK? ciuil frd[)i)ait U: plus sf>uvL-nt sans motif, avec uno violence
qöneralement inutile, uniquoment pour se faire bien voir de ses chcfs,
Attendu qu'il y a lieu de souliqner qu'äge actuellement de 23 ans,
il d ete döporte et inlerne dcpuis l'äge de 15 ans,
Attendu que le k ipo S Z C Z E P .A N 1 AK Sigmund de nationalite
poionaise. dit ,,Moundok" a c'e le kapo le plus terrible, d'une cru-
<iu?ö sans paroil'o, aydnt de tres nombreux morts sur la conscience ;
q 1 il a msssacre ä coups de bälon sur place, pietine sur le cou et
Id p(»'trine d^ s internes jusqu ä la mort, sad;que des coups matra-
<<'n^Lir permanent, sc v<int int d'a\oir ete im orand criminol d.;ns son
p^iys et d(> le demeurfn sans c os-o,
Mtendu quo \v kapo DGB INS KI Boloslaw dit , Bolek", de
n-ilionalite polonaise, a ete un ka]:)o' sunguinaire ; qu'il a friippe a do
noinlnouses roprist'S, a coups do i)aton, jusqua epiiisein« nl total ei
(;u li a pioline jusqu a la mort,
Qu :' (l(.'<lar(^ a\'oir Irappc slmplomonl pour maintenir I'ordio et
av'i r pic'tiuö des ;nUin«'s, m.us contoste que ces coups auraient
entrdine Id mort ; que ses dcnegalions ne sauraiont clre lelCiUios en
piLsence du uonibre des d6po:,itions precises ot roncordantos u'n
tt;nies qui ont et'"' U's leinoins des fuils qui lui sonl rcprca 'v''S.
Atv.ii'lii our ics riord ' IS SS. I.OCES Karl, NA COR':! N
Kc.ntiardt, W L B l: 1< David, BAUER Friedrich de nationaiite alle
7.V str.t/iuk SS Geilsei (Anton), zwany „bial.i rckawir/ka"
n.itodc^vox i nicniicckiej, znany -/ suiovo-ci, p. hui svv;^ iunkcje
sha/mka niolylko boz zadnocjo uc/.ucia li.d/kicMjo, .ilt" z !;:ii' Itims- la,
wi/is/(.ui boz pfZ(<iwy, zadajac niaksinium piaiy, l.ijuc kw.l.u ;,jb
kopiac; /t' np. pobil i ciezko zraiul j(Mlnr()o uiI'm nowtiiiecii', kloty
nie miiil jaz sily do f)racy;
ze slrazjiik SS Kellinger (Siineon) zwany ,,Miu.i)t tku ', / ntod/cniu
rumun, ktoiy wstapil do aimii i.icnuoc ki( j, zininy / suiowosci,
brutalny na skutek leku przi'd SS-m.)nami .Nnmf.imi, ni»' jn.ij.iry
nigdy najmniejszogo odruchu ludzkiogo, jjohil uiianowi( i. iKlrrzo-
niami kolby jednego mlodogo inteinowanego, wyglodzonego. za lo,
ze podniosl z ziemi owoc, ze oskaizony przyznal sio /n s/lu, z«
bil czasami z blahych powodow;
zwazywszy, ze w obozie Dnulmergon:
4-ej blokowi SS-mani Becker (Hans), Braunwarth (Andreas),
Theiss (Albert) i Billotin (Leo), narodowosci niemiecki^'j, byli
straszliwymi kierownikami blokowi, ze bili c/.f.'sto intoi n<nv..nych
podczas dlugotrwalych apelow, odbywajacyf h sie w bhjcio i inimo
niepogody, ze co niedziele bili i kazali bic in'ornowanych nkaranych
w ciagu lygodnid;
ze mianowicie Becker mial zawsze kij w reku, zapomoca ktore
go bil do smierci internowanx ch i potem tiatowal ich nogami,
ze Braunwarth, ktory pelnil takze tunkcje kierownika magazynu
odziezy. nietylko stale bil kijem, gdy yo proszono o odziez, ale
jeszcze zabieral nowoprzybylym ich ciepla odziez i buty, w dodatku
odinawial ro/dania intornowanym pjzediniotow odziezowych, chociaz
rnial ich w magazynie swym dostalec/ne ilosci, ze podczas egzekucji
w kwit^tniu nM5r. dohil jodiicgo .iitornowarogo, ktory zostal po
powieszeniu i oderwaniu sio peUi przcnio'^iony do izby chorych,
ze Theiss i Billotin bd siliiie mternowanych kijom, a nawet
chorych podczas niekonc/acych sie apelow w blocie, ze dawali
rozkaz bicia inlernowanych w niodzule, zc wrcs^cie skopali i pobili
na smicrc internowanecjo chorego przyniesionego przez jednocjo ze
swych towarzyszy;
zwa/ywszy, ze szef ,,kĂĽinando" Deutsch (Josef) narodowosci
austnackiej bil okrutnie az do omdlt nia, ze nawot do jednogo
Rosjanina, ktory probowal ut ie( str/(<lil 1)0/ uprzedzonia i zabit go,
j.odobnie jak i innogo internowanogo, ktory podniosl owoc lozacy
na ziemi;
zwazywszy. ze ,,kapo" Markus (M<iur\o\) iziaelita naiodowosci
polskioj, byl szofem bloku /\ th'^' ^^' ol^r/ie, zo bil guHK.wa palka
z taka gwaltownoscia, ze jogo liczno ohary musialy byr piz^noszone
do izby chcrych;
7\v<'/'v ws/y, 7'> oskar/ony Iwioid/i, /i' bil tylko diu utizvinania
|.M)izad.ku w oboz'.o, jednakzc^ jak vvym' <i z 7r/nr.n sv. iadk^nv In! on
wi.'^iiii ozcslo boz powodu i naogul z (iwaltdwnobcia niou'/.i-.adniona,
iodyiiii' by h\o wkrasr w laski svv\c li szolow,
nali'zv jodnak podkie.-iic, i/ ina on to;.;.' /ulodwio 2^ lata, 7i' byl
dl poi lowaiiy i inloiiicwany j'iz ni.'j-ic lat 1.»;
zwci/> ns/v, /o ..kapo ' S/cv. ; ini.ik i7\omunt) n.'rndowf^sci
|.olski( ). /wauy ,,M.:ndok', 1>\ I slIa■•/.^ via k.:'-ni •> nu>';' wr-onym
«•K r viviciisl wie i in<i n.i suiii! 'niw !» •
v/'io!e w^' â– :idkiv.\
ze
j uuis.ik I' v. .il u<i micj.cu udf /' ni.iuii kija, |,oti iii »lalwvwa lUJjaiiU
=662
Journal Officiel du Coramanderaent en Chef Francais
mdnde. SCHENKEL Eduard, de nationalita Russ^. out exerce
leurs fonctions de sontinelles avec une grande brutalite, frappant A
^oups de Crosse et de bäton. seit lors des appels, so t sur le chan-
tier QU en cours de route, sous les pretextes les p^Uis fitiles, au poiiit
qiie plusieurs internes durent etre transport^s 4 rinflrraerie^
Attendu qua le gardicn SS. PO SSL ER Anton, Ide nationalite
roumdine. Charge du kommanda de jardmage du camp, a fiappe
avec brutalite la plupart des internes travaillanl sous ses ordrcs,
au point que Tun d euK a eu un oöil creve et que plusieurs en
sont morts.
Attendu que si les qardiene SS. SCHLECHTRIEM Otto.
BEFFUR Bernhardt. KIRSTEIN Paul, tous de nationalite a.Ue-
mdnde ont rempli leurs fonctions de sentinelles avec riguour et ont
parfois bdttu, il senible que les consequences de ces violences et de
ces sevices n'aient entraine aucune consequence grave, que cepen-
dant ils savaient qu'en se livrant ä des violences sur des individus
affaiblis et sous-dlimentes. ils accomplissaient des actes d inhunvitutÄ
Attendu que, contrastant avec Tattitude des chefs de camp, des
qard >ns et des kapos, seul. l'accuse DOLD Erwin, de nationalite
allemande qui fut chef de camp ä DAUTMERGEN, manisfesta des
sent-ments dhumanite unanimement reconnue par tous les internes
du camp, entendu conune teraoins ; qu'il a fait preuve d'initiative
et d dutorite malgre son jeune äge et raalgre les risques qu'il pou
vait encourir pour aineliorer la Situation generale du camp et le sort
606 internes. n«.n seulement au point de vue ravitaiUement, mais
encore au point de vue habĂĽlement, et disciplme generale ; que tous
los temoins entendus ont affirme qu'il avait ete p-nu tous d'un
grand reconfort moral,
Qu'il avait dejd eu au surplus la meme attitude dans un camp
oĂĽ \\ avait ete auparavant gardien.
Attendu enfin qu'examinant le cas particulier des chets de camp
et de leur adjomt du camp de NATZWEILER-STP.UHOF. eai leur
qualite de chefs des sous-camps taisant lobjet du present proces,
rObersturmbanntĂĽhrer HARTJEN STEIN Fritz, de nationalite
allcmande. quoiqua ancien Officier Superieur d'active de la >A^ehr-
mdcht (Licutenant-Colonel) a assume en tant que chef de camp de
NATZWEILER-STRUTHOF, le controle deb sous-camps pendant au
moins cinq mois.
Que pendant cette peiiode, il s est abslenu de pio. euer a des
inspections serieuses. ne rechorchant en aucune faqon a se rensei-
gner sur les conditions de vie des internes, sur l'etat sanitaiie des
Cdmps ainsi que sur les causes de la mortalite exceptionnelle. qu'il
sest ainsi rendu sciemment coinplice de crimes en omettant volon-
tairement d'user de ses prerogatives et de son autorile qui devaient
en empecher la perpetration,
Attendu qu'ĂĽ en est de meme de i HauptsturmfĂĽhrer S C H V/ A R Z
Heinrich, de nationalite allemande, qui a succede ä HARTJENSTEIN
en Fevrier 1945,
Qii.' cet accuse. meiuore du parti depuis 1939, et depuis la meme
dato mcmbre des SS. a reconnu s'etre, au couiö de rares inspecüoas,
rendu compte de l'etat miserable des mternes,
Quil na cependant pas pris les mesures indispensables pour
anu'horer leur sort,
Quen agissant ainsi, il s'est egalement, de propos deiibere, rendu
coniplice des memes crimes cn omettant volontairemeĂĽt duser de sei
Prärogatives et de son autonte qu' devaient en empecher la perpe-
tration.
Attendu, enfm, en ce qui concerne lObersturmfĂĽhrer, S C H MI -
ĂĽ ET ZK I Walter, de nationalite allemande, volontaire SS. depai'5
1<J34. qui fut radjoint de SCHWARZ h partir du 15 Fevrier 1945,
quf tet accuse tut Charge plus particulierement de rorganisatioa
materielle des sous-camps et des questions administratives.
Qui! s'est abstenu delibeiement, en presence du denuement com-
plet des internes au point de vue habĂĽlement surtout pendan^. li
perioĂĽe dhiver. Je donner dos Instructions pour que les vetemonts
se troLivant en grande quantite dans les magasins du camp soion^
distribues aux. internes,
Quen outre. au point de vue ravitaiUement, cet accuse a reconnu
cjue les denrees dĂĽmentaires, dont la foumiture 6tait imposee p3r
contrat aux firmes employant les internes, 6taient en anuvais eta*
et que les quanlites prevues n'etaient pas livrees,
po szyji i klatcö pietsiowoj internowanych az do smieici, saaysta
bil ( laqle, chwalac sie, ze byl w swym kraju wielkim zbiolniaiz^Tu
i ze nim /lawsze zostanie;
zwazywszy, zo ,,kdpo" L)oi»in-..-i (Hole^l-jw) zvvuns, .,Uok-k ,
narodowosci polskiej, byl krwiozeic/ym kat^wn i ze '.vM'ie ra/y bi
palk i az do wyrzerpania i kopal az do sini"r(i, ze o^wiid^zv' ir
bil ledynie dla utrzymania porzadku, ale zapt-recza lemu, iak)!/
te udiTzenia mialy spowodowac smierc. z«' te je«i<> zapi zer/.oiu-j
nie moga byc wziete pod uwag^• wobec lic/:nycl:. 'lokLidis^ m
zgodnych ze soba zeznan interuowany« h, ktorzv bv!; swwilr. j:p
zarzncanych mu czynow,
zwazywszv, ze straznicy SS Logos (Karl). Nagoisea iRt;;uiid;'
Weber (David). Bauer (Friedrich) narodowosci niemi^Tku-) Sc'^^-nke
(Eduard; narodowosci losyjskiej, wypelniali swe funke je sttazniko^
7 wieika brutalaoscia, biiac kolba i kij.-m czy ^o pod' ^as apol-,
czy to na miejscu pracy. albo po drodze. z jak najbani/i.n biahv.
powodow i z tdka gwaUownoscia, ze v/ielu internowat:vr)» mii^ia-
byc przeniesionych do izby chorych;
zwazywszy. ze straznik SS Possler (Anton, narodowos- i runiu.i^kiv-
ktory piowadzd obojowe „komando" ogrodnicze, btl z 'ak..
brutalnoscia vviekszosc internowanych pracujacycu pod ^-g-
rozkazami ze jednemu z nich wybil oko. a wielu innvch zabi',
zwazywszy, z.. sr.raznicy .SS Schlechtrien 'Otto). Defur (Ăźernp.ard)
Kirbchstem (Paul), narodowosci niemieckiej. pelnilt swe tunkc>
warS^wnikow z surowoscia i niekiedy bili. zdaje sie jednak z-
skutki »ych gwallownosci i razow nie mialy powaznvch nastepsiv.
tym niemniej wiedziell om, ze bijar internowanych oslabionvcl
rniodozywioaych popelnali w sto.unku do nich czynv nieluUzkie
zwazywszv. ze w prz-ciwienstwie do zachowania sie komendan
tow ooozow. straznikow . . kapo •. jcdynie oskarzony Dold (Erwin)
narodowosci niemieckiej. ktorv byl komendantem oboz. w Daut
mergen wvkazal uczucia ludzkie. .ednoglosnie uznaue prze.
wszvstkich internowanych obozu, przeslurhanvch jako swiadkow
ze .lal on dowod inic.aiywv : auioryteui. mimo sweqo mlodeo..
....k. 1 mimo vyzyka na kroi. .le naiazak aby ooiepszvc o,o;no
sytuacr w obozie . los HUernowanych ni.tylko pod wzc.led.n.
wv.ywienia. ale takze pod wzgled.m odziezv i ogolne] dy.cvpU.y
1 zp ws-vsrv swiadkowie przesluchini stwierdziU iz byl on d.a n'...'
wie..a oodpora moral.a, ze ponad^. mial taki sam spo,ob zachowa-
n'3 ä
11.» '.
vf irinvni
Myui^. y kt.irym prreatcm bvl iUdzniki^m.
.««vwszy.ze K,.u.r.r.!*c ...idneUue wypa.io'. kierovs.niko^^ ..iK.r.
i id, oor.u>r.uk3 ob.«'.; N.tJweiier Strulho; w zvv'iazk» z .c, äl.no
visk.em szou,-v tych , pod .» o.oW, bedacycn .,rz.am,o,em o.,ecnec,o
oro.-.su Oh.rsturmb.nn.-..<er Ha,tjcn..e.;. ,r,iu>. naroclowosc-
;.e;«K..:^:e,. pom.mo, ,. by. «y.ulum .mcor-nn « czvnno, sh,.-
:,.e WearmachU. (podi>..k..wmlO nvia- p-i *woim nad-oiem ..p^-a»-
bo.V <.ik. l'..e,own>k .V»... Nat-veikM-Snu-hoi, pr.ez okre^
„..w... S :,u...!ecv. ze : ■:.a.,u teqo cza... mo w-Yi.oavwa-, uupekcj
powazuv.!-., :«e st.ral .i^ zupclni-. poznac w..„.nk..w zvca -.ntero
••vjnyct,. ..an. -..o.eny « ol,...i. au. u-z :.r.vczvn wv,atkowo duze
.„u.,<ein.c, ■: z. w ^r. sp.o.. .,^vi ,d -mie s.a- s.e «spolsprawc.
.„..dm. -ue ..ykouyitJjac z wlasn..; woU sw.Mc^ .xaw . a^-tury
I -tu kiore mo.ily tej zbrjdn- i-.upobiec.
zwazywszy. z.« äprawa przed.iawia sie .d.n'ycznio jesU chodzi .
Haiipu.urm.uluera Schwanz» iHoiuncl.a» r,.i...dow..-; n.om.ock.ei
k. ..y p.zojal f.mkcj.. po Hau ;o»-.ilc-i.»o w lutv... VnS. ze o..karzom
i..», cdj.iek pa.-.« ...J l'i.'yr. l ozl.,c.k SS o.l teyo samego cza.u
^^ Journal Offtclel du Commandrrr.f nt on Chrf Francals
663^
ons aĂĽ^
Gucrre.
Or rttttMidu qail nv justifie däucune deiiiürche serieftise et utile
oour distnbacr les effets d'hdb ]k>ment e>istant tn rc^erve et qni
)ermcttaient de (aiie fdce d tovitc eventvuihte.
Altendu qa'en acpssant aiusi. il a contnbue ä 1. detresse physi-
]ue et moidle des internes,
Attendu que tous ces ac)issements coustĂĽuenl des iniiacti
.ois et Coutumes des Nölions Civilisees et „ax Usaqes df 1a
•t des Crimes contre 1 Hiimdnite •
LS CONSt(JtENCE
et a la majorite des deux tiers au moins.
LE TRIBUNAL GGNERAL.
1.— Df.CLARtlaccuse:
DOLD Erwin
NON COUP ABLE des faits q..i hn soĂĽt iepioches pa
l'accusation
2. — DtCLARE :
SCHWARZ Ikinrkh
HARTJENSTEIN Fritz
SCHMIDETZKI Walter
SEITH Willy
GLEICH LudwKj
BUSCH Nikolaus
JETZELSBERGER Josef
DITTMAR Karl
STORZ Greqor
VOLLRING Walter
MAREK Paul
PFEFFERKORN Rolf
PATOLLA Josef
LINK Jakob
DEUTSCH Josef
BRAUNWARTH Andreas
BECKER Hans
SZCZEPANIAK Sicrmiirid
BILLOTIN L^o
THEIS Albert
LOGES Friedrich
NAGORSEN Reinhardt
WEBER David
RIEFFLIN Karl
KELLINGER Simon
GEISEL Anton
OLESCH Paul
OEHLER Herben
TLLSCHOW Walter
\V INTERBAUER Oskai
STACH Lorenz
HERRMANN Jakob
DORNAt^ER Johann
DANEK Wolfqang
POSSLER Anton
KiRSTElN Paul
SCHLECHTRIEM Otto
SCHENKEL Edouard
MARKUS Maurice
BAUER Friedrich
BURTEL August
OPITZ Gustav
ECK Philipp
DAHLMANN Fritz
LORENTZ Hermann
OTT Paul
.EIDING Heinrich
piyy/nal sie, Iz w czasie swoich rzadkith inspekcji zdawal sobio
spaiwt y nf dvnych warunkow bylowania intr rnt.wtTnyrn.
VC jodndk nie pizedsiewzial niczi-qo. aby uli los [.oprawn ze
j.(.sU'|.u|ai w ten spo6ob i on täkzc swiadomie stai sn' wspolsptawc a
•\ili fomvcl. ybrodni nie v, ykor/ystu|d* swuidoiinc ^w..;<h ft.iw i
,.iilon-let.r, kiore moqly zbrodnioni tym zopobicf;
zwdzyw'szy w koncu. ze Obersturmfulut r v. hn.uit tzl- 1 iW.iltc.)
naroöcwsci niemietkiej. ochotnik SS od )*iMr .Uisippc a S/w.irtza
Od 15 luteqo 1945r., z,e oskarzony Un mi.il z.» zadanit oMiariiz.K je
rnalerialna i.odobozow i zajmowai'su- sprawuini adm.iuMr.K vjr;vm),
ze lezeli thodzl o sprawe zupelueijo braku od/iezy infnĂĽMV/anvc b.
sAviadomie nie wydal on lozkaza. oby o.l/ie/ U. znajdui.c. sm w
oivych üoscich w magazynach obozow byla rod/ulon.. ;nii i/y 'J.'«-!-
r.c'Adnycb, ze pozatem jezeli rhodzi o ^vyzy^^•i^•n,r ofkorzonv p.M/nal.
,e ĂĽrtykuly zywnosdowe. klorych doslawa r.a mocy Vontrakt)
m.aly sie za.iac przedsiebiorstwa. zatrudmajact mternowci.yf h b'i ly
vv zlvm slonic i r.ie hyiy dostarczane >' ilosci przt,widziönei. zau^w,
if rs-czym n.e uzasadnii dlaczeqo nie przedsiewziul zadny. K p<,-
^^äz^y^h ftarar. w celu rozdzielenia orzrdmiotov odzit^uwvrh
:!:-ajdajacych sie w rezerwie. ktore mogly wystofzyc nu ..dpo-
wiednie zeopatrzenie internowanych, zwazyws7y, ze dzialajac v ten
sposob pizyczyml sie do iwukszenia nedzy hzycznej i d:ub< wei
intfcinowanychi
Li
DEFFUR Bernhard
DOBINSKI Boleslavr
COUPABLES de Crimes de Guerre et de Crime« contie
rHi.mar.ile dans les bmites ri-dessĂĽs fixees.
Vu Id deciaration dt cuipabilite preceĂĽcnle,
ATTENDU que tous les faits retenus ä la chöiut ues accvises
scnt prcvus et lepnm^s par l'article 2 de la loi No IC da Ccnseil
de Controle AUie, tn date du 20 Decembre 1945
Quil n'y a donc pas heu de faire apphcation des a:tides on
Cud.- peaal Allemand vises dans l'acte d accusation,
ET ATTENDU que le TRIBUNAL GĂźNtRAL possedt ies e:ements
soff sants aappreciation pcar fixer le montant des pemes L infligei
ou. cntferents accuses aeclares coupable.. compte ^enu ae la part
prise par chacun aeux dans id Reahsation oe Ventreprise criminelle
faisnut I'objet de lu oresente procedure.
r N r O N S t Q U E N C E
PARCESMOTIFS
CONDAMNE. a la majorite des r.eux ticrs au moins, les
< rranes
l. —
SCHW ARZ Heinrich
HARTJENSTEIN Fritz
SEITH Willy
GLEICH Luuwuj
Bl.'SCH Nikolatis
STORZ Giegor
OEHLER Huijer!
TLLSCHOVv' Walter
WINTERBAUER Oskar
D<JRNAUER Johann
BRAUNWARTH Andreas
BECKER Hans
SZCZEPANIAK Sigmund
BILLOTIN Leo
THEIS Albert
DOBINSKI Boleslaw
POSSLER Anton
BUKTEL August
DAHLMANN Fnlz
LORENTZ Hermann
2.^
DEL'TSCH joset
A LA PEINE DE M O R T
q\ii sciti exec'itet conformement ä la loi.
RIEFLIN Karl SCHENKEL Edouard
HLRRMANN Jakob MARKUS Maunce
LOGES Friedrich OTT Paul
A LA PEINE DE M P R I S O N N E M E N T
A PERPETUlTĂź AVECTRAVAUX FORCtS
zwüzy^vszy. se wszystkie 1« ezyny fianowia naruszenie pr^w 1
zwyciajow nlrodow cywiĂĽzowanych, awyczaiow woiennych " ^tunc-
uiĂĽ zbiodnie przeciwkc Ludzkosci,
wobec czego ;
Trybunal W^,jskov/y:
A^ickszoscic cor.aimniej iiwoih trzecich glo.ow.
1- anitv.:nmaoska:zoneg* Doida (E, wina) z zarz^nov osVöi..nio
2- uznu.)e Busche Jetzelbergero, Diltmara. Stoizca Voinnga.
Ma^ka, Rifllina. Keilingera. Geiseia. Oiescba, Oehlera, Te.sche>v. Win-
Urbouera Stac ha Hermanna. Dornaaera, Daneka FfeflerKorna Potoii..
Unl^a. Deutscha. BfaunAvarlha B.ckera Sz.zepanu.ka. B.llot.na
Tne:ssa. Looessa, Nagorsena. .V..< r. D.Hu:a. Dobm.M.gc.
FoĂźiera, K.rnstemc. Schieslnena. Schenkela MorKas. Bauera Bul
leia. Opitza Ecka Doimana lo.entza. Otta Ledu.n« - ur.-.Mra.
zbiooni woiennych i zbrodni «ohec Ludzk.sci w o^an.cach .vzej
okreslonych.
Trybunal orTeka:
Op>*r«iac Sit ^6 o:......:n.., T.< ■■.«.■.>. .-<.-^r,.c w,v,v . or,,o
31 sl\czniä 1947t.,
ctkrtJu,
1 ^^Lcv kiiintiK i.c'V't.ianvcb w akcie
cskarzeniĂź,
,U wv„,i;n.n,a ...Ino.ny.h ><.. >' MOM.nKu ..c ,H...c.enc.nvch
..►.:.cr,vch v,...«.v<h «i^-V™ »'«'-->' "" "'^'""* "^"'^ '""'^
.=-664 --^
JourÄal Officiel du Commandrment pn Chef Francais --
3.—
ins
MAREK Paul WOHER Dav
SCHMIDliTZKI Waltor OPITZ Custd|v
NACiĂĽRSIiN Reinhardt ECK Philipp
A LA l'lilNE DE VINGT AN'
D'EMPRISONNEMENT AVEC TRAVAIuX FORCES
PFEFFERKĂśRVSf Rolf
PATOLLA Joiief
LINK Jakob
BAUER Friedrich
A L A P L 1 N E DE D I X A N N G E S
DEMPRISONNEMENT AVEC TRAVAUX FORCES
JET/LLSIU RGER Josef DEFFUR Bernhaid
DinM,\R Karl LEIDING Heinrich
SCHLECHTRIEM Otto ^
A LA PEINE DE CINQ ANNEES
DEMPRISONNEMENT:
4.— KELLINGER Simon
Gl :SLL Anton
SI \CH Lore PZ
DAN^OK Woltnancj
5.—
6.—
VOLLRINCi Walter
A LA I>EINEDETROIS ANNEES
DEMPRISONNEMENT:
OLESCH Paul Jo.-,ef
KIRSTEIN Paul
7.—
A LA PEINE DUNE ANNĂźE DEMPRISONNEMENT:
Fixe lo poiut de depart des peines privatives de liberle ä la datc
de lincarceration ordonnee par los Autoril6s Jiidiciaires Francaisos,
4 sdvoir :
RIEFLIN Karl
HERRMANN Jakob
•■LOGES Friedrich
SCHENKEL Edouard
â– MARKUS Maurice
OTT Paul
MARLK Paul
SCIiMIDETZKI Walter
NAGORSEN Reinhardt
WEBER David
OPITZ Gustave
ECK Phiiipi)e
KELLINGER Simon
CiCiSEL Anton
Sla( h Lorenz
DANEK Woifqang
PFEFFERKORN Rolf
PATOLLA Josef
LINK Jakob
BAUER Friedrich
JETZELSBERGER Josef
DITTMAR Karl
SCHLECIITRIEM Otto
DEFFUR Bernhard
LEIDING Heinrich
VOLLRING Walter
OLESCH Paul Josef
KIRSTEIN Paul
Les condamne solidairement aux frais et depens du pioces.
Dit que le lecouvrement de ces depens interviendra immediate-
ment, et, en cas de non paiement, fixe la duree de la contrainte par
Corps ä raison de un jour par dix Marks (10) non payos ä l'oxpira-
tion de la peine, sans toutefois que cette conlrainte depasse un
inaximum de six mois,
Ordonne la confiscation au profit de l'etat des deux bagues saisies
et romises au Tribunal General au cours des debats,
RELAXE le nomine DOLD des Hns de la poursuite,
Av'dnt d:^ clore, le President a donne avis aux condamnes qu'ils
avaicnt le dioit de se pourvoir en revision dans un delai de dix
jonrs tranrs, a compter du present jour.
En consecfuence, lo Commandant en Chef Frangais en Allernagne
mande et or'' >nnc ä toute personno legalement requise d'executer la
prösonle decision et de preler main forte ä son execution.
Fait et jucje a RASTATT, le premier Fevrier, Mil Neuf Cent
Quai ante Sept.
L'j President : Lc Greffier :
Si.jne: AUSSET Signe : GRAATZ
P O U R E X T R A I T C O N F O R M E
Le (iToffier en Chol :
Siqne : PORTE
Ju(|omen confirme par decision en date du 27 Fevrier 1947 du
Tribunal Gc lOral de RASTATT, sieqeant en matiere de revision,
toutcs chanilues rOunies, pour tous les condamnös, sauf en ce qui
conrorne le nommö STORZ Gregor, dont la peine de mort a eto
inlitmöe vi cj'.i (^s! rotulaamö n nouvoau ä la peine des TR A V AUX
FORCGS A PERPEITJITE.
Le Grelfier en Chef :
Si(jne : PORTE
pour
•
•
dU
9
Octobre
1946
II
2U
Seplembre
1946
if
B
Octobre
1946
M
25
Octobre
1946
II
15
Mais
1946
ir
25
Octobre
1946
M
14
AoĂĽt
1946
fl
29
Novembre
1946
)•
8
Octobre
1946
If
13
Juin
1 945
II
25
Octobre
1946
II
21
Septeinbre
1 946
II
8
Octobre
1946
• 1
8
Octobre
1946
11
10
Eeviier
l'!46
M
8
Octobre
1946
II
25
Oclobie
1946
II
12
Octobre
1946
II
8
Octobre
1946
• 1
25
Of t(jbie
1946
M
8
Octobre
1946
M
8
Octobre
1946
N
25
Octobre
1946
N
21
Mai
1945
II
28
AoĂĽt
1946
N
25
Octobie
1946
• f
25
Octobre
1946
If
30
Mai
1946
zb:odni. stanowiacej przedmiot ninieiszi
z ni( h w popelnieniu
pDStepowania,
wob«'r j)owyzszcgo
ska7.uje:
SCHWARZA, HARTJENSTEIN, SEITHA, GLEICH A. BUSCH
STORZ /\, OEHLERA.TELLSCHOWA, WINTERBAUER A, DORN AT 'LR
DEUTSCH A, BRAUNWAR I HA. BECKER A, SZCZEPANIAKA. B
LOTINA, THEISSA, DOBINSKIEGO, POSSLERA. BI R . El, \ DAl
MANNA, lORENTZA —
na kar(? smierci, ktora Z(jstanie wykonana stosowni»> do [)rzei>i \
prawĂĽ;
Skazuje:
RIEFLINA, HERMANNA,
OTTA —
LCXiESA, SCHENKELA. MARKUS
na kare dozywotnich ciezkich robot;
Skazuje:
MARKA, SMIDETZKIEGO, NAGORSEN A, WEBERA, OPIFZAI
ECKA —
na kare 20 lat ciezkich robot;
Skazuje.
KELLINGERA, GEISELA, STACHA. DANEKA, PFEFFERKORN,
PATOLLA, LINKA, BAUERA —
na kare 10 lat ciezkich robot;
Skazuje:
jetzelbergera, ditim ära, schliestriema, deffura,
leidinc;a —
na k.ire 5 lat wlezienia;
Skazuje:
VOLLER lN(iA —
na kare 3 lat wio/ienia;
Skazuje:
OLESCHA, KIRSTEINA —
na kare jednogo loku wlezienia;
Ustala poczatok wykonania kaiy pozbawienia wolnosci od daty
aresztovvania przez vvladze sadowe francuskie;
Skazuje:
wszystkicb wymienionych na solidarne ponos/.enie kosztow postepo-
wania i opIat sadowydi;
Zwalnia:
oskarzonego DOLDA od kary.
Rastall, dnid pierwszego lutego 1947.
Prezes :
( — ) Ausset
Sekretarz :
(--) Graa^z
Za zfiodnosc
Sekrolai/. T: v l)ui\alu
(- ) IV.itO.
Ninlcj:vzv wyiok zoslal /alwivrdzony v. iusiauLji apelacyjnej za
wyjalkioMi Storza. ktoremu ka-a ^mi^Tci /oslala v-ini'.'ni<ina na kare
do/.yvvotnich ciezkich robot.
W powy/szym procosic brali ud/ial ilwij przedstawiriclo Polski;
Major Dr. Henryk (ilELB w cha:akUM/.o scd.iego a Major PLAWSKI
p(»pioral Ob!;ai /.enie.
Iniprmicrie NaUoiiale 64. 17 — J. 2016 (RH)
\t
EXl'KDrilON DE JlKiKMKNT.
(Art. 9G du Code dejus>tiie inililaire.)
\
V
"^
HKIMililJOlJ!' I^'KANCAISK.
u.
ji]Gr:\n]NT
L
rcmlu pur Ic TiumiiSAL MiUTAini: j^inianent dt
sranl ä
fa-
An- ik> >' '.»:'.» ■„,
de )a NoinoiiclaĂĽjre L;t'ner
(KouMi i.i: \° :\\) In
N- 4 l^ 4 L)OIU)HK AN
N* Lj U| Q D^. I,A SF.BIK <,i: •
ĂĽate du t riino ui; <lu rie;
I I
^<Cc^:zcy ^\^
An No.M Dl' Pi:i pm: Fha\(^.\is,
Le rrlljuna! inllltairo pormaiienl de,
a reii !u le jugenieiil doiii la teneiir suit:
i I \-' w
qiiarantG iix
>(,^M^
PrcRideot;
ĂĽ
CKJOunD'Hui VINGT TRCI3 AVRIL D:.:] 1 » an mil noiif rent
Le 'J'riijiinal mililaire pcrniaruMit d*. 1. i,< //j ,.
rouiposti, confoniiiimeĂĽt [\ larlic ie lo du Code de justice militaire, de xMM.
BI-iiaULJ, Golonol, Goninnnclant lo C^ Racitnent dV'^rtillĂĽrie
SILOIDl-^.U, Chef Ja ^^ataiilon, du 23^' Roviraent li^liilYinteri
ayont appartenu» ä une or^^aiiica t ir.ri og ^u'-sistance
JL'\R.DI'/ILi.a!J ,Gapitaine, de l'Etat-Lia jor de otraGOOur:; I
ayant i'aiu partie des Vorcau ].^rarjcai>se.o'''c';c 1* "^'ntc^.^ia r-^
CfRUTIl.):^H, Liüutv.nant, du JJepot du Prlsonniüx-i:. du 0-UüPrc n-^ 103 )"''«ge»;
ayant fai.t pai^tiiG des Purccö Fraa-aiscs do ] ' Tn^üx-' eup
BUC ;R, AdD-iidnnc-OhGf, du 23- R^/nniGijt d^Infanturio
ayant Taic pai-tiĂĽ des i-^orcĂĽs ?pancaiSGs de 1^ IntĂĽpi-. ui-
uomraes, le President, .)iii ifiii uitafar CtT , les jusi^es inilitaires, par le (ieiieral roinmanJaiU ia : 0- Rej^ici
M.DriUBIoölJ, GolonGl dQ Justice i..ilidjair-e ('Onimissain- du Gouverueir
M.Bi'ilLi'i, Gapita ina GreHi«;r pres ledii Tribunal niilit
ayant toiis pret*'; les senneiils prescrits par la loi et ne sc iiouvaut daus auouii des cas d'incDmpalibilite prevus par les article» i^
et 20 du Code precite ;
Le Tribunal, convfKjue jiar Vordre du (ien»''ral commaudaiil ila 6- Rir^iun J -~ , confc rmeineut aux articles 69 e.
du Code de justice niilitaire, s'est r«'*uni dans le Heu ordinaire de ses s('anres, eu audience publique
ArefTetdejugerld2) le aoĂĽiHi^ ^AC^'J^ Robert, IlGinrich, de natior:aite alle^iianclc
filsde de feu BAGĂ–'ISGK Jean-i'ineri'e Gt de <x$ckfeue .A(^E^ i^atp^^ine, na le !
^TDMdisSiMlieiit rix L Linda h6 departementd G Bade > profession d >;^jX-Soul
^^re
o«"^ MaiTons clair
residant, aiKiÄKsüüCEdtH^iürscjrBCK, a I'a rlspuliG ( Bade ) ." )G ier theiaop-allG .'.2- . - . n Mfsacc
Taille d'uD metre 750 millimetres, cheveux cha t a i n 3 ri S OU; :a nt s
»rout , uez busque , visa^e en tüUpiü w-'
I\ensei<;nemeiĂĽs pliysionomiques complementaires : n/n't
Marques partieulieies: Cicatp CG ICil/ic.l CUiSGG rpUCllG l)OSt':ric p
Numero malricule : 1" au coros : — *' —
, '1"' au rciiuleuieiit :
• f if
accuĂĽc' de: 1^) PRĂśVOGATIOII Dj:J PH.\:.0-I3 A ]K.^L^ ]...3 .\Ri..Z3 .;CIf:\^; :\ ^^XliO'^
FRAIIGK
I
o
3°) /.'.^TEirATS A T^'\ LiB.rrri'.': i:n;r/iDij-'i,LK
V ) CCkPLICI'ri] D'AS6AJ3I1J/,TJ
1^
i.A AnfcrcdeiUs inn'Ieiaires Hv^ant
^,-, , ..r,,rH"l J'^ noraae -?0:3:, IlĂĽi.iaanii, Ouatav, i'iriliv.-, ,ie u-j tiouL^li t<- ollei:
xils ao_x.ClL_: ouL.3 tri; de i-'ĂśCILJ .-llico, n- le 2i dc.ce:,:bi'u ,'^02 .. licidelbor,/ (l
-orofessiün d'i:J.x-Vico-r;-aulGJ.tor i'.i]rj;ic«j
ä
y^.f^ r
COUĂĽ DE CAbbATICN - CHAMBRE CBIJillTELLE
. ^ » ^ • ^ •
# "■" • "~ • ^ • ^ •
24 Juiliet 194-6
Mo m&AT GUICjUE, Präsident
WAGl^ER et autres c/M.P.
Sr.r les pourvois de : !• YfAGI^fiR Robert, Heinrich - 2* ROEHN
HermaraM Gustav, Philipp - 3^ SCHĂĽPPEL Adolf - 4* GAEDEKE Walter,
kartlx. 3t 5* GHUNER H\i;;o, coiitre un jugement rendu la troiö mal mil
ne-uf Cent cuarante 's ix par le Triburuil lÄilitaire Permanent da Stras-
bourg oui lee a condaianris ä la jjeine de mort : WAGNER , pour "compli-
citi \ra.narr.inat3, ]^rovocation de Prangais ä porter las arzaes contra
la France, eriröleiuijnöö au pro^'it a'uiie puiß^ance itrargfere en guerre ,
avoo la Praiice" - GAip^^KE, pour »^complicitö d 'aesaesinats et anrola-
menta au profit a^uae ^J^^i ^^^'^J^-^ rtraji^äre avec la jPraace"- GRÜNER,
pour "adf^aBöinata";
LA COUR,
F^ur io rapfort de »vU le Congeiller Battestini, les obsarvations
;;e ISi'iaeB r^eldmann, BrrJ.ez-ivltt^ar/, Boovial, i^icolay et Galland, Avocate
er. la Co\:ir .^t lec conclur.:'.ĂĽn;c de 4^ l'Avocat General Dupuich;
Joint l8B pourvois en raison de la connaxit^;
Vu les mömoires produits;
Sur le moyeii propose par WAGl^R, ROEM et SCilUPPEL et pris dö
la violation de larticla 156 du Coda da Jtistice Militaira, en ce qua
la Tribunal Militaira a He irrcguli&rement compose, WAGHER ayant
ninfi ^ie Gjn^:ral Coiwiiandant de Corps d'Araöa et le Trlb^uaal na pouvEint
parGulta, 5tra prusid^S par un Colonal^
Attendu tu'aux termes de l'artiola 5 da l'ordonnanoa du 28 acut
1944 "pour le Juwoment des crimes de guerra, la Tribunal Militaire
est compose coiĂĽme 11 est dlt au Code de Justice Militaira";
AI terdu que lee dispositions das articles 10 et suivants at 156
du Code de Justice Militaira qui modifiant, suivant la grada da
l'inculpe, la oompOBition das Tribunaux Milltairas, na s^appliquant
4U*aux militairae frangais at assimil^si
Que les dispositions de l'alinia 13 de l'artlo^a IO, qul döro-
gent k cetta rfegla at aux tarmas desquallas laa Tril)uxiaux Mllitaires, '
1
«1
I
/*«•••
/
â– /
/
ai cil.s k jUr^er doG p^n^^^oriniora Ha ,^uerre, sont composöa comine pour
le ,1uÂŁ;;aine]^L des aiiiitiires frMn^ais d*a]:r^3 les ansimilations de
^rade, i:e sauraient o'arplii^uer h WAGNERf lecuel n' a pas it6 defirä^
au Trll)"ai.'~J. Uiilltaii'e oou'ije priaonnier de giaerrej
Que, a&3 ior8, c*e;.t k ^on droit oue Icö den^and^iira ont c^t-i
T.radvlts de vaiit im TriVunrĂĽ. iwilltaire composd oonforaenjant aiAX dis-
poeitions des articleb 156 et 186 du Code de Juatice Militaire;
Siv.« le ix)yen propoca par V/AGIIER, ROEHU^ SCHUPPEL et GAEDEKE et
vriti (.e la vioiaticn de \*:n't;lcie 165 du Code de Justice üäliitaire,
ei. ce \:e 1' ordonnanoe de ronvoi ayant ?ti rendlue le 6 avril 1946,
a^Tint le retour ci *une CĂĽmalssion ro/^atoire dolivree par le Juge
uUntttruc tion le 14 mare I9^^6, ä l\£fet d*entendre ROBEEiNTKOP, iOBITEL
et LAuivjERS, ieB dv,f en^f^urs des accuais n'ont p6is eu cocr'iimication ,
163 iiv-.;ositiün6 de« dito tiifioins avf:nt la oloture de i* Information«
Attendu .v'aijx temea de l'article' 81 du Code de Justice Mili*
taire, appiic?:ble aevarit let% TribuTcai^x Lviilitairee • etablis dane les
circoiiccriptionb törritorialee en etat de guerre en vertu des dispo«
«itione iu paragraphe 5 de l'article 179, il appartenait aux accusäs
ae lorinuler le (jrie i' jont il •^•^..^it davant le Tribunal Militaire;
Quö, favte pur .ii;x: ue l^cr-^oir fait, le moyeii m saurait etre
i>rojot^^i^ -ĂĽur la pri.;ji^re tOa^, dovant la Cour de Cassation;
Sur le iTOyeii pro 03u par WAGNER, ROEH», SCHUPPEL et GAEDEKE
d^ins sa ireiniore braixhe, xit commun ä tous leo demandeurs dans sa
sacüitdc? brciacüe, ^ris de la vLoiafciou des articlee 71, alinea !•,
^'^? ^^J.,.^79 du Code dti Ja^tloe inilitcxire, !• de 1» ordonnance du 28
aout 1^44, Viola tion ddö uroiös ie la defense, en ce que^ d^une part,'
l'acte d'ao'juöcvtion n' ^ oi,b ': te notifi^J aux deiLandeura troia nours
au moinĂź avant la rJunion du Tribunal, avant le texte de la lol ap* j
plicable et les nou.s, pr.noiaa, profeasiona et rt-sidencea des tömolna;!
en ce i^ue, d'auCre part, la cltation ä co^Lparaltre k l'audience notl-
fiöe aux acoueis ne contenait paa au noinbre des textes de la loi ap- !
plicable, celiri de 1' ordonnance du 28 acut 1944, alors oue cetta notl
fication est imp -rieusejxnent exi^ee par les textes susvisäs et cut
ladite ordonnance cul doniiait aux actes inorimin>äs la qualif ication I
:lö criiiAee de guerre aervait de baae dux poursuites et justifiait *
ĂĽeule la comp^^teiice du Tribi^nal i^iili taire frangais k l'egard de res* '
rorti3ĂĽants d'une nation anneiuie ayant agi comiae belligeranta, itait '
lu pre-iier chef un texte de loi applicable a «x poursuites et devait ,
d*^s lora etre notifiee; '
Attendu .^u^il rjeulte de Ici oombinaison des articles 172 et 179
•iu Code de Justice ulilltairö que las dispositiona de l^article 71,
.airh?a I«, du liiö/^ Codo no roiit pas ap-lic ablas aux prooddures eui-
vies devant la Tribunal flĂĽilitaire citabll dans une ciroonscription
territoriale en ^tat de ruc ^i^e^
Qu^aux teriaes de l^irticlo 179 susvisd, l^inculpd renvoyeS <Ja-
vant lĂĽdit Tribunal, doit, v.i;:gt -uutre heuree au moins avant la
/•••••
• t
c»n. '^^^'''''.^.T.; Vt.-rta .io Icl applicable et las nome des t,i-
crx;.. "^\<^^/cox ••4t3 .^J Govv^.rne;.ar.t ee .ropose de faire en-
AttenduHue l.r, civ.t.ci..- ox,t ."t.^. r^guliferea-ent not-lfiees .ux
accwse» Is 6 ^vril 1946;
£it '" Ll^er^B d;"I'.rt,_ol3 179 du Cod« de J..tice Militair.,
r..ff l^ovdi, bi-r;che ui:, xovon visa unl^veceut les textea de lol
e^r^afctent leel°i:..a a.-lic .blas 3ux iiofractlons ccn.:.i8.8;
Quf. tel n'eet i;Cie xe aas. dars l'eapöce. de l'ordcnmnc. du
28 acut 1944;
Qve
fi
«o ICTs, lei- t',r^^i:^ f^raiul^s par le moyen, dans ses
dt: 1.x br.ii'CtTxey rrc- ^-crit p;.-ö ror.ä-Jö;
ooj:;?:,.o™'uulS'.Un-r «.„«.t I. faire .nte».« pl^l.ur. t4«.ln.,,
Attendu uu'en statuant ainsl, le 1?ribm^a «^^J^^^'^? */*J* "''•
At.emu t.w t^xi /iisr,o3i-fcions dti paragrapli« 3 de l'artiol«
179 du Code ^«^^f^,J^^^,",if it JttaSn pr?Lable de faire.eutendr.
Qovw.vtJBmenX a^'BK.t l'ouvartvre des dubats, pourvu ..u ix soix px
Beut H l'auäiei;c«i"
Qu'ainai le moyeii n'est pas foiidi;
»U ■eovsiuieeB k l'lne cruc o.vii, ort a-ßii a ooje «, «o
dierxje et servi de bi-se ä la condan.nation;
Attendu '-iue les docu:.eUt8 visos au mJyen fi^urent au dossler
/:. . . .
• » • • I»
de VdL pruo -eure d ' 'Int'ori.Lit- :-! jt ort rait l*obJet dar^ inter.rop,;i-
toirea de l'irjculp: ROJ]lL:^ ju J..:o3 Je^ I8 Juin et 8 octobre I?^-5;
Qu*iln oiit ."t<i ti'jiiu.ij -. l.w diyci^aĂĽior die parties, au ccurs
des d^jbatt:!, sinn cue i'o.illeurö le dr.^.nßndeur ait ßoulevJ ä ce gu-
D'o.
11 ĂĽ'uit :.uo le
ĂĽicye)
>^nv:'ue piir le fait riema oui iai
3*)r t de b-AĂĽe ;
S"ur Le idoyeii .ro.os>j par 'J^'AGti'ba et pi'^a de la violation de
i'art.oie 4 du Code ?er:al et au prl-^i. ipe .'ie 1;^ non re tro?.ctivlt4
de la lĂĽi i^^raxt^, 2r ce cu'il t iti Tait; ^ipplioatTon au deraar.deur
de i' ordonnance du 2b w-out I9'H alorn qiie c^tte ordonivince qui
r^\jriĂĽie dec l'aitB 0Tit:.r'.eir2 a ^3a ^ r j:';ulv;:ition ĂĽ-a paa reapact^
I':.rtiole 4 et le >^rlnc ip8 ĂĽi-'Gvis-is;
Attemu „uo 1' ordcrr^^ince du 28 --^cut 194-4 dieide cue les ori-
iueö et d:lltG visjs dana i^on :..rticl9 ler "cui ont - 1^^ comrais de-
puls 1 * ov vor t-uro der ho ^tilit-rjö" s^^ront pourcuivia devant les
Tribuiu:ux iitilit^-ires ^•r.n.gi-i.y ^t ju^.-iö couf oroieroerit aux lols
frangaiseB er vi^n-err '^»t I-. 3e£^ o :i ßpot'5.t: oTiS:
Qi:e ca "i:e:'T.e x ' c^l ^ '/.'/nuj ereiuvir.t i.roriulgu.^ , l'alt la r^gle
des Triburi^auc ei r^ tr^'^^ '^trc -tt-^ru.j '"ev^rt eux :^otir cause d'in-
constitut'.oni^alit-il;
Qu'il c.uit df* i& ^iv:l Ăź'.oyen ne aaurait ^^tre acouailli;
Si-^r lo muveĂĽ ivc^-^t,; per '^VAGT-^IT-R et [)t1^ de la violfitior prir
l'ausae aj:};lic?^.tion, de 1* oj dormance du 28 acut 194-41 en ce c^ue
lee laits incriruint^c cnt . t' coi^m^is ers Aleace, BDr^tSa par l'Alle-
Ăźiagne et ::ur le territoire do ].c*cuelie la r^ouverair.etb frangaise
avait cesser da 8'e:<örcer4
Atteudu v.uc lex ^r'tiojiduQ l'.-^lJVHtinr d ' ^jnnexicn de l^Alsace
par 1' Alleuvagne, invoquie ev iroyan, n'a ite -^u' un acte unilateral
^-ui ne pouvait c.odifler jtTridic^ueuent les ollaue^s du traitf^ «ign^^ f
h VERiSAILLES, le 28 juJb 1919, l^-^r les reprcpentarts de l'Ktat
all..iiiand|
Q\ie, dfee lorR| les ectes r^^jrcchee h WAGNER ayant 6t4 commis
i^ri Ali3j;cR, terrltoire fT<'v<^'*^.^-f oonstltualent dec cri-Mea de guerre.
•iu sone de l'orticle ler ae 1* crdonnfdnce du 28 aoüt 1944;
Sur lo iiioyen comnmn h tou3 lee demandeure et prlo de la vio- \
lAtion dec articlcB 68, 90, 172 du Code de Justice rvülitaire, I®
de 1' ordonnance du 28 aoĂĽt 1944, T cie la Ici du 20 avril I8I0 et
iiifenrue de baee Ivgale, -?n ce cu*auct>iie des c^ueatione po3~;eĂź aux
Ju/s^ 9 fwilitnireo n'a dei^andj h cou:x-ci si les fnite Incriruin^s
'talent ou non juötifieB ^lv Iju lols et coutvmes de JLa guerre,
alora :ue e'af^iaßant de la pourimite de criutes et d^lits cönmie
p'ar dee r^: r^sortitsoantö d'u^t) ri<itlc;n ennenie dont les actes sont
1
i*l
\
/..
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7^iIb;Ui r. . i^fOi^ t«.rv. iU^nb X^lrc ;\f«uri?trii -iu^ll n'avät. pas ao. a^/pi
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'out l — H A xi;. .-'^M^ iü ou *iae 1-33 iT >.lt8 ri^^t-ilct jiiia J 'leti-
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u }.i*x i^'w .i^i^ir:i»x illt^ilrea ^rjr'j.nio, ooi5lorfnon:*-nt -x-joi
de l^Oi'ĂĽ'^.nnArov; ;U ,:? ' iOvit* l'-j-i'x doiv rtf
}.i\r l^'ö -.'rib
.. M r-. .lr:> .;<:; j-vs i i 3].^cn<.t^ .jI'B quo la ^.^ariyioation
eilt; jöv utj'i':llo, ozoli-^l'^o 'ir Vi orjL'rdr.^litu»
•V* tc::<'d.i Ivb l^r-s, i.i 'ler\ . .cM^ticno dintirovos l^ ..r l'oKis-
t'O: CO üv; 00 1 -'ii t.; -^3 w^ * l3uJ. li li ' vlt xier.t jis>ir fc n :«3Cü?*airüS, j-aisqu'
ellu> uDuicnt i^pl::cil.-? er i .h..jl ;aet5 ^i:a;3 c<..11gs jw o,/A;abilltĂĽ#
::-*0 4 11 3.1t 1 V j lo iVjHiii ?i'',-3t P'.in londu;
â–şioj* 1%(H mj.jnj r.: ./:iB ^.-rcpcaoa jva' r.kCtxl-'Af xiOVMl^f MWĂĽt'/Ji j
et C\:'^\K-. et i.iriG a; 1.^ vlcl:vtlor d< 3 tirtl(3l<-;3 7^ .'.t fj du Jode ^
lüHiil, cu.) l'artlole >: ^u- la Ici du. <-.j Jiillot l'i/M, uoX»*>t de ri-
,.o>fäc V. .; oonoL i-^lor.^, on oo -1^3 le^ domaTi-io irs ont; ot<5 coaptbloD
i^. x\io:U.cn .i tx s^iiia :urt cl^f^f '.lors a iO o^s textot^ q .1 viarnt,
Iv? -rtrilcr .rĂĽ:; .iCr:.^:U Ica /r/r-r^^^la, Ic ac-oord le . dĂĽr u- cra n'i'*
taienr, :-/vr« ^«.pjilo.vll^i^ a:x djf.::i: ü;^ .jra, ret5.-crtia:> :.:.fB d^vuie natlon
ni ^ lari'e avöc li -ri/oo; i .j 1' ordern •»r^oo ö i .'3 -.Cvt l.>44 x^o sc
r:;-r'^, j«a:-i .i.ix .xrtiol^-a da ;oue jrr-il y k^svIbos; qae la lacstlor* de
a.KVolT 3i l:>3 . rovo>-iJ.iCi.*T uo ivir. uiö a porter Ito ;irt:.ea conire
li .r.uce ÂŁiv i^nt dto oĂĽ ."v:r t^ ^lv\oB d'Gfi'et, i^a jus ^tĂĽ pos6c|
â– \iV'. .:G.;;r? li ^- .l/v^*I?/<', c^l il^<?^ 4''';ricM,cnniv!rod -.ribiltoniĂĽa n'ont
itit ii'uo'jir A^jc orarea re,^ la Ac Ic jra a öin, qu'tjr.rin Ic rribun^U
a cr^lB CIO rjiondrj ;\...x o ;r?l u.aUj.3 ä^! düi:oi»oe:vr do 'Ai .^ K.-: iiwo-
q i.-u" V CO i it j .a*:iIio:itlI'.
\t t/c nd a "i .4 ♦ .nc p xr t , >i ; e : • . il 1 1 ja pr<.» r..i er do 1 ' ar r. t o Xo
'{ , C\\ Jc'le j-urol iS die Ire aou^aMo d^eaploniuv^e ''toit ;5tr:u..er
i ii 3r ^ertru ITari ^ca \otca 7:is^u3 •*••••• a I^article 73 p'Ar<.<^,ra
piic > " loq .;el rox^ri u j.otrx • rt, Iv-^i enrolt^n ent« x"><^'^^ *''C ) Is-
a rioci u'rajv 're ':^ti. *\;vi'rc ...v •-; 1» /j*;V 3 , ne iTai t 'ictjiu uiatir.o-
Lion '/' ^.re Ica 4trMj[\;--rr8 ö.viv ri*. -; •IIa oontu ou i\ci\ roß »ortiaa >t t
d» ,nc r..i*.;icr oime Iv^«
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,t\' ä. ^ 'li K:\Mxr\.ox:xit ^ la Jcfennj do dem rdcr i^^e a^s
-c-c'3 e 1' :• inl.. ". :^ la lol d. ^^^ J^^llet Dil ct. n'ny-ii rt
,..V3 ;t: s.ivi.a dM:i.t; rr. ü o iu'elle n»a I»9^-80 de a: arolt et
d. Jid- i\;Dal rva..vief* -i l.i oh.u-^^e de 3CVTP}'*r, .-t ĂĽe G/Li^D^K, ia
i^G^tiör . ^to ^03ue i. :r:lb.xaL llit 1-e d^ a wolr ßo. V"^^,:^^^
i <iY\ ^ i. i par ordi-- da boö s . iriHiTS iour dea objot-^ d;. roösur
Ut^jr.du d«anö p -rt :i.u> l:i i^oeitlon de oea a-ios iuia donji.>At
3 vlla: •-t4.oi:i A la ue;:.u.de .crr;ulie a.ina lee ooncliöloriß rrlaes
atnanda d'aitrf? ^.u-t-, 'i »iL a itvi i';parida nu.:tttive^. ait jor 1
rri.;iuiul I ci'.;A3vine des ditea :i..oatiünö#
^^ae Us r.'porno3 lciQxl^^:i^^rl f li tos 4 oea lacation^* r6^;ilifer«
uiert (oaj^vĂź acnt irr-irr'i|:i :l a; ^^
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q... I: rricar.^a j. rcjotu, p,r ,j vĂĽ.iont, inolaunt da jjj Avril 1 Vj, li-
Q<>r.;i .aoiit> u » ina /..pv;*o:.03 |.rl«o..- p.^r iM:::-rv, p;ir le rr.oMl' rae i.\ oo
i T'^'^unal ' llit.i . T;^ s.iai /ar l'oroonii'xroe :lo ret/voi tĂĽ p.
SIC er. ;.catlOL iXoi :i» -^.^xux ttKrT,o3 ie 1» ^.rtiol»- -l a^ Co
r c IC •'!.%; v..\ \. iTit otö io^-kia (»n Lor;.': toiro vllci:. »j'j
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/.; !/;> ai Le urtl.^l^:^
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d ^.i'A.; tr'eo <u> l'artiole a d.i Code 'le J 3t!oc >iLi-
dtat do , -A:rrOf ci\ v^^r... .. .: l'ari.iole 1/... j.uir .^ruphe ^ d; u.C e ^oae.
da ;|.iG Ic vio! i.3i::..r do :) Mlij^li rr/ant av^xnt. LVj.aition dos
t.juOxiia t i' ö ^*^5' 0 nvjl ci4i üHiT. .'cril/ae terda t \ l'injoniptiüt^i.oo da Tri
li^ii .ilit/vir;j o/i JiiCti^ ^ .c lea i'jita n*uVrUt.Pv ^aa w-ti ooriL'u 3, r»i en
l'.^r.o..i. :>rt .^.^'*ai prijad^oc d'.mo dea pcraom^es viaJca en l'.linja Isi
vi<* l'artijlo l::r du l'i?r-...>nn.v.oe ^a .^ .out l^/;4f 1- .'rlbunii .uIXIzlkI
;.ir i-xo:,.enz iiioiaert d i;> ivril 1 Ht^» <'^ t>%<» rejetö oee ocn. lasions
^'c*j: 10 nioti^: 4.0 If. reiwo.l deVvnt la jiu^ldlotiori crlvirolle 4tvt.t att
c ;:lx dj juridiotrion et l*orJiorin/^noo de reuvoi av-orit uo;Ă„ia l'autorlt
1 • CJ;-Ooü
iai3o en q-iestior«
,]x;.je, xJ.tv :^op[ 03i tion, sa oomp^St^rc r.c pouv.tlt utre
\tterdu q^u'er stut. ,nt Ina , le Tri :>unal . lllu tirö a viol^. lea
ui3xü3^'^-^^"^ö 3-*^rappelor3 »e l'articlo '1 da Codo do ' latdoe .i^it ire
Attenda d'a^tro tnrt, q.io 1.' llnia Icr dt l'artlole lor de l'or
r.,vrco d.. jd \oat l'^i-l diapo^^ie "»or,t po ;r ^ livls dev.»r*u lea Tribonaux
•.iiit. ilres ■'ruv.;ai8 et »i A,^6a conrprni.ii.n- ;.t jl.ix lois fr<*n(^t.U .-es en vigno
hjj \i
et .4 X dioprjgttl Mi de li pr «tr te ordormrinoe, les luibionaax ennorciß o
a,jt?MQ r.on j'ru.'^aia eu tk) Service d-^ 1' tdaiintatration o\x ĂĽe'<^ Interets
orrii i rie, ^^o-j; :j1o3 de oriir.es oa
.es OoLill:6-^ cxi ezi Fr aiOC 0
de d lits oo:z;j:.is dopaia l'ouver* jre
uria an vorrltoirö reXev Mt de l*.ia o
rltö du lt. /r.incö, soit Ä l'^i-,cn:rii i' m n'itional ou d'or. pi-otJ u Tr :
CcilSf d» »n i.llltaire servo; t oa int aervl soae le dr:j.peaa frvUiQaiö,
d* n apitriic rdaidai.t 6 .r Ig terrltoira Ir^no^ls aviu,t Ic 17 ^ain
n r^i-vtiĂĽ Sir
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ter Ivoirc Iran alu, aoit a< pri^idico dea
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I08 i> ra.|iL|>ös oorivl33 ir.ri^al .:ß, larsi^c oeaiixfrao; ions .:fi::ie aocoiiiplli
ci l'cjjs'iaior oji aoaa Xkt j>rj:.ex:.e u !• jt.it de (^xerref xie aont pas Jaa-
coal.4.9"r.;a ue l.i. tcrra*
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ooupable de quatre homÄoides volontaires, spöoifiös ohacun, en ces termes
pur les questions numörotöes de 31 ä 38 •
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i^i' r:r6cyjv di:^ ;::»caa .t^ J/.^;-.; .•^rru^v^ allivio r.o 3011I as .c oo^ix »^üi ^.tox
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,.it;ö au;:.^iu de.;ra aor;t 5:m r^ir.cbcrü^ i 30 t^Xro :;n ^:,rio£ de la viclavion
d^/ lu loi lrv;ri:un :U u.O^'er»
u.n;l vrv3 nun röoevAbio»
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aso^jr. X'i'^P-'^^ i>^^ h':;. wD.;k:: ot prl^ ac la vlolatior ae l^irtiole GO d^i
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3i..,ci iti'ri u ?o lof^ q.eaticrj3 n^' 1 a .:?o, dont 11 a ito d^clarö ooui>a-
ülc jt,.a' Ijb ripon.n<j^ üi.^: quc3ticns i\^ 11' ä iHt la pcHno qui 1 li a
:t.j j.i.pli-i..ie otar;t lif^ao-'V^ort; Va^tiri-it: on •;, ard aux dlsi>OQitior:8 des
ar:.:ol'3 7:^ et 77 d* Code .wnia q i r^iriKient lo criniö d' ei.ro lonicjit au
Tiollt u« ui!3 i iiBca*iji;j ^trrvi\ rß et -t. ecllcs do l^artiale 411 du
.-.cjctt:; loe x^oarvcls do /::l•?^ rit Kor^'i::, GCinrPJüL <^ CAKi>:^::S,
Oor.d;"i .•.-.(•• l-sd\t'? d»)ii:.:vr,dc .re Bülid^\iro::-v)j:t ivox d'ipenß*
Clv.3!5e ot arjrialo la ;|U.:o!;;.inl Inoid^nt du J avrll l,u;6 q^ a reje-
tu X' 3 oonoloaloaü ü •lnuO.:-p}te2i':v.: ae ra I. >R, imsei^ble lo ju^^er^nt du
j ...»A IKT) m>ia et^ 'louunt d.a.» cclloo ae oea di\c)poaition© relativt^a
rlOAro •
.:t .i.ttcda q^a l%ja no'.oö rcleVvia a 1^ oiuiTf.« ti« OaJI^l'iÄ ne relevsn* j
i'iiio äö la Q^Uij^jtaxsiQ des jaiMaiotlur.^i Ir m;rilscto«
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8 Octobre 1966
JOLKNAL OmCIHK DM LA hllTIilinlK FHAN<:AISK
8853
Par decret en date du 3 octobre 1966, sont approuvees les
diverses modifications apportees a ses Statuts par la Congrega-
tion des sa«urs des Sacres-Ctrurs de Jesus et de Marie, existant
legalement ä Mormaison (Vendee) en vertu de l'ordonnance du
5 septenibre 1837 et du decret du 13 noveinbre 1859. , , .
Par decret en date du 3 octobre 1966, sont approuvees les
diverses modifications apportees a ses Statuts par la Congregation
des stcurs de la Charite, dites du Saint-Sacrement, existant legale-
nient ä Bourges (Cher) en vertu des decrets des 16 fevrier 1811
et 30 janvier 1905. notamment la transformation de son titre en
Congregation des sa?urs du Tres-Saint-Sacrenient et de la Charite.
Decrets du 3 octobre 1966 portant abrogation
du titre d'existence legale d'etablissements congreganistes.
'Ai>
â– y (,j
â– /â– â– '
Par decret en date du 3 octobre 1966, sont abrogees les dispositions
de I'article 1" de l'ordonnance du 1'' septenibre 1827 et de
l'article 2 du decret du 23 octobre 1867 en tant qu'elles ont autorise
l'ctablissement particulier de Blesle (Haute-Loire) des Soeurs de
Saint-Joseph-du-Puy. s . . - . .. , - • ;:,..â–
Par decret en date du 3 octobre 1966, est abroge l'article 1" du
decret du 17 fevrier 1954 portant reconnaissance legale de l'etablisse-
ment particulier d'Ernee (Mayenne) des Soeurs de la Misericorde
de Sees.
^<
y Inspection generale de radministration.
ir*
Par arrete du ministre de l'interieur en date du l'"^ septembre
1966:
Sont inscrits au tableau d'avancement pour l'annee 1966 pour
l'acces au grade d'inspecteur general de l'administration au minis-
tere de l'interieur :
1 M. Galy. — 2 M. Wiehn. — 3 M. Fontaine. ' *■'" •
Est inscrit au tableau d'avancement pour l'annee 1966, pour
l'acces au grade d'inspecteur de l'administration au ministere de
l'interieur : M. Robin.
MINISTERE DE LEDUCATION NATIONALE
Decret n" 66750 du 3 octobre 1966 abrogeant le decret
n" 60-465 du 19 mai 1960 relatif ä l'application de ia loi du
31 juillet 1959 prevoyant des mesures speciales en faveur des
jeunes gens ayant servi en Algerie.
I •'» " - - <- • „ I ,, , I „ • .
Le Premier ministre, , l :
Sur le rapport du ministre de reducation nationale,
Vu la loi n" 59-'960 du 31 juillet 1959, et specialement sa
section V ;
Vu le decret n" 60-465 du 19 mai 1960 relatif ä l'application
de la loi du 31 juillet 1959 prevoyant des mesures speciales en
faveur des jeunes gens ayant servi en Algerie ;
Vu l'avis du conseil superieur de l'education nationale ;
Le comite de coordination de la promotion sociale entendu,
Decrete :
Art. 1* ^ — Les dispositions du decret n" 60-465 du 19 mai 1960
susvise cesseront d'etre applicables ä compter du 1'^' janvier 1967,
sous reserve des dispositions de l'article 2 ci-apres.
Art. 2. — Les jeunes gens ayant ete blesses en cours d'ope-
ration en Algerie ou ayant contractu en Algerie, avant le
1" juillet 1962, une maladie ouvrant droit ä pension pourront
solliciler le benefice des dispositions du decret n" 60-465 du
19 rnai 1960 pendant les trois annees suivant la date de conso-
lidation de leur blessure ou la fixation du pourcentage
d'invalidite.
Les prorogations accordees en application du precedent alinea
ne pourront exceder le 1"' janvier 1970.
Art. 3. — Le ministre de Teducation nationale est Charge de
Texecution du present decret, qui sera public au Journal ojficiel
de la Republique frangaise.
Fait ä Paris, ie 3 octobre 1966.
Par le Premier ministre : Georges pompidou.
Le viinisire de Veducation nationale,
CHRISTIAN FOUCHET.
MINISTERE DES ARMEES
Decret n 66749 du 1" octobre 1966
portant reglement de discipline generale dans les armees.
» «
RAPPORT AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE
Monsieur le President,
L'cpoque contemporaine inipose ä notre pays et ä son armee des
changenients de toute nature.
La mise en service des nouveaux armements, l'evolution de la
Strategie, dominee par le fait nucleaire, conduisent a une Organi-
sation des forces plus complexe, se developpant dans un cadre
interarmes et souvent interarmees,
Le progrcs des armes et du matöriel reclame, pour leur emploi,
une qualification toujours plus precise et plus longue ä acquerir.
Les aspects previsibles de futurs conflits, dont les necessites de
la defense interdisent d'exclure Teventualite, impliquent que les
combattants soient prets a affronter les situations les plus imprevues
et lourdes des perils les plus graves. Les aleas de la bataille peuvent,
ä tout moment, couper les Communications, disloquer les unites,
separer leurs elements de leurs chefs et, ainsi, contraindre des
groupes reduits, parfois des isoles, ä poursuivre la lutte en ne
comptant que sur leurs propres ressources.
Aussi la preparation des armees exige-t-elle du personnel militaire
des qualites morales et techniques excluant toute defaillance. Elle
commande, en fait, d'augmenter la proportion des specialistes sous
contrat et de solectionner de maniere plus severe les jeunes appeles.
Mais les uns et les autres aspirent a trouver dans la vie militaire
des conditions comparables a Celles qu'ils trouvent dans la vie civile
et qui connaissent ellcs-memes de profondes transiormations.
Dans le meme temps, en effet, la population s'accroit ä un rythme
rapide, la migration des campagnes vers la ville s'accentue ; chaque
jour des progres scientiliques et tecliniques modifient les conditions
d'existence et de travail ; une legislation sociale, maintenant gene«
ralisee, apporte la securite de la vie familiale et professionnelle.
De nouvelles perspectives sont ainsi offertes a la jeunesse. Plus
instrüit, gräce ä une scolarisation plus etendue et plus longue,
beneficiant de moyens considerables d'information, se deplagant
davantage pour son travail comme pour ses loisirs, le jeune homme
d'aujourd'hui entre dans la vie active avec une conscience avivee
de ses possibilites et de ses droits. II est anime par I'ambition
d'acquerir au plus tot dans la societe une place repondant ä ses
aspirations. ; ,
Cette affirmation de la p2rsonnalite tend ä l'affranchissement de '
tutelies trop etroites ailant parfois jusqu'ä la contestation des valeurs
traditionnelles. Les conditions actuelles de l'existence isolent souvent .
le jeune Frangais dans des masses anonymes, imposent ä tous ses
actes un rythme accelere, le soumettent ä la pression de I'actualite
et estompent chez lui le sentiment de ses obligations envers la
communaute nationale.
:. -. ' * •■■■;' : :
Cette evolution des armees et des esprits impose que les regles
de la discipline militaire soient adaptfees aux conditions de notre
epoque. II Importe donc de reviser les decrets de 1933 et 1937
portant reglement de discipline, respectivement pour les armees .:
de terre et de l'air et pour la marine.
Ainsi, en eliminant dixers anachronismes, seront renforcees l'intan-
gibilite et la necessite du principe superieur de discipline sans
lequel la mission des armees ne saurait etre accomplie. ,, - ^
La discipline reste, en effet, la regle qui* guide chaolin dans
laccomplissement d'un devoir diificile et l'irremplagable moyen de
fortilier les caracteres, d'accoutumer les esprits ä l'abnegation et
de preparer les hommes ä l'action du temps de guerre comme ä
Celle du temps de paix.
Mais, la discipline ne prescrit pas seulement l'execution litterale
des ordres, eile requiert aussi une initiative londee sur la competence
professionnelle et la recherche du rendement. Elle doit se conformer
aux prescriptions inherentes a toute discipline fonctionnelle et les
assortir de la fermete indispensable au combat.
De meme, le chef est amene ä exercer son autorite sur une unite
oü sont remplies des fonctions specialisees qui tendent ä la fois ä
is'oler les individus et ä les rendre plus etroitement interdependants.
Son röle prend ainsi une importance plus grande et devient plus
complexe ; il lui appartient, en particulier, de rechercher la parti-
clpation volontaire et active de ses subordonnes et son souci doit
etre, dans la mesure oĂĽ la conservation du secret le permet, de
les informer du but general poursuivi et de ses intentions.
W)
8854
l:'™!exi,T crL^saX du ,o.e des chels et ri>„portanec pour les
inĂĽu-s de ccrtains factcurs de coliosion. ,â– â–
dolaborer im nouveau rejislenient.
quTnd ĂĽ le faut, les parlicularites et les tradiĂĽons.
joi UNAL oiiicii:!^ i^i: i'A niiM ni.ioijn: FRANr.AisK
8 Octobre 1966
*
* *
Cc dccrct comprend un preambule et cinq titres.
I e Preambule est consacre aux principes generaux. Apres avoir
' ^n„riornlcessites de la defense et la mission mcombant aux
ZI U raonel e que la discipliae fait la f orce principale des
"mees; ll tr'aft'e ensufte de les'prit militaire, de la cohcsion des
unites et de l'obeissance.
Le titre I" expose les regles de la hiörarchie et du commandement.
II a paru necessaire de distinguer :
_ la hiörarchie des grades qui classe les militaires les uns par
rapport aux autres en superieurs et subalternes.
_ la hierarcbie des fonctions qui classe les mihtaires en chefs et
subordonnes. j
La hierarcbie des fonctions est generalement conforme ä la
hierarcbie des grades.
L'importance du commandement est soulignee. Les f^f f")^^^^
lesquelles il est exerce et maintenu sont def mies d une manicre
^"^L^'t^tre II expose dabord les obligations incombant ä tous les
militaires. .^ • a«
Les devoirs des chefs et des subordonnes sont ensuite precises.
Ilc pLXt des responsabilites inherentes aux fonctions de chacun^
L parttcXr le chef doit obtenir de ses subordonnes une obeissance
totale et encourager leur initiative.
Le reglement met l'accent sur les responsabilites que les chefs
ou Ls submdonnes pourraient encourir en ordonnant ou en accom-
pUssant de? actions qui constitueraient des crimes ou des delits.
Des dispositions particulieres consacrees ä la formation militaire
ind^^uent les conditions dans lesquelles les chefs sont prepares a
"exercice de l'autorite et les subordonnes ä l'execution des ordres.
CetteTormation est dispensee dans toutes les activites individuelles
et collectives de la vie militaire.
Un chapitre concerne les devoirs au combat. II prescrit a chacun
de poursu'ire la lutte Jusqu'ä l'accomplissement de «^ Mission. II fixe
aussi la conduite ä tenir pour ceux qui auraient le malheur de
?omier aux mains de l'ennemi. II rappeile enfin les principales
prcscriptions relatives aux lois et coutumes de la guerre.
Le titre III a pour objet les regles du f ^^i^^." ^^% ^f P^,';'^^"'
tendent ä developper la solidarite au sein des unites et a marquer
l'appartenance des militaires ä la nation.
Les manifestations exterieures de la discipline, liees aux exigences
partTcuTiLes de la vie militaire, ont ete pour la plupart conservees ;
certaines ont ete renovees ou allegees.
Les principales modifications concernent le droit de revetir la
tenue c vHe et la liberte de circulation ; l'un et l'autre ont ete
Sdus pour tenir compte des conditions actuelles de l'existence.
Le titre IV traitant des recompenses et punitions modifie le
regime des punitions actuellement en vigueur, notamment dans les
armees de terre et de l'air. '
Attribue ä la fonction et non au grade, le droit de punir est reserve
ä trois echelons de commandement: le ministrc des armees, les
officiers generaux dans leur commandement, les chels de corps. Ce
dernier terme designe, outre les commandants de formation formant
corns de l'armce de terre, les commandants de batiment de la
marine, les commandants de base ou de formation aerienne et les
autorites äquivalentes. Une delegation de ce droit peut etre donnee
par l'un de ces trois echelons h un echelon subordonne selon des
modalit^s qui seront precisees dans des textes d'applicntion. En tout
etat de cause tous les echelons de commandement conservent le
droit de demander une sanction et celui de prendre ä l'encontre
d'un de leurs subordonnes les mesures privatives da liberte que
peuvent imposer les circonstances. • y,
Toute punition fait l'objet d'une procedure qui ecarte l arb.lraire :
c'est le Chef de corps qui est obligatoirement saisi de toute demande
de' punition concernant un de ses subordonnes. Un bareme lui
permet de determiner la nrture et le taux de la sanction a mlhgcr
suivant la laute commise. Si celle-ci exige une sanction qui exc.de
ses pouvoirs, il transmet une demande de punition a 1 echelon
^"Les'Xrniers articles de ce titre sont consacres aux garanties.
L'exercice du droit de redamation est defini et organise : le .subor-
donne qui aurait ä se plaindre d'une mesure injustifiee est assure
que son recours sera transmis. si besoin est, jusqu au sommot de
la hierarcbie. .. * •• * • •"
Le titre V traite des dispositions diverses et fixe, notamment,
le champ d'application du reglement. ^
Tel est l'objet du present decret que nous avons l'honneur de
soumettre ä votre approbation. 'r.*r-^
Veuillez agreer, Monsieur le President, l'assurance de notre
profond respect. " >
Le President de la Rcpublique,
Sur le rapport du Premier ministre et du ministre des
ariTiees
Vu la loi du 14 avril 1832 sur l'avancement dans larmce ;
Vu la loi du 19 mai 1834 sur l'etat des officiers ;
Vu la loi du 30 mars 1928 relative au Statut des sous-officiers
de carriere de l'armee ; . ^ „
Vu la loi du 31 mars 1928 sur le recrutement de 1 armee ;
Vu la loi du 4 mars 1929 portant Organisation des diffcrents
corps d'officiers de l'armee de mer et du corps des cquipagcs
de la flotte ; , . . ♦ ,i«
Vu la loi du 13 decembre 1932 relative au recrutement de
l'armee de mer et ä l'organisalion de ses reserves ;
Vu la loi du 9 avril 1935 fixant le Statut du personnel des
cadres actifs de J'armce de Tair ; '^
Vu l'ordonnance n" 59-147 du 7 janvier 19a9 portant Orga-
nisation generale de la defense;
Vu la loi n" 65-550 du 9 juillet 1965 relative au recrute-
ment en vue de l'accomplissement du service national;
Vu le Code de justice militaire, ^ _
Decrete :
PREAMBULE
I —La loi, expression de la volonte nationale, def mit la
defense comme le moyen d'assurer en tous temps, en toutes
circonstances et contre toutes les formes dagression, la secu
rite et l'intcgrite du territoire, ainsi que la vie de la popu
^urrmee assure la defense par la force des armes; sa mission
et ses moyens lui sont fixes par l'Etat. ._
Tous les Citoyens francais, recrutes conformement a la Im
participent ä la defense sous la forme, soit du service mili
taire destine ä repondre aux besoins des armees soit du sei
vice de defense destine ä satisf aire les besoins de la detens.
en personnel non militaire.
II — L'appartenance ä l'armee confere, en tous temps, au
Citoyens presents sous les drapeaux des devoirs et des respor
sabilites exceptionnels. . , ^ - rm^ Hof in.
La discipline fait la force principale des armees Elle defm-
l'obeissance et regit l'exercice de Fautorite. Elle s appliqu
ä tous Sans distinction de rang, precise a chacun son dexoir e
aide ä prevenir les defaillances. , • . „„jf »m
L'esprit militaire, qui procede de l'espnt civique ""»^ jo
les membres des forces armees, developpe en eux le sens ci,
leurs responsabilites particulieres et les incite a servir ave
loyaute et abnegation. II se manifeste par le courage, 1 a d i.
cipline et la solidarite. Sa plus haute expression est le sens (
l'honneur fondc sur le respect de soi-meme et ^ autrui, la tier
d'appartenir ä une unite militaire et le devouement a la patrM
IIi _ La formation militaire inculque ä chacun la valeur
l'exigence du devoir militaire. Elle aide ä a^quenr les q
lites morales necessaires pour l'accomplir en dePit des au
cultes du Service et des dangers du combat. Elle feconae
discipline dans la vie et l'action collectives.
8 Octobre 1966
JOURNAL 01T1C1I:L DM \A IWVini.UjVE MlAN(;AISL<:
• ^ *
l
La formation concourt ä creer et ä maintenir dans les unites
la cohcsion et le moral indispensables ä rexdcution de la
mission de Tarnice.
' La cohesion rcpose sur l'adhesion de chacun ä son devoir,
sur la qualitc des liens qui unissent les niembres des forces
arm6es et sur la confiance mutuelle qu'exige la solidarite dans
l'action. j.
Tout militaire doit, dans sa fonction, faire preuve de la
conscience professionnelle et de la discipline necessaires a l'ac-
complissement de la mission de son unite.
Chefs et subordonnes etendent leurs relations profession-
nelles aux relations humaines que la communaute de vie et
d'action developpe en eux. La valeur de la personne comme
de la fonction doit etre reconnue.
- rV. — Conferee par la loi, l'autorite implique le pouvoir
d'imposer l'obeissance. Dans l'exercice de son commandement,
le Chef, depositaire de l'autorite, la maintient et la transmet
intacte. II a le droit et le devoir de donner des ordres et de
les faire executer. Toute faiblesse, comme tout abus d'autorite,
sont des manquements ä la discipline.
V. — L'obeissance est le concours actif et sans defaillance
apporte au chef par le subordonne. Elle procede de la sou-
mission ä la loi.
Le subordonne est responsable devant son chef de l'execu-
tion des ordres regus ainsi que des consequences de leur
inexecution. Le devoir d'obcissance ne degage jamais le subor-
donne des responsabilites qui lui incombent au regard de la
loi. II peut en appeler ä l'autorite competente s'il se croit
l'objet d'une mesure injustifice ou s'il regoit un ordre illegal.
• ■■' f'^ ..rr-vVV. TiTRE i«r • ;.„ ; ■■. • .•
RECLES DE LA HIERARCHIE ET DU COMMANDEMENT
CHAPITRE l''' :■■•"•
• • . ■* . . •
Regles de la Hierarchie. -
.â– --. ' â– ','â– â– â– . â– :-^: . Articie r^ y " " '
.*'.;■Autorites gouvernementales. - ~' •• -• -
Conformcment ä la Constitution et a la loi, les armees relevent :
Du President de la Republique, chef de l'Etat, chef des armees,
garant de l'independance nationale et de l'integrite du
territoire ;
Du Premier ministre, responsable de la defense nationale ;
Du ministre des armees, responsable de l'execution de la poli-
tique militaire du Gouvernement. - •. - â–
8855
••;■•"!- ' ,^-.
1../.
•-.,•' . f-««: ' 4 ..-.'
• -«^
.. ' • â– '*,'â–
Articie 2.
■1 .'.'• .'•*'■,"' ■*'/ •».-•'- ..<',
■• ■', y 'ji ; •'•
. . * • ■■'' ,
Hierarchie
1. Les armees ont une structure hierarchique.
La hierarchie est l'ordre des grades ; eile est definie par les
Statuts generaux qui regissent les personnels.
Les militaires appartiennent, d'apres leur grade, ä l'une des
trois categories de personnels :
Officiers. ^i. . . • - ;
Sous-officiers. ' ^^ •■,^ "' • *v ■' '
Hommes du rang. . " -f "'^ - ^ -<i?^ •.;^. .
2. Selon leur place respective dans l'ordre hierarchique les
militaires ont, les uns par rapport aux autres, la qualit^ de
superieur ou de subalterne. â– '-^^ :
. ' â– V'.' Articie 3.
Grade.
• ». ' > > •
1. Le grade consacre l'aptitude ä exercer des fonctions deter-
minees. II confere une appellation, des prerogatives et comporte
des obligations. ^
2. A egalite de grade, l'ordre hierarchique resulte, sauf dispo-
sitions particuheres, de l'arfciennete dans le grade- ä egalite
d'ancienneto dans le grade, de l'anciennete dans' le grade
mferieur. s^auc
3. L'anciennete dans le grade est le temps passe en activite
de Service dans ce grade. av^uvue
4. Les officiers et sous-officiers en retraite ou en oosition
Interruptrice d'anciennete. rappeles a l'activite, se classent
d apres leur grade et leur anciennete de service actif ^dan^
ce grade. A egalite de grade et d'anciennete, ils se classent
apres les officiers et sous-officiers du cadre actif. ., w, : -.
II en est de meme des officiers et sous-officiers de reserve.
â– En ce qui concerne les officiers generaux, le temps passe
dans la 2" section n'est pas pris en compte pour determiner
leur classement relatif.
5. Le titulaire d'un grade a le droit et le devoir de faire
respecter les regles generales de la discipline par tous les
militaires qui lui sont inferieurs dans l'ordre hierarchique.
' . ■' ": ' ; • (• Articie 4. " ••■' . .
Hierarchie generale des grades des officiers.
1. La hierarchie generale des grades des officiers dans
chaque armee est rappelee dans le tableau ci-apres :
ARM^E DE TERRE
ARMäE DE MER
ARM^E DE L'AIR
General d'armee (2).
General de corps
d'armee (2).
General de division,
General de biigade.
Marechal ou amihal de France (1)
Officiers generaux.
Amiral (2).
Vice-amiral d'escadre
(2).
Vice-amiral,
Contre-aniiral.
Officiers superieurs.
General d'armee
aerienne (2).
General de corps
aerien (2>.
General de division
aerienne.
General de brigade
aerienne.
Colonel.
Lieutenant-colonel.
Commandant (3>.
Capitaine.
Lieutenant,
Sous-lieutenant.
Capitaine de vaisseau. I Colonel,
Capitaine de fregate.
Capitaine de corvette,
Officiers subalternes.
Lieutenant de vaisseau.
Enseigne de vaisseau
de 1" classe,
Enseigne de vaisseau
de 2" classe.
Lieutenant-colonel.
Commandant.
Capitaine.
Lieutenant.
Sous-lieutenant.
(1) Ce titre est, en outre, une dignite dans l'Etat
(2) Korrespondent a des rangs et appellations et non ä des grades. •
(3) Ou chef de bataillon ou chet d'escadron (s) suivant l'arine
2. La hierarchie particuliere de chaque corps ou cadre ainsi
que, le cas echeant, ses correspondances avec la hierarchie
generale des grades sont definies par le Statut particulier de
chaque corps ou cadre. Elles sont rappelees dans l'annexe I
au present decret.
La hierarchie du contröle general des armees ne comporte
aucune assimilation de grade avec les hieraichies des autres
corps. Les membres de ce corps sont independants des chefs
militaires et, du point de vue de la discipline, ils ne relevent
que du ministre et de leurs superieurs dans leur hierarchie
propre,
Les magistrats militaires sont soumis ä la discipline generale.
Toutefois, dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, ils sont independants
des Chefs militaires ; ils ne relevent que du ministre et de leurs
superieurs dans leur hierarchie propre.
Les aumöniers militaires n'ont, en cette qualite, ni grade
ni rang dans la hierarchie militaire pendant la duree de leurs
fonctions, Ils sont soumis aux obligations de la discipline mili-
taire et, ä ce titre, directement subordonnes aux commandants
des formations auxquelles ils sont rattaches. Ils ne regoivent
d ordre que des commandants de ces formations et de leurs
superieurs dans leur hierarchie propre.
8 Octobre 19ii6
JOUHNAL oKnaKLOi^ LA miH lUJoUK rUANilAlSK
8H57
3. Le sup.^riour »•a.irossant ä u„ subalterne utilise les appel-
't'::™\e..c et ae Ta. (V co.p.s la .enCanneHe
— ;i. ; .PP^e le — e^ .; - -f - f^t
son nom . .1 "^^^. "S« / P^^^^^n „„„ „„ par son grade confor-
b> \rmiV de mer (y compris la gendarmene mant.me) .
tuellemcnt suivi de leur nom. . .
c) Corps assimiles : â– . ' ; . . ^;' ^'.^n '^^rps assimilc
U„ superieur s'adressant a un ^f f^' "^^^f^f Pention du
ZrvZ"^e : SsE:.' t "Li ev^enluellement du grade,
Sans enonce de la classe. e^uiot ohasseur
appellation propre ä leur arme ou service. .^ .. .,.
CHAPITRE 2
'*• • •
. fi
Regles'dĂĽ commandemenf et de la Subordination.
' • "-' ' "^ ■Article 10. «. . ^. . :
; â– i'.
-/ â– ' i CoTumandement et sitbordmation. ' *
' » "
( <
L.>
1 T o nninmandement est l'exercice de l'autorite.
La su'boSXon Tstretat dans lequel se trouve le personnel
"Le'command'J^nTTt la Subordination resultent du grade et
des fonc~ rem^nes Hs presentent un earactere permanent
OU occasionnel. .
1 Dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions, les militaires sont
vent delecation d'autorite pour exercer des fonctions parli
culieres. ' ' ' ' * " • ' -^„„
1 Tout militaire qui exerce, meme provisoirement une fonc-
tion eJtl^^v'ti de l'autorite et de la responsabihte afferentes a
cette fonction. s * i ' < ' '
A T a hierarchie du personnel militaire femmm ne compor-
ses droits comme dans ses devoirs.
. ■^.•••" ,:■• -: Article 11. " ' ". : .:
' ,. f Comynandement des unites.
1. Le commandement d'une unite implique a ^a fms, le
droit et l'obligation d'exercer l'autorite sur les personnels
constituant cette unite. â– '" â– â– " ,' - ;'*^
2. Tout commandement d'unite est attribue nom^^^^^
par dccision de l'autorite superieure, soit a titre definitit, soit,
parfois, ä titre provisoire. ^ , , .
Article 12. • '
• Coimnandement territorial ■• '
TTn rnmmandement comportant des attributions speciales rela-
tives Tunrc^rrnscHp^^ territoire est appele . commande-
.Tient territorial >.
Article 13.
Commandement operationnel
Pnur la prcparation et l'exccution de missions particulieres,
de? comm^andements operationnels » peuvent etre constitues
pour met re en c«uvre des groupements de foyces composes de
plusieurs unites ou meme de fractions d'unitcs.
Article 14. * • ■. ,
Reunion fortuite d'uniies.
Fn eis de reunion lortuite d'unitcs relevant de diffj'M r.M
.om nandemen s e coupees de leur chef, le connnandanl d'.H..io
irpius a^n dans le'grade le plus eleve'prend le con.man-
dement de l'ensemble. . „„..t^inp^ «l'iTilre
Tl confirme leurs missions aux umtes. Si ceitanics d tnirt
elles n^ önt plus en mcsure de les exceuter, .1 leur f,xe une
nouveUe mission. 11 en reud comple des que possible.
, ,.vv i : x â– :y^' Article 15 ' '' ' '
â– : Continuite du commandemeyit.
1 L'exercice du commandement doit etre continu.
-^ Fn cas d'absence du titulaire, le commandement est
exe'rce par e Premier des subordonnes selon Tordre hic.ar-
chique, si aucun ordre de devolution parlicuher n est prevu.
Un tel commandement est dit <^ par intenm ».
n s'exerce jusqu'au retour du titulaire ou jusqu a la pnse
de fonction d'un nouveau titulaire.
*.> . Article 16. .
' â– pernianence du commandement.
1 L'action du commandement doit eire permanente.
*> Torsaue le titulaire d'un commandement ne peut. direc
Sol.S p- 1. «IPPK.V, p„.i»»™™t, ". r.~pi»>™»»'
de tout ou Partie de sa mission. -
Article 17.
- - Cas particuliers. \' â– 'â– â–
1. A grade egal, le commandement peut a^^^^^^^ •
titulaire d'une let.re de service speciale ou dune lettie Q.
commandement.
2 Les officiers et sous-officicrs des corps dont le Statut
le'menĂĽonne s'nt subordonnes, quel que soit leur g^ade ma
dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions seulement, aux ofticiers
sous-officiers des autres corps.
3. Les commandants de bätiments ou ^'«f '^^^^\?^,",
sab es de l'execution de la mission et de la secur ite, ont a ce
titre autorite sur touies les personnes presentes a leur bord.
TITRE II -: -" .
1 DEVOIRS ET FORMATION DES MILITAIRES
- CHAPITRE 1^'
.. Devoirs generaux. " '
,. " , i Article 18. ''
Devoirs generaux du militaire. . ' J '
L En tant que citoyen, il doit: , ,., , ' '''
Sc conformer aux lois ; :•
'^orvi^ avec loyaute et devouement ; .• i . .
HonorerTe drapeau et respecter les traditions nationale ,
S'?nterdii^ tout acte, propos ou attitude contraires aux inteiUs
ou ä l'honneur de la nation. . . •'
2. Membre des forces armces, il doit:
Observer la discipline et les reglements ; ' __ ,
Accepter les sujetions de l'etat militaire ; ,^
Se comporter avec droiture et dignite ; ^ _
P^;:X ioi^r maT.4". :rd:'s\nsta..atioas appar.enan, aus
armees ou places sous leur dependance. • . '
3. Responsable d'une fonction dans ^on umto ĂĽ doit.
Anporter un concours sans defaillance a lau out
S'Sui^e pour tenir son poste avec compcU^^^^^
S'entrainer en vue d'etre^efficace dans lacuon.
-.*j'l-v.
Vt
8858
jornNAi. (»mciKL dk la nKi>muoiiK nuNrAisi^
8 Octobre 1966
4." Chaque miWairc a Ic devoir de sc P'-^'P»'"" P'^^'^'^^^f ;;'^
et moralemenl au combat et d'accomplu- sa m.ss>on. nume a«
peiil de sa vie. ,
Article 19.
' ' ^ ' Superieurs et subalternes. - .
1 'La hierarchic impose des devoirs reciproques aux supe-
tieurs et aux subalternes, quelles que soient leur armee d appar-
tenancc et leur unite d'affcciation.
2 Le superieur doit etre un exemple pour le subalterne,
celui-ci Uli doit obcissance et respect.
3 Un superieur ne peut donner d'ordres ä un subalterne ne
relevant pas de son autorite que pour faire apphquer les regles
fienciales de la discipline.
4 Tout militaire, quelle que soit sa qualite ou son grade,
doR seeönfirnVe? aux Instructions ou obtemperer aux mjonct.ons
dun militaire mcmc subalterne, si ce dcrnier est en service et
agU en vertu d'ordres ou de consignes qu'il est Charge de faire
appliquer. , •. . .
CHAPITRE 2 • [''' '
Devoirs et responsabilites des chefs et des subordonnes.
Article 20. - . .
Chef et snhordonne.
Tout militaire appartient ä une unite oü il regelt la responsa-
bilTt^d'^e foncUon. 11 est, de ee fait, directement subordonne
' Chefet subordonne ont, ä ce titre, des responsabilites et des
devoirs particuliers. *" '
Article 21. -v •
Veviiirs et responsabilites des chejs.
1 L'autorite dont le chef est investi lui donne le devoir de
pre;d^e des d6cisio.s et de les faire appliquer par ses subordon-
nes II traduit ses decisions par des ordres.
Les ordres doivent etre precis et fermes.
1 Le Chef est responsable des ordres qu'il donne, de leur
exLtton 't de eurs consequenees. Lorsqu'il Charge 'un de ses
surordonnes d'agir en ses lieu et place, sa responsabilite demeure
entl^re efLiw'^ les actes de ses subordonnes accomphs regu-
lierement dans le cadre de leurs fonctions. _
3 Le Chef a le droit et le devoir d'exiger l'obeissance de
ses su^rdonnes ; toutefois, il ne peut leur ordonner d accomphr
delactes dont l'execution engagerait leur responsabilite penale.
Ces actes sont les suivants : ^^r:«;^«
Actes contraires aux lois et coutumcs de la guerre, defmies
auv articles 34 et 35 du present reglement ; , , . .^ ^n
Ictes qul constituent des crimes et delits contre la suret6 de
l'Etat, la Constitution ou la Pf P"^^\^^^^^^^^ j^ liberte des
p^^nef^t ^l^ ^o^ia^'duÄs ne sont pas iusti-
fies par l'appUcation de la loi.
4. une obeissance parfaite ne peut etre «Wf ""e que s. ^
ehef excrce son autorite avec competenee, Justice et fermete^
A fS de ses subordonnes, son aa.tude doit fac.liter
'T^:.%^T^^ in-Jn^rp que d-i^pose.
SleTXdonnt T^^^^l ef^-»' ^^
n Oriente leur initiative et obtient leur particinat.on active a la
"f '"^ Chef transmet ses ordres par la voie hierarchique Si
rurgei^e la nlcessite ou des directives particuliJres le.condu..
sentTs''affranchir de cette voie, il intorme tou» les echelons
concerncs. , ., i ..^^ao
6. Le Chef instruit ses subordonnes ; il controle les progres
*inc*hnmmes et la valeur des unites. , . .
II noT ses subordonnes et formule ses appreciations apres
avoir Dris l'avis de leurs superieurs dirccts. • ^ ,^,
11 tedgne sa satisfaction par des recompenses. roprime les
- fautes Tr des punitions ; il est attentif aux conditions mate-
Tklles de vie et aux preoccupations personnelles de ceux qui
ßont plac^s sous son autorite. v • /
Article 22.
Devoirs et responsabilites des subordonnes.
1 L'obeissance est le premier devoir du subordonne. Cclui-
execute loyalement les ordres qu'il regoit. II est responsnb
de leur execution ou des consequenees de leur inexecution.
responsabilite exclut l'obeissance passive. Le subordonne d(
donc se penetrer, non seulement de la lettre des ordres. m:
aussi de leur esprit. " . " ^ ,, . ^.
2 Le subordonne a le devoir de rendre compte de 1 exccut,
%::TirTonsi.ie c^n lui est impossible d'executer
ordre! il en rend compte immediatement ä 1 autorite que
donne. " ^,.^ / i- '
3 Sous reservc des dispositions des articles 114 (alinoa
et 190 du Code penal, le subordonne qui execu erait un orc.
prescrivant raccomplissement d'un acte . »X' J'^^^^^,' «
cle 21-3 du present reglement, engagerait plcmement sa r
ponsabilitc penale et disciplinaire. â– ^ _
Si le subordonne croit se trouver en presence d un tel ord
il ale devoir de faire part de ses objections a rautoritc qu.
donne" en°ndiquant expressement la significat.on illegale q.
'' Sitordr;res[ mMntr et si, malgre .es explications ou linl
nr6 a ion qui .1 en ont ete donnecs, le subordonne pers.sted.
prctation qui u. mesure d'execution
."„r tf de "^h Ions suplnenrs qu'il a la possibilite de joimi
Ad"faut de cette dernrire possibilite, ou si, bien que con ir
par ?autöri?6 superieure, l'ordre lui «PP«-". X"';,„^f ^^l
d'illeealitc le subordonne peut ne pas lexccuter, sans
ceSnt exonere des sanctions qu'impliqueraü «_^^e inex ™t
dans le cas oü, par la suite, celleci "« P°"[™\,;''^,f;^;te:tc
une exacte appreciation du caractere illegal de 1 ordre co.nest.
CHAPITRE 3
Formation militair«.
[ ; ," . Article 23. _'' ", .
â– â– ' ' But et caracteres. - -
1. La formation militaire tend ä developper le sens du ^
vice et resprit de solidarite. Elle prepare les chefs a cxer<
de l'autori?!, les subordonnes ä rexecution des ordres, les un-
ä l'action cohcrente.
9 T a formation militaire s'adresse ä tous et suppose la p.
entretiens. les inspections et les mutations, pour les appr
dir. .. : ^ r • . , ;
/ ■' ...,**•, :/•' Article 24.
Moyens.
, La formation militaire est dispensee k Voccasion de tc
les'activites individuelles et coUeetives.
1 L'instruction, Ventrainement et les loisirs sont les prj
paux mĂ–?ens dSrer efficacement cette fo-^m^^o-J-^^^ '"
Tns TL notation permettent d'apprecier les resultats obtc
>'-•-.•
->»
Article 25.
,', ti'
â– . i ;â– .- ':
Instruction et entrmnement.
1. L'instruction et l'entrainement rendent les hommesi
les unites aptes ä remplir leurs fonctions et ä exccuter
raission, quelles que soient les circonstances.
9 T a nratiuue reguliere de l'entrainement physique acc
l'cndu^anc'e e Ta mMtrise de soi. eduque les r^lexes et pre
i'raction en equipe. Elle ^eveloppe chez lindivid« et^^n
groupe le dynamisme necessaire a toutcs les activiies m
3. La formation tcchnique, portant esscntiellement sur
connaissance du materiel et de sa mise cn «uvre, donne a
8 Octobre 1966
JOĂśliNAL OFMUI'IL hl'] l,\ lUllini.inn-: l'hANTAlSK
8859
cun la qualification indispensable, le scns des responsabilites et
l'exacte notion de sa place dans un ensemble.
4. La preparation au combat, en simulant les conditions
reelles, monlre ä chacun les risques et les difficuUes de la
lutte et indique les moyens d'y faire face.
Les exercices et les manaeuvres permettent de juger du
dcgre de preparation des hommes et des unites.
■» .
. . Ji V Article 26. • - / •
Inspections et notaiion.
1. Les inspections permettent au commandement de constater
l'etat de preparation des unites. En faisant apparaitre les diffe-
rences qui peuvent exister entre les objectifs fixes et les resul-
tats obtenus, elles doivent etre l'occasion de preciser les res-
ponsabilites tant des chefs que des subordonnes.
2. Les notes eclairent le commandement sur la valeur, l'apti-
tude professionnelle et la maniere de servir des militaires. Elles
doivent etre etablies avec precision et en toute objectivite.
A Toccasion de la notation, le chef, au cours d'un entrelien
avec chacun de ses subordonnes directs, leur fait connaitre
son appreciation sur leur maniere de servir et leur cfonne les
conseils necessaires. .'. . - .•
Article 27. ^^ 7 ^ • 7 .
,^
5 .
* ' 'i
Detente et loi'iirs.
1. La detente est le complement indispensable du travail,
dont eile ameliore la qualite et le rendement. Elle assure le
bon equilibre de l'individu et entretient la cohesion et le moral
des unites.
2. Les activites de detente visent ä donner ä chacun, dans un
climat de camaraderie, la possibilite de satisfaire ses goĂĽts et
ses aspirations intellectuelles et spirituelles.
La pratique des sports individuels et collectifs complete l'ins-
truction physique et developpe un esprit de saine emulation ä
l'occasion des competitions.
3. Ces activites peuvent s'exercer au sein de groupes animes
par leurs membres sous l'impulsion et le controle du comman-
dement, celui-ci contribue ä les organiser, leur procure les
moyens necessaires et facilite les contacts et les echanges avec
l'exterieur.
ij _ . .; . - . -
. .- • . -.. Article 28. • •
' Promotion sociale. . '
L'armee s'attache ä repondre au desir de promotion sociale
qui pousse l'individu ä s'elever dans la societe en ameliorant
ses connaissance? et ses aptitudes. •
Le commandement informe les militaires des possibilites qui
leur sont offertes pour perfectionner leur Instruction generale
et professionnelle. II leur donne ä cet effet les facilites compa-
tibles avec les necessites du Service. v ' .. . . . â–
â– , '' â– >â– â– ' • â– .â–
• < • ' ". Article 29. ' " '. '
Formation civiqiie.
1. L'armee inculque aux Frangais servant sous les drapeaux
le sentiment de leur soldarite et des devoirs qu'entraine leur
appartenance a la communaute nationale.
2. Les actes importants de la vie militaire rappellent ä cha-
cun le devoir d'assurer la defense de la patrie. Ils doivent
permettre aux citoyens de prendre conscience de leurs obli-
galions et des sacrifices qui peuvent leur etre demandes.
CHAPITRE 4 .
Devoirs des militaires au combat.
Article 30. ,
Generalites.
La force et la cohesion des unites au combat exigent que
chaque militaire participe ä l'action contre l'ennemi avec
energie et abnegation.
Cette action est menee, quoi qu'il arrive, jusqu'ä l'accomplis-
sement total de la mission.
Article 31.
Devoirs du chef au combat.
. "> :
1. Le chef conduit la lutte et poursuit le combat jusqu'au
succes ou jusqu'ä l'epuisement de tous ses moyens.
2. 11 stimule la volonte de combattre de ses subordonnes,
maintient en toutes circonstances l'ordre et la discipline ; au
besoin, il force l'obeissance.
3. Le chef prend toutes dispositions pour qu'aucun document
important ni materiel utilisable ne tombe aux mains de
l'ennemi.
'•".->■Article 32. , ■■■■- -^ y-.
.' Devoirs du combattayit.
1. Tout combattant doit remplir sans defaillance les devoirs
qui Uli incombent, soit ä titre personnel, soit ä titre de membre
d'une equipe ou d'un equipage.
2. En particulier : v
II s'efforce de detruire l'ennemi ;
II met tout en oeuvre pour atteindre l'objectif designe ou
tenir le poste qui lui est assigne ;
II maintient en etat de fonctionnement les armes ou le mate-
riel qui sert ; il s'efforce d'assurer le Service des armes ou
des materiels collectifs dont le personnel a ete mis hors de
combat ;
II evite la capture et rejoint l'unite ou l'autorite la plus
proche si, dans l'impossibilite de remplir sur place sa mission,
il ne peut recevoir des ordres de ses chefs.
3. II est interdit au combattant :
D'abandonner des armes et des materiels en etat de servir ;
D'entrer en rapport avec l'ennemi ;
De se rendre ä l'ennemi avant d'avoir epuise tous les moyens
de combattre. *
4. Quand tous les chefs sont tombes, l'homme le plus brave
prend le comnjandement et poursuit le combat.
Article 33.
Devoirs du prisoyinier.
1. Si un combattant tombe aux mains de l'ennemi, son devoir
est d'echapper ä la captivite en profitant de la confusion de
la bataille et de toutes occasions favorables pour rejoindre les
forces amies.
S'il est garde prisonnier, il a le devoir de s'evader et d'aider
ses compagnons ä le faire.
2. Un prisonnier reste militaire. II est donc, en particulier,
soumis dans la vie en commun aux regles de la hierarchie et
de la Subordination vis-ä-vis de ses compagnons de captivite.
3. Tout prisonnier doit conserver la volonte de resistance
et l'esprit de solidarite necessaires pour surmonter les epreuves
de la captivite et resister aux pressions de l'ennemi.
II repousse toute compromission et se refuse a toute declara-
tion ecrite ou orale et en general ä tout acte susceptible de
nuire ä son pays et a ses camarades.
4. Le militaire prisonnier ne donne ä l'ennemi que ses nom,
prenoms, grade, numero matricule et date de naissance. II peut
contribuer ä fournir les memes renscignements pour des cama-
rades qui ne sont pas physiquement capables de les donner
eux-memes.
Article 34. . i
Lois et coutumes de la guerre. ' •. 'â–
1. II est prescrit aux militaires au combat: •
De considerer comme « combatlants rcguliers » les membres
des forces armees ou de milices volontaires, y compris la
resistance organisee, ä condition que ces formations aient un
<s?.
8860
JOUnNAL OIIICIKK l>i: I^A lUiriinMOU!': Fr.ANr.Aisi:
8 Octobre 1966
Chef dcsiĂźnc, quc lours mcmbrcs arborent un signo distinctif,
portent des armes dune ia(;on apparente et respeclent les lois
pt usaees de la Ăźuerre ;
De traiter avec humanite sans dislinclion loutes les personnes
mises hors de combat ; , , , . , i ,i«o
De recueiUir, de protcger et de soigner les blesses, les malades
et les naufrages dans la mesure oĂĽ les circonstances le permet-
^"^De' respecter les höpitaux et les lieux de rassemblement de
malades ou de blesses civils ou militaires, les personnels, les
formations, les bätiments, les materiels et les transports sam-
taires et d'epargner les edifices consacres aux cultes, aux arls,
aux sciences et a la bienfaisance et ies monuments histonques,
ä condition qirils ne soient pas employes ä des fins miiitaircs.
2 De plus, il leur est interdit :
De prendre soiis leur feu, de blesser ou de tuer un ennemi qui
se rend ou qui est capturc ou avec lequel une suspension d armes
a etc conclue ;
De depouiller les morts et les blesses ;
De refuser une rcddUion sans condition ou de doclarer qu'il
ne sera pas fait de quartier ;
De se livrer ä toute destruction inutile et a tout pillage, en
particulier, des biens prives ;
De prendre des otages, de se livrer a des represailles ou ä des
sanctions coUectives ;
De condamner des individus sans jugeaient prealable rendu par
un tribunal rcgulierement constitue et assorti des garanties ]udi-
ciaires prevues par la loi ;
D'attaquer ou de retcnir prisonnier un parlementaire arborant
le drapeau blanc ;
D'utiliser tous les moyens qui occasionnent des souffrances et
des dommages inutiles ;
D'utiliser indĂĽment le pavillon parlementaire, le pavillon
national de l'ennemi ainsi que les insignes distmctifs des Conven-
tions internationales ;
De porter atteinte ä la vie et ä l'integrite corporelle des
malades, blesses, naufrages, ä Celles des prisonniers ainsi que
des personnes civiles, notamment, par le meurtre sous toutes ses
formes, les mutilations, les traitements cruels, tortures et sup-
plices ;
De forcer les nationaux de la partie adverse ä prendre part aux
Operations de guerre contre leur pays ;
De tirer sur l'equipage et les passagers d'avions civils ou mili-
taires sautant en parachute d'un avion en detresse, sauf lors-
qu'ils participent ä une Operation aeroportee ;
De detruire et de saisir des navires ou des acronef s de com-
merce neutres, sauf en cas de contrebande, rupture de blocus,
et autres actes contraires ä leur neutralite. , ^
Article 35 - , .-
' " Traitement des prisonniers. ,. .. •
Des leur capture, les prisonniers doivent etre traites avec huma-
nite Ils doivent etre proteges contre tout acte de violence,
contre les insultes et la curiosite publique. Ils ont droit au
respect de leur personne et de leur honneur. Ils doivent rester
en possession de leurs effets et objets d'usage personnel, sauf
les armes, equipements et documents militaires.
Les prisonniers doivent etre evacues dans le plus bref delai
apres leur capture vers des points de rassemblement situes
assez loin de la zone de combat. En attendant leur evacuation,
ils ne doivent pas etre exposes inutilement au danger.
L'evacuation des prisonniers doit s'effectuer dans les memes
conditions, notamment de securite, que les deplacements des
troupes frangaises. '•
La liste des prisonniers evacues doit etre etablie aussitöt
que possible ; chaque prisonnier n'est tenu de declarer, quand
il est interroge ä ce sujet, que ses nom, prenoms, grade, dato
de naissance, numero matricule, ou, ä defaut, une indication
equivalente.
Les prisonniers malades et blesses sont confies au Service
de sante.
TITRE III . ' r
'S * ' ' '
RECLES DU SERVICE
. . . CHAPITRE 1" '•
' , » ■■_
Ceremonial militaire.
â– , .. > Article 36. ' /
' ' Biit et esprit du ceremonial militaire.
Les ceremonies militaires ont pour but de donncr la solen-
nite qui convient ä certains evenements de la vie nationale et
de la vie militaire.
Elles manifestent publiquement la valeur et le prestige des
armees et les liens qui les unissent aux autorites et aux popu-
lations. Elles temoignent de la discipline des forces armees et
de l'esprit de solidaritc qui les animent. , , - .
Leur signification doit etre comprise de tous.
Les autorites civiles, les associations d'anciens combattants.
les associations des militaires de la rcserve et de preparation
militaire peuvent etre invitees ä ces ceremonies.
Article 37. .. ' ,
» -■. _ ■. *
Rcgles du ceremonial. â– :â– <
Le ceremonial militaire comprend les prises d'armes et les
honneurs militaires.
Les regles en sont fixees par le reglement sur le service
de garnison et par le decret sur les « marques, honneurs, saluts,
fetes nationales et visitcs dans les forces navales et ä bord des
bätiments de la marine militaire ». ^ • • ^
L'instruction et la preparation des unitcs au combat imposent
de reduire l'importance et la frequence des ceremonies mili-
taires Lorsque la preparation ä ces ceremonies est indispen-
sable, eile doit etre conduite de iaqon ä perturber le moins
possible rentrainement des unites. ..,•.:•. .
Article 38
Prises d'armes.
).
Les prises d'armes, consistant gcneralement en une reviie
suivie dun def ile, sont organisees :
Pour rendre les honneurs au drapeau, aux morts des guerres,
ä une haute personnalite ;
Pour feter un anniversaire ou rehausser l'eclat d'une maniies-
tation ; " - *• «
Pour marquer une prise de commandement, une inspection
ou une Visite; ' ' . . â– ' -' '-. . -
Pour remettre des decorations ou des insignes. ,; .^
Elles peuvent l'etre egalement pour assurer l'execution de
certaines condamnations. /;
I 1
. V' ^>\: '••;: Article 39. ' ' • '■■■'
.-.-.•■. â– â– '. â– " "â–
'':â– '-â– 'â– ' ,. â– _ ^ â– i, ;'s ..-
; / r Honneiirs militaires.
1 Les honneurs militaires sont des demonstrations exte-
rieures par lesquelles l'armee presente, dans des conditions
dcterminees, un hommage special aux personnes et aux symboies
qui y ont droit. c r, . ./ -. v >• =
2. Ils sont rendus par les troupes, les cquipages, les gardcs,
les factionnaires, les sentinelles et les militaires isoles ainsi que
par les piquets d'honneur et les detachements fournis speciaie-
ment dans un but d'apparat.
3 Les honneurs ne sont rendus qu'une fois ä la m6me
personne ou au meme symbole au cours de la meme pri.se
d'armes. Lorsqu'une prise d'armes concerne une personne ou
un Symbole, les honneurs sont rendus uniquement a cctte per-
sonne ou ä ce Symbole, sauf prescriptions speciales du comman-
dant d'armes. Toutefois, chaque fois qu'uno troupe renconire
un drapeau, eile lui rend les honneurs.
L'execution du Service n'est pas interrompue pour rendre
les honneurs.
nC)
1
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/ > 7 /
i>
p F V n H
â– 'â– *^- /*; .^;
» s.,
_ ..'DJ
IC
ET A
Di[\i:(;Ti:in\s
MARCEL WAL8NE
GEORGES BERLIA
i'iu)ii;s-i TU A t.A I'.c:m ri; it kiuut
i.i i'i.s sr.ii Nc.ivS ^c^t^"^^:ol I > in. i'MU:<
i'Mi.i-rs^'iriH A i.\ r\CM.Ti-. m. I'U.)ii
i.r nr > si ii n<:i:< i'<',r)Mi\i:Qi is m. i-mu-»
Sriri'taira de la r'''darlii>n
T H 1 R c S 5 P I N ÂŁ I
SOMMAIIU:
^
[. Li: Norxi-.M ĂĽ i (;f.i:M i.n i ds. disci i>i,i m (.i.MitATr I)AN> i.i.s \i;mi.i:s,
~i' vV]!linm UOULi,!' n. ^ . ' ' ' '
H. CHRONIQUES ETR ANGERES. I
/,/â– siisUw' <'r rontrn'r dr hl cii.sl i!ii!in;,niditr m'.v I <Is , n Ilnh<-. p.ir VeziO CRISAFULLI
l.rs r/J<irf.-:di' rii;<'>7-(t< ln'infii! drs iii'-tilit'ions dr drnil pidihr dr In /.'. \. I ..d,l Im!.,
d,- hl S>irir ri dr l'Ahjrri''. |.;ii' Gilbert TIX^ER ;|>. l ;,;'. i
11[. CHRONIOUE CONSTITUTIONNELLE ET PARLEMENTĂ„IRE '
FRĂ„NgAISE
l),„ini»i>i : h:< d/'hnii!ions du ;.'.'' Jiiiivirr V-Xi^ du l'n'sidrnl (h /'. t.--.v'7)j/;/.'c .\iiU'>- '
niih\ < hidiit}i-l ichiKis !|). 1551. 1
|\', Anvi.'cs': ni:s •ii:xrr.s i.i' (.isT.Aiirs i:r m'jii.r.rj l.n i \i i-.i.s l '''' s(j»Irii!i)i<'- ,
31 (Ircctnl.Tc 1067 , j);!i' Therese FINET p. ini). I
\\ ANALYSES DE JĂśRISPRUDENCE
1. rSoTi:s nr. .TT-iMSPiuni-Nri-., ).';ir Marcel WALINE tji. 17;"^.
sj I. I.is titnlnh'rii/ii)rs dl' iiniii.h' mirir iiuf-rUr.< h' cnrd'hrr d' nur n!//-,'- /;<</) prifdr .
iCon^iil cl'l.l;il. I"':ii.iis K;'';. Ihniidsrllr I .rsinh .
l 2. f.'' sldhil inriili'jnr i'r.s lln'rls dr vidr it:..!i>r|| .li'.l.it. i; \\\.\v- !(/•;. Ihiinli'tn .
li. CoNCi.^'sioxs i)i:s r.<^MMissAiin.s or ( '.or vi.ii.nimi.n r ' p. ''"7 •
l)rs rfjrlx dr 1' (nilinUilinn ^anv r.nrs dr [â– oinudr. .!//>'â– // 'â– '/.' pnv','.' dr hi i-imii- inhtit)
du rrriu'nnil r/ui u (diUuu sdti^^'urlinu. o sr i-n'\'/ihiir dr I iiiinidn'nii' 'r.^lrv^'nnir <> .i-n-<-:\
,]'\ji,\, 1^ juill' ( K,');. /■.■(';/'• Pri\'i'r dr Iddrs dr I 'r,-r'.i Ihs . * j.iicln-i'»!!- •!'•!
Michel BERNARD. i
TU. l»r.vri-, Di: .turisphudi.nci: admixis ri-.ATivi:.
^ I. f!i"jh\<i i,'i7i(7v//('.s^ du ( ovlrnt'vux.
A) ('lUnpiUriirr, j>;ir J.-r?! AUFY (p. \<^\\ \
]\] Prnrrilirrr. p.ir Rdlaiul HRAGO ip. KjT^ i
!^ ::. Droit adininislrdlif uriirral. i'ar J.-M. AU i>Y p. :^~'. \
I
VI. Bibliographie ip. --21).
Partes 1 a 234
Jcnvier-rcvrier I95Ăź
N" !
LIBRAIRIE GfiNfiRALE DE DROIT ET DE JUPJSPP.UDEMCE
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;i pierre a I edlliet
illi
«dm d<' (»rniiMiiiN <.ir '> iine (''\(diili(>n irall'aildissanl pas rellieaeile de la
disiaplme ntais • enrrespnnda iil anx aspirali(tii< i\r< eiloNens voh^ |rs
armes >> I l i,
La preparalion du propd de iHtiiNcau leLlleiiienl ;i d.dMird ('h- (-(uirH'e
a iiiie ( juiimissKMi plaeee soiis la pr(''sidenee du (ieiier.d ( ia iii hie/.. Les
hasaiix de eelle (jmmiission onl al)nuli en li)<)4 ä l;i red;ieli(tn diin
lexl<' pari leuliereinenl \(dimii neu x. \isildenieiil Sdiieieiix de faire la
synlliese de pr«ddemes lies dil]V'i'enls el /diaiieliaiil sur cerLiiiis poini«-.
a\fe cpiehpie ridieeiice d esl \ ra I , des S(duli(Uis ii<tii\tdles en maliere
de responsalulih' par exem|)le. I*ara llelenien I un eeil.iin iKUiihn- de
consullal MMis elaienl lanciM's el perniel I aienl de prendre Tavis dasso-
I a ri d I
la (
cialKMis de |eim<'s. laridis (pie la Lmiinussinii « A rniees .leiinesse" pre-
scnl.iil Uli rapp<Ml r(''suinanl les priMteen pa I i<uis. les lialiiliides de \ ie
S l-ai U)(
)»>.
le ( leii(''i;il Wi^cwD tMai\;iil d;tiis soll llislnirc dr IWrt
iii'f
rancdisr. I'l;uiirn;uiun, p, 4()(» ; ^ L;i diseiplirie l'.iil hnijeins l;i fdice priu-
ei|):i
le .l(
\
plHc des .■ilinees. .Neus li el < u Uiei« Uis persitjuie en tle<;ild (|
II eile es
I ;"i renieii-
ilre : «I iseipl
ine ex I eneiire <
I pl
plus eiicdfe d iseiplliie de | esplll
.1
res ternie iu;i is
'i'''lnL!''Mle. e.ir il s iioi| de e( »in prendre, ... ee «pii \<-iil dire (pie riinli;ili\e de
poiir n|)eir lliieux. peiir reiliplil ;ili luieiix l.i peii^i'e dil
elliieil n do
I S exercer'
•I,ef,
(Ql l'Jiide p;ir im ni,Mi|te (Tollieieis du (1. I. T. I ). M. : les jeiines el Li d
IS-
eipline nillll.iire. Iie\ue
/; i
riiit'c
II" 45. ie\ rier ii)h3. p. 4;
K); A [iropns des jeiiiies el de |;i diseipliiie iiiilihiire : le poilil de \ llt;
d im eitMipe (le resp(Mis;il)les de iiKtuxcineii I
s (je jeiinesse. lH'\ue
i:.\
niii'c
n" 5 I . (»elultre l^ji)},, p. 32 : - le puinl de \ iie (1*1111 nrciipe (roHieiers. id.. j». 36,
(ll) All. eih'-. I>(>^ue LWrtnrc. uelohre 1965, n" Sr, j». ^().
yjfivvy- ,f" jjmm v^'w '
'.'» r"t '.i<^*t "I 'E "^' '"l"".' » i> "»JT"
'mnmitmii^ i^i^ww*
IIP
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,| ••) ■^....iit.iAy s..|> ,..i.M'^i'<H\ 'iini|P|ii.min..o(| ..p "j.'j.l bl
â– ()()(. I ,..H1<>|"' *: "T ''l""'l\' â– ''!
r I «IM \ \ "-
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I -^zi'j sm.'>'nMj s,)niP)r s.»| .umI sipi.tss,).t stii«»s.»(j s.>| pi
II s:T:rivuv s:ii ?mv(i ^iivnriM/io 7is.rr.iiD>ia :n
I iA::iK:ri'»:ni av:iA los: :ri
tf^tmt-^m^Vr'f* ^*^'
E
J. •)
^MW^LaH^kAik
1 -| -■-^ *■-^-^>— -
•aai ■I Ifcr ifc !■■n "^1
â– <â– I •■-â– >â–
■II fth - • ■■- < — ^-~
i.i: Norvi-AU iu';<;r.i:Mi:.M in; discii'J.i.nl; (;i'.m':uai.l da.ns lls aixMi;i>
1 1
I It'S jlt'SftillS FTSSCIll IS \);\V IcS jtMIIK
IVaiK'iiis 112). La iMMniiiuincal n»ii
(In h'xit' clahoiT par la ('.<»nniiissi(jii
(fauti-c pari iiii jironpc (
foll
inrrs (
ilu CiriKM'al Claiiiltii'/. des all cnndim«'
l,. V\'A'iAi' \. B. C. (1
(' Saiinmr ;i rctli
[VI Uli i'a|t|K»i
r
acccnt siir iiiif roiict'j)
I ivlalil" a la lormalluii inililaiic ^^riirralc. C.c juojrl iiictlail
lion rlai'iiic ilc la (lis('i|tlin»' t'l pircoiiisail I .•iiiploi
tl(' iiH'tlindi'S a.ti\ rs cii p('Mlaoc)oi(. : nun;
luxlc elail (l"cii\ isa<;«M' ik
la pniK'ipalc nri<:inalilr du
Ucmt'iil If rcliis (i'()iK''issaii('<' v\ de j»i<)|M(srf
rinslilulioii (limc juiidi*'! ioii speciale douV la inissiou amail rlr <lr ju-vr
[v l>'icii-l\»inlr ilr iTlIr alliUulr, et i\v saiictlonucr soll raulctir i\r la.lr
illriia
I, soil If suliunl
nlllH' a
vaiil alMisivriiHiil n'Sistf a im (»rdi«,-
\ a
lahlc II
j' u
pi(..|i
I r.aml.i.'/. . dr\ail ciisiiilr rliv r.'pris r\ iviiiaiiM' par mir
^('^ t
iiulr (lomiiiissinii. (liii«i(M' pai
If (Iriirral Aillri'cl. axaiil d'rlir nitm
so
iiiiiis ii Ulli' (Icriiirif (',t»miiiission, ((»mposc' c
|"iiii pi'l 1 1 tiioii pc <!•■I'tiic
I Kdiiiaircs r[ d (»IIich'IS
lli
I placcc soiis
M. Mcssiiicr 14 . II «'t.ii\i<'ii
A riiMM'
hiixail (rrlaltoralioii <lii iionscai
raiihii'ilr (lii'ccir du Miiiisl \r Ai'>
l de iiohT la pai'licipal KUi a n-
I rrulniiful du Lculif d'l'd iidcs r| d(
Sociolooif Mililaiic
c. !•:. S. M
(jui a r<'|
(â– 'l)('il (M'ic <'l lassciuhlr uiir
inip.U'laiih' dn.imirulalh.u pcinirllanl mir 1 11 vrsl i-a I mn lush.rKpi.- r\
niics de la discipliii«' <'ii \ i«:ut'ur »laus Ics aiiiirrs
;i iclri't'iirc aux ik»
I i
i 1
t'l raiiĂĽcrrs . I ^
a Ulis«' t'ii
Ininii' dcl'miliw du drrrrl a culraiiir mir sciililalwui Ar
â– jruirul- du pr..jrl liiilial. Irop \ ( .1 II iiiiiH'UX cl L^riirra
1.
I ,t's disposi I IONS V
.|;,ti\cs a Trlal drs mililairrs rl aux lilMitf> jaiMi-
(JUCS 0
'1
lal
cia
iil v\v liiuih'fs ;i (picapics a
li irlo coiisaciTS
ii |:i hln-rtr ilt' cncu
inu. a la icsuicntc m
luililaircs. ai
loil
IX liltcrlrs drxpiTNSKMi cl d a
ISS» »•
li,,!!. (■(•11. • l»iic\<-lr IM- doli pas surprcndiv ca
raiiirlf 34 d(
la (lonshIiilKMi ^\r IW5^, »<»iis C(
â– i'laiiu's rt'scrxcs rcsullaiil de I iiilic
ilc i^aiauln'S l»uida-
]>!vlali(ui d(uiiirc par la jurisprudciKM' a la iioiioii (
nMMilal.'S pour Irxr.virr drs liberU'S puldi<pi<"S. allriluir daiis er douiaiiir
cmiip.'d.Mirr a la Im. C/.-l doiic cii (pirhpir sorlr par Iradilmu rl p.nir
fairr suilr aux di>pn>i I ioiis drs pr6c6driils rro|ruir(il> <p ' '
if !»• orrrr
2 (j.lniirl (.. r.vrix.ix. L,:s ji-uncs l'rdttrdis. 'l'rxlr rMiir..l\p
Miiiisl. drs A riiH'r
1 ;i Crilirr d"|-Ju<lr cl Ai- ^.Miolunic iilllllalt'r : ('// suji
â– I ,h
/"'"/
â– / ilr (' l'.i <>l,
.1. />'. ('. (If SdunLKr: I »...11111. nl ;d i(.n ä Tusii.j.- (
lifS liMrlcnirnls i\r disciplllir u,4i,'i;dr ; r.>IM-nl\p
ilc la ( ,tHUIiU>>loll i\r I cliinlr
ac(| iic> I N X \ U I».
114 er,
151 i''iclir (\t- 1 )iMUIiirii
S ocloltl-r I9O4.
Lc Moiidi' du ^ oclultrc I 00(1
tat iuii, Millislrir des Annrr
C. !•:. ^. M
11" J ; I <lu
l!
J-Lu-
%-6c=» — 4
' QĂĽjuut /-a.i'.
u
t^L U < CLH.K.
K rr ĂĽu^
c^
S^^^k^
4 rC(
C-i
c^ C«-<c*
flf^ ^/^p**
^'tr 1 'i*^ ^'^^^ C'VO'*^
<a_^.-*r
/^
6UXAA>^
-1
«
t
ft^Vc-^ .uJ.^
Ol
[^ (^c<,„..>0
/
(ii j^rPv4-
/^ts ^t-'*
C^. ^
T^e-t-' (^-f^z^
(^clA
oU
^i^-n'f^-*-^
fY^^^y ^u^
- ^ ^öTuJ^ e t
«\
H^
0.ti^
JöLJu4^ cur ^
Bo)( 30;/^
^^-<f
r
i H.^«f(^l^^' «=^^ , J'?<V,ilv f>-(^OyC'^^frtillUf^jS'<^^^thl l«<3g-N^^~^
^ â– (
V^xblt^hed in 13 Volumes as ^ollavs:
Vol. 1-^ fendom IIouso ( Hey York ) ^^^^ ,,
Vol* Cll3 Harper and -rothers ( i'^e.: lorl') 19.0
ifiä Volnmr^ I - "Thc^ Gnnesis or" tho Kevr Deal"
1?2'-1932
R.?jidon Iiouse - i^'e-j -ork- 1?3'3
N
o mc
ntion 0.1 *^' vrs or J^evrish Dro^-lems
o,
Th~. ^'ub"^ic t'aper and ^^^yclrpr.ses of l'rarlr'.in D» Roosevrdt eciitod by Sanuel I.jlosonnan
VoliiHG II " Th- ^en.r of Crisis" - 1933
( ĂĽandon Hon sc - ^'^evr York - 1933 )
No Tüf^ntion oi Jp-vs or ^efjish r^rohlcns» /
Volura:-^ III "Tho Aclvance of .locovery and Reform" -193U
C Rajidoii IIqucg - i«evr York -1932 )
i'^'o riiention oi Jeirs or 'Jev.d.sh r^roblens.
"V" "iC TrT
Volune IV "The Court Disapprovcs" 193b'
( Iia.nf'On rloiise. - ^"eT: York- 193Ă– )
No nention of Jer/s or «^evrish rrobleris )
Vo urie V
»' \/ \'
"The Peoplc -pr^rcve" -1936
( Itanf'om i^ouso - I-Ierr York -1933 )
^'. -*'- •%
t\ <» t\
Vol.VI "Th- Constitution i'revails" -1937
( The Kacn-iillan Cornpan^''- ^^ev: Yoik-19lil )
Indo: ro^r^rnnces un':^Gr -^oll-anc: ^if^aöin^s: ,
"^evrs" ( Itpn 13,^^.66)
"Palpstine" -P.66 _ „' ^^
" National Con"pr-nc3 for ialostine ''-i.oo
"United lalestine Appeal" - P.66
"A arcetinc to thn ĂĽnited i -il stin .^ppeal"
Feb.6,1937
In th3 form of a friondly letl^cr to D^. ^^iso, iuocsov-lt GXtmds bis -ood
vrishes to the Conference arid s'.ys:
" Th^ iimerican pecple -
th- ef'orts of the J:
ancient hon:land
.— have T/atched vdth s-inpatrctic intcrost
^-rs to rener- in lalestine th': ties of their
" P.66
0.
Th
-â– Pm^lic Parers and .Kidrensesorj;r^^ edrbod bv Sinmel I. Rosen i^an
Volune VII - "The Con'.inuinc StrugcXe for Liboralisn" - 1938
( The Ilc'.cnillan Company-^^err York - 19'! )
InHe- -tnfercnces: Soe "Pal':-stine"r'JeY:s"; "Refusees"; "Oerman Govornnont";
— -^ ^^^ — "Kitler".
"Lo'-tor to Senator
:"illird . T^'-incs on the PalestinG Situation" IO/19/38
RooGGvelt €JBrre:scs " s-npath:r_ in he - stabil shnent 01 a
National Homr' for tho Jg^ts in Palostine".
P.530-,S51
\/ V.' \f
"Presir''ential St.rtenent on Hefugoes in Palestine" - 11/23/1933
" -^t in re-^orted he-e that the niuiberof refnceos to e pei-riitted
enti---^ into Palcstine vrill be iTt?.torially increased ".
P. 609
<v /v /»
"The ^C'lst t-rr.ss Conreronce ( '^xcoiTts)" - II/I8/
3Ă–
Th'-^: President vras asked qu-'-stions b-'- the press about "the
oxtonsicn of passports Tor refugens".
RcosGvelt T)ropo5od the extension of "Visitor's PeiTnits" to Gernan
Refugees ( *JoTd.sh and others).
P. 6C2--:')0U
"ilie JCOth Press Conference" - ll/l373ö
Th- -^resident is intervierred -anon^ other tbings- on thr- racial
^ers-ciition 01 the Jev's in lemany. The Presirent read a prerarod
statenent as follovrs:
V ^
The nevrs ... fron Gernany has dcepl:'- shocked r^u': lic opinion
in the United States ..•'. I m^^olf could scarcely believe that
sncV thinĂźs could occur in a 20th Ccntur^- civiliaation. . ."
P. 596-598
^ndersin^: ^niversit"^^ Schcle.rvnhips for Refugeees fron Gemiany" 12/l[|./38
i^etter froin the PxÂŁ:si4ent to '^^v, Robert -. Lane of the Harvard
Co^^-'^ittee to AidfCrer^nanAStudert Refu^ees. /^^
P^''6li5
-u-
Th- -^uVlic lar^ers ajirl Ac^cItgsgos q-^ Franklin D^ rJQJLSGXgli -ditcd by Sainuel I. Rosemian
Volume VII ( conbinuod ) . J93j
.^-~^- ■/»* y* , , , "^
"Tli^ Conti nu/'inP' Stru^--le for Liberalisn^^Q^^r^
— " %^^
( '-^h- liaadllan Co ipany-l^erf York-19)il)
Vi
U
II'
rh:
Uni^
i:.ed States ^-ovcs to ^^olp Aefug -es fron German-^ St-te Department Release.
{S\(Krt\^ -2.^,1^"^^ \ot^^y^^r note: " The fomrtoinf: release o^' the Dert, oi --täte T^as issund
^ TZ. — v:h-n thc.rrefugoe r^roblcm hac' ro-ached an acut^ stage in 193o.
^ ^^^^uL^-^iJ: ^ At that tine it bec-ne apparent that some ornerl''' rlan for
Vatx '• int-r- :ovemnontal cooDoration had to be for-iuLated to deal
vdtl: th- m-ss omif^r^tionn -/hich had beconcj noCRSsar^r, Por
tho facilitios of private orcardzations to find rlaces
o-^ refu;:;e had bocone overtr:x:ed", I'. 169-175
^
li
d
^'^
,.>'
J^
x
1-
â– ! \
. 3/38
/38
3. ^
li.
5.
O.
^-o-'^-'R-^^^^ thnn inroceeds to :;ive a conDrehensivo revic-; of all
activitaoiii-iU.cli 'oonfi^vrll i.;-''b IjivuI^'.aI- on behalf oT tho
refu:'e?s iarc^-T-^trr — ^Iih CulTu ij^+j j. , /'m i '"victrs^ <:^ ^ WiUio^ '.
1. ?/?-3/3o - 'loosnven.t sug'jcsts fornation of Intnrr!overnrr:ntal
Com-^ittee.
- Roosovelt nniies Advisor-^ Com^dttee on 1 olitical
rtefup;eos.
- icoosevelt a-npoints -^Ton C, Taylor ;dth rank of
Arabassador as bis rerrcsertative at tho nropoi^ed
neeting of th^ Cortiittoe 'v Ini.org(3^rnr.iGntal Coronittee),
lief er nee is also ma(^e to th- uvian -^-^.eting to br held
^'ul>^- 193Ă–. Ta lor -ras cho:.en Clk^driikan b^^ th?i Delegates.
i^'ir. George Rublee, aji -i-inerican International lav;"er, is
cho:-en as (dr^ctor of tho Coiruidttee apT)ointcd to
negotiato ^dth the conntries of exo ius and ref\3^"e.
Re.'erence to the -^on'on /-iieting Aui:;,3^ 193^
10/.'1/38 Reference to Roosevelt's letter to Chanberlain (^^njaoted.
in conf-^lete te::t) asldng Ch-r-iriber^ain toApeisonall.:/"^
intervene^fath the Gernan Government in behalf o± the
refugees, Cfhis nessa^e hiito'to '7a s impublished. ^t
apP'-^-ars on page 172 •!
" In rerdy, the "^rin^ ^dnister ^ Chc3iribcrlain) imdcated
preference for an ap^^roach to Gerr.^any through the
Anerican an^'. British Anbas.sacors at Berlin". (The
quotes are of Rosenmans exact te:rb.)
Reference to Amr^assac'Or dlson*s visit uDon ^%rr
'Teizsaeckepy
Refer nee tr secon-^. necting of the office-^s of the
Inter^rovernnontal Co^urdtteo at i^onrion.
Reference to Dr. »^chacht^s visit to i^ondon.
-tefer'-^nce to th^ "Rublce Plan" ( an outgrevth o-^
con'irential ne-^o fron ^Vlnuth '.Vohlthat-'roerinr"' s aide-
to -r. Riiblee.). { see ^tem 8l!.-1939-Vol VIII )'
leference to fiill neetin;.: of th;- Int er governmental
Committee helc^ in -^on on.
7. 10/1^5/38
8. 12/2/38
9. 12/1-/38
in.
11. 2/11 !/39
- 5 -
The Puhnc Papot^ /miiil^£££^s_^lJ^ ^^'^''^^ ^^ ^^^^^^ ^- °^"^^^
Vol^ome YIII - ( The Ibxmllan Company-
1939 Volune
'"A^r - anc^ üeutralitV«
^^077 York-0.9hl)
" AH.-^reGS at th^ -eeting of the ^f ^icers of the Intergc^ei^montal Gon-ittce on
Folitical ilefucces" - Cct. 17,1939
T^oosevplt v^ni tribiitc to 1^he Co^^'iittee for tho v:ork it has dcne
on behalf or'rniur^een ( ^PTdsh and others). ^
"Th- i'resinent Stresses This Goverrai.nt's Intercst in the Refus cc^^-roblem"
^/,i ^- ; _ l'his is cont.nin(Hl in r. lon.r. letter to -'r. I.rrron C. Ta-i-or, -vmeric.-'n \
/Aj^iiii^" -- .^^) repreyentative on J-nterEOvemmcntal Con att e. i-.ji.^y-;>o^ ^j\
ip.J^'*^
a6
illso soe :'i.©s**«s*i ' - notcs cont.-.ining acl-Utional 'ata. P. 3y2-3öU \^
Volume DC - 19)lO Volume- "^.mr -And Aid to D-mocracics"
l The -^.cmil^an Conpany-^^ev; ""iork-l?!^)
^^o refcrcncOvS to *^ev;s or «Jev.lsh problcns.
Volume. X..-
19) a Volurac - "7he C-ll to Battle titations"
( Karr^or anr" Brot her s-i^ev: York -19^0 )
Ho re^er-nces to ^evrs or J-v;ish nronl-'^^is.
1f '.'**/ T% \
Volume XI - 19)12 Volume - " Huianit- on th- DoronsivG"
( Hapr^or and Brothers - i'Jer/ Y(^;rk-19^^0 )
" Th- President iinnounces the Plan to Tr^/ Kazi War Crimin-ils"
IO/7/U2
" Tt is our in-'<ention tha" iust md sure punistapnt shall be r.ieted out
to th^ rinrleaders ros-nonsible for th^ organized rauraor o^' housands
of innocent r^^'^^ons ...." P. lP-0
^^os'^nnan notr-*
Th-" -Public I"'apers and Addrosses of Franklin D, Roos^'velt edited by
' —• — ...^ ^— — SaiTiut-1 !• Rosonnian
Volime.J.11 - 19U3 Vol.une- "The Tir^c Tarns"
( H ar^er and ^■Tothers - '^«or; lork - 191:^0 )
"Staterrbn -^ns'ied -- i^rcsixlent ^loosevelt, ^'vrrv^^ Minister Clm-^chill,
and i^T-GTiier Stalin Rer-^rding Atrociti-s". Il/l/l9i;3
"'-â– ^his s'.nterient "vas r^iscusscd at th- I'oscot/ Conference of Foreign
IdniGters :mo it --,s issued at the conclu^lon of the Gonier^^ncr^.
It T:as the stronrcst statenent on â– :ar Crines vdhh v.hich i^rosmdent
Itoovsevelt asGociated his na.me".
\t \f \'
Volune XIII -(l9!:l;-19l!^' Voluine) "Victoi-r 9i\r th- Threshol^'. of i'oace"
( Harper ajid Brothers - ^err ^ork-19!:'0 )
Index .lefercnces un(^er: "*^eY:s"; "aefuseeG".
"The ^'^ar Refugee Board is Est' blished" -^ecutive ^rder #9la7 - l/22/UU
P. h0-5l
'^^ .
"^ i.1'". .^lao rcoGennapJs nobeo Xli ^f
/
(.•-^ ?
".■fö-'i- of t"'"'- "'!-':.•• -'^efuEijoe "noarcU^'i
'^K^a
J
" The •■^at^ of the Jevrs and other ninorit-- nrours is one
o^'th- blackest chapters in hiurm histor-. t ^^hould be ^
Gaid, ho^vever, that the .:ar -^efucee Bor,ra, by airec^ ^^'^' . ^ ,
ne-otiation, and b- clanr^eGtin^ means, in sorao measure sortened
th" b-]o-ÂŁ on th- trasic victi^iG of the l^azis". Ci<a%<:n ,v-.^ /^ \
^ • ^""eL ,„ph. ^resKlent ..sl:s Xh..t Frontiers Be -^^neri^to Victin.of Ka.i Op.rossion
The i- resident con.-3imod the brut-^lit^^ o" the ^Vy.is :ind describod
atrocitics aĂźalnst th^ Jerjs ax.d others, cecUirmc:
" It iG thern^ore fittin^ that ds shotild Rgain T^rocl.aim our
reteit^iination thnt none r,ho -oarticipated in ^h|se ac.s o.
cpvpf-prv Pball fo unmnifiind .... All ---ho kno.anj.7 uAko part
if *e do„or*.tion of Je.vs to thoir death in ^olanc, . .re
oqually guilty v.ltli the nxncutioner. All r;ho share the ^nult
shaTI ph^je t,he •nunisknent".
•' - F. 103-106
/^
..rjhr. Frr-sl'lent -v'conionds >inrinc 1000 Refusees i^the United atates".
Chlngran to .umbassador Ttobert .-un^h" in 'S-l'.;iers o/9/itU - Ti. ioj-xoi.
--essace to the Consrecs on itefucce ^''^^f' '=5_''-o"_'Y72'^^'^^ .7 c.^'^t^
• ■1/'. ZOT
r. 160 - 172
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Tbe Ptt>)Uc J>M)era aAA Aldreeaea of Frahklin P. BooaeYelt, edlted hj
Samuel I. "RoaeniBftn,
13 Tolumea. ( toI. 1-'5 :W[: tandom Ho/uae, 1938)
Vol. 6 - 9 : N.Y.iMacmlllan ,19^1
7*1. 10 - 13 : N.Y.i Harper & Br g., 1950.
Toi. 1 - V c^ntain no refere-^ce ^o Jewa or Jevle^ problems. (Th^ corer
the yeara 1928 - 1936,lncluPlTe.)
7il. VI, T^e C^rg11^\i»:l3n Prev^ila ( coverlng the year 1938)
rpproducea " A Greetlng t,o the Unlfed Pialestlne «Appeal" from President
Poosevelt. It la a le^ter to Dr. S^epVen S. Wiae, extendlng the Presldeet 'a
good vlehea to the Conference, and atatlng :
"...The American people. .. .hare watched wlth aympathetlc intereat
the effor^a f the Jeva t^ renew In palestlne the tles of their
/*>'
ancleng hoaeland... '
1.66
Vol. VIT. The Continulng Struggle for Li>^eraliaTB. (coyerlng the year 1938 )
N.yTi Macmlllan ,19^1.
'Xetter to Senator Miliard K. ^dinga on the Paleatine 5?ltuatlon", Oct. 19,1938.
The Prealdent expreaeea "Bjw^thy in the eata^llshBĂ„nt of a National
Hoae for the Jewa In ftileatlne. . . . "
pp. «550/1
••Preaidential Statement on Befugeea In Paleatine"
H T.23,1938
"It ia rep rted here that the nu»ber of refugeea to he permitted entry
In^o Ă„ileatlne vill he materlally increaaed... "
.•609
jTO papera
'*r^e "JOGth Press Conference*' Nor. l'J, 1938
Tbe President le Interrlewed, anong other thlngs, an the raclal
persecutlon of gh Jevs In Germanj. TYe President read a prepared stateaent:
•^e news...from OeriMiny has deeply shocked public oplnion In the
United Sta es...! i^jrself could scareely bellere hat euch thlngs could
occur In a 20th Century clTlllzatlon
II
pp.'596 - '598.
/fĂĽll text of thlg statenent reproduced elsewhere
In these excerpts /
The ^501 et Presa Conference (Kxcerpts )" N v. 18,1938
T e ^resident was aaked quekiilons hy t^e press about "the eii^.ensloxi
of passpor s for refugees",
The President proposed tVe ertenalon of Tlsltor's pemdts" to
Germa- "Refugeea ( Jevish and ot^ers).
p.602 . k
"I^doriing ĂĽnlTeralty Schllarahlps for Refugees from Genaany" Dec.l4,19i8
Leiter fr im the President to Mr. Boher^ S. Lane of the Harrard
Coamittee to S^Md Geraan Student Hefugees.
p.6^
•*e United States Movea to Help Befugses frc« Gemany. Stfc4e Department Helease. "
Ifarch 24,1938
*»Thla GoTemment ha« hecone so inqpreaaed vlth the urgency of the prkhlea
of polltlcal refugeea that it has
inqulred of a nuaher of Goyemaenta in
Burope »ind In thia healaphere whe^her t ey vould be willlng to cooperate in setting
1 1
\
jra PAMRB
' X
-ii —
(
K
,/
(1
i
«*-
up h special coiMinee for the purp Be of facll tatin« the emlgratl n froa
/ AuoVrla an« pr«BUi»1'ljr fro» Oermny of poll+lcal refugeea."
p.169
N
• Tbl8 teit 18 folloved >>y a "5ote", runnlng from p.l69,l»ottoia to p.l7^^,
coTerlng League of Ttotlone *M 08 Sf^te Dept. documents, references to Mr. Cordell
Hüll '8 Memoire, e*c. - al -^f whlch »aterlal Is referred to ekiewehere In thee«
exoerpts .
'^â– - The'Tlote" etarts ae foUows: " The foregolng release of the !)eoartment
of State vaa lesued yhen tne refugee problem had reached an acute etage In 1938.
At that tliie It becnwe apparent that some orierly plan for Interpgpvenjiient al
Cooperation had to he fornulated to deal vith the wk^z eulgratlma whlch had
hecoBie neceesaiT, for the facllltlee of prtnrate organUatlons to find placea of
refuge had hecoae overt,axed."
There follove a con^rehensle rerlew of actlvltles on behalf of refugeeo,
naaely :
1. March 23 1938 - l^ooawelt suggesta foraatlon of Tnterg vemiientÄ 1 Coamlttee.
2. March 1938 - BooaeTelt naaes Adrlaory* Conalttee or\. Polltlcal l^efugeea.
3. May 1938
- "Roeaevelt appolnta Myron C. Taylor vitli rank of »i^ibaasador
Inr erg ;^vemmentA 1
ae '-^^lö repraentA^lTee at the propoaed neetlng of the/CcOTnlttee
^. . Bnan Taeetlng,iBB!tarriMaA Julj 1938- Taylor waa choaen chalrmn.
Mr. George T^u^lee, an Ă„rrerican International lavyer, Is chosen aA Alrectcr
of the CoMmlttee a polnted to negotlat/e vlth the countrlea of exodua and
refuge*
15^ • T^eference to the Lo'^ndon nectlng, Aug. 3, 1938.
I. Oct.'5Tl938 - reference t-^ BooaeTelt'a letter to Prlne Mlnlater Chamber laln
(letter le <iuoted In füll) aakln« Chamberlaln ♦« ir.f.
^^Ä ■«'.■^ - ' •~«~ -. 1 ^ —
• • «
I
TOR laperB ^
\
yi
I
tTie Oe««a Gorem-ent in ^h>ü.t of th# refu8-3. ( Thla «asage,
hltherto impuhllehed, U reproduce* In fĂĽll on p.n2 )
\
a,
"In repU, the Prl» Minister indlcated preiteronce «or an approach
to Germny through the A^rican and British AAa98ador3 at Berlin. "
(
(text of Chamborlaln'e repljr is not glTen.)*
7. 'oot.18,1938 - Beferenoe to Aist-assador Wllson'e vtait to Weiiaaecker.
8. Dec.2.1938 - Beferenoe to secon« «eeting of offlcers of Int«-«oTem»ental
Coigpnittee in I^ondon.
9! Dec.W,1938 " Brference to ScUachfe Tlelt to London.
10. / - Peferebce to tl^e "«»»lee Plan" , aa an outgrowth of a confid-
/ /■entlal «ehorandu» V Hel»iuth Wohlthat, G^rin«-8 alto, to Bublee.
: ( see T^elow, «cerpf^ from Toi. VIII of thle flerles, pp. 3^9 ff.)
11. re^ru^ry «9 1^,1939 - Reference to füll «eeting of the I„tergoTer.»ental
Cowmlttee heW In London.
fH» T>,»lic RtD«»^ -»nd Addreaaes nt .Franklin D. Bm.P7f.1t. Vlth a special.
Tntr.o*uction •^r.A BxrAanatory W tea V Preaident BooBevelt.
1939 Tolu-e ( Toi. iTTTT W.,. ■and «eutrality. If.Y.tMacIllan,!^'^!-
roblem.
"The Preaident Streaaes Tbla OoTemaenf a Interest In the Befu«ee
June 8,1939
"Vly iear Kr. TtCf'^oTi
"I wlah to aet forth cer^ain consldemtlona and euggestlons ft>r your
guldance in cotmection vlt^ the forthco»dng -ettin« of the Intergovm«ental
JTO PAPERS
Connltte©«
y
/
.(1) The refueee pro.len, contlnue. and vlU unaou)>te41y contlnue for
a 10 6 tl-e. It «y a* an, tl« ^e g-atly a««r.^t.d ^ a n« va«
of pcrsccutlor^ In Gennany.
1..« mtere^- in effortG to b^lng about a Solution
"(2) T^ls Ck)Tem«ent'B IntereP m cn
or t.e pro.1« 1. -trong thlB Go.enu.ent Me naturall. ^fer-ed
.p täte Bucr actlon thro««h ^he Intergove^-ental . Co-lttee rather
tha- throui^ »ny other aeency.
..(3) At t.e -a-e tl-e, tbe i«inent eata»llsh«.t of tbe Befugee
«4.,«4.<rtn rÄaui-^ing a neu Integration
Foundation... has created a nev Situation, requl.l g
of private and goTemmental effort.
"(i,) T^^e .tondatlon. .hich vas enviea.ed in the Bu^lee plan and is
.elng set up in accordax-ce vith tbat plan, is deslgned to 1>e in a
Position to negotiat* ^re effectively vith the Gen«n authorities
concemlng flnanclal, ard per^.nps or^nr i
Cownlttee«
"(9)...
"(6)...
«(T» It «uat, y. reluctantly ad«ltted hat thia Oo^em^enta. affort.
to stl^Oate concrete aCtion .y other Government, to n«et the proUe«
hare ^«et at >'eet »y a lukevai» attituAe. "
'^Ihlect to general appn^val, the I.,terg ^vem^ngal Co«ittee should
täte .teps t. tum over ite fonctlona of negotiating vith «he G t-
«„«.., Of countri. of attlement and the Leagu. of Hations High
Co-i«loner for l^efugeee. If thie is done, thie Gorem-ent i-
dlBpoeed to contrmte t ^ the exjenees of the High uomu
thlB purpoae.
• • • •
/â–
/
IDR P^JPERS
•In «aklng t>nlB change every effor «ust V exerted to «Inlal»« the
rlak of unfaTora>>le reactlon In Gtemany "
pp.3'59-362
A 'Tfote " (pp.362.364) rerlcws the^f vark of th« Intergoveniiiental Conmlttee
esta^llB^ed at Bvlan.
"Address at the Meeting of the Offlcers of the Intergoremmental Ccnnlttee on
Pölltlcal l^efugeea "
Washington, Oct. 17,1939.
The President pay^ trlbute to the Commlttee for the vork it had
done on ^^ehalf of refugees (jewleh and othera) . pp.'5'^6-'5*52
, :f •
7ol. IX — 'Var > and flid to DeiK>cracleg. " (iWkflbmi (19^*0 toIum)
Toi. X — '^e Call to Battle Statlons/^ ( 19^1 volun*)
Vol. XI - '^taanlty on the Befg^slve " ( 19^2 volune )
Vol. XTT - "The Tide Turne." ( 19^3 roluae)
contaln no refferencea to Jews and Jewleh problcMĂź.
In Vol. n, p.UO,
the Item, "The President Announcea the Plan to Txy Naiil }Ă„far Criiainala ' (Oct.
7,191^2), reproduces that announcenent :
*'..Ilt io our Intentiin that Just and sure punlshaent shall he iteted out
to the rlngleaders reeponslhle for the organized murder of thoupadAs
of Innocent persona...." , fp* .-^Hi ,. t», « ^ uT « j.
Wlth refere/CG to ^he ^^tatewent Isaued hj President Rooaevelt, Pi^ine WJ-niater
Cvurchlll, and Premier Stalin R«garaing Atrocltiea" ( Hot. 1,19^3) , Mr. l^oaennan
JTO paper«
statea In a •^ofe" ( 7ol. HI, p. ):
0heck p.
"Thls statene^^ nae dlBCUcsed at the Moacoir Conference of Foreign
M^nlBtere and It vas leemed at the conclualon of the Cohference. Tt vae
the etrongeat atatement on War Crlmlnala wlth wblch President Poeaevelt
aasoclated hla na»e.*'
The Ptthllc ftiperfl and Addreaeea of i?'raliklln P, Boosevelt, Cc«plled_vlth
Special Materlala and Kxtaanatoiy Wotea hy Samiel I. Boeenaan,
7ol. XITI. - 'Yictoiy aM ^Vie y-reabold of Peace>" ( 19^if-19^^ voluae)
,:»5,v>.'»^ f-V"!»«.
V5t?-^Vf»^^**^«
^>^'>y.^.-ft- .'»•-'«i'"' >4» ■)^
ig, fs ««-„.«««. -«.»'^-'rtr-M«*
/■»/"«i'i,'^ V«^,-*-. ••.^•r^--*fP
"The Vir Refugee Board is Estttllehed. **
Executive Order l?ol 9^17 - J^n. 22,19^4.
"HT'ereas It In tV!e pollcy of Vnls a:>>erfimerif. to hake all meaBurea
vithin Its Jower to reeCue ^^-e »IctliaB of enei^y opporeaion who aiBnfeva are in
liBiinent danger of death and otherwlae to afford such vlctlma all poselhle rellef
and aĂźslatance coneisten^ vlth the succespful proaecution of the war:
Ifow, t>er fore, 'bj rlrtue of the authority vefitsd in ne by the Conat-
Itutlon at^ the gtatutej^3 of the United Sta+ea, ^n President of the Ynlted Statea
and aa coanander^Ln-chlef of the Avm^r and Naiy, and in order to effectuat« ^?lth
ap all posaihle speed the reecue and rellef of such vlctinio of aneaer oppresslon,
It la herety orderes aa follows:
1. There iĂź eatahliĂźhed in the Eiecutl e Office of the Preaident a
War Befugee Board (herelnafter re#erred to aa the Board)
2 The functlcÄie of the Board ahall Inclide wlthout llmltation
the development of plana and pro reae and the Inaugurat on of effectlre meaaurea
for (a) the rescue, trän eportat Ion, «alntenance, and rellef of the vlctlne of
FÜR iwii«r9
8
enmy opprtpglon, and (h) tVie «staMlahBftnt of harwriB of teaporary refuge
for such TlCtlBB.**
/ The remlnlng polnts pertaln to the functions to be perfowied
V ^>^« täte, Treaaxary and Vsr T^epartmenta "vlthin thelr i^spective spheres," /
(füll te«+ of Executive Order: pp. 48-^0)
T^^ls l8 follovea by a Note frow Mr. Boeeimar , pp,90-^3, vhlch contalne
«kso references to -f-he Frlan C-^nference ar.i
Cciamlttee on P^lltical Befugeee.
ne Inter^ovemBaĂźatal
*l!he foregolng Ixecutire Order es ta>) 11 ah In 3 the w-r l^efiigee
Board vas issued to Jcoblllze all posslble effor^.s of *eieril Atienclee
and r opel ^ go^em»ent.8 tf3 reecue and aid the vlct?.mr.
... Beeret aiy of the Treasuiy Henry Morgenthau, Jr. lalC a good detil
of the groundwork for the War Kefugee ĂĽoard...."
p.n
pe
•T)1rect^ CTacuatlon vaa one of the moet dlTficult taske undertaken
by the Var Refugee Board. In the exec tlon of thls dra»atlc program,
contact
peraone vho c-^operated wlth the Board «alntalned cloae
wlth the realstance groupe vlthin eneny territory , brlbed Geman off-
IclalB, provlded f^lee Identlflcatl n papers for refugeea, and succeofl-
full^ ueed o^her undercorer aeans.
p.52
..'tJnder arrflngeRients comple ed V the War Fefugee Board, eeveral
refugee ca^^s vere ope^el.... / In North Africa, In Svltzerland, In
the Mlddle fiaet./
" ..T^rough the dlrect Intervention of the President, 1,000 refugeea
nho had eecaped to S-^uthem iJfance vei-e hrought here durlng the suaner
ITJR papers 9
. * ^ —T-aencT refu«»c shalter at fort »tarlo,
,t l9JfU, ara «ere housed at an emergency r«x^
Cewego, 1»e¥ York. "
p.^
* - »
1 nL Ladtin
'H
Wair
• In hla long Note on the vork of .he/Refugee Boa^, M.. BOeenmn atat*3
In ckncluslon :
: .^e fate .^ th« Jewe an« otY.er «Ini»!.^ «roupu is c^ of the M.ckeat
cMpte^ m .^n Msto^. It s.puM ^ sa.1,.o.ev^. t.at Ue War Bef.^e BoaH,
V «reo. ald. nc^latio.., and >r cla^^estlne «eane, in .o^ «easure aoftened
ffjiaHfr/aĂĽ^mm
p.'53
I »
♦**
.^e P«.ldent .sl« T.at ...ntl.rs Be Opened to Victi« c^ Na.i On.esslon and
I,ecla>.s Tvat War Crlnlnal. WiU Be T^l.d a.^ lSnis.ed. " Mar..2.,19M..
/^e President conderoned the ^rutallt.y of t^.e Na^ls and deacrlW
atrocltiee .galnst the Jeva ar.d at^l«B- o^hero, declarlng :/
^^ "It lu therefore flttlng tlnt ve ahould a^ln pr^clal«. ou. deter-
^..tl^ t^at none v^. pa^-icipated in tVe.e acts of .avage.^ shall go unpuni*ed...
,U vho knovl.«!. take ^rt n the depo^tlon of ^ J.w. to th.ir dea«^. in
Poland.... are e.-.all, .Ulltr .ith the executtoaer. AU vho sbare ^ ^ĂĽt ^^^
A \
•D, 103-106
♦»♦
\ â–
-r^e P^-ll-^t ^ecammend. B^inglns 1.000 lefiu^jees into the ĂĽnitel .tatea."
ItAly
mt
S 10
I hnve declded that approxlnately 1000 refu«ees s^ould be Inaedlatel/ brought
from Italj- to tV^ifl countr/, ti be placed In an Emergencar T?efugee Sbelter to b«
establlĂźhed at i<Wrt Ontarlo near Oovego, Uew York, where fmler appropriate aecurlty
reatrlctloma tbey irlll reiaaln for t.he rturatlon of the «ar. "
pa63-U
(p. 168-172)
/in this meĂźffage, the Preeident advlsed the Congresa of tbe Ptepe he hdd
taken to adinlt tre 1000 refugees to the U,S.:/
"♦••T^ere^ore^I wie^ to report to you tx>day concerntng a step
whlch I VmTe take^. In an ei'fort toaave addltlonal llves and wVlch I am certaln
vlll meet nith your approval.
• • •
"Accordingly, arrangenents have been m?Ae to bring IroHedlately to thlo
count y approxiaately l,000flf refugees vho baTe fled fron thelr hoaelands to
Southern Italy. ĂĽpon the termlratlon of tbe var they vlll be eent back to thelr
bÄn»elands. "
p. 170-171
.^•. "rf-
{^yji^tyL^t^-fJT' -•y^
G^Lje^,jUt
y
^,c^ /B^:
!2
r^
%
7}
1,
â– #
^^GEORG BÜCHNER Dram4 und Geschieht« .... 129
^^^ULA ILLYfeS Zeichen \^
LUDWIG STRAUSS Brief eines Frontsoldaten . . . 131
/B^JERT BRECHT Jugend im Dritten Reich 138
^*^'aRL ZUCKMAYER Des Teufels General .... 139
STEPHAN HERMLIN Ballade eines Städtebewohners 145
ARNOLD BAUER Tagebuchblätter J49
ALBRECHT SCHAEFFER Das Ruinenlied .... 151
WALTER KOLBENHOFF Der Werwolf 153
ARL AUGUST WEBER Die Heimkehr 157
HEINRICH MANN Drei Jahrhunderte der Warnung . 161
TUDOLF HÄRTUNG Gedichte J^ö
' MARTIN KESSEL Von der Weisheit J^/
ILJA EHRENBURG Anna A. Achmatowa it|J
ANNA A. ACHMATOWA Gedichte ^ '' ' ' ' ]!!
RICHARD GABEL Vom Jenseits der Musik • ' Jz
P.B.SHELLEY Osymandias . . . . •,.• ^ ^; ' ' Hl
WERNHER SIEBERT Welt der Vergeblichkeit . . 178
P\ULSCHAAF Entdeckung des natĂĽrlichen Verhaltens 1 /y
MDNCHCN
PRBI8 1.60
JAHRGANG 2
heptO
tMm
â– a
DIK FAH 11 F bringt demnächst:
Andre Gide, Erdachtes Interview Ăśber die
amerikanische Literatur. Rudolf Härtung,
Marcel Proust. Emory Holloway, Whitman's
Botschaft fĂĽr heute. Arturo Loria, Die Pe-
rĂĽcke. Robert Musil. Beginn einer Reihe wun-
#
dersamer Erlebnisse. Hedwig Rhode-Schnell,
Mohr. Romain Rolland, Die drei Blitze. Thom-
tea Wilder, Und der Knecht hieĂź Malchus.
DIK FAHRF Redaktion: MĂĽnchen 27. Herzogparkstr. 2,
Telefon 480 331. Schritfleiter: Hans Hennecke,
MĂĽnchen und Herbert BurgmĂĽller, MĂĽlheim
(Ruhr). Platanenallee 33.
Mit der Literaturzeitschrift „das silberboot",
herausgegeben von Ernst Schönwiese, Salz-
burg, besteht eine Arbeitsgemeinschaft
DIB FAHRR erscheint monatlich und ist durch den Euch«
handel im Abonnement zu beziehen. Das Ein-
zelheft kostet RM 1.80. Falls keine KĂĽndigung
erfolgt, läuft das Abonnement weiter.
DIE FAflRI<: ist veröffentlicht unjer Zulassung Nr.US.E. 157
der Nachrichtenkontr. der Militärregierung.
Druck: R. Oldenbourg. Graphische Betriebe
G.m.b.H., MĂĽnchen. Umschlag von T. Barthel.
^1
WILLI WEISMANN VERLAG. MĂśNCHEN 27, HERZOGPARKSTR. 3
GEORG BĂśCHNER
(
DRAMA UND GESCHICHTE
Der dramatische Dichter ist in meinen Augen nichts als ein Ge-
schichtsschreiber, steht aber ĂĽber letzterem dadurch, daĂź er uns die
Geschichte zum zweitenmal erschafft und uns gleich unmittelbar
statt eine trockne Erzählung zu geben, in das Leben einer ZeU
hinein versetzt, uns statt Charakteristiken Charaktere und sta t Be-
schreibungen Gestalten gibt. Seine höchste Aufgabe ist, der Ge-
schichte, wie sie sich wirklich begeben, so nahe a s möglich zu
kommen. Sein Buch darf weder sittlicher noch »insi".l'^her sein a^
die Geschichte selbst, aber die Geschichte ist vom heben Herrgott
nicht zu einer LektĂĽre fĂĽr junge Frauenzimmer geschaffen worden
und da ist es mir auch nicht Ăśbel zu nehmen, wenn mein Drama .
ebensowenig dazu geeignet ist. Ich kann doch aus einem Danton
und den Banditen der Revolution nicht Tugendhe den machen!
Wenn ich ihre Liederlichkeit schildern wollte, so muĂźte ich sie eben
liederlich sein, wenn ich ihre Gottlosigkeit zeigen wollte, so muĂźte
ich sie eben wie Atheisten sprechen lassen. Wenn einige unanstän-
dige AusdrĂĽcke vorkommen, so denke man an die weltbekannt^
obszöne Sprache der damaligen Zeit, wovon das was ich kleine Leute
sagen lasse, nur ein schwacher AbriĂź ist. Man konnte nur nun noch
vorwerfen, daß ich einen solchen Stoff gewählt hätte. Aber der Ein-
wurf ist längst widerlegt. Wollte man ihn gelten lassen, so mußten
die größten Meisterwerke der Poesie verworfen werden Der Dichter
Tst kein Lehrer der Moral, er erfindet und schafft Gestalten, er macht
vergangene Zeiten wieder aufleben, und die Leute mögen dann
darL'lernen, so gut wie aus dem Studium der Geschichte und de
Beobachtung dessen, was im menschlichen Leben um sie herum vor
geht. Wenn man so wollte, dĂĽrfte man keine Geschichte studieren
weil sehr viel unmoralische Dinge darin erzählt werden, mußte mit
verbundenen Augen ĂĽber die Gasse gehen, weil man sonst Unan-
ständigkeiten sehen könnte, und müßte über einen Gott Zeter
schreien, der eine Welt erschaffen, worauf so v'^l^Li^^^^^^^f f^"^
vorfallen. Wenn man mir ĂĽbrigens noch sagen wollte, der Dichter
mĂĽsse die Welt nicht zeigen, wie sie ist, sondern wie sie sem solle
so antworte ich, daĂź ich es nicht besser machen will als der hebe
Gott, der die Welt gewiĂź gemacht hat, wie sie sein soll.
f
Die Fähre 111/ 9
129
/
GYULA ILLYES
ZEICHEN
Frostige Aste klopfen an mein Fenster, weisen auf die Landschaft:
Sieh das stille Tal, Heimat deiner Ahnen.
MĂĽde Pappeln halten Wache dort am Bergeskamm.
Vom verborgenen Herd in dünne Winterluft steigt Rauch — ,
Sich verflĂĽchtigend: Der Armut stummes Opfer.
Auf verborgnem Herd mit geducktem Feuer brannte hier mein Leben,
Knisternd, flackernd und sich selbst verzehrend.
Aber jetzt, da diese Flamme schmerzhaft mein Herz erreicht.
Steige Rauch ĂĽber das vergessene Tal,
In die klirrende Kälte, in klingende Regionen,
Und flattre wie das Notsignal der SchiffbrĂĽchigen:
Menschen wohnen hier!
Schiffer ohne Schiff, Vergessene atlantischer Zeiten die,
Den alten Pfad vergessend, nun die Heimat und sich selbst vergessen
haben.
Aus geraubtem Boden nährt sich hier mein Busch.
Im Hof hinter dem gräflichen Park an einem Sonntagsmorgen
Aus geraubtem Boden sproĂź auch meine Seele,
Gebeugt, gehärtet, jedoch nie gebrochen,
Bitteres Lächeln — Du weißt es Anna — meine Blüte.
Aus geraubtem Boden hochgeschossen, mĂĽde Knechte lehrten mich
das Gehn
Sie lehrten mich das Wort, das schwer erweckt, sein Echo sucht.
Der Blick, der immer in die Ferne schweift •
In gleichgültigeren Ochsenaugen Todesrätsel sucht
Und über Wälder starrt, / !
Ist ihre Erbschaft.
Viel bin ich in der Welt herumgekommen, wohl fĂĽhle ich mich nur
bei euch.
Die ihr still seid, so wie ich, die Herren still verachtend,
Das Licht, das hie und da in mir erglänzt, ist nicht für sie,
Einfachen Herzen wollte ich von hier ein Zeichen geben. -
Deutsch von Tibor Podmaniczky
. Nähe einschlug. Aber etwas war mir verlorengegangen, was jeder
V ^ neue Ankömmling ins Feld mitbringt: das Gefühl der Persönlichen
^ Kugelsicherheit. Seit jenem Tag weiĂź ich wirklich, was ich vorher
nur zu wissen behauptete: daĂź ich sterben werde und jede Stunde
sterben kann, wahrscheinlich nicht den Heldentod, sondern irgend-
einen beschmutzten und entfärbten, feldgrauen Tod. Seither weiß ich
das WeiĂźt du es noch von dir? ..
ich könnte, um dich zu beunruhigen, furchtbare Bilder beschwo-
ren gewiĂź furchtbarere als die eines durchschnittlichen Tages im
Ste lungskriege und eines Bombardements aus FeldgeschĂĽtzen Ich
könnte dir das Schlachtfeld nach dem Gasangriff schildern, mit den
in den Boden verbissenen und verkrallten Leibern, die der unerträg-
liche Schmerz verkrĂĽmmt hat, das Feuerwerk des Nachtgetechts mit
der von roten Raketen beleuchteten schwarzen Erdfontane gegen-
über aus der zwei eben noch zusammenhängende Beine in Stiefeln
und Hosen oben heraustanzten, ohne Leib durch das farbige Licht
hintanzten ins Nichts. Das Trommelfeuer, den Nahkampf, das Zer^
spritzen des von unterirdischen Minen gesprengten Bodens und
aUe Lebendigen, das er trägt. Aber was sollten diese Bilder fruch-
ten wenn ich sie einem ausmalen wollte, den der gewöhnliche Tag
S;eTden ich schilderte, und das Entsetzen seiner Gewohn ichkei
nicht erschĂĽttern konnte? Ihr Vernichtungsprunk wurde dich nur
betäuben, statt dich wach zu machen und offen ff f ^ -^Ij^.^^^fJ«^^
Grauen, das ich dir ins Herz treiben will. Jenes Lehmhcht, das nun
als einziger Inhalt erscheint, wenn ich dir mein Inneres auf tue, das
sollst du schmecken und schlucken, bis es dich so erfĂĽllt wie mich.
""' wLum denn schreibe ich dir? Nur, weil ich nicht will, daĂź du
dir mein Leben, wenn es denn Leben heiĂźen darf, als deine Ver-
gangenheit anmaĂźest! Nur, weil du wissen sollst, daĂź mein verzwei-
felter Fluch dem Menschen gilt, der gesagt hat, daĂź die Erinnerung
vergangener Leiden süß sei! Kein Fremder kann "lich so schändlich
verraten, wie du mich verraten wĂĽrdest, wenn mein Leiden dir suĂź
wĂĽrde, und nicht nur mich wĂĽrdest du verraten! Aber deshalb, nur
deshalb schreibe ich dir, um dir abzusagen, um dir zu melden, daĂź
diesen Ausgesetzten hier keiner heimholen kann, auch sem eigenes
künftiges Ich nicht. ,. ■. -u ■> \\r=„t
Oder drängt mich doch noch anderes, dir zu schreiben? Wagt
doch noch etwas in mir den Wunsch, daĂź du dich wirklich erinnern
möqest? Daß einmal einer, ein erster von vielen, an die solche
Briefe wie dieser ergehen könnten oder in Gedanken ergehen sein
verqanqenes Leiden nicht verriete, sondern seinen Blick aushielte
und bei ihm wachte? Habe ich dir doch, du EntrĂĽckter, nicht aus
HaĂź geschrieben, sondern aus Hoffnung?
vm
137
«
V
/i
BERT BRECHT
DIE JUGEND UND DAS DRITTE REICH
/
Das Regime behauptet, die Jugend
Sei schon gewonnen fĂĽr das Dritte Reich.
Das bedeutet, in zehn, zwanzig Jahren
Werde das ganze Volk nur noch
Aus Anhängern des Regimes bestehen.
Welch ein kindhcher Rechenfehler!
2 '
Die ihr Brot noch nicht verdienen mĂĽssen
Sondern es auf den Tisch gelegt bekommen, sagen:
Es ist leicht, Brot zu bekommen. Soll das bedeuten, wenn sie
In zehn Jahren ihr Brot verdienen und es ihren Kindern
Auf den Tisch legen mĂĽssen, werden sie
Immer noch sagen: es ist leicht?
- 3
Denen das Mark noch nicht augesogen ist, die
Loben das Regime, das soll bedeuten, wenn ihnen
Einmal das Mark ausgesogen sein wird, werden sie
Immer noch das Regime loben?
4
Die noch keine Kugel haben sausen hören, sagen:
Es ist schön, zu schießen. Das soll bedeuten, wenn sie
Einmal die Kugeln sausen hören, werden sie
Immer noch sagen: Krieg
Ist schön.
5
Ja, wenn die Kinder Kinder blieben, dann
Könnte man ihnen immer Märchen erzählen.
Da sie aber älter werden
Kann man es nicht.
6
Wenn das Regime händereibend von der Jugend spricht
Gleicht es einem Mann, der,
Die beschneite Halde betrachtend, sich die Hände reibt und sagt:
Wie werde ich es im Sommer kĂĽhl haben mit
Soviel Schnee! \
HEINRICH MANN
DREI JAHRHUNDERTE DER WARNUNG
— UND DER HOFFNUNG
Es gab Tage in Deutschland, an denen der Himmel vom zar-
testen Rosa ĂĽber Lachsgelb bis zum flĂĽssigen Gold in allen Farben
spielte. Der Glanz breitete sich immer weiter aus, machte aber
dann, allmählich schwächer und schwächer werdend, einem bloßen
Leuchten Platz. Vielleicht geschah das alles im Laufe einer einzigen
halben Stunde.
Dieser Vorgang am Himmel hat sein Gegenspiel unter den
Menschen. Viel seltener freilich als die Sonne auf- und untergeht,
werden die Menschen dazu entflammt, ein neues Leben zu beginnen.
Dann aber halten sie es noch einmal der MĂĽhe wert, zu glauben
und für Frieden und Gerechtigkeit — die ewigen Sehnsuchtsziele
ihres Geistes — zu kämpfen. Nirgends und niemals wurde in den
vergangenen Jahrtausenden dieses Verlangen wirklich gestillt. Mag
sein, daĂź Deutschlands Anstrengungen geringer waren als die der
zeitgenössischen Nationen, die aber auch nicht zahlreich waren und
von denen sich viele als Versager erwiesen.
Da wir um Deutschlands traurige Lage und um die Wiederkehr
eines unvergleichlichen Zusammenbruches nach einer kaum ermeĂź-
baren Schuld wissen, ist es zugleich bewundernswert und rĂĽhrend,
daĂź Stimmen wie die, die in dieser Anthologie gesammelt wurden,
noch erhoben werden konnten. Welches Buch hat jemals so viel
wohlbegründete Beweise — 300 Jahre alte neben solchen jüngsten
Datums — dafür geboten, daß trotz derartig zahlreicher Fehlschläge
noch immer Hoffnung fĂĽr Deutschland besteht? Die Bitterkeit des
Wortes kann das Vertrauen nicht zerstören, und Zorn ist neuer
Ansporn fĂĽr den Mut. In dieser Anthologie sprechen, gefolgt von
den jĂĽngeren SchĂĽlern, den groĂźen Alten, die der Sprache das Leben
verliehen, das selbst das Vergehen der Nation ĂĽberdauert.
Aber ein Land mit einer lebenskräftigen und Widerhall finden-
den Literatur stirbt nicht. Selbst wenn seine Literatur abgeschafft
oder sogar vergessen wĂĽrde, so mĂĽĂźte sie dennoch ein heimliches
Leben fĂĽhren. Die Literatur ist Beweis fĂĽr das tiefe und wahre
Wollen seines Landes: Deutschlands Literatur erstrebte immer
Gerechtigkeit und Frieden. Sie verdient deswegen kein besonderes
Lob. Jedes Volk, auch das der Deutschen, gehorcht seiner ursprĂĽng-
lichen Natur, seinem BedĂĽrfnis, das Leben zu erhalten und zu ver-
bessern. Jede große Literatur aber verteidigt die Rechte der Völker,
die leben wollen, und damit die Rechte der Menschheit; den Blick
auf den Tag gerichtet, an dem alle ein wĂĽrdiges Leben fĂĽhren
können oder vernichtet sind.
Die Fähre 111/ 11
161
i:38
Aus eigenem Antrieb, um seines wirtschafĂĽichen Wohlergehens ? l
wilÄn hlfkein Volk jemals den Krieg gewollt. Deshalb wurde ihm ]
unweigerlich eingeredet, daĂź es das Opfer eines Angriffes sei. Die
Völker sind sich zumindest im Unterbewußtsem darüber im klaren, i
daß sie durch einen Krieg nur verlieren können. Die wenigen Indi-
viduen, die einen Krieg auf Kosten des Volkes, natĂĽrlich eines
siegreichen, gewinnen wollen, haben mit immer größeren Schwierig-
keiten zu kämpfen, um ihre Anhänger hinters Licht zu fuhren. Im
Falle Deutschlands hatten sie noch einmal Erfolg. Sie benotigten
dazu allerdings einen beträchtlichen Aufwand an falschen, selbst-
mörderischen Lehren und an betrügerischen, verderblichen Ver-
sprechungen. ErfĂĽllung fand schlieĂźlich nur das Versprechen auf
„rollende Köpfe" — solange, bis alles ins Rollen kam.
Im Gegensatz dazu stand die gesamte Literatur der Deutschen.
Sie hätte warnen sollen und würde dies auch getan haben; für eine
verhängnisvolle Spanne Zeit jedoch wurde sie aus dem mensch-
lichen Bewußtsein verdrängt. Die Erkenntnis der allgemein mensch-
lichen Werte, der wahren Bedeutung der groĂźen Literatur wurde
in Deutschland durch den blinden Wahn der Macht ersetzt. Was
aber nĂĽtzt die Macht, wenn durch sie die menschliche Gesellschaft
mit Füßen getreten wird? Und schließlich wird — wie uns die
jüngste Vergangenheit bewies — zum Bösen verwendete Macht
zur Impotenz. Was seine groĂźe Literatur so lange Zeit getan hatte,
das hatte Deutschland versäumt: die Erforschung seines Gewissens.
Es erscheint viel natürlicher und grundsätzlich einfacher, das
menschliche Leben auf der Wahrheit aufzubauen, als es durch das
Mittel ausgeklügelter Unwahrheiten unerträglich zu gestalten. Da
der menschliche Geist aber die Wahrheit oft nicht aufzunehmen
bereit ist, wird das Leben durch diese Erkenntnis aber keineswegs
leichter gemacht. Wie ist es nun möglich, daß die bedeutenden
Werke der Literatur grundsätzliche Gedanken und Geister, die
nach denselben Prinzipien handeln, offenbaren? Ein Kritiker — es
war Leibniz — bemerkte dazu: „In der Tat, alles was ich gelesen
habe, ist richtig" — denn die grundsätzlichen Absichten waren
ĂĽberall die gleichen. Wohin er immer schaute, ĂĽberall ging es um
die menschliche WĂĽrde, um ihre Aufrechterhaltung und um ihre
Förderung mit Hilfe des Wissens. Die Ziele dieser Bestrebungen
waren seit jeher Gerechtigkeit und Frieden.
■^ Die bedeutenden Werke der Literatur müssen unmißverständlich
sein; sie sind einfach, sie stimmen in der Erfassung menschlichen
Wertes immer überein. Nehmt alle schönen Dinge, die jemals
geschrieben wurden, ohne an die durch persönliche Ausdrucks-
gestaltung geprägten Unterschiede zu denken. Dann gleicht Goethe
Marx, Hölderlin Fichte und Nietzsche ungefähr Nestroy.
Achtung vor allem Menschlichen ist die Vorbedingung, die von
162 • '
jedem, der die Feder zum Schreiben eintauchen will, verlangt wird.
D(mn wie könnte er den Mut fassen, vorwärtszuschreiten, sich eine
Sonderstellung anzumaĂźen, wenn es ihm nicht tief ernst um die
grundsätzlichsten Werte wäre? Er wird deshalb nie von ihnen
abweichen, sondern durch sein Werk ihre latente Kraft hervor-
heben und allen zum BewuĂźtsein bringen.
Diejenigen, die an den Menschen etwas auszusetzen haben, ver-
langen viel mehr von ihnen, als die Nachsichtigen. Die Meister der
Schwarzmalerei sind zugleich die Schöpfer der blendenden Helle;
und es muĂźte ein Deutscher ohne Illusionen sein, der als erster die
Möglichkeit des ewigen Friedens bewies. Manchmal ist es schwierig,
sich Kant als Deutschen vorzustellen, oder die Deutschen als seine
Gefährten. Sich nationale Verantwortung für eine derartige Höhe
vergeistigter Menschlichkeit anzumaĂźen und dann zu handeln, als
sei sie null und nichtig, ja die Menschlichkeit bis zur Selbstver-
nichtung zu bekämpfen — warum wurde das Land der Deutschen
fĂĽr dieses Schicksal ausersehen?
Sein unteilbarer Charakter konnte es ursprĂĽnglich nicht dazu
bestimmt haben. Auch seine groĂźe Literatur, die ein unmenschliches
Deutschland widerlegt und völlig verwirft, steht in Gegensatz zu
diesem Handeln. Sie tritt unermĂĽdlich fĂĽr ein Deutschland voll guter
Absichten ein, das den innigen Wunsch hat, mit der Welt in
Freundschaft zu leben. Aber diese Literatur kann vergessen oder
kann gefälscht werden.
Die Deutschen sind ein Volk, das als Nation wenig GlĂĽck hatte,
und das erst verhältnismäßig spät zu einer nationalen Einheit wurde.
Seine politischen Unternehmungen waren zu Ăśbertreibungen und
Prahlerei neigende StĂĽmperwerke. Alles trug den Stempel der Rache
— - und das erklärt sehr vieles. Schneller Erfolg begünstigt mehr noch
als gar keiner das Anwachsen der Unzufriedenheit. Mißtrauen quälte
das jüngst unter die Weltmächte aufgenommene Land. Es hätte
sich wohler gefühlt, wenn es keine Macht gewesen wäre.
Aber da es einmal so war, muĂźte es zur einzigen Macht werden.
Das allein, so wurde fälschlich angenommen, würde Neid und
Furcht beseitigen. So begann sich ein seltsames quid pro quo zu
entwickeln. Dem durchaus nicht als naiv zu wertenden EigendĂĽnkel
einer Nation mittlerer Größe, die im Grunde genommen genau über
sich Bescheid wuĂźte, sollte der Stempel der Echtheit verliehen wer-
den, vorausgesetzt, daĂź es ihr schnell gelingen wĂĽrde, die Welt zu
unterjochen. Und das war falsch, völlig falsch! Die Überlegenheit
der Nation wĂĽrde sich auf diese Weise ebensowenig beweisen
lassen, wie ihre Eignung zur Beherrscherin der Welt. Die leiden-
schaftslosen und daher auf lange Sicht erfolgreichen Sieger waren
nach Ursprung und Art Europa fremd, es sei denn, daĂź sie ihm sehr
weit voraus waren.
ir
163
RUDOLF HĂ„RTUNG
TĂ–DLICHER HERBST
Das Grün der Gärten . . . Sonnenblumen. Schatten
Yon Stimmen, rund. O gekeltertes Schweigen:
Herbst. Frucht und Abschied. Aus dem blauen satten
Himmel tropft Dein Tod, Herz, tropft Dein Tod; steigen
- • .• -. §
die Lerchen nicht mehr. Nun ist es Zeit, Du,
nun, späte Rose. Weinen um Dich wäre
der Gnade zuviel; denn dem Tödlichen zu
singt es empor jetzt, strahlend. Dunkle Beere
am Strauch ruht. WeiĂźe Schwinge der Taube
steht in der Luft zeitlos dröhnendem Erz.
SĂĽĂźes Dasein und was je verrann: Traube,
volle. Du birgst es. Tod, berge mein Herz!
DIE WEISSE STADT
Fremde StraĂźen liegen unterm Wind
weiĂźer Himmel. GruĂź und FĂĽlle: Turm;
grĂĽner Berg aus KĂĽhle . . . Wo wir sind,
ist Dasein: Hingehaltensein im Sturm
Fremden Weinens an die nie erreichte
Drohung, die das Schweigen maĂźlos macht;
Tand und Wirrsal und die kleine leichte
Hand; blaue Woge, stĂĽrzend, der Nacht.
Wo wir sind . . . Wir werden niemals bleiben.
TĂĽcher wehen, Augen blicken matt.
Ging nicht gestern, teilend sanft dies Treiben,
ging nicht Gott durch diese weiĂźe Stadt?
r
1
r?
f
\
W
166
BUCH- UND KUNSTHANDLUNG
ANTIQUARIAT
AN- UND VERKAUF v'
VON WERTVOLLEN BĂśCHERN,
GRAPHIK UNDHANDZEICHNUNGEN
KUNSTAUSSTELLUNGEN
KUNSTAUKTIONEN
HAMBURG 36 • ESPLA5rADE43 • 1. .STOCK
TCBLiAO HEBMA^rX BIlirM
Die haiipt^chlichen Verlagsgebiete sfnd:
ALLGEMEINE GESCHICHTE
INSBESONDERE BIOGRAPHIEN
GEISTESWISSENSCHAFT
•
ARCHITEKTUR UND HANDWERK
nU^CHEIir 34 . «CHAI-TEBFACH
y
X
»IS FÄSIRi:
BBINOT IN DEN NICHSTEN HEFTEN U.A..
JULIUS BAB
Zuckmayers »Des Teufels
General**
RUDOLF BORCHABDT
Eplleiromena zu Eomer
FELES BRAUN
PflaazenffleichnlMse
HERMANN BBOCQ
Demeter oder die yerzaaberiinir
MAX BROD
üosen — Mlttelmeerlandäcbafl
HEINRICH CARLĂź
Die KrweckuDg: des Herru
Denteld
LOUIS EMIfi
Tani de« Morgren«!
HERMANN GRAB
Die AdTokatenkanzIol
QENO HARTLATJB
Die Sehwestem
FBIEDHELM EEMP
Comte de Lantr^amont
WEBNER KRAFT
Ăśber allen Gipfeln
KARL KRAUS
Briefe an Baron Berber
^:lse lasker-schĂĽler
Jerusalem
• OMTE de LAUTBfiAMONT
Der Kampf mit dem Engel
' BORIS LAWBENJOW
Ule Welt in einem Stfiekeheu
Gla«
KURT LEONHARD
Das Problem der Form uud
das orphUehe Dasein
JOACHIM MAASS
Wie ich Abschied nahm
JOSEF MĂśHLBERGER
Das Kneehtlein
ROBERT MUSIL
Mootbrurger
HEINRICH RINGLEB
Der Splesrel — In der Nacht
ROMAIN ROLLAND
Die drei Blltse
JULES SUPERVIELLE
Dae Mädchen mit der
Gelffenatlmme
FRITZ USINOEB
Rudolf Pannwlts
THOMAS WOLFE
Anatomie der Einsamkeit
.^
I
Wllilil WEISinANN VERL.AG MĂśNCHEN
Aufstehen!
Aus welchem Regiment
sind Sie?
Beeilen Sie sich!
Begleiten Sie mich!
Hände Hoch!
Hände hoch, ^
oder ich schieĂźe!
Haben Sie bei sich
Meldung
Halt!
Hinlegen!
Gehen Sie voran!
Kehrt!
Sie bleiben hier!
Vorwärts marsch!
Waffen ablegen!
Wo sind Patrouillen?
Wo sind Waffen ?
Habt ihr Waffen
oder Munition?
Sind hier deutsche
Truppen?
Kaffee / Kawa / Kawa
Schreibweise.
Powstah
Z ktörego pulhu
jestescie?
Pospieszcie si^!
Idzcie zemn^!
R^ce do göry!
R^ce do göry,
bo strzelam!
Macie przy sobie
meldunki?
Stöj!
Padnij!
Idzcie naprzöd
Wtyl zwröt!
Zostaniecie tu!
Naprzöd marsz!
Odlöz broh
Gdzie S4 patrole?
Gdzie sa broh?
Macie bron jub
a municj^?
Czy tu niemieckie
wöjsko?
Tee / Herbata / Herbata
Aussprache.
Pofstein!
Skutreogo pluhku
jästäschtschä
Pospiäschtschä schiän!
Idschtschä sämnon!
Räncä do gury!
Ränzä do gure bo
stschälam!
Matschä pschüsobiä
meldunki?
Stoj !
Padnij!
Idschtschä naprzöd!
Fteu swrut!
Sostaniätscha tu!
Napschod marsch!
Odwosch breun !
Gdschä schan patrolä?
Gdschä jest breun?
Matschä breun lub
amunizien?
Tsche sson tu niämiazkiä
weusko?
Zigaretten / Papiarosy / Papieresse
Ausprach'^
f ff
Schreibweise.
Ist der W^g
gut?
Czy ta drog.i
Jest dobra i
Tsche ta droga jässt dobrv?
Was fĂĽr ein
Dorf ist das?
Co to za wioska? |
/o to sa wioska?
Wieviel km sind nach . . |
Ile kilometr«
»w do . . .
IIa kilomätruw do . . .
Wo wohnt d
er Gemeinde« 1
Gdzie mies:
ka
Gdschä miäschka
Vorsteher?
szöhys V
scholtĂĽss?
Wohin fĂĽhrt dieser Weg?
Dok^d prov
adzi ta droga?
Dokont pro wadschi ta droga
Bitte Herr(F
rau) (Fräulein)
prosz4 Fanc
(Pani)
proschem Pana (Pani)
Brot
chleb
chläb
Eier
•
jaja .
jaja
Fleisch
mi^so
miensso
Wasser
woda
woda
Ja
«
tak
tak
Nein
nie
»
niä
Quartier
kwater
kwatär
1
jedna
jeden
2
dwaj
dwa
3
trzej
tschi
4
cztery
stcherĂĽ
.5
pili
pientsch
6
szesi
scheĂźtsch
7
siedm
,
siedem
8
osim
oschem
9
dziewi^i
dziewientsch
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pziesi^i
dzieschientsch
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und aus jedem Ö-Sild sfinOxi «i
^Mnxokl LtauQ\l?artr [/-in^abitn
*i4 (yhneni so vielstthfj und
fesselnd sind die [AĂĽja-^clhoto-
Uäiier' QvsQxr'xeien ! C/te zeigen
mann%0faü\e ^fOej}« xu gutem
jJhotograpnteren - und der c/ ort-
gesckriiiene uetĂź kaum, was er
euersi auswerten soll: solcheC/ulle
lelttreiĂźier 1/ inregungen zu neuen
^flloiwen und erprohen ^tnsleU
lungen fxndei er vor ! xTiejie, a\
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(5efd)icf)te bn 3Deutf(l)cn tDc^rmad)t j
Don Ö5cncraüeutnant von € od) cn\) auf tn
Prä^l^cnt öcr öcutfd)cn (0cfcUfcl)aft für VV>ebrpolitit unö lX>cbrtpifTfnfd)aftcn
I.
^ic cr(>cn ^(nfängc (lcbcn^cr ^cere geben in ^eutfd)Ianb auf Me 3eit nad) bem iDreif^ig*
jährigen IRricge ^urücF. iDamald irar eö ber „03 rolle :Eurfür(^" ^^>icbricl) Wilhelm von
Brandenburg, ber mit biefen Gruppen ^ie in fein Jllanb eingefallenen Sd)lre^en in ber Bd)lad)t
bei .t'ehrbellin )675' cntfdieibenb fd)lug. ^-^r forgte für gleid)mä]pige ^lu^bilbung, 23eu\iffnung
un^ ^^tudrii(^ung. Heben ihm fd}ufen bie :RurfĂĽrj>en Hlav ^-fmanuel IL von 23ayern unb
^ol^ann CPcorg IIL "oon Bad)fen (lanbige ^ruppeneinheiten, bk an ben von )0$3 bis jOgo
irahrenben :Eriegen gegen bie vCĂĽrfen ebenfo ivie bie Branbenburger ruhmreid)en ^Inteil nahmen,
♦f r u^ar aber aud) ber UTann, ber ale erf^er beut) dm* ,\Hir(l ben Wert einer ,^^lotte Har unb
a^eitfid)tig ernannte unb ber ben lllut unb bie i;atfraft hatte, ^um erjlen lllale nad) jahrhunberte*
langem »Erliegen beutfd)er Beegeltung bit flagge feinem Btaatcö, bamit aber aud) bie beutfd)C
,\'lagge, uneber auf Bee 3u 3eigen. ^Der uralte WiHngergeijl, ber in unferen ^(Itvorberen gelebt
hatte, ber bie beutfdx ^anfa befeeltt unb feebeherrfd^enb mad)te, er vererbte ftd) aud) auf bic
nianner, bie unter bem Koten unb banad) unter bem Sd)irar3en ^iMer ber :RurfĂĽrj^en von
Branbenburg unb 2vönige von preuf>en fuhren, ^cin >^nf el, :Rönig ^^^ r i c b r i d) W i l h e l m I.
^^ricbrid) tcr <3vo^c
Svkbtid) VDiU)clm, bcr (Bco^e :RucfĂĽr(>
1
von prciif;cn, iran^tc fein gan^c^ ^Jntcrcjjc bcm ircitcrcn ^(iifbau bce> ^ccrcd .^^ii. i^r vermehrte
et? un^ ttab ihm ein Offi^erl-orpt^ von einzigartiger CPejlalt. ?lld obcrjler (Dffi.^ier bea »geere^
trug er jlet^ Uniform unb ii\ar leud^ten^e^ X>orbil^ in allen militarifd)en €iigenben. ^n ber
Gruppe berrfd)te unter ihm fd>ĂĽrfjle tnanne?3ud)t. ^tn ^ie Btelle ber frĂĽheren tief gegliederten
(Beit'althaufen fĂĽhrte er ^ert IRampf in langen, fe(l gefd)loffenen ^reiglie^rigen dinkn ein, bie
unter ^alvenfcuer ben ,\'ein^ angriffen, if r hinterliej; feinem Sohn ^\' r i e ^ r i d) ^ e m (35 r o |; e n
ein ixv^hlgeĂĽbte^ ^ecr von $o oco Hlami. tiefer erhob preuf;cn ^ur CPro|;mad)t. ^n bvci :Rriegcn
gegen (iSjlerreid) geiwmn er Sd)leften. Urr hatte in biefem :Eampfe halb iSuropa gegen ftd), aber
er unterlag nid)t ^er ungeheuren übermad)t, ix^eil er mit rücfftd)tölofcr ^atfraft un^ beunm*
^ernt^ll1erter ^artnaif igfeit immer mcbcv einen ^anb nad) bem anderen auö bcm ^tlbt fd)lug.
niollnnr;, ^ohenfrie^berg, Kof;bad), Jlicuthen, 3ornborf fmb bit Hamen jener ruhmreid)cn Biege,
bit er erfod)t. ^a^ ^cer felb(> erfuhr unter feiner Xegicrung eine n^eitere X>ermehrung. 23e"
fon^cr8 Mwv ed bie :Eavallerie, ^eren Keitergeiijl xmb ^d)ncib unter bcn CPeneralcn 3ieten unb
BevMit5 jlvln^ig it>ud)5?. ^Iber aud) ^ie ^(rtilleric anirbe in ihrer 23>eit>eglid)l^eit unb ^^euerl^raft
uiefentlid) vervolll^ommnet. — ^t\iebrid) ^er C!5ro(;e nuij^te feine t^auptl^raft im IRampf 3u ^anb
mit ^en vielen Wi^erfad)crn feinem Staaten erfd)öpfen, aber troij allem verfud)tc er, feinem
X>oll^ wicbcv bcn Weg 3ur Bee frei 3u mad)en, it>eil er btn VDert von Beehan^el xinb Beegeltung
Har ernannt hatte, icn von ihm in ^en fĂĽnfziger fahren bts js. 3al)rl:)unbertd gcgrĂĽnbeten
f5anbeL^gefellfd)aften, ber „afiatifd)en" unb ^er „bengalifd)en" :Rompagnie, irar jirar gröf;erer
<frfolg verfagt, aber alö jrss ^ie Bd)uieben Stettin bebrohten, jlellte ber :aönig eine ^^lottiüe
von beiwiffneten ^anbel^fd)iffen auf, bie aud) am jo.Beptember )7S9 bie ^^hre beö Bd)war3en
preuj;ifd)en ^iMerd im weiften ^^elb tapfer 3u wahren iruf^te. iDie notirenbige ^tnfpannung aEer
:Rrafte bts Btaatea zum Xl^ieberaufbau bts burd) bie :Rriege arg mitgenommenen preuf,ifd)en
Btaated lie^ bem :Rönig leiber feine 3eit unb mittel, feine Beefahrtaplane iveiter^uverfolgen.
Unter ben Had^folgern bts „C5ro(5en :Rönigd" ging aud> ber Wert bce t^eered zufel^enbd
3urü<f. nian ahmte bie alten (P>efed)töformen nad) unb überfah, baf5 in ^^ranFreid) nad) ber
Revolution von J789 eine neue A'ed)tn>eife entflanben «t^ar: Mb S*üt5engefed)t in loderen
Linien, benen tiefe, gefd^loffene »olonnen folgten.
nun iiberfab, ^«fi ^ctr „Sol^atenl=«i|er" Vlapoleon L, bcr ^ol•t Me macht «n f.d) n^, fe ne
SeJe überMerreid^er unb Kuffen vor «Uem feiner .irnergie unb ber .^'ab.gk.t vcrbo-ihe,
Sfc uppen f ir f.d, ,« begeiflern. So nal,m ba. Verbangni. feinen £«uf. Unter bem :aom.
lo Zlterter Jiac„.fdWdKC ^'«brer ..urbe ba. preu^if_d,e ^eer .n ber ^-PPjj^'^j;
hliTena unb ^lucrftÄbt ySoO ncfd,lagen unb burd) eine Idwe Verfolgung vottig «uf.
5'rier y:tie";rcuf,L Ke'gieru-g f# ,e^c .^üblung n„t be.n X^o.e -'- b^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
biefed ben 3ufammen
brud) bes Btaated
glcid)gĂĽltig hin. S^^
aUe ,^e(^ungcn ivur.
ben bem ^^cinbe wiber*
(^anböloö übergeben.
2(Uein ber (Dber(l
von (Bneifenau l)ielt
burd) bie tapfere X>er^
teibigung von Col*
berg bie iÂŁl)rc ber
preuĂźifd)en Waffen
t)od). )$07 muffte
PreuĂźen btn fd)impf"
lid)en ^^rieben von
;Cilftt fd)lief>en unb
alle feine ÂŁanber wt^
lid) bcr iÂŁlbe abtreten.
iÂŁd burfte nur ein
^cer von 42 oooUIann
unterhalten. Beine
^^ejlungen blieben von
franjöftf d)en Gruppen
befc^t. ^^ine Kettung
au8 biefer Hot unb
Bd)anbe war nur
möglid), wenn ein an
<;>l)oto ^ct)crl, «etim
Sd)arnl?or^
berer (5ei<^ ftd) bes
preui;ifd)en X>olfe9
bemvĂĽd)tigte.^emnii*
ni(>cr ^^reiherr
vom Btein gelang
e^, burd) bie ^öfung
ber Bauern aud bcr
^eibeigenfd)aft unb
burd) bie Btäbteorb»
nung ba^ X>erantwor*
tung^bewuĂźtfein bea
einzelnen gegenĂĽber
bem X>aterlanbe z"
wedren. 3)er BĂĽrger
biefed neuen Btaates
empfanb, ba^ er ba*
mit nid)t nur bie glci*
d^m Ked)te erhielt,
fonbern ba^ ihm bar*
aud bit neue Pflid)t
erunid)6, ba^ X>ater*
lanb von ber ^^remb*
herrfd)aft zu befreien.
Qo war bie (Brunb*
läge für bie Keorga*
nifation bed preuĂźi*
fd)en Speeres gefd)af.
©türm prcu^ifd)ec (Brcnabiece bei (Bro^gÖrfd)cn jSjj
f:;'' ' mn i B ;.rnbor,. ibren zielbewuĂźten Rubrer fanb. ^^''^^^^T^^t
5,er nur bem ..bei offen^b, «>urbe je,t aud, ben nid,tabligen erorrnet. ^e.ft^e Bübrntg
unb ebrenbaftes Verbalten «-urben jeßt b.e ^^eale, bie bas ©ff.j.ertorp* errutt en. 3Daburd,
r«rbe ber ©ffijier 5um Vorb.lb unb 5um 'irjieber feiner mannfd,art. 5D.e,e m.eberum
fteDte Sd,arnl orfl burd, »efeitigung ber entebrenben l=örperlid,en Straren a«r e.ne bol,ere
f. tlS,e Stt fe m.d, ber einfad,e Solbat empfanb e. je^t ab .B,re, ^em Vaterlanb ju b.enen.
U mit i fe bea «einen, von Hapoleon jugelaffenen ^eere. mögUd,«i v.ele "'«"mdWten
auiubilben, ül,rte Sd,arnbor(t ba. „SrümperfyOem" ein, b. b. e. .vurben unter Beurlaubung
länger bien nberSolbaten junge Kefruten in (tänbigem Wed,fel ju h.rjerl.u.b.lbung eingezogen.
W nun im Winter ,8,,/,. bie „(Broße llrmee" be* :aaifer. Hapoleon aur ben SdTOlfcern
Kußlanba größtenteils jugrunbe gegangen war, fd,lug für 2>eutfd_^anb ber tag ^« »^[«.ung^
3n Preußen würben «Ue wehrfähigen fianbeseinwobner jum Snegsb.en,^ verpfhd,tet unb
aufgeboten. Heben ben Ă„inientruppen wĂĽrbe bie fianbwebr aufgefieOt.
So konnte PreuĂźens Voll^abeer verjĂĽngt unb in neuer (Beflalt, von Vaterlonbaliebe unb (Dpfer.
mSS befeelt, unter tatkräftigen ^ül,rern in ben Befreiungsl=ampf j.eben. Unter ^ubrung
23lĂĽd)ert^, ^cm 0nci|cnau als a5cncraljlab}?d)cf 3ur Bcitc (lanb, crfocl)tcn Mc pmif;ijd)eri
Cnippcn nad) anfänglid)cnnTif;crfolgen bic Biege an ber'Äatjbad) unb bei ^enneivitj. 0emcin)am
mit bell verbünbeten ä>j>crreid)ern, Xiiffen unb Bd)ircben brannten fte aUbam bas t^tcv Hapolcond
v»or ^icip.vn ^iifamincn imb fd^lugen ea in breitagiger Bd)lad)t cntfd)eibcnb aufd ^aiipt.
)5H itiurbc ber Kbein iiberfd)ritten, unb banf ^lĂĽd)er6 ^-fnergie ber fid) verzweifelt mcbrenbc
:Raifer bia nad) Paris .^uriidgebrangt. ^^r banfte ah unb iniif.te ftd) auf bie ^nfel ^^Iba begeben.
^(ber |d)on im folgenben '3^1>t*c lanbete er irieber in ^ivanfvcid) unb befeitigte bic injtrifd^en ein*
gerid)tete neue Kegierung. Bofort maren aber feine CPegncr ii^ieber auf bcm plan. 23ei 23elle*
^llliance fd)lugen bic
verbĂĽnbeten preu(;en
unb ifnglanber bcn
Ă„aifer enbgiiltig aufs
^aupt. ^amit iv»ar
bic ^t'reibeit bcr eure*
paifd)en Völker irie*
bergeuionnen. ^urd)
bas VDebrgefctj bcs
IRriegaminijlerö von
2boycn ii\ir bereits im
3abre )Sj4 bit ^(Ib
gemeine \P e b r -^
pflid)t in preu|i;en
eingefiibrt a^orben. t^s
i^anb mit biefer Zlla^*
nabme allein ba in
(Europa, bcnn in allen
anberen Zaubern, felbjl
in ^t>anh*eid), i-'ebrte
man ^um langer bit'
nenben Bcrufsbeer ^u-
riicf. Wäbrenb bort
bas tgeer fid) mebr
unb mebr vom X>olF
cntfrembete, blieb es
in preuf;cn burd) ba&
Priii3 'Jibalbcrt von PreuĂźen
alljabrlid)e IRommen
unb (Beben ber Kefru*
tenjabrgange mit ilym
in enger X>erbinbung.
^lus Bparfaml'eitB*
griinben freilid) fe^tc
man bie BtarFe bes
(lebenben Speeres im
iiauf ber 3eit mebr
unb mebr l^erab unb
liej; bcn gröf;ten ^eil
ber VDebrpflid)tigen
burd) bic oberfläd)'
lid)e, nur wenige Wo*
d)cn bauernbe "^(usbil*
bung ber Xlanba^el^r
geben, ^as rad)te fid)
)$9o, als ber !Eampf
um bic X>orl)errfd)aft
in ^eutfd)lanb .^iv>ifd)en
PreuĂźen unb cbjicrreid)
unmittelbar bevor-
f^anb. preu(;en fĂĽl)lte
fid) nid)t(larf genug unb
muj;te bcn entiriu*bi»
genben X>ertrag von
CMmĂĽt; abfd)lie(;en.
^a war es Bönig Wilbelm L, ber, 3ur Regierung gel^ommen, geanüt a^ar, preuf;en wieber
eine \iavH, ncu^eitlid^e Webrverfaffung ^u geben. (Segen bcn Vl^illcn ber Volksvertretung fĂĽbrte
er, mit Unter jliit;ung feines niinijlerprafibenten ^ismarrf unb feines :Rriegsminij>ers Koon,
bic ^lllgemcine \l>ebrpflid)t im (Peijlc Bd)arnbor(ls wieber ein, 3eber Vt)el)rfal)ige muf;te brei
3abrc im j^cbenben tgeere bicncn, 3n biefer 3eit er(>anben aud) wieber bic ^(nfange einer
prcuj;ifdien :Rr i egsmar ine. Prin^ ^Ibvxlbert von PreuĂźen anirbe um bie HTitte bes vorigen
;;'iabrbunberts 3um Präger unb ^^örberer preuf;ifd)er unb bamit beutfd)er Beeintereffen. Wobl
vcrfud)te aud) bamals bas Keid), feinerfeits eine Itlar ine 3u griinben, aber bic ^(nfä^e blieben
in ibrem Einfang (Icdr'en. )$4$ wĂĽrbe bic beutfd)e 23unbesflotte mit ganjlid) un3ulanglid)en
Ulitteln gcfd)affen, vier "(abre fpätcr fd)on fanb fie ein rubmlofes i^nbe burd) bic öffentlid>e
X>erj>cigerung. Unb tro^bem batte aud) fte, bie in il^rer inneren 3ufammenfe^img eigentlid>
einen rid)tigen nationalen !Rern v>ermiffen lief; — ein (Bropteil ber (Dffi^iere waren 'Jtuslänber — ,
ftd) wad'er gefd)lagen, a^o ftd) (Belegenbeit baju bot. PreuĂźen l^atte ftd) an ber ^unbesflotte
neben anberen Btaaten nid)t beteiligt, nid)t aus mangelnbem HationalgefĂĽl^l, fonbern weil es
bic Un5ulanglid)feit ber (Brunblagen biefer (35rĂĽnbung re(i)t3eitig ernannte. PreuĂźens eigene
«lotte, &«m«l9 n«cf) Hein, abtv t.on fc(icm innerem 3uf«ntnienbalt, foUte ^er ©nmMlorf ^ec
neuen «ne!>erer<i«rfen^en bentfdien illarine .vcrben. »ie mertx^oUilen Sd)tffe bei- ehemaligen
»unbeeflotte .rurben am ber Verj^eigerung, el)e f.e in fren.be ^anbe ^Mcn Kannten gerettet.
S,an5ig mürbe 2lrieg»Dafen. j8?4 «i^urbe b«9 ^«begebiet von (Dlbenburg ermorben. Wilhelms-
UnTer TeMShmbigen .^üDnmg bea prinjen l.b«lbert, feit ,8.4 ^'Nniral ber prcuf,ifd)en
«lotte, ging es knafam, aber «ietig m.fmärts. ,864 befreite Preußen im Bunbe ""t a>,^erre.d
tluZUmn\ou ber ^errfd,.ft ^.„emar... -.m e.ige. «uhme. l. t .n b.e.em :E ege
wirb ber Bturm auf
bie^ĂĽppclcr Bd)an*
5en unb ber Ăśbergang
nad) Hilfen fein.
^ann Um es )$00 ^u
ber erwarteten ^lus*
einanberfet3ung 3tvi"
fd)en PreuĂźen unb
öj^erreid), auf beffen
Bcitc aud) bas Bönig*
reid) Hannover unb
bic fiibbcutfd)cn Btaa*
ten traten, ^(ber Bönig
VDilbelm battc im (Be-^
neral von tlTolt^c
einen genialen (Bencral*
jlabsd)ef. Beiner ĂĽber*
Icgcnen ^^iil)rung ix^ar
es 3u banden, ba^^ bic
«Hannoveraner beim
X)crfud), ftd) mit bcn
Bübbeutfd)en 3» ^^^"
einigen, hei ÂŁangcn*
fal^a nad) tapferem
Bampf bic VDaffen
(Freden muĂźten, ^ann
wĂĽrben brei preuĂźifd)c
<t>t]Oto edieil, 53erlin
C5encralfclbmarfcl)an von llloUfe
^Irmccn aus Bad)fcn,
ber J[lauftt3 unb IHittel»
fd)leften ^um Vov*
ntarfd) nad) Böbmen
angefei3t. Bic erf ampf^
ten ftd) bcn ^lustritt
aus bcn (Gebirgen unb
fd)lugcn bann bie (t>\tcv'
reid)er entfd)cibenb bei
Böniggra^. Wab-
rcnbbeffen unterlagen
aud) int U^e^^cn bic
fiibbcutfd)en Cruppcn
bcn prcu^ifd)cn in
mebreren (I3efed)tcn.
P r e u (; c n gewann
burd) bcn ^\>icben von
XI i ^ 0 1 s b u r g ^an*
nover, t^effen-naffau
unb ^^ranffurt a. 111.
xmb wnvbe bamit ber
mäd)tigjle Btaat bes
^eutfd^en 23unbcs.
^ie fĂĽbbeutfd)cn Btaa*
ten fd)loffen mit il)m
niilitarvertragc ah
unb fiibrtcn nad) feinem
mX bT;n;;:r: Wehrpflid,t .. - :^..^ ^er fr.n,,.f.fd,e B.ifer ^f P^leon I^ ^^^^^^^
tete mit Heib unb Beforgnia biefe innere -Irfiarhrng ^-^^^^t^^^'^Z, '^^^^S^.
fä*li*e X>eranI«fFung «uf, um Preußen ben Xrieg "l^»««"-.'^;^,.^^"" f ,' .TilnlX
beutfd,en auf feine Seite treten mürben. 2>arin irrte er „d) aber ?;""f ^^^^' ,'"";"" 'J^
aUe eutfd,en Stämme bem «ufe :Rönig Vl?iU,elm.. mit "''"'^-•df ^^'^•®*"^'^'5; * "f;'Xb^
brei ^.rmeen in ber pfalj auf unb traten ben Vormarfd, gegen ben .^e.nb «". ^ ^^ " "^^ '^
madiung nod, nid,t roUenbet hatte, »ei Spid) er n, Weißen bürg unb Wort l> mürben
eine er ©renje 3unäd)<l (tel^enben ^orps gefd,lagen. 5Dann überfd,reiten b.eJDeut.dKn m una„r^
Utfamem Vormarfd, b ie «tofel oberhalb »le^. 3n ben blutigen Sd)lad,te„ be. lllar. U
Cour «nb (Bravelotte merben bie ^ranjofen me(ilid) biefer .^efiung be,.eg unb m thr
eingefd,Ioffen. 3Die anberen beutfd)en ^Irmeen fe^en ben Vormarfd, fort, unb es gelingt nun ber
gSen ilhrungshmfl Uloltfes, ben Ke(t be. fran^öfifd^en ^f ''««1^"^^^^,;" '" jf^
unb Dier ,00 000 Mtann jur Waffenftrerfung 5U jmingen. 3Der Sa.|er rrapoleon gel)t nad,
Wilbelmshöhe bei Saffel in Bricgsgefangenfd^aft.
3Dcr loftcaritt bcc XSti^abe 2ittbow in bei- Srf)lact,t bei mar» l« Tour ,870
^fud) bie pm.f;tfd)e Kriensmarinc errang in öiefer 3eit bead)tlid)c «rfolge gegen bie fran-
30fifd)e, Me untere Tuijlen 31. blorfieren fud)te. Sie xvav iwav erl^eblid) fd)it.äd,er ab bie bamala
über Me neu3eitlid,0en Sd)iffe «erfiigenbe .flotte bes 3.rciten fran3Öf.fd,en Sai|erreid)e9.
:Jlber mo fte f.d) |d)liig - imb f.e ging feiner fid) bietenben ®elegenl>eit am bem Wege -, ba
ge|d)a^) ee m.t n?ut unb teihreife mid) glan3ertbeni Ofrfolg, wie bas )iegreid)e (Bcfedit 3roi|d)en
bem Kanonenboot „lUeteor" unb bem fran3Öfifd,en 3(«i|o „Bout^et" v)or ,ä«wanna bewiea.
3Die beut|d,eii C!(rmeen rĂĽrfen vor Paris unb fd)lie^en bie Kie|enfe(iung ein. 3lber bie nunmehr
errtd)tete fran3Ă–fifd)e Kepublif wiD ben Kampf nid)t aufgeben. TroĂźbernnteĂź mit , So 000 mann
fapituhcrt, .rcrben neue 2trnieen an ber üoire unb in norbix>e(lfranFreid) aus bem »oben
ge(tamprt, bic paus entfeĂźen foUcn. -Dergcbena! iDen feflgefĂĽgten, kampferprobten beutfdien
Truppen erliegen biefe mangelhaft ausgebilbeten Kefrutenwerbänbe bei St. a^uentin bei
^m.ens, bei (Drlean^. unb ILt lltana. ^Im ,8. Januar ,87) ivirb König Will>ehn in
rerfaiDes 311m SDeutfd)en Kaifer proFIamiert. Vlad) met^rercn 2lu9faaĂĽer|ud)en muĂź nun aiid)
P a r I a in bie Ăśbergabe tpittigen. ,franf reid) muĂź ,f rieben |d)IieĂźen unb tritt iCIfafi.fiothrinnen
an 5^eiitfd)Ianb ab. - > / j
5Da9 beutfd)e Volf hat leiber nad) biefen großen «rfolgen für ben weiteren 2(u8bau feines ,<eeres
nid)t ba» notirenbige Verjlänbnis aufgebrad)t. Solange »ismarcF nod) Xeidi9ran3ler war (bis
mo), fetjte er gegen ben miberjlrebcnbcn Keid)8tag burd), i>a^ bas ^eer entfprcd)enb ben
JiarFen Xu«>ungcn unferer t:iad)barn genügenb verfiärft würbe. SDann aber vernad)Iäffigte man
troe bes allgemein wad^fenben \t>oI)lflanbes bie Wehr, «s Fam l)in3U, ba^ unfere «ntwirflung
3ur Weltmad)t eine (larFe .flotte notwenbig mad)te. Unter ber stelbewuĂźten Leitung bes C35roĂź.
abmirals von TirpiĂź wĂĽrbe biefe feit (Cnbe ber 90er 3al;re ausgebaut unb erreid)te afl.
mal>lid) eine bead,tlid)e (Bröße*). «Cirpi^ cr3og bas beutfd)e "DolF 3u bem ffiebanFen ber See«
mad,t unb Seefal)rt. «r legte bie ©runblagen für ben organifatorifd)en, ted)nifd)en unb mili.
tarifd)en 2(usbau ber beutfd)en Kriegsmarine. 5Die beutfd^e .flotte, bie )9)6 am QFagerraF bem
(Englanber fiegreid) bie Stirn bot, ijl in il)rem tieffJen, innerfien Kern fein WerF.
Ăśberall bort, wo beutfd)e Sd)iffe auftraten, wuĂźten ]ie bie (El>re il>rer .flagge 3u wal^ren/wur.
ben n!el)rer von mad)t unb 2(nfehen bes Seid)es. So in Cl?ina bei ber Befd)ießung bes CaFu«
•) 38 (Progr«mpffcf)iffe, yo Sccujcc, 144 lorpebobootc mb ttwa jo Untecfccbootc mit tunb 76000 mann.
forts bei ber f.d, bas Kanonenboot „^Itis", ber würbige Xladifolger ber ,89J fo dKcnvoU in
Äen „nterge angenen er,^en „:Utis", unter feinem tapfei-en f^-^^^' ^f^ -; » '
F,;n in V /'ans bem fpäteren ^ilbmiral, aus3eid)nete. So im t^crero.^Uinlanb '^04 unb bei ar
^r^.^'S^^i^<^^^^^ m ^er Dnfel ponape, an ber 'f-^""f -^'^^/^^ .^J "
viieoeiuuTi J ," v>,,..„,,ertt" mitwirFtcn! 5ielbcwu|;t würbe in ber <i,amat bei
;fcttrC;baf rrn e'^m; n^^^^ .f.ottengefe.e burd,gefü„rt. .tud, bie .Cnfange einer
r„ wa fe nt,V.„be„ in biefer ,3eit infolge ber genialen .frfinb.ing bes '^^^^;«" '"^ J J'^J
; O^vaf ..eppe'un unb bie ..nt.id-lung bes .flugseugs für '"•'•'-•''^;-^-|^^. ,. ^^
^ccu l^nlr^c in ben
crimen )^ Z^cAnxn unfc*
rcd 3abrlnni^crt55 trotj
bea ^iU'Un 2in\vady
fcnd unterer 23cvöll:c*
riing in faum nennen^*
werter Weife ver-^
mcbrt. Bo Vant es,
Nij; )9)o alljabrlirf)
nur nod) S3 pro3ent
ber u^ehrfabigeniHann*
fd^aft 3"m c^nivtn
^ien(> einge(^ellt anir-
ben gegenĂĽber S5 Pro*
3ent in ^^ranh-eid).
3d)arnbor(>^ a3cban^e,
baj; je^er gefunbc
mann ftd) int Waffen*
bicn(^ 3um Bd)ut3 ber
v^eimat ĂĽben muffe,
war völlig in "Oer*
geffenbeit geraten, ^r^as
^^eer batte aufgebort,
baB 3u fein, was ee
nod) unter :RaiferXt>il-
l)elm L gewefen n?ar:
iM)otü ödiorl, iöerlm
(pro^abmiral von Zivynt^
eine i^r.Mebung^fdiule
fĂĽr ba? gefamte X>olL
^abei anid^d mit je*
bem t^abr bie von Q>\i
unb \Vc\t brobcnbe ^c*
fabr. ,^ranh*eid) batte
fid> bereite Einfang ber
9cer 3abre mit Ku^*
lanb verbĂĽnbet, unb
biefem BĂĽnbnid iv>ar
♦Irnglanb beigetreten.
iDad mit iDeutfd)lanb
verbimbetc (bi^erreid>
Ungarn vernad^läffigte
noci) fd)limmer al? iv>ir
feine Wel>r, unb Dta*
lien wm-t^c ein immer
unftd)rerer Bunbc^ge»
novfe.^^nMid),imriÄln'C
j9)), erirannte man,
irobin bie langjabri*
genVerfaumnivfefiibr*
ten. llTan vermebrte
bk ^^rieben?(^arfc bee
t^eeres^ von 6to oco
auf 750 000 niann,
;Slte Sf"abrnod, nid. bie.enige .fra„Freid,s, bie .^-cco m.„n 3.^.0 0^^^^^^^^ i^^
SevölFerungssahl um .0 miDionen geringer ^'^YVn'XSlTXteuSrt^l «^«
waffnung unb ^U.sbilbung bes beutfdxn -^eeves (ianbcn bab i auf beb uten^^^^^
.fraliFreid, imb Kußlanb befaßen eine unverhältnismäßig viel größere .,ahl ausgemibete
keferveoffi3iere unb -mannfd^aften.
so brad, benn €nbe 3uli „H ^ie c,-ße Kata^rophe herein. J,^errei^. Jonf.iFt mit Serbien
würbe bas fran5ofi|d>englitdic '^«r •" «""i ^""'•^' «„sLs^rff ben in (Dftpreußen einbrcdienben
gefdilagen. tJm ^en bereiteten f"''"^'''^..^'^J'^^^^^^^ beutfd,en
Kuffcn eine vernid)tcnbe rjicberlage. Unaurl)alt|am ging bic nrcni'^«
•) ,9,4 gab CS 6 'iuftfdjiffer. unb f ^licgcr-SAtaiDone.
5^ic ecc|d}lacf)t am Qfagcrraf
ÜopDriöDt bi) aiiiDiuD «onfl lüi-üuü, »film
Jen .flurtcl. In. ,„ ^ol,c von p.ri. weiter. 5D«nn aber nwks e. f,d), b«g 6ie bcii-erfeitigen
f m n' ' ^. ^>''^' ""'*'"• *'' W"terla,7lm£(*|•iin^cn Hv VovMt^^mit md,teti f.d,. (Cinem
6o.m,nio„cn.X->olt rtcUnj c- nid,t, ein 4o4ninionen.VolF nie&er,unncen, ireil bkk» ia(t aUe
Webrr.ab.gen mL^jebikSet unb an Me A'ront gejleUt hatte, mäbrenb bei ims ^unberttaufencSe wn
Unausgebilbeten 5ur fflcidien ,^eit in ber ^ei.nat nod, bie ei-(ien folbatiidjen ^(nfantsgrĂĽnbe er.
ernen nnipten. s^ierMird, unb Mird, ^^ebler ber A-übrunj verebbte &er beutfd,e Eingriff «n ber
marne jn ben me.teren Kämpfen bi.^ jum (Pftober verlängerte f.d) bie beiberfeitige x-rc-nt bia
5um llleer. 2>er SteĂĽimgeFrieg begann. 3m <t>\icn battcn inwifd,en bie (iSficrreid,er unb Ungarn
nad) anrangl.dien Erfolgen gegenüber ber riiffifdien Übermad)t ®ali,ien nidit behaupten fönnen.
^urd^vrei Frartig geführte CJlngriffe an.. Sd)lefien unb fpäter aus ©egenb »Chorn, Kid,tung
War,d)au bradite jebod, ^inbenburg bie ruffifd,e iDampfiralje juni ^"alten unb fid,erte bie
linfe ,\lanhe ber a>|lerrcidKr. 2>ann aber Fam ea aud) hier mm SteDungsFrieg
^MZUĂśn ,0K begann mit fd).reren Eingriffen ber ^'ranjofen in ber Champagne, bie abgemiefen
mĂĽrben, jtalicn trat auf bie Seite unferer ,<feinbe. 3Die mit uns verbiinbctc TĂĽrFei mehrte ba^
gegen taprer bie Eingriffe ber «nglänber unb ^'ranjofen gegen bie JJarbaneDen ab. 3m (Dften er.
gnrren mir Einfang Illai bie (T-ffenrivc, burdibradien bie ruffifdien SteHungen bei (Borlice-
Cornom unb marfen in immer micber erneuerten Eingriffen Sd)ulter an Sd)ulter mit ben (Pfter.
reid).Ungarn ben ,^emb aiw ©alijien, polen unb Litauen heraus. *£v\i im September mußte bk
gro^e (Pffeniive eingejteDt merben, meil im Wcjlen neue Eingriffe ber .franjofen unb «nglänber
baju jmangen, einen Teil ber beutfdien »räfte auf biefen 2lriegsfd)aupla5 ju überführen. Croß.
bem gelang es uns, im ^erbjt jojy bas ferbifdie ^eer burd) einen gemeinfamen Eingriff mit ben
mir uniere Seite übergetretenen Bulgaren vöHig ju |d)lagen unb baburd) ben Weg 5ur tCürFei
rret MI madien. So (ianb bie ĂĽage tÂŁnbe j^)? burdiaus gĂĽn|>ig.
5Da3 3al)r joK- brad)te unferen Großangriff auf Verbiln, bem leiber ber «Erfolg verfagt-blieb.
3m (Pfien fetjten bie Xuffen, naincntlid) im Sommer, eine (Dffenfwe auf breiter <front jur iEnt.
laflung ihrer me(tlid)en Verbünbeten an, aber bie »TapferFeit ber beutfd)en Truppen, bie ben(»jler,
reid)ern ju .^ilfe eilten, fing btn gemaltigen Stoß be» ©egners auf. Unfer ttlißerfolg bei X)erbun
m
unb ein mit gemaltigen Mitteln gef ĂĽhrterfran5Ă–f.fd)er Eingriff an ber Sommebrad,ten uns fernere
Verluile. 5Da trat aud, nod, Rumänien gegen uns in ben Krieg em unb bebrohte bas ta)-i u".
nefd,ÜRte Siebenbürgen. JDiefe fd,mere Krif.s mürbe baburd, behoben, bap «n ^inbenburg.
P .b «borf f bie lefamtleitung bes Krieges vom Kaifer übertragen mürbe. Jhnen gelang es
,^id,t nur, bie £age mieberberjuileDen, fonbern Elumänien entfd,eibenb aufs tgaupt ju |d,lagen.
»ie beuticf)e <;od,f eef lotte mürbe bebauerlid,ermei|e 5""äd,(t nid,t einge|et5t pie im
E^slan 5 nbHd,en Sd,;ffe führten bagegen einen erfolgreid,en KreujerFr.eg. -ÄTf "'"'»"^"
Seb" ise" v^er enFte in Fühnem U.Boots.Elngriff brei englifd,e Kreu,er. ©as d5e,d,maber bes
Lt ra s <Sraf Spee id,lug im v^erb^^ )9M ein britiid,es entfd,eibenb be, Coronel r«n^ '^^cr,
von mcWaier ĂĽbermad,t ĂĽmi^eDt, bann an ben ^^alFlaubsinfeln einen ruhmre.d,en Untergang.
Ells Elntmort auf bie engli|d,e Blorfabe mĂĽrbe aisbann im ^-rĂĽhjabr J9)? ber U.Soot.
K ieg irö nct. W i^eUte [u1, enblid, am ^MUai mo bie englifd,e ^'lotte am SFagerraF
5um K«mpf. Elbmiral Sd,eer griff f.e an unb fügte ihr fd,mer(Ve Verlüde ,ni.
UHfere taineren Sd,imtruppen in ben Kolonien mehrten fid, mit aUen Kräften ge?en bie
SrlSunerer (Gegner Elber balb fielen Kiautfd,o„, Kamerun unb 5reutfd,.Sübme(iarnFa.
Slm"« ieü;fd><J>MrL gelang es ber gefd,idten, energifd,en .Rührung bes O^ber,^ v. 'i e 1 1 o m •
Y) 0 r b e cF , ftd, ^t behaupten. .
^lu* ta<^ -(ahr ,0,7 mar mieberum erfuttt mit fd,meren Eingriffen unferer Ö5egner ,m We(^e„,
^ mib^nie. n,b «n ber Ostfront. überaU mürbe ber .^einb unter fd,meren X>rlu,1en ab.
Lem e?n 'inbere f its"^ ber Kampfmert ber ruff.fd,en Elrmeen infolge ber hier ausbred,enben
S iontmermel r. ^er Italiener, ber am 3fon,o i„„,.er mieber ^^V^^^^^ ^£:;^
reid,i|d,en SteD.mgen ,u burd,bred,en, erlitt burd, einen gegen ,e,ne l.nFe ManFe geiuhiten
(GroĂźangriff eine |d,irerc Vliebcrlage.
Union IcutitlK SScclao««"!'»" Stuttflart
(Bcgenftog bcutfctjcc Sturmtruppen burd, bas tCridjtcrsclĂĽnbc in ^Unbern ,9,8
8
"im ,\'clnnmr )9)7 crHartc ^cutfd)lan6 ^cn uncingcfd)ranhcn U"23oo t*:Rr icg, ^cr axid)
anfange fchr gute «^rfolttc brad)tc. ^(bcr ^cr balb baraiif crfolftcn^c i^intritt ^(mcrifad in bcn
'Evica; vcrfd)lcd)tcrtc Mc >^rfol0^aii^ftd)tcrt ^cr n]ittclmad)te.
^ic J(iiif tunif f c hatte ftd) feit :RricgtUKctinn unter ^cr encrgi|d)cn ilcitung bcd Oberj^
^omfen mif;erorbentlid) cntunifelt. 23ereiti^ in ^en ^erbjlfd)lad)tcn )9h l>ittcn bie ^\'lieger fel^r
u^ertvollc ^tiifHänina^erftcbniiJc fjebrad^t, u\1ihrcn^ ^a^ ({iiftfd)iff fid) im ({anbh'icge nid)t beiv»abrtc.
Magerten griffen bie lllarine-^uft*
fd)iffe mit unerhörtem t^el^enmut
immer llMe^er bie feinMid^en ^aupt*
jlaMe J^onbon unb Paris an. Von
jz) ^uftfd)iffcn blieben ))o auf bcm
^t'clbe ^er t^hrc. ^er Vlame bes :Rapi*
tans Btraffer unb vieler an^erer ge*
hören bcr C!5efd)id)te an. Währen^ ber
groj^en ^lbiv>ehrfd)lad)ten im We(>cn
eranes? ftd) bic X>ermel)rung unfe*
rer ^^'lug^euge mel^r unb mel^r als
unabit^eisbar, a^eil bie i^rringung
ber £uftiiberlcgenl;)eit ftd) alö eint
ber ^auptbebingungen fĂĽr bcn t^r*
folg env>ied. Unter fd)neibigen, vor*
bilMid)en ^^'iihrcrn iv>ie "^mmelmann,
Boekf c, CPöring unb Übet gelang es
immer uMeber, bcn 3ahlenmäf;ig
ĂĽberlegenen (Gegner nieber3uringen.
Unter allen biefen s^elbcn (Prahlt bcv
Hamc K i d) 1 1) 0 f e n in un(lerb*
lid)em ÂŁid)t.
3m Winter )9)7/)S fd)ieb Kuf^lanb
burd) ben ^t'rieben von Bre(l*^itoirff
au!d ber Keihe unferer C!5egncr aus.
^ieinittelmäd)te befe^ten jur @id)er*
(Teilung ber X>erpflegung bic Ukraine,
â– ^m VDejlen fd)ritten luir im lllarj
.^ur entfd)eibenben (Dffenftve. ^tbcr
ber Eingriff lief ftd) tro^ grö(;tcr
Eingabe unferer Gruppen aus Hl an*
gel an :Eraften fe(l. 3m Q>^tn bt^
freiten irir bic baltifd)en provin3en
vom Terror bcr 23olfd)eiriFen unb l)alfen btn ^^innen bei ber (Beirinnung ihrer Belb(^änbigfeit.
^od) biefe ^Teilerfolge konnten bie ftd) fĂĽr uns immer ungĂĽnstiger gef^altenbe CDefamtlage nid)t
änbern. VXad) mel)rfad) erneuerten (Großangriffen im VDe(len mußten unfere burd) über*
an(>rcngung unb (Grippe erfd)öpften Gruppen allmal)lid) unter bem ^ru(f ber übermad)tigen,
burd) bie kampfkräftigen ^(merifaner ge(lärften ^^'einbc jurücfgel^en.
5)a brad) im September bie bulgarifd)e ^^ront in HTajebonien unb bie türi^ifd)e in paläjlina
jufammen. Z^nx (Dftobcr löjle ftd) ba& ö(lerreid)ifd)*ungarifd)C ^geer in Italien infolge feiner
:Krieg9mĂĽbigfeit auf. nid)t6bc(lon:>eniger leijletc unfcr VDe(ll)cer unerfd)ĂĽtterlid)en VPibcr*
(^anb. Einfang Hovember verfemte bann bit in iDcutfd)lanb amhvc&ftnbt Devolution bem ^^ront*
l>eer ben ^old)(loĂź von l>intcn.
J^uftFampf )9j8
^« imerbört ^al)em Kinnen l^atte baa bcutfdic ^cer über v)ier 3al)rc scjen emc Wc x>on
TänZT^liLi verteibigt. t>on ben ,. miUioncn beutfCcr Sol^aten haben .,1 . ni.U..ncn
iTivcuc ,u Vo\f unb Voterknb nut bcnt Tobe bef.egelt. 5Die «c.nt.t l^atte .nfoltte bcr vo er. ^
reiten irinen 2JlocF«be .^ngUnb» bie fd„ver,^en .fntbebnmgen crbulbet, .r«r bann aber uMÜcn.
ofbrntJelof einer «anLu getriffcnlofer Verrater jum O^pfcr gefallen, ^o >vurbe bem
tlbbe r tro.3 feiner gemitigen ^-folge unb „nfagUcl,en UTuben ber S.ege.^ran, «" * ^^f
S ben i'nbei ge.runben «nb ba. au. tm.fenb Wunben bh.tenbe 5Deutfcl,la„b ber W.nh.r e.ne
vlbe a?4el fert I>ie flotte n.u^te nad) ben. 5Diftat be* übern,ad)tigen ©egner. au.gel.erert
Sen Ir S,-S „gen unterLmiral «.Deuter retteten bie-ibre ber unbewegten beut,d,en
irieSlSge ^"^cl) bie red^t^eitige Verfenhmg ber Sd,iffe in ber Bud,t von Scapa .Mo.r.
111.
WäDrenb bas Vl^cfibeer (I0I5 erhobenen v^aupte. unb in tabellofer a^rbnung "f;«L^^" fj'^'"
,urĂĽcrmarfd)ierte, jattten fiafiauto. n,it be.raffneteni X)erbred)erge).nbel burd, ^^\^''^l"l''
b .fd en S äbte Wal)renb jebe. Solbaten ^er, ber mel,e @d,n,er5 über ^'^J"f "^•^^' f "^"
'Sinfl«nb.bebing«ngen 5err.^, rief ^,err Sd,eibemann vom ^'en^ler ber Jc.J.^an c^^^^
SeutU K publi« mit ben Worten «„.: „^a. beutfd,e Volf bat a»r ber ganjen e.n.e ge,.cg
unb bl betorte Po« glaubte biefem Betrug. Unter ben iiinben r.p man (!>rr.?.eren, b.e n
mänd^er Sbfd lad,t il)ren beuten vorange,^iirn,t .varen, bie ^.d,fel,^üd=e herunter «-arr f-^J^.
Bot unb ?raS Jt /uf^en nad> il>nen. 3Das .var bergan, be. -^-^^^.^ f^
tum ber lernten 3abre, für aU bie .Entbehrungen «nb ©eraDren, über b e .d b e ^ " ^«t "^ .^ "
fi^rf -DorfteUunn ncmadit hatte. U*»ar es ein Wunber, baj? ber ,^clb)olbat, bei taptcr |cine
p fw,^get?n Se' Ln grimmigen «af; empfanb gegen iene marvift.fd,en Hu.n.e^er, gegen
icne -Dcrrater bencn bie internationale böl)er fianb als bas Vaterlanb;
S Te r m'ad thaber hatten nid,ts .Eiligeres ,u tun, als bas ilolje, ^'^^^?^^'^\f%f';'Z
ShtJöfen r dl -e fürd,tetcn, es fönne ihnen gefährlid, «-erben. 5Diefen fp,er,.gcn paMT-ften fam
„ rS ©"b n"dV einmal bas X)ol? 5um legten MMber(^anb aufzurufen, m.e es b.e ^ran.
S„ nad) iS-er t^iebeiage bei Seban ,^70 getan hatten. Sie lieferten bem ^embe aUe Kampf-
mittel aus, fie mad)ten bas beutfd)e X>olf wehrlos. .„„ah^., rtetten-
"iber balb n uĂźten f.e ernennen, bag f.e ber Umfiurjbe.regung im Jnnern >fl^<* '"^^"^'^^egen^
überftanben 5 B rlin unb in fajl aUen größeren beutfd,en Stäbten verübten b.e SpartafM^en
metrt;^^ 3Das, Jas an Truppen in ben Kafernen 5"!;'**5ebl.e - ^^^^^
fi* m kämpfen So ntuj^te bie neue Kegierung ber fojialben.otratiidien X>oltsbeauf fragten am
^'ZcInLTJv Bilbung neuer Truppen fd,reiten, um n.it ihnen ben Spartahsnu s, b.e
t^itSb proirriats, ,u bekämpfen. UTan rief nad) einem alten Xejept *es oj.al e,no.
Sit Sn Sbrers Bebel e ne „freitriEice Volfs.rebr" a.,f. Sie .vablte .bre V.hrer lelb^l,
^TZ^^^^^^^^'r., ein ^ertrauensrat von f.inf ^^^Z^^t^ ^
neuen Truppen er.riefen f.d) aber balb als vöU.g imjuverlan.g, »fe.l .bre inannesjud,t fa,t
.rillen ber v^ein.at untergraben hatten, nid,ts ĂĽbr.g, als f.d, an b.e_ alten a>ff.5.ere, an b.e ^ront
Dampfer ,« ..enben, bie il>nen «Vets ^'^;^;^^:;;%^:;:Z ^^c unb bas V>erant.
-^tS^SSĂ„Ă„^
neuen aud)tbabern gegenüber eii.pfanben. Balb b.lbeten f.d) ^ " • » . ''J
10
11
polen. Bic boten ftd)an, Me verlorene prov»in3 pofen iineber;unebmen, aber bie neuen niact)tbaber
fonntcn bayu ^en >^ntfd)lu); md)t f in^en. ^ie neuen X>crban^e |d)ĂĽi5tcn (r>(>preui;en unb bk balti|d)en
Provinzen gegen bcn fid) immer bc^rol>lid)er heranfd)ieben^en rufftfd)en ^olfd)eandmue. 3m
Innern fd)ufen )it ĂĽberall (Drbnung; fte befreiten Berlin unb IHimd^en von ber Bpartahidl)errfd)aft.
^ie rjamen ^er Generale von ^^ p p unb IH a e r f e r finb auö jener 5eit nod) l)eute in aller llTunbe.
Unter bem Bd)ui5e biefer ^^â– reil^n^igen*X>erban^e tagte ^ie XDeimarer rjationalverfammlung, bie
bem Keid) bie neue X>erfaffung gab. Bie iv»ar nid)t nad) bem Binne biefer ^^'ronthümpfer, ireil aus
biefer X>erfaffung ein irirnid)l-'eitöfrember, unteranirfiger <5ti^ fprad). ^tber man hatte irenig-
(Icna bad Keid) vor ^em v>ölligen 3ufammenbrud), vor ber ^ludrottung feiner jRultur beitiabrt.
3et3t bieg es, in ^er
Stille weiterarbeiten,
um bie neue, nod)
red)t buntfd)crfige
VT>ebrmad)t einbeit-^
lid) 3u organifteren.
<fd ij> ba5? grof^e 'Oer-^
bitn\t beö (Generale
Walter Keinbarbt,
bicfc fd)it>ere iinb viel*
fad) angefod)tcne ^luf*
gäbe erfolgreid) burd)*
gefĂĽhrt 3u baben.
^m 3anuar jojo
irurbe im preugifd)en
!Rriegaminif^erium ber
„Keid)dtrebraudfd)u|^"
in& dthcn gerufen unb
am6.nTar3)02o von bcr
national verfammlung
in Weimar baa (Befet^
über bic „X>orliüufigc
Keid)?n:)ebr" angenom*
men. 3unad)f^ xvat be*
abftd)tigt, bie Btärfe
bcv Kcid)9it)et)r auf
^^rcüC'Süuitrntiou .t>cinrid) \Hiffiiiauii, 5öorlin
Keid)9ilattl)altcr Xittec von iCpp
200 000 lllann ju be*
meffcn. 5Die ÂŁage im
cDj^en unb bie irieber
auf f lacf ernben Unrubcn
im Keid) jirangcn aber
ba^u, biefe Btärfe 3u
iibcr)d)reiten. Bo anir*
ben unter 4 (Ăźruppen*
l^ommanboö balb 22
groge unb )$ Heine
Kcid)öirebrbrigaben
gebilbet, bie mit ben
Bonbertruppen etira
400 000 lUann (larf
a^aren.
^Iber ba^ ifnbc 3uni
)0)9 ^eutfd)lanb auf*
gezwungene ^ i 1-' t a t
von X>erf aillea
a^arf biefe gan^c (Dr*
ganifation wieber ĂĽber
btn tgaufen. ^^0 fetzte
bie Btarfe bes tgecres
auf )QOQoo ITTann fe(>,
fd)rieb feine (Drganifa*
tion in allen i^in^el*
beiten genau vor, befeitigtc bit ^tOgemeine Webrpflid)t unb forberte bit ^^infĂĽ^rung eince
Berufabceres von .^a^iölfjabriger ^ienj^^eit. Unter bcm ^rucF biefer 23e(limmungen würbe
bit Btärfe bes ^eeree nun 3unäd)jl bie ^um ^^rüb]abr auf etwa zqcooo UTann verringert,
^ie gan^e Wut bes Bolbaten ĂĽber jene wiUenlofen (frfĂĽllungapoliti^er, bie an ber Bpitje
beö Keid)ee (lanben, mad)te ftd) nod) einmal im :Kapp*putfd) £uft. HTan wollte tint nationale,
felb(lbewugte Kegierung in btn Battel beben. 'Jtber ba^ Unternebmen fd)eiterte, weil bit 3eit
nod) nid)t reif bafĂĽr war. 7ln vielen BteUen bes Keid)e9, namentlid) im Xul)rgebiet, erbob ber
!Eommunidmu9 erneut bae> tgaupt. ^er gcfd)icFten unb energifd)en ^^ĂĽbrung bee (Generals
von Bcecft gelang es, aud) biefer ^(uf(^änbe nad) hir^er Mit *^err 3U werben.
75is 3um ), OHohtv )02o wĂĽrbe bas Keid)dbeer bann auf )9oooo, bis ).;3^nuar jgz) auf
100000 ITTann 3urĂĽrfgefĂĽl)rt. ^amit batte es bit ^^orm erbalten, bie il)m bas X>erfailler ^ihat
v»orfd)rieb. Wäl)renb in bas alte X>orfriegsbeer mit feiner .^weijat)rigen ^ienj^jeit-alljährlid)
ĂĽber 300000 junge UTanner neu eintraten, um bas VDaffenbanbwerf 5u erlernen, waren bies
im neuen ^eer mit feiner jwölf jäl^ngen ^ienjljeit nur nod) etwa aooo HTann. 3n biefen fahlen
fam fo red)t bit ganje iÂŁntmad)tung unferes Btaatswefens ^um ^(usbrucF .
12
iP^ war baber flar, ba^ biefes fleine ^eer gar nid)t in ber Hage war, btn Bd)u^ ber .^ennat
aettenĂĽber einem :!(ngriff ber llTiUionenbeere unferer nad)barn ^u lei(>en. Um )o weniger xvav
b es möglid), weil bem neuen ^eere aUe neu3eitlid)en Kampfmittel verboten waren namlid):
; Lrere itiĂĽerie ĂĽber ein Kaliber von )o,. cm; a. ^(ufHarungs, ^agb* unb BombenrUeger;
Kampfwagen jeber :!lrt. Was bas bieg, mögen nad)(>ebenbe 3ablen beleud)ten (Btanb von ,95 )):
550
72
^^ranfreid) . .
polen ....
Cfd)cd)oflowa^ei
^eutfd)lanb . .
^as Keid)sl)eer ver*
fĂĽgte ĂĽber l'eine llTa*
terialrefervcn. ^ie ge*
famte :öewaf fnung unb
^lusrĂĽ(>ung war im
X>erfailler X^ertrag
bis in aUe ^^inzelbei*
ten festgelegt. iDas
ging fo weit, baj; bie
3abl ber 23eneibungs*
garniturcn fĂĽr btn ein-
zelnen UTann vorge*
fdnneben a\ir. ^ie Be*
a\affnung bcs gefamten
«^ceres bc(>anb aus) ) 54
leid)ten, 79^ fd)a^eren
inafd)inengca>cbren,
2^2 niinemvcrfern unb
iSS leid)ten ^Pcfd)ĂĽ^cn.
Hur bie v^e(tung Kö*
nigsbcrg burftc 22
)d)aKre C!5cfd)ĂĽt5e be*
baltcn, bie \t\t einge*
baut ftnb. ♦fine (taat*
lid)c KĂĽ<>ungsinbuj>rie,
ĂĽber bie alle auslanbi
6$'6 23atterien
462
//
//
//
2^oo^\nug3euge
)000
$S0
n
(nur lcid)te)
//
//
a^ooKampfxvagcn
)00
//
//
(Dcnecalober(l von ©eccft t
fd)cn inilitvĂĽrmad)tc
verfĂĽgen, befagen wir
nid)t mcbr. Xlur we*
nige Privatfirmen lie»
fcrten bie »Ergänzung
bcs unbraud)baren HTa*
terials. ''Clod') bis y^\w
ZSahxt 19^^ wĂĽrben
Gruppe unb.^abri^cn in
entanirbigcnbcr Weife
von ben internationalen
Kontroll tommiffionen
bcimgefud)t.
5Die Befestigungen an
unferer We^tgrcnze,
auf t^clgolanb unb am
Wertteil ber (!>jtfce
muf;ten laut X)crfaiaer
iDiftat gefd)lcift wer*
btn, Bo liegt unfere
wc(tlid)e Kcid)sbalftc
völlig fd)ut3los einem
feinbiid)en ^^inmarfd)
gegenĂĽber offen. iDie
befestigten Werfe an
unferer ^ixb^^ unb C^^-
ĂĽvu-e,, alle ^icfc ^'Olun.cn entn^affnct. ^ÂŁ. pelKH-tc e.nc ,^uh .uven d t "M 1 r^^'
Bccidcnmg ^m, «nr,ef,d,t« biefer vur^reiKlten €«ne anen ^eni « pmren, ^^^^
bc.ffnun..lc.|e :.«.f.ci)ten für ben .<f«ll e.ne. Br.ege. erorrnete. ^'^.^^ f J"'7"; ;f„.,J '
lU.fl,au be. neuen «eere. fd^ritten, f.ben in ihm nur e.ne »^"^'-"S^J'*;'" "% n n bie n\
""'" '"\'" risrirrt ^^u^rberr^ tjs^Tz^^L.
rir n Cvtf^J^CinZf'^- Bie, en.or.enen_.rrun,.^^^^^^^^
^eeL ,u benJren unb .re-terjuentuntfeln. Unter b.e.em ^'f^'f^f'2'^;;^ fZ^l
von a'cecf t feine ^Irbeit. «r ivurbe Sd)öpfer bea neuen «eerea. Silber m.d) eines imnne.
riien^-^rbieibd gebenden, ber, obwohl fe.bO nid,t Bolbat, <^>^J^ ^^ U ^
burd,brun.en, n.annbaft für bie Xeid,.,rebr Umpitr- ^^'*r^^""'"'.'^"J',;®lf lehrte
.t-ar e., b^r ;d,t 3«l,re Unr, bie .^influßnab.ne ber "'/"^vjen aur b,e \rebrmad,t «b.vebrte
unb ihr bie inöglidifeit 5" rul)igeni, plannwgtgem 21ufb«u jcDut.
13
^cr ^ClItfd)c '5ol^at fab feit ^cm ^tiift'ommcn jlebcn^er vgccrc im )7.3^l;t-bimbcrt feine ibeale
^ebeits^aiifgabc ^arin, bit t^cimat in ^er Btlm^c bei' (Pefal^r gegen ben aiif;eren ^^'einb 311 ver*
teibiften. '^cin X)erantirortiing^beit)ii|^tfein gegenĂĽber feinen irebrlofen Volt'^genoffen trieb ihn,
bie O^efabren iinb »irntbel^rungen bc^ Äricge^ auf ftd) 311 nebmen, ja, fein ^cben für fein X>o\f
311m (Dpfcr 311 bringen. 2Die cntirĂĽrbigcnben 23e(limmiingen be^ X>erfailler "Oertraged verfolgten
beiriif;t Ni^^icl, bcn beutfd)en Bolbatcn an ber ^oöbarfeit biefer^difgabc ber ^anbe^verteibigung
ver3ii^eifebi 311 lajfen. «^r foüte fid) nur nod) a\e> CPlieb einer poli3eitruppe füblen, er follte in
cinent j^umpffmnigen Ă–tabtfolbatentum verfumpfen, wie wir es am ber beutfd)en :Rlein^laaterei
bcs jö.^abrbunbertö unfeligen :jtngebenfend l'ennen. Unfer tgeer batte in einer foId)en Umgebung
ben letzten Kejl feiner ^^\ĂĽbigFeit verlieren muffen, bie sgeimat gegen bcn auj;eren ^tinb 3u ver*
teibigen. t^ierin l^aben ftd) unfcre CPegner am bem Weltkriege geirrt. 5>ie Keid)j?uicbr l>it von
•^(nfang an ibre :jlufgabe barin gcfeben, alle feelifd)en :Rrafte, bit in unfcrem X)olf^beer ber X>or*
fricg^3eit lebten, uieiter3uentand'eln. ^ae> tgeer lief; ftd) nid)t irremad)en, bcn £anbeöfd)u^
ald feine ^Hauptaufgabe an3ufcben unb bas ^öd)(lmöglid)e in biefer ^inftd)t 3u leijlen. 0:3 iv»ar
von ber Über3eugung burd)brungen, ba$ nur eine auf nationaler ©runblage ftd) von3iel)enbe
<fntiiMd-'lung und ane> unferen vielen Hoten l)erau9l;)elfen l'onnte. ^(ud) bit Keid)ömarine irar ftd)
ber ibr in ber nadi(>en 3ufunft 3ufallcnben ^(ufgabcn voH bciinij;t. VDaren aud) bic @d)iffe babin,
war aud) ber s^offnung^funFe, au^ bem 3erjlörtcn eine neue Hlarine iiMeberauf3ubauen, nod) fo
flcin, ber erlaube it\ir geblieben. iZe> fanbcn )id) lITanner, bie troi3 ber fd)einbaren ^luĂĽiftd)ta*
loftgfeit cineö fold)en X>erfud)eö ba^^ Unmöglid)e wagten. MTit sal^ejler ^atfraft gmgen fte
unter ^\^ĂĽbrung von ^(bmiral v. llrotba bavan, bic vCrĂĽmmer 3u ftd)ten. Sd)on wenige 3al)re
nad) :RriegBfd)lu^ 3eigte ber itneber in ^icn^ gejlellte :Ereu3er „Berlin'' bie beutfd)e ^^lagge im
^(uBlanb, fubren brei ber uns verbliebenen ^inicnfd)iffe nad) Spanien. llTel^r ald alles anbere
baben biefc .t'abrten beutfd)er :ariegdfd)iffe bem ^(us^lanb bewiefen, bafy bic beutfd)c :Rraft tro^
fd)aicr(ler Bd)id'fal?fd)lage ungebrod)en war, baben unferen ^(uölanbbeutfd)en ge3eigt, ba^ bit
tgeimat nodi lebte unb an fte bad)te. — 3mmer mtlyv fejhgte ftd) ber innere 'Kcvn ber neu*
gegrünbeten jungen Keid)dmarine, bie bewußt bit Überlieferungen il^rer rul^mvoUen X>orgängerin
ĂĽbernabm unb iveiterpflegtc. ^mmer mel^r wud)fen bic ^(ufgaben, bic il)r gejlcHt wĂĽrben unb
bie fte getrculid) erfüllte. Heue @d)iffe irurben trotj größter Bd)wierig!-*eitcn in ^itn^ gcj^cllt,
gingen ind ^(uslanb, trarben bort fĂĽr bcutfd)ee ^(nfeben, 3eigtcn unferen fejlcn Willen, ba&
Ked)t ^eutfd)lanb0 auf Bcegcltung 3u wal)ren.
Bo fud)te bic VDebrmad)t burd) bit C5ĂĽtc ber ^cijlung bea ein3elncn bae wett3umad)en, xva^ il)v
an 3abl gcbrad); fte fc^tc alleö baran, m ibrcr :>(usbilbung gleid)en Bd)ntt 3u l^alten ntit ben
@icgcrmäd)ten; fte bedampfte mit allen ibr 3u (35ebotc (lebcnben HTitteln bcn bti une> gebulbetcn
unb fogar ge3üd)tetcn internationalen pa3ifidmuö; fte bilbcte ftd) einen eigenen ^^brbegriff, ber
bem bcö VOeimarer Btaatea fremb war; fte webrte ftd) mit ifrfolg gegen bic ^urd)fci5img bcö
Bolbatentuniö mit parteiifd)em (Bei(>; fte erbielt ftd) in ibrent inneren C!5efügc bcn 3u|lanb
unantaj^barer ^(utoritat; fte pflegte bae ewige nationale (Seban^engut in ber ^^r3iel7ung fcine9
nad)wud)fed. ^ie Keid)9wcbr war bic IRlammer bce> Kcid)ö in bcn fd)wer(len ^agcn feit )9)$,
Bic irar ber crbittert(le ^^einb bolfd)ewijlifd)cr Umtriebe.
3brem Bolbatentum brückte bic vcrebrungöitnirbigc (Bcjlalt bee ^felbmarfd)all9 unb Keid)?*
präftbcnten tginbcnbu rg einen befonberen Btempcl auf. ^^r bilbete bae moralifd)c ^^unba*
ment, auf bem ftd) bit Webrmad)t aufbaute, ^^r war ber Bd)irmberr il;rcr Waffencl)re, bit
Icbenbig fortwirfenbc ^rabition bts alten t^^tttt^, ^a, man fann fagen, baf; ^inbenburg bas
militarifd)c X>orbilb ber ^if3iplin unb X>aterlanb8licbc wicber binaustrug in bae X>olL llTan
fab aHmablid) in ibm eine mvtbifd)e (Bcj^alt, bcn getreuen f^dbarb bea iDeutfd)tum9.
^(ber glcid)3citig war ein anberer ITTann am VDcr^c, ber ba& von ^emo^raten unb Hlarvif^cn
verfalfd)tc unb gcfd)mal)te Bolbatentum wieber 3u ^^bren 3u bringen gewillt war. '^(bolf
t^itlcr, ber (Befreite bts Wcltfriegcö, begann bcn :Rampf, um bas X>oll^ einer neuen Welt*
anfd)auung 3U3ufĂĽl)rcn, einer Wcltanfd)auimg, bie bit Pflid)t 3ur ^anbeaverteibigung irieber in
btn niittelpunn bt^ neuen Btaate.^ <>eUen wiü. »^r griff babei auf dStbanUn ber grof.en prcur.i*
idicn Reformatoren 3urĂĽd, mit bencn bicfe bereite gegen benfelbcn verbevblid^en 3eitgciu an*
Uämpft batten. ^^r c^ab feinen politifd)en Bolbaten bai^ geiftige Küf^3cug bicfer lllanner m bie
kanb baa in ber nad)lfricai^3cit im Vo\U fa(^ gan3 verfd)ĂĽttet war. Wenn wir bcn .Rubrer von
ber ^»^bre ber Vlation fpred^en boren, glauben wir Claufewitj' feurige BcKmntniffc 3um Vater*
lanbMu vernebmen. Wenn er bic Verteibigung bcö lKimifd)en Boben? ab pflid)t lebce XXMtt^*
ttenoffen bini^cĂĽt, btnhn wir an Bdiarnbor|^t5 berĂĽbmte.^ Wort, baf. icber 23ewobner ber ge*
borene Vcrtcibigcr feines /ianbee fei. W^enn er aĂĽcin bic voflc Eingabe ber Beele an bit gror^c
Bad)C ttelten laf,t, glauben wir (35neifenaus Worte 311 boren. „:aeinc sHer3cnserbcbimg obne
uoetifdien Bd)wung. Wer nur nad) Harer Bered)nung banbclt, wirb ein jlarrcr ^^goijl.'; Wenn
er fd)lieĂźlid) bae folbatifd)c :Rampfcrtum als etwas ^obes, ^^rbabenes bc3eid)net, als eines ber
s<auptfunbamente fĂĽr bie cr^rebte X)olt'sgcmeinfd)aft, beni^en wir wiebcrum an a5nei|enau, ber
bn einfad)cn Bolbaten ben „l)od)ad)tbarcn Vl^affcngefabrtcn" fab unb nad) bem Biege an ber
%a^had^ in ^iebe unb Bewunberung über ibn bic Worte fagte: „a5ibt es etwas »^brwürbigercs
als fold)CS ^Dulbcrt, gepaart mit fold)cr ^apfcrfeit^" ^
5Damit fd)uf ftd) ber ^lil)rcr eine (35efolgfd)aft, bic in bcn 3ebn ri^m-en bes Ă„ampjes immer
ftarFer wĂĽrbe. 5Damit fd)uf er bic leibenfd)aftlid)e ^^infai5bereitfd)aft ber Partei rĂĽr )eine Jbec.
Wie einft bie ^H'cii^orps im offenen ^ampf mit ber Waffe in ber ^anb ben ^lurrubr ber ^om.
muniftifd)en internationale nicbcrfd)lugcn, fo rangen bie B^l. unb BB. in ^lincm, bartem unent*
wentem :aampf obne Waffe um bic Bede ber irregeleiteten X>olfsgenoffen. Bic 3Cigten babei ..ugc
ed)ien beutfd)en Bolbatcntums: (Dpfermut, ^artnarfigfcit, treue :Eamerabfd)aft. Bo mand)er
tapfere Dampfer muffte feine ^reuc 3um .^Hibrcr mit bem /ieben bc3ablcn. Bie )tnb getanen m ber
aleidicn ^ront wie bie vielen unbekannten Bolbaten bes Welth'icges, fĂĽr!Deut|d)lanbs^rcibeit
las ber Rubrer am 3C.rianuar )933 aus ber s^anb bes greifen ^clbmarfd^aUs bas ^(mt bes
Kcid)s^aniers ĂĽbertragen erl^ielt, war es fein fc)>er WiUe, bem unwĂĽrbigen .u^b umerer
p«rabc bea t^cercs vor bem iei)rcnmal in Berlin
14
15
\l>cbrloftgl^cit ein »^n^c 511 mad)cn. 2(m )6.nian )039 führte er am eigener n?ad)tv>onfommem
l)eit bie ^(Ilgemeine \r>el;rpflici)t irieber ein un^ lernte bie QUivH ^e^ neuen »geercd auf )2 ^(rmee*
Forp? mit 56 5Divifionen fej>. »fr befeiti£;tß ireiter ^ie un^ ^urd) baö X>erfaiaer sDihat mif^
erlegten »^infd)ränhinnen. iDa.^ tgeer erhielt fd)ivere ^trtilleric iin^ pan3ertruppcn. Unter bcr
MelbeunifUen /ieitung be^ Keid)dh'iegamini(>erö, C5eneralfelbmarfd)ulb von 23 lomberg, unb
^e^ Oberbefehlshabern bes ^cereö, 0eneralober(^en ,>f r e i b e r r v 0 n ,\' r i t f d) , ivurbc es nad)
neu3eitlidien CP»efid)tnpunften gegliebert unb auj?gebaut. 2ln feine Bcite trat unter ^^ül^rung beö
a^eneralober(> Döring eine ^avH /iuftiraffe, bic im a5ei(lc bes großen ,\lieg'erbel^en bcö
Xr>eltfriegen, Kid)thofen, bereit i(l, ben Bd)u^ unferer sgeimat gegen bie (Warfen Luftflotten
unferer llad^barn 3u ĂĽbernehmen. Unb aud) ^ie :Rricgnmarine beginnt unter ^er Leitung ^en
C!5enerala^mirale K a e b e r ihren Neuaufbau.
^er ^VĂĽhrer hat ^urd) bie FĂĽhne sCat ber Wie^ertinfĂĽhrung ber ^tĂĽgemeinen Wehrpflid)t bie
unertraglid)e Bd)an6e von uns genommen, bie ^arin ihren ^(usbruif fanb, ba(; einem groj;en
l^ulturvolf mit einer iooojahrigen ruhmreid)en CPefd)id)tc ban Ked)t vera^ehrt irar, feinen
Lebennraum mit ^c^ Waffe in ber ^anb 3U verteidigen. iDer .^^ĂĽhrer hat t^abci mit rid)tigem
militarifdiem 2Mid' erfannt, ^a|; en einzig unb allein mit &iefer Wehrform moglid) ij>, einen
Staat mit fo langen Lan^engren3en wie ^en unfrigen mit Orrfolg ^u vertei^igen. ^^r ireij; aber
aud), bat; bcv ^Ăślgemeinen U>ehrpflid)t eine befonbern cr5ieherifd)e 23c^eutung ^uFommt. iDer
u^ehrfäl>ige junge Hiann glaubt, baj; en eine jammerlid)e X>erantaiortung9loftgFeit gegenüber
feinen irehrlofen X^olt=ngenoffen n^are, wenn er ftd) ircigerte, biefe in ber Stun^e ^er (35efal>r
mit bev Waffe in ber s^anb ^u vertei^igen. deshalb tritt er freubigen »^er^enn in bie Kcihen ber
Wehrmad)t ein, wo er nid)t nur ^aJ? Waf fenhan^au•rl' erlernt, fon^ern aud) ^ur »Eingabe an ^ie grof^c
QadK, 3ur pflid)ttreue, 3um ^tnjlanb, ^ur ^^hrcnhaftigl^eit xmb Belb(llofigFeit erlogen anr^
Zicbev 5>eutfd)e aber fann unferem ^^ĂĽhrer unb Keid)nfan3lcr nid)t ^an^'bar genug fein, baf; er
unn bie Wehrfreiheit aMeberfd)ent'te xinb ban Werf unferen grof;en Keformatora Bd)arnhor(>
erneuerte. 5^a^urd) i(> "^Ibolf ^itler ^um Bd)irmer unferer nationalen ^^hre, 3ur a-'ehenben
^^ahnc unferer neuen Wchrmad)t geirorben.
Die 6eutf(t)e2ltaftfa^tf ampftwppe
'
ii
X>on (Dberjlleutnant Waltl^er Vlel;ring
„ed)nca 3U fein, xvav ju allen Seiten bas Äcnn3eid)en genialer ^ül?rung. . . . XVdd) geii^aU
tigee ^'elb eröffnet fid) \)itv mit ben motoriftl)en UTitteln bem ^'elbl?errn ber JuFunft . . ."
*£[}tm. preu^. Äriegsminijler General Keinl^arbt in „Wel^rFraft unb Wel^nriUe '.
Zie l)öl}er ber Btanb bev Wehrbereitfd)aft einen Volten ijl, be\io (harter i\t feine eid)erl)eit
mb bamit bie i^rl^altung ben ^'riebenn geanil^rleijlet, ba bM Kiftfo ben ^(ngreifern mit ber
Btarfc ben X>erteibigern wäd)^, ^lun biefer Haren »^rfenntnin l^eraun ergibt fid) alfo bie
^^'orberung unb ^^'olgerung, bie Wel)rbereitfd)aft mit allen ^ur X>erfügung j^el^nben lllitteln 3»
förbern unb 3u verbeffcrn. 5Diefer ;i:atfad)e i^ ber ^iiüynv burd) feinen heroifd^en ♦^ntfd)lu]^
vom )6.niär3 )95^ gered)t gea^orben; er l;)at bie Wel;rl;ol)eit bee> ^eutfd)en Keid)en in voUem
Umfang aMeber l^crgej^ellt unb ein ) d)lagl^r af t i gen, neu.uitlid) geglieberten
X)oli=nl)eer gefd)affen, ban voll befähigt i)l, ben beutfd)en 15oben 3U verteibigen unb »^hre
unb ^t'i*cil>cit ^^^ Vlation 3u a\il;ren.
3n biefem tgeere fpielt bie :a r a f t f a l) r f a m p f t r u p p c ') bie ihr gebĂĽhrenbe Holle.
(Sv^n^ allgemein gliebert ftd) bie :Rraftfal^rfampftruppe m bie panier* unb panier*
a b a^ e h r a^ a f f e , in motoriftcrte ^l u f H a r u n g n v e r b a n b e foane in B d) ĂĽ 13 e n * unb
:Kr af tr ab fd)ü^en^ »^^^nfc" befonbern ge^
e i n l^ e i t e n. ^(aei:eile ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^m^^^ ^^n WiQen be^
entxvebev baiu ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^M Gegnern
ernb ober nad) ber ^^^^^^^^^^^^^H ^^lu^erbem
:ariegnlage von ^^aU ^^^^^^^^I^^^^^H ^''
3u grör;eren ^^^^F^ ^^^^^H ^''''"^^^'^'"
Vevbänben ^ufammen^ ^^^V . l^^^^H mit aungejlatteten ^eg^
c^cfafn. ^^^ ^.id^^^^M ne^ unterlegen.
^ie junge panier*
t r u p p e
lj> eins ber l^auptfäd)*
lid)(^en nTad)tmittel
ben neuen s^^eren. 3l;re
Waffe i^t ber pan*
3 e r K^ m p f am g e n ,
be^en Bd)öpfung auf
ber beifpiellofen Lei-
jlung bee> ^Z}:\)\o)xoni^'-
motorn aufgebaut ijl.*)
Xleu3eitlid)e ^eere ohne
Pan3ent>affen finbeben^
founbenfbar wie fold)e
ol^ne ÂŁuft<lreitt'rafte.
3m Zeitalter ber un-
gel^cuer ge(^cigerten
Wirfung moberner
Waffen ftnb pan3er*
in)Lno 5cl)erl, ^Berlin
(pcncral (Detralb ^uQ,
ber crflc Ilommanbierenbe iPcncral
ber beutfd)en pan3ertruppe
3hre gefd)id)tlid)e
i^ n t aM rf l u n g
Bd)on »irnbc )9 H nahm
man in iCnglanb aln
iielyve ber ^^lanbern*
fainpfe ben 23au von
:Eampfaiagen auf, unb
am j^-. Beptembcr )9)^
erhielt bae^ bie ba\)in
jlreng gel^eimgel^altene
Kampfmittel feine
^^'euertaufe in ber
Bommefd)lad)t. Wenn
aud) bie »^r folge ber
4^ eingefe^ten pan3er*
fampfiragen, bie aun
^arnungngrĂĽnbcn
^anfn genannt wxxv*
ben, nid)t übenrältigenb
^re)ic»;jlluitratiüii iuniind) ^ünmauu, ■ücxün
«Cinmarfcf) beutfcf)er Gruppen in bas Kl^cinlanb
') X)gl. „^eere von morgen' vom fclben X>erfaffcr, t>erlag X)oggcnreiter )93S> 3. ^(uflage.
2) t>gl. 23ilbl?eft „Panjer unb tllotor in fremben t^ceren" vom fclben X)erf affer, X>erlag X>oggenreiter j^jo,
2. '^iuf läge.
16
1
irarcn, fo hatte man ftd^ bod^ von ihrer 23raud)barfeit liberjeugt unb ging otro^^ĂĽgig *^xiv
:>lnfertigiing v>on k^^ '^^i'^'f fĂĽi' ^^c geplante Offenfivc ^e^ fahret? )9)7 ĂĽber. VX^d) mand)en
,\'ehl)\tlägert in biefcm Oahre, ^ie .;um Xeil auf mangelhaften X>en^^en^lmgt^g'run^|at5en, jum
'^Teil auf mangelhafter tedinifd)er 5>urd)bilMmg beruhten, Fant beim J^infat^ von Cambrai am
ic. nox'>embcr jor enMid) bie lang erfehnte Btunbe. ^ie Bd)lad)t it^ar fĂĽr bic cnglifdicn
:Eampfmagen ein ĂĽberuniltigenber ^^rfolg; man ^ann fte als bic a5ebur t^ j^unbe ncu3cit^
l i d) e r p a n u r v c r b ä n ^ c be.^eid^nen.
^cr umgriff Ynm iiberrafd1cn^ une nod) fein anberer ^uvow ^er »f nglän^er ver3id)tete .;unt
erjlenmal auf jcglid^e :jlrtillcriev>orbereitung.
„Xlad) irenigen tlTinuten cine^ rafen^en ^Irtilleriefeuers? bredien v^un^erte cnglifdier TanFe
(etuM ^co) in bie ^cutfd)en Stellungen ein. 2lĂĽn(llid)e Vlebelfd)u\iben verbergen fic. UnbcfĂĽm^
mert um bie beutfdu Infanterie, unven^nm^bar unb ihrer ĂĽberlegenlKit beunif.t, fahren fte
über bie rafd) aufgeu^orfenen CPräben, u^al^en ^ie t^in^ernit7e nieber, um^ngcln bk Dörfer,
pojlieren ftd) feuernd an ben Wegefreu^en un^ taudien nad) einer halben '^tun^e mitten in bcn
>>atterie(>ellungen auf.
^ie "^Irtilleric fommt im Hebel überhaupt nid)t ^\m ^dmf>. '^k hört am IHotorcngerraifd) wohl
ba5 t>^crannahen ber bunHen O^efpeniler, aber fic cntbed't fte nid)t, bii^ ihre fdwar^cn '^d)attcn
unmittelbar in ^er a^efd)üt:,linic erfdieincn —
â– l^Doto 3d)ci-(, '.yciliii
«Eroberter ciiglifrf)cr Zanf aus ber Bd)lad)t bei Cambrai am 20. Hoücmbcr )9)7
3rS !Rampfi\\igen ĂĽberrollten ^ie ĂĽberrafd^ten ^cutfd)en Stellungen in breiter ^^ront, iiial3ten
Waffen ^urd) ^ie ^rahthinbcrniffe unb kämpften ^ie l)\<5. nie^er; oit 3nfanterie flutete nad),
:Rav>allerie ritt darĂĽber hinaus?. 2(uf )5 'Kilometer 23reite brang ber Eingriff in )z Stunben
i) ^Kilometer vor, $oco (befangene un^ joo CDefd^ĂĽt^e itnirben erbeutet, ^i^her iraren berartige
tSrfolgc nur in monatclangcn ^(rtillericfd^lad^ten unter eigenen fd)it>eren blutigen X>erlujlen
erhielt ux>r^en, fo ^a^ ^ic englifd)e ^^ĂĽhrung bamit nid)t gered)net hatte, ^al^er fam e^ nid)t ^ur
fofortigen ^(uemutjung ^iefe^ ^(nfangeerfolgeö unb Mmit nid)t 5um ^urd)brud) ^urd) bie ^eutfd)e
^t'ront mit feinen unabfehbaren ^^'olgen.
^Im )$. Z^uli )9)$ fet3te UTarfd^all ^odj ^um entfd)ei^en^en (Gegenangriff gegen ^ie v^on bcr
tia^tncn (l>ffenfix'>e erfd)öpften beutfd)en sgeere 3ir>ifd)en Soiffons un^ Chäteau ^hierry auf
40 :Rilonteter ^\'rontbreite an, 3n langen Linien rollen ĂĽber Ooo :Rampfiragen, vielfad) im l)ol>cn
(betreibe l'aum ^u fehen, ^er feinMid)en Infanterie voraus. Bie ^urd)bred)en bie beutfd)en Linien
un^ bringen ^ie 9. unb 7. ^Irmee an ^en Tianb bes X)crberbenö.
^Im S. xlugu(> trifft bie ^eutfd)e 2. ^Irmee ein neuer Bd^lag bts ^^einbeö. lluj^ralier, IRanabier
unb ^^ran^ofen treten bei^erfeit6 X>illerö ^retonncuv auf 30 :Rilometer ^^rontbreite 3um Eingriff
an, t»er mit ^en glcid)en lltitteln trie am )S. ^uli gefül^rt wirb. VTur i^ feine Wirhmg nod)
furd}tbarer.
23eumelburg hat in feinem unvergleid)lid)en Werf „Bperrfeucr um ^eutfd)lanb'' bae ^rama
biefcr Bd)lad)t in unerreid)barcr tDcifc gefd)ilbert: -
•i^lioto 3cliorl, 'i^orliii
IM e cf) ^1 a 1 1 panier!
iDiircb bcn fff)marf)voacn X>crtrag von X>cr|aiaed irar ircut|d)lanb untcrfartt, pan^crFampfii'^^Pcn yu bauen
^offnungt^los Unehren ftd) einzelne Bdiüi^ennc^lcr gegen bie übermadit. •^t> gibt Batterien, bic
auf fiinf.^ig ilieter Urntfernung bie grauen :EoIo|Tc bet^ Bdiladitfelbet^ erlebigcn uttb bann 31""
:Rarabincr greifen, um ftd) bic feinMidic Onfantcric vom ^alfc ^u halten —
?lud ber ^inic ber fdm^ercn ^anffoloffe löfcn ftd) bie fd)nellfahrenben Heincn Wagen. "Kaval^
lerie trabt hinter ihnen. CPefdiuv-^ber von Oagbfliegern öffnen ihnen ben Weg, jcben vISegncr
von oben herab angreifcnb. t^eftig um ftdi fcucrnb, eilen bie leidsten ^anf^ xx^rau^.
Bo brauj^ ba^ über ba^ Bd)lad)tfelb, in bem jeber Wibcrjlanb ftd) verzettelt hat. «irine ohn-^
mäditige ^luflöfung breitet ftd) au^.
.)it>ei Btunben nad) Beginn bce> ^Ingriff^ erfd)eincn <ranfgefd)n^aber ntit englifd)er :aavaUerie
H :Rilometcr tief hinter ber beutfd)en ^^>ont in ben Stabsquartieren ber iDiviftoncn. »^s |d)eint,
ald oh von btv beutfd)en ^(birel)r überl)aupt nid)td mehr übriggeblieben fei —
♦^in Unglücfstag, tin fd)irar3er ^ag — "
mit hir;en paufen folgten bie Eingriffe ber (Entente einanber. <^s begann bie letzte „Sd)lad)t
ber )oo ^Cage". U n a u f h ö r l i d) r 0 1 1 1 e n b i e :E a m p f ir a g e n n a d) v 0 r n. •
,)tt>ifd)cn 0>i)t xinb 7lie>nc ĂĽberrannten .^^euent^al^e, pan5ergefd)iraber unb ^agbflieger bie SteU
lungcn ber 9. :>trmee. 5Der beutfd)c ,^clM)err iiubenborff fagt ĂĽber biefen neuen UTif^erfolg:
„mid) ber io.^Uigu(> irar irieber tin id^tvav^tv ^ag...bie Gruppe ertrug nid)t mel)r...ben
^anfpurm.''
i
2(m 5. September wiv» ^ie nvt«n(lentmg von Hampfmagen Mirrf,brc.d)en un& niiifi «ufgenebcn
lrer^el1. .^ine ^iob9botfd)«ft folgt ^er unteren ... • • «»rgcgeocn
^ie moralifdie Wi^er^,n^i<Fraft ^el• .scut|M,en ^Divificnen nimmt fd,nea ab uli^ ^el• tCanf.
[tZtZ, trIL '^\""- ^'""" '■''*'' '"^' '*' "n>ninglid,e a^eri„gfd,ä<5u„g .liefet- „eum-tigcn
mnre aur ^eiit|d,ei- Qe.te, iw m<,n mir ĂĽber jo eigene p^njerFampfuwn lm^ etma j? ?^eute.
magen x^errugte, ^ie nwn ^em ©egner abgenommen l;atte.
Sln'L'^Üf '."jrT "■"-^*'" ""■' >^"'"''''"''' "'^ "•" '-^•"'•^'•■' f"'' "" ^-^Si"" ""lerer
legten gio^en '£nt|d,eiMmg.orren,.ve, hatten gro(5e 'irrfolge bei X-)iner..»retonneuv am j,.i,ril
mLTI'^T" *'^ir' -TL^""" "" ^"'"'' f^""""' *" ''' »Champagne un^ in ^er ..lltarne.
|d,lad,t .m Jul,, um ,d,l.epl.d) am ,,.(^Ftober ,<„8 bei Cambrai jum letztenmal eingefe^t v
merben. S.e taten mehr al. ihre pfüdit; aber es mar unntöglid,, gegen 6ie feinMid,en pan,er.
maffen, Mc bei Srieg^emSe ctma <oco Wagen whlten, aiifjuFommen. ... â–
• • ' ^ i c (P e tt c n un^ r t
5>arau. haben mir gelernt ,m^ bie not.ven.sigen Aolgenmgen gebogen. Xlad, „ lahren er-
wungener Untat.gte.t, Me auf ^em fd,mad,voUen 2>iFtat von X>erfaine. beruht^ un^ n r
mangelharte Übungen ,n.t behelfsmäßigen Had^bilbungen au. »led, erlaubte, i^ ^ie Panzertruppe
nn 5Drmen Xe.d) nn Segriff, unter ^cr ,,ielbemu(;ten /ieitung ihre. er,len Son.manr, eĂĽLn
S'Z's" "f ®^^'^"".?^",^''^ ^uf,uh,Un, ,va, .x,. ^,u.la„^ ihr bisher voraus hatte....
^s liegt Me Arage nahe, mie Me Panzertruppe geglie.sert i,r ^ier mie beim <Perät felbft ift nod,
vieles ,m ,M«p, ^a Me («ntmuf lung „od, lange nid,t abpefd^Ioffen fein mir^. Hm groj5 n ganzen
becFt fid) bic (Plicbenmg mit berjcnigen ber ĂĽbrirren VOaffcngattungcn. Ulan faf;t bie cin^^clncn
pan^crfainpfmagcn (volfdtümlicf) aiid) Zanfs genannt) in ;^iigc ^i ?— 7 VOagen, in :Rompanien
511 5—4 ^ügcn inib fo it^citcr ^iifammcn. 7l\it bicfe X>crbänbc untcr(>eben bem :Rommanbo bcr
pan.^crtnippcn in 23crlin.
♦f ^ crfd^cint nid)t möglid), mit einem einzigen pan^cmiagcntyp alle bie 3ab(reid)cn ^tufgabcn .;ii
löfen, bie ftd) im (Pefed^t zwangsläufig ergeben. UTan braudH bayu genau fo, irie bit ^trtillerie
ober bie ^iuftu-'affe verfd)icbenc Wirten von C5efd)üi3en bjir. .^lug^eugen benötigt, pan^envagcn,
beren 23auart unb ^(usrĂĽf^ung auf ihre ^onberaufgaben .^ugefd-inittcn ftnb. Bei ihrer ^Ronf^ru^
tion ftnb (35eirid)t, Beu^affnung unb Panzerung voneinanber abhängig, ^as heij^t, je jlärl-'er
Waffen unb panier ftnb, bejlo höher ivirb ba? CPeund^t bes Wagens unb bamit aud) bic ^(n-
fd^affungs* unb Unterhaltungsfo(^en. ^aher irirb bit HTaffe ber pan3erv»erbänbe v>orausftditlidi
immer aus leidHeren Wagen bejlel^en muffen, ^as hat bcn X>orteil, baj; man mehr Wagen
bauen l^ann, bie burd) il^re größere ^(n^al^l bit feinblid)e panzerabir»el)r mehr zerfplittern, unb
baj; man au^erbem Heinere, fd)ir>er zu treffenbe 3iele bietet.
^tb|d)lie^enb follen nod) bie ^luf gaben von (Offizier unb HTann betrad'itet u^erben, bic
ftd) im ^ien(l ber Panzertruppe ergeben. Belb(^ver(^änblid) i)l bejles :Rampfgcrät eine u n e r »
läj;lidK X>orausfet3ung für ben i^rfolg im :Eriege; aber nidit bit einzige. Weber Ted^nit' nod^
Zaftif nod) ^apferl^eit für ftd) allein fönnen btn Sieg erziinngen, fonbern lebiglid) bas reibungs*
lofc i^ufammemrirFen aller biefer ^^al'toren. ^aher fommt es barauf an, baj; (Offizier unb Ulann
Ztd)nif unb ^ai'ti^ v>oll beherrfd^en unb ftd) bienjlbar mad)en. ^ e r B 0 1 b a t m u j; ^ e r r b c r
;C e d) n i f u n b n i d) t i h r a b h ä n g i g e r :R n e d) t f e i n, bann itnrb bic tote '^tahlmaffc ber
rcutic^er Uidjtcv pauzecfampfivagcn in ^al)tt qucrfclbcin
^45l)ĂĽtĂĽ ^ĂĽfimaiiit, 5c
"i^reiie-OUiiitratioucu vonmaun, 'äcrliu
i£in 2a\)v XVc\)t\vei\)cit: j6. 3. j935'— 20. 4. )936!
^cut|cf)e pan3crabircl?rFanonc
"i^rcijc-OUuftratiüiicu .'öofTmaiiii, )bcxl\n
2vampfiragcn Heben gcirinncn; bann wcvbcn ^013 unb ^I>ei|j^ ^e^ llicn)\1)cn, bk :Rraft bce> lUotov^
unb bk ^\'cucninid)t ^cr Waffen 311 einer leinbeit x->erfd)mel3en, bit ^ c m ^ e e r e von l;) e u t c
feinen Stempel aufprägt! 5>aber muj; bic ^efai5untt irie ein Ubrnicrf mifeinanber
cingcfpiclt fein unb )^d^ gegenfeititt ergänzen, ^eber i(l :aiinjller in feinem ^i^d); von \cbtm bangt
^a53 Wohl unb U\be ^e^ pan^enragen^ unb bcv IRameraben ab, ^(Id pan^erfĂĽbrer, ab ^'abrer,
al^ ,\'iinfer ober al^ Sd)iit3e muffen fte ibren fd)it>eren, aber irid)tigen 5Dien(l tun. a^rc>f;e X>er'^
antiixM^tung unb gefpannte ^tufmerffamFeit, j^arfc ^itjeentiricflung, verbraud)te ÂŁuft unb
mangelnbe^ ^iid)t bei gefd)loffenen £ufen, bk ifnge bts Kaums, ber J^ärm bcv HTotoren, bct
CPlei^fetten unb bce> eigenen ,\>uer?, bk fd^irierige X>erj>anbigung untereinanber unb buvd) ^iun^
mit bcn anderen :Eampfu^agen, ba» Kollen unb Bto^en bts Wagend, bae> praffebt feinMk1)er
n]*J>.*a^efd)otTc unb "Splitter auf bcv panjerbaut 3errcn an bm Herven. rr u r g a n 3 e UT a n n e r
u n b :R a m p f e r f i n b b i e r 3 u b r a u d) e n u n b n 0 1 ir e n b i g , wenn es dn^ 3ur X>erteibigung
bcv „befejligten Cinfel ^eutfd^lanb" l^ei^en feilte: ,3 a m p f w a g e n a n b i e ,^ r 0 n t ') !"
iDiefe Hlanner )inb ftd) ber «ibre unb :>(uB3eid)nung betrugt, in ber pan3crii>affe bienen 3u biirfcn,
bie bae> jüngjle IRinb ber beutfd}cn Wel^rmad^t i(i unb ber bit 3u Fünft gel^ört. 3eber
^(ngebörige biefcr Gruppe, bk mit befonberem Btol3 il^re fd)u^ar3e ^Dienjluniform mit bem
Cotenfopf, bem Symbol aujperjler J^infat5bereitfd)aft, tragt, ijl ftd) barĂĽber flar, was es bebeutet,
„Pan3erfd)iit5e" 3u l)eif.en unb im IRreife ber :Rameraben fingen 3u biirfen:
„Vcrjlaubt ftnb bk (Pefid^tcr, boä) frol; ijl unfcr einn.
>fö brauft unfcr panjcc im Btunm^>in^ bal?in!"
^ i e p a n 3 e r a b 111 c l> r ')
7ixw bcn ^iuafĂĽl^rungen ĂĽber bk Pan3ertruppe ergibt ftd) bk iiberragenbe ^ebeutung, bk ber
^lbiv>ebr feinblid^er Pan3er, alfo ber pan3erabn'>ebr, bei3ulegen ifl. (Berabe ireil bk pan3er'^
ivaik fo au!?fd)laggebenb i\i, i(l ei^ um fo notwcnbiger, bk ^tbwel^r bagegen aud3ubauen. lllan
fann nid)t an allen ^^'ronten gleid) f^arl^ fein, bae> beij^t, pan3erh'afte in autH*eid}enbcm lHaf;e
verfügbar l>aben, fonbern man muß ftd) l>üufig mit ber ^lbiv»el)r begnügen, um bann im Sd)iv»er'
punft bk entfd^eibenbe pan3eriv>affe in größter Starl^'e einfetjen 3u tonnen,
^aber erfd)eint e^ müßig, über bic Vlotirenbigt^eit ber pan3erabit»el;)r unb ibrer Sonbeni^ffen 3u
(breiten, if benfoirenig mie bit pan3ent>af fe i^ bic p a n 3 e r a b \v* e b r t r u p p e aue> einem neu*
3eitlid)en »^eere fort3ubenl^en. 3m eigenen »5^ ^^* ergan3en beibe einanbcr in tal"'tifd)er unb
operativer 23e3iel)ung wie Bd)it>ert unb Sd)ilb; als ^cinbc )xnb fte geeignet, ba^ alte Bprid)*
ir»ort it>al^r 3u mad)en, wonad) „ein Sd)tt>ert bae> anbere in ber Sd)eibe l>ült", alfo enta^eber
bcn ^^' rieben von vorneherein 3u fid)ern ober im !Eampf ben (Begncr 3u labmen, bas
l^eiĂźt, feine ?lbftd)ten 3u burd)freu3en.
^ i e m 0 1 0 r i f i e r t e ^l u f H ä r u n g
UnerlaĂźlid) fĂĽr bic obere ^>fĂĽl>rung irie fĂĽr bcn i^infat^ aller Waffengattungen ij> ferner eine
vor3üglid)e ^lufHarung. \te> i|j^ felbftverf^anblid), ba^ fie im 3eitalter ber €cd)nil: motorifiert ij>.
IHel^r ald bie anberen ^^inl^eiten ber ^Eraftfal^rtampftruppe iv>erben bie ^UifHarungd*
abteilungen von ber Bd)nelligfeit il^rea lliotorj? vBcbraud) mad)en Tonnen unb muffen, um
ĂĽberrafd)enb in bcn ^cinb vor3uj>oĂźen unb ferne ^lbftd)ten auf3ubed'en. :RĂĽl)n unb vera^egen
muĂź bic Gruppe gefĂĽl^rt irerben; nod) hil^ner unb nod) verwegener muĂź ber ein3elne Bpal^trupp
banbeln, ber ber if rf>e am ^^'einb i^ — gan3 auf feine veranta^ortung^voUe ^Jlufgabe eingestellt,
bie il)n 3um ^(uge unb Q>l)t bea oberen CruppenfĂĽl^rerd a^erben laĂźt . . . !
©ein (Berat i^ ber leid)te unb ber fd^a^ere pan3erfpal;anagen, bie in 3ügc unb Kompanien
3ufammengefaĂźt ftnb.
^ie motorifiertcn Bd)ĂĽ^en
^en Keigen ber ^Rraftfabrl'ampftruppe befd)lieĂźen bie m 0 1 0 r i f i e r t e n B dni t^ t n , bic in
X>erbanben bie 3u Kegiment^j^ärFe im 3nf^"^"^c"»^^J^^c" '"^^ ^^^ anberen Teilen nidit una^efentlidi
,3»,
•'') I^rofdiüre vom fclbcn t^erfajjcr, t>crlac( 5^ctfc, ^cip.^ig, )<)39, 2. :2iuflage.
*) XVo)ci)ĂĽrc vom fclbcn V>crfajyer, X>crlag Ulittlci* & Ă–oljn, J956.
ĂĽtidjtet panjerfpal^rt'agcn im (Cclanbe
"i^tioto ^dirĂĽtcr, Coualinicf
#v
MI ^crcn ^-f rfolgen beitragen können, panier unb Öd)ü^cn ergän3cn einanber in vielen liufgaben,
^ie ^er an^ere attein nicl)t leijlen Fann. ^er panser erobert, it?al>renb ber @d)ĂĽ!5c befeijt unb fe(>*
l?ält. (Dber t^er @d)ii^e greift an, unter(>ü^t vom panjer, ober er nimmt für ben panier ungang*
barea (3üänbc in 23eft^ unb ermöglid)t fo bas nad)5iel?en bts letzteren. Seine ^Hufgaben ftnb fo
irefentlid), ba^ feine ^^(uabilbung befonbera forgfaltig erfolgen muĂź; benn er vereinigt in )id)
bcn vorjiiglid) auagebilbcten t^nfanteriflen, ben gei(lig unb ^örperlid) beireglid^en Xeitcr unb
btn tcd)ni|d) burd)gcbilbeten motorifterten Klampfen
<finc ^Ibart bcr Ă–dnit;cn fmb bit :Rraf trabf d)ĂĽ^en ; fte finb bic fd)ncnjle crbgebunbcnc
SdxSpfung bci^ IHotora. ^(udgcjlattct mit ^a\)\nid)cn ^uverlaffigen HTafd^inengeirebren unb be^
fcclt xvm fĂĽbncn, u\igcmutigen (Pei(l ber leid)ten Keiter ,^>iebrid)6 bed C5rof;en, j^eflen fic eine
neu3eitlid)c Waffe von I^ol^er ^t'euer* unb Eingriff aFraft unb einer taglid)en Keid^it^eite von
200 bie> 300 2vilomctcr bar. HTebr als bti btn anberen Gruppen fommt ed hier auf bcn einzelnen
niann ein, bcr ein „ganzer :acrl" fein mu|^. (Dft auf ftd) allein gejlcüt, fei ea nun ab Ulelbcfabrer
iibcr u^citc Btrccfcn, fei ea, abgcfetjt von ber Ulaffe feiner :Rompanie, im niafd)inengeit?ebrtrupp,
fei ce> auf f ĂĽbncr Bpabfabrt ober ald ftd)ernberX>orpo(>en fĂĽr feine rulxnben:Rameraben, immer muĂź
bcr :Rraftrabfd)ĂĽ^e bae> ti^tvy auf bem redeten ^kd baben, bic 41age rid)tig beurteilen unb 3ircd-'*
voll banbcln fonncn. >^r ijl baber fein Mitläufer in ber großen Ulaffe, fonbern ein ♦flitcfolbat
in einer teiitctruppc. ^ic O^runblagen ba3u muĂź ber UXann mitbringen; ^^r^iebung unb ^(ua*
bilbung, :Ramcrabfd)aft unb :Rorpj?gei(l formen ibn bann 3ur X>ollenbung, um nun mit
bcrcdnigtcin Stol^ fmgcn 5u fönncn: „Wir finb bic :Rraftrabfd)ü^en unb uns? gebort
bic Welt!"
^ie ^l u f g a b c n cinct^ :araftrabfd)ĂĽt3cnvcrbanbcd erj^red' en ftd) in gleid)er Weife auf 'ivampf
iric auf ^lufHarung. »irr i\i für ^iufgabcn aller ^Irt geeignet, vor allem für fold)e, bie ein fd)ncllca,
fprungartigea 3ufaffen unb ^^ejlbalten verlangen.
Kafd) unb venregen mirb an bcn ^cinb l^eran-
gefal;)ren unb bic gefamte ,t'e»<^^l^^^f^ fd)lagartig
eingefe^t, um ftd) bann ebenso wcnbiQ vom 0eg*
ncr 3u löfen unb an anberer Btclle erneut vor*
5ulegen, ober il;n in ^lanH unb KĂĽcfen an3u*
pacfen. 3ufammenfaffen bcr :Rraftc unb ^lua*
nu^en ber 23eit>eglid)feit unb Bd)nelligfeit aud)
in ber X>erteibigung finb ^^'orberungcn, bic an
alle motorifterten Gruppen 3u (bellen ftnb. Bie
verbürgen bcn »Erfolg.
3n fnappcn Umriffen follte l^icr ein Bilb vom
^(rbeiten unb VDirfen einer (Truppe gegeben ircr*
bcn, bic ii?eiten !Rreifcn unferer Volfagcnoffen
nod) unbekannt i(l. Wir fĂĽl)ren hierbei bic
ernjle lITal^nung bcö norbamerifanifd)en (35c*
neral(>ab9d)efö an, bic er )933 nieberfd)rieb:
„tUel>r bcnn je in unferer (5efd)id)tc
muĂź jeber BĂĽrger fein ^(ugenmerf
auf bic Ă„raud)barfeit unferes ^ee*
r e a r i d) t e n !" ^
^enn aud) trir ftnb mit bem fran36ftfd)en Hlar*
fd)all £yautey (in Hle^ )930) „über3eugt, ba^
bas bejle ItTittel, um bcn ^^rieben 3u ftd)ern,
bavin be(^el)t, jlarf 3u fein. ITlan ad)tet nur
bicBtarfen....!''
parabcaufjlellung ber :Rraftrabfcf)ĂĽQcn
vor il?rcm (DbcrfVen ^ĂĽl;rcr am 20. ^pril J936
Die i>etttf<^e Ä«t>öHccie
Von (l>bcr\llcutnant von ^Irnim
1 1
iDie ^(nfänge bcr branbenburgifdvprcußifdicn :Ravallcric fallen in bic Kcgicrungt?3cit bca
^ISroßcn :Rurfür(>cn (3640— ) 658). >i:r wav bcr Bcgrimbcr eincd einbcitlid)cn, bif3iplinicrtcn
i^ccrca. ,t'in' feine :Rricga3ĂĽgc 3ur X>crtcibigung feines (lanbcs in Q>\y unb Weil braud)tc er
eine fd)ncllbcixu*glid)c ^Truppe. Bo fdnif er v»or allem bic ^Dragoner, eine Waffengattung,
bic Bd)nclligl=cit mit ,\'cucrh'aft in ftd) vereinigte.
Unter feinen Xlad)folgcrn anirbc bic j^avaUcric vcrnad^lafftgt, ibr cigcntlid)ca •Clement, bie
23eireglid)feit, würbe 3ugunjlen ^avvcv ♦^vcr3icrformcn eingcfd)ranft.
»i:rj> ala ber größte ,^'elbbcrr auf bem ^Cbron Preußens, .^riebrid) II. (ber (Broße), bic 5ügel
bcr Kegicrung ergriff, fd)lug bic Btunbc bcr :Rv;vaUcrie.
iDurd) fein Kcglcmcnt von )745, burdi unausgcfct^tc grĂĽnblid>c ^tusbilbung im ^>icbcn,
ivobci ibm ni.^nncr iric bic CPcncralc v. 3ictcn unb v. Bcvblit:, ^uv Beite j^anbcn, iries er
bcr :Ravaaeric bcn Weg 3um Biege. Hamen tvic t^obcnfricbbcrg, KoĂźbad), 3ornborf Hingen
in bcr a5cfd)idne auf als Ool3cftc Bicgcstagc fribcri3ianifd)cr :Ravallcric.
Bei 3ornborf fiel bae> cixng bcnhxnirbigc Wort bcs :aommanbcurs ber (35arbebul=orps bes
l^önigs, bes Kittmci^lcrs v. Wal^cnitj: „Dd) baltc eine Bd)lad)t nid)t für verloren, in bcr
bie C5arbcbul-orps bcs Ivönigs nod) nid)t attaquiert bat; id) attaquicrc!"
s
•
Regiment prinj Cuclan* Cl>et)«uj;lcgcc bti Solin
1
«etioto ©äd)?. Sanöeöbilbftenc, ^re«ben
J*V**«-
Ă–oknttc :Rrica^gcfi*l)id)tc ttclchrt uMr^, wcr^cn Mcfc ZaUn unx^crgcffcn fein; ^ie :Ravancrie
nur bit |d)lad)tcncnt)d)ci^cn^c Waffe.
Had) ^em Zobc t>ce> groj^en IRönig^ fanf aud) bie :Ravanerie xxMt il)ver ^ol^tn <iö{)c. ^k
23efreiung^h-icge fallen wol^l viele einjelne l^ervorratjen^c Zattn von ;Capfer^cit, allein —
gro^e, entfd1ci^cn^e Ulitunrhmg an bm Bd)lad)ten blieb ber Keiterei verfagt, bis auf bie
[vcltbcnihnttc X>ci folgung nad^ btv Bd)lad)t von Waterloo C)5. '^^mi )SK). ^icr irarcn
ed bie mav^ifd>cn ^Dragoner unb Ulanen, bit unter ^(nfiil^rung bc^ €bef^ beö a5eneralj^abe6
bcr 2Miid)erfd)en ^Irmee — v. (I5neifenau — biö 3um legten ^aud) von Ulann unb Kof;
bic gefd)lagene fran3Ă–ftfd)e ^Irniee verfolgten, biefe enbgĂĽltig unb voll^^anbig 3crfprcngtcn,
fo bafy ber :Erieg beenbet ivar.
♦^.^ folgten lange ^'riebene^jal^re. 5Die lluebilbung unb bie ^Irt ber X>envenbung enttprad)cn
nidn ntebr bcn^irrforberniffen be.^ ^^rn^^faUei^ - eine ^^rfal^rung, bie jebe 3u lange ,\nebcnt5.
>eit bejlatigt. 2>er :Rriet? von )S00 fab baber feine grot;en vCatcn; bod) am Wmb ber
i^ntfd)eibunqt>fd)lad)t von :aöniggrai5 C5. 3uli )S00) ritten ad)t preuf>ifd)e Regimenter
auf ber blutgetrant'ten WaM^att von Btrefeti^ mit ^apferfcit unb Bd^neib gegen bie oj^er^
rcid)ifd)en :Eavalleriebiviftonen an unb xrarfen fte.
»i:rj^ ber :Rrieg von )S7o/7i fottte wieber unverganglid)en /iorbeer um bie Btanbarten ber
^avaflerie trinben. Wer l^at nid)t fd)on gel^ört von bcn ^Ittacfen ber ), O^arbebragoner bei
Uiar.^4a.i;our, ber 7. :aĂĽrafftere unb )6. Ulanen hei X>ionviUe am )6. ^Uigu(l )S70: jn
beiben fiUen unirben burd) bM tobe^mutige, energifd^e Einreiten bie vorbringenben ^ran-^
30fen 3urĂĽ(f gefd)lagen, ber fd)n?er ringenben Infanterie ÂŁuft gemad)t unb baburd) bie ÂŁage
uneberbergejleUt. ^ .,., ....
:>lm :ibenb bcefelben ^agee^ fanb auf ber ^od)ebene von Ville-^tur.^l^ron, ivc^^lid) von Ulct^,
bie gröf4e ^RavaUeriefd^lad^t ber Heujeit <^att eed)8 beutfd)e Regimenter maßen jtd) mit
ber fran3Ă–ftfd)en :Ravaaerie. ^ae> Kingen enbete mit bem Kiaf3ug ^er v^'^^<^"3ofen.
Xlad) ben dienen be. )S. ^lugu^^ bei a5ravelotte-Bt. privat folgte bie gror>e ^(urHarung.^
tatit^l^eit ber ivavaUerie. 5Durd) bcn Befel;l beö a5eneraMlabdd)ef6 v. tUoltl'e: ,,^avallcrie
ivcit vor bie .t^ont", feijten ftd) bk ^RavaUeriebiviftonen weit vor bit ^^ront ber ^Urinee unb
j^cllten bcn ^ibmarfd) bed ^^'einbe^ nad) Horbtre^^en fe<l. _
iDcr voraueeilenbcn :RavaUerie folgten bie beutfd)en Speere, benen es gelang, ba^ fran^o^tjdie
^ecr mit feinem :Eaifer bei ^tban einjufd^lieĂźen unb gefangen^unebmen.
^\n bcn folgenben, langen .^'rieben^ial^ren irurbe bie IRavaUerie aufö be^^c au^gebilbet für
ĂĽ)re groĂźen ^tufgaben, bit man il;r 3"0ebad)t: fĂĽr bie ^lufHarung unb fĂĽr ben :Eampf mit
ber fcinblid)en Keiterei.
nian nabm ale ftd)er an, ba^ 3" Beginn eined IRrieged aud) auf ber .^^einbfeitc bie groj^cn
:Kavallerieförper fid) 3um :Rampf fteUen ivnirben.
X>iclc .t'veiiinllige ber Reiterregimenter batten fid) in bcn :Rampfen in vÂŁbina um bie 3abr^
bunbertivenbe unb in btntn in iDeutfd^öübwejlafrii'a beteiligt unb bort 3um Kubme ber
Waffe unb 3ur »fbre bte> beutfd)en X>aterlanbeö gefod)ten.
iDer groĂźe Tu'ieg fal) bit bcutfd)e :Rvavallerie in ber ad)tunggcbietenben BtarVe von ))c Kegi*
meutern gegen bit S^inbt ausriafen. iDic Ula^Te biefer Regimenter war in elf :aavallcrie''
biviftonen 3u je fed)6 Regimentern eingeteilt, ivabrenb bie ĂĽbrigen al^ iDiviftonefavalleric
— hti jeber 3nfanteriebivifion ein Regiment — X>erwenbung fanben.
^le im Weisen aufmarfd)ierenben 3el7n :Ravalleriebiviftonen waren in vier :aavallcriel-orpt^
gcgliebert, gegen bie Ruffen war 3unäd)(^ nur bit ). :aavalleriebivifton verfügbar. 3n breiter
^t'ront in ^^ranh-eid) unb 23elgien einmarfd)ierenb, löj^en bit beutfd)en :Ravalleriebiviftonen
ll^re tv^t ^lufgabe: @d)u^ ber beutfd)en (Bren3e unb X>erfd)leierung bed eigenen ^(ufmarfd^ed,
in glän3enber Weife. 5Da8 auf bem redeten ^ecreeflügel vorget)enbe z, :Äavanerieforpd über*
nal;m vorauöeilenb bit Bid)erung unb 2(ufHarung am ^lügel unb 30g in großen Itlarfd^en
burd) Belgien unb Horbweflfranfrcid) biö fafl vor bit ^ore von parie.
' v^WX
:^ÂŁi
«» »
I I
rr
--5 c_ -^
- 1;*/,
--**.i-.!»*.-
.^*^^^SSf«^.
â– iĂźfioto Tenamaiin, CJjdjaiefle
^Dragoner hz\ einer :R«i)crparÄbc voc bem Weltfricg
t^ic UTarnefd^lad^t (?. bi?
t^. »^^cpt. )914) brad)te ba^
ftegreid)e XX^rgel>en %^\n^
^tilljlanb. :illmablid) cr-^
(>arrten bie ,t\'onten im
Wcjlcn im Bd)ĂĽt3engraben;
fĂĽr bie Ixavalleric bot \\dy
bicrbei fein Betätigung;?*
fclb mebr.
Vlodi einmal ritten brei
bcutfdie :Eav>alleriebivifto*
ncn (T^f tober )9)4 <^m red)*
tcn t^ccre^f lĂĽgel burd) ,\'lan*
bcrn unb Xlorbfranfreid)
weit in^ ^x'cinbe^lanb, bann
3tt»ang feinblid)e übermad)t
aud) t)ier bie beutfd)en
t^eere 3ur X)erteibigung. . ^ . «^
^Iber bamit war bie ^ätiafeit ber IRavaUerie nod^ lange nid^t 3" ^^tibe; ibr BdMverpunft
verlagerte ftd) tten (!>j^en. ^ier batte im Bommerfelb3ug bie (o(^preuĂźifd)e) ). :Ravanerie*
bivifton fd)on ^ervorrattenbet^ in ^lufHärung unb Eingriff gegen bie gewaltige ninnd^c
Übermad)t tteleijlet. - ^^ine ibrer größten .taten war bie t>erfd)leierung gegen bie rututd)e
^(rmee bt^ 'o^eneral^ v. Rennenfampf, woburd) fie ber beutfd^en S. ^(rmee, bie ^Canncnberg
fd)lug, btn y^Mtn beifte unb baburm 3" ^cm groĂźen Biege beitrug. Tim Bommer ^c)^<; 3ogen
bcutfite Reitermaffen nad) :Rurlanb binein unb eroberten bier weite i^ebiete, um bann gegen
^tn vor3ubringen unb ftd) an bem ftegreid^en :^urĂĽcffd)lagen ber Ruffen 311 beteiligen.
Im t^crbft be^ ^^abret^ feben wir ein au? fĂĽnf :Ravalleriebiviftonen be^"^ebenbe? :Ravanerie'^
forp.^ in ber WĂĽnafd)lad)t weit im RĂĽrfcn bet? ^inbt^, bort nad.fdnib unb X>erbinbung
mit bem .^interlanb unterbred)enb unb gegen bie rĂĽd'wartigen ^Teile ber ruf^td.en :irmee
xx^rttebenb. ^ ^, ... ,, ^
)0i6 batte bie :Ravallerie rübmlid^^len ^mteil an ber rafd)en »Eroberung Rumäniens. Unter
bem (Beneraleutnant C!5rafen
v». Bd)mcttow war a\\^ ber
—— — — ^ ' ^ 6. unb 7.^^*v>aneriebivifton
tin :Eav>allerieforp? gebil*
bet worbcn. t^atte biefe?
3unäd)<^ fd^were :Jtbwel;)r*
fampfe in btn ^ranafylva*
n\\&)tn ^rlpen 3u fĂĽt)ren, fo
fd)lug bann nad) geglĂĽdr'tem
:Rampf um btn ^(ustritt
au8 bem CPebirge in bit
weite i^bene ber Walad)ei
nod) einmal bit Stunbe ber
:Eavatterie. ^tm ^lĂĽgel ber
^trmee ^^alfenbayn, btn'^n*
fanteriebiviftonen vorauö^
eilenb, it>ar ba'$> :Eavanerie*
forps immer bort, wo es
galt, burd) Umfaffung ben
UUnen ht\ Beginn bcs xrcltfcicgcs
%\)M\M (2d)erl, 33erliu
/
U UI_»-iUiJ"
• ^~'
ĂśberfcQcn
'•4;l)ütü (£d)eil, SBerlin
,^cin^ auMigrcifcn ^n^ .^u fcblarrcn. :Rciner ^cr .^ablrcid^en großen Waffcrläiifc, an bencn btv
Scinb ^ic >3rii(fcn gcfprcnctt o^cr ^ic XX^rbercitungcn bicrni ttetroffcn hatte — ^cnn oft
a^arcn imfcrc Kcitcr fd^nellcr ba — , x^cnnocl)tcn bcn Biegcsritt auf3ubaltcn.
CT^cftcn Mc überall ttefdilacrenen un^ .;urüd•'geben^en Rumänen fam Me Keiterei 311 x^ielen,
fdiönen ♦frfoltten, ^ic ibren ^(ue^ru(f in 3ablreid)en (befangenen iinb erbeuteten C5efd)ii^en,
IITCP.^ unb IRolonnen uftt>. fanben.
^efon^cre »^ruMbnimg x-^erbient ^ie ^. Bd)lva^ron ^es IRüraffterregimentd Hr. z (Kittmciiler
x\ Bor re), ^er e^ in fdincibiger ^Ittacfe hei ^vaivoci gelang, zco lUann feinMid^e Infanterie
mit mcbrercn Offi.^ieren gcfangen.nmebmen un^ eine niafd^inengewebrabteilung auf ^rage=
tieren .^u erbeuten, ^ie nid)t mel^r ^uni ^t'^uern gekommen nn;ren.
?hn ^. 5:^e.;cniber nabmen Teile ^ea IRavaUerieForps? im t^anbjlreid) ein ^iovt bcv V^or^mejl*
front um 23ufarej>. »^in .^eid^en ^afür, ii>a? ^ie :Eax>allerie gegen einen erfdnitterten ^cinb
hei frifdum iDrauf geben ni leij^cn vermag! iDer -^d^lu^ ^ee Kriege? fab bie niajTe ^er no&i
beritten gebliebenen :Ravallerie in ^er Ul'raine im Bampf gegen ^Ie Bolfd^emiren un^ ben
roten vEerror un^ 3ur ^id)erung ber u^eiten, für bie ♦frnabrung t>ed ^eutfd)en X>olfed not*
u''en^igen CPebiete.
•irin Teil bcv *Äax\lllerie^ix'>iftonen batte ^ie Pferbc <ihc^chcn muffen, um als Öd^üijen im
vr»raben hei ^er X>erteibigung ibrer ^eimat il^ren mann 3u (^el^en; fte baben ftd) als 3nfan=
terijjlen ebensogut beiräbrt wie als Keiter.
♦^s fam ^er Mijlere Tag von "Derfaillea, ber unfcr ^ecr 3erfd)lug.
Von ^en (lol^en )k Kegimentern hiithcn )$ mit 97 Bd)wa^ronen, 3ufammengefa(;t in ^rei
:Rax>allerie^ivif!onen, übrig, ^m X)ergleid) ju ben anderen VDaffcn blieb nod) ein Verhältnis*
maf.ig \iavhv "Btamm erbalten, aus bem mit eifernem ^leij5 eint neue :Raxv.nerie gefd^affen
unirbe, mobern in ber ^(usbilbung, aber in (5ei(^ unb ifr^iel^ung auf ben altbewährten (25runN
lagen aufbauenb, irĂĽrbig, bic rul^mvoDen, j^ol^en Traditionen in eine neue 3uhmft 3u retten.
„^lOes i(l im ^\luf/', unb BtiUjlanb i^t töMid). Unferc Seit wirb bel;crrfd)t vom niotor, feine
fdynelle ^^ortentwicflung unb X>crwenbung in ^^lug^eugen unb .^abr.^eugen aller 'Jlrt hat aud^
bie .Bebeutung ber :Rax>allerie — 3umal in grot;en Verbanben — beeinfluj^t. Hidit mehr alle
X>erwenbungsmoglid)feiten, bit ber hir^e "^Ibrif; ber (PefdndHe ber :Rax>allerie uns geigte,
kommen heute für bie Keiterei in S^aaic, iDie ^t^ernaufHärung haben bie .Flieger übernommen,
unb in ben KĂĽd'en unb in bie ,\lanFen bes .t^inbes wirb ber moberne .^elbberr ^ampfh-aftigc
motorifterte ober Panzertruppen werfen. HTit ber »^infd^ran^ung aUerbings, ba(^ ein einiger*
maf^en ausgebautes Btra^en* unb VDcgene^ vor^)anben i(>.
Zinx Ojlen unferes t>aterlanbes i^ biefes nod) nid)t in bem ITTa^e unb in ber CPĂĽte x>orhanben
xvic im Wejlen ober in ber llTitte bes Keid^es. »Sollten einmal friegerifd>e X>erwirflungen
eintreten, fo wirb ber Q>\icn nod) auf lange 3eit hinaus ein Betätigungsfelb aud) für groj;ere
:Rax>allerieverbanbe bieten, '^ier in bcn ti^eiten, menfd)en* unb inbu(>riearmen Kannten, ba
haben aud) l)eute nod) Pferb unb Xeiter ihren Wert, ba wirb bie :aax>allerie unter tat*
h-äftiger .^Uibrung ba^u berufen fein, im Kücfen ober in ber ,\lanfe eines ,\>inbes yu
erfd^einen unb fo entfduibenb an bem Biege mitzuwirken.
Um bcn ,t'c»vberungen ber Seit geredet zu werben, bat man )id) entfd^loffen, mand')e X>erbanbe
ber :Eax^allerie zu motorifteren. Wir fehcn hierin eine notwenbige ^Inpaffung an bie
gegebenen X>erhaltniffe unb betrad)ten bie Bd)ü^en auf :Rraftrab ober gelänbegangigem
Wagen als unfere :Eameraben.
5>ic ^ofung muf; beute heilen: Pferb unb Hlotor. ^llle :Rräfte, über bie eine tlation verfügt,
muffen ber X^erteibigung bes X>aterlanbes nutzbar gemad^t werben.
:RaĂĽallccic auf bem lUarfcf)
^5t)oto Ă„Ui)ftone, SSerlin
X-
•»Jk."
^i^^ fo WanMiniftcn im Bc(>anb imb in ^cr X>cn^>cn^unrt bcr :Rav»aneric nicht .^u vermci^cn
gcu''cfcn, fo bc^cutct ^ict^ aber nodi nicht bas <^n6c ^cr :Ravancric. Hod) immer i(> ^ic Keiterei
^ie bcirealid^i^e un^ f^elan^eftanftitt(lc Waffe. ,^ĂĽr ftc bieten u^eber \Va\b nod^ ^erge, nod)
fd)ledite Wette, u^e^er iDun^elbeit nod) Hebel unb fd)led)te Witterunrt ein ^inbcrni?.
•^0 i\i bie :Ravallerie fo redn bie Waffe für bit Halv unb (r>efed)t9aufnarimft. X>or bem
^Vliegcr bat ftc xxn-au^, baj; fie genaueren »f inblicf in bai^ (Pelänbe erhält; ferner, baf; fte burd)
kat^ fcinMidie A'c"cr berau^finbet, wo imb ireld)er ^(rt ber ,^einb i(>, unb baf, fte burd)
•iriniix^bncr imb CPefangene irid^tige Haduid)ten erhalten l'ann.
i^cm motorificrten :uifnärcr gegenüber bat fte ben X>orteil ber grö(;ercn (P>cräufd)loftgFeit
imb ben, bA\i bae> pferb feinen Kciter nidn in bem HTaf.e beanfprud^t, ixne bcv UTotor feinen
,Vabrcr/baf; alfo ber Keitcr fein ^(ugenmerf viel mebr auf bcn ,Veinb rid^ten l^ann. ^er >\citcr
mit feinem treuen pfcrb iinrb aud) Nmn iiuMterreiten unb <\n fein i^icl gelangen, u^cnn bas?
,\uttcr einmal nid)t redit.^eitig ober gar nid)t x>orbanben iji, iräbrenb jeber lUotor obne
:Eraftil^off fofort verfagt.
sDie :KaxMllerie jlcllt bie Itlelbereiter, um bie X>erbinbung Mvifrf)en bcn vorn fampfenben
^Ceilcn aufred^t^uerbalten, iro ted)nifd)e UTittcl nod) nid)t eingefet^t ftnb ober nid)t eingefct^t
irerben Kennen. 5Dariiber l)inau9 aber tt>irb ber mobernc :RavaneriefĂĽl)rer aud) (Belegcnbeiten
erfpäben, um auf Beitenivegen, gebed^t burd) natürlid)e Bobenbeit>ad)fung ober burd) bie
Had^t, an bcn A^inb bcran^ul'ommen.
©0 taud^t bie CPcjlalt be^ alten 3ieten alt^ £cbrmeif^er eines gen:>anbten unb verfdilagenen
Deiters, bcr ftd) in allen ^agen :^ured)tfinben muß, trieber auf. Veränbert .^trar bie Waffen
unb bie 23ebingungen, unter benen man kämpft, aber ber <3ti^ i\^ ber alte, ber bes rücfftd)t?^
lofen, breiigen X>orii\ĂĽrtereitens? ran an bcn ,^cinb!
Um biefe x^iclfeitigen ^lufgaben lofen ^u können, bebarf ber :Ravaneri<l einer forgfältigen
• "JUkUnlbuntt. . .
©id)erc 23el)crrfd)ung bea Pfcrbeö, feines treuejlen lUitFämpfers, i^i er^^e V>orbcbingung für
bcn Keitersmann. ^a bas Keitcn eine :Eun<> i\i, bie nid)t jcber fdinell erlernt, fo \\t es vor==
teilbaft, ix^enn bit innren Keitersleute fd)on von t^axi» am mit pferben umgeben tonnen,
auf leben ^aĂĽ muffen fte iLn\i unb ^Ziebe ju bem ^ier mitbringen. Oeber :Ravallcri^l \\^
ausgerĂĽstet mit :Earabincr unb Babel, ^ic voHfonttnenc 23eberrfd)ung biefer Waffen tmrb
geforbert, um foirol>l als leinscltampfcr iric aud) im größeren X)crbanb feinen IMann jlebcn
3U können.
Welche ^ätigfeit aud) für btn einzelnen :Eavallerieverbanb im X^orbergrunb j^cben mag,
ftdier ij>, ba^ feine ftd) obne :Rampf abfpielen ix^rb, unb um biefen ju fĂĽl;ren, verfĂĽgt bie
:Ravallerie ĂĽber leid)te unb fd)irere niafd)inengeirel)re. ^lUe Keitcr irerben am erf^eren, dn
Zeil am fd)it>eren lTIafd)incngen?el)r ausgebilbct. Wieber anberc erlernen bie ^cbienung bcr
pan3erabirel)rfanonen, btnn mit Sicherheit muĂź man heutzutage mit bem ^(uftreten feinb*
lid)er motorifterter Panzerfahrzeuge red)ncn, unb zu ihrer ^(btrehr verfĂĽgt aud) bk 'BiavaU
lerie ĂĽber motoriftertc panzerabixiehrgefd)ĂĽ^e.
Wieber anbere trerben als :Kavalleriepioniere ausgebilbet. !Rcin Wafferlauf barf bas rafdu
X>orgeben ber IRavaUerie hinbern, ruhenbc Gruppen muffen burd) Sperren, HI inen ufix\
gegen Panzerfahrzeuge geftd)ert unb 23rĂĽcfen, BtraĂźen ober ^al^ncn fĂĽr bcn ^einb unbraud)^
bar gemacht irerben können.
^(ud) fonjl gibt es noch mand)e Aufgabe, fĂĽr bit bit :Ravalleriepionicre unentbebrlid) ftnb.
♦^nblid) i^ für jeben :Ravaneri(len ftd)eres Xeiten unb 3ured)tfinben mit unb ohne :Eartc in
]ebem C5elänbe erforberlid). Wieviel l^ann von bem red)tzeitigen «Eintreffen einer ixnd^tigen
nielbung ober einer ^tbteilung an be<limmter Stelle abhängen!
Von bcn ^\Hibrern aller C5rabe irirb entfd)loffenes, oft felbjj^änbiges s^anbeln, X>crjVinbnis
für bie große J^age unb bit ^t'ähigfeit, aus furzen llugenblidren bes Sehens rid)tige Sd)lüffe
zu ^itljcn, geforbert.
r
. 'S--.---' **--
^^ütü 6ct)erl, iöerUu
^m>-' '^
<Ut)ütü Sdierl, iöcrliu
^t)oto 3d)crl; ^Berlin
Cranfcn ber pfcrbe
(l>IympiaO<*9bfpfi"9^"
ITTarfcf) burcf) potsbam
J»K
U>ur^c vor bcm grof5cn :Ertege ^cr ^auptwcrt auf bie ^(u9bil^lmg gcfd)loffcner Verbanne
gclcpt, fo liegt jctjt bei* öd)werpun^t auf ^er ^lu^bilbung bcö einzelnen Kcitcrs. Bein über*
Icgenee :Rönnen foU ü)n in ^ie ilage fe^en, eö aucl) mit einer IHebr^al^l von ,^^einben auf-^
^unel^men. ^ei t>er fd)itf fall^aften ^iage unfereö Vaterlant'eö im tger3cn von »Europa muffen
irir immer mit mcl^reren ^Segnern red)nen, wie wir ja aud) ^en gan3en Weltkrieg ĂĽber petd
gegen ĂĽbermad)t himpfen muĂźten.
^e^er beutfdie Keiters^mann xvivb wal^renb feiner ^ien<^3fit ^abin erlogen, felbpanbig unb
entfd)loffen ju banbeln, unb ftd) immer Har 3u fein, baß „Unterlaffen unb X>erfaumni9 ihn
fd)U'»crcr belaj^cn aU ^^'el^lgreifen in ber Wahl ber Ulittel".
Had) bcm CPrunbfatj, baß nur »^infad^ee im :Rriege »Erfolg verfprid)t, fmb alle get'ünj^elten
^'ormen unb 23eii?egungen, bic frĂĽl)cr bM j^avaUerie^J^K^^^ierreglemciit fannte, verfd)iDunben.
^ic tgauptform fĂĽr Bewegung unb Verfammlung i\t bit lllarfd^^olonne ju ^xvtitn,
^iefe ^iovm wirb angewenbet von bem Bpal^trupp bid ju btn größten X>erbanben berauf.
^ie niarfd}l=olonne eignet ftd) fowol^l $um bewegen auf BtraĂźen unb Wegen, wie fte aud)
biegfam im CDelanbe ijl unb ftd) ĂĽberall leid}t anpaĂźt, ^^int ed)wabron ^ann )id) in 3ĂĽge,
ein 3ug in O^ruppen jerlegen unb je nad) breite unb sCiefe 5wifd)enraume ober ^lb(>anbc
nel^men unb ftd) jjlaffeln — immer in tnarfd)tolonne — je nad)bem feinblid^ea ^'euer ober
(Belänbe ober 23ebrol7ung burd) ^lieger 3um 3erlegen zwingen.
^'ür Verfammlung unb paraben j^ettt man bie »finl^eiten — 3üge h^xv, ed)wabronen — in ftd)
in nTarfd)t'olonncn mit verringerten :>ibj^anben unb 3it>ifd)enraumen auf unb bekommt fo
eine gefd)loffenc IMa^t auf engerem Kaum.
Stäben ivnr bidl^er von ber :Ravallerie alö ber VDaffe unb Cruppe gefprod)en, fo mag $um
Ă–d)luĂź nod) auf folgenbcd l;ingeit>iefen werben. 5Da6 VDefen ber Keiterei ij^ bic Verbinbung
bed Öolbaten mit bem pferbe. 3ebeö Keiten ijl aber an ftd) aud) ein von jel;cr gepflegter
ritterlid)er Bport. 3m iLthtn ber Vlationen fpielt ber Bport 3ur 3eit eine groĂźe Xolle; nad)
ber ^eilnalime an ilym unb btn fportlid)en »Erfolgen bemißt man Bpann^raft unb Hebend*
willen ber X)ölfer. ^ie berufene X)ertretung im Keitfport liegt bti ber :Ravallerie. VUir
fel;en baXytv mit Btolj in bem frieblid)en Vl^ett^ampf auf bem grĂĽnen Kafen hei vCurnieren
im '3n* unb llu^lanbe unfere X)ertreter ber beutfd)en Keitcrei ftd) mit btn 15t\ttn ber anberen
Nationen meffen unb oft btn Bieg erringen. Weld) größerer ^riumpl; i^ «?ol;l bent'bar alö
ber, ba^ bei ber dMympiabe )930 in Berlin fämtlid)e im Keiten ju erringenben (Bolbmebaillen
an bie beutfd)en Keiter fielen^ ^o tragen aud) biefe „frieblid)en Biege' mit ba^n hti, vBeltung
unb ^(nfel^en unfereö X>aterlanbed in ber VDelt ju meieren.
VDir baben in einem turjen ĂĽberblid' bit <Defd)id)te ber beutfd)en :RavalIerie an uns vorĂĽber*
Rieben felien, irir l^aben einen itinbiidc in bas VDefen unb VDirfen ber mobernen :Ravallerie
getan. nid)t umfonjl l)at man btn je^t bejlebenben beutfd)en Keiterregimentern ^Crabitionen
ber alten Regimenter gegeben, ^ie igrfabrungen einer langen :Eriegd* unb ^t'riebenajeit, aber
aud) ber Kubm unb bit ^-^rinnerung an \to\^t tattn foUen auf bit jungen Bolbaten ber je^igen
(Generation ĂĽbergeben unb fte ntit Btol3 erfĂĽllen unb jum Vlad)eifern anfporncn.
Waffen unb :Eampfedart ftnb linberungen unterit?orfen, bit (Brunbbebingungen hnegerifd)en
Wirkend bleiben unveranbert.
Trabition verpflidHet! >^ine Waffe, bic fo j^ol3e unb rul^mvoUe Ăśberlieferung ju wabren
l)at, wirb aud) unter veranberten X>erbaltniffen alles baranfe^en, bas Bejle 3U leijlen unb
auf ber ^f^ölyt ber ^luöbilbung für btn mobernen :Rrieg 3u hltibtn, UTit bem C5eneralober||lcn
V. Beetf t ftnb wir ber llTeinung, ba$ „bit vCage neujcitlid) auögerü^eter unb gefübrter
Keiterei nid)t gejäblt ftnb, unb ba^i fte nod) itnmer 3uverftd)tlid) il^r ^al^nlein itn Winbe ber
3u^unft flattern laffcn barf''.
Kuft bann eineö ^ageö bas X>aterlanb 3u feiner X>erteibigung, bann wirb aud) bit beutfd)e
:Ravallerie wieber il)ren VtXann ^tlytn, jum Bd)u^e bte X>aterlanbe6, $ur ^Zlyrt ber Waffe
unb in tttut jum ^ĂĽl)rerl
(Bcid)xd)U ^er II./2(ufF(ärung6=Kegtmmt 6
2tuöuft 1^34 -2lpnl 1^38
von <i>berleutnant von /Xiuf
'Jim t.cI>Ftobcr ]0^0 wnivbc cr^^malig ber V>crfudi gcmacbt, burd> bic IHotorificnmg ^cr ;. Bdiiivi*
^rc♦n/?^citcr^Xcgimcnt 4 ♦Erfahrungen für fpätcrc größere tllortorificrungcn ber Kavallerie %u (ammcln.
Unter ber ^\'iibrung von Kittmei)>cr Bd^mel^er, fpäter Xittmei^lcr Kiebel, cntu^rfclte ftd) bie
^diuMbron berartig gĂĽn)>ig, ba\\ fie am 1. "Jlugu^^ 10^4 ^ufammen mit ber Kraftfahr^'Jlbtcilung
\riint^borf bic Btamme ^>cllcn t-'onnte fĂĽr bi: vPrlIn^ung ber Kraftfabr^^lbtcilung pott^^am.
^In ^iefem Tage ĂĽbernahm ber lKomman^eur, lUajor Xleumann"Bilfou\ au^ ^teilen von ad>t Xeitcr*
Regimentern unb ben Btammen ber ?. Bd)u\abron/Keiter^Kegiment 4 unb Kraftfahr^llbtcilung
Wünt^borf feine 'Jlbtcilung, bie an Buntheit ber Xegiment^nummern un^ reiterlid-^em Können fid)
einen Hamen hatte mad^en Fönncn, nodi nidit aber im Kahmen ber ihr ge^^ellten "Jlufgabe, al^ motori*
ficrte ^lufflarung^*?lbteilung u^eit vor ben eigenen (iinien un^ v^eeres^tcilen auf;uflaren. !Uit ^er
XofalV^affenfarbe un^ ^er Z>e3eid)nung Kraftfahr^llbteilung pott^bam begann ^er Komman^eur mit
folgenben Kompanicd)ef^ unb cDf fixieren nn feine fdiu^ere 'JUifgabe heranzutreten:
(r»ffi.;ier^>ellenbefei3ung:
Kommanbeur:
:l^jutant: *
»Hauptmann beim Btabe:
'^tab' unb nad)rid)ten*.>ug;
1. Kompanie:
Pan.^crfpäh^Kompanie
:. Kompanie:
Kra^fdnil3en*Kompanie
;. Kompanie:
fdMrerc Kompanie
ĂśTajor lleumann-Bilfou^
(I>berleutnant von ^V<^l^ecf
vi^auptmann xx-^n lllanteuffel
(l>berleutnant 2b e rf
v^auptmann Kiebel
(Oberleutnant Troit^fd")
»Hauptmann lUiiller
(ieutnant von finde
Leutnant von Cf^aubed'cr
^^auptmann ,Vrhr. v. •frfharbt^'lein
(T^berleutnant Weltner
(leutnant von Bd^t^opp
^^ InnUlcutiuiut Oceiimattn= 3ilfLMi)
MLMllmaIl^cur Der li- 1 xHiiftlänmöv rHofliiiiont n
^ie Cffijicio ber \nutUiuunöc-=''-}ll'teiUiiio «
Fott»: (». Bcri-or. ^^(^^(lilm
8
vaiiiumanii (I-.* vonri', 3iiU'
Kiito: \i<lii\ Linipcrt
i.'iMiniain Modi, \Mojiitiiiii
l'olo: \iilii\ l.iiii|><Tl
^iin'vMiiiuiu nur xĂĽiiiii
Fi'lo: Sfliatzmanii. Pui-dam
^ic "Ilbtcilium l^1tcr^â– ^an^ ^cr i. Kavallcric^^ixMfioii, uv^ fic unter ^cr ,\'iihninfc v>on vl^cncrallcutnant
.Reifte lm^ O^cnerallciitnant .treiben- von Wilinou^ftv ihren er^>cn ."^ufammcnbrtlt lln^ ^lufffbunntn
fan^ lI^^ ab icOM^tober ]i)^< ^ie l^vU-idinung ^liifHarunat^ "Jlbteilung .'^ f"l^i*ff- -*'" Verlauf bet^ ^luf
baut^ ^er ÜTotoriMerunft un^ ^er ^luflofung ^er ^nceret^hivallerie unu♦^e fie mit vier an^eren lUiv
Harunftt^^^lbteilunrien am i. "Jlpril lOU' ^er ^>lufHaru^f^^^l^rifta^c Berlin, mit ^cm I^riga^e=
Komman^eur «l'^ber^^ "^tever, initer^>eUt.
Uaiiibem )\(b in ^ie)'em Nahmen ^ie "Jlbteilung buvcb ihre (iei^^ungen un^ ihren xu-^rbilMid^en ^3^ei^>
einen Hamen rremadn hatte, l^nIr^e fie im nuMteren »^eere^aufbau am i.cM^tober lo^r mit ber ^luf
Harungt^'^Jibteilung 0 cd^ ^(ufHarungt^ Regiment o, unter .RĂĽhrung ^e^ Xegiment^l-'ommanbeurt^
(r»beri>leutnant von Z>ülou\ ^er i. leidsten ^ivifion unter CPeneralmajor v^oepner unterstellt.
\"iad) häufigem Wed^fcl ein.Klner (l>ffi^icre, ^er v^eranbilbung eigenen (r»ffi;ier*nadmnid)fet^ un^ ber
^luf Stellung einer uuMteren Kompanie im V>erfudi i\i ^ic '^teUenbefer;ung am t. Januar )i)^$ folgen^e;
(!>ffi.;iers>ellenbefet3ung:
'^tab: (r>bcrs"^leutnant Xlcumann-'^ill-'oiw ^Ibteilungt? Komman^eur
(icutnant Kodi, 'J(^jutant
^^auptmann (K) <^enh'e
'^tabi^V^hlmei^^er ^ahn
(Dber^ahlmei^^er ^ocr
}\egierung6baurat UTartcn
(J>berfcl^iiiebel \Dcgener
UntcroffiMcrfor^'? f>. ' "•?(uffläntnflv>'
;KcninuMit <">
Foto: Th. RciiinT«. Pot>i(laiii
UiitoroffiMcrfonio 7. \HuffIärunn':
Foto: Tli. Rt'imrr». Pol«iliiiii
4
."). '!?luffliiviinöv'0)ioniiiiciU (j
Foto: öanduu, Berlin \\ !>
.s^niuniiiann von ^c\bcd
(i./'OliiftliiniUöC' »icfltiiiont <;
F'oto: Arclii\ Lim peil
Cticrloiitiuint lutn ÂŁ?urf
/.yOdtfniirunnc-^Keo'i'ic'nt (J
Folo: Arclii\ Limpcrt
UntcroffiAicrtürVv «./ 'Otuffläriinflv^
JRefliment <
Foto: Th. Reimers, Potsdam
Uiitm-infiucvo ro-> 2tiiL>oc' ll. \Muftliininn'?=J>{cni'"out <;
Foto: Th. RciriKT«. I'iit«tliini
t
.wiiiiniuaitit /vroiOcrr ihmi (i-ctliorMUi iu
,s. xHitffliinmnv ^lioiiinuMit (i
^
^^ Kompanie:
6. Kompanie:
PaiiKrfP^l^ 5<ompanie:
-. Kompanie:
Kra^ffbiit;cn Kompanie
$. Kompanie:
fcbu^ere Kompanie
5. iHn-fciPuiclu'l "-I'oOdiMicr
C IhttoIpuhHuM C'Hnull
.'). xHiifflnrunrtoo)iortiiiiout
»Hauptmann .^ierv>ogel, Kompanied)ef
Leutnant Hoe^l^'e
(Leutnant v»on Wolff
(Leutnant ^. X. .Freiherr von ,Vur^>enbci*g
(^>be^feI^ll'»ebel Cl^erull
t^aiiptmann von ^Vaberf, Kompaniedief
(ieiitnant v>on niit^laff
(Leutnant ^. X. IHoIinari
(l>berfelbu^ebel Wittenburg
(Oberleutnant v>on (iucf, Kompanicd)ef
^ieutnant CPraf von Pfeil u. Klein^»^llgiith
Oberfelbit>ebel Kufd)el
ti^auptmann ^^reiberr v>on 'fcfbarbt^lein, Kompanierf)ef
ileutnant ^. K. ^r. Kicf)ter
<r»berfelbwebel ^renneifen
j.Uitte ^^ebniar treten v>om \PaffenIebrftang in ^obcrit^ ;ur 'Jlbteilung bie Leutnante:
von Biinau, von '^tubnii?, CPraf x^on Kittberg, von KothFird) unb Pantbcn.
r»n vielen Übungen unb UTanovern Fonnte bie ^Ibteilung ba^, ira^ fie im 'Btanbort gelernt hatte, burdi
'Erfahrungen erharten unb lernte groj;e Ceile ^eutfd)lanb^ mit ihrer Bevölkerung unb ihren ver*
fdMebenen CharaFteren Fennen.
llutinoffi.iicrforpo ."). xniiftläruuflv ?Kcfliincnt (i
l'diti: Ar(lii\ l.iinpc t
7.,\)luftliiruuoüJ='Kon''iu'"^ *•
l'dtos: \r(ln\ Limpert (5). Rpinirr«. FNil-dimi (I)
tr>ic r^avcrifd^c <l^\hn.M't Mc ^v.^^^fl).U ^dMin-iv Wurttcmbcra, <.ctTcn, ba. ^aucrlanb, U\M>T<^lni
,nl^ genau fo iric Mc /iiincburncr .:^cl^c, a^l^c^lnll•ft, IHcrflcnburg. Pommern un^ Me IHarb rtM^c
neariffc fnr Me ^Ibteilunrr acirorben unb haben ^en ^ori.^ont aller enreitert xmt> ^en IMut Tur Mc
rbuHM.fU.na.reulH' ^d>onbeit unferer .^^eimat ttefdn.lt. Befonber. ^lidn au. Mefen .Viten harten
:T>ien,>e^. un.s fdv-^nen '.^rieben., ^er ^Ibteilung Me Ăśbergabe ber '=^tanbarte Mird) ben FĂĽhrer un^
a>bert>en ^^^efehl^habcr ^er n\'hrmadn bei O^iebehla.st mit ^em anfd.lief;en^en v^^e^Tenmanover io>o
fotrie ^a. grot;e UVhrmadit.manover ^^)- hervor, '.^benfo lrer^en Me jährlidn-n XVreiMgungen Mn
Keh-uten .Mn« ^Ibteilung auf ^em hi^>ori)d)en ^^o^cn im (Ln\^avtcn von pott^bam ^uv alle un
vernef;lidi fein.
neben ^em harten un^ an1>renaen^en ^ien^l unterliet; e. ^ie ^Ibteilung nid)t, ihr Können Mird
fnortlidn- V>eran^laltuncTen m,t Kraftfahrzeugen un^ N.bei er.^ielte »f rfolge unter l^etrei. ui ^lellen
nt vPelan^ebefpredM.ngen ).d) ireiter yu fdn.len, Munt ^portfe^^e ferne X>ielf:itigl=ett xu betreuen.
Viele a^ol^me^aillen unb llTannfdvnt.preife befin^en fut heute in v^än^en ^er ^Ibteilung, unter an^erc.
^cr pr-'i^ be-^ cl>berbefehlt^haber.^ ^e. v^eere. fĂĽr vSie be^>e lUanufd^aft ber I^riga^e in ber X>iel
fcitmi^eit.prufuna. Keiner ber d^ffi^cre ivirb Me vPelanbebefpre.-bungen bei .^amburg-Z5remen un.s
in .Vn :ilven ve'rgeiTen, bie gleidHn-mai;en bie tahifdu' llu.bilbung irie ba. TMifammengehorigtcit.^
gefuhl im a^ffiuerforpt^ forberten.
^urd> Wn-fi.hruncren, ^portfe^^e, .Vitung.beridne unb U\^d)enfd)auen gelang e. ber ^Ibteilung. ĂĽber
bcn Xahmen ber' O^arnifon^lavM hinau. mit ber >3evolFerung, ihren XeferveofriMcren unb au.v
gefd)iebenen "^olbaten eng^^te .tiihlung auf^mehmen unb ni erhalten.
'>UH ber unbekannten, bunt ;ufammengetrurfelten ?lbteilung unirbe, ivenn aud) ber Xlame ired)feltc,
eine «Irinheit, bie nidn nur im ^cere, fonbern baruber hinaus in ihrer ^arnifon^^abt unb bei ber
I^evolt=eruna ein l^eariff geix^M-bcn i\i.
^a. Urteil ihrer hod^^len V>ortTefei:,ten ii> ber be^>e >>eirei., bat; hier ein '^tein im ^U.fbaii be. ^t^eerc.
gefugt irurbe, ber allen an ihn herantretenben Einforderungen t^anbhalten ivirb, >um U\>hle xm]cvc:^
Volh't^ unb feine, ^^uhrer..
f
öcfcbichte Öcr Aufhlärunge=Abtcilung 8
Vom 1. Noocinber 1938 biĂź zum l. April 1939
4
, II (Aufklärungö-Rcgimcnt 6)
Vom 1. April 19S8 biö :um 1. Noücmbcr 1938
üon Leutnant üon Rothhirch, 3. Äufhlärungö^Äbtcilunsß
II., xHuilianiiiövOKcoimcut
Koti): Hoih-zcla'lcii. Pol^daiii
X>ier Oahrc be^^eht bie pot.bamcr "Elll. Cmot.), bic,
^cn .vv»eiten Hamen tragenb, für ba. Oahr )0^S
innerhalb bc. t>erbanbe. bc. Elufflarung.*Kcgi*
mcnt. 6 ber i. leid)tcn ^ivifton unter^^cht.
iDurd) viele O^aue ^cutfdilanb. ift fte in biefer
^eit gerollt.
'^n 23ergen \^ bie ^Ibteilung geirefcn, hat \t>alM
bränbe gelöfd)t, Sd)arffd)iet;en iinb 25eftd)tigung
hinter fid) unb fpiclt ftd) mehr \m^ mehr in bcn
Xahmen be. von (Dbcr^^ von BĂĽloii^ gefĂĽhrten
Kegimentes? ein.
X>on '^uli bi. September liegt ftc im Stanbort.
Währenbbejjen taudien am politifd)cn Fimmel
WetteruK^lFen auf. Om '^ĂĽben be. Keid^e. mad>t
ber Heine tfd)ed)o*flounafifd)e Btaat fid) immer
unliebfainer bemerfbar. "^oA), it^a^ himmert'^ Mc
^Ibteilung. '^ic hat bas? grof;c Bportfe^^ vor fid),
^a^ heuer nne all jähr lid) bcn 'Jlbfd^luf; bc^ liw^*
bilbung^jahre^ an.^eigt.
Wod^en unb Tage vergehen fd^nell. 'Jim 2S. ^lugu^^,
einem fd)önen ^pätfommertag, \^ pot^bam l^ü
un^ in ber CParbe!?*bu*ÂŁorp^'Kaferne. V>or ber
Kaferne n^ehen .;u^ei pan^erfpähiivigen, neben
ihnen m^ei Podien in ber fd)mutfen, fdiirar^cn
Uniform ber pan^erfdiĂĽQcn. '^ic tragen ihre
»i^anbuMffe, Me UTafd)inenpitlole.
^ic TribĂĽnen unb bae ii^eitc Kunb ber ^t^^hrbahn
finb bidit befer;t unb umt>cllt v>on einer cniMr*
tung^f rohen lUenge.
•^ben ;eigt bie Kafernenuhr 14.00 Uhr, fd)on
kommen, tabellot? au^geridnet, im ÂŁauffd)ritt
\\a&) einem Kavalleriemarfd) Curnabteilungen in
TrainingsanzĂĽgen auf ben piat;. 'fin Pfiff!
/ieidnathletif jeber ^Irt fĂĽhren bie ^olbatcn vor.
t>om leidsten "^piel mit bem UTebi.zinbaU ĂĽber
Bobengvmnat^if, Khönrabfahrcn bis nun |d>une*
rigolen Keif* unb ^arrenturnen pichen bie Silber
bunt an uns vorĂĽber, ^ie Btimme bes nie feh*
lenben Elnfagers untermalt bie einzelnen Ăśbungen.
llTufif Hingt auf, ^ie 'Bportabtcilungen rĂĽdr'en ah,
um jeijt ben Krabafrobatcn, unter ^t'ĂĽhrung von
^t'elbuiebel »^hrharbt, bas ^\'clb frci3umad)en.
^a kommen ftc, ireij; leud)tcn bie 'JCnuigc, frei*
hänbig, mit ^tn Knien bas Krab lenfcnb, flehen
ftc auf ber UTafd^inc. »Pinmal umfahren fie bas
Kunb bcs piatjcs, um nun m ber 'Jlusfahrt \&)on
mit einer neuen 'Jtttraftion ^u beginnen. <f rj> mit
TOil^clm Cimpert, DruA« unb Ccrlag6l)au?, "Berlin SUD fiS
einem, Nanu mit ;ii>ci, fd)licf;lidi mit vier ^ob
baten auf bcr niafitine. IHinlergultift erfĂĽlle" MC
ihre fitirere ^Uifaabe. ^^elfall Hingt auf, pau^crt
nidn, alt^ jctjt unfer O^lan^huf beranrollt. ^ic
auf ;u^ci gct'oppclten lUafdiinen xn^n ]< lUann
ge^>ellte, fabrenbe vProf;pvramibc. «^nMofer ^ci*
faU Mvingt bie braven '^olNUcn. immer ivieber
nur Wieberholung.
^50 vergehen '^^tunben ber ,^reube unb ^^egei^le^
rung, unb fd^on am näd>\>en Zcic^c fnib irir in bcn
XXn-arbeiten fĂĽr bie IHanover.
Wieber xvlUieht fid), nne in jebem v^erb^l, bcr
reibung^lofe ^Iblauf aller ber llrbciten, bie fĂĽr bic
iHarfd)fertial=cit ber :ibteilung nodi notivenbig
(F..t..: Iffz. Wolter ^. AA K.)
ĂĽnb 5>ic ^timmuna ber Bolbatcn geht horf), Hegt
ja aud> ber fd^ön^le vCeil be.^ ^olbatenjahre^, bad
lUanövcr, vor un^. ^Dic klugen aller lcud)tcn. Sic
lcud)tcn aber in einem anbcrcn »Plan.; ab foni|>.
ÂŁiegt bod> ĂĽber un^ allen immer bringenbcr,
llnmer be^^immter bie ,^ragc: ,^X\'^^ unrb mit
Bubetenbeutfdilanb:" ^Ihnen ^o&i alle, i>ar. y>xiv
•f ntfdieibuna ^icfc^ Problem;? bie beut)d>c Wehr*
madn beitragen irirb. \^od) 1)^ aUe^ ungeuMt;.
O^ar mand>er fdviut im lUorgenncbel be^ )o. Bep*
tember mit einem letzten, liebevollen ^luf »ber
bie gute, alte Kaferne. ,,Werben ivir fie unebe^
fehen-" iDiefc .^racre licat ĂĽber un^ aUen, aU )td)
um O.oo Uhr ber 4dilagbaum beim Pförtner hebt
unb ,^ahr.;eug um ,^ahr.;cug au^ ber Kaferne roUt
— hinein in eine fd)u^ere, ungcuM^Je ."^uhmft.
Dn flottem llTarfdi geht c^ in Xid)tung Buben,
v^eller '^onncnfdiein liegt nun fd^on feit vielen
iagen ĂĽber bem sChĂĽringcr fLan^, Ăśbung um
Ăśbung haben iiMr fd)on hinter un^.
\^c>d) einmal u^erben unfcre CPebani'en von bcn
grof;en »freignitTen biefer vEage abgelenl=t burd)
bie letzte grof;c Übung, ba^ letjte «Tivifion^*
manövcr. -^'aben u^r fdion in ben Wod)en vorher
begei)>crt alle lUvxnövertage unb .Übungen mit*
aemad)t, fo ^>eigt heute nad) 23el-'anntgabc ber
(läge bie "Stimmung ^od^ auf ben *:>öhevninft.
morgen ivirb bie i. leid>te «Tivifion ihr Können
unter ^emei^ ^>ellen.
^^ell unb ^lernenHar i^> bie Xladn, al^ tvir nad)
bem ĂĽbung^raum .^irirfau aufbredn'n. v^cutc
haben wiv ',Xot" gefetzt, heute fmb ivir „A'ei1t^'^
«Die gan;e ^ivifion unrb heute nur gegen brei .^u-
fammengc^^ellte ^^dmt^enl-'ompanien angreifen. ^^Ui^
ben .>ĂĽgen un-rben Kompanien, au^ ben Kom-
panien ^^ataillone unb :ibteilungen, um ^cn
aufu-ren Kahmen füUen ;u fönnen, ben bie iU(\c
vorfd)reibt.
c!>^hi%irt^ .^irirfau entbrennt um i).oo Uhr ber
Kampf. Ungeheure ^^egei^>erung hat un^ alle ge*
pacfr, nur imgern erfĂĽllen uMr heute bie ^lufgabe,
„^t'einb" M» fein unb .^urüd'gehen ui mui^cn. ^od)
ivir uM^Ten, es? i\i bie vPcneralprobe fĂĽr un^ alle,
•^onufagen ba^ V>orübcn mit piar,patronen vor
bem '^^vtulfd^iefuMi.
."^äh unb verbifjen kämpfen iiMr um ieben S^ip
breit Bobcn^, bod) langfam, in hinhaltenbem
Wiber^hanb rĂĽrfiinirt^ gehenb, mĂĽ^Je" i^^ir ^rt um
(!>rt, ^Pelanbe^lreifen um vJSclanbe^^reifen bem ĂĽber*
mädnigcn »Pegncr überla^Jen. '^^dion ^>eht bic
'^onne' im ."^enith. Ommer nod) fnattern bie
>nafd)inengeix>chrc, roUt ba^ ^Irtillcriefeuer, bellen
bie ]:'af unb j*c-ni*Kanonen. Weiter unb uieitcr
muffen nnr .^urĂĽrf. Unaufhaltfam bringt bic ^u
vifton vor. »f nblid) bei St. »f gibicn haben iinr
eine 'Stellung an einem ^crghang gcfunbcn, au^
ber unr nid)t fo leid)t .;u vertreiben ftnb. ^in
unb her ux-^gt ber Kampf, bod) nirgenb^ gelingt
e^ bem »J>cgner, Kaum 3u geiinnncn, hinter bic
(Foto: Gefr. Kloss 3. AA. H)
Bahnlinie .^u fommcn. '^d^on beginnt bic iUu*
nition fĂĽr un^ fnapp .;u u^erben, bal^mĂĽfTcn irir
bie Keferven angreifen. iDa plörjid) tauduMi in
ber ^iUmfc Kampfuvxgcn auf. X>or unfcrcn ^litgcn
entrollt fid) nun ein phanta^>ifd)C^ Bilb. Kampf*
waoicn um Kampfiragen bridn au^ bem Walb her*
vor. 9>ofort haben iinr einen ,^'rontii^ed)fel voll*
>ogen. ."^irifdicn unfcrcn nia^.*'^tellungcn haben
fid) pan.H*rabiiHM>rfanoncn gefd)obcn unb beginnen,
mit feurigem O^ebell ben ĂĽberlegenen ,\\'inb .;u
^>oppen. ^a taud)en blaue .Vlicger auf. Om Xief*
angriff, uuMiige Uteter ĂĽber bem I^obcn bahin*
rafenb, bebringen fie hart unfcre Linien unb
Vinngen uns? immer iincbcr, irgenbiix'» ^erfung nu
nehmen. Unfcre "Jlbnu-hr, baburd) gcfd)u%xd)t, t'ann
bcn O^egner nidn mehr am V>orbringcn hinbern.
:^um hinhaltcnben Wibcr^^anb i^^ unfcre Kraft m'
fd)ivad); fo heifu c^ jer^t: Verteibigung bi^ ;ur
legten Patrone, ^ic '^onnc geht im Wc^^cn fd)on
\uv Ku<>c, altv enblid) baj? von 2: 000 'Bolbaten*
hcruMi lehnlid)^! crmartete unb freubig bcgrĂĽfue
»Signal „-Das? O^an.K — halt!" crHingt. Xlun
tarnten aus? allen X>erticfungen, r»obcniiH*llen,
vPrat^ unb vpetreibegarbcn '^olbaten auf, bic man
vorbem gar nid)t gefehen hatte, nun, ba ber
„Krieg" .{u '^nbc i^>, finb irir uneber Kamcrabcn.
Kameraben, nufammcngcfdniHMfu fĂĽr bic fommen*
bcn fd)ircrcn '^reigni)Te, bie un^ bevorstehen.
IMutrot vcr^nft bic "^onne, unb balb steigt aui^
bem im abcnblid>cn Xlebelbun\> liegcnbcn O^lcn ber
ĂĽionb empor. ^Caufenbc unb aber ^aufenbc von
'Sternen Icudnen ĂĽber unferem ^^cimuu^g.
On ^lus?ubung feiner pflirfn ^larb
ber
(Dbcrgcfrcitc Kabott C4. ^Ht. S)
UH'if;glänKnbc I^anb ber ^lutobahn. '^d)on fint^t
ber ^Ibenb herab, al^ iinr, bie "Jlutobahn ver*
laiJcnb, bie cr)>e bavcrifdn- '^tabt, v^of, crrcidien.
^m bcn '^traf;cn s>eht bic I^cvolferung. I^lumen
fallen in Wagen unb Kraber, .â– ^igaretten unb
"^d^ot'olabe uMrft man un^ ;u. "Jln ber grofu'u
I^rĂĽ^fc s>cht ber ^ix>ifions?l-'ommanbeur, vPencral*
Icutnant v^oeppner, \mi^ nimmt bcn Porbcimarfdi
feiner *riviOon entgegen. iTie \ladn brid>t herein.
TrĂĽbe unb xu'rhangcn Icuditet ber iltonb auf \m^
nieber. ^ic einfam beuvilbctcn *^ohcn bcs? l^ohmer*
uMlbc;? nehmen un^ auf.
X>orlaufigcs? :Uarfd\;icl bie '^tabt ĂĽiittcrteidv
^er UTonb hat ]ui) in;^iiMfdH'n hinter einer tief*
hängcnben, unburdibringliduMi WolhMibctf e ver*
)>ccft, leidner Xcgcn fommt auf. Wie Taufenbc
von CPci^lcr fmb bie roten »^toplidncr ber ,Vahr*
U'ugc an^ufchcn, u>cnn ber Weg einmal eine
vj^cgcnhirvc nimmt. Kein .Vahru'ug barf hellen
<iid)t fuhren, alle (iampen fmb mit blauen ^lenb*
h'appcn verfchen. "^diarf fmb bie klugen ber ^t\ihrer
auf bat^ rote (iidn be^ Vorbermanncs? gerid)tet.
'^r barft* nidn verlieren, fon^^ rcif;t rettungslos?
bic Kolonne auscinanber. Kein -^trafuMiranb, h'in
Baum i\^ Ml erh'nnen, nur ber vor uns fahrcnbc
Wagen u'igt uns ^cn Win.
Oet^t cr^l crt'enncn irir ridnig ^cn Wert ber fo
oft xH'runinfdncn .^ahnibungcn bei Madn ohne
(iidn. Kein .Wahrer, er fei benn '^olbat, fann er*
mcjTen, uu'ldi grof;e (ici^lung hier von ^a\ vielen
hunbert ^Vahrern ber ^ix>ifion vollbrad>t unrb.
^Cag fĂĽr Z^ioi neue rradnidnen, enblid) ber cr^lc
l^cfchl, ber bcn '^rn^l- ber '^^tunbe H'igt. On aller
•Stille UH-rbcn baraufhin famtlid)e ^x'ahr^cugc auf
^a\ ?lusuHMd)plat3 gcbradit unb im '^d^atten ur*
alter (iinben, x>or;ĂĽglid) gegen tfd)cd)ifd)e ^t'liegcr
getarnt, aufgesiclit. ^luf bcn ^äd)ern flehen von
nun ab bcutfcbe '^olbatcn mit ihren Ulafdiincn*
geii^chrcn, um ^a\ €fd)cd)cn bat? unberednigte
ĂĽberfliegen bcutfdicn v^oheitsgebictet? ein fĂĽr alle*
mal yu verfallen, (liebevoll gleitet ber Blirf ĂĽber
bie blanden nicffmghĂĽlfcn ber fd)arfcn IHunition
unb bic fd)u\u\u'n UTctallteilc bes treuen Käme*
raben, bes :Uafd)incngcu^ehrs. Wann unb iix> iinrb
es .!^um 'Bd>ut3 bcutfd)cr :Uenfd)en .;um erstenmal
feine helle, eherne 'Stimme crhcbcnr
»Enblid) fommt ber UTarfd)befchl. Kur; ftnb bic
:naf;nahmcn, einige -Stunben barauf )>chcn bic
Kompanien fahrbereit. ĂśTittcn unter uns, neben
uns s^cht bic Bevölkerung, beiinifu bcs •^rn^^cs
ber (läge, gibt fic uns ihre bellen Wünfd)C mit auf
bcn Weg. Blumen ix^erben gercid)t, (liebcsgabcn,
bann brau^^ bas (lieb ber UTotoren auf unb in
herrlidn>cr Stimmung, trotj bcs fd^u^crcn 'Jlb*
fd)icbs, rollen ixnr hinaus aus ber Stabt, bic uns
Wod>en s^eimat gcixiefcn.
Balb rollt ^f^hr3eug um ^'abrjcug bahin ĂĽber bas
r»n 'Jlusübung ihrer pflidn ^larbcn
hier
(r»bcrfdMir,e Wilfc Stab)
Sd>ut3C Wegner (Stab)
•Tic cr^lcn ^aufer von Ulittcrteid) tauduMi vor
uns auf; enblid) uncbcr ein (lid)t, eine Straf;en*
latcrne. Dn einer Straf;c l^ommen bie Kompanien
notbĂĽrftig unter, ^ic ^^ahrunigc bidn an ben
*^aufern.'v>erpflcgungs. unb !Uarfd)paufc, «raucr
;ix^ei Stunben. Sd)on vcrfud)en bic .wahrer, einige
:Uinuten .;u fd)lafen, um balb uncbcr frifd) .;u
fein. Beifahrer unb So.^iusfahrcr, a>ffi.;icr unb
Unteroffizier greifen .;u, um ben ^V^hrcrn bicfes
lUal bie "Jlrbcit bcs Tanfens abzunehmen. Balb
i\t aud) bas getan, nun nod) «rc IHinutcn irirt'*
lid)c paufe. '•^rfd)öpft fallt jcber in einen hir.u'n,
traumlofcn Sd)laf. Hur bic Sd)ritte ber fd>ncll
auf gebleuten Wad)tpos>cn erinnern baran, baf; hier
nod) (ieben herrfd)t. Kaum fmb unr cingcfd)lafen,
ba gellt fd)on uneber ber Xuf: „^^crtigmaduMii"
burd) bic Straf;c. Ulinutcn vergehen, unb i^A\m
rollen unr une vorher auf ber Straf;e uu'itcr, bem
neuen :Uarfd)zicl, Tannesberg, entgegen, ^cr
Ketten hat aufgehört, ein cifiger Winb brud-'t uns
tief in bic UXiftciiMt^c unb läfu iiiu^ ic^c^ '^türfitcn
^toff mehr beranveheii.
^ 4^ Uhr Kirrt ^ic U\aacnuhr, al^ ivir enMid) vor
unt^ im heilen IHonMidn ben Kirdnurm von
XannetUn-rtt erh'nnen. v^^ier \\n^ct ^ie gan.K ^Ib-
teiluna Unterhnift. '^^d^nell )n1^ ^ie (Drt^vicrtel
verteilt, ^^al^ liegen ^ie '^ol^aten auf ^cm Stroh.
»Hin heller, Harer ülorgen i\i angebrod)en. (län(^\i
^d^t ^ie "^^onne hodi am .^^immel, ab ivir au^ ^em
'^^troh h-ieduMi un^ bic a^lie^er red'en.
^Da cmpfannt unt^ ein O^erud^t, ^a^ unfcre ^eru^i
fitneller fd^iatren la^u. 'i^t^ foll loi^gchen. IHorgcn
fd>on lver^en irir en^gultig marfdiieren, um nun
enMid) .;ur ^^efreiuna unfercr I^ru^er im '=5u^eten*
lan^ geaen bie tfdn'd)i)dH' U^illhir anzutreten.
^^odi nein ^ie 'Stimmung, ĂĽberall nur freu^lgc
^i^efidner, obux^hl nod) feine ^^e^>atigung ^iefe^
vPerudnej5 ^a i\>. (liebevoll gleitet ^er IMirf ĂĽber
Vahr.zeugc un^ niafdMnengeuu'hre. ĂĽbcraU ftn^
^ie SolNUen eifrig bamit befdvaftigt, ^ie leisten
^^an^griffe fĂĽr ^ic niarfd)bereitfdvaft %u tun. llun
enMid> l^nr^ man un^ einfetten. Xlirgen^J^ ein
ang^^lidiet^ O^efidn, nirgen^^ U\M-te bcr >>efĂĽrd)^
tung. I^ci ^en Sol^atcn \\i eine uncnMid)c ^e-
gei^>erung eingekehrt.
^ic Photoapparate arbeiten, um hie unb Ni nod)
einmal bie .>uge unb vPruppen in ihrer CPe|d)lotTc""
heit im I^ilbe fe^^.^uhalten. X>ielleid>t fnib wir
heute Ulm letzten IHale ^ufammen.
."ZugfĂĽhrer .zum Chef. 5^ic Spannung hat ihren
<;ohepunft erreidn, nun iinrb un^ enMid) bcr
heif;erfehnte llngrifft^befehl gegeben u-^erben. ^anl"
bem SdMrffal, M^ un^ biefe grof;en Tage erleben
lief;.
^n einer Heinen ^auern^lube, bereu ^euv^hncr
fid) fĂĽr einige lUinuten zurĂĽrfgczogen haben, ^>eht
ein .^ug. .^reubig crn^> aud") hier bie \^eftd)ter.
n^ijTcn bod) alle,' ba|; jcr^t ber ."ZugfĂĽhrer ben fo
lange criwirteten ">3efehl geben uMrb. Sd^meigenb
hören ftc au6 bem IHunbc bc^ (l>ffi.zicr^ bie ^In*
orbnungcn fĂĽr ben morgigen Tag. VXod) einmal
u^erben bie notu^enbigen X>orbereitungen burd>*
ge|prod>en, geprüft, bann entläfu ber i^ugführcr
feine (icute.
^a^ «^reignit^ be^ :Hündiener ^Ibfommen^ zcru^ört
alle t=riegerifd>en ^Ihnungen, unb am 4. (IM-'tober
marfd>ieren aud) ir»ir ein.
nX-nige Sehuiben nod), unb ber Sd^lagbaum bei
Waib'hausi^ hebt ftd), um bie Spitze ber lcid)ten
iDivifton, bie II./ll. 6, in^ befreite Subetenlanb
einzulaufen. :im ."^oUhau^ ^>eht ber 5^iviftonJ?*
fommanbeur unb grĂĽfu .^ahr.zeug um ,\'ahr.zcug
feiner ^Cruppe. iflit lad)enbcn iPcftd)tern unb
leud)tenbcn klugen fahren ivir heute an ihm
vorĂĽber.
X>or unj? ba^ er\>c „tfd)ed)ifd)c" iDorf. ^T^irlanben
unb \r>impel, >Mumen unb Kränze begrüf;cn und
am »Eingang. Bd)neU gemalte Craneparcnte —
fmb ^o<b ^ic €fd)ed)en hier er^> u^enige Stunben
vorher abgerücft — leud)ten von ben *>>äufern.
Unb nun bettinnt bie gröf.te A^^^^i*^ unfere^ /iebent^.
•^in ruibel ohneglcid)en empfängt und bereite hier
am imfang unfere^ X>ormarfdKt^. Vhifere «fr*
unirtungen von ber >3egei^lerung ^er >3evolferung
u^crben'vöUig übertroffen. So etwad hatten irir
nid)t im entferntesten ern^artct, gcfd)ireige benn
für möglid) trehalten. De irciter irir im Üani^
fahren, \im fo grof.er iinrb ber ^ubel, ber und
empfängt. >Mumen über ZMumen, ."Zigaretten zu
*^unberten, Z3rot, Q>H ""^ ^'i^^^^ anbere ^Dinge
fĂĽllen unfere \V>agen. 5>ic 23evolferung fd)reit,
iveint, lad)t, ed i)i faum mit U\uten zu fagen,
ii^eld>e «^inbrücfe und allein hier, fd)on furj hinter
ber „alten" Frenze, begegnen.
•Die ehemald tfd)ed)ifd)en 3>orffd)ilber fmb v»on
ber >3evölferung \änn\^ übermalt, überall begrüt;cn
und fd>on beutfd)e \Portc. Dmmer lieber, burd)
jeben Ort, bcn iinr burd)fahren, branbcn bie ^eil*
unb ruibelrufe empor. 5>ie Bevölferung s>eht feit
Stunben an ben Straften. 'Ült unb jung, UTänner
unb ,t>^^»f" f<"^ ^^' X>erla)Ten fmb bie t^äufer,
fein UTenfd) benft heute an häudlid)e ^Irbeiten.
^ad Subetenlanb feiert feinen gröf.ten vCag, ^cn
Zcioi ber Z3efreiung, ber ^eimfehr zum UTutter»
lanbe.
^rucf am ti>ammer. ^ic von ben Cfd)cd)en auf'
gepflĂĽgte, von btn Bubetcnbeutfd)cn rafd) unb
notbĂĽrftig irieber eingeebnete Straf;e i\^ bae> cv\tc,
\vae> und an bie Stunben unb Cage vorher zurĂĽcf*
bcnfcn \äf^t.
s^icr foU (Quartier bezogen iverbcn. «f ine VOicfc,
fd>neU ald parFplaQ audgefud)t, nimmt unfere
^^'ahrzcuge auf. iDann empfängt und bie jubelnbc
Bevölkerung. iDad 23ei|lc, was ftc bat, i)^ gerabc
gut genug, um ed und, btn Solbatcn i^cs ^^'ĂĽhrerd,
geben zu können. iDie £cutc fd)lafen auf Stroh
in ber Sd)cune, nur bamit bie Solbaten ein ^ett
haben. Ununterbrod^en muffen wir cffen. Wir
banfen, lehnen ab, ireil irir cinfad) nid)t mehr
fonncn, iDod) fte laffen ftd) nid)t abircifen. ^^'reubig
geben fte und alled, was ftc haben, nur um und
bamit eine ^^reube zu mad)en.
■^tm llbenb unfer er^^er „IHanöverbaU" auf
tfd)ed)ifd)em l^obcn. »^ntrün^et hat man cd ab*
gelehnt, ald tvir ^ier faufcn iroUtcn. Hun rollen
ftc Cd tonncnireife heran, «f d i\t leid)ted pilfner
>3ier, man fann fd)on eine ganze lUenge vcr*
tragen. U^ir ftngen alte unb neue Sol^atenlieber.
Ungeheuer i\y bie Begeisterung, ald unfere inuftf-
fapelle ^cn »^gerlänber llTarfc^ intoniert,
ilange nad) nTitternad)t er)^ gehen n:>ir heute z"
Bett.
Klar unb Falt i^l ber näd)\^c morgen, ald «»ir
und zum UTarfd) trieber in Beilegung fe^en.
VOeiter geht cd, ber einstigen tfd}ed)ifd)en Be*
fcshgung'dlinic entgegen. Sd)arf ftnb unfere Blirfe
nad} vorn gerid)tct. <I^efpannt fd)aut jeber nad)
(Foto: I.t. V. StuHtnitz. A A. H)
ben berĂĽhmten tfd)ed)ifd)en Bunfern, bie hie unb
ba im Cf^elänbe verstreut ftnb. ^Drahtverhaue,
^CanffaUen, fpanifd)e Keiter auf beutfd)em Boben,
von frember ^f^an^ gebaut, um beutfd)c Solbaten
an ber Befreiung biefed urbeutfd)en iianbed z"
hinbern. t^^ier tiniren iiMr burd)gebrod)en, hier
niäre it>ohl fo mand)er von und liegengeblieben,
um niemald bie <>eimat uneberzufehen. ^o&i wenn
aud) viele gefallen irären, iinr ii^ärcn burd)'
gebrod)cn unb hätten aud) ben leisten Winfel
biefed mofaifhaften Staated erobert.
Weiter geht ed gen pilfen. Unteni-tegd begegnen
und immer häufiger entlaffene fubetenbeutfd)e
Solbaten. Sie tragen faj> alle nod) bie tfd)ed)ifd)e
Uniform, ^od) ihr Blicf i]^ freubig, ihre Seele
frei unb begeistert rufen s'te und „^eil %>>itler!" .zu.
Bei einem furzen t^alt am Straf^enranb irirb
befanntgegeben, baf^ mit bem ."Zufammentreffen mit
teilen ber „Koten Wehr" zu red)nen fei. «Erfreut
nehmen tt>ir biefe nad)rid)t auf. ^av mand)er
hört fd)on bas eherne (lieb ber lUafd)inengeiv>ehre
im CPeisle erflingen. ^od) nid)td .zeigt ftd) beim
Wcitermarfd). ĂĽberall nur bie Spuren ehemaliger
tfd)ed)ifd)er Befeijung, ĂĽberall Sperren, ^raht^
verhaue unb t^inberniffe jeglid)er "Itrt. ^ic Be*
völferung hat alle ^emmniffe ix^eggeräumt, unb
fo bringen trir unaufhaltfam vont>ärtd. Wieber
teilt ftci) bie ^(bteilung. ^ie Kompanien verteilen
ftd) auf bie Dörfer: Wfd)eran (Stab, <., 6. Kom*
panie), llTojling ($. Kompanie), ."Zahrabfa (r. Kom»
panie), Kunoiint^ (S. Kompanie), t^ier iiMrb wohl
nun bie neue CPrenze verlaufen, fagt man.
So vergeben bie ZaciC. «fd fommt ber )0. (i>f tober
unb mit ihm bie nad)rid)t, t*a\% irir balb abgelöfl
irerbcn. 'Jllled freut ftd) fd)on fehr auf potdbam,
trenn und aud) ber 'Jtbfd)ieb aud biefetn fd)önen
^anbe nid)t leid)t irerben tvirb. ^aben trir bod)
hier fo mand)' fd)öne Stunbc verlebt. „<>eute nad)t
gebfd lod," fommt eben ein IHelber. Hun tiMrb
alled nneber gepad't. ^ie braujzen liegcnben .)ĂĽge
ii^erben burd) ^iunf unb Telephon vcrs^änbigt.
(Pegen ]z Uhr nad)td gellen bie ^llarmtrompeten.
Balb feijt ftd) bie Kompanie irieber in Beii^egung.
Vlad) furzem IHarfd) trifft bie ^Ibteilung zu*
fammen, unb nun geht ed heimträrtd.
CPerabe ald bie ersten Sonnenstrahlen bad herbs>*
lid) bunte (iaub bcd BohmeruMlbed aufleud)ten
lasJcn, iiberfd)reiten irir bie ehemalige vj^renze, um
ber t^eimats^abt potdbam entgegenzufahren.
^im nad)mittag bed li?. a>f tober .zieht bie ^Ib*
teilung irieber in potdbam ein.
Gcfchichtc Ă–C6 Ă„A. 8
oom 1. NoĂĽcinbcr 1938 bit> l. April 1930
•Der i.november is> für bie ll./^l^l. 6 von befon--
berer Bebeutung. ^ie ^Ibteilung fd)eibet aud bem
X>erbanbe bed ^lufflärungd^Xegimentd 6 aud unb
irirb innerhalb ber >\ panzerbivis'ton (O^enerah
leutnant v. V>ietinghoff ) irieber felbs^änbige
im. (mot.). .lugleid) erhält s"tc ben Uamen irieber,
ben ]ic brei ^abre getragen hat: yii, $.
mit bem i.november verliert bie ^Ibteilung ihre
rofa Waffenfarbe, bie s"»c feit ihrer O^rünbung
trug, unb erhält bafür golbgelb, bie ,t'arbe ber
Ka\>allerie.
^er allseitig beliebte unb verehrte Kommanbeur
«nerr Q>bcv\i Heumann^Silfoir, major v. '^dr'arb*
siein, v^auptmann C'^) *^enfe, (Oberleutnant Kod),
Leutnant v. ,^ĂĽrs>enberg, (ieutnant Vloedfe, (ieut*
nant *r»raf v>. Kittberg, Leutnant Kettler foirie
(Oberleutnant v. ilurf mit bem grosuen Teil ber
7. Kompanie verlasJcn bie llbteilung, um in ben
V>erbanb bed ^lufflärungd^Kegimentd r uberzu-^
geben.
So beginnt mit bem i.llovember ein neuer ^Ib-
fd)nitt fĂĽr bie '^Ibteilung.
Obre ^t'übrung liegt jct^^t in ben v^änben von
(Obers^laitnant' CProlig (0X1. 6). Ohm .zur Seite
Sieben:
Stab: Leutnant v. UTit^Iaff, ^Ibjutant
lleutnant v>. Stubnit?, nvu-l)rid)ten*(r»ffizicr
Stabdzahlmeis^er Oahn
Kegierungdbaurat ^Pehrfe
Oberzablmeis'^er ^utj
1. Sd)irabron: Kittmeis^er .>iervogel
Leutnant llTolinari
2. Sd)irabron: (Oberleutnant *^asTcl (1^1.6)
(leutnant v. BĂĽnau
Ăśeutnant v. Bartenirerffer
^.Sd)u%ibron: Kittmeis^er t^^oeffner (vi.O^D.)
(leutnant ^raf Pfeil
Leutnant v. Kothf ird)
4. Sd)n^abron: (Oberleutnant «Dr. Kid)ter
(leutnant ^vd'erhoff
'Jim «fnbe bcs Oabred verläs'U nad) Zii'cij*'i^^i*i?cr
Tätigfeit innerhalb ber im. i? Kittmeis^n- ."Zier*
vogel bie ^Ibteilung, um in ben Stab ber OH. 6
.v""*-
ubcruitrctcn. "Jln (eine 'Stelle tritt >\ittmci\>cr
^ic WintcrautUMl^una vergeht u^^ ^ie ^dMivi"
M-onen flehen Y\\v\ vor t^en Xeh-iitenbeHdnigungen,
a\^ am ^uubmittan ^el^ m. niar; ^er :ilarmriif:
„marfd'>ln*reit madn-n" ^Ie ^Ibteiliing aut^ ^cm
•Einerlei ^et^ tiaglid)en T^ienjlei^ b:r.auin-eifu.
:im nad>)len morgen gegen 10 Uhr rollt Me junge
>ni. iJ aiu> ^er alten v3^ar^elv^n KorpivKafern-: in
?\idniing "^d^lefien.
U'^ir Mn^ in Xofenhain. '^d'^nell lver^rn ^ie }\c\\i
plar;e aih^gefud>t, bie 'i^innuMfer an ^ie '^^trafu'
gei^ellt. Kurx ^aralIf trifft ^ie ^Ibteilung ein.
U'^ir halten hier MX->-:i '^tun^en.
•^^ beginnt jet^t )>arl=er ;u )d)neien. Oe naher iinr
^e)n vj^ebirge kommen, um fo hoher liegt ^i'r
'^d^nee. Om ^animerlidn ^el^ ĂĽn^*en^en ZkX^^'J'
^urdnahren irir MeitJe. ^unfelheit \\i um un^,
aU^ unr in .>iegenhalt?, unferem heutigen Tage^*
^iel, einfahren.
^aj^ Katen nad) .^iiH\f unb .>iel unferer Keife hat
ein 'i^n^e, alt^ uMr am nadij>en morgen erfahren,
^a); ^er floirafifdu' lUini^ler Tifo nad> l^erlin
>um ^tuhrer gefahren i^> unb ihn gebeten hat, ^en
^dniv, ĂĽber ^en flouv^l^ifduMi ^taat .;u ĂĽbernehmen.
On ^er TfdieduM felb^'^ follen Unruhen fein. U^ie^er
hört man von überfallen auf bie ^eutfduMt. U^ir
^enlâ– 'en an ^ie U\n'te bc^ ^^uhrer^ vom 'September
)0^S'. „^ic ^eutfduMi in ^er ^fdu'dio^'^louvit'ei
fln^ UH•^er uu'hrlo^, nod) fmb fie verlaffcn."
'=>tunMid'> )>eigt unfere "Spannung, ^od1 ber Zac{
vergeht, ohne ^af; etu\;^ Meue^ beh'annt uMrt».
neuer l^efehl: „"Sofort tant'en un> allej? vPerat
fertigmadu-n." ^ann nod) ^ixu'i '=5tunbcn Kuhc.
16.00 Uhr ^Ibmarfd).
^In ^ie ^VahrH'uge! ^er .ZugfĂĽhrer hat fdion ^ie
er^^en VnuuMfunnen in ^er Tafdu*. U\'nn u^r fic
^od) audi fdion unifuen. "Jlber ^Penaue^ i^^ unt^
immer nod) nid)t begannt.
Bi^ ^^ohent^aM lrir^ mit 'iidn gefahren, ^ann
mĂĽfTcn UMr unt^ fo uu'iter beiiu'gen. Xla, bi^ bahin
\\t ja nod) .>eit.
nun beginnt ein fd)a^crer ĂśTarfd). ^(n feinem
Z<xci\: unferer ^lu^bil^ung hat man foviel von unt?
verlangt une in ^iefer '^aui\H'tternad)t.
•^iv beginnt fofort nad) ^em ^Ibmarfd) n^art* .;u
fd)neien. ^at^ '^d)neetreiben behinbert ^ie '^id)t.
v^aben \v\v aud) ^ic ">>rille auf, fo fd)lägt ^od) ^er
'^d)nee uMe mit Nabeln gegen bie CPe)"id)ter. «f in
einiger ^Pin^ fährt uns^ an un^ läfu un^ ^J^änfe-
haut um O^änfehaut ^en Korper herunterlaufen.
Wir frieren ^>arf, trotj ber ^Gummimäntel unb
Krabpullover.
'^ben fahren wiv burd) ,Vreiu%;lbau. \rir ftnb im
'^ubetengau. ^ie l^evol^^erung ^>eht an bcr '^trafu-
unb ruft un^ .^u: „CJ^ebt't? ihnen '^aure^!" ^at? hebt
unfcrc ohnehin freubigc 'Stimmung nod) mehr.
l^ergauf geht't^, hinein int^ ^lltvatergebirge.
Spiegelglatt )m> bie 'Straf;en. ^e hoher uMr
t-ommen' um fo hoher liegt aud) ber '=^d)nee. 'irr
verminbert iiH*nig)>en^ einigermaf;en bie vPlätte,
lafu aber bie Keifen aud) nod) rutfd)en.
^ie Solofahrer finb fd)limm bran heut. Sie
rutfd)en mehr, alt^ )ic fahren. iTod) \tc halten
burd). '»rioher unb hoher geht\^ hinauf, '^ine
Serpentine nad) ber anberen irirb ĂĽbenininben.
„Ob UMr ruberfommen bei bem Sd)nee, ohne
Sd)neel-*etten: Klar, IHenfd), unr i^ommen ruber.
Sd)ieben Tonnen unr ja aud) nod). ^ai^ hat unt>
bod) ber ^^fahrlehrer beigebrad)t."
t^er Sd)nee fällt jet^t fo bid)t, baf; xviv fcium ben
t>orbermann fehen l^onnen. «Tva^ U^etter unrb
immer toller, '^ine Kolonne von Sd)neemänncrn
auf lUotorräbern fährt hier burd) bie \V>intcr*
nad)t bet^ ^lltvatergebirget^. (T'ft mii^T*-^" »^'i^' runter
von ber :Uafd)ine, um ein paar lUeter ui fd)ieben.
"Jlber unr fommen uuMter. !Uand)mal unrb ioc^av
gehalten, ^at^ Einfahren i)> befonber^ fd)led)t. '^s5
geht unaufhaltfam, uu*nn aud) langfam, voruvirt^.
(Pott fei iDanf. iDa \\i bie Kote I^ergbaube. U^ir
finb oben. Hun geht's? uMcber hinunter. \V»ir
rutfd)en fa^> nur nod) auf bcr uncber fehr glatten
Straf;e. Ked)t^ unb lini-'t? meterhohe Sd)neeuviinbe,
bie mand)mal, un-nn einer abrutfd)te, burd)brod)en
finb. Wie ber nur uneber auf bie Strafu- fommtv
Weiter.
^er Sd)ncefaU hört auf, bafür nimmt bie Kälte
uMeber .;u. X>or uns? bie eid)ter eine^ Dorfes?.
Wir haben viel .>eit verloren. XI un miijTcn unr
ctu^it^ fd)neller fahren. 5>at? mad)t uuMiig Spaf;
bei ber Straf;englätte. .>unfd)enburd) uMebcr O^e*
banden an bcn ?>\v^d unferer ,t'ahrt, bic ba^ *^er>
fd)neller fd)lagen lafjen.
Mäher fommen unr an t^ohen^>abt. Wir u^ijT^"
nun: .t'ahren unr von bort aus? uuMtcr, bann unrb's?
'i:rn^>, bann fnallt's?.
v^ohen)>abt. Uun eid)t aus?, '^ine Stunbe paufe.
i>er Leutnant \\^ fortgegvingen, Z3efehle ni emp*
fangen. ,\'ieberhaft cru^arten unr feine KĂĽrffehr.
V>or bem (lanbrats?amt treten xviv an. ^Der Ăśeut*
nant i-'ommt.
„!>. ."^ug herhören. 5>ic politifd)e (läge i\y eud) bc--
fannt. 'Iluf l^cfehl bes? ,VĂĽln-er^ u^crbcn beutfd)C
Truppen, alfo aud) unr, nod) heute nad)t bic
tfd)ed)ifd)e vPren.K ĂĽbcrfd)reitcn, um im tfd)ed)i*
fd)en Staats?gebiet nun aud) a>rbnung yu fd)affen,
um bie ^r. *^ad)a, ber präfibent bcs? Staaten,
ben ^VĂĽhrer gebeten hat."
•^in hörbare^v 'Jlufatmen geht burd) bie Keihen.
^er ilcutnant vcrlie)"^ nun ben ^lufmif an bie
tfd)ed)ifd>c l^ev'ölhnning. „IHit überfd)reiten ber
vPren.K haben unr mit .■^ufammen^>öf;en ni red)nen.
^er ^luftrag ber ^Ibteilung \\y c^, bie tfd)ed)ifd)e
O^arnifon pro^nit? ni entuv^ffnen. ,\'rieblid) ober
mit ^Pcuvalt. ^i<: ^ivifton nimmt gleichartig
(tNlmüt^." Wir hören l^aum nod) hin, fo hat un^
bas? alles.^ in «Erregung verfet^t. 'i:r<> als? ber
(ieutnant nod) einige birefte ^hniunfungen gibt,
finb unr uneber bei ber Sad)e.
^t*ahruH*ife unb lHarfd)u^eg gibt uns? ber (ieutnant
nod), bann verabfd)iebet er fid) von un^. ^ic
Stimmung hat i>a\ ^^ohepunft erreid)t. Wir
treten an bie ^^ahru'uge. IHarfd). Wie vl^luh^
häfcr fehen bie Kolonnen aui^ mit ihren blauen
abgeblenbeten (iid)tern.
Wie im ^3^ei)>ermarfd) geht'^ ber vPren^e .;u.
IHuglit^. "w^ier nod) ein paar Stunben KĂĽhe. Wir
gehen trot? ber frühen Stunbe in bie i^äufer. 'f^
fd)lägt gerabe > Uhr. 5^ie I^ev>olferung nimmt
uns? fehr liebevoll auf. '^s? ftnb hier alle^ Subeten^
beutfd)e, bic nod) vor u^enigen ĂĽTonaten bie
Sd)rect'en bin* tfd)ed)ifd)en %^errfd)aft erlebt haben.
Sie geben unt^ Kaffee, l^rot, .Zigaretten. Si:
unjjen, u\i^ uns? bevor^^eht unb ftnb fehr ^ci\k'^
freunblid).
'Pin lUelber fommt. 'i:^ geht los?. ^In uns? vorbei
rollen panun-fpähunigen, ^ie heute als? erjle bie
d^ren^e überfd)reiten. V>oran ber Spähtrupp
/ieutnant v. I^ünau, ber fpäter in Z>rünn al^ er^'ier
Spähtrupp bic X>erbinbung mit bem au^ ber Q>\i'
marf einrĂĽd'enben <. vj^ruppenfommanbo her)"lellte.
^er vÂŁhcf fprid)t nod) einmal 3U un^, bann gehen
unr an bie ^V^ihr.Kuge. „!Uad)f^ gut!" ruft uns?
ber (ieutnant nod)mal >u, bann bonnern unr lo^,
ber nahen CPren:^e entgegen.
CPleid) hinterm a>rt ^leht ba^ .^ollhaut^. 5>er
Sd)lagbaum hebt ftd), es? i\i jcijt furj nad) 0 Uhr.
(Fotos: Gcfr. Kloss 3. AA. «)
•^in lct?te^ „-^eil t^itlcr!" ruft man un^ m, ^^^""
ftnb unr nur nod) gefpannte «f runirtung.
^a^ cr)>c ^orf. 5>ic >3evölferung mit red)t
grimmigen CPeftd)tern fäumt bie Straf;e. V>icl
llrbeits?iofe lungern herum. Sehen ĂĽbel au^. Wohl
alle^ Kommuni^K-n. ^Darunter halbunid)ftge l^ur*
fd)en, bie un^ heraus?forbernb anfehen. Wir legen
bic pinlolcn griffbereit unb bie t^anbgranaten auf
ben Sd)of;. ^luf;erhalb ber (l>rtfd)aften fd)auen unr
gcfpannt auf jebe *;^öhe unb »Erhebung, geu^^rtig,
baf; von irgenbu-io bas^ vCaifen einei^ !liafd)inen^
geuH'hri^ erHingt. "Jlud) nad) oben geht unfcr
IMiif. Wo ftnb bie vielgeruhmten tfd)ed)ifd)':n
,\'lieger? Warum l^ommen fie nid)t: Wir uvarten
auf )K. Weiter geht^s balb nunjen unr am ."^iel
fein. Kuru'r »^^alt am Strafu-nranb.
r»efehl vom v£hef : „:. .>ug, ver^lärl^t burd) eine
\?af.> fid)ert bie Straf;e (Mmur;— pros?nir; bei
ITC." ^er er)le Kampfauftrag \\} gefomnu'n. Stol;
verla^Jen unr bie Sd)unabron unb bonnein feinb*
unu'ts^ ^hi bem punl^t :-o )>eht ein sKab Wagen
ber 2. Sd)u\abron.
«Tic panu'rf pähu\^ gen braufen uunter, ber .>ug
geht in Stellung. I^lanf unb blir;enb rafd)eln bie
Patronengurte in bas? iHafd)inengeuH*hr, \\nn
unrb geMd)ert unb nun: ,,Ueunu'hntel feinet^
(iebents unirtet ber Solbat vergebens?." Xlid)ts.^
U'igt ftd) als.> ein paar .>ivilu\agen, bie Uvid) clMmur;
u-iciterfahrcn burfen. '^ben Fommt in einem lcid)ten
Panu'rfpahu^agen cDberleutnant ^^a^Jel, vÂŁhef ber
2., mit ^olmetfd)er unb uunfu'r .flagge, '^r fahrt
nad) pro^nir;. Sehnfud)tig fd)auen unr bem im
Sd)neetreiben xH*rfd)unnbenben ^^ahr;eug nad).
V>on rurfunurtt^ i^ommen jer;t bL'utfd)e Kampfunigen
bie Strafu* entlanggebrau)>. Illfo i^onnen unr ab*
riid'en.
„Wee)>e A'ritje, id-'e für meine V^ci')^^"' ^<^ i^'^^^'^
nid) mehr an bet •^rfd)einen ber Tfd)ed)en. Wo
bleiben fe benu: ^ie haben bc^>immt bet Uff)"iehn
heute verje^Tcn unb nu ii^ et au^ mit fe."
„Dt^ aber bod) ]ammerfd)abe, uf hätte fo jerne
ccnmal fd)arf gefd)ofyen, eenmal fo rid)tig, nid)
une uff Krampnit? A ober Kiefbrud). Xlu is? et
xvk^a nifd)t jeu^iorn."
Wir haben un^ mit bem t. ."^ug jer,t ber 4. Sd)unv
bron angefd)lo)Tcn, '^.^ foU nad) Wifd)au, einer
Heinen Stabt ;%* Kilometer vor l'»runn, gehen.
•Pin eiftger Winb treibt uns? uneber bie Sd)nee*
florfen in^ a^c)"id)t. O^latt i^"^ bie Straf;e unb
holperig ba.;u. '^nblid) ftnb unr auf ber grof;en
Chau^Tee a'^lmür;— I^runn. Xlun geht'^ rafd) v>or^
u-tärts?. 'irs.^ unrb uvirmer, ci^ beginnt %n tauen, '^in
fomifd)es? Wetter. Ked)t^ vor un^ taud)t jeijt bic
'^^ilboiicttc einer großen Kaferne auf. U^ir umjTc»/
^a^; ^ic ^Ibteilung hier (dion ^ll^d1 \\i, alfo feine
vPefnbr bezieht, 'ifnttaufdn geben unr ^ie ^I^e^anfen
an ^al^ )o |ehnlid>|l enrartete '^d)varf)d)icf;en nun
en^gultig auf.
Wir fahren in Wifdviu ein.
^ie ^Ibteilung l>at fdion auf ^em IHarftplai? ?luf^
\idUu\ai genommen, ivir fahren an unferen piatj.
(Fotos: 3. Iffz. ()t/.<lnrf .<. A \. 8)
Unfcre l^lirfe fd)u^cifcn ĂĽber ben IHarftplatj, an
bcn Käufern entlang. U^ic in ^en Dörfern, Mc
trir bie^her burd>fuhren, fo liehen aud) hier iric^er
fehr vienirbeit^lofe umher, »fin fiir un^5>eutid)e
volh^an^ia unaetvohnte^ >Mlb. «fm ^auto T^^^rt
eben vorbei, ^luf ihm ^>ehen lUanner mit einer
.^at^enh-eunahne, bie unt? .^uiubehi. '^a Jtnb
i^eut)d>e au^ ber ivenige Kilometer entrernt
lieaen^en '=5prad)infel. ^ie fordern un^ auf .^u
Ihnen ;u kommen. ^le A'rauen bort hatten icbon
viel KudHMi fĂĽr bie beutfdnMi '^oibaten gebacken.
V>orlaufig mĂĽffni ivir banl^enb ablehnen.
^er >ivote Mm ^^cllt heute bie \X\id)c in ber
pan.HH-f aferne", ^^gt eben ber (leutnant. '^r l^eUt
felb^l bie Wad)c nifammen, bann marf)en irir una
fertig ^um ^Ibmarfd).
Um 16.^0 Uhr ^^ellen unr un^ am «f ingang bcr
Kaferne auf. ,,^et i^ aber een .^iemlid) eintönigem
Icbaubc, irat^" ,,l^ei une in 5>eutfd)lanb fehcn
Sie neuen Kafernen K^d^ fd)öner aum." iDer ^ieut^
nant läfu jeQt ^lilh^ehen, bann übernimmt er von
bem tfd)cd)ifd)en KafcrnenoffiMer bie gefamtc
\X>ad)e. Wir treten uu^g inj? \V>ad)lofal.
„-^ier im bet ja fa^l irie in potmbam! «^en paar
pritfd>en, een ^ol.Uifd> unb eene Unmenge von
'^dihnTeln, bereu ^^erhmft feener fennt."
5>ie \:^o\icn n^crben abgelö^>, bie Xfd)cdKn v»er*
la^Ten fĂĽr immer bie U\id)e. Wir ftnb unter unm.
Willem i\y hier fehr fauber un^ orbentlid). Ăśberall
hangen bie WadnHM-fdn'iften, po^^enami^cifungen
unb*Tclcphonli^>en. Unfer fubetenbcutfd)er Käme*
rab, ber tfd)cd)ifd) )prid)t, ĂĽbcrfetjt unm aUem.
.-^um er^len lUale ^>ehe id) heute auf Pollen unb
nun gleid) in einer tfd)cd)ifd)en Kaferne. '^m nt
ein efgenartiaem sPefĂĽhl. '^dn'itt fĂĽr '^d)ritt gehe
id) iin Kaferncnbcreid^ herum, meinen po^^enireg
entlang, «^m beainnt bunfel yu irerben. ^Drüben
^>eht ein grof;em ^Pebäube, ein Kino für bic BoU
baten. T^alid) vveimal u^erben bort ^^ilme ge-
zeigt, bie bie <=^olbaten fĂĽr u^enig (T^elb, c PTv
fehen fönncn.
TDie tfd)ed)ifd)en -^^olbaten mad)en afimählid) ^Mv
naherunnmv>erfud)e. IHit ^ilfe unferem fubctcm
bcutfd>en 5>olmetfd>erm fönncn iinr unm ganj gut
ver^^anbiaen. '^^ie freuen ftd) ĂĽber ihre balbige
•fntlafFung unb mad)en feinen ^ehl baraum, bat;
fic aern irieber nad) ^au^ gehen, 'fm beginnen
;i:aufd)tTcfd)äfte. ;Cfd)ed)ifdK .^elbmütjen, Uniform*
fnöpfe'unb :ib^eid)en ired)feln gegen beutjd)e
;Cafd)enuhren ihre Z>efit3er. ^eber von unm iriU
ein fleinem ^Inbenfen mit nad) potmbam nehmen;
einitre tfd)ed)ifd)e '^olbaten, ,^einmed)anifer von
Beruf haben fleine lUobeUc ihrer Kampfivagen
angefertigt, bie fte imm für 4-- ^^^ ^^ ^^•^'"'^"
ĂĽbcrlaffen.
5>ie erfle Had^t in ber neuen Kaferne i\t ruhig
unb ohne bcfonbere X>orfaUe verlaufen. :*n ber
Kantine faufen irir .^^igaretten unb Butter. Ulan
behanbelt unm ^uvorfommenb unb höflid).
iDer Leutnant betritt bic Xr>ad)ftube: „'^eutc
gegen 9.^0 Uhr irirb ber (Dberbefehlmhaber hier*
herfommcn. V>ieUeid)t aud) ber .FĂĽhrer, ber \n
Brunn cintte^otten i\r" 'fmfig gehen wir fofort
baran, unfeVcn Stiefeln, bie feit ber t^cimat nid)t
mehr rid)tig blanf iraren, (Plan.^ auf.^ulegen. Wir
ivartcn.
5>rauf,en t^ebt ber Leutnant in Unterhaltung mit
tfd)ed)ifd)en (l>ffnJcren, bie heute in «Sonntagm*
uniform ebenfalls auf bam •frfd)einen unterem
(Dberbcfchlmhaberm uwtcn. Vlad) einer halben
Btunbe erfahren irir, baf. ber (peneralober^^ nid)t
fommen irirb. — Bd)abe.
(Foto: <,<-fr. Moss H. AA. ö)
•fm mag gcrabe 11.00 Uhr fein, alm bie er^^en
beutfd)en ^t'liegerformationen ĂĽber bie Kaferne in
Kid)tung Brunn braufen. .â– ^irci CPefd)waber ver*
fd)iebcncr »Einheiten halten bie Xfd)ed)en für ein
paar lUinuten in Staunen unb t>cnrunberung.
^ia\^ ungläubig haben fie gen ^immel gefd)aut
unb unm bann gefragt, ob bam irirflid) allem
beutfd>e ^^lieger geirefen mären? Btol.; haben ir>ir
geantirortct, ba^ biem nur ein gan.; flciner Teil
icr beutfd)en iluftmaffe n^ar, bcn fie foebcn ge*
fehcn haben. Bic fehen unm ungläubig an.
)^.oo Uhr. Wir werben abgclö^^. »fm bauert eine
gan.^e Weile, bim wir bie nad>folgenbc Wadie, ge*
\it\it von ber 1. Bd>irabron, in fd)war3er Uniform,
hier in bae' gan.K ^rum unb ^ran eingeiriefcn
haben, «^nblid) fahren wir lom. 'Iluf bem Ularft*
plaQ eine fur^^e UTittagmpaufe, bann fahren wir
mit ber Bd>wabron lom, um .;wei beutfd)en Dörfern
unferen verfprod>enen Befud) ab.nM^atten, währenb
bic anberen Bd>wabroncn in bic fĂĽnf anberen
bcutfd)cn Dörfer gehen. Wir freuen unm fehr auf
bic fommcnbcn Btunben. Vor unm liegt, im Za\
eingebettet, ba^ fleinc ^orf «^obitfd)au.
^ie Bcvölfcrung )>eht am «Eingang in malerifd)
bunten Trad)ten unb bcgrĂĽ|;t unm mit uncnblid)cm
Oubcl. ^ie Bd)ulfinber fd)wcnfen ^afenfrcuv
fähnd)cn unb bie jungen nTäbd)cn fingen bcutfd)e
lieber, »^m bcrrfd)t eine fehr grof;c Begeit^crung.
^cr Oubcl n^eigcrt ftd), alm nad) ber BcgrĂĽfuing
burd) bcn Bürgerincitler wir im »^rcr^icrmarfd)
inm ^orf einrücfcn. 'Jim «oclbcnbenfmal nehmen
wir llufjl-ellung. ^cr sichrer hält eine hir^c Iin-
fprad)c, bann fagt ber vEbef Worte bc'^ 5^anfcm
für bcn begeisterten »Empfang, wir präfcnticrcn,
bas Bicg^'ocil auf unferen ^^ĂĽbrer unb bic
Xlationalhymncn becnben bicfe einbrucfmv»olle
v^ciert^unbe. ^cr 2. ^ug bleibt mit bem f. UKP.*
^alb^ug unb ber Krab*nTclbcj>affcl hier im ^orf,
währenb ber anbere Teil ber Bd)wabron weiter
nad) bem Ort Kutfd)erau fährt. Wir t>cllen unferc
vt'abr^cuge auf ber Btra^e auf unb ftnb nun (Bäjle
bte> Dörfern im (Baij>haum. »Ratten unm fd)on bic
»^ingangmfunbgcbungcn vorbin in eine <^od)*
l^immung vcrfer^t, fo werben wir nun beim «^in*
marfd) in bcn Baal gerabe^u überwältigt von
bem 'Empfang, bcn man un^ hier bereitet. Dmmer
wieber ruft, jubelt unb lad)t bie Bevolferung
unm, alm ihren Befreiern, ni, wir fonnen fein
Wort mehr fagen. lllan fei^t fid) nun mit unm
an bie aufgestellten Tifd)e ;um ^^'e^lmahl. ^ie
TĂĽren gehen auf unb bie Bauermfrauen bem (l>rtem
fommcn mit Kud)en unb Bratenfd)ui7eln herein.
CProf;er unb gro|;er werben bie Berge von Bufug»
feiten, bie bie Tifd)e fa)l ^um Bred)en bringen.
Bo etwam haben wir, felb^l beim «f inmarfd) in bam
Bubetenlanb, bimher nid)t erlebt. Belb)"^ ber
rauhes^e Krieger i\i gerĂĽhrt v>on biefer <r>a\i'
freunbfd)aft.
Vlad) einer Btunbe, längst finb bie Kud)cnberge
wieber burd) neue erfei^t, muiJen wir wieber auf^
bred)en. llTan will unm nidn fortlaijen. '^r|l nad)*
bem wir verfprod)en haben, bes"^immt wicbcr*
^ufommen, gibt man unm frei. Wir treten im
Baal nod) einmal an. ^er (ieutnant bebanft fid)
in unferem Mainen fĂĽr biefe unvergef;lid)e Btunbe
ber vPas"^freunbfd)aft in «^c»bitfd)au, wir fingen bam
von unferem Kameraben Kavfer fomponierte
„Krabfd)üi3enlieb", bann verlaiJen wir unter bem
wicbcr anfd)wellenben Oubel ber beutfd)cn
Bauern ben CPa^^hof, um an unfere lliafd)inen ;u
geben.
^er Wagen bem ^eutnantm i\i bim oben hin gefĂĽllt
mit bem nod) ĂĽbriggebliebenen Kud)en, Korb um
Korb wanbert nod) immer hinein, bim enblid) bie
^lbfd)icbmfcfunbe fd)lägt. ^ie UTotoren heulen
auf, bae> nTarfd);^eid)en fommt, unb fort geht cm
wicbcr nad) Wifd)au. Wie im Traum haben ivir
biefe legten 3wci Btunben erlebt, ^eijt auf ber
bunflen ÂŁanb)>ra|;e wirb unm cv\i flar, iinirum bie
Begeisterung ber Bcvölfcrung fo ungeheuer gro|;
iS>. Vlad) zwanzigjähriger ^\'rembhcrrfd)aft, in
ihrem ^cutfd)tum immer unb ĂĽberall unterbrud'i,
ftnb bicfe wenigen ^cutfd)cn, bic wie ein steifen
in ber Branbung gcs^anbcn unb ihr ^eutfd)tum
nid)t aufgegeben haben, nun burd) bic s^^rfe «^anb
ji- v*"^
( I Olli: (.1 h. Kl..-- :5. \ \. ii)
iibcr Uadtt uMCbcr }\i ihrem ^cllt^â– d)c^ X^atc^la^^c
;uriKfnci-'cln-t. — —
^lodi Kanac Hinat ^icfct^ «^rlcbnit^ in inu^ un-itcr.
u^^ wir UHn*^c^ Ci^ wcbi nicmaU^ xv;rge|Jcn.
'i'inc Wodu- bleibt ^ic :i^l. i? nod^ in U'^ifd^uii, bit^
^ic 4. '^dM^^a^ro^ mit ^C1n Pclia^c^ ^l•l^ t|dn\1)i^
fduMi i^ccrci^fTcratCi^ fertig i)>.
?lin 4. "^Ipril ^Ibfiabrt nadi poti^bam ĂĽber pro^^
nin d'^hmir; '^ternberg — ."^uifinantel — Xlci^Jc—
vj^rotth'au I^ret^lau.
^lin 6., nad'>mittagi^ i6.c»o Uhr, fahrt ^ie "Jibteilimg
im (iin>garten am Komlnan^eur vorĂĽber ll^^ be^
e^^et N;mit ^al^ nnvergefdidu* 'irrlebtiit^. '^in^
(l'..l... l (i/. (tl/..l..rr:5. AA. H)
m
arfd) in ^ic ehemalige sCfdH'd)o '^louMt'ei.
3tnli
1. SdiuiaDron
3ilmniiM'oii
.»* V*«»»
;;. 3dUĂĽatiron
CET
10 as llalir 103$
lOon fi. Rlactln, filajor im Obechommanöo öec fflchrmadit
•Tic ticfr!l•^ilI^igc 23.c^cutu^g von 'frcipniiTcn unb 'f fkliniffcM wirb bcin etiiKlncn oft nidit flar
.renn ci- mitten in ihnen (lebt; cr)^ wenn fid) feine 2.etr.^cl)tung von ber X'>ielf«lt bcr "=r^
)d)cinungen lo)t unb fid) rĂĽd'bltd-'enb bcm (Pannen .^uwenbet, ivcitet fid> ber Blirf
So werben xnele Kameraben, bie imTlabr ,9?» ben Sorf bess^ccres netrancn haben, erft fpäter,
vicncid)t tviimd) Jahren ernennen, weld) gefd)id)tlid) ungeheuer wid)tiges unb cntfd)eibcnbea
3ahr fie als Solbaten ber neuen Wehrmad)t erlebten.
23ei »eginn bea ^lusbilbungajahrc» m7liS hat wohl feiner ber eingefteUten Kehuten ber
auabilbenben (Befreiten, Unteroffiziere unb (Pffi.vere geahnt, wm ba'a bahr m$ an ircbr.
politi|d)cn tEnt|d,eibungen bringen wĂĽrbe. Kuhig unb jidbewupt wie immer begann bie
llrbeit bes Winters. Jm harten 5Dicn,^ unb mitten in ber alle Kräfte in ^Infprudi nehmenben
wid)tigen 2lusbilbung blieben wenig (Pebanfcn frei fĂĽr bie 'fntwirflunn ber politifdicn "aat
So mag aud) wohl ben vielen Kameraben, bie am 0. Utar, m$ bie '^inFĂĽnbigung bes'ebc^
maltgen Bunbesfanjlers 5Dr. Sd)ufd)nigg hörten, wonad) er fid) plöRlidi xu einer merf-
.mubigen tnib beud)lerifd)en X->olF9ab(limmung entfd)lo,Ten hatte, in ihrer groĂźen r.ebeutunct
nid)t flar geworben fem. -^ ' -«^»^""""g
Unb bann begannen ftd) bie 'freigni,Te bereits .;u iiberiiür^n. ^im morgen bes r lltärx
mar|d)tertcn beutfc^ »Cruppenteile aUer Waffengattungen über bie ehemalige <!5ren;e m'ifLn
5Deutfd)lanb unb Jeutfct)o,lerreid,. I^enjenigen, bie bamals ben Sefreiungsmarf* na*
(P(Verreid) mitgemacht haben, werben ihr ganjes fieben lang biefe Tage als befonberes -^rlebni^
vorgingen fiel>en. l.ls Befreier famen bie beutfd,en tCruppen unb fmb in biefem liTme von
ber »evolFerung empfangen unb begrüpt worben. r»cber, ber an biefem iltarf* teilgenommen
hat, wirb wohl fem be,onberes Erlebnis haben, bas beffer als lange Worte bie Vreube "er
Bevoireruiig unb aud> feine eigene Stimmung, bie bamals fein ^ir? fdineHer fdilaaen lieĂź
beleud)tcn Fann. ;}(ber aud, biejenigen, bie nidit babeifein burften, bie weiter in ihren Kafernen
unb auf Ihren iibungsplaeen im harten ^lusbilbungsbien)^ begriffen waren unb nur ftunben.
weife an ben ^autfpred)ern unb aus ben ."Leitungen von bem <ÂŁinmarfd) ihrer Kameraben unb
bcm Empfang burd) bie Bevdlferung hörten, werben wohl Flar erFannt haben, weldi widitine
SoDe ber ^uhrer unb ©berfie Sefehlsh^^er in biefen Tagen ber bcutfd)en Wehrma*t %u-
4. 3dnuat>ron
Pörß^c ror v>cni vSüI>rcr ßuf ^cm öflöcnplc^ in Wien am UATläv^, 1938
^tvilticlm Stmport, Trucf- unt> ^iHnlaiv-bauv, i^i um ^ .. o
79._ VI- V). — 1250.
rf'Jk'
mmmsMMmĂźmm
hör<btaui I9 war ein granMofc» '£>rcinpel, eine e.n^eutIge «Peneralprobc, Me ^«9 beutle
St iölanSr - 5 S Semotben Vurd, bie .frlebniffe in ds<iemicb -, ^«l? «" ber ^lus.
?i Äeid, lf|? feinen 3.reifel ^«n.ber, b«ß ^a9 Xed,t ^er 5Deutfcf,en nod, mtmer ,d)eel «n-
S£i,i"He"vtÄen^^^^^^^ ^'e fd,.n immer über ^ie ,.u"eiMnen6e
ISüngir 2uS" »niber jenfeits ^er (Brenne berichtet hatten, ,.cl, nnmer be^roW.cf,er
r/Äir^DÄTeU" rrSoed,o=Blo.aFei, Sie fpred,e„ ^iefelbe Sprad,c fie
;' . Li.f^ r,^« aittVti fie finb bietelbcn mentdien i» e wir. Sie werben von Tf(i)ecl)en unter
L^'' V.«If A Svft n aef eÄtet m^ w rben ihnen nicf)t bie geringsten Ked,te juerfannt
lZ äÄ?ÄutTc5" Stamm bagegen ju wehren anfangt unb feine ^^orberungen au
mieiAberffiunn l"ut unö lauter anmeldet, beginnt eine pertobe einer m«uropa faum
feSĂ„en UnteTbriirfĂĽng. 5Da8 Siel ifi flar-, Kned,tung jer,t, unb fĂĽr b.e Sufun t angfame
^f T;rtL^IiM\7"in«rottun^ nach bem Sieg be» Xlationalfo^^lisnius in iDeutfd)lanb uer-
-i ' i/'Jrt J Lmt,T i"e ieutlSen i^i ber\fd)edio.Slowaf ei finben, burd) bie national.
iSa Äe t^MtZfiauunc, geeK ?mmer mehr^ Ä-'mmen. Ommer fd,ärfer werben aber
'^1 slv Unt^thHirP iiinsmethoben ihrer Peiniger. Vtad) ber Wiebervereinigung 5Deutfd).
Ä. mit SÄ Sbe^^^^^^^^ leiten nod, ,ielbewuf,ter „nb nod, harter
rtcfĂĽl)rt.
*
irj"rt>fd>ifcl>cr 25cfcftigiin(jögürtcl xrcftlid) Troppiiu
Waren biöbcr bic UntcrbrürfungBmctbobcn getarnt, be^^onb bie llletbobe ^.^^ ^J"^^^^J ^
bea ^r^eutfcbtuma bauptfäd)Ud) in einer tt>ol)lüber legten (Sefe^gebung, bte ftd) gegen aUed
^eut{d)e rid)tete, unb in ber :>lntt)enbung vieler HtMid^tv aber fĂĽr ben etn.^elnen ftdj futr^ter-
lid) aumrirrenber X)ertraltung8mapnabmen, fo trurbe ber ^^^^^fMe^t offen br Uta unb ^on
leiten ber 23enefd)*ÂŁeute mit ber Knute unb bem Ba|onett gefubrt. <ÂŁ8 floĂź ^["*' -^"J^^^
mebr fpittten ftd bie ^^reigniffe ;u. 5Die prager Kegierung mt bie au^ge<lrecfte .^onb ber
eubetenbeutfcjen Partei in X^erfennung ibrer ÂŁage unb t>ertrauenb auf ^l^ .^''^'J^^^^
ibrer Bunbeegenoifen ^urĂĽcf. lUan t?erfud)t auf Beiten ber Benef cl)'^partet mjtjef^ cf ten
metbober-^e^^^^ unb immer trieber 3cit 3u gett>innen. :^n5trifd)en muffen ^u fd)e bluten,
Sffen l^euÄKbe^^^^^ ber Parteitag in Nürnberg beginnt, i^ t>it gonje Welt, befonbera
abef bafbeutfio^^^^ auf ^<^s ^uĂźer<^e gef pannt. Biaber i^ i.on beutfd)er Bette no* feine
f lare unb eTbeutige B eĂźungnabme'ju ben legten ^^reigniffen erfolgt. JUber man mer!?t, ba^
e ^aaFn bT^uft liegt. Unb ala am jz. September bk Worte bea ^ubrera trte s^ammer^
|(t)läge fallen, „ba^, wenn biefe gequälten Kreaturen fein Xed)t unb feine «gilfe felbul finben
fönntn, ftc hcibcs x?on una bekommen werben", i\t ^a^ feine Bcnfation mebr, fonbern faii> eine
j^rlöfung, eint ^^rlöfung, befonbera für bie Brüber im Bubetenlanb, aber aucf) für bas ganjc
bcutfd)e X>olf, bae von ber Bpannung ber letzten Wod)en immer mebr erfai;t iv>orben i\t unb
auf bie tgntfd)eibung bea ^^'ĂĽbrera wartet.
Wie eine ÂŁait>ine rollen nun bie ^^rcigniffe ah. Konrab s^enlein, ber ^^ĂĽbrer ber Bubeten*
beutfd)en, rid)tet ba& Verlangen an Prag, bas Btanbred)t .;urĂĽcF:^unebmen unb aud) bie Btaata*
poli.^ei ^urĂĽcfju^ieben. ^Dreijel^n ^obeaopfer in vierunb^wanjig Btunben ftnb ber ^tnlaj^ ju
bicfer enbgĂĽltigen ^^'orberung. ^ie wirb nid)t beantwortet.
Cn ben nun fommenben vCagen rĂĽjlet ftd) bas beutfd)e X>olf, feine Webrmad)t, befonbera aber
bas tgeer, ju ernflem (Bang, ^ruppentranaporte beginnen ju rollen, "Oerlcgungcn von ^^in»
beiten be» t^eerea in Kid)tung ber tfd)ed)0'floit>aHfdKn CPren.^e mebren ftd). i>ie politifd)e
^age i^ immer nod) ungegart, präg vertraut auf bie t^^ilfe ber ire(>lid>cn Demokratien.
Wabrenb ber ."^ufammenfunft ber vier Btaatamanner, imitier llTuffolini, Cbamberlain unb
Dalabier, (leben im groj^en Umfreia um bie ^fd)ed)o*Blowafei, in Bd)leften, Bad)fen, Bayern
unb ber Öjlmarf, ^avfe beutfd)e »Einheiten bereit, ^ie ftnb vorbereitet unb gcrüjlet — trenn
ca nun bod) fein foH — ibren beutfd)en Brübern mit ber Waffe in ber t<^anb ^u ^ilfe ;^u eilen.
i^vn^ unb entfd)loffen i(l bie Btimtnung ber Gruppe. Kein Btrobfeucr faffd^en t^^urra*
patriotiamua ifl 3u fpĂĽren. Der beutfd)e Bolbat fennt bie Vt>irfung moberner Waffen, (fr
treiß: ea i(l fein Kinberfpiel — ein Krieg. Dcabalb i\i ber (^ei\t eiferner •fntfd)loffcnbeit,
ber Wille .;ur Pflid)t, ^um C5eborfam böber ein^ufd)a^en ala eine laute unb grof;fpred)crifd)e
Begeisterung.
'tcr SĂĽbrcr in Sucfmantcl
Überra|d)enb unb wie ein Wunber anmutenb trirb plö^lid) aua ben ^(ngriffabefeblen bie
VT>eifung fĂĽr ben frieblid)en ifinmarfd). Die ĂĽberragenbe politif ^(bolf s^itlera bat geftegt.
3n bie 3one I rĂĽcfte am ). (Df tober bie ^^eercagruppe bes (Beneraloberjlen Xitter von ^eeb um
H Ul)r ^wi^ö:)en tgelfenberg unb ^tnjlerau ein. Um zz Ul>r war ba» iagea^iel erreid)t. plan»
maĂźig l)at am nad)<len ^age bie ^eereagruppe ibren X>ormarfd) fortgefe^t.
^Im ^.(Df tober trat bie sgeereagruppe be& (5eneralober(>en von 23ocf um )3 Ubr .^irifd)en
Kumburg unb ^^rieblanb ĂĽber bie (Brenne unb begann mit ber Befe^ung ibrea ^Ibfcbnittea.
^m 5. (Dftober ĂĽberfd)ritt bie t^eereagruppe bes (Bencrala ber ^(rtillerie von Keid)enau beiber*
feita bes ^(fd)er 3ipfcla ^wifd^en Belb unb nTarfneufird)en bie (Brenne unb begann mit ber
Befe^ung bea ^(bfd)nittea III.
I
jr V *>*^
Vliir UHMiiftc ;Cagc fpater, am 6. (Df tober, bccjann ^ic ^ccrcdgruppc ^c^ CPencralobcrj^cn von
?^un^^lc^t mit ^cr Bcfetjung ^c^ 2(bfct)nittcd IV, in^cm ftc ^un{ct)cn /ian^cd' un^ /icobfd)ĂĽt;
bic (Brenne ĂĽbcrfd^ritt.
Dn ^cn ^Cagen vom S. bis )o. (Dhobcr haben in ^en genannten ^ibfd)nitten ^ie ^Heeresgruppen
Mc als „3one \" be3eid)neten (Gebietsteile im a^eiteren X>ormarfd) crreid)t, irobei eine
Heeresgruppe unter ^FĂĽhrung ^es ^Penerals ^er Infanterie fii\l aus ^em CPau ^ie^cr^onau
^UMfd)en /^un^enburg unb fUa a. ^. Zhava foirie vinfd)en 5Drofen^orf unb Vlcwl^iitvi^ bie
ehemalige beutfd) . tfci)eito ^ flou^arifd)e (Brenne ĂĽberfct)ritten l^at. Kur^ i\^ bit ITIelbung bes
Oberfommanbos ber Wchrmaci)t vom 9. Oftober, )9 Uhr: „Unfere Gruppen haben ihre
^ages^iele erreid)t."
^Im )o.(DFtober irar fo feas gefamte im ^Ibfommen vom 29. September feftttelettte Gebiet
befe^t. » ' y j
Dnsgefamt gehorten ^u ben einriicfenben vCruppcn ^ehn ^Irmeeforps mit annähernd breif^ig
^ivi^tonen. ^ia^ bic »^alfte biefer iDivifionen waren motorifterte ober pan;erbiviftonen.
:^(u(;erbem iraren nid)t geringe Kräfte bereitgejleUt für ben immerhin möglid)en\t'an, baf. bie
vC(d)ect)en ober ^eile von ihnen ben fricblid)en ifinmarfd) (Porten unb bamit dnc friegs'
maf;igc (Operation nötig geit>orben wäre.
^ie^^um ♦irinmarfd) bej^immten vCeile bes Speeres waren )d)on feit längerer 3eit ausbilbungs*
maf;ig auf bcn Kampf um 23efej>igungen vorbereitet; er wĂĽrbe als befonberes ^lusbilbungs'
gebiet betrieben. :aie Waffen, befonbers Infanterie, Pioniere unb pan^ert'ampfwagen, hatten
)id) uifammen mit bcr Artillerie bis in alle »Einzelheiten mit biefcr Kampfweife vertraut
gemad)t.
^ie ganje VlVlt l^at bcn reibungslos unb wie ein Uhrwerf ablaufenben ^Einmarfd) mit
etaunen, Anerkennung — felbn^verj^anblid) teilweife aud) mit gemifd)ten (Befühlen — ver^
folgt unb begutad)tet.
^ic Gruppen aUer Waffengattungen hatten bei bem ^Einmarfd) aud) förperlid) erheblid)e
ÂŁcijlungen auf^uweifen. Dn bem oft bergigen (Belaube hatte es befonbers bit Infanterie
fd)wcr; benn immer wieber würbe aus bem fa<^ kriegsmäßigen »Einmarfd) eine ^^^icr in einem
^orf ober einer Ă–tabt, hei ber ein parabemaj^iges Auftreten ber vCruppc notwenbig war.
23aum^ unb anbere Bperren, bic von ben Z^(i)ed)en angelegt waren, ^rĂĽcf en* unb Btrat^cn-
fprengungen mu|;ten ĂĽberwunben, j^cile, oft fd)led)te unb furvenreid)e StraĂźen, hohe paflfe
muĂźten pafftert werben. Unter einem Kegen von Blumen, UUnn, KoĂź unb .^al^r^eug
gcfd)mĂĽcft, fo jogen bie beutfd)en Bataillone, Batterien unb Bd)wabronen ein unb (lanben
pĂĽnftlid) uir vorgefd)riebenen 3eit mit ihren Portierungen unb ^^elbwad)en auf ben vor*
gcfd)riebcnen planen.
Aud) hierbei wirb jeber ber 3ahlreid)en Kameraben, bie babei waren, fein eigenes »Erleben
i)aben, fein Erlebnis, bas ihm beffer als alles anbere ben Sinn biefer €age nargemad)t hat:
mag es bas llad)eln eines jungen nTabd)ens, ber ^änbebrucf einer alten ,^rau, bie Umarmung
eines kleinen Kinbes gewefen fein. X>ielleid)t war es ber Augenblicf, in bem feine ^Truppe,
er felbn^ ben ^iiif, ĂĽber bie ehemalige Keid)sgren.;e fe^te, ober bas Erlebnis ber V^ad^t, wo er als
cinfamer ,\'elbpo(>en an ber neuen Keid)sgrenze <^anb, in bas iDunfel <>arrte unb ben Bd)laf
feiner Kameraben unb ber wieber ins Xeid) heimgekehrten X>olfsgenojfen in ben Dörfern unb
©tabten hinter ihm bewad)te.
Aber nid)t nur biejenigcn, bie biefe ^agc bes Einmarfd^es erlebt haben, fotten von ber Er*
innerung bes Jahres }93$ auf immer gepacft werben. Aud) bie Kameraben, bie vom Sommer
bis in ben Spatherbjl an ben Befej^igungswerfen mit eigener t^^anb gearbeitet haben, unb bie
oft in behelfsmäßigen Unterkünften unb mit perfönlid)en Entbehrungen aller Art ihren ^ien\i
tun muĂźten, haben fĂĽr ein groĂźes :^iel ihre pflid)t getan. Aud) biejenigen Kameraben, bie
vieĂĽei&ft ĂĽberhaupt nid)t aus ihrer (Barnifon fort waren unb bis ^u il)rcr Entladung il^ren
taglid)en ^ien\i erfĂĽllen muĂźten, mĂĽjjen wiffcn, bap aud) fie an bem (Beiingen biefer in ber
(Befd)id)te ^eutfd)lanbs fo bebeutungsvollen Ereigniffe ihren Anteil hatten. ITTag eine Armee
nod) fo groĂź unb jahlreid) fein, es fommt auf jeben ein;;elnen an, unb gleid)gĂĽltig, wo er (leht,
er bleibt — wenn aud) ein kleines — fo bod) ein wid)tiges Kabd)en am größten Uhrwerf. Bein
Ausfall, fein X>erfagen laĂźt es ungleid)maĂźig gehen.
derjenige, ber )93$ ben grauen Kocf getragen hat, wirb, folange er lebt, mit Stol^ unb ^f reube
bavan ^urücfbenfen fönnen. ^e mehr er ftd) von ben Ereigniffen entfernt, be^o flarer wirb
ihm werben, ba^ er mitgeholfen hat, einen ^ahrtaufenbe alten ^raum bes beutfd)en X>olfes
ZU erfĂĽllen:
bie Bd)affung (BroĂźbeutf d)lanb!
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Calcutta t2 ^Xndia.)
The Inequality of States
A STUDY OP THE SM ALLER POWER IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Ăźv DAVID VITAL Umversity of Sussex. This book is the first systematic consideration of
the Problems which face the small State in its international relations. Dr. Vital analyzes the
piimary problems faced by small powers as a result of their limited resources. cons.dermg
their implications for foreign and defense affairs. He then examines the poss.biht.es of natmnal
polici^hich are open to such States: passive, active, and defensive. «4.80
W OXFORD "W UNIVERSITY W PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016
PU(ue mentum Tat American Political Scibnci Review whe« wriling to advertisers
704
look up INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOC,
LONDON 1920 FOW; and Laws of '/Var at Sea.
C kISTIANA IvOb Uv\i of Beliiyerence. Neutrality.
Berlin 1906 Neutrality,
Vienna 1926 8, Stockholm 1924 :adopted Statute for proposed Intl Penal Court
1 1 1
Hague 1921, -BHeeft6-Ay#e6-irViiĂĽ- POW
Buenos aires 192.2 CHEMICaL WARFaHE
Bpest 1^34
Luzern 1952 State Imrnunity
also look up : Warsaw 1928 Extradition
Paris 1^36
Amsterd. 1938
Cambridge 1946
also look up :
)
)
) Civilians
)
1953
1962
1964 Tokyo
1 1
'^ar'non. Your quotntion fro • ,e -^-.^J^^mif^^'^--^-'' -^^ interssting.
^^ '^5^.: c^Tg^tivc s< «r it:,i octicn is any one v,as invaded--the
^i^ ov those thot caro to i: •^l^^''''''
^. i I 4.1.* ^.\c5 riMp^'^ratior teils about if.aiso
•A >r,r i - u iiA-av.A"" Arbor.t'ich 48i04 aH after thot
906 Ferdai. Torace.Cha lott.svine.^ ...>0o. sincersU.
It was good to hoar ror, you. .^ quincy V.TJGITr.
f
r
SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS
Being a Discourse on the Origins & Development of the First Principles of Ameri-
can Government— Populär Sovereignty, Natural Rights, & Balance & Separation
of Powers
By PaulK.Conkin
A noted historian examines the meanings of key moral and political doctrines
underlying American government in a study distinguished for its erudition and
Vision.
256 paj
THE PAPERS OF GENERAL LUCIUS D. CLAV
Germany 1945-1949
Edited by Jean Edward Smith
Clay's recently declassified papers from the years of his military governorship of
Germany will be invaluable to those seeking a reevaluation of the postwar years
and the origins of the Gold War. (A puhUcation of the Institute of Gernmn
[Studies, Indiana ĂĽniversity]
,216 pages, 2 vols., index. $35.00
Afl/k
ORALITY AND VIETNAM
The Peace Militants and the Courts
By John F. Bannan and Rosemary S. Bannan
An analysis of the trials of six groups of peace militants, including the Berrigan;
Dr. Spock, and four lesser-known cases, with interviews with the war resisters
and their judges.
288 pages, index $10.00
CAPTIVE CAPITAL
Colonial Life in Modern Washington
By Sam Smith
A Washington Journalist reveals the truth about life inside "the monument," de-
scribing the city's growth, neighborhoods, schools, police, and political leaders
and presenting a compelling case for statehood for Washington, D.G.
320 pages, photos, index $8.50
THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF PEASANTS
A Study of an Egyptian Community
By Iliya F. Harik
A leading authority on political and social change in the Middle East analyzes its
effects on an Egyptian village, viewing his subject in the broad context of evolu-
tionary change. {International Development Research Center, Studies in Develop-
ment No. 8)
320 pages, index $12.50
INDIANA ĂśNIVERSITY PRESS
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NE\A/ BOOKS FROM
A.W.SIJTHOFF
P.O.B.S6 LEIDEN THE NETHERUAMDS
KALSHOVEN, F.
Belligerent reprisals
Pr6face par Jean Pictet
Pub. March 1971
XV, 386pages. ClothDfl. 45.—
Scientific collection of the Henri
Dunant Institute no. I.
ISBN 90 218 9051 8
Please circulate to:
READERSHIP: Graduate students and scholars of public international law and
politics.
CONTENTS- The purpose of this study is to examine whether, and to what extent
belligerent states are free, as a matter of law, to have recourse to reprisals con-
sisting in an intentional infringement of the law of armed conflict. In the first
chapter the concept of belligerent reprisals is placed, both historically and from
a systematic point of view. in the context of the general notion of reprisa s and,
even wider of international law and the sanctions processes forming part ot it
The second and third chapter s are devoted to an examination of the attitudes taRen,
and the rules developed, with respect to belligerent reprisals by the various
Conferences and other international bodies involved in the periods prior to the
First and Second World Wars, respectively. The fourth chapter deals with the
British measures of reprisal taken in the Second World War in 1939 and 1940, m
the context of economic warf are against Germany and her allies. Other reprisals,
or alleged reprisals taken by belligerents in that war and involving such matters
as indiscriminate bombardment of the enemy population and the kiUing of Pr^soners
of war are examined in chapter V. The developments after the Second World War
are dealt with in chapter VI: war crimes trials involving the pleaof belligerent
reprisals achievements and so far unsuccessful attempts in the tield ot the
codification and development of the law of armed conflicts. The last chapter,
finally, summarizes the results of these enquiries.
AUTHOR: Frits Kalshoven, reader in international law at the University of Leyden.
/
XVin HURWB^CJ AAR CRIMW â– . TRIAL-. (21) PRISD 28/6/49
The "Winl'^trl93 Ca3e% so called bac-^use airong tba 21 defoncl -
nnts wer« three of Hitler '3 csblnet mini st ^rs ( Darre, Sclrrerln
von Kro3lgk,and L rrrer9)f38verpl top functlrn rlĂźs of th^
Foreign Office (Includlng ^nst von Wel/fzsaecker, St te Sacre-
Porelsn : 'nl-?t'3r ^^„«.v «« 4-v,^
tary umer/Rlbbentrop who was 3.3ntence^. to deeth \n ttie
Ooorlng Trlal); ntrbMSsadora; Otto Dietrich , Germ ny's ''Pro3s
Chief"; Ernst Bohle, Chief of the "Porslgn D-^onTtnon of tha
NgZl P".rty(thlch Department wn3 in Charge of propagat5 n of
Nozisr abroad)? KwM Puhl,Vlc8 Prnslclent of the Rolcv Bank!
anö 3ev3ral hoMers of top govv nm.--^ntal econo-!c po^itlons,
Iri oid't^on to t-vo 53 G-nnsrals and a ban e r, Thl? v/ar, f- e
larg=.3t and llng^st of all N .rnVerg oases^laatlng frok Nov-
ember 1947 until Aorll 1949 .It brought to llght the gr-at^at
numbsr of -op secrot docum-jnta »ospscllly rel^tln^ to t^e
diplorr tlc actlvitl'^a in B3Tlln,«nd betweon Berlin -n- v rloua
Oerm-n ^.b aaies abroad, arxi to the Nazi "Hew Ord r" -Alch ^^a"
in ^.uroPe
bu'lt up/iurlr« th© war.
Bro.dly apoaklng, the c e/ invdlved ront of the dipl " fc
arü polltlcal,inä m ny of the econotrlc prepartlons fo- the
varloua G^r-^n .^resalons.and Tor the r^lda-snread 11 'egal
"rogr-TS c-rled ot durlng the wsr - ranging from the Inv "^-"on
of Boh-m5a/'/orivl- In M -rch 1^39, to econo-rlc spoltlon of Prance
and B-lg1um,th9 "lyncb^ng" of Alliaci avlator3,the mur-^ r ir^
111-treatment of 4111 -1 nrlsonora of w<»r,th3 il ve 1 bor prcgrnr
in Russla nd eise vhere.ond vhe deoortat' on of Eungarlan «»ewT,
^hrougv- t>ie Q^rran airba lor In Buiapont,to 0«rran concentra-
tion c m^s In Pol nd. The Judgment In thla ca-e (more than 800
\
. vnr^n-berig. Judgir«nt (apnrt fror tve "aeerlni:
pogea long) 13 t>ie only TTurnber^ig o 8«^ , ., „
., V, ..f .t^ nt3 r^ei^ fou-M ^uUt .not only of /ar
^ . «r rr^^rrPT qff^lnst *^eace-
^ Crlr^' «g inst Hu-<in1ty.but of Crime, ag m
It ^ou^c^ that flv. of be accuaad Gor, an
, .,,e' 0 tM 'n u leashlng .gsras.We war ...'chV as
nnd lcno-.7lngly Partie n t...a n , ^ _, ,,
* *^«xa«^«t««x the GoerlBB Ju^-S'^entst -s . 1.
tH» "<iuorom9 crlro." ■*^„
^^ y. r^ nov^rbsfore b >-n a war c uslrg
BUonceJh22i- J"^* a3th.reh.novr
^^ â– . M.n aif-erlng m i ieaths ^. rli-^ World -n-
^,. ^««^itl^3 witn9^38d durlng i-,3 0 h ä thcr-
II. o" 1-a'^lng to thc atrocitl.3
, .„, 1 d -tr^ni for the cunlshffi^nt. of
r,^.j.rr ^'^forc >..3en such a unlv-:^r3 1 a .rr rti i , \ , ,
,,.1 1u3tlc^| and the Nu^n^^g trl«!-^
,/ . „i t a bigre^'t tri Is of t^ls ty.e (whlle h^r/re <^
â– . , -,-rt" of the -orl-i.) alt.hnu#
o^ ,. IT.r on.:. .vare hold m rrm.y Tt- ox
,, „>^ r. o^ . r.on3 wert, tri^d ^n Mr -
cert-'n dlf-T-nt vi -r;3 er. axpr^sse ,^ ' \ .
.ua^tion-^ t e h..3-c ^^^
,.» -^ar is - tjunUih blo Internat^oma cr.r. ,
ijint *b9 laaa '"^ customs oi a. ,
^,^. .X^^.«. i^-8«-er '09 oerson. ln.1ct-d in «urnb.rg.5 co
a.u...a ^,i«ti-:r./^.^ ^-'W %^r w:^'?d^ ^.ocoe.ings »g.inst 5 wer.,s^
«^^d "o- r^-nona of b^id he .t^.Of the ra f^rr», t
. .«n to v.ry^ng prlr^on 3^l«*PH«9e^23
3P wara ao ;ult ad.lO^ aa-tencaa to ^,^ry-ng
to iife ir-prlsonr-nt.and 30 to deatb.
(VUĂĽ)
(v)
lay 6.1968
Mr. Stefan Kapsch
Dept.of Polltlcal öclenoe
Unlv.of Minne s ctg
Mlnneapolis, i-lnn. 55^55
Dear
Kapsch.
I am returnlng to your friendly letter
/^f' H«fc>» ?^. reiTPirdlm: ^'ir, Aldana's P^I.D. Thesls,
?HS STERNlTlSriSpONSIBIUrY OsSFATES â– ^ĂĽi. INJĂśRIn^
TO ALIHJvS. .. • j
T wonder whether you would be good enough and
let me have the name and address of the Professor who
acted as rhesls advlser to Mr. Aldana; or.ln oase thls
ts not posslble. whether you would advlse me of the present add
ress of lir, Aldana,
My Intention is to find o'ot whether the Thesis
deals with any aspect of war crimes and orimes a^ainst
peace, - the subjects of my present work.
With thanks in advance .
Sineerely ,
John Fried
AdJ.Frof . of Political :^cience
\>
t\
t
UNIVERSITY OF
'l/WnMSOtd
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL AKTS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE • MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA 55455
February 26, 1968
Professor John H. E. Fried
Department of Political Science
The City College
The City University of New York
New York, New York 10031
Dear Professor Fried:
Thank you f or your inquiry of February 19 regarding
Mr. Manuel Aldana's doctoral dissertation "The International
Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens in Recent Inter-
national Law." Unfortunately, the Department does not have a copy of
this dissertation so we are unable to comply with your request. The
copies in the collections of the University of Minnesota Library
and the Graduate School are restricted to local circulation. Non-
local circulation of Minnesota doctoral dissertations completed after
1951 is handled through University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor,
Michigan, 48106. You could obtain a copy of Mr. Aldana's thesis from
them although there is a charge for their Services.
Thank you again for your interest. Please feel free to
write to me if I can be of any further assistance.
Sincerely,
Stefan Kapsch
Administrative Assistant
SKimcc
^Ăź ^f4'*
V 'iV
CHINA
.E OF DIENBIENPHU
^nts of Last Year at Marienbad (and other
?w wave") characterize this narrative of
3Ugh China with 28-year-old Brigitte, "her
throat of a dove." Their 1964 visit, which
|aths, ended in two. Neither could endure
Mis of constant surveillance.
\hed in tears: 'Why do they pretend to
\ US, when it is not trueV I could only
l/iey are Chinese. All their declarations
\an indiscriminate and irrational mis-
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It the China, "the madhouse," they
i hear, or about the sufferings of
ig mistre'is, Roy brings to his
idor of a true novelist. The
irhtening. $7.95
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ts Bush. $4.95
by HANS HELLMUT KffiST
author of THE NIGHT OF THE GENERALS
"A German veteran's group. Six raen meet regularly. They have
no victories to celebrate, but theyVe elevated to a mystique
the desperate comradeship of their last days in Hitler^s army.
It gradually becomes apparent that more than this binds them:
the memory of one of their last acts together during the war.
It transcended the brutalities of battle. A teenage prostitute,
evidently a willing one, had nevertheless been killed and the
murder framed on an unpopulär comrade whose death had
been engineered. When the supposedly dead soldier tums
up alive, the reaction goes f rom comic fear to savage guilt.
Süperb storytelling."- XirÄi/s Service. "A cunning
suspenso exercise at the expense of Germany's guilty
men grips as a witty and strongly plotted melo-
drama/'-TĂ„e Observer (London). "A good
story, a good book and highly recom-
mended,** -Library Journal $5.95
0.
(D
^
AT ALL BOOKSTORES
^.^gtätMegmiü>*ii>i6^
ir ftiw'iiii<i^iiiftiOT w jWtMiit»^^'^*'^'**'**^**' *'*'^^>'^^'*^'^^*^'^*^'^*^^
The untold story
of Jewish resistance
TODAY we halt a busy world for a moment
of truth.
We are proud to call to your attention
a new book which could end forever the per-
petuation of the final Nazi atrocity, their big-
gest lie : that the Jews were cowards.
They Fought Back is the untold, almost
unknown story of how a People, doomed by Hit-
ler, and deserted by the allies, declared their
own Underground war — and all alone, day af ter
day, carried out successf ul acts of Sabotage and
organized armed uprisings inside virtually
every city, ghetto, and concentration camp of
occupied Europe.
They Fought Back is the result of years
spent piecing together a great truth which lay
buried in neglected archives - and in the living
memories of men. It is the first public presenta-
tion of extensive documented evidence that the
Jews fought back.
It is a missing page in history.
A Dead Sea Scrolls of the Holocaust
Why the truth has taken so long
For a quarter of a Century, most
Americans — even most Jews —
have quietly accepted the myth of a
martyrdom without protest. Why?
Because until this book, the world
has had to depend, in whole or in
part, on Information that was either
incomplete or imfactual. For exam-
ple: historians and scholars who
relied on German sources alone
found little evidence of resistance.
And for this reason: the Nazis de-
liberately hid the fact that there
was a network of Jewish resistance,
They Fought Back, based on Yuri
Suhl's interviews with actual par-
ticipants in the revolts, an exhaus-
tive examination of hitherto
untranslated monographs, and au-
thenticated historical material,
denies the Nazis their final victory
— the incineration of memory.
A few of many who
fought bock
Alexander Pechersky and his
men, who organized the break-
out of 600 prisoners from the
Sobibor extermination camp in
Poland. Ten Nazi officers were
quietly killed (Jewish camp
tailors and shoemakers hid
hatchets under their clothes and
invited their "clients" in for a
final "fitting"). The successf ul
revolt, permanently ended Oper-
ation of the death camp.
NiuTA TErrELBOiM (the legend-
ary Warsaw heroine known as
"Little Wanda with the braids") .
She was a slight, innocent girl
who often wore a flowered ker-
chief on her head. Her special-
ties: executing Nazi officers,
smuggling Jews out of the War-
saw Ghetto, and blowing up es-
pecially vital communication
lines to the Eastem Front.
David Szmülewski — a Polish
Jew, prisoner at Auschwitz. He
hid high above the rafters of a
death Compound and took for-
bidden photographs of a sight no
,one was supposed to witness.
These photographs were smug-
gled out of the Camp via tjie
Cracow Underground to provide
the first graphic evidence for the
outside world. (Every photo-
graph is in this book.)
"Treblinka" The true story of
how Jewish prisoners - by them-
selves — carried out the destruc-
tion of one of Hitler's most
notorious death camps.
Herbert Baum, leader of "The
I Baum Group" — Here is the very
first account in English of the
' incredible activities of an Under-
ground of young Jewish fighters
who operated in Berlin until
1942. (One of their most spec-
tacular feats: entering Joseph
Goebbels* prize Propaganda
show, "Das Soviet Paradis", and
setting it aflame.)
A Publishing note
Even before publication, They
Fought Back sold out in its first
printing. (We believe it will be-
come one of the milestone books of
modern times.) A new second print-
ing is selling out rapidly, although
there are still copies available to-
day at local bookstores. But may
we suggest, to be sure of reserving
your copy and getting the fastest
delivery, that you please either call
your bookstore or write to Crown
Publishers, Dept NW, 419 Park
Avenue South, New York City,
10016. Phone: MU 5-8550.
«
First tributes
Itnpressive and startling.*'
—New York Times
"Read Yuri SahPs book! . . . it
once and for all refutes the ac-
cepted thesis." — ELIE WIESEL
"A proioundly stirring book.*'
— SAUL BELLOW
THEY
FOUGHT
BACK
Edited by YURI SUHL,
poet, novelist, biographer ^^
$5.95, now at your bookstore '^'^^/7ffU/H
fWk^^iia^i(k:itmi^Uii44Mk'
It
THE Nl
Staatsmänner
•
— —TJB
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BERNARD & GRAEFE VERLAG FĂśRWEHRWESEN
Staatsmänner
und Diplomaten bei Hitler
Vertrauliche Aufzeichungen ĂĽber Unterredungen
mit Vertretern des Auslandes. 1939-1941.
Herausgegeben und erläutert von Andreas Hillgruber. Bernard & Graefe
Verlag fĂĽr Wehrwesen, Frankfurt am Main. 1967. 699 Seiten. Mit 30 Ab-
bildungen auf Kunstdruckpapier. Ganzleinen DM 58,—
DaĂź Hitler es meisterhaft verstand, die Massen zu beherrschen, ist un-
umstritten. Wie aber gelang es Hitler, ausländische Staatsmänner und
Diplomaten in seinen Bann zu ziehen? Wie erreichte er es, zur fĂĽhrenden
Gestalt einer Mächtegruppe zu werden, die der nach dem Ersten Welt-
krieg aufgerichteten Ordnung den Kampf ansagte?
Die aufsehenerregende Veröffentlichung der Protokolle seiner Bespre-
chungen mit Staatsmännern und Diplomaten der verbündeten und neu-
tralen Staaten — teilweise vorabgedruckt in der Tageszeitung DIE
WELT — zeigt Hitlers Hintergründigkeit in der Verhandlungsführung,
seine Taktik im Umgang mit VerbĂĽndeten und Umworbenen, aber auch
seine unumstößlich festliegenden ideologischen und machtpolitischen
Grundsätze.
So bilden die Protokolle, die aus den Aufzeichnungen des Chefdolmet-
schers Paul Schmidt und des Vortragenden Legationsrats Walter Hewel
stammen, eine Primärquelle ersten Ranges. Sie umfaßt Gespräche mit
Mussolini, Ciano, Franco, Petain, Laval, Darlan, Molotow, Matsuoka,
Oshima, Antonescu, Horthy, Dahlems, Hedin, Quisling, dem GroĂźmufti
von Jerusalem, dem König der Belgier Leopold III., der italienischen
Kronprinzessin Marie-Jose, dem amerikanischen Vizepräsidenten der
General Motors Corporation, Mooney, dem amerikanischen Unterstaats-
sekretär Sumner Welles u. a.
Jeder Aufzeichnung ist eine kurze EinfĂĽhrung in die jeweilige Situation,
in der die Unterredung geführt wurde, vorangestellt. Diese „Texte" ver-
binden zugleich die insgesamt 99 Aufzeichnungen. Noten und Anmer-
kungen zu den Aufzeichnungen sowie ein Personenregister erleichtern
ihr Verständnis.
Ein zweiter Band mit den Dokumenten aus der Zeit zwischen dem 1.1.
1942 und dem 31. 12. 1944 ist in Vorbereitung.
Ix^'
'S-?
Die letzte Begeynun« Hitlers mit cne.n --'-";-''-;f '"r Besud;'''d;s' fa';;::;;>^tn
Cr„Ren Politik weitreichende Bedeutuny ukc,n , "" f _liUer versudite, Idp.n inr
^r:;^nS'^!;:;:;:^tten S^llf ntr^:.^^:^:^' ..r.ar.s.,s,..e.
An> A„end des ,2. U . .940 <,a,> R,i>.,entrop '«l^;l^^tJ^i: , rei^erini'st::
^p'r, ^sTsä-rri^nroret^c ■^,f .rX":tp, » u..
/f''
•K-^.
-' V-
:-|'
>.
"te
V -„
\
^*; *
.-.-«Ji*.- -
Weitere BĂĽcher zur Zeitgeschichte
ANDREAS HILLGRUBER
Hitlers Strategie
Politik und Kriegführung 1940/41. 1965. 704 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 78 —
Hillqrubers Budi . . . bietet in der kriegsgeschichtlidien Forschung ĂĽber den ZweUen
Weltkrieg eine bisher kaum erreichte Leistung, fĂĽr die ihm hohe Anerkennung gebĂĽhrt.
Adolf Heusinger im Spiegel
ANDREAS HILLGRUBER / GERHARD HĂśMMELCHEN
Chronik des Zweiten Weltkrieges
1966 VIII 196 Seiten. Paperback DM 19,80. Ganzleinen DM 28,—
„Ein wertvolles Hilfsmittel, das dem Leser die k^i^g^g^^^^^^/^^^^^/^^^tTp^^^^
Kriegsschauplätzen des Zweiten Weltkrieges nadi dem neuesten Stand der Forschung
in konzentrierter Form darbietet." Allgemeine Schweizer MilitärzeitschrUi
* --rr-V^- k
Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Herausqegeben von Percy Ernst Sdiramm in Zusammenarbeit mit Andreas Hillgruber.
WalthefHubatsch und Hans-Adolf Jacobsen. 1961-1965. Vier Bände m sieben Banden.
6656 Seiten, 9 Karten, 4 Tafeln. Halbleder. Preis des Gesamtwerks DM 696,—
Das vielleicht verblĂĽffendste Charakteristikum des OKW-Tagebuches ist seine Objek-
i'ivität . . . einer der wichtigsten Beiträge zur Kriegsgeschichte." ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^.^^^^^
PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM
Hitler als militärischer Führer
Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen aus dem Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehr-
macht 2., durchgesehene Auflage 1965. 207 Seiten. DM 12,80
Auf Grund seiner Erkenntnisse hat der Göttinger Historiker eine Studie geschrieben
;on der wir glauben, daĂź eine neue Ă„ra der Kriegsgeschichtsdeutung mit ihr beginnen
sollte."
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
PAUL SCHMIDT
Statist auf diplomatischer BĂĽhne 1923-1945
Erlebnisse des Chefdolmetschers im Auswärtigen Amt mit den Staatsmännern Europas.
10 Auflage 1964. 607 Seiten. Paperback DM 16,80
Fr war nur Statist aber er dachte selbständig, und was er gesehen hat, weiß er mit
demlockenen Humor d^Be^^ zu erzählen. So entstand ein Buch das dein Laien
ein^ bunte FĂĽlle spannender Gesdiichten, dem politisch-historisch Interessierten un-
sdiätzbares Material bietet." Süddeutsche Zeitung
WERNER MASER
Die FrĂĽhgeschichte der NSDAP
Hitlers Weg bis 1924. 1965. 496 Seiten. 13 Abbildungen. Ganzleinen DM 29,80
Werner Maser, ein SchĂĽler von Niekisdi und Sdioeps, hat hier ein Budi geschrieben,
äas in seiner Objektivität und Akribie nicht seinesgleichen hat.
Ihre Buchhandlung:
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,h'77
W. PAUL GORMLEY
The University of Tulsa
The Procedural Status
of the Individual
before International
and
Supranational Tribunals
PoKOMTo.
\o MN o\
MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NIJHOFF
PUBLISHER — THE HAGUE
The most important Single Factor in guaranteeing the eftective pro-
tection of human rights - including economic and property interests -
isthat private individuals and groups be capable of maintaining a judicial
action against any sovereign State causing them injury. Thus, individuals
must possess the necessary locus standi at both the regional and international
levels. A private individual must be able to prosecute an action before an
international tribunal - in his own name - against an offending govern-
ment, particularly his own. Unfortunately, this necessary right of action
was not recognised under traditional international law. It is only very
recently, since the adoption of the European Convention of Human
Rights and the Estabhshing Treaty of the Common Market, that non-
governmentai entities have achieved locus standi betöre international courts.
The author, therefore, advances the conclusion that it is no longer valid
to hold that only sovereign States are procedura! subjects of international
law. Nevertheless, it must - tragically - be conceded that individuals
do not en joy the same rights as do Member States. Starting with the propo-
sition that the individual is a subject of the Law, this book not only
analyzes prior examples supporting this viewpoint, but it concentrates
on the more important shortcomings, primarily thosecurrently existing
within the legal Systems of the Council of Europe, the European Economic
Community, and the United Nations. Further, recommendations are
offered as to the specific improvements that must be made in order to
more realistically implement the natural law rights of individuals.
About the author: Born April 24, 1926; Studied at San Jose State College (A.B., 1949),
University of Southern California (M.A., 1951), University of Denver (Ph.D. in
Speech, 1952), George Washington University Law School (LL.B., 1957, LL.M., 1958),
the Hague Academy of International Law, summers 1 960-1961 , 1963-1964; Ford Foun-
dation Law Teacher Fellow, New York University Law School (1961-1962); Assistant
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law (1958-1961); Assistant to Associate
Professor of Law, University of South Dakota (1962-1965); from 1965 Associate
Professor, University of Tulsa.
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Abridged)
I. Implementing man's natural rights: the developing international law
IL The development of procedural remedies
III. The inter-war period
IV. The efforts of the United Nations
V. The Council of Europe: Political unification
VI. European economic organizations
VII. Conclusions
1966. XVI and 206 pp. roy. 8vo.
Guilders 27.— =$7.50
MARTINUS NIJHOFF — PUBLISHER — THE HAGUE
YEARBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Commission and European Court of Human Rights
*
ANNUAIRE DE LA CONVENTION EUR0PÂŁENNE
DESDROITS DE L'HOMME
Commission et Cour Europeeniies des Droits de VHotnme
Vol. I: 1955-1956-1957. 1959. XIV and 276 pp. 28.- = S 7.80
Vol. II: 1958-1959 1960. XV and 684 pp.
VoL III: 1960. 19G1. XV and 773 pp.
Vol. IV: 1961. 1962. XV and 682 pp.
Vol. V: 1962. 1963. XV and 400 pp.
VoL VI: 1963. 1965. XV and 849 pp.
Vol. VII: 1964. 1966. XIX and 563 pp.
All volumes are cloth boimd.
49.50
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79.—
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ANNUAIRE EUROPfiEN/
EUROPEAN YEARBOOK
Puhlie sous les auspices du Conseil de UEurope /
Published wider the auspices of the Council of Europe
1. (1948-1953)
2. (1954). 1956.
3. (1955). 1957.
4. (1956). 1958.
5. (1957). 1959.
6. (1958). 1959.
7. (1959). 1960.
8. (i960). 1961.
9. (1961). 1962.
10. (1962). 1963.
11. (1963). 1965.
12. (1964). 1966.
XX and 727 pp.
XX and 534 pp.
XXI and 708 pp.
XX and 755 pp.
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W. PAUL GORMLEY
The Unlversity of Tulsa
The Procedural Status
of the Individual
before International
and
Supranational Tribunals
The US $ price is based on the
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It is suhject to change without notice
\o MN 0\
MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE
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r,^ 1/Wä_^ Uji ~ T-f^o*^" <^ 9-
Uji .'V
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Weitere Bücher zur Militärgesdiichte
Joachim Kramarz
Claus Graf Stauffenberg offwi^r^
15. November 1907 bis 20. Juli 1944 Das Leben emes Offiziers.
1965. 245 Seiten. 13 Abb. Ganzleinen DM 24,80
Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
(WehrmachtfĂĽhrungsstab) Andreas
Hrsq von Percy Ernst Schramm in Zusammenarbeit mit Andreas
HĂĽlaruber Walter Hubatsch und Hans-Adolf Jacobsen.
1^61 " 1965 Vier Bände in sieben Bänden. Halbleder. Preis des
Gesamtwerkes DM 696,—
Andreas Hillgruber
Hitlers Strategie
Politik und KriegfĂĽhrung 1940/41
1965. 715 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 78,—
^:s DeXr OHUierKorps in GeseUscha.t und S-t 1650 _ ^5
1965. 4., Ăśberarb. und erw. Aufl. 361 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 29,80
Handbudi zur deuts*en Mililärgesdiichle 1648 - 1939
Vel^^LtUcbung des Milit..gesa>*«ichen Forscbun^^^^^^^^^^^
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fäM ff. Erscheint in 8 Lieferungen. Gesamtumfang e wa 2000Se.tej^.
Preis des Gesamtwerkes in 2 Halblederbanden etwa DM 230, .
Subskriptionspreis ca. DM 176,—
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Zehn Jahre und zwanzig Tage ,^ i„
FrLerunnen des Befehlshabers der deutschen U-Boote .m
7 .In writkrtea (1965 aus dem Athenäum Verlag uber-
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T:rr6' Seutn aI; auf Kunstdruck. 1 Aussdrlagkarte. Ganz-
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Weitere Bücher zur Militärgeschichte
Joachim Kramarz
Claus Graf Stauffenberg
15. November 1907 bis 20. Juli 1944. Das Leben eines Offiziers.
1965. 245 Seiten. 13 Abb. Ganzleinen DM 24,80
Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
(WehrmachtfĂĽhrungsstab)
Hrsg von Percy Ernst Schramm in Zusammenarbeit mit Andreas
Hillgruber, Walter Hubatsch und Hans-Adolf Jacobsen.
1961 - 1965. Vier Bände in sieben Bänden. Halbleder. Preis des
Gesamtwerkes DM 696, —
Andreas Hillgruber
Hitlers Strategie
Politik und KriegfĂĽhrung 1940/41
1965. 715 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 78,—
D^f DeXJL'Joflizierkorps in Geseilschaft und Staat 1650-1945
1965. 4., Ăśberarb. und erw. Aufl. 361 Seiten. Ganzleinen DM 29,80
Handbuch zur deutschen Militärgeschichte 1648 — 1939
Veröffentlichung des Militärgeschichtlichen F«r^*^^g^^^7\"t;^"
Freiburg/Br. Herausgeber: Oberst i. G. Dr. Hans Me-r-We^^er.
1964 ff. Erscheint in 8 Lieferungen. Gesamtumfang etwa 2000 Seiten.
Preis des Gesamtwerkes in 2 Halblederbänden etwa DM 230.-.
Subskriptionspreis ca. DM 176,—
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Zehn Jahre und zwanzig Tage
Erinnerungen des Befehlshabers der deutschen U-Boote im
Zweiten Weltkrieg. (1965 aus dem Athenäum Verlag über-
nommen) 3.. durchges. Aufl. 1964. 491 Seiten. 5 Kartenskizzen im
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^
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(11
> •
'//.
LESEPROBE
gingen die Meinungen weit auseinander. Während Stein aus
patriarchalischer Sicht weniger gegen den Schlag mit dem Stock
an sich, als vielmehr gegen die bloĂźe WillkĂĽr des PrĂĽgelnden
eingestellt war, verfocht Gneisenau seinen Standpunkt höchst
nachdrücklich: Mit der Abschaffung der Prügelstrafe „ehrt sich
zugleich die Nation selbst, indem sie es ablehnt, Einrichtungen
zu dulden, die sie in den Augen anderer herabsetzt" 108).
Das Problem lag also darin, daĂź man allgemein lernen muĂźte, den
Begriff „Disziplin" zu sehen, ohne ihn mit der Prügel zu verbin-
den, und sich eine Armee vorzustellen, die sich nicht mehr in
erster Linie selbst bewachte, sondern aus freien Männern bestand
und die trotzdem funktionierte 109). Einer freien Persönlichkeit
gegenĂĽber muĂźte jede ZĂĽchtigung untersagt sein. Weder SpieĂź-
rutenlaufen noch Stubenexekutionen, weder öffentlicher Straf-
vollzug noch persönliche Schikane kamen als Programm für die
Aufrechterhaltung der Mannszucht in Frage. Der Soldat als kon-
kreter soziologischer Typus, der auf Grund seiner Stellung im
Staat entsprechend behandelt wurde, sollte bestätigen, daß das
Menschsein in der Uniform recht und billig war 110). Die Dis-
ziplinarstrafe verlagerte sich daher auf den Freiheitsentzug, der
den freien Mann härter traf als den Unfreien der Hieb.
Dieser Umbau dehnte sich auch auf die Gesamtlebensverhältnisse
aus, die nach der Rechtsordnung des 18. Jahrhunderts die Ab-
sonderung der Armee noch gefördert hatten. Straf- und Familien-
rechtwaren in die Militärgerichtsbarkeit einbezogen gewesen 111).
Nun prüften in langen Verhandlungen der Freiherr von Schrötter
und der Generalauditeur von Koenen, ob man den vollen Schritt
ins Neuland tun sollte. Die Entscheidung fiel am 19. 7. 1809 aus
allgemeinen und praktischen Erwägungen so aus, daß alle bürger-
lichen Angelegenheiten den Zivilgerichten ĂĽbertragen wurden,
während alle „Kriminal- und Injuriensachen" beim Militär ver-
blieben. Nur noch fĂĽr die Zeit des Dienstes war kĂĽnftig der
Bürger der Militärgerichtsbarkeit unterstellt, vor und nachher
unterlag er der zivilen. In dieser Regelung sah man einen glĂĽck-
lidien Kompromiß, weil die Straffälligkeit, sofern ihre Ahndung
108) Gneisenau — zit. Hoehn, R., 1944, S. 570
109) Ebda., S. 566 ff. — Schneider, H., Die Militärgeriditsbarkeit i. dt.
Heere von 1650 — 1933 in Wehrrechtl. Abhandlungen, Heft 4.
110) Hoehn, R., 1952, S. 256/297
111) S. Anm. 109 — auch 110
Hitler Was His Only Master
The Memoirs of Field-Marshal
KeiieU edited by Walter Görlitz,
translated by David Irving (Stein ö
Day. 288 pp. $7.95), contains top-
level revelations by Hitlers loyal
palĂĽdin. Louis L. Snyder, professor
of history at The City University of
New York, is author of "The War: A
Concise History, 1939-1945:'
By LOUIS L. SNYDER
ri^HIS book sliould be »equired read
* ing for our good friends of the British
gadfly school of historiography, who,
wben faced witb a cboice between fact
and witty fiction, invariably gravitate
toward the academic wisecrack. In tben
peculiarly perverse reasoning Adolf Hit-
ler and Na/i Germany are absolved ot
blame for the outbreak of World War II.
The pusher, Hitler, becomes the pushed,
and ridicule is directed against those
Allied statesmen who were outwitted by
the Wizard of Berchtesgaden.
If any further proof be needed to
show the bankruptcy of this view, it can
be found in these memoirs of Field-
Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. Hitler s Chief
of the German High Command between
1938 and 1945 reveals that, as early as
May 20, 1937, the FĂĽhrer issued a di-
rective commencing: "It is my unaltera-
ble decision to smash Czechoslovakia by
militaiy action in the near future.' In
the Summer of 1939 he had a timetable
for his military Operations. And Keitel,
who was in a position to know, stated it
plainly: "Hitler . . . staked everything
on the one card: war!"
Need there be further examples ot
the innocent FĂĽhrer being shoved into
countermeasures by incompetent Allied
diplomats? .
Keitel was second only to Hitler in
directing the German military machine
in the Second World War. Born into a
middle-class Hanoverian family of land-
owners, Keitel came from a region with
a strong anti-Prussian tradition, yet he
epitomized the Junker militarist-tall,
broad-shouldered, with monocle firmly
held in the left eye. Born in 1882, he
served as an efficient young officer dur-
ing World War I, in which he was seri-
ously wounded. He was posted to the
General Staff , and, in 1936, promoted to
lieutenant-general.
On February 3, 1938, after scandals
involving Field-Marshal Werner von
Blomberg (marriage to a lady of ques-
SW/March 5, 1966
tionable virtue) and Colonel-General
Freiherr von Fritsch (accusation of ho-
mosexuality), Hitler announced the re-
tirement of the top echelon of the
Reichswehr, and took over supreme com-
mand himself. He set up a new military
authority, the O.K.W. Oberkommando
der Wehrmacht, High Command of the
Armed Forces. Keitel was selected as its
Chief and remained in this post until
Hitler's suicide in 1945.
Keitel never feit adequate for his lofty
Position, but there is no question of his
loyalty and complete subservience to
Hitler. He was unpopulär among bis
comrades, who called bim "Yes-Keitel"
and "the nodding ass." Irreverent critics
went so far as to label Keitel "Lakaitel
from the German word Lakai-]ackey or
flunkey.
Flunkey or rfot, these memoirs are of
considerable historical importance. After
the editor's introduction on background
and career, the text gives Keitel's de-
scription of the Blomberg-Fritsch crisis
of 1938 with its spicy scandals; the
events leading to the annexations of
Austria and Czechoslovakia; the fateful
month of August 1939; and the cam-
paigns against Poland, the Low Coun-
tries, and France.
Additional chapters include an ac-
count of the planned invasion of Eng-
land (omitted from the German Version)
and an absorbing report on the attack
on Russia. Keitel describes Hitler's shift-
ing strategy and his increasingly hostile
treatment of bis generals, whom he
blamed for the Stalingrad disaster. Most
engrossing of all is Keitel's eyewitness
narrative of the last eighteen days of the
Third Reich. He remainccl in the be-
sieged bunker and saw the hysterical
FĂĽhrer conducting the Baltle (>f Berlin
with divisions that no longer existed.
The memoirs give additional evidence of
the crazy-quilt pattern inside the Nazi
hierarchy, with ringmaster Hitler Crack-
ing the whip and the cowed generals
reacting with Pavlovian reflexes.
In his apologia Keitel reveals ambiva-
lent feelings toward Hitler. "At the bot-
tom of my heart," he confesses, "I was
a loyal shield-bearer for Adolf Hitler."
He praises the FĂĽhrer's iron will, his
steadfastness, and his unrelenting sever-
ity in the Russian campaign, without
which "the Gei-man Army would ines-
capably and inevitably have suffered in
1941 the fate of [the French] in 1812."
On the other band, Keitel resented
the way he was treated by his master.
"1 was never peiTuitted to make deci-
sions: the FĂĽhrer had reserved that right
to himself even in seemingly trivial mat-
ters." "The FĂĽhrer cut me short and told
me what he thought and what his own
views were." "If he once got an idea in
his head, no man on earth could ever
shake bim out of it." At one point Keitel
speaks of facing up "to a demon like
that man." "That I would become the
victim of Hitler's unbridled dictatorship
. no human being could have foreseen."
Y
Field-Marshal Wilhelm Kei-
tel "as helpless as a habe.
»»
_ ET Keitel never rebelled against this
degrading treatment. An otherwise un-
distinguished Dr. Lehmann caughl the
triith with this remark: "Keitel is brave
enough to take on a lion in bare-fisted
combat; but faced with Hitler he is as
helpless as a habe."
Keitel's abject servility to Hitler
brought bim in 1945 before the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
on charges of participation in a conspir-
acy, crimes against peace, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity. He was
sentenced to death by hanging. He
wrote these memoirs while in prison dur-
in g the six weeks before his execution
on October 16, 1946. His last wish, to
be executed by firing squad instead of
hanging, was denied.
In an addemltm, editor Walter Gör-
litz presents the familiär argument that
the Nuremberg trials violated the West-
ern world's doctrine of mdlc poene sine
lege. He charges that the victors sat in
judgment on the vanquisbed. He pre-
sents sympathetically Keitel's defense
that "a soldier's cardinal virtue is obe-
dience," and Keitel remains to him "a
senior officer and gentleman." He finds
Keitel "an honorable man":
He was no longer concerned to haggle
and bargain for his own skin; his main
objective was to establish his honor,
and not only his personal honor; he
bclieved it was his duty to uphold the
honor of all German troops, because
he was too honest to admit that he had
frequently proved inadequate in his
defense of the traditional concept of
Prussian military honor.
The word "honor" seems stränge in
this context. It would have been far
more honorable for Keitel to refuse loy-
alty to a bestial hypomaniac. Or perhaps
there is a better word than "honor" to
describe stifF-necked, unflinching obedi-
ence in the service of barbarism. That
word might well be a kind of higher
"stupidity."
Mr. Görlitz, who is known for his ex-
cellent book The History of the German
General Staff, has pruned the material
by eliminating"historically unimportant"
passages not bearing on military matters.
The danger of this kind of editing is that
historians differ on what is essential and
what is of little consequence. The mem-
oirs would be far more valuable in tbeir
original State.
The translation is generally satisfac-
tory, although the translator, unfortu-
nately, leans toward such slangy clich^s
as "sure of their stuff," "beat around the
bush," and "to-ing and fro-ing."
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BOOK REVIEWS | 307
the scholarly development of her occasional insight. The covert dog-
matism of her intuitions prevents her from developing poUcy-rich aher-
natives, from which decision-makers might work.
After reading Mrs. Camps' book — a sequel to her Britain and the
European Community, 1955-1963 — one wonders why the Council on For-
eign Relations tolerates norms in the execution of its work which seem
neither to meet those of the contemporary scholar or those imperative to
creative and circumspect poUcy work.
Harold Guetzkow
Northwestern University
C
.^
Das Ende des Dritten Reiches: Die Deutsche Kapitulation 1945 hy
Reimer Hansen. Stuttgart, Ernst Klett, ip66. — 24y pp. 19.80
DM.
^ It is' difficult to find a parallel for the end of the Third Reich. German
j. historians have compared it with the catastrophe of the Thirty Years'
War, with the dissolution of the Holy Roman empire in 1806, and with
the end of the First World War; but the German Reich survived 1648,
1806 was a symbolical rather than a real turning point in history, mark-
ing a change that had already taken place, and in 1918 a regime was
destroyed but not the sovereignty of Germany as a whole. In contrast,
1945 marked the total destruction of a thousand years of history, an
absolute nadir that justified those Germans who described this fateful
year as Jahr Null.
At least, this is the view of Reimer Hansen, and because he feels this
way he has thought it important to write a detailed study of the last days
of the Hitler Reich, emphasizing the agonized attempts of German
political leaders to avoid the fate that their ambitions had made in-
evitable. In doing so, he has directed his attention principally to three
aspects of the story: the unconditional surrender policy of the Grand
Alliance, the vain attempts of Hitler's associates to make deals with their
antagonists in the days when Allied forces were converging on their
capital, and the regime of Admiral Doenitz and the way in which he
approached the question of capitulation.
Mr. Reimer points out that, once the Allies agreed upon the policy of
unconditional surrender (and he is interesting in his treatment of So-
viet ambivalence with respect to a policy that did not accord with their
interests until their troops entered Poland) there were no options left
to the Germans except capitulation or a hopeless fight to the end. Most
i
iW't*- V' CK
308 I POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
of his account is a description of mothlike flutterings against this flame
on the part of Hitler's paladins, like the well-known negotiations of
Himmler in Sweden. More interesting is his section on the Doenitz period,
which includes a uscful bibUographical essay, and which shows that, in
a hopeless position, Hitler's successor was able to eke out a few small ad-
vantages in the way in which the inevitable surrender was carried out,
saving about two million soldiers from captivity and arranging to have
West Holland, Norway, and Denmark surrendered without needless
bloodshed. On the other band, Mr. Hansen's picture of Doenitz is so
generous as to be uncritical. He seems willing even to believe that the
admiral knew nothing of the concentration camps until after he had
taken over from Hitler, although the capture of Buchenwald by the Al-
lies six weeks before that time had made its horrors known to all the
World.
Gordon A. Craig
Stanford University
The Development of Technical Education in France, 1500-1850 h\/
Frederick B. Artz. Cambridge, Mass., The Society for the History
of Technology and The M.I.T. Press, 1^66. — x, iji^ pp. $7.95.
France occupies a prominent place in the history of technical education.
Its Ecole des Fonts et Chaussees, founded in 1747, was the world's first
school of engineering. Its famed Ecole Polytechnique, a creation of the
Revolution, served as a model for scientific and engineering schools the
World over, notably in Germany and for early U.S. engineering schools
such as West Point and R.P.I. In this volume Professor Artz, who in
a long and fruitful career has made several notable contributions to
European political, cultural, and intellectual history, returns to a sub-
ject in which he has for long maintained an interest.
The book is divided into four substantial chapters dealing with, re-
spectively, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Age of En-
lightenment, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, and the Constitu-
tional Monarchy. Within each chapter, in addition to discussing the
distinctive feature of each era, the author treats systematically technical
education in elementary and secondary schools, trade schools and adult
education, advanced technical schools, and military and naval education.
He does not mention the universities, in which scientific study was al-
most as backward and neglected as technology, nor the Ecole Normale
Superieure, a more serious ommission because of the excellence of its
BOOK REVIEWS [ 3I9
Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Pol-
icy, 1930-1938 by James B. Crowley. Princeton, Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1966. — xviii, 428 pp. $9.00.
This is a clearly written and forcefully presented study of Japan's foreign
affairs between the London Naval Conference of 1930 and the Konoe
declaration of January 1938. It is probably the first of its kind in a West-
ern language that tries to penetrate Standard frames of reference and
reconstruct the past around a new set of conceptions.
The basic conceptual framework Crowley presents is that of national
security. He argues that certain national security considerations led to
the Manchurian incident of 193 1, which in turn necessitated reorienta-
tion of Strategie thinking. As new security problems arose, there was a
corresponding increase in the role of the supreme command in Japanese
decision-making. Underlying all these developments was the overriding
question how to preserve Japan's military autonomy. Concepts such as
"total war," "national defense State/' and "self-sufficiency" interacted
with specific Strategie goals (for instance, to prevent the combined hos-
tility of the United States and Britain) and determined the actual course
of Japan's foreign relations in the decade.
An important corollary of this focus on security is the author's anal-
ysis of army factionalism and fanaticism. Since the security question is
essentially a "rational" one, necessitating realistic calculations or risks
and evaluations of capabilities, military policy could never be and was
in fact never left in the hands of young fanatics. These, Crowley sug-
gests, should be relegated to their proper, that is, minor, role in Japanese
history. Senior military leaders, on their part, desired drastic national
reconstruction in order to prepare for total warfare, but they could not
tolerate impetuous action by immature cadets.
Holding consistently to his major thesis, the author refuses to use
words such as "aggression" and "invasion" when discussing Sino-
Japanese relations in the thirties. Japanese behavior in Manchuria, North
China, and finally in the rest of China is examined, not as a premeditated
crime against the neighboring country, but as part of the new conception
of security which the military were trying to put into effect. One gets the
impression that the short-lived cabinet of General Hayashi comes close
to the author's ideal type; Hayashi tried to carry out national security
policy without recourse to force abroad or hysteria at home. The suc-
ceeding Konoe cabinet set the stage for national disaster, but Crowley
argues that Konoe did not radically depart from the basic defense policies
set by his predecessors, and lauds the Prime Minister's attempt to re-
unify the line of command and implement a consistent China policy.
320 [ POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
The book blames the ultimate failure of Japanese policy on the infatua-
tion with the Imperial and pan-Asianist ideas that were not supported by
a realistic appraisal of miHtary capabilities.
There is a risk in writing about a period as recent as the nineteen-
thirties, when fresh evidence is uncovered Hterally every day. There is
relatively Httle new in the facts that the author has marshaled, and he
has missed some pertinent facts. There are certain errors in the spelhng
of personal names. But the book's value lies in its sĂĽperb Organization,
systematic analysis, and the fresh meaning it gives to well-known facts.
No other book has done so well the job of discarding old cliches and
laying the groundwork for new interpretations.
Akira Iriye
University of California, Santa Cruz
The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enter-
prise to Socialism, 1952-1965 by Patrick O'Brien. London, New
York, and Toronto, Oxford Ujjiversity Press under the auspices of
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, ig66. — xvi, }^^ pp.
S5S.
Despite the apparent purity of the two terms in his subtitle, private enter-
prise and socialism, Mr. O'Brien shows iis, in this able and comprehen-
sive study, that there was a great deal of government control over eco-
nomic affairs in Egypt in the three or four decades before the advent of
military rule in 1952, and that the large-scale nationalization of the early
nineteen-sixties has not led to much socialism in the sense of "distribu-
tive justice."
The author, lecturer in the London School of Economics, presents a de-
tailed analysis of the nature and achievements of the Egyptian economy
since 1952, against the background of its development since the early
nineteenth Century. He does so on the basis of an enormous number of
primary sources as well as the most important secondary ones (though,
among the latter, he often cites Charles Issawi's works in footnotes, he
leaves them out of the long bibliography).
Mr. O'Brien divides economic history under the military regime into
three pcriods. In the first, 1952-56, the officers had no "economic ideol-
ogy," were "preoccupied with consolidating their power and expelling
the British," and so did not depart seriously from the economic policies
of the regime they had overthrown (pp. 68-69). In one of the most valu-
able contributions of the book, the author shows how the reformers mere-
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Bräutigam, Otto, Ueberblick ueber die Beaetzten Oatgeblete
vaehrena äec 7ivelten Veltkrie^^B. (Studien dee Tnetltutt fuer
Be^atzungafragen In Tübingen «u ^en Deutschen Besatzungen Im 2.
Welttorieg, No.3. ) Taebln^en, Januar 19*5^. (mim.) 97 pp.
Contalna aitogether 10 llnes on "Juedlsches Termoegen"
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VI
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BOOKS and the AKTS
il//
T
•ipt to Power
FĂśLL CIRCLE. The Memoirs of Sir
Anthony P^en. Houghton Mifflin Co.
676 pp. r^^K^
George Steiner ^ ^
THJS is a somber story. niiving bccn,
for too long a time, the crown prince in
ChurchilTs giant shadow, Sir Anthony
Eden finally acceded to power in April,
1955. Less than two years later, he had
to resign, hroken hy political circum-
stance and ill health. History, moreover,
played hini a crucl turn. I hc virtues
which had carricd Eden to high place,
his skill as a classical diplomatist, his
uncompromising hatred of dictatorship,
and his aloofness from^ partisan politics,
proved inadequate or inappropriate to
the task. The man failed to rtiatch his
hour.
Eden's conception of policy was com-
pletely molded hy the events of Fehru-
ary, 1938. At that time, he resigned from
the Chamberlain government rather than
condonc further appeasement of Hitler
and Mussolini. Two years later the world
plunged into a catastrophic war. It is
Eden's profound conviction that this
War could have heen avoided on two
conditions: the Western democracies-
would have had to take a dccisive stand
y against Fascism „and Nazism from the
Start; and they would have had to work
togcther in close. flexible alliance. When
the Second World War ended, Eden was
resolved that the errors of the 1930s
ghould not bc repeated. As Foreign Sec-
rctary and Prime Minister, in the pe-
riod from November, 1951, to January,
1957, he sought to pursue two principles:
the Containment of dictatorship wher-
cvcr it might arise, and the transforma-
tion of the Western alliance into a struc-
ture of real and permanent security.
Both these principles are unassailable,
but the difficulty hiy in applying them.
First, bccausc the Western democracies
HO longer held even a potential monopoly
of military initiative (as they did in
the 1930s); second, because the allies
with whom Eden had to deal were no
GEORGE STEINER, no-io teaching at
Princeton Univcrsity, zcas ort the staff
of The Economist, London, in 1952-53
and 1954-56. He was in London during
the two shipoivners' Conferences and
nearly the whole of the pre-Suez crisis.
Mr. Steiner is the author of Tolstoy or
Dostoevsky {Knopf),
230
longer a Roosevelt or a Marshall, but
in Eisenhowcr and a DuUes. It was
[den's peculiar tragedy to have learned
ie lessons of history too well; he did
lot realize how greatly the context of
power had altered.
THESE memoirs center on two crlses:
Indo-China and Suez. The first showed
Eden at his finest; the second brought
him to political ruin. In April, 1954, the
Kreuch position in Indo-China was grow-
ing hopeless. On April 24, the Western
leaders met in Paris. Mr. Dulles ad-
vanced the view that Anglo-American
military intervention was now essential
and that an air-strike should be ventured
to relicve the hard-prcssed garrison at
Dien Bien Phu. Admiral Radford sup-
ported this view and suggested that
R.A.F. Units should be sent from Malaya
or Hong Kong to Tongking. "Neither
he nor Mr. Dulles gave any morc ex-
plicit account of the Joint military ac-
tion they contemplated." Eden at once
raised the question of a Chinese counter-
intervention. "Admiral Radford replicd
that he had never thought that the
Chinese would intervene in Indo-China,
nor had. they the necessary resources
available. If they attempted air action,
we could eliminate this by boml)ing the
Chinese airfields, which were very vulner-
able." Eden immediately returned to
London, convinced that the United
States had ncither formulated a con-
sequent policy nor weighed the fĂĽll
risk. Sir Winston Ciuirchill concurred.
As he saw it, England was being asked
"to assist in misleading Co^gress into
approving a military Operation, which
would in itself be ineffective, and might
well bring the world to the verge of a
major war."
During rhosc hair-raising days, Mr.
Dulles played his usual complex game
of impulse and vacillation. By-passing
the British Ambassador in Washington,
he sought to suggest to the French that
the British Government was now com-
mitted to some form of militar}- action.
Fortunatel^^ M. Bidault realized that
this was not the case. On the con-
trary: on the afternoon of April the
28th, Her Majesty's Government de-
cided to reject the .\merican proposal.
Eden now faced an niimensely difficult
task: he had to justify this refusal to
the imperilcd French, safeguard the
Anglo-American alliance, and bring
ahout some settlement of the Indo-
China war by negotiation. In the en-
suing weeks, he showed his grcat tech-
nical master}^ of diplomacy. Although
agonized by the news of the fall of Dien
Bien Phu, Bidault understood perfectly
British reluctance to intervene on Mr.
Dulles' vague and unconsidered terms.
The real difficulty lay with Washington.
One cannot read Eden's account of the
preliminary meeting at Geneva without
an acute scnse of embarrassment about
the tone of American foreign policy un-
der the Dulles regime:
Mr. Robertson, whose approach to
these questions is so emotional as to
be impervious to argument or indeed
to facts, was keeping up a sort of
"theme song" to the effect that there
were in Indo-China some three
hundred thousand men who were
anxious to light against the Vietminh
and were looking to us for support
and encouragement. I said that if
they were so anxious to fight I could
not understand why they did not do
so.
To this perfidioiis objection the im-
passioned Mr. Robertson seems to have
had no answer. Fortunately, Mr. Bedell
Smith arrived upon the scene. With his
help, Eden succeeded in pulling Mr.
Dulles back from the brink. One more
crisis occurrcd on June 18: "Mr. Robert-
son . . . at the last moment launchcd a
violent and wholly unexpected attack on
the Chinese proposals which the French
were working on." But now Mendes-
France was in the wings, able and willing
to conclude an armistice. "He was," as
Sir Anthony notes with Churchillian
aptness, "the man for the short lap."
Although Dulles had been largcly re-
sponsible for caUing the Geneva Con-
ference, he refused to associate the
United States with its outcome. Eden's
achie^'ement was nevertheless a major
one: "we had stopped an eight-year war
and reduced international tension at a
r,oint of instant danger to world peacc."
July 21, 1954, was Eden's finest hour.
1 he Indo-China crisis should have
alcrted him to the underlying stress of
the Anglo-American entente. Instead,
Eden abided by his lofty conception ot
mutual trust. The American interven-
tion in Guatemala in June, 1954, Struck
the British Government as inept and
perhaps unjustifiable, but London feit
that the first priori ty must be given to
the solidarity of the Anglo-American al-
liance. "If allies are to act in concert
The Nation
X
only vvlicn tlicir vlcvvs are idcnticnl, al-
ĂĽances have no meaning." That noble
doctrine was to become Eden's epltaph.
THE ROOTS of the Suez crisls can be
traced back to April, 1956. During tbat
month, Bulganin and Khrushchev came
to Eondon. In tbe course ot dlscussions
Oll the Midille East, Eden thought it
best "to be absoliitely blunt abour tbe
oil, bccause wo vvould figbt for it." In
bis opinion, the Standard of British lite
depended closely on the free flow of
Middle Eastern oil and on the concomi-
tant free passage through the Suez Canal.
Whoever would threaten this flow would
be putting bis thumb on England's
windpipe. In short, a Nasser might suc-
ceed where Hitler had failed. Eden is
often charged with failing to understand
tbe differences between tbe two dictators.
That is not entirely true. He saw plain-
ly that Nasser was a more petty busi-
ness. But in certain respects he was bet-
ter located than Hitler. He could strike
at the heart of the British economy
while staying close to home. Knowing,
moreover, how closely Hitler followed
the mad plans set forth in Mein Kampj,
Eden took more seriously than did other
Middle East experts, Nasser's avowed
Intention of forming a single Arab bloc
from Bagdad to Casablanca. When Nas-
ser seized the Canal, on July 26, 1956,
he seemed to be on the way to his wild-
est ambitions.
Why did England and France not act
at once? In part, because Eden hoped
to prod the United Nations into ac-
tion. Freedom of navigation was, after
all, an international concern and tbe
United States bad long left in abeyance
its solemn pledge to secure such free-
dom for Israeli ships. But the more im-
portant reason was one of logistics:
Cyprus had no sufficient harbor for
landing craft and transports, and "We
had nothing like enough airborne
troops." Unable to use immediate force,
Eden set out to marshal world opinion
and, above all, American support. The
latter was forthcoming but in a man-
ner which Eden judged fatally inade-
quate:
At the beginning of the crisis the
Americans appeared to wish to isolate
Egypt among the nations of the
World, and to bring the moral pres-
sure of combined opinion to bear
upon Colonel Nasser. This was an
acceptable intention, but it took no
account of tbe probability that Nas-
ser would show himself impervious
to moral pressure. In practice it was
to mean Conferences and resolutions,
but no action. The result was words.
This is the crux of the Eden case, and
March 12, 1960
the rcsults of the two London Conferences
of shipcwning nations conlirmed his
gloomy prediction. Nasser derided the
proposals brought to bim by Mr. Men-
zies and regarded the very fact of in-
ternational concern as an insult to
Egyptian rights.
Once again, moreover, Mr. Dulles
pl.iyed a quecr, shadowy game. At one
nionuMit, he was eloquent in support of
international pressure on Egypt. In tbe
next, he woidd reier to the whole con-
flict as a distasteful vestige of British
and French colonialism. One thing would
be Said to the British Embassy in Wash-
ington, another over the direct wire to
Downing Street, and a third to State
Department cronies vvho would then leak
it to the press. On September 12, 1956,
be let the cat gaily out of the bag. He
Ict It be knovvn, in a nearly casual man-
ner, tbat the United States would not
use force and that be did "not recall
just exactly what Sir Anthony Eden said
on this point." This was to signal Nas-
ser that he could with impunity reject
the final proposals of the eighteen-nation
Conference. From that moment on, Eden
and Pineau knew they would either have
to surrender to Nasser or go it alone.
Up to that point, Eden's account is
thoroughly defensible. It is thereafter
that the memoirs become as unconvinc-
ing as was the actual Suez campaign.
Eden could have argucd tbus: the
American attitude and the Soviet veto
made effective intervention by the Unit-
ed Nations impossible. There was clear
proof that Nasser was trying to gather
the Arab nations toward a renewed at-
tack on Israel. If he were allowed to get
away with his seizure of the Canal and
given tbe time to ecjuip bis armies with
Soviet tanks and planes, there would be
no stopping bim. Ibis was Nasser's
Rbineland. If the democracies fougbt
back now, as they might have done in
1934 or 1936, a potential Hitler might
be brought to bay. One can agree or
disagree with this estimate. But it is
perfectly justifiable. Instead, Eden sticks
to his original contention. England and
JFrance, he asserts, wished only to
separate the hostile armies of Israel and
l'.gypt. riie purpose of the entire Suez
Operation was to safeguard tbe Canal
from "becoming a zone of warfare, and
to arrest tbe spread of fighting in tbe
Middle East."
This makes no sense. One does not ar-
rest a war by joining it. One does not
jeopardize one's most precious alliance
in Order to create a no-man's land be-
tween two foreign powers. And by stick-
ing to this curious explanation of his
motives, Sir Anthony does nothing to
allay one of the gravest charges against
him: that of collusion with Israel. Many
Ringiiig the Beils
And this is the way they ring
the bells in Bedlam
and this is the bell-lady
who comes each Tuesday morning
to give US a music lesson
and because the attendants make 3'ou go
and because we mind by instinct,
like bees caught in the wrong hive,
we are the circle of the crazy ladies
who sit in the lounge of the mental house
and smile at the smiling woman
who passes us each a bell,
who points at my band
that holds my bell, E flat,
and this is the gray dress next to me
who grumbles as if it were special
to be old, to be old,
and this is the small hunched squirrel girl
on the other side of me
who picks at the hairs over her lip,
who picks at the hairs over her lip all day,
and this is how the bells really sound,
as untroubled and clean
as a workable kitchen,
and this is always my bell responding
to my band that responds to tbe lady
who points at me, E flat;
and although we are no better for it,
they teil you to go. And you do.
Anne Sexton
231
obscrvcrs liave statcil catej^orically that
thc attack on Port Said and Ismailia was
tiinrd to coincidc \\'n\\ the Israeli swct'p
through rlic descrt ar^d that England,
Irancc and Israel had hocn in closc
prior consnlration.
BU 1 NvJKittver liis niotivcs, Kden had
cntircly failcd ro gange thc rcaction hoth
in the United States and in l'-ngland it-
self. He had thoiight that Washington
woiild grant to its dosest aliy that ])ene-
fit of the doubt which it often accorded
to its cnemics. 1 he saddest passage \i\
this sad hook is that in which J'.d<'n
compares the American attitnde toward
llnngary with its attitnde toward Suez:
Ihe United States representativc
. . . voiced liis suspicion that \vc werc
urging the Hnngarian Situation to di-
vcrt attention from Suez. The United
States Government appeared in no
hiirry to move. Their attitnde pro-
Aided a damaging contrast to the
alacrity thcy were shownig in arraign-
ing the French and onrselves.
Mr. Dullcs scemed to find himself in
fĂĽll accord with Mr. Nehm. Ihe jarter
tliougiit tlie Anglo-French ontrage
against Ug> pt "clear as daylight,"
whereas lie could not lollow ^'tlie very
contusing Situation'' in Budapest.
But Eden was left in the Unch not
only by the l nited States and most ot
the Commonwealth. \ spasm of re\nl-
sion wcnt through England. Its exteiit
has heen grossly exaggerated. hut un-
(louhtedly a great numher of English
people wcre not prepared to support
armcd intervention even against Nas-
ser. Eden teils pathetically how Lady
Eden went out to Trafalgar Square to
vicw the hostile demonstrations. It is
a revealing note. Having spent his po-
litical life in foreign affairs, the Prime
Minister was gravely out of touch with
his own people. Herc Churchill nuist
bcar part of the hiame. He had long
viewed Eden as his successor hut done
little to broaden him for the task.
Ihe tinal hlow. however, came neither
from Moscow, nor from Washington, nor
even from thc flaming oratory of Mr.
Bevan. On November 5, the Chancellor
of the P-vXchequer informed the cabinet
tbat the Suez crisis had unleashed a
beavy run on Sterling. Reserves were
lalling fast, he asserted, and he feit
(lubious whethcr England could finan-
ciall)^ sustain further military action.
Again, Eden was vulnerable through
lack of experience. Eikc Churchill, he
had no interest in the ''dismal science''
of economics. He feit that he must take
his Chancellor's estimate at fĂĽll valuc:
A ccasc firc became incvitable.
Now this raises a fascinating qucstion,
232
fĂĽr who was the Chancellor? None uther
than Mr. Macmillan. At the statt of thc
Suez venture, Macmillan seems to have
giveti Eden his CDmplete backing. Did
he swiftly reappraise the Situation whcn
he saw matters going wrong? And
might he not, in that cvent, feel that it
w as his diity to the Conservative Party,
to the .\nglo-.\merican alliance and to
England to ease Eden out of office?
Perhaps we shall never know, but it
seems liard to believe that the run on
Sterling was quite as damaging as Mac-
millan made out. One cannot help
wonderinj!;. also, about Churchiirs role.
Might he ha\e given Macmillnn a
ir(iitle nod.' In view of Macmillan's
sĂĽperb renovation of the Tories over thc
past tbrec ycars this would havc becn
ruthless farsightedness. Eden had to go.
.\ad 550 he did, a sick and bitter man.
It is his con^nction that present trcnds
in the Middle East are accumulating
toward future disaster and that thc
democracies are repeating in the sixtics
the errors they committed thirty years
ago. The FĂĽll Circle is a grim onc; it
seems to lead back to Munich. Sir
Anthony is confident that the dark
future will justify his action against
Suez, though it may not forgive his lack
of prompt success (or, one might add,
his methods). Many of his readers will
disagree. I believe he is right.
Ne>v Ear for Emerson
KMKRSnW .1 MODERX AXTHOLO-
(rV. Edired by Alfred Ka/in and
Daniel Aaron. Houghton Mifflin Co.
399 pp. H.
THE KARLY LFXrrVRES OF RALPH
WALDO I':.\f/':RSO.\\ Vol. I (183.^-
l.S3rO. Edited by Stephen Whicher
and Robert Spiller. Harvard Univer-
sity Press. .^45 pp. y^l2.5{).
David L. Xorlon
rWO GENERAITONS of our forebears
looked to Ralph Waldo Emerson as the
embodied spirit of rcligious America,
and a third knew his name as the author
of a set of volumes shelved prominently
in every cultivated home. J hen his light
taiied, and there are few people today
in whom the name I^merson sparks more
than a dim association or two. Now. sud-
denly, there are signs that the voice
ot the Concord sainr will he heard again.
The ps\chic pendulum of the recent
past has swung between anger and an-
guish. Ears attuned to sonic boom and
cries of outraged flesb give no response
to the serene harmonies of a I ranscen-
dental mystic. lo haye turned to Emer-
son in the first half of our Century would
have becn an act of madness, like tend-
iug a rose tbroughout a shattering earth-
(piake.
Curiously, hoth the ([uakes in our
buman foundations and the great struc-
tures which science has nevertheless
nianaged to build on them throw cold
light on two failings of E^merson —
bis blindness to evil and his disregard for
DAVID L. NORTOX is Associatc
Lcdder oj the Ethical Society of St.
J.Ollis. Hc ivrites rcgularly jor the
Post-Dispatch and is co-produccr oj a
discussion proi^rani carricd on the edu-
(dtional TV Channel in St. Lotus.
facts. Evil for him was a misunderstand-
ing. a shortsightedness. It thrcatened
only those who lacked a nobler vision.
Emerson's own preoccupation with thc
ideal left him no room for anything less.
And facts were merely springboards for
the mind. "Nature is no literalist; every-
thing must be taken genially." Facts, he
thought, require only to be recomposed
by Reason — by which he meant imagi-
nation. Ibis past half-ccntury has dealt
harshly with geniality and metaph\sical
miagmation.
But signs appear now, indicating that
\Ne are ready to forgive. These two
books, one populär, one for scholars,
will turn new interest toward Emerson.
At least two recent studies of currcnt
values in our culture have citcd Emer-
son, and called for reorientation on lines
he laid down. A travehng exhibit of
American art bas heen organized on
Emersonian principles, opposing the so-
ciological mode of Interpretation. ;\nd
soon, I predict, interest in the humanism
of the late Albert Camus will evoke a
pcrception of his startling similarity to
the Concord philosopher.
If Emerson's voice is becoming audiblc
again, this can mean only that our en-
vironment is setting us free, for a timc,
to contemplate ideal possibilities, to
perceive the grains of beauty in ugliness,
of truth in ahsurdity, and of virtue in
the unswept corners of existencc.
IHE Modern Anthology is particularly
suited as a reintroduction to Emerson's
thought. Drawing from the Essays, Jour-
nals, and Letters, it regroups the most
characteristic passages under themes
of current interest. x\mong the chapters
carved out by Messrs. Kazin and Aaron
are *'An Original Relation to the Uni-
vcrse" (metaphysics and religion),
The Nation
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Gerians on Nbg«
Gerraan
bibliogröahy on ITbg.
Carl Haensel. Das Gericht Vertagt siel . Aus d, Tagebuch deines Woger
Verteidigers. HcinbrgLClaasseen, 19^0, 3U6 ßp»
Joe J. Heidecker k Johannes Leeb. Der Bbger Piozess, Bil jDE der lĂĽOO Jahre.
Koeln,Be lin: Kieoenheuer &. Ruprecht 1957. 60 9 pp.
Aug. von Kniereim, ĂĽnjuif^uernbe rg . Rechtliche und menschliche Probleine.
Stuttg: Klett 19^3. 573 .P#
Viktor Frh.v.d. Lippe. Nbge^ Taebuchnot i^en. Hov.l9li5- ia-4-i9it6 ĂĽkt.l9i!6,
Eine chronolog J)arste. lung d.l^ger Hauptkriosgverb.rcherprozesses <Sc s eL ner
Problematik. Frankf : Knapp 1951, 5^-i7pp .
fVuedr.Meineeke, Die deutsche Katastrophe. Netrachtimgnn & Erinnerungen.
5th ed.V/iesbaden :Brockhaus 1955. l8l pp.
Hiekisch, Ernst . Deutsche iJas eins vor fehlung» Berl:Aufbau Verl. 19U8. 92 p.
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Qennans on Nbg.
Qerman
blbliogr^lior on Nbg*
Carl Haeusel. Das Gericht Vertagt siol • lus d, Tagebuch deines Nb|er
Verteiaigera» HaabrgLClaasseen^ 1950, 3U6 pp#
Jfoe J.Heideoker a Johannes Loeb« Der Hbger P osess* Bil^MÄ der 1000 Jahre*
Koeln^e lini Kiepenheuer & Ruprecht 1957* 6D9 PP«
Aug*v n Kniereim. Ifc^IuomLerg* Rechtliche und laenschliohe Probleme.
Stuttgt KLett 19Ă–. 573 PP#
Vllctor Frh^v.d. Lippe. Hbger Taebuchnot izen. lov.l9U5- ^'4 Ii9k6 Okt.l9U6^
Eine chronologJ)ar Stellung d.lfeger H^uptkriosgyerbrcherprozesses Ecaä^ner
Problematik. Frankf i Knapp 1951, 5ü7pp •
J^edr Jieinccke, Die deutsche Katastrophe. Netrachtungnn & lĂĽrinnerungon.
5t h ed .Wiesbaden iBrockhaus 1955 • l8l pp»
Hiekisch^Emst . Deutsche Das eins Verfehlung. BerliAufbau Veil. 19li8. 92 p.
At all hooksellers DOUBLiDAY
It
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Int
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the
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Could the Jews
have f ought back
at Auschwitz?
Dr. Bruno Bettelheim, of Chi-
cago University, examines Ihis
provocative question in all its
frightening aspects in his fore-
word to Ihe new book, "Ausch-
^vitz — A Doctor's Eyewitness
Account'' by Dr Miklos Nyiszli.
Dr. Bettelheini's conclusions
have already caused much con-
Irovery and discussion in
magazines, newspapers and
synagogues.
If you wish a free copy of
this foreword, write to:
FREDERICK FELL, Inc.
Depl. N
386 Park Ave. South, New York
253
Man — The Reluctant Brother,
by Mattlu'w les Spcttcr (F'ieldston).
A book about good and evil wliose
bürden — although it touches on
many subjects and probcs into man\'
subtleties — is simple: I wish, the au-
thor says, to cxpose the mutilation of
the human person, and I wish to
arousc my generation against the
paral\zing trends that make pawns
out of people. Dr. Spetter, who is a
spccialist in mental health and ac-
tive in the Society for Ethical Cul-
ture, was born in Holland, was a
member of the Resistance durin«: the
war, and is a survivor of both
Auschwitz and Buchenwald. He
Stands against all political and reli-
gious abstractions, all rationaliza-
^tions of power, and all intoxications,
:rom the chic absurdities of anti-art
[ind the litcrature of despair right
nn down to the John Birch Socie-
't\'. He sees reason for hope but not
for optimism in the present human
condition, and his book is a clear
Statement of the crcdo of libcralism,
delivered without anv apology what-
ever.
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jockbool
The Story of the German Soldier
JOHN LAFFIN
After a detailed and intriguing
study of German military lore
from Frederick the Great to
the present day one arrives at
the inescapable conclusion—
Europe will onre again tremhle
to the tramp of the German
jackboot,
•' Extremely interesting."—
ROBERT PiTMAN, Sunday Express.
30/-
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SOCI^TE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT RENAL MILITAIRE ET DE
DROIT DE LA GUERRE
Inscrite au regisfre des Associations du Tribunal d'lnstance de Strasbourg
Secrefariat: adresse provisoire: 10, Rue Schiller - Strasbourg
Strasbourg, /e
La Socidt^ Internationale de Droit P^nal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre
vient de publier les Travaux qui ont 6t6 pr6sent6s ä Toccasion du Congres de Bruxelles
les 14 et 16 Mai 1959 sur le thdme 'ACTION PfiNALE ET ACTION DISCIPLINAIRE '.
Cet ouvrage constitue une ^tude de droit compar^ entre les diverses legislations
des pays du Monde Occidental en ce qui concerne le droit penal Militaire et Texercice
de Taction disciplinaire.
D'eminents juristes specialistes de ces probldmes ont collabor^ ä cet ouvrage,
nous citerons parmi eux : M M. J. Barendrecht (Hollande) F. R. Bickell
(Canada), Henri Bosly (Belgique), Earl V. Brown (USA), M. T. G. Carneiro
(Brasil), Rodriguez Devesa (Espagne), J. Engster (Suisse), Ivar Follestad
(Norvdge), Gratien Gardon (France), John Gilissen (Belgique), Otto Grunewald
(Rep. Fed. d'Allemagne), R. C. Halse (Grande Bretagne), G. Landi (Italic), S. B.
Nyholm (Dänemark). C'est dire qu'il s'agit d'un document de grande valeur qui a sa
place non seulement dans toutes les bibliothdques juridiques, mais aussi parmi les ou-
vrages qui ont trait ä la Vie Militaire.
Cette oeuvre se presente en un volume du format 25 x 16 de 228 pages, impri-
me sur papier Edition bouffant.
Son prix est fixe ä 20 NF.
Les commandes doivent etre adressees au Secr^tariat de la Societe 10, Rue
Schiller ä Strasbourg, accompagnees d'un titre de paiement (cheque, mandat ou vire-
ment postal au C.C.P. 115-871 Strasbourg).
Le Secrötaire G^n^ral
Professeur J. LEAUTE
BULLETIN DE COMMANDE
Je soussigne
commande ä la Societe Internationale de Droit Penal Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre
exemplaire de Touvrage
''Action penale et Action disciplinaire"
Le r^glement en est effectud par
le
Signature
.^
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
3642 LINDELL BOULEVARD
SAINT LOUIS, MISSOURI 63108
September 26, 1968
Professor John H.E.Fried
Department of Political Science
Wagner Hall, City College
The City University of New York
New York, N.Y. 10051
Dear Professor Fried:
I wonder if the Gendrel-LaFarge Bibliographie
has served its purpose? One of my students is engaged
in a study of war crimes in connection with the new
intercollegiate moot court problem and I would like
to make it available to him.
S^-ncerely^ yours ,
HSL : cba
\Ki2
Howard S. Levle
Professor of Law
J
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I
October 4,1968
Lear rTotessĂĽx Levie, / ^
As of this Fall, I have moved from Lity College to its newest
senior »'brother" . änd hence your ietter or Sept.-^b reochea .lie only
loday. I , ,
The Jenurel Laparge riblio9rppay -vill be m^iled to you early
nexL .veek. I shoulc. havs returned it eariiei. It provea lo be very
useful, and I want to thank you agöin for your greai CüUXLesy.
Incidentally, .1 confess thai I leerned only from your Ietter
abput the ne-A mcot court you refer co. interested as I am in students'
reactions to :he pioicieu^s of war c.imes- i .'JOĂĽIĂĽ like to neai laore about
thisi anu ii 1 can oe o'i any assistance,. hope you will let ine knov«.
Siacereiy yuurs,
Professor Howard S. Levie
Law SchooljSaini Louis JruverSi-y
Saint Louis, \'oss.6310ĂĽ
John H.c.Friea
Professox-- of rolitical bcier\ce
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I
JAPAN'S QUEST FOR AUTONOM Y: JMAliUJNAl. SECURITY AND
FOREIGN POLICY, 1930-1938. By James B. Crowley. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966, 428 p. $9.00.
Changing definitions of national security and national objectives within the
Japanese government in the thirties. Emphasis is on attitudes, opinions and policics
as articulated by the ministers of State.
t
^
^pers, Covers tf>e period from his becoming Chief of Staff of theTs A™v '
the mvasion of North Africa. ^
' *«• ■•&«..
ITALY BETRAYED. By Peter Tompkins. New York: Simon and Schuster,
I966, 352 p. $6.50.
A former O.S.S. agent here criticizes, in a vigorous and personal narrative, thi
failure, quite unnecessary in his eyes, of the Allies to take fĂĽll advantage of Mus-
^olini's fall. The policy of working with Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio comes in]
for particular criticism. _ _^^_ *.«*-,^.
BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES
511
Morality and the Law. By Samuel Enoch Stumpf.
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966.
Pp. xiv, 247. $5.00.)
Does the law have any moral connotations
whatsoever? Professor Stumpf poses the age-old
qu^stion and then proceeds to answer it in a re-
sounding affirmative. He builds his case by deal-
ing with, among others, such tough areas as the
Soviet Union and the international Community,
and he argues that all Systems of political Organ-
ization must, in the final analysis, construct and
operate legal Systems on a moral foundation.
Moreover, he attempts to prove that even such
avowed positivists as Austin, Bentham and
Hobbes conceived of law as something more than
simply commands of the sovereign, that even for
them the law contained an essencespringing from
the nature of man and of society. The study is both
a defense of the natural law tradition, albeit in
modern dress, and an attack on the notion that
law has no real connection with moral values.
The first chapter of the study deals with the
moral dement in judicial opinions, particularly
those of the United States Supreme Court.
Stumpf argues that law has always "been shaped
to fit the contours of moral conviction," that the
law "has never been able to dissociate itself fully
from the notion that there is a diflference between
an arbitrary command and a law." His evidence
for this is a very brief allusion to the classical and
medieval periods and to Justice Cardozo's asser-
tion that today's judges respond to a "moral
urge." Stumpf suggests that the judge in the
present day, however, has often attempted to ad-
here to the concept that the law has no real con-
cern for moral and ethical values, or at least to the
view that if there is a moral base for law, it must
be infused in the law by the legislature and not
by the judge. But a more profound influence on
the American judge is the modern philosopher,
whether it be Whitehead ("The conception of the
universe as evolving subject to fixed eternal laws
regulating all behavior should be abandoned.")
or John Dewey ("The sanctification of . . . uni-
versal principles as methods of thinking is the
chief obstacle to . . . social advance by means of
law."). No matter how hard a judge may try,
however, he cannot eliminate subjective judg-
ments, values, or a moral dement from his deci-
sion#.
But the moral element in law in Stumpfs view
is universal, and is an integral part of those very
Systems that loudly disclaim it. The Soviets pro-
duced a society, for example, dedicated to the
abolition of the rule of law in the traditional sense.
Theoretically the dictatorship of the Proletariat
is its own source of authority without constitu-
tional or statutory limitation. This follows from
the Marxian idea that law is the reflection of the
material order by the mind of man. Since all law
is the law of the ruling economic class and con-
tains within it no a 'priori principles, the mind is
not free to create rules of human behavior, only
to transform the material forces which impinge
upon it into conscious formulations of rules. The
consequences of this Marxist theory of the source
of law are significant, sa3^s Stumpf, for when law
is viewed not as the embodiment of justice but as
a reflection of the material interests of the dom-
inant class, it is reduced to the naked force of that
class, and it cannot embody any thing permanent.
But the Soviets have not practiced what they
preach. Not only have they not been able to elim-
inate law from their System, they have actually
used the law for moral ends, for creating a moral
consciousness. Law in Russia is no longer simply
a power mechanism; it is "viewed as a moral
vehicle which should be respected because of its
intrinsic moral content." It is to be obeyed not
because it is the command of the sovereign but
because of the moral ends — fulfillment of norms
of socialist law — it is seeking to achieve. Ideology
has not only become respectable but has assumed
the ethical characteristic of "ought." Even
though law and morality are tied together in So-
viet law, this does not mean. Stumpf teils us, that
Soviet law as a legal system is under any moral
restraint since the validity of law is still condi-
tioned upon the consent of the Communist party.
However, the very f act of the revival of Soviet law
indicates that man's nature requires more than a
command of the sovereign; it requires reasons for
the command.
Probably the most interesting essays in the
study are those dealing with Austin, Bentham
and Hobbes. The distinction between law and
morals has been a powerful influence on jurispru-
dence ever since Austin's time, says Stumpf, but
men have always been uneasy about it. While
almost all of the Austinian legal theory is found
in the three concepts of sovereign, command and
sanction and suggests in the abstract that the
sovereign is a "morally indifferent entitj'-," Austin
is, in Stumpfs view, far from considering law in
such arbitrary terms since he sees law as a correc-
tive of evil proceeding from a "good" which in
Austin's words is "bottomed in the common nature
of man." And even Bentham whose contempt for
natural law was unequivocal was much concerned
over law reflecting the "good" of the Community
when he urged that in order for law to be com-
plete, its commands must take into account the
moral concerns of society. Hobbes, too, insisted
that law and morality have the same content and
that the obligatory force of law was to be found
in morality. Hobbes speaks of "natural reason"
throughout his discourses, and although he once
Said that there can be "no unjust laws," he did not
deny, says Stumpf, that sovereigns could give er-
roneous interpretations of natural law. Sovereigns
can err, said Hobbes, and their acts of authority
are not equivalent to morality. Fitting Hobbes
into the natural law tradition depends upon one's
definition of natural law, and the author is quite
aware of this when he suggests that it is not neces-
sary to say that a known set of unchanging, ab-
solute values exists in order to have a viable theory
of natural law: it is important only to agree that
human nature has a permanence from which one
can — as Hobbes did — derive certain natural laws.
And this returns us to the central point of this
study: that law is a matter of thought or con-
sciousness, that it represents the capacity of man
to transcend himself and to look at his social Or-
ganization objectivdy. In spite of the "high de-
gree of analytic imprecision in most natural law
discourse" and "the difficulties of epistemolog-
ical relativism" there is a nagging persistence
that moral ends cannot be separated from law. We
must conclude then that no organized legal system
is ever completely positivistic and, we might add,
no individual is totally a positivist.
Professor Stumpf has produced .a creative and
imaginative book. It adds a new dimension to the
growing body of literature that is attempting to
capture the idealism and morality of a great tradi-
tion in political and legal theory, that öf natural
law. Professor Stumpf is persuasive, not dogma-
tic; analytical, not autocratic; learned, not shal-
low. Each chapter, incidentally, is a neat, self-
contained essay, but the study has a systematic
unity and wholeness because the author never
loses sight of his noble theme. — Robert J.
Steamer, Lake Forest College.
UtO^ '^^'
(>Ui(>
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NO LAURELS FOR DE GAULLE. By Robert Mengin. New York: Farrar,
Straus and Gironx, 1966, 402 p. $6.95.
A strong anti-Gaullist appraisal based on the diary of a French Journalist during
the years 1939-43-
LA REVANCHE DE 1945. By General Beaufre. Paris: Plön, 1966, 313 p. Fr.
14.58.
General Beaufre's memoirs and reflections on the period 1940-1945 in France
and the French resistance abroad.
r
in France " j
__!!^ĂślilZ?LI= The aftermath of
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Reviews and News • 193
com«^ in Argentina. Mass centenary editions of many of Lenin's works
are plahned in Columbia, Venezuela, Chile, and some other Latin-Amer>ÂŁan
countries.
It is seeH^from the UNESCO figures that in our days Lenii/s works
have gone throb^ a greater number of printings and larger e^ions than
the Bible, regarde^for so long as the most widely-read book/in the world.
To give a correlst assessment of all these facts, it shodld be borne in
mind that the path Lenin's works have to travel before Coaching the people
is blocked by many obsh^cles-ideological, administrative, and sometimes
even terrorist. In those counthi^s where even the outward signs of democracy
are scorned, the publication and\distribution of the^truth of history, expressed
by Lenin in his writings, are considered to be crimes against the State. Peo-
ple responsible for the publication öf these w^rks risk not only their liberty
but sometimes life itself. Neverthelek, Lip^in's immortal words are to be
heard everywhere-even, let us say, in Pokdgal.
The activities carried on by the/Ă„vante Printing-works, the organ of
the Portuguese Communist Party, ^re truW heroic. Self-sacrificing labour
and staunch devotion to the cai^^ have enabled Avante to publish many
of Lenin's works, including his/ärticles Concernh^g Strikes, Karl Marx, Class
Collaboration with Capital o/Class Struggle agah^t Capital? and the book
Left-Wing Co?7imiinisni-an' Infantile Disorder. Jos^ Moreira, a prominent
Portuguese revolutionaryxafter steadfastly refusing under torture to disclose
the whereabouts of ^e party printing-works to theXpolice, met with a
terrible death. But the spirit of those who lighten the glö^m with the torch
of Lenin's ideas c^ never be broken.
The whole^ World reads Lenin, ponders his works, lesjrns from his
political expenence and his life; the whole world consults Leniivs^he guiding
spirit of tl)e greatest social revolution, the founder of the first socfisilist State
in the wi
VLADIMIR NAIDENOV
U
EYEWITNESSES FROM THE WEST
Amongst the flood of books about the Soviet people's resistance to
fascist aggression there are not a few by eyewitnesses from the West-
American or English authors, who happened to spend part of the war in
the embattled Soviet Union. These books differ widely in style. One thing,
however, merits particular attention: those accounts which were written
from live Observation and particularly those written immediately after events
they describe are, in spite of the widely differing personalities and styles of
t\r\i
l^ U'^c'"^
194 • Reviews and News
thcir nuthors, agrccd if not identical in something very essential-in their
appreciation of the Soviet people's war effort and their understanding of the
pcculiar social nature of tlie Soviet people's heroic and victorious struggle.
The eruption of the fiery nazi lava-tide over the U.S.S.R. caught the
American writer Erskine Caldwell and his wifc Margaret Bourke-White,
a skilled Photographie reporter, in the depths of our country near Sochi.
What they remembered from the first day of the war was the expression
ĂĽf iron determination on thousands of faces; people who spent their vacation
in this sea resort hurried to leave for home before setting out for the
front; and the volunteers, among them greyheads and young boys, besieg-
ing the Military Commissariats. In Moscow Caldwell found telegrams await-
ing him from several U.S. Information centres and he was soon broadcasting
war-reports over the wireless. Later these were published in book form under
the title All-Out on the Road to Smolensk; it was published in New York
in 1942, one of the first Western accounts of the struggle between Germany
and the Soviet Union.
Caldwell wrote from Moscow when it was under direct threat from
nazi tanks and planes, impressively conveying the atmosphere of the vast,
blacked-ĂĽut city preparing to resist. The news from the front at that time
was depressing. The foreigners in Moscow were far from optimistic: many
were convinced that the city must fall within the next two or three weeks.
Nevertheless, Caldwell retained confidence in what President Roosevelt
characterized as "almost super-human courage and will power of the Rus-
sians," in their readiness to forge their own victory without outsidc help,
scvcn days a week and twenty-four hours a day. "After seeing the Russians in
action during the first week of war, I never for a moment doubted their
ability to stop the Germans," he wrote.
In August Caldwell left with a group of foreign reporters for the
Western Front; in Vyazma he was caught in an air raid and closer to the
front line, near Yelnya, he was shelled. That was at the time when the
fascists closing in on Moscow were for the first time effectively counter-
attacked: the reporters were given the opportunity to convince themselves
of this in conversations with German prisoners and by inspecting the shat-
tered remains of German weapons and vehicles.
Behind the journalistic sketches of this book one feels the author's
belief in the particular, populär and nation-wide character of Soviet resis-
tance, in the amazing stamina of the Soviet infantrymen, in the courage and
daring of the fighter-pilots, who in more than one case had brought down
cnemy planes by crashing their aircraft into them in their defence of the
Moscow skies, in the efficicncy of the teenagers setting out to work at the
factories, in the energy of the thousands of students, civil servants, and
housewives who were out day and night digging trenches on the roads to
the capital. Caldwell's journalistic love of sensational detail did not prevent
Reviews and News
195
him from seeing events in depth, from understanding the sources of Soviet
patriotism: "The attitude of the people towards war and their duties was as
Stern and inflexible as their adherence to the Socialist plan of their State.
There was no Suggestion of frivolousness in the character of the people.
Their all-out effort to win the war is probably unique in the world's history."
Margaret Bourke-White' s book Sbooting the Russ'ian War (1943)» i^^
which a diary-type text is excellently illustrated by nearly a hundred pho-
tographs, compliments her husband's. Margaret Bourke-White was the only
Western Journalist who, at the beginning of the war, was granted the
right to use a camera; the reader of her book is confronted with a series
of vivid photographs: the dark Moscow sky netted with searchlights, the
contours of the capital during air raids, ruined cities, battlefieds and, ot
course, people-soldiers, generals, peasants, workmen, heroes and victims
of the war. This expressive documentary story in photographs of the jour-
nalist's experiences goes to make a composite picture of a people shouldermg
the common bĂĽrden in the hour of their nation's most terrible trial.
In the book of another American Journalist Henry Cassidy MoscouT
Dateline (1943) the basic stages of the Battle of Moscow are delineated.
Cassidy lived in our country from spring 1941 to spring 1945 as representa-
tive of the Associated Press Agency. Summing up his impressions, he noted:
"The Battle of Moscow was won by as smart and successful a trick play
as has ever been sprung on an unsuspecting Opponent. It was won as well
by sheer strength, courage and sacrifice. Winter, silent white ally of the
Russians, helped. But the most surprising, and perhaps the most important
factor, was contributed by the Red Army's tactics."
Cassidy gave due credit to the fighters of the narodnoye opolcheniye
(a kind of home guard-Tr.), the "communist volunteers," as he called them,
often insufficiently trained and under-armed, who nevertheless stood to the
last man, winning time to prepare the counter-attack. He wrote of the pro-
digies performed by women and adolescents working at the munitions fac-
tories and on building up the defences of the city. All this was very different
from the fate of Paris, BrĂĽssels and other conquered European capitals, and
the author, though far from sympathetic to the communist System, con-
cludes: "A great people or a strong system, is one that can undergo such a
test, know the danger and rise above it. That Moscow did."
' One of the chapters of this book is called "General Winter." At that
time (not that it never happens now) there was a tendency to believe the
widespread rumours attributing the decisive role in the winning of the
Battle of Moscow to the severe Russian frosts. Cassidy bears witncss to the
fallibilitv of this point of view. Touring the battleficld he was convinced
that the cold made things as difficult for the defendcrs as for thosc struggling
to attack through drifts of snow and blocked or muddy roads: "General
Winter," wrote Cassidy, "did not belong to the Red Army. If he did, he
I
i
196
RevleiiS and Neics
Reviezii's und News
197
shĂĽuld have been shot for treason because he opposed the Russians just as
much as he did the Germans, He was fighting for no one but himself."
The American journaUst James E. Brown, then representing the Inter-
national News Service, came to much the same conclusion. Joseph E. Davies,
former American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., recommended Brown's
book Russia Figbts to the wide reading public of America, noting that
though the author "holds no brief for the Soviet political system" he never-
theless "teils us frankly that it has brought great benefits to Russia Even
his few criticisms are voiced with an honesty that lends added weight to
his favourable comment.' At the end of one of the most vivid episodes in
the book-a record of chats with wounded Soviet soldiers who took part in
the Batde of Moscow, Brown wrote: "I left the hospital with one question
answered, and it was a question I had been wondering about for a long
time: How was the morale of the Red Army? It was good."
Winter 1941-42 was a hard time for the allies of the U.S.S.R. in the
anti-German coalition. The echoes of Pearl Harbour were still sounding,
American batdeships were sinking, Singapore and Hong Kong, Malaya and
the Philippines had all fallen. Thinking back to this period in his book
Tbe Year of Stalmgrad (1946) the English Journalist Alexander Werth
wrote: "Sub-editors in Fleet Street said: 'Thank God for Russia, there is
no good news from anywhere eise to put on the front page' Throughout
the Winter, Russia remained perhaps the only real enthusiasm of most people
in England. If there was still a good chance of winning the war, people
thought, it was thanks to the Russians."
The indestructible moral and political unity of the Soviet people which
was one of the foundation stones of the victorious outcome of the war was
particularly evident, in the opinion of many observers, during the Great
Battle of Stalingrad.
James Brown, describing the fierce battles around Rzhev, the function
of which was to keep the nazi forces bogged down in this area, writing of the
unspectacular gallantry of the workers, housewives and schoolchildren
noted that, in those days, the word "Stalingrad" was on everybody's Ups
and that an awareness of participation in the fate of the hero-city inspired
the thoughts and actions of all Russians. ". . .It came to be a symbol of the
whole struggle against the invaders," Brown noted. "Workers and peasants
were ccnfident the Volga capital would not fall; it was a curious faith, not
based on knowledge of the military factors, but simply a deep, unreasoning
conviction."
And Stalingrad did not fall. The German divisions which had advanced
thĂĽusands of kilometres through the countries of Europe could not conquer
those last few hundred metres which lay between them and the Volga. "The
Battle of Stalingrad was one of the hardest-fought sieges in modern his-
tory. . ." Brown commented. "It was the greatest defeat Hitler had received
i
\
since the beginning of the war.... Stalingrad will remain the proudest
achievement of Russian arms."
Among the countless stories of populär courage with which the war
years abound, the one to have most captured the imagination of foreigners
is, perhaps, the story of Leningrad. In early 1944 Alexander Werth's
Leningrad was published simultaneously in London and New York; its
author had visited the blockaded city in September 1943 when trace's of
destruction were yawning on every band and artillery shelling was a constant
feature of existence. He wrote of the airmen and the writers, of the school-
children who astonished him by their combination of childish thinking with
the courage and resourcefulness of grown men, of the sailors of the Baltic
Fleet who were such a scourge to the enemy.
Werth dedicated his book to the workers of the Kirov Factory. The
factory was only two or three miles from the German positions, it was sub-
ject to constant bombing and shell-fire, people were killed in the Workshops,
died of starvation at their places, but did all that the front demanded
of them. This patriotic devotion to duty had a quality of its own. "A quality
which was composed not only of profound patriotism both local and national,
but also a revolutionary fervour that was essentially working-class, and
enthusiasm that was in the revolutionary tradition of the Petrograd of 191 7."
Soon after the defeat of the nazis at the approaches to Leningrad in
February 1944, other foreign journalists arrived in the town. Among others
was the Life correspondent Richard E. Lauterbach. The theme of Russia
was an important one for his whole career as a Journalist. He had first
visited US in 1935. His direct contacts with Soviet people, soldiers and
workers, and numerous journeys about the country gave him the rieh
material of which he made use in his book These Are the Russians (1944)
with the Intention to increase mutual understanding between the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.A.
"For generations there will be poems and stories and novels and plays
about how the Russian people rose up and defended their cities," wrote Lau-
terbach. Basing his story on documents and personal impressions, he wrote a
vivid account of the coUective heroism of the inhabitants and soldiers of
Leningrad. He was particularly Struck by the massive scale on which people
helped one another, by the evidence of unselfishness and humaneness;
he wrote of the Komsomol members who went from house to house helping
those whose strength had failed them, of the discipline in the bread queues,
of the generosity of the soldiers who asked that their own far from sufficient
ration should be cut to relieve the sufferings of the population; he quoted
words from the letter of Leningrad workers to the soldiers of the Red Army:
'We are with you. Death will be afraid of us, before we are afraid of
death.' " That was the title Lauterbach gave to his chapter on Leningrad.
"Death Will Be Afraid of Us."
I
198
Ri'vit'ic\< and Nezc's
Rt'vieui's and News
199
The cndurance of Leningrad showed how firmly rooted was the new
ĂĽrdcr born of the October Revolution. Ella Winter undcrstood this better
than many of her colleagues. An American Journalist, widow of the distin-
guished columnist Lincoln Steffens, she first visited our country in 1930-31,
when she spent some time living with Russian families. The result of this
sojourn was the book Red Virtue (1933) dealing with moral problems and
social relationships in Soviet Russia. In 1944 she camc back to the U.S.S.R.
as correspondent of the New York Post and in 1946 she published
the book / Saw the Russian People. 'T had seen the Russia of the Five
Year Plan," she wrote, "the exciting new experiments in industry, education,
art, architecture, family relations and housing. I wanted to know what war
had done to Russia-to her farms and factories, her science, art, family,
women and children."
Summing up what she had seen Ella Winter wrote: ". . . Citizen and
soldier feit it was the planning and unity achieved under Soviet socialism,
plus the spirit and strength of Russia, that had made the unbeatablc combi-
nation of morale and fighting qualities of the victorious Red Army and
people."
Since we are on the subject, all the facts and conclusions in the books
of which we have been speaking here are in most definite disaccord with
the theses of Harrison Salisbury's The Siege of Leningrad (1969), a belated
attempt to discredit and turn upside down the very essence of the Leningrad
epic. However, those who were already acquainted with the style of this
professional "Kremlinologist" expected little eise; he has as a general rule
been anti-Soviet in all his previous books as well.
Objective observers saw on other parts of the giant Soviet-German
front and far behind the lincs the same couragc and greatness of spirit, which
had Struck them during the battles of Moscow, of Stalingrad and during
the siege of Leningrad. In the wake of the advancing Soviet forces,
foreign correspondents found plenty of evidence to convince them that
the Population of nazi-occupied regions had not settled down peaceably
under the "New Order" and had remained faithful to the Soviet System.
The American columnist Jerome Davis who was present at the libera-
tion of the capital of Byelorussia, reduced by the Germans to a heap of
rubblc, recorded: "I visited Minsk when the Germans were still ncar the
city, and it seemed from all I heard, that the Germans had been the real
prisoners in Minsk and that it was the Russians who had been free. . . . The
Germans were afraid to go out at night for fear of being killed-and yet
vengeance reachcd them."
Towards the end of 1944 the Soviet Army embarkcd upon the libera-
tion of Europe: entered Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw and Budapest.
When spring came in 1945 the Soviet soldiers were engaged in tough
fighting round Berlin which thcy took in battle.
i
One of the first Western attempts to understand on a deeper level the
lessons of the Soviet people's great Patriotic War was Jerome Davis'
Bebind Soviel Power (1946). Its author who witnessed the October Revolu-
tion, is a Journalist, pedagoguc and social worker; he has studied our coun-
try for many years on the basis of observations and Information he has
himself collectcd. He first came to Russia in 1916 as a worker for the Young
Men's Christian Association and stayed until the end of 191 8, met Lenin,
witnessed the first steps of the Soviet government. Since then he paid fre-
quent visits to our country in the twenties and thirties and from 1943-45,
working as a war correspondent, he accompanied Soviet troops through
Rumania and Poland.
In the foreword to his book he says: "At the start of the Revolution
it seemed apparent to me that the Bolsheviks would retain control, and it
was my opinion that Russia would become one of the strongest powers in
Europe. . . . When Germany treacherously attacked Russia , on June 22, 1941,
I publicly predicted that Russia would never be defeated Later I said
that the Red Army would be the first to reach Berlin" And so it all feil out.
Behind Soviet Power is a political and sociological book. Davis analyses
various sides and aspects of the life of the Soviet Union and, by the logic
of the facts, guides his reader to the just conclusion that the basic condition
of victory in the most appalling war the earth has known was socialism, a
progressive social order. Davis shows vividly how Russia had profited from
the basic socialist reconstruction of her economy. He describes, on the basis
of facts and statistics, how gready over a very few years the industrial
might of the country was increased; how, in place of scattered small
holdings, the collective and State farms had arisen which, in spite of every-
thing, had proved able to feed the army and the people; how titanic was
the growth of Soviet culture, science, technical ability and how monolithic
the moral and political unity of Soviet society, how firm the fricndship
forged bctween the nations which inhabit the wide Spaces of the Soviet
Union.
Albert Rhys Williams in his book The Russians: the Land, the People
and Why They Fight, coined the happy phrase that the Russian secret wea-
pon was the people. Those same Soviet people, who, as Alexander Werth
wrote, by bearing on their Shoulders the main bĂĽrden of the war, had saved
the lives of millions of Americans and English, were people of a new social-
ist era.
It would be misleading not to mention the fact that in some of his
latest books Werth has proved stardingly inconsistent, contradicting many
things he said at the time he was eyewitness to the struggle of the Soviet
people against the fascist aggressors. Such a metamorphosis is, alas, some-
thing that occurs not infrequently in the West. But there's no arguing with
facts, as the saying goes.
200 • Reviews and News
And everyone who knew how to look facts in the face naturally paid
tributc to the worthy part played by Soviet Communists during the war,
which decided the fate of so many generations and countries.
Richard Lauterbach in his book about the Soviet people in arms writes:
"The party was everywhere reaching into the depths of the Byelorussian
forests to organize guerillas, into Siberian factories to step up production,
into the coUective farms, into the press, the radio, the army. The Communists
had the leadership, the programme and above all, the means. When slogans
were needed, they had them by the pamphletful. When a song was needed
to improve morale-they had the songs-and stirring ones, too. When a plant
urgently required a high priority building material, the party Channel was
the quiekest way around wartime red tape. The party recruited, tramed,
propagandized. Every dav it spoke to miUions in Pravda, it spoke through
the political advisers in the Army and Navy; it spoke through the Under-
ground, through trained members who remained behind when the Germans
moved in; it cemented the fortress." .
Much time has passed since these books which reflect the Flame of
battle were first published but they still retain the readers' interest.
BORIS GILENSON
SOVIET ARTISTS' WORKS ON WAR THEMES
Pyotr Osolins. Peace to the Peoples, a poster
Sergei Gerasimov. A Partisan s Mother
Solomon Yudovin. In the Studio (In Blockaded Leningrad)
Beniamin Basov. An iUustration to Mikhail Sholokhov's story A Mans Lot
Mikhail Rudakov. An iUustration to The Volokolamsk Highway by Ale-
xander Bek
Bezhan Shvelidze. In the Memory of the Heroes
Mikhail Savitsky. The Partisan Madonna
Leonid Ostroushko. Taking-off
lustifying Man s Ways to Man
4t
eloquent, tough, dissenting"
Eliot Fremont-Smith, ^^vj York Times
You Shall He ns Gods: A Radical
InterpreKĂĽion of the Old Testa-
ment and Its Tradition, by Erich
Fromm (Holt, Rinchart 6 Winston.
240 pp. S4.95), aml After Auschtvitz:
Radical TheoUr^y and Coniempo-
rary Judaism, hij llicharcl L. Ruhen-
stein (Bobbs-MerriU. 287 pp. $5.95),
consider varioiis aspects of jeicish
identity vis-a-vis tradition. Bernard
Mandelbaiim is president of the Jew-
ish Theolo^ical Seminary of America.
By BERNARD MANDELBAUM
G
OD IS ALIVE! What is moie, after
reading what some of His children
say about Hirn these days. He is a
patient, loviiv^ Father.
Criticism of the voliinies iinder con-
sideration derives from moie thaii a
differeiice of opinion with the authors
about the meaning of God. It is ditficult
lo comprehend how two obvioiisly cre-
ative and learned people hke the psy-
clioanalvst and philosplier Erich Fromm
and Richard Rubenstein, a rai)bi with
a master's degree in Hebrew Htcrature,
fail to recopiize a basic inconsistency
in their position.lt has been said: "The
sign that teils you which road to take
does not necessariU have to walk down
the road." However, by the very nature
of dieir enterprise, philosophers and
theologians who reason about the re-
lationship between nian's thought and
behavior have some Obligation to relate
tlieir own principles to their practices.
It is perplexing, therefore, to find Mr.
Fromm beginning his presentation with
a plea for a dispassionate, nnprejudiced,
almost iahida rasa examination of what
Judaism has to say to contemporary man
"-" . . . to avoid the danger of picking
out some data to support a precon-
ceived thesis"-and then posit the fol-
lowing preconceived assumption: "I
wish to make my position clear at the
outset . . . God is one of the many dif-
ferent poetic expressions of the highest
value in humanism, not a reality in it-
self ." In other words. Fromm Starts with
his belief that God is dead (or never
lived). He then proceeds to portray a
Judaism that speaks with great rele-
vance to twentieth-century man who
seeks self-understanding and the im-
provement of society. Fromm's amazing
ränge of authorities for this picture is
SR/February 25, 1967
drawn from Biblical, rabbinic, and other
classical Jewish sources-all of which
make the very opposite assiunption.
Human e(iuality, freedom, life's un-
certainties and complexities, the values
and goals of existence that Fromm
describes so meaningfully derive from
Views of rabbis, scholars, and philoso-
phers whose wisdom is based on their
l^elief in the realitv of a God who is
1- !
alive. I
x\ctuallv, Mr. Fromm and the radical i
thinkers of our day (he uses the term j
"radical humanism," rather than the'
"radical dieology" label of Mr. Ruben-
stein) are battling windmills. Their
difficult\ is the literalness of interpre-
tation of a statement-for example, the
sentence with which this review begins.
Teachers of the earliest Rabbinic period
(through the year 500), Maimonides
and other medieval commentators are
as critical of a literal, anthropomorphic
reading of Scripture as the most so-
phisticated twentieth-century Student of
thought. 'The Torah {i.e., Bible)," they
teil US, "speaks in a language that is
understandable to man."
A,
^ _LL the doubts, questions, uncertain-
ties, changes in the concept of a living
God which Fromm and Rubenstein in-
voke were part of the concern of the
most pious. "Seek the Lord when He is
to be found. "-Isaiah. ". . . indeed there
are tinies when it is difficult to find
Him."-Z{)liar. "Why does the Bible state
God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of
Jacob, repeating His name three times?
Because each generation finds new j
mean^n'.': in God's reality." — from an i
eighteenth-century commentary. This is \
the inevitable lot of finite man seeking |
to understand an infinite Reality. Noth- I
ing has yet been written to compare I
to Scripture's Job in his blunt questi )n- |
ing of God's justice in a world where j
good people suffer and the wicked ap-
pear to prosper. The dilemma of justify-
ing "God's ways to man," which Ruben-
stein raises poignantly in After Ausch-
witz, aroused a Milton of the seven-
teenth Century, just as it perplexed wise
men of the Roman period who witnessed
the animality of men in a coliseuni
whose "thumbs down" and cheers sig-
naled a gladiator to massacre helpless
victims before their very eyes. However,
when in doubt, the believer in God
makes the assumption of faith in God's
reality.
Mr. Rubenstein frequently quotes the
ARTH^^Ăś,
IJH
THE
BITTER^
HERITAGE
VIETNAM
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would understand the meaning of
Vietnam to Americans."
General )ames M. Gavin
"A brilliant historian presents a
perceptive and forthright analysis,
offering common sense sugges-
tions, not glib Solutions . . ."
General M. B. Ridgway
". . . should be required reading for
any American who wants wisdom,
thought, and challenging opinions
about Vietnam. " Dean Brelis
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57
words of Ivan Karamazov: "If there is
no God, all things are pennissible." Yet
tlie Substitute for a faitli in God is not,
as Fromm and Rubenstein imply, a de-
monstiable, scientific, experientially ver-
ifiable set of principles. What we find
is tbe Substitution of anotber "faitb,"
witb less proĂĽf, less autboiity, and less
bistoricity.
Tbis is particularly evident in After
Auschwitz, by Riebard Rubenstein. In a
bigb point of tbis volunie of essays, tbe
cbapter on "Tbe Meaning of Torab in
Contemporary Jewisb Tbeology," be
vvrites: "Tbe limitation of Jewisb atbe-
ism is tbat it ofl:ers no vvay of actively
sbaring or participating witb otber Jews
in tbe wisdom, tbe aspirations, tbe re-
membrances and tbe insigbts of earlier
generations." Yet Rubenstein fails to
follow tbrougb witb any significant use
of tbese autliorities for bis own radical
tbeology. His new propbets (be even
uses tbe word "propbet" in reference to
tbem) are Freud, Nietzscbe, Dostoev-
sky, Melville. To put it mildly. tbe fol-
lowing Statements of Rubenstein, wbicb
would require a volume to refute in de-
tail, are radical, rcductio, and a sorry
Substitute for Moses, Isaiab, Rabbi
Akiba, and Maimonides: ". . . buman
freedom is limited tbe moment tbe nurs-
ing infant is compelled to refrain from
utilizing its milk teetb to bite tbe breast
of its motber. . . . For Freud [and, tbere-
fore, beyond question] God is tbe pro-
jected superego of tbe Community. . . .
Norman Cobn [a minor propbet] bas
stressed tbe role of tbe Jew as tbe cas-
trating fatber in tbe paranoid fantasies of
tbe anti-Semite. . . . Eartb is a Motber,
but Eartb is a cannibal Motber. Sooner
or later it consumes wbat it gives birtb
to."
Nevertbeless, tbe reader sbould not
be discouraged from reflecting on tbe
signincant, and often exciting, contents
of tbese two volumes. Fromm, despite
bis foundationless structure, gives a
vivid description of a living tradition
wbicb speaks witb great meaning to
man in bis struggle to feel at bome in
tbe World; "to bring man to life again."
His extensive footnotes, in particular,
contain most erudite and creative inter-
pretations of Jewisb tbougbt.
Rubenstein's discussions are sĂĽperb
concerning tbe differences between Ju-
daism and Cbristianity in tbe interpre-
tation of tbe Messiab; tbe concept of
law; belief versus bebavior in contem-
porary radical tbeology; tbe deptbs
of Nazi bestiality and its continuing
tbreat to society; tbe undeniable reality
tbat two tbousand years and more of a
living tradition become a part of eacb of
US at birth.
Grimirial Record
The Mark Fein Case, By William A.
Reuben. Dial. $5. On Februray 20,
1964, a millionaire Manbattan industri-
alist was cbarged witb tbe murder of a
bookmaker to wbom be allegedly owed
$7,200; be was convicted and sentenced
to from tbirty years to life, and is now
serving bis time in Sing Sing Prison.
Trial and subsequent proceedings are
bere examined in close detail. (Did jus-
tice miscarry?)
The Verdicts Were Just. Edited h\j Al-
bert Averbach and Charles Price. Law-
yers Coöperative Vublishing Company.
Distribtited by McKay. $6.95. Eigbt na-
tionally known trial lawyers bere present
tbeir "most memorable" cases, witb ex-
tensive citations of testimony; only two
(Eicbmann and Cbessman) are criminal,
tbe rest civil; all are fascinating.
The Secrei Service Story. By Michiul
Dorman. Delacorte. $5. Tbis lively ac-
count of tbe work of tbe nation's oldest
law enforcement agency is particularly
enligbtening and amusing in its treat-
ment of tbe protection afforded a Presi-
dent's sisters and bis cousins and bis
aunts.
Wolves, Widows and Orphans. By
Dan Tijler Moore. World. $5.95. Here
are tbirty-five brisk little narratives of
con men and otber slick Operators wbo
capitalize on tbe sometbing-for-notliing
yen we all bave. Rules for self-protection
are appended.
The February Plan. By James Hall
Roberts. Morrow. $4.95. USAF beuten-
ant's deatb brings fatber to Japan, wbere
details of diabobcal plot emerge. Beauti-
fully integrated Performance is beaded
for Hollywood under MGM auspices;
novel is also BOMC alternate selection.
Smiling the Boy Fell Dead. By Mi-
chael Delving. Scribners. $3.95. Con-
necticut manuscript dealer seeking prize
item in rural Gloucestersbire runs into
oddballs, rigbt guys (and gals), and
murder; Anglo-American amity abounds
(but not all tbe time. ) Deligbtful. (Come
again soon!)
The Terrihle Pictures. By Ben Healey.
Harper 6- Row. $4.50. Englisb artist en-
joying working vacation on Cote d'Azur
runs into rougb stuff, including murder;
ligbt-hearted tale is skillfuUy wrougbt
but accumulation of personnel is mildly
botbersome.
Cable Car. By June Drummond. Holt,
58
Rinehart 6 Winston. $4.95. Political tur-
moil in mountainous area near Tbat
Curtain, plus debate over new dam, im-
peril lives of engineer and his daugbter
trapped in ski-trolley. Fine suspenso
piece. Autbor, a Soutb African, is new-
comer to our sbores.
Always Kill a Stranger. By Robert L.
Fish. Putnam. $3.95. Captain Jose Da
Silva of Brazilian police moves fast to
sbort-circuit assassination attempt wben
VIPs gatber in Rio; Wilson of U.S. Em-
bassy (still no first name) gets in on
act. Moves up to fine climax.
The Eliminator. By Andrexo York. Lip-
pincott. $4.95. Concupiscent batcbet
man for British security set-up coveis
mucb ground and air (Barbados, Chan-
nel Islands); karate is practiced, cbess
played. Runs the gamut from savage to
uproarious.
Death on the Reserve. By Josephine
Bell Macmillan. $3.95. Retired medico
wbo enjoys playing peeper bas chance
to show bis stuff while holidaying on
rugged nortbwest coast of England; two
die. Tbis one simmers ratbcr tban boils,
but it's tboroughly enjo> a})le.
The Saint Magazine Reader. Edited
by Leslie Charteris and Hans Cantes-
son. Doubleday. $4.50. Fifteen yarns are
assembled in tbis first collection taken
from the youngest of our mystery maga-
zines. The Saint's creator adds entertain-
ing glosses.
Sleuths and Consequences. Edited by
Thomas B. Dewey. Simon ir Schuster.
$4.95. Despite its corny title, tbis latest
annual short-story anthology by mem-
bers of the Mystery Writers of America
maintains tbe high Standard set by pre-
vious volumes.
House of Cards. By Stanley Ellin. Ran-
dom House. $5.95. Yank club-fighter in
Paris is unwittingly involved witb mem-
bers of secret army tbat raised hob in
Algeria; action moves on to Venice and
Rome. Story roars along to a gory and
stunning denouement.
What Should You Know of Dying?
By Tobias Wells. Crime Club. $3.95.
Knute Severson, Boston detective (wbo
teils Story), looks into refrigerator suf-
focation of five-year-old boy; attempt
on second child brings cases into fo-
cus; goldfisb-swallowing craze recalled.
Holds up nicely. —Sergeant Cuff.
SR/ February 25, 1967
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32
Neuerscheinungen 1968 - eine bibliographische Auswahl
I. Die Auseinandersetzung miÂŁ_^er_Vergangenheit_1933-1945
David Schoenbaum, Die braune Revolution. Eine Sozialgeschichte des Dritten
Reiches. Aus dem Amerikanischen. 388 S., 28,— DM. Verlag Kiepenheuer und
Witsch, Köln.
Franz Josef Heyen (Hrsg.), Nationalsozialismus im Alltag. Anhand von 200
Quellen zeitgenössische Dokumente über zwölf Jahre nationalsozialistischer
Herrschaft in Deutschland. 370 S., 24,— DM. Harald Boldt Verlag,
Boppard/Rhein.
Horst Ueberhorst, Elite fUr die Diktatur. Die nationalpolitischen Erziehungs-
anstalten 1933-1945. Dokumentarbericht. 350 S., 26,80 DM. Leinen. 19,80 DM
Paperback. Droste Verlag, DĂĽsseldorf.
Hajo Bernett, Nationalsozialistische Leibeserziehung. Eine Dokumentation
ihrer Theorie und Organisation. Bd. 1 der Schriftenreihe zur Theorie der
Leibeserziehung. 17,60 DM. Verlag Karl Hofmann, Schorndorf.
Hans -Christi an Brandenburg, Die Geschichte der HJ. Wege und Irrwege einer
Generation. 350 S., 24,— DM. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik Berend von
Nottbeck, Köln.
Karl-Dietrich Abel, Presselenkung im NS-Staat. Eine Studie zur Geschichte
der Publizistik in der nationalsozialistischen Zeit. Veröffentlichung der
Historischen Kommission zu Berlin. 176 S., 28,— DM. Colloquium Verlag,
Berlin.
H. Weinkauff/A. Wagner, Die deutsche Justiz und der Nationalsozialismus. Bd. I
(Institut für Zeitgeschichte). Ca. 336 S., 46,— DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt,
Stuttgart.
Gert Buchheit, Richter in roter Robe. Freisler, Präsident des Volksgerichts-
hofs. 272 S., 23,— DM. Paul List Verlag, München.
Peter Thoss, Das subjektive Recht in der gliedschaf tlichen Bindung. Zum
Verhältnis von Nationalsozialismus und Privatrecht. 208 S., 24, — DM.
Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.
Kuno Bludau, Nationalsozialismus und Genossenschaften. Schriftenreihe des
Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich-Ebert-Stif tung. Ca. 180 S., ca. 19,80 DM
Verlag fĂĽr Literatur und Zeitgeschichte, Hannover.
Dieter Petzina, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische^
Vier jahresplan. Schriftenreihe der Viertel jahreshefte fĂĽr Zeitgeschichte.
Nr. 16. 204 S., 9,80 DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.
H.S. Hegner, Die Reichskanzlei von 1933-1945. Gang durch 12 Jahre deutscher
Politik. 554 S., 8,80 DM Paperback. Societäts-Verlag, Frankfurt.
Hans Adolf Jacobsen, Die nationalsozialistische AuĂźenpolitik 1933-1938.
Ca. 800 S., ca. 80,— DM. Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt.
33
33
Konrad Kwiet, Reichskommissariat Niederlande. Versuch und Scheitern natio-
nalsozialistischer Neuordnung. Schriftenreihe der Viertel jahreshefte fUr
Zeitgeschichte, Nr. 17. Ca. 150 S., 9,80 DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt,
Stuttgart.
Friedrich Heer, Der Glaube des Adolf Hitler. Anatomie einer politischen
Religiosität. 764 S., 48,-- DM. Bechtle Verlag, MUnchen und Eßlingen.
Karl Lange, Hitlers unbeachtete Maximen. "Mein Kampf" und die Ă–ffentlich-
keit. 211 S., 9,80 DM Paperback. W. Rohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart.
Kurt Halbritter, Adolf Hitlers Mein Kampf. Gezeichneter Kommentar. 240 S.,
200 Zeichnungen, 16,80 DM. Verlag Bärmeier und Nikel, Frankfurt.
Jochen von Lang (Hrsg.), Adolf Hitler - Gesichter eines Diktators. 160 S.,
120 Fotos, 20, — DM. Paul Wegner Verlag, Hamburg.
Lew Besymenski, Der Tod des Adolf Hitler. Unbekannte Dokumente aus den
Moskauer Archiven. 140 S., 10,— DM. Paul Wegner Verlag, Hamburg.
Walter Hof er. Die Diktatur Hitlers bis zum Beginn des Zweiten Weltkriegs.
256 S., 19,50 DM. Akademische Verlagsanstalt Athenaion, Frankfurt.
Edouard Calic, Ohne Maske. Geheimgespräche zwischen Hitler und R. Breiting
1931. 180 S., 12,— DM. Societäts-Verlag, Frankfurt.
H. Heiber/H. V.Kotze (Hrsg.), Das Schwarze Korps. Faksimile Querschnitt.
208 S., davon 171 ganzseitige Faksimileabdrucke, 24,80 DM. Scherz Verlag,
Ber n/MUnchen/Wien .
Helmut Heiber, Reichs fĂĽhrer ! . . . Briefe an und von Himmler. 288 S., 24,80 DM.
Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.
Wilhelm Th. Wulff, Tierkreis und Hakenkreuz. Als Astrologe an Himmlers Hof.
288 S., 24, — DM. Bertelsmann Sachbuchverlag, Reinhard Mohn, Gütersloh.
J.P. Gallagher, Der Monsignore und der StandartenfĂĽhrer. Aus dem Englischen.
229 S., 18,— DM. Verlag Styria, Graz /Wien/Köln.
Christian Petry, Studenten aufs Schafott. Die WeiĂźe Rose und ihr Scheitern.
250 S., 14,80 DM. R. Piper Verlag, MĂĽnchen.
Gerhart Binder, Irrtum und Widerstand. Die deutschen Katholiken in der Aus-
einandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus. 455 S., 19,80 DM. Verlag
J. Pfeiffer, MĂĽnchen.
Martin Rock, Christ und Revolution. Widerstandsrecht und Widerstandspflicht,
140 S., 5,80 Paperback. Aktuelle Reihe "Christliches Leben heute". Verlag
Winfried-Werk, Augsburg.
Reinhard Dobbert, Das Zeugnis der Kirche fĂĽr die Juden. Heft 16 der Schrif-
tenreihe "Missionierende Gemeinde". 108 S., 9,80 DM. Lutherisches Verlags-
haus, Berlin.
34
34
Harold C. Deutsch, Verschwörung gegen den Krieg. Der Widerstand in den Jah-
ren 1939-1940. Aus dem Amerikanischen. Ca. 450 S., ca. 34, — DM. Verlag
C.H. Beck, MĂĽnchen.
Daniel Melnikow, Der 20. Juli 1944. Legende und Wirklichkeit. Aus dem Rus-
sischen. 250 S., 14,80 DM Paperback. Paul Wegner Verlag, Hamburg.
Bodo Scheurig, Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin. Ein Konservativer gegen Hitler.
288 S., 28,— DM. Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg und Hamburg.
Ingeborg Drewitz, Leben und Werk von Adam Kuckhoff. Zum 25. Todestag des
1943 hingerichteten Schriftstellers und Widerstandskämpfers. 5,50 DM.
Friedenauer Presse in Berlin.
Erhard Frommhold (Hrsg.), Kunst im Widerstand. 470 S. mit 500 Abbildungen.
Ca. 78, — DM. Röderberg Verlag, Frankfurt.
Arnold Paucker, Der jĂĽdische Abwehrkampf gegen Antisemitismus und National-
sozialismus in den letzten Jahren der Weimarer Republik. 312 S., 25, — DM.
Leibniz-Verlag, Hamburg.
Josef Poläk (Hrsg.), Theresienstadt . Aus dem Englischen. Veröffentlicht
unter Förderung des Rates der jüdischen Gemeinden in Prag. 344 S., 38, —
Europa Verlag, Wien/Frankfurt/ZĂĽrich.
DM.
Adolf Rieth, Den Opfern der Gewalt. KZ-Opfermale der europäischen Völker.
32 S. Text, 10 Seiten Abbildungen, 28,— DM. Verlag Ernst Wasmut, Tübingen.
Dorothee Linn, Das Schicksal der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Memmingen 1933-1945.
Ca. 93 S., ca. 7,50 DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.
Anton Keim, Tagebuch einer jĂĽdischen Gemeinde 1941-43. 112 S., 4,80 DM
Paperback. Verlag v.Hase und Koehler, Mainz.
Helmut Genschel, Die Verdrängung der Juden aus der Wirtschaft im Dritten
Reich. Göttinger Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft. 338 S., 48, — DM.
Muster Schmidt- Verlag, Göttingen/Zürich/Berl in/Frankfurt .
GĂĽnter Altner, Weltanschauliche HintergrĂĽnde der Rassenlehre des Dritten
Reiches. 82 S., 9,80 DM. Theologische Studien im EVZ-Verlag, ZĂĽrich.
D. Wagner /G. Tomkowitz, Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein FĂĽhrer! Der AnschluĂź
Österreichs 1938. 380 S., 25,— DM. R. Piper + Co. Verlag, München.
Herbert Rosenkranz, Reichskristallnacht. Der 9. November 1938 in Ă–sterreich.
60 S., 3,— DM. Europa Verlag, Wien/Fr ankfurt/Zürich.
James V. Compton, Hitler und die USA. Die Amerikapolitik des Dritten Reiches
Aus dem Amerikanischen. 288 S., DM 26,—. Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg
und Hamburg.
Arthur D. Morse, Die Wasser teilten sich nicht. Die amerikanische Einwande-
rungspolitik gegenĂĽber den Verfolgten im Dritten Reich. Einleitung von
Asher Ben Natan. 362 S., 20,— DM. Scherz Verlag, Bern/München/Wien.
35
35
Nerin E. Gun, Die Stunde der Amerikaner. Die dramatische Befreiung des Kon-
zentrationslagers Dachau. 328 S., 22,— DM. blick + bild Verlag S. Kappe KG,
Velbert.
Max Brusto, Im Schweizer Rettungsboot. Dokumentation Ăśber die Judenemigra-
tion nach der Schweiz. 146 S., 14,80 DM. Starczewski Verlag, MĂĽnchen.
Claude L6vy/Paul Tillard, Der schwarze Donnerstag. Kollaboration und End-
lösung in Frankreich. Aus dem Französischen. 224 S., 14,— DM. Walter Ver-
lag, Freiburg.
Johann Wuescht, Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich. Deutsch- jugoslawische
Beziehungen von 1933-1945. Ca. 400 S., ca. 26,— DM. Seewald Verlag,
Stuttgart.
Francis L. Carstens, Der Aufstieg des Faschismus in Europa. Bd. 65 der Reihe
"nes novae", 305 S., 16,80 DM. Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt.
Ernst Nolte, Die Krise des liberalen Systems und die faschistischen Bewe-
gungen. Ca. 480 S., 35,— DM. R. Piper Verlag, München.
Klaus Peter Hoepke, Die deutsche Rechte und der italienische Faschismus.
Beiträge zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien.
Bd. 38, 348 S., 48,— DM. Droste-Verlag, Düsseldorf.
Ernst Nolte, Der Faschismus. Von Mussolini zu Hitler. Schriftenreihe
"Mächte und Kräfte unseres Jahrhunderts". 400 S., 64,— DM. Verlag
Kurt Desch, MĂĽnchen.
Rudolf Absolon, Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich. Aufbau - Gliederung -
Recht - Verwaltung. Insges. 6 Bände, 1. Bd. 1968. Ca. 320 S., 30,— DM.
Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard/Rhein.
JĂĽrgen Rohwer /Gerhard HĂĽmmelchen, Chronik des Seekrieges 1939-1945. Heraus-
gegeben vom Arbeitskreis fĂĽr Wehrforschung u.v.d. Bibliothek fĂĽr Zeitge-
schichte. 464 S., Subskr. Preis (bis 31.3.69) 48,— DM. Endpreis 56,— DM.
Gerhard Stalling Verlag, Oldenburg und Hamburg.
Karlheinz Völker (Hrsg.), Dokumente und Dokument arfotos zur Geschichte
der deutschen Luftwaffe. Aus den Geheimakten des Reichswehrministeriums
1919-1933 und des Reichsluftfahrtministeriums 1933-1939. Herausgegeben
vom Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt. Ca. 520 S., 32 S. Tafeln,
90, — DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.
Heinz Bardua, Stuttgart im Luftkrieg 1939-1945. Veröffentlichung des
Archivs der Stadt Stuttgart. 300 S., 20,— DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.
Hans Umbreit, Der Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940-1944. Militärge-
schichtliche Studien, Bd. 7, herausgegeben vom Militärgeschichtlichen
Forschungsamt. 396 S., 36,— DM. Harald Boldt, Verlag, Boppard/Rhein.
Hanson W. Baldwin, GroĂźe Schlachten des Zweiten Weltkrieges. Aus dem Ameri-
kanischen. 500 S., 11 Karten, 22,— DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.
36
36
John Toland, Das Finale. Die letzten hundert Tage (des 2. Weltkrieges) . Aus
dem Amerikanischen. 600 S., 38,— DM. Droemersche Verlagsanstalt Th. Knaur
Nachf . , MĂĽnchen.
Ernst-GUnther Schenk, Wer das Ende sah. Als Arzt böim Totentanz des Dritten
Reiches. Ca. 550 S., 25,— DM. Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, Herford.
Margret Boveri, Tage des Ăśberlebens. Berlin 1945. 336 S., 19,80 DM.
R. Piper + Co. Verlag, MUnchen.
Sabine Leibhol z-Bonhoef f er , Vergangen - erlebt - ĂĽberwunden. Schicksale
der Familie Bonhoeffer. 232 S., 14,80 DM. Johannes Kiefel Verlag, Wupper-
tal-Barmen.
Erich Matthias (Hrsg.), Mit dem Gesicht nach Deutschland. Dokumentation
über die sozialdemokratische Emigration. 700 S., 92,— DM. Droste Verlag,
DĂĽsseldorf.
Otto Zoff, TagebĂĽcher aus der Emigration 1939-1944. Herausgegeben von
Lieselotte Zoff. 290 S., 28,50 DM. Verlag Lambert Schneider, Heidelberg.
Marcel Reich-Ranicki, Die Ungeliebten. Sieben Emigranten. 52 S., 3,50 DM
Paperback. Verlag GĂĽnther Neske, Pfullingen.
Josef Carl Grund, Der Mann aus Prag. Geschichte des ehemaligen SS-Mannes
Scherbe und des Juden Jelinek. Jugendbuch. 224 S., 10,80 DM. Arena Verlag,
WĂĽrzburg.
Ludwig Marcuse (Hrsg.), War ich ein Nazi? Politik als Anfechtung des Ge-
wissens. 168 S., 16,80 DM. Scherz Verlag, Bern/MĂĽnchen/Wien.
Michael Horbach, Gesicht einer Generation. 400 S., 20,— DM. Verlag
Alsatia, Freiburg.
Armin Mohler, Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Von der Läuterung zur Manipula-
tion. Schriftenreihe der Studiengesellschaft fĂĽr Zeitprobleme. 102 S.,
5,— DM Paperback. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.
Wilhelm Backhaus, Sind die Deutschen verrĂĽckt? Ein Psychogramm der Nation
und ihrer Katastrophen. 324 S., 18,— DM. Gustav Lübbe Verlag, Bergisch-
Gladbach.
II. Israel und Judentum / Antisemitismus
David Ben Gurion, Wir und die Nachbarn. Gespräche mit arabischen Führern.
Aus dem Hebräischen. 450 S., 28,50 DM. Rainer Wunderlich Verlag Hermann
Leins, TĂĽbingen.
David Ben Gurion (Hrsg.), Die Juden in ihrem Land. 392 S., 78,— DM.
Arena Verlag, WĂĽrzburg.
Isaac Deutscher, Der israelisch-arabische Konflikt. DM 2,50. Voltaire-
Flugschriften, Heinrich Heine Verlag, Frankfurt.
37
37
Walter Laqueur, Nahost - Vor dem Sturm. Die Vorgeschichte des Sechs tage-
Krieges im Juni 1967. 272 S., 19,50 DM. Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt.
Christoph Freiherr von Imhoff, Duell im Mittelmeer. Moskau greift nach dem
Nahen und Mittleren Osten. 434 S., 24, — DM. Rombach Verlag, Freiburg.
Raymond Aron, Zeit des Argwohns . De Gaulle, Israel und die Juden. 210 S.,
14, — DM. S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt.
Andrö Beaufre, Die Suez-Expedition - Analyse eines verlorenen Sieges. Vor-
wort von Oberstkorpskommandant Ernst Uhlmann. Aus dem Französischen. 240 S.,
18,50 DM. Verlag Huber, Frauenfeld/ Schweiz; Auslieferung in Deutschland
F.A. Brockhaus, Stuttgart.
GĂĽnther Wagenlehner, Eskalation im Nahen Osten. Politische und psychologi-
sche HintergrĂĽnde eines Konfliktes. Schriftenreihe der Studiengesellschaft
für Zeitprobleme. Ca. 160 S., ca. 8, — DM. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart.
Sami AI Joundi, Juden und Araber. Die groĂźe Feindschaft. Darstellung des
Konflikts aus arabischer Sicht. 212 S., 22,— DM. Bechtle Verlag, München
und EĂźlingen.
Kurt Sontheimer (Hrsg.), Israel - Politik - Gesellschaft - Wirtschaft.
364 S., 19,80 DM Paperback. R. Piper Verlag, MĂĽnchen.
Georges Friedmann, Das Ende des jüdischen Volkes? Aus dem Französischen.
280 S., 12,80 DM. Rowohlt Verlag, Hamburg-Reinbek.
Stuart Jackmann, Die Affäre Davidson. Ein Gerichtsfall in Jerusalem.
260 S., 18, — DM. Peter Hammer Verlag, Wuppertal-Barmen.
H.J. Andel, Spione machen Politik. Der Geheimdienstkrieg im Nahen Osten.
Ca. 260 S., ca. 16,80 DM. I 1mg au- Verlag, Pfaf fenhofen.
Hermann Meier-Cronemeyer , Kibbuzim - Geschichte, Geist, Gestalt. Schriften-
reihe des Forschungsinstituts der Friedrich Ebert-Stif tung, ca. 250 S.,
ca. 32, — DM. Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hannover.
Anny Latour, Israel - Gelobtes Land. Idee und GrĂĽndung eines Staates.
264 S., 18,— DM. Verlag S. Fischer, Frankfurt.
Karl Katz/P.P. Kahane/Magen Broshi, Von Anbeginn. Bildband über Archäologie,
Kunst und Manuskripte im Israel-Museum in Jerusalem. 288 S., 214 Abbildun-
gen, 38, — DM. Verlag Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg.
Hed Wimmer, Das ist Israel. 208 S. mit 160 ganzseitigen Bildtafeln. 18,— DM
Heinz Moos Verlag, MĂĽnchen.
Hanns Reich, Jerusalem, terra magica-Bildband mit einem Vorwort des Jerusa-
lemer BĂĽrgermeisters Teddy Kollek. 104 Bild-, 24 Textseiten. 26,80 DM.
Hanns Reich Verlag, MĂĽnchen.
38
38
Gabriele Rosenthal /Werner Braun, Jerusalem. "Panorama "-Buch, 104 S.,mit
40 Farbtafeln, 26, — DM. Wilhelm Andermann Verlag, MUnchen.
Kathleen Kenyon, Jerusalem. Die heilige Stadt von David bis zu den Kreuz-
zUgen. Ausgrabungen 1961-1967. 300 S., 44,— DM. Gustav LUbbe Verlag,
Bergisch-Gladbach.
Willy Guggenheim/ Annemarie Meier, Jerusalem. 186 S., 118 Bildtafeln,
28, — DM. Atlantis-Verlag, Freiburg und ZUrich.
Dagmar Nick, Israel - gestern und heute. Eine Dokumentation mit 220 Fotos
208 S., 19,80 DM. GUtersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, GĂĽtersloh,
Stiasny /Harris, Nazareth. 175 S., 24 Seiten Farbbilder, 29,80 DM. Steyler
Verlag, Bonn-St. August in.
Alfons Senfter (Hrsg.), Jahves Land. Bildbuch Ăśber das Heilige Land.
120 S., 19,80 DM. Christopherus-Verlag, Freiburg.
Gerhard Lisowsky, Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte des judischen Volkes. Von
Abraham bis Ben Gurion. Ca. 320 S., ca. 26,— DM. W. Kohlhammer Verlag,
Stuttgart.
Katl Heinrich Rengstorff/Siegfried von Kortzfleisch (Hrsg.), Kirche und
Synagoge . Handbuch zur Geschichte von Christen und Juden. 504 S., 56, — DM.
Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.
Clemens Thoma (Hrsg.), Auf den TrĂĽmmern des Tempels. Land und Bund Israels
im Dialog zwischen Christen und Juden. 128 S., 10,80 DM. Verlag Herder,
Freiburg/Basel /Wien .
Kurt Wilhelm (Hrsg.), JĂĽdischer Glaube. Eine Auwahl aus zwei Jahrtausenden.
524 S., 17,80 DM. Carl SchĂĽnemann Verlag, Bremen.
Johann Michael Schmidt, Die jĂĽdische Apokalyptik. Erforschungen von den
Anfängen bis zu den Textfunden von Qumram. 384 S., 44,80 DM. Neukirchener
Verlag, Neukirchen-Vluyn.
Hans-JĂĽrgen Hermisson, Studien zur israelitischen Spruchweisheit. 208 S.,
24,80 DM. Neukirchener Verlag, Neukirchen-Vluyn.
P.J. Cools (Hrsg.), Geschichte und Religion des Alten Testaments. Aus dem
Niederländischen. 352 S., 15,— DM. Walter Verlag, Freiburg.
Talmud Babylonicum (Codex Hebraicum Monacensis 95). Faksimile-Ausgabe der
einzigen erhaltenen Talmud-Handschrift. Lichtdruck in Originalgröße.
1140 S., Subskr. Preis 2.000,— DM. Süddeutscher Verlag, MUnchen.
(In Vorbereitung.)
Die FĂĽnf BĂĽcher der Weisung (FĂĽnf BĂĽcher Moses). Verdeutscht von Martin
Buber gemeinsam mit Franz Rosenzweig. Einmalige Sonderausgabe in der
Reihe "Die Bücher der Neunzehn". 570 S., 14,80 DM. Jakob Hegner Verlag, Köln
39
39
Max Tau, Auf dem Weg zur Versöhnung. 252 S., 18,— DM. Verlag Hoffmann und
Campe, Hamburg.
Werner Schochow, Deutsch- jüdische Geschichtswissenschaft . Einzelveröffent-
lichungen der Historischen Kommission zu Berlin, Bd. 3. 272 S., 48, — DM.
Colloquium Verlag, Berlin.
E.L. Ehrlich, Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland. 2,40 DM. Schwann Ver-
lag, DĂĽsseldorf.
E. Hamburger, Juden im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands. Bd. 1: 1848-1918.
Verlag J.B.C. Mohr, Tübingen. 54,— DM.
Erwin J. David, Wege. Das Leben eines deutschen Juden. 336 S., 19,80 DM.
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Gesamtwerk von 20 Bänden. Erster Band Herbst 1968: Das Kabinett Cuno.
November 1922 bis August 1923. Bearbeitet von Karl-Heinz Harbeck. 800 S.,
60, — DM. Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard.
Ernst Deuerlein, Deutsche Kanzler von Bismarck bis Hitler. 496 S., 26,80 DM,
Paul List Verlag, MUnchen.
Hans Peter Bleuel, Deutschlands Bekenner. Professoren zwischen Kaiser-
reichen und Diktatur. 288 S., 19,80 DM. Scherz Verlag, Bern/MUnchen/Wien.
Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik.
Studienausgabe mit einem Ergänzungsteil : Antidemokratisches Denken in
der Bundesrepublik. 363 S., 17,— DM. Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung,
MUnchen.
Hans L immer. Die deutsche Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Ăśberblick Ăśber mehr als
125 Jahre gewerkschaftlichen Wollens und Wirkens. Taschenbuch der Reihe
"Geschichte und Staat". 160 S., 2,90 DM. GĂĽnter Olzog Verlag, MĂĽnchen.
Karl Kautsky, Texte zu den Programmen der deutschen Sozialdemokratie
1891-1925. 340 S., 15,80 DM. Jakob Hegner Verlag, Köln.
Hugo Eckert, Liberal- oder Sozialdemokratie. FrĂĽhgeschichte der NĂĽrnber-
ger Arbeiterbewegung. "Industrielle Welt", Bd. 9. ca. 288 S., ca. 34,— DM.
Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.
Friedrich Andrea/Sybil Gräfin Schönfeldt (Hrsg.), Demokratie von Bebel
bis Heuss. Geschichte in Lebensbildern. Taschenbuch Nr. 936, Fischer-
BĂĽcherei, Frankfurt.
Hugo Sinzheimer /Ernst Fraenkel , Die Justiz in der Weimarer Republik. Eine
Chronik. 488 S., 38,— DM Leinen, Studienausgabe 28,— DM. Luchterhand
Verlag, Berlin/Neuwied.
Werner Conze/Hans Raupach (Hrsg.), Die Staats- und Wirtschaftskrise des
Deutschen Reiches 1929/33. Industrielle Welt, Bd. 8. 255 S., 24,— DM.
Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.
Arno Scholz/Walther G. Oschilewski (Hrsg.), Ein groĂźes Vorbild. Paul Lobe
zum Gedächtnis. 60 S., 16,80 DM. arani Verlags-GmbH, Berlin.
Erich Matthias/Susanne MĂĽller (Hrsg.), Die Regierung der Volksbeauftragten.
Protokolle der revolutionären Übergangsregierung vom 9. November 1918.
Schriftenreihe "Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politi-
schen Parteien", Bd. 6, zwei Halbbände, zus. ca. 1000 S., 98,— DM.
Droste Verlag, DĂĽsseldorf.
Golo Mann und Andreas Burckhardt, Prinz Max von Baden: Erinnerungen und
Dokumente. Neuherausgabe nach 40 Jahren. 704 S., 37,50 DM. Ernst Klett
Verlag, Stuttgart .
Hagen Schulze, Freikorps und Republik 1918-1920. Militärgeschichtliche
Studien, Bd. 8, herausgeb. vom Militärgeschichtl . Forschungsamt. 400 S.,
36,— DM. Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppard.
49
49
Peter Bucher, Der ReichsvehrprozeĂź. Der Hochverrat der Ulmer Reichswehr-
offiziere 1929/30. Militärgeschichtliche Studien, Bd. 4, herausgeg. vom
Militärgeschichtl. Forschungsamt. 608 S., 38, — DM. Harald Boldt Verlag,
Boppard.
Ernst Nickisch, Die Legende von der Weimarer Republik. 240 S., 20, — DM.
Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik Berend von Nottbek, Köln.
Hjalmar Schaft. 1933. Wie eine Demokratie stirbt. 170 S., 16,-- DM. Econ
Verlag, DĂĽsseldorf.
Franz von Papen, Vom Scheitern einer Demokratie. Die letzten Jahre der
Weimarer Republik von 1930/33. 408 S., 25,— DM. Verlag v.Hase + Koehler,
Mainz.
Treviranus, Das Ende von Weimar. Heinrich Brllning und seine Zeit. 450 S.,
25, — DM. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.
Ernst Deuerlein, Der Aufstieg der NSDAP 1919-1933 in Augenzeugenberichten.
464 S., 24,80 DM. Karl Rauch Verlag, MĂĽnchen.
Theodor Heuss, Hitlers Weg. Eine Schrift aus dem Jahre 1932. Veröffent-
lichung des Theodor-Heuss-Archivs, Stuttgart. 280 S., 19,80 DM. Rainer
Wunderlich Verlag Hermann Leins, TĂĽbingen.
Wilhelm Hegner, Der politische Radikalismus in Deutschland 1919-1933.
Taschenbuch der Reihe "Geschichte und Staat". 256 S., 4,80 DM. GĂĽnter
Ol zog Verlag, MĂĽnchen.
Heinrich Brüning, Reden und Aufsätze eines deutschen Staatsmannes.
Herausgeg. von Wilhelm Vernekohl . 385 S., 19,80 DM. Verlag Regensberg,
MĂĽns ter .
Hermann PĂĽnder, Von PreuĂźen nach Europa. Lebenserinnerungen. Ca. 350 S.,
ca. 32, — DM. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart.
Karlheinz Dederke, Reich und Republik. Deutschland 1917-1933. Ca. 280 S.,
14,— DM. Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart.
Eine Analyse der deutschen Buchproduktion
Ein Bericht aus "Wirtschaftsblätter Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft",
16. Jahrgang, Nr. 9.
Mit 30.683 Titeln wurde im Jahre 1967 in der Bundesrepublik einschlieĂźlich
Berlin (West) die höchste Zahl an veröffentlichten Titeln innerhalb eines
Jahres seit 1951, dem ersten Jahr nach dem Krieg, in dem die Titelproduk-
tion wieder registriert wurde, vorgelegt. GegenĂĽber dem genannten Ausgangs-
jähr hat sich damit die Jahres-Titelproduktion mehr als verdoppelt (1951 =
14.094 Titel).
50
INSTITUT FOR POLITISCHE WISSENSCHAFT
AN DER FREIEN UNIVERSITĂ„T BERLIN
-Akad.Rat Dr J.Fi jalkowski-
Herrn
Fried
Professor John H.E
55 East 86 Street
New York,NY 10028/USA
Wilmersdorf
1/ B E R L I N - Ä^^S»?W J^^JÄ^ 51
©: fr fe=P^-R^ =S ^ «= A- S^S=B= T^
Babelsberger Str. 14
12. April 1967 Fi/Gr
Sehr geehrter Herr Professor Fried:
Ihr an Herrn Prof. Brachers Adresse in Berlin, Institut fĂĽr
politische Wissenschaft, gerichteter Brief vom 20. März 1967
war zunächst von uns an Prof. Bracher, der sich seit Jahren
nicht mehr im Institut sondern an der Universität Bonn befindet,
weitergeleitet worden und ist jetzt von Prof. Bracher an uns
zurĂĽckgeschickt worden, da Sie Ihren Besuch in Berlin ankĂĽndigen.
Zur Sache selbst darf ich Ihnen mitteilen, daĂź seit dem Aus-
scheiden Herrn Brachers und Herrn Prof. Sauers, der jetzt an der
University of Berkeley ist, im Institut sich niemand mehr mit
dem Sie interessierenden Thema des Kriegsrechts und der Kriegs-
verbrecherprozesse beschäftigt hat oder beschäftigt. Unsere Bi-
bliothek enthält zwar eine kleinere Sammlung von Titeln, die zum
Thema interessant sein könnten. Eine Aufstellung darüber füge
ich Ihnen bei. Größere Sammlungen von Materialien dürfen sich
jedoch in der Bibliothek fĂĽr Zeitgeschichte in Stuttgart, bei der
Wiener Library in London und beim Institut fĂĽr Zeitgeschichte in
MĂĽnchen befinden.
Unter diesen Umständen werden Sie selbst am besten ermessen
können, ob sich ein Besuch für Sie in unserem Institut lohnt.
In der Hoffnung, daĂź Ihnen diese Hinweise nĂĽtzlich sind.
verbleibe ich
mit besten GrĂĽĂźen
Anlage
Ihr ergebener
(Dr: JĂĽrg^ Fijalkowski)
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
ALBANY 3
Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland. Ihre Eobgliderung and ihr
E-:n^uss of Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik & Gesistesleben.
hersg.ton Eugen Lemberg - Friedr. Edding.
in Verbidnung mit Max Hiidaim Hildebeit Boehm-Karl Heinz
Gehrraann - Alfred Karasek-Langer
3 bde.
Ferd. Hirt, Kiel, 1959
printed on p.: ĂĽeberreich fem Bdsmin.fuer
Vertriebene, FlĂĽchtlinge ' Kriegsgesc aedigte
^%,^i>(ii W)ijuji^ Lhxci^ (^uĂź^^-t^ Up^fjbo:^s^
\
New Booh I
GERMANY
Fiross, Werner (iespräche mit Hermann
CJörin^ während des Nürnberger Prozesses.
llcnsbur^ : Cliristian Wolff. 1»)50. \MiS pp., illusj
Stenot^raphic notes of talks between (".örin^ aiKl
the assistant to Dr. Stalinier, (iörin^s dcfence
sei.
Defence in the Cold War. The task for the
free world. \ re])()rt by a Chatliani Hoiise Studv
(".rou]). London : Koyal Institute of International
The roll' Ol the ( lerinans
ed. :
men
Politisches Lesebuch.
; aus Qeschichte und
ily
ine, on
fnH'dom of exiVJssion, etc.
Ntfans. 1 !)■)(». Ii>:ipp.
pp. 7S-i»2).
Kckardt, Hans von,
riften und D
Polfdk. [N^utga
.'U4 j))^ \.\n\iith
("â– ernianVjlocunv^ts, 1
hies, politics, the State
Germany, 1947-1949. The Story 1n Docu-
ments. Washington : l)e])t. _i>f State ( \S)AS)].
().'}| pp. American jioliey tTTwaiTls i.erniaiiy, and
])ertinent developments in C.ermany, including
uestions of Denazification War Crimes, Prisoners
f War and DI^s, Berlin Crisis, Restitution, Kduca-
tion Keforni Kestoration of religions freedoni, etc.
tiörlitz, Walter : Der Deutsche Generalstab,
eschichte und Gestalt 1657-1945. I rankfurt
a.M. : N'erlag der lYankfurter Hefte. h>.")(». 70S pp.
\)his tables.
(irimm, Hans : Die Krzbischofsschrift. Ant-
wort eines Deutschen. Ciöttingen : IMesse-
V<Tlag, 1JK")(). IWl pp. (See p. 28.)
(.nmm, Hans : Rückblick, (iöttingen : Plesse-
Verlag, 1950. 37 pp., front, port. — }*ersonal
reininiscences.
Hartlaub, Felix : Von unten gesehen. Impres-
sionen und Aufzeichnungen des Obergefreiten
Felix Hartlaub, hrsg. von Geno Hartlaub. Stutt-
gart : Koehler, 1950. 15(5 pp. — Secretly recorded
im])nssions of a young historian, employed as a
!nir(«r otticial in the (ierman (ieneral Staff and later
in Hitld's head(]uarters.
H((lin, Sven : Ohne Auftrag in Berlin.
Buenos Aires | i^ĂĽrer Verlag, 1949. 283 pp., fnjnt.
jxjrt. C"f. Wiener Library Bulletin, vol. IV, Xo.
#)tes on the DĂĽrer \'erlag.
Heusnir, 'Adolf : Befehl im Widerstreit.
Schicksals tunden der deutschen Armee
1923-194.S. TĂĽbingen : Kainer Wunderlich Verlag,
1950. WM) pp., map. — Chronology of fateful hours
of the.J vrman Army, presented in the form of
ed talks.
rd, Elizabeth : Barriers Down. Notes
-War Germany. London : l'Yiends Home
C'omniittee, 1950. 111 pp. The story of
rest home " maintained bv tlie lYiends
dram
H(
|)p[r(
Vft-
. ervice
the refuget
Committee.
Jugend unterm Schicksal. Lebensberichte
junger Deutscher, 1946-1949. Ausgewählt und
herausgegeben von Kurt Hass. Hamburg : Chr.
Wegner, 1950. 244 pp. — Selections from life stories
of Cierman boys and girls written at their matricu-
lation.
KĂĽrschners Deutscher Gelehrten-Kalender,
1950. Berlin: Walter de Clruyter, 1950. 2534 pp.
- The first post-war edition.
Lemberg, Eugen : Die Ausweisung als
Schicksal und Aufgabe. Zur Soziologie und
Ideologie der Ostvertriebenen, (iräfeling nr.
MĂĽnchen : Gans, 1949. 07 pp.
Tana I'eter, and Scholz, Oscar : LuftbrĂĽcke
Berlin. Ein dokumentarisches Bildbuch.
Berlin : Arani-\'erlag, 1950. 110 pp., ilhis.
Rauschning, Hermann : Deutschland zwischen
West und Ost. Hamburg : Christian \erlag,
1 950. 200 pp.
J^ave, Paul Ortwin : Kunstdiktatur im Dritten
Reich. Hamburg : Mann, 1949. 95 pp., illus.
The Nazi war against Jewish and " degenerate "
artend artists, and the looting of art treasures.
5chäfer, Emil : Von Potsdam bis Bonn.
FĂĽnf Jahre deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte.
Porträt, Zeittafel und Dokumentation 1945-1950.
Lahr : Moritz Schauenburg, 1950. 239 pp.
schreibe, , Georg : Zwischen Demokratie und
Diktatur. Persönliche Erinnerungen an die
Politik und Kultur des Reiches (1919-1944).
MĂĽnster : Verlag Regensberg. 1949. 149 pp.
The gnater part of the book is devoted to the
politics of the Weimar Kepubhc.
Schröder, Gustav : Heimatlos auf hoher See.
Berlin-Charlottenburg. Beckerdruck, 1949. 47 pp.,
illus.— Journev of the refugee ship " St. Louis "
(1939).
Settel, Arthur, ed. : This is Germany. New
^'ork : Sloane, 1950. 42!> pj). A sympcjsium by
j,listinguished journalists and correspondents.
\\jhni)\vsky, I ilo l'rciherr nou : Warum wurde
Krupp'Vtrurteilt } Legende und Justizirrtum.
Stuttgart : NOrwerk, 1950. 224 ])p., illus. The
author considers Kruj^p's eonviction at .\uri"inl)erg
a miscarriage of judgment.
PERSECUTION, TERROR
AND RESISTANCE
Pu'lircnd-Rosenfeld, Else R. : Ich stand nicht
allein. Erlebnisse einer JĂĽdin in Deutschland,
193.^-1944. Hamburg : Euroj^äisehe X'erlagsan-
stalt, 1949. 301 pp. German edition of a book
l)re\iously j:)ublishe(l in Switzerland under the title
\'erfehmt und verfolgt."
Bod( r, J^avid P. : I did not interview the
Dead. l'rbana : l'niversity of Illinois J'ress, 1949.
220 pp. X'erbatim transcriptions of the narratives
of eight displaced ])ersons, interviewed by Dr.
Boder, a Professor of Psyehology, relating their
e^^eriences in (ierman coneentration camps.
Brand, George, ed. : The Vglpke Bajiv Home
Trial. Trial of Heinrich X^erTTceTG^oFg
ite^^Tfng, Werner Noth, Hermann MĂĽller,
Gustav Claus, Richard Demmerich, Fritz
Flint, Valentina Billen. London : Hodge et Co.,
1950. 35() pp. (" War Crimes Trials," vol. Vll.
Gem,"ral editor Sir David Maxwell Pyfe.)
International Tracing Service : Catalogue
Camps and Prisons in Germany and Ger-
man-occupied territories, September 1, 1939-
May 8, 1945. Arolsen : l.T.S. Records Brauch,
1949-50. 2 vols., maps, charts.
'Krakauer, Max : Lichter im Dunkel. Stuttgart :
Behrendt-X'erlag, 1947. 131 pp. Inderground life
and survival of a Jewish couple in Nazi Germanv
througli continuons hei]) nnder peril of death bv
decent (iermans.
Our Destruction in Pictures. Ccjllected and
edited by Rafael Glevski Dawid Rosental —Paul
Trepman. Bergen-Belsen : Publ. by Our Voice
under the auspices of the Central Committee of the
Liberated Jews in the British Zone, 1940. 38 pp.
Introduction and captions in Viddish, English
and (ierman.
Philipp, Berthie : Die Todgeweihten, Roman
um Theresienstadt. Hamburg : Morawe &
Schelfelt, 1949. 447 pp.
Strobel, I'erdinand : Christliche Bewährung,
Dokumente des Widerstandes der katholischen
Kirche in Deutschland, 1933-1945. Ă–lten : Otto
Walter, 1940. 320 pp. With list of documents
and Short bibliography.
Torberg, l>ieilrich : Hier bin ich, mein Vater.
Stockholm : Bermann-1-ischer, 1948. 348 pp.
A novel abont the confiict of a young Viennese Jew,
iaced with the jxjssibility of rescuing his father
from Dachau by spying on fellow-Jews for the
Nazis.
LAW
Foreign Office : Manual of German Law.
Vol. I : General introduction, civil and
commercial law. London : H.M.S.O., 1950.
297 pp. The editor and main contributor, Dr.
E. J. Cohn, Stresses in his preface that " the work
is mainly confined to describing the law in force in
1948, throughout the British Zone. . ."
Ciodin : Kommentar zum RĂĽckerstattungs-
gesetz., U. S. Zone. Berlin : de Ciruvter, 1948.
318 pp.
Heyland, Carl Widerstansdrecht des Volkes,
gegen Verfassungswidrige AusĂĽbung den
Staatsgewalt im neuen deutschen Verfas-|
sungrecht. TĂĽbingen : J. C. B Mohr, 19.50.
123 pp.
Lautherpacht, Hersch ; International Law
and Human Rights. London : Stevens, 1950.
475 pp.
Mangoldt, Hermann \ . Das Bonner Grund-
gesetz. Kommentar. 1. Lieferung. Berlin and
Erankfurt : Verlag fĂĽr Rechtswissenschaft vorm.
l'ranz Vahlen, 1950. 123 pp.
Nadolny, R. : Völkerrecht und deutscher
Friede. Hamburg : Hans von Hugo, 1949,
151 pp.
Page 37
WORLD WAR II.
B( ntwuh, Norman : 1 IJnderstand the Risks.
The Story of the Refugees from Nazi Oppression
who Fought in the British Forces in the World
War. London : Gollancz, 1950. 192 pp.
Best, Captain S. Payne ; The Venio Incident.
London : Hutchinson, 1950. 20(> \)]^., Ulus. The
kidnapping of two British Intelligenee ofticers
(Captains Best and Ste\ens) at the Dutch-German
Ironticr in No\'ember 1939, and the author's s\d)se-
(pient e.\j)erienci's in German conc t-ntration camps.
Bor-Komorowski, T. The Secret Army.
London : Gollancz, 1950. 407 })p., front. p<»rt..
ma})s. The stc^ry of Polish resistance to German
occupation, culminating in the Warsaw rising, told
by the late eommander-in-chief of the Polish home
army.
Choltitz, von : brennt paris } adolf
hitler . Tatsachenbericht des letzten
deutschen Befehlshabers in Paris. Mannheim :
CNA WeitbĂĽcherei, 1950. 101 pp. How the last
(ierman Commander in Paris disobeved Hit^ r's
Orders to destroy the I-Yench caj>ital.
Dunand. Georges : Ne perdez pas leur
trace ! Neuchatel (Switz«'rland) 1^1 . de la
Baconnicre, 1950. 244 \)\\. Etforts of the Inter-
national Committee of the MlhX Cross on behalf of
])artisans and Jews in Slovakia towards the end of
the Sec(»nd World War.
blicke, W. I'. : Die Rote Kapelle. Hdden/
Rhein : \'ier-J^rücken-\'erlag, 1949. 377 pp. —
An exciting accomit of the (ierman counter measures
against a widespread net of secret wireless trans-
mitters (working under the nanie of " Rote
Kapelle ") in Germany and (ierman-occupied Western
luirope.
Kleist. Peter : Zwischen Hitler und Stalin,
1939-1945. Aufzeichnungen, l^onn : Athenäum-
X'erlag, 1950. 344 pp. With appendix of docu-
ments. The bid for German-Russian friendship,
1939-41 ; Germany as an occupying power,
1941-45 ; Russian peace feelers, 1943-45.
Leahy, William D. : I was there. The personal
Story of the chief of staff to Presidents Roose-
velt and Truman, based on his notes and
diaries. . . . With a foreword by President
Truman. London : (iollancz, 1950. 592 pp., front.
AIa( hjewicz, Josef : Katyn ungesĂĽhntes Ver-
brechen. ZĂĽrich : Thcjmas N'erlag, 1949. 222 pp.
Personal investigations and secret fV)lish Govern-
ment documents suggest that tlu- Katyn massacre
(1943) was the w(jrk of the Ru.ssians.
Moyzisch, L C. : Operation Cicero. With a
PostScript by Franz von Papen. London ;
Wingate, 1950." 208 pj).
Rossi, A. : The Russo- German Alliance,
August 1939-June 1941. London : Ciiapman tSc
Hall, 19.50. 218 pp.
South African Jews in World War II. Pub-
lished by the South African Jewish Board of
Deputies, Johannesburg, 1950. 189 pp., illus.
Strölin, Karl : Stuttgart in Endstadium des
Krieges. Stuttgart : Vorwerk, 1950. 08 pp.- —
By the former Nazi Mayor of the city.
Thorwald, JĂĽrgen : Es begann an der Weich-
sel. Stuttgart : SteingrĂĽben-Verlag, 1950. 352 pp.
Toepke, GĂĽnter : Stalingrad wie es w'rklich
war. Stade : Kogge- Verlag, 1949. 140 pp., maps.
Westphal, Siegfried : Heer in Fesseln. Aus
den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel,
Kesselring und Rundstedt. Bonn : Athenäum-
Verlag, 1950. 332 pp. A professional (ierman^
soldier looks at exents leading to the downfall of
the Third Reich.
FRANCE
Abetz. Otto : D'une Prison. Precede du
Proces Abetz vu par Jean Bernard-Derosne. Suivi
des principales depositi(?ns, du requisitoire et de la
plaidoirie de M. Rene T<lori<}t. T'aris ; Amiot-
Dumcmt, 1949. 313 pp.
'Bouthillier, \ves : Le Drame de Vichy. I :
Face ä l'ennemi, face ä Tallie. Paris : Plön,
1950. 320 pp. The author was Minister of I-inance
iiVthe Vichy Government.
Isorni, Jacques and Lemaire, Jean : Requet en
revision pour Philippe Petain, Marechal de
France, l^aris : Flammarion, 1950. 24() pp.
Marek, ÂĄ. : Frankreich von der dritten zur
vierten Republik. Wien : Stern-Verlag, 1947.
210 pp.
1^
f i/ ir'iAM
"^ I«
Page 38
New Books II
PREJUDICE AND
DISCRIMINATION
Civil Rights in the United States in 1949.
A Balance Sheet of Group Relations. Pub
lislR'<l by tlu- American Jcwish CoiiKifss and tlu-
National Association for tho Advanccmcnt ol
C'olourcil IVopIc. New N'ork. IHf)!». 71 pp-
Davis, Jeronic Character Assassination.
Nrw York : Philosoplncal l,ibrary. llJäO. 'IT^S) pp.
An analysis ot discriinination against individuals
and i^nmps in tlic l'.S.
latton, Paul Das Rassenproblem in SĂĽd-
afrika. Zürich: WandcrcrA'erlaK, n».~,0. lU pp.
(koprint from I-Auiv^rlisi hcs .1//.s.s?f))?.s«u«^'<r:/>/).
I'orstcr, Arnold : A Measure of Freedom.
New York : Doublcday. 1050. 25«) pp. An Anti
Dclaniation Lcagnc Report on prejudice and \n^
tolerance in the l .S.
(.ibbs, Henry : Twilight in South Africa.
J.ondon : Jarrolds (HMl)). 288 pp.. ilhis. VUv
author's experiences in South Africa durint; a three
in-iiilhs Visit descril)ing i)rob]eins arisinj; out of the
Malan (iovernnient's policy of ' Apartheid."
Hav. Malcolhi The Foot of Pride. The
Pressure of Christendom on the People of
Israel for 1900 Years. Hoston ; The Heacon
Press, lOäO. :{.')2 pp., bibliog.
Scott. Michael ; Shadow over Africa. Witli an
introduction by loin Driberg, M.!'. The l'nion of
])enuicratic C"i)ntrol. London, 1".).')0. 2.') pp.
A Statement by the champion of the S.W. Alncan
fribes to the l'ourth Committee of the IN on
N(»vember 2«). MUH.
Issher, Arland ; The Magic People. London :
C.ollancz, lO.lO. ir>8 pp. An Irish author's over-
urown â– ' essav on the lews,'" denonncint; aiiti-
siinitism.
JUDAICA
( 1 heil. Israel Contemporary Jewiy. A
Survey of social, cultural, economic and
political conditions. London ; Metlmen, 10.")U.
41 <» pp., diagr.
1 risch. Daniel ; On the Read to Zion, .V..:;lected
Writings. Neu N'ork Zionist Organization f)f
America. lOöO. 240 p]>.. front. ]i(»rt. I^y the late
J'resident of fhe Z.O.A.
Koth. ("ecil : The Great Synagogue, London,
1690-1940. London: (loldston, ll«.^)0. :iU pp.,
illus.
Stern. Selm;i The Court Jew. A Contribu-
tion to the History of the period of Absolutism
in Central Europe. Transl. by Ralph Weiman.
IMnladelphia : |e\vi>h Publication Society, l'.>50.
:jl2pp.
VIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science,
vol. !\'. n»4'.>. ; New \'ork : >'iddish Scientific
Institute, 1940. :il2 pp.
MIDDLE EAST
Abdullah, King of Transjordan : Memoirs. Ed.
by Philip P. Graves, with an introducti«^! by
R. J. C. Hroadhurst. London : Cape, lOöO.
278 pp.. front.
niooinĂĽeld, Hernard M. : Israel Diary. New
\()rk : Crown Publ., I0r)0. 182 i)p.. illus.. map.
Personal impressions and discussions, March-.Xfay
I04<>.
Hrod, Ma.x : IJnambo, Roman aus dem
jĂĽdisch-arabischen Krieg. ZĂĽrich Steinberg
X'erlag. 1040. :?02 pp.
Dunner. Josejih : The Republic of Israel.
Its Ilistory and Its Promise. New York
Whittlesey House. 1050. 200 p]> , illus., map.
Part 1 : Historical devehjpment ; Part 11 : The
(;overnment of Israel ; Part 111 : Israel in World
Atfairs.
Ilvamson, Albert M. : Palestine under the
Mandate, 1920-1948. London : Methuen. 1050.
210 pp.
Israel. Documents, Facts and Figures.
London : The Diplomatie Press and Publ. Ccj.,
105(K 4S j)p.. maps. A booklet in the series
" International Studies."
Kimche, Jon : Seven Fallen Pillars. The
Middle Käst, 1915-1950. Lomlon Secker &
Warbiirg. 1050. :{2(t pj).. illus. Strongly criticising
Hritish Middle Kastern policies.
Magil. A. H. : Israel in Crisis. New \'ork :
International Pub!., 1050. 224 pp. Plea for a
fight against " Anglo-American iniperialist interests
in Israel," and for " Co-operation with the Soviet
l'nion."
(The) Middle F.ast. A political and economic
survey. Loiulon : Royal Institute of Inter-
national Atiairs, 1050. 40H pp.. map, bibliography.
An analvsis bv a grou]i of experts.
(The) Middle E:ast, 1950. A survey and
directory of countries of the Middle East, compiled
by the publishers in collaborati(ni with the Intelli-
gence Init of 'Ihr licoiinnn.st. London : Kuropa
Publications, 1!»5(». 'MTy pp., nia})S, cliarts.
Includes a " Who's Who in the Middle Käst."
Pearlman, Moshe ; The Army of Israel. New
^'--' Philoso]-»1iical l^brary, 10.50. 25(i pp.,
illus., iiiaj)s.
BIOGRAPHY
Kckener, Hugo Im Zeppelin über Länder
und Meere. F:rlebnisse und Erinnerungen.
Kiensburg : Chr. Woltf, 1040. 50«) pp.. illus.
With a chapter " Hegegnung mit Hitler und der
N'SDAP. 1020-10:^0." pp. 4:i0-5O2.
Kuck<'n-Krdsiek, Kdith : Grösse und Wahn.
Drei Essays ĂĽber Friedrich II. Napoleon I.
Hitler. TĂĽbingen : Laupp'sche Huchhandlung,
105<K 200 pp. A philosophical and psychological
approach to the lives and actions of three dictators.
Hindus. .Milton : The crippled giant. A bizarre
adventure in contemporary letters. New York
Hoar's Head Hooks, I0.")0. I5,S pp. A studv on
Louis l*"erdinand Cehne.
Dr. Wcizmann's Autobiography
The publicatiou of Dr. Weizmann's memoirs had
l>een a long clierished anibition of Mr. H. Horovitz
whose Publishing Company owns the Käst and West
Library, London. Though forestalled by Messrs.
Hamish' Hamilton, he has now gratitied his desire
by producing an edition* which enhances the
uiterest in the text by adding 1S5 illustrations
selected and arranged by the pul)lisher who in
cloing so, offers the President of Israel his reverence
and adm'iration. Most of the pictures depict stages
in the dexelopinent of Palestine. The 30-odd
photosof Dr. Weizmann and his familyare matchcd
by an almost equal number of pictures of other
Zionist leailers. Special attention has been given
to illustrations of Jewish lite in Kurope during the
last fifty years, in fact it was the publishers wish
" to rescĂĽe from oblivion the face of the East
European Jew, that face on which the sutfering of
centuries is engraved." Through a perhaps
characteristic accident, the illustrations of bondage
are almost exactly as many as those of Hritish
leaders who, in one way or another, helped bring
about the liberation. Lnfortunately a number oi
errors havc crept into the captions to some of the
pictures. The photo (No. <)8) purporting to show
(•) Trial and Error. The Autobiography of Chaim
Weizmann. With 185 illustrations selected and arranged by
B- Horovitz East and West J.ibrary. London. 1950, HOS pp.
Proskauer, Joseph M. : A Segment of my
Times. New York : Karrar. Straus & Co.. lĂĽĂźO.
270 pp. Creat events recounted by the President
of the American Jewish Committee, 1043-1040.
Reuter, Krnst : Ein Leben fĂĽr Freiheit und
Sozialismus. Herliu ; Aiani \ erlag. '•**•'•
los pp., illus. CoUection of speeches and writings
by W. Herlin's Lord .Mayor, with a biographical
introduction by Kduard Reuter.
Samuel, Mauric(> The Gentleman and the
Jew. New ^'ork : Knopf, 105O. :{25 pp. Auto-
biography.
Strauss, Kuhard Betrachtungen und Erin-
nerungen. Gedrucktes und Hn^edrucktes
aus den Jahren 1892-1948. Kd. bv W. Schun.
Zürich : \tlantis .\Lusikbiicherei, 1010. -'<>♦> pp-
' Weber, Marianne ; Max Weber. Ein Lebens-
bild. Heidelberg : Lambert Schneider. 10.50.
7H0 ])p., front., port.
Weizsäcker, Krnst von : Erinnerungen.
MĂĽnchen : Paul List. IO.'">0. 1^01 pp., fnmt. port.
Memoirs of th<> late Permanent Secretary of State
in the (ierman l'oreign C)ftice.
Weygand, (rcneral : Memoires. Rapp^^l^ ^"
Service. Paris : ITammarion, 1050. <><'^' IM*
W'itii a})]ien(lix of documents and maps.
Willstcätter, Richard : Aus meinem Leben.
Von Arbeit, MĂĽsse und Freunden. Hrsg. von
Arthur Stoll. Weinluim (Hergstrasse) ; Verlag
Chemie, 1040. 458 pp., illus. Memoirs of the great
Crerman- Jewish scientist, winner of the 1015 Nobel
Prize for Chemistrv.
MISCELLANEOUS
Freedom of Information. A Compilation.
Vol. 1 : Comments of Governments. New
York : L.N. Department of Social Attairs. 10.50.
271 pp.
Jerrig h. O. : Aus Breslau wurde Wrociaw.
Hanover : W. Kwiecin,ski, 1040. 50 pp., illus.,
"'Lexerkuehn. Raul. ed. : Wirtschaftliche Bes-
timmungen in Friedensverträgen. Hamburg :
Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlicher \erlag, 194S,
:i08 pp. " Hamburger Beiträge zu \.>lkerrecht-
licheii Tagesfragen. '
Lip])er, Klinor : flf Jahre in sowjetischen
Gefängnissen und Lagern. Zürich üpreclit,
1050. 27S pp. \ \
,noslev, Oswald : The F-'COO'^an Sltu^Ation.
The Third Force. Moslev Public 'ons. Rams-
bur\-, Wilts. March 105(K 18 p] As part ot
British l'ascist propaganda, this pan. >^*^t was also
published in C.erman under the title '«ettung des
Abendlands. Die 1 )ritte Macht." 1
Sciiacht, Hjalmar ; Gold for Europ^ London :
Duckworth, 1050. 12t) pp. -A transVition, by
Edgar Stern- Rubarth, of Dr. Schacht's tf<-.n.)!nic
prciposals })ublished in Hamburg in 1040 ui^'^^'^ ^he
title • Mehr (".eld. Mehr Kapital, Mehr Arl^'jK^
Sörensen, Hanno : Finale Rumänien. nWe-
Tragödie der 750,000 Kriegsgefangenen, i ;erlin
Grunewald: Arani \ Arlag, 1040. 52 pp. The täte
of (iermans in Rumania and Hessarabia.
\
Mr. C hiirclidl as 1-irsl Lord of the Adiniralty in
1010, was actually taken in 1018. Cieneral Allenby
(Xo. 84) entercd' Jerusalem on J)ecember 0, 1017
(not in 1018), and the proclamation (Xo. 100) of
Transjordan 's indepiMidence (in 1023, not 1022) was
unconnected with the Churchill White Paper.
These errors partly already occur in the text ol
Dr. Wcizmann's autobiogra]ih>- which has been
criticallv examined by J)r. O. K. Rabinowicz in a
booklet" entitled " ITfty Vears of Zir)nism," and
described as " a historical analysis " of " Error and
Thal '(**). The learned antl exacting writer ]H)ints
out a large number of discrepancics and inaccuracies
relating to the whole course of Zionist history from
Tlerzl to the outbreak of the second w^orld war.
Though Dr. Rabinowicz is known as a political
Opponent of Dr. Weizmann, he has sound reason
to Claim that he " only cited facts '" without draw-
ing any conclusions. His often disturbing cnticism
is throiighout based on first-hand evidence of which
invariably chapter and verse is given, lending
colour to the author's statement that since Dr.
Weizmann is a scholar emph^ying scientific methods,
" nothing short of a scholarly and scientific
approach can claim to reach his level."
(••) Fifty Years of Zionism. A Historical Analysis of
Dr. Weizmann's " Trial and Error." by Oskar K. Rabino
wicz. Loiulcm. Kobirt Ansronibo & Co. 1950. 131 pp.
Libraries in Israel
TlKJusaiids of books ha\e been bought by the
Library Division of the Israeli Ministry of Educa-
tion. for distribution among new Settlements and
other public institutions. Since April lO.lO forty
new Settlements received a basic Hebrew reference
librarv of about 70 to 100 books. varying according
to the character of the settlement and the com-
position of the group (e.g. native-born or immigrant.
orthodox or non-orthodox). Discussing the work
of the Division which was established in Dccember
1040, Dr. H. Har Dayan, its Director, said that
" public libraries are one of the most iniportant
instruments of adult education, and particularly
to-day in Israel." Seventy-five new libraries will
be sent t(^ new Settlements shortly, and a mobile
Library is planned to serve those still without books
of their own. It is also hoped to establish a countr^--
wide central card catalogue, modelled (>n similar
catalogues abroad, .\nother project is the estab-
lishment of a central Hebrew Braille Library for
the use of Jewish blind throughout the v.orld. An
U-member Public Ad visory Committee wasrecently
set up to draft legislation on library matters. The
Committee consists of the directors of the Jewish
National Library and the Tel Aviv and Haifa public
libraries, the head of the State Archivcs and
Library, also representatives of Histadriith and
communal Settlements. Cf. The Jewish Igency'.-
Digesl, Jerusalem, 15/0/5(>. ....
rriuted by LANGLEY & SONS LTD., Euston Buildin««, London N.W.l
From Sijthoff, Le2/den,Metherlands:
Drost.P.N., IimiÄN lilGHTS ÄS LEGAL RIGHTS. 1965 -£1.22.50
ti
mB6 CkBE OF STATE, Vol. I. Human icide. 1959. fl.2C.90
V6l.II, Genocide. 1959. fl. l6,95
From Do ĂĽb 1 ed ay :
Raymond Aron. t^^CE AMD MM
1967. $10.00
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20540
Office of the
Law Librarian of Congress
October 18, 1968
Dear Professor Fried:
Reference is made to your letter of October 10, 1968,
in which you request infonnation concerning the possibility of
obtaining the publication Court s-Martial Law of Soviet Russia,
Germany, Italy, Switzerland and Japan and the Disciplinary
Code of Soviet Russia (2nd ed., Washington, Library of Congress,
Law Library, 1944) •
The above-mentioned item, being the latest edition of
this work, is a reproduction of a type-written copy. No later
edition is being prepared. It is not available coiranercially;
however, it may be obtained on an interlibrary loan.
Sincerely yours,
Francis X. Dwyer ^
Associate Law Librarian
Professor John Fried
Department of Political Science
Herbert H. Lehman College
Bedford Park Boulevard West
Bronx, New York IO468
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